

INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of "sectioning" the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again--beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.

**University
Microfilms
International**

300 N. Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

8326844

Baker, Donald Leslie

CONFUCIANS CONFRONT CATHOLICISM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY KOREA

University of Washington

PH.D. 1983

University
Microfilms
International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Copyright 1983

by

Baker, Donald Leslie

All Rights Reserved

Confucians Confront Catholicism
In Eighteenth-Century Korea

by

Donald Leslie Baker

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

1983

Approved by *James C. Pelais*
(Chairperson of Supervisory Committee)

Program Authorized

To Offer Degree Department of History

Date 12 August 1983

Doctoral Dissertation

In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctoral degree at the University of Washington, I agree that the Library shall make its copies freely available for inspection. I further agree that extensive copying of this dissertation is allowable only for scholarly purposes, consistent with "fair use" as prescribed in the U.S. Copyright Law. Requests for copying or reproduction of this dissertation may be referred to University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, to whom the author has granted "the right to reproduce and sell (a) copies of the manuscript in microform and/or (b) printed copies of the manuscript made from microform."

Signature Donald J. Rubin

Date August 12, 1983

Table of Contents

	Page
Chapter One: Introduction	1
Notes for Chapter One	24
Chapter Two: Jesuit Science Through Korean Eyes	27
Acceptance of the Western Calendar	42
Astronomy Cleansed of Theology	61
Notes for Chapter Two	73
Chapter Three: Catholic Stranger in a Neo-Confucian World	80
Precedents for Judgment	86
Yi Ik	94
Sin Hudam	101
An Chŏngbok	106
More Than a Language Barrier	114
Notes for Chapter Three	125
Chapter Four: Metaphysics and Morality	131
Cognition as Moral Endeavor	153
Unity Amid Differentiation	160
Principles and Universals	167
The Moral Aim of Education	173

Notes for Chapter Four	181
Chapter Five: Catholic Assumptions and Neo-Confucian	
Presumptions	189
Principle and the Great Ultimate	197
The Dangers of Theism	202
Ontological Self-Sufficiency and the Denial of	
God	212
The Creative Role of <u>I</u>	218
The Immanence of God in Principle	230
Notes for Chapter Five	236
Chapter Six: Christian Soul and Neo-Confucian Mind	241
The Nature of the Soul	243
Life After Death	247
Substance, Function, and Attributes	252
Heaven, Hell, and Society	162
Catholic Pessimism and Neo-Confucian Optimism	269
Notes for Chapter Six	282
Chapter Seven: Confucian Catholics and Catholic	
Confucians	286
Ascetic Neo-Confucianism	288
The Meeting at Chu ^u ōsa	294
The First Attacks	312
Notes for Chapter Seven	320
Chapter Eight: The Path to Martyrdom	324

Theistic Confucianism	329
The Ancestor Memorial Service	335
The Arrest and Martyrdom of Paul Yun and James Kw ^u ŏn	343
Notes for Chapter Eight	359
Chapter Nine: Conclusion	362
Notes for Chapter Nine	380
Bibliography	381
Vita	

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

No dissertation is solely the work of one mind. Over the years the author has benefited greatly from the advice, criticism, and encouragement of family, friends, teachers, and classmates. Special thanks are due to Professors James Palais, Kent Guy, Ken Pyle, and Alison Black and to Thatcher Deane for their assistance in the preparation of this dissertation. Arlene Cavanaugh provided support and sharp proofreading eyes that made polishing the dissertation into its final form an easier and more pleasant task than it normally is. In addition, the author wishes to express special appreciation to the people of Kwangju, who first taught the author to appreciate Korean civilization.

Chapter One

Introduction

Next year, sometime during 1984, Pope John Paul II will fly from Rome to Seoul to join with the Korean people in a celebration of the two-hundredth anniversary of Catholicism on that Northeast Asian peninsula. While in Seoul, the Pope is expected to canonize a number of Korean Catholics who, over a hundred years ago, offered up their lives as testimony to their Christian faith. A people who once prided themselves on their fidelity to Confucianism will witness the elevation of one hundred and three of their ancestors into the ranks of the officially recognized saints of the Roman Catholic Church.

These new saints represent only a few of the hundreds, perhaps even thousands, who were martyred in the waves of anti-Catholic persecutions that swept across Korea in the nineteenth century. Those martyrs were the spiritual children of a few bold Confucian scholars and students in the last quarter of the eighteenth century who introduced Christianity into Korean society. The Confucian officials

who carried out the nineteenth century persecutions were the heirs of an eighteenth century tradition of severe criticism of Catholicism coupled with harsh condemnation of individual Catholics. The bloody war between Catholicism and Confucianism which took so many lives in the last century began registering its first casualties over two centuries ago.

The first Korean to die on Korean soil for his Christian beliefs was Kim Pōmu. Kim, a government foreign language interpreter, died in 1786 of wounds inflicted a year earlier when he had been tortured by Yi dynasty officials for permitting Catholic services to be held at his home. Four years later, on October 8, 1791, two Catholic converts from Korea's Confucian literati elite were taken before the P'un^ugnam Gate in Chōn^uju, in southwestern Korea, and decapitated on orders from the central government in Seoul. Yun Chich'ung (1759-1791), baptized as Paul Yun, was only thirty-two years old when he was executed. His cousin James Kwōn Sang'yōn^u (1751-1791) was forty. They died because they had chosen to follow the dictates of Rome rather than the laws of their state. They had destroyed their ancestral tablets and refused to follow the standard Confucian mourning ritual for Yun's mother, who had passed away the previous spring. These two sons of Korea's upper class had abandoned the traditions, beliefs, and practices of their forefathers for the alien religion

of Catholicism.

There had been no Catholic priests in Korea since Toyotomi Hideyoshi sent Jesuit chaplains from Japan with his invading forces almost two hundred years earlier. Furthermore, there had been no practicing Korean Catholics on the peninsula until 1784, just seven years earlier, when Yi Sunghun (1756-1801) returned from Peking with church literature and the baptismal name of Peter, given him by European missionaries in the Chinese capital. Yet, in those seven years, despite the absence of any foreign missionaries on Korean soil, this Western religion had grown so strong that men were willing to give up their lives for it --and others were willing to kill to protect their values and their society against it.

Why were so many Koreans violently opposed to Catholicism? Conversely, why were a few so bravely committed to that imported creed? The search for an answer to these two questions can reveal much about the ways Koreans thought, reasoned, and judged two centuries ago.

Korea holds a unique position in the history of Western proselytizing efforts in East Asia. Unlike China or Japan, Korea gave birth to its Catholic Church without foreign missionaries on hand to serve as midwives nudging the infant church into existence or as nurses nurturing it as it grew. With the exception of Peter Yi Sunghun, all of Korea's early Catholics were either converted through

Chinese language materials written by European missionaries in China and smuggled into Korea or were convinced of the merits of Catholicism through the persuasive powers of their already converted friends and relatives in Korea. Korea therefore offers the intellectual historian an unusual opportunity to examine the reaction of a traditional East Asian society to Western ideas encountered with a minimum of the distortions often introduced by the personalities, peculiarities, and political entanglements of Western missionaries.

Any philosophy, religion, or civilization, any comprehensive world view, rises from a foundation of unquestioned premises that are rarely explicitly stated but are always implicitly assumed. A specific world view can not be understood by outsiders until its unspoken premises are uncovered. What men think is determined by their unconscious assumptions about how they should think: what questions they consider significant or permissible, what form they expect questions and their answers to take. Equally important is what form they expect experience to take: how they organize the sensations and impressions their mind receives, and which elements of experience they pay the most attention to and which they dismiss as irrelevant. Such unarticulated presuppositions impose cultural variations on perception, cognition, and cogitation. The various conceptual frameworks created by

these unconscious assumptions form different schemata for classifying and categorizing raw experience. The resulting conflicting pre-cognitive stances toward the world ensure that representatives of opposing world views frequently see and interpret the same phenomena in contradictory ways.

A pre-cognitive stance toward the world reveals itself in a variety of ways. How a philosophical school defines itself reveals that school's implicit definition of the human mind: the mind's limitations, its powers, and its proper concerns. Observe the heresies that a religion produces. Those points on which men loudly disagree often indicate unspoken agreement on what issues are important. Trace the historical unfolding of a particular philosophy or religion. As new generations discover new truths in their tradition, they produce overt statements of what was buried and implicit in their forefathers' thoughts.

A fourth situation in which the hidden patterns that direct thinking are unveiled is conflict between one world view and another radically different. Forced to justify and defend their beliefs against an alien challenger, Korean Confucians in the eighteenth century revealed the tacit assumptions and values which supported those beliefs. Under attack, the implicit became explicit.

The Korean encounter with Catholicism provides a framework for an exploration of how Korean Neo-Confucians approached such basic issues as the nature of man, truth,

morality, and society. Out of that violent conflict which left Kim Pŏmu, Yun Chich'ung, and Kwŏn Sang'yŏn dead, a clear picture of the structure of Korean thinking can emerge. Thrown into sharp relief by comparison with opposing assumptions from the West, the hidden premises of traditional Korean intellectual life can be uncovered and identified.

Of course, no study of a single episode of cross-cultural confrontation between East and West can exhaust the possibilities for conflict or agreement between the great number of different schools of thought found in East Asia and the great diversity of values and beliefs found in the pre-modern West. The meeting of East and West in Korea in the eighteenth century was an encounter between one specific form of European Catholicism and one particular school of Korean Neo-Confucianism. Though both represented their respective cultures, not all Koreans thought exactly as the Koreans examined in this volume did, any more than everyone in Europe would have agreed with everything the European missionaries in China wrote. Nevertheless, the versions of Korean Neo-Confucianism and European Catholicism scrutinized in these pages were components of major strands in the cultural traditions they represented. As such, they can be profitably studied for information on how those two cultures differed overall.

The West Korea encountered in the eighteenth century

was the Renaissance Catholicism of the young and vigorous Society of Jesus --the Jesuits. At the time Yi Sunghun was baptized in Peking, the Jesuit order was in temporary suspension worldwide by papal decree and had been forced to withdraw from missionary activity in East Asia. However, the writings which stimulated Korean interest in Catholicism and convinced some of the truth of the Christian faith were largely the products of almost two centuries of Jesuit proselytizing in China.

Founded in 1534 in Paris by Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556), the Jesuits were a Catholic response to the new Europe that was growing out of the Renaissance and the Reformation. The Jesuits, unlike previous religious orders, accepted the legitimacy the new Europe granted to secular activity. Instead of retreating into monasteries, as the monks of the Middle Ages had done, Jesuits mingled with the laity in towns and cities, ministering to the growing thirst for knowledge and education.

The Jesuits, more than any previous Catholic religious community, respected and encouraged an active and wide-ranging intellectual life. Jesuit priests spread throughout Europe in the sixteenth century, establishing schools and universities and winning renown as effective educators. They were often trained equally well in both secular and spiritual disciplines. Years of theology would be matched by an equal amount of time and energy spent on

mastering the latest developments in the arts, mathematics, or natural sciences of their day.

The Catholicism of the Jesuits was an educated, rationalistic Catholicism. Their deep spirituality and commitment to Christianity was supported not by faith alone but also by the sophisticated logical arguments of Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274). The Jesuits agreed with Aquinas that faith should be anchored in reason. In their view, Catholicism, though it drew many of its tenets from divine revelation, stood on a foundation of rational truths that were open to all men. Anyone with a clear mind and a respect for the laws of logic would recognize the validity of the ethical, philosophical, and theological conclusions reached by Aquinas. This Thomism was the guiding philosophy of Jesuit educators, both for training their own members and for teaching others.

The Thomistic philosophy and theology, which Jesuit missionaries later brought to China, was thirteenth-century Europe's answer to the age-old problem of the certainty of knowledge. Thomas Aquinas never seriously doubted the certainty of the doctrines of his Church; he constructed his complex philosophical system to show that reason supported the convictions of his faith. Borrowing heavily from Aristotle, Aquinas created an analytical framework for dissecting human nature, society, and the physical and spiritual universes. Working within that framework, he

then built arguments that belief in the existence of the Christian God and the validity of Christian ethics was rational.

Thomism, also known as Scholasticism, was built with a rich vocabulary, rooted in Latin, which encouraged distinctions that are ordinarily ignored in everyday discourse. The analytical approach and vocabulary of the Jesuits created rifts that Koreans traditionally did not recognize between the spiritual and the material, man and God, and the cosmos and the Creator. Men raised in Korea's Neo-Confucian environment had difficulty understanding Thomistic terms as the Jesuits intended them to be understood.

The Jesuits who traveled from Europe to East Asia to preach the gospel were aware that they were undertaking an arduous mission. They came, however, from a Europe recently grown confident of cultural, economic, technological, as well as spiritual, superiority over the rest of the globe. The Jesuit overseas missionary drive was born as Europe was just beginning to expand beyond that Western corner of the Eurasian land mass that had long been its only domain. In the wake of that commercial expansion, the Jesuits peddled values, beliefs, and assumptions which they thought possessed the power to compel universal assent.

On April 7, 1541, only seven years after the order

began and one year after the Society of Jesus had received official recognition from the Pope, the Jesuit priest Francis Xavier left Lisbon with orders from Rome to sow Catholicism in Asia. Xavier slowly worked his way through the non-Christian East. He stayed in India for six years and then, on April 15, 1548, he set sail for Japan. Four months later he became the first European to preach the Christian gospel in the Japanese islands.¹

Fr. Xavier's arrival in Japan marked the beginning of a dramatic era of Japanese history that one scholar has labeled, with some exaggeration, "the Christian century in Japan".² Catholics gains at first were rapid and substantial, with hundreds of thousands of Japanese names on church registers by the end of the century. Success was short-lived, however. The newly established Tokugawa shogunate turned against Catholicism and the Jesuits as an extension of foreign power onto Japanese soil. By 1638, Japanese authorities had eradicated Catholicism from the archipelago for all practical purposes.

Catholicism in Japan had little effect on Koreans in Korea. Fr. Gregoria de Cespedes, the Spanish Jesuit in Korea with Hideyoshi's forces from late 1593 through mid-1595, ministered to the Japanese forces, not to the Koreans they were attacking.³ Some of the Koreans who were forcibly taken to Japan by retreating Japanese troops were converted to Catholicism by Jesuit missionaries there.

One, named Vincent Kuoan in Jesuit records, was received into the Society of Jesus as a lay brother in Japan before suffering martyrdom there. Another, Antonio Corea, was taken to Europe and settled down in Italy for the remainder of his life. Several Koreans are among those honored as martyrs for the faith in the anti-Catholic persecutions of the Tokugawa shogunate.⁴

The Jesuit missionaries in Japan were impressed by Korean receptivity to Catholicism. In 1595 Fr. Lois Frois wrote to Europe that he had been preaching to three hundred Koreans slaves in Nagasaki alone and had converted many of them. "They are a people well-disposed to receive our Holy Faith," he wrote, adding that in this respect the Koreans were "in no way inferior to the Japanese." He told his correspondent God had used the Hideyoshi invasion of 1592 to reap His first harvest of Korean souls. If only the gospel could be preached on the Korean peninsula itself, many more could be brought to the bosom of the Church.⁵

Fr. Frois's dreams were in vain. If there were any Catholic converts among those Koreans allowed to return home from Japan in the first decade of the seventeenth century, they were unsuccessful in spreading their faith in their homeland.⁶ China, not Korea, provided the bridge by which Catholicism eventually penetrated Korea. The architect of that success, though it occurred over a century and a half after his death, was Matteo Ricci

(1552-1610).

Ricci arrived in China in 1583. At first he settled in Kwangtung province not far from the Portugese colony of Macao. Less than two decades later the Italian Jesuit priest Matteo Ricci was living in Peking, having won the friendship of many learned Confucians through his command of both spoken and written Chinese and gained their esteem through his writings on such subjects as friendship and mnemonics as well as his world map, which introduced the Western world to the Chinese.⁷

Ricci was the first of what George Dunne has called a "generation of giants", the pioneer European Jesuits in the China mission who overcame their Eurocentrism and adapted both the Christian message and their own life style to Chinese culture.⁸ Meeting the Chinese scholar class on its own terms, those Jesuits turned their order's expertise in education into a key that gave them admission into leading Chinese intellectual circles. Over the almost two centuries of Jesuit missionary effort in Ming and Ch'ing China, Jesuits from Europe, with the aid of native converts, printed well over three hundred titles in Chinese.⁹ Theology, philosophy, ethics, music, geography, astronomy, mathematics, hydraulics, biology --there was hardly a subject left untouched. Ricci himself published works on geometry, physics, and natural theology and even wrote eight tunes for the clavichord, with accompanying

edifying lyrics.¹⁰

Easily the most influential book by Ricci was his T'ien-chu shih-i (The truth about God), published in Peking in 1603. In this introduction to fundamental Christian concepts, Ricci criticized Buddhism, Taoism, and Neo-Confucianism. He called for a return to the "original theism" of the Chinese Classics.¹¹ Ricci was aware that the Classics could be interpreted in a variety of ways, but felt the interpretation that led to the atheistic monism of Sung Neo-Confucianism had departed from the core meaning of the original pre-Han Confucian texts. By returning to the texts themselves, freeing them from the distortions of centuries of commentators, Ricci believed he could show that the basic doctrines of pristine Confucianism were perfectly compatible with Christianity.¹² The obscurity of the early texts strengthened his argument. As Ricci himself noted in his journal, "It was very helpful to draw to our opinion the leader of the sect of the literati, Confucius, by interpreting in our favor anything which he left ambiguous in his writings."¹³

Ricci had not gone to China to help the Chinese recover their own original tradition. He praised primitive Confucianism as a prelude to Christianity. He worked to convince his Chinese readers that Confucianism would remain incomplete and imperfect until it was supplemented by the truths of the Catholic faith. His strategy was to use

select elements of the early Chinese tradition as steppingstones to Catholicism. By building a Chinese Catholic Church on an indigenous foundation, Ricci believed he was making it easier and safer for Confucians to become Christian. He assumed painting Catholicism in native colors would eliminate Chinese fears that conversion required abandoning their heritage. He also expected the compromises he advocated with Confucian culture and customs would allow Christians to operate effectively and openly within Confucian society.

Ricci discovered during his decades in China that Chinese found logical arguments less persuasive than moral example. "They say that truth does not come to light by itself, rather it is made known in the religious life of those who preach it."¹⁴ Consequently, in many of his popular writings, he either deemphasized Catholic dogma to stress purely moral themes or wrote of science and mathematics in order to convince the Chinese that he had something useful and important to say. In these works, the author's Christianity seemed almost incidental. His high moral standards and his superior command of mathematics and celestial phenomena would, Ricci assumed, lead Chinese scholars to accept him as their equal and to respect those religious beliefs that lay behind his accomplishments. Then, once his Chinese audience was prepared to listen to him and to take him seriously, he could introduce them to

the more arcane teachings of the Church. Ricci presumed, as Jacques Gernet has noted, that the Chinese would reason that "If what the 'Western literati' said of the visible world proved to be accurate, what they said of the invisible world of angels, devils, hell, paradise, and the existence of a Creator God must be reliable as well."¹⁵

Ricci's approach of accommodation to Confucian culture was followed by most of the Jesuit missionaries who came after him. In the eighteenth century Rome modified that policy by forbidding Catholic participation in certain Confucian rituals and by condemning the borrowing of terms from the Confucian Classics to name the Christian God. However, the basic strategy survived. European missionaries in China continued to present Catholicism in Confucian scholarly dress. It was this form of Catholicism that Korea encountered.

Though no Jesuit priest from China ever reached Korea in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, many Jesuit publications did. As early as the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Koreans were reading and commenting in print on works on religion and natural science by European authors.¹⁶ In addition, though the missionaries in Peking did not go to Korea, they did meet with a few Koreans who came to China.

Throughout the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, Koreans in Peking on official business

--ambassadors, astronomers, scholars, officials, and even one crown prince-- sought out those European missionaries, whose moral standards and scientific expertise had won them respect and renown in Peking and beyond.¹⁷ Intrigued by the Jesuits' strange astronomical instruments and exotic religion, Koreans went to the Jesuit residences in the Chinese capital to observe, ask questions, and, if they were fortunate, acquire copies of the latest Jesuit publications. Ricci's T'ien-chu shih-i was only one of dozens of Chinese language works by European missionaries brought back to Korea by men returning from Peking.¹⁸ Thus, long before there were any Catholics active on the Korean peninsula, educated Koreans had heard of Catholicism. Two and a half centuries before the Hermit Kingdom was forced to open its land to the Western world, the Korean response to the West had begun.

The Korea that responded was a Neo-Confucian Korea. Korean Neo-Confucianism was derived from the teachings of the Sung dynasty philosophers Chang Tsai (1032-81), Ch'eng Hao (1032-85), Ch'eng I (1033-1089), and Chu Hsi (1130-1200). Somewhat more rigid than the Chinese, Koreans officially held fast to the teachings of the four Sung philosophers, exhibiting the dogmatism and inflexibility often displayed by those converted to imported doctrines. They rejected the revisions of later Chinese Neo-Confucian thinkers such as Wang Yang-ming (1472-1528).

The rigidity of Korean Neo-Confucianism might also be due to its late development. Introduced into Korea in 1291 by An Hyang (1243-1306), it was not fully assimilated in all its philosophical complexity until the sixteenth century. Yi Hwang (1501-1570), better known by his pen name T'oegye, and Yi I (1536-1584), pen named Yulgok, were the first Korean thinkers to raise important metaphysical issues in Neo-Confucianism little discussed by Chinese. Their debate over the relationship between i (C. li, 理) and ki(C.ch'i, 氣) reveals a familiarity with key Neo-Confucian concepts possible only when those concepts were no longer seen as the exclusive property of Chinese neighbors. In their debate, T'oegye and Yulgok displayed a willingness to explore previously unnoticed implications of cardinal Neo-Confucian terms, adding an original Korean dimension to a school of thought that had been entirely Chinese in origin and development.

In the seventeenth century Korean thinkers continued their independent exploration of philosophical issues that could be broached within the limits of Chu Hsi orthodoxy. By the eighteenth century, however, most of the possibilities for the creative development of Neo-Confucian metaphysics had been exhausted. The best Korean minds began to search elsewhere for fields in which to exercise their intellectual talents. Statecraft, natural science, geography, history --a number of subjects suddenly

attracted new attention. The result was what Koreans today call "the School of Practical Learning", a misnomer for an explosive expansion of the range of scholarly interest.¹⁹ Among the many subjects, both practical and impractical, which became the focus of scholarly attention in the eighteenth century was "Western Learning" (서학, sohak). In Eighteenth-century Korea, "Western Learning" referred to both the Western science and the Catholicism taught by the Jesuit missionaries in China.

Frederick Mote has argued that a cosmological gulf of conflicting assumptions divided China and the West.²⁰ Korean Neo-Confucians shared the basic assumptions of their fellow Neo-Confucians in China. First of all, Koreans assumed the supreme importance of the cardinal Confucian virtues of filial piety and loyalty. They accepted the Chinese vision of morality comprising those rules governing man's relationships in an autonomous hierarchical social order. Like the Chinese, Koreans did not anchor their moral principles in any supernatural realm or spiritual being transcending the human community on earth.

To support their Confucian moral principles, Koreans accepted the metaphysical apparatus of the Sung originators of Neo-Confucianism, with its accompanying ethical implications. Like Chinese Neo-Confucians, Koreans were "organicists", seeing the cosmos as ultimately one interwoven moral substance. I, the universal normative

pattern of appropriate interrelationships, linked ki, primal matter and energy, in an all-encompassing network that rendered Catholic belief in a transcendent deity superfluous. Moreover, the Neo-Confucian universe inhabited by Koreans and Chinese was self-sufficient, formed by i directing ki without the assistance or direction of any external creator.

I both defined what everything was essentially and prescribed what it was supposed to be ideally. Therefore, the Neo-Confucian ascription of unity to the cosmos through i was not only an assertion of total ultimate ontological linkage, it was also a call for man to cleanse himself of those selfish desires and biases which blocked complete integration into the universal moral nexus. Such a unifying vision contrasts sharply with the world view of a fractured cosmos that informed Jesuit writings. The cosmological gulf was also an ethical gulf. Neo-Confucians and Catholics differed not only over the origin of the universe and the structure of reality but also over how men should relate to the world which they shared with their fellow human beings.

That any Neo-Confucians at all were converted to the radically different beliefs of Thomistic Christianity seems almost a miracle. Yet, despite converts in the tens of thousands in China, the Jesuit mission is generally adjudged a failure, since China did not become a Christian nation.

The scholarly debate in the West over the reasons behind that failure usually revolves around competing evaluations of the validity of Ricci's strategy of adapting Catholicism to Confucian language and customs. Donald Treadgold, for example, argued that "The Jesuits of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had an opportunity to convert the Chinese Empire". If the authorities in Rome had not blundered by condemning the Jesuits' compromises with Confucian terminology and tradition, the Jesuits' proselytizing, enhanced by the popularity of Western science, might have generated a Chinese Christian civilization.²¹ George Dunne agreed that the Jesuits could have converted a substantial segment of the Chinese population if they had been allowed to preach a synthesis blending the "partial truths of Confucianism" with the "supernatural revelation of Christianity," just as their predecessors in the early church had done with Greek philosophy.²²

The papal rejection of Jesuit flexibility has had its defenders. Kenneth Scott Latourette, in his monumental History of Christians in China, suggested that whether or not the rites and terminology dispute had arisen it is unlikely the Society of Jesus would have won lasting acceptance for its alien presence in China.

No large body of Christian missionaries could have lived and worked in China at this time, no matter what their attitude toward the term for God and the rites to ancestors and Confucius, without

eventually arousing intense opposition.

Moreover, Latourette added, the Church's refusal to bend to Chinese cultural pressure preserved the purity of Christian truth and the standards of its adherents.²³ Arnold Rowbotham echoed Latourette's assessment, writing that if Ricci's policy of accommodation had been thoroughly implemented, "The Catholic Church in China might sooner or later have lost its identity and become merged in the relatively formless chaos of native philosophical thought."²⁴

The dispute over the soundness of Ricci's compromise with Confucianism often overlooked the other side of his strategy. Ricci's assumption that he could use science and technology to sell religion was seldom questioned. Only recently have Western scholars begun to point out that respect for Jesuit technical and scientific achievements did not necessarily lead to respect for Christian philosophy and theology. Jacques Gernet contended in a recent article that neither science nor cultural accommodation could bridge the large gap between the Christian and the Chinese visions of the world.²⁵ If Gernet is correct, whether or not Chinese Catholics had been permitted to honor their ancestors with traditional rituals and call upon God with titles drawn from the Confucian canon, external assimilation of Confucian words and ways could not have disguised the Catholic challenge to

the fundamental assumptions that shaped Confucian thought and civilization.

Koreans writing in the twentieth century on their ancestors' encounter with Catholicism have tended to blame those who rejected the message rather than the messengers. The serious moral conflict between the Catholic religion and Confucian culture is slighted by many contemporary Koreans, both Christian and non-Christian, who wonder why their forefathers were not as open to Western influence as they today believe those living two centuries ago should have been.

Anti-Catholicism in eighteenth-century Korea is often depicted as more political than moral or philosophical in nature, as though the opponents of "Western Learning" were more concerned with preserving Korean sovereignty than with protecting Korean values.²⁶ Some have described the anti-Catholics as narrow-minded pedants so limited by their stubborn adherence to Neo-Confucian orthodoxy that they were incapable of understanding or appreciating the valuable new ideas the Western writings offered Korea. An Chŏngbok's (1712-1791) polemical attack on Catholic beliefs and practices, for example, has been derided as "nativistic", implying that An would have reacted blindly to any challenge to the ideological status quo.²⁷ This conservative, defensive character of Korean Neo-Confucianism, supposedly exemplified by An and other

vehement anti-Catholics, has even been blamed for Korea's failure to adopt Western ways and modernize early enough to have prevented the Japanese colonization of Korea in this century.²⁸

Such an interpretation does justice neither to An Chongbok nor to Korean Neo-Confucianism in general. The eighteenth-century rejection of Catholicism is evidence instead of the strength and sophistication of traditional Korean thought. There is no more justification for calling An Chongbok bigoted because he condemned Catholic teachings than there would be for labeling Matteo Ricci prejudiced because he rejected Neo-Confucian philosophy. Both men were simply being faithful to their cultural values. When Catholicism penetrated Korea in the eighteenth century, it confronted a healthy Neo-Confucianism that was a worthy opponent of the Western challenge.

Notes for Chapter One

1. Arnold H. Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin: The Jesuits at the Court of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942), pp.43-45.
2. C.R. Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1951.
3. Ralph M. Cory, "Father Gregoria de Cespedes", Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean Branch, vol. 27 (1937), pp.1-55.
4. Fr. Charles Dallet, Histoire de L'Eglise De Corea (Paris: Victor Palme, 1874), pp. 3-10; Yu Hong'nyŏl, Han'guk Ch'ŏnjugyohoesa [The History of the Korean Catholic Church] (Seoul: Catholic Press, 1975), vol. I, pp.22-40.
5. Dallet, pp. 3-4.
6. Kim Yangsŏn has shown conclusively that the arguments by some that there were an active Catholicism on the peninsula in the seventeenth century is based on a misreading of official records. "Ch'ŏnjugyo sŏnghaengsŏl egwanhan chaegoch'al" [A new look at theories of the spread of Catholicism], Kidokkyo sasang, vol. 8, no. 5, pp.39-45.
7. For a good, concise biography of Ricci, see Dictionary of Ming Biography, pp. 1137-44.
8. George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962).
9. Yi Wŏnsun, "Myŏng-ch'ongnae sŏhaksŏ ūi Han'guksasangsaajok ūi ūi" [Catholic books in classical Chinese and their influence on traditional Korean thought], Han'guk Ch'ŏnjugyohoesa nonmunŏnjip, vol. 1, (1976), pp. 142-45.
10. For a bibliography of Ricci's works, see Louis Pfister, Notices biographiques et bibliographiques sur les Jesuites de l'ancienne mission de Chine (Shanghai, 1932), pp.34-42.
11. The edition that will be cited in this dissertation is a Korean reprint of a nineteenth century Chinese language text. Ch'onju silŭi (Seoul: Kwangdoksŏ, 1972).
12. Paul Rule, K'ung-tzu or Confucius: The Jesuit interpretation of Confucianism (Canberra; Australian

National University, unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1972), pp. 126-75, esp. p. 155 where Ricci is quoted as saying that there is nothing essential to Confucianism that is contrary to Catholicism. For a detailed description of Ricci's use of the Confucian canon, see Yi Sangok, "Ch'ŏnju silui wa kyonghak sasang" [T'ien-chu shih-i and the Chinese classics], in Yu Hongnyŏl paksa hwagapkinyŏm nonch'ong (Seoul, 1971). Ricci's approach was later condemned for risking a confusion of the Catholic God with the false gods of Chinese tradition and T'ien-chu shih-i was revised to eliminate all direct identification of God with Shang-ti or T'ien.

13. Rule, citing Fonti Ricciane (Rome: La Libreria dell' Statc, 1942-49), II, p. 296.
14. Louis J. Gallagher, China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci, 1583-1610 (New York: Random House, 1953), p.201.
15. Jacques Gernet, "Christian and Chinese Visions of the World in the Seventeenth Century", Chinese Science, 1980, no. 4, p. 3.
16. For example, see Yu Mongin, "Sŏgyo" [Catholicism], Ouyadam, pp. 73-4, reprinted in Oujip [works of Yu Mongin] (Seoul: Kyongmunsa, 1979); Yi Sugwang, Chibong yusŏl [Classified writings of Yi Sugwang] (Seoul: Ulyusa reprint, 1975), I, pp. 514-5.
17. Yamaguchi Masayuki, "Ch'ŏngjo e issŏsŏ ūi chaejigu kwa chosŏnsasin" [Korean Envoys and the Europeans at the Ch'ing court in China], Han'guk Ch'ŏnjugyohoesa nonmunsonjip, vol. 2 (1977), p. 69. This is a Korean translation of an article that originally appeared in Japanese in Shigaku zasshi vol.44, no. 7 (1933); Yamaguchi, "Shoken Seshi to Tō Takubo" [Prince Sohyon and Adam Schall], Seikyu gakusō, vol. 5 (1931), pp. 101-17; Kim Yŏngdok, "Sohyŏnseja yŏn'gu" [A study of Crown Prince Sohyŏn], Chosŏn hugi sasang yŏn'gu [A study of the intellectual history of the latter half of the Yi dynasty, (Seoul: Ulyu munhwasa, 1977), pp.393-460; Yu Hongnyŏl, pp.41-48.
18. Pae Hyonsuk, "17.8 segye chŏllaet'oen Ch'ŏnjugyo sŏjŏk" [Books on Catholicism introduced from China into Korea in the 17th and 18th centuries], Kyohoesa yŏn'gu, no. 3 (1981), pp.3-40; Kang Chaeon, "Chŏsen denrai no seiyo shomoku" [A list of the Western books that were imported into Korea], Shisō, no. 625 (July, 1976), pp. 107-29.

19. See my analysis of twentieth century sirhak (Practical Learning) historiography in "The Use and Abuse of the Sirhak label: A New Look at Sin Hudam and his Sohakpyon", Kyohoesa yŏn'gu, no. 3 (1981), pp.183-203.
20. On the cosmological gulf that separated traditional Chinese civilization from Western civilization, see Frederick W. Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp.13-28.
21. Donald Treadgold, The West in Russia and China (Cambridge: At the University Press), 2: pp.31-33.
22. Dunne, Generation of Giants, p. 369.
23. Kenneth Scott Latourette, The History of Christian Missions in China (reprint, Taipei: Ch'eng-wen, 1975), pp. 153-55.
24. Rowbotham, Missionary and Mandarin, p. 296.
25. Gernet, "Christian and Chinese Visions", pp.1-17.
26. Ch'oe Ch'anggyu, Han'guk ūi sasang [Korean Thought] (Seoul: Somundang, 1973), pp. 100-41.
27. Chai-sik Chung, "Christianity as a Heterodoxy: An Aspect of General Cultural Orientation in Traditional Korea", Yung-hwan Jo, ed., Korea's Response to the West (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Korea Research Publications, 1971), pp. 57-86.
28. For the charge that the eighteenth-century rejection of Catholicism blocked needed reforms in Korea, see Han Ugun [Han Woo-keun], "Ch'onjugyo ch'ogi chŏnpa wa kŭ panung" [The spread of Catholicism in late eighteenth century Korea and the reaction it evoked], Yijohugi ūi sahoe wa sasang (Seoul: Ulyu munhwasa, 1969), pp.353-54; Kum Changt'ae, "Ch'onjugyo ūi chollae wa sogusasang ūi suyong" [The entrance of Catholicism into Korea and the acceptance of Western thought], Han'guk ch'olhakhoe, ed., Han'guk ch'olhaksa, vol. 3 (Seoul: Tongmyŏngsa, 1978), pp. 166-91.

Chapter Two

Jesuit Science Through Korean Eyes

Father Matteo Ricci learned soon after his arrival in China that he could make his Christian message more palatable to Chinese taste by packaging Christianity in Confucian colors. He could further strengthen its appeal through association with Western accomplishments in cartography, astronomy, and mathematics. The Riccian approach of cultural accommodation to Chinese Confucian mores was partially curtailed by papal decrees in the early eighteenth century.¹ The other feature of Ricci's plan for bringing the Chinese to Christ, his borrowing of European advances in science and technology to promote Western religion, overcame initial opposition within the church and survived.² By 1644 the German Jesuit Adam Schall had been appointed director of the Imperial Bureau of Astronomy in Peking. Except for a brief hiatus in the 1660s, Jesuits continued to serve as China's official astronomers until Rome ordered the global suppression of the Society of Jesus in 1773.³ This Riccian presentation of Catholicism as compatible with Confucianism and cloaked in scientific and

technological expertise is the version of Western learning that Koreans first encountered.

The Korean response to the encounter with Catholicism was as diverse as the Jesuit scholarship they were responding to. Jesuit writings on Catholic ethics, philosophy, theology, world geography, astronomy, and other natural sciences all provoked comment, eliciting praise by some and criticism by others. A survey of their reactions to some of the startling scientific ideas introduced by the missionaries from Europe can give us a glimpse of the impression the Jesuit picture of Western civilization, Western religion, and Western science made on Korean minds.

Not long after his arrival in China at the end of the sixteenth century, Ricci announced that "the earth is round and has inhabitants living all around it."⁴ The Chinese, who believed that they lived in the center of the world, were surprised by this challenge to the popular East Asian belief that heaven was round but the earth was square.⁵ Koreans, who received a copy of a Jesuit map of the world as early as 1603, were just as surprised as the Chinese.⁶

For the next century and a half Koreans debated this European assertion. Some rejected outright the claim that the earth was a sphere; others accepted Jesuit geography without drawing from it the conclusions the Jesuits hoped they would draw. The Jesuit map of the heavens, with its twelve solid crystalline spheres surrounding the round

earth, was equally controversial, winning acceptance from some but being rejected by others.

Ricci presented himself as a scientist and a scholar as well as a priest to win legitimacy for his presence in China, to overcome the Chinese tendency to view all non-Chinese as barbarians, and to convert the Confucian world to Christianity. An important part of the missionary strategy he adopted was to use those elements in the natural science of his time in which the West surpassed China to "season with an intellectual flavoring" his religious message.⁷ Ricci was acting on two assumptions shared by most of the Jesuits who followed him in the China mission from the end of the Ming through the first century and a half of the Ch'ing dynasty. Those missionary priests who served as officials in China's Imperial Bureau of Astronomy felt that their secular responsibilities complemented rather than hindered their spiritual mission. They believed that Chinese, as well as other East Asians influenced by Confucian values, would be drawn by admiration for Jesuit skill in predicting celestial phenomena to trust in Western cosmology. They expected further that acceptance of the Catholic picture of the physical structure of the universe would lead to belief in the Catholic doctrines. The Jesuits in China assumed that once they had won respect for Jesuit reasoning regarding nature, respect for Jesuit authority in faith and morals

would naturally follow.

The missionaries never attempted to hide the theological assumptions behind their scientific work. On the contrary, they would often preface their writings on astronomy with the argument that an orderly universe indicates the existence of an Orderer, a Lord of Heaven (T'ien-chu). For example, in a 1615 introduction to Ptolemaic astronomy, T'ien-wen lüeh (A Catechism of the Heavens), Emmanuel Diaz (1574-1659) wrote

If you enter a great elegant and majestic palace and find the interior arranged quite tastefully and all the staff working orderly and diligently, even if you don't see the master of that palace, you can be sure someone powerful, wealthy, and wise is in charge there. Think how much more majestic is the Celestial Vault, how much more beautiful is the arrangement of the Sun, the moon, and the five planets in the sky; how much more orderly is the rotation of the seasons and the fecundity of the cosmos. Who can behold such a magnificent spectacle and yet deny the Lord who created and rules over heaven, earth, and the myriad things within.

The Jesuits learned soon after their arrival in China that they could predict solar and lunar eclipses as well as other celestial movement more accurately than the Chinese. They assumed that their calendrical calculations were more exact because they were based on a more accurate geometric map of the universe, reflecting the actual constitution of physical reality.⁹ Practical success in applied astronomy provided confirmation that their cosmological theories were correct. Precise prediction of celestial phenomena was possible because the universe itself was orderly and

amenable to mathematical representation. This regularity in empyreal movement, in turn, was possible because the universe was regulated by a Regulator, the Christian God who created the universe and continued to govern it.¹⁰

In the West, at least for the last four centuries, theory and practice in natural science have become inseparable. The modern science of the heavens was born in the sixteenth century with the joining of cosmological theory with astronomical practice. Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) married the astronomical data contained in Ptolemaic tables to the philosophical presuppositions of Aristotelian cosmology. For centuries natural philosophers in Europe had taught that the universe was composed of twelve concentric crystalline spheres with the earth immobile at the center. Celestial bodies were depicted as moving in uniform circles on those spheres at constant rates of speed. Practicing astronomers, on the other hand, based their predictions on a model of the heavens in which all motion was charted along forty circles, both eccentrics ("circular orbits whose centers lie a short distance from the center of fixed stars") and epicycles ("circles whose centers move along the eccentric orbits").¹¹ These eccentrics and epicycles were treated as mathematical fictions rather than as cosmological claims.¹² Astronomers refrained from interfering with the philosophers' theorizing.

Copernicus was bothered by the inaccuracies in the ephemerides available to astronomers of his day and by the inconsistencies between what astronomers recorded and what natural philosophers taught. He attempted to reconcile theory and practice by devising a model of the cosmos that would allow both more accurate predictions to be made and the Aristotelian assumptions of how celestial bodies moved to be preserved. He did so, as we all know today, by pushing the earth out of the center of the universe and putting the sun in its place.¹³ Copernicus believed that his heliostatic system not only provided a better base for the mathematical formulae used in calendrical calculation but was also an accurate description of how the universe was constructed.

The first Jesuits in China did not adopt Copernicus's displacement of the earth, but taught instead the Aristotelian doctrine of geocentric celestial spheres. Nevertheless, they appropriated the tie between theory and practice, which Copernicus had established, to argue for the truth of Catholic cosmology, natural philosophy, and religion from the accuracy of Jesuit calendars and the precision with which Jesuit astronomers predicted the onset and duration of solar eclipses. The response of Joao Rodrigues (1561?-1633), when challenged by one Korean on some specifics of his Aristotelian description of the heavens, is representative of the Jesuit argument.

Rodrigues replied that errors had crept into Chinese ephemerides because Chinese astronomers did not know why celestial bodies moved the way they did and therefore could not ground their calculations on reality. Rodrigues assured his questioner that once the Jesuits had reformed the Chinese calendar, it would never need corrections again, proving that Catholic cosmology was correct.¹⁴

The link between astronomy, cosmology, and theology was argued implicitly by the publication in Peking in 1626 of T'ien-hsüeh ch'u-han (An Introduction to Heavenly Learning), a collection of Jesuit writings with equal space devoted to ethics and religion, on the one hand, and astronomy and mathematics, on the other. The term t'ien-hsüeh itself was probably selected for its fruitful ambiguity, since it can refer either to the study of the heavens (i.e., astronomy) or the study of Heaven (i.e., God). Although the actual link in Jesuit astronomy between theory and practice grew tenuous as the need to display advanced technical skill compelled Jesuit astronomers to use the latest Copernican tables from Europe at a time when church authorities forbade them to teach Copernican cosmology, the missionaries hid that embarrassing discrepancy as best they could and continued to present their astronomy, cosmology, and religion as a coherent unity.

They continued to claim knowledge of the true structure

of the universe even after the crystalline spheres had dissolved and been replaced by the modified geocentrism of Tycho Brahe (1546-1601). The Jesuit dream was that Chinese impressed with Western science would also be impressed with the Western religion that accompanied it. Joseph Needham has unveiled the presuppositions behind that campaign. "The implicit logic was that only Christendom could have produced [the new science]. Every correct eclipse prediction was thus an indirect demonstration of the truth of Christian theology."¹⁵

Such Jesuit hopes were based on a misreading of European assumptions into Sino-Confucian culture. During the T'ang dynasty, Chinese divorced cosmology from astronomy.¹⁶ From then until modern times, East Asian astronomers limited themselves to providing maps of the skies and precise predictions of the movements of the sun, the moon, the planets, and the stars so that accurate ephemerides could be compiled. It was not their job to concoct theories that explained why the heavenly bodies moved the way they did. Consequently, as Nakayama has observed, Chinese astronomers traditionally displayed little interest in the mechanistic geometric models characteristic of Ptolemaic astronomy. "Chinese astronomy showed no concern for projection in space; for all purposes of measurement, heaven was two-dimensional."¹⁷ What shape the cosmos took was left for philosophers to decide.

The Sung philosophers who revived Confucian thought in the eleventh and twelfth centuries took up the challenge. Though they lacked specialized knowledge of the techniques of astronomers or of the data astronomers had gathered, Chang Tsai (1020-77) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200) debated the relative merits of the various cosmological theories found in Chinese tradition. In Neo-Confucian discussions of the hun-t'ien (渾天) theory of a spherical heaven that surrounds the earth like the white of an egg surrounds the yolk or of the more popular kai-t'ien (蓋天) theory in which the earth is conceived of as a rounded bowl that is square at the base and has the sky as a hemispherical cover over it, we find no signs of the common Western correlation of theoretical with experimental data. This separation of cosmological theory and astronomical practice meant that more time than the Jesuits had anticipated was required to coax Koreans to take even the first step in the two-stage progression from astronomy to Christianity. The Confucian tradition allowed skepticism regarding Western cosmology to coexist alongside admiration for Western astronomy.

The missionaries were eventually successful in gaining recognition of their claim to describe the cosmos as accurately as they predicted its movements, to know not only where and when celestial objects would move but also why and how such movement occurred. By the end of the seventeenth century, most knowledgeable Chinese and Korean

scholars were convinced that the world was indeed round. The matching concentric spheres also won acceptance, to such an extent that one European observer of Chinese culture in the nineteenth century ridiculed the popular belief in those spheres as outmoded remnants of Chinese tradition.¹⁸ The twelve crystalline orbs also survived as explanatory tools in the astronomy section of the Chŭngbo munhŏn pigo, the revised and updated version of Korea's official encyclopedia, printed in 1908.¹⁹

Persuading Koreans to take the next step, from cosmology to religion, proved more difficult. Most Korean and Chinese Confucians who accepted the Catholic diagram of the structure of the cosmos as factual ignored and rejected the Jesuit assumption that such facts had philosophical or theological implications. A late eighteenth-century Chinese comment on Diaz's T'ien-wen lüeh, found in the Ssu-k'ü ch'üan shu tsung-mu t'i-yao, is probably representative of the informed Confucian reaction two centuries after the Jesuit mission began. Diaz's explanations and calculations earned praise as superior to those previously available, but his insertion of theology into his handbook on astronomy was damned as deceptively borrowing the validity of his mathematics to counter arguments against the existence of his God. "Let us set aside those absurdities he is trying to foist on us and keep only those techniques which are precise and

well-grounded."²⁰ Yi Ik (1681-1763), a Korean scholar writing on the T'ien-wen lüeh a few years earlier, simply ignored the religious elements in Diaz's work and confined his approbation to its Aristotelian cosmology.²¹ Jesuit astronomy and cosmology were widely adopted only after they were purged of the Christian doctrines, which were the missionaries' reasons for offering them.

The Jesuits who came to China were followers of the medieval Scholastic philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and students of the natural science of early Renaissance Europe. They represented a period of transition in Western thought, just after the link between theory and practice had been established and just before the link between science and religion was severed. Their Scholasticism appeared in Ricci's introductory apologia for his faith, where he presented the argument from Aquinas that logic and natural reason, unaided by divine revelation, can guide men from the recognition that there is order in the universe to the realization that there is an Orderer, a Supreme Being whom all mankind must love and respect.²²

The leap from the existential claim that God exists to the moral demand that all men worship God is an example of the derivation of an "ought" from an "is" that the British philosopher David Hume (1711-76) complained had marred all moral reasoning in the West up to his time.²³ This assumption of a logical bridge between the world of fact

and the realm of value has often meant in practice that changes in the way the natural world is interpreted can threaten traditional moral principles. Ethics grounded in nature is vulnerable to shifts in man's perception of that ground. Men may rush to defend their values by denying new discoveries or theories in science that appear to undermine them.

The Jesuit missionaries to China intended to produce the opposite effect. They believed that the undeniable superiority of the Western science they brought would undermine traditional East Asian science and the Neo-Confucianism associated with it. Just when science was beginning to encroach upon Christianity in the West, these Christian missionaries planned to use science to weaken the hold Neo-Confucianism and Sinocentrism had on the East.

In recent centuries, men have grown accustomed to the spectacle of conflict between science and religion. Religious values rooted in cosmological beliefs galvanized the Catholic church in 1616 into suppressing heliocentric cosmology and today incite Christian fundamentalist attacks on the teaching of evolution. When man's claim to a special place in the universe is challenged, whether as the inhabitant of the center around which all else revolves or as the unique product of creation in the image of his Maker, the notion of man's special relationship to God, with all the moral obligations on man that entails, appears

to grow problematic.

The Jesuits represented, however, a Roman Catholic civilization that denied any possible contradictions between the teachings of true religion and the findings of true science. Science, to them, was the study of God's handiwork and, unless abused, would lead to greater, not less, respect and love for the Creator. When properly handled, science would remain a loyal servant of the church and a legitimate tool in the promotion of Christian doctrines.

The particular relationship that the Jesuits saw between science and religion underlay their assumption that cosmology led to Christianity. Science produced statements about causation that, when turned over to philosophers, were transformed into statements about God as First Cause. The philosophers then became theologians who built the foundations of the Catholic religion and Catholic ethics from the statement that God exists. The Jesuits presumed that once they had convinced the Confucians of God's existence it would be relatively simple to persuade them to worship that God through the Catholic church.

Catholic religious discourse can be interpreted to be largely value judgments masquerading as factual assertions. The claim that God exists demands more than intellectual assent. Religious dogmas are inseparable from and incomprehensible without the moral imperatives they imply.

When the Jesuits preached that there existed a God above who would judge men after death and consign them either to heaven or hell depending on their conduct in this life, they were trying to influence the behavior as well as the beliefs of their audience. As the twentieth-century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein has pointed out, statements of religious belief are more like pictures intended to regulate conduct than descriptions of reality.²⁴

The Jesuits, of course, saw their theology as more than regulatory metaphor. They believed that God, heaven, and hell really did exist and therefore men were obliged to take those facts into account when deciding how to act. This dual role of theology, making claims about what existed as well as about what men should do, allowed it to serve as the bridge from science to Christian morality. Jesuit apologetics could move from discussions of the cosmos to declarations of ethical imperatives without appearing to leap any large logical chasms.

The Jesuits did not realize that Confucian thought did not follow Western channels or make the same connections. In the Neo-Confucian philosophy that dominated intellectual life in China and Korea at the time of the Jesuit mission to China, ethics enjoyed an autonomy it lacked in the Catholic West. Rather than religion generating morality, in Confucian tradition morality dominated religion. Religious ideas had to pass the test of compatibility with

Confucian values before winning respectability.²⁵

Unaccustomed to drawing ethical conclusions from astronomical practice or cosmological theorizing, suspicious of theological talk, and rejecting any attempt by religion to define morality, few Confucians followed the Jesuit path from crystalline celestial spheres to the Catholic church. Traditionally, debates over the merits of cosmological hypotheses had little, if any, effect on Confucian moral thinking. No one model of the structure of the cosmos had been accepted as canonical, therefore challenges to those models in no way discredited the moral principles contained in the Chinese Classics. The commitment to Neo-Confucianism escaped unscathed from the victories of Jesuit astronomers in eclipse prediction. Respect for Jesuit technical achievements did not produce many Confucians falling on their knees in devotion to the Jesuits' God.

The history of Korean reactions to the Jesuit marketing of religion through science abounds with cases of Koreans responding contrary to missionary expectations. Astronomy was uncoupled from cosmology, which, in turn, was isolated from theology and morality. The conceptual roots of the incompatibility between Catholicism and Confucian culture find concrete expression in these Korean responses in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to world maps, star charts, and astronomical handbooks prepared by the Jesuits.

The initial response was doubt that the earth was round and mistrust of Aristotelian cosmology, combined with recognition of the skill Jesuit astronomers displayed.

Acceptance of the Western Calendar

In 1631 Chŏng Tuvŏn (1581-?), a Korean government official on a diplomatic mission to China, met the Portuguese Jesuit Joao Rodrigues in the Chinese city of Tengchow. Rodrigues presented Chŏng with a number of books on Western astronomy and geography, as well as world maps, a telescope, a sundial, an automatic striking clock, and a pair of guns. Chŏng was obviously much impressed with Rodrigues, describing him in a report to the Korean throne as skilled in astronomy, calendrical calculation, and gun manufacturing, with "a noble spirit and graceful appearance. He was like one of the immortals."²⁶

The telescope Chŏng brought back from China had been invented only a couple of decades earlier in Europe. Koreans treated that telescope as primarily a military tool that would allow a man to "observe clearly even the smallest details of an enemy camp a great distance away." They did not use it for astronomical observation.²⁷ The automatic striking clock was a puzzling toy. Kim Yuk (1580-1658) reported that "No one understood the mystery of how it worked. People all laughed at it." It was another fifteen or twenty years before anyone in Korea deciphered the secret of telling time by counting the number of times

the clock struck.²⁸ As for the books Rodrigues gave Chong, we do not know who read them or what happened to them or to the guns and other presents. Around a century later Yi Ik noted that only Diaz's T'ien-wen lüeh and the Chih-fang wai chi (On World Geography) by Julius Aleni (1582-1649) survived.²⁹ All else, the guns, the sundial, the telescope, and the striking clock, disappeared from Korean records before the seventeenth century was out.

Chong's assistant, Yi Yŏnghu, sent Rodrigues a letter thanking him for those presents and requesting further information on Western techniques of calendar calculation. Yi's letter and Rodrigues's reply provide the first record of an exchange of views between a Korean official and a European missionary and show how far apart they were in their thinking. Yi's letter shows the same Sinocentrism and the same respect for the accuracy of the Western calendar combined with skepticism toward Western astronomical theory that characterized much of the early Korean attitude toward Western science. Rodrigues's answer presents the same attempt to argue from the superiority of the Western calendar to the superiority of Western religion that marked so much Jesuit missionary writing in China.³⁰

Yi praised the Jesuits for their ability to ascertain exactly "where the sun and the moon will be at any given time, with the five planets falling into their proper places like pearls on a string."³¹ He confessed that he

was impressed when he learned that Westerners could produce more accurate ephemerides than those compiled by Chinese. He went on to say, however, that he could not accept the cosmological baggage that accompanied Jesuit astronomy. In particular, he objected to their description of the earth as a round ball at the center of a universe consisting of twelve concentric crystalline spheres, with the moon, sun, planets, and stars all affixed firmly to their respective orbs.

Yi appears to have had some difficulty comprehending the significance of the earth's rotundity. He complained that, on the map of the globe, the Jesuits had placed China slightly off to the right of center instead of precisely in the middle where it belonged. China belongs in the middle, he wrote Rodrigues, to show that it occupies the center of the pellucid ch'i (ether) at the heart of the world. That ch'i, which "sweeps round and, twisting back upon itself, envelops China in a two-fold blanket," is responsible for China's greatness, having stimulated the birth of a succession of sages over the ages who created a civilization unmatched anywhere in the world.³²

Rodrigues responded to Yi's assertion of Chinese superiority with the retort that it did not really matter where China was on the map, since "on a sphere any country whatsoever can be the center." Besides, he added, China had no monopoly on wisdom. There had been saints and sages

in the West as well. As proof, he offered the "Heavenly Learning" of the West, both the astronomy-cosmology and the religion.

Yi gave no clues in his letter to his evaluation of the Christian religion, although it was probably unfavorable. He does sharply criticize the Jesuit cosmological schematic. Yi objected to the spheres for separating the five planets from the fixed stars. Korean astronomers, following Chinese practice, plotted the movement of the sun, the moon, and the planets into constellations along the equatorial line in order to calculate the divisions of the calendrical cycle. However, the Jesuits placed the fixed stars on one of the outermost spheres and gave the sun, the moon, and the planets their own separate spheres closer to the earth so that their paths never crossed. This rendered meaningless the traditional coordinates of suk (宿, C. hsiu, constellations) and ch'a (次, C. tz'u, Jupiter stations), used to identify segments of the calendar year in East Asia. Yi feared that if Western cosmology were accepted Jupiter could not be seen as moving through the stars, and the sun and the moon could not be seen as dwelling in sequence in the twenty-four constellations that marked their progress across the sky.

Yi also protested that the Jesuits had moved the equatorial line to heaven's apex, though by definition it should run right through the middle of the heavens.

Aristotelian cosmology located the equatorial on the primum mobile, the highest material sphere, with no stars of its own but turning the stars and planets below it as it made one complete revolution a day. Placing the celestial equator beyond the stars eviscerated the equatorial coordinates that were the heart of East Asian astronomy.

In the astronomy preached by the Jesuits, the ecliptic assumed more importance than the equatorial. The ecliptic, which the Chinese and Koreans took to be the mean path of the sun and the planets, was the line along which Jesuit astronomers calculated the movement of the zodiac. In Yi's critical eyes, this left the planets, on their separate spheres, with no paths to follow.

Rodrigues brushed aside all of Yi's objections with the rejoinder that the successful application of Western astronomy would prove the validity of Jesuit cosmology. Ironically, today Yi's support of the polar, equatorial astronomy of the Chinese places him in a better light than Rodrigues with his fixed stars along ecliptical coordinates on crystalline spheres. According to Joseph Needham, "the system of celestial coordinates used throughout the modern world is essentially Chinese."³³ European astronomers, beginning with Tycho Brahe in the sixteenth century, have found equatorial coordinates more convenient in devising astronomical instruments, something Chinese astronomers, with their greater experience in observing the heavens, had

long known.

Yi's questioning of the concentric spheres in space also places him closer to modern science than Rodrigues was. The modern world has abandoned the spheres for the ancient Chinese picture of stars floating in infinite, empty space.³⁴ However, Yi was not so much interested in defending Chinese cosmology in his exchange with Rodrigues as he was in protecting the integrity of astronomy. In effect, he charged that the Jesuits were forcing three-dimensional cosmology onto astronomy where two dimensions would suffice.

Chinese and Korean astronomers were concerned less with the structure of the heavens than with what happened there. The specific physical contours of the cosmos were irrelevant to what they perceived as the main task of astronomy: predicting the movement of the sun, the moon, the planets, and the stars.

It is hard to find in the development of Chinese astronomy any notable tendency towards conceptual schemes or mechanistic or geometrical models. The approach of the Chinese official astronomers was to represent numerically the course of the celestial bodies without depending upon a geometrical model.³⁵

East Asian astronomers could forecast astronomical events with relative accuracy by treating celestial objects as moving points in the sky, setting aside any consideration of what external forces made those points move or what shape or dimensions the sky and its occupants took.

Standing firm within his tradition, Yi saw astronomy as a practical, not a theoretical, science. He rejected the spheres as an unnecessary complication of the astronomers' work and an unwarranted intrusion by cosmology into the domain where bare mathematics should prevail. The Jesuit strategy of arguing from the accuracy of their calendars to the validity of their natural philosophy failed to persuade traditional thinkers such as Yi, who thought in terms of a division of labor that drew no automatic connection between astronomical precision and cosmological truth.

Thirty-two years after Ch'ŏng reported to his government on his meeting with Rodrigues, the Yi dynasty officially adopted Western methods of calendrical calculation. In 1653 the Sihŏn (時憲, C. Shih-hsien) calendar replaced the old-style calendars, dating back 365 years to Kuo Shuo-ching of the Yuan dynasty in China, on the advice of Kim Yuk, then the director of the Bureau of Astronomy and Meteorology. Kim argued successfully that the reliability of the Jesuit ephemerides and the formulae from which they were derived merited their adoption.³⁶

This embrace of the Jesuit calendar by the Yi dynasty in the seventeenth century deserves our close attention. Korean acceptance without much debate of a calendar clearly Western in origin shows that traditional Korea had few misgivings about accepting products of non-Confucian civilization if they were compatible with traditional goals

and values. When one official astronomer complained in a memorial to the throne in 1650 that the Western calendar was based on alien methods, he was not objecting to the eventual use of that calendar. He was merely explaining why he was having difficulty fully understanding all the details of the new methods of calendrical calculation and needed more time to study the Jesuit books on astronomy. Court records report few challengers to the astronomer's statement that the old calendar of Kuo Shuo-ching was out of date and that the new calendar devised by Westerners was the most accurate one available to replace it.³⁷

Of course, Koreans had Chinese precedents for learning from foreign astronomers. A Persian astronomer had prepared a calendar for the Mongol rulers of China in 1267. When the Chinese regained control of their country in 1368, the first emperor of the Ming dynasty established a Muslim Astronomical Bureau alongside the Chinese Astronomical Bureau so that his regime could benefit from Arab mathematical and astronomical expertise.³⁸ In 1629, after the Jesuits had demonstrated that they could predict more accurately than either Chinese or Muslim astronomers the onset and duration of eclipses, the last Ming emperor asked the missionaries to advise the Calendrical Bureau in a revision of the official calendar.³⁹

When the Manchus captured Peking in 1644, establishing the Ch'ing dynasty, Jesuit astronomers were asked to

continue their work. The German Jesuit Adam Schall was promoted to the directorship of the Bureau of Astronomical Observation. Soon afterwards, Schall's calendrical calculations became the basis for the official calendar of the Ch'ing dynasty.⁴⁰

So the absorption of alien technicians and technology into Confucian culture was nothing new. According to the eighteenth century scholar Yi Ik,

From days long past, astrological calculation, mathematics, the fashioning of utensils, and the like have been fields in which men from the West excelled. That is why the Chinese have turned over such matters to foreign priests. You can find this confirmed by Chu Hsi himself.⁴¹

The adoption of the Sihōn calendar by the Ch'ing in 1644 and by the Koreans in 1653 was a continuation of Confucian tradition, not a break with the past.

In the seventeenth century, few Chinese, Manchu, or Koreans saw the superior technical skill of Westerners as a threat to the values of their societies or the stability of their governments. In the nineteenth century, Confucians defending their heritage against superior Western military and economic might found that they could not follow the advice of Chang Chih-tung (1837-1909) to adopt Western techniques for practical application while preserving traditional Confucian values unchanged. By then Western technology and science had grown strong enough to dominate and reshape non-Western cultures. Two centuries earlier, it was a different story. The imbalance between East and

West had not yet grown so great that the admission of Western superiority in one field implied total East Asian inferiority.

Not yet on the defensive against European military threats to national sovereignty or Western economic challenges to social stability and self-sufficiency, a government in Peking could employ European astronomers without appearing to slight the worth of Confucian civilization. Similarly, the Korean government was able to adopt Western methods of calendrical calculation, just as it was able a century earlier to consider using shipwrecked seamen to manufacture firearms, without seeing in such actions an admission that the West had any claim to equality, much less superiority, with the East.⁴² Even the Japanese in 1720, despite a record of harsh anti-Christian persecutions, exempted calendrical and astronomical treatises from a ban on Western-authored works so that their official astronomers could avail themselves of the latest and most reliable techniques.⁴³

Not all Chinese agreed that the Western control of their Bureau of Astronomical Observation was harmless. In the 1660s, a small group of xenophobes led by Yang Kuang-hsien (1597-1669) was successful for a short time in having the missionaries in Peking jailed and their astronomical accomplishments temporarily disallowed. Yang argued that the European priests and their Chinese

followers were a potentially subversive force and should not be allowed so near to the heart of the empire. After his attempts to prove Jesuit astronomy inferior to traditional Chinese methods failed and the priest-astronomers were reinstated, Yang continued to complain that it would be better to have an inaccurate calendar than to permit Westerners to stay in China. "Even with an inaccurate calendar, the Han dynasty still lasted for over four hundred years."⁴⁴

Despite its reputation for more rigid adherence to Confucian orthodoxy than China itself, Korea had no such vocal anti-Western minority in the seventeenth century. Koreans followed the Ch'ing in discontinuing use of the Western calendar during Yang's ascendancy at the Chinese astronomical bureau, though the Koreans appear to have believed that the Ch'ing had abandoned the Western calendar because of possible inaccuracies, not because of its alien roots. King Hyŏnjong ordered that a calendar prepared according to Western methods be maintained to see how it compared to those being promulgated in Peking.⁴⁵ He apparently wanted to decide for himself whether Peking's temporary reversal of astronomical policy was justified.

Korea was not blindly following the lead of the rulers in Peking when it made the decision to adopt the Western calendar in 1653. Quite the contrary. Korean officials went against the wishes of the Ch'ing court in altering

that calendar to make it more appropriate to conditions on the peninsula. Koreans believed that there was an intimate connection between events in the heavens and events on earth. A comet streaking through the sky had more than purely astronomical significance. If predicted by the official calendar, that comet confirmed the monarch's status as the link between man and earth and thus strengthened his right to rule. A comet that appeared without warning became an ominous portent proclaiming heaven's displeasure with the ruling house.⁴⁶ The Korean court needed reliable notification of impending celestial events. The Sihŏn calendar calculated and promulgated in Peking could not suffice, for it foretold only what would happen in Chinese skies, and was not designed to forecast with equal precision what Koreans would see when they turned their eyes heavenward.

A perfunctory implementation of the new Chinese calendar that did not take into account the changes in longitude and latitude from Peking to Seoul could have brought more harm than good to the Yi dynasty. Total subservience to Peking astronomers might strengthen the claim of the emperor of China to be the ruler of all under heaven, but it would thus underscore Korean dependency on China. Moreover, an eclipse or the appearance of a comet over Korea not predicted by astronomers in Peking could threaten the legitimacy of the Korean king. When the

Ch'ing government forwarded a copy of the new calendar to Korea, they did not include information on how that calendar had been calculated. Koreans had to find out for themselves the formulae needed to adjust the calendar to Korean conditions, just as they had done for the previous calendars since the time of King Sejong (r. 1418-50).⁴⁷

Obtaining that information was not easy. As Kim Yuk pointed out in his 1645 memorial urging adoption of the Western calendar, since China did not permit tributary nations to draw up their own calendars, Korea had to be discreet in sending men to Peking to learn the Western methods.⁴⁸ Discretion, plus substantial quantities of silver placed in the right hands, enabled Korea to circumvent Ch'ing restrictions and obtain enough information on the means of calculating the movement of the sun and the moon to promulgate its own version of a calendar based on Western techniques in 1653.⁴⁹ Ch'ing barriers to the release of astronomical data to foreigners prevented Koreans from learning the additional information on planetary movement necessary to fully implement their own Sihon calendar until 1708, however.⁵⁰ To keep abreast of later refinements of the astronomers' art introduced from the West, Korea added an occasional astronomer to the entourage of official tribute missions to Peking. As late as 1823, despite an official policy of suppression of Catholicism at home, Korean records reveal that court

astronomers were still seeking out Catholic astronomers in Peking with the blessing of the Korean court.⁵¹

A modern reader is struck by how seldom mention of Western religion or cosmology appears in the official accounts of discussions on Western methods of calendrical calculation. Until well into the eighteenth century, Koreans continued to treat astronomy as a matter of mathematical formulae barren of any theoretical or metaphysical overtones. For example, as late as half a century after Korea endorsed Western calendrical science, resistance to Jesuit cosmology remained. In 1720 some opposition to the notion that the earth is round still persisted.

Yi Imy^ung (1658-1722), a Korean envoy to the Ch'ing court in 1720, met a couple of the Jesuit missionaries while he was in Peking. Following that meeting, Yi wrote Frs. Ignatius Kogler (1680-1746) and Joseph Suares (1656-1736) for further information on their methods for calculating the movements of the stars and the planets. In his letter Yi informed the European priests that his high regard for their technical expertise did not mean that he gave equal credence to their cosmological and geographical theories. He wrote that he had no quarrel with their statement that heaven is curved. Everyone agrees that it can be seen to rise in the middle above us and to drop down at the edges off in the distance. However, only men from

the West claim that the earth, too, is round. "I don't know on what grounds you make such an inference."⁵²

The missionaries apparently gave Yi some religious tracts, along with the astronomical handbooks, when he visited them. Yi told them he found the writings of Ricci and Aleni quite interesting. He had no objections to the little he had learned of Catholic ethics.

Your approach of living as if always in the presence of Sangje (C. Shang-ti) and of striving to recover your original nature does not seem much different from our Confucian approach. Unlike the Taoists, with their nihilism, and the Buddhists, with their quietism, not once do you threaten morality or deny principle by blocking the path to loyalty and filial piety.

To the missionaries' dismay, Yi praised Catholic teachings only where he found them supportive of his Confucian values. When the Jesuits tried to lead him beyond Confucianism to Catholic theology, he demurred.

Your story of the descent of the Lord of Heaven resembles those told of the Buddha's birth. Your doctrine of reward in heaven and retribution in hell--how can that be? If you think you can transform the entire world with such nonsense, you face quite a difficult task.⁵³

Detaching religion from morality and cosmology from astronomy, Yi dismembered the Jesuit argument that the accuracy of the Western calendars validated Christian theology.

There were those who followed the Jesuits part of the way and accepted a link between reliable astronomy and trustworthy cosmology. Nevertheless, few were willing to

climb the next step and accept the religious core of the Jesuit message. One of the first Koreans to publicly declare support for Western cosmology was the writer and official Kim Manjung (1637-92), who wrote that the Western hypothesis of a spherical earth compelled belief, as it far surpassed the traditional kai (蓋) and hun (渾) theories in consistency and explanatory power. He criticized those who doubted that men could actually live on a sphere as having the proverbial limited vision of a frog in a well. He went on to suggest the possibility that the spherical earth rotated, dismissing the objections that a revolving earth would leave people hanging upside down as no more a valid refutation of the rotation of the earth than it was of the earth's sphericity. Despite his admiration for Jesuit astronomy and cosmology, Kim did not feel that the effectiveness of Western science enhanced the appeal of Western religion. Catholicism appeared to him to be merely an offshoot of Buddhism.⁵⁴

It is not known which works on European cosmology Kim had read. The earliest Jesuit writings were complete with illustrations of the twelve crystalline spheres encasing a stationary earth. In the 1630s the missionary astronomers quietly dropped those spheres, along with Ptolemy's epicycles, in favor of the theologically acceptable variation on Copernicanism of Tycho Brahe. Jesuits began teaching through their Chinese language publications that

the planets revolved around the sun rather than around the earth. The sun itself was placed in orbit around the immobile earth still at its post in the center of the universe. Heliocentrism was not mentioned, having been condemned as heretical in 1616. Not until Copernicus's De Revolutionibus was removed from the church's index of forbidden books in 1757 could the scientist-priests in China dislodge the earth and send it in motion around the sun.⁵⁵

Though forbidden to mention the annual revolution of the earth around the sun, the Jesuits were allowed to discuss the globe's diurnal rotation. Unlike heliocentrism, that hypothesis had not been branded as contrary to the scriptures. Consequently, James Rho (1590-1638) brought up the earth's daily rotation on its own axis as one theory heard in the West but immediately refuted it with arguments supporting the orthodox doctrine that the earth remained stationary at the middle of a revolving universe.⁵⁶

The eighteenth-century scholar Yi Ik admired Western science and accepted without question that the earth was round, despite the objections of some among his contemporaries.⁵⁷ Yi also weighed the soundness of the conjecture that the earth rotated. He ended up agreeing with what he had read in Jesuit books.

Yi read and wrote more widely about natural science

than did most of his fellow Neo-Confucian literati.⁵⁸ Several short essays dealing with astronomy and cosmology can be found in his Sŏngho sasŏl, a multi-volume collection of miscellaneous musing. He had nothing but praise for the Western calendar, which he said was so accurate that even the Sages would follow it if they were still alive. His only caveat was that the Western calendar dealt solely with the world of phenomena and did not plumb the hidden meanings behind celestial events. It was "a calendar for men, not a calendar of heaven." Astrologers who read men's fate would do better to refer to old-style calendars. Yi refused to grant astrological or metaphysical significance to Western advances in calendrical science.⁵⁹

Yi Ik was not and did not intend to be a scientist. He was a Confucian scholar disposed to analyzing and evaluating what others said about nature instead of personally engaging in direct empirical examination of the material world. Yi stands out in eighteenth-century Korea for the depth and breadth of his discussions of both Western science and Western religion. In his excursions into natural philosophy and Jesuit publications, Yi wielded the twin tools of a formidable intellect well-honed on moral, metaphysical, and political issues and a vast store of knowledge acquired from wide-ranging readings in both Confucian and non-Confucian sources.⁶⁰

For example, on the hypothesis of the rotation of the

earth, Yi reached back beyond Jesuit statements on that question to note that in the fourth-century Chinese state of Chin, one Yu Hsi had proposed a cosmology of a stationary heaven and a rotating earth.⁶¹ He also observed that Chuang-tzu and Chu Hsi, too, had raised the possibility that it might be the earth rather than heaven that moved in one complete turn every day. He pointed out further that no matter whether the figures the West provided or those given by Chinese astronomers for the size of the empyrean were correct, there was no doubt heaven was extremely large and must move incredibly fast to complete a full revolution every day.⁶² Nevertheless, despite the support he found for the earth's rotation, he concluded the evidence that it was heaven which was turning was even stronger.

What was the evidence? First, Yi cited classical Confucian authority: the Book of Changes said, "the movement of heaven is full of power."⁶³ Therefore, Yi reasoned, heaven does have enough strength to make one full revolution every day despite its great size. Second, Westerners said that heaven revolved around the earth. The accuracy of their calendar attested to the truth of that assumption. Third, borrowing an argument from Chu Hsi, Yi Ik wrote that traditional cosmology demanded that the earth remain still. The earth was held in place in the middle of the universe by the constant rotation of heaven around it.

If the earth moved, it would throw itself out of balance and drop out of position.⁶⁴

On questions of natural philosophy, Yi sided with what appeared most rational. Rationality did not mean rigid adherence to the words of the founders of Neo-Confucianism. He rejected Ch'eng Yi-ch'uan's explanation of the tides as the result of evaporation in favor of the Western explanation that the pull of the moon caused the seas to rise and fall, for example. Nor did rationality mean unquestioning acquiescence to the claims of Jesuit science. Yi spurned the twelfth unmoving sphere of Aristotelian-Scholastic cosmology as detracting from the motion of the heavens needed to maintain earth in its place.⁶⁵

Rationality in Yi Ik's philosophy meant agreement with the moral message of the Confucian Classics and compatibility with sense experience. Yi Ik was open to the West when it offered better explanations of sensory phenomena than Confucian tradition could furnish. However, he turned his back when the Jesuits claimed the right to either alter or add to Confucian ethical principles and moral practice.

Astronomy Cleansed of Theology

Yi's respect for the achievements of Western science as practiced by the Jesuits did not have the effect the missionaries assumed it would have. It did not shake his faith in his own tradition. In fact, the findings of

Jesuit science seemed to him at times to support that tradition, as seen in his linking of the Book of Changes, the Western calendar, and Chu Hsi in the argument against the rotation of the earth. Nor did admiration for Jesuit accomplishments in calendrical calculation lead him to embrace Western religion. Yi read many of the Jesuit books on ethics and theology and was favorably impressed with the high moral standards the missionaries upheld in their writings and in their lives, but was not as impressed with Catholic religious doctrines. He described talk of God and of spiritual being in Jesuit writings as "grains of sand and pieces of grit" that mar what would otherwise be orthodox publications.⁶⁶

Esteem for the Western command of scientific fact did not move Yi to accept Western authority in religious dogma. As he told his disciple An Ch'ongbok (1712-91), he trusted what the men from the West said about the sky and about the earth but not what they said about their "Lord of Heaven."⁶⁷ The traditional relegation of cosmology and religion to separate spheres subordinate to the morality of the Confucian tradition to which Yi was heir guaranteed Yi that no cosmological challenge from the West would affect his moral obligations. He could not be convinced that he should worship a foreign God by men he viewed as mere technicians--talented technicians, it was true, but technicians nonetheless. He was susceptible to no

Copernican revolution in values through the influence of Jesuit science.

For all his interest in natural philosophy and scientific theory, Yi showed little interest in scientific practice. He did not realize that the celestial spheres so important in the early Jesuit works he read did not appear in later cosmological treatises, since by the middle of the seventeenth century Jesuit astronomers were plotting planetary orbits along elliptical rather than circular orbits. Nor does he appear to have known that two official astronomers in Korea, in the latter half of the seventeenth century, had constructed geocentric orreries, demonstrational armillary spheres, that suggest the earth's diurnal rotation. These astronomical clocks, made by Song Iyŏng and Yi Minch'ŏl, each contained an inner terrestrial globe that was connected to the polar axis of the armillary sphere in such a way that the terrestrial sphere rotated one full turn each day.⁶⁸

In this lack of attention to the practice of astronomers even in his own country, Yi resembles Hong Taeyong (1731-83), a minor government official and scholar who also dabbled in cosmological speculation. In Korea today, Hong is admired for being an early advocate of the diurnal rotation of the earth. Hong and his friends thought that Hong's discovery that the earth made a complete turn on its own axis once a day was original to

him.⁶⁹ They were apparently unaware of the astronomical clocks built by their countrymen a century earlier. Nor, despite meeting with Jesuit astronomers in Peking three times in 1766, does Hong indicate any knowledge of Copernican cosmology, though the priests were by that time free to teach the rotation of the earth as well as heliocentrism.⁷⁰ In fact, Hong criticized the West for recognizing that the world was round without drawing the inescapable conclusion that the world therefore cannot be immobile, since it is the nature of round objects to rotate.⁷¹

Hong, like Yi Ik, admired the precision of Jesuit astronomers. Unlike Yi, he did not take that precision as proof that Western cosmology was an accurate description of physical reality. Instead, he looked with a critical eye at both Western and traditional Chinese cosmologies and came up with what he thought was an original hypothesis that improved on what either civilization had offered previously.

Hong was a philosopher, not a practicing astronomer, but unlike other Korean Confucian scholars, he kept a set of astronomical instruments at his home. However, they appear to have been only for amusement, as he left no records of ever having used them for systematic observation of the heavens.⁷² Hong acknowledged that Western science had built its great accomplishments on a foundation of

mathematics supplemented by careful observations, yet he himself did not adopt that Western approach.⁷³

Hong's rotating earth theory resembles those suggested by Herakleides in ancient Greece and Nicholau Oresme in fourteenth-century France, men who also speculated that maybe our eyes deceive us and it was really the earth that was turning instead of heaven. All three found their revolving globe in their imaginations, not in the astronomers' data. No more than Yi Ik did Hong see the need to combine theory with practice or to test his hypothesis against reality. Both Hong and his friend Pak Chiwŏn (1737-1805) confess the abstract impracticality of his cosmological vision, admitting that it was more convenient for calendrical calculation and astronomical observation to assume that the earth was stationary and heaven alone was moving than that the earth rotated on its axis once a day.⁷⁴

When Hong visited Frs. Augustine von Hallerstein (1703-74) and Anton Gogeisl (1701-71) at the South Church in Peking, the priests naturally tried to have Hong adopt the same interest in their religion he had shown toward their science. Hong's record of his conversation with those two missionaries shows, however, that he asked only a few perfunctory questions about the priests' religious beliefs. He was more interested in seeing the Jesuits' astronomical apparatus and hearing their views on the

structure of the heavens than he was in learning about the nature of their God or their ethics. Catholic technology, not doctrine, was what brought Hong Taeyong to the South Church. Steeped deeply in Confucian tradition, he saw no logical connection between the success of Western science and the claims of the Catholic faith.⁷⁵

The reaction in Korea to Hong's suggestion that mankind lived on a revolving sphere was the same yawn of indifference he himself had shown toward Christian theology. Whether the earth under man's feet was static or in constant motion was of little import in a culture that elevated moral and political philosophy above science. In this respect, Korea's response to Hong resembles China's equally dispassionate reaction to heliocentrism, when it was finally introduced by the Jesuits in the second half of the eighteenth century.⁷⁶ In the Neo-Confucian universe, values and moral principles were beyond cosmological disputes and philosophers could look with insouciance upon competing physical models of the earth and the heavens.

As long as natural philosophy and technology remained detached from the realm of ethics and value, Koreans could continue to express admiration for Western science even after they began a violent condemnation of Western religion. In the midst of a deluge of heated denunciations of Western religion that followed the discovery that Yun Chich'ung and Kwŏn Sang'yŏn had destroyed their ancestral

tablets in 1791, there was still respect for Western science.

In the months immediately prior to the royal decision to make Paul Yun and James Kwŏn pay with their lives for placing the authority of their Catholic church above the authority of their Confucian state, we find records of discussions at court on acquiring the latest information from China on the Western methods of calendrical calculation. Officials responsible for formulating the calendar were particularly interested in obtaining copies of Shu-li ching-yŭn, a work by Mei Ku-cheng (1681-1763) introducing Western mathematics, and Li-hsiang k'ao ch'eng hou pien, a sequel to a compendium on calendrical science and astronomy prepared by Ignatius Kogler and other Jesuit scientists. No concern was expressed about the Catholic pedigree of those works.⁷⁷

In the wake of Yun and Kwŏn's execution in 1791, one junior official in the Office of Special Counselors suggested to King Chŏngjo (r. 1776-1800) that all Western learning should be condemned. Sin Hŏnjo argued that the term Western learning itself was improper, since nothing so immoral deserved to be called hak (學, learning), an appellation also used for the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. Sin demanded that all ideas and techniques from the West be labeled Western practices instead. For practices, Sin used the word sul (術), which refers both

to the technical skill of artisans and to the occult arts of shamans and was clearly intended by him to indicate that which was unworthy of the attention of the true Confucian scholar.

The king rejected Sin's suggestion as narrow-minded. He declared that there was nothing wrong with using hak to name both orthodox scholarship and heterodoxy. He pointed out that other words have a similar ambiguity. Li (principle) is nature (song, 性). Ki (material force) is nature, too. Still, men do not often confuse their innate good nature (ponsong, 本性) with their physical nature (chilsong 質性), which is the source of moral frailty. Ponsong remains li and chilsong remains ki, despite the lexical coincidence. King Chongjo dismissed Sin's complaint because he believed it unlikely that men would be fooled into ranking Western scholarship alongside Confucian scholarship simply because they both laid claim to being called schools of learning. Furthermore, Catholic science could be safely studied by Confucian scholars and officials, since it dealt only with ki and "ki had no power to muddy the Confucian moral values enshrined as li." Therefore, no harm would result from talking of Jesuit astronomy as yanghak (洋學, foreign learning) or sohak (西學, Western learning). Though the king did not specifically say so here, he certainly granted, however, that care should be taken to distinguish Catholic science

from the Catholic religion, which carried the designation sahak (evil learning).⁷⁸

King Ch^ungjo accepted the distinction that also shaped the reactions of Yi Yonghu, Kim Manjung, Yi Ik, and Hong Taeyong to the Jesuit missionary writings from China. Their refusal to concede a necessary connection between cosmology and theology explains at least partially why only a small minority of Confucian scholars were converted to Catholicism. The Jesuits went to China well aware that Confucians held beliefs different from theirs but thinking that all men reasoned fundamentally the same, but the assumptions that channeled Catholic thought were radically different from those of Confucianism. The link between science and religion, which appeared so natural to the Jesuits from Europe, broke apart when confronted with the logic of Korean Neo-Confucianism. King Ch^ungjo stood solidly in the mainstream of his country's intellectual tradition when he decided to ban the Catholic religion while protecting Jesuit science from censure.

More evidence for the failure in Korea of the Jesuit attempt to fuse astronomy and Catholicism into an inseparable package appears in a 1786 memorial by Pak Chega (1750-1815). Pak was a dissident voice in eighteenth-century Korea, advocating developing the Korean economy by promoting commerce and acquiring the latest technology from Ch'ing China. One year after the first uproar over

literati involvement with Catholicism, Pak dared to propose formally that the court invite some Jesuits to come and live in Korea. He argued that those priests could teach Korea much about astronomy, mathematics, the manufacture of firearms, the construction of city walls and bridges, and much more.

It is true that, just like the Buddhists, they are fervent believers in heaven and hell. However, they also know how to improve the livelihood of the people and that is something the Buddhists do not know anything about. If we could learn the various techniques they have to offer, we could benefit from their presence here. We have to be careful to treat them well, though. Otherwise, they will not come here even if we invite them.⁷⁹

In 1786 no one condemned Pak Ch'ega for suggesting that Catholic missionaries be officially invited to Korea. Even after a major anti-Catholic persecution broke out in 1801, Pak was not among those exiled or executed for pro-Catholic sentiments. Although he was forced out of public office and into exile by political enemies, his 1786 memorial was not at issue.⁸⁰ At the time Pak made his proposal, the distinction between Western science and technology and Western religion was clear in most Korean minds.

The Confucian inclination to disassociate science from theology did not blind Koreans to the Jesuit plan to turn their scientific expertise into a proselytizing tool. In 1790, on the eve of the martyrdom of Paul Yun and James Kwŏn, Yi Hŏn'gyŏng (1719-91) warned that there were a few foolish enough to let the technical talents of the Jesuit

astronomers in China trick them into believing every nonsensical statement those Jesuits made. To counter that alarming development, Yi wrote a short essay on the dangers of Catholicism in which he contended that it was important to remain aware of the discrepancy between the validity of Jesuit astronomy and the absurdity of Jesuit religion.⁸¹

In a letter to a friend about to depart on a diplomatic mission to China, Yi alerted Hong Yangho (1724-1802) to the presence of Catholics in China and cautioned him to remember that Western learning excels only in calculations and instrumentation. "How can anyone look at such limited expertise and then believe that Westerners also know the True Way?"⁸² Yi need not have worried. Although more than a hundred literati were converted to Catholicism in the last fifteen years of the eighteenth century, they remained only a minute minority among the Confucian scholars and officials who dominated Korean state and society.⁸³ Korea held firm against the Catholic onslaught.

The Jesuit missionaries, as successful astronomers with a fully developed cosmology, eventually convinced many Confucians, both Chinese and Korean, that perhaps theory and practice should be linked in science and technology. Despite their own inconsistency, forced on them by theological barriers to heliocentrism, Jesuit astronomers converted many through the accuracy of their ephemerides to their vision of the physical structure of the universe.

Where they failed, with but few exceptions, was to induce Confucians to take the next step, the leap from trust in Western science to belief in Western religion. The missionaries from Europe discovered in two frustrating centuries of proselytizing on the East Asian mainland how difficult it was to convert a people who did not share the basic presuppositions of the medieval religion and Renaissance science of Europe. The vast difference between the Catholic West and the Confucian East could not be overcome by dressing Christianity in the robes of science.

Notes For Chapter Two

1. For a detailed account of the dispute over how to maintain the purity of the Christian message in a Chinese environment, see Antonio S. Rosso, Apostolic Legations to China of the Eighteenth Century (South Pasadena, Calif.: P.D. and Ione Perkins, 1948).
2. George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants: The Story of the Jesuits in China in the Last Decades of the Ming Dynasty (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), p. 123.
3. For a concise summary of the Jesuit use of astronomy to gain acceptance in China, see Jonathan Spence, To Change China: Western Advisors in China, 1620-1960 (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 3-33.
4. From the preface to Matteo Ricci's map of the world, cited by Kenneth Ch'en, "Matteo Ricci's Contribution to, and Influence on, Geographical Knowledge in China," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1939, 59:327.
5. See, for example, the note in the Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao [Notes on the works listed in the Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu catalogue] 106:67, on Sabbathin de Ursis, Piao tu Shuo [The gnomon] (1614): "Talk that the earth was a small sphere shocked a great many people when first heard in China."
6. Yi Sugwang, Chibong yusŏl [Miscellaneous essays by Chibong Yi Sugwang], 2:34b-35a.
7. Louis Gallagher, trans., China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci, 1583-1610 (New York: Random House, 1953), p. 325.
8. Emmanuel Diaz, T'ien-wen lüeh [A catechism of the heavens], T'ien-hsüeh ch'u-han [An introduction to heavenly learning], 1628 (Taipei reprint; 1965), 5:2631.
9. Jesuit confidence in their Aristotelian cosmology appears misplaced to modern observers. Ricci made the smug comment that the Chinese "never knew, in fact, they had never heard, that the skies are composed of solid substances, that the stars are fixed and not wandering around aimlessly, that there were ten celestial orbs enveloping one another, and moved by

contrary forces. Their primitive science of astronomy knew nothing of eccentric orbits and epicycles." Gallagher, China in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 325-26.

10. See, for example, Matteo Ricci's influential introduction to Catholic teachings, T'ien-chu shih-i [The true Lord of Heaven]: "If there were no great Lord above directing the movement of the sun, the moon, and the stars, how could chaos be avoided?" (reprint; Seoul: Kwangdoksä, 1972), p. 49.
11. Aleksander Birkenmajer, "Astronomer of the Age of Transition," The Scientific World of Copernicus, ed. Barbara Bienkawska (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidal, 1973), p. 49.
12. Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers (York: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 76-80.
13. Copernicus's system was not precisely heliocentric. The center of his universe was located in empty space, just a short distance from the stationary sun.
14. Joao Rodrigues's reply to Yi Yonghu can be found in Chinese, along with Yi's letter, in Yamaguchi Masayuki, Chōsen seikyōshi (Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 1967), p. 46.
15. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1959), 3:449.
16. Nathan Sivin, "Cosmos and Computation in Early Chinese Mathematical Astronomy," T'oung Pao 55, nos. 1-3; 1-73.
17. Shigeru Nakayama, A History of Japanese Astronomy: Chinese Background and Western Impact (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 68.
18. Needham, Science and Civilisation, 3:442. Nathan Sivin points out that a popular introduction to astronomy published in China in 1819 contained a chart of the ten layers of the celestial spheres taken from Diaz's T'ien-wen lüeh ("Copernicus in China," Studia Copernica 6 [1973]: 85).
19. This section appears to have been simply carried over, unrevised, from the original 1770 edition. It contains the warning that "there aren't really twelve spheres in the sky. We talk of spheres only as a way to describe the different paths celestial objects follow."

20. Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao, 106:69. A partial translation of this note on the T'ien-wen lueh is provided by Gernet, "Christian and Chinese Visions," p. 15.
21. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sŏnsaeng chŏnjip [The complete works of Yi Ik] 55:30a-31b.
22. T'ien-chu shih-i, especially pp. 48-50, 60-62, 228.
23. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Biggs (Oxford: 1888), pp. 469-70.
24. Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Lectures on Religious Belief," Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 53-72.
25. C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), especially pp 278-93, "Religion and the Traditional Moral Order."
26. Michael Cooper, Rodrigues the Interpreter (Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1974), pp. 347-50; Kukcho pogam [Yi dynasty chronicles], 1908 ed., 35:17-18.
27. Kukcho pogam 35:17-18; Jeon Sang-woon [Chŏn Sang'un], Science and Technology in Korea: Traditional Instruments and Techniques (Cambridge: Mass: MIT Press, 1974), p. 77.
28. Kim Yuk, "Chamgok sŏnsaeng p'iltan," Chamgok chonjip [The complete works of Kim Yuk] (Seoul: Taedong munhwa yon'guso reprint, 1975), p. 398; Jeon, Science and Technology in Korea, p. 163.
29. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl [Minor writings of Yi Ik], 4:2.
30. Yamaguchi, Chŏsen seikyŏshi, pp. 44-46.
31. Ibid., p. 45.
32. Ibid. Yi describes the ch'i enveloping China with a phrase Han Yu (768-824) used to describe the home region of a Taoist priest he respected. Hong, as Yi does here, attributed superior spiritual and intellectual gifts to an environment of unusually clean ch'i. See Han Yu, Han Ch'ang-li chi [Collected writings of Han Yu] (Shanghai: Shanghai yinshugwan, 1936), p. 31.

33. Needham, Science and Civilisation, 3:270.
34. Ibid., pp. 438-42; Needham argues that more than coincidence may be involved. He suggests that the transmission of Chinese cosmological ideas to Europe might have been one of the elements responsible for the dissolution of medieval views and the birth of modern astronomy.
35. Shigeru Nakayama, "Copernicanism in Japan," Studia Copernica 5:154. For more on this point, see Nakayama's "Characteristics of Chinese Calendrical Science," Japanese Studies in the History of Science 4 (1965): 124-131.
36. Chosŏn wangjo sillok, Injo 23.12 pyŏngsin (1645); Chŭngbo munhŏn pigo, I, 5a-b.
37. Ibid., Hyojong 1.7 kyong'o (1650).
38. Needham, Science and Civilisation, 3:49.
39. Dunne, Generation of Giants, p. 209; Pasquale M. de Elia, Galileo in China, Relations through the Roman College between Galileo and the Jesuit Scientists-Missionaries (1610-40), trans. Rufus Suter and Matthew Sciasci (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 2-21, 41.
40. Dunne, Generation of Giants, p. 321.
41. Sunamjip, 17:36a-b.
42. For more on those unfortunate Dutch seamen, see Gari Ledyard, The Dutch Come to Korea (Seoul: RAS, 1971), especially pp. 46-57.
43. Nakayama, History of Japanese Astronomy, p. 122.
44. Yang Kuang-hsien, Pu-Te-I, found in Hsu Kwang-ch'i, et al., ed., T'ien-chu-chiao tung-chuan wen-hsien hsu-pien [Additional material on the Catholic mission to the East] (Taiwan reprint, p. 1249); John D. Young, "An Early Confucian Attack on Christianity: Yang Kuang-hsien and his Pu-te-i," Journal of the Chinese University of Hong Kong 3, no. 3 (Dec. 1975): 185.
45. Sillok, Hyonjong 7.12 pyŏngjin (1666).
46. Park Seong-rae, "Portents and Neo-Confucian Politics in Korea, 1392-1519," Journal of Social Science and Humanities 49 (June 1979): 53-118.

47. Chŭngbo munhŏn pigo [Official encyclopedia of Korea, revised]. 1908. I, 5b.
48. Sillok, Injo 23.12 pyŏngsin (1645).
49. Sillok, Injo 24.6 muin (1646); Jeon, Science and Technology in Korea, p. 83.
50. Jeon, Science and Technology in Korea, p. 84; Chungbo munhon pigo, I, 6b.
51. Chŭngbo munhŏn pigo, I, 6a-10b.
52. Yi Imyŏng, Sojaejip [Collected writings of Sojae Yi Imyŏng] 19:2b.
53. Ibid., p. 1b.
54. Kim Manjung, "Sop'ŏ manp'il," Sop'ojip [Collected writings of Kim Manjung] (Seoul: Tongmun'gwan reprint, 1971), pp. 580-81; 514.
55. Sivin, "Copernicus in China," pp. 63-103.
56. Ibid., pp. 78-79, citing Rho's Wu-wei li-chih, 1:7b-8a.
57. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 2:532b.
58. Yi Wonsun, "Sŏngho Yi Ik ūi sŏhak segye" [Yi Ik's view of Western Learning], Kyohoesa yŏn'gu, no. 1 (1977), pp. 2-39.
59. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 2:43b; 1:51a-b.
60. For a detailed discussion of Yi's reaction to Jesuit publications, see Yi Wŏn-sun, "Sŏngho Yi Ik." An authoritative introduction to Yi Ik's overall philosophy is Han Ugŭn, Sŏngho Yi Ik yŏn'gu [A study of Yi Ik] (Seoul: Seoul University Press, 1980).
61. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 2:36a; 3:47a.
62. Ibid., 3:47b-48a; 14a-15a.
63. I Ching, Richard Wilhelm trans.; English by Cary Baynes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 6.
64. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 3:47b-48a; 14a-15a; 2:35b; 3:48a; Chu-tzu yu-lei, 1:4a.

65. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sŏnsaeng chŏnjip, 43:24a-27a. For Ch'eng Yi's position, see Erh Ch'eng ch'uan shu, 15:4b-5a; Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 3:48a.
66. See Yi Ik's comments on the Ch'i k'e [Seven victories] of Dedacus de Pantojo, Sŏngho sasŏl, 11:2a-b.
67. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sŏnsaeng chŏnjip, 26:19b.
68. Jeon, Science and Technology in Korea, p. 19.
69. Pak Chiwon, Yŏnamjip [Collected writings of Yonam Pak Chiwon], 2:48b.
70. Hong's record of his conversation with the two Jesuits can be found in his Tamhŏnsŏ, waejip [Writings of Tamhon Hong Taeyong], 7:9a-15a.
71. Pak Chiwon, Yŏnamjip, 2:47b; Hong Taeyong, Tamhŏnsŏ, naejip, 4:22a-b.
72. Pak Sŏngnae, "Han'guk kunse ui sogugwahak suyong," p. 272.
73. Hong, Tamhŏnsŏ, waejip, 7:9b.
74. Pak Chiwon, Yŏnamjip, 14:8a; Hong, Tamhŏnsŏ, naejip, 4:22a-b.
75. See Hong, Tamhŏnsŏ, waejip, 7:9a-15a.
76. Nakayama, History of Japanese Astronomy, p. 172.
77. Sillok, Chŏngjong 15.10 imja, 15.10 mujin (1790).
78. *Ibid.*, 15.10, kimyo.
79. Pukhagŭi (Seoul: Ul'yu munhwasa, 1971), p. 372. Note that a reprint of a nineteenth-century collection of Pak Chega's writings includes the memorial in which he suggested inviting the Jesuits but leaves out the specific section where the Jesuits are mentioned. Chŏngyujip pu pukhagŭi (Seoul: Tamgudang, 1974), p. 334.
80. Kim Yŏngdok, "Chŏngyu Pak Chega ŭi yŏn'gu" [A study of Pak Chega], Chosŏn hugi sasangsa yŏn'gu (Seoul: Ulyu munhwasa, 1977), pp. 89-94; 111-18.
81. Yi Hŏn'gyŏng, Kanongjip, 23:39a-44b.

82. Ibid., 19:27a.
83. On the number of yangban Catholics, see Cho Kwang, "Sinyu pakhae ūi punsŏk jok koch'al" [An analysis of the 1801 persecution], Kyohoesa yon'gu, no. 1 (1977), pp. 41-74, especially p. 58.

Chapter Three

Catholic Stranger in a Neo-Confucian World

The study of strange doctrines is harmful indeed!
--Confucius (551-479 B.C.)¹

There are thousands of deviant doctrines, all
different, yet all flowing from the common spring of
selfishness.
--Sin Hudam (1702-1761).²

Over two millennia separate the Korean scholar Sin Hudam from the Chinese Sage. Confucius spoke in vague generalities when he condemned false teachings in the sixth century B.C. In eighteenth century Korea his followers were more specific in their denunciations. Mencius in the fourth century B.C. had taught them to reject the ideas of Yang Chu and Mo Tzu. Chu Hsi in the twelfth century had condemned Buddhism and Taoism. Yi Hwang, whom some considered the Korean Chu Hsi, warned them against the positions taken by Wang Yang-ming. Sin and some of his contemporaries wanted to add "Western Learning" to this list of unacceptable teachings. They charged that the Catholicism preached by Jesuit missionaries in China and propagated in Korea through Jesuit-authored Chinese language texts was idan (異端).

Idan literally means "a different thread." It was a term Koreans applied to ideas and practices which did not follow the way laid down by the sages of ancient China.³ Arthur Waley translated the statement by Confucius which opens this chapter as "He who sets to work upon a different strand destroys the whole fabric."⁴ Waley's rendition preserves the metaphor which Confucius used to warn his listeners that his teachings were sewn from a common thread which must be preserved intact lest the moral order thus woven unravel.⁵

In eighteenth century Korea, Neo-Confucians asked two questions in testing ideas to determine whether they were orthodox or heterodox, whether they followed or threatened the thread of Confucian tradition. Did those ideas encourage or discourage proper behavior? Did they contradict or support the moral message of the Confucian Classics? The two criteria were interrelated. The behavior that orthodoxy promoted was deemed proper because it was ordained by the Classics. And the moral message of the Classics was respected and protected because the Classics taught men the proper way to behave. Consequently, any statements, any doctrines that undermined fidelity to the Confucian moral code enshrined in the Classics were idan.

As is often the case with key Confucian terms, there is no precise English equivalent for idan. Neither heterodoxy

nor heresy carries the full meaning idan had for Koreans. Both idan and heterodoxy indicated opinions and beliefs contrary to those accepted as orthodox. However, idan designated dangerous heterodoxy that not only departed from orthodox Confucian beliefs and values but challenged them as well in both words and deeds.

The Korean Neo-Confucian conception of idan also differed significantly from the notion of heresy prevalent in the West that the Jesuit missionaries in Asia represented. There was a much more institutional and dogmatic tone to the Roman Catholic definition of heresy. As a recent study of early Christianity by Elaine Pagels has shown, in its first centuries the Church determined who was a true Catholic and who was a heretic by seeing who adhered to the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures adopted by the institutional church. Obedience to Church authority was the touchstone.⁶ Later heresies, and there were many movements condemned as heresy in the Middle Ages, also represented

The claim by an individual or a sect to its own version of Christian truth [that] was a denial of the role of the Church as the arbiter of God's will on earth, and [thus] of the spiritual power to which all believers had to submit.

In the Neo-Confucian world, outside of the state itself there was no organization entrusted with the power to use force, if necessary, to establish, safeguard, foster, and defend orthodoxy. There was no Confucian church specifi-

cally established to define Confucian doctrine. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, was primarily a spiritual, not a secular, organization and had as its sole raison d'etre its claim to be the voice of God on earth. If negligent in defending dogma, the Church would forfeit its legitimacy. A Confucian state had no such need to compel rigid adherence to specific formulations of Confucian teachings. Free debate by scholars could be and often was permitted. Only when the political authority of the state, or the rituals and morals that were the core of Confucian practice, was challenged was the government compelled to intervene in intellectual disputes.

The Jesuits who came to China in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries entered a world that generally tolerated private deviation from orthodox thinking but condemned such nonconformity⁸ if it went beyond the realm of ideas into public action. What a person believed in the privacy of his own heart was no concern of the Confucian state. What a person did with others was. Buddhism, for example, was idan, yet Buddhists were not punished merely for believing in Buddhism. However, when they met secretly with other Buddhists at night and proclaimed that the coming of the Maitreya was at hand, they violated the laws of the state and risked official censure and punishment.⁸ The Chinese state had learned from experience that secretive Buddhist sects could turn rebellious, so they had

to be controlled. Likewise, Confucian governments chastised those who violated the regulations governing ritual or disobeyed the moral rules governing human relationships, since ritual and social morality were the glue that held Confucian society together. Confucian officials acted vigorously to protect the social order. They showed less concern for how closely the thinking of the masses mirrored the orthodox interpretations of Confucian philosophy. Challenges to the accepted ethical norms were prohibited, though disagreement on minor philosophical or doctrinal issues was permitted as long as that disagreement remained within the boundaries delineated by orthodox morality.

The Catholic Church did care about what an individual thought. The Church saw a duty to work for the salvation of every single human soul. Since right belief was necessary for salvation, the Church felt obligated to ensure that everyone held correct beliefs. Those who refused church guidance in such matters had to be condemned as heretics and punished for their recalcitrance as a lesson to others. Purity of dogma was not the only concern, of course. Until the Reformation forced the papacy and the governments of Europe reluctantly to tolerate religious pluralism, theological dissent was a threat to the political and social order of Christendom. Nonetheless, judgments of heresy were always couched in terms of doctrine, for that was how Christianity and heresy were differentiated.⁹

Julia Ching, in a recent comparative study of Christianity and Confucianism, noted that "Christianity is constituted by the belief in the God of Jesus, whereas ethical values --rather than belief in God-- determines who is Confucian."¹⁰ Jesuit missionaries came from Europe to teach the Chinese what to believe, to show the Chinese that their Neo-Confucianism was untrue. Most Neo-Confucians were more interested in how the Jesuits behaved than in what those Christians from the West believed. Neo-Confucians tended to judge Catholicism according to the morality its teachings implied and the ethics its adherents followed.

Idan was primarily ethical rather than doctrinal deviation. Goodness was the standard more than truth. In Catholic eyes, a Confucian was a pagan, an infidel, a nonbeliever, but not a heretic. The term heretic was reserved for those baptized Christians who denied one or more of the central tenets of the Catholic faith.¹¹ Idan cast a much broader net. Not deviance within Confucianism but teachings that denied Confucianism, any ideas or practices that were seen as preventing, discouraging, or distracting men from the performance of their moral responsibilities to society, were idan. The Jesuit missionaries had to prove that they were not promoting idan, that their religion and behavior were consistent with and supportive of Confucian classical ethical principles, before they could win a hearing in educated circles in

China and Korea.

Precedents for Judgment

In evaluating Catholicism, Korean Neo-Confucians relied on precedents from Chinese tradition as well as their own. Those who declared Catholicism idan invariably directly or indirectly compared it to one or more of the teachings condemned as immoral in the past. For example, the charge that European religion lacked proper respect for rulers and parents echoed Mencius's complaint against Yang Chu and Mo Tzu.¹² Yang Chu taught that each man should think of himself first, that self-interest should be paramount. Mencius argued that such selfishness was a denial of the just claim of a ruler to our loyalty and obedience. Mo Tzu went to the opposite extreme, in Mencius's view. By advocating that men should love everyone equally, Mo Tzu denied the special claim parents have on the heart. Mencius concluded that to refuse to acknowledge special obligations to rulers and to parents was to show oneself more beast than human.¹³ Catholic missionaries in China had to show both in their writings and in their actions that they, unlike Yang Chu and Mo Tzu, did recognize the importance of loyalty and filial piety.

Another accusation revived from the past to be used against Catholics was that they, like the Buddhists and the Taoists before them, destroyed the moral bonds that made a human community possible.¹⁴ The Confucian revival in Sung

China in the eleventh and twelfth centuries gave birth to a Neo-Confucianism that, though borrowing some terminology and philosophical concepts from Buddhism and Taoism, condemned Buddhism and Taoism for denying the validity and significance of those virtues that governed all human relationships. Buddhism, by teaching that this world was essentially an illusion and not ultimate reality, and Taoism, by encouraging men to leave their villages and pursue personal immortality in distant mountains and forests, were denounced for going even further than Yang Chu and Mo Tzu in undermining the very foundations of morality by denying man's duties to society.¹⁵

Ch'eng Hao (1032-85), Ch'eng I (1033-1107), and Chu Hsi (1130-1200), the fathers of the philosophical Confucianism now called Neo-Confucianism, recognized some similarities between their teachings and Buddhist doctrines. In particular, they respected some Buddhist techniques for mental discipline. However, they believed Buddhists erred in failing to apply the self control gained from meditation to the affairs of the real world. "In the learning of the Buddhists there is a seriousness to straighten the internal life but no righteousness to square the external life."¹⁶ Such neglect of the ethical rules governing man's interaction with his fellow human beings was alone enough to merit condemnation, without further need to ponder the truth or falsity of Buddhist doctrine.¹⁷ If the Catholic

missionaries could not show that they, unlike Buddhists and Taoists, took seriously the world of human relationships as the main arena for moral action, they too would be dismissed as preaching immoral doctrines unworthy of the attention of a true Confucian gentleman.

Koreans also had their own tradition of criticism of Buddhism. Yi dynasty Confucians blamed Buddhism for the social disorder which brought about the fall of the Koryo dynasty in 1392. They argued that Buddhism had led to an erosion of social ethics and a misdirecting of individual moral efforts. One prominent theme in Korean Neo-Confucian attacks on Buddhism was that Buddhists frightened people with talk of heaven and hell. Hope of illusionary future reward or fear of imaginary future punishment turned men's attention away from the real world. Another frequent accusation was that the Buddhist mode of self-cultivation, because of its stress on individual enlightenment, encouraged selfish withdrawal from society.¹⁸ Both themes reappeared in the eighteenth century when Korean Neo-Confucians saw Catholicism as bearing a dangerous resemblance to the Buddhism their forerunners had condemned.¹⁹

Though Koreans relied heavily on Chinese precedents in distinguishing orthodox teachings from the heterodox, they did not limit themselves to pious repetitions of Chinese judgments. They felt enough confidence in their own command

of Confucian principles to decide for themselves if doctrines even the Chinese tolerated fit Korean Neo-Confucian criteria for orthodoxy. They did not accept any of the schools of thought the Chinese Confucian tradition condemned, but did brand as idan some ideas Chinese had found acceptable. Some mistakenly believed, for example, that Catholicism was flourishing in China, since there were European priests serving as official astronomers in Peking and many of the Jesuit books that had made their way into Korea included laudatory prefaces by Chinese Confucian officials. Nevertheless, there were those who felt that Koreans should proudly proclaim their rejection of Catholicism so that all the world would know that in Korea, at least, there were still scholars who held fast to the legacy of Mencius and Chu Hsi and had not been deluded by evil doctrines.²⁰

The eighteenth century rejection of Catholicism was not the first time Korean thinkers had differed from their fellow Neo-Confucians in China. Three centuries earlier, T'oegye Yi Hwang had condemned the teachings of Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), which were popular in China at that time. Wang insisted on the unity of mind and principle, and of knowledge and conduct, and in innate knowledge of the good. He taught further that there was no need to engage in the exhaustive study of principles in external things and events that Chu Hsi had demanded, since principle resided

complete within our own minds. T'oegye had argued that Wang Yang-ming was wrong in challenging some of Chu Hsi's interpretations of the Classics, particularly those dealing with the Great Learning. T'oegye charged that Wang's suggested emendations to Chu Hsi's commentaries were not only a distortion of the original meanings of the characters under dispute but also would lead to a denial of Confucian moral principles.

To T'oegye, Wang's stress on truth within, on innate knowledge of the good, was dangerously one-sided and self-centered. He wrote that unless subjective insights into principle were confirmed with the objective principles in the external world, the original impartial mind that alone makes men truly human would be lost. T'oegye cautioned that Wang Yang-ming would have men turn inward, as the Zen Buddhists do, rather than reaching outward with their moral strength, as good Confucians should do.²¹ Wang Yang-ming's etymological errors disturbed T'oegye less than the immoral conclusions Wang derived from them. Wang was not only incorrect, his teachings were morally tainted and had to be condemned alongside those of Mo Tzu, Yang Chu, Buddha, and Lao Tzu.

T'oegye's writings shaped mainstream Korean Neo-Confucian thought for the rest of the Yi dynasty. Never was Wang Yang-ming to have in Korea the respectability he won in China. T'oegye's influence was particularly strong among

that small group in the eighteenth century that debated the merits and demerits of Western Learning. An Ch'ongbok's (1712-91) advice to his disciple Hwang T'ogil (1748-1800) is indicative of the respect many Koreans accorded T'oegye.

Treat the words of Confucius and Mencius as you would the laws of the land, the words of Chu Hsi and the Ch'eng brothers as the moral direction of a stern teacher, the words of T'oegye as the admonitions of a kind father.²²

Those Korean scholars who attacked Catholicism as a dangerous heterodoxy believed they were following T'oegye's example in defending orthodoxy. Hwang T'ogil, for example, praised An for furthering that tradition of refutation of evil doctrines with his anti-Catholic writings.

When Wang Yang-ming was growing popular in Korea, T'oegye was the first to point out the damage his teachings would do. When Western books first began to come into Korea, Songho [Yi Ik] was the first to criticize their absurdities. Now you have continued the task they began and further clarified that the standard they used was the same.²³

What was that one standard, that one yardstick used to measure the worth of moral and philosophical doctrines in the Neo-Confucian world? The degree to which an idea represented kong (Chinese, kung 公), selflessness, or sa (Chinese, su 私), selfishness, determined whether that idea was orthodox or idan. One which stemmed from concern for personal benefit without regard for the needs of society as a whole was immoral and therefore unacceptable. One which placed the needs of the community above those of the individual was moral and therefore orthodox.

Kong means much more than the English translation selflessness indicates. In English selflessness implies a willingness to sacrifice one's own interests for the good of others as well as a lack of excessive longing for the rewards power, prestige, and money can bring an individual. In Neo-Confucianism, kong meant all this and more. Kong implied not just deference to the needs of others, but identification with others. A person infused with a kong spirit knows that he exists only as part of a much larger whole and therefore thinks and acts morally and correctly only when he thinks and acts as a member of society rather than as an isolated individual. Such a person will not only be unselfish, he will also be impartial. By identifying with the world around him, he will be able to react to and judge people and events as they are in themselves, not just as they relate to his personal self-interest.

Sa also means more than its English counterpart indicates. A person dominated by sa not only puts his own interests first, greedily pursuing personal profit at the expense of others, he also turns inward, away from the external world and thus denies a very important part of himself. His self-centered thoughts and actions isolate him from the social and material environment which surrounds and shapes him. A person with a mind distorted by sa reveals himself by his biases, by his incomplete understanding of how everything, including himself, relates

to everything else. Unable to fully comprehend that which is going on around him and unwilling to recognize his responsibilities, he fails to properly develop the social vision which would enable him to become truly human and truly moral.²⁴

If the description of kong and sa above is correct, selfishness is both an ethical and a cognitive flaw.²⁵

Ideas rooted in selfishness are both immoral and irrational. Such was the Neo-Confucian judgment of idan.

This chapter opened with a statement by Sin Hudam that all deviant doctrines flow from the common spring of selfishness. Sin went on to explain the selfish elements in the various idan schools. In Yang Chu, the selfishness was obvious, since Yang argued openly that one should not give up even one hair from his body to benefit others.²⁶ In Mo Tzu, Sin did not find selfishness in the advocacy of universal love but in the call for frugality in ritual. Sin believed that anyone who scrimped and saved on funeral rites showed that he thought more of his own purse than of his parents. Among the followers of Chuang Tzu and Lieh Tzu selfishness sprouted in their incessant search for eternal physical life. The Buddhists, too, selfishly hungered for eternal life, though they were more sophisticated and attributed immortality to an immaterial soul rather than to the body.

As for this Western religion, it is nothing more than the dregs of Buddhist doctrine. They have

made a few cosmetic changes to give themselves the appearance of greater rationality, but they can not hide their unseemly greed for life and distaste for death. If scholars now only realize that Catholicism is rooted in selfishness, and if they do not let themselves be moved by dreams of life after death, Catholicism will have no attraction for them at all.²⁷

Other critics of Catholicism also pointed to the Catholic doctrines of heaven, hell, and the immortality of the soul to prove that Catholicism was idan. For An Chongbok, as for Sin, it was not so much that it was foolish to believe in personal survival after death as that it was immoral to do good out of a selfish desire for eternal happiness.

The doctrines that are introduced in Western books appear profound at first glance, but further analysis shows them to be idan. The only reason we Confucians do good and avoid evil is that that is what we are supposed to do. We never for even one moment do so in order to earn some reward in life after death. The only reason Catholics do good is that they expect to be judged later by God for what they do in this life. Catholicism is totally unlike our Confucianism.²⁸

Yi Ik

Sin Hüdäm and An Chongbok shared more than just an aversion to Catholicism. They were both disciples of Yi Ik (1682-1763). It was as disciples of Yi Ik that they came to know of Catholicism, and it was as disciples of Yi Ik that they came to condemn it.

Yi, usually called by his pen name Songho, was an influential Neo-Confucian scholar in eighteenth century Korea and the intellectual mentor of the Namin. Though his

great grandfather, his grandfather, and his father all held responsible government posts, Yi himself was kept from a career of public service by bitter factional disputes that ravaged political circles in his day. His father, who had risen as high as Inspector General, died in exile in the far northwestern corner of Korea a year after Yi Ik was born. While Yi was still in his twenties, an older brother died as a result of a beating ordered by government officials angered by a memorial submitted to the king. Understandably wary, Sŏngho declined the two minor government posts that were offered him over his long lifetime. Yi apparently preferred the secure and stable life of a rural scholar. He stayed on his few acres of rice land in the countryside, out of the limelight, and quietly wrote essays, letters, and short notes on topics ranging from metaphysics and ethics to natural science and socio-economic reform.²⁹

Yi Ik was remarkable in his time for his willingness to accept help from any quarter in pursuing Confucian aims. He read at least twenty jesuit-authored works, including moral and religious tracts, scientific treatises, and introductions to world geography and western technology.³⁰

Idle curiosity may have motivated some of his reading. Julius Aleni's Chih-fang wai-chi (World Geography) and Matteo Ricci's T'ien-chu shih-i (The True God Above) offered little information or advice that Yi Ik would have

found relevant to the cultivation of moral self-perfection or socioeconomic stability.³¹ Such was not the case, however, with some of the other Catholic books Sŏngho read and wrote about. The suppression of selfish desires preached by Diego de Pantoja (1571-1618) in Chi k'e (Seven Victories), for example, won praise from Sŏngho for its similarity to the Confucian morality of self-denial. Pantoja's Ch'i k'e, first printed in 1614, stressed morality over theology, extolling the seven cardinal virtues of humility, charity, patience, compassion, temperance, diligence, and self-restraint with which the vices common to all men could be controlled.³² Pantoja's portrayal of the moral man leading a simple and frugal life in which reason has firm control over passion appealed to the Chinese literati, who had been taught to respect the Confucian ideal of the philosopher-scholar whose mind rules his body. Yi Ik was impressed as well.

Yi wrote that Chi k'e surpassed all Confucian writings in its use of similes to elucidate the relationship between vice and virtue.

This book will be a great help to our effort to restore proper behavior. It is surprising, though, to find talk of god and spirits mixed up in this otherwise fine work. If we excise all such non-essential bits of grit and copy down only the parts in it that are worthwhile, then we can treat it as orthodox Confucianism.³³

Western writings impressed Sŏngho when they advocated the frugality and self-discipline he believed essential to

a healthy and moral society. In addition, Yi believed that the Jesuits offered practical techniques for strengthening and sustaining the legitimacy of the Yi dynasty. For a Confucian government to preserve its mandate of heaven and justify its continued rule, it had to protect the people against marauders, both domestic and foreign; build and maintain irrigation and water control systems so that agriculture would not suffer unduly from flood or drought; and accurately predict celestial phenomena to show that the sovereign remained the link between humanity and heaven. The Westerners could offer assistance in all three areas.

Korean respect for Western firearms dates back to the end of the sixteenth century, when they saw how effective Western style muskets and cannons were in the hands of their Japanese enemies and Chinese allies. By 1597 Koreans were trying to manufacture their own version of the "Feringi", the gun used by the Europeans, called Franks by the Chinese.³⁴ In the early seventeenth century, the Jesuit missionary Joao Rodrigues had presented a Korean envoy in China with a couple of Western style guns along with a booklet explaining how to use them.³⁵ The Dutch sailors shipwrecked in Korea in 1627 and 1653 also introduced Western weaponry to the Koreans.³⁶ Despite these opportunities to learn from the West and strengthen Korea's armed defenses, S^unggho complained, in the eighteenth century Koreans still did not know how to make or use

Western weapons properly. As a result "our state's armies are so weak that they would be unable to resist an enemy."³⁷

Adequate protection against an enemy could mean nothing if Korea could not feed its people. The West provided an answer to this problem, too. Yi Ik accepted the Confucian maxim that agriculture was the foundation of the nation. He also believed that there was nothing Korea could do to benefit agriculture more than to insure sufficient water for farmers. He decried the decay in the irrigation and water control systems established at the beginning of the Yi dynasty and argued for their renovation and improvement by the adoption of the Archimedes screw Western type water pump, which was far superior to what Koreans were using in the eighteenth century. As long as Korea remained ignorant of the latest Western agricultural technology available through the Jesuit missionaries in China, Korea would remain poor and its people on the verge of starvation.³⁸

Koreans, like the Chinese saw the heavens as a mirror reflecting the moral order on earth. A good ruler had not only to insure his subjects' food, shelter, and peace, but by being a model of virtue he also had to guarantee stability in the skies. If a ruler was virtuous and therefore free of all selfish bias, he would see clearly the principles governing the heavens and be able to predict the movement of the sun, the moon, the planets, and the

stars. However, if an unexpected eclipse of the sun or some other unusual and unpredicted celestial phenomenon occurred, suspicion would be cast on the king's moral caliber and his claim to serve as heaven's representative on earth could be damaged. The accuracy of the calendars compiled and published by the court, or rather the luni-solar ephemerides, for the calendars of Korea were concerned with much more than the demarcation of months and seasons, influenced the respect accorded the monarch. It was for this reason that Korea adopted the Western style calendar of the Jesuit astronomers in Peking in the middle of the seventeenth century. Yi Ik approved that decision.

This Sihŏnnyok calendar we use now was drawn up by a Westerner and is the best product of the astronomer's art available. Not once has there been an error in the Sihŏnnyok's tables of the movement of the sun and the moon, of lunar and solar eclipses. If the Sages of old³⁹ were alive today, they would surely follow it.

There had been little objection to the Western origin of the Sihŏnnyok when it was adopted in 1653. The new Ch'ing dynasty in Peking had already erased any alien taint and given the Westerner calendar the Confucian cachet of approval several years earlier. The rest of Western learning did not earn such easy acceptance in Korea, for a couple of reasons. First of all, most of Korea's literati elite prided themselves on their distance from manual labor and technical work. They saw it as beneath their dignity to read works on agricultural machinery or gun production.

Even Yi Ik, broadminded as he was in his reading, never attempted to apply what he read in Western books to the making of Western-style guns or water pumps himself.

Secondly, the Sihonnyok was simply a collection of tables and formulæ for calculating celestial movement. Other Western books, whether on religion or on agriculture, usually included some reference to Catholic theological doctrines. After all, the Jesuit had come to China as missionaries to convert the Chinese to Christ. They wrote on science and technology only to win an audience for their religious message. Many Confucians in Korea felt that the presence of such "bits of grit", as Yi Ik had called Catholic teachings on the soul and the after-life, in a Western book rendered that whole work unacceptable.

Yi Ik was much more tolerant of heterodoxy and even idan than most of his contemporaries were. He disagreed with the common assumption that a failure to properly explicate the Confucian Way and eradicate idan was responsible for village poverty and unrest. Rather, it was the other way around; only when the people were well fed and well housed would they follow the Way and turn away from idan teachings.⁴⁰ Yi also said that the Confucians of his day had much they could learn from Taoists and Buddhist monks. He agreed that a good Neo-Confucian should not believe what a Taoist or a Buddhist teaches. He could, however, imitate certain Taoist and Buddhist ascetic

practices. In fact, Yi Ik wrote, some Buddhist monks he had seen far surpassed most Confucians in their compassion, their respect for their teachers, and their self-control.⁴¹

Yi Ik stands apart from most of his fellow Korean Neo-Confucians in his willingness to use heterodox means to reach orthodox ends in fields other than calendrical science. Yi overlooked the heterodox character of Buddhist and Taoist beliefs to praise some of their practices. This ability to see some good in what is not Confucian, to find something useful even in heterodoxy and idan, marks Yi's response to Catholicism as well. Despite his conviction that Catholic religious doctrines were a threat to Confucian values, he nevertheless insisted that there was much in Catholic writings that could be beneficial to Korea. Though he condemned the Western religion as disguised Buddhism and as fundamentally irrational and immoral, he continued to praise Western technology and science as supportive, not subversive, of the Way of the Sages.

Sin Hudam

Sin Hudam had a much less benign view of Jesuit works. An admiring disciple of Yi Ik, Sin argued with his mentor over the value of Western books the first time they met. When Sin met Yi in 1724, ^USongho praised some Jesuit writings. His curiosity aroused, Sin then read Ricci's T'ien-chu shih-i, Aleni's Chih-fang wai-chi, and Ling yen li shao (On the soul), a Thomistic explanation of the

nature of the human soul and its faculties by Francis Sambiasi (1592-1649). Neither Ricci's theology, Aleni's geography, nor Sambiasi's psychology particularly impressed Sin. He decided that the West had little to offer Korea besides strange and dangerous ideas.⁴²

Sin was a couple of decades younger than Sŏngho. He was born in 1702 in Seoul into a family of minor office holders. His father had once held the rank of section chief in the Board of War and his grandfather on his mother's side had held a sinecure as an official at a royal tomb.⁴³ Sin spent his youth reading widely in both Confucian and heterodox sources. Late in his teens, following a series of reprimands from his father, he abandoned his reading of Taoism and Buddhism and became totally absorbed in Neo-Confucianism. Though he passed the preliminary examinations for government service and was awarded the chinsa degree at the age of twenty-two, Sin abandoned further examination preparation and retired to his home, where he engaged in moral cultivation through intensive reading of the Confucian Classics and the practice of strict Confucian self-discipline.⁴⁴

Sin spent the rest of his life in determined pursuit of moral perfection. After Sin's death at the age of sixty, Yi Ik said of him, "Whether at home or outside managing his affairs, Sin always maintained a cautious and conscientious attitude."⁴⁵ At twenty-four, he posted a list of his moral

faults on the wall of his room as a constant reminder of his need for further self-improvement. He chided himself for not being cheerful enough when serving his parents, not getting along well enough with his brothers, being too casual and insincere in his dealings with friends and too loose in his conversations, and for not being consistent in following through on resolutions previously made.⁴⁶ In 1725 Yi Ik had advised his young disciple to practice quiet-sitting and not keep himself in a continual state of anxiety, frustration, and distress. Sin at that time apparently had worked himself into a state of physical and mental exhaustion in his vain efforts at becoming a paragon of Confucian virtue.⁴⁷

Neo-Confucian thought balanced on the two poles of moral perfection within and sagehood without. A complete Neo-Confucian ideally would be both a scholar and a statesman, concerned both with recovering his innate goodness by overcoming selfish tendencies and with promoting a peaceful, harmonious, and prosperous society. Yi Ik paid equal attention to both goals, writing about self-cultivation as well as political and socioeconomic issues. His student Sin was more one-sided. Sin's preoccupation with nurturing his personal virtue blinded him to the possible benefits to society of heterodox scholarship.

In their 1724 discussion of Western learning, Sin

argued that Catholicism, because of its fundamental absorption with heaven, hell, and the fate of the individual immortal soul, was no better than Buddhism. Yi responded with a defense of Catholicism, saying that such coincidental similarities between Catholicism and Buddhism should not cause them to overlook the great difference between the nihilism of Buddhism and the practicality of Western learning. Sin refused to admit that there was anything to be gained from the study of Western books unless Yi could show him that the West provided techniques for governing the state as grand as the Way of the legendary rulers of ancient China. Yi then pointed out that the Jesuits had made advances in calendrical science, for example, that surpassed anything any man, Chinese or barbarian, had ever accomplished before. When he spoke of the practical benefits that Western books offered, Yi explained, he was referring primarily to books on astronomy and mathematics.⁴⁸

Sin viewed the West through eyes focused more on the moral than the political strands in the Neo-Confucian tradition. He was dismayed that a respectable Confucian scholar such as Yi Ik would brush aside the serious moral threat Western writings posed simply because the books contained amid their absurdities some bits of useful information which might be of interest to the technicians and artisans of the state. After Sin read The True God

Above, On World Geography, and On the Soul, he wrote out a long Neo-Confucian critique of Catholic thought, condemning it as dangerous, erroneous, and immoral.⁴⁹ Sin's proud descendants later wrote that Sin's Sŏhakpyŏn (On Western learning) deserved to be ranked alongside Chu Hsi's denunciation of Buddhism and Mencius's condemnation of Yang Chu and Mo Tzu, though they noted that others more favorably inclined to Christianity saw Sin simply as stubborn and inflexible.⁵⁰

The forty-two year old Yi Ik was not swayed by the twenty-two year old Sin's essay. When they met again in 1725, Yi told his young disciple that he was disappointed to learn that Sin still did not realize that Catholicism was different from those heterodox teachings which do nothing more than delude the people. Yi insisted moreover that there were a lot more similarities between the Catholic God and the Lord-on-High of the Confucian Classics than Sin was admitting. He concluded, "I am afraid you have not shown enough deep thought in this criticism of yours."⁵¹ Yi was so unimpressed by Sin's anti-Catholic essay that when he wrote Sin's obituary forty years later, he did not include the Sŏhakpyŏn among the many titles of Sin's works he judged worthy of mention, although Yi did give the titles of five separate works dealing with the Yi Ching alone.⁵²

Having failed to convince Yi Ik of the foolishness of

his weakness for Western books, Sin made no further excursions into Jesuit literature, except for a brief glance shortly before his death at an introduction to astronomy by Emmanuel Diaz (1574-1659), the T'ien wen lüeh (A survey of the heavens), and a world atlas by Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688), the K'ün yu t'u shuo (An annotated map of the world). His appraisal of the West had not changed over the decades. Sin repeated his charge that Catholicism was essentially no different from Buddhism. He warned that the Jesuits might be quite detailed in their discussions of the natural world, but not everything they said could be believed.⁵³

An Chongbok

Sin was not the only disciple with whom Yi Ik discussed Western learning. An Chongbok (1712-1791) also sought Yi's opinion on the value of Western ideas and techniques. Unlike Sin, An did not object to Yi's interest in Jesuit writings, for he agreed with Yi that there were useful elements in Western scholarship that could be extracted from the theological nonsense in which they were embedded.⁵⁴

An did not meet Yi Ik until 1746, but they quickly established a close master-disciple relationship.⁵⁵ It was An who edited Yi's vast encyclopedic collection of essays into the more manageable form which made Yi's reputation, the Songho sasöl yusön (A selection for Yi Ik's

miscellaneous writings). And it was An who defended Yi's reputation as an orthodox Neo-Confucian scholar when, after Yi's death, the popularity of Catholic books among some young Namin raised suspicion in some quarters that Yi himself had been too tolerant of heterodoxy.

An, like Yi Ik and Sin Hudam, was a rural scholar. He spent most of his life at his farm in Kwangju near Seoul and held no important government posts until late in his life, when he was appointed tutor to the Crown Prince in the last years of King Yǒngjo's reign and then was sent to Mokch'ŏn in Ch'ungch'ŏng province as magistrate soon after King Chǒngjo ascended the throne.⁵⁶ An read widely in a variety of areas, from frivolous fiction to serious philosophy, but he remained committed to the Neo-Confucianism of Chu Hsi.⁵⁷ Unlike Yi Ik, who read and wrote much about politics, economics, and natural science, or Sin Hu-dam, who dedicated most of his scholarly energy to explicating the Book of Changes, An devoted much of his attention to history. His Tongsa kangmok (An outline of Korean history), which covered the beginnings of Korean history to the end of the Koryo dynasty in 1392, is respected today for pioneering the critical analysis of primary sources in Korean historiography.

An exchanged a couple of letters with Yi Ik on Western learning in the 1750s but it was not until the 1780s that An began seriously to examine and criticize Catholic

writings.⁵⁸ It was then that Catholicism became more than an exotic novelty to spice up conversation among Namin and began to be practiced seriously as a religion by some. Among Korea's first Catholics, converted soon after Yi Sŭnghun (1756-1801) returned from baptism in Peking in 1784, were An's son-in-law Kwŏn Ilsin (?-1791), as well as Kwŏn's older brother Ch'ŏlsin (1736-1801), one of An's disciples. Also attracted to the new religion from the West were two more of An's disciples, Yi Kiyang (1745-1802) and Yi Kahwan (1742-1801), the latter a grandnephew of Yi Ik.

In 1785 An wrote two treatises on Catholicism in which he pointed out the flaws in that European religion from a Sino-centric Neo-Confucian perspective. In Ch'ŏnhakko (Reflections on Heavenly Learning), An turned his vast store of historical knowledge into a powerful weapon aimed at the Jesuit claim that Catholicism, "Heavenly Learning," had parallels in orthodox Confucian tradition. Citing Chinese records from the Han dynasty through the Ch'ing, he argued that Catholicism resembled such barbarian religions as Islam, Nestorianism, and the idol worship of central Asia more than it did Confucianism. He supported this rejection of the Christian pretense to orthodoxy by quoting explicit criticism of Catholicism by the Chinese scholar Ku Yenwu (1613-1682) and by An's own predecessors in Korea, Yi Sugwang and Yi Ik.⁵⁹

An explained at the beginning of the Ch'ŏnhakko why he

had prepared his historical survey of East Asian reactions to Western religions.

Western books have been coming into Korea since the end of the reign of King Sonjo (r.1567-1608). There is no respected official or learned scholar who has not looked upon them as belonging to the same category as Taoist and Buddhist works, books left on a library shelf for amusement. All they have to offer are some techniques in mathematics and the study of the heavens. Recently a young scholar picked up some of those books while in Peking on a diplomatic mission and brought them back into Korea. Subsequently, in the last couple of years (1784-5), a group of bright young men have begun preaching that the Lord Above descended to the earth as a divine messenger and other Catholic doctrines.

What a tragedy! They spend their entire lives studying the works of the Sages of China and then, in just one morning, throw it all away for such strange teachings. That is as bad as someone who goes off to study for three years and then, when he returns home, impudently addresses his mother by her given name. It is really a pity. I have selected some records from history and compiled this Ch'ŏnhakko to show them that this "heavenly learning" has been around China for quite some time. It even⁶⁰ reached Korea a long time ago. It is nothing new.

In his Ch'ŏnhakko An tried to convince Kwon Ch'olsin and others sympathetic to Catholicism that they had been fooled by Jesuit writings into believing that Catholicism was accepted in China and acceptable in Korea, when actually Chinese and Koreans had been condemning it and similar immoral religions for centuries. In his other anti-Catholic polemic, Ch'ŏnhak mundap (A conversation on heavenly learning), An attacked the specifics of Catholic doctrine which offended his Confucian values.

An's Ch'ŏnhak mundap takes the form of a dialogue in

which An responded to over thirty questions about Catholic thought and practices. His anonymous questioner asked his opinion of the Catholic claim to be the true "heavenly learning," teaching the proper way to show the respect for heaven that Confucianism demands. An replied that, quite the contrary, Catholicism was immoral, irrational, illogical, anti-social, unrealistic, selfish, and superstitious; in a word, idan.

An died in 1791, just before the first major anti-Catholic persecution took the lives of three yangban, including his son-in-law Kwŏn Ilsin. There had been an arrest of some Catholics in 1785, for which An disclaimed responsibility, though there were those among his former associates who nevertheless blamed An for the authorities' discovery of a Catholic service in progress at the home of the chungin Kim Pŏmu.⁶² It was not An's intention to expose to official punishment those among his disciples who had defected to Catholicism. Rather, he hoped to win them back to the orthodox fold before word of their unorthodox views spread too far. An shared Yi Ik's belief that the Catholic doctrine of heaven and hell was dangerous because it led men to place the salvation of their individual soul above the needs of society as a whole. For Yi, that concern was purely theoretical since there were no Catholics in Korea while Yi was alive. An felt a greater urgency. The spread of Catholic ideas among his own disciples and in-laws

compelled him to write a condemnation of Catholicism more strident and detailed than Yi Ik had ever written.

When the seventy-three year old An took up his pen in 1785 and wrote the Ch'ŏnhakko and the Ch'ŏnhak mundap, he intended his essays to awaken the Catholics to the error they had fallen into. An had been shocked and saddened by the dangerous turn his friends, relatives, and students had taken. Though An's writings were more polemical than the earlier philosophical critique of Sin Hudam, An nevertheless wrote to persuade more than to condemn. At first Kwŏn and the others were willing to sit and discuss the merits of Catholic doctrine with An, but by 1785, An complained to Yi Kiyang, they had grown tired of arguing with him and would not even answer his letters anymore.

Their Jesus is called the Messiah. That means that he wants to save the world by guiding the ignorant to enlightenment. So how can they refuse to answer my questions, keeping their beliefs secret and denying enlightenment to me in my ignorance? Is that how their Lord of Heaven intends to save the world?⁶³

An also had a practical, political motive for writing his anti-Catholic essays. He believed that Confucians who converted to Catholicism not only debased themselves, they also endangered their friends and associates. In the heated factional politics of Yi dynasty Korea, it was not wise for any group, especially one as weak as An's group, the Namin, were in the eighteenth century, to become associated with controversial philosophies. Kwŏn Ch'ŏlsin and most of the

early Catholic yangban were members of An's Namin faction. Yet prudence demanded that the Namin maintain a safe distance from even the hint of heterodoxy. In an admonitory letter, An warned Kwon Ch'ŏlsin that, considering the factional rivalries of their day, Catholicism could easily be seized by their enemies as a weapon for slandering and destroying all the Namin. He reminded Kwŏn that Christians had been killed by the tens of thousands in Japan and even in the West. Could the Lord of Heaven save them if the same fate threatened them in Korea?⁶⁴

In 1783 An wrote Ch'ae Chegong, the highest ranking Namin in the government, to join with him in his anti-Catholic campaign. An informed Ch'ae that many talented Namin were dabbling in that new religion, proclaiming it the true Way. If he and Ch'ae did not work together to put a stop to the spread of alien doctrines in their ranks, An wrote, the entire Namin faction could be in danger.⁶⁵ An showed an astute understanding of the nature of traditional Korean politics with that expression of concern, for what An feared came to pass in the great persecution of 1801. Those Namin tainted by the slightest contact with Catholicism were purged from power. Many, including some who had renounced or never accepted Catholicism, were executed. Ch'ae himself, though he had risen as high as Second State Councillor before his death in 1799, was posthumously stripped of all his titles and

honors in 1801 because he had not acted firmly enough in suppressing Catholicism.⁶⁶ An, on the other hand, received a posthumous promotion to the post of Sixth State Councillor for his contribution to the fight against the Catholic idan.⁶⁷

A third reason An was so active in refuting and condemning Catholic teachings was his concern for his teacher's reputation. Since so many of the Catholics had been students of Yi's writings, An was afraid that Yi Ik would be branded as the man responsible for their folly. At the end of his Ch'ŏnhak mundap, he appended a defense of Yi saying that those who read Yi's admiration for Western science and technology as praise for Western religion were wrong. An argued that there was nothing wrong in recognizing Western expertise in astronomy or noting that Western craftsmen surpassed the Chinese in some areas, since China traditionally had relied on barbarian monks for such skills. Since Yi had clearly condemned such Catholic doctrines as the after-life as idan, there was no justification for accusing him of believing in or tolerating Catholicism.⁶⁸

Yi Ik, Sin Hudam, and An Ch'ŏngbok provided the ideological framework for the anti-Catholic movement in Korea in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. As An noted, many read the Catholic books from China. Few, however, believed what those books taught about God, man's

soul, virtue, or human nature. The position laid out by Yi, Sin, and An became the majority view: Catholicism was inherently contaminated by selfish interest in personal salvation and had no rightful place in their Neo-Confucian world.

More Than a Language Barrier

Though Yi, because of his broader range of interests and greater tolerance for diversity, was willing to listen to what the West had to say on matters concerning statecraft, nature, and self-discipline, he was no more willing than Sin or An to ingest Western theological fare. He differed from An and Sin primarily in being less wary of the power of Catholicism to spread its poison through other than theological offerings and more confident of the power of Confucianism to successfully resist the virus of selfishness.

Why did Catholicism fail to escape condemnation even by someone as open-minded as Yi Ik? The Jesuit policy of accommodation to Confucian culture through the presentation of Catholic theology in Confucian language failed to disguise the heterodox nature and foreign origin of Catholic concepts. Many of the Jesuit missionaries wrote their arguments for their faith in eloquent prose garnished with liberal quotations from the revered Confucian Classics. Yet Yi Ik, Sin Hudam, and An Chôngbok represented a majority Korean view that beneath that beautiful prose

lay an ugly immorality. Matteo Ricci's strategy failed to take into account the semantic gap between what the Jesuits intended by the Chinese characters they wrote and what connotations their Confucian audience usually read into those words.

After all, a common language requires more than just a shared lexical, phonemic, and grammatical base. A linguistic bridge can join two cultures only when it is supported by pillars of mutually compatible, fundamental assumptions. Only men who invest their words with the same meanings can truly understand one another. The European missionaries in China in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though they wrote in the Chinese language of their audience, appeared unable to use that language in the same sense in which most Chinese of that time used it and understood it. The Jesuits adopted Chinese words for God, virtue, human nature, and the soul, for example, but when they used those words to argue their case for Christianity, they had to define them in new and startling ways. Most Confucians who read Jesuit books could not totally understand them. Many of those who did understand what the Jesuits were trying to say were more disturbed than convinced by the Christian message. Catholicism in Confucian terminology remained Catholicism--an alien religion in the Neo-Confucian world.

The differences between Catholicism and Confucianism were thus more than differences of language. The

Catholicism of the Jesuit missionaries in China and the Neo-Confucianism of eighteenth century Korea represented two opposing cultures, two competing world views. Catholics and Neo-Confucians interpreted the physical and mental spheres of their experience through dissimilar categories. The pre-cognitive stance taken by Neo-Confucians before the universe, their a priori assumptions regarding the nature of truth, reality, value, and human nature which constitute the lens through which all thought must pass, differed radically from that taken by the Jesuits preaching Catholic Scholasticism from Europe. Two philosophies so different in the ways they divided, classified, and defined all that was brought before the bar of reason could hardly be harmonized through superficial linguistic compromise.

As noted earlier, the major Korean Confucian objection to Catholicism was that it was rooted in selfishness. Sin Hudam denounced Catholic writings as nefarious glorification of self-interest. He charged that when Catholics acted morally, they did so only because they expected to be rewarded for their good behavior in this life or after death. Sin insisted that Catholics showed Confucian respect for the Lord above only because they believed that God determines how long they live, whether they are favored with good fortune or stricken with bad luck while they live, and whether they will gain eternal happiness or endless misery after death. "What they call reverence is

not the reverence that comes from a sincere heart....All they care about is winning happiness and avoiding suffering." In Sin's judgment, Catholic teachings were the product of minds bent on the pursuit of personal interest. He declared that such selfishness clearly could not be compared to the sincerity with which the Sages of old addressed Heaven.⁶⁹

An Chŏngbok made a similar point in a letter to his pro-Catholic disciple Kwŏn Ch'ŏlsin. An, too, objected to Catholic belief in heaven and hell, "two realms whose reality no man can verify." An argued that when Catholics talked of salvation ("saving the world" 救世), they really were talking only about the individual rewards such salvation promised and were therefore teaching the same selfishness that perverted Taoist and Buddhist teachings."Their so-called 'salvation' is as different from what the Sages have done to clarify virtue and renew the people as kong, selflessness, is from sa, selfishness." An warned that such doctrines try to replace the real with the imaginary and the genuine with the fraudulent and could delude men's minds as badly and as dangerously as Buddhist millenarianism had done.⁷⁰

The Confucian employment of the moral criteria of selflessness versus selfishness to judge and condemn Catholicism contrasts sharply with the Jesuit denunciation of Neo-Confucianism on doctrinal grounds. The first Jesuit

missionaries were careful not to condemn outright the Confucian moral code, which they read as incomplete but largely in accord with natural law. Nicolaus Trigault (1577-1628) noted that Matteo Ricci

Did not find fault with the literary sect; on the contrary, he praised them and particularly their great philosopher, Confucius, who preferred to observe silence relative to the future life, rather than put forth erroneous ideas about it, and to explain the law by offering precepts for regulating the life of the individual, for the direction of the family, and for the proper government of the kingdom.⁷¹

Ricci instituted a missionary policy in China of presenting Christianity not as a replacement for Confucianism but as a supplement to it and perfection of it.⁷² He preached that Catholic doctrine would complete, not contradict, the ethical foundations of Confucianism.

To those who argued that belief in heaven and hell was unnecessary or even detrimental for a moral life, Ricci responded that only those who accepted this Catholic doctrine of reward and retribution after death were true gentlemen. When his Confucian questioner in T'ien-chu shih-i asked if simply acting as a gentleman was not enough, Ricci answered with a quotation from the Odes. Since the Odes described the Sage King Wen as reverently serving the Lord Above, Ricci argued that all men who aspired to be gentlemen had to imitate King Wen's faith in God. Moreover, God, as God, exemplified benevolence and impartiality (in 仁 and kong 公) and such a God

necessarily showed his benevolence by rewarding the good with eternal happiness and his impartiality by punishing the evil with eternal misery. Therefore those who shared King Wen's belief in God had to also believe in heaven and hell. Otherwise, they rejected both the message of the Classics and the force of logic.⁷³ Proper Confucian behavior had to be coupled with correct Catholic belief to earn the title of gentleman: that was the core of the Riccian case for Catholic theology.

Of course, there were areas of Confucian practice which Ricci and other missionaries condemned as immoral. Concubinage, even if necessary to fulfill the Confucian obligation of producing an heir to continue one's family line, was not acceptable. Nor would the missionaries accept the Confucian toleration of Taoist divination or Buddhist idols.⁷⁴ The papal condemnation of Confucian mourning ritual in the eighteenth century is perhaps the best known example of conflict between Catholic and Confucian moral standards.

Yet the thrust of the Catholic disagreement with Confucianism was doctrinal. The Jesuits were apparently unaware that most Neo-Confucians viewed disputes with Europeans over dogma as a reflection of a basic moral antagonism. The missionaries wrote, preached, and proselytized as though their differences were more over what to believe than over what to do. They more often

condemned Neo-Confucianism as wrong than as immoral. A century and a half after Ricci arrived in Peking, the Jesuit priest Alexander de la Charme (1695-1767) listed over twenty-five reasons why Neo-Confucianism should be condemned, all of them doctrinal. The idolatrous implications of ancestor memorial services appeared to him less relevant than the failure of Neo-Confucian metaphysics to admit the existence of the Creator. "These books on nature and principle (理性) [i.e., Neo-Confucianism] talk only of i and ki and do not push beyond them to their origin in the Creator. The harm they do is far worse than that done by the pagan religions which worship false gods."⁷⁵ This Catholic missionary believed that it was better to worship false gods than to deny the existence of any god at all, for atheism was the ultimate impiety. For de la Charme, as for Ricci, errors in Chinese thought were more in need of rectification than errors in Chinese behavior.

From Matteo Ricci to Alexander de la Charme, the Jesuit missionaries in China consistently argued that Catholicism was the true religion, more faithful both to the dictates of reason and to the unadulterated sense of the original Chinese Classics than the Neo-Confucianism then dominant in China and Korea. Korean Neo-Confucians resisted this attempt to force the debate between Confucianism and Christianity into a battle of competing truth claims. Sin

Hudam and An Chôngbok instead shifted the focus of the dispute to morality, charging that the fundamental difference between Confucianism and Catholicism was best seen in terms of concern for society versus selfish egotism. The Korean refusal to accept the Jesuit terms for the debate reveals that Scholastic Catholicism and Neo-Confucianism were divided by contrasting assumptions regarding the nature of truth itself.

Catholicism was rejected by most Korean Confucians because it appeared to conflict with the requirement of Confucian social morality that men always act without regard for their own personal benefit. By Confucian standards, the Catholic doctrines of heaven, hell, and individual salvation were immoral and therefore could not and should not be believed. The missionaries argued, however, that truth should determine moral judgments, rather than moral presuppositions determining what is accepted as true.

The core argument by the Jesuits in their Chinese language writings was that God exists and lived on earth as Jesuit Christ, the savior of all mankind, and that His words are found in the Bible, which promises eternal life to all those who love and obey God. To the Jesuits, the divine revelation found in the Bible determines what is good, since morality is nothing other than the will of God codified for man. In the Thomistic Catholicism which Korea

encountered in the eighteenth century, there can be no moral good independent of the will of God.⁷⁶ The Jesuit position was that God has told man both in the Bible and indirectly in the Confucian Classics that He wishes to reward the good in heaven and punish the wicked in hell after their death, so men are morally justified in reflecting God's will by seeking that eternal reward and have no moral or logical justification for denying the existence of heaven and hell or repudiating their role in moral decisions.⁷⁷

Sin and An could not understand this argument. For them, morality was the given, the unquestioned assumptions on which all other judgments were based. Any assertions which appeared to contradict the tenets of Confucian morality could not be true, as Confucians conceived truth. In their world, truth was determined by the good. That which conformed to basic ethical principles was true. That which challenged those principles was false. Ethical consequences were more important than logical considerations in evaluating the worth of an idea.

In the anti-Catholic essays of Sin Hudam and An Ch'ngbok, there are countless examples of greater concern for questions of good and evil than of truth and falsity. Heaven and hell were not the only Catholic doctrines attacked as immoral. An wrote that the Catholic belief in the devil should be dismissed on the same grounds. He

believed that if men believed in a devil, they would be tempted to attribute their own moral weakness to external pressure and would neglect their own obligation to cultivate their innate goodness through rigorous self-control.⁷⁸ Whether or not a devil really existed was less important to An than what the consequences would be of the belief that he existed.

Sin Hudam used a moral standard to criticize certain Biblical accounts of God's intervention in human affairs. As noted earlier, an essential element in Confucian morality was impartiality. The Christian claim that God selected the Jews to be His chosen people and that God appeared to man only in Palestine and left the rest of the world to receive His guidance secondhand made God appear guilty of favoritism.⁷⁹ Nor did God's treatment of the inhabitants of the town of Sodom reflect well on His claim to perfect goodness and justice. According to Aleni in his Chih-fang wai-chi, the people of Sodom had angered the Lord with their licentious ways and their open display of contempt for morality by their shameless practice of homosexuality, so God destroyed their city and all who lived there, sparing only the family of a particularly just man named Lot.⁸⁰ Sin agreed that homosexuals should be punished, but he condemned the indiscriminate destruction of an entire town for the sins of some of its citizens. "Sodom must have had within its walls some children only

seven or eight years old as well as some old men in their seventies and eighties. How could these children and old men have been guilty of homosexuality? Yet they were destroyed along with the others."⁸¹ A God who could be so partial to the Jews and unfair to the Sodomites was a dangerous God indeed, for if God could act with such disregard for the fundamental principles of fairness, so could man. Sin preferred to believe that an immoral God was no god at all and that the Biblical tales were in error, since they depicted an amoral deity. Accordingly, the Bible could not be the infallible revelation of God the Jesuits claimed it to be.

Until the Jesuits convinced men like Sin and An to accept their premise that theology preceded ethics, that God provided the standards by which all else was judged, the missionaries could not expect a large receptive audience. Until Neo-Confucians abandoned their belief that religion was the handmaid of morality rather than the reverse, few Koreans could read Jesuit apologia for Christianity with sympathetic eyes. The Catholic hope of selling religious dogma to men who recoiled at the implied price in moral values was doomed to disappointment.

Notes for Chapter Three

1. Analects, II, 16.
2. Sin Hudam, "Sŏhakpyŏn," in Yi Manch'ae, ed., Pyŏgwip'yŏn [In defense of orthodoxy and against heterodoxy] (Seoul: yŏlhwadang, 1971), p.40.
3. Chŏng Yagyong, "Nonŏgogŏmju" [Notes on the Analects], Chŏng Tasan chŏnjip [The complete collected works of Chŏng Yakyong], II. 7:31a.
4. Arthur Waley, trans., The Analects of Confucius (New York: Vintage Books, 1938), p.91.
5. See, for example, Analects IV, 15, where it is explained that there is one theme that unites the teachings of Confucius. That theme is identified as the virtues of loyalty and consideration for others.
6. Elaine Pagels, The Gnostic Gospels (New York: Random House, 1979).
7. Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), Gordon Leff, "Heresy in the Middle Ages", II, p.417.
8. Taemyŏngnyul chik'ae [The Ming law codes explained] (reprint, Seoul: Pŏpjech'o, 1964), p. 294-5; J.J. M. de Groot, Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China (New York: Paragon Books, 1970), pp. 137, 147.
9. David L. Holland, "Heresy, Renaissance and Later," Dictionary of the History of Ideas, pp.424-31.
10. Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1977), p. xxii.
11. Holland, "Heresy, Renaissance and Later," p.424.
12. For example, see An Chŏngbok's 1784 letter to Kwŏn Ch'ŏlsin, Sunamjip [An Chŏng-bok's collected works], 6:29a-b.
13. Mencius, III, 2, IX.
14. For example, see Hong Nagan's letter to Ch'ae Chegong in Yi Kigyŏng, ed., Pyŏgwip'yŏn [In defense of orthodoxy and against heterodoxy] (Seoul: Kyohoesa yŏn'guso, 1979), p.26.

15. Chu Hsi and Liu Tsu-ch'ien, ed., Wing Tsit-chan, translator, Reflections on Things at Hand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.279.
16. Ch'eng Hao, I-shu, 4:4b, as translated by Wing-tsit Chan, A Sourcebook of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p.535.
17. Chu Hsi, Chu Tzu ch'üan-shu [The complete works of Chu Hsi], as translated by Chan, Sourcebook, p.646.
18. Martina Deuchler, "Neo-Confucianism: The Impulse for Social Action in Early Yi Korea," The Journal of Korean Studies, 2 (1980), pp. 75-79; Küm Chang-t'ae, "Chungjongjo t'aehaksaeng üi pyöbul undong" [The anti-Buddhist campaign of Confucian students during the reign of King Chungjong], Han'guk Yugyo üi Chaejomyöng [A new light on Korean Confucianism] (Seoul: Chönmangsa, 1982), pp. 199-208.
19. For example, see Yi Ik as cited by An Chöngbok, Sunamjip, 17:26b.
20. Letter by Yi Hön'gyöng to Hong Yangho before Hong's departure on an official mission to Peking, Kanongjip [The works of Yi Hongyong], 9:36a-38a; also note Pak Chiwön's criticism of the arrogant assumption of moral and cultural superiority some Koreans displayed in China, Yölha ilgi [Peking diary], in Yönamjip [Pak Chiwon's collected works], 14:1a-4a.
21. Küm Changt'ae, "T'oegye üi Yangmyöng'hak pip'an" [T'oegye's criticism of the Wang Yangming school], Han'guk yugyo üi chaejomyöng, pp.209-18; Kim Kilhwan, Chosönjo yuhaksasang yön'gu [A study of Confucianism in the Yi dynasty] (Seoul: Iljisa, 1980), pp. 69-76.
22. Hwang Tögil, Haryö sönsaeng munjip [The collected writings of Hwang Togil], 16:10a.
23. Hwang, *ibid.*, 16:11a.
24. For an illuminating discussion of selfishness and selflessness in Chinese Confucian writings, see Donald Munro, "The Concept of Interest in Chinese Thought", Journal of the History of Ideas, 41, no. 2, pp.179-97.
25. Munro, "Concept of interest", p. 180.
26. On Yang Chu, See James Legge, Mencius, pp. 92-99.

27. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp.40-41.
28. An, Sunamjip, 2: 16a-b, 1757 letter to Yi Ik.
29. Mun Sang Seoh, "Yi Ik, an Eighteenth Century Korean Intellectual," Journal of Korean Studies, I, 1 (1969), pp.9-21; Song Chu-yŏng, "Sŏngho Yi Ik ūi kyŏngje sasang" [Yi Ik's economic thought], Han'guk sirhak sasang taeyo [The gist of Korean sirhak thought] (Seoul: Pagyongsa, 1979), pp.67-127, abridged in English as "Practical Learning of Yi Ik," Korea Journal, 12, no. 8, pp.38-45; Han U-gŭn, Sŏngho Yi Ik yŏn'gu [A study of Yi Ik] (Seoul: Seoul University Press, 1980).
30. Han, Sŏngho Yi Ik yŏn'gu, p. 49, lists all the works Yi Ik mentions by name in his writings.
31. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sŏnsaeng jŏnjip [The complete works of Yi Ik], 55:24a-26b; 27b; 30a.
32. The Ch'i k'e can be found in Ch'ŏnhak ch'oham, pp.192-307.
33. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 11:2b.
34. Sang-woon Jeon, Science and Technology in Korea (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1974), p.205.
35. Kukcho Pogam, 35: 17-18.
36. Gari Ledyard, The Dutch Come to Korea (Seoul: RAS, 1971), says that Jan Weltervee, shipwrecked in 1628, was known for his skill in manufacturing cannon and was assigned to the government bureau in charge of manufacturing weapons as well as training troops in their use (pp. 30-31). The later arrivals, Hendrik Hamel's group, were assigned to that same bureau, although it does not appear that they made much of a contribution to Korean armaments (pp.46-47).
37. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 5:68a. For more of his comments on Western weapons, see 4: 3b-4a (note on Rodrigues); 5: 67a-68b (on firearms); 6:74b-75a (on incendiary arrows).
38. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 2: 38a-40a. Also see Sŏngho sŏnsaeng munjip, 45: 39b-40b.
39. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 2: 43a-b.
40. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 14: 23a-24b.

41. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 13: 22a-b; 30: 39b-40a.
42. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp.38-103.
43. "Habin sŏnsaeng nyŏnbo" [A chronology of the life of Sin Hudam], Asea yŏn'gu [Journal of Asiatic Studies], 15 (1972), no. 2, p. 197; Yi Ik, "Sŏng'gyun'gwan chinsa Sin'gong myojimyŏng" [An obituary for Sin Hudam], Sŏngho sŏnsaeng chŏnjip, 64:33a.
44. "Habin sŏnsaeng nyŏnbo," pp.197-99; Ch'oe Tonghui, "Sin Hudam ūi sŏhakpyŏn e gwanhan yŏn'gu" [A study of Sin Hudam's Sŏhakpyŏn], Sirhak sasang ūi yŏn'gu [Studies of sirhak thought] (Seoul: Hyŏnamsa, 1974), pp.121-31.
45. Yi Ik, "Sŏng'gyun'gwan chinsa Sin'gong myojimyŏng," 34:b.
46. "Habin sŏnsaeng nyonbo," p. 200.
47. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sŏnsaeng chŏnjip, 22: 30a-31a.
48. Sin Hudam, Habinjip [The collected works of Sin Hudam], vol.2, cited in Kim Yangson, "Han'guk sirhak paljŏn sa" [A history of the development of Korean sirhak], in his Maesan kukhak san'go [Kim Yangson's writings on Korean Studies] (Seoul: Sungjŏn Univeristy Museum, 1972), pp. 136-38.
49. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp. 38-103.
50. "Habin sŏnsaeng nyŏnbo," p. 199.
51. Kim Yangson, "Han'guk sirhak paljŏn sa," p. 138, citing Habinjip, vol 2.
52. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sŏnsaeng munjip, 22: 33b-34a.
53. "Habin sŏnsaeng nyŏnbo," pp. 216-7.
54. An, Sunamjip, 17: 26a-27a.
55. An provides a record of that first meeting in his "hanjang nok," Sunamjip, 16:13b.
56. Sunamjip, "nyŏnbo" [A chronological account of An Chongbok's life], 33b, 47a.
57. Sunamjip, "nyŏnbo", 3a.
58. In a 1757 letter to Yi, An gave his reasons for

labeling Catholicism idan. (Sunamjip, 2:16a-17a). In 1758 An wrote Yi to discuss the Catholic concept of the soul. (Sunamjip, 2:26b-30a).

59. An; Sunamjip, "Ch'ŏnhakko", 17:1a-8a.
60. Ibid.
61. An, Sunamjip, "Ch'ŏnhak mundap", 17:8a-26a.
62. Yi Manch'ae, ed., Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp. 105-08.
63. An, Sunamjip, 8:21a.
64. An, Sunamjip, 8:24b.
65. An, Sunamjip, 5:19b-20a.
66. Yi Manch'ae, ed., Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp. 596-98.
67. Ibid., p. 489; Yi Kuyong, "Sunam An Chŏngbok ui saengnae wa sasang" [The life and thought of An Chongbok], Kangwon taehak yŏn'gu nonmunjip [Research papers from Kangwon University], 1972, p.374.
68. An, Sunamjip. 17:26a-28a.
69. Sin Hudam, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp.91-92.
70. An Chŏngbok, Sunamjip, 6:33b-34a, 1784 letter of Kwon Ch'olsin.
71. Nicolaus Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, p.337.
72. Ibid., p.98.
73. Matteo Ricci, Ch'ŏnju silui (Seoul: Han'guk kyohoesa yŏn'guso, 1972 0, pp. 243-44. The phrase Ricci cites from the Odes can be found in Legge's translation, p.433.
74. Trigault, China in the Sixteenth Century, pp.416, 434.
75. Sheng-li chen-chuan, p.305, as cited in Chu Ch'ien-chih, "Yesuhui tuiyu Sung-ju lihsueh chih fanhsiang" [The Jesuits' reaction to Sung Neo-Confucianism], T'ao Hsi-sheng, et al., Ming-tai tsung-chiao [Ming dynasty religion] (Taipei: The Student Bookstore, 1968), pp.158-9.
76. Note Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Part IIA,

- question 19, article 9, "the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the divine will," trans. Anton E Pegis, Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1948), vol.II, p.346.
77. Ricci, Ch'ŏnju silui, pp.238-41, argues that the Classics support a belief in heaven and hell. Page 245 argues this hope for reward and fear of punishment is an acceptable motive for doing good, though it would be better to do good for good's sake or out of gratitude for God's love.
78. An, Sunamjip, 17:15b-16a.
79. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn.
80. Giulio Aleni, Chih-fang wai-chi, in Ch'onhak ch'oham [An introduction to Heavenly Learning] (Seoul reprint, Asea Munhwasa, 1976), pp.363.
81. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p.102.

Chapter Four

Metaphysics and Morality

The contrast between a stress on truth and an emphasis on ethics marks a fundamental point of conflict between Western and Korean thought in the eighteenth century. It would be a mistake to view the clash between Catholicism and Confucianism as simply an ideological battle between opposing creeds or to believe that the dispute arose from antagonistic claims to truth rather than from a more intractable disagreement over the nature and importance of truth itself.

A superficial comparison of Catholicism and Confucianism might paint a picture of apparent similarities where significant differences actually exist. Both Christianity and Confucianism condemned the licentious and the covetous, praised the loyal and the filial, encouraged honesty and discouraged deceit. Such parallels have misled some contemporary Koreans into arguing that Christianity and Confucianism shared a common concern and orientation. They then interpret Confucianism as a moral philosophy which can be accommodated through compromise to the philosophy and theology of Christianity.¹

Others have treated the Christian claim that God created the universe as of the same logical order as the Neo-Confucian statement that the universe began with the intermingling of the cosmic forces of yin and yang. They portray both statements as factual claims, attempts to describe what actually happened at the beginning of time. Under this approach, Neo-Confucianism is depicted as simply a Chinese answer to mankind's universal attempt to understand the world in which we all live. The clash between Neo-Confucianism and Western thought is thus described as amenable to rational resolution with the tools of logic and analysis.²

A third common element many modern thinkers find in Confucianism and Catholicism is dogmatic dependence on authority. Just as Catholics referred to their Bible or to the writings of Thomas Aquinas to support their beliefs, Neo-Confucians quoted from their Thirteen Classics and the writings of Chu Hsi. Both schools of thought have been described as uncritically relying on authorities that have not been tested with the philosophers' reason and logic, dissected by the historians' philological scalpel, or checked against the archaeologists' discoveries.

The picture of Confucianism and Catholicism as similarly dogmatic is only partly true, for they did not ask their authorities the same questions. Faced with a new moral, philosophical, or metaphysical claim, Catholics

would first refer to their Scriptures to see if the statement was true or false, if it contradicted factual as well as moral assertions found in the Bible. Neo-Confucians, faced with a similar proposition, would ask first if it contradicted the moral message of the Classics, whether or not it promoted proper behavior, as their Classics and their tradition defined it. A common reliance on authoritative written records does not erase the important difference revealed in how those records were used.

Two centuries ago, the Scottish philosopher David Hume pointed out that the West had long tried to derive the "ought" from the "is", a procedure he denounced as invalid.³ Hume charged that there was no logical justification for deriving moral judgments from statements of either logically necessary truths or facts about the natural or supernatural world.⁴ Hume was the first important Western thinker to identify what has since been labeled the "naturalistic fallacy", the belief that somehow the good straddles the realms of fact and value.⁵ Not all Western philosophers agreed with Hume's impeachment of ethical naturalism.⁶ One does not have to agree with Hume's verdict, however, to recognize that his description of traditional ethical thought in the West was correct. Whether or not ethical naturalism is valid, the Jesuit missionaries in China assumed it was.

Thomistic Catholicism grounded morality on belief in the existence of God, as revealed in the Bible and confirmed by logic. Standing firmly in the Western tradition, Catholics gave fact and existence priority over values. Only after they had established what man was, would they argue what man should do. Catholic moral reasoning usually began with the Creation. They believed that both the Scriptures and naked natural reason proved that the God who created the universe was good. "Since God is the first producing cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to him."⁷ Since God was good, all his creation was good as well, including man. Of course, Thomists recognized the existence of evil in men, but they argued that God gave men reason and a natural appetite for the good so that they would both want to and know how to overcome evil. Catholic morality was rooted in this rational inclination to the good implanted by God in all men, paralleled and supplemented by Divine commands.

Since Neo-Confucians also described their moral principles as based on human nature, it might appear that this was a point on which Confucianism and Catholicism could have agreed. However, the similarity was only superficial. In Catholicism, human nature was good because it was created by a good Creator. In Neo-Confucianism, human nature was good because it was coterminous with i,

the inherent principles of the good which pervaded the cosmos. In effect, morality provided its own foundation. Questions about whether or not God existed or how the world was created played no role in the formation of Confucian moral judgments.

The Catholic missionaries assumed that moral principles were derived from the attributes of human nature. Neo-Confucians viewed morality as the manifestation of human nature. Because of the insistence that morality was what men naturally felt within their own hearts they should do if they were to be worthy of being called men, Neo-Confucianism more closely resembled the moral sense philosophy Hume was advocating than the naturalistic ethic he was attacking. Hume wrote that "all morality depends upon our sentiments."⁸ Neo-Confucians would have agreed that spontaneous moral impulses in man determined right and wrong. They would not, however, have followed Hume and the other members of the moral sense school in identifying man's moral sense with the feeling of pleasure virtuous actions gives and the discomfort felt in the presence of evil.⁹

In Korean Neo-Confucian ethical reductionism, pleasure in the good played no role in establishing moral standards. Men instinctively recognized virtue. Any enjoyment derived from virtue was supportive, not decisive. Mencius provided what became the definitive Confucian definition of man's

innate moral sense when he wrote that men possess the seeds of morality in the basic emotions of compassion, shame, reverence, and sensitivity to right and wrong.¹⁰ For Mencius, and for the Confucians who followed him for over two millennia, those four seeds of morality stood alone with no need for external justification or support.

From these four seeds, described by Thomas Metzger as the "incipient manifestations of one's spontaneously moral feelings," Neo-Confucians obtained the "ought" from which they derived the "is" that defined truth.¹¹ They believed their Confucian Classics were true because they were illustrations of the implementation of man's innate sense of right and wrong. "The fact that the Classics have been accepted as the highest standards for human activity implies that the eternal truths which they embody are essentially moral."¹² The Classics were true because they were good. This approach contrasted sharply with that of Catholicism where the statements of the Bible and Church authorities were the "is" by which the "ought" of human emotions and actions were judged, the factual assertions from which ethical values were derived.

Neo-Confucian metaphysics was subordinate to morality and therefore functioned differently from metaphysics in the Catholic tradition. Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologica and his Summa Contra Gentiles, began with metaphysical issues such as the nature of God and the

universe. Only after he had established what was did he turn his attention to what men should do. Scholastic philosophy established that God exists as an infinite personality and is the creator of the universe before it established that men must honor and obey God. Ricci's T'ien-chu shih-i, probably the most influential introduction to Catholicism in China, Japan, and Korea during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, followed this Thomistic approach. The eight major chapter headings are a list of Catholic doctrines concerning the nature of man and his relationship with God, from the first chapter, which attempted to prove that God created the universe and preserves it in being, to the last, which told why priests do not marry and introduced the story of God's incarnation among the Jews of Palestine as Jesus of Nazareth.¹³

Neo-Confucianism, as Theodore de Bary has noted, used metaphysics primarily to provide support for Confucian ethics.¹⁴ The Great Ultimate and ying-yang cosmology, for example, were important primarily as symbols of the common moral thread believed to link mankind with heaven and earth. The Neo-Confucian claim that the universe had its origin in the alternation of yin and yang within the formless repository of Principle known as the Great Ultimate was not meant to be a literal cosmogony.¹⁵ The Great Ultimate and yin-yang referred to nothing more than heaven and earth themselves as their own eternal organizing

principles and were not intended to be taken as names of an actual temporal creator. Temporal creation was both irrelevant to Confucian moral concerns and inaccessible to the human mind. "If we try to go back before the universe began, we can see nothing, just as we can not imagine the end of the universe."¹⁶

In sharp contrast to the Catholic view that men possess a spiritual soul which set them apart from the strictly physical world of nature and matter, the yin-yang picture of the universe assumed a common substance shared by man and the rest of the cosmos. The ki (material force) that constituted a man differed only in degrees of clarity and purity from that which composes everything else. This physical unity prevailing all forms of beings supported a another communal inheritance: i, principle. Just as men, oscillating between the moral push of principle and the sometimes immoral pull of passion, felt torn by conflicting forces within them, the universe, too, was forced into constant change by the interaction and intermingling of the cosmic forces of dark, cold, passive yin and bright, hot, aggressive yang. Men often felt their bodies rebelling against their minds. The universe was subject to similar tension, with ki hindering the perfect expression of i. Neo-Confucian metaphysics treated the material world as one manifestation of the all-pervasive moral order struggling to realize itself. This picture differed sharply from the

Catholic vision of the universe as an emanation from God's rational will, with the moral order only one part of the divinely ordained natural law.

This contrast between Catholic emphasis on metaphysical and theological truth and Confucian stress on principles of morality and techniques of moral self-cultivation is starkly revealed in a comparison of the chapter headings from Ricci's catechism with those of Chin-ssu lu (Reflections on Things at Hand), a Neo-Confucian anthology edited by Chu Hsi and used as a basic introduction to Neo-Confucian thought in China, Korea, and Japan for the last seven centuries.¹⁷ Ricci devoted every chapter to knowledge and belief. Over half the chapter headings in Chin-ssu lu refer to how men should act. Such chapter titles as "Correcting Mistakes, Improving Oneself, Self-discipline, and Returning to Prosperity," "The Way to Regulate the Family," and "Methods of Handling Affairs" show why the Chin-ssu lu has been characterized as primarily a guide to achieving sagehood.¹⁸ Though metaphysics was present in the text, the overwhelming emphasis was on practical advice on cultivating proper behavior.

Not only did the authoritative Confucian texts differ in subject matter and orientation from Catholic works, the Confucian attitude toward written authority was quite different as well. In the Catholic tradition, the Bible was

the revealed word of God, imparting truth man would not have learned otherwise. After the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas became the official church guide to the interpretation of Biblical truths, with his reconciliation of the rational approach of Aristotelian philosophy and the often mysterious teachings of divine revelation. The task to which Aquinas addressed himself was to absorb the respect for logic and reason exemplified in the secular thinking of Aristotle into the Catholic world of faith and religious truth.¹⁹

The Confucian Classics were not read as revealing new truth. Even Confucius himself said that he did not teach anything new but was only a transmitter of ancient moral values.²⁰ Instead of serving as vehicles for the disclosure of truth, the Confucian Analects and other Classics clarified and developed moral themes already present in the Chinese tradition. The Neo-Confucianism developed by Chu Hsi and the Ch'eng brothers was an attempt to revive these traditional Chinese values after centuries of neglect by Chinese infatuated with Buddhist metaphysics.

The Scholastic philosophy of Thomas Aquinas was designed to demonstrate that logic supports, rather than contradicts, religious doctrine, thus legitimizing a role for reason in a world of truths accepted on faith. Chu Hsi's Neo-Confucianism was an effort to recover primacy for ethics, reversing the Buddhist use of metaphysics to

downgrade the significance of the phenomenal world which served as the stage on which the Confucian moral drama was enacted. Aquinas reinterpreted Aristotle to make secular Greek philosophy compatible with Catholic doctrine. Chu Hsi promoted a metaphysics which affirmed the reality of the world and the human community in order to deny Buddhist negation of Confucian social ethics. Accurate understanding of the deep differences between Neo-Confucianism and Catholicism can only be reached through a recognition that the leading authority of the Catholics was a defender of Catholic truth while the leading authority of the Neo-Confucians was a defender of Confucian morality.

Western philosopher and Eastern moralist are not distinctions that have appeared only in the last thousand years. As early as the fourth century B.C. Europe and Asia had already embarked on divergent paths. This is clear in the writings of Plato (427 B.C.-347 B.C.) and Mencius (372 B.C.-289 B.C.). The Greek philosopher Plato and the Chinese sage Mencius were both concerned with determining what was good, but for Plato the good was an object of knowledge and intellectual understanding. For Mencius the good was what men felt and did as a matter of course, if their innate tendency to do what was right was able to operate unhindered.

Plato's famous simile of the cave is representative of his approach. He compared man's limited knowledge of the

truth to the picture of the real world available to men chained facing the wall of a cave, able to see only the shadows of objects that pass by the mouth of their cave. Those men in the cave can learn what those shadows on the wall represent only if they break free from their chains, walk out into the open air, and look at the world as it really is, no matter how painful the light of the sun might be to eyes accustomed to darkness. Plato argued that, similarly, men accustomed to viewing the realm of the senses as real must dare to leave behind their trust in sensation to advance into the world of abstract intellectual concepts. Only there will they learn to distinguish accurately between reality and illusion. In their awakening to reality and truth, men will discover that "the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort."²¹

Mencius, on the contrary, depicted the good as easy to recognize. In his tale of a child about to fall into a well, a story as well-known in East Asia as Plato's story of the cave is in the West, Mencius argued that men instinctively felt what was right without any effort or thought whatsoever. He claimed that any man, upon witnessing a child about to fall into a well, would immediately feel concern and compassion for that child and would want to go to the child's aid. This emotion was not the result of any calculated desire to appear noble in the eyes

of his neighbors nor was it the product of a wish to win the favor of the child's parents. It was the spontaneous reaction to seeing harm about to befall an innocent child. The heart moved to help the child before the head had time to calculate an appropriate response.²² In Mencius's view, men had the natural ability to sense the good and were naturally disposed to do what was right. There was no need for the arduous intellectual search for the good recommended by Plato.

The Book of History said "It is not the knowing that is difficult, but the doing."²³ Despite the recognition later by Neo-Confucians that it was not easy to achieve complete understanding of precisely how man's moral impulses should be implemented in each of the myriad situations in which man finds himself, emphasis remained on the greater difficulty of doing good than knowing it.²⁴ Sin Hudam found nonsensical the Catholic claim that understanding of the good was beyond the capabilities of the unaided human mind, a claim that went beyond Plato's philosophy to a theological realm in which God himself became Goodness personified and knowledge of that Absolute Good became possible only with a supernatural boost to our limited cognitive powers.²⁵ "This is not like our Confucian teachings at all. When we use our mind to delve into principle, we obtain knowledge that is clear and precise."²⁶

Sin complained that Francis Sambiasi's celebration of Absolute Good in his Ling yen li shao (On the nature of the soul) revealed an inexcusable ignorance of the ways in which the good could be known. The Ling yen li shao was a detailed exposition of Thomistic psychology.²⁷ In it, Fr. Sambiasi (1583-1649) explained the Scholastic conception of the soul, its nature, its powers, and its appetites. He concluded by describing the ultimate goal of the soul's desires. That aim was Absolute Goodness, which Sambiasi identified in true Thomistic fashion with God Himself in all His glory.

Sin found fault in Sambiasi's explication of the relationship between that Absolute Good and the human mind. Though Sambiasi correctly stated that the good can neither be heard nor seen, he did not mention the spiritual power of the mind to grasp it nonetheless.²⁸ Nor did he realize that the wise and holy men of ancient times had a clear understanding of the good which they put down in writing for later generations to study.²⁹

When Sambiasi talked of Absolute Good, he was talking about an object of understanding akin to Plato's Idea of the Good, infinite in nature and thus by definition surpassing the scope of man's finite mind. When Sin talked of the good, he meant concrete guidelines for moral action, for that was the goodness that was relevant to Confucian concerns. The term Sambiasi used for the Good, "The Supreme

Beauty and Goodness (至美好) was replaced in Sin's counterargument by Tao, the Way. Sin assumed that the two terms were synonymous, unaware that the Way of morality, which was absolute in Neo-Confucianism, was subordinated to a metaphysical absolute in Catholicism.

The difference between the Catholic Good of metaphysics and the Confucian good of ethics is symptomatic of the larger difference between Scholasticism as a religious philosophy and Neo-Confucianism as a moral philosophy. Of course, there was ethics in Scholasticism and there was metaphysics in Neo-Confucianism. The question is not of either one or the other, but of priority. As the British philosopher William G. Burgh pointed out, "In morality, knowledge is for the sake of action; in religion, action is for the sake of knowledge."³⁰

As has been shown earlier, in Neo-Confucianism metaphysics undergirded the Confucian moral stance toward the world. Neo-Confucian knowledge was for the sake of action, providing information on the arena in which man exercised his moral power and directions on where and how he should implement his ethical principles. In Catholicism, on the other hand, moral action aimed at greater knowledge, for the final end of man was to understand God.³¹ Jesuit theologians recognized that the finite man of man could never totally grasp the infinite nature of God as Absolute Goodness. Nevertheless, as rational beings, men must try

to know God as completely as their minds would allow. Therefore, Catholics were encouraged to do good in order to know Good.

Admittedly, much Catholic doctrine was perceived as having instrumental moral value. The Jesuits showed by their attempt to convert Confucians to Catholic dogma that they believed that correct knowledge was a prerequisite for correct behavior. Yet that morality which Catholic doctrine supported was itself only a steppingstone to greater knowledge. The ultimate goal of Catholicism as defined by Scholasticism was for the individual soul to achieve immediate understanding of God in heaven, to be granted the beatific vision after death of He Who is Absolute Goodness and Truth.³²

Perhaps it is because the classical Chinese language, the philosophical language of Koreans until this century, does not lend itself easily to treating goodness and truth as disembodied, isolated absolutes that the vision of God as Goodness and Truth lacked much persuasive power for Koreans. A. C. Graham's comment about the impact of linguistic structures on Chinese philosophical thinking applies to Koreans as well. Like the Chinese, eighteenth century Koreans found it unnecessary to "Platonize, to talk about abstractions as though they were rarefied things."³³ In the Indo-European languages to which the Jesuits were accustomed, there is a sharp distinction between verbs and

nouns such that a discussion of verbal or adjectival concepts leads to "entification," a term coined by the linguist Alfred Bloom to describe the Western tendency to "talk of properties and actions as if they were things."³⁴ Transformed by entification, real becomes Reality and "to be" becomes Being.

Chinese grammar makes no such demands. A verb can stand in a subject or object position within a Chinese sentence without having to be nominalized.³⁵ One Sino-Korean approximation of the word "truth", for example, is the compound si-bi (是非 C. shih-fei), formed from the two antipodal verbs to affirm and to deny. Si-bi retains in classical Chinese usage the dynamic force of its root verbs and refers more to action than to attributes. A discussion of si-bi revolves more around the fit between what should be and an actual state of affairs than between a substance and properties predicated of it. Si-bi is truth as right or wrong, what is or should be done, rather than truth contrasted with falsity, what is or logically could be.³⁶

Truth in the abstract, separated from right and wrong in concrete human behavior, rarely appeared in Neo-Confucian writings. Nowhere in Feng Yu-lan's two volume History of Chinese Philosophy, for example, is there any specific discussion of any Confucian theory of truth.³⁷ Neo-Confucians were much more interested in what was true than in what truth was. Not for them the complex episte-

mological debates that at times have dominated the history of Western philosophy.

In the West, discussions of the nature and limits of man's knowledge, topics seldom addressed in Confucian works, have for centuries been considered a necessary preliminary to serious philosophical investigation. The search for a definition of truth that would allow men to distinguish accurately between reality and illusion has inspired much Western thought over the centuries, producing four competing concepts of truth.³⁸ The most widely accepted definition, and the one assumed in the Jesuit missionary publications in China, defines truth as correspondence between belief and fact. Thomas Aquinas phrased it "truth is the equation of thought and thing."³⁹ Ricci stated it somewhat differently in the T'ien-chu shih-i, though the key notion remained that truth was the correspondence between what men thought and what really was. "Only when the facts about a thing and the principles in the human mind coincide can we talk of truth."⁴⁰

There is another traditional Western definition of truth which emphasizes internal coherence more than correspondence with external reality.

To say that a statement is true or false is to say that it coheres or fails to cohere with a system of other statements: that it is a member of a system of other statements whose elements are related to each other by ties of logical implication as the elements in a system of pure mathematics are related.⁴¹

A recent alternative to these traditional concepts of truth is offered by language analysts who argue that to say that a statement is true is not to judge the correspondence of that statement with what actually is nor the coherence of that statement with other statements but simply to state that one agrees with or endorses that statement.⁴² This redefinition of truth is challenged by pragmatists who insist that truth refers to more than subjective evaluation. Impressed by the practical accomplishments of the scientific revolution, they state that truth is something that adheres to a statement that has been verified in practice. "We can not call a statement true until it is confirmed in practical application."⁴³

None of these Western definitions of truth is applicable to an explication of Korean Confucian thought in the eighteenth century. Except for their stress on moral impact rather than instrumental validation, however, the Confucians do at times appear to resemble the pragmatists. Donald Munro has succinctly described the Neo-Confucian criteria for truth as based primarily on ethical practice instead of logical consistency or empirical soundness.

Traditionally, theories and philosophical claims have been accepted or rejected in China less because of logically or empirically convincing demonstrations than because of their behavioral implications. In other words, acceptance or rejection often would be based primarily (though of course not entirely) on answers to such questions as: Can the theory be interpreted to imply that people should act in a certain way? What kind of behavior is likely to occur if people

accept it?⁴⁴

The Korean Neo-Confucians were in this respect no different from the Chinese. They examined Catholic doctrines to determine whether they would aid or hinder adherence to Confucian social morality. Ethics was their standard for measuring truth. For those in the mainstream of Korean Neo-Confucianism, only the good was true. Statements, whether metaphysical, cosmological, or ethical, that did not promote proper behavior were rejected as useless and dangerous. The "is" a proposition asserted was less important than the "ought" it implied. Korean anti-Catholics applied to Western religion the same standard the Ch'eng brothers had used in the eleventh century in China to denounce Buddhism. "Only judge them by their practice: their practical teaching being what it is, what can their ideas be worth?"⁴⁵

This reversal of the Western use of truth to determine the good meant that religion in China and Korea occupied a position radically different from the one it held in Europe. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, religion has been the source of ethical values. In China, according to the sociologist C.K. Yang in Religion in Chinese Society, "The chief moral role of religion lay not in its being a premise of ethical values, but in its assistance in the enforcement of secular moral standards."⁴⁶ The same could be said of Yi dynasty Korea. During the ascendancy of Neo-Confucianism,

religion in China and Korea supported Confucian ethics rather than creating vits own fundamental moral rules.

Religion may be related to morality in a number of ways. It is possible to treat morality as merely part of what religion entails. In this view, a religious person must be moral, but a moral person is not necessarily religious. A man who does good for the sake of doing good is moral, but a man who does good out of love for God is both moral and religious. Others would disagree and instead identify religion with morality. There are those who have argued that ethics is the essence of religion, that love for God can only be expressed through love for one's fellow man. In this view, anyone who is upright in his dealings with others is religious and anyone who professes love for God but does not extend that love to humanity is irreligious. A third conceivable relationship separates morality from religion, allowing the individual quest for eternal salvation to overshadow the needs of the human community on earth. Such separation appears in the lives of those who cheat in business yet faithfully attend worship services every week. A fourth logically possible relationship between religion and morality subordinates religion to the role of supporting morality. Immanuel Kant held such a view, explaining that religious dogma existed to enhance the power of moral commands with the aura of supernatural sanction.⁴⁷

Yi Ik, Sin Hudam, and An Chŏngbok judged Catholicism with this supporting role of religion in mind. They could not accept the Catholic attempt to draw moral commands from theological assertions, since in China and Korea popular belief in gods and supernatural reward and punishment had traditionally encouraged adherence to Confucian values rather than generating opposing moral commands of its own. Catholics argued that men must honor their parents because God has so commanded. Chinese and Korean religions argued that the gods punish those who fail to honor their parents because the gods are offended by violations of accepted standards of conduct. Most Neo-Confucian scholars, of course, disclaimed personal belief in the actual intervention of supernatural beings in human affairs. Nevertheless, they tolerated such beliefs among the masses because fear of the supernatural inspired peasants to act morally. Catholicism, which refused this subordinate role, could not be as easily tolerated. This difference between Confucian and Catholic expectations of the role of religion in society made the confrontation between Catholicism and Confucianism unavoidable.

Thomas Aquinas wrote in his Summa Theologica "the true is prior in nature to the good."⁴⁸ Chu Hsi said "action is more important than knowledge."⁴⁹ The Jesuits works filtering into Korea in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were based on the Scholastic philosophy of

Aquinas. Most Koreans at that time were faithful followers of the Neo-Confucianism expounded by Chu Hsi. The resulting contrast, revealed in Korean criticism of Catholic doctrine and practices, between truth and ethics, between the "is" of knowledge and the "ought" of action, formed a chronic source of friction between Neo-Confucianism and Western thought in eighteenth century Korea.

Cognition as Moral Endeavor

Since the Catholic understanding of the nature and function of truth was different from the Neo-Confucian conception, there was also a divergence of views on how truth could be learned and knowledge obtained. Etienne Gilson, one of the foremost interpreters of Thomas Aquinas in the twentieth century, explained that "the definition of truth as an adequation between the thing and the intellect, adaequatio rei et intellectus, is a simple expression of the fact that the problem of truth can have no meaning unless the intellect is regarded as distinct from its object."⁵⁰ This bifurcation of reality, splitting mind from the external world, was precisely what the Neo-Confucian search for truth sought to overcome.

The classic Neo-Confucian statement of the nature of knowledge is found in Chu Hsi's commentary on the Great Learning. In the Great Learning we find the lines, "The extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of

things. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere."⁵¹ The precise meaning of this passage has been debated by Neo-Confucian philosophers for centuries. One school, whose most prominent representative was Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), argued that the investigation of things is best carried out through introspection, since the most important things a man needed to know were the moral principles which constituted his own mind. Chu Hsi offered a different explanation. To him, the investigation of things meant the confirmation of the mind's moral insights by the principles embedded in the external physical, social, and historical setting in which man finds himself. In Korea, Wang Yang-ming was condemned as heretical and Chu Hsi's interpretation became Neo-Confucian orthodoxy on the investigation of things.

Things (物, mul) here does not refer only to the inanimate material objects English speakers usually think of when they use the word "thing". Ch'eng I, on whom Chu Hsi closely relied in his interpretation of this passage, explained, "A thing is an event [sa, 事]. If the principles underlying all events are thoroughly comprehended, then there will be nothing that is not understood."⁵² When Neo-Confucians encouraged their students to investigate things, they were not talking about the scientific examination of man's physical environment. To

them, the investigation of things was the search for clarification of the moral principles men need to guide them in everyday life.

There are many ways to do this. One way is to read books and elucidate moral principles. Another way is to discuss people and events of the past, and to distinguish which are right and which are wrong. Still another way is to⁵³ handle affairs and settle them in the proper way.

To investigate things, when things were understood as events, meant to "investigate the principles of all things we come into contact with."⁵⁴ With this line from his commentary on the Great Learning, Chu Hsi supported Ch'eng I's new interpretation of the word investigate. Although previous commentators had argued that kyòk (格) meant to come, to rectify, to ward off, or to take as a model, Ch'eng I glossed it as to arrive or to reach.⁵⁵ He, and Chu Hsi after him, taught that the investigation of things occurred through empathic contact between the mind and that which it investigated. The Korean philosopher T'oegyè further interpreted that contact to mean fusion, which subsumed the real distinction between the mind and the event to the ultimate unity of the principles both the mind and the event contained.⁵⁶

The investigation of things was a moral endeavor intended to expand thoughts and feelings beyond selfish concerns. Through the investigation of things men could gain release from the murky world of sa and enter the clear world of kong. The Western concept of knowledge in which a

clear distinction was maintained between the subject as knower and the object as known appeared to Neo-Confucian eyes as dangerously self-centered. A Neo-Confucian in the Chu Hsi--T'oegye tradition sought to expand his knowledge through the investigation of things, erasing the barriers of egoism that separated him from the principles in the world that surrounded him, in order to clear away the film of selfishness that veiled the moral principles within his own mind. He believed he had true knowledge only when he could grasp what was happening around him on its own terms without arbitrarily classifying it according to personal whims or interests.

Two terms that often appeared in Neo-Confucian discussions of knowledge express this notion of linkage between subject and object as an essential ingredient in the extension of knowledge, which was the basis of self-cultivation. Cognition was sometimes described as a reverberating response (感應, kam-ung) and sometimes as thorough penetration (貫通, koan-t'ong). Reverberating response referred to the passive absorption of stimuli from outside in such a way that the principles telling why things are the way they are, and how they should be, were received and echoed in the mind without any distortions introduced by personal interests. Thorough penetration referred to the mind leaping beyond the self to join and enter (embody -- 體, ch'e--was the term Chu Hsi used)

into an external situation or thing, enabling the mind to grasp both cognitively and through affective empathy from the inside the principles of what it is investigating.⁵⁷ Both reverberating response and thorough penetration cleared the mind of selfishness and created the moral objectivity necessary for a clear understanding of the universal pattern (i) which determined the appropriate place and role for every thing and event in the universe.⁵⁸

In the synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology created by Thomas Aquinas, knowledge was for the sake of greater knowing, as noted earlier. Men needed to know the truth so that they could know how to act if they were to win the ultimate reward of direct knowledge of God in heaven. In Neo-Confucianism the fruits of knowledge were more immediate. Rather than studying the good now in order to know Good later, Neo-Confucians studied the good in order to be good and do right immediately. In the words of Tu Wei-ming, a contemporary commentator on Neo-Confucian philosophy, "The quest for knowledge is perceived as an integral part of one's inner self-transformation."⁵⁹ It was through the investigation of things that the will overcame selfishness and became sincere, and sincerity was the cornerstone of morality.

Sincerity, as was true with "thing" and "investigate", carried quite a different connotation in Sino-Korean philosophical writing than it does in English. The

character sŏng (誠), translated here as sincerity, is formed from the radical for speech and a character meaning to achieve or to complete. Sŏng may originally have meant what is meant today in English when someone is called sincere: free from deceit or pretense. He was sincere who meant what he said. Early in Chinese history, however, sŏng took on a much larger significance. Already in the early Classic The Doctrine of the Mean, sŏng was used in such lines as "Sincerity is the beginning and end of all things. Without sincerity there would be nothing."⁶⁰

Sincerity, sometimes translated as truth or reality, as the beginning and the end of all things was more than just a state of mind. Sincerity was the correspondence between what is and what should be, not just in human relationships but in the entire universe. An Chongbok defined sincerity in terms that had been used by many Chinese and Koreans before him.

In heaven sincerity is real principle (實理, silli). In man it is a real mind (實心, silsim). Real principle in heaven is what naturally is. Real mind in man is achieved only with effort....Real principle in heaven is nothing more than the absence of any irregularity, that's all. Real mind in man is also nothing more than the absence of irregularity (無事, mumang). The way to achieve it is simply to have no irregularity in thought, no irregularity in speech, and no irregularity in conduct.⁶¹

Sincerity and selfishness were diametrically opposed. Selfishness separated man from the natural operation of things as-they-are-and-should-be and caused him to act

falsely, recklessly, or foolishly, at odds with the universal flow of events. To become sincere, he had to cast aside all divisive considerations of personal advantage and recover the unifying principles at the core of his being. If he replaced his egocentricity with a selfless spirit of community, he would spontaneously respond appropriately to everything he came into contact with and to every situation he encountered. He would be what he should be and would do what he should do. He would be true to himself and therefore he would be true to i, which was his true nature. He would be sincere. "He who is sincere is one who hits upon what is right without effort and apprehends without thinking. He is naturally and easily in harmony with the way."⁶²

A sincere will was attuned to i, the omnipresent principles ordaining the way things are (so-i-yon, 所以然) and the way they should be (so-dang-yon, 所當然). In the Chu Hsi-T'oegye tradition, such sincerity could only be earned through an investigation of things which opened the mind to the objective principles beyond the self, providing standards for distinguishing between universal norms and subjective personal predilection. The investigation of things projected the mind through empathic penetration into the external world to seize principles which were then brought back and internalized as extended knowledge. This knowledge of principles within united with principles

without to overcome the biases of the isolated individual, rousing man to act as he was supposed to act--as a member of the cosmic community, one substance with heaven, earth, and everything therein. The investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, and making the will sincere were all stages in one continuous process. "To learn from what is outside and grasp it within is called 'understanding'. To take what is inside and join it to what is outside is called 'sincerity'. Sincerity and understanding are one."⁶³

Unity Amid Differentiation

This Neo-Confucian view of knowledge as a process of moral self-transformation by which man extricates himself from the selfishness inherent in isolated individuality contrasts sharply with Scholastic cognitive psychology. Neo-Confucianism stressed the unity underlying diversity. The oft-quoted phrase li-i1 bun-su (理一分殊, principle is one but its manifestations are many) expressed the doctrine that all the principles which determined the specific roles individual men, things, and events play in the universal order were intertwined to form one comprehensive network of Principle governing the totality of interrelationships which form reality. The investigation of things was the step men took to discover where they fit into that complex web. The extension of knowledge that resulted enabled them to identify and follow specific principles in that network, achieving the sincerity that

freed them from the selfishness that divides man from men and men from nature.

Thomistic psychology, on the other hand, assumed the fundamental reality of differentiation. A major problem for Scholastic philosophers, given their denial of the ultimate unity of the universe, was finding an explanation for the power of the mind to bridge the gap between thought and thing and produce knowledge of the external world. Sin Hudam learned of the Thomistic answer in Francis Sambiasi's Ling yen li shao.

Sambiasi broke down the acquisition of knowledge into a series of discrete steps, each handled by a separate faculty (mental power). First there were the five external senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch which convey raw sensation to the brain. They were called the external senses since it was through them and only through them that man could directly receive information from the material objects which lay outside the immaterial realm of the mind. These five external senses had no power to organize or correlate the sensory impressions they received. They simply passed on to the internal senses a disorganized assortment of sensation.

The internal senses took this jumble of sense data and reworked it into a form usable by the mind. First, there was what Thomas Aquinas called the "sensus communis", that faculty which received the sense impressions from the

external senses and put them together in a coherent image. Next that image was stabilized by the imagination so that it would linger after the transitory sense impressions faded. The cogitative sense then evaluated that image as good or bad, useful or useless, dangerous or benign. In the fourth step the image, along with its evaluation, was stored in the memory for future reference and correlation with past experience.

According to this Thomistic analysis, at this stage of perception, emotion (the appetite) took over. The concupiscible appetite propelled men instinctively toward that which they perceived as good and away from what they perceived as bad. The irascible appetite was a little more complicated, galvanizing men to overcome obstacles to their pursuit of good and flight from evil. From these two sensory appetites came such basic emotions as love, hate, joy, despair, fear, and anger.

Men shared with animals the five external sense, the four internal senses, and the two sensory appetites. They surpassed animals and rose to a higher level of being by their ability to understand what they had sensed. Sambiase drew a Scholastic portrait of understanding as a product of cooperation between an active intellect and a passive intellect. The active intellect first erased all individualizing non-essentials from an image that had been processed through the internal senses.

In understanding, you do not grasp the concrete individual itself. You have to strip away the particular physical shell and carefully unveil the generic elements that are not directly visible as such to the senses. The individual concrete object is a particular. The subtle generic elements are universals.⁶⁴

Only after the active intellect had freed the universals from the image of the individual object in which they were encased could the passive intellect grasp the principles of that object and reach understanding.

This power to extract and comprehend abstractions was not the only talent men possessed which was absent in lower forms of life. Men also enjoyed the faculty of volition. In addition to the sensory appetites, those instinctive reactions to good and evil which were the common heritage of both mankind and the animal kingdom, men also had a will which allowed them consciously to choose or reject that which their intellect informed them was good or bad. To direct that will, God had implanted in man three natural drives. The first was the desire for life and that which is necessary to preserve life. The second was the desire for physical pleasure. The third, and the highest, was the desire for what is right and morally good. This innate inclination toward that good, whether that good was seen as that which sustains, that which pleases, or that which ennobles, did not compel. Men were free to choose one good over another, such as sensual delight over conjugal fidelity. According to Catholic doctrine, it was how men

exercised their free will, whether they consistently chose the greater good of morality or perversely chose to pursue personal survival or individual enjoyment at the expense of higher values, that determined whether they would be rewarded with eternal bliss in heaven after death or would suffer eternal torment in hell.⁶⁵

Sin was the only eighteenth-century Korean Neo-Confucian to leave a detailed response to the Thomistic psychology taught by the Jesuits in China, though he was not the only one to read Sambiassi's Ling yen li shao.⁶⁶ Sin found the Jesuit's analytical description of the activities of the intellect "a verbal game played with meaningless concepts."⁶⁷ For example, the distinction between external and internal senses was declared "not reasonable (不近理)", since the mind is the seat of all perception and the external sense are only the tools through which the mind contacts the outside world. "Though we reach and become aware of things through our eyes and ears, do we say that it is our eyes and ears that perceive them or is it our mind that does the perceiving?"⁶⁸

Sin was appalled that Sambiassi separated knowing and willing into separate faculties, placed consciousness and sensory memory in the brain, and attributed man's cognitive powers to his soul (云魂 hon) rather than to his mind (sim).⁶⁹ Sin believed that both cognition and volition were located in the heart, which was the site of the mind. He

charged that Western psychology turned the sim, that heart-and-mind, into nothing more than a useless plaything.⁷⁰

"They do not realize that the sim is the master of all that happens within. What they call 'within' is not at all what 'within' means to us."⁷¹

Thomistic psychology compartmentalized man's cognitive and volitional activities, slicing up the soul into separate and distinct faculties differentiated according to their objects and modes of operation.⁷² Sin preferred to concentrate on the unity of the mind which was exercising all those functions rather than on the diversity of the functions themselves.

The mind is the site of man's intelligence and motivation and is considered the master of the body. If the mind is not responsible for man's memory, his reasoning, and his ability to interact with his fellow men, then what is?⁷³

Sin stood firmly within the Confucian tradition in which the mind represented man's moral power to perceive the world around him in such a way that he would choose to act properly in his relationships with his fellow men. Such a view allowed no sharp separation of cognition and volition. Correct knowledge prompted correct action. Neo-Confucianism blurred the Western distinction between judgments of fact and determinations of value.⁷⁴ In a philosophy that defined the true in terms of the good, knowing meant knowing what should be done. Moreover, knowing what should be done automatically generated a

desire to do what should be done. This epistemological union of understanding, evaluation, and moral resolution was matched by a psychological union in the mind "which both evaluates the requirements of a situation and commands proper action."⁷⁵ The resultant ambiguity of the term sim leads us to translate it sometimes as heart, when it specifically refers to that physical organ or to man's emotions and desires, and sometimes as mind, when it refers to those intellectual activities the West has traditionally located in the head.

Sambiasi's refusal to describe the mind in the language Sin was accustomed to rendered the Scholastic argument impotent. Sambiasi's use of the character for soul (hon) rather than heart-mind (sim) betrayed a different focus. Scholastic philosophers placed man's mental powers within his skull. The Confucian tradition placed the locus of thought in the middle of the body.⁷⁶ The heart in the West as well as in the East, connoted the seat of emotion in man. In Neo-Confucianism it was the job of the heart to feel what was right while engaging in rational cerebration and evaluation and then to order the head and body to act in accordance with that feeling, leading to what Donald Munro has labeled "clustering", the combining of knowing, feeling, and promptings to act in the actual functioning of the mind.⁷⁷ However, the Jesuits severed rational thought from emotional response, arguing that the mind had first to

know intellectually what was right before it could move the heart and the body to do what was right. This difference in how the mind was conceived, as a rational brain rather than as a moral heart, led Sin to charge that Sambiasi misunderstood the meaning of hon and the significance of sim.⁷⁸

Sambiasi offered a description of the process by which the immaterial intellect gained knowledge of the material world and an explanation of why the heart sometimes willed what reason knew was wrong. He provided answers to questions Sin had not asked. Sin expected psychology to be more prescriptive than descriptive, to teach him how to ensure that the knowledge he gained was uncontaminated by distortions from a selfish ego so that he could respond with sincerity to all that he encountered. For Sin's purposes, the Scholastic logical dissection of the processes of cognition and volition was useless.⁷⁹ It bore no moral fruit and was therefore unworthy of the attention or credence of a true Confucian scholar.

Principles and Universals

Knowledge in the Chu Hsi-T'oegye tradition, to which Sin Hu-dam belonged, meant more than the accumulation of information. As pointed out earlier, orthodox Korean Neo-Confucians believed that the act of knowing transformed and purified the mind. Expanding knowledge broke through barriers of selfishness, erected between the mind and the

principles embedded in the external world of men and events. In the words of Chu Hsi, "selfishness separates and obstructs, and consequently one and others stand in opposition," but, by eliminating selfish desires, thereby "enlarging one's mind, one can enter into all things in the world." To enter into (ch'e, 居) all things, he explained, meant the same as the expressions "investigation of things" and "extension of knowledge".⁸⁰ This Neo-Confucian goal of a mind purged of all selfish bias and in empathic union with all things in heaven and earth assumed an organic universe in which intimate linkage between thought and thing was more than merely possible; such linkage was preferable as the natural order of things to which all men should return through the investigation of things.

Catholic cognitive psychology was built on contrary assumptions. The Scholastic universe was ontologically fractured, with sharp breaks between the spiritual and the material, the natural and the supernatural.⁸¹ The Western scalpel of analysis split the cosmos asunder and made linkage along Neo-Confucian lines inconceivable. In the Catholic view, no direct contact between the immaterial mind and a material object was possible. An intermediary --the stripped down image produced by the internal senses and the active intellect-- was necessary. This abstract image, sometimes called a species or phantasm, was the

intelligible aspect of the object and had to come between a subject and an object before learning could occur.⁸²

Rather than rejoining man to the world selfishness had torn him away from, knowledge in Catholic philosophy created the intelligible image as an additional barrier isolating the mind of man from the world of things.

Catholic philosophy borrowed the notion of an intelligible image from Aristotle. Aristotle argued that only individual concrete entities existed. The universal forms which made up the intelligible subsisted, rather than existed, as the common elements among particulars. Men formed an intelligible image of a dog, for example, by isolating in their minds what all creatures called dogs had in common. There was no actually existing universal dog but only individual dogs which shared some features in common which made them dogs. Yet without the universal forms, without the intelligible image, men could not understand what class of being an individual dog was. Men could not recognize a particular dog as a dog without some mental picture of what dogs in general were.

Aquinas accepted the Aristotelian denial of separate existence to universals apart from particulars. In his epistemology, he assumed that universals, those classes that determine how an individual entity is defined, are the products of logical abstraction and have no real independent existence of their own. He was no idealist. For him,

as for Aristotle, the similarities among particulars were genuine objective phenomenon. A round tree and a round pond were both round, whether any human being was around to observe and take note of their roundness or not. The creation of the concept of roundness, such that the shape of the pond and the shape of the tree could be recognized, did require the intervention of an intellect, however. According to Scholastic philosophy, universals outside the mind subsisted as potential rational principles of human understanding only and were dependent on the active intellect to extract them from concrete individual material entities and actualize them in the mind.

Before you can understand the principles that make something what it is, first the active intellect has to make those principles comprehensible and then the passive intellect has to comprehend them.⁸³

Sambiasi explained the dependency of principle on the intellect with an analogy to color. A white object would only appear white when illuminated, though it was still called a white object even when hidden in the dark. Likewise, the principles that defined the nature of an object subsisted as real principles, potentially available to the mind, whether men were aware of them or not, though they could not be grasped directly until they were processed by an active intellect and made intelligible.⁸⁴

Sin rejected this picture of principle as some lifeless logical phantasm abstracted from concrete existence. He

charged that principle, rightly understood, did not require a human mind to activate it.

Sambiasi, caught up in his own foolish thoughts, insists that all that is produced in the world is nothing but a multitude of images created to serve the intellect....He does not recognize that the principles of things are as they are in themselves and are nothing which man through his power to know can add to or subtract from.⁸⁵

Moreover, Sin believed that the Catholic effort to rip principle from the particular in which it dwelled destroyed the unity of the concrete object and led to empty abstractions.⁸⁶

Sin was a naive realist. He believed that the principles which determined what an object was could be found in that object and be fully fathomed by the human mind. In the Neo-Confucian use of the term, principle (i) referred more to functions than to properties. I had little connection with mental images, with universal categories of beings.⁸⁷ Principles shaped the respective roles various things and events played in the immanent universal pattern which determined how everything related to everything else. As such, each individual principle was a manifestation of one unifying Principle, one thread in the all-embracing web of interrelationships. As Ch'eng I stated, "The principle of one things is one with the Principles of all things."⁸⁸

The ambiguity of the Chinese language, with no demands for grammatical distinctions between singular and plurals, encouraged such linkage. The same Sino-Korean character

could refer to a specific individual principle (i), a group of principles (i), or all-embracing universal Principle (i) with no morphological changes, suggesting to Chinese and Koreans a unity where Western grammatical signals indicated diversity. This unified diversity and diversified unity embraced all things, man and his mind included. Ch'eng I gave an explicit statement of the seminal Neo-Confucian doctrine. "There is but one principle in things and in the self. If you understand one, then you understand the other. This is the way the internal and the external are united."⁸⁹

In a metaphysical vision in which man, nature, and heaven are one, with no sharp break between the physical and the mental world, there was no need for the elaborate epistemological gymnastics Sambiasi engaged in. The "corporeal" world of physical entities and the "immaterial" world of the mind represented to Sin different stages on a continuum of being, not qualitatively distinct categories of existence. The mind was composed of a more rarefied ki, that was all. That which thought was ki, though that which was thought was i. Just as principles existed amidst the ki of material objects, so, too, they existed amidst the ki of the mind. Mind-matter dualism, which looms so large in the history of Western thought, was obviated in Korean orthodox Neo-Confucianism.

Sambiasi does not see that the Way and that in which it is realized are one, that no gap exists

between the manifest and the hidden, or that the material and the immaterial have the same principle.

Sin valued knowledge for its integrative, cognitive, emotive, and moral force and rejected Scholastic epistemology because of its alienating implications. Knowledge viewed as a self-validating process by which man overcame self-centeredness to recover primordial unity with the totality of reality contrasts sharply with knowledge seen as the dry classification of things into their proper categories within a fragmented universe. Sin's Neo-Confucian picture of the nature of knowledge and of what knowing entailed led him to extend his criticism of Scholastic epistemology to Jesuit educational theory.

The Moral Aim of Education

Sin learned of the Jesuit approach to education in Julius Aleni's Chih-fang wai-chi (World Atlas). Fr. Aleni (1582-1649), an Italian fondly remembered by his fellow Jesuits for having discovered the grapes of Shansi from which sacramental wine could be made, published his atlas to introduce the world beyond Asia to the Chinese. Chih-fang wai-chi was more than just a map of the world as known to seventeenth-century Europe. It was a cultural geography as well, providing information on the customs and physical characteristics of the various peoples of the globe, as well as descriptions of the fauna and flora that inhabited the earth's various regions.⁹¹

Sin read in that work that, in the Catholic school system in Europe, those who graduated from university theology departments (道科 Togwa) had no role in government. Public officials were instead chosen from among those who specialized in government (治科 ch'iqwa). In addition, there were two other mutually exclusive majors in Western universities, according to Aleni: medicine and canon law (教科 kyogwa).⁹² Sin found two major flaws in this Jesuit university curriculum. Medicine was included where it did not belong and government, law, and theology were separated, though they should have been treated as one.

Sin was shocked to learn that the Jesuits ranked what he considered a mere technical skill such as medicine on a par with public administration and the study of the Way. In his Confucian world, doctors were supposed to be nothing more than skilled laborers who dutifully obeyed the orders of their superiors. The ancient ritual guidebooks of the Chinese listed doctors alongside clerks, archers, and charioteers, not among the scholars of the realm.⁹³ To his eyes, the Western elevation of the study of medicine was unwarranted and provided further confirmation that the Jesuits did not understand the ethical aim of education and failed to distinguish between technical expertise and moral competence.

"As for government, canon law, and theology, they can

not be treated as totally separate fields." Government was the implementation of teachings (kyo) which were derived from the Way (To). Education was worthless unless it led to this application of the principles of social morality to the practical problems of administering society and the state.

If those who study the Way are not worthy of participating in the affairs of state, then what kind of way is it that they have studied? And if the Way is not followed in governing the people, then their government has no foundation.⁹⁴

The will of heaven and the moral rules governing the human community formed an integral unity and could not be arbitrarily split into theology, law, and government, complained Sin. Obviously, what the Way meant to Sin was not the same as what it meant to Sambiasi. Western theology, with its focus on the supernatural, could hardly be compared to the Neo-Confucian study of the Way perceived as the normative pattern immanent in society and nature. Aleni's attempt to borrow Neo-Confucian vocabulary to describe the segmented Western curriculum was a failure. "His terms have lost all their meanings and the curriculum he describes is so shallow and simplistic as to be laughable."⁹⁵

Sin believed that the moral orientation which gave unity and meaning to education should permeate all levels of schooling. In the ideal Neo-Confucian world, "students study only in order to cultivate their innate goodness. And

teachers teach only in order to promote proper moral behavior." However, the Jesuits bragged that in their elementary schools students studied such subjects as poetry, history, and rhetoric, subjects which Sin felt should be pursued only after moral training had been completed. When Sin criticized the teaching of poetry to young boys as "only showing them how to arrange nonsense in an attractive literary setting," he may have been echoing the reformist sentiment of his time which warned that excessive emphasis on literary form could obscure the moral message literature was intended to convey.⁹⁶

If Western primary education struck Sin as dangerously distracting, middle school education must have appeared to him as even worse. According to Aleni, in the third year of middle school students were introduced to metaphysics, translated as "the study of that which is beyond principle and nature" (·生理以上).⁹⁷ Aghast, Sin wrote,

He does not know that there is nothing beyond the realm of principle and nature. No matter how much they may strain their minds, there is nothing to be gained from such a futile effort. In the end they will end up unbalanced and unstable.⁹⁸

Further confirmation that Catholic thought and education was gravely misdirected from the Neo-Confucian point of view came from Sambiasi, when he wrote that man's ultimate goal was knowledge of an Absolute Good (至美好) beyond the comprehension of the finite human mind. According to Sambiasi's Ling yen li shao,

If, after profound contemplation and reflection on the Absolute Good, you come to believe that you can know and understand it, then you have not understood it at all. If you think as hard as you can and as deeply as possible but end up confused, feeling stupid and ignorant, with no clear vision of the Absolute Good, then you have achieved true understanding.

Sin commented that it was only natural that Catholics ended up confused when they contemplated this "Absolute Good", since it was something concocted out of thin air and was not grounded in concrete reality susceptible to verification.¹⁰⁰

The Limits of Cognition

Sin rejected Sambiasi's contention that there existed a higher realm of reality beyond that open to normal human reasoning. Sambiasi had written that there were two ways men could know. One way was the natural light of reason (自然之本光), the power men have in themselves to expand their knowledge by pursuing principle (推理, t'oeli). That Sin could accept, though he found the Catholic terminology a little strange. He could not accept the claim that men could also gain knowledge through a supernatural light of reason which went beyond principle (在理之上), nor that such access to supernatural knowledge was a gratuitous gift from God unobtainable by the naked intelligence of man alone.

There could be no knowledge beyond principle for Sin, since principle was the intelligible pattern which made knowledge possible. Principle was nothing more than that

which determined what things were. "Anything beyond principle is something that can not be deduced from principle. If it can not be deduced from principle, then how can we verify whether it really exists or not?"¹⁰¹ According to the Neo-Confucian understanding of principle, to be beyond principle was, by definition, to be unintelligible and unknowable.

Sin suspected that the Jesuit missionaries deliberately used such abstruse and incomprehensible language in order to cover up the flaws in their argument. "They try to make their position so esoteric and opaque that they are impervious to challenge." He warned that the Catholics are what the Book of Changes was talking about when it said "an untrustworthy heart shows itself in confused speech", and what Mencius was describing when he said "evasive words show me that the speaker is at his wit's end."¹⁰²

Sin assumed that all that was, was naturally knowable without supernatural cognitive crutches. All that was, was what it was through i and the i of things was one with the i that informed the mind. Those Catholics who sought Absolute Good beyond principle did not realize that they needed only look within their own heart or study the words of the Sages to find all the knowledge necessary for a moral life. They described their God as the Supreme Good and then said that he was infinite and undefinable and could never be fully comprehended by the finite human mind,

even with divine aid. Yet the Chinese Classics provided many examples of men who had clear and precise knowledge of what to do without bothering to define or understand an Absolute Good. Therefore, argued Sin, this alleged unobtainable perfect knowledge of God as the Good was unnecessary. Besides, who, except Westerners, would be so foolish as to make an unknowable being the central focus of their thoughts and the determinant of their actions.¹⁰³

Divine revelation had no place alongside Sin's Neo-Confucian epistemological confidence. Aleni's tale of Moses going up a mountain to receive the Ten Commandments from God puzzled Sin. He wondered why, if Moses was as wise as Aleni said he was, Moses needed specific directions from God to know what was right. If, on the other hand, Moses was not wise enough to be truly a sage, why did God choose him instead of a wiser man to receive those Ten Commandments?¹⁰⁴

Sin Hudam was the only Korean in the eighteenth century to take Jesuit epistemology seriously enough to subject it to detailed criticism. Nonetheless, his criticisms reveal more than just how one particular Korean Neo-Confucian thought. The clash of fundamental assumptions concerning the meaning and purpose of knowledge, laid bare in Sin's attack on Sambiassi's Scholastic psychology and on Aleni's portrayal of the Jesuit educational system, betrays the depth and width of the chasm that separates the Scholastic

and the Neo-Confucian world views. To Sin, as well as to many others in the Korea of his time, Catholicism appeared a selfish religion supported by a nonsensical and worthless philosophy that prevented men from joining in moral union with the cosmos by blinding them to their innate power to overcome the isolation selfishness brings.

Neo-Confucian differences with Catholicism were more than doctrinal; they were categorical. Men could hardly be expected to agree on what was true when they did not agree on what truth was. And they could hardly be expected to learn much from each other when what one taught was not what the other wanted to learn. The Jesuit missionaries from Europe took on an almost impossible task when they strove to convert Neo-Confucians to Christianity through Scholastic philosophy. Koreans who made the leap from Neo-Confucianism to Christianity had to leave behind the deeply rooted assumptions embedded in their culture's approaches to truth, metaphysics, religion, and morality. Such a radical renunciation of the dominant traditional world view could attract only a limited number. Few could comprehend ideas or appreciate values radically different from those they were accustomed to. Even fewer were strong enough to resist the powerful pressure from society to conformity or could withstand the hostility of both the state and society that conversion to Christianity engendered.

Notes for Chapter Four

1. For a recent, particularly sophisticated example of this approach, see Kum Changt'ae, "Chosŏn hugi Yuhak-Sŏhakgan ūi kyorironjaeng kwa sasangjŏk sŏng'gyŏk" [The ideological conflict between Confucianism and Catholicism in the late Yi dynasty], Kyohoesa yŏn'gu, no.2 (April, 1979), pp.89-139.
2. Perhaps the most influential presentation of Confucianism as a philosophy different from Western philosophy in language and approach but not in substance is that of the Columbia University-trained Chinese philosopher Feng Yu-lan. His History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952-3), and Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, trans. E.R. Hughes (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), are marked by his attempt to portray the history of Chinese thought --Confucian, Taoist, Buddhist, and Neo-Confucian--as leading to a modern metaphysical system which is Chinese in language and concepts but comparable to Western metaphysical systems in logic and organization. Feng thus places much more emphasis on metaphysics than did the Neo-Confucians he discusses.
3. David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (London: 1911), Book III, part 1, section I, pp.177-78.
4. Antony Flew, "On the Interpretation of Hume", Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. V.C. Chappell (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), pp.278-290.
5. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), s.v. "Ethical Naturalism" by Jonathan Harrison. It should be noted that the "naturalistic fallacy" made famous by G.E. Moore is slightly different from this "ought from the is" mistake Hume warned against.
6. Roger Hancock, Twentieth Century Ethics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), discusses a twentieth century revival of naturalism by Marcus Singer and John Rawls. Earlier the utilitarians and the pragmatists argued for different versions of ethical naturalism.
7. Anton C. Pegis, ed. Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York: Modern Library, 1948), p.46, from Summa Theologica, Book I, question 6, article I.
8. Hume, Treatise, Book III, part 2, section 5.

9. For a short summary of the moral sense doctrine, see Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Moral Sense" by Elmer Sprague.
10. Mencius, VIA,6. It would be tempting to compare Mencius to twentieth century advocates of intuitionism who argue that "we can know that certain actions are morally right directly and immediately and without consideration of their consequences" (Hancock, Ethics, p.42), except that intuitionism explains intuitive knowledge but Mencius emphasized spontaneous emotion.
11. Thomas Metzger, Escape from Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p.295.
12. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese Theory and Practice", The Chinese Mind, ed. Charles Moore (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), p.13.
13. See the table of contents of Ricci's Ch'önju silüi, pp.29-42.
14. Wm. Theodore de Bary, "Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism", Confucianism in Action, ed. David Nivison and Arthur Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p.44.
15. For example, see the argument by Yang Kuang-hsien that the Great Ultimate explains the universe in terms of principle, not in terms of actual creation. Pu-de-i [I could not otherwise], vol. 1, pp. 19-20, cited in Chu Ch'ien-chih, "Yesuhui tuiyu Sungju lishueh chih fanghsiang", p.167.
16. Sin, Pyögwip'yön, p.80.
17. Wing-tsit Chan, trans., Reflections on Things at Hand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
18. Wm. Theodore de Bary, "Neo-Confucian Cultivation and the Seventeenth-century Enlightenment", The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism, ed. De Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp.153-60.
19. W.T. Jones, The Medieval Mind, volume two of A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969), especially chapter 6, "Thomas's Metaphysics", pp.208-41.
20. Analects, Bk. VII.,1.

21. Plato, The Republic, trans. Benjamin Jovett (New York: Modern Library, 1942), p.401.
22. Mencius, IIA,6.
23. Legge, p.258. (VIII B,13).
24. Metzger, Neo-Confucian Predicament, pp.63-68, on the Neo-Confucian commitment to "total cognitive clarity," a demanding goal indeed.
25. Frances Sambiassi, Ling-yen li-shao, in Ch'onhak ch'oham, pp.336-44.
26. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp.72-3.
27. Ch'ŏnhak ch'oham, pp.308-44.
28. Ibid., p.68.
29. Ibid., p.72.
30. William G. de Burgh, "The Relations of Religion to Morality," Proceedings of the British Academy, vol.21, (1937), p.85.
31. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book III, chapter 25. Also see Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1956), pp.351-56.
32. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, question 16, article 5, argues that God is the highest truth. Question 6, article 2, argues that God is the highest good. On the beatific vision, see Sambiassi, Ling-yen li-shao, p.377.
33. A.C. Graham, "Being in Classical Chinese," John Verhaar, ed., The Verb 'be' and Its Synonyms, vol.I, p.17.
34. Alfred Bloom, The Linguistic Shaping of Thought (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981), p.37.
35. Graham, "Being in Classical Chinese," p.17.
36. Ibid, pp. 10, 13.
37. Feng Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, op. cit.
38. See Stephen Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942), for an

illuminating description of the assumptions behind these divergent visions of the truth.

39. Aquinas, Introduction, p.170, (Summa Theologica. Book I, question 16, article 1). For more on the correspondence theory, see Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Correspondence Theory of Truth" by A.N. Prior.
40. Ricci, Ch'ŏnju sil'ŭi, p.77.
41. Encyclopedia of Philosophy , s.v. "Coherence Theory of Truth", by Alan R. White.
42. Ibid., s.v. "The Performative Theory of Truth", by Gertrude Ezorski.
43. Ibid., s.v. "The Pragmatic Theory of Truth", by H.S. Thayer.
44. Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971), p.1.
45. Ho-nan Ch'eng-shih yi-shu [Additional writings of the Ch'eng brothers from Ho-nan--Ch'eng I and Ch'eng Hao], 15 :10a, as translated by A.C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers (London: Lund Humphreys, 1978), p.88.
46. C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p.286.
47. J. Milton Yinger, The Scientific Study of Religion (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 41-55. W.W. Bartley, Morality and Religion (London: Macmillan, 1971).
48. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Book I, question 16, article 4, as translated by Pegis, Introduction, pp.174-5.
49. Chu Tzu Yu lei chi-lueh, II, 14a, as translated in Chan, Sourcebook, p.609
50. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p.231.
51. Chan, Sourcebook, p.86.
52. Honan Ch'engshih Yi-shu, 15:1a.
53. Ibid., 18:5b.
54. Chu Hsi's commentary on the Great Learning, chapter 1.

Chan, Sourcebook, p. 89; Legge, The Great Learning, p.365.

55. See the notes in Chan, Sourcebook, pp.561-2.
56. Yi Wonjae, "T'oegye sŏnsaeng ūi hangmun jŏk pangbŏp" [T'oegye's methods of study], Yi Wonjae, et. al., T'oegyehak yŏn'gu (Seoul: Seoul University Press, 1972), pp.371-402.
57. Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971), p.31.
58. For more on the Neo-Confucian concept of knowledge see, in addition to Munro and Yi cited above, Donald Munro, "The Concept of Interest in Chinese Thought", Journal of the History of Ideas, 41, no.2 (April-June, 1980), pp.179-197; William E. Hocking, "Chu Hsi's Theory of Knowledge", Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 1 (1936), pp.109-27; Yun Sasun, T'oegye ch'ŏlhak ūi yŏn'gu [Studies in T'oegye's philosophy] (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1980), "Chilligwan" [The concept of truth], pp. 21-39.
59. Tu Wei-ming, "Yi Hwang's Perception of the Mind", T'oegye hakpo. no. 19 (1978), p.465.
60. Chan, "Doctrine of the Mean", Sourcebook, p. 108.
61. An Chongbok, Sunamjip, 8: 26b-27a.
62. Chan, Sourcebook, p.107.
63. Ch'eng I, in Chan, Sourcebook, p. 252. For a look at one Korean Neo-Confucian understanding of sincerity, see To Kwangsun, "Yulgok ui sŏngsasang" [Yulgok's notion of sincerity], Han'guk hakbo, no. 22, pp.59-76. Though Yulgok and T'oegye disagreed on many issues, the position Yulgok took on sincerity was similar to that held by T'oegye and most other Korean Neo-Confucian writers.
64. Sambiassi, Ling yen li shao, p. 320.
65. Sambiassi, op. cit., pp.315-20. More information on the Thomistic psychology which Sin encountered can be found in Willard J. Peterson, "Western Natural Philosophy Published in Late Ming Ching", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 117, no. 4 (August, 1973), pp. 295-322; Etienne Gilson. Christian Philosophy, pp. 207-48; Dictionary of Philosophy, s.v. "Thomas Aquinas".

66. Yi probably read it. In fact, it was probably Yi Ik who gave a copy to Sin. Kwŏn Ilsin, one of the first Catholic converts in Korea, also read it. Pae Hyŏnsuk, "17.18 Seigi e chonnaedoip Ch'ŏnjugyosoch'aek" [Catholic books introduced into Korea in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries], Kyohoesa yŏn'gu, 3 (1981), p. 27.
67. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p.49.
68. Sin, *ibid.*, p.48.
69. Sin, *ibid.*, pp. 48-52.
70. Sin, *ibid.*, p.51.
71. Sin, *ibid.*, p.49.
72. See, for example, Summa Theological I, question 77, articles 2 and 3, where Aquinas argues that there are several powers of the soul, distinguished by their acts and objects.
73. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p. 51.
74. See the illuminating discussion by Donald Munro in The Concept of Man in Contemporary China, pp.22-67.
75. Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 51.
76. Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (New York: Vintage Books, 1938), p. 44.
77. Donald Munro, Contemporary China, pp. 22-67.
78. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp. 65-67.
79. Sin, *ibid.*, pp.56-57.
80. Chu-Tzu ch'üan-shu, 44: 12b-13b, partially translated by Wing Tsit Chan in Sourcebook, pp. 629-30 and by J. Percy Bruce, The Philosophy of Human Nature (London: Probstan and Co., 1922), pp. 180-81.
81. Ricci, Ch'ŏnju silüi, pp. 163-69, has the Jesuit argument against the Neo-Confucian doctrine that all things are one substance.
82. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p.227.

83. Sambiasi, Ling yen li shao, p.320.
84. Sambiasi, *ibid.*.
85. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p. 56.
86. Sin, *ibid.*, p. 57.
87. A. C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers, p. 18.
88. Erh Ch'eng ch'üan-shu, 2A: 1a; Chan, Sourcebook, p. 551.
89. Erh Ch'eng ch'üan-shu, 18: 8b. See Chan, Sourcebook, p. 563 and Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers, p. 8, for slightly different translations.
90. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p.52.
91. Aleni, Chih-fang wai-chi, in Ch'ŏnhak ch'oham, pp.345-406.
92. Aleni, *ibid.*, p.370; Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p. 44.
93. Sin, *ibid.*, p. 97.
94. Sin, *ibid.*, pp. 97-99.
95. Sin, *ibid.*, p. 99.
96. Sin, *ibid.*, pp. 95-99. For examples of the disdain for literary arts in eighteenth century Korea, see Yi Ik, "yukdu" [Six scourges], Sŏngho sasŏl, 12: 2a-3a, in which Yi lists the cultivation of literary skill instead of morality as one of those six scourges.
97. Aleni, Chih-fang wai-chi, p. 370.
98. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p.97.
99. Sambiasi, Ling yen li shao, p. 341.
100. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p.72.
101. Sin, *ibid.*, pp. 70-71.
102. Sin, *ibid.*, p. 67. The citation from the Changes can be found in Wilhelm's translation, p. 355, where it is translated as "the words of a man who entertains doubt in his inmost heart are ramified." The statement by Mencius is found Bk. II, 1, II, 17 (Legge, p. 191).

103. Sin, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp. 68-73.
104. Sin, *ibid.*, p. 100.

Chapter Five

Catholic Assumptions and Neo-Confucian Presumptions

Matteo Ricci and the Jesuits who followed him to China knew well that belief in God must precede belief in Jesus Christ. A man who was not first a theist could not be a Christian. The task facing the missionaries was clear. Neo-Confucianism, to medieval European minds, was atheistic, since it denied the existence of a supernatural being responsible for the creation and supervision of man and his universe. Before the priests from Europe could convince East Asian Neo-Confucians to worship and serve Jesus Christ as God, the missionaries had to convince them that God existed.

Ricci's introduction to Catholic teachings, T'ien-chu shih-i, does not discuss Jesus until near the end of the eight and final chapter.¹ As noted earlier, T'ien-chu shih-i is primarily philosophy rather than theology. The focus of this primer was those church doctrines which were believed accessible to the unaided human mind. In Scholastic philosophy, the existence of God was a truth logic and reason could lead all men to. That God was born among men as Jesus Christ, however, was known only through

revelation. Ricci sought to first lay a foundation of rational Christian doctrines, assertions which he assumed could be logically derived and defended, before building the superstructure of the more esoteric Catholic dogma revealed in the Bible and Christian tradition. For this reason, he opened T'ien-chu shih-i with a series of Thomistic arguments for the existence of God, the creator and sustainer of all that existed.

Given the Neo-Confucian predilection for ethical practice over religious creeds, Ricci was swimming against the current in T'ien-chu shih-i. His treatise on friendship (Chiao-yu lun) and Pantoja's discourse on the seven cardinal virtues (Ch'i k'e) won far greater acceptance for their moral aphorisms and advice on character development than the T'ien-chu shih-i did for the Catholic teachings it presented. When the Jesuits offered practical counsel on cultivating virtue, they found an appreciative audience. Confucians were generally eager to listen to discussions on how to behave properly. However, when the Jesuits shifted to telling Confucians what to believe, they lost much of that audience. Catholic insistence on faith in specific religious tenets struck many in China and Korea as a peculiar feature of Western thinking, a quirk of little interest to civilized men.

Ricci fought to overcome the Confucian antipathy to theological discussion by glueing religious beliefs to

character formation. He began T'ien-chu shih-i with the tactful admission that self-cultivation was the chief concern of all respectable men. He then skillfully had his fictional Chinese interlocutor ask him to expound on the ultimate purpose of that self-cultivation and on what the practice of virtue was grounded. Thus Ricci gave himself an opportunity to reply that the true gentleman was he who cultivated his virtuous nature through the worship of the God who is the lord of all creation.²

Only a few pages into his apology for his faith, just after this mandatory nod to self-cultivation, Ricci launched into a series a dry, logical arguments for the existence of God. His arguments were all drawn from the Thomistic tradition in Europe and made no more specific reference to moral practice. He wrote as though, once he had proven that God existed, recognition of the importance of God to self-cultivation would automatically follow and need not be repeatedly or explicitly affirmed. He also assumed that his proofs for God's existence were based on self-evident principles which no rational man could disallow. Ricci's naive trust in the universality of Western logical categories and assumptions left him unaware that many of his premises with which he constructed his proofs were themselves open to dispute in the Neo-Confucian philosophical universe. What appeared self-evident to Ricci did not necessarily appear so to Chinese or Koreans.

Ricci may have been less confident of the power of his proofs than he appeared to admit. If his arguments were each logically compelling, why did he need six of them? The argument from the universality of theism, variations on the argument from order in the universe, and a couple of versions of the argument from causation can all be found in the first chapter of the T'ien-chu shih-i. The only arguments, from the Catholic stable of proofs of God's existence, that are missing are those which can not be expressed in classical Chinese without convolutions of syntax and semantics: the ontological argument from necessary being, made popular by St. Anselm (c. 1033-1109), and the arguments Aquinas based on contingency and on graduated degrees of perfection.³

The opening weapon in Ricci's arsenal was his claim that the universal recognition that God existed proved that God did indeed exist. He wrote that all men, when in distress, prayed for deliverance as though they were calling for the aid of a loving parent. Similarly, when men did evil, they became anxious, as though fearing the wrath of an enemy. This instinctive recognition that some superior being existed who could help man when his was good, but would punish him when he was evil, was found everywhere in the world, even in China. Such widespread human sentiment could not be groundless. Therefore God existed.⁴

That argument had obvious flaws from the Neo-Confucian perspective. The very fact that Ricci was arguing from the universality of theism to counter Neo-Confucian atheism shows that belief in God was not totally universal. Besides, the Chinese, who considered themselves the most civilized people on earth, were unlikely to be impressed by the contention that the rest of the world, the people the Chinese labeled barbarians, believed in God.

Neo-Confucians, Chinese and Korean alike, could not deny that, as Ricci pointed out, the Sages of ancient China are recorded in the Chinese Classics as also talking of God.⁵ Nevertheless, orthodox followers of Chu Hsi denied that the god of the classics was the anthropomorphic god that Ricci claimed he was. In his definitive outline of Neo-confucian thought, Chin-ssu Lu (Reflections on things at hand), Chu Hsi enshrined the explanation by Ch'eng I that the term God refers only to the Tao, the Way, in its function as master and should not be read as the name of a distinct and separate deity.⁶ Chu Hsi himself in a number of places expressed his agreement that Ti (Lord, 帝) and T'ien, (Heaven, 天) were nothing more than different ways of describing the functioning of principle and that there was no actual sentient being corresponding to either of those two names.⁷ This atheistic interpretation of the theistic language of the Classics provided the stock answer to Jesuit attempts to paint primitive Confucianism in

Christian colors. In the second chapter of T'ien-chu shih-i, Ricci directly confronted this Neo-Confucian argument and dismissed it as false hermeneutics distorting the logic and sense of the words of the Chinese Sages.⁸

Ricci may have been partially correct in his reading of the Classics. In the Odes and the Book of History, and even at some spots in the Analects, T'ien, and sometimes Ti or Shang-ti, is spoken of in human terms.⁹ There is no doubt, though, that by the time Ricci came to China, the personal attributes of God had faded away and been replaced by a metaphysical absolute devoid of consciousness or will. If there had been Confucian theism in ancient China, few Neo-Confucians could recognize it beneath the centuries of atheistic commentary.

Yet an ambivalence remained. Committed to equating god with principle, the Way, and the Great Ultimate, Neo-Confucians still found it useful at times to conceive of God as a person. Yi T'oegye, who more than any other single Korean shaped Neo-Confucianism on the peninsula, urged his followers to always live as if in the presence of the Lord on High.¹⁰ This suggestion was not original to T'oegye. In fact, he was merely citing Chu Hsi's "Admonition on mindfulness" (Ching-chai chen), which had paraphrased a line from the Odes reading "in response to him in heaven."¹¹ Like Chu Hsi, T'oegye denied the existence of a concrete, conscious being answering to the names Shang-ti

(K. Sangje) or T'ien (K. Ch'on), yet he recognized that, if men assumed that God not only existed but also watched over their every thought and move, they would be more apt to observe the demands of morality even when alone in the privacy of their own rooms.¹²

The ambiguity of the Korean Neo-Confucian concept of God predates T'oegye. In the diary of Ch'oe Pu (1454-1504), a Korean Neo-Confucian official set adrift by a storm off Chuje island and blown toward China, prayers to Heaven appear alongside disclaimers that Heaven answers man's prayers. As he drifted out of control on the Yellow Sea, buffeted by high winds and short of food and water, Ch'oe prayed,

In the world I have tried only to be loyal, filial, friendly, and loving....Far way above us though you are, you must be aware of this....If I have sinned, let punishment come to me alone. Will you, Heaven, presume to be so unmerciful as to let over forty innocent men drown with me?¹³

As the days passed with no sight of land, the crew of Ch'oe's ship, and the secondary officials who had come along expecting only to travel with Ch'oe from South Cholla province to Cheju, grew more and more anxious that their ship, not intended for sailing on the high seas, would sink. On the seventh day adrift, Ch'oe tried to calm them by urging them to accept their fate. "Whether we live or die is up to Heaven....Let each of you be diligent in the things that are within the power of men and accept the fate (decided) by Heaven."¹⁴ Still the crew grumbled, concerned

that Ch'oes failure to petition Heaven with offerings before they set sail was the cause of their plight. Ch'oe dismissed their complaint as unfounded. "Heaven and Earth are not partial....Can one say that Heaven, Earth, the gods and spirits send down damnation and blessings on men for the sake of flattery, food, and drink? That can not possibly be."¹⁵

Ch'oe prayed to an impersonal Heaven, an impervious deity whose determination of men's fate could not be altered by petitions from below. Ch'oe's prayer in distress was merely an expression of his sincerity, of hope, and of trust in the basic fairness of the universe. He expected no response. Heaven was addressed as a conscious being, though no consciousness was assumed, much as an atheist today may cry out "Oh, God!" with no implications of theism.

Early Korean Neo-Confucians could comfortably use anthropomorphic language in talking of the immanent impersonal principle which governed the universe, as long as they were assured that educated listeners would not take them literally. It was permissible to write about the will of Ch'ŏn or the power of Sangje when readers saw those names as metaphors for Principle in operation, the Way manifest. In the eighteenth century, however, when Koreans realized that there were Jesuit missionaries in China arguing that the references in the Classics to a Supreme Being should be taken literally, Korean Neo-Confucians were

forced to address the haziness of their traditional religio-philosophical language. Most responded by dissolving the ambiguity in favor of an unequivocal rejection of anthropomorphism.

Yi Ik sounded the first faint alarm. In his note on the T'ien-chu shih-i, Yi warned, "Their Lord of Heaven is the same as the Sangje of we Confucians, but the way they respect, serve, fear, and trust God is just like the way the Buddhist treat Sakyamuni."¹⁶ The protests grew shriller in the next generation.

Principle and the Great Ultimate

Sin Hudam took umbrage at Ricci's attempt to make God rather than the Great Ultimate the ultimate ground of reality. The Great Ultimate (T'aeguk, 太極) was the core of Neo-Confucian cosmology. Borrowed from Taoism and the Book of Changes by Chou Tun-i, the Great Ultimate became an integral part of the grand synthesis by Chu Hsi that formed Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. As defined by Chu Hsi, the Great Ultimate was supreme abstraction, the metaphysical undifferentiated unity of the universe underlying all differentiation. It was another name for the totality of Principle, for the Way in its entirety.¹⁷

It might be useful to conceive of Principle (i, 理), the immanent pattern that orders the cosmos, as a web of intertwined threads. The Great Ultimate, then, would be that web taken as a whole, with the proviso that the Great

Ultimate be understood as that web before even the first strand materialized and the web was still a seamless unity that had yet to reveal its concrete constituent elements. Chou Tun-i also called the Great Ultimate the Ultimate of Non-being (muguk, 無極), to emphasize that the Great Ultimate per se did not exist. It merely subsisted. In Aristotelian terminology, it could be called pure potential. Before the first movement of yin and yang which issued forth the five elements, which in turn were shaped by principle into the myraid things, the Great Ultimate was. All that would be, was contained in the Great Ultimate. Yet in the Great Ultimate itself nothing was...yet.

The Great Ultimate was the metaphysical, not the material or chronological, wellspring of the universe. It was not some thing which existed apart in time and space from that which it was the source of. The phrase "Great Ultimate" was used by Chu Hsi to convey his insight that all the principles of what is and what should be were interrelated and that their interrelationships formed the network which linked man to the cosmos and everything ultimately to everything else. All that was, existed as a part of, and acted in accordance with, one all-encompassing pattern. The Great Ultimate was that pattern undifferentiated.

The abstract character of the Great Ultimate was

difficult for Ricci to grasp. Pure potential would be nothing, according to Scholastic reasoning, and nothing could not be the origin, source, or ground of anything. Thomistic philosophers instead posited the ultimate ground of reality to be pure actualization. God was defined by Aquinas as total actualization.¹⁸ That which was only potentially something was incomplete. Since God, by definition, was perfect, he could not lack anything. He was all he, or anything, could possibly be. That was what made creation possible, since Thomistic thought assumed that a cause could not impart what it itself did not possess. By contrast, the Great Ultimate was the diametrical opposite of God, since it contained no actualization whatsoever.

Potentiality and actuality are difficult concepts to express in Chinese and are not categories Neo-Confucian philosophers were accustomed to handling. Ricci therefore was forced to make an oblique attack on the Great Ultimate. Since he could not argue convincingly or coherently in Chinese that pure potential was inferior to pure actualization, he argued instead that the Great Ultimate was a Buddhist intrusion into Confucian thought. Ricci challenged the legitimacy of the concept of the Great Ultimate by noting that, though he had read widely in the Classics, nowhere did he find mention of men worshiping or honoring the Great Ultimate, although there are numerous references to displays of reverence and respect for the

Lord of Heaven and Earth.¹⁹

Sin rejected Ricci's appeal to pristine Confucianism. Sin wrote that the Classics did not mention worship of morality, either, but that did not mean that the Sages did not respect morality. Sin argued in his penetrating criticism of T'ien-chu shih-i that Ricci confessed his ignorance of what the Great Ultimate really was when he talked as though it should exist in a spatial or temporal sense. Although the Great Ultimate took no concrete shape and occupied no specific location and could therefore be called vacuous (ho, 虛), it was still real (sil, 實) in terms of principle. The men of old held ceremonies in honor of God because God could be conceived as dwelling in a definite spot, in heaven above. They could not worship the Great Ultimate since there was no one spot one could turn to and identify as its home.²⁰ That did not mean that they did not know about the Great Ultimate or did not recognize its importance.

Sin charged that the Catholic misunderstanding of the nature of the Great Ultimate resembled a mistake made by Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming, two Chinese Neo-Confucian scholars condemned for heterodoxy by Koreans. According to the twentieth-century historian of Chinese thought Feng Yu-lan, Lu differed from Chu Hsi in refusing to grant reality to principle or the Great Ultimate outside of the material world.

For Chu Hsi, reality comprises two distinct realms, one lying within the limits of time and space, the other transcending these limits. For Lu, however, reality comprises only a single realm, wholly confined to time and space.²¹

Sin saw a resemblance between the assertion of Lu and Wang that principle and the Great Ultimate could be found only within the concrete human mind and the Catholic argument that the Great Ultimate had to exist within a concrete spatial, temporal, and material form for it to have any claim to our attention and credence. "The school of Lu and Wang flourished during the Ming dynasty. It is really strange that these Westerners from over 90,000 li away across the ocean happen to think the same way."²²

As far apart as Wang and Lu's idealism and Scholastic realism might appear, Sin's charge was warranted. Both Wang Yang-ming's identification of principle with mind and the Catholic grounding of reality and morality in God were rejections of the Neo-Confucian balancing act that juggled i between the mind and the external world in an eternal tension between subjectivity and objectivity.

Wang Yang-ming represented a swing in one direction, toward the affirmation of i through the personal experience of moral truth. In Wang's view, a mind enlightened to i would transcend the biases inherent in individuality and achieve an objective subjectivity. Catholicism moved in the opposite direction. Catholics sought to anchor ethics and existence in a totally transcendent personality whose will

determined what was and what should be. God for Catholic philosophers was subjective objectivity.

Neither Thomistic Catholics nor followers of Wang Yang-ming felt comfortable with Chu Hsi's formulation of the Great Ultimate as they understood it: a disembodied, impersonal collection of lifeless, desiccated principles. What Sin saw as the mistaken imposition of existential categories onto the realm of subsistence was actually an effort to clarify and revive the personal element which Chu Hsi had obscured in man's encounter with ultimate reality.

The Dangers of Theism

Sin was not alone in finding the Catholic reification of moral and metaphysical concepts offensive. Half a century after Sin composed his philosophical critique of Catholic reasoning, the next generation of Yi Ik's disciples mounted a more virulent attack on anthropomorphic deities. Yi Hŏn'gyŏng (1719-1791), for example, wrote that it was an insult to Sŏngjŏ, tantamount to sacrilege, to make an image of him and treat him as though he was some sort of humanoid demon.²³ Yi's friend, An Chŏngbok, agreed and found the Biblical account of God's incarnation as Jesus Christ, a man living among men, particularly appalling.

They say that this Jesus took upon himself responsibility for the sins of all mankind and allowed himself to be nailed to the cross on which he died. Since they claim that this Jesus is none other than the Lord of Heaven come down to dwell among men, then how can they write that he died in

such an ignoble manner. This is about as ridiculous as anything can be and is an affront to the dignity of the Lord-on-High.²⁴

True to the moral pragmatism of his Neo-Confucian tradition, An appeared even more concerned about the dangerous consequences of the belief in an anthropomorphic deity than in the insolence such a belief implies or the logical absurdities it entails. Catholicism reminded him of those secret Buddhist societies which, emboldened by their faith in the imminent appearance of the Maitreya, the Buddhist messiah, had often rebelled against the government in China. He recalled that only a few decades earlier, in 1758, Korea had suffered a similar disturbance. A shaman had proclaimed herself the living incarnation of the Buddha and caused thousands of peasants throughout central Korea to riot and destroy their ancestral tablets and shrines to local gods. Peace was only restored when that woman was beheaded by an official dispatched from Seoul. An pointed out that such a disruption should serve as a reminder that it is easy to delude and excite people but difficult, once they are aroused, to calm them down so that they can see that they have been led astray.²⁵

An feared that if Catholics were allowed to proclaim that their Lord of Heaven had appeared in the West, then men would grow accustomed to hearing such fantasies and soon the peasant masses would be led this way and that by tricksters crying out that God had materialized here or

there. He expected Catholics to protest that it was unfair to liken them to shamans and self-professed Buddhas since Catholicism was the true religion and posed no threat to society or morality. An was ready with the rejoinder that there was no objective criteria for distinguishing the Catholic claims from those made by other believers in supernatural beings. He bemoaned the blindness of his friends and disciples who had become infatuated with Catholicism without realizing that their talk of God and Jesus was "like the whirring arrows that signal the start of a bandit attack." He decried their failure to see that "they have become like maggots eating away at Confucianism."²⁶

Even if Catholicism was not guilty of inciting social upheavals, An still felt he had sufficient grounds to condemn the imputation that God was a concrete entity endowed with a personality. He believed that such a doctrine distracted men from the obligatory moral tasks facing them. Because Catholics foolishly believed that God was a person, they wasted their time with rituals and prayers of no real benefit to themselves or to others. An asked rhetorically if Catholics were truly concerned only with serving Heaven, as they claimed, then why did they advocate abstaining from meat every seventh day, loud praying to beg God's forgiveness for past sins, and other superstitious activities. To serve Heaven properly men

needed only discipline their minds so that they could preserve and cultivate their innate goodness through proper self-restraint. Rituals and practices which aimed at currying favor with some imaginary divinity were of no real purpose and took up time and attention better spent on self-cultivation.²⁷

More pernicious than the waste of time and effort a belief in God encouraged was the subversion of morality it effected. As seen earlier, in Neo-Confucianism morality reigned supreme and tolerated religion only in the role of a servant. An recognized that Catholicism reversed that relationship by treating morality as merely one of many manifestations of the will of God. He saw a danger that men who believed in a conscious and purposeful deity might be more concerned for toadying to the whim of their God than for doing good.²⁸

An and Sin were representative of the mainstream of orthodox Korean Neo-Confucianism. For most of their contemporaries as well, the Christian portrayal of God as some transcendental entity, existing totally separate and apart from man and his material universe, had little appeal. The Catholic conception of the transcendent addressed questions Neo-Confucians saw no need to answer. Catholic philosophy saw the world as closed in time but ontologically open. The Christian universe had a true beginning in time, which meant that, before it could come

into existence, something not of the universe had to serve as its cause. That something was God. Without a supernatural being, beyond space and time yet reaching out with his will to create and sustain space and time, the world would be without foundation. Neo-Confucianism assumed the converse. The Neo-Confucian universe was open in time but ontologically closed. The world had always existed and could not be said to have sprung into existence at some specific point in time. Therefore there was no need to look beyond the universe for some external cause. In fact, there could be no beyond to look into. The universe was all there was and thus served as its own foundation.

Sin Hudam may have been mistaken when he accused Ricci of misunderstanding the Great Ultimate because of an inability to comprehend abstraction.²⁹ Ricci was well-versed in the complex abstractions of Scholastic philosophy, as were all the Jesuit missionaries in China. The type of abstractions Ricci was used to, however, was quite different from those at the heart of Neo-Confucian reasoning. In traditional Western thought, abstractions have been formed by the severing of relationships, by isolating concepts from their embodiment in concrete contexts in order to apprehend them in terms of how they differ from everything else. In the Neo-Confucian tradition, on the other hand, abstractions were created by the expansion of correlations. Entities were defined in terms

of their interrelationships. What something was, was what role it played in the complex fabric of interaction that was its setting.

The greater the degree of abstraction in Catholicism, the greater the degree of removal from the actual environment. Thus God, the supreme abstraction, was completely above and beyond the world man knows. In Neo-Confucianism, the greater the degree of abstraction, the wider and more comprehensive the web of relationships that was spun. The Great Ultimate was all-inclusive, containing all the principles that molded and directed the functions and characteristics of all that was.

The Catholic process of abstracting produced precise definitions of concepts and clear delineations of what something was and what it was not. Such precision alarmed An and Sin. To specify what God was, it was necessary to specify what was not God. But a God who did not embrace all reality would, in their view, be inferior to the Tao which was all-embracing and therefore impartial. Partiality, in Sino-Korean characters as well as in English, can refer both to that which is incomplete and to that which is immoral. To be incomplete means to be imperfect and God can not be imperfect and still be God. To be immoral, that is to say, to side with a part at the expense of the whole, would likewise be incompatible with the ethical nature of God. The Catholic notion of God was, according to Neo-

Confucian reasoning, a contradiction of both logic and morals.

Sin and An both found evidence of this favoritism and unfairness in some of the Jesuits' tales of their God's activities on earth. It has already been noted that Sin rejected as immoral and therefore absurd the claim that God would have a chosen people who would be the only group to receive his personal revelations.³⁰ Sin also denounced the Biblical account of God's destruction of the entire town of Sodom because of the sins of a few.³¹ Even Jesuit reports of miracles performed in God's name, designed to impress Chinese with the power of the Lord, had the opposite of their intended effect. Aleni wrote in his Chih fang wai chi that the kings of France had been specially favored by God with the gift of healing. "With the touch of their hand, they can cure the tumors and boils of others."³² Sin retorted that if God had really wanted to favor France, he would have given it kings with illustrious virtue like Yao or profound wisdom instead.³³ There was no room in the rationally and impartially ordered Confucian universe for miracles which granted some men unearned benefits, such as immediate release from sickness or pain, that was denied others. Nor could there be respect for a God who purposely punished the innocent or allowed only a small far off tribe of barbarians in Judea to know the truth about the origin of the universe or man's duties on

earth.

An seconded Sin's assessment. He criticized the Catholic claim that eternal torment in hell awaited evil men after death by arguing that a truly just God would never punish men so harshly for their mistakes.³⁴ He also condemned God's reported behavior toward Adam and Eve and their descendants. In the story of Adam and Eve, whom An noted are called the ancestors of all mankind, the Bible tells of God allowing the Devil to tempt Adam and Eve into violating divine law. When Adam and Even then succumbed to this temptation which God had permitted in order to test their moral fiber, God expelled them forever from the paradise which he had given them as their home. Yet, An pointed out, any wise father who suspected that his son was not as good a man as he shold be would admonish that son and encourage him to reform. Any good teacher would do the same for his students. An asked how could God not do likewise. He asserted that a God who was truly the personification of all that was right and good could not have allowed Adam and Eve to fall into sin and then punish them so severely for what was only their first offense. A fair God instead would have warned them about the Devil's temptation and helped them resist the blandishments of Satan.³⁵

More offensive to An's sense of justice was the Catholic doctrine that the punishment incurred by Adam and

Eve was passed on to their descendants, generation after generation. The Jesuits taught that men in their day suffered from poverty, disease, and death because of that one sin committed by Adam and Eve centuries before. Yet the Sage Kings of ancient China had decreed that punishment should not extend to a criminal's descendants. Could it be that God was more vindictive and less equitable than the Sages?³⁶

The flaws that Sin and An perceived in the character and behavior of the Christian God reflected the differences between how Catholics and Neo-Confucians created the abstractions which channeled their visions of the structure of ultimate reality and the shape of morality. Catholics used abstractions to transcend the mundane world of material bodies. Neo-Confucians used abstractions to explore the inherent universal pattern of interrelationships that made reality for them one vast organic unity.³⁷ It was inevitable that those who searched for God within, as an omnipresent unifying principle, would reject a description of God as a supernatural being shattering that unity, just as those who insisted that God was a distinct personality could not comprehend a totally immanent deity. Radically divergent approaches to the fashioning of abstractions rendered much Neo-Confucian metaphysics impenetrable to the Jesuits and made most Scholastic philosophy and theology unintelligible to

Neo-Confucians.

The Jesuit arguments for the existence of God were doomed to failure. Only a few Neo-Confucians, on the fringes of orthodoxy, found them convincing, since the fundamental presuppositions underlying those arguments contradicted those of mainstream Neo-Confucianism and their basic orientation was essentially the reverse of that which directed normal Neo-Confucian thinking. Catholics sought to transcend the limitations of human individuality by linking up with the divine, to surmount the weaknesses of the flesh by partaking of the supernatural assistance of God. They believed God could lift them above this earthly region of sin and evil. Neo-Confucians, too, sought to transcend the propensity to error and immorality that individuality nurtured. The Neo-Confucian vision of transcendence was trans-subjectivity.³⁸ Man overcame the biases and distortions of separate existence by tearing down the walls of selfishness within that rose as barriers to union with his fellow man without. The search for transcendence was directed toward the human community, not out into some mystical realm beyond. In contrast to the other-worldly orientation of traditional Catholicism, the focus of Neo-Confucianism was the universe of society and nature thorough which men moved. This humanistic philosophy defined even transcendence in terms of immanence, of inter-connections within an ontologically closed universe.

Neo-Confucianism could find little common ground on which to build a dialogue with the Christian religion and its dreams of a transcendental realm outside the confines of time, space, matter, and men.

Ontological Self-sufficiency and the Denial of God

The clash of Neo-Confucian immanence and Catholic transcendence is highlighted by the impotence of Ricci's arguments for God's existence as the creator and sustainer of the universe. Five of his six arguments were based on assumptions of transcendence which Neo-Confucianism, rooted in immanence, did not share: that an infinite regress in time was not possible and that nothing could be its own cause.

Ricci had little difficulty arguing from the lack of utter chaos in man's physical environment that there was order in the universe. Nor did Neo-Confucians object to his claim that birds and animals, though they lack intelligence themselves, sometimes act intelligently, that is to say, they know to search for food when hungry and to look for water when thirsty.³⁹ After all, it was a cornerstone of Neo-Confucian philosophy that all objects, animate and inanimate, are infused with rational principle.

However, when Ricci insisted that that rational order must have an intelligent external cause, he collided with the core of Neo-Confucian logic. Centuries earlier, even before Confucian thinking had been rationalized and

systematized by Sung philosophers, Chinese and Koreans had raised the question of whether the cosmos had a creator. Their answer, accepted as definitive for generations afterwards, was a resounding no.

In the early part of the fourth century A.D., a Chinese Neo-Taoist named Kuo Hsiang (d.312) wrote an influential commentary on the famous Taoist work Chuang Tzu. In his commentary, Kuo asked,

Is there a creator (C. tsoowu,造物者)?...Before we can talk about creation, we must understand the that all forms materialize by themselves.... Everything creates itself without the aid of any creator. Since things create themselves, they do not depend on anything else. This is the norm of the universe.⁴⁰

Ricci argued the exact opposite. His fourth proof of God's existence stated explicitly,

Nothing can create itself. An external cause is essential. For example, if you see a building, you know it did not construct itself. In every case, you know that building was built by some workmen. It is the same with the universe. It could not have simply created itself. Something must have created it. That Creator is the Lord of Heaven I speak of.⁴¹

Ricci expected that his argument would be universally recognized as logically compelling. He failed to perceive that the limits his European linguistic and cultural heritage placed on his thought processes were absent in the Chinese intellectual tradition.⁴² He could not conceive something creating itself and he could not imagine anyone else who was rational and clear-headed conceiving of self creation, either. He could not prove that nothing could

create itself, of course, any more than a Neo-Confucian could prove the converse. Both positions reflect conceptual stances toward the world that are as logically unassailable as they are empirically undemonstrable.

A similarly irreparable rift vitiated Ricci's argument that because an infinite regress of causes is impossible God must exist. Ricci wrote that, whenever men looked around them, they saw that living beings were all produced by other living beings, whether through embryos, eggs, or seeds. If they searched for those beings that generated embryos, eggs, and seeds, they would find still more embryo-, egg-, and seed-producing beings.

Eventually we must reach back before there was any particular species and locate that which was the first to give any life at all. This primal source of life is the Lord of Heaven I speak of.⁴³

Over a millenium earlier, Kuo Hsiang had considered just such an argument and dismissed it as senseless. For him, not only was an infinite regress conceivable, it was the only logical solution to the question of ultimate causation.

No matter how far back you go, there has never been a time when there was absolutely nothing and there never will be such a time....What came into existence before there were things? If I say yin and yang came first, then since yin and yang are themselves entities, what came before them? Suppose I say nature came first. But nature is only things being themselves. Suppose I say perfect Tao came first. But perfect Tao is perfect nonbeing. Since it is nonbeing, how can it come before anything else. Then what came before it? There must be another things, and so on ad infinitum. We must understand that things are what

they are spontaneously and are not caused by something else.⁴⁴

Belief in unlimited temporal regress and self-transformation were not the private preserve of Taoist and Neo-Taoist writers alone. As fundamental components of the Chinese world view, these metaphysical assumptions supplied some of the premises from which Neo-Confucianism was constructed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. As core Neo-Confucian concepts, the ontological self-sufficiency and temporal infinity of the universe penetrated Korean thinking as well and became as self-evident to Korean philosophers as their contraries were to Jesuit missionaries.

The twin pillars of Korean Neo-Confucianism were T'oegye Yi Hwang and Yulgok Yi I (1536-1584). Both men, despite their famous disagreement over the relationship between i and ki, agreed that i and ki alone were sufficient to account for the existence of the cosmos and the order it displayed.

T'oegye wrote in a 1568 letter to a friend:

Both movement and quiet in the Great Ultimate are caused by the Great Ultimate moving and stopping itself. Likewise, the widespread implementation of the will of heaven is caused by the will of heaven implementing itself.

True, when we observe how the Ultimate of Non-Being, yin and yang, and the Five Elements mysteriously cooperate, intertwine, and coagulate to produce the myriad entities, it certainly seems as if some Lord is directly the whole process. That is what the Book of History is talking about when it says, "God has conferred even on the inferior people a moral sense"⁴⁵ and what Master

Ch'eng means when he said "That which rules is the Lord."⁴⁶ But this is nothing more than a way to refer to the mysterious functioning of i and ki working together to produce things. There is nothing superior to i. i⁴⁷ directs what things are and nothing directs i.

For T'oegye, with his feet firmly planted in Sung Neo-Confucianism, the Great Ultimate, the will of heaven, the Lord Above, and principle were all synonyms for the pervasive immanent pattern that gave order, coherence, and stability to the universe. Yulgok gave voice to a similar sentiment a decade earlier. On a 1558 state examination, Yulgok was asked to explain what was responsible for the beauty of the heavens and the regularity of its movements and what caused winds to blow, rain and snow to fall, thunder to roar, and lightning to flash. His answer won praise as an eloquent restatement of the orthodox position.

The myriad transformations all have their roots in yin and yang. Ki in motion is yang. Ki at rest is yin. The alternation of yin and yang is ki. That which moves ki and stops ki is i....The sun, moon, and stars, so beautiful in the skies; the snow, rain, dew and frost fallen on the ground; winds and clouds, thunder and lightning; these are all nothing but ki. But the reason why the sun, moon, and stars beautify the skies; the reason why snow, rain, dew, and frost cover the ground; and the reason why clouds appear, winds arise, and thunder and lightning occur; for all of these, the reason why is none other than i.⁴⁸

Neither T'oegye nor Yulgok addressed the question of when i began to operate as the directive force molding ki into the myriad entities that comprise the universe. Since the universe was assumed to be of infinite duration, reaching as far back in time as it reached ahead, the

question of when it all began did not arise.

Another reason orthodox Neo-Confucian scholars showed little interest in debating when the universe began is that they believed creation was a continuing process. An Ch'ongbok, for example, believed that everyday experience proved that life was still being created through purely natural processes. He noted that when he washed all the dirt and sweat from his body and put on clean clothes which had been scrubbed thoroughly, he was free of lice. But, after just a few days, he would see quite a few lice living in his clothes. Where did those lice come from? They were not created by God but were generated by the spontaneous intermingling of the vapors (ki) that rose from his body and his clothes.⁴⁹

An's universe was constructed and maintained by a similar intermingling of yin and yang, the cosmic expressions of ki. Man was formed from the clearer, purer ki. The animal world and the plant world were made up of the heavier, more opaque ki. There was no room for a separate creator in this Neo-Confucian vision of the world as the product of the spontaneous interaction of cosmic forces.

Until the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, Europeans, too, believed in spontaneous generation.⁵⁰ But what for Neo-Confucians provided empirical verification of the self-sufficiency of nature

was, for Catholics, further evidence of God's continuing direct intervention in the affairs of men and nature. The same phenomena, refracted through contrary assumptions, supported antipodal conclusions.

Ricci's contention that the universe must have been created by some transcendental carpenter convinced few of his Korean readers. The shared recognition that the cosmos was orderly was not matched by agreement on the direction in which the cause of that order was to be found. Sin Hudam summarily dismissed Ricci's thesis that men know, when they observe the order and regularity of the universe, that it must have been created by some Great Craftsman since they have never encountered any house that was not constructed by intelligent workmen. In Sin's view, "The creation of the universe is not at all like the building of a house. And the Supreme Ruler Above can not be compared with a mere craftsman."⁵¹

The creative role of i

An and Sin both charged that at the root of the erroneous Catholic conception of creation was a misunderstanding of the role of principle in the formation and maintenance of an orderly universe. Ricci had argued that principle could not be the active organizing force in the universe Chu Hsi said it was. According to Ricci, principle was not itself an object or entity. It could only exist in conjunction with some concrete object. In

Thomistic terminology, i was an attribute, a secondary characteristic of an entity, rather than a substance, the core entity itself. Before the universe began, there were no principles. When no things exist, there can be no attributes of things. Only when God created the universe did principle appear. God, not principle, was the Creator and Organizer of the universe.⁵²

In addition, principle was unconscious and incapable of self-movement or volition. Therefore it could not have created on its own the world which contains the conscious and moral mind of man. "Principle can not give other things what it itself does not have. The true source of all things must have a mind capable of conscious knowledge and able to make moral decisions."⁵³

Sin and An agreed with Ricci that there could be no object without its principle nor could there be a principle without its object. In Western philosophical language, the two were ontologically inseparable. Yet Sin and An went on to claim that this ontological unity did not contradict the logical priority of principle. After all, i was by definition that by which things were what they were. Queried Sin, "If you say that before an object exists, its principle does not exist either, then how could such an object come into existence?"⁵⁴

An objected that even the Catholic God could not create something without a clear notion of what he was going to

create.⁵⁵ In human terms, how could a carpenter make a chair before he knew what a chair was? How could the Christian God create heaven, earth, and the myriad creatures that dwell therein before there were any principles establishing what the universe --and God himself--was? Beings did not accidentally or arbitrarily become what they were. The principles which assigned them their specific characteristics and functions gave them their identity. No temporal priority of i over ki was necessarily implied. These defining i were logically prior to the actual concrete embodiment of those principles in the union of principle and material force (ki) that was an independent entity.

An and Sin represent the T'oegye wing of Korean Neo-Confucianism that has sometimes been labeled chu-li (主理), those who stress i, in contrast to the Yulgok school which is called chu-ki (主氣), those who stress ki. This division arose in a debate over the metaphysical roots of the psychological forces behind human behavior. In a nutshell, T'oegye argued that the four beginnings (the fonts of virtue) are generated by principle and are therefore good, but the seven feelings (the basic human passions) are generated by ki and are therefore a mixture of good and evil. Yulgok, on the other hand, asserted that the four beginnings are contained within the seven feelings and therefore both are generated by ki, though directed by

i.⁵⁶ Yulgok was less eager than T'oegye to wield rational analysis to separate i from ki and virtue from feeling. Because he insisted on preserving, even in metaphysical discussions, the seamless unity that was the mark of Neo-Confucian reality, Yulgok and his followers have been branded as ki-supremacists under the mistaken impression that, since they insisted that i could not be isolated from ki, they believed that i was inferior to ki.⁵⁷ Since Ricci also had written that principle could not be separated from the object to which it adheres, An wrote "this is just like the theory of some latter day Confucians that ki precedes i. It is not even worth discussing."⁵⁸

Loyalty to T'oegye's insistence on the logical priority of i over ki may have affected the intensity of An's and Sin's protests against Ricci's denial of autonomous status to principle. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that disciples of Yulgok would have found Ricci's thesis any more convincing. Ricci not only misunderstood the role of i, as An and Sin charged, he also misunderstood the meaning of that key term in the Neo-Confucian lexicon. Ricci assumed that i corresponded to the Western concept of the universal. He was mistaken.

In the Greco-Roman derived medieval European world of philosophical discourse in which the Jesuits had been educated, an entity had to be before it could be something. Thomism differentiated between what something was and that

something was. This distinction between essence and existence promoted a further division between what something was essentially and what it was incidentally. The first rupture separated the universal, the concept of man, for example, from the existence of an actual living, breathing, talking, and thinking individual. The second cleavage severed those aspects of a being which were definitive of the class to which that being belonged from those features which were peculiar to the particular individual under discussion. Man's reasoning power was assigned to his essence, since a man who could not think at all would not be a true man. The color of his hair was incidental. Whether his hair was red, black, or blond, he was still a man. Hair color therefore was, in Scholastic terminology, an attribute or an accident.

Neo-Confucianism lacked the linguistic equipment to clearly distinguish between existence and essence. In classical Sino-Korean, the statement that something existed was difficult to make without simultaneously providing information about what that something was. For example, instead of "a horse exists (mal yu" 馬有 *), anyone writing in Sino-Korean wishing to indicate the existence of a horse would have had to write "there is a horse" (yu mal, 有馬), pointing to a specific object standing out against a background of formless, infinite, eternal being. As A.C. Graham has pointed out, and as Ricci had realized before

him, the ontological argument for God's existence as necessary being, an argument dependent on the assumption that existence is a predicate added to essence, was not permitted by the vocabulary or grammar of classical Chinese.⁵⁹ The Western notion of universals, abstract categories which defined the types of being into which the totality of existence was disbursed, never played a significant role in Neo-Confucian thinking. Existence was not disbursed. It was eternally present, inseparable from essence. Consequently, Neo-Confucians saw no need to postulate a Creator to infuse existence into lifeless essence. Essence, viewed as the principles which determined what something was and should be, contained its own animating power.

I was not the dead abstraction Ricci believed it to be. Nor was it a parasitic phantasm, existing only as a mental construct lifted from concrete existence. Ricci was led astray by the morphological signals of Indo-European languages that set off adjectives as parts of speech distinct from verbs and amenable to nominalization. The map of reality that a language provides through its grammar and vocabulary is often mistaken for reality itself. Since it requires only a relatively simple linguistic transformation to change the adjective red into the noun redness, Western thinkers have been tempted to hypostatize the quality of redness apart from individual red objects.

A major issue throughout the history of Western thought has been the status of such qualities, the debate starting with Plato, who granted universals more reality than the particulars in which they appear, and Aristotle, who believed that only concrete individuals are real and the universals are nothing more than the common elements in particulars and have no separate existence. Ricci and his fellow Jesuits were heirs to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition which denied ontological autonomy to universals. Ricci thought that principles functioned as adjectives limning the shared characteristics of various categories of entities. Under this definition of i, Ricci's argument that i could not be the organizer and regulator of the universe was reasonable.

Unfortunately for the cogency of Ricci's argument, Neo-Confucianism did not define i as a universal. In the Confucian tradition, the concept of the universal had been given little attention. Once, in the fourth century B.C., a small and insignificant group of Chinese philosophers did briefly discuss the relationship between particular individuals and general characteristics. These "logicians", as they are sometimes called, used the term chi (C. chih, 指), not i, and it is not clear whether or not chi should be interpreted in their writings as universal concepts. The few fragments extant of their discussions are difficult to decipher, since the classical Chinese they used does not

distinguish morphologically between singular and plural or between the concrete particular and the abstract universal. The word for whiteness was the same as the word for white and the word for horse was the same as that for horses.⁶⁰ The difficulties the logicians faced, in trying to grapple with notions the Chinese language was ill-equipped to handle, remained to discourage exploration of the universal by Neo-Confucians over a thousand years later. Sin's discussion of Sambiassi's explanation of the stages of cognition, examined in the last chapter, is a prime example of the problems Chinese and Koreans faced when wrestling with the concept of the abstract universal, and of the obstacles the Jesuit encountered in trying to translate their philosophy into Chinese.

Ricci misunderstood i because he thought the Chinese intended i to answer questions European philosophers had posed. But the questions that generated Chinese metaphysical thought were different from those central to Platonic, Aristotelian, or Thomistic philosophy. Since adjectives could function as verbs in classical Chinese, Neo-Confucians were less inclined to reify qualities and attributes or to treat them as somehow apart from the functioning entity in which they were found.⁶¹ Instead, Chinese and Koreans were drawn by the pivotal role of the verb in their philosophical language, and the consequent relative scarcity of abstract nominalizations, to classify

entities according to their functions rather than according to their attributes.

(Principle) accounts not only for the properties of a thing but for the task it must perform to occupy its place in the natural order....The Neo-Confucians take no interest in the properties of a thing, only in its function....⁶²

When Ricci derided i as a subordinate property incapable of creative activity, he was thinking of i as comparable to the white color on a white horse. The horse may be truly white, yet he would still be a horse if he were brown instead. Therefore in no way could whiteness be conceived as essential to the horse's existence nor could whiteness be credited somehow with any part in the production of horses.⁶³ However, when Neo-Confucians talked of principles, they talked, not of properties or attributes, but of functional relationships. A example frequently used was the principle that governed the behavior of a subject toward his superior and of the ruler toward his subject or that which regulated the duties of a son toward his father and the obligations of a father toward his son. As understood by Neo-Confucians, principle determined more what someone should do than what he looked like.

Since Korean Neo-Confucians pictured entities primarily in terms of their roles in the universal immanent order of the cosmos, with those roles allocated according to i, principle could not be dismissed as dispensable. In a

function-based ontology, eliminating the functions of an entity casts that entity into an abyss of nothingness. Sin found ludicrous Ricci's description of principle as a non-essential, secondary characteristic. He complained that Ricci treated principle as though it were some tumor that suddenly appeared out of nowhere and attached itself like a parasite to some already existing object.⁶⁴ Unstated in Sin's criticism, because the obvious did not need to be stated for his Neo-Confucian audience, was the explanation Ch'eng I had provided: "That which is inherent in things is principle."⁶⁵ Such a conception of principle does indeed render Ricci's presentation ludicrous. It is only to be expected that Sin would conclude, "Ricci does not understand principle at all."⁶⁶

When principle was understood as Ricci understood it, i could not be the sculptor of the universe. Under the Neo-Confucian definition, i could not be otherwise. Principle, of course, was not the creator in the Christian sense of a conscious supreme being who constructed the universe out of nothing at a specific point in time. As was pointed out earlier, Neo-Confucians did not believe that the universe had a temporal beginning. Sin was willing to admit that perhaps this particular universe he lived in was not eternal. But, he added,

The productive and formative work of i has never stopped for a moment. Even before this heaven and earth that we know existed, another heaven and earth existed, and there will be another one after

this one. If you look into the past, you can not see where this process first began. Nor, if you look into the future, can you see where it all will end. The transformations that give birth to men and other creatures and the alternation of summer and winter will necessarily be the same from universe to universe....How could there ever have been a time when things were not being produced.⁶⁷

Sin viewed i as the author of the universe in that it was principle which infused ki, the material content of the universe, with determinate shape, form, and direction. Since i and ki always were, it was useless to discuss principle as a concrete entity temporally or spatially separate from the physical environment in which it was embedded. Ricci erred when he isolated i from the creative transformations of ki that produced all that existed, just as Sambiassi had erred when he analyzed human cognition as a process of extracting i from the individual bundle of ki it was found in. As Sin saw it, both errors were based on a misunderstanding of the logical and ontological status of principle.

Sin accused Ricci of confusing the realm of the material with that of the immaterial. More precisely, Sin accused Ricci of confusing that which has concrete shape, in other words, that which occupies specific points in space and time (in modern philosophical language, that which exists), with that which is shapeless (that which subsists and is beyond space and time). The Western distinction between the spiritual and the material did not

arise in the classical Sino-Korean language or in Neo-Confucian thought. Sin clearly included both the material world of man and the spiritual world of God within the sphere of existence rather than subsistence. The Catholic attribution of a personality to their Supreme Being indicated to Sin that Catholics believed their God existed within space and time. He charged that they failed to recognize, however, that principles transcend the limitations of shape, form, space, and time.

Principle was real. Its existence could be verified through its manifestations in the material world of ki. For example, it can be confirmed that there is a principle of consciousness by pointing to the existence of individual conscious human minds. Principle was not real, however, in the same sense that objects in space and time were real. It was a mistake to charge that i itself had to be able to move before it could impart motion to material objects, though Sin would probably have agreed with the Thomistic assumption that a material object at rest could not place another stationary material object in motion. Similarly, it was wrong to assert that principle itself had to be a self-conscious entity if it was to be responsible for man's self-consciousness, though again Sin probably would have agreed with Ricci's presupposition that in the material world nothing could give what it itself did not have.

But principle was not a material object. I was found

within material entities, not alongside them or separated from them. The principle of motion existed within, not apart from, moving objects. And the principle of consciousness existed within, not apart from the conscious mind. The Catholic insistence that principle could not serve as the ultimate basis of order in the universe, since it was not a separate and distinct entity in its own right found at a definite spot in space and time, convinced Sin that the missionaries fundamentally failed to grasp what made principle principle and what made an object an object.⁶⁸

The Immanence of God in Principle

An Chongbok argued that men knew principles were real because they daily observed it in operation. An cited the classical authority of the Book of Changes to buttress his argument. He noted that the Changes said, "the alternation of yin and yang is called the Way."⁶⁹ This meant in the Neo-Confucian tradition that all that existed was a mixture of warm and cold, light and dark, masculine and feminine, strong and weak, active and passive elements. And the Way everything existed was Principle. God (Sangje) and Principle were merely different names for this spontaneous activity of yin and yang described in the Book of Changes.⁷⁰

Ricci had ridiculed Neo-Confucian charts showing the role of yin and yang in creation by labeling them "weird

symbols with no referent in the real world."⁷¹ Sin's angry response was that to deny yin and yang was to deny the earth at man's feet and the sky above, since heaven was yang and the earth was yin.⁷²

An's and Sin's reactions to Ricci's cavalier repudiation of Principle, the Great Ultimate, and yin and yang in favor of God the Creator shows that the Jesuit missionary in China and the Neo-Confucians in Korea were thinking in two different languages. Ricci, accustomed to the rigidly compartmentalized universe of Thomistic European Catholic thinking, assumed that the separate and distinct Chinese terms for God, Principle, the Great Ultimate, and yin and yang must refer to separate and distinct entities. An and Sin, immersed in the organic cosmic vision at the heart of the Sino-Korean Neo-Confucian tradition, used those same Sino-Korean characters to highlight different aspects of the functioning of one dynamic, creative, organizing, universal pattern, a network of interrelationships needing only ki to become manifest.

Sin and An denied the existence of God as the Creator apart from creation because there was no need in their universe to ground in an external being phenomena, such as life and consciousness, which could be explained adequately in terms of internal functioning alone. Neo-Confucian consciousness, for example, was nothing more than the mind functioning in accordance with the principles which made it

a conscious mind. Consciousness was not an attribute placed in the human mind by an external implanter of consciousness. Rather than a "ghost in a machine", as Westerners have sometimes pictured it, consciousness was the machine itself, or, more precisely, the machine on its own, operating as it was supposed to operate.

An and Sin tried to understand man and the universe on their own terms. Oriented toward immanence, they believed all could be comprehended in terms of the functional interaction of i and ki. Consequently, though they both accepted the word God, if by God (Sangje) was meant i functioning as the immanent ruling principle of moral order, they were not interested in elucidating any particular attributes of that God. Neither An nor Sin found much merit in the lengthy descriptions of the nature of God provided by Ricci and Sambiasi.⁷³ Whether or not God was infinitely good, complete and perfect unto Himself, omnipotent, or pure spiritual being was irrelevant, if not meaningless. It was only God's function as master of the universe, in other words, as Principle, that made God real.

For this reason, Sin criticized Sambiasi's use of analogies drawn from the nature of God to describe the human soul. Sambiasi compared the soul to God to emphasize the immateriality of the soul. Sin, of course, did not accept that bifurcation of existence into the material and the immaterial. It made more sense to him to portray God as

analogous to the mind rather than to the soul. It was the mind which ruled the body as God ruled the universe. In fact, a synonym for mind in Sino-Korean was "Heavenly Ruler" (ch'ŏn'gun, 天君). Sin concluded that when the Jesuits likened God to the soul, "they reveal that they do not understand what makes God God. They are misusing our Confucian vocabulary."⁷⁴

An condemned the Catholic expropriation of Sino-Korean terminology in even stronger terms. In a 1784 letter to a disciple who was favorably impressed by missionary writings, An warned that the Jesuits wanted to fool their readers into thinking that Catholicism was superior to Buddhism and Taoism, so they stole the name "Lord of Heaven" with the hope that no one would dare to attack a deity with such an august title. "This is quite a clever scheme. They are acting just like those in ancient China who stole the title of Emperor in order to usurp power over the feudal lords."⁷⁵

Yi Hŏn'gyŏng, writing when Christianity was gaining its first Korean adherents, joined in the chorus denouncing Jesuit authors for distorting the meaning of the word Sangje. He wrote in his own Conversations on Catholicism (Ch'ŏnhak mundap) that it was a mistake to identify the Sangje of the Confucian Classics with the anthropomorphic deity Catholics worshiped. "In things and events God is the principle of what should be done. In the human heart, God

is the moral nature men are endowed with."⁷⁶ In the same vein, Yi wrote An Ch'ongbok that the Catholics' mistake was to look for God in the world beyond rather than in their own heart.⁷⁷

To those Neo-Confucians, such as Sin, An, and Yi, who interpreted Sangje as immanent guiding moral principle, the Jesuit missionaries from Europe acted improperly in borrowing the names Sangje and Ch'ŏn for their transcendent, supernatural deity. These Neo-Confucians were echoing a charge made by Catholic critics of the Jesuit missionary approach in China. By the early eighteenth century Rome had forbidden the Ricci-initiated practice of using titles drawn from the Chinese Classics for the Christian God. The Jesuits' critics convinced Rome that traditional Chinese Confucian terms were not flexible enough to convey Catholic theological concepts without generating dangerous misinterpretations. Korean comments on those Catholic works written before Rome forced the substitution of Ch'onju for Sangje and Ch'ŏn are evidence that these critics were right.

The Jesuits tried to force a vocabulary of immanence into an argument for transcendence. For most of their readers, they failed, though there is no evidence they would have been more successful if they had coined their own neologisms. The Thomistic God was alien not only to Sino-Korean vocabulary but also to the Neo-Confucian

conceptual stance toward the world. Logical argument is impotent against those who do not share the assumptions on which that logic is based. Neo-Confucians in Korea were, by and large, satisfied with their self-sufficient, self-created, and self-organizing universe. God as Creator was an unnecessary, and therefore dispensable, hypothesis which even the eloquence of Matteo Ricci could not persuade them to accept.

Notes For Chapter Five

1. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, pp.324-5.
2. Peter Hu, a contemporary Chinese theologian at Fujen Catholic University in Taiwan, argues that the T'ien-chu shih-i, despite its lengthy explication of the basic religious dogmas of Christianity, takes self-cultivation as both its starting point and its final purpose. He believes it was Ricci's claim that worship of God was essential to self-cultivation that attracted some Chinese literati to Christianity. (Unpublished paper by Peter Hu delivered at Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, October 9, 1982.)
3. A.C. Graham has an interesting discussion of the problems of translating the ontological argument into Chinese. In "Being in Chinese," he points out that the ontological argument is only possible in languages that can use the same verb for being and for identity. Latin is such a language. Chinese is not. The arguments from contingency and from graduated degrees of perfection both assume the reification of abstractions such as being and goodness, a tendency much stronger in Indo-European languages than in Chinese. Graham, pp.15-8.
4. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, p.48.
5. Ibid., pp. 85-87.
6. Wing-tsit Chan, translator. Reflection on Things at Hand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p.9.
7. For example, see Chu-tzu Ch'ŭan-shu, 49:25a, "The lord is principle functioning as master."
8. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, p.87.
9. D. Howard Smith, Chinese Religion from 1000 B.C. to the Present Day (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), pp.12-31; Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1971), pp.115-23; Joseph Shih, "The Notions of God in the Ancient Chinese Religions", Numen XVI, no.2 (Sept., 1969), pp.98-138.
10. "Chin sŏnghak shipdo", T'oegye chŏnsŏ [The complete works of Yi Hwang] (Seoul: Songgyun'gwan University Taehan Munhwa yŏn'guso, 1958), vol. 1, p.209 (7:31a).
11. Legge, vol. 4, p.569.

12. For T'oegye's understanding of God, see Yi Sang'un, "T'oegye ui hangmun kwa sasang" [T'oegye's thought and scholarship], T'oegyehak yŏn'gu [Studies on T'oegye's philosophy] (Seoul: Seoul National Univrsity Press, 1972), pp.29-139, esp. 123-31.
13. John Meskill, translator, Ch'oe Pu's Diary: A Record of Drifting Across the Sea (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1965) p.34.
14. Ibid., p.36.
15. Ibid., p.44.
16. Sŏngho chŏnjip, 55:27b.
17. Chu-tzu Ch'üan-shu, 49:8b-18b, partially translated in Chan, Sourcebook, pp.638-41.
18. Summa Theologica, Question 3, article 1; question 4, article 1.
19. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, pp. 73-4.
20. Sin Hudam, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p.78.
21. Feng Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol.II, p.587.
22. Sin, p. 82.
23. Yi hŏn'gyŏng, Kanongjip, 19:27b; 23:41a-b.
24. An Chŏngbok, Sunamjip, 17:18a-b.
25. Ibid., 17:12b-13a.
26. Ibid., 17:13a-b.
27. Ibid., 17:9a-b.
28. Ibid., 2:16b (a letter to Yi Ik, dated 1757).
29. Sin, p.81.
30. Ibid., p.88
31. Ibid, p.102.
32. Ibid., p.101; Chih-fang wai-chi, p. 375.

33. Sin, pp. 101-02.
34. An Ch'ongbok, *ibid.*, 6:32a-b (1784 letter to Kwon Ch'ol-sin).
35. An, *ibid.*, 17:17a-b.
36. *Ibid.*, 17:17n-18a.
37. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. II, esp. pp. 465-66, presents probably the most influential argument for this interpretation of Neo-confucianism as a philosophy of organicism.
38. Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity, p.219, has come to a similar conclusion.
39. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, pp.48-50.
40. Kuo Hsiang, Nanhua chen-ching, Ssu-pu ts'ung k'an edition, 1:47a. Translated in Chan, Sourcebook, pp.330-31, and in Feng, vol. II, p.210.
41. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, p.51.
42. A.C. Graham, "Being in Classical Chinese", argues that the verb to be encourages the detaching of immaterial being from the material, promoting visions of God before the Creation. Chinese, on the other hand, are incapable of making such distinctions. "The inseparability of the Tao from the universe is not an accident of Chinese thought. It is inherent in the functions of the words yu (being) and wu (non-being)." P. 21.
43. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, pp.55-6.
44. Kuo, *ibid.*, 7:54-b-55a; Chan, Sourcebook, p.335.
45. Shu Ching, III, 2, 2; Legge, p.185.
46. See Chan, trans. Reflections on Things at Hand, p.9.
47. T'ŏegye chŏnso, 13:17a (vol. 1, p.354).
48. Yulgok chŏnso [The complete works of Yi I], 14:55a-b (p. 308).
49. An, 17:16a-b. Chu Hsi and Ch'eng I also used lice to prove spontaneous generation. See Feng, vo. II, p.550, and A.C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers,

p.36.

50. "Spontaneous Generation", Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol IV, pp.307-12.
51. Sin, p.75.
52. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, pp.76-84.
53. Ibid., p.81.
54. Sin, pp.79-80.
55. An, 17:22a-b.
56. Exploration of the i-ki debate in Korean Neo-Confucianism has been a major theme in twentieth-century studies of Yi dynasty thought. Two studies available in English are Pae Chong-ho, "The Four-Seven Controversy in Korean Confucianism", Korean Thoughts, ed. Chon Sin-yong, Seoul: International Cultural Foundation, 1979, pp.37-52; Munsang Seoh, "The Ultimate Concern of Yi Korea Confucians: An Analysis of the i-ki Debates", Occasional Papers on Korea, no. 5 (March 1977), pp.20-66.
57. That this is a mistake is clear in any careful reading of Yulgok and his disciples. Note, for example, Han Wonjin, a supposed ki-supremacist, who wrote that the way to distinguish orthodoxy from heresy is to see whether stress falls on i, in which case it is orthodoxy, or on ki, in which case it is heresy. Namdangjip, cited in Kim Kil-hwan, Chosŏnjo yuhak sasang yŏn'gu [A study of Confucian thought in the Yi dynasty] (Seoul: Iljisa, 1980), p.213.
58. An, 17:22b.
59. Graham, "Being", p.33.
60. On the logicians, see Chan, Sourcebook, pp.232-43; Feng, Vol. I, pp.203-15.
61. Graham, "Being in classical Chinese", pp.12-8, also Two Chinese Philosophers, p.41.
62. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers, p. 18.
63. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, p.76.

64. Sin, p.79.
65. Chan, Reflections, p. 16.
66. Sin, p. 80.
67. Ibid.
68. Sin, p. 81.
69. Chan Sourcebook, p.266. This is from chapter five of the Appended Remarks, part I, found in Wilhelm-Bayres, p.297.
70. An, 17:22a-b.
71. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, p.74.
72. Sin, p.79.
73. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, pp.60-7, 83-4, 160-1, 285-7. Sambiasi, pp. 335-44.
74. Sin, p. 66.
75. An, Sunam chŏnjip, 6:31a. An made that point again in Ch'ŏnhak mundap, 17:9b.
76. Yi Hŏn'gyŏng, 23:41a.
77. Ibid., 13:27b-28a.

Chapter Six

Christian Soul and Neo-Confucian Mind

Psychologists in the twentieth century often use word association to bring to light the private language of thought behind public discourse. One word instinctively paired with another word reveals what specific connotations those two words normally evoke, what nuances color the understanding of the concepts those words represent. Although a distance of over two centuries makes it impossible to place either the Jesuit missionaries in East Asia or their Korean and Chinese audience on the analyst's couch, it is possible to analyze the dyads that leaven their writings. Such an analysis will aid the excavation of the roots of the ideological and moral conflict between Catholicism and Neo-Confucianism in eighteenth-century Korea.

For example, a medieval or Renaissance Catholic would probably have completed "heaven and..." with "hell", though a Neo-Confucian would have been more likely to add "earth" instead. Similarly, a Catholic steeped in Scholasticism, hearing the phrase "substance and...", would instinctively think of attribute. For a Neo-Confucian, "function" would

have been the usual automatic response.

Convincing Neo-Confucians in Korea or China that God was real was not enough to make them Christians. Before anyone could be called Catholic, he had to confess faith in the immortality of the human soul, with all the consequences for life after death that entailed in the orthodox Christian tradition. Therefore, once a Jesuit missionary had offered his proofs for the existence of the Christian God, he quickly moved onto the next step and argued that man's soul was an indestructible substance that would live forever and that the soul of a virtuous man would enjoy eternal bliss in heaven while the soul of a sinner would endure perpetual torment in hell.

Few Neo-Confucians could follow the logic of the Catholic argument, at least not until the Neo-Confucian conceptual links between heaven and earth and between substance and function had been broken and been replaced by the Thomistic association of heaven with hell and attribute with substance. The differences between the Catholic and the Neo-Confucian pairings are reflections of the underlying differences between the unarticulated preconceptions that constitute their respective conceptual stances toward God, truth, knowledge, morality, and the world. So long as the gap between the fundamental categories of Catholic reasoning and the cardinal assumptions of Neo-Confucian thinking remained unbridged, Jesuit writings continued to

appear immoral and irrational to orthodox Neo-Confucians, and the Neo-Confucian rejection of Catholicism seemed illogical and perverse to the missionaries.

The nature of the soul

Matteo Ricci's lengthy presentation, in the T'ien-chu shih-i, of his case for the immortality of the soul and the reality of heaven and hell is a good example of the inability of a European missionary, as accommodating and understanding of Confucian ways as Ricci was, to grasp fully the depth of the difficulties his proselytizing faced. Ricci, as was his wont, borrowed Confucian terminology for Catholic concepts. For soul, he chose the word hon (C. hun, 魂) and then unfolded a six part argument establishing that the human soul (yonghon, 靈 魂 , C. linghun) was an immaterial substance. His argument was that it is the soul which rules over the body, not the body the soul; that it is the soul which is aware of itself; that it is the soul that receives and manipulates immaterial images; that it is the soul that understands and desires; and that it is the soul that aspires to virtue. In every instance, he pointed out, those operations of the soul were immaterial and therefore could only be performed by an immaterial substance.¹ That argument possessed persuasive power only for those who shared Ricci's convictions that the soul was the site of human consciousness and that there was a rupture in the realm of being between the material

and the immaterial.

Orthodox Korean Neo-Confucians did not share Ricci's convictions. In their understanding of the nature of reality, there were no such things as immaterial entities. All that existed was made up of ki and was therefore material. The Sino-Korean term Ricci adopted for the immaterial, muhyong (C. wuhsing, 無形), meant "without form" and referred in Neo-Confucian texts to either primal ki, before that material force had been directed by i into specific shapes, or to i and other abstractions which subsisted rather than existed and so were not considered concrete beings or actual entities. The spirit and souls Ricci described as immaterial were perceived by Neo-Confucians as composed of rarefied ki. Spirits existed at one end of the ki continuum running from the tenuous and light to the dense and heavy. This seamless Confucian universe of ki permitted no radical separation of material and immaterial being.²

Nor did Neo-Confucians make the soul the agent of consciousness. It was the mind, written with the character for heart, that was conscious. The soul, or rather the two souls, the hon and the Paek (C. p'o, 魄), merely provided the vital force which kept the body alive and allowed the mind to think and sense. this theory of two souls dates back at least to the time of Confucius, to the ancient classic The Spring and Autumn Annals,

In man's life the first transformations are called the earthly aspect of the soul (paek). After paek has been produced, that which is strong and positive is called the heavenly aspect of the soul (hon).

Just as the cosmos was activated by a dynamic harmonizing of the interaction of the strong and assertive forces of yang and the retiring and reactive forces of yin, so, too, man was animated by yin and yang. Animal life, that which gave man his physical vitality, was supported by the yin forces of paek. The breathing which kept man alive, thinking and feeling, was supported by the yang forces of hon. However, no Neo-Confucian would have confused either the hon or the paek with the mind. Man's souls kept him alive so that he could think. They did not do his thinking for him.

As Sin Hudam saw it, Catholics mistakenly fused the material life of man's souls with the moral life of his mind. He noted that Catholics insisted that the soul is located in the brain. He could accept that, since it agreed with the tenets of Chinese medicine found in the Classic of the Yellow Emperor. He warned, though, that the Catholics erred when they took a concept appropriate to the practice of medicine and applied it to the more important issues of knowledge, perception, and moral action. The brain may be the seat of life but to make it also the site of thought was to let Taoist concern for the body encroach on Confucian concern for moral decision making. Such ignorance on

the role of the mind-heart as the moral organ in man Sin found inexcusable.⁴

Sambiasi's On the Soul further convinced Sin that Catholic doctrine was predicated on a distorted image of the soul. Sambiasi drew analogies between the nature of God and the characteristics of the human soul in order to elucidate the imperfect spirituality of man and the perfect immateriality of God.⁵ As seen in the last chapter, Sin believed that such analogies only proved that the Catholics did not understand the proper meaning of the Sino-Korean word they were using for God.

Sin's quarrel was not with the transliteration from the Latin Sambiasi used for the soul --he accepted anima (亞尼瑪) as a peculiarity of European vocabulary--but with Sambiasi and Ricci's equating of anima and hon. For one thing, the hon was not the ruler of the body the Catholics said it was. The mind, not the hon, played the role in the body that corresponded to the commanding role God played in heaven. For another, the detailed Catholic description of the nature of the hon was largely irrelevant. The specific attributes of the soul were less important than its functions. As Neo-Confucians defined it, the hon was the yang spirit of expansion in the body, just as the paek was the yin spirit of contraction. Yet, Sin pointed out, in the Jesuit discussions of the soul,

There is not even the slightest mention of the signs of yin and yang, of contraction and

expansion. Their anima has nothing in common with what we call the hon. They obviously do not understand what makes a hon a hon.⁶

Three decades later, An Ch'ngbok continued the Korean Neo-Confucian evaluation of the Catholic concept of the soul. In a letter to Yi Ik, An acknowledged that the Catholics were probably correct when they said that man had only one soul instead of two. After all, hon and paek were nothing more than ways of distinguishing between the yang and the yin functions of the soul and did not need to be interpreted literally as two ontologically distinct entities.⁷

Life After Death

An was also willing to see some merit in the Catholic argument that the soul survived the body. As An saw it, the Confucian explanation of death, as the dispersal of the ki which had coalesced to form life, was inadequate for an understanding of ancestor memorial rites. If the oft-quoted statement from the Book of History that "the imperial progenitors come to the service" was to be taken, as it had long been taken, to mean that the spirits of the departed were present at memorial services honoring them, then the ki of those ancestors could not have completely dispersed and dissolved into the formless void at the moment of death. Moreover, unless the ancestors were in some sense actually present at the ritual, the homage their descendants payed them was nothing more than a foolish and

disrespectful game.⁸

The problem of reconciling the rationalistic denial of life after death with the moral necessity of reverence for the Classics, ritual, and ancestors was not new to Neo-Confucianism. Chu Hsi had wrestled with this question earlier. His solution was to claim that those who performed memorial services inherited their ki from those they honored and that this heritage of a common ki allowed them to say that their ancestors were present at the rites.

Think of the waves in the ocean. The water at the crest of a wave is not the same water as that at the trough. And a later wave is not the same wave as an earlier wave. Yet it is all basically one wave. It is the same with the ki that links generations. The ki of the sons and grandsons is to the ki of the deceased fathers and grandfathers as the water in the trough is to the water at the crest.

Pressed further to explain, within the limits of his materialistic definition of the soul, what was meant by the phrase in the Odes which states that "the Three Sovereigns [of ancient China] are in heaven," Chu Hsi evaded a direct answer with the excuse that such questions deal with matters "mysterious, intricate, and hard to explain in words."¹⁰

Sin thought Chu Hsi's explanation sound. In fact, Sin copied this section from the Recorded Conversations of Chu Hsi verbatim into his refutation of Ricci's attempt to support Catholic doctrine with citations from the Confucian Classics.¹¹ An, on the other hand, was not as satisfied

with Chu's response. Either the human souls outlived the bodies in which they were encased or the Classics were untrustworthy and the ancestor memorial service meaningless. Chu Hsi's equivocation was unacceptable to the more literal-leaning An.¹²

For example, An wrote Yi Ik that the mere inheritance of ki a chesa ($\frac{\text{氣}}{\text{心}}$) celebrant had received from the ancestor he was honoring would not be sufficient to justify the traditional application of the phrase "the spirits come to the service." If it were true that, at the moment death occurred, the soul was totally absorbed back into the formless primal ki whence it came, then where would the ki that came to the service come from? Once ki had returned to the void, it lost all traces of individuality and could no longer be the spirits of the specific deceased individuals being honored. If ancestral spirits were actually present at the services memorializing them, then at least some of their ki had to have survived their death to preserve their personality.¹³

Saying that the soul outlived the body was not the same as saying that the soul lived on for eternity. An staked out the middle ground between the Confucian assumption of immediate annihilation and the Catholic assertion that the soul was immortal. An argued that, if the Catholic doctrine were correct, the soul of everyone who had ever lived, good or evil, would still be alive. But if that were the case,

the number of souls would be so great that it would far exceed the capacity of heaven and hell to contain them. An reasoned that souls clearly outlive their bodies for only a short while, dissipating slowly over time.¹⁴

Disagreement over whether the death of the human soul was instantaneous or gradual remained within the boundaries of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy in both Korean and China. Though Chu Hsi had argued that personal identity was inseparable from the body, in Korea such respected figures as Yulgok and Songho taught that some elements of the personality remained for a generation or two.¹⁵ An and Sin were both faithful to their tradition despite their minor differences of opinion on this issue.

Common to all orthodox Neo-Confucian interpretations of the nature of the soul were two important points. First, everyone agreed that the soul was ki and did not represent a form of existence radically different from that which men found at hand in the material world around them. Second, ki per se was indestructible. The ki that composed the soul did not decay. When the soul dissolved, that ki survived and, sooner or later, was absorbed again into the reservoir of undifferentiated primal material force from which all things were formed.

Both of these Neo-Confucian doctrines directly contradict Catholic dogma. Essential to the Scholastic argument for the immortality of the soul was the belief

that the soul came from the spiritual side of a universe bifurcated by a rift between the material and the spiritual. Equally indispensable was the certainty that one characteristic which divided the spiritual from the material was the permanence of the former and the transience of the latter.

The Chinese Classics support the Neo-Confucian stand on the fragility of the soul and the tenaciousness of ki. An and Sin both cited the passage from the Book of Changes that defines death: "The escape of the soul brings about change."¹⁶ Sin explained that this meant that the unraveling of the life-giving union of yin and yang brought death. "That is what is meant by change. When there is change, then what was, is no more." Death occurred when the soul, which served as the animating element in man, broke down into the hon and paek which comprised it and was dispersed. Sin wrote that it was absurd to talk of man surviving death, through the immortality of his soul, after the unity that was a living human being ceased to be.¹⁷ An added that it was equally absurd to talk of the annihilation of the ki that had been the soul. The Book of Changes said that the escape of the soul brought about change, not nothingness, since the ki underwent transformation, not destruction. Though it no longer formed a complete soul, that ki nonetheless continued to exist as ki.

Substance, Function, and Attributes

Koreans concluded that the soul died, though its ki survived, because of the Neo-Confucian tendency to treat the soul as a substance in terms of its functions rather than its attributes. As Korean Neo-Confucians used the word, the soul was more an activity than an object. A soul was defined as rarefied ki which lived, perceived, and thought. It was not so much the attenuation of ki as it was what that attenuated ki did that made a slice of ki a soul. Ki that had been a soul ceased being a soul as soon as it ceased acting as a soul, though it remained as rarefied as before.

This functional definition of the soul predates Neo-Confucianism. In the fifth century a Chinese philosopher named Fan Chen (450--ca.515) wrote an anti-Buddhist essay entitled Shen mieh lun (An essay on the extinction of the soul). Attacking the Buddhist doctrine of metempsychosis, Fan argued that:

The body is the substance of the soul; the soul is the functioning of the body....The relationship of the soul to its substance is like that of sharpness to a knife, while the relationship of the body to its functioning is like that of a knife to sharpness. What is called sharpness is not the same as the knife, and what is called the knife is not the same as sharpness. Nevertheless, there can be no knife if the sharpness is discarded, nor sharpness if the knife is discarded. I have never heard of sharpness surviving if the knife is destroyed, so how can it be admitted that the soul can remain if the body is annihilated?¹⁸

Twelve centuries later Sin Hudam profered a similar

objection to Catholic arguments for the immortality of the soul. Both Ricci and Sambiasi had written that the soul exercises three functions: life, perception, and thought. Death merely suspended the functioning of life and perception until the resurrection at the end of the world, when man's soul would again be united with his body.¹⁹ Sin replied that it made no sense to talk of life that was not alive and sensation that was insensible. To say that such powers were unusable was no different from saying that they no longer existed. Besides, he asked, how were the souls of the dead supposed to enjoy the happiness in heaven that the missionaries promised as a reward for good behavior or suffer the pain in hell that was said to await sinners, if neither sinners nor saints were capable of feeling anything? "If what the Catholics say about men losing their powers of life and sensation after death is true, then why would anyone bother to seek a reward in heaven after death?"²⁰

Sin believed that the men from the West contradicted their own principles when they claimed that the soul was immortal because consciousness somehow survived the loss of life and sensation. He pointed to what appeared to be a logical inconsistency in the Catholic description of anima. Sambiasi and Ricci had written that plants had only an animating soul, animals had an animating and perceiving soul, but men had a soul that possessed the powers of

animation, sensation, and cogitation. Sambiasi warned that these three faculties did not represent three separate souls in man. "Anima is one, not three. The rational soul also has the powers of life and sensation."²¹

Sin charged that this affirmation of the unity of the soul conflicted with Catholic teachings on the immortality of the soul. Catholics admitted that the ability to live and perceive was perishable, since neither animals or plants had immortal souls. Yet if man's soul was one, while its animal, sensitive, and rational powers were inseparable, then it should follow that man must retain life and sensation as well as consciousness after death.²²

At the core of the Catholic argument was the Scholastic notion of substance. As Ricci explained it, a substance was that which could stand alone. The opposite of substance was an attribute, or accident, dependent on something else for its existence or operation.²³ In other words, a substance was any entity, material or immaterial, capable of independent existence. Substance corresponded to the grammatical subject of a sentence in an Indo-European language --it was that which predicates were predicated of and which was not itself predicated of anything else.²⁴ The soul was the subject of such sentences as "the soul lives," "the soul perceives," and "the soul thinks." As subject, the soul was a substance and therefore was independent of the predicates living, perceiving, and

thinking.

The immortal human soul was one example of a substance. Other examples Ricci gave were heaven, earth, animals, plants, rocks, and the four elements: earth, air, fire, and water. Ricci contrasted these substances with attributes such as color, sound, taste, emotion, and virtue.²⁵ There are no actual entities such as virtue or greenness, for example. Virtue and greenness are found only in conjunction with substances, such as virtuous men or green leaves.

Thomistic philosophy classified reality into nouns (substances) and adjectives (attributes). It is probable that this metaphysical schema was generated by the linguistic pressure in the Western world to "entification", the nominalization of verbal concepts.²⁶ In the European languages which framed Catholic dogma around substance and attributes, the noun occupied the center of gravity. Nominalization was commonly used to hypostatize abstractions drawn from verbs. To exist turned into existence, live into life, and to think into thought.

In Sino-Korean philosophical language, the verb was more powerful than the noun. For example, in classical Sino-Korean, there were no true adjectives, as a separate and distinct class of nominal modifiers. Instead, stative verbs played the corresponding role. In addition, verbalization of nominal concepts occurred more frequently than true nominalization of verbs. A particularly relevant

example of such verbalization is a line used by Han Yu (768-824), in his condemnation of Buddhism, that was often cited by Confucian polemicists for centuries afterwards. Han urged the Chinese Emperor to destroy Buddhism and restore Confucian values by laicizing the Buddhist monks -- (人其人, in ki in), literally "make men of those men", with the noun "men" serving as a verb in the sense of to humanize.²⁷ Another example of a noun functioning as a verb is "embody" (ch'e, 身), the term adopted by Chu Hsi to refer to the penetration of a mind into an object it is studying.²⁸ Ch'e was normally a noun meaning either substance or body, but in this instance it was used to mean "to enter into" or "to become a common substance," revealing that the term substance, from the dyad substance-function, could itself designate a function.

When the reverse of verbalization occurred and a verb was nominalized, that verb often maintained the formal characteristics of a verb, taking the verbal negative pul (不) instead of the nominal negative mul (無). One well-known example is the statement in Mencius that "there are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them." (不孝者有三, 無後為大).²⁹ Unfilial, derived from the verb "to be filial" took the verbal negative, though posterity took the nominal negative.

In a verb-centered language, function has priority over

substance, just as substance dominates function in a language built around nouns. It should come as no surprise, then, to find that in the Neo-Confucian lexicon even substance had a functional definition. Substance (ch'e) was defined as inactive function, and function (yong, 用 C. yung) was defined as active substance.³⁰ Usually the two terms were discussed together and explained with similarly linked pairs. T'oegye, for example, wrote that when Confucians talked of substance and function, they meant repose and response, stillness and movement, the unmanifest and the manifest, or human nature and human emotion.³¹ Substance could not be grasped or explained without reference to function, and function meant nothing without reference to substance.

The universe Thomas Aquinas conceived in Latin consisted of autonomous islands of being, enriched by attributes of appearance and function affixed to those separate substances. In contrast, a network of interrelated events constituted the Neo-Confucian cosmos. As in the modern process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), objects in Neo-Confucianism were interpreted as a focus for activity rather than as nodules of being.³² Neo-Confucians identified things by those principles which determined a thing's relationships with other things. Scholastic philosophers formulated definitions built on those descriptive elements which distinguished things from

the other things around them. This Thomistic conception of substance as independent existence was inconceivable to an eighteenth-century Korean who saw the entire universe as one vast interrelated organism.

Catholic arguments for the existence of God lost persuasive power when the Catholic description of the attributes of the Supreme Being, with Being viewed as a noun, was translated into Sino-Korean, which took the Being of Supreme Being as a gerund. Supreme Being, which was a person in Catholicism, in Neo-Confucianism was the impersonal Supreme Ultimate in which all functions were grounded.

Similarly, the Catholic argument for the immortality of the soul could not be convincingly rendered into Chinese. The static, separated substances of Western ontology could not fit into the dynamic, organic world of Neo-Confucianism. In Thomistic thought, the line between substance on the one hand, and attribute and function on the other, was clearly drawn. The soul was a substance. Life, sensation, and thought were its functions. Though life was impossible without a soul, a soul could exist without life. The soul after death could continue to provide a base for consciousness.

In Neo-Confucianism, as noted earlier, consciousness was centered in the mind, not the soul. For a conscious personality to survive death, the mind had to survive. Yet

the mind was not an immortal substance, in the Western sense of an incorruptible object. The term substance, applied to the mind, more often than not referred to a state of activity, to a phase rather than to an entity. As Wing Tsit-chan explained, "Everything can be either substance or function and is both substance and function."³³ The mind at rest, before it had manifested a reaction to external or internal stimulation, was substance. That mind, once stimulated, moved in response and becomes function. Even T'oegye, the chief representative of the analytical forces in Korean Neo-Confucianism, argued that the mind, as the seat of consciousness, could not be distinguished from its stillness and movement. For T'oegye, as for Sin Hüdäm and An Chöngbok, there was no thing called a mind which sometimes moved and sometimes was still and yet was separate from those two stages of activity, nor was the the soul an object to which the mind adhered and which existed independently of the operations of the mind.³⁴ Whereas the Jesuits wrote that the soul possessed the power to rest in quiet repose or to respond to the outside world, followers of T'oegye said that the mind was that repose and response. Therefore, once the mind was no longer alive to react to external stimulation, it was no longer a mind. When there was no human mind, there could be no human soul. When substance was inseparable from function, life after death was inconceivable.

The gap between the Catholic and the Neo-Confucian concepts of substance is strikingly manifest in Ricci's denunciation of the Neo-Confucian teaching that all things form one substance. Ricci argued that if there were no real substantial differences between fathers and sons, rulers and subjects, and elders and juniors, then Confucian moral principles were meaningless, since those principles consisted primarily of rules governing man's relationships with other men within a hierarchical social order.³⁵ For a Neo-Confucian, the statement that all things form one substance in no way negated the real differences distinguishing one man from another. The substance that underlay cosmic unity was ultimate, metaphysical substance, the undifferentiated i which was the ontological ground of the universe. All things partook of that fundamental substance because all things had roles allotted them by i within the universal pattern of interrelationships that was the cosmos. What Ricci misinterpreted as pantheism was an assertion of moral unity throughout the universe, a declaration of the ethical imperative for men to abandon those selfish biases which hindered cooperation with the universal natural order.

Scholastic substance shattered the unity of being which Neo-Confucian substance represented. Because Ricci did not define or conceive substance as unmanifest, unrealized, undifferentiated, unmoved, and as yet unactivated function,

he misunderstood what Neo-Confucians meant by all things being of one substance. Because Neo-Confucians did not imagine substance as individual, solid packets of being beneath and apart from all activity and function, few could be persuaded by the Jesuit argument for the immortality of the soul.

The same conceptual antagonism lay behind the Neo-Confucian rejection of the Christian belief in a Creator apart from creation. Compared to the solid, irreducible substantia of Jesuit writings, ch'e appears insubstantial and ephemeral, with a tendency to dissolve into function. The ontological self-sufficiency of the universe, discussed in the previous chapter, required that substance as agent and function as act be ultimately inseparable. In Neo-Confucian organicism, the Creator could not be a substance disengaged from the function of creating. In this aspect, Neo-Confucianism resembles modern quantum physics, of which it can be said,

In this world view there is no substance....At the subatomic level there is no longer a clear distinction between what is and what happens, between the actor and the action. At the subatomic level the dancer and the dance are one.³⁶

Neo-Confucians knew nothing of subatomic levels. Their metaphysical vision was on a much larger scale. They denied any unbridgeable ontological break between the actor and the action in either the creation of the universe or in the life of the human soul. When the dancer and the dance are

one, and substance is defined by function, then there can be no Creator existing before the universe began, nor a soul that exists after its life has ended.

Even when presented in eloquent classical Sino-Korean, medieval European philosophy could offer no satisfactory answer to the central problem at the core of Neo-Confucian concerns: how to overcome the selfishness which isolated men from principle and drove them to operate at cross purposes to nature. The Catholic notion of the soul was inescapably immoral, since it presupposed the very gap between the mind of man and the world of nature which Neo-Confucianism sought to close. Partiality, the root of moral imperfection, was inherent in substance defined as unchanging identity rather than as potential for interaction.

Heaven, Hell, and Society

Further evidence that Europeans tore fissures in the moral fabric of the universe appeared in the Christian belief in hell. When Neo-Confucians thought of heaven and automatically paired that word with earth, they advertised the unity of heaven and earth that was the cosmos. When Catholics paired hell with heaven, they proclaimed the existence of supernatural realms totally apart from the natural world in which men lived. References to heaven as the metaphorical abode of Sangje and the Sages were accepted, since the Odes included such lines as those

saying that the King Wen dwells on high.³⁷ Talk of hell, however, was not sanctioned. Hell implied a vengeful --and therefore unjust--God to assign the souls of sinners there.³⁸ What is more important, hell, if it existed, would be a place of radical and permanent alienation from the universe. Such institutionalization and legitimization of externally enforced ontological alienation Neo-Confucianism could not allow.

In the integrative universe predicated by Neo-Confucianism, reward for virtue and punishment for evil occurred naturally. In the Book of History, it was written "Heaven distinguishes the virtuous...and punishes the guilty."³⁹ The Neo-Confucian reading of this line was that action that conformed to principle would be rewarded as a matter of course, while action that violated i would naturally suffer for its deviation from the proper course of nature.⁴⁰ All was determined by the immanent pattern of organic relationships. There was no need for any transcendent, posthumous incentive to moral behavior.

To an orthodox Neo-Confucian, virtue truly was its own reward. Sin Hudam was articulating the consensus of his contemporaries when he proclaimed that no real gentleman would make selfish interest or personal gain his motive for acting virtuously, showing proper respect for heaven, or performing properly his social obligations to parents, superiors, and friends.⁴¹ Sin seems driven by a Kantian

rigor in his denial of any role in morality for considerations of personal happiness. He rejected as libelous the Augustinian position, presented by Sambiasi, that man is naturally drawn to the good and will never be completely happy until he can be blissfully at peace with God, the Supreme Good, for all eternity in heaven.⁴² Sin refuted the Catholic assertion that greed for eternal happiness is a natural and universal phenomenon. He argued that, on the contrary, not only was such selfishness not a part of man's innate spiritual capacity for virtue, it was not even an essential element in his physical endowment. In East Asia, only Taoists and Buddhists shared the Catholic concern for personal interest and private benefit.⁴³

Sin rejected out of hand Sambiasi's claim that men are willing to suffer and forgo worldly pleasures in this life only because they realize that that is the price they must pay for the supreme happiness and pleasure they will win after death. To one who denied categorically that moral action could arise from selfish motivation and thoughts of personal reward, the Catholic description of man's final reward for leading a good and moral life--as the greatest pleasure, ultimate gain, perfect satisfaction, complete contentment, and supreme righteousness--could not but appear a lure to beguile men into believing doctrines which calm, rational reflection would tell them to reject. Sin felt that the Catholic's "extravagant use of such

ostentatious terms" was further proof of their insincerity and immorality.⁴⁴

When they split the universe asunder with their doctrines of immortal, individual substances and eternal damnation in hell, and then claimed that their arguments were logical, the Catholic missionaries defied the Confucian criteria for rationality. When Confucius was once asked about life after death, he answered that men should not discuss such matters before they fully understand life before death.⁴⁵ As An Chongbok explained, Confucius was teaching that rational men talked only of things that could be seen and heard in the everyday world. To neglect the world in which man lived and indulge instead in speculation about matters beyond the range of human knowledge and irrelevant to customary concerns was irrational.⁴⁶

This irrational strain in Catholic thought posed a threat to the ethical underpinnings of Confucian society, for it was precisely the irrational dream of a posthumous paradise which led men to disregard the moral significance of human relationships. Sin noted that the Jesuits abandoned their families and friends to travel to foreign lands and preach their doctrines to strangers. This desertion was a clear sign of their immorality and was precisely what the Great Learning warned against when it condemned slighting what was important while paying too much attention to the inconsequential.⁴⁷

An also claimed that Catholics brandished their disdain for moral principle by turning men against their own parents and rulers. The missionaries taught that men should treat their own bodies as their enemies because physical passions and desires can lead men into sin. But, added An, men received their bodies from their parents. If their bodies are their enemies, then they should view their parents as their enemies, too. Such an attitude would violate filial piety, the love and respect due parents which is the root of all morality.⁴⁸

The Catholic contempt for man's body misled Catholics into honoring voluntary life-long chastity in a male. An pointed out that Ricci, in the Seven Victories, even asserted that for some men marriage was forbidden. That Catholic teaching challenged the moral relationship between man and wife which was one of the indispensable elements of any decent society. For An, who shared the opinion of the Confucian sage Mencius that the greatest offense against filial piety was the failure to have children to keep the family line alive, the immorality of the Catholic position was blatant.⁴⁹

An also found the Christian injunction to love one's enemies offensive to his Confucian moral sensibilities. He saw nothing wrong with men responding with love to hatred directed only at them personally; but to offer love to those who were the enemies of parents or superiors would

violate the fundamental virtues of loyalty and filial piety. An argued that Catholics had gone even further than the heretic Mo-tzu, from China in the fourth century B.C., who preached that all men should be loved equally and impartially. Because Mo-tzu denied the special ties that bound sons to fathers and subjects to rulers, he was condemned as heterodox and immoral.⁵⁰ The damage Catholics did to righteousness was even worse. They not only denied the absolute importance of the moral bonds between fathers and sons and between rulers and subjects; they went further and asked their followers to take positive steps contrary to the obligations those bonds entail. If men truly loved their parents and respected their superiors, as all men should, then they were obligated to hate those who threatened their parents or superiors with harm. The Catholic command to love one's enemies should not be obeyed. It contradicted more basic tenets of morality and required men to be unfilial and disloyal.⁵¹

An believed that it was no accident that Catholic precepts threatened to alienate men from their parents and from their sovereigns. Catholicism at bottom was anti-social and a direct contradiction of the social morality on which Neo-Confucianism was based. An wrote that men should devote all their energy to doing good in the world in which they found themselves. When the Jesuits condemned this world as a vale of tears, more fitting for beasts than for

humans, the missionaries disparaged the moral obligations between fathers and sons, husbands and wives, rulers and subjects, and between friends and brothers, without which no moral or humane society is possible. An charged that by placing God and the salvation of the personal immortal souls above their duties to their fellow men, Catholics ended up denying the fundamental importance of the human community. Despite the Christian insistence on the relationship between God and the individual soul, no man was an island. Catholic denigration of this world of human relationships revealed an immoral and irrational anti-social posture.⁵²

Moreover, the Catholic denial of the significance of this life and this world implied that it would be better for men not to be born at all. When Catholics said that this earth was not man's true home, they implied that the human race should be exterminated and the world turned into a barren wilderness inhabited only by wild animals.⁵³

The European missionaries preached that wealth, honor, and other worldly allurements were as dangerous to moral health as the body and the Devil were. They counseled mankind to withdraw from this profane realm in order to escape its temptations. They did not realize that anyone who withdrew from the secular world was evading his ethical responsibilities to those around him. "Would it not be better to cultivate self-control, as we Confucians do, in

order to fulfill social obligations without being led astray by thoughts of personal reward or glory?"⁵⁴

Catholic Pessimism and Neo-Confucian Optimism

The Catholic Church taught that, without divine aid, men could not maintain moral purity amid the lures of the world. A radical pessimism informed Catholic thought, growing out of the doctrine that Adam and Eve, the progenitors of humanity, had forever perverted human nature with their Original Sin.⁵⁵ Though all men possessed a conscience, the ability to rationally discern and select moral good, the voice of the conscience was often drowned out by the cacophonous clatter of carnal desire and selfish self-interest. When Adam and Eve first violated God's command in the Garden of Eden, they weakened conscience so that it could barely speak above a whisper and, without supernatural assistance, could not consistently override the call of illicit pleasure. The Catholic missionaries taught that since this inherited moral weakness was an inescapable element of the post-Adam human condition, men would be wiser to shun the world altogether than to try to confront directly the seductive snares it contained.

An was a product of a more optimistic tradition. He believed that men were strong enough to live ethically in this world. Sin agreed that the moral infirmity Catholics recognized in themselves was a result of their own foolish misconceptions rather than an inherent characteristic of

human nature. The Catholic analytical scalpel, honed on substance and hell, not only severed men from the moral community of man, it also cut each man off from his own innate moral power.

Catholics held that perfect goodness lay beyond humanity, existing only in the transcendental divine nature of God. Sin argued that the Jesuits erred by treating human nature and morality as though they were two separate and distinct aspects of reality. They detached morality from concrete individual human existence and made the impossible demand that men pursue good in defiance in their own nature. The Catholic description of the soul as irresistibly drawn to an extrinsic good conjured up in Sin the comical image of the soul being led to good like a horse being pulled up a hill. Sin's staunch Neo-Confucian belief that virtue arose from the cultivation of man's universal, innate tendency to do good forced him to reject such a picture.⁵⁶

The Confucian tradition also contained descriptions of men drawn to external goodness. Mencius said that even the Sage Shun, "When he heard a single good word, or saw a single good action,...was like a stream or a river bursting its banks, and flowing out in an irresistible flood."⁵⁷

Shun was not responding to some supernatural, totally transcendent goodness, however. Goodness gained its power to attract him and others because good deeds and good words

resonated with the goodness within man. Men are drawn to goodness that reminded them of what they could be. Confucian virtue was not some dazzling, unobtainable goal.

Sin charged the Jesuits with misusing Confucian terminology. Virtue in Christian books meant something entirely different than it did in Neo-Confucian writings. Ricci defined virtue as the product of rational deliberation leading to habitual conduct which conformed to moral principles. In other words, only by rational control of behavior over a long enough period of time for virtuous deportment to become almost second nature could a man be called virtuous. Ricci explicitly denied the Neo-Confucian teaching that virtue was already present in human nature and needed only to be activated and recovered rather than earned.⁵⁸

Sin responded with the Confucian definition of virtue as that which men naturally desired in accordance with the nature heaven had bestowed on them from birth. In support of that position, Sin quoted the famous passage in the Odes, "Heaven, in giving birth to the multitudes of people, to every faculty and relationship annexed its law. The people possess this normal nature and they consequently love its normal virtue."⁵⁹ In Sin's Neo-Confucian lexicon, virtue was defined as action in conformity with the ethical principles inherent in human nature. If men simply followed their natural moral impulses, they would be virtuous.

Catholic doctrine denied the moral character of human nature.

Sin, on the other hand, accepted the explanation by Chu Hsi that human nature and principle were one. The spontaneous feeling of concern a man felt upon seeing a child about to fall into a well proved to Sin that men had the principles of morality within their own hearts. Anyone who acted upon his instinctive impulse to go to the aid of that child or who followed his natural inclination to honor his parents would be virtuous. Men do not have to engage in complicated logical reasoning. They needed only to allow their virtuous nature to operate unhindered.⁶⁰

Of course, Sin did not mean to suggest that the exercise of virtue was effortless and required no thought whatsoever. After all, Confucius had advised his disciples to think twice before acting and Mencius had warned that those who fail to think twice will fail to reach their full moral potential.⁶¹ What Confucians meant by thought was quite different from cerebral deliberation, however. As Arthur Waley explained in his translation of the Analects,

We are dealing with a process that is only at a short remove from concrete observation. Never is there any suggestion of a long interior process of cogitation or ratiocination, in which a long series of thoughts are evolved one out of the other, producing on the physical plane a headache and on the intellectual, an abstract theory. We must think of ssu [K.sa,] rather as a fixing of attention (located in the middle of the belly) on an impression recently imbibed from without and destined to be immediately re-exteriorized in action.⁶²

Virtue could be found and activated by focusing within and overcoming the emotional and cognitive distortions introduced by egotism. A virtuous man was one who had vitalized the innate recognition of and tendency toward moral action that constituted unsullied human nature.

The disagreement between Neo-Confucianism and Catholicism was not over the difficulty of behaving virtuously as much as it was over where men should look to gain the strength and guidance needed to be virtuous. Mencius had said, "He who has exercised his mind to the utmost knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows heaven."⁶³ Sin interpreted this statement to say that serious and diligent study of real moral principles, the confirmation through the investigation of things of the objectivity of individual moral inclinations, would lead to certain knowledge. Certain knowledge of the good would automatically lead to good conduct. Sin saw no need for men to look to supernatural assistance to supplement their natural mental and moral powers.⁶⁴

Sin cited the lives of the Sages as proof that virtue was within man's reach. Though not all men were virtuous, some men were. These few virtuous men were evidence that all men were capable of virtue. He noted that Mencius was the authority for the belief that benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom and universal, inborn human qualities. To reject Mencius would be to make

nonsense of the line in the Great Learning about "Making our virtue shine" and to ignore the references in the Mean to "virtuous human nature."⁶⁵

Since Sin defined virtue in terms of the moral impulses that compose human nature, clearly what Sin meant by human nature was not the same as what the Jesuits meant by the term. The Jesuits conceived human nature primarily as desires of the flesh. They therefore drew a sharp distinction between virtue and human nature. Sin followed the Neo-Confucian teaching that the two are identical. He could not accept the Catholic doctrine that men must rely on the power of rational thought and on supernatural aid from God in order to rise above the limitations of their flesh and blood driven to sin by carnal desires. "When they say that it is wrong for men to act in accordance with their own human nature, we can see that they obviously do not understand the roots of human nature and morality."⁶⁶

Although the Jesuits included man's rational appetite for moral good as one manifestation of human nature, in their writings the missionaries stressed man's moral weakness and the inability of his rational will to consistently control the emotional pull of the lesser appetites without the aid of divine grace. Sin found a contradiction in this Catholic picture of man at war with himself. On the one hand, the Jesuits preached the need to control and suppress the desires that are an inescapable

part of human nature. On the other hand, they encouraged men to respect and cultivate their natural desire for immortality and eternal bliss. Sin questioned why that one desire was the sole exception to the Catholic demand that all demands be brought under the firm control of the rational will. "They say one things and then turn around and say the opposite. They can not hide this contradiction."⁶⁷

Sin represented the puritanical T'oegye-Yi Ik wing of orthodox Korean Neo-Confucian understanding of human nature. Sin did not deny the existence of misguided human emotion. He just refused to view it as an integral part of true human nature. At the core of the T'oegye advocacy of i-primacy was the insistence that principle, which is human nature, must not be confused with ki, material force. Likewise, moral desire, which was rooted in selfless integration into the universal immanent pattern of interrelationships, had to be sharply distinguished from human desire, which was generated by egotism and physical appetites.⁶⁸ As Ch'ong Tasan explained two centuries later, T'oegye taught that for men to be virtuous they had to recognize their innate virtue. Only if they had learned to discriminate between emotion based on i and emotion grounded in ki could they hope to properly nurture their innate virtuous nature.⁶⁹

Catholics were guilty of the error T'oegye had warned

against. They confused man's human desires with his moral desires and thus did not see the capacity for virtuous perfection that true human nature contained. Sin pointed out that the Sino-Korean character for human nature was written by combining the characters for mind and for birth. This graphically illustrated the Confucian belief that human nature was the moral mind all men were born with. "The sense of rectitude which the Lord above bestows on man is the mind which is an integral part of human life. This is what we Confucians call human nature."⁷⁰

The Catholic rupture of the Confucian link between virtue and human nature made Catholic moral advice unsatisfying to an audience of Korean readers. Only those who shared the Christian vision of the congenital corruption of man could be persuaded that the Catholics offered an efficient, effective, and essential means to moral perfection. A person had to perceive fissures in reality to discern any value in Catholic techniques for healing those cosmic moral and ontological wounds. Neo-Confucians posited an ultimate unity that rendered Catholic concerns superfluous.

At the center of the unity which permeated Neo-Confucian reality was the human mind. The mind fused principles harvested through introspection and self-examination with principles acquired through the investigation of things. The result was Principle, the

integrating network that embraced all that was. The Christian understanding of the capabilities of the human mind was more modest. Sin noted that Sambiasi had described God, the Absolute Good, as unknowable by the mind of man. Sambiasi wrote that God could neither be seen nor heard and his infinite goodness could only be partially comprehended by men. He compared seeing the Absolute Good through the supernatural light of faith to getting a glimpse of the sun through a small crack. Just as no man could see the sun in its full brightness through that crack, so, too, with finite minds, no human could see God in the fullness of his infinite glory. To this, Sin replied, "How can we believe in something that our minds are incapable of knowing?"⁷¹

Sin added that the Jesuits admitted that man could never know God, yet they preached about him as though they knew him. "Are they not also men?" Moreover, in exclaiming the incomprehensible majesty of the Absolute Good, the missionaries from the West never once mentioned that men had only to look into their own hearts for clear and distinct knowledge of the good.

If they try to force people to believe in something that can neither be seen or heard, yet they do not say how that object of theirs can be known, then even the most ignorant and foolish will surely see how ridiculous their words are.⁷²

Sin was convinced that men could search their hearts and obtain from their inborn sense of right and wrong sufficient understanding of their moral obligations.

Catholic talk about man's finite mental powers being unable to grasp the full magnitude of God's infinite existence struck Sin as irrelevant to the central human concern for good behavior and a denigration of the valuable powers of the human mind.⁷³

Because Christians did not know that the good lay within, within their reach, they were ignorant of man's moral strength. Consequently they preached a pessimism that went counter to the Neo-Confucian optimistic assumption that all men are capable of becoming sages. Sambiasi wrote that men could not earn the reward of eternal happiness through human effort and determination alone. They needed the help of God to overcome the moral weakness that had been an inherent characteristic of human nature since Adam and Eve. Only with God's aid, aid which was a free gift from God and not something which man could demand as his right, could man consistently do good and avoid evil.

Sin responded that, if it were impossible for men to do good through their own efforts alone, they should abandon their fruitless attempts at self-cultivation in pursuit of perfection and rectitude and should instead wait for God to favor them with his divine grace. But then what basis would God have for rewarding the good with eternal happiness if the good were not good through their own efforts but only because they had received special assistance from God? And what kind of God would be so unjust as to offer his

assistance to some men only, condemning the rest to eternal damnation. "How could the Lord of Heaven above be this unjust and unfair?"⁷⁴

Chung-ying Cheng, a contemporary Chinese philosopher, has written

A candid comparison between the Confucian vision and the orthodox Christian view indicates thatthe difference is one of ontological identification and justification: whereas the Confucianist recognizes an ontological unity between the need, the ideal, and the deliverer, the orthodox Christian disclaims the existence of such a unity.⁷⁵

That difference is rooted in opposing concepts of substance. When substance is defined as static, discrete packets of being, then overall unity is inconceivable and unaided human perfection is out of reach. A Scholastic substance was an irreducible, permanent unit forever distinct from the myriad substances that surrounded it. Substances interacted, of course, but those interactions were peripheral activities that did not contaminate the core essence of separated, stable, individual entities. This Catholic notion of substance was possible only in an ontology of identity in which the logic of contradiction reigned supreme. A logic of contradiction identified by differentiation and isolation --identity required that what was identified be set off from everything else. A does not equal B was the ruling assumption.

Correlation, not separation, was the basis of Neo-Confucian reasoning. Neo-Confucian identity was built

on principles of interaction. It was not what something was in itself but what it did, what role it played in the universal pattern, that determined identity. A was A only because it functioned as A in relation to B, just as B was B only because it functioned as B in relation to A.

Catholics believed that only God was perfect. Men by their very nature as independent substances had to seek perfection outside themselves in the divine being from whom they remained forever ontologically separated. The Neo-Confucian definition of substance, on the other hand, produced fundamental unity. Substance as the not yet actualized, not yet manifest, ever-expanding concentric rings of possible appropriate inter-relationships led to a vision in which everything was ultimately linked to everything else. Substance defined as what could and should be generated a vision of men who were essentially inseparable from the good they could and should be.

Catholic pessimism was sired by Catholic egotism. A search for the good that began with an isolated individual and advanced by further detaching that individual from the society and material world in which he lived could never be successful by Neo-Confucian standards. The emphasis on division and separation at the core of Catholic philosophy, theology, and ethics meant that Catholicism was fundamentally immoral, since morality, for a Neo-Confucian, meant overcoming barriers between the self and the outside

world, not erecting additional barricades.

Such conceptual gulfs made it almost impossible for Catholic and Neo-Confucians to use terms like virtue, human nature, substance, or heaven in the same sense, with the same connotations and references. Misunderstanding was inevitable. Until either Catholicism or Neo-Confucianism shifted the conceptual ground on which it stood, only a few among the Confucian literati elite could be converted. Eighteenth-century Korea was no more likely to become a Catholic state than Europe was apt to become Confucian.

Notes for Chapter Six

1. Ch'ŏnju silŭi, pp.106-13.
2. Sin Hudam, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p.81. For more on how Neo-Confucian thought does not make the same distinction between immaterial mind and material body that has been at the heart of Western philosophy for centuries, see Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers, pp.31-8.
3. Translation from Chan, Sourcebook, p.12. See the Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen, Book X, Duke Ch'au, seventh year, Legge, p.613.
4. Sin, p.52.
5. Sambiasi, Ling yen li shao, in Chŏnhak ch'oham, pp.331-36.
6. Sin, p.66.
7. An, Sunamjip, 2:29b-30a.
8. An, Sunamjip, 2:26b-27a. The phrase from the Book of History can be found in Legge, p.87.
9. Chu-tzu yu-lei, 3:20a.
10. Chu-tzu yu-lei, 3:20b. The statement from the Odes can be found in Legge, p.458.
11. Sin, pp.84-5.
12. An, Sunamjip, 2:27a-28a.
13. Ibid., 2:27a.
14. Ibid., 2:27a-b.
15. Derk Bodde, "The Chinese View of Immortality: Its Expression by Chu Hsi and Its Relationship to Buddhist Thought", Essays on Chinese Civilization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp.316-30; Yu Inhui, "Tongyang'in ŭi yŏnghongwan" [The oriental concept of the soul], Han'guk sasang, vol. 16 (1978), pp.197-239; Yulgok Yi I, "Sasaeng kwisin non" [A discussion of life, death, and spirits], Yulgok chŏnso (Seoul: Songgyun'gwan Taehakkyo Taedongmunhwa yŏn'guso reprint, 1958), pp.1066-69; Songho Yi Ik, "Chesa chi li" [the principles of ancestor memorial rites], Songho sasŏl,

- 16:28b-30a.
16. I Ching, Wilhelm translation, p.294.
 17. Sin, pp.38-9.
 18. See Derk Bodde, trans., Feng Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II, p.290. For more on Fan Chen, see Etienne Balazs, "The First Chinese Materialist", Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy, translated by H.M. Wright (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp.255-76.
 19. Ricci, Ch'ünju silüi, pp.102-3; Sambiasi, p. 312.
 20. Sin, pp.44-5.
 21. Sambiasi, p.312; Ricci, pp. 102-3.
 22. Sin, *ibid.*
 23. Ricci, pp.75-77.
 24. "Substance and Attribute", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 8, pp.36-40.
 25. Ricci, pp.75-6.
 26. Alfred Bloom, The Linguistic Shaping of Thought (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaun Associates, 1981).
 27. Han Yu, "Yuan Tao".
 28. Chu-tzu ch'üan-shu, 44:12b-13a.
 29. Mencius, IVA, 26 (Legge, p.313). A.C. Graham claims nominalization of individual verbs rarely occurs at all in classical Chinese. "Being in Classical Chinese", pp.4, 17.
 30. Chu-tzu ch'üan-shu, 44:36b.
 31. Yi Hwang, T'oegye chönso, "Simmu ch'eyongpyön", 41:16b-17a (vol. 1, pp.918-9.)
 32. "Alfred North Whitehead", Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 8, pp.290-96.
 33. Wing Tsit-chan, "Patterns for Neo-Confucianism: Why Chu Hsi differed from Ch'eng I", Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 5:2 (June, 1978), p.116.

34. Yi Hwang, 41:16b-20b.
35. Ricci, pp.163-5.
36. Gary Zukav, The Dancing Wuli Masters: An Overview of the New Physics (New York: William Morrow and Co, Inc., 1979), pp.211-2.
37. Legge, Odes, pp.427-8.
38. An, 6:32a.
39. Shu Ching, part II, Bk.3, chapter IV, part 6, Legge, p.74.
40. Sin, p.39.
41. Sin, *ibid*.
42. Sin, p.57.
43. Sin, p.59.
44. Sin, pp.63-4.
45. Analects, Book XI, chapter 11.
46. An, 17:12, 13b-14a.
47. Sin, p.103; Great Learning, 7, Legge, p.359.
48. An, 17:15b, 19a.
49. An, 17:19; Mencius, 3:II,26.
50. Mencius, 3:II, 9-10.
51. An, 17:21b.
52. An, 17:14b-16a.
53. An, 17:17a.
54. An, 17:15b.
55. Ricci, Ch'ōnju silūi, pp.323-24.
56. Sin, pp.71-4.
57. Mencius, VII, A:16, (Legge, p.457).

58. Ricci, pp.257-8; Sin, p.86.
59. Odes, II, 3, VI (Legge, p.541).
60. Sin, pp.59, 86-7.
61. Analects, V, 19; Mencius, 6A, 17.
62. Arthur Waley, trans., Analects, p.45.
63. Mencius, VIIA, 1.
64. Sin, p.68.
65. Sin, pp.86-7.
66. Sin, p.61.
67. Sin, *ibid.*
68. T'oegye chŏnsŏ, 37:27a-b (I, p.849).
69. Chŏng Tasan chŏnsŏ, I,12:8a (I, p.245).
70. Sin, pp.66-7.
71. Sin, pp. 70-1.
72. Sin, p.69.
73. Sin, p.45.
74. Sin, pp.46-7.
75. Chung-ying Cheng, "Dialectic of Confucian Morality and Metaphysics", Philosophy East and West, 21:2 (April, 1971), p.107.

Chapter Seven

Confucian Catholics and Catholic Confucians

Historians learn early in their apprenticeship to beware absolute terms such as "always" and "never." This study is one good example of the value of that training. The preceding five chapters present an argument for the intrinsic incompatibility of Catholicism and Neo-Confucianism. Readers could be misled into assuming that no Neo-Confucian could ever become Catholic. Yet if there had been no Korean Neo-Confucians attracted to Catholicism, orthodox Korean Neo-Confucians would not have produced the anti-Catholic writings in which the arguments of those chapters were found. Serious anti-Catholicism could only arise in an environment in which Catholicism was perceived as a formidable threat.

Moral, conceptual, and linguistic incompatibility with Neo-Confucianism formed barriers to conversion to Catholicism but did not prevent conversions entirely. Neo-Confucianism, like any complex religion, philosophy, or comprehensive world view, contained a number of contradictory strands. The dominant strands examined in the previous chapters ensured Catholicism a hostile

reception on the peninsula. Yet conversion was not precluded for a minority who pursued a vision of their tradition that diverged from the majority view. The orthodox conception of an immanent God identified with principle could be weakened in those who carefully read the anthropomorphic references in the Odes to Sangje and Ch'ŏn. The self-perfectibility of man could appear less certain to those who noticed that no living Confucians were perfect. Men who focused their attention on those contradictions in Neo-Confucianism, which mainstream Korean Neo-Confucians had overlooked, deemphasized, or explained away, were more susceptible to Jesuit proselytizing than the rest of their countrymen.

Though Korean Neo-Confucian converts to Catholicism were few, they were nevertheless important. The first Christians on the peninsula included some of the most creative and most brilliant representatives of the eighteenth-century Korean literati elite. An exploration of why a few Neo-Confucian scholars adopted alien ideas from the West reveals as much about the structure of traditional Korean thought as the study of the reasoning of their more numerous opponents has done.

Korea's first Catholics were drawn to Catholicism because of, not in spite of, their Confucian values. They, just as the anti-Catholics did, read Jesuit writings with eyes trained in Neo-Confucian schools. In their initial

reactions to those writings, they neither forsook their heritage nor forgot their education. However, their peculiar visions of those Confucian values engendered unconventional responses to Catholicism.

Some embraced Catholicism believing at first that it supported Confucianism. These Catholic Confucians reached out to the Christian God hoping to ground Confucian ethics in an external, immutable personal source that could offer them strength and security as they strove to meet stringent Confucian moral demands. Others moved from Catholic Confucianism to Confucian Catholicism. These Confucian Catholics believed that God was the personification of filial piety, the supreme ethical value, and therefore his commands superseded all human rules and regulations. The Confucian Catholic exaltation of God above the human community led to a confrontation in which Confucian Catholics and Catholic Confucians alike were beset and battered for threatening the fragmentation of the organic Confucian moral universe.

Ascetic Neo-Confucianism

The particular brand of Korean Neo-Confucianism most open to Catholic ideas was found in the school stemming from the thinking, writing, and teachings of Sŏngho Yi Ik. Sŏngho has been mentioned frequently in this study as the dominant intellectual influence on Namin circles in the eighteenth century. Sŏngho displayed a remarkable

receptivity to both the findings of Western science and to the moral self-cultivation techniques associated with heterodox schools. His persuasive presentation of the merits of adopting valuable ideas, wherever they were found and whatever their pedigree, encouraged the interest many Namin demonstrated in Jesuit publications. In fact, a quarter of a century after Songho's death, when in the 1780s many who called themselves his disciples began practicing some Catholic precepts, a few Namin wondered if Yi Ik himself had not accepted Catholicism.¹

As pointed out in an earlier chapter, Songho was no Catholic. Yet his critics' observation that Songho's interpretation of Neo-Confucianism could weaken resistance to Christian proselytizing was perceptive. Sin Hudam and An Chongbok had pulled back sharply from Yi Ik's indulgence of the unorthodox. Others among Yi's disciples moved in the opposite direction, exhibiting even more willingness to learn from alien sources than Yi had shown. An ascetic strand in Songho's thought seems to have had particular relevance for those drawn to Catholicism. Yi Ik preached a Neo-Confucian puritanism that went beyond the usual uneasiness over the desires and pleasures of the body. This asceticism made those of his followers who attempted to implement Yi's rigid moral principles especially vulnerable to the Catholic teachings of the moral frailty of man and to the missionaries' insistence that man needs to rely on

God if he is to overcome evil.

Songho raised ethical demands so high that failure was inescapable. Out of frustration, men who could not reach Songho's standards of moral perfection through their own efforts in Confucian self-cultivation began to seek assistance elsewhere. Yi Ik's radical isolation of principle from ki, of morality from material force, turned some of his students away from this world toward a transcendental realm that approached the Catholic world of the supernatural.

Songho acquired his strong stand on the primacy of principle from T'oegye Yi Hwang. Songho looked up to T'oegye as the greatest Confucian philosopher Korea had ever produced and followed T'oegye's lead on metaphysical and moral questions.² For example, Songho sided with T'oegye in the dispute over the roles of i (principle) and ki (material force) in generating and controlling man's emotions. Though Songho did not agree with every point in T'oegye's argument that the four manifestations have their origins in principle and the seven emotions have their origins in material force, he shared T'oegye's basic stance. The opposing position of Yulgok Yi I, that both the four manifestations and the seven emotions have their origins in ki, seemed to Songho to obscure the important differences between principle, that which determines what should be, and material force, which can often block the

proper operation of principle.³

Yi Ik inherited from Yi Hwang a mistrust of the ki which composes man's physical nature. He went even further than T'oegye and argued that principle not only generates the four manifestations, it also generates the seven emotions when they are an expression of virtue rather than selfishness.⁴ Sŏngho taught that when a man feels pleasure at observing an act of filial piety, he is moved by i. When he feels pleasure at engaging in illicit sensual delight, he is moved by ki. Only when i was in charge would Sŏngho say that a man was ruled by kong rather than sa.

This radical denial of any moral role for ki led Sŏngho to advocate an ascetic ethics of stringent self-denial. He went so far as to advocate severe restraint on the exercise of even those normal human desires for food and sex which are essential for the survival of the human race. For example, he encouraged husbands and wives to sleep in separate rooms. He also suggested that men eat less than one full bowl of rice at every meal.⁵ Though both appetites were dangerous, lust alarmed him more than hunger. Sŏngho wrote that men have lost their virtue, their honor, their property, and their health to women. He warned that the thin line of morality which separates men from the animal kingdom can be destroyed by sexual indulgence, dropping men to a level below even cattle, beasts, and fowl.⁶

Sŏngho's ethics of self-denial is reflected in his

political and socio-economic philosophy. ^USongho was a traditional Confucian reformer who dreamed of bringing Korea back to the simpler days of the past. He believed that a growing use of money and an increase in the number of periodic rural markets were responsible for much of the economic distress afflicting Korea's farmers. A commercial economy tempted farmers into abandoning the cultivation of staple crops for the production of useless handicrafts to sell in market towns. Artisans, he charged, were among the main blights on the Korean economy, since they represented a drain on the nation's limited resources and were themselves essentially nonproductive.

To relieve Korea's chronic poverty, he advised a ban on the use of currency and a limit to the number of days on which periodic markets could open.⁷ He also suggested that if Koreans ate less, then the food they had would go a lot further and they would be less likely to feel hunger later. In his opinion, a decrease in consumption and waste would do more than any increase in production could do to improve the living standards of Korea's farmers.⁸ ^USongho stood firmly in the Confucian tradition that strong moral character could overcome any political or socioeconomic difficulties. His harsh puritanism, however, gave more emphasis than was usual to asceticism at the solution to the problems of both statecraft and self-cultivation.

As is often the case with the products of fertile

minds, Songho's writings contained seeds of extremism that were brought to fruition by disciples who carried his ideas further than he had intended. One such disciple was Hong Yuhan (1726-1785).⁹

Hong is hailed today as the first practicing Catholic on the peninsula. Fr. Charles Dallet tells us that in 1770 Hong was convinced by some Jesuit publications to abandon the study of Confucianism, which had up until that time occupied his time and attention. Hong vowed instead to dedicate the rest of his life to the mortification of the flesh. He was convinced that the desires of the body were evil and had to be suppressed. As part of his program of strict self-discipline, Hong left his marriage bed sleep alone and refused to eat anything other than unappetizing foods. He also had read just enough about Catholicism to have heard of the sabbath, so he decided to spend every seventh day, that is, the seventh, the fourteenth, the twenty-first, and the twenty-first of every month, in quiet meditation, refraining from involvement in any worldly affairs.¹⁰

Dallet's claim that Hong Yuhan took Catholics writings as his sole guide to self-cultivation is not supported by any eighteenth century documents extant today. However, there are sources that document Hong's rigorous ascetism. Shortly after Hong's death in January, 1785, Kwón Ch'òlsin (1736-1801), a younger disciple of Yi Ik, eulogized Hong

for successfully conquering selfishness. Kwŏn wrote that, at first, "I foolishly doubted the value of your resolution to strict self-discipline, suspecting that it went beyond the Way of the superior man who always kept to the Mean." Kwŏn feared that Hong's fasting would endanger his health and that Hong's lack of interest in the production of progeny was unfilial. However, Kwŏn wrote, later he realized that Hong alone among Yi Ik's disciples had truly followed their master and had succeeded in eradicating every single particle of selfishness from his heart.¹¹

Kwŏn ended his eulogy by noting that "for over ten years several of us have tried to do as you have done but, in the end, in our hearts and in our actions, we fell from the correct path and our group dissolved."¹² Kwŏn may have been referring to a group of Namin he had led in a Confucian retreat at a Buddhist temple in the winter of 1779.

The Meeting at Chuŏsa

In 1779 a small group of Yi Ik's disciples met in the Ch'ŏn^ŏji hermitage of the Chuŏ^ŏ temple not far from Kwangju in Kyŏnggi province in order to discuss a number of issues relevant to self-cultivation, the elimination of selfishness, and man's relationship to the cosmos. Fr. Dallet writes that this group of eager young Confucian students spent over ten days at that temple debating among themselves questions concerning heaven, this world, and the

nature of man. Drawing on the works of scholars before them, the writings of the ancient Chinese sages, and the guidance of Kwon Ch'olsin, they found they still did not have satisfactory answers to the serious questions which troubled them. They therefore turned to the books written by Catholic missionaries dealing with philosophy, mathematics, and religion.

Lacking a Catholic priest or even a layman properly instructed in the faith, and possessing only a few Western publications, many of the group at Chuosa felt they did not have enough information about Catholicism to adequately understand it. They did attempt for a while to implement the little they thought they knew. They imitated Hong Yuhan and observed a sabbath of rest, abstention from meat, and meditation on the seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first, and twenty-eighth of every month. They followed that regimen for only a short time, however, before tiring of it and abandoning that practice. Nevertheless, the few days of reading and discussion in the winter of 1799 had whetted their appetites for more knowledge of the West and its religious and ethical teachings.¹³

Chong Yagyong's description of this meeting is somewhat different. Tasan Chong Yagyong (1762-1836) was not present at Chuosa but he later heard first person accounts from some who were. Tasan wrote that the young Confucian students at that retreat were interested in traing the ides

of Chu Hsi back to their roots in original Confucianism. Yi Yunha (?-1836), who was Yi Ik's grandson by adoption. Yi Sŭnghun (1756-1801), who was a distant maternal relative of Yi Ik, and Chŏng Yakchŏn (1754-1816), who was Yi Sŭnghun's brother-in-law and Tasan's older brother, organized that meeting.¹⁴ They asked Yi Yunha's brother-in-law Kwŏn Ch'ŏlsin to lead their retreat.

Kwŏn agreed and set up a strict schedule for them to follow during their seminar. He had them arise before sunrise, wash their face and hands in ice water, and then recite the Admonition on Rising Early and Retiring Late (Sugyajam, 夙夜箴) by the Sung Neo-Confucian Ch'en P'o. When the sun came up, they chanted Chu Hsi's Admonition on Seriousness (kyŏngjejam, 敬齋箴). At noon they intoned the Four Things Not Done (samuljam, 四物箴). And at sunset they chanted the Western Inscription (sŏmyŏng, 西銘) of Chang Tsai. Yi Pyŏk, who later played a pivotal role in the birth of a Catholic Church in Korea, heard of their meeting and hurried to join them, coming over one hundred li and hiking over snow-covered mountain trails to join his friends in the reciting of Neo-Confucian admonitions and their discussions of the Confucian Classics from early morning until late at night.¹⁵

Tasan's account of the Chuosa meeting reveals much about the intellectual climate in which the Korean Catholic Church was born. An examination of those admonitions so

faithfully recited at the retreat divulges the basic values of this particular group of eighteenth-century Koreans. The Western Inscription, for example, presented the metaphysical basis of Neo-Confucian ethics. Written in China in the eleventh century, it introduced the doctrine that man forms one body with heaven and earth and that his practice or violation of virtue has cosmic repercussions. It opens with the statement that "Heaven is my father and Earth my mother," goes on to say that "all people are my brothers and sisters, and all things my companions," and from this draws the exhortation, "Do nothing shameful in the recesses of your own home and thus bring no dishonor to them." The Western Inscription is a call to be virtuous toward everything and everyone everywhere and at all times.¹⁶

The three admonitions offer more specific ethical guidance. The Four Things Not Done of Cheng I is an elaboration of the command in the Analects that, if something is contrary to propriety, do not look at it, listen to it, say it, or do it.¹⁷ Cheng I stressed the constant self-control necessary to avoid those four temptations to impropriety. He warned that any contact with the world outside the mind, any external sensation, was a potential threat to the calm and purity that was the foundation of intrinsic virtue. He taught that only through rigorous self-discipline could man protect his innate goodness from disturbances originating in the external

world.¹⁸

Ch'en P'o's Admonition on Rising Early and Retiring Late furnished precise rules governing every period of the day. Ch'en wrote that on awakening men should lie in bed for a while to compose their minds for the coming test the day will pose to their ability to remain serious, solemn, and composed in the midst of activity. Before rising, he advised reflection on faults and weaknesses revealed on previous days. In the evening, he suggested, when the time has come to go to bed, men ought to lie with their hands at their sides and their feet together and let neither their bodies nor their minds relax or wander.¹⁹

Further encouragement to constant watchfulness over thought and behavior is found in Chu Hsi's Admonition on Seriousness. Chu directed his followers to always keep a calm and focused mind, as though in the presence of the Lord on High. He warned them to be constantly cautious and careful never to relax their guard, for the consequences of even the slightest slip were awesome.

Falter for a single moment and selfish desire will burst forth in full force. Make the slightest mistake and heaven and earth will be turned upside down, destroying the basic moral principles governing society, and bringing about the collapse of civilization.²⁰

Attention to these admonitions was not new. T'oegyē had included all but the Four Things Not Done in his Sŏnghak sipdo (Ten Diagrams on the Learning of the Sages), an influential systematic survey of Neo-Confucian ethical

thought. What was new was the seriousness and literalness with which the group at Chu^usa took those texts. Whereas previously Neo-Confucian demands for constant vigilance against the slightest slip into selfishness had been treated as the ultimate goals toward which all men should strive, that small band of Yi Ik's disciples read those admonitions as demands which had to be met perfectly everyday. Just as few Christians, outside of the pacifist sects such as the Quakers, have tried to immediately implement Christ's command to love one's enemies, so, too, few Neo-Confucians had truly expected to immediately gain total mastery over the distractions of the mind and the selfish desires of the body. Ch^ung Yagyong, Yi Sunghun, Yi Py^uok, and Yi Yunha were the impatient exceptions. With the impetuosity of youth, they expected to be able to achieve instant moral perfection.

Such stringent moral expectations created feelings of guilt in those unable to remain constantly calm and unperturbed and filled with nothing but selfless thoughts twenty-four hours a day. Tasan once recalled a conversation with his brother Yakch^un in which Yakch^un told him, "I have a lot to repent. Everyday I remind myself of all that I have done wrong." Tasan commented that his brother's remark caused him to reflect on the frailty of man. He noted that men are unable to reach perfection, no matter how wise or diligent they are, since they are not just a disembodied

mind but also possess a body filled with passion and carnal urges. Even the sages of ancient China were not perfect. If they had been perfect, they would not have been human. But, Tazan went on, man can turn this evil into good. Just as manure can be used to fertilize rice fields, contrition and regret can serve to fertilize minds. If men constantly remind themselves of serious mistakes they have made in the past, even mistakes they no longer commit, then that feeling of remorse can stimulate them to reform. Repentance can build virtue from man's sins.²¹

Tazan's recognition of man's inherent weakness, of guilt as an inescapable yet useful feature of the human condition, contradicts one of the fundamental assumptions of Confucian ethics: that men are inherently perfectable. Frustration at repeated failures to conform to the Neo-Confucian vision of rectitude led to guilt. That guilt led to disillusionment with one of the cornerstones of Neo-Confucian thought. Conventional Neo-Confucian moralists presumed that all men have within themselves the strength to eventually become a sage, to form a trinity with heaven and earth. Tazan and his friends asked if all men can be sages, why are not all men sages? Especially, they asked themselves, why were they, who tried so hard to eliminate self-centered biases and follow moral principles, unable to go through even a single day without going astray at least once in thought or action? The guilt these men felt at

their inability to live up to the high demands of the Songho school of Neo-Confucianism stimulated them to question if their Neo-Confucianism actually did provide the only truly effective path to righteousness.

That doubt surfaced in an exchange of letters between the two intellectual leaders of the Namin faction in the 1780s, An Chongbok and Kwŏn Ch'olsin. According to Tasan, Yi Ik's disciples took Kwŏn as their teacher after Yi Ik's death in 1763.²² However, An was much older than Kwŏn and often asserted his claim to leadership when he felt Kwŏn was leading the younger Namin astray.

In 1784 Kwŏn wrote An that he had found Neo-Confucian writings fruitless and planned to avoid any further debate with An over the interpretation of their contents. Instead he planned to retire into quiet self-cultivation and concentrate only on avoiding evil.²³ An sent back an angry reply that Kwŏn was foolish to abandon the study of Neo-Confucian texts. He told Kwŏn that if he would only put a little more effort into following the practical advice found in those writings, he would not be so frustrated.²⁴

In a second letter later that year, An charged that Kwŏn reaped no fruit from Neo-Confucian moral cultivation because he rejected the core technique of sitting quietly with a reverent mind (chukyŏng, 主敬), preserving the mind in its state of pure tranquility in preparation for responding to external stimuli (mibal, 未發).²⁵

An knew what Kwŏn meant when he said he was going to retire into quiet self-cultivation. Kwŏn meant that he was replacing Neo-Confucian mental discipline with Catholic rituals. An complained that the Catholic practices Kwŏn obliquely referred to were no different from the chanting and praying Buddhist engaged in.²⁶

An followed up his first complaint with a lengthy epistle in one more attempt to dissuade Kwon from abandoning Neo-Confucianism for Christianity.²⁷ It was not only Kwŏn he was worried about; An saw that the young Namin who were dabbling in Catholicism, including his own son-in-law and Kwŏn's brother, Kwŏn Ilsin, were all associates of Kwŏn and only Kwŏn could call them to their senses.²⁸ An's Conversations on Catholicism was probably based on an actual discussion with Kwŏn and was intended for the many Namin who were attracted to the new ideas from the West out of frustration with their inability to fulfill the promises of their tradition.²⁹

The Korean Catholic Church is Born

It is not clear whether or not Kwŏn Ch'ŏlsin actually converted to Catholicism.³⁰ In any case, 1784 was the year that many of the young Namin who had studied under Kwŏn at Chuŏsa became Catholic. Yi Pyŏk and Yi Sŭnghun, not Kwŏn Ch'ŏlsin, served as the final catalyst. In late 1783 Yi Pyŏk learned that the father of Yi Sŭnghun had been named the Third Secretary of the Winter Solstice Tribute Mission

to the Manchu Court in Peking that year. Yi Sŭnghun planned to accompany his father on that trip to the Chinese capital.

This was the chance to learn more about Western mathematics, science, and religion that Yi Pyŏk had been waiting for since the 1779 retreat. He went to Yi Sŭnghun and told them that there was a Catholic church staffed by European missionaries in the northern part of Peking. Yi Pyŏk urged his friend to go to that church and meet the missionaries there. He encouraged him to show great interest in their religion, asking for copies of their books explaining Catholic doctrine and requesting to be baptized.

If you do that, those Westerners will be delighted with you and you will get a lot of interesting presents from³¹ them. Make sure you do not come back empty-handed.

Yi Sŭnghun followed his friend's suggestion and sought out the European priests in Peking. He confessed later that he had originally approached them out of a desire to learn more about Western mathematics. However, he was soon convinced by conversations with the missionaries that Catholicism was the true religion.³² At first his request for baptism was denied on the grounds that his knowledge of Church dogma was inadequate. Nevertheless, Fr. Louis de Grammont finally agreed to accept him into the Church. After receiving further instruction in Catholic doctrine, Yi Sŭnghun was baptized Peter with the hope that Peter Yi

Sūnghun would become the cornerstone around which the Korean Catholic Church would be built.³³

Yi Sūnghun returned from Peking in early spring of 1784, bringing with him several Catholic books in Chinese as well as various products of eighteenth-century Western science and technology. He immediately visited Yi Pyŏk, informed him of his conversion, and shared with him the treasures he had brought back from China. Yi Pyŏk eagerly pored over the books explaining Catholic teachings and decided that Catholicism was the path to perfection he had been searching for. Apparently bolder and more fervent in his new faith than Yi Sūnghun, Yi Pyŏk began proselytizing his discovery among his friends and relatives right away.³⁴

The infant Korean Church was fortunate in having Yi Pyŏk as an early evangelist. He was an effective and enthusiastic propagator of his faith. Fr. Dallet, in his pioneer history of the Catholic Church in Korea, described Yi Pyŏk's impressive physical appearance. "He was eight ch'ŏk tall and could lift over one hundred kŭn with one hand. His commanding presence attracted everyone's attention."³⁵ He also had a respectable family background. A member of the Kyŏngju Yi lineage, his immediate family had a record of distinguished service as high ranking military officers. His grandfather had been a Regional Army Commander as were his two brothers.³⁶ His intelligence and character had won him respect from many of his

contemporaries. Fr. Dallet reports that one eighteenth-century source said of him,

He showed penetrating insight into whatever problems he adressed. When he was studying the Confucian Classics, it was almost second nature for him from the time he was very young to look for the deeper meaning of the texts.

In April, 1784, Yi Pyŏk joined Chŏng Yakchŏn, his brother-in-law and fellow participant in the discussions at Chuŏsa five years earlier, on a boat trip up to Seoul from the Chŏng family home in rural Kyonggi province where they had just taken part in a memorial servie for Yi's sister. Riding with them to Seoul were Chŏng Yakchŏn's two younger brothers, Chŏng Yakchong (1760-1801) and Chŏng Yagyong. On the way up to Seoul, Yi shared with them what he had learned from the books Yi Sŭnghun had brought back from Peking. After they reached Seoul, Yi showed the Chŏng brothers some of his collection of Catholic works, including T'ien-chu shih-i and Ch'i k'e. Chŏng Yagyong later confessed that he and his brothers found the conversation on the boat fascinating and the books a pleasure to read.³⁸ That introduction to Catholicism through Yi Pyŏk was the beginning of an interest in Western religion that would later lead to martyrdom in 1801 for Chŏng Yakchong and exile for Tasan and Chŏng Yakchŏn.

Yi Pyŏk next turned his attention to his friends

among the chung'in, the hereditary government specialists in foreign languages, law, medicine, astronomy, and other skills important to the functioning and administration of the Yi dynasty government. Ch'oe Ch'ang'hyŏn, Ch'o Ingil, Kim Pŏmu, and Kim Chŏnggyo were converted at this time and began to preach their new faith to their friends among the chung'in, yangban, and commoner classes. Slowly the number of Koreans who accepted Catholic teachings was increasing.

Yi Kahwan (1742-1801), Yi Sŭnghun's uncle, heard of Yi Pyŏk's promotion of non-Confucian doctrines. Tasan relates that Yi Kahwan's initial reaction was to sigh and say,

What a pity! I have read T'ien-chu shih-i and Ch'i k'e, too. While they do contain some good points, in the final analysis they are not acceptable as orthodox scholarship. How can Pyŏk think he can replace our Confucianism with such things?

Yi Kahwan, a well-respected Neo-Confucian scholar who later served as Minister of the Board of Works, went to Yi Pyŏk's home to try and convince him that he was committing a serious error.

But Yi Pyŏk argued his position with rhetoric as powerful as a raging river and defended his beliefs with the strength of iron. Yi Kahwan realized that he could not win such an argument with Yi Pyŏk and³⁹ so he gave up and left, never to visit his again.

According to this account by Tasan, Yi Kahwan, though impressed with the fervor of Yi Pyŏk's convictions, was not

converted by him. However, Hwang Say^ung, a son-in-law of Ch^ung Yakch^un, wrote in the midst of the 1801 persecution that Yi Kahwan had been converted by Yi Pyok, although he was reluctant to be baptized by him, preferring to wait until he could go to Peking and be baptized by the Western priests there.⁴⁰ The Yi dynasty court also believed Yi Kahwan was a Catholic and executed him along with his nephew Yi S^unghun and other prominent Catholic yangban in 1801.

In the fall of 1784 Yi Py^uok visited Kw^un Ch'olsin and his family in their home village of Yanggun (in what is now Yangp'y^ung gun) in Ky^unggi province to urge them to follow him in his adoption of Catholicism. Yi converted Kw^un Ilsin then, adding another prestigious yangban scholar family to the roster of Catholic believers in Korea. Also introduced to Catholicism in those first few months after Yi S^unghun returned from Peking were Yi Kiyang, Yu Hanggum, Hong Nangmin, and Yun Chich'ung, all representatives of recognized yangban lineages.

Yun Chich'ung did not learn of Catholicism from Yi Py^uok directly but through Yi's friend, the chung'in Kim P^umu, a central figure in the early months of the Catholic Church in Korea. It was at Kim's home in Seoul that the first worship services were held. And it was at Kim's house that Catholicism was brought to the attention of the Yi authorities. In the spring of 1785, Yi Py^uok, Yi S^unghun,

Chŏng Yakchŏn, Chŏng Yagyong, and several others met at the Myongdon residence of Kim Pŏmu to hold religious services.

Yi Pyŏk wore a dark cloth over his head from his forehead back to his shoulders and stood in the midst of the gathering, preaching to them. Yi Sŭnghun, the three Chŏng brothers, and Kwŏn Il-sin and his son all called themselves his disciples. With books in their hands, they gave him their undivided attention. When Yi Pyŏk preached to them, their demeanor was more solemn than that of Confucian students at the feet of their teacher.⁴¹

They met like this regularly for several months, with dozens of yangban and chung'in in attendance. Then one day an agent of the Board of Punishments passed by and though he heard the sound of drinking and gambling coming from Kim's house. He rushed in to find out what was going on and discovered this group of worshippers with, according to one report, powder on their faces and dark pieces of cloth over their heads. Startled by this strange sight, the chujo kumni (秋曹禁吏) arrested those present and confiscated their portraits of Jesus, their books, and various other religious articles. The Minister of the Board of Punishments, Kim Hwajin, saddened that men from such distinguished families should be involved in such foolishness, lectured the yangban on the proper behavior of a Confucian gentleman and then released them.⁴² Kim was beaten severely, kept in confinement for ten days, and then sent into exile in Ch'ungch'ŏng province when he still refused to denounce Catholicism. He died of his wounds in the fall of 1786 and thus Thomas Kim Pŏmu became the first

Catholic martyr on Korean soil.⁴³

The discovery of the meeting at Kim's house was a severe setback to Catholicism on the peninsula. Not only did the struggling Church lose Kim Pŏmu, but its two founding members Yi Sŭnghun and Yi Pyŏk withdrew from further public involvement. The publicity given their participation in the Catholic services brought their unorthodox activities to the attention of their families. Yi Pyŏk's father threatened to hang himself unless his son abandoned his practice of Catholicism. Torn between love for his father and respect for the teachings of his faith, Yi Pyŏk broke off all contact with the friends he had introduced to Catholic teachings. A year later, in 1786, Yi Pyŏk died of typhus at the age of 33, estranged from the Church he had done so much to establish in Korea.⁴⁴

Yi Sŭnghun also came under pressure from his father and relatives to renounce his faith. His father called all the family and relatives together to burn the books Yi had brought back from Peking and to smash the presents he had received from the missionaries. Yi was then forced to write a statement condemning Catholicism for immorality and send that statement to the Board of Punishments in Seoul.⁴⁵

Peter Yi Sŭnghun's apostasy appears to have been merely pro forma, however, as he continued to associate with his fellow Catholics, although he was more circumspect after 1785.

Despite the warning of Kim Pōmu's martyrdom and the forced renunciations of Yi Pyōk and Yi Sūnghun, the infant Korean Catholic Church continued to grow. Before Kim's arrest, Yun Chich'ung had borrowed T'ien-chu shih-i and Ch'i k'e from him and made copies of those works for his own personal use before returning them. Yun had passed his chinsa examination in 1783 at the age of 23 and, no longer having to think only about preparing for that literati qualification examination, was free to pursue his interest in "studying ways to have a pure heart and live a conscientious life."⁴⁶ He left Seoul and returned to his home in a village in Chinsan county in north Chōlla province. There he assiduously studied his two Jesuit books and discussed their contents with his maternal cousin and neighbor Kwōn Sang'yōn. After three years of meditation and reflection on Catholic teachings, Yun Chich'ung decided to make the commitment to Catholicism. In 1788, under the urging of his cousin Chōng Yakchōn, he was baptized as Paul. His cousin Kwōn also became a Catholic with the new Christian name of James.

In the intolerant atmosphere of late eighteenth-century Korea, those few young scion of yangban lineages who had become convinced that there was some moral profit to be gained from the study and practice of Catholic teachings had to be careful with whom they shared their discovery. A look at the roster of the earliest believers shows that

Catholicism spread among the literati along blood and marriage lines. Apparently, either relatives were more likely to listen to novel approaches to spiritual training or they were less likely to report such heterodoxy to the authorities and thus could be trusted.

For example, Yi Pyŏk concentrated his proselytizing on in-laws. His sister was married to the eldest Chŏng brother, Chŏng Yakhyŏn (1751-1821). Yi himself married a daughter of Kwŏn Ilsin, making himself the husband of An Chŏngbok's granddaughter. Yi Pyŏk wove the first Christian network from the marriage ties he and his sister had established to the Chŏng and the Kwŏn families.⁴⁷

Yi Sŭnghun added further to the Chŏng's Catholic connections. Yi married the Chŏng brother's sister and later his younger sister married Chŏng Tasan's eldest son. With both of the founders of the Korean Catholic Church related through marriage to the Chŏng family, it is no accident that three out of the four Chŏng brothers were sympathetic to and deeply involved in Catholicism in its first years on the peninsula.⁴⁸

Yi Sŭnghun also added some legitimacy to the new church through his distant relationship to Yi Ik. Yi Sŭnghun's mother was the older sister of Yi Kahwan and thus was the great-granddaughter of Yi Ik's paternal uncle.⁴⁹ A closer tie between Yi Ik and the first Catholics can be traced through Yi Yunha. Yi, one of the organizers of the 1779

retreat, was the adopted son of Yi Ik's daughter. Though it is not clear whether Yi Yunha himself was a Catholic, his sons and daughters were among the most fervent of the second generation of martyrs for the faith. Yi Yunha was married to a sister of Kwŏn Ilsin, becoming in effect the uncle-in-law of Yi Pyŏk. Through Yi Yunha, Yi Pyŏk and Kwŏn Ilsin established a link they used to draw some of Yi Ik's great grand-children into the Catholic fold.⁵⁰

The three younger Chŏng brothers, after having been brought to Catholicism by their in-laws, focused their religious zeal on their relatives. Their mother was the sister of Yun Chich'ung's father, making Yun their cousin and a prime candidate for conversion. Though Yun was first told of Catholicism by Kim Pŏmu, it was Chŏng Yakchŏn who convinced him to accept Catholicism as the true religion.⁵¹

The early Church in Korea was largely a family affair, with in-laws converting in-laws and relatives converting relatives. Even the chung'in converts were mostly close friends or associates of the Catholic yangban or relatives of chung'in converted before them. Before long, however, word of this growing band of Christians spread beyond safe family circles.

The First Attacks

In 1787 Catholicism became the target of heated criticism among the students of the Sŏnggyun'gwan, the national university where young Confucian scholars prepared

for the qualifying examination for government service.⁵² Yi Sunghun and Chŏng Yagyong were then both students at the Sŏnggyun'gwan, supposedly immersed in the study of Neo-Confucian philosophy and ethics. A friend and fellow student, Yi Kigyŏng (1756-1819), discovered that Yi Sunghun and Chŏng Yagyong had instead been meeting at a house outside the school grounds under the pretext of engaging in some friendly poetry writing competition. Rather than writing poems, however, they had been reading more Catholic books and preaching Catholic doctrine to their fellow students.⁵³

This was not the first time Yi Kigyŏng had heard of Yi Sunghun and Chŏng Tasan's interest in Western religion. In 1784, Tasan lent Yi Kigyŏng copies of T'ien-chu shih-i and Sheng shih ch'u jao (The Teachings of the Church in Everyday Language, by Fr. Joseph de Maille).

Everytime I ran into Yagyong after that, he wanted to talk about those books. I pointed out the absurdities I found in them, though I conceded that those books did make some interesting points.⁵⁴

Yi Kigyŏng had thought that the 1785 incident ended further experimentation with Catholicism. Then he stumbled upon that reading circle in 1787. Puzzled by the continued attraction such writings had for fellow students he respected, Yi asked to borrow another Jesuit work. Yi Sunghun lent him Chen tao tzu cheng (The true way is self-evident, by Fr. Emericus de Chavagnac). Yi Kigyŏng

started reading it, but when he read that men owe more to God than to their parents and that, moreover, God is superior to any earthly ruler, "a chill came over my heart and I returned that book without finishing it."⁵⁵

Yi Kigyŏng tried at first to talk his colleagues out of their infatuation with Catholicism. When they failed to heed his advice, he turned to another student at the Sŏnggyun'gwan Hong Nagan (1752-1811), and told him about his anxiety over the spread of Western ideas among their fellow students. Hong's reaction was that they should immediately memorialize the government to condemn those heretics. Yi Kigyŏng, however, did not want to be responsible for his friends suffering public disgrace. He argued instead for quiet attempts to reason with those who had been seduced away from Confucian morality by alien books. He believed that logical persuasion and moral example would be more effective than force in fighting flirtation with Catholicism.⁵⁶

As rumors spread of alien practices among some Sŏnggyun'gwan students, Chŏng Yagyong wrote an angry letter to Yi Kigyŏng, blaming Yi for being behind those rumors linking Chŏng and his associates to immoral heterodoxy. Chŏng wrote that though he had made a serious mistake in placing too much trust in Yi, Yi had made the graver error of judging others too quickly. "Without even a full day's reflection, you decided that we were miles apart in matters

of principle and morality."⁵⁷

Yi defended himself by reiterating to Chông^u his warning of the dangers of Catholicism. Yi pointed out that the Ten Commandments of Christianity did not say anything specifically about serving one's ruler, and they listed the command to honor one's father and mother in fourth place instead of at the top of the list where it belonged. Such blindness to the proper moral priorities was not something that a true gentleman could accept. Moreover, he noted some of those who were studying Catholic books were hiding that fact from their fathers and older brothers and that was not the way a true gentleman should behave. He summed up his objections to Chông's^u dabbling with Catholicism by declaring, "it perverts the moral rules governing human relationships and does not make any sense at all."⁵⁸

Yi Kigyông's^u letter to Chông^u Yagyong is representative of the Korean Neo-Confucian reaction to Catholicism. Yi did not display much concern for arguing the truth or falsity of Catholic statements about the existence of God, the divinity of Jesus Christ, or the immortality of man's soul. He was more concerned with the moral consequences of those beliefs. Catholicism, he argued, led men to slight their responsibilities to their parents and superiors. That reason alone made it unacceptable to a Confucian moralist.

Similar reasoning led one year later to a government ban on the private possession of books by European authors.

In August, 1788, Yi Kyōngmyōng, a junior official at the Censorate, reported to the court that Catholicism was flourishing and was even spreading beyond the capital region to distant villages. Yi recommended that the government take immediate action to block further growth of that dangerous religion before it was too late.⁵⁹

Yi's report sparked a debate before the king over what approach to take to the Catholic problem. Yi Sōng'wōn, the Second State Councillor, suggested that harsh suppression was the answer. Ch'ae Chegong (1720-1799), the Third State Councillor, disagreed.

Though Ch'ae was a leader of the Namin faction, from which Korean Catholicism had sprung, and had married sons into the families of Yi Sūnghun and Chōng Yagyong, he was strongly opposed to Catholicism.⁶⁰ Ch'ae informed King Chōngjo that he had read Ricci's T'ien-chu shih-i and recognized that it constituted a serious menace to Confucian morality. Ch'ae cautioned, however, that Catholic writings were not totally evil. They contained some good points, such as their teaching that God watches over the affairs of men. The small merit in Jesuit works was nevertheless outweighed by the immoral Catholic demand that men worship their God and creator first and only then pay respects to their parents. "That is the same as not showing any respect to parents at all." Still, Ch'ae did not think it wise to punish severely individual adherents

of Catholicism. It was his opinion that such harsh measures were not the most effective way to eliminate evil ideas. He advised instead concentrating on promoting the Confucian Way while blocking the reading and distributing of Catholic publications.⁶¹ He apparently assumed that an inadequate elucidation of the Confucian tradition had misled a few immature students into overlooking the moral incompatibility of Confucianism and Catholicism. Once those students had no more Western books to distract them from their study of the Confucian Classics, Ch'ae expected them to return to the orthodox path. King Ch^ungjo agreed and a degree was issued ordering that all Christian books in private hands be turned into the government for destruction.⁶²

The 1788 edict was ineffective. The number of Koreans reading Western books and accepting Catholic teachings continued to grow. The strategy that King Ch^ungjo adopted for fighting Catholicism assumed a lack of attention to the Classics which, in fact, was not a factor in the growth of Catholicism. Moreover, King Ch^ungjo and Ch'ae Chegong insisted upon an ethical antagonism between Confucianism and Catholicism which the new Catholics still denied.

Ironically, Ch'ae Chegong himself pinpointed one reason for the failure of the policy he successfully proposed. Catholic statements that God watched over human affairs resonated with the language of the earliest Classics, the

Odes and the Book of History. The first Korean Catholics were young Confucian students who took literally the occasional anthropomorphic references to Ch'ŏn and Sangje in those Classics.⁶³ They believed that they had rediscovered the true Confucianism and confidently rejected the dominant non-theistic interpretations of Neo-Confucian rationalists.

Yi Sŭnghun, Yi Pyŏk, Kwŏn Ilsin, and the other yangban converts to Catholicism discovered that European religion at a time when their particular school of Korean Neo-Confucianism was being transformed by its own internal logic into an increasingly ascetic Confucianism more congenial with Catholicism than traditional Neo-Confucianism had been. Moreover, they represented a movement to revive the pristine Confucianism of the Sages which they feared was in danger of being buried under the metaphysical superstructure erected by Sung Neo-Confucian philosophers. According to Chŏng Tasan, the return to original Confucianism had begun with Yi Ik and been continued by Kwŏn Ch'ŏlsin.⁶⁴ Tasan himself declared that when Sung philosophical glosses conflicted with the literal meaning of the early Confucian texts, he chose to follow those texts over Chu Hsi or the Ch'eng brothers.⁶⁵ The desire of these eighteenth-century Koreans to return to the original message of the ancient Classics made them a receptive audience for the Jesuit presentation of

Catholicism as true to the principles of primitive Confucianism. These first Christians therefore turned a deaf ear to the call by King Chongjo and Third State Councillor Ch'ae Chegong to return to the tenets and values of the Confucianism which the Catholic Confucians and the Confucian Catholics did not believe they had ever left.

Notes For Chapter Seven

1. An Chǒngbok, Sunamjip, 17: 26a.
2. Yi Honhyong, "Sirhakup'a ŭi T'oegyegwan: Sǒngho-Tasan ŭi kyōngu" [The School of Practical Learning's view of T'oegye: the cases of Sǒngho and Tasan], T'oegye hakbo, no. 34 (1982), p.16.
3. Mun-sang Seoh, "The Ultimate Concern of Yi Korean Confucians: An Analysis of the i-ki debate," Occasional Papers on Korea, no. 5, pp.52-3. The four manifestations are the four basic moral tendencies as defined by Mencius, II, 1, 5. The seven emotions are joy, anger, grief, fear, love, hate, and desire.
4. Seoh, *ibid.*
5. Yi Ik, Sǒngho sasol, 26:15a-b.
6. Yi Ik, *ibid.*, 13:41b-42b.
7. Yi Ik, *ibid.*, 11:31b-38a; 12:4a-5a; 13:14a; 16:18b-19a.
8. Yi Ik, *ibid.*, 17:58b-60a.
9. Little information is available on Hong today. Dallet, p.12; Kim Kubok, "Han'guk ch'oesinja: Hong Yuhan e kwanhan saryo palgyōn" [Korea's first Catholic: Recently discovered documents on Hong Yuhan], Kat'ollik Ch'ōngnyon, 1965, no. 11, pp.60-72.
10. Dallet, p. 12.
11. Kim Kubok, pp.68-69.
12. *Ibid.*, p.69.
13. Dallet, pp.14-15.
14. Yu Hongnyōl, Han'guk sahoe sasangsa non'go [Studies on the history of Korean social thought] (Seoul: Iljogak, 1980), has some information on the complex relationship among the Namin. On Yi Yunha, see pp.191-95. On Yi Sūnghun, see p. 210-12.
15. Chǒng Yagyong, Chǒng Tasan chōnsō, I, 15: 35a; 39a.
16. Chan, Sourcebook, pp. 497-500. For a discussion of how Korean Neo-Confucians read the Western Inscription, see

Michael Kalton, The Neo-Confucian World View and Value System of Yi Dynasty Korea (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1977), chapter II, pp.41-66.

17. Analects, 12: 1.
18. Four Things Not Done is found in Chan, trans. Reflections on Things at Hand, pp.155-57.
19. Kalton, chapter X, pp.268-83.
20. Kalton, chapter IX, pp.247-67. The translation is mine.
21. Chŏng Yagyong, I, 13: 37b-38a; II, 2: 23a.
22. Ibid., I, 15: 33a.
23. An, Sunamjip, 6:27b.
24. Ibid., 6: 27b-28a.
25. Ibid., 6: 30b.
26. Ibid., 6: 28a.
27. Ibid., 6: 28a-35b.
28. Ibid., 6: 32a.
29. Ibid., 6: 35a.
30. Dallet, p. 22; Hwang Sayong, Hwang Sayong paeksŏ, ed. Yun Chaeyong (Seoul: Chŏngnyŏn, 1975), p. 28. Both claim Kwŏn was baptized. Dallet says Kwŏn took the baptismal name of Ambrose. However, Chŏng Tasan denies that Kwŏn ever became a Catholic and claims that Kwŏn was executed in 1801 only because those around him were Catholic. Chŏng, I, 15: 35b-36b. Yi Usŏng, "Nogam Kwŏn Ch'olsin ŭi sasang wa kŭ kyongjŏn pip'an" [Kwŏn Ch'olsin's thought and his criticism of the Classics], T'oegye hakbo, no. 36 (1982), pp.57-8, agrees with Tasan.
31. Paeksŏ, pp.55-6.
32. See Yi's letter to Peking, written in 1789. This letter survives only in French translation and can be found in Andrew Ch'oe, L'Erection du Premier Vicariate Apostolique et les Origines du Catholicisme (Schoneck-Beckenried, Switzerland, 1961), p. 91.

33. Paekso, pp.55-56.
34. Ibid.. Also see Dallet, pp. 20-25 for a full account of Yi Pyok's proselytizing activities.
35. Dallet, p. 13. Obviously, the ch'ok Dallet mentions must be shorter than the current ch'ok if thirty centimeters and the kun must be lighter than the current kun of 600 grams. However, Yi Pyok was undoubtedly a tall and strong man by the standards of his day.
36. Kim Okhui, Kwangam Yi Pyok ui Sohaksasang [The Catholic Thought of Yi Pyok] (Seoul: The Catholic Press, 1979), p.22.
37. Dallet, p. 14.
38. Chong Yagyong, I, 15: 42a.
39. Ibid., I, 15: 24a-b.
40. Paeksŏ, pp. 56-8.
41. Yi Manch'ae, ed. Pyogwip'yŏn, pp.105-06.
42. Ibid.
43. Sahak chingui [A warning against Catholicism] (Seoul: Pulhan munhwasa, 1977), p.82, 378.
44. Dallet, pp.28-29.
45. Yi Kigyong, Pyogwip'yŏn, p. 80.
46. Dallet, p. 46. Dallet is quoting here an account of Yun's 1791 persecution that Yun smuggled out of his prison cell.
47. Chong, I, 16: 34b; 41a-b; Kim Okhui, Yuhandang Kwŏnssi ui onhaeng sillok e kwanhan yŏn'gu [A study of the "Authentic records of words and deeds" by Kwŏn Yuhandang], Han'guk hakbo, vol. 8, no. 2 (summer, 1982), pp.51-55.
48. Yu Hongnyol, Han'guk sahoe sasangso non'go, pp.206-11.
49. Ibid., pp.210-11.
50. Ibid., pp.191-202.
51. Ibid., pp.212; Dallet, pp.37-8.

52. For a description of the Sŏnggyun'gwan and student life there, see Kim Tong-wŏk (Kim Tong'uk), "The Life of the literati in the Sŏnggyun'gwan", Upper Class Culture in Yi Dynasty Korea (Seoul: International Cultural Foundation, 1973), pp.41-65.
53. Yi Manch'ae, ed. Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p. 113.
54. Yi Kigyŏng, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, p. 143; Chosŏn wangjo sillok, Chongjo 15.11. kapsin (1791).
55. Yi Kigyŏng, *ibid.*, p.144; Sillok, *ibid.*
56. Yi Manch'ae, ed. Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp.114-17.
57. *Ibid.*, pp.117-18.
58. Yi Kigyŏng, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp.7-13.
59. Sillok, Chongjo 12. 8. sinmyo (1788).
60. Cho Kwang, "Ch'ae Chegong ŭi Sŏhakwan yŏn'gu" [A study of Ch'ae Chegong's attitude toward Catholicism], Sach'ong, no.17 (Feb. 1973), pp. 305-22.
61. Sillok, Chŏngjo 12.8. imjin (1788).
62. Sillok, Chŏngjo 12.8. ulmi.
63. For example, see Tasan's summation of Yi Pyŏk's arguments for a theistic reading of the Confucian canon. Chong Tasan chŏnso, II, 4:22a.
64. *Ibid.*, I, 15:33a.
65. *Ibid.*, II, 4:2b.

Chapter Eight

The Path to Martyrdom

Korea's first Catholics left few written records of the reasoning that led them to Christ.¹ History usually favors the persecutors over the persecuted and the anti-Catholic persecutions in eighteenth-century Korea were no exception. Though pages of Anti-Catholic treatises, letters, and memorials remain, there are no comparable arguments for Catholicism extant from Korea in the 1780s.

There are, however, the writings of Ch'ông Tasan. Tasan was heavily influenced by Catholicism when he first started writing commentaries on the Classics. In his reflection on the Doctrine of the Mean, the Great Learning, Mencius, the Analects, the Odes, and the Book of History, Tasan presented a radical reinterpretation of Confucianism, an interpretation that can be called Confucian Theism and may represent the form of Confucianism that encouraged those early Catholics to believe that their new religion was compatible with the values of their Confucian past. Particularly relevant is Tasan's essay on the Doctrine of the Mean which he wrote in 1784.

When Tasan was a twenty-two year old student in Seoul,

he was asked to answer a set of questions on the Mean posed by King Chŏngjo. Tasan went to Yi Pyŏk to ask his assistance in framing his replies. Yi Pyŏk at that time was busy reading the Catholic books Yi Sŭnghun had just brought back from Peking, but he took time out to help his friend and relative. The result was an essay that won the praise of the King as the best any of the students had written. Thirty years later, when Tasan wrote a revised commentary on the Mean, he recalled with pride the complement his collaboration with Yi Pyŏk had earned, and he grieved that Yi was no longer alive to answer his questions.²

In his 1784 commentary, Tasan challenged Chu Hsi's explanation of the title of that ancient Chinese Classic. Chu Hsi had written that the second character in Chungyong (the Doctrine of the Mean, 中庸) meant ordinary, that is to say, the normal, everyday practice of virtue. Tasan denied that yong could mean ordinary in that context. No ordinary man reached the high standards preached in the Mean. Tasan insisted yong must mean constant adherence to rigid ethical norms, no ordinary feat.³

The usual orthodox Korean Neo-Confucian defense of Chu Hsi would have been that it was not out of the ordinary to be virtuous, since men were by nature virtuous. It was rather a deviation from the norm that men had become less than virtuous. Tasan countered that men were not born virtuous but had to acquire virtue through vigorous ethical

practice. Tasan asserted that no man could be called virtuous until he consistently and over a long period of time acted virtuously.⁴

The arduous path to virtue was not Tasan's original discovery. Confucius himself had said, "Goodness cannot be obtained till what is difficult is duly done."⁵ Tasan noted also that Kwŏn Ch'ŏlsin had taught that men may possess an innate moral drive but the Four Virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are the result of acting on that drive and should not be confused with an unrealized moral impulse.⁶ Moreover, the Catholic books which had filtered into Korea and were available to Tasan described virtue as habitual moral behavior and denied that men were virtuous from birth.

Despite his conviction that virtue had to be earned, Tasan did not abandon the Confucian axiom that human nature was essentially good nor did he accept the Catholic belief in original sin and the inherent depravity of man. He argued that even though men did not possess virtue as a birthright, they were born with a desire for the good and a distaste for evil. It was that tendency, that natural inclination toward good and away from evil, that constituted human nature and allowed men to be called naturally good, despite their frequent failure to act as they should.⁷

In Tasan's view, living virtuously required more effort

than Chu Hsi and the other Neo-Confucians, with their theory of inherent virtue, had realized. Tasan rejected the orthodox position that when the mind is in a state of non-arousal, that is, when the mind is not responding to external stimulation with feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, it need only be kept calm and unmoving, focused inward with serious concentration. He charged that such quietism was nothing more than Zen Buddhist doctrine disguised in Confucian language. Rather than trying to clear the mind of thought and feelings, man should instead maintain a constant sense of awe and apprehension, remaining ever aware how difficult it was to be consistent in the pursuit of virtue and how easy it was to fail.⁸

With this shift from inner composure to awe and apprehension, Tasan signaled his intention to extricate man from the universe.⁹ Chu Hsi had described man as he believed man should be --fully integrated into the all-pervasive cosmic network. In his organicistic vision, the goal of mental discipline was to still emotion in order to eliminate all self-centered drives, which isolated man from nature and the human community and which blinded him to the moral principles which lay within his mind and made him a part of the universal normative pattern.

Tasan, on the other hand, described men as he believed they actually were --alienated from nature through man's unique possession of moral sensitivity and the concomitant

ability to ignore that conscience and do evil.¹⁰ Tasan explicitly rejected the Neo-Confucian doctrine that the universe forms one substance. "None of the ancient Classics talk of all things being one substance....How can plants, trees, and wild birds and beasts be one substance with me?"¹¹ Therefore Tasan believed that, rather than stilling emotion in a vain effort to remove barriers to linkage with that illusionary universal substance, man should recognize his own autonomous subjectivity by nurturing and preserving a feeling of awe and apprehension before the external moral power that governs the universe.

Awe and apprehension combined in Tasan to produce an attitude of kyōng (敬, C. Ching). In Neo-Confucian writings, kyōng was a major term rendered into English by various translators as earnestness, seriousness, mindfulness, composure, attentiveness, and prudence.¹² Kyōng referred to an internal state of complete control over the mind in which thoughts were not allowed to wander or feelings to stir and total attention was directed toward one thing. "Often this one thing represented the unity of all things in principle."¹³ In earlier Chinese texts, however, kyōng is best translated as reverence and refers to the attitude men outwardly display toward another or toward heaven. Tasan emphasized that original meaning of kyōng. He called for men to reinforce a stance of cautious apprehension of their own moral frailty through a feeling

of reverence for Sangje, the God of the Confucian Classics.

Theistic Confucianism

Tasan's introduction of God at this point was not, on the surface, a radical departure from Neo-Confucianism. In his Admonition on Seriousness, Chu Hsi had proposed the cultivation of a calm and focused mind, as though one were in the presence of Sangje, as an important part of mental discipline. Chu Hsi placed the presence of God in the hypothetical because, to him, God did not exist as a person but was simply another name for the impersonal i, the normative principle that gave order to the universe. T'oegye, though he too talked of God, supported Chu Hsi's position.¹⁴ Tasan repudiated that interpretation, pointing out that in the earliest Confucian texts the terms for God clearly referred to an intelligent personality governing the universe.¹⁵

Tasan identified a significant contradiction in Neo-Confucian thought and practice. Confucianism was built on social morality, with ethics defined in terms of man's relationship with his fellow man. Men were considered virtuous only if they displayed the proper attitudes and behavior toward superiors and inferiors, parents and children, older and younger siblings, and spouses and friends. Yet Neo-Confucianism also demanded that men maintain an attitude of kyōng, and kyōng could most easily be cultivated by withdrawing from the distractions of the

external world of men and objects. Though kyong^u was intended to be a means to an end, the necessary mental preparation for moral action, Tasan feared that for some it had become an end in itself. Men who achieved inner peace often, like the Buddhists, hesitated to risk that pleasant state in encounters with the real world. He believed that the danger of such a lapse into quietism could be lessened by replacing the abstract metaphysical terminology of Sung Neo-Confucianism with the concrete anthropomorphic language of the Classics.

The Neo-Confucian turn inward undermined the link between internal moral attitudes and external ethical behavior that was the mark of earlier Confucian morality. Tasan sought to revive that link by reversing the Neo-Confucian orientation and reclaiming an external object of reverence from the original Confucian tradition. Just as men should show respect for their elders, loyalty to their superiors, and filial piety to their parents, when they were alone they should display respect and reverence for God so that they would always remain in a proper moral frame of mind even when no one else was around. Always and everywhere morality for Tasan involved a relationship with another. He rejected the Neo-Confucian concern for disinterested attentiveness and substituted reverence for God in its place.

Tasan reasoned that only if men were conscious that God

watched their every move and knew their every thought would they be able to maintain constant attention to propriety. Abstract impersonal i had no power to instill righteous fear into the hearts of men. But awe of God's unlimited vision would keep men from relaxing their guard against selfish desire for a single moment. Men could be persistent and consistent in watching over themselves even when alone if they were aware that God, too, was watching them.¹⁶

The God Chong T^uasan believed in was not the Christian God. T^uasan called God the ruler of the cosmos, not the creator. He credited God with the implanatation and management of the principles which provided the order in the universe but material force, in T^uasan's Confucian cosmos, appears to have had no beginning in time and needed no creator. Nor did his God appear directly to man to impart revelation. T^uasan wrote that man could learn the will of God only by listening to his own conscience. Furthermore T^uasan said nothing of God passing judgment on the souls of the dead and passing out reward and punishments for the deeds of this life. In fact, T^uasan said little about God's nature or activities, except that God was to be held in awe as the intelligent governor of the normative principles which directed the universe. T^uasan did not bother with the detailed description of the divine attributes that occupied so much of the attention of

Scholastic theologians. His God was solely a moral force. That was what made him a Confucian God.¹⁷

Chong Tasa^un's theistic reinterpretation of the Confucian tradition, if representative of what Yi Pyo^uk, Yi Sunghu^un, and the other pioneer Catholic yangban were thinking, indicates that those men took their Confucian values seriously. But their determination to be faithful to their moral principles in their relationships with their fellow men led them to conclude that a morality centered on personal interaction was ill supported by a metaphysics of impersonal principle and an abstract Great Ultimate. Tasa^un replaced the Great Ultimate with a conscious personality ruling the universe and had that God provide a solid foundation for insubstantial normative principle. Others went further and were inspired by the central role of filial piety in Confucian ethics to accept the Catholic vision of God as the father not only of all mankind but also of the cosmos: God the Creator.

Both the converts to Catholicism and their opponents initially agreed moral considerations were primary in judgments, both of behavior and of statements. This shared assumption, however, did not mean that compromise was possible, since it was not matched by agreement on what those moral considerations were. Orthodox Neo-Confucians assumed that morality referred first to a state of mind. The heart had to be cleansed of selfishness before selfless

moral principles could direct interaction with others. Therefore they would accept only those statements and actions that promoted or indicated a spirit of kong.

The Catholics were more inclined to stress the ultimate object of moral attitudes and actions. Selflessness for them was not truly selfless unless it was oriented toward an external object of reverence, awe, and apprehension. They did not at first realize that by thus altering the focus of their moral endeavors they were placing themselves in deadly opposition to those who maintained the orthodox Neo-Confucian conception of morality. The shift from immanent, impersonal substance to the transcendental, personal substance that was God pulled Confucian theists toward a suspicion that social morality might not be its own justification. At the same time, when a vision of the human community as morally self-sufficient was replaced by the image of individual souls utterly dependent on God, some were led to wonder if man's relationship with God might be more important than his relationships with his fellow men. Catholic doctrines originally seized as means to a Confucian end were transformed by a few into ends in themselves.

Others held back. Tazan, for example, continued to consider himself a Confucian until his death despite the great influence Catholic ideas had on his thinking, and despite his older brother Yakchong's whole-hearted

commitment to Catholicism.¹⁸ Tasan's inability to become a Catholic while remaining a Confucian proves the basic irreconcilability of these two approaches to reality. He stretched Confucian ideas to their limits of compatibility with Christianity but, when he saw that further stretching would lead to a break, he backed away from the implications of his own ideas. He recognized that man was essentially alienated from the universe, yet he failed to see that, once he had extricated man from the Neo-Confucian organicistic network and replaced immanent principle with a transcendent deity, the foundations of the Confucian ethics of selfless integration into the cosmos had been shattered.

Tasan was committed to both truth and morality, but Confucian moral standards had priority. He borrowed only those elements of Catholicism he could use to promote adherence to Confucian values. He rejected those he recognized as a challenge to his fundamental moral principles. For his martyred brother Yakchong and his cousin Yun Chich'ung, the reverse was true. They respected and obeyed only those Confucian ethical demands which did not conflict with Catholic teachings.

The test that separated Confucian Catholics, such as Yun Chich'ung, from Catholic Confucians such as Ch'ong Tasan came in 1790. A letter arrived from Bishop Alexandre de Gouvea in Peking which shook the Korean Church to its foundation. For the first time, the Korean Catholics were

officially informed of a papal ban on participation in ancestor memorial services. Yi Sunghun withdrew from active leadership of the Church upon hearing this news, turning his responsibilities over to Kwŏn Ilsin.¹⁹ Chŏng Yagyong and his brother Yakchŏn also withdrew from further participation in Catholic activities after the announcement of the ban on Confucian ancestor rites, although their brother Yakchong remained an active leader of the Church until his execution in the 1801 persecution.

Korea's first Catholics had been converted primarily by books written by Jesuit missionaries in the seventeenth century who stressed compatibility rather than conflict between Confucian society and the Catholic faith. The books the Koreans had read did not tell them that the Pope in Rome had ruled in 1704 against the Jesuit policy of accommodation, demanding instead that Asian Catholics make a complete break with their non-Christian culture. Rejecting the Jesuit argument for toleration of cultural diversity, the Pope insisted that all members in good standing of the Catholic Church in East Asia desist from participation in the Confucian ritual of bowing and offering bowls of food and wine to tablets on which were inscribed the names of ancestors.²⁰

The Ancestor Memorial Service

What was the nature of this rite which caused so much difficulty for the Catholic Church, both in Korea and in

China? It is often referred to as "ancestor worship", but that translation of the Korean word chesa (祭 祀) is misleading. No worship of ancestors was involved. Family members and descendants of the deceased simply gathered together in remembrance of their ancestors as an expression of filial piety and family unity. The ancestor memorial service was the glue that held Confucian society together. It was this ritual that reinforced the recognition that men were not individuals living isolated and alone on this planet but were members of a family and a community, with all the duties, responsibilities, benefits, and rewards that entailed.

Confucians looked upon society as an extension of the family. Filial sons in the families of the nation meant subjects loyal to the throne. To reject the ritual honoring of ancestors, as Korean Catholics were ordered to do, was to challenge the core of the Confucian political, moral, and social order. To be moral and loyal in eighteenth century Korea meant, above all, to show filial piety by serving, honoring, and obeying parents faithfully, before before and after their death. The refusal to perform these rites meant a refusal to show proper respect for parents, a refusal to carry out the duties of a loyal subject of the sovereign, and a refusal to act in a manner befitting a respectable member of society.

The element in the ancestor memorial service that most

offended the Pope in Rome was the wooden ancestral tablet which represented the spirit of the ancestor being honored. During the mourning period and on the anniversary of the death, direct descendants and relatives of the deceased to the fourth generation, led by the eldest surviving male direct descendant, were supposed to perform the ancestor memorial service before the appropriate tablet. That service essentially consisted of placing the tablet on a low table, arranging bowls of food and drink on the table in front of it, and bowing several times to show respect for the person the tablet represented while offering the food and drink to the spirit of the ancestor being remembered.²¹ The Catholic Church in the eighteenth century chose to interpret this service as a religious ritual that assumed the actual presence in the wooden tablet of the soul of the deceased. This interpretation made this ritual appear to be a form of idolatry, forbidden to all Catholics. The early Jesuits in China had recognized the importance of this rite in family-oriented Confucian society and had realized that, viewed symbolically, the ritual did not offend against any points of Catholic doctrine. Later missionaries were under orders from Rome to construe the ritual literally, as though the bowing to the ancestral tablet and the offerings of food necessarily implied the assertion that a soul actually was present within the wood tablet.

In retrospect, the Jesuit understanding of the actual significance of the ancestor memorial service appears to have been more accurate. K'ang-hsi, the Manchu Emperor of China from 1661 to 1722, declared in 1700 that veneration of ancestors was an expression of love and filial remembrance, not intended to bring protection to the worshipper. Furthermore, there was no idea, when an ancestral tablet was erected, that the soul of the ancestor dwelt in that tablet.²²

Emperor K'ang-hsi was not placing a new rationalistic interpretation on an old superstitious Chinese practice with his statement. Almost two thousand years earlier the Li Chi (Book of Rites) had declared, "the idea of sacrifice is not something that comes from without. It issues from within, being born in the heart. When the heart is deeply moved, expression is given to it in ceremonies."²³ The ancestor memorial ritual was described even in early Confucian Classics as more an expression of the filial piety of the living than an assertion of the presence of the soul of the dead in a wooden tablet. As the sociologist C. K. Yang noted of the early rationalist tradition in Confucian philosophy, "All the ritual behavior and offerings made to the spirits were to be interpreted as an expression of longing for the continued existence of the dead without belief in the actual existence of the soul."²⁴

Korean Confucians also understood the symbolic nature

of the ancestor memorial ritual. They knew the motive and state of mind of the person performing the ritual were more important than any belief or skepticism about the survival of the soul. Yi Ik discussed chesa in a short essay entitled "the reason for ancestral rites" (chesaji i). He pointed out that the ancestor memorial ceremony was more for the living than for the dead. He argued that the Sages established that ritual for the sake of humanity and morality. Through proper performance of the ancestor memorial rite a filial son was able to express the depth of the gratitude he felt toward the parents who gave him life. It was this sincere expression of filial sentiments that provided the foundation of morality and social order in the Confucian world. Whether or not a soul existed to accept the ritual offerings of food and drink was of secondary importance.²⁵

Yi Ik's disciple An Ch'ongbok showed a similar concern for the sincerity with which the ancestor rites were performed in his criticism of Catholic doctrine and practices. Writing before the Catholics in Korea had been informed that they were forbidden to play any role whatsoever in ancestral rites, An reported that Catholics already had been criticizing as absurd the placing of food before ancestral tablets. Furthermore, the Catholics were advising their friends to take part in such superstitious Confucian ceremonies only under silent protest, inwardly

turning toward heaven and asking God's forgiveness for not being able to resist the social pressure to participate in this Confucian ritual. Calling such advice "a perversion of our rituals and a slander against Confucianism," An declared that the Catholics did not understand the moral principles by which the Sages in ancient China established ancestor memorial rites to show respect for forefathers.²⁶ An argued that the ritual was meaningful only if the participants sincerely desired to show through their performance of the traditional ceremonies their filial gratitude to the ancestors who gave them life. The reluctant participation the Catholics advised revealed an immoral lack of respect for ancestors and contempt for time-honored tradition.

The papal interpretation of the significance of the Confucian ancestor memorial service was apparently based on a two-fold misunderstanding. First of all the Papacy, disregarding the learned opinions of the Jesuits who had decades of experience among the scholarly community of China, confused the Confucian philosophical explanation of the meaning of ancestor rites with the superstition of the masses. As early as the third century before Christ, the Confucian philosopher Hsun Tzu had explained,

Sacrifice is to express a person's feeling of remembrance and longing...Among gentlemen it is considered the way of man; among the common people it is considered as having to do with the spirits.²⁷

From the time of Confucius on, scholars placed the importance of traditional rituals of sacrifice in the moral and social functions they served. Sacrifice of food and drink to the ancestors was cultivated as a way of encouraging the virtues of filial piety and loyalty. As Hsun Tzu noted, the significance of the ritual lay in the effect it had on men rather than on spirits. However, the uneducated masses were allowed to hold their belief that rituals were necessary to placate the spirits of the dead. Scholars recognized the value of such myths in supporting the people's adherence to traditional Confucian values.²⁸

Rome confused the popular interpretation of the ancestor memorial service with the orthodox Confucian interpretation. The Church failed to realize that educated East Asian Catholics could, without contradicting Catholic doctrine, participate in rites honoring their ancestors, since for them and the rest of the scholarly Confucian world the rites did not necessarily have any superstitious significance. By insisting the ritual implied the actual presence of spirits in ancestral tablets, the Catholic Church aligned itself with the ignorant masses and seriously damaged its claim to be worthy of the attention of the intellectual elite of China and Korea.

A second, more serious, error made by the papacy in the eighteenth century was to view Confucian custom and practice through Western categories. Instead of listening

to Chinese arguments on the salutary effect on Confucian ritual on the promotion of virtue and morality, Rome insisted on examining the existential claims the ritual seemed to imply. In Rome's eyes, ancestor memorial services expressed the belief that the souls of ancestors were actually present in wooden ancestral tablets. For Confucians, the question of whether or not the spirits of the ancestors dwelled in those tablets was of little importance. More important was the role the ritual played in preserving social order, promoting family unity, and fostering the practice of virtue. When the Catholic Church condemned the ancestor memorial service as false, it ignored the Confucian claim that that ritual was good. The Western preoccupation with truth clashed with the Confucian interest in morality. The victims of that clash were the Chinese and Korean Catholics who had tried to live as good citizens of a Confucian society while following Catholic claims to religious truth.

Though the papacy was wrong to condemn ancestor memorial rites as idolatry, Rome was right to challenge the Jesuit contention that a Confucian could convert to Catholicism without abandoning or altering the moral principles and assumptions of his society. A Chinese or Korean who had to ask Rome for permission to honor his ancestors with traditional ceremonies, no matter whether Rome answered yes or no, had already signaled where his

true loyalties lay. No Korean could grant Catholic dogma and directives authority over Confucian ritual and regulations without appearing immoral and heterodox, provoking enmity among his contemporaries.

Moreover, whether or not the ancestor rites issue had arisen, Catholicism would still have found Korea an unfriendly environment. Before 1790 Sin Hudam, An Chŏngbok, Yi Kygyŏng, and Hong Nagan were already condemning Catholicism as an immoral deviation from the orthodox path. Matteo Ricci had misled his readers when he argued that Confucian values and Catholic doctrines were compatible. The rites issue was a symptom, not a cause, of the moral friction between the doctrinal, supernatural orientation of Catholicism and the moralistic, humanistic focus of Neo-Confucianism. The papal decision against the Jesuit policy of accommodation merely guaranteed that the Catholic challenge was more flagrant than it otherwise might have been.

The Arrest and Martyrdom of Paul Yun and James Kwŏn

After 1790 Koreans sympathetic to Catholicism could no longer evade the choice that faced them. They could either be loyal to their new religion or at peace with their government and their society. The letter from Bishop de Gouvea made clear that faithful adherence to the directives of the Church would inevitably lead to conflict with their society, with their family, friends, and neighbors. Two

who made the decision to risk that confrontation were Paul Yun Chich'ung and James Kwŏn Sang'yŏn. In the spring of 1791 Paul Yun's mother died. He and his cousin James decided that they would follow all the customary Confucian mourning rituals except the rites involving the ancestral tablets. Going beyond the instructions from Bishop Gouvea in Peking, they not only did not make a tablet for Yun's mother, they burnt all the ancestral tablets in their possession and buried the ashes. Given the central role of the tablets in the mourning ceremonies, their absence could not go unnoticed by relatives who came to the village in Chinsan to join Yun in mourning the loss of his mother.²⁹

Soon rumors spread of Yun and Kwŏn's violation of Confucian mourning ritual. These rumors reached the ears of Hong Nagan, Yi Kigyŏng's friend who in 1787 had wanted to punish Yi Sŭnghun and Chŏng Yayyong for the Catholic study group at the Sŏnggyun'gwan. Hong was now a minor official in the Royal Secretariat. He apparently felt that his post gave him the authority and the responsibility to demand strict adherence to Confucian norms from the members of Korea's literati elite. He sent a long letter voicing his opinion to Ch'ae Chegong, who was still a senior official in King Chŏngjo's court. In that private letter, Hong demanded that Ch'ae, as the highest ranking member of their Namin faction, take drastic action against Yun and Kwon before the Catholic cancer spread further and

threatened both the Namin and the entire society and government of Korea.

Hong charged that Catholics treated their fathers and their rulers as no different from strangers they might happen to pass on the street. "They have thrown away their moral principles as if they were worth no more than a pair of old shoes." Asserting that moral principles were eternal and unalterable and that Korea had taken ritual and righteousness as the foundation of the nation for thousands of years, he wrote, "Even the most perverse and immoral have not dared to violate the rules of propriety that require them to serve their parents while they are alive and to bury them properly when they die." Yun and Kw^Uon had lowered themselves to the level of beasts and barbarians. They had let their belief in their "strange and monstrous god" deceive them into refusing to follow the proper burial and mourning procedures. Not only had they refused to make an ancestral tablet for Yun's mother, they had gone even further and burnt the ancestral tablets they already had.³⁰

What a tragedy! Nothing this bizarre has happened since time began. The laws of our land declare that the crime of destroying an ancestral tablet is as serious an offense as murder. The laws also say that anyone who deliberately destroys his father's ancestral tablet with his own hands should be treated exactly the same as someone who rebels against the throne. Even if Yun and Kw^Uon were shown to be insane, we could not let them escape the full penalty the law demands. They openly condemn the Way of our ancestors and embrace perversion without hesitation or

restraint. Look closely at the evil nature of their crime. It is one hundred times worse than rebellion. If we do not exterminate them now, then the moral bonds among men will be destroyed everywhere and this land where ritual and righteousness have prevailed for four thousand years will fall into ruin, and become fit only for savages and wild animals.³¹

Hong's charges were too serious to be ignored. An official search was made of Yun's and Kwŏn's homes and no ancestral tablets were found. Warrants for their arrest were issued immediately. Near the end of November, Yun and Kwŏn were taken into custody by the magistrate of Chinsan county. That magistrate, Sin Sawŏn, had reluctantly arrested Yun and Kwŏn, doing so only after receiving explicit instructions from Seoul. He obviously did not want the embarrassment of official recognition that heresy had sprouted in the county under his jurisdiction.

In the notes Yun Chich'ung took of his interrogation by Magistrate Sin, the magistrate appears to have tried to save his prisoners' and his own reputations by having them renounce their more extreme actions and provide an explanation of their Catholic beliefs that would make this Western religion completely compatible with Confucian orthodoxy. But Yun and Kwŏn held fast to their convictions. Sin reminded them of the Confucian injunction to filial sons to protect the body their parents had given them. To allow themselves to suffer torture and death, argued the magistrate, would bring ruin and disgrace on their families and show a lack of proper filial respect for

the lives which they had received from their parents. Unmoved, Yun countered with his belief that filial piety meant always acting in accordance with what was right, even at the cost of torture and death. Magistrate Sin, seeing that he could not convince Yun or Kwŏn to abandon their religion, placed cangues around his prisoners' necks and sent them to Chŏnju, where they were turned over to the provincial governor.³²

In Chŏnju, Yun continued to deny any wrongdoing in his adherence to Catholic doctrine. He attempted to justify the destruction of ancestral tablets by using logic and reason to show the absurdity of the ancestor memorial service. Yun's defense, adopted from the Western insistence on the irrational and superstitious character of Confucian ritual, clashed with the Confucian concern for the symbolic and ethical significance of the rite. The account of the interrogation in Chonju shows Yun and his interrogator talking past each other rather than to each other. Yun kept insisting that he had done what he had done in order to ensure that his actions were in accordance with truth. The governor kept insisting that Yun admit that what he had done and what his Catholic book taught were immoral. Yun could not understand how actions which offended against logic and reason could be moral. The governor could not understand how considerations of truth or falsity could affect a person's performance of his

social obligations.³³

Yun first argued that it was an affront to the dignity owed his father and mother to treat pieces of wood as though they held their souls. He noted that the fourth commandment ordered Catholics to honor their fathers and mothers. If their parents were actually present in those wooden ancestral tablets, then Catholics would be obligated to show respect for the tablets. But those tablets were made of wood.

They have no flesh and blood relationship with me. They did not give me life nor educate me... How can I dare to treat these man-made pieces of wood as though they were actually my mother and father?³⁴

Yun argued further that it was foolish to place food and drink before a block of wood, even if a soul were present in it. Yun pointed out that the soul was not a material object and could get no nourishment from material goods. No matter how delicious the wine and nutritious the meat, the soul could get no benefit from the offering. Furthermore, even the most filial son did not try to serve his parents food and drink when they were asleep.

If people can not eat while they sleep, how much more foolish is it to offer food to our parents when they are dead? How can anyone who is sincere in his filial piety try to honor his parents with such an absurd practice?³⁵

This Catholic Korean even dared to challenge the fundamental assumption of Confucian morality which made filial and loyalty the absolutes from which all other value

and virtue were derived. He denied that those two virtues were complete and axiomatic in themselves but instead argued that "the basis of loyalty to the ruler is the laws of God, and the basis of filial piety towards one's parents is also the laws of God."³⁶ This was a radical contradiction of the core of Confucian thought. Rather than accepting the virtues of filial piety and loyalty as the standards by which all else was to be judged, Yun claimed that filial piety and loyalty were themselves only conditional obligations, binding on man only because God, the source of all value, has so willed.

Paul Yun did not completely escape the behavioral orientation of the Confucian world which placed concern for what should be done ahead of concern for what should be believed. When told to provide a short summary of Catholic teachings, he replied not with an account of the divinity of Jesus Christ and his power to redeem men from their sins, but with the statement that "What we practice can be reduced to the ten commandments and the seven virtues."³⁷ Yun thus reduced Catholicism to its moral commands and presented it as essentially a collection of guidelines for ethical behavior.

The ethical behavior Catholicism demanded differed from that Confucianism required. Catholicism, unlike Confucianism, was more oriented toward the next world than toward this one. Yun's view of Catholic morality placed him in

fatal conflict with his Confucian society, since he placed his obligations to God above his obligations to his fellow man. Yun was asked by his interrogator to state the ten commandments by which Catholics regulated their conduct. The governor immediately noticed that there was no specific mention of the relationship between subjects and their rulers. He demanded that Yun explain this deficiency. Yun's reply, that the king was the father of his realm and his subjects owed him the same respect and loyalty they owed their parents as enjoined by the fourth commandment, did not satisfy his interrogator. Yun was ordered to write down in greater detail the Catholic principles of morality, keeping in mind the need to "emphasize the principles of loyalty to the king and filial piety so that you might be able to save your life."³⁸

Yun responded with a written statement in which he declared that the Lord of Heaven was the Creator and Father of all men. Since he recognized God as his Father, he could not disobey any of God's orders. God had forbidden his children to have ancestral tablets in their homes or to offer meat and wine to the spirits of the dead represented by such tablets. He could do nothing but obey.

Yun also explained the difference between Confucian and Catholic expressions of filial piety. Catholics emphasized diligent application to the practice of virtue instead of participation in rituals of doubtful merit.

This Catholic interest in the sincere practice of virtue should be seen as the expression of loyalty and filial piety that it was, not as rebellious and immoral. After all, Yun noted, commoners and impoverished yangban were not strictly punished if they did not carry out the mourning ritual strictly according to regulations. Why should those who were only obeying the commands of their God in the privacy of their own homes be threatened with capital punishment and charged with defying the laws of the land?³⁹

Though the arguments of Paul Yun might seem reasonable to men in 1980, they appeared irrelevant to Confucian officials in 1791. Few intelligent scholars then needed to be convinced that the souls of the dead were not actually present in the wooden ancestral tablets. They had long been following the injunction of Confucius to show respect for spirits as if they were present.⁴⁰ Yun's contentions did not in the least mitigate the impression in their orthodox Confucian eyes that both Yun and Kwŏn were guilty of a grave offense against both the laws of the their state and the mores of their society.

The governor of Chŏnju reported to Seoul that Paul Yun Chich'ung and James Kwŏn Sang'yŏn had indeed destroyed their ancestral tablets and had abandoned the Confucian ways of their fathers. On December 3, 1791, King Chŏngjo commanded that Paul Yun and James Kwŏn be beheaded without delay. Five days later the thirty-two year old Yun and

the forty year old Kwŏn were martyred for their faith. Their belief that religious truths determined morality and their denial that Confucian moral presuppositions determined what could and could not be believed cost them their lives.⁴¹

The persecution of Catholics did not stop there. Kwŏn Ilsin, who had taken over leadership of the church from Yi Sunghun, was brought in for questioning. When he was first asked to respond to reports that he was the leader of Korea's small band of Catholics, Kwŏn denied he was a Catholic. However, he steadfastly refused to condemn Catholicism as heretical or evil. His defense of the teachings of Jesus echoed the moral justification of Catholicism Yun had offered before him.

Kwŏn argued that Catholic books contained nothing immoral in them but only encouraged men to be loyal to their superiors and filial to their parents. When pressed for a more explicit definition of Christian teachings, Kwŏn replied that Catholicism could be summed up in the phrase "be serious and respectful and continually in awe of the Lord," a line reminiscent of the language of the Odes and the Doctrine of the Mean. Kwŏn insisted that Catholics respected and honored the Lord because he was the origin and foundation of all things. He added that Western writings merely made explicit what the Confucian Classics already hinted at.

Kwŏn Ilsin conceded the validity of using moral criteria to evaluate truth claims. He said that if Jesus Christ could be shown to have taught anything contrary to the five basic moral principles governing human relationships, then Catholics could be rejected as heretical. Kwŏn denied, however, that any of the Jesuit books he had read contained such poisonous instructions. In fact, Kwŏn claimed ignorance of the Catholic ban on participation in chesa. Unlike Yun, Kwŏn condemned the destruction of ancestral tablets.⁴² Kwŏn may have been a Catholic but only as a Catholic Confucian. He had embraced Catholicism for the support it seemed to offer to fundamental Confucian moral values. Kwŏn took the ten commandments and respect for God as guidelines for reaching Confucian sagehood in the faithful practice of unselfish loyalty and filial piety.

Catholicism remained a means to an end for Kwon Ilsin and was not the end in itself it had become for Yun Chich'ung and Kwŏn Sang'yŏn. Kwŏn Ilsin's commitment to his faith was therefore not as unconditional or as firm as the commitment Yun and Kwŏn Sang'yŏn had made. After several days of torture, following by a decree of exile to Chejudo that would have separated him from his dying mother, Kwŏn Ilsin made a faint and ambiguous renunciation of Catholicism. His sentence was changed to exile at a site closer to his mother's home and soon thereafter he

died of his wounds while on his way to Ch'ungch'ong province.⁴³

Ch'oe P'ilgong, a chung'in Catholic leader, was brought in for questioning about the same time as Kw^Uon Ilsin. Ch'oe initially proudly proclaimed his commitment to Catholicism. He defended his religion for asking nothing more of its adherents than that they show respect for heaven and live virtuous lives. He also called God the Father of the universe and said that there could be no greater display of filial piety than to die for such a God. Ch'oe suffered imprisonment and torture for a full month before he finally relented and made a formal statement renouncing Catholicism, although he later returned to his faith and was martyred in 1801.⁴⁴ Several other Catholics were also tortured into at least temporarily abandoning Catholicism in the immediate aftermath of the Yun-Kw^Uon incident.⁴⁵

The 1791 persecution was only a prelude to a succession of violent confrontations between Catholicism and Confucianism in Korea. In 1801, 1839, 1846, and 1866 hundreds of Catholics died for their faith. As noted earlier, the initial conflict over the proper performance of mourning ritual was more a symptom than a cause of the rift between Confucians and Catholics. Paul Yun and his associates abandoned the basic assumptions and values of their civilization when they gave priority to their

personal vision of truth over the Confucian conception of morality. Those Catholics believed the individual's relationship to God more important than his relationship to his fellow man. When the demands of Confucian society conflicted with the demands of their God, they followed God. No matter how beneficial to society the ancestor memorial service might have been, it violated God's command to refrain from idolatry and therefore could not be tolerated.

The conflict between Confucianism and Catholicism was fueled by the friction between radically different views of what it meant for a person to be moral. The Confucian picture of virtue entailed being a good member of society: serving parents faithfully while they were alive, honoring them properly after their death, obeying the dictates of secular superiors, and living in peaceful harmony with neighbors. Individual self-interest was supposed to be sacrificed to the needs of the hierarchical human community. Selfishness would be overcome in selfless immersion in the common good and in selfless obedience to the demands of society. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, taught that virtue meant obedience to God's commands as interpreted by his Church. Kings and parents were to be obeyed only insofar as their commands did not conflict with the laws of God. Selfishness would be conquered only by those who subordinated all selfish interests, individual

and societal, to the commands of God. Personal salvation for eternity was the reward for those who let faith in that God above guide their actions on the earth below.

This was a challenge to the social morality of Confucianism that could not have been hidden by a Catholic toleration of the ancestor memorial service. Catholic doctrine denied the Confucian emphasis on human relationships as the proper determinant of moral behavior. Confucianism taught what men should do to create a better world in this life. That goal, in Catholic eyes, was superficial and shallow. Catholicism taught what men should believe in order to win eternal life in a better world after death. That aim, to most Confucians, was immoral and absurd.

As long as Catholicism emphasized the personal pursuit of truth and salvation over the elimination of selfishness through submission to society as a whole, conflict was unavoidable. Confucians charged that the Catholic insistence on man's obedience to God forced believers to slight their responsibilities to the society in which they lived. Catholics countered that the Confucian stress on social obligations ignored the larger question of who created society and for what purposes He did so. Confucians insisted that Catholics fostered a selfish individuality that rent the moral fabric of the cosmos. Catholics answered that Neo-Confucians wove a net of

principle and material force that kept the individual soul from God.

Such radically different views of the meaning and purpose of human existence could not be reconciled. The potential for conflict between man's obligation to live in harmony with his fellow human beings and his duty to follow his personal vision of truth will remain as long as there is more than one person living on this planet earth. Such a conflict cost the lives of Paul Yun and James Kw^Uŏn in 1791.

Neither Catholic Confucians nor Confucian Catholics escaped unscathed from that tragic incident. Any hope for compatibility between Confucianism and Catholicism collapsed in the face of violent, implacable opposition from their government and their fellow Confucian literati. The expressions of incredulity and moral outrage, emanating from their more orthodox contemporaries, that met their protestations that Catholic dogma supported Confucian morality convinced Korea's Catholics that neither their state nor their society would allow them to claim to be both Catholic and Confucian. They had to choose between submission to the mores and authorities of this world, as Confucianism demanded, or obedience to what they believed was the will of God relayed through the representatives of the Roman Catholic Church.

Catholic Confucians abandoned their Catholic ideas and

practices in order to survive and be accepted as Confucian. Confucian Catholics recognized that their new religion required total alienation from their Confucian culture. Those who stayed within the Confucian fold preserved the traditional understanding of truth as defined by the good and sacrificed their individual religious beliefs to the ethical political demands of the Confucian community. Those who chose the Catholic path held truth high as the touchstone of the good and severed their ties with anyone who clung to Confucian practices. The unbridgeable gulf between the Confucian East and the Christian West now divided Korea as well.

Notes to Chapter Eight

1. A manuscript purported to be by Yi Pyŏk surfaced a few years back. This Songgyo yoji [Essential teachings of our holy faith] appears to be a Chinese rather than a Korean work. Its language, including references to social structure and everyday life, is pure Chinese with no mention of any uniquely Korean customs, institutions, or conditions. Moreover, the Songgyo yoji is mentioned by none of the contemporary records which otherwise discuss Yi Pyŏk's proselytizing activities in great detail. Finally, the author of the Songgyo yoji displays a much more sophisticated understanding of Catholic doctrine and the geographical detail of Biblical stories than anyone in Korea in Korea was likely to have at that time. A Korean priest, Yi Songbae, and a Korean nun, Kim Okhui, disagree with this assessment and treat the Songgyo yoji as a model of indigenous Korean theology. See Kim Okhui, Kwangam Yi Pyŏk ūi sŏhak sasang [Yi Pyŏk's Catholic Thought] (Seoul: Catholic Press, 1979); Yi Songbae, Yugyo wa kuristogyo [Confucianism and Christianity] (Waegwan, Korea: Benedict Press, 1979).
2. Chŏng Yagyong, Chŏng Tasan chŏnsŏ, II, 4: 1a-b.
3. Ibid., II, 3: 8a-9b; II, 4: 9b-10b.
4. Ibid., I, 21: 34a-35b; II, 3: 25a.
5. Analects, 6:20 (Waley, p. 120).
6. Chŏng Tasan chŏnsŏ, I, 15: 34b.
7. Ibid., II, 6: 21a-24b.
8. Ibid., II, 3: 6a-7b; 4: 5b-8b.
9. Michael Kalton, "Chŏng Tasan's Philosophy of Man: A Radical Critique of the Neo-Confucian World View", Journal of Korean Studies, 3 (1981), p.18.
10. Chŏng Tasan chŏnsŏ, III, 5: 34b-35b; 6: 19a-b.
11. Ibid., II, 4: 8b-9a.
12. Chan, Sourcebook, p. 785.
13. Wm. Theodore DeBary, Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the

Learning of the Mind-and-Heart (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p.14.

14. Chapter Six (Catholic Assumptions and Neo-Confucian Presumptions), p.194-5.
15. Chong Tasan chŏnsŏ, II, 3: 4b-5b.
16. Ibid., II, 4: 22b-23b.
17. Ch'oe Tonghŭi, "Tasan ŭi sin'gwan" [Tasan's concept of God], Han'guk sasang, no. 15 (1977), pp.106-34; Han Chongman, "Tasan ŭi Ch'on'gwan" [Tasan's concept of Heaven], Tasan hakbo, 2 (1979), pp.121-49; Ha Ubong, "Chŏng Tasan ŭi sŏhakgwan'gae ŭi taehan ilgoch'al" [A look at Chŏng Tasan's relationship with Catholicism], Kyohoesa yŏn'gu, 1 (1977), pp.71-112, esp. pp.97-101.
18. Pak Chonghong, "Taesŏgujŏk segyegwan kwa Tasan ŭi susagugwan" [Tasan's Confucian fundamentalism and his attitude toward the West], Sirhak non'chong (Kwangju, Chonnam, Korea: Chŏnnam University Press, 1975), pp.97-125. For Tasan's denial of Catholicism in his own words, see Chong Tasan chŏnsŏ, I, 9: 42b-46b; 16: 1a-4b.
19. Dallet, pp.34-5.
20. Sisto Antonia Rosso, Apostolic Legations to China of the Eighteenth Century (South Pasadena: P.D. and Ione Perkins, 1948).
21. A recent study of chesa in contemporary Korea, and how much folk traditions have influenced what was formally a Confucian ritual, see Roger L. Janelli and Dawnhee Yim Janelli, Ancestor Worship and Korean Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). Another detailed description of chesa can be found in Griffin Dix, "How to do things with ritual: The logic of Ancestor Worship and other offerings in rural Korea," Studies on Korea in Transition, ed. David McCann, John Middleton, and Edward Shultz (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1979), pp.57-88.
22. Jonathan D. Spence, Emperor of China: Self-Portrait of K'ang-hsi (New York: Vintage Books), 1974, p. 79.
23. Li Chi, as translated by Derk Bodde in A History of Chinese Philosophy, Feng Yu-lan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), Vol. I, p.350.
24. C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1961), p.48.

25. Yi Ik, Sŏngho sasŏl, 16: 28b-30a.
26. An Chŏngbok, Sunam sŏnsaeng munjip, 17: 24b-25a.
27. Hsun Tzu, translated in Sources of Chinese Tradition, ed. by DeBary, Chan, and Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p.110.
28. Yang, Religion, pp.28-53, 253-55.
29. Dallet, pp.37-8.
30. Yi Kigyong, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp.27-29.
31. Ibid., pp.29-30.
32. Ibid., pp.39-42.
33. Dallet, pp.42-53.
34. ibid., p.48.
35. Ibid., p.49.
36. Ibid., p.47.
37. Ibid. p.43.
38. Ibid., p.47.
39. Ibid., pp.47-8. A version of Yun's statement similar to that found in Dallet can be found in sillok, Chŏngjo 15, 11, muin (1791).
40. Analects, 3:12.
41. Dallet, pp.53-4.
42. Yi Kigyong, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp.110-14.
43. Ibid., pp.114-118; Dallet, pp.57-9.
44. Yi Kigyŏng, Pyŏgwip'yŏn, pp.218-9; Dallet, pp.60-1. For a report by a staunch Neo-Confucian impressed by Ch'oe's integrity and moral courage, see Hong Yang'ho, Igye Hong Yangho chŏnsŏ, 27: 19b-23a.
45. Dallet, p. 61.

Chapter Nine

Conclusion

The eighteenth century Korean confrontation with Catholicism exposed an underlying guiding impulse behind Korean Neo-Confucianism. From the anti-Catholic essays and memorials, and from the few surviving pro-Catholic documents as well, a picture has emerged of a world view in which the demands of organicistic morality outweighed the claims of analytical rationality. Korean Neo-Confucian thinkers wanted the truth, but the truth they sought was usable truth, truth that would serve their moral aim of integration into the human community and the cosmic nexus. They showed less interest in truth that promised little more than correspondence between solitary thoughts and isolated facts.

The Jesuits argued in volume after volume of fluent, even eloquent, Chinese that the Catholic religion was true to the literal meaning of theistic passages in the oldest works in the Confucian canon. The missionaries from Europe were probably correct in identifying theistic statements in the earliest Chinese writings. Those Korean Neo-Confucians unconvinced by the missionaries' tracts, however, were

usually more interested in whether or not Catholicism conformed to the moral message their tradition read into those canonical writings. Truth not supporting kong, truth that did not aid man's integration into the universal network of principle, was to them a contradiction in Neo-Confucian terms.

There was no precise equivalent of the Western term "truth" in the Neo-Confucian lexicon. The closest to a synonym might be chilli (真理), "real principle." However, chilli traditionally referred to principles governing those correct attitudes and actions which promoted appropriate interaction with nature and within the human community. Chilli rarely, if ever, referred to those principles of correspondence between thought and thing which Thomists meant by truth. Neo-Confucian truth defined what was proper, not what was real.

The purpose of this Neo-Confucian truth was the realization of total harmonious cooperation within society and within the cosmos, with each element playing its assigned role in a hierarchically ordered universal pattern. Orthodox Neo-Confucian moralists strove to eliminate all divisive selfish interests and biases so that heaven, earth, and man could form a unified organism animated by the ethical web of inter-relationships they called i. Catholicism, with its stress on individual salvation earned by obedience to a God who transcended

human society and the natural world, threatened this Neo-Confucian vision of the ultimate good. To conventional Neo-Confucian eyes, the doctrines of Catholicism were permeated with sa and led to a fragmented universe in which men were torn from their society and alienated from nature by selfish greed for other-worldly rewards.

Of course, no generalization concerning a school of thought as broad, old, and diverse as Korean Neo-Confucianism is likely to be universally applicable. There most assuredly were Neo-Confucians in Korea, besides those influenced by Catholicism, who did not share the precise concepts of truth and morality delineated in this study. Nevertheless, the contrast drawn here between Korean Neo-Confucianism and Jesuit Thomism illuminates several central assumptions of Yi dynasty thought which clash sharply with presumptions of approximately equal weight in the pre-modern West.

Unanimity is not required to validate the thesis of fundamental incompatibility. Clearly not all Korean Confucians considered Catholicism a selfish repudiation of hallowed moral principles. Those who adopted a stand sympathetic to Catholicism, however, found themselves at odds with the vast majority of their fellow literati. The converts' denial of irreconcilable conflict could not erase the actual antagonism Catholicism inspired in a Neo-Confucian world. The conversion of a few does not prove

that accommodation was possible; on the contrary, the widespread animosity the converts encountered is strong evidence that no Confucian could become a true Catholic in eighteenth century Korea without ultimately abandoning Confucianism.

No one could assert the existence of a transcendent divine personality without lessening the role of i. No one could embrace the Christian notion of the afterlife without devaluing secular obligations. No one could divide reality between the spiritual and the material without undermining the search for cosmic harmony. And no one could allow religious dogma to predominate without challenging the preeminence of morality.

This list of competing premises is by no means exhaustive. Nor does that list offer a complete explanation of the Korean response of Catholicism. As is often the case with doctoral dissertations, this study raises at least as many questions as it answers.

For example, Korea is now one of the most Christian regions in Asia. At least twenty percent of the population of the Republic of Korea professes belief in Christ. Yet two centuries ago Catholicism and Neo-Confucianism met as implacable adversaries. Did Koreans abandon the conceptual framework of their forefathers for one more compatible with Christianity? If so, when and how did that transformation take place? Perhaps that question is misleading. Maybe

there was no major alteration in the way the majority of Koreans thought. The Neo-Confucianism examined here was the philosophy of the minority ruling class of landlords and scholars. The peasantry were more comfortable with talk of immaterial beings and promises of life after death. The current proliferation of Christian churches on the peninsula, rather than invalidating the thesis of this dissertation, might instead merely point to the victory of the folk culture over the elite traditions of the Yi.

Another phenomenon left unaccounted is for the extreme vehemence of the Korean reaction. Why, for example, did Korea move so quickly and so violently against its first Catholics when Ming China, equally Neo-Confucian, had allowed prominent converts such as Paul Hsu Kuang-ch'i to hold important government posts? Why did the staunchly Buddhist Japanese tolerate the presence of European missionaries on their soil for decades longer than Korea tolerated the existence of a native Christian church?

One explanation could lie in the practical benefits which China and Japan received from the Catholic presence. In the sixteenth century feudal lords fought for hegemony over a splintered Japan. The trade and firearms European missionaries had to offer, appealed to warring daimyo, who hungered for the wealth and strength that might prove the winning edge. In China the Jesuits offered accurate techniques of calendrical calculation. Since the precision

of the official calendar reflected on the legitimacy of the ruling house, the authorities in Peking may have found the Jesuit contribution worth its price of religious toleration. Korea was a different case. The Catholics there were native sons who had no rare foreign goods or skills to sell. Korea's Catholics had nothing to offer Korea except Catholicism.

The intensity of Korean anti-Catholicism may also have been a product of a stronger emphasis on kong and sa than was present in the Chinese version of Neo-Confucianism, adding an element of self-righteousness absent elsewhere. The political climate could also have been partially responsible for the violence of the persecutions. The yangban elite was rent by bitter factional divisions that had already taken many lives over the two centuries preceding the arrival of Catholicism. Anti-Catholicism in Korea did not begin as a factional issue. The first Catholics and the first vocal anti-Catholics were friends and fellow members of the Namin faction. However, having grown accustomed to the spectacle of Confucians killing Confucians over ostensibly ritual issues, Koreans may have felt that Catholics, who impugned the most sacred ritual of all, deserved treatment no less severe. In addition, anti-Catholic namin such as Hong Nagan and Yi Kigyong may have felt impelled to call for the harshest possible penalties against the minority of Namin who were Catholic

in order to protect the rest of their faction against attack for being responsible for the growth of that dangerous heterodoxy.

Why did Catholicism surface in this hidebound atmosphere fraught with danger for non-conformists? In chapters six and seven it was argued that the first Koreans attracted to Catholicism were mostly young students of Neo-Confucianism who became convinced that Catholicism was compatible with their Confucian values. They originally seized upon the Christian God in order to anchor Confucian ethics in the personal ground lacking in Neo-Confucianism, built on the impersonal Great Ultimate.

These chapters did not explain why Catholicism did not win any converts sooner. Jesuit publications in Chinese had been circulating on the peninsula for a century and a half before Yi Sunghun returned from Peking a baptized Catholic. What had changed in the last decades of the eighteenth century to make a few Koreans more receptive to the Jesuit marketing of European religion than any of their forefathers had been? If, as was argued, the road to Catholicism was paved by dissatisfaction with Neo-Confucianism's failure to provide the moral strength it promised, why did that dissatisfaction arise in the 1780s instead of in the 1680s?

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were apparently a time of accelerating unsettling socioeconomic

change in Korea. The traditional agrarian society was under attack from commercialization and the adulteration of the yangban class.¹ The actual extent of increased social mobility and the expansion of the market economy is uncertain. That many important Neo-Confucian scholars of that time believed they were witnessing ominous changes in their society is undeniable. An increased urgency in both reform proposals and social criticism in the late eighteenth century points to a growing sense of distress and bewilderment as the rigid heirarchical agrarian society that was the Confucian ideal appeared to be dissolving. Even the peasantry displayed signs of insecurity. In 1756, for the first time in the history of the Yi dynasty, a millenarian Buddhist revolt rumbled across central Korea, engulfing several counties in Hwanghae and Kyonggi provinces before it was suppressed.²

The privileged classes usually express their discontent in a less violent manner. An upper class whose position is being undermined by shifts in the social, economic, or political system that gives it its power, status, and wealth often responds intellectually rather than physically. Individual members of that class respond in different ways. Some may display the mental flexibility to exploit the new opportunities they see ahead; others may try to dam the tides of history by reviving old values which they hope can resist the threatening changes; a third

group may simply turn its attention elsewhere and ignore disquieting ripples in the world around them. The Pukhākp'a ("School of Northern Learning"), a group of late eighteenth-century writers who advocated the promotion of technology, markets, and foreign trade, represent the first approach. Yi Ik, with his call for rolling back the intrusion of commerce into farming villages, represents the second. The early Korean Catholics may have represented the third.

There were exceptions, of course. Chōng Tasa^un, though sympathetic to Catholicism, was very close to the Pukhākp'a. In many of his writings he offered concrete suggestions for adapting to the changing socioeconomic order. However, the vast majority of the Catholic yangban showed little or no interest in commercial or economic matters. When the government seized Catholic libraries throughout Korea in the persecution of 1801, it found nothing but religious publications.³ The many Jesuit works on irrigation, technology, medicine, and natural science apparently had little appeal to those who looked to the West for spiritual rather than material guidance.

Some contemporary historians have argued that Catholicism represented a protest against the strictures of the feudal order.⁴ Yet the first Korean Catholics claimed to uphold filial piety and loyalty, the cornerstones of that order. They voiced no complaints against the

prevailing social system. Though they awarded supreme dominion to God, implicitly challenging the theoretical roots of secular authorities' claims to ultimate legitimacy, those Catholics refused to acknowledge the threat their religious beliefs posed to the ideological underpinnings of the society in which they lived. The Church of the pioneer Korean Catholics was not a protest movement. The Catholics believed they were reaffirming, not denying, the best elements of their tradition. In doing so, however, they unconsciously rejected the political concern that was the core of traditional orthodox Confucianism. They turned their backs on the social and economic problems of their times and escaped into the realm of the supernatural, replacing a dedication to the secular goals of society with a search for personal salvation. Rather than directly challenging the social structure, they treated it as ultimately irrelevant, freeing themselves from undue concern over either its inequities or its instability.

To those who sought to harness the forces of historical change, to those who worked to hold back the future, and even to that vast majority who remained confused as to what policy was best in Korea's changing socioeconomic environment --for all those in the mainstream of Yi dynasty thought--the traditional humanistic world view remained sound. No matter whether the means they advocated was

progressive or reactionary, no matter whether they wanted to enlarge the roads to market towns or to decrease the frequency of market days, their final goal was the same. They all wanted to build a harmonious community out of hierarchical relationships of reciprocal responsibility which provided security and stability for every member of society. Only the Catholics rejected a better terrestrial community as the ultimate aim of all moral endeavor.

Catholic doctrines were a direct challenge to the moral vision at the heart of traditional Korean values. Korea's anti-Catholic Neo-Confucians charged that the Catholic doctrine of heaven and hell was absurd and the Christian belief in a divinity who personally rewarded individual good behavior and punished evil was dangerous. Such teachings turned men's minds away from their community. These Neo-Confucians equated concern for personal salvation with selfishness which threatened to unravel the social fabric. They placed such narrow self-interest at the root of all immoral teachings in the Confucian past.

Matteo Ricci and his successors in China attempted to present Catholicism as a fulfillment of the kong spirit of pristine Confucianism. Neo-Confucians in Korea perceived Christianity instead as merely the latest version of the many barbarian religions which had existed on China's borders for centuries and had been rejected and condemned by true Confucians. To most Koreans in the eighteenth

century the personal rewards promised by Catholic missionaries tempted men to abandon their tradition, to rebel against their rulers, and to neglect their families, their ancestors, and their community. In the Neo-Confucian world, Catholicism at its core appeared anti-social and therefore immoral and unacceptable.

In addition to these serious contradictions of Confucian social morality, Catholicism also promoted cognitive assumptions that injected sa into the Neo-Confucian universe of kong. In both cosmology and epistemology, the medieval philosophy preached by the Jesuits in China denied the fundamental ontological cosmic unity which provided the metaphysical foundation for Neo-Confucian values.

The Jesuits traveled to Peking armed with the latest Western advances in astronomy and calendrical science. They intended to use the accuracy of European predictions of celestial movement to claim superior insight into the structure and origins of the universe. The missionaries argued that the precision of their calendars was proof that they knew how the universe was made. They expected their East Asian audience to admit that the "heavenly learning" from the West provided an accurate description of cosmic order. They assumed further that this admission would lead to the recognition that that order had been created by a divine Orderer. After all, the argument for the existence

of God from the existence of order in the universe had a long history in the West, predating even Christianity itself.

The Jesuit expectations were wrong. Neo-Confucians did not deny that the universe was orderly, nor, after a brief period of indecision, did they deny that Western astronomy was superior to anything indigenous East Asian science had to offer. What Neo-Confucians did deny was a split between the order in the universe and that which made the universe orderly.

In the traditional Christian world view, God was totally beyond and above the material world, existing as the transcendental, supernatural, external creator and sustainer of the universe. Neo-Confucianism, on the other hand, was a philosophy of immanence that posited no need for such extrinsic explanations of existence. In Neo-Confucian cosmogony, the cosmos was self-created and self-organizing. God was excluded from this self-sufficient universe.

Moreover, the Catholic assertion of the existence of a transcendent Creator implied that every man, along with every thing that existed, was directly dependent on God for his existence. This Catholic declaration of the total dependency of finite existence on an infinite Being was a repudiation of the total ontological inter-dependency that bound the Neo-Confucian universe together and gave it its

self-sufficiency. All things could not be one substance in a universe inhabited by the Catholic God. Since an acknowledgment of essential inter-dependence was a prerequisite to kong, Catholic astronomy and cosmogony, as well as the metaphysics that accompanied them, were contaminated by sa and tore man away from the natural world selflessness would have drawn him closer to.

Thomistic epistemology also shattered the unity of being which Neo-Confucians sought to foster. Scholastic philosophers raised barriers between thought and thing, between the mental and the material realms. They denied it was possible for the mind to know anything directly, insisting instead that knowledge could only come indirectly, through abstractions filtered through the senses and extracted from individual sensory impressions by the mind's cognitive processes.

There was no such mind-matter dichotomy in Neo-Confucianism. Koreans rejected the Western distinction between the subject as knower and the object as known as foolishly egocentric. Their investigation of things was supposed to erase the very barriers between man and his environment which Catholic Scholasticism solidified. The cultivation of kong and the eradication of sa were the ultimate aims of the Neo-Confucian extension of knowledge. Neo-Confucians held that true knowledge allowed men to overcome the biased perspective of isolated individuality

and the distortions introduced by selfishness. Then men would recognize that the principles in the external world and the principles in their own mind were one. An insistence on maintaining a sharp separation between subject and object would instead block the intended unifying effect of Neo-Confucian cognition. Knowledge which was supposed to cultivate kong would nurture sa instead.

Moral incompatibility fueled the eighteenth-century rejection of Catholicism. Yet the consequences were political. The blood of Paul Yun and James Kwon splattered on the ground in front of the P'unngnam Gate in Ch'onju provided an exclamation point to the Yi dynasty's stern no to contact with the West.

The West Korea rejected was not the modern West. Essential hallmarks of modern civilization--the rejection of the authority of tradition, a mathematical-mechanical picture of nature, and the separation of religion and science--were absent in the version of European culture the Jesuits represented. However, because the West Korea first encountered was inseparable from Catholicism, Korea began to regard all elements of Western culture as inherently dangerous. Their eighteenth-century experience made them leery in the nineteenth. When Western merchants and diplomats first approached, Korea bolted its gates.

Perhaps if in the eighteenth century Korea had glimpsed

a less threatening West, one stripped of the theology, philosophy, and evangelizing zeal of the Jesuits, the nineteenth-century reaction may have been less fearful. If Koreans had had more contact with the Dutch, for example, the eventual opening to modern civilization might have been less traumatic. A Korea free to learn from the West in the first half of the nineteenth century would have been better prepared to cope with the challenges of the second half.

The Jesuit publications that introduced European civilization to Koreans provoked a rigid anti-foreign sentiment which later crippled Korea's initial response to the modern world. That negative impact on Korean history is the strongest legacy of the Catholic mission on Korea today. Nevertheless, the Jesuit record on the peninsula cannot be belittled. The cosmological and ethical chasms between Neo-Confucianism and Catholicism were so deep and so wide that the conversion of any Koreans at all is quite a remarkable accomplishment. To bring Neo-Confucians to a Christian perspective on the world required a 180° degree turn in their outlook on life, man, society, and the universe, accompanied by a willingness to risk the anger of relatives, the scorn of neighbors, and the wrath of the Yi dynasty government.

To men who were content with the non-theistic philosophy of immanence that was Neo-Confucianism, to men who defined morality as overcoming selfish interests and

divisive individuality in order to become attuned to the universal flow of events which should guide all behavior, Catholicism was intolerable. Catholic doctrines of God and the afterlife, as well as Catholic concepts of the cosmos and of cognition, appeared rooted in sa, in a selfish orientation toward the individual rather than the community, and toward man as apart from the cosmos instead of as a part of the universal natural order. To these Neo-Confucians, it was clear that if Catholicism were allowed to spread, men would turn their backs on their parents, their ancestors, their communities, their society, and their government to seek personal salvation. Enticed by the accomplishments of Western science or fascinated by the intricacies of Western philosophy, men would grow blind to the ties that joined them to the world around them and would be unable to recognize the principles that should govern their actions in that world.

It was a duty of a Confucian statesman to enforce the harmonious cooperation of man with man and of men with nature. Any Korean official who feared Catholicism would have a corrosive effect on basic societal bonds was therefore obligated to use the political instruments at his disposal to eradicate the Catholic threat. When basic moral values are involved, toleration is not a viable alternative. When the survival of the state is at stake, the government can remain neither passive nor permissive.

Whether or not Paul Yun and James Kwon had burned their ancestral tablets, conflict between Korean Catholicism and Neo-Confucianism was inevitable. The conflict may have been less bloody, but nevertheless conflict would have come. As long as Neo-Confucianism dominated the thinking of the ruling elite on the peninsula, and as long as the socioeconomic system which supported Neo-Confucianism remained undamaged by Western and Japanese commercial advances, Korean Catholicism was doomed to remain a persecuted minority sect in a hostile land.

Notes For Chapter Nine

1. Kim Yongsŏp, Chosŏn hugi nongŏpsa yŏn'gu [Studies in the Agrarian History of the Yi Dynasty] (Seoul: Iljogak, 1970-71); Kam Man'gil, Chosŏn hugi sangŏp chabon ūi paldal [The Development of Commercial Capital in the Latter Half of the Yi Dynasty] (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1973); Chun Shin-yong (Chŏn Sinyong), Economic Life in Korea (Seoul: International Cultural Foundation, 1978); Kim Young-mo (Kim Yongmo), "The Conceptualization of Social Strata and Its Changing Structure during the late Yi dynasty", Social Science Journal, 9 (1979), pp. 107-25.
2. An Chŏngbok, Sunamjip, 17: 12b-13a.
3. Sahak chingŭi, pp. 379-86.
4. Cho Kwang, "Sinyu pakhae ūi punsŏkjŏk koch'al" [An analysis of the causes of the 1801 persecution], Kyohoesa yŏn'gu, 1 (1977), pp. 41-74.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

- An Ch'ongbok. Sunamjip [Collected writings of An Ch'ongbok]. Preface dated 1900.
- Ch'ae Chegong. P'ŏnamjip [Collected writings of Ch'ae Chegong]. Preface dated 1924.
- Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I. Erh Ch'eng ch'üan shu [The complete works of the Ch'eng brothers]. (Shanghai: Chung-hwa shu-chü, 1936).
- Ch'ong Yagyong. Ch'ong Tasan ch'önsö [The complete works of Ch'ong Yagyong]. (Seoul: Munhon p'yönch'an wiwönhoe, 1960-1).
- Chosön wangjo sillok [The veritable records of the Yi dynasty]. (Seoul: Kuksa p'yönch'an wiwönhoe, 1955-58).
- Ch'ungbo munhön pigo [The official encyclopedia of Korea, revised and updated]. 1908 edition (Seoul: Tongguk munhwasa, 1959).
- Dallet, Charles. Histoire de L'Eglise De Corea (Paris: Victor Palme, 1874).
- "Habin sonsaeng nyönbo" [A chronology of the life of Sin Hudam], reprinted in Asea yön'gu, 15, 2 (1972), pp.197-219.
- Hong Yangho. Igyejip [Collected writings of Hong Yangho] (Seoul: Minjok munhwasa, 1982).
- Hö Kyun. Hö Kyun chonjip [The complete works of Hö Kyun] (Seoul: Songgyun'gwan Taehakkyo Taedong munhwa yön'guso, 1972).
- Hong Taeyong. Tamhönso [The writings of Hong Taeyong] (Seoul: Kyongin munhwasa, 1969).
- Hsu Kwang-ch'i, ed. T'ien-chu-chiao tung-chuan wen hsien hsu-pien [Additional materials on the Catholic mission to the East] (Taipei: Taiwan Student Bookstore, 1965).

- Hwang Sayǒng. Hwang Sayǒng paeksǒ [The Silk Letter of Hwang Sayǒng] ed. and trans. by Yun Chaeyong (Seoul: Chǒngnyǒn, 1975).
- Hwang Tǒgil. Haryǒ sǒnsaeng munjip [The collected works of Hwang Tǒgil] Preface dated 1918.
- I Ching [The Book of Changes]. The Richard Wilhelm translation, rendered into English by Cary R. Baynes (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967).
- Kim Manjung. Sop'ojip [The collected works of Kim Manjung] (Seoul: Tongmun'gwan, 1977).
- Kim Yuk Chamgok chǒnjip [The complete works of Kim Yuk] (Seoul: Taedong munhwa yon'guso, 1975).
- Kukcho pogam [Yi dynasty chronicles]. 1908 edition (Seoul: Sejong Taewang kinyǒm saophoe, 1976).
- Legge, James. Editor and translator. The Chinese Classics, volumes one through five (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960).
- Li Chih-tsao, ed. T'ien-hsúeh ch'u-han [An introduction to Heavenly Learning] (Taipei: Taiwan Student Bookstore, 1963).
- _____, ed. Ch'ǒnhak ch'oham (Korean reprint of T'ien-hsúeh ch'u-han, Seoul: Asea munhwasá, 1976).
- Pak Chega, Chǒngyujip pu Pukhagúi [The collected works of Pak Chega plus the Essay on Northern Learning] (Seoul: Tamgudang, 1974).
- Pak Chiwǒn. Yǒnamjip [The collected works of Pak Chiwǒn] (Seoul: Kyongin munhwasá, 1974).
- Ricci, Matteo. T'ien-chu shih-i [The True Lord of Heaven] (Seoul reprint under the title Ch'ǒnju silui, Seoul: Kwangdoksá, 1972),
- Sahak chingúi [A warning against Catholicism] (Seoul: Pulhan munhwasam 1977).
- Ssu-ku ch'úan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao [An annotated bibliography of books in the Ssu-ku ch'úan-shu] (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1933).
- Taemyǒngnyul chik'ae [The Ming law codes explained] (Seoul: Pǒpjech'o, 1964).

- Yi Hŏn'gyŏng. Kanongjip. [The collected works of Yi Hŏn'gyŏng]. Preface dated 1797.
- Yi Hwang. T'oegye chŏnsŏ [The complete works of Yi Hwang] (Seoul: Songgyun'gwan Taehakkyo Taehan munhwa yŏn'guso, 1958).
- Yi I. Yulgok chŏnsŏ [The complete works of Yi I] (Seoul: Songgyun'gwan Taehakkyo Taedong munhwa yŏn'guso, 1958).
- Yi Ik. Sŏngho sasol (The miscellaneous writings of Yi Ik] (Seoul: Minjok munhwa ch'ujin hoe, 1977-78).
- Sŏngho sŏnsaeng munjip [The collected works of Yi Ik] (Seoul: Kyŏngin munhwasa, 1974).
- Yi Imyŏng. Sojaejip [The collected works of Yi Imyŏng]. Preface dated 1759.
- Yi Kigyŏng, ed. Pyŏgwip'yŏn [In defense of orthodoxy against heterodoxy] (Seoul: Kyghoesa yŏn'guso, 1979). This is the original Pyŏgwip'yŏn, compiled shortly after 1801, on which the Pyŏgwip'yŏn of Yi Manch'ae is partially based.
- Yi Manch'ae, ed. Pyŏgwip'yŏn (Seoul: Yolhwadang, 1971).
- Yi Sugwang. Chibong yusŏl [Classified writings of Yi Sugwang] (Seoul: Ulyusa, 1975)
- Yu Mongin. Ŭujip [The collected works of Yu Mongin] (Seoul: Kyongmunsa, 1979).

Asian Language Secondary Sources

- Akagi Nihei. "Chŏsen ni okeru tenshukyō o ryūnyū to tenrei mondai ni tsuite" [The introduction of Catholicism into Korea and the Rites controversy], Shigaku zasshi, 5, nos. 6, pp.707-36, 7, pp.847-81, 8, pp.1023-62 (1940).
- Chen Shou-yi. "Ming-mo Yehsu hui-shih te Juchiao kuan chi ch'i fan-hsiang" [The reaction of the Jesuits to Confucianism in the late Ming], in Chen Shou-yi, et. al., Ming-tai tsung-chiao [Religions in the Ming dynasty] (Taipei: Taiwan Student Bookstore, 1968), pp.67-123.
- Ch'en Yuan. "Ts'ung chiao-wai tien-chi so chien Ming-mo Ch'ing-ch'u chih T'ien-chu Chiao" [A glimpse of the Catholic missions in China, sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, from the writings of non-Catholic

- authors], Kuo-li Pei-p'ing t'ushu kuan kuan-k'an, 8 (March-April, 1934), pp.1-31.
- Cho Kwang. "Ch'ae Chegong ūi Sōhakgwān yōn'gu" [Ch'ae Chegong and his attitude toward Catholicism], Sach'ong, 17-18 (Feb. 1973), pp.305-27.
- _____. "Sinyu pakhae ūi punsōkjōk koch'al" [An analysis of the causes of the 1801 persecution], Kyohoesa yōn'gu 1 (1977), pp.41-74.
- Ch'oe Ch'anggyu. Han'guk ūi sasang [Korean Thoughts] (Seoul: Somundang, 1973).
- Ch'oe Ikhan. Sirhakup'a wa Chōng Tasan [The School of Practical Learning and Chong Tasan] (P'yōngyang, Kungnip ch'ulpanbu, 1955).
- Ch'oe Sogu. Han'guk Ch'ōnjugyohoesa nonmun sōnjip [A selection of articles on the history of the Korean Catholic Church], (Seoul: Han'guk kyohoesa yōn'guso, 1976) vol. 1.
- _____. "Ch'ōnjugyo seryok ūi hwakdae" [The spread of Catholicism], Kuksa p'yōnch'an wiwōnhoe, ed. Han'guk sa, vol.15 (Seoul, 1975), pp. 155-285.
- _____. "Ch'ōnjugyo ūi suyong" [The acceptance of Catholicism], Kuksa p'yōnch'an wiwōnhoe, ed. Han'guk sa, vol.14 (Seoul, 1975), pp. 88-123.
- _____. "Sahak Chingūirul t'onghaeso pon ch'ogi Ch'ōnju kyohoe" [Early Korean Catholicism as seen in the Sahak chingui], Kyohoesa yōn'gu, 2 (1979), pp.3-47.
- Ch'oe Soja. "17-18 Segi Hanyōk sōhaksō e taehan yōn'gu: Chungguk kwa Han'guk ūi sadaebu ege mich'in yōngyang" [Western books translated into Chinese in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and their influence on the literati of China and Korea], Han'guk munhwa yōn'guwōn nonch'ong, no. 39 (1981), pp.79-111.
- Ch'oe Tonghūi. "An Chōngbok ūi Sōhak pip'an egwanhan yōn'gu" [A study of An Chongbok's criticism of Catholicism], Asea yōn'gu, 19, 2 (July, 1976), pp.51-80.
- _____. "Tasan ūi sin'gwan" [Tasan's concept of God], Han'guk sasang, 15 (1977), pp. 106-34.
- Chong Sōngch'ōl. Sirhakup'a ūi chollak sasang kwa sahoe chōngch'ijōk kyōnhae. [The philosophy of the

School of Practical Learning and their social and political opinions] (P'yongyang: Sahoegwahak Press, 1974).

Chu Chaeyong. Kat'olliksa ūi unḡwi [A defense of Korean Catholic history] (Seoul: Korea Catholic Press, 1970).

_____, Sōnyu ūi Ch'ōnjusasang kwa chesa munje [Theism among early Confucians and the Rites question] (Seoul: Kyonghyang chapchisa, 1958).

_____, "Yamaguchi chō Chosen Seikyoshi ch'amjong" [Some errors in Yamaguchi's History of Korean Catholicism], in Yu Hongnyōl Paksa hwagap kinyomhoe, ed. Hyeam Yu Hongnyok Paksa hwagap kinyōn nonch'ong [Essays in honor of the sixtieth birthday of Dr. Yu Hongnyol] (Seoul: Tamgudang, 1971), pp. 482-98.

Chu Ch'ien-chih. "Yeh-su-hue tui-yu Sung-ju li-hsueh chih fan-hsiang" [The Jesuits' reaction to Neo-Confucianism], in Chen Shou-yi, et. al., Ming-tai tsung-chiao [Religions in the Ming dynasty] (Taipei: Taiwan Student Bookstore, 1968), pp.125-80.

Fang Hao. Fang Hao liu-shih tzu-ting kao [Selected works by Fang Hao] (Taipei: Taiwan Student Bookstore, 1969).

Goto Motomi. Mei-sei shiso to Kirisutokyo (Tokyo: Kenbun, 1979).

Ha Sōngnae. "Ch'ōnju kasa yōn'gu" [A study of Catholic hymns], Han'guk ōn'ō munhak, 8-9 (1970), pp.297-312.

_____, and Yi Sōngbae, trans. Sōnggyo yoji [The essential teachings of our Holy Faith]. Purported work by Yi Pyōk (Seoul: Catholic Press, 1976).

Ha Ubong. "Chōng Tasan ūi Sōhak gwan'gae ui taehan ilgoch'al" [A look at Chōng Tasan's relationship to Catholicism], Kyohoesa yōn'gu, 1 (1977), pp.71-112.

Han Chongman. "Tasan ūi Ch'ōn'gwan" [Tasan's concept of Heaven], Tasan hakbo, 2 (1979), pp. 121-49.

Han Uḡun (Han Woo-keun). Yijohugi ūi sahoe wa sasang [Thought and society in eighteenth century Korea] (Seoul: Ulyumunhwadang, 1976).

_____, Sōngho Yi Ik yōn'gu [A study of Sōngho Yi Ik] (Seoul: Han'guk munhwa yon'guso, 1981).

Han Yu. Han Ch'ang-li chi [The collected writings of Han

Yu] (Shanghai: Shanghai yinshukwan, 1936).

Han'guk hak. Vol. 19 (1978), Sunam tukjip [Special issue on An Chongbok].

_____. Vol. 20 (1979), Chibong tukjip [Special issue on Yi Sugwang].

Hong Yisop. Ch'ong Yagyong ūi ch'ongch'i kyongje sasang yon'gu [A study of the political and economic thought of Ch'ong Yagyong] (Seoul: Han'guk yon'gu Tosogwan, 1959).

_____, "Ch'ongh'ŏn Yi Kahwan e simun sobyu" [Fragments of the writings of Yi Kahwan], in Yi Pyongdo Paksa hwagap kiyomhoe, ed. Yi Pyondo Pakso hwagap kinyŏm nonmunjip [A collection of articles in honor of the sixtieth birthday of Dr. Yi Pyŏnddo] (Seoul, Iljogak, 1956), pp.451-67.

_____, "Pyŏgwip'yŏn p'ilja Yi Kigyŏng e ch'ŏn'gi ch'alyo" [Some documents on Yi Kigyŏng, the editor of the Pyŏgwip'yŏn], in Ch'oe Hyonbae sonsaeng Hwangap Kinyŏm monmunjip [A collection of essays in honor of Mr. Ch'oe Hyonbae's sixtieth birthday] (Seoul: Sasanggyesa, 1954), pp. 521-45.

_____, "Sirhal e inyomjŏk ilmo" [One model of Sirhak thought], Inmun kwahak, 1 (1956), pp.35-59.

_____, "Sowi Pyŏgwip'yŏn ūi hyŏngsŏng edaehayo" [On the Formation of the Pyŏgwip'yŏn], Inmun kwahak, 4 (1959), pp. 193-214.

Hsu Tsung-tse. Ming-Ch'ing-chien Yeh-su hui-shih i-chu t'i-yao [An annotated guide to the Chinese language publications of the Jesuits in Ming and Ch'ing China] (Taipei: Chung-hwa shu-chu, 1958).

Kang Chaeon. "Ch'osen denrai no Seiyō shōmoku" [A catalogue of Western books in Yi dynasty Korea], Shisō, no. 625 (July, 1976), pp. 107-29.

Kang Man'gil. Chosŏn hugi sangŏp chabon ūi paldal [The development of commercial capital in the Yi dynasty] (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1973).

Kim Han'gyu. "Sahak chinguirul t'onghaeso pon ch'ogi Han'guk Ch'ŏnju kyohoe ūi myotkaji munje" [The sahak chingui and some questions on the early Korean Catholic Church], Kyohoesa yon'gu, 2 (1979), pp.49-87.

- Kim Hansik. Sirhak ūi chongch'i sasang [Sirhak political thought] (Seoul Iljisa, 1979).
- Kim Kilhwan. Chosŏnjo yuhak sasang yŏn'gu [Studies on Confucian thought in the Yi dynasty] (Seoul: Iljogak, 1980).
- Kim Kubok. "Han'guk Ch'aech'o sinja Hong Yuhan igwanhan saryo palgyŏn" [The discovery of some documents on Hong Yuhan, Korea's first Catholic], Kat'ollik ch'ongnyŏn, vol. 19, no. 11 (1965), pp.60-72.
- Kim Kyongt'ak. Yulgok ūi yŏn'gu [A study of Yi I] (Seoul: Han'gukyon'gu tosowon, 1960).
- Kim Okhui. Kwangam Yi Pyŏk ūi Sŏhak sasang [The Catholic thought of Yi Pyŏk] (Seoul: The Catholic Press, 1979).
- _____, "Yuhandang Kwŏnssi ūi ŏnhaeng sillok egwanhan yŏn'gu" [A study of the "Onhaeng sillok" by Yuhandang Kwŏn], Han'guk hakbo, 8, no.2 (summer, 1980), pp.50-83.
- Kim T'aejin. Hong Taeyong kwa ku ūi sidae [Hong Taeyong and his times] (Seoul: Iljisa, 1982).
- Kim Yangsŏn. Maesan kukhak san'go [A few essays in Koreanology by Kim Yangson] (Seoul: Sungjon Taehakkyo museum, 1972).
- _____, "Ch'ŏnjugyo sŏnghaengsŏl egwanhan chaego" [A re-examination of some theories on the spread of Catholicism in Korea], Kidokkyo sasang, 8, no. 5 (1964), pp.39-45.
- Kim Yongdŏk. Chosŏn hugi sasang yŏn'gu [A study of thought in the latter part of the Yi dynasty] (Seoul: Ulyu munhwasa, 1977).
- Kim Yongho. "Tasanhak paeknyŏn" [One hundred years of Tasan studies], Han'guk sasang, 15 (1977), pp. 135-55.
- Kim Yongsŏp. Chosŏn hugi nongŏpsa yŏn'gu [Studies in the Agrarian History of the Yi dynasty] (Seoul: Iljogak, 1970-71).
- Koryo Taehakkyo minjok munhwa yŏn'guwon. Han'guk munhwasa taegye [An outline history of Korean culture], vol. 6 (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1974).
- Kŭm Changmo. "Kwisin sasaengnon kwa yugyo sŏhak kane nonbyŏn", Songgyun'gwandae nonmunjip, 17 (1972), pp.271-94.

- Kūm Changt'ae. Tongsō kyōsōp kwa kundai Han'guk sasang ūi ch'ui egwanhan yōn'gu [A study of changes in modern Korean thought prompted by contact with the West], unpublished doctoral dissertation, Songgyun'gwan University, 1978.
- _____, Han'guk yugyo ūi chaejomyōng [New light on Korean Confucianism] (Seoul: Chōnmangsa, 1982).
- _____, "Chosōn hugi yuhak sōhakkan ūi kyori nonjaeng kwa sasangjōk sōnggyōk" [The ideological conflict between Confucianism and Catholicism in the late Yi dynasty], Kyohoesa yōn'gu, 2 (1979), pp.89-139.
- _____, "Chōng Yagyong kwa Ch'ōnjugyo sinang" [Chong Yagyong and the Catholic faith], Han'guk hak, 24 (1981), pp.19-29.
- _____, "Ch'ōnjugyo ūi chollae wa sōgu sasang ui suyong" [The entrance of Catholicism into Korea and the acceptance of Western thought], Han'guk chorhaksa [The history of Korean philosophy], vol. 3 (Seoul: Tongmyōngsa, 1978).
- Pak Chonghong. "Taesōgujuk sagyegwan kwa Tasan ūi susagugwan" [Tasan's Confucian fundamentalism and his attitude toward the world], in Yi Urho Pakso hwagap kinyōmhoe, ed. Sirhak nonch'ong [Studies on Sirhak] (Kwangju, Korea: Chōnnam University Press, 1975), pp.97-125.
- Pak Sōngnae. "Han'guk kŭnse ūi sōgu kwahak suyong" [Western science in Korea, 1700-1860], Tongbang hakchi, 20 (1978), pp.257-92.
- Pae Hyōnsuk. "17.18 segi e chonnae toip Ch'ōnjugyo sōch'aek" [Catholic books introduced into Korea in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries], Kyohoesa yōn'gu, 3 (1981), pp.3-45.
- Sōng Chuyong. Han'guk sirhak sasang taeyo [The gist of Korean sirhak thought] (Seoul: Pagyongsa, 1979).
- Suematsu Yasukazu. "Keishokaku tokeisho somoku" [The Kyujanggak and its catalogue], in Oda sensei shoju kinen Chōsen ronshu [Essays on Korea in honor of Oda Shōgō] (Keijo, 1934), pp.399-416.
- Tanaka Hidenaka. "Chōsen ni okeru kirisugokyō denrai hokokushō" [Reports on the introduction of Catholicism into Korea], Chōsen gakuho, 10 (1956), pp.189-241.

- To Kwangsun. "Yulgok ūi sŏng sasang" [Yulgok's concept of sincerity], Han'guk hakbo, 22, pp.59-76.
- Urakawa Wasaburo. Chōsen Junkyōshi [The history of Korean martyrs] (Osaka: Zenkoku shobo, 1944).
- Yamaguchi Masayuki. Chōsen Seikyōshi [The history of the Korean Catholic Church] (Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 1967).
- _____, Hwang Sayōng hakushō no kenkyū [Studies of the silk letter of Hwang Sayong] (Ōkaka: Zenkoku shobo, 1946).
- _____, "Chōsen ōkoku no okeru Tenshukyō no kakuritsu" [The establishment of Catholicism in Yi dynasty Korea], Seikyū gakuso, 12 (1933).
- _____, "Shoken Seshi to Tō Takubo" [Prince Sohyon and Adam Schall], Seikyū gakuso, 5 (1931), pp.101-17.
- _____, "Kinsei Chōsen ni okeru seigaku shoso no tōzen to sono hatten" [The importation and development of Western thought in modern Korea], in Oda Sensei shoju kinen Chōsen ronshu [Collected essays on Korea in honor of Oda Shōju] (Keijo, 1934), pp. 1500-40.
- Yi Hyōnjong. "Chōson kwa Sōse tongjōm" [Korea and the Eastern advance of Western power], Han'guk sa, vol. 14. (Seoul: Kuksa p'yōnch'an wiwōnhoe, 1975), pp.15-49.
- Yi Ihwa. Hō Kyun ūi saenggak [Hō Kyun's thought] (Seoul: Ppuli kipum namu, 1980).
- Yi Kuyong. "Sunam An Chōngbok ūi Saengae wa sasang" [The life and thought of An Chōngbok], Kangwōn Taehak nonmunjip [A selection of essays from Kangwōn University], 1972, pp.371-80.
- Yi Nunghwa. Chosōn kidokkyo kŭp oegyoesa [A history of Christianity and foreign relations in Korea] (Seoul: Han'gukhak yōn'guso, 1977).
- Yi Sangok. "Ch'ōnju silui wa kyōnghak sasang" [T'ien-chu shih-i and the Chinese Classics], in Yu Hongnyōl Paksa hwagap kinyōm nonch'ong [A collection of essays in honor of Dr. Yu Hongnyōl] (Seoul, Tamgudang, 1971) pp.441-62.
- Yi Sangun. "T'oegye ūi hangmun kwa sasang" [T'oegye's thought and scholarship], in T'oegyehak yōn'gu [T'oegye studies] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press,

- 1972), pp.29-139.
- Yi Sŏngbae. Yugyo wa kuristogyo [Confucianism and Christianity] (Waegwan, Korea: Benedict Press, 1979).
- Yi Urho. Tasanhak ūi ihae [Understanding Tasan] (Seoul: Hyonamsa, 1975).
- _____, Tasan kyŏnghak sasang yŏn'gu [A study of Tasan's interpretations of the Confucian Classics] (Seoul: Ulyusa, 1973).
- Yu Usong. "Nogam Kwŏn Ch'ŏlsin ūi sasang wa kŭ kyŏngjŏn pip'an" [Kwŏn Ch'ŏlsin's thought and his criticism of the Classics], T'oegye hakbo, 36 (1982), pp.51-58.
- Yi Wŏnjae. "T'oegye sŏnsaeng ūi hangmunjŏk pangbŏp" [The academic methodology of T'oegye], in T'oegyehak yŏn'gu [T'oegye studies] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1972).
- Yi Wŏnsun, ed. Han'guk Ch'ŏnjugyohoe sa nonmun sŏnjip [A selection of articles on the history of Korean Catholicism], vol. 2 (Seoul: Han'guk kyohoesa yŏn'guso, 1977).
- _____, "An Chŏngbok ūi Ch'ŏnhak nongo" [An Chŏngbok's writings on Catholicism], in Yi Haenam Paksa hwagap kinyŏm sahak nonch'ong [A selection of historical essays in honor of the sixtieth birthday of Dr. Yi Haenam] (Seoul, 1970).
- _____, "Chikpang woegi wa sŏyang kyoyungnon" [The Chih-fang wai-chih and Western educational theory], Yŏksa kyoyuk, 11.12 (1969), pp.201-30.
- _____, "Chosŏn hugi sirhak chisŏng ūi sŏyang kyoyungnon" [Yi dynasty intellectuals' views of Western education], Kyohoesa yŏn'gu, 2 (1979), pp.139-93.
- _____, "Chosŏn hugi sirhak e sŏhak ūisik" [Consciousness of Western learning among late Yi dynasty scholars], Yŏksa kyoyuk, 17 (1975), pp.135-85.
- _____, "Sŏngho Yi Ik ūi Sŏhak seqye" [Yi Ik's attitude toward the West], Kyohoesa yŏn'gu, 1 (1977), pp.3-39.
- _____, "Sŏyang munmul Hanyŏk haksulsŏ ūi chŏllae" [The introduction of Western civilization and scholarly works translated into Chinese], Han'guk sa, vol. 14 (Seoul: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwonhoe, 1975), pp.49-88.

- Yu Chongdong. T'oegye ui saengae wa sasang [T'oegye's life and thought] (Seoul: Pagyongsa, 1974).
- Yu Hŏnhyŏng. "Sirhakup'a ui T'oegyegwa: Sŏngho-Tasan ūi kyongu" [The School of Practical Learning's view of T'oegye: the cases of Sŏngho and Tasan], T'oegye hakbo, 34 (1982), pp.8-24.
- Yu Inhui. "Tongyang in ūi yŏnghon'gwan" [The East Asian concept of the soul], Han'guk sasang, 16 (1978), pp.197-239.
- Yu Hongnyŏl. Han'guk Ch'onju kyohoe sa [The history of the Korean Catholic Church] (Seoul: The Catholic Press, 1975).
- _____, Han'guk sahoe sasangsa non'go [Studies on the history of Korean social thought] (Seoul: Iljogak, 1980).
- _____, "Hong Kildong Chŏnul chiun Hŏ Kyun kwa kŭ ūi sinang saenghwal" [The faith of Hŏ Kyun, the author of Hong Kildong Chŏn], Katollik Ch'ŏngnyŏn, 9 (1955), no. 3, pp.41-47; no. 4, pp.68-76.
- Yun Sasun. T'oegye ch'ŏrhak ūi yŏn'gu [Studies of T'oegye's philosophy] (Seoul: Korean University Press, 1980).
- Yun Sasun, et al. Sirhak sasang ūi t'amgu (Seoul: Hyonamsa, 1975).

Western Language Secondary Sources

- Aquinas, Thomas. Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Anton C. Pegis, ed. (New York: Modern Library, 1948).
- _____, Summa Theologica, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province in three volumes (New York, 1947).
- _____, Summa Contra Gentiles [On the Truth of the Catholic Faith], trans. by Anton C. Pegis and others (New York, 1955).
- Allen, Charles Wiltford. Jesuits at the Court of Peking. (Arlington, VA: 1975).
- An Chongbok. "A Korean's View of Christianity," an excerpt from his Ch'ŏnhak mundap [Conversations on Catholicism], translator unknown. Korea Magazine, 1917,

- pp. 262-268.
- Baker, Donald L. "The Use and Abuse of the Sirhak Label: A New Look at Sin Hudam and his Sohakpyon," Kyohoesa yon'gu, no. 3 (1981), pp. 183-254.
- Balazs, Etienne. Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy. H. M. Wright, trans. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
- Bartley, W. W. Morality and Religion. (London: Macmillan, 1971).
- Bergson, Henri. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).
- Bernard, Henri. Matteo Ricci's Scientific Contribution to China. E. C. Werner, trans. (Peking: H. Vetch, 1935).
- Bierkarksa, Barbara, ed. The Scientific World of Copernicus. (Deerdrecht: Reidel Publ. Co., 1973).
- Bloom, Alfred H. The Linguistic Shaping of Thought. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981).
- Bodde, Derk. Essays on Chinese Civilization. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).
- _____, "The Chinese View of Immortality: Its Expression by Chu Hsi and its Relationship to Buddhist Thought," Review of Religion, 6, 1942, pp. 369-383.
- Boxer, C. R. The Christian Century in Japan. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951).
- Bruce, J. Percy. Chu Hsi and His Masters. (London: Probsthain, 1923).
- _____, trans. The Philosophy of Human Nature by Chu Hsi. (London: Probsthain, 1928).
- _____, "The Theistic Impact of the Sung Philosophy," Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 49 (1918), pp. 111-127.
- Burt, Edwin A. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954).
- Butterfield, Herbert. The Origins of Modern Science. (New York: The Free Press, 1957).

- Cameron, Nigel. Barbarians and Mandarins: Thirteen Centuries of Western Travelers in China. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
- Chan, Wing-tsit. A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).
- _____, "Neo-Confucianism: New Ideas in Old Terminology," Philosophy East and West, 17 (1967), pp. 15-35.
- _____, "Chinese and Western Interpretations of Jen," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 26 (1975), pp. 107-29.
- _____, trans. Reflections on Things at Hand Compiled by CHu Hsi and Lu Tsu-chien. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
- _____, Neo-Confucianism, etc.: Essays by Wing-tsit Chan. (New Haven: Oriental Society, 1969).
- _____, "The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept of Li or Principle," Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, 4, no. 2 (1964), pp. 123-149.
- _____, "Patterns for Neo-Confucians: Why Chu Hsi Differed from Ch'eng I," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 5, (1978), pp. 101-126.
- Ch'en, Kenneth. "Matteo Ricci's Contribution to and Influence on Geographical Knowledge in China," Journal of the American Oriental Society (1939), pp. 325-359.
- Chang, Carsun. The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought, 2 volumes. (New Haven: Bookman Associates, 1957-62).
- Chappill, V.C., ed. Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).
- Cheng Chung-ying. "Dialectics of Confucian Morality and Metaphysics of Man," Philosophy East and West, 21 (1971), pp. 111-123.
- _____, "Theory and Practice in Confucianism," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 1 (1974), pp. 179-198.
- Ching, Julia. Confucianism and Christianity. (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1971).
- Cho Kijun. "Silhak Thought in the Late Yi Dynasty and Its Socio-economic Background," Asea Yon'gu, 11, no. 4 (1968), pp. 95-113.

- Choi, Andrew. L'erection du Premier Vicari ofe Apostolique et les origines du Catholicism en Coree. (Switzerland: Schoneck-Beckerried, 1961).
- Choi Min-hong. A Modern History of Korean Philosophy (Seoul: Songmunsa, 1978).
- Choi Suk. "The Factional Struggle in the Yi Dynasty: 1575-1725." Korean Quarterly, 7, no. 1, pp. 60-91; no. 2, pp. 70-96.
- Ch'ŏn Kwanu. "Hong Tae-yong, 1731-1783," Korea Journal, 12, no. 11 (November 1972), pp. 34-39.
- Chun Sinyong, ed. Economic Life in Korea. (Seoul: International Cultural Foundation, 1978).
- _____, ed. Korean Thoughts. (Seoul: International Cultural Foundation, 1979).
- Chong Chai-sik. "In Defense of the Traditional Social Order: Ch'oksa Wijŏng," Philosophy East and West, April 1980, pp.355-73.
- Clark, Charles Allen. Religions of Old Korea (Seoul: Christian Literature Society, 1961).
- Cohen, Paul. "The Anti-Christian Tradition in China," Journal of Asian Studies, XX (1960-61), pp. 169-180.
- Columba, Cary-Elwei. China and the Cross: Studies in Missionary History. (London: Longmans Green, 1917).
- Cooper, Michael. Rodrigues the Interpreter. (Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1974).
- Cory, Ralph M. "Some Notes on Father Gregorio de Cespedes: Korea's First European Visitor," Transactions of RAS (Korea), XXVII (1937), pp 1-55.
- Cua, Antonio S. "The Logic of Confucian Dialogues," Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, 4 (1969), pp. 18-33.
- DeBary, Wm. Theodore, ed. The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
- _____, Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of Mind-and-Heart. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

- DeBurgh, William G. "The Relation of Religion to Morality," Proceedings of the British Academy, 21 (1937).
- D'Elia, Pasquale M. Galileo in China. Rufus Suter and Matthew Sciascio, trans. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
- deGroot, J. J. M. Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China. (New York: Paragon Books, 1970).
- Dehergne, Joseph, ed. Actes du Colloque International de Sinologie: La Mission Francaise De Pekin aux XVII et XVIII Siecles. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1976).
- _____, Repertoire des Jesuits de Chine de 1552 a 1800. (Rome: Institutum Historium SI, 1973).
- Deuchler, Martina. "Neo-Confucianism: The Impulse for Social Action in Early Yi Korea," The Journal of Korean Studies, 2 (1980), pp. 71-111.
- Dix, Griffin. "How to Do Things with Ritual: The Logic of Ancestor Worship and Other Offerings in Traditional Korea," Studies on Korea in Transition, ed. David McCann, et al (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1979), pp.57-88.
- Dubs, Homer H. "Theism and Naturalism in Ancient Chinese Philosophy," Philosophy East and West, 9 (1959-1960), pp. 163-172.
- Dunne, George H. SJ. Generation of Giants: The Story of the Jesuits in China in the Last Decades of the Ming Dynasty. (Notre Dame, 1962).
- Eliade, Mircea and Joseph M. Kitagawa, ed. The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959).
- Elison, George. Deus Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).
- Feng Yu-lan. A History of Chinese Philosophy. Translated by Derk Bodde. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952-3).
- _____, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy. Translated by E.R. Hughes. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962)
- Forke, Alfred. The World-Conception of the Chinese (London:

- Probsthain, 1925).
- Gallagher, Louis J., trans. China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci, 1583-1610 (New York: Random House, 1953)
- Gedalecia, David. "Excursion into Substance and Function: The Development of the T'i-yung paradigm in Chu Hsi," Philosophy East and West, 24 (1974), pp.443-52.
- Gernet, Jacques. "Christian and Chinese Visions of the World in the Seventeenth Century," Chinese Science, 4 (1980), pp.1-17.
- Giles, Lionel. "Translation from the Chinese World Map of Father Ricci," Geographical Journal, 52 (1918) and 53 (1919).
- Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. (New York: Random House, 1956).
- Gompertz, G. St. G. "Some Notes on the Earliest Western Contacts with Korea," Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 33 (1957), pp.41-54.
- Graf, Olaf. Tao und Jen, Sein und Sollen im sungchinesischen Monismus (Wiesbaden: Otta Harrassowitz, 1970).
- Graham, A.C. Two Chinese Philosophers (London: Lund Humphries, 1978).
- _____, "'Being' in Classical Chinese," in J. W. M. Verhaan, ed. The Verb "Be" and Its synonyms (Deerdrecht: Reidel Publ. Co., 1960), vol. 1, pp.1-39.
- Hall, A. Rupert. The Scientific Revolution. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
- Han Ki-sik. "The Christian Impact and the Indigenous Response in 18th and 19th Century Korea," Koreana Quarterly, 10 (Spring, 1969), pp.1-25.
- Han Woo-keun. The History of Korea, trans. Kyung-sik Lee. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974).
- Hancock, Roget. Twentieth Century Ethics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
- Helm, Paul. ed. Divine Commands and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
- Henderson, Gregory. "Chong Tasan: A Study in Korea's

- Intellectual History," Journal of Asian Studies, 16, no.3, pp.377-86.
- Hocking, W.E. "Chu Hsi's Theory of Knowledge," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 1 (1936), pp.109-27.
- Hong Yi-sup (Hong Yisop). Korea's Self-identity (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1973).
- Hu Shih. "The Concept of Immortality in Chinese Thought," Harvard Divinity School Bulletin, 1946, pp.26-43.
- Hume, David. A Treatise on Human Nature. Ed. L.A. Selby-Biggs. (Oxford, 1888).
- Janelli, Roger L. and Dawnhee Yim Janelli. Ancestor Worship and Korean Society. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
- Jean Sang-woon. Science and Technology in Korea. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1974).
- Jo Yung-hwan, ed. Korea's Response to the West (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Korea Research Publications, 1971).
- Jones, W.T. A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969).
- Kalton, Michael. The Neo-Confucian World View and Value System of Yi Dynasty Korea. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1971.
- _____, "Ch'ong Tasan's Philosophy of Man: A Radical Critique of the Neo-Confucian World View," Journal of Korean Studies, 3 (1981), pp.3-38.
- _____, "An Introduction to Silhak," Korea Journal, 15, no.5 (May, 1975), pp.29-46.
- Kearney, Hugh. Science and Change, 1500-1700. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971).
- Kim, Joseph Chang-mun and Joseph Jaesun Chung. Catholic Korea, Yesterday and Today. (Seoul: Catholic Publishing Co., 1964).
- Koestler, Arthur. The Sleepwalkers. (New York: Penguin Books, 1964).
- Kong, Roberta L. "Metaphysics and East-West Philosophy: Applying the Chinese T'i-yung paradigm," Philosophy East and West, 19, no. 1, pp.49-58.

- Kim Young-mo. "The Conceptualization of Social Strata and Its Changing Structure during the Late Yi Dynasty," Social Science Journal, 6 (1979), pp.107-25.
- Lanchashire, Douglas. "Anti-Christian Polemics in Seventeenth-Century China," Church History, 38 (1969), pp.218-41.
- Ledyard, Gari. The Dutch Come to Korea. Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, 1971).
- Lee Woosung (Yi Usŏng). "Korean Intellectual Tradition and the Sirhak School of Thought," in Hugh H.W. Kang, ed. The Traditional Culture and Society of Korea: Thought and Institutions (Honolulu: Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, 1975), pp.105-38.
- Liu Shu-Hsien. "The Religious Import of Confucian Philosophy," Philosophy East and West, 21 (1971), pp.157-75.
- Meskill, John, trans. Ch'oe P'u's Diary: A Record of Drifting across the Sea (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965).
- Metzger, Thomas. Escape from Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
- Ministry of Culture and Propaganda, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Progressive Scholars at the Close of the Feudal Age of Korea (P'yongyang: New Korea Press, 1955).
- Mitchell, Basil, ed. The Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
- Moore, Charles, ed. The Chinese Mind (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967).
- Mote, Frederick W. Intellectual Foundations of China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).
- Munro, Donald J. The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
- _____, The Concept of Man in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971)
- _____, "The Concept of Interest in Chinese Thought," Journal of the History of Ideas, 41, no. 2, pp.179-97.

- Nakayama Shigeru. A History of Japanese Astronomy: Chinese Background and Western Impact (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).
- _____, and Nathan Sivin, ed. Chinese Science: Explorations of an Ancient Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974).
- _____, "Characteristics of Chinese Calendrical Science," Japanese Studies in the History of Science, 4 (1965), pp.124-31.
- _____, "Diffusion of Copernicanism in Japan," Studia Copernicana, 4 (1972), pp.153-88.
- Needham, Joseph. Science and Civilization in China, volumes 1-4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954-71).
- Nivision, David and Arthur Wright, ed. Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953).
- Pagels, Elaine. The Gnostic Gospels (New York: Random House, 1979).
- Palmer, Spencer J. Korea and Christianity (Seoul: Hollym, 1968).
- Park Seong-rae (Pak Songnae). "Hong Tae-yong's Idea of the Rotating Earth," Korea Journal 21, no.8 (August, 1980), pp.21-29.
- _____, "Portents and Neo-Confucian Politics in Korea, 1392-1519," Journal of Social Science and Humanities, 49 (1979), pp.53-122.
- Pepper, Stephen. World Hypotheses (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942).
- Peterson, Willard. "Western Natural Philosophy Published in late Ming China," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 117 (1973), pp.295-322.
- Pfister, Louis. Notices biographiques et bibliographiques sur les Jesuites de l'ancienne mission de Chine (Shanghai: Mission Catholique, 1932-34).
- Plato. The Republic, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Modern Library, 1942).
- Porter, Jonathan. "Bureaucracy and Science in Early Modern China: The Imperial Astronomical Bureau in the Ch'ing Period," Journal of Oriental History, 18 (1980),

- pp.61-76.
- Richards, I.A. Mencius on the Mind (London: Kegan Paul, 1932).
- Rosemont, Henry. "On Reappraising Chinese Philosophy," Philosophy East and West, 21, no. 2 (April, 1971).
- Rosso, Antonio Sisto. Apostolic Legations to China of the Eighteenth Century (South Pasadena: P.D. and Ione Perkins, 1948).
- Rowbotham, Arnold H. Missionary and Mandarin: The Jesuits at the Court of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942).
- Rufus, W.W. Korean Astronomy (Seoul: Chosen Christian College, 1936).
- Rule, Paul. K'ung-tzu or Confucius: The Jesuit Interpretation of Confucianism. Unpublished doctoral dissertation at Australia National University, 1972.
- Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. Philosophy East--Philosophy West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
- Schindler, Bruno. "The Development of Chinese Conceptions of Supreme Beings," Asia Major, introductory volume (1922), pp.298-366.
- Seoh, Roy Munsang. The Principalist Tradition of Yi Korean Confucianism and the Case of An Ch'ongbok (1712-1791). Unpublished doctoral dissertation at the University of Washington, 1977.
- _____, "The Ultimate Concern of Yi Korean Confucians: An Analysis of the i-ki Debates," Occasional Papers on Korea, 5 (1977), pp.20-60.
- _____, "Yi Ik, an Eighteenth-Century Korean Intellectual," Journal of Korean Studies, 1 (1969), pp.9-21.
- Shih, Joseph. "The Notion of God in Ancient Chinese Religions," Numen, 16 (1969), pp.98-138.
- Sivin, Nathan. "Copernicus in China," Studia Copernicana 6 (1973), pp.63-122.
- _____, "Cosmos and Computation in Early Chinese Mathematical Astronomy," T'oung Pao, 55, no.1-3, p.1-73.

- Smith, D. Howard. Chinese Religions (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968).
- _____, "Chinese Concepts of the Soul," Numen, 5 (1958), pp.165-79.
- Smith, Huston. "Western and Comparative Perspectives on Truth", Philosophy East and West, 30, no.4 (October, 1980), pp.425-38.
- Song Chuyong. "Practical Learning of Yi Ik," Korea Journal, 12, no. 8 (August, 1972), pp.38-45.
- Spence, Jonathan A. To Change China: Western Advisors in China, 1620-1960 (New York: Penguin Books, 1969).
- _____, Emperor of China: Self-Portrait of K'ang-hsi (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).
- Spalatin, Christopher A. Matteo Ricci's Use of Epictetus (Waegwan, Korea, 1975).
- Taylor, Rodney L. "Neo-Confucian Sagehood and the Religious Dimension," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 2, no. 4(1975), pp.389-415.
- Treadgold, Donald. The West in Russia and China. In two volumes (Cambridge, England: At the University Press, 1973).
- Tu Wei-ming. "The 'Moral Universal' from the Perspective of East Asian Thought," Philosophy East and West, 31, no.3 (July, 1981), pp.259-278.
- Waley, Arthur, trans. The Analects of Confucius (New York: Vintage Books, 1938).
- Weber, Max. The Religions of China, trans. Han H. Gerth (New York: The Free Press, 1951).
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Beliefs, ed. by Cyril Barrett (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
- Wach, Joachim. The Comparative Study of Religions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).
- Wang, George Ho Ching. China's Oppositions to Western Religion and Science During Late Ming and Early Ch'ing. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1958.

- Wright, Arthur F. "Fu I and the rejection of Buddhism," Journal of the History of Ideas, 12 (1951), pp.33-47.
- Wu Pei-yi. "Self-examination and Confession of Sins in Traditional China," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 39, no.1 (June, 19789), pp.5-38.
- Wylie, Alexander. Notes on Chinese Literature (Shanghai, 1902).
- Yang, C.K. Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961).
- Yinger, J. Milton. The Scientific Study of Religion (London: Macmillan, 1970).
- Young, John D. "An Early Confucian Attack on Christianity: Yang Kuang-hsien and his Pute-i," Journal of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 3, no.1 (1975), pp.159-86.
- Zukav, Gary. The Dancing Wuli Masters: An Overview of the New Physics (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1979).

VITA

Donald Leslie Baker

Birthplace: Tampa, Florida

Birthdate: August 1, 1945

Education: University of Washington
Graduate School Department of History
1977-1983

Institute for Comparative and Foreign
Area Studies. M.A. in Korean Regional
Studies.
1974-1977

Louisiana State University
B.A. in Philosophy.
1963-1965, 1966-1967

East-West Center, University of Hawaii
1965-1966

Jesuit High School
Shreveport, Louisiana
1960-1963