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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
DIST : 06 JULY 1982
COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR
SUBJECT: [Redacted] THE INSURGENT SITUATION
IN EL SALVADOR

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SOURCE: [Redacted]

SUMMARY. THE SALVADORAN INSURGENTS RETAIN APPROXIMATELY THE SAME STRENGT HAS BEFORE THE 28 MARCH 1982 ELECTIONS,

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OCCUPY ESSENTIALLY THE SAME BASE AREAS, AND HAVE SUFFICIENT ARMS, ALTHOUGH AMMUNITION IS IN SHORT SUPPLY. THEY HAVE ALSO IMPROVED THEIR TACTICS. MORALE IS GENERALLY HIGH AMONG RURAL INSURGENTS WHILE LOWER AMONG URBAN CADRE. ARMS INFILTRATION CONTINUES BY AIR, LAND AND SEA. A CONTINUED WEAKNESS IS THE INSURGENTS' INABILITY TO REINITIATE URBAN MASS ACTIVITIES AND ANY MEANINGFUL URBAN MILITARY OPERATIONS. FACTIONALISM ALSO CONTINUES AMONG THE INSURGENT GROUPS, ALTHOUGH THE GROUPS HAVE APPARENTLY AGREED ON A COMMON MILITARY PLAN. HOWEVER, THE INSURGENTS ARE DIVIDED IN THEIR POSITION TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. INSURGENT GOALS IN THE FUTURE WILL BE TO REASSERT THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE, STRIKING AGAINST THE ECONOMY, MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT. THEIR LONG-TERM GOAL IS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO THE CITY ALTHOUGH THEY LACK THE ABILITY TO DO SO IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

1. INSURGENT STRENGTH REMAINS ABOUT EQUAL TO THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD WITH APPROXIMATELY 5000 ARMED, FULL-TIME INSURGENTS IN THE FIELD. WE BELIEVE THAT THE NUMBER OF INSURGENTS THAT IS ACTUALLY IN COMBAT AT A GIVEN TIME IS LESS THAN THE TOTAL ARMED BECAUSE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF TRAINING, STATIC DEFENSE IN BASE AREAS, AND RESUPPLY AND OTHER OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FUNCTIONS. IN FACT, THE MAJORITY OF THE ARMED INSURGENTS' TIME IS PROBABLY OCCUPIED WITH RESUPPLY AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN RURAL BASE AREAS BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF RESUPPLY AND LIVING CONDITIONS. OTHER THAN FULL-TIME INSURGENTS, THERE ARE MILITIA ELEMENTS THAT ARE CHARGED WITH ORGANIZING THE LOCAL POPULATION IN RURAL AREAS, DEFENDING THE MASSES DURING RETREATS FROM BASE AREAS, AND RESUPPLY. ARMED WITH OLD CAST-OFF ARMS, THESE INSURGENT MILITIA CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF RURAL INSURGENTS. THE NUMBERS OF MILITIA VARY; THE INSURGENTS GENERALLY INCLUDE ALL ABLE-BODIED MEN NOT INVOLVED IN FULL-TIME UNITS AS PART OF THE MILITIA WITHIN EACH BASE AREA. THUS, THE TOTAL NUMBERS ARE A FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER OF PEASANTS IN EACH BASE AREA.

2. FOLLOWING THE FAILED PRE-ELECTION OFFENSIVE, THERE WERE SEVERAL REPORTS OF FOREIGNERS LEAVING INSURGENT RANKS AS WELL AS INCREASED DESERTIONS OF INSURGENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE CITIES; HOWEVER, DESERTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO AFFECT SERIOUSLY THE INSURGENTS' OPERATIONAL ABILITY. A CONTINUAL PROBLEM IS THE RECRUITMENT OF NEW CADRE. THE AGE RANGE OF POTENTIAL RECRUITS IS APPROXIMATELY 12-18. MOST RECRUITS ARE PROBABLY 15 OR UNDER AS OLDER TEENAGERS ARE EITHER ALREADY INVOLVED IN INSURGENT GROUPS, IN SCHOOL, OR PERFORMING OBLIGATORY MILITARY SERVICE. OLDER RECRUITS ARE SOMETIMES FOUND AMONG SOLDIERS WHO COMPLETE MANDATORY MILITARY SERVICE. AS OLDER, EXPERIENCED INSURGENTS ARE LOST IN BATTLE, THEY ARE BEING REPLACED BY YOUNGER AND INEXPERIENCED CADRE. THIS TREND SHOULD CONTINUE, THUS DECREASING THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. THE CONSTANT REQUIREMENT FOR TRAINED FIELD LEADERS DOWN TO THE SQUAD LEVEL PUTS A STRAIN ON INSURGENT GROUPS THAT MUST SEND THEIR BEST CADRE ABROAD FOR TRAINING. INSURGENT LEADERS ARE STRETCHED THIN IN THE FIELD. THE POOL OF OLDER, EDUCATED AND HIGHLY-TRAINED COMMANDERS IS LIMITED.

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THUS, FRONT GROUP LEADERS ARE ABSORBED INTO THE ARMED GROUPS, SERIOUSLY HANDICAPPING THE INSURGENTS' MASS ORGANIZATIONAL WORK.

3. INSURGENT STRONGHOLDS HAVE CHANGED LITTLE SINCE 1981. THE FARABUNDO MARTI POPULAR LIBERATION FORCES (FPL) DOMINATES CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT WITH MOST UNITS DEPLOYED IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE DEPARTMENT. THE FPL ALSO IS THE LARGEST FACTION IN SANTA ANA DEPARTMENT EAST OF METAPAN AND IN SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT ON CHINCHONTEPEC VOLCANO. THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) IS THE DOMINANT FACTION IN MORAZAN NORTH OF THE TOROLA RIVER, USULUTAN DEPARTMENT, AND LA UNION DEPARTMENT. THE ERP AND REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF CENTRAL AMERICAN WORKERS (PRTC) HAVE DISPLACED THE FPL AS THE DOMINANT FACTION IN THE TRES CALLES/SAN AGUSTIN AREA OF USULUTAN DEPARTMENT. THE PRTC ALSO HAS CONTROL IN THE CERROS DE SAN PEDRO AREA OF SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT. THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL RESISTANCE (FARN) CONTROL THE GUAZAPA VOLCANO BASE AREA. THE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERATION (FAL) IS A MINOR PLAYER ON ALL WAR FRONTS. RECENTLY ERP UNITS FROM USULUTAN AND SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT HAVE DEPLOYED TO NORTHERN SAN MIGUEL DEPARTMENT, TRADITIONAL FPL TERRITORY, TO ESTABLISH MORE SECURE BASE AREAS. AT THIS TIME, THE BALANCE OF POWER AMONG THE INSURGENT GROUPS APPEARS TO HAVE SWUNG TOWARD THE ERP. THE ERP EXERCISES CONTROL OVER FARN, FAL, AND PRTC UNITS IN THE EASTERN AND PARACENTRAL FRONTS AND HOLDS A DOMINANT POSITION IN DECISIONMAKING IN THE CENTRAL FRONT. THE FPL, ON THE OTHER HAND, FOR THE MOST PART ACTS ALONE. THUS, THE ERP HAS BEEN ABLE TO SHOW THE STRONGEST PRESENCE IN RECENT INSURGENT ACTIVITIES.

4. A PRINCIPAL INSURGENT STRENGTH HAS BEEN THEIR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN STABLE BASE AREAS IN GUAZAPA, SAN AGUSTIN, NORTHERN MORAZAN AND THE SAN VICENTE VOLCANO AREA. GOVERNMENT MILITARY SWEEPS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY CLEARED INSURGENT STRONGHOLDS FOR SHORT PERIODS, BUT FOLLOWING SWEEPS, THE INSURGENTS RETURN. UNLESS SWEEPS ARE FREQUENT, AND THE MILITARY PRESENCE IS MAINTAINED IN INSURGENT BASE AREAS, THERE IS LITTLE PERMANENT DISRUPTION TO INSURGENT OPERATIONS. ONLY IN THE CERROS DE SAN PEDRO AREA AND EASTERN CHALATENANGO HAVE MILITARY OPERATIONS SERIOUSLY HAD AN IMPACT ON INSURGENT ACTIVITIES.

5. INSURGENT URBAN OPERATIONS AND URBAN SUPPORT NETS HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED BY INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE POLICE OPERATIONS. THE INSURGENTS BELIEVE THAT ARGENTINE ADVISORS HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ORGANIZING AND CARRYING OUT URBAN COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE AND TEACHING POLICE EFFECTIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES. THERE IS A CONSTANT FEAR OF INFILTRATION AND OPERATIONAL SECURITY HAS BEEN TIGHTENED. FEAR HAS DRIVEN SOME URBAN CADRE TO SEEK REASSIGNMENT TO RURAL UNITS.

6. BECAUSE OF THEIR LONG-TERM RESIDENCE IN THEIR VARIOUS BASE AREAS, THE INSURGENTS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BUILD ELABORATE DEFENSES, DEVELOP FALLBACK DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, AND ESTABLISH ROUTES OF RETREAT. THEY ALSO HAVE AN INHERENT TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OVER THE ARMED FORCES BECAUSE OF THEIR INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN. THESE BASE AREAS ARE SITUATED TO ALLOW EASY ACCESS TO MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE ELECTRIC GRID, AND RURAL GOVERNMENT OUTPOSTS. THUS, THE

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INSURGENTS HAVE THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT HIGH VISIBILITY, ECONOMICALLY DESTRUCTIVE, BUT LOW-RISK, MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH FEW LOSSES. THIS ABILITY SHOULD NOT BE SERIOUSLY REDUCED IN THE SHORT TO MID-TERM AS LONG AS SECURE BASE AREAS ARE MAINTAINED.

7. TACTICALLY, THE INSURGENTS HAVE IMPROVED OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS. AMBUSH OPERATIONS ARE BETTER PLANNED AND EXECUTED BUT MORE IMPORTANT, INSURGENT COMMANDERS CAN NOW MOUNT COMPANY-SIZE OPERATIONS EFFECTIVELY. ALSO, DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ARE BETTER DESIGNED ONLY TO YIELD TERRITORY GRUDGINGLY AND EMPLOY CREATIVE COUNTERATTACKS TO HIT THE ARMED FORCES AT THEIR WEAK POINTS. SNIPERS ARE EMPLOYED TO KILL MILITARY OFFICERS. FIELD COMMUNICATIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN IMPROVED WITH CAPTURED MILITARY RADIOS AND HAND-HELD TRANSCEIVERS. FINALLY, THE INSURGENTS HAVE GIVEN ATTENTION TO FIELD INTELLIGENCE, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE LACK OF A SUFFICIENT TACTICAL AIRLIFT CAPABILITY BY THE ARMED FORCES ENSURES THAT THE INSURGENTS ARE NOT OUTFLANKED.

8. THE INSURGENTS APPEAR TO BE WELL EQUIPPED WITH ARMS, BUT AMMUNITION IS APPARENTLY IN SHORT SUPPLY. DEFENDING AGAINST LARGE-SCALE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND CONDUCTING LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS THEMSELVES SERIOUSLY DRAINS AMMUNITION RESERVES. THUS, THE INSURGENTS' CAPABILITY TO MOUNT SUSTAINED MILITARY OPERATIONS SHOULD NOT IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY WITHOUT AN IMPROVED RESUPPLY SYSTEM. EARLIER THIS YEAR INSURGENT GROUPS HAD A MIXTURE OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND BOLT-ACTION RIFLES; IT NOW APPEARS THAT THERE ARE ENOUGH AUTOMATIC RIFLES FOR ALL ARMED INSURGENTS, WHICH ALLOWS INSURGENTS TO ARM MORE MILITIA ELEMENTS. THE INSURGENTS APPEAR TO HAVE IMPROVED THEIR DIRECT FIRE AND INDIRECT FIRE CAPABILITY WITH THE USE OF RECOILLESS RIFLES AND MORTARS. THEY HAVE ALSO A GREATER NUMBER OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM MACHINEGUNS USED IN A FIRE SUPPORT AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ROLE. THERE HAVE BEEN UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE INSURGENTS HAVE OBTAINED ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES BUT NONE HAVE YET TO BE EMPLOYED.

9. THERE IS LITTLE HARD EVIDENCE OF LARGE-SCALE ARMS INFILTRATION. IT APPEARS, HOWEVER, THAT ARMS CONTINUE TO ENTER THE COUNTRY BY AIR, LAND AND SEA. SUPPORT NETS ARE RUN [REDACTED] FOR OVERLAND TRANSPORT OF LARGE- AND SMALL-SCALE SHIPMENTS. THERE HAS BEEN ONE REPORT OF AN AIR BRIDGE OPERATED [REDACTED] NICARAGUA HAS TAKEN EXTREME MEASURES TO MAINTAIN PLAUSIBLE DENIAL OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS TRAFFICKING BY SHIFTING OPERATIONS TO THIRD COUNTRIES [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FRAGMENTARY REPORTS INDICATE THAT ARMS ARE STILL ARRIVING ALONG THE PACIFIC COAST BETWEEN EL CUCO AND THE RIO LEMPA, POSSIBLY BEING SHIPPED FROM NICARAGUAN PACIFIC PORTS SUCH AS VENICIA. UNLESS THE SALVADORAN MILITARY INITIATES AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS TO CLEAR INSURGENT BASE AREAS AND FORCE THE INSURGENTS TO EXPEND AMMUNITION, INSURGENT ARMS AND AMMUNITION STOCKS SHOULD REMAIN ADEQUATE. ATTEMPTS BY THE ARMED FORCES TO INTERCEPT ARMS SHIPMENTS INTERNALLY HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE OF THE NUMEROUS ROUTES OF TRANSPORT AVAILABLE AND THE

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RANDOM NATURE OF THE SHIPMENTS. ALSO, SHIPMENTS ARE BROKEN DOWN INTO SMALL QUANTITIES WHICH REDUCES THE IMPACT OF ANY INDIVIDUAL ARMS BUST. INSURGENTS TAKE FEW PRECAUTIONS TO CONCEAL WEAPONS FOR INTERNAL TRANSPORT AND EXPRESS LITTLE FEAR OF INTERCEPT. THE SALVADORAN MILITARY HAS MADE LITTLE HEADWAY IN DISCOVERING ORGANIZED ARMS INFILTRATION NETS.

10. MORALE AMONG INSURGENTS VARIES ACCORDING TO THE AREA OF OPERATION, LEVEL OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, HEALTH AND NUMEROUS OTHER VARIABLES. GENERALLY, HOWEVER, INSURGENT MORALE AMONG RURAL CADRE IS HIGH. THE COMMUNAL ATMOSPHERE OF RURAL CAMPS AND RESTRICTED ACCESS TO OUTSIDE MEDIA TEND TO ESTABLISH AN "ESPRIT DE CORPS" AMONG CADRE WHO REMAIN IGNORANT OF ANY NEGATIVE FACTORS AFFECTING ON THEIR POSITION. SOME CADRE ARE DISENCHANTED BECAUSE OF THE LENGTH OF THE STRUGGLE AND HARD LIVING CONDITIONS. ALSO, BOREDOM SETS IN DURING LULLS IN FIGHTING. IN EASTERN CHALATENANGO AND THE CERROS DE SAN PEDRO AREA, MORALE IS APPARENTLY LOW BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF FOOD AND FREQUENT HARASSMENT BY THE ARMED FORCES. AS CROPS ARE BROUGHT IN LATER THIS YEAR, THE FOOD PROBLEM WILL BE EASED. THE INSURGENTS' TACTICAL TRIUMPH IN THE MORAZAN OPERATON, WHICH THEY CALL "COMPANERO GONZALO," SHOULD ALSO GIVE THE INSURGENTS A MORALE BOOST. IN URBAN AREAS, INSURGENT MORALE IS GENERALLY LOWER THAN IN THE COUNTRYSIDE BECAUSE OF THE EXPOSURE TO GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA AND A MORE DIFFICULT OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

11. SOME INSURGENT GROUPS BELIEVE THAT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND NOT ENOUGH ON MASS ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE CITY. THIS HAS BEEN THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE INSURGENTS' INABILITY TO CREATE AN INSURRECTIONAL CLIMATE AND THEIR RETREAT TO A STRATEGY OF ATTRITION, COUPLED WITH ISOLATING THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR DIPLOMATICALLY. THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY BLOC (BPR) AND THE UNITED POPULAR ACTION FRONT (FAPU) HAVE ATTEMPTED TO REINITIATE ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR SECTOR BUT WITH LITTLE SUCCESS. THE SALVADORAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCES) IS ATTEMPTING TO REBUILD ITS DEPLETED RANKS OF INTELLECTUALS. HOWEVER, THE LOSS OF EXPERIENCED FRONT GROUP CADRE TO ARMED GROUPS OR POLICE ROUNDUPS, THE LACK OF FUNDS, AND IMPROVED POLICE OPERATIONS IN THE CITY WILL MAKE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL MOBILIZATION PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE IN THE CITY FOR THE NEAR TO MID-TERM.

12. DESPITE THEIR LACK OF SUCCESS IN ORGANIZING THE MASSES IN THE CITY, THE INSURGENTS HAVE MADE GOOD STRIDES IN ORGANIZING PEASANTS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE IN AREAS THEY CONTROL. GUAZAPA IS A NOTABLE EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION. HOWEVER, INSURGENT RESOURCES ARE STRAPPED TO HANDLE LARGE NUMBERS OF FOLLOWERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT FOLLOWERS ARE NEEDED TO SUSTAIN THE INSURGENTS. THE ERP HAS HAD A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT PROBLEM HANDLING ITS FOLLOWERS

THIS HAS CREATED FRICTION BETWEEN THE ERP AND FPL BECAUSE OF THE LATTER'S DESIRE TO ABSORB THE ERP'S FOLLOWERS INTO ITS MORE HIGHLY DEVELOPED ADMINSTRATIVE ORGANIZATION. AS LONG AS BASE AREAS REMAIN SECURE, THE PROBLEM WITH FOLLOWERS SHOULD DECREASE AND STAIBLIZE, ESPECIALLY AS HARVEST APPROACHES. THE SALVADORAN

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ARMED FORCES' HEAVY USE OF ARTILLERY AND THEIR TENDENCY TO ESTABLISH FREE FIRE ZONES SHOULD CONTINUE TO CAUSE RURAL PEASANTS TO SEEK THE PROTECTION OF THE INSURGENTS IN TRADITIONAL INSURGENT TERRITORY.

13. FACTIONALISM CONTINUES TO BE A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM AMONG THE INSURGENT GROUPS. WHILE "DOMESTIC" DISPUTES ARISE AMONG ALL FACTIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL, THESE DO NOT SERIOUSLY DISRUPT OPERATIONS. AT THE FRONT AND FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) CENTRAL COMMAND LEVEL, THE DIFFERENCES ARE MORE CLEAR CUT AND SERIOUS.

[REDACTED] BASICALLY THE FPL VERSUS THE FMLN. IN OTHER WORDS, THE FPL OPERATES ALMOST TOTALLY INDEPENDENT FROM THE OTHER FMLN GROUPS. MEANWHILE, THE ERP APPEARS TO DOMINATE MILITARY PLANNING WITHIN THE FMLN COMMAND STRUCTURE. THE DEEP PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES AND DISTRUST AMONG THE GROUP LEADERS SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAMPER JOINT PLANNING AND REDUCE MUTUAL SUPPORT; PARTICULARLY DURING LARGE-SCALE OPERATIONS. AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL, UNITS FROM THE DIFFERENT FACTIONS ARE SEGREGATED INTO SEPARATE CAMPS AND DO NOT TRAIN TOGETHER. THIS HAMPERS JOINT TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND INCREASES THE INCIDENCE OF BICKERING AND INFIGHTING.

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14. WHILE UNITY REMAINS A PROBLEM, THE FMLN HAS APPARENTLY AGREED ON A COMMON MILITARY STRATEGY WHICH EMPHASIZES "ANNIHILATION", "RECUPERATION", AND "DISRUPTION" OPERATIONS; SMALL-SCALE ACTIONS AND MOBILITY ARE EMPHASIZED WHILE THE TAKING OF TOWNS IS NOT ENCOURAGED. THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH FOLLOWS A BASIC FPL STRATEGY, HAS ALREADY BEEN BROKEN WITH THE ERP'S OCCUPATION OF PERQUIN AND SAN FERNANDO. YET, THE ERP'S ACTION SHOULD BE INTERPRETED MORE AS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A FAVORABLE TACTICAL SITUATION IN WHICH THE RISK WAS WORTH THE GAIN, PARTICULARLY IN THE PROPAGANDA SENSE. THIS ERP PHILOSOPHY OF OPPORTUNISM WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THEIR OPERATIONAL GOALS IN ANY GIVEN ENCOUNTER.

15. THE INSURGENTS' POSITION TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT ALSO APPEARS TO BE DIVIDED. THE INSURGENTS KNOW THAT THEY MUST SEEM INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATING IN ORDER TO RETAIN SUPPORT FROM WESTERN GOVERNMENTS SO THEY WILL CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE NEGOTIATIONS. YET THERE APPEAR TO BE STRONG DIVISIONS OVER WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SINCERE OR ONLY USED AS A TACTIC WHILE PURSUING A MILITARY VICTORY. WHILE THE FPL SUPPORTS THE LATTER POSITION, THE OTHER FMLN GROUPS APPEAR TO BE WILLING LEGITIMATELY TO SEEK SOME SORT OF DIALOGUE WITH SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (FDR), AND POSSIBLY THE PCES AND FARN, ARE PUSHING THE LATTER LINE AS A RISK-FREE MEANS OF ACHIEVING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND REDUCING SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY FROM THE U.S. YET, INSTEAD OF A LARGE-SCALE EFFORT TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS, THE FDR AND ELEMENTS OF THE FMLN WILL APPARENTLY SEEK TO ESTABLISH LOWER-LEVEL DIALOGUES WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MILITARY ELEMENTS TO BUILD GRASSROOTS SUPPORT FOR SINCERE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THE FMLN DOES NOT ACHIEVE A MILITARY PRESENCE TO THREATEN SERIOUSLY THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES, THEY REALIZE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE WILLING TO OFFER ACCEPTABLE CONCESSIONS.

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16. INSURGENT MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS APPEARS TO BE DESIGNED TO REESTABLISH THEIR MILITARY CREDIBILITY BY EXECUTING HIGH VISIBILITY ATTACKS THAT WILL DRAW ATTENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. THE RECENT CAPTURE OF PERQUIN AND SAN FERNANDO THUS WAS MORE A PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY TO REESTABLISH THE FMLN'S PRESENCE THAN AN OPERATION SEEKING MILITARY GAINS. YET, BECAUSE OF THE ARMED FORCES' MISTAKES, THE ERP WAS ABLE TO GET THE ADDITIONAL BENEFIT OF A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY VICTORY AS A BONUS. INSURGENT TACTICS ARE DESIGNED TO CAUSE MAXIMUM MILITARY CASUALTIES AND INFLICT MAXIMUM DAMAGE AGAINST THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE. THE INSURGENTS HOPE TO CONTINUE TO RETAIN THE TACTICAL INITIATIVE AND DICTATE THE TIME AND TERRAIN OF BATTLE.

17. IN THE INTERMEDIATE TERM, THE INSURGENTS HOPE TO CREATE A CRISIS OF DECISION WITHIN THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT AND WEAKEN THE UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES. THEY HOPE TO MAINTAIN AND EXPAND THEIR SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHILE REDUCING THE SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT. A PARTICULAR TARGET IS THE U.S. CONGRESS, WHERE, THROUGH POLITICAL CONTACT, THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO RESTRICT MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO THE GOVERNMENT.

18. THE INSURGENTS' LONG-TERM GOAL IS TO BRING THE BATTLE TO THE ENEMY BY RETURNING THE WAR TO THE CITIES. ALSO, THEY CONTINUE TO DESIRE A TOTAL CONTROL OVER SOME TERRITORY WHICH WILL IMPROVE THEIR CHANCES OF GAINING RECOGNITION OF THEIR STATUS AS BELLIGERENTS. WHILE THEY HAVE IMPROVED THEIR LARGE-UNIT OPERATIONS, CAN TAKE OVER TOWNS FOR SHORT PERIODS, AND PRESSURE LARGE TOWNS IN EASTERN EL SALVADOR FOR SEVERAL DAYS, THE INSURGENTS STILL LACK THE ABILITY TO TAKE AND HOLD TERRITORY INDEFINITELY BECAUSE OF THE SALVADORAN MILITARY'S SUPERIOR FIREPOWER. THE ERP'S HEAVY LOSSES DURING THEIR OCCUPATION OF USULUTAN IN MARCH 1982 SHOWED THE PRICE THAT IS PAID FOR OCCUPYING CITIES WITHOUT SUFFICIENT LOGISTICS OR RESERVES. THE INSURGENT MILITARY CAPABILITY HAS PRACTICALLY PEAKED BARRING (A) A CUTOFF IN AID TO THE SALVADORAN MILITARY; (B) A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT; (C) THE ACQUISITION BY THE INSURGENTS OF IMPROVED FIRE SUPPORT AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, OR IMPROVED LOGISTICS; (D) A REVERSAL OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM; OR (E) WIDESPREAD REPRESSION BY THE MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES. YET, AT ITS CURRENT LEVEL, IT REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT THREAT FOR THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES, PARTICULARLY OVER THE LONG TERM AS ATTRITION TAKES EFFECT AND THE WILLINGNESS OF SOME COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT WANES.

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