

**(Re)bordering Territory and Citizenship  
on the Greek-Turkish Borderland**

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**Abstract**

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For almost a century, the Greek-Turkish antagonism has been central to the construction of notions of national citizenship and national territory in their official historiographies, state policies and public view. In the 2000s, Greek-Turkish relations have taken a more friendly direction, the old hostile us-them distinctions and the rights of minorities in each other's lands have been revisited under the EU framework. This is also the period when transit migration through the Greek-Turkish border in the Thracian borderland and in the Aegean Sea has accelerated and gradually been met with stricter EU-led measures of border control. These developments are often studied as two distinct phenomena, in relation to nationalism-minority-citizenship nexus and migration-citizenship-security nexus respectively. My dissertation shows that these are manifestations of changing state-society relations. Following a cross-border historical approach and taking all moving subjects as a starting point allows a holistic analysis of this change.

In this study, based on an ethnographically informed fieldwork in the Greek and Turkish border towns in Thrace, I look at the impacts of changing state-level relations since 1974, the heyday of the Cyprus conflict, at the local level on (a) governance of diversity and cross-border

interactions, (b) cross-border mobility practices and (c) othering or the hierarchies of otherness between citizens, minorities, co-ethnics, and foreigners, be they the citizens of a neighboring country or migrants from third countries. I argue that this is a relational and dynamic *regime of bordering* which is best observed in the local state and nonstate actors' activities, mobilities and interactions in three interrelated fields, namely security, economy, culture.

The analysis of this Europeanizing regime of bordering reveals that states' responsibility to control national territorial spaces against the passage and presence of unauthorized border-crossers has become shareable whereas sovereignty has remained national in economic and cultural fields. However, in each one of the three fields, uninstitutionalized cross-border mobility and cooperation practices of nonstate actors have significantly challenged the effectiveness of mechanisms of control and identifications determined by political centers. These practices then produce a new hierarchy of otherness that distinguishes subjects at two junctures. The first junction is legality which separates unauthorized from authorized border-crossers, or the invited versus the uninvited others. At the second junction, the unauthorized border-crossers are differentiated according to their perceived il/licitness whereas authorized ones, namely day trippers and commuters, are once again distinguished according to their ethno-religious kinship ties. These junctures reveal the specific conditions under which the power of states' political centers in defining the notions of citizenship and territory are renegotiated or defied.

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## Foreword

The summer of 2015 is now retrospectively called the “summer of migration” as well as the “summer of austerity” in the southeastern borders of the EU. In September 2015, that is, four months after I completed my fieldwork at the Greek and Turkish border towns in Thrace, almost 3000 people were marching to the Turkish border province of *Edirne* demanding a safe passage route to Europe. While the march came out of the blue and was met with compassion by domestic and international public, the way it was governed demonstrated how the Turkish state exerted its power a posteriori over space and people at the external borders of the EU, which is the topic of this dissertation.

This dissertation is about the adjustments that the notions of national territory and citizenship have gone through in the face of Europeanization of sovereignty. My aim is to uncover the effects of people’s mobility practices on these notions over the course of the last forty years of the Greek-Turkish relations, in a period when relations between the two countries have begun to be managed under the shadow of the EU. What has unfolded since the summer of 2015 has reinforced the main argument of this thesis on the current state of affairs: states’ forceful actors selectively share sovereignty in order to maintain control over nationally defined territories and citizens whereas diversification and intensification of formal and informal mobilities allows people to circumvent mechanisms of control, even if at greater risks.

As reported on the UNHCR website on December 30, 2015, over 800,000 refugees and migrants came from Turkey into Greece via the Aegean Sea that year. This meant thousands of new arrivals on touristic Greek islands every day. These arrivals accounted for 80 per cent of the people arriving in Europe by sea in 2015. It was also estimated that a further 34,000 crossed from Turkey into Bulgaria and Greece by land.<sup>1</sup> This was a direct result of the exponential

increase in new arrivals to Turkey from its surrounding war torn areas. Since the beginning of the war in Syria, the number of Syrians given “temporary protection” status – and whose rights in Turkey change continuously – grew from zero in 2011 to 224,655 in 2012 and then to 2,503,469 in 2015. This was on top of the 64,252 registered international protection applications made to the recently established Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management,<sup>2</sup> and the approximately 200,000 registered asylum seekers in the UNHCR Turkey office – mainly from Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, apprehensions of irregular migrants also increased from 42,651 in 2014 to 242,707 in 2015 at the Aegean Sea, and from 1,914 to 3,009 at the land border across Edirne.<sup>4</sup> According to IOM records, over 800 people lost their lives on that route, while 279 migrants or refugees perished in Turkish waters in 2015.<sup>5</sup> At the end of the year, five Greek islands facing Turkey were declared “Hotspots”; this designation triggered the hybrid EU-Member state tool, which offers operational support to Member States facing disproportionate migratory pressure, with the aim to help them swiftly identify, register, relocate, or implement returns.<sup>6</sup> This was and still is a risky and chaotic time in Turkey, Greece, and the surrounding area in terms of human mobility.

It was also the summer of austerity in Greece, and the new arrivals were only adding to the already heated public scene with the bail out referendum of July 5, 2015. Despite the fact that over 61% of voters said no to the austerity measures imposed by the Troika, the Syriza-led government accepted a bailout package on Monday, July 13 with larger pension cuts and tax increases than the one rejected in the referendum. That year, the unemployment rate for people aged 25-74 was 23.4% and youth unemployment reached 49.8%. The flow of migrants to the Greek islands badly affected local tourism, which was the main source of livelihood.<sup>7</sup>

By the early September, thousands of clandestines, who were already in Greece, seeing no future for their asylum applications in the overwhelmed Greece, marched along the Balkan route towards Western European countries. While three-year-old Aylan Kurdi's lifeless body washed onto the shores of Turkey, and despite the EU's pressures on Hungary to keep its borders tight, the marchers were allowed in the trains. When 3,700 people reached Munich station in the beginning of September, they were greeted warmly by local residents who had brought food, toys, clothing, and blankets. It was in this context, in mid-September 2015, approximately 3000 people with no permanent legal status organized themselves on Facebook, under the slogan "Crossing No More," and started marching from Istanbul towards the Greek land border in Edirne. These were mostly Syrians under humanitarian protection in Turkey—though there were also some from Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and a few African countries.

Under these circumstances, the demand of the "Crossing No More" group in Turkey was simple. They did not want to risk their lives in the sea and were not able to afford the rising smuggling fees for a safer trip, by tourist yacht for example, hence they wanted a "safer passage route to Europe" with the hope of having permanent status somewhere, and peace of mind.

Although I was away from the field at that time and had already started drafting this manuscript, I decided to visit Edirne to observe the effects of the group and its humanitarian/political demand on Edirne and in Orestiada, that is, on the other side of the fence constructed in 2012. Since my first exploratory fieldtrip in the summer of 2012, this fence had been considered by many to be the reason why "transit migrants" had appeared less and less in the Greek and Turkish border towns in Thrace. Indeed, the decrease in apprehension rates on land and the simultaneous increase at sea also showed that the traffic had shifted from land to the sea border. Between September 2013 and May 2015, when I was going from one Thracian

town to another, I observed the measures that kept the transit migrants away from this border and saw that this was not of much interest to the locals of the Thracian borderlands. Hence my trip to Edirne gave me an opportunity to see the local response to the participants of this march, as much as to support the marchers in their legitimate demand for safe passage.

The number of people involved is hard to estimate as it was dispersed in different spots and the crowd changed over the course of the march. But the migrant activists who initiated the event, and the European and Turkish activists from Istanbul who followed them and wrote the first report at the heat of the march on September 20, estimated that there were approximately 3000 people on the way. It lasted ten days in total, from September 14 to 24. Yet at different moments, people either were forced to return to the Turkish towns, where they were registered as a “guest” with temporary protection, or they voluntarily dropped out after the local authorities and NGOs, politically close to the Turkish government, “convinced” them to return. This convincing often happened while they were at the coach stations of Istanbul or Edirne, on the highway, or at the public park they occupied in Edirne. The stadium to which marchers – young single men as well as whole families – were forcefully transferred and detained is in Sarayıçi, the remains of the old Ottoman Palace; it is outside the town center and close to Edirne’s detention center, which meant the first few days of the refugee march in the city center were immediately rendered invisible.

With the arrival of the refugees, the stadium and its yard turned into an ad hoc refugee camp. Humanitarian help arrived from government-led NGOs from Istanbul, social workers from the newly formed Edirne branch office of the Ministry of the Interior’s Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) were present, and security forces were on 24-hour duty to prevent people escaping the stadium and trying to cross the border. A few local,

politically-engaged people visited the stadium from time to time. Yet, with understandable reservations they carefully avoided becoming too involved in the matter, meaning they did not confront the local authorities. As one of them stated openly, “When everyone eventually leaves this place, we will be the ones to look at each other here, every day.”

At the beginning of the march, the governor of Edirne gave the group a three-day notice to return to the cities they came from. Seeing their determination, however, he came to the highway to join them in the Friday prayer, together with a local imam. There he promised that he would make available a small group of representatives to meet the then prime minister Davutoğlu and officials from DGMM in Ankara. In the press release in Ankara and Edirne, the government representatives and bureaucrats showed their good will and understanding of the motivations of the marchers and called the European leaders to consider the pressing needs of asylum seekers waiting in Turkey.<sup>8</sup>

The refugees’ representatives returned to Edirne with more hope than they’d had before going to Ankara; they told the group in the stadium to hang on until the end of the upcoming meeting of the EU heads of state, on September 23. Officials in Ankara said the group’s demands had been heard by the European leaders, so it was expected that the upcoming meeting would include a decision on safe passage. And had that happened, many would have wholeheartedly agreed to walk for thousands of kilometers. Anything was better than the treacherous sea journey to leave Turkey.

Almost everyone expressed a desire to go to Germany, though their reasons varied. Some had a family member needing surgery, some wished to continue the university education they had left prematurely in Syria, others wanted better housing or a job that fit their profession instead of working in textile ateliers in Istanbul. The reasons all related to a lack of social and

economic rights in Turkey. Some families had left rented homes and travelled to Edirne with whatever they could carry, leaving them with nowhere to return. Many were sincerely grateful to Turkey for offering a safe refuge, but it was now time to move on and get a new life. Turkey was a waiting room that offered neither the legal nor the social conditions to make a new beginning possible. That new beginning, they believed, was awaiting them in Europe, and especially in Germany. And shortly before this march, Germany's Chancellor Merkel, the "angel" as some called her, had said that Germany would continue to welcome refugees.<sup>9</sup>

A few hundred determined marchers were "allowed" to stay at the stadium, where they waited for the Brussels meeting and expected to hear a decision about the opening of a humanitarian corridor through the Balkans. However, nothing came out of this meeting concerning their immediate demands. In their informal meeting, the EU leaders discussed the relocation of those who were already on the Balkan route and also the aid that should be provided to Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. They also discussed the need to "reinforce the dialogue with Turkey at all levels (...) cooperation on stemming and managing migration flows."<sup>10</sup>

It is difficult to describe the replacement of hope with despair in some of the young people's eyes. As one of them said, "[they] got used to this; actually it was too good to be true." The word "This" in this sentence referred to being given false hopes, no more having real hope for the near future but still hanging on. The person who said this was one of those young, single men who were the most skeptical of the group who went to Ankara. This was the group that booed the governor during his visit to the stadium after the Ankara meeting, to convince them to end the march.

September 24, the day after the EU informal meeting, was the first day of the sacrifice feast. The DGMM and other local state officers involved in the makeshift camp came early in the morning for the special Morning Prayer and, as is tradition, greeted everyone in person. This was yet another show of solidarity with their Muslim brothers, who were automatically assumed to be practicing Sunni Muslims. It was also a gesture to bring everything nicely to closure. As the police officer supporting the local DGMM said, “The meeting is also over. So there is no reason to stay here.”

The condescending tone in his voice made this whole ten-day long struggle into a cabaret that was coming to an end. After everyone showed their good will until this very special day; it was a good time to get people going back to wherever they had come from. This was likely the deal made between the refugees’ representatives and the leaders in Ankara. However these representatives eventually, one by one, disappeared from the stadium and their whereabouts were unknown to anyone. Some blamed them openly for selling the group out, perhaps in return for Turkish passports that were promised to them during that meeting in Ankara.

As the feast days are official holidays in Turkey, the handful of people in Edirne who had been coming occasionally to see if the demonstrators needed any social assistance were away from town. I took a tour in the town center and checked the Friday market, which is always full of cars with Greek and Bulgarian plates; the parking lot was empty. A sign at the big iron door of the market said, in three languages, that the bazaar was closed that week because of the feast break. The next day, I visited a Greek friend in Orestiada who was involved in the local group protesting the construction of the fence back in 2012. He said when the Crossing No More marchers were in Edirne, they also came a few times to see what was going on there but

could only watch from afar. The gendarmerie had stopped the marchers more than five km away from the border, so the Greek supporters could offer little support even if they could organize something on the Greek side of the border. But even that was doubtful. The first day, extra police forces were deployed at the Greek border village of Kastaneis, where the 10.5 km fence is located. When it was clear that things were “under control” in Edirne, they withdrew.

Hence, this demonstration ended as a performance of the Turkish state leaders, through the local state agents. On the one hand they showed European leaders their power to control (read ‘manipulate’) the group’s movements by detaining demonstrators in the open stadium area. On the other hand it was a show of solidarity with the migrants through organizing the prayers, first on the highway and then on the first morning of the feast, and offering a free bus ride to whichever Turkish city they had to return to according to their temporary protection registration records. Though few national and international news channels were allowed to watch and cover the story, this *mise en scene* did become visible to the international community.

Some people, the most vocal voices in the Stadium and on the highway to Edirne, were detained after the march. After two months they were deported back to Syria.<sup>11</sup> What was more unexpected in this case was the much quicker deportation of two EU citizens, who were detained in the first days of the march while showing solidarity with the group marching on the highway. Juxtapose their deportation with the closing of the two lanes of the highway for Friday prayer, where the governor showed his sincere support to the marching group’s cause. From the Turkish state’s perspective, as much as the deportation of the Syrians whose actions were beyond grateful guests, the deportation of the EU citizens was meant to prove the power of the state over the terms of mobility as well as the terms of engagement with the mobile subjects.

Yet the hurry to deport the EU citizens also revealed the state authorities' exertion to maintain control over people and their acts of disobedience and resistance.

This story depicts an *image* of Turkish state as a strong one, able to keep society under control. Although it did not lead to any joint action of solidarity with the marchers, the simple fact that few Greek citizens were wandering in the city to observe the situation, and the fact of the note at the gate of the Friday market, point out that there are other sorts of mobilities that were allowed to be realized. Considering that Greeks were the national enemy in the Turkish official historiography for almost a century, what makes this strong state allow them inside its border while not allowing others to go outside of it? This is a slightly different version of the simple question that the people in the march were asking: "Why does not the Turkish state just let us go?"

This is a question of state sovereignty over space and over people. In this dissertation, I unpack the impacts of various authorized and unauthorized cross-border mobility practices on the changing power of states' from a historical and comparative perspective. Due emphasis is given to the changing meanings of territorial borders on top of dividing the nation-states: in this case, becoming an external border of the EU. Zooming in to the practices of mobility and governance at the cross-border peripheries shows that some mobility practices may lead to contesting or renegotiating, whereas others to, unintentionally or not, reproducing states' role in governing territory and citizens/noncitizens. As the Crossing No More group's short presence in Edirne shows, the story of the changing functions of a border is a story of the states' attempts to maintain a strong image vis-à-vis other states and moving subjects when people defy existing terms of the state-society relations.

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<sup>1</sup> Available at <<http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/12/5683d0b56/million-sea-arrivals-reach-europe-2015.html>> (Accessed December 2016)

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<sup>2</sup> Latest numbers are now available in DGMM website, updated in January 2017. According these official records, there are also 6,490 registered Syrians in Edirne as of January 2017. Available at <

[http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection\\_915\\_1024\\_4748\\_icerik](http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik)> (Accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>3</sup> Available at < [http://www.unhcr.org/turkey/uploads/root/tr\(35\).pdf](http://www.unhcr.org/turkey/uploads/root/tr(35).pdf)> (Accessed December 2016)

<sup>4</sup> Available at <<http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2015.pdf>> (Accessed December 2016)

<sup>5</sup> Available at < <http://www.iom.int/news/iom-counts-3771-migrant-fatalities-mediterranean-2015>> (Accessed December 2016)

<sup>6</sup> Available at <<http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS-Report-5.12.2016..pdf>> (Accessed December 2016)

<sup>7</sup> Available at <[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Table\\_3\\_unemployment\\_rates\\_by\\_age\\_and\\_gender\\_new.PNG](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Table_3_unemployment_rates_by_age_and_gender_new.PNG)<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/sep/03/greece-islands-economic-depression-migration-kos>

<http://nearfuturesonline.org/welcome-management-making-sense-of-the-summer-of-migration/>>> (Accessed December 2016)

<sup>8</sup> Available at <<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/suriyeli-siginmaci-temsilcileri-ankara-edirne-yerelhaber-979397/>> (Accessed December 2016)


<sup>9</sup> For a similar opinion on Merkel versus all the EU leaders, see:

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/08/angela-merkel-refugee-crisis-europe>> (Accessed December 2016)

<sup>10</sup> Available at <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/23-statement-informal-meeting/>> (Accessed December 2016)

<sup>11</sup> This information is based on personal follow-up communications with two informants, one of whom was also in the group organizing the march. According their accounts, they were detained in Erzurum for almost two months. In the end, around 200 people all of whom took part in this march were brought to Reyhanli and handed to Ahrar Alsham members in Syria. Some of those, who deported, later reached Germany through the infamous sea route.

## Map of Greek and Turkish Thrace



## Chapter One: Introduction

The 4<sup>th</sup> High Level Cooperation Council meeting between Greece and Turkey took place in Izmir on March 8, 2016, the last day of the Turkey-Greek Business Forum. In his speech at the Business Forum, the then Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu brought up cooperation on the current “refugee crisis”:

We are here crying out loud from Izmir, where two people had lived deep grief in the past. All the way from the Balkans and Greece, we say that the century ahead of us is the century of friendship. If the first step for this is to pass the psychological threshold, we achieved that. Under normal circumstances, if there was such a refugee crisis 30 years ago, probably Turkish and Greek governments would be accusing each other and throwing the ball on each other’s court. Now, we don’t blame it on each other. We understand each other and we look at the problem as a team (*Hürriyet* March 8, 2016).

At the end of the council meeting and the signing of a joint declaration, the Greek PM, Alexis Tsipras, stated that many controversial matters had been discussed. These included Cyprus and the use of Aegean airspace, Greece’s support of Turkey’s EU accession process, and illegal migration. Tsipras also underlined that at a time when conflicts in the Middle East and the “refugee crisis” are causing tension, “the Aegean needs to remain a sea of stability, a sea of peace and cooperation” (*To Vima* March 8, 2016). Davutoğlu once again emphasized that the “critical psychological threshold has been passed in bilateral relations” and that old political disputes are no longer obstacles for cooperation in many fields. Furthermore, Davutoğlu noted that, with the joint decision of Greece and Turkey, NATO could aid with the “refugee crisis” and that both countries’ leaders “put in brackets [other] problems and do not block cooperation on the refugee crisis” (*Hürriyet* March 8, 2016).

As the word “bracketing” indicates, the agreement for joint action on the “refugee crisis” was not reached so easily. The Joint Action Plan, which was activated at the EU-Turkey summit on November 29, 2015, was followed by much discussion. In addition to the activities of the

EU's border management agency, Frontex, in the Aegean Sea, Germany, Greece, and Turkey invited NATO's assistance in solving operational problems between Greece and Turkey over the use of airspace and maritime zones in the Aegean. NATO defense ministers decided, on 11 February 2016, to assist Frontex in the Aegean through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the Aegean Sea. Yet operational problems related to the use of airspace and territorial waters continued until early March, as Turkey awaited reassurances from Germany regarding the exact spots where Germany-led NATO maritime forces would be deployed (*Cumhuriyet* March 2, 2016). Finally on March 7, at the EU Migration Summit in Brussels, an implementation agreement was reached regarding the readmission of irregular migrants from Greek hotspots to Turkey. Fresh from Brussels, Tsipras and Davutoğlu reached the last session of the business council and ministerial meetings on March 8 in Izmir and gave the above cooperation messages on the “refugee crisis” as well as on economic relations.

Greece and Turkey share a long history of conflict, and the countries' borders have been sites of antagonism that culminated in Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974. In the aftermath of 1974, military forces were heavily present along the Greek-Turkish border, the national minorities in each other's lands were overtly discriminated against, and new disputes occurred on the Aegean Sea border pertaining to the use of air space and the continental shelf. There has been a sensible change in all these matters following the official rapprochement led by the foreign ministers of the time and Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999. The 2000s saw a beginning of cooperation on border control measures against unauthorized migrants at the same time that new networks and relations at the state and society level emerged across the border, and minority rights improved.

The puzzle here is why and how there is a new, official friendship and cooperation discourse between the two states that did not solve but “put in brackets” their old disputes, and how this process of change is experienced at the level of everyday practices. This may not seem puzzling at first glance, however. After all, one may immediately say why not? Do they have to solve all their problems immediately? Surely state actors, just as any person, may take their time to resolve their issues until it is in their best interest to do so. As Davutoğlu says, the psychological threshold is past and they can now cooperate if needed. But what would it take to solve these disputes, and again, why would they solve the disputes if they can simply bracket them and work together to manage the biggest refugee crises of the century?

My ethnographically informed research in the Thracian borderlands demonstrates that this seemingly diplomatic question could only be addressed with a thorough understanding of the state-society relations that these bilateral disputes are embedded in. With that aim in mind, I investigate in this dissertation the local implications of the Greek-Turkish nation-state border becoming an external border of the EU. My aim is twofold: (a) to map out the ways in which policies of rebordering territorial space and people, determined by the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations, are translated into actual practices, and if and how they are complied with, circumvented, or contested by different state and non-state actors on the peripheries of the states; and (b) to assess to what extent the hierarchies of otherness, or the old us-them distinctions, have actually been redefined through the local practices of rebordering in the last forty years. In doing so, I study the changing limits of the two states’ relations with and control over their citizens, minorities, co-ethnics, and foreigners, be they citizens of the neighbouring country or migrants from third countries, hence the title “(Re)bordering Territory and Citizenship.” At the theoretical level, I bring the *regime of bordering* as a new dynamic

conceptual tool to study the transformations of states' sovereignty over space and people from a cross-border historical perspective.

I aim to achieve these goals by comparing the new local practices with the old practices of the pre-rapprochement era. I specifically focus on the transformation of the Greek-Turkish borderland in Thrace. The Thracian borderland is distinguished from the Aegean sea border both topographically – with a 12.5 km land border followed by a 206 km long river that naturally divides the region – and demographically, due to the presence of an established Turkish-Muslim community in Greek Thrace. These features make the Thracian borderland a microcosm in which to study critical issues of Greek-Turkish relations over the last forty years and their impacts on state-society relations.

In the next section, I pose my research questions and explain the significance of this research. In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I first offer a historical overview of Greek-Turkish relations that have also shaped state-society relations, specifically the notion of citizenship, in both countries. Then I provide a brief demographic, social, and political account of Thrace followed with a section on the methodology of this research. At the end of the chapter, I give an outline of the dissertation.

## Research questions and significance

This dissertation examines the practices of (re)bordering of the territory and citizenship along the Greek-Turkish border in Thrace over the last forty years. It scrutinizes the changing Greek-Turkish relations as embedded in the regional and global transformations and how these changes are experienced by the people who are neighbours along the Thracian borderland. In other words, it explores the continuities and differences in the Thracian borderland between the more rigidly defined border regime of the two nation-states, and today's so-called porous border between an EU member and a candidate country. This cross-border historical research is a single case study of the Bourdieusian relational fields in which the practices of local state and non-state actors in states' peripheries take place, not only vis-à-vis the power centers of the two states but also with respect to one another. It is as well a comparative inquiry in the sense that it compares past and present practices. Based on ethnographically informed body of fieldwork extending from September 2013 to May 2015 on both sides of the Thracian border, this research seeks answers to the following specific questions:

- How have the changes in the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey, under the EU political framework, affected interactions at the local level?
- Who has been “allowed” to cross the border in the old and the new border regimes and for what purposes? In other words, who are the authorized and unauthorized mobile subjects of the old and the new border regimes?
- In what ways do emerging cross-border interactions and border-crossing practices at the local level affect established us-them distinctions between the two societies?
- How do the micro-level practices then affect their established notions of citizenship?

As the last one of these empirical questions implies, this research is driven by my theoretical inquiry into the changing limits of state power over space and people. I am particularly looking at what happens to the notions of national territory and citizenship with the impact of increasing cross-border mobilities and in the presence of a postnational framework that to some extent shape the two states' bilateral relations.

To answer these questions and the changes I observed in the Thracian borderland, I consult three bodies of scholarship that fall under citizenship, border, and regime analysis. As I demonstrate at length in Chapter Two, they all provide partial explanations. By combining the conceptual tools offered by each body of work, I suggest looking at the local changes as part of a dynamic *regime of bordering*. This is a regime that is determined by all sorts of localized acts of cross-border mobilities and cooperation emerging as contestation, negotiation, or reproduction of the established conceptions of citizenship in Greece and Turkey. Through this new analytical lens, I examine the changing limits of states' sovereignty over space and people in three main fields of power: security, economy, and culture.

Throughout the dissertation, it is shown that variations in subject positions of local state and non-state actors along the Thracian borderland depend very much on the particular field of action where their cross-border encounters take place. Recalling Bourdieu's notion of relational field (1991), these positions also depend on the relative weight of the social capital held by the very actors involved. Hence, one needs to be attentive to the different experiences in each field while examining the impact of the Europeanization process on an already established regime of bordering.

I explain how I come to define this process as a changing regime of bordering in the next chapter on conceptual tools. Here I would like to briefly state what appears as new in each

field in the face of changing Greek-Turkish relations in the 2000s. In the security field, intrusion of the EU in Greek-Turkish relations is most visible in both countries' harmonization with the EU migration and border regime, which has shaped the new discourses and practices of cooperation on border control. In the economic field, it becomes apparent that, in the same way that market conditions on both sides of the border did so, the remnants of past disputes interfere with developing sustainable cross-border economic ties and cooperation within the EU regional policy framework. In the cultural field, the emerging assertive power of the Turkish political center becomes most apparent. Even more than the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations, the future of cross-border economic and cultural ties is determined by the heavy impact of the Greek economic crisis and Turkey's neo-Ottomanist foreign policy instruments actively used in the Thracian peripheries.

As the example in the foreword demonstrates, the region has been deeply affected in recent years by two significant events: the Greek economic crisis and the "refugee crisis." As a result, new cross-border relations and networks of cooperation have emerged to control the border against unauthorized crossers, to boost local economies, and to make use of available cross-border resources for education and social activities. In that sense the region seems less divided than it used to be, regardless of the fact that the political centers are not too eager for the institutionalization of cross-border cooperation. Furthermore, increasing encounters in each one of the three interrelated fields have put certain actors with the right kind of resources – either formal or informal – in a favorable position over the others, such as the upper-middle class residents of Turkish Thrace, the Greek businesspeople active in tourism, and the Turkish-speaking minority of Greek Thrace. These encounters sometimes trigger change in the existing habitus, and hence in the existing limits of the states' sovereignty over space and people. I argue

that this is a new, yet slowly changing regime of bordering that brings forth novel positions of the local actors in the Thracian borderland.

I claim that it is possible to apply this analytical approach in other contexts. Regarding sovereignty over space, neither the military deployment of the earlier decades nor the recent deployment of fence and thermal cameras along the Greek-Turkish border are exceptional. Similar processes are at work in other so-called western countries' borders, as in the case of the US-Mexico border (Andreas 2000; Heyman 2008; Nevins 2002; Brown 2010), and Canada's (Rygiel 2010) and Australia's borders (Hyndman and Mountz 2008; McNevins 2012). According to the estimates in 2009, 28 walls or barriers have been constructed globally since the end of the Cold War (Hassner and Wittenberg cited in Mountz 2010).<sup>1</sup> Trump's ambition to build a permanent wall all along the border was a central topic of his campaign in the 2016 US presidential election and it continues to be so in the aftermath of his executive orders to ban entry of people from seven majority Muslim countries. Except for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which connects the US with Mexico at the same time as the existing fence separates them, the difference between the borders of other western countries and the Greek-Turkish border is the lack of an international framework that unites as much as divides national sovereign bodies.

Regarding the EU framework, the Greek-Turkish border is not exceptional either. There has been a fence around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla already and new fences have been constructed over the last years at the Bulgarian-Turkish border and between Southeast European countries on the Balkan route to Schengen countries. Other than the fencing, the securitization of the borders is accelerating in the EU's neighborhood as close as Ukraine bordering several EU countries (Crane 2013) and as far as Mauritanian borders (Anderrson

2014a, 2014b). Yet, as will be discussed in Chapter Two at length, studies on the borders of the EU are exclusively focused on the control aspect of the border while leaving aside other functions that they entail. My aim is to fill in this void in the growing literature on the EU border regime by looking at an external border of the EU from a historical and cross-border perspective.

This dissertation makes several contributions to our understanding of how the Europeanization processes works out on a micro level of practices, especially at one of the EU's external borders. It also draws lessons regarding the changing dynamics of state-society relations as they are embedded in global structural transformations that might be observed in other regional and historical contexts as well.

First of all, it shows that the EU-ization of the border regime and the new discourses and policies of cooperation between the two states have created new formal and informal mechanisms of security, which are defined less by territorial concerns and more by notions of future risks and crises. Secondly, and related to the first, it shows that unlike the recent cooperation on border control, most cross-border practices and exchanges in the economic and cultural fields do not become institutionalized. The main reason for the lack of institutionalization, however, is the fact that the political power centers govern the formal mechanisms regulating these economic and societal interactions in the shadow of the old national territorial disputes. In other words, territorial sovereignty remains national for economic and cultural interactions that concern the everyday life of borderlanders, whereas the responsibility to control the same space against the passage and presence of certain border-crossers is considered shareable. This shows that even the claims that the states make for territorial sovereignty are no longer all-encompassing.

This brings me to my third point, which is about othering and the fact that territorial and symbolic borders are intertwined. This study portrays the new temporary forms of mobilities and the increasing variation in actors. Distinctions are made between mobile students, middle class professionals, minorities and “transit” migrants, and those that the states considered outlaws. This paves the way for the redefinition of the historical others on both sides of the border. Here the new formal and informal mechanisms of social inclusion/exclusion are defined by various forms of social capital and legal status that people hold, on top of the old demarcation lines of ethnicity and religion.

Fourthly, I claim that despite the intrusions of the center in the periphery and the lack of institutional mechanisms for cross-border cooperation, local actors develop their own ways of building cross-border ties. These are genuine acts of citizenship that are contingent upon the availability of the right resources, such as language as social capital, at the right moment, regardless of the availability of the EU framework.

Finally this study aims to offer “regime of bordering” as a new analytical tool to look at other disputed borders, such as Israel-Egypt and India-Bangladesh; in these cases, “transit” migrants are adding a new layer on top of historical disputes, yet there is no overarching framework, such as the EU, within which the two states, their people, and the newcomers meet. I unpack my conceptual framework further in Chapter Two. The next section gives a brief overview of the Greek-Turkish relations as they shape the dynamic regime of bordering.

## **Overview of Greek-Turkish relations**

In the coming section, I document the issue areas that kept Greek-Turkish relations near the boiling point from the signing of Laussane Treaty in 1923 until the 1999 political rapprochement. I then show the drastic changes in the 2000s with the impact of each country’s

relations with the EU and end this section by pointing at the current balance of power between the two countries.

### **Old regime of bordering**

Greece and Turkey share a long history of conflict and both countries built their national identities by fighting each other. Greece's war of independence from 1821 to 1829 was fought against the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey's predecessor. Greece gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. The wars of 1897, 1912-1913, 1916-1918, and 1919-1922 led to the formation of Greece's modern borders, and the last one set the western borders of modern Turkey (Gavrilis 2008). Nineteenth century Greek and Turkish nationalisms constructed ethno-religious national identities antagonistically on both sides, defined each other as a threat to their sovereign rights, and pitted their national selves in opposition to one another in their novels, textbooks, and official historiographies (Anastasakis et al. 2009; Birtek and Dragonas 2005; Millas 2009; Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008; Tsibiridou 2007). The "Asia Minor Disaster" in 1922 hallmarked not only the Greek national historiography, but also shaped, as the peak moment of "Independence War," the rising Turkish national identity. The two states had already used similar strategies of economic boycotts and "cleansing" of unwanted subjects in the early 1900s, in Macedonia by the Greeks and in Anatolia by the Turks (Millas 2009). As the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922 exacerbated ethno-religious tension on both sides of the border, an official population exchange was then seen as necessary for recovery (Kayali 2008:143).

The Lausanne Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Population, signed on January 30, 1923, became the main determinants of the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. By the end of that decade, the out-migration of about one million Orthodox

Greeks and the transfer of some 400,000 Muslims from Greece were completed. Only the Greek-Orthodox population of Istanbul, Imbros, and Tenedos, and the Muslim population of Western Thrace/Greek Thrace<sup>2</sup> were saved from the exchange (Hirschon 2003).<sup>3</sup> The Greeks of Edirne and Karaağaç, on the Turkish side of the Thracian border, moved across the new borderline towards what they then called Nea Orestiada, after the old Greek name of Karaağaç. The displaced Greek population of Edirne was encouraged to settle there in order to balance the demographic composition of Evros and make up for the small Muslim minority of Alexandroupoli in Greek Thrace that was exempt from the official exchange. The Lausanne Convention, which was developed within the legal framework of the League of Nations, defined the group rights of those who stayed behind. Yet, due to lack of enforcement mechanisms it could not prevent, in Akgönül's words, the "marginalization of Turks in Greece and virtual disappearance of Greeks in Turkey" in various ways. Today, the Turks of Greece form almost 1.5% of Greece's total population whereas the Greeks of Turkey constitute less than 0.01 % of the total population (Akgönül 2009).<sup>4</sup>

The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923, ended the long conflict between the Allies of WW I, including Greece, and Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. It also set out the basic framework to regulate all border issues between Greece and Turkey up until today. In Thrace, the Evros River became the natural border between the two entities, apart from Karaağaç, the only Turkish territory beyond the river. However, the airspace and territorial waters in the Aegean remain disputed until today and, as explained in the following pages, several military crises have occurred especially in the aftermath of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus.

The bilateral relations have been cooperative, especially following the 1930 rapprochement between the two state leaders, Venizelos and Atatürk, and the signing of

bilateral political, economic, and military agreements (Akgönül 2007). During Greek Prime Minister Venizelos's visit to Ankara on October 30, 1930, the following agreements were signed: a Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration (*Dostluk, Tarafsızlık, Uzlaşma ve Hakemlik Antlaşması*); a Protocol on Naval Armaments (*Deniz Kuvvetlerinin Sınırlandırılmasına İlişkin Protokol*); and the Convention of Residence, Commerce and Navigation (*İkamet, Ticaret ve Seyrisefain Antlaşması*). Next was the official visit to Athens in October 1931 by Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras (Chousein 2009). The friendly relations carried on well into the beginning of the Cold War period. With both countries' NATO membership in 1952 as well as the EEC associate membership of Greece in 1961 and of Turkey in 1963, they became part of what is often called the "Western security community" (Rumelili 2003; Aybet 2009).

Nevertheless, except for the brief rapprochement in the 1947-1953 period when they signed an educational exchange agreement (*Kültür Anlaşması/Mορφωτικό Πρωτόκολλα*) (Anagnostou 2001), first Cyprus and then Aegean disputes have caused serious friction between the two countries (Aybet 2009; Coufoudakis 1985, 1991; Bahçeli 1990; Clogg 1991 cited in Çuhadar et al. 2015). The outbreak of tensions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the mid-1950s,<sup>5</sup> followed by unconfirmed news about an attack on Kemal Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki, triggered the infamous September 6-7 Pogrom in 1955 against non-Muslims, which mainly targeted Greeks of Istanbul and urged many members of the community to leave Istanbul for good. Shortly after, in response to increasing unrest and attacks on Turkish Cypriots in 1964, the Turkish government deported twelve thousand members of the Greek-Orthodox community of Istanbul with Greek citizenship (Akgönül 2007).<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, numerous Turkish-Muslim minority families in Greek Thrace also migrated to Turkey. This migration had already started with the Greek Civil War (1946- 1949) and the state-led encouragement of right-wing and nationalist groups in the region against the “communist threat” from Bulgaria. With the colonels’ regime in Greece (1967- 1974), living conditions became harder for the minority community in Greek Thrace; discrimination and barriers in everyday life intensified, such as bans on property ownership and getting driving licenses. These conditions pushed many members of the minority either to move to Turkey or to enroll in the guest worker schemes of Western European countries, with the encouragement of the Greek state. However, soon after they left their home towns, people were erased from the registers and lost their Greek citizenship on the basis of Article 19 of the Greek constitution, which came into effect in 1959.<sup>7</sup> Article 19 was finally modified in 1998 for instrumental reasons, namely compliance with the EU norms. Yet, until then, official measures like Article 19 and aforementioned informal measures were used to balance out the demographic decline of the Greek population in Istanbul (Anagnostou 2005; Christopoulos 2013). The Consultative Committee of the Turkish Minority of Western Thrace estimates that around sixty thousand people have been stripped of their citizenship over the years, while the Council of Europe reported that there were about two hundred minority members living in Greek Thrace, still stateless (*heimatlos*) as of 2008 (cited in Demetriou 2013: 191).

Some critical scholars underlined that minority policies against Muslims in Greece, which were common practice until the 1990s, were an example of how religious and ethnic affiliation affected the class condition of many members of the minority community (Demetriou 2013:16, 132) and created political and economic dependencies on their local brokers (see also Trubeta and Tsibiridou cited in Gkintidis 2014). In the second half of the 1980s, their

politicization gained momentum with a powerful demand for self-determination as a “Turkish minority.” This was achieved both with the support of the Turkish General Consulate in Komotini and by activating European institutions around human rights (Anagnostou 2001). An electoral alliance was formed under the leadership of Ahmet Sadık, who was persecuted in January 1990 for referring to the minority as “Turkish” in his election campaign. This has escalated inter-communal tensions in Komotini (ibid.). The whole event raised a diplomatic crisis between Greece and Turkey. The Turkish Consul of Komotini, Kemal Gür, was declared *persona non grata* by Greece and expelled from the country for addressing the minority as “our kinsmen” in a letter he wrote to Greek authorities demanding compensation for damage done to minorities’ shops and workplaces. Turkey retaliated by expelling Ilias Klis, the Greek Consul in Istanbul (Oran 1991). This event also pushed the Konstantinos Mitsotakis government, in 1991, to develop minority rights in the spirit of “legal equality-equal citizenship” (ισονομία-ισοπολιτεία), while at the same time introducing the 3% threshold for parliamentary elections to preclude their re-election (Anagnostou 2001: 103).

Meanwhile, Turkey’s 1974 Cyprus Operation and ongoing occupation has accelerated conflicts, threats of war, and mutual mistrust, leading to securitization of all aspects of bilateral relations, from foreign policy to minority rights (Tekin 2010). It has become a widespread perception among the political leaders of both states that the other would pursue revisionist foreign policy to alter the status quo in the Aegean and Thrace, as well as in Cyprus. Hence both parties pursued policies of containment against this perceived threat to national security. In addition to the strategy of maintaining the presence of ethnic kin in each other’s land, their foreign policies were based on building up military capabilities to deter the other from attacking

one's territory and gaining international support in the face of new disputes (Agnantopoulos 2013; Çelik and Rumelili 2006).

Regarding the first component of this policy, namely the military capabilities, the Aegean controversy has kept the two sides on their respective toes. The Aegean dispute is composed of several issues, namely the delimitation of the territorial waters and national airspace, demilitarized status of the Greek islands, the undetermined sovereignty over small islets, and the use of continental shelf and flight information regions (FIR). These controversies have produced three crises between the two NATO member states on the brink of war until the 2000s. Two continental shelf crises occurred, first in August 1976 and then in March 1987, over oil search attempts in disputed parts of the Aegean Sea. The dispute regards the degree to which the Greek islands off the Turkish coast should be taken into account for determining the Greek and Turkish economic zones. Finally, the two navies were on the verge of a major clash after a Turkish cargo ship ran ashore and needed to be salvaged on the uninhabited islets of Imia/Kardak, one of the many "grey zones" of undetermined sovereignty in the Aegean (Heraclides 2011).<sup>8</sup>

The second component of foreign policy, namely international support, has been used twice since 1974 to overcome the Aegean disputes, first in the diplomatic talks of 1975-1981 and then in the recent talks of 2002-2003 (Heraclides 2011).<sup>9</sup> Regarding the former, the relative improvement in bilateral relations coincided with the membership application of the two states to the European Community (EC) and was driven mainly by Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis' desire to secure Greece's EC membership (Çelik and Rumelili 2006; Diez et al. 2006). This was manifested in the way Karamanlis responded to the continental shelf crisis of 1976, as he took the issue to the UN Security Council and International Court of Justice

(Tsakaloyannis 1980). After Greece became an EC member in 1981, and as Turkey was trying to build closer relations with the EC, Greece began to use its membership as a source of diplomatic leverage. Similar tactics were used by Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal to defuse the second continental shelf crisis in 1987 and to continue dialogue with Greece, although no bilateral agreement was reached (Yannas cited in Çelik and Rumelili 2006). Özal, first as a key bureaucrat and then as the prime minister, was the forerunner of the 1980 economic restructuring plan that was supportive of an open market economy and EC membership. In line with his neoliberal political economic vision, and soon after he became prime minister at the end of the military rule, Özal's cabinet made the decision to lift visa requirements for Greek passport holders. As shown in the empirical chapters of this dissertation, this decision was very influential in the cross-border mobilities, interactions, and cooperation possibilities, even in the absence of an official rapprochement.

Starting with the EC's negative response to Turkey's application in 1989, and throughout the 1990s, the EU has made Turkey's membership conditional on resolution of the Cyprus issue and other Greek-Turkish disputes. Between 1986 and 1998, the Greek state followed a policy of negative conditionality by obstructing the EU-Turkish contractual relations and the EU's financial assistance to Turkey. For example, Greece refused to sign the Adaptation Protocol in 1986 and also tried to prevent a final decision by the EC-Turkey Association Council on the Customs Union that was due in December 1994. A year after the aforementioned Imia/Kardak crisis, Greece attempted to redeploy Russian S-300 missiles from Cyprus to Crete to safeguard the aerial corridor from Greece to Cyprus. These conflict situations were eventually controlled before they could accelerate further, under pressure from the international community (Akgönül 2009; Aybet 2009; Rumelili 2003). Nevertheless, in this context, Turkey

was not granted candidate status in the Luxembourg European Council meeting on December 12-13, 1997, with the concluding notes that the EU-Turkish relations were conditional upon the “establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey” (Çelik and Rumelili 2006: 217).

Greek state officials, under the leadership of Kostas Simitis, representing the “modernist faction” within the incumbent PASOK government, gradually changed their position as they received some minor concessions as of 1995. These improvements included the free movement of Greek citizens in the Schengen area, abolition of some of the discriminatory measures of the 1964 decree on the Greek residents of Istanbul, and the prospect of EU membership for Cyprus. Finally, the policy of negative conditionality was dropped following the 1999 European Council decision to decouple Cyprus’s accession process from the precondition of a resolution of the ongoing conflict (Agnantopoulos 2013). In other words, the bilateral relations, minority rights, and territorial disputes, some of which the 1923 Lausanne Treaty sorted out and some of which were left unresolved, remained controversial until 1999.

At the societal level, the first steps of change towards a culture of reconciliation had already been developing from the mid-1990s onwards, as manifested in the festivals organized at the Aegean coastal towns and Cyprus, the Greek-Turkish Council of Businessmen, and the Greek-Turkish Forum. These initial attempts are described by academics, journalists, artists, businessmen, and members of civil society organizations in detail, in a few edited volumes (see Ulaş-Belge 2004; Pekin and Tsitselikis 2008). As Özel (2004) aptly notes, such track two diplomacy has proven to be an effective supplement to interstate relations in this process, whereas it is also learned that these societal initiatives need both a first-track opening in the background and a degree of official sanctioning that does not jeopardize their independence.

There were two diplomatic initiatives started following Ismail Cem's appointment as the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997 and Giorgos Papandreou's appointment as the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999. The first was the Greek–Turkish Forum (GTF) that was set up in 1997 at a Wilton Park meeting, and which was active from 1998 to 2000. This was, strictly speaking, a process of track two diplomacy, but a de facto state-level enterprise with the active involvement of former foreign ministers, ambassadors, and admirals. Hence, in Papandreou's words, it was “track-one-and-a-half diplomacy.” The second initiative was official track one diplomacy, conducted informally and secretly following the December 1999 EU Helsinki decision on resolving border disputes, and it was apparently successful in its task of clearing the ground for future talks (Heraclides 2011: 229).

Meanwhile, in February 1999, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the fugitive leader of the outlawed armed guerrilla organization PKK, with a Cypriot passport at the Greek embassy in Nairobi, caused serious political tension at both state and societal levels.<sup>10</sup> Yet this time, Greek-Turkish relations got quickly back on track with strong pressure from the United States and the EU towards a culture of cooperation on the basis of mutual trust and interest instead of a cultural of conflict based on “siege mentality” (Gündoğdu 2001). The quick recovery from the “Öcalan Crisis” in the same month was also made possible by the appointment of Papandreou, a politician with genuine belief in the possibility of Greek-Turkish reconciliation, as the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs (Karakatsanis 2014; Ker-Lindsay 2007). As Karakatsanis (2014:199) rightfully says, incompetence in handling the Öcalan debacle proved the futility of anti-Turkish foreign policy doctrines followed by the “patriotic” bloc of governing PASOK, and moved Greece forward to a policy of rapprochement aligned with the EU and NATO partners.

In July 1999, the first round of discussions was organized in Ankara and Athens. Rather than focusing on traditional, historical conflicts of “high politics” such as the Aegean Dispute or the Cyprus and minority issues, which are regarded as national problems, both countries decided to cooperate in low politics. Those issues of “low politics” were culture, tourism, cooperation on crime, human trafficking, and illegal immigration. This dialogue reached back to the societal level when two devastating earthquakes hit first Turkey and then Greece the same year. The earthquakes emerged as a “tragic and contingent opportunity to tighten these new links” (Karakatsanis 2014: 200), as, for the first time, people from both sides of the border offered unconditional support to each other for rescue and recovery, and people from Lesbos could tell “a story that speaks to all of us appealing to our common humanity” (Myrivili 2009:347; also see Rumelili 2003). In a nutshell, with the 1999 rapprochement at the official and societal level, the Greek foreign policy of negative conditionality has changed drastically towards positive conditionality. This change was proven by Greece’s support of the 1999 Helsinki European Council decision to grant Turkey candidacy status.

However, as Agnantopoulos’s process tracing shows, Greek support for Turkey’s candidacy is not necessarily a change in her “security logic,” but a deliberate change in strategy that reveals a better understanding of how the EU policy-making system works and how its diplomatic culture of coordination shapes the way national interests are pursued at the EU level (Agnantopoulos 2013: 73-77). The second round of diplomatic talks on the Aegean Dispute started in February 2002 as part and parcel of this strategic change. Additionally, it is also argued that the sense of common fate, in the aftermath of the earthquakes, might have provided additional legitimacy to the rapprochement and a shield against the nationalist critics, but it did not lead to a radical ideational change at the societal level (Agnantopoulos 2013; Heraclides

2011). Hence the old, confrontational regime of bordering established by the Lausanne Treaty has been changing with the Europeanization processes in the Greek and Turkish contexts. Yet the change so far has been more a strategic one than a genuine change in perceptions of the other.

The ethnographic accounts from the Thracian borderland demonstrate that the impacts of this process of change are not “either-or.” In the early years of rapprochement, the old regime of bordering was immediately dismissed by some local state and nonstate actors, while being maintained by others. Today there are those who have actively contributed to the ideational change and worked to overcome the old us-them distinction, while there are still those who are ready to call up the reserves. Variations in subject positions depend very much on the dynamic field of action where cross-border encounters among the local actors take place. Recalling Bourdieu’s notion of relational field (1991), these positions also depend on the relative weight of the social capital held by the very actors involved. As stated earlier, this dissertation calls the reader to look closely at different subject positions in three interrelated fields of action, security, economy, and culture in order to capture the nuances in the way the Europeanization processes affect the regime of bordering on the ground.

So far, the foundations of the old regime of bordering between Greece and Turkey and the specific issue areas that remain contested are presented. The next section demonstrates the impact of the Europeanization process on an already established regime of bordering.

### **New regime of bordering**

This section discusses how the aforementioned issue areas are affected in the face of Europeanization. Specifically it shows that the EU’s impact on Greek-Turkish relations in the 2000s is part and parcel of larger EU-level transformations. These transformations are observed

in the almost simultaneous development of policies to define and regulate (a) citizenship and minority rights within the EU, (b) borders of and migration towards the EU, and (c) relations with the immediate neighbors of the EU. All three policy areas have impacts on the old Greek-Turkish regime of bordering, the most recent and direct of all being the the involvement of the intelligence-driven EU-agency Frontex in the region.

Some scholars underline the EU's positive role in bilateral Greek-Turkish relations in the early 2000s (Rumelili 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Tsakonas 2010), while others are more cautious due to continuing past perceptions of the other at the societal level (Çarkoğlu and Kirişci 2004); at the institutional level, namely the church, media, and educational institutions (Millas 2010); and at the elite level (Ifantis et al. cited in Cuhadar et al 2015). Some may even argue, from the perspective of the center, that the reproduction of the old us-them distinction at many levels, with implicit hostility and suspicion of the friendly actions and discourses of the other, prevent official talks from reaching an agreement (Heraclides 2011). These mixed interpretations show that it is a disputed and ongoing process with no definitive outcomes (cf. Anastasakis et al 2009).

Based on the four-pathway model of EU impacts on border conflicts, Diez et al. (2006) show that European integration, and specifically the EU accession process, activates new discourses in conflict societies and works to “desecuritize” the conflicts. At least the main disputes then become less about conflicts over identity than about disagreements. Diez et al. (2006) argue that both Greece's 1974 coup in Cyprus, followed by Turkey's military intervention, and the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis were instances of securitization. Although the former was more symbolic than the latter, both were based on perceptions of existential threat. In the same line with Rumeli's (2005) emphasis on gradual societal rapprochement in the

aftermath of Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999, Diez et al. (2006) also claim that since then the bilateral relations have been de-securitized to a great extent and the same territorial disputes have begun to be considered as disagreements waiting to be resolved. By combining Conflict Resolution and European studies to explain the EU's influence on Turkey's Kurdish and Greek-Turkish conflicts, Çelik and Rumeli (2006) show that the EU's involvement could lead, at best, to a significant degree of conflict de-escalation if not to actual settlement of the old conflicts. Scholars therefore acknowledge continuities in the old conflicts despite substantive and mutual changes in political rhetoric, practices, and at the level of civil society.

Nevertheless what is left unexamined here is the fact that this process of Turkey's EU candidacy and its aftermath coincide with another ongoing process: formation of the EU Schengen regime for free movement of EU citizens and, concomitant to that, construction of the EU external borders. Over the years, the infiltration of societal life by securitization might appear minor when one looks only at the old Greek-Turkish conflicts. However in recent years, securitizing moves have shifted focus from the neighbouring country and its people to the irregular migrants. It is through the construction of this new EU border regime that the national territorial border between Greece and Turkey has been transformed into one of the EU's external borders, which are built to control the mobility of non-EU citizens and, in Balibar's (2004) words, pave the way to "European apartheid." Therefore the EU's impact on Greek-Turkish relations in the 2000s must be considered as part of these larger transformations at the EU-level.

Indeed, as many EU scholars argue, Europeanization is not the explanation of a phenomenon but a process to be explained (Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Gilardi 2012; Lavenex 2007; Strang and Meyer 1993; Graziano and Vink 2006).

Especially following the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, the EC has evolved into the more political European Union (EU) with increasing emphasis on democratic rights of its citizens, of its external border regime, and of its regional policies in its neighbourhood. This evolving EU framework has had a direct impact on the *policies of citizenship and minority rights, border and migration management, as well as the foreign and regional policies* of Greece, as a member country since 1980, and of Turkey, as a candidate country since 2005. Below, I briefly touch upon the development of each one of these three policies at the EU-level in general and in the Greek and Turkish contexts in particular.

### ***Citizenship and minority policies***

As much as the rule of reciprocity is based on the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the ideal of achieving equal rights among the EU citizens that developed in the 1990s has shaped minority policies in Greece and Turkey in the last two decades.

Promulgation of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 designated “respect for and protection of minorities” as a condition for membership, though without a clear definition of what constitutes a minority. The European Court of Human Rights became the institutional mechanism for Europeanization of minority rights protection and individual appeals on minority issues (Grigoriadis 2008; Onar and Özgüneş 2010) as well as for Europeanization of migrant rights and individual appeals on migration related issues (Tsitselikis 2012). Political relations within the EU (for Greece) and with the EU (for Turkey) also foster democratization and non-discrimination for majorities and minorities in Greece and Turkey (cf. Anastasakis et al. 2009). The EU exercised leverage on Greece, already a member state, through a strategy of “shaming” based on the monitoring of European Parliament and other intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations’ (i.e. CoE’s PACE) Amnesty International reports. For Turkey, a

member to be, the leverage was achieved through the accession carrot, which required regular reports of candidate's compliance with political criteria, including minority rights.

As Kadioğlu (2009) noted, minority rights swing back and forth, on the one hand by the deepening of democratization through the monitoring processes of the EU and on the other hand by rising nationalist backlashes, in Turkey for the preservation of the state and in Greece for the nation. On the Greek side, the abrogation of Article 19 in 1998 could be precisely seen as a change instigated by EU-level actions of “shaming.” Other changes in the lives of the minorities in that period include the abolition of the restricted zone in the northern borderline of Thrace and the affirmative action constituting a 0.5% university quota for students from the “Muslim minority.” Yet, from 1984 until today it has been forbidden to register an association using the word ‘Turkish’ in the title (Akgönül 2009). Among the Council of Europe countries, Greece is one of the four countries that signed but did not ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, whereas Turkey is among the four countries that have neither signed nor ratified the convention. On the Turkish side, the third so-called ‘Harmonization Package’ of August 2002 amended the Law on Foundations, thus enabling non-Muslim foundations to acquire real estate property with the authorization from the Council of Ministers and also to register any unregistered property. Yet some religious rights of the non-Muslims (e.g., reopening of the Orthodox Halki Seminary) still await political will to be implemented, even though they were guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty (Akgönül 2009, Onar and Özgüneş 2010). Hence, reciprocity is at play in the area of minority rights and for that matter these rights are generally used by each country's government to manipulate Greek-Turkish relations (Akgönül 2009).

### *Migration and border policies*

Simultaneously with the development of EU-level governance of the migration and EU's external borders, new techniques for border control were deployed along the Greek-Turkish border and the respective states' migration and asylum policies have gradually harmonized with the EU regime.

According to the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, Schengen *acquis* was incorporated into the EU legal order even though six members of the EU were not included in it.<sup>11</sup> The 1999 Schengen Regulations Action Plan of the European Council, which envisaged regulations concerning local border traffic and common standards for the surveillance of land and sea borders, was finally adopted as the Schengen Borders Code in 2006. Such regulations began to occupy a space on the EU policy agenda; this was mainly due to the sharp increase in sub-Saharan migration across the Mediterranean from 2000 onwards, and the events of 9/11 brought border regulation back onto the EU's policy agenda (Rijpma 2009). In this context, the establishment of FRONTEX as a "common corpus of legislation" was brought on the EU policy agenda for the first time by the European Commission's response to the 2001 JHA Council meeting, during which decisions about the integrated management of external borders, information coordination, and dissemination were made (EU council 2004).<sup>12</sup>

Based on the Dublin Convention of 1990, the Amsterdam Treaty also authorized the European Commission to negotiate and sign readmission agreements with non-EU countries, to facilitate the return of people residing irregularly in an EU country to their country of origin or a country of transit. During a 2002 meeting in Sevilla, the European Council suggested that the Commission add the readmission conditions to any cooperation agreement negotiated with third countries. These are tools to contain asylum applications in a safe first country of arrival in the

EU, or a safe third country in the EU's neighbourhood, externalizing border and migration control to countries like Turkey and Greece that are at the margins of the EU (Hyndman and Mountz 2008). In December 2003, a year after the idea of creating a "zone of security" around the EU was encouraged at the 2002 Sevilla meeting, the concrete European Security Strategy was adopted at the Brussels EC meeting (van Houtum and Boedeltje 2011). It is in this context that, on November 8, 2001, a protocol on readmission was also concluded between Turkey and Greece.

As controls in other southern borders of the EU intensified in the 2000s, the Greek-Turkish border became a critical node for unauthorized crossings. Since 2006 the intelligence-driven EU agency Frontex has been providing operational assistance to Greece. Its direct operations at its external land and maritime borders, such as Poseidon Sea 2010, the RABIT (Rapid Border Intervention Teams) operation, and Poseidon Land 2011, reinforced the number of guest officers and assets deployed along the Greek-Turkish border. In addition to new remote controlled policing equipment, such as thermal cameras to detect border-crossers when they are still in the Turkish territory, pushback techniques have been widely used to stop migrants before they cross the EU border in the Evros river and the Aegean Sea (Amnesty International 2013; Human Rights Watch 2008; ProAsyl 2007; for a concise summary of the expansion of surveillance systems see Topak 2014).<sup>13</sup>

The Greek-Turkish border in Thrace has specifically been a center of attention from 2010 onwards. While the flow of migrants was originally directed through the sea routes of the eastern Aegean islands from 2005 to 2009, it later shifted to the Thracian border across the Evros River, with the daily number of border-crossers reaching up to 250-300 (ProAsyl 2012). This constituted the majority (estimated at more than 80%) of migratory flows into the EU

(Hatziprokopiou and Triandafyllidou 2013). According to a report by the Turkish Parliament Human Rights Commission (2012), one third of the unauthorized border crossers in 2010 (11.384), and half of them in 2011 (22.664) were apprehended in Edirne. As a deterrence against this “flow,” the Thracian border has gradually become highly securitized through the involvement of Frontex, which monitors the Evros river and the land crossings; through the construction of new detention centers on both sides of the border; through the local Operation Aspida (Shield) and deployment of 1,800 extra officers along the 206 km-long border in the Evros region; through completion of the fence along the 12.5 km-long land border between Kastaneis and Karaağaç; and through increased intelligence sharing between Greek and Turkish security forces (Migreurop 2009; ProAsyl 2012, 2013). As a result, the migratory routes have shifted back from Thrace toward the Aegean Sea in the south (Amnesty International 2013) and, more recently, to Bulgaria in the north where new fence construction immediately started.<sup>14</sup>

Until recently, the EU-led readmission practices have not been effectively implemented in the Greek-Turkish context. According to data compiled by İçduygu (2011), the annual figures of irregular migrants who were returned to Turkey as irregular migrants from 2002 to 2010 was only 269, out of a total of 65,300 migrants whom Greece wanted sent back to Turkey based on the 2001 readmission protocol. Finally, based on the 2012 cooperation agreement between Frontex and Turkey, an EU-Turkey readmission agreement was initiated on June 21, 2012 and ratified in the Turkish parliament in 2014. Based on this agreement, the EU heads of state forged the current EU-Turkey Statement that came into existence on March 18, 2016; it addresses the overwhelming flow of smuggled migrants and asylum seekers traveling across the Aegean from Turkey to the Greek islands. According to this EU-Turkey Statement, “all new irregular migrants” arriving in Greece after March 20 were going to be returned to Turkey. In

exchange, Syrian refugees residing in Turkey would be resettled in EU member states, visa liberalization for Turkish nationals would be accelerated, and existing financial support for Turkey's refugee population would be improved. In total, 1,546 irregular migrants were returned to Turkey from Greece in 2016. According to the European Commission report in June 2016, 462 people were returned from the Greek islands to the Turkish coasts by Frontex boats based on this deal, including 31 Syrians who returned voluntarily; in the same timeframe 511 Syrians were resettled from Turkey to various EU countries, which is slightly more than the number returned under the EU-Turkey Statement. The rest of the returns were done under the framework of the 2001 Bilateral Readmission Protocol.<sup>15</sup>

Besides the EU-initiated attempts to control unauthorized border-crossings from Turkey to Greece in the 2000s, the two countries' migration and asylum systems have also been under the close watch of the EU. Accession Partnership documents dated 2001 and 2003 commit Turkey to harmonizing with the EU requirements and priorities in all matters of migration: visa systems, border control, readmission, fight against human trafficking and 'illegal' migration, refugee status determination, and reception conditions. National action plans dated 2005 further set the framework for legal and institutional transformation and culminate in the enactment of a new and much more comprehensive law, titled "Foreigners and International Protection Law," in 2013 (İkizoğlu-Erensu and Kaşlı 2017). Similarly, Greece had been under heavy criticism for its lack of a proper asylum system and was expected to improve it to the level of other EU countries. Both the European Commission and the ECHR criticized Greece for its lack of legal guarantees for a substantial examination of the application of asylum claimants. Finally, the Law 3907/2011 introduced a new Asylum Service, an Appeals Committee, and a First Reception Service that are in compliance with the EU norms (Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi

2011). In other words, migration policies in the 2000s, in both Greece and Turkey, have been gradually coming into line with the EU-led goal for border control.

### ***Regional and neighborhood policies***

In the 1990s, a few different schemes were developed in the neighbourhood of the EU, such as the Interreg cross-border cooperation program initiated in 1990 with the aim to turn borders from “blocks” to “bridges” between neighbouring countries of the EU. This has fostered Greek-Turkish relations as immediate neighbours, whereas institutionalization could not be achieved due to unresolved disputes.

Overall three different EU cross-border cooperation (henceforth CBC) programs have been developed and financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Used as a formula for promoting regional cohesion, competitiveness of regions, and more equal development among EU members and the immediate neighbours, these programs include the INTERREG-CBC among member states, the IPA-CBC among members and candidates, and the ENPI-CBC with states that are in the neighbourhood of the EU but do not have membership prospect. As part of the EU regional integration policy, this program was put under “European Territorial Cooperation” and became one of the main aims of the harmonization process with the July 2006 Council decision.<sup>16</sup>

As van Houtum and Boedeltje (2011) aptly state, ENP made clear that after the eastern enlargement of 2004, the EU had no intention of further territorial enlargement but would be interested in maintaining good relations with third countries that may qualify as “neighbours” from the perspective of the EU. Early studies claim that these regional cooperation schemes are politically significant mechanisms for deepening relations within Europe and with non-EU neighbours (Anderson, O’Down, Wilson 2003; Scott, 1999); others, however, claim these

policies show that Europe's borders are not fixed while also working as tools for rebordering as much as debordering the space and the people (Bialasiewicz et al. 2009; Popescu 2008; Scott 2012; Rumford 2008; Scott and van Houtum 2009; van Houtum and Boedeltje 2011).

The Greek-Turkish rapprochement, with the financial and administrative support of the EU, has encouraged cross-border cooperation in economy (Papadopoulos 2008; Özel 2004; Tsarouhas 2009). The détente during the 1988 Davos World Economic Forum, where the then prime ministers Turgut Özal and Andreas Papandreou decided to establish a Turkish-Greek business council, became a temporary rapprochement at least between businessmen (Öniş and Yılmaz 2008). The duties on primary agricultural products by the European Community were already eliminated in January 1989; Turkey has enjoyed access to Greek markets on exactly the same basis as the other Member states, while the Customs Union for industrial products began in January 1996.<sup>17</sup> The “Economic Cooperation Agreement” of February 4, 2000 facilitated the formation of the Turkish–Greek Joint Economic Council. The signing of the Prevention of the Double Taxation Treaty on December 2, 2003 also enabled the resolution of a long-standing problem hindering economic relations. Neoliberal orthodoxy was fully established with Greece's entry into the Eurozone in 2000, despite its closeness to all sorts of FDI's until recently, and with Turkey's 2003 Law on Foreign Investment (Tsarouhas 2009).

In this process, Greek-Turkish regional cooperation was foreseen under the already existing INTERREG-CBC program. The first meetings in preparation for this cooperation program started in 2000, for the 2000-2006 Interreg Program period. Nevertheless, until December 2003 no decision could be made regarding the areas and the type of cooperation due to long-lasting Aegean disputes on the borders of the continental shelf, the seawater and the airspace, and on small islets. With the involvement of foreign ministers and the European

Commission, four meetings took place from September to December 2003 to finalize this program. In the first meeting, it was decided that the program could support projects that were decided on an individual basis and need not be bound by the notion of border regions. The statement went as follows: “Eligible region for application of the programme is the whole of the eligible neighbouring regions of the two countries.”<sup>18</sup> Therefore the remnants of past disputes prevented the political elites in the center from openly and directly welcoming projects in the immediate border zone between the two countries.

Despite the absence of an institutional cooperation scheme, the 2000s saw an increase in cross-border trade and business, tourism and cultural interaction, as well as other new cross-border activities. Civil society organizations, such as cultural exchange programs for students across borders, and mostly funded by other EU programs like the Delegation of the EC to Turkey for Civil Society Dialogue, helped to legitimize Greek-Turkish cooperation not just at the governmental level but also at the civil-society level (Anastasiou 2008; Aybet 2009; Rumelili 2004a, 2005a; Myrivili 2009). After the period of Cem and Papandreu, the positive dialogue was also promoted by the then Prime Ministers of both countries, Tayyip Erdoğan and Kostas Karamanlis, both from center-right parties. Erdoğan paid an official visit to Athens in 2004 and Karamanlis came to Ankara in 2008. The Greek-Turkish rapprochement reached new heights with the inauguration of the Turkish-Greek pipeline of the Southern European Gas Project on November 18, 2007, to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Italy (Anastasiou 2008; Papadopulos 2008; Öniş and Yılmaz 2008).

Additionally, Business Council Greece-Turkey was established in 2007, and in February 2008 a delegate of approximately 1000 business people gathered in Athens to foster bilateral economic connections (Tsarouhas 2009). Yet cross-border economic relations did not

automatically become problem-free. On the one hand, Greece became the third ranked state investing in the Turkish market for the period 2002–2007; and on the other hand, Turkish investments in Greece and Greek exports to Turkey were met with bureaucratic barriers. These manifested in withholding residence and work permits to Turkish businessmen, and extra customs duties and time-consuming procedures in the agricultural and alcoholic beverage sectors, which might be considered in breach of the EU-Turkey Customs agreement (Papadopoulos 2008). Political reactions to Turkish investment in Greek Thrace arose when the opening of a branch of the Ziraat Bank in Komotini was discussed in the Greek Parliament (Athanasίου 2011).

Economic relations are developed hand in hand with political relations. When Prime Minister Erdoğan came to Athens on May 14, 2010 with a team of ministers, 320 business people, and representatives from NGOs and chambers, the High Level Cooperation Council (*HLCC-Yüksek Düzeyli İşbirliği Konseyi*) was inaugurated as a new mechanism for promoting and structuring cooperation in soft policy areas. During the second session of HLCC in Istanbul on March 4, 2013, 25 agreements were signed, including in the fields of health, tourism, prevention of illegal migration, sports, and female entrepreneurship. Like the forth session mentioned at the beginning of the introduction, the third session was held in Athens, on December 5-6, 2014, together with the Greek-Turkish Business Forum. It ended with a joint declaration emphasizing the importance of neighbourly relations; cooperation on issues such as trade, energy, tourism, and illegal migration; and Turkey's EU membership.<sup>19</sup>

These developments show that, despite the availability of the neighbourhood schemes under the EU framework, Greek-Turkish relations in the Thracian region and the Balkans in general are shaped by the relative economic and political power of each against the other. Many

scholars have underlined that the proactive Turkish foreign policy of the 2000s under the AKP rule is not only built on the earlier proactive and globally-oriented leadership and policy of Özal in the late 1980s and the foreign minister Ismail Cem in late 1990s, but is also contingent upon global political dynamics (Keyman 2012; Oran 2012; Öktem and Kadioğlu 2012; Onder 2008; Öniş and Yılmaz 2008). As Fisher-Onar aptly puts it, Ahmet Davutoğlu's 2009 book, *Strategic Depth*, has been an “effective cognitive and heuristic framework for policymakers and the public and (...) offered a timely formula for navigating Turkey's perennial identity crisis at a time of structural shift in international relations” (Fisher-Onar 2012: 63).

The notion of “Neo-Ottoman” historical, cultural, and economic drive was introduced after 1989 to describe Turkey's involvement in post-communist space. It was also used more commonly during the AKP period to refer to Turkey's larger sphere of influence, including the Balkans and the Middle East (Anastasakis 2012: 187). Davutoğlu rejects the use of the term “Neo-Ottoman.” However, his “zero-problems-with-neighbours” vision relies on Turkey's historical and geographical depth. The former involves rehabilitation of the Ottoman era for both domestic and international audiences, and the latter is embedded in a “cross-border sphere of influence” at the interstices of many regions, from the Balkans to the Persian Gulf (Fisher-Onar 2012). This vision foresees development of soft power resources. What Öktem (2012) calls “non-conventional policy actors” of this new foreign policy are the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), Yunus Emre Cultural Centres, and the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) under the Prime Ministry; educational and business networks of Gülen Schools and the Confederation of Business and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON); and finally the Turkish soap operas that are watched in a geography stretching from Slovakia to Malaysia.<sup>20</sup>

The “demonstrative effect” of Turkey’s performance as a “trading state,” in Kirisci’s (2011) terms, based on developing relations with its neighbours from Syria to Serbia, located Turkey as a “model” for its neighbourhood. This was also part and parcel of Davutoğlu’s “zero-problems-with-neighbours” vision. One example is the regional cooperation initiatives that emerged at the eastern borders of Turkey, as Turkish and Syrian governments began working together between 2006 and 2011, until the outbreak of the civil war in Syria. Out of this cooperation came a joint CBC-fund to support local state institutions, small businesses, and civil society organizations in the fields of economic and regional cooperation, which, as Sezgin and Erkut (2014) note, was adopted from the EU-CBC process. Yet Turkey’s leadership trajectory in its neighbourhood has been called into question regarding not only its Middle East policies in the aftermath of the Arab Revolution and ongoing conflict in Syria, but also its lack of developing concrete steps for cooperation in Caucasus in the East, and with Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece in the Balkans (Fisher-Onar and Watson 2013; Öktem 2012).

Simultaneously with the rise and fall of this zero-problem vision, the recent EU/Euro and Greek crises have created a new political economy in Southeastern Europe. Until recently, as Fisher-Onar and Watson (2013) discuss in detail, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, and all the Balkans used to be embedded in an enlarged EU-oriented framework. Nevertheless, even in the absence of an EU motor Turkey seems to have leverage in the Western Balkans, as it is possible to use building blocks for regional cooperation, integration, and mutual recognition that were established under the EU-brokered framework of the earlier era. In a similar vein, Anastasakis (2012) argues that, despite being a post-imperial, neo-Ottoman policy, the pragmatic AKP activism in the Balkans seizes a “window of opportunity” related to some pockets of instability,

such as in Kosovo, Bosnia, Sandzak, and in the absence of other regional competitors such as Greece or external powers like Russia or the US.

In sum, there have been substantive changes in the Greek-Turkish relations, and specifically in the three aforementioned policy areas. The changes, which are often attributed to each country's relations with the EU, took place almost in tandem with the development of these policies at the EU level. Nevertheless, Europeanization of the existing regime of bordering seems most successful in the way border control is enforced against the "flow" of people from third countries. Other matters, namely minority rights and regional policies, are determined mainly under the shadow of the old regime of bordering. Zooming in the Thracian borderlands does not automatically disprove what comes out of existing studies in that respect. However, looking at it over time and tracing the formal and informal networks, ties, and mobility practices in three interrelated fields (security, economy and culture) reveal the peculiar ways in which the two states' power over space and people are sometimes circumvented, renegotiated and contested at the level of everyday practice.

### **Thrace at a glance**

In this section, I introduce Greek and Turkish Thrace. By documenting economic, demographic, and geographical characteristics of Thracian borderlands, I show how this spatial focus is necessary to study the changing Greek-Turkish relations.

Evros is the easternmost regional unit of Greece, part of the region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. According to 2010 Kallikratis reform of the Socialist PASOK government that aimed at autonomy of self governance, public transparency, and overall accessibility to citizens, Evros is one of 74 regional units, and is one of three Thracian regional units, together with Rhodope and Xanthi. According to Turkish officials and minority leaders,

the Muslim-Turkish minority of Greece concentrated in these three regional units is often referred to as Western Thracian Turks. However, to avoid appropriating claims of one side or the other, I will refer to the region as Greek Thrace. The capital of Evros is composed of five municipalities: Alexandroupoli (capital of Evros), Samothraki, Soufli, Didymoteicho, and Orestiada. Komotini, the capital of the region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, is where the Turkish General Consulate is located. It is home to the largest minority population, and hence is considered the main center for the minority community. According to the 2011 census, the population of Evros is 147,530, whereas the total population of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace is 608,182.

Edirne is one of the 81 provinces of the more centralized governance structure of Turkey and it is geographically part of the Ergene subdivision of the Marmara region, one of the seven regions of Turkey. Edirne is the capital of the province of Edirne, which is composed of nine districts, namely Lalapaşa, Süloğlu, Edirne, Havsa, Meriç, Uzunköprü, Ipsala, Keşan, and Enez. According to the 2014 census, the city population is around 165,979 and the provincial population is 400,280. Orestiada in the north and Enez in the south are the furthestmost points on each countries national maps. Throughout this dissertation, to simplify this picture, I refer to Thracian regional units as Greek Thrace and to Edirne province as Turkish Thrace.

Since the border was sealed by the Peace Treaty and the Conventions and Protocols of Lausanne signed in 1923, Greek Thrace was divided into two worlds: the “Greek” and the “minority.” As previously pointed out, this new configuration of territory and citizenship has stigmatized the Muslim-Turkish minority as a deviant component of the ideal of cultural homogeneity, and the region has remained one of the less developed regions in the Balkans and the EU (Anagnostou 2005; Demetriou 2013; Gkintidis 2013; Yikoumaki 2006). As Yikoumaki

aply notes, in popular Greek imagination the border region has signified “exile, desertion, remoteness, backwardness, development programmes, industrial subsidies and military camps. The minority was imagined primarily as a locus of imminent upheaval, and the notorious border with Turkey felt persistently permeable and porous, particularly at times of political crisis” (2006:148). According to local accounts, the Evros region was and to an extent still is an extent remote from the rest of the country. The Alexandroupoli-Thessaloniki ride was six hours until the Egnatia road construction started in the 1990s—double the time it takes now. I was told that, before Greece’s EU membership, there were bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education who did not even know how the minority schooling was governed in Thrace.<sup>21</sup>

Since the 1951 census, there has been no official data collected on the size of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities. As a result, the total population of the Muslim minority and its breakdown according to ethno-linguistic differences are contested. According to the 1999 statement published on the Greek Foreign Ministry website, the minority population total, based on the 1991 census, was 98,000 out of approximately 10 million Greek citizens; “50% of the minorities are of Turkish origin, 35% are Pomaks (an indigenous population that speaks a Slavic dialect and espoused Islam during Ottoman rule) and 15% are Roma.”<sup>22</sup> According to human rights organizations, about 50,000 of the 90,000 Muslims have Turkish as a mother tongue, 30,000 have Pomak and 10,000 have Romanes. In the minority and Turkish state sources, the minority population is estimated as 150,000.<sup>23</sup> Today, a large majority of all Muslims, including Pomaks and Roma, have a Turkish national identity, thanks to a push by Greek authorities in the early 1950s to promote a Turkish identity. This continued until the introduction of a 1980s policy denying the Turkish identity.<sup>24</sup> In the Evros regional unit, the mountain villages are mostly populated by Pomaks and Turks. There are few Greek-Turkish

mixed villages to the west of Alexandroupoli, whereas at the outskirts of the city to the east and north, the population is mostly minority of Roma origin.

In Turkish Thrace, however, there was no such ethnic diversity in the aftermath of 1923, as the last Greek residents moved to the other side of the border. The remaining non-Muslim communities in Edirne comprised a very small community of Armenians, Bulgarians (most of whom left the city during and after the Balkan Wars and WW I), and the well-established Jewish community. The latter group also gradually left Edirne due to discriminatory measures of the Turkish governments starting in the 1930s. Similar to its Greek counterparts, Turkish governments had encouraged ethnic homogenization along its borderlands (Kaşlı 2014). The residents of the towns and villages in the Thrace borderlands are descendants of refugees who left their hometowns on the other side of the border drawn by the Lausanne Treaty. The current residents of Karaağaç, the border district of Edirne, are mostly the descendants of refugees (*muhacir*) who were originally from the Greek side of the border—some from the closest villages and some from as far as Serres in Greek Macedonia—and who settled in the empty Greek houses. Similarly, the farmer families in and around Kastaneis, the border district of Orestiada, are mostly refugee (*προσφυγες*) families who had to leave their homes right across the border, Bosnaköy and Karaağaç, in 1923. Among the Greek families settled in Orestiada, some were from the Turkish-speaking Orthodox community called the Gagauz people. They were able to speak Turkish simply through generations of co-habitation in Edirne. After being forced to move across the border, they built the town of (Nea) Orestiada, named after the Ancient Greek name of Karaağaç area. As noted by Mr. Papathanaki, journalist from Orestiada, the town itself is “a product of this border, [the border] is in its DNA.”

Although the Greek-Turkish border in Thrace is not a disputed border like the Aegean Sea, it has been under strict military control since the Laussane Treaty of 1923. On the Turkish side, the First Army of Turkey has been ever-present in Thrace to guard Istanbul and the western borders (Oran 2004). As confirmed by a retired military commander from Enez in Edirne, the Turkish land along the border has been a restricted military zone ever since the border was drawn. The lands along the Evros/Meriç River and all the way down to the Aegean Sea were confiscated by the treasury soon after the foundation of the republic. Since then, Turkish citizens have been allowed 49-year rental terms on land used for farming outside the city, and for cafes and restaurants in the city. Foreigners were not allowed to buy or rent property in the Thracian borderlands until the 2012 law on land ownership in the restricted zones. Military control over the borderland was gradually lessened, though not completely eliminated, in the 2000s. In Enez, the southernmost point of Edirne, the restricted military zone is decreased from 1000 to 30 meters in 2004 by a Cabinet decision based on the advice of the General Staff. This was followed in 2006 by a Cabinet decision to declare Enez a “Culture and Tourism Protection and Improvement Area.” Historically, local farmers and fishermen needed permission from the local military authorities to reach the land along the river; as explained by locals of Enez, this continued in practice even after 2004.<sup>25</sup>

On the Greek side, the border region continued to be a space of conflict in World War II and during the subsequent Civil War. After the beginning of the Cold War, mountain villages of Rhodope and Evros, almost entirely populated by Turkish and/or Pomak minorities, were designated as restricted zones. This was then justified with Cold War measures against the “Communist threat” from Soviet Bulgaria. Minority villages were kept under strict surveillance, with military check-points at or close to village entrances, until 1996 (Anagnostou 2005;

Demetriou 2013). These villages were, therefore, cut off from the reach of minorities' religious and community leaders as well as the officials at the Turkish consulate in Komotini. As of 1974, extraordinary measures were taken in Edirne and in Evros in case one side declared war on the other. The Greek military presence in the plains next to the Evros River and the land border was minimal until early 1960, but mine fields were laid all along the border as of 1974. As local witnesses confirm, these have still not been completely demined. The deserted check points also materially stand still in the entrance of many mountain villages. Similarly, on the Turkish side, extra military divisions were deployed in 1974 along the riverbed and were only slowly withdrawn to the center in the last few years.

Greek and Turkish Thrace are connected at the moment through two border gates, though in the past there was a third gate at Pythio/Uzunköprü, where trains could pass. The northern villages and towns of Rhodope and Evros are closely connected with the town center of Edirne through the Kastaneis/Pazarkule Border Gate. There is no customs entry for commercial buses and trucks in this rather small gate; individuals cross over in private cars, on tour buses, or on foot. This is in the neighborhood of Karağaç, which is the only Turkish land beyond the Evros River. The Kipi/Ipsala Border Gate in the south unites two sides of the river. It is considered the main gate on the new highway, completed in 2009, stretching from Thessaloniki to Istanbul. It also connects the town of Keşan in Edirne with Alexandroupoli, Komotini, and Xanthi in Greek Thrace, all towns with a considerable number of Muslim-Turkish minorities. Keşan and Alexandroupoli are the closest commercial towns along this route, whereas Enez and Alexandroupoli are located on the two sides of the Evros River on the Aegean coast. Edirne's town center in the North and Alexandroupoli's in the South are considered the vibrant economic and cultural centers for each side.

Economically, there is no big gap between the two sides. While Evros has been the least developed region of Greece, economic development in Edirne has gained some momentum since the late 1970s. With the shifting of industry away from Istanbul, the province of Edirne has gradually moved from an agricultural to a manufacturing area, developing mainly labour-intensive and low-value industries (Olcay & Erkut cited in Turlay 2011). More importantly, it is located on the networks of highways linking Turkish cities to Europe via Greece and Bulgaria. As such, the region is Turkey's gateway to Europe. In Evros, on the other hand, the dominant agricultural sector is followed by textile and services, i.e. tourism. The region is also characterized by availability of rich natural resources. The main reasons for the low level of investment and manufacturing are the region's partial isolation from major national markets and infrastructure networks, and a lack of personnel specialization and human capital in the region (Stathakis 2008). In Edirne, 47.42% of the regional GDP is based on services, while agriculture is 35.8% and industry 16.78%. Similarly in Evros, 57.6% of regional GDP is in services, 21.4% is in agriculture, and 21% is in industry (for further information see Turlay 2011). As shown in Chapter Five, due to this similarity, cross-border economic mobilities and interactions may cause conflicts over the market shares of economic actors with similar interests.

Despite their geographical proximity, connections between Greek and Turkish Thrace have been interrupted and transformed in relation to the bilateral disputes and detente between the two states. This dissertation is about the impact of changes at state-level relations on the everyday interactions at the Thracian borderlands. More specifically, the mission here is to understand the process of Thrace becoming a contact zone at the EU's external borders (a) to be controlled against the transit migration, (b) to be developed in terms of the minorities' rights and (c) to be lifted to the EU standards for regional development. In other words, to capture the

Europeanization of the regime of bordering as it unfolds along the Thracian borderlands, through its effects on the relations between the two peripheries, and each peripheries' relations with their centers; hence the relation between states, territories, and citizens.

## **Methodology**

In this section, I first briefly discuss my methodological approach to study changes over time in the relations between states and their territories and citizens. I then document the material collected during my fieldwork in the Thracian borderlands. Finally I reflect on my subject position as a researcher.

## **Relations, Processes and Fields**

In their comparative history of borderlands, Baud and van Schendel (1997) underline that borders are markers of territorial consolidation of states but also their actual power over societies (1997:215). To understand the formation and territorialization of states, they argue for the importance of studying relationship between peripheries and centers through the struggles and adaptations that the imposition of a border causes (1997:212). For them the antidote to the dominant state-centered perspective is comparative historical research. In other words, the unit of analysis has to be the peripheries on both sides of a border as a joint space, as a cross-border periphery. Such a cross-border perspective then allows the researcher to look at the power relations between states, regional elites, and local people in a borderland as part of the “triangle of power relations.” They suggest thinking of these power relations as a “double triangle whose points may overlap to a greater or lesser extent, according to how far the two states involved have been able to break up the unity of the elite as well as the ‘common people’ in the borderland” (1997:227). This, however, presupposes a unity between the elites and the local

people, which is not the case, at least in the Thracian borderlands. Regardless of that, the image of a triangle is still helpful for my aim to trace the changes in the states' actual power over their own societies in the face of Europeanization of a given border, considering that there are at least some ties between all the groups that Baud and van Schendel (1997) identified. Yet a revision becomes necessary when considering that the new actors, such as the unauthorized border-crossers coming or at least passing through the already set border, may also affect what they say the border is a marker of, that is, the actual power that the states wield over their own societies.

In my unit of analysis as cross-border peripheries, I trace changing power relations between various actors over time. Interpretive methods that pay attention to context, language and meaning become necessary for such process tracing (Wedeen 2010). Process-tracing is a popular method in case study research and it has been widely employed in Europeanization studies (see Moumoutzis and Zartaloudis 2016). Yet it is rarely taken to the street-level. In their anthropology of public policy, Shore and Wright also suggest “studying through,” that is, “tracing the ways in which the different actors, discourses or technologies create new webs and relations of power” (Shore and Wright, 1997: 14). Juxtaposing with Marcus' definition of multi-sited ethnography as an “exercise in mapping terrain,” I “follow the people” and “follow the life or biography” of a place or a person to track webs and relations of power that are embedded in the mobility practices (see 1995: 99-109). Also, inspired by Marcus's suggestion to “follow the conflict,” I follow the cooperation across the border, which reveals the remnants of the conflict (see Marcus 1995: 99-109).

I look at different issue areas where these webs of relations are observed, namely security, economy, and culture. To distinguish between the issues, Bourdieu's notion of field is quite helpful. For Bourdieu it is a “network, or a configuration, of objective relations between

positions,” and positions are “objectively defined by their present and potential situation in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc)” (cited in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). For Bourdieu (1991) the amount and type of capital that an agent possesses also locates him in the social field according to the ‘distribution of species of power (or capital)’, yet not only with respect to the overall volume of the capital they possess but also according to the relative weight of the different kinds of capital in the total set of their assets. In that sense, looking at the issues as fields and disclosing the power relations among actors that come across at different moments helps me see the change in the regime of bordering as an ongoing process with moments.

I analyze relations and webs of power in the cross-border peripheries from an interpretivist approach. There is a vibrant debate going on in IR on ethnography as a method and methodology (Aradau and Huysmans 2014; Crane-Seeber 2013; Jackson 2008; Rancatore 2010; Salter 2013; Vrasti 2008, 2010). This debate originates from Geertz’s (2000) distinction between the two, that is, the ethnographic method as participant observation, and ethnographic methodology as the endeavor to make sense of how others make sense of the world. In this research, I used the ethnographic method of participant observation at various moments, at least as far as my language competence in both languages allowed, which is essential for a multi-sited ethnography. As a native Turkish speaker not fluent in Greek, I was better immersed into the field on the Turkish side. On the Greek side, I could initiate and follow informal conversations in Greek but I employed a translator for formal interviews and in-depth conversations in public events. However, during and after the fieldwork I have made sense of how others make sense of the world as I trace the creation of certain webs and relations of

power in the context of states' peripheries. In that sense my interpretivist approach is informed by ethnographic methodology as well as ethnographic methods.

### **Data collection and analysis**

In the summer 2013, I spent one month in Istanbul and one month in Thessaloniki to connect with academics working on Greek-Turkish relations, minority rights, and citizenship and migration, and I collected local contacts in Greek and Turkish Thrace. In September 2013, I conducted a half-month exploratory field trip to the big towns and few mountain villages of Greek Thrace and towns of Edirne in Turkish Thrace. During eight months of ethnographically informed fieldwork (spread out between September 2013 and September 2015) on the Thracian borderlands, I was based mainly in the town center of Edirne. I also stayed in Orestiada in the north and Alexandroupoli in the south of Evros (2 months in total), and Enez and Keşan in the south of Edirne (20 days in total). I also visited other towns and villages in Rhodope and Evros and Edirne during these stays.<sup>26</sup>

Throughout the research period, I utilized various methodological tools. I did participant observations in public meetings on issues related to the borders and border-crossings of all sorts, as well as in public spaces where daily talks about the border and border-crossers emerged. These took place during cross-border bus and car rides, at coffee/tea houses, restaurants, and other entertainment sites, at market places, and at important cultural sites such as museums, old sanctuaries, and memorial sites. I crossed the border several times, accompanying different groups of informants from both Kastanies/Pazarkule and Ipsala/Kipi Border Gates. I was allowed to sit and observe the border-crossings in Pazarkule once a month in the spring of 2014. I took extensive notes of these observations as well as of my informal chats with people during the time I spent in these places.

I collected leaflets, local periodicals, and reports related to cross-border cooperation, migration, and minority issues. I did archival research in one local and one national newspaper on each side of the border: *Hudut* and *Hürriyet* on the Turkish side, *Eleftheri Thraki* and *Kathimerini* on the Greek side. Among the local papers, *Eleftheri Thraki* is considered nationalistic and *Hudut* leftist compared to other established and well-known papers on their respective sides of the border. Yet, they were chosen according to the criteria of widest distribution and readership in order to capture the “voice” of the border. I examined the national papers *Kathimerini* and *Hürriyet*, which are both mainstream (center-right) papers with wide readership. I specifically tried to look closely at the coverage of seven events that emerge as critical moments in Greek-Turkish relations in the last forty years: the 1974 Cyprus Conflict, the 1996 Kardak/Imia Crisis, the 1999 Öcalan Crisis, Earthquake diplomacy, Turkey’s EU candidacy, the 2004 Annan Plan for Cyprus, and the 2012 construction of the fence in Evros. However, due to access problems on the Greek side a systematic comparative analysis of newspapers is not achieved. Despite that, and especially for the 1974 period, I used newspaper archives that I could access in order to have an understanding of the public discussions at the local and national levels at that time. I mainly used my survey of newspapers as talking points during interviews with local informants.

Next to informal chats during observations, I conducted 185 open-ended semi-structured and unstructured interviews tailored according to the informants (104 in Edirne and 81 in Evros). My primary goal was to capture the multiplicity of subjects that il/legally cross over the border. Looking at the impact of EU on the Greek-Turkish relations, Rumelili (2005b) earlier identified five categories of actors in the field: (1) people in positions of formal authority; (2) actors recognized as influential opinion makers, from former politicians to researchers; (3) actors

such as journalists, educators, firm-makers, artists, and grassroots activists, which are collectively often called civil society; (4) those who are not politically active but engaged in direct economic and cultural relations, such as businessmen, tourists, mixed couples, and minority groups; and (5) people who are neither politically active nor engaged in any direct relations with the other country. This is a more or less complete categorization of the actors involved in the Thracian peripheries, if we consider that there are further divisions within each one depending on the level of formality of these relationships.

According to this classification, my research is mainly concerned with the third and fourth groups, while I also try to incorporate as much as possible the local formal authorities on each side of the border and some local key figures that fall under the second group. In different working papers, Rumelili also examined all four groups' discourses of cooperation in the early rapprochement period (see Rumelili 2004, 2005a, 2005b). She does that, recalling Baud and van Schendel (1997), from a state-centered perspective. Since my starting point is the peripheries of the states and the focus is on the moving subjects, there emerge new relationships that need to be taken into consideration. Here, I specifically mean the necessity to incorporate Greek and Turkish facilitators of the unauthorized border-crossers in the picture. This group may still fall under one of these categories but in any case, the categorization needs a revision so as to incorporate people who are not politically active and engaged in informal economic relations.

Here I must also note the access problems I encountered reaching certain actors who would enrich this research, and some decisions I made while I was in the field. My initial plan was to include all key actors of the local formal authorities that are concerned with cross-border mobilities and interactions. However throughout my fieldwork, I repeatedly sent petitions to the Directorate of Migration Management in Ankara asking for access to the detention center and to

conduct interviews with the officers as well as the detainees in Edirne. My petitions were rejected. I did not try to do that in Evros, since I was already informed during my informal contacts with the UNCHR lawyers that I was not likely to get permission for research. Transit migrants in both Edirne and Evros were very hard to reach and build rapport with in order to start a conversation, as they were not visible in public spaces and did not stay too long in the region. In some cases, I tried but then did not pursue reaching the heads of the municipalities and governorships themselves for formal interviews, since my primary interest was not to hear their official discourse, which is available in public sources, but to see them in action. Informal encounters, on the other hand, allowed the informants to better reveal their personal take on the subject matter. For that reason, I specifically relied on observations during local and cross-border activities that the state agents also took part in and during my rather informal visits to their offices. I also documented the other local actors' accounts of their encounters with local formal authorities. Considering these limitations, the breakdown of interviews is as follows:

Categories	Evros (Greek Thrace)	Edirne (Turkish Thrace)
Local stakeholders (business organizations, bar associations, unions, universities, NGOs)	18	35
Local officials, elected/ appointed political figures (street-level state agents)	6	13
Consulate Generals	1	1
Local “elites” (in business, politics, law, education sectors) and “laymen” (small shopkeepers, retired civil servants and villagers)	28	40
People self-identified as members of the officially defined category of national minority	14	3
Commuters in between Greek and Turkish Thrace	9	10
Local journalists	5	2
local smugglers	1	3
“Migrants”	1*	3**
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>110</b>

\* Once a “transit” migrant eventually a resident

\*\* Syrians under temporary protection with valid residence permits

Most of the time, I started recording the conversations after a long informal chat.<sup>27</sup> For the informants who did not feel comfortable with recording, I relied on note taking during interviews. After each recorded and unrecorded interview, I also took extensive notes for myself. I “digested” the data while collecting it, as suggested by Lynch (2004) and persistently tried to answer these two questions in each step: “Why am I gathering this information? And what is it telling me that I didn’t know before?” (Lynch 2004: 10). From an interpretivist perspective, I coded my field notes and transcribed interviews in Atlas.ti7 and then made code families to have a network view of related codes and to explain the relationship between the repeated discourses and practices that emerged in the coding process. Building on the discourse-historical approach and the emphasis on the “critical discourse moments” developed by Reisigl and Wodak (2009), I followed Carvalho’s (2008) suggestion to pay due attention to time, place, and the social actors involved in these “critical discourse moments.”

### **My position as a researcher**

In his inquiry on the usefulness of ethnography to understand world politics, Jackson underlines that “in interpretive research, the researcher is the research instrument, so attempts to minimize unique or idiosyncratic aspects of the researcher’s individual experiences would make little sense” (2008:92). Although I do not reflect in the manuscript on my position in making sense of each and every example I give from the fieldwork, I would like to take a moment here to reflect on my position as a researcher in the Thracian borderlands.

I am a female Turkish citizen, born and raised in Izmir. In Turkey this city is called the “infidel” city in reference to its Greek and other non-Muslim stock until the end of the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922. As this was an important front of the independence war of Turkey,

Izmir is also considered at the forefront of the founding principles of the republic. This is not an ungrounded consideration since majority of the people from Izmir remain ardent supporters of these founding principles. Izmir also constitutes a crucial place in the Greek collective memory, especially with reference to the 1922 catastrophe of Smyrna, the fire that destroyed much of the non-Muslim quarters of the city. The attachment to republican values in Izmir extends to discriminatory discourses and practices towards different ethnic groups, particularly Kurds (see Neyzi 2008; Özkırmılı and Sofos 2009; Saraçoğlu 2010).

Among all Turkish cities, Edirne is one of the closest to Izmir's collective urban memory and identifications, as well as its approach towards outsiders. Since I was known to be coming from outside of Edirne, saying I was from Izmir brought me one step closer to Edirneans. I was told many times that "you are one of us," assuming that I, like the majority of people from Izmir, am an ardent defender of republican values. As I was closer to "us," it was easier to talk with me about "them," the imminent others in Isin's (2002) words, be they Kurds the "betrayers" to the nation or the people from the neighbouring country of Greece.

In addition to my Izmir/Smyrna background, my family's migration history, which goes back to Crete, was an important icebreaker for many informants in Greek Thrace. They had similar migration stories to tell, as descendents of the population exchange either from Capadocia, Pontus, or Smyrna in Asia Minor. That family history put me one step closer to "us", the Greek self, compared to the members of the established Muslim-Turkish community; in the best case they were considered with pity as people "in-between," and in the worst case they were considered as the "pawn" of the Turkish state.

With the Muslim-Turkish minority in Greek Thrace, building rapport was less straightforward than I had expected. I was introduced and referred to a few times as "Tourkala

Tourkala” by minorities, which literally meant Turkish Turkish. This underlined that I am not a Western Thracian Turk, like them, but a Turkish citizen from Turkey. My Turkish passport was then an asset for many who had some sort of ties with Turkey, the imagined homeland. Yet my position was a difficult one to maintain especially in relation to the Roma community in Alexandroupoli, who were the most excluded by both the Greek majority and the Turkish-Muslim minority communities of Greek Thrace. On one occasion, a Greek friend from another town and I were hosted by a local notable of Alexandroupoli. Our host kindly said to the Turkish speaking waitress, whom the local notable automatically assumed to be of Roma origin, “she is one of us” and, after the waitress left, explained to me and my friend that “[you] are like people in Komotini, not like them.” Hence in her hierarchy of otherness, if I was going to be associated with anyone who is Turkish then it was those educated and better-off ones who are from the heartland of the minority community. In my few encounters with the members of the Roma community, I understood the low level of trust on their part towards everyone, be they the members of minority community from Komotini, the majority Greeks or Turkish citizens like myself. For that reason I did not pursue too much of these networks as I thought it requires in-depth study of their liminality which would be the topic of another research.

The way my own place of birth has been perceived was crucial for me in understanding the hierarchies of otherness that I try to trace in the changing webs and relations of power along the Greek-Turkish border. However, my position as a student from an American institution was also making things complicated for some people. If my Turkish passport brought me closer to my informants, my interest in the mundane practices in the border towns sometimes put me in a suspect position. Having built a relationship of mutual trust, a few informants on both sides of the border jokingly warned me that I might be taken for a US spy. Conspiracies were clearly

waiting to pop up at different moments of daily conversation, though mostly as jokes, in these militarized border towns where the arrival of a curious outsider was hard to miss. Being female was surprisingly feeding this phantasy, as some said, this would be even a better cover than sending a male spy to the borders. My gender then was both an asset and liability for this research. I was given lifts to the fields and the river by exclusively male fishermen, farmers and hunters. The kind of conversations that would emerge, if I were not woman, is a question to be pursued by a male researcher.

Lastly I must say a few words about working with an interpreter in ethnographically informed research. I acknowledge the fact that not having a full grasp of the minute details of the language might have caused a level of distance between me and my Greek speaking informants. Nevertheless, I am not sure how much this distance would be closed if I was more fluent and therefore wandering alone in the towns and villages of Greek Thrace. There were many moments when I could be immersed more easily in the daily conversations between Greek speakers with the help of my interpreter, who happened to be a good friend of mine. I think the interpersonal trust between us made it even easier for the locals of Thrace to accept me, in an area where few Turkish reseachers show interest in everyday life. This is aside from the exponential rise in the number of journalists, NGO workers, and researchers mainly from European countries who have come to observe the impacts of emerging EU border management apparatuses on the ground.

## **Outline of the dissertation**

To recap, this dissertation examines changes over time in the cross-border relations and mobility practices and their impacts on the old us-them distinctions along the Greek-Turkish borderland. The aim here is to understand whether and how the notions of national territory and

national citizenship are reconsidered through local practices as the border has become an external border of the EU. This endeavour reveals states' power over space and people in the face of changing terms of sovereignty.

The next chapter introduces the conceptual tools used throughout the dissertation, based on a critical engagement with previous studies on citizenship, borders and regimes. These inquiries lead me towards developing the concept of *regime of bordering* as a new epistemological tool in order to better grasp the dynamic notion of citizenship that is shaped by various forms of mobilities and interactions across state borders.

In Chapter Three, I describe how the national regime of bordering, which reached its peak with Turkey's military operation in Cyprus in 1974, affected the Thracian borderland. Building on chapter three on militarization of the border in the aftermath of 1974, chapters from four to six unpack the changes in the three interrelated fields of security, economy and culture.

The Chapter Four on the security field portrays the absence of formal cross-border cooperation at the local level apart from the center-led network policing the border against the increasing numbers of transit migrants in the 2000s. Here I also disentangle the changes over the years in the actors of unauthorized border crossing and the perceived legitimacy of some of these unauthorized acts. Chapter Five on the economic field shows that, despite the lack of official schemes for regional development, both local state agents and nonstate actors' imaginations of the economic space have expanded beyond the state scale with acceleration and diversification of acts of cross-border mobility. Chapter Six on the cultural field illustrates that preservation of local cultural history and memory, as well as cross-border cultural mobilities and interactions in the Thracian borderlands, have persistently been contested. Some of these local practices recall the pre-nation-state imperial imaginations that rely on ethno-religious ties

whereas new and more inclusive configurations have recently been observed as well. The role of key brokers is proven to be important in building and maintaining economic and cultural contacts and in the reconfigurations of us-them distinctions.

In the concluding chapter, I first summarize key findings on the three dimensions, namely practices of local governance, cross-border mobility and othering, which crosscut these interrelated fields and make the “new” regime of bordering. Based on this analytical gaze, I return to the example of Tsipras and Davutoğlu presented at the beginning of this chapter. Finally I draw out the conceptual take away from this research.

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<sup>1</sup> As the data compiled by Vallet and David (2012) shows, between 1945 and 1991 there were 19 walls and barriers built all over the world and only 7 were added to the 13 walls that survived the Cold War between 1991 and 2001 whereas 28 walls were constructed after 9/11, including the one between Greece and Turkey. Vallet and David estimated that as of 2010, there were nearly 45 border walls which would soon be 48 (2012:112).

<sup>2</sup> Muslim-Turkish minority community calls “Western Thrace” the region in between two rivers, Evros River to the East and Nestos River to the West, whereas its administrative name is the East Macedonia and Thrace. In order to make it easier for the reader, I will refer to this region as “Greek Thrace.” The east of Evros River, from Edirne province in the West to Istanbul in the East and Canakkale in the South, is called “Thrace” by its inhabitants and is administratively part of the larger Marmara region. For the convenience of the reader, I will refer to the larger Edirne province as “Turkish Thrace.”

<sup>3</sup> Protestant or Catholics were not given the permission to leave Turkey on the grounds that they were not Orthodox whereas a group of Orthodox Arabs in Cilicia was expelled to Greece. Additionally, mass deportation of Albanian Muslims from Greece and of Orthodox Rumanians, Bulgars and Yugoslavs from Turkey was tried to be prevented through long negotiations (Planhoi cited in Andrews 1989: 30).

<sup>4</sup> According to 2008 report of Anagnostou and Triandafillydiou, the overall population of Thrace is 340,000. Yet there is no official census since the 1950s, thus estimates for the number of Muslim population ranges from 90,000 to over 120,000 while official accounts put it between 110,000-135,000. They follow Alexandris’ estimate for the year 1981 which is about 120,000, with 45% Turkish-speaking, 36% Pomaks and 18% Roma.

<sup>5</sup> Eventually, by the London and Zurich Agreements of 1959 and 1960, both Turkey and Greece, together with the former colonial ruler Britain, became the guarantor powers to preserve bi-communal consociationalism and independent state of the Republic of Cyprus proclaimed in 1960. This guarantorship became the source of further disputes, ever since.

<sup>6</sup> While some of them were residence permits holders based on 1930 dated residency agreement, most of them were *établis* (a term borrowed from French) according to the Lausanne Treaty, meaning already established in the Prefecture of Istanbul before October 30, 1918 and hence exempted from the population exchange (Akgönül 2007).

<sup>7</sup> This information is gathered and confirmed during my interviews with the Western Thracian Turks on both sides of the border as well as few Istanbul Greeks now living in Greek Thrace, including a correspondence with Simeon Soltaridis in Komotini, September 3, 2014. Many interviewees mentioned that only the members of the minority community lost their citizenship when they emigrate as guest workers. These people then mostly obtained the citizenship of the European countries they immigrated to.

<sup>8</sup> Heraclides further notes that these conflicts were a heavy drain on the economy of the two countries and turned Greece one of the most militarized countries in NATO and the EU. While Greece allocated 4.6 per cent of its GDP for defense in the period of 1988 and 2000, with a peak of 4.91 in 2003 and then 4.30 between 2005 and 2010, Turkey spend relatively less between 1990 and 2003 but later increased it to 5.3 per cent between 2004 and 2010

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(Heraclides 2011). It could be argued that the recent increase in the military budget of the two countries was also encouraged as more part of the global expansion of the military-industrial complex.

<sup>9</sup> For further details on these talks, see Heraclides (2011).

<sup>10</sup> The details of this Greece's National Intelligence Agency (EYP) operation to transfer Öcalan from Greece to South Africa via Kenya became soon available, three cabinet members and the chief of EYP resigned (Varouhakis 2009). Nevertheless, the Turkish opinion leaders in the mainstream media even today follows closely the key figures involved in this operation, specifically the army major and EYP officer Savvas Kalenteridis' past and future endeavours in order to prove Greeks as a continuing threat to national unity. For an early example see "PKK'nin paraları Atina Bankalarında" by Enis Berberoğlu (Hürriyet May 30, 1999) Available at <<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=-82533>> (Accessed January 2017). For a recent example see "MIT Yasası" by Yılmaz Özdil (Hürriyet April 20, 2014) Available at <<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/26258020.asp>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>11</sup> Of the six EU members that do not form part of the Schengen Area, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania are legally obliged to join the area and will eventually do so while the other two Ireland and the United Kingdom maintain opt-outs. Four non-members of the EU, but members of EFTA, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland participate in the Schengen Area.

<sup>12</sup> FRONTEX was established with the adoption of Council Regulation No 2004/2007 which was subsequently amended by Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 (Rijpma 2009). It is a Warsaw-based intelligence driven EU agency that is formed in 2004, with the ultimate aim of improving information coordination and dissemination efforts in the field of border security. As a public clearing house, it is composed through the integration of several centers (the Air Borders Center in Rome, the Center for Land Borders in Berlin, Maritime Borders Centers on Madrid and Piraeus, COLPOFOR and the Risk Analysis Center in Helsinki). In the field of border enforcement other complementary EU tools are the European-wide fingerprints database known as EURODAC and the EUROSUR, as a common border surveillance system. In addition to the several public clearing houses like FRONTEX (namely CIREA and CIREFI) that collect and disperse most of the information on the risk of immigration, van Munster (2009) points to a very crucial point: the increasing role the private actors (i.e. insurance and travel companies) that began to take in border control. Moreover, the notion of integrated management system defined in December 2006 JHA Council includes not only border control but also inter-agency cooperation and the fight against crime, which the Commission labelled altogether as "the EU Border Package" in February 2008.

<sup>13</sup> The new humanitarianism and the coexistence of moral sentiments together a hardened attitude to border policing, i.e. the tension between risk and rescue, is critically examined both as "humanitarian borders" in the context of Europe and specifically in Evros (Pallister-Wilkins 2015).

<sup>14</sup> This shift from land and sea could be seen in the table 2 of this report by Triandafyllidou (2015). Available at <<http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2015.pdf>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>15</sup> Information retrieved from Multeci-Der website, available at <<http://multeci.org.tr/haberdetay.aspx?Id=140>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>16</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, 31.07.2006, pp. 25-78. Available at <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006R1083&from=EN>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>17</sup> Initially in September 1980, the Association Council decided on the elimination of duties on primary agricultural products by 1 January 1987. However after the September 12, 1980 coup, the Community suspended relationships until 1986. When the Association Agreement had to be adopted in order to take account of the accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece, some transitional arrangements applied for a while for Spanish and Portuguese markets but not for Greek market. Available at <[http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-91-46\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-91-46_en.htm)> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>18</sup> According to this definition, the region of cross-border cooperation covers an area of 81.215 km<sup>2</sup> (the 17,6% and the 8,1% of total extent of Greece and Turkey respectively) and has a population of 8.100.753 (10,21% and 10,2% of countries respectively." The second meeting in Brussels resulted into the Common Program Document concerning four fields, namely infrastructure, economic development and employment, quality of life/environment/culture and technical assistance (cited in Ohtamış 2008).

<sup>19</sup> Information retrieved from Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Available at <<http://www.mfa.gr/en/blog/greece-bilateral-relations/turkey/>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>20</sup> The tension between AKP and Gülen movement reached a whole different level after the infamous coup attempt by a junta close to Fetullah Gülen on July 15 2016.

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<sup>21</sup> This is a personal story told by professor Hatzoupolos from Democritus University during our meeting in June 2014 in Alexandroupoli.

<sup>22</sup> Information available at <<http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/musminen.htm>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>23</sup> Information available at <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/bati-trakya-turk-azinligi.tr.mfa>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>24</sup> Information available at <[http://www.minelres.lv/reports/greece/greece\\_NGO.htm](http://www.minelres.lv/reports/greece/greece_NGO.htm)> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>25</sup> This was possible according to the 1981 law on military zones, article 5, which leaves the area of governance to the discretion of the Cabinet. Information available at <<http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.2565.pdf>> (Accessed January 2017).

The 2004 decision is confirmed by Edirne MPs speeches at the Parliament the same year. In 2004 Edirne MPs also request in the parliament for the customs in Enez Port which was used until 1980 to be reactivated in order to attract touristic boats coming to Alexandroupoli. As explained by the then CHP MP Necdet Budak, the distance between Alexandroupoli and Enez via Ipsala/ Kipi Customs is 150 km whereas the sea distance is only 20 km. Budak estimated that to reactivate the customs would create 3000-5000 jobs and revive the local economy tremendously. For details, see the parliamentary records available at <[https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak\\_B\\_SD.birlesim\\_baslangic?P4=11145&P5=B&page1=49&page2=49](https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak_B_SD.birlesim_baslangic?P4=11145&P5=B&page1=49&page2=49)> (Accessed January 2017).

With that decision, Saros Gulf, of which Enez is the westernmost point, was declared “Culture and Tourism Protection and Improvement Area” (Kültür ve Turizm Koruma ve Gelişim Bölgeleri”) based on the 2003 Tourism Promotion Law. The full list of places that are at different points declared protection and improvement area could be reached at the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Information available at <<http://yigm.kulturturizm.gov.tr/TR,9669/ktkgb-ve-turizm-merkezleri.html>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>26</sup> According to the American Anthropological Association’s 2004 statement on ethnography and institutional review boards: ‘Ethnography involves the researcher’s study of human behavior in the natural settings in which people live. Specifically, ethnography refers to the description of cultural systems or an aspect of culture based on fieldwork in which the investigator is immersed in the ongoing everyday activities of the designated community for the purpose of describing the social context, relationships and processes relevant to the topic under consideration’. See American Anthropological Association, ‘Statement on Ethnography and Institutional Review Boards’, adopted 4 June 2004. Available at <<http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/irb.htm>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>27</sup> I had been through Human Subjects Review process and received IRB approval as of November 17, 2013 and extended it for two years. Throughout the dissertation, I use pseudonyms for my interlocutors, except for few public figures who gave consent for the use of their real names.

## Chapter Two: Conceptual Tools

*“If important features of the territorial and institutional organization of the political power and authority of the state have changed, then we must consider that key features of the institution of citizenship- its formal rights, its practices, its subjective dimension- have also been transformed even when it remains centred on the national state.”*  
(Sassen 2006:306)

In this dissertation, I investigate how changes in the state-level relations between two countries, which formerly perceived each other as a “national threat,” shape the notions of territory and citizenship at the peripheries of the two states. At the empirical level, I explore what has happened with the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations in the peripheries of states that are immediate contact zones. To do that, (re)bordering practices of a multitude of state and nonstate actors over time are examined. (Re)bordering here implies the reconfigurations of existing practices of governance, cross-border mobilities, and othering in the peripheries of states. At the theoretical level, this study aims to understand how the prevalence of a postnational framework affects states’ sovereignty over space and people.

The mixed and merged bodies of literature informing this task are three fold: (a) citizenship studies in relation to minority, migration, security, and mobility studies; (b) studies on state sovereignty and borders; and (c) studies of regime analysis. These explorations stem from various disciplines, namely political science, sociology, anthropology, and geography, and they are mostly interdisciplinary due to the nature of their inquiries. They inform my analytical perspective on the notions of national territory and citizenship as (re)constructed and contested at the peripheries of Europeanizing nation-states as contact zones.

In the first section on citizenship, I show that studies along the national-postnational and security-citizenship nexus either focus too much on border control mechanisms or choose to study certain subject positions – some look at migrants as minorities, others as newcomers, and

very few consider the undocumented. I then demonstrate that mobility studies and its focus on the viewpoint of the moving subjects, together with scholars studying citizenship practices as acts and deeds rather than status, provide the conceptual starting point to study the various acts of cross-border mobility and their impact on the changing us-them distinctions, or hierarchies of otherness. Yet, my goal to analyze the changing limits of states' sovereignty over people *and* space, over a period of forty years, requires me to situate both the mobile subjects and actors of governance in the local context of states' peripheries. Therefore, in the next section on borders I turn to the established scholars of state theory and border studies. While both disentangle the notion of state sovereignty and state-society relations, the latter does so by zooming in on border regions as specific geographical configurations, thereby underlining the role of spatiality as much as temporality. In the last section on regimes, I study the impacts of a postnational framework in the peripheries of the two states by looking at the state of the art in studies of regime analysis; these consider the transformations in state-society relations as part and parcel of global political economic changes. I try to overcome state-centered analyses in Europeanization studies and the regime analyses developed by International Relations (henceforth IR) scholars, with the new dialogical approach in IR and ethnographic regime analysis approach in anthropology of migration.

### **On citizenship**

Studying changing limits of states' sovereignty over space and people requires being attentive to the varying degrees of rights that certain populations have, enjoy, and claim in a given polity. While previous scholarship at the intersections of minority and citizenship studies sheds light on the gaps in the use of rights among formal citizens in practice, those at the intersections of migration and citizenship focus on the gaps either between the citizens by birth

and those who transitioned from being migrants to citizens (see national and postnational citizenship section), or between citizens as a monolithic group and unauthorized newcomers (see security and citizenship section). I would argue that these are not either-or situations. As will be shown in the last section (acts of mobilities as acts of citizenship), a comprehensive analysis of all degrees of exclusion and othering, as well as the analysis of the conditions for change, are possible by paying attention to existing politics of mobility and fixity as well as any act/deed that creates a rupture in sociohistorical patterns. Yet, in order to grasp the changing meanings of territory as much as citizenship, both of which are central to my inquiry on the limits of state power, this mobility perspective needs to be complemented with a spatial focus on states' physical limits. This is the topic of the next section on borders.

### **National and post-national citizenship debates**

This section gives an overview of the citizenship studies focusing on limits of states' sovereignty over people, with a specific focus on the positions and rights of certain groups in a given polity, namely minorities and migrants. As Delanty (2000) notes, since Marshall's (1964) configuration of citizenship as a set of expanding rights, the focus of citizenship debates has shifted from market to state; since then, state-citizen relations have been the backbone of field citizenship studies. Yet the Marshallian understanding of the expansion of citizenship rights—the assumption that acquiring rights guarantees their enjoyment, and the expectation that social rights would function as a social integration mechanism to balance the unequal distribution of resources in capitalist societies—did not remain unchallenged (for a detailed critique see Hindess 2005).

Various comparative studies have been conducted to examine how different traditions of citizenship and nationhood determine specific articulations of rights and obligations for migrants

and for citizens (Bloemraad 2005, 2006; Brubaker 1992; Giugni and Passy 2004). However these studies mainly disregard the discrepancy between written laws and their practices. Some scholars following a Marxist contention show that access to full citizenship is differentiated in terms of social class for formal citizens (Holston 2008) and for migrants (Bosniak 2006). Others argue that citizenship is not only about integration but also about the preservation of group differences, hence a “politics of difference” as much as a “politics of equality” (Delanty and Rumford 2005). “Multicultural citizenship” (Kymlicka 1995) and “differentiated citizenship” (Young 1990) debates investigate the grounds on which the cultural rights of all socially disadvantaged groups could be protected and expanded. More and more scholars, however, underline the necessity to be occupied with changes in the society at large rather than merely focusing on distinct disadvantaged groups. They urge inquiry into various public discourses of exclusions and inclusions as socially shared beliefs (see edited volumes by Duyvendak et al. 2013 and Schrover & Schinkel 2013), and the ways in which new diversities brought by migration are received and governed in the host/receiving countries (see Vertovec 2007, 2010). Nevertheless, despite a consideration of transnational ties, studying inclusions/exclusions and diversities as practiced in national contexts takes states’ territorial sovereignty for granted and the nation-states as the unit of analysis.

Some scholars of nationalism and ethnicity draw attention to the interconnection between domestic and international politics and bring this connection to the fore as the very source of inclusions/exclusions, acceptable/unacceptable differences and diversities, especially among those holding formal citizenship in a given polity. These are studies focusing on the prevalence of a kin-state as the third actor in state-minority relations (Brubaker 1996; Fox 2007), the impact of previous colonial relations on how citizenship in the so-called mother country is differentially

enjoyed by “juridical” and “ethnic” citizens (Laarman 2012), or the presence of external political powers supporting a “non-core group” in a country where the ruling elite sees them as “unassimilated” (Mylonas 2012). Especially in the specific case of Greek-Turkish relations, several studies give due emphasis to the contemporary processes of democratization and expansion of minority rights under the EU framework (Akgönül 2009; Anastasakis et al. 2009; Grigoriadis 2011; Onar and Özgüneş 2010; Tsitselikis 2012). Regarding the connections between domestic and international politics, few scholars focus on the increasing role of postnational membership that is based on personhood and territorial presence and that allows “newcomers” to enjoy certain rights protected by the international human rights laws, regardless of national membership in the context of the EU (Soysal 1994) and the US (Bosniak 2006).

Nevertheless, similar to the aforementioned scholars who are concerned about certain classes and/or cultural groups’ access to full citizenship (Bosniak 2006; Holston 2008; Kymlicka 1995; Young 1990), the scholars who consider interconnection between domestic and international politics also remain focused on people who already secured residence rights. These individuals are part of clearly identifiable or predetermined communities, and are waiting and/or aspiring to perform some given social and/or cultural rights. In that sense, they do not offer conceptual tools to study the current, ever-exclusionary migration governing techniques that the core EU countries and the countries in the EU’s neighborhood, in this case Greece and Turkey, continue to develop in the face of migration “flows” towards the EU Schengen zone.

Therefore, none of the studies mentioned so far foresee the exclusionary measures taken towards people without permanent legal status, or the hierarchies of otherness between people with irregular/no legal status, migrants with permanent legal status, and minority citizens. This hierarchy, even in the present international human rights regime, which Soysal (1994) and

Bosniak (2006) see as the foundations of the postnational membership, has become all the more apparent with the growing discourse of “refugee crisis” in Europe. It has reached a whole new level when *some* EU citizens and civil society organizations are also criminalized by the Draft Council Conclusion of January 26, 2016 and the concomitant national legislation in Greece, which penalize humanitarian assistance of European citizens and, by doing so, fail to abide by international obligation (Gkliati 2016). Therefore, ‘acceptable citizenship practices’ are renegotiable and the aforementioned studies ignore this dynamism intrinsic to the notion of citizenship in the “receiving”/“host” country contexts, as elsewhere.

Numerous critical scholars of post-national citizenship argue precisely for a more dynamic understanding of state-society relations in receiving societies that are in conjunction with the global transformations in governance and markets. To name a few, McNevin’s (2006) analysis of migrants’ rights claims in western countries; Mandel’s (2008) two decades of ethnography on cosmopolitan Berlin; Sassen’s (2006) identification of the new “global classes” with “denationalized citizenship,” namely professional elites, networks of government officials, activists, and low-wage migrant workers; Ong’s (1999) portrayal of the “flexible citizenship” of Chinese entrepreneurs in the US; and Glick Schiller’s (2005) description of migrants as “transborder” citizens all exemplify renegotiations of the core elements of the national selves and structures that are increasingly embedded in transnational social fields. However, despite their attention to global transformations and the diminishing association between states’ territorial governance and citizenship, scholars of what I just grouped as post-national citizenship also mostly disregard the experiences of many people with precarious legal status on the edge of deportability (see de Genova 2002, 2013; Calavita 2005; Coutin 2011) and the way their acts of border-crossing are met at the wall-like borders of the nation-states and the EU.

In sum, whether and how the growing number of people who arrive at the states' borders, or who are newcomers with a precarious or no legal status, experience and transform the notions of “postnational”/“denationalized”/“flexible”/“transborder”/“cosmopolitan” citizenship remain unanswered in post-national inquires as well as studies occupied with national citizenship. It is scholars who look at citizenship practices in the face of securitization of borders that fix this shortcoming. On that note, I turn to the growing literature at the intersections of security and citizenship.

### **Security and citizenship**

This section looks at previous work that examines the recent securitization of migration and meticulously demonstrates the impact of securitizing discourses about and practices towards the “unwanted” subjects. Hence they draw attention to the hierarchies of otherness stemming from the new mechanisms of border control that the national and postnational citizenship studies mostly disregard. However, this perspective is still not sufficient to understand the multiplicity of mobility practices across the Greek-Turkish border; it either remains solely occupied with the control function of the new border regimes or it does not consider the impacts of authorized mobility practices on (de)securitization processes.

The concept of securitization has been an established term in academic circles to analyse European and North American politics, especially in the 2000s. In the early works of securitization theory scholars, referred to as the Copenhagen School, securitization is perceived as an elite practice of governmentality based on speech acts of political elites (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver, 2002). Their conceptualization rests on the Schmittian understanding of politics that sharply distinguishes between friends and enemies, and they read security politics as the process of producing existential threats that then justify exceptional measures. As securitization is

defined in opposition to normal politics, unmaking it or desecuritization of an issue implies a retrieval of the conditions of ‘normal politics’ (see Buzan et al. 1998: 29). While the normal politics implied by this securitization framework is liberal democracy, the definition of it remains unclear.

Other scholars, mostly referred to as the Paris School of critical security studies, are suspicious of the explanatory power of the distinction between exceptional and non-exceptional measures in today’s management of unease. They criticize securitization theory for falling short of grasping the everyday formation and development of new security issues and politics expressed in transnationally shared bureaucratic expertise (Aradau, 2004; Aradau et al. 2008; Bigo, 2002, 2005; Neal, 2009; Walters 2006; 2010) and beyond the nation-state’s realm of governance (Huysmans, 2006; Petersen, 2008; Rasmussen, 2006). In other words, for them the common patterns in the management of unease cannot be explained within the confines of national politics. (For concise and critical assessments of the development of early critical security studies and ensuing debates see C.A.S.E 2006 and Gad & Petersen 2011.)

The contemporary governmentality of the mistrust and fear of the “uninvited other,” as coined by Bigo (2002), leads to securitization of migration through the language of risk and with a proactive logic. Such risk-based governance is observed in the moral economy of compassion and repression in French public discourses and practices articulated by helping undocumented migrants in need without supporting their right to asylum (Fassin 2005); in the common EU response to migration, security, and borders through hardening of tools of control and management (Neal 2009; van Munster 2009); and in exterritorializing border controls and policing the potential border-crossers at a distance (Bigo 2002; Bigo and Guild 2005; Walters 2010) as well as at the actual sites of border crossings (Andersson 2014; Fassin 2011; Geiger and

Pécoud 2010; Hess and Kasparek 2010; Huysmans 2000; Hyndman 2012; Jansen et al. 2014; Papadopoulos et al. 2008; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Mountz 2010; Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011; Topak 2014; van Reekum 2016).

However, as Guillaume and Huysmans (2013) rightfully state, although critical security studies have analysed how security practices constitute domination and subordination, political authority, political identity, and boundaries of communities, they mostly overlooked the fact that “security apparatuses operate within sites and situations where political beings have the ability to contest, negotiate, struggle over, or twist these apparatuses and their governmental practices” (2013:9). Their almost exclusive focus on the elite discourses, experts, and technological governances has led to de-politicizing the nature of security practices and disregarding the people who, rather than only being acted upon, act and “create moments in which securitized/-ing sites and situations become political again” (2013:22). Very recently, prominent ethnographical works on the African route to Europe (Andersson 2014a, 2014b) and the Mediterranean and Aegean (Dijstelbloem et al. forthcoming; van Reekum 2016) overcome this problem by drawing attention to the actual encounters between border patrols and the border-crossers as the moments when the realization of securitized border policies becomes a political act. The ethnographic accounts that I provide in Chapter Four support these recent contributions.

As a complement to Guillaume and Huysmans’ recent critique of depoliticization from a citizenship perspective, it is also possible to argue that both wings of critical security studies often disregard the more profound implications of global transformations and the long durée that feed into the production and governance of risk and threat. As some scholars already underline, despite the severe impacts of 9/11 and the so-called “fight against terror” on securitization of migration and borders, securitization in the EU context goes back to the abolishment of the

internal border control (Balibar 2004; Huysmans 2006; Guillaume and Huysmans 2013) and, in general, to the already existing neoliberal global order that simultaneously tightens and eases border controls. This is achieved through e-borders privileging the movement of economically desirable bodies (Rygiel 2010), “stabilizing system of dams” to regulate migrant labor (Mezzadra 2011: 131), and hence separating profitable movements from those who are not (Bigo 2007; Boswell 2007; Sparke 2009). In a similar vein, Walters (2015) criticizes the presentist focus of much governmentality scholarship on migration and calls for inscribing migration research in genealogies of postcolonial government.

Few migration scholars are concerned with the changing notion of citizenship in relation to subjugated migrants with precarious legal status, enacting themselves as political subjects. They are the ones who try to situate the current practices of securitization in a larger context of globalization, and who put in historical perspective how securitization works for different social groups in different contexts. These scholars draw attention to the contestations that the new governmentalities trigger in the context of the EU, USA, Canada, and Australia as well as the transnationalizing and internationalizing techniques governing insecurities, namely the international organization of detention centres and the regulation of border controls across states (McNevin 2012; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Nyers 2008; Rygiel 2010; Squire 2011). Thus they show that once the dynamic notion of citizenship and acts of rights-claiming are included in the analytical gaze through which the conduct of bureaucrats and/or political elites are examined, one grasps what securitization actually *does*. Hence, these previous studies looking at the securitization process through the lens of citizenship and rights struggles are either directly built on or follow a similar approach to Isin’s theorization of “acts of citizenship.” According to that approach, citizenship is not a membership but “a relation that governs the conduct of (subject)

positions that constitute it (...) conduct across social groups all of which constitute a body politic” (Isin 2009:371); it sees “acts of citizenship” as ruptures in the habitus that “create a scene” with no predetermined qualities (Isin 2009: 379-380; Isin 2008, 2012).

In a similar vein, Huysmans and Guillaume (2013) call for a careful look at political possibilities created by the rights claims of people with or without formal citizenship, in order to address the lack of emphasis on the political in many works of securitization of migration mentioned above. Their suggestion of an “analytics of the interstitial between security and citizenship” foregrounds citizenship as a practice of negotiating, configuring, and enacting political being in securitizing moments and sites. For them, analytics of the interstitial:

(...) [M]akes the relation between security and citizenship conjunctive and disjunctive at the same time (...) [They] work in conjunction to reinforce subjugations and alienations (...) also work disjunctively through practices of citizenship, enacting new modes of political being that disrupt the securitizing of citizenship and the alienations (2013: 28).

Hence epistemologically, Huysmans and Guillaume include the “excluded” people as political subjects enacting rights and claims to justice which, from the perspective of mainstream political science and sociology scholars, may be dismissed as unsuccessful, limited, or exceptional cases. This goal is also present in Papadopoulos et al.’s (2008) *Escape Routes*, where they analyse techniques of policing cross-border mobility as responses to the “autonomy of migration.” They argue it is “the social and political movement in the literal sense of the words, not as a mere response to economic and social malaise,” and therefore escape and autonomous migrant actions come before practices of control (2008:202).

The interstice between security and citizenship, which Huysmans and Guillaume (2013) identify, is indeed helpful to analyze the processes not only governing mobility across the borders but also governing diversity within the territorial borders of states. There is a stimulating

debate between Roe (2004, 2006) and Jutila (2006) on what securitization does to the minority communities, if and what kind of desecuritization strategies may be applied to overcome the securitization of minorities. On the one hand, Roe (2004) argues that the best strategy for “desecuritization” is to try managing the dynamics of minority situations, by mitigating, ameliorating, and not transcending societal security dilemmas. On the other hand, Jutila calls for reconstructivist thinking for desecuritizing minority rights by “incorporat[ing] the question of minority rights in the quest for an alternative founding of the political community” (2006: 179). Yet in their attempt to develop earlier theories of desecuritization, neither Roe nor Jutila consider the affect of existing citizenship regimes in the processes of managing or reconstructing minority, as they both disregard the role of specific philosophies of integration aimed towards different social groups (see Diez and Squire 2008; Favell 1998; Mylonas 2012).

Gianni’s (2013) analysis of the integration of Muslims in Switzerland seems to fill this void by looking at the securitization of Islam and Muslims from the perspective of the interstice between security and citizenship. As Gianni (2013) argues, the Swiss philosophy of integration has, over the last decade, emphasized individual willingness to integrate; as a result, social representations, manifested in the construction of minarets, have turned all members of Swiss society associated with Islam into “a collective (Muslim) Other” and a threat to be thwarted (Gianni 2013: 217-18). Through this securitizing process, alternative ways to be political and forms of contestation are hierarchized and even delegitimized, which, he argues, may contribute to the radicalization of immigrant communities and reinforce their opposition to the majority. Although Gianni does not explicitly claim so, his consideration of the majority public view and the securitized minority community calls our attention to the fact that discourses and acts of

securitization and desecuritization take place in a Bourdieusian relational field. Here, actors adjust their positions according to the power they hold relative to other prevailing actors.

In a nutshell, these studies looking at what Huysmans and Guillaume (2013) call the interstitial politics from the perspective of either mobile newcomers (Papadopoulos et al. 2008) or established minorities (Gianni 2013) show that they are active agents vis-a-vis securitizing discourses and practices. As such, recalling Isin and Nielsen's (2008) "acts of citizenship," their responses to securitizing moves may stimulate ruptures of some sort in the established habitus. However, my inquiry about the limits of states' power over both space and people requires me to consider the impact of securitizing moves on *all* subjects moving in and across the Thracian borderland, be they state or nonstate actors, members of minority or majority communities, authorized or unauthorized border-crossers. Hence, by starting from the vantage point of all *moving* subjects of a given space, I take a slightly different perspective than scholars concerned with the security-citizenship interstitial. This perspective allows me to study governmentality practices in relation to the changing definitions of security and threat by looking primarily at locally-situated acts of citizenship that are driven by increasing cross-border mobility practices along the Thracian borderland. By doing that, I can disclose the ways in which various formal and informal acts of mobilities contribute to or challenge both the emerging techniques of governmentality, and the new, nuanced hierarchies and parameters of otherness in the ongoing Europeanization process of Greek-Turkish relations, minority rights, and migration regimes in both countries.

From this perspective, in Chapter Three, I depict local responses to the securitization of the minority situation in Thrace and its lasting affects in the region. In Chapter Four, I portray the more contemporary politics of securitizing irregular migrants almost simultaneously with the

deseuritization of the minority situation. I discuss that these changes in the relational field of security are a by-product of Europeanization of the interstitial space between security and citizenship in both Greek and Turkish contexts. I also consider this change in the security field in relation to the “neoliberalizing citizenship” (Sparke 2009) that governs mobilities of desirable and undesirable populations. What Mezzadra calls (2011:131) “stabilizing system of dams” then manifests itself in the accelerating spatial mobility of formal members/citizens of the two states, together with Greek-Turkish joint control over irregular migrants from third countries and outlawed Turkish citizens. Hence this ethnography of the Thracian borderlands demonstrates that these new mobility and fixity practices are (re)bordering the old hostile us-them distinctions, which earlier led to the exclusion of minorities in each other’s land, this time by securitizing a new population. On that note, in the next section I look at previous studies at the intersections of mobility and citizenship.

### **Acts of mobilities as acts of citizenship**

This part shows that the mobility studies’ emphasis on the vantage point of the moving subject, as well as the relationship between politics of mobility and fixity, are crucial to our understanding of the dynamic notion of citizenship that is, recalling Isin (2009: 371), “a relation that governs the conduct of (subject) positions that constitute it.”

In the first issue of the *Mobilities* journal, Hannam et al. (2006:9-10) identify the growing research field of mobilities as encompassing “studies of corporeal movement, transportation and communications infrastructures, capitalist spatial restructuring, migration and immigration, citizenship and transnationalism, and tourism and travel.” The “new mobilities paradigm” (Hannam et al. 2006; Sheller and Urry 2006) is built on the previous theoretical suggestions that the focus of sociological analysis should turn away from fixed sites and categories such as

society, community, and field, to mobilities, flows, and links that transcend their borders and boundaries (Appadurai 1996, Urry 2000). However, against their almost exclusive focus on flows and the “people on the move” in Urry’s words (2007)—from migrants and refugees to businesspeople and tourists—Cunningham and Heyman (2004: 293) point at a “mobilities-enclosure continuum” and argue that “much of what we will say about mobility can be deduced from the fact that mobility is conceptually the inverse of enclosure.”

Further critiques from within the mobilities paradigm pay attention to this mobility-fixity tension without posing it as a dichotomy; they urge us to be attentive to the specific form of the mobilities under investigation and hence to consider the *politics* of mobilities and their unevenness (Allon 2004; Ballinger 2012; Cresswell 2010; Kalir 2013; Rogaly 2015). These empirical studies look at the mobility-fixity tension in a given space that is embedded in the global political economic order. Yet some are concerned primarily with international mobility, whereas others are careful not to prioritize it in studying people’s relations with the places they move in and out of.

Scholars focusing on international mobility are keen on the relations between mobility and experiences of place-making in new destinations. For example, in his study of the construction and consumption of tourist spaces in Sydney, Allon (2004) pinpoints the juncture of traveling and dwelling that is manifested in the conflict between backpackers and travelers: working holiday makers (WHM) on the one hand, and local places and residents on the other. Allon also underlines that promotion of WHM happens at a time when the Australian government is spending millions of dollars on coastal surveillance to deter arrival of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant workers, labelling them as invaders, illegals, and potential criminals. These two groups, as Allon (2004: 61) nicely puts it, belong to the same system of

global movement that privileges some forms of voluntary mobility while punishing the forced, involuntary mobility of others. Similarly, Lindquist (2009) studies mobilities into and through the Indonesian island of Batam as a contact zone in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle; he shows how certain channels facilitate or constrain movement and how particular groups of people, in this case Indonesian mobile underclass subjects, configure in only particular circuits of mobility. Lindquist (2009) specifically points out that Indonesian migrants' movement takes place not only across nation-state borders but also across emotional boundaries, such as being away from home, being unauthorized/being out of place, and a feeling of not living up to the standards of "home."

On the other hand, scholars, who are careful not to prioritize international mobility over other forms of mobility, are particularly keen on situating the experiences of international mobility in their subjects' life trajectories. Kalir's (2013) ethnography of Chinese migrant workers in Israel is a case in point. Kalir (2013) gives special attention to the fact that migrants define their presence in Israel as a stepping-stone, as do the moving subjects in Lindquist's ethnography of Batam. For Kalir (2013), the reason for this international bias lies in the pervasiveness of "methodological nationalism," as coined by Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003), in shaping our research locations, populations, and questions in such a way that mobility *across* national borders is accepted as the most significant (cf. King and Skeldon 2010; Rogaly 2015). In a similar vein, Notar (2008) criticizes the common assumption of cosmopolitanism as being embodied in persons who are metropolitan, mobile, and consumers. In his ethnography of a borderland town in the Himalayan foothills of China, Notar (2008) shows that people who are immobile, like ethnic minority café owners, may also emerge as cosmopolitan subjects; their "continuous openness" to the world, manifested in their interest to learn several languages as

well as creating a cosmopolitan atmosphere in their cafés, is driven by their motivation to attract transnational tourists. As Notar also notes, while doing that, the café owners do not distance themselves from their ethnic and religious ties at their localities, hence proving that cosmopolitanism and other forms of identification are not mutually exclusive.

I think Kalir's and Notar's call for not limiting our understanding of the politics of mobility-fixity to international mobilities complements nicely Ballinger's (2012) and Cresswell's (2010) stress on the importance of analysing mobilities and enclosures as interrelated processes. As Ballinger (2012: 399) argues, "different state and economic regimes may instantiate divergent perceptions and experiences of time among displacees and stayees" at any given context. Her examples of the mobile "natives" and immobile "colonials" in postcolonial Libya challenge, in her words, both the sedentarist assumptions that "valorize emplacement" and their critiques claiming that "cosmopolitan intellectuals promoting anti-sedentarist approaches necessarily endorse elite visions" (2012: 402). Similarly, Cresswell's (2010) mesotheoretical approach to politics of mobility also stays tuned to the politics of fixity. To disentangle this relationship for each particular case of mobility, Cresswell finds it necessary to ask the following questions: why does a person or a thing move? (motive force); how fast does a person or a thing move? (velocity); in what rhythm does a person or a thing move? (rhythm); what route does it take? (route); how does it feel? (experience); when and how does it stop? (friction). In that sense, all four authors warn us to be cautious of our assumptions about motivations of mobile/immobile subjects.

Mobility scholars who prioritize international mobility in understanding people's relations with the places they live and move into/out of add a new twist to some citizenship scholars who give attention to politics of mobility and struggles for mobility as much as control

in the cities, borders, or more generally borderzones as dispersed multi-dimensional sites (for example Mezzadra 2011; McNevin 2012; Isin and Nielsen 2008; Papadopoulos et al. 2008; Sparke 2009; Squire 2011; Rygiel 2010). This is a methodological twist that favors the viewpoint of the mobile subjects and takes the perceptions of one's own spatial movements seriously. Once we, in Kalir's words, "bring in the state as people experience it" (2013: 325), we can then see a very different image of the state: a state "struggle[ing]...with maintaining the hegemonic idea that crossing international borders constitute the most significant type of human mobility in our world" (2013: 312). This perspective allows us to overcome the statist ontology that exists even among the many critical citizenship scholars mentioned above.

In my investigation of the changing limits of state sovereignty over space and the people along the Greek-Turkish border, I question the politics of mobility-fixity from the viewpoint of the mobile subjects. In doing so, I give special attention to encounters between various subjects' positions as these are the moments of "being Political" (see Isin 2002) and the moments where new "acts of citizenship" come into being (see Isin and Nielsen 2008). The following quote from Isin's introduction to *Being Political*, clarifies the endeavor:

The closure theories that define citizenship as a space of privilege for the few that excludes others neglect a subtle but important aspect of citizenship: that it requires the constitution of these others to become possible (...) The logics of alterity embody differentiation and distinction, not as strategies of exclusion, but as strategies of elective affiliation, recognition, incorporation, and congregation. (2002:4, 25)

For Isin (2002), being political is that moment when a being constitutes itself as a subject of justice; a subject making a claim and articulating it from *a* position of citizen, stranger, outsider or alien as distinct forms of otherness that make citizenship itself possible. Their modes of being political and their relationship, which involves the conduct of conduct, or the government of the self and the other, can be solidaristic (affiliation, sociation, identification),

agonistic (conflict, competition, resistance, tension), or alienating (exclusion, estrangement, oppression, expulsion) (2002:31). Through these different modes and forms, political beings are constituted in different subject positions as not necessarily intentional but purposive (Isin 2002, 2005).

“Acts of citizenship” are then understood as deeds that disrupt habitus; create new possibilities; claim rights; shift established practices, status, and order; or rupture the socio-historical patterns (Isin and Nielsen 2008:11). Hence acts of citizenship are to be studied by looking at various subjects’ everyday deeds and as specific configurations of forms and modes of being political in a relational field at a historical moment. For Isin, this is the city. Yet he deliberately argues that the city, as the site where acts take place, is not a container but a space that works as a “difference machine.” As such, city is not equal to urban in his view, it is more than that:

The city is neither a background to these struggles against which groups wager, nor is it a foreground for which groups struggle for hegemony. Rather, the city is the battleground through which groups define their identity, stake their claims, wage their battles, and articulate citizenship rights, obligations, and principles (Isin 2002: 283–284).

In this view, the territoriality and the sovereignty of the state is performed and invented through the “city” where groups encounter each other, orient towards each other and take positions. As Isin says, “even a territorial border as a state border can never come into existence without there being a city, or a web of cities, that organizes, assembles and produces it. It just simply cannot be there” (2005: 386). Following Isin, it is possible to think of borders as part of this web of relations and as a venue of the battleground where political beings enact and, through these acts of citizenship, the idea of inclusion relentlessly produces exclusions.

Hence I investigate people's involvement in the governance of cross-border mobilities and cross-border interactions in Thrace, the peripheries of the two nation-states, in the same way Isin approaches the encounters in the city as a difference machine. While doing that, I stay attuned to the politics of mobility *and* fixity that, as elaborated by the critiques from within the new mobilities paradigm (namely by Ballinger, Cresswell, Kalir, and Notar), is manifested in various motivations, representations, and experiences of travelling and dwelling depending on the particular kinds of mobile subjects and practices. From this perspective, local citizens' passive acceptance of "illegal" cross-border mobility of irregular migrants in Thracian borderland gains meaning as acts of citizenship: not justice in the sense of fighting for the irregular migrants' rights to the city, but rather as a vernacular, pragmatic performative justice in the form of turning a blind eye to or "helping" unauthorized crossings. Similarly, it is possible to interpret as acts of citizenship these cross-border cooperation activities that are initiated by local nonstate actors in Greek and Turkish Thrace, as well as silencing local memories of nationalist reflexes and rendering them passé. After all, such local acts emerge as moments of learning to subversively build cross-border ties,<sup>1</sup> (re)framing forms of acceptable mobilities as well as desirable and/or undesirable cross-border travelers. These acts, as shown in the following chapters, emerge despite the fact that the old us-them distinctions and politics of fixity are sometimes deliberately maintained and sometimes carelessly reproduced by national state and nonstate actors in the political centres.

In sum, critical citizenship literature at the intersections of security, migration, and globalization helps us consider outsiders, aliens, and minorities as constitutive actors of the contemporary manifestations of citizenship. Yet it is the critical scholars of the new mobilities paradigm who take the perspective of the moving subject as the starting point of their analysis

and at the same time do not take for granted international migration as the most significant form of mobility. Therefore, in my investigation of the limits of state power over space and the people, I combine the tools of the two perspectives. This combination makes me cautious in not automatically valuing acts of crossing *national* borders over other spatial movements. I am also careful not to overvalue the governing capacities of states, or else empires and republics, which are, in Isin's (2005: 385) words, "hypostatized, fetishized and ontologized as real entities but in fact are performances enacted through the city" (cf. Migdal 2001; Mitchell 1991; Scott 1998).

Yet, my goal to analyze the changing limits of states' sovereignty over people *and* space, over a period of forty years, requires me to situate both the mobile subjects and actors of governance first in the local context of states' peripheries (in the next section on borders) and then in the regional processes of change, namely Europeanization as well as globalization of neoliberal political economic order (in the last section on regimes).

## **On borders**

This section focuses on the previous scholarship that questions, in different ways, the obviousness of the state-territory-sovereignty link that the Westphalian system of modern states is assumed to set as the overarching principle of the global order. In the first part I examine critical works that unpack the notion of state and show the co-existence of multiple sources of power within the territorial borders of a given modern state. In the second part, I delve into recent interventions in border studies that, in the same line with some scholars of state sovereignty, give due emphasis to the multiplicity of actors involved in bordering practices and prove wrong the assumption of a given state-territory-sovereignty link.

## **Borders of state sovereignty**

In the coming section, I portray different perspectives on state, sovereignty, and center-periphery tensions. Prominent scholars of state and sovereignty share the view that sovereignty in modern states, colonial or otherwise, is an *effect* of practices that make such structures appear to exist. They also contend that states' territorial control is highly uneven; patchy, in most cases; shaped in relationship to available local strongmen or key brokers as mediators; and always contested and in the making (Agnew 1994, 2005; Brown 2010; Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Migdal 2001, 2004; Mitchell 1991; Scott 1998). The involvement of many actors in legal and illegal activities and local decisions pertaining to border control, from civilians/borderlanders to bureaucrats, soldiers and police, indeed undermines any possibility of a unified and consolidated image of state sovereignty; this often causes a mismatch between what the sovereign aspires to do and what happens in reality. Many call for careful scrutiny of states' attempts to build and maintain coherent images, and for bearing in mind that nation-states, as the effect of all these processes of domination, control, and resistance, are not the natural and self-evident centers of sovereignty. Rather, they are one among several sovereign bodies that try to assert themselves upon territory and the bodies of mobile subjects and that are sometimes utilized by them (Brown 2010; Hindess 2005; Migdal 2004; Mitchell 1991; Rygiel 2010; Ong 2006; Schinkel 2009; Sparke 2009).

Despite the incoherence between image and practices of sovereign powers, and the fact that state authorities are not the sole sources of power, state actors' claims and actions for territorial control are a phenomenon that requires careful scrutiny. In their seminal work *Empire*, Hardt and Negri (2000) define the contemporary emerging global form of sovereignty as a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule. Contrary to this, Hindess (2005) argues that territorial boundaries remain at the heart of the emerging global order, which shows more

similarities than discontinuities with the earlier imperial world order. Similarly, Brown (2010: 81) draws attention to the fact that the emerging twenty-first-century walls are responses not to international invasions by other state powers but to transnational economic, social, and religious flows that do not have the force of political sovereignty behind them. Ironically, then, the larger historically specific context of declining state sovereignty indeed generates the material and psychological meaning and effects of walls in many places. Yet, drawing on the violence that surrounds borderlands as peripheral spaces, and border struggles across various geographical scales, Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) suggest focusing on the mechanisms of differential inclusion and the temporality as much as spatiality of movement to grasp transformations in citizenship, state and capital today.

This dissertation tests these assertions as I try to understand to what extent the new transnational flows, and the responses to them, lead the way for reconsideration of old sovereign conflicts between two nation-states and the old us-them distinctions. By comparing the local effects of the new governing practice derived from the Europeanization of border control—through construction of a fence and deployment of Frontex along the Greek-Turkish border—with the previously militarized form of border control against each other’s army and the people, I try to capture the continuities and ruptures with what Malkki (1992) calls “national order of things.”

It is widely accepted that contemporary territorial borders of sovereignty, and more specifically the new constructions of walls and barriers simultaneously with fast track passages, must be examined from the perspective of people as well as states, and in terms of their symbolic and affective representations (Brown 2010; Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Migdal 2004; Navarro-Yashin 2005, 2012; Sparke 2004, 2009; Rygiel 2010). Actual borders are seen as sites where

one's affective and bureaucratic ties to a state are, in Sparke's (2004: 280) words, "worked out and written out in space," hence where the disarticulations of the nation-state could be easily examined. Navaro-Yashin's (2005) ethnography in the Turkish side of divided Cyprus clearly shows that waning state sovereignty generated various affects, at the time of deepening economic crisis and bilateral talks about opening few gates at the border for the first time in the early 2000s. Most importantly, the militarized border between Greek and Turkish Cyprus, and the sovereign attempts to maintain it, leave marks on people's conscious and unconscious worlds. These marks then become "borders on the imagination" of political subjects, including the ones who are very critical of the self-proclaimed, Turkey-supported, Turkish-Cypriot governing authorities. Due to these "borders on the imagination," people express feelings of unease about being outside the designated area or ease within the political entity they were brought up in (2005: 115). Similarly I look closely at the role of historical relationships between Greek and Turkish states as two sovereign bodies, as well as the involvement of the EU, in the process of territorial control. More specifically I examine the marks left as the "borders on the imagination" of state and nonstate actors in the Thracian borderland, and the affects they generate in their imaginations and motivations regarding cross-border cooperation and mobility.

However, such affective ties surely depend on the position of the actors in the relational field of power, and each actor holds multiple affective ties simultaneously. In his introduction to *Boundaries and Belonging*, Migdal (2004) identifies multiple checkpoints (sites and practices that enforce separation between group members and non-members) and mental maps (cognitive ideas and meanings people attach to spatial configurations and groupings) overlapping one another for every political subject. Migdal then argues that a border guard, who is party to a smuggling circuit, may possibly have a mental map that is evoked by this smuggling circuit

preceding the state map during actual practices of border control and border crossings. Similarly, a judge may use kinship or racial prejudice as criteria to dictate the court's ruling, or a state official simply may not carry out court's order depending on the mental maps that are evoked by specific cases at hand (Migdal 2004:20). In that sense, as much as the strict territorial controls impose certain "borders on the imagination" and shape people's affective ties to the state, state sovereignty is always open to contestations even by the very actors that are thought to construct and maintain it.

Furthermore, as some scholars argue, stricter practices of territorial control may not offer a solution to the states' waning sovereignty problem but may rather intensify the criminality and violence that it purports to repel. This leads to reconfigurations of the position of actors who are part of territorial control apparatus and who are involved in border crossing activity (Andreas 2000; Brown 2010; Migdal 2004; Nevins 2002; van Schendel 2005). As Brown (2010: 97) underlines, the neoliberal political rationality pits security against economy, presumes autonomy of the political and the economic in order to maintain states' waning sovereignty, and, by doing that, erases the strong distinction between criminal and legal entrepreneurial activity embodied in the proliferation of migrant and drug-smuggling industry and escalating levels of violence from drug gangs during the course of the fifteen years of U.S.-Mexico fortification. In their introduction to the edited volume titled *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things*, Abraham and van Schendel (2005) raise similar concerns about how the distinction between what states consider to be legitimate ("legal") and what people involved in transnational networks consider to be legitimate ("licit") is blurred in the current public discourses about terrorism, security and all sorts of "illegal" border crossing activity:

(...)illegality is a form of meaning that is produced as an outcome of the effect of a criminalized object moving between political, cultural, social and economic

spaces. Illegality becomes a feature of this movement (...) What determines legality and illegality at different points of the commodity chain is the particular regulatory scale the object finds itself (...) Based on this criterion, we find it useful to distinguish between political (legal and illegal) and social (licit and illicit) origins of regulatory authority (Abraham and van Schendel 2005: 16-17).

In that sense, Abraham and van Schendel's distinction of il/legality and il/licitness follows Heyman and Smart's call for open-minded studies of state-illegality relations in order to "transcend the stultifying assumption that states always uphold the law" (1999:1). Additionally, similar to Migdal's depiction of overlapping mental maps and checkpoints, Abraham and van Schendel (2005) also note that definitions of what is illicit and illegal are always situational and that there is no such thing as fixity and singularity of "crime" itself.

van Schendel (2005) also seems to complement the critical scholars of the mobility paradigm mentioned above, as he studies flows of goods and people in borderlands from the perspective of the "transporters" of unauthorized goods or persons. For him, the intermingling and overlapping of various legal and illegal flows, and the networking around the border reveal how people "scale" the world they live in. The state scale may be the most important but not the hegemonic scale in the cognitive maps of the borderlanders, be they state or nonstate actors. van Schendel (2005) then identifies three types of scale, specifically in the borderlands as the peripheries of the states, that are relevant for state and nonstate actors of the borderlands: "scales-we-almost-lost" (pre-border web of relations), "state scale" (web of relations that comes with the border and is confined to the national territory), and the "border-induced scale" (cross-border webs of relations that spring up because of the border's existence) (2005: 56). The coexistence of these multiple scales leads to the politics of scales in the borderlands, manifested in clashes between borderland actors experiencing and imposing different scales in organizing everyday life.

Therefore, in addition to Migdal's stress on the overlaps of multiple checkpoints and mental maps, and Navaro-Yashin's description of the "borders on the imagination," this dissertation is inspired also by van Schendel's call to study the "politics of scale" in the borderlands to capture the centre-periphery tensions and to pay attention to the perspective of borderland actors. Here, I investigate, in Andreas' (2000) terms, the "border games" in the Greek-Turkish Thracian borderland that take place in different fields of contestations and negotiations among state and nonstate actors over cross-border cooperation and mobilities. I further argue that in the case of center-periphery tensions at the Greek-Turkish border, the Europeanization process adds a new postnational dimension to people's borders on the imagination, checkpoints and mental maps, and the politics of scale. In order to grasp the nuances in the impacts of postnational scale of governance on the local encounters at the states' peripheries, I look at social perceptions of il/licitness as well as official configurations of il/legality in the old and new cross-border mobility and cooperation practices along the Greek-Turkish borderlands.

As shown in the next part, critical debates on bordering/debordering/rebordering, with a focus on Europeanization of national borders, complement the theoretical approaches to state sovereignty presented here that are mostly concerned with how sovereignty is perceived, embodied, and practiced by state and nonstate actors. It is essential to note here that these two debates on the limits of state sovereignty and bordering are crucial, not because they underline the uniqueness of the peripheries/margins of the states but because they identify borders (a) as dynamic social and political constructs with changing roles and meanings, and (b) as contact zones where various actors, old and new discourses, and practices meet. As such, they both offer

guidance as to how to investigate the interactions between state and nonstate actors over cross-border mobilities and cooperation practices along the Thracian borderland.

### **Bordering as a process**

In the coming section, I portray different perspectives in border studies regarding where bordering practices are observed and how to study them. Borders and border regions become revealing places for research, especially with the end of the Cold War, the growth of regional organizations such as the EU and NAFTA, and the inadequacy to consider the world primarily in terms of rationally organized hierarchies of sharply bounded territorial containers. The emergence of new nation-states as well as expansions of regional organizations, globalization, Europeanization, and “new regionalization” are closely examined as processes that create new flows and spaces across state borders, and that change old models of governmental regulation (Jessop 2000, 2002; Perkmann 2007; Perkmann and Sum 2002). Yet it is also underlined that there are more state institutions and more state intrusion into the daily lives of citizens and denizens at the territorial borders of the states (Scott 1999; Wilson and Donnan 1998, 2012; van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002; van Houtum 2005). In that sense, as Wilson and Donnan (2012) state, the study of everyday life of border cultures was and is still the study of the daily life of the state (For a detailed summary of the border studies in Anthropology see Alvarez 1995; Donnan and Wilson 1999).

In addition to their keen interest in the everyday life of the state and its spatial limits, border studies, which developed slightly differently under different disciplines until the 1990s – as geographic studies of border landscapes, historical studies of borderlands, political and sociological studies of border regions, as well as anthropology of border identities, cultures, and border aesthetics – have gotten closer regarding their comparisons of some sort, across time or

space. According to Wilson and Donnan (2012: 16-17), this “comparative turn” heralds a postdisciplinary state in border studies, with shared features such as emphases on culture, various forms of ethnography, process rather than structure and institutions at the borders, and new relations and processes of “bordering,” “rebordering,” and “borderization” as the main aspects of changes in territorialization and marginalization. Provided that bordering is a process and a verb, and not a noun or a fixed line, scholars have focused on a more actor-oriented, dynamic outlook on how divisions between entities are produced and sustained (Johnson, et al. 2011; Newman 2006; Parker and Vaughan-Williams et al. 2009, 2012; Suarez-Navaz 2004; van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002; van Houtum 2005, 2010).

However, it is still debated *where* to look in order to observe these processes of bordering/debordering/rebordering. As in van Houtum and van Naerssen’s (2002) piece on *Bordering, Ordering and Othering*, the territorial strategies that often take place at the spatial scale of states are considered part of the practices of ordering the society and the discursive us-them distinctions, and vice versa. It is underlined that the complex connection between money, power and space becomes apparent at the borders:

It is only when the socially ‘dirtified’ people, the ‘Heimatlosen,’ the ‘displaced persons’, the illegal immigrants, the people without papers and/or economic resources, knock on the doors of our societies that the manifestation of the often covert and taken-for-granted principles of bordering is directly asked for (van Houtum and van Naerssen 2002:129).

Similar to Isin’s definition of cities as difference machines, van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002) point out that “others” are both constitutive for the formation of the borders and are implications of the process of forming these borders. Similar to the idea of cities not being confined to urban centers, this turn to “bordering” rests on the assumption that any border is a socio-spatially constructed, always dynamic configuration of social relations and networks, and

that borders are increasingly carried around over space by the human body and mind (van Houtum 2012:406-407).

So far various critical scholars of migration, who mostly fall under the security-citizenship nexus mentioned above, have carefully studied various groups, institutions, and technologies doing the “borderwork” that is increasingly diffused throughout societies (Amoore 2011; Amoore, Marmura and Salter 2008; Balibar 2002; Bigo 2002; Jones and Johnson 2014; Nyers 2003; Parker and Vaughan-Williams et al. 2009; Rumford 2008; Salter 2004; Squire 2011; Walters 2006). However there are a few shortcomings of this growing body of literature in terms of border studies. Firstly, as already stated, they may de-politicize the nature of security and overlook the possibility of acts of citizenship that might challenge these borderworks (cf. Huysmans and Guillaume 2013). Secondly, their overarching idea that “borders are everywhere” runs the risk of obscuring an accurate understanding of the viewpoints of various agents, authorities, and bureaucrats involved in the control of contemporary state borders (cf. Andersson 2014a, 2014b; Basham and Vaughan-Williams 2013; Frowd 2014; Geiger and Pecoud 2010; Hess and Kasparek 2010; Hess 2012; Neal 2009; Nevins 2002; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Topak 2014; van Reekum 2016) and how these controls takes different forms. This includes new border fences (Jones 2009), increasing violence at the border (van Houtum and Boedeltje 2009), and expansion of not only security practices at airports and border crossings (Salter 2008) but also governance of the routes through mapping and making visible the clandestine movements (Hess 2010) and externalization of border control to other places (Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Mountz 2010, Rygiel 2010).

Thirdly, and this is the most important point regarding my research questions, these studies on border control often downgrade the function of borders, regardless of where they are

located, to simply controlling migration (cf. Müller 2014). Therefore this recent debate, the starting point of which is the securitization of bordering practices, disregards other functions of the border and misses the possibility of developing a comprehensive perspective on bordering practices.

Many border studies scholars from various disciplines had already acknowledged the multiplicity of borders' functions and underlined that borders unite as much as divide people and places; they serve simultaneously as barriers, bridges, resources, and symbols of identity (Anzaldúa 1999; Anderson and O'Dowd 1999; Ballinger 2003; Baud and van Schendel 1997; Green 2010; Heyman 2008; Martinez 1994; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Paasi 2009; Vila 2003; Wilson and Donnan 1998). Numerous studies show that the old national borders have acquired new functions with the involvement of postnational governance structures. Special attention is given to various cross-border regional cooperation programs, as well as neighborhood policies of the EU. These have worked as processes of rebordering as much as debordering the space and the people, and they have kept on the table the question of where exactly Europe's borders are (Bialasiewicz et al. 2009; Popescu 2008; Scott 2012; Rumford 2008; Scott and van Houtum 2009; van Houtum and Boedeltje 2011).

Ironically, however, even the prominent works that look at the implementation of the EU's Neighborhood Policy (ENP) most often follow a state-centered perspective. By doing so, they focus almost exclusively on the views of state actors and policy elites and neglect local communities and civil society actors involved in co-operation at the EU's external borders (see for example Müller 2014; Popescu 2008; Scott and Liikanen 2010). Müller's political sociological study entitled *Governing Mobility Beyond the State* is a case in point. Relying on Simmel's assertion that a "boundary is a sociological fact that forms itself spatially" (Simmel

1908 cited in Müller 2014), Müller distinguishes analytically between the institution and the function of the border. For him, in the context of the EU, institutional changes in borders occur through subsequent EU-level rules attached to the national borders' "core rule" of separating the exercise of authority (2014:34). However, as much as Müller's consideration of borders as institutions and his incorporation of supranational actors for institutional change is important, this perspective limits rebordering practices into negotiations between core EU states' actors and peripheral states' actors from the perspective of the EU. However, as described in the previous section on sovereignty, the state-sovereignty-territory link that is implicit in Müller's approach has already been challenged by many critical scholars of state sovereignty. Moreover, the impact of local actors in the "peripheries" of the political "centers" in the formation and transformation of state borders has also been emphasized in the pioneering works of border scholars (see Anderson and O'Dowd 1999; Baud and van Schendel 1997; Paasi 1991; Sahlins 1989; Wilson and Donnan 1998). The co-existence of multiple sources of legitimacy and authority, and more importantly the co-influence of various local state and nonstate actors on the image of state, escape the kind of institutional analysis that Müller is occupied with.

While studies on cross-border interactions at EU's internal and external borders often focus on EU and/or state-level actors, there is a growing scholarship, mostly in geography, that takes a practice-oriented approach. These are mostly case studies of different European borders, looking at the course of cross-border cooperation in everyday life in the Swedish-Finnish (Paasi and Prokkola 2008; Prokkola 2011; Prokkola et al. 2015), French-Spanish (Harguindeguy and Bray 2009), Finnish-Russian (Paasi 1996), Polish-German (Matthiesen and Bürkner 2001), Czech-German (Mirwaldt 2010), Dutch-German (Strüver 2002; van der Velde and van Houtum 2004), and Dutch-German-Belgian borderlands (Varro 2016). These studies rely on a similar

perspective as Paasi's early work, titled "Deconstructing Regions," where he draws on Bourdieu's habitus and Giddens's structuration theory and argues that "various levels of history meet each other in territorial socialization and consciousness formation" (1991: 240).

Varro (2016), however, offers a critique from within as she points out the limitations of this growing body of literature despite its focus on practices. She argues that, in most of these studies, there still remains risk of foregrounding the primary structuring role of national spatial socialization and structuring power of the nation-states. Based on her fieldwork in Dutch-German-Belgian borderlands, Varro suggests rethinking the notion of practice in a more "open-ended way" that leaves room for agency and change without neglecting structural constraints. She argues that discourse theory and practice theory may allow for a fresh look at these EU integration processes, as they direct our attention to how subjects take an active role in bridging seemingly contradictory discourses and practices in which they "find themselves" instead of assuming that "people's 'nationally shaped' knowledge of the world determine their actions" and instead of focusing on practices representing "nationally shaped ways of doing and thinking" (2016: 186). For Varro, practice theory's proposition to look at practices that have a "collective dimension" and that depend on shared skills or understandings seems sufficient to achieve the task of considering practices in an open-ended way.

However, I would argue that the condition of having a collective dimension may already limit our interpretations of individual acts as possible and unconventional contestations to institutionalized power. For that reason, I suggest complementing Varro's focus on practices with Isin and Nielsen's (2008) notion of *acts* of citizenship, which encourages the researcher to look for unusual places especially regarding shared embodied know-how and cross-border cooperation practices. Considering that the official Greek-Turkish INTERREG program was

suspended soon after it was announced, the kind of transnational/cross-border interactions that have developed in the Thracian borderland in the 2000s have developed mostly in informal ways and based on individual initiatives. If collective dimension were our criterium to assess people's discourses and practices of cross-border mobility and cooperation, then the debordering and rebordering processes, which unfold as contingent upon "various levels of history" (Paasi 1991) and "sense of border" (Green 2012) at this particular moment in this particular context, would be easily missed out on. This does not imply just losing some ethnographic detail but rather carries the risk of falling back into the trap of "nationally shaped ways of doing and thinking," in Varro's words.

It is no coincidence that studies with micro-level ethnographic attentiveness not only consider the multiplicity of borders' function but also look at bordering practices and relations, formal or informal, among various actors. This perspective pushes the researcher to take seriously the materiality, representations, and performances of and around state borders. From this perspective, Green (2012: 580) claims to add "borderness" as an adjective to "bordering" as a verb and practice, in order to emphasize the different "senses of border." As already mentioned in the introduction, Green believes that in order to recognize any given practice as a bordering practice, one has to first know what counts as "border": the classification systems distinguishing (or failing to distinguish) people, places, and things in one way rather than another (2012: 580). This classification and its discontents, then, are the different "senses of border" that have been expressed in different places and at different times. What differentiates Green's approach to the border as an institution from that of Müller and others analyzing official processes is not that one recognizes its existence and the other does not. To the contrary, following the process-oriented approach, Green (2012) draws attention to the perseverance of state borders. Yet she

does so by pointing out that state borders materialize differently at different moments in time, take different meanings, and leave different impacts on the everyday life of border regions and on the relations between state and nonstate actors. In other words, she suggests, borders and their meanings are always historically contingent (cf. Del Sarto 2010; Walters 2015) but, once constructed, they take on thing-like qualities in people's imaginations as well as in practice.

In a similar vein, many studies of anthropology of borders have shown that the Westphalian nation-state logic of borders, or what Malkki (1992:35) calls the "national order things," is not drawn without any conflict; these conflicts left their marks on the present borders. For example, in many post-Ottoman areas there had been ongoing disagreements about the precise location of the border and the nationalities and ethnicities of the people living on either side (Akyüz 2014; Cowan 2000; Myrivili 2004; Nistiakos 1996; Özgen 2007; Pelkmans 2006; Şenoğuz 2014). In some cases, border dynamics lead to stasis more than change and generate a sense of waiting, as in the case of Cyprus (Navaro-Yashin 2003, 2012) or in the West Bank (Rabinowitz 2001). In other cases, the borders may shape people's imagination of space and identity, and have the appearance of a permanent fixture, to such an extent that people's imagery of the other side continues to follow the old, established rules of border even after the border again becomes permeable (Donnan 2005; Pelkmans 2006, 2012). Similar observations are made in cases of the Europeanization of national border regions (Paasi 1996,1999; Scott 2012; van Houtum and Boedeltje 2011) or the transformations in the post-Soviet Union borders in the last two decades (Green 2005; Paasi 2009; Pelkmans 2006). In Green's words, these hint at the multicentricity of the worlds as "knowledge practices and ontologies [preceeding the national order of things] that can exist, in parallel, and that might be involved differently in making or defining senses of border" (Green 2012: 581). Therefore, building on the idea of bordering as a process,

an inquiry into the sense of border then allows one to focus on changes while at the same time considering the very marks that established borders leave on the space and on the imagination.

While Green urges us to be wary of the multiple worlds and the marks that the historically contingent bordering processes have left on classification of places, people, and things, Walters (2015), in his recent intervention in migration and border studies, suggests gearing our gaze towards the routes as much as bordering strategies. By recalling the Latin roots of the word *via* as road or way, Walter suggests studying “viapolitics.” This, for him, would “address the different ways in which routes and their vehicles become stakes in power relations and political actions.” This ontological proposal is actually in line with van Schendel’s emphasis on the co-existence and tension between different scales of the border. As such, the emphasis on the route is also crucial in analyzing cross-border mobilities and interactions since it epistemologically pushes one to search for formal and informal routes that transcend the borders, that survived or built against the contemporary border regimes, and for continuities and changes in these routes in which people act with a sense of border.

It is the combination of these three notions, namely bordering as a process, established senses of border, and routes that transcend the existing border, that help me understand the prevailing organic ties of the Greek-Orthodox Turkish speaking Gagauz people of Orestiada in Evros, with Edirne’s town center in Turkish Thrace; the smuggling routes across the Evros River that survived the militarization of the border in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus dispute; the close connections between the Muslim-Turkish minority of Xanthi and Komotini in Greek Thrace with Keşan on the Turkish side more so than with Alexandroupoli on the Greek side of the border; historical ties the descendents of Enez refugees in Alexandroupoli try to rebuild with the highly securitized town of Enez in Turkish Thrace; or the newly emerging commuting

practices between Edirne and the Turkish-Muslim minority villages of Greek Thrace that used to be isolated territories under military surveillance. Once we look at new practices in an open-ended way, as Varro (2016) says, then we can see various examples of cross-border mobilities and interactions emerging as possible acts of citizenship, sometimes in order to continue old established ties and other times to build new ones. These acts of citizenship also point at the new limits of states' sovereignty over space and people in the face of Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations, the border control, and the minority rights in both countries. However, my focus on changes in the life of the Thracian border, from being a national border to an EU border, requires me to put my micro-level analysis of the states' peripheries back on macro-level, yet still region-specific, political economic transformations. On that note, I move on to the existing debates on regimes informed by Europeanization and mainstream IR literatures, and alternative views from within IR and the anthropology of regime analysis.

### **On regimes**

This section first portrays the current trends in Europeanization studies in relation to the role of agency and local experiences in the Europeanization process. While there is a growing interest in examining elite socialization and norm diffusion, the analytical tools of the existing literature fall short of studying bottom-up initiatives, negotiations, and contestations between state and non-state actors of cross-border peripheries. In the second part, after looking at previous examples of regime analysis within mainstream IR scholarship for a bottom-up analysis of the Europeanization process, I then turn to relational approaches to international regimes.

### **Europeanization as diffusion**

Copious studies investigate the extent to which policies and institutions of the European Union spread across different contexts. In their edited volume *Europeanization New Research*

*Agendas*, Graziano and Vink (2006:13) aptly note that the perspective of “new institutionalism” forms the basis of Europeanization literature. “Europeanization” appeared for the first time at the 1993 European Summit in Copenhagen; it defined the accession criteria for candidate states in such a way as to combine rational institutionalist emphasis on conditionality, and sociological institutionalist interest in norm diffusion and social learning (Emerson 2004). This topic has been of crucial importance, especially following the EU’s Eastern Enlargement (for detailed analysis see Börzel and Risse 2007; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Graziano and Vink 2006; Olsen 2002; Sedelmeier 2011). The scholars studying diffusion of EU rules and norms in accession countries, as well as in the EU’s neighborhood, also follow in the footsteps of these earlier works. While some scholars have investigated governance by conditionality (Ademmer 2011; Faist and Ette 2007; Grabbe 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005, Schimmelfennig et al. 2003; Sedelmeier 2011), others have given particular attention to socialization and the complex process of learning by domestic actors (Börzel and Risse 2007; Checkel 2005a, 2005b; Cowles et al. 2001; Radaelli 2003).

Recently, more emphasis has been given to the specificities of domestic politics as a corrective to top-down analyses of Europeanization. Diffusion, then, is conceived as a *process* through which ideas, normative standards, policies, and/or institutions spread across time and space (*emphasis mine*, Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Gilardi 2012; Strang and Meyer 1993). For example, Börzel and Risse (2012) carefully identify direct and indirect mechanisms of diffusion as well as the “scope conditions” determining the diffusion, namely domestic incentives, degrees of (limited) statehood, democracy vs autocracy, and power (a)symmetries in accession or neighborhood countries. Nevertheless, as they clearly underline, like their predecessors they take institutional change as the dependent variable to study the

spread of European policies, which are understood as social structures, formal and informal systems of rules and norms. Numerous case studies, based on their analytical framework, investigate behavioral changes at the domestic political level that focus exclusively on political centers in respective countries (see Börzel and Risse (eds.) 2012).

Europeanization scholarship on Greek and Turkish cases is also dominated by these principles of new institutionalism. The primary focus is on institutional change and institutionalization of certain norms and behaviors in the political centres of the two states, one as a member on the periphery of the EU and the other as a candidate country. Various scholars scrutinize, in both contexts, the formal and discursive changes in Greek-Turkish relations at the state level (Agnantopoulos 2013; Aybet 2009; Rumelili 2003, 2004; Yavaş 2013), changes regarding citizenship and minority rights (Anagnostou 2005; Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou 2007; Grigoriadis 2008; Kadioğlu 2009; Onar and Özgüneş 2010; Onar 2009), regional policies (Dulupçu 2005; Ertugal 2011), migration policies in general (Içduygu 2007; Mavrodi 2007; Triandafyllidou 2013), or irregular migration control in particular (Ozcurumez and Senses 2011; Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). Nevertheless, besides a few exceptions that record or observe civil society activities (see Çuhadar et al 2015; Rumelili 2005a,2005b; Ulaş-Belge 2004; Gkintidis 2013; Yiakoumaki 2006) similar to the aforementioned studies on Europeanization and diffusion, they also solely look at top-down policy changes and policy making processes.

These studies speak to a better understanding of the impact of EU's norms and institutions on the respective policy areas. Yet the almost exclusive focus on the perceptions of ruling elites, if not official reports and policy making processes in the political centres, runs the risk of disregarding actual practices and actors' changing positions—in other words the bottom-up processes of socialization and diffusion at work on the ground. Additionally, the research

questions and main puzzles of Europeanization literature, centered around policy implementation, seem to push researchers to make the observed actions of policy makers and executors fit in one of three logics of action, namely instrumental, normative, and communicative rationalities. For that reason, the starting point of Europeanization literature limits researchers' understanding of the domestic dynamics affecting the peculiar forms that the Europeanization process would take in specific local contexts.

Therefore, I would argue, following the perspective of Europeanization may lead to overlooking the seemingly contradictory actions of people, namely local political elites, street level bureaucrats, or nonstate local actors, whose acts show whether the diffusion takes place, and how. As the accounts of my interlocutors in the Thracian borderland demonstrate in the following chapters, actors in fact follow multiple logics at the same time, as in Green's "multiple worlds", Migdal's "mental maps" or van Schendel's "multiple scales." These logics of action are not necessarily determined by political centers like Brussels, Ankara, or Athens, but instead are driven by local knowledge and relations shaped in particular historical contexts that are reconsidered in response to the availability of new discursive practices, facilitated by the Europeanization processes of the two states.

Another shortcoming of these studies is their Euro-centric perspective in analyzing why and how these processes of Europeanization and/or diffusion have come about. Scholars who critically analyze the EU project in this respect mostly look at EU's new neighborhood policies (ENP) and its impact on neighboring countries, the ultimate goals of which, they argue, are protecting Europe from external 'threats' and continuing European expansionism (Bialasiewicz 2008; Bialasiewicz et al. 2009; Crane 2013; Kuus 2004, 2011; Scott 2005; Sidaway 2001; Sparke 2002; Boedeltje and van Houtum 2011). To capture this, Kuus specifically underlines the need to

examine the “whole range of formal and informal practices that form the analytical and social space of geopolitical reasoning” (2011: 1152-3). A good example of such research is Andersson’s (2014a, 2014b) study on the Euro-African borderlands where a gift economy between European paymasters, African forces, local youth, and potential “smugglers” keeps the would-be migrants away from certain routes, and opens others. He calls this cooperation among various sectors involved in border control the “illegality industry” (2014a:15), the by-product of the EU border regime with a historical and geographical pedigree (2014a:22, 67). As Walters aptly puts it, the merit of such studies is that they “[do] not rely on arguments as to whether or not local authorities have been ‘socialized’ into European norms to account for the extension of the border regime” but rather “trace[s] the complex connections, relays, translations, alliances and betrayals which go into making an assemblage of governance. What a border is, and what a border does, is being made on site, as it were” (2015:15).

Andersson’s research gives us a hint as to how European involvement along the African route to Europe reshapes the perceptions of state actors regarding their roles in border control and their position vis-à-vis border crossers and border crossing activities. My research takes Andersson’s process-tracing one step further by expanding the inquiry into different functions of the border, other than controlling unauthorized crossings. Hence instead of Andersson’s multi-sited methodology to trace production of illegality through border control, I investigate the impacts of the constitution of the EU border regime at a given border by emphasizing the web of relations, or in some cases non-relations, that are by-products of the old national border regime. My aim is to capture the complex connections that go into making an assemblage of governance at the Greek-Turkish borderland, as a cross-border periphery, and that are beyond migration control. This attempt, I would argue, offers insights into the limits of the states’ sovereignty over

space and people in the face of Europeanization of the given border, while not overemphasizing the power of agency in maneuvering what van Houtum and van Naerssen (2002) called bordering, ordering, and othering apparatuses. Such an analysis of bordering processes, as assemblages of governance that are built on already existing relations and conflicts at a given border, requires an all-encompassing regime analysis instead of a narrow focus on Europeanization. On that note, I move in the coming section towards regime analysis.

### **Regime analyses**

In this last section, I look at early works of IR scholars on international regimes where regime analysis has first emerged. However, it is the new dialogical approach from within IR and the ethnographic regime analysis approach from anthropology that help overcome the state-centered analysis of the previous scholarship.

International regimes become significant in IR literature starting with Ruggie's (1975:559) assertion that "international behavior is institutionalized," and Krasner's (1983) influential definition of a regime as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (1983:2). Keohane (1984), from a liberal IR perspective, explores the problems of cooperation under relatively favourable conditions for development of economic regimes among the First World states, and suggests that some regimes are "nested" within others and regimes can "nest" a variety of more specific arrangements. Donnelly (1986), from a neorealist perspective, analyses the international human rights regime as it came about in the aftermath of WW II and points out the co-existence of regional and single-issue regimes as (sub)regimes within a weak international regime. Donnelly (1986) further states that regime analysis offers a

new approach to see familiar material from a more holistic perspective, towards a broad analysis of conflict and cooperation.

These studies of international regimes, however, do not go uncontested from within the liberal and realist IR scholarship. For example, Strange suggests that the way the concept is developed leaves unheard the complaints of the underprivileged, the disenfranchised, or the unborn,” hence “ignores the vast area of non-regimes that lies beyond the ken of international bureaucracies and diplomatic bargaining” (1983: 338). Young (1986) criticizes its methodological assumptions of independent and equal actors. Similarly, Haggard and Simmons (1987) criticize what they call the structural, game-theoretic, and functionalist regime theories for downplaying the central insight of the interdependence theorists, which is that foreign policy is integrally related to domestic structures and processes. Pointing at Putnam’s “two-level games” and cognitivists such as Haas (1989), Haggard and Simmons (1987) argue that state actors are to be considered sitting in between structural constraints, interests, and choices. Next to these critiques from within the liberal tradition of IR, engaging critically with the earlier works of Krasner, Keohane, and their critiques, Keeley (1990) further suggests a new reading of the regime concept “in non-liberal ways that are not merely a return to usual realist approaches” (1990: 84).

For Keeley (1990), the main problem in liberal approaches to regimes is their assumptions that regimes are a benevolent, voluntary, cooperative, and legitimate community. This understanding, as Keeley rightfully argues, disregards the fact that “community consists of actors so organized, not just of actors who accept this organization as legitimate. We are then freed to deal with contestation over these fundamental elements as a basis for our regime analysis” (1990: 90). In that sense, he refers to Foucauldian concepts of discourse, discipline,

resistance and power/knowledge, which allow us to treat regimes as efforts to organize a realm of action without overlooking fundamental contests.

Borrowing Foucault's interpretive approach and analytical devices, Keeley (1990: 91-92) underlines how international regimes can be read as "regimes of truth," which goes beyond agenda setting. From this perspective, by endorsing certain languages, symbols, modes of reasoning, and conclusions, a regime appears to render those who do not use them as unintelligible, to specify an issue-area or phenomenon as of public interest, and to make visible certain actors as targets of observation and control. Following Foucault's definition of power as a network of relations, Keeley (1990) then suggests that once a regime exists, there may be found four groups of actors: (1) those accepting and cooperating willingly, (2) free riders, (3) deviants and rebels, and (4) outsiders or other communities organized in other public spaces. By noting the actors who might be members of different and/or overlapping regimes, and the types of issues and disputes at any time and over time, we may engage in a dynamic regime analysis. Keeley's dynamic and power-induced understanding of regimes offers a totally new entry point to the regime analysis and an escape from a liberal-realist continuum. Nevertheless, his focus on individual states as actors of this network of relations (see 1990:96) limits a rather encompassing analysis of a regime that, as my fieldwork in Thracian borderlands show, is shaped and contested not solely by states but also by nonstate actors that crisscross national borders.

In addition to the growing emphasis on relationality and processes in critical citizenship and border studies, Guillaume's (2011) dialogical approach to IR offers a novel perspective on how to pursue a Foucauldian regime analysis. It also overcomes the strong spatial imagery of IR and its misconception that, in Guillaume's words, "international is the space within which pre-defined agents are *inter*-acting one with the other" (2011:140). The key to that is a process-

based conception of the international, which, as Guillaume (2011: 139) notes, recently made its way into few post-structuralist IR studies influenced by “relational” sociologists, including Norbert Elias, Andrew Abbott, Pierre Bourdieu, Margeret Somers, and Mustafa Emirbayer. Looking specifically at the collective identity formation process in Japan and partly the veiling issue in France, Guillaume develops a dialogical approach to identity and the international in order to study the relations between a multitude of potential and possible articulations of an identity. Echoing Bourdieu’s (1998) field of relations, Guillaume suggests that through this approach, we can see hegemonic collective political identities – as well as their alternatives. Dialogism in that sense becomes “*interweaving* of utterances ‘responding’ each other (...) depicted by their expressions, their contexts and relations to other utterances” (Guillaume 2011: 49). This complements Isin and Nielsen’s (2008) notion of “acts of citizenship” that refers to specific configurations of forms and modes of being political in a relational field at a historical moment.

This dialogical approach to the international is instructive for my examination of cross-border mobilities and interactions in Thracian borderlands. These movements shape the processes of bordering/debordering/rebordering on the ground and are embedded in the Europeanization of (a) citizenship and minority rights, (b) migration and border policies, and (c) regional and neighborhood policies in Greece and Turkey. Unlike Guillaume, my investigation may appear limited to a very local context, yet I analyze acts/deeds or utterances of local state and nonstate actors’ in the two states’ peripheries. I would argue that taking cross-border peripheries as the unit of analysis offers a novel epistemological approach to capture the nuanced changes in states’ sovereignty over space and people in the face of Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations.

While sharing similar ontological and epistemological concerns with Guillaume, specifically regarding how to identify and study the international in the local, methodologically I follow the ethnographic regime analysis developed by Hess and her colleagues to analyze the new EU border regime. Their multi-sited ethnographic project entitled ‘Transit Migration’ (2002-2004) was conducted in the southeast border region of the European Union (including the Former Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey). For the team of researchers involved in this project, and in their ongoing follow-up research along the infamous Balkan route, the notion of regime makes it possible to include a multitude of actors whose practices relate to each other in a space of conflict and negotiation and are not ordered in the form of a central logic or rationality (Hess 2012; Hess and Kasperek 2010; Karakayali and Tsianos 2010; Tsianos et al. 2009). Beyond a system level analysis (cf. Mazower 2004; Zolberg 1989) and keen on not jumping into heroic glorification of migrant tactics, the authors aim to develop a theory of “border regime” that takes migration “as an immanent central driving and structuring force” of border policies, and hence makes regulations of migration as *effects* of people’s movements (Hess et al. 2009, emphasis mine). It is no coincidence, therefore, that the authors refer to migration and border regime interchangeably since their starting point is the effect of people’s clandestine border-crossings on states’ and other postnational authorities’ regulation practices.

Following this ethnographic regime analysis approach, my research picks up Hess’s (2012) suggestions for further research, with an added twist. Hess (2012: 436) draws attention to the need to look into the specific legal, social, and economic infrastructure comprising the “precarious transit zones of stratified rights” that they investigate from the migrants’ point of view. In my research, I analyze both authorized and unauthorized movements that create an effect on the eclectic ensemble of the national and the EU border regime of today, as it is built on

the specificities of the past regime of bordering determined by Greek and Turkish nation-state building processes.

I therefore look at the changing bordering practices of a multitude of actors over time, including borderlanders as well as unauthorized migrants and national/postnational authorities of migration control. As a result, I focus on the *changing regime of bordering* that is determined by all sorts of localized licit/illicit as well as legal/illegal acts of cross-border mobilities and cooperation, emerging as contestation, negotiation, or reproduction of the established conceptions of citizenship in Greece and Turkey. This is how the three pillars of the conceptual framework complement each other to make me fully grasp the possible impacts of Europeanization of a given national border.

### **Concluding remarks**

In this chapter, I offered a close reading of the conceptual debates that my research is informed by and contributes to with a new conception of the *changing regime of bordering*. My overview of the citizenship literature firstly shows the limits of available perspectives on national and postnational citizenship. These perspectives take for granted the legal status of newcomers and overemphasize migrants' subjective experiences in a transnational field of action, to the extent of disregarding the strengthening of border controls and the securitization processes that make migrants into clandestines. Secondly, I draw attention to studies at the intersections of the security-citizenship nexus that offer a corrective to the shortcomings of national and postnational debates. However, I argue that the perspective of critical mobility studies, the starting point of which is the moving subjects, is more comprehensive than studies at the intersection of security-citizenship, as the latter considers mobilities only in relation to the control function of borders. On the other hand, looking at all kinds of mobilities allows me to grasp dynamic and

interrelated politics of mobility and fixity from the viewpoint of any moving subject, be they local state or nonstate actors. These subjects' acts of (im)mobility and (non)cooperation might create shifts or ruptures to the established practices and socio-historical patterns on the ground.

Moreover, as I aim to explain the changes over time in the limits of state power over space *and* people, I situate the encounters between mobile subjects and actors of governance in the local context of states' peripheries. I consult the toolkits offered by scholars of state theory and borders to better observe acts of citizenship that emerge in the spatialized acts of cross-border mobilities and cooperation in the peripheries. The focus by scholars of states theory on the co-existence of multiple sources of sovereignty, mental maps, and scales underline the necessity to look at the local practices of governance as they unfold, not as predetermined by the authority of the "state" as a monolithic entity apart from society. Critical examples of border studies complement this attentiveness to multiple sources of action by drawing attention to multiple functions of borders. I follow in the footsteps of this perspective as I look at the role of actual cross-border practices of local state and nonstate actors in bordering/debordering/rebordering processes on the ground, while at the same time being aware of the established senses of borders that are implicated in people's multiple worlds and imaginations of what a possible cross-border act or deed is. However, to reiterate, I balance this micro focus on acts of citizenship at the states' peripheries with the macro approach of regime analysis to not lose sight of the context in which changing bilateral relations have been reshaped. More specifically I follow the ethnographic regime analysis approach that looks at local network of power relations to capture the changes and continuities between past and present processes of bordering in a given regional context. Hence I offer *regime of bordering* as a dynamic analytical tool to study the Europeanization of the Greek-Turkish border.

Despite offering partial answers to my inquiry, that is, what are the current limits of two states' sovereignty over space and people, it is essential to stress here that the critical interventions in all three bodies of work come from scholars who emphasize processes and relationality in their conceptualizations of citizenship, borders, and regimes. Indeed, my inquiry also follows in the footsteps of the Bourdieusian notion of the field that considers the relationality of actors as the key to understanding the rules of the game, and that would then allow me to focus on the interconnectedness between state and nonstate actors playing the citizenship game according to the relative weight of their social capital in the field.

In the remainder of this dissertation, I look at various acts of citizenship as they emerge in the local state and nonstate actors' cross-border mobility and cooperation practices, and their implications on the parameters of us-them distinctions. Situating the analysis in a historical and cross-border context helps me overcome state-centered analysis and look at citizenship practices as embedded in an ongoing and relational process of negotiation between mobile subjects and actors of governance in multiple political centers and peripheries. This also allows me to zoom in on the particular sociopolitical conditions and trace their changes over time, as they are the conditions that make contestations and/or compliances likely from specific subject positions determined by the national and regional political economic contexts.

To recap, in the following chapters I look at the existing senses of border together with de/rebordering practices in the Thracian borderland. I consider the changing bordering practices in the post-1999 Greek-Turkish rapprochement, as they are built on an already militarized border. The Cyprus dispute between Greece and Turkey created a sense of border for the local state and nonstate actors distinct from the pre-1974 period. Hence I depict how the

Europeanization of the Greek-Turkish border, which I call the new regime of bordering, intermingles with the knowledge practices and ontologies of the national order of things.

In the next chapter I analyze the national regime of bordering that reached its peak with Turkey's military operation to Cyprus in 1974. In the following three chapters I unravel the changes that Europeanization of the regime of bordering has brought in interrelated Bourdieusian fields of power observed in the the Thracian borderland: security, economy, and cultural fields. In Chapter Four I specifically focus on the ways in which the control function of the border has gone through transformations, from militarized control of national borders of the neighboring country and its people to policing of the external borders of the EU against the mobilities of "transit" migrants. I show how such re-(b)ordering of the space paves the way for new parameters of othering, i.e. invited/uninvited others based on un/acceptable mobilities. Following the emphasis of scholars of state sovereignty and borders on multiple functions, senses, and experiences of borders, I also look at the uniting functions of the borders, namely economic and cultural interactions. As shown in Chapters Five and Six, the differential inclusion of mobile subjects and temporality of cross-border movements and cooperation practices are determined by the dominant interpretation of the specific function of the border that they trigger at a given moment. By distinguishing these functions as three fields of interactions, I aim to disentangle the ways in which multiple worlds (Green 2012), mental maps (Migdal 2004), and politics of scale (van Schendel 2005) shape and reshape the positions of local state and nonstate actors vis-à-vis their counterparts across the border and vis-à-vis their political centres.

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<sup>1</sup> These theoretical inferences got crystal clear with Engin Isin's constructive comments on my work at his Master Class with PhD students at University of Amsterdam. May 12, 2016.

### **Chapter Three: Militarization of the border**

This chapter examines the direct impacts of the 1974 Cyprus conflict on both sides of the Thracian border, and the distinct marks it left on the local governance of territorial space, the cross-border mobilities of all sorts, and the us-them distinctions among the borderlanders. The post-1974 period in Greek-Turkish official discourse may appear as a showcase of securitization and desecuritization, developed by the Copenhagen school of securitization studies and its later critiques, which are mentioned in Chapter Two. However, zooming in on the practices of cross-border mobility and local governance of national space in the Thracian borderland shows that securitization occurs in a field of power where the securitization of the ethnic minority's position is determined by the relations between the country of origin, Greece, and the kin state, Turkey.

In her critique of the Copenhagen school of securitization, Jutila joins sociologists Brubaker (1996, 2004) and Somers (1994), who work with the Bourdieusian notion of relational field, and underlines the necessity to focus on the process and the discursive aspects of securitization. Focusing on the process through which an issue becomes securitized indeed makes it possible to capture the changing positions of the actors in this relational field of security. In addition to Jutila's emphasis on process, recalling Brubaker's triadic nexus (1996) between nationalizing state, ethnic minority, and kin-state, I also include the impact of the two states' relations on the process of securitization of minority condition.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first give a short background about the situation in Thrace to prove the point that the peak of the Cyprus conflict was the historical juncture determining the aftermath of the cross-border relations in Thrace. The second part disentangles the militarization of the border in three dimensions, namely on governance, cross-border

mobility, and othering practice. Finally I show that despite the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations bringing some changes in the local perceptions of “threat,” and therefore moving a step towards rebordering, the militarization of the border has established a “sense of border,” in Green’s (2012) words, that was also observed in the early years after the 1999 rapprochement.

### **Setting the scene**

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Greece and Turkey established political, economic, and military alliances soon after the end of the Greco-Turkish war and the signing of 1923 Lausanne Treaty, in 1930 and 1931. The Convention of Residence, Commerce and Navigation allowed migrations of two groups from Greece to Turkey: the Muslim-Turkish minority in Greek Thrace – mostly rich landowners – and the former Greek-Orthodox Istanbulites – who had to leave Istanbul in 1924 for not holding valid residency (Chousein 2009).

The 1930’s alliances, built on the premises of the Lausanne Treaty, have also shaped the governance of ethnic diversities in each country. Both Greek and Turkish governments have considered each other’s perspectives, that is, the ethnic homeland perspective, in their minority policies. For example, upon Turkey’s demand, Greece expelled the anti-Kemalists in Greek Thrace, the group known as “150s” (Yüzellilikler); likewise, upon demands from minority primary schools, Greece also allowed the modern Turkish alphabet to replace the Arabic alphabet, in line with the kin state’s education policy. Turkey also avoided interference in Patriarchate elections and minority education (Fırat cited in Chousein 2009). In 1949, after the Greek civil war ended, the first secular minority high school was opened in Komotini and named “Celal Bayar Lisesi,” after the Turkish President at that time. In the same year, the minority was allowed to elect their own community administrative board (*Cemaat Idare Heyetleri*) (Oran 1991: 280). These positive relations between the nationalizing states, minorities, and their kin

states continued for few more years after both Greece and Turkey came under the common NATO security framework in 1952.

From 1955 onwards, conflicts emerged in this triadic nexus that directly affected the minority communities' position in the states to which they were connected by formal citizenship. The pressure of the Cyprus Dispute had triggered first the infamous pogrom against the Orthodox-Greek community of Istanbul in 1955, and then the oppression of the Muslim-Turkish community of Greek Thrace. In Greek Thrace, the curtailment of the Muslim-Turkish minorities' basic rights escalated in the 1960s and reached its peak during the military junta in Greece (1967-1974). In 1968 the Greek Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs founded the Special Pedagogical Academy in Thessaloniki/EPATH to educate teachers for minority schools and impede the previous practice of appointing teachers with a diploma from Turkey (PEKEM 2014a, 2014b). Many minority members fled to Turkey as result of the schooling issue and other obstacles: restrictions on the purchase of immovables, bans on issuing driving licenses and licenses for hunting rifles, maintenance or construction of houses not being allowed, and arbitrary fines and mistreatments. All who left, including those going to study in Turkey, were deprived of Greek citizenship (Anagnostou 2005; Demetriou 2013).

This shift in the dynamics of the triadic nexus, which the Cyprus dispute triggered, had direct implications in the everyday life in the towns and villages along the Thracian border. As mentioned in the introduction, the residents of the Thracian borderlands are mostly descendants of refugees from across the border that was drawn by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. As such, previous generations' relations with the land and the people on the other side of the new border were organic ties. Hoping to return one day, new residents of both Orestiada and Edirne choose to stay close to the border so they can continue cultivating their lands, using their mills, and

breeding their animals on their properties on the other side. Local informants who are now in their 70s confirm that the neighboring fields on both sides of the Evros River and the land border between Karaağaç and Kastanies used to be a relatively porous space where Turkish and Greek farmers watered each others' fields, gave each other gifts, and exchanged products that were cheaper or only available on one side of the border.

Nevertheless, few elderly residents of Orestiada underline that after 1964, both the Greek and Turkish military exercised stricter controls in the region. An old farmer from one of the border villages in Orestiada relayed stories that circulated, of fisherman and farmers being killed by the Turkish soldiers; farmers subsequently stopped taking their animals to their old fields across the border. Despite rising tension and deployment of troops along the border, a retired military officer in Edirne, who was appointed as a high commander to the region shortly before 1974, remembers Turkish gendarmes in the Uzunköprü area crossing the border to Greece to play volleyball with Greek soldiers. He added, "such levities did not continue of course after that [1974]."

In sum, the everyday life practices of the Thracian borderlanders, up until the Cyprus dispute caught flame, showcase the "scales-we-almost-lost," in van Schendel's (2005: 56) terms. In the aftermath of 1974, the transnational ties of the Muslim-Turkish minority in Greek Thrace were further strengthened whereas the organic ties of Greek refugees from Edirne were cut off abruptly. The evidence provided in the next section supports Gkintidis's (2014) point that, since the invasion of the northern part of Cyprus by the Turkish army in 1974 and the ensuing Greek-Turkish rivalry, Greek Thrace has been rendered a field of competition between Greek and Turkish nationalisms, due to the spatial concentration of the Turkish minority in the region as well as the region's proximity to Turkey. Although the border has been official since 1923, it is

the bordering practices from 1974 onwards and the “senses of border” from borderlanders’ perspective that typify van Schendel’s “state scale” (web of relations that comes with the border and is confined to the national territory) and the “border-induced scale” (cross-border webs of relations that spring up because of the border’s existence).

### **1974 and its aftermaths**

In this section, the local impact of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus is depicted in detail with due emphasis on the similarities and differences between the perspectives of the two centers and peripheries. The differences confirm that the ethnic particularity of the Thracian borderlands has its imprint in the relations between the Greek center and Greek Thrace *and* between the Turkish center, Turkish Thrace, and Greek Thrace. The first part of this section examines the governance of people and space, and the second part disentangles cross-border mobility practices that are always considered licit from the perspective of social regulation yet are welcomed, by the official authorities, sometimes if they are legal and other times if they are illegal. The last part focuses on citizens’ reactions and the limited acts of citizenship in light of changes in the militarized regime of bordering.

#### **On governance**

In this section I document governing practices in the Thracian borderlands after the Cyprus conflict. The evidence, based mainly on local newspaper excerpts and life histories of borderlanders, shows that the official nationalist discourse of conflict, driven by ethno-religious ties, was also appropriated by the forceful agents of the peripheries. It dominated the governance of space and people in both Greek and Turkish Thrace until the Europeanization of bilateral relations with the 1999 political rapprochement.

### *Polarizing the people*

This section shows how ethnic identifications were reinforced and ossified at the time of the Cyprus conflict. When Turkey's Cyprus operation started in July 1974, farmers living and/or working in the fields in Karaağaç and Kastanies areas moved further inland temporarily. While they eventually returned, the military personnel deployed along the border stayed on. As one retired military officer in Enez stated in August 2014, "the extra troops [he] brought there in 1974 left just few years ago."

Militarization also quickly took over the mainstream public discourse. In the days leading up to Turkey's intervention, the Greek national papers *Kathimerini* and *To Vima* emphasized the international political context and specifically US-Turkey relations. The official view of the US government, as the two countries' Cold-War ally, was seen as important as both are considered intrinsic to domestic politics. US pressure on Turkey to ban opium production was covered extensively in the news, whereas the escalation of political conflict in Cyprus was overlooked, except for mention of the Makarios government being replaced by Mr. Sampson's on July 15 (*To Vima*, July 16 1974). However, following Turkey's operation on July 20 there was much coverage of the Greeks running in support of Greek Cypriots. It was noted that not only soldiers from the mainland but also guestworkers in Western Europe were returning to Greece to bear arms for Cyprus (*To Vima*, July 21 1974). These solidarity messages were followed with a focus on the fall of junta and concomitant leadership changes in Greece as well as Cyprus, and reassurances from the US and the new Greek governments for a peaceful solution to the conflict on the island (*To Vima* July 28, 1974).

Unlike mainstream Greek media that mentioned Cyprus only after the change of leadership in the political centers of Greece and Cyprus, the Turkish national paper *Hürriyet* gave regular, detailed reports of the bilateral diplomacy and the situation of the Turkish

Cypriots' in Cyprus. Immediately after the Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus, *Hürriyet* showed vocal solidarity with the Turkish governments' decision to intervene. Moreover the newspaper also claimed to be the forerunner of the Turkish victory, with references to its founding father, Sedat Semavi – an ardent opponent to the Greek authority in the island, and to his op-eds and news reports published in the paper back in 1948 and 1949 (*Hürriyet* 21 July 1974). *Hürriyet* also gave some news from the Thracian border. The news mentioned the military preparations of the Turkish army in Edirne as well as the Greek army in Evros. Next to pictures of tanks passing through Edirne's city center and people praying in the famous Selimiye mosque, the caption read: 'Almighty God let our army succeed' (*Hürriyet* 22, July 1974). There were also reports of the capture of nine Greek soldiers who were laying mines on the Turkish side of the border, and the Greek army retreating inland (*Hürriyet*, 27 July 1974).

Local newspapers' coverage seems in line with the national security discourse, with a local twist. Solidarity messages were regularly published in the local papers on both sides of the Thracian border. *Eleftheri Thraki*, a Greek paper from Alexandroupoli, published in a celebratory tone about the "offers of the Evros residents in solidarity with Cyprus" (24, 28 and 29 August 1974). Right after Turkey's operation on July 20, *Hudut*, a Turkish paper from Edirne, started publishing a complete list of donors and amounts donated to the Turkish Armed Forces, next to daily updates about the developments in Cyprus. Unlike *Eleftheri Thraki*, *Hudut* published sporadic articles on the effects of the Operation in Cyprus on border-crossings in Edirne. It was noted that although the city was still under martial law, "at the weekend, life went on in the normal way" (*Hudut*, 22 July 1974; 27 July 1974). The paper also acknowledged that "few entries and exits at İpsala and Pazarkule border gates [on the Greek border] were observed although the traffic continued in Kapıkule customs with Bulgaria in the normal way" (*Hudut* 27

July 1974). Right after the agreement at the Geneva Conference on the Cyprus Conflict, it was reported that the exits from Pazarkule had begun with the expectation that border-crossings would “soon get back to *normal*” (*Hudut* 8 August 1974, emphasis mine). In this sense, recalling securitization theory scholars’ definition of security as a speech act that is used to justify exceptional measures against the “existential threat” (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan and Wæver 1997; Wæver 2002), the contrast between the Greek and Bulgarian border gates emerges as a “securitizing move” that marks the former as the exception to the normal politics and, as such, a necessary move.

The local papers also followed the minority policies of their political centers, selectively framing the local impacts of the Cyprus dispute, silencing *some* borderlanders, and giving voice to others. *Eleftheri Thraki* extensively covered the Cyprus invasion as well as Turkey’s foreign policy from the perspective of the Greek political center, whereas its impacts on the locals of Evros Thrace were not given much space. *Hudut* followed the situation in Evros slightly more closely. For example, the story of two young men of Turkish-Muslim minority background from Alexandroupoli was covered in the following way:

(...)They said ‘we were thinking and planning to flee to Turkey and to reach freedom. For a week we hid in the fields, we didn’t have food or water but our desire to be free in Turkey overcame everything and finally it came true. (*Hudut*, 16 July 1974)

Such coverage shows that the voice of locals of Evros is heard only in *Hudut* and only after it is filtered through the established ethno-religious lense. It reinforces the Greek periphery’s ties with the Turkish political center and its aim to maintain the status quo, namely Turkey’s role as the guarantor of the rights of the Muslim-Turkish minority in Greek Thrace.

During my fieldwork in Evros, forty years after the conflict, it was evident that the military measures used over the Turkish-Muslim minority at that time pushed the minority

further away from the Greek political center and Greek co-habitants in Evros, and drew them towards the Turkish center. Several informants in their 30s and from one of the mixed mountain villages in Evros, reiterated the following story in slightly different ways:

That summer night in 1974, Greek soldiers came and collected in the village center all the Muslim men over fifteen, and kept them all night under the vigilance of armed men, some of them being Greek neighbors from the same village. Next morning, the head of armed men said that [they] were brought there to be killed but, upon the new order received from Athens, [they] were free to go.

As the narrative goes, these encounters with the Greek authorities in 1974 made the minority community “wake up and realize that in the eyes of the Greek state and the Greeks [they] were all the same.” Until then, there was some distance between the Sunni community, who were mostly Pomak speakers, and the Alevite community. Yet, after that night, the elders of the village met and decided to speak only in Turkish from then onwards. As opposed to minorities’ experiences as such, the pages of *Eleftheri Thraki* in 1974 underlined local solidarity with the Greek Cypriots and the Greek army, with headlines like “the people of Komotini [Greek-Orthodox majority] are uprising for revenge about Cyprus” (*Eleftheri Thraki* 27 July 1974), “whipping round on Asvestades [village] for Cyprus” (*Eleftheri Thraki* , 29 August 1974).

This common minority narrative is engrained in the “collective memory,” not because there is a common mentality emerging out of individual memories but “because actors do” (Ballinger 2003: 21) the act of repeating the same narrative. Its reiterations in 2014 derive from the subsequent and ongoing hardships encountered in everyday life by minorities who were and are active agents in the field of security between Greece and Turkey. Surely, as Jutila (2006) says, researchers must be careful not to freeze such narratives and contribute to the fiction. For that, the analysis must be focused on the process of the formation of minority identity and politics. Yet, as underlined by the C.A.S.E (2006), collective memory plays a pivotal role in the

constitution of collective self and its respective other(s), and unfolding the collective self sheds light on the politics of memory and the heritage of founding violence in the constitution of security imaginaries. This memory-security relationship complicates the neat picture of the security world offered by traditional security studies with a focus on actors' strategies. From a memory-security perspective, this repeated minority narrative in Greek Thrace pinpoints the historical moment of the founding violence that pitted the collective self of the Muslim-Turkish minority against the Greek other.

Besides this ethnicized minority narrative, local newspapers' coverage of the Cyprus event also shaped the "collective memory" of a majority of the Greek community, in the case of *Eleftheri Thraki*, and of the Turkish community, in the case of *Hudut* through the recollection of antagonistic and securitizing memories of earlier Greco-Turkish conflicts. In a few op-eds in *Hudut* there appeared vulgar representations of "shallow brained" Greeks and "their dream of Enosis [that] died forever when faced with the Turkish soldier ready to fight at any cost" (*Hudut*, 27 July 1974). The paper also proudly presented the details of "military success" of the Turkish army invading the island, followed by a series of articles that appeared from the 6th to the 12th of August, titled "1897 Turkish-Greek War in the Folk Music." Concurrently, *Eleftheri Thraki* recalled what happened in September 1922, showing its disappointment in the Western powers, namely Britain and the US, which sided with the Turks in the Cyprus issue and "did not let [them] repay the attack with our army in Evros" (*Eleftheri Thraki* , 31 July 1974). At other moments, the paper applauded the opening of a monument in Samothraki for the people of the island that had been slaughtered by the Turks (*Eleftheri Thraki* , 7 August 1974) or criticised the US support of Turkey: "50 years after the slaughter of Armenians!" (*Eleftheri Thraki* 20 August 1974).

In sum, the ethnicization of the minority and securitization of the minority situation in Greek Thrace as of 1974 emerged as the *effects*, not only of the Greek and Turkish political centers and local state actors—namely soldiers—in the borderlands, but also of the actions of the borderlanders themselves in Greek and Turkish Thrace: local residents showing solidarity with Cypriots of their own choosing, columnists recalling the previous atrocities between Greeks and Turks, and newspaper editors and owners choosing which news to publish. As Anagnostou aptly points out, the role of media and the founding violence in 1974, the many years of being excluded from channels of economic participation and political representation in Greek Thrace, and Turkey’s patronage to compensate their exclusion, which was intensified in 1980s, “transformed [the minority] from a *de jure* ‘Muslim minority’ to a *de facto* ‘ethnic minority’ and in the mid-1980s mobilized to claim a common Turkishveş consciousness” (2001: 107). This process drew the Turkish-Muslim minorities’ position in Greek domestic politics closer to the Turkish ethnic homeland, encouraged their spatial mobility to towards Turkey, and deepened the ethnically determined us-them distinctions in everyday life.

### ***Re-b/ordering the national space***

This section shows that, in addition to the reiterations of negative images in the public discourse of the other that is physically located very close, the militarized governance of the borderlands has further limited physical connections between the Greek and Turkish borderlanders. It has also reinforced the idea that Greek and Turkish Thrace where these images circulated are two distinct units with no social connections.

As mentioned earlier, military deployment and tightening of border controls brought stricter rules to the everyday life of both Greek and Turkish borderlanders. Farmers, hunters, and fishermen had to receive special permission, granted by military authorities, just to reach their

fields along their own side of border. The Thracian border still remained a zone of surveillance as of 2014, as I could pass some hours on both the Greek and the Turkish side of the border only when accompanied by local hunters, farmers, and fisherman on the Greek side, and farmers on the Turkish side, who still hold permissions. In Enez, two police officers gave me a “tour” to the riverside and showed me fishermen’s huts, next to which I could also see rubber boats used by smugglers. They warned me in a friendly tone not to go there again on my own, saying “otherwise, there is no way to go there.”

The spatial effects of this militarization are also observed in the historical Orient Express Railway in Karaağaç, Edirne. Karaağaç, one of the most multi-ethnic, multi-religious neighborhoods of Edirne that was inhabited mainly by non-Muslims before the Balkan Wars (Balta 1998), went through a transformation due to the Cyprus disputes. After its Greek inhabitants moved to Orestiada following the Lausanne Treaty and refugees arrived from Greek Macedonia, the century-old train station in Karaağaç was a contact zone, connecting people of Orestiada and Edirne. After the national borders were drawn with the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, trains coming from Istanbul used to crisscross the Thracian border from Pythion/Uzunköprü to the Greek side, continue to the north, and make a stopover in Karaağaç before heading further north towards the Balkans. The local informants in Karaağaç recall times when Greek machinists were buying sugar from Karaağaç as it was scarce and more expensive in Greece, or bringing Greek coffee to Karaağaç, which, for Turkish borderlanders, was better quality for the price. Although leather smuggling was mostly done in the 1980s and via the villages along the Evros River, some locals in Karaağaç remember that leather was also illegally transported to Greece on these trains crisscrossing the border.

Nevertheless soon after the change in railways, these interpersonal exchanges were cut off. In 1971 a new train station was constructed for the Istanbul-Edirne route that was closer to the town center of Edirne. The main reason, as explained by many locals, was to cut bureaucracy at customs and reduce the amount of taxes paid to each country's border authorities for each entry and exit. According to these procedures, Turkish passengers heading to northern Thrace had to pay more than Greek passengers because the tax was calculated according to the distance the wagons took in the neighboring countries' lands. Hence Karaağaç station lost its regional role as a hub where Greek and Turkish borderlanders could meet.

Notwithstanding the economic costs of this joint venture, the timing of Turkish authorities' decision to build the new railway does not seem accidental, considering the rise of inter-communal disputes in Cyprus that had started in 1963. From the time the new train station started operating in Edirne in the early 1970s until the new railway was constructed along Greek Thrace in later years, Greek trains operating between the towns of northern Evros were still passing through the historical station in Karaağaç. However, when the Cyprus dispute escalated, it was noted in the local Turkish paper that "there [were] no passengers on the Greek trains. They pass[ed] quickly, with all lights on and without making a stop [in Karaağaç]" (*Hudut* 17 August 1974). The tone of this news coverage implied that "Greeks" avoided any encounter with "Turks." Soon after, a new railway was also constructed on the Greek side, further inland, and the train station in Karaağaç was completely closed.

Just as the deployment of more military forces in Karaağaç and mine fields in Orestiada right across the border reconstituted the border from a porous to a sealed-off border, the construction of new train stations on both sides of the Northern Thracian border for domestic train rides drew the borderlanders further away from each other in everyday life. After the

closure of the train station, this historical site was allocated to the newly founded Trakya University of Edirne and, away from the main campuses of the university, the station and the lands surrounding it were not actively used for many years. The Karaağaç neighborhood, once the contact zone for Greek and Turkish borderlanders, became nothing more than the westernmost point of the Turkish geo-body and, as explained in the previous section, the construction of the Lausanne monument early in the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations reinforced the national character of this space while neglecting local cross-border ties.

In sum, the mobilization of nationalist discourse in Turkish and Greek Thrace has paved the way for the construction of two distinct, national territorial spaces in which the old translocal ties were selectively cut off. These changes in the Thracian peripheries, in the aftermath of the Cyprus conflict, become showcases of van Schendel's (2005) politics of scale. The fading organic ties of the refugee families in Orestiada and their land across the border exemplify the "scales-we-almost-lost" (pre-border web of relations). The ethnicization of the Muslim-Turkish minority of Greek Thrace and strengthening of their connections with the Turkish homeland reveal the "border-induced scale" (cross-border webs of relations that spring up because of the border's existence). Finally, Karaağaç station's diminishing role as a contact zone for Greek and Turkish borderlanders shows the (re)configurations of the "state scale" (web of relations that comes with the border and is confined to the national territory).

#### **On cross-border mobilities : from legal *and* licit to illegal *yet* licit at the national border**

This section documents the impact of the Cyprus dispute and militarized measures taken by the two political centers on the motives, rhythms, and forms of cross-border mobilities and interactions along the border—in other words, on the politic of mobility. In particular, the

minority's unauthorized border crossing acts reveal that the lines of legality and licitness did not necessarily overlap in this militarized regime of bordering.

In their edited volume on the regulation of human mobility in Asia, Kalir et al. (2012) follow up on Abraham and van Schendel's (2005) distinction between licit and legal, and call for a careful look at the state categorization of informal mobility. From the perspective of the mobile people, they show "how 'regimes of permissiveness' condition and sustain informal migration" (2012:19). In a similar vein, I focus on the experiences of the mobile people across the Thracian border and critically look at how licit acts of border-crossings have been rendered sometimes legal and other times illegal, and why. As the migration experiences of the Western Thracian minority show, the il/legality of licit border-crossings are determined by the changing foreign policy goals of the sending and receiving states that are byproducts of their militarized regime of bordering.

### ***Legal and licit***

This subsection demonstrates which acts of cross-border mobilities the militarized regime of bordering has rendered legal and licit. As explained, the militarization of the border suddenly cut the organic ties between the borderland villagers and their ancestors' land across the border. However, border crossings through customs for daily visits to Edirne's town center continued after a short interval in the summer of 1974. These daily visitors were mainly Gagauzes and other Turkish speaking Greeks living in North Evros, and the Muslim-Turkish minority of Greek Thrace who previously had social and, in some cases, familial ties in Edirne. Yet there was more substantive mobility of what I call *day trippers*, from Greek to Turkish Thrace after Turkey lifted visas for Greek citizens in 1984. This was right after then-prime minister Özal's visit to Edirne where he was convinced that easy crossings from Greek Thrace via Pazarkule Border Gate

would positively affect Edirne's local economy. Nevertheless, this was a one-way change in policy as Turkish passport holders then, and still, required a visa to cross the border.

This one-sided change in visa policy created an economic advantage for Edirne in the 1980s. Yet it was short lived as the shop owners in Orestiada and other places had raised their voices as they were losing income. In response to the growing unrest among local shop owners in the Greek periphery, and in addition to the Turkish political center's ban on diplomatic passage from Pazarkule in 1982,<sup>1</sup> Greek authorities increased custom taxes and introduced stricter controls on the amount of goods brought from Edirne. Then, in 1989, they limited the opening hours of the Kastaneis Border Gate, at the other end of Pazarkule, to 4 hours a day. The economic exchanges as well as people's mobility were severely affected and came to a halt until 2000, when the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers came together and agreed to keep the border gate open 24 hours a day. This was possible thanks to ardent action by local stakeholders soon after the 1999 political rapprochement. The local encounters in the economic field that the new rapprochement triggered are depicted in detail in Chapter Five.

As explained in the introduction, members of minority communities in the two countries fled to their kin-states in times of tension between Greece and Turkey. Most of the Greek-Orthodox minority fled Turkey due to the 1955 pogrom and the subsequent 1964 expulsion. The Turkish-Muslim minority, however, has migrated over time, especially during and after military rule in Greece from the 1960s until the mid-1980s, mainly due to being systematically excluded from channels of economic and political participation. Some members of the minority community have also chosen to go to Germany for economic reasons, first as guest workers and later thanks to the availability of free movement for citizens of Greece as an EC member

(Anagnostou 2001). However, especially for minority students, Turkey has always been a popular destination.

Until the first minority secondary school was opened in 1949, studying in Turkey was the only option for children of the minority community who finished minority primary school. This was also preferred by the prominent families of the minority community due to chaos and conflict in the region during World War II and in the subsequent Civil War period in Greece. Yet, as repeated by many informants and mentioned by Greek scholars (see Anagnostou 2001, 2005; Demetriou 2013), minority policies of the Junta Period were an important turning point that made studying in Turkey the common trend for the minority community.

The intrusion of the Turkish political center in the Greek periphery also played a role in student mobility across the border. Specifically, the Turkish consulate in Komotini has been the authority allocating students to a public boarding school somewhere in Turkish Thrace. While Edirne was a common destination for its proximity, many families who had relatives in Bursa and Izmir in Western Anatolia, a popular destination for immigrants from the Balkans, also preferred these cities for their children's schooling. Some families accompanied their children who went to study and then stayed in Turkey after completing their studies. Many people lost their Greek citizenship because of Article 19 of the Greek constitution, which allowed the local Greek authorities to erase people from the registers soon after they left their home addresses. Regardless, Turkey remained the main destination for secondary and tertiary education until Greece's discriminatory minority policies began to change in the mid-1990s.

Take, for example, Önder, who was born in 1954 as a member of the Muslim-Turkish minority community in Gümülcine/Komotini. When the Cyprus operation started in the summer of 1974, Önder was already studying medicine in Turkey and was back in Komotini for summer

holiday. Right before the start of the academic year, Önder crossed the border with a valid student visa. Yet he had to stay in Turkey after graduating in 1978 because he had lost his citizenship based on Article 19, while his family stayed in Komotini. Although he married a Turkish citizen from Keşan, Edirne, and settled there, he remained *heimatlos* for several years and could not visit his family across the border during that time. In 1984, based on a Cabinet decision, Önder acquired Turkish citizenship along with at least 10 thousand others.<sup>2</sup> As noted in the introduction, around sixty thousand people were stripped of their citizenship based on this article, until it was modified in 1998 (Demetriou 2013: 191). The minority members who are older than Önder and who live in Edirne also noted that either they themselves or their family members became *heimatlos* for leaving their hometown to study in Turkey or to work in Germany.

The experiences of those who arrived in the 1980s or later are different from previous generations, which implies that Article 19, despite staying in force, was less strictly applied. The life story of Mehmet, who was born in 1981, portrays this change very well. Mehmet was raised in an ethnically mixed and nowadays almost abandoned village by the Evros River. Since there was no minority school in or close to the village, Mehmet and his sister were sent to Edirne in the mid-1980s, accompanied by their grandparents; his mother and father stayed to take care of their fields. However, after consecutive floods made it harder to live in the village and most villagers moved towards the center of Orestiada, Mehmet's parents also moved to Edirne. Mehmet and his family continued to visit their village, collect the harvest, and keep up with their Greek-Orthodox, Turkish-speaking Gagauz neighbors who were looking after their fields. Mehmet's parents had no schooling but could speak enough Greek to communicate with their Greek speaking neighbors in the village. Mehmet, on the other hand, learned Greek during his

military service in the Greek army, after he earned his degree in Turkey. The whole family had Greek citizenship for all those years. While Mehmet and his sister were holding student visas, their parents and grandparents were making use of visa-free entry to Turkey. Frequent visits to their village was also sufficient to secure their Greek citizenship, as well as a visa-free stay in Turkey. Turkish citizenship was then needed only for Mehmet in order to be able to work as a teacher at a public school. With no hope of returning to their abandoned village, no network in Orestiada or elsewhere in Greece, and no accredited diploma for the Greek job market, Mehmet had no other option but to work at any job that would secure him residency based on his work permit and, at the end of five years of uninterrupted residence, apply for Turkish citizenship.

This is a common generational story among the minority from Greek Thrace, which has experienced the transition from the most conflictual period when many people, like Önder, lost their Greek citizenship in the Europeanization of minority rights, and positive developments in minority schooling in the 1990s. With the lifting of visas for Greek citizens in the 1980s, the Muslim-Turkish minorities from nearby villages and towns of Evros began to enjoy cross-border mobility while keeping their legal status on both sides. Indeed, visa-free travel to Turkey and geographical proximity have remained the main reason for many people Mehmet's age or younger to study in Edirne and eagerly settle there after finishing their schooling in various Turkish cities. The younger generations' experiences with developments in Greek minority policies are detailed in Chapter Six.

Other than the minority members from Greek Thrace, Edirne also received immigrants from Bulgaria as well as other Balkan countries. There have been several migration waves of ethnic Turks from Soviet Bulgaria to the "Turkish homeland": with the bilateral voluntary resettlement agreement in 1925, after the advent of communism and collectivization of land in

1950-1951, following the signing of treaty to unite separate families in 1968, and the last and the biggest after the infamous assimilation campaign of the Zhivkov government when 300,000 people migrated to Turkey in 1989 (Eminov 1997; Kaşlı and Parla 2009; Şimşir 1986). Kapıkule Border Gate in Edirne was their main point of entry to Turkey and many families settled in Edirne as it feels close to their “home” in Bulgaria. Similarly, during the Kosovan war, people fleeing to Turkey first stayed in Edirne until they were settled in camps elsewhere in the early 2000s. These were all authorized crossings along the Thracian border that were welcomed by the Turkish authorities in a different way than the ones explained in the next section.

### *Illegal yet licit*

This subsection discloses the ways in which illegality was sometimes tolerated and even embraced by state actors for the perpetuation of licit mobility acts. Illegal yet licit acts, in this case, refers to the violation of state’s control over the national territory through unauthorized acts of crossing the border from Greece to the Turkish homeland. As explained above, following the Turkey’s Cyprus Operation, the Muslim-Turkish minority community in Greek Thrace was exposed to severe securitizing measures in their everyday life, and in some cases their right to life was threatened. This led many people to flee to Turkey, as manifested in the story of two young members of the minority community found hiding in the fields on the Turkish side (*Hudut* 16 July 1974). Önder underlines that fleeing to the Turkish side of the Thracian border was a common practice and the most feasible option for those who did not have a student visa as Önder did.<sup>3</sup> More interestingly, Önder’s own experience shows that illegal border-crossing was a more effective way to acquire Turkish citizenship, as illegality in this case was taken as proof of seeking refuge in the kin-state. Thus, the rising tension in Greek-Turkish relations as of 1974,

which led to further militarization of the border, also rendered illegal crossings of the ethnic-kın legitimate:

How is it now for the people from the Middle East trying to cross the river and get perished? Somehow the same (...) Back then too there were of course people who got commission to help you. They would put you in a cab, 2-3 people together. It was let's say around 1000 Mark at that time. You would pay that and they would pass you to the other side. There the [Turkish] soldiers would catch you immediately asking what happened. And you would say 'I crossed illegally.' The soldiers also knew about it, they would take you to the police station, just a regular procedure. Then they would give you temporary residency, so they would not turn you down, not give you back or something. Of course they didn't want to empty that place [Western Thrace] but they were also sensitive. It's also a very emotional thing you know, seeing the venture, hearing the atrocities from you... To be frank, if it was legal, everybody would want to come to Turkey in '74. It was already hard and it got harder, people taken into custody, going through torture... it's hard to be a minority (...) My own case is maybe one in every thousand. People mostly came illegally. But in my case, I don't remember if it was during the military rule [1980-83] or not but there were some high commanders we knew. We found them via via. They helped us with that. They said 'OK we will note that you had to come illegally.' I mean they made such a change in my statement... Of course you would come as a student and a tourist but then you were not allowed to work. As a tourist you could stay maximum 1 month and then return. Same for students, we were expected to return. Illegal [in that case] meant that you were seeking asylum. You would say, I am of Turkish origin and I seek refuge here. So I guess they [the high commanders] were making it fit into the [international] law. Before doing that, I sent petitions for citizenship maybe every year and I didn't get a reply (...) After making that petition, I finally got the citizenship with a special decree. It was so many people. Even the current Minister of Health was in that group.<sup>4</sup>

The international law that Önder refers to is the 1951 Refugee Convention that Turkey signed, but with a geographical limitation added to it with the 1967 Protocol. This protocol allowed her to limit humanitarian residence permits to those fleeing from the west of Turkey. As explained by the head of the Western Thracian Turks Solidarity Association (Batı Trakya Türkleri Dayanışma Derneği, henceforth BTTDD) in Istanbul, there was an "open door" policy of then-Prime Minister Menderes in the early 1950s that allowed 40 to 50 thousand people to acquire individual migrant (*münferit göçmen*) status with a pathway to citizenship, according to the Turkish Settlement and Citizenship Laws. Otherwise, the citizenship acquisition process for

“Western Thracian Turks,” the Muslim-Turkish minority from Greek Thrace, has followed in all those years the following steps: (1) acquiring a humanitarian residence permit in Turkey, (2) losing Greek citizenship according to Article 19 of the Greek Constitution and becoming *heimatlos*, and (3) obtaining Turkish citizenship.<sup>5</sup>

Yet transition from *heimatlos* status to Turkish citizenship was not very smooth. The explanation of the BTTDD leader and the personal accounts of several informants in Edirne show that Greek citizen minorities, like Önder, who became *heimatlos* at different times between the 1950s and 1970s, eventually obtained Turkish citizenship based on Cabinet decisions specifically sought for people of Turkish descent and culture. Nevertheless, there were still approximately 30 thousand *heimatlos* people in the early 2000s because they were not able to maintain valid residency for five consecutive years and earn the right to apply for citizenship according to the asylum precedures.<sup>6</sup> Eventually, based on a Cabinet decision, those who had two years of uninterrupted residency were given Turkish citizenship in 2008 and 2009. This implies that the procedure that applied to Önder and others in the 1980s was repeated in the 2000s. Thus the experience of *heimatlos* people from Greek Thrace stands as yet another form of Turkish state practice to activate the ethnicized notion of “migrant” in the Turkish Citizenship and Settlement Laws with ministerial decrees and Cabinet decisions, as was done for co-ethnics from Bulgaria in the 2000s (Kaşlı and Parla 2009). In that sense, Önder and others were also granted *münferit göçmen* status with a pathway to citizenship, as were the Western Thracian Turks of the Menderes period. Yet as discussed elsewhere, the recent changes in Turkish citizenship and residency laws, as part of Turkey’s harmonization with EU norms and rules, made the *münferit göçmen* status even harder to claim in 2010 (Kaşlı 2016; Parla 2011).

In a nutshell, in all cases I encountered in Edirne, il/legality of the minorities' border-crossing acts were determined in relation to Turkey's policy towards its ethnic-kins abroad at the time of cross-border mobility. For example, an entire family, whom I met in Edirne, migrated from Xanthi in early 1950s with valid papers that they had acquired from the Turkish consulate in Komotini, giving them *münferit göçmen* status; Önder's friends, on the other hand, had to cross the border illegally in 1974. Further, Önder, who actually crossed the border legally, had to pretend that he crossed the border illegally. Yet in both cases, people's citizenship acquisition was secured via Cabinet decisions. The difference between these two seemingly dissimilar decisions – the former referring to the available citizenship laws, the latter giving consent to the violation of states' control over its territorial borders – was due to the fact that, concomitant to the break of the Greek-Turkish detente by mid-1950s, the open door policy of Turkey towards her ethnic kin was replaced with keeping the minority population in their home countries so as to increase Turkey's foreign policy leverage. As shown in Chapter Six on cross-border cultural encounters developed parallel to the Europeanization of the Greek-Turkish border, this is still the determining motivation of Turkish government's support to ethnic kin in the Balkans, including Greece.

These local accounts show that the Muslim-Turkish minority's acts of cross-border mobilities were seen as licit and welcomed in Edirne and elsewhere in Turkey. However their search for legal ways to stay permanently was met with different political motivations of the center at different times. As Önder's case of faking illegal entry demonstrates, shortly after the Cyprus conflict crossing the border illegally into Turkey was a licit act for the ethnic-kin in Greek Thrace, while illegality became the precondition to have access to citizenship of the kin-state. Ironically then, illegal acts of border-crossings acquired a positive meaning with the

acceleration of the militarized regime of bordering. As manifested in Mehmet's case, it was easy for the younger generation of mobile minorities to access schooling but not the labour market. The changing regime of bordering in 1980s welcomed Greek majority and minority citizens with a valid tourist visa, and later even without a visa, mainly in the market place and tourist sites. Members of the minority community were also welcomed in secondary and tertiary schools, without making their permanent legal stay any easier and illegal entry acceptable. These different minority experiences imply that the acceptable configurations of (il)legality and (il)licitness depend on the prevailing politics of mobility and fixity at a given moment in the regime of bordering.

#### **On othering: Nationalist reflexes at critical junctures**

This section discusses impacts of militarization of the regime of bordering on the othering practices among various local actors of the Thracian borderlands. The imprint of the regime of bordering is observed in examples of hostile discourses and actions based on sharp us-them distinctions, even during the early years of the official rapprochement. These examples imply that some actors in states' peripheries may fall behind their political centers in adopting the Europeanization of relations and the changing notions of citizenship and territory.

As depicted above, local receptions of 1974 were dominated by statist views in the peripheries of the nation-states. This convergence between centers and their peripheries, on the perception of security, national territory and the nation to be defended, have gradually dissolved as the regime of bordering has begun to change. Notwithstanding the fact that the Aegean disputes – begun in 1976 and repeated in the 1980s and 1990s – added to the unresolved Cyprus conflict, some sectors of civil society in both Greece and Turkey, such as business communities and journalists, began to come together throughout the 1990s (Kotelis 2006; Öniş and Yılmaz 2008;

Özel 2004). Nevertheless, these crucial initiatives, examples of track-two diplomacy, were not accepted without resistance at the local level.

From the 1990s onwards, Europeanization processes of the two countries seemed to have direct implications on both the positive initiatives and reactions to them. This process of elite socialization and learning has shaped the specific positions of the local actors and has paved the way for the notions of national security and national threat to be revisited. Initially it is the political centers that seem to have started the process of friendship, which didn't fit in the "sense of border" in Green's (2012) words, that the local actors had been operating in for a few decades. While some local actors were already looking for possibilities of cross-border interactions, others have gradually come to realize the benefits of change in the old militarized regime of bordering, letting go of their established roles as the defenders of the borders of the national self and the national space, and embraced the friendship discourse, even more so than the actors in the political centers. While in some cases these discourses are distinguished according to the actors involved, in other cases the same actors embody both of these seemingly contradictory discourses.

The former, that is, the presence of different views and discourses among local actors on the official rapprochement, becomes apparent in the personal experience of Yannis Laskarakis in Greek Thrace. Laskarakis, from the local paper *Gnomi* in Alexandroupoli and a member of the cross-border initiative of journalists, recalls local counter-reactions he had to face around the time of the 1999 official rapprochement. As part of the track-two diplomacy mentioned above, a group of Greek and Turkish journalists gathered, soon after the 1996 Imia/ Kardar Crisis, to discuss what roles journalists should play in such political disputes. They agreed to organize the next conference in Komotini following two successful meetings in Izmir and Istanbul. However,

in reaction to the upcoming journalists meeting, some MPs mobilizing the Greek parliament asked for an official apology from Turkish authorities for the Cyprus invasion before the Turkish journalists' visit to Greece. Also, Laskarakis was personally attacked by nationalists groups in Alexandroupoli. Not only did he receive threatening letters calling him "Turkish seed" and "betrayed," but his car was burned down the day before the explosion near the Turkish Consulate in Komotini. This explosion happened on the same day as Öcalan's arrest in the Greek embassy in Kenya (*Kathimerini* 10 February 1999). While many racist groups, including the infamous Golden Dawn, were pointed out as possible perpetrators, the attack was condemned quickly by local leaders, MPs, and government officials and was called an attempt to destabilize the region and harm relations with Turkey (*Eleftherotipia*, 13 February 1999).<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, as Laskarakis says, the journalists' conference was cancelled due to these threats and no other official attempt at joint meetings was pursued in the border region until after the first visit of Erdoğan to Komotini in 2004.

In addition to having different local actors with clashing views on rapprochement, these contradictory viewpoints sometimes co-existed in the discourses and actions of the same actors. The roles attributed to the Karaağaç train station in the 1990s is a case in point. As depicted before, the immediate closure of the historical Karaağaç train station in the 1970s went hand in hand with the local recollections of past Greek-Turkish atrocities, which nurtured sharp distinctions between what is defined as the national self and the other. The main and adjacent buildings in the courtyard of the station complex were then given to the newly founded Trakya University. Known as the only territory along the Greek-Turkish border that was earned not by military but by diplomatic power of the Turkish delegate in Lausanne, the bordering role of Karaağaç is further inscribed in space with the university administration's decision to construct

the “Lausanne monument, museum and square” in 1998 in the yard of the old train station. What is striking here is that the monument was officially opened in the presence of then president Süleyman Demirel in July 1998, at a time when track-one as well as track-two diplomacy had already started and just before local economic elites in Edirne publicly demanded increasing cross-border exchanges with Greece (*Hudut* 26 October 1999). These efforts are detailed in Chapter Five.

The decision to construct the monument in this specific space was made unanimously during a university senate meeting in November 1996, “against the internal and external activities to revitalize the Sèvres [the 1920 treaty that marked the beginning of the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and its ultimate annihilation] and overthrow the founding principles of the republic.”<sup>8</sup> Soon a national campaign was launched to raise funding for the construction and it was supported by individuals as well as the Edirne Municipality and the Edirne Chamber of Industry and Commerce (henceforth ETSO). As inscribed on the monument itself, the aim is “to acknowledge the role of the treaty which represents, both territorial and national foundations of modern Turkey as it granted this piece of land, including Karaağaç, to Turkey.” The monument is composed of three columns of different lengths surrounded with water, representing three pieces of land: Anatolia, Thrace and Karaağaç. Together they represent the territories of the Turkish republic, surrounded by three seas yet divided from one another by the Bosphorus and Evros, respectively. While the three columns are surrounded with a circle that represents national unity, the female figure holding a dove in one hand and the Lausanne Treaty in the other symbolizes law and kindness as well as peace and democracy. (See Appendix for a photo of the monument and the train station.)

As Winichakul illustrates in his book *Siam Mapped A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, such representations of the national self and identifications with the national historiography create the “geo-body” of modern nation-state and its “floating image” (1997: 168), without any connection with the people, landscape, and social life on the other side of the border, and a narrative of the “lost territories” to claim continuity of the rule of the manufactured nation since time immemorial (Winichakul 1997:154-156). In a similar vein, the Lausanne monument in the westernmost point of the Turkish geo-body, Karaağaç, also reproduces the “floating image” of modern Turkey and its territorial unity with no connection with what exists beyond its borders.

This monument materially constructs the cultural and social memory of this space, while contradicting the practice. In its materiality, it disregards the long-gone, multi-ethnic and multi-religious history of the Ottoman Edirne of the early 1900s when there was not yet a national border as such (Balta 1998; Kaşlı forthcoming). It also does not give room to incorporate more recent local history of cross-border interactions, which are still alive in the memory of borderlanders old enough to remember everyday life in the region before the Cyprus Conflict. Moreover, it neglects the fact that, in practice, Greek Thrace and the minority in these “lost territories” of the Ottoman Empire have been seen as part and parcel of the national self ever since the agreement on the territorial borders in Lausanne. Last but not the least, such memorialization of the founding violence in 1998 shows that the local actors who were, in the 2000s, the pioneers of cross-border interactions with great enthusiasm – namely professionals at the university, municipality, and local chambers – were also the ones holding on to the national regime of bordering.

Both the construction of the Lausanne Monument at the old Karaağaç station in Edirne and the reactions against the cross-border journalists' meeting in Evros show that in the first years of rapprochement in the late 1990s, the long-established nationalist discourse and the sharp divide between the national self and the other were quite vocal in the peripheries of the two states. Local acts of citizenship aiming to shift established practices in the militarized regime of bordering were either met with immediate reactions, as in the case of attacks to Laskarakis, or were still accompanied by acts to maintain the image of strong nation and state, as in the case of support from leading local business organizations to the Lausanne monument just before their efforts to strengthen cross-border relations began.

Embodiment of seemingly contradictory practices, which, on the one hand, reproduce the old us-them distinction and, on the other hand, ask for more cross-border interaction, are also observed in the reactions of local political elites to the EU membership of Cyprus in May 2004. In April of 2004, local representatives of many political parties, as well as some local NGOs, formed a platform in Edirne and made an official declaration at the Meeting Hall of ETSO. The news about the "No to Annan Plan Platform" appeared on the first page of *Hudut*, and another half page of the daily was devoted to the text of the press release. The text was read by the local head of *Saadet Partisi* (Felicity Party), the more conservative wing of the Islamist tradition that was superceded by the more liberal AKP. Hitting at the strategic role of Cyprus for Greece, it stated that "Greece tries to limit Turkey from the south via Cyprus." Raising the issue of the available hydrocarbon resources on the island, the platform totally rejected such a referendum "that is based on the Greek thesis" and that represented, from their perspective, "a total surrender" (*Hudut*, April, 17 2004). Demonstrating the extensive local support given to this statement, the declaration was signed by local heads of other mainstream left and right

nationalist parties, namely DSP, GP SP, DYP, ANAP, MHP, CHP, and the local branch of the state-led public servants union, Türkiye Kamu-Sen (*Hudut* 17 Nisan 2004). Exceptions included representatives of the leftist parties such as ÖDP and SHP, the incumbent AKP, the ultranationalist BBP.

At first sight, such extensive support for this initiative from local political and economic elites, and coverage of the news in the most read local paper, suggests that militaristic concerns about national security and the sharp us-them distinctions were intact in Edirne. However, a decade later local notables who were closely connected with the political parties that signed the 2004 declaration, thinking *retrospectively*, marked the early 2000s as a very positive period when cross-border visits and meetings with their counterparts on the other side of the border had begun. This positive part of collective memory is also inscribed in *Hudut*'s pages. On the same day as the declaration of "No to Annan Plan Platform," recent developments in the construction of the road to Pazarkule Border Gate were presented with very positive remarks. Only few days later, the newspaper mentioned the results of the third meeting of thirteen regional governors of Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey where they discussed possibilities of cross-border cooperation and decided to open a joint office in Orestiada to develop cross-border EU-funded projects (*Hudut*, April 20 2004).

These official cross-border exchanges were seen as part of the 2000-2006 Greek-Turkish INTERREG III/A program, the EU regional cooperation program that the local stakeholders, politicians, and governors were then expecting to be approved by Ankara and Athens. Despite the local cross-border initiatives of governors and business organizations, even the consecutive rounds of INTERREG could not be implemented as both sides' Ministries of Foreign Affairs did not agree on the territories where the program could be implemented.<sup>9</sup> The impact of this failed

attempt at cross-border relations and governance of the region are discussed in the next chapters on Europeanization of the border. Here it is necessary to highlight that, as of 2004, local support for such cross-border initiatives took place in the presence of nationalist reactions and, even more interestingly, sometimes the same actors embodied both of these discursive acts.

Take, for example, Ahmet, a small tradesman in his early 50s from Karaağaç. Ahmet had been a board member of a right-wing party until recently. As noted in *Hudut* in 2004, Ahmet, as the local head of his party, was also a signatory of the “No to Annan Plan” platform. However, Ahmet is today one of the most mobile persons in Karaağaç. While his first visit to Greece was in the early 1990s to find his ancestors’ village in Seres in Greek Macedonia, his personal connections with several families in Orestiada were built during his repeated visits with his family and friends from Edirne, especially in the 2000s. Although he signed up for Greek classes offered at the Chamber of Commerce in order to learn a few words of Greek to develop his friendship ties, he apologetically says most of his friends from Orestiada and its surroundings, who are 50 years old or older and used to hearing Turkish either from their parents or their neighbors, are able to speak some Turkish. During one of my visits to Ahmet’s shop in Karaağaç, upon my insistence to hear more about the local political atmosphere in 2004 and mentioning the news piece about the platform that I encountered in *Hudut*, he finally said the following:

It was such an unnecessary move. The organizer of that event [the then local head of Felicity Party] is my old time friend. He called me the night before and said ‘so you are coming tomorrow [to the press release], right?’ and we [I] said ‘yeah yeah.’ I didn’t even question so much what was going on. Probably many people who went there were like me. This is how things sometimes go in a small town like this. You go there for the sake [hatır] of your friend.<sup>10</sup>

While the formation of such a platform and the way it was presented in the most widely circulated and read newspaper of Edirne reveals a local political positioning in the ongoing

future of Cyprus debates, this firsthand insight of a platform member gives us a wider perspective regarding how local actions are shaped within a complex web of social relations. As repeatedly revealed by various examples from the fieldwork provided in the following chapters, such webs of social relations emerge as the most crucial factor for various debordering and rebordering practices at the societal level.

In terms of center-periphery divide, ironically, this positioning of the local actors, as in 2004, stands in stark contrast to the then relatively more liberal AKP government's support to Turkish Cypriots who were for the Annan Plan. The same occurred with the center-right Karamanlis government in Greece and the Greek Cypriots who were skeptical about the Annan Plan (see Öniş and Yılmaz 2008). While social relations might have played an important role in this local performance, participation of local notables in the press release implies persistence, or even tacit acceptance, of the old militarized discourse that draws the borders between the national self and the other. This persistence comes at a time when the geographical location of Edirne, bordering the EU country of Greece and the EU candidate of Bulgaria, was increasingly becoming an asset.

Following Diez et al.'s (2006) four pathway-model of EU impact on border conflicts, it is possible to argue that European integration, and specifically the EU accession process, activates new discourses in conflict societies as in the case of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Diez et al. (2006) note that both Greece's 1974 coup in Cyprus, which was followed by Turkey's military intervention, and the 1996 Imia/Kardak Crisis were instances of securitization, as both were based on perceptions of existential threat. In the same line with Rumelili's (2005a) emphasis on gradual societal rapprochement in the aftermath of Turkey's EU candidacy in 1999, Diez et al. (2006) also claim that since then, bilateral relations have been de-securitized to a great extent and

the same territorial disputes have begun to be considered disagreements waiting to be solved. Hence, they argue, while not solving the conflicts, the Europeanization process works to “desecuritize” the conflicts by framing them not as conflicts over identity but as disagreements in political rhetoric, practices, and at the level of civil society.

From this perspective, Ahmet’s personal involvement in the ad-hoc “No to Annan Plan” platform in 2004, despite his high cross-border mobility and personal ties with Greeks, and his seemingly strategic act of forgetting it a decade later, might be interpreted as an instance of socialization and learning the new issue frames, which the Europeanization of the Greek-Turkish relations had facilitated despite its failures at institutional levels. As local cross-border encounters intensify, and direct and personal contacts are strengthened, local political (and economic) actors, like Ahmet, seem to become active participants in the transformation process and gradually catch up with the new terms of bilateral foreign policy within the EU framework. After all, as Ahmet sheepishly stated:

It was not one of the things that I would want to tell about myself or about Edirne. So I just explain it now because you seem to know it already... I can say those days are long gone. I don’t know who was really behind it because it was a one-time reaction and nobody even the organizer [the then local head of Felicity Party] himself didn’t insist on it afterwards. And today nobody would do such things here anymore.<sup>11</sup>

Ahmet’s trivialization of this event and his insistence on the impossibility of a repeat of 2004’s local political action proves that local nonstate actors, as well as state actors, go through a learning process and understand by experiencing what would, and would not, work best for their own position as local actors under given political and economic circumstances. After all, this case is an exception in the sense that the local political actors so openly contradicted the new official discourse regarding Greek-Turkish high politics. As such, it shows that this was a moment of transition for local actors who had been learning the rules of the new game of

Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations, and the position of Edirne in that game. This learning process eventually went beyond the limited change in the state-level relations, as Ahmet and other political and economic stakeholders in Edirne showed their discontent with the lack of political will for substantive changes and apathy for institutional change among the state elites in the two countries' capital cities.

In a similar manner, Gkintidis' (2013) analysis of the World Thracian Congresses show changes over the years in local actors' take on Europeanization of the Greek foreign policy and the new discourse of Greek-Turkish cooperation. The World Thracian Congress has been organized since 1993 by what Gkintidis (2013: 457) calls, "networks of Thracian militants" that include local politicians in cooperation with neo-orthodox intellectuals from Athens, businessmen, local clergy, and cultural associations. The congress of 1998 emerged as the critical juncture after which, despite protests by local clergy or marginalized "patriotic militants," the congresses reflected the "dominant configuration of political power" (Gkintidis 2013: 459). Similar to Ahmet's embarrassment in talking about the platform a decade later, Gkintidis observes that during his fieldwork in Evros, started in 2006, most of the organizers of earlier congresses were avoiding direct references to what was previously framed as "competitive nationalism." Gkintidis's example of one local PASOK representative clearly distinguishing his public and private views – the former follows a discourse of "maturity and rationality" and the latter underlines his loyalty to Greek nationalism – hints at the utilitarian motives in what is considered elite socialization. This double discourse among a number of local political elites, Gkintidis argues, is based on their reading of new Greek foreign policy as driven by the idea of separating national and personal interests, which implied "Greek-Turkish friendship was the 'right thing to do in public' during the early 2000s" (Gkintidis 2013: 464). The fact that there is

no more room for securitizing moves in the peripheries, in the sense that they were embraced at the peak of Cyprus conflict and early years of the official rapprochement, is also implied by Ahmet as he says that “today nobody would do such things here anymore.” Moreover, looking at the local indifference to the annual commemoration ceremony of Lausanne Treaty in the last years, I would argue that the founding memory and the meaning of the border are not erased but at least continue to transform in the mental maps of the people of Edirne, hence reshaping the acts of citizenship that the new regime of bordering encourages as the “right thing to do in public.”<sup>12</sup>

These local examples of the diverse and sometimes contradictory citizens’ actions and reactions in the face of new friendship discourse shows various directions that a slowly changing regime of bordering/debordering/rebordering may take. The different positions held by political actors of the peripheries, a few decades after the Cyprus conflict, reveal the impacts of the militarized regime of bordering and its change over time on local discourses and practices of othering. Similar contradictory discourses could also be observed in other parts of Greece and Turkey. However, what distinguishes local experiences in the Thracian borderlands is the fact that the changing limits of the two states’ power over space and people has everyday life consequences for the peripheries. The local actors, dwelling in a territorial space where the militarized regime of bordering has enforced a politics of fixity more than mobility and sharpened us-them distinctions in public space and in the popular imagery, adjust their sense of border to the new game in town in their own particular pace and way. In the case of the “No to Annan Plan Platform,” continuities in the antagonistic us-them distinction became visible in the local public discourse when the old national disputes, which were the remnants of the militarized regime of bordering, were brought up in the early years of political rapprochement. Yet, Ahmet’s

account as of 2014 and the lack of interest in Lausanne commemorations in Edirne in the last years support Gkintidis's (2013) analysis of the transformation of the political discourse in Evros. Hence, in the Thracian borderlands it is observed that, through elite socialization and learning, at least the discursive imagery of the old national other has changed in the process of Europeanization of the bilateral relations.

Mitchell (1991: 95) argues that "state" is an effect of detailed mundane social process such as spatial and temporal arrangements, functional specifications, supervision, and surveillance, which "create the appearance of a world divided into state and society." In the Thracian borderland, both at the peak of the Cyprus conflict and during the gradual rebordering process, the idea of two states and their higher political interests, as distinct from the everyday needs and interests of the borderlanders, is produced through the militarized regime of bordering that has then been embraced and reproduced by many local state and nonstate actors. In addition to that, as Migdal's state-in-society approach (2001) reminds us, what we analyze as a state discourse or action, i.e. Greek-Turkish rapprochement and Turkey's support for the Annan Plan for a united Cyprus, is taking place in "a field of power." The seemingly coherent image of state, embodied in the political rhetoric of state leaders, is to be assessed in relation to "practices of loosely connected parts or fragments, frequently with ill-defined boundaries between them and other groupings inside and outside the official state borders...[and] conflicting set of rules with one another and with 'official' Law" (Migdal 2001:22). This is similar to Isin's (2005: 385) notion of states as "performances enacted through the city." Therefore what appears as a certain image of state is not only the effect of mundane processes of control but also the product of performances of different actors affiliated with various sets of rules.

The co-existence of contradictory discourses in one's own lifetime and of conflicting discourses from different actors are all performances that show the local perceptions of territory and citizenship shaped in relation to what was then a very recent image of Greek-Turkish friendship. And yet, following Migdal and Isin's attentiveness to the practices/performances of images, I would say that these contradictory responses at the states' peripheries to the new image of friendship show the true limits of the political centers' power over the process of (re)bordering territory and citizenship. As such, accounts from Thracian borderlands show that, in the early years of Europeanization of the regime of bordering, the militarized sense of border, the footprint of the Cyprus Conflict, was pursued by local actors more forcefully than at the political centers. Hence local practices continued for a while to contribute to the notion of the two states as each others' enemies.

## **Conclusion**

After setting the social and political scene in the Thracian region following the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, this chapter has drawn out how the escalation of the Cyprus conflict in 1974 left its footprint on the Thracian borderland. The militarization of the border affected everyday life along the Thracian borderland as a contact zone, perhaps even more deeply than it affected the political centers and other parts of each country. While the narratives of people and newspapers are not taken at face value, it is crucial to underline that the border's meaning is determined by what is remembered in retrospect, and by whom.

As the section on governance shows, increased militarization of the border in that period limited physical connections between the Greek and Turkish borderlanders and reinforced the idea that Greek and Turkish Thrace are distinct units with no social connections. This process also reaffirmed the national allegiances of the local state actors and the majority nonstate actors

in the two countries' peripheries with their political centers. However, it must be noted that the ethnic particularity of the Thracian borderland played an important role in the ways in which the peripheries appropriated the centers' views at the peak of the Cyprus Conflict. The securitization of both bilateral relations and the minority condition led to the convergence of center and periphery views within each nation-state over a militarization of the regime of bordering. In other words, the center-periphery convergence over the newly emerging regime of bordering took place in relation to the established Turkish-Muslim minority community in Greek Thrace, which was perceived as a "threat" from the Greek perspective and as an asset to be protected from the Turkish perspective.

Concomittant to the militarization of the regime of bordering, few acts of citizenship seemed to develop at the local level against the stream. "Acceptable" ethnic and religious diversity in the two border regions as well as the "acceptable" practices of mobility across the border have been governed in compliance with hostile foreign policies as well as exclusionary minority policies of the two states' power centers. In this context there occurred licit yet unauthorized acts of cross-border mobility of the Muslim-Turkish minority of Greek Thrace, as co-ethnics fled to the kin-state. Local accounts reveal that the illegality of such licit acts of mobility was embraced by officials of the "ethnic homeland" at the time. I would argue that these illegal yet licit acts of mobility are still acts of citizenship, from the perspective of the moving subjects, as they challenge the politics of fixity at the time that were shaped through the militarized regime of bordering. After all, unlike the 1950's open-door policy towards the minority fleeing from Greece, those who crossed the border illegally in 1970s—or as in Önder's case, pretending to cross illegally—came and stayed in the "ethnic homeland" without a prior call and permission to stay. Hence, such acts and performances of illegal mobilities and the

concomitant claims of formal citizenship can be considered acts of citizenship in their own right, for they push the available limits of ethnic kin-homeland relationships.

It is also necessary to note, however, that regardless of the different meanings attached to il/legality over time, the Muslim-Turkish minority was never treated in the same way as those whom Bigo (2002) calls “uninvited others.” Unlike the Muslim-Turkish minority, the illegal acts of border-crossings of the latter group were governed with mistrust and fear. As the illegal mobility practices presented in the next chapter explicate, the “uninvited others” of the Greek-Turkish borderland are the “outlaws” of Turkey and the nationals of third countries whose illegal border-crossing acts are considered illicit in their own particular ways. Compared with the positions of the “uninvited others,” the positive reception of Turkish-Muslim minorities’ illegal and licit acts of mobility reinforced the ethno-religious foundations of the notion of citizenship on both sides of the border, instead of creating a rupture in the habitus.

This chapter further shows that the militarized regime of bordering did not freeze cross-border relations at the states’ peripheries. As briefly mentioned here and shown in detail in the next chapters, already a decade after the conflict, the lifting of visas for Greek citizens positively affected their short-term legal cross-border mobilities and led to the continuation of suspended cross-border networks and the construction of new ones in economic and cultural fields. As described in the introductory chapter, following the beginning of each country’s individual experiences of Europeanization we witness a gradual Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations by the late-1990s. This has not yet led to resolution of Aegean and Cyprus disputes. But with the rapprochement of 1999, the discourse of friendship and neighborly relations has gradually become the dominant discourse, at least at the official level. As local accounts also show,

securitizing moves are now seen as tactics of the old regime of bordering in the Thracian borderland.

However, the changes at the official level have not automatically transferred to the local actors. Local framings of us-them distinctions, the notions of security and threat, have continued to be shaped through the past experiences and memories of the long-established national and militarized regime of bordering. At least, this seemed to be the case in the 1990s and early 2000s at the beginnings of the official rapprochement. In short, gradual normalization – if not desecuritization – of bilateral relations has taken a vernacular form in the Thracian borderland that does not necessarily follow the rhythms or the motivations of changes at the discursive and to some extent formal institutional level in the political centers of the two states. Scholars studying diffusion of EU norms and ways of doing things—in other words, socialization and learning processes—mostly focus on the political centers of the Europeanizing states (see the special issue by Börzel and Risse 2012; Diez et al.2006; Radeaelli 2003). Instead, in order to grasp variations at the level of practices, the following three chapters focus on tensions between centers and peripheries at critical junctures when a new form of relationship with the national other is taking hold.

For now, this chapter demonstrated that especially in the border regions, where the Europeanization process has direct impacts on the governance of everyday life by reshaping not only the power positions of particular local actors but also notions of security and threat, the early years of the Europeanization process brought peculiar forms of discontent as well as compliance. In some cases, local actors simply could not catch up with the changing official rhetoric and only later were able to fine-tune their positions. This is manifested in the old nationalist reflexes of local political stakeholders in Edirne who protested the possible solution

of the Cyprus conflict via the Annan Plan, without considering the changing foreign policy rhetoric of Turkey. In other cases some actors insisted on endorsing the old militarized regime and were gradually silenced by other local actors, as in the case of the old establishment in Greek Thrace opposing Greek-Turkish cooperation, which has become the dominant paradigm in the World Thracian Congress in the 2000s. These examples show how an established “sense of border” (Green 2012) or “borders on the imagination” (Navaro-Yashin 2005) of local actors shape local political responses to the changing bilateral relations. Yet they also imply that neither the sense of border nor the borders on the imagination remain intact. Hence the emphasis on rebordering processes in the coming three chapters.

While a closer look at the local experiences show that the particular relationships between the two countries’ political centers and their Thracian peripheries have not gone through drastic changes in the process of Europeanization of the regime of bordering, the peripheries have at least acquired new roles, other than their primary role in the defense of nation-state borders. Especially in the last decade, this process has given *some* space for different local actors to develop various formal and informal cross-border ties, and for different actors to be mobile subjects at different degrees. The following chapters depict local manifestations of this evolving regime of bordering, which seem to take place at different degrees of formality and informality in three respective axes: transformation of the notion of border control, emerging regional economic interests, and selective endorsement of diversities.

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<sup>1</sup> Although the reason for its closure could not be found in any local or secondary source, I reckon it might be related to the Aegean disputes and coming into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (Art.3) which increased standard width of territorial waters to 12 miles. Greece is party to this convention whereas Turkey is not.

<sup>2</sup> According to Önder’s account, 10-20 thousand people acquired citizenship with this decision. Yet the exact numbers are unknown. Personal communication with the leader of Batı Trakya Türkleri Dayanışma Derneği (BTDD), May 6, 2016, Istanbul.

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<sup>3</sup> During one of our informal exchanges, in May 2014, in Edirne, Dr. Ali Hüseyinoğlu (born in Gümülcine/Komotini, currently working at Trakya University) mentioned that he heard stories of some acquaintances from his hometown who crossed the border illegally even in early 1990s to permanently settle in Turkey. This information implies that migrations continued up until Greece's minority policy changed.

<sup>4</sup> Müezzinoğlu, originally from Gümülcine/Komotini, came to study medicine in Turkey and stayed. He was Edirne MP from AKP (2011-2015). During that time and later when he became the the minister of health, he paid special attention to Turkish and Greek Thrace and he was very active in the formation of AKP's Balkan policy. This new policy perspective is analyzed in detail in chapter six.

<sup>5</sup> Personal communication with BTTDD leader, May 6, 2016, Istanbul.

<sup>6</sup> However, around 2000 people are still heimatlos due to not being able to maintain the economic costs of uninterrupted residence permit or inconsistencies in their names in Greek and Turkish registers. Personal communication with the BTTDD leader, May 6, 2016, Istanbul.

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.iospress.gr/megalo1999/megalo19990213.htm>

<sup>8</sup> Interview with Osman Inci, the then rector of Trakya University, in October 28, 2013. Information also available at <<http://www.ismetinonu.org.tr/index.php/trakya-universitesi-lozan-aniti-meydani-ve-muzesi>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>9</sup> Information retrieved during interviews with cross-border relations officers at ETSO on the Turkish side and ΕΠΙΜΕΛΗΤΗΡΙΟ ΕΒΡΟΥ on the Greek side.

<sup>10</sup> Personal interview, Karaağaç, Edirne, August 20, 2014.

<sup>11</sup> Personal interview, Karaağaç, Edirne, August 20, 2014.

<sup>12</sup> Inci's reflections on the local contributions for construction of the Lausanne monument and lack of local interest in the commemoration ceremony in 2014 are Available at <<http://www.hudutgazetesi.com/haber/19007/lozanin-sonusu.html>> (Accessed January 2017).

## **Chapter Four: From militarizing to policing the border**

This chapter on security field portrays the gradual shift in the focus of border control in Thrace from protecting the territorial and national unity of each state to protecting the border against certain populations' entry into the EU territory. It also historicizes the current securitization practices so as to overcome the pitfalls in the critical security and migration literature. As discussed in Chapter Two, this scholarship focuses almost solely on exclusionary bordering practices in various public sites, thereby running the risk of obscuring an accurate understanding of how contemporary borders function today (cf. Topak 2014) or downgrading the function of borders to simply controlling migration (cf. Müller 2014).

With the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations in the 2000s, which coincided with the EU's externalization of migration and asylum management, Greek and Turkish Thrace are sometimes reclassified as a common space of neighborhood. According to recent accounts from the Thracian borderlands, the militarized techniques of border control, which were deployed against a possible attack from the neighboring country, have not been forcefully applied. Military watchtowers are largely unmanned on the Greek side, and checks on civilians passing through the military zone on both sides are less rigorous. The contemporary governmentality of the mistrust and fear of the "uninvited other," in Bigo's (2002) terms, has paved the way to securitization of migration through a proactive language of risk (Bigo 2005; Neal 2009: 348). This new configuration in Thrace also produced its own "uninvited others." Greek and Turkish authorities began to take joint measures against both third country nationals illegally transiting through Turkey into Greece, and the political "outlaws" of Turkey justified with a joint mission of "fight against terrorism" (cf. DeGenova 2013). The national division of the two people has also been renegotiated; they become, what I call, each other's "invited others."

However, a closer look at cross-border mobilities and interactions shows that othering works at various levels and in complicated ways. Not all “illegal” acts of cross-border mobility are considered equally “illicit” by all local state and nonstate actors. This difference stems mainly from the subject position of the border-crosser vis-à-vis the mainstream public opinion on each side of the border. Accordingly, the presence of irregular border-crossers from third countries is considered legitimate for borderlanders as long as it is temporary. On the other hand, any encounter, including smuggling, with outlawed Turkish citizens is unacceptable for both state and nonstate actors on the Turkish side. Mainstream public opinion in Greek Thrace was initially critical of cooperation between Greek and Turkish authorities on the readmission of outlawed Turkish citizens. In that sense, I argue that Europeanization of the security field turns the Thracian borderland into a “difference machine,” similar to Isin’s (2002) notion of the city where groups encounter each other, orient towards each other, and make a claim from a position of citizen, stranger, outsider, or alien. As shown in the following pages, these encounters in this field occasionally create new possibilities or small ruptures in socio-historical patterns, resulting in what Isin and Nielsen (2008) call acts of citizenship.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first portray the impact of the Europeanization of border control on local governance as well as cross-border cooperation attempts. Secondly, I disclose the changing line of il/licitness of “illegal” border-crossers. Lastly, I disentangle distinctions among different groups of “invited” and “uninvited” others, such as third country nationals, outlawed citizens, minorities, and citizens of neighboring countries. Here I touch upon the varying positions of the local actors vis-à-vis the new politics of mobility-fixity and desecuritization of the Greek-Turkish relations. The aim is to find continuities and changes

between the past regime of bordering and to depict how center-periphery relations affect the (re)construction of the field of security in the larger context of a changing regime of bordering.

### **On governance: cross-border possibilities**

This section describes the relations between two peripheries and their political centers in the 2000s. This is a period when Europeanization of the control function of the Greek-Turkish border has gone hand in hand with the initial steps of political rapprochement. These simultaneous processes have paved the way for formal and informal cross-border cooperation attempts and, in some cases, for reconsiderations of the notion of security and threat among some state and nonstate actors.

Two factors were decisive in determining the direction of cross-border cooperations. First, as various examples of cross-border encounter show, local attempts were filtered through the sense of border that the militarized regime of bordering had established. Hence, cooperation and communication have evolved in different ways, depending on the specific issue at hand. Second, the center-local relations and the level to which actors at the peripheries complied with policies of the power centers, in other words degrees of centralization in Greece and in Turkey, were an important determining factor.

In Turkey, the central governments' strict control over provincial administrations' appointed officials and the limited political power of the elected majors has their roots in the state tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire (Celenk and Guney 2010). Despite small changes and triggered by Turkey's EU accession process, this relationship has so far been maintained in the name of national unity (ibid.). In Greece, however, since the 1980s, European cohesion policy and the Greek state's dependence on EU structural funds have paved the way for decentralizing reforms and, gradually, empowering ethno-religious minorities and their political

and economic positions in the Thracian region (Anagnostou 2001). This is supported by the examples in the section on othering, which show that minorities have been politically empowered by the election of prefecture governors, who have to consider minority votes as much as the majority population in their districts.

In general, this difference in center-local relations, which derives partly from the variation in the Europeanization processes of a candidate and a member country, has more apparent impacts on the governance of the economic and cultural field in the Thracian peripheries that I investigate in more detail in the following chapters. Yet, as discussed in forthcoming sections, the sustainability of cross-border cooperation practices has been at times determined by how center-periphery tension plays out for different local actors, namely governors, police authorities, street-level state agents, lawyers, civil initiatives, and smugglers.

#### *Cooperation among local state actors despite the centers*

This section documents the beginnings of cross-border cooperation attempts by local state actors. Following the official rapprochement of 1999, local state and nonstate actors were increasingly interested in better and closer neighborly relations. Talks for the Cross-Border Cooperation Network of Greece-Bulgaria-Turkey Prefectures started in 2003, while the Greek-Turkish INTERREG program between Athens and Ankara was still being negotiated.<sup>1</sup> Meetings at the level of provincial governors took place with great enthusiasm. Despite many rounds of diplomatic negotiations, political centers did not agree on the terms of the INTERREG program; the Turkish foreign ministry had concerns about the definition and limitation of the “border region” covered by the program. Nevertheless, some local state officials and civil society actors established relations during this process that have endured in the ensuing years.

Nikolaos Zambounidis, at that time governor of the Evros prefecture and a leading figure in this regional initiative, explained in detail their cooperation with Edirne's governors, Fahri Yücel and his successor, Nusret Miroğlu. He particularly emphasized the progress they made in terms of building cross-border ties, developing projects, and trying to find joint solutions to their common problems. Initially the meetings of the three country prefectures under the Cross-Border Cooperation Network were diplomatic in nature. There was a thematic division of labour among six Thracian prefectures from Greece, four prefectures from Bulgaria, and one from Turkey (Edirne) to develop joint future projects. In their program presentation, the network focused on issues in the following, order under two titles: contamination of the environment and mosquitos, tackling of disasters, diseases and epidemics, issues related to husbandry and crop production, and illegal migration under the title of "civil protection and everyday life"; and cooperation between universities, region's competitiveness, and tourism and culture under the title of "development." After many meetings, no cross-border solution could be found on the issue of illegal migration as, in Zambounidis's words, "it is an issue that is not just ours." Yet many ideas emerged on how to work on the other topics, especially on the flooding of the Evros affecting the lives of borderlanders in winter months.<sup>2</sup>

By the time it became clear the INTERREG program would not open officially, governors as well as leading stakeholders had already established personal ties and shared interests to maintain these local relations. Hence, they decided to use the Bulgarian-Greek Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) program for the Cross-Border Cooperation Network. One official from each country was employed in a newly opened office in Orestiada from 2004 until the end of the IPA program in 2008. In that way, Turkish counterparts could also participate in thematic meetings among governors, civil society organizations, and other local state officials. The end of

the IPA program coincided with the change of governors in Edirne. Although Zambounidis was in office until 2011, he asserted that the governors succeeding Miroğlu in Edirne were never as eager to cooperate and trusting personal relationships could not be maintained at the prefecture level.

In addition to stressing the importance of interpersonal trust, officials from the Edirne governorship who were involved in this cooperation also underlined that it was a matter of calculating costs and benefits of maintaining this uninstitutionalized cooperation. Since Turkey was not officially a partner in the IPA project, there was no budget for the salary of Turkish personnel. Furthermore, in some instances staff was reassigned from the Edirne governor's office to its counterpart in Orestiada with no compensatory arrangements made.

The network has certainly made progress over the years in terms of sharing information and taking joint actions; one concrete result was setting up a direct phone line between Evros and Edirne authorities to manage the course of Evros in the winter. Moreover, local actors have been eager since the first meeting to pursue large infrastructure projects, such as the construction of an artificial lake at the intersections of the three countries, to solve the problem of flooding. However, without financial support and in light of territorial concerns regarding border maintenance at such a shared lake, accomplishing such plans has been impossible. The lack of both an official program and a future probability for EU funding for planned joint projects has made cooperation at the governors' level unsustainable.

In addition to informal personal ties and budgetary concerns, a third factor for sustainability of the cross-border cooperation has been identified during our conversation with Mr. Zambounidis, the Greek official, and several Turkish officials working at the Orestiada

office: the importance of speaking a common language in building and maintaining cross-border networks.

The Orestiada office was staffed by English-speaking officials from the Edirne governorship for a total of 12 months. Following that, a Greek citizen and member of the Turkish-Muslim minority from Komotini, a woman named Elif, was employed there for three years, from 2005 to 2008. She was a perfect fit as she incurred no visa costs and had the appropriate language skills, being fluent in Greek. Elif had finished university in Istanbul and moved back to Edirne in 2005 with her husband, who originates from a neighboring town in Turkish Thrace.

Elif was employed by the Edirne governorship to work at the Orestiada office until she took maternity leave in 2008. At the end of her maternity leave, the Orestiada office was closed because there were no more external funds to run the program and pay the salaries of Greek and Bulgarian officers. Elif was then hired by the State Hydraulic Works office in Edirne with a permanent contract as a translator, thanks to her Greek language skills and her experience in coordinating the governor's cross-border relations. When I met Elif in her current office in April 2015, after hearing about her from Zambounidis and officers in Orestiada, Elif said the following:

Basically I am the network at the moment (laughter). This is why I could get the position here so easily. And even until now, when [the governor's office] receives a letter or a phone call from Greece and they cannot figure out what it is, they call me for clarification.

Apparently the Cross-border Cooperation Network has brought some street-level state agents into closer contacts that are maintained even today. Hearing the same people mentioned by both local officials and local business organizations in Edirne and Evros implies that there was and still is a very small group of people on both sides who maintain these contacts due to

certain skills and positions they have held. As shown in the next chapter on the economic field, these initial contacts at the level of governors also encouraged other influential local stakeholders—mainly business organizations—to collaboratively develop joint projects that might fit within the INTERREG program. In the absence of external funds, local actors turned to personal ties developed during initial meetings to create uninstitutionalized networks.

In sum, consent of the states' political centers, budgetary concerns, and to some extent language skills are the most important factors for both perpetuating and suspending cooperation at the local governors' level, on issues related to the control function of the borders. After all, as late as March 2015 the local public agenda was focused on the importance of constructing a dam for the region, which was simultaneously impossible due to the territorial concerns of the political centers (*Hudut* March 2015). Therefore, in addition to ongoing information-sharing on the water levels of Evros through a phone line that Elif is still coordinating, and at least until the economic crisis and the local budget cuts in Evros, the Greek/Turkish governors' implementation of a joint pesticide treatment for mosquitos in Evros had been the most successful practice of cooperation between state actors in the Thracian borderlands.

*(No) ties among nonstate actors*

This section describes initial cooperation attempts by nonstate actors for joint action on (illegal) migrants' rights in the early 2000s. While the Cross-Border Cooperation Network acknowledged that it could not act upon the growing issue of "illegal migration," the Edirne Bar Association intended to address the issue from a human rights perspective. More specifically, the local actors' concern was the detention conditions of "illegal migrants." In May 2003, given the possibility of using the regional cooperation frameworks for future joint projects at that time, the then head of the Human Rights (HR) Commission of the Edirne Bar Association invited representatives from Evros (Greece) and Haskovo (Bulgaria) Bar Associations. As explained by members of the HR commission who were active at that time, the aim of their invitation was to discuss what they could do together for "illegal migrants," as they were then called in the official papers. Very quickly, the commission agreed to apply available EU funds for the development of better detention facilities, train local lawyers on international refugee law and national regulations, and ensure detainees had access to legal assistance and basic rights such as health care.

However no further communication between Greek and Turkish counterparts followed this first meeting. During one of our conversations in 2014, looking back at his personal experience a decade prior, the former head of the HR commission in Edirne recalled that "the Greek partner did not feel comfortable being there." While he underlined that he did not clearly remember what happened at that first meeting in 2003, he said:

The Greek colleague that we invited said he did not want to take part in this and he left in the middle of the meeting. But later on we heard that he applied for EU funds based on a similar project on detention centers. So maybe he wanted to do it on his own, I don't know. We also heard he later had some financial troubles due to that project. But these are all rumors of course.

When I was on the Greek side in June 2014, I spoke on the phone to the then head of the regional Bar Association based in Didymoteicho, to hear his personal experience. He refused to meet and said that he did not have anything to say either about cross-border relations or about the meeting that he participated in, in 2003. Although neither Turkish nor Greek counterparts shared openly what went wrong in that first encounter, it was clear that this first and only cross-border encounter between lawyers was not a pleasant experience for either side. Members of the Edirne and Haskovo Bar Associations, however, maintained contact and tried writing several project proposals for EU funds. Unfortunately their applications were rejected, once for late submission and once for not complying with the budgetary concerns of the funding scheme.

Despite the failed attempts at cross-border cooperation and acquiring EU funds, the lawyers in the HR commission in Edirne continued observing the detention center closely; at that time it was located inside the police department. The same lawyers who were active in the commission in 2007 and 2008 published several reports on the detention conditions in Edirne. They shared these with local press and attended Bar Association meetings in Istanbul and other cities, as well as seminars organized by the UNHCR in Turkey, to gather information and know-how on asylum law. The then head of the HR commission believes that their reports were taken seriously by the authorities in Ankara; the new detention facility – constructed under the supervision of the EU and the UNHCR and opened in 2011 – displays the parameters they suggested in their reports. Yet he also acknowledges that the activities of the HR commission did not continue, due to lack of interest among local lawyers as well as other civil society organizations.<sup>3</sup>

In Edirne, the local branch of the Refugee Solidarity Association (Mülteci-Der) was opened in September 2012 but was never active in the field. Only a few lawyers, those who were

on the HR commission of the Bar Association and/or at the board of Mülteci-Der, have provided legal aid for emergency situations. UNHCR contracted a local lawyer for a short period in 2014, but this mission was later handed to the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM), the national partner of UNHCR in Turkey. In the summer of 2015, ASAM launched a new project in Edirne to address the legal and social needs of an increasing number of Syrians arriving in and around Edirne, while also offering socio-legal aid to people from other countries kept in the detention center. The ASAM team is composed of one lawyer and a few social workers coming from different cities.<sup>4</sup> However, I was informed by an interlocutor in June 2016 that ASAM is not very active in Edirne, as most of the Syrian families who arrived were “convinced” to settle in other cities in Turkey.<sup>5</sup> At the level of civil society, there are a handful of people, mainly members of the Migration Work Group under a civil initiative called the Edirne City Council, that are legally operating under the municipality and overseeing issues related to urban governance. The City Council keeps an eye on the basic needs of irregular migrants, but only sporadically. It was also the members of this group and their acquaintances that showed solidarity with “uninvited others” by bringing food and blankets when the CrossingNoMore group was in town.

Similarly, in Evros, the only NGOs that are active in this field are Athens-based organizations, namely Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the Greek Council for Refugees (GCR), and the Association for the Social Support of Youth (ARSIS) (ProAsyl 2012). While no local NGO or association has access to the detention centers, UNCHR lawyers who rotate between other Greek cities and Orestiada have access to the first reception center and provide legal aid for asylum applications. Only ARSIS, funded by the European Economic Area (EEA), provides care for unaccompanied minors at their office in Alexandroupoli. Here, children stay for a year on

average until the ARSIS officers reach a family member either in Europe or in the children's home countries. A very small group of people involved in the No Border Network in Orestiada keep a blog titled "Stop Evros Wall" and sometimes organize demonstrations in front of detention facilities or elsewhere in town.

Until today, there has been very little communication between these civil society organizations in Edirne and Evros, active in issues pertaining to irregular migrants. Following the Greek government's decision to construct the fence in January 2011, activists in Orestiada and Edirne met in April 2011. This was during a one-day event initiated by the Istanbul Migrant Solidarity Network, a non-hierarchical activist group, and organized together with the City Council of Edirne. The event included a photo exhibition and a panel on irregular migration in March 2011.

There are two main reasons why the initial contacts were not maintained or further developed. First, the language barrier between civil society actors impedes personal contacts. While many Greek borderlanders in their 30s and younger speak English, language competence on the Turkish side is very low. Furthermore, apart from the Muslim-Turkish minority of Greek Thrace, there are very few people who speak the language of the neighboring country. Those who are eager to learn the language of the other are not active in any of these social and political circles engaged with asylum seekers or irregular migrants. Second, neither of the two sides pursued these contacts due to the fact that the people involved in these solidarity circles were not outspoken in their own locales. Both the Greek and Turkish counterparts felt they should be cautious at all times in small border towns like theirs, where what you say and do is easily followed by the police and the army. Hence the militarized regime of bordering and its established sense of border, as well as the existing language barriers, not only shape the limits of

the civil society activities in the border region but also determine the “borders of imagination,” in Navaro-Yashin’s (2005) terms, even among those who seem to sympathize and offer social and/or legal aid to “illegal” border-crossers.

Finally, other than the failed attempt by lawyers in 2003 and the one-day gathering in 2011 initiated by activists from outside the Thracian borderlands, there has been no locally-driven and/or cross-border organization providing socio-legal assistance to migrants/asylum seekers. This lack at the local societal level indicates that migration-related issues along the borderlands were governed solely by the policies of the central governments. As shown below, cross-border cooperation on this matter was institutionally established a decade after first contact of the local Bar Associations in 2003. When it did, it was a top-down policy of cooperation on controlling irregular migration, based on which the local police on both Greek and Turkish sides engaged in joint actions *against* the “uninvited others.” This top-down joint action is part of harmonization with the EU border and migration governance, which is enforced on Greece, as member, and Turkey, as candidate country.

### ***The emerging cross-border governance of migration***

This section discloses the process that led to the recent cross-border cooperation between local police authorities on both sides of the Thracian border. As such it shows the diffusion of EU border and migration policies at work. My observations in the Thracian borderlands, the NGO reports from the field, and previous studies drawing on data compiled at states’ centers show that concomitant to the EU’s involvement at the borders, since the beginning of 2000s, bilateral cooperation attempts have been developing rather cautiously, as they are built on the memories of distrust.

EU institutions have been directly involved in the management of Greek-Turkish borders since 2006, mainly in the form of operational assistance provided by the intelligence-driven EU agency, Frontex, in Greece. Over the years Frontex has brought in new policing equipment at land and sea borders as well as know-how of pushbacks in the sea (for a concise summary of the expansion of surveillance systems along the Greek-Turkish border, see Topak 2014).<sup>6</sup> Greece launched Operation Aspida ('Shield') in mid-August 2012 to prevent migrants entering across the Evros border, deployed 1,800 extra officers along the 206 km-long border, and completed the fence along the 12.5 km-long land border between Kastaneis and Karaağaç. As mentioned earlier, in response to these measures migratory routes have shifted back from the Thracian borderland toward the Aegean Sea in the south (Amnesty International 2013), and more recently to Bulgaria in the north where new fence construction immediately started. The immediate effects of Operation Aspida in dropping the entries and shifts in the route were acknowledged in the annual risk analysis reports of Frontex, which noted that "2,000 were slashed to just 10 entries a week by October."<sup>7</sup>

In the 2000s, Greek and Turkish governments were also repeatedly asked to adjust their migration and asylum laws and procedures to comply with EU norms and rules. In Turkey, the enactment of a new and comprehensive law in 2013, titled Foreigners and International Protection Law, was a major step towards the Europeanization of migration management that was set in the 2005-dated national action plans (İçduygu et. al. 2014). One of the biggest changes brought by the 2013 law was the transfer of authority and responsibility of the detention center from Foreigners Police to a civilian and expert institution called the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), under the Ministry of Interior. However, the transition period took longer and Foreigners Police were still kept active in the provinces to assist in that process.

During my fieldwork, it was this transition phase that I witnessed in Edirne where the detention center was still managed by police and civilian officers.<sup>8</sup> This detention center was constructed with EU financial support and opened in January 2012. Reception centers for asylum seekers and refugees have been under construction through the EU-IPA funds in seven cities, including Kırklareli, a neighbor of Edirne.<sup>9</sup>

When I visited Edirne at the time of the Crossing No More march in September 2015, I saw that social workers of DGMM had finally been appointed. Nevertheless, working so closely with the police seemed to be a concern for at least some of the DGMM personnel, as one of the social workers stated, “[I] didn’t apply this position to be a police officer.” This shows that the roles of police and civilian authorities were still conflated. Moreover, neither police nor civilian officers in the field that I talked to foresaw when the transition to civilian hands would be completed, due to the fact that “events like that” could erupt in Edirne bordering Greece and Bulgaria.

Similarly in Greece, based on the law enacted on June 7<sup>th</sup>, 2013, authority and responsibility for asylum management was transferred from the Police Department of Aliens to an independent Asylum Service under the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection. One of the employees in the new Asylum Service in Alexandroupoli reported, in the summer of 2014, that they processed approximately 10 thousand cases in a year, while police still had thousands of cases waiting to be processed. This was a service for applicants from north of Thessaloniki, as there are units in Thessaloniki, Athens as well as the mobile units that were deployed at the North Aegean islands as of the summer of 2013. The same law of 2013 also governs the establishment of a First Reception Service as an autonomous structure supervised by the Ministry. At the time of my fieldwork, there was a First Reception Centre (KEPY) operating in

Filakio, which was also a detention center. People arriving in Evros were first taken to the First Reception Center, where UNHCR lawyers give legal aid to people seeking asylum. Soon after, applicants are taken to the detention center. As part of this new process, those who do not meet the asylum criteria are to be deported, after a period of detention that cannot exceed 12-18 months. According to activist scholars, Evros was deliberately chosen for the new deportation facilities as it is not only already militarized but also the least politically engaged border region, unlike Lesbos or other islands bordering Turkey.<sup>10</sup>

This position of Evros as the main route for deportation has slightly changed in the aftermath of the March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, which facilitated hundreds of people being sent from the port of Mytilini (Lesbos) to Dikili (Izmir) on the Turkish coast, starting on April 4.<sup>11</sup> Lesbos is one of the five Greek islands across the Turkish coast that, having faced disproportionate migratory pressure, were declared “hotspots” at the end of 2015. This is a hybrid EU-Member state tool to offer operational support from EU agencies to Member States that face disproportionate migratory pressure, with the aim to help them swiftly identify, register, relocate, or implement returns (ECRE 2016).

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Greece and Turkey signed a readmission protocol on November 8, 2001 to facilitate the return of irregular migrants that entered Greece via Turkey.<sup>12</sup> It was never effectively implemented, however (Içduygu 2011; Triandafyllidiou 2013). As Triandafyllidiou (2013:12) noted, Turkey has accepted the return of only the third country nationals it shares direct borders with (i.e. Georgia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Armenia), and it has often canceled out the readmission process by exhausting the time limit incorporated in the Protocol. The joint Greek-Turkish statement (signed in May 2010) to accept about 1,000 readmission requests per year, and the opening of the port of Dikili to receive readmitted persons

in 2010, proved ineffective between 2010 and 2012 (ibid). The memorandum of understanding that Frontex and Turkey signed in May 2012 precipitated closer cooperation along the Greek-Turkish border.<sup>13</sup> The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement was also ratified in October 2014 and was expected to be implemented in June 2016.<sup>14</sup> Hence from April to the end of June 2016, 468 individuals under the The EU-Turkey Statement of 2016, 1,055 under the bilateral Readmission Protocol, and 43 Turkish nationals in line with the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement were readmitted to Turkey (ECRE 2016). The EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 in a way facilitated the implementation of readmissions, based on different protocols.<sup>15</sup>

In Thrace, as part of this newly developing institutional framework of cooperation facilitated by Frontex, regular meetings have been held between the Greek and Turkish border police since 2013. During my fieldwork, I observed that these meetings seem to work as socialization channels that take on a new life outside work, for example through family visits on weekends or for cross-border sports tournaments organized among the personnel. As street-level state agents, they are so much embedded in the everyday life in the border towns they live in that they come across with each other and other stakeholders, even during cross-border cultural activities, such as the opening of an art exhibition that the Greek Consul organized in Edirne in May 2014. Such encounters demonstrate that agents of border control and their relations are also part of the good neighborly relations that have been slowly developing on the ground.

It was in that art exhibition that I was introduced to the head of the Foreigners Police of Edirne, who was chatting with the police head of the Kastaneis Border Gate. I asked to interview them both for my research.<sup>16</sup> At that official transition phase, the head of the Foreigners Police of Edirne was sharing his duties on the local governance of the detention center with the provisional civilian officer from the Edirne governorship. During my interviews with both the provisional

police and the civilian officers in Edirne in May 2014, they underlined that their job is a “delicate matter.” Recalling the historical position of Turkey as the kin-state, the head police officer also made it clear that, according to him, this new process is “even more sensitive.” Being cautious but hopeful for the future of the cross-border cooperation, he added:

Turkey took serious measures. They [Greek border police] call us for example and ask could you go pick these people and we do it. We [Turkish police] immediately call the soldiers [at the border] so they apprehend the people before they cross over to Greece. We do this for them but in return we expect *sincerity* [samimiyet]. They should not have any other plans. I told them this openly ‘no plans behind and beyond your back.’ If we are sitting at this table every month, it means something. We tell them openly that we cannot accept any *hidden agendas* [başka ajandalar]. We tell them not to do push-backs but they sometimes do. They [Greek police] took a lot of caution with Frontex (...) I must say one reason why I am so sensitive about this is the Western Thracian Turks, we have *our* 150,000 *people* [insanımız] there. I have to consider their *safety* [emniyet] too (...) In the beginning our relations were a bit tense of course. But as we got to know each other, things got better. Since the first day we are exchanging *gifts*. I sent them to the final games in Istanbul for example. They loved it! Here we organized basketball games, like a “friendship game” [dostluk maçı] between the police teams of the three countries. Such things are very important. (emphases mine)

These emerging relations evoke Anderrson’s (2014a, 2014b) depiction of the “gift economy” in the Afro-European borderland, where, with each financial exchange, social bonds were created and new facets added to the relations between African and European forces. While Anderrson’s gift economy mainly refers to financial benefits made by the actors of border control as well as the others who made the “illegality industry,” in the Greek-Turkish case, the gift economy includes real gift exchanges. Cooperation on migration and border control has coincided with the attempts for official rapprochement and building of good neighborly relations between the two states and the societies, thereby transforming the field of security in a peculiar way.

Considering the center-periphery relations, it is crucial to underline here that cross-border cooperation among the border police emerged as part of a top-down process. As opposed to the

Cross-Border Cooperation Network of Regions developed by governors and the failed initiative of the Bar Associations meeting a decade earlier, in this case personal ties were initiated after the power centers reached an agreement that is in compliance with their national interests. Unlike other cooperation attempts, official cooperation over border control has been taken even more seriously due to the EU's pressure on central governments to implement already agreed-upon measures. In that sense the positions of the state actors in the peripheries are determined not only by the capital cities of the respective states, but also by relations between actors in the capital cities and the actors of the EU institutions of border control, namely the European Commission and Frontex.

Yet, these relations are still filtered through the classifications of the places and people that the militarized regime of bordering has shaped, and the mark it has left on people's sense of border in Thrace, in this contact zone. This is clearly seen in the account of the then head of the Foreigners Police in Edirne, presented above. While talking about the joint border control actions against unauthorized border crossers, he referred to the importance of "sincerety" and not having "hidden agendas." These notions are certainly residues of the old regime of bordering, which is shaped by a total distrust of the national other. Calling the other for sincerety therefore implies the fragility of his intentions to build interpersonal trust with the "untrustworthy." For the same reason, cross-border cooperation seems conditional upon, in his words, the "safety" of "our people" in Greek Thrace.

What is even more important regarding my inquiry on the changing regime of bordering is the fact that this local state actor suddenly enacted himself as the agent of the "ethnic homeland" and brought up the security of the Muslim-Turkish minority, while the topic of conversation was cross-border cooperation against irregular border-crossers. This utterance is a

performative act of citizenship that, on the one hand, underlines the connectedness between the co-ethnics across the national territorial space of the state and the Turkish political center and the periphery, and, on the other hand, proves his loyalty to the established notion of citizenship and its ethnic origins. Hence, as a police officer, his acts of exchanging gifts, initiating friendship games, and attending the monthly meetings with his Greek counterparts become acts of a loyal state agent ready to reach common ground in their joint goal of border control against unauthorized acts of cross-border mobilities, *and* to achieve the safety of the people on both sides, which, for him especially, includes the Turkish-Muslim minority on the Greek side.

In sum, during these monthly meetings for joint border control efforts in the states' peripheries, which were initiated by the EU and the capital cities, an understanding of partnership as well as operational cross-border cooperation has recently begun to be developed between the local security forces. This cooperation seems to have an impact on the unauthorized cross-border mobility acts, as the main traffic route shifted to the Aegean Sea and the Bulgarian-Turkish border. The counter-conducts of the border-crossers in response to the Greek-Turkish cooperation were later met with new measures at the EU level. During our talk in May 2014, the then head of Foreigners Police in Edirne mentioned that there were already attempts to incorporate the Bulgarian counterparts in their two-country cooperation and he was called for a tri-partite meeting in Bulgaria in order to share his experiences of border control in Edirne. Soon after, he was appointed to a position in Ankara where, as an interlocutor in Edirne said, he was expected to share his hands-on experience in the Thracian borderlands. The European Commission's Draft Action Plan of October 2015 proved him right, as it is noted that Turkey intended to step up cooperation with Bulgarian and Greek authorities by effectively implementing the tri-partite agreement signed in May 2015 and establishing a common center in

Capitan Andreevo.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, the initial readmission practices in the aftermath of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 also seem to confirm strengthening of cross-border cooperation at the sea border. Yet, as depicted in the next section, these control measures did not effectively stop unauthorized border-crossings and instead only triggered a change in smuggling networks.

### *Fall of old informal networks and the rise of new tactics*

While the Europeanization of border control had increased the role of police vis-à-vis the soldiers, it also had implications on the practices of the local smuggling networks. As a remnant of the militarization of the border over the last forty years, the locals of Thrace have already learned the importance of maintaining good relations with privates on duty and their commanders in the field in order to avoid any tension in their own villages. As mentioned before, the rules of the military zones required everyone to have official permission to pass or stay in the fields along the border. Although the region is no longer strictly a military zone, soldiers stopping someone they deem suspicious is still considered normal in practice.

Like all locals of the border villages, those involved in smuggling are keen to develop and maintain good relations with the soldiers, either to distract them while others help migrants cross the river, or in hopes they'll turn a blind eye during such passages. The involvement of some members of the security forces in smuggling goods and people used to be an open secret on both sides of the border. As a journalist in his mid-50s from Orestiada explains:

Nothing passes without the permission of the states. Everybody who is responsible to protect the borders also makes money out of it, police and soldiers in both countries. It is the same for drugs and for people.<sup>18</sup>

The permissiveness of state borders is thus embodied by soldiers and police officers who, as street-level state agents, encounter borderlanders and border-crossers in the states' borderlands. I witnessed such an encounter in April 2014 while driving along the Evros River

with Yücel, a farmer and ex-smuggler from a nearby border village in Edirne. Soon after we reached the narrow, unpaved road that runs parallel to the river along rice fields, we were stopped by two soldiers on regular guard duty. Before they asked anything, Yücel said we were going to “this building over there,” the shared building of the villagers working in those fields. As he slowly drove on he said that, were he alone in the car, the soldiers would have probably asked for cigarettes.

Several years ago, Yücel was sentenced for hosting and guiding border-crossers without papers and was detained for several months in prison in Edirne. Ironically, Yücel noted how easy it was, in his words, “to make a bigger network” in prison if people wanted to continue the business after the end of their sentences. Yet, people involved in smuggling also admitted that the recent phase of border control made things harder for them. Yusuf, another ex-smuggler from Enez, repeated several times during our conversations in the summer of 2014 that “the lack of business nowadays is not because there are no people wanting to cross and also not because Turkish soldiers or police is doing its job more carefully, as they say. The sentences got so high that even if someone on the Turkish side is willing to accept to do it, it is not easy to find someone on the Greek side.” Yusuf was dismissive of the Turkish border control authorities, as he told stories of he and his friends easily convincing them to turn a blind eye on many occasions while they smuggled people.

These repeated stories of cooperation between street-level state agents and smugglers, and between smugglers across the border exemplifies the prevalence of a mental map, in Migdal’s words (2004) among smuggling circles that does not necessarily coincide with the maps and check points of the two nation-states. However, recent cooperation among Greek and Turkish state authorities on border controls, and decreasing incentives for local cross-border

smuggling networks also illustrate van Schendel's (2005) "politics of scale" at work and show how the pre-EU border web of relations is now replaced by this new border-induced scale. As such, the new scale has negatively affected smugglers' business as usual.

Inquiring how the new politics of European border policing unfolds at the district of Orestiada, Pallister-Wilkins (2015) shows that concern for both care and control makes the actors of policing engage in rescuing migrants, preventing their entry, and simultaneously catching smugglers who facilitate entry. Nevertheless, their successful disruption of the smuggling networks not only led to a shift in the modus operandi of the smugglers, which put migrants in greater danger, but also triggered the need for more rescue operations (Pallister-Wilkins 2015:62). Locals' accounts provided here reaffirm Pallister-Wilkins' point, as they show that this new process does not stop border crossings but puts migrants' lives at greater risk. Yet these narratives also add a local twist to the impacts of the EU's involvement in policing of this border; this process has removed from the game only the local actors of smuggling with better know-how of the topography, while it turned migrants into smugglers for a successful crossing over. Yücel explained very clearly how the infamous push-back operations and the increase in fines and sentences for smuggling made the business both more dangerous for irregular migrants and less appealing for the local smugglers, while bringing new actors to the game from outside the region:

The reason for the deaths in the river is this European police. They teach the Greek police how to do such things. They come with these zodiacs within no time, like out of blue. And they hit inside the boats so that the boats go upside down (...) It got really strict around 2 years ago [2012]. But of course the traffic did not stop. But migrants now do it by themselves. It is mainly the Iraqis who are involved in smuggling now. They guarantee a safe transit from Istanbul all the way to Athens. When they are caught on this side [Turkey], they say they themselves were crossing. They say my name is Ahmet, not Mehmet. It doesn't matter because the police cannot prove anything. But when they catch us, it's not the same; you are immediately sent to the prosecutor...Now they mostly say they

are Syrians because you know if you are a Syrian, even better because you have a right to travel so they just release you! ...All I can do, if I want to do it again, is to show them [border-crossers] the way. If they need someone like us, they need only for that part. But I won't do it only for that. It pays very little. It isn't worth the risk.

Similarly, a lawyer in Enez explains the diminishing role of her clients, who have been involved in smuggling, in the following way:

The brokers or the 'barons' are in Istanbul. They use the people here because there is no job here. They say OK for even 100-200 euro. What they do is transporting or hosting migrants in their houses. And according to the new penal law even when they are not involved in a deathly accident, if they were caught, they get 3-4 year sentences.

Other lawyers in Edirne and Alexandroupoli also mentioned that sentences have recently gone up to more than 20 years in cases where smugglers are proven guilty for the deaths of passengers. Thus smuggling as an occupation has become less attractive for the locals of Evros as well as Edirne, and, as in the way smugglers deliver the message across borders, recently "there is no road" ("δεν έχει δρόμο") to show to "passengers." This does not mean the passages stopped completely but rather that local smugglers could not operate along safe routes.

This is similar to what Andreas observed earlier at the US-Mexico border, that the escalation of border controls disrupted traditional routes and methods of clandestine entry, but also made room for the "emergence of professional smuggling agencies that elbowed out smaller operators" (2000:95). In the US-Mexico case, small operators involved local coyote or self-smuggling. At the Greek-Turkish border as of the 2010s, however, within these transnational networks stretching from Istanbul to Athens and other EU countries, irregular migrants themselves have begun to play more active roles.

In this sense the changes in the smuggling networks of the Thracian borderlands follow a similar line with Andersson's (2014b: 145-146) depiction of migrant adoptions of illegality en

route; some of them self-consciously adopt the terms of clandestine illegal migration while others embody despair, in response to Europe's streamlined strategy of governing irregular migration. Despite the increasing surveillance, death and exclusion, and suspension of rights, people continue to cross from the same routes in the Greek-Turkish borderzone, thus challenging such biopolitical controls (Topak 2014: 821). Supporting the autonomy of the migration argument developed in *Escape Routes* (Papadopoulos et al. 2008), the local accounts provided here show that as long as the root causes of migration are not addressed and the pressing need to migrate into the EU continues, further cross-border cooperation for control and fight against smuggling are doomed to continue, leading to the emergence of new tactics to circumvent state actors.

To recap, in the face of increasing mobility acts of unauthorized border-crossers, there have been some limited encounters between different local state and nonstate actors from Greek and Turkish Thrace. Among these encounters, the only one maintained so far is the latest one initiated by the political centers concerning the control function of the border. In that sense, the cross-border encounters deepened the chasm between local actors and unauthorized border-crossers, and turned the latter into so-called "uninvited others." Yet these recent and fragile cross-border practices of border control are also contested by the "uninvited others" who have then become smugglers of their own.

### **On unauthorized cross-border mobilities: illegal and (il)licit at the EU border**

This section demonstrates the changes over time in the "illegal" migration practices across the border in Thrace and further elaborates on how these different illegal practices have been received in the Thracian public spaces. Ethnographic evidence shows that the different discourses and practices pertaining to unauthorized border-crossers are determined by (a) the

subject position of the border-crosser vis-à-vis the mainstream public opinion, (b) the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations and its effects on the position of the particular group of border-crossers vis-à-vis the local authorities, and (c) the specific “transit” position of the region on the migration routes. Based on these three factors, the unauthorized border-crossing acts are sorted out on the line of licitness.

The Greek-Turkish border in Thrace has been used by members of leftist political opposition groups and PKK insurgents who flee Turkey to seek refuge in Greece and Western European countries. This started with the 1980 coup and continued through the ongoing war between Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK. The very first entry in the death registers of unauthorized border-crossers in Evros is from 1989. The Mufti in Didymoteicho has been officially authorized to bury supposedly Muslim “illegal” border crossers found dead in the Evros region, during and/or after crossing the land border in the Kastanies/Karaağaç area or the Evros river. According to his registers, the first burial ceremony he conducted in 1989 was for three Turkish citizens from the city of Tunceli, in the Dersim area, where a majority is Kurdish and/or Alevite and many rebellions against state violence took place. This was before the border became a critical node for people from countries east and south of Turkey, in the late 1990s.

As the Mufti underlines, this information about the first burials of 1989 does not tell us how long Turkish citizens and/or citizens of other countries were passing this border. Nevertheless, the fact that the deceased’s country of origin as registered in the border region has shifted from Turkey to third countries to the east and south of Turkey implies that the same crossing route was increasingly being used by people from other countries. This is also supported by the recent Human Costs of Border Control database that shows death registers at borders of Southern European countries between 1990 and 2013. According to the database, among 3188

registered deaths, 399 are registered in Evros and only 12 of those are Turkish citizens, with the last two persons being registered in 2010 (Last 2015). On the other hand, there has been a gradual increase in the number of unauthorized border-crossers from third countries in Evros. This increase is generally attributed to the strengthening of the EU's other external borders, especially in Spain, in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and the Canary islands (Migreurop 2009).

While the Greek-Turkish border has become a feasible option for more people from third countries, especially in the 2000s, the drop in numbers of Turkish citizens crossing illegally might be explained with the EU-led reforms in freedom of expression in Turkey, and the changing attitude of the Greek state as well as other European countries towards political asylum-seekers from Turkey. As mentioned earlier, following the official Greek-Turkish rapprochement – with the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan and the beginning of Turkey's EU candidacy status in 1999 – the positions of Greek and Turkish authorities vis-a-vis the unauthorized border-crossings of Turkish and third country nationals have gotten closer.

Ethnographic evidence below shows that local actors perceive differently the unauthorized border crossings of outlawed Turkish nationals and those of people from third countries in the Thracian borderlands. The presence of or interaction with the outlawed Turkish citizens is considered unacceptable for Turkish state and nonstate actors. Recently, this group is even subjected to joint operations of Greek and Turkish security forces. The “illegal” act of border crossing by third country nationals is often perceived licit by local nonstate actors and, to some extent, even by local state actors. For the latter, the line of il/licitness seems to be drawn by the specific ways in which they show (temporary) presence in the public spaces of Thrace.

Following this change in states' attitudes, the perceived line of il/licitness of "illegal" acts of border crossings has also shifted over the years.

*illicit "PKK'lı" – licit "kaçak"*

This section demonstrates the distinctions between outlawed Turkish citizens and third country nationals according to the perceived licitness of their unauthorized border-crossing acts. This licitness in this case is determined by the subject position of the border-crosser and whether or not their act of escape from their home country is seen as legitimate. The answer to this question determines which illegal border-crossing acts "deserve" direct/indirect support and understanding, and which do not.

In the first half of 1999, *Hudut* had, on average, three news pieces per month on the apprehension of "kaçak"/ "kaçak mülteci" in Edirne. This increased to six pieces in the summer months. While "kaçak" refers to anyone involved in illegal activities, "kaçak mülteci," followed with the word "refugee," implies that people's reasons for escape are well-founded regardless of legal recognition. These words seem to have been used interchangeably in the newspaper as it is the case in Edirne in general. As already stated elsewhere, these were almost standard pieces, using a template to report daily legal and illegal border crossings with only changes in numbers and countries of origin. This standard coverage proves that there was some sort of public awareness of the illegal as well as legal mobility practices. Yet it was almost at the level of apathy since, other than this quantified coverage, the presence of *unauthorized border-crossers* was only worth recording in cases of drowning, dead bodies found by the river, or a disappearing relative searching for someone who got lost on her/his way to Greece. In other words, the unauthorized border crossers were seen only as numbers or voiceless subjects involved in

illegality—even when they were the victims of the illegal acts by others, kidnapped or left alone to die (Ikizoglu-Erensu and Kaşlı 2017).

For regular captures during the act of crossing, the news template went as such: “X number of illegals were caught in X area and sent to the prosecutor for legal procedures.” There was no explanation of what followed next. An old and locally well-known tour agent, Hilmi, explained the next step, that is, deportation:

I worked for Emniyet [Police department] for almost ten years [1997-2007]. We were taking the people they caught here at the border here to the border of Iran, Iraq, sometimes to Georgia. That was the hardest period maybe...In terms of the ongoing terror in the region [clashes between PKK and Turkish Army] (...) Lately the business became more and more competitive. There were bigger companies, not from Edirne. These companies were closer to Ankara [central government]. So they bypassed us and gave the work to these big companies... But OK, I am not complaining. It was a very stressful work anyway... You know those borders are not safe places. There is still terror. I am even relieved that I don't have to go there or send my personnel there.<sup>19</sup>

For Hilmi, the deportation “business” was almost business as usual with just the added risk of getting close to conflict zones. His discontent at being left out of the new circle was due to his economic loss. Otherwise, supporting the political center’s determination to fight against the insurgents, he stated that he never understood the Kurds getting into this deadly war with the state, which “allah’tan [fortunately] cannot be weakened.”

Suspicion towards people from Eastern Anatolia (“Doğulu”) in general and Kurds in particular is the dominant discourse in Edirne, where many people in casual conversation overtly show their dislike of Kurds and proudly embrace their Turkish and Balkan roots. Even smugglers, though being involved in an illegal activity from the perspective of the Turkish state, not only openly support the Turkish state’s official discourse of “fight against terrorists” but also consider smuggling PKK members as “betraying the nation.” Conversely, locals in Edirne are

generally indifferent towards “illegal” border-crossers coming from third countries and violating entry and exit rules of Turkey and Greece to reach other European countries.

This contrast is best exemplified in two pieces published in *Hudut* on the same day (11 April 1999). A short news piece hiding among advertisements, headlined “56 *kaçaks* are apprehended at the border,” first stated that “there are everlasting *kaçaks*, who wanted to go abroad by violating our country’s border.” The article continued by detailing the nationalities of the people and where they were apprehended by the soldiers. However, half of the first page of the newspaper discussed the apprehension of “PKK militants,” two men and one woman, caught smuggling bombs from Germany. Under the headline “They are not successful this time!”, the article identified the three PKK members and their motivations in smuggling bombs. At the end, it was noted that “despite being married to someone else, the apprehended woman, called Filiz Çevik was found to be pregnant from one of the apprehended man, called Mehmet Canpolat.” The illegitimate love affair between the two suspects was then presented as an extension of the PKK members’ illicit activities, implying a correspondence between betraying the nation and betraying their beloved ones.

On the Greek side, throughout 1999, the previously welcoming position of the state towards PKK members also went through transformation. The mainstream public view in Evros, on the other hand, did not follow the Greek center’s position vis-à-vis the PKK. The local paper, *Eleftheri Thraki*, stated that “[Greek] Thrace expresses its solidarity with the Kurdish people” (20 February 1999) soon after the capture of PKK leader Öcalan at the Greek Embassy in Kenya. Later, with a rather critical tone, it noted that “we [Greek government] are now in agreement with Turkey on terrorism despite Foreign Ministry’s refusal of such a deal until yesterday” (21 December 1999).

The local suspicion in 1999 of the sudden change in the Greek governments' official discourse demonstrates that there was a divergence between the Greek center and the periphery regarding how to position those subjects who were considered "illicit and illegal" from the united perspectives of the Turkish center and periphery. The divergence in the former derives from the fact that Greek-Turkish relations had been negotiated, first and foremost, by the political centers and that the diffusion of any new rule, norm, and rhetoric to the periphery did not happen overnight. It is similar in that sense to the center-periphery tension observed in 2004 in Edirne, where, as described in the Chapter Three, the local political elite came together under the "No to Annan Plan Platform" at a time when the Turkish state was supportive of the Annan Plan and the EU membership of a united Cyprus. Thus the Greek political center's changing position towards Kurds seems to have been met with unease by local actors. It was embedded in the existential threat and security notions of the national regime of bordering, which, as shown in the previous chapter, not only militarized the territorial border but also deepened the us-them distinction. As the following chapters demonstrate, the lasting impacts of this militarized regime of bordering are observed, albeit differently, even in the fields of economic and cultural interactions.

Throughout the 2000s, the Greek-Turkish readmission protocol of 2001 shaped the legal basis of Greek-Turkish cooperation against terrorism. Although Greece did not outlaw the PKK and other leftist organizations such as the Marxist-Leninist DHKP-C, the EU and USA branded them as terrorist organizations in 2008. Following that, Greece took bolder measures against incoming "outlawed" Turkish citizens, in line with the interests of its partners, including Turkey.<sup>20</sup> This supports De Genova's (2013) argument that in the post-9/11 era, immigration control and antiterrorism efforts are conflated to show force and determination to fight terrorism.

An example of the Greek state's repositioning against "outlawed" Turkish citizens is the recent readmission of Bulut Yayla to Turkey. Yayla was a Kurdish archeology student who was accused by the Turkish authorities of having links to the outlawed DHKP-C. He fled from Turkey to Greece at a time when around 1,000 students were being held in Turkish prisons on similar charges. According to eye witness accounts and his family's testimonies, on May 30, 2013, Yayla was forcefully pushed inside a police car in Athens and taken into custody. After suffering violent abuse and ill-treatment at the hands of the Greek police, Yayla was delivered to the Police Department of Edirne and from there was transferred to Istanbul's Antiterrorist Unit. The Greek Council for Refugees (GCR) based in Athens declared that he was a victim of torture in Turkey due to his political convictions and therefore must be granted refugee status according to the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, the GCR never received an official response to Yayla's application from the Greek authorities, and he was therefore deprived of the legal protection provided to registered asylum-seekers under international law. The Group of Lawyers also noted that this was "not the first time the partner authorities of the Greek and Turkish states used brutal force and arbitrary violence under the pretext of the 'war against terrorism.'"<sup>21</sup>

It is clear that, whereas an outlawed Turkish national's illegal act of border-crossing would be considered licit under the old national regime of bordering, and their right to asylum would be protected, their presence in Greece is no longer considered acceptable by the Greek authorities. Borrowing from Huysmans and Guillaume (2013), the new regime of bordering has led to a common security-citizenship interstitial. This cooperation was made possible by an EU policy tool, that is, the bilateral readmission agreement, developed to incorporate the countries in the EU's neighborhood in the governance of "illegal" border-crossings to the EU Schengen zone.

### *Temporary thus licit “kaçak”*

This section shows that in this process of Europeanization of the Greek-Turkish border, illegal acts of border crossing by people from third countries are still considered licit, provided their presence is temporary. As mentioned in the governance section above, local authorities in Edirne, particularly the police and civilian heads of the detention center, cooperate with their Greek counterparts in compliance with EU regulations. Yet this cooperation does not automatically lead to criminalization of the people transiting through Edirne. In fact, the discourse of local state agents suggests an implicit understanding of transit migrants’ victim status. While they do sympathize with people’s reasons for and motivations to cross over to Greece, they are also aware of their own responsibilities. Hence their discourse discloses the overlaps between their subjective understanding of the situation and their objective positions as state agents. In May 2014, the provisional civilian head of the detention center said:

Unless the root causes of migration are solved, people will continue to try to cross these borders. But we do what we have to do. We cannot let everyone pass the border. After all we must also show everyone that we do our job right.

Their insistence on doing their job right implies that, while people’s aim to leave the country is seen as licit despite its illegality, the local authorities have to take a different position the moment people without papers are caught crossing the border illegally, apprehended, and held in detention. This is similar to Andersson’s (2014b) argument that travelers are not fully formed as illegal migrants until they are at the Mauritanian “gate to Europe” and are apprehended by police for what they then really are. While agreeing with Andersson’s point about the moment of the formation of “illegal migrant,” I would also stress that, from the perspective of border control authorities, the short-term presence of people in transit right before or after a (successful) move across the border is considered licit, as long as they are not legible to the authorities. As also displayed above in the account of the head of the detention center, their

legibility by the Greek or Frontex authorities rendered their presence illicit for the Turkish authorities, too, since the latter then had to take action to prove their control over national territorial space and moving subjects. As discussed elsewhere, it is not only that the failed attempt is then considered illegal due to violation of legal entry and exit rules, but also that the ex post presence of the border crosser becomes a criminal act (Ikizoglu-Erensu and Kaşlı 2017). This is also supported by Pallister-Wilkins's (2015) research on Orestiada, where Greek authorities conflate the discourse of pity and risk regarding their perception of people apprehended on water or land right after they crossed the border. In that sense the local state agents' perceptions of the "kaçak mülteci" also follows international humanitarian discourse, which simultaneously victimizes and criminalizes "smuggled people" (Kaşlı 2011).

The temporary (and invisible) presence of "kaçaks" is an accepted public secret in the Thracian borderlands, both from the perspective of state and nonstate actors and from the perspective of unauthorized border-crossers. For the latter, both sides of the Thracian border, as another "gate to Europe," are temporary stations on their way to the next destination, if not a space where they are detained right before or after their actual attempt to cross into Greece. Among those who successfully cross without being apprehended, only a few migrants have elected to settle in the borderland rather than continuing their journey to Athens or other big cities in Europe. Previous border-crossers, who now have valid papers, may temporarily return to Evros. Some people come to guide new border-crossers or give them a lift to Athens, while others come for short-term missions as interpreters for refugee legal aid organizations. There are a few exceptions to this temporary presence, such as a handful of migrants working in the marina or on fishing boats in Alexandroupoli, and others who married locals in Evros and settled in the region.

Take for example Masoud, who is in his mid-30s and from Tunisia. Masoud's experience is rather exceptional as a person who stayed in the border region, yet it gives crucial insights regarding the continuities and changes in the border's control functions. It complements both the smugglers' narratives depicted above and Topak's (2014) analysis of the formation of biopolitical control practices against illegal border-crossings in the Aegean and Evros in the last decade. During his first attempt in 2004, Masoud came to Turkey on a tourist visa. Not using the word "smuggler" even once during our two-hour long talk seems like a deliberate choice, as he instead considers them people who "facilitated" his journey across state borders. In his first attempt, he crossed the border with 47 other people; each paid around 40 euros and all managed to cross the river safely:

The airport was already full of people going to Turkey for the same reason. So you could set up a group and stay together during the journey and try to find someone trustworthy to help you cross the border. Sometimes they say, give me 300 euros and I will take you to the other side. Then they take the money and leave (...) So we found the right guy and reached [Greek side] and started our walk. At some point while we were hiding in the bush, we got caught because of few impatient people in the group getting out of the bush too early. They [Greek police] put us in a police truck and then took back to the river. There were maybe around 12 policemen and there were other people like us too. So we were almost 70 people. With the police accompanying us on the boat, they transferred all of us to the other side.

Apparently this was not an official readmission between Greek and Turkish authorities. Yet as soon as they landed on the Turkish side of the river, Masoud and his friends were apprehended by Turkish authorities and detained in Edirne. After being taken only as far as Istanbul and given an expulsion order, Masoud traveled with another person he had met to Adana, the southernmost city on the Mediterranean coast, to cross to Northern and then to Southern Cyprus. However they were detained by the port authorities in Northern Cyprus and the next day sent back to the Turkish coast for not having proper documentation to enter, i.e. either

an invitation or a hotel booking to stay in Northern Cyprus. Since his one-month tourist visa was about to expire, he decided to go to Tunisia.

Masoud soon came back to Turkey by the same route. This time, being familiar enough with the route to take it alone, he paid someone 500 euros just to show him the way. He was taken somewhere close to the land border in Karaağaç where he could watch the Turkish soldiers on night shift and reach the Greek side of the border with just a 15-minute walk. He reached Alexandroupoli, hiding in the train. However, due to an accident at the train station, he was hospitalized and spent almost half a year recovering, thanks to the financial and moral support of the local people of Alexandroupoli. Having developed a good relationship with hospital staff and their acquaintances, he started working as a carpenter. While his initial intention had been to go to Western Europe, he eventually decided to stay in Alexandroupoli as he had developed a social network and support system during his long recovery period that he did not have in Athens or elsewhere in Europe. After three years of permits as a self-employed worker, he gained permanent residency in 2008. He also works as an Arabic-Greek interpreter at the court house in emergency situations, though he does not consider it an official “job.”

Nevertheless, the Greece of 2005 when Masoud arrived was different than the Greece of today. Before the ongoing economic crisis, it was relatively easier to survive and even settle in Greece. There were three waves of regularization, in 1998, 2001, and 2005, and a smaller informal one in 2007 (Triandafyllidou 2013). As a residence permit is attached to proven employment in Greece, it was possible to find jobs before the crisis and to renew residency (*ibid.*), and it was also possible to raise local funds for people like Masoud. Moreover, although crossing from Turkey to Greece was not necessarily easier than it is today, it was less deadly.

While Masoud's deportation experience was comparable with the practices of unregistered readmission practices of the current period, Frontex had not yet appeared in the region with its pushback operations. Greek and Turkish authorities had also not started coordinating control of the borders. The fact that there are not many people like Masoud living in Evros or Edirne shows that their presence in the region has been temporary.

Similarly, my interlocutors in Edirne mentioned that, for a short period around 2010, before the intensification of border control on the Greek side in 2012, "Arabs were everywhere": shopping in the Saraçlar Street at the town center, walking over the Tunca Bridge, or even getting on the minibus to reach the fields bordering the Greek fields in the Karaağaç neighborhood.<sup>22</sup> As the new detention center, which opened in 2011, is far from public sight, apprehended border-crossers have been invisible in the everyday life of Edirne. During my fieldwork, there were two public spaces where Syrians and other irregular border crossers were occasionally present. One was the coach station where they come from Istanbul, usually arriving early in the morning and waiting to be picked up for their next destination, and the other was the yard of the Selimiye mosque, where people with no place to go and no money to get a hotel room could spend the night. These two places are just spaces of flows, stopovers before the border crossing attempt with almost no contact with the locals.

In the summer of 2014, news began to spread among locals that a few Syrian and Afghan families had come and were renting houses in certain neighborhoods. Many people mentioned seeing Syrians in the neighborhood markets or at the old market place in Edirne center, but they were not as visible in the parks, cafes, weekly bazaars, or at the new malls of the city. One of the neighborhoods where they were seen is Kaleiçi. This is the old, non-Muslim quarter of the city, lately inhabited by the working class and the urban poor, namely migrants from different

Anatolian cities as well as Romas from the outskirts of Edirne. Another area is Yeniimaret, an old neighborhood at the outskirts of the city where the new detention center is located. Housing in these neighborhoods is older, cheaper, or even abandoned, as opposed to new apartment blocks where newcomers are easily recognized and visible each time they enter and exit the building.

The legal status of Syrians under temporary protection is not fully known in public and blurs the picture for people in Edirne. Despite the fact that reasons for migration are well-founded, being seen with any border crosser in public, or renting your house to Syrians puts you in a suspicious position. Many interlocutors, from the civilian head of the detention center to the members of City Council, revealed their suspicion in the following way: “You ask them where are you from and he just makes up something. They do not tell the truth.” The survival strategy, which irregular border crossers use to say the right thing at the right moment to the right authority, becomes a reason for mistrust among locals and calls into question the licitness of their presence in this border town.

In June 2016 an interlocutor from Edirne informed me that some Syrian families who had settled in the town were “convinced” to move to other cities by local authorities that they had approached for assistance. The reason, which my interlocutor also found “reasonable,” was that Edirne was a border town and therefore not convenient for the settlement of refugees and migrants. This seems to be a continuation of the local authorities’ 2015 policy towards the participants of Crossing No More, who were forced to go back to other cities in Turkey as soon as they arrived.

These examples imply that the line of il/licit does not always coincide with the line of il/legal acts, especially in the case of interactions with Syrians border crossers who have the

papers to stay and travel in Turkey. For Syrians under temporary protection, the moment of interaction with any local becomes the moment when they are labelled the “uninvited other” in this border town, and the boundary of the licit-illicit is redefined.

As mentioned in the governance section, there is a general lack of interest among local societal actors to get involved in migration-related issues on both sides of the Thracian border. This is mainly explained by the sense of border that makes borderlanders feel they are under close surveillance. The hesitation when encountering Syrians in Edirne is also partly driven by this concern, though locals also rarely come across people with irregular legal status, be they Syrians or otherwise.

In Edirne, one locally-driven activity encouraged encounters between locals and border-crossers from third countries, explaining the irregular border crossers’ temporary presence in town and sharing their personal stories, traumas, and aspirations: a social responsibility project conducted at a public high school in 2013. Esma, a high school teacher and the organizer of the project, explains how it coincidentally came about:

Okay, Edirne is of course a border town. But normally you don’t see migrants here every day. Two years ago [2012], I was looking for a place to give away extra clothes we have and a neighbor said the police station takes them to distribute. So my husband and I went there. The police officer on the door told us better if we can classify them as men, women, and kids wear. She told me that I could do it downstairs. I went down and I saw something like a jail with bars and somebody saying something like “bahçe” [garden] in broken Turkish. Then a policeman came and he said yeah they want to go out but they can’t. And then I asked why. That’s how I learned that they were migrants, caught while crossing the border.

While that image remained in her mind for a while, she did not do anything about it. Later on, when her students were searching for possible topics for their social responsibility project, she recalled that detention center experience. Esma decided to contact the head of the Foreigners Department who was also the head of the detention center. He suggested that students

would be welcome to prepare a playroom for kids in the new detention building. Esma passed on this suggestion to her students. Based on consensus, the students picked this topic to pursue that year. Knowing nothing about migration issues herself, Esma reached the City Council of Edirne and invited a member of the Migration Work Group to her school to inform students and teachers on this matter. As part of this project, students volunteered to prepare a playroom in the area allocated to women and children. From the people of Edirne they also collected books, medicine, clothes, and enough money to buy a TV for common use in the detention center. While the interaction between volunteers and detainees took place only in the presence of police officers, and while they were not allowed to walk freely in the detention center, the teacher reported that students still had the chance to get to know some of the women and children who stayed there for long time. As Esma says, “each time when the students were back there, they were wondering if they are still there or left and if left where they are now.”

By now the invisible presence of the “illegal” border crossers in the new detention center was known to many people through the statistical and procedural information described in the local newspapers. Nevertheless this activity remained the one and only example of a civil initiative in town; none of the local officials or members of civil society organizations involved in this project have tried to continue similar projects or to continue relations that were set up with the detention center during this project.<sup>23</sup> Yet, for Esma, this project became a life changing experience for its participants, and in her words, “At least it made things clear in the minds of the local people that these border crossers are not criminals because they are involved in an unauthorized action. In this sense, it had a positive impact on the world view of those young citizens of Edirne involved in it.”

A similar example of locals meeting the border-crossers is observed in Alexandroupoli. Athens-based ARSIS is running a boarding house in Alexandroupoli where only a small group of unaccompanied minors stay temporarily. ARSIS officers explain that Greek schools, students, and parents are welcoming these migrant children who follow classes sometimes for a whole year while ARSIS officers search for their family members or until they are settled in a safe European country. During our visit to the ARSIS facility in Alexandroupoli in September 2014, one officer explained the local people's reactions to the presence of children in the everyday life of Alexandroupoli as follows:

They build real friendships so quickly. The kids in their schools even cry when the time comes for example for one kid to leave Alexandroupoli... But of course these are kids. For them there is no politics. They simply love each other. And for parents too, they cannot say anything for a kid who is in need of help and also they know that eventually these kids will leave.

What is common in both cases is the locals' compassion towards children, accompanied or unaccompanied during their journey. Additionally the locals' experiences are always coordinated by official authorities responsible for the children. Finally, these personal relations are temporary since, in both cases, children eventually leave the centers in which they were temporarily "hosted."

To reiterate, temporariness emerges as a very important element that explains why the border-crossing attempts of people from third countries are seen as licit. This is repeated in many conversations with locals in Evros as well as in Edirne. Similarly in border villages, people often spoke about their encounters with people whom they called "Arabs" or "Pakistanis" over the course of the last decade. "Feeling bad about these people on the road," some continue to give food or let them stay in empty buildings in the villages for few nights before they continue their journey towards the Balkans or down to Athens. To the borderlanders, it seems it does not matter

whether it is a multitude of people passing by as long as they do not stay. As a no-border activist from Orestiada said:

Before the fence was finished [in 2012], every morning when we woke up we were seeing people walking on the street, covered with a blanket. But they were just passing by (...) Here everyone has in their family either a soldier or a police. This is how it is. So what will they do in this border town? Nothing! Everybody knows everybody here. People are suspicious of strangers in places like this. Even my father, he himself was a migrant in Germany for many years, yet he does not want to understand why these people come here. People don't want them and they don't want to stay anyway.

In sum, since the summer of 2014 it has been possible to see Syrian families who crossed over the river waiting around the train station of Orestiada to catch the next train to Alexandroupoli and then all the way to Athens. In Edirne, on the one hand, their momentary visibility in the coach station, as the point of arrival, and in the yard of Selimiye Mosque, as a safe roof for travelers, reinforced their temporary presence, and on the other hand, their invisible yet longer presence in few neighborhoods began to stand out as a new temporal form. Yet the longer they stay in town, the more they are suspected of illegal acts of border crossing in Edirne, the furthest point in Turkey away from the Syrian border and closest to the EU border. As shown elsewhere in comparing the local reception of asylum seekers in this border city and in an inland city of Turkey (Ikizoglu-Erensu and Kaşlı 2017), the licit presence of unauthorized border crossers in both Greek and Turkish Thrace also sits on slippery ground and is determined by their invisibility in public spaces and their temporary stay.

### **On othering: different degrees of otherness**

This section demonstrates that the Europeanization of the regime of bordering has not only created common “uninvited others” but has also paved the way for the repositioning of borderlanders among each other. As my survey of the local paper *Hudut* throughout 1999 illustrates, at this critical juncture, concomitant to the increase in acts of mobilities, there

emerged a remarkable effort in the public discourse to distinguish these mobile subjects who pass through or visit Edirne. The distinctions were also underlined between “komşu” (neighbor referring mainly to Greek and rarely to Bulgarian visitors), “gurbetçi” (referring to the guest workers in Europe), “Kosovalı göçmenler” (Kosovans of Turkish origin who sought temporary asylum during the 1998-1999 Kosovo War), “PKK’lı” (PKK supporters), and “kaçak” (illegal crossers) or sometimes “kaçak mülteci” (illegal refugees from third countries). Through those markers, which distinguish different actors of authorized and unauthorized border-crossings, a new hierarchy of otherness seems to emerge. On the one hand, as shown in the previous section, the distinctions made between “PKK’lı” and “kaçak”/“kaçak mülteci” have underlined the licitness of some “illegal” border-crossers whose motivations elicit sympathy. On the other hand, the visits of “komşu” (the old national other) in Edirne have been considered a positive movement, just as with the arrival of “gurbetçi” (the co-citizens) from Europe and “Kosovalı göçmenler” (the ethnic kin) who flee from armed conflict. These representations, which reveal a process of rebordering of the old us-them distinctions, are also supported by people’s memories of initial encounters with the old national other, and the changes in their experiences over time. I would suggest these changes in experiences, albeit not always in a progressive manner, are where new acts of citizenship can be observed.

### ***Criminalizing “outlaws” and pitying “migrants”***

As shown in the previous section, the licitness of the acts of cross-border mobility in the public view depends mainly on who is crossing the border. The unauthorized border-crossing acts of outlawed Turkish citizens are automatically criminalized, whereas the same act by the “kaçak mülteci” is met with pity, if not sympathy. The criminalization of the former goes so far that even borderlanders who are facilitating their border-crossings are stigmatized by their fellow

countrymen. As one smuggler I met in Enez said with a threatening tone, “PKK’lılar should not even get on [his] way!” while he considered all other unauthorized border-crossers “[his] passengers.” This distinction demonstrates that, recalling Migdal (2004), the mental maps of local smugglers in Thrace have many layers, although the official historiography seems to set the ultimate limits for acceptable acts of smuggling. It also shows that securitization of migration did not automatically lead to the same consequences for all unauthorized border-crossers, as such mental maps determine local smugglers’ responses to changing border control practices. After all, the distinction made by smugglers, as well as other local actors mentioned in the previous sections, appears as deeds that shape how the Europeanizing regime of bordering unfolds on the ground. As such, they are acts of citizenship that create a scene and claim the terms of loyal citizenship.

As shown earlier, borderlanders generally empathize with third-country nationals who cross the border to escape war and/or economic and ecological destruction in their home countries. These hardships inspire pity for those who take such serious risks to embark on long journeys, just to be able to start a better life. Living so close to a long established and militarized border zone also brings some awareness of the difficulties in obtaining a valid visa to travel to another country legally. Thus, it is possible to claim that through such a sense of border, following Green (2012), and the border-induced scale, following van Schendel (2005), many interlocutors in Edirne and Evros do feel pity, if not compassion, for unauthorized border crossers from third countries, despite having little or no involvement in humanitarian initiatives themselves and sharing no political or cultural allegiances with the border crossers.

When it comes to Syrians in Edirne, this mix of indifference and pity sometimes leads to stereotypes about Arabs in the official historiography and history books used at secondary

schools, associating them with dirt, backwardness, and cowardice. In May 2014 at the Edirne coach station, I witnessed how quickly the discursive othering may change from pity to racism. I was at the free shuttle service that takes passengers to the town center. A police officer and the shuttle driver were watching a group of Syrians who had just arrived on the morning bus from Istanbul, and who, with their temporary residency, were confident enough to wait in the open yard of the station to be picked up by their local hosts before trying to cross the border.

The police officer, not so loud that all the passengers in the shuttle could hear but also not caring if he was overheard, said, “These poor people, they think it is easy but probably they will be back in here either tomorrow or in few days after being caught on this side or on the Greek side.” He and the driver then chatted about the specific crowd waiting there, mostly young, male, and supposedly Syrian Arabs. The driver said, “[I] don’t understand why such healthy men are here. I mean if there is war in your country, you stay and fight for it, not run away like this, right?” By saying this, the driver also proved his own loyalty to the Turkish state he belongs to. Perhaps this was his line when talking to any state official, regardless of their rank and position. The police officer replied by asking, “Didn’t they after all sell us out [Ottoman Empire] too during the war [WW I]?” The answer seemed apparent to both, as the driver nodded his head and started blowing the horn at the Syrian crowd. Then he called to them to jump in the shuttle but at the same time closed its door. This quick swing of reactions from pitying to mocking revealed the particular ways in which othering works through such commonly shared national prejudices against Arabs, compared with other unauthorized border crossers from other countries.

The particular discourse of othering on the Turkish side, being indoctrinated by Ottoman and Turkish state perspectives, is different compared with the borderlanders on the Greek side who have gained their knowledge of history from the Greek state perspective. Their different

subject positions in encountering Syrians, and Arabs in general, lead to slightly diverse discourses of othering in Greek and Turkish Thrace, whereas emotions of pity, at best, and indifference, at worst, determine the common discursive positions vis-a-vis people from other countries. Hence, on each side of the border, the citizens' affective relations with the people in transit are mediated through the specificities of the old national regime of bordering, ordering, and othering in each national context, as well as the current Europeanizing regime of bordering that determines the il/licitness and il/legality of the unauthorized border crossers' presence in the Thracian borderland.

*(Partially) incorporating the minorities*

As mentioned briefly in Chapter Three, the first concrete step for neighborly relations between Greece and Turkey after the 1974 Cyprus Conflict was Turkey's lifting of visa requirements for Greek citizens in April 1984. This, as many interlocutors on both the Turkish and Greek sides highlighted, was a very important turning point in cross-border relations in the two states' peripheries. Greek citizens could easily access Turkish markets, and visit heritage sites and their ancestors' homes in Turkish Thrace and elsewhere in Anatolia. In particular, the Muslim-Turkish minority in Greek Thrace could more easily visit extended family members who had previously settled in Turkey. Not long before, legal border-crossings had been unidirectional from Greek to Turkish Thrace because Turkish citizens' mobility across the border was a new phenomenon. Encounters developed in the economic and cultural fields, and the particular ways in which Greek and Turkish borderlanders have become what I call "invited others" from across the border are examined in detail in the following chapters. In this section and the next, I will briefly depict the extent to which the securitized othering discourses of the old national regime of bordering were transformed or maintained after the Cyprus Conflict, while at the same time

Greek and Turkish bilateral relations, citizenship, and migration policies have been gradually Europeanizing.

The transformation of the Greek-Turkish regime of bordering has had crucial impacts on the everyday life of the Muslim-Turkish citizens of Greek Thrace. This includes both those who still live in Greek Thrace and those who live on the Turkish side of the border. As Greek citizens, the Muslim-Turkish minority community has become more mobile over the years, driven by familial, educational, economic, and political motives. Right before the 2010 local election in Greece, *Eleftheri Thraki* widely and furiously covered the news about the BTTDD Bursa branch arranging free bus rides for minority Greek citizens living in Turkey, to go and vote in the Greek local elections on November 7 (November 2, 2010). Days after the election, the newspaper captions read “Until when will the voters’ caravans of Turkey decide the fate of Thrace? Is the national pride gone before the party interest?” The news article was criticizing the fact that, although the liberal-conservative New Democracy candidate, Giorgos Pavlidis, was ahead in other prefectures including Evros, minority votes in Rhodope determined the result; the social-democratic PASOK candidate, Aris Giannakidis, who has excellent relations with the Turkish consulate in Komotini, was elected (November 10, 2010).

This representation in *Eleftheri Thraki* of the minority’s and kin-state’s involvement in Greek politics may seem a continuation of the old regime of bordering, which used to perceive the minority as an existential threat to national unity. Yet this news also points to the fact that the minority communities’ political engagements could determine the turn of local governance at a certain level of change in the regime of bordering. While othering of the minority was not completely eliminated, their direct political participation at least shifted their position from being passive objects of securitized policies of the past regime of bordering to active political subjects

in local politics. As such, the statement in *Eleftheri Thraki* shows the local mainstream public's continuing unease with the ongoing process of desecuritization of the minority condition, whereas the election result might then be interpreted as an assertive act of citizenship from the perspective of minorities.

In that sense, the position of the minority community in Greek Thrace, despite the local imagery of the minority as the "pawn" of Turkey, stands in stark contrast to the position of the minority community in Greek Thrace, presented in Chapter Three, which made many flee to the kin-state in the 1970s. According to my interlocutors in Edirne and Evros, two factors appear as decisive here. First, the easing of mobility in the mid-1980s had a crucial impact on the minority's perception of the self and the homeland. Second, Europeanization of minority policies in Greece in the 1990s strengthened the minority's political and social position in Greece. Önder explains this as follows:

So now people could come whenever they want. Thus they began to see what that homeland looks like. For us who came in the 70s or even earlier, we didn't even know how it looked like. We were just hearing stories that people like us, our relatives etc, were happier there. But once people could come more easily, then they started comparing and judging if they could actually do it here [Turkey]. Also Greece became an EU country, so we too became European citizens. Especially since the 90s, life is better for the minority in Greece. And if they want to move somewhere, they can now go to Europe too. The homeland is not the only option any more. So it is not the same homeland as in the 70s that magnified in our thoughts.

Although some affirmative action was taken in the 1990s, such as minority quotas at Greek universities, institutional obstacles in education have still pushed minority students towards Turkish universities. However, the migration pathways of minority members in their 30s or younger support Önder's comparison of what "homeland" meant back then and now. After he lost his Greek citizenship for choosing to stay in Turkey in the 1970s, Önder could revisit his home in Komotini only after he acquired Turkish citizenship in the mid-1980s. Yet people who

are in their 30s and younger have been able to commute easily between their hometowns in Greek Thrace and the Turkish cities where they study. For many, Trakya University in Edirne has become a popular destination, for the specific reason that it is easier to maintain contact with their hometowns in Greek Thrace. Hence for younger generations of Western Thracian Turks in Edirne, whom I call *commuters*, staying in Turkey after completing their studies is a decision determined by the socioeconomic conditions in Greece and Turkey. While some people who came to study later on married Turkish citizens and eventually acquired citizenship through familial kinship, there are also those who continued to stay with valid work and residence permits. In such cases, Edirne and other towns of Turkish Thrace as far as Bursa and Istanbul are preferred due to their proximity to home and availability of minority networks in these towns.

Recalling Ballinger's (2012) attention to replacement and emplacement as dynamic processes that might take various forms, it is possible to claim that, with the developments in minority rights in Greece and the ease of cross-border mobility between Greece and Turkey, the minority community of Greek Thrace is able to maintain homes in both places, instead of having to choose one. Hence, compared with the militarized regime of bordering, the minority emerges as active agents in the new politics of mobility and fixity (a) through their involvement in local politics, and (b) by their relative ability to choose the way they would like to re-emplace themselves in their hometowns or ethnic homeland, instead of being displaced or staying in state-controlled minority spaces.

Since the crisis erupted in Greece in 2009, there has also been a growing interest among Greek-Orthodox residents of Evros to learn Turkish and also to study at a bilingual master program at Trakya University. While Istanbul is the main job destination for both Greek and Turkish citizens, Edirne has increasingly become a popular study destination for Greek citizens

due to its proximity and affordability. Hence, what Navaro-Yashin (2005) calls “the borders on imagination” to describe people’s feelings of ease when they are on the right side of the border in divided Cyprus, has been transcended in the case of Thrace in the 2010s. The everyday lives of both the Muslim-Turkish minority and the Greeks of Evros are not limited anymore to national territorial space. In Chapter Six, I portray in detail, on the one hand, the new practices of commuting for all Greek citizens as well as the limitations to it, and on the other hand, the changes in minorities’ position in Greece and their roles in cross-border social relations in the Thracian borderlands.

***Some sort of welcome to the neighbor***

As just mentioned, the easing of border crossings has positively affected not only the ethno-religious minority but also the majority populations of the Thracian borderland. Since the lifting of visa requirements in 1984, Greek citizens have already been cross-border *day trippers* (*günübirlikçiler*). They have often visited the markets in the town center of Edirne and Keşan where basic household needs were, for a long time, cheaper due to the Drahmi/TL and EURO/TL exchange rate. Many stakeholders and shopkeepers in Edirne repeated that the removal of the visa requirement for Greek citizens gradually made Edirne a more vibrant place. Although the arduous visa application procedure for Turkish citizens until very recently worked as a negative incentive for many to visit Greece, there were still a few people eager to obtain a visa and cross the border. What united these early visitors was that they had some familial ties with places they wanted to visit, either as descendents of population exchange or as members of the Muslim-Turkish minority community of Greece. Thus they have also been active *day trippers* as long as they could obtain a visa. Yet, without exception, all the early travelers from Turkey emphasized that the thought of visiting their ancestors’ lands became probable in the late 1990s,

after Greek-Turkish relations took a friendlier turn. While the local experiences of border crossings for market exchanges are discussed in detail in Chapter Five, mobilities for heritage visits are presented in Chapter Six.

Here it is necessary to mention a few examples of how the image of the other as an “existential threat,” shaped by the old militarized regime of bordering, have continued to reappear at different encounters among the borderlanders, be they state or nonstate actors. In both Edirne and Evros, local interlocutors mentioned that in the early years of daily crossings, they had experienced detailed security checks at customs, were skeptically interrogated about the reasons of their visits, were sometimes secretly chased by police until they reached their final destination after crossing the customs, or were even stopped sporadically for identity checks during their stay in towns. Kostas, a farmer from Kastanies and now in his 60s, said he used to go to Edirne often to buy agricultural products to sell in Orestiada. He shared what he called a “fun memory” from one of his regular visits to Edirne in the early 1990s:

It was those years when the customs was open half a day. Once my friend who has a shop in Alipaşa, he said stay tonight, let's go drink somewhere. So we did. Everything was fine. We went to our hotel. Then I wanted to go out to get more alcohol because it was my friend's birthday and we wanted to continue drinking. Everywhere was closed at the time but a guy approached me and told me he had vermouth. I said OK. I put it inside my coat and went to the hotel (laughter). But apparently somebody saw me hiding something inside my coat and called the police. Few hours later, a receptionist came and said police was waiting for us at the reception. It turned out that the receptionist didn't know how to write my name, so wrote it wrong. And when the police checked my ID and saw that it didn't match the hotel records, they got even more suspicious of who we were. And then we called this lawyer friend who spoke Greek. He came and he helped us explain the situation. It was finally all ok (laughter). It is a funny story to tell now but then we were scared of course.

Similarly, Basri shared his experience on the Greek side during his first visit in 2002. Now in his early 40's, Basri is a civil servant in the Enez municipality and is from a Roma family that migrated from Alexandroupoli during the population exchange. Basri's first visit was

to Komotini to meet a woman DJ, a minority member, from a local radio that he listened to in Enez:

I think because it was military zone here, we had better access to Greek radio channels than to Turkish ones from Istanbul for example. Once I sent a letter to this DJ that I was a big fan of and we started exchanging letters. After a while we wanted to meet in person. I went all the way to Edirne center to apply for a visa and of course I had to spend days to figure out how to do that... And then also to go there [Komotini]. Compared to now, I spend a fortune I can say... I made the first mistake at the border gate at Kipi. The police officer asked me where I am going and I said 'to Gümülcine' [Turkish name] and then went like 'what Gümülcine? You mean Komotini?' I learned later from the people there and never said Gümülcine at the customs again (laughter). So when I was walking in Gümülcine. I realized that someone was chasing me. But I didn't speak any Greek so I couldn't do anything. After a while, I found a Turkish market and I entered and then the guy came in after me. With the help of the market owner, I told him why I was there. He was very surprised to hear that I was there for a love story. He was so sure that I was an agent I guess (laughter). After he was convinced, we left in good terms (...) Eventually it didn't work out with that girl but not because of the visa issue at least (laughter) (...) But I still go sometimes. I made many friends. There are many people there speaking Turkish. As a civil servant, I will soon reach [the ranking needed to acquire] the special passport. Then I can go whenever I want.

In her ethnography of Greek Thrace, Demetriou argues that changing village and town names in Thrace was a policy tool with bipolar objectives, that is, governing the everyday through Hellenizing the Thracian landscape (2013: 76). Basri's example shows that naming of places is also a performative act; it marks what Winichakul (1997) calls the geo-body of the nation-state at the very first encounter with the state authorities, at the moment of border-crossing, while simultaneously marking the performer as an insider or outsider. Several informants shared similar stories of how conversion of name places are used to mark the borders of sovereignty, especially at customs.

In August 2012, a similar encounter happened at Kipi when a group of ministers and high officials from Turkey wanted to pay a visit to the minority community in Greek Thrace during Ramadan. A few of the visitors, including the then Minister of Health, Mehmet Müezzinoğlu,

were from Greek Thrace and, like Önder, they had been *heimatlos* before getting Turkish citizenship. The border police, checking their passports, did not allow visitors with Turkish names of their Greek birthplaces to cross the border, including Müezzinoğlu. Despite diplomatic intervention at the prime ministerial level, these high-ranking visitors first had to get their Turkish birthplace names changed into Greek names. The next day they crossed the border with their renewed passports.

The Greek authorities' reaction at customs rested on the bilateral agreement signed earlier in 2012, to register birthplaces of the Greek Orthodox minority in Turkey with the current Turkish name, and those of the Muslim-Turkish minority in Greece with the current Greek name (*Hürriyet*, August 21 2012). Recalling the critical mobility scholars' stress on the ongoing tension between politics of mobility and fixity, this border crossing experience then shows that acts of mobility of neighboring country's citizens are still shaped in relation to a politics of fixity that is overdetermined by old disputes of the national regime of bordering, such as naming of places.

Although these examples show that controls at the border gates remained strict and suspicious towards the national other until recently, several local stakeholders also noted that political rapprochement in the second half of 1999 had some immediate positive effects at the local level. It triggered some symbolic encounters, such as the governor shaking hands with border guards at Ipsala Border Gate, and giving chocolate and flowers in return for the gesture made by a Greek officer at Kipi (*Hudut*, July 1, 1999). A few months later, right after the earthquakes, local representatives of the political parties visited the Greek Consulate in Edirne to show gratitude for their help and used the opportunity to request visa exemption for Turkish

citizens. In his response, the consul made it clear that there was not much he could do since visa issues were coordinated by Brussels (*Hudut*, September 7, 1999).<sup>24</sup>

At the same time, local initiatives began making use of these emerging relations. In October 1999, the association of shopkeepers of the historical Alipaşa Bazaar rented a bus, bringing residents from the neighboring Greek town of Orestiada for a day trip to Edirne, to show that opening customs would benefit the people of Orestiada as well as Edirne. This initiative was covered in *Hudut* with the headline, “Borders are not obstacles to friendship! The bus rented by the Alipaşa shopkeepers brought the first convoy of tourists” (*Hudut* 26 October 1999). Finally the authorities agreed to keep the Kastanies/Pazarkule Border Gate open for 24 hours, starting on January 6, 2000. Soon after, the then foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey made a one-day visit to three border towns in the three countries, and declared that one of the aims of their meeting was to discuss possibilities of cross-border trade and mobility (*Milliyet*, March 6, 2000). The changes in the economic field over the years and the role of local actors in this process of change are analyzed in Chapter Five.

The fact that local nonstate actors in the border region were already eager to find new channels of communication and exchange, as well as reconsidering their belonging over time, confirms Heraclides’ (2011) point that the local actors quickly embraced and even furthered the Europeanization of official relations. However the fact that it was not possible to realize all locally-driven demands, namely visa exemption for Turkish citizens, shows that local actors’ demands are realized only when they merge with the interests of the power centers. After all, it was only after the economic crisis in Greece that procedures for tourist visas got easier and visa requirements for special Turkish passport holders, namely high ranking civil servants and their families, was lifted in 2010.<sup>25</sup>

To reiterate, the positive changes in bilateral relations have paved the way for new types of mobilities and turned the old national other into “invited others” whose presence in the other’s public spaces, especially in the market places, has become desirable. As commuters and daily crossers, the locals of the Thracian borderland, including the Turkish-Muslim minority, have become more flexible and open to negotiating their affiliations and belonging according to their current interests and needs. Yet, as manifested in the insistence of the naming of places in Turkish bureaucracy at the registers and by the Greek bureaucracy at the border gate, the militarized regime of bordering and its homogenizing efforts still continue to leave their marks on the way space and people are classified.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter focused on the impact of the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations and their shared border on the notion of security and threat along the Thracian borderland. A poster saying “Borders divide, Customs unite” hung in the Pazarkule Border Gate in 2014 to evoke what a few scholars (Anderson and O’Dowd 1999; Baud and van Schendel 1997; Green 2010; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013) earlier called the key aspects of border. As a way of making and marking distinctions, borders imply relations as well as separations, thus “separation axiomatically generates a connection between the separated entities” (Green 2010: 261). Especially for the locals of the Thracian borderlands, this border’s function of connecting two pieces of Thrace has grown in importance in the 2000s as well as functioning to jointly controlling migration flows.

The local cross-border cooperation attempts to govern two distinct spaces and peoples, as they emerged with the effect of the Europeanization process, indicate that there is substantive change away from the past national regime of bordering, despite the sudden appearance of an

established sense of border and a residue of the militarization of the border. In other words, as the given examples show, old securitizing moves of the militarized border regime, which identified the neighboring country as a security threat, had left their marks on the new bordering process that is taking place under the framework of the EU. These moves have sometimes come from local actors, as manifested in the assertive rhetoric of “No to Annan Plan” Platform and the suspicious approach of the members of the Bar Associations towards each other’s intentions. At other times, as in the case of the Cross-border Cooperation Network, the center’s intervention to maintain interests established according to the old regime of bordering puts on hold the local actors’ enthusiasm to engage in dialogue and common action. As the Europeanization of the border carried on, the border’s separation function did not disappear but has gone hand in hand with connecting the two separate entities. The fact that the head of the Foreigners Department in Edirne feels responsible for the security of the minority in Greek Thrace, while at the same time doing his job of policing the European borders, indicates how the new securitizing moves are built on the remnants of the old ones.

In the face of political economic restructuring in the region in the 1990s, the local state and nonstate actors have taken particular direct actions, or at least taken firm stances, in relation to their local counterparts across the border. Regardless of the current messiness of the Greek and Turkish political centers’ relations with the EU, the re-bordering process, which the EU framework facilitated, has become a learning process at the local level. All the actors who have been involved in the process in one way or another have met the national other and acquired a better understanding of the boundaries of their own principles in relation to the other. More importantly, this re-bordering of the self and the other is an ongoing learning process. Every interaction adds to the previous ones, helping to knit together the personal networks that were cut

off with the abrupt closure of the border in 1974 and the mobilization of the national historiographies of the two states that defined the other as the national enemy. Through these personal networks, the informal ties that they maintained and developed in the 2000s, and the increasing mobility of the borderlanders, people in Edirne who are politically engaged, like Ahmet, look back to their ad hoc reaction to the Annan Plan in 2004 and say “nobody would do such things here anymore.” Those in Alexandroupoli, like Gkintidis’s (2014) informants, use the dominant rhetoric of friendship in the name of protecting their personal as well as national interests.

The emerging cross-border interactions in the 2000s further underline that the power centers are still the forceful actors of the relational field of security that has been reshaped under the EU framework. Ethnographic evidence shows that local political actions, which were not overtly encouraged by the power centers, either left a negative sense of engagement with the Other in the absence of new encounters (as in case of the failed Bar Association initiative) or were forgotten in the presence of further positive personal contacts (as in the case of the “No to Annan Plan Platform”). However local actions that were initiated with the support of the power centers has tended to create a positive sense of engagement with the Other, even when the power centers have later withdrawn their support (as in the case of the Cross Border Cooperation Network), or when they force upon local actors new rules pursued under the EU framework (as in the case of monthly meetings of border police forces).

Nevertheless, the ongoing intrusion of the center in the periphery does not necessarily mean they have full control over *all* forms of cross-border interactions and mobilities at the local level. In this relational field of security, the power centers have revisited their apparatus of border control in the 2000s. The new securitizing moves against the “flow” over the EU-

Schengen border have diminished the roles of the old military techniques of border control deployed against the other country's armed forces. On the one hand, the border has been equipped with new technologies of biopolitical control, which has made border-crossings harsher for irregular migrants from third countries. On the other hand, there has been a transfer of authority (though at the time of this research it was not yet completed on the Turkish side) (a) from military to police forces with the joint goal of control over mobility of the populations instead of territory, and (b) from the police to the civilian state authorities regarding the management of migrants and refugees within the territories of each state. However, these changes did not succeed in ending the acts of illegal border-crossings and smuggling of people. They just changed the actors who help people cross over, and shifted the focus from local to transnational smuggling networks. Ironically, the increasing involvement of the EU has, on the one hand, led to the construction of cross-border cooperation among local state actors and, on the other hand, led to replacement of the old local actors of smuggling with new transnational (migrant) networks. The new regime of bordering therefore made the "business" less profitable and more risky for borderlanders while the same routes have continued to be used by new and this time mobile actors of smuggling. This immediate counter-conduct shows that the center never achieved full control over cross-border interactions and mobilities; it just triggered the emergence of new tactics as acts of citizenship that create a scene, in this case, by the non-citizens.

In this re-bordering process, the old us-them distinction between Greeks and Turks has diminished and been replaced by growing numbers of *unauthorized border-crossers* from third countries who are, at best, seen as strangers in transit. Their "illegal" acts of crossing over are considered licit, as their motives for leaving their war-torn lands and movement to the Western

countries are well-founded. Yet the moment this passage turns into a stay, the new hierarchies of otherness crystalize in the spatial positioning of irregular migrants at the outskirts of cities, in detention centers, at coach and train stations. Commuters and daily crossers, in contrast, are spatially scattered in market places, main streets, schools, and cultural centers of the cities. Moreover, illegal acts of crossing over the territorial borders gain different social meanings depending on whether or not the borderlanders have some political and/or cultural affinity with them. Especially on the Turkish side, the positions of the locals, including the smugglers, change if the unauthorized border crossers are Kurdish insurgents. Similarly for Syrians, old prejudices against Arabs are easily uttered in public, whereas for people from other countries, pity for the hardships of their journey is followed with apathy and indifference for personally getting in touch with these strangers in transit. However, there is at least no open public reaction towards them, as it is the case in local villagers patrolling the Bulgarian borders and forcing people to cross back to Turkish side of the border and being honored by the Bulgarian chief of the border police and prime minister.<sup>26</sup> The lack of such direct anti-immigrant sentiments in Greek and Turkish Thrace implies that there is at least a certain sense of justice, which is also an act of citizenship for creating new possibilities, if not entirely shifting established practices.<sup>27</sup>

In the 2000s, with the increasing cross-border mobility of the Thracian borderlanders, a new image of mobile subjects has come into existence. The visibility of the old national other in each other's public spaces has gradually been normalized and welcomed despite the reappearance and disappearance of past disputes in this re-bordering process. New incentives have developed for the mobility of borderlanders traveling across the border as *commuters* and *day trippers*. Built on the initial phases of market exchanges in the 1980s and 1990s, with the increasing visibility of the old national other in the public spaces across the border and recurrent

personal relations, borderlanders from the other side of the border have been seen less and less as suspicious subjects.

Therefore, concomitant to the growing temporary presence *and* visibility of the unauthorized border-crossers, mainly from third countries, and increasingly mobile borderlanders in the public space of Edirne and Evros, the notion of otherness is being reconsidered. In contrast to irregular migrants or “uninvited others,” as coined by Bigo (2002), the new mobile subjects of the Thracian border region have become what I call the *invited others*. What makes the invited others’ visibility attractive and even desired in the public space, at least so far, is the fact that most of the borderlanders cross the border for short stays as *day trippers* for market exchanges, visits to historical sites, and cultural activities. Those who are *commuters* between their two homes on each side of the border enjoy a longer presence in both spaces, are mostly members of the Muslim-Turkish community of Greek Thrace, and hold an insider rather than an outsider position in Edirne. Chapters Five and Six unpack the nuanced ways in which the new mobile subjects are “invited” at different degrees, and the limits to these different forms of cross-border mobilities and interactions in terms of their transformative role on the notion of citizenship and us-them distinctions.

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<sup>1</sup> With the initiative of the Head of the Prefecture of Xanthi, Mr. Pavlidis, the heads of 6 prefectures from Greece (Evros, Rhodope, Drama, Kavala, Serres and Xanthi), 4 prefectures from Bulgaria (Blagoevgrad, Haskovo, Kardzhali and Smolyan) and one prefecture from Turkey (Edirne) met and decided unanimously the creation of the network of cross-border cooperation. The Agreement of Cooperation between Greece-Bulgaria-Turkey was signed on April 16th, 2004 in Orestiada, Greece (Topaloglu et al 2014).

<sup>2</sup> Information regarding the issue areas are retrieved from the material provided by Zambounidis. Interview conducted at his office in Alexandroupoli, September 8, 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Personal communication with lawyer Coşkun Molla at his office in Edirne, in May 29 and June 1, 2014.

<sup>4</sup> Information retrieved during my last visit in September 2015 at the time of Crossing No More march. How the relations between the ASAM officers and the few local activists have been developing since then require further field work.

<sup>5</sup> The most recent official numbers contradicts the local perception of non-existence of Syrians in town center. As mentioned in the introduction, according to the latest statistics in DGMM website, there are also 6,490 registered Syrians in Edirne as of January 2017. Their whereabouts are unknown to me at this moment and the relations

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between locals and the new arrivals require further research. Information available at <[http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection\\_915\\_1024\\_4748\\_icerik](http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik)> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>6</sup> The new humanitarianism and the coexistence of moral sentiments together with a hardened attitude to border policing, i.e. the tension between risk and rescue, is critically examined both as “humanitarian borders” in the context of Europe (Fassin 2011) and specifically in Evros (Pallister-Wilkins 2015).

<sup>7</sup> Information available at <<http://frontex.europa.eu/news/annual-risk-analysis-2013-published-WuhFH2>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>8</sup> The transfer of authority in provinces like Edirne could officially be done only in May 2015. The current situation after the official transfer is completed needs further scrutiny.

<sup>9</sup> While the detention center in Edirne is not designed as one of those seven reception and accommodation centers, it is still possible to ask for legal aid to seek asylum.

<sup>10</sup> Information retrieved from Ilias Pistikos’s lecture and subsequent informal talks with colleagues in the “Cultures, Migrations, Borders” Summer School in Lesbos in 2014.

<sup>11</sup> Information available at <<http://multeci.org.tr/haberdetay.aspx?Id=139>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>12</sup> According to Turkish police sources, the annual figures of irregular migrants who were actually returned to Turkey as irregular migrants from 2002 to 2010 was only 269 out of a total number of 65,300 migrants who Greece wanted to send back (İçduygu 2011). Yet Greek sources show the return for the same period much more than that. According to Greek police sources during the period 2006-2012, out of 5,686 requests made by Greek authorities concerning 122,437 cases, 12,326 cases (10.1%) were accepted by the Turkish authorities but only 3,805 people (3.1%) were effectively readmitted in Turkey (Triandafyllidou 2013). Between 2004 and 2008, out of 300,666 apprehended migrants only 548 managed to apply for asylum and 258,590 of them were deported back to their countries of origin (Multeci-Der 2010: 25; see also HRW, 2008).

<sup>13</sup> Information available at <<http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-signs-a-memorandum-of-understanding-with-turkey-UBa8Yy>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>14</sup> The EU-Turkey readmission agreement, which came into force in October 1, 2014, foresees the readmission of the nationals of the EU member states and Turkey, and the readmission of any other persons (including the third country nationals and the stateless persons) that entered into, or stayed on, the territory of either side directly arriving from the territory of the other side. According to this agreement the future prospects of visa liberalization for Turkish citizens was conditional upon the effective implementation of the readmission and management of irregular migration flows arriving to the EU from the Turkish territory in the following three years. So far progress on readmissions is limited, so is the visa liberalization.

<sup>15</sup> This is a rather long process. When a person asks to return to Turkey, a request for readmission is sent to the Turkish authorities who then respond with a readmission decision based on the bilateral (Greece-Turkey) readmission agreement, normally within a week to ten days. People are not returned individually, thus have to wait to be grouped before departure. With this process, the total number of persons returned under the EU Turkey Statement up to end September was 578 (ECRE 2016).

<sup>16</sup> Although his Greek counterpart too showed enthusiasm, during the exhibition opening, to offer me his help for my fieldwork in Orestiada, he later on hesitated to meet me in person to discuss migration management in the region and instead suggested that it is better to try NGOs than state agents. Personal correspondence first in June 5, 2014 and later in September 2014.

Following my first personal contact at the exhibition with the then head of the Foreigners Police in Edirne, I made an informal visit to the office of the Foreigners Police which is located in the newly constructed detention center. While the police officer at the time answered few research questions, he underlined that this was an informal interview and kindly asked me to make a petition to Ankara for an official visit to the detention center during which he could provide me some detailed statistics and led me in to the sections of the center where irregular border-crossers stay and that, according to law, shall be accessible to researchers. My petitions declined few times due to the messy situation in Ankara throughout my field research. During my visit to the Directorate General of Migration Management in Ankara in September 2014, I was told to try in one year time, when hopefully the police and civilian data will be merged and the provincial departments will be formed fully.

<sup>17</sup> EC Draft Action Plan is available at <[http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-15-5777\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5777_en.htm)> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>18</sup> Interview with Papathanaki, Orestiada, June 5, 2014.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with the owner of the tourist agency in Edirne, March 4, 2014.

<sup>20</sup> Information available at

<<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=71034&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&d>

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[ir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=408346](#)>. Also available at <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:188:0071:0076:EN:PDF>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>21</sup> Available at <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/special-report-the-tortured-activist-whose-fate-tells-turkish-protesters-dont-seek-refuge-in-greece-8650289.html>> > (Accessed January 2017) Available at <<http://omadadikigorwnenglish.blogspot.com/2013/06/for-case-of-enforced-disappearance-of.html#more>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>22</sup> The word “Arabs” was used by many locals to refer to any foreigner passing through. This denigrating usage is a simple reproduction of the old infamous label that has been commonly used in Turkey to point to anyone with even a slightly darkish skin color that is associated with the descendants of the Ottoman ‘Arab’ slaves. The varying countries of origin of the newcomers are known more among the people such as the headman of the neighborhood or people in the governorship or in chambers, unions and other civil society organizations.

<sup>23</sup> This project was told as the exemplary event in town by many different informants who were involved. Thus I have almost a complete picture of it from different angles; the head of the detention center, the teacher responsible for the project and the local “activist” provided some expert knowledge at different stages of the project.

<sup>24</sup> The same group also visited the Bulgarian consul to Edirne to pay gratitude and made the same request. Here they got the response that there is a time frame for visa flexibility which will come in two years. In deed it came into force in 2001, as the ambassadors stated, as part of harmonization with the EU Schengen visa regime. For an ethnographic study on the changing visa regime between Bulgaria and Turkey-- from stricter to flexible and then again stricter visa regime-- and the impact of this policy change on the everyday lives of the Turkish migrants from Bulgaria, please see Kasli and Parla 2009.

<sup>25</sup> Until very recently, Greece was the only Schengen country that required visa for the special passport that first degree state officials and their family members hold in Turkey. Available at <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/yunanistan.tr.mfa>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>26</sup> Further information on Bulgaria is available at <<http://bulgaria.bordermonitoring.eu/2016/04/13/bulgarian-state-supports-racist-groups-which-are-hunting-for-migrants/>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>27</sup> I am grateful to Engin Isin for helping me interpret such subtle reactions or sometimes lack of negative reactions with a constructive lens. Personal communication at Master Class with Engin Isin, University of Amsterdam, May 12 2016.

## **Chapter Five: From national to regional economies?**

This chapter examines the economic field, one of the three fields of power that invoke new citizenship practices in Greek and Turkish Thrace, towards a new regime of bordering between Greece and Turkey. Such practices range from smuggling of goods, commerce, and tourism to uninstitutionalized ways of mobilizing cross border cooperation between Greek and Turkish counterparts. Here I specifically investigate which people are invited and welcomed into the economic field, and what has changed/remained the same over the years in the positions of local actors when it comes to economic interactions in the Thracian borderlands.

As mentioned earlier, in the Greek-Turkish case political centers suspended the EU-led INTERREG-CBC. However local stakeholders in Thrace showed willingness to develop cross-border ties and made use of available formal and informal channels of economic interaction. While this willingness points to a certain level of regionalization, as Gkintidis (2014) aptly notes, this is patriotism refashioned in terms of individual economic conduct and entrepreneurial success. In his study of the changing discourses and practices of political and economic elites of Greek Thrace in the last decades, Gkintidis (2014) shows how nationalist undertones became even more apparent with the recent economic crisis in Greece. The local accounts presented in this chapter support Gkintidis's point about Greek Thrace. Also, in Turkish Thrace, economic practices do not overrule nationally shaped ways of doing and thinking. They sometimes even mobilize it for individual economic interests.

However, despite nationalist undertones, there is ground for some sorts of local practices that eventually lead to center-periphery divergences in terms of people's identifications with their political centers. The changes in local actors' positions vis-à-vis their counterparts across the border and their own political centers also depend on each country's economic performances

at a given time. The market asymmetries sometimes lead both the “winners” and the “losers” of this game to hold on to the presence of national borders to pursue their gain. Furthermore, as I demonstrate below, with the lifting of visas for Greek citizens and the easing of procedures for Turkish citizens, the increasing levels and diversifications of cross-border economic mobilities pave the way for building interpersonal trust, which, the fieldwork shows, is an important asset for local small-scale and mostly informal business relations. This contributes to the transformation of the old militarized sense of border and perceived ideas about the old national other. As such, accelerating acts of economic mobilities emerge as new acts of citizenship, which challenge the state scale politics and lead to reconsiderations of what Green calls the “sense of border,” or what Navaro-Yashin calls “borders on imagination.”

The first section of this chapter focuses on local governance of economic relations in the border region by demonstrating the different impacts of the presence and absence of institutionalized cross-border cooperation schemes. The next section delves into cross-border mobilities that involve economic exchanges. The final section discusses the impact of these cross-border governance attempts and economic mobilities on the discursive practices of othering, and it examines how professional expertise and language skills as social capital might lead to changes in the positions of some local actors in this relational economic field, thus changing the notion of otherness in the Thracian borderlands.

## **On governance**

This section explores the distinction between regionalism and regionalization in action, and the local manifestations of each in the Thracian borderlands. *Regionalism* is a set of purposeful actions, programs, and projects that is typically based on state-led projects and leads to formation of a formal regional institution. *Regionalization*, in contrast, appears as a process of growing and deepening of regional patterns of interaction, which is driven more by local actors and their economic activities (cf. Onder 2008).

Previous studies show that regional schemes and the purposes they serve are embedded in global transformations, reintegrating the post-socialist and emerging economies into the capitalist world market (Jessop 2000; Perkmann and Sum 2002; Onder 2008). In the EU context, this is achieved through cross-border cooperation (henceforth CBC) programs aimed at removing national structural and cognitive barriers blocking border regions' economic development in the EU (Scott 1999) or wider EU neighborhood (Delanty and Rumford 2005).

However, looking at EU regionalism in action, it is apparent that contrary to the program documents' claims of harmonious cross-border regions, state borders determine the norms and spatial organization of this cooperation at the local level of practice (Prokkola 2011). At best, different territorial attitudes towards open borders compete or conflict with each other (Popescu 2008). In some cases, the level of decentralization at the national scale and availability of regional leadership (Harguindeguy and Bray 2009) and, in other cases, personal contributions of nonstate actors involved in the cross-border projects (Prokkola et al. 2015; Varro 2016) determine the direction that projects of regionalization take in overcoming the state scale.

In the first section, I present the local impacts of Greek-Turkish cross-border cooperation attempts that were initiated in the absence of institutional support and discuss the reasons for

their success and failure. In the second section I contrast these cross-border cooperation experiences, developed in the absence of support from the political centers, with the more institutionalized cross-border cooperation experiences with the third neighboring country, Bulgaria.

### **Cross-border cooperation possibilities as regionalization**

As described earlier, the foremost role of the Thracian border towns in both Greece and Turkey was, until very recently, national defense. While there was no official contact at the local governors' level until the 1999 rapprochement, attitudes began to change in the 2000s with the possibility of cross-border cooperation under the EU-CBC schemes. The Euroregion Evros-Maritza between Greece and Bulgaria, established in June 2001 and named after the Greek and Bulgarian rivers between the three countries, was expanded in October 2001 to include Meriç – the Turkish name of the river – as the INTERREG III/A (2000-2006) was on its way.<sup>1</sup> This was building onto numerous bilateral agreements signed in the aftermath of the rapprochement.

In building these initial contacts at the official level, the regional and national business organizations played active roles. In particular, the Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce in Thessaloniki, the Union of Hellenic Chambers (KEEE), the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises (SEV), the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), and the Turkish-Greek Business Council created in the framework of the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) have worked as alternative channels of communication (Tsarouhas 2009). Business people have participated in official visits and in Greek-Turkish Business Forums introduced mainly by SEV and DEIK, and lobbied in support of policies associated with a “trading state” (Kirişçi 2009). In the context of Thrace, local chambers, namely the Commercial & Industrial Chamber of

Rhodope and the Edirne Chamber of Industry and Commerce (ETSO) have also developed strong ties.

Despite the concrete steps taken, such as determining the managing authorities, budget, project priorities, etc., INTERREG III/A was eventually suspended. According to Özerdem (2011: 86), who is the founding coordinator of the European Union Coordination Center in the Governship of Edirne, the program was not implemented mainly due to the fact that the managing authority on the Greek side, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, did not follow procedure in launching a call for proposals for projects and factors. Lack of coordination, differences in program periods in two countries, and imbalances in budgetary allocations caused difficulties in synchronizing activities. Yet during my fieldwork in Edirne, the EU and Foreign Relations officer as well as other officers in ETSO explained that the suspension of the program was mainly due to the fact that the EU scheme foresaw the sea and land border as the program's implementation area. While the State Planning Organization (DPT), as the managing authority on the Turkish side, was fine with this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had difficulties framing this development within its foreign policy pertaining to the Aegean disputes. Later on, the head of the European Projects and International Affairs Office in Komotoni also gave the same reason for the absence of an institutional cooperation scheme between Greek and Turkish Thrace.

Regardless of the suspension of Greek-Turkish INTERREG, some chambers in Greek and Turkish Thrace pursued cross-border relations. This was achieved despite the lack of full institutional support from the political centers, which is essential to make use of EU-led regional schemes officially. As depicted in the previous chapter, Edirne was incorporated into the existing Bulgarian-Greek Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) program for the Cross-Border Cooperation Network. The aim of that office was to prepare projects for upcoming INTERREG programs.

Once the funding period of the Bulgarian-Greek IPA was over and there was no Greek-Turkish INTERREG on the horizon, the office lost its *raison d'être*. In that sense, recalling van Schendel's politics of scale (2005), the new (Europeanizing) border-induced scale allows for some informal cooperation channels to develop and flourish, whereas the state scale determines the extent to which cross-border cooperation in the Thracian borderland would be maintained and brought forward.

Despite the suspension of the EU-led regional scheme, cross-border economic cooperation was still pursued at the state level. Following then Turkish PM Erdoğan's visit to Athens in May 2010 and the signing of agreements in 21 fields of cooperation, the Kastaneis/Pazarkule gate was opened to the passage of diplomatic passport holders for the first time in 28 years.<sup>2</sup> Ten of the 320 Turkish visitors who joined the Turkish PM on this visit were ministers, and the majority of the rest were Turkish businessmen from different sectors.

Following the official formation of the Greek-Turkish High Level Cooperation Council in Athens during this visit, several regional business forums were organized to bring together businessmen from Turkish and Greek Thrace. The First Regional Business Forum took place in Edirne in June 2010 and was followed by another meeting in Thessaloniki in December 2010, which was attended by 15 businessmen from Edirne out of a total of 50 participants from Turkish Thrace.<sup>3</sup> During the Second Regional Forum in Komotini in January 2011, all parties agreed to invite Bulgarian counterparts to the next meeting taking place in November 2012 in Çanakkale, Turkey. That meeting, however, moved away from a regional focus towards a country-wide cooperation initiative since it was open to businessmen from different regions of Turkey.<sup>4</sup> More importantly, it was not followed by a third regional meeting afterwards, which seems to hinder initial regional dialogue.

Meanwhile, active business people and some officers of business organizations in Evros and Edirne had developed personal relations, which they pursued by inviting their counterparts in neighboring country to their public events, meetings, and business fairs. As a result, trust started to develop in the Thracian peripheries. Yet my observations during several public events in Edirne and Evros reveal that it was mostly the same small group of people taking part in these cross-border activities. As repeated by many interlocutors, one practical obstacle for Turkish stakeholders is visa expenses. Stakeholders on both sides of the border were primarily concerned that such social gatherings had no direct economic returns in the presence of ongoing bureaucratic obstacles to cross-border trade and investment.

Yet, these ongoing interpersonal interactions seemed to make an impact at least on the small groups of participants. Similar to Prokkola's (2011) study on Swedish-Finnish cross-border relations, face-to-face contacts are considered important in creating a feeling of togetherness and trust, and in building new networks. Many people consider customs an obstacle for further economic cooperation in the border region. One officer in the governorship of Edirne defines the sole aim of the border gates these days as checking whether the goods people carry across the border are appropriate or not, and "not to prevent people from stepping into each other's land." On both the Turkish and Greek sides, I was told many times that the removal of customs checks on the daily visits of borderlanders and the tourists would be the best-case scenario for joint development of Greek and Turkish Thrace. From the hotel owners association in Alexandroupoli and Orestiada to the business chambers in Edirne, local actors seem to be captivated with the plans developed during the Network of Regions meetings, imagining the Greek, Turkish, and Bulgarian border region as a united space of free trade and travel.

One way local stakeholders imagine Thrace as a united economic zone is through talking about joint regional development projects. According to the head officer in the Development Office under the governorship of Edirne, big developmental projects that make use of the geographical specificities of Thrace would be the best way to contribute to the economic development of the three countries' border regions:

Instead of dividing the 10-15 million euro into 100 or 200 small projects, they can maybe start supporting 3-4 big projects which might produce more added value and more concrete impacts. The small projects that were necessary to make each other get to know one another served their purpose well but I think it is time for a change in strategy....There may be a project about Meriç [River], the use of water in a more active way. It might be a big project to connect again three neighbor countries. In the olden times this river had been used for economic transportation. If we can revive that again, this will be very good for the regional development.

Similarly, in both Evros and Edirne, representatives of business organizations mentioned future possibilities for the joint development of "tourism potential" in the region. For many, Alexandroupoli and Edirne, as two important centers, would be supported by the available facilities, services, recreational possibilities, and site-seeing options right across the border, that is, in Enez and Orestiada respectively. In the case of Edirne town center and Orestiada partnership, Bulgaria's Haskovo also emerges as a third site for cultural tourism. Such plans across borders were already noted in cross-border cooperation programs as a strategy for attracting tourists visiting one of these three sites on a day-trip to stay longer in the region (see European Territorial Cooperation Program Greece-Bulgaria 2007-2013 and IPA Bulgaria-Turkey 2007).

In practice, however, building coordinated business networks and infrastructure in a cross-border space as such is not an easy task, due to bureaucratic obstacles. It requires crucial investment and political will. Many stakeholders in both Turkish and Greek Thrace underline that such a cross-border space is possible only if there are no visa requirements at customs. They

also acknowledge that this would require new regulations at the EU level as it is beyond the power of local and even national authorities.

Local actors are also well aware of the new limitations that the Europeanization of the Greek-Turkish border has brought to the region. According to the Association of Hotel and Restaurant Owners and Shopkeepers in Alexandroupoli, the visible presence of both military personnel and border police is the main obstacle to sustainable regional development in Thrace. While saying that, they also acknowledge the existing tension in the borders and affirm the idea that border controls are needed to stop “illegal immigration.” For the association, this new security concern causes a dilemma for policy-makers that can only be resolved by international cooperation:

Enez could be an opportunity for tourism in Alexandroupoli too, just a longer coastal line with more restaurants and hotels to visit.... But with the army next to you, forget it. The tourists cannot feel secure when they know or see illegal immigrants and the army passing from where you are. If you want development, you must eliminate tension on the border...Migration is a worldwide problem and many countries have to be involved. At the moment it is very easy for Turkey to be a transit country and let them [unauthorized border-crossers] pass....But if you want to be an international player, you have to ask for help from the EU and International organizations. For the relations with Greece it is nothing but relations with EU is affected negatively at the end of the day. Turkey will lose if they don't cooperate. It's a humanitarian problem OK but the problem has to be solved at the source countries. For Syrians, the solution might be to give them temporary residence in places close to the border there.

These examples show that some local stakeholders have moved from the first step of getting to know each other to imagining more substantive cross-border infrastructural changes. In particular, the narrative of the Association of Hotel and Restaurant Owners and Shopkeepers in Alexandroupoli makes it clear that the remnants of the militarized regime of bordering is seen as an obstacle to future development of the region, whereas cross-border cooperation on border control within the EU framework and effective policing of the border are framed as necessary

security measures to be taken. In that sense, it is clearly accepted that touristic mobility and economic development in a united Thracian contact zone are conditional on the immobility of those who are called “illegal immigrants.”

While some economic actors seem to embrace the idea of demilitarizing while still policing the border, there are also those who benefit from the continuation of the old militarized regime of bordering and the perception of neighboring people as a threat to national unity *and* to the national economy. There are examples where local actors in the latter group might mobilize the old establishment in the state bureaucracy to work as a stumbling block on the way to cross-border cooperation. Local stakeholders and business people in both Edirne and Evros generally complained that developing personal cross-border relations were not sufficient for lasting economic relations due to bureaucratic obstacles to cross-border commerce and investment.<sup>5</sup> This is especially true for Greece where foreign investment is generally not welcomed (Papadopoulos 2008).

Many studies of Greek-Turkish economic relations mention the opening of the Ziraat Bank (Bank of Agriculture) branch in Komotini/Gümülcine as the turning point for Turkish investment in Greek Thrace, though it initially caused serious debate in the Greek parliament in 2007 (Athanasίου 2011; Papadopoulos 2008; Tsarouhas 2009; Turlay 2011). The debates continued over whether this Turkish public bank should be allowed to inscribe the words *T.C. Ziraat Bankası* (“Turkish Republic”) on its plaque, as is usually the case in Turkey. Finally, the Athens office and then the Komotini/Gümülcine office were opened in February 2009. However, days before the openings, the General Secretary of the Eastern Macedonia and Thrace region refused to attend the ceremony; his invitation had been written only in English and Turkish with the name of the town written as Gümülcine. Soon he received a new corrected invitation and the

crisis was solved (*Hürriyet* 18 February 2009). Yet this symbolic invitation-refusal-reinvitation process reaffirms the point I made in the previous chapter regarding the reappearance of the old national border regime in encounters between state actors, which makes these actors perform their loyalties according to the old national sense of border. This case further proves that the disputes over place names emerge as a source of conflict not only at the border gates and registrars but also in the way state actors' are involved in the economic field.

During my interview with the director of the branch office in June 2014, I was told that the bank's presence in Komotini/Gümülcine is "a little bit for the [minority's] sake, a little bit for commerce." Its rather symbolic presence is also reinforced by the fact that the directors of both branches are Turkish citizens appointed from Turkey, all the personnel in Komotini/Gümülcine are from the minority community, and in Athens all of them belong to the Greek majority. For him, this is normal given that the Komotini/Gümülcine location mainly serves small business owners from the minority community, and Athens is intended to serve as corporate banking. However, without technical infrastructure comparable to the Greek banking system and given the lack of sufficient investment from the Turkish bank's budget, as of 2014 the bank was unable to offer much service even to the Muslim-Turkish minority. In both cases, their main task eventually became easing transactions between Greece and Turkey.

While this is a state-led and highly politicized investment attempt, the head of the Edirne Industry and Business Association (EDSIAD) himself experienced first hand the hardships of investing in Greek Thrace as a local Turkish businessman:

My brother and I started up a business in Alexandroupoli in 2007. A good friend from here, Mustafa, he is a lawyer and he speaks perfect Greek, he was our partner here. We made partnership with a very close friend of his from Alexandroupoli, like a childhood friend, they are so close. It was a 50-50 partnership. We were selling construction material to the Greek side. All was going well in the beginning. But soon after, things changed. Such a coincidence,

the head of the chamber of commerce in Alexandroupoli, he had business in the same sector. So he found out about that and he becomes disturbed. So he reported this to the ministry of foreign affairs in Greece to make pressure on our Greek friend to close the firm. Of course they could not close it just like that, it was a legally running business. But they kept on chasing him, annoying him, asking why he was doing business with Turks etc. So my brother and I decided instead of losing our friends here and in Alexandroupoli, better to end this business. But it didn't even end there, they [Greek authorities] cancelled my brother and friend's business permits and even banned them entering Greece for 2-3 years. This [lawyer] friend found a way to go around it. He got business visa and then even citizenship from Bulgaria. So what! But then when I was in Athens with Ali Babacan [the then Minister of Foreign Affairs] that year, we brought this issue up to the Turkish consulate in Athens. They said 'are you insane? How did you even dare to this in the first place? Don't you see there is only a handful of Turkish business here and none of them are in Thrace.' Indeed we checked the list of companies, there were maybe 10 Turkish companies in total and most of them were opened by the Greeks from Istanbul. There were only 2 with a partner from Komotini but the Turkish partners had a very small share. So it was obvious they were careful to give permits even around Athens but in the border region even more so.

Similarly, heads of chambers of industry and commerce in Edirne (ETSO) and Keşan (KTSO) as well as other business people in different parts of Edirne repeatedly said that, after the crisis in Greece, it would be possible to do investing in other parts of the country, mainly closer to Athens. However, they said the security concerns of the old regime of bordering in Greek Thrace still reappear, not in the form of legal obstacles but administrative ones, such as delays in signing necessary papers, to make it harder to start up a business or make an investment. Although few people actually tried starting up businesses in Greek Thrace, many searched for ways to do it. Once they learned about the bureaucracy and the failed attempts for partnership, however, they withdrew the idea. Instead, as shown in the section on mobilities, they looked for other ways to circumvent the formal rules and procedures to develop their business ties in more mobile and informal ways.

It must be noted that it is not only the Greek political center that impedes Turkish investment in Greek Thrace. The direct involvement of the Turkish consulate in Komotini in the

everyday life of the minority communities was also mentioned by both Greek and Turkish business people as a factor that makes joint Greek-Turkish business ventures less likely. Several business people in Edirne mentioned the active presence of the Turkish state in Greek Thrace, which makes the region vulnerable to the delicate and changing parameters of Greek-Turkish politics, as a reason for them to instead try to invest in other places, such as Bulgaria or Romania, where one can “just do business.”

Hence, there have been some local attempts and thoughts emerging for regionalization of economic relations and governance of economic development in the 2000s. Yet the established sense of border seems to remain intact when it comes to imagining the border region as a joint space of governance, and this impedes the institutionalization of cross-border networks and ties that many economic actors are eager to pursue. As mentioned before, the Greek-Turkish INTERREG has been suspended but the Greek-Bulgarian CBC and Bulgarian-Turkish IPA programs are active and in use by local stakeholders. The next part of this section compares and contrasts the Greek-Turkish case with these institutional cooperation practices, in order to assess the extent to which availability of EU schemes makes a difference in cross-border relations in the economic field. In other words, I will examine the nuances in the politics of scale as they appear in the economic field of the changing regime of bordering.

### **CBC projects as regionalism**

Many state institutions in the border region do their best to use available EU funds for their local development projects, to compensate for the lack of funding from the central governments. As stated by Mr. Arseniou, the head of the European Projects and International Affairs Office of the Region of East Macedonia and Thrace, located in Komotini, “the future is in the regions.” Previous studies on CBC between Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria show that over

the years, municipalities, districts, or provincial governors' offices, including institutions such as public schools under the authority of the governor's office, have been the main beneficiaries.

On the Greek side, as explained by Mr. Arseniou, since the passing of Law 2218 in 1994 and subsequent laws that foresaw decentralization of the local administration in Greece, it has been common practice to plan development from a regional perspective and use CBC funds. While the prefectures became directly elected bodies, the then 13 administrative regions established their own regional development funds and participated in policy making and administration of national and European funds and projects (Anagnostou 2001). It is in this context that local government bodies have developed the practice of searching for local and cross-border partners with similar goals and capacity for project implementation. Depending on the available EU scheme, these local organizations pair with counterparts in different countries with similar motivations, with the ultimate goal of developing the human capital of their own localities. Similarly in Edirne, the number of state institutions (municipalities, governorships, and public schools) that applied and ran Bulgaria- Turkey IPA-funded projects was five out of thirteen in 2003. The number of state institutions using IPA funds increased to 30 out of 47 in 2011 and their total budgets comprised no less than 70% of the total funds (Sezgin and Erkut 2014).

While these projects might have contributed to the development of local capacity, know-how, and infrastructure to some extent, regionalism as it is experienced in the Thracian borderland provides very limited regional cohesion beyond the state scale of governance. As Sezgin and Erkut (2014) stated, for local stakeholders in both Turkish and Greek Thrace the CBC funds are substitutes for limited resources coming from the central government, and they do not necessarily aim to attract global investors to the region. For example, representatives in

governorship and prefectures as well as in business organizations in Edirne and in Evros have underlined that EU funds are important resources mostly used for renovation activities. For them, this would help develop the region's tourism potential, which is crucial for the future of the local economies of Edirne and Evros. CBC schemes are, in that sense, important economic resources for regional development that is still envisioned, recalling Navaro-Yashin (2005), within the national borders on imagination.<sup>6</sup>

Some interlocutors, namely shopkeepers and small business owners, are even suspicious of the use of CBC funds regarding their direct economic returns for local economic actors. Mert, a man from Edirne, had an export business for many years that shipped mainly to Romania and Bulgaria. Upon my question about the CBCs in Edirne, Mert explained why he was suspicious of the state and business organizations promoting CBCs so much:

All they do is visiting each other, staying in a hotel and having nice dinner for free, having meetings that do not really mean much for the people(...) I do not feel anything about the EU here [Edirne] or there [Greece, Bulgaria] in any sense of the word. For me nothing changed in the past 25 years. Ok they renovate some buildings. They say this building is going to be used for this purpose, mainly for cultural activities, but even the mayor himself said the other day that these are not being used to the full, I mean not very actively used. So for me, such things are only a show-off. The only thing that can maybe change the situation for people a little bit is the lifting of visa requirement. Doing business between Greece and Turkey must be like doing business between Edirne and Havsa [a town 20 km east of Edirne]. So this visa thing is not fair for us...Or for example, the Greek state for example used to give subsidies to their firms, before the crises, subsidies for truck rental [for export/import] etc. So something like that is needed everywhere. Good trade is done with good money. If you don't have money to begin with, you cannot do anything.

It is often repeated that affiliations in business organizations are important only when participating in international fairs in neighboring countries or abroad. In such cases, the visa application goes smoother if done with documentation and logistical help from these organizations. The several ETSO personnel I met at different times confirmed this. In their

defense, they said, what they try to do is inform their members when there are new procedures to be followed for export/import businesses. Yet, as they underline, it is up to these companies themselves to develop individual business relations, while acknowledging the fact that such an initiative requires the availability of specialized personnel in each firm who could carry out such communication and then follow up. In that sense, the local business organizations accept that their role as an interest group is limited and they are simply intermediaries between the local economic actors and political centers, namely the capital cities of the two states and the EU.

Despite their limited contribution to immediate economic return and insufficiency in large scale regional development, CBC meetings still have the potential to provide cross-border mobility opportunities for different social groups. Perhaps this is where the institutionalized schemes are most influential. Unlike the Greek-Turkish case where institutionalized CBC schemes are lacking, the presence of an institutionalized Bulgarian-Turkish IPA program seems to encourage cross-border mobility of different social groups. Ziya, a project consultant in Edirne who had conducted a few CBC projects for municipalities in Edirne province, explains how:

In our project on bee feeding, the main target group was rural women, living in Süloğlu [in Edirne]. So around 30 of the participants were women and around 25 of them were those who could never go to Bulgaria in their lives otherwise. So it was a completely mind changing experience for them to go even as far as Haskovo (...) For example in Bulgaria ATAKA got more marginalized over the years as we [Turkish citizens] continue to have relations with Bulgarians. At least people are not scared of meeting each other. This is very important. The same seems to be happening with Greeks too but they are personal initiatives with no state involvement. 240 people from Bulgaria and Turkey visited each other only for our project. There is no such number even when you add up all the initiatives taking place between Greece and Turkey.

This observation implies that the outreach of such institutionalized attempts may be much wider than individual and informal initiatives of local stakeholders working towards building contacts. Similar roles of CBCs are underlined by Mr. Arseniou in the use of the Greek-

Bulgarian CBC scheme, referring to projects developed in cooperation with local NGOs for the social inclusion of the most disadvantaged groups in the region. For example, one of their projects aimed at helping minority women gain certain skills to increase their employability. For Arseniou, this project not only encouraged these women to gain access to the job market, but it also allowed them to meet women in the neighboring country with similar backgrounds and to work together in workshops that would not be possible otherwise.

These local experiences show that such regional funds certainly provide room for cross-border cooperation and mobility of different local groups, for whom such mobility would not be possible in the absence of such institutionalized support structures. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that these projects stand as the exceptional examples. As mentioned above, the majority of projects are designed as small infrastructure and renovation projects, bringing two or more counterparts together only for official meetings throughout the project periods, and not prioritizing mobility of larger groups of people. Varro (2016) draws attention to the translocal imaginaries that the Dutch-German-Belgian CBC seems to stimulate in the discourses and practices of at least some of its active participants. These few examples of EU-CBC programs in the Thracian borderland further show that, when specifically aimed at incorporating socially disadvantaged groups, these schemes may contribute to diversification of spatial mobility practices and help more socially disadvantaged groups transcend established national imaginaries.

Nevertheless, overall differences in the local practices of informal Greek-Turkish cooperation and the formal IPA schemes reaffirm Sparke's (2002a) point that cross-border regions are political geographies of place promotion that are very much shaped by national political preoccupations. Yet, as Sparke (2002b) also argues elsewhere, governance is comprised

of both formal and informal power relations that have consequential regulatory effect. It takes multiple forms that morph into new shapes and sizes in contingent as well as routine attempts to re-regulate and redirect emerging cross-border practices. In search for such contingent attempts that are initiated by local nonstate actors and their informal networks, the second part of this chapter unpacks various cross-border economic mobility practices in the Thracian borderland as a contact zone.

### **On cross-border economic mobilities practices**

This section depicts various economic activities around which local actors' acts of mobilities are shaped. Here, as in the previous chapter on the security field, I follow two axes. First, along the line of licit/illicit, I specifically focus on the licit economic activities regardless of their legality. I point out local strategies that almost naturally emerge in the borderlands when actors contest or maneuver the legal norms and rules set by political centers of their states. The politics of mobility-fixity is the second axis along which economic practices are examined. This axis helps me scrutinize what sorts of economic interactions allow the spatial, and in some cases social, mobility of which actors. These two axes reveal formal and informal power relations that shape acts of citizenship and determine changing parameters of bordering/debordering/rebordering as they unfold in the economic field. Looking closely at acts of mobilities along these two axes will bring us to the last section of this chapter, where I point out specific factors that help local nonstate actors build ties with their national others, who are gradually becoming "invited others," mainly as *day trippers*.

As already mentioned, the visa requirement was removed for Greek citizens in 1984 while remaining the main obstacle for cross-border personal interaction along the Thracian borderland for Turkish citizens. This emerges as the most decisive factor for who is mobile in the

economic field as well as in the cultural field. As of 2010, soon after Prime Minister Erdoğan's visit to Greece, it became easier for Turkish citizens to apply for tourist visas, and visa requirements were lifted for high ranking civil servants and their families holding special passports (namely Green passports). In addition to this specific socioeconomic group, others that are often mobile include local businessmen, professionals, and their family members who can easily acquire a visa with the help of business organizations. Ironically, despite the fact that small shop owners interact the most with daily Greek visitors to Edirne, they are the least mobile. They say this is mainly due to the cost of a visa application and the fact that they work long hours and tend their shops six to seven days a week.

For many Edirneans, the recent easing of visa application procedures and issuing longer visas stem from the economic crisis in Greece and their need for more tourists for economic returns. However, during our meeting in May 2014, Katerina Varvarigou, the then Greek consul to Edirne, emphasized that the increasing number of visitors from Turkey was attributable to the growing economic power of the middle classes in Turkey and their growing interest in traveling abroad. Based on my firsthand observations at the Ipsala and Pazarkule border gates and touristic places in Alexandroupoli and Orestiada, and with the personal narratives of my interlocutors in Edirne, I would argue that it is the joint effect of the rising economic power of Turkish middle classes and Greece's easing of visa requirements that made specific groups of Edirneans *day trippers*. Despite recent changes, cross-border economic mobility between Greek and Turkish Thrace still remains low-profile even when it is compared with neighboring Bulgaria. The specific reasons are explained below according to the type of economic activity that borderlanders were or are involved in.

### **“Smuggling” for personal use and for petty trade**

While nowadays there are no customs checks on goods people carry from one EU country to another, Van Schendel (2005) reminds us that this was not the case until very recently. In post-War II Europe, there were local smuggling rings along the Dutch-Belgian border where local villagers brought in goods that were cheaper on the other side of the border, such as cigarettes. This recent history of licit movement of goods in the region is acknowledged by local authorities and even memorialized with a statue of a smuggler that was opened in the presence of two ex-smugglers and a Belgian border officer (2005: 50). The Thracian border is no different than what the Dutch-Belgian border used to be. It is noted by many interlocutors in Thrace that various goods have always travelled across the border, especially when the good that was on demand on one side of the border was cheaper on the other side. People travelling across the border have carried such goods with them either for household use or as gifts for each other. Smuggling of certain consumer goods, such as leather and electronics, along the Evros River is also considered as licit as passengers carrying goods across the border. In one interlocutor's words, “these things [smuggling goods] happen since the world started to exist and will continue as long as it exists.”

From the perspective of borderlanders, what is overtly illicit is the drug trade. As discussed in the previous chapter, while smuggling of people is often considered licit, there are cases when it is defined as illicit, as manifested in some smugglers' refusal to help PKK members because it would be betraying the nation and the state. For the smugglers I interviewed, drugs were an even bigger no-go. This is not only because it has more serious legal repercussions but also because it is an irreversible scar on one's family reputation in their small town or village. In one smuggler's words, “[he does smuggling] to meet [his] family's needs, not to inherent [his] grandchildren a dirty name.”

While explaining their experiences at the Kastanies-Pazarkule and Kipi-Ipsala Border Gates, many borderlanders stressed that customs officers check on frequent travelers mostly to see “whether things people carry across the border are appropriate or not.” When asked further about what is considered “appropriate,” it became clear it was more related to the quantity of goods carried over and frequency of doing this than what you bring in.

Many interlocutors also stated that regular checks at customs may or may not turn into moments of tension, depending on the position of the border-crossers vis-à-vis the authorizing customs officer. Hüseyin, from a well-known mountain village in Evros, related what his uncle had been through in the early 1990s, returning from Edirne to Evros at the Kastaneis Border Gate. On one occasion his uncle was stopped at customs for three kilos of bananas, and on another, for a grilled chicken he wanted to bring to his children in the village. In both cases he was not allowed to cross, so he sat in front of the customs officers and ate as much as the goods as he could. The rest he threw in the trash to ensure the officers didn’t get it. Telling this story proudly as an act of resistance, Hüseyin finished this anecdote with his uncle’s words: “so he said, ‘now what will you do? The food passed the border in my stomach!’”

In June 2014, I crossed the same border with Ekrem, a Karaağaç resident in his late forties and a frequent daily visitor to Orestiada. The Greek customs officers did a very quick check at the trunk of the car, and from the way they greeted each other in both Greek and Turkish, the officers seemed familiar with Ekrem. After we passed customs, Ekrem confirmed that the officers knew him, at least by sight, and never gave him hard time. When we met his Gagauz friends in a taverna usually occupied by Edirneans at dinner time, Ekrem passed a full pack of bullets he had brought for one of these friends who likes hunting. Although the Gagauz

friend insisted on paying him, Ekrem told him “Come on! You said it is cheaper in Edirne and it is cheap! So just take it as a present from me.”

During my participant observations—sometimes as a passenger in people’s cars and tour buses, other times as a pedestrian, and a few times at sit-in observations at the Pazarkule Border Gate—I witnessed the differences in attitudes of customs officers and border police towards people. On one occasion, a lower-class minority family had filled their car with things bought in Edirne, possibly to sell in their neighborhood. They begged the Greek customs officer not to make them throw everything away; the officer told them she knew they had done the same thing before but let them off with a warning, saying she would not let it happen again. Another time, while I was walking with the head of the customs officers on the Turkish side near cars queuing in front of the border police, I saw him salute people in cars with Greek plates. Sometimes he spoke in Turkish, sometimes with few sentences of Greek. Once, a minority family gave him a package of Greek coffee, which he had apparently asked for on their previous trip through the gate. It is now common practice for borderlanders to shop in Edirne’s Friday market and at other shops, and bring goods for personal use without any problem.

The difference in the customs officers’ approach to Hüseyin’s uncle in the 1990s and to Ekrem in 2010s might be explained to a great extent by the impact of changing state-level relations on border control. To reiterate, although Greek citizens did not need a visa to cross to the Turkish side after 1984, Turkish authorities put a ban on diplomatic passages in 1982 and Greek authorities limited the opening hours of the Kastanies Border Gate to 4 hours in 1989. Following the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1999, the Pazarkule-Kastaneis Border Gate was finally open 24 hours a day, every day, in 2000, and diplomatic passages have been allowed since 2010. Yet at the small Kastanies-Pazarkule Border Gate, passages are limited to

pedestrians, private cars, and tour buses due to a lack of necessary infrastructure and personnel for customs clearance of commercial buses, trucks, and goods.

Nevertheless, just as the customs officer let the Greek family go with a warning, the following experience of Orhan, a businessman in Edirne, illustrates very well the discretionary power of street-level state agents' and their role in deciding what kind of goods pass, hence making small exchanges happen or not. Orhan manufactures door and window frames, and from time to time he has customers from Evros who know him through word of mouth. A few years ago, after he sold frames for a newly built 10-unit apartment block in a small Greek town, his customer asked for another 4 frames. The cost of sending only 4 frames through Ipsala Customs would have cost approximately 300 euros with all taxes and customs duties included, which for both of them would defeat the purpose of doing business. While Orhan was expecting his customer to cancel the order, the customer said "just bring it to Pazarkule, I will pick it up from there." To Orhan's surprise everything went very smoothly:

The border police on our side [Pazarkule] said no in the beginning but the customs officer said 'We are selling a Turkish product here, everything is done according to the book, they have invoice and everything.' So he used his own initiative. And then our client put all these frames in his van and passed through the Greek customs again without any problem. Such a thing wouldn't even be imagined until maybe a decade ago. We were all cowards, scared of even the idea of transporting goods with truck through Ipsala, even if we knew everything would be legally done, we would suspect what if someone puts some drug on the truck or something. Now we know it is really not a big deal, you can even try your chance in such limited circumstances. But of course the attitude of the local administration is very important!

The changing attitude of street-level state agents at the border gates from the early 1990s to the present affirms that as daily border-crossings have become more of a common practice in the last fifteen years, border checks have gotten less strict. Thus, at times when Greek-Turkish relations were still tense, a minority Greek citizen returning home to an Evros village from a

daytrip to Edirne might have been forced to leave even a small amount of food at the border. Now, any household items for personal use, and even bullets, can be brought over as long as you do not cross the border too often with a car packed with similar items.

As already mentioned, for borderlanders, the rule of thumb for goods that are licit to carry across the border is the relative price of those goods on the other side. For example, in the fish market in Edirne, which locals call the “Bulgarian Market,” it is possible to see women from Bulgaria coming every day and passing time with a suitcase full of liquor and nuts. However, this kind of suitcase trade, which has been done between Bulgaria and Turkey since the early 1990s, does not take place between Greece and Turkey because market price differences between the two are less compared with Bulgaria.

Along the two sides of the Evros River, there have always been some villagers involved in smuggling goods not only for personal use but also to be sold in the market. When I asked Yücel, a former smuggler about this, he jokingly said that “smuggling is a family business here.” He added that since 1986, when he was 6 years old, he has heard about things and people being smuggled through their village:

Back then it was small goods. For examples Turkish people living there [Greek Thrace] were coming here for their daughters dowry, buying all those stuff for marriage ceremony or for their son’s circumcision ceremony. The store from which they did their shopping was giving us a call and we were passing the stuff they bought to the other side of the river. Sometimes these stuffs were going faster than the people because people themselves had to wait at the line in the border gate. It is logical you know, otherwise these people had to pay also customs fee for these things and that was maybe almost the same price they pay at the shop.

Locals in neighboring border villages confirmed that such exchanges of goods between fishermen on the river were common. For a long time the most popular items were leather or other textiles coming to the Greek side, before leather wear became less popular in Greece. From

the Greek side, it was technological products that went to the Turkish side due to the high import taxes on such goods. Melih, a tradesman from Keşan, gave a more recent example in his own village, closer to Enez: Turkish villagers bringing pesticides from Greece to be used in their fields. Angry with companies selling the same or similar products with slightly better ingredients in Greece, Melih finds what he calls “neighbors trade” very legitimate from the perspective of the villagers who want to increase the productivity of their land:

These villagers on both sides of the rivers, they are neighbors for many many years. So when one needs something from the other side, it is not so hard to reach it. Especially in this age of internet, people even order the pesticide to their neighbors address. But it is not possible to bring it through Ipsala [customs] so it's a problem for the villagers and they find other ways to bring it in. But then the gendarmerie can make operations to people's villages just for a box of pesticide as if they found heroin, with 10 soldiers and G3 guns! That's why villagers do not like soldiers here. When this state's prosecutor allows such an operation, he protects the companies who sell less effective pesticide to the villagers against the villagers. But let me tell you this, such trade, let's call it neighbors trade, always existed and will continue to exist. No ban can stop it.

To reiterate, due to the spatial proximity between the two sides, informal transfer of certain goods across the border has always been common practice, and the main determinants for such acts has been the price and quality differences. Based on local accounts, it is possible to claim that, unlike the business of smuggling people, which, as shown in the chapter on security, seems to change hands from local actors to transnational migrant networks smuggling other migrants, the circles smuggling consumer goods seem to remain stable, especially in small villages along the Evros River. These circles are composed mainly of fishermen and/or fieldsmen, who already have personal relations with their counterparts to some degree. Many borderlanders who are day trippers, frequently traveling between the border towns of the three countries, admit they sometimes hide some of the things they buy since they are never sure how many packages of cat food, kilos of meat, or liters of alcohol will be “tolerated” or considered

“smuggling” by the street-level state agents at the border gates. People differentiate their acts of carrying goods across the border for personal use from suitcase trade or smuggling for petty trade. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the latter is illicit from the borderlanders’ perspective, especially considering the fact that the “Bulgarian market” in the center of Edirne’s oldest shopping street remains popular among locals of Edirne, and shopping there is seen as a licit act as much as the circular mobility acts of the Bulgarian women with their suitcases of liquor and nuts.

### **Merchandise, crafts and services**

As described earlier, Edirne, the old capital city of the Ottoman Empire, was an important political and economic center of Thrace for many centuries, until it became a westernmost point of the Turkish geo-body after the borders were set in 1923. The historical Alipaşa Bazaar (*Alipaşa Çarşısı*), built in the sixteenth century and also known as the “Covered Market,” had for a long time been the main shopping destination in the region. As Yılmaz, the current head of the Alipaşa Shopowners underlines, after most of the Jewish population of Edirne left the city in the 1970s, Alipaşa became almost abandoned. The older generation of Turkish speaking Gagauz people and the Muslim-Turkish minority who lived in Greek Thrace and had some friendship and/or familial ties with Edirneans continued to visit Edirne, even after 1974. Yet, only after the visa exemption did more people began to frequent Alipaşa and other shops in Edirne. Erdem, the long time head of the Alipaşa Bazaar, is in his early 60s and has been working at his father’s shop since his primary school years. Looking back to the more than fifty years he spent at Alipaşa, Erdem remembers the 1980s as the peak of their business:

We learned doing business from Jewish shopowners. I always say that. Without them we wouldn’t learn how to do business. When the Jewish shopowners left, it was sort of a ghost market here. Then it was the Greek clients who made it alive again. Soon after Greeks started coming, they realized that they could make use of

the enormous price differences between TL and Drahmi [Greek currency before Euro]. First people were coming as a family for their basic needs but then some of them also started small businesses over there. There were even days we were selling here a truck of socks, a truck of underwear! Some Edirneans were resentfully saying that we were prioritizing Greeks over them. But the reality was that the Greeks were the real buyers. They were bringing purses full of Deutch Marks! Our job is to sell but there were days we were even getting tired of selling. It was that busy! (...) After the fire (1992), the business never got back to the same level. It was a different period, in terms of their economy and our economy. The border was open for 4 hours only (...) It got a bit better in 2000s again. I was in the municipal board at that time. With few others we pushed for making a bus line from Pazarkule to the center so that people without cars could cross the border on foot and then reach the center easily.”

Erdem also explained how the heyday of the 1980s came to a halt. First, the shop owners in Orestiada and other places had raised their voices as they were economically on the losing side. In response, the Greek authorities intervened by imposing new measures at the border gates, such as increasing customs taxes and stricter checks on goods that people carried with them. Yet, according to Erdem, the traffic really came to a halt when the Greeks cut the opening hours of the Kastaneis Border Gate from 24 to 4 hours a day, in 1989. This was a reflection of a turning in Greek-Turkish relations. Soon after the Sismik Crisis in 1987, another continental shelf crisis in the Aeagean, it became clear that, as Heraclides (2010: 132) aptly notes, the detente spirit of Davos (1986, 1988) was deahesd and Greek-Turkish relatons got back to their “familiar situation of mutual suspicious stand-off.” According to Erdem, this situation gave Greek authorities a reason to reciprocate what Turkey had done earlier by limiting the opening hours of the Kastanies and thereby banning diplomatic passage from the Pazarkule Border Gate:

You know there is Greek consulate here. Like everyone, for them too the Kastanies/Pazarkule Gate was very convenient as they could cross to Orestiada or go anywhere in Evros from Edirne very easily. But few meddlesome high officers in the military quarters close to that gate declared to Ankara that this is not appropriate for security reasons. So with a sudden decision Greek diplomats were no more allowed to use that gate and they had to use Kipi/İpsala more than 100 km away from Edirne center. I think after that Greek government also decided to cut down the working hours from 24 to 4 hours. So they didn’t have time for

shopping so much. I remember for a while diplomats started using Greek taxis instead of their own cars to come to Edirne but then visa requirements for the cars got worse. The drivers were driving twice to Komotini to apply visa at the Turkish consulate. After three days of waiting, they were given only three month long visa. So they had to make 1000 km in total for 3 month-long visa. It was insane.

Seeing no reason for such security concerns as the two states were already NATO allies, and local people were getting along well and making use of the easing of the customs, Erdem was critical of this tug of war, which went on for decades. That is why, even after the Alipaşa Bazaar restoration was finished and it was reopened in 1997, cross-border trade remained low due to the limited opening hours of the gate. Soon after the 1999 rapprochement, the Alipaşa Shopowners Association and representatives from other business organizations like ETSO visited then-Foreign Minister Cem and demanded that he discuss the opening hours of the Kastaneis/Pazarkule Gate with his counterpart, Papandreou. Cem took their demand seriously and soon after, the border gate was once again open 24 hours. The two leaders also paid an official visit to Thrace, joined by their Bulgarian counterpart (*Hürriyet* March 6 2000). An ardent supporter of Özal's free market policies and now the incumbent AKP, Erdem says, "even though I do not share most of his political views, İsmail Cem [from center-left DSP] did something very valuable for Edirne, so I always remember him with gratitude."

Local economic actors on the Turkish side made good use of the positive political climate in Greek-Turkish relations to revitalize borderlanders' acts of economic cross-border mobility. By organizing few free bus tours from Orestiada to Edirne in 2000, the shopkeepers tried to revive Greek borderlanders' old habit of shopping in Edirne. Along Saraçlar Street, all the way to the weekly Friday market, shop signs are visible in three languages: Turkish, Greek, and Bulgarian. They advertise all kinds of businesses, from delicatessens and fisheries to bridals, graphic designers, and supply stores. While Alipaşa is still visited by Greek customers every day,

shop owners say the volume of trade has never reached the same levels as in the 1980s. When it comes to sales, again the shopowners say, it is less than 10% for even the most popular dairy shop in Saraçlar.

According to shop owners in the old town center, the main reason for this is the opening of new malls and supermarket chains in the newer section of the city, away from the center. I observed the profile of visitors by regularly walking in these new market places, and also by checking on cars and buses with foreign plates on two consecutive Fridays and Saturdays, almost every month from Spring to Autumn 2014. These observations reveal that many daily crossers from Bulgaria and Greece visit the weekly Friday market for low quality textiles and footwear, and the new malls for better quality products and household needs. While this does not constitute an important portion of the overall economy of Edirne, as the new head of Alipaşa points out, the local shops in the town center are not able to compete with the companies and chains that are more attractive to both local customers and daily visitors from Greek and Bulgarian Thrace.

The same process seems to repeat itself in Keşan, which is close to the Ipsala/Kipi Border Gates. As the representatives of the Keşan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KTSO) as well as business owners stated, until recently the center of Keşan was filled every Saturday with daily visitors from Greece, both minority and majority Greeks. Again the 1980s were mentioned, this time by Mesut who, back then, had an exchange office in the center of Keşan. He explained that the main customers were members of the minority community, mainly from Komotini and the Xanthi area. They were coming to exchange Deutsch Marks for gold as it was considered a more valuable gift to give at weddings and other traditional ceremonies. Similarly, stores selling costumes for such traditional ceremonies were and are still the winners of minorities' cross-border visits. Yet as first the Greek Drahmi and then the Euro lost value compared to the Turkish

Lira, daily crossers have become more careful with their expenses in Keşan. With the coming of outlets and shopping malls on the İpsala-Istanbul highway, which are away from the messiness of Keşan center and an easier reach for daily crossers coming on bus tours, the center of Keşan is being visited less and less.

What is more important regarding the positions of local economic actors is that the construction of new shopping centers inevitably leads to capital changing hands in these small towns, from local business owners to national and international firms. What is also mentioned in the context of Keşan is that the new highway made it easier to reach Istanbul and rendered Keşan a less attractive option for daily visitors. So people from Greek Thrace now reach more quickly and easily to bigger and cheaper shopping centers in or closer to Istanbul and prefer to visit the city of Istanbul more than spending time in a small town like Keşan. Therefore, today cross-border customers from Greece, who boosted Edirne's economy in the 1980s, do not constitute a crucial part of the local economy. However, the fact that three-language shop signs are common in the public scene shows that this practice continues regardless of its volume, and that there is an interest in maintaining it as long as the border gates remain open.

Apart from market places, the auto repair shops and services in Edirne, which are already frequented by customers from North Evros, have become easier to access with a protocol signed between ETSO and the Thrace Regional Directorate of Customs and Trade, in December 2013. Earlier borderlanders from Greece and Bulgaria were not allowed to leave their vehicles in Edirne, but with this protocol garage owners could get official permission to keep their foreign customers' cars for up to 15 days. According to the garage owners, while the economic crisis had already increased the number of customers from Greece over the last five years, the protocol

positively affected the garage owners who could secure the permission from their business chambers.

Regardless of the recent protocol, exchanges around this service also contributed to local acts of mobilities in different ways. There were and are still times when repair people have to travel to fix a vehicle. This is especially true when servicing agricultural vehicles that have to be fixed where they are. For example, Yavuz has had Greek customers ever since he opened his garage in 1984, he has learned to speak Greek, and he has well-established relations with Greek borderlanders. He never turns down his customers if they need help. Therefore if the customers cannot come to him, he has his passport and visa ready to cross the border and check the problem in its place. Then he calculates the cost of the parts that need to be changed and decides whether to bring it from Turkey or buy it from the suppliers in Thessaloniki. In that sense, what makes this service preferable for the Greek customers is the mobility of the service providers and the licitness of getting the service wherever it is cheaper.

According to estimates by ETSO, this new procedure has the potential for 200,000 euros in extra income for repair shops in Edirne.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, in this case, one side's gain means the other side's loss. Similar to the protests of shopowners in Orestiada at the heyday of Alipaşa in the late 1980s, repair people in Edirne have heard about Greek garage owners' discontent with this new trend. In the spring of 2015 rumors spread that Greek customs might no longer allow motor parts to be brought from Turkey, or that people might not be allowed back in without their cars. Nevertheless, in practice this became one of the cheaper services that Greek passport holders continue to enjoy in Edirne. Further research is needed to determine whether it will be possible for the central political authorities to intervene in such licit economic exchanges and mobility of service providers, at a time when Greek-Turkish rapprochement has reached a

sustainable level with no serious tugs of war related to Aegean or Cyprus disputes. In short, it is possible to say that political rapprochement has allowed local shopkeepers and craftsmen to voice their demands to develop cross-border business opportunities, as long as it is to their benefit.

### **Commerce and investment**

As noted in the introductory chapter, the expected economic returns of the Customs Union membership of Turkey by 1996 was cut by first the Kardak/Imia Crisis in January 1996 and then by the Öcalan Crisis in February 1999. Yet following the 1999 Papandreou–Cem talks, significant growth in bilateral trade was built on administrative adjustments and political agreements. While the fields of agreement ranged from tourism and organized crime to economic cooperation, trade was one of the first economic sectors that adjusted to the new friendship approach towards bilateral relations (Papadopoulos 2008; Tsarouhas 2009). Yet cross-border trade has not reached the significant level along the Thracian borderland that it did in nearer economic hubs such as Kavala, Thessaloniki on the Greek side, and Tekirdağ, Istanbul on the Turkish side.

In the context of Edirne, as of 2014, only 5 out of 31 companies registered with ETSO as involved in export business do trade with companies in Greece, in various sectors from furniture to agricultural products. In the Keşan area, the number of companies increased from 3 in 2010 to 10 in 2013, again ranging from home supplies to grains. When we compare the weight of exports from Edirne to Bulgaria and Greece within the total amount of exports, it becomes clear that Edirne is not well connected to the Greek markets. According to ETSO records, the total sum of exports from Edirne was 112,718,964.89 USD in 2010. Among 42 countries, Bulgaria was the highest with 44,273,611.67 USD, and Greece was only 2,935,324.33 USD. In 2014, among 29

countries, Bulgaria was still the highest with 19,046,065.15 USD, whereas Greece was as low as 397,499.36 USD in the total amount of exports which also dropped sharply that year (See the Table I in Appendix)

This comparatively low level of trade with Greece was also revealed during interviews with some business people listed as main exporters in both the Keşan and Edirne centers. While the informants stated that their trade with Greece has never been the most crucial part of their business, they also underlined that there was a real drop in demand, wholesale and/or retail, from their Greek counterparts in the 2010s, due to the heavy impact of the crisis on the local economy. Many informants in Evros also stated that, due to the economic crisis, they preferred not to shop in Edirne for goods that were available in their hometowns, in order to support local business.

Mahmut, for example, owns a local family enterprise in Enez and sells seafood to Greece. Although they are a very well-established family, active in fishing for many years in Enez, they built business ties with Greece only in the 2000s. As Mahmut says, with the demise of tension and controls over fisheries in the Aegean sea with the 1999 Rapprochement, the fishermen from Enez and Alexandroupoli could finally chat with each other in the sea. Via these relations among the fishermen, restaurant owners in Alexadandroupoli begun to visit Enez to buy seafood, making a better profit with the high Euro/TL exchange rate. This was before the crisis hit the most popular restaurants in Alexandroupoli.

Besides the economic crisis, another factor that affects the volume of trade is the bureaucratic obstacles at customs. As already mentioned, although the Pazarkule Border Gate connects the Edirne town center with North Evros, it is closed to truck traffic. This is identified as the biggest obstacle by local business people in Edirne. Ercan, in his mid-40s, got a university education in Istanbul in the early 1990s and then returned to take over his family's lumber

business in Edirne. Since 2001, they have had three steady partners in the Orestiada area, all Gagauz people, and some occasional business ties with several small enterprises in Bulgaria. Their business relations with one of the three partners in Orestiada developed so well that, in Ercan's words, "they became like family." However, for him, as much as common language and geographic proximity unites them, the bureaucratic obstacles seem to set them apart for business purposes. Regarding business, like others who have tried and eventually gave up on it, Ercan explains how discouraging the process is:

If we could use this gate [Pazarkule/Kastanies], then I could do business all the way from Orestiada to Çerkezköy [port town to the west of Istanbul]. In that case going to Orestiada would be the same as going to Havsa [20 km east of Edirne] from here....There is an unnecessary bureaucracy on the customs at the moment. You need to bring the personnel on your own, from Edirne town center to the customs in Ipsala so that they check the coming trucks and give consent. It is time consuming and expensive. They almost say 'don't do business.'

While the distance between Orestiada and Edirne is 31 km, Edirne and Ipsala are 120 km apart. This works as a negative incentive, especially for small enterprises on both sides of the border. Such hardships in transportation and delivery are also cited by the owner of a well-established home appliance company in Edirne as the main reason why she gave up pursuing business opportunities in Western Thracian towns. The same business owner also stated that after visiting the region few times she concluded that the majority of people in Evros, and even further away in Rhodope, were "low segment customers"; the limited business they offered was not worth the extra effort at customs.

Another way that local business people tried to overcome the cost of customs on cross-border trade is franchising. Some newly opened Turkish companies in Evros, such as the two home stores of Istikbal, suggest that this business strategy could work better for Greek borderlanders than for Turkish borderlanders. The Greek owner of the store in Orestiada,

Yorgos, explained that he got a franchise after seeing that it was not profitable for either himself or his Turkish partner in Edirne to import furniture on demand from the Edirne branch. More importantly, the owner of the Istikbal store in Orestiada contacted the headquarters in the inner city of Kayseri with the help of his business partner in Edirne. Similarly, even though the EDSIAD leaders' partnership attempt did not last long, his company in Edirne continued to sell construction material to the contacts they had made via their partner in Alexandroupoli for as long as it was profitable for both him and his counterparts in Evros. Hence, like Ercan and his family's experience with the Gagauz business people in Orestiada, cross-border business relations led to development of friendship ties, and these ties eventually led the partners to find different ways of overcoming the obstacles and high costs of doing cross-border business.

These experiences of cross-border mobilities and interactions for trade and merchandise do not contradict points made by previous studies that trade is one of the first sectors to adjust to new bilateral relations (Papadopoulos 2008; Tsarouhas 2009). Business organizations, such as EDSIAD and ETSO, acknowledge the positive steps taken by the political centers, namely the signing of the Prevent of the Double Taxation Treaty on 2 December 2003, in order to ease the process for business relations. Nevertheless in practice, these initiatives so far seem to have very limited impact on cross-border trade relations in the Thracian region. Here the perpetuation of any business relationship is determined mainly by easy access to customs and the market conditions in the two neighboring countries.

When it comes to investments, the biggest obstacle, as already described in the governance section, appears to be the Greek bureaucracy towards FDIs in general and Turkish investments in the border region in particular. Loxandra is both a Turkish and a Greek citizen, in her early 40s, and she is a lawyer in Alexandroupoli. After marrying a Greek man years ago, she

got Greek citizenship and now interchangeably uses her Greek and Turkish names. She started her own law firm in 2013 and in one year's time had 4 clients from Turkey for whom she got work and residence permits to start up businesses in Evros, mostly in the food sector. Loxandra explains the current legal process as follows: The investor first applies to the Greek consulate in Turkey. The application file is investigated by a committee in Greece that consists of members of the Ministry of Economics and its regional directorate. Once the committee confirms the application, the Greek consulate in Turkey issues a residence permit so the investor may come and start the business. Although this process takes 3-4 months, it is the easiest way to open a personal company as a self-employed person. Once the business is started, it is possible to convert it to a joint venture with a Greek partner, to make things go smoothly. As she confirms, "smoothly" in that case means lowering bureaucratic costs and having the business more easily accepted by the locals.

The way Loxandra's clients experienced the process of starting a business in Alexandroupoli in 2013 seems very different from the experience of the EDSIAD leader in 2007 (see page 7). While the difference might be explained with the sector that the new companies operating in, it might also be driven by the impact of the economic crisis and the concomitant easing of FDI procedures in Greece. Otherwise, it is mentioned by almost all economic actors interviewed in Edirne that, although there is no official ban on Turkish investment in Greek Thrace, in practice it is not possible to "survive" without having partnership with a Greek citizen to gain trust in the Greek market. As presented in the governance section, the EDSIAD leaders' personal experience clearly shows that, even after investments are legally made and work successfully for a while, they can be brought to an end by publically shaming the businessmen engaged in cross-border partnership, hence turning a legal activity into an illicit one.

Many informants complained that it is not easy to build long-term trust relationships between Greek and Turkish businessmen whose respective business cultures have been shaped under different rules and institutional settings during many years of almost no economic contact. While Turkish business people have generally complained about the “laziness” of Greek counterparts, Greek business people competing in the same sectors have been suspicious of Turkish and other foreign investors taking over their small local markets. As the financial advisor of the Chamber of Evros Thanos Pantazis rightfully explained, lack of interest in cross-border business partnerships is also partly a product of low economic development in Evros, compared to the rest of Greece and Edirne, meaning not many people are willing to start up new businesses. Entrepreneurship is even lower among the Muslim-Turkish community. This is mainly attributed to the minority policies of the Greek state that were in place until the mid-1990s, and which sustained Muslim-inhabited areas’ dependence on agriculture and impeded their incorporation into different sectors (Anagnostou 2001). Thus it was hard to meet potential partners and develop cross-border business relationships.

One strategy common among Turkish businessmen looking for cross-border investment opportunities in the region is to set up a company in Bulgaria, which welcomes Turkish investors, and then use the less problematic Greek-Bulgarian trade route to do business with Greece. In fact, as Turley (2011) also pointed out, both Greek and Turkish investors prefer Bulgarian towns close to the Turkish border, such as Haskovo and Kardzhali, where they can find a cheap, qualified labour force and low transportation costs. Additionally, Turkish investors from Edirne who invested in Bulgarian Thrace also mentioned two more reasons: fewer administrative difficulties and the employability of the Turkish speaking minority as labourers and local brokers.

Melih's experience of cross-border investments is a case in point. Since 2002, Melih has been in the seafood trade, mainly turbot, from Bulgaria and Romania to Turkey via a Greek company in Thessaloniki. He explained that, due to the complicated procedures and requirements for trade and investment in Greece, he decided to start up a company in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. With the help of a Bulgarian lawyer it took him less than two working days to start it up. Melih never tried applying for a business visa in Greece as he thought it would not be as easy as a tourist visa. The first time he applied for a visa in 2001, he declared his intentions for travel as "touristic visits," and during the interview he underlined that he wanted "to spend money and eat in the nice restaurants." He said that in his last visa application at the Greek consulate in Edirne in 2014, he intentionally left his casino card inside his passport and got a visa for much longer than the previous times. Melih acknowledged that this might be because he has proven himself as a frequent traveler. Yet he still believes the casino card might have been a factor, because soon after that his friend followed a similar strategy upon his suggestion and also got a longer visa than usual. "So of course they are welcoming when you say you will spend money," Melih said sarcastically.

As he has learned the region well during all these years traveling between Greek, Bulgarian, and Turkish Thrace, Melih has also gotten involved in tobacco production. He is an informal shareholder of a small business in a Komotinian village, primarily inhabited by a Muslim-Turkish minority. These agricultural investments across the border are, he admitted, informally done by many people in Edirne. In that sense, unlike starting up or investing in a business in the cities, the concentration of the minority population in agriculture becomes an asset when it comes to such informal partnerships in the rural areas of Greek Thrace. Hence, the

bureaucratic and political obstacles to investing legally in the border region seem to be overcome by finding such licit albeit legally shady ways of investing in different sectors.

For formal investments, Bulgaria offers much easier conditions. There, one does not need a local partner to do business and taxes are as low as 10 percent. Thus there are many people from Keşan and Edirne who have started up lumber or agricultural businesses as well as casinos and restaurants, especially in Bulgarian border towns. Melih explains his own way of doing business in the tripartite Thracian region, including Bulgaria, as follows:

The trade quotas between Bulgaria and Turkey are very low and, for all live animals imported from Bulgaria to Turkey, Bulgarian companies are forced to use the Greek customs in Kavala for health checks. So, what I do is, I show on paper that I sell it from my own company in Bulgaria to a Greek company and then this Greek company sells these goods to my company in Turkey. Once the papers are ready, they are exported from Greek customs to Istanbul. Of course, this double selling increases the costs of trade and there is one day delay in transportation from Varna to Istanbul which is very critical in goods such as fish. But it is still the most efficient. We work with the same Greek firms in Kavala and we hire a Greek speaking guide each time to do the paper work for us. Mostly those people are Istanbulite Greeks living in Greece. So we cooperate only at this level. For real partnership, it is not easy. There is still trust problem on both sides, plus people do not like working there anyway. The same goes for Bulgarians but there it is easier to find people from the Turkish community to help you out.

In this way, Melih seems to find a both licit and legal way to continue his business in the Thracian region, while being highly mobile between three pieces of Thrace with a tourist visa from Greece and a business visa from Bulgaria. While he is aware of the bureaucratic obstacles and overcomes them in his own way, he refers to the stereotypes about Greek “laziness” as well as mutual trust problems to rationalize why he could not develop deeper business relations with Greek counterparts on the ground.

Therefore, cross-border commerce and investments in the Thracian peripheries are not overtly encouraged by the political centers, and this seems to determine not only the sustainability of cross-border economic activities but also the borderlanders’ strategies to

overcoming the obstacles. On the one hand, as the financial advisor of the Chamber of Evros and EDSIAD leader underline, political problems may impede doing business in different ways, such as blocking customs, but they cannot cut cross-border friendship ties once they are established between partners. This statement is proven by the accounts of Mahmut and Ercan in Edirne and Yorgos in Evros. On the other hand, as the firsthand experience of EDSIAD's leader illustrates in the governance section and as Melih's account portrays here, the existing bureaucratic obstacles and the continuation of old securitizing moves in Greek Thrace make it harder to overcome the distrust nurtured by old stereotypes about each other when it comes to long-term investments.

### **Tourism and entertainment**

Greek tourists have been interested in Turkey since the 1980s, starting with visits to Greek heritage sites in Eastern Thrace and Constantinople/Istanbul, and later on including Western and Northern Asia Minor/Anatolia. Tour agents in Alexandroupoli and Orestiada report that while the Cyprus dispute affected border traffic in 1974, the main problem for Greeks then was the lack of economic well-being in Greece, especially during the transition period following the fall of the junta in 1974. In this period, Greek citizens leaving the country were allowed to carry a maximum of \$250, which made touristic visits abroad harder. This changed with Greece's EU membership in 1980.

As one of the pioneers of tourism in Alexandroupoli, Katherina has had steady relations with a big tour operator in Turkey ever since she started her business in 1988. She stated that there has been a steady increase in people's interest in visiting different parts of Turkey. Greek tourists even reached the 8<sup>th</sup> position in Turkey with an increase in the number of visitors from 146,000 in 1999 to 585,000 in 2005 (Papadopoulos 2008). In addition to the economic power of

the Greek middle classes in the 2000s, Katherina and other tour agents in Alexandroupoli and Orestiada explained that interest in Turkey grew when the conflict between Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK came to a halt after Öcalan's arrest, and political stability returned. In other words, while the economic power of the mobile subjects is the necessary condition for cross-border touristic mobility, political stability in the destination is also considered an important factor for security reasons.

Compared to touristic visits from Greece to Turkey, the number of visas Greek consulates issued to Turkish visitors only reached 67,996 in 2006. The low numbers were attributed primarily to existing visa requirements from the EU and the high departure tax in Turkey, which was finally reduced from \$50 to 15TL in March 2007 (Papadopoulos 2008). Following the lifting of visa requirements for green passport holders, the number of Turkish citizens visiting Greece reached 200,348 in 2011 (Athanasίου 2011). While the number of Turkish visitors still seems low compared with 616,489 Greeks visiting Turkey in the same year (*ibid.*), it was an important change especially for the middle and upper class green passport holders in Edirne who were eager to travel abroad.

Particularly in Thrace, in addition to the visa exemption for the green passport holders, the numbers of visas issued by the Greek consulate in Edirne also increased from around 6,000 in 2011 to 16,800 in 2013. Longer term visas have also been issued if applicants can prove they make good use of their last visas.<sup>8</sup> As confirmed by the Greek consul in Edirne as well as many day trippers interviewed in Edirne, these changes positively affected the intensity and direction of cross-border touristic mobility from Turkey to Greece.

As explained earlier, at the time of political rapprochement, local economic actors like the Alipaşa Shopkeepers Association and ETSO took an active role in increasing cross-border

economic mobility of Greek citizens, acting as a pressure group on the Turkish Foreign Ministry to convince their Greek counterparts to reconsider the working hours of the Kastanies-Pazarkule Border Gate. In 2012, it was the Association of Hotel and Restaurant Owners and Shopkeepers in Alexandroupoli who reached out to Mr. Dimas, the then Foreign Ministry in the provisional government in the wake of the debt crisis, and explained the importance of making the visa process smoother for the Turkish borderlanders, for the local economy of Evros. The head of the association in Alexandroupoli explains the process as follows:

The hard part is to reach the table with the right persons. Mr Dimas was also a European Commissioner before. So he is an open-minded person. I am the one the most related persons with the process. I told him, if I am in Edirne, to eat fish in Alexandroupoli, I pay 35 € more for each plate, is that normal? I made it so simple to them. They reached the consulate here and opened extra services in Istanbul. Now the major problem is the traffic at the customs in high season and I am trying to solve this as well. The minister of tourism must come and visit the border and inspect it herself. You have to 'live' the problem. And when it is explained in simple logical terms, the solution is also so obvious.

This local attempt seemed to trigger a crucial change for the mobility of Turkish citizens and it is also proven by the data collected by the public officer at the Edirne Tourist Information Bureau. The considerable increase in the number of Turkish citizens crossing Edirne's border gates, and especially the Greek-Turkish border gates, implies a critical upswing in the cross-border mobility towards nearby destinations in Greece.

In 2011, out of a total of 837,277 Turkish citizens exiting Edirne, 231,833 people used Ipsala and 27,039 people used the Pazarkule Border Gate. In 2013, the total number of Turkish citizens exiting Edirne increased almost 67% and reached 1,402,332, of which 287,646 were from Ipsala and 66,404 were from Pazarkule. While there was a 24% increase in the exits from the Ipsala Border Gate on the highway connecting Istanbul to Thessaloniki, exits from the Pazarkule-Kastanies Border Gate increased 145% in two years. Due to their spatial proximity

and lack of infrastructure for commercial buses and trucks, the Pazarkule Gate is preferred by people in the Edirne town center as well as by domestic visitors in Edirne, whereas the Ipsala Gate is preferred by residents of Keşan, Uzunköprü, and Enez as well as other foreign and Turkish tourists travelling from other parts of Turkish Thrace directly to Greece. Therefore the substantive increase in Pazarkule exists makes even clearer the localized effect of easing visa procedures for normal Turkish passport holders and lifting visa requirements for Green passport holders.

Although the economic crisis has begun to impact the purchasing power of Greek citizens, the number of Greek visitors entering Turkey did not diminish and in fact remained rather stable. According to records in Edirne, the number of Greek citizens who entered at the Edirne's border gates increased slightly from 460,560 in 2011 to 488,564 in 2013. In the same period the number of Bulgarian citizens entering increased from 995,967 out of a total of 3,531,306 in 2011 to 1,246,683 out of 3,862,133 in 2013. This difference in entrances is attributed mainly to the daily suitcase traders who come to the "Bulgarian Market" in Edirne's town center and Edirne's two weekly markets. They come more often than Greek citizens, who have become more careful in spending their money abroad since the economic crisis.

As the tour agents in Alexandroupoli and Orestiada underlined, Greek visitors to Edirne are mostly lower to middle class people with low expectations. They are interested in market visits and shopping for products that are cheaper than in Evros, whereas Turkish visitors especially to Alexandroupoli are middle and upper class, coming to spend money in bars, restaurants, and casinos. Hence, cross-border mobility of Turkish middle and upper classes since the economic crisis has been considered detrimental to the local economy of Evros. Local shop and restaurant owners in Evros started welcoming these day trippers, who are interested in Greek

cuisine, entertainment, and site-seeing, with Turkish menus and Turkish speaking personnel, that is, from the Muslim-Turkish minority community.

Unlike culinary tourism, a more controversial mobility practice that has recently been popular for Turkish visitors in Evros is casino tourism. Many Edirneans travel to the Bulgarian border town of Svilengrad where a Turkish entrepreneur has opened a large casino hotel in the center of the town. After a growing number of tourists from Istanbul and other Thracian towns began visiting luxury resorts in Alexandroupoli, the owner of a casino in Xanthi also decided to move his business to this seaside resort. As with daily shopping tours from Greek Thrace to Keşan and Edirne, a tour agent in Keşan and the owner of the new casino in Alexandroupoli agreed to start organizing daily tours for people from nearby Turkish Thracian towns in autumn 2014. Although I was no longer in the region when the daily tours started, my observations at the casino in Alexandroupoli and chats with people in Edirne who have been to these casinos, or know someone who has, show that this activity, although not legal in Turkey, is considered licit in Edirne. While many people said they witnessed people going through serious economic losses and family fights, crossing the border to visit casinos is not considered something that requires strict measures of social control.

This was proven in Spring 2015 when the Edirne governorship issued a circular requiring all civil servants to get permission from their own institutions before exiting the country. Some informants said this circular was issued upon the news of one public official in the governorship being seen at the casino in Svilengrad during his working hours. When news broke of the governor's decision for strict control over all public employees, it was met with reaction from different sectors of society. Soon after, in May 2015, the public official in question filed a court case and the district administrative court subsequently suspended application of the governor's

decision, saying it interfered with all citizens' right to movement (*Hudut* June 9, 2015). According to my follow-up conversations with a few interlocutors, the ruling on the governor's decision confirmed the common view in Edirne that going to a casino is a personal matter and is not to be regulated by any social or political means.

In the specific context of Orestiada, which attracts day trippers from the town center of Edirne, cross-border mobility is determined by geographical proximity and the quality-price ratio of cuisine in Orestiada compared with its counterparts in Edirne. Several Greek tavernas in Orestiada, which have adapted their services to better fit Turkish visitors' tastes, have local fame in Edirne. In particular, a restaurant called Murmuria was the first, and often the only, name that people in Edirne mentioned during our conversations. The Greek owner of this restaurant is in his mid-30s and, seeing the potential in Edirne, has started learning Turkish. He has gotten himself a Turkish nickname, which his Turkish customers use to address him, and he has hired Turkish speaking personnel from a nearby village. While word of mouth is the best advertisement for such local fame, he also had his business cards and menus printed in Turkish at a graphic store in Edirne. On the business card, there is also a map showing how to get there so that, he says, "[Turkish] customers do not even have to bother to follow Greek scripted direction in town." He has built friendships with frequent customers whom he visits occasionally. While Murmuria was the first restaurant to become so popular among Edirneans following the easing of visa requirements, a few other restaurants that followed it in Orestiada have more than half of their tables reserved on weekends during warm seasons. These are Turkish customers coming mainly from Edirne and sometimes from other Thracian towns east of Edirne.

In a nutshell, tourism has become an emerging field of interaction, especially with the increasing mobility of Turkish citizens and the economic crisis in Greece. Thus economic

interactions between Greek and Turkish borderlanders, which for many years were taking place on the Turkish side, have recently been extended to Greek Thrace through licit and legal entertainment as well as culinary tourism. This also leads to new local actors meeting in this field where economic and cultural interests merge. While previously the economic interactions were between the lower and middle classes from Greek Thrace and the shopkeepers of Turkish Thrace, the middle and upper classes of Turkish Thrace and the people in the service sector of Greek Thrace have recently begun developing personal relations. In that sense, more borderlanders have become “invited others” for each other. The next and last section of this chapter depicts the changing position of some actors in the economic field, and it explores the factors that lead to such changes in this relational field and what they mean in terms of acts of citizenship.

### **On othering**

There are many different forms of cross-border economic encounters along and across the Thracian border, which are at times interrupted by bureaucratic obstacles or found to be no longer profitable for the actors involved. Local economies in both Evros and Edirne are still limited to national borders, and cross-border economic ties and connections are still in their infancy. There are no formal cross-border cooperation schemes under which Greek and Turkish partners could engage with each other and develop joint projects with economic benefits to both sides of the border. Hence the economic returns of cross-border mobilities and governance attempts have so far remained low. However, initial contacts established when the EU INTERREG program was still a possibility have been pursued and maintained as informal business networks. Every contact sows seeds of friendship and, as long as it is profitable for both sides, local economic actors find a way to pursue business relations across the border.

Regarding the friendship aspect, my observations on both the Greek and Turkish side reveal that in the 2000s, economic actors—business people, business organizations, local state institutions related to regional economic development—began meeting at official functions, at the market places, during business exchanges. Through these encounters they reached a better understanding of each other’s motivations and interests from a pragmatic perspective rather than a national interests perspective, thereby revisiting old perceptions of the national other. For example, Cenan is in his late 30s and is the general secretary of the Edirne Chamber of Artists and Artisans (EDOSOB); with a tertiary diploma and sufficient command of English, his cross-border encounters, which started with EDOSOB’s visit to Orestiada in 2006, had real impact on his perceptions of the other in the following way:

If you asked me before 2006, I would say NO to something like this. I could even beat a Greek person if I came across with one. But it was because I never met anyone from Greece. Now after meeting them, I realized how similar we are. Now I have few really good friends from the other side [Greece]. They even call me for their personal problems, like getting advice for a common friend of us who is thinking of getting a divorce. Can you believe it? (...) So that process triggered the formation of real friendship which requires reciprocity. Earlier it was only one way. Greeks or Bulgarians were coming but Turks were not able to go. At least this one-sidedness has changed during this process. Now finally we think that our [cross-border] interaction here is reciprocal and sort of equal. This is partly done thanks to the IPA and the EU support. We got to know each other in this process. But the change in the economic position of Turkey and Greece also played a role in this. Now we trust ourselves more and we already know each other a little bit, so we can set up true friendly relations.

Cenan’s narrative supports not only the official missions of the EU regional cooperation schemes, but also the narratives of state actors working at the EU coordination center of the Edirne governorship, the vice-governors, and the civil servants who believe the primary goal of CBC-IPA and similar CBC programs is to overcome prejudices about people of neighboring countries, to change preconceived ideas about each other, and to plant the seeds of future economic and cultural cooperation. In the Greek-Turkish case, even the failed INTERREG-CBC

seems to work to some extent as a socialization channel for local stakeholders from neighboring countries. It challenged participants' established borders on imagination despite not overcoming the old regime of bordering that ultimately pushed political power centers to suspend the program.

As shown above, personal ties similar to the ones that Cenan developed are apparent in the narratives of small business owners in Edirne, who are members of these local business organizations. Unlike Cenan, their experiences are built through economic exchange in the market places and not through engaging in CBC activities of chambers or other business organizations. On the one hand, established business relations often become lasting friendships; as Ercan, doing lumber business with Orestiada, once said, such friendships become "unbreakable even if two states go to war tomorrow." On the other hand, the stereotypes about the Greeks' laziness popped up in many conversations with borderlanders on the Turkish side, as in Melih's narrative, to explain the difficulty in building business ties with Greek counterparts under these limited circumstances.

As the observations and accounts presented so far in this chapter hint at, there are two groups of local actors with certain forms of human capital that are key in determining the turn of these interactions and bring together the old national others as "invited others." These groups are local professionals and the minorities. In her examination of the CBC practices in the Dutch-Belgian-German borderland, Varro (2016) claims that despite national obstacles and often sluggish progress in cross-border initiatives, the officers who take active part in the projects show great commitment to furthering these initiatives. Thus for Varro, they are the local drivers for thinking and acting beyond the state scale. Similarly, by comparing borderlanders' social networks developed during the Spanish-Portuguese and Finnish-Estonian CBC programs,

Gonzalez-Gomez and Gualda (2014) point out that the local experts and “regionauts” who are able to use the world on both sides are the ones with cross-border acquaintances. They have crucial resources in learning CBC management and a better knowledge of the region’s needs. In the Greek-Turkish case, local professionals emerge as the social group with the necessary language and communication skills, as well as technical know-how, to develop and follow up contacts and projects. Minorities, in contrast, sit between two worlds and, with their competence in both languages, become the bridge between the Turkish and Greek borderlanders.

In the remainder of this section I look at the particular forms of social capital held by local professionals and minorities in the Thracian context. I assess whether their mobilization of social capital in the face of current cross-border mobility practices paves the way for new acts of citizenship, in the form of revisiting the established imagery of the other and the hierarchies of otherness along the Thracian borderlands.

### **Language and know-how as social capital**

As shown in the governance section, the local effects of institutionalized and uninstitutionalized cross-border cooperation practices are limited to a small group of borderlanders who are well-connected with their counterparts as a result of repeated encounters at social events, meetings, and project development attempts. In Edirne, ETSO stands out as the most active business organization with well-established connections to various chambers, from Kavala in the southwest of Greek Thrace to Alexandroupoli and Orestiada in Evros. The main reason for ETSO’s enduring relations, however, is Melike Tatlı, the head EU and Foreign Economic Relations officer. Since the first contacts in early 2000s, Melike has been responsible for EU-related projects and has successfully built personal ties with several stakeholders across the border, thanks to her academic background in political economy and her competence in

English. It is not a coincidence that, during my almost two-hour long meeting with Mr. Arseniou, the head of the European Projects and International Affairs Office in Komotoni, the only person he cited as a Turkish colleague and friend from Edirne was Melike from ETSO.

Other local business organizations in Edirne acknowledged that they had to seek professional consultancy to compensate for their lack of language skills and know-how in project development. The fact that Turkey's regulations, unlike the EU regulations, do not allow personnel to get paid for extra hours spent working on EU-funded projects was also a negative incentive for the Turkish side. In Greece and Bulgaria, by comparison, social and business organizations as well as state institutions hire personnel specifically for EU-funded projects (Sezgin and Erkut 2014). The officer responsible for Bulgaria-Turkey IPA-CBC projects in the Edirne Governorship explains a common pattern he observed in the context of Edirne:

When a partner is missing any of these three things, they are doomed to fail: language, experience and financial resources. This happened many times with NGOs here which do not have a lot of resources to start the project but they end up being partners. It is easy to sign a contract in the beginning, because during application periods, organizations come from Bulgaria with a project ready in their hands and all they do here is to sign. But then in the middle of the project, they fail because they do not have the resources, other than the financial support from the EU.

Similarly, Sezgin and Erkut (2014) also noted that in the early years of the Turkey-Bulgaria IPA-CBC in Edirne, educational and other local institutions under the governorship were the main beneficiaries, since it was teachers and some state officers who were competent to run a CBC project. They were the ones with a good command of English, the capabilities to learn how to prepare project proposals, and the institutional financial support for the kickstart. Some business organizations also compensated for their lack of know-how by hiring professionals with expertise from outside. The downside, however, was that organizations capable of hiring the necessary human capital already had a financial advantage over other civil organizations and

social groups with a greater need for EU support. This is best explained by Ziya, a project consultant in Edirne who ran a bee feeding project that sent 30 women from Edirne's villages to visit Bulgarian border towns:

The main obstacle is the lack of qualified educated personnel who speaks English and knows the EU procedures etc. If an institution is asking for funding it means they do not have money to do it on their own, right? Here everything works the other way around. You have to have money to be able to start the project in the first place (...) Unless you have that, you cannot even think about applying. This is not fair and it does not help the ones who need the funds the most. So the funds end up getting into the same hands over and over again.

In that sense, the funding system dictates from the beginning which local actors can access such funds, and what sorts of projects are developed and get the chance to be implemented as part of CBC schemes. This, according to Ziya, reproduces even deepen inequality of opportunity among the local people; it becomes an obstacle to the development of new local experiences and opportunities to develop new perspectives, which would transcend the established senses of border and challenge the "borders on imagination." Therefore, it is possible to argue that a lack of language and know-how, as social capital, indirectly contributes to the maintenance of old us-them distinctions by impeding positive and productive encounters of the less advantaged groups with the "national other."

The same pattern is also observed in the sustainability of cross-border business relations between local firms. Business owners could make first contact with their counterparts in Greece and Bulgaria by participating in fairs and other events held by the business organizations active in the region. Yet many local firms either do not have the capacity or, calculating the economic returns, are not eager to make the extra investment in human capital necessary to be informed about rules and regulations specific to cross-border trade, and to build and maintain cross-border business ties. As shown in the examples of Ercan, Yavuz, Yorgos, and the EDSIAD leader, those

actors who overcome language barriers are likely to develop and maintain friendships ties with their counterparts across the border, even if their decision to pursue business are determined by market conditions.

In most cases, everyday market exchanges do not lead to deep conversations between the people when language is a barrier. Foreign language competence is a serious handicap in Edirne, even more so than in Evros where at least people in their 30s and younger are able to communicate with foreigners in English. Regarding everyday interactions in the market places in Edirne, most exchange practices take place without speaking a common language. In the weekly bazaar as well as in the new malls of Edirne, it is common to see Greek buyers asking for discounts using hand gestures, or by entering numbers on a calculator, and the Turkish sellers replying by the same means.

In fact, business relations have stimulated some local interest in learning the language of the other. Many shopowners who have regular Greek customers mentioned that they became eager to learn some basics, such as numbers and sizes as well as greetings. A few stated that they initially attended language courses offered at ETSO and Halk Eğitimi Merkezi (the public education center under the governorship) with enthusiasm, but they quickly gave up because they found the language training too focused on grammar and reading rather than the basic spoken Greek they needed to do business. Besides several locals in Edirne and a minority from Greek Thrace, a small group of faculty in the department of Greek Language and Literature at Trakya University are also competent in the language. Their training, however, is in Latin and Ancient Greek more than modern Greek. Some of them took active role in these language courses but, as they themselves acknowledge, their academic orientation and interest in grammar became an obstacle for the students who were only interested in daily conversation.

In Edirne, a common strategy for sales or services that require detailed explanation is to ask an acquaintance for help with translation. One such person is Yavuz in the open market where all auto repair shops and services are located in Edirne. When the only garage owner, who was part of the Muslim-Turkish minority from Greek Thrace settled in Edirne, stopped working due to health problems, Yavuz became the only Greek speaker that other garage owners could rely on for translation between them and their Greek customers.

On the wall of Yavuz's garage hangs a picture of Dimitri, who passed away a decade ago. He was a taxi driver, and on one of his trips bringing people from Orestiada to Edirne he got his car fixed at Yavuz's shop. Dimitri, who grew up in Orestiada as a son of a Gagauz family originally from Edirne, spoke "perfect Turkish," Yavuz says. They got along very well and Dimitri soon became like an older brother to Yavuz. Dimitri wanted to host Yavuz in Orestiada so in 1986 he sent him an invitation letter for a visa application. Since then Yavuz has visited Greece regularly. He learned the Greek words for the technology and equipment he works with from his Greek customers, because like other shop owners, he found that such practical and specific vocabulary was never taught in language courses.

Towards the end of my fieldwork it became clear that every interlocutor had referred to the same handful of English speakers with the necessary know-how for CBC projects, and a few Greek speakers with sufficient knowledge of everyday language. The English speakers were holding key positions in business organizations as well as the governor's office and the municipality, and they were the most experienced in CBC projects. Regarding Greek speakers, it was very hard to find people like Yavuz who were self-trained through their personal relationships with Greek people visiting Edirne.

In Evros, many interlocutors noted that, especially following the economic crisis, people's interest in learning Turkish increased substantially. Language teachers and students of these courses that I met in Orestiada and Alexandroupoli noted learning Turkish is especially popular among well-educated but unemployed young people and local business owners. The common motivation for learning Turkish is to use it as an icebreaker in everyday encounters with Turkish people. "Arkadaş" (friend) was the first word that many people greeted me with when I told them I was from Turkey. As most interlocutors in Edirne underlined, this welcoming approach, at least on the part of business owners, has become more and more the rule in Greek Thrace, in the aftermath of the economic crisis and the increasing mobility of Turkish citizens as tourists. Interest in learning Turkish also seems to have been cultivated by the Turkish soap operas that became popular in Greece, raising Greek people's interest in discovering the common roots between Greek and Turkish cultures. As this trend coincided with the economic crisis, young people began to consider moving to Istanbul for work, and local business people, especially in the tourism-related sector, were motivated to develop relations with Turkish customers and firms.<sup>9</sup>

Therefore, language and know-how are important resources in order to build ties with the "invited other" in both Edirne and Evros. In their absence, economic encounters remain sporadic. In their presence, however, economic encounters have the potential to lead to long term friendships and hence reconsiderations of old us-them distinctions.

### **Minorities as key brokers**

As already mentioned, the people who used to be the most connected with the Turkish side are the old generation Gagauz people and the Muslim-Turkish minority of Evros. Concomitant to the rise of cross-border mobility of Turkish citizens in the 2010s, many local

businesses have hired members of the Turkish-Muslim minority to ease communication with Turkish customers, to gain their trust, and to establish long-term ties with them. Similarly, minority members from Greek Thrace who live in Edirne and have good command of both local languages also turned into key brokers. However, the fact that Turkish speaking Gagauz people are Orthodox-Christians puts them at a distance compared with the Muslim-Turkish minority of Greek Thrace. The established national (read ethno-religious) regime of bordering brings in a level of cautiousness in the mostly informal and small-scale economic exchanges, for which interpersonal trust is considered key.

In Edirne, several Muslim-Turkish minority Greek citizens married to Turkish citizens were repeatedly mentioned during my conversations with different economic actors. As people with a good command of Greek, they were approached by business organizations and the Public Education Centers in different municipalities of Edirne. During my fieldwork, a woman named Nurcan was mentioned by many interlocutors. She was a private tutor, mainly for professionals and businessmen, while at the same working as a certified interpreter for Edirne's court house on cases that involve Greek citizens, usually related to smuggling. The governorship and the municipality of Edirne also relied on those same people to translate during international events organized in the city, or when a Greek official visited Edirne and a reliable translator was required. Although there are many Turkish-Muslim minority students and few Greek students from Greek Thrace studying at Trakya University, the former's knowledge of Greek is very basic as is the latter's knowledge of Turkish.<sup>10</sup>

In Evros, as depicted earlier, the lifting of the visa requirement in 1984 helped the old translocal networks of Gagauz people living in Greek Thrace become as active as that of the Muslim-Turkish minority. They both became key brokers in their local communities if someone

wanted to visit Edirne for shopping or other reasons. Through these encounters in the market place, and in addition to their old friendships from the times of co-habitation in Edirne, new ties were established, such as the ones between Dimitri and Yavuz, Ercan's family and their three partners in Orestiada, Mustafa the lawyer, and many second-generation Gagauz people and other descendants of Greek refugees from Edirne living in Evros.

Despite being key brokers, Gagauz people seem to hold a liminal position in the region. During our interviews and informal conversations, a few Greek informants in Orestiada commented that Gagauzidis, as they are called in Greek, are "not fully Greek." This perception derives from the fact that the older generation, who arrived from Edirne and did not have any schooling, used to speak only Turkish. Hence, they were considered Greek by religion but not by language. Their liminal position in Greek Thrace does not automatically bring them closer to Edirneans and instead might even put them into a suspect position on both sides of the border. Despite his very close and friendly relations with all Greeks and his positive views about the Greek lifestyle, cities, and landscape, Yavuz could not help but give what he called "brotherly advice" four times during our two-hour conversation:

80% of the Christians are untrustworthy. A Gagauz man comes and says don't trust the Greek, the Greek comes and says don't trust the Gagauz. But they are both Christians. Of course there are people like that here too but it is not the same. They themselves don't trust each other. How can I trust them?

Ironically then, being Orthodox was not enough for the Gagauz people to be called Greek, while it also put them into a suspect position in Edirne. Yavuz also stated that some Gagauz people are known to make profits from their own villagers by helping them access Edirne's markets, either by bringing things they ordered or helping them bargain with the shop owners. For example, I met one such man, whom Yavuz called "trickster," when I was observing the border-crossings at the Pazarkule Border Gate. I then met him again in his village in

Orestiada. Like many shopkeepers in Alipaşa Bazaar, Yavuz knew him very well and said “everyone here is aware of what he does.” Thus, Yavuz said, interpersonal trust, which is perceived as the key to economic relations, is not easy to establish even with Gagauz people to whom they feel closely connected by shared language. Hence the Gagauz people have remained in a rather liminal position on both sides of the border, unlike members of the Turkish-Muslim minority community whom Edirneans more easily welcome as ethnic-kin.

As mentioned earlier, while the Turkish-Muslim minority from Greek Thrace in Edirne play a key role as interpreters, not many people among the minority are eager to take an active role in building business ties or partnerships between economic actors across the border. Many informants in Edirne attributed this to a lack of entrepreneurship among the minority community, which is mostly attached to land and agriculture. Another factor mentioned by informants in both Edirne and Evros is the invasive role of the Turkish consulate in the everyday life of the minority. Compared with its lack in Bulgaria, this makes it harder for them to independently interact even with people from Turkish Thrace. A few businessmen in Edirne said, “I don’t want to get into trouble with Turkish or Greek state” to explain why they preferred to set up businesses in Bulgaria

Compared to the key positions that the Greek-Orthodox minority of Istanbul holds in newly established joint Greek-Turkish ventures (Mavrogenis and Kelman 2003), members of the Muslim-Turkish minority of Greek Thrace are the new cultural brokers in service sectors. Greek restaurants in particular have become a niche market for members of the minority community who are competent in both Greek and Turkish. Many restaurants hire minority people to serve regular Turkish customers. Therefore the increasing cross-border mobility of Turkish citizens, especially for tourism and entertainment, have paved the way for the visibility and incorporation

of the Muslim-Turkish minority, including the Turkish speaking Muslim Roma community, in Greek public life, and have made them key brokers between Greek business owners and Turkish customers.

Here it is also necessary to note another nuanced layer of otherness in Thrace, which seems to be changing with these new encounters in the economic field: that is the sharp distinction among the minority community, especially in Evros, due to the presence of a considerable Turkish-speaking Muslim Roma community in Alexandroupoli. In the villages to the west of Alexandroupoli, on the way to Komotini, there are Muslim-Turkish minority people with whom the Turkish consulate in Komotini has maintained close relations. In contrast, relations have always been weak between the Turkish Consulate and the Turkish speaking Muslim Roma community, which is located at the outskirts of Alexandroupoli and whom the established members of the minority community call “our dark citizens” (*esmer vatandaşlarımız*). This mirrors the dominant narrative in Edirne and elsewhere in Turkey regarding the Roma community, which has been considered “Turkish but not quite.” This distinction between “dark citizens” and other Muslim-Turkish minorities is repeatedly underlined, not only by minorities from nearby villages where there is no Roma community, but also by the Greek inhabitants of Alexandroupoli. Especially for the former it was a way to elevate themselves to a position closer to the Greek community of Evros and the minority community in Komotini, where the political center of the minority community is.

Therefore, the Turkish speaking Muslim Roma community emerges as the most socially and spatially excluded group in Alexandroupoli, whereas Gagauz people, though not an official minority, also hold a liminal position between Turkishness and Greekness in Orestiada and Edirne. The bridging role of the Gagauz people, however, is further diminishing as the

generation of Turkish speakers are getting older and the younger generations no longer speak Turkish. Meanwhile, some members of the Turkish speaking Muslim Roma community have become more visible in public life through their involvement in the tourism and service sectors. This stands in stark contrast with earlier policies and practices of exclusion and stigmatization that kept the Roma community at the margins of both minority and majority communities of the Thracian borderlands. Hence the changing regime of bordering paved the way for new cross-border economic mobility practices of Turkish citizens, which have lifted the minority, including the Turkish and Greek speaking Roma of Alexandroupoli, up to a new social position of “being needed” by the Greeks. Ironically, some of them even became the ones with the most secure jobs, despite the economic crisis.

In sum, mainly with the easing of visa requirements, Turkish day trippers have been welcomed as first class customers in Greek Thrace, in the same way that Greek day trippers had been since they started visiting Edirne’s markets in the 1980s. People’s sense of border and preconceived ideas about the old national other have certainly been revisited through these new acts of cross-border mobility in the economic field. In this field, local experts and minorities have emerged as the ones most connected with the worlds on each side of the border. Although local experts are few in number in the Thracian borderland, they play key roles in establishing limited but durable networks that are sometimes mobilized by local economic actors, even in the absence of institutionalized EU cross-border cooperation schemes and in the presence of bureaucratic obstacles from the power centers. Minorities with competence in both languages also play a major role in building weak economic ties between the two majority communities.

Regarding the notion of citizenship, the fact that the Turkish speaking minority community has gained new public presence and the younger generation of Gagauz people has

become less Turkish than their ancestors implies that there has been a shift in established practices, status, and order. The suspicion towards Gagauz people in Orestiada as being “not fully Greek” and the exclusion of the Roma community as neither Greek nor Turkish may show that there is an insistence to maintain the old hierarchies among minority groups and between the majority and minority. However, despite the persistence of such discursive practices of othering, the ways in which Muslim-Turkish minorities in particular are becoming more visible in the economic field point to changes in the notion of citizenship and a reconsideration of the distance between the citizens and the immanent others (cf. Isin 2002). The emerging weak business ties between economic actors on each side of the border and the strategies they develop to maintain these ties create a rupture in the established pattern, which was not even considered before 1999.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter investigated cross-border encounters in the economic field. By looking at cross-border economic interaction and cooperation experiences, it deciphered a new layer of the politics of mobility-fixity and identified who the new “invited others” are and under what conditions they are invited. The political rapprochement also seems to play a crucial role in this field. After all, local economic actors—business people, business organizations, and local state institutions concerned with regional development—had the chance to come together only in the 2000s and they have slowly worked on building trust. While Greek passport holders were already familiar with Edirne’s market following the visa exemption in the mid-1980s, the mobility of Turkish passport holders rapidly increased in the 2010s, for two reasons: the growing economic power of the Turkish middle classes, which made traveling abroad possible, and the 2009 economic crisis in Greece, which triggered the easing of visa requirements for Turkish

passport holders. In this process, Greek Thrace's tavernas have become as appealing for day trippers across the border as Turkish Thrace's open markets.

Many factors have determined the direct economic outcomes of encounters on each side of the border and created winners and losers at different times. The relative market sizes and price differences put shopkeepers in Edirne center and Keşan at an advantage over Greek market places, especially in the 1980s and again in the 2010s. The geographical coordinates of local economic actors have proven important for people from South of Evros and Rhodope who have had easy access to Keşan through the Ipsala border gate, whereas Orestiada and Edirne town center have had organic ties that go back to pre-border scale. Finally, easing of border-crossing requirements turned first the minority and majority middle and lower middle class Greek citizens, and recently the middle and upper class Turkish citizens, into mobile subjects. Here Bulgarian Thrace also emerges as an attractive alternative for both Greek and Turkish borderlanders who seem to compare and contrast it with the other two in terms of availability of goods and services. The low prices of certain supermarket items in Bulgaria sometimes makes it a better destination for shopping, while it is seen as a better option for local traders and investors due to low costs of labour and easy bureaucratic process.

In this process of increasing cross-border economic mobility, the national sense of border still determines the scope of these mobilities and encounters, and, in that, political actors in capital cities seem to play more decisive roles than local economic actors. The CBC program between Greece and Turkey is still suspended, while High Business Council meetings are being organized and attended by business people from local as well as national circles. This implies a continuity in the power centers' approach to one another that is determined by "national

interests.” This is also apparent in the bureaucratic obstacles that business people face, especially in Greek Thrace.

The notion of “national interests” is mobilized by local economic actors, sometimes to trigger change in the old regime of bordering and sometimes to maintain it. The best example of the former is how local economic stakeholders in Edirne reached out to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to demand increasing opening hours of the Kastanies/Pazarkule Border Gate. The latter becomes most apparent in the short business partnership experience of the EDSIAD leader with a Greek businessman in Alexandroupoli, which came to an end when the Greek partner was disturbed by a more politically forceful businessman in town. These examples and the intrusion of the centers in economic relations in both Turkish and Greek Thrace support Gkintidis’s argument, based on his examination of the new elite discourse of friendship in Greek Thrace: “the ‘Europeanist’ discourses and the reimagination of Greek-Turkish relations at the local level in many respects a new iteration of Greek nationalism” (2013: 464).

Looking at the cross-border acts of economic mobility in more detail also reveals that what Navaro-Yashin calls the “borders on imagination” nowadays expand beyond the state scale for the majority of the borderlanders. Various practices presented in this chapter show how local economic actors are in fact flexible in their take on cross-border business opportunities. In the absence of formal channels, some economic actors look for ways to circumvent the limits set by the power centers, as in Melih’s case, to find ways to informally invest in Greece and maintain cross-border mobility and communication with trading partners in Greek Thrace through tourist visas. They are sometimes even supported by the street-level state agents who use their discretionary power to help ease the process of exchange, as in the case of both Greek and Turkish customs officers at the Pazarkule-Kastaneis Border Gate letting Turkish products cross

into Greece that, according to regular procedures, should go through clearance at commercial customs at Ipsala-Kipi. When contrasted with how hard it was to bring simple items for personal consumption in the 1990s, it is possible to interpret this change in the attitudes of street-level state agents at the border as a new act of citizenship: an act that is the outcome of intensification of the mobility of borderlanders following the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, and that implies a shift in both local state and nonstate actors' "borders on imagination," regardless of their prevailing nationalist undertones.

Considering il/licitness and mobility-fixity axes, it is the licitness of the specific kind of economic activity that eases people's economic mobilities and interactions across the borders. Otherwise, as the public shaming that the EDSIAD leader's Greek partner experienced shows, formal business cooperations may easily be rendered illicit once they are in conflict with the economic interests of their competitors. This happens regardless of the fact that the legal procedures for cross-border mobility for business people, namely work and residence permits, have recently been eased. In response, informal or less institutionalized forms of partnership and business exchange become licit, and common strategies to circumvent the bureaucratic obstacles of the power centers are developed. These informal business ties therefore emerge as local acts of resistance and reveal a center-periphery divergence. Melih's informal partnership in tobacco production as well as Yavuz's, Melih's, and others' use of tourist visas to visit their customers and provide necessary services are cases in point. Additionally, the common practices of shopping across the border and/or buying smuggled goods in the "Bulgarian market" of Edirne show that cross-border mobility of licit goods with people are considered licit and justified easily as rational consumer behavior in looking for cheaper options. The borderlanders' acts of mobilities are considered licit even in the case of casino tourism to Alexandroupoli or

Svilengrad. All these acts of mobilities also contribute to reconsideration of the established “sense of border” and the “borders on imagination” along the Thracian borderland.

The examples provided in this chapter prove that mobile subjects from across the border become “invited others” for each other, as long as the interests of local actors on the two sides merge and don’t clash with each other. The first encounters of the early 2000s were pursued by economic stakeholders even in the absence of an insitutional framework of cooperation and economic development. This seems conditional, however, on the presence of key brokers in business organizations. Here the most needed skill, as in other fields, is language competence. Additionally, what is needed to develop projects and seek joint funds from the EU or other foreign funding agencies is the expertise to write projects, in combination with the language skills to communicate with a partner from the neighboring country. For this and economic encounters in everyday life, the language competence of the Muslim-Turkish minorities has increasingly become an asset for the economic field and created new possibilities for them, which might be interpreted as a shift in the established hierarchy of otherness. The emerging weak business ties between economic actors on each side of the border, and the strategies they develop to maintain them, have created a rupture in the established patterns of the pre-1999 period. All these developments seem to lead, to some extent, towards new scalar articulations in the narratives of local actors, who benefit from increasing economic interaction: an articulation that transgresses the national borders and imagines a united space of Thrace. Such a transnational space is openly envisioned, especially by the actors involved in tourism, as they are eager to position Thrace within larger mobility flows of people from other places. Yet the emphasis that its success is conditional upon the stricter control over irregular migration reinforces the

distinction between the “invited other” and “uninvited other” and makes clear the fact that the new regime of bordering implies mobility for the former and fixity for the latter.

To conclude, in the absence of substantive steps for formal regionalism, the locally-driven formal and informal economic relations between Greek and Turkish Thrace reveal a distinct experience of regionalization that shapes governance of cross-border cooperation, sometimes by manipulating the limits set by the power centers and at other times by relying on the old established sense of border and its conflictual discourse against the existential (read economic) threat. Market relations continue as long as it is profitable for both clients and service/product providers. Yet relations set through repeated economic encounters, be they for possible future projects or actual economic exchanges, often lead to lasting personal relations especially when the two counterparts find a common spoken language. This is why language as social capital plays the utmost role in building interpersonal trust and in sustainability of cross-border relations among the “invited others.” The role of language becomes even more apparent in encounters in the cultural field, which further shows the distinct experiences of welcomed borderlanders depending on the different levels of social capital they hold in the Thracian contact zone: a relational field where layers of otherness are redrawn by the emerging regime of bordering.

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<sup>1</sup> In accordance with the Structural Funds for 2000-2006, INTERREG III proceeded INTERREG I (1991-1993) and II (1994-1999) programs, all of which were designed to strengthen economic and social cohesion throughout the European Union (EU), by fostering the balanced development of the continent through cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation.

<sup>2</sup>Information available at < <http://www.turkishgreeknews.org/tr/pazarkule-sinir-kapisi-diplomatik-gecislere-acildi-2530.html>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>3</sup> Although in the official sources the Thessaloniki meeting is presented as the first meeting and the Komotini as the second few, Thessaloniki meeting was already a follow up of previous meetings took place in the same year. Information gathered from several online sources are available at

<<http://www.batitrakya.org/bati-trakya-haber/turkiye-yunanistan-1nci-bolgesel-is-forumu-edirmede-yapildi.html>>

<[http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/202802/Yunan-Turk\\_is\\_forumu\\_Selanik\\_te\\_yapilacak.html#>](http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/202802/Yunan-Turk_is_forumu_Selanik_te_yapilacak.html#>)

<[http://www.deik.org.tr/Konseylcerik/1984/T%C3%BCrkiye\\_Yunanistan\\_II\\_B%C3%B6lgesel\\_%C4%B0%C5%9F\\_Forumu\\_14\\_15\\_Ocak\\_2011.html](http://www.deik.org.tr/Konseylcerik/1984/T%C3%BCrkiye_Yunanistan_II_B%C3%B6lgesel_%C4%B0%C5%9F_Forumu_14_15_Ocak_2011.html) [retrieved on November 15, 2015]> (Accessed January 2017).

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<sup>4</sup> Different chambers of commerce and industry, from Inegöl to Gaziantep, announced the upcoming meeting to their members with the participation form via their websites. Information available at <<http://www.itso.org.tr/ab-kosgeb-deik/turkiye-yunanistan-bulgaristan-iii-bolgesel-is-forumu.html>; <http://www.gso.org.tr/Content/Deik/?ID=210>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>5</sup> Parallel to Sezgin and Erkut's study, my interlocutors also underlined the fact that bureaucratic obstacles emerge as a disincentive to apply for available CBC schemes. Although the regulations related to the project implementation are adapted to the EU rules, the existence of the public awarding law causes problems for many local actors who are informed about the new bureaucratic rules and specifically for public institutions who have to abide by the different rules of the state and the EU (Sezgin and Erkut 2014).

<sup>6</sup> The future plans to make Edirne the center of "health tourism" is a case in point. It was mentioned by many local economic actors as an opportunity to boost Edirne's economy. In the Regional Development Agencies' "Thrace Tourism Master Plan 2013-2023," Edirne's historical position as the gate to the Balkans and the available infrastructure in this province, such as the research hospital and medical school at Trakya University, as well as the availability of natural resources and endemic species in its surroundings are presented as assets for health tourism. There are already some signs of cross-border mobility for health related reasons which is materialized in the road plates in Keşan showing the direction of the hospital in Greek as well as in Turkish. Few informants working in private hospitals in Edirne's town center and locals spending long hours for treatments in hospitals mentioned that several times they came across with members of minority from Greek Thrace visiting Turkish hospitals. However the Master Plan considers this as a very long-term investment with no priority (Trakya 2023). Therefore whether or not the current practices will remain as rare cases or will take a leap forward is to be seen in the near future.

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.dunya.com/toplum/toplumsal-haber/yabanci-araclar-edirne-tamir-edilebilecek-213341h.htm>

<sup>8</sup> These are the numbers that the then Katherina Varvarigou, the then Greek Consul-General in Edirne shared during our interview in May, 11 2014.

<sup>9</sup> This is also proven by the increasing numbers of the Greek community in Istanbul. According to the estimations of a new Greek Platform founded in Istanbul, around 800 Greeks moved to Istanbul in less than a decade which is an important addition to the shrinking Greek Orthodox community of 2500 members. Information available at <<http://www.turkishgreeknews.org/tr/istanbul-yerlesen-yunanlar-azalan-rum-toplumu-icin-de-taze-kan/12564.html>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>10</sup> Recently in March 2015, the professors at Trakya University, together with the support of the Turkish Abroad Office of Prime Ministry in Edirne, started Greek courses specifically for the Muslim-Turkish minority students to improve their language skills. This process is described in the next chapter.

## **Chapter Six: From defending the nations to bridging cultures?**

As depicted in the previous chapters, although lack of resolution of disputes had impeded official EU cross-border cooperation schemes, local business organizations and local authorities have pursued, albeit loosely, cross-border cooperation and communication in the 2000s. Local institutional initiatives, from secondary schools and universities to social clubs and cultural associations, have also shown an eagerness to get involved in cross-border interactions or to expand their local activities across the Thracian border. Thrace has increasingly become a contact zone where the outer environment begins to engender new subjective feelings for the Thracian borderlanders, who have grown up with memories of war and displacement and a negative image of the other.

This chapter on cultural field then seeks answers to the following questions: (a) whether and how cultural differences and diversities are endorsed and nurtured by state and nonstate actors, (b) what kind of cultural mobilities the new regime of bordering encourages and/or impedes, and (c) in what ways the new encounters and mobilities affect the reconfigurations of the us-them distinctions and the possibilities for a common regional identification, hence a reconsideration of the notion of territory and citizenship.

As scholars under the c.a.s.e. collective (2006) suggested, politics of memory and the heritage of founding violence play important roles in the constitution of security imaginaries and security policies of different collectives. Here, I take on the c.a.s.e. collective's suggestion of understanding the relationship between securitization and the politics of history and memory to examine the ways in which cultural heritage is memorialized and collective memory is recalled by different actors. Through this I aim to capture the limits of transformation in the established security imaginaries along the Thracian borderlands. The analysis of the tensions, negotiations,

and reconsiderations of the old us-them distinction in the cultural field complements those in the fields of security and economy, and shows in all its complexities the limits of the change away from the militarized regime of bordering towards a new regime of bordering.

The ethnographic evidence demonstrates that cross-border cultural interactions and mobilities are taking place in a field of power where “Thracianness” as a common regional identification is defined, contested, and negotiated among various state and nonstate actors. In the same vein as Migdal’s (2004) “mental maps,” van Schendel’s (2005) “politics of scale” and Green’s (2012) “multiple worlds,” all these actors hold various overlapping and co-existing mental maps that respond to the current politics of scale and create multiple worlds. So far, what seems to dominate the Thracian public spaces are practices reproducing the multiculturalist discourse based on the memory of long-gone, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious imperial legacies. Yet there are also dispersed local cross-border interactions and acts of mobilities that try to embrace, in Vertovec’s (2012) terms, the existing “facets” of diversity. These activities, albeit limited to a small group of people, are attempts towards a more inclusive social imaginary at the Thracian peripheries.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first unpack the notion of diversity as it is narrated and represented in the Thracian borderland, and the actors involved in its production and, in some cases, contestation. I then move onto mapping out the diverse experiences of cross-border mobility in the cultural field, with emphasis on the durability of such experiences and their differences from and similarities to cultural mobility experiences of the past regime of bordering. In the last section, I discuss the possibilities and limits of the current narrative of “Thracianness” that emerge from the new local practices of governing diversities and cross-border mobilities in the cultural field.

## **On governance: embracing the “diversity”**

This section portrays the ways in which cross-border social and cultural encounters have gained local momentum, especially in the 2000s, and endorsed multiculturalism as an asset (Gkintidis 2014). This process of endorsing diversities is partly embedded in the growing global trend of “selling places” (Kearns and Philo 1993) or “urban imagineering” (Yeoh 2005). It defines “acceptable” and “unacceptable” forms of difference “to counter negative stereotypes and make them more appealing to investors, business, tourists, consumers and residents” (Young et al. 2006: 1691). In a similar vein, the endorsement of multi-ethnic diversity, in the context of Evros (Yiakoumaki 2006), and multi-religious diversity, in the context of Edirne (Kaşlı forthcoming), has determined the “acceptable” form of differences.

In this process of endorsement, most activities are initiated by local nonstate actors, whereas various state actors have also been involved and left their footprints in different ways. Cultural diversity of the region appears to be governed and contested mainly in two ways: through memorialization of the past and organization of current cultural events. In the first part of this section, I explore the work of maintaining cultural artifacts in museums and renovating heritage sites, which allows encountering the other through the mediation of objects in the absence of actual subjects. In the second part, I delve into cross-border cultural events that provide opportunities for direct personal contact between members of minority and majority populations, and that also disclose the interplay between different state actors and nonstate actors in the cultural field.

### **Defining what to remember**

In this section, I document how collective identity is memorialized in the Thracian borderlands in different milieus. There are certainly substantive differences between museums

and heritage sites as different spaces of representing the past. While the former simulates the past, the latter aims to conserve it wherever it is (Walsh 1992). Behind this difference, a commonality is concealed, that is, the active decision-making process that leads to what is remembered and endorsed as part of collective memory and what is forgotten, hence the politics of memory. Here, seeing like a “visitor” in Evros and in Edirne, I trace the local politics of memory as a process of selectively remembering and forgetting the past, particularly by looking at non-muslim heritage sites in Edirne, and two local museums in Evros: the Ethnological Museum of Thrace in Alexandroupoli and Historical and Folklore Museum in Orestiada.

The Historical and Folklore Museum of New Orestiada and Region (Το Ιστορικό και Λαογραφικό Μουσείο Νέας Ορεστιάδας και Περιφέρειας) is a product of a local initiative to meticulously present the local history of contemporary Orestiada and its inhabitants as situated in the larger Thracian region. The representation here relies almost exclusively on their experience of forced migration from Karaağaç and other neighborhoods of Edirne as part of the population exchange. The Historical and Folklore Museum in Orestiada was renovated and opened in 2010 in its current extended and modernized form with the joint support of EU programs, the Stavros Niarchos Institute, and private funders. This museum works closely with the Association of Descendants of Karaagac-Adrianapoli (Σύλλογος Απογόνων Καραγατσιανών – Αδριανουπολιτών), which was founded in 2000 with the aim to collect archival material related to the Greek past in Edirne up until the Lausanne Treaty.<sup>1</sup>

The origins of the Historical and Folklore Museum go back to 1974 when local notables, mostly teachers, decided to collect historical and folklore materials in Nea Orestiada and its peripheries. As descendants of the former residents of today’s Karaağaç and Edirne, who were the founders of the 20<sup>th</sup>-century Greek town of Orestiada, their main premise is to protect the

cultural and religious artifacts from Edirne that their families brought with them. Such cultural associations were considered crucial for political change from below and were encouraged during the restoration of democracy in the aftermath of military rule in Greece (Papadopoulos 1989). It is in this context that the “Ellinomousion Ainou” Cultural Society in Alexandroupoli (Ελληνομουσείον Αίνου» Πολιτιστικός Σύλλογος Αλεξανδρούπολης) was also founded in 1976 by the descendants of Ainos/Enez exchangees and began keeping a record of the Greek heritage in today’s Enez, their ancestors’ hometown. The historical roots of the current inhabitants hold a crucial place in these museums, and the founding violence seems to determine what is included in the collective memory. This is best manifested in the soil samples that were brought from different Thracian towns on the Turkish side of the border and which are exquisitely presented in the entrance of the museum in Orestiada.

In contrast, the Ethnological Museum of Thrace (Το Εθνολογικό Μουσείο Θράκης) deliberately aims at presenting various cultures that make up what is Thracian. The museum started as a private endeavor in 1998 when Aggeliki Gianakidou brought into public view the Thracian clothes, tools, and objects she had been collecting since the 1960s. The museum took its current form in 2002, after restoration of the old Alexandroupoli house was completed. Restoration costs were covered mostly by the actual owner of the house and partly through financial support from the Onassis foundation, and the renovated house was then rented out to the museum. Today this private museum stands not only as a landmark building but more importantly as a crucial cultural center. As Gianakidou explained during our lengthy interview, the ethnological museum, as its name implies, brings together the ethnic and cultural history and richness of the Thracian region, from the 18<sup>th</sup> century to the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Indeed, old ethnic variations, including those no longer visible in public life, such as distinctions in the dresses of

Karakatanis and Albanites, are carefully noted in the detailed labels provided for each piece of artifact in the museum. Nevertheless, the emphasis on “ethnic” variation goes so far as to overlook existing religious differences among the local populations in Thrace, such as the Bektashi, Sunni, and Armenian communities, which are not mentioned in the written pieces on the walls or represented through the presentation of any artifacts.<sup>2</sup> In that sense, the collective memory of Thrace that the museum aims at embracing and protecting emerges as the memory of an almost forgotten past, instead of an existing present-day diversity.

The diverse experiences of founding violence by the local actors involved in the construction of the Ethnological Museum of Thrace in Alexandroupoli and the Historical and Folklore Museum in Orestiada are echoed in the cultural activities that they show interest in pursuing. Whereas the former is eager to organize cross-border cultural events, the latter is inclined to host activities related to Greekness and Greek culture. For example, the latter frequently hosts Nikos Ligeros in Orestiada. Famous for his extraordinary IQ, Ligeros is a known strategist and consultant to the Greek state and military academy. As many informants in Alexandroupoli and Orestiada noted, he has often visited the Evros region in recent years to give public lectures. Some of the lectures took place in the library of the Association of Descendants of Karaagac-Adrianapoli (Σύλλογος Απογόνων Καραγατσιανών – Αδριανουπολιτών).

In June 2014, during one such visit to Orestiada, Ligeros gave six lectures in two days on topics ranging from a precious mineral rock called zeolite, available in the Orestiada area, to an Annan Plan for Cyprus.<sup>3</sup> In one of these lectures, about the history and future of the Greek-Turkish border, he talked about the geostrategic position of Thrace from the 1878 Congress of Berlin until today, using the analogy of a chess game and emphasizing that he is interested in “logical” (ορθολογικά-orthologika) solutions since only logical solutions can solve political

disputes forever. Throughout his speech, he tried to prove that the border in Thrace remained disputed in the Congress of Berlin and the Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne. He stated that unless the border is drawn along the Bosphorus, where, for him, the Thracian region geographically begins, geo-strategically speaking it may keep on moving. A little more than 50 people, most in their 40s or older, attended this lecture, and none challenged his views. A few of my interlocutors later explained that the general scarcity of public events and of famous Greek visitors in town, due to its geographical isolation, explained the growing interest in Ligeros's lectures in Orestiada. Apparently, this is not the case in Alexandroupoli which, as the economic and cultural center of Evros prefecture, hosts many international and national public events throughout the year. As journalist Yannis Laskarakis from Alexandroupoli jokingly stated, Ligeros stopped coming to Alexandroupoli after being openly criticized by the audience few times.

In Alexandroupoli, Ms. Gianakidou, the owner and the manager of the ethnological museum, also proudly shared her experiences in Greek-Turkish cross-border meetings and cultural activities, sometimes as a guest speaker in Istanbul and other times as a member of the hosting team in Alexandroupoli. The walls of the multi-purpose room of the museum are adorned with pictures from Istanbul taken by the world famous Armenian-Turkish photographer Ara Güler, whom the museum hosted twice in Alexandroupoli. One night I was invited to the museum by Dr. Thanasis Kougoulos, an adjunct faculty in Trakya University of Edirne and Democritus University of Alexandroupoli. Dr. Kougoulos is also the academic consultant of the museum. That night he was giving Turkish lessons in the multi-purpose room to Greek students from all walks of life. Additionally, the information leaflet was translated into Turkish in 2014, in response to the increasing number of Turkish tourists visiting the museum. In other words, the

museum has been a crucial space for interaction between Turkish visitors and the locals of Alexandroupoli.

The clear differences between the two local stakeholders in Greek Thrace showcase local varieties in people's approach to what is to be maintained as local collective memory and heritage, and what kind of relations are to be cultivated for the near future. The eagerness of the owner of the museum in Alexandroupoli to build cross-border ties heralds new acts of citizenship that create new possibilities. By comparison, the lack of such focus in Orestiada seems to be shaped by the specific marks left by the founding violence and the national regime of bordering on the collective memory of founders of the museum of Orestiada, and by the fact that the idea of forming such a society was, back then, encouraged by the Greek political center. Yet, other than from the EU and the Greek philanthropic foundations, financial support from the Greek state was limited in the construction of these two museums. Hence the differences in the founders' approaches to collective memory and heritage are, to a great extent, determined by local specificities.

This stands in stark contrast to the Turkish case where such local enterprises are absent in public spaces. In Turkish Thrace, maintaining local cultural memory and heritage is considered the job of the state and is mostly limited to the restoration of old Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman artifacts. Although there are a few self-proclaimed local historians who have been collecting documents, objects, and stories pertaining to the non-Muslim past of the city, these endeavors are limited to small reading groups and personal editing and publication of the collected materials.<sup>4</sup>

In Edirne, the development and execution of heritage renewal projects are often used to cultivate the image of the city as “the city of culture, history and tourism,” as mentioned

occasionally on billboards and touristic materials. In doing so, various actors participated in reshaping urban space and memory mainly with reference to its multi-religious past (Kaşlı forthcoming). As part of Turkey's EU accession process, a new law on non-Muslim Foundations was put into effect in 2008, leading to the direct involvement of the Directorate General of Foundations in the absence of a living religious community in the specific locale. This new framework made possible the restoration of several churches and synagogues throughout Turkey, including the Bulgarian churches and the Great Synagogue of Edirne. Similarly, the surroundings of the Enez Castle, in which a 12th-century Greek-Orthodox church is located, were also rehabilitated as part of a cultural heritage project funded by the Bulgaria-Turkey IPA-CBC program, thus within the EU framework.

The decision on the new function of the renovated sites is far from being a local experience. The process takes place in the form of negotiations between state and nonstate actors at the national level. Take for example the Great Synagogue's recent change of function from a religious site to a cultural one. In the absence of a living community of Jews in Edirne, the decision on the new function was left to the Regional Committee for the Protection of Cultural Heritage under the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Yet, considering Turkey's foreign policy interests, the committee was obligated to get confirmation from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs before reaching a final decision. Hence the ministry contacted the representative authorities of the old Jewish community of Edirne in Turkey, in this case the Jewish community of Istanbul as well as the diaspora organization in Israel.<sup>5</sup> The same procedure was followed for the restoration of the two Bulgarian churches in Edirne.<sup>6</sup>

The case of the Orthodox-Greek heritage in Edirne, however, is less straightforward. While there is no Greek church that survived to the present in Edirne, there is the Hagia Sophia

church in Enez Castle, which was converted to a mosque and called the Fatih Mosque, after the Ottoman Sultan who conquered Enez in 1456. As the local interlocutors explained, this converted mosque was in use until the 1965 earthquake when the dome of the building collapsed. Since the implementation of the IPA-CBC project for the rehabilitation of Enez Castle, there have been ongoing debates over whether and how the church would be restored. During my visits to Enez in 2014, many informants mentioned recent visits by the Regional Directorate General of Foundations in Enez, which convinced them that the restoration of the church would soon start. Nevertheless, in April 2015, Adnan Ertem, from the General Directorate of Foundations, officially declared that the Regional Committee for the Protection of Cultural Heritage had already confirmed the reconstruction plan with no change of function, meaning that the building was going to be used as a mosque.<sup>7</sup>

This official declaration was complemented by the attitude of the newly elected mayor of Enez from AKP, when he welcomed Greek visitors from Alexandroupoli to Enez. During his speech about the history of Enez, the mayor did not even mention the Byzantium past of the town. This encounter is depicted in detail below, in the section on revisiting cultural heritage from the perspective of mobile subjects—in this case, the Greek descendents of Enez in Alexandroupoli. Yet it is crucial to mention here, as it shows the intrusion of the political center in the way cultural heritage is maintained in Turkish Thrace. It also demonstrates that, in the absence of autonomous civil societal actors, local collective memory is framed mainly by local political authorities who are in compliance with Ottoman references in the current, proactive foreign policy approach of the Turkish political center.

Today synagogues and churches in Edirne and some other cities are renovated for use as cultural sites in the absence of non-Muslim communities. In the case of Enez, the reverse process

took place with the Hagia Sophia museums in Iznik and Trabzon, which were turned back into mosques. In these cases, the current proposals for Enez and other Hagia Sophia museums emerge as discursive and performative acts that aim to emphasize these sites' Islamic past above anything else. They become, therefore, manifestations of the incumbent AKP's urban and cultural policies to encourage faith tourism and promote the consumption of nostalgia for Ottoman multiculturalism, while at the same time reinforcing Islamic elements as the leitmotiv of that multiculturalism (Kaşlı forthcoming). Yet further research is needed during and after the restoration, to observe the kind of "affect," in Navaro-Yashin's terms (2009), that such a renovated space of memory may produce for both the local community and "outsiders," mainly Greek visitors.

In sum, heritage sites in Edirne and the cultural history museums in Evros emerge as renewed and sanitized spaces where the past is selectively remembered, imitated, and presented. Driven partly by what Hall calls "commercial multiculturalism [which] exploits and consumes the difference in the spectacle of the exotic 'other'" (Hall cited in Vertovec 2010: 85), these initiatives contribute to the construction of a particular local collective memory that cherishes the multi-ethnic and multi-religious *pasts* of the region. In Edirne's case, this is done by re-appropriating the non-Muslim architecture in the absence of the non-Muslim subjects who once lived there. In the Evros case, collective memory is presented either with an exclusive focus on the founding violence, as in the museum in Orestiada, or by embracing ethnic but not religious differences in even the most inclusive presentation of cultural diversity of the region, as in the museum in Alexandroupoli. In that sense the representations of Ottoman multiculturalism in Edirne and the harmonious life of ethnic groups in Evros pave the way for a distinction between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" differences in the two separate public spaces of the Thracian

borderland. In Greek Thrace, this is done mostly by the nonstate actors themselves, whereas in Turkish Thrace the field is dominated by intrusions of the political center in the periphery. In either case, the way multicultural nostalgia has so far been endorsed does not pave the way for the acceptance of more substantive “facets” of diversity, *à la* Vertovec (2012), for a more inclusive social imaginary. In her contemplation of how to desecuritize the minority condition, Jutila (2006) underlines the necessity of a new discourse as well as practice to reconstruct an issue that was securitized. Considering that discourse and practice must go together, the local politics of history and memory as experienced in Thrace do not seem to transcended the national regime of bordering yet. Regardless, though, the activities of the Ethnological Museum of Thrace nurturing cross-border cultural ties offer new examples of acts of citizenship that disrupt habitus towards new directions, create new possibilities, and shift established practices, status, and order.

### **Center in the periphery**

This section on cross-border cultural activities and interactions between Greece and Turkey unpacks the interplay between state and nonstate actors. Cultural events have mostly been initiated, especially in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, by civil society actors in big cities, mainly journalists, artists, academics, and business people (Ulaş-Belge 2004). Yet in the case of Thrace, state actors have been directly involved in societal rapprochement through the Turkish Consulate in Komotini and the Greek Consulate in Edirne. More recently the Turkish center seems to be more involved in both Greek and Turkish Thrace through the local branch offices of the Presidency For Turks Abroad and Related Communities, under the Prime Ministry (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, henceforth YTB) and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Edirne temsilciliği, henceforth MFA Edirne) in Edirne. Ethnographic evidence shows that there are striking differences in the aims and motivations of

Greek and Turkish state actors in supporting locally-driven cultural, social, and educational endeavors. The actions of Greek state actors facilitate further cross-border interaction across diverse social groups, whereas Turkish state actors seem to be primarily concerned with protecting the interests of the Turkish-Muslim minority of Greek Thrace.

During our May 2014 interview in Edirne, then Greek consul, Katherina Varvarigou, spoke very positively about the future of cross-border relations in Thrace. She specifically underlined that, as the consul, she was not concerned with institutionalizing any type of cross-border relations but rather in initiating new contacts between different groups and letting them take life at their own pace. With that aim in mind, she organized a meeting on International Women's Day for businesswomen and spouses of businessmen from Edirne and Alexandroupoli, soon after taking office in 2012. For International Women's Day two years later, female officers at the Evros prefecture's cross-border relations office organized an event titled "The women in Peoples' Neighborhood, Greece-Turkey" ("Γυναίκες στη Γειτονιά των Λαών, Ελλάδα-Τουρκία"). This event took place in Orestiada with the participation of Turkish women invited via ETSO in Edirne. At the organizers' request, Mrs. Varvarigou reached out to some Turkish female artists and invited them to the event. This event, run by women active in local state and nonstate institutions, supported Mrs. Varvarigou's point that local actors "do not need to be controlled and directed," and that her role is only to "help them cultivate the fertile grounds for cross-border relations."

Other events that Consul Varvarigou was involved in were also geared towards facilitating initial cross-border contacts. For example, in cooperation with the governor of Edirne she organized a weekend-long event for primary school students from Edirne and Orestiada. The education department of the district governor reached around 15 students in Edirne while

Varvarigou contacted families in Orestiada. First, Turkish students went to Orestiada and were hosted by Greek families. Together with Greek students, they attended a doll-making workshop offered by a famous Greek artist. The next day, Greek families brought the Turkish students back to Edirne and spent the day there with the Turkish families. For this activity, the Turkish students were provided one-day special visas by the Greek consulate. In addition to several musical events, one large cultural activity organized by the Greek consul was a special art exhibition in May 2014, in a 15<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman building renovated for use as a cultural center. Varvarigou explained her choice of exhibition as follows:

This year I wanted to bring to Edirne the works of Greek Naïve artists, and not for example a modern art exhibition. The everyday life presented in these paintings show things that are common between us. This is what I aim in all the activities I try to organize here.

The opening ceremony of this exhibition is where I met a customs officer from Orestiada and the then head of the detention center of Edirne, whom I mentioned in Chapter Four. Apart from being a venue where Greek and Turkish officials and local notables could catch up, residents and children from the neighborhood of the Greek Consulate were also invited to the opening ceremony. One corner of the exhibition room was allocated specifically for children; they were offered free papers and paints to do their own paintings after visiting the exhibition. For Varvarigou, such cultural events are small but crucial steps toward creating positive memories in the minds of local people and future generations.

The Greek consulate in Edirne has direct relations with the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki, and they both participated in a business meeting in Edirne organized jointly by the two cities' chambers of commerce and industry. However, despite geographical proximity, there is no such contact between the Greek consulate in Edirne and the Turkish consulate general in Komotini. In the presence of a substantive Muslim-Turkish minority community, the latter is

more concerned with overseeing the activities of the Greek state actors and minority communities and playing the role of a bridge between the minority of Greek Thrace and Turkey's political center. This special status of the Turkish consulate is equivalent to the Greek consulate in Istanbul, both of which were assigned a central role in overseeing matters of minority education in the Protocol of Greco-Turkish Cultural Commission signed in 1969 (Demetriou 2013: 135).

During our interview in Komotini, in September 2014, then Turkish consul general Osman İlhan Şener explained this special status of the consulate general by underlining that, after Jerusalem, this is the second most important consulate for Ankara in light of its political duty to protect education and religious rights of minorities. Additionally he emphasized that they try to show special care towards communities that were far from the reach of the Turkish consulate general until the mid-1990. This lack of contact was due to close military surveillance of villages on the Rhodope Mountains, all the way from Xanthi to Evros. As a reflection of this policy, the consul general himself was keen on paying a visit each week to a different village by, for example, joining them for Friday prayers together with Gümülcine/Komotini's elected mufti, who works as a bridge between the consulate general and the minority community.

At the end of our interview, the consul general informed me of his visit the following Friday to Bektashi/Alevi, one of the mountain villages in Evros. He noted that these visits were announced beforehand via the consul's Twitter account and thus were not in any respect secret meetings. In order to observe the local reception of the consulate general's visits, I attended on the following Friday. In this meeting at the mosque of the village, a few civil officers from the Greek security services were also present to observe the occasion. They didn't enter the mosque but waited until the end of the prayer in the yard of the mosque and recorded the consul general's

and the elected mufti's speeches from the window. In their speech at the mosque, and during the lunch served by women villagers, both the consul general and the elected mufti repeatedly mentioned the Alevi and Sunni brotherhood and assured villagers that they were always there for any immediate need of the minority community, whether material or spiritual. They had already provided financial and material support by opening a kindergarten next to the mosque for minority children from the neighboring villages.

As soon as the visitors from Komotini left, however, some villagers swiftly stressed that the mosque has been mostly unattended and they themselves came on that day only because there were visitors from Komotini. In addition to the immediate urge to distance themselves from the establishment in Komotini, there were also some symbolic gestures that one could interpret as resistance towards the infusion of Sunni tradition in their lifestyle and traditions. One such sign was the presence of beer cans spread over the lunch table next to the other refreshments. Consumption of alcohol is a delicate matter within the minority community, a characteristic that distinguishes the Sunni-Muslim minority's lifestyle from that of the Greek majority. Although no one drank beer during the lunch, its presence was a matter of symbolic resistance against Sunni-Muslim intrusions into their everyday life especially through the services provided by the Turkish consulate general. Nevertheless, as some local interlocutors in the neighboring villages mentioned, the consulate's intrusions have gotten stronger and it has gradually consolidated its presence in the region by getting involved in the appointment of Bektashi leaders (baba) in Evros, as well as by providing financial and organizational support for centuries old Bektashi feasts and festivals.<sup>8</sup>

Similar to the consulate general in Komotini, one of the primary aims of the YTB office in Edirne is to strengthen the ties of the Turkish-Muslim minority of Evros and the rest of Greek

Thrace with the Turkish homeland. Together with the Izmir office, the YTB office in Edirne was officially opened in October 2012 and it has been active at the local level since November 2013.<sup>9</sup> The MFA Edirne office, composed of two expert diplomats, one ambassador, and one regular officer, was also opened in November 2012 especially to help coordinate local authorities' relations with Greece and Bulgaria. Both the YTB and MFA branch offices are located within the yard of the Edirne governorship, as the local representatives of the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Interior.

While the opening of these branch offices might have eased communication between local authorities and the capital city, it has actually brought the center further into the periphery. It is also possible that, acting as the eye of the center and overseeing local authorities and stakeholders' official cross-border projects and practices in Edirne, these offices are the embodiment of the main pillars of the new Turkish foreign policy apparatus aimed towards the Balkans.<sup>10</sup> During my visit to the MFA Edirne office, one of the expert diplomats explained that their primary role is to represent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in international meetings and events that take place in Edirne, and to accompany local NGOs, municipalities, and officials from the governorship in their visits to neighboring countries. During our interview, Fatih Ot, the head of the YTB office in Edirne, stated that their main missions in Edirne are supporting students from abroad studying at Trakya University (henceforth T.U.) and developing contacts with the Turkish-Muslim communities in the Balkans. The underlying aim of these events is, as Fatih Ot noted, to help students develop local contacts with the Turkish state and culture and to maintain those ties after they finish their studies and return to their home countries.

What is crucial regarding center-periphery relations is that the direct involvement of these local branch offices in organizing local and cross-border events does not leave room for

alternative discourses and practices of cross-border relations to flourish. One example is the role played by the YTB and MFA Edirne offices in the “International Student Academy.” Beginning in the Spring of 2014, the YTB office started organizing the annual four-month-long “International Student Academy” in 18 different cities, including Edirne. With these aims, the officers at YTB Edirne also arranged weekly lectures in specific areas of interest that students sign up for, as well as cultural excursions in and around Edirne and orientations for Turkish-type households through meetings with host families. In 2015 there were 160 students registered in the academy, part of which included the MFA ambassador in Edirne giving a lecture on Turkish foreign policy.<sup>11</sup> Greek lessons were also offered in cooperation with the Balkan languages department at T.U. This language course was arranged especially for students of minority origin from Greek Thrace whose command of Greek was not sufficient. The YTB office also organized other activities that were open to members of the minority community in Greek Thrace. One such event was the NGO capacity development program, organized in May 2014 in Edirne, where representatives of minority organizations from Evros and Edirne participated.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, T.U. itself also stands out as a crucial pillar of the new Turkish foreign policy apparatus developing in Edirne. Founded in 1982, T.U. started accepting foreign students in 2002. Aiming to play the role of a regional university, T.U. initiated the formation of the Balkan Universities Association (BUA) in 2008 and held the general secretariat of the association, which became active in 2014 upon the request of the Rector of Trakya University, Prof. Dr. Yener Yörük, and the involvement of Ioannina University of Greece and Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski of Bulgaria (Bulletin1, April 2015).<sup>13</sup> The main objectives of BUA are stated as the enhancement of cooperation between the universities in the region, the improvement of the

mobility of faculty and students, making joint applications for projects, and setting up of joint bachelor's and master's programs (Bulletin 4, January 2016).<sup>14</sup>

Whether and how the BUA activities will positively affect student mobility from and to T.U. needs further scrutiny in the coming years. More importantly, however, the future activities of BUA and its cooperation with other Balkan universities are to be considered in conjunction with other institutionalized student mobility schemes that the Council of Higher Education in Turkey developed and that T.U. is also part of. These schemes include the Farabi exchange program, which started in 2009 for student and staff mobility among universities in Turkey; and the Mevlana exchange program, which started in 2011. So far, through the Mevlana Program, T.U. has already made protocols with 27 universities. Twenty of the protocols are with Balkan universities while the rest are with schools in Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan (2 universities from each), the US, Ukraine, and Malaysia (one university from each). Juxtapose these programs with the cooperation between the YTB Edirne office and T.U. in the organization of the “International Student Academy” to orient T.U.’s foreign students towards Turkish culture, and to provide assistance (e.g. Greek language courses) to minority students to ease their reintegration in their home countries. It seems clear that T.U. also appropriated the mission to attract students in the Balkans who are close to Turkish culture. This is also proven by the ratio of students from the Balkan countries among the total number of foreign students at T.U. (see Table II in Appendix).

This comparison of Greek and Turkish state actors’ involvements in the Thracian borderland shows the following: First, whereas the Greek consuls in Edirne have relative freedom in their activities and hence may use their position for the development of cross-border cultural ties between Greek and Turkish borderlanders, the Turkish consul general in Komotini is primarily responsible for protecting the Turkish-Muslim minority community’s interests as

defined by the Turkish political center. Second, concomitant to the Neo-Ottoman foreign policy of the AKP period, Edirne has been more actively positioned as the gate to the Balkans, where closer ties with the people of Turkish descent and culture could easily be established. This policy is manifested in the recent opening of branch offices of the YTB and MFA that work closely with the governorship and the university in Edirne.

The divergent ways in which Greek and Turkish state institutions get involved in cultural interactions in the Thracian borderlands complements the differences in terms of how the past cultural diversity of the region is endorsed and framed exclusively by state actors in Turkish Thrace and by the nonstate actors themselves in Greek Thrace. The local accounts presented here show that the Turkish political center has more control over local practices in the Thracian peripheries compared with the Greek political center. This difference in the political centers' approach to Thrace seems to derive from and be justified by the ethno-religious composition of the region, that is the presence of the Turkish-Muslim minority in Greek Thrace. As the next section shows, this difference also has crucial impacts on the new acts of cross-border cultural mobilities; in some cases these lead to reactions from the political centers in order to maintain their forceful positions at the Thracian periphery, and in other cases they lead to shifts in the "sense of border" of the inhabitants.

### **On cross-border mobilities**

As shown in the previous chapter, cross-border economic mobilities were taking place even before the 1999 political rapprochement, yet gained a new momentum in the 2000s. In the case of the cultural field, the political rapprochement seems to have played an even more crucial role in encouraging people to engage in cross-border cultural mobilities and interactions. In some cases, such cultural encounters are dependent on the presence of key local agents. In other cases,

availability of local institutional support is the driving force behind the specific forms of mobilities. In all cases it is the local specificities that lead to the emergence of these practices, whereas their sustainability is determined by outside interventions of some sort. As a field of power where state agents are also actively involved, some of these interactions are met with the interventions of power centers. In the 2000s, there emerged three main forms of acts of mobilities in the cultural field: re-visiting cultural heritage, participating in cultural events, and schooling.

### **Revisiting cultural heritage**

This section documents the changing mobility practices between Greek and Turkish Thrace. While the direction of mobility was for many years from Greece to Turkey, this became a two-way mobility with the recent changes in the visa procedures. According to the accounts of tour agents and locals of Evros, Istanbul has always been an important destination as the old capital and the religious center for Orthodox Greeks. However, the lifting of visa requirements in 1984 had a positive impact on the frequency of people's visits. Yet tours to various other destinations, namely Thracian and Anatolian towns with Greek heritage, became popular only after the official rapprochement.<sup>15</sup> Touristic visits to Turkey almost came to a halt after the explosion of a Greek tourist bus in 1991. Although the perpetrator, who also died during the bomb attack, was officially presented as a person with psychological problems, this left a dark spot in the collective memory of Greece until the official rapprochement.

The first visits from Greek to Turkish Thrace dated back to 1976, when the "Ellinomousion Ainou" in Alexandroupoli was founded by those who were born in Ainos/Enez and had to move to Alexandroupoli during the population exchange. Although it was only a short time after the 1974 Cyprus Invasion, the restoration of democracy in Greece allowed the first

generation exchangeees to finally consider visiting their home town of Ainos/Enez, just 20 km away from the coast of Alexandroupoli. Yet that was the one and only visit by the first generation, then elderly members of their community, as Enez was under strict military surveillance until 2004. The next visit of their descendants took place in 2007.

As explained in the introductory chapter, 2007 was the first year after the first prime ministerial meetings in 2004 when the Greek-Turkish rapprochement reached new heights with the inauguration of a gas pipeline. For cross-border mobilities and interactions in the Thracian borderlands, this was in addition to the decrease in Enez's restricted military zone status in 2004 and its recognition in 2006 as a "Culture and Tourism Protection and Improvement Area."<sup>16</sup> During their first visit in 2007, after almost 30 years, representatives of "Ellinomousion Ainou" were warmly welcomed by the then mayor of Enez and even allowed to conduct a religious ceremony in the old Hagia Sophia at Enez Castle. Mrs. Kladara, the president of the association, recalls that the 2007 ceremony was a very special one for her community as it was the only time, outside the Bulgarian invasion of Enez during the WWI, that a Christian ceremony had been conducted in that venue since the day the church was converted into a mosque in the 15<sup>th</sup> century.

While the local authorities were happy to have them visiting the town in later years, they were not allowed to conduct their religious ceremony beginning in June 2010. This sudden change was a result of the unexpected demand by American tourists to do a prayer at the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul. In reaction to that demand, the political authorities in Ankara warned all local governors, including the Edirne governorship, against such demands from foreigners. As Mrs. Kladara says, the mayor at that time, with whom they had friendly relations, sadly informed her about this decision. He was sincere in his sentiment, she felt, as he stated that although the

authorities in Enez had no problem with her and the visitors from Alexandroupoli, they could no longer allow the ceremony and did not want to cause a trouble for either the visitors or the locals. Having that ceremony cancelled at the last minute, the group did not visit Enez for another two years. In 2013 and 2014 they visited other Byzantium heritage sites and their ancestors' villages around Enez.

In the Turkish local elections in March 2014, the AKP candidate for Enez municipality won over the previous mayor who was from the main opposition party, CHP.<sup>17</sup> Although the new mayor welcomed a group of representatives from “Ellinomousion Ainou” who visited Enez in June 2014, Mrs. Kladara was still suspicious about how their relationship would develop in the coming years:

I think he is a good person. He was very polite and he tried to welcome us and told us the history [of Enez] but he skipped the whole Roman period! From ancient times hop up to Ottoman period! So I asked him ‘can I tell you how we, the Greek people, interpret it?’ (Smile in her face) Previous mayor was different. He had interest in local history. He was searching together with us, bringing us the old maps of the region that he found. He was coming here [Alexandroupoli] sometimes just to have a drink by the sea and giving us a call. OK, this new mayor is also a nice man but he is from a conservative party. So I am not sure if we can have such friendly relationship with him.

For Mrs. Kladara, their first encounter with the new mayor in 2014 and his discourse about local history were crucial signs regarding the future local policy towards the Greek visitors and cultural heritage in town. In a similar vein as Mrs. Kladara's concerns, my observations in Enez also showed that maintaining cross-border contacts and mobility does appear to be a priority of either the local political authorities or economic actors in Enez. During my visit to his office in August 2014, the new mayor was giving an interview to correspondents from a periodical from Turkish Thrace. Upon a question on cross-border relations, he openly stated that although he found cross-border relations and cultural events important, his primary goal would

be the economic development of the region. Locals of Enez were also hopeful that the harmony between the new mayor and the incumbent government might finally attract public and private investors to Enez. Many informants even seemed indifferent towards Greek visitors; from their perspective, the short durations of the daily visits in the past years did not add much to the local economy. Hence closer ties with the political power centers seemed more important, for both local state and nonstate actors in the context of Enez, than cross-border mobilities and relations.

For Turkish citizens, the easing of visa procedures after the rapprochement made frequent visits to Greece possible. As underlined by a few early travelers in Edirne, until then both the visa application process at the consulates and the border checks were a challenge for Turkish passport holders. Mesut, for example, is member of a well-known family in Keşan that was originally from Greek Thrace and migrated as a family in the 1950s. In 1996, Mesut got married and, with his wife, wanted to go to Greece in their honeymoon. Although they provided all the necessary documents and showed sufficient finances for a touristic visit, their visa application was rejected with no explanation. Mesut remembers that when they applied for visas again in 2001, the officer in the Greek Consulate in Edirne saw the rejection stamp in their passports and personally apologized to them. Similarly, the head of the Laussane Exchangees Foundation (Lozan Mübadilleri Vakfı, henceforth LMV) in Istanbul recalls his first visit to Greece in 1997, when he was the only non-Greek traveler on the bus. The customs police at the Kipi Border Gate had never encountered a Turkish traveler before and suspected his motivations for traveling; he was interrogated, his suitcase was thoroughly checked, and finally they were convinced that his sole aim was to visit his family's old village in Greek Macedonia. In his later visits, he underlines, such interrogation never happened again. He believes this was because the officers at the gate were then used to seeing Turkish visitors on the buses and in their own cars.

As many families in Edirne are descendants of population exchangees from Greek Macedonia and Thrace, if not immigrants from other places in the Balkans, there has been a growing interest in day or weekend trips to small Greek towns and villages all the way to Serres and Thessaloniki. Apart from such visits to family villages, many frequent day trippers in Edirne repeated that the nearby Evros region is not very attractive for Turkish visitors in terms of cultural heritage. While one reason is that the region was not part of the forced population exchange, another reason is that even the most important Ottoman heritage sites in the region are not well maintained. The ruination in Evros, as well as many parts of Greek Thrace, is generally explained as the effects of the Balkan Wars, two World Wars, and the concomitant civil war in Greece that severely affected the region.

Take for example the early 15<sup>th</sup> century Çelebi Sultan Mehmet Mosque in the center of Didymoteicho, which is considered not only a crucial Ottoman heritage site in the region but also the largest mosque in Greece and the most important one in Europe.<sup>18</sup> The mosque was closed in 1952 because most of the Muslim-Turkish community had left the town to go to Turkey. There were some preservation attempts in the late 1990s, and then in 2010 the Greek Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Greek Central Archaeological Council showed a willingness to restore it with national and EU structural funds, called ESPA in Greece. However this project has yet to be accomplished.<sup>19</sup> Many interlocutors in Edirne and Evros mentioned that if this mosque is renovated and opened to visitors, it will be a very important heritage site, especially for day trippers from Edirne as well as other parts of Turkey. A few people in Edirne also compared Bulgaria with Greece in that respect and said they would prefer to visit Bulgaria and Macedonia where Ottoman heritage has been better maintained.

To sum up, visiting cultural heritage sites is a very recent phenomenon in the Thracian borderland. Although visits were initiated by local actors soon after the official rapprochement, how these practices develop is determined not solely by the local actors themselves. In some cases, local encounters are open to the intervention of the political centers, manifested in the case of repeated visits from Alexandroupoli to Enez. Similarly restorations of the main artifacts are beyond the capacity of the local actors and require financial and political support of the political centers, as in the case of the mosque in Didymoteicho. As such, cultural policies' of the capital cities seem to play an important role in cross-border mobility practices for visiting cultural heritage sites.

### **Participating cultural activities**

Cross-border cultural activities have been initiated and organized by local nonstate actors themselves, whereas in most cases the local state authorities are involved in various ways in the process of organizing and by providing funds, venues, and/or personnel. Many interlocutors reiterated that the political rapprochement was to some extent important as it allowed local stakeholders to maintain their initial contacts and local state authorities to support such initiatives. Yet the driving force behind activities that are either participated in or co-organized by Greek and Turkish counterparts has been a handful of people with the right form of social capital, that is, equipped with the language and other necessary skills, and with a personal interest in organizing such events. As first time examples, these activities have become new acts of citizenship paving the way for unprecedented acts of cross-border cultural mobilities and fixities, and for shifts in, in Navaro-Yashin's (2005) terms, the "borders on imagination." Below I depict in detail the specific conditions for cultural events organized by and for the Greek and Turkish borderlanders. The distinction between one-time events and repeated encounters is based

on the experiences of the participants in these events. As the examples demonstrate, repeated events give much more room for people to get to know the national other, reconsider their positions vis-à-vis the other, and develop a new sense of border. In that respect, these repeated acts of cross-border cultural mobilities and interactions become sources of new acts of citizenship.

### *One-time events*

Notwithstanding the ongoing local efforts, there are only a few cultural activities that bring together borderlanders not already connected through business organizations, which are known to be the most active civil society organizations in cross-border cooperation in both Evros and Orestiada. In some cases these are one-time events, such as the three-country hairdresser workshop organized in Orestiada in 2008 and attended by many people from all three countries. Although it was a one-time event, the general secretary of the Edirne chamber of merchants and craftsmen mentioned this as the beginning of his own personal contact with his counterparts in Orestiada. There have also been several art exhibitions and receptions on various special days, such as the International Women's Day events in 2012 and 2014, again organized and hosted mostly by chambers of commerce of Orestiada and Edirne and the Greek consulate in Edirne. Although they have all been public events, they remained within an exclusive circle of acquaintances, namely the members of these organizations, the local state authorities, and representatives from other civil society organizations. In that sense, as also demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five, these events mostly served as opportunities for elite socialization into the new norms of cross-border interaction and cooperation.

While there are more and more cross-border cultural events organized in Edirne with “international” and/or “Balkan” included in the title, the ability to speak foreign languages

continues to be the determining factor in how guests from Greece and other neighboring countries can actively participate of these events. Take for example the exhibition of guest painters from various Balkan countries, which the governorship of Edirne hosted for one week in August 2014. During the event's public ceremony at the end of the week guests had spent in Edirne, the organizers as well as the mayor and the governor gave speeches in Turkish. The governor of Edirne, Dursun Ali Şahin, then gave the guests their certificates of participation. With limited English but friendly intentions, Şahin asked each participant their name. He tried to 'Turkify' each Muslim name, which would be pronounced differently in the hosts' country of origin, whereas for the non-Muslim names he simply said "It's Okay" with a big friendly smile and further remarks in English. If jokes are important indicators of power relations, this was the moment when the governor, as the "host," showed the "guests" what is most welcome in Edirne. Although not understood by "guests" who didn't speak Turkish, this gesture in fact complemented his speech in which he emphasized Edirne's special role in the Balkans as the old Ottoman capital. A similar pattern was observed during the 4<sup>th</sup> International Band and Fried Liver Festival in April 2014. Despite there being four bands from Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania invited to the 3-day-long festival, the entire program was run in Turkish, including the welcoming and closing speeches, which mostly focused on strategies to develop tourism in Edirne.

One exception is the "International Bicycle Fest" that the Edirne Outdoor Sports Club (Edirne Doğa Sporları Klübü- henceforth EDOSK) and EU Coordination Center at the Governorship have jointly organized since 2009 as part of the May 9 "European Day" activities. During our interview in October 2013, the head of EDOSK noted that they organized a 3-day, 3-country bike tour as part of European Day for 2014. Their aim was not only to encourage biking

in their region but also to see Edirne added into the European cycle route network (EuroVelo) that is crucial for biking tourism. This 3-day, 3-country bike tour again took place at the 7<sup>th</sup> International Bicycle Festival in May 2015, with even more participants from neighboring cities as well as bikers from Greek and Bulgarian border towns. During this weekend-long activity, participants from three countries had cycled into Greek, Turkish, and Bulgarian Thrace. In comparison to the other international events mentioned here, this one was certainly an international event with translations provided in all three languages at all times, and with a European rather than just a Balkan agenda.

These new acts of mobilities that bring in a new “crowd” of people to the town center suggest a new sense of border, one that is not a wall but a door open to “guests” from neighboring countries. Nevertheless, there are limits to who can enjoy these new acts of mobilities and in what ways. While the bicycle festival could also be considered a repeated cross-border cultural event aiming to continue in the coming years, for many participants it is a one-time and rather local experience in 3 different places. First, the primary aim of this activity is to finish a pre-determined tour on time, and the nature of such an activity does not give much space for interaction among people from other countries. This became apparent during the closing lunch in Edirne by the river, where bikers preferred to sit and talk with friends from their own hometowns rather than mingling with others. Second, and more importantly, the Turkish participants in these three country events were mostly green passport holders who did not need a visa to cross the border. Previously, the head of EDOSK and many locals who are members of EDOSK complained about the visa procedures and expenses that they felt should be eased, at least for sportspeople eager to join cross-border sports activities. Yet, due to this visa barrier, such activities remain one-time events for many participants. Considering the Turkish bikers in

the festival were mostly green passport holders, this is a rather exclusive group, composed of civil servants and their immediate family.

### *Repeated events*

There are only a few cross-border, cooperative events through which people have the opportunity to build long-term ties. The main reason is that not many people have the necessary skills, resources, or willingness to maintain established personal ties. While it is the informal nature of these interpersonal relations that makes them possible in the first place, the same conditions, ironically, make them harder to maintain against any outside intervention, from either state or nonstate actors.

One such long-term tie is the cross-border cooperation that lasted for more than a decade between secondary schools in Orestiada and Edirne. As repeatedly underlined by the teachers behind it, this connection has been the longest such experience in the Thracian borderland thus far, and it is also the first instance of cross-border cooperation among secondary schools in Greece and Turkey. Thanks to the determination of two teachers, one Greek and the other Turkish, many students and their families had the chance to visit neighboring towns, meet their peers on the other side of the border, and engage in joint educational activities.

Prokkola et al.'s (2015) examination of the School of Language and Culture in Pello, in Finnish-Swedish borderland, shows that although local people may initially be interested in using regional development infrastructure and funds and policy guidelines offered by INTERREG programs to support their own interests, the very experience of cooperation prompts them to take an active role in a multi-dimensional and contested process that brings together people with divergent interests. They further show that cross-border interactions sometimes contribute to constructing a regional culture and identity and sometimes turn into a performance

of national differentiation and identity. The teachers' first hand experiences also reveal similar moments of performances against one another in the early years of their cooperation. However in the absence of an institutionalized INTERREG program, the cooperation between secondary schools in the Thracian borderland was achieved mainly through the two teachers' personal will. In that sense this cooperation showcases debordering of the national divisions and rebordering them as regional identity over the years.

The two teachers, Katherina and Sevcan, met for the first time in the late 1990s. Katherina, who spoke only Greek, had contacted the Greek Consulate in Edirne to express interest in organizing a school trip to show students the Greek heritage of Edirne. Needing someone competent in both Greek and Turkish to facilitate the trip, the consul contacted Sevcan, an English teacher at a private school in Edirne. As a member of the Muslim-Turkish minority, and having grown up in Greek Thrace, Sevcan could speak Turkish, Greek, and English equally well.

At the consul's request, Sevcan's school hosted Katherina and her Greek students. After a warm welcome in Edirne, Katherina invited Sevcan's school to join an environmental project on the Evros River that Katherina's school was already running in cooperation with a high school in Bulgaria. This project was supported by the Comenius program, a European Union educational project. Sevcan's school was incorporated into this project as a "silent partner," meaning a participant with no financial benefits or obligations. Katherina and Sevcan continued to develop joint projects together, with students and their parents from both sides of the border, until Sevcan moved to Istanbul in 2012. The projects were mainly environmental and cultural in nature, organized around the Evros River as it unites the two people and cultures.

Katherina was born in the early 1960s in Orestiada, and as a descendant of refugees from Edirne was well-informed about the history of the Greek community in what she still calls Adrianopoli. Sevcan was born around the same time in Komotini/Gümülcine, moved to Turkey to study in the 1990s, and eventually settled in Edirne to be close to her hometown in Greek Thrace. Sevcan acknowledged that the living conditions and political position of the minority in Greece has gotten better since the 1990s. Yet she also sincerely confessed that she was first and foremost interested in this cooperation, which, for her, was “therapy to overcome the wounds of [her] own past as a minority.” She couldn’t help crying while talking about a children’s book titled “The Turk, I and the Arab” (Το τουρκάκι, εγώ και το αραπάκι) by Matoula Karagianni-Tolka, which her father gave as a gift when she was in primary school:

It’s a great story. So Ahmet is a soldier’s boy in Meriç [Edirne], Kostas’s grandfather hates Turks because of the bad memories of the war (...) but somehow they meet by the river by coincidence and start playing together (...) Kostas doesn’t dare to say his grandpa but he loves Ahmet so much. The same goes for Ahmet (...) after a while they both move with their families to the capital cities. Years later, when they meet again, it is July 1974 and they are both soldiers at this bridge over Evros River, you know, the one on the Ipsala-Kipi Border Gate. That summer night when the clashes in Cyprus started and everyone in Thrace was waiting on their toes for a shooting order, soldiers over the bridge could not even dare to turn their backs to each other.... And soon after the last shift change, they recognize each other and say ‘Ahmet!’ ‘Kosta!.’ That last scene of the book I read this book so many times that I memorized it. ‘The two arms opened unarmed to embrace each other against bullets flying in the air’ ... I still cry whenever I read it. You know, everyone has a dowry and this book is my dowry (...) Looking back I can see that this book was influential in all the big steps I took in life (...) It was of course important to have the support of our school principle for this joint project. But, I really believe, in our cooperation with Katherina for all these years, the main energy came from this book. It gave me the motivation to make more children hug each other, like Ahmet and Kostas, to live that last scene of the book over and over again. (...) Katherina and I, we both genuinely believed in this mission.

Similarly Katherina also underlined that these projects had real positive impact on students’ perception of each other and help them build friendship ties. She gave touching

examples from these encounters, such as a student searching his pockets and finally giving a 2 euro coin to his Turkish friend in memory of the day they met, and others leaving each other in tears at the end of a year-long project.

In some cases these projects built ties between families and helped people develop a different vision to apply in other fields. Some parents who accompanied their children during these activities became first acquaintances and then friends, regularly visiting each other. One of Sevcan's students, who later studied business administration at Trakya University to run his father's business, started up a partnership with a company in Athens. In that sense, Sevcan believes, these cultural activities for school children had long-term impacts on the cross-border relations of borderlanders who otherwise might not have had the possibility for such in-depth contact with people across the border.

The unofficial nature of the projects also paved the way for locally-driven engagement in the projects, and for reconfigurations in the established sense of borderness. For Sevcan and Katherina, incorporating families helped them more easily go around the bureaucracy of cross-border projects that existed, especially at public schools. As Katherina explained, for any activity involving foreign countries, it was necessary at her school to get permission from the Ministry of Education in Athens. However, when it was organized in the form of a school trip accompanied by parents, only the local authorities needed to be involved. In the first few visits, extra security forces escorted the visitors in both Edirne and Orestiada, on the assumption that such an event might be met with reactions by the local communities. Gradually, however, the local authorities stopped escorting them and then, as Sevcan said, some students began to feel so familiar with the other side that a few of them suggested crossing the border on their bikes to attend the project meetings in Orestiada.

These activities have been on hold since Sevcan moved to Istanbul and started working at the Istanbul branch of the same private school, but this cooperation became an example for a larger cross-border initiative that Sevcan was appointed to run from Istanbul. This new initiative has brought together many private schools in different cities in Greece and Turkey and has also been supported by the EU Comenius Program. As the forerunner of the very first cross-border cooperation between secondary schools, Katherina was invited to this initiative from the beginning; however, she was hesitant to be part of it. From her perspective the new program was lighter in academic terms, as its focus moved away from local projects and specificities of the regional history and instead moved towards projects with national focus. The language barrier was also a factor that put her on the periphery of this new initiative, since English became the common language for the new actors involved.

Soon after Sevcan moved to Istanbul, the principal of her school, who had been actively involved in their project, also left Edirne. As the new principal explained, the new administration had no memory of the cooperation between Orestiada and Edirne and was overloaded with the new larger, national-scale initiative; in the absence of Sevcan and the old principal, the administration did not feel competent to also get involved in a regional project. Although Katherina was still eager to pursue the cross-border environmental projects with the same school, she herself admitted that she could not develop with the new English teacher, who is a Greek citizen, the kind of friendly relationship she had with Sevcan. Thus, the regional projects couldn't survive in the face of institutional changes and in the absence of the synergy that the two teachers had developed and pursued with personal enthusiasm.

Besides this years-long cooperation, another rare example of informal cross-border cooperation is the one between the youth swimming clubs of Orestiada and Edirne. This case is

necessary to mention as it confirms the role of agency in pursuing such repeated activities. It also shows the delicacy of such local initiatives, especially in the face of intrusion of political centers.

The connection between the swimming clubs was possible thanks to Aynur, who is from Edirne. Since marrying a Greek man from Orestiada in 2005, Aynur has been living in Orestiada with her husband and son. She visits Edirne once a month to see her family and friends, who are not as mobile as Aynur due to visa costs. Aynur and her son have been active members of the swimming pool since it was opened in 2010. During one of her regular visits to Edirne in 2012, she saw advertisements for the upcoming swimming competition in town. She contacted the organizers and got the Orestiada youth team invited to the race. This was how the friendship between the two communities of swimmers began.

When it became clear that the swimming pool in Orestiada was going to be closed in 2012-2013 due to budget cuts from Athens, Aynur and the swimming teacher, Panos, reached out to their contacts in Edirne and asked if their students could train there. This was a more convenient option than traveling to Alexandroupoli, 120 km south of Orestiada. Their request was welcomed by the managers of the pool and the local representatives of the swimming federation in Edirne, who were by then friends of both Panos and Aynur. As Panos explains, families in Orestiada were a bit hesitant to send their kids there in the beginning but once they saw that it was safe and friendly, the number of students that went to Edirne increased from 10 to 25. The local shop owners in Orestiada were also initially concerned about losing customers to Edirne in the middle of the economic crisis, thinking that families accompanying their kids to Edirne would also choose to shop there. Yet, Panos says, eventually it went well for everyone and for that reason they repeated this again in 2013-2014 season.

Nevertheless, this cross-border solidarity at the local level was interpreted in different ways by the national media and political centers. For Panos, the news coverage in the mainstream Turkish national newspapers was disturbing as they used the event to show the incompetence of the Greek state and to applaud the generosity of the Turkish state for letting them use the pool in Edirne.<sup>20</sup> Once this incident reached the national news in Greece, it also had a political cost for the mayor of that time. Stuck between with pressures for budget cuts and subsequent interrogations from Athens, and pressure from locals demanding that the pool be reopened, the mayor lost the 2014 local election. For Panos and the director of the pool, the mayor's defeat was not merely because he decided to close the pool for budgetary reasons but more so because he chose to cover up what was going on instead of defending openly the local community's demands. Later on, during talks in the summer of 2014 between representatives from the Ministry of Sports and the newly elected mayor, who promised to keep the pool open during his election campaign, the ministerial representatives promised to secure funds specifically for heating the swimming pool. In our follow-up contact in autumn 2015, Panos was content that the pool was open for all but one month throughout the winter, while he jokingly said, "they did whatever they can for us not to go to Edirne."

Similar to Katherina and Sevcan's cooperation, Panos and Aynur's initiative might be considered an act of citizenship so far as they created a scene and made a rupture in the established habitus in which visits across the border went no further than market visits. The cooperation between them and their counterparts in Edirne opened up a new site of encounters between mobile subjects of the Thracian borderland, and a new sense of border. As such, this act of cooperation is an act of citizenship. Eventually both repeated events were interrupted for different reasons, but the experiences left their mark in the minds of those who took part in them

and paved the way for new reconfigurations of the local actors' social imaginary, hence the "borders on imagination."

In sum, these local accounts show that, unlike one-time events, repeated events and cooperation across the border for cultural events are contingent upon the presence of key actors who can help maintain contacts between the counterparts: Sevcan in the case of the secondary schools and Aynur in the case of the swimming clubs. While their ability to speak both Greek and Turkish was the necessary condition for communication, it was not sufficient to maintain the contacts. It was rather their personal interest in investing in such cooperation that made these ties sustainable. Furthermore, these examples illustrate that such locally-driven networks are more easily maintained when they are based on interpersonal trust. At the same time, they might be cut or suspended quickly in the face of outside interventions, until the next time the circumstances are ready to reactivate them. In the case of administration of the swimming pool in Orestiada, this is proven by the involvement of power centers, whereas in the case of the secondary schools' cooperation in the Thracian peripheries, it is the other nonstate actors who got inspired from this regional cooperation and aspired to play it on the national scale.

### **Studying across the border**

This section describes the third main acts of mobility in the cultural field: student mobility. As explained in Chapter Three, it has been a common practice for the Turkish-Muslim minority in Greek Thrace to come to Turkey to study in Turkish high schools and universities. This was mediated by the Turkish Consulate General in Komotini, which has been assigning each applicant to an available public boarding school in cities of Turkish Thrace or the Aegean or Marmara regions, not far from their hometowns in Greek Thrace. This practice was justified by the Turkish state's role to guarantee the educational rights of the Muslim-Turkish minority in

Greek Thrace (Demetriou 2013). Student mobility was also used by many minority families as the first step to subsequent family migration at different periods of conflict and hardship in Greek Thrace, namely the Civil War right after WW II, the restrictions of the junta, and the local effects of the Cyprus conflict.

In her work on the rhythms of mobility, Ballinger (2012) underlines the fact that displacement/emplacement/replacement are all context specific and dynamic experiences. Hence one cannot speak of a common experience of either one of the three. In a similar vein, there are various experiences of student mobility from Greek Thrace to Turkey, depending on the two state's bilateral relations, their rights as minorities in Greece, and their citizenship rights in both places. However, even when border enclosures were determining the national regime of bordering, student mobility was not a total experience of displacement from one's home and emplacement into a new "home." This was despite the fact that many minority students, like Önder, lost their Greek citizenship and hence their hope for return. Theirs were still different from the experiences of the population exchangees and their descendants in both Edirne and Evros. It was also different from the experiences of earlier family migrations from Greek Thrace, in the 1940s and 1950s, since most of these families no longer had direct ties with their hometowns in Greek Thrace. As Önder and Mehmet's accounts show in Chapter Three, they were deliberate acts on the migrating minority's part: acts driven by the replacement of the home country as birth place with an imagined ethnic homeland, while still keeping familial ties back in their hometowns. As the comparison of Önder and Mehmet's experiences as two different generations also shows, minority subjects' understanding of home and belonging is not static. It has indeed been changing as the national regime of bordering was loosened over the course of the last thirty years, first with visa-free travel for Greek citizens after 1984, then with the positive

developments in the minority policies of Greece in the 1990s, and finally with the political rapprochement that further eased daily and frequent cross-border mobilities in the 2000s.

In this process of reconfiguration of the old senses of border, minority students (and their families) have gradually emplaced themselves on both sides of the border. As shown in this and the previous chapters, they have contributed to the re-placement of the Thracian borderland into a contact zone with new limits, where they increasingly play a bridging role between two societies. In the last few years, the new acts of mobility of Greek students from Evros to Edirne have added a new twist to local experiences of place-making in the Thracian borderland, as Greek students' experiences of emplacement have also expanded beyond the territorial borders of the two states. Below, I describe this process as experienced by Muslim-Turkish students and Greek students respectively.

#### *Settling in mobility between the home and the "homeland"*

Edirne High School, one of the first high schools of the republican era, and Edirne Imam Hatip High School, opened in 1967, used to be the two boarding schools of the region that were popular destinations for minority students from Greek Thrace. This pattern began to change with the introduction of a minority quota in Greek universities in 1995, during Georgios Papadopoulos' term as the Ministry of Education. This has given minority students some incentive to stay in the Greek education system and, if that doesn't work out, to opt for Turkey.

Mahmut's experience is a case in point. Born in 1981 in a mixed village west of Alexandroupoli, Mahmut finished minority primary school with poor command of Greek. For his secondary schooling he went to the Eastern Thracian town of Çanakkale, studied dentistry in Izmir, and returned to his village in 2008. As Mahmut says, he was motivated to go to Turkey so early in his life because he was aiming for a university diploma. Although he grew up in a mixed

village, there was not much interaction with the Greek residents other than greetings and gift exchanges at each other's religious feasts. Their home language was Turkish and his mother spoke almost no Greek. Being aware of his lack of language competence, Mahmut says, "If I stayed, I could get a high school diploma at a Greek school one way or another. But it was obvious that I would not be good enough to get into and finish university in Greece."

While most of Mahmut's friends also followed a similar path, for those born in 1985 or later there were then two options to choose from: continue studying in Greece and get into university through the minority quota, or follow the old trend of going to Turkey.<sup>21</sup> This affirmative minority policy led many students to continue their secondary schooling in Greece, especially if they were geographically closer to the bigger centers of Xanthi and Komotini where there are several high schools. Not concentrated in the same schools, the minority students could better integrate into the Greek education system. However, in Evros, where the minority communities are mostly scattered in villages, minority students are mainly concentrated in the same Greek boarding schools in the closest town center. Ironically, this minority concentration gradually led to Greek students leaving these schools, and then, as classrooms were filled with minority students with limited understanding of Greek, a decrease in the quality of education.

As my aim is to understand the impact of changing terms of mobilities on those who cross the border for education purposes, the rest of this section focuses on those who study in Turkey instead of trying to stay in the Greek education system. Thus I try to shed light on the mobile minorities' past and present positioning vis-à-vis their home country of Greece and their "ethnic homeland" of Turkey. Following Ballinger (2012), at the end I assess whether this is a new form of emplacement in the larger Thracian space compared with previous generations.

The Turkish consulate in Komotini/Gümülcine still facilitates students' enrollment in Imam Hatip High School, which remained the only public boarding school in Edirne after Edirne High School's boarding facility was closed. Another alternative for schooling is Serhat Koleji in Edirne, founded in 1997. In 2014, the school came under the framework of Fatih Koleji in Istanbul, close to the Gulen Movement, which implies that it follows similar moral premises as the Imam Hatip schools.<sup>22</sup> During my short visit to the school in the summer of 2014, the then college's vice-principal confirmed this and also stated that one-fifth of their students are from middle class minority families from Greek Thrace.<sup>23</sup>

In recent years, the minority community in Evros has consulted the Turkish consulate for university education. For many years, the Foreign Student Exam (Yabancı Öğrenci Sınavı-YÖS) was the central exam that all foreign students took in order to study in Turkish universities. Recently, the university entrance system has changed and foreign students are made to apply to each university separately and according to the selection criteria determined by the universities themselves, namely exam or diploma grade. Additionally, YTB became the authority allocating scholarships to foreign students based on oral exams conducted in the Turkish consulates in students' home countries, in this case the General Consulate in Komotini. In 2013, YTB representatives invited 9 students from Evros for interviews in the General Consulate, though none of them were ultimately given scholarships.<sup>24</sup> At the same time that the possibility of a YTB scholarship was lessening, it became easier to enroll at T.U. than at most other universities in Turkey; T.U. set a separate quota and ranking system according to diploma grade, especially for applicants from Greek Thrace.

With the possibility of easy enrollment at T.U. and the aim of the YTB Edirne office to develop closer ties with the minority in Greek Thrace, Edirne has increasingly become popular

among minority students from Greek Thrace. This recent shift is reflected in student enrollment at T.U. According to the records of the T.U. student office, there were no students with Greek citizenship registered before 2008-2009. The total number of foreign students enrolled also remained very low: less than 300 before the 2010-2011 academic year. In 2008-2009 there were 63 out of 286 (22%) students with Greek citizenship, and this went up to 178 out of a total of 630 (28%) in 2010-2011. Then, with an addition of approximately 100 students from Greece every year, it reached 503 out of 1,515 (33%) in the 2013-2014 academic year (see Table II in Appendix). While this data does not distinguish the ethno-religious background of students, interviews with the faculty and students affirm that those enrolled at T.U. are almost exclusively from the minority community in Greek Thrace.

Melek, for example, studies pre-school education at T.U. Melek was born in 1993 in one of the mountain villages of Evros and finished high school in Soufli, where minority students from the central and mountainous part of Evros are concentrated. Melek said a few of her classmates, who are also members of the minority community, enrolled in Greek universities, but her parents did not want to send her to a Greek school. The imam and community leader of the village, Ibrahim, who also finished all his education in Turkey except for primary school, openly stated that he has been encouraging students, including his own sons, to continue their studies in Turkey. As a community leader observing closely the youth's educational and cultural development, he said he could see that many minority students who have enrolled in Greek universities eventually drop out due to their poor command of Greek and low quality secondary schooling, which pull them down in the Greek education system.

Additionally, as a parent, Ibrahim also shares similar concerns as Melek's parents about sending his kids to Greek universities. For them, Edirne or another Turkish city closer to Greek

Thrace is more feasible than going to a Greek city that would be cumbersome to reach from their hometown in Evros, thus harder for the families to keep an eye on their kids. T.U. in Edirne, then, becomes a feasible option due to its geographical proximity to home. As Melek says, while her cousins studying in Istanbul visit home maybe once a semester, she can visit once a month and, if not, her mom comes and stays with her in Edirne for a while. This is repeated by many minority students, family members, and young professionals I interviewed in Edirne and Evros. Most students who are former classmates from high school and co-villagers use their Greek mobile phones to communicate more easily and cheaply among themselves and with others in Evros, while they are in Edirne. The geographical proximity between their hometowns in Greek Thrace and their new homes in Edirne helps them maintain their circle of friends and family in both places, and “[they] feel home when they are in Edirne.” Melek explains her and her family’s choice of Edirne as follows:

Turkey feels closer and comfortable for us. Let’s say you are allocated to a university through the [minority] quota and it is far from home. With whom will you stay here, with whom will you be friends? These are things that our families would be concerned with. I already had cousins, 2-3 years older than me, studying in Istanbul and Edirne...Actually before they came to Turkey, Turkey felt like somewhere far away. We [my friends and I] used to say ‘why would I go to Turkey, to do what there? Better we stay in Greece, this is our home and we are used to it.’ But as we grew older, we came to realize that in fact what is far away from us is not here [Turkey] but there [Greece] (...) After I stayed with my cousins in Istanbul, I wanted to study in Istanbul. My mom was saying ‘inşallah you study in Edirne.’ I was telling her ‘don’t say so!’ My exam grade at Marmara University [Istanbul] was enough to enroll in economics, but I couldn’t get scholarship [from YTB]. So I finally I said OK to Edirne. I could already enroll here in the program I wanted. And of course everything is cheaper here. So even without scholarship, it was fine. It is so close to home [in Greek Thrace]... I have many friends from village and high school here.(...) I still go to my cousins in Istanbul, still love it. But I am used to being here in a medium size city close to home, life is easier here. So I don’t mind living here after graduation. So I think, for masters too, T.U. will be my first choice.

Like Melek, other students at T.U. referred to the importance of being physically close to “home.” This motivation is shared by the older minority members, like Sevcan, who came to

study to become academics, doctors, and teachers, and then settled in Edirne. Yet, when probed further there is also a commonly defined feeling of “comfort” that comes with being on the Turkish side of the border. Melek underlined that she never felt discriminated at school, either by her teachers or her Greek classmates. However she also added that, as minority children, they never mingled with the Greek students and stayed as a close community, mostly speaking Turkish among themselves. She and her friends’ relations with the Greek community in town have also been limited to small talk at shops and cafes or chit-chat with people at the bus stop. A few times during these encounters, old Greek ladies in Soufli curiously asked her “why [she] was covering her beauty with that [headscarf].” Although Melek said wearing a headscarf was not necessarily the reason for feeling more comfortable in Turkey in general, she repeatedly used the word “comfortable” to explain why Edirne felt like home for her. Surrounded with many of her friends from high school and her village, Edirne certainly seemed to her not only geographically but also socially closer to what could be defined as “home” than any other town in Greece.

Juxtapose this feeling of “comfort” with the concerns of many parents in Evros, who want to send their kids and especially their daughters to Turkey. While education of girls has become more and more valued among the minority community in the last decades, there are growing concerns about their integration into Greek culture, which some people fearfully referred to as “being ruined.” Hence especially among conservative families, sending their daughters to Turkey is a strategy to keep them away from the “Greek culture” associated, above all else, with spending time in the cafes and tavernas where alcohol and pork, considered “haram” in the strict practices of Sunni tradition, are consumed. Sending children to study in Edirne, then, becomes the best available option because it is not only easy to reach for families but also a place where both children and families feel “comfortable.” Although there might be

various factors determining the gender ratios in university enrollment, this cultural concern may partly explain why, except for the first year, the number of female students from Greece enrolled in T.U. is higher than male students.

### *Student mobility after Greece's economic crisis*

As many interlocutors confirm, since the beginning of the economic crisis in Greece in 2008 and the exponential budget cuts in public sector in recent years, most of the new graduates from Greek Thrace have been trying their chances in the job market in Turkey instead of immediately returning to their hometowns. The programs that have always been popular among students from Greek Thrace are medicine and theology, followed by education and Turkish language and literature programs. Theology and pre-school education have become popular, especially among women students, due to the growing demand for female preachers and kindergarten teachers in the minority community. Yet, as Melek says, this demand is now almost met. For future graduates like Melek, there are two options: either get a Turkish diploma accredited in Greece by taking extra exams, and wait to be appointed at a Greek school, or look for a job in Turkey. Work opportunities in Edirne are very limited considering the high number of new graduates from T.U. compared to Edirne's small and still very local economy. Regardless of that, in the last years, a few doctors with Western Thracian backgrounds have been employed in the private hospitals of Edirne. There are also many faculty members working in the medical school and other faculties, and students continuing their postgraduate education at T.U. Thus Edirne was and still is welcoming to the minority from Greek Thrace.

More interestingly, with the impacts of the economic crisis, studying in Edirne has begun to be seen as a feasible option among the Greek majority in Evros, as well. Specifically, the bilingual (Greek-Turkish) MA program in Visual Culture that opened in the 2013-2014 academic

year is quite popular among Greek students. Professors from different departments such as Archeology, Greek Language and Literature, and Art History teach in this interdisciplinary program. Twenty out of 55 students enrolled in the first two years of the program are Greek students from Greek Thrace, mostly from the Evros region. Greek students take part in this program thanks to Dr. Thanasis Kougoulos, who has been actively involved not only in the Ethnological Museum of Thrace in Alexandroupoli and teaching Turkish lessons there, but also in the Greek languages department at T.U., working as visiting faculty from the University of Ioannina between 2008 and 2013.

I met Dr. Kougoulos and his students in Alexandroupoli and Orestiada. Most of the students in this program are teachers in primary or secondary schools in Greece and Turkey. For Dr. Kougoulos, the main objective of this program is revisiting the nationalist historiographies of the two states' official curricula and contributing to scientific cultural knowledge production. Therefore teachers who sign up for this program are also people that have a great interest in learning each other's language and culture.

For Greek students from Evros, the main advantage of this program is the convenience of studying in Edirne compared to enrolling in a master's program in another city in Greece. Take for example Dimitra, who studied Greek literature in Athens and after returning to her hometown of Orestiada in 2012 was looking for feasible options to continue her education and specialize in a field that she finds interesting. Dimitra explains how and why she decided to study in Edirne as follows:

Before I went to [studying in] Athens in 2008, I went only few times to Edirne. At that time not many people from here [Orestiada] were going there [Edirne]. I think it started becoming popular when I was in Athens. When I came back [in 2012], everybody was going to Edirne (...) Then I wanted to do masters. I looked for options in Greece. They are too far from here and too expensive. I knew Thanasis [Kougoulos] already. Then I heard from him about this program in

Edirne and I said why not! I thought it would be convenient to work here and study there. I have my friends and family here. (...) During the university, Athens was fine but I didn't want to stay there afterwards. All my friends left Athens too. No job, it is expensive and I don't know... It is different there... Now for example I went to Istanbul last week. I feel I like it more there [Istanbul], the culture, the weather, and it's also more convenient for me... Since my first visit, besides the language, I didn't feel like a foreigner in Istanbul or in Edirne. People are really friendly. And now I am learning the language so it is more fun to go there. The customs officers know why I am going to Edirne every week and they ask each time 'so what did you learn today at school?' We have funny conversations.

Dimitra's emphasis on "convenience," explained as the ease of commuting and low fees paid in TL instead of Euro, was repeated by other Greek students that I met in Alexandroupoli. This MA program, with its comparative focus, is itself an innovative and totally locally-driven attempt to bring the two academic communities together. For that matter, Greek students' involvement in the program as much as Turkish students is crucial for the development of the program according to its initial aims. However it is also hard to predict what the Greek students' take would be on enrolling in this program if there was no economic crisis in Greece.

It must also be noted that, although studying in Edirne seems to be an attractive option for Greeks as well as the minority of Evros, there is still a considerable difference between the two groups regarding their engagement with the locals of Edirne and with the city. Since it is an MA program, seminars are designed to allow students, both from Greek and Turkish Thrace, to keep their jobs and homes in other towns of Greek Thrace or Turkish Thrace and still follow the program located in the Edirne town center. Edirne therefore became a meeting point for the participants of this program from Greek and Turkish Thracian towns.

However, personal experiences of Greek students from Alexandroupoli and Orestiada differ due to the physical distance from Edirne town center. For example, for Dimitra it was possible to go to Edirne whenever she needed to. She could easily commute between Orestiada

and Edirne for her language course. She gradually developed very close friendship ties with the Turkish students she met at different cultural or educational events in Edirne. These ties developed so well that she could spend few nights a week in her friends' houses instead of going back to Orestiada every day. However for students coming from Alexandroupoli once every month, their relationship to the city remains more similar to day trippers' from Evros and beyond.

In contrast to these Greek commuters who are loosely attached to both places, the minority students who are enrolled in undergraduate programs spend two to four years of their life in Edirne and even consider settling in Edirne after graduation. In the latter case, it is not only students but also their families who become more connected with Edirne; they rent or buy a house in the city and visit, on average, once a month to stay with their children. While there, they shop for household goods, which they say are not only cheaper but also "closer to their taste." In that sense the minority's relationship with Edirne seems to get even stronger as T.U. aspires to play a leading role as a Balkan university and attract students from neighboring countries. This relationship takes the form of making both sides of the border one's home and being even more strongly embedded in cross-border regional ties.

As the examples of Sevcan (in this chapter) and Filiz (in Chapter Four) show, those with the language skills of both worlds become key agents, connecting different actors in their two homes as the regime of bordering is loosened to allow cross-border cultural cooperation. Nevertheless, for those who lack language as social capital, their new acts of mobility—commuting between two homes—might produce a distinct social space that transcends the territorial border of two states. In this joint space, members of the minority community make use of the two worlds to the extent that they fit in them while not being able to take an active role in

connecting them. In that sense the transformative role of these new commuting practices in terms of the minority's acts of citizenship depend on language as social capital as much as their ability to move freely across the borders. The increasing student mobility practices across the Thracian border are to be studied to see which directions the minority positions take in the cross-border cultural field in the near future.

The next section examines how the discourses and practices of othering are shaped in the face of these new acts of mobilities and local governing techniques of "acceptable" differences in the Thracian borderlands.

### **On othering: Towards a new framing of the past?**

In this section, I examine the impacts of new governance and mobility practices in the cultural field on the reconfigurations of us-them distinctions. I discuss to what extent the current configurations reshape the sense of border in a way that transcends the national borders, towards a regional identification.

The way the acceptable differences are represented gives us a hint about the current boundaries of the self and the other. This is most apparent in the way cultural heritage is endorsed on both sides of the border. From the Greek borderlanders' perspective, Turkish Thrace is endorsed as part and parcel of the Byzantium and Greek culture, and the continuity is proven with references to the ancestors' hometowns. From the Turkish borderlanders' perspective, Greek Thrace is embraced as part of the Ottoman and Turkish culture proven by the presence of the Muslim-Turkish minority and even by the small community of Turkish-speaking Orthodox Gagauz people in Greek Thrace. This is also supported by the state and nonstate actors who actively decide on what is to be protected and nurtured as part of the collective memory of the Thracian region.

In Thrace, Edirne holds a culturally central position as it is connected with many local Greeks of Orestiada through ancestral ties and the Muslim-Turkish minority of Greek Thrace with the ethno-religious ties. The organic ties with Edirne still seem to be part of the collective memory of Orestiada, as in the vernacular use of “going inside” (Πάω μέσα) when one talks about going to Edirne. This expression is a manifestation of the border-induced scale, in van Schendel’s (2005) terms, that leaves its marks on the cognitive map of locals of Orestiada. One Greek informant in Orestiada even said that “Edirne for Orestiada is what Athens is for Greece.” Although the analogy puts Edirne into the position of a political center, it at least shows that it is considered a regional center not only from the perspective of Turkish state actors but also from the perspective of Greek borderlanders in Northern Evros.

In their examination of the local practices and experiences of cross-border cultural cooperation at the Finnish-Swedish borderland, Prokkola et al. (2015) aptly state that regional identities are not something that regional entities already have. Instead, they are created through local practices and experiences of cooperation and through certain social networks and disjunctures, determining which “particular spatial identity performances may or may not be possible at a particular time and place” (2015: 114). Personal accounts of the participants of cross-border cultural events also point at the emergence of a new sense of border through reclassification of places and people. This is done not necessarily by recalling the pre-border web of relations, as in the economic relations built through old generation Turkish speaking Gagauz people and Edirneans, but by building new ones. The new ties between Orestiada and Edirne seem to be strengthened by the growing interest of both Greek and minority students to study in Edirne and, as described in the previous chapter, the growing interest of people to learn Turkish and increasing cross-border economic mobilities and exchanges. Similarly, connections between

the swimming clubs of Edirne and Orestiada, the students of Katherina and Sevcan, as well as the events organized by the business organizations and the Greek consulate in Edirne show that the geographical closeness between the two towns makes formal and informal interactions and partnerships feasible between the communities on the two sides of the border. Through such encounters, people who come together for their own particular interests notice and embrace commonalities between them that are reminiscent of the past cohabitation –as in the case of common vocabulary in the two languages – and other times of the effects of shared geography. Hence these encounters themselves become acts of citizenship to various degrees, as they contribute to shifting the old us-them distinction towards more inclusionary social imaginary.

Nevertheless, the reconstruction of otherness remains a contested field of power. Analyzing a state-led culinary activity in Komotini in the late 1990s, Yiakoumaki (2006) shows that the visibility of the Other's culture, namely the Muslim minority's culture, became acceptable only when it was deprived of history: by forgetting the “differences” that are the effects of social power, and by neutralizing those with references to familiar notions such as the indispensable roles of mothers in the family. Similarly, the examples provided in the governance section also reveal that the collective memory and history of the region are also selectively remembered, embraced, and presented in museums of Evros and renovated heritage sites of Edirne.

Cross-border encounters in the cultural field reveal what the c.a.s.e collective (2006) suggested we question, that is, the relationship between politics of memory and security imaginaries. As already portrayed in Chapters Four and Five, both the emerging institutional cross-border cooperation on border controls and the intensification of uninstitutionalized economic cooperation attempts have led to some reconsideration of the old us-them distinctions.

Changes in the hierarchies of otherness are observed in the increasing cross-border friendship ties between Turkish and Greek borderlanders, despite the ongoing marginalization of Turkish-speaking Muslim Roma and Turkish-speaking Gagauz people, who are seen as belonging to neither the majority nor the minority communities of Greek Thrace. It is also apparent that the established sense of border is still recalled at times, in the name of maintaining local economic interests (see the accounts of EDSIAD leader and Melih in chapter five) and to reassert the place-making power of the states (see the examples of Basri in the early 2000s and of Turkish state officials at the Kipi Border Gate in 2012, in Chapter Four). Similarly, in the cultural field, both Greek and Turkish nationalist reflexes are quickly reproduced as in the case of initial local reactions to the cross-border cooperation among local swimming clubs and the immediate intervention of the national power centers that followed suit.

To be even more precise, when we look closely at the impacts of the national power centers on the local practices of governing collective memory and mobilities in the cultural field, we see remnants of the national regime of bordering in Greek Thrace and a rather neo-Ottoman regime of bordering emerging in Turkish Thrace. On the one hand, traces of the national regime of bordering and of the founding violence are revealed in locals' interest towards Ligeros's statist and geostrategic approach in Orestiada. On the other hand, the new foreign policy goals and related activities of the Turkish political center in the Thracian borderlands try to keep alive the memory of Ottoman multiculturalism and its tolerance towards different ethno-religious groups under the Sunni-Turkish ruling order. The cultural tensions between the national and neo-Ottoman regimes of bordering are also manifested in the Turkish political center's impact on the attitudes of mayors of Enez towards "Ellinomousion Ainou" visiting the Greek heritage in Enez, as well as the Greek and Turkish center's vigilance over minority villages in Evros.

Either way, the sense of border has shifted beyond the national borders together with more frequent visits across the border. Motivations for cultural mobilities and interactions are still primarily nurtured by curiosity for those places, people, and things towards which one already has a shared sense of cultural belonging. However, there are also local initiatives that aim to bring forth and nurture the current shared characteristics and commonalities between different groups of Greek and Turkish borderlanders, as in the examples of the Greek Consul's involvement in cross-border cultural activities for kids and women, EDOSOB's bike festival, Sevcan and Katherina's years-long cross-border projects bringing students together around the Evros river, and Panos and Aynur's connection with the swimming pool in Edirne. Our closer examination of all one-time and repeated events point out that having a common spoken language plays a crucial role, especially in maintaining interpersonal ties around cultural activities that crosscut ethno-religious communities. In the absence of a common language and a key broker to play the bridging role, good intentions may bring people together but they do not lead to long-lasting relations. However the very few repeated events certainly prove that it is now possible to cultivate a common regional identification, driven by sharing a common space with people who are no longer the distanced Other of the old security imaginaries.

In that sense, there are both inclusionary and exclusionary social networks and practices simultaneously developing in the region. The very fact that they both could come about in the first place proves that the cultural field is a site of contestation between various actors with potentials for new acts of citizenship. Therefore, I argue, the co-existence of these acts slightly changes the established patterns in the national way of doing things. As such, they are ruptures that, recalling Isin (2009), "create a scene" with no predetermined qualities. They write new

regional stories among the Greek-Turkish borderlands, which, as Jutila (2006) states, are essential to accomplishing desecuritization at the societal level.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter explored preservation of local cultural history, practices, and heritage as well as cross-border cultural mobilities and interactions in the Thracian borderlands. I showed the negotiations and contestations over us-them distinctions in the cultural field that transgress the borders of nation-states. In this contact zone, numerous local state and nonstate actors claim different approaches and act upon on what to preserve, and how.

Secondly, while being over a space that crisscrosses national borders, the marks of the national regime of bordering and its sense of border are observed in the ways the established historiographies of the two nation-states and center-periphery relations unfold. As shown in the example of changing relationships between Greek visitors from Alexandroupoli and old/new mayors of Enez, the cross-border encounters are open to interventions from political centers, especially in Turkish Thrace, as much as political orientations of the local state authorities. Similarly, the selective remembrance of the past manifests itself in different ways. Cultural museums, which were initiated by descendants of refugees from Edirne and Enez in Orestiada and Alexandroupoli, respectively, with the support of the Greek state, still seem to contribute to the construction of the collective memory of Thrace by holding onto the founding violence and the idea of a lost homeland. State-led protection of cultural heritage in Edirne tries to reclaim the non-Muslim Ottoman past of the city in the absence of non-Muslim communities, while the ethnology museum in Alexandroupoli embraces the multi-ethnic past of Thrace without acknowledging still-existing religious diversities.

Thirdly, this chapter portrayed the differences in the way agents of the political centers are involved in the everyday local, cross-border cultural mobilities and activities as well as the local constructions and governance of diversities in the Thracian peripheries. Compared to the Greek Consulate in Edirne, the special status of the Turkish Consulate General in Komotini had been legally established by the reciprocal minority policies of the two states. However, Edirne has recently also taken a leading role for Turkish foreign policy interests in Greece Thrace and the whole Balkan region, which is embodied in the opening of branch offices of the YTB and MFA that work closely with the governorship and the university in Edirne. In contrast, the involvement of Greek state agents in the Thracian borderland is mostly limited to facilitating some cultural contacts between Greek and Turkish communities on each side of the border, as manifested in the activities organized by the Greek consul in Edirne. Even in cases such as the cooperation between the new mayor of Orestiada and the Ministry of Sports in Athens to ensure that the local swimming club does not lean on Edirne, and unlike the assertive role the Turkish state agents play in the region, Greek state authorities intervene only if it is necessary to adjust the power imbalances in the region, and they do so only after the fact.

The fourth point is related to the role of agency in all these encounters. Examples such as the restoration projects in Edirne and the cultural history museums in Evros contribute to the construction of urban memories, which selectively cherish the multi-religious and multiethnic *pasts* of the region, locate the imagery of “acceptable” differences in the past, and do not lead to a social imaginary that endorses diversity in the here and now. However, ethnographic evidence also shows that repeated cross-border cultural activities foster the idea of the geographical and cultural closeness of the communities across the border, as proven by the decade-long cooperation between Katherina and Sevcan as well as the more recent contacts between the

swimming clubs of Orestiada and Edirne. These activities have been possible with the ease of cross-border mobility and increasing permeability of the border in Thrace, which not only changed the meaning and the function of the border for the borderlanders but also triggered different experiences of being “emplaced” in the same geographical space and perceiving oneself in relation to that place. These new subjective feelings then challenge official historiographies, at least to a certain extent. Yet, what is also necessary to underline here is that these repeated local encounters in the cultural field are always contingent upon the presence of key brokers with the ability to speak both languages, and with personal interests in such activities.

A similar contrast is also observed between the emerging interest of Greek students in postgraduate studies at T.U. and the Muslim-Turkish students’ interest in studying at T.U., which follows in the footsteps of the previous generations’ migration for schooling. While the former is again achieved through the presence of a key broker, Dr. Kougoulos, and with structural factors like the economic condition of Greece, the latter is encouraged and achieved as part of Turkey’s foreign policy nurturing kinship ties abroad. It is possible to trace these differences in the way students define their choice to study in Edirne. Considering T.U.’s aspirations to play a regional role and the growing number of international students, further research is needed into the depth and breadth of minority, Greek, and other international students’ engagement with the public spaces and the people of Edirne.

To sum up, the easing of cross-border mobility has certainly brought numerous local actors in contact in the cultural field. While the local governance of cultural diversity is still achieved to a great extent with a sense of border, the role of agency has proven to be important in building and maintaining new types of relations that crosscut ethno-religious communities and thereby lead to reconfigurations of us-them distinctions. However, perhaps more surprisingly, the

emerging sense of border, albeit with different motivations and in different ways, refers to the “scales-we-almost-lost” (pre-border web of relations), in van Schendel’s (2005) terms. In Evros, while not applauding the Ottoman rule per se, memorialization of the regional and local history serves the purpose of praising the times when there was not yet a national regime of bordering, let alone the militarization of that border with the Cyprus conflict. Considering the ways in which Turkish state actors are involved in and nurture cross-border cultural practices and activities, the sense of border that is cultivated in Edirne and Evros certainly implies the pre-nation-state, Ottoman approach to “acceptable” differences and diversities and an associated classification of places and people. From this perspective, with growing emphasis on Edirne’s Ottoman past and its geostrategic role as the old Ottoman capital, the city’s central role in the Balkans is brought back into the present cultural interactions along the Thracian borderland. This recollection of the imperial border simultaneously with its Europeanization is discussed further in the concluding chapter as I disentangle the nuances in the three fields of encounters that together form the three axes of the “new” regime of bordering.

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<sup>1</sup> Information available at <[http://adrianoupolis-orestiada.blogspot.nl/p/blog-page\\_19.html](http://adrianoupolis-orestiada.blogspot.nl/p/blog-page_19.html) > (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>2</sup> I am grateful to Dr. Mavrommatis who brought to my attention this overemphasis on “ethnicity” during one of our personal communication in Alexandroupoli, in June 2014.

<sup>3</sup> One agriculture company based in Orestiada even quotes Ligeros to prove the special role of zeolite in farming. See <<http://zeolife.gr/en/>>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>4</sup> This observation is based on repeated personal communications with Mazlum Güngör and Oral Onur in Edirne and Istanbul, 2012-2014.

<sup>5</sup> I learned about the change of function process during my informal talks with officers in the Regional Committee for the Protection of Cultural Heritage that I conducted in Edirne in October 2013. One stated that they received the confirmation letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs along with the restoration project in 2008.

<sup>6</sup> Interview with the priest of the Bulgarian church in Edirne, 2 November 2013.

<sup>7</sup> Information available at <<http://www.bik.gov.tr/ayasofyalar-bir-bir-restore-ediliyor-haberi-88415/>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>8</sup> Traditionally the annual wrestling festival of Seçek is held in a plateau near the village of Ano Kambi under the direction of the “Lord of the Plateau” (yayla ağası) who is a follower of the Tekke of Seyyid Ali Sultan. This Tekke, founded in 1402 AD, is the most important Bektashi monument in Northern Greece and is located by the village of Roussa/Ruşenler in the mountainous area between Didymoteicho and Soufli where approximately 3,000 rural Bektashis live (Mavrommatis 2008). Since 1997, it has been organized by Seçek Minority Education and Culture

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Association (Seçek Azınlık Eğitim ve Kültür Derneği). It is a public secret that members of this association who are also in close contact with the consulate general in Komotini, attempt to change the focus of this local cultural festival, and in general to “Turkify” the local culture and to “Sunnify” the local Alevi organizational structures and gaining control over the Tekke of Seyyid Ali Sultan (Tsitselikis 2012: 250).

<sup>9</sup> YTB office in Ankara was opened in 2010. During the interviews with the personnel of the Edirne office, I was informed that there were plans to open new offices in few other cities, at the moment there are only 2 branch offices that are active, Edirne office and Izmir office that was opened in March 2012.

<sup>10</sup> The head of the YTB office in Edirne also underlined the fact that YTB is one of three institutions that represent Turkey’s soft power under the Vice Prime Minister Emrullah İşler. Mr. İşler also explains the role of these institutions, namely YTB, TİKA and Presidency of Religious Affairs in his speech at the 6<sup>th</sup> Conference for Consulates, on 14 January 2014, in Ankara. Information available at <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mew28Sz8vbU&list=PLB3F9DB8E0010C3D8&feature=c4-overview-vl>> and also at <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/buyukelciler-konferansinin-ikinci-gununde-sayin-cumhurbaskanimiz-buyukelcilerimizi-kabul-etti.tr.mfa>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>11</sup> This academy took place at the Edirne Mimar Sinan Foundation which was founded in 1987 by a group of intellectual most of whom studied in Edirne Imam Hatip High School. The connection between this school and the minority community of Greek Thrace goes back to those years when, as a boarding school, this school offered a good opportunity for minority children to complete their secondary education and continue their studies in Turkey. Information available at <<http://www.edirnetv.com/haber/3986/buyukelci-konferans-verdi.html> <[http://www.mimarsinanvakfi.org/~mimarsin/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=43&Itemid=63](http://www.mimarsinanvakfi.org/~mimarsin/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=43&Itemid=63)> and also at <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UZbCEpDXK6s>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>12</sup> One interlocutor from Evros mentioned this program during our interview and stressed that they were taught how to apply EU funds as well as funds available in Turkey. The same training is applied in 7 European countries as well as Edirne and Izmir. For more information, see <<http://zurih.bk.mfa.gov.tr/ShowAnnouncement.aspx?ID=199654>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>13</sup> While 36 universities participated in the first meeting in September 2014 in Edirne, BUA reached to 57 members in October 2015. The new members included National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and Aristotle University of Thessaloniki from Greece. During this second meeting in Edirne, elections were held for upcoming presidency of the association, to which Tetova State University was elected for 2017 and Aristotle University of Thessaloniki for 2018. Although the Democritus *University* of Thrace, with its departments spread over three cities of Greek Thrace, is geographically the closest, it is not a BUA member. Yet it is one of the 9 Greek universities among a total number of 102 universities that T.U has Erasmus protocol with. As Dr. Kougoulos shortly noted, since the first cooperation attempts between the Balkan languages and literatures departments of Trakya University and the Democritus University did not work out in 2007, Trakya University approached Ioannina University with which the close cooperation took off first at the departmental level and then later at the university level.

<sup>14</sup> Despite this inclusive discourse to encourage regional cooperation and mobility, according to the numbers that are recorded at the T.U. Erasmus office, at least so far T.U. seems to be visited only by students from Bulgaria, more specifically by the Muslim-Turkish minority of Bulgaria, followed with students from Greece and in some years Poland, though with a substantive drop in numbers.

<sup>15</sup> Over the course of the 2000s until the economic crisis hit people in Evros in the last years, the tour agents have been organizing trips every year to Cappadocia, Western and Northern Anatolia where the descendants of exchangees settled in Alexandroupoli were mostly from. Yet Istanbul has by far been the main destination for people in Evros especially during religious holidays, due to its geographical proximity and its religious importance. This might be compared to the popularity of Thessaloniki among Turkish tourists who go mostly as further as Thessaloniki to visit the house that Atatürk was born. Beyond Thessaloniki is repeatedly mentioned as different from the northern Greece where one could still observe the Ottoman influence.

<sup>16</sup> The full list of places that are at different points declared protection and improvement area could be reached at the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Information available at <<http://yigm.kulturturizm.gov.tr/TR,9669/ktkgb-ve-turizm-merkezleri.html>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>17</sup> His election to the office was not foreseen considering the constituency of Enez that has consistently supported CHP in the last 20 years. In the summer of 2014, it was still a hot topic among the locals of Enez months after his election.

<sup>18</sup> It is presented as such in the Greek newspaper Kathimerini in 26 November 2010. Available at <<http://www.kathimerini.gr/412006/article/politismos/arxeio-politismoy/anasa-zwhs-sto-vagiazht-tzami-sto-didymoteixo>> (Accessed January 2017).

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<sup>19</sup> Information available at <[http://www.ethnos.gr/politismos/arthro/erga\\_apokatastasis\\_sto\\_temenos\\_bagiazit-43518949/](http://www.ethnos.gr/politismos/arthro/erga_apokatastasis_sto_temenos_bagiazit-43518949/)> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>20</sup> Information available at <<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/orestiada-nin-yuzuculeri-22399538>> (Accessed January 2017).

<sup>21</sup> During the fieldwork, I came across with few minority members who studied in Greek universities. Mahmut also mentioned that there were few doctors of minority origin who are older than him and studied in Greek universities. Yet these are still exceptional cases. Additionally my aim here is to explain the impact of mobility practices on those who cross the border for education purposes and to point out the continuities and changes in the minorities' positioning vis-à-vis their home country Greece and Turkey.

<sup>22</sup> After the failed coup attempt in July 15, 2016, Serhat Koleji is not among the 149 secondary schools that were closed.

<sup>23</sup> Additionally, Serhat Koleji in Edirne, founded in 1997, is also preferred by middle class Western Thracian families. Active under the framework of Fatih Koleji in Istanbul that is close to the Gulen Movement, it is not wrong to claim that this college is the private version of Imam Hatip schools. The college's vice-principle stated, as of 2014, one fifth of their students are from Greek Thrace.

<sup>24</sup> The imam and the community leader of a village in Evros, Ibrahim, says that he approached the head of the YTB at a workshop in Edirne and brought to his attention to what he considered as lack of care for students in Evros. Ibrahim says, the then head of the YTB took a note of this situation and advised Ibrahim to call right before the next years' oral exam period started and give the list of students from Evros. Unfortunately, Ibrahim utters, the head of YTB changed and he lost his personal contact at the higher level of bureaucracy.

## Conclusions

This dissertation portrayed the perpetuation of the nationalistic rebordering practices and the emerging denationalized rebordering practices along the Thracian borderland. In the 2000s, the successive Greek and Turkish governments began to work towards harmonizing their migration and border control, citizenship, and minority policies as well as regional and neighborhood policies with EU norms and rules. Europeanization is an ongoing process, in the Turkish case a process that is far from being complete. Yet in this process, the region has become a space where local Greek and Turkish citizens encounter people in transit and claim a position in the public space as citizen, stranger, outsider, or alien, following Isin's (2002) hierarchy of otherness. In other words, the region turned into a "difference machine," using Isin's analogy for the city. First time encounters, triggered by the Europeanization process, gradually normalized new types of border-crossing practices and made it possible to reconsider what is called the "sense of border" (Green 2012) or the "borders on the imagination" (Navaro-Yashin 2005). This reconsideration itself implies a change in the regime of bordering, which intermingles with the knowledge practices and ontologies of the national order of things. As such, Europeanization of the border has played an indirect role in the emergence or expansion of cross-border encounters and mobilities.

Therefore what I focused on here is the *changing regime of bordering*, which is determined by all sorts of localized licit/illicit as well as legal/illegal acts of cross-border mobilities and cooperation and leads to reconsideration of the established conceptions of citizenship in Greece and Turkey. At the theoretical level, this changing regime of bordering elucidates the limits of states' sovereignty over space and people in relation to the presence of an international framework of governance, the EU.

What first drew me to study human mobilities across the Thracian border was a desire to understand what it actually meant for Greek and Turkish borderlanders that there were more and more migrants from third countries passing through “their” lands to reach western European countries. My aim was to observe the meanings of these new encounters, which I expected would lead to the emergence of a closer affinity among the borderlanders in response to the increasing “flows” of migration by those who are outsiders to these lands.

According to Isin’s (2002:31-32) classification of citizenship and its alterity, the relationship between the citizen and the “stranger” is shaped by a combination of solidaristic (affiliation, sociation, identification) and agonistic (conflict, competition, resistance, tension) strategies and modes of being political, whereas the relations between citizens and “outsiders” are determined by agonistic or alienating (exclusion, estrangement, oppression, expulsion) strategies and modes. Following this classification, I expected to see Greek and Turkish borderlanders move closer to the self, from the position of “outsider” to “stranger,” at the same time as the “transit” migrants from other countries have become the new “outsiders” to the borderlanders.

As I got immersed in the field, I came to realize how little space “transit” migrants have held in the everyday life of the Thracian borderlands. I began to pay attention to different mobility practices of Greek and Turkish borderlanders as they are engrained in the local actors’ personal lives and memory of the space. As I documented and observed old and new practices of cross-border mobilities and interactions, I was able to distinguish the peculiar conditions that nurture different solidaristic, agonistic, and alienating strategies and modes of being political in relation to the “strangers” and the “outsiders.” These conditions, as demonstrated in previous

chapters, are shaped by the relative positions of the local actors of the peripheries vis-à-vis one another and their political centers in different fields of power.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the changes in (a) governance of diversity and cross-border interactions, (b) cross-border mobility practices, and (c) othering or the hierarchies of otherness, all of which are observed in different ways in the Bourdieusian fields of security, economy, and culture. The three dimensions of governance, mobility, and othering directly address the specific questions posed in the introductory chapter: that is, what are the impacts of bilateral relations on interactions at the local level over the years, what kind of mobilities were and are “allowed” to take place across the border, and how do these local relations and mobilities affect the us-them distinctions on the ground? The parallel study of the three fields allows us to capture the “new” regime of bordering that is manifested in the selective sharing of sovereignty among state actors and in the informal ties and networks of mobile subjects against the political centers that encumber formal mobilities and interactions. In this light, I then return to the opening question of the dissertation regarding the Tsipras-Davutoğlu meeting in 2016. Finally, I discuss the methods of studying the changing power of states’ over space and people through practices of cross-border mobility and interaction, by using Bourdieusian field and capital. This discussion also addresses the last question posed in the introduction, on the impacts of local practices on the established notion of (national) citizenship, as it is connected to the theoretical inquiry on changing state power.

### **What is new about the Greek-Turkish regime of bordering?**

#### **On governance**

The study shows that, in the Thracian borderlands, interactions among officials and actors of civil society started immediately after the 1999 official rapprochement. Yet they have not

reached the same level of institutionalization that cooperation among police authorities has in the last years. This, I argue, shows the new limits of state sovereignty over space and people at the margins of Europe. The governance of the borderlands is Europeanized in relation to respective states' border and migration policies. However the Europeanization process does not force the states to make concessions for the sake of their national interests in economic and cultural fields. Hence they could suspend EU regional economic development schemes or develop economic and cultural cooperation paths embedded in the national order of things.

In the absence of EU-led schemes, informal cross-border networks have still flourished. States' visa and entry procedures were decisive in the kind of informality that has developed over the years. While Greek citizens have enjoyed visa-free entry to Turkey since 1984, it used to be a practical obstacle for Turkish stakeholders even to join a social or business gathering in Greece. In 2010, that is, in the aftermath of the economic crisis in Greece, tourist visa requirements were eased and bureaucratic processes for investing in Greek Thrace have become relatively faster for Turkish citizens. However people seem to refrain from even considering trying, due to the sour experiences of a few who earlier had trouble setting up and/or maintaining cross-border businesses.

In the cultural field, the presence of the Turkish-Muslim minority in Greek Thrace gives higher leverage to the Turkish center to get enmeshed in the Greek periphery. What Öktem (2012) calls the new non-conventional policy actors of the Turkish state were brought to Edirne and strengthened the already existing ties between minorities and the Turkish state via the Turkish Consulate in Komotini/Gümülcine. In the 2010s, in contrast to the Greek state, the Turkish state's higher degree of centralization, its political economic power, and its involvement in the Balkans seems to reinforce the pre-nation-state, Ottoman scale of politics in the Thracian

borderlands. This is also reproduced in the cherishing of the multi-religious Ottoman past of the region in the center-led restorations in Turkish Thrace. The locally-initiated cultural museums in Greek Thrace also endorse past multiethnic diversity and not the present religious diversity. In conclusion, the discursive representations of diversity in the public space and the majority of the formal ties between the peripheries are still governed according to the notion of citizenship driven by the policies of national political centers.

### **On mobility**

In the 2000s, cross-border mobilities have exponentially increased in the Thracian borderlands for each of the three groups of identified border-crossers: the *day trippers*, the *commuters* and the *unauthorized cross-border*. The diversification of the day trippers and commuters' mobilities show that the politics of fixity, implicated in the state center's attempts to control activities in the cultural and economic fields, are able to be circumvented in different ways. The informality of the local networks and relations kept them hidden from close vigilance by the political centers. In the presence of mobile subjects with the right kind of social capital – determined by language competence, know-how, and personal interest – various formal and informal economic and cultural activities observed in the Thracian borderlands prove that crosscutting old established ethno-religious ties is possible and already happening.

The *commuters* with a home on each side of the border enjoy a longer presence in both spaces are still mainly members of the Muslim-Turkish community of Greek Thrace, either students at the university or professionals working in Edirne. The diversity is more apparent among the day trippers. Throughout the years, the main *day trippers* from Greek to Turkish Thrace have been Gagauz people as well as the Muslim-Turkish minority, both of whom have had social ties with Edirne and whose class positions were also nurtured by their cultural liminality in Greece. In the 2010s, Turkish middle- and upper-middle class borderlanders have

been welcomed by Greeks in the tourism and service sector, just as Greek customers are in Edirne's market places. As the local accounts show, even officials at the border gates have changed their position from the 1990s to the 2010s and in several occasions have used their discretionary power to help business people overcome bureaucratic obstacles. Such local interactions are new acts of citizenship and herald shifts in the "borders on imagination" (cf. Navaro-Yashin 2005).

When it comes to the mobility acts of unauthorized border-crossers, the politics of fixity are currently governed by the two states' relations with the EU as much as with each other and yet people find ways to outwit them. In that case, informality works slightly differently. The formal cross-border ties between local agents of border control put on hold the informal cross-border ties between local smugglers. Yet unauthorized mobility is then pursued through new informal channels developed by the migrants' own transnational networks. In that sense state sovereignty over space and people is once again circumvented, not just by borderlanders but by those who are outsiders to the borderlands.

### **On othering**

As noted above, following Isin's (2002) categories of otherness, the Greek and Turkish day trippers and commuters are either strangers or insiders to the citizens, whereas the unauthorized border-crossers are either outsiders or aliens. Looking closely at the acts of cross-border mobilities and interactions further shows that alterity is sorted out at two junctions. At the first junction, legality of the crossing acts separates unauthorized from authorized border-crossers. At the second junction, the unauthorized border-crossers are differentiated according to the perceived il/licitness of their acts, while authorized ones, namely day trippers and commuters, are distinguished according to ethno-religious kinship ties.

The perceived il/licitness of the unauthorized border-crossers at the periphery of states is determined by three factors. One is the subject position of the border-crosser vis-à-vis mainstream public opinion. The second factor is inter-state relations, that is, the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations, which shaped the relations of power between the two states and made an impact on the position of the particular group of border-crossers vis-à-vis the local authorities. The third factor is the specific “transit” position of the region on the migration routes. In relation to citizenship and alterity, there is a shared understanding of the mobility motivations of people from third countries and a tacit acceptance, blended with pity and/or apathy, of the momentary presence of these “aliens” transiting through the Thracian public space. The outlawed Turkish citizens are “outsiders” from the Greek perspective and “aliens” from the Turkish perspective, implicated in estrangement of even those who facilitate their unauthorized crossings. What came out of the difference machine is a closer affinity between Greek and Turkish state agents who started cooperating over controlling their national borders against the “aliens” in transit. However, this affinity still takes place under the shadow of the established notion of citizenship and alterity determined by ethno-religious ties.

The positions of authorized border-crossers vis-à-vis the citizens are also multiple. In the early 2000s, the “stranger,” in Isin’s (2002) terms, was implicated in overtly “agonistic” strategies of the Greek lawyer who abruptly left a Bar Association meeting for a refugee legal aid project, or Edirne’s political elites rejecting the Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus. Both of them were locally-initiated nationalist reflexes nurtured by the militarized sense of border for several decades. However cross-border activities, initiated with the support of the power centers, created a positive sense of engagement with the “strangers,” even when the power centers withdrew support later, as in suspending the INTERREG program or when the activities are

pursued under the EU framework, as in the monthly meetings of police authorities. These experiences show that “sociations” develop among the “strangers” on issues that concern the national self, be they governor officials, economic and cultural elites, or agents of border control.

Over the years, the day trippers and commuters have also become desirable subjects in the Thracian public spaces because of their temporary nature, i.e. for market exchanges, visits to historical sites, and cultural activities. As just mentioned, the commuters are mostly members of the Muslim-Turkish minority, hence closely affiliated with citizens in both Turkish and Greek Thrace. Several Greek students, who recently signed up for the bilingual MA program at Trakya University, show a new form of “sociation” that crosscuts ethno-religious ties. Studying this relationship in the coming years will reveal the new limits of us-them distinctions.

Repeated cross-border activities in particular foster the idea of geographical and cultural closeness and the feeling of being “emplaced” in a shared space. These new subjective feelings challenge the alterity produced by the official historiographies where certain subject positions are still stigmatized: the Turkish-speaking Orthodox Gagauz people, who are “not fully Greek” for Greek borderlanders and “not trustworthy” to Turkish borderlanders; and the Turkish speaking Muslim Roma community, who are “neither Greek nor Turkish” for both. Despite their active roles in the economic field, they remain “strangers” for both Greek and Turkish citizens.

To sum up, all these developments seem to lead towards new scalar articulation that transgresses the national borders towards imagining Thrace as a united space for both Greeks and Turks. This is observed in the narratives of the winners of the economic and cultural field, such as the shopkeepers in Edirne, those involved in tourism and services in Evros, and participants of repeated cultural events. Albeit with different motivations and in different ways, the pre-border webs of relations, in van Schendel’s (2005) terms, are frequently evoked in the public discourse.

Turkish state actors' involvement in the Thracian peripheries especially nurture ethno-religious classification of places and people, through revitalizing Edirne's Ottoman past and the city's central role in the Balkans.

The simultaneous examination of three forms of practice –governance, mobilities, and othering, on three Bourdieusian fields of power –security, economy, and culture- show that states' power over space and people is slowly changing. However the diffusion of the EU rules and norms is observed only for border control against unauthorized border-crossers, who are the “outsiders” from both the Greek and Turkish perspective. By purposefully keeping an eye on the peripheries, states' centers try to maintain their sovereignty over territory and citizenship. Yet against the background of their attempts to define the limits of formal cross-border mobility and cooperation practices, and thanks to repeated encounters, local actors are no more “outsiders” but invited others or “strangers” for each other. They have been developing informal ties and networks which, in most cases, escape state control and show that the states' power is more limited in practice than the image they try to maintain at the level of official relationships.

### **Looking at 2016 from the regime of bordering perspective**

The Davutoğlu-Tsipras declaration in March 2016, which this dissertation begins with, foresaw joint border patrolling based on the infamous EU-Turkey Deal. Although it is going slower than these two leaders anticipated in the press release, official cooperation is on the table and is happening as Frontex-escorted irregular migrants are carried from the port of Mytilene to Dikili every now and then. Having depicted the kind of cross-border cooperation and mobility practices that have been encouraged, impeded, and/or turned a blind eye to in the past forty years, and the press release and the process of readmission that follows suit, here I ask again the same question I posed in the introduction: What would it take to solve the old disputes and why

would the disputes even be solved if they can simply be put in brackets while the sides work together to manage the biggest refugee crises of the century?

As this research shows, the two states seem willing to cooperate in the security field while they pursue more protectionist policies in the cultural and economic fields. Protectionism in this case does not mean having closed borders. To the contrary, the border is more permeable than it ever was before. However the two political elites in the states' centers pursue the premises of a national regime of bordering in the realms of culture and economy, as these fields do not concern other EU countries in the way that movement of third country nationals do. Hence they remain as the domains of national authorities of control. That is why on the one hand, official cross-border cooperation on border control against unauthorized crossings is pursued with the involvement of NATO and EU forces in the Aegean and, on the other hand, the INTERREG PROGRAM is still suspended because Aegean disputes have not yet been solved. Turkish state apparatuses are further involved in the Greek and Turkish periphery for reasons of overseeing the minority rights.

At the theoretical level, the difference among the three fields of power reveals the following. Unlike the national regime of bordering, states and their forceful agents of the new regime of bordering selectively share their proclaimed right over a given space with different actors and to different degrees. However they sometimes also do the opposite and claim to establish their authority beyond the territorial borders. This is most apparent in the case of strengthening ties between the minorities of Greek Thrace, Edirne, and Ankara through the non-conventional policy apparatuses inserted in Edirne. What comes out of these selective claims for sovereignty depends on the relative power of the respective states vis-à-vis one another. The fact that the current processes of mobilities and capitalist globalization challenge states' exclusive

power within a bounded territory has already been meticulously shown by critical scholars of state sovereignty (cf. Agnew 2009; Brown 2010; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Sassen 2006, 415; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013; Ong 2000). While this research reaffirms their point, it further shows that the state elites, and specifically policy makers, are no longer interested in claiming total sovereignty.

The Greek and Turkish states selectively share the right and responsibility to control a given space when it is deemed necessary, as in the case of the “refugee crisis.” But then, why not solve the old disputes or again, put them in brackets, to make INTERREG program work, for example? What would it take to do that?

The answer to this question is in the acts of citizenship that I observed in the Thracian borderlands and that make the second theoretical inference of this study. As local relations and networks that crosscut ethno-religious ties are developed in the absence of EU-level cooperation schemes or are institutionalized in their own ways, as in the case of the new bilingual MA program, the image of the old national other, the borders on imagination, and the established sense of border are already changing. In other words, in the minute details of cross-border relationships, a new sense of border that is beyond the control of political centers is already developing. Therefore the way people experience a change in the notion of citizenship at the states’ peripheries, as constituted by its alterity, shows the limits of states’ power over space and people in practice. Against this level of practice, not solving the old disputes may seem to reproduce the power of political centers as the decisive actors of the changing regime of bordering. After all, state elites’ willingness to share responsibility in the “refugee crisis” and dragging their feet on the INTERREG program are two faces of the same coin: the attempt to maintain control over mobile subjects and their terms of interaction over a given space.

However, their attempt is unavailing in practice, other than to help keep up with an image of strong states and their political elites as the decisive actors of the (re)bordering processes. This is proven by the ongoing unauthorized crossings through the emergence of new smuggling networks, and the cross-border economic exchanges and cultural interactions taking place beyond the limits foreseen by the political centers.

### **Conceptual take away**

This ethnography of the Thracian borderlands demonstrated that new mobility and fixity practices are (re)bordering the old hostile us-them distinctions, the notions of citizens and immanent others. The complex process of redefining citizenship and its alterity becomes apparent only when one is attentive to the living history of the border. The cross-border and historical study of the Greek-Turkish borderlands pointed out critical issue areas and junctures where interests of local, national, and EU-level actors diverge and converge in terms of what the acceptable cross-border mobilities and issues of cooperation are. The acceptable forms of mobilities and cooperation, which are forced upon by the political centers and circumvented by the informal practices of the moving subjects, hint at the changes in the notion of citizenship that used to be defined by states with exclusive monopoly of power within a bounded territory, hence the (re)bordering of territory and citizenship.

The starting point for investigating this change was not a particular (regular/irregular) migrant or minority group, as is the case in national and post-national debates in citizenship literature. The minorities are the subject matter of many works on transformations of Greek-Turkish relations, nationalism, and citizenship in relation to each country's Europeanization processes. As shown in Chapter Two in detail, however, these studies do not consider the dynamic and changing politics of mobility and fixity that reveal the hierarchies between people

with permanent legal status and those without. Neither does this dissertation focus only on the control function of the border, which is often the case in securitization of citizenship and migration literature. The main concern for these studies is to flesh out the current state of governance of the (im)mobility of unauthorized people. Instead, the starting point of this research considers all acts of mobilities as they take place in a given space, the Greek-Turkish borderlands. Focusing on all sorts of mobilities, and the encounters that occur as a result of these mobilities, allowed me to consider the changing bordering practices of a multitude of actors as they take place on the two sides of the border and over the course of a critical forty years in Greek-Turkish relations. It is my contention that examining the locally-shaped bordering practices is essential to capturing potential new acts of citizenship that allow a reconsideration of notions of citizenship and territory overdetermined by states' political centers.

Situating the analysis in a historical and cross-border context helps me overcome a state-centered analysis to look at diverse citizenship practices as embedded in an ongoing and relational process of negotiation between mobile subjects and actors of governance in multiple political centers and peripheries. This approach also makes it possible to understand particular social, political, and economic conditions that the actors of the periphery contest or comply with policies established by political centers. This is an important query especially for societal actors, so as to draw lessons from the type of actions that empower them in the face of new state-led techniques of governmentality. Towards this end, the concepts utilized in this research can be applied beyond states' peripheries.

Critical scholars of state sovereignty and borders have already underlined that group identifications, affiliations, and differentiations are multiple and overlapping, despite the coherent images of institutionalized forms such as the state, the border, the nation, and the

citizen. In addition to multiple sources of action, they also underline that functions of borders are not limited to controlling migration; they are multiple and sometimes unite the two sides. Following these studies, I looked at the role of actual cross-border practices of local state and nonstate actors in bordering/debordering/rebordering processes on the ground, while at the same time being aware of the established senses of the border that are implicated in people's multiple worlds and imaginations of what a possible cross-border act or deed is. As the accounts of my interlocutors in the Thracian borderland demonstrated, actors in fact follow multiple logics at the same time, as in Green's (2012) "multiple worlds", Migdal's (2004) "mental maps" or van Schendel's (2005) "multiple scales." These sources of action are also not necessarily, or at least not automatically, determined by political centers like Brussels, Ankara, or Athens. They are rather driven by local knowledge and relations shaped in particular historical contexts, which are reconsidered in response to the availability of new discursive practices facilitated by the Europeanization processes of the two states. How these multiple sources of action come into play in relation to the multiple functions of the borders cannot be grasped with the tools of Europeanization scholarship, which is mainly preoccupied with checking the levels of diffusion of norms and rules at a given policy area and according to presumed logics of action.

The concepts of regime and ethnographic regime analysis, as developed by some critical scholars of migration, are helpful to investigate heterogenous social structures, discourses, actors, and rationalities that intervene in processes of governmentalization of the border. However, as Mezzadra and Neilsen remind us, the risk of speaking the language of governance may reveal that states continue to be the main stakeholders of the border and migration regimes. For them, "states are confronted with an elusive environment of governance, within which multiplicity of stakeholders play crucial and not always predictable roles" (Mezzadra and

Neilsen 2013: 179). They then underline that the concept of sovereignty still retains its importance as a “framing” that transcends the modalities of the processes of governance and governmentality. Yet they suggest “not to look for sovereignty in its most traditional manifestations, which means where it is directly linked to the claims and actions of sovereign states” but instead to “map the scattered effects of sovereignty well beyond any methodological nationalism, and particularly where governance, governmentality and global law fail to reproduce the framing of their operation” (2013: 202). This, for them, is possible by referring to border as a method, and by looking for and studying the very attempt of bordering in any place where there is a struggle to define the inside/outside—a distinction which, they show, is itself a goal and not a reality.

By focusing on states’ peripheries and pointing at the changes in states’ claims over territory and citizenship, I may be looking at a rather traditional manifestation of sovereignty by Mezzadra and Neilsen’s standards. However, parallel to their suggestion, my research on the three interrelated fields of power at the cross-border peripheries aims to understand the ways in which sometimes national and other times regional governance schemes succeed or fail to reproduce the framing of their operation. Hence it is a novel attempt to study a traditional site by looking at borders’ function of controlling mobilities *and* their roles in constituting cross-border relations. These mobilities and cooperations either challenge or reproduce sovereignty as it emerges at a border that is now, institutionally, both a national and an EU border. Here the notion of regime remains useful, especially methodologically, as it allows me to look for structures, discourses, actors, and rationalities that (re)shape both authorized/unauthorized mobilities and formal/informal cooperation possibilities. Therefore, the notions of border as method (Mezzadra and Neilsen 2013), borderscape (Johnson et al., 2011; Parker and Vaughan-

Williams et al. 2009; Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2007), and borderzone (Squire 2011) are helpful to reveal sovereignty as it unfolds in various sites in everyday life. This study, meanwhile, shows that looking at the usual site of borderlands with the sensitivities of regime analysis in different fields of power reveals the ways in which nation-states' power is maintained, challenged, or reproduced in contemporary manifestations of sovereignty. This is a query not to recover the power of the states, but rather to be attuned to what state actors are still capable of doing and what not, with the underlying motive to understand how we can cultivate more inclusive social imaginaries beyond the national way of doing and thinking. I will come to this at the end but first let me clarify my take on the notions of field and capital.

As I consider that bordering is a dynamic and processual regime, and that there are multiple functions of borders and multiple sources of action for people who are involved in bordering practices, I look at three issue areas through the use of the Bourdieusian notion of relational fields of power. As mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation, Bourdieu's notion of a relational field implies a network or configuration of objective relations between positions that could be observed at any relatively autonomous realm in which a particular activity is pursued for its own sake (cf. Bourdieu 1991). The critical scholars of state argue that the recently published lectures of Bourdieu *on the State* reveal the limits of his own theorization of fields when it comes to studying state (cf. Schinkel 2015; Steinmetz 2014). According to Bourdieu's theorization, everything about a field, including its very existence, is open to revision on the basis of struggles and changes inside and outside the field. However in his lectures, state acquires the "meta-field instance which itself contribut[e] to the constitution of fields," the precondition of the differentiation of society into semi-autonomous fields (Bourdieu 2015:201). As Schinkel (2015: 231) aptly argues, while Bourdieu's own experience with the French state

might lead to his conception of a quasimetaphysical state, this is not a plausible approach for a sociological inquiry of the current world.

Steinmetz (2014: 4) notes that Bourdieu's interchangeable use of "state field," "bureaucratic field," and "administrative field" shows that there is a need to distinguish the wider state field that includes lower-level public employees, and the narrower state field consisting of policymakers and upper-level officials. Also noticing his interchangeable use of the three terms, Schinkel (2015) suggests that the confusion is intrinsic to Bourdieu's conception of state field, which refers to two different things, namely the state as "latent field" and state as "manifest field." The bureaucratic field, like any other field, is a "manifest field" whereas the "latent field" is a "meta-field" above all other fields:

In the form of a *principle*, the state can be considered as a *latent field*, a principle of orthodoxy indeed organizing other fields but not itself an actual field consisting of separate agents, institutions, et cetera. In that sense, the state is indeed a meta-field or a field of fields, but it is a field of a different status, more like a principle of regulation running through social space as a whole. That is how various agents that are part of other fields, such as bank employees and salespersons, can be considered, as Bourdieu does (SE: 34, 177–8), as 'state agents' in the sense that they *enact the state* through what Bourdieu calls 'state acts', also when no bureaucrats are directly involved (SE: 62, 177, 226) (Schinkel 2015:224-225).

Schinkel's meticulous critique shows that Bourdieu's approach to state as a meta-field jeopardizes a sociological study of the state. Yet, as he also underlines, this partly derives from Bourdieu being "less interested in the 'state' than in 'acts of the state'" (2015:220). The distinction between latent and manifest fields may recall the image–practice duality that Migdal (2001) also highlights as the defining feature of the current forms of states. However, Bourdieu's state as a meta-field assumes that the state is the "first mover" and the "final instance" of social life (Schinkel 2015: 228-229). To the contrary, Migdal's definition offers an analytical separation that does not presume a state acting without protagonists. As he says, "[t]he state is a

field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts” (2001: 15-16).

Following Migdal and other scholars of sovereignty and regimes mentioned above, I would suggest using Bourdieu’s notion of field, not to study not the state as a field but to study interrelated social fields (security, economy, culture) that allow us to understand the limits of the power of the state as an actor in the face of changing terms of sovereignty. This then becomes the study of states’ forceful actors as they appear in other “manifest fields.” This is what my investigation of the dynamic regime of bordering is about: the changing power of states over space and people as shaped by the discourses and actions of local state agents and local nonstate actors. The new regime of bordering is different from the old national regime of bordering in which notions of citizenship and territory were overdetermined by the bilateral (and hostile) relations between the neighboring states’ political centers. With increasing formal and informal mobility and cooperation practices, and hence diversification and multiplication of actors involved in bordering practices, capital cities’ say on the way national citizenship is perceived and experienced is diminished. However studying three fields at once shows that the relative power of states’ forceful actors are not equally distributed in every field of social life.

Therefore, while being aware of the limitation of the Bourdieusian notion of field, I trace rebordering practices through local manifestations of three policy areas (minority, migration, and neighborhood policies) as they shape and are shaped by three interrelated fields of power (fields of security, economy, and culture). Looking simultaenously at three interrelated fields helped me overcome static typologies, like Martinez’s (1994) classification of four types of borderlands, namely alienated, coexistent, interdependent, and integrated. This study shows that the

borderlands and borders are experienced differently depending on the position of actors in a given social field, at a given moment in the history of Greek-Turkish relations. In the 2000s, considering the state agents' formal ties for border control in the security field, the Greek and Turkish borderlands seemed to move from coexistent (with minimal contact and unfriendly relations between the two states) to interdependent borderlands. However they emerge as interdependent spaces in the economic and cultural field only for certain actors (primarily, though not exclusively, minorities) and for certain types of relations (mainly informal). Through a simultaneous study of three relational fields, I show that both states' claims for sovereignty and the new acts of citizenship that create a rupture in the established sense of border vary from one field to the next. Hence, the study of three "manifest fields" leads to the dynamic notion of a regime of bordering that has to be tested in each one of the three fields and from the perspective of multiple state and nonstate actors.

Regarding the notion of capital as determining the position of actors in each and every field, Bourdieu's notion of capital is useful to the extent that it is considered beyond its institutionalized forms. In that sense, Wilk's (1999) analysis of cultural consumption in Belize offers an early corrective to Bourdieu's consideration of cultural capital as linked to underlying variation in class lines. In an increasingly open global society like Belize, Wilk shows, the contemporary markers of what is fashionable are shaped in a multidimensional space of migration. In his revision of cultural capital, Wilk (1999:252) argues that unlike Bourdieu's consideration of a stable regime of taste that is carried over generations, the cultural taste is fluid and changeable even from one year to the next.

Wilk's emphasis on fluidity is key here for my take on other forms of capital that appear more crucial for distinguishing the positions of local actors along the Greek-Turkish borderland,

namely (1) legal capital, (2) language, and (3) practical know-how. Legal capital corresponds to what I refer to, throughout the dissertation, as the distinction between authorized and unauthorized border-crossers, and subsequent distinctions among these two forms of mobilities based on ethno-religious ties and the perceived licitness of their illegal act of mobility, respectively. Language and know-how also emerge as important to building contacts in each of the three fields, in the specific context of the Greek-Turkish borderlands. While know-how is an extension of educational capital, language has so far been a capital that ethno-religious minorities, who are between the two societies, already have and only recently have begun to utilise (e.g. for organizing cultural events or working in tourism sector) with the increasing cross-border interactions in the post-rapprochement era.

What we can therefore take away from this study is that the Bourdieusian notions of field and capital are useful in understanding states' changing power over space and people in the face of Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations, the context in which sovereignty is being redefined. This study showed that the limits of state power are best understood by looking at practices as they take place in cross-border peripheries, as suggested by Baud and van Schendel (1997). Taking the cross-border peripheries as the unit of observation strengthened the relational analysis of the three fields of power. This methodology also allowed me to avoid a state-centered analysis of state power and hopefully overcome the pitfalls of a Bourdieusian approach to state. For the close-up examination of states' peripheries, joining the forces of the dynamic notion of bordering as a process with Green's (2012) "sense of border" and Navaro-Yashin's (2005) "borders of imagination" made it possible to capture the lived marks of the past on the rebordering processes on the ground. Abraham and van Schendel's (2005) distinction between the licit and the legal is needed to flesh out the distinctions between the legal/illegal and

licit/illicit activities of mobility and cooperation that lead to the rebordering processes. These minute details, when considered in the light of Isin's (2008) theorization of acts of citizenship, showed whether and how cross-border mobility and cooperation practices at a given moment in time emerge as novel contributions towards redefining the established us-them distinctions.

Finally, the underlying philosophical motivation of this study is to understand how to reach more socially inclusive imaginaries that are free of hostile visions of the past, and that do not replace them with new ones. Against the background of policy makers' insistence on keeping certain conflicts in brackets or sorting out others in their best interest so as to maintain distinctions between citizens and others, the local experiences of increasing and diversifying cross-border mobilities and interactions presented in this study are harbingers of vernacular responses that bear the potential to challenge the national way of doing and thinking on the ground.

## Appendix

**Table I: Export volume from Edirne**

Years	Total Export	Bulgaria	Greece	Bulgaria / Total	Greece / Total
2010	112,718,965	44,273,612	2,935,324	39%	3%
2011	105,650,603	39,499,190	816,063	37%	1%
2012	84,240,183	27,447,263	830,479	33%	1%
2013	97,248,112	29,331,601	1,057,055	30%	1%
2014	42,865,019	19,046,065	397,499	44%	1%

\*in USD

Data obtained from the Edirne Chamber of Industry and Commerce in April 2015.

**Table II: Students at Trakya University, Edirne**

Years	Total # of Students	Total # of Foreign Students	Total # of Female Greek Students	Total # of Male Greek Students	Foreign / Total	Greek / Foreign
2002-2003	25,803	294	0	0	1%	0%
2003-2004	27,347	319	0	0	1%	0%
2004-2005	29,537	321	0	0	1%	0%
2005-2006	32,344	318	0	0	1%	0%
2006-2007	22,560	290	0	0	1%	0%
2007-2008	23,837	275	0	0	1%	0%
2008-2009	20,402	286	30	32	1%	22%
2009-2010	24,179	339	50	40	1%	27%
2010-2011	27,449	630	103	75	2%	28%
2011-2012	31,281	887	152	125	3%	31%
2012-2013	34,630	1,257	208	178	4%	31%
2013-2014	36,697	1,515	269	234	4%	33%

Data obtained from Trakya University International Student Office, in August 2014.

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