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**The Mennonites and the Russian State Duma,
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
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Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor

The Mennonites and the Russian State Duma, 1905-1914

By Terry Martin*

Russia's brief experiment with constitutional monarchy and a national parliament has received contradictory evaluations. A single large question has focused this debate: did the Duma period witness a reduction or an increase in the estrangement between government and society?¹ This question has usually been addressed by focusing on class and *soslovie* (status) divisions. However, there were other important axes of conflict. Constitutionalism raised doubts about the status of the Russian empire and so highlighted issues of national and ethnic conflict. The new order also challenged traditional definitions of Russianness, in particular its link to autocracy and Orthodoxy, which in turn raised the question of religious toleration. Finally, responses to the Duma experience also varied regionally.

In this paper, I will examine the question of popular reaction to the Duma experience and the issue of society's estrangement from government through an in-depth case study of the Russian Mennonites' response to the Duma system. Although the Russian Mennonites were a very small community, with a population of about one hundred thousand, they allow one to examine all four axes of conflict outlined above: religious, ethnic, class/*soslovie*, and regional. The Russian Mennonites left behind an extremely rich source base. They published two national newspapers, almost the entire population was literate, and an unusually large segment of the Mennonite community took part in political debates.² Therefore, they provide a unique opportunity to undertake a detailed case study.

The Russian Mennonites can best be described sociologically as a mobilized diaspora.³ Mobilized diasporas differ

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from ordinary diasporas in that the mobilized diaspora community has sufficient political organization and economic or political skills in order to bargain with its host government for specific privileges. Pre-modern governments used mobilized diasporas to fulfill roles either that the native population could not perform or that the government felt were politically dangerous to assign to the native population. The most famous example of a mobilized diaspora in tsarist Russia was the Baltic Germans, who exchanged their military, diplomatic, and bureaucratic skills for a privileged position in the Baltic provinces.⁴ Although the Russian Mennonites were a rural community, far removed from positions of political power, at their own modest level they performed a role analogous to that of the Baltic German nobility.

The Mennonite religion emerged out of the Anabaptist movement, the radical wing of the Protestant Reformation that broke with Zwingli, Luther, and Calvin over the issue of adult baptism.⁵ The Mennonite confession arose in the Dutch lowlands in the mid-1500s. Due to intense religious persecution, Mennonites gradually moved to the Danzig region and the relative religious toleration of the Polish commonwealth. Intense religious persecution transformed the Mennonites from a radical proselytizing Protestant sect into a closed traditional ethno-religious community, whose most striking religious features were adult baptism, pacifism, the lack of a church hierarchy, and a communal rather than individual approach to salvation. They also established a reputation as model farmers, which made them attractive tenants for the Polish nobility and crown. Objectively the Mennonites were purchasing religious toleration with their economic skills. They had taken on the traits of a mobilized diaspora.

These Mennonites began to emigrate to Russia in 1789 in response to Catherine II's invitation to settle foreign colonists in the middle Volga and Black Sea regions. The Mennonites settled in the Ekaterinoslav and Tavridia *gubernii* (provinces) of the newly conquered Black Sea region which was now known as New Russia. All such colonists received a package of economic and political privileges that distinguished them from the enserfed Russian peasantry. Unlike other foreign colonists, however, the Mennonites first sent two representatives to negotiate a special deal with the tsarist government. These representatives asked for not only additional religious guarantees but further economic privileges as

well. The Mennonites also insisted that the tsar issue a decree confirming these privileges, which resulted in a separate Mennonite Charter of Privileges granted by Paul I in 1800.⁶

These origins led the Mennonites to conceive of their relationship to the Russian state in personal terms. In their opinion, the Charter of Privileges, granted by Paul I and renewed by subsequent tsars, had established a personal and contractual relationship between the Mennonite people and the Russian tsars. The Mennonites offered their loyalty and service as model farmers in exchange for privileges such as local self-administration, generous land grants, and exemption from military service, privileges unimaginable to the enserfed Russian peasantry.⁷ This ideology was typical of mobilized diasporas whose loyalty was directed to their new sovereign, not to the state and certainly not to the host nation.

The Mennonites' personal contract with the tsar was first seriously threatened by the Great Reforms of the 1860s. These reforms emancipated the Russian peasantry, provided a modern judiciary, and introduced some local self-government through the new *zemstvo* organs.⁸ The Mennonites, however, had never been enserfed and already had more extensive self-government than the new reforms promised. They feared these reforms would end their special status and reduce them to the level of the Russian peasantry. The Mennonites' distinct *soslovie* category of "propertied settler" (*poselian-sobstvennik*) was abolished, and the Mennonites were categorized simply as peasants. The Odessa-based Guardianship Committee (*popechitel'nyi komitet*), which had allowed the Mennonites and other foreign colonists to deal directly with the central government and bypass local authorities, was also abolished. Most significantly for the pacifist Mennonites, their military exemption was threatened.⁹

The Mennonites responded to this threat with the two strategies characteristic of the mobilized diaspora. They began a mass emigration movement (which resulted in about a quarter of the entire Russian Mennonite population moving to North America), and they mobilized all their political resources to negotiate a new contract with the tsar. A series of delegations were sent to St. Petersburg, special Mennonite councils were convened to discuss strategy, petitions were written and delivered, and important tsarist officials were lobbied.¹⁰ These efforts did finally succeed as the government, faced with the threat of losing the economically

valuable Mennonite community, relented and granted the Mennonites the right to alternative military service in forestry camps located nearby in New Russia. Mennonite youths would serve a full military term in these camps, which would be administered and financially supported by the Mennonite community as a whole.¹¹

The Great Reforms created a decisive shift in the Mennonites' formal relations with the Russian government. The Mennonites had previously communicated with the government through the Odessa-based Guardianship Committee and its German-speaking officials. The Great Reforms' crisis forced the Mennonites to innovate. The sending of a delegation of experienced community members, often church elders, to St. Petersburg became a favored form of communication with the government. These delegations would often convey a petition approved by a new institution that arose in this time period, the Mennonite Annual General Conference, which began in 1879.¹² If there was not time for such a conference, a Church council of elders and ministers would convene. These unifying efforts were reinforced by the Forestry Service, whose upkeep required a centralized Mennonite administration. Thus, the Mennonites emerged from the Great Reforms' crisis with a greatly strengthened political organization and the sense of a newly revitalized special contract between the Mennonite people and the Russian tsar.¹³

The Mennonites thrived economically in the freer society established by the Great Reforms. They began to purchase massive quantities of land and to reproduce their social order across the entire Russian empire. By the late 1880s, for instance, they owned approximately ten percent of all agricultural land in their home regions of Ekaterinoslav and Tavridia *gubernii*.¹⁴ The Mennonites also came to dominate the milling and agricultural implements industry in New Russia.¹⁵ Attempts by local Russian elites to pass legislation limiting the right of "Germans" (Mennonites used German as their literary language and Low German, a Dutch dialect, as their everyday language) further united the Mennonite community. In response to these threats the Mennonites emphasized their Russianness, which furthered the emergence among Mennonites of the belief that they represented a distinct ethnic group, the Russian Mennonites.¹⁶

By the time of the 1905 revolution, the Russian Mennonites considered themselves one of the many distinct ethnic groups of the

Russian empire. In their view, each of these groups had its own contractual relationship with the Russian government and the Russian tsar, whereby privileges received depended on services rendered. The Mennonites' superior economic performance justified their privileged standing; the promised introduction of a modern, parliamentary system threatened this order. The Mennonites were in close contact with their brethren in Germany, America, and Canada. They had, therefore, some idea of the consequences of economic, social, and political modernization. As an upwardly mobile, economically skilled group who had already thrived following the Great Reforms, the Mennonites were attracted to this promised new order. However, as a traditional religious and ethnic group, as a mobilized diaspora, the Mennonites greatly feared the consequences of a modernizing and nationalizing state.

The Mennonites' response to the threats and promises of this new era would be concentrated in their response to the newly created Russian parliament, the state Duma.¹⁷ The Mennonites' efforts to achieve representation for their people in the Duma led them into greater participation in the world of Russian politics than ever before. It also led to a fundamental reorganization of local Mennonite institutions. The Duma era awakened new hopes in the Mennonite community for a more rational state order and ultimately frustrated those hopes. Most importantly, the Duma era witnessed an unprecedented Mennonite estrangement from the Russian state, an estrangement which they shared with Russian society as a whole. This estrangement undermined traditional Mennonite loyalty to the tsar and his government and brought them into closer contact, sympathy, and even strategic alliance with Russian society.

The Friesen Party: An Abandoned Alternative

As we have seen, by 1905 the Mennonites had developed a variety of points of contact with Russia's political environment. In order to protect their right to alternative military service, the Mennonites had cultivated an impressive network of contacts in the Russian bureaucracy. Many of these officials had originally served in the New Russian Guardianship Committee. Large Mennonite estate owners and industrialists were well integrated into the local political environment. They served in the *zemstva* and city government.

In addition to these official connections, some Mennonites also had ties with one group which, against its own wishes, stood in political opposition. In the 1860s, a new Mennonite religious movement had emerged under strong pietist and Baptist influence. This movement would form the Mennonite Brethren church.¹⁸ Many of these converts helped proselytize and organize a rapidly developing Baptist (or Stundist) movement among the New Russian peasantry.¹⁹ This behavior was illegal and when the government's repression of the Baptists increased, the Mennonite Brethren moderated their behavior. Nevertheless, both personal and religious ties remained, and some individuals continued both to associate with and even support the Russian Baptists.

One of these individuals was Peter Martinovich Friesen.²⁰ In his youth, Friesen joined the new Mennonite Brethren movement and participated in some of their missionary activity although he eventually found the church's clannish religious isolation too stifling.²¹ Friesen had broadened his horizons by studying first in Switzerland and later in Odessa and Moscow. Like many Mennonite intellectuals, he developed a passionate love of Russia and the Russian people, which helped motivate his evangelical work among them.²² Friesen taught high school in the New Russian Mennonite colony of Halbstadt, but soon moved outside the Mennonite world. He became minister in a German Baptist congregation in Odessa, where he developed further ties with the Russian Baptist movement.²³ Later he moved to Sevastopol, where his continued involvement in Baptist circles drew critical attention from Russia's Ministry of the Interior.²⁴

Given Friesen's connections to the illegal Baptist movement and his presence in the revolutionary city of Sevastopol, it is not surprising that it was Friesen who initiated the first Mennonite political initiative following the tsar's 1905 October Manifesto. Following the tsar's announcement that a representative parliament would be convened, a large number of small and short-lived political parties emerged. Most of these parties centered around local figures and quickly merged with a major political party or died.²⁵ One such party emerged in Sevastopol under the grandiloquent name, "The Union of Freedom, Truth, and Peace: Foes of all Violence, Proponents of Unceasing Civil, Economic and Moral-Spiritual Progress."²⁶ It was known locally, after its founder, as "the Friesen party."²⁷

The Union of Freedom formed in the immediate aftermath of the October Manifesto and the surrounding violence in Sevastopol. The party's political platform was published in the liberal Sevastopol daily, *Krymskii viestnik* (The Crimean Messenger), and drew considerable public attention.²⁸ Their platform was quite liberal and was likened to that of the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), Russia's major center-left party.²⁹ It called for a constitutional monarchy, universal suffrage (though excluding the army and police), language rights for national minorities, extensive local self-government, independent courts, generous labor legislation, universal education, the "elimination of poverty," and freedom of conscience, speech, assembly, and personal inviolability. The platform diverged from Kadet ideology, however, in emphasizing the center-right Octobrist party's favorite themes of an "unshakable monarchy" and an "indivisible state."

The most distinctive characteristic of the Union's platform, however, was its strong Christian character. The last plank of its platform, for instance, called for "the complete realization of the teachings of Jesus Christ." The Mennonite and evangelical origins of the party were reflected in the platform's aversion to all violence and strong pacifist sentiments. It advocated the radical demand for "the renunciation forever of any attempts at military conquest" and the right of alternative service for conscientious objectors. In 1905, only Mennonites possessed this latter right. In addition, the party petitioned Prime Minister Sergei Witte to spare the lives of Lieutenant Schmidt and his fellow mutineers, despite their firm opposition to revolution.³⁰ The party's platform was signed by seven individuals including two Mennonites, Friesen and Johann Isaak, and four prominent Sevastopol Baptist ministers, I. M. Staroverov, N. V. Odintsov, S. T. Shpak, and P. E. Iudin.³¹ The Union of Freedom, then, was an attempt, the only one in the Duma period, to form a political party based on Russia's small, but rapidly expanding evangelical movement.

Sevastopol was a logical base for such a party. In 1903, an Orthodox missionary called Sevastopol, "undoubtedly one of the most visible centers of Stundism not only for Tavricheskaiia guberniia (province), but for many other places as well."³² The evangelical movement emerged there in the late 1880s. By 1897, there were eighty-nine evangelicals in Sevastopol; by 1904, there were 130.³³ This was a large open following since Russian Baptism

(called Stundism by the government) was declared illegal in 1894, and followers thereafter were severely persecuted. However, the Sevastopol authorities were apparently lenient. An Orthodox missionary reported with annoyance that the Baptists met "completely in the open: sectarian singing resound[ed] in the southern suburbs, drawing the attention of the curious Orthodox."³⁴

P. M. Friesen had arrived in Sevastopol in the early 1890s. He established a boarding-house for the city's small Mennonite student population and established a small Mennonite church. Since the Mennonite religion was legal, they could gather openly in the city center, whereas the Baptists prudently remained in the southern suburbs. When the 1904-05 liberation movement made open religious worship and even proselytizing possible, Friesen's residence became the center of Russian evangelical activity in Sevastopol.³⁵

According to Friesen, his decision to form the Union of Freedom was a reaction to the violence which swept Sevastopol following the pronouncement of the October Manifesto. First, revolutionaries attacked the city prison which resulted in nine deaths. Then pogroms began to break out. Friesen later explained, in words illustrative of his identification with the Russian intelligentsia's ethos, that he "felt in [his] conscience God's command to go to the people."³⁶ In the city marketplace he found a large crowd in an ugly mood which, he claims, he succeeded in dispersing with an impromptu speech on Christian love.³⁷

Meanwhile Friesen's Mennonite students, who were also agitated by the events and wished to make some contribution short of revolution, asked his counsel. Under the impression of these events, Friesen drafted his political platform. He showed it to his evangelical colleagues whose suggestions were incorporated into a revised version which was published two weeks later. These events illustrate that under the pressure of revolutionary events, portions of the Mennonite community, in particular students, did respond sympathetically and were capable of liberal political action.³⁸

The Union of Freedom, however, proved unable to maintain a consistent ideological position, which made it difficult to recruit popular support. The party's platform was revised again on 28 November 1905, making it both more specific and more liberal.³⁹ These changes included specifying that parliament should have a single chamber and no laws come into force without its approval;

election by universal, direct, equal, and secret vote; an all-estate "small *zemstvo*" and abolition of the land captains; and a ministry responsible to the Duma. Most significantly, the new platform called for providing "in factual possession to the tillers of the soil a sufficient quantity of land, under conditions which would secure a tolerable existence" for the peasantry. The government would compensate landowners for their losses.⁴⁰ These changes radicalized the Union's platform considerably and brought it into alignment with that of the Kadets.

There are two plausible causes for these changes. Most likely, they were in preparation for an electoral alliance with the Kadets. Due to its small size, the Union of Freedom had to search for allies. Friesen later revealed that on 12 December the party had entertained alliance offers from the Octobrists and Kadets. The latter offer was accepted on 19 December and announced publicly by Friesen on 29 December in the *Krymskii viestnik*. As a part of this deal, Friesen became an honorary member of the Sevastopol Kadet Central Committee, and the Kadet president, General Leskevich, received the same honor in Friesen's party.⁴¹

It also seems likely that Friesen faced pressure from within the party for a more liberal position. His allies were experienced veterans of the religious opposition who, despite their social conservatism, had developed a strong distaste for the tsarist government and saw alliance with the Kadets as a logical step. The 28 November revisions also coincided with the appearance of I. S. Prokhanov, a prominent evangelical minister in St. Petersburg with extensive contacts in liberal circles, as a member of the Union's Central Committee.⁴² Prokhanov was important for the Union's pretensions to become a national party. The influence of Prokhanov and other Baptists leaders, although they were not at all social radicals, likely did make the Union more receptive to opposition politics and so pushed the party politically further left.

Prokhanov had long-standing ties to the Crimean Mennonite Brethren community. In fact, as the Union of Freedom emerged, Prokhanov was organizing a venture with a Mennonite publishing house to produce Russian evangelical literature. This would result in the Halbstadt-based Raduga company, which would develop into one of the largest publishers in New Russia and the most important evangelical publishing house in the Russian Empire.⁴³ Raduga and the Union of Freedom represented two manifestations of the new

post-October 1905 possibilities for alliance between the Mer-non:te and Russian evangelical communities for political and social action. This alliance, however, would always be an uneasy one.

The Union of Freedom illustrated this fact well. Its alliance with the Kadets crumbled rapidly. In January, Friesen entertained another offer from the Octobrists. Although he rejected their offer, he wrote the local Octobrist leader a letter in which he expressed some attraction to the Octobrist program and likewise expressed his own ambivalence about the ongoing electoral campaign. This letter was hardly appropriate given the Union of Freedom's Kadet alliance. On 9 February, Friesen confirmed the disintegration of the Kadet alliance when he sent a letter to the Sevastopol Kadet Central Committee withdrawing from their organization.

Friesen gave the following reasons for this withdrawal: i) he objected to the Kadets' alliance with the "Jewish Union" because he opposed purely national or religious parties, whether German, Jewish, Baptist, or Protestant; ii) he objected to the Kadets' dalliances with the Social Democrats, not due to their politics, but due to their advocacy of violence; iii) the Kadets' monarchism was "too pale" (*slishkom bleden*) for Friesen; iv) the Kadets were too supportive of political separatism among ethnic minorities; and v) Friesen's health had deteriorated, so his political activity had to be kept to a minimum. Overall, Friesen maintained that the Kadets had moved to the left, so their program no longer coincided with the Union of Freedom, Truth, and Peace.⁴⁴

Friesen's departure was publicized and assailed by a local Kadet leader, Dikii, in the 17 February issue of *Krymskii viestnik* only a few weeks before the city voting began. Dikii pointed out that the Kadets' nationalities policy, attitude to the monarchy, and commitment to dialogue with the Social Democrats were all public knowledge before the alliance with Friesen and had not changed. In addition, the Jewish Union was actually the "Union for the Achievement of Equal Rights for Jews." They had announced their support for the Kadets and the Kadets had gladly accepted it. There was no political alliance. Finally, Dikii was bewildered that the sickness of one individual should affect the political orientation of an entire party.⁴⁵

Dikii concluded that in reality, "already in the middle of January, the Union of Freedom, Truth, and Peace dramatically veered from their platform ... [T]he Union diverged to the right." He

pointed out that while rejecting an alliance with the Octobrists, Friesen already in January had sent a circular suggesting members support either Kadets or left Octobrists. Dikii concluded that voters should reject candidates of the Union of Freedom if that party, "relying on its many members among the German Mennonites," should field candidates in the election. In fact, the Union fell into disarray before the elections, fielded no candidates, and disappeared soon after the elections.

Dikii's comment about the Union of Freedom's many Mennonite members raises the question of the level of support for Friesen's political venture among his own people. Friesen presented the Union as neither ethnically, religiously, nor class based, but rather a national party open to anyone in sympathy with its general aims.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Dikii insinuated that Friesen's shift to the right was linked to his Mennonite support, a charge explicitly made by the Soviet historian Aleksandr Klivanov.⁴⁷ Dikii's concern about Mennonite political influence had nothing to do with the Sevastopol alliance, where there were only about twenty Mennonites in the city. He was concerned about the final Tavridia *guberniia* elections, where the large landowners supplied thirty-one of the ninety-six electors and the Mennonites' massive landholdings could be quite influential.⁴⁸ These landholders, however, would likely not be attracted to the Kadet demand for expropriation of some of their property.

Dikii's argument is plausible and deserves consideration. Moreover, the question of Mennonite participation, or even substantial interest, in the Union of Freedom, Truth, and Peace is an important one since it addresses the Mennonites' openness to one plausible political alliance. There was a potential base for Friesen's Union in Tavridia. It could hope to attract the land-rich Mennonite and German populations with its appeal to religious and national freedoms coupled with monarchist patriotism and opposition to national separatism. Indeed, the Union of Freedom did attract some German interest.⁴⁹ Religious freedom and the party's Christian rhetoric could appeal to the wealthy Molokan and Old Believer population.⁵⁰

In addition, with the almost complete absence of a landed, Russian nobility in Tavridia, the independent, prosperous, former state peasants, the so-called "*Tavrichane*," played an influential role in Duma elections. These peasants had successfully imitated many

German economic practices but, unlike the Stundists, had not adopted evangelical religious beliefs.⁵¹ A successful Mennonite-Lutheran-*Tavrichane* alliance did in fact form in the Bakhmut *uezd* (county) of Ekaterinoslav *guberniia* (province), where all three groups had made massive land purchases.⁵² This landed support would be allied to whatever middle-class urban support the evangelical communities could muster in the cities. Since the evangelical movement more than doubled its numbers from 1905 to 1914, this support may not have been negligible. Such would be the potential alliance the Union of Freedom could offer the Mennonites in Tavridia *guberniia*. With a Kadet alliance, it could plausibly capture one or two Duma seats. A similar situation prevailed in Ekaterinoslav *guberniia*, the other Mennonite stronghold, except that the greater Russian noble presence would weaken the alliance's strength.

Friesen and Johann P. Isaak, the other Mennonite member of the Union's Central Committee, did make serious efforts to recruit Mennonite support. The Union's political program was published in the Mennonite newspaper *Der Botschafter* on 7 December 1905, and the corrections of 28 November were added in the following issue.⁵³ Only two Mennonites endorsed this platform in *Der Botschafter*. An unidentified author argued that the platform was Christian and would draw the support of other parties, which would allow "our Mennonite people (*unser Mennnitenvölklein*) to attract enough support to elect their own representative. Our own deputy, he concluded, would be needed to protect our right to alternative service, "for scarcely anyone who knows the times will believe that in a free state, privileges for one religious confession can exist."⁵⁴ This would form one of the basic arguments of the Mennonite Duma debate; the Mennonites' previous isolation had ended, and if they wanted to protect their right to alternative service, they would have to elect their own representative.⁵⁵

The question facing Mennonites who advocated political activity, however, was how great an ideological sacrifice were they willing to make to attract political allies. P. M. Friesen's appeal for Mennonite support for the Union of Freedom, written on 12 December 1905 but only published in February 1906, indicated where he felt his program would offend Mennonites: "Many will find our political program far too radical - on the women's right to vote, the land question - but we are right in the center of events [in

Sevastopol]; we see and hear what the people want; we believe [our program] is the very minimum of what alone can pacify them. And we find nothing here which contradicts the Holy Scriptures.”⁵⁶ The tone of Friesen’s appeal implies that he himself did not favor such radical measures, but that the revolutionary events were forcing his hand, events which isolated Mennonites in their villages did not fully comprehend.

Friesen’s appeal did not draw support. In part, this is because his party collapsed before the elections, but it is also true that he failed to attract even verbal support in the Mennonite press. Friesen interpreted this failure as due to the innate conservatism of the Mennonite people. Six years later he wrote that, “as a genuine Christian-conservative and generally bourgeois group, ninety-nine out of one hundred Mennonites considered such words as ‘democrat’ and ‘democratic’ with suspicion, foreboding ill, and from a democracy only evil was expected ... One would have moved farther to the right if there had not been a concern for freedom of religion and language in church and school.” Had it not been for these concerns, “at least seventy-five percent of the Mennonites - ‘for the sake of the Tsar’ and out of antipathy to democracy, socialism, and everything that smelled of revolution - would have been ‘Truly Russian People’ in the monarchical, patriotic and social sense.”⁵⁷ In other words, Friesen himself supported Dikii’s interpretation.

The evidence available, however, does not support Friesen’s extreme comments, which seem at least partly motivated by personal bitterness. It is true that only a minority of Mennonites were willing to support the Kadets, especially after the November-December outburst of peasant unrest.⁵⁸ In this, the Mennonites behaved as other landed property owners, whose initial openness to reform (sometimes even quite radical reform) disappeared under the real threat of united, hostile peasant actions.⁵⁹ However, as we shall see, the Mennonites were open to a cautious reform program which combined educational, administrative, labor, religious, and even parliamentary reform, with a guarantee of private property, a preservation of the monarchy, and an appeal to their patriotism.

Despite his condescension to the Mennonite masses, these views seem quite close to Friesen’s own views. His political program emphasized the Octobrist themes of an “unshakable monarchy” and “indivisible state.” His party was presented as a “union” of like-minded citizens, again following the Octobrist rather

than the Kadet model of political organization. He broke with the Kadets' over their Jewish, Social Democrat, and republican ties, all factors which made Mennonites suspicious of the Kadets. The radical planks in his program, with the exception of the religiously motivated ones, were concessions to the times, not matters of principle, and he appears to have abandoned them after the 1905 crisis passed. Ironically, had Friesen followed his own convictions, he might have constructed a program that suited both the Mennonites' liberal needs (religious and national freedom) and their conservative sentiments (patriotism and monarchy). Such a program could have gently nudged the Mennonite community leftward and would not necessarily have been rejected by the evangelicals. As it worked out, the Friesen Party represented one Mennonite political option tried and abandoned.

The Mennonite Duma Debate

Not only did the Mennonites respond sluggishly to the appeals of the Friesen Party, but their participation in the first Duma elections as a whole was minimal. The Lutheran and Catholic German regions in Kherson and Bessarabia enthusiastically participated in the complex multi-tier Duma elections and successfully elected a German colonist to the Duma from each of these *gubernii*.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, the Mennonite strongholds of Ekaterinoslav and Tavridia elected no German representatives to the Duma, although German electoral strength in these *gubernii* was comparable. The Mennonites' electoral performance was sufficiently poor to draw some criticism in the German colonist press.⁶¹

More importantly, it provoked a bout of self-criticism in the Mennonite press. The pseudonymous J. Gotthelf, one of the two Mennonites to have publicly backed Friesen's party, scolded his compatriots: "Thanks to our unjustifiable reluctance to participate in public life, and thanks to our indifference to political rights and duties, a by-product of our general prosperity, and thanks to our social conservatism, we remain a confession without representation in the Duma."⁶² The last phrase alluded to the embarrassing success in Kherson and Bessarabia of the Lutheran and Catholic confessions, whom the Mennonites always thought of as culturally somewhat less advanced.

Gotthelf's criticism provoked further responses. David Epp, the editor of *Der Botschafter* and one of the Mennonites most influential in determining Mennonite relations to the Russian state, invoked a traditional patriarchal theme: "[We are] no longer 'guests' in this land, but 'children' of the same. We have the child's rights, but are refusing the child's duties."⁶³ Others were blunter: "Overall, we have a quite philistine sensibility."⁶⁴ Still others interpreted this as a national defeat. One author noted that the small Karaim Jewish community of Crimea had elected one of their own, S. S. Krym, to the Duma. The Mennonites should have achieved the same: "We Mennonites occupy a special position in Russia distinct from all, so that with justice we can be considered as *a small republic* in a giant state" (emphasis mine).⁶⁵

This feeling of national disenfranchisement and wounded national pride gave way to panic when the Kadets introduced civil rights legislation into the first Duma which seemed to threaten Mennonite privileges. The legislation included a clause that "no one can, on account of his or her religious convictions, refuse to fulfill his or her civil and political duties."⁶⁶ As read, this clause would eliminate the Mennonites' principal privilege of the right to alternative military service in special reforestation camps, a concession granted to the pacifist Mennonites in the 1870s when universal military service was adopted.

This legislation prompted a flurry of Mennonite activity. Upon receipt of this news, a meeting of Mennonite church elders was immediately convened in Halbstadt on 25 May 1906. This meeting elected elders Abraham Goerz and Isaak Dyck, both with "wide-ranging connections in the highest circles," to travel immediately to St. Petersburg in order to consult with members of the State Council and "perhaps" the state Duma as well.⁶⁷ Goerz and Dyck set out to St. Petersburg with the intention of consulting the Kherson and Bessarabia German Duma delegates, Muench and Widmer, the former Ekaterinoslav governor, Shlippe, and State Council member, M. V. Rodzianko. Shlippe had defended the Mennonites from attempts by Russian nobles to limit their landholdings in the early 1890s. Rodzianko was a large landowner in Ekaterinoslav and president of the Ekaterinoslav *zemstvo* from 1900 to 1906, from which he was elected to the State Council. Rodzianko was also a founder of the Octobrist party and future president of the state Duma.⁶⁸

The delegates found only Rodzianko, who assured them that the legislation would not affect their standing and sent them to his Octobrist Duma colleague, Count Peter Heyden. Heyden likewise assured them there would be no problem. When pressed by Goerz and Dyck, Heyden agreed to present a Mennonite petition to the Duma president Muromtsev and represent Mennonite concerns in the future. The delegates were pleased with this result, which they reported in the Mennonite press after their 11 June return.⁶⁹

A second conference, attended by four elders and six influential preachers, was held in Schönwiese on 26 June to draft the petition to Muromtsev. It was also agreed that the annual Mennonite General Conference would be moved forward to 10-11 August to approve the petition and that Abraham Neufeld, a respected Mennonite intellectual with experience representing Mennonite interests before the government, would accompany Heyden in presenting the petition.⁷⁰ All this effort came to naught, however, as the first Duma was swiftly dissolved by the government for its overly radical demands and the Kadet legislation died with it.

Nevertheless, the Mennonite response to this issue was very revealing. Why did the Kadet law project, which knowledgeable experts insisted would not affect the Mennonites and moreover would never become law, provoke such frenzied Mennonite activity? The Kadet bill embodied the Mennonites' fears of the new post-1905 order, their fears of a republic, and of republican parties (such as the Kadets). The subsequent Mennonite Duma debate was filled with references to the "leveling spirit" (*Nivellierungsgeist*) of the Kadets, the state Duma, and the times in general.⁷¹ They feared that rationalizing legal reform would level the playing field, which would mean improving the legal situation of some (Russian peasants, for instance) and hurting the legal standing of others (i.e. Mennonites). P. M. Friesen summarized the conventional wisdom well: "When reforms and liberties are provided for others, we Mennonites are always short-changed."⁷²

Friesen was referring to the Great Reforms' crisis of the 1860s. It was the system of Mennonite communication with the Russian state established during that crisis that the Kadets' legislation had brought into motion. An emergency arose, and first a Church council was convened. This council authorized a delegation to St. Petersburg. One of the delegates, Abraham Goerz, was even a veteran of the original Great Reforms' delegations.⁷³ The delegates

insisted that a petition, now to the Duma president rather than the tsar, be delivered. This petition followed the pattern established in the 1870s; the Mennonites' loyalty to the tsar and useful services (*nützliche Dienst*) were stressed, and it was asked that the tsar's historical commitments to the Mennonites be continued.⁷⁴ The petition embodied the traditional Mennonite understanding, representing their ideology as a mobilized diaspora, that they provided useful service and loyalty in exchange for privilege. Finally, a General Conference was to be convened to confirm the petition. However, at the same time that the Mennonites were engaging in this traditional activity, many were questioning whether the old service logic, with its old strategies and organizations, was adequate for the new constitutional era.

The Mennonites' failure in the first Duma elections and the subsequent panic over the Kadets' bill provoked an extensive debate in the two Mennonite newspapers prior to the second Duma elections. This debate centered on the following question: should the Mennonites have their own Duma representative?⁷⁵ One side in this debate was represented by Heinrich Janz of Halbstadt. Janz insisted that the Mennonites did need their own representative because the Mennonites' special interests could only be protected by "someone from among us, only by a Mennonite, who is a member of our community in body and soul and holds the people's interest in his heart."⁷⁶ An outsider could not be relied on. Count Peter Heyden had promised to represent them, only to assert the next week that his party opposed all special religious privileges. This was because Heyden was "not one of us."⁷⁷

Janz proposed that the Mennonites should petition "the Prime Minister, or directly His Majesty the Tsar, with the request that the Mennonites be excluded from the general electoral law and instead be given the right to elect from their own midst one or perhaps two representatives."⁷⁸ Janz was referring to a special provision of the Duma electoral law which allowed the government to reserve seats for national minorities. This provision was used in the first Duma for some Central Asian nomads, who could not participate in the normal territorial system. Later it would be used for Russian minorities in the Caucasus and western borderlands.⁷⁹ Janz justified the Mennonites' inclusion in this category as follows: "Have we not as a distinct religious community - indeed a completely unique one - and in part also as an ethnic group that has preserved

many valuable customs, have we not just as much a claim to a consideration of our desires as any other.”⁸⁰ Janz’s arguments were repeated by others and, as we shall see, had important private backing as well.

Janz’s proposal represented an attempt to narrowly adapt the existing Mennonite service outlook and strategies to a new environment. Janz believed that the Mennonites were a distinct ethnic group, “a little republic in a large state” as an earlier author had put it, and could therefore not be grouped together with other German colonists. Janz furthermore adopted a position of ethnic particularism; only “one of us” can successfully represent Mennonite interests. Moreover, he sought to circumvent the electoral system by petitioning the tsar directly, the traditional protector of Mennonite privileges.

Janz’s proposal represented the existing Mennonite vision of an empire composed of different peoples and estates, each with different responsibilities, talents, and privileges. The Mennonites’ political loyalty and economic skills earned them greater cultural autonomy. Hence, the Mennonites would elect their own representative in a separate, fully democratic procedure, while Russians would vote in their own property and estate based electoral system. This reflected the Mennonites’ past experience of a separate and privileged system of local administration. P. M. Friesen’s political creed for the Mennonites summarized this outlook: “We believe that we will be able to stand as a patriotic, culturally-useful, small member in the large family of Russia (into which we have been adopted by divine Providence).”⁸¹

Janz’s proposal was challenged in two articles by an author identified only as ‘i’.⁸² ‘i’ mocked the idea that sixty thousand Mennonites should be given one “or perhaps two” seats in an electoral system which granted one seat to every 250,000 citizens.⁸³ More fundamentally, he denied the continuing relevance of the Mennonite service outlook. Janz and others had raised the specter of another mass emigration, similar to the 1870s emigration which had led the government to make concessions on military service.⁸⁴ ‘i’ pointed out that today such a migration would mean 700,000 *dessiatin* of land would be made available for rebellious, land-hungry peasants - hardly a major threat. Indeed, the government’s 1915 land liquidation laws were passed with exactly that rationale, to satiate peasant land hunger.

Not only was Mennonite economic power now of dubious value, so too was their unquestioning loyalty. 'i' suggested that a special Mennonite representative in the current, rebellious Duma would be counter-productive. He would be seen as "the representative of a privileged caste ... On him would hang the odium of being privileged by the government." Any arguments he made would be viewed as no more than special pleading. He would be isolated by the powerful political parties whose support he would need to win any votes. According to 'i,' "he would have to be a Demosthenes were he not to be [irrelevant]."⁸⁵

Finally, 'i' denied the Mennonites' separate ethnic identity. He argued that the Mennonites had only confessional interests to protect, principally the right to alternative military service. Their national interests were identical with other Germans and should be handled in cooperation with them. Janz, on the other hand, had argued that the Mennonites had specific economic and political customs worthy of protection. 'i' pointed out that Janz's ethnic separatism had created "much bad blood" among the Germans, without whose support the Mennonites could not possibly elect a Duma representative. Indeed, Lutherans had attacked Janz's proposal as selfish Mennonite separatism.⁸⁶ 'i' maintained that Mennonites had to adjust to the new order: "I think it is about time that we get used to the idea that in the future we will have to live in a constitutional state alongside citizens with equal rights, and that in such a state it will hardly be possible to preserve our privileged position."⁸⁷ He ended his piece by reversing Janz's positive patriarchal imagery, arguing that the Mennonites were behaving like a "bawling child, that always wants something special."⁸⁸

Despite these strong comments, 'i' did not reject the goal of Mennonite Duma representation. He insisted only that a Mennonite representative must be elected through an alliance with German voters and a major political party, whose interests he would represent in the Duma. Then, if on one or two important occasions he defended Mennonite interests, one would not view it as special pleading. 'i' also proposed a new form of Mennonite representation in St. Petersburg. The community should sponsor a private person to defend Mennonite interests in St. Petersburg. Such a person would not draw attention to himself, but work behind the scenes with all parties to insure that Mennonite interests be served. In modern terms, he would be a lobbyist. 'i' thought such a lobbyist would

complement, not replace, a Mennonite Duma deputy.

The proposals of Janz and 'i' represented the two major options put forward, one relying on traditional Mennonite values, the other declaring them anachronistic.⁸⁹ Not surprisingly, Janz's proposal had considerable support. He later revealed that his proposal had been formulated by "a large group of Mennonite estate-owners" and that Elders Goerz and Dyck had brought up the proposal during their St. Petersburg visit.⁹⁰ The rival proposals were considered at a Church Council meeting on 10 December 1906, where it was decided not to petition the government for a special representative. The reasoning behind this decision was not made public, but both David Epp and Abraham Kroecker (*Die Friedensstimme's* editor) emphasized the need for German solidarity, so this argument may have been decisive.⁹¹ The meeting did endorse the proposal of 'i' for a Mennonite lobbyist (*Vertrauensmann*) in Petersburg.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Mennonite Duma debate was its exclusive focus on the question of a special Mennonite representative. Two seemingly important questions were largely neglected: what electoral strategy should the Mennonites employ and which party should they support. Some of the participants did make passing comments on their political preferences, but this issue never became central.⁹² This seems to have been due to a narrow focus on specific Mennonite issues to the exclusion of larger national concerns. Questions of electoral strategy involved a certain embarrassment. The Mennonite Duma debate was addressed to, and carried out by, the Mennonite community as a whole. Despite the origin of Janz's proposal among Mennonite estate-owners, he called for the Mennonite deputy to be chosen "from the midst of the people" and not to be "a lord."⁹³ However, the Mennonites' electoral power lay exclusively with the lords.

The Duma electoral system divided voters into four principle categories: land and property owner, peasant, urban resident, and worker. In the first stage of voting in each *guberniia*, all four categories chose "electors" separately. In the second stage, these electors gathered to choose the *guberniia's* Duma representatives. Peasants were not considered landowners because they possessed their land communally. This was very important, since the majority of Mennonites lived on communal land. Although individuals had the hereditary use of their land and the right to sell it, in all

Mennonite *volosti* (districts) (Halbstadt, Gnadenfeld, Khortitsa etc.) the land was legally held by the commune.⁹⁴ As a result, these Mennonites had no influence. Their votes were drowned in a sea of hostile Russian peasant votes. Instead, all Mennonite electoral strength lay with a small number of estate and factory owners.

As a result, the formulation of electoral strategy fell to this group. Since electoral strategy primarily involved forming an alliance with one of the main political parties, strategy also involved ideology. Although most of this work was kept out of the public eye, a major split did emerge and can be traced. There appear to have been two primary groups involved, both located in Ekaterinoslav *guberniia*, a group of smaller private landowners centered around the Memrik colony in Bakhmut *uezd* and a group of large estate and factory owners concentrated in Ekaterinoslav and Aleksandrovsk *uezdy* (counties). It is not clear from the published sources what relation the Janz landowner group had to either of these groups.⁹⁵

The first group published a manifesto in *Der Botschafter* on the eve of the second Duma elections.⁹⁶ This group called itself a union of German landowners in Ekaterinoslav *guberniia*. However, they met in a Mennonite village, Silberfeld, and only one non-Mennonite (a Lutheran) attended. The group's program stated that "the national and cultural interests of the Germans" in Ekaterinoslav demanded their own Duma representative. Since the Duma electoral law had left powerless "the true bearers and representatives of our national and cultural interests," who lived in the *volosti*, the landowners must vote on their behalf. The achievement of a German representative was made the exclusive goal; they regretted the recent confessional separatism that had hindered that goal. To achieve this end, the group was open to an alliance with any constitutional party of the center, which it defined as extending from the center-left Kadets to the center-right Octobrists.

This group put forward a very general political platform which nevertheless was fairly liberal in orientation:

The German electoral group will vote in the elections as "German-speaking Russian state citizens" who, in recognition of the constitutional monarchical principle, honestly and uprightly strive for the constitutional development of our political life [and] for justice and legality, who stand for a thoroughgoing satisfaction of the social and cultural needs

of the different strata of the population of our Fatherland, and who also call for the right of all non-Russian nationalities, according to their own needs, to arrange their own affairs in language, school, church, and administration.

The group declared its candidate for Duma representative to be H. Kornelius Unrau, an engineer with higher education, who had "remained a good German" during his student years outside the Mennonite community. Unrau was a member of the Memrik settlement, a Mennonite *volost* in Bakhmut *uezd*, and therefore should not have been eligible for election. However, the landowners announced that the Memrik settlement had won the right to vote in the landowners *curia* because it was located on land purchased from a Russian noble, not granted by the government (as Khortitsa and Molochnaia were). The group sought to balance its unilateral choice of a Mennonite with the call for a similar Tavridia group, where the Mennonites would support a Lutheran candidate.

The information contained in this manifesto - the candidacy of Unrau, the role of the Memrik settlement, and the relatively liberal program, especially their deference to the *volost* Mennonites - all identify this union of German landowners with the Bakhmut *uezd* Germans. These Mennonite and Lutheran Germans had been the only Germans in Ekaterinoslav to aggressively participate in the first Duma elections, as they did again in the second Duma elections.⁹⁷ These Germans were representative of the distinct social composition of Bakhmut *uezd*, which was populated by small, recently arrived landowners and had a dearth of large estate owners. These landowners, therefore, still thought of themselves as *volost* members.

The second group of Mennonite landowners did not publicize their activities but can be identified by their actions. This group included large estate and factory owners in Ekaterinoslav and Aleksandrovska *uezdy*. Many had participated in the *zemstva* and other local government activities. All were familiar with the local Russian elite from business contacts and sometimes social ones as well. They united with similar Lutheran and Catholic Germans on 21 January 1907 to form an Ekaterinoslav German Octobrist group.⁹⁸ Two founders of this group are representative of their social profile. Johann Esau studied at the prestigious Ekaterinoslav gymnasium, received an engineering degree in Riga, opened a steel producing

factory in Ekaterinoslav, and then from 1905 to 1909 served as the city's mayor.⁹⁹ Johann J. Thiessen owned the largest steam mill in Ekaterinoslav and was a member of the Ekaterinoslav *zemstvo* and the city Duma.¹⁰⁰ In other words, these individuals were members of the Ekaterinoslav business and political elite.

It is not surprising that these individuals would support the Octobrist party. The local noble elite who aligned with the Octobrists and Ekaterinoslav *guberniia* became the Octobrists' most important stronghold. M. V. Rodzianko was a founding member of the Octobrist party and later became president of both the Octobrist party and the Duma itself. Rodzianko had been president of the Ekaterinoslav *zemstvo* and had served as the Ekaterinoslav Marshall of the Nobility.¹⁰¹ M. M. Alekseenko was a professor at Kharkov University, a large estate owner in Ekaterinoslav *uezd*, and became chairman of the influential budget committee in the third and fourth Dumas.¹⁰² P. V. Kamenskii was Marshall of the Nobility in Mariupol *uezd*, an active participant in the 1905 *zemstvo* liberation movement, and later became vice-president of the Octobrist Duma faction.¹⁰³ All three served on the nineteen member Central Committee of the Octobrist Duma faction in the third Duma.¹⁰⁴ The Ekaterinoslav Octobrist elite, then, represented an unusually powerful potential ally, or enemy, for the Mennonites active in Ekaterinoslav politics and business.

This outline represents, then, an approximate sketch of the Mennonite political landscape prior to the second Duma elections in February 1907. In contrast to the previous elections, the Ekaterinoslav Germans participated very actively in the second Duma elections. They succeeded in capturing sixteen of the available 135 electors (11.9%), more than triple their representation in the population. Ten of the sixteen electors were Mennonites, the others probably all Lutheran. The electoral breakdown was as follows:¹⁰⁵

<u>CURIA</u>	<u>TOTAL ELECTORS</u>	<u>MENNONITE</u>	<u>OTHER GERMAN</u>
Ekaterinoslav Landowners	3	1	0
Aleksandrovsk Landowners	9	3	2
Bakhmut Landowners	3	2	1
Pavlograd Landowners	9	0	3
Novomoskovsk Landowners	7	1	0
Ekaterinoslav Urban	11	3	0

German electoral strength lay almost entirely in the countryside. The exceptional urban success in Ekaterinoslav *uezd* was due to two factors: i) the city of Ekaterinoslav elected one Duma representative in a separate election and so was not included in this vote; and ii) this made the sizeable industrial capital in the Khortitsa colony a decisive factor in the property-based elections. With sixteen electors, the Germans were in an excellent position, if they stayed united, to elect a Duma representative at the final vote in Ekaterinoslav.

However, the German vote split, not along confessional lines as many had feared, but along ideological lines. At the electoral meeting on 6 February 1907, the "extremely well-organized" Kadet delegation formed an alliance with a group of non-party peasants, which nevertheless fell short of a majority. As a result, they offered to elect one German representative if the Germans would guarantee ten votes for their candidates.¹⁰⁶ The Germans, however, could muster only seven votes for the proposal. Jakob Martens, a Mennonite elector from Bakhmut who was one of the seven, said the following two objections were raised: first, one of the Kadet candidates was Jewish; and second, they objected to the Kadets' land program. The Kadets explained that their land program would not be binding on the Germans but to no avail. Martens accurately noted that neither of these objections was decisive. Rather, the majority did not want "to insult our Russian Octobrists."¹⁰⁷ As a result, lamented Martens, "instead of a German, a revolutionary was elected."¹⁰⁸ In fact, the Social Democrats demanded of the Kadets two representatives for their support and received them.

Dietrich Epp, whose brother Heinrich was an elector from the Ekaterinoslav urban *curia*, denounced this behavior even more vehemently: "The German voters did not vote as Germans, but only as representatives of the possessing class for whom the land question was decisive."¹⁰⁹ He insisted that their Octobrist allies included not only true constitutionalist Octobrists, but also Russian chauvinists with the slogan "Russia for the Russians." The electors should have thought of other interests than their property, namely, "church, school, language."¹¹⁰ From these two letters, it seems clear that the German voters did split along the lines sketched above. The three Bakhmut electors appear to have been joined by the three Ekaterinoslav urban electors and an unidentified seventh to form the minority, while the Octobrist group held nine votes for a narrow

majority.

Several newspaper articles shed further light on the behavior of the German electors. In the Aleksandrovsk landowners *curia*, the Germans had a clear majority and so could have brought through exclusively German electors, as the Bakhmut Germans had done. Nevertheless, they supported the election of four Russians, reserving only five seats for themselves. Moreover, the Russians were not Octobrists but sympathetic to the extreme right-wing Union of the Russian People.¹¹¹ According to W. Heine, a German Lutheran who participated in the Aleksandrovsk elections and opposed this behavior, the Mennonite electors made this deal for two reasons: first, they feared reprisals from the authorities; and second, they wanted to secure right-wing support to elect a Mennonite representative at the final elections in Ekaterinoslav.¹¹²

An article in a local Ekaterinoslav paper confirmed the use of intimidation. This article reported that the local police, acting on instructions from the Aleksandrovsk Marshall of the Nobility, had arranged that no liberals be informed of the pre-election meeting (a meeting held the day before elections to allow everyone to form alliances). This meeting was to be held at the Mennonite Neufeld's factory in Sofievka. Anyone violating this order would be jailed for three months.¹¹³ Intimidation, then, was a real concern in the Aleksandrovsk elections.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, the fact that the pre-election meeting was held at a Mennonite factory makes one uncertain whether the Mennonites were the intimidated or intimidators. At the very least, it reveals how the Octobrist Germans were within the local political elite and willing to play its anti-democratic games.

I have deferred a discussion of the Mennonites' relationship with Russia's principal political parties because the Mennonites themselves initially de-emphasized this question. The issue only became central when a small group of landowners refused to support a Kadet alliance at the second Duma elections. Their decision did in fact lead to a Mennonite-Octobrist alliance. This alliance has proven controversial. Dietrich Epp viewed it as a class-based betrayal of the Mennonite community by its estate and factory owners.¹¹⁵ P.M. Friesen viewed it as a reflection of the extreme conservatism of the Mennonite community as a whole.¹¹⁶ The Mennonite historian David G. Rempel, whose brother John was active in the Ekaterinoslav Kadet party, combined the two arguments. The Octobrist alliance

was forged by the elite and accepted by the even more conservative Mennonite community. Only the small Mennonite intelligentsia, primarily teachers and professionals, opposed it.¹¹⁷ Rempel, moreover, condemned this alliance: "The Mennonites' participation in conservative politics was a complete failure and proved its bankruptcy during World War I [when conservatives backed laws liquidating German property]."¹¹⁸

I will argue instead that Mennonite support of the Octobrists was due to the Mennonite community's attraction to the cautiously progressive reform program and traditionalist outlook of the Octobrist party. The extent of the Mennonites' political conservatism has been exaggerated.¹¹⁹ Prior to the first and second Duma elections, Mennonite newspapers published letters, articles, and editorials supporting all the centrist parties - the Kadets, the Party of Peaceful Renewal, the Octobrists, and Friesen's Union of Freedom, Truth, and Peace. Abraham Kroeker's *Friedensstimme*, which was sympathetic to the Peaceful Renewalists in the second Duma elections, was slightly to the political left of Epp's *Botschafter*, which supported the Octobrists.¹²⁰ Both papers were unwavering in their support of a constitutional order.¹²¹ To the extent that they expressed them, the Mennonites' political outlooks fell into the constitutionalist center of Russian politics in the Duma era.

However, there is no doubt that the Mennonites supported the center-right Octobrists over the center-left Kadets. This was only partially connected to their official programs, which in 1906 were quite close. The Kadets and Octobrists had emerged out of the 1904-05 *zemstvo* liberation movement.¹²² The Kadets represented the left-wing of that movement and had their base of support in the urban intelligentsia. The Octobrists represented the movement's right-wing; their support lay with liberal estate and factory owners. Two formal issues divided the parties. The Kadets advocated forced confiscation of some estate owners' land with compensation to satisfy peasant land needs. Also, the Kadets supported greater autonomy for national minorities.

The Kadets' land program was a major obstacle for the Mennonites. As noted above, Friesen's rather timid support of the Kadet land program alienated potential Mennonite support in the first Duma elections. More importantly, the Ekaterinoslav German electors split over this issue at the second Duma elections. Not only Mennonite estate owners, but *volost* Mennonites as well, had seen

their land come under attack during the 1905-06 agrarian unrest which raged particularly strongly in Ekaterinoslav.¹²³ While partial defenses of the Kadet position were published in the Mennonite newspapers, this was the one issue that most decisively alienated the Mennonites from the Kadets.

More important than questions of ideology, however, was the Mennonites' strong affinity for the service ethic of the Octobrists and its various manifestations. The Octobrists' world outlook and political style were as important as their policy statements.¹²⁴ An important example of this appeal was the Octobrists' repeated invocations of their loyalty to the tsar and their Russian patriotism. These themes appealed strongly to the Mennonites, who shared the Octobrists' ideal of service to the tsar. One of the chief reasons P. M. Friesen broke with the Kadets was his belief, certainly correct, that the Kadets' monarchism was "pale."

The Octobrists were also suspicious of modern political parties. They called themselves a "union" (*soiuz*), not a party, and presented themselves as an umbrella organization for all well-meaning patriots who supported the principles embedded in the October Manifesto. This suspicion aligned with the Mennonites' own worries about where they would fit in a republican order. P. M. Friesen also presented his organization as a "union" rather than a party. The Octobrist union offered German groups, which formed in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Ekaterinoslav, alignment with the Octobrists while maintaining a certain degree of independence.¹²⁵ The Kadets, on the other hand, prided themselves on being a modern, West European party with excellent organization and strict discipline.

This shared world outlook also helps explain why the Mennonites found the Octobrists' position on the nationalities issue, which might have seemed a stumbling block, attractive. The Octobrists stressed the unity and indivisibility of the Russian empire, opposing regional autonomy for national minorities, but supporting their legal equality and the use of national languages in primary education. This approach suited the Mennonites and Germans since, as a perceptive *Botschafter* contributor put it, due to their "systematic dispersion" across the empire, the Germans have "as large an interest in free civil local administration as in the preservation of a strong state authority which can protect them."¹²⁶ The Mennonites had always looked to the tsar and the Russian state to protect them from

hostile neighbors. Regional autonomy held no attraction for them.

David Rempel reported that the Kadets had approached the Mennonites with the argument that their program granted to non-Mennonites those rights and privileges Mennonites traditionally enjoyed and therefore deserved their support. The Mennonites, however, selfishly refused to support it.¹²⁷ In fact, while the Kadet platform did support traditional Mennonite rights, the Octobrist platform is striking for its emphasis on exactly those rights. The Octobrists supported local self-government, in particular at the *volost* level, universal public education, solution of the land problem through rational cultivation of the land, the need to raise "the cultural level" of the masses, freedom of religion, and a unified, but multinational empire.¹²⁸ This is exactly the world the Mennonites lived in prior to 1905 and which was quite foreign to the Russian peasantry. It is hardly surprising the Mennonites would support such a program. The Kadet program contained these ideas as well, but emphasized other more radical proposals which put the Mennonites on guard. At the time, only a few perceptive Mennonites realized that Kadet support for these principles was much firmer than that of the Octobrists.

The Third Duma and the New Mennonite-State Relationship

The Mennonites finally achieved their stated goal of a Mennonite Duma representative in the third Duma elections of October 1907. On 3 June 1907, Peter Stolypin dissolved the second Duma for being too obstructionist and simultaneously published a new electoral law designed to produce a more conservative Duma.¹²⁹ This electoral law dramatically increased the voting strength of large estate and factory owners (31 to 50.4% of electors) at the expense of workers, urban residents, and especially peasants (43-22%).¹³⁰ The law also contained a clause stating that all peasants who maintained a formal tie to the commune could not vote as landowners unless they owned land in a different *uezd*. Since almost all German colonists maintained such a tie, this clause had an enormous impact on them.¹³¹

These changes strengthened the Mennonite electoral position due to the Mennonites' enormous landholdings in Ekaterinoslav *guberniia*. In Ekaterinoslav, estate and factory owners were assigned 62 of 108 electors (57.4%) as opposed to 31 of 135 (23.0%) in the previous two elections. The new electoral law

apparently weakened the position of Lutheran and Catholic Germans in Kherson and Bessarabia, who relied heavily on the votes of their *volosti* and small landholders. The latter had maintained their formal ties with their *volosti* and were therefore denied the right to vote in the landowner *curia*. In both cases, the new law reduced electoral enthusiasm since it concentrated influence in the hands of the estate and factory owners.¹³² There does not appear to have been any substantial debate concerning these elections among the Mennonites.¹³³

The Ekaterinoslav Germans managed to bring through ten German electors in the first round of voting. This was actually a somewhat worse performance than in the previous election (10/108 vs. 16/135), a reflection of reduced Mennonite enthusiasm. In this election, all German electors came from the landowner *curiae*: three from the Ekaterinoslav *uezd*, five from Aleksandrovsk, and two from Bakhmut.¹³⁴ Eight of the electors were Mennonite and two Lutheran. In the Ekaterinoslav *uezd*, the Germans allied with the Octobrists. In Aleksandrovsk, they repeated their controversial alliance with the right. In Bakhmut, the Germans were segregated into a separate landowner *curia* and given only two electors. Despite the Germans' electoral superiority, the Russian landowner *curia* was given five electors. This division was clearly punishment for the Bakhmut Germans' refusal to elect the Russian Marshall of the Nobility the previous year.¹³⁵ The Germans made an electoral alliance with the Octobrists in advance of the final *guberniia* voting in which the Octobrists promised to support one German candidate.¹³⁶ The Germans chose Hermann Bergmann, who was duly elected.¹³⁷

Bergmann modestly reported that he had not wanted to be elected and had attended only to support his fellow Germans.¹³⁸ Nevertheless, Bergmann was an obvious choice. He was by far the most experienced Mennonite politician. He had been elected to the Ekaterinoslav *zemstvo* in 1890 and became part of its three member governing board in 1892. In that role, he served as director of the Peasants' Small-Credit Bank. He was a member of the governing board until his Duma election in 1907, after which he remained an honorary member. He was elected to the Ekaterinoslav *zemstvo* in 1906 and remained a member until the revolution.¹³⁹ Bergmann entered politics in the 1890s under the patronage of the Ekaterinoslav governor Shlippe, who defended the Ekaterinoslav Germans from proposals to limit their landholdings.¹⁴⁰ Shlippe confirmed

Bergmann's *zemstvo* election and in 1892 appointed him to supervise famine relief efforts.¹⁴¹ In 1909, Bergmann was given the governmental rank of a *guberniia* secretary, which made him a non-hereditary member of the Russian nobility.¹⁴²

Bergmann fit one of the typical sociological profiles of an Octobrist Duma representative quite well. He was a large landowner, an active *zemstvo* participant, and a philanthropist. He and his brother Abram inherited his father's enormous 4436 *dessiatin* estate, Bergmannsthal, in 1885.¹⁴³ They both expanded their landholdings so that by 1898, Abram owned 3543 *dessiatin* and Hermann 4090.5 *dessiatin*. This made them two of the largest landowners in Ekaterinoslav *guberniia*.¹⁴⁴ Attention was drawn to Bergmann in 1889 when, in the midst of a scurrilous anti-German campaign, the official organ of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ekaterinoslav published a laudatory article about Bergmann.¹⁴⁵ The article praised Bergmann's philanthropic activities among the peasantry of the neighboring village, Solenoe. He had helped to build a local church in exchange for a promise from the village commune to close its pub for six years.¹⁴⁶ He also helped them purchase land and provided wheat to them in famine years.¹⁴⁷ In addition to this local activity, Bergmann served as director of the Ekaterinoslav orphanage and helped oversee a high school in the village Sursko-Litovsk.¹⁴⁸

Bergmann was an atypical Octobrist in being neither Russian nor Orthodox.¹⁴⁹ His ties to the Mennonite community were strong, but he remained something of an outsider. Bergmann's family emigrated from Prussia to Russia in 1862 when Bergmann was twelve years old, and they never lived in a Mennonite colony.¹⁵⁰ Thus Bergmann, unlike most Mennonites, did not belong to the colonist estate, but was instead an honorary citizen.¹⁵¹ He received his schooling at home, not in a Mennonite village. His political career, as sketched above, was a purely Russian one. Yet Bergmann maintained strong ties with the Mennonite community. Like many wealthy Mennonite estate owners, he helped fund the excellent Mennonite school system. Bergmann served as a director of the Nikolaipol high school.¹⁵² Moreover, throughout his political career, Bergmann was seen as a representative of Mennonite interests. In the Duma, Bergmann was considered by the Mennonites as "our delegate" (*unser Abgeordneter*), a title which he always accepted, although electorally he owed his seat only to the German estate

owners and their Octobrist allies.

Ideologically, Bergmann was an almost complete sphinx. Other than the fact that he belonged to the Octobrist party, Bergmann left few traces of his opinions. In a ten year career in the Duma, he never once made an address. This led the local Kadets to joke that Bergmann's only speech came when the roof of the Duma chamber collapsed and Bergmann cried out, "*Bozhe moi!*" (O, my God!).¹⁵³ However, such silence was not abnormal in Russia's nascent parliament. In the 1908-09 Duma session, for instance, half the delegates never addressed parliament.¹⁵⁴ After his election in 1907, Bergmann expressed an opinion on only one issue in an interview with a Ekaterinoslav reporter. He stated that he was "an opponent of forced expropriation of land or any property whatsoever" and that he spoke for the German community on this issue.¹⁵⁵

Bergmann's position on this issue may have been influenced by his personal experience of the 1905-06 agrarian unrest. Bergmann became personally involved in this unrest as the village Solenoe, located adjacent to Bergmannsthal, became "the revolutionary headquarters of the peasant movement" in Ekaterinoslav *guberniia*.¹⁵⁶ The founding congress of the Ekaterinoslav Peasants' Union, a branch of the nationwide union formed to articulate peasant demands, assembled in Solenoe on 29 November and left elected delegates there.¹⁵⁷ On 23 December, twenty Cossacks arrived to arrest the delegates but were beaten back by the villagers. In response to this invasion, the villagers sent a message to the Bergmanns that if the Cossacks attacked again, Bergmannsthal "would be completely destroyed."¹⁵⁸ They asked Bergmann to guarantee their delegates' safety. Meanwhile the Ekaterinoslav governor sent word that if Bergmann's estate were attacked, the entire village of Solenoe would be strafed with artillery and burnt to the ground.

On 2 January, 180 Cossacks arrived with two cannons and were quartered at Bergmannsthal.¹⁵⁹ On 3 January, they demanded that Solenoe surrender. When it refused, the village was bombarded resulting in an official casualty total of one dead and ten wounded. The village then surrendered. The Cossacks proceeded to drive the villagers into the village church with whips for a loyalty oath. Fifty were exiled to the far north.¹⁶⁰ Bergmann's estate was not burnt down although several months later the peasants did revenge themselves by setting fire to several haystacks on his estate.¹⁶¹ Bergmann himself

moved to the city of Ekaterinoslav permanently in 1905. Thus, despite his previous positive relationship with the Solenoe peasantry, Bergmann was subject to the same threat of peasant violence as his fellow estate owners, Russian and Mennonite. Like the Mennonite community as a whole, he was also not loathe to sanction brutal force to protect his property.¹⁶²

Bergmann became a crucial part of the new Mennonite strategy for dealing with the Russian state that developed during the third Duma period (1907-12). According to numerous accounts, Bergmann used his Octobrist connections and his membership on the Committee on non-Orthodox Religious Affairs to serve Mennonite interests.¹⁶³ On all important matters, the Mennonites would appeal to Bergmann for information and help. Whenever he returned home to Ekaterinoslav, he invariably consulted with leading Mennonite figures, especially on issues of religion and education. Bergmann sent regular, if somewhat uninformative, accounts of Duma affairs to the Mennonite newspaper *Der Botschafter*.¹⁶⁴ One of Bergmann's most important functions was to keep the Mennonite leadership informed of recent developments in the arcane world of Duma commissions.¹⁶⁵ According to one non-Mennonite report, "Bergmann never speaks in the Duma plenary sessions, but participates actively in Commission work ... He helped work out the religious reform bills in the third Duma."¹⁶⁶ The same report listed as one of Bergmann's chief assets his personal friendship with the influential Octobrist P. V. Kamenskii.¹⁶⁷ Indeed, for the Mennonites Kamenskii became a more valuable asset than Bergmann.

Like Bergmann, Kamenskii was a large estate owner, active *zemstvo* member, and philanthropist. Kamenskii owned two large estates in Bakhmut and Mariupol *uezdy*, which had been granted to his family by Catherine II for military service. Kamenskii had a law degree from Kharkov University but devoted himself to public service. At age twenty-six, he became Mariupol's Marshall of the Nobility. He was also an active member of the *zemstva* of both the Mariupol *uezd* and Ekaterinoslav *guberniia*.¹⁶⁸ Kamenskii was an important participant in the 1904-05 *zemstvo* liberation movement.¹⁶⁹ Later, he joined the Octobrist party, where he quickly became a member of its Central Committee.¹⁷⁰

Kamenskii was an active philanthropist. Like Bergmann, he was involved in the 1891 famine relief. He helped found an Ekaterinoslav *zemstvo* organization for servicing the poor and

participated in a 1909 Paris congress on philanthropy, which led him to write a book on the history of Christian charity.¹⁷¹ Kamenskii wrote about a dozen books and numerous articles. He was best known to the Mennonites for his 1895 work, *A Question or a Misunderstanding?*, in which he defended the German colonists from right-wing attacks and attempts by his fellow nobles to limit German landholding.¹⁷² Kamenskii had a lively affection for the Mennonites and would frequently escort guests at his Bakhmut estate to the nearby Mennonite Memrik colony. In 1910, for example, he visited the Octobrist leader A. I. Guchkov.¹⁷³ Kamenskii appears to have befriended Bergmann during the research of his book on the German question. During their Duma service, they shared a flat in St. Petersburg.¹⁷⁴

In the third Duma, Kamenskii chaired the Committee on non-Orthodox Religious Affairs and was entrusted by the Octobrists to shepherd through the Duma three important bills extending religious tolerance.¹⁷⁵ In this role, he received numerous Mennonite delegations and petitions and offered guidance on possible dangers.¹⁷⁶ He was also a member of the Education Committee, the other most important issue for Mennonites, and regularly consulted with Mennonite leaders on this issue. As a leading Octobrist personally sympathetic to Mennonite concerns, Kamenskii provided the Mennonites with an influential and committed ally.

Kamenskii and Bergmann, then, formed the Petersburg element of the Mennonite lobbying system. If we think back to the proposal of 'i' in the Mennonite Duma debate, we can see that Kamenskii and Bergmann functioned similarly to his proposal for a Mennonite deputy, who would primarily be concerned with general governmental issues but willing to aggressively defend Mennonite interests when necessary, and a permanent lobbyist, who would work behind the scenes exclusively on Mennonite concerns. Ironically, it was the Russian nobleman, Kamenskii, who played the role of Mennonite Duma delegate, and the Mennonite Duma delegate, Bergmann, who played the role of Mennonite lobbyist. Nevertheless, the tandem proved quite effective in practice.

Thus, a new system of Mennonite representation had come into being in St. Petersburg. However, the old system of isolated Church councils and yearly general conferences remained in place at home. In dealing with issues raised at the Duma level, this system had considerable defects. Issues arose rapidly in the Duma and

required rapid response. The Church councils could gather rapidly but represented only their given community and confession. They could not present a unified front. Moreover, there was an increasing demand for greater secular leadership. Also, Duma issues tended to be quite arcane and so difficult to follow with only occasional meetings. Some permanent body which could follow issues carefully and keep in permanent contact with St. Petersburg would be needed. Finally, there was no court of last appeal. The annual conferences still excluded the approximately one quarter of the Mennonite community represented by the Mennonite Brethren. These defects were already acknowledged at the time of Bergmann's election and began to be addressed rapidly.¹⁷⁷

The catalyst for these developments was proposed religious legislation in which the Mennonites were labeled as a sect. Such a designation implied considerable disadvantages under current legislation and so was an ominous development.¹⁷⁸ For instance, it would hardly be possible for the Mennonites to keep their military exemption as a sect. The bill itself had not targeted the Mennonites; rather, it was designed to limit the persecution of sects. Thus, it was another case where legal rationalization hurt the privileged Mennonites. Since the Mennonites lacked a hierarchy and a government-confirmed Church leader, they fit the definition of a sect and were so identified. This development was telegraphed by Bergmann to Elders Dyck and Goerz in January 1908.¹⁷⁹

Dyck and Goerz, in keeping with traditional Mennonite practice, undertook a delegation to St. Petersburg to consult with Bergmann on this issue.¹⁸⁰ They then arranged a novel meeting - a joint congress of Mennonite Church Councils, both Brethren and General Conference, at Alexanderwohl on 8 February 1908.¹⁸¹ The joint congress produced a resolution on the Mennonites' attitude towards the new law proposal, which was subsequently approved by all congregations and forwarded to Bergmann.¹⁸² Bergmann then consulted with the Ministry of Interior's Department of Religious Affairs, who had originally authored the bill.¹⁸³ This newly improvised procedure addressed some of the flaws in the existing Mennonite organization. The united council of General Conference and Mennonite Brethren was able to respond quite rapidly to a sudden emergency and provide a unified Mennonite position.

One further body arose out of the 8 February united Church Council. The council authorized Goerz and Dyck to continue their

work in response to the new sect legislation. A second joint congress at Schönsee on 28 January 1910 elected a third member, Heinrich J. Braun, to join them and replaced the ailing Elder Dyck with *Der Botschafter* editor, David Epp.¹⁸⁴ Braun was a Mennonite Brethren minister, giving the three member group representation from both major Mennonite churches. Goerz, Braun, and Epp were then elected to form a permanent Commission on Doctrine (*Kommission für Glaubensangelegenheiten*) at the 1910 Mennonite General Conference in Schönsee.¹⁸⁵

This was also a landmark General Conference as it was the first to be attended by Mennonite Brethren delegates, who made up one-third of the total delegates.¹⁸⁶ This conference approved a long petition on religious affairs, drawn up by Goerz, Braun and Epp, for presentation to the authorities.¹⁸⁷ Thus, the year 1910 witnessed the crystallization of both a small, permanent body to monitor government legislation affecting the Mennonite community and a larger body which could authoritatively represent the entire Mennonite community. P. M. Friesen rightly emphasized the historic nature of this development for Russian Mennonite affairs.¹⁸⁸ The bitter Mennonite ecclesiastical split of the 1860s had made unified Mennonite action almost impossible. As late as 1896, the Khortitsa Church Council petitioned the Ministry of the Interior to designate the Mennonite Brethren a Baptist confession and cease to consider them Mennonites.¹⁸⁹ This would have cost the Mennonite Brethren their right to alternative military exemption and possibly exposed them to the fierce anti-Baptist measures then being pushed by Pobedonosov. Given such high levels of acrimony, the ability to produce a joint statement on matters of Mennonite church organization only fourteen years later is striking.

The Commission on Doctrine continued to take on a more permanent character in the following years. In 1911, David Epp was voted chairman and granted a 500 ruble annual salary. In addition, a lay member, Kornelius Unrau, was added, and Abraham Klassen replaced the deceased Abraham Goerz.¹⁹⁰ This addressed, but did not satisfy, growing demands to secularize the commission.¹⁹¹ In 1912, the commission was renamed the Commission on Church Affairs (*Kommission für Kirchliche-angelegenheiten-KfK*). It was also agreed that the commission be allowed to serve an additional four years and that it be given the authority to co-opt expert non-members for various tasks.¹⁹² The commission had in fact already engaged in

this practice. For example, to write an extensive memorandum on the Mennonite position on military service, three Mennonite lawyers and several others had been recruited.¹⁹³ This further allowed the commission to utilize the growing professional skills of the Mennonite lay community.

To summarize these developments, let us look at how the new Mennonite organization for state affairs functioned between the 1911 and 1912 Mennonite General Conferences (August 1911 - October 1912), based on David Epp's report at the latter conference on the KfK's activities.¹⁹⁴ According to this report, the KfK gathered five times in the course of the year to discuss the following issues: the legislation naming the Mennonites a sect, new legislative proposals on military service, and new government regulations for Mennonite church registers.¹⁹⁵ Two delegations were sent to Bergmann and Kamenskii, and conversations were twice held with the two deputies during their vacations in Ekaterinoslav. Moreover, on several occasions Epp exchanged emergency telegrams with Kamenskii.¹⁹⁶ The KfK kept in regular contact, then, with the Mennonites' Petersburg tandem.

The KfK had to respond to one perceived emergency during this year. In late December 1911, Epp read in the papers that a new bill on alternative military service for sects was being proposed. He immediately consulted with Kamenskii, who assured him not to worry. On 1 February 1912, however, "there was a mighty scare," as Epp read in the papers a quote from a Ministry of Interior official that the law on sectarian military service would be substantively reworked. Epp immediately telegraphed Bergmann and Kamenskii, who again reassured him. However, on 8 and 9 March, the two deputies telegraphed that things had indeed taken a bad turn as Kamenskii's bill on this issue had been unexpectedly rejected.¹⁹⁷

The KfK immediately convened and decided to wait for Kamenskii and Bergmann's imminent arrival in Ekaterinoslav on Easter vacation. After consultation with them, the KfK again met (3 April) and decided to call a united Church Council for 9 April. At this meeting, it was decided to produce a memorandum for the government and Duma Committee on non-Orthodox Religious Affairs outlining the Mennonite position on military service. The KfK formed a committee including itself and two elders, one minister (P. M. Friesen), three lawyers, and two other lay members. This group met once and produced a 42-page document, which was duly

accepted by the 1912 General Conference and published that year.¹⁹⁸ Meanwhile, the third Duma ended its five-year sitting and the emergency ended.

This episode, however, gives a good illustration of how the new Mennonite system came to operate. The KfK monitored Duma and government policy carefully, keeping in constant contact with Bergmann and Kamenskii. When an emergency arose the two deputies were consulted personally, a KfK meeting was called, and then a general Church Council meeting was called which could authorize the KfK to take action and could assign it qualified help. Finally, all important matters were confirmed by the annual General Conference. One should also note the role of the Mennonite press. Epp was editor of *Der Botschafter* and Braun published *Die Friedensstimme* and owned the Halbstadt-based Raduga press. The KfK used the newspapers to communicate with the dispersed Mennonite community between general conferences and used the Raduga press to print petitions and memoranda speedily.

The Eclipse of the New Mennonite System

While the Mennonites were developing a unified and effective local organization for dealing with the Russian state organization, their Petersburg system began to collapse. The problems began within the Octobrist party, with which the Mennonites had allied themselves. The Octobrist party was never a unified body. Its leadership and its program were always more liberal than its membership. Many politically passive nobles, disoriented by the 1905 revolution, deferred to the wealthier, more educated, more politically active, and more liberal nobles. However, under the pressure of specific Duma debates, the more conservative and chauvinistic majority began to push the Octobrist party to the right.¹⁹⁹

Several perceptive Mennonites had seen this danger. Dietrich Epp had warned after the second Duma elections that most of the Mennonites' Ekaterinoslav allies were not true Octobrists but rightists with the slogan 'Russia for the Russians'. He correctly noted that the influential Rodzianko was one of these.²⁰⁰ A. A. Neufeld, a veteran of the 1888-94 anti-German campaign in Ekaterinoslav, also warned the Mennonites about this danger.²⁰¹ In fact, the Ekaterinoslav *zemstvo*, from whose membership the

Ekaterinoslav Octobrists were formed, had voted in 1891 to petition the government to severely limit German land purchases.²⁰²

These conservative and chauvinist instincts emerged among the Octobrists during the third Duma. The first Octobrist crisis occurred in early 1909. The Octobrists decided to support a Social Democrat interpolation demanding that the government explain its violation of trade union rights. However, the committee on interpolations, led by the Ekaterinoslav Octobrist Gololobov, rejected the interpolation. The Octobrists voted to censure Gololobov for his action. The end result of this episode was that Gololobov left the party and formed a small group of right Octobrists.²⁰³ Another warning episode occurred in 1909 when a significant portion of the Octobrist faction refused to support a bill granting tolerance to the Old Believers. Persistent rumors linked Rodzianko to that faction.²⁰⁴

A second crisis emerged over Stolypin's Finland bill, which was designed to severely curtail Finland's century-old autonomy. The Octobrists backed this proposal but faced fierce opposition from a minority of left Octobrists. In particular Baron Meyendorf, the most influential German in the Duma, threatened to leave the party. A group of Octobrists was ready to join him but were dissuaded. Instead nineteen Octobrists had a statement of protest read into the Duma records. These represented most of the major left Octobrists, Kamenskii, Glebov, Golitsyn, and Khomiakov. Hermann Bergmann also signed this document, placing him squarely in the left Octobrist camp.²⁰⁵ The Octobrists' increasingly conservative position on the rights of national and religious minorities began to draw negative comment in the Mennonite press as well.²⁰⁶

The third major Octobrist crisis occurred in March 1911 when Stolypin dissolved the Duma and State Council for several days in order to pass his Western *Zemstvo* bill under emergency regulations. This bill was also a nationalist project, which introduced *zemstva* into six Western provinces using a gerrymandered electoral system to grant the Russian nobility predominance over the Poles in newly created western *zemstva*.²⁰⁷ In response to Stolypin's arbitrary act, the Octobrist leader A.I. Guchkov resigned as president of both the Duma and the Octobrist Duma faction.

This led to a bitter fight within the Octobrist party over who should succeed him as Duma president. The left Octobrists

supported the Ekaterinoslav deputy M. M. Alekseenko, who could count on the support of the Kadets, and the right Octobrists favored Alekseenko's fellow Ekaterinoslav deputy, M. V. Rodzianko, who had the support of the Duma's Nationalists. Rodzianko prevailed.²⁰⁸ However, when the right Octobrists attempted to elect Rodzianko as Octobrist faction leader as well, the left minority threatened to leave. A meeting of left Octobrists was held to organize a new party. Kamenskii and Bergmann were again in attendance.²⁰⁹ Under this threat, the right produced a compromise whereby Rodzianko would be president, but the left Octobrist Kamenskii would be made vice-president.²¹⁰

These events weakened the position of Kamenskii and Bergmann, who were now part of a beleaguered minority within the Octobrist party. It also increased Mennonite suspicion of the Octobrists. The event which decisively alienated the Mennonites from the Octobrists, however, was the appearance of a bill designed to forbid German colonists from purchasing, renting, or inheriting land in the three western provinces of Kiev, Podolia, and Volynia. This bill was introduced by the Ministry of Interior into the Duma Commission on Local Affairs in 1910 and was accepted for debate with Octobrist support. This infuriated influential German Octobrists who threatened to leave the party with their votes and money if the bill was not withdrawn.²¹¹ As a result, the Octobrist Duma faction voted on 10 May 1911 to reject the bill, and the government withdrew it eight days later for reworking.²¹²

The Octobrists' initial support for this bill greatly accelerated a growing Mennonite estrangement from the Octobrists.²¹³ The 1888-94 anti-German campaign in Ekaterinoslav had been preceded by a similar campaign in the same three western provinces, which had resulted in remarkably similar legislation to that proposed now.²¹⁴ This unexpected attack from the right, and the initial support given it by the Octobrists, caused the Mennonites to rethink their electoral politics: "Thus the government, which attacked the forced expropriation of the Kadets so firmly, has cold-bloodedly reached for the same means."²¹⁵ Such oppositionist rhetoric was no longer exceptional in the Mennonite press. Rather, in the lively expression of opinion that preceded the fourth Duma elections, Mennonites expressed a strong disillusionment with their former allies and a new openness to the center-left and even to the idea of opposition to the government.

The Mennonite discussion surrounding the fourth Duma elections differed radically from that surrounding the second Duma elections. Debate now centered around which party and which individual candidates to support, not over whether to elect a Mennonite representative. David Epp published an important editorial which looked back at Mennonite electoral strategy and declared it a failure.²¹⁶ Epp pointed out that five years ago the Mennonites focused on two issues, land expropriation and freedom of religion. The Kadets were a threat on the first issue and the right on the second. Therefore, the Mennonites had supported the Octobrists.²¹⁷ However, "the Germans have grown richer from their experience."²¹⁸ It turned out that very few Octobrists sincerely supported religious toleration, while the left's support was unwavering. Moreover, a serious threat arose to all German property on the right, not the left. Epp, a firm supporter of the Octobrists in the previous two elections, asked what the party had done for the Mennonites and concluded "nothing, absolutely nothing."²¹⁹ As a result, Epp recommended the Mennonites support only Kadets, Progressives, and left Octobrists, men such as Meyendorf and Kamenskii.

The sentiment in Kroeker's *Friedensstimme* was even more critical. Kroeker sponsored a debate in his paper by noting German interest in the new Progressive party, which had placed itself ideologically between the Kadets and Octobrists, and invited commentary on which party the Mennonites should support.²²⁰ Several articles followed, all in support of the Kadets and Progressives and in opposition to the Octobrists. One author argued that the Octobrists were responsible for an upsurge in chauvinism and that "only due to Octobrist support was the German colonist bill possible;" he accused them of having turned the "people's legislative assembly" into a "tool" of the government. This author recommended exclusive support for the Kadets.²²¹ Another author stated the growing Mennonite consensus that their three crucial issues were "language, religion, and education," and that the left was superior on all three. He recommended voting for only Kadets, Progressives, and left Octobrists, such as Kamenskii.²²²

Kroeker himself supported these views. Like Epp, he acknowledged the Mennonites' past electoral strategy had failed: "At the present we must unfortunately conclude that the majority of the Octobrists have not justified our trust." Kroeker likewise

stressed the issues of school, religion, and education. He also emphasized choosing the best men available from among the Kadets, Progressives, and left Octobrists.²²³ Kroeker later even went so far as to call himself "a constitutional liberal."²²⁴ Were it not for Kamenskii, it seems the Mennonites might have rejected the Octobrist party in its entirety. Mennonite anger at the Octobrists was not unique. It was echoed by Germans in Aleksandrovsk, Odessa, St. Petersburg, and Moscow.²²⁵

Another important aspect of the fourth Duma election debate was the absence of any emphasis on the need to elect Mennonites or Germans. An *Odessaer Zeitung* editorial explained this shift: "Experience has shown us that a non-German can do us much more good, if he is an upright man, than a German."²²⁶ In the Mennonite articles, one is struck by how few references there were to the need to re-elect Bergmann.²²⁷ Instead, there was an overwhelming emphasis on choosing good men. Their Octobrist experience had made Mennonites and Germans suspicious of political parties. Kroeker recalled how before the split in the Octobrist party he had seen the Ekaterinoslav Octobrists Kamenskii and Gololobov speak and instinctively knew the former was an ally and the latter a foe.²²⁸ This suspicion explained the Mennonite reluctance to endorse a single party. Instead there was a compromise between individual and party politics - a call to elect the best men from among the Kadets, Progressives, and left Octobrists.

However, the actual voting would be done by estate and factory owners. These Mennonites were closely connected to the Ekaterinoslav Octobrist elite. More than a third (10/26) of the electoral committee appointed by the Ekaterinoslav Octobrist party to supervise their campaign outside the city of Ekaterinoslav were Germans.²²⁹ Half of these members were Mennonite. Bergmann was still an Octobrist party member and therefore expected to support their ticket. It seemed likely, then, that Mennonite wishes would not be observed at the fourth Duma elections. After all, the Octobrist party had made a nation-wide electoral alliance with the rightist Nationalist party that the Ekaterinoslav branch, under party president Rodzianko, was expected to observe.

This alliance, however, was exceptionally shaky in Ekaterinoslav *guberniia*. The Nationalists were confident of their growing strength. Their clergy had been mobilized to support the right by Archbishop Agapit, who called the Octobrists, "those who

sold Christ.”²³⁰ The Nationalists demanded that the Octobrists reject Alekseenko and especially Kamenskii, whose unwavering advocacy of religious toleration had provoked Agapit’s comments. The Octobrists refused to sacrifice Alekseenko but did concede Kamenskii.²³¹ It is not clear what part the Octobrist Germans played in the rejection of their principle Duma ally. A confidential circular of the Ekaterinoslav secret police stated that Kamenskii and Bergmann would both lose their seats; the Nationalists and Octobrists were haggling over who should replace them.²³² If accurate, this report implied one of two possibilities: i) the Nationalist-Octobrist alliance felt it could do without German support; or ii) they were hoping to recruit German support from those willing to sacrifice Bergmann.

The German electoral performance in 1912 was identical to their third Duma performance in 1907. Their electoral strength was again concentrated in three landowner *curiae*. The Germans captured three of seven electors from Ekaterinoslav *uezd*, five of eleven from Aleksandrovsk *uezd*, and two of seven from Bakhmut *uezd*.²³³ As in 1907, eight of the ten electors were Mennonites. In Ekaterinoslav, the Germans had thirty-five votes, the clergy twenty-five, and Russian landowners eighteen. The Germans (almost all Mennonites) allied with the Russian nobles to bring through three Germans and three Russians, one of the latter being M. M. Alekseenko. Despite their protests, the clergy were given only one seat. Thirty-five of forty-five eligible German voters showed up for the election, an extremely high rate of participation by Duma standards and evidence of how serious the Germans were taking these elections.²³⁴

In Bakhmut, the Germans were again placed in a separate landowners *curia* and given only two of the seven available electors. This was part of the government-backed campaign to deny Kamenskii a Duma seat. The clergy had mobilized in Mariupol, where Kamenskii had an estate and from where he had been elected in 1907; they had the strength to defeat Kamenskii there. As a result, Kamenskii shifted his candidacy to Bakhmut, where his second estate was located.²³⁵ The decision was then made to separate the Russian and German voters in order to deny Kamenskii his German support. This so outraged the Bakhmut Germans that serious proposals were made to boycott the elections. This led *Der Botschafter* to warn that such action might lead to “serious,

unpleasant consequences for our Germans in general and the Mennonites in particular.”²³⁶ There was no boycott, but the very threat of such an action indicates how alienated the Mennonites had become that they even considered what the government would interpret as clearly oppositional behavior. The Germans brought through their designated two electors.²³⁷ To considerable Mennonite remorse, Kamenskii was narrowly defeated in Bakhmut.²³⁸

In Aleksandrovsk, the German-Nationalist alliance, which had already created controversy in the second and third Duma elections, remained in place. The Germans again had a majority (76 or 77/144) at the Aleksandrovsk meeting and yet brought through six Russian Nationalists. Among these were V. S. Mirgorodskii, who had published an extremely conservative scurrilous newspaper *Russkii natsionalist* during the Duma campaign, and S. T. Reseshmakov, president of the Nationalist party's Aleksandrovsk branch. In other words, they supported the alliance which defeated Kamenskii and intended to unseat Bergmann. Once again it was the Mennonites, in particular the estate owner Wilhelm Janzen, who supported this alliance against the protests of the Lutheran Germans.²³⁹ These results were denounced roundly by the entire German community.²⁴⁰ Assuming such voting was the result of intimidation, the editor of the *Odessaer Zeitung* wrote that “such political lack of character is out and out criminal.”²⁴¹ Janzen did not respond to these attacks until after the final voting in Ekaterinoslav.²⁴²

The final Ekaterinoslav *guberniia* voting resulted in an unexpected triumph for the new Mennonite political position. Several days before the election, *Der Botschafter* saw “an unconsoling picture,” a likely Octobrist-Nationalist triumph.²⁴³ However, *Der Botschafter* was poorly informed. The Octobrist-Nationalist alliance had collapsed and a new center-left alliance formed in which the Germans played an instrumental part. This alliance resulted in the election of one Social Democrat (the future Bolshevik leader Grigorii Petrovskii),²⁴⁴ one Kadet, one Progressive, one left-center peasant, four Octobrists (including Bergmann and Alekseenko), and one Nationalist. The single Nationalist was considered to be a moderate and a decent man. Moreover, the Aleksandrovsk Germans acquitted themselves well. When the Octobrist-Nationalist alliance collapsed, the Nationalists desperately offered the Germans four of the nine available seats if the Germans

would support five Nationalists. The Germans refused.²⁴⁵

The result, then, closely matched the new Mennonite consensus. Six of nine candidates fell into the acceptable Kadet-left Octobrist spectrum. Moreover, the voting illustrated the new Mennonite consensus that electing Germans was not the most important outcome, as the Germans turned down three seats to support the center-left. Nevertheless, there still were major tensions in the German delegation. Two days before the election, the Kadet newspaper *Riech'* reported that the center-left Ekaterinoslav alliance had not yet solidified because the Germans were insisting on Unrau as their candidate.²⁴⁶ Thus, it would appear that the Bakhmut Germans were still supporting their candidate in the second Duma elections, Kornelius Unrau, against the Octobrist Germans' candidate, Bergmann. Moreover, the Aleksandrovsk Germans' argument that their support for Nationalists had only been clever tactics in order to avoid a confrontation until the final voting, drew only grudging acceptance.²⁴⁷

The Mennonites participated in an even more unexpected success in Tavridia. Although the Mennonites had a large presence in Tavridia, it was concentrated more in several large *volosti* (the enormous Molochnaia settlement) and so had less electoral influence.²⁴⁸ In the first and second Duma elections, no Germans were elected to the Duma. In the third Duma, two Germans were elected, a German colonist, Gallwas, and the enormous estate owner, Falz-Fein.²⁴⁹ Both aligned themselves with the right Octobrists. In general, however, Tavridia politics was much more polarized than in Ekaterinoslav. With almost no Russian nobility, the Octobrists were much weaker than elsewhere. In the fourth Duma elections, a Kadet-Progressive alliance faced off against a Nationalist-extreme Right alliance. The government undertook a series of electoral manipulations, principally the division of voters by nationality and the creation of separate Russian Orthodox *curiae*, to throw the election to the right.²⁵⁰

Since the Germans had voted conservative in Tavridia, two special German peasant *curiae* were created, one for Berdiansk *uezd* and one for Melitopol *uezd*.²⁵¹ This meant granting one elector to the Molochnaia Mennonite settlement and a second elector to the neighboring Lutheran settlements of Prischib and Euginfeld. This measure was grossly undemocratic. It granted two of the eighteen peasant electors in Tavridia (11.1%) to less than one percent of the

peasant population. It was also a tactical blunder. The Molochnaia Mennonites elected their former Oberschulz, Gerhard Duerksen, and gave him specific instructions to vote progressive. The Lutherans likewise elected the liberal-minded Prischib bookseller, Schaad.²⁵²

This turned out to be the beginning of the collapse of the government's electoral strategy. With the government's assistance, the Germans brought through an impressive fourteen electors, which gave them 18.9% of the seventy-eight Tavridia electors. Six of the fourteen were Mennonite.²⁵³ At the final electoral meeting, the Germans had the balance of power in their hands. It was assumed by the right and left that the Germans would support the Nationalist-extreme Right coalition. However, on election eve the Germans convened a meeting in Simferopol.²⁵⁴ According to one participant, the Melitopol industrialist and landowner Wilhelm Klassen, whom he called "more right wing than the blackest Markov,"²⁵⁵ supported the extreme right and "with irresponsible frivolity attempted to do the same, which was done in Aleksandrovsk."²⁵⁶ According to another report, he was supported by two other Mennonites, but this position was rejected by the majority, who voted to support the Kadet-Progressive alliance.²⁵⁷

As a result, the Tavridia assembly elected three Kadets, one Progressive, one Social Democrat, and a center-left peasant.²⁵⁸ Two of these were Germans, a veteran *zemstvo* activist from Yalta, Vinberg, and the Mennonite estate owner Peter Schroeder. This result shocked and delighted the normally well-informed *Krymskii viestnik*: "Such a turn of events would have been difficult to predict. All efforts were undertaken [by the government] to weaken the progressives, so that the right would win a complete victory. However, neither a massive reinterpretation of the legal code, nor the division of electors into separate *curiae* could help [the right]."²⁵⁹

The Mennonites were also overjoyed at the result. The Mennonite elector Johann Huebert telegraphed the results to *Die Friedensstimme*, and Kroeker exulted, "We have cause, considering the present mood [in the country], to greet this electoral result with relief. Not only because a German (Mennonite) was elected, but because the whole result, so to say, represents a conscious protest against the current direction [of the country]."²⁶⁰ This statement again illustrates the extent to which the Mennonites had adopted a sympathetic attitude towards opposition politics. Such an electoral result - all six candidates were members of parties in declared

opposition to the government - would surely have horrified Kroecker five years ago. The new Mennonite deputy, Peter Schroeder, declared he too would align himself with the oppositionist Progressive party.

Schroeder was much less well known than Bergmann. He had not been active in *zemstvo* politics. Schroeder owned a large estate near Simferopol and was active in its management. Like Bergmann, he did not belong to the colonist estate but was officially a merchant (*kupets*), presumably due to his father's activities. Also, like Bergmann and many Mennonite estate owners, Schroeder was on the board of directors of a Mennonite high school in Crimea.²⁶¹

The *Krymskii viestnik* published the following testimonial the day after Schroeder's election:²⁶²

Peter Schroeder is a new man, almost completely unknown to the public. Many are inclined to see in his election a simple concession of one Duma seat to the Germans ... as a matter of fact, nothing of the sort. Being very close to the father of the newly elected deputy, the late P. A. Schroeder, a man of remarkable nobility of soul, goodness, and a pure gentleman, I know his son, P. P. Schroeder, as well - a man with a very modest personality, who does not desire outward distinctions and does not pursue them. A committed rural resident but not completely absorbed in business affairs ... a person with an independent, in part, philosophical mode of thinking; in any case, a progressive in his convictions ... P. P. Schroeder made no effort to become a deputy. All this happened on its own, without any effort on his part.

Schroeder gave the Mennonites two Duma representatives. Oddly, as the Mennonites de-emphasized the importance of electing their own candidates, they simultaneously doubled their own representation. With eight times the representation warranted by their population, the Mennonites were surely the most over-represented ethnic group in the fourth Duma.

Conclusion

The Duma years, then, witnessed a fundamental transformation of Mennonite political behavior. After halfheartedly flirting with an alliance with Russian evangelicals, the Mennonite leadership intensified its traditional political strategy of negotiating directly with the central government to ensure the Mennonites' special position within the Russian empire. This strategy involved mobilizing all of the community's resources to elect a Mennonite representative and seeking a strategic alliance with the one party, the Octobrists, whose world view most closely echoed the Mennonites' own service outlook. This strategy initially looked successful, as the threat of a new parliamentary system led the Mennonites to unify internally and innovate creatively within the context of their traditional political behavior.

The Mennonites felt threatened by the "leveling spirit" of modernity, in particular in its socialist form. However, they underestimated a second threat of modernity, one particularly dangerous for mobilized diasporas, viz., nationalism. Stolypin's decision to ally with the Duma's nationalists exposed the weaknesses of the Mennonite strategy. The Mennonites were suddenly threatened nationally as Germans, religiously as a non-Orthodox "sect," and economically as an overly prosperous non-Russian ethno-religious group. Worse yet, most Octobrists passionately supported this new government policy. This new development forced the Mennonite leadership to shift its emphasis from an ethnic to an ideological approach.

This led them into an alliance with oppositional political parties - the Kadets, Progressives, and left Octobrists - a move unprecedented in Mennonite political history. The Mennonites had been extremely bitter and disillusioned by the Great Reforms, but they had responded with the traditional strategies of the mobilized diaspora. Now the Russian Mennonites were not threatening to leave Russia and find a new "tsar" but were cautiously embracing republican values. Mennonite estrangement from the tsarist government offers striking support to Leopold Haimson's argument about a growing cleavage between state and society in the Duma period since the privileged Mennonites had been among the most loyal subjects of the tsar up to and during the 1905 revolution.²⁶³

Thus far my analysis has emphasized religious, ethnic, and

socio-economic factors but left out the fourth factor mentioned in my introduction, regional variation. The 1912 Duma elections illustrated this regional variation dramatically, as Ekaterinoslav and Tavridia bucked the national trend, which had produced a slightly more conservative parliament and so reinforced the government's increasingly reactionary policies.²⁶⁴ Ekaterinoslav was a stronghold of left Octobrist politics due to the alliance of relatively liberal estate-owners, industrialists, and Mennonites. Tavridia lacked a local nobility, and its relatively wealthy Russian and Ukrainian peasantry (the *Tavrichane*), foreign colonists, evangelicals, and urban residents combined to produce an even more liberal outcome. The prosperous agricultural and expanding industrial region of New Russia, with its marked ethnic diversity, provided a stronger support for Russia's embattled political center than most other regions.

Events during the fourth Duma quickly confirmed the new Mennonite political course. The Octobrist party split yet again on ideological lines. In early 1913, A. I. Guchkov, the former Octobrist leader and Stolypin's chief ally in the Third of June System, publicly advocated moving the Octobrists into opposition. His disillusionment strikingly echoed that of the Mennonites:²⁶⁵

Looking back on the path we have trodden, we must admit that the attempt made by Russian society in the form of our party to achieve a rapprochement with the government, that attempt at a peaceful, painless transition from the old order to the new, has failed ... Russian society would have acted inexcusably if it had refused support to a government which to all appearances had embarked on reform with conviction and determination ... But it would be a totally inexcusable mistake to continue the experiment in the present changed circumstances ... The agreement has been broken and torn up.

Guchkov's speech split the Octobrist party. The majority of the Octobrists refused to follow Guchkov's advice. Therefore, twenty-two left Octobrists departed to form their own faction.²⁶⁶

Somewhat surprisingly, Bergmann did not choose to join them. Apparently his earlier affiliation with the left Octobrists was a result of the now absent Kamenskii's influence. Given the Mennonites' expressed opinions and voting behavior in the fourth Duma campaign, Bergmann's choice cannot be seen as reflecting

Mennonite desires. In any case, with Octobrist influence crippled by this split and his influential ally Kamenskii gone, Bergmann's political influence was curtailed. Nevertheless, he continued his traditional function in St. Petersburg, both informing the Mennonites of coming legislative dangers and lobbying government agencies on their behalf.²⁶⁷

The fourth Duma intensified its attack on national and religious toleration. In 1913, legislation restricting German landholdings was resubmitted to the fourth Duma. German Octobrists again convinced the Octobrist leadership to reject the bill, but it was only withdrawn by the government, not abandoned.²⁶⁸ With the outbreak of World War I, a much more radical decree was passed by the government that would have led to the liquidation of almost all Mennonite landholdings in New Russia.²⁶⁹ Likewise, the fourth Duma witnessed further legislation threatening to designate the Mennonites as a sect. This legislation provoked a serious debate on the eve of World War I as to whether the Mennonites should adopt the hierarchical structure demanded by the government for all confessions.²⁷⁰ Once again the legislation was not passed due to the outbreak of World War I. However, during World War I the government began to refer to the Mennonites in both public and internal documents as a sect.²⁷¹ Thus, World War I did not introduce new threats toward the Mennonite community, but rather rapidly accelerated already existing threats. Likewise, Mennonite estrangement from the Russian government was not an entirely new phenomenon of the war, but again a rapid acceleration of an already existing state of mind.

The Mennonites' war experience also justified their new progressive political alignment adopted in 1912. P. V. Kamenskii continued to represent the Mennonites in his new position in the State Council.²⁷² Progressive and Kadet deputies were most active in the state Duma in denouncing the government's anti-German measures.²⁷³ Moreover, the Tavridia *zemstvo* sent a delegation to St. Petersburg to protest the anti-German measures. The head of that delegation, S. S. Krym, had been elected to the fourth Duma with German and Mennonite votes.²⁷⁴ Meanwhile, Ekaterinoslav conservatives took revenge on the Germans for deserting them. The Ekaterinoslav *zemstvo* petitioned the government to extend and deepen the anti-German legislation which had been adopted in 1915.²⁷⁵

The Duma era, then, had enormous consequences for Russian Mennonite society. Internally, it witnessed the production of new institutions to deal with an increasingly unstable Russian state. Most significantly, a significant rapprochement occurred between the hostile General Conference Mennonites and the Mennonite Brethren. As the Mennonites began to unify internally, they grew increasingly estranged from the Russian state which they had traditionally seen as their protector. The Mennonites' quite avid participation in Duma politics led to a dramatic re-evaluation of their political ideology. By 1912, the Mennonites were abandoning their traditional behavior as a mobilized diaspora and supporting candidates associated with the centrist political opposition while not infrequently mouthing oppositionist sentiments themselves. In doing so, the Mennonites were moving closer to the broad elements of Russian society who were likewise disillusioned by the failure of Duma politics.

NOTES

¹ The central work for this debate is Leopold Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917," (2 Parts) in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 1964), pp. 619-42 and Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 1965), pp. 1-22.

² The two Mennonite newspapers were *Die Friedensstimme* (1905-14), published in the Mennonite colony of Halbstadt, Tavricheskaia guberniia, which served the Mennonite Brethren community; and *Der Botschafter* (1905-14), published first in Ekaterinoslav and then Berdiansk, which served the Mennonite "kirchliche" community.

³ John A. Armstrong, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas," in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (June 1976), pp. 393-408.

⁴ John A. Armstrong, "Mobilized Diaspora in Tsarist Russia: The Case of the Baltic Germans," in Jeremy R. Azrael (ed.), *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 63-104.

- ⁵ George H. Williams, *The Radical Reformation* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962).
- ⁶ The best account of the emergence of the Russian Mennonites is James Urry, *None but Saints: The Transformation of Mennonite Life in Russia, 1789-1889* (Winnipeg: Hyperion Press, 1989).
- ⁷ The best statement of this view is in David Epp, *Die Chortitzer Mennoniten: Versuch einer Darstellung des Entwicklungsganges derselben* (Odessa: A. Schultze, 1889).
- ⁸ On these reforms, see W. Bruce Lincoln, *The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia* (De Kalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois Press, 1990); Terence Emmons, *The Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); T. Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich (eds.), *The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Daniel Field, *The End of Serfdom: Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855-1861* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
- ⁹ On these reforms, see Alexander Avgustovich Klaus, *Nashi kolonii: opyty i materialy po istorii i statistike inostrannoï kolonizatsii v Rossii* (St. Petersburg: V. V. Nusvalta, 1869); Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen im Zarenreich: zwei Jahrhunderte deutsch-russische Kulturgemeinschaft* (Stuttgart: Deutsch Verlags-Anstalt, 1986); and Urry, *None but Saints*, pp. 174-93.
- ¹⁰ Urry, *None but Saints*, pp. 194-218.
- ¹¹ Abraham Goerz, *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Forsteidienstes der Mennoniten in Russland* (Gross Tokmak: H. Lenzmann, 1907).
- ¹² Heinrich Ediger (ed.), *Beschlüsse der von den geistlichen und andern Vertreten der Mennonitengemeinden Russlands abgehaltenen Konferenzen für die Jahre 1879 bis 1913* (Berdjansk: H. Ediger, 1914).
- ¹³ On these events and the new Mennonite consensus, see Peter M. Friesen, *The Mennonite Brotherhood in Russia, 1789-1910*, trans. by J. B. Toews, et al. (Fresno, Calif.: Board of Christian Literature, General Conference of Mennonite Brethern Churches, 1980; reprint of 1st ed. Halbstadt: Raduga, 1911).

¹⁴ Terry Martin, "The German Question in Russia, 1848-1896," in *Russian History*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter 1991), pp. 417-420.

¹⁵ D. H. Epp, "The Emergence of German Industry in the South Russian Colonies," ed. and trans. by John B. Toews in *Mennonite Quarterly Review* (Goshen, Ind.), Vol. 55, No. 4 (October 1981), pp. 289-371.

¹⁶ On this development, see Harvey Dyck, "Russian Mennonitism and the Challenge of Russian Nationalism" (includes A. A. Paltov, "The German Conquest of Southern Russia," ed. and trans. from Russian by Dyck), in *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (October 1982), pp. 307-41; Urry, *None but Saints*, pp. 242-277; and Martin, "The German Question."

¹⁷ There has been very little study of the Mennonites' relationship with the state Duma. See, however, David G. Rempel, "Zum 200 jährigen Jubiläum der Mennoniten Einwanderung in Russland, 1789-1889," in *Der Bote* (Winnipeg, Manitoba), Nos. 22-23 (1991); and Lawrence Klippenstein, "Mennonite Pacifism and State Service in Russia: A Case Study in Church-State Relations, 1789-1936," (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Minnesota, 1984), pp. 135-47.

¹⁸ On the Mennonite Brethren movement, see P. M. Friesen, *The Mennonite Brotherhood*; Urry, *None But Saints*; and John A. Toews, *A History of the Mennonite Brethren Church: Pilgrims and Pioneers* (Fresno, Calif.: Board of Christian Literature, General Conference of Mennonite Brethren Churches, 1975).

¹⁹ On these activities, see Heinrich Loewen, *In Vergessenheit geratene Beziehungen* (Bielefeld: Logos Verlag, 1989); and Lawrence Klippenstein, "Johannes Wieler (1839-1889) among Russian Evangelicals," in *Journal of Mennonite Studies* (University of Winnipeg), Vol. 5 (1987), pp. 44-60.

²⁰ F. C. Thiessen, *P. M. Friesen: Persönliche Erinnerungen* (Winnipeg: Board of Christian Literature, General Conference of the Mennonite Brethren, 1974); and Abraham Friesen (ed.), *P. M. Friesen and His History: Understanding Mennonite Brethren Beginnings* (Fresno, Calif.: Center for Mennonite Brethren Studies, 1979).

²¹ P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, pp. 649-50.

- ²² H. Unruh, "Erinnerungswort auf Grab P. M. Friesen," in *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 87 (1914), p. 2.
- ²³ Both the Mennonite Brethren and German Baptist Churches were granted legal recognition by the state. Only the Russian Baptists were persecuted as a sect.
- ²⁴ *Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA)* f. 821, op. 5, d. 940, "Mennonity, ustroistvo, upravlenie 1820-1904," l. 202-209.
- ²⁵ Terence Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 134-42; and Don C. Rawson, "Rightist Politics in the Revolution of 1905: The Case of Tula Province," in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 99-116.
- ²⁶ *Krymskii viestnik*, No. 263 (8 November 1905), p. 3; *Der Botschafter*, No. 13 (7 December 1905), p. 2; "Sektantstvo v g. Sevastopole," in *Tavrisheskiiia eparkhial'nyia vedomosti*, No. 30 (1906), pp. 1185-1190; and Aleksandr Ilich Klibanov, *History of Religious Sectarianism in Russia* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 317-20. Hereafter referred to as "The Union of Freedom."
- ²⁷ Dikii, "K predstoiashchim vyboram," in *Krymskii viestnik*, No. 38 (17 February 1906). Frizen is the Russian spelling of Friesen.
- ²⁸ *Krymskii viestnik*, No. 263 (8 November 1905).
- ²⁹ On the formation of the Kadet party and its early ideology, see Emmons, *Formation of Political Parties*.
- ³⁰ *Der Botschafter*, No. 16 (1906), p. 3.
- ³¹ The seventh signer was G. N. Zemliak.
- ³² "Sostoianiiia raskola i sektantstva i dieiatel'nost' pravoslavnoi missii v Tavrisheskoi eparkhii v 1903 g.," in *Tavrisheskiiia eparkhial'nyia vedomosti*, No. 4 (1904), p. 272.
- ³³ "Svideniia o sostoianii raskola i sektantstva i o dieiatel'nosti pravoslavnoi missii v tavrisheskoi eparkhii v 1897 g.," in *Tavrisheskiiia eparkhial'nyia vedomosti*, No. 1 (1 January 1898), p. 30; and "Sostoianiiia raskola," p. 272.

³⁴ "Iz vlechenie iz raportov Tavricheskago eparkhial'nago missionera sviashchennika Vl. Stanislavskago, fev. 12-17," in *Tavricheskiia eparkhial'nyia vedomosti*, No. 20 (1900), p. 1441.

³⁵ "Sektantstvo v g. Sevastopole," in *Tavricheskiia eparkhial'nyia vedomosti*, No. 30 (1906), pp. 1187-88.

³⁶ *Der Botschafter*, No. 19 (2 February 1906), p. 3.

³⁷ Another version of this story is related in F. C. Thiessen, *P. M. Friesen*, pp. 15-18; and *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 29 (1912), p. 3.

³⁸ For a similar response in 1917, see John G. and David G. Rempel, "Of Things Remembered: Recollections of War, Revolution, and Civil War, 1914-1920," (manuscript, n.d.).

³⁹ *Der Botschafter*, No. 14 (28 November 1905), pp. 2-4. The Soviet historian Klibanov, citing an archival document, claims that this revised program preceded the 8 November program published in the *Krymskii viestnik*, and therefore the Friesen Party first moved rightward politically. However, the changes Klibanov noted correspond exactly to those reported in *Der Botschafter*, No. 14 (1905), dated 28 November. I therefore believe Klibanov to be mistaken; Klibanov, *History of Religious Sectarianism*, pp. 317-20.

⁴⁰ *Der Botschafter*, No. 14 (30 December 1905), pp. 2-4.

⁴¹ P. M. Frizen, "Ot tsentral'nago biuro 'Soiuza svobody, pravdy i miroliubiiia,': izvieshchenie chlenov i druzei," in *Krymskii viestnik*, No. 298 (29 December 1905), p. 3.

⁴² *Der Botschafter*, No. 14 (1905), p. 4; and *Krymskii viestnik*, No. 298 (1905), p. 3. On Prokhanov, see Wilhelm Kahle, *Evangelische Christen in Russland und der Sowjetunion: Ivan Stepanovich Prochanov (1869-1935) und der Weg der Evangeliumschristen und Baptisten* (Wuppertal: Oncken, 1978).

⁴³ Kahle, pp. 51-64; and A. M-y., *Zur Erinnerung an das 25-jährige Bestehen der ersten mennonitischen Druckerei in Russland* (Halbstadt: n.p., 1913).

⁴⁴ P. M. Frizen, "Pis'mo v redaktsiiu," in *Krymskii viestnik*, No. 44 (24 February 1906).

⁴⁵ Dikii, "K predstoiashchim vyboram," in *Krymskii viestnik* (11

February 1906).

⁴⁶ Apparently the party was accused of having a class bias, as Friesen published the occupations of the party's Central Committee to refute that notion in *Krymskii viestnik*, No. 44 (1906).

⁴⁷ Klibanov, *History of Religious Sectarianism*, pp. 317-20.

⁴⁸ Emmons, *Formation of Political Parties*, p. 238.

⁴⁹ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 33 (1906), p. 2; and No. 39 (1906), p. 2. The latter article from the Don region reported support for Friesen "among the Swabians as well as among the Low Germans [i.e. Mennonites]."

⁵⁰ However, the party was attacked by the leader of the Molokan group most sympathetic to the evangelicals, Zakharov, as reported in "Shtundizm, sovremmenoe ego sostoianie v otnoshenii veroucheniia, zhizni i organizatsii," in *Tavrisheskiiia eparkhial'nyiia vedomosti*, No. 27 (1908), pp. 1102-03.

⁵¹ On the *Tavrichane*, see Levko, "Pogonia za zemliu (pis'mo iz ekat. gub.)," in *Ekaterinoslavskiiia gubernskiiia vedomosti*, No. 87 (1889), pp. 2-3; and *Report for the Year 1908 on the Trade and Commerce of the Consular District of Odessa* (London, 1909), p. 70. The *Tavrichane* were not all from Tavridia. They were strongest in northern Tavridia and southern Ekaterinoslav (Melitopol, Berdiansk, Aleksandrovsk, Bakhmut uezdy).

⁵² *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 39 (1906), p. 3.

⁵³ *Der Botschafter*, No. 13 (7 December 1905), pp. 2-3; and No. 14 (30 December 1905). Unfortunately, the 1905 and early 1906 issues of *Die Friedensstimme*, the Mennonite Brethren organ, do not appear to have survived.

⁵⁴ *Der Botschafter*, No. 13 (7 December 1905), p. 2.

⁵⁵ The same argument was made by the pseudonymous J. Gotthelf in *Der Botschafter*, No. 21 (1906), p. 6.

⁵⁶ P. M. Friesen, "Zur Geschichte der politischen Plattform in # 13," in *Der Botschafter*, No. 19 (1906), p. 3; and *Der Botschafter*, No. 20 (1906), p. 2.

⁵⁷ P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, p. 628.

⁵⁸ On this unrest, see *Der Botschafter*, No. 15 (1906), p. 3; *Der Botschafter*, No. 16 (1906), p. 4; Leonard G. Friesen, "Mennonites in Russia and the Revolution of 1905: Experiences, Perceptions, and Responses," in *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 42-55; and Em. Kogon, "Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Ekaterinoslavskom uезде v 1905 g.," in *Letopis' revoliutsii* (Kharkov), No. 6 (1926), pp. 169-229.

⁵⁹ Roberta Manning, *The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 177-204.

⁶⁰ Emmons, *The Formation of Political Parties*, p. 323-24; *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 86 (1906), p. 2; and *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 93 (1906), p. 2.

⁶¹ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 264 (1906), p. 3.

⁶² *Der Botschafter*, No. 31 (1906), p. 10.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, No. 24 (1906), p. 4.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 26 (1906), p. 7.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 33 (1906), p. 10.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 32 (1906), p. 2.

⁶⁷ *Der Botschafter*, No. 34 (1906), p. 2; No. 35 (1906), p. 2; and *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 22 (1906), p. 234.

⁶⁸ Mikhail V. Rodzianko, *Krushenie imperii* (Moscow: Skify, 1992); *Der Botschafter*, No. 19 (1907), p. 1; and *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 26 (1911), p. 9.

⁶⁹ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 25 (1906), p. 262; and *Der Botschafter*, No. 37 (1906), p. 1.

⁷⁰ *Der Botschafter*, No. 39 (1906), p. 4; and *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 27 (1906), p. 285.

⁷¹ *Der Botschafter*, No. 73 (1906), p. 1; and *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 45 (1906), p. 501.

⁷² P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, p. 629.

⁷³ Abraham Goerz, *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Forsteidienstes der Mennoniten in Russland* (Gross Tokmak: H. Lenzman, 1907).

⁷⁴ The petitions are reproduced in *Der Botschafter*, No. 39 (1906), p. 4; and *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 27 (1906), p. 285.

⁷⁵ The principal articles appeared in *Der Botschafter*, No. 21 (1906), p. 5; No. 33 (1906), p. 10; No. 36 (1906), p. 2; No. 44 (1906), p. 4; No. 59 (1906), p. 1; No. 70 (1906), p. 1; No. 70 (1906), p. 2; No. 73 (1906), p. 1; No. 74 (1906), p. 1; No. 77 (1906), p. 1; No. 79 (1906), p. 1; No. 80 (1906), p. 2; and No. 2 (1907), p. 3. *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 31 (1906), p. 333; No. 43 (1906), p. 475; No. 44 (1906), p. 485; No. 45 (1906), p. 501; No. 46 (1906), p. 515; and No. 51 (1906), p. 573.

⁷⁶ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 43 (1906), p. 475.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 43 (1906), p. 475.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 44 (1906), p. 485.

⁷⁹ *Der Botschafter*, No. 21 (1906), p. 5.

⁸⁰ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 43 (1906), p. 475.

⁸¹ P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, pp. 652-53; on the development of a Russian Mennonite identity, see Harvey Dyck, "Russian Mennonitism"; Urry, *None but Saints*, pp. 265-77; and Terry Martin, "The Empire's New Frontiers: New Russia's Path from Frontier to *Okraina*, 1774-1920," in *Russian History*, Vol. 19, No. 1-4 (1992), pp. 181-201.

⁸² *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 45 (1906), p. 501; No. 46 (1906), p. 515 [also published in *Der Botschafter* 70 (1906), p. 1]; and *Der Botschafter*, No. 77 (1906), p. 1.

⁸³ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 45 (1906), p. 501.

⁸⁴ Abraham Kroeker raised this possibility, *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 51 (1906), p. 573.

⁸⁵ *Der Botschafter*, No. 77 (1906), p. 1.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 77 (1906), p. 1.

⁸⁷ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 45 (1906), p. 501.

⁸⁸ *Der Botschafter*, No. 70 (1906), p. 1.

⁸⁹ A compromise of the two positions was advocated by J. Gotthelf who favored petitioning for a special Mennonite representative but felt that representative should advocate generalizing the Mennonites' privileges to all Russian citizens, *Der Botschafter*, No. 73 (1906), p. 1.

⁹⁰ *Der Botschafter*, No. 80 (1906), p. 2; and *Der Botschafter*, No. 74 (1906), p. 1.

⁹¹ *Der Botschafter*, No. 77 (1906), p. 2; and *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 51 (1906), p. 573.

⁹² Most who mentioned a preference supported the Octobrists. However, Gotthelf supported the Kadets and Kroeker called for supporting either the Octobrists or the Party of Peaceful Renewal, *Der Botschafter*, No. 73 (1906), p. 1; and *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 45 (1906), p. 500.

⁹³ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 44 (1906), p. 485.

⁹⁴ Klaus, *Nashi kolonii*.

⁹⁵ Since Janz was from Halbstadt and so associated with the Molochnaia colony in Tavridia, it is quite possible his group was associated with neither of the Ekaterinoslav groups.

⁹⁶ *Der Botschafter*, No. 4 (1907), p. 1.

⁹⁷ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 39 (1906), p. 3; No. 58 (1906), p. 3; No. 264 (1906), p. 3; and No. 275 (1906), p. 2.

⁹⁸ *Der Botschafter*, No. 5 (1907), p. 1.

⁹⁹ George Epp, "Urban Mennonites in Russia," in John Friesen (ed.) *Mennonites in Russia, 1788-1988: Essays in Honour of Gerhard Lohrenz* (Winnipeg: CMBC Publications, 1989), pp. 239-260; and Epp, "Mennonite-Ukrainian Relations (1789-1945)," in *Journal of Mennonite Studies*, Vol. 7 (1989), pp. 131-44.

¹⁰⁰ For his election to the two posts, see *Der Botschafter*, No. 52 (1906), p. 2; and No. 74 (1913), p. 2.

¹⁰¹ Rodzianko, *Krushenie imperii*; and *Russkaia pravda* (Ekaterinoslav) (17 October 1912).

¹⁰² Ben-Cion Pinchuk, *The Octobrists in the Third Duma, 1907-1912* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 156; and *Russkaia pravda* (17 October 1912).

¹⁰³ *Russkaia pravda* (17 October 1912).

¹⁰⁴ Geoffrey A. Hosking, *The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 48.

¹⁰⁵ The electors were: i) Ekaterinoslav landowners - Hermann Bergmann; ii) Aleksandrovska landowners - Wilhelm Janzen, Johann Dyck, Jakob Niehbuhr, Ivan Miller, Jakob Schmidt; iii) Bakhmut landowners - Jakob P. Martens, Peter P. Lepp, David G. Vetter; iv) Pavlograd landowners - Johann Killmann, Johannes Dobs, Karl Meier; v) Novomoskovsk landowners - H. Wiens; and vi) Ekaterinoslav urban - Heinrich Epp, A. Unger, Kopp. *Der Botschafter*, No. 5 (1907), p. 1; No. 6 (1907), p. 1; No. 6 (1907), p. 3; No. 7 (1907), p. 2; No. 9 (1907), p. 3; *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 21 (1907), p. 2; No. 22 (1907), p. 3; No. 24 (1907), p. 2; and *Pridnieprovskii krai* (Ekaterinoslav) (29 January 1907).

¹⁰⁶ *Der Botschafter*, No. 9 (1907), p. 3.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 9 (1907), p. 3.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 9 (1907), p. 3.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 14 (1907), p. 1.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 14 (1907), p. 1.

¹¹¹ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 30 (1907), p. 2.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, No. 30 (1907), p. 2.

¹¹³ *Pridnieprovskii krai*, No. 3000 (24 January 1907).

¹¹⁴ As an example, the Bakhmut Germans were punished for their refusal to elect a Russian. In the third Duma elections, the German and Russian landowners were divided into separate *curia*. The dominant Germans were given two electors, the minority Russians

were given five. *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 224 (1907), p. 3.

¹¹⁵ *Der Botschafter*, No. 14 (1907), p. 1.

¹¹⁶ P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, p. 628.

¹¹⁷ Rempel, "Zum 200 jährigen," nos. 22-23.

¹¹⁸ David G. Rempel, "The Mennonite Commonwealth in Russia: A Sketch of its Founding and Endurance, 1789-1919 (Concluded)," in *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (January 1974), p. 53.

¹¹⁹ Leonard G. Friesen, "Mennonites in Russia and the Russian Revolution of 1905: Experiences, Perceptions and Responses," in *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 42-55.

¹²⁰ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 42 (1907), p. 464; No. 45 (1907), p. 500; and *Der Botschafter*, No. 28 (1907), p. 5.

¹²¹ See David Epp's comment on the October Manifesto, *Der Botschafter*, No. 7 (1905), p. 7; and Abram Kroeker's comments on the convocation and dissolution of the first Duma, *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 18 (1906), p. 185; No. 28 (1906), p. 300.

¹²² For the best account of the emergence of these two parties, see Emmons, *Formation of Political Parties*.

¹²³ *Der Botschafter*, No. 15 (1906), p. 3; No. 16 (1906), p. 4; L. Friesen, "Mennonites in Russia;" and Kogon, "Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie."

¹²⁴ Ernst Birth, *Die Oktobristen (1905-1913): Zielvorstellungen und Struktur* (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1974).

¹²⁵ On the formation of the German Octobrist group in St. Petersburg, see *St. Petersburger Zeitung*, No. 7 (1906), p. 3.

¹²⁶ *Der Botschafter*, No. 45 (1906), p. 3.

¹²⁷ Rempel, "Zum 200 jährigen," no. 22.

¹²⁸ Emmons, *Formation of Political Parties*, pp. 206-36.

¹²⁹ On this electoral law, see Alfred Levin, *The Third Duma: Election and Profile* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973); on the third

Duma, see Hosking; *Russian Constitutional Experiment*; Birth, *Die Oktobristen*; Pinchuk, *Oktobrists in the Third Duma*; and Aron IA. Avrekh, *Stolypin i Tret'ia Duma* (Moscow: "Nanka," 1968).

¹³⁰ Leopold H. Haimson, "The Russian Landed Nobility and the System of the Third of June" in Leopold Haimson (ed.) *The Politics of Rural Russia, 1905-1914* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 18.

¹³¹ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 143 (1907), p. 1.

¹³² Apathy was particularly strong among the Lutherans and Catholics, *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 143 (1907), p. 1; No. 154 (1907), p. 1; No. 156 (1907), p. 1; No. 161 (1907), p. 3; and No. 178 (1907), p. 1.

¹³³ None appeared in *Die Friedensstimme* or *Odessaer Zeitung*. *Der Botschafter*, which covered Duma politics closely, did not publish from May to October 1907 due to the illness of its editor, David Epp.

¹³⁴ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 224 (1907), p. 3; and *Russkaia pravda* (28 September 1907). It is possible, but unlikely, that there were additional German electors, as the poor electoral coverage in the German press did not produce full returns. The Germans were the following: Ekaterinoslav - Hermann Bergmann, Franz Peters, Kornelius Martens; Aleksandrovsk - Wilhelm Janzen, J. Schmidt, P. Tjart, G. Wiens, J. Niehbuhr; and Bakhmut - David Vetter, Peter Lepp.

¹³⁵ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 224 (1907), p. 3.

¹³⁶ See P. V. Kamenskii's comments to an Ekaterinoslav reporter on the eve of the election, *Pridnieprovskii krai* (14 October 1907), p. 5.

¹³⁷ *Der Botschafter*, No. 17 (1907), p. 2; *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 246 (1907), p. 1; *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 42 (1907), p. 550; and *Russkaia pravda* (28 September 1907).

¹³⁸ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 47 (1907), p. 622.

¹³⁹ *Der Botschafter*, No. 63 (1906), p. 1.

¹⁴⁰ A. Rennikov, *Zoloto Reina, o nemtsakh v Rossii* (Petrograd: A. S. Suvorin "Novoe-vremia," 1915), p. 276. On this episode, see Martin, "The German Question," pp. 414-33.

¹⁴¹ Milan M. Boiovich, *Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy: portrety i biografii, 4-yi sozyv (1912-17 gg)* (Moscow: Izd. T-va I. D. Sytina, 1913), p. 94.

¹⁴² *Der Botschafter*, 15 (1909), p. 2. Apparently Bergmann never wore his noble's uniform or considered himself a noble until the outbreak of World War I, Rennikov, *Zoloto Reina*, pp. 294-95.

¹⁴³ Petr V. Kamenskii, *Vopros ili nedorazumenie?: k voprosu ob inostrannykh poseleniakh na iugie Rossii* (Moscow: A. A. Levenson, 1895), pp. 98-99. 4436 *dessiatin* equals 11,977 acres.

¹⁴⁴ *Spisok zemel'nykh vladenii Ekaterinoslavskago uiezda Ekaterinoslavskoi gubernii* (Ekaterinoslav, 1899), p. 9.

¹⁴⁵ Ia. Pavlovskii, "Zamiechatel'nyi fakt popecheniia inoviertsas-Mennonita o blagoustroenii pravoslavnago mestnago sel'skago khrama i obshchestva," in *Ekaterinoslavskiiia eparkhial'nyia vedomosti*, No. 15 (1 August 1889), pp. 440-47. Pavlovskii also authored numerous anti-German articles.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 444-46.

¹⁴⁷ Kamenskii, *Vopros ili nedorazumenie?*, pp. 98-99.

¹⁴⁸ Boiovich, *Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy*, p. 94.

¹⁴⁹ On the typical Octobrist profile, see Robert Edelman, *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party, 1907-1917* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980), pp. 37-49.

¹⁵⁰ Private communication from Bergmann's descendent, Irmie Wiebe.

¹⁵¹ Other active Mennonite Octobrists, such as Johann Esau, also belonged to this estate. Epp, "Urban Mennonites," p. 256.

¹⁵² Boiovich, *Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy*, p. 94.

¹⁵³ Private communication from the late David G. Rempel of Menlo Park, California.

¹⁵⁴ *Ukazatel k stenograficheskim otchetam Gosudarstvennoi Dumy tret'iago sozyva* (St. Petersburg, 1909).

- ¹⁵⁵ *Russkaia pravda* (17 October 1907).
- ¹⁵⁶ Kogon, "Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie," p. 178.
- ¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 203.
- ¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 221; and *Der Botschafter*, No. 15 (1906), p. 3.
- ¹⁵⁹ *Der Botschafter*, No. 16 (1906), p. 4.
- ¹⁶⁰ Kogon, "Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie," pp. 222-24.
- ¹⁶¹ *Der Botschafter*, No. 54 (1906), p. 5.
- ¹⁶² Terry Martin, "The Terekers' Dilemma: A Prelude to the Selbstschutz," in *Mennonite Historian*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1-2; and Helmut-Harry Loewen and James Urry, "Protecting Mammon: Some Dilemmas of Mennonite Nonresistance in Late Imperial Russia and the Origins of the Selbstschutz," in *Journal of Mennonite Studies*, Vol. 9 (1991), pp. 34-53.
- ¹⁶³ M. Wiedemann, "Die deutschen Abgeordneten der vierten Reichsduma," in *Deutsche Monatsschrift für Russland* (1914), pp. 257-65; *Der Botschafter*, No. 38 (1912), p. 5; Cornelius Krahn, "Die Tragödie der Familie Hermann A. Bergmann," pp. 1-2 (unpublished manuscript in author's possession); and private communication from David G. Rempel.
- ¹⁶⁴ *Der Botschafter*, No. 24 (1907), p. 1; No. 26 (1907), p. 1; No. 27 (1907), p. 1; No. 32 (1907), p. 1; No. 8 (1908), p. 1; No. 11 (1908), p. 1; No. 13 (1908), p. 1; No. 15 (1908), p. 1; No. 16 (1908), p. 1; No. 20 (1908), p. 1; No. 24 (1908), p. 1; No. 25 (1908), p. 1; No. 27 (1908), p. 1; No. 29 (1908), p. 1; No. 40 (1908), p. 1; No. 19 (1909), p. 2.
- ¹⁶⁵ *Der Botschafter*, No. 38 (1912), p. 5.
- ¹⁶⁶ Wiedemann, "Die deutschen Abgeordneten," p. 259.
- ¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 259.
- ¹⁶⁸ *Russkaia pravda* (17 October 1912).
- ¹⁶⁹ Emmons, *Formation of Political Parties*, p. 388.
- ¹⁷⁰ Hosking, *Russian Constitutional Experiment*, p. 48.

¹⁷¹ P. V. Kamenskii, *Vrachevanie biednosti: opyt istoricheskago issledovaniia* (Moscow, 1909).

¹⁷² Kamenskii, *Vopros ili nedorazumenie?*; "Noch ein Wort über die mennoniten Kolonien in Russland," in *Mennonitische Blätter* (Danzig, West Prussia) (1896), pp. 74-75; and Martin, "The German Question."

¹⁷³ *Der Botschafter*, No. 33 (1910), p. 2.

¹⁷⁴ H. Nikkel, "Eine Reise nach Petersburg," in *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 5 (1909), p. 5.

¹⁷⁵ Pinchuk, *Octobrists in the Third Duma*, pp. 88-90; Hosking, *Russian Constitutional Experiment*, p. 179; and Petr V. Kamenskii, *Veroispovednyia i tserkovnyia voprosy v Gosudarstvennoi Dumie tret'iago sozyva i otnosheniia k nim "Soiuza 17 oktiabria"* (Moscow: Tipo-lit. E. Kudinova, 1909).

¹⁷⁶ For several instances, see *Der Botschafter*, No. 85 (1912), p. 3.

¹⁷⁷ In particular, see David Epp, "Was dürfen unsere Dumaabgeordneten von uns erwarten!" in *Der Botschafter*, No. 24 (1907), p. 1.

¹⁷⁸ On the restrictions on sects, see Ivan Stepanovich Prokhanov, *Zakon i vera* (St. Petersburg, 1910).

¹⁷⁹ P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, p. 629; *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 1 (1908), p. 8; and *Der Botschafter*, No. 2 (1908), p. 2.

¹⁸⁰ P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, p. 629; and *Der Botschafter*, 8 (1908), p. 1.

¹⁸¹ P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, p. 629; and *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 7 (1908), p. 105.

¹⁸² The resolution is printed in P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, pp. 630-31.

¹⁸³ *Der Botschafter*, 41 (1908), p. 2.

¹⁸⁴ P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, p. 1030 (note # 9).

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 649; and Ediger, *Beschlüsse*, p. 143.

¹⁸⁶ P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, pp. 645-50; Abe Dueck, "Mennonite Churches and Religious Developments in Russia, 1850-1914," in John Friesen (ed.) *Mennonites in Russia*, pp. 174-76; and Klippenstein, "Mennonite Pacifism," pp. 140-44.

¹⁸⁷ Printed in full in P. M. Friesen, *Mennonite Brotherhood*, pp. 637-45.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 645-50.

¹⁸⁹ "Ot mennonitskikh konventov Khortitskogo i Kronsvendenskogo prikhodov," *RGIA* f. 821, op. 5, d. 940, l. 89.

¹⁹⁰ Ediger, *Beschlüsse*, p. 145.

¹⁹¹ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 61 (1912), p. 1; and *Der Botschafter*, No. 63 (1912), p. 5.

¹⁹² *Der Botschafter*, No. 85 (1912), p. 3; and Ediger, *Beschlüsse*, p. 150.

¹⁹³ *Der Botshafter*, No. 85 (1912), p. 3; and *Svedeniia o mennonitakh Rossii* (Berdiansk: G. A. Edigera i Ko, 1912).

¹⁹⁴ "Die nikolaipoler Bundeskonferenz," in *Der Botschafter*, No. 85 (1912), p. 3.

¹⁹⁵ *Der Botschafter*, No. 85 (1912), p. 3; *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 80 (1911), p. 2; No. 5 (1912), p. 3; and *Der Botschafter*, No. 4 (1912), p. 2.

¹⁹⁶ *Der Botschafter*, No. 85 (1912), p. 3.

¹⁹⁷ This version called for alternative military service for conscientious objectors at double the normal length of service, with a clause saying Mennonite service should remain at its current level (i.e. normal military length of service).

¹⁹⁸ *Svedeniia o mennonitakh v Rossii*.

¹⁹⁹ Hosking, *Russian Constitutional Experiment*, pp. 182-214; Pinchuk, *Octobrists in the Third Duma*, pp. 81-103; and Edelman, *Gentry Politics*, pp. 73-85.

²⁰⁰ *Der Botschafter*, No. 14 (1907), p. 3.

²⁰¹ See David Epp's comment in 1912: "Very few, among them the late A. A. Neufeld, raised their warning voices against the Octobrists and advised an alliance with the progressive parties." *Der Botschafter*, No. 47 (1912), p. 1.

²⁰² Martin, "The German Question," pp. 424-25.

²⁰³ Pinchuk, *Octobrists in the Third Duma*, pp. 86-87; and Hosking, *Russian Constitutional Experiment*, pp. 87-91.

²⁰⁴ Hosking, *Russian Constitutional Experiment*, pp. 99-100.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 116.

²⁰⁶ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 41 (1909), p. 10.

²⁰⁷ Edelman, *Gentry Politics*, pp. 116-26.

²⁰⁸ Pinchuk, *Octobrists in the Third Duma*, p. 147.

²⁰⁹ Avrekh, *Stolypin i Tret'ia Duma*, p. 418.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.417.

²¹¹ Edelman, *Gentry Politics*, pp. 125-26.

²¹² *Otchet TSentral'nogo komiteta Soiuza 17 oktiabria i ego dieiatel'nosti s 1 sentiabria 1912 goda po 1-oe oktiabria 1913 goda* (Moscow: K. S. Menshova, 1913), pp. 17-24; and Karl E. Lindemann, *Zakony 2-ogo fevralia i 13-ogo dekabria 1915 g. i ikh vliianie na ekonomicheskoe sostoianie IUzhnoi Rossii* (Moscow: K. S. Menshova, 1916), p. 8.

²¹³ *Der Botschafter*, No. 89 (1910), p. 2; No. 94 (1910), p. 2; No. 81 (1911), p. 4; *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 80 (1910), p. 7; No. 96 (1910), p. 9; No. 35 (1911), p. 9; and *Bürgerzeitung* (Aleksandrovsk), No. 2 (1912), pp. 2-3.

²¹⁴ Martin, "The German Question," pp. 403-14. It is striking, however, how few references were made to the previous anti-German campaign in the Mennonite press from 1911-13.

²¹⁵ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 80 (1910), p. 7.

²¹⁶ David Epp, "Unsere Stellungen zu den Reichsdumawahlen vor 5

Jahren und jetzt," in *Der Botschafter*, No. 47 (1912), pp. 1-2.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 47 (1912), p. 1.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 47 (1912), p. 2.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 47 (1912), p. 2.

²²⁰ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 44 (1912), p. 11.

²²¹ H.A. "Zu den bevorstehenden Wahlen in die 4. Reichsduma," in *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 49 (1912), pp. 10-11.

²²² R. "Zu den Dumawahlen," in *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 54 (1912), pp. 11-12.

²²³ A[braham] K[roeker], "Noch einmal zu den bevorstehenden Dumawahlen," *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 52 (1912), pp. 11-12.

²²⁴ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 78 (1912), p. 3.

²²⁵ *Bürgerzeitung*, No. 6 (1912), p. 1; *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 129 (1912), p. 2; No. 135 (1912), p. 2; No. 176 (1912), p. 2; *Golos Moskvyy* (14 September 1912), p. 3; and *Der Botschafter*, No. 50 (1912), p. 2.

²²⁶ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 135 (1912), p. 2.

²²⁷ See, however, *Der Botschafter*, No. 69 (1912), p. 3.

²²⁸ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 52 (1912), pp. 11-12.

²²⁹ Ekaterinoslav: A. J. Heinrichs, K. M. Martens, J. J. Hooge; Novomoskovsk: J. D. von Gesberg (likely a Russified noble); Bakhmut: S. A. Auerbach, K. A. Unrau; Aleksandrovsk: J. H. Niebuhr, W. A. Janzen, J. J. Mueller; Mariupol: Eberhard. *Der Botschafter*, No. 41 (1912), p. 2.

²³⁰ Hosking, *Russian Constitutional Experiment*, p. 183.

²³¹ *Der Botschafter*, No. 24 (1912), p. 3; No. 51 (1912), p. 3; No. 67 (1912), p. 2; No. 69 (1912), p. 3; No. 70 (1912), p. 3; and *Riech'* (St. Petersburg) (2 September 1912); (4 September 1912); (7 September 1912).

²³² *Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Dnepropetrovskoi oblasti (GADO)*, f. 313 "Ekaterinoslavskoe gubernskoe zhandarmskoe upravlenie," op. 1, d.

2655 "Spiski chlenov 4-ikh gosudarstvennykh dumy," l. 22.

²³³ Ekaterinoslav: Hermann Bergmann, Kornei K. Martens, Petr J. Dyck; Aleksandrovsk: Jakob H. Niebuhr, Johann P. Tjart, Jakob P. Neufeld, Evgodii F. Wedel, Gustav G. Meerman; Bakhmut: David G. Vetter, Kornelius A. Unrau. *Ekaterinoslavskiiia gubernskiiia vedomosti*, No. 119 (11 October 1912); and *Der Botschafter*, No. 77 (1912), p. 3; No. 79 (1912), p. 3.

²³⁴ *Der Botschafter*, No. 73 (1912), p. 3.

²³⁵ *Golos Moskvy*, (4 September 1912), p. 3.

²³⁶ *Der Botschafter*, No. 73 (1912), p. 3.

²³⁷ *Der Botschafter*, No. 77 (1912), p. 2. The Memrik voters were allowed to vote in the landowner *curia* and so Kornelius Unrau, the Bakhmut Germans' candidate in 1907, was brought through.

²³⁸ *Der Botschafter*, No. 79 (1912), p. 3; *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 79 (1912), p. 9; and No. 83 (1912), p. 10. The *Odessaer Zeitung*, however, accused the Mennonites of insufficient remorse, *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 84 (1912), p. 7; and *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 251 (1912), p. 3.

²³⁹ *Bürgerzeitung*, No. 57 (1912), p. 5.

²⁴⁰ *Der Botschafter*, No. 79 (1912), p. 3; No. 80 (1912), p. 3; No. 81 (1912), p. 1; *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 231 (1912), p. 2; No. 248 (1912), p. 3; No. 251 (1912), p. 3; and *Bürgerzeitung*, No. 57 (1912), p. 5.

²⁴¹ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 231 (1912), p. 2.

²⁴² *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 254 (1912), p. 3.

²⁴³ *Der Botschafter*, No. 81 (1912), p. 1.

²⁴⁴ The Social Democrats were not part of the alliance. The Duma electoral law granted one Ekaterinoslav seat to a worker. Since the workers elected exclusively Social Democrats, the assembly had to support a Social Democrat.

²⁴⁵ *Der Botschafter*, No. 83 (1912), p. 3.

²⁴⁶ *Riech'* (October 17, 1912).

- ²⁴⁷ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 254 (1912), p. 3.
- ²⁴⁸ In previous elections, Mennonite electors had only been reported from the Melitopol landowners *curia*, where in the first and second Duma two Mennonites (in each case, W. Klassen and J. Wiebe) were brought through. However, the Tavridia reports were so poor that it is possible others were elected. *Der Botschafter*, No. 27 (1906), p. 7; and No. 8 (1907), p. 3.
- ²⁴⁹ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 246 (1907), p. 1.
- ²⁵⁰ *Riech'* (8 September 1912); (11 September 1912); and (16 September 1912).
- ²⁵¹ *Der Botschafter*, No. 73 (1912), p. 3; and *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 72 (1912), pp. 9-10.
- ²⁵² *Der Botschafter*, No. 77 (1912), p. 2.
- ²⁵³ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 248 (1912), p. 3. The Mennonites were the following: Melitopol landowners: Wilhelm Jakob Klassen, Johann Jakob Dueck, Johann Peter Janzen; Berdiansk German peasant: Jakob Duerksen; Simferopol peasant: Johann Huebert; and Simferopol landowner: Peter Schroeder.
- ²⁵⁴ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 80 (1912), p. 11.
- ²⁵⁵ Markov was a famous reactionary deputy from Tambov *guberniia*.
- ²⁵⁶ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 248 (1912), p. 3.
- ²⁵⁷ *Bürgerzeitung*, No. 66 (1912), p. 3. This account lists Wilhelm Klassen and Wilhelm Schroeder as two of the Mennonite opponents of the Kadet-Progressive alliance. However, no other source lists Wilhelm Schroeder as an elector; he would represent a seventh Mennonite, whereas there were only six Mennonite electors.
- ²⁵⁸ *Odessaer Zeitung*, No. 248 (1912), p. 3.
- ²⁵⁹ *Krymskii viestnik*, No. 274 (26 October 1912).
- ²⁶⁰ *Die Friedensstimme*, No. 84 (1912), p. 11.
- ²⁶¹ Boiovich, *Chleny Gosudarstvennoi Dumy*, p. 328.
- ²⁶² "K vyboram tavrisheskikh deputatov: neozhidannyi siurpriz,"

Krymskii viestnik, No. 275 (27 October 1912).

²⁶³ Haimson, "Social Stability." Previous Mennonite scholarship has dated this estrangement either to the Bolshevik revolution or to the anti-German legislation of World War I. For an emphasis on the October Revolution as central, see John B. Toews, *Czars, Soviets and Mennonites* (Newton, Kan.: Faith and Life Press, 1982); for a strong argument that the World War I experience was central, see Rempel, "Zum 200 jährigen," no. 21; "Mennonite Commonwealth," (1974), pp. 51-4; and Rempel and Rempel, "Of Things Remembered."

²⁶⁴ Edelman, *Gentry Politics*, pp. 167-75; and Hosking, *Russian Constitutional Experiment*, pp. 182-214.

²⁶⁵ *Otchet TSentral'nago komiteta Soiuza 17-ogo oktiabria o ego dieiatel'nosti s 1-ogo oktiabria 1913 g. po 1-oe sentiabria 1914 g.* (Moscow, 1914), pp. 6-7.

²⁶⁶ Hosking, *Russian Constitutional Experiment*, pp. 187-88; and A. Ia. Averkh, "Raskol fraktsii oktiabristov v IV Dume," in *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 4 (1978), pp. 115-28.

²⁶⁷ For instance, Bergmann was active in helping the Mennonites get permission to hold their annual General Conferences in the last years before World War I and to conduct the proceedings in German, *RGIA* f. 821, op. 133, d. 1012 "O s'ezdakh mennonitov, protokoly zasedanii ...", l. 4-5, 229.

²⁶⁸ *Otchet TSentral'nago ... s 1 sentiabria 1912 g. po 1-oe oktiabria 1913 g.*, 17-24; and Lindemann, *Zakony 2-ogo fevralia*, pp. 10-11.

²⁶⁹ See Lindemann, *Zakony 2-ogo fevralia* and David G. Rempel, "The Expropriation of the German Colonists in South Russia during the Great War," in *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1932), pp. 49-67.

²⁷⁰ See *Der Botschafter*, No. 28 (1914), p. 4; No. 29 (1914), p. 3; No. 30 (1914), p. 3; No. 32 (1914), p. 3; No. 38 (1914), p. 3; No. 43 (1914), p. 4; No. 56 (1914), p. 2; and P. M. Friesen, *Konfession oder Sekte?* (Halbstadt: Raduga, 1914).

²⁷¹ S. D. Bondar, *Sekta mennonitov v Rossii* (Moscow, 1916); for the documentation collected by Bondar for his work, see *RGIA*, f. 821, op. 133, d. 319 "Sekta mennonitov: obsledovanie byta i

sovremennogo sostoianiiia.”

²⁷² Lindemann, *Zakony 2-ogo fevralia*, pp. 44-6.

²⁷³ Rempel, “Zum 200 jährigen,” no. 21; and Rempel, “A Response to the ‘Lost Fatherland’ Review,” in *The Canadian Mennonite* (13 August 1968), pp. 9-12.

²⁷⁴ Lindemann, *Zakony 2-ogo fevralia*, pp. 13-15.

²⁷⁵ *Zhurnal zasedanii Ekaterinoslavskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1915 g.* (Ekaterinoslav, 1916), pp. 7-15; includes protest of this petition by Hermann Bergmann.

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