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# Hegelian Aesthetics and the 'Dramatist' Plays of Karl Gutzkow

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

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

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

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**Abstract**

Hegelian Aesthetics and the 'Dramatist' Plays of Karl Gutzkow

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My dissertation argues that Karl Gutzkow uses metadiscursive structures in his literary works to instruct his audience how to interpret literature. I claim that he develops this strategy through his reading of Hegel's philosophy. My first chapter elaborates the reception theory implicit in Hegel's Ästhetik. I argue that reception, an extant but underdeveloped element in the Ästhetik, actualizes artistically-presented ideas in society and thereby motivates changes in artistic production and reception. Chapter two details how Gutzkow overlays Hegel's theory of historical change onto aesthetic works as mediators of ideas so that literature may effect social change. Gutzkow incorporates the argumentative dimension of his journalistic writings into his literary works by including in his works analyses of other works of literature. This metadiscursivity constitutes a recurring strategy for communicating his ideas. In the next two chapters I elaborate the function of this strategy in the most obvious examples from his oeuvre, his plays about playwrights. Chapter three deals with Richard Savage (1839), where Gutzkow contrasts arguments for the effectiveness of drama in his depiction of the title character with arguments for the effectiveness of journalism in Savage's

friend Richard Steele. Although Gutzkow demonstrates the power of a play within his play, he simultaneously undermines this argument by portraying Savage as a dandy and Steele as a responsible journalist. In chapter four I argue that similar self-reflexive structures in Das Urbild des Tartüffe (1844) reveal that Gutzkow has overcome his ambivalence in favor of drama's social power. In this play he portrays Molière as a potent manipulator of public opinion through his plays. I argue that the choice of satirical comedy over tragedy attests to Gutzkow's new confidence in the power of drama. The concluding chapter highlights Gutzkow's unique adaptation of Hegel by comparing his works with those of other so-called Hegelian dramatist, namely Friedrich Hebbel and Heinrich Laube, and contrasting Gutzkow's practice of self-reflexive drama to their poorly articulated and implemented use of the same tropes.

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# Introduction

In this dissertation I aim to detail the scope of Hegel's influence on a self-confessed political writer, Karl Gutzkow. I therefore focus on two questions: What aspects of Hegel's aesthetics, and/or of his philosophy in general, did Gutzkow draw upon for developing his own theory of socially critical literature? And how did these theoretical principles appear in Gutzkow's literary works? These questions require an elaboration of certain terms, as well as an explanation of the texts I investigate, before beginning with Hegel. Describing the context of "political" works for Gutzkow will articulate the importance of literary reception. This term not only defines my methodological framework, but also describes an important category in Hegel's and Gutzkow's conception of literary function. And justifying my choice of texts will bring out the historical and philological frame that arose in the course of the study.

I define political literature as any work that comments on policies in the public sphere. This definition broadens the scope of what may be considered political topics beyond merely governmental policies or actions to include established social practices that may or may not be enforced by governmental agencies. Addressing such social issues can pertain to political systems without specifying the political context of a given state at a specific time. Gutzkow makes use of interconnections between social and political concerns in response to the restrictions he was working within. These include primarily the inevitable censorship of any works that included overt political criticism, and the need to appeal to audiences in the various German states with their

heterogeneous political contexts. By focusing on social issues such as religious tolerance or freedom of speech, for example, Gutzkow attacks customs that underlay the policies of many German states without attacking specific laws or practices and thereby narrowing the audience to whom the topic would be of interest. Another feature of Gutzkow's texts is his exclusively critical treatment of social issues. Instead of promoting a set of ideals that his audiences should work to realize in the public sphere, Gutzkow presents the drawbacks of the social practices he hopes to change. Because of this exclusively critical approach to topics of political relevance I use the terms "political" and "socially critical" as synonyms in my text, but I tend to prefer the latter because it more concretely expresses the broad domain of the public sphere as well as the desire to effect change by articulating criticism upon which others can act.

Authors of political works universally believe that political literature achieves its ends not only by presenting ideas, but also by somehow motivating the audience to respond to and realize the presented agenda. Because Gutzkow and Hegel both considered the drama as the most effective form for engendering political activism in the audience, I will use a theoretical model of how the public responds to a play as the paradigm of reception. In his study Dramaturgie des Publikums, Volker Klotz has described the relationship between dramatic performance and its public by defining the audience as both subject and object of the theatrical performance:

> [Das Publikum] wirkt mit an der öffentlichen Aktualisierung des dramatisch-szenischen Ereignistexts. Indem das Publikum, was es zu sehen und zu hören kriegt, als sinnvollen Zusammenhang verarbeitet, vollführt es selber dramaturgische Tätigkeiten. [...] So gehen sie [die

> Zuschauer] in zweiter Instanz noch einmal dramaturgisch um mit dem dramatischen Material und den dramatischen Konstruktionsverfahren, wie das schon seitens der Theatermacher geschehen ist. [...] Das Publikum wird zum Objekt dramaturgischer Maßnahmen—mit dem Zweck, es als dramaturgisches Subjekt zu beteiligen. (17)

Within the theater, during the course of the play, the audience is constantly working to understand the meaning of what is presented, literally speaking, as dialogue and action by costumed persons on a decorated stage. In order to complete the meaning projected by the plot that is communicated by the actions of the characters, their identities and the context provided by stage elements, the audience undertakes interpretive acts. These acts aim to comprehend the performance as a construct that contains ideas or meaning. Klotz restricts his articulation of this process to the occurrence of the performance itself. But if the plot and context of the play are sufficiently indicative of situations and events in the greater society outside the theater, then this process of actively working to constitute the meaning of the dramatic events can be transferred to a program of action in the real, political world.

This model remains hypothetical with regard to the actual response of the audience to the play and the extent of their transference. It must remain hypothetical, as Klotz himself notes, because it is impossible to generalize an individual's response even for the audience members of a single performance, let alone for different performances at different places and different times. "Somit gerät das Publikum als dramaturgisches Subjekt weit ins Hintertreffen gegenüber dem Publikum als dramaturgischem Objekt" (ibid. 23). Hence an inventory of responses to a work or oeuvre cannot lead to definitive

conclusions about the intrinsic capacity of the specified work(s) to motivate action on the part of the audience, as some reception theorists maintain. Peter Bürger makes a solid case against the positivistic tendencies within reception theory that promote accumulating such empirical documentation as an end in itself when he exposes the lack of meaningful contexts and theoretical models for evaluating this material (Vermittlung 118-99). Klotz's model does, however, present the ideal conditions that a political author would try to create in the theater, and encourages an exploration of textual features that actively seek such a response. This shifts the focus from a given audience's response to the text itself, while still emphasizing the importance of audience reception. Although these features may be either thematic or formal, the structural aspects more clearly show how the author tries to express an argument or opinion to his audience.

By using this approach I address how Gutzkow tried to influence his audience rather than how his audience interpreted his works. Gutzkow had a reputation as a political writer because of the publicity created by the ban on his works, along with those of the Young German authors in general, imposed by the Bundestag in 1835. His audiences also clearly understood the social criticism he intended in the content of his plays. Studies such as Horst Denkler's have already described both Gutzkow's political intentions as well as the failure of his plays to provoke any noticeable political response.[1] My aim, however, is to bring out the structures of the plays which, in combination with the content, are programmed to encourage an active audience response despite

[1] Restauration und Revolution refers to Gutzkow as a political writer throughout the text, but concentrates specifically on Gutzkow pp. 258-63 and 297-300; cf. also his article "Das Drama der Jungdeutschen."

the fact that the intended reaction did not occur. The lack of a political response does not necessarily prove the ineffectiveness of these structures, since unquantifiable factors such as political oppression and intimidation, behavioral norms associated with social class, etc. also influence the viewers. Thus without delving into the reactions to Gutzkow's plays as proof of his success or failure as a political playwright, I believe I can show specific ways he constructed his dramatic works in order to engender a politically relevant response.

The fact that Gutzkow writes journal articles and pamphlets that specifically address political topics begs the question why he so adamantly concentrates on developing literary forms that more indirectly express his socially critical views. The most obvious answer to this question is the oppressive censorship on overtly political writings during the Vormärz. But I propose that other factors, both practical and theoretical, significantly influence Gutzkow's emphatic preference for creative literature as a medium for political critique. His studies of Hegelian philosophy at the university in Berlin represent the most important of these factors.

Essential concepts from Hegel's philosophical system influence Gutzkow to a greater degree than do Hegel's aesthetic theory. Hegel develops the theoretical notion that effective literary mediation of socially critical ideas occurs under certain historical conditions. But although he claims that literature loses the ability to engender this kind of response, the epistemology that underlies his initial assessment of the literary work is omnipresent, thus maintaining the potential for any adequately composed literary work to achieve such a response. Although he elaborates these theories in his aesthetics, the

importance of epistemology makes a study of the influences on his theories and of the philosophical background of the Ästhetik necessary. I therefore describe the impact that Friedrich Schiller's Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung had for Hegel's theories of the epistemological function of art. Hegel's points of agreement, but especially his differences with Schiller, highlight the importance Hegel places on the function of art to mediate knowledge. I also develop a model of epistemology from Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes that is universally applicable in the system as a whole. By understanding this model, Gutzkow could understand the function of art in Hegel's philosophy regardless of whether he had heard the lectures on aesthetics, which is doubtful. The focus on epistemology also makes the contested nature of the text of the Ästhetik unproblematic for my study.[2] The specific works and elements of artistic composition that Hegel develops in these lectures still have their exemplary character and are valid as such for my exposition. But I do not use this text as the basis for my development of Hegel's argumentation, but rather turn to the published texts of the Enzyklopädie and especially to the Phänomenologie to outline his theory of aesthetic reception. In addition to his theory of epistemology, these works include Hegel's basic description of the function of art that he elaborates in the Ästhetik. In his memoirs Gutzkow explicitly claims to have studied these texts, and this exposure thus provides him with Hegel's fundamental writings on art and epistemology.

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[2] The published text of the Ästhetik was originally edited by one of Hegel's students, H. G. Hotho, after Hegel's death. Hotho compiled the book from Hegel's lecture notes and numerous lectures he himself attended, as well as from lecture notes by other students from the various years and two universities in which Hegel presented his course on aesthetics. Because Hegel had no hand in this edition, it has been contested as tainted with Hotho's personal beliefs and incomplete access to materials from each of the five times Hegel gave the lectures. Cf. Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, "Die Rolle der Kunst im Staat: Kontroverses zwischen Hegel und den Hegelianern," Welt und Wirkung, ed. Gethmann Siefert, 65-102.

Gutzkow has long been labeled a "Hegelian" for a number of reasons, but I trace for the first time the specific textual evidence of Hegel's influence on him and come to new conclusions regarding his interpretation and use of Hegel's ideas in the realm of aesthetics. Gutzkow, and the Young Germans in general, have long been perceived as perverting Hegel's ideas to the point that their conclusions diametrically oppose his. Above all, their advocacy of a subjective, authorial presence within the work contrasts with Hegel's emphasis on an objectivity he believes is provided by the autonomy of the aesthetic frame. But in my reading of the Ästhetik I show how Hegel often retreats from the ideal of objectivity to allow for a meaningful inclusion of subjective viewpoints within the work of art. Hegel's argumentation for validating these inclusions is not specific to the Ästhetik, but rather shows how his fundamental conception of the artistic work as an epistemological object allows such opinions to have an impact on the audience. So although Gutzkow indeed calls for reinserting subjective points of view in literary works, I argue that the theories underlying his practices nevertheless develop from an origin in Hegel. Especially in his Philosophie der Tat und des Ereignisses, Gutzkow articulates his differences with Hegel's philosophy of history. But the aspects of historical progress and the role of the individual in history allow for a conceptual translation into Gutzkow's aesthetic theory. Like Hegel, Gutzkow designates artistic works as potential agencies of historical change. And although they view the motivations of individual actions differently, they both see the individual as the initiator of social transformations. While these viewpoints are hardly unique to Hegel, I trace the textual record that makes Hegel the clear source for Gutzkow's theories on the capacity of literature to induce historical

change. I thus achieve my reading by analyzing the writings in which Gutzkow specifically develops his interpretation of Hegel, rather than comparing Gutzkow's works and pronouncements on aesthetics directly to Hegel's Ästhetik.

The textual evidence from Gutzkow's works is widely scattered and much of it is unpublished. I have relied in part on reprints of his published works, but have also read through the major journals he edited in the 1830's and 1840's. I also refer to that part of his correspondence that has been published. I decided not to reference such things as journals and the unpublished correspondence at the Gutzkow archive in Frankfurt because of the scant relevance such materials had for the published, "interesting" examples. Gutzkow's beliefs regarding Hegel and literary mediation are well-developed in the published materials and, given the sometimes contradictory nature of many of his theoretical statements and the vast quantity of his (often mundane, business-related) letters, I feel confident of having provided an accurate representation of his views.

Also new is my discussion of self-reflexivity in Gutzkow's works. Such constructions include reference to, or analysis of, literary works within his own work, and plays within plays. I describe these constructions as strategies he uses for motivating a socially relevant reading of literary works by his audience. These tropes are inescapable in his prose works as well as his dramatic pieces. However, scholarship has rarely looked at these structures, nor did his contemporaries take notice of this recurring feature. I briefly describe self-reflexive features in Gutzkow's prose works of the 1830's to show their rudimentary forms, then argue that he refines his techniques in his

dramas, especially in his plays about playwrights.

I use the terms reflexive and self-reflexive primarily as descriptions of structural features in these works. Confusing this distinction, however, is the fact that these works are always self-reflexive in that they discuss art and its social function from within the aesthetic frame. This thematic self-reflexivity appears most obviously in his plays about playwrights, but also comes up in most of his works in a variety of situations, such as discussions about books or inserted performances. Gutzkow's repeated use of such situations is not interesting in and of itself, but rather because they foreground literary works as constructs that can and should be read as persuasive entreaties on political subjects. My investigation thus goes beyond identifying the circumstances as self-reflexive in order to concentrate on how the structures help Gutzkow communicate to his audience.

I roughly explore the period between 1830 and 1848. Gutzkow began studying at the university in Berlin in 1828 and published his first journal article in 1829, but ventured upon his first editorial experience in 1830 while still a student of Hegel's. He began writing plays in earnest in 1839, and decreased his production by the mid-1840's because of the declining popularity of his works and his appointment as dramaturg in Dresden in 1846. With the exception of Der Königsleutnant, which was written for the Goethe-Jubiläumsjahr 1849, he shifts away from dramatic production and back toward both journalism and novel writing after 1848. Thus, although the period 1830-1848 does not subsume his entire career as a writer, the major trends that are important for my study take place within this time frame.

My conclusions have relevance beyond this period and this author, however.

In the concluding chapter I compare Gutzkow's dramatic theories and practices with those of two contemporaries: to Friedrich Hebbel, who as a dramatist has been called Hegelian, but whose use of Hegel does not correspond to Gutzkow's; and to Heinrich Laube, another Young German author who uses self-reflexivity in his plays without achieving the metanarrative relevance that characterizes Gutzkow's practice. These examples indicate further potential applications of my interpretive framework to other works by Gutzkow, to other so-called Hegelian dramatists, and to other dramatists who employ self-reflexive dramatic modes.

## Chapter 1: Hegel and Aesthetic Reception

Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik reveal a preoccupation with issues of artistic reception. The viewer of art, the theater-goer, the reader—as a paradigmatic compound figure, the "member of the audience"—is as surely addressed in Hegel's lectures as the philosophy students who attended them. Certainly many of his tenets on aesthetics reveal their origin in his own perspective as a viewer or reader. This perspective, I wish to argue, informs Hegel's basic notion of how artistic works effect changes in society. I will first show why Hegel gives the arts this function. While he was influenced by a variety of writers on aesthetics, Schiller clearly stands out as the most direct source of Hegel's thinking on the potential of art to effect social change. I will describe the affinities and differences between Hegel's and Schiller's aesthetics with special attention to questions of how art influences the public. Hegel's belief in art's capability to mediate ideas leads to his definition of the work of art as an epistemological construct. I will detail the elements in this construction to show that art retains this mediating function even when Hegel undermines this idea by relativizing the work's ability to compel action on the part of the audience. Finally, I will delineate the process of reception that necessarily complements Hegel's construal of art. To this end I will read the Master and Servant parable from Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes as a universal model of the exegete. When thought of as a unified figure, the Master/Servant, this dialectical model has the attributes of enjoying the objects of the sensual world as well as laboring both physically and cognitively. The location of this episode in the Phänomenologie, and its universal applicability

to the act of acquiring and using knowledge in Hegel's philosophy as a whole, makes this figure the archetypical example of the recipient of art.

The most interesting newer interpretations of Hegel's Ästhetik attempt to show the relevance, or at least the applicability, of Hegel's criteria of art to 20th-century artworks and aesthetic theories.[1] These readings invariably note the functionality of works of art in Hegel's conception of aesthetics. While the function changes in scope and effectiveness depending on the historical culture in which the work was created, Hegel incorporated an epistemological function into his definition of art as "das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee." Despite Hegel's belief in an "end" of art, these critics assert that art defined in this manner retains its educational or mind-expanding effect despite the historical and cultural loss of effectiveness Hegel claims. These readings admirably separate Hegel's essential notions of what art is from his less defensible, over-generalized theories on the cultural importance of art and art forms in their various historical contexts.

To speak of art's function, and especially to claim that art's function is the mediation of "truth," as Hegel does, implies a specific mode of reception on the part of an audience. Aestheticians in the 18th century from Baumgarten to Kant in fact focused a great deal of attention on the changes the beautiful work effected on an individual and, to a varying extent, on society. Hegel, too, makes reference to the ramifications of artistic reception, although his remarks, even

[1] D. Henrich put forth the earliest thesis on the modern relevancy of Hegel's aesthetics: "[Hegels Modernismus] äußert sich vor allem in seinem Verzicht auf eine Utopie der Künste, der wiederum zur Voraussetzung hat, daß die Reflektiertheit der modernen Kunst als Folge ihres partialen Charakters erkannt worden ist: ("Kunst und Kunstphilosophie" 27-32, here 27). More recent examinations of this topic continue to revolve around the "partial character" of art as defining a continued function for art despite Hegel's apparent claim to the contrary. Cf. Gethmann-Siefert Funktion der Kunst 371-410; Jamme 284-86; Vieweg 136; Wicks, Theory of Judgment 147-56; Pepperle.

when explicitly addressing audience response, tend to be oblique. But regardless of his shift of emphasis from the receptive faculties of an individual to a work-centered description of how art affects people and society, Hegel already incorporates reception into his theory by defining art as an epistemological construct. Art will thus evoke a cognitive response on the part of the audience. Moreover, Hegel prescribes quite precise effects for works of art within historic cultures. In other words, the work *directs* the viewer toward assuming or enacting the world-view it communicates.

Yet even those scholars who accentuate function in Hegel's aesthetics orient their inquiries around Hegel's reluctance to elaborate on his implicit reception theory. This is by no means due to skepticism on the part of these interpreters that Hegel's aesthetics contain such a theory. Instead, the receptive moment simply remains underarticulated. Robert Wicks, for example, implies the idea of reception in seeking Hegel's theory of aesthetic judgment. But he brackets out the effects of the works upon the viewer in order to concentrate solely on judgment as an evaluative function regarding beauty (Theory of Judgment 3). And yet he still concludes that "[Hegel's] interest is in showing how artistic expression serves the communicative function of art, insofar as people often express themselves artistically to introduce their deepest insights into the public sphere" (138-39). Wicks is clearly aware that evaluation is an ancillary faculty within the process of reception, and that Hegel's own focus in elaborating a function of art is to determine a work's social relevancy. Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert more expressly brings out the broad societal implications of Hegel's aesthetics. Her intention is to explore the development of Hegel's ontological definition of art, as well as his varying determinations on

art as mediation of truth (Funktion der Kunst 16). Gethmann-Siefert ultimately notes two potential effects of art which have immediate repercussions for the audience: "Die eine *Möglichkeit ist die eines freien, vielleicht gar kulturstiftenden Wirkens der Kunst*...Die andere Version geschichtlicher Wirkung ist die *unter ideologischer Fixierung des kulturell Möglichen*" (ibid. 385; Gethmann-Siefert's emphasis). Gethmann-Siefert, like Wicks, frames her conclusions about art reception in Hegel in terms of the social relevance rather than individual, psychological relevance of art works. Art could inspire its audience to act in the public sphere on the basis of the information mediated by the work, either to change their society, or to demarcate the tolerable limits of discourse. But because she orients herself ontologically, Gethmann-Siefert touches upon these potentialities only briefly in the context of the relevancy of Hegel's aesthetics for modernity—that is, when the Ästhetik is read outside Hegel's philosophical system. Significantly, both Wicks and Gethmann-Siefert are led to conclusions about the social context of aesthetic reception in Hegel's theories even though they pursue inquiries that define reception narrowly or marginalize it.

Wicks and Gethmann-Siefert also both specify a cognitive appeal of the work of art when Hegel articulates its function in the public sphere. They suspend Hegel's insistence that art, other than Greek classical art, does not convey knowledge in the most efficacious way, and focus instead on his definition of art. Within Hegel's narrow determination of cultural relevancy as a factor underwriting art's role as a mediator of information, they release Hegel's aesthetics from its most controversial and least tenable argument: that art, due to its outmoded sensual character, can mediate only historical information for the modern audience. But in reinstating art as an adequate

means of communicating ideas, Wicks and Gethmann-Siefert reach different conclusions regarding the kind of reception modern works of art will evoke. After investigating the essentially passive act of judgment in Hegel's aesthetics, Wicks rather surprisingly asserts a hitherto unmentioned active consummation of reception when he claims that Hegel has defined the artist and his or her productions as a "social self-consciousness, " so that when any work of art is judged, "we are thereby led into the sphere of culture critique" (Theory of Judgment 142). Equally surprising, because of her tendency to expose breadth where Hegel has typically been interpreted as giving narrow determinations, Gethmann-Siefert concludes that the only contemporaneously tenable element of Hegelian aesthetics is the mediation of "Handlungsorientierung" based on historical events (Funktion der Kunst 399). Despite their respective negative and positive formulations of the kinds of knowledge art still communicates, Wicks and Gethmann-Siefert both clearly show that reading Hegel's aesthetics "against the grain" of his own assumptions highlights the undeviating function of art as mediation of knowledge.

If function can be ascribed immanently to the work of art, then not only should the results be identifiable, but so should the process that realizes this function. Hegel believed he had accomplished this when he described the progression of art forms through history. Art mediates knowledge that is of cultural relevance, according to Hegel. But describing form and content of art as they change through history articulates only the results rather than the ways in which works of art influence society, as Hegel claimed they did. A perspective switch from the work to the audience helps rephrase the encounter with the work in order to initiate a more detailed study of how the idea at the

heart of a work of art is understood and potentially acted upon. If *function* describes the work of art in relation to the society in which it was produced, then *directed reception* would manifest Hegel's implicit conception of how the audience seeks to realize the ideas transmitted by the work of art.

## I. Schiller's Aesthetics of Ethical Improvement

Hegel's adoption and rejection of certain concepts put forth by Schiller in his essay Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen provides the most fruitful orientation toward a theory of reception in Hegel's aesthetics. This thesis seems counter-intuitive in the light of the lengthy discussion of Kant's aesthetics in Hegel's introductory lectures, the philosophical weight Kant carries as opposed to Schiller, and the unsystematic character of Hegel's remarks on Schiller. Moreover, Kant already models the concept of art as mediation of knowledge, which Hegel argues for as well—meaning that Hegel had no need of Schiller's mediation of this concept. But Hegel sees art as mediating truth, a supra-sensual field of knowledge that he criticizes Kant for specifically banning from artistic representation (2: 324).[2] Hegel asserts that Schiller's "großes Verdienst" is to have recognized both that art expresses truth, and that art is capable of motivating or actualizing Reason ("Vernunft") via the sensual representations of truth (13: 89ff.).

Schiller is thus central for Hegel's notions of reception because Schiller specified how this mediation could resonate in the public sphere. Gethmann-Siefert identifies three main points that Hegel adopts or modifies only slightly

[2] All Hegel citations refer to the Theorie-Werkausgabe, 20 vols.

from Schiller's aesthetics (Funktion der Kunst 28 and *passim*). The first is overcoming the ahistoricity of Kant's aesthetics. In his first letter of the Ästhetische Erziehung, Schiller attests to his reliance on "Kantische Grundsätze;" in his second letter he programmatically announces his supercession of Kant when he claims that aesthetics will resolve the *political* problem of attaining freedom. Schiller argues that the improvement of ethical behavior on the part of the individual, which Kant claims as the effect of the beautiful, becomes externalized so that a receptivity to aesthetics signifies moral status on both an individual and social level. Because of this progressive improvement, Schiller can claim that an actual, historical progression occurs. Second, Schiller sees art's function in relation to society as showing a positive, or even utopic, representation of the solution of societal problems. He asserts that as aesthetics consummates the transition of instinctual to moral behavior, ethical improvements on the part of the mass of individuals become solidified in the political constitution of the state. The "aesthetic state" is the manifestation of these ethical ideals within art, a state that may never be realized but that impels societal progress toward this goal. Finally, Schiller valorizes Classical Greece because it provides a historical example of his concept of the aesthetic state and initiates history in a manner that allows aesthetics to again achieve for modernity the equivalent wholeness of the Greek individual in harmony with the surrounding society.

The extent to which Schiller actually relies on Kant's aesthetics can be evaluated on many levels;[3] for articulating a reception theory, evaluating art's

[3] Eva Schaper, for example, discusses the modifications Schiller makes on Kant's conceptual framework; Wolgang Düsing is more interested in the necessity for Schiller to address questions of aesthetic content after attempting to restrict Kant's vague determinations of subjective response to beauty; and Robert

communicative capabilities in Kant will show how Schiller modifies Kant toward supra-individual effects of art. Kant claims that of all beautiful objects, only beautiful art ("schöne Kunst") can mediate knowledge to the audience. This is a significant exception to Kant's general determination that beauty evokes "ein Gefühl der Lust" which in turn instigates a judgment of taste ("Geschmack"). Such a judgment provides no knowledge, but rather has a mediating function itself in that it filters empirical sensation or observation for the individual's cognitive faculties. Beautiful art, however, allows the feeling of desire to appear itself as "Erkenntnisarten" (Kritik der Urteilskraft 239). He then specifies such knowledge as "aesthetic ideas": "[U]nter einer ästhetischen Idee aber verstehe ich diejenige Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, die viel zu denken veranlaßt, ohne daß ihr doch irgend ein bestimmter Gedanke, d.i. Begriff adäquat sein kann, die folglich keine Sprache völlig erreicht und verständlich machen kann" (ibid. 249-50). While this definition ascribes an epistemological function to art, Kant nevertheless disbars any single message or concept from being transmitted by art. Rudolf Makkreel explains the hermeneutical ramifications of Kant's determination by stating: "Although such ideas cannot enlarge concepts qua concepts, they broaden our interpretation of experience by presenting rational ideas to sense" (121-22). Excluding logical articulations of concepts or an overly determinate thought, Kant opens a broad spectrum of topics that art can directly mediate for cognitive reception.

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Wicks explores how Schiller extends Kantian dualistic concepts into tripartite dialectical constructs that show progress through (historical) time. But all interpreters commonly trace how Schiller develops his aesthetics from a Kantian point of origin.

Schiller follows Kant up to this point, for he also disbars art from being the medium for a message within the work's content (22. Brief, 382).[4] But for Kant the ascertainable effect of art ends with the individual's act of judgment. Kant does believe that appreciation of the beautiful and development of good taste lead to improved moral behavior and that art will play an increasingly important role in cultivating a moral society (Kritik der Urteilskraft 297-301). He carefully emphasizes the hypothetical nature of these claims, however, and explicitly states: "Ein bestimmtes objektives Prinzip des Geschmacks, wornach die Urteile desselben geleitet, geprüft und bewiesen werden könnten, zu geben, ist schlechterdings unmöglich" (ibid. 282). As much as Schiller would agree that taste could never be reduced to a formulative definition, he does in fact claim that the degree of refinement in aesthetic judgment can be measured by the organization of society.

But Schiller's first basic divergence from Kant is the externalization of individual moral development. Schiller upholds the Kantian notion that art improves morals when he claims that the central function of art is to wean humans from adherence to natural laws or "instinctual" behavior, encouraging them instead to rely on ethical laws. Art achieves this by engendering an alternative mode of human volition besides either physical neccessity or unrestricted freedom. "[E]s käme darauf an, [...] einen dritten Charakter zu erzeugen, der, mit jenen beiden verwandt, von der Herrschaft bloßer Kräfte zu der Herrschaft der Gesetze einen Übergang bahnte und, ohne den moralischen Charakter in seiner Entwicklung zu verhindern, vielmehr zu einem sinnlichen Pfand der unsichtbaren Sittlichkeit diente" (3. Brief, 315). This "third mode"

[4] Page numbers refer to the Nationalausgabe of Schiller's Werke, vol. 20.

thus has the distinction of not only transforming the individual into a more ethical person, but also provides "ein sinnliches Pfand" of the individual's moral status. In other words, the degree to which one is aesthetically attuned is also a measure of one's degree of ethical development. Schiller thus provides verifiable criteria for demonstrating morality early in his essay, while Kant maintained only an internal occurrence of ethical improvement until he posited the hypothetical, future social function of individual morality at the conclusion of his analysis of the beautiful.

Schiller further strengthens the notion of a supra-individual function of art when he defines the term "aesthetics." In the 20th letter he states:

> Diese mittlere Stimmung, in welcher das Gemüt weder physisch noch moralisch genötigt und doch auf beide Art tätig ist, verdient vorzugsweise eine freie Stimmung zu heißen, und wenn man den Zustand sinnlicher Bestimmung den physischen, den Zustand vernünftiger Bestimmung aber den logischen und moralischen nennt, so muß man diesen Zustand der realen und aktiven Bestimmbarkeit den ästhetischen *heißen*. (375; Schiller's emphasis).

Schiller significantly incorporates dynamic activity into the aesthetic condition with its "Bestimmbarkeit" as opposed to sensual or reasonable "Bestimmung." And besides reiterating in dynamic language ("tätig sein") that the aesthetic mode interrelates with both the sensual and moral modes, Schiller attests to the "real and active" character of aesthetic determinability.

This determinability is a two-way process, so that artistic reception takes in norms while exuding competence or moral status. Schiller couches this dual function of aesthetic reception in terms of general guidelines for the production

of aesthetic works in order to accomplish this improvement on the part of the viewer. "Verjage die Willkür, die Frivolität, die Rohigkeit aus ihren Vergnügungen, so wirst du sie unvermerkt auch aus ihren Handlungen, endlich aus ihren Gesinnungen verbannen. Wo du sie findest, umgib sie mit edeln, mit großen, mit geistreichen Formen, schließe sie ringsum mit den Symbolen des Vortrefflichen ein, bis der Schein die Wirklichkeit und die Kunst die Natur überwindet" (9. Brief, 336). Schiller imbues art, by virtue of its aesthetic form, with the ability to enact unconsciously the program of ethical improvement that he adopted from Kant. But he also reverses this movement so that what is provisionally only "appearance" becomes "reality" and "art" supercedes "nature." By conflating the notion of aesthetics as expressive of an individual's moral character and the idea that aesthetics is a process that relies on an interface with the "real," Schiller shifts Kant's emphasis on self-improvement from the level of individual to that of social relevance.

But Schiller also needs to explain how the effects of artistic reception move from the individual to the societal level; just because aesthetics has a social function does not yet explain an institutionalization of improved morals. Schiller follows the conclusion of the third letter, quoted above, by opening the fourth letter with the demand that the transformation of instinctual into ethical behavior is meaningless unless achieved on a cultural level: "Soviel ist gewiss: nur das Übergewicht eines solchen Charakters bei einem Volk kann eine Staatsverwandlung nach moralischen Prinzipien unschädlich machen, und auch nur ein solcher Charakter kann ihre Dauer verbürgen" (4. Brief, 315). Here Schiller openly professes his belief that ethical development on the part of the individual leads to changes in the societal constitution. More importantly,

though, he addresses the unique competence of aesthetics to achieve this end. Of the two principles Schiller asserts here for the aesthetic mediation of social change, the second one is the more intuitively logical: if art effects a processual improvement of the moral condition of society, then it establishes improvements on a durative basis. This is important because a fluctuating wave pattern of regress and progress could never achieve the goal of a completely moral society, which Schiller establishes at the end of this linear process. Schiller's other principle, that aesthetics make this process "unschädlich," has a twofold meaning in reference to the power of aesthetics to transform society. As opposed to the enforcement of laws, aesthetics compels gradual change. By virtue of its constitution as a third mode, distinct from but in mediation with both the physical world and the sphere of ethical norms, art becomes the "Werkzeug" for "[a]lle Verbesserung im Politischen [durch] Veredlung des Charakters" (9. Brief, 332). In other words, art enables rather than enforces political change, and does so by means of a gradual "ennobling" rather than by autocratic insistence. On the other hand, Schiller also reserves art as a medium of expression that is neither provided by the state nor susceptible to infringement by "politische Gesetzgeber" (ibid. 333). Schiller is claiming that aesthetics is an effective means for societal change on a mass level, but he excludes attempts at societal change that are not initiated on the basis of such mass appeal.

To review briefly: Schiller claims that aesthetics improves the ethical condition of individuals, and that this improvement is necessarily mirrored in the improved political organization of the whole society. He also states that aesthetics alone is capable of this function because it influences all persons, and

does so by virtue of some interior rather than external compulsion. So Schiller needs to define what this interior compulsion is, since it is uniquely provided by aesthetics and universally valid as compulsion. Schiller argues that aesthetic form, simply by being beautiful, has immediate access to all persons and addresses all persons in a manner that compels the progressive change in moral behavior. Aesthetics accomplishes the former by accessing the individual in a "play" mode (Spiel) and by addressing individuals as totalities.

Schiller takes great pains to define aesthetics as a unique and universal mode for compelling social change by virtue of aesthetic form rather than by means of the content of the work of art. He claims that aesthetic form is the only means of communication to which all members of society are receptive: "Alle andere Formen der Mitteilung trennen die Gesellschaft, weil sie sich ausschließend entweder auf die Privatempfänglichkeit oder auf die Privatfertigkeit der einzelnen Glieder, also auf das Unterscheidende zwischen Menschen und Menschen beziehen; nur die schöne Mitteilung vereinigt die Gesellschaft, weil sie sich auf das Gemeinsame aller bezieht" (27. Brief, 410-11). If all other forms of communication address the viewer to different degrees, depending on the individual level of receptivity to the message or capacity for understanding, then Schiller must define how aesthetics has an immediate access to all persons.

Schiller locates the intrinsic receptivity of humans to aesthetics in what he calls "der Spieltrieb." He claims that there are actually only two "Grundtriebe," namely "der sinnliche Trieb" and "der Formtrieb," and that these two conflicting drives cannot be mediated by means of themselves (13. Brief, 347). But he also claims that a receptivity to aesthetic modes of

communication is a "Geschenk der Natur" (26. Brief, 398), which indeed it must be. In order to stand outside of the essential drives, such receptivity cannot be a skill acquired from the sensual realm. For although all people have access to the natural world and thus have means to acquire such skill, the natural world is a world of necessity from which aesthetics is trying to distance the individual. Nor can this receptivity result from conceptual knowledge, for concepts cannot be universally and immediately known. This "gift of nature," then, must be situated analogously to the "third mode" that, for Schiller, paves the way for the mediation between the natural and ethical realms.

In fact, play corresponds exactly to that "third mode" when Schiller shifts his discourse from the description of the process of moral improvement to the determination of human faculties in confronting the object world—that is, the discussion of "drives." The play drive provides a mediate realm that fuses the objects of the sensual realm, "*Leben* in weitester Bedeutung," with those of the conceptual realm, "*Gestalt* [als] alle formalen Beschaffenheiten der Dinge und alle Beziehungen derselben auf die Denkkräfte," into "*lebende Gestalt*, [...] ein Begriff, der allen ästhetischen Beschaffenheiten der Erscheinungen und mit einem Worte dem, was man in weitester Bedeutung *Schönheit* nennt, zur Bezeichnung dient" (15. Brief, 355; Schiller's emphasis). Schiller thus directly equates play and aesthetics, making aesthetics not merely the only means by which the two opposing realms of nature and ethics overlap, but also a universal mode of accessing the intrinsic human ability to play.

Schiller further claims that "der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des Worts Mensch ist, und er *ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt*" (ibid. 359; Schiller's emphasis). This fundamental thesis (by Schiller's own

reckoning) of the Ästhetische Briefe again represents an externalization of the interior play drive into a social signification, so that the paradigm of the human individual is exhibited by the degree of aesthetic competence or "playfulness." But the idea of the "total human" expressed in the quote also underlies Schiller's arguments for aesthetic form as mediation for both the individual and the whole of society. His emphasis on totality in turn informs his construction of the ideal of the aesthetic state as well as his interpretation of classical Greek society.

Schiller maintains that aesthetics addresses both the whole of a person and the whole of society. On the one hand, aesthetic form is solely capable of accessing the play drive, "denn durch die Form allein wird auf das Ganze des Menschen, durch den Inhalt hingegen nur auf einzelne Kräfte gewirkt" (22. Brief, 382). Aesthetics intrinsically appeals to all individuals because such constructs address the total person via the one drive that unites both basic drives. All other communication addresses various "Kräfte" that are engaged by an appeal to sensuality or rationality. Such one-sided modes of reception result in one of two unsociable human responses: "entweder als Wilder, wenn seine Gefühle über seine Grundsätze herrschen; oder als Barbar, wenn seine Grundsätze seine Gefühle zerstören" (4. Brief, 318). Complementary to this notion of the totality of the individual, Schiller also insists that aesthetics can only develop within a societal framework: "Nicht da, wo der Mensch sich troglodytisch in Höhlen birgt, ewig einzeln ist und die Menschheit nie *außer sich* findet, auch nicht da, wo er nomadisch in großen Heermassen zieht, ewig nur Zahl ist und die Menschheit nie *in sich* findet—da allein, wo er in eigener Hütte still mit sich selbst und, sobald er heraustritt, mit dem ganzen Geschlechte

spricht, wird sich ihre liebliche Knospe entfalten" (26. Brief, 398). The metaphor of the "tender blossom" refers to beauty, which can only bloom in association with the whole of society.

Aesthetics provides not only the means for achieving an ideal society, but also the ideal itself. The concept of the innate sense of the aesthetic in development with a necessary reference to society explains Schiller's only declarative statement of what constitutes the aesthetic state: "[D]er ästhetische Staat allein kann [die Gesellschaft] wirklich machen, weil er den Willen des Ganzen durch die Natur des Individuums vollzieht" (27. Brief, 410). The innate sense of beauty on the part of the individual allows the will of the whole of society to achieve true realization only in the aesthetic state. Two corollaries of this definition help to show the historical relevance of Schiller's conception. First, Schiller thematizes a totality of individual and society, a state in which the individual can stand as a representative of the whole and vice-versa; he calls this "Totalität des Charakters" (4. Brief, 318). Schiller believes that, in the modern world, this totality is ruptured by the split between the sensual and conceptual realms, between nature and ethics. The function of aesthetics is to realize this totality on the level of the individual and, reciprocally, on the societal level. Second, Schiller claims that this state is an ideal that doesn't exist except as a "Bedürfnis [...] in jeder feingestimmten Seele," but perhaps only "in einigen wenigen auserlesenen Zirkeln" (27. Brief, 412). Schiller's aesthetic state thus does not exist within historical time, but rather stands as the endpoint of history; at the same time, it is omnipresent throughout history as the representation of this goal. The aesthetic state is the telos of history, and only aesthetics can achieve this end.

But Schiller also sees a historical realization of the aesthetic state in Classical Greece. For him, Greek civilization arose prior to the internal split in humans between thought and nature, a split that corresponds to that between society and individual. Hence the Greek individual could stand as a "Repräsentant seiner Zeit," meaning that each person typified both all other individuals and the social organization as a whole (6. Brief, 322). From this "maximum" of totality, Schiller claims that continued empirical experience with the natural world and, simultaneously, an increasing capacity and interest in speculative thought, engendered the split between the sensual and spiritual, nature and society, individual and community. Far from lamenting this historical development, Schiller in fact emphasizes that history could not have progressed, nor could the manifold expansions in human knowledge between Schiller's time and Classical Greece have been made, unless this totality bifurcated into polarities in conflict with each other. "Dieser Antagonism der Kräfte ist das große Instrument der Kultur, aber auch nur das Instrument; denn solange derselbe dauert, ist man erst auf dem Wege zu dieser" (ibid. 326). Hence, as Gethmann-Siefert has pointed out (Funktion 76ff.), Greek society provides Schiller with both a historical model of the ideal having been achieved and a conceptual model of the instigation and motor of history toward a reacquisition of this totality at a higher level of human development.

## II. Hegel's Appropriations of Schiller

Hegel takes up these aspects of Schiller's aesthetics to a great extent, albeit with shifted emphasis. For Hegel is not concerned with moral

improvement per se, but with the more generally conceived level of "geistig" development, of which ethics is a facet. He traces the development of spirit with regard to aesthetics along the same lines as were just elaborated for Schiller. That is, Hegel seeks to establish art as a means for progressively changing society toward Reason. This deviates only slightly from Schiller's project, since Schiller directly equates Reason with morality (3. Brief). When Schiller argues that aesthetics both informs and signifies ethical development, he is likewise asserting the progressive inculcation and instantiation of Reason. Hegel, by contrast, equates Reason with "Wahrheit," but his notion of truth in aesthetic mediation has the same dual function as Schiller's morality. On the one hand it is informative, advancing the subjective condition of the viewer toward the ideal (13: 76), and on the other hand artistic forms correspond to progressive stages of world-views (ibid. 103), which serve as the "sinnliches Pfand" of a given stage. So Hegel makes aesthetic mediation into a more cognitive process than Schiller does, and views the indicators of societal development toward Reason as more concrete; but he maintains the same structure for the function of art that Schiller develops in the Ästhetische Erziehung.

Focusing on cognitive factors and concrete signifiers of social development allows Hegel to articulate more fully the historical moments of aesthetic mediation. Schiller proposes a progression from nature to ethics without providing historical examples or even a conceptual differentiation of stages, relying instead on the intertwining of aesthetics with both reality and morality to connote an implicit correspondence between aesthetic and historical progress toward the aesthetic state. Hegel links historical societies with art

forms to show societal progress toward Reason. He thus exemplifies the abstract notion that artistic form and a society's world-view correspond by providing increasingly specific illustrations of the cultural significance of varying art forms. Symbolic art, for example, which for Hegel is a historical as well as formal category, reveals an underdeveloped grasp of artistic form as well as an underdeveloped capacity for abstract concepts. Symbolic art shows both of these deficiencies through the use of predominately unchanged or ineptly mimicked natural forms as representations of ideas (13, 107). Within this category, Hegel further elaborates individual aesthetic forms and their commensurate meaning in terms of the mediation of concepts. He then follows this pattern for explaining Classical art as the representation of Spirit through aestheticized forms of the human body (ibid. 110), and Romantic art as the representation of individual interiority through the increasingly abstract forms of painting, music and literature (ibid. 119-20). By claiming that artistic forms are successively paradigmatic for concepts that likewise develop in complexity over time, Hegel describes the social relevance of aesthetics with a concreteness lacking in Schiller's description of progressive improvement of a society's ethical norms.

For Hegel and Schiller alike, the force driving the progression of aesthetics and coincident societal change is the ideal character of the aesthetic construct. Schiller's claim that aesthetic works provide the means to achieve the goal of an ethical society and also represent such an ideal relies on the unique ability of art to access an intrinsic and universal receptivity to aesthetic mediation. Hegel, however, makes aesthetic mediation a predominately cognitive process by defining its content as idea. Like Schiller, Hegel also views

the aesthetic object as a universal means for addressing all members of society (13: 353). But he insists on the actuality of aesthetic content even in defining this content as ideal: "Das Ideal ist [...] die Wirklichkeit, zurückgenommen aus der Breite der Einzelheiten und Zufälligkeiten, insofern das Innere in dieser der Allgemeinheit entgegengehobenen Äußerlichkeit selbst als *lebendige Individualität* erscheint" (ibid. 207; Hegel's emphasis). This "living individuality" has a clear affinity to Schiller's "lebende Gestalt." Schiller, however, made this concept the central demand of his definition of the ideal aesthetic work. For Hegel, the connection to "Wirklichkeit" becomes paramount, while living individuality is given secondary emphasis. By stipulating an intimate connection between reality on the one hand and aesthetic representation as the representation of an ideal on the other, Hegel claims that the work of art represents achievable ideals for the society in which it is produced. When he subsequently traces the history of aesthetic works that achieve the ideals they promote, he presents the development of artistic forms as a successive chain of innovations corresponding to historical changes at a social level. Where Schiller provides only the future promise of the realizing an ethical society in the aesthetic state, Hegel shows the stages in the realization of the Reason-able society that aesthetics documents.

Finally, Hegel follows Schiller in evaluating ancient Greek society as a harmonious ideal. While Schiller restricts his depiction of ancient Greece in the Ästhetische Erziehung to a description of both individual and societal wholeness, he notes the ramifications for aesthetics of such a lack of antagonisms in his essay Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung. "[Der Grieche] scheint in seiner Liebe für das Objekt keinen Unterschied zwischen

demjenigen zu machen, was durch sich selbst, und dem, was durch die Kunst und durch den menschlichen Willen ist" (Werke 20: 429). In other words, the ancient Greeks did not require the "Machwerk der Kunst" to lead them to an ethical state via an aesthetic education; instead, the intrinsic unity of both individual and society allowed them to produce art as the manifestation of their "ungeduldige Phantasie" (ibid.). Hegel likewise places ancient Greece at a "maximum" stage of development in regard to the totality of individual and society: "[I]m griechischen sittlichen Leben war das Individuum zwar selbständig und frei in sich, ohne sich jedoch von den vorhandenen allgemeinen Interessen des wirklichen Staates und der affirmativen Immanenz der geistigen Freiheit in der zeitlichen Gegenwart loszulösen" (14: 25). Hegel reiterates here, in terms very similar to Schiller's, the notion of the totality of the individual as well as the individual's total incorporation into the whole of society. But Hegel also gives this conception a concrete articulation in his definition of how Greek works of art express this world-view. Classical art becomes a perfect harmony of form and content for Hegel, paradigmatically realized in the sculpted human figure (13: 109). As a representation of the human, sculpture allowed the content of Spirit—which intrinsically constitutes the human—to achieve a beautiful physical manifestation. The ability to conjoin these two aspects makes Classical art the pinnacle of aesthetic expression, according to Hegel, since it does not lack spiritual content as does Symbolic art, nor does it overreach the potential for physical representation like the more developed "geistig" themes of Romantic art.

These modifications show how Hegel comes to focus predominately on the work of art rather than on the psychological aspects of the individual that

preoccupy Schiller. This shift allows Hegel to pursue the argument that works of art influence society in explicitly historical terms. Schiller defers the recovery of individual and societal totality, as achieved by Ancient Greece, to a utopic future. His orientation around individual moral improvement compels him to theorize this recovery as an aggregate yet individual process that cannot be articulated in terms of how close society is to achieving the goal (7. Brief, 328ff.; cf. Werke 20: 438). But even where Hegel adheres to Schiller's notions of the progressive societal impact of aesthetics or the conception of Greek totality, he consistently transposes these theories into identifiable characteristics of forms of art. Hegel's emphasis on the work of art becomes even more apparent when elaborating the differences between his aesthetics and Schiller's. The most important of these differences are Hegel's linear concept of history, as opposed to Schiller's circular model; Hegel's positive view of the sensual character of art; Hegel's cognitive "Idee" rather than Schiller's psychological "Spiel" as the fundamental element of aesthetic mediation; and Hegel's demotion of the importance of the individual artist for the production of art.

When Schiller sets up Classical Greece as a model of totality and claims that aesthetic education will eventually lead once again to a community made up of such unified individuals and comprising a harmonious society, he is advancing a circular model of history. This is not to say that Schiller seeks to reestablish Greek society as exactly as possible in modernity, for as noted above, he believes that the evolution beyond Greek totality to a bifurcation both within and between individuals and society was a positive, necessary

progression.[1] Nor is Schiller's theory of history entirely circular, since the natural perfection attained by the Greeks is both qualitatively different and unattainable in modernity (Werke 20: 428ff.). But Schiller relies on the Greek model to delineate the telos of history so that, like bookends, the unity of individual and society stands at both the beginning and end of history. Schiller thus summarizes world history as follows: "Die Natur macht [den Menschen] mit sich eins, die Kunst trennt und entzweit ihn, durch das Ideal kehrt er zur Einheit zurück. Weil aber das Ideal ein Unendliches ist, das er niemals erreicht, so kann der kultivierte Mensch in *seiner* Art niemals vollkommen werden, wie doch der natürliche Mensch es in der seinigen zu werden vermag" (ibid. 438). Schiller incorporates an infinite progression into his conception of historical progress so that history in fact never comes to an end. He likewise inscribes this infinite progression into aesthetic mediation by claiming that such mediation inevitably results in a "bestimmter Zustand" that has only limited temporal, spatial, and metaphysical validity and therefore must be perpetually redissolved via a new aesthetic experience (21. Brief, 378). And yet Schiller clearly aligns the concepts of natural and ideal unity, so that the function of art is to facilitate the reattainment of the totalized individual and society. Because he cannot elaborate the effectiveness of art in communicating and realizing the Ideal, his description of historical progress and aesthetic mediation remains vague.

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[1] Gethmann-Siefert seems to believe that Schiller could only have wanted an imitative restoration of Classical Greece when she claims that for Schiller, "die griechische Kultur und Kunst stellt eine nicht wiederholbare Einlösung anstehender Forderungen an eine Kunst in politischer Intention dar" (Funktion 77). While this statement is accurate, it is not to the point of what Schiller found most positive in Greek society—namely the totality of individual and society that made "political" art unnecessary.

Although Hegel also sees Greek society as a model, he sets Ancient Greece into a linear conception of history by assessing Greek perfection in purely aesthetic terms. Hegel views sculpture as the paradigmatic art form of the Greek Classical age because it perfectly fuses physical representation and conceptual content in the depiction of the human body (14: 19). Because of this "Durchdringung" of objectivity and subjectivity in the statue, Hegel establishes Classical art as the pinnacle of aesthetic form, "[die] mit dem Begriff des Schönen zusammenfallende Realität" (ibid. 13). There are, however, limitations to this art form because subjectivity is not truly representable in physical form for Hegel. He therefore claims that art progresses on to less material forms of representation.

> Das Prinzip dieses Überganges liegt darin, daß der Geist, dessen Individualität bisher mit den wahren Substanzen der Natur und des menschlichen Daseins als im Einklang angeschaut wurde und der sich, seinem eigenen Leben, Wollen und Wirken nach, in diesem Einklang wußte und fand, jetzt in die Unendlichkeit des Innern sich zurückzuziehen anfängt, doch statt der wahren Unendlichkeit nur eine formelle und selber noch endliche Rückkehr in sich gewinnt. (ibid. 117)

Hegel, like Schiller, sees human history progressing beyond the perfection that Ancient Greece represents. Hegel, too, attests to a unified conception of individual and society in Classical Greece, a condition he considers both as enabling the perfection of Greek art and as mirrored by their art. But in contrast to Schiller, Hegel claims that this perfection was ultimately only formal and finite. As Spirit becomes more attuned to its infinite interiority, the individual realizes that this interiority cannot be adequately signified by any

external representation of individuality. Hegel thus identifies the function of art for the Classical era quite specifically by describing an aesthetic form in terms of its societal relevance for a certain historical society, and in fact follows this methodology in describing each historical period's paradigmatic aesthetic forms. The Classical unity becomes for Hegel a stage in history, rather than the beginning and end of history as in Schiller.

Despite Schiller's fundamental belief in the power of art to achieve social change, he remains apprehensive of a subversive and immoral appeal of the sensual world. This skepticism persists throughout the Ästhetische Erziehung and results in two peculiar stipulations in regard to aesthetic constructs. First, he undermines the synthetic function of art by emphasizing conceptual aspects over material components of aesthetics. Art is supposed to free humans from the dual danger of natural baseness ("Rohigkeit") and untempered freedom of action ("Verkehrtheit") by reconciling and harmonizing these two extremes (5. Brief, 321). As shown above, beauty effects this reconciliation of sensuality and Reason by activating the individual's play drive. But contrary to his construction of play as a third mode, distinct from sense and thought, Schiller repeatedly affiliates aesthetics with Reason by emphasizing form over matter. He thus asserts that form should dominate over "dürftiger Sinn" (12. Brief, 347); that the mediation of the sensual and formal drives is an "Aufgabe der Vernunft" rather than immanent to aesthetics as a third mode (14. Brief, 352); and that Reason establishes ("aufstellen") the ideal both of beauty and the play drive (15. Brief, 356), to list but a few examples.

In addition to this prejudice toward Reason, Schiller also makes the development of "Kultur" prerequisite for a potential balance between

sensuality and Reason (13. Brief, 348). On an individual basis, he maintains that culture is developed by increasing, through practice, the faculties of receptivity in both the sensual mode ("Empfänglichkeit") and the rational mode ("Freiheit der Vernunft"; ibid. 349). He then claims that culture will spill over into society by aggregate development, analogous to his theory of the social inculcation of Reason. But Schiller also restricts aesthetic mediation from effecting the development of Reason until culture is generally developed: "[Der ästhetische Schein] wird nicht allgemein werden, solange der Mensch noch ungebildet genug ist, um einen Mißbrauch davon machen zu können; und würde er allgemein, so könnte dies nur durch eine Kultur bewirkt werden, die zugleich jeden Mißbrauch unmöglich machte" (27. Brief, 404). Schiller's preference for Reason over sense and his demand that an indeterminate "cultural" development precede aesthetic mediation both contradict the supposed universal appeal of an aesthetic resolution to the conflict between sense and Reason.

Hegel's definition of art as "sinnliches Scheinen der Idee" already connotes his antithetical notion of the physical aspect of aesthetics in comparison to Schiller. Hegel's enthusiasm for the arts stems from the capability of the aesthetic object to give sensual manifestation to an idea and therefore make concepts comprehensible to the widest audience possible. Art mediates such ideas via sensual form by means of "Schein."[2] For Hegel,

[2] M. Böhler's argument, namely that Hegel expands only minimally on Schiller's notion of "Schein" and consequently develops the historical categories of artistic forms from this basis, conflates the terms "Schein" and "Spiel" without adequately addressing the elements of Schiller's aesthetics that reveal his reluctance to endow the physical "Erscheinung" with an immediate and universal connection to the individual's sense of play (189 ff.).

aesthetic appearance means that a physical object has been changed or created with the specific intention of representing an idea for its audience.

> Doch der *Schein* selbst ist dem *Wesen* wesentlich, die Wahrheit wäre nicht, wenn sie nicht schiene und erschiene, wenn sie nicht *für* Eines wäre, für sich selbst sowohl als auch für den Geist überhaupt [...]. [S]o ist die Form der Erscheinung, welche ein Inhalt in dem Bereiche des Denkens gewinnt, allerdings die wahrhaftigste Realität; doch im Vergleich mit dem Schein der sinnlichen unmittelbaren Existenz und dem der Geschichtsschreibung hat der Schein der Kunst den Vorzug, daß er selbst durch sich hindurchdeutet und auf ein Geistiges, welches durch ihn soll zur Vorstellung kommen, aus sich hinweist, dahingegen die unmittelbare Erscheinung sich selbst nicht als täuschend gibt, sondern vielmehr als das Wirkliche und Wahre, während doch das Wahrhafte durch das unmittelbar Sinnliche verunreinigt und versteckt wird. (13: 21-23)

Hegel thus gives aesthetic representations a better capacity for representing concepts than the natural world or the prose explanation of human history. Hegel specifically associates this preeminent communicative power of the aesthetic object with a broad definition of the receptivity to such communication: it is not just for one individual, but for all individuals as incarnations of Spirit. Moreover, its sensual construction makes it as approachable as merely existent reality, while at the same time mediating a higher truth as opposed to the "immediately sensual." This intrinsic sensual objectivity of the work of art allows Hegel to claim that art is comprehensible "ohne [den] Umweg weitläufiger entlegener Kenntnisse unmittelbar durch sich

selber" and "für die Nation im großen und ganzen" (ibid. 353). In other words, the sensual character of art guarantees the widest possible receptivity for the communication of concepts.

This difference regarding the sensual aspect of art is codified in their different analyses of "Genuß." For Schiller, the term "enjoyment" in reference to the aesthetic object is a synonym for the third mode, or for play. "Da nun aber bei dem Genuß der Schönheit oder der ästhetischen Einheit eine wirkliche Vereinigung und Auswechslung der Materie mit der Form...vor sich geht, so ist eben dadurch die Vereinbarkeit beider Naturen, die Ausführbarkeit des Unendlichen in der Endlichkeit, mithin die Möglichkeit der erhabensten Menschheit bewiesen" (25. Brief, 397). Enjoyment depends on the presence of the truly aesthetic object that represents the synthesis of the sensual and conceptual, and Schiller excludes any enjoyment from pertaining to aesthetics if it derives from the merely sensual (27. Brief, 405). For Hegel, however, the aesthetic sense of enjoyment specifically incorporates the sensual appeal of art, so that the work of art is "für den Genuß der Anschauung, für ein Publikum, das in dem Kunstobjekt sich selbst seinem wahrhaften Glauben, Empfinden, Vorstellen nach wiederzufinden [hat]" (13: 319). Hegel significantly uses the term "Anschauung" in a twofold sense here. As a cognitive process, the term refers to knowledge gained by intuition rather than reasoning, and in Hegel's statement it connotes the acquisition of knowledge via representation in the work of art rather than by reasoning.[3] Hegel clearly believes that such cognitive activity provides enjoyment, and he describes this enjoyment as the recognition

[3] Knox translates "Anschauung" in this context as "contemplation," which highlights both the cognitive and visual elements (1, 245).

by the audience of the "beliefs, sensibilities, representations"—that is, elements on the level of content and thus for cognition. But Hegel is likewise referring to the physical aspect of the work of art with his emphasis on the object of art and the parallel construction of its existence as "for enjoyment" and "for the audience." Hegel is also specifically discussing the "äußerliche Bestimmtheit," the physical manifestation of the ideal work of art in this section of the text. So despite his admixture of cognitive pleasure with the sensual enjoyment of art, he differentiates between both elements as causing pleasure, whereas for Schiller, aesthetic enjoyment was solely a result of the synthesis of matter and form.

The differing evaluations of art's sensual aspect lead Schiller and Hegel to pose different locations for the productive moment of the receptive act. Because they both argue that aesthetic mediation can lead to societal change, the work of art must motivate action on the part of at least some viewers in order to translate the aesthetic communication from theory into practice. For Schiller, this process of change is an internal, individual act that repercusses in the social sphere at the undefined point at which enough individuals have undergone the transformation to make individual norm become societal norm. For Hegel, the aesthetically mediated Idea is inherently relevant to the social order, and the act of realizing any change provoked by art can occur as individual or institutional change. While the work itself initiates the process for both Hegel and Schiller, the mechanics of producing change is an indeterminate psychological act even in Schiller's aesthetics, whereas the cognitive appeal of the work of art permits Hegel to conceive of a formal, work-immanent change in correspondence with historically ascertainable social change.

Schiller's theory of aesthetically induced change in fact has almost no recourse to the work of art beyond the individual's initial encounter with it. His conception of the human progression from merely natural existence to an ethical and rational society via beauty rests on the premise that play allows the synthesis between the physical realm of natural constraints and the rational realm of conceptual freedom. Engaging the play drive is the inherent function of the aesthetic object, which manifests itself as "lebende Gestalt." But Schiller cannot specify the aesthetic any closer than as this indeterminate synthesis. On the one hand, this is due to the purely subjective determination of what constitutes beauty. Using the description of a beautiful person as an example, Schiller claims: "Nur indem seine Form in unsrer Empfindung lebt und sein Leben in unserm Verstande sich formt, ist er lebende Gestalt..." (15. Brief, 355). Beauty is thus recognizable only by interiorizing formal and thematic elements of the beautiful object and measuring or reconstituting them against the concept of beauty. This follows from Schiller's reduction of all aesthetics to the faculty of play. Because of his reciprocally conditioned definition of aesthetics as play and play as aesthetic, the conditions for beauty must be an internal component of the play drive. On the other hand, Schiller's misgivings toward sensual representation lead him to define beauty as "immer nur Idee, die von der Wirklichkeit nie ganz erreicht werden kann" (16, Brief, 360). Since beauty could never truly be manifested, Schiller cannot claim that the aesthetic object directly provokes individual change. Instead, beauty spurs the play drive into action, which is then a wholly internal and indescribable process of judging the finite object against the ideal, synthesizing Nature and Reason, and improving one's ethics.

In Hegel, however, the work itself exhibits both why it should be considered aesthetic as well as the relevance of its message for individual and society by virtue of its aesthetic form. Hegel defines form very broadly, stipulating only that the work be "ein Produkt menschlicher Tätigkeit" (13: 44). In addition to this corporeal requirement, Hegel asserts that in order to be seen as art, the work must represent something essentially conceptual: "Kunstwerk ist es nur, insofern es, aus dem Geiste entsprungen, nun auch dem Boden des Geistes angehört, die Taufe des Geistigen erhalten hat und nur dasjenige darstellt, was nach dem Anklange des Geistes gebildet ist" (ibid. 48). At this most general level, the work of art is characterized merely as an object which has been altered or produced by humans and which thereby signifies some concept. This definition of art clearly allows the work to directly address issues of social concern, but also allows an overwhelming breadth of objects to be considered artworks. Hegel condenses his definition of art by incorporating the audience as a necessary aspect of aesthetics. He specifies that the Idea expressible in sensuous form must be contemporaneously relevant: "[...] nur der in seiner Realität gegenwärtige und mit derselben in Einheit gesetzte Begriff ist Idee" (ibid. 145). He furthermore sets this aesthetic idea into a dialectical relationship with aesthetic form, so that as the conceptual interests and problems of the society that comprises the audience change, so do the art forms which mediate these concepts (ibid. 390). Thus the work of art achieves its status as aesthetic object because its audience recognizes it as a sensual object that has been worked upon and therefore communicates culturally relevant information. On this basis, Hegel can use works of art themselves to describe a

historical progression of aesthetic forms that he can simultaneously formulate as a progression of social development.

Hegel's transference of the process of aesthetic transformation from an immediate internal experience to a cognitive reflection based on immanent features of the work of art also entails a radically different notion of the artist compared to Schiller. Indeed, Schiller continues Kant's conception of the artist as genius to whom an instinctual faculty for creating art is given (Kritik der Urteilskraft §46). This means not only that the artist creates from an individual and interior capacity, but also that the artist is an exceptional person in comparison to others. Hegel opposes this notion by establishing the form and content of works of art as external to any singular individual, so that the artist approaches the notion at the heart of the work from outside instead of producing the conception from within. This difference serves to make Hegel's artist significantly less elevated in social stature than the genius-artist.

For Schiller, the artist accesses a reified stratum of concepts and imparts to them an ideal form. Because aesthetics functions for Schiller on the formal level, he sees the main task of the artist as producing an effective form. "Den Stoff zwar wird er von der Gegenwart nehmen, aber die Form von einer edleren Zeit, ja jenseits aller Zeit, von der absoluten unwandelbaren Einheit seines Wesens entlehnen" (9. Brief, 333). In choosing the content, the artist can adapt any contemporaneous material, since content has only limited appeal to an audience at large. Schiller describes the source of aesthetic form, however, in terms of the artist's internal and external unity, and these are the same totalized terms in which he also described both Ancient Greece and the unrealizable aesthetic ideal. This makes that artist into an exceptional figure who is capable

not only of bridging the intrinsic human split between sensually and rationally determined activity, but who can also mediate this unity for others in the work of art. However, this restriction of artistic production to a small, elite group induces Schiller to problematize the relationship between artist and audience with regard to aesthetic mediation. Schiller notes—as part of his directive to the artist that contemporary material is merely incidental to the aesthetic work—that the artist should disregard public judgment (ibid. 334). Schiller also engages in a diatribe against the "Mangel an Form in dem Beurteiler" (22. Brief, 382). By setting the artist on a pedestal, then, Schiller both distances the artist from the general populace and undercuts the effectiveness of aesthetic mediation.

Hegel, too, conceives of the artist as intuitively creating the formal components of the work of art. But because content is the significant aspect of the aesthetic work for Hegel, the artist has a more technical than metaphysical faculty.

> Die Stellung des Künstlers ist...von der Art, daß er eben als *natürliches* Talent in Verhältnis zu einem *vorgefundenen* gegebenen Stoffe tritt.... Wenn nun aber der Künstler in dieser Weise den Gegenstand ganz zu dem seinigen hat werden lassen, muß er umgekehrt seine subjektive Besonderheit und deren zufällige Partikularitäten zu vergessen wissen und sich seinerseits ganz in den Stoff versenken, so daß er als Subjekt gleichsam die Form ist für das Formieren des Inhaltes, der ihn ergriffen hat. (13: 372-73)

The passivity of the artist is strikingly apparent in this passage: the content of the aesthetic work is clearly given prior to any production by the artist, whose

fundamental task appears to be the effacement of any features of the work that could imply a subjective treatment of the material. In fact, the spurious relationship of a specific content to Schiller's artist is exactly reversed in Hegel, so that the specific artist becomes the irrelevant factor of artistic production.

Hegel clearly conceives of the artist analogously to his conception of "great historical figures" ("die welthistorischen Individuen"; 12: 45).[4] Hegel claims in his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte: "Ihre [der welthistorischen Individuen] Sache war es, das Allgemeine, die notwendige, nächste Stufe ihrer Welt zu wissen, diese sich zum Zwecke zu machen und ihre Energie in dieselbe zu legen...[Sie] sind darum als die Einsichtigen anzuerkennen; ihre Handlungen, ihre Reden sind das Beste der Zeit" (ibid. 46). This passage shows how Hegel envisions both the historical leader and the artist as effective communicators who are, however, essentially integrated within the community. First and foremost, they are productive in communicating their insight to the populace. They do not announce any sort of personal vision; their contribution is rather the discovery and use of an adequate means of mediating their perceptions of socially relevant problems for the greater populace. In the Ästhetik, Hegel de-emphasizes this active element of the artist, but does indeed make reference to the artist's personal contribution to the work under the rubric "Begeisterung." "Die wahre Begeisterung...entzündet sich an irgendeinem bestimmten Inhalt, den die Phantasie, um ihn künstlerisch auszudrücken, ergreift, und ist der Zustand dieses tätigen Ausgestaltens selbst..." (13: 371). Notably, Hegel still maintains

[4] Robert Wicks also notes this correspondence in describing Hegel's "theory of artistic expression" (Theory of Judgment 141).

the primacy of the content in provoking the agency of the artist to give the material "aesthetic expression." But Hegel plays down the exceptional faculties of such individuals in perceiving such content. Both the historical figure and the artist distinguish themselves only by this activity and proficiency in facilitating mediation of socially relevant ideas, and not by any intrinsic constitution as with the genius. Positioning the artist or leader as a talent rather than as a genius intimates that such political or artistic "insights" would be made regardless of the historically identifiable individual. Besides reinforcing the supremacy of content over form, the relative irrelevance of the mediator acts as a guarantee for the success of mediation via speech or work of art, since the topic of the speech or work was "ripe" for expression and could have been made by anyone.

The comparison to Schiller provides the necessary base from which to understand the ramifications of Hegel's notions of art's societal effects. Clearly, Hegel is indebted to Schiller for articulating the effects of aesthetics as inevitably supra-individual and therefore historically relevant as an agency for societal change. Hegel also incorporates Schiller's depiction of Classical Greece as an ideal into his own conception of aesthetic perfection. The differences between these two theories are equally important for grasping Hegel's new conception of how aesthetics influences society. Hegel's shift to a work-oriented theory of aesthetic mediation, as opposed to Schiller's formal-psychological theory, enables him to argue that aesthetic works thematize contemporaneous societal problems in a physical mode that allows access to conceptual problems for the greatest number of a society's members. Because of this fundamental importance of the work of art, it is now necessary to

examine what it means when Hegel defines the aesthetic work as Spirit, and how Hegel explains the coincidence of the historical progression of art forms with the changes of Spirit.

## III. Hegel's Historical Progression of the Function of Art

Hegel conceives of an underlying "organisches Prinzip" that informs both the work of art itself and the development of artistic forms through history. Just as the work represents a self-sufficient whole, the phenomenon of art is conceived as an exhaustive series of artistic forms, each of which performs the act of "sensual representation of the idea." Hegel then postulates a self-propulsion of aesthetic innovation because he sets the content of art as a sub-category of his most developed notion of human conceptual activity, "absoluter Geist," and claims that the history of Absolute Spirit and of the world are synonymous (10: 371). By defining this aesthetic idea as latent in society, Hegel asserts that works of art correspond in an immediate way to the norms and ideals of society. But this immediacy does not explain the progression of form. Because Hegel excludes any conscious decisions by the artist as to the adequacy of artistic form for an aesthetic representation in its historical context, the Ästhetik gives the impression that artistic forms engender themselves in a hermetic, preordained manner.

Artistic forms obviously require some agency to effect the changes Hegel postulates. To locate this agency, these changes must be differentiated from the progression of content. Hegel sets the content of the work of art as a manifestation of historical changes in Spirit. When viewed as a specific topic

derived from a society's world-view, content is an idealized representation of human events. Hegel generally calls history "die Gestaltung des Geistes in Form des Geschehens" (7: 505). The content of the aesthetic work differs from the historical event by infusing the latter with ideal notions. "[Der Geist] erzeugt aus sich selbst die Werke der schönen Kunst als das erste versöhnende Mittelglied zwischen dem bloß Äußerlichen, Sinnlichen und Vergänglichen und dem reinen Gedanken, zwischen der Natur und endlichen Wirklichkeit und der unendlichen Freiheit des begreifenden Denkens" (13: 21). Hegel's belief that art synthesizes actuality with ideal notions links the arts to the historical timeline, and complements his demand that works of art be comprehensible to their audience by pertaining to contemporaneous societal issues. The content of art thus permutates along with the progression of history. History progresses dialectically for Hegel, so that its manifestations become a reflection of what Spirit *has been* and intimates *ensuing* manifestations. "Das Resultat dieses Ganges ist also, daß der Geist, indem er sich objektiviert und dieses sein Sein denkt, einerseits die Bestimmtheit seines Seins zerstört, anderseits das Allgemeine desselben erfaßt und dadurch seinem Prinzip eine neue Bestimmung gibt" (12: 104). Spirit thus develops organically, "[er] ist wesentlich Resultat seiner Tätigkeit" (ibid.), an idea that can also be expressed by saying that a society's world-view manifests Spirit as it is and connotes Spirit as it will be in the immediate future. This notion of historical progression from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history clearly shows the affinity between the treatment of the historical event and the work of art in that both deal with situations taken from finite reality and produce reflection leading to a renewed determination, either as a historical event or as a work of art.

But artistic form is contingent *on*, not determining *for*, these changes. Hegel paradigmatically invokes the image of emergence ("hervortreten") when describing the origination of form out of content. "Indem nun diese Tätigkeit [der Menschen] nicht nur als solche, sondern in ihrer bestimmten Erscheinung durch die Kunst soll aufgefaßt werden, hat sie an und in solchem Material ins Dasein zu treten" (13, 318). Because aesthetic form lacks the immediacy of Spirit's activity, Hegel's concept of form is derived from the requirement that content be manifested physically in order to make this content accessible to an audience. Hence the progression of Spirit does not immediately motivate the art-intrinsic progression of aesthetic forms; there must be some agency that actualizes the alterations in form in accordance with the demands of the content. But Hegel relativizes the contribution of the individual artist in making such changes. Now the artist again becomes the passive receptor of the impetus for changes, but instead of Spirit, the reception accorded to new works compels the artist to make changes in form.

Hegel's concept of form has only ever been investigated as an indicator of the historical context of aesthetic works. Such readings tend either to uncritically describe form in Hegel's own terms as a measure of complexity and hence as a reflection of a society's placement on the historical timeline (Bloch 285), or to criticize Hegel for establishing overly rigid typologies that do not adequately describe the entire empirical set of art works of all temporal origins (Karelis 432ff.; Winfield 163 and *passim*). Tilottama Rajan, on the other hand, expressly notes two connotations for artistic production revealed by Hegel's projected synthesis of aesthetic form and content. "To begin with, the self-representation of the subject in language and form is always productive as well

as reflexive. Secondly, the alienation of the signifier from the signified formalized in symbolic and Romantic art remains the semiotic expression of a problem that must be referred back to the structures of (historical) consciousness" (175). Rajan's first remark points to the fact that in Hegel's definition of works of art as representations of Spirit in aesthetic form, the work induces a productive response, whether this be conceptual-reflective or aesthetic-productive. In other words, art engenders a productive response not just by virtue of its content, but also by virtue of its form. However, in claiming that in Hegel's theory the imbalance between form and content in certain historical periods simply externalizes a split subjectivity, Rajan retreats from an analysis of form as an element of historical progression to the typical reading of form as a static historical marker. Rajan concludes that Hegel's aesthetic theory describes a "sub-version of aesthetics" that "valorizes art forms that...do not cohere as acts of representation" (174). Ultimately, then, "Art for Hegel is therefore a praxis whose inevitable failures in representation must be read symptomatically as expressing the contradictions of their historical moment" (176). This conclusion again reifies the aesthetic work into a testimonial for the (art) historian, without reference to the societal function that originally gave the work of art its status as effective mediation of an idea. These interpretations all focus on how aesthetic form comprises part of the end product, rather than on how the succession of forms provides an insight into Hegel's conception of the effectiveness of aesthetic mediation of socially relevant ideas.

To show how changes in aesthetic form reveal the productivity of reception, I will first examine Hegel's concept of the work of art itself to show how it is structured as both product and producer of a society's world-view.

Hegel argues that the work of art is an autonomous construct that does not reveal itself as means of communicating from one individual to another. Instead, art appears as an "organic" whole, independent of both producer and viewer. This distance enables art to achieve "Objektivität," according to Hegel, and therefore to constitute truth. By also claiming that art intrinsically relates topics about humans and of human interest, Hegel concludes that art mediates the objective conditions of a society, or its world-view, and thereby also objectifies that society's problems. Finally, Hegel's stipulation that aesthetic form is likewise always contemporaneously relevant enables him to link art forms with historical cultures in a continuous progression, establishing this progression as likewise organic.

I will then argue that conceiving of the audience as the active agency of this progression propels the historical development of art in conjunction with the evolution of cultures or world-views. The only way to conceive of changes in artistic form in connection with content is to ascribe to the work of art the function of eliciting a productive response as the impetus for artistic production. When thought of in this way, reception becomes a central concept for Hegel's aesthetics. Art works must direct their reception toward a productive act, one that results at least in the creation of new works of art, organically developing through a gradually progressing chain of forms. But since art and society are so bound up together in Hegel's definition of what art *is*, this reception must also have potential repercussions in the public sphere—that is, the productive act that art compels must also potentially be a political act. I will compare Hegel's readings of Classical and Romantic drama to show how he explicitly details the social impact of Classical drama, and

subsequently relativizes, but does not discount, this impact for Romantic drama. Hegel describes a reduced effectiveness of drama to initiate social change on the basis of changes in Spirit, or, in other words, to effect changes in society by promulgating such changes in the drama. But I will trace how Hegel maintains the same conception of formal changes in spite of his insistence on a radical break in the content of Classical and Romantic drama. It is my hypothesis that maintaining the productive function of the viewer assures the continued social relevance of drama beyond ancient Greece, and that this productive function is identifiable as the development of formal innovations in aesthetic works.

Hegel insists on an equivalence between the content of art on the one hand and the world-view that informs the viewer on the other. In the most general terms, Hegel expresses this equivalence as a reconciliation of the viewer with the "äußere Welt." He claims that these two "worlds," that of the subject and that of the surrounding world, "stehen [...] in wesentlicher Beziehung und machen in ihrem Zusammenhange erst die konkrete Wirklichkeit aus, deren Darstellung den Inhalt des Ideals abgibt" (13: 319). The "ideal" here is the successful work of art, which not only reflects the collisions of these two worlds, but also provides knowledge of the "essential relationships" between the two. Hegel speaks elsewhere of art as "die erste Lehrerin der Völker" (ibid. 76) and of the knowledge gained from viewing art as "staatsstiftend" (ibid. 135ff.). He thereby posits art as both contributing to the construction of the "actual world" and as drawing its material from this world.

Hegel accords to the work of art the ability to stand as an entirely independent totality when he claims that it is "eine lebendige Individualität"

(13: 207). By defining the work as an intrinsic unified figure that does not rely on any element outside of itself in order to show itself as constitutive of the "actual world," Hegel claims that the work represents objective truth:

> [...] dem Wesen des Schönen nach muß in dem *schönen Objekt* sowohl der Begriff, der Zweck und die Seele desselben wie seine äußere Bestimmtheit, Mannigfaltigkeit und Realität überhaupt als aus sich selbst und nicht durch andere bewirkt erscheinen, indem es...nur als immanente Einheit und Übereinstimmung des bestimmten Daseins und echten Wesens und Begriffs Wahrheit hat. (ibid. 156)

Hegel here uses language again indicative of his notion of the work of art as an individual, describing its interior "soul" and external "reality" to establish its independent existence. This apparent independence insures that the work of art is an instantiation of truth by bracketing out both the potential that it is merely a natural object with no interiority, and the possibility that it is an artificial construct employed by some external agency to directly propound an idea to the viewer. That aesthetic content represents truth is given for Hegel when he establishes the equivalence of aesthetic content and the human condition in the world. "Menschliches Interesse, der geistige Wert, den eine Begebenheit, ein individueller Charakter, eine Handlung in ihrer Verwicklung und ihrem Ausgange hat, wird im Kunstwerke aufgefaßt und reiner und durchsichtiger hervorgehoben, als es auf dem Boden der sonstigen, unkünstlerischen Wirklichkeit möglich ist" (ibid. 48-49). Hegel's hermetic conception of the aesthetic work in relation to the viewer enables the work to represent "more clearly" aspects of general concern regarding human endeavors than the study of unmediated reality would allow. The autonomy of

the work thus acts as a guarantee of its truth content, defining art as an object that mediates true knowledge about human existence in the world.

Hegel reinforces the autonomous status of works of art by describing their production in terms of a capacity for self-generating aesthetic forms. In this respect he speaks of "der Kunstgeist," which determines form on the basis of content "aus sich selbst zu einem in sich gegliederten System schöner Weltanschauungen des Göttlichen und Menschlichen" (14: 245). Beyond underscoring the autonomous condition of aesthetic works, this conception is the culmination of Hegel's determinations of aesthetic production already touched upon. Again, the function of the artist is de-emphasized to the point of effacement. More importantly, Hegel formulates the prescription of form by content here in terms that allow a systematic historical development of aesthetics. That is, he elucidates a theoretical motivation for the search for adequate aesthetic form in the Symbolic era that he ultimately sees realized in the Classical era. This description of the organic progress of forms is clearly formulated as parallel to the organic development of artistic content and historical world-views, so that all three elements of aesthetic mediation are synchronized. Hegel's thesis that art forms produce themselves immanently from the basis of the content of the work of art thus also effects an organic link between the viewer and the work.

The apparent unity of these three elements in the work of art is compromised, however, when posited along with Hegel's demand that the work of art represent an ideal and be a "teacher" for society. Because aesthetic content can never exactly correspond to the viewer's world-view without losing its function as mediator of the ideal, Hegel's requirement that form be adequate

to representing the content for the audience is a demand that in fact must have dual components. The discrepancies between the content of art and the condition of society are revealed in the dual demand on form to be an adequate expression *of* the idea as well as *for* the audience. This discrepancy is not revealed in Hegel's determination of the adequacy of form to the idea, for this aspect comprises his definitions of Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic art. These definitions—that Symbolic art represents vague ideas in vague forms, that Classical art represents Spirit as a unification of body and mind in sculpture, that Romantic art represents subjective interiority in increasingly abstract forms—might be challenged by cultural historians, but Hegel maintains the consistency of his claims throughout the Ästhetik. As Ernst Bloch has noted, these definitions and their historical order are the basic theoretical premise from which Hegel develops what Bloch calls an "Inhaltsästhetik" (288). Because Hegel conditions his aesthetics on this proposition that form is adequate to content, he can identify, with historical hindsight, the correlations of forms and historical periods that he posits.

Regardless of historical accuracy, Hegel thus preserves the symbiosis of content and societal world-view in the static identification of forms with societies. Hegel can even maintain his notion of the content of art as a construction of ideals, for he can describe subsequent changes in either a society or its art as reflections of how a previously mediated idea manifests itself in later incarnations of society or art. What this does not explain is how art forms can organically change in a process that is only ever posited, but never described, by the genealogy of art itself. In other words, Hegel explains the continuous organic equivalence of content and representation, but does not

adequately address the reciprocal organic progression of form as indicative of receptive comprehensibility. His notion of this progression really requires some agency that provides for the continuity of form as a means of preserving the adequacy of form's communicative function.

But Hegel does in fact discuss just this notion of the individual's response to art as engendering both comprehension and production of aesthetic works. His purpose in this section, however, is to establish more generally the conditions under which humans are receptive to art. This occurs only after humans have liberated themselves from a dependency on the natural world (13: 332). After demanding that the natural world become a resource rather than point of resistance, Hegel continues:

> Der Mensch aber *zweitens* hat Bedürfnisse und Wünsche, denen die Natur nicht unmittelbar Befriedigung zu verschaffen imstande ist. In diesen Fällen muß er sich das nötige Selbstgenügen durch seine eigene Tätigkeit erarbeiten; er muß die Naturdinge in Besitz nehmen, zurechtmachen, formieren, alles Hinderliche durch selbsterworbene Geschicklichkeit abstreifen und so das Äußere zu einem Mittel umwandeln, durch welches er sich allen seinen Zwecken nach auszuführen vermag. Das reinste Verhältnis nun wird da zu finden sein, wo beide Seiten zusammentreten, indem sich mit der Freundlichkeit der Natur die geistige Geschicklichkeit insoweit verbindet, daß statt der Härte und Abhängigkeit des Kampfs bereits die vollbrachte Harmonie durchweg zur Erscheinung gekommen ist. (ibid.)

Hegel is distinguishing here between stages of general human development and claiming that a certain level of sophistication regarding the human capacity

to control the elements of the natural world preconditions the appreciation of art. This passage can also clearly be understood in terms of both aesthetic reception and production, making this a description of both processes. Humans create objects from natural products in order to fulfill "needs and wishes" not immediately met by naturally occurring objects. Art would be one such creation in Hegel's definition of the work as the "sensual representation of the idea." The resultant product moreover provides a representation of the human world in "harmony" with the natural world. This corresponds not only to Hegel's concept that art present an ideal, but also of the complementary, "harmonic" relationship between the content of the work of art and the world-view of the society. But once given object form as art, this harmony is reified at its historical point of creation. The continued sensual form of art retains its potential as a mere object to provoke a new creation when it no longer meets the "needs and wishes" of its audience. This nexus of historically fixed cultural idea and the provocation inherent in art as an object underlies Hegel's hitherto unarticulated claim that aesthetic form progresses organically along with the progression of history and of the content of art.

To effect this progression in an aesthetically immanent manner, Hegel is really claiming that the appropriately mediated content of the aesthetic work functions to direct its own reception by predetermining that there will be an aesthetically productive reception of the work. Upon identifying new artistic forms in his genealogy of the arts, Hegel assumes that substantial changes in societal constitution have arisen, which he then identifies by interpreting the discrepancies between the contents of the compared art forms. He thus justifies his conception of the intertwined relationship of Spirit and art by reading the

reception of works of art as indicative of the development of Spirit both within and beyond aesthetics. Hegel's reception theory claims that the work of art stands as a directive to action, based on the representation of the conditions of society as well as of societal conflicts to be resolved, which results in—among other possible productive responses—the creation of new works of art. This predetermined reception must stay at the general level of determining the activity, rather than the specific work that results from any given act of reception, for obviously not every viewer is going to produce a new work of art. As the example of drama will show, this receptive act results in both aesthetic and non-aesthetic productive acts, depending on the historical context.

Examining the drama as a changing aesthetic form provides the best example for depicting the progression of culture that Hegel claims are reflected in the formal permutations. Hegel establishes drama as the most developed form of literature, and literature in turn as the most general form of art, capable of portraying the widest scope of contents (15: 233ff.). Drama is thus the crowning point of an art form that Hegel denotes as not only the broadest in range, but that also has always existed parallel to all other aesthetic forms (ibid. 245). Hegel's conception of formal change within literature mirrors the changes in all modes of art. More specifically, drama arises during the Classical era and continues into the Romantic period, thus providing insight into how Hegel coordinates the formal changes with historical progression. The transition from the Classical to the Romantic era is especially interesting for tracing such changes because Hegel sees non-aesthetic influences as the primary factors for aesthetic change. This departure from the "organic principle" has important repercussions for the efficacy of art in determining its own reception: for the

inability of drama to generate formal innovations mirrors its inability to direct a socially relevant reception. Hegel's claim that Romantic drama mediates a message of essentially individual relevance problematizes the mediation of the aesthetic content to society via the viewer, although such mediation remains possible.

While the drama begins as a form in the Classical era of ancient Greece, Hegel asserts that it is most appropriately a Romantic art form. Between these two periods, the form of drama hardly changes, and yet Hegel establishes fundamentally different kinds of reception that drama instigates for the two periods. In the Classical drama, the play shows a self-conscious individual attempting to change the social environment in which he is portrayed. Hegel claims that, regardless of the actual effectiveness of this hero in achieving the intended changes, the Greek hero is constitutionally capable of effecting such changes to his milieu. The Classical viewer sees himself personified on the stage, not just in this individual hero but also in the chorus as community. The viewer thus perceives the resolution of the conflict between the individual and the social environment as an illustration of a code of behavior that is as valid for the actual society of the viewer as it is for the dramatic representation of society and hero. In the Romantic drama, however, Hegel strips from the individual hero the immediate relevancy to the society, so that his actions can only be perceived as having individual validity and, moreover, so that the immediate identification of the viewer with the hero would be misleading. Hegel presents these altered conditions of reception as a result of changes in Spirit brought about by the development of Christian conceptions of the world, and allows only the disappearance of the chorus as an immanently aesthetic signifier of

this change. More significantly, he shifts the genre paradigm within the form of drama from Classical tragedy to Romantic comedy and claims that this represents the shift from the unified conception of individual and community to a notion of the singularity of each individual. Hegel then asserts that the modern, individual-oriented relevancy of aesthetics prevents any homogeneous and immediately relevant reception of Romantic drama.

Hegel initially claims that the capacity of Classical art to mediate a necessarily socially relevant content results from the immanent development of the Classical from the Symbolic era of art. For Hegel, the art of the Symbolic period attempts to relate the dominant position of the individual in relation to the natural world. Nature stands as an uncontrolled environment in which the individual must find his position and assert himself. The Symbolic work of art functions to educate the viewer about this essential constitution as self-consciousness that is intrinsically superior to this natural world (13: 406; cf. 3: 517). However, these first attempts at art produce only "abstrakt und unbestimmt" (13: 390) expressions of this concept because form is still merely experimentation with objects found in the natural world, "[diese Kunst] verdirbt und verfälscht die vorgefundenen Gestalten" (ibid. 391). Classical art supercedes these vagaries in form and content such that Hegel describes Symbolic art to be "der Anfang" that arrives at a "Resultat" in Classical art (14: 31). On the formal level, Hegel maintains that the Greek use of the human form achieves the physical representation of self-consciousness that the Symbolic form only partially or abstractly accomplishes. On the level of content, Greek art shows unified subjectivity as opposed to merely attesting to self-consciousness as a basic human condition. He follows his "organic principle"

here by positing the basic problems of the human condition, which are addressed in Symbolic art, as receiving increased detail until they are given their most adequate aesthetic representation in the Classical era.

Hegel conceives of this representation of the human condition in Classical art as the synthesis of human form and the unified subjectivity of the individual. But he also insists that this unified conception of the individual testified as well to the unified conception of the society as a whole, so that there was no division between individual and society. Hegel repeatedly emphasizes this coincidence of individual and society in the Classical period, so that "die Substanz des Staatslebens ebenso in die Individuen versenkt [war], als diese ihre eigene Freiheit nur in den allgemeinen Zwecken des Ganzen suchten" (14: 26). This synthesis, which Hegel sees paradigmatically represented in sculpture, informs the constitution of the heroic character as well. He thus claims that the hero as an individual is "staatstiftend" without, however, differentiating himself from the community. The hero has this competence because he formulates the laws of the community on an intuitive basis, drawing upon this intuitive knowledge of "was das Rechte und Sittliche ist. Diese unmittelbare Einheit aber von Substantiellen und Individualität...liegt in der griechischen Tugend, so daß die Inidividualität sich selbst das Gesetz ist, ohne einem für sich bestehenden Gesetz, Urteil und Gericht unterworfen zu sein" (13: 244). Hegel's assertion that the hero founds the state thus lies in his conception of every individual's immediate knowledge of what is "right and ethical" and the ability to act on the basis of their "virtue." On the other hand, Hegel provides a corrective for individual transgressions of the right and ethical by attributing to the hero a consequential notion of individual

responsibility for one's actions. The hero "steht für das Ganze seiner Tat mit seiner ganzen Individualität ein, [...] und [hat] ein Bewußtsein von sich nur als in substantieller Einheit mit diesem [sittlichen] Ganzen" (ibid. 246-47). Transgressors thus suffer the penalty of exclusion from the community, typically by death. Hegel sees this model of individual action and consequence mirrored in the tragedy. Tragic dramas represent a one-sided comprehension of ethical behavior on the part of the individual, and the action of the play results in the re-establishment of communal ethical law upon the death of the hero as the transgressor (15: 524 and 543ff.; c.f. Pöggeler, Hegels Idee 90). Even in comedy, which Hegel perceives as a testimony to the dissolution of this unified sense of individual and community, the hero's actions are oriented toward "die allgemeinen öffentlichen Interessen" and "die Grundrichtungen des öffentlichen Daseins" (ibid. 535-36). The Classical drama thus corresponds to Hegel's broad notion of Classical art as the representation of a unified subjectivity that loses its identity as such if distinguished from the community.

The Classical viewer of drama, then, always sees the action on the stage in reference to individual action in the actual world. Because Hegel conceives of content analogous to a society's world-view, the Classical dramatic representation of individual and society is reflective for him of their unified condition in the historical society. The viewers thus identify themselves and their actions with the events on the stage. Hegel develops his notion of identification most clearly in his explication of the Aristotelian terms "Furcht" and "Mitleid." Aristotle claimed that the tragedy specifically brought the hero to a tragic end in order both to stimulate fear and pity in the audience and to cleanse them of these emotions. Hegel accords the function of stimulating fear

and pity little attention, since these emotions can be easily engendered by non-dramatic means. Instead, he concentrates on the cleansing aspect, or catharsis, which he more specifically calls "Versöhnung," reconciliation. For Hegel, this reconciliation occurs when the hero enacts his conception of ethical behavior on the basis of his intuitive understanding, but his notion of ethical behavior turns out to be one-sided. The hero's transgression results in a reconstitution of the society's ethical norms on a conscious level by illustratively ridding the community of the challenge to the ethical order through the death of the hero. The viewers can only comprehend the motivation of the hero as well as the socially beneficial resolution through the death of the hero if they are able immediately to identify the action in the tragedy with the constitution of their society. According to Hegel,

> [...] die Tragödie [gewährt das Gefühl der Versöhnung] durch den Anblick der ewigen Gerechtigkeit, welche in ihrem absoluten Walten durch die relative Berechtigung einseitiger Zwecke und Leidenschaften hindurchgreift, weil sie nicht dulden kann, daß der Konflikt und Widerspruch der ihrem Begriffe nach einigen sittlichen Mächte in der wahrhaften Wirklichkeit sich siegreich durchsetze und Bestand erhalte. (15: 526)

The tragedy achieves its effect by showing how the merely individual conceptions of ethical action, devalued to "one-sided goals and passions," must give way to the realization of "eternal justice" when this plot is conceived as pertaining simultaneously to the action on the stage and to "actual reality." This doubling of reality in the drama entails the identification of the viewer with the hero, for the viewer—as an individual who, like the hero, acts on the

basis of intuitive "virtue"—fears the dissolution of the hero and empathizes with him.

Hegel complements the identification of the viewer as an individual with the hero by positing the identification of the viewer as a community member with the chorus as the representation of the community as a whole. To mirror his conception of the individual and community as a unified whole in ancient Greece, Hegel establishes this coincidence also in the drama in order to support the notion of the drama as the double of "actual reality." Hegel skims over Aristotle's determination that the chorus provides reflection on the play's topic for the audience, emphasizing instead Aristotle's notion of the chorus as a single figure. "...[Der Chor] ist die wirkliche Substanz des sittlichen heroischen Lebens und Handelns selbst, den einzelnen Heroen gegenüber das Volk als das fruchtbare Erdreich, aus welchem die Individuen wie die Blumen und hervorragenden Bäume aus ihrem eigenen heimischen Boden emporwachsen und durch die Existenz desselben bedingt sind" (15: 541). On the one hand, Hegel clearly posits the chorus here as a requisite complement to the individual, thus showing the difference between the two figures. On the other hand, he defines both figures as incarnations of a single source, namely that "intuitive ethical behavior" that informs the constitution of the individual hero as well. In this way Hegel depicts hero and chorus as two aspects of the same entity within the play, and portrays viewer and the compounded dramatic figures as two aspects of the same entity on a meta-dramatic, societal level.

When he links dramatic action with social issues for the Greek viewer, Hegel also unifies the result of the productive act of reception. In other words,

the content of whatever action results from the message of the play is the same whether the viewer creates a new work of art or acts in the public sphere. This conclusion is already intuitively given in Hegel's formulation of the reciprocity of Greek individual and state (14: 26). But Hegel clearly conceives of both aesthetic and non-aesthetic responses to art when he elaborates on the differences between Symbolic and Classical artists:

> Wenn der symbolische Künstler daher der Bedeutung die Gestalt oder diese jener einzubilden strebt, so *bildet* der klassische die Bedeutung zur Gestalt um, indem er die schon vorhandenen äußeren Erscheinungen nur gleichsam von ihrem ungehörigen Beiwesen befreit. In dieser Tätigkeit aber, obschon seine bloße Willkür ausgeschlossen ist, bildet er nicht nur *nach* oder bleibt in einem starren Typus stehen, sondern ist zugleich für das Ganze *fort*bildend. Die Kunst, die ihren wahren Gehalt erst suchen und erfinden muß, vernachlässigt noch die Seite der Form; wo aber die Bildung der Form zum wesentlichen Interesse und zur eigentlichen Aufgabe gemacht wird, da bildet sich mit den Fortschritten der Darstellung auch der Inhalt unmerklich und unscheinbar fort, wie wir überhaupt Form und Inhalt bisher in ihrer Vervollkommnung stets haben Hand in Hand gehen sehen. In dieser Rücksicht arbeitet der klassische Künstler auch für eine vorhandene Welt der Religion, deren gegebene Stoffe und mythologische Vorstellungen er im freien Spiele der Kunst heiter fortentwickelt. (ibid. 29)

As already noted above, and reinforced here, the artist is a relatively unimportant element in the mediating process, who functions passively to "release" meaning via aesthetic form. Because Classical art achieves a generally

commensurate form for the idea of self-consiousness in the depiction of the human being, the Classical artist can concentrate on refining form. And significantly, Hegel claims that the progression of aesthetic form corresponds to the progression of the Classical world-view as well. He sets this world-view equivalent with Greek mythology, or, in other words, with the religion that he, in turn, claims is synonymous with Greek life in general.[1] This consolidation of both form and content reveals the Classical viewer's contribution to this progression as multiple, taking the form of either art or social action, but influencing society equally.

The Classical drama thus stands as a totality in two ways: as the art-immanent illustration of community and individual, and as a microcosmic illustration of the actual society. Hegel strips Romantic art works of the ability to represent these totalities, claiming instead that post-Classical works show only singular individuals as subjectivity. This development, however, does not result from a synthesis of contradictions within the aesthetic relationship of form and content, but rather because the spread of Christianity, as an intrinsically different world-view that divides the world into secular and divine realms, makes impossible the aesthetic representation of the world as a totality. The corollary to this dissolution of Classical totality is the only mediate relevancy of aesthetic communications for "actual reality," for without the totality of individual and community, individual action can only be considered in terms of personal choice rather than as intrinsically grounded in notions of the community. These changes, which Hegel fomulates in terms of changes in

[1] Hegel in fact labels Greek mythology the "Religion der Schönheit" and identifies the activities of the Greek gods as the intuitive enactment of ethical laws (17: 96 ff.) He thus understands Greek myths in analog to Greek tragedy.

content or Spirit, are reflected in formal changes in drama by the disappearance of the chorus and the genre shift from tragedy to comedy.

In contrast to the aesthetically immanent progression of the Symbolic to the Classical epoch, the transition from the Classical era to the Romantic is explicable only in historical terms. That is, Hegel separates the development of aesthetics and society for the first time in his conception of this historical progression. This is due to a new transformation of Spirit that Hegel sees following upon the development of monotheistic Christianity as a societal norm, which manifests itself in a fundamentally different conception of the individual. God is conceivable as both a finite being and as infinite conception; or as the historical person of Jesus and as the canon of universal ethics.[2] The synthesis of a historical person and universal ethics in religion intimates the possibility of such a synthesis for the individual, but only in the historically actualized example of the individual, and not necessarily for a society as a whole. The aspects of universality and potentiality distinguish Hegel's Classical and Romantic individuals. For while the Classical individual was not potential but rather an actualization of the synthesis of individual and community, the Classical ethical norms were only socially valid rather than universally true. Conversely, Romantic ethics is universally true but only potentially realizable, and then only immediately for the individual.

The particular rather than universal conception of Classical ethics is reflected aesthetically in the unity of representation and meaning in Greek art, a unity that does not hold for Romantic signification. Since the work of art and

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[2] In the Ästhetik Hegel emphasizes only these two aspects of his notion of the Trinity (14: 147 ff.). For a broader sketch, see his outline of absolute religion in the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (17: 213-18).

actual world are seen as a totality, Hegel claims that there is no ambiguity about what the Classical aesthetic representation expresses (14: 19). The individual in the Classical tragedy, for example, is not primarily an individual for Hegel, but rather the embodiment of a singe ethical notion, "ins lebendige Handeln eingetreten und somit zum alleinigen Pathos eines bestimmten Individuums geworden" (15: 549). The Romantic individual differs from the ancient Greek in that any particular character no longer expresses a single ethical notion or any other single facet of Spirit; instead, particular characteristics are only finite and transitory expressions of the individual (14: 128-29). Hegel describes the acquisition of this concept of the individual in terms of a revelation through religion and refutes the ability of art to mediate this concept. "Dieser neue [romantische] Inhalt nun also wird nicht durch die Konzeptionen der Kunst zum Bewußtsein gebracht, sondern ihr als ein wirkliches Geschehen, als Geschichte des fleischgewordenen Gottes von außen gegeben. Jener Übergang durfte insofern nicht von der Kunst her seinen Ausgangspunkt nehmen, der Gegensatz des Alten und Neuen wäre zu disparat" (ibid. 112). With this rupture in the development of modes for the expression of Spirit, art loses its immediate relevancy to societal development, becoming instead the expression of Spirit as individual subjectivity.

Parallel to this loss of societal relevancy, Hegel details a rupture in the organic development of aesthetic forms in his analysis of satire. He notes that no aesthetic theory has been able to accomodate satire within aesthetics, but then seems himself to vacillate on whether or not satire is truly an art form. For Hegel claims that satire is an aesthetic form that produces neither poetics nor any other truly artistic work (14: 123). Instead, satire represents the attempt on

the part of an individual to continue the practice of enacting ethical viewpoints from an intuitive origin when, according to Hegel, these viewpoints have become "abstrakte Grundsätze" that no longer accord with "empirische Wirklichkeit": "Deshalb ist der satirische Standpunkt nicht aus jenen Gattungen der Poesie zu begreifen, sondern muß allgemeiner als diese Übergangsform des klassischen Ideals gefaßt werden" (ibid.). Hegel then establishes the Roman world as the era of satire (ibid. 120ff.), thus coordinating the historic period between the decline of ancient Greece and the spread of Christianity with the aesthetic break in the organic development of art forms.

Because of this rupture, Hegel no longer discusses Romantic art in terms of an aesthetics that necessarily confirms and orients Spirit, but instead describes art as an outmoded form of mediation. He reinforces this conclusion when he characterizes modern drama as essentially unchanged since the Classical period. The belief that Romantic art represents subjective interiority connotes very different content than in Classical art, and yet the formal changes—as shown in the example of the drama—are minimal. The stagnation of formal development, despite increasingly complex content, leads Hegel to posit his infamous thesis of the "end of art," in which he claims that art loses its efficacy for communicating socially relevant topics.

Hegel nevertheless positively evaluates both the forms of Romantic art and their function of representing subjective interiority. He views the focus of aesthetic content on interiority as a progression toward incorporeality and abstraction, a progression he identifies in general for Spirit, but also associates with the formal characteristics of Romantic art. Hence he describes a preliminary objective representation of interiority in painting, which is

counterposed to the almost complete immateriality and subjectivity of music. The contradictions between these two extremes find synthesis in poetics, which Hegel sees as having both materiality and conceptuality in language as a sign system. Within poetics, Hegel further claims that the synthesis of objectivity and subjectivity, represented by epic and lyric literature respectively, results in the drama. Of all art forms, then, Hegel establishes Romantic drama as the most developed, and locates the pinnacle of dramatic production in the Romantic era because of the formal competence of drama to represent subjective interiority. Drama accomplishes this, on the one hand, because it represents individuals in concrete form on the stage, and, on the other hand, because it addresses the conceptual faculty of the viewer by virtue of language.

However, Hegel's notion of art as representation of subjective interiority already reduces the validity of the reception intended by the Romantic work of art to the individual, so that the actions of an aesthetically represented individual are considered personally motivated rather than evoked by ethical necessity. The individual is no longer conjoined with any other external embodiment of Spirit, as the Classical individual was attached to the community, and thus does not immediately influence the social environment through his actions. Hegel instead claims that the Romantic individual "[gehört] einer bestehenden Ordnung der Gesellschaft an und [...] handelt deshalb auch nur als befangen in derselben, und das Interesse an solcher Gestalt wie der Gehalt ihrer Zwecke und Tätigkeit ist unendlich partikulär" (13: 254-55). Moreover, Hegel asserts that the principle of Romantic interiority subordinates all representations to the expression of this interiority, so that the objects and conditions of the environment in which the work of art depicts

subjectivity are merely "zufällig" and viewed as "ein gleichgültiges Element" (14: 139). This results in the incapacity of Romantic art to give any absolute representation of actual reality because all representations are relative, having no absolutely fixed meanings. Hegel asserts that they are instead designed primarily to inform the viewer about interiority rather than the external world (ibid. 140). Hence Romantic art cannot represent either the individual or the world as a totality, but instead provides only relative knowledge of the figures it presents and the world in which it sets these figures.

The only explicit distinction in form between Classical and Romantic drama that reflects this change is the disappearance of the chorus. Because actual reality is no longer representable as a unified whole in such a single—albeit compound—figure, Hegel denies the chorus any manifestation in Romantic drama. He claims that every attempt to insert a chorus has inevitably failed precisely because it is an insertion, a purely artificial attempt to revive an outmoded formal trait (15: 543). In Greek tragedy, the chorus succeeded not only because of its capacity to act as the community in counterpoint to the hero, but also because it arose organically in the constitution of the drama, in correspondence with Greek religious rites, and hence formally comprised "ein integrierendes Glied" of the drama (ibid. 542ff.). Romantic drama has lost the bond of chorus and community with regard to content, as well as the formal connection between the chorus and religious practices. To the extent that communal viewpoints can be represented in Romantic drama, Hegel insists that they be expressed only by individual characters (ibid. 493).

Hegel articulates drama's shift from a tragic to a comedic orientation as the main difference between Classical and Romantic literature. This cannot be

termed a change in form, since he identifies tragedy and comedy in both epochs. But he argues for a progression of dramatic form by virtue of the adequacy of comedy to represent subjective interiority. While comedy arose in Greece, and Hegel shows a great appreciation for the comedies of Aristophanes in the Ästhetik, he nevertheless maintains that Classical comedy is one of the central indicators of ancient Greece's cultural decline (15: 555). The modern tragedy, on the other hand, portrays the conflict between ethical characters and their environment only as individual attempts to realize subjectively held beliefs (ibid. 558). Hegel sees the Greek comedy as a precursor or preliminary manifestation of the Romantic notion of individual subjectivity, and the modern tragedy as a form that, because the Romantic individual has manifold rather than singular character traits, can no longer represent what is objectively true, or "wahrhaft Wesentlich" (ibid. 556) in the Romantic world-view. This shift serves the same function as the actual formal changes Hegel posits for aesthetics, in that his concept of Romantic comedy displays formal change as indicative of an advancement in the general condition of Spirit.

Hegel thus claims that the comedy represents the power of the subjective individual as self-conscious of this power. He differentiates between two types of comedy: one that is comical to the audience, and one that is comical for the figure itself (15: 552). The first type does not fulfill Hegel's definition of comedy, for it uses strategies to elicit laughter from the audience which do not necessarily make conscious for either the audience or the dramatic figures that the individual retains a coherent sense of subjectivity despite the accidental dissolution or thwarting of that individual's intentions. "Zum Komischen dagegen gehört überhaupt die unendliche Wohlgemutheit und Zuversicht,

durchaus erhaben über seinen eigenen Widerspruch und nicht etwa bitter und unglücklich darin zu sein, die Seligkeit und Wohligkeit der Subjektivität, die, ihrer selbst gewiß, die Auflösung ihrer Zwecke und Realisationen ertragen kann" (ibid. 528). True comedy thus represents subjectivity which has become "der vollständige Meister" of the actual world because the conflicts between individual and world do not ultimately detract from the basic condition of the human as subjectivity (ibid. 527). This is the polar opposite of tragedy, in which the individual as embodiment of a single concept is destroyed in the resolution of the conflict between that concept and the actual world. However, Hegel is careful to link comedy immediately with tragedy by asserting, on the one hand, that the content of comedy is still the essential condition of the actual world (ibid. 530). On the other hand, he also claims that the point of departure for the comic figure is equivalent to the tragic figure upon the latter's resolution of conflict, so that where the tragic character succumbs to the external conflict, the comic character laughs at the unimportance of such conflict in comparison to the individual's status as "master" (ibid. 552). The shift from tragedy to comedy, then, entails the shift from the relative importance of conflicts in the actual world to the focus on the individual as a subjectivity that knows itself to be essentially indifferent to such conflicts.

Hegel's description of comedy not only parallels the development from Classical to Romantic drama, but also enables the dissolution of aesthetics as an adequate means of mediation, thus allowing a continued organic progression as Spirit develops beyond aesthetics. When Hegel conceives of the individual as indifferent to the specific, transient conflicts of the actual world, he is attesting to a progression of Spirit in its level of self-awareness and, correspondingly, in

its manner of addressing the object world. The introspective or self-reflexive focus on interior subjectivity that peaks in the comedy corresponds to the Christian world-view and the multiple identity of Spirit represented in Hegel's interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity: "der christliche [Gott] ist zwar auch konkrete Persönlichkeit, aber als *reine* Geistigkeit, und soll als *Geist* und im Geist gewußt werden" (13: 102). Hegel sees this self-reflexivity as indicative that an exterior object is no longer necessary to initiate this exploration of Spirit as such. In the Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion he posits this transition as a progression from contemplation of an existent object ("Anschauung") to the incorporeal visualization of a concept ("Vorstellung";[3] 16: 138ff.), so that the content that was mediated by the comedy remains the focus of Spirit while its aesthetic form becomes unnecessary. But although theoretically unnecessary, aesthetic works do not simply cease to be created, but rather immanently reveal their inadequacy in the comedy: that is, in the highest mode of aesthetics.

> Stellt nun aber die Komödie diese Einheit [vom an und für sich Wahre in realer Erscheinung und Gestalt] nur in ihrer Selbstzerstörung dar, indem das Absolute, das sich zur Realität hervorbringen will, diese Verwirklichung selber durch die im Elemente der Wirklichkeit jetzt für sich frei gewordenen und nur auf das Zufällige und Subjektive gerichteten Interessen zernichtet sieht, so tritt die Gegenwart und Wirksamkeit des Absoluten nicht mehr in positiver Einigung mit den

[3] "Vorstellung" in Hegel's philosophy of religion is typically translated as "representation" (e.g. Brown et al. in Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 238). I am alternatively translating it as "visualization" to avoid confusing this cognitive activity with my typical usage of representation to mean aesthetic signification.

> Charakteren und Zwecken des realen Daseins hervor, sondern macht sich nur in der negativen Form geltend, daß alles ihm nicht Entsprechende sich aufhebt und nur die Subjektivität als solche sich zugleich in dieser Auflösung als ihrer selbst gewiß und in sich gesichert zeigt. (15: 573)

By crystallizing the object of Spirit's focus out of itself as the only element remaining after the comedic negation of the actual world that comprises the comedy, Hegel sees comedy as organically negating its own form. He thus maintains the progression of Spirit into other modes of mediation while preserving the function of aesthetics to impel this progression through the manifold forms until comedy intrinsically gives way to religious visualization of the concepts of Spirit.

Despite Hegel's conception of the Romantic drama as the pinnacle of aesthetic form, this form is incapable of compelling the kind of specific reception that the Classical drama could still achieve. Without recourse to the representation of humans and their environment as a totality, the audience can no longer immediately interpret the action on stage in relation to their actual world. Hegel thus explicitly warns the modern viewer not to identify with the figures in the drama (13: 361), for these characters provide "ein bloßes Beispiel" that cannot be taken as a model for a specific action. "Denn ihre Handlungen sind stets nur eine ganz partielle Verwirklichung eines einzelnen Falles, nicht aber die Verwirklichung desselben als einer Allgemeinheit in dem Sinne, daß diese Handlung, dieser Fall dadurch zu Gesetz gemacht oder als Gesetz zur Erscheinung gebracht würde" (ibid. 240). Because art provides only such

provisionally valid depictions of Spirit in the modern world, works of art can no longer adequately direct their reception to initiate "laws."

Hegel does not, however, revoke the potential of art to effect such changes, but rather prescribes only the immediacy of aesthetic reception and, consequently, the compulsive component of directed reception. He establishes the universal relevance of aesthetically mediated content in the Romantic period when he claims: "Die Kunst lädt uns zur denkenden Betrachtung ein, und zwar nicht zu dem Zwecke, Kunst wieder hervorzurufen, sondern, was die Kunst sei, wissenschaftlich zu erkennen" (13: 26). Romantic art continues to provoke thought, according to Hegel, although it is impossible to determine whether the invitation is accepted and a reflective reception takes place. He also reduces this reflective reception to an act of philosophical reflection on the essence of aesthetics as such, both in this passage and in the surrounding text. Romantic art thus elicits only a classificatory impulse on the part of its audience, the "scientific" interest in integrating the work in question into art history. Romantic reception as mere reflection on aesthetics seems to be confirmed in the stagnation of the productive process intimated by Hegel's claim that art no longer provokes art; if the aesthetic productive response is recanted, the socially relevant productive response would theoretically suffer the same consequence. But Hegel only alleges that Romantic art no longer has this "aim" of inducing a productive response, meaning that such a response remains a possibility. More significantly, Romantic art continues to engender reflection and thus mediate knowledge as it always had. Hegel claims that "...[die Poesie ist] die allgemeinste und ausgebreiteste Lehrerin des Menschengeschlechts gewesen und ist es noch" (15: 239-40), and hence

considers Romantic art, in its most adequate form of poetics, as continuing to mediate new knowledge to its audience. He even accords to the poetic work the potential for mediating philosophical insights (ibid. 255). Because he considers philosophy the adequate form for communicating contemporaneously relevant ideas in the Romantic era, this tenet maintains the correspondence between the content of Romantic art and the modern world-view. Hegel's claim that art is henceforth "nach der Seite ihrer höchsten Bestimmung für uns ein Vergangenes" (13: 25) can mean only that the conditions of reception have made art archaic, and not that art itself is only a historical artifact.

This so-called thesis of the "end" of art has been an issue of debate concerning the contemporaneous validity of Hegel's aesthetics,[4] a debate that focuses primarily on the potential for Romantic art to continue to have a societally relevant function. There is widespread consensus that Hegel sees a continuation of aesthetic production, and even a broadening of the content he deems representable in Romantic art.

> Kein Inhalt, keine Form ist mehr unmittelbar mit der Innigkeit, mit der *Natur*, dem bewußtlosen substantiellen Wesen des Künstlers identisch; jeder Stoff darf ihm gleichgültig sein, wenn er nur dem formellen Gesetz, überhaupt schön und einer künstlerischen Behandlung fähig zu sein, nicht widerspricht. Es gibt heutigentags keinen Stoff, der an und für sich über dieser Relativität stände, und wenn er auch darüber erhaben ist, so ist doch wenigstens kein absolutes Bedürfnis vorhanden, daß er von der *Kunst* zur Darstellung gebracht werde. (14: 235)

[4] See Jamme 273, footnote 1, for a select bibliography on this debate.

Art is thus no longer immediately attached to a narrowly conceived societal world-view because the Romantic world has achieved insight into Spirit as the essence of all things. Because Spirit can be found everywhere, art can represent Spirit via any aesthetically manipulated content and form. This dissolution of the innate ability of aesthetics to direct reception has been variously interpreted. Christoph Jamme considers this thesis to engender, indeed require, the development of "eine wissenschaftliche Ästhetik" in order to explain the truth content of art for an audience who can no longer immediately approach the work (279). Jamme's conclusion is too narrow, for as I will show, Hegel still conceives of at least historical dramas as having a direct educational influence on the viewer. Klaus Vieweg, on the other hand, lists a string of potential functions for Romantic art that neither narrow nor circumscribe its capacity as mediation (136). Least convincing is Stephen Bungay's claim that Romantic art continues aesthetics because there is a formal, but no "Spirit-ual" need for art (86), and that Romantic art engenders exactly the same kind of reception as did Symbolic art (88). Hegel's thesis is that there is in fact neither a formal nor an intellectual need for art, but a continued potential for art to succeed at mediating knowledge. And Bungay's notion that Symbolic and Romantic art provoke corresponding responses in the viewer results foremost from an incorrect conception of Symbolic art as not directing its own reception (e.g. 57). These interpreters all address the possible results of aesthetic mediation rather than exploring elements in Hegel's theory that allow Romantic aesthetics to fulfill a continued social function.

Hans-Georg Gadamer points to the most important insight regarding the potential for a socially relevant reception of aesthetically mediated ideas when

he interprets the end of art as "die vollständige Loslösung von den Vorgegebenheiten substantieller Inhalte, denen gegenüber der Künstler ehedem gar keine Wahl hatte" (Gesammelte Werke 8: 229). Gadamer appropriately emphasizes the artist, for Hegel gives the Romantic artist subjective choice in the selection of content and form. In continuing the lengthy quote above, Hegel asserts that "[d]eshalb verhält sich der Künstler zu seinem Inhalt im ganzen gleichsam als Dramatiker, der andere, fremde Personen aufstellt und exponiert" (13: 235). Hegel indeed demands of the dramatist in general that the author be visible as the creator of dramatic events (15: 502). This refers back to Hegel's notion that the reception of Romantic works results primarily in an evaluation of the work, hence the desire to recognize any drama as "das Produkt des selbstbewußten und originalen Schaffens und deshalb auch die Kunst und Virtuosität eines individuellen Dichters" (ibid.). Ingrid Pepperle has noted how this dissolution of the work as an independent totality corresponds to Hegel's notion of modern society as itself unrepresentable as a totality (142ff.)—another indicator of Hegel's continuation of the content of Romantic aesthetics in correspondence to the Romantic world-view .

Making the artist visible as the originator of aesthetic communication also gives the dramatist the power to direct reception as the Symbolic and Classical work itself did.

> [...] in manchen Epochen [wird] besonders auch die dramatische Poesie dazu gebraucht, um neuen Zeitvorstellungen in betreff auf Politik, Sittlichkeit, Poesie, Religion usf. einen lebendigen Eingang zu verschaffen [...]. Erweist sich solch eine individuelle Anschauung des Dichters als ein höherer Standpunkt und tritt sie nicht in selbständiger

> Absichtlichkeit aus der dargestellten Handlung heraus, so daß diese nicht zum Mittel herabgesetzt erscheint, so ist der Kunst kein Unrecht und Schaden angetan. (ibid. 503)

Thus as long as the content and form of the dramatist's personal convictions appear objective, in the sense of representing a "higher viewpoint," then such plays should function to "introduce" new concepts, and Hegel specifically names topics of societal relevance in mentioning politics, ethics, literature, and religion. And although the dramatist is singled out here, Hegel conceives the Romantic artist in general as "like a dramatist," or in other words, as producing art that is capable of mediating socially relevant concepts with the understanding that these ideas will elicit at least a reflective productive response.

Hegel both corroborates and delimits the extent of a socially relevant reception of Romantic art when he determines the historical drama to be the paradigmatic art form for modernity. For Hegel, the task of modern art is to express "das Erscheinen und Wirken des unvergänglichen Menschlichen in seiner vielseitigsten Bedeutung und unendlichen Herumbildung" (14: 239). He continues to maintain the fundamental need of contemporaneous relevance for comprehensibility, so that it is counter-intuitive to claim that Hegel prioritizes the historical drama above all other contents of Romantic drama. However, Hegel continuously invokes an orientation around the past as an assurance that this demand for "eternally human" content is met. Thus he relativizes even his demand that content be nationally oriented to help achieve comprehensibility in order to allow Greek drama a universal relevance (15: 246ff.; cf. 499). Most significantly, Hegel devotes almost the entire section of the Ästhetik entitled

"Die Äußerlichkeit des idealen Kunstwerks im Verhältnis zum Publikum" to a discussion of the criteria for making historical events contemporaneously understandable without overloading such works with historical detail (13: 342-61). Significantly, he deals primarily with drama in this section, elevating the historical frame in drama to an ideal form because he believes that the historical background promotes insight into what is generally and universally of human interest. On the one hand, he claims that historical events allow for a more realistic and cohesive exposition than contemporary, or especially fictive, events (13: 248; 331). But more importantly, Hegel reduces the historical material with potential for aesthetic presentation to events that he assumes lie in the general cultural consciousness. "Die Vergangenheit [...] gehört nur der Erinnerung an, und die Erinnerung vollbringt von selber schon das Einhüllen der Charaktere, Begebenheiten und Handlungen in das Gewand der Allgemeinheit, durch welches die besonderen äußerlichen und zufälligen Partikularitäten nicht hindurchscheinen" (ibid. 248). Because of historical distance, the viewer recognizes the events, but only generally. For Hegel, this leads inherently to an emphasis on what is essential in the historic event because the audience is not tempted to analyze the degree to which the depicted events are factually accurate, as they would if they had more directly experienced these events. Thus the Romantic viewer, confronted with the partial character of the work of art, is assured of access to the essential idea because the historical event gives both a believable appearance to the aesthetically-mediated content, and also makes possible the emphasis on what is "eternally human" through the contrast between the prosaic knowledge of the event and its aesthetic reproduction.

But allowing the artist the potential to direct reception, or even confining content to historical events of common knowledge for Romantic viewers, does not necessarily intimate a socially relevant response because it is aesthetic form itself that Hegel sets up as the guarantor of engendering such a response. He especially relativizes the efficacy of aesthetic form for Romantic art to mediate the content of art as "truth," but he makes his claims in general about aesthetics provoking changes in individuals and societies based on these "truths" as a universal aspect of art. The manner in which the response to aesthetics can be productive as reflection, the creation of new works of art, or some action in the public sphere remains intangible until the mechanics are explained by which the ideas that make up the content of art appear as societal practice. Hegel's assertion that changes in artistic form arise in response to the cultural changes intrinsically situated as the content of art implies that the productive response to the work of art engenders these changes. As has just been shown, Hegel evaluates the efficacy of art differently for subsequent historical periods with regard to its capacity to motivate the realization of the notions it presents, but he never refutes the potential for art to change society. As the example of drama illustrates, changes in the viewers' ability to conceptualize and an increasing tendency to favor acquiring knowledge in the form of religion or philosophy do not change either the form or the content of art, but rather alter the complexity of the receptive process. Where Greek drama had immediate relevance for Greek society, modern drama has immediate relevance for the individual, and *may* then lead to a "second reflection" that relates the individual relevance of the message conveyed by the work of art to the larger societal context. The commonality between these two historical "forms" of

drama is the necessarily productive response of the viewer. Although Hegel conceives of the product of this response as immediately social in the Classical period and only immediately reflective in the Romantic, the mechanics of the response to art remain the same: the viewer is confronted with an epistemological object and both approaches and responds to the work of art as such an object. Elaborating the specific moments of this confrontation with art shows just how modern drama retains the potential for social change by articulating a model of the viewer from within Hegel's philosophy that productively responds to the epistemological object both physically and cognitively.

## IV. The Master/Servant Dialectic and its Relevance for Aesthetic Reception

When Hegel claims in his lectures on aesthetics that works of art influence the social and political organization of the society in which they were produced, he restricts his explanations to two fields of inquiry. On the one hand, he establishes paradigmatic themes for the Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic epochs, and on the other hand, argues that art has differing levels of influence on society in each of these eras. Missing from his Ästhetik, however, is a discussion of how the ideas mediated through art are put into effect to shape society. I will argue that Hegel provides a general model of the art recipient who productively responds to the work of art as an epistemological object in the Master and Servant dialectic. This episode in the Phänomenologie des Geistes describes the qualitative leap from human perception and understanding of the empirical world to the ability to combine concepts with

empirical knowledge and hence learn the truth about both the world and about humans as Spirit. This transformation shapes all further development in Hegel's philosophy, including the ability to produce and understand aesthetic objects. But Hegel also develops the concepts of enjoyment and work as part of the Master and Servant episode, concepts that have particular relevance for both the production and reception of art. For the self-consciousness that has overcome the bifurcation of Master and Servant can henceforth both find pleasure in the objects of the sensual world and perform the work of understanding and asserting its own position in the world. By incorporating the element of enjoyment I believe that the Master and Servant parable can be read as a model of both artistic production and, what is less obvious, of artistic reception. I will read this episode as a parable rather than as a historical event, and will show how Hegel positions the ensuing construct of self-consciousness as the unification of both figures, the compound Master/Servant. This will require a brief discussion of Hegel's definitions of consciousness, desire, and self-consciousness before I can summarize the conflict between Master and Servant with an emphasis on enjoyment as a component of the synthesized Master/Servant. I will then show how Hegel uses the language of the Master/Servant parable specifically to introduce art as the first stage of the development of Absolute Spirit, and how his reapplication of Master and Servant in these introductory remarks underscore the composite Master/Servant as both an artist and an exegete.

Beyond the key function that the Master and Servant play within the Phänomenologie and for Hegel's system as a whole, these figures have attracted interpreters due to their applicability and relevance for historical or

anthropological studies. Indeed, the predominant interpretations either disregard or downplay the structural importance of the episode for Hegel's philosophy in favor of describing the cultural significance of servitude. Karl Marx's reading is paradigmatic in this regard. Marx criticized Hegel's idealism and claimed that what truth could be found in Hegel's philosophy first had to be excised from its philosophical framework. Thus from the very outset, his criticism intentionally excluded an explanation of Hegel's use of the Master and Servant figures. Instead, Marx used this conflict as a generalization of historical events and social structures concerning domination and exploitation, most notably the class conflict.[1] Alexandre Kojève, whose lectures on Hegel's Phänomenologie in the 1930's have profoundly influenced modern views on Hegel's text, focused on the Master and Servant episode as the impetus for historical progression. Unlike Marx, Kojève sought to explain the ramifications for Hegel's philosophy while simultaneously applying the parable to history. Kojève underscored consciousness—the activities of desiring and negating—as the fundamental process and originating moment of history in the Phänomenologie. This led him to insist that the conflict between Master and Servant could never be resolved, for it would in effect end history with its closure.[2] Because they have shifted their focus from Hegel's philosophical project to its historical application, neither reading is able to explain adequately Hegel's subsequent development of self-consciousness into Spirit.

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[1]See especially the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 for Marx' critique of Hegel.

[2]"Man was born and History began with the first Fight that ended in the appearance of a Master and a Slave. That is to say that Man—at his origin—is always either Master or Slave; and that true Man can exist only where there is a Master *and* a Slave" (43). See also 38 ff. for Kojève's discussion of desire and negation.

The episode is best considered a parable that, within its context in the Phänomenologie, serves as an illustration of certain aspects of Hegel's abstract concept of self-consciousness. However, Hegel himself seems to legitimize the practice of interpreting these figures in a historical context in a footnote to his reiteration of this episode in the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften: "...der Kampf um Anerkennung [kann] in der angegebenen bis zum Äußersten getriebenen Form bloß im *Naturzustande*...stattfinden, dagegen der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und dem Staate fernbleibt" (10: 221). While Hegel is disclaiming any possibility for these figures to be read as indicative of modern social conflicts, he does seem to intimate that the Master-Servant conflict did take place prior to the advent of civilization. But this remark is really an aside to his development of the concept of self-consciousness in the body of the text. Understanding the metaphysical meaning of the parable within Hegel's delineation of self-consciousness does not prevent its application at other points in his philosophy, as I would argue he is doing in this remark. Otto Pöggeler argues convincingly that in the Phänomenologie, "das Selbstbewußtsein, von dem in der spezifischen Phänomenologie des Selbstbewußtseins die Rede ist, wird ganz abstrakt eingeführt als die Wahrheit dessen, was überhaupt ist" (248). To read these figures in an anthropological light contradicts the level of abstraction—that is their aspect in constructing "the truth about what [self-consciousness] intrinsically is,"—which Hegel maintains prior to and following this episode.

But even critics who challenge the anthropological reading of the Master and Servant dialectic find importance only in work and in the Servant. Hans-Georg Gadamer, for example, carefully notes the tangential nature of the Kojève

and Marx interpretations and reaffirms Hegel's goal of transforming mere understanding into Reason via the conflict of Master and Servant. But Gadamer believes that the Servant is the true focus of this episode, and that the Master serves as the grain of sand that germinates the pearl. This leads him to conclude that "[Hegels Argumentation] meint ein Bewußtsein des Herrn, der Herr ist und bleibt" (Gesammelte Werke 3: 59). Gadamer's entrenchment of Master and Servant as permanent categories eliminates the trait of enjoyment, which Hegel identifies specifically with the Master, from the subsequent collusion of the Servant figure and self-consciousness as Reason. Gadamer does specify enjoyment as an attribute of the Master, but allows this trait to disappear along with the erasure of the Master by the Servant. Hence Gadamer's reading represents a reduction of abilities upon the development of self-consciousness as Reason and makes work the sole faculty for interacting with the world.

To understand Hegel's definition of self-consciousness ("Selbstbewußtsein") as the most basic description of a uniquely human subjectivity, it is necessary to see Hegel's conception of both consciousness ("Bewußtsein") and desire ("Begierde") as faculties that enable the condition of self-consciousness. The definitions and relationships between these three terms are exceedingly complex within Hegel's general philosophy in both structural and textual terms. However, it is possible to elaborate certain basic relationships in the construction of self-consciousness in relation to consciousness and desire based on Hegel's articulation of these moments in the Phänomenologie alone. Robert Pippin has effectively argued that regardless of inconsistencies between this work and Hegel's articulation of his system

throughout his other works, and despite even notable incongruities within the Phänomenologie itself, "even those most skeptical about the work have to try to take into account the fact that Hegel intended a transition from 'Consciousness' to 'Self-Consciousness'" ("You Can't Get There" 78). Pippin discovers this transition in the Master and Servant episode by following Hegel's own assertion that this episode is "the very 'turning point' of the whole Phenomenology" (ibid. 58). Hegel claims, in turn, that the Phänomenologie is the articulation of how Spirit comes to know itself as the interplay between consciousness and self-consciousness (583). An analysis of this episode can thus develop an illustration of Hegel's basic definition of what self-consciousness is and how it functions.

Hegel begins the Phänomenologie by assuming consciousness as an inherent capability for humans, but one that necessitates development. Consciousness is the dialectical process of negating attributes of an object that seem foreign to understanding, thus making the object conform to the notion of what that thing ought to be. Hegel devotes the first chapter of the Phänomenologie to his claim that there is always a contradiction between how things and relationships *seem* and what they *truly are*. In the subsequent two chapters, he explains that to arrive at truth, consciousness makes explicit the contradiction between the initial appearance of something and what that something ought to be while retaining those attributes discovered to be essential to the object. Hegel describes this activity as intrinsically a process that continually feeds information to self-consciousness. "Dieses wahrhafte Wesen der Dinge hat sich jetzt so bestimmt, daß es nicht unmittelbar für das Bewußtsein ist, sondern daß dieses ein mittelbares Verhältnis zu dem Innern

hat und als Verstand durch diese Mitte des Spiels der Kräfte in den wahren Hintergrund der Dinge blickt" (3: 116). Hegel claims here that the attributes of objects can be thought of not as static, constant singularities, but as defined by the relationships of their parts that is established by varying perceptions. Consciousness arrives at a truthful notion of what the object is because it continuously articulates the various elements comprising the object for self-consciousness. Another way of stating this would be to say that consciousness makes self-consciousness *conscious of* the contradictions between appearances and essences, and also *conscious of* the resolution of these contradictions. Consciousness can be thought of as a condition, as the undeveloped rationality Hegel describes in the term "Verstand," but within the development of self-consciousness it is more properly a procedure, and as an activity must be thought of as a tool of self-consciousness. Its sole function is to gain knowledge, and it is the fundamental means of gaining knowledge in Hegel's philosophy.

Desire is a necessary motivating complement to the activity of consciousness. Kojève describes the fundamental importance of desire for Hegel by asserting that desire represents Hegel's supercession of the essential limitations to Descartes' formulation of self-consciousness in the capacity to think. "Hence it is not purely cognitive and passive contemplation that is at the base of Self-consciousness [...], but Desire" (37). Kojève overstates the importance of desire, however, for while desire brings the activity of negation into an unmediated relationship to self-consciousness, consciousness continues to comprise a basic element of the interface between self-consciousness and object world. "So selbständig also das Bewußtsein, ebenso selbständig ist *an*

*sich* sein Gegenstand. Das Selbstbewußtsein, welches schlechthin *für sich* ist und seinen Gegenstand unmittelbar mit dem Charakter des Negativen bezeichnet oder zunächst *Begierde* ist, wird daher vielmehr die Erfahrung der Selbständigkeit desselben machen" (3: 139-40; Hegel's emphasis). The activity of consciousness thus makes apparent the independence of the object from self-consciousness, and it is the function of desire to erase this independence. Desire accomplishes this by the same means of negation that consciousness uses to determine the composition of the object in the first place. Henry Sussman has correctly noted that Hegel uses the procedure of bifurcation and negation as the "basic model for reflection, self-consciousness and criticism" (32-33). But while consciousness negates—or *defines*—in order to determine base structures, desire negates those structures that establish the object as an independent entity—or *acquires*. Self-consciousness is made up of these two faculties that accomplish different objectives—knowledge of the thing and acquisition of it, respectively—for self-consciousness.

All humans intrinsically have consciousness and desire, according to Hegel, because all humans are self-consciousness. Consciousness and desire are thus attributes, while self-consciousness is a state of existence. However, the human condition of being self-consciousness has only immediate truth to begin with. In other words, humans have to learn that they are self-consciousness. Desire compels self-consciousness to learn the truth about the world by applying consciousness to every external object it encounters. But Hegel claims that self-consciousness, which experiences the world by making all objects conform to its own concepts, would never be made conscious of its own difference from and superiority to the object world unless it learned

through experience of its difference and superiority. And the only way self-consciousness can make its own condition explicit for itself is to experience self-consciousness as the other. The first meeting of two self-consciousnesses initiates a conflict that results first in the relationship of Master and Servant, and concludes with the knowledge of self-consciousness that it is self-consciousness.

This initial meeting is a struggle because both combatants are employing negation as their tool for mediating knowledge of the other. Both have their own concept of what this other ought to be. Hegel claims that up to this point, self-consciousness has always wanted the other to be something useful to itself, hence it negates such attributes of this thing so that the formerly independent object is made subservient to self-consciousness. "Der Nichtigkeit dieses Anderen gewiß, setzt es *für sich* dieselbe als seine Wahrheit, vernichtet den selbständigen Gegenstand und gibt sich dadurch die Gewißheit seiner selbst als *wahre* Gewißheit, als solche, welche ihm selbst auf *gegenständliche Weise* geworden ist" (3: 143; Hegel's emphasis). Hegel describes here both the epistemological and ontological repercussions of this activity of self-consciousness. On the one hand, the object is known in a truthful manner only to the extent that self-consciousness uses consciousness to recognize what the object is, and exploits desire to subordinate the object's independent status to the status of certainty for self-consciousness. On the other hand, the object serves as a testimony in "material form" of the capacity of self-consciousness to approach the object world in this manner and learn its truth. In Hegel's hypothetical first meeting of two self-consciousnesses, neither of which has ever experienced any other object capable of exercising consciousness and desire,

each self-consciousness proceeds as usual with this new object. In this moment self-consciousness experiences the act of being negated, of being forced to conform to the wishes of the other self-consciousness. Hegel says that self-consciousness will resist subservience to the point of death. But if this conflict always resulted in a death, self-consciousness would never experience itself as the other and human development would be permanently blocked at this stage. So Hegel claims that the drive to self-preservation ultimately supersedes the resistance to domination. The winner of this battle is the Master, the loser the Servant.

The Master is only the winner in the short term, however. For now the Servant procures everything the Master desires. Hegel describes this situation by stating that the Master enjoys ("geniesst") being served and enjoys the things the servant brings upon command. "Der Begierde gelang dies [die Befriedigung] nicht wegen der Selbständigkeit des Dinges; der Herr aber, der den Knecht zwischen es und sich eingeschoben, schließt sich dadurch nur mit der Unselbständigkeit des Dinges zusammen und genießt es rein; die Seite der Selbständigkeit aber überläßt er dem Knechte, der es bearbeitet" (3: 151). Instead of employing the faculty of desire to subordinate the object, the Master achieves "pure enjoyment" by causing the Servant to mediate the object. But since the Servant provides entirely, the Master no longer even comes into contact with unadulterated reality, and the Master thus becomes helplessly dependent upon the Servant (ibid. 151ff.).

The Servant suffers the opposite loss of ability—the Master usurps the desire of the Servant by forcing the latter to obey imposed desires. But the Servant continues to practice negation on the objects of the world in order to

make these objects in accordance with the wishes of the Master. Or, as Hegel says, the Servant works ("arbeitet"). Hegel notes two important features for his philosophy in general of this work that is learned by order of the Master. First, Hegel defines the resulting product of work as "*gehemmte* Begierde, *aufgehaltenes* Verschwinden, oder [die Arbeit] *bildet*" (3: 153; Hegel's emphasis). This point has multiple implications for Hegel, but in my context I would like to concentrate on the object as the signification for self-consciousness of its ability to act and to think.

The self-reflexive operation resulting from the worked-upon product provides the means by which the Servant figure comprehends itself as self-consciousness. If work is repressed desire, then this can only refer to the desire of the Servant, for the Master by definition represses no desires. On the other hand, the Master only desires, but no longer engages in negating the object world to prepare it for himself, and so the Master's ability to negate atrophies. So in contrast to the Master, who loses the faculty of negation, the Servant merely defers the faculty of desire. The other important implication here is that the object of human production is marked as an incarnation of self-consciousness. Hegel is using "bilden" in a twofold sense: on the one hand in the sense of shaping material or ideas via the process of work, but on the other hand as educating self-consciousness about itself as self-consciousness. "Die Begierde hat sich das reine Negieren des Gegenstandes und dadurch das unvermischte Selbstgefühl vorbehalten. Diese Befriedigung ist aber deswegen selbst nur ein Verschwinden, denn es fehlt ihr die gegenständliche Seite oder das Bestehen" (ibid.). That is, when self-consciousness changes the object by working upon it, the product becomes a durative signifier of itself as exercising

its faculties—consciousness in identifying the elements of the extant object, and as explicitly addressed here, desire in negating the independence of the object. When self-consciousness sees the worked-upon object, it also sees itself as the activity that the product signifies and as the actor who is capable of changing the world to fit its own needs.

Moreover, Hegel claims that the recognition of itself in the produced work means that self-consciousness achieves the ability to think. Self-consciousness has hitherto made use of consciousness as a tool, without reflection upon the relationship of consciousness to self-consciousness. Only when the worked-upon object reflects consciousness in object form can self-consciousness become aware of a doubling of consciousness—its own immediate consciousness and, simultaneously, its own consciousness in the work. "Denn nicht als *abstraktes Ich*, sondern als Ich, welches zugleich die Bedeutung des *Ansich*seins hat, sich Gegenstand sein oder zum gegenständlichen Wesen sich so verhalten, daß es die Bedeutung des *Fürsichseins* des Bewußtseins hat, für welches es ist, heißt *denken*" (3: 156; Hegel's emphasis). In Hegel's terminology, the essential being of consciousness is expressed as its "Ansichsein," which attains corporeality in the product of work and hence becomes also "für sich," or self-aware. Hegel asserts that this doubling elevates the conceptual power of self-consciousness, providing a categorical leap from the ability to apply consciousness and desire when confronted with the object world to the ability to think in terms of concepts ("Begriffe").

With this realization, which Hegel says occurs inevitably during servitude, the Servant knows itself to be true self-consciousness that is capable

of dominating the world despite the initial subservience to the Master. While the Servant clearly achieves this superior condition by performing work and thus gaining insight into its own condition as self-consciousness, this knowledge is not the sole dividend of work. In his negative example of the Unhappy Consciousness, Hegel posits the continued bifurcation of work and pleasure as the source of this figure's inadequacy. "Wenn das [Unglückliche] Bewußtsein für sich selbständiges Bewußtsein und ihm die Wirklichkeit an und für sich nichtig wäre, würde es in der Arbeit und in dem Genusse zum Gefühle seiner Selbständigkeit gelangen, dadurch daß es selbst es wäre, welches die Wirklichkeit aufhöbe" (3: 171). Engaging in the process of self-discovery by working on the object world of "reality" succeeds in bringing self-consciousness to the awareness of its independence through both work and enjoyment. Hegel already hints that work is intertwined with enjoyment when he claims that the Master experiences "pure enjoyment" ("genießt rein") of the objects the Servant works over for the Master. This implies that the result of work provides enjoyment, and that the Master's access to the products of work without having to labor himself qualify such enjoyment as "pure." Hegel's admonition to the Unhappy Consciousness shows that work and enjoyment can coincide in a single consciousness and implies that recognizing this fact could dispel the unhappiness of this figure.

Including enjoyment as a feature of the Servant figure upon its independence from servitude makes this figure a true sublation of Master and Servant: a Master/Servant. Another name for this figure could indeed be the Happy Consciousness, for once the Servant achieves true self-consciousness, it necessarily develops the ability to both work and enjoy. Of course, this figure is

an ideal representation, and Hegel subsequently discusses the figures of Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness to show imperfect realizations of this ideal. But regardless of potential deficiencies, Hegel accords to the Servant both capacities of work and enjoyment.

The role of Master, on the other hand, has proven to be one-sided and therefore false. The Master is therefore compelled to adopt the attributes of the Servant. Hegel argues circuitously in the Phänomenologie that the Master seeks recognition as self-consciousness from the Servant. But because the Master negates the Servant as an independent self-consciousness, the Servant's recognition is empty for the Master because the latter does not regard the Servant as equal, as an equivalent self-consciousness. Hegel notes other moments of this episode that reiterate that the Master would also need to perform work to realize true self-consciousness, but Hegel only implies that the Master also actually becomes true self-consciousness. Only in the Enzyklopädie does Hegel explicitly claim that both figures necessarily become true self-consciousness:

> [...] die *positive* Seite der Freiheit [erhält] erst dann Wirklichkeit [...], wenn andererseits das Selbstbewußtsein des Herrn durch die zwischen ihm und dem Knechte stattfindende *Gemeinsamkeit* des Bedürfnisses und der Sorge für die Befriedigung desselben sowie durch die Anschauung der ihm im Knechte gegenständlichen Aufhebung des unmittelbaren einzelnen Willens dahin gebracht wird, diese Aufhebung auch in bezug auf ihn selber als das Wahrhafte zu erkennen und demnach seinen eigenen selbstischen Willen dem Gesetze des an und für sich seienden Willens zu unterwerfen. (10: 225-26; Hegel's emphasis)

Hegel shows here that the Master conscientiously becomes like the Servant by "recognizing" the truthful nature of the Servant's subjectivity and "acceding" to the "laws" governing the Servant's behavior. Here, too, Hegel does not make reference to the Master giving up enjoyment, but rather notes that the Master is swayed to the viewpoint of the Servant by recognizing the "commonality of their need." This lack is the inarticulated state of self-consciousness itself, or is the need for self-revelation of self-consciousness as such. The Master attains "fulfillment" of this need by emulating the Servant and engaging in work that brings knowledge and enjoyment. Both figures are now synthesized as self-consciousness that is capable of the operation of work.

Hegel has another name for this now-unified figure: Reason. Reason is simply self-consciousness that knows itself to be such, which is the initial result of the conflict between Master and Servant. Work has enabled self-consciousness to productively modify the objects in the world rather than merely negate them. Moreover, the doubling of consciousness in the objects of work enabled self-consciousness to liberate itself from merely object-based notions of the world and achieve conceptual thought. Hegel now claims that this first incarnation of Reason, which he also refers to as "true self-consciousness" and "general self-consciousness," is only the immediate, unarticulated condition of Reason, "[s]ie versichert nur, alle Realität zu sein" (3: 180). For Reason to be called true Reason, self-consciousness must develop itself as Spirit, and in fact must develop itself in all three realms that Hegel denotes for Spirit—Subjective, Objective, and Absolute. Thus while Reason appears here only in a preliminary stage, this incarnation is the beginning point for every further development in Hegel's philosophy.

It is also the beginning point for developing *each* of the three areas of Spirit. Whereas there is a singular line of development for self-consciousness until it appears as Reason, three separate but interconnected realms of development comprise the remainder of Hegel's philosophy. Hegel outlines Subjective Spirit (ethics), Objective Spirit (institutions such as the family or state), and Absolute Spirit (knowledge of the human condition) in this linear order in the Phänomenologie. But he is not thinking of this development in the linear mode that the narrative constrains him to follow. Rather, self-consciousness progresses simultaneously through all three aspects once it has overcome the split between Master and Servant. Hegel does determine a course of development within each area, but he never gives a definite correspondence of this conceptual progression of self-consciousness to historical events, nor does he programmatically link stages of development in one area to development in the other two areas. Only the beginning point is determined as the initial process for each aspect of Spirit.

Hegel claims that art is the first stage of discovering what Absolute Spirit truly is. In other words, art relates the highest understanding of the human condition, and there is no content or concept that lies outside the realm of artistic expression. This means that when self-consciousness becomes Reason, it is effectively prepared to experience art.

> Die unmittelbare Einheit des Geistes mit sich selbst ist die Grundlage oder reines Bewußtsein, *innerhalb* dessen das Bewußtsein auseinandertritt. Auf diese Weise in sein reines Selbstbewußtsein eingeschlossen, existiert er in der Religion nicht als der Schöpfer einer *Natur* überhaupt; sondern was er in dieser Bewegung hervorbringt, sind

seine Gestalten als Geister, die zusammen die Vollständigkeit seiner Erscheinung ausmachen, und diese Bewegung selbst ist das Werden seiner vollkommenen Wirklichkeit durch die einzelnen Seiten derselben oder seine unvollkommenen Wirklichkeiten. (3: 502; Hegel's emphasis)

The "immediate unity of Spirit" indicates the condition of self-consciousness as self-aware yet underdeveloped, that is, just at the point of burgeoning Reason. Especially clear here is the dual potency of self-consciousness to "produce" ("hervorbringen") works that themselves in turn promote the "development" ("das Werden") of self-consciousness. As a Master/Servant it is capable of enjoying both the sensual appeal of art and of recognizing art to be a product of self-consciousness that provides information about self-conciousness. The Master/Servant is also capable of producing art through work. In other words, when I apply my reading of true self-consciousness as this unified Master/Servant, it becomes a construct that illustrates both aesthetic production and reception. This reading is reinforced by Hegel's prefacing episode to the beginning of art in the Phänomenologie, which replicates the figures of both Master and Servant in the Entity of Light ("das Lichtwesen") and the Foreman ("der Werkmeister"), respectively. But although they recall Master and Servant, they are each already true self-consciousness. In other words, Hegel doubles each figure, making each capable both of producing and responding to the aesthetic object.

Hegel explicitly states that the Entity of Light is a more developed incarnation of the Master. And yet, Hegel's brief and metaphorical description clearly shows that this representative figure of enjoyment is now also a producer: "[D]ie Bewegungen seiner eigenen Entäußerung, seine Schöpfungen

[...] sind Lichtgüsse; sie sind in ihrer Einfachheit zugleich sein Fürsichwerden und Rückkehr aus seinem Dasein, die Gestaltung verzehrende Feuerströme" (3: 506). The Entity of Light seeks to reaffirm itself as self-consciousness by producing an object to substantiate its own belief that it is self-consciousness. Its products, however, are inadequate to do this yet because, according to Hegel, this entity is still reliant on the forms of nature as its models. Therefore its productions are only imitations of nature, without the infusion of concepts, and so have no durative worth. The Entity of Light reabsorbs them immediately only to produce new ones, eternally practicing the act of production without the reward of seeing its true self embodied in those productions.

The Foreman is obviously the counterpart of the Servant, for it knows how to take the objects of the natural world and change them to signify its own power as self-consciousness. But the Foreman is as much a preliminary figure as the Entity of Light, for despite the Foreman's ability to introduce its own conceptual changes into natural forms, these works remain too abstract for any other self-consciousness to see itself in these objects. Hegel claims that these objects require explanation of their significance, for they are dependent on the Foreman as the creating self-consciousness to signify that they are in fact products of work and not merely natural objects. "Die Werke empfangen also nur den Geist entweder in sich als einen fremden, abgeschiedenen Geist, der seine lebendige Durchdringung mit der Wirklichkeit verlassen [hat; sic.], selbst tot in diese des Lebens entbehrenden Kristalle einkehrt; oder sie beziehen sich äußerlich auf ihn als auf einen solchen, der selbst äußerlich und nicht als Geist da ist, —als auf das aufgehende Licht, das seine Bedeutung auf sie wirft" (3:

509). This means that the Foreman must interpret its own work. Complementary to the Entity of Light, in which the consumptive, Master-oriented tendencies were emphasized and the productive aspect relativized, Hegel focuses on the productive faculty of the Foreman while only implying the capacity to enjoy by virtue of the intrinsic element of enjoyment attached to the notion of work.

The artist, finally, incorporates both the Entity of Light and the Foreman into a single figure. As the culmination of both these figures, Hegel's artist is clearly competent in production as well as reception, for the artist's works "lösen sich zur geistigen Gestaltung auf, —einem Äußeren, das in sich gegangen, — einem Inneren, das sich aus sich und an sich selbst äußert; zum Gedanken, der sich gebärendes und seine Gestalt ihm gemäß erhaltendes und klares Dasein ist" (3: 512). Hegel ascribes this productive and receptive flow, which he describes in the first part of this passage in terms of the confluence of form and content, to the artist as well. He concludes this description of the work with the assertion that, herewith, "Der Geist ist Künstler" (ibid.). In other words, the artist provides the externalization of "thought" as well as being the product of "thought." But the most significant development when self-consciousness becomes an artist is the power of representation possessed by the aesthetic objects it produces: "[...] indem [die Kunst] für das wirkliche Bewußtsein die Gestalt des Bewußtseins hat, so heißt dies soviel, daß sie, die Individualisation hat, von [den Menschen] als ihr eigenes Wesen und Werk gewußt wird" (ibid.). Once self-consciousness has discovered how to represent itself as self-consciousness via the aesthetic object, this object is universally appreciable—that is, it speaks to every one. Moreover, Hegel defines this work

of art as "true Spirit" and "ethical Spirit," which is the embodiment of an entire people: "[Der wahre Geist] ist das freie Volk, worin die Sitte die Substanz aller ausmacht, deren Wirklichkeit und Dasein alle und jeder Einzelne als seinen Willen und Tat weiß" (ibid. 512-13). Art is thus a means of representing the order of the entire society. The aesthetic object relates the communally-held values in a durative, object form. Just as the object of work reaffirmed the Servant as to its condition as self-consciousness, so the aesthetic object reaffirms the unity and coexistence within a society of its members as self-consciousness.

This conception of the artistic work as mediation of a totality between individual self-consciousness and societal whole obviously finds its reflection in the Ästhetik only in the Classical period. But reading the figure of Master/Servant into Hegel's aesthetics is more productive at the level of the aesthetic object in general. As a product of work that mediates knowledge about the human condition, self-consciousness reacts in the same productive manner regardless of the content. If art represents aspects of the way society is organized, then the reciprocity between society and aesthetic object implies that the audience can understand the work of art as social commentary. And if every self-consciousness is thought of as the composite Master/Servant construct as I have portrayed it, then both artistic creation and exegesis are inextricably linked to the organization of the social sphere. The creation of true art in the Phänomenologie shows the ability of every self-consciousness to see itself as creator and interpreter. This corresponds to the way in which Hegel conceives the artist as a talented, but more importantly, attuned individual who is distinguished from the other members of society not so much because of an innate genius as because of a propensity to actualize innate productivity by

creating art. Thinking of self-consciousness as having a productive response to art, an ability that Hegel never disclaims, maintains the potential of artistically mediated change, whatever this response and whatever the scope of its effect may be. The Master/Servant as exegete thus provides an explanation of how art motivates action in relation to society, and why this function cannot be simply thought of as disappearing even when the representational adequacy of art diminishes, as in Hegel's estimation of the Romantic period.

The aim of this chapter has been to show the importance of the act of reception in Hegel's aesthetics. Because he assumes rather than explicates the processes by which changes in society are initiated by works of art, elaborating the receptive act helps explain the mechanisms that are internal to his notion of how art functions. These mechanics show how Hegel presupposes that art engenders a productive response to art that, according to his definition, expresses content of social relevance. Even when he defines the Romantic paradigm of drama as revealing individual interiority, his advocacy of historical plays shows how this content is still embedded in a social setting that provides the potential for a socially relevant interpretation. Hegel's apparent disavowal of the potential for Romantic art to have an impact on society must thus be understood only as a relativization of this potential.

Hegel thus develops the social function of art as an application of his definition of the epistemological process. Art achieves and loses its power to mediate ideas of social relevance because of principles inherent in his development of a philosophical system that underlies the sphere of aesthetics. And yet in the field of literary studies, most critics evaluate the influence of the Ästhetik according to whether authors incorporate specific tenets Hegel

advocates. Such analyses are relatively superficial, since few of Hegel's stipulations about aesthetic form and content are radically different from contemporaneous beliefs and norms. Articulating a more specifically Hegelian influence identifies the beliefs and practices of artists who both claim such a social function of art and explicitly cite Hegel's influence. Karl Gutzkow, I will argue, fulfills both these criteria. I will show how he not only identifed the same underlying, epistemological issues as Hegel's most important and innovative contributions to aesthetic theory, but also how he criticized Hegel's assumptions about the progression of history in such as way as to circumvent the necessity of an "end" to the social influence of art

## Chapter 2: Gutzkow's Adaptation of Hegel

When Gutzkow reflects in his memoirs on his student days in Berlin,[1] he repeatedly talks about his relationship with Hegelian thought and with the philosopher himself. He recalls how he and some fellow students began a study group to discuss the Enzyklopädie—Hegel's outline of his entire philosophical system—to complement the lectures they attended. He critiques Hegel's alienating lecture mannerisms and questions the competence of the Dozenten to mediate Hegel's ideas. Gutzkow also quotes a discussion with Hegel in which the philosopher revealed that he had read issues of Forum der Journal-Literatur, the journal Gutzkow was publishing at the time. A tension between enthusiasm and skepticism characterizes these recollections. Gutzkow claims that every Hegel lecture enticed him to quit his theology studies in favor of philosophy, and yet he suspected Hegel of being a "Jongleur" performing a "Becherspiel" with philosophical concepts (43). He holds up Hegel's philosophy of history as a "Webermeisterstück" that inspires in him "andächtige Schauern," but he also asserts that he later recognized "Gefahren" in Hegel's construction of history (ibid.). Elsewhere in his text Gutzkow counters the positively connoted metaphor of the tapestry when he describes Hegel as a "Spinne, die in der Ecke ihres Netzes verborgen liegt und ihre Fäden nach außen immer weiter hinaus, nach innen immer enger zusammenzuziehen sucht" (39-40). And while he is clearly flattered that Hegel reads his journal, he vociferously defends his articles against Hegel's criticisms. From the historical

[1] Das Kastanienwäldchen zu Berlin (1869).

perspective in his memoirs, then, Gutzkow attests to a study of Hegel that develops from an intensive and somewhat awestruck study to an increasingly critical distinction between his own ideas and Hegel's thought.

This biographical documentation of Hegel's influence on Gutzkow has not been adequately corroborated in Gutzkow's texts. A tendency to look for general similarities or differences in concepts underlies this omission in the scholarship. Studies of Young Germany, a group of authors writing in the 1830's who were bound together by their liberal political views and their strategy of using journalism and literature to promote their political ideas, typically support their arguments for Hegel's influence on these writers only at this general level.[2] As a member of this group, Gutzkow's direct ties to Hegel are ignored or subsumed to the criteria of the broadest common reception of Hegelian concepts. Claims that the Young Germans oriented themselves on ideals rather than empirical realities (Sengle, Biedermeierzeit 1, 166), that they insisted on a dialectical relationship between world events and metaphysical concepts (Kleinmeyr 42), that they saw an intrinsic connection between historical reality and aesthetic content (Dietze 157), or that they revised Hegel's covalence of reality and rationality to an activist program by which ideas engendered the rationalization of reality (Denkler, Restauration 27 ff.)—all apply to Gutzkow, and yet none articulate with any concreteness the manner and consequences of his interpretations of Hegel. These asserted "Hegelian" concepts are, moreover, so vague that they cannot be ascribed as a uniquely Hegelian influence on Gutzkow and his Young German compatriots.

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[2] No one has yet asserted that Hegel did not influence the Young Germans at all; they had at least an "ambivalent" response toward the philosopher, meaning that they selectively adopted some elements while rejecting others (Hömberg, Zeitgeist 163).

Analyses that focus specifically on Gutzkow also tend to identify superficial correspondences between Hegel's philosophy and Gutzkow's ideas about literature. Rainer Funke claims that "Teile der Hegelschen Ästhetik [sind] komplett übernommen oder vorausgesetzt" in Gutzkow's literary theory (108). Funke does not specify or articulate which parts are taken over, however, so that his claim remains vague. Erich Fritscher, on the other hand, identifies specific elements that Gutzkow borrows from Hegel for his dramatic praxis (51 ff.). These include the demands that the drama be contemporaneously relevant and that it achieve its effectiveness as mediation by using engaging staging methods. But these elements are not specifically Hegelian to the extent that Gutzkow's incorporation of these tenets in his dramas could be considered his recourse to Hegel. Both Funke and Fritscher justify isolating singular theses by claiming that Gutzkow rejected Hegel's underlying system, but neither adequately describes Gutzkow's direct commentary on such underlying concepts.

I will identify Gutzkow's aesthetics as Hegelian in three stages, beginning with the relevance of Hegel's philosophy of history. Gutzkow's essay "Zur Philosophie der Tat und des Ereignisses," in which he sets out his own theory of history, includes his only developed reading of any of Hegel's theories. I will show how he tries to use Hegel's historiographical methodology without subscribing to the philosopher's teleological conception of history by emphasizing the individual as an agent for historical change. Second, I will explain how his alterations of Hegel enable Gutzkow to position the artist as the potential agency of historical change through the work of art. Whereas Hegel was constrained by the teleology of his system to proclaim the inability of art to

motivate social change after the decline of Ancient Greece, Gutzkow can develop criteria for literary works that, he argues, enable them to have a political function. But he does not simply advocate "Tendenzliteratur," that is literature that directly comments or criticizes current events or social norms. I will show how Gutzkow tries to classify such direct commentary as journalism and define more mediated articulations of social criticism as literature. I will then detail his theoretical arguments, set out for the most part in his journalistic articles of the 1830's but also visible within his literary works of this decade, for preferring fictional literature to achieve political change.[3] And third, I will conclude by demonstrating how this preference for mediated rather than direct criticism appears in Gutzkow's literary praxis as self-reflexivity: that is, he incorporates discussions of literary works within his own literary works in order to model for his audience how to understand social criticism cloaked in fictional form. Although he never addressed this feature of his works himself, I will argue that understanding this strategy allows a better understanding of the social relevance of his oeuvre as a whole.

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[3] Two factors impede a clearer description of the texts I will be examining. Gutzkow's prolific journalistic writings have yet to be collected together, nor can the many journals he wrote for be succinctly listed. Furthermore, Gutzkow incorporated many of his articles into other publications that do not evince the origin of the texts in journals. I will explicitly label his longer, published essays and his fictional works as such; other texts, regardless of citation by journal title or book title, should be understood as having been written as journal articles. Cf. Rasch, 9-10, for the most recent discussion of Gutzkow's publishing practices.

## I. Gutzkow and Hegel on History

In order to show how Gutzkow champions the essential effectiveness of art to change society, which Hegel weakens for modernity, it is first necessary to analyze Gutzkow's interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of history. He attacks Hegel's dialectical methodology while supporting the kinds of conclusions Hegel draws on the basis of his argumentation. This dual response serves as a model for the way Gutzkow grapples with Hegelian thought, including the way he interprets Hegel's philosophy of history, the most influential element of Hegel's thought for him. Gutzkow adapts Hegel's concept of a linear progression of history while discarding the philosopher's passive formulation of history as "development of Spirit" (e.g. 12: 86) and the state rather than the individual as the prime agency of historical change (e.g. ibid. 55ff.). This formulation of historical progression in turn informs his understanding of Hegel's aesthetics. That is, he embraces the historical relevance of the aesthetic work while disavowing Hegel's systematic relegation of the agency of historical progression to institutions other than art. The assertion that Gutzkow adopts elements of Hegel's Ästhetik remains untenable because there is no proof that he was directly acquainted with the lectures, however reasonable this assumption may seem in the light of biographical information on Gutzkow and his literary theories. A more consistent argument with broader ramifications can be made by showing instead how Gutzkow subscribes to Hegel's underlying notion that art generally addresses topics of

social relevance. The greatest difference between their aesthetic theories is in fact their conflicting estimation of the efficacy of artistic mediation of ideas in their contemporaneous society. Gutzkow's understanding of artistic works as an agency for social change derives from his refutation of Hegel's historical teleology. By rejecting this teleology, Gutzkow avoids the systematic conditions that induce Hegel to undermine the competency of modern art to achieve such change.

Gutzkow criticizes Hegel for the apparent arbitrariness of his methodology, insofar as he believes Hegel misapplies his dialectical argumentation. Gutzkow describes Hegel's method in terms of a game played by an experienced manipulator: as a "Versteckenspielen" (Beiträge 1: 72) in which Hegel avails himself of the "Stehaufmännchen der Negation" (ibid. 75), or, as quoted above, the magician performing a shell game. Gutzkow suggests criticism by accusing Hegel of relying on tricks to make his arguments. But Gutzkow uses this insight to turn Hegel's methodology against the philosopher's conclusions. He in fact defends Hegel's methodology precisely because it affords the potential for virtually any application. Gutzkow reaches this conclusion because he sees Hegel's argumentation functioning on the plane of abstraction. "[...] Hegel findet ja in seiner Negation nur eine Elastizität, die gar nicht in den Dingen, sondern in der größern oder geringern, in der unendlichen Energie des beliebigen Denksubjektes liegt" (Beiträge 2: 213). Gutzkow sees Hegel as legitimizing an essentially subjective philosophical approach. By removing Hegel's assertion of objectivity, that truth can be found

"in things," Gutzkow positions himself to criticize Hegel's assertions about the world: "Indem Hegel zeigen wollte, daß die Wahrheit weder vor noch hinter den Dingen läge, sondern in ihnen, indem er in seiner Art nachwies, daß nichts wahr daran sei, als der Begriff; fixierte er die Dinge und veranlaßte eine Philosophie, die an dem Bestehenden ein sehr verdächtiges Genüge hat" (Beiträge 1: 358-59). Gutzkow claims that Hegel exploits the elasticity of his dialectics only to reinforce the authority of existent rather than ideal conceptions of the world. In his view, Hegel makes a mistake when he moves from abstract, metaphysical concepts to the analysis of the world. Gutzkow's reasoning implies that Hegel's strategy is sound and only the results are faulty. He thus interprets Hegel as delivering the argumentative means to establish claims even in opposition to Hegel's own conclusions.

Gutzkow confirms his implicit advocacy of Hegelian argumentation when he publicly supports other critics engaged in rewriting Hegel's conclusions within the premises of the underlying philosophical system. This is clearly illustrated in his essay "Leo und die Hegelingen" (1838), in which he supports the Young Hegelian readings of Hegel against the attacks of Heinrich Leo, a conservative historian who, as a professor at Halle in the 1830's, was a vocal critic of the Young Hegelians. Gutzkow insists that Hegel's writings are not directly pertinent to world conditions, claiming that "Er [Hegel] hinterließ seinen Schülern als schwierige Aufgabe die Ausgleichung des Systems mit den mannigfachen Positivitäten unseres Lebens, unserer Sitten, unserer Ueberlieferungen" (Ges. Werke 10: 148). Gutzkow sees the work of

interpretation as moving from the abstract system to the multiple singular elements of the actual world. But Gutzkow defends Hegel when the system itself or its parts are questioned. "Man bekämpfe diese Hegelsche Dialektik innerhalb der Philosophie, nenne sie ein Spiel, aber man hüte sich, ihren Begriffen, die immanent sein sollen, mit einer Anklage entgegenzutreten, die etwas Einzelnes beträfe!" (ibid. 150). Gutzkow again refers to the arbitrariness of Hegel's method, but argues that critics who attack parts of the metaphysical foundation do not understand the internal consistency of Hegel's system and its conceptual basis. The composition of the system, Gutzkow is saying, underwrites its application to events or ideas in the objective world.

Gutzkow's use of Hegel should thus be looked at not in terms of his fidelity to specific Hegelian theses about the social world, but rather in terms of the extent to which his opinions and arguments depart from certain tenets in Hegel's thought. That is, he is willing to follow Hegel's lines of thought up to the point of analyzing real world events, and at this point offers his own alternative position to Hegel's conclusions. His admonishment to the Young Hegelians serves as the motif of his own practice as well: "Es ist durchaus für die Hegelsche Philosophie ein immer lebhafter werdendes Bedürfniß, daß sich ihre Anhänger von dem Universalismus des Systems und seinen sonstigen Anwendungen zurückziehen, und die Wahrheit ihres Meisters mit dialektischer Originalität aus sich selbst herausconstruiren" (Beiträge 2: 216). Gutzkow intimates that the need for interpretation, for bringing one's own "original constructions" to the "Master's truth," is becoming increasingly necessary,

indeed that "applications" of Hegel require such a contribution. Gutzkow's readings of Hegel resulted in attacks against his interpretation. Friedrich Engels notes as early as 1842 that Gutzkow and the other Young Germans erroneously made Hegel out to be a "Prophet der subjektiven Autonomie" (360). But the interesting feature of Gutzkow's interplay with Hegel is not his supposed "incorrect" reading of Hegel. Nor should his invocation of Hegel be understood as a conscientious "Gegengewicht zur Adaption Hegels durch restaurative Kräfte," an assessment that Rainer Funke appends to his otherwise insightful analysis of Gutzkow's interpretive strategy regarding Hegel (89). Instead, Hegel is valuable for Gutzkow as a starting point from which to develop his own theories.

Gutzkow's process of adapting Hegel's philosophy is especially evident in his theories on history, since Hegel's philosophy of history is the only element in Hegel's system that Gutzkow analyzes in depth. Gutzkow counters Hegel's passive formulation of the individual's role in history with an active construct: whereas he sees any person as the potential instigator of societal change through their own volition, Hegel conceived of the individual as only the mediator through which the evolving "Spirit" (Geist) manifests itself as societal change. Gutzkow argues that Hegel preordains the course of history with this conception, ratifying a teleology that produces indifference and apathy. However, he is not willing to argue the potentially chaotic consequences of history continuously made by any individual who intends to thereby change society. Gutzkow therefore assimilates the organic, self-

propelling notion of history from Hegel, and allows for increased effectiveness of individual action during "transitional times" ("Übergangsphasen"). In effect, Gutzkow shifts the emphasis but still relies on the central premise of Hegel's philosophy of history, namely that ideas motivate history's progress.

In Hegel's formulation in his Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, history is described as the evolution of Spirit transforming itself from idea to reality. "Diese unermeßliche Masse von Wollen, Interessen und Tätigkeiten sind die Werkzeuge und Mittel des Weltgeistes, seinen Zweck zu vollbringen, ihn zum Bewußtsein zu erheben und zu verwirklichen; und dieser ist nur, sich zu finden, zu sich selbst zu kommen und sich als Wirklichkeit anzuschauen" (12: 40). Hegel makes this process sound as if the impulse for and realization of historical events were hermetically contained within the abstract figure of Spirit: It sets its own goal of manifesting itself as reality and manipulates human volitions as its tools. But Hegel clearly attributes the realization of history to individuals, and insists even that all persons act in their own self-interest and only secondarily and unconsciously realize the aims of Spirit as well (ibid. 36ff.). Thus even when Hegel credits "welthistorische Individuen" (ibid. 45) like Julius Caeser or Napoleon with historically significant social transformations, he portrays them as passive agents of Spirit who achieve preordained changes to society while pursuing their own self-aggrandizing agendas.

Gutzkow understands Hegel's theory of history as a necessary development in historiography, but a nevertheless overly rigid conception of

history. In his treatise on the theory of history, Philosophie der Tat und des Ereignisses (1836),[1] Gutzkow announces at the outset of his critique of Hegel that he is not a detractor from Hegelian philosophy and professes instead his high estimation for Hegel's historical studies (Ges. Werke 12: 107 and ff.). He disputes, however, the capacity of Hegel's philosophy to provide preordination for every historical event, as Gutzkow claims Hegel does (ibid. 108). Gutzkow calls this "Geschichtskonstruktion": "Geschichtskonstruktion heißt, die einzelnen Höhepunkte der Geschichte mit Spinnweben verbinden und das Disparateste zu witzigen Harmonieen zusammenbinden" (ibid.). This is not the methodological criticism it appears to be, for Gutzkow also sees historiography as establishing relationships between events and people, as "vergleichende Anatomie der Ereignisse" (ibid. 114), with the intention "das Aehnliche [zu] verknüpfen" (ibid. 115). Gutzkow is protesting instead against what he sees as a misuse of this procedure in which Hegel makes connections between dissimilar events in order to prove preconceived concepts of historical progression. This "Schematismus" (ibid. 110) relies on an essentially false premise, according to Gutzkow: Hegel sees the events of history as the result of "logische Ideen" (ibid. 109) that have no direct relation to the actual events they supposedly engender. According to Gutzkow, the notion that history results from ideas reduces human involvement from an intrinsic to an accidental role. So although Gutzkow praises Hegel for advancing the analysis of historical

[1] Gutzkow originally titled this work Zur Philosophie der Geschichte. He changed the title when he incorporated the work into his Gesammelte Werke in 1845 and retained the change in the 1876 edition of the Ges. Werke, vol. 12, that I cite. Cf. Rasch 1: 85.

events, he ultimately views Hegel's conclusions negatively because there is no allowance for individual action outside the framework of "logical ideas."

But Gutzkow still adheres to the conception that there is some sort of framework beyond individual impulses that guides human activity. He expresses this only warily, so that it is difficult to elucidate exactly what this framework is or the extent to which any individual's actions are determined by prior history. He claims, for example, "Ohne Zweifel liegen Gesetze in der Geschichte, aber es sind Gesetze, die sich die Geschichte selbst gegeben hat. Ich möchte die Menschen von den Begebenheiten und von den Ereignissen das Individuelle trennen" (Ges. Werke 12: 96). While both of these sentences are vague, their juxtaposition within the same paragraph is especially confusing. Since Gutzkow does not specify what the "laws" of history are or how history "gives itself" these laws, the reader hopes for an articulation in the subsequent arguments. Instead, Gutzkow provides an intended methodology that refers only to events and individuals and sheds no light on the relation of these events and individuals to "laws." Gutzkow also provides no articulation of why he wishes to separate people from occurrences or how this methodology will increase or enhance our understanding of history, human society, or anything else, for that matter. Despite this vagueness, Gutzkow clearly comes out for some sort of overarching conceptual framework that unites past events and persons with each other and with the present. He also reiterates elsewhere in the text his conviction that there is continuity throughout history that transcends individuals. "[...] die Form der Geschichte [ist] nicht Auf- und

Absteigen, nicht der concentrische Kreis oder die Spirale, sondern der epische Parallelismus, bald congruirend, bald divergirend" (ibid. 112). Gutzkow is concerned here with the connotation of historical progress that views it as developing completely new ideas and/or completely discarding old ideas. Gutzkow believes instead in "welthistorischen Ideen" (ibid. 111) that variously recur or are dominant in varying degrees in different time periods. "Epic parallelism" refers to the relationship of these ideas and the historical timeline. Moreover, Gutzkow reaffirms the continuous progression of these converging and diverging lines in a later essay, "Deutschlands Gegenwart" (1841), when he writes: "Die Zeiten gebären sich nie als neu, sondern saugen aus einander ihre Kraft und machen ihre wechselseitigen Resultate zu wechselseitigen Initiativen" (Ges. Werke 10: 182). Here he restates both the conception that history generates change or progress through some unspecified but intrinsic method not necessarily linked to individual action, and the organic notion of historical progression.

The tenet that history is an unfolding development of ideas in the human world, motivated by the essential correctness of these metaphysical concepts rather than by any essentially human characteristic, represents Gutzkow's principle adoption of Hegel's theory of history. This is revealed most explicitly in the comparison between Gutzkow's description in Philosophie der Tat und des Ereignisses first of Hegel's understanding of how the idea produces history, then of his own assessment of the role of the "ideal":

> Sie [die logische Idee bei Hegel] ist mit einem Worte der metaphysische Urstoff, aus welchem sich die Dinge als die Ideen darüber entwickeln, vielleicht Gott selbst, wenn man Beweglichkeit des Geistes genug hat, sich unter diesem Stoffe nichts Ruhendes und Abstractes, sondern ewig Gebärendes und Schaffendes vorzustellen. (Ges. Werke 12: 109)

> Ein göttliches Ideal wohnt in unserer Brust, ein harmonisches Gesetz der Tugend und der Schönheit, bei dem Einen als Gewissen, beim Andern als mystische Intuition. Dies Ideal—das ist vorläufig unser faßbarer Gott, der Urtypus unserer sublimen Begriffe und die Ahnung jener Bilder und Grundlagen der Ideen, die von Anbeginn der Dinge im Schooße der Weltschöpfung ruhten. Und um diesen Typus, diesen Gott, der in uns wohnt, zu erzeugen, leben wir [...]. (ibid. 203)

Gutzkow's concept is distinct from his description of the Hegelian theory in that he tries to locate the ideas within the individual person. Whereas Hegel ascribes the impetus for individuals to engender changes in the public sphere to Spirit, Gutzkow transfers the source of such ideas to the individual, albeit maintaining a divine origin analogous to Hegel's. Historically significant ideas ultimately reside in God and underlie history from its very beginning for both Hegel and Gutzkow, as Gutzkow sees it. In both descriptions God is directly equated with ideas, and these ideas are defined as originary and become tangible also in the physical world. Fritscher's claim that "Gutzkow greift [...] philosophisch in die voridealistische Zeit der Aufklärung [...] zurück" (75) and that Gutzkow's emphasis on the individual represents his "antihegelsche Sichtweise" (76) entirely overlooks the movement from idea to physical world.

Despite Gutzkow's emphasis on the human role in mediating or materializing these ideas, he clearly conceives of the metaphysical primary to the physical in such a way as to place himself in the tradition of German Idealism. And more specifically, Hegel's influence is clear when we take into consideration Gutzkow's access to Hegel as a teacher, his explicit reference in this essay to Hegel's philosophy of history as the primary starting point of his own theories, and the coincidence of language and concepts describing Hegel's and his own theories.

Gutzkow emphasizes the individual's role in order to circumvent what he sees as the teleological intransigence within Hegel's theory. He believes that Hegel sees necessity in all historical developments to such an extent that he rhetorically asks, "Ist der Weltgeist der Souffleur aller großen Worte gewesen, die von Menschen gesprochen wurden?" (Ges. Werke 12: 110). Gutzkow judges this overdetermination first of all as contradictory to the notion of human freedom, and furthermore claims that Hegel thus allows himself to be misled into casting the contemporaneous Prussian state as the telos of history. Gutzkow's critique drives at very practical repercussions of this teleology rather than criticizing it from a purely methodological standpoint. "Dieser philosophische Schematismus...erzeugt einen indifferenten Quietismus für die gegenwärtige Zeitlage, und selbst wenn dieser richtig wäre, so müßte man ihn bestreiten, weil er der Tatkraft die Sehnen zerschneidet" (ibid.). Gutzkow is pointedly seeking a theoretical underpinning for his conviction that the populace can and must be motivated to change the "contemporary situation of the age." He co-opts Hegel where the latter's theories support his own ends, but is willing to challenge Hegel as well, "even if this [schematism] were

correct."[2]

The emphasis on the individual does represent the significant departure from Hegel on Gutzkow's part because it allows him to conceive of every individual action as potentially historic in the sense of changing social norms. In Gutzkow's treatment, individuals appear to have a more direct, subjective role in determining the progress of history. Focusing on the individual as inherently capable of "making" history with every action circumvents the determinacy in the telos and course of history that Gutzkow criticizes in Hegel's theory. In his most extreme formulations, his emphasis on the individual's role indeed sounds unconstrained by any forces outside the individual's subjective desires. "Die Geschichte ist ein Complex ungezählter Individualitäten, die da kommen und gehen und das Recht haben, in die Wagschale [sic] der Ereignisse zu werfen, was sie wollen [...]" (Ges. Werke 12: 95). Gutzkow subsequently curtails significant or relevant history from this "Complex ungezählter Individualitäten" to "der moralische Mensch...in seiner Beziehungen zur Tat und zum Ereigniß" (ibid. 115). He consistently points to these two aspects of historically important individuals—not only that they take action, but that they also act on the basis of an ideal ethics. He claims, for example, "die Geschichte beginnt nicht mit dem ersten Menschen, sondern mit dem ersten Charakter. Ihr Signal ist die erste Tat" (ibid.). Here he conflates the active with the ethical individual so that truly historical activity occurs only

[2] Werner Storch overlooks the importance of the active role Gutzkow provides to individuals and hence overemphasizes Gutzkow's allegiance to Hegel on this point: "Durch dieTat oder die Kunst vermag das Genie die Antinomie des Seienden und Seinsollenden aufzulösen. Der Kerngedanke dieser Theorie war hegelisch; die Einheit zwischen Dichter und Held lag für Hegel darin, daß beide der einen Gesetzesmäßigkeit des Geschichtsverlaufes unterworfen waren, gleichsam Marionetten des Weltgeistes" (65). Gutzkow counters the notion of the artist as a "puppet" when he underscores the capacity of the artist to act.

upon the emergence of "character." As in his reference to the "laws" of history, Gutzkow omits any specification of what comprises "character" or "the moral individual." This indeterminacy reserves the potential for any person to assume the necessary attributes to become historically effective, thus potentially allowing anyone and everyone to participate in "making" history. Furthermore, Gutzkow can use this open definition of such a person in conjunction with historical perspective to characterize actual individuals from the historic record as such moral, active persons. In the concluding pages of Philosophie der Tat he then describes the process of history in terms of artistic production: history is "ein roher Block. Darum schlagen, drechseln, formen wir an diesem Kloß des Daseins [...], wir [formen und meißeln] an der äußern Form des Daseins [und es wird] die vollendete Statue eines Charakters" (ibid. 202-03). Gutzkow promotes the agent of historical change as an artist who creates a work of art that embodies "character." Thus the artist imbues the work with character in the process of creation, implying that this person has "character," and the statue then also represents "character" to potentially compel changes in ethical behavior among the audience. Gutzkow thereby implies an elevated role for artists among the individuals who "make" history.

In keeping with his conception of history as nearing and receding from the ideal, Gutzkow subsumes both positively and negatively connoted moral actions under "character," although his obvious emphasis is on the positive. Not only does the inclusion of both poles as motivation for action account for changing correspondences between actual world and ideals over time, but this polarity also enables the definitions of ethical norms to shift and hence cause temporal progress:

> Der Zweck der Geschichte ist der moralische Lebenszweck, die Tugend oder das Laster [...]. Die Hebel, Formen und Voraussetzungen des Lebens, ich meine jener moralischen und bewußten Existenz des Einzelnen, nutzen sich ab und verlangen durch die Geschichte neue Veränderungen. [...] Jeder Moment der Geschichte is in sich abgerundet und vollständig. Scheint ihm etwas zu fehlen, so ist es gerade das, was das zeitgenössische Individuum aus den Hülfsmitteln seiner Tugend und seines Genies zu ersetzen hat. (ibid. 145)

If, as Gutzkow asserts, every moment of history is essentially complete, there is no possibility for development, either for better or for worse. But by shifting emphasis onto the individual, Gutzkow incorporates a subjective assessment in which the historical moment "appears" to the individual acting at that moment to be deficient in some way. The active individual tries to correct this lack based on a personal conception, or interpretation, of the moral ideal. Hence movement comes into Gutzkow's conception of the historical moment. Since the ethical norms are the concurrent "causes, forms, and preconditions" for any changes, as Gutzkow formulates it here, and the translation of ethical ideals from the metaphysical to physical realm relies on an individual, progress or movement can only come about through individual initiative.

Gutzkow also provides for varying degrees of effectiveness of individual action depending upon whether a given historical epoch has a well-defined character or whether it is considered a "transition period" ("Übergangszeit"). He depicts such transition periods as alienating and unreal to those living through them, and yet these conditions also make the social body especially receptive to revelations of a "fingierte neue Welt" (Ges. Werke 12: 179). That is,

the activity of enacting the ideal for the actual world acquires enhanced efficacy during these transition periods. Such conditions also conspire to provoke "die eigentümlichste Charakterentwicklung" (ibid. 181) on the part of individuals. The transition periods thus provide Gutzkow with an explanation of historical moments of radical change and a cause for such change that accords with his notion of the primary role of individuals.

Gutzkow's remarks on transition periods are connected with his theories about the function of literature, since he claims that literature has the same heightened effectiveness for change as active individuals do. Literature and philosophy provide the exclusive means during such chaotic times for grasping what is happening in the "Außenwelt" (ibid. 179) and for proclaiming the "fabricated new world." Indeed, Gutzkow claims in an article intended for the first issue of his journal Deutsche Blätter (1835) that literature replaces action in such times: "Wir müssen Etwas thun, was Ersatz ist für Das, was wir thun könnten. Es muß wenigstens eben so groß sein, wie unsere Vorstellung. Wir ergreifen die Feder" (Beiträge II, 169). Needless to say, Gutzkow conceived of the 1830's as just such a transition period, as described in Philosophie der Tat und des Ereignisses. Through his literary works he hoped to both enlighten his readers as to the conditions in the "external world" and provoke change through his action of proselytizing a "fabricated new world."

Gutzkow's adaptation of Hegel's aesthetics follows the model of the philosophy of history in accepting Hegel's basic premise but emphasizing individual acts over generalized forces. He subscribes to Hegel's underlying assumption that art communicates ideas of direct relevance for the audience's society, but his comments on the role of the individual artist and his disregard

for traditionally reified formal constraints for literary works show that he does not ascribe wholeheartedly to Hegelian aesthetics. As shown in the previous chapter, Hegel presents a self-engendering process of transformations in aesthetic form that parallels, and at times motivates, social changes through history. While he also sees a progressive decline in the autonomous construction of the aesthetic work, he does not advocate such a disruption of form (14: 235ff.). Gutzkow's theory of transition phases, rather than a teleological progression of history, as well as his belief in the individual's potential to effect social change, induces him to advocate a more direct influence of artistic works than Hegel does. As an alternative to Hegel's "end of art" and recourse to argumentative prose, Gutzkow incorporates argumentation into his literary works.

**II. Functional Literature**

In order to see Gutzkow's fictional works as an attempted synthesis of argumentation directed at his audience and the construction of autonomous aesthetic form, I will examine his theoretical distinctions on the varying functions of journalism and literature. He generally uses the term "journalism" when referring to non-fictional writings from literary criticism to essays, and considers fictional works "literature." Gutzkow's desire to expand the definition of literature to include topics and forms traditionally found in argumentative prose, as well as his advocacy and practice of journalism, raise questions about why he so stridently promotes the literary mediation of ideas as the best means of influencing society. It might seem more consistent with his

own literary theory and practice for him to be in agreement with Hegel on the potential of argumentative forms of writing to engender social change and thus favor journalism over fiction. He does continue to support journalistic forms as a complement to literary works, but he nevertheless describes a distinction between these genres in terms that envision a greater social efficacy for fictional works than journalism. Gutzkow prefers literature for both pragmatic and theoretical reasons. Contrary to Hegel's idealistic notion that philosophical texts should be more influential than any other kind of text, the German literary public in the 1830's and 1840's read vastly more literary than scholarly works, and even more books than journals. Moreover, literature did allow authors to "smuggle" ideas past censors by using (ostensibly) fictitious characters and situations, whereas such ideas in argumentative prose may have caused serious repercussions for the author. Gutzkow is also committed to literature for theoretical reasons. He believes that only literature gives adequate opportunity for the individual as genius to express the truth. Gutzkow also claims that during transition phases, the literary work is uniquely effective for engendering the social changes that give such periods their historical importance. He thus presents the author of literary works with the theoretical capacity to effectively influence public opinion in the same way he presented the individual with the ability to effect historical change.

Gutzkow transposes from his philosophy of history to his aesthetics the theory that society-changing events begin with concepts. Already in the first article of his first journal, Gutzkow proclaims a prominent role for literature in society. "[...] wie sehr das Leben und die Literatur getrennt sind, so wird es um so notwendiger, [die] Feder in den Strom des Lebens zu tauchen [...].

Hinwiederum würd' es aber töricht und ungerecht sein, behaupten zu wollen, die gegenwärtige Literatur wäre so durchaus tot und wirkungslos und vom Leben entfernt" (Estermann, Literatur-Zeitschriften 5: 32). Gutzkow expresses his pessimism here about the ineffectiveness of contemporary literature to influence "life," but does not conceive of literature in general as potentially ineffective. Even before admitting that contemporaneous literature is not as "completely dead and ineffective" as some might believe, he champions a reorientation of literature rather than its demise. Gutzkow advocates the social relevancy of literature repeatedly and stridently, but especially in a series of texts from 1835. In his open-letter in which he defends his novel Wally, die Zweiflerin, for example, he claims that there are no means other than words for changing society, and "keine schlagenderen als die der Poesie" (Wally 158). In the essay "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit," which he incorporated into Wally, Gutzkow maintains that literature provides the oppositional, ideal, and true construct of society: "Es baut sich eine Wahrheit der Dichtung auf, der in den uns umgebenden Institutionen nichts entspricht, eine ideelle Opposition, ein dichterisches Gegenteil unsrer Zeit [...]" (ibid. 131). His conception of the "truth of poetics" defines the truth value of literature unambiguously as a counter to existing society, a model that serves to orient the audience toward the ideal. But he writes his most direct discussion of the effectiveness of literature in an article for his journal Deutsche Revue. Here he claims that literature must do more than be the "Spiegel des Nationallebens" (Beiträge 2: 166ff.). The main task now is to motivate the masses: "Man warnt vor einer aristokratischen Literatur. Ich meine, man sollte vor einer Literatur warnen, die den Massen schmeichelt" (ibid. 168); and "Ich glaube, daß nur diejenige

Literatur von Wert ist, welche der Masse imponiert" (ibid. 171). Here he instrumentalizes literature as an incitement to action on the part of the "masses" of readers. Gutzkow clearly views literature as providing the ideal as well as the motivation for social change through a strategy of confrontation rather than flattery. The connection to his theory of history manifests itself here too in the slogan, cited above, that during transitional periods the literary text influences society just as does an individual: "Wir ergreifen die Feder."

Gutzkow's emphasis on the individual in his philosophy of history appears in his aesthetics not only as an empowerment of even solitary works, but also in his conception of the author as genius ("Genie"). He maintains that although the author initially draws on concepts from philosophy, literature thrives principally upon subjective contributions. "Dies ist ein Gesetz der Literaturgeschichte: Nach der Blutstockung der Systeme springen die subjektiven Adern. Einzelne Köpfe arrondieren sich gerade so weit im Systeme, als es nötig ist, um einen gewissen Zusammenhang in seinen Ideen zu haben; das weitere Band ist der Charakter, die Laune, der subjektive Einfall" (Ges. Werke 12: 113). Gutzkow reiterates the cyclical progression of history for literary history as well, so that periods of stagnation are succeeded by periods of "release" impelled by the subjective contributions of individuals. While Gutzkow does not explicitly label the author a genius in this passage, he repeatedly refers in his essay Goethe im Wendepunkt zweier Jahrhunderte to the figure of the genius in the context of the author who instigates social change. He claims, in fact, "es gibt genug Dichter, die ihre Nation beglückt haben," but goes on to elevate the genius as potentially even more effective than such authors (Ges. Werke 12: 40 and ff.). He conceives of the genius as

having the revolutionary capacity that he intimated for the author in Philosophie der Tat. Gutzkow thus asserts that the genius not only raises the implied baseness of the masses ("Masse," "Menge") to a condition more attuned to the ideal represented in the content of the work ("Inhalt"; ibid. 63), but also thereby propels the progression of history: "Das Genie [...] kostet die Menschheit etwas. Da muß immer ein Stück Religion, Philosophie oder Wissenschaft zu Grunde gehen. Diesen Schaden wird das Genie freilich später aus seinen Mitteln ersetzen" (ibid. 78). Gutzkow makes the genius-author responsible for superceding the past with subjective, yet contemporaneously appropriate conceptions of basic cultural norms in "religion, philosophy, and science." He also maintains elsewhere that "die poetische Wahrheit offenbart sich nur dem Genius" and that the genius is always ahead of the times (Wally 130). In other words, the genius's literary works transform society by introducing new concepts in an effective way to the broadest cross-section of the populace.

Despite repeated references to the "masses, " Gutzkow targets his ideas toward a specifically bourgeois population when he establishes literature as the means for reforming society. He essentially believes that promulgating his ideas widely among the bourgoisie, who were economically able to purchase books or journals and had the leisure to read them, will ultimately result in their acceptance as a political program, or at least in a public debate over their merits. This perception of how literature influences political discourse testifies to the continued applicability in the 1830's of the model Jürgen Habermas has described for 18th century Germany. He argues that the bourgeoisie, excluded from political power by class, institutionalized public opinion as a

legitimization of their rationally-grounded critique of political and social structures. Habermas singles out literature as especially effective for transposing the rational order of the bourgeois family, which underlies this critique, into the public sphere: "Sobald sich die Privatleute [...] die öffentliche Gewalt in ihrem gemeinsamen Interesse bestimmen möchten, dient die Humanität der literarischen Öffentlichkeit der Effektivität der politischen zur Vermittlung" (121). Literary representation of "humane" alternatives to aristocratic arbitrariness in regulating society influence public opinion with the potential to become popularly accepted as a rationally articulated critique of the *status quo*. Gutzkow's literary theory, which I elucidate below, ascribes to this transposition of ideas presented through literary works into politically intended social criticism.

Gutzkow had very practical reasons for believing that literary works were more effective than non-fictional prose at communicating his ideas to the widest possible audience. Hegel could project which literary forms would be successful, and even whether literature was an appropriate genre in which to undertake a debate of public issues at all. For Gutzkow it was paramount that his ideas be widely disseminated in order to have the greatest possible effect on public opinion. In articles such as his opening essay of the Forum and "Literarische Industrie" (Beiträge 1: 1-22) among others, Gutzkow is clearly aware of the radical growth of the literary market. And even if he does not see this growth in completely positive terms, he clearly favors quantity over quality for better assuring that the kinds of works he theorizes get published (Beiträge 1: 21). In addition to the sheer numbers of people he can reach through literary works, Gutzkow also views literary form as a means for articulating ideas that

would be censored if not related as a hypothetical or fictive belief. Both of these positions can be corroborated, especially for the 1830's and early 1840's.

Sibylle Obenaus has described the radical increase in publishing during the *Vormärz* (1815-1848). In the seventeen-year period between 1821 and 1838, the number of books published increased 150%, an expansion twice as rapid as that at either the end of the 18th or the end of the 19th centuries (44). This increase in book production continued even beyond 1838, peaking with the publication of 14,039 titles in 1843, as compared to 4,505 titles published in 1821 (ibid.). Significantly, books under the rubric of the "Schöne Künste und Wissenschaften" comprise the largest single category of book publications, and novels make up the greatest portion by far of this category (44-45). These numbers greatly outweigh the publication of journals, which only doubled in number from 1826 (371 titles) to 1848 (688 titles) and did not even approach the level of 1790 (1,225 titles; 57). Moreover, journals tended to be issued in fewer copies (ibid.). While Obenaus names Gutzkow's Telegraph für Deutschland (1838-1843) as an especially successful journal that allowed him to address a general public beyond the confines of literary circles for many years (59), books, especially novels, represented the greatest potential for widely disseminating one's ideas among the reading public.

In spite of the tribulations involved in publishing a book that aimed at having social relevancy, books were censored much less rigorously than journals. Books of over 320 pages in length were exempted from approval by the censor prior to publication, although they could still be confiscated and banned after appearing in stores (Obenaus 50). Books also profited from the influence or wiliness of publishers, from inconsistencies in censorship

regulations in the various German states, and of course from the potential for authors to profess the literary autonomy of their fictitious work over against actual events or people—a strategy Gutzkow employed in defending Wally (149ff.). Journals, on the other hand, required a government license in order to begin publication, and the number of journals allowed to discuss political events was severely restricted. Journals found to overstep the line between literary discussions and political commentary had their license revoked or, as Gutzkow and fellow Young German author Ludolf Wienbarg experienced in trying to publish two different journals in 1835, rescinded on the basis of a preview of the first issue by the censor.

Literary form provided not only the best strategy for attracting readers, but also for circumventing censorship of one's works. Walter Hömberg has labeled this dual strategy on the part of the Young Germans as the "Lock- und Tarnfunktionen" (32-33) of literary form. Literature encourages readers because a storyline allows easier access than an argumentative essay, and similar argumentation can be woven into the fictional action. While the publication numbers show that readers were more inclined toward literary works, the attempts to hoodwink censors into passing books unedited met with mixed results. The ban on publishing issued by the Bundesversammlung in 1835 against seven Young German writers—including Gutzkow, and instigated in great part by the scandal over Wally—represents the most radical example of the failure of this strategy. And while Gutzkow found ways to continue publishing despite the ban, many of his subsequent works were subjected to

censorship and prohibited in various German states.[1] Nevertheless, the plethora of works Gutzkow published in the 1830's and 1840's is a testimony to the potential for success of this practice.

Gutzkow also theorizes that "Ideenschmuggel" appeals to readers more than argumentative prose. He writes to Georg Büchner: "Treiben Sie wie ich den Schmuggelhandel der Freiheit: Wein verhüllt in Novellenstroh, nichts in seinem natürlichen Gewände: ich glaube, man nützt so mehr, als wenn man blind in Gewehre läuft, die keineswegs blindgeladen sind" (Büchner 398). The strategy of using literature to articulate political ideas appears here as a means of avoiding the weapons wielded by the authorities, but also to communicate ideas that are unusual and intoxicating. But in his first novel, Briefe eines Narren an eine Närrin, Gutzkow ties subversive communication more closely to literature as its necessary form when he claims: "Der Ideenschmuggel wird die Poesie des Lebens werden" (190). This statement appears acontextually in a lengthy reflection on the potential of truth to be broadly disseminated by word of mouth. Gutzkow's images of neighbors leaning out their windows in discussion and farmers in intimate conversation at the mutual border of their properties hints at a causal reversal from the apparent intention of the quote: rather than the smuggling of ideas becoming the poetics of life, the poetics of life—the passing along of news, as Gutzkow indicates with the metaphor of passing water buckets down a line toward a burning house—becomes the smuggling of ideas. This image articulates a correspondence between literary

[1] Sammons summarizes the more notable struggles Gutzkow had in bringing his novels and plays to the public after 1835 (27). For a more detailed account of the ban on publications by the Young German authors, see Houben, Jungdeutscher Sturm und Drang, 42-85.

form and daily discourse that intimates a universal comprehensibility of poetics as the smuggling of ideas. By clearly marking this discourse as poetics, however broadly conceived, Gutzkow also promotes literature as especially facilitative of mediating subversive ideas.

Gutzkow also provides theoretical arguments for selecting fictional forms to effect social critique when he draws a distinction between journalism as negative criticism and fiction as a positive representation of ideals. He asserts this difference when he disparages the negative intentions of current literary works:

> Es ist eine Literatur der Negation in Anzuge, welche Alles zerbröckelnd und auseinander schälend, die Schranken der Objektivität niederreißen will, und Alles auflöst in Reflexion. Das Urteil und die Meinung sind an die Stelle der Kunst getreten. Hier ist der Punkt, wo die jüngere Generation die Fortführung unserer literarischen Interessen übernehmen wird. Bis hieher sind wir im Augenblick gekommen, bis zu dem Grundsatze: die kritische Periode ist vorüber. (Phönix 22)

Gutzkow's distinction between journalism and literature is exposed here as a difference in what I will term mode. Journalism engages in negative criticism, pointing out flaws and advocating remedies. He opposes art to rational argumentation by characterizing "Urteil," "Meinung," "Literatur der Negation" and "kritisch," as inconsistent with his notion of literature as the positive articulation of ideals, as "ideele Opposition." This is not to say that literature, in order to be considered art, should abandon the social criticism he so vehemently advocates; he clearly represents art in this passage as regaining an "objective" basis and capable of articulating the Young German program,

"unsere literarischen Interessen." Gutzkow implies instead that literature should articulate social criticism in the form of a positive representation of alternative social practices, as he described in reference to the literary productions of the genius. This division between direct, negative criticism in journalism and literary construction of ideals as implicit criticism allows him not only to distinguish between the functions of these kinds of texts, but also to establish both endeavors as complementary: "Unsre junge Generation hat die Aufgabe, positiv zu verfahren, selbst zu schaffen; zu lärmen und zu perhorrescieren würde ihr schlecht stehen. Da ich mich selbst zu ihr rechne, so schlendr' ich als Kritiker gemütlich fort, ohne viel Aufhebens zu machen [...]" (ibid. 24). The apparent contradiction here between being positive and constructive on the one hand and a critic on the other is resolved as he develops his ideas about the continuing role of journalism in spite of his belief that the critical period is over.

Gutzkow establishes the early 1830's as the heyday of the effectiveness of journalistic criticism. He devotes his first article as the editor of the literary supplement of the Phönix (January 7, 1835) to a defense of the role of criticism for German literature and an argument that this role ought to be superceded by literature itself. The main function of criticism at this time was to free modern readers and writers from an inappropriate "Anbetung" and "Despotismus des Ruhms" (21) regarding the works of Classical German literature. "Sie [die Kritik] übernahm einen ununterbrochenen Feldzug gegen die Herrschaft des Ruhms und die Prahlerei des Elends [...]. Universell, Allem vertraut, mit dem Rückhalt einer imposanten Keckheit, einer frischen Gedankenfülle, und um gewandte Ausdrucke nicht verlegen, mußte sie überall siegen" (22). Gutzkow

recognizes two effects of this criticism. First, it consistently promulgated the message that German Classicism did not represent the ultimate pinnacle of German literary production. Gutzkow wants to communicate not only that authors should reorient themselves away from literary models of the past, but also that the "victory" of criticism enabled a renewed focus on writing literary works instead of journalism. And second, literary criticism championed such emancipated literature as the source for new and exciting ideas. According to Gutzkow, this period of criticism had the effect of training readers: "in Sachen des literarischen Urteils [ist] eine solide öffentliche Meinung verbreitet" (ibid.). He thus claims that criticism has achieved its purpose of wiping out the uncritical attitude of the public toward German Classicism and replacing this attitude with a set of faculties for adequately appraising literature, especially contemporary works.

The distinction between journalistic and literary functions allows Gutzkow to continue to call for the continued production of both forms rather than the replacement of journalism by literature. He writes in the program for his journal Deutsche Blätter für Leben, Kunst und Wissenschaft (1835) that literary criticism, and journalism more generally, still provides a forum for educating readers about how ideas are mediated by literature: "[Die Deutschen Blätter] werden ihre Leser vertraut machen mit Begriffen, welche für die Literatur eine neue Phase bilden, sie werden ihren Stoff von den Erscheinungen in der öffentlichen wie der Bücherwelt nehmen, bis eine weitere Verständigung möglich ist [...]." (Estermann, Zeitschriften 53). Gutzkow claims here that journals introduce the conceptual discourse about literature to their readers, and also thereby advance the mediation of ideas through literary works

themselves. He defines the content of both genres as topics in "the public as well as literary worlds" to likewise allow journalistic discussions to prepare the reception of the same themes in literary form.

With this distinction Gutzkow apparently intends to argue for the autonomy of aesthetic representations. He has claimed that both journalism and literature have the same content and differ only in their respective modes of negative criticism and positive representation of ideals. This difference in modes is not the formal distinction between the two genres that Gutzkow implies, however. It is easy to conceive of literary works that incorporate criticism as well as journal articles that include descriptions of ideals; indeed, Gutzkow himself wrote both of these kinds of texts. He never expressly mentions the obvious formal difference between the two that his differentiation implies, namely the non-fictionality of journalistic criticism and the fictionality of literature. Journalism functions effectively as criticism because it cites verifiable facts for argumentation, whereas representing the ideal alternatives to the social order demands a fictional depiction of intangible and unproven ideas. Gutzkow's distinction thus appears to define literary representations as autonomous constructs in opposition to journalistic citations of reality.

But Gutzkow avoids articulating this difference of modes in terms of the autonomy of the literary work because elements of his literary theory contradict such a status for fictional works. Without reference to the genre distinction he has articulated, Gutzkow argues for broadening the criteria for judging a work as literature. He advocates an orientation around content over one tied to form, which undermines the apparent autonomy from the historical world that constituted traditional literary forms. His criteria explicitly include didactic

features that refer to events or ideas that lie outside the narrative frame of the literary work. Gutzkow also asserts that literary works coerce to some extent an intended interpretation, or in other words, they direct the readers toward a relatively uniform understanding of the ideas they communicate.

Gutzkow portrays the tradition of autonomous aesthetics as responsible for the irrelevance of literary works for society. He even objects to Schiller's and Goethe's adherence to traditional forms, even though he generally regards their works as relevant and effective in a social sense ("Goethe im Wendepunkt" 74). But he is never specific regarding the extent to which formal constraints should be followed or ignored. Instead, he promotes an individualized use of form for each writer that subsumes formal rules to issues of content. "Stil und Abwechselung geht beim Siege des Systems verloren. Emancipation vom System ist Fortschritt" (Philosophie der Tat 113). While Gutzkow refers to philosophical ideas when he cites the "system" here, he is talking more about form than content. For he does not wish to eliminate philosophy from literature, but rather seeks to free literary discourse so it can incorporate such ideas in a broader conception of both the content and form of literature.

When Gutzkow claims that literature provides an "ideal opposition" to reality, he is arguing for its didactic function. In keeping with his characterization of an ideal opposition, Gutzkow envisions literary works as providing an orientation for the future, and they "instruct" in the sense of suggesting the potential ways of achieving these ideal goals in society. "Die poetische Wahrheit ist schöpferisch. Sie baut mit den geheimsten Fäden der menschlichen Seele, sie combiniert nicht, wie der Staat, die Familie, die

Religion, die Sitten und das Herkommen combinieren, sondern revolutionär. Die poetische Wahrheit offenbart sich nur dem Genius. Dieser lauscht niedergestreckt auf den Boden der Wirklichkeit und hört, wie in den innersten Getrieben der Gemüter eine embryonische Welt mit keimendem Bewußtsein wächst" (Wally 130). Gutzkow addresses both how literature presents an argument and how the author draws on a visionary yet contemporaneously relevant material. He elaborates on both these theses in attempting to describe the literary work as capable of instituting social change. Gutzkow claims first that literature "creates" and "builds," that is, constructively changes its audience. Moreover, literature utilizes the same logical or argumentative method used by societal institutions such as the state, the family, or even the code of ethical norms;[2] only literature is capable of a more radical, and presumably more effective, "revolutionary" influence on individuals than these other agencies. Second, Gutzkow also claims that the genius author, in expressing "poetic truth," provides the mediating link between the ideal future and the actual present society. Literature is thus constructive for its audience in an evangelical sense, as the revelation of the truth and the future by the author as visionary priest, and Gutzkow indeed describes this function in exactly such terms. Both of these aspects have their synthesis in Gutzkow's wish for a "Bible" for modernity.

Gutzkow first delineates the capability of literature to create group identities or allegiances based on common beliefs, and only later argues that like-minded authors need to form parties to further encourage their spread in

[2] "Combinieren" is not listed in Grimm, but is defined in the Duden Großes Fremdwörterbuch (1994) as "[gedanklich] miteinander verbinden, schlußfolgern, mutmaßen" (740).

the general populace. In Goethe im Wendepunkt Gutzkow claims that popularizing and critical trends began in the latter half of the 18th century, and these trends have enabled literature to encourage the development of "interest groups." "Parteiung tritt an die Stelle der exoterischen Andacht; die Interessen ziehen Schaaren von Beteiligten und Verbündeten nach sich und die Literatur wird das Vehikel dieser Interessen. Allmählich werden die, welche lesen, die Faktoren des Schriftwesens; die Bücher nähern sich den Briefen..." (46). As literature becomes more accessible, it inevitably engenders groupings among its readers, a development that encourages the conscientious use of literature to promote specific "interests." Writers thus not only express their ideas in more direct forms to their audience, but they also write with their audience in mind. Eight years later Gutzkow has moved from the mere description of what he sees as a historical development in literature to the advocacy of party-building as a goal of literature. "Überzeugt man sich nun auf den ersten Blick, daß die gegenwärtige deutsche Literatur, soweit sie ein allgemeines Interesse anspricht, in Parteien zerfallen ist, so bedarf es kaum einen zweiten, um sich zu überzeugen, daß diese Parteien sich selbst nicht begreifen" (Estermann, Literatur-Zeitschriften 6: 247). While the "interests" expressed through literature still lead to the development of parties, Gutzkow now decries a lack of awareness on the part of writers that group solidarity could promote their causes. He thus advocates seeking "Wahrheit unserer Zeit nur bei der Partei" and defines an effective party as one that exhibits unity ("Einheit;" ibid.). The obvious intention of this partisanship among authors is to bring about a similar solidarity in the parties created through literature.

Because he hopes that literature can ultimately align these parties into a

unified political movement, Gutzkow pines for a Bible for modernity in Philosophie der Tat. He downplays the conception of the Bible as the kind of revelation "wo ein visionäres Prinzip die verworrensten Phantasieen rechtfertigte," in favor of the Bible as a "Gesetzbuch" and "Bildungsbuch" (154). At the same time he is careful not to preempt the authority of the Bible as revelation, since this would annul its function of preordaining the future. Instead, Gutzkow claims that medieval Catholic exegesis encouraged the reading of Biblical stories in a fantastic light, and it was Luther's service to return this exegesis "in die kanonische Gleise der Vergangenheit" (ibid.). Gutzkow's notion of a Bible for modernity thus depends on the content of such a book being accepted as the authoritative code of law which could assure a "happier" societal organization: "Hätte der Liberalismus ein Gemeingesetz, wie die Bibel, ein Werk der Berufung, eine gemeinschaftliche Auslegungsquelle, so lägen die modernen Zustände mit lachenderen Aussichten da" (154-55). As "general law" this codex would create a more stable society, Gutzkow argues, because such a Bible would inculcate in its readers new social norms. Since this ideal work is unattainable, Gutzkow sees modernity forced to rely on partisanship.

Gutzkow never catalogues these "interests" or develops a program, but he does justify the authenticity of these interests as "truth" by portraying the author-genius as attuned to the future. Hömberg, among others,[3] notes how this missionary role of the author allows the Young Germans to legitimize a "desired and ordained" future (gewollt und gesollt; 31)—that is, a program rather than a mere vision of the future. Gutzkow ascribes a flexibility to this

[3] Cf. Bliemel 146-48; Wülfing 279-81.

agenda by linking it to contemporaneous ideals. He thus reassures his readers, "Gleichaltrige Jugend, du hast einem treuen Kastellan die Schlüssel deiner Luftschlösser übergeben" (Phönix 24). And below this passage he unifies the author's missionary role more generally with the ideals of his audience: "Ich verkünde nichts, als Eure Evangelien: Eure Götter sind die meinen; die Arbeit dieser Blätter ist ein Cultus, in welchem ich, als Priester, die Opfer verrichten will!" (ibid.). By linking popularly projected solutions to problems in current affairs and the authority of the author as the prophet of the future, Gutzkow lends to the properly-themed literary work a prescriptive function.

By thus proposing an authorial voice that speaks directly to the reader from within the narrative frame, Gutzkow reaffirms the capacity for literary works to use argumentative rhetorical strategies. He thereby undermines the strict genre classifications he theorizes for argumentative and idealistic modes of social criticism. This contradiction indicates an aporia in his beliefs about the potency of literary texts to effect social change. Gutzkow wants the "best" of both genres: the popular appeal that derives from the reader's perception of the literary work as fictional and autonomous, as well as the argumentative capabilities of non-fictional journalism. His proposed solution to this aporia—to give the literary work the status of the Bible and the author the role of prophet—represents his solution to Hegel's thesis on the "end of art" as well. Hegel claimed that after the decline of Greece, art necessarily lost its capacity to immediately motivate a socially relevant reception or, if it used argumentation, lost its status as art and became theological or philosophical prose. Gutzkow in essence agrees that the autonomous literary work cannot compel a politically relevant reception when it departs from his implied equivalence of modes and

genres. But he reasserts the suggestive appeal of literature through the use of an authorial voice masquerading as a part of the narration. This strategy allows him to argue for his beliefs in the literary work while maintaining some appearance of aesthetic autonomy. Although Gutzkow never explicitly articulated this method of "Ideenschmuggel" in his theoretical writings, his fictional works of the 1830's and 1840's confirm this tactic in his literary praxis.

### III. Gutzkow's Strategy of Literary (Self-)Reflexivity

As a repercussion of the increasing importance of philosophical discourse, Hegel theorizes that post-Classical art no longer represents object reality, but instead provides a form for presenting concepts into public discourse: "Deshalb verhält sich der Künstler zu seinem Inhalt im ganzen gleichsam als Dramatiker, der andere, fremde Personen aufstellt und exponiert" (14: 235). Artistic form enlivens the mediation of the author's beliefs, but in Hegel's view there is no longer a difference between the content of art or a philosophical essay except in the adequacy of the latter form to persuade its readers. Udo Köster has already pointed to this notion as constitutive of Young German aesthetics: "So siedelten die jungdeutschen Autoren die Kunst auf der Ebene des philosophischen Diskurses an [...]: ihre Romane wurden Reflexionsromane, die die Ergebnisse der Theorie zum Element fiktionaler Schreibstrategien machten" (Literatur und Gesellschaft 139-40). Köster's insight begs specification regarding which theoretical beliefs surfaced as discursive fictional strategies. I have argued that Gutzkow envisions some sort of synthesis between journalistic argumentation and an ostensibly autonomous

narrative frame. This goal did not fail, as Peter Bürgel has claimed, due to a supposed aporia between journalism and fiction that led to journalism as "Kunstersatz" (286).[1] Instead, Gutzkow's theories clearly present themselves in his fictional work as the inclusion of rational arguments that reflect critically on social practices. In the 1830's he crudely inserts journalistic writings into the narrative frame, often without motivating these exhortations in such a way as to maintain the perception of an autonomous aesthetic construction. When he begins writing plays, however, he uses a complex strategy of modelling a mode of critical reception: he includes the social repercussions of drama within his own play with the intention of motivating his audience to respond similarly.

In his study of *mise-en-abyme*, Lucien Dällenbach has specified the self-reflexive function of inserted narratives in the novel. He designates such insertions "fictional *mise-en-abyme*" and claims that they "provide a kind of internal dialogue and a means whereby the work can interpret itself" (55). The inserted text duplicates the actions of the main narrative in order to encourage the audience to interpret these events as having a deeper meaning than mere exposition. The insertion thus draws attention to the reiterated events as well as providing hints for their interpretation. Authors insert such "self-interpretations" in order to provide their own commentary on the surrounding narrative without seeming to issue these pronouncements themselves. Dällenbach singles out Realist authors as the main practitioners who want to present an apparent autonomy of the aesthetic work, but his description is equally valid for Gutzkow: "[F]orbidden from reflexion by contemporary

[1] Cf. Richter 62-63. Both critics dismiss Gutzkow's fiction as unliterary because of its "Tendenz," whereas I have tried to show that Gutzkow himself defined the category of literature in such a way as to combine the genres rather than replace one with the other.

theoreticians who are unanimous in the belief that, in order to be credible, the fiction must feign independence, the author avoids this difficulty by intervening at the level of the characters, allowing him/herself to be heard while still respecting the sacrosanct commandments of 'objectivity' and 'impersonality'" (52). For Gutzkow, as I have shown, both the critical and popular criteria of aesthetic autonomy make these constructions appealing.

I want to use these two quotes to point out a structural difference in Gutzkow's fictional praxis between what I will call reflexive and self-reflexive insertions. Dällenbach focuses on the mirroring or "reflecting" connotation of the term "reflexive" in order to define *mise-en-abyme*. Such insertions are more precisely self-reflexive in the sense of reflecting elements of the surrounding narrative. And although the insertion clearly disrupts the narrative, its content as reflection of the framing narrative can stay within the established frame of the aesthetic work. It is thus an "internal dialogue," it reflects itself rather than referring to anything outside the frame. But the term "reflexive" also connotes reflexion in the sense of "thinking about" something, of "reflecting on" a topic. This kind of insertion has unlimited referentiality since characters can be portrayed as thinking about virtually anything, and they can easily relate disparate thoughts back to elements in the narrative in order to make such thinking appear motivated within the aesthetic frame. Dällenbach understands this type of reflexion as an important element of insertions but ancilliary to his study of *mise-en-abyme*. The phrase "intervening at the level of the characters," however, foregrounds the activity of the author as the instigator of the inserted actions or speeches. Reflexive and self-reflexive insertions thus differ in the scope of their potential content and the degree to which the author is hidden as

the initiator of the reflections.

This difference also affects the potential for the audience to recognize the metanarrative relevance of the insertions. Self-reflexive insertions are more likely to appear relevant only within the literary frame, even though the author is present as the initiator of the disruption to the narrative and as the shaper of the interpretation implied by the reflective insertion. If the viewers or readers recognize this authorial voice, then the construction of reflecting on the literary work within the work itself still engages the audience in a two-part act of interpretation: once they have understood the reading provided for the encompassing work, they can reflect on the pertinence to their world of the ideas presented by this act of interpretation. In the case of reflexive insertions, the characters relate views in the course of the diegesis that often have clear metanarrative relevance, and the progression of the narrative is suspended with greater cost to the appearance of aesthetic autonomy when the characters reflect aloud or otherwise express opinions of tangential relevance to the narrative. This strategy provides a relatively direct mode of address by the author to the audience. These two structures thus differ in their degree of direct appellation to the audience.

Gutzkow uses both of these strategies throughout the 1830's and 1840's with increasing sophistication. In his novels he tends to insert argumentative statements into the mouths of characters that correspond to his own, often publicly expressed opinions. But he also begins to include discussions of literary works that show self-reflexivity. These literary criticisms within the aesthetic work do not correspond exactly to the mirroring construction articulated by Dällenbach of inserted narratives reflecting the framing

narrative. The function is clearly the same, however, on a metanarrative level: Gutzkow reflects on the function of literature within his own literary works in order to provide his readers with information that will guide their interpretation of his work. This form of self-reflexivity, which draws on literary works and themes from beyond the work rather than from the framing narrative, becomes a standard practice in his plays. He still uses reflexive utterances that proclaim his own opinions through the characters of his dramas, but also mediates his ideas about society by promoting interpretive strategies of plays within his plays that orient the audience toward an understanding of the social criticism in his own plays. Thus the shift from narrative to dramatic forms in the 1830's and 1840's is paralleled by the shift from predominantly reflexive to predominantly self-reflexive structures.

His earlier works more commonly exhibit reflexivity, such as having a character direct statements at a conflated figure of the fictional character and the actual reader. Perhaps the most radical example is his epistolary novel Briefe eines Narren an eine Närrin (1832). The epistolary form allows the author to present information under the guise of fiction, but also in a form that Gutzkow's contemporary readers considered intimate and authentic (Nickisch 187ff.). He also underscores this authenticity by opening his book with a preface, written by a gravedigger who purportedly found them, which relates a scholarly furor over the right to write a commentary on them. By setting out only the fool's side of the correspondence, rather than both the fool's and his beloved's, Gutzkow has the fictive letter-writer ostensibly address his beloved while in effect directly appealing to the reader. Gutzkow then issues commentary on political, social, and philosophical topics open to debate,

interspersed with declarations of love, as the content of the letters. These reflections only occasionally become self-reflexive on the topic of literature, and even then he tends to voice programmatic statements: "Wir Deutsche würden mehr Vertheidiger der politischen Freiheit aufweisen können, wenn sie mit unserer Kunst, Wissenschaft und Literatur inniger zusammen hinge" (Narrenbriefe 214). This kind of statement represents a reflexion rather than a self-reflexive structure: he calls here for incorporating political issues into artistic works rather than providing an interpretation of literary works that exemplify such a program, which would be a more authentically self-reflexive strategy. But even in this first fictional work, Gutzkow promotes the politicization of literature within the narrative, but has not yet developed very complex formal means to maintain the illusion of autonomy for the aesthetic work.

His novel Wally, die Zweiflerin, written three years after the Narrenbriefe, already shows self-reflexive strategies that better maintain the division between aesthetic and real worlds. A scene at the beginning of the novel provides a paradigmatic example of this tactic:

> [Wally] blätterte in dem jüngsten Musenalmanach von Schwab und Chamisso. "Diese guten Waldsänger," sprach sie vor sich hin, "nehmen sich die Freiheit, sehr ennuyant zu sein. Wenn uns die Reime nicht in einer Art von melodischer Spannung hielten, die Monotonie der Gefühle und Anschauungen wäre tödlich. Ich ziehe Prosa vor. Heines Prosa ist mir lieber als Uhland und sein ganzer Bardenhain." (9)

By having Wally issue this statement as a monologue to herself, Gutzkow allows the reader to "overhear" her comments just as the chambermaid does,

who is combing Wally's hair in this scene. The citation of authors then provides a set of expectations for the reader as he or she begins the novel: Heine is a model because he can relate interesting ideas in a stimulating way, while Schwab, Chamisso, and Uhland merely make good rhymes. Gutzkow follows this passage with Wally's commentary on a set of books by the Young German authors, thereby further refining the reader's expectations for Gutzkow's text. Gutzkow not only lists Wienbarg, Laube, and Mundt as the principal authors of the group, but also has Wally point out shortcomings in these writers, thereby foretelling the "improvements" that can be expected in Gutzkow's text. Finally, this self-reflexive commentary reinforces the notion of literary communication as ideally suited for mediating ideas and provides his readers with educational statements about literary forms. Prose is preferable to poetry precisely because it affords authors like Heine the opportunity to relate ideas rather than merely produce aesthetically pleasing texts.

But Gutzkow also continues to use appellations to the reader under the guise of addresses to characters in the fictional frame. Book Three of Wally, for example, is entitled "Wallys Tagebuch," and relates Wally's thoughts on the debates regarding religion and morals that comprise the rest of the novel. Like the letters in Narrenbriefe, the diary entries represent a supposedly intimate and authentic communication by the fictitious character in a form of direct address that includes the reader. He further has Wally attach to her diary a "Glaubensbekenntnis" that her ex-lover Cäsar sent to her. Gutzkow not only inserts this declaration in a form of direct statement to the reader, but the essay itself is one that he published in his literary supplement to the Phönix just a few

months before the appearance of Wally.[2] All these examples show how Gutzkow communicates his own beliefs, marked as such by their metanarrative relevance, while attributing them to characters within his prose works.

In 1839 Gutzkow succeeded for the first time in having one of his plays performed. This event marks a turning point in his career, for he ceases to write novels and concentrates almost exclusively on plays. But this shift to a new form for his literary work represents a new attempt to achieve social change through literature. By no means did Gutzkow repudiate his program of the 1830's, as Denkler has implied.[3] His continuous editorship of Der Telegraph für Deutschland from 1838 to 1843, as well as the content of many articles he writes for this journal during this transitional period, reiterates the important critical function he ascribes to journalism. Moreover, he had already written plays in the 1830's that evidence the same strategies for presenting social criticism as his prose works of the period. The works of the 1840's should be seen as the continuation of his program for literature. And yet this shift to drama provokes two questions: What was the lure of the theater that motivated this shift? and How did Gutzkow use reflexive and self-reflexive constructions in his dramatic texts?

The first question is answered by the enormous popular appeal of the theater in the *Vormärz*. Otto-Reinhard Dithmar writes of "der dramatische

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[2] In "Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit," cf. pg. 19 above.

[3] Restauration 258-63. McInnes has noted that the turn to drama did not denote a repudiation of Young German beliefs in addressing socio-political goals through literature. He asserts: "Die Beschäftigung mit einer Institution, die so eng mit dem Hof verbunden war, enthüllt ein reiferes, pragmatisches Anliegen, Reformmöglichkeiten zu verfolgen, die unmittelbarer und dem alltäglichen Leben der Gesellschaft näher waren" (18). While McInnes does not cite examples here, Gutzkow's trend toward self-reflexive rather than reflexive strategies corroborates his claim that Young German drama was more "mature" and pursued their socially critical agenda through more mediated forms of literary address.

Bann" to describe the popularity of the theater among the German population as well as among leading theoreticians of the 1830's (35ff.), and Edward McInnes proclaims that "das Theater [wurde] Zentrum des öffentlichen Interesses und zu einer Leidenschaft, die die verschiedenen Gesellschafts-schichten verband" (15). Socio-economic developments in the German states fueled this growing interest. Theaters were first established in many German cities in the late 18th and early 19th centuries,[4] thus creating the possibility for more people to go to the theater. The increasing numbers of theaters was in turn enabled by growing wealth and a resultant increase of leisure time for larger sections of the populace. In keeping with Habermas's portrayal of the literary market as an alternative to political discourse, these audiences interpreted the ideas and events in the drama with a view toward their relevance for the real world. At the same time, politically engaged writers and thinkers were advocating the theater as the site of their greatest influence. Gutzkow saw himself as part of a tradition dating back to the 18th century of articulating social criticism through the drama. He actively worked to educate his audiences about this tendency by championing such writers and plays in his journalism. Gutzkow thus views the theater as the best means of reaching a broad audience that was potentially receptive to the ideas he was trying to communicate.

I will broach the second question by sketching the peculiar structures that reflexive and self-reflexive tropes take on in the drama. As Peter Szondi has pointed out in his Theorie des modernen Dramas, the autonomy of the dramatic events was a constitutive feature of the Classical play (17). Since this

[4] Cf. F. Michael et. al., Geschichte des deutschen Theaters, 45-75.

formal paradigm dominated German stages of the 19th century as well, dramatists at least oriented themselves around this standard, even if they rarely achieved the ideal, in order to get their plays produced and hopefully to achieve a popular reception. In his dramas Gutzkow thus adapted his strategy of letting characters speak his own thoughts and of discussing literature within the literary frame. I will identify his dramatic strategies as monologic constructions and theater-within-the-theater, respectively. Gutzkow communicates his beliefs through his characters by using what Manfred Pfister has called "Monologhaftigkeit" (180-82), which includes, but is not limited to, the traditional definition of a monologue as a self-addressed speech by a character alone on the stage. Pfister details how even speeches that are addressed to other characters often serve the monologic purposes of informing the audience about topics not intrinsically necessary to the dialogic development of the plot. This diversion from the task of advancing the storyline and the capacity to be explicitly or implicitly structured as direct address from the characters to the audience allow the author of the drama to present ideas with potential metanarrative relevance in a quasi-dialogic form that meets the popular criteria of dramatic autonomy.

Gutzkow also creates theater-within-the-theater, a concrete form of play-within-the-play. Manfred Schmeling defines play-within-the-play in the most inclusive terms possible in his survey of the structure, but notes that these inserted performances function predominantly as "Reflexions- und Potenzierungsmechanismen" (5), regardless of sub-categorizations or marginal forms. The inclusion of theatrical performances within the frame of the play thus inevitably draws attention to the construction of the framing play itself as

a play. As such, the imbedded performance can comment on thematic and/or structural features of the framing play, but also on dramatic construction as such. Theater-within-the-theater, which Schmeling designates as plays that include a stage and audience for the performance of the play-within-the-play, emphasize the "Publikumsrezeption" of the drama (15-16). Gutzkow uses theater-within-the-theater to show his audience the ideal reception of the framed play as a model. Ideally the audience would apply this model for interpreting the framing play and, potentially, plays in general.

The following chapters of this study investigate two plays that exemplify both reflexivity and self-reflexivity. As with his prose works, Gutzkow uses this strategy to varying degrees in all of his dramatic works. His plays about playwrights, however, show the clearest examples of his practices because the character of the dramatist allows him to articulate and judge tenets of dramatic composition with clear metanarrative relevance. They also foreground the effect of the play upon the audience and, in turn, on society, while keeping this discussion within the narrative frame. My readings of Richard Savage (1839) and Das Urbild des Tartüffe (1844) will not only elucidate these structures, but also show how Gutzkow's opinions about the effectiveness of drama and journalism change in the period between the composition of these two plays.

## Chapter 3: Gutzkow Conflicted: Richard Savage

In the preceding discussion I have laid out the importance of sub-textual messages in Gutzkow's writings. I claimed that despite the appearance that he distances himself from Hegel by openly criticizing aspects of his philosophy, Gutzkow's reiteration of the political function of literature derives from Hegelian aesthetics. I used a broad selection of texts that cumulatively exposed how the Hegelian belief in the social relevance of ideas mediated through literature informs his communicative intentions in his literary works. This outlook not only compels a politically oriented interpretation of Gutzkow's works, but also encourages interpreters to look for sub-textual communication as a strategy that pervades his writing. Critics have already articulated censorship as the cause of this strategy,[1] but have focused less attention on the formal repercussions of this strategy within his fictional works. Richard Savage represents an exemplary work for investigating the (self-)reflexive formal methods Gutzkow develops because he dramatizes an episode in the life of a historical playwright. Moreover, Gutzkow borrows another figure from the period, Richard Steele, and thus explores journalistic mediation of ideas as well. I will evaluate how Gutzkow discusses and illustrates the functions of theater and journalism within the play. Such an interpretation is possible only by recognizing the importance of the reflexive and self-reflexive constructions in the play and reading their metanarrative implications in the light of their

[1] All major studies of Young Germany identify censorship as a fundamental influence on the authors' indirect, insinuative style, but R. Rosenberg most clearly describes the cause and effect relationship of censorship and literary style (41-43).

repercussions on the narrative level. The fact that there are so many occurrences of reflexivity that foreground journalism and drama signals an emphasis on the problem of literary mediation that falls outside of the essential plot of the drama. This has the effect of elevating the debate over genre to a focus equivalent to the main storyline, even though this debate contributes only marginally to advancing the plot. The main narrative, on the other hand, is fundamentally important for evaluating statements on the metanarrative level. The dual function of the reflexive statement--that it is relevant both inside and outside the frame of the dramatic action--allows the metanarrative meaning to be interpreted by the effect is has within the play. Likewise, the reception of theatrical performances within the play functions for Gutzkow's audience as negative or positive models depending on their contextualization at the narrative level. Because conflicting notions of the value of journalism and drama are presented, any of these opinions could be taken by an audience unacquainted with his other writings to represent Gutzkow's thought. The metanarrative value of ideas expressed through reflexive comments and self-reflexive performances can only be assessed as an authorial voice by first testing the success of these ideas on the narrative level. In Richard Savage, the uses and effects of journalistic texts and dramatic performances in resolving or exacerbating the conflict between Savage and Lady Macclesfield provide the means for assessing the degree of success to which public-sphere issues can be resolved through these genres. Analyzing the reflexive and self-reflexive constructions in Richard Savage allows for a more complex reading of the figures of Savage and Steele as articulations of Gutzkow's beliefs about the public impact of socially critical drama and journalism, respectively.

Gutzkow uses reflexivity as a way to communicate ideas that are relevant outside the framework of the play. In their metanarrative context, reflexive comments represent the voice of the author. If the reference has meaning outside the frame of the play, then the characters themselves do not intend to evoke such associations. As Szondi has pointed out, the characters cannot have knowledge of any frame of reference outside the fictitious one they themselves create and play out.[2] Any direct relevance of comments by the characters to events or objects outside this frame are either hermeneutically understood by the audience and/or intended to have such metatheatrical relevance by the author. The self-reflexive aspects of the play, however, provide more concrete evidence of the specific reception Gutzkow was seeking for his ideas, and communicate his beliefs about the function of literary forms in advocating and realizing his political program. He includes three characters who put on performances in the play and also engage in discussions about either drama, journalism, or both. The metanarrative interpretation of their opinions tends to corroborate the reception staged in response to the performances of each character, but each character's contribution to the debate over these genres has comparative relevance for the ideas presented by the other characters as well. Gutzkow organizes their statements about the function of literature as a debate by establishing for each character a consistent point of view on the topic. Savage presents a positive representation of the effectiveness of drama, especially in the performance of the play within the play, but also weakens his advocacy of drama through the weakness of his

[2]"Das Drama kennt das Zitat so wenig wie die Variation. Das Zitat würde das Drama aufs Zitierte beziehen [...]. Zudem würde ein Zitierender oder Variierender vorausgesetzt und das Drama auf ihn bezogen" (Schriften I, 18).

character and his failures on the narrative level. Steele not only casts journalism in a positive light but also picks up the slack from Savage and promotes dramatic mediation of ideas as well. Lord Tyrconnel, finally, also reinforces the power of communicating ideas through both drama and press, but shows through his nefarious goals how these genres can be misused.

## I. Richard Savage

Gutzkow depicts the English poet and playwright Richard Savage (1696-1743) in a public feud over the identity of his birth mother. The play begins with Savage's discovery of documentation that proves that Lady Macclesfield, an aristocrat of high status in London society, is his mother. When he presents himself to her, however, she rejects his claims out of hand. Savage becomes obsessed with winning her over, and tries repeatedly to persuade her of his case and to ingratiate himself with her. He indebts himself financially in order to make his appearance and living quarters seemly, sends her copies of his literary works and believes that her attendance at the performance of his play will reconcile them. Instead she feels publicly disgraced by a passage in the play that represents motherhood as a virtue. When Savage tries to see her after the performance, he clashes with her brother-in-law and kills him in a sword fight. Although Lady Macclesfield has every reason to be happy about the death of this leeching brother-in-law, she allows Savage to be arrested and hopes for his death sentence. Savage is instead rescued by one of the Lady's spurned lovers, Lord Tyrconnel, who becomes Savage's benefactor. Savage continues to pine for recognition from Lady Macclesfield, and when Tyrconnel tricks her into

coming to his masked ball and publicly confronting her with the issue of her parentage of Savage, he renounces Tyrconnel's patronage and returns to his original role of impoverished poet. But he is unable to overcome his obsession and wastes away, ultimately dying as Lady Macclesfield admits her identity as his mother too late.

Savage's friends, the journalist Richard Steele and the actress Miss Ellen, are peripherally involved throughout these events. Steele criticizes Savage's growing fixation and comments on the depravity of character and detrimental effects on his literary endeavors it causes. But Steele also works as Savage's advocate, publishing articles in his journal that advocate Savage's case and finally presenting his arguments to Parliament and achieving the verification of his claims. Miss Ellen also tries to aid Savage by appealing directly to Lady Macclesfield to use her influence to urge clemency when Savage is charged with murder, and when this does not work, by appealing directly to the queen. Although they do not ultimately influence the conflict between Savage and Lady Macclesfield, their actions and speeches illuminate the social context and provide insights into the characters of the main plot.

Gutzkow's inspirations for this work have been well documented. Paul Weiglin has found reference in Gutzkow's memoirs of an actual occurrence in Hamburg of a son who was refused recognition by his aristocratic mother (27-28), and notes also that in 1837 the Frankfurt journal Telegraph related the issue in Savage's life in a series of anecdotes (6). Gutzkow then read Samuel Johnson's biography of Richard Savage (1744) and used it as the main source for his play. But Gutzkow was also looking for material that would appeal to the theater-going public in order to establish himself in his new undertaking as

dramatist. In his memoirs he claims:

> Die ästhetische Formengebung beschäftigte mich indessen nicht wenig, ja in solchem Grade, daß ich die Lust und selbst das Vermögen zu eigner Produktion verloren haben würde, [...] wenn mir nicht die Bühne, die mir in Hamburg in ihrer ganzen unmittelbaren Wirkung auf das Gemüt des Volkes entgegengetreten war, ein Heilmittel geworden wäre für meist trübe und entsagende Stimmungen. (Ausgewählte Werke 9: 85-86)

Drama thus began to appeal to him upon his relocation from Frankfurt to Hamburg in late 1837, when both the articles about Savage and the situation of the disowned son in Hamburg were fresh to him. He could also count on a good public response to this material. In a letter to Alexander Weill he defends himself from a claim that he plagiarized a French play on the subject of Savage by referring to the story as "eine bekannte Episode der englischen Literaturgeschichte," (qtd. in Weiglin, 33). Both his assertion that the episode was well-known in Germany, as well as the fact that the story had been dramatized by a contemporary French author and seen or read by a German audience, attest to the popularity of the Savage story. Finally, Richard Steele surely appealed to Gutzkow as a paradigm of the successful journalist. His journal, The Tatler (1709-11), was one of the earliest and most widely read literary journals in England, with an estimated readership of 10,000, and was regarded as a benchmark of good journalism throughout Europe in the 18th century (Basker 320 ff.).

Gutzkow departs from his source material on Richard Savage in ways that illuminate his focus on the influence of drama and journalism. Although

he claims in the introduction to the play that he closely follows Johnson's biography of Savage, Gutzkow actually incorporates only the scandal surrounding Savage's filial claims and attempts to achieve recognition from Lady Macclesfield as her son. Johnson mentions only one play by Savage that received public attention, and focuses instead on Savage's poems, since they constituted the basis of his literary fame. Gutzkow makes little reference to Savage as a poet, representing him instead with a passionate commitment to the theater. Gutzkow also ignores Johnson's assertion that Richard Steele was at least as morally corrupt and financially irresponsible as Savage. Steele instead becomes the moral ideal in comparison to Savage, whose tragic flaws of dissipation and affectations become strikingly apparent. These departures from the biographical information show how Gutzkow pairs Savage and Steele as dramatist and journalist, irresponsible "Schwärmer" and ethical social critic, for purposes of making comparative arguments about the two genres.

Criticism on this text focuses primarily on the extent to which Gutzkow can be identified autobiographically with his characters. Horst Denkler ("Drama der Jungdeutschen" 119) and Friedrich Sengle (Biedermeierzeit I, 185) have both argued that Gutzkow reworks the historical material to make an entertaining play that above all allows him to recreate himself in the role of the socially maligned poet Savage. Their readings entirely ignore the possible connection between Gutzkow and the journalist Steele, and also disregard Gutzkow's representations of the influences texts can have on the public sphere. Paul Weiglin encompasses both these issues when he claims Steele is "der eigentliche Dolmetsch von Gutzkows Ansichten über Literatur und Leben" (16). While this characterization of Steele as the voice of Gutzkow allows

Weiglin to analyze the play as an articulation of the social function of journalism, he is too dismissive of the association between Gutzkow and Savage (14) and of the topic of drama in general. These critics all point out that Richard Savage is a play about the social function of art or journalism, but their focus on the autobiographical elements remain one-sided depictions of Gutzkow as either journalist or dramatist.

Edward McInnes explores the socially critical aspect of Gutzkow's dramas more fruitfully when he concentrates on their historical basis. In a series of publications on Young German drama he claims, "Die Hauptaufgabe des Theaters bestand [...] darin, die fortschreitende Bewegung des historischen Prozesses zu zeigen, das Bewußtsein eines neuen Zeitalters wachzurufen und dadurch dessen Ankunft zu beschleunigen."[1] Here McInnes identifies the strategy by which Gutzkow achieves a future-oriented, prophetic role for literature that incorporates negative criticism rather than a positivistic representation of ideals. "Historische Analogie" (Deutsches Drama 19) allows Gutzkow to critically treat social or political issues in a historical setting to imply that similar conditions in contemporary society need to be overcome. When he turns to Richard Savage, though, McInnes deems the play "a confused but, for the dramatist, highly instructive experiment" because he feels that Gutzkow failed to achieve a formal synthesis between the psychological conflicts within the characters of Savage and Lady Macclesfield on the one hand, and the social origins and repercussions of these conflicts on the other. McInnes thus ignores both his own insights into the function of the historical context as well as the importance of Richard Steele for the social dimensions of

[1] Deutsches Drama 18 and ff. Cf. Also his essay "Drama as Protest," 192-95.

the play in favor of a reading along generic aesthetic criteria. McInnes's reading marginalizes the social criticism that he himself asserts as a hallmark of Gutzkow's plays, and that presents itself so markedly in the self-reflexive preoccupation with literary function in Richard Savage.

In his writings about Richard Savage, Gutzkow never specified a political sub-text. But the criticism of aristocratic misbehavior in the main plot of the play clearly follows a tradition of socially critical drama from the late 18th century, and was understood as such by the audiences. Gutzkow expresses the traditional ideological message of the bourgeoisie when he uses a morally upstanding bourgeois character to castigate aristocratic immorality. Richard Savage's unsuccessful attempts to convince Lady Macclesfield that she is his mother creates a scandal that makes the Lady a social pariah by demonstrating her adherence to a strict class division. Richard Steele, an influential and reputable journalist, presents her refusal as a breach of ethics: the Lady not only refuses to acknowledge the familial bond with Savage in the face of overwhelming proof, but also appears indifferent to legal means of forcing her to recognize Savage as her son. The bourgeois characters Savage, Steele, and Miss Ellen all decry the Lady's refusal to acknowledge her own son. The noble characters in the play, on the other hand, uniformly use Lady Macclesfield's misfortune to their own advantage. Her former lover Lord Tyrconnel repeatedly humiliates her in public over the episode, her brother-in-law intends to use the incident to get more money from her, and Lords Berwick and Winchester press amorous claims on her that otherwise would be socially out of place. This class division conveys a suspicion of aristocratic motives in issues relevant to the public sphere, for Gutzkow clearly shows that self-interest alone

determines their behaviors. He gives a contrasting positive portrayal of the bourgeois position, articulated by the artists in the play (journalist, playwright and actress), that "natural" familial bonds supercede social ties.

Gutzkow assumes this ideological class dichotomy from the social criticism of German bourgeois tragedy.[2] Rainer Funke has thus noted, "Indem Dramen wie "Richard Savage" [...] auf die inhaltlichen Traditionen des bürgerlichen Schauspiels rekurrieren, nimmt deren Autor ganz bewußt Bezug auf einen weiteren Wirkungszusammenhang: die Kristallisationsfunktion für eine kulturelle und die darauf basierende gesellschaftliche Identität des Bürgertums im 18. Jahrhundert" (203). Funke implies here that Gutzkow's audiences readily understood the play's ideological message and his intentional advocacy of this program through the play, a belief that is corroborated by Horst Denkler's survey of reviews of Richard Savage ("Drama der Jungdeutschen" 118 ff.). But although Funke takes note of Gutzkow's intention to achieve a specifically socially critical reception, he does not analyze the self-reflexive structures that Gutzkow uses to facilitate a more direct communication with his audience than through traditional ideological themes.

The ideological message of the main plot is moreover problematic in its simplicity and lack of originality. Although seduced into irrational, "aristocratic" behavior for most of the play in order to win over Lady Macclesfield, Savage ultimately offers complete renunciation of worldly pleasures as the alternative to the nobles' dissimulation. But his extreme asceticism is not really a viable alternative, for Savage starves himself to death as the melodramatic culmination of the play. Steele and Miss Ellen, although

[2] Cf. Karl Guthke, esp. 66-72.

critical of Savage's economic excesses, also do not corroborate this radical austerity as a mark of ethicality. Instead, Steele delivers a rather impotent eulogy as the last speech of the play in which he summarizes the bourgeois position: "O spränge doch die Fessel jedes Vorurteils, daß mit dem vollern Atemzuge der Brust die Herzen mutiger zu schlagen wagten und nicht im Getümmel der Welt mit ihrer kalten Bildung und ihren sklavischen Gesetzen auch die Stimme der Natur dem mahnenden Gefühl die Antwort versagte!" (132).[3] The subjunctive mood immediately undermines this sentiment as a wish rather than a reform that could reasonably occur. The lack of success on the part of the bourgeois characters in the play also weakens the vague injunction that consulting an intrinsic "voice of nature" might overcome destructive social norms. This resolution of the plot line fails to communicate any viable alternative to its tragic end. The play also reiterates a dualism between immoral and self-serving nobles on the one hand, and morally upstanding bourgeois characters on the other, that had been made conventional by decades of bourgeois tragedies. Every one of the noble characters in the play pursues only his or her own selfish interests without regard for the repercussions of their actions on others. Savage's tragic end is the price for succumbing to aristocratic norms in his single-minded pursuit of making himself socially acceptable to Lady Macclesfield. Karl Guthke thus notes that although Gutzkow situates himself as a descendent of the *Stürmer und Dränger* and uses drama as a means of "emancipating" the bourgeoisie, the class conflict is oversimplified and the message redundant. "Das Drama wird Waffe im Kampf um die Emanzipation des Bürgertums. Nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen kann

[3] All citations of the play refer to Houben (ed.), Ausgewählte Werke vol. 2, 74-132.

die häufig schon aus dem Sturm und Drang vertraute vulgär-rousseauistische Formulierung der Gegensätze im Sinne von verderbter Zivilisationsgesellschaft und unverbildeter reiner Natürlichkeit, zu der es zurückzukehren heiße (94). All the representatives of bourgeois values in the play use exactly this language of "pure naturalness" to define themselves in opposition to the "heartless" nobility, as evidenced paradigmatically by Steele's speech at the end of the play. But the social critique put forth by the representation of bourgeois suffering at the hands of unfeeling aristocrats cannot have the same weight some 60 years after its original articulation in German drama. Gutzkow thus expresses his social criticism in the main plot line by means of a formulaic conflict that is both overused and out of date.

## II. Journalism and Theater in Richard Savage

The reflexive structures in Richard Savage are so striking that they focus attention on the sub-plot as well as on their own metanarrative implications. The specific relevance of these structures to drama and journalism presents the secondary debate over these genres as parallel rather than subordinate to Savage's struggle to be acknowledged by Lady Macclesfield. The focus on Richard Savage as a dramatist establishes reflexivity as a trope and thus encourages the audience to recognize that it is at work in connection between Richard Steele and journalism as well. Steele also presents the comparison between Savage and himself and their respective genres in the opening scene, before even beginning the exposition of the central dramatic conflict in the play.

Richard Savage, unser vortrefflicher Freund, ist alles, nur kein kritischer

> Kopf. Der erste Eindruck entscheidet bei ihm. Wie bei allen dichterischen Naturen gibt es für ihn nur Dinge, die ihn ansprechen, oder solche, die gar nicht für ihn vorhanden scheinen. Dem, was er nicht sogleich in eine bestimmte Form und Gestalt bringen kann, hängt er auch nicht nach und bewegt sich nicht, wie ich, in dem verworrenen Gebiete halber Schönheiten, halber Wahrheiten, unvollkommener Versuche und ermüdeter Anläufe, mit denen sich ein Kritiker beschäftigen muß. (76)

Steele identifies a much greater field of interests for himself as critic, since he deals not only with successful works of art but also with less successful works. Steele also reserves for the critic the question of the truth content of a work, an issue that stretches beyond aesthetics. Savage as dramatist is portrayed as interested only in ideas that are conducive to an aesthetic representation in drama. This dichotomy between artistic and critical approaches to events introduces the criteria by which their works will be evaluated in the narrative, and will have repercussions for their moral characters as well.

Steele functions as a non-essential yet highly prominent character whose main purpose is to comment on the action of the play. Paul Weiglin in fact calls him "eine Art personifizierter Chorus, der die Stellung des Dichters zu den Begebnissen des Dramas verkündet" (18). While I disagree with Weiglin's oversimplified assessment of Steele as the voice of Karl Gutzkow, the fact that this character has no role in the primary plot makes conspicuous his function of representing journalism and generally providing metanarrative commentary. As might be expected of an extraneous character, Steele's speeches are the least dialogic of any characters in the play. Besides the opening dialogue with Miss

Ellen and Savage in the first act, his discussion with Lord Tyrconnel in the second act, and his conversation with Savage in the third act, Steele delivers many of his lines as soliloquies or asides that address the audience directly. Even his dialogues all contain longer monologues that have as much metanarrative as narrative relevance. Steele also expands the scope of the play's reflexive analysis from just drama to include journalism as well. Although Steele's profession allows his character to act as a reviewer of plays and thus reasonably incorporates him into the plot, he also provides reflexive commentary on the function of journalism and compares journalism and drama as means of expressing social critique. Already sensitive to the metanarrative implications of the discussions of drama, the parallel constructions for journalism compel an analogous reading for Steele's reflections on his activities as a writer.

The first scene of the play presents deliberations on journalistic criticism and drama, marking these for the audience as topics of discussion. Indeed, the first words of the play describe the function of journalism: "Immer tadeln, nichts als tadeln!" the actress Miss Ellen exclaims to Steele (75). Her declamation alludes to Steele's journal The Tatler and thereby immediately introduces journalistic criticism as a problem within the play. She and Steele then argue over the function of criticism for improving dramatic performances, raising two points that will be reinforced over the course of the play. Steele insists that "Ein guter dramatischer Künstler [...] muß mehr auf den Beifall des Verstandes als auf den der Phantasie geben" (76). By this he means that dramatists who follow only their imagination end up with "halbe Schönheiten, halbe Wahrheiten" (ibid.) Dramatists must instead concentrate on the cognitive

reception their works can achieve, on receiving applause from those who understand that the play can be both beautiful and communicate a message. Miss Ellen then asserts that Steele only criticizes in the performance the faults that he actually wants to indict in the government. Her remark is a conscious exaggeration that Steele picks up on humorously, but it acquaints the audience with the notion that ideas presented in the theater can be pertinent to the public sphere. Only after introducing these central topics do Steele and Miss Ellen finally bring up the main plot of the play by way of discussing their friend Richard Savage's recent changes in behavior.

Savage has but a few scenes in which he discusses drama, and he tends to reflect largely on the fame and social status he has achieved as a playwright. These passages tie into his portrayal as self-obsessed artist, rather than offering thoughts about the social function of drama. Until the discovery of his apparent descent from nobility, he has lived in shame of his poverty, fraternizing primarily with sailors because their social status was lower than his own (83). He intends to overcome his squalor through his literary career, and by associating his name with a literary elite, thereby making himself socially acceptable to Lady Macclesfield: "[I]ch schenke ihr nicht einen Klotz von Menschen, den die Natur fleischfarben anstrich und auf dem Rücken mit irgend einem obskuren Namen stempelte, damit er nicht mit andern verwechselt werde. Sie wird meine Stücke kennen, sie wird wissen, was Steele, Addison, Johnson über mich geschrieben haben" (ibid.). Although these critics have presumably discussed how good his plays are, Savage emphasizes the renown he gains through their reviews, and appears not to care about their judgments on the aesthetic merits of his plays.

But his first meeting with Lady Macclesfield contains a debate about Shakespeare that functions especially on the metanarrative level. When Savage introduces himself as a playwright, Lady Macclesfield reacts with disdain. "Ganz recht. Sie gehören jener neuen Richtung an, die unsern Geschmack wieder für das Studium Shakespeares gefangen nehmen will [...]. Ich ziehe Werke vor, in welchen sich die englische Kraft mit den feinern Gesetzen der französischen Grazie vermählt hat," to which Savage responds, "Mylady, eine Britin!" (86-87). This interchange serves to show Lady Macclesfield's immediate scorn for Savage, a dislike which intensifies throughout the play as Savage tries to exact recognition from her as her son. But championing Shakespeare also alludes to a body of German literary criticism from the Enlightenment period right up to Gutzkow's times. Shakespeare was promoted as a better model than French Classicists such as Racine because his departure from Aristotelian restrictions on dramatic form enabled broader definitions of plot and contextualization, including the potential to construct a body of literature relevant specifically to a single nation. Savage's exclamation underscores this political function of promoting a national literature.

Despite his lack of commentary on drama, Savage comes across as a model playwright because Steele considers him to be such. Savage aligns himself with Steele in promoting Shakespeare, for both repeatedly cite Shakespeare whenever they want to refer to an exemplary dramatist. Savage also claims positive critiques from Steele's pen in the past, implying that he and Steele share the same criteria for good drama. This assessment is supported by the faith Steele expresses in Savage as a dramatist throughout the play. In the first act Steele appears to tease his friend when he says of Lady Macclesfield,

"Sie hat außer dem größten Dichter unserer Epoche auch die kleinen schneeflockenartigen Toupets auf die Welt gebracht" (78), and he then calls Savage "den berühmten Homer der Vorstädte, den Sophokles der Schenken" (81). These appellations seem overblown in this context, but when Steele later discusses with Tyrconnel the upcoming performance of Savage's play, he expects "außerordentlichen Beifall, den sein dichterisches Talent [...] finden muß" (92). Here Steele is speaking to a fellow journalist and critic to whom he wants to present an objective characterization of Savage. To this end he tries to shift the discourse from their personal interests in the scandal—his own friendship with Savage and Tyrconnel's enmity with Lady Macclesfield—to focus on Savage's real merits as an author. His earnest defense of Savage's "poetic talent"implies a grain of truth to his hyperbole of the first act.

Steele, the journalist, rather than Savage, the playwright, provides the most succinct self-reflexive commentary on drama in the play. "Lustspiele, Savage!" he implores, "Feine gesellschaftliche Bezüge, satirische Gemälde des Lebens der höheren Stände, Ironien auf die Advokaten, auf die Ärzte, auf die Priester [...]. Frage die Schauspieler, sie urteilen selbst so" (110). Steele backs up his advocacy of satirical comedy with this last injunction to ask the opinion of the actors. This helps reinforce the narrative relevance of his statement that writing such plays will bring Savage the prestige he desires. Steele is in fact urging Savage to write plays that accomplish what his own journal articles do through the same methods of satire and irony. Plays will then profit from their appeal in poking fun at socially prominent figures, but also from the political relevance that these satires have shown themselves to have in the journals.

The metanarrative relevance is clearly presented by the context of this

demand and given credence by Steele as its originator. Steele couldn't make this suggestion at a less opportune moment—Savage is in a jail cell lamenting his immanent deportation when Steele delivers this line. And although Steele tries to put a positive spin on Savage's exile as an exciting opportunity to work as his foreign correspondent, Savage remains so morose that Steele's advocacy of writing comedy seems out of place. In the framework of the whole play, Steele's call for comedy also appears to contradict the tragic momentum of the play itself. His remark thus draws attention to itself for the unexpected sentiment it expresses within the logic of the narrative. The apparent discrepancy in having the journalist rather than the dramatist deliver this theoretical tenet has narrative reasons that are especially important for the metanarrative meaning. Steele's characterization as the rational critic provides him with the competence to accurately judge drama, and his stability in contrast to Savage's irrational obsessiveness makes his judgment more credible than that of the actual dramatist. The main plot also demonstrates how introspection on the part of tragic characters undermines the critical potential of drama. Savage's tragic flaw—his need for acknowledgment from his mother—ultimately prevents him from writing at all. And for him, the performance of his tragedy really becomes reduced to a means for convincing Lady Macclesfield of his reputation as a dramatist and awakening her maternal instincts. Savage's emotional appeal and narrowly-conceived intended audience work against the effectiveness of the play as social criticism. When explored for its metanarrative validity, it thus becomes important that Steele rather than Savage pronounces the most heueristic statement about drama in the play.

Steele, in sharp contrast to Savage, consistently advocates journalism and uses the critical influence of his journal responsibly. In addition to the opening scene of the play, Steele has two long exchanges about the function of journalistic criticism. The second act opens with a soliloquy by Steele on his tasks and the power he wields as a journal editor (88-89). He emphasizes his responsibility to comment critically on public affairs. After this speech Lord Tyrconnel, the avowed enemy of Lady Macclesfield, arrives to urge Steele to condemn the Lady's refusal to recognize Savage as her son. Steele does not readily acquiesce, for while Lord Tyrconnel uses Steele's friendship with Savage as an argument, Steele distances himself from Savage's wild attempts to win the Lady's favor. He grounds this stance in his duties as a responsible journalist: "Mylord! Je verheerender meine Waffe ist, desto vorsichtiger muß man mit ihr umgehen. Die öffentliche Meinung ist nicht immer die richtende Themis, sondern weit öfter eine Harpyre, die nichts wieder herausgibt, was sie einmal zerrissen hat" (92). His rejoinder both shows his sense of responsibility and presents journalism as an enormous influence on public opinion.

His comments on journalism moreover invite a metanarrative reading because of their structural and contextual disjunction from the narrative. As noted, his activities within the play have no influence on the main plot, thus establishing his role as commentator. His speeches are consequently often structured as monologues with no direct relevance to his dialogic opposite, or as soliloquies *ad spectatores*. When Steele urges him to become his correspondent in Botany Bay, for example, he inserts political commentary that has little relevance to Savage: "Der Zustand unserer Kolonien soll schauderhaft sein, die Gouverneure saugen ihnen, hungriger als die Spanier in Mexiko, das

Blut aus; kein Schutz der Gesetze, keine Hilfe beim Parlament für die unglücklichen Bewohner derselben ist gegeben [...]—das muß einmal ans Tagelicht" (108). Steele certainly isn't cheering up his friend about the fate that awaits him in exile, nor, in fact, is he contributing any information that furthers the plot of the play. These statements convey rather the political influence of journalism by implying that such problems can be redressed if "brought to light."

Gutzkow thus provides within the dialogue reflections on drama and journalism that have both narrative and metanarrative relevance. But giving the dramatist the title role of the play draws attention to self-reflexivity as well. A play about a playwright has to awaken the audience to at least the expectation of getting a "behind-the-scenes" look at how a dramatist works. Gutzkow's play-within-the-play fulfills especially his intention of modeling an appropriate and active audience response to the play, for here the audience sees the relationship between author, play and audience reproduced exactly as it exists for them as spectators of Gutzkow's play. He then also inserts a "performance" of journalism by Steele to provide a similarly instructive model of reception for journalistic texts.

Gutzkow uses self-reflexive constructions to decidedly different ends than did his two probable models, Ludwig Tieck and Shakespeare. Tieck's Gestiefelter Kater exemplifies the use of an on-stage audience and the character of the dramatist to problematize the act of reception. While there is an ongoing discussion between dramatist and audience throughout the play, the prologue in particular addresses the issue of reception. The audience members discuss their expectations of the play they are about to see, coming up with fantastic

connotations and potential themes of a play about a cat in boots. The dramatist appears when their speculations have led them to already condemn the play as tasteless and they begin to drum on their chairs to protest the imminent debasing of their aesthetic judgment. He calms them by humbly exalting their role as judges on his poetic efforts and by insuring them of his intention to amuse them with his play. Tieck thus immediately represents the power of the audience to act upon information from the aesthetic work and, over the course of the play, shows the effects their responses have as they criticize the action on stage. But he undermines this apparent power by making their interpretations absurd, a tendency that is already clear in the prologue when the audience decries the play that hasn't even started yet. Tieck thus calls into question the competence of the audience at aesthetic judgments. Moreover, the audience on stage does not seriously relate their interpretations of the play they watch to a metatheatrical or social context. Although Tieck includes numerous citations of other aesthetic works and important cultural figures in the bantering of the audience members, the allusions serve as aesthetic critiques of the play-within-the-play or of the cited works themselves. By limiting the audience's influence to the realm of the aesthetic, and even then questioning its ability to issue meaningful interpretations, Tieck infers that the reception of the drama has only limited value and that even worthwhile judgments have relevance only within the theater.

Shakespeare's Hamlet shows self-reflexivity for primarily narrative purposes rather than for illustrating metanarrative implications of the audience's understanding of the play-within-the-play. While the play is rife with internal performances, the most significant for modeling reception is the

staging of "The Murder of Gonzago" by a traveling theater troupe at the Danish court. In this play a king is murdered by someone intent on usurping both his title and his queen. This narrative exactly reflects the murder of Hamlet's father by his father's brother, who now is king and married to Hamlet's mother, even repeating the method of pouring poison in the ear during the king's nap in an orchard. When the play comes to the point of the murder, the new King reacts with horror and flees the performance. Hamlet has made known to the audience in the theater that he intends exactly this response: he asked the players to insert a small speech of his own composition into the text, presumably to more exactly parallel the events between "The Murder of Gonzago" and the situation at the Danish court. He also instructed his friend Horatio to observe the response of the King especially at this juncture of the play to see if the King exhibits any signs of guilt. The play-within-the-play thus functions as an exposé that produces a metatheatrical effect for specific members of the audience within Shakespeare's play, but the general audience response to "The Murder of Gonzago" is not especially relevant on a metanarrative level for the audience of Hamlet. The narrative function of the inserted performance is so clear, and the primary relevance of all the self-reflexive elements in the play for the narrative made so repeatedly, that the interior audience retains their individual identities as characters in the play Hamlet rather than representing an audience *per se* or demonstrating the act of reception as a model.

In Gutzkow's construction, the play-within-the-play primarily exemplifies the potential influence of drama on the public. A brief exchange from Savage's play is heard offstage through the closed curtain of Lady Macclesfield's box:

(Hinter der Szene. Entfernt, aber deutlich vernehmbar.)

Männliche Stimme im Schauspiel: Du warst's, die ihn verdarb!

Weibliche Stimme (Miss Ellen): Ich?

Männliche: Deiner Liebe

Verdankt er dieses Übermaß der Triebe!

Weiblich (Miss Ellen): O schilt mir nicht die holden Blumenkränze,

Die ich um meines Sohnes Kindheit wand!

Wo gab es Blumen, gab es Freudentänze,

Als er im Wetter seines Schicksals stand?

Da er noch klein, wie konnt' ich wohl ihn strafen,

Wenn oft ich noch den Todesengel sah,

Wie der der Wiege kleinem Friedenshafen

Um einen Schwung der Sense stand so nah!

Und als er wuchs, da kann die Mutter warten!

Der Vogel fliegt hinaus zum Nest!

Ihr schon genug, wenn er von seinen Fahrten

Sie manchmal fromm und treulich grüßen läßt.

Die Mutterlieb' ist reich durch stetes Geben,

Sie ist schon glücklich, wenn sie weinen kann;

Dem Taue gleicht ihr sorgenvolles Leben--

Er setzt sich nur in kühlen Nächten an.

Sei ruhig! Laß das Herz Mariens zeugen,
Als an dem Kreuze all ihr Glück verdarb,
(lauter und beziehungsreich)
Und (als zeigte sie auf die Lady) jenen Marmorstein, in dessen
Schweigen [t/o]
Dem Griechen seine Niobe erstarb.
(Ein Beifallssturm hinter der Szene.) (99-100)

The self-depiction of the mother represents the opposite of Lady Macclesfield as a mother. The popular awareness of the scandal encourages the audience to use this representation as a measure for Lady Macclesfield as the purported mother of the play's author. But to assure the repercussions of the speech for the audience of the play-within-the-play, Gutzkow includes two directives for the actress: "Lauter und beziehungsreich" and "als zeigte sie auf die Lady." The stage directions then stress the reception of the play-within-the-play. There is a storm of applause in response to this speech, and Lady Macclesfield, who was watching the performance from the off-stage side of the curtain that falls between her box and the backstage, returns visibly shaken from the effect of the play: "([Sie] reißt den Vorhang zu und kommt mit leidenschaftlicher Aufregung in den Vordergrund.). Ich halt' es nicht länger aus—diese Blicke töten mich!" (ibid.). Placing the audience of the play-within-the-play in the audible offstage allows Gutzkow to focus his audience on the act of reception taking place rather than on the performance.

Not only is the internal audience's response to the scene audible, but their response also continues and gets more emphatically directed at Lady Macclesfield. Roger Jones needlessly complicates the interpretation of this

theater-in-the-theater when he labels it a "Brechtschen [...] Gestus des 'Zeigens'" (188). The criticism expressed in the staged play is interpreted by the audience as directly relating to Lady Macclesfield rather than as an example of a specific behavior that represents a larger social issue. To be sure, the criticism of the Lady as an unfeeling mother accords with and contributes to the general criticism of the aristocracy in Gutzkow's play. This scene, however, demonstrates that the audience makes the connection between the comments about a mother's role in the play and the failure of Lady Macclesfield to play this role. The audience's reaction also models an ideal transposition of the criticism in the play into action. Immediately after her monologue to Gutzkow's audience in response to the storm of applause, the fictitious audience is again heard—once calling menacingly for Lady Macclesfield, and again approvingly for Richard Savage (101). Gutzkow thus visibly demonstrates how the audience understands the relevance of the play for issues outside the theater as the audience follows the cues given in the scene regarding the social conflict between Savage and the Lady.

Ultimately, however, this self-reflexive demonstration of the power of drama is weakened by Savage's obsession with gaining recognition from his mother. The first indication of his new priorities comes just after his Shakespeare debate with Lady Macclesfield. "Mylady," he responds to her critique of the new generation of playwrights, including himself, "Sie verwunden mein Herz, und doch (für sich) gerade in dieser Sprödigkeit liegt etwas, das mir den Triumph, sie überwinden zu können, doppelt reizend macht" (87). Savage shrinks from openly defending the reinvigoration of the British stage that has been his ostensible focus and instead falls into his own

interior, demonstrated by his sudden aside. From now on his main goal will be to satisfy his psychological desire to overcome her resistance. Until the performance of his play in the second act, Savage maintains the pretence that the resistance he wants to overcome is the Lady's antipathy to his new kind of drama. After she refuses to acknowledge him as her son, he states more and more clearly throughout the rest of the play that his sole focus in life is on getting her to accept her role as a mother. This attitude in fact motivates the tragic end of the play, for Savage prefers to starve himself to death rather than live as the object of Lady Macclesfield's hate. Steele's concluding monologue, indeed the whole final act, makes no reference to drama or Savage as a dramatist.

This leads him to misuse dramatic form to influence specifically Lady Macclesfield rather than primarily a public audience. The mother in the inserted play is protective and giving even to the point of self-abnegation. The speech also significantly emphasizes that the mother is present from infancy to the departure of the child from the parental home. Finally, a contrast is made between a mother who has as sensitive a heart as St. Mary and one who is as silent and unfeeling as marble. Savage characterizes the mother in these emotional terms not only to provide an obvious contrast to Lady Macclesfield for his audience, but also to appeal directly to her on a personal level. She responds to the passage in the play in these terms as well: "Ich fühle nicht als Mutter für ihn—in meinem Herzen ist auch nicht die kleinste Stelle für ihn, nicht ein Winkel, wo man eine Wiege hinstellen könnte!" (100). She clearly recognizes this speech as an appeal directly to her, but rejects these pleas on similar emotional grounds. The melodrama of the mother's monologue in

Savage's play also contradicts Steele's program for good drama of satirical social commentary. The mother resents the departure of her child to the outside world in favor even of the sorrow and worries she's experienced as a mother. This vision articulates a purely personal relationship between mother and child that seeks to shut out issues outside of their interactions. These sentiments reflect Savage's emotional desires for a mother, but are out of place in the socially critical drama he is theoretically committed to. Thus even though the play-within-the-play succeeds at influencing public opinion, this effect is tempered by Savage's misuse of the dramatic form for personal rather than public communication.

The most striking presentation of how journalistic comments should be understood comes in Steele's "performance" of journalistic critique. Lord Tyrconnel throws a masked ball at which he intends to force Lady Macclesfield to recognize Savage as her son. In a scene completely unrelated to this plot development, Steele enters dressed as a harlequin with a whip. He addresses ten different costumed party-goers by their name or title and asks each one a question. He then ignores, interrupts or comments on their responses with satirical answers to his own questions, and then immediately moves on to his next victim. This episode has the form of a stage-like performance of journalistic criticism. The role of jester alludes to drama and the reflexive role this stock character often fulfills.[1] In this capacity Steele has comedic license to offer truthful insights in the form of jokes. As Roger Jones has recently pointed

[1] Cf. Rose-Werle 23-25 and 49-50. Rose-Werle notes that the harlequin had been popularized in England between 1800-1836 by Joey Grimaldi, an actor who virtually reconstituted the role beyond the commedia-del-arte tradition as a satirical clown figure (23). Gutzkow thus insinuates an analogy between contemporary and historical theater when he models Steele's performance on Grimaldi.

out (188), the satirical form of Steele's comments corresponds with his advocacy of satire and irony as the means of incorporating journalistic criticism into the dramatic work. The scene also shows again the influence of journalism, since he is allowed to make biting criticisms of such important political figures as the "Lordkanzler" and "Sprecher des Parlaments" (122-23).

This performance also demonstrates an apparent advantage of journalism over drama in addressing criticism directly at its intended target. Steele's practice of cutting off the person trying to respond and moving on to the next victim suggests its effectiveness:

> Steele: Herr Minister des Auswärtigen Amts, wovon sollen die Parzen, wenn sie noch in England Verehrung finden wollen, den Lebensfaden Europas spinnen?
>
> Sechste Maske: Von—
>
> Steele: Von Baumwolle—merkt es Euch—und nicht (zu einer siebenten Maske), Herr Gesandter, von französischer Seide. Heda, Herr Obersteuerdirektor [...] (123)

The rapid transitions serve two functions. As a performance of what is normally written in a journal, the disregard of any retort or occasional snap response to the person's defense of Steele's criticism emulates the structure of criticism expressed in the print media. The journalist puts forth an opinion and then may or may not take note of other voices in the debate. But letting Steele always have the last word also implies that his criticism has been on the mark, for none of the vilified ministers seeks further rejoinder. While Savage's performance affected Lady Macclesfield only through the mediation of the audience, Steele's jibes give the impression of hitting home with the object of

their censure. The effectiveness of his criticisms is only implied in this brief scene, but substantiated later when he convinces the lower house of Parliament to recognize Savage's filial claims against Lady Macclesfield (132).

## III. Ethical Character and Narrative Contextualization

Steele's strength of character contrasts sharply with Savage's self-consumption. He repeatedly uses his influence in the government to help his friend Savage, first by arguing in his journal against Savage's sentencing in the killing of Lady Macclesfield's brother-in-law, then by presenting Savage's case to the lower house of Parliament in the hopes of forcing the Lady to recognize him as her son. But Steele also knows where to draw the line between using his journal for personal matters and using it to influence public policy. When Lord Tyrconnel leaves after urging Steele to attack Lady Macclesfield, Steele notes in a soliloquy: "Ich werde mich seinem Antrag nicht entziehen dürfen—denn Savage und Miß Ellen leiden unter dem Verhältnis, das ganz London beschäftigt; aber als Lückenbüßer für mein Journal will ich doch die Bemerkung brauchen, daß in dieser Welt keine Wahrheit mehr denkbar ist, zu der nicht hinten—eine, wenn auch noch so kleine, versteckte Hühnerstiege des Interesses führt" (93). Steele justifies to the audience, as much as to himself, the reasons for taking up the attack on Lady Macclesfield. And his justification is grounded in both his needs as an editor to fill column space with current events, but also on ethical principles that he wants to promote in the public sphere through his writings. Steele's sense of professional obligation and moral character

highlights the lack of such traits in Savage.

The issue of character is ultimately the most significant measure of the metanarrative meanings of the reflexive and self-reflexive constructions. For while Gutzkow presents both drama and journalism as effective means of communication, he differentiates their effectiveness within the narrative by showing only the ethical character to be ultimately successful in the public sphere. This is clear from the comparison in the moral substance of Savage and Steele, but Gutzkow also emphasizes the importance of ethics by including a negative example in the machinations of Lord Tyrconnel. This character's attempts to subvert the journals and his lavish public productions designed to humiliate Lady Macclesfield show how these forums can be misused. Lord Tyrconnel's lack of morals, revealed by his abuse of the power of journalism and drama for strictly personal aims, ultimately unmasks his apparent successes in these endeavors as hollow.

Lord Tyrconnel is very successful as a journalist, but only writes in order to further his own causes rather than the public weal. He is apparently quite good at disguising the blatantly self-serving aspects of his articles under the cloak of public servitude. Upon first being introduced, Steele acknowledges him as a fellow journalist and critic, "*Ultor et vindicator* der Rechte der Natur, wie Sie sich in den Zeitungen nennen" (90). But Lord Tyrconnel's exchange with Steele foregrounds his duplicity by first taking Steele in, only to reveal his selfish aims by the end of their discussion. Steele initially reacts with skepticism when Lord Tyrconnel urges him to publicly decry Lady Macclesfield's refutal of Savage's claim, for he knows that Lord Tyrconnel is a spurned ex-lover of the Lady. Lord Tyrconnel admits this, but then promotes

Savage's claim on such impersonal grounds that Steele reflects in an aside, "Scheint eine wirkliche Überzeugung des Mannes zu sein!" (91). But Lord Tyrconnel concludes his arguments by trying to win Steele's favor through a profession of liberal sentiments. To this Steele reasserts his skepticism in a soliloquy after Lord Tyrconnel's departure: "Diese liberalen Edelleute! Nur weil sie eitel und zuweilen furchtsam sind, geben sie sich das Ansehen, als liebten sie Humanität und Freiheit! [...]. Der will für die Tugend und das Unglück einstehen? Der will, da er vergeblich der stolzen Lady den Hof machte, sich jetzt an ihr rächen und noch eine Dividende bei der öffentlichen Meinung gewinnen?" (98). Steele here provides a general condemnation of fashionably liberal nobles before expressing in rhetorical questions his derision of Lord Tyrconnel for so transparently invoking moral standards in the pursuit of his own self-interests. Steele, who has already been characterized as the responsible journalist in the opening monologue of this act, stands as a competent judge of Lord Tyrconnel as a journalist. Steele delivers all of these judgments *ad spectatores*, emphasizing that this information is important above all for Gutzkow's audience, so that they perceive Lord Tyrconnel's disingenuousness. Steele's process of going from skepticism toward Lord Tyrconnel's professed good intentions to belief in the nobleman's impersonal motives, and culminating in a reconfirmation of his original skepticism, marks Lord Tyrconnel as an effective but manipulative journalist.

Lord Tyrconnel also uses public performances to achieve purely personal goals. When he adopts Savage and ushers him from his jail cell, he makes this adoption a public spectacle: he has laid red carpet from the jail door to the door of his own palace, organized an honor guard of 50 noblemen, and acquired

permission for the marching band of the royal regiment to accompany the procession. The stage directions call for a show of the parade's popularity: "Inzwischen hat sich das Theater ganz mit Volkshaufen, mit Matrosen, die ihre Schiffswimpel schwingen, angefüllt. Richard, von Tyrconnel geführt, besteigt schwankend die Stufen. Allgemeines Hoch!" and continuing after a brief monologue by Steele, "Trompetentusch draußen und fortgesetztes Hoch der versammelten Menge" (118). The mass of this crowd, and its designation as a "Volkshaufen" with sailors, conveys the popular appeal of Richard's case and, concretely, of Lord Tyrconnel's successful promotion of the case in the general public. But while Lord Tyrconnel claims to be doing this to ameliorate the injust prison time Savage has had to endure, all three men make reference to the fact that Lord Tyrconnel has underlying motives for his aid. He himself expresses the conviction at two points that the social "intrigues" against Savage must be brought into the public eye, the very personal goal he has had all along to impugn Lady Macclesfield. Savage is also aware that Lord Tyrconnel is exploiting him, asking Steele, "Darf ich mich auf eine so schwindelnde Leiter wagen?" (112). And Steele himself addresses the negative effects the parade will have on the Lady in his closing monologue of the scene (113).

Lord Tyrconnel's masquerade ball shows even more dramatically his misuse of public performance for his own aims. He holds his masquerade on the same night as another masquerade given by an ally of Lady Macclesfield. He then reproduces the exterior features of the house at which the other party is to be held, and decorates the interior in a reasonably similar fashion. Lord Tyrconnel thus not only stages a party at which the guests become masked characters, but actually stages a performance of another party. He explains his

intentions in a monologue to his servants: "Der Wagen [von Lady Macclesfield] hält statt vor dem Hotel der Herzogin von Sussex vor dem meinigen [...]. Ich werde ihr dann den Sohn vorstellen, sie veranlassen, daß sie mit ihm tanzt und wenn sie den Irrtum--gemerkt hat, dann wird die Chronik Englands um eine pikante Anekdote reicher sein" (116). The complexity of his staging makes his intention of manufacturing an indelicate scene all the more ludicrous. He confirms his casual use of people for his own gains in a soliloquy in which he reveals that despite the largesse he has lavished on Savage, he will get rid of his adopted son as soon as Savage's value for advancing his political career has been expended.

Although Lord Tyrconnel achieves his ends with both his journalistic and dramatic endeavors, his lack of ethics is enunciated so concretely that there can be no mistaking his use of these genres as abuse. But first his successes are clearly stated: at the beginning of the fourth act he is planning his party after having rescued Savage from jail. Six months have passed since his meeting with Steele, and now Lord Berwick asserts that he has become "Beherrscher der Presse" and thus increased his popularity, being now praised as "der Mann des Volkes" (114). This triumph is followed by the success of his plan for coercing Lady Macclesfield into recognizing Savage as her son at his party. But in accepting him as her son without admitting to be his mother, the Lady vows to hate Savage forevermore, and this declaration moves Savage to break his bonds with Lord Tyrconnel.

> Savage: (Wirft [Lord Tyrconnel] Uhr, Ringe und sonstigen Schmuck, Börse und Papiere hin.) Hier all das Gold, der Flitter, mit dem Sie mich aufputzten zum Schreckbild für ein Weib, das Sie nur gehaßt haben und

an dem Sie sich rächen wollten. Hier Ihre Pretiosen, Ringe, Ihr Gold, Ihre Bankzettel; hier der Schlüssel, wo Sie alles finden können, was Ihnen gehört--auch die Beweise meiner--Echtheit! Ich habe mehr Mut Hungers zu sterben, als von der Gnade eines Mannes zu leben, den ich verachte [...] Sie, Mylord, wenn Sie diesen Glanz verlieren, können nichts mehr werden; ich kann wieder werden, was ich war! (125-26)

Savage explicitly reiterates here that Lord Tyrconnel has only used his wealth and standing to support Savage's claims in order to achieve his own goal of revenging himself on Lady Macclesfield. But he also marks Lord Tyrconnel as essentially unethical, as opposed to his own deviance from a set of ascetic moral norms. Despite Lord Tyrconnel's popularity, deriving at least in part from his achievements as a journalist and dramatist of sorts, the reading public should have always assumed his duplicity because of his noble status.

Reading Gutzkow's communicative intentions depends on understanding the interdependence of literary production with moral fortitude. He emphasizes the power of literary works to influence public opinion in his characterizations of all three authors, but he does not immediately ascribe a positive value to either of the genres brought up in the play. Instead, he warns that both journalism and drama can be misused to inappropriate or unethical ends. Savage's claim against Tyrconnel, "to be able to become again what I once was," refers both to his profession as writer and to his ethical status. When he renounces the wealth and status he acquired through Tyrconnel's lavishness, he again becomes worthy of the respect that Steele lost when Savage wildly indebted himself in order to buy fancy trappings to impress his mother. He also regains his powers of literary composition: whereas he mourned his

inability to write while enjoying wealth because "Der Muse kann man nicht wie einen Lakaien klingeln" (118), he composes a poem at the beginning of his next scene following his break from Tyrconnel (128). While the figures of Steele and Tyrconnel serve to represent class-affiliated poles of appropriate and inappropriate use of literary communication, Savage displays the underlying cause of misuse as a lapse in ethical values.

Gutzkow thus presents his audience with a more complex set of criteria than mere class affiliation for judging the authenticity of social criticism mediated through literature. He shows how literary works that serve merely private interests achieve only petty ends, and conversely, that even private issues can be related to public interests for positive social change. Tyrconnel fuels the public furor in his writings and in his staged provocation of Lady Macclesfield at his party in order to achieve his personal goal of vengeance. His subordination of means to ends results in Savage's unwitting complicity in this plot and consequent self-destruction because of his role in shaming his mother. Steele, on the other hand, develops the social relevance of his advocacy of his personal friend's case. Although he wants to achieve Lady Macclesfield's acknowledgment of Savage as her son because of his affection for Savage, he discusses the scandal in terms of legal rights and responsibilities and pronounces the "slavish" deference to social norms rather than to the "voice of nature" as a social malady that results in Savage's tragic death. Tyrconnel's literary activities contribute to this death, while Steele's engender pronouncements from the government and, in the end, recognition from the remorseful Lady that his polemics were correct.

Gutzkow's audience also sees how their counterpart, the audience of

(theatrical) performances within the play, confirms through its response the correctness of the expressed public criticism. Despite Savage's intentions, the actress Miss Ellen helps the general audience in the theater understand the criticism of inhumane aristocratic behavior implied in the contrast between her character and Lady Macclesfield. The audience responds with catcalls against the Lady and hurrahs for the author of this criticism. In contrast, the "Volkshaufen" that Lord Tyrconnel musters to witness his adoption of Savage cheers his hyperbolic claims that he is adopting Savage to right a wrong done to the author by England. Steele then claims that he will need to append the word "authentisch" to his description of the events in his journal in order to convince those of his readers not familiar with the habits of the British aristocracy that these events did occur. This artificial audience, which is also differentiated from Gutzkow's by the fact that they are sailors rather than theater-goers, not only responds positively to a negatively-connoted event, but also has no influence on others in the play. Gutzkow thus uses his representations of audiences to reinforce the truth-content of the message to which they are responding, and to model the potential social ramifications of a correct response by an audience to an accurate social criticism.

## IV. Conclusion

This kind of direct appellation and coercive techniques directly contraindicates Hegel as an influence on Gutzkow's dramatic praxis, at least in regard to formal criteria of drama. For Hegel, the drama motivates a socially critical response through a constructed analogy between character conflicts in

the play and conflicts experienced by individuals in daily social life. The audience members perceive the relevance of the play for their own lives more because they relate to the conflict between characters than because they recognize the dramatic setting as an illustration of their own society (15: 270). Hegel asserts that plays that treat "substantiell-menschliche Interessen" have greater effect on their audiences than those that dramatize "ganz spezifische Charaktere und Leidenschaften" (ibid. 499). He also notes that the conflict between characters should develop through their actions, so that preoccupations with a character's subjective interiority or a character's reflective observations based on "Parteilichkeit in [...] Weltanschauung" impede the proper development of the dramatic conflict (ibid. 481). Gutzkow transgresses these dictates in Richard Savage by developing his personal debate over literary genre as a theme primarily via the historical setting; by including Steele's observations as a primary focus of the play despite their disjunction from the main plot; and by articulating a social critique through monologues by characters about their moral flaws rather than through direct conflict between characters.

But Hegel also details just such breaks of the dramatic frame when he specifically discusses comedies. Hegel's distinction between the comedy of Aristophanes and that of Molière exemplifies Gutzkow's adaptations to, but general accordance with, Hegel's basic notions of the social influence of drama. Both playwrights moved away from developing dramatic conflict exclusively between characters to engage in direct criticism of their societies; Hegel notes that Aristophanes directly addressed his audience to express his personal opinions about political conditions in Athens (ibid. 504), and Molière attacked

very serious vices that are, in Hegel's opinion, not at all humorous (ibid. 570). Hegel cites this lack of intrinsic humor in Molière's plays as the distinction between classical and modern comedy: where Aristophanes's characters are able to laugh at themselves and thus communicate the notion that the individual stands above the tribulations of the world, Molière creates situations in which his audience laughs at the satirized character (ibid. 569). But Hegel only gives this new strategy a pejorative reading when he believes that satirizing an individual becomes the central function of the comedy, and otherwise intimates that Molière's plays are paradigmatic for modern drama. Gutzkow clearly orients himself on this modern strategy, even with regards to his tragedy. In composing Richard Savage he consistently has his audience's reception in mind rather than the intrinsic development of conflict between the characters. Although Steele's performance of satirical journalism demonstrates the political intentions of this strategy most explicitly, Gutzkow maintains a social relevance for even the private conflict between mother and son at the center of the play by consistently reiterating the function of social class for this conflict.

Molière not only provided Hegel with a model of the modern comedic dramatist, but also provided Gutzkow with a literary antecedent that he dramatized with similar intentions to his use of Richard Steele. Gutzkow repeated the successes I have documented for Richard Savage—modeling authorial character and intention as well as the ideal reception of the play and conduct of the audience—in his next play about a playwright, Das Urbild des Tartüffe. This play in fact provides an answer to the unresolved issue in Richard Savage of which literary genre he finds most effective. It also allows a

greater degree of insight into how Gutzkow uses historical material to address contemporary social issues. Richard Savage thus remains a preliminary work in a greater sense than just as Gutzkow's first staged play. In Das Urbild he achieves a more concrete articulation of his views on literary mediation of social criticism and exhibits refined techniques of self-reflexivity by literally taking his own advice from his earlier play, as advocated by Steele: "Lustspiele! [...] Satirische Gemälde des Lebens der höhern Stände, Ironien auf die Advokaten, auf die Ärzte, auf die Priester!"

## Chapter 4: The Strategy of Satire: Das Urbild des Tartüffe

Gutzkow's desire to incorporate social criticism in his literary works makes satire a natural choice for him. As the depiction of a negative model of behavior that is ultimately overcome, satire not only contains explicit criticism of personalities or conditions that actually exist, but in the resolution of the conflict also sets out, or at least implies, a positive model that counters the negatively represented characters or events. The emphasis on the negative behavior or figure, however, can leave the implied positive behavior inarticulated. Regine Seibert has pointed to the predominately individual relevance of Enlightenment satires. Because the general world-view of the period included a rigid, theologically grounded moral code, satirists oriented their criticisms on individual behaviors, and intended to improve or eradicate these behaviors through their critiques. Seibert claims, "daß sie [die Satire] ein pragmatisches Interesse bekundet an dem, was sein soll, und damit unmittelbar an gesellschaftlich-moralische Bestimmungen gebunden ist" (12). These "pragmatic interests" are implicitly supra-individual and denote a social relevance through the assumed cumulative effect on ever greater numbers of individuals. The destabilization of the moral code in the wake of the Enlightenment[1] has two important repercussions for Gutzkow. First, the disappearance of a universal set of ethical norms means that he cannot assume that criticism of individual behavior will be immediately pertinent to his audience members. He is thus compelled to choose institutional policies in the

[1] Cf. Seibert 9-10.

public sphere as the targets of his satire. And second, the rigidity of the moral code provided a fixed polar opposite of negative behaviors, so that criticism also articulated an ideal. Without such determinate polarity between critique and ideal, Gutzkow must articulate within the work the ideal solution to the practices he criticizes if he wants to direct his audience toward a single, ideal resolution. Wolfgang Preisendanz thus claims that without the immediate polar relationship between the object of criticism and the (implied) ideal, "selbst dann und gerade dann wäre der Erweis fällig, durch welche Mittel und Verfahren die satirische Darstellung transparent wird, durch welche Praktiken der Satiriker seine Vorstellungen dessen, was sein sollte, 'im Gemüt zu erwecken weiß'" (415). While Preisendanz does not offer any examples of potential "means and practices," I will argue that Gutzkow's use of self-reflexivity represents one such practice. In Das Urbild des Tartüffe he casts the socially critical playwright, Molière, as the positive figure who not only wins out over the satirized villain, but also communicates how plays function as the means to expose such villains.

In this chapter I will articulate the confluence of reflexivity, satire, and a focus on the public sphere in Gutzkow's treatment of Molière's play Tartuffe, ou l'Imposteur. His choice of a playwright as a central figure for his drama also allows him to again incorporate reflections on what he considers constitutes good drama, and his inclusion of a performance within the play concretely illustrates these reflections. Gutzkow effectively exploits the two levels created by including a play-within-the-play when he positions the performance of the interior play as the origin and resolution of the conflict of the embedding narrative, so that the potential effects of the performance of Molière's play

become the issues over which Molière and various state officials collide. The dual relevance of the (self-) reflexive comments on drama once more serve a metanarrative function while simultaneously pertaining immediately to the action on the narrative level. Gutzkow achieves this by adapting elements of Molière's struggles to stage the play along with aspects of the original plays' plot into his own story line, then affirming or dismissing the articulated concepts about the function of the theater by showing the reactions of the audience to the performance. This configuration allows Gutzkow to show the power of the theater in society: on the one hand in the theatrical exposé of La Roquette as the biographical model for the figure of Tartüffe in Molière's play, and on the other hand in the ultimately improper censorial response of the authority figures when they realize the potential of the drama to single out an identifiable individual for public rebuke. But Urbild[2] represents a far more optimistic evaluation of drama as social critique than in Richard Savage, for its happy end is likewise the success of Molière's play at bringing about a change in society. Gutzkow also presents his beliefs about the critical function of theater more clearly because he uses reflexive, monologic authorial proclamations about drama instead of recurrent performances to model reception to his own audience on a metanarrative level. By showing his audience that the performance of a play can result in the downfall of a political figure, this positive depiction of the relevancy of theater for society achieves his conception of Hegelian drama.

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[2]When referring to Gutzkow's play I use the abbreviated title Urbild, and refer to the play-within-the-play by Gutzkow's character Molière as "Tartüffe." I cite the play written by the historical Molière as Tartuffe.

The few critics who have interpreted Urbild, however, devote their greatest attention to how Gutzkow incorporates the historical material into his play. A contemporary critic of Gutzkow, Julian Schmidt, broached the topic of historical veracity already in the 1850's. Although he found the play to be well-composed and humorous, he asserted that Gutzkow had seriously distorted the historical facts, especially concerning the figures of Louis XIV. and Molière himself. Schmidt reproaches Gutzkow for making the playwright into a "preacher" (Prediger; 116) who proselytizes on morals, a purpose the critic views as incompatible with comedy. But this satirical function is exactly what other critics praise as both successful and historically correct. Heinrich Houben not only claims that Gutzkow accurately represented the spirit of the 17th century (Gutzkow-Funde 143), but also cites the editor of a German edition of Molière's works, who noted Molière's explicit intention of instructing the king and the general public about moral topics via satire (ibid. 135 ff.). And while Sengle observes that historical accuracy was a "secondary consideration" (Nebensache) for Gutzkow, the connection between the two eras lay precisely in the critique of the influence inauthentic piety had at the courts of Louis XIV. and Friedrich Wilhelm IV. (Historisches Drama 181). But Houben and Sengle discuss only how Gutzkow selectively incorporated historical facts to achieve a contemporaneously relevant, Molière-esque comedy.

In the most detailed reading to date, Paul Weiglin brings out the issue of public vs. private sphere (65). He specifies that Gutzkow brought up the subject matter of Molière's play for his own time because of its relevance for the Prussian court, where the appearance of piety could be turned into influence. Weiglin also emphasizes that Gutzkow moved the setting from the familial

space explored in Molière's play to the court circles of Louis XIV., where the playwright Molière had to convince the king of the appropriateness of his play for the public. Gutzkow in fact opened the introduction to the play in the 1871 edition of his dramatic works by identifying this theme as the point of difference between his own treatment of Molière's fight to produce Tartuffe and the Italian dramatist Carlo Goldoni's version of the episode. "[Goldoni] hielt sich, ohne die Heuchelei im Lichte seiner Zeit schärfer auszuführen, an dieselbe enge Familiensphäre, in welcher sich der Scheinheilige bei Molière bewegt" (3).[3] Gutzkow thus immediately announces his program both to examine the hypocrite more sharply within the context of his own contemporaneous time, and to show the repercussions of the hypocrite's duplicity in a public and social rather than in a private and familial milieu. Houben briefly notes that La Roquette is thereby shown at a later station of his life than Tartuffe in Molière's play, but that it is the same character, now depicted at the height of his influence precisely because he has shifted from disrupting families to inciting discord among the leaders of the French nation (Gutzkow-Funde 138). But Houben does not make explicit the connection between this shift from private to public sphere and the relevance of the play as social criticism for Gutzkow's viewers.

## I. Gutzkow's Sources: Molière and Tartuffe

[3] All citations of the play refer to Houben (ed.), Ausgewählte Werke vol. 3, 3-76.

Gutzkow uses Molière's play, but especially the social context of its performance, as the source of his own fictionalized plot. His play portrays Molière and members of his troupe of actors who are rehearsing and eventually perform "Tartüffe" in the final act of Urbild. Gutzkow projects the historical Molière's treatment of hypocrisy as a reenactment of events that, in Gutzkow's play, the character of Molière intends as a critique of other characters. Within the narrative Gutzkow establishes the identity of La Roquette as a hypocrite by his embodiment as Tartüffe in Molière's play, thereby making the play-within-the-play a revelatory piece that will open the eyes of the main characters to La Roquette's true identity. La Roquette's underhanded attempts to ban the performance pits him against Molière, who for both personal and political reasons is determined to put on the play. While this represents the central conflict of Das Urbild, a sub-plot develops when Louis comes into conflict with Molière over the playwright's fiancée Armande. Here, too, the performance of "Tartüffe" is linked to both private and public goals of the king. The performance of the inserted play becomes the impetus for the development of the action in the framing play, but centering the conflicts over the performance of the play-within-the-play also develops implications of the effects such a revelatory drama can have in the public sphere.

As the title implies, Das Urbild des Tartüffe relates how the plot of Tartuffe grew out of supposed authorial interests of Molière. The playwright is engaged to be married to his leading actress, Armande, who as a child suffered the dissolution of her family through the machinations of La Roquette. This man used false piety to ingratiate himself with her father, Duplessis, and gain control of the family's finances. When Duplessis discovered that La Roquette

had also seduced his wife, he committed suicide, leaving his wife to die of a broken heart and his daughters to be sent to foster homes. La Roquette escaped with the family fortune. Molière has discovered La Roquette, now the president of ecclesiastic charities in Paris, and incorporated obvious personal traits of this figure into his character Tartüffe. Upon learning of his unmistakable representation as a self-serving hypocrite, La Roquette tries to effect a ban of the play by manipulating others into arguing for censorship, while personally maintaining a professed indifference to the debate over its suitability for public performance. But despite being banned twice in the course of the action, Urbild concludes with the performance of "Tartüffe," and only La Roquette's renunciation of political power and the restitution of the Duplessis fortune save him from being publicly reviled.

By promoting the staging of the play, the actresses Armande and Madeleine bring about their own reunion as sisters and Molière's intended revenge on La Roquette. Armande saves the performance from two nefarious attempts to derail the show, first by starting a police search for the manuscript of "Tartüffe" when it is stolen, and then by tricking the king into allowing the performance by insinuating that she will give him a favorable sign from onstage for a private rendezvous. Madeleine unwittingly conveys Molière's plans to La Roquette. When she first meets him at Chapelle's house in the first act, she believes him to be testing her budding acting abilities when his actions and speeches correspond to those penned by Molière for the character Tartüffe. La Roquette thus learns his role in the play, and is able to act the role of drama critic so that in subsequent meetings in the third and fourth acts Madeleine continues to confide in him. When she finally discovers his identity as the

Tartüffe who destroyed her family, she exposes him as the model of the hypocrite in the play and herself as Armande's sister. These two roles most clearly show the repercussions of the plot of the play-within-the-play on narrative events surrounding the inserted play.

The characters Chapelle, Louis XIV., the ministers Lionne, Lefevre, and Dubois, and even Molière himself are less integral to the revenge plot. Chapelle, a member of the Academie Francaise and dramatist in his own right, is La Roquette's only consistent ally against the performance. However, Chapelle writes plays as prescribed by Classical rules of composition, with emphasis on rhyme and meter and advocacy of tragedies based on ancient myth or biblical stories. He motivates the exposition in the first act of Urbild through his response to the refusal of the royal theater troupe--Molière's troupe, that is--to stage his play "Nebukadnezar." Incensed into leading the attack on "Tartüffe," Chapelle repeatedly exhibits a lack of creativity, slavish adherence to abstract rules of composition, and a preference for empty, flowery prose. These traits brand him as Molière's opposite and he ultimately admits defeat in the final act by promising to support Molière's admission into the Academie. Louis XIV.'s involvement is at first entirely political, for he believes that banning the play might damage his reputation as a strong ruler by making him appear afraid of the repercussions of a mere play. He then bans the play for the entirely personal reason that he is enamored of Armande and does not want a successful performance to finance the wedding, and subsequently lets the play to go on because of Armande's insinuation of a tryst with him if the play is allowed. The ministers likewise become involved in the debate over the performance for political reasons: As advisors to the king, the ministers are

forced to take sides according to their beliefs in what is good for the state. But although they agree with Molière's critique of La Roquette, whose power they all attest to and of whom they are not personally fond, they feel threatened by the potential of the theater to satirize them personally in their capacity as public figures. And although Molière admits his intention to recreate La Roquette as the character Tartüffe in order to avenge Armande and relates the story of La Roquette's skullduggery, he grounds his efforts to stage "Tartüffe" with general claims about the positive influence of the theater in society. So while the revenge plot provides the basic motivation for arguments to perform the play-within-the-play, the issues that confront most of the characters in Urbild deal with plays in general rather than with "Tartüffe" itself.

The actual performance of "Tartüffe" in the final act wraps up all the various plots in the traditional comedic happy end. La Roquette's identity as the Tartüffe of the play is visually reinforced when Molière appears dressed as the part: "(*schon für den Abend in täuschender Ähnlichkeit mit La Roquette als Tartüffe gekleidet, tritt auf und besieht sich im Spiegel*). Die Maske ist gut! Ich habe nicht vermeiden wollen, dem Präsidenten ähnlich zu sehen. Bin ich's? Ja, ich bin's!" (65). Although the scene is the king's box rather than the stage, Molière's appearance as La Roquette is confirmed in the stage directions, his own judgment of himself as he looks in the mirror, and the monologue that verbally substantiates his similarity to La Roquette for the audience. This duplicity is then reconfirmed for the audience interior to Gutzkow's play as the various officials arrive at the king's box and first mistake Molière for La Roquette, and then La Roquette for Molière. The two finally confront each other in the final scene of the play, and Molière extorts a promise from La Roquette to restore the

inheritance to Armande and Madeleine in exchange for Molière's costume change to make La Roquette's identity as the model of the hypocrite less obvious. The king then further insists that La Roquette be banished from official posts in Paris forever, and confirms Molière's future ability to express himself freely through his dramas. This also achieves vengeance for Madeleine and Armande and confirms them as sisters. And although Armande appears on stage with a blue kerchief, thereby deterring the king's advances, Louis is afforded a suitable replacement for his ardors in the younger sister of the original object of his desire.

Gutzkow thus maintains the theme of false piety from the original play, but focuses attention on the overlap between the play-within-the-play and the framing play, which allows him to develop the plot of the framing play. The issue of hypocrisy plays just as central a role in Gutzkow's play as in Molière's, but Gutzkow spreads the blame, so to speak. Molière surrounds Tartuffe, who puts on a pious face whenever his victim Orgon is around but reveals his base intentions to all others, with a group of honest and forthright characters who magnify Tartuffe's duplicity through their own good behavior. Molière even draws attention to this fact in his first appeal to Louis XIV. to allow the performance of the play (297). Gutzkow, however, shows not only the hypocrisy of La Roquette's feigned piety, but also how hypocritical all the officials are who insist on the banning of "Tartüffe" in Urbild. La Roquette, failing to convince an assembly of ministers that "Tartüffe" should be banned, claims that Molière's upcoming plays satirize not only the professions of these various ministers, but are also based on their actual persons. Amused by Molière's obvious satirization of La Roquette, these ministers quickly reverse

their positions upon hearing that they themselves will be poked fun at (33-37). Gutzkow emphasizes their hypocrisy by making them stammer out their responses to the question of whether the play should be forbidden, for while all of them express their belief in the right to freedom of expression, none of them can actually speak the words "The play should be banned." La Roquette then reinforces their hypocritical reversals by ending the scene with a monologue: "Alle sind sie Tartüffes! Alle—! Ob in schwarzen Gewändern, ob heimlich oder offen, ob betend oder fluchend, ob vor Heiligen kniend oder vor schönen Weibern oder—vor ihren eigenen Egoismus—alle sind sie Tartüffes! Der Sieg ist mein!" (37). Gutzkow then extends the accusation of hypocrisy to Louis XIV. himself, who in a later scene changes his advocacy for the play to an injunction against it because he is jealous of Molière's relationship with Armande (50). Gutzkow thus extends the treatment of hypocrisy in the inserted play into concrete repercussions of hypocritical stances by public officials.

Gutzkow not only expands the scope of the themes from the original play, but also demarcates his own work as a succesor to Molière's play rather than an imitation or recreation of it. While La Roquette is supposed to represent the same person as the Tartuffe who bilked an innocent family of their money in Molière's play, Gutzkow explicitly distinguishes the events motivating the action of his own play from the events of the original. The character Molière relates the biographical story of the Duplessis family that provides the source, the "Urbild" for the play he has written:

> In meinem Tartüffe hab' ich die Verwirrung einer Familie geschildert, die einst das Opfer eines solchen Heuchlers wurde. Mein Vater war mit einem Manne befreundet, der sich auf die redlichste Art von der Welt ein

bedeutendes Vermögen erworben hatte. Um es zu genießen, zog Duplessis aufs Land und lebte eine Zeitlang glücklich im Besitz einer schönen und liebenswürdigen Frau und zweier holden Mädchen, ihrer einzigen Kinder. Da führte ein böser Stern in den Schoß dieser Familie einen Mann, der unter dem Deckmantel der Frömmigkeit das Verderben aller wurde. Geschützt zuerst von Duplessis' alter Mutter, erwarb er sich bald die Freundschaft des reichen Mannes und benutzte sein Vertrauen zu einer Oberherrschaft, die er zuletzt über alle Angelegenheiten des Hauses gewann. Seelenfreundschaft, Herzenverschmelzung waren die Worte, die er stets im Munde führte. Duplessis, von Natur zur Melancholie geneigt, verlor den Sinn für die praktischen Bedingungen des Lebens und überließ dem heuchlerischen Freunde die Verwaltung seines Vermögens [...] Man warnte Duplessis, aber ein blindes Vertrauen fesselte ihn an einen Menschen, dessen drittes Wort die Religion war. Endlich aber wurde er auf eine furchtbare Art enttäuscht. Er entdeckte, daß der schändliche Freund durch eine falsche, verhimmelnde und sinnliche Philosophie auch sein Weib Adele betört hatte, und so schwach war sein Geist durch diese falsche Religiosität geworden, daß Duplessis in dem Augenblick, wo er Weib und Freund ihrer Schändlichkeit überführen konnte, statt sich zu rächen, in einem Anfall von Geistesverwirrung sich selbst das Leben nahm. Mit dem geraubten Vermögen verließ der Betrüger das Haus und gab das entwürdigte Weib und die armen Kinder dem größten Elend preis; die Mutter starb am gebrochenen Herzen, ihre Kinder gerieten in fremde Pflege. (29)

The elements of this story reproduce basic developments in Molière's play, but also clearly distinguish the events on which Gutzkow's Molière bases his play from those portrayed in the historical Molière's work. In this story, as in the original play, the pious hypocrite wins over the favor of the head of the household, Duplessis, despite the efforts of others to enlighten him as to Tartüffe's inauthenticity, and Tartüffe eventually wins control over Duplessis's estate. Certain trivial elements also resonate between this story and the original play, like the existence of Duplessis's mother as a character and the revelation of Tartüffe's duplicity with the seduction of Duplessis's wife. But many elements, both trivial and important for Gutzkow's text, underscore the differences between the original play and the source story for Molière's play in Urbild. The most significant is the unhappy end in this story. While the original play ended with the arrest of Tartuffe as a swindler and restitution of Orgon's estate, the Duplessis story ends tragically with his suicide, the death of his wife and dispersal of his daughters into foster homes. This tragedy inspires Gutzkow's Molière to write his play to avenge his fiancée Armande, one of Duplessis's daughters. Gutzkow also substitutes another daughter, Madeleine, for the son in Molière's play. These changes affect plot developments in Gutzkow's drama, but a whole series of minor changes further communicate Gutzkow's intention not to reproduce Molière's original. In this story Duplessis's mother tries to protect her son from the hypocrite, in exact contradiction to the original; Gutzkow's Tartüffe ingratiates himself through "Seelenfreundschaft und Herzenverschmelzung," whereas the original manipulated his victim by threatening self-martyring actions; the wife, Elmira, was not actually seduced, but cleverly used Tartuffe's advances to convince her

husband of the hypocrite's malevolence; and the original father Orgon had no trace of the melancholy that Gutzkow's version attributes to Duplessis and that motivates his suicide.

Gutzkow also significantly reworks the only two characters who exist in both plays--La Roquette/Tartuffe and the daughter Mariana who appears in Urbild as Armande—to accord with his own plot developments. La Roquette repeatedly suffers from self-doubts as to whether his schemes are going to succeed, and whether he will be revealed as a hypocrite. He speaks frequently in asides and monologues about these fears directly to the audience. Tartuffe, on the other hand, never speaks in monologues or asides, never reveals his interiority at all--he is instead consistently characterized as a self-confident schemer by his dual strategies of succoring Orgon and then using his power over him to threaten repercussions to Elmira and anyone else who tries to betray his true nature to Orgon. In the story related by Gutzkow's Molière, the daughter has no significant role in the events, whereas in the historical Molière's play Mariana tries to convince her father of Tartuffe's duplicity and is rewarded for her efforts by being promised to the hypocrite in marriage. This betrothal ultimately helps convince Orgon of Tartuffe's insincerity when he sees the man to whom he has promised his daughter make advances toward his own wife. This betrothal is rendered improbable when Gutzkow sets his play many years after the destruction of the family by the hypocrite, for the character Molière claims to have heard the story from his father. Armande would then be older than is indicated in Gutzkow's play had she played the same role as Mariana. The rest of Gutzkow's characters have no relation to Molière's, since Gutzkow changes not only the time but also the place of the action.

Gutzkow's only direct borrowing from the original play is La Roquette's use of a kerchief purportedly to shield an uncovered bosom from his eyes. This scene occurs in both plays upon the first entrance of the hypocrite, but serves different functions in each drama. In Molière's work the scene demonstrates Tartuffe's profession of piety, which is commented on by the servant girl Dorine. Upon seeing her, Tartuffe yells offstage to his servant to prepare his hair shirt and scourge, and claims that he is on his way to the prisons to pass out alms. Ignoring Dorine's scoffing at this claim, he then pulls out his kerchief: "Cover your bosom. I can't bear to see it. Such pernicious sights give rise to sinful thoughts" (135). He does not actually give the kerchief to her, however, but simply parries Dorine's accusations that his professed modesty is a sham until Elmira arrives to talk with him. In Gutzkow's play, however, the intention is to show that La Roquette is none other than the Tartüffe embodied in Molière's play. Thus although La Roquette also yells the same instructions offstage, Madeleine—who plays Dorine in the play-within-the-play—reacts with a series of asides that confirm his manner of speech to be identical to Molière's characterization of the hypocrite: "Mein Gott, was ist denn das? Das ist ja der Scheinheilige selbst"; "Das sind die wörtlichen Umschreibungen meiner Szene!"; and "Mein Himmel, ganz wie in dem Stück!" (17). La Roquette also engages in asides that expose his intentions: "Sie hat einen reizenden Wuchs! Die Schultern sind graziös geformt. Ich will mein gewöhnliches Mittel anwenden! (*Zieht sein Tuch.*)" (ibid.). So while the original play demonstrates that Tartuffe plays the role of the pious innocent, Gutzkow uses the scene to equate La Roquette with Molière's characterization of him as Tartüffe.

La Roquette is repeatedly and explicitly characterized as the model for Tartüffe in Molière's play. The kerchief scene is the first of a series of scenes between La Roquette and Madeleine that show him acting in precisely the same manner as the scripted Tartüffe. When she encounters him muttering to himself outside the king's chambers after failing to effect a ban on the play, she relates in asides: "Da ist ja schon wieder der Tartüffe! Der alte Freund des Herrn Chapelle ist wahrhaftig in die Rolle ganz vernarrt [...] Er spielt die sechste Szene aus dem dritten Akt! Er gesteht seine Sünden ein und will seinen Freund Orgon durch Demut rühren" (45). Although this is not at all what La Roquette is doing, Madeleine reaffirms his identity as Tartüffe directly to the audience. And when La Roquette subsequently seeks her out in the hopes of discovering where Molière learned of his past actions, she reveals her identity as Armande's sister by telling the story of her father's destruction at the hands of the hypocrite. La Roquette then immediately verifies for the audience that he is indeed this same person: "Madeleine, Tochter meines unvergeßlichen Freundes—ich, auch ich gehörte zu den treuesten Freunden deines liebenswürdigen Vaters! — (*beiseite*) des Dummkopfs!" (55). Here he not only informs the viewers of his duplicitous relationship with her father, but also demonstrates his hypocritical practice of making compliments but believing the opposite. Madeleine reiterates his identification as Tartüffe when she confirms the name of her family's destroyer as Jean Baptiste La Roquette (ibid.), and again at the end of the act when she learns his true identity (64).

La Roquette's correspondence to Molière's Tartüffe is also known and commented on by the officials as well as by La Roquette himself. When Molière initially gives the police chief Lionne a defense of his play against accusations of

indecency, he describes the kerchief scene in an attempt to show how he uses authentic examples of predatory hypocrites that will not libel members of the Parisian audience. But Lefevre, a member of the government, immediately recognizes the scene because he interrupted La Roquette's advances on Madeleine with the kerchief, and responds:

> Lefevre: Sieh! Sieh! Kürzlich hab' ich jemanden in ähnlichen industriellen Studien überrascht. Es ist doch nicht der Präsident La Roquette?
>
> Molière: La Ro—? Ich habe in meinem Tartüffe—keine einzelne Person, sondern eine—Gattung geschildert. (30-31)

Unaware that Madeleine has already unwittingly induced La Roquette to present himself in exactly this situation, Molière is surprised at Lefevre's insight. Because he is trying to prove that his play is not dangerous to the social body, Molière tries to cover up the correspondence between La Roquette and the Tartüffe in his play. Lefevre and the royal doctor Dubois, however, are not fooled. When La Roquette is announced shortly after this exchange, Dubois claims "Wir bekommen eine Spezies der Tartüffes früher dargestellt als das Publikum auf der Bühne" (31). Lefevre and Dubois then use the context of Molière's kerchief anecdote to reiterate this link between La Roquette and Tartüffe with innuendos about La Roquette as a friend of the textile industry of Limoges (32ff.). La Roquette is stymied by these references, but for the audience they communicate the characters' knowledge about his identity as Tartüffe. And ultimately La Roquette addresses an explicit confession directly to the audience in a monologue: "Vernichtet, geopfert dem Gelächter von Paris und der Welt! Der Tartüffe bin ich! [...] Heilige Vernunft! Gib mir einen Rat, ich

flehe zu dir, Schlauheit der Luchse, Klugheit der Schlangen, Geschmeidigkeit der Katzen, wirf mir eine Schlinge zu, noch so dünn, ich fädle sie in eine Intrige—! Ich, ich soll auf die Bühne—! (45). Here he not only admits his identity as Tartüffe, but also reveals how devastating and irrefutable the performance is going to be for his ability to engage in covering his opprobrious intentions with a pious appearance.

Apart from identifying his character for both the audience and the other characters, La Roquette's response to the proposed performance of "Tartüffe" leads to many of the plot developments of the framing play. Madeleine's discovery that he was responsible for destroying her family identifies her as Armande's sister and thus makes her provisional position in Molière's troupe a permanent one by virtue of the family tie, but also because her familial relation to Armande implies a comparable ability to act and the looks to draw admirers to the theater. La Roquette successfully uses the effects the performance will have on his own reputation to convince the officials to ban the play as a precedent for attacks on their own persons in future Molière plays. And of course his awareness that the performance will put an end to his ability to pursue his nefarious goals by faking piety drives him to argue for the banning of the play over and over again.

Molière's personal goals for staging the play also use the performance as motivation for plot lines. His main intent is to revenge Armande by wrecking La Roquette's life, just as he ruined her family, and also to destroy his ability to do so to others. His impending marriage with Armande is also dependent on the revenues from a successful run of this play in the theaters, as he claims to

the king (50). But Molière also has the public good in mind, and not simply because he believes the performance will bring about La Roquette's downfall.

> Sehen wir nicht täglich in die Herzen der Familien, auf die Katheder der Schulen, in die Kabinette der Minister, an die Stufen des Thrones Männer schleichen, die unter dem Deckmantel der Religion nur ihren persönlichen Ehrgeiz verbergen und nichts lieber an sich reißen möchten, als die Herrschaft der ganzen Welt [...]?! Diesen Feinden der Gesellschaft [...] hab' ich in meinem Tartüffe den Handschuh hingeworfen zu einem ehrlichen Kampf, und erwarten von allen denen, die ein reines Gewissen haben, daß sie mich in diesem Kampfe unterstützen. (28-29)

Although Molière engages in hyperbole here in his efforts to defend his play before Lionne and the other officials debating its release by the censors, he brings up three important intentions regarding the effects his "Tartüffe" can have in the public sphere. He claims to be attacking a type of person, the religious hypocrite, rather than attacking the subject of religion. To underscore this claim, and to point out further benefits of performing this play, he cites the manifold institutions in which such hypocrites wield negative influence: families, schools, and even in the cabinets and on the king's court itself. Molière implies that because they hide their personal ambitions, exposing the negative effects of their craftiness can keep them from their apparent intention of "world domination." And finally, the play should present a rallying point around which all conscientious people can unite to fight the influence of such hypocrites. These intentions become the subject of repeated debate throughout the play, to be proven with the performance of "Tartüffe" in the closing act.

The performance also allows Gutzkow to develop story lines that expose both the personal and public nature of King Louis XIV. Louis's decision-making process about allowing the performance in fact revolves entirely around his relationship with Armande. In his first appearance on stage, Louis reveals through a whispered dialogue with Delarive that he longs to see Armande, that he has sent her presents, and even wants to repeal holidays to prevent the theater troupe from traveling to Lyon so that he can arrange to see her. Delarive then gives him a letter from Armande in which she begs him to lift the interdiction on "Tartüffe." Having already argued for allowing the performance, he repeats his views in the strongest terms immediately after reading the letter, compelling Lionne to repeal the ban (40). However, in a discussion with Molière soon after, Louis confirms not only his recent discovery that the playwright intends to marry Armande, but also learns that they have been betrothed for two years already. In a fit of jealousy, the king delays the producation until he has had time to read the play. He thus bans the play for all practical purposes, since "Könige handeln rasch, aber sie lesen—langsam!" (51). His sole intention here is to prevent Molière from earning enough money to have his wedding.

Louis also reinstates the performance for purely personal motives having to do with Armande. He visits Armande in her dressing room while she is between scenes in the hopes of convincing her to finally become his mistress instead of Molière's wife. Armande cleverly uses this desire to manipulate him into granting permission for the performance of "Tartüffe." She feigns indecision, and is required to appear soon in the performance going on during their conversation, and so suggests that she give the king a sign during the

next-day's performance. Louis asks her to wear a blue kerchief if she is favorable toward him, a yellow kerchief if she will stay with Molière. Armande then claims that only in "Tartüffe" does she wear a kerchief, and so the king promises to allow the performance (63).

Despite these personally motivated decisions to allow the performance, Louis argues both to Lionne and Armande that banning the play will have negative consequences for his kingdom. At his court audience he provides both a negative effect of the ban and a positive effect of the performance for the state. He first asserts to Lionne that banning a comedy about a hypocrite makes his government seem weak, "als müßte sie [die Regierung] vor den Versen eines Schauspielers zittern"(40). And to Armande's reminder about the controversy over the play Louis responds "Freilich, freilich, ich besinne mich—es hat Schwierigkeiten. Aber werd' ich darum aufhören, König von Frankreich zu sein, wenn man den Tartüffe spielt?" (63), and peremptorily dismisses the arguments of the various influence groups that have agitated against the play. Louis does not believe that the theater has such influence as to topple his government, but he does believe it can support his reign: "Ich kann den Tartüffe nicht verbieten; denn merken Sie wohl, meine Herren, zu allen Zeiten, von dem Tage an, wo das Königtum langweilig wurde, datierten sich die Republiken" (45). Louis asserts here that only the theater as entertainment has a relevant social function. In his view the content of a play can never convey a political message that would threaten his absolute rule, but the lack of (entertaining) theater could create conditions in which the populace had enough leisure time to contemplate dangerous political ideas. His enthusiasm for the theater but disinclination to read reaffirms this opinion; literary works

are for enjoying, not for working through. The king clearly sees a political function for the theater only as a panacea for the tribulations of daily life.

While Gutzkow dramatizes Molière's efforts to perform his play "Tartüffe" as an act of personal revenge, the furor over the anticipated effects of the performance develops into a battle over the function of the theater in general. In the opposition between Chapelle the academician and the theater-savvy Molière, and in the vacillating allegiance of the ministers and king toward allowing the performance, Gutzkow presents his ideas about the function of theater. The narrative intrigues that develop because of the revenge plot double as agitation for or against socially critical theater and emerge as a debate over the merits and drawbacks of censorship. When these characters articulate their position on allowing the performance of "Tartüffe," they simultaneously communicate conceptions of drama that can then be evaluated by their treatment within the narrative.

## II. (Self-)Reflexive Presentations of the Drama

Gutzkow encourages his audience to understand the play as an argument for the social relevance of theater above all by choosing a playwright as the protagonist and including the performance of a play in his own play. The issues of censorship and the potential of the theater to influence society have clear metatheatrical relevance to the audience for which Gutzkow is writing, especially given his prominent role in the debates over the rejuvenation of the German theater and on the censorship of literary works. But censorship only becomes the main issue when he transfers and expands the issue of

hypocrisy from Molière's familial context to the public sphere because he centers his play around the performance. In order to attack censorship, Gutzkow first advocates a positive social function for drama. Although the beliefs Gutzkow's Molière promotes are opposite of the king's, he develops his position most clearly through his conflict with Chapelle, the academic dramatist, over what constitutes a good drama. This debate not only presents conflicting opinions about aesthetic questions that are answered by the decisions made in the play about allowing "Tartüffe" to be staged, but also provides an opportunity for the playwright Molière to make general comments about drama. The debate over censorship between Molière, on the one hand, and the ministers and king, on the other, is resolved in Molière's favor when his theory that drama can cure social ailments is proven through the performance of his play.

While the strands of narrative detailed above overlap in many instances, the conflict between Molière and Chapelle stands out as a metanarrative debate because it does not dovetail with the other plots very much. Their battle over accepting Chapelle's play "Nebukadnezar" for performance provides mostly background information about Molière as a dramatist. Although Molière wants to deny the play a space in the royal troupe's program upon reading it, Chapelle's friend Lefevre, a lawyer, forces a presentation of the play by arguing in court that a play by a member of the Academie could not be rejected for performance without allowing the judging committee to hear it. The committee, however, on which Molière also sits, rejects the play because it lacks "Originalität, Reiz und Interesse [...], ferner, da durch die Aufführung dieser im ganzen sowohl wie im einzelnen mißlungenen Arbeit dem Publikum keine

angenehme Unterhaltung, wohl aber der Kasse ein empfindlicher Nachteil erwachsen würde" (10). These grounds summarize in negative form what Molière will articulate later as the criteria for a good play: not only is "Nebukadnezar" severely lacking in literary merit, but it is judged to be so bad that it could not possibly even entertain the public and would damage the theater's potential to stage other plays by draining financial resources. Lefevre, although he has fought the legal campaign for Chapelle, adds to this condemnation of the play: "Stellt doch Menschen hin, die nicht vergangenen Jahrhunderten, sondern der Gegenwart, nicht den Assyriern und Babyloniern, nein euren Umgebungen entnommen sind" (ibid.). These critiques of Chapelle's play paint him as a conservative classicist who writes tragedies in verse that adhere to the Aristotelian unities and dramatize Classical or biblical stories. He thus constitutes the antithesis of Molière, a caricature of a dramatist who writes plays of contemporary political irrelevance according to academically sanctified rules.

This contrast surfaces later in the play to provide the grounds for why Molière deserves to be in the Academie. The theme of election to the Academie arises in Chapelle's only other appearances in the play, at the audience with the king in the third act, and at the performance of "Tartüffe" at the end of the play. Chapelle responds with indignant astonishment at the king's suggestion that Molière be accepted into the Academie:

> Sire, einen Schauspieler! Einen Possendichter, der sich nicht an die Regeln hält! Im Namen dieser Regeln, im Namen dieser ewigen Kunstgesetze steh' ich vor Ew. Majestät und flehe demutsvoll, inbrünstiglich, ein huldvolles Auge auf die Verschlechterung des

> Geschmacks zu werfen und Dero erhabenen Schutz von einer Literatur abzulenken, welche die Neuerung wagt, sich mehr an spanische, englische und italienische Muster zu halten, als an die ewigen Vorbilder der Griechen und der Römer. Ja, Sire, statt dem Ideal zu dienen, greift dieser Molière seine Stoffe förmlich, mit Erlaubnis zu sagen, von der Straße auf--Menschen, die uns stündlich in den Weg laufen, bringt er bestäubt und ungesäubert auf die Bühne und läßt sie in einer Sprache reden, Sire, in einer Sprache, die immer mehr zur bürgerlichen Prosa des Lebens herabsinkt. (43)

Chapelle champions the single criterion of adherence to classical aesthetic norms as the sole measure of literary merit. This stubborn resistance to innovation is what causes the royal committee to judge his play "unoriginal, and without appeal and interest." But Chapelle also articulates here the positive traits of Molière's dramatics in inverted, critical form. The litany of popularizing traits he condemns in Molière are exactly what makes Molière's theater a success: his acting experience, which attunes him to performative elements in his compositions; his choice of comedy over tragedy; his openness to recent innovations in drama from other European traditions; the material drawn from contemporary daily life; and his use of easily understood vernacular rather than elevated rhetoric and rhyme. But he admits his own hypocrisy in criticizing Molière's popular theater while simultaneously asserting that the idea for Tartüffe was his own, thus revealing his actual understanding of the importance of popular appeal (66). This story line is ultimately resolved with the other plots in the happy end when Chapelle

concedes that the successes of Molière's dramas on the stage make him worthy of election to the Academie (75).

This argument over aesthetic principles allows Gutzkow to put theoretical statements about drama into Molière's mouth. These positions are then confirmed as positive within the narrative and by Gutzkow's drama itself. Whereas Chapelle undermines his position by finally admitting the importance of general accessability to the dramatic work, Molière gives a statement of general beliefs regarding the drama that is then confirmed throughout the rest of the play:

> Molière: Exzellenz, ich muß Sie daran erinnern, welche Aufgabe ich der französischen Bühne gestellt habe. Ich habe das Lustspiel von meinen Vorgängern in Form sittenloser und ausgelassener Possen überkommen und habe mit meinen schwachen Kräften versucht, ihm einen edlern Ausdruck zu geben. In der Poesie suchte ich eine Waffe zu finden für den Kampf der Aufklärung gegen die Lüge; ich habe den Egoismus, die Eitelkeit, den gesellschaftlichen Betrug auf der Bühne schon in den meisten seiner Spielarten darzustellen gewagt, und man hat mir das Zeugnis gegeben, daß durch mich die Bühne wenigstens eine würdigere Bedeutung gewonnen hat.
>
> Lionne: Nicht nur die Nation, sondern auch Se. Majestät, Ludwig XIV., haben Molière in diesen ruhmwürdigen Bestrebungen anerkannt.
>
> Lefevre: (*beiseite*). Guter Chapelle, wenn du das hören müßtest! (28)

Molière justifies here all the innovations that Chapelle lists as flaws as part of his reform of the comedy in the interest of improving public civility. He claims

to have changed the comedy from mere entertainment to a more aesthetic work through "dignified language." But more importantly, he has made the theater a more socially influential institution by showing how morally reprehensible actions by individuals negatively impact society. He then immediately cites the general opinion that he has largely realized his goal and thereby won public approval, a conviction that is seconded by Lionne's reference to his recognition by both the nation and the king. Lefevre then underscores the opposition between Chapelle and Molière, clearly inferring in this context of general adulation for Molière that Chapelle's notion of drama does not compare favorably.

Molière's predominance over Chapelle is again confirmed at the hearing before Louis XIV. In an effort to demonstrate concretely the weakness of Molière's play, Chapelle begins to describe the kerchief scene. La Roquette embarrassedly tries to hush him, especially when Louis shows interest, but Chapelle really only wants to criticize Molière's rhyme scheme:

> Nicht von der Szene rede ich, Sire, nicht von der Erfindung, sondern von einem entseztlichen Reim, den sich der Autor an dieser Stelle wider alle Regeln der Metrik erlaubt hat—er läßt nämlich in einem Verse die neunte Silbe, nein, die siebente oder doch die neunte—nein, nein, die siebente—oder—Die Akademie hat diesen Gegenstand ausführlich in einer eigenen Denkschrift behandelt, die ich hiermit die Ehre habe, Ew. Majestät demutsvoll zur baldigen Lektüre zu überreichen. (44)

Chapelle himself gets so confused over the "rules of metre" that he cannot clearly explain Molière's presumed error, even though it is discussed in the treatise composed by the Academie. The strict academic view of aesthetics is

ridiculed again through Chapelle's incompetence, but also by the very notion of presenting a learned essay to a king disinclined to reading. Louis's ensuing decision to allow the performance represents a triumph of Molière's views over Chapelle's. This situation is touched upon again in the final act when Molière's position outweighs Chapelle's criticisms (75).

The relative disjunction of this conflict from the other plots facilitates reading these theoretical statements as metanarrative assertions about drama as such. Because neither Molière's election to the Academie nor the rejection of Chapelle's play significantly contribute to the main narrative of revenge upon La Roquette through the performance of "Tartüffe," this plot invites questions as to its purpose in the play. While Chapelle's opposition to Molière does provide exposition in the first act that sets up the rest of the play, structural and thematic elements support a reading of their conflict as an opportunity for Gutzkow to communicate tenets of his dramatic theory. Structurally the statements about drama are all delivered in monologic speeches, even though they are given in the context of dialogues rather than spoken *ad spectatores*. Their thematic correspondence to Gutzkow's program for drama especially suggests a metanarrative relevance of these remarks.

These conflicting statements about what constitutes a good play in the opinions of Molière and Chapelle are delivered programmatically despite their respective contextual embedding in the dialogues that introduce drama as a topic. They never directly debate with one another, but rather make their claims during conversations with various other characters. However, both characters clearly suspend the thread of their conversations in order to present their thoughts on drama. Molière thus prefaces his answer to Lionne's question

about the subject matter of Tartüffe with his statement on the innovations he has brought to the French stage (28). And Chapelle uses Ludwig's assertion that Molière should be accepted into the Academie to elaborate on the subject of good and bad drama (43). Both characters are then called upon to return to the original topic after delivering their remarks. The digressive nature of their speeches highlights the relevance of their statements outside of the conversational context in which they are delivered. A further striking feature of the passages of their debate discussed so far is how long they are in comparison to the speeches in the surrounding dialogue. In both instances the length of their statements stands out against the conversational pattern of short speeches by alternating or varying characters. This structural difference foregrounds their role as monologic rather than dialogic utterances, especially in conjunction with their programmatic content about drama. As the only two playwrights in the text, they also have a representative function that elevates their debate beyond the confines of the framing play. Their diametric opposition to each other and Chapelle's ultimate capitulation implies that Molière's views on drama are correct.

The main topic of their debate is the social relevance of drama. Chapelle's insistence on proper metric form serves primarily to characterize him as a pedant, but also contributes to the main debate over making the modern drama temporally relevant. Chapelle insists on maintaining only the Classical tradition, by which he means writing in metre and using formal or elevated language rather than "bourgeois prose," and modeling both form and content of the drama on Greek and Roman examples. He thus disparages Molière for daring to use Spanish, English and Italian plays as models, and for

transposing typical modern people directly into his dramas. Molière, on the other hand, prides himself on just these reforms. He claims to have developed the comedy from merely humorous and profane entertainment into a "weapon [...] in the campaign of enlightenment against lies" and a means to criticize socially destructive individual behaviors. His theater thus provides a didactic function for his audience by attuning them to the negative repercussions of such behaviors for broad segments of society. Because form and content of his plays are more attuned to his contemporary world, his theory of drama not only achieves political relevancy but also facilitates comprehension by its viewers, both of which are made impossible in Chapelle's exclusion of modern themes and language.

The proclivity of his play to achieve socially beneficial effects in the public sphere not only proves his theory right, but also shows that the characters who want to censor the play are wrong. But whereas the presentation of dramatic paradigms was clearly marked as a debate by its relative autonomy from the narrative, the attack on censorship uses a satirical model of exposing duplicity on the part of the characters who promote censorship. While their actions remain intrinsic to the narrative, this plot element achieves its metanarrative relevance through the representation of state officials, including the king, so as to intimate that state officials in general misuse the power of the censor.

All the government officials pursue self-serving agendas when they advocate censorship. Dubois, Lefevre and Lionne take pleasure in Molière's satirization of La Roquette, but when the latter asserts that the playwright is developing new plots aimed at doctors, lawyers and the police, they all

abashedly retreat from their anti-censorship principles. Since all of their conversations are composed in parallel with each other, Dubois can be taken as a paradigm for the manner in which all of them reverse their opinions. Both Lefevre and Dubois greet Lionne's declaration that "Tartüffe" has been approved for performance with the exclamation "Brav, Lionne!" (30). But when La Roquette describes the impression that the character of the doctor from L'Hypochondrie made at a public reading Molière gave of the work at Ninon, Dubois nervously responds, "[M]an hat mir allerdings gesagt, daß bei Ninon über zwei Akte von Molière sehr anzüglich und in der Tat über uns Ärzte gelacht worden ist--aber, Exzellenz, hören Sie darauf gar nicht--die Bühne muß ihre Freiheit haben" (34). But his allegiance to this ideal wanes further as La Roquette forecasts decreasing revenue and respect for doctors if the play is staged in Paris. Dubois then changes his recommendation regarding "Tartüffe":

> Exzellenz, allerdings sollte die Bühnenfreiheit gewisse Grenzen haben, die Molière, ein Mann, der mir am Unterleib zu leiden scheint, mit einem Wort ein Hypochonder, nicht überschreiten sollte.
> Indessen—allerdings— wenn man freilich—gesetzt auch—gewissermaßen— Es ist das nur so meine einfache, schlichte Meinung, Exzellenz. Ich habe die Ehre, guten Morgen zu wünschen. (*Ab*). (ibid.)

Dubois moves here from disbelief that Molière would satirize his profession to an acknowledgment of his discomfort over the attack on doctors while still maintaining his belief that the theater should not be censored. When La Roquette paints an ominous picture of the personal repercussions for Dubois of

Molière's satire, the doctor claims that Molière is sick. This assertion reaffirms him in his professional capacity, and also presents a special circumstance that justifies the need for censorship. He is still unable to say that "Tartüffe" should be forbidden, and instead makes a hasty and embarrassed departure after stumbling over his caveats. Lefevre responds identically when La Roquette describes Molière's treatment of lawyers in "Tartüffe" (35-36), and Lionne very similarly when La Roquette explains that a policeman addresses the final monologue of the play about religious tolerance to Louis, as if to instruct the king on state policy (36-37). All three begin to see a negative side to Molière's satires when their own profession is criticized, but become censorial upon learning that they personally might be identified as the inspiration for the role in the play.

The same logic motivates Louis to reimpose the ban on "Tartüffe" after he has defended the play's satirical methods. When the various ministers appear at court to support the ban on the performance, the king articulates a variety of reasons for allowing the play to go on. To Lionne he claims that censoring the play implies that a king fears a playwright; to Dubois he asserts that laughter is the best medicine, hence a comedy has a positive public effect that makes doctors' work easier; similarly, he promotes the positive effect for priests when false piety is satirized. And in his most generalized claim he champions the function of entertaining theater for keeping the populace happy and supportive of the monarch that promotes such theater (45). Just as his ministers changed their minds when their personal interests were threatened, Louis also reverses his opinion upon learning that Molière intends to use the proceeds from the play to finance his marriage ceremony with Armande. And

like his ministers, he has to grasp for some semi-believable reason to cloak his negative decision--to Molière's surprise, he claims to defend public decency (50). And finally, he mirrors the other statesmen when he stumbles over his expression of the ban: "[...] aber das, worauf mir doch alles ankommt und wenigstens meinem persönlichen Geschmack entspricht, Molière, das ist—das ist denn doch die— Moral! Ja, Molière[,] die Moral! Sagen Sie Paris, ich verbiete den Tartüffe nicht, das nicht--keineswegs—aber ich— (*beiseite*), was tun, um Zeit zu gewinnen?" (51). Unable to pronounce the ban, he comes up with the solution of needing to read the play before allowing its performance, a task which can be stretched out to any length of time at the king's discretion. As the highest representative of the state, the king corroborates the personal motivation of censorship already modeled by the ministers.[1]

The reservations about censorship displayed by all these state officials reiterates the injustice of censoring literature, specifically drama, at a level of discourse that encourages the transfer of their attitudes and behaviors to state officials outside the realm of the theater. The idea presented here with repetitive reinforcement is that government officials censor works out of purely personal motives. Not one of them is capable of defending their practice of censorship. Their discomfort results not only from the purely personal motivations for their about-face on the issue, but precisely because censoring the play transgresses their stated beliefs about the positive function of literary freedom. In other words, they are able to provide general policy statements

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[1]Sengle has noted that including the king in this comedy connotes "die lustspielhafte Relativierung der Königswürde und des monarchischen Systems" (Biedermeierzeit I, 186), and Gutzkow's representation of Louis as especially lascivious supports this reading. But in the context of his revolving characterization as defender of the arts/censor, Gutzkow also maintains the status of the king in order to critique his performance as a leader.

against censorship, consistently arguing that socially critical theater strengthens rather than destabilizes the state. When they act contrary to this policy, their reasons are poorly grounded, being merely pretenses to shield their personal agendas in supporting censorship.

The performance of "Tartüffe" in the final act supports the arguments made about the social function of the play, but also provides a model for the audience that furthers the potential for dramas to achieve this theorized social function through an appropriate reception. The fifth act takes place in the foyer of the king's theater box, and the performance of "Tartüffe" begins in the fifth scene and plays through the end of Urbild. Although the action on the interior stage is neither seen nor heard, the audience is repeatedly heard applauding, and the characters in the foyer frequently comment on their applause. The commentaries most often describe the audience's reception of Madeleine, for whom Louis feels an increasing attraction in the wake of Armande's rejection. But the audience also applauds the ideas presented both onstage and off. Hence the audience claps when the king enters his theater box because, as Dubois notes, they reward him for allowing the performance (70). And twice the audience's applause is interpreted as their enthusiasm and anticipation of the impending satirization of the villainous hypocrite. "Klatscht nur! Klatscht!" La Roquette remarks bitterly, "Ha, sie kosten schon Blut! —der Appetit steigert sich [...]" (ibid.). And Molière tells him after another round of applause, "Hörst du, wie sie dich schon erwarten? Die Ungeduld, dich in mir und mich in dir zu sehen, grenzt an Raserei" (74-75). This second observation points out especially that the audience is not only excited about satirical

comedy per se, but also in the specific critique of this figure—the religious hypocrite—as a social malaise.

In addition to these outbursts from the audience that reward the repeal of censorship and reinforce how the play is received as social criticism, the conversation in the foyer likewise foregrounds the ways in which the play communicates both of these themes. The effectiveness of the drama in criticizing La Roquette as a powerful and destructive individual who hides under the cloak of piety is graphically presented through the comic mix-up that ensues when Molière appears in the foyer in his costume as La Roquette. When the ministers arrive they mistake him for La Roquette, and express admiration for Molière's art when they realize it is the playwright rather than La Roquette. When La Roquette subsequently arrives, they assume that he is Molière and laud him for the effects his satire will achieve. "Die Angst, die Verlegenheit des Bösewichts—wie treffend stehen sie auf den Zügen seines Antlitzes gemalt!" (69). Lefevre responds to La Roquette's denials that he is Molière in costume, and Dubois adds, "Dieser Ausbruch der Wut wird Ihnen ausgezeichnet stehen, wenn Ihre Schandtaten, die Sie im Hause des armen Duplessis begingen, an den Tag kommen [...]" (ibid.). The ministers thus forecast exactly what La Roquette has been fearing, that the performance will clearly unmask him and lead to his deposition.

The ministers and king now also recant their support for censorship when they recognize this positive effect that the satire will have. Dubois says in reference to the ministers, "Sire, alle fangen wir an, dem erhabenen Beispiel Ew. Majestät zu folgen und uns mit dem Tartüffe zu versöhnen, seitdem Molière eine so treffende Charaktermaske gewählt hat" (ibid.), and Louis declares, "ich

mache mir ein Vergnügen daraus, [...] Frankreich zu zeigen, daß ich in Molière die Kunst, in der Verbannung und Entlarvung seiner (*auf La Roquette*) Feinde die Freiheit der Gedanken und der Gewissen ehre" (75). These speeches do not go so far as to promote the end of censorship in general, and indeed all of these characters reiterate during the course of this act their tendency to censor when it suits their personal interests. But they all recognize the need and ability for the theater to articulate legitimate social criticism. They therefore condemn censorship when it counterproductively harms the society that it is supposed to protect.

The audience's response to the performance represents self-reflexive commentary on their role. Because the performance of "Tartüffe" is never audible for the audience of Urbild, the judgments of the internal audience lack specific references and thus remain unarticulated to a certain extent. But the inclusion of audience responses obviously points toward a metanarrative function in a play that has already repeatedly signaled that its themes are intended to have implications beyond the theater. The interpretive commentary of the audience's applause does not merely provide the correct reading of the audience response to Urbild, but also focuses attention on the active role played by the interior audience. Their appreciation models the correct response, both in applauding the performances of the actors as well as indicating their positive reaction to the ideas presented during the performance, to what has been confirmed as a good play in the course of the narrative. And the actions of the king and other powerful statesmen in Urbild result either directly from the response of the public or from the anticipated public reaction to "Tartüffe." Louis refers repeatedly to his loss of esteem and popularity

among the public during the third act, and in the fifth he is lauded with applause for permitting the performance. La Roquette, as well as the other ministers, ground their arguments against the performance in its potential to harm them personally, and in the end La Roquette's fears are proven right—the play does have the power to unveil his villainy and lead to his loss of office.

## III. Conclusion

In Urbild Gutzkow better communicates the effectiveness of drama as an instigator of social change than he did in Richard Savage. While using the performance of the play to successfully depose the representative of the *status quo* power in the public sphere is the most obvious change, this "happy end" is but the result of more significant compositional differences. Gutzkow uses self-reflexive modeling of an ideal audience response less than reflexive structures, which allows him to present his beliefs more directly to his audience. This rhetorical rather than illustrative approach derives from his new choice of theme: his dramatization of a satirical playwright, as well as his focus on the personally and socially topical theme of censorship, induce him to use the more cognitive appeal of argumentation through reflexive tropes. In doing so, he more clearly fulfills the Hegelian credo of relating the content of the drama to the constitution of the public sphere.

One thing that Gutzkow does not change is the connection between good drama and criticism of the public sphere, on the one hand, and between the inappropriate use of drama and self-absorbed writers, on the other. Molière uses his play to criticize the self-indulgent, generally destructive behaviors of

social elites just as Richard Steele had in the earlier play. And like the character of Richard Savage, Chapelle wants his play performed for selfish personal reasons—to increase his own fame. But Gutzkow articulates this schema of good drama-public issues vs. bad drama-private goals more clearly by downplaying the issue of the dramatist's moral character. Molière's ethics are affirmed in comparison to the king, but this sub-plot relates only tangentially to the topic of drama. Louis's passion for Armande leads him to display a lecherous aspect that underscores Molière's proprietous relationship to her, but this contrast does not factor into the king's positive evaluation of "Tartüffe." Louis never doubts the appropriateness of Molière's play; he bans the performance on personal rather than aesthetic or political grounds and reaffirms the social benefits of the performance at the end of Urbild. The main debate over drama between Molière and Chapelle, however, eschews confirmation of their dramatic worth through their moral characters in relying on the public/private criteria. Gutzkow thus implies that the decision to write dramas criticizing public-sphere policies already confirms that the playwright is good without needing to articulate the dramatist's ethics.

In contrast to Savage, Gutzkow more prominently foregrounds the social function of drama. This occurs by virtue of the undivided focus on drama instead of the contrast with journalism, but also through the argumentative rhetoric of the debate over drama between Chapelle and Molière. In Savage the many performances convey both positive and negative models of how scripted events achieve their effects, and force the audience to evaluate the performances in reference to their outcomes on the narrative level. These performances are also scattered throughout the play, and are not always

explicitly marked as performances by grounding them in the text of a play. Gutzkow does include other performances in Urbild, but they are almost exclusively incidents in which Madeleine catches La Roquette acting exactly like the character Tartüffe from Molière's play. These scenes have the narrative function of reaffirming La Roquette as Tartüffe rather than a metanarrative function of modeling reception. Most importantly, Gutzkow positions the performance of the play-within-the-play at the end of Urbild, thereby making it the corroboration of Molière's arguments in the debate that has come before. While this proof also involves relating argumentative statements by the characters to narrative developments, the structure is the opposite of Savage: instead of interpreting the inserted performances through the resolution of the plot, the inserted performance establishes the metanarrative validity of Molière's views. The theme of drama stands out as a topic because of Chapelle's and Molière's debate, and the criteria for good drama are easier to understand because only two, diametrically opposed views are presented.

Choosing a dramatist like Molière instead of Savage also facilitates Gutzkow's presentation of drama as an effective influence on society. Whereas Savage was a relatively obscure author who only wrote one play, Molière was a renowned satirist who wrote numerous plays that criticized his contemporary world and who was influential even in court circles. Molière also modeled interests that Gutzkow held important, such as a focus on good performances and exerting influence on his contemporaries. Beyond the dramatist's relevance as a subject for dramatization, Molière's plays stand as examples of the kinds of dramas Gutzkow wants to write himself. Andrew Calder argues convincingly that although Molière avoided explicit reference to the

contemporaneous targets of his dramatic critiques, he was "famous for his telling portraits of well-known groups" (155 and ff.). This practice of veiled but evocative references to aspects of society he felt should be changed makes him an exemplary practitioner of the same tenets Gutzkow articulates in his dramatic theory. But while Molière's practice of satire makes him an obvious model, Gutzkow also distinguishes himself from his predecessor in the degree to which he tries to coerce a response to the social criticism in his plays. Calder claims that for Molière, "the salutary effects of a good comedy could be achieved only indirectly" because "the spectator is free to respond to satirical portraits in whatever way he or she wishes" (50). He implies that Molière was indifferent as to whether his criticism of individual morals would translate into progressively improving social practices or whether his audience would ignore the moral lessons in favor of merely enjoying the entertainment. As shown above, Gutzkow seeks to determine the reception to his play to the greatest possible extent.

Because of this intention, Gutzkow chooses Tartuffe from Molière's ouvre in order to take advantage of the historical background of its staging. To be sure, Gutzkow can appropriate the theme of hypocrisy for his own purposes more easily than vices such as hypochondria or preciosity. But the repeated attempts to prevent Molière from staging Tartuffe immediately evoke the topic of censorship. Although many social groups felt attacked by the content of his plays and occasionally succeded in having their performance suspended until Molière could use his influence at the court to get them back on stage, the playwright had to fight for five years before Tartuffe was finally permitted in public theaters in 1669. The single performances in 1664 and 1667 drew such a

virulent response from religious groups, including even the papal legate, that Louis XIV. was compelled to ban the performance despite his personal support for Molière. When the play was finally permitted, he used the opportunity to reiterate his intentions in a preface: "The finest passages of a serious moral treatise are all too often less effective than those of satire and for the majority of people there is no better form of reproof than depicting their faults to them: the most effective way of attacking vice is to expose it to public ridicule" (Molière 101). Gutzkow uses this credo from the preface to develop his play to a greater extent than the content of Molière's play. He also takes advantage of the fact that Tartuffe became Molière's most successful play when he includes the enthusiastic reception of the play-within-the-play and implies a continuing successful run of the performance.

Gutzkow's personal sufferings at the hands of the censor made the topic compelling for him, but it was also a matter of public discussion. In his 1871 foreword to the play he wrote, "Vorstehendes Lustspiel wurde im Sommer 1844 geschrieben und nahm seine nächste Veranlassung aus dem Geist und den Kämpfen der damaligen Zeit. Am Bundestage, in Österreich, in Sachsen, in Preußen waren die Bücher-, Zeitungs- und Dramenverbote an der Tagesordnung" (ibid.). His main goal in selecting this material was to criticize censorship because it was such a contested and popular topic. Gutzkow also published his opinions on the subject with some frequency. Already in his Forum he had claimed that freedom of the press was so fundamental that its necessity required no proofs (Brandes 274), and of course his continual battle with the censors over virtually every one of his publications was common knowledge among the reading public, and was reinforced by editorial

aphorisms in his journals. In his most detailed article on censorship, "Paragraphen einer Censurordnung" (1837), he declares, "Pressfreiheit ist der Normalzustand der Literatur; Censur ist eine Ausnahme [...] Da die Censur Ausnahme ist und nicht im Interesse der Literatur, sondern dem der Gesellschaft gehandhabt werden soll, da sie ferner nach dem Willen des Staates die Literatur weder aufheben noch in dem möglichsten Grade ihrer organischen Freiheit beschränken will; so muß die Censur eine der anschmiegsamsten, willfährigsten und nachgiebigsten Institutionen des Staates sein" (qtd. in Brandes 275). Gutzkow concedes the state's need to censor in the "interests of society," but clearly tries to minimize the scope of what may justifiably be censored by staking out a vague "organic freedom" for literary compositions. He further argues that the censors should be as lenient as possible in assessing the dangers posed to society by a literary work. In Urbild he illustrates the negative effects that can occur when censorship is easily and arbitrarily imposed, and the positive social function of allowing the play.

Gutzkow's Hegelian heritage appears more evidently in this play because he presents the relevance of the play's topics for the public sphere within a more autonomously constructed aesthetic frame. In discussing Richard Savage I noted how Gutzkow oriented his composition around Hegel's belief that comedies appropriately break the dramatic frame and comment on current events, in contradiction to his more general advocacy of the autonomy of the literary work. This clearly occurs in Urbild too, but in a manner that is simultaneously more direct and less obtrusive. In this play all of the various plot elements contribute to the resolution of the conflict. This was not the case with Steele's advocacy of satirical comedy, for example, nor for his performance

and endorsement of journalism. Whereas these sub-plots stood out as unnecessary for the plot, the debate over drama remains intrinsic to the plot while presenting dramatic theories that also have metanarrative relevance. The dialogic construction of the debate also maintains the appearance of autonomy for the events on stage better than the monologic, often *ad spectatores* speeches in Savage. Nevertheless, as I have argued, the discussion about drama between Molière and Chapelle still stands out as a debate with metanarrative connotations despite its narrative relevance. The (self-)reflexive presentation of the function of drama in turn sets up the metanarratively relevant topic of censorship without resorting to direct appeals or argumentation to the audience.

But Gutzkow apparently subverts Hegel's notions of the proper focus of modern drama. In his essential definition of comedy, the purely subjective focus of humor functions to present the individual as completely self-determining: "Der allgemeine Boden für die Komödie ist daher eine Welt, in welcher sich der Mensch als Subjekt zum vollständigen Meister alles dessen gemacht hat, was ihm sonst als der wesentliche Gehalt seines Wissens und Vollbringens gilt; eine Welt, deren Zwecke sich deshalb durch ihre eigene Wesenlosigkeit zerstören" (15: 527). This conception makes the events of the real world irrelevant to the individual as a subject, rendering the setting an unimportant backdrop for showing how characters maintain their identities as subjects despite tribulations. Hegel uses this definition to underpin his argument that art ceases to communicate essential information about the condition of the individual in the world. By viewing the comedy as a diremption of the individual from any meaningful engagement with the

surrounding world, Hegel argues that "die Komödie [führt] zugleich zur Auflösung der Kunst überhaupt" (15: 572). For him, the condition of humans can no longer be sensually represented in the arts, but rather only explained by theological or philosophical arguments. He thus positions the comedic play as the last stage of his genealogy of the arts in order to fulfill the teleology of his system by organically bridging the passage from the representation of self-assured subjectivity to the assumption that all individuals are so constituted.

But Hegel also believes that drama, and especially comedy, encourages its audience to engage in social criticism by criticizing events and institutions in the public sphere. In Ancient Greek drama, the characters stood as "individuelle Repräsentanten" of the gods, and the outcome of their conflicts demonstrated lessons about "die wesentlichen Lebensmächte" in the tragedy and, in the comedy, "die allgemeine Verkehrtheit [...], zu der sich in der Gegenwart und Wirklichkeit selbst die Grundrichtungen des öffentlichen Daseins umgewandelt haben" (ibid. 536). Tragedies thus provided models of how individuals should engage with other members of their society, but comedies offered direct commentary on social issues. Because Hegel believes that the characters of modern drama no longer represent gods, he claims that their views are no longer underwritten by divine authority and therefore express only subjectively held views. But he still ascribes a deeper insight into human affairs to the literary author, and therefore deems the modern drama able to communicate "das Walten einer höheren Weltregierung, sei es als Vorsehung oder Schicksal" (ibid. 537-38). These comments reassert a significant function for the social setting that specifically present the modern comedy as a forum for articulating authorial views about public-sphere issues.

Gutzkow adheres to this conception of the prophetic faculties of the author, and tries to prove this function in his play when he shows how drama can effectively influence public opinion.

Gutzkow's development from prose writing to drama, and from tragedy to comedy, relies on deeper aspects of Hegel's philosophy than the superficial correspondence to Hegel's dictate that comedy is the highest art form. In Savage the preoccupation with the relationship between Savage and Lady Macclesfield detracts from the messages of the sub-plots regarding the value of literature for the public sphere and how to react to performances. This split evidences Gutzkow's struggle over his Hegelian program of communicating social criticism to his audience, on the one hand, and developing an aesthetically coherent and entertaining plot, on the other. This struggle manifests itself in the earlier play as a dilemma between genres, where the more literary drama is paired with the more argumentative journalism, and in the dual elements of satire and the advocacy of comedy and the composition of the work as a tragedy. Urbild uses the same structural strategies of reflexivity as Savage to spotlight literature as a means of communicating to the audience. But it succeeds in intertwining the public sphere interests with the development of the main plot and using satire to expose faults in public policies and officials. These features make it a more successful representation of Gutzkow's adherance to the Hegelian belief that art can effect social changes by inducing the audience to act on the message of the work.

The plays about playwrights are but the most obvious examples of reflexivity in Gutzkow's dramas, but this structure pervades all of his works. In conclusion I will point out his usage of this trope in other plays that exhibit a

political tendency through other means as well. The (self-)reflexive appeals to the audience represent the more authentically, deep-rooted allegiance to Hegel's notions of the function of drama than do the themes. As a contrast, I will also look at two other playwrights, Friedrich Hebbel and Heinrich Laube. Hebbel has been seen as a paradigmatic Hegelian dramatist, but, as I will argue, only in the superficial sense that I have shown to be less pertinent for Gutzkow's adherence to Hegelian aesthetics. Laube, the only other Young German to achieve success at writing drama, also engages in self-reflexive structures in his own plays, but without the communicative intention that marks Gutzkow's usage. These comparisons will highlight Gutzkow's uniqueness in choosing self-reflexivity as a strategy for realizing the political potential of art that Hegel claims for it.

## Chapter 5: Conclusion

In the previous chapters I have traced two important facets of Gutzkow's development as a socially critical writer. First, he borrows the underlying systematic conception of the social function of art from Hegel's philosophy rather than orienting himself on the norms for artistic composition that Hegel describes in the Ästhetik. Second, Gutzkow then uses self-reflexive constructions in his literary works in order to model the successful realization of this theoretical social function for his audience. In conclusion I will elaborate the relevance of Gutzkow's praxis by comparing his strategies to some of his contemporaries. Other authors of the period also looked to Hegel's aesthetics as a guide for their intentions in writing literary works as well as for their conceptions of literary forms. Likewise, other writers availed themselves of self-reflexive constructions in their literary works. Gutzkow, however, was the only one to use self-reflexivity as a strategy for achieving his understanding of the Hegelian aesthetic program. While an exhaustive comparison to other like-minded writers of the period would comprise a study of its own, I will contextualize Gutzkow's practices against those of the two most similar contemporary playwrights. I will first show how Friedrich Hebbel interprets and applies Hegel's ideas about art differently from Gutzkow. While both authors share the belief in a social relevance of literature, Hebbel borrows directly from the Ästhetik, as opposed to Gutzkow's interpretation of systematic elements, and hence develops an entirely different theory of literary form and function than Gutzkow. I will then compare Gutzkow's plays about

playwrights to such a play by Heinrich Laube in order to demonstrate the functionality Gutzkow achieves for self-reflexive elements. Laube, the only other Young German to write plays, also incorporated literary figures into his dramas. But in his clearest example of such structures, Die Karlsschüler, Laube uses these elements for purely narrative functions rather than metanarrative communication to his audience. I will conclude by contextualizing these differences through the critique of Young Germany by Friedrich Engels. Engels not only provides specific criticisms of Gutzkow, but also approaches Gutzkow's works as failed attempts at Hegelian social criticism. I will use Engels's judgments to relate Gutzkow's differences from Hebbel and Laube as unique practices that have been judged mistakes or left unnoticed.

**I. Friedrich Hebbel**

Hebbel and Gutzkow were personally acquainted with each other, and generally regarded each other's works positively. Their judgments on each other were tainted by their rivalry, for as Gutzkow notes in his memoirs, both were hailed as the "Messias der deutschen Bühne" (Ausgewählte Werke 11: 40). But Gutzkow wrote favorable reviews for Hebbel's Judith and Genoveva even though most critics disliked these works. He points out that dissenting from the majority jeopardized his reputation as a theater critic, thus implying that these reviews expressed his true convictions (ibid. 41). For his part, Hebbel claims in his essay "Mein Wort über das Drama" that Gutzkow's review of Genoveva was less than favorable, and he is unwilling to champion Gutzkow as a literary talent (Werke 3: 322-23). But he also defends Gutzkow's ability to

develop plays that effectively communicate ideas and recognizes Gutzkow as an important figure in the "Regeneration" of German theater in the 1840's (ibid. 321 ff.).

Hebbel reservedly praised Gutzkow as a writer of socially critical works. He classifies "das soziale Drama" as one that directly addresses contemporary social issues—"in die Gegenwart hineingreift"—and defines his own practice as inclusive of, but not as direct as, such social criticism (ibid. 311, 313). Hebbel supports "Zeitpoesie [...] insofern sie dem Augenblick wirklich dient," that is, as long as such plays constructively criticize rather than just "scolding" ("Schelten"), and as long as their "epigrammatisch-rhetorische Existenz" is not mistaken for an aesthetic quality and advocated as the primary attribute of a play (ibid. 342). In this regard he promotes Gutzkow as a model playwright of socially critical drama precisely because the latter depicts "der Mensch im Kampf mit der Gesellschaft" by showing the social causes of this conflict, "ihre tiefere Notwendigkeit," rather than motivating such conflict through arbitrary character traits (ibid. 322 ff.). Hebbel is, however, quick to point out Gutzkow's limitations as solely a dramatist of social criticism, and he cannot praise any of Gutzkow's first four plays without expressing reservations about each one and about the series collectively due to their lack of purely aesthetic merits. Hebbel's limited tolerance of socially critical plays and his censure regarding Gutzkow's dramatic productions indicate that he considers social criticism a valid, albeit unaesthetic, element of plays.

Despite these misgivings, Hebbel lauds Gutzkow's success at communicating social criticism through satirical comedy. In an 1849 review of a performance of Das Urbild des Tartüffe at Vienna's Burgtheater, Hebbel

highlights Gutzkow's choice of comedic form as the successful means to incorporate commentary of specific relevance to the contemporaneous audience. He expects Gutzkow to provide social criticism in his plays, but has hitherto been disappointed by the absence of an illusion of autonomy for his dramatic works. However, he does not condemn Gutzkow for including themes directly relevant to contemporaneous events or social issues, but rather cites that Gutzkow's inopportune choice of tragedy over comedy as the cause of the aesthetic deficiencies of his plays. Hebbel claims that tragic drama can only be successful in a perfect form, but that every comedy has "Wert und Verdienst" (3: 387). He praises Gutzkow for achieving three potentialities of comedy: including reflections on specific rather than universal human issues, criticizing erroneous or ideological conceptions of society, and satirizing current events and people. For Urbild Hebbel especially notes Gutzkow's success, on the model of Molière himself, on this last point: "Dialogisierte, und wenn man lieber will, personifizierte Satire ist es denn auch, was Gutzkow im 'Urbild des Tartüffe' gibt. Nicht Menschen mit Fleisch und Blut treten vor uns hin, sondern Typen" (ibid.). Hebbel seems to disparage Gutzkow's ability to create characters, but the context of his review shows that he believes such underdeveloped characters are appropriate for Gutzkow's intentions as well as for the comedic form. Although Hebbel himself writes almost exclusively tragedies, he agrees with Gutzkow's developing practice of using satire as an effective means for criticizing the public sphere.

Hebbel responds to Hegel's philosophy with criticisms similar to Gutzkow's. In her thorough investigation of Hebbel's interpretations of Hegel, Birgit Fenner brings out his explicit disagreements with the philosopher over

the function of art. In a passage from his correspondence Hebbel claims that philosophy mediates in some indeterminate but important way between art and nature. However, he categorizes philosophy as reflection and privileges art and nature as action: "Ganz gewiß ist die That das Höchste und nur die Kunst Thut, nur die Natur Thut" (sic; qtd in Fenner 29). Hebbel thus disputes Hegel's systematically determined prevalence of philosophical explanations that leads the philosopher to posit the "end" of art. He instead links art to the real world by making it an active agent of change. This is clearly reminiscent of Gutzkow's main criticism of Hegel's philosophy: it functions well as an analytical tool, but is incapable of engendering action that changes the world. Their common definition of art as "Tat" also underscores their mutual belief in the relevance of drama for their contemporary society. This position leads Hebbel to critique Hegel's teleological construction of history in the same terms as Gutzkow. Both dramatists claim that works of art can influence the historical world rather than providing merely documentary evidence of such change, as Hegel implies. Hebbel's reading of Hegel thus echoes Gutzkow's program to maintain the relevance of the aesthetic work for social issues despite Hegel's skepticism about such a function in modernity.

In contrast to Gutzkow, however, Hebbel adheres to certain tenets on composition and themes that correspond to Hegel's aesthetics. Fenner cites evidence in Hebbel's journals and correspondence of his intensive study of the Ästhetik, and quotes his claim that his conception of tragic fate exactly coincides with Hegel's definition (28). While Hebbel does not cite Hegel as his source, the fact that he agrees with a specific concept from Hegel's aesthetics marks a difference to Gutzkow. This admission, coupled with Hebbel's almost

exclusive composition of tragedies, points especially to Hegel's theories of Classical Greek tragedy as the most influential section of the Ästhetik for Hebbel. His devotion to tragedy leads him to advocate the same kinds of themes and structures for drama that Hegel describes in this section, especially regarding the universal relevance of the dramatic events.

Hegel establishes the ancient Greek tragedy as the paradigm for the form and content of this genre. He claims that the historical conditions of classical Greek culture allowed the individual to represent a single ethical trait. Greek dramatists were therefore able to portray a conflict between two equally justifiable ethical beliefs as a clash of two characters, and their audience would immediately sympathize with the situation of both characters. Hegel compares Shakespeare's plays to classical Greek works to show how changed values in composition and reception have made modern plays less accessible. Above all, he cites the modern tendency to flesh out characters with nuanced, subjective personalities as a hindrance for the audience's understanding of a character's moral code. Hegel then states, "Die antiken Stoffe hingegen werden zu keiner Zeit ihre Wirkung verfehlen" (Werke 15: 499). Although he elsewhere denies that antiquated artistic forms can be revived to achieve their original function in a later historical era, his formulation here implies that classical tragedy will always achieve an effective response.

Hebbel's tragedies attempt such an anachronistic rejuvenation of these formal traits. He constructs his characters not only as obsessed with a single moral tenet, but also as intransigent in their fixation to an improbable degree. Herbert Kaiser correctly reads these structures as Hebbel's adherence to a

formal imperative,[1] although Kaiser does not cite the similarities to Hegel's presentation of classical tragedy. Similarly, Heinz Schlaffer describes Hebbel's predominant tendency to dramatize mythical stories as a formal characteristic. He claims that Hebbel "biegt die Tragödie in eine mythische Welt strikter Schicksalhaftigkeit zurück," but that "der rekonstruierte Mythos imitiert den ursprünglichen nur im Hinblick auf seine tragische Funktion" (128). For Schlaffer, the post-Enlightenment world could not accept characters in a contemporary setting who were unable to avoid their tragic, preordained fate through Reason. Hebbel therefore has to locate his tragedies in a distant or mythical time in order to achieve the "strict conception of fate" that tragedy, especially as defined by Hegel, depends upon. The formal attributes of classical tragedy that Hegel describes in the Ästhetik thus appear as the same guidelines Hebbel uses for composing his plays.

For Hebbel, form becomes a fundamental guarantor for the universality of the dramatic message in his theory and practice of tragedy. He designates tragedy as the paradigmatic dramatic form because it incorporates the only human characteristic he deems universal, guilt:

> [Die Kunst] hat die Vereinzelung durch die ihr eingepflanzte Maßlosigkeit selbst immer wieder aufzulösen und die Idee von ihrer mangelhaften Form zu befreien gewußt. In der Maßlosigkeit liegt die Schuld, zugleich aber auch, da das Vereinzelte nur darum maßlos ist, weil es, als unvollkommen, keinen Anspruch auf Dauer hat und deshalb auf seine eigene *Zerstörung* hinarbeiten muß, die Versöhnung, soweit im

[1] "Die Figuren handeln nicht aus sich, sondern stehen unter dem Diktat der 'Notwendigkeit.' Ihr Bezugssystem ist nicht personal, ethisch, sondern ganzheitlich, ästhetisch begründet" (9). Kaiser underscores Hebbel's orientation on aesthetic form over the apparent thematic orientation on ethics.

> Kreise der Kunst darnach gefragt werden kann. Diese Schuld ist eine uranfängliche, von dem Begriff des Menschen nicht zu trennende und kaum in sein Bewußtsein fallende; sie ist mit dem Leben selbst gesetzt. (Werke 3: 327)

In Hebbel's formulation "Schuld" can only be defined as "tragic flaw" once it has been transposed into the aesthetic work. But he claims it is intrinsic to individuality, and in fact so basic that most people are unconscious of its existence. In its unarticulated, everyday occurrence the immoderate or obsessive pursuit of the individual's goal may not appear as a flaw; tragedy magnifies and thus exposes it as a flaw and depicts the tragic repercussions of the individual's fixation. By articulating this mania as a flaw that has general relevance to all people, Hebbel claims that art can achieve a "Versöhnung," a positive reconciliation to the immoderation because of the tragic results that accrue to the individual. Although the tragic character suffers, the inevitable death that awaits all humans is compensated for by the fact that the drama elevates the character's story into universal relevance, placing it beyond time and death. Hebbel's ideal play is thus a tragedy that achieves its connection to the audience by making the abstract notion of tragic flaw accessible through its representation in drama.

Hebbel also promotes an atemporal relevance for the ideas communicated by modern plays if they avoid reference to contemporary society. He assures playwrights, even if the times in which they write are inhospitable for an appropriately appreciative reception of their works, "daß die Geschichte zur rechten Stunde jeden Goldfaden in ihr großes Gewebe zu verflechten wissen wird" (ibid. 318). This passive formulation of the author's

attitude toward the reception of his or her play repudiates all the social and economic factors that affect playwrights of the period, emphasizing instead an ahistorical, individual relevance of dramas. Hebbel also suggests here that the content of a good drama needs to be so universal as to be comprehensible even by audiences in the future that may have very different conditions of reception. He makes this point by urging playwrights not to pay attention to the reviews of their plays, but instead to write for the "Theater aller Zeiten," (ibid. 345), an abstract conception of all potential audiences.

To achieve this effect, Hebbel argues that the dramatic events should also not be perceivable as imitating the events of the world. He claims that the drama functions in essence as "symbolic" signification, "daß das Drama nicht bloß in seiner Totalität, wo es sich von selbst versteht, sondern daß es schon in jedem seiner Elemente symbolisch ist und als symbolisch betrachtet werden muß [...]" (ibid. 310). Significantly, Hebbel formulates this thought as a demand for the reception of plays rather than as a compositional rule. His intention is to direct theater audiences toward a non-immediate mode of interpreting plays. He already assumes a common understanding "as a whole" of the drama as a symbolic communication; his point here is that each part of the drama needs to be understood as having symbolic relevance for other parts and for the entire composition. He explains himself further with an analogy from painting: the red cheeks and blue eyes of a portrait are not painted by using a distillate from these parts of the body, but are rather represented through artificial paints and dyes. Relating this back to the drama, the individuals and scenes within the play are not representatives of actual people and situations, but are rather the materials the playwright uses like paint to evoke a representative whole picture

of the world. But for Hebbel neither the constituent parts nor the whole should be directly mimetic of conditions in the world.

Hebbel's points of agreement with Hegel's conception of tragedy help explicate the wide divergence between the kinds of plays he and Gutzkow produce. Hebbel attempts to relate universal human conditions through a strict formal construction of tragedy. This leads him to set his plays and restrict the actions of his characters in ways that hinder correspondences between the dramatic and real worlds. He also believes that tragedy functions most universally as an impetus for individual ethical changes. Gutzkow, on the other hand, advocates change at a social level and direct appeals to the audience in order to instigate connections between the staged events and contemporary issues in the public sphere. Their common belief that works of art can change the world while philosophy can merely describe it does not translate into a common dramatic practice. Instead, they choose different contexts for the effects they intend with their works, prefer different genres and appeal to the audience through radically different structures.

## II. Heinrich Laube

From a biographical point of view, Laube is certainly the most apt comparison to Gutzkow as a writer during the *Vormärz* period. Both began to write and edit journals from 1830 on, and both were able to bypass the ban on Young German publications, successfully pursuing their journalistic writings in the late 1830's and through the 1840's. Both wrote primarily novels, travelogues, and literary history during the 1830's, then suddenly switched to

composing dramas around 1840. Moreover, both had substantial successes with some of their dramas during the 1840's. Although their careers diverged after 1848—Laube became director of Vienna's Burgtheater while Gutzkow returned to writing novels—both continued to write plays sporadically during the 1850's.

Laube, however, does not share Gutzkow's interest in drawing on philosophical aesthetics to develop his dramatic praxis. Laube includes in his literary history a section on aesthetic theories of philosophers from Kant through Hegel, but he does not affiliate himself with any of their programs. Nor does he aim to fulfill any theoretical goal in constructing his plays. He claims that he began writing plays only because his wife coerced him into developing a monologue he'd written into a full play. And when the success of this first play inspires him to write more, he chooses topics as he comes across interesting anecdotes in history books or literary works (Werke 3: 342-43). When Laube writes plays about playwrights, then, he is not seeking out a construction that allows him to present his thoughts on the profession of dramatist or the process of composition, but is rather inspired to dramatize a literary or historical event that appeals to his creative impulse. This approach diametrically opposes Gutzkow's, who chooses subject matter on the basis of its conduciveness for mediating social criticism.

Laube does develop a theoretical program of encouraging German nationalism through his plays by dramatizing important historical events and figures. In the foreword to Monaldeschi he promotes historical drama as history elaborated by commentary: "[Die Idee im Kunstwerk] muß nicht bloß gedacht, es muß entstanden, es muß geworden sein. Die Poesie hat es nur

auszusprechen, die Kunst hat es nur zu gestalten, es muß vorhanden sein, wenn auch nicht für den Alltagsblick; es muß Geschichte sein, oder wenigstens auf dem Punkte der Reife stehen, um durch die Tat des Künstlers als geschichtlich empfunden und anerkannt zu werden" (ibid. 11). By this formula the dramatist elaborates what makes historical events significant, or at least designates what events should be considered historical and important. The underlying idea remains for Laube that the historical events distinguish themselves as relevant, and the artist merely reformulates them to assure that their significance is understood in the contemporary context. While this practice retains the potential for the writer to express social criticism, his arguments against Prussian censorship of noble historical figures reveals his ideological rather than critical intentions. He protests the blanket prohibition against dramatizing past Hohenzollern and other ruling Prussian families because it deprives the drama of its ability to promote German unification:

> Heutiges Tages durchsetzen wollen: daß die historischen Figuren der Nation von der Teilnahme dieser Nation ausgeschlossen sein sollen, daß die großen Theater ohne Verbindung bleiben sollen mit dem tieferen Bedürfnis der Nation, das ist eine Unmöglichkeit. Besteht man darauf [...], so ist das unvermeidliche Resultat folgendes: Man kommt allgemein zum Bewußtsein, daß diese Theater den Charakter von Privattheatern erhalten. (Theaterkritiken 246)

In framing this debate between the polarities of harmless private theaters and nation-building historical drama, Laube elides any reference to the possibility of using historical events to comment critically on contemporaneous events. The intensity of his disagreement with this censorial policy in fact gives the

impression that using national historical events and figures for any other reason than encouraging a consciousness of national identity has never crossed his mind. His naïve and uncritical use of historical material contrasts sharply with Gutzkow's practice of encouraging his audience to relate the socially critical aspects of the historical situation to contemporary events.

Although both authors wrote plays about playwrights, this topic exposes further differences in both their intentions and in their compositional structures. In the self-commentary he provides in the forewords to his plays on dramatists, Laube claims that well-known writers can also be dramatized to foment nationalism. In the foreword to Die Karlsschüler he maintains that using German poets is an acceptable alternative to figures from the historical ruling families because "in den Schicksalen unsrer Poeten der uns allen gemeinschaftliche Funke zu suchen sei" (Werke 3: 9). This "common ember" reflected in the "fates" of German authors can only be the belief in a unified Germany. And although Laube would prefer to use political leaders from German history, he believes he can unify the nation around representative cultural figures that unite Germans in the same manner as those rulers: "[G]erade des Dramatikers Beruf kann es sein, [...] Sünden der Literatur zur Absolution zu bringen dadurch, daß er Poeten zu Helden auf der Bühne macht, welche geliebte Eigenschaften der Nation und nicht bloß der Literatur an sich tragen. Dadurch wird eine Ausgleichung möglich für beide Teile, für Literatur und für Nation" (Werke 2: 297-98). This explication of his choice of figures for his play Gottsched und Gellert refines the notion of dramatist as national hero by subordinating what constitutes good literature to the nationalist program. Although he presents his intentions as somehow synthesizing literary and

national history, the task he outlines for dramatists is to "purge the sins" of the literary figures by bringing out or infusing them with nationalist characteristics. The play itself, as he admits in the foreword, has nothing to do with the debate between the two authors over literary topics such as the Hanswurst in German drama, but rather claims to present a comedic satirization of "der deutsche Pedant" and "der deutsche Gelehrte" (ibid. 296). In actuality, however, it provides a series of situations in which German unification can be valorized (cf. Weiglin 114-29). The role of the dramatist is largely ignored and an assessment of the literary value of these two authors is deferred to the comparison of their allegiance to nationalist sentiments.

Laube's different intentions regarding the function of portraying the literary author within a play lead him to weaken the self-reflexive aspect of dramatizing a dramatist in Die Karlsschüler. In this play he presents the conflict between the young Schiller and Herzog Karl von Württemberg over the content of Schiller's play Die Räuber. Laube restricts Schiller to championing nationalism and does not allow the figure of the playwright to articulate a theory of drama. Laube does, however, include two performances of plays within his play. Schiller has a role in both: first as an actor playing the lead in Clavigo, then as the acclaimed author of Die Räuber. Both roles inform Laube's audience about aspects of the conflict between the Duke and Schiller, and do bring out Schiller's intentions to break away from merely formal compositional rules as a dramatist. But neither performance significantly communicates ideas about either the metatheatrical function of drama in society or of the audience in bridging the ideas of the theater with the larger world.

The performance of Goethe's Clavigo allows Schiller to present himself

in opposition to the title character he plays and hence in opposition to the aesthetic values of the Duke. While Schiller believes that literary works should reflect the interests and insights of the genius author, the Duke sees aesthetic value only in works that comply with traditional stylistic norms and unprovocative themes. Schiller balks at playing a royally appointed writer who is more concerned with his status at the court than with the authenticity of the works he creates. He therefore asks the Duke to let him play a different role, "da sie [die Rolle von Clavigo] meinem Wesen ganz und gar nicht zusagt," (Werke 3: 53), but the Duke denies his request. For his part, the Duke is determined to force Schiller to obey the wishes of his ruler and give a good performance even of a role that does not appeal to him. The actual performance of the play reaffirms their initial positions in this conflict. The Duke storms onto the stage after stopping the performance of Clavigo in the middle. He rages to Schiller, "Er hat ja die Rolle gesprochen, wie ein Schulbube, Er hat sie geheult, statt sie zu sprechen, Er spricht schwäbisch statt deutsch. Er hat keine Vorstellung von Übergängen und Nüancen, Er hat also auch keine Vorstellung von einem Kunstwerke" (ibid. 104). The Duke inflates Schiller's lack of focus on speaking his part well to an incompetence in aesthetic productions whatsoever. And Schiller clearly sabotages the performance, for even the women of the court who typically defend his actions against the Duke confirm that he acts the part very poorly. This very minor plot line of the Clavigo performance thus helps identify the conflict over aesthetics as a main issue of the frame play, although it does not significantly elaborate either character's aesthetic program.

The performance of Die Räuber in Mannheim establishes Schiller as an

authentic artist and verifies the impotence of the Duke to stop historical progress. In the final scene of the play a letter arrives which the Duke believes will contain the confiscated manuscript of Die Räuber from Mannheim. The letter is read out loud and confirms on the contrary that the play has been performed to great acclaim, especially for its author. The correspondent writes:

> [...] es war der Sieg deutschen Talentes über das französische Theater, von welchem wir bisher abhängig, [...] es war ein Sieg, welcher Deutschland eine große dichterische Zukunft verspricht, und deshalb hab' ich von Herzen eingestimmt in den allgemeinen Jubelruf [...]: Es lebe der schwäbische Jüngling, in welchem der Genius unsers Vaterlandes einen großen Dichter erweckt hat, einen Dichter, welcher Außerordentliches leisten und unsre Kinder und Kindeskinder noch entzücken wird, es lebe Friedrich Schiller! (ibid. 145-46).

Schiller is thus confirmed in precisely the attributes that he articulated elsewhere in the play for the true poet: as a genius whose work has a nationalistic effect on its audience, and has more than just local and temporally limited effect. And the confirmation of Schiller as a poet, as well as the applause for the work as thematically relevant, indicts the Duke's world-view as outmoded, a fact he explicitly concedes (ibid.).

Laube's plays-within-the-play support arguments made in the plot of his play, functioning almost entirely on the level of content. Both acts of reception are far more mediated than in Gutzkow's plays. Although the Duke and others report about the reception of the Clavigo performance—that Schiller was terrible, that the Russian lord yawned throughout and completely lost interest in the second act—Laube's audience does not hear or see these responses

directly, nor do they hear parts of the performance. The same is true of the Räuber performance, which is reported via letter. Thus none of the modeling structures that Gutzkow presented so explicitly to his audiences are included in Laube's play. And even the enthusiastic reception of Die Räuber does not promote any sense of the way in which theater can effect social change. Instead of responding to the content of this "revolutionary" play, the audience reportedly celebrates the future fame of the play's author. This projects the image of Schiller as a national poet rather than as a socially critical writer, and leaves the potential articulation of the aesthetic values and innovations of Die Räuber undeveloped.

### III. Gutzkow

In his 1842 review of Alexander Jung's literary history, Friedrich Engels critiques Gutzkow in ways that highlight contemporary beliefs about what constitutes a Hegelian writer and what characterizes literature as political. Engels labels Young German literature "die Unphilosophie" and accuses Jung of inaccurately deriving thte group's literary theory from Hegelian philosophy. For Engels, the Young Germans completely misunderstood Hegel as "der Prophet der subjektiven Autonomie" (360). He specifically notes that Gutzkow polemicized against Hegel, thus implying that the philosopher did not influence Gutzkow at all (359). Engels goes on to praise Gutzkow as the "clearest" writer among the group, but he also criticizes Gutzkow's recent productions:

> Will er auf dem dramatischen Gebiet bleiben, so sorge er indes für

> bessere, ideenvollere Stoffe, als er sie bisher gewählt hat [...]. Wir verlangen mehr Gedankengehalt als die liberalen Phrasen des Patkul oder die weiche Empfindsamkeit des Werner. Wozu Gutzkow viel Talent hat, ist die Publizistik. (367)

Engels singles out Patkul and Werner, two of Gutzkow's early plays that advocate and represent the socially critical function of drama the least. On this basis Engels concludes that writing plays is a waste of Gutzkow's talent since these dramas only communicate "liberal slogans" or dramatize bourgeois infidelities. Engels sees Gutzkow as an articulate social critic in the argumentative genre of journalism, and thus advises him to quit writing literary works.

Contrary to Engels's opinion, Hegel exerts a great influence on Gutzkow. Engels looks for an exact reconstruction of Hegelian thought in Young German works, and condemns them as un-Hegelian because he doesn't find such elements. A similar attitude has led other critics, most recently Erich Fritscher (51 ff.), to conclude that Gutzkow was a Hegelian playwright because some of his dramatic practices correspond to certain statements in Hegel's Ästhetik. This methodology functions well for Hebbel, who critically read the published form of Hegel's lectures and articulated his agreement with selected points. These points can be seen within Hebbel's works despite the dramatist's stated disagreements with Hegel's philosophy. Engels, among others, does not refer to Gutzkow's essays, but rather assumes that differences between Hegel's theories and Gutzkow's works result from misunderstandings or refutations on Gutzkow's part. Gutzkow, however, isolates tenets from Hegel's philosophy and, while agreeing with some aspects, develops alternative conclusions to

Hegel. In his aesthetic theory and literary works, these alternatives appear almost exclusively as disagreements rather than conformity with Hegel's ideas. Gutzkow's appropriations only emerge when his criticisms of Hegel are examined in the context of his strategies for influencing his audience.

In particular, Gutzkow's strategy of directly addressing the audience seems at odds with Hegel's aesthetics. Hegel repeatedly praises universal relevance and closed form as the main criteria of good art. When he criticizes "Manier" in the Ästhetik, he thus invokes "allgemeine Seele and Substanz" and "in sich vollendet abgerundete" form against "eine nur diesem [Künstler] angehörige Konzeption und zufällige Eigentümlichkeit der Ausführung" for composing works of art (13: 375 ff.). Hebbel clearly affirms these directives through his theory and practice of tragedy. Laube also intends at least a national relevance for his works, and generally maintains a closed frame in his plays. Gutzkow, however, makes overt reference to current affairs and social issues, and in doing so breaks the dramatic frame, thereby limiting to some extent the temporal and topical relevance of his works. But Gutzkow orients himself around Hegel's notion of the social function of art rather than around his aesthetic theory. He refutes axioms of Hegel's philosophy such as the passive role for the individual, including the artist, and the teleological conception of historical progress. By doing so, he also contests the "end" of art and maintains the theoretical potential of art to change society. In practice, though, his desire to incorporate argumentation into his literary works induces him to break with the traditional conceptions of aesthetic autonomy that Hegel endorses. Thus the strategies he develops to maintain the socially critical function of literature result in a literary praxis at odds with the tenets of the

Ästhetik.

Self-reflexivity becomes a cornerstone of these strategies and a common feature of Gutzkow's works. Although Engels's testimony points out that it is not omnipresent, Gutzkow incorporates self-reflexive tropes throughout his career and across literary genres. His earliest novel evidences this practice in its epistolary form and preoccupation with book reviews, and he continues to refine self-reflexive structures in his subsequent prose works. In the plays about playwrights, however, it becomes very clear that Gutzkow wants to focus attention on the capacity of literary texts to influence their audience. In these plays he shows the audience the intentions of the writers and the effects their works have on the interior audience. This contrasts significantly with other practitioners of the trope, such as Laube, who make little or no use of the metanarrative ramifications of self-reflexive structures. My discussion of Gutzkow's playwright plays provides a reading of the function he intended for the self-reflexive discussion of literary works, and points toward two areas of further interest: to explore why he was so unique in using this construction the way he did, and to suggest a consistent usage of inserted literary creations in his works where their function is not highlighted to such a degree as in these plays.

Surprisingly, Gutzkow's use of self-reflexivity has escaped serious investigation. Only Paul Weiglin focuses on Gutzkow's consistent use of the author figure to communicate social criticism, and his study does not analyze the function of the literary work within Gutzkow's plays.[1] But there has been no subsequent reference to self-reflexivity in Gutzkow's works beyond the

[1] Gutzkows und Laubes Literaturdramen, 1910.

autobiographical aspects, which again center on the figure of the author. Gutzkow's reputation as a political writer certainly underlies this omission. Other structures in his works, and especially the topics he chooses to write about, inform the audience of his socially critical intentions. That he presents the political function of literary works thus contributes, but does not define, his identification as a political writer. The fact that he never remarked on this trope in either his public or private writings also detracts attention despite its repeated appearance in his works. So although audiences and readers have understood the political ramifications of his works, no one seems to have perceived that while he was "sprinkling liberal phrases," he was also advertising and teaching how literature can be understood as advocating social change.

Besides elaborating these underexplored elements of Gutzkow's literary theory and dramatic production, my analysis has bridged two periods of his literary career that are rarely interpreted with a view toward their continuity. The journalistic, novelistic and theoretical writings of the 1830's have generated the most interest in scholarship on Gutzkow, indeed almost to the point of ignoring the rest of his career. And when his dramas or later novels are interpreted, the theories developed in the Thirties are referenced inadequately. But Gutzkow clearly follows basic notions about the function of art that he develops in this first phase of his career when he rather suddenly shifts to writing dramas in 1839. Although I have restricted my analysis to the period from 1830 to 1848—for this second date represents yet another reorientation in his literary activities—I do not wish to imply a sudden abandonment or disjuncture of the Hegelian and self-reflexive tropes in his literary theory and

works. Indeed, even though his production after 1848 is dominated by his novels and novelistic theory, he also pens the plays Der Königsleutnant (1849) and Lorbeer und Myrte (1857) which both contain artists as main characters. My study thus constitutes a beginning point from which to work toward an articulation of self-reflexivity as Gutzkow's innovative realization of socially relevant art.

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## Vita

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