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Normative Pluralism in Kyrgyzstan
National, Community, and Individual Perspectives

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A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2013

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University of Washington School of Law

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Abstract

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Current Knowledge: Normative pluralism (plural sources of social ordering) has existed in in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) since pre-Tsarist times. Respected male elders (*aksakals*), for example, led nomadic groups where customary laws prevailed and sedentary groups where Islamic laws prevailed. During Tsarist times, Kyrgyz *aksakal* elders' courts processed disputes alongside Islamic and Russian courts. The Soviets abolished such courts. In post-Soviet times, Kyrgyzstan incorporated a reinvented version of Kyrgyz *aksakal* courts into the state judicial system. Today, however, some people reject their authority. This state manipulation and popular rejection of a Kyrgyz normative order reflects how majority populations shape normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan.

Research Gap: Most English-language works explore normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan from a state / majority perspective (e.g. Tsarist, Soviet, and Kyrgyzstani manipulation of majority Kyrgyz *aksakal* elders' councils). Few studies explore how minority groups or women shape normative pluralism. Therefore, several research questions remain unanswered. Do minority groups in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan maintain their own normative orders? Do they rely upon male elders as sources of authority? If so, do some people now reject their authority and why? Do women also act as sources of authority?

Contribution of this Dissertation: Based on original fieldwork, this dissertation helps to answer these questions on a national, community, and individual level for minority Uyghurs in post-Soviet northern Kyrgyzstan. Part I explores how the “Ittipak” Uyghur Society of Kyrgyzstan created and maintains throughout Kyrgyzstan a normative order based on respected male Uyghur elders. Part II explores why a community of Uyghurs in Toshtemir City (pseudonym) rejected that order in their city in northern Kyrgyzstan. It argues that the rejection occurred due to a normative cleavage between the two groups. Part III explores how one prominent Uyghur Muslim woman in Toshtemir exerts normative authority in the way that she mediates bride kidnapping cases.

Conclusion: A better understanding of how Uyghurs shape norms and normative orders will help complete the picture of normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan. This is important given ethnic tensions in Kyrgyzstan. It also contributes to a paucity of English-language research on Uyghurs in Central Asia.

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Preface

Where are the White Beards?

Originally I intended to study how Uzbek *mahalla* (Central Asian urban neighborhood) leaders process disputes in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. My expectation was that *mahalla* neighborhood committees of respected male elders (*aksakals*, literally “white beards”) process disputes.¹ In the power vacuum after the 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan, however, ethnic violence broke out between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in southern Kyrgyzstan and Osh. Thus, I moved my research site to Toshtemir City (pseudonym) in northern Kyrgyzstan where Uzbeks also live in *mahalla* neighborhoods.

On my first day in Toshtemir, however, I began to realize that most people there no longer use *mahalla* neighborhood elders to process disputes.² My Uzbek teacher, Salomat Alimova (pseudonym) confirmed this phenomenon, as did most people I later spoke with in Toshtemir. Ranjbar confirms it in other parts of the country.³ Therefore, I asked myself, “Where are the white beards and do women influence normative ordering?”

In my search for white beard dispute processing and in my lengthy discussions with Salomat, an Uyghur woman, I discovered a few examples of how Uyghurs shape normative pluralism (plural sources of social ordering) in Kyrgyzstan. The “Ittipak” Uyghur Society of Kyrgyzstan is based in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. It maintains Uyghur councils of elders throughout the country which process disputes and provide Uyghur sources of social ordering. Many Uyghurs in Toshtemir, however, rejected these sources of authority.

¹ Paul Georg Geiss, *Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: communal commitment and political order in change* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 87; 98———, “Mahallah and kinship relations. A study on residential communal commitment structures in Central Asia of the 19th century,” *Central Asian Survey* 20(2001); Eric W. Sievers, “Uzbekistan's Mahalla: From Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations,” *Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law* (2002); Renee Giovarelli and Cholpon Akmatova, “Local institutions that enforce customary law in the Kyrgyz Republic: and their impact on women’s rights,” *Agriculture & Rural Development e-Paper* (2002): 6; Sabine Freizer, “Neo-liberal and communal civil society in Tajikistan: merging or dividing in the post war period?,” *Central Asian Survey* 24, no. 3 (2005): 227; Christine Bichsel, *Conflict transformation in Central Asia: irrigation disputes in the Fergana Valley* (London: Routledge, 2009). 72.

² Appendix A: 01.19.11; Appendix D: 01.19.11 Long-Term Interview with PEG.

³ Azita Ranjbar, “The declining use of aksakal courts in Kyrgyzstan,” (Eurasia Foundation, 2012).

This dissertation describes how Ittipak created on a national level its own sources of authority and why Uyghurs on a community level rejected them in Toshtemir. While this does not explain the apparent disuse of white beards it explores how minority Uyghurs help shape normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan. It also explores ways in which Salomat, a minority Muslim woman, seeks to shape norms surrounding the crime of bride kidnapping.

After settling in Toshtemir, I intended to conduct semi-structured interviews about dispute processing and then craft a survey to test hypotheses based on the work of Genn.⁴ While waiting for my human subjects review at the University of Washington, I realized how much valuable information my Uzbek teacher, Salomat Alimova (pseudonym), was providing. Thus, I decided to use her as a main respondent and, as other scholars, to collect parallel data.

⁴ Hazel G. Genn, *Paths to justice: what people do and think about going to law* (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 1999).

Acknowledgements

While I am thankful to everyone who helped me complete this dissertation, I want to especially thank the following people:

- My wife and children;
- My language teachers in Kyrgyzstan;
 - Salomat (pseudonym) – Uzbek
 - Kalia (pseudonym) – Uyghur
- Research assistants in Kyrgyzstan who opened doors and provided translation;
- Judy Davis who provided hundreds of books and articles via inter-library loan;
- My dissertation committee who provided valuable direction; and
- The following fellowships:
 - David L. Boren Fellowship
 - Chester A. Fritz Fellowship for International Research
 - Univ. of Washington Graduate School Fulbright-Hays Replacement Grant
 - Ellison Center Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowships

Dedication

to my wife and children

Introduction

Chapter 1 – The Research Problem

As one of the poorest post-Soviet transition countries,⁵ Kyrgyzstan has difficulty providing basic services to its citizens. Many people, for example, do not have hot running water in their homes. Roads are poorly paved, and public infrastructure built during Soviet times is old and worn out. Nevertheless, upon my arrival in Kyrgyzstan to conduct field research in early 2011, I noticed many ordinary people taking the initiative to shape their own physical environment.⁶ Ordinary citizens I met, for example, organized people to contribute labor and resources to build playgrounds,⁷ drainage ditches,⁸ and hot water lines⁹ in their neighborhoods. Wealthy citizens like “Graf”¹⁰ from Toshtemir City (pseudonym), a research site of this study, also contributed funds to pave roads, erect street lights, build mosques, provide security, purchase homes for the homeless, and deliver coal in the winter for the poor and elderly.¹¹

If ordinary people in Kyrgyzstan can shape their own physical environment can they also shape their own normative environment (competing sources of normative authority)?¹²

⁵ <http://data.worldbank.org/>.

⁶ Sarah Kendzior, "Where following the law is radical," *Al Jazeera, Opinion Section*, June 14, 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/2012610132026390191.html>. ("In Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan, volunteer organisations have emerged to carry out civic acts the governments fail to accomplish: rebuilding infrastructure, providing childcare and issuing loans.")

⁷ Appendix D: 09.21.11 Formal Interview with WUX.

⁸ Appendix D: 09.14.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat (EVT).

⁹ Appendix D: 03.20.11 Informal Interview with VSF.

¹⁰ <http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/> lists Graf under his real name and connected to a different country as one of the top 500 billionaires in the world.

¹¹ Appendix D: 07.08.11 Informal Interview with OGK, 07.19.11 Long-Term Interview with GWH, 08.16.11 Formal Interview with CEL, and 08.25.11 and 09.14.11 Long-Term Interviews with Salomat, 08.30.11 Observation, 09.05.11 Informal Interview with QVL, 09.08.11 Formal Interview with LJH, 09.21.11 Formal Interview with ZAF; 09.21.11 Formal Interview with WUX; 12.15.11 Formal Interview with YXW; 02.02.12 Formal Interview with LVV, and 03.15.12 Informal Interview with PNI.

¹² Gordon R. Woodman, "The idea of legal pluralism," in *Legal pluralism in the Arab world*, ed. Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger, and Laila Al-Zwaini (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 14. ("[S]o as not impliedly to claim that the bodies of law in question must be highly systematic," I use the phrase "legal environment" rather than "legal system" or "legal order.")

This dissertation explores how minority Uyghurs do so in northern Kyrgyzstan by creating and rejecting their own normative orders and seeking to shape those of other groups.

A. Current Knowledge

Normative pluralism (plural sources of social ordering)¹³ existed in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) since pre-Tsarist times. As tribal leaders and in councils, for example, respected male elders (*aksakal*, literally “white beard”) led nomadic groups where customary laws prevailed. Ancestors of today’s Kyrgyz and Kazakh populations gained membership in such groups through blood lineage. *Aksakal* elders also led sedentary groups where Islamic laws prevailed. Along with Muslim leaders, these elders wielded social authority in urban Central Asian neighborhoods (*mahalla*). Ancestors of today’s Uzbeks, Tajiks, and other populations gained membership in these communities through residence in the *mahalla* neighborhoods.¹⁴

During Tsarist times, customary courts of *aksakal* elders processed disputes alongside Islamic and Russian courts. While Tsarist leaders allowed customary and Islamic courts, they manipulated them to meet their needs.¹⁵ The Soviets abolished such popular courts and

¹³ See, for example, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, "Religious norms and family law: Is it legal or normative pluralism?," *Emory International Law Review* 25, no. 2 (2011).

¹⁴ Nadira A. Abdurakhimova, "The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34, no. 2 (2002); Geiss, *communal commitment and political order*; Judith Beyer, "Revitalisation, Invention and Continued Existence of the Kyrgyz Aksakal Courts: Listening to Pluralistic Accounts of History," *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 53(2006).

¹⁵ F. J. M. Feldbrugge, "Criminal law and traditional society: the role of Soviet law in the integration of non-Slavic peoples," *Review of Socialist Law* 3 (1977); Virginia Martin, "Barimta: Nomadic Custom, Imperial Crime," in *Russia's Orient: imperial borderlands and peoples, 1700-1917*, ed. Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, *Indiana-Michigan series in Russian and East European studies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); ———, *Law and custom in the steppe: the Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian colonialism in the nineteenth century* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000); See also, Geiss, *communal commitment and political order*; Virginia Martin, "Kazakh oath-taking in colonial courtrooms: legal culture and Russian empire-building," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5, no. 3 (Summer 2004); Olga Brusina, "The Russian experience of reforming nomadic courts according to adat in Turkestan, 1850-1900," *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 52(2006); Adeeb Khalid, *Islam after communism: religion and politics in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

established Soviet courts. Nevertheless, individual *aksakal* elders continued to wield social authority and process some disputes during Soviet times.¹⁶

In post-Soviet times Kyrgyzstan did not revive Islamic courts. Nevertheless, *mahalla* neighborhood committees of respected male elders continued to exist among Uzbek populations in southern Kyrgyzstan. They exerted social power in dealing with neighborhood cleanliness, poverty, festivities, and family disputes. Neighborhood women's committees established during Soviet times also continued to exist. They worked with male elders and local leaders to help with women's issues.¹⁷

Through the Aksakal Court Act Kyrgyzstan revived *aksakal* courts.¹⁸ After independence it incorporated a reinvented version of Kyrgyz *aksakal* courts into the state judicial system. Nevertheless, non-state *aksakal* elders continued to influence communities and process disputes alongside state *aksakal* judges as independent sources of authority.¹⁹ Today, however, Ranjbar argues that some people in Kyrgyzstan turn less frequently than in the past to Kyrgyz *aksakal* elders as sources of authority.²⁰ This state manipulation and popular rejection of a Kyrgyz normative order reflects how majority populations have shaped normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan.

¹⁶ Feldbrugge, "Criminal law and traditional society: the role of Soviet law in the integration of non-Slavic peoples."; Beyer, "Revitalisation, Invention and Continued Existence."; ———, "Imagining the state in rural Kyrgyzstan: how perceptions of the state create customary law in the Kyrgyz Aksakal Courts," *Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers* 95(2007).

¹⁷ Giovarelli and Akmatova, "Local institutions that enforce customary law."

¹⁸ "Utverjdeno, Ukazom Prezidenta, Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki, ot 25 Yanvarya 1995 goda I UP-30, Vremennoe Polozhenie, O Sudax Aksakalov Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki [On approval of temporary regulations on courts of elders in the Kyrgyz Republic]," (Kyrgyz Republic 1995); *Law on Courts of Elders*.

¹⁹ Beyer, "Revitalisation, Invention and Continued Existence."; ———, "Imagining the state in rural Kyrgyzstan."; ———, "According to Salt: An Ethnography of Customary Law in Talas, Kyrgyzstan" (Dissertation, Martin-Luther-Universität, 2009); See also, Feldbrugge, "Criminal law and traditional society: the role of Soviet law in the integration of non-Slavic peoples."; Olga Brusina, "Folk law in the system of power of Central Asian states and the legal status of the Russian-speaking population," *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 45(2000); David E. Merrell, "State engagement with non-state justice: how the experience in Kyrgyzstan can reinforce the need for legitimacy in Afghanistan," *Central Asian Survey* 29, no. 2 (2010); Giovarelli and Akmatova, "Local institutions that enforce customary law."; Judith Beyer, "Authority as accomplishment: intergenerational dynamics in Talas, Northern Kyrgyzstan," in *Eurasian perspectives: in search of alternatives*, ed. Anita Sengupta and Suchandana Chatterjee (Kolkata; New Delhi: Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies; Shipra Publications, 2010).

²⁰ Ranjbar, "The declining use of aksakal courts in Kyrgyzstan."

B. Research Gap

Most English-language works explore normative pluralism in Central Asia and what is today Kyrgyzstan from a state (e.g. Tsarist, Soviet, and Kyrgyzstani manipulation of majority Kyrgyz *aksakal* elders' councils) and/or majority (e.g. the normative order of majority Kyrgyz *aksakal* elders) perspective. Few studies explore how minority groups (e.g. Uyghurs, Dungans²¹) or women shape normative pluralism. Given the history of ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan between majority and minority groups with different normative orders, this research gap is significant.

Therefore, several research questions remain unanswered. Do minority groups in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan maintain their own normative orders? Do they rely upon male elders as sources of authority? If so, do some people now reject such sources of authority and why? Do women also act as sources of authority? Answers to these questions will help to define the normative roles that minorities and women play and help to complete the picture of normative pluralism in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan.

C. Contribution of this Dissertation

Based on original fieldwork, this dissertation helps to answer these questions for minority Uyghurs in northern Kyrgyzstan. Kandiyoti suggested that studies in Central Asia could review a particular topic on the state, community, and individual level.²² In her study of bride kidnapping Kyrgyzstan, Handrahan used a tri-part analysis of state, society, and individual.²³ This dissertation also takes this approach and presents a national, community, and individual level perspective of how Uyghurs shape normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan.

²¹ Dungans are Central Asian Muslims with Chinese ancestry. They speak a variant of the Chinese language. People compare them to the Hui in China.

²² Deniz Kandiyoti, Gulnara Ibraeva, and John Schoeberlein, "Developing local research capacity in Central Asia: challenges and strategies," in *Central Asian Studies Institute First Annual Conference: Twenty Years of Central Asian Independence: Shared Past, Separate Paths?* (Bishkek: American University of Central Asia Central Asian Studies Institute, 2011).

²³ L.M. Handrahan, "Implications of international human rights law and bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan," *PRAXIS The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies* XVI(2000): 7.

1. Part I (National Perspective – Uyghur-Based Norms)

Part I presents a national perspective. It explores how the “Ittipak” Uyghur Society of Kyrgyzstan created and maintains throughout Kyrgyzstan a normative order based on respected male Uyghur elders. It does not explore to what extent Uyghurs throughout Kyrgyzstan refer to these elders as sources of authority; it simply outlines the existence of the order. Through the Kyrgyzstan Assembly of Nations “Ittipak” maintains a network of national-, city-, and neighborhood-level respected male Uyghur elders. As with Kyrgyz elders, Ittipak Uyghur elders perform social, administrative, and judicial functions for Uyghur populations in Kyrgyzstan. These elders act individually and in councils to promote Uyghur unity and peace and to preserve Uyghur customs and traditions in Kyrgyzstan. They also seek to preserve peaceful relations with other ethnicities. While male elders lead the organization, Uyghur women also hold national positions within Ittipak and Ittipak also maintains national-, neighborhood-, and street-level women’s councils. This Part merely documents the existence of this normative order and not its effectiveness among Uyghurs.

By creating and maintaining this national Uyghur-based normative order, Ittipak Uyghurs actively help shape normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan.

2. Part II (Community Perspective – Neighborhood-Based norms)

Part II presents a community perspective. When a group of Uyghurs attempted to extend Ittipak’s normative order into Toshtemir (pseudonym), a city in northern Kyrgyzstan, many Uyghurs there rejected Ittipak’s influence. Part II argues that the rejection occurred due to a mismatch in social norms. Many Toshtemir Uyghurs trace their ancestry back many generations in Kyrgyzstan. Through time they socially integrated with other ethnicities in their community. Therefore, their social norms emphasize inter-ethnic identity and neighborhood unity. This Part explores several social aspects of Toshtemir (e.g. mosque

ceremonies, religious leadership, diaspora committees, and quarter committees) that evidence this neighborhood-based norm.

Many Ittipak Uyghurs, on the other hand, came from China more recently and retain sentiments of Uyghur nationalism. Their norms, therefore, emphasize Uyghur identity and unity. Due to these normative differences many Toshtemir Uyghurs rejected Ittipak's normative order. Ittipak's network of Uyghur elders, therefore, does not function in Toshtemir as they do in other cities.

This rejection of Ittipak's normative order represents another way that Uyghurs actively help shape normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan.

3. Part III (Individual Perspective – Bride Kidnaping Norms)

Part III presents an individual perspective. It explores how one woman, Salomat Alimova (pseudonym), adopts and tries to shape Kyrgyz norms that influence how people (abductors, victims, and their families) perform the crime of bride kidnaping. Salomat is a prominent minority Uyghur Muslim woman from Toshtemir who mediated bride kidnaping cases in her family and community.

Bride kidnaping occurs when a man kidnaps a woman against her will for marriage. Current scholarship documents it among Kyrgyz populations in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhs in certain parts of Kazakhstan. This Part documents it among Uyghurs and Uzbeks in Toshtemir. Salomat adopts Kyrgyz bride kidnaping customs, but seeks to shape them through Islamic norms. She considers non-consensual bride kidnaping a reprehensible practice. Nevertheless, she claims that those involved in the practice should use Islamic norms to mitigate its negative consequences.

By adopting and seeking to shape Kyrgyz bride kidnaping norms, Salomat actively helps shape normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan.

4. Methodology

This dissertation relies upon original field research data that I collected in northern Kyrgyzstan from January 2011 through June 2012. From January through September 2011 I lived with my family in Toshtemir. From September 2011 to June 2012 we lived in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, also in northern Kyrgyzstan. During that time I conducted research in both cities, but mostly in Toshtemir.

In Toshtemir I conducted interviews and participant observations mainly in two *mahalla* neighborhoods on one end of the city. Many of the city's Uzbek, Uyghur, Tajik, and Dungan minorities live in those neighborhoods. People outside of the *mahalla* neighborhoods often refer to the location as the "Uzbek *mahalla*."²⁴ Additionally, I collected the "as told to" autobiography and native ethnography of my Uzbek teacher, Salomat Alimova (pseudonym).²⁵ She is a prominent minority Uyghur Muslim woman. Even though she is ethnically Uyghur, she taught Uzbek language and literature at and directed the Uzbek school. She also served as the secretary to the Uzbek diaspora committee in Toshtemir. As such she maintains respect in her community. Salomat gave me her full cooperation as well as her oral and written consent to record and use her life history to support this dissertation.²⁶ Much of the information she gave me I confirmed through parallel interviews in Toshtemir.²⁷ Additionally, I received information from community interviews that Salomat confirmed and expanded upon. Salomat also acted as an entry point for me into the Toshtemir community. From her introductions I was able to attend many community events that I describe herein.

²⁴ Appendix D: 04.19.12 Group Interview with KXJ and SWK.

²⁵ H. Russell Bernard, *Research methods in anthropology: qualitative and quantitative approaches*, 5th ed. (Lanham, MD: AltaMira, 2011). 408-15.

²⁶ João Guilherme Biehl, *Vita: life in a zone of social abandonment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 6, 10.

²⁷ See, for example, *ibid.*, 12-13; H. Russell Bernard and Jesús Salinas Pedraza, *Native ethnography: a Mexican Indian describes his culture* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989). 14. ("... El Guindi collected parallel data on her own to compare with those of her colleague.")

In Bishkek and surrounding areas I conducted interviews with national-,²⁸ city-,²⁹ neighborhood-,³⁰ and street-level³¹ leaders of Ittipak; document reviews of Ittipak's newspaper; and many participant observations in Ittipak's office. During the summer of 2011 I took Uyghur classes from Kalia (pseudonym). As Salomat had done with Toshtemir, Kalia introduced me to leaders of Ittipak.

Overall, I conducted hundreds of semi-structured interviews, many participant observations, and several document reviews. Appendix D describes the methodology I used to conduct the interviews and provides a Table of Respondents that lists the interviews I cite as sources in this dissertation. Appendix A contains a Table of Participant Observations that lists many, but not all, of the participant observations I conducted. Appendix B contains a Table of Archival Documents that lists the statutes, conference reports, and newspaper articles that I cite as sources in this dissertation. Appendix C contains a brief joint ethnography of Ittipak that I co-wrote in Cyrillic Uyghur with Kalia, an Uyghur woman and my Uyghur language teacher in the summer of 2011. The research cut-off date for this study is December 12, 2012.

D. Conclusion

On a national level, Part I explores how Ittipak created and maintains an Uyghur-based normative order in Kyrgyzstan. On a community level, Part II explores why some

²⁸ On the national level I interviewed Ittipak's president, secretary, newspaper editor, and education committee leader (also formerly the women's committee leader). Additionally, I interviewed leaders from the national Uzbek and Tajik diaspora committees. Furthermore, I reviewed Ittipak newspapers and spoke with many Uyghur taxi drivers in Bishkek.

²⁹ In Toshtemir I interviewed the long-time leader of the Uzbek/Uyghur/Tajik diaspora committee, the current Ittipak Uyghur leader who usurped and abandoned Ittipak control there, the man who challenged him in the election where he usurped control, the young woman who instigated the election, and many other Uyghurs.

³⁰ On the neighborhood level in Toshtemir I interviewed two district leaders, five quarter committee leaders, and a few quarter committee *aksakals* (all defined below). Finally, I spoke with many ordinary people about the topics of this chapter. On the neighborhood level outside of Toshtemir I interviewed three Ittipak *yigit beshi* (head man) leaders of Uyghur *mahalla* neighborhoods (While I label them Uyghur or Uzbek *mahallas* because the Uyghurs or Uzbeks living there refer to them as their *mahallas*, people of many ethnicities live in the *mahalla* neighborhoods.) surrounding Bishkek.

³¹ On the neighborhood / street level I interviewed an Ittipak woman's committee leader of a city near Bishkek and one of her street-level woman's leaders.

Uyghurs in Toshtemir rejected that order. On an individual level, Part III explores how Salomat adopts Kyrgyz bride kidnaping norms and attempts to shape them based on Islamic norms. This creation, rejection, and adoption³² of various norms and normative orders represents three ways that Uyghurs help shape normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan.

This information helps to complete the picture of normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan. Current English-language scholarship documents ways in which the state and majority populations shape norms and normative orders. This dissertation helps to shift the focus of normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan to non-state groups and minority populations. It shows that minorities do not passively accept the normative orders presented to them. Rather, even though it may occur unconsciously over time, minorities actively shape norms and normative orders. Therefore, discussions of how to shape normative pluralism in any country should include minorities as dynamic actors (not just consumers) in the process.

As this dissertation explores social ordering of and by minority Uyghurs in northern Kyrgyzstan, it also contributes to the paucity of English-language research on Uyghurs in Central Asia. Most English-language works about Uyghurs discuss their existence in China.³³ Some explore Uyghurs in Kazakhstan.³⁴ Very few focus on this ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, this Part contributes to Uyghur studies and provides a Kyrgyzstan comparison to existing works in other parts of Central Asia. Exploring one minority group or one region contributes to the general story of Central Asia as a whole.³⁵

³² In each case, the creation, rejection, and adoption of various norms were actually a combination of these factors. The rejection of Ittipak, for example, resulted in a partial adoption of Ittipak in Toshtemir. While he does not work with Ittipak, Uyghurs in Toshtemir elected Kenesh as the Ittipak leader in their community. Additionally, Salomat's adoption of Kyrgyz bride kidnaping norms is not complete as she incorporates Islamic norms in the way she mediates bride kidnaping cases.

³³ See, for example, Jay Dautcher, *Down a narrow road: identity and masculinity in a Uyghur community in Xinjiang China*, vol. 312, Harvard East Asian Monographs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). See also works by James A. Millward, William Clark, and Gardner Bovingdon.

³⁴ See, for example, Sean R. Roberts, "Everyday Negotiations of Islam in Central Asia: Practicing Religion in the Uyghur Neighborhood of Zarya Vostoka in Almaty, Kazakhstan," in *Everyday life in Central Asia: past and present*, ed. Jeff Sahadeo and Russell G. Zanca (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).

³⁵ Morgan Y. Liu, *Under Solomon's throne: Uzbek visions of renewal in Osh* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012). 1. ("The tale of one city can tell a story about a society, a region, and a historical

Furthermore, on a national level, this dissertation can inform policy makers, in places like Afghanistan, who debate whether and how the state should engage non-state normative orders.³⁶ To create a normative order on the national level Ittipak relies upon the state Assembly of Nations. The Assembly is a state organization dedicated to promoting inter-ethnic harmony and the culture and traditions of minority groups in Kyrgyzstan. It gives Ittipak legitimacy and an organizational structure to extend its influence into cities and communities throughout Kyrgyzstan. This may be an unintended consequence. Nevertheless, it shows that indirect state influence can facilitate the creation or revival of normative orders. Therefore, in addition to direct legislation, like the Aksakal Court Act, certain state actions may indirectly facilitate normative orders.

On a community level, this dissertation confirms that non-state groups influence normative behavior. The composition of non-state groups and social events in Toshtemir, for example, evidence a norm of inter-ethnic unity that clashed with Ittipak's norm of Uyghur unity. Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks in Toshtemir, for example, joined for many years under the Uzbek diaspora committee. Quarter committees in the Toshtemir *mahalla* neighborhoods also maintain an inter-ethnic composition. Only Uyghurs, however, participate in Ittipak. Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks in Toshtemir also routinely join with other ethnicities at religious and social functions. Social functions for Uyghur men in Bishkek, however, only include Uyghurs. In short, a tendency towards inter-ethnic unity exists among Uyghurs in

moment."); Roberts, "Everyday Negotiations of Islam in Central Asia: Practicing Religion in the Uyghur Neighborhood of Zarya Vostoka in Almaty, Kazakhstan," 340. ("Although these negotiations are played out in daily life differently in different communities, both urban and rural, and among different ethnic groups, the issues with which Central Asians are grappling . . . are fairly common across the region.")

³⁶ Ali Wardak, "Building a post-war justice system in Afghanistan," *Crime, Law & Social Change* 41, no. 4 (2004); Merrell, "State engagement with non-state justice."; Christina Jones-Pauly and Neamat Nojumi, "Balancing relations between society and state: legal steps toward national reconciliation and reconstruction of Afghanistan," *American Journal of Comparative Law* 52, no. 4 (2004); Thomas Barfield, Nojumi Nojumi, and J Alexander Thier, "The clash of two goods: state and non-state dispute resolution in Afghanistan," *United States Institute of Peace*(2006), <http://www.usip.org>.

Toshtemir while a tendency towards Uyghur unity exists among Uyghurs in Bishkek. These differences help explain why Ittipak Uyghur elders do not function in Toshtemir.

Finally, this dissertation confirms that individuals also influence normative behavior. Through her teachings at the Uzbek school, Salomat believes that she helped reduce the occurrence of bride kidnapping crimes among Uzbeks (Uzbek, Uyghur, and Tajik) in Toshtemir. While she prefers that the crime does not happen, she teaches that certain Muslim safeguards can reduce its negative effects. This provides a rare glimpse of how minority Muslim women can influence norms. Salomat also confirms that Uzbeks commit bride kidnapping in northern Kyrgyzstan. Current studies document it among Kyrgyz populations in Kyrgyzstan³⁷ and many people argue that it only occurs among the Kyrgyz.³⁸ Part III shows that the problem extends beyond Kyrgyz populations in Kyrgyzstan. Why the practice exists among Uzbek and Uyghur populations in northern Kyrgyzstan remains a research gap.

³⁷ Sarah Amsler and Russell Kleinbach, "Bride kidnapping in the Kyrgyz Republic," *International Journal of Central Asian Studies* 4(1999); Russell Kleinbach, "Frequency of non-consensual bride kidnapping in the Kyrgyz Republic," *International Journal of Central Asian Studies* 8, no. 1 (2003); L. Handrahan, "Hunting for women: bride-kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 6(2004); Russell Kleinbach, Mehrigiul Ablezova, and Medina Altieva, "Kidnapping for marriage (ala kachuu) in a Kyrgyz village," *Central Asian Survey* 24, no. 2 (2005); Russell Kleinbach and Lilly Salimjanova, "Kyz ala kachuu and adat: non-consensual bride kidnapping and tradition in Kyrgyzstan," *Central Asian Survey* 26, no. 2 (2007); Russell Kleinbach, Gazbubu Babaiarova, and Nuraiym Orozobekova, "Reducing non-consensual bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan," (2009).

³⁸ See, for example, Sheraz Sadiq, "Interview with Petr Lom: marriage by abduction," *FRONTLINE/World* 2004. ("Bride kidnapping is pretty much exclusively a Kyrgyz custom in Central Asia."); Giovarelli and Akmatova, "Local institutions that enforce customary law," 12n22. ("Uzbeks do not practice bride stealing.")

Chapter 2 – The Research Site and Population

As this dissertation follows the research process proposed by Kandiyoti (national, community, and individual perspectives), it provides a background on Kyrgyzstan, Toshtemir, and Salomat Alimova.

A. Kyrgyzstan



<http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/kyrgyzstan-political-map.htm>

Kyrgyzstan is a poor, mountainous, landlocked country in Central Asia. It borders China to the southeast along the Tien Shan Mountains, Kazakhstan to the north, Uzbekistan to the west along the fertile Ferghana Valley, and Tajikistan to the south. Geographic, political, and social divisions exist between the southern and northern portions of the country. This dissertation focusses on northern Kyrgyzstan.

According to the 2009 census, Kyrgyzstan's population includes nearly 5.4 million people. This includes approximately 70% Kyrgyz, 14% Uzbek, and 8% Russian. Other ethnicities include Dungans, Uyghurs, and Tajiks.³⁹ Approximately 65% live in urban areas and 35% in rural areas. The two most prominent religions are Islam and Russian Orthodox Christianity. Literacy is almost 99%. GDP per capita in 2012 was \$2,400 with 8.6% unemployment (2011 estimate).⁴⁰

While their ancient history is disputed, the Kyrgyz formed a distinct entity by the 16th century.⁴¹ They lived a nomadic lifestyle with summer and winter pastures.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Junghars and Kazaks controlled the area that is today Kyrgyzstan. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century's power transferred to the Uzbek Kokand Khanate.⁴² Many of Toshtemir's Uzbeks came to Toshtemir during this time period.⁴³ In 1876 power transferred to the Russian Empire.⁴⁴

The Soviet Union took control of the Russian Empire in 1917. In 1936 the Soviet Union created the Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic (Kirgiz SSR) and the Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic. Previously it created the Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik SSRs. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 these SSRs became independent autocratic (Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) and despotic states (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) and civil war broke out in Tajikistan in 1992.⁴⁵

Askar Akayev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Kirgiz SSR, became the first president of the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) in 1991. As previously discussed, president Akayev's administration incorporated a reinvented version of Kyrgyz *aksakal*

³⁹ "Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009," ed. National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyz Republic (Bishkek2010).

⁴⁰ "Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan," in *The World Factbook* (The Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).

⁴¹ Yuri Bregel, *An historical atlas of Central Asia* (Boston: Brill, 2003). 78.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 57-63.

⁴³ Appendix D: 02.09.12 Formal Interview with FTD.

⁴⁴ Bregel, *An historical atlas of Central Asia*: 64.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 92-96.

courts into the state judicial system.⁴⁶ Even though a newly independent country, Kyrgyzstan retained many organizational methods established during Soviet times. One Soviet legacy, for example, includes the use of law to benefit leaders rather than the people.⁴⁷ In 2005 Akayev fled office after the so called “Tulip Revolution.”⁴⁸

Kurmanbek Bakiev became the second president with promises of democratic reforms.⁴⁹ Democratic reforms did not materialize, corruption continued, and criminals intermixed with government officials. After the second revolution in 2010 Bakiev also left office, although more violently.

Roza Otunbaeva became the third president. In the power vacuum after the second revolution severe ethnic violence broke out between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in southern Kyrgyzstan. Under Otunbaeva, the country adopted a new constitution that transferred some of the powers of the president to the parliament. Therefore, unlike its Central Asian neighbors, Kyrgyzstan is moving away from super-presidentialism. President Otunbaeva voluntarily gave up power and in 2011 the people elected their fourth president, Almazbek Atambayev. This was the first peaceful electoral transfer of presidential power in post-Soviet Central Asia.⁵⁰

Kyrgyzstan’s national political divisions include: the president who is elected to a single term of six years; the parliament (*Jogorku Kenesh*) which consists of 120 deputies elected by proportional representation for five year terms; the government which consists of

⁴⁶ Beyer, "Revitalisation, Invention and Continued Existence."

⁴⁷ See, for example, Gerald Staberock, "A rule of law agenda for Central Asia," *Essex Human Rights Review* 2, no. 1 (2004): 3. ("As in many authoritarian countries, the function of law in the former Soviet Union was to allow the Government to rule. Law constituted a tool for the Communist Party to implement its policies, but could also be set aside if needed.")

⁴⁸ See, for example, Scott Radnitz, "What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?," *Journal of Democracy Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (2006).

⁴⁹ David E. Merrell, "The post-Tulip Revolution moment of constitutional reform: will Kyrgyzstan ever get a good tsar?" (University of Washington Ghallager Law Library, 2009).

⁵⁰ N. O. Borbieva, "Empowering Muslim Women: Independent Religious Fellowships in the Kyrgyz Republic," *Slavic Review* 71, no. 2 (2012): 289-90. (summarizing post-independence political history in Kyrgyzstan) See also, http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyzstan_new_president_inauguration/24407831.html.

ministries led by a prime minister; and the judiciary.⁵¹ In 2011 several political parties shared power in the parliament.⁵²

Similar to states and counties in the US, Kyrgyzstan divides its territory into oblasts and rayons. Within those boundaries independent cities and villages (*ayil*) also exist. Seven oblasts (Chui, Issyk-Kul, Naryn, Osh, Jalalabad, Batken, and Talas) and two cities (Bishkek - the capital and Osh) exist on the national level in Kyrgyzstan.⁵³ The northern (Talas, Chui, Issyk-kul, Naryn, and Bishkek City) and southern (Batken, Osh, Jalalabad, and Osh City) oblasts and cities are separated geographically, which leads to political and cultural rivalries between the north and south.⁵⁴ Most Uzbeks live in Osh city and the southern oblasts of Osh and Jalalabad. Most Uyghurs live in Bishkek city and surrounding areas.

Kyrgyzstan		
7 Oblasts	Bishkek City	Osh City

Each city has a mayor and a city council (*kenesh*). Cities can be divided into districts and quarters. Toshtemir City, for example, divides its territory into eight districts and 42 quarters with locally elected district leaders and quarter committee chairs. At least in Toshtemir, each quarter committee is supposed to have an elder's court (*aksakaldar sotu*) and a woman's committee. That does not always happen. In Soviet apartment blocks, as opposed to detached single family homes, there is a block leader ("*dom kom*") who performs the function of the quarter committee chair. In Bishkek, most people live in apartment blocks. In Toshtemir and other places outside of Bishkek, most people live in homes. There are several apartment blocks, however, in Toshtemir, but none in the *mahalla* neighborhoods.

⁵¹ Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (2010), §§ III-VI.

⁵² See, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5755.htm>. When I toured the "White House" ("*bieli dom*") where the parliament meets, the tour guide pointed out the offices of two major political parties (one was the president's) which were located near the president's office in the same building. Appendix A: 01.26.12.

⁵³ *Kyrgyzstan: Brief Statistical Handbook, 2005-2008*, (Bishkek: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2009). 7.

⁵⁴ See, for example, "Public Opinion Report: The Reform of the Internal Affairs Bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic," (Bishkek: SIAR Research and Consulting, 2012), 4. ("According to the study, the possibility of [a] civil war, . . . the separation into North and South, . . . cause concern among the population of Kyrgyzstan.")

Each apartment block is divided into several stairwells of apartments and each stairwell can elect its own leader who works under the block leader.⁵⁵

Large villages can stand alone, but smaller villages are grouped together. The number of villages in each group depends on the size of the villages. Some groups may have many small villages and others a few larger villages. Grouped villages can also have their own village leader (*ayil boshchi*). As with cities, each village or village group has an executive body (*ayil hukumati*) and a representative body (*ayil keneshi*).

Oblast	
Rayons	Cities (Mayor & City Council)
Villages / Village Groups (Village Government & Village Council)	

Each village or village group can have an elder’s court (*aksakaldar sotu*) and various committees (e.g. woman’s, youth, and veteran’s). With village groups these bodies often have representatives from the various villages in the group which serve each village collectively.⁵⁶ In one group of three villages near Toshtemir, for example, an aksakal court of seven *aksakal* judges exists. It elects *aksakal* judges from each of the three villages for five year terms. In one eight month period (February – September 2011), they only heard one case. A cow trampled neighboring crops. The aksakal elders convened, heard the stories of both sides, and fined the owner of the cow. The owner of the crops received the fine and an apology.⁵⁷

B. Toshtemir

1. Toshtemir City

Toshtemir City (pseudonym) is located in northern Kyrgyzstan. Ethnically it is very diverse. In 2011 it claimed a population of 55,157 with 72 ethnicities among which the most

⁵⁵ Appendix D: 09.22.11 Long-Term Interview with YCX, and 04.05.12 Group Interview with WKH and PYR.

⁵⁶ Appendix D: 11.01.11 Long-Term Interview with GML.

⁵⁷ Appendix D: 09.08.11 Formal Interview with SKD.

numerous include Kyrgyz (21,938), Russian (12,583), Dungan (9,649), and Uzbek (5,145).⁵⁸

To help maintain ethnic harmony it created a House of Friendship where ethnic diaspora committees maintain offices.⁵⁹

For many years the Uzbek diaspora committee included Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks. Therefore, people in Toshtemir sometimes use the term “Uzbek” to mean Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks. Due to Soviet repression of Uyghurs in Toshtemir many Uyghurs there changed their ethnicity over time to Uzbek. They did so by claiming Uzbek as the ethnicity of record of their children. The Soviets also shut down the Uyghur School in Toshtemir and forced Uyghurs in the city to attend the Uzbek school there or other non-Uyghur schools. Therefore, many Uyghurs in Toshtemir also assimilated to Uzbek customs as they learned Uzbek language and literature at the Uzbek school.

As discussed in more detail below, Toshtemir divides its territory into districts and its districts into quarters. Quarter leaders and their committees oversee payment for garbage collection, maintain neighborhood peace, and perform other neighborhood functions. Most quarter leaders that I spoke with maintained a committee and/or council of *aksakal* elders. It appears that the *aksakal* elders theoretically act in Toshtemir as the *aksakal* courts revived by President Akayev in Kyrgyzstan. While some claim that *aksakal* elders’ councils maintained significant influence in the past in Toshtemir’s *mahalla* neighborhoods,⁶⁰ most people with whom I spoke believed that they did not today.⁶¹ This conforms to Ranjbar’s findings of a declining use of *aksakal* councils for dispute processing in Kyrgyzstan.⁶²

⁵⁸ Paper presented by Bolasogun’s Vice Mayor at a June 9, 2011 conference “Between the State and Civil Society in Preventing and Resolving Ethnic Conflicts in Kyrgyzstan.” The 2009 Housing and Population Census of Kyrgyzstan lists the population as follows: Total (53,231), Kyrgyz (24,910), Russian (10,930), Dungan (8,790), Uzbek (4,556), Uyghur (923).

⁵⁹ Appendix A: 06.09.11.

⁶⁰ Appendix D: 04.13.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat, and 12.15.11 Formal Interview with MSC.

⁶¹ See, for example, Appendix D: 04.13.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat, 04.20.11 Long-Term Interview with PEG, 12.15.11 Formal Interview with MSC, 03.29.12 Group Interview with CNC, URE, JOO, and WQL, 04.19.12 Group Interview with KXJ and SWK, and 05.15.12 Informal Interview with JJC.

⁶² Ranjbar, "The declining use of *aksakal* courts in Kyrgyzstan."

Fourteen official mosques function in Toshtemir. Two main mosques exist, one at the entrance to the city and one near the bazaar market. The bazaar mosque is very popular due to its location near the bazaar. Because all ethnicities work in and frequent the bazaar, men of all ethnicities attend the bazaar mosque. For this reason people also refer to it as the Friendship Mosque.

Other mosques in town have a reputation of belonging to certain ethnic groups, despite the claim that Islam does not segregate by ethnicity. Most minority Dungans, Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks live on one end of the city near the bazaar in two *mahalla* neighborhoods. There is one mosque in each of those two neighborhoods which “Uzbeks” mainly attend. One is the Friendship mosque, which is led by an Uzbek imam and was funded by a very rich Uyghur from Toshtemir, who people there refer to as “Graf.” People sometimes refer to the other mosque as the “Uzbek” mosque even though it is led by an Uyghur imam. That mosque is also the oldest mosque in Toshtemir and so many people refer to it as the Frist Mosque. Dungan men attend five other mosques near the bazaar. One of those mosques contains Chinese Dungan architectural features.

In the power vacuum after the April 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan severe ethnic violence broke out in June 2010 between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in southern Kyrgyzstan (e.g. Osh and Jalalabad cities and Oblasts). While bandits burned Uzbek, Uyghur, and Dungan restaurants and stores in Toshtemir after the revolution in April, ethnic violence did not break out in June, despite a relatively large Uzbek population in Toshtemir. Scholars document the violence and its causes in the south. They typically, however, do not document the lack of ethnic violence in the north and reasons for that scarcity.

The multi-cultural nature of Toshtemir and the peacemaking efforts of quarter committees, ethnic diaspora committees, Muslim leaders, and others appear to have contributed to the relative peace in Toshtemir during the violent ethnic conflict in June 2010

in southern Kyrgyzstan.⁶³ Many people with whom I spoke in Toshtemir told me “We are international” or “We are a friendship city.”⁶⁴ Two Russian university students from Toshtemir who live outside of the *mahalla* neighborhoods, for example, stated that in June 2010 nobody was afraid of ethnic violence coming from within Toshtemir. “We are a small city,” “Everyone is friendly,” and “We relate with all ethnicities,” they said.⁶⁵ Rather, the fear was that people from outside of the city would come into the city to attack the Uzbeks in Toshtemir.

2. Toshtemir’s *Mahalla* Neighborhoods

As mentioned, most minority Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks in Toshtemir live on one end of the city in two *mahalla* neighborhoods. As such, the “*mahallas*” have a reputation throughout the city as the place where the “Uzbek” minorities live.⁶⁶ Many Dungans also live there. Majority Kyrgyz and Russian populations largely live in other locations.

Mahalla is an Uzbek term taken from Arabic that means quarter, district, or neighborhood in an urban area.⁶⁷ It often signifies a tight-knit urban community that shares a normative order, often led by *aksakal* elders. Due to the influence of Islamic law that does not discriminate based on ethnicity, membership in the community order was geographically based. All who lived within the geographic boundaries participated in the community order.⁶⁸ As discussed below, this is the case with Toshtemir’s *mahalla* neighborhoods today. Ittipak Uyghur *mahalla* neighborhoods in northern Kyrgyzstan, however, appear to be ethnic-based. Only Uyghurs who live within the geographic boundaries participate in the community order. Similar ethnic-based divisions may also exist in the Uzbek *mahalla* neighborhoods of southern Kyrgyzstan where ethnic tensions exist.

⁶³ See, for example, Appendix D: 01.26.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

⁶⁴ See, for example, Appendix A: 03.24.11; and Appendix D: 05.11.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

⁶⁵ Appendix D: 04.19.12 Group Interview with KXJ and SWK.

⁶⁶ See, for example, Appendix D: 04.19.12 Group Interview with KXJ and SWK; and Appendix A: 04.10.11.

⁶⁷ *O'zbekcha / Inglizcha lug'at : Uzbek / English dictionary*, trans. William Dirks (The Central Asian Heritage Group, 2005). 166; Geiss, "Mahallah and kinship relations," 97.

⁶⁸ ———, "Mahallah and kinship relations."

Each *mahalla* typically has a local name that Uzbeks use to refer to where they live. Some *mahallas* in other parts of Central Asia have distinct boundaries along with an executive committee, a women's committee, and a council of elders (*aksakals*). Respected neighborhood elders (*aksakals*) often sit on the executive committee and the elders' council. These groups perform various functions for the neighborhood including arranging wedding and death ceremonies, organizing neighborhood service projects, and mediating disputes.⁶⁹ As I present in this section, however, the *mahalla* neighborhoods in Toshtemir, and likely elsewhere in Central Asia, do not always follow this pattern.

Two main *mahalla* neighborhoods exist in Toshtemir. Large Mahalla (pseudonym) is much larger and Small Mahalla (pseudonym) appears older. The people in both neighborhoods live in courtyard homes, rather than in Soviet high rise apartment blocks. The Uzbeks (Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks) in both neighborhoods live together in solidarity as a tight-knit community. While the Dungans there are friendly with the Uzbeks, they maintain their own separate social networks.

One day my wife and I walked Small Mahalla and asked people on the streets where its borders begin and end. The people consistently told us the borders of the *mahalla* neighborhood.⁷⁰ Many people, however, who moved outside of those borders, still claim the *mahalla* as their residential identity.⁷¹ Toshtemir's bazaar roughly separates the two *mahalla* neighborhoods. Therefore, people living west of the bazaar, even if they live outside of the historical boundaries, claim Small Mahalla. Those living east of the bazaar claim Large

⁶⁹ Azita Ranjbar, "Informal justice in Tajikistan: the role of informal leaders in providing and preventing access to justice," (Eurasia Foundation, 2012); Geiss, *communal commitment and political order*: 87; 98———, "Mahallah and kinship relations."; Sievers, "Uzbekistan's Mahalla."; Giovarelli and Akmatova, "Local institutions that enforce customary law," 6; Freizer, "Neo-liberal and communal civil society in Tajikistan: merging or dividing in the post war period?," 227; Bichsel, *Conflict transformation in Central Asia: irrigation disputes in the Ferghana Valley*: 72; Marianne Kamp, "Between women and the state: Mahalla committees and social welfare in Uzbekistan," in *The transformation of Central Asia: states and societies from Soviet rule to independence*, ed. Pauline Jones Luong (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 38-39; David M. Abramson, "From Soviet to Mahalla: community and transition in post-Soviet Uzbekistan" (Dissertation, Indiana University, 1998).

⁷⁰ Appendix A: 04.10.11.

⁷¹ Appendix D: 04.14.11 and 04.20.11 Long-Term Interviews with EVT.

Mahalla. One day some Uzbek friends of mine from Large Mahalla drove me around their neighborhood and showed me its boundaries.⁷² While an outsider could not tell where the neighborhood begins and ends, they described its borders with specificity.

While attending Muslim ceremonies, which I describe below, men in the *mahalla* neighborhoods were surprised and pleased that I knew about the two neighborhoods and their boundaries. The two neighborhoods provide distinct identity markers for these men. Other smaller *mahalla* neighborhoods also exist and Uzbeks living south of the bazaar who cannot claim Large Mahalla or Small Mahalla often claim that they live in the catch-all “Middle Mahalla.” From January to September 2011 I lived with my family in Middle Mahalla. Some people in Middle Mahalla state that there are three, not two, *mahallas* in Toshtemir. This allows them to still claim a *mahalla* residence and participate in Uzbek identity.

While respected male elders (*aksakals*) exist in Toshtemir’s *mahalla* neighborhoods, they do not socially control *mahalla* inhabitants as they may have in the past. Salomat, for example, told me that *aksakal* elders socially controlled Small Mahalla during Soviet times, but that they do not maintain much control today.⁷³ When I asked her why not she stated what others stated, “Times have changed” and “We now live in the 21st Century.” She also stated that people took problems to the *aksakal* elders during Soviet times because it was forbidden to do so. Now that the prohibition no longer exists people no longer seek their help.⁷⁴ An Uyghur *aksakal* elder in the greater boundaries of Small Mahalla also told me that during Soviet times a Tajik *aksakal* elder in Small Mahalla used to prevent intermarriages between Tajiks there and people of other ethnicities. That practice changed, he said, when that *aksakal* died.⁷⁵ This shows the power of individuals to shape normative orders.

⁷² Appendix A: 04.17.11.

⁷³ See, for example, Appendix D: 04.19.11 Long-Term Interview with EVT.

⁷⁴ Appendix D: 09.08.11 Long-Term Interview with EVT.

⁷⁵ See, for example, Appendix D: 09.21.11 Formal Interview with ZAF and 09.14.11 Formal Interview with NKM.

While many claim that the *aksakal* elders have lost authority in the *mahalla* neighborhoods, a *mahalla* council of elders still exists. Most people I spoke with in Toshtemir, however, agreed that their authority is limited.⁷⁶ Somehow over time people in Toshtemir's *mahalla* neighborhoods rejected this *mahalla*-based normative order and its mediations through *aksakal* elders.⁷⁷

3. Uyghurs in Toshtemir

Uyghurs in Toshtemir sometimes state that they are different from Uyghurs in Bishkek.⁷⁸ These differences contribute to the cleavage between the two groups. Many Uyghurs in Bishkek came to Kyrgyzstan from western China in the 1950s after the Communist Party came to power in China.⁷⁹ Others came in the 1960s after incidents of repression and violent uprisings.⁸⁰ As long as the borders remained open, back and forth migrations occurred between China and the Soviet Union.⁸¹ Uyghur merchants still cross back and forth. Most Uyghurs in China today live in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China. Due to this history many of the Bishkek Uyghurs retain Uyghur culture and sentiments of Uyghur nationalism.

⁷⁶ For a discussion of elder authority in Central Asia, see Beyer, "Authority as accomplishment: intergenerational dynamics in Talas, Northern Kyrgyzstan."

⁷⁷ Ranjbar, "The declining use of *aksakal* courts in Kyrgyzstan."

⁷⁸ See, for example, Appendix D: 08.22.11 Formal Interview with IKW, and 09.08.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

⁷⁹ Appendix A: 01.14.12; Appendix D: 04.27.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat, 07.05.11 Long-Term Interview with GWH, and 09.21.11 Formal Interview with ZAF.

⁸⁰ Appendix A: 01.14.12; Appendix D: 09.14.11 Formal Interview with NKM, 09.15.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat, 02.13.12 Formal Interview with AAD, 05.23.12 Group Interview with QNI and MJQ, 05.28.12 Formal Interview with TSP; William Clark, "Ibrahim's story," *Asian Ethnicity* 12, no. 2 (2011): 208; William Carl Clark, "Convergence or divergence: Uighur family change in Urumqi" (1999), 78; Dautcher, *Down a narrow road: identity and masculinity in a Uyghur community in Xinjiang China*, 312: 241; ———, "Folklore and identity in a Uighur community in Xinjiang, China" (1999), 327; Lars Hojer, "What does it take 'to migrate'?: Uyghur perspectives from Kyrgyzstan," (2009), <http://src.auca.kg/>; James A. Millward, "In the People's Republic of China (1950s-1980s)," in *Eurasian crossroads: a history of Xinjiang* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 257.

⁸¹ For references to this migration see, Ablet Kamalov, "Uyghurs in the Central Asian Republics," in *China, Xinjiang and Central Asia history, transition and crossborder interaction into the 21st century*, ed. Colin Mackerras and Michael Clarke (London: Routledge, 2009), 117; James A. Millward, *Eurasian crossroads: a history of Xinjiang* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 264; Dautcher, "Folklore and identity in a Uighur community in Xinjiang, China," 327; Clark, "Convergence or divergence: Uighur family change in Urumqi," 78; Clark, "Ibrahim's story," 208n9; Dautcher, *Down a narrow road: identity and masculinity in a Uyghur community in Xinjiang China*, 312: 241.

The families of most Toshtemir Uyghurs, on the other hand, have lived in what is today Kyrgyzstan for many generations. These Uyghurs are more integrated into Kyrgyz society and less connected with politics in China.⁸² As discussed, many Uyghurs in Toshtemir have also taken on Uzbek identity and customs. Therefore, each group developed different norms that clashed when Ittipak Uyghurs attempted to integrate their sources of social ordering with those existing in Toshtemir.

Uyghurs refer to Uyghurs who were born in China and later came to Kyrgyzstan as *Xitoydan* (from China) Uyghurs. They refer to those who were born in Kyrgyzstan or whose ancestors have lived in Kyrgyzstan for many generations, as *yerlik* (local) Uyghurs.⁸³ Differences sometimes exist between *yerlik* Uyghurs, who make up many of the Uyghurs in Toshtemir, and *Xitoydan* Uyghurs, who make up many of the Uyghurs in Bishkek.⁸⁴ Those differences surfaced as a point of resistance when Ittipak tried to maintain a stronghold in Toshtemir. Migrant Uyghurs who come from China on a temporary basis to conduct business in Kyrgyzstan form a third category of Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan.⁸⁵

One incident that caused many Uyghurs to migrate to Kyrgyzstan from China occurred on May 29, 1962. On that date the Chinese government violently repressed riots in Ghulja (Yining), China that resulted from a border dispute.⁸⁶ Some of the Uyghurs in Toshtemir and Bishkek that I met witnessed that incident and one wrote an article about it in

⁸² See, for example, Appendix D: 02.09.11 and 03.02.11 Long-Term Interviews with Salomat, 07.05.11 Long-Term Interview with GWH, and 07.08.11 Formal Interview with RWL.

⁸³ Sean R. Roberts, "Toasting Uyghurstan: negotiating stateless nationalism in transnational ritual space," *Journal of Ritual Studies* 18, no. 2 (2004): 88. See also, Appendix D: 02.09.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

⁸⁴ See, for example, Appendix D: 10.13.11 Long-Term Interview with EVT and 11.29.11 Formal Interview with PNF.

⁸⁵ Hojer, "What does it take 'to migrate'?: Uyghur perspectives from Kyrgyzstan"; See also, Roberts, "Toasting Uyghurstan: negotiating stateless nationalism in transnational ritual space," 88.

⁸⁶ Kamalov, "Uyghurs in the Central Asian Republics," 117; Millward, "Eurasian crossroads," 264.

the Ittipak newspaper.⁸⁷ Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan commemorate that incident on its anniversary each year in Bishkek and elsewhere on other special occasions.⁸⁸

On May 29, 2012, I attended the 50th anniversary remembrance hosted by Ittipak and attended by many senior Uyghur men and women, including some eye witnesses of the event.⁸⁹ The eyewitnesses shared their accounts of the event. The ceremony, however, quickly turned into a very long report of the 4th World Congress of Uyghurs from those who represented Ittipak at the Congress in Japan. They showed a video of Ittipak leaders at the Congress meeting Rabiya Kadeer, the fugitive leader from China of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). Rabiya Kadeer and the WUC represent Uyghurs worldwide in their struggle to establish Uyghurstan as a nation independent from China. While Ittipak supports the sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan, the attention it placed that day on the WUC shows its interest in preserving Uyghur nationalism in Kyrgyzstan.

As their ancestors have lived in Toshtemir for many generations, *yerlik* (local) Uyghurs in Toshtemir, do not as readily identify with the WUC, Rabiya Kadeer, or events like the May 29, 1962 Ghulja uprising / massacre. This presents a wedge in relationships between the two groups.

Soviet repressions under Stalin's rule led many people in Toshtemir to change their passport ethnicity from Uyghur to Uzbek and contributed to a cultural shift towards Uzbekness in the Toshtemir *mahalla* neighborhoods where many Uzbeks live.⁹⁰ For many years the Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks in Toshtemir shared the same diaspora committee. They all joined together in the Uzbek committee. People in Toshtemir often told me "We are

⁸⁷ See, for example, Appendix D: 02.13.12 Formal Interview with AAD and 05.23.12 Group Interview with QNI and MIQ; and Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 205, 14 (2012).

⁸⁸ See, for example, Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 193, 3 (2011) and Appendix D: 09.14.11 Formal Interview with NKM.

⁸⁹ Appendix A: 05.29.12.

⁹⁰ See, for example, Appendix D: 02.09.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat and 07.07.11 Group Interview with GWH and OGK; and Appendix A: 07.09.11.

international.”⁹¹ Thus, unless pressed for more details, many Uyghurs and Tajiks in Toshtemir assume the label of Uzbek. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, the term “Uzbek” in this study means the Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks in Toshtemir, most of whom live in the *mahalla* neighborhoods which are located on one end of the city.

The Kyrgyzstan constitution grants citizens the right to choose their own ethnicity.⁹² Citizens typically make that choice when they turn 16 and receive their passport which lists their ethnicity, but they can also change it later in life. The 2009 census reports roughly 4500 Uzbeks and 1400 Uyghurs in Toshtemir. Many Uyghurs whose families did not make the shift to Uzbek ethnicity claim that the “true” numbers are or used to be the opposite; 1400 Uzbeks and 4500 Uyghurs.⁹³ Some state that many Tajiks in Toshtemir also changed their passport ethnicity to Uzbek.⁹⁴

The immediate past president of the Uzbek diaspora committee in Toshtemir, for example, is Tajik (the current and immediate past directors of the Uzbek school are Uyghur). His wife and children, however, are Uzbek, which departs from the custom for children to take the ethnicity of their father. He said that when people of many ethnicities came to Toshtemir their children started claiming Uzbek ethnicity and that the Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks there share the same culture and customs.⁹⁵

One seventy year old Uyghur quarter committee elder (*aksakal*) in Toshtemir’s greater Small Mahalla has an interesting history. His father came from China to Kyrgyzstan as a merchant in the 1920s, but due to border closures he remained in Kyrgyzstan and married an Uyghur woman from Ghulja (Yining), China. He was born in Toshtemir in 1941 and seven days later his father left to fight for the Soviet Union in World War II, but he never

⁹¹ See, for example, Appendix A: 03.24.11; and Appendix D: 05.11.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

⁹² Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (2010), § II, Art. 20, 38.

⁹³ See, for example, Appendix D: 09.02.11 Formal Interview with EBI.

⁹⁴ Appendix D: 09.08.11 Informal Interview with CEN and 09.22.11 Long-Term Interview with EVT.

⁹⁵ Appendix D: 06.15.12 Formal Interview with LFP.

returned. Due to the inequality of Uyghurs at the time they listed Uzbek as their children's passport ethnicity.⁹⁶

As others, these two elders of Toshtemir agree that their language and customs are “Toshtemirlik” (Toshtemirness), not “Uzbek,” “Uyghur,” or “Tajik.”⁹⁷ This allows them to join in a community-based unity that does not discriminate based on ethnicity. This hearkens back to the days before the Soviets invented Central Asian ethnicities when people there identified themselves as being from a city or region rather than from an ethnicity. Claiming “Toshtemirlik” rather than separating out Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks helps to preserve a perception of unity. Such perceptions played an important role in the normative cleavage between Toshtemir and Ittipak Uyghurs.

Interestingly, one Uyghur quarter committee chair in Toshtemir told me that after the June 2010 ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in southern Kyrgyzstan, some Uzbeks in her quarter changed their passport ethnicity to Kyrgyz. She knows this because they had to come to her for proof of residency in order to change their passport. She also said that after Kyrgyzstan's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 some Uzbeks changed their ethnicity to Uyghur to better conduct trade in China. Uzbeks change their ethnicity to Kyrgyz, I assume, to avoid perceived or real ethnic discrimination after the June 2010 ethnic violence.⁹⁸ One Uzbek community elder (*aksakal*) from southern Kyrgyzstan, for example, claims that on a trip to Kazakhstan to find work a Kyrgyz border agent told him to get back in the end of a long line after the agent saw his Uzbek passport ethnicity. Instead, however, he paid a bribe to get through.

⁹⁶ Appendix D: 09.21.11 Formal Interview with ZAF.

⁹⁷ See, for example, Appendix D: 08.17.11 Long-Term Interview with GWH, 09.14.11 Formal Interview with NKM; 09.21.11 Formal Interview with ZAF, 05.15.12 Informal Interview with JJC; 06.15.12 Formal Interview with LFP; 12.13.12 Long-Term Interview with YAN.

⁹⁸ Rein Müllerson, "The Kyrgyz tragedy: particular and general," *Chinese Journal of International Law* 10(2011).

C. Salomat Alimova

Salomat Alimova (pseudonym) is a prominent minority Uyghur Muslim woman from Toshtemir City in northern Kyrgyzstan. She grew up in Small Mahalla and now lives in its greater boundaries in. She comes from a *yerlik* (local) Uyghur family with long roots in Toshtemir. Nevertheless, she obtained a diploma in Uzbek language and literature in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, served as the director of the only Uzbek school in Toshtemir for 25 years where she also taught Uzbek language and literature, and served as secretary of the Toshtemir Uzbek diaspora committee. While she is Uyghur she assumes Uzbek cultural identity. She is also Muslim and a former Communist Party member. Therefore, Salomat is a good example of Uyghur assimilation to Uzbek culture in Toshtemir.

With these public roles she gained respect in her community and became acquainted with most of the Uzbek families and their problems and how they try to resolve them. She was also invited to most of the Uzbek weddings and, therefore, knows the community's marriage practices, including spousal abuse and bridal abductions.

Even though she directed the Uzbek school for 25 years, served as secretary for the Uzbek diaspora committee, and claims Uzbek culture, Salomat is, nevertheless, very proud of her Uyghur ethnicity. She cried while telling me how Soviets under Stalin purged her grandfather because of his wealth and his Uyghur ethnicity and how her family does not know where or when he died. Because of political tensions with Uyghurs in China, Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan still experience occasional discrimination. Due to her Uyghur ethnicity the Kyrgyzstan secret police once detained Salomat in the airport and prevented her from visiting friends in Germany. This continues to happen on occasion to Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, Salomat does not, as many other Uyghurs in Toshtemir do not, promote Uyghur nationalism or other Uyghur-based norms like *Ittipak*. Rather, she promotes inter-ethnic unity and neighborhood-based norms in Toshtemir.

Several events in her life also affected her sociolegal outlook and changed the course of her life. While studying in Tashkent her brother died in a motorcycle accident and this prompted her to return to Toshtemir, rather than stay there to work. Later in life she lost her entire life's savings in a violent robbery in which the robbers held her and her family at gun point. She also facilitated her daughter's divorce after her daughter suffered severe physical spousal abuse.

In my many interviews with Salomat I based my initial questions on the work of Genn and asked how people in Salomat's community solve problems.⁹⁹ Over time, however, it became apparent to me that her responses to my questions about solving everyday problems showed how she and others in her community shape their normative environment.

Salomat, as many others in Kyrgyzstan, tried to to avoid the state when processing disputes. She processed neighborhood disputes through community channels outside of the state legal system. In her narrative of one street cleaning dispute, for example, she describes how she appeals to her woman quarter committee chair:

I want to get out and go to my quarter committee chair Lola's to request that she speak to them because they must clean the edge of the street which is very dirty. This is our problem now. In order to solve this problem, of course, we need to ask our quarter committee chair for help.¹⁰⁰

While she appealed to her woman quarter committee chair in this and other instances for help, Salomat claims that people in her community no longer appeal to respected male elders, who maintained social control of her neighborhood during Soviet times (see Chapter 5). In our communications Salomat introduced me to many women to interview, but despite repeated requests she never introduced me to any prominent men in her community. These actions match Salomat's rhetoric of gender equality. She was a Communist Party member and she often told me how the Soviets introduced gender equality to Central Asia.

⁹⁹ Genn, *Paths to justice*; See also, Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, *The common place of law: stories from everyday life*, Language and legal discourse (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

¹⁰⁰ Recorded by Salomat on 04.07.11; Corrected by Salomat on 04.19.11 and 10.12.11.

In 2008, however, when Salomat and her family were robbed of their life savings at gun point in their home, she was forced to work with the state legal system. Even then, as a believing Muslim, she placed her trust in God, not the state, by confronting her robbers in an eye witness line-up with a threat that they will receive punishment from God. The robbers robbed fourteen families and murdered many people, but Salomat's family was preserved alive. As she states, "Why is it that we were so completely protected? God preserved our lives."¹⁰¹ The following is her exchange with her robbers during an interrogation, "'Do you remember hitting me,' I said to him. 'No, I didn't hit you,' he said. Then, I said to him, 'My strength is not enough for you, I cannot do anything, however, God will find you.'"¹⁰²

In about 2006 Salomat secured her daughter's divorce. The first time Salomat's son-in-law beat her daughter she warned him that she would encourage a divorce. After the second time Salomat fulfilled her words and helped her daughter obtain a state divorce. Just before the divorce, however, Salomat's attorney along with the local imam and a respected male community elder (*aksakal*) came to Salomat's home to plead for reconciliation. Due to gender segregation they initially spoke with Salomat's husband and father of her daughter. They quickly realized that Salomat was in charge and asked her to come out and speak with them. Despite their pleas for reconciliation she pressed forward with the divorce.

As spousal abuse is a major problem in Kyrgyzstan,¹⁰³ Salomat's actions made a social statement that women should not tolerate spousal abuse and that divorce is one possible remedy. As she moved forward with divorce, however, she stopped short of encouraging her daughter to press charges for abuse against her abusive

¹⁰¹ Recorded by Salomat on 04.05.11; Corrected by Salomat on 04.13.11 and 10.12.11.

¹⁰² Written by Salomat on 11.10.11; Corrected by Salomat on 12.01.11.

since God, not the state, preserved her life. Hartog, *Man and wife in America*: 41

¹⁰³ See, for example, Appendix D: 08.09.11 Formal Interview with EAE.

husband. When I asked why, Salomat stated: “We do not turn people over to the police. Toshtemir is small, everyone knows each other, and we don’t want rumors.”

Salomat’s position as director of the Uzbek school allowed her to move forward with the divorce without fear of community shame. As she states: “In Toshtemir many people knew of the divorce, however, they are afraid of me. Therefore, they did not ask me about it because I was the director of the Uzbek school.”

The divorce of her daughter after severe spousal abuse and the robbery of her life savings at gun point caused Salomat severe physical and emotional distress. This drove her to retire early as director of the Uzbek school. For a few years after retiring as the director she continued to teach Uzbek language and literature. It was at this period in her life that I met Salomat as my Uzbek teacher. Now Salomat has also retired as a teacher from the Uzbek school and she now enjoys her grandchildren and catching up on performing daily prayers.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Appendix D: 11.02.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

Part I: How Does Ittipak Create Uyghur Sources of Authority in Kyrgyzstan? (National Perspective – Uyghur-Based Norms)

In the summer of 2011 I studied Uyghur in Toshtemir City (pseudonym) in northern Kyrgyzstan. Through my Uyghur teacher, I met Nazira (pseudonym), a very active young Uyghur woman from Toshtemir. Nazira is very proud of her Uyghur heritage and, unlike many Uyghurs in Toshtemir, she highly values Uyghur nationalism.

Uyghurs, like Nazira, live as minorities in northern Kyrgyzstan where many of their families came after fleeing from political persecution in western China. As Uyghurs lack a titular nation (e.g. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan), many of them maintain strong sources of social ordering in northern Kyrgyzstan. One of those sources is the “Ittipak” Uyghur Society of Kyrgyzstan. Ittipak is the national Uyghur diaspora committee in the Kyrgyzstan Assembly of Nations, a state body created to promote minority cultures and inter-ethnic harmony. To varying degrees Ittipak maintains national-, city-, neighborhood-, and street-level representatives. These representatives promote Uyghur culture and unity, process disputes, and help maintain peace with other ethnicities in Kyrgyzstan. This builds Ittipak authority among Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan and creates a normative environment to different degrees on the national, city, neighborhood, and street levels.

While pursuing university studies in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, Nazira worked for Ittipak. In the course of her work at Ittipak she saw cultural celebrations and other Uyghur events sponsored by Ittipak in other cities, but not in Toshtemir, her own city. Therefore, she asked Ittipak leaders about this disparity. They advised her to consult Uyghur leaders in Toshtemir to see if they want to hold an election for an Ittipak representative in their city. Among those leaders were Baxtiyar (pseudonym), a successful Uyghur businessman, and Kenesh (pseudonym), an Uyghur city politician. Baxtiyar shared Nazira’s desire to extend Ittipak’s influence to Toshtemir, but Kenesh and others did not. Despite the

opposition, the election proceeded in 2002. Baxtiyar and Kenesh ran against each other and Kenesh won as the Ittipak representative in Toshtemir.

As with many disputes in Kyrgyzstan, allegations of corruption surround this election. Baxtiyar and others like Nazira claim that Kenesh paid a bribe to win. They even claim that after the election Kenesh boasted to Baxtiyar that he paid a bribe to win. Baxtiyor, however, claims that he refused to buy his position and, therefore, lost. Some also claim that Kenesh rose to power due to his relationship with “Graf,” a very rich Uyghur man from Toshtemir. As many mixed ethnicity families live in Toshtemir, another issue with the election was deciding who could vote. Some people voted while others in the same did not family due to their stated ethnicity.

Regardless of the fairness of the election, Kenesh was among those Uyghurs in Toshtemir who did not want an Ittipak presence in their city. Therefore, even though he became Ittipak’s representative, he refused to work with Ittipak. Through his inaction Kenesh usurped the election. He thwarted the intent of Nazira and Baxtiyor in Toshtemir and Ittipak leaders in Bishkek to extend Ittipak’s authority to Uyghurs in Toshtemir.¹⁰⁵

Based on my discussions with them, Nazira and Ittipak leaders are frustrated with this result and still hope to extend Ittipak authority to Toshtemir. Others in Toshtemir regret the election ever took place. Prior to the election Uyghurs joined Uzbeks and Tajiks under the Uzbek diaspora committee in Toshtemir. Now a partial split exists in this unity. Even though Kenesh does not allow Ittipak authority to penetrate Toshtemir and its *mahalla* neighborhoods, he is still the elected Uyghur leader in Toshtemir.

Nevertheless he seeks to maintain inter-ethnic unity in Toshtemir. Such efforts at maintaining inter-ethnic unity may explain why relative peace existed in Toshtemir during

¹⁰⁵ Sally Engle Merry, "Anthropology, law, and transnational processes," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 21, no. 1 (1992): 366. (This is similar to Merry’s summary that people sometimes "usurp control of local courts by taking over management positions, reinterpreting rules, controlling access, and resisting supervision (78, 171, 190).")

the ethnic violence of 2010 in southern Kyrgyzstan. Some in Toshtemir refer to this unity as “Toshtemirlik,” identity in, and allegiance to, the social fabric of one’s location rather than one’s ethnicity. Many of Toshtemir’s minorities live on one end of the city in neighborhoods they refer to as *mahallas* (Central Asian urban neighborhood). Therefore, this unity is mostly focused in the *mahalla* neighborhoods.

In addition to diaspora committees and “Toshtemirlik,” other aspects of life in Toshtemir’s *mahalla* neighborhoods reflect this unity. Male and female Muslim leaders of different ethnicities, for example, lead inter-ethnic Muslim ceremonies. Inter-ethnic quarter committees also provide neighborhood services. This dissertation explores these and other aspects of neighborhood-based unity in Toshtemir. It argues that such unity prompted Kenesh and other Uyghurs to reject Ittipak’s Uyghur-based sources of social ordering. This creation and rejection of Ittipak authority is one example of how minority Uyghurs help shape normative pluralism in northern Kyrgyzstan.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, 03.29.12 Group Interview with CNC, URE, JOO, and WQL, 07.07.11 Group Interview with GWH and OGK, 08.17.11 Long-Term Interview with GWH, 08.25.11, 09.28.11, and 11.02.11 Long-Term Interviews with Salomat, 09.02.11 Long-Term Interview with OGK, 09.14.11 Formal Interview with NKM, 06.15.12 Formal Interview with LFP, and 12.13.12 Long-Term Interview with YAN.

Chapter 3 – How Does Ittipak Create and Maintain an Uyghur Normative Order?

A. The Kyrgyzstan Assembly of Nations

The Kyrgyzstan National Assembly of Nations (*Assambleya Naroda*, the Assembly or the Assembly of Nations) is a state-sponsored entity through the Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Culture. Each major ethnicity in Kyrgyzstan maintains membership in the Assembly, in the form of a national diaspora committee or cultural center.¹⁰⁷ The Assembly seeks to help preserve ethnic traditions and promote inter-ethnic unity in Kyrgyzstan. During the presidencies of Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiev, the government appointed the president of the Assembly of nations. During the presidency of Roza Otunbaeva, however, the diaspora committees elected their own president.¹⁰⁸

The Assembly meets periodically as a whole body in a conference of nations known as a *kurultai* (Turkic word from the root *qur-*, which means to build). The Seventh Kurultai of the Assembly occurred on June 18, 2011. President Otunbaeva presided and more than 800 delegates attended from across the country. In addition to representatives of the diaspora committees, delegates included members of Parliament, regional political leaders, and representatives of private organizations. Diaspora committees also met individually as a group during these proceedings. The “Ittipak” Uyghur Society of Kyrgyzstan, for example, elected its current national president during the Seventh Kurultai of the Assembly.¹⁰⁹

An attractive building in the center of Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, houses the Assembly and contains a room for each ethnicity. This building prominently sits next to the national Museum and the main Ala-Too square where people celebrate holidays and hold political demonstrations.

¹⁰⁷ Appendix A: 10.06.11 and 10.08.11.

¹⁰⁸ See for example, Appendix D: 06.12.12 Group Interview with RKE, HXW, and GEM.

¹⁰⁹ Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 194, 1-2 (2011).

On various visits to the Assembly of Nations I spoke with representatives from the Assembly's executive committee and Uyghur, Uzbek, Tajik, and Tatar diaspora committees.¹¹⁰ Each ethnicity adorns its office with a mix of books, photographs, musical instruments, clothing, flags, and other items representing their culture and titular nation (e.g. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, but also Tatarstan and Uyghurstan). The Tajik diaspora committee, for example displays Tajik books, photos of Tajikistan, and traditional Tajik clothing. The diaspora committees also host cultural events and provide resources to their members. The Tatar committee, for example, provides annual scholarships for Tatar citizens of Kyrgyzstan to attend a university in Kazan, Tatarstan, Russia.

The Assembly of Nations provides a medium through which Ittipak can thrive. Without the Assembly Ittipak would not survive. In return Ittipak maintains loyalty to Kyrgyzstan and does not outwardly promote Uyghur separatism in China. To ensure such loyalty executive leaders of the Assembly of Nations keep track of Ittipak actions. They attend, for example, Ittipak social functions where Ittipak displays the Kyrgyz flag and leads the audience in the national anthem of Kyrgyzstan.

B. The “Ittipak” Uyghur Society of Kyrgyzstan

In December 1989 the “Ittipak” Uyghur Society of Kyrgyzstan (Ittipak; literally “unity”) was formed. Through the Assembly of Nations Ittipak formally represents Uyghurs on a national level in Kyrgyzstan. Ittipak's office in the Assembly of Nations displays a flag of Uyghurstan, an unrealized nation, along with Uyghur books, musical instruments, and other cultural items. Ittipak plays an important role in preserving Uyghur language, culture, and traditions in Kyrgyzstan.¹¹¹ To do so it maintains a network of people in Kyrgyzstan who promote social ordering based on Uyghur traditions. This social network consists of

¹¹⁰ See, for example, Appendix A: 07.08.11, 08.09.11, 10.06.11, 01.14.11, 03.10.12, 05.21.12, 05.22.12, and 06.12.12.

¹¹¹ Appendix C; and Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 176, 2 (2009).

national-, city-, neighborhood-, and street-level elected individuals, including male Uyghur elders who process disputes. The network is particularly strong in many areas in and near Bishkek. Not all Uyghurs in Bishkek, however, affiliate with Ittipak.

The national level executive committee includes a president, vice president, and secretary. A national level women’s committee, male *aksakal* elder’s council, and *yigit beshi* (head man of a *mahalla* neighborhood)¹¹² committee also exist alongside education, culture, poetry, art, youth, sports, and other committees.¹¹³ The following chart depicts Ittipak’s levels of social ordering:

National Level	Executive Committee (president, vice president, secretary)
	Other committees (women’s, male elder’s, <i>yigit beshi</i> , education, culture, poetry, art, youth, sports, etc.)
City Level	Male city leader (<i>shoebe rais</i>)
Neighborhood Level	<i>Yigit beshi</i> (head man), women’s committee, elder’s council
Street Level	Women’s committee street representatives


According to the ideal model, the city level includes a male city president (*shoebe rais*) and the neighborhood (*mahalla*) level includes a male leader (*yigit beshi*, literally “head man”), a women’s committee, and an *aksakal* elders’ council. Some women’s committee representatives also exist on the street level. Street-level representatives, for example, can collect money for local funerals and the poor and pass that up to the neighborhood representative.¹¹⁴ In locations near Bishkek where Uyghurs are sparsely populated, these leaders organize social events, collect money for the poor and needy, and help process disputes. Of course, variations exist in this ideal description.¹¹⁵ Along with Ittipak media (e.g. newspaper, cultural events), as depicted in the following chart, each of these groups promote Uyghur-based norms.

¹¹² Roberts, "Everyday Negotiations of Islam in Central Asia: Practicing Religion in the Uyghur Neighborhood of Zarya Vostoka in Almaty, Kazakhstan."

¹¹³ Appendix D: 07.08.11 Formal Interview with NFU.

¹¹⁴ Appendix D: 11.07.11 Formal Interview with FMI; and 11.07.11 Formal Interview with MSH.

¹¹⁵ Appendix C.



1. Ittipak Presidents

The following chart lists the Ittipak presidents:¹¹⁶

Date	President
1989-1996	Kenjiev Nurmuhemmet
1996-2000	Nighmet Bazakov
2001-2007	Abdulbakipev Rozimuhemmet
2007-2011	Dil'murat Akbarov
2011-	Artiq haji Xadjiev

Artiq haji Xadjiev and his vice president, Jamaldin Nasirov, were elected at the Seventh Kurultai (national congress) on 9 April 2011.¹¹⁷ Shortly after their election many new Ittipak city and *mahalla* neighborhood leaders were also elected. As listed in the chart below, the Ittipak newspaper ran stories of such elections just after Artiq haji was elected as president. It did not, however, run stories of local elections immediately before or several months after his election. Many of the stories state that Artiq haji himself conducted the election along with the national Ittipak *yigit beshi* and that the former leader “resigned” due

¹¹⁶ Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 176, 2 (2009); and Appendix C.

¹¹⁷ Appendix C.

to “health problems.”¹¹⁸ Therefore, it appears that Artiq haji may have influenced their resignations and “selected” many of his own leaders. Through such processes, Ittipak maintains its authority among Uyghurs in northern Kyrgyzstan. As discussed below, however, Ittipak was not able to wield its influence in selecting, or dismissing once he came to power, Toshtemir’s Ittipak leader (*shoebe rais*).

Date	Position	Source ¹¹⁹
9 April 2011	Artiq haji Xadjiev elected as the new Ittipak President	07.08.11 Formal Interview with Artiq haji
29 April 2011	Almazbek Turdipev elected as the Kara-Balta city <i>shoebe rais</i>	Ittipak Newspaper 193, 14
15 May 2011	Hajimhammad Tilibaev elected as the Chet Kol village <i>yigit beshi</i>	Ittipak Newspaper 193, 14
21 May 2011	Yarmuhammad Aysaevni elected as the Ken Bulun village <i>yigit beshi</i>	Ittipak Newspaper 193, 15
29 May 2011	Abdumejit Nabiev elected as the Lebedinovka <i>yigit beshi</i>	Ittipak Newspaper 193, 3
17 July 2011	Abdurahman oghli Jahanov elected as Nova Pokrovka village <i>yigit beshi</i>	Ittipak Newspaper 195, 14
28 November 2011	Ayupjon Yakubovni elected as the Lebedinovka <i>yigit beshi</i> (Abdumejit Nabiev resigned due to work concerns)	Ittipak Newspaper 200, 2
21 March 2012	Toxtiev Abdujelil elected as Belevodskoe village <i>yigit beshi</i>	Ittipak Newspaper 206, 11

2. Ittipak *Mahalla* Neighborhoods

Ittipak follows state political boundaries and local naming conventions to define its *mahalla* neighborhoods. They include major areas where Uyghurs live, but do not necessarily form a tight neighborhood bounded by walls that define the *mahalla* neighborhood. Many *mahallas* exist in the greater Bishkek area, each ideally with a *yigit beshi*, women’s committee, and elder’s council. The following chart lists some of those areas defined by city, microdistrict, and neighborhood:¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ See, for example, Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 195, 14 (2011).

¹¹⁹ Appendix C and D.

¹²⁰ Appendix C; and Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 176, 3 (2009).

Cities	Microdistricts	Neighborhoods
Novapakovka	Alamadin-1	Tokuldosh
Lebedinovka	Vostok-5	Tetz
Ala-Too	Vostok-6	Karpinka
Ken-Bulun		Vakonbayeva
KokJar		Ataya-Ogonbaeva
Vostok		
Komsomol		
Chet-Kol		
Malovodnoe		
Belovodskoe		

3. Ittipak *Yigit Beshi*

Ittipak *yigit beshi* act as the elected representatives of Uyghurs living in locally defined communities that Ittipak refers to as “*mahalla* neighborhoods.” Again, the neighborhoods are not necessarily Uyghur neighborhoods or Ittipak creations. Ittipak political boundaries simply mirror local community boundaries. Therefore, even though high concentrations of Uyghurs may exist in some neighborhoods, the Uyghurs live among people of all ethnicities. Dungan, Kyrgyz, Russian, and Tatar populations, for example, live alongside 400 Uyghur families in one neighborhood outside of Bishkek. Approximately 2500 Uyghurs live in that “*mahalla*” neighborhood out of about a total of 7000 people.¹²¹

In these neighborhoods, Ittipak *yigit beshi* leaders organize weddings, funerals, and cultural events; collect money for Ittipak; work with the leaders of *meshrep* social gatherings for men (also called *yigit beshi*); and maintain peace among Uyghurs and with other ethnicities. As discussed below with Ruslan and Mirlan they also perform other important functions for Uyghurs in their communities. To fulfill these responsibilities for Uyghurs in their neighborhoods, Ittipak *yigit beshi* leaders sometimes work with other political and community leaders like quarter committees and *aksakal* elders’ court judges.¹²²

¹²¹ Appendix D: 05.23.12 Group Interview with QNI and MJQ.

¹²² Appendix D: 05.23.12 Group Interview with QNI and MJQ; 05.23.12 Long-Term Interview with PEE; 05.24.12 Group Interview with nine Uyghur *aksakal* elders; 05.28.12 Formal Interview with MHL; and 05.28.12 Formal Interview with TSP.

Ruslan (pseudonym), the *yigit beshi* leader of an Uyghur apartment block community outside of Bishkek, organized Uyghurs to fund and construct a building (*to 'yxona*) for hosting wedding and funeral celebrations in his neighborhood. About 200 Uyghur families live in his *mahalla* neighborhood, which consists of a few Soviet era high rise concrete apartment blocks. While people of other ethnicities also live there, people refer to his group of apartment blocks as the Uyghur Quarter (*Uyghurski Quadrat*). They constructed the wedding hall, along with a small mosque, in the courtyard below the apartment blocks. As Uyghurs there live in apartment blocks, not courtyard houses, there is no room to host wedding and funereal celebrations and it can be very expensive to host them in restaurants. Now, for a small fee, people can rent the building, which contains tables, chairs, tea cups, plates, cooking space, and other necessary items to host wedding and funeral celebrations.¹²³

Ruslan tells an interesting story about how he secured the construction of the mosque in 1994-95. With the help of Almazbek Atambayev, he received a construction permit from the mayor. Almazbek is now the president of Kyrgyzstan, but at the time he was a deputy in Parliament. Ruslan told Almazbek that he would gather Uyghur votes in return for his help. Almazbek agreed and so Ruslan told Uyghurs to vote for Almazbek and they did and Almazbek won. Ruslan also received materials and workers from Saudi Arabia for the construction. Ruslan also spoke with the Grand Mufti of Kyrgyzstan to secure an Uyghur mullah for the mosque. Nevertheless, the mosque serves all ethnicities. A committee of seven people from several ethnicities (Dungan, Kyrgyz, Uyghur, etc.), for example, decide how to distribute alms money to the poor. The mosque also contains a *madrassa* school, where boys and girls can attend classes at different times.¹²⁴

Similarly, Mirlan (pseudonym), another *yigit beshi* leader, secured the construction of a mosque for his *mahalla* neighborhood outside of Bishkek. Mirlan and other Uyghur

¹²³ Appendix D: 05.23.12 Long-Term Interview with PEE; and 05.28.12 Formal Interview with MHL.

¹²⁴ Appendix D: 05.28.12 Formal Interview with MHL.

aksakal elders collect alms when men come to mosque for the two Muslim holidays. With that money they pay the mosque mullah, muezzin, cleaning women, security, technician, and secretary. They also give money to the poor to help them pay for their electricity and other needs. While they built the mosque (in 1991) and clearly run it, the muftiate appointed a Kyrgyz mullah. People appeal to them, however, and not the mullah with disputes.¹²⁵ This work of Mirlan and Ruslan shows the importance of Ittipak *yigit beshi* and what they can accomplish for their people.

Three levels of Ittipak *yigit beshi* leaders exist. On the smallest level, each *meshrep* social gathering for Uyghur men (described below) elects its own *yigit beshi* leader. The Uyghurs in each *mahalla* neighborhood elect a *yigit beshi* leader, the topic of this section. Finally, the *yigit beshi* of each *mahalla* neighborhood sits on the national *yigit beshi* committee. In 2012, Imerjan Hamraev, Ittipak's national head *yigit beshi*, led that committee.¹²⁶ It appears that the *yigit beshi* position predates Ittipak and that Ittipak tries, with varying degrees of success, to enroll these leaders into its social order.

Yigit beshi leadership elections typically occur on an as needed basis. When local Uyghurs (or Ittipak leaders as discussed above) are ready for a new leader they hold an election. Otherwise the leader can remain in office for several years. Ruslan, for example, was elected in 1987 and remained in power for 25 years. His election came before the creation of Ittipak and so his position was clearly adopted by Ittipak.

Occasionally, Ittipak hosts *yigit beshi* day festivities in Bishkek where it gives awards to *yigit beshi* leaders who performed exceptionally well according to Ittipak expectations. Such awards allow Ittipak to promote its social model. Ittipak granted the awards based on the following five criteria:

¹²⁵ Appendix D: 05.23.12 Group Interview with QNI and MJQ.

¹²⁶ Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 193, 14 (2011); and Appendix C.

- 1) solving family and ethnic conflicts;
- 2) gathering membership dues;
- 3) delivering the Ittipak newspaper;
- 4) organizing cultural events; and
- 5) performing other important activities.¹²⁷

In line with the first criteria of a “good” *yigit beshi* leader, Artiq Haji, Ittipak’s national president, told me that the *yigit beshi*’s first duty is to solve conflicts. Of course, he also appreciated those who distributed the Ittipak newspaper and collected funds.¹²⁸ While it is unclear to what extent people refer disputes to Ittipak leaders, the *yigit beshi* leaders that I spoke with confirmed that they process disputes among Uyghurs in their *mahalla* neighborhoods.¹²⁹ Future research can determine to what extent Uyghurs use Ittipak elders to process disputes and whether a declining use exists as with Kyrgyz populations.¹³⁰

Some Uyghur male elders I spoke with agreed that *yigit beshi* leaders process disputes, but they claimed that they, the *aksakal* elders, process most of the Uyghur disputes in their neighborhood (e.g. family and small crimes).¹³¹ As other male elders they encourage disputing spouses to reconcile with each other.¹³² In line with their contention, Ruslan, the *yigit beshi* leader of this group of elders, said he processed about two to three disputes per year in his 25 years as the leader. When mediating disputes he spends several hours with the parties. He talks to each party separately and then together to resolve the problem. For bride

¹²⁷ Appendix D: 07.08.11 Formal Interview with NFU.

¹²⁸ Appendix D: 07.08.11 Formal Interview with NFU.

¹²⁹ Appendix D: 05.28.12 Formal Interview with MHL; 05.23.12 Group Interview with QNI and MJQ; 05.23.12 Long-Term Interview with PEE; 05.24.12 Group Interview with nine Uyghur *aksakal* elders; and 05.28.12 Formal Interview with TSP.

¹³⁰ Ranjbar, "The declining use of aksakal courts in Kyrgyzstan."

¹³¹ Appendix D: 05.24.12 Group Interview with nine male Uyghur elders.

¹³² Cynthia Alkon, "The increased use of 'reconciliation' in criminal cases in Central Asia: a sign of restorative justice, reform or cause for concern?," *Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal* 8(2007); ———, "The increased use of reconciliation in criminal cases in Central Asia: a sign of reform or cause for concern?," *19th International Conference of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law*(2005), <http://www.isrcl.org/>; "Reconciled to violence: state failure to stop domestic abuse and abduction of women in Kyrgyzstan," *Human Rights Watch* 18, no. (9)(D) (2006), http://www.crinorg/docs/hrw_kryg.pdf; <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/kyrgyzstan0906/3.htm>.

kidnapping cases he convinces the victim's parents that the abductor and his parents are good people. He also asks the abductor's family to ask forgiveness and the victim's family to give permission for the marriage.¹³³ After this exchange they arrange for the Muslim *nikoh* marriage ceremony.¹³⁴

Another *yigit beshi* leader said he only processed five to six disputes in his two year tenure. His tenure ended when he moved to Uzbekistan. He processed family, neighborhood, and youth related disputes. On one occasion he was called to the house of a member of his Uyghur *meshrep* group for men. When he arrived his *meshrep* companion was holding a knife and ready to stab his wife. He took the knife from him, talked to him, and told him not to hit his wife or else he will call the Police. The next day he returned with 4 other men from their *meshrep* and they spoke to him and were forceful. They said it would be shameful if he had to spend time in jail. They also discussed the potential consequences for his five children. This lessened the tension. This also shows ways the *meshrep* brothers can help each other with problems.¹³⁵

Finally, Mirlan processes family and neighborhood disputes for Uyghurs in his *mahalla* neighborhood. He also instructs youth with regard to alcohol and smoking. When problems arise he sometimes meets with those involved in the neighborhood mosque where people encourage them to pray, be good Muslims, and follow the *Shari'a* path of God. Mirlan works closely with the quarter committee and *aksakal* judges connected to the quarter committee. Mirlan and his companion who served simultaneously on the community *aksakal* court and the Uyghur Ittipak *aksakal* council, for example, told me of the following dispute they processed. One Uyghur man hit his wife while drinking. The man promised in writing to Mirlan that he would not hit his wife again. If he did Mirlan would give the note to the

¹³³ See "Reconciled to violence: state failure to stop domestic abuse and abduction of women in Kyrgyzstan"; ———, "The increased use of 'reconciliation!.'"; ———, "The increased use of reconciliation in criminal cases in Central Asia: a sign of reform or cause for concern?"

¹³⁴ Appendix D: 05.28.12 Formal Interview with MHL.

¹³⁵ Appendix D: 05.28.12 Formal Interview with TSP.

aksakal court for them to fine the man. They wanted a divorce, but now they are a fine family. Mirlan and his companion were very proud of their accomplishment in keeping this family together.¹³⁶

In addition to *yigit beshi* leaders, if husband-wife, neighbor, or youth disputes arise among Uyghurs in a *mahalla* neighborhood they can call the women’s committee and/or elder’s council to help process the disputes. Shame can result if the parties to the dispute do not follow the advice of those leaders.¹³⁷ After consulting family, if these local leaders cannot resolve the problem, they can appeal to city- or national-level Ittipak leaders.¹³⁸

4. Ittipak Aksakal Elders’ Councils

Previously, the national Ittipak elder’s council (*soviet aksakal*) held more power. Artiq Haji, the Ittipak president who was elected in 2011, however, told me that he reduced their numbers to about 21 and reduced their scope of work to an honorary advisory board.¹³⁹ One Uyghur elder in Toshtemir, for example, told me that he used to belong to that committee, but that he was not sure of his current status.¹⁴⁰ Ittipak elders’ councils also exist on the mahalla neighborhood level.

5. Ittipak Women’s Committees

The following chart lists some of the national Ittipak women’s committee presidents:¹⁴¹

President	Occupation
Xayrinisa Turdieva	Uyghur radio commentator
Nuraniya Qasimova	Director of a kindergarten in Bishkek
Farida Nizamutdinova	Director of a school in Novapakrovka (near Bishkek)

¹³⁶ Appendix D: 05.23.12 Group Interview with QNI and MJQ.

¹³⁷ Appendix C.

¹³⁸ Appendix D: 09.02.11 Formal Interview with EBI.

¹³⁹ Appendix D: 07.08.11 Formal Interview with NFU.

¹⁴⁰ Appendix D: 09.14.11 Formal Interview with NKM.

¹⁴¹ Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 185, 9 (2010).

In addition to *yigit beshi* leaders and *aksakal* elders, Ittipak women's committees also help process some Uyghur problems. This helps to perpetuate Uyghur-based norms. The former president of Ittipak's national Women's Committee, for example, deals with the following types of problems: smoking, drinking, hooliganism, bullying, truancy, impoliteness, hitting, and fighting. She used to shame Uyghur children into behaving by threatening to broadcast their bad deeds on a bi-weekly Uyghur radio show. When I interviewed her she was Ittipak's national Education Committee chair the director of a kindergarten outside of Bishkek.¹⁴²

One Ittipak women's president of a neighborhood outside of Bishkek said that she does not process disputes. Nevertheless, she helps women with problems they encounter. Her committee consists of a treasurer, a council of 12 women, and street leaders. All women in the neighborhood elect the committee president and the women on each street elect their own street leader, or a leader for every 20 or so families. The informal elections usually only occur when the women want a new leader. About 150 Uyghur women live in her *mahalla* neighborhood and she maintains a list of them all. The street leaders watch after the women on their street and report to her any problems. They know how the women live, how many kids they have, if they work, when they are sick, etc. If a woman is sick the committee can give her some money. If she does not have work they can give her a loan to pay back the next month. They also give advice to women. The treasurer and each street leader have a notebook of the women on the street in which they note things like who paid their annual fee. The committee meets on its own but with the neighborhood *yigit beshi* leader and his council of men when big issues remain unresolved.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Appendix D: 08.09.11 Formal Interview with EAE.

¹⁴³ Appendix D: 11.07.11 Formal Interview with MSH.

6. Ittipak Cultural Celebrations

In the largest stadium in Bishkek that was filled near to capacity I attended an Uyghur dance festival hosted by Ittipak and presented by an Uyghur dance group from Almaty, Kazakhstan. On another occasion I attended a smaller gathering to celebrate the life of an Uyghur poet. On both occasions, a Kyrgyz leader from the Assembly of Nations attended and said a few words in Kyrgyz, the Uyghur Ittipak president acknowledged the importance of Ittipak's relationship with the Assembly of Nations and the benefits of holding Kyrgyzstan citizenship, and the entire group rose as they sang the Kyrgyzstan national anthem.¹⁴⁴

In this way, and others, Ittipak reinforces its allegiance to Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan allows Ittipak, and its local networks, to exist and monitor's its actions through the Assembly of Nations. Therefore, the Assembly of Nations is an important catalyst for the creation of Ittipak's normative order in parts of northern Kyrgyzstan.

7. Ittipak Media

Ittipak publishes a monthly newspaper. It runs articles in Cyrillic script Uyghur, Arabic script Uyghur, and in Russian. The Ittipak newspaper almost always runs a political story about Uyghur connections to China. It documents Chinese repressions of Uyghurs, for example, and publishes stories about Rabiya Kadeer, the fugitive leader of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). The WUC openly promotes the separation of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China and creation of Uyghurstan.¹⁴⁵ The newspaper also usually runs historical stories highlighting the works of historical poets or Uyghur leaders. Additionally, it often highlights the many accomplishments of contemporary Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan (e.g. successful Uyghur owners of Bishkek restaurants, bazaars, and factories). Finally, it allows readers to publish personalized anniversary and other greetings. In this way, the Ittipak

¹⁴⁴ Appendix A: 09.04.11 and 04.18.12.

¹⁴⁵ <http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/>.

newspaper promotes Uyghur unity and culture. In addition to the newspaper, Ittipak has maintained a weekly Uyghur radio show in Bishkek.¹⁴⁶

The following chart shows some of the paper’s monthly distribution in Kyrgyzstan, which is some reflection of the Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan.¹⁴⁷ As discussed below, however, not all Uyghurs subscribe to the paper or to Ittipak:

Location	# of papers
Novapakrovka (outside of Bishkek)	400
Lebedinskaya (outside of Bishkek where 7-800 Uyghur families live)	370
Tokuldosh (outside of Bishkek)	170
Osh Oblast (southern Kyrgyzstan; there is an Uyghur village near Osh)	150
Jalalabad and Uzgen (southern Kyrgyzstan)	150
Tetz (outside of Bishkek)	120
Ala Tou village	100
Alamadin Adin (outside of Bishkek)	100
Karakol (northern Kyrgyzstan)	100
Kenbulun (northern Kyrgyzstan)	95
Tokmok (northern Kyrgyzstan)	95
Vostok 6 (in Bishkek)	35
Vostok 5 (in Bishkek)	15

Therefore, while Ittipak does not receive direct state sponsorship, as do Kyrgyz elders’ councils, it uses the Assembly of Nations as a catalyst for its existence. The Assembly seeks to preserve ethnic traditions and promote inter-ethnic harmony, not necessarily to create ethnic-based normative orders. Ittipak’s normative order appears to be an unintended consequence of the Assembly. Nevertheless, through the Assembly Ittipak creates and maintains social networks and influence through the Ittipak newspaper, cultural celebrations, and national, city, neighborhood, and street-level representatives. Therefore, normative orders do not require direct state sponsorship (i.e. legislation that incorporates them into the state legal or administrative systems) to exist. Indirect sponsorship (e.g. the Assembly of Nations) can facilitate non-state normative orders. This information can help

¹⁴⁶ Appendix D: 08.09.11 Formal Interview with EAE.

¹⁴⁷ Appendix D: 07.08.11 Formal Interview with RWL.

inform policy makers, in places like Afghanistan, as they explore direct and indirect options of state engagement with non-state normative orders.

Another important way that Ittipak maintains its influence, at least among Uyghur men, is through male *meshrep* social gatherings, the topic of the next section.

Chapter 4 – How Does *Meshrep* Evidence Uyghur-Based Norms?

Meshrep is a social activity in which male Uyghurs regularly participate; typically on a monthly basis with a regular membership of close friends. It is one example of how Ittipak maintains influence over Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan and how Uyghur males in Bishkek promote Uyghur unity and nationalism. This is in contrast to Osh ceremonies, a male social activity in Toshtemir described below that promotes neighborhood-based unity.

Each month in Bishkek groups of about 15 Uyghur men (they affectionately refer to themselves as “30 men”)¹⁴⁸ attend social gatherings they call *meshrep*. Not all *meshreps* maintain a connection with Ittipak. In these gatherings they promote Uyghur language, nationalism, and etiquette as they practice dressing, speaking, and acting as Uyghurs. This unites them as Uyghurs. Sean Roberts describes the unifying factor of *meshrep* in Almaty, Kazakhstan as follows:

The *māshrāp* is a Uighur male ritual which has multiple functions as a rite of passage into manhood, a vehicle for teaching and regulating moral, religious, and social etiquette, and a means of forming male peer groups in local social structure. More generally, the ritual is meant to unite Uighur men locally under a common ideology and, thus, has the potential in the modern context to be central to the creation, maintenance, and regulation of Uighur national culture both in local *māhälläs* and in the larger de-territorialized Uighur nation.¹⁴⁹

Roberts also argues that rituals like the *meshrep* help Uyghurs create unity, a system of moral values, and a way to imagine Uyghurstan, their unrealized titular nation.¹⁵⁰ These descriptions comport with my experience attending *meshrep* gatherings in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Jay Dauthcher also describes the Uyghur *meshrep* in Ghulja (Yining), China.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ See, for example, Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 188, 8 (2010) and 200, 14 (2011).

¹⁴⁹ Sean Roberts, "Negotiating locality, Islam, and national culture in a changing borderlands: The revival of the *Māshrāp* ritual among young Uighur men in the Ili valley," *Central Asian Survey* 17, no. 4 (1998): 675.

¹⁵⁰ Roberts, "Toasting Uyghurstan: negotiating stateless nationalism in transnational ritual space," 103.

¹⁵¹ Dauthcher, *Down a narrow road: identity and masculinity in a Uyghur community in Xinjiang China*, 312.

Based on my participant observations,¹⁵² this section contributes to these works by describing my experience with *meshreps* in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

Men who lead the *meshrep* can receive titles like *yigit beshi* (head man), *pashshap* (person who preserves order), *kazi* (honorific judge), and *kasir* (treasurer).¹⁵³ In the *meshreps* I attended, I only saw *yigit beshi* and *kassir* as leaders. Members of the group come and go, but they are all Uyghur. Some *meshreps* in Kyrgyzstan have celebrated 40 years together.¹⁵⁴ The participants in the *meshreps* I attended did not drink alcohol at the meetings, but I am told they do at other *meshreps*. Uyghur women near Bishkek also meet regularly in groups called *chay* (tea).

As in Almaty, the *meshrep* in Bishkek is a way for Uyghur men to create social norms based on Uyghur unity. As discussed below, Toshtemir Uyghurs attend male social gatherings (*osh*) with men of other ethnicities where they create social norms based on inter-ethnic neighborhood unity. This difference contributes to the reasons why Toshtemir Uyghurs rejected Ittipak's ethnic-based system of social ordering.

A. Tetz Religious *Meshrep*

Akbar aka, Ittipak's newspaper editor, stated that many *meshreps* exist in the greater Bishkek area. Some of them he stated are "religious," while others are not; at some alcohol is served, but not at others. He said a large religious *meshrep* is held each month in Tetz, near Bishkek.¹⁵⁵ One of my Uyghur taxi drivers confirmed this and stated that he attends that *meshrep*. He described it as follows:

They have about 30 members. They meet around the 30th day of each month from 6-11 at a certain mosque. Many businessmen attend, including, the director of the Madina Bazaar (a large outdoor / indoor market where many Uyghurs sell fabrics and other materials;

¹⁵² See Appendix A.

¹⁵³ Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 188, 8 (2010); Roberts, "Negotiating locality, Islam, and national culture in a changing borderlands: The revival of the *Māshrāp* ritual among young Uighur men in the Ili valley," 682.

¹⁵⁴ Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper 200, 14 (2011).

¹⁵⁵ Appendix D: 07.08.11 Formal Interview with RWL.

the son of an owner of the Madina Bazaar attended my second *meshrep*, discussed below) and sometimes Ittipak's president. Most have been on the hajj, including my taxi driver, and they gather money to help each other go. They also collected \$300 to help two of their members attend the 4th Uyghur World Congress held in Japan in May 2012. Each month each member pays 700 som (about \$17). They help the poor with the money and give 1000 som (about \$25) each month to Ittipak. The ritual often goes in the following order: eat appetizers (*dasturxon*), listen to Muslim advice (*maslahat*), eat the main meal, and listen to *maslahat* again. They do not play the dutor (traditional Uyghur instrument) as it is not allowed in the mosque. They have a *Yigit Beshi*, *Pashshap*, *Kazi*, and *Kassir* as leaders.¹⁵⁶

B. My first *Meshrep*

An Uyghur friend of mine in Toshtemir took me to my first meshrep in November 2011. It was held at a home near Bishkek in Novapakrovka. Only 12 of its 15 members attended that evening. The *yigit beshi* (head man) and another member were on the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. One of the members, who attended that evening, is the son of an owner of the Madina Bazaar. The ritual occurred as follows:

For the first hour we ate appetizers (chicken, fish, salads, juice, pop, etc.) sitting on the floor around the edge of a room. There were no tables or chairs in the room. In the center of the room was a large table cloth (*dasturxon*) with all kinds of fruits, salads, nuts, meats, and deserts. Alcohol was not served. During this hour each member was expected to speak Uyghur, or potentially face a 5 som fine for each word they spoke in Russian. After the first hour they could speak Russian. Not all members spoke Uyghur well and so this was good language practice. Many of the members had beards and one had a prayer dot on his forehead, meaning that he prays often. Then we took a break while the host's wife cleared up our plates.

¹⁵⁶ Appendix D: 06.09.12 Long-Term Interview interview with AIK.

After the break we ate the main meal and then “played” *meshrep*. First everyone kneeled up from our sitting positions and they checked to make sure everyone had a handkerchief. They fined those who did not have a handkerchief 200 som (about \$5). They did not fine me since I was a guest. They joked that they should fine my friend who brought me without telling me to bring a handkerchief. One man stood up to go get his handkerchief and they fined him for not asking permission to leave. This all brought many laughs as the fines were given in jest. They also charged fines for the following errors: being the last to arrive, not regularly attending the monthly gatherings, not speaking Uyghur during the first hour, standing up without permission, not bringing your handkerchief, and not saying the muslim greeting “*assalamu alaykum*” (“peace be upon you) when entering the room. They used the fine money to go on trips to the mountains and such.

At the end one member who attended Al-Azhar in Egypt recited the Qur’an and gave Muslim advice (*maslahat*) in Russian for about 20 minutes. Then they each paid 1100 som (about \$28) to the host. There was some discussion about the money, but the kassir (treasurer) resolved it with a calculator and recorded the amounts each member paid in dues and fines. Each month a different member hosts the meshrep and getst to keep the 1100 som from each member to pay for the meal and as a revolving credit system.¹⁵⁷

C. My second *Meshrep*

The second *meshrep* I attended was very similar to the first. While I only attended first *meshrep* once, I attended with the second group several times. The second group took me in as a member. In both *meshreps* they ate appetizers during the first hour and talked in Uyghur. Then they took a break and came back to eat the main dish. During the subsequent hours they talked in Russian. They talked about regular life issues, but also about Uyghur nationalism, Uyghurstan, and Uyghur discrimination in China and Kyrgyzstan. This

¹⁵⁷ Appendix A: 11.04.11.

contrasts with discussions I heard at Osh ceremonies among men in Toshtemir (described below) where males did not typically discuss nationalism.

After the main dish they “played” *meshrep* by giving out fines for those who broke the social rules. Then they closed with different activities. The first group closed with Qur’anic readings and Muslim advice while the second group closed with Uyghur music and card games. My friend who invited me to the second group sometimes played the dutor (traditional Uyghur stringed instrument). At other times they watched videos of Uyghur dance and music festivals in China and other places. While watching these videos they discussed such things as the proper way to wear traditional Uyghur hats (*do’pi*).

The second group also had slightly different etiquette rules and fines. The second group, for example, did not fine members for not having a handkerchief (I was ready with mine, but they did not check), but they fined them for not wearing a *do’pi* (traditional Uyghur hat) or a collar shirt. While the first group only gave out monetary fines, the second group mostly gave out social fines. For breaking the rules, for example, they made one member stand up and act like a chicken in front of the whole group. They made another dance like a girl while they played music. This was very funny and they enjoyed thinking of creative fines. If a member could not or would not perform the fine then they allowed him to pay a fine, but that was a last resort.

This group also did not share a revolving credit. At the end of each gathering they all paid 100 som (about \$2) to the host to cover the cost of the meal. Even though this amount of money was relatively trivial they had long discussions about payments. Each time I attended a different member hosted the *meshrep* at their house and it played out slightly differently. One time they made a yearly schedule of who would host each month. While I did not attend, in the Spring they held picnics in the mountains for the monthly gathering.¹⁵⁸


¹⁵⁸ Appendix A: 01.14.12, 02.11.12, and 03.16.12.

All of these *meshrep* gatherings are different, but they each promote Uyghur unity, Uyghur social norms, and Uyghur nationalism.

Part II: Why do Toshtemir Uyghurs Reject Ittipak's Influence? (Community Perspective – Neighborhood-Based Norms)

As discussed above, an Ittipak election occurred in Toshtemir in 2002. Kenesh won the election, but he refused to participate in Ittipak's normative order. Therefore, he usurped the election and frustrated attempts to extend Ittipak's influence in Toshtemir. While he likely has personal reasons for doing so (e.g. political gain as a City Council representative), this Part argues that social pressures in Toshtemir also influenced his rejection. In essence, Kenesh refused to work with Ittipak in order to retain the existing social order in Toshtemir's *mahalla* neighborhoods. That order seeks to maintain unity among the various ethnicities in the neighborhood, rather than promote one ethnic order (e.g. Uyghur elders) above others.

Based on original research of social phenomena in Toshtemir this section argues that several social factors (some more than others) evidence neighborhood-based norms in Toshtemir. As depicted in the diagram below, these factors include the way that people practice Muslim ceremonies and the composition of quarter committees, diaspora committees, and Muslim leaders in Toshtemir's *mahalla* neighborhoods.



Chapter 5 – How do *Osh* Ceremonies Evidence Neighborhood-Based Norms?

As discussed, *meshrep* ceremonies for men in Bishkek only include Uyghur members and promote Uyghur unity. *Osh* ceremonies for men in Toshtemir, discussed in this section, include men from all ethnicities and promote neighborhood-based unity. This difference contributes to the reasons why Toshtemir Uyghurs rejected Ittipak.

Each Thursday afternoon Toshtemir men from the *mahalla* neighborhoods meet in a mosque, restaurant, or home to share *osh* (Central Asian rice pilaf) in celebration of a wedding or death. They customarily give *osh* remembrance feasts on the 3rd, 7th, 20th, 40th, year, and even four year anniversaries of the death. While men meet in large public groups for about an hour, women hold *osh* separately in smaller private groups, typically in a home, for a longer period.¹⁵⁹ In Toshtemir Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tajiks, and other minorities share the *osh* meal together without regard to ethnicity. This leads to neighborhood- rather than ethnic-based loyalties. In Bishkek, male Uyghurs hold *meshrep* social gatherings. These gatherings promote Uyghur language and culture and are limited to Uyghurs, which promotes ethnic unity. These differences reflect different social norms contributed to the Toshtemir Uyghur rejection of Ittipak.

This chapter first describes Muslim ceremonies generally in Toshtemir's *mahalla* neighborhoods and then it specifically describes my experience with attending *osh* ceremonies for men.

A. Socio-Religious Ceremonies in Toshtemir's *Mahalla* Neighborhoods

One pleasant summer evening I attended an iftor *osh* in the Friendship Mosque sponsored. At first I felt ashamed for attending alone, but as I walked towards the mosque I saw a crippled Uzbek friend slowly hobbling towards the mosque and so I caught up with him and we entered together. While there I saw some of the Uzbek men on my street who

¹⁵⁹ Appendix D: 03.22.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

called me over to their table and also spent some time sitting, eating, and talking with them. Such experiences clearly build unity and strengthen solidarity between people.

While waiting for another *osh* ceremony, this one a wedding, a man entered the group and asked if I upheld the Uzbek custom of shaking everyone's hand. Ceremonies reinforce group ethics (norms). Conformance to group ethics also helps to preserve one's status in the group. In addition to monetary incentives, like avoiding the payment of bribes, Ellickson argues that status incentives also help describe why individuals act in the way they do with regard to the law.¹⁶⁰ One Uzbek Muslim ethic in Toshtemir is to greet everyone with a handshake and the phrase "*assalomu alaykum*" (greeting – Arabic for "peace be upon you") when entering a room or approaching a group. While waiting outside with a group of men for a wedding ceremony an Uzbek I did not know entered our group and greeted everyone in this way. To determine my status in the group he asked the others if I also conformed to the group ethic. They confirmed that I did and that I belong to the group. As shown below with regard to bridal abductions, failure to conform to group ethics can damage your reputation and alter your status in the community. Such punishments, or the perception that they exist, influence normative behavior.

In addition to wedding and funeral *osh* events, many other ceremonies exist in Toshtemir that bring people together to create solidarity and shape group norms. Some of the other ceremonies include evening wedding parties (*to'y* in Uzbek, *vecher* in Russian), *kelin salom* (when the bride greets the groom's family), *gap* (monthly conversation clubs for men, similar to Uyghur *meshrep* gatherings; in Toshtemir men of all ethnicities meet together; husbands and wives also meet together in some *gap* gatherings); *hay chay* (monthly conversation clubs for women; some pay monthly dues that they give to a different participant each month as rotating credit; Uyghurs in Bishkek call it *chay* – "tea"), and *sunnat*

¹⁶⁰ Robert C. Ellickson, "Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms," *The Journal of Legal Studies* 27, no. 2 (1998): 545-46.

to 'y (circumcision party). Ceremonies related to Muslim holidays also exist. The following chart depicts my osh observations: dates, occasion for the osh celebration, and location. As you can see I attended a wide variety of combinations; different types of events at different locations, but the format was always the same.

Date	Location	Funeral Anniversary				Wedding	Circumcision	Iftar
		1 st Th	40 th d	1 yr	4 yrs			
3/24/11	Friendship Mosque	X						
4/15/11	First Mosque					X		
4/21/11	Home		X					
4/22/11	Friendship Mosque			X				
4/28/11	First Mosque			X				
5/1/11	Home			X				
5/11/11	Home				X			
5/14/11	First Mosque					X		
5/20/11	Restraunt					X		
7/8/11	Home						X	
7/21/11	Restraunt					X		
8/25/11	Friendship Mosque							X
3/15/12	First Mosque	X						
5/24/12	Home-Bishkek	X						
6/21/12	Home-Bishkek		X					

Funeral ceremonies are very important to Uzbeks and the funeral prayer (*janoza*) is one of the only Muslim rites performed during the Soviet repression of Islam.¹⁶¹ In addition to the three, seven, twenty, forty, and year anniversaries of a death, people often recite the Qur'an and share *osh* every Thursday (*payshanbalik*) until the fortieth day after the death. As Toshtemir Uzbeks celebrate most death anniversaries on Thursdays, the seven,

¹⁶¹ Marianne Kamp, "Where Did the Mullahs Go? Oral Histories from Rural Uzbekistan," *Die Welt des Islams* 50, no. 3/4 (2010): 530-31. ("Our respondents remembered times when it was difficult to engage in any practice of Islam publicly, but they emphasized that nonetheless, community members fulfilled the ritual that they deemed most essential: the funeral prayer.")

twenty, and fortieth day anniversaries may correspond with the first Thursday celebrations. Uzbeks in Toshtemir often refer to the funeral *osh* events as “Payshanbalik.” To save money Uzbeks do not always give *osh* on all of these anniversaries and they do not always give it in the mosque where up to 400 people can attend. It is common, however, to at least host a large public *osh* on the first Thursday (*birinchi payshanbalik*) after the death and on the one year anniversary.¹⁶²

Uzbeks in Balalsagun’s mahallas say that *osh* brings them together and creates unity.¹⁶³ Nurlanjon, imam (*domla*) of the Oldest Mosque, for example, told me that *osh* is an international (*i.e.* not just Uzbek, Uyghur, Tajik) tradition to strengthen friendship and peace and preserve culture and etiquette. My attendance at *osh* ceremonies made me feel part of the community. Men on the street recognized me from *osh* and stopped to say hello. After several months I stopped attending *osh* because I moved to Bishkek. Even though Bishkek provided living amenities not found in Toshtemir I missed attending *osh* ceremonies. During trips back to Toshtemir men asked me why I quit attending and invited me back. Because I experienced it to a small degree I understand why *osh* builds solidarity and connections. While I am tempted to label it Uzbek (Uzbek, Uyghur, Tajik) solidarity they describe it as international (inter-ethnic) unity or “Toshtemirlik” (the state of being from Toshtemir’s *mahalla* neighborhoods).

Every time someone attends a funeral *osh*, whether for the first Thursday, year, or other anniversary, they celebrate the connection they enjoyed with the deceased and the networks they still maintain with the survivors. Similarly, wedding *osh* helps families of the bride and groom celebrate new networks they will forge through the marriage. As people cannot rely upon the state and the rule of law to provide basic services, enforce contracts, and

¹⁶² See, for example, Appendix D: 09.14.11 Formal Interview with EBX.

¹⁶³ Maria Elisabeth Louw, *Everyday Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2007). 76. (“Networks are cultivated through common activities and exchanges.”)

compensate injuries, they must rely upon relationship networks to solve problems.

Therefore, relationship networks fostered through ceremonies like *osh* are very important in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia generally.

Reciprocal monetary exchanges to fund *osh* events also foster relationships.

Reciprocal exchanges, however, can sometimes cause conflict. A group of men in Toshtemir shared resources to bring cars from Europe to sell in Kyrgyzstan. They maintained a rotating list where each man took turns receiving the profits from the car sales. The brother of one man lower on the list, however, murdered first man on the list. He buried him alive three meters underground in concrete.¹⁶⁴ It is very expensive to host an *osh* for up to 400 men, but they can do it because they all share the expense. While some cite gifts from about \$5-20 I witnessed gifts from around \$5-100.¹⁶⁵

B. My Experience Attending *Osh* Ceremonies for Men

The following is my experience attending many *osh* events for men.¹⁶⁶ No matter the occasion or location each *osh* unfolds in a very similar fashion. Every Thursday at about 10:00 A.M. up to 400 men, mostly Uzbeks (Uzbek, Uyghur, Tajik) from the *mahallas*, but also men of other ethnicities (Dungan, Russian, Kyrgyz, etc.) and locations meet to talk, eat *osh*, and listen to the two imams recite the Qur'an. They meet in the covered courtyard of the First Mosque, the bowery of the Friendship Mosque, the open courtyard of a home, or a special restaurant for such celebrations. The bowery of the Friendship Mosque is specially made for these events with long picnic tables and benches that can hold up to 400 people. It also has its own kitchen with a huge bowl for cooking *osh* (*qozon*) and eating platters and spoons, other food preparation rooms, and a tandoor oven for cooking flat bread (*non*) and *samsas* (meat, fat, oil, and onion inside a bread-baked shell) served at the *osh*. After almost

¹⁶⁴ Appendix D: 11.23.11 Long-Term Interview with EVT.

¹⁶⁵ Appendix A: 07.21.11.

¹⁶⁶ While Uzbek men separate from women for these events, I am told by Kyrgyz friends that Kyrgyz men and women celebrate them together.

exactly one hour the men all get up and leave together. As they leave, as well as when they enter, they mingle. There is also a young boy at the entrance / exit with a pitcher of water and a towel for them to wash their hands. The water comes out of a plastic pitcher and falls into a round plastic tub, both imported from nearby China. Greens are often sprinkled in the tub.

During *osh*, the men sit across from each other on long tables with benches. They try to sit by friends and call out for friends as they enter. Sometimes men I met at prior *osh* events or my neighbors called out for me to sit at their table. That made me feel included as part of the group. In the First Mosque, however, there is not much room between the tables and spots on the benches and so everyone sits together mostly in the order in which they entered as a crowd. Restaurants provide nicer accommodations with smaller tables and chairs and more room to negotiate one's sitting position. Upon entering, the family of the couple getting married or the deceased greet everyone in a line at the entrance. One person accepts monetary contributions and another records who paid and how much. That way the host family can reciprocate when someone who contributed money hosts their own *osh* event. Contributions, however, are not required and those who do not pay can still enjoy the event.

First the men share the *dasturxon* (tablecloth set with food) already set up with candy, flat bread, nuts, and fruit. When a critical mass arrives at the table they jointly perform the *amin* (wiping the palms of their hands down their face) in reverence to God before eating. Behind the scenes women are, and have been, preparing the meal and tables. Men, often friends and relatives of the host, serve the food and ensure that everyone has enough tea to drink. Next these men deliver one hot *samsa* to each person. The men pass them down the line to the end of the bench until it is their turn to receive one. Then in an assembly line from the large cooking *qozon* to each table the same men deliver hot *osh* on large round platters. They also deliver a small salad of shredded carrots and other vegetables on a small plate.

Every two men sitting across from each other share one platter of *osh* and the salad. One of the two men sharing the *osh* cuts the meat and fat placed on top of the *osh* with his hands, or a knife if he brought one. They both share the *osh*, meat, and fat eating with a large spoon each from his own side towards the middle. Then one of the two finishes off the remaining *osh*; a requirement. All the while those sitting near each other talk. This builds solidarity and an opportunity to exchange cultural norms.

The two imams of the New and First Mosques always sit next to each other with respected aksakals at the place of honor on the head table. After they eat they take turns reciting the Qur'an. The *so'pi* (mosque leader who invites people to *osh*) calls all to attention before the Qur'anic recitation. Close family members of the wedding couple or deceased sit near the imams as they recite the Qur'an. Sometimes the *imams* give Muslim advice (*maslahat*) to the family. They teach the path of God and how to get along as families and neighbors. After they recite the Qur'an two aksakals each say a prayer (*duo*); one for the host family and one in gratitude for the food consumed. During the recitation and the two prayers the men hold their hands together in cupping shape with their palms up in reverence. After each prayer the men say "amin" and wipe the palms of their hands down their face as they did when they began to eat.

When *osh* is given at a home the *so'pi* announce to those sitting in the courtyard outside who cannot hear the Quran'ic recitations and prayers performed inside when to hold their hands in cupping shape and when to perform the amin after each prayer. While eating the *so'pi* also stand and announce in a loud voice the occasion for the next *osh*, when and where it will be held, and by whom. They sometimes ask the person holding the next *osh* to stand in recognition. In this fashion everyone in attendance is invited to the next *osh*. In summer months several *osh* events can be held on consecutive days each week and more than once per day. Funeral *osh*, however, is typically reserved for just Thursdays.

At the close of the two duos everyone abruptly stands up and leaves. As they leave, however, they continue to mingle and share rides to their respective destinations. As the *imams* and *so'pi* leave the host gives them a packet with food and money in appreciation for their services. Before leaving the men also gather the leftover food in packets that they give to the poor. Poor people also enter the venue at the end of *osh* and gather up the remains. After morning *osh* some of the men gather again at the home of the wedding couple or deceased for further afternoon and evening wedding and funeral rituals.

Chapter 6 – How do Community Organizations Evidence Neighborhood-Based Norms?

A. Quarter Committees

Unlike Ittipak *mahalla* committees in Bishkek, which consist of an Uyghur *yigit beshi* (head man), an Uyghur woman's committee, and an Uyghur elder's (*aksakal*) council, quarter committees in Toshtemir are inter-ethnic and promote neighborhood- rather than ethnic-based unity. This contributes to the reasons why Toshtemir Uyghurs do not look to Ittipak for normative authority.

City quarters and quarter leaders in Central Asia date back to at least the Khanate and Tsarist periods.¹⁶⁷ Very little information, however, exists about them in English.¹⁶⁸

Toshtemir, which mostly consists of single-family homes (some Soviet apartment blocks exist), divides its territory into eight districts and 42 quarters with locally elected district leaders and quarter committee chairs.¹⁶⁹ A district leader (commonly referred to in Russian with the acronym TOS) oversees approximately five to six quarter committee chairs.

Approximately six quarters exist in the Large Mahalla while only one exists in the historical boundaries of Small Mahalla.

Quarter committee chairs manage utility payments, insure neighborhood cleanliness, verify residency for citizens to obtain state documents and benefits, maintain peace, and process some disputes. To maintain the existence of the district / quarter system Toshtemir City meets regularly with district leaders and quarter committee chairs. In Soviet apartment blocks, at least in Bishkek, there is a block leader (“*dom kom*”) that replaces the quarter

¹⁶⁷ Abdurakhimova, "The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan," 240. ("As during khanate times, an “elder” (*aksakal*) was in charge of the native population of the cities, and elders of the city quarters reported to him . . ."); Bregel, *An historical atlas of Central Asia*: 80. ("The city [Bukhara] was divided into *guzars*—city quarters (or neighborhood communities), whose number in the early 20th century was 220 . . .")

¹⁶⁸ Abdurakhimova, "The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan," 240, 45; Emil Alymkulov and Marat Kulatov, "Local Governments in the Kyrgyz Republic," in *Local Governments in Eastern Europe, In the Caucasus and Central Asia*, ed. Igor Munteanu and Victor Popa (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2001); Babken V. Babjanian, "Local Governance and Citizens' Welfare in Kyrgyzstan," in *SRC Publications* (American University of Central Asia, Social Research Center, 2007), 8; Giovarelli and Akmatova, "Local institutions that enforce customary law," 5-6.

¹⁶⁹ Appendix B: Law on Local Government, Chapter 7, Article 51 (2010) (authorizes quarter committees).

committee chair. Each apartment block is divided into several stairwells of apartments and each stairwell can elect its own leader who works under the block leader.

As in pre-Soviet times, quarter residents in Toshtemir elect their quarter committee chairs who receive a small compensation and report to the city administration.¹⁷⁰ Quarter committee elections in Toshtemir are very informal. At some public location (e.g. school, street, restaurant) the chair gives a report and the residents in attendance tell a representative of the city whether they want the chair to stay. If so, the chair continues. If not, they select a new chair. This is similar to how residents elect diaspora committee leaders. Salomat's quarter committee chair took the place of her husband who was the chair when he died. Similarly, the quarter committee chair of the only quarter located in the historical boundaries of Small Mahalla took the place of his father who was the chair when he died.

The quarter committee consists of the chair and typically two assistants. Technically Toshtemir City requires quarter committees to maintain an elder's court (*aksakaldar sotu*; Toshtemir appears unique in that it integrates elder's courts with quarter committees) and a woman's committee. In reality, each of the six quarter committee chairs I interviewed described different compositions of their committee. None of them had a woman's committee. All four of the woman quarter chairs had a list of elders (*aksakal*) they could call in case they needed help processing a dispute. They stated, however, that they rarely needed to call them. Instead of a separate "*aksakal* court" one of the male quarter committee chairs stated that he had a large quarter committee consisting of several men. Whether the chair refers to them as *aksakals* or committee members, the composition of these extra helpers often included representatives from the various ethnicities living in the quarter. This contributes to neighborhood unity as opposed to the ethnic unity of Ittipak.

¹⁷⁰ Abdurakhimova, "The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan," 245.

B. Diaspora Committees

Unlike Ittipak, which limits its membership to Uyghurs and promotes Uyghur-based norms, the Uzbek diaspora committee in Toshtemir welcomes Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks and promotes inter-ethnic unity. This contributes to the reasons why Toshtemir Uyghurs reject Ittipak's influence.

Ethnic diaspora committees started in Toshtemir in the 1980s.¹⁷¹ To manage diversity, Toshtemir City decided in 2002 to create the Friendship House (*dom drujba*), which opened in 2004. Its purposes include maintaining “ethnic harmony . . . and promoting the traditions, customs and rituals of ethnic groups inhabiting the city.”¹⁷² The Friendship House contains diaspora committees representing 15 ethnicities: Slavic, Uzbek, Uyghur, Tatar, Korean, Dungan, North Caucasian, Ukrainian, German, Kalmuk, Armenian, Kazakh, Belarus, Roma, and Cossack. The Toshtemir mayor meets with them regularly.¹⁷³ Its office is a converted house in Large Mahalla that contains shared offices for each diaspora committee along with an assembly room. Many, but not all, of these diaspora committees maintain connections with national diaspora committees through the Assembly of Nations in Bishkek. In 2004 Toshtemir also created the first ethnic development council in Kyrgyzstan.¹⁷⁴

Until Toshtemir Uyghurs elected Kenesh as the Uyghur diaspora leader in Toshtemir, Uyghurs and Tajiks joined with the Uzbeks in the Uzbek diaspora committee. The Uzbek diaspora committee in Toshtemir maintains a president and a council of elders who can solve large problems and inter-ethnic disputes.¹⁷⁵ For many years its president was Tajik and Salomat, an Uyghur, served as its secretary. This shows how Uyghurs and other minorities in

¹⁷¹ Appendix B: June 9, 2011 Dungan diaspora representative's speech; Appendix D: 06.09.11 Informal Interview with XVA, and 06.09.11 Informal Interview with CNC.

¹⁷² Appendix B: June 9, 2011 Vice Mayor's speech.

¹⁷³ Appendix B: June 9, 2011 Vice Mayor's speech.

¹⁷⁴ Appendix A: 06.09.11; Appendix B: June 9, 2011 Vice Mayor's speech and Dungan diaspora representative's speech.

¹⁷⁵ Appendix D: 06.15.12 Formal Interview with LFP.

Toshtemir assimilated to Uzbek culture and adopted neighborhood norms based on inter-ethnic unity rather than Uyghur unity.

To maintain this inter-ethnic unity Kenesh and other Uyghurs in Toshtemir reject Ittipak's Uyghur-based normative authority. Kenesh, however, is also a member of the Toshtemir City Council, which is also very ethnically diverse. Therefore, he may have other undisclosed motives for refusing to work with Ittipak. Developing closer ties with Ittipak, for example, may alienate him from potential Uzbek and Tajik voters. Toshtemir is also a very independent city. It maintains its own Friendship House, for example, instead of only relying upon the national Assembly of Nations. Residents of Toshtemir claim that for several years it was the only city in Kyrgyzstan to have its own little Assembly of Nations. Some even travel to other cities to help them set up their own city-level Assembly of Nations.¹⁷⁶ Thus, in line with Toshtemir's independence, Kenesh may desire to maintain distance from national organizations like Ittipak.

Nevertheless, through the leadership of Kenesh, *yerlik* Uyghurs in Toshtemir rejected Ittipak's normative environment. The rejection caused a split in the Uzbek diaspora committee. Even though he does not affiliate with Ittipak, Kenesh now acts as the Uyghur leader in Toshtemir. Similarly, the former Tajik leader of the Uzbek diaspora committee now represents Tajiks in Toshtemir. This split disappointed Salomat as it meant a break in the inter-ethnic unity she experienced between Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks for so many years in Toshtemir. It also complicates loyalties as many families in Toshtemir, like Salomat's, are both Uzbek and Uyghur (Salomat is Uyghur, but her husband and children are Uzbek).

This split is somewhat cosmetic, however, as Kenesh works to retain a relationship between Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks in Toshtemir. The old Tajik leader of the Uzbek diaspora committee also sometimes continues to represent Uzbeks at the national Assembly

¹⁷⁶ Appendix D: 09.08.11 Formal Interview with LJH.

of Nations in Bishkek. He does so even though an Uzbek now leads the Toshtemir Uzbek diaspora committee.

From Salomat's perspective, the *Xitoydan* Uyghurs in Toshtemir and Ittipak caused a split in the Uzbek unity by forcing an Ittipak election. From Ittipak's perspective and that of other active *Xitoydan* Uyghurs in Toshtemir like Nazira, however, the *yerlik* Uyghurs hijacked their election and now they essentially have no leader in the city. Based on my conversations with Nazira, Kalia, and Ittipak leaders they are still trying to figure out a way to extend Ittipak's social network to Toshtemir.

C. Male Muslim Leaders

While the many Dungan Muslims who live in Toshtemir's *mahalla* neighborhoods largely frequent their own mosques, follow their own Muslim leaders, and maintain their own patterns of unity (and separation), the other Muslims (Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tajiks, etc.) stick together and Muslim life provides a catalyst for their group solidarity. This presents an obstruction for Ittipak solidarity, which is based largely on Uyghur nationalism. The non-Dungan male and female Muslim leaders in each neighborhood, for example, have different ethnicities, but they perform Muslim ceremonies without regard to ethnicity. The ceremonies that they perform bring people together and help form a sense of neighborhood harmony ("Toshtemirlik," Toshtemirness) among them (Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tajiks, and other non-Dungan minorities). As discussed by Geiss with regard to historical *mahalla* neighborhoods in Central Asia, Islam has the ability to transform kin-based solidarity into neighborhood-based solidarity.¹⁷⁷

Five main mosques exist in the Large Mahalla (pseudonym) neighborhood while only one exists in the Small Mahalla (psuedonym). While Muslims do not typically segregate by ethnicity when praying, Dungans mainly attend prayers at four of the five mosques in the

¹⁷⁷ Geiss, "Mahallah and kinship relations," 102.

Large Mahalla.¹⁷⁸ Uzbeks (i.e. Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tajiks) mainly attend the First Mosque in Large Mahalla. It is the First Mosque in Toshtemir and dates to pre-Soviet times, thus its nickname as the “First Mosque.” As it sits next to the Toshtemir bazaar, the Friendship Mosque is truly multi-ethnic, thus its nickname as the “Friendship Mosque.” People of many ethnicities come from the bazaar and surrounding area to pray at that mosque which was built with money from “Graf,” a very very rich Uyghur from Toshtemir.

Prior to the afternoon prayer at the Friendship Mosque the imam or his assistant, both are Uzbek, gives *maslahat* (Muslim advice) in Uzbek and then in Russian (the lingua franca for minorities).¹⁷⁹ Leaders of the First Mosque give Maslahat in Uzbek. Both mosques amplify their *maslahat* and the daily calls to prayer through loudspeakers. Salomat lives near the Friendship Mosque and so she can listen to the advice each week. The Friendship Mosque is much larger than the First Mosque and is filled to capacity for Friday prayers.

1. Imams (*Domlas*)

The imam (*domla*, literally “teacher”) of the First Mosque, Nurlanjon (pseudonym), is Uyghur and he studied at a madrassa in Bukhara, Uzbekistan.¹⁸⁰ The imam of the Friendship Mosque, Sidiqjon (pseudonym) is Uzbek and he studied in Cairo, Egypt.¹⁸¹ Both jointly attend most wedding and funeral ceremonies in the *mahalla* neighborhoods. This shows the solidarity between the Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tajiks, and other non-Dungan minorities in each neighborhood.

The two imams are authority figures for many in the *mahalla* neighborhoods. Sidiqjon is often late to *osh* celebrations and even mosque prayers, but when he arrives you can feel the respect men have for him in the air. Once while waiting for an *osh* meal to begin I asked those nearby about *mahalla* leaders. As they were deciding who their leader is,

¹⁷⁸ Appendix A: 02.22.11.

¹⁷⁹ Appendix A: 02.18.11 and 03.02.11.

¹⁸⁰ Appendix D: 02.02.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat; 08.22.11 Formal Interview with IKW.

¹⁸¹ Appendix D: 02.13.11 and 06.27.12 Long-Term Interviews with Salomat; 08.22.11 Formal Interview with IKW.

Sidijon made his entrance and one man pointed to him and stated “there is our *domla* (teacher, master).”¹⁸² Others told me, at least for those who attend mosque prayers regularly, that shame or threats of shame in the mosque community can help resolve economic and other disputes. Despite the current unity between the two *mahalla* neighborhoods, for example, there was a time when youth groups in each neighborhood fought each other as rival gangs. While Imarjon denies this happened (most community leaders claimed to me that no conflict occurs in their community), others claim the two imams gathered the parents of the fighting youth and mediated a resolution. Some even claim that a marriage arrangement brought the two neighborhoods together in peace.

While each neighborhood has its own imam, both imams religiously attend and take turns praying at the weddings and funerals of both neighborhoods. There is clearly currently a strong unity between both neighborhoods and that unity transcends ethnicity as one imam is Uzbek, the other is Uyghur, and the men in attendance are from many ethnicities.

2. Mosque Elders (*aksakal*)

Each mosque also has respected male elders (*aksakals*) that regularly attend their respective mosques and give advice. They consult, for example, with the imam on how to help the poor in their neighborhood and how to solve neighborhood problems and disputes.¹⁸³ Nurlanjon (Imam of the First Mosque), an elder from the First Mosque, and Salomat’s own attorney, for example, all appealed one day to Salomat in her home to not encourage her daughter to get a divorce. Due to the severe spousal abuse Salomat’s daughter received, Salomat disregarded their advice and pressed forward with helping her daughter secure a divorce. Salomat told me that due to her position as the director of the Uzbek school people in her neighborhood did not shame her family for making this decision. Salomat’s attorney

¹⁸² Appendix A: 04.15.11.

¹⁸³ Appendix D: 01.25.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

also told me that it is normal for people in the *mahalla* neighborhoods to seek, but disregard, the advice of the imams.

3. Mosque Treasurer (*kassir*)

Both mosques have a treasurer who acts behind the scenes to keep track of mosque money and schedules. The schedule is important because both mosques must coordinate their schedules so that both imams can jointly attend all events.

4. *So'pi*

Unlike the treasurer, the role of the mosque *so'pi* is very public. He calls the people to prayer like a *mua'zzin*, but also invites them to attend *osh* celebrations. During the *osh* meals, for example, the *so'pi* stands up and invites the men to the next *osh* by giving the date, time, location, and occasion for the *osh*. As discussed below, these celebrations occur almost every Thursday in Toshtemir's *mahalla* neighborhoods and up to 400 men attend. These gatherings provide solidarity for the neighborhood residents (Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tajiks, etc.), which contributes to why they rejected Ittipak and largely solve problems on their own without resort to the state legal system.

D. Women Muslim Leaders (*otin-oyi*)

Women Muslim leaders (*otin-oyi*) exist among Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks throughout Central Asia.¹⁸⁴ Very little English-language literature, however, exists about them in northern Kyrgyzstan. They read the Qur'on, give advice, and lead Muslim ceremonies for women. Some claim that Kyrgyz women do not need women Muslim leaders as Kyrgyz women read the Qur'an together with men. Uzbek women Muslim leaders exist,

¹⁸⁴ For many citations to works that discuss women Muslim leaders in Central Asia (*otin-oyi*), see David E. Merrell, "Islam and dispute resolution in Central Asia: the case of women muslim leaders," *New Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 1 (2011), <http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/>.

however, because Uzbek women typically do not read the Qur'an in groups with men.¹⁸⁵

Historical factors likely exist for this difference in gender segregation.

There are two main *otin-oyi* in each of Toshtemir's *mahalla* neighborhoods; one leader and her apprentice (*shogird*) for each neighborhood. Salomat sometimes refers to them as the first and second *otin-oyi* of the neighborhood. When one leader dies or becomes incapable of performing her functions the women in that neighborhood meet to elect a new leader by consensus. Often they choose to promote the apprentice who cannot technically take the title *otin-oyi* until she is elected as such. Unlike elections for Ittipak women's committee positions, which are exclusively held by Uyghur women, elections for Toshtemir *otin-oyi* are open to women of all ethnicities. All women of all ethnicities in each *mahalla* neighborhood can participate in the elections. This promotes neighborhood-, not Uyghur-based norms.

In about 2005 the Large Mahalla *otin-oyi* died and the women elected her apprentice as the new *otin-oyi*. Even though Salomat lives in the greater boundaries of Small Mahalla she still sent her consent, she could not attend in person, to elect the new *otin-oyi*. When the Small Mahalla *otin-oyi* got sick and could no longer read, the women elected a new *otin-oyi*. Both current *otin-oyi* know Arabic. The Large Mahalla *otin-oyi* is Tatar and from China and her apprentice is Uzbek (originally Uyghur). The Small Mahalla *otin-oyi* is Uyghur from China and her apprentice is Uzbek who studied at the women's madrassa connected to the Friendship Mosque in Small Mahalla. Growing up, Salomat lived next to an Uzbek *otin-oyi* with whom her mother visited often.

The importance of *otin-oyi* for this dissertation is that while the men share *osh* with the *imams* in the mosques or cafes, the women share *osh* separately with the *otinoyi* at home. The *imams* read the Qur'an for the men and the *otinoyi* read it for the women.

¹⁸⁵ Appendix D: 02.09.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

While the men from both *mahalla* neighborhoods attend *osh* wedding and death celebrations in a mosque, restaurant, or home under the direction of the imams, the women meet separately in a home. They eat, talk, and read the Qu’ron under the direction of the *otin-oyi*.¹⁸⁶ As with the men, the women do so without regard to nationality. This contributes to the closeness and unity of the minorities in Toshtemir’s *mahalla* neighborhoods.

Unlike both imams who were appointed by the state muftiate,¹⁸⁷ the women leaders do not have state sanction; they live by neighborhood norms. An Uzbek young woman from southern Kyrgyzstan told me that some *otin-oyi* in southern Kyrgyzstan stopped practicing due to new religion laws that place tighter restriction on informal religious teaching and practices. Like the two imams, the women leaders have different ethnicities. This fosters neighborhood-based norms as opposed to the Uyghur-based norms of Ittipak. The following chart depicts the current and historical leadership of the Toshtemir women Muslim leaders.

	Small Mahalla	Large Mahalla
Past <i>otin-oyi</i>	Mastura	Muxtaram
<i>Otin-oyi</i> in 2011	Lutfinsa, former apprentice to Mastura (Uyghur)	Moxira, former apprentice to Muxtaram (Tatar)
Apprentice in 2011	Hamida (Uzbek)	Xalbu 2 (Uzbek)
Other	Lalubi ¹⁸⁸ (Uzbek)	Xalbu 1 ¹⁸⁹ (Uyghur)

In addition to women Muslim leaders (*otin-oyi*), Salomat expressed respect for the two women’s madrassas in Toshtemir. She desired to study there, but was inhibited by social pressure not to get too involved with a certain woman who taught Islamic studies.

Women do not attend the First Mosque or the Friendship Mosque; those who pray do so at home. A madrasa for women, however, exists in both *mahalla* neighborhoods; one in

¹⁸⁶ Appendix D: 04.27.11, 05.03.11, 09.07.11, 10.05.11, and 11.30.11 Long-Term Interviews with Salomat, and 07.20.11 Long-Term Interview with GWH.

¹⁸⁷ The Religious Directorship of Kyrgyzstan’s Muslims (Muftiate) is technically an independent body, but when I asked the Honorific Mufti of Kyrgyzstan’s Muslimism (his business car title) about the Muftiate’s relationship with the state, he pointed to a video camera in his office and said he has official license plates and acts like a state minister. See Appendix D: 11.29.11 Formal Interview with PNF.

¹⁸⁸ Salomat’s childhood neighbor.

¹⁸⁹ Mother-in-law of “Graf,” a very rich man from Toshtemir.

Large Mahalla and the other in Small Mahalla. Many of the teachers there are Dungan who teach in Dungan or Russian, which inhibits some Uzbeks (i.e. Uzbeks, Uyghurs, Tajiks) from attending.¹⁹⁰ A madrassa for men does not exist in Toshtemir, but there is one in a small microdistrict about 45 minutes away by car. That madrassa, however, is run by a Turkish organization and accomodates students from all over the country. Thus, it is not neighborhood-based like the women's madrassas.¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ Appendix D: 02.02.11, 03.11.11, 05.03.11, 10.05.11, and 11.30.11 Long-Term Interviews with Salomat; 02.01.11 Informal Interview with TWE.

¹⁹¹ Appendix A: 05.15.11.

Part III: How Does Salomat Act as a Minority Female Source of Authority? (Individual Perspective – Bride Kidnapping Norms)

International Women's Day, March 8th 2012, is a day that I will never forget. On that day an Uzbek young man from Bishkek abducted for marriage Karima (pseudonym), the Kyrgyz daughter of Nuria (pseudonym), a very good long-time Kyrgyz friend of mine.¹⁹² While Karima knew her abductor for five years and was dating him, the abduction was against her will. She thought she was going to enjoy the holiday with her boyfriend strolling in the public square, but he picked her up in a car and abducted her for marriage. Karima did not know about his plans beforehand and had not yet decided to marry him; she was just 18 and a freshman in college.

The abduction forced Karima's choice in marriage¹⁹³ and forced her to begin a strange new life as a daughter-in-law (*kelin*) living in her mother-in-law's home and serving her mother-in-law while still attending college.¹⁹⁴ It also forced Nuria, who did not even consider calling the police, to make hasty wedding plans with an Uzbek family and customs with which she was not familiar. Because Karima could not handle the new responsibilities suddenly forced upon her through marriage (e.g. getting up early before dawn and staying up late after dusk to cook and clean for her new husband and in-laws all while taking a full load of university courses as a freshman medical student¹⁹⁵) she left the home of her husband and in-laws and returned to her mother's home to sort out a better life for herself and her new husband. All of this caused Nuria and Karima much emotional distress.

¹⁹² Nuria's husband / Karima's father left Kyrgyzstan several years ago to work in Russia and he no longer maintains contact with them.

¹⁹³ Marianne Medlin, "New efforts challenge Kyrgyzstan's bride kidnapping epidemic," *Catholic News Agency*(2011), <http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/new-efforts-challenge-kyrgyzstan-bride-kidnapping-epidemic/>. ("For most, their education stops, their choice of spouse is denied, most lose their choice of occupation and place of residence," [Kleinbach] said.)

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. ("Once married, brides can also be expected to take on substantial home or farm-related work and have a household status similar to a servant.")

¹⁹⁵ Medical school is an undergraduate field of study in Kyrgyzstan.

Kamp describes this holiday during Soviet times as follows, “International Women’s Day, March 8, became the main occasion in the Soviet calendar when the Party and the state promoted women’s issues.”¹⁹⁶ While this experience does not represent how most people now celebrate Women’s Day in Kyrgyzstan,¹⁹⁷ it does represent post-Soviet moves towards nationality in Central Asia that now crowd out gender equality introduced by the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁸

Such moves impact bride kidnapping norms and Salomat’s life reflects this shift. As discussed below, during Soviet times she blocked the bride kidnapping of one of her students so that she could graduate by threatening to call the police. During post-Soviet times, however, she encourages abducted brides in her family to marry their abductors rather than call the police.

While Salomat shapes group norms in several ways, the most obvious and direct way she does so is in the way she responds to bride kidnapping cases. Therefore, this chapter describes how she adopts and seeks to shape bride kidnapping norms in Kyrgyzstan. It does not present a study of bride kidnapping. For that I would have conducted a random sample survey. Rather, it describes how a prominent minority Uyghur Muslim woman influences group norms through bride kidnapping cases that she encountered. The way she handles bride kidnapping cases, by not calling the police and counseling abducted girls to marry their

¹⁹⁶ Marianne Kamp, *The new woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, modernity, and unveiling under communism*, Jackson School publications in international studies (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). 145-46; Geoffrey A. Hosking, *The first socialist society: a history of the Soviet Union from within*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 240. (“On International Women’s Day huge women’s meetings would be held, in which the participants demonstratively cast off their veils and committed them to the flames of a large bonfire.”)

¹⁹⁷ “Kyrgyz women hope for equality”, *BBC News*, 8 March 2010. (“On International Women's Day, five women, helped by the British Red Cross and the Kyrgyzstan Red Crescent, share their stories of hardship and hopes for equality.”)

¹⁹⁸ Cynthia Werner, “Bride abduction in post-Soviet Central Asia: marking a shift towards patriarchy through local discourses of shame and tradition,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 15(2009): 328. (“In the post-Soviet period, the state has different priorities, such that the construction of a national identity has assumed more importance than the Soviet goal of achieving gender equality.”); Kathleen Kuehnast, “Aging: Central Asia,” in *Encyclopedia of women & Islamic cultures*, ed. Suad Joseph (Boston, MA: Brill, 2006), 3. (“The paradox of the post-Soviet transition for Central Asian women is that while they have gained their national independence, their former Soviet status of having equal rights has been deeply challenged.”)

abductor, is largely representative of how other women throughout Kyrgyzstan handle the cases. She differs in the way that she attempts to shape that process through her teachings at the Uzbek school and at home.

Through Salomat's life history and my parallel participant observations, statutory reviews (through 2012), and semi-structured interviews, this chapter helps to answer some of the following outstanding questions on bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan:

- Currently, most English-language scholars and human rights activists point to the fact that the state rarely prosecutes bride kidnapping crimes, but they do not fully understand the legal reasons why they fail to prosecute. Therefore, this part helps to answer the question, at least through 2012: What are some legal reasons why the state does not prosecute bride kidnapping cases?
- Most English-language scholars and human rights activists who study bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan focus on the abducting young man or the abducted girl. They rarely, focus on the women who perpetuate the customary law that kidnapped girls must marry their abductors. Therefore, this part helps to answer the following research question: Why and how do women perpetuate the customary law that kidnapped girls must marry their abductors?
- Currently, most English-language scholars and human rights activists believe that mainly only Kyrgyz populations conduct bride kidnapping crimes in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, this part helps to answer the following research question: In addition to the Kyrgyz, do Uzbeks and Uyghurs in northern Kyrgyzstan also commit bride kidnapping crimes?
- Finally, as this part shows that Uzbeks and Uyghurs commit bride kidnapping crimes in northern Kyrgyzstan, it also helps to answer the following follow-up

research question: Do Uzbeks and Uyghurs have any differences, or perceived differences, in the way that they commit and process the crime?

This part first discusses how Kyrgyz families and the state jointly created a legal environment for processing bride kidnapping crimes. Second, it discusses how Salomat adopted that environment in post-Soviet times through the way that she helps process bride kidnapping cases in her family. Through her actions Salomat negotiates to retain the current legal environment, which favors private over state resolutions of bride kidnapping crimes. Finally, this part discusses how Salomat tries to influence that environment through her teachings at home and at the Uzbek school. She teaches that non-consensual bride kidnapping is wrong, but that if it is done certain Muslim safe guards should be put in place to mitigate any negative consequences of the act.

Chapter 7 – What is the Dominant Kyrgyz Norm of Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan?

A. Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan

Bride kidnapping occurs when a boy abducts a girl for marriage. Sometimes, the abduction is consensual, but too often the girl does not consent to the abduction. With non-consensual abductions the girl sometimes knew the boy before the abduction, but other times she did not. As in the case of Karima, described above, it often gets difficult to categorize the abduction as either consensual or non-consensual.

Along with spousal abuse, bride kidnapping is one of the most common crimes against women in Kyrgyzstan.¹⁹⁹ While spousal abuse falls under general crimes that prohibit the intentional infliction of bodily injury regardless of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim,²⁰⁰ specific crimes exist for bride kidnapping.²⁰¹ The constitution also prohibits non-consensual marriages.²⁰²

Kleinbach, the leading English-language scholar on bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, defines the act as follows:

Bride kidnapping in the Kyrgyz Republic (*ala kachuu* in Kyrgyz) is the act of abducting a woman to marry her and includes a variety of actions ranging from consensual marriage to kidnapping and rape. Typically a bride kidnapping involves a young man and his friends taking a young woman by force or deception to the home of his parents or a near relative. She is held in a room and his female relatives convince her to put on the marriage scarf. If necessary she is kept over night and is thus threatened by the shame of no longer being a pure woman. When she agrees, all relatives are notified and a marriage celebration takes place in the following few days.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ See, for example, "Reconciled to violence: state failure to stop domestic abuse and abduction of women in Kyrgyzstan". (at 1: "Domestic violence and abduction for forced marriage (bride-kidnapping) are pervasive forms of violence against women in Kyrgyzstan."); "2010 Human Rights Report: Kyrgyz Republic," (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2010), 20. ("According to a poll conducted in 2008-09 by the Association of Crisis Centers, 83 percent of respondents stated there was physical violence against women in the home."); Kleinbach, "Frequency of non-consensual bride kidnapping," 119. ("... as many as one-third of ethnic Kyrgyz women were married against their will as a result of bride kidnapping.")

²⁰⁰ Appendix B: Criminal Code, Articles 103-112 (2012).

²⁰¹ Appendix B: Criminal Code, Articles 154-155 (2012).

²⁰² Kyrgyzstan, "Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic," *Journal of Eurasian Law* 3, no. 3 (published on 21 May 2010, approved by referendum on 27 June 2010): Article 36 ("No marriage may be entered into without voluntary mutual consent of the couple.").

²⁰³ Kleinbach, "Frequency of non-consensual bride kidnapping," 108.

While Werner, who studied bride kidnapping in Kazakhstan, uses the term “bride abduction,”²⁰⁴ I use the term “bride kidnapping” simply because most scholars and journalists who study the phenomenon in Kyrgyzstan use that term.²⁰⁵ With regard to other terms, I follow the lead of Werner and refer to the victim as a “girl” rather than a “woman” and the abductor as a “young man.” As Kazakh and Uzbek are both Turkic languages, the following quote, which describes Werner’s reasons for using these terms, also applies to the Uzbek language, which Salomat used and which I used in my interviews:

I use the term “girl” to refer to an unmarried woman. This is consistent with Kazakh language usage, which distinguishes “girls” (*qyz*) from “women” (*aiyel*) through the act of marriage and consequently sex. The term “girl” is synonymous with “virgin,” and the term “woman” is synonymous with “wife.” Contemporary American English, in contrast, distinguishes “girls” from “women” based on their age, though the distinction is often ambiguous. When it comes to men, the term “young man” is less problematic as a translation for the Kazakh term *zhigit*, and thus it is used consistently in this paper.²⁰⁶

B. The Legality of Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan

While the Criminal Code penalizes spousal abuse and bride kidnapping, up until 2013, the Criminal Procedure Code (2012) required the abused or abducted woman to file a complaint before the state could prosecute the alleged perpetrator of the crimes. The Criminal Procedure Code defines three types of crimes: private, private-public, and public crimes. The state cannot prosecute private crimes; the state can only prosecute private-public crimes if the victim signs a complaint; and the state must prosecute public crimes regardless of the victim’s consent. As spousal abuse (depending on the severity) and bride kidnapping

²⁰⁴ Werner, "Bride abduction in post-Soviet Central Asia," 316.

²⁰⁵ See, for example, N. O. Borbieva, "Kidnapping women: Discourses of emotion and social change in the Kyrgyz Republic," *Anthropological Quarterly* 85, no. 1 (2012); Kleinbach, Babaiarova, and Orozobekova, "Reducing non-consensual bride kidnapping."; Jackie Dewe Mathews, "'Ala kachuu', bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan," www.jackiedewemathews.com(2009); Petr Lom, "Bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan: a film by Petr Lom," (Icarus Films, 2005); Handrahan, "Hunting for women."; Amsler and Kleinbach, "Bride kidnapping in the Kyrgyz Republic."

²⁰⁶ Cynthia Werner, "Women, marriage, and the nation-state: the rise of nonconsensual bride kidnapping in post-Soviet Kazakhstan," in *The transformation of Central Asia: states and societies from Soviet rule to independence*, ed. Pauline Jones Luong (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 60n2.

were (through 2012) private-public crimes, the state could not prosecute them unless the woman filed a complaint against her husband or abductor.²⁰⁷

As observed by Terada during a USAID legal workshop in Uzbekistan, this is one difference between law in Central Asia and the U.S.:

The concept of evidence gathering with a view that the state may prosecute such law violations without the cooperation, or even presence, of the complaining victim was foreign to this audience, whose experience included a requirement of examination by a forensic physician before an abuse victim is even permitted to file a police report. The presenters shared the American experience of mandatory arrest and prosecution as a mechanism to deal with the great pressure to recant often placed on the victims by their batterers.²⁰⁸

As alluded to in this quote, due to extreme pressures, women often do not file complaints. Rather, abducted girls often sign letters for their parents stating that they consent to the marriage (even though her consent was forced by the abduction) of their abductor. The roots of this practice, as a precautionary tactic, could stem from the legal requirement for the victim to sign a complaint to initiate prosecution.

Therefore, the police and prosecutors often cannot prosecute the crimes. If a woman does sign a complaint she often feels strong pressure to later release the charges. If she does the police and prosecutor cannot continue with prosecution of the crime. One Kyrgyz woman working for an international NGO on police reform in northern Kyrgyzstan told me that the police and prosecutors often do not take women seriously when they file complaints for spousal abuse because they often drop them shortly thereafter.²⁰⁹ The Criminal Procedure Code also gives victims wide latitude to drop charges.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ Appendix B: Criminal Code, Articles 10-11, 103-112, and 154-155 (2012), and Criminal Procedure Code, Articles 26, and 159 (2012).

²⁰⁸ Suzanne Terada, "An Uzbekistan experience," *Hawaii Bar Journal* (1999): 42.

²⁰⁹ See also, "Reconciled to violence: state failure to stop domestic abuse and abduction of women in Kyrgyzstan". 46-47. ("If a woman calls about beatings, the police often don't come, because there are so many such cases . . . They may also believe the woman will withdraw the complaint and view the effort expended as wasted.")

²¹⁰ Appendix B: Criminal Procedure Code, Articles 29, 50, and 53 (2012).

Recently activists in Kyrgyzstan promoted changes to the law that increased the penalties for bride kidnapping.²¹¹ As the private (less than 3 years in jail), private-public (3-5 years in jail), and public (more than 5 years in jail) crime distinction is based on jail time, increasing the prison sentence for bride kidnapping elevated the act from a private-public crime to a public crime. That requires the state to now prosecute the crime even if the victim does not sign a complaint.²¹² Nevertheless, even if the Criminal Procedure Code requires the state to independently prosecute spousal abuse and bridal abduction cases, state legal actors may view such crimes as social issues rather than legal cases and still refuse to prosecute them. As stated by Human Rights Watch:

Rather than treat cases of domestic violence as law enforcement issues, police often dismiss them as community matters and pass them off to the aksakals, or community elders. While Kyrgyz law envisions that some domestic violence cases will be handled by the aksakal courts, police appear to resort excessively and inappropriately to this option in order to get rid of such cases, which they deem unworthy of their time and attention. . . . in dealing with family matters, including domestic violence, aksakals promote reconciliation, often at the expense of a woman's safety.²¹³

While under very different circumstances, similar things have happened in the U.S. Women file spousal abuse cases and state legal actors sometimes treat them as social issues rather than legal cases and transfer them to mediators for resolution. The following quotes the first two paragraphs from Merry's book where she describes similar issues she found in the U.S.:

The lower courts in the United States generally dislike handling problems between neighbors, friends, lovers, and spouses. Yet ordinary people persist in bringing such problems there. Sometimes people coping with a persistently noisy neighbor, an unfaithful lover, or a disobedient child interpret their problem as a legal one and turn to the courts for help. People come to the courts because they think the law has something to offer them: protection from a violent lover, obedience from a teenage child, punishment for a rude and inconsiderate neighbor, control over a battering husband. For women who feel vulnerable to violent men, courts offer the possibility of power.

²¹¹ The research cut-off date for statutes cited in this dissertation is 2012. I did not review 2013 laws.

²¹² Appendix B: Criminal Procedure Code, Article 158 (2012).

²¹³ "Reconciled to violence: state failure to stop domestic abuse and abduction of women in Kyrgyzstan". 63.

But the court officials who handle these problems consider them out of place in the court. Most are referred to as “garbage cases,” as frivolous and troublesome, and as evidence that people “use” the court. Domestic-violence cases are more likely to be considered serious but may still be categorized as garbage. Judges, lawyers, clerk-magistrates, and mediation-program staff attempt to manage and settle these personal problems as moral dilemmas while not taking them seriously as legal cases, offering lectures and social services rather than protection or punishment.²¹⁴

With regard to Kyrgyzstan, Human Rights Watch continues, “Once the police pass on cases that would rightly be prosecuted under the Criminal Code to the aksakals, the case is no longer considered a criminal matter, but a social problem.”²¹⁵ With regard to family and neighborhood disputes in the U.S.²¹⁶ Merry similarly states, “To the people who work in the lower courts—the judges, prosecutors, and clerks—interpersonal cases are unwelcome. Court officials do not feel that they can refuse these requests for intervention, yet they also feel that these cases are not really “crimes,” not “real legal problems. . . . Prosecutors and clerks prefer to send cases such as these to mediation [the U.S. version of aksakal elders courts] rather than to bring them to trial.”²¹⁷

Therefore, a legal solution to these crimes is not always available. A spousal abuse victim, for example, who refuses to testify against her husband, might hinder state prosecution. With bride kidnapping, however, there are often many witnesses to the crime. Several young men often abduct the girl in public and his family members or friends often harbor the abducted girl. If the girl, however, consents to marry her abductor, as she often does, then the family of the bride and groom may not want the state to independently prosecute the kidnapping. This would disrupt the newly created family.

²¹⁴ Sally Engle Merry, *Getting justice and getting even: legal consciousness among working-class Americans* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 1.

²¹⁵ “Reconciled to violence: state failure to stop domestic abuse and abduction of women in Kyrgyzstan”. 65.

²¹⁶ ———, *Getting justice and getting even*: 13. (“quarrels with people they knew personally: intractable neighbors, disobedient children, abusive spouses, violent lovers, uncooperative merchants, and irresponsible landlords.”)

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

Merry observed such tensions in the U.S. between protecting the rights of individuals and keeping the state out of family and neighborhood affairs. The following quotes the last four sentences of her book *Getting Justice and Getting Even*, which summarizes her findings:

This book concerns an arena of behavior which lies in the gray area between that traditionally regulated by the state and that which is private and beyond state control. The location of this boundary between public and private is now recognized as a profoundly political boundary and is being hotly contested, particularly by feminists (e.g., Minow 1990). To see family and neighborhood problems as being within the scope of the law is to expand that boundary and to increase government supervision over areas of life long defined as private; to deny access for these problems is to violate the expectations of relatively powerless citizens that the authority of the law is available to them as well as to the more privileged. This paradox is inherent in the legal order of contemporary America itself.²¹⁸

With bride kidnapping and spousal abuse this paradox is similarly inherent in the legal order of contemporary Kyrgyzstan. The public and private boundary between state regulation and family / neighborhood privacy with regard to these crimes is also hotly contested in Kyrgyzstan. The location of the boundary between private and public prosecution of bride kidnapping (i.e. state regulation of the family v. family privacy) is hotly contested in Kyrgyzstan. Many people argue that bride kidnapping is an ancient Kyrgyz tradition. By so doing they negotiate towards privacy and less government supervision over the practice. As bride kidnapping is a crime many people, including international human rights activists, argue that the state should more actively prosecute it. As stated by Werner:

Local understandings of non-consensual bride abduction in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are contested and negotiated in political environments where civil society, with its ties to transnational flows of ideas and resources, has taken over the state's role as the defender of women's rights, and where state and non-state actors have fostered a sense of pride in national 'traditions'.²¹⁹

As the state does not, or cannot, provide basic services like restraining orders, women's shelters, humane prisons, social services, welfare, health insurance, retirement plans, retirement homes, stable jobs, available credit, etc. people must rely upon family and

²¹⁸ Ibid., 182.

²¹⁹ Werner, "Bride abduction in post-Soviet Central Asia," 328.

connections for such services. Without these and other services people in Kyrgyzstan cannot live as independently as they do in the U.S. Many communal customs that allow people to cope in the absence of adequate state services revolve around family and neighborhood. This can intensify problems with bridal abduction and spousal abuse and make it more difficult for people to allow government supervision over those areas of life.

When they get married, for example, as was the case of Karima, discussed above, Central Asian women often move into the childhood home of their new husband and become *kelins* (daughters-in-law). As a *kelin* they live with their husband in a separate space, but in the home of their in-laws where they are often expected to serve their mother-in-law. When they get older, however, they can expect their daughter's-in-law (*kelins*) to similarly serve them.²²⁰ Along with gender equality between men and women, Salomat also taught this practice between mothers and daughters in-laws at the Uzbek school. People also told me that such customs were particularly prevalent in Small Mahalla. Additionally, as Salomat narrates in Chapter VII, the youngest son in the family often inherits the family home with the expectation that he takes care of his parents in their old age. Salomat's only son and his family, for example, live with her and her husband. Additionally, as described below, people share the cost of weddings and funerals.

People may fear that inviting increased government supervision over the family and neighborhood may cut off some of these vital connections. Calling the police on an abusive husband or a neighborhood young man who abducted a girl could damage vital connections. As discussed herein, those connections are created and fostered in Toshtemir through Muslim ceremonies, the Uzbek school, and neighborhood organizations. Some law students in Bishkek told me that if you fail to assist your connections in Kyrgyzstan you are placed in a

²²⁰ See, for example, Colette Harris, *Control and subversion: gender relations in Tajikistan*, Anthropology, culture, and society (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2004). (at 99 with regard to Tajikistan: "a kelin is useful to provide household labour, not financial support, which should be left to the men")

vacuum where nobody helps you. Of course, in such situations, vulnerable people need state intervention. As stated by Salomat and repeated by other women in Toshtemir, “If we quarrel, we may be surprised to be in-laws in the future, and there will be shame.” Thus, when Salomat encouraged her daughter to get a divorce to escape severe spousal abuse it makes sense that she stopped short of pursuing abuse charges against her son-in-law.²²¹

Additionally, people in Kyrgyzstan often try to avoid the state when solving problems. Many factors contribute to this tendency including corruption, poor prison conditions, preserving community harmony, maintaining connections, etc. People, for example, state that sending a man to prison could ruin the rest of his life. Salomat also states, “In Toshtemir the problem of wife beating of course exists, but women who are beaten by their husbands cannot always call the police because our city is small and Uzbeks are basically relatives, in-laws, acquaintances, and friends to each other.”

Furthermore, scholars refute popular notions that bridal abduction is an ancient Kyrgyz tradition.²²² As stated by Werner, “As transnational feminists and local NGOs take steps to change these practices, conflicts often arise between activists who attack gender-based violence in defence of human rights and local community members who justify these practices in the name of culture.”²²³ To increase the prosecution of bridal abduction and spousal abuse is “to increase government supervision over areas of life long defined as private.” This could require social upheaval. To deny prosecution, however, “is to violate the expectations of relatively powerless citizens that the authority of the law is available to

²²¹ See the divorce case in Chapter VII.

²²² Kleinbach and Salimjanova, “Kyz ala kachuu and adat,” 314. (“Further, in Kyrgyzstan, where bride abduction is increasingly re-imagined as a national tradition, women and activists who challenge this practice can be viewed as traitors to their ethnicity.”); Sadiq, “Interview with Petr Lom: marriage by abduction.” (“... bride kidnapping is still very often perceived as a legitimate custom, and so though it is officially illegal now, it is hardly ever prosecuted.”); Amsler and Kleinbach, “Bride kidnapping in the Kyrgyz Republic,” 185. (“While illegal, bride kidnapping is often popularly defined as a national tradition as opposed to a crime.”); Werner, “Bride abduction in post-Soviet Central Asia.”

²²³ ———, “Bride abduction in post-Soviet Central Asia,” 328.

them as well as to the more privileged.”²²⁴ As in the U.S., citizens of Kyrgyzstan must decide how to define this boundary.

Scholars, therefore, should also ask whether Kyrgyzstan citizens believe spousal abuse and bridal abduction warrant increased government supervision in Central Asia. International human rights activists argue that they do and they blame the state for not actively prosecuting alleged perpetrators.²²⁵ As discussed above, however, as of 2012 the Criminal Procedure Code limited the state’s ability to prosecute these crimes without the victim’s consent, which is difficult to achieve.

The state, therefore, had one foot in each camp of the debate. By criminalizing spousal abuse and bridal abduction the Criminal Code appeases those who desire greater government intervention. By not allowing the state to prosecute, however, without the consent of the victim, the state appeased those who desired more family and neighborhood privacy. Thus, the law reflected society²²⁶ and created this paradox which is the legal environment of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan; an environment created both by the state and the people. Along with state lawmakers and law enforcement officials, young men who kidnap girls and older women, like Salomat, who encourage them to marry their abductors, create and perpetuate this environment.

As individuals and society move towards one side of the debate or the other the law can likewise change, or vice versa. Therefore, in addition to promoting top-down and state-centered law reforms, similar to those passed in 2013 with regard to bride kidnapping, law

²²⁴ Merry, *Getting justice and getting even*: 182.

²²⁵ See, for example, "Reconciled to violence: state failure to stop domestic abuse and abduction of women in Kyrgyzstan". (at 1: "The problems of domestic violence and abduction have long been neglected by government officials, and urgently need to be addressed."); Mathews, "'Ala kachuu', bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan". ("Ala kachuu (bridal abduction) was outlawed during the Soviet era and remains illegal under the Kyrgyz criminal code although kidnappers are rarely prosecuted."); Handrahan, "Implications of international human rights law and bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan." ("This article hopes to encourage the government of Kyrgyzstan to fulfill their international commitments to uphold women's and international human rights agreements.")

²²⁶ Jean-Noel Ferrie, "Norms, law and practices: the practical obstacles that make it impossible to separate them," in *Legal pluralism in the Arab world*, ed. Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger, and Laila Al-Zwaini (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999).

reformers should also explore how groups and individuals influence the debate. With this information they can find ways to empower them to negotiate towards decreasing incidents of the crime.²²⁷ As stated by Gill with regard to bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, “the rule of law does not spring only from the [formal] legal system.”²²⁸

Ordinary people negotiate this boundary in what they *do* and *say* about spousal abuse and bride kidnappings. In the way they *respond* to specific incidents and as they *talk* about the issues (e.g. at Muslim ceremonies, at home, and at school) they negotiate the boundary one way or the other. The next section in this chapter discusses how Salomat and other Uzbeks and Uyghurs in northern Kyrgyzstan adopted this legal environment of bride kidnapping. Through their adoption of this practice they negotiate the boundary away from state enforcement of the crime. The final section discusses how Salomat seeks to shape that environment through her teachings at home and the Uzbek school and in the way that she talks about how proper Muslims should process the crime.

C. 2013 Postscript (Aynuru Altybaeva)

For this chapter I reviewed Kyrgyzstan’s 2012 statutes. In early 2013, however, it appears that Kyrgyzstan increased the statutory penalty for bride kidnapping.²²⁹ Therefore, while I did not review the actual code, it appears that bride kidnapping is now a public crime rather than a private-public crime. If this is the case, the state is now obligated to prosecute bride kidnapping cases even if the victim does not sign a complaint. This gives the state much more power to enforce compliance with the law. Therefore, at least on paper, the state no longer straddles the fence to appease both segments of society, those who want greater state involvement and those who want to retain private resolutions. Time will tell whether

²²⁷ See, for example, http://faculty.philau.edu/kleinbachr/new_page_14.htm.

²²⁸ Brian Gill, "Aiding the Rule of Law Abroad: The Kyrgyz Republic as a Case Study," *The Fletcher forum of world affairs*. 29(2005): 150.

²²⁹ Altynai Myrzabekova, "Kyrgyz politician gets her bride-theft law " (Bishkek: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2013); "New law in Kyrgyzstan toughens penalties for bride kidnapping," *UN Women* February 6 2013(2013), <http://www.unwomen.org/2013/02/new-law-in-kyrgyzstan-toughens-penalties-for-bride-kidnapping/>.

and how the state will implement its new policy and whether women like Salomat will assist or resist implementation.

There is at least one woman in Kyrgyzstan, Aynura Altybaeva, that understood why the police did not prosecute most bride kidnapping cases; they could not unless the victim signed a complaint, which she rarely did. Aynura knew that in order to change that situation the penalty for bride kidnapping had to be increased from three years in jail to more than five years. Increasing the penalty to more than five years would turn the crime into a public crime and require the state to prosecute, even without the consent of the victim.

According to news reports Aynura Altybaeva, a women member of the Kyrgyzstan parliament, with the support of civil society groups, pushed for and achieved stricter penalties that turn the crime into a public crime. In this way she used the state legal system to shape the legal environment of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan. The following is her response in a news interview:

Until now, the victim hasn't been able to seek protection from a public prosecutor acting for the state. Now that it's counted as a serious offence, there's no need for the girl to report it. Criminal proceedings are applicable the moment a kidnapping has occurred. The investigation starts as soon as the girl is abducted.

When the sentence for a crime can reach ten years in jail, it's no longer a private legal action, it becomes a state prosecution.²³⁰

²³⁰ _____, "Kyrgyz politician gets her bride-theft law ".

Chapter 8 – How Does Salomat Adopt Kyrgyz Bride Kidnapping Norms?

This chapter discusses how Salomat and other Uyghurs and Uzbeks in her community adopt the Kyrgyz legal environment of bride kidnapping. She does so by encouraging girls to marry their abductors to avoid a potential life of shame without marriage rather than leave them and initiate legal action. In this way, Salomat, as many other women in Kyrgyzstan, negotiates away from state and towards private resolutions of the crime.

Werner describes the anatomy of a typical bride kidnapping in southern Kazakhstan, which is similar to Kleinbach's description of Kyrgyz bride kidnappings in Kyrgyzstan, as follows: 1) a young man and his friends abduct a girl for marriage and take her by car to his home; 2) female relatives of the abductor insist that the girl wears a marriage scarf to acknowledge publically her willingness to marry her abductor; 3) relatives of the abductor ask the girl to write a letter to her parents as evidence that she is not harmed and willing to marry her abductor; 4) respected men from the abductor's side go to the girl's parents to deliver the letter, ask forgiveness for the abduction, and negotiate a marriage between the couple; 5) men and/or women from the girl's side visit the girl to check on her condition; and 6) through a ceremony the girl introduces herself to the groom's relatives and she begins the life of a daughter-in-law.²³¹

Through this process, which rarely includes calling the police, Kyrgyz and Kazakh citizens negotiate bride kidnapping norms away from state prosecution. As described in the next sections, by adopting Kyrgyz and Kazakh practices, Uzbeks and Uyghurs also negotiate away from state prosecution.

A. Salomat's Bride Kidnaping Cases

In the following kidnapping cases Salomat acts on behalf of the Soviet state, as a mediator for her family, and as a counselor for a neighbor. The post-Soviet cases show that

²³¹ Werner, "Women, marriage, and the nation-state," 70-76.

Salomat adopts, and thus promotes, the Kyrgyz legal environment of processing bride kidnapping cases privately and outside of state control. That is not how she acted, however, during Soviet times when she had very different incentives. See Chapter VII for Salomat's complete narratives of these and other cases.

1. Soviet State Actor

This first case occurred during Soviet times while Salomat was a member of the Communist Party and director of the Uzbek school. Due to the Soviet emphasis on education, Salomat could have lost her job as director if one of her students dropped out of school to get married. As stated by Salomat, "In the time of the Soviet system, in our constitution, every single child from the age of seven was compelled to study in school and it said that finishing eighth grade in the middle school was required."²³² Therefore, when a young man kidnapped one of her female students for marriage she intervened to prevent the marriage. In this way Salomat negotiated bride kidnapping norms towards increased government supervision over the crime.

The following is Salomat's partial narration of this case; see Chapter 6 for the complete version:

In Soviet times, in about 1979-80, based on my experience, one Uzbek boy kidnapped for marriage an Uzbek girl who was a student in the 8th grade. In that time, finishing school, well, every single student had to receive an education through middle (grades 1-8) or high school (grades 1-11). This is because it was written as such in our constitution. Every single student had to receive an education. Because she was an eighth grade student who hadn't graduated from middle school (grades 1-8), such was the problem, there still had to be a very hard examination by the education department of our city.

After I heard about the girl's bride kidnapping I went to his home that day. I spoke with the boy's parents for a long time. They said that according to Uzbek custom the girl couldn't return after she was kidnapped. I didn't consent, however, because the girl hadn't yet reached the age of maturity; she had just barely turned 15. The boy's parents tried everything they could to not give her up. After that I told them I would call the police, the district police. I think that the boy's parent's fear of the police must be because Toshtemir was

²³² Recorded by Salomat on 05.11.11.

a military city. After that they gave permission for the girl to return. I returned that girl to her home and with a whole lot of discussion I explained to that girl that she can get married only after she graduates from the eighth grade.²³³

2. Post-Soviet Mediator

Several of Salomat's nieces and nephews were involved in bride kidnappings cases as the victim and the abductor respectively. In those cases Salomat was often called upon to mediate for the family. Even though she broke up the bride kidnappings of her female students during Soviet times so that they could complete school, she convinced her nieces and the abducted girls of her nephews to stay in the non-consensual marriage to avoid the stigma of a girl who stayed the night with a boy's family and then left him. Therefore, Salomat's incentives were very different with her nieces and nephews in post-Soviet times than with her students in Soviet times. It would be very interesting to know how Salomat would have acted if her own daughter was kidnapped at any point or her female relatives while attending school in Soviet times. Maybe the young men knew better than to attempt such abductions on Salomat's relatives.

In 2007 Salomat's niece, Guljon (pseudonym), was abducted for marriage. Salomat and her son immediately searched for her because they knew that if she was held overnight it would be very difficult for her to leave the situation as she would then be accused of having been married, which would make it difficult for her to later get married to another man. They did not find out where she was held until the next morning. Guljon's mother, Salomat's sister-in-law, sent Salomat to negotiate for the family and begged Salomat to come back with her daughter. Salomat mediated the abduction, but did not bring back Guljon. After assessing the situation, Salomat convinced Guljon and Guljon's mother that it was best for Guljon to stay and marry her captor rather than face a life of stigma due to the fact that she stayed the night with the young man's family, even though by force, and then left him.

²³³ Recorded by Salomat on 05.11.11; Corrected by Salomat on 05.12.11 and 10.12.11.

Guljon was held in the home of her abductor's aunt, not the young man's own home, which meant to Salomat that Guljon was not taken advantage of or raped. Nevertheless, in Salomat's mind it also meant that other people would still judge her as if she was no longer a virgin. This latter concern is why Salomat convinced her niece and her niece's mother to allow the marriage even though it was arranged by physical violence.

When Salomat arrived to assess the situation the young man's aunt pleaded for Salomat to let Guljon stay. After speaking with the aunt, Salomat narrates as follows how she convinced Guljon and Guljon's mother that Guljon should stay and marry her captor; see Chapter 6 for the complete version of this narrative:

Then, after that, I met with our girl Guljon. "Do you have a boy friend?" I asked Guljon. "If so, I'll take you home now," I said. Guljon didn't have a boyfriend. Thus, I explained to her that that this family wasn't bad, they were a good family, the young man even had a job, his mother was nice, and they had a place for her to live. "Now, you stayed with this family for one night, '*qochgan qiz*' they will call you (a girl who left her husband)." "If you don't have a boyfriend it could be difficult for you to get another marriage proposal." Therefore, "think it over," I said.

I called my sister-in-law and told her, "she's now taken, the place isn't bad, they took her to the aunt's house, you should agree, I spoke with Guljon, let's put it behind us," I said. Then, after that, my sister-in-law also cried, but I also convinced my sister-in-law. I met with the girl again; "Give your consent to stay with him," I said. Guljon cried, but because she was held for a night and didn't have a boyfriend I explained to her very well the positive and negative sides of her situation. Then, after that, she gave her consent to stay and marry him.

That evening Salomat took Guljon to the young man's house, the abductor's house, where they performed the nikah Muslim marriage ceremony. After the ceremony Salomat left her there as a married woman. As with most women in this situation, Salomat did not call the police to resolve the abduction. In this way, at least in post-Soviet times, she perpetuates private resolutions of bride kidnapping cases. As discussed, below, however, some do call the police, which negotiates towards state resolutions.

In Chapter 6 Salomat narrates two other kidnappings of her nieces that she helped mediate. In those cases she also consents to the marriage because her niece stayed the night in the home of the young man's relatives. In one case she describes it as follows, "The boy's parents are good people. They had lived in Large Mahalla. Therefore, we used to know them and we consented to give her in marriage because we couldn't find her the first night. The girl agreed."²³⁴ In another case she and her husband were called upon to mediate the kidnapping of her husband's younger sister's daughter. That is because her husband was the oldest son and as his father passed away he acted as the family elder to take charge in such situations. In that case Salomat describes their mediation as follows:

Because my younger sister and brother-in-law wouldn't get involved my husband and I gave permission. I responded to the women and my husband (our father) responded to the men. Of course, after the kidnapping, after the girl stayed in the home one night, after she stayed in the home of his relatives, the girl gave her consent to the marriage. Our girl gave her own consent, then, we also consented and before a week passed they held the wedding party.²³⁵

Therefore, at least for Salomat and likely many other women in Kyrgyzstan, it is better for girls to marry their abductors than to face a potential life without marriage. For this reason Salomat encourages her nieces and other girls to marry their abductors. In Bishkek, I met one Kyrgyz woman who refused to marry her abductor and even though she never married she was glad that she exercised her agency to refuse him. Stories like hers, while they negotiate away from the customary law that women must marry their abductors, perpetuate the understanding that those who disobey the law receive the punishment of not marrying.

3. Post-Soviet Counselor

In the final narrative that I present here (Chapter VII contains more) Salomat acted as a counselor to Amira, a girl who managed to escape her abduction. After she was abducted

²³⁴ Recorded by Salomat on 04.12.11; Corrected by Salomat on 04.28.11 and 10.12.11.

²³⁵ Recorded by Salomat on 12.14.11.

and held for one night three male elders (*aksakal*) mediated the crime. One represented her, another represented the young man (her abductor), and the third represented them both.

Because she did not want to stay and her father threatened to call the police the elders returned Amira to her own home.

The following is Salomat's partial narration of this case; see Chapter 6 for the complete version:

At the end of 2010 in our Small Mahalla an Uzbek bride kidnapping happened. In that case an Uzbek boy liked a girl, but the girl didn't like the boy, in other words she wasn't going with the boy. The boy, with his friends, abducted the girl for marriage. The girl, however, didn't want to marry the boy. The parents of both families got involved in the case. They sent elders (*aksakal*) to ask for the girl's hand in marriage. They took the boy's grandfather and respected elders from the neighborhood and went to the girl's home, but, the girl's father didn't consent. He demanded that they return the girl and bring her back. According to Uzbek customs and traditions (*urf-odat*), if the girl doesn't come home on the first day, if she doesn't sleep in her own house, they should give the girl to the boy in marriage. The girl's parents, however, didn't agree to this.

Several days passed in this case. The girl, however, wasn't in Toshtemir, she was taken to Bishkek and because the girl stayed with another family, two days later, "if you don't return the girl we will file a complaint with the police," they said. Only after that did the boy's parents return the girl. In this case the girl didn't marry the boy. In about January of 2011 the boy married another Uzbek girl.²³⁶

It only took the boy a few months to marry another girl, which shows his disregard for women. After Amira returned home, she was depressed and Salomat counseled with her and her mother. Here is how Salomat describes Amira's situation:

The girl's fate is very complicated. "She is a girl that returned home from her marriage ("*qaytgan qiz*")," they may think. Until now nobody has asked her to marry because she stayed one night with the boy's family. She also doesn't

²³⁶ Recorded by Salomat on 04.12.11; Corrected by Salomat on 04.20.11 and 10.12.11.

This case is interesting for many reasons. First, the girl's father refused to accept the customary law that requires the girl to marry her abductor if she stays one night with the boy's side. By threatening to call the police he negotiated towards the rule of law. He made a social stand that elevated criminal law above customary law. While he used the law to his advantage, he apparently stopped short of inviting the state to intrude into this family and neighborhood problem. Once the boy's family returned his daughter he did not file charges for bridal abduction. While bridal abduction is a crime the state cannot prosecute it without a complaint from the victim.

have a boyfriend. Therefore, based on these facts I think she needs to work out her fate. This situation is very bad for her.²³⁷

Many people in Toshtemir's *mahalla* neighborhoods are aware of Amira's situation and they point to her as justification for why girls stay and marry their abductors. Such discussions perpetuate this customary norm of resolving bride kidnapping cases in private so that the girl can marry her abductor. If they get the police involved (or now if the police get involved on their own) she will lose an opportunity for marriage.

B. Uzbek / Uyghur Kidnappings in Northern Kyrgyzstan

Scholars and journalists have documented bride kidnapping among the Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhs in southern Kazakhstan.²³⁸ Some state that the practice only exists among traditionally nomadic populations (e.g. Kyrgyz, Kazakh).²³⁹ While many people in Toshtemir claim that the practice does not occur much among Uzbeks and Uyghurs,²⁴⁰ this study shows that it also occurs to some extent among them in northern Kyrgyzstan. Some also claim that it occurs among the many Dungans in or near Toshtemir.²⁴¹

The following chart lists interviews where respondents narrated different Uzbek / Uyghur (and some dungan) bride kidnapping cases in northern Kyrgyzstan. In some cases the abduction occurred in southern Kyrgyzstan, but the couple moved to northern Kyrgyzstan

²³⁷ Recorded by Salomat on 10.12.11; Corrected by Salomat on 10.27.11, 12.01.11; and Reviewed by an Uzbek research assistant in December 2011.

²³⁸ Amsler and Kleinbach, "Bride kidnapping in the Kyrgyz Republic."; Kleinbach, "Frequency of non-consensual bride kidnapping."; Kleinbach, Ablezova, and Altieva, "Kidnapping for marriage."; Kleinbach, Babaiarova, and Orozobekova, "Reducing non-consensual bride kidnapping."; Kleinbach and Salimjanova, "Kyz ala kachuu and adat."; Werner, "Bride abduction in post-Soviet Central Asia."; ———, "Women, marriage, and the nation-state."; Handrahan, "Hunting for women."; Lom, "Bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan: a film by Petr Lom."; Azita Ranjbar, "Kyrgyzstan: justice elusive for kidnapped brides," *EurasiaNet.org*(2012), <http://www.eurasianet.org>; Mathews, "'Ala kachuu', bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan".

²³⁹ "Reconciled to violence: state failure to stop domestic abuse and abduction of women in Kyrgyzstan". ("There have been some cases reported also of abductions among ethnic Uzbeks, but these appear to be rare."); Sadiq, "Interview with Petr Lom: marriage by abduction." ("Bride kidnapping is pretty much exclusively a Kyrgyz custom in Central Asia."); Giovarelli and Akmatova, "Local institutions that enforce customary law," 12n22. ("Uzbeks do not practice bride stealing.")

²⁴⁰ See, for example, Appendix D: 02.13.12 Group Interview with IKW, OJP, DUI, and EAF.

²⁴¹ Appendix D: 04.13.11 Long-Term Interview with ZLV, 06.03.11 Group Interview with NRB, XLC, and LUR, 07.08.11 Long-Term Interview with OGK, 07.21.11 Informal Interview with PDE, and 02.16.12 Long-Term Interview with WUU; See also "Bride kidnapping Dungan way (as "learned" from Kyrgyz) ", http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7_QJc4nG_WU.

where I met them. In only two cases were the police called to process the crime. Therefore, the Uzbek and Uyghur families involved in these cases adopted the dominant Kyrgyz norm by processing the case in private and outside of state control. This negotiates the boundary away from state prosecution of the crime.

Interview Date	Respondents²⁴²	Description
04.12.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	Sidiqjon's (the Uzbek imam of the Friendship Mosque) cousin was kidnapped.
04.12.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	In 2001 an Uzbek boy kidnapped Salomat's niece-in-law from Small Mahalla.
04.12.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	In 2004 Salomat's nephew from Small Mahalla kidnapped a girl whose parents were from Toshtemir
04.13.11	Long-Term Interview with ZLV	In about 2005 a Dungan man from Kazakhstan, just across the Toshtemir border, kidnapped a Dungan woman from a city near Toshtemir. The man was about 20 and the woman about 18 at that time. The man was driving in a car with his friends in Toshtemir on the road to Bishkek. The woman was in another car and they stopped her car and forcibly pulled her out and put her in their car. Then they took her to his home across the border in Kazakhstan. While the man loved the woman, she did not love him and did not want to stay with him in marriage. Therefore, her parents came and took her back. Now the man is married to another woman who was chosen for him by his parents.
04.17.11	Group Interview with ISL and COA	ISL, COA, and young men from Large Mahalla in Toshtemir described three incidents of Uzbek kidnappings in Toshtemir.
05.11.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	In about 1979 or 1980 an Uzbek boy kidnapped an Uzbek girl in Salomat's school. Salomat blocked the marriage until the girl graduated from school.
05.11.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	As related by one of Salomat's relatives, in Soviet times an Uzbek young man kidnapped a Kazakh girl from Large Mahalla.
06.03.11	Group Interview with NRB, XLC, and LUR	The parents of a Dungan girl from northern Kyrgyzstan would not let her marry a certain boy. Therefore, she allowed that boy to kidnap her for marriage.
06.27.11	Group Interview with UOR and AFR	UOR is Uzbek with Kazakh blood and he kidnapped AFR, his Uzbek wife, in southern Kyrgyzstan, where they are both from. Then, they moved to Toshtemir, where UOR worked.
07.08.11	Long-Term Interview with OGK	OGK is Uyghur from Toshtemir. She stated that three of her Uyghur cousins were kidnapped.

²⁴² See Appendix D.

07.26.11	Long-Term Interview with GWH	GWH is Uyghur and she moved to Toshtemir from Bishkek when she got married. In 2010 her cousin was kidnapped in Karakol in northern Kyrgyzstan.
09.21.11	Formal Interview with EYB	EYB is Uzbek from Toshtemir. He kidnapped his wife because her parents did not agree to their marriage.
10.12.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	In 2011 an Uzbek boy from Large Mahalla was engaged to an Uzbek girl from Large Mahalla. After he purchased certain furnishings for their new home she did not like what he purchased and she called off the wedding. Because a wedding was already planned he kidnapped another girl. Her parents called the police who put him in jail. After his family agreed to return the girl to her home the police released the young man from jail.
10.12.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	In 2011 in a town outside of Bishkek an Uzbek young man kidnapped with her consent an Uyghur girl. He kidnapped her to force a wedding because his parents were in mourning due to the death of a relative and could not host a wedding during their mourning.
10.12.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	In about 1997 a feud began between two Uzbek families in Toshtemir. An Uzbek young man from one family kidnaped and Uzbek girl from another family. Later, an Uzbek young man from the wronged family kidnapped a girl from the abducting family.
10.27.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	In 2011 an Uzbek boy kidnapped an Uzbek girl from Toshtemir because her parents did not agree to the marriage as he had a previous wife.
11.16.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	In 2007, Salomat's neice-in-law was kidnapped.
12.14.11	Long-Term Interview with Salomat	In 2006 Salomat's niece from Small Mahalla was kidnapped.
12.15.11	Formal Interview with YXW	During Soviet times, with her consent, an Uzbek pilot kidnapped EYB by plane. They flew to southern Kyrgyzstan where he lived. Later she left him and returned to Toshtemir.
01.19.12	Long-Term Interview with PEG	PEG is Uzbek from Toshtemir. Only one of his friends kidnapped his wife. It happened in about 2002. His Uyghur aunt also eloped with a Tajik man.
01.19.12	Group Interview with GGW, SDK, RBT	All three are Uyghurs from Toshtemir. Of GGW's two friends one kidnapped his wife with her consent because her parents did not agree to the marriage.
02.02.12	Formal Interview with LVV	LVV is Uzbek from Toshtemir. He kidnapped his first wife, an Uzbek from one of the <i>mahalla</i> neighborhoods.
02.09.12	Group Interview with YKI, IRM, and SXG	All three are Uzbek from Large Mahalla. They described the 2010 Uzbek kidnapping by an Uzbek young man of an Uzbek girl in Small Mahalla that Salomat describes in Chapter 6.
02.13.12	Informal Interview with SMP	SMP is Uzbek from Toshtemir. He kidnapped his Kyrgyz wife.
02.13.12	Group Interview with	All are Uyghurs of the same family. In 1989 an Uyghur

	IKW, OJP, DUI, and EAF	whose family is from Ghulja (Yining), China kidnapped DUI.
02.16.12	Long-Term Interview with WUU	WUU's Dungan group mate who is from Toshtemir wanted to get married to a Dungan man from across the Kazakhstan border, but her parents didn't give their permission. Thus, the man told her dad that he would kidnap her if he didn't give her permission. Thus, they agreed to the marriage.
02.18.12	Long-Term Interview with PEE	PEE is an Uyghur from Bishkek. PEE's cousin had been dating a girl for about one year. In 2012, because the cousin lacked money for a proper wedding he kidnapped his girlfriend
03.11.12	Long-Term Interview with NGL	NGL is my good long-time Kyrgyz friend. On March 8 th , 2012 (International Women's Day) an Uzbek boy from Bishkek kidnapped her daughter.
03.15.12	Informal Interview with TML	TML is Uzbek from Toshtemir. In about 2006 her younger sister was kidnapped because her parents did not consent to the marriage.
04.08.12	Long-Term Interview with PEE	PEE is an Uyghur from Bishkek. In 2012 another kidnapping occurred in his family. This time it happened with the consent of the girl because their parents did not agree to the marriage.
04.19.12	Group Interview with KXJ and SWK	Both are Russian college students. One described a non-consensual Uzbek kidnapping in Toshtemir that occurred in 2011.
05.25.12	Group Interview With BZD and RIK	Both are Uzbeks from Jalalabad province in southern Kyrgyzstan. Before they moved to Toshtemir for work, BZD kidnapped RIK because her parents would not agree to her marriage to him. She said that she consented to the kidnapping.

Chapter 9 – How Does Salomat Attempt to Shape Kyrgyz Bride Kidnapping Norms?

While Salomat adopts Kyrgyz bride kidnaping norms by counseling her nieces to marry their abductors, she also seeks to shape them, through her discourse, for Uzbeks (Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks) in her community. While Salomat only represents one voice in her community, her discourse and actions nevertheless influence bride kidnapping norms. Like the distinct songs of individual whales that shape the song of their school,²⁴³ Salomat's discourse and actions shape her normative environment. Each whale school sings a unique song. When scientists record that song in short time intervals it remains the same, but due to individual variations in the song it changes over time.²⁴⁴ Just like whales, each person, who comes from a different background and experience, sings a slightly different song as they interpret social norms. These individual differences replicate and alter the group song, or the way a group understands social norms.²⁴⁵ This section does not document the group song. Rather, it explores how Salomat faithfully replicates and slightly alters, thus shaping, the group norms of bride kidnapping in Toshtemir.

As a teacher and director at the Uzbek school she influenced the lives of many young Uzbeks (Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks). She firmly believes that her teachings helped to reduce the occurrence of Uzbek bride kidnappings in her community. As they still occur, however, she tries to shape, through her discourse, the way Uzbeks commit the crime. She believes that Islamic norms can mitigate some of the negative consequences of the crime.²⁴⁶

²⁴³ Ewick and Silbey, *The common place of law*: 44-45.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

²⁴⁶ While laws in what is today Kyrgyzstan have criminalized the practice of bride kidnapping for centuries, some people in Kyrgyzstan are still confused about its criminality.

A. Teaching Gender Equality at that Uzbek School

1. The Uzbek School

At the Uzbek school Salomat taught gender equality and she counseled boys not abduct girls for marriage against their will. She firmly believes that her teachings helped to reduce spousal abuse and bride kidnapping crimes among Uzbeks (i.e. Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tajiks) in her community. In this way she shaped the legal environment of bride kidnapping in Toshtemir's *mahalla* neighborhoods.

During Soviets times an Uzbek school and an Uyghur school existed in Toshtemir. Salomat's mother, an Uyghur, initially attended the Uyghur school as a child. In 1938, however, Soviets under Stalin closed the Uyghur school and required all children at that school, including Salomat's mother, to attend the Uzbek school. Thus, Salomat, an Uyghur, also attended the Uzbek school in her childhood. Through the Uzbek school, where teachers teach Uzbek language and traditions, Salomat and other Uyghurs assimilated to some extent to Uzbek culture in Toshtemir. This assimilation contributed to the reasons why Toshtemir Uyghurs rejected, as discussed below, Uyghur-based sources of social ordering from Bishkek. Today, there is still only one Uzbek school and no Uyghur school in Toshtemir.

Economics accounts for one reason why Salomat and other Uyghurs attended the Uzbek school in Toshtemir. During Soviet times learning Uzbek language and culture at the Uzbek school allowed many Uyghurs in Toshtemir to more easily acquire employment in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. Tashkent attracted many students from Toshtemir because it contains a much larger economy than Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan.

As did any others, after her graduation from the Uzbek school, Salomat attended college in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan she identified herself as from Toshtemir, not as Uyghur. She studied Uzbek language and literature and hoped to stay in Uzbekistan for work. She came home to Kyrgyzstan, however, when her brother unexpectedly died in a

motorcycle accident. Upon her return she used her degree to teach Uzbek language and literature at the Uzbek school and quickly became the director of the school, a position she held for many years. She taught there for 37 years and simultaneously served as the director of the Uzbek school for 25 years. In addition to gender equality, Salomat taught Uzbek customs at the Uzbek school, like those relating to marriage and women, in her Uzbek language and literature classes. She did so even though she is Uyghur.

Salomat believes that the Uzbek school plays an important role in preserving “Uzbekness.” Unfortunately, however, in her eyes, the role of the school diminished after Kyrgyzstan gained independence because it became more difficult for students of the Uzbek school to go to college in Uzbekistan. During Soviet times students, like Salomat, who graduated from the Uzbek school with Uzbek language competency could obtain a quality higher education in Uzbekistan and stay there to take advantage of Uzbekistan’s larger economy. With post-Soviet border restrictions, however, many parents started sending their children to Russian schools to prepare them to enter Russian language universities. For the same reason and because it became harder to find Uzbek speaking teachers the Uzbek school began teaching more classes in Russian. In post-Soviet times the enrollment of the school declined to about 200 from around 800.²⁴⁷

Therefore, the Uzbek school now plays a diminished role in preserving “Uzbekness” and Uzbeks and Uyghurs in Toshtemir appear to be slowly losing their Uzbek language and customs. As language and customs influence norms, this may signify a normative shift in Toshtemir. Based on my observations many senior Uzbeks and Uyghurs in Toshtemir, like Salomat, retain their Uzbek language while many middle-aged Uzbeks have trouble speaking Uzbek and their children often only speak Russian. Impact from the June 2010 ethnic violence against Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan may also contribute to this loss. Thus,

²⁴⁷ For a similar fate of other Uzbek schools in Kyrgyzstan, see "Kyrgyzstan: Uzbek-Language Schools Disappearing," *EurasiaNet.org*(2013), <http://www.eurasianet.org>.

Salomat's words in this dissertation help preserve the passing history of Uzbeks in northern Kyrgyzstan.²⁴⁸

During Soviet times Salomat acted simultaneously as a Muslim and a member of the Communist Party. As she states, "Even though I joined the Communists in Tashkent, however, they never once asked me whether God exists or not." Both aspects of her life influenced her teachings. She teaches that Soviet laws introduced gender equality to Central Asia. Simultaneously, she uses the literature and plays of modernist Uzbek Muslim intellectuals ("Jadids") to promote gender equality. In her own words:

In Toshtemir, however, whether in the Russian school, the Kyrgyz school, or the Uzbek school we use the plays of those authors to explain to our children that our women have equal rights. In this way we explain and teach rights in a ton of classes at our school. In one section of our constitution it states, "men and women have equal rights." We help our children understand this law in class through literature.

In this way Salomat taught her students to respect women and to not beat them or abduct them for marriage against their will. Despite Salomat's teachings of gender equality, some argue that after the fall of the Soviet Union moves toward nationality in Central Asia now crowd out gender equality introduced by the Soviet Union.²⁴⁹ Kamp, for example, states, "International Women's Day, March 8, became the main occasion in the Soviet calendar when the Party and the state promoted women's issues."²⁵⁰

2. Jadid Literature

At the end of the 2012 school year I attended some of Salomat's Uzbek language and literature classes. The students respect her and she does not tolerate tardiness or noise. She

²⁴⁸ For an example of social changes affecting norms in the US, see David M. Engel, "The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community," *Law and Society Review* 18, no. 4 (1984).

²⁴⁹ Werner, "Bride abduction in post-Soviet Central Asia," 328. ("In the post-Soviet period, the state has different priorities, such that the construction of a national identity has assumed more importance than the Soviet goal of achieving gender equality."); Kuehnast, "Aging: Central Asia," 3. ("The paradox of the post-Soviet transition for Central Asian women is that while they have gained their national independence, their former Soviet status of having equal rights has been deeply challenged.")

²⁵⁰ Kamp, *The new woman in Uzbekistan*: 145-46; Hosking, *The first socialist society*: 240. ("On International Women's Day huge women's meetings would be held, in which the participants demonstratively cast off their veils and committed them to the flames of a large bonfire.")

talks a lot when teaching and asks many questions, but her questions typically lead the students and mostly require one word answers. Nevertheless, she claims that she held class discussions about spousal abuse and bride kidnaping on the days that she discussed plays of Hamza Hakimzoda Niyoziy (1889-1929) and Komil Yashin (1909-1997).

“Komil Yashin is one of the writers who played a significant role in the development of twentieth century Uzbek literature, and especially drama.”²⁵¹ From 1958 to 1980 he served as the first secretary of the Board of the Uzbekistan Writer’s Union.²⁵² “Nurxon,” one of his most famous works, is a musical drama based on the true story of one of the first Uzbek women to appear on stage unveiled. It is set in Soviet Uzbekistan during the Hujum (attack or assault), which, with regard to Uzbek women, Kamp describes as, “the Communist Party’s call for public demonstrations of their liberation and embrace of rights by throwing off their *paranjis* and *chachvons* (body and face veils).”²⁵³ During this period many murders occurred of women, including Nurxon, who appeared in public unveiled. Gray describes the Soviet setting of Nurxon’s story as follows:

In the 1920s, theatre became a weapon of Bolshevik propaganda, especially against the old social order. Rich landowners, the Muslim clergy and the oppression of women came under attack. A martyr to these early days of Uzbek theatre was Nurkhon, a young Uzbek girl who ran away from home to perform in a theatre company founded by Russians. Her life and subsequent murder at the hands of her brother was chronicled in the musical drama *Nurkhon* by Kamil Yashin, who also wrote *The Dawn of the Revolution*.²⁵⁴

Based on interviews and document reviews, Kamp describes the true story of Nurxon as follows:

²⁵¹ A. Kattabekov and B. Rahmonov, *O'zbek adabiyoti: 8- sinf uchun (darslik-majmua)* (Toshkent: O'zbekiston Respublikasi Xalq Ta'limi, 1995). 95.

²⁵² John Soper, "Shake-up in the Uzbek literary elite," *Central Asian Survey* 1, no. 4 (1983): 59.

²⁵³

²⁵⁴ Laurel Victoria Gray, "Uzbekistan," in *The World Encyclopedia of Contemporary Theatre: Asia/Pacific*, ed. Don Rubin, et al. (London, England: Routledge, 1998); See also, ———, "Cultivating professionalism," *The Best of Habibi* 16, no. 2 (1997), <http://thebestofhabibi.com/>. ("Nurkhon helped bring the dances of Uzbek women out of the *ichkari*, or women’s quarters, into the light of day . . . As punishment . . . Nurkhon was stabbed to death by her own brother at the command of their father"); ———, "The splendor of Uzbek dance Part Two: Ferghana," *The Best of Habibi* 14, no. 3 (1995), <http://thebestofhabibi.com/>. ("One dancer, a young girl named Nurkhon, was murdered by her own brother for performing in public.")

Nearly all of my informants remembered one of several notorious cases in which an Uzbek actress was murdered by a family member, a recollection shaped by newspaper accounts of the time, and repeated references over decades since then. In her memoir, Uzbek historian and activist Fotima Yo'ldoshbaeva related one of these well-known murders. The incident concerned Nurhon Yo'ldoshxo'jaeva, a teenager from the Ferghana Valley who ran away from home and joined a travelling theater troupe in Samarkand. Very few Uzbek women were stage actresses in the 1920s; going on stage meant that one appeared in public unveiled. Nurhon's troupe travelled to the Ferghana Valley and performed near her home village. Her aunt invited Nurhon and her friends to her home, and some of Nurhon's male family members appeared:

[Salixo'ja, her brother, acted as though he had something important to say to Nurhon, and brought her into a room.] Her brother closed the door tightly and immediately, in a mad rage, stabbed his sister again and again with a knife . . .

As was later shown, the murder of Nurhon was planned in advance. Participants included the mingbashi [a local government [sic] official], the mullah Kamal G'iasov, and the girl's father Yo'ldashxo'ja Salimxo'jaev. It was they who forced Salixo'ja to swear on the Quran that he would kill his sister, who had disobeyed their father's will. In court, Salixo'ja Yo'ldoshxo'jaev admitted that he committed murder at the order of his father . . . [The case was tried publicly and attracted much attention. Women demonstrated in favor of a death sentence for the murderers.]

[The court] made the following decision: the murderer of Nurhon, Salixo'ja Yo'ldoshxo'jaev, and her father, Yo'ldashxo'ja Salimxo'jaev, were sentenced to death by shooting; the mingbashi . . . and the mullah . . . were sentenced to five years' exile from the Ferghana region.²⁵⁵

Hamza Hakimzoda Niyoziy was an Uzbek poet, playwright, writer, composer, teacher, Communist, and Jadid.²⁵⁶ In the late 19th and early 20th centuries an Islamic modernist movement composed of Muslim intellectuals known as Jadids promoted reforms in Islamic education and society in Central Asia. They built new method schools and used

²⁵⁵ Marianne Ruth Kamp, "Unveiling Uzbek women: liberation, representation and discourse, 1906-1929" (1998), 308-09; See also, Kamp, *The new woman in Uzbekistan*: 205-06.

²⁵⁶ Kamp, "Unveiling Uzbek women," 15-16, 260, 97. (at 297: "Hamza Hakimzoda Niyoziy (1889-1929) was a poet, playwright and teacher who devoted his Communist career to transforming society through culture, using theater to promote radical change."); Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*, Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 299; ———, *Islam after communism*: 80; Ilse Laude-Cirtautas, *Chrestomathy of modern literary Uzbek* (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1980). 56. ("Hamza Hakimzoda (1889-1926), considered the founder of Soviet Uzbek literature, was a poet, writer and composer.")

literature, theater, and journalism to deliver their message, which included: learning from history; refocusing Islam as a cultural force; redefining education; empowering women; and strengthening material productivity.²⁵⁷ Initially the Soviets embraced the Jadids for their message of cultural change. As such, in the 1920s the Jadids “saw themselves creating a new civilization-modern, Soviet, Central Asian, Turkic, and Muslim all at once.”²⁵⁸ Later, however, the Soviets repressed the Jadids in part due to their connection to Islam.²⁵⁹

As a “daring propagandist for women’s rights” Hamza was intensely reformist and committed to Jadidism and Communism.²⁶⁰ Despite initial nationalist works, Hamza, “under pressure from the Soviet government, went over to ‘the Soviet side’ . . .”²⁶¹ As Salomat, during Soviet times he acted both as a Muslim and a Communist. He studied in a madrasa in Kokand (now in Uzbekistan) and “traveled extensively in Chinese Turkestan and India.”²⁶² As a writer he is “considered the founder of Soviet Uzbek literature.”²⁶³ Khalid explains his fate as follows:

In 1929, he moved to the mountain village of Shohi Mardon near Kokand, where he opened a school for girls and also began to organize Party activities. Shohi Mardon was also the site of a shrine attributed to Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet and a foundational figure in Islamic lore. In March 1929, a number of activists, Hamza among them, decided to close the shrine and to turn it into a museum. Hamza and several others were beaten to death by a mob angry at the attempted desecration.²⁶⁴

²⁵⁷ Edward J. Lazzerini, "Jadidism," in *The Oxford encyclopedia of the Islamic world*, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 222.

²⁵⁸ Khalid, *Jadidism in Central Asia*: 299.

²⁵⁹ See generally, *ibid*; ———, "The fascination of revolution: Central Asian intellectuals, 1917-1927," in *Empire, Islam, and politics in Central Eurasia*, ed. Uyama Tomohiko, *Slavic Eurasian studies*, no. 14 (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2007); ———, *Islam after communism*; Edward J. Lazzerini, "Beyond renewal: the Jadid response to pressure for change in the modern age," in *Muslims in Central Asia: expressions of identity and change*, ed. Jo-Ann Gross (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992); ———, "Jadidism."; John Schoeberlein, "Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus," in *The Oxford encyclopedia of the Islamic world*, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 103.

²⁶⁰ Kamp, "Unveiling Uzbek women," 260, 15.

²⁶¹ Tahir Qahhar, "Uzbek literature," *World Literature Today* 70, no. 3 (1996): 618.

²⁶² Khalid, *Jadidism in Central Asia*: 97.

²⁶³ Laude-Cirtautas, *Chrestomathy of modern literary Uzbek*: 56. ("Hamza Hakimzoda (1889-1926), considered the founder of Soviet Uzbek literature, was a poet, writer and composer. He was influential in shaping the new Uzbek literary language.")

²⁶⁴ Khalid, *Islam after communism*: 80.

Khalid, who writes extensively about Jadids, describes Hamza's play about Maryamxon, "A poisoned life," as follows:

Hamza's *A Poisoned Life* was as much about the relations between the generations as about ignorance. It is a tale of eighteen-year-old Mahmudkhān, "most open-minded . . . [and] nation-minded [*millatparast*]," and seventeen-year-old Maryam khānim, the daughter of a craftsman who "although educated in the old maktab had read novels, newspapers, and magazines under the influence of her love for Mahmudkhān, . . . a slave of the nation [*millat jāriyasi*]." They are in love and plan to open a school, but their wishes are quashed by their parents. Mahmudkhān's father refuses outright to marry his only son to the daughter of a poor craftsman. Maryam's "ignorant and money-worshipping" parents, on the other hand, have promised her hand to a sixty-year-old ishān who already has six wives. The result is disastrous, and both young people take their own lives rather than acquiesce to the dictates of their parents. Hamza attempts to portray them as victims of ignorance and martyrs to the nation, but the most memorable lines in the play involve the two protagonists cursing their ignorant (*jāhil*) and loveless (*shafqatsiz*) parents for riding roughshod over their wishes.²⁶⁵

Here, Salomat narrates how she used Hamza's play "A Poisoned Life" (Maryamxon) and Komil's play "Nurxon" to teach gender equality:

When we study the drama "Nurxon" we teach the eighth grade students that they shouldn't beat girls because the reason for her mother's sickness is because of her husband; based on a husband-wife fight she fell very ill. Also, the girl Nurxon, was killed by her own father. I teach the students and discuss with them how much of a huge sin it is.

In the eleventh grade with "Maryamxon" and the love between her and the man she loved I teach the graduating students that "in your life you should also love like Maryamxon." If there is some barrier you should pass that barrier in the right way. Well, I tell them, "you do not need to abduct girls for marriage you should solve the problem by discussing it with your parents." Abducting girls for marriage is not good because every parent wants to dress their daughter in white clothing and expects to send her off with a prayer to the in-law's house. I try to teach every single student that they need to treat women, girls, and mothers with respect. We teach from the school that the girl they love is also the future mother of their children and so they must show her respect, love, and honor.

Salomat told me that even if she was ill she never missed the days when she taught Hamza's and Komil's plays. Using these plays she taught that woman had no rights before the Soviet revolution (e.g. they were given in marriage and required to wear body and face

²⁶⁵ ———, *Jadidism in Central Asia*: 151.

veils (*paranji* and *chachvon*) and that the Soviets introduced gender equality as enshrined in the constitution. She taught that men should respect women and not beat them or abduct them against their will for marriage.

While Salomat taught against non-consensual bride kidnapping, she also taught her students that consensual bride kidnapping (i.e. elopement) is fine. Many people with whom I spoke shared that sentiment. One middle-aged Uyghur taxi driver in Bishkek who is very committed to Islam and attends madrassa classes, for example, agreed that bride kidnapping occurs among Uyghurs in Bishkek. While he told me that non-consensual bride kidnapping is a sin, he said that consensual bride kidnapping is good because otherwise the youth might not have enough money for a proper (“*chirayliq*”) wedding.²⁶⁶ The problem, however, as evidenced by the story of Karima at the beginning of this section, is that it is difficult to determine the difference between consensual and non-consensual bride kidnapping.

B. Teaching Gender Equality at Home

Salomat believes that her teachings at the Uzbek school helped reduce the occurrences of spousal abuse and non-consensual bride kidnappings among Uzbeks in Toshtemir. She also believes that what parents teach their children at home makes a difference. Kleinback, Babaiarova, and Orozobekova also believe that education with regard to bridal abduction can make a difference.²⁶⁷ As part of their educational initiatives they show a documentary film that depicts the horrors of bridal abduction, including suicide,²⁶⁸ from the perspectives of abducted girls.²⁶⁹ After a similar showing in Toshtemir some male university students

²⁶⁶ Dautcher, *Down a narrow road: identity and masculinity in a Uyghur community in Xinjiang China*, 312: 118. ("In our hearts, we hope that this wedding will be pretty (*chirayliq*), will be good, that it will be very uniting.")

²⁶⁷ Gazbubu Babaiarova and Russell Kleinback, "Karakol City, Kyrgyzstan -- Anti Bride Kidnapping Education Project," (Kyz Korgon Institute, 2011); Kleinback, Babaiarova, and Orozobekova, "Reducing non-consensual bride kidnapping."

²⁶⁸ Colette Harris, "Suicide: Central Asia," in *Encyclopedia of women & Islamic cultures*, ed. Suad Joseph (Boston, MA: Brill, 2006), 452. ("Women in Kyrgyzstan, where bride stealing is common, may kill themselves for related reasons (Sadiq 2004).") See, Sadiq, "Interview with Petr Lom: marriage by abduction.")

²⁶⁹ Lom, "Bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan: a film by Petr Lom."

commented that before viewing the film they did not understand how much bridal abduction negatively affects abducted girls. Harris also provides narratives of how women in Tajikistan creatively educate their husbands with regard to practical difficulties of living as a woman in Central Asia.²⁷⁰ These efforts help to shape group norms.

Here, Salomat narrates what she taught her children:

Basically, in our family we have taught our children since they were small. Boys always help girls, they can't fight with girls because my husband never fought with me or spoke loudly to me, and he also didn't speak harshly. Therefore, if we suddenly quarrel about something in our family some time or if we don't come to terms about something, in these situations we never quarreled in front of our children. If there was some problem, we would resolve it in our own bedroom. Our children never saw or heard this.

Instead, we taught our children to respect each other. My daughters and son studied at the Uzbek school, thus they learned Uzbek customs and traditions (*urf-odat*). In the family we always taught our son that he should protect girls and not hit them, "when you are older and get married you must also respect your own wife because she'll be the mother of your children," we taught him. My husband respects me a lot. I also respect my husband. Therefore, if we quarreled about something we never spoke harsh words to each other in front of our children. The best thing is that we didn't say anything we quickly put it aside. In this way my children, my daughters, were taught. If her husband beats her, I taught my daughters, if her husband beats her in the future, if she doesn't receive kindness from that husband, then she should divorce that husband. Therefore, seven years ago I had my older daughter divorced.²⁷¹

C. How Muslims Should Process Bride Kidnapping Cases

According to Salomat and others, Uzbeks and Uyghurs in Toshtemir deviate, or at least claim deviation, from the Kyrgyz pattern of bride kidnapping. The following paragraphs depict some of these claimed deviations, many of which stem from perceived differences in Muslim traditions between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in northern Kyrgyzstan. In fact when Salomat narrates differences between how Uzbeks and Kyrgyz practice bride kidnapping she often uses the phrase "Muslims do" to mean "Uzbeks do"

²⁷⁰ Harris, *gender relations in Tajikistan*: 1.

²⁷¹ Appendix D: 11.03.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

1. Assigning the Location of the Abduction

After abducting a girl for marriage, Salomat claims that Uzbek boys do not take the abducted girl to their own home. Rather, as Salomat says, “Among Uzbeks, they take the abducted girl to the house of the boy’s relative.” They can also take her to the house of a close friend. This is evident in the bride kidnapping cases of Salomat’s nieces and nephews narrated below. Salomat claims that this prevents pre-marital sex which would violate Islamic law and protects the girl’s virginity or the appearance that she lost her virginity since she does not stay the first night in the young man’s home. Some older people with whom I spoke in the Large *mahalla* neighborhood confirmed this notion. Here is one of Salomat’s explanations, “with Uzbeks they take the kidnapped girl to the home of a relative of the abductor. Therefore, the boy does not have intercourse with the girl.”²⁷²

Many younger and middle-aged people, however, stated a more pragmatic reason for not taking the girl to the boy’s home. They claim it is done simply so that the parents of the girl cannot find her. Because Uzbek boys are not supposed to abduct girls for marriage (it’s unIslamic), they claim that if the boy were to take an abducted girl to his own home his parents would immediately return the girl to her house and punish the boy.

2. Defining Responsibility for the Abduction

Additionally, Salomat claims that the adults in the home where the abducted girl is taken have a responsibility and are accountable to protect the girl. They must protect her *virginity* before the Muslim nikah marriage ceremony, her *life* so that she does not commit suicide due to the shame of the abduction (something which happens far too often), and her *will* so that if she decides to marry her abductor her choice was not forced, a prerequisite for the Muslim nikah ceremony. Salomat describes this as follows, “The young man, of course,

²⁷² Written by Salomat on 11.30.11; Corrected by Salomat on 03.28.12.

brings the kidnapped girl to the house of his closest relative. After the kidnapping, the man of that house is responsible for the health, life, and virginity (*qizligi*) of the girl.”²⁷³

3. Preserving Post-Abduction Consent for the Marriage

Furthermore, Salomat and others claim that Uzbeks never force abducted girls to marry their abductors. Nevertheless, they still encourage them to do so by advising them of the potential consequence, a life of shame without marriage, if they do not marry their abductors. While they despise the act, many believe this is the only prudent choice when it occurs.²⁷⁴ In the following narrative (see Chapter VII for the complete narrative) Salomat describes how she helped mediate her younger brother’s son’s abduction of a girl for marriage:

We didn’t force the girl to give her consent to the marriage. Of course, the girl cried. We tried to convince her and my younger brother’s wife (*kenayi*) tried to convince her. So, “he’s a good boy, he has a place to live,” we told her as advice. The girl agreed.

If the girl hadn’t agreed, if there wasn’t consent, it would’ve been required of us to return her because that is one of the unwritten rules to take her back to her home. Therefore, if the girl doesn’t consent we have to return the girl back to her own home because we are responsible for her life. That is one of the unwritten rules, because, with a girl that doesn’t agree, of course, we have to return her to her own place. That is what we as parents teach and know because parents make a big effort to raise and train every single girl, every single child. We wouldn’t make someone’s child go out into the street, but, we would deliver her to the place where she was taken.²⁷⁵

Salomat and I watched a popular Kyrgyz film (*Bo’z Salqin*) together in class that she used to illustrate some of these perceived differences.²⁷⁶ It depicts the story of a rural young man who planned with his family a non-consensual bride kidnapping. On the night of the kidnapping, his male relatives accidentally kidnapped the wrong girl; a girl from Bishkek, the city, who already had a boyfriend. Despite protests from the future groom they continued to

²⁷³ Recorded by Salomat on 12.14.11.

²⁷⁴ Werner, "Bride abduction in post-Soviet Central Asia," 322. ("Many of the same people who told me that they believe it is wrong for a man to abduct a woman without her consent also believe that it is wrong for an abducted woman to reject the marriage.")

²⁷⁵ Recorded by Salomat on 12.14.11; Corrected by Salomat on 03.28.12.

²⁷⁶ 11.23.11 Long-Term Interview with Salomat.

kidnap the wrong girl. When she arrived at the boy's house, the boy's female relatives took charge and physically forced her against her will to wear a white scarf as a symbol of her consent to the marriage. After several hours of physical struggle against the physical and verbal attempts of the boy's female relatives to convince her to wear the white scarf, she finally consented to the marriage.

That night the young man entered the bridal chamber, a white cloth hung in a corner of the room behind which the couple spent the first night. When the young man saw that the girl did not want to consummate the marriage he slit his wrist and bloodied the sheet on which they slept to show the appearance of consummation. Later when the girl's boyfriend came to save her from the marriage she refused him. While she was a city girl the film ends with her romantically falling over time in love with her new husband and the romantic Kyrgyz life on a mountain pasture in a yurt. While each bride kidnapping case is different, Kyrgyz girls claim that this movie accurately depicts how they perceive it might happen.²⁷⁷

Salomat pointed out several differences she perceives in the way that Uzbeks in Toshtemir conduct kidnappings compared to Kyrgyz methods depicted in this film. First, Uzbek young men do not take abducted girls to their own house as depicted in the film. As discussed above, that prevents intercourse before the Muslim nikah marriage ceremony. Second, while Uzbek female relatives counsel with the girl about her future, they do not physically try to force her to stay that night in the young man's house or wear the white marriage scarf as depicted in the film. As discussed above, this protects the girls "consent," so that the imam can perform a proper Muslim nikah marriage between two consenting partners.

Finally, Salomat pointed out that the Muslim nikah marriage ceremony did not play any role at all in the film. While the couple in the film did not perform intercourse on their

²⁷⁷ Appendix D: 11.17.11 Long-Term Interview with WUU.

first night of marriage, the fact that the girl wore the white scarf and they both slept in the nuptial chamber behind a white sheet appeared to be enough to constitute the marriage.²⁷⁸

According to Salomat, among Uzbeks, a marriage is not constituted until after a Muslim nikah ceremony. Uzbek families would not allow the young man to sleep with the girl and much less perform intercourse with (or rape) her before the the nikah ceremony. After the girl spends the first night under the protection of another home and she “consents” to the marriage Uzbek families then take her to the boy’s home to perform the nikah. Only after that ceremony do they consider the couple married, which allows for consumation.

Salomat’s narratives of bride kidnappings in her family (see Chapter 6) confirm this discourse. When Salomat’s nephew abducted a girl for marriage he did not take her to his house, but to his uncle’s house, Salomat’s older brother. When that happened, as the responsible party for the girl’s virginity, life, and will, Salomat’s older brother summoned Salomat to come to his home to help resolve the situation. While she did not force the abducted girl to wear the marriage scarf, as depicted in the film, Salomat advised the girl that her life could be difficult if she did not stay and marry the young man. The girl “consented” to the marriage and they held a Muslim nikah ceremony the next day, after which the couple started living together in marriage.

4. Maintaining Neighborhood Solidarity

Finally, Muslim wedding and death ceremonies, discussed below, create neighborhood solidarity which creates pressure to process bride kidnapping and other disputes privately and outside of the state legal system. Many people in Toshtemir and Kyrgyzstan confirmed that for many reasons like corruption they prefer not to process disputes through the state legal system. Rather, they use family members or friends to help

²⁷⁸ In interviews with others, I received contradictory evidence as to whether wearing the white scarf constitutes marriage in Kyrgyz tradition. See Appendix D: 03.10.12 Long-Term Interview with RWL; and 03.21.12 Long-Term Interview with GML.

them process disputes. Salomat describes this situation with regard to bride kidnapping in Toshtemir as follows:

With regard to bride kidnapping (*olib qochish*) in Toshtemir, of course, we rarely call upon the courts or the police because in Toshtemir we all know each other well. Therefore, if a girl is abducted for marriage, but we don't want the marriage, we threaten to go to the police. Then, they give back our daughter because in Toshtemir we all meet together and we know each other. According to my thinking Toshtemir is a small city; we meet each other often in weddings and funerals. If we quarrel, we may be surprised to be in-laws in the future, and there will be shame.²⁷⁹

Even though the population of Toshtemir exceeds 50,000,²⁸⁰ Salomat refers to it in this narrative as a "small city." When she uses that phrase, however, she is referring to the *mahalla* neighborhoods, which can feel like a "little city."

In her role as teacher and director of the Uzbek school, Salomat got invited to and attended many weddings and funerals. Upon my arrival she invited me to many of those events. By participating in Muslim wedding and death ceremonies, Salomat contributes to the neighborhood unity that places pressure on people not to call the police.

Sometimes, however, as Salomat states above, they threaten to call the police in order to gain leverage in a private resolution. This often works because people usually want to avoid the state legal system, which could take more time and cost them more money in bribes. In the bride kidnapping case of Salomat's neighbor who did not marry her abductor, the girl's father threatened to call the police to get her back. Salomat describes it as follows, "Several days passed in this case. The girl, however, wasn't in Toshtemir, she was taken to Bishkek and, "if you don't return the girl we will file a complaint with the police," they said. Only after that did the boy's parents return the girl."²⁸¹ In this way the girl's father negotiated towards state resolutions of bride kidnapping cases.

²⁷⁹ Recorded by Salomat on 10.12.11; Corrected by Salomat on 10.27.11; Reviewed by an Uzbek research assistant in December 2011.

²⁸⁰ "Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009," (National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2009).

²⁸¹ Recorded by Salomat on 04.12.11; Corrected by Salomat on 04.20.11 and 10.12.11.

Conclusion

Current Knowledge: Normative orders based on respected male elders (*aksakals*) have existed in Central Asia and what is now Kyrgyzstan for centuries. Upon independence Kyrgyzstan incorporated a reinvented version of Kyrgyz *aksakal* elders' courts into the state judicial system.²⁸² Nevertheless, non-state *aksakal* councils continued to process disputes and wield authority outside of the state judicial system.²⁸³ Today, some people no longer look to *aksakal* elders as a legitimate source of authority.²⁸⁴ People that I spoke with in Toshtemir confirmed this phenomenon.

Research Gaps: Therefore, do minority groups maintain their own normative orders in Kyrgyzstan? If so, do they use respected male elders as sources of authority? If so, do some people not respect them as legitimate sources of authority? Do women also act as normative sources of authority?

Contribution of this Dissertation: Part I of this dissertation argues that, through the Assembly of Nations, Ittipak maintains a normative order for Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan led by respected male elders. It maintains a network of National-, City, and neighborhood-level elders who act as authority figures for Uyghurs. These elders promote Uyghur culture and unity and peace among Uyghurs and between different ethnicities. This study merely documents the existence of Ittipak's normative order. It does not document the extent to which Uyghurs rely upon it as a source of authority or the extent to which it influences the

This case is interesting for many reasons. First, the girl's father refused to accept the customary law that requires the girl to marry her abductor if she stays one night with the boy's side. By threatening to call the police he negotiated towards the rule of law. He made a social stand that elevated criminal law above customary law. While he used the law to his advantage, he apparently stopped short of inviting the state to intrude into this family and neighborhood problem. Once the boy's family returned his daughter he did not file charges for bridal abduction. While bridal abduction is a crime the state cannot prosecute it without a complaint from the victim.

²⁸² Beyer, "Revitalisation, Invention and Continued Existence."; ———, "Imagining the state in rural Kyrgyzstan."; ———, "According to salt."; See also, Merrell, "State engagement with non-state justice."

²⁸³ Beyer, "Revitalisation, Invention and Continued Existence."

²⁸⁴ Ranjbar, "The declining use of aksakal courts in Kyrgyzstan."

choices made by everyday Uyghurs in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. Future studies could explore the effectiveness of Ittipak's sources of authority.

Part II of this dissertation argues that many Uyghurs in Toshtemir rejected Ittipak's normative order. As a result Ittipak elders do not function in Toshtemir as they do in other cities where Uyghurs live. This rejection occurred due to a normative cleavage between Ittipak Uyghurs and Toshtemir Uyghurs. Ittipak Uyghurs promote Uyghur-based norms while Toshtemir Uyghurs follow inter-ethnic neighborhood-based norms. Social and historical factors evidence these normative differences. Uyghur men connected to Ittipak in Bishkek, for example, conduct *meshrep* social gatherings. Only Uyghur men attend these gatherings and they promote the Uyghur language, Uyghur dress standards, Uyghur culture, etc. Similar, *osh* ceremonies for men in Toshtemir, however, accept men of all ethnicities. Toshtemir neighborhood organizations (e.g. diaspora committees, quarter committees, and Muslim leadership) also function without regard to ethnicity. Therefore, to preserve inter-ethnic neighborhood unity in Toshtemir, many Uyghurs there rejected Ittipak's Uyghur-based normative order.

Part II of this dissertation argues that minority Muslim women do help shape norms in Kyrgyzstan. Salomat adopts Kyrgyz bride kidnapping norms in the way that she mediates bride kidnapping cases. Nevertheless, she also seeks to lessen the negative consequences of bride kidnapping cases using Islamic norms. She believes that Islam requires abductors to protect the virginity, health, and consent of victims. Protections that can facilitate this protection include taking the victim to the home of the abductor's relative rather than the abductor's home. That way the abductor's relative become responsible for her virginity, health, and consent.

Conclusions: Through Ittipak, Uyghurs maintain their own normative order in Kyrgyzstan. As Kyrgyz *aksakal* elders' councils, that order uses respected male Uyghur

elders as sources of authority. Not all Uyghurs, however, respect Ittipak's normative order. Many Toshtemir Uyghurs, for example, reject Ittipak's authority in their community. Uyghur women, like Salomat, also act as normative sources of authorities in Kyrgyzstan.

This dissertation contributes to the following additional conclusions:

- 1) **Indirect State Influence can Facilitate Non-State Normative Orders:** Without the Assembly of Nations, Ittipak would not exist and would not wield national influence among Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan. While the Aksakal Court Act directly created a national normative order based on Kyrgyz *aksakal* councils, Ittipak created its normative order indirectly through the Assembly of Nations. Therefore, state legislation is not the only way to support non-state normative orders. Indirect means may also work. This can inform policy makers in places like Afghanistan as they explore ways to achieve state engagement with non-state normative orders.²⁸⁵
- 2) **Preserving Non-State Normative Orders Requires Maintenance:** As discussed, Kyrgyz normative orders based on aksakal elders have existed in Central Asia since pre-Tsarist times. Tsarist leaders tried to manipulate them, Soviet leaders tried to abolish them, and the first president of Kyrgyzstan tried to revive them. Subsequent presidents, however, did not continue to promote aksakal courts as did the first president. This may contribute to the reasons why the influence of aksakal courts may be waning today.²⁸⁶

While this dissertation does not gauge the effectiveness of Ittipak's normative order (it

²⁸⁵ Ali Wardak, Daud Saba, and Halima Kazem, *Bridging modernity and tradition: rule of law and the search for justice*, ed. Center for Policy and Human Development, Afghanistan human development report 2007 (Islamabad: Army Press, 2007); Deborah J. Smith and Shelly Manalan, "Community-based dispute resolution processes in Bamiyan Province," *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Case Study Series*(2009), <http://www.areu.org>; Deborah J. Smith, "Community-based dispute resolution processes in Nangarhar Province," *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Case Study Series*(2009), <http://www.areu.org>; Merrell, "State engagement with non-state justice."; Jones-Pauly and Nojumi, "Balancing relations between society and state: legal steps toward national reconciliation and reconstruction of Afghanistan."; Rebecca Gang, "Community-based dispute resolution processes in Balkh Province," *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Case Study Series*(2009), <http://www.areu.org>; Jon Eddy, "Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Intrusion of Reality," *Journal of International Cooperation Studies* 17, no. 2 (2009); Barfield, Nojumi, and Thier, "The clash of two goods: state and non-state dispute resolution in Afghanistan"; Thomas Barfield, "Culture and custom in nation-building: law in Afghanistan," *Maine Law Review* 60, no. 2 (2008).

²⁸⁶ Ranjbar, "The declining use of aksakal courts in Kyrgyzstan."

merely highlights its existence), Ittipak leaders are taking steps to maintain the order.

They do so by preserving their relationship with the Assembly of Nations, and thereby the state; maintaining national-, city-, neighborhood-, and street-level Ittipak representatives; encouraging the election of new leaders as needed; publishing and distributing the Ittipak newspaper; holding Uyghur cultural events, etc. This maintenance helps to preserve Ittipak's normative order.

- 3) **Minority Groups also Maintain their Own Sources of Authority:** While a dominant majority-based non-state source of authority typically exists (e.g. Kyrgyz *aksakal* councils), minority groups also maintain their own sources of authority.²⁸⁷ A better understanding of minority sources of authority can provide a more complete picture of normative pluralism. Such information can inform policy makers in countries like Afghanistan seeking to explore ways to engage non-state normative orders.²⁸⁸ This dissertation documents Uyghur sources of authority in northern Kyrgyzstan.
- 4) **Minority Groups Help Shape Normative Pluralism:** Minority groups, not just the state or majority populations, create and reject (i.e. shape) normative orders. A better understanding of how minority groups shape normative pluralism (plural sources of normative orders) will help complete the picture of normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, most normative studies focus on It also helps to confirm that normative pluralism is a dynamic process in which minorities participate in unpredictable ways as producers and consumers. Therefore, discussions of how to shape normative pluralism should include minorities as dynamic actors in the process.

²⁸⁷ See, for example, Smith and Manalan, "Community-based dispute resolution processes in Bamiyan Province"; Smith, "Community-based dispute resolution processes in Nangarhar Province"; Gang, "Community-based dispute resolution processes in Balkh Province"; "The customary laws of Afghanistan: a report by the International Legal Foundation," (International Legal Foundation, 2004).

²⁸⁸ Afghanistan, for example, struggles to determine whether and how to incorporate state and non-state sources of authority. For citations to articles that describe and debate proposals for state engagement with non-state justice in Afghanistan, see Merrell, "State engagement with non-state justice."

- 5) **Normative Clashes Also Exist Between Non-State Groups:** Most normative studies focus on clashes between international norms and state laws or state laws and social norms.²⁸⁹ Few focus on clashes between two non-state groups. This dissertation helped fill that gap as it explored how Toshtemir's neighborhood-based norms clashed with Ittipak's Uyghur-based norms. Through this and other similar normative struggles Uyghurs actively shape normative pluralism in Kyrgyzstan. A better understanding of non-state clashes can inform conflict prevention programs as many conflicts exist between non-state groups. Furthermore, "an overemphasis on the relationships between state and non-state law can hide . . . the immense variety of interactions between different NSLOs [Non-State Legal Orders]." This dissertation documents a normative cleavage between two non-state groups; Ittipak Uyghurs and Tokmok Uyghurs.²⁹⁰
- 6) **Normative Diversity Exists within Minority Groups:** The works, that examine Kyrgyzstan's Aksakal Court Act, which incorporates non-state elders' councils into the state judicial system, do not address the tensions between different minority sources of authority in Kyrgyzstan. This dissertation explores Ittipak as one minority source of authority in Kyrgyzstan. While it appears that Ittipak represents Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan, not all Uyghur share Ittipak's ideals. Toshtemir Uyghurs, for example rejected Ittipak's normative order. They did so in order to retain their own inter-ethnic neighborhood-based norms. Therefore, policy makers who seek to directly or indirectly engage non-state normative orders should realize that not all members of a specific group share the same values of that group. Subdivisions within that group may exist.

²⁸⁹ See, for example, Yusheng Peng, "When Formal Laws and Informal Norms Collide: Lineage Networks versus Birth Control Policy in China," *American Journal of Sociology* 116, no. 3 (2010); Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard, "The Transplant Effect," *American Journal of Comparative Law* 51(2003).

²⁹⁰ Policy International Council on Human Rights, *When legal worlds overlap: human rights, state and non-state law* (Geneva: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2009). 45 and see 51, 59.

- 7) **Scholars Should Ask Why Relative Peace Occurred in Northern Kyrgyzstan:** In June of 2011 ethnic violence broke out between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in southern Kyrgyzstan. Scholars document this occurrence and historical tensions between the two groups in southern Kyrgyzstan. Few scholars, however, explore why relative peace occurred in northern Kyrgyzstan in cities like Toshtemir where Uzbek and Kyrgyz populations live together. Several factors contribute to the relative peace in Toshtemir. Interethnic norms, for example, prevail at *osh* wedding and death celebrations for in Toshtemir. State and non-state neighborhood organizations in Toshtemir (e.g. the Friendship House, diaspora committees, quarter committees, Muslim leadership) also promote inter-ethnic cooperation. While the Friendship House is a government initiative, this inter-ethnic unity in Toshtemir. Further study of these organizations, social factors, and state / non-state relations could contribute to peace studies in the region.
- 8) **Scholars Should Continue to Study Community Organizations in Central Asia:** Scholars document Islam and *mahalla* neighborhoods in Central Asia. Few scholars document quarter committees, district committees, ethnic diaspora committees, or national (e.g. the Kyrgyzstan Assembly of Nations) and local (e.g. the Tokmok Friendship House) diaspora assemblies. This dissertation helps fill these gaps and provides some context for how these organizations function in Kyrgyzstan.
- 9) **More Scholars Should Study Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan:** The majority of Uyghur studies explore Uyghurs in China. Some explore Uyghurs in Kazakhstan. Few explore Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, this dissertation contributes to Uyghur studies.
- 10) **Uzbeks and Uyghurs also Participate in Bride Kidnapping:** Uzbeks and Uyghurs commit bride kidnapping crimes in northern Kyrgyzstan. Currently, many scholars claim that it only occurs among Kyrgyz populations in Kyrgyzstan and/or that it does not occur among Uzbek populations.

11) A Legal Reason Exists Why Kyrgyzstan Failed to Prosecute Bride Kidnappings:

Kyrgyzstan's Procedural Code accounts for one reason why Kyrgyzstan failed for so many years to prosecute bride kidnapping cases. For a long time, most English-language scholars that addressed the topic of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan placed partial blame on the state for failing to prosecute the crime. In doing so they only cited the Criminal Code, which outlaws the practice. They did not review the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). For many years the CPC categorized bride kidnapping as a private-public crime. The police cannot prosecute private-public crimes without the victim's signed consent. Due to the fear of community shame, many bride kidnapping victims do not file charges against their abductors. Rather, they often sign documents stating they consent to the forced marriage and then marry their abductors. In 2011 the law changed to make bride kidnapping a public crime. As such, the state must now independently prosecute bride kidnapping crimes, even without the consent of the victim. Time will tell if Kyrgyzstan now completes its obligation in this regard.

12) More Scholars Should Study the Role of Women in Bride Kidnapping Crimes: Most bride kidnapping studies explore women as the victim of bride kidnapping crimes. While this is very important, women like Salomat also participate in the act as mediators. Therefore, more can be learned about the phenomenon by studying it from a different perspective.

13) Group Ethics and Individual Morality Also Matter: In addition to state laws, group ethics (norms) and individual morality also impact choices people make.²⁹¹ State laws banning the practice of bride kidnapping exerted little impact on the way that Salomat mediated bride kidnapping crimes. Community and religious ethics (e.g. shame, Islam) affected her actions more than state law. Additionally, her own individual morals (e.g.

²⁹¹ Nancy J. White, *Principles and practices of construction law* (Columbus: Prentice Hall, 2002). 111-12.

gender equality), reflected in her teachings at home and at school, impacted the way she transmitted, adopted, and sought to shape bride kidnapping norms in Toshtemir. Through their choices, individuals like Salomat make a difference in society. Individual morality shaped by group ethics (e.g. family, religion, school, organizations) and state laws help guide those choices. Therefore, in addition to focusing on state laws, people should focus on family, religion, school, and other organizations to promote positive group ethics and reinforce positive individual morality.

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Appendix A: Table of Participant Observations²⁹²

Date	Event	Location
01.19.11	<i>Mahalla</i> neighborhood tour	Small, Large, & Middle Mahalla
02.18.11	Mosque Friday prayer	Friendship Mosque
02.21.11	Mosque prayer	Friendship Mosque
02.22.11	Mosque prayer	Dungan mosques in Toshtemir
03.01.11	Mosque	Dungan mosque in Toshtemir
03.02.11	Mosque prayer	Friendship Mosque
03.17.11	Mosque prayer	Dungan mosque in Toshtemir
03.20.11	Large Mahalla visit ²⁹³	Large Mahalla
03.24.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -1 st Thurs	Friendship Mosque
04.10.11	Small Mahalla visit	Small Mahalla
04.15.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -wedding	First Mosque
04.15.11	Men's madrassa	Microdistrict outside of Toshtemir
04.17.11	Large Mahalla tour	Large Mahalla
04.21.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -40 th day	Home in Toshtemir
04.22.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -1 year	Friendship Mosque
04.28.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -1 year	First Mosque
05.01.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -1 year	Home in Toshtemir
05.06.11	Large Mahalla visit	Large Mahalla
05.11.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -4 year	Home in Toshtemir
05.14.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -wedding	First Mosque
05.20.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -wedding	Restraunt in Toshtemir
05.20.11	Funeral prayer and burial	First Mosque & Toshtemir cemetary
06.01.11	Quarter Committee Chair shadow	Toshtemir
06.04.11	Academic Conference	Toshtemir
06.07.11	Large Mahalla visit	Small Mahalla
06.09.11	Ethnic Conflict Community Conf.	Toshtemir
06.09.11	Friendship House tour	Large Mahalla
07.08.11	Assembly of Nations-Ittipak & Tatar	Bishkek
07.09.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -circumcision	Home in Toshtemir
07.21.11	Men's <i>osh</i> -wedding	Restraunt in Toshtemir
08.09.11	Assembly of Nations-Ittipak	Bishkek
08.25.11	Men's <i>osh-iftar</i>	Friendship Mosque
08.30.11	Mosque prayer for Roza Ayt	First Mosque & Friendship Mosque
09.04.11	Ittipak Concert	Bishkek
10.06.11	Assembly of Nations-Ittipak	Bishkek
10.08.11	Assembly of Nations-Ittipak	Bishkek
11.04.11	<i>Meshrep</i>	Home in the greater Bishkek area
11.10.11	Large Mahalla tour & Oldest Mosque	Large Mahalla
01.14.12	Assembly of Nations-Ittipak	Bishkek
01.14.12	<i>Meshrep</i>	Home in the greater Bishkek area
01.26.12	Parliament	Bishkek

²⁹² This chart does not represent all of my participant observations, just those for which I kept good records.

²⁹³ My visits to Small and Large Mahalla occurred many more times than depicted in this chart.

02.09.12	Men's <i>Osh</i>	Restraunt in Toshtemir
02.11.12	<i>Meshrep</i>	Home in the greater Bishkek area
02.16.12	Large Mahalla visit	Large Mahalla
03.10.12	Assembly of Nations-Ittipak	Bishkek
03.15.12	Men's <i>osh</i> -1 st Thurs	First Mosque
03.16.12	<i>Meshrep</i>	Home in the greater Bishkek area
04.18.12	Ittipak historical commemoration	Bishkek
05.05.12	Uzbek school-Uzbek language class	Large Mahalla
05.16.12	Uzbek school-Uzbek literature class	Large Mahalla
05.21.12	Assembly of Nations-Tajik Cmte	Bishkek
05.22.12	Assembly of Nations-Ittipak	Bishkek
05.23.12	Tour of an Ittipak <i>mahalla</i>	Bishkek
05.24.12	Men's <i>osh</i> -1 st Thurs	Home in the greater Bishkek area
05.28.12	Tour of an Ittipak <i>mahalla</i>	Bishkek
05.29.12	50 th anniversary of the Ghulja event	Bishkek
06.12.12	Assembly of Nations-Uzbek Cmte	Bishkek
06.15.12	Assembly of Nations-Uzbek Cmte	Bishkek
06.21.12	Men's <i>osh</i> -40 th day	Home in the greater Bishkek area

Appendix B: Table of Archival Documents

Document	Section(s)	Description
<i>Уголовный Кодекс Кыргызской Республики</i> (Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic), 2012	Articles 10-11	Crime categories
	Articles 103-112	Spousal abuse
	Article 154-155	Bride kidnapping
	Article 29, 50, and 53	Victim's rights to drop charges
	Article 158	Public crimes
<i>Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс Кыргызской Республики</i> (Criminal Procedure Code of the Kyrgyz Republic), 2012	Article 26	private, private-public, and public prosecution
	Article 29, 50, and 53	Victim's rights to drop charges
	Article 158	Public prosecution
	Article 159	Private-public prosecution
<i>О местном самоуправлении и местной государственной администрации</i> (Law on local government and local government administration), 2010	Chapter 7, Article 51	Law on territorial self-government, which authorizes quarter committees
"Between the State and Civil Society in Preventing and Resolving Ethnic Conflicts in Kyrgyzstan." Toshtemir, 9 June 2011	Vice Mayor's speech	Discuss Toshtemir demographics and the Friendship House
	Dungan diaspora representative's speech	
<i>Иттипак</i> (Ittipak Newspaper)	Edition 176, page 2 (Dec. 2009)	20 Year Anniversary of Ittipak
	Edition 176, page 3 (Dec. 2009)	Our Association
	Edition 185, page 9 (Aug. 2010)	Ittipak Women's Committee Leaders
	Edition 188, page 8 (Nov. 2010)	<i>Meshrep</i> in Qara Balta
	Edition 193, page 3 (May 2011)	Lebedinovka <i>Yigit Beshi</i> elected
	Edition 193, page 14 (May 2011)	<i>Yigit Beshi</i> Elected
	Edition 193, page 14 (May 2011)	<i>Shoebe Rais</i> Elected
	Edition 193, page 15 (May 2011)	New <i>Yigit Beshi</i> (Kenbulun)
	Edition 194, page 1 (June 2011)	Report of the Assembly of Nations' 7 th Kurultai
	Edition 194, page 2 (June 2011)	Report of Ittipak's presence at the Kurultai
	Edition 195, page 14 (July 2011)	New <i>Yigit Beshi</i> in Nova-Pakrovka Village
	Edition 200, page 2 (Nov. 2011)	New <i>Yigit Beshi</i> Elected
	Edition 200, page 14 (Nov. 2011)	40 Years of Our <i>Meshrep</i> (Lebedinovka)
	Edition 205, page 14 (May 2012)	Unforgettable Days

		(50 th Anniversary of the May 29 th Affair)
	Edition 206, page 11 (June 2012)	New <i>Yigit Beshi</i> Elected

Appendix C: Joint Ethnography of Ittipak

The following document provides a brief description of the “Ittipak” Uyghur Society of Kyrgyzstan (Ittipak). It is the joint effort in the summer of 2011 of me and RBL. RBL is a Xitoydan Uyghur woman who grew up in the greater Bishkek area and moved to Toshtemir when she married her yerlik Uyghur husband. As she has lived both lives, she states that there are many differences between the social practices of Xitoydan and yerlik Uyghurs in northern Kyrgyzstan. She taught Uyghur language course at the Krgyz National University (KNU) in Bishkek along with RWL, the editor of the Ittipak newspaper. After KNU dropped its Uyghur curriculum she married and moved to Toshtemir. She taught me Uyghur during the summer of 2011. This document is the product of that class.

To gather information for the document we interviewed Ittipak’s national president, executive secretary, and the editor of the Ittipak newspaper. We also interviewed a former national Ittipak Women’s Committee President who was the national Ittipak leader of Ittipak’s Education Committee at the time. Additionally, we reviewed articles in the Ittipak newspaper. Finally, after writing the brief ethnography of Ittipak, RWL, the editor of Ittipak’s newspaper reviewed it, approved it, and made a few changes, mostly typographical.

RBL typed the document in Cyrillic Uyghur. As many Uyghurs in Kyrgyzstan do not read Uyghur in Arabic script and most can read Russian, Ittipak’s newspaper contains articles written in Cyrillic Russian, Cyrillic Uyghur, and Arabic Uyghur.

Иттипак

Декабрь айда 1989-жили Қирғизистанда яшайдиған уйғурлириниң ярдими (қоллан қубағлиши) билән «Иттипак» жәмийити қорулди. Бу жәмийәтниң асасий мэхсити – ана тилини сақлаш, уйғурларниң урпи-адәтлирини, миллий мәдәнийитини өстүрүш үчүн чоң роль ойнайду.²⁹⁴ «Иттипак» жәмийитидә рәис, муавин рәис, баш

²⁹⁴ Appendix B: Ittipak Newspaper, 176, 2 (2009).

секретарь вә шөбә рәисләр бар. Шуниндин кейин мәркизий комитети, ақсақаллар совети, вә совет жигит беши бар; мәркизий комитет 31 кишидин ибарәт. Шундақла йәнә аяллар кеңеши, яшлар кеңеши бар, башқа әзалар спортсчилар, шаир-язғучилар, сәнъәтчи-рәссамлар, мәрипәтчилар вә башкилар билән ишләйду. Ақсақалларниң совети болса 21 кишидин ибарәт. Қирғизстанда һәр бир мәнәлиләрдә бир жигит беши бар. Улар совет жигит бешиға кириду.²⁹⁵

Бишкек шәһәридә көп уйғур мәнәлиләр бар. Мәсилән: Новопокровка, Лебединовка, Ала-Тоо, Кәң-Булуң, Көк-Жар, Восток, Комсомол, Чәт-Көл, Маловодное, Беловодское йезилар; Алампедин-1, Восток-5, Восток-6 микрарайонлар; вә Токульдош, ТЭЦ, Карпинка, Ваконбаева, Атая-Огонбаева мәнәлиләр. Иттипак 176, 3. Мәнәлиләрдә жигит беши, аялларниң кеңеши вә совет ақсақалов бар. Мәнәлиләрдә әр-аял, хошнилар, балилар билән жанжал болса жигит бешини, аялларниң кеңешиниң рәисини яки совет ақсақалларниң вәкиллирини чақириси мүмкин. Уларниң һәл қилған сөзлирини әмәл қилмиса уят болиду.²⁹⁶

«Иттипак» жәмийити Бишкек шәһиридики Қирғизстан хәлиқ ассамблеясиғә жайлашқан. У йәрдә уйғурлардин башқа өзбәк, татар, азербайджан, дунган, тажик, чечен вә башқа диаспорилар бар. Қирғизстан хәлиқ ассамблеясида рәис бар. У рәисни диаспориларниң рәислири сайлиди (Акаев, Бакиевниң пәйтидә һөкүмийәттин тайинланған). У диаспориларниң рәислири билән ишләйду. Әгәр Қирғизстан хәлиқ ассамблеясида жиғин болса диаспориларниң рәислири шу жиғинға қантишиду. Field notes, 7774 & 6355.

2011-жили 18-июнда Қирғизстан хәлиқ ассамблеясиниң VII-Қурултай болуп өтти. Бу қурултайда Қирғизстан хәлиқ ассамблеясиниң рәиси сайланди. Бу рәислигиғә миллий академияниң химия вә химиялик технология институтиниң мудури 70 яшлиқ

²⁹⁵ 8 July 2011 interview with Artıq haji Xadjiev, Ittipak's president.

²⁹⁶ 8 July 2011 interview with Akbar aka.

Бектемир Мурзубраимов сайланди. Қирғизстан хәлиқ ассамблеясиниң кеңәш әзалири 65 адәмдин ибарәт вә тәптиш комиссияси 5 кишидин ибарәт. Уларниң ичидә «Иттипақ» жәмийитиниң рәиси Артиқ һажи вә 31 башқа диаспориларниң рәислири бар. Иттипақ 194, 1; Field notes __.

Иттипақниң рәиси

«Иттипақ» жәмийитиниң рәислири: Кенжиев Нурмуһәммат (1989-1996), Ниғмәт Базаков (1996-2000), Абдулбакипов Розимуһәммәт (2001-2007), Дильмурат Акбаров (2007-2011), Артиқ һажи Хаджиев (2011-). Иттипақ 176, 2. 2011-жили 9 апрель айда «Иттипақ» жәмийитиниң VII-Қурултайда Артиқ һажи Хаджиев сайланди вә униң муавин рәиси Жамалдин Насиров. Interview & Иттипақ 193, 14.

Шөбә рәислар

Мәһәлиләрдә шөбә рәислар бар. Мәсилән, 2002-жили Тоқмоқ шәһәридә Эргеш Айепахунов, 2011-жили 29-апрель күни Қара-Балта шәһиридә Алмазбек Турдипев болуп сайланди.küni. Иттипақ 193, 14 & Field notes GWH.

Совет жигит беши

«Иттипақ» жәмийитиниң уйғур мәшрәплириниң баш жигит беши Имәржан Һәмраев. Иттипақ 193, 14. мәһәлиләрдимү жигит бешилар бар. Мәсилән, 2011-жили 15-май күни Чәт-Көл йезисида Һажимәһәммәт Тилибаевни, 21-май күни Кәң-Булуң йезисида Ярмуһәммәт Айсаевни, 29-май күни Лебединовка йезисида Абдумежит Набиевни жигит беши қилип сайлашти. Иттипақ 193, 14; 193, 15; & 193, 3.

Совет ақсақалов

«Иттипақ» жәмийитиниң ақсақаллар кеңешиниң рәиси Абдукерим һажи Осман. Мәһәлиләрдә көп яшайдиған уйғурлар болса ақсақаллар кеңешиниң рәислири сайлиниду. Мәсилән, Лебединовка вә Новопокровка йезиларда көп уйғур аилиләр

яшайду, шунинч үчүн у йәрдә совет аксакалов бар. Чәт-Көл йезисида Абләт Тилибаев, Рехим ака Кебилов ақсақаллар кеңәш әзалириға кириду. Иттипақ 193, 14.

Аяллар кеңеши

«Иттипақ» жәмийитининч аяллар кеңешининч рәислири төвәндикичә: Хайриниса Турдиева (Тәңри-Тағ садалири уйғур радиосининч коментатори), Нурания Қасимова (Бишкек шәһиридики 162-балилар бағчисининч мудури), Фарида Низамутдинова (Новопокровка йезининч 2-оттура мәктәпнинч мудури). Иттипақ 185, 9. мәһәлиләрдә аяллар кеңешининч рәислириму бар. Мәсилән, Маһинур Айсәева Кәң-Булунч йезисининч АКнинч рәиси, Арзигүл Набиева Лебединовка йезисининч АКнинч рәиси. Иттипақ 152, 9 & 193, 3.

Яшлар кеңеши

Мәһәлиләрдә яшлар мәшрәп жигит беши бар. Мәсилән, 2011-жили 10 май күнида Абдумежит Набиев Лебединовка йезисининч яшлар мәшрәпнинч жигит беши болуп сайланди. Иттипақ 193, 3.

Иттипақ гезити

1994-жили март айдин тартип «Иттипақ» гезити чиқишқа башланди. Бу гезитнинч биринчи муһәррири (редактор) Музаппархан Қурбанов болған. Шуниндин кейин Шамсидин Абдурахимов вә хәзир Акбаржан Баудунов. 1994-жилида номер қол билән йезилған. Кейин 18 номер машинка билән, 1997-жилдин тартип компьютер билән йезилиду. «Иттипақ» гезити айда бир кетим чиқиду ва уйғурлар яшайдиған йезиларға вә мәһәлиләргә әвителиду. Мәсилән, 400 гезит Новопокровка йезисиға, 370-Лебединовка йезисиға, 170-Токульдошқа, 120-ТЭЦқа, 100-Ала-Тоо йезисиға, 100-Аламедин-1, 95-Кәң-Булунч йезисиға вә Тоқмоқ шәһиригә, 35-Восток-6, ва 15-Восток-5. ош областқа-150 гезит, Жалалабад вә Узгенға-150 гезит әвителиду.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁷ 8 July 2011 interview with Akbar aka.

Appendix D: Table of Respondents

As shown in the chart below, I conducted 400 interviews for this dissertation. Data from all of those interviews, however, is not included in this dissertation. The larger chart below depicts in more detail the interviews I cite in the dissertation. Most of these interviews I conducted from January 2011 through June of 2012 in northern Kyrgyzstan. Eight of them I conducted in the U.S. from July 2012 through December 2012. Below I define most of the labels I use for the types of interviews I conducted.

Interview Type	Number of Interviews (including those not cited in this dissertation)
Long-Term Interviews	242 (81 with Salomat, 30 with Kalia, 11 with Nuria, 5 with Nazira, and many others)
Informal Interviews	60
Group Interviews	50
Formal Interviews	45
E-mail Interviews	5
Total Interviews	402

For most interviews I spoke in Uzbek and the respondent spoke in the Turkic language that they knew best (e.g. Uzbek, Uyghur, Kyrgyz). Many Dungans in Toshtemir, for example, spoke to me in the Toshtemir dialect of Uzbek, or “Toshtemirlik.” While there are differences among the Turkic languages, I was able to communicate with most Turkic speakers. Some respondents spoke to me in English and I used a translator for those who did not speak a Turkic language. Informal interviews were mostly “of convenience,” meaning that I spoke with people I happened to meet on the bus, in a taxi, on the street, and elsewhere. Formal interviews were mostly arranged by my language teachers (Salomat and Kalia), research assistants, or other people that I knew well. Group interviews were mostly with my neighbors and other friends. Therefore, I did not take a scientific approach, other than “snowballing” to find respondents.

All interviews were semistructured open-ended interviews where I asked how people process disputes, what kinds of disputes they experience, and what organizations help process disputes. In at least 50 of them I specifically asked about Uzbek / Uyghur bride kidnapping norms, how they differ from Kyrgyz norms, and how they relate to state legal institutions.

Respondents included government administrators; city council representatives; city district leaders; city quarter committee chairs; prosecutors; police investigators; police chiefs; attorneys; *aksakal* (Kyrgyz for “white beard or respected male elder) court judges; neighborhood, mosque, and family *aksakals*; national, city, neighborhood, and street level ethnic diaspora committee chairs; women’s committee chairs; NGO leaders, business leaders, bankers, authors, teachers, law professors, other professors, bread makers, and people of various professions; the Chief Mufti of Kyrgyzstan; mosque imams and other Muslim leaders; school students, college students, and other citizens of all ages and backgrounds. While most respondents were Uzbeks from Toshtemir, many were Kyrgyz, Russian, Dungan and other ethnicities from Toshtemir, Bishkek, and other parts of the country.

Before conducting the interviews I tried to explain that the purpose of the interview was to gather data to publish in my dissertation and elsewhere and that I would not use the respondent’s name in my publications. Additionally, I asked for the respondent’s oral consent to take notes, ask questions, and use their responses. In November of 2011 I also began giving respondents a letter from the university where I took Uzbek and Uyghur classes which described my research project, informed them that I will use all data anonymously, and encouraged them to participate.²⁹⁸

The table below only represents those respondents whose information I cite in this dissertation. It does not include citations to the many other interviews I conducted, but do not

²⁹⁸ Simon Halliday and Patrick Schmidt, *Conducting law and society research: reflections on methods and practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Chapter 9 Alan Paterson and the law lords; and Chapter 19 Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey and The common place of law; *ibid*; Kleinbach, Ablezova, and Altieva, "Kidnapping for marriage," 194.

cite. Feel free to contact me for a complete list of respondents and field notes. The following bullets describe each of the columns in the table:

- **Code:** To maintain anonymity I gave each respondent a random three letter code. Except for the second and subsequent respondents in group interviews, the first column lists that code alphabetically.
- **Date:** The second column lists the date of the interview.
- **Interview:** The third column lists one of the following types of interviews that I conducted:
 - Formal: Formal interviews for which I had a prior appointment to meet with the person. Sometimes that prior appointment was impromptu, for example, when one interviewee called up another interviewee to come and join the interview.
 - Informal: Informal interviews for which I did not have a prior appointment to meet. These are interviews that I conducted in the street, on the bus, in a taxi, at gatherings, or at any other place that I met people.
 - Long-term: Long-term interviews with people that I knew well and with whom I interviewed on more than two occasions. Salomat (EVT) is the prime example of a person with whom I conducted long-term interviews. Due to the large number of interviews I conducted with her I placed her citations at the end of the table.
 - Group: Group interviews, both formal and informal, with more than one person. For clarity, I highlighted each person involved in the interview.
- **Age:** The fourth column lists respondent's ages as follows:
 - Youth: Respondents approximately under the age of 25; typically college students.

- Adult: Respondents approximately between the ages of 25 and 65.
- Senior: Respondents approximately over the age of 65; typically retirees.
- **Ethnicity**: The fifth column lists the ethnicity of the respondent, most often as reported by the respondent.
- **Gender**: The sixth column lists the gender of the respondent.
- **Profession**: The seventh column lists the profession of the respondent.
- **Domicile**: The eighth column list the domicile of the respondent, the place where the respondent lived at the time of the interview. It does not necessarily represent the place where the respondent was born and raised. The following defines some of the geographic terms I use in this column:
 - Bishkek: The capital of Kyrgyzstan. This term includes the greater Bishkek metropolitan area and not just the political boundaries.
 - Large M.: The Large Mahalla neighborhood in Toshtemir.
 - Small M.: The Small Mahalla neighborhood in Toshtemir.
 - Toshtemir: A city located in northern Kyrgyzstan, which is the research site of this dissertation. Respondents listed as from Toshtemir lived: in Toshtemir, but outside of Large Mahalla or Small Mahalla; in those *mahalla* neighborhoods, but I was not aware of that fact or in which neighborhood they lived; or in a location outside of, but near, Toshtemir.

Code	Date	Interview	Age	Ethnicity	Gender	Profession	Domicile
AAD	02.13.12	Formal	Senior	Uyghur	Male	Teacher	Bishkek
AIK	06.09.12	Long-Term	Adult	Uyghur	Male	Taxi driver	Bishkek
BZD	05.25.12	Group	Adult	Uzbek	Male	Bread (<i>non</i>) maker	Toshtemir
RIK			Adult	Uzbek	Female	Bread (<i>non</i>) maker	Toshtemir
CEN	09.08.11	Formal	Adult	Uyghur	Male	Farmer	Toshtemir
CNC	06.09.11	Informal	Adult	Dungan	Female	Attorney	Toshtemir
CNC	03.29.12	Group	Adult	Dungan	Female	NGO leader	Toshtemir
URE			Adult	Kyrgyz	Male	NGO leader	Toshtemir
JOO			Adult	Dungan	Male	NGO leader	Toshtemir
WQL			Adult	Uyghur	Male	NGO leader	Toshtemir
EAE	08.09.11	Formal	Adult	Uyghur	Female	Women's Cmte	Bishkek
EBI	09.02.11	Formal	Senior	Uyghur	Male	<i>Xitoydan</i> leader	Toshtemir

EBX	09.14.1	Formal	Adult	Uzbek	Female	Housewife	Toshtemir
EVT	See the last entry below						
EYB	09.21.11	Formal	Adult	Uzbek	Male	Migrant worker	Russia
FMI	11.07.11	Formal	Senior	Uyghur	Female	Women's Cmte	Bishkek
FTD	02.09.12	Formal	Senior	Kyrgyz	Female	Teacher	Toshtemir
GGW	01.19.12	Group	Adult	Uyghur	Male	Bread (<i>non</i>) maker	Toshtemir
SDK			Adult	Uyghur	Female	Bread (<i>non</i>) maker	Toshtemir
RBT			Youth	Uyghur	Male	Bread (<i>non</i>) maker	Toshtemir
GML	11.01.11	Long-Term	Adult	Kyrgyz	Male	UNDP admin	Bishkek
	03.21.12						
GWH	07.05.11	Long-Term	Adult	Uyghur	Female	Univ/K-12 teacher	Large M.
	07.19.11						
	07.20.11						
	07.26.11						
	08.17.11						
GWH	07.07.11	Group	Adult	Uyghur	Female	Univ/K-12 teacher	Large M.
OGK			Adult	Uyghur	Female	Business person	Toshtemir
IKW	02.13.12	Group	Senior	Uyghur	Male	So'pi-Old Mosque	Toshtemir
OJP			Senior	Uyghur	Female	Home maker	Toshtemir
DUI			Adult	Uyghur	Female	Home maker	Toshtemir
EAF			Youth	Uyghur	Male		Toshtemir
IKW	08.22.11	Formal	Senior	Uyghur	Male	So'pi-Old Mosque	Toshtemir
ISL	04.17.11	Group	Adult	Uzbek	Male	Phone technician	Large M.
COA			Adult	Uzbek	Male	Bank employee	Large M.
JJC	05.15.12	Informal	Adult	Uyghur	Male	Business person	Toshtemir
KXJ	04.19.12	Group	Youth	Russian	Female	College student	Toshtemir
SWK			Youth	Russian	Female	College student	Toshtemir
LFP	06.15.12	Formal	Senior	Tajik	Male	Diaspora leader	Toshtemir
LJH	09.08.11	Formal	Adult	Uyghur	Female	Qtr cmte chair	Toshtemir
LVV	02.02.12	Formal	Adult	Uzbek	Male	Business person	Toshtemir
MHL	05.28.12	Formal	Senior	Uyghur	Male	Ittipak <i>yigit beshi</i>	Bishkek
MSC	12.15.11	Formal	Adult	Kyrgyz	Female	Qtr cmte chair	Toshtemir
MSH	11.07.11	Formal	Senior	Uyghur	Female	Women's Cmte	Bishkek
NFU	07.08.11	Formal	Adult	Uyghur	Male	Ittipak President	Bishkek
NGL	03.11.12	Long-Term	Adult	Kyrgyz	Female	Translator	Bishkek
NKM	09.14.11	Formal	Senior	Uyghur	Male	Qtr cmte aksakal	Toshtemir
NRB	06.03.11	Group	Youth	Dungan	Female	College student	Toshtemir
XLC			Youth	Kyrgyz	Female	Collegel student	Toshtemir
LUR			Adult	Dungan	Female	College librarian	Toshtemir
OGK	07.08.11	Long-Term	Adult	Uyghur	Female	Business person	Toshtemir
	09.02.11						
PDE	07.21.11	Informal	Adult	Dungan	Male	Milkman	Toshtemir
PEE	02.18.12	Long-Term	Adult	Uyghur	Male	Taxi driver	Bishkek
	04.08.12						
	05.23.12						
PEG	01.19.11	Long-Term	Adult	Uzbek	Male	Driver	Toshtemir
	04.20.11						
PNF	11.29.11	Formal	Adult	Kyrgyz	Male	Chief Mufti of Kg	Bishkek
PNI	03.15.12	Informal	Adult	?	Male	Taxi driver	Toshtemir
QNI	05.23.12	Group	Senior	Uyghur	Male	Ittipak <i>yigit beshi</i>	Bishkek
MJQ			Senior	Uyghur	Male	Ittipak <i>aksakal</i>	Bishkek
QVL	09.05.11	Informal	Adult	Uzbek	Male	Driver	Small M.
RKE	06.12.12	Group	Adult	Uzbek	Female	Diaspora leader	Bishkek
HXW			Adult	Uzbek	Female	Diaspora leader	Bishkek
GEM			Adult	Uzbek	Male	Diaspora leader	Bishkek
RWL	03.10.12	Long-Term	Adult	Uyghur	Male	Ittipak news editor	Bishkek
	07.08.11						

SKD	09.08.11	Formal	Adult	Uzbek	Male	<i>Aksakal</i> judge	Chui Reg.
SMP	02.13.12	Informal	Adult	Uzbek	Male	Taxi driver	Toshtemir
TML	03.15.12	Informal	Adult	Uzbek	Female	Phone sales person	Toshtemir
TSP	05.28.12	Formal	Senior	Uyghur	Male	<i>Ittipak yigit beshi</i>	Bishkek
TWE	02.01.11	Informal	Adult	Uzbek	Male		Large M.
UOR	06.27.11	Group	Adult	Uzbek	Male	Bread (<i>non</i>) maker	Toshtemir
AFR			Adult	Uzbek	Female	Home maker	Toshtemir
VSF	03.20.11	Informal	Adult	Kyrgyz	Male	Government	Bishkek
WKH	04.05.12	Group	Adult	Kyrgyz	Female	Attorney	Toshtemir
PYR			Adult	Kyrgyz	Female	Attorney	Toshtemir
WUU	11.17.11	Long-Term	Youth	Kyrgyz	Female	College student	Toshtemir
	02.16.12						
WUX	09.21.11	Formal	Adult	Uyghur	Female	Qtr cmte chair	Toshtemir
XVA	06.09.11	Informal	Adult	Korean	Male	Diaspora leader	Toshtemir
YAN	12.13.12	Long-Term	Youth	US	Male	College student	USA
YCX	09.22.11	Long-Term	Adult	Kyrgyz	Female	Univ teacher	Bishkek
YKI	02.09.12	Group	Senior	Uzbek	Male	Qtr cmte chair	Large M.
IRM			Senior	Uzbek	Female	Homemaker	Large M.
SXG			Senior	Uzbek	Male	Qtr cmte chair / Mosque aksakal	Large M.
YXW	12.15.11	Formal	Senior	Uzbek	Female	Qtr cmte chair	Large M.
ZAF	09.21.11	Formal	Senior	Uyghur	Male	Qtr cmte aksakal	Toshtemir
ZLV	04.13.11	Long-Term	Youth	Dungan	Male	College student	Toshtemir
Salomat (EVT)	01.25.11	Long-Term	Senior	Uzbek	Female	School director / Teacher	Large M.
	01.26.11						
	02.02.11						
	02.09.11						
	02.13.11						
	03.02.11						
	03.11.11						
	03.22.11						
	04.12.11						
	04.13.11						
	04.14.11						
	04.19.11						
	04.20.11						
	04.27.11						
	05.03.11						
	05.11.11						
	06.27.11						
	08.25.11						
	09.07.11						
	09.08.11						
	09.14.11						
	09.15.11						
	09.22.11						
	09.28.11						
	10.05.11						
	10.12.11						
10.13.11							
10.27.11							
11.02.11							
11.03.11							
11.16.11							
11.23.11							
11.30.11							

	12.14.11						
	06.27.12						