



Task Force 2010

Succeeding Failure

**A Comprehensive Approach to
Strengthening Fragile States**



**Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington**





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Task Force 2010

Succeeding Failure: A Comprehensive Approach to Strengthening Fragile States

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


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Succeeding Failure by Devon Cook <i>An Introduction to Fragile and Failed States</i>	pg 6
Between Rhetoric and Action by Christopher Sherman <i>Discerning the US Government's Real Interests in Failed States</i>	pg 17
Engaging with Conflict in Fragile States by Shannon O'Neill-Creighton <i>The Importance and Significance of a Non-Violent Approach</i>	pg 47
Advancing Growth by Taryn Elledge <i>Where US Intervention Policy Coincides with Development</i>	pg 76
The Regional Dynamics Imperative by Rachel Proefke <i>Addressing the Exogenous Aspects of State Failure</i>	pg 101
Looking Forward by Amanda Shockley <i>Grasping Opportunity in the Event of a Failed North Korean State</i>	pg 125
Burma by Brian Steyer <i>A Case Study on Prevention</i>	pg 153
Haiti by Laurel Severt <i>Opportunity in Disaster?</i>	pg 165
Somalia by Angelissa Savino <i>A Failed State with a Glimpse of Hope</i>	pg 190
Democratic Republic of Congo by Rachelle French <i>Ongoing Violence Calls for a New Approach</i>	pg 206
Afghanistan by Jessica Tarabay <i>Addressing Ethnic Divisions and Regional Dynamics Along the Road to Recovery</i>	pg 234
Sectarian Conflict in Iraq by Aisling Underwood <i>A Case Study</i>	pg 256
Bosnia by Eric Thesen <i>The Crisis in the Balkans</i>	pg 276
Lebanon by Ryan Torpie <i>An Analysis of Post-Conflict State Reconstruction Strategies and Implementations</i>	pg 299
Intervention in Failed States by Clarke Reid <i>Policy Recommendations to the US and Concluding Remarks</i>	pg 326




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Succeeding Failure

An Introduction to Fragile and Failed States

Devon Cook




What is it to succeed failure? What does it mean for a state to fail? Can the US ever provide a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the structural inadequacies that cause state failure and the humanitarian disasters that so often result? In this report we seek to do just that. By analyzing multiple cases of state failure and expanding on theoretical aspects of the issue, we hope to provide the United States government with a strategy to guide future endeavors in strengthening fragile states.

Fragile states, wherever they fall along the spectrum of failure, present a serious challenge to US foreign policy. The attacks of September 11, 2001 drew attention to the security implications of state collapse. As states fail, they become sources of terrorism, weapons proliferation, organized crime, infectious disease, environmental degradation, and regional instability.¹ Examples of the internationalization of state failure abound.

¹ Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick, "Index of State Weakness in the Developing World." (Washington, DC: 2008) 3.

Somalia affords a haven to pirates as they attack shipping lanes, disrupting the flow of international commerce and trade. The failing Yemeni government is relatively powerless to stop Al Qaeda from setting up training facilities for future terrorist attacks.

Terrorists from Yemen, pirates from Somalia, even drugs from Afghanistan and Colombia – all of these are threats to national security. One must only look to the conflagration in Central Asia, centered in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to understand the implications that state failure have for the United States. Even seemingly strong states, such as North Korea, were they ever to fail, have major implications for the US, both in a security capacity and because of the potential humanitarian disaster. Not only would the collapse of such states result in the exposure of huge weapons caches, as was seen after the USSR collapsed in 1991, but the already suffering populations would be without support. State failure perpetuates



humanitarian disasters, as seen in Rwanda, Bosnia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The US has the capacity to provide aid to prevent such catastrophes. The recent earthquake in Haiti illustrates the need for each state to develop the capacity to protect and provide for its population, and failed or failing states cannot deliver. If the US can develop a comprehensive strategy to address such situations would address many of our security concerns and improve international opinion regarding the United States in the process.


In 1918, Max Weber stated that “a state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”² This definition encapsulates the conventional Western concept of a state. Indeed, state sovereignty has been enshrined in Western law since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. And reciprocally, states have failed throughout history. However, the latter half of

² Max Weber “Politics as Vocation.” (Munich: 1918).

the 20th century has seen an unprecedented amount of change in the concept of state failure, as countries have disappeared, been renamed, subsumed, and their borders redrawn, ignored, and renegotiated. A rapid succession of state failures in the latter decade of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st, from Nigeria to the USSR to Zimbabwe,³ and the devastating consequences stemming from them, have raised questions about the international community’s approach to failed states. Indeed, the human toll of such collapses raises serious issues regarding the need for a new approach to humanitarian intervention, aid, and development.

In order to address the issue of failed or failing states, it is first necessary to develop working definitions. Most current literature, including the Brookings Institute’s *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* and Foreign Policy’s *Failed States Index*, focuses on definitions of state failure without

³ United States. US Agency for International Development. *Fragile States Strategy*. Washington, DC (USAID, 2005).



providing much in the way of guidance for understanding the process of state failure or recovery. Perhaps most pivotal in defining a failed state is first to determine what is a successful state. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) defines a successful state as one which is able to exercise authority over its sovereign territory and has adequate administrative capacity to be effective.⁴ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, experts on the subject of state failure, define state effectiveness by the ability of a state to exercise ten critical functions, including upholding the rule of law, control of a monopoly on the means of violence, and an ability to oversee international relations.⁵ The Brookings Institute also defines strong states as those that are capable of administering the

core functions of the state, but also are responsive to the needs and desires of the populace and legitimate in the eyes of their citizens.⁶ Weak states are characterized as those that have lapses in critical functions related to security, provision of basic services, and protection of essential freedoms,⁷ or as states unable or unwilling to work towards poverty reduction.⁸ Failed states, according to USAID's Fragile State Strategy, have unstable, ineffective, or illegitimate governments.⁹ The Brookings Institute defines failed states as:

...countries that lack the essential capacity and or will to fulfill four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their population.¹⁰

⁴ Magui Torres and Michael Anderson. United Kingdom. UK Department for International Development. Poverty Reduction in Difficult Environments Team Policy Division. *Fragile States: Defining Difficult Environments for Poverty Reduction* (London: PRDE, 2004) 7

⁵ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart. "The Ten Functions of the State." Institute for State Effectiveness. (Web. 15 Feb. 2010) <<http://www.effectivestates.org>>.


⁶ Rice and Patrick, 10.

⁷ Stuart E. Eizenstat, John E. Porter, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." *Foreign Affairs* 84.1 (2004). (University of Washington. Web. 20 Jan. 2010) 136.

⁸ Torres and Anderson, 3

⁹ USAID, 3

¹⁰ Rice and Patrick 3




Parabolic Continuum of State Failure

Figure 1

We accept this definition, which is broadly consistent with commonsense notions of state failure. However, this report goes beyond definitions and proposes a dynamic approach to understanding the trajectories of state failure and recovery.

Instead of looking at state failure as a static concept, in which states are assigned numerical values based on their scores on indicators such as GDP, repressive capacity,

and numbers of refugees, we emphasize the importance of the *direction* in which a state is moving. In an index such as those developed by the Brookings Institute and Foreign Policy, states that are recovering are placed with states that are failing, and one cannot differentiate between the two categories. This is important because the appropriate policy toward states in different sections of the parabola may differ. In a failing state,




preventive measures may be necessary to preclude its descent to failed status. In a recovering state, however, measures should be taken to support further improvements in governance. Keeping this continuum in mind, these are how we will conceptualize the areas on the parabola, shown above in Figure 1:

- Strong state. A state that enjoys legitimate control over its territory and provides sufficient public goods to its citizenry.
- Failing state. A state which is partly unable to maintain security and provides limited public goods.
- Failed state. A state which has lost control over security and does not provide public goods.
- Recovering state. A state which has failed, but has begun to recover control over security and is able to provide public goods.

Examples contained in this report are placed along the parabola according to their status.

Burma and North Korea, which have strong authoritarian governments, are placed as “failing” because their governments maintain power through force and provide limited goods to their citizens. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia are failed states in that they have lost control over all aspects of governance. We argue that Haiti occupies the failed portion of the continuum, due to the inability of the Haitian government to address the needs of its people following the February 2010 earthquake. Afghanistan and Iraq are recovering states because, although the state apparatus lost control over the means of violence, they have begun to recover it. Further up the continuum are Bosnia and Lebanon, because although both have legitimate control over security and are capable of delivering services, they have yet to fully recover as a result of facing paramilitary threats to their authority.

In addition to this new way of conceptualizing state failure, we are




proposing a new set of guiding principles for addressing state failure. Keeping in mind the strategic and humanitarian motivations behind US interest in failed states, these principles are meant to advise future US actions in such situations. Each principle is summarized and followed by an explanation.

- **Carry out all interventions in a sustainable manner by committing the necessary resources and planning extensively before taking action.** By conducting a comprehensive review of the resources and time necessary to address each situation, the US can avoid problems of overextension and inadequate resource commitments. We may conduct such an analysis and find the costs of action too much to bear. In such an instance, instead of committing to an intervention doomed to failure, we should consider other, less invasive, less costly measures.

Though the short-term humanitarian or security costs may be high, we can avoid making situations worse by leaving them mid-process without the aid and resources necessary to emerge from collapse. In the long term we will avoid perpetuating an impetuous and destructive image of the US, and reduce anti-American sentiment by avoiding situations where we appear to involve ourselves purposelessly. We must make sure to plan adequately for the future of each endeavor.

- **Be sensitive to the causes and contexts of state failure by incorporating local actors in an effort to address both the origins and symptoms of state failure.** In order to fully address the needs of states, the US must work in concert with actors on the ground. If we can better understand the internal causes of state failure, and implement plans



which incorporate those most directly involved in such situations, we will be better equipped to deal with the uniqueness of each case. If we do not exert every effort to understand the causes and context of each failure then we run the risk of missing crucial knowledge that may inform the outcome of our involvement in particular cases.

- **Work in concert with other states, particularly neighboring states and former colonial powers, non-state actors, and regional and international organizations.** Often state failure is a result of externalities beyond the control of a country's government or citizens. In order to tailor resources to fit each situation, we must understand these external factors which have caused failure. This may include regional actors, neighboring states, international

organizations, and others who have exacerbated the situation. Not understanding the history and interests behind state failure dooms us to repeat the mistakes of the past.

- **Realize the need for security in all endeavors, recognizing that military intervention is only of several tools, while differentiating between active and passive action.** Though recent US military interventions have been of limited or little success, the need for security should not be underestimated. Aid cannot be distributed without first ensuring the security of both the personnel on the ground and the resources they provide. There are situations where military intervention is necessary, particularly in instances of armed conflict or where violence has become a barrier to development in any form. When such an instance calls for military force, care must be


taken to ensure such action is specific to the situation—not excessive and not too feeble. Military intervention should be undertaken into concert with all other principles to ensure that it does not make a bad situation worse.

- **Promote economic sustainability and legal means for development by incentivizing stability.** For economic growth, a country must first have a stable economy. This means the creation of institutions that make commerce possible, as well as the integration of the domestic economy into the international market. While every effort can be made to give a country the resources to raise it from failure, until a country can support itself it will never be a functioning state. Every effort should be made to promote sustainability and regional trade in line with an assessment of the

situation, so as to ensure future solvency and stability.

All of these principles should be taken into account, both individually and holistically, in any effort regarding fragile states. They ensure that all aspects of state failure are accounted for and adequately addressed. Without a careful consideration of the complexity of each situation, we run the risk of repeating mistakes made in the past.

This report will cover these principles in more depth. Along with case studies that examine individual states, we also provide a theoretical overview that examines failed states and elaborates our strategy in greater depth. This section will cover the regional aspects of state failure, bottom-up approaches to development, and humanitarian and military conflict resolution. We will detail a comprehensive strategy that reinvents the US approach to failed states, and in the process, benefits US and international security, and



advances the well-being of people living in
fragile states.

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
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Between Rhetoric and Action

**Discerning the US Government's Real
Interests in Failed States**

Christopher Sherman




Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the question: Why does the US government care about failed states? Answering this question is crucial for making recommendations on US policy toward failed states. In order to say what the US government *should* do in failed states with any sense of authority, it is important to know what it *has* done in failed states. To illustrate the US involvement with failed states this paper will analyze three examples: Greece in 1947, Rwanda in 1994, and Yemen in the present. Evaluating past cases of US interventions in failed states provides the opportunity to examine the different approaches the US government has taken in intervening in failed states, and what the consequences of those approaches were. For policy makers, determining which intervention strategies have been successful will work toward an improved methodology

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**Why does the US
 government care
 about failed states?**
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for dealing with failed states. The format of these case studies allows for a comparison between what the US government said its interests were in each case and what was actually done. Individually, these cases were chosen because they represent different types of US intervention. Greece was chosen because it is an example of when the stated US interests in intervention mostly matched the demonstrated interests, derived by analyzing how US aid was implemented. Simply put, Greece is a perfect example of the US doing what it said it would. Rwanda, on the other hand, was chosen because it represents just the opposite of the Greek case—policy and promises did not reconcile. Yemen was chosen because it represents a contemporary case of state failure and because the US government has yet to develop a substantive plan on how engage Yemen. The idea is to determine whether Yemen is perceived as either a security threat




or a humanitarian mission, and thereby define US goals in the country. Along with the individual merits of each case, these cases were chosen to demonstrate the spectrum of past US actions in failed states and to introduce a three regions that is not covered in the remainder of the report. The methodology of each case study is quite simple. The goal is to answer two questions: *Why did the US say it needed to intervene? And how did the US actually intervene?* A brief background of each case is provided to help explain US motivations for intervening. Based on an examination of how the US actually intervened in each case, this chapter will analyze the implications for why the US actually cares about failed states. This chapter will also discuss the differences between the US intervention in Greece and the US's non-intervention in Rwanda during the massive genocide in 1994. This chapter will discuss the apparent disconnect between stated interests in intervening in Rwanda and the

lack of action of the US's part until after the majority of the killings had been carried out. Ultimately, the goal is to compare the case of Greece, an example of stated interests connecting to demonstrated interests, with Rwanda, a case where stated interests and demonstrated interests experienced a disconnect, and try to answer the question: *Why does the US intervene in some states and not in others?* The logic behind such an approach is that if an answer to this question can be reached, then an answer to the original question of this chapter as to why the United States cares about failed states, is not far behind.

Case Studies

As stated in the introduction, the purpose of conducting case studies is to analyze what the US government has done in failed states in the past, and what those actions imply about US interests. These case studies will show that there are two aspects to the US's method of dealing with failed states.




One aspect is based on rhetoric--speeches and testimonies regarding failed states and what the US government says it wants to do. The other aspect is based on action-- how the US government implements its various and often limited resources in failed states. As the following case studies will show, there are instances when the US government has followed through on its stated interests in failed states—instances when the rhetorical and action aspects were correlated—as well as an instance when the relationship between the rhetorical and action aspects experienced a disconnect. The reasons for this disconnect will be discussed, but the purpose of discussing it is to highlight the importance of follow-through in stated interests, and to highlight the apparent priority given to different states.

Defining the US's interests in a failed state is not an exact science. For clarification purposes, interests are separated into classifications. They are differentiated as

security interests, humanitarian interests, development interests, ideological interests, and political interests. For example, political interests in the case of Rwanda refer to the domestic issues President Clinton faced following the events in Somalia in October 1993, and the consequences of those events (i.e. decreased public support for humanitarian missions) that forced Clinton to consider the political risks of a second crisis in Rwanda.

Of all the classifications, ideological interests are the most difficult to define. Much of the rhetoric discussed in the case studies is of ideological interest, often in the form of claiming to support democracy in a failed state or working to uphold democracy. However those claims, at least in the cases of Greece and Yemen, are more about security interests than a true interest in advancing American values for the benefit of others. In the case of Rwanda, the US government claimed to support democratization, and one



could argue that the US government's efforts to broker a peace deal between the Hutu Rwandan government and the primarily Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front are evidence of the US's ideological interest in Rwanda. After all, Rwanda as a failed state did not pose much of a security threat to the US, thus it is unrealistic to think ideology was more about security in Rwanda. However, as the case studies will show, the US's stated reasons for trying to broker a peace deal were its concerns over the violence between the two sides and the increased risk to the Rwandan people. Thus, one could argue that the US's ideological interest in Rwanda was based more on a humanitarian concern than helping Rwanda democratize. Ultimately, this chapter would like to recognize that, despite what these case studies indicate about whether ideological interests are real or not, examples of true ideological interests may exist; these case studies simply do not exhibit such an occurrence.

In reality, the only true way to identify what the real US interests are, is to analyze how the US implements aid. Usually, it is clear what the US interests are in a failed state. When half of US aid goes toward a state's military to help it defend against a threat like communism or Al-Qaeda, it is clear that security was the biggest priority in that case. Occasionally, as illustrated above, identifying the real US interests in a failed state is difficult and relies more on interpretation than fact. Nevertheless, in order to answer the question "Why does the US care about failed states?" historical methods of intervention and implementations of aid are the best places to find an answer.

Case Study #1: Greece

Though the concept of a "failed" state did not exist in the early years of the Cold War, the US government recognized the need to assist states that had been ravaged by World War II. One example of a state that was considered weak or failed following

World War II is Greece.¹ In a speech before Congress in March of 1947, President Truman asked the US government to begin sending aid to the Greek government for two reasons. The first reason was for the reconstruction of the roads, railways, port facilities, communication devices, merchant marine, and villages that had been destroyed by the Germans in World War II.² According to Truman, when liberation forces entered Greece, in addition to finding most of the basic infrastructure destroyed, they also found that 85 percent of the children were tubercular and that majority of Greece's livestock had disappeared.³ Truman elaborated that in these conditions, a small, militant minority had been exploiting the human misery and suffering and created political chaos that was

hindering Greece's recovery.⁴ In order to begin reconstruction, Truman explained, the Greek government needed financial and economic assistance to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds, all of which were necessary for the subsistence of the Greek people and the restoration of the internal order and security that was so necessary for Greece's political and economic recovery.⁵ Essentially, Truman's first reason for asking the US to send support to the Greek government was to help alleviate the suffering of the Greek people and aid in the recovery and reconstruction process. Thus, Truman was stating a humanitarian and developmental interest in Greece.

Truman's second reason for requesting US aid to Greece was to support to the Greek government in its civil war against the militant arm of Communist Party of Greece (KKE).⁶ President Truman's concern

¹ For an account of the conditions within Greece following WWII, see: "Background Memo on Greece, March 3, 1947." *Truman Library*. Web. 18 February 2010.

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
² Truman address on Greece and Turkey, pp 1-2

³ Truman address on Greece and Turkey, p. 2

⁴ Truman address on Greece and Turkey, p. 2

⁵ Truman address on Greece and Turkey, p. 2

⁶ "The Truman Doctrine, 1947." US Department of State. Web. 7 February 2010



with Greece falling to the KKE was based on both ideological opposition to communism and security concerns with a communist Greece. The first indication of Truman's ideological opposition to the KKE was in

• • •
“totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States”
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termining the Greek government “democratic” and the communists “terrorist”.⁷ The second indication was his point, in a speech requesting


US aid to the Greek government, that US foreign policy, which sought to create conditions in which all nations could work out a way of life free from coercion, would not be met unless the US government was “willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.”⁸ This

statement suggests that Truman considered the KKE the type of aggressive movement he was referring to. Therefore, if the KKE sought to impose a totalitarian regime upon the Greek people, a goal that ran counter to US foreign policy objectives, then the Greek communists were opposed to US foreign policy objectives, and as such, were ideologically opposed to the US government. Thus, by requesting support for the “democratic” Greek government against the “terrorist” KKE Truman was exhibiting his ideological opposition to the Greek communist party.

Along with an ideological opposition to a communist Greece, Truman also had security concerns with a communist Greece. According to Truman, The fact that Truman considered the KKE an aggressive movement aimed at imposing a totalitarian regime on the Greek people has already been shown. Therefore, if Truman thought the Greek communists wanted to impose a totalitarian

⁷ Truman address on Greece and Turkey, p. 2

⁸ Truman address on Greece and Turkey, p. 3



regime upon the Greek people, while believing that totalitarian regimes represented a security threat to the US, then Truman saw the KKE as a security threat to the United States. Truman's equation of a communist Greece to a national security threat established a precedent for the remainder of the Cold War. From then until the end of the Cold War, communism was represented as the biggest threat to United States national security. Truman's opposition to the Greek communists was ideological and security-based. Thus, along with a humanitarian and development interest in Greece, Truman was stating a security and an ideological interest in Greece.

At the end of his speech, President Truman asked that congress approve \$400 million in assistance to Greece and Turkey, as well as military and civilian personnel to supervise the use of financial and material aid and assist in reconstruction efforts.⁹ On May

⁹ "Address of the President of the United States: Recommendation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey,

22, 1947, Congress approved Truman's request and granted him the aid to use at his discretion.¹⁰ The period of US assistance to Greece lasted until the end of June 1948, and in a report issued on June 15, 1948, a summary was given of how the aid was spent. According to the report, the US spent a total of \$338 million in Greece. \$300 million of this aid came from the Greek Aid Program, and \$38 million came from the Foreign Relief Program. 51 percent of the funds went to military aid, 24 percent to food aid, eight percent to agricultural rehabilitation, seven percent to reconstruction, and the remaining 10 percent on materials, equipment, and miscellaneous materials.¹¹

March 12, 1947." *Truman Library*. Web. 18 February 2010.


<<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study%5Fcollections/doctrine/large/folder5/tde02-1.htm>>.

¹⁰ "Public Law 80-75 - Assistance to Greece and Turkey, May 22, 1947." *Truman Library*. Web. 18 February 2010.

<<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study%5Fcollections/doctrine/large/folder5/tde03-1.htm>>.

¹¹ "Factual Summary Concerning the American Mission for Aid to Greece, June 15, 1948." *Truman Library*. Web. 18 February 2010.

<<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study%5Fcollections/doctrine/large/folder9/tdi01-1.htm>>.




The distribution of US aid to Greece provides great insight into what its real interests were in Greece. First, in establishing that half of the aid was spent on training and equipping the Greek military, the security of the democratic Greek government, and its ability to defend itself must have been our most pressing priority. Truman's statement that totalitarian regimes imposed on free people represented a security threat to the US, coupled with the massive amounts of aid spent on protecting the Greek democratic government from communism, indicates that Truman's stated security interest in Greece was real. The fact that one-fourth of the aid went to food indicates that the subsistence needs of the Greek people were also a major priority for the US government. Thus, the humanitarian interest Truman expressed in his speech was a demonstrated interest. The stated interest in reconstructing Greece was supported by the fifteen percent of aid that

went to agricultural rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The only stated interest that was not necessarily demonstrated was ideological. While the US government sent civilian and military personnel to supervise Greece's reconstruction, the fact that the majority of aid was implemented to equip and train the military to fight communist forces suggests that the American presence was less about sharing American ideals, and more about making sure the security interests were fulfilled. Truman was careful to point out that the US government had not always condoned the Greek government's past actions, and that implementing a democratic system there would help to correct these problems.¹² This suggests a true ideological interest in Greece. However, the US government continued to provide large amounts of aid to the Greek government, most of which went to strengthen the Greek military, which is interesting considering that in most cases of

¹² Truman, p. 3



human rights violations, the military is usually the perpetrator. All of this aid also came before any possible reforms could have been made by the Greek government to reduce the number of apparent human rights violations,¹³ which suggests that while Truman stated a true ideological interest in Greece, the security interest was clearly more important. This is logical, given the Cold War context in which the US intervened in Greece. This was a time when promoting democratic ideology was less about spreading democracy, and more about containing the threat of communism. The promotion of democracy for the sake of benefiting other states was more a characteristic of the post-Cold War era, and even then promoting democracy was still security matter of security.¹⁴ Thus, the

ideological interest that Truman expressed in his speech, and the mission of keeping Greece democratic, was mostly focused on security for the US rather than other interests..

Given the complex nature of US interest in Greece, one could argue that the US government stated and demonstrated a humanitarian, developmental, security, and ideological interest in Greece. However, because the ideological interest was so closely tied to security in this case, and the promotion of democracy was more about combating threats than spreading values, this case study shows that the ideological interest as defined previously was not demonstrated. Thus, in the case of Greece the US demonstrated real humanitarian, developmental, and security interests, while the ideological interest was more rhetoric. An additional point worth noting is the apparent priority of each interest as demonstrated by how aid was distributed. Judging by the distribution of aid, security was the highest priority, followed by

¹³ Truman does not actually say what actions the Greek government has carried out that the US government does not condone. Thus, it can be assumed that Truman was referring to human rights violations, but it is hard to be certain.

¹⁴ See: Lake, Anthony. "From Containment to Enlargement." Federation of American Scientists. Web. 21 February 2010. "The addition of new democracies makes us more secure because democracies tend not to wage war on each other or sponsor terrorism."

humanitarian and development assistance respectively.

Case Study #2: Rwanda¹⁵

In a testimony given before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign


¹⁵ Logan, Justin and Christopher Preble. "Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case Against a Standing Nation Building Office," *Cato Institute*, (2006): In 2000, the CIA produced a report to recognize occurrences of state failure from 1955-1998.¹⁵ As Justin Logan and Christopher Preble explain, in the first attempt at producing such a report the CIA's definition of state failure was when "central state authority collapses for several years".¹⁵ According to this definition, the CIA only found 20 cases of state failure in the specified time period.¹⁵ Logan and Preble explain that in an effort to produce more significant results, the CIA expanded their criteria to include the "lesser events" of revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides.¹⁵ Within these criteria, the CIA found 114 cases of "state failure" in the specified time period.¹⁵ The CIA's report included Rwanda in the "NTF" column for 1994, citing ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocide as its indications of state failure. The fact that Rwanda appears in the "NTF" category, which Logan and Preble claim suggests Rwanda's inclusion in the CIA's original 20 cases of state failure, indicates that Rwanda, even by the most basic definition of state failure, qualified as a failed state in 1994. Thus, this section will examine the case of Rwanda, which history shows to have been a case of non-intervention on the US's part, using the framework outlined in the introduction.

Affairs Committee in March of 1993, Herman J. Cohen, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, explained that the US wanted to resolve Africa's many conflicts because it was a necessary step toward stability, economic reform, democratization, and better governance in Africa.¹⁶ According to Cohen, the human suffering caused by these conflicts was more than a hindrance to development in Africa, it was "an imperative for intervention and massive international humanitarian relief..."¹⁷ Cohen stated that the Clinton administration had been "conducting a full-scale review of conflict resolution requirements and resources worldwide," and it had "devoted a great deal of thought to these problems in Africa..."¹⁸ Elaborating further, Cohen cited participation in mediation efforts in places such as Rwanda as one of the four ways the US practiced conflict

¹⁶ Cohen, Herman J. "Peace-keeping and conflict resolution in Africa." *US Department of State Dispatch* 4.16 (1993): 270. *Military & Government Collection*. EBSCO. Web. 18 Feb. 2010.

¹⁷ Cohen

¹⁸ Cohen



resolution.¹⁹ Cohen expressed recognition of the benefit of working with other states in conflict resolution, but then stated, "...our role as the world's remaining superpower often makes the US imprimatur an essential contribution to a lasting settlement."²⁰ Cohen's remarks established several significant points, especially important considering the US's conduct in Rwanda just one year after this speech.

According to Cohen, the US was interested in helping Africa resolve its many conflicts because such conflicts were a hindrance to African stability, democratization and development. By specifically citing Rwanda as one of the places where the US was working to resolve such a conflict, Cohen was stating a security, ideological, and developmental interest in Rwanda. The important thing to note in the case of Rwanda, however, is that, unlike the case of Greece, the interests were for security,

democratization, and development *in Africa*. In Cohen's speech there was never a direct suggestion that Africa's regional conflicts threatened US interests or security. Cohen also claimed that Africa's conflicts caused human suffering and necessitated intervention and humanitarian relief. Without any real connection between US security interests, and evidence that the stated ideological interest was based more on humanitarian concerns than a desire to promote democratic ideals, Rwanda can be classified as of strictly humanitarian interest to the US government. Additionally, Cohen's remarks recognized the US's significance in helping Rwanda reach a peaceful settlement of its conflict.


In the year that followed this speech, the US government's actions in Rwanda appeared to correspond to the interests Cohen stated. The US government continued its efforts to broker a deal between the Rwandan government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, and on August 4, 1993, the two sides

¹⁹ Cohen

²⁰ Cohen

signed the Arusha Accord.²¹ The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established²² to help realize the Arusha Accord's mandates. They included agreements to end the war and implement a power-sharing agreement between the Rwandan government and the Patriotic Front²³.

Initially, the US did not lend its support to UNAMIR.²⁴ As William Ferroggiaro explains, this was because the US “saw two potential outcomes: the authorization of a new UN force and a new mandate without the means to implement either; and worse, the very real possibility of



Source: “Rwanda Genocide Poster”
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/pix/events/b/ww/17867.htm>

the US having to bail out a failed UN mission.”²⁵ It was at this point that US actions regarding Rwanda began to diverge from what Cohen stated in his speech. While the US did not support UNAMIR, according to Assistant Secretary Cohen, it did plan to continue its support of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) peacekeeping force in northern Rwanda.²⁶ However, in a report

²¹ GOUVERNEMENT DU RWANDA / GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA. Peace agreement between the government of the republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese patriotic front. 2009.

²² United Nations. “United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda.”
<<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamir.htm>> Accessed 19 February 2010.

²³ GOUVERNEMENT DU RWANDA / GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA. Peace agreement between the government of the republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese patriotic front. 2009.

(See Article 1 and Article 2, Section III.)

²⁴ Ferroggiaro, William. “The US and the Genocide in Rwanda in 1994: Information, Intelligence and the US Response.” Obtained at
<<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB17/index.htm>> Accessed 19 February 2010.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Cohen

issued by the OAU in May of 2000, the US's role was criticized as "brief, powerful and inglorious".²⁷ Thus, despite the stated interest in and need for massive humanitarian aid and intervention, the US withheld support from UNAMIR, and provided very little support to the OAU. This reality illustrates a disconnect between the US government's *stated* versus *demonstrated* interests in Rwanda.

Though it did not support any of the peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, the US government did continue working with the leaders of the Rwandan Government and the Patriotic Front to reach a power-sharing agreement. These efforts, however, were obstructed by seven months of delays. In March of 1994, Prudence Bushnell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, visited both Juvenal Habyarimana, President of the Republic of Rwanda, and leaders of the Patriotic Front to encourage the two sides to reach a power-

²⁷ "OAU Report Regarding Rwandan Genocide." American Journal of International Law. 94. 4 (2000), p. 693.

sharing deal.²⁸ The meaning of Bushnell's visit was demonstrated by the nature of her discussion with President Habyarimana. She expressed the US's concern with the lack of action on the part of the Rwandan government in implementing the agreed transitional government, and justified the need for action if Rwanda was to continue receiving aid from the U.N.²⁹ Bushnell also explained that every delay was costing the Rwandan people significant amounts of aid, and that the increasing violence in Rwanda was costing the Rwandan government significant amounts of support.³⁰ Overall, Bushnell conveyed the US government's concern with the increasing violence between Habyarimana's supporters and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and that the distribution of arms and arms caches within Rwanda that threatened the security of the Rwandan people.³¹

²⁸ Reporting Cable on Rwanda, p. 1

²⁹ Reporting Cable on Rwanda, p. 2

³⁰ Reporting Cable on Rwanda, pp. 2, 4

³¹ Reporting Cable on Rwanda: p. 4

While the lack of support for the peace keeping operations made it seem as though the US was not living up to its stated humanitarian interest in Rwanda, the fact that Bushnell was sent to encourage the opposing Rwandan parties to work together in implementing a power sharing agreement would indicate that the US was living up to its stated ideological interest. However, the Bushnell's argument regarding aid suggests that her visit was less about getting the Rwandan government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front to implement democratic ideals in their power sharing agreement and more about urging them to work together. Ultimately, her advice was not about how to make Rwanda democratic; it was about reducing the physical risk to Rwandan citizens. Bushnell's visit indicates that the ideological interest was based on humanitarian concerns, and therefore, that the US *did* have a humanitarian interest in Rwanda. Bushnell's visit is also evidence that

the US recognized its role in helping the Rwandan civil war come to a peaceful end.

When juxtaposed with the lack of support for peace-keeping missions, the US government's support for the Arusha Accord and the power-sharing agreement makes discerning the US interests in Rwanda difficult. Any ambiguity regarding the level of commitment to Rwanda was eliminated on April 21, 1994, approximately two weeks after the genocide started. The US, along with other members of the U.N. Security Council, voted to have the number of U.N. troops in Rwanda reduced from 2,548 to 270.³² The US government followed up by issuing Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 on May 3, which outlined reform measures on US foreign policy toward multilateral peacekeeping operations.³³ PDD 25 explicitly stated "It is not US policy to seek to expand

³² United Nations. "United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda." <<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamir.htm>> Accessed 19 February 2010.

³³ US Department of State. "Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." Federation of American Scientists. Web. 20 February, 2010.

either the number of UN peace operations or US involvement in such operations. Instead, this policy... aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective.”³⁴ Two weeks later, however, the US voted in favor of U.N.S.C. resolution 918, which approved increasing the number of U.N. troops in Rwanda to 5,500.³⁵ Even with the passage of Resolution 918, the damage had been done, and the US’s response was too late.

The lack of US support for peacekeeping operations in Rwanda directly contradicts what Assistant Secretary Cohen stated in his speech regarding US interests in Rwanda. The US government did act on its humanitarian interests, but only briefly and, realistically, only on a diplomatic level before and during the genocide. It was only after the genocide had started to wind down that the US really demonstrated its humanitarian

interest in Rwanda. The continued encouragement by the US government for the Rwandan government and the Patriotic Front to come to a deal supports Cohen’s point about the US’s recognition of its crucial role in brokering a peace deal in Rwanda.


However, the US’s vote to remove troops on April 17, 1994, and its issuance of PDD 25, actions that effectively minimized US responsibility in Rwanda, shows that the US had bigger concerns than resolving the Rwandan civil war. Ultimately, contradictory statements and actions by the US reveal a disconnect between the US’s stated and demonstrated interests in Rwanda.

Why the disconnect?

The paradoxical nature of US actions in the Rwandan genocide has prompted many to ask, “What happened?”. One of the most oft-cited reasons for the US’s reluctance to intervene in Rwanda is the deaths of 18 American servicemen in Somalia just six

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ "UN Security Council adopts Resolution 918 on Rwanda." *US Department of State Dispatch* 5.22 (1994): 352. *Military & Government Collection*. EBSCO. Web. 21 Feb. 2010.



months prior to the Rwandan genocide.³⁶ Evidence of this fact is found in comparing the rhetoric of Herman Cohen, the former Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, in his testimony delivered to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in March of 1993, with a testimony given by former Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in November of 1993. As exhibited earlier, Assistant Secretary Cohen's testimony stated the US government's interest in helping Africa solve its many conflicts. There was no delineation of which conflicts the US government wanted to resolve; Cohen's statement seemed to suggest that the US government was interested in solving all of them. Secretary Christopher's testimony gives an alternative view, however, by discussing the , US interest in regional conflicts and citing Africa as one

of the places the US had been working on regional conflicts.³⁷ Christopher made the point that "Some [regional conflicts] touch our national interests or will if they are not checked, but other conflicts, other regional conflicts may not."³⁸ This clear change of tone between Assistant Secretary Cohen's speech in March and Secretary of State Christopher's speech in November was certainly, influenced by what happened in Somalia.

The political implications of US soldiers dying on peacekeeping missions were the main force behind this change in foreign policy rhetoric toward regional conflicts. For the Clinton Administration, 18 American deaths in Somalia on October 3, 1993 sparked a "political firestorm" and a massive public outcry to withdraw troops.³⁹ By October 7, an agreement was made between Clinton and

³⁶ "OAU Report Regarding Rwandan Genocide," p. 693; Ferroggiaro; Metz, Jamie Frederic. "Rwandan genocide and the international law of radio jamming." *American Journal of International Law* 91.4 (1997): 628. *Academic Search Complete*. EBSCO. Web. 21 Feb. 2010, p. 629.

³⁷ Christopher, p. 12

³⁸ Christopher, p. 5

³⁹ United States. Cong. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Policy Update. 103 Cong., 1 sess. S. Doc. 103-326. United States Government, 1993. Print.

members of Congress to withdraw troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994.⁴⁰

While public opposition was certainly a major factor in the US's decision to withdraw from Somalia, as Eric Larson and Bogdan Savych point out in their book *American Public Support for US Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad*, the majority of Americans opposed the US presence in Somalia before October 3.⁴¹ Citing an ABC News poll, Larson and Savych highlight that public support for pulling troops out of Somalia increased from 58 percent to 64 percent after October 3.⁴² This finding suggests that, though it did increase following October 3, public opposition in itself was not a significant enough factor to influence the Clinton Administration's policy on Somalia. Therefore there must have been a different, more powerful factor that led to the US's withdrawal from Somalia.

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Larson and Savych, p. 34

⁴² Larson and Savych, p. 33

The key factor that led to the US's withdrawal from Somalia was the realization that humanitarian missions work very little for further US strategic interests. In the conclusion of their book, Larson and Savych outline the factors that influence public opinion on military operations. According to the authors, the importance of the stakes, prospects for success, and expected and actual casualties are the three main beliefs linked to support for or opposition to military intervention.⁴³ Larson and Savych elaborate on the meaning of "stakes" by defining them, "in terms of vital national interests, security interests, or moral or humanitarian interests".⁴⁴ As Larson and Savych point out, the US explicitly stated a humanitarian interest in Somalia, and there was widespread belief that it would succeed in its mission of establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations with few or no

⁴³ Larson and Savych, p. 213

⁴⁴ Larson and Savych, p. 213



casualties.⁴⁵ After October 3, though, these beliefs changed.

On a realistic level, US prospects for success were still present. If desired, the US government could have committed 30,000 troops to Somalia and completely eliminated any opposition to its efforts to restore order and peace. Additionally, though 18 men may have been more than the expected level of casualties in Somalia, 18 casualties is still miniscule compared to many other military operations in the US history. Thus, if the prospects for success were still alive, and the expected level of casualties was still relatively low, it must have been the importance of the stakes that changed for the US government to withdraw troops. The realization that humanitarian missions, although popular in theory and good for reputation, were not valuable enough to the American public, or to US interests, to sacrifice American lives was the ultimate influence in pulling troops out of Somalia. Ultimately, Somalia set a precedent

for weighing US humanitarian interest in a state against the potential casualties.

Conscious of the prospect of casualties on peacekeeping missions, the fact that the public did not view humanitarian missions worthy of American lives and the reality that humanitarian missions did not serve the US's strategic interests, the Clinton administration's decision to not intervene in Rwanda makes sense. However, this is not to say that the lack of action in Rwanda was in any way justified. This chapter is simply pointing out that similar to Somalia, events in Rwanda did not necessarily affect US national interests, at least on a strategic level. Thus, the political consequences for the Clinton Administration were sure to be great if American soldiers were killed Rwanda. The disconnect between stated and demonstrated interests in Rwanda was an effect of political interests, specifically public opinion, and security overriding humanitarian interests.

⁴⁵ Larson and Savych, pp. 29-31

Case Study #3: Yemen

According to the Fund for Peace, Yemen has been a failed state since at least 2005.⁴⁶ It was not until Christmas of 2009, however, after the failed terrorist attack on NWA Flight #253 that Yemen's "threat was brought home to the American public."⁴⁷ Quoting President Obama, Jeffery Feltman, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, in a testimony given before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 20, 2010, explains that the would-be perpetrator of this attack had joined an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen, where he was equipped with the explosives and given instructions to attack flight #253 headed for America. Not surprisingly, the primary threat

⁴⁶ For a report on Yemen's Failed States Index ratings, see <www.fundforpeace.org>

⁴⁷ Feltman, Jeffery D. "TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR JEFFREY D. FELTMAN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS AND AMBASSADOR DANIEL BENJAMIN COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM." Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing January 20, 2010. Web. 21 February 2010

within the country, according to Feltman, is the Al-Qaeda related extremists operating within its borders. In recognition of this growing threat from Yemen, Assistant Secretary Feltman outlined the US's "two-pronged" strategy for dealing with it. The first prong focuses on strengthening Yemen's government to promote security and minimize the threat from extremists within its borders. The second prong focuses on mitigating Yemen's economic crisis and deficiencies in government capacity, provision of basic services, and transparency.⁴⁸

Elaborating on the basis of this strategy, Feltman recounted the several issues the Yemeni government faces within its own borders, including the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives who have carried out attacks on Americans and citizens of other states, a protest movement in the South that began with Yemen's unification in 1990, and a rebellion in the northern part of Yemen by a group of Shia Muslims known as the

⁴⁸ Feltman, p. 1-3

Houthi.⁴⁹ Clearly, Al-Qaeda is a threat to US security, and the presence of Al-Qaeda in Yemen makes Yemen a security interest for the US government. The humanitarian concerns Feltman discusses that result from the conflicts in the north and south of Yemen, such as the thousands killed and the 20,000 displaced persons who are sometimes forced to live in “appalling conditions”, also establishes Yemen as a humanitarian interest for the US.⁵⁰ In addition to the security and humanitarian interests, Feltman also states that the US supports a unified, stable, democratic and prosperous Yemen.⁵¹ His inclusion of “democratic” in this list is a stated ideological interest in Yemen. Thus, Assistant Secretary Feltman’s testimony ultimately states a security, ideological and humanitarian interest in Yemen.

⁴⁹ For more information on the Houthi rebels and the conflict between them and the Yemeni government, which is Sunni-led, see: “Profile: Yemen’s Houthi Fighters.” Al-Jazeera. Web. 22 February 2010.

⁵⁰ Feltman, p. 3


⁵¹ Feltman, p. 1

As of yet, there have been very few US actions toward Yemen. There are, to date, no US troops in Yemen, nor are there expected to be any troops stationed there in the near future. US aid to Yemen has significantly increased. In his testimony, Feltman stated that development and security assistance to Yemen increased from \$17.2 million in 2008 to \$40.3 million in 2009.⁵² He states that this number could go up to as much as \$63 million in 2010.⁵³ Feltman also said that these numbers do not include the “approximately \$67 million in [counter terrorism] funds for 2009...”⁵⁴ The increases in aid, and the type of aid, that he mentioned suggests that the US government’s stated security interest in Yemen is a very real interest. The fact that counter terrorism funding is projected to be higher than the security and development assistance is yet another indicator that the US places high priority on its security interests.

⁵² Feltman, p. 4

⁵³ Feltman, p. 4

⁵⁴ Feltman, p. 4



Along with the funding for development, security and counter-terrorism, Feltman also cites the \$7.5 million in food aid given by USAID, and the \$3 million given by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance for relief efforts as actions carried out in Yemen on behalf of the US government.⁵⁵ These actions indicate that the US's stated humanitarian interest in Yemen is a real interest. When compared with the amount of money spent on the security interests, these funds, though not insignificant, also indicate that humanitarian interests are less of a priority for the US government than security interests in Yemen.

In regards to ideological interest in Yemen, Feltman also discusses the educational and cultural exchange programs the US has with Yemen. The purpose of these programs is to help allay suspicion and misunderstandings because, Feltman explains, “[a]s public understanding of US policy and American values increases in Yemen,


⁵⁵ Feltman, p. 3

extremist and anti-American sentiment wanes.”⁵⁶ The existence of these exchange programs indicates that the stated ideological interest in Yemen is real. The fact that these programs are explained as tools to minimize anti-American sentiment also indicates that the ideological interest in Yemen is related to US security. Thus, though the stated ideological interest appeared to be for the sake of the Yemeni people—given that a “democratic” Yemen was mentioned with unified, stable and prosperous (i.e. terms that imply benefits for the Yemeni people)—in reality, the demonstrated ideological interest is more about security for the US.

The ideological interest, while forwarding US security interests in the region, could also be a tool to alleviate criticism for providing massive amounts of funding to a government that has a history of human rights violations.⁵⁷ By claiming to support unity and democracy in Yemen, the US government

⁵⁶ Feltman, p. 4

⁵⁷ See: “World Report Chapter: Yemen” Human Rights Watch. Web. 22 February 2010.




could pass off aid as a method of helping the Yemeni government to build better governance structures and practices. Admittedly, some of the aid did go toward development, which is necessary for such change. However, the majority of the aid went toward security and counter-terrorism, which is likely being used by the Yemeni government in its conflicts with Al-Qaeda as well as the Houthi rebels in the north and the secessionist movement in the south. These are the very conflicts in which the Yemeni government is accused of violating human rights. Thus, though the US government claimed to have an ideological interest in Yemen, the manner in which aid has been implemented suggests that the ideological interest is more about security, and possibly improving international opinion of the US.

Overall, the US government has, thus far, demonstrated that its stated security and humanitarian interests in Yemen are real. Similar to both Greece and Rwanda, the case

of Yemen indicates that the real US interests in failed states include security and humanitarian interests, and that security is a higher priority than humanitarian interests. Particularly congruent to Greece, the case of Yemen indicates that stated ideological interests are closely related to security interests and less concerned with promoting democratic ideals.

What do the Case Studies Imply About US Interests in Failed States?

Individually, the case of Greece indicates that real US interests in intervening in failed states are security, humanitarian concerns, and developmental issues. For Greece, ideological interests were closely related to US security and less concerned with advancing American values for the sake of others. For this reason, ideological interests, as defined in this chapter, were not a real interest in Greece. The case of Rwanda also indicates that the US government's real interests in intervention are security and humanitarian concerns, but also introduces



political interests as a consideration in intervention. As previously explained, ideological interests in Rwanda were more concerned with protecting Rwandan citizens and less concerned with advising the Rwandan government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on how to come to a power-sharing agreement. Thus, the ideological interest in Rwanda was based more on humanitarian concerns than implementing democratic ideals in the Rwandan government. The case of Yemen further illustrates that the US government's real interests in failed states are security and humanitarian issues. The stated ideological interest in Yemen is actually more of a security interest because, similar to Greece, the US is more concerned with reducing anti-American sentiment than with reforming a government that has a history of human rights abuses.

Collectively, these case studies indicate that the real US interests in failed states include:

- **Security:** The majority of the funding in Greece and Yemen went toward combating the threats of communism and Al-Qaeda, two of the most recognized threats to US security throughout history. In Rwanda, the realization that US soldiers could be killed on peacekeeping missions was enough of a potential security threat to keep the US government from getting involved. Overall, the previous case studies indicate that any time there is a perceived security threat to the US, either territorially or to US citizens, the government will go to great measures to address that threat and eliminate or avoid it.
- **Humanitarian Issues:** All of the previous case studies indicate that humanitarian issues, whether the result

of conflict or poor governance, are of concern to the US government.

Considering the large disparities between aid for security purposes and aid for humanitarian issues, the case studies indicate that humanitarian concerns are less of a priority than security issues.

- **Political Issues:** The case of Rwanda illustrates how political issues can be an interest in deciding whether or not to intervene in a failed state. The reality that the Clinton Administration was reluctant to intervene in Rwanda because of the potential political consequences if US soldiers died on a peacekeeping mission shows how important political issues can be in regards to intervention in a failed state. The fact that the political issues regarding intervention in Rwanda were enough to keep the US out of the country also indicates that, at times,

political issues take precedence over humanitarian issues.

- **Ideological Interests:** By the definition of ideological interests in this chapter, and the evidence that stated ideological interests in Greece, Rwanda and Yemen were either more concerned with security or humanitarian issues than promoting or upholding American ideals, it is not clear that true ideological interests were present in any of the case studies. This does not mean, however, that true ideological interests are not present in instances of intervention in failed states.⁵⁸ Considering the amount of rhetoric concerning ideological interests in failed states, it is very possible that there are many examples of true ideological interests that have motivated past interventions and that these three case studies represent a

⁵⁸ See: Collier, Paul. *Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security*. Rep. Oxford University, 2009. Print.


sample void of true ideological interests. It is also possible, and more likely, that this chapter's conception of ideological interests is inaccurate and in need of revision. Nevertheless, this chapter included ideological interests as part of the US interests in failed states because it is possible and probable that they do exist.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to answer the question: Why does the US government care about failed states? This chapter analyzed how the US government implemented aid in each of the case studies and determined security, humanitarian issues, and political issues as the main US interests in failed states. Though these case studies did not exhibit true ideological interests, ideological interests were included as a real interest because of the amount of rhetoric claiming ideological interests. Of course, this rhetoric may just be a tool to justify

intervention based on other pretexts (i.e. security or humanitarian concerns). Deciding whether ideological interests are true or simply pretexts, however, is a highly subjective endeavor.

The case studies of Greece and Yemen provided strong evidence that ideological interest of promoting democracy was more closely related to US security than any other motivation. Ideological interests in the case of Rwanda are less clear. The US government did try to work with the Rwandan government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front to help the two sides reach a power sharing deal. Initially, these efforts may have been motivated by a true interest in helping Rwanda establish a democracy in which both Tutsis and Hutus were represented in the government. As Prudence Bushnell's visit in March of 1993 indicates, however, the US government's efforts to broker a peaceful settlement to the civil war between the Rwandan government and the RPF became



less about helping the two sides install a democratic system, and more about reaching a deal for the security of the Rwandan people. Thus, the ideological interest in Rwanda ultimately became more of a humanitarian concern as time went on.


While the findings of this chapter indicate what the demonstrated US interests are (i.e. why the US *has* cared, and what it *has* done), this chapter was not meant to suggest why the US government *should* care about failed states. That is the purpose of the remainder of this report. To understand that why the US *has* cared is not necessarily why it *should* care, one need only look at the consequences of the US approach to failed states thus far. In Rwanda, the US government's interests, or lack thereof, are at least partially responsible for the deaths of 500,000-1,000,000 Rwandans.⁵⁹ Granted, Rwanda was nearly sixteen years ago. For more recent proof that the US government's

⁵⁹ Harsch, Ernerst. "OAU Sets Inquiry into Rwanda Genocide." *Africa Recovery*, Vol.12 #1 (August 1998), page 4. Web. 23 February 2010.

approach to intervention in failed states is not necessarily what it should be, one need only look at the current conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US government intervened in Afghanistan in 2001, albeit militarily, and in 2009 Afghanistan was ranked #7 on the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy's Failed States Index.⁶⁰ Similarly, the US intervened in Iraq in 2003, militarily, and in 2009 Iraq was ranked #6 on the Failed States Index. While military intervention is not the only method available for the US government in failed states, it has been the most popular method in recent years. That reality is not surprising, however, given the US government's concern with security following September 11, 2001.

The following case studies will serve as further illustration of what the US government's real interests in failed states have been and what they currently are. It is likely that most of the following case studies will mirror the findings of this chapter. It is also possible that some findings will differ

⁶⁰ See <www.fundforpeace.org>




from this chapter. Ultimately, the goal of this chapter and the following case studies was not to be in complete agreement. The goal of this chapter and the following case studies is to figure out what the US government has been doing in failed states, and then to figure out how to improve the US response. As Stephen Krasner and Carlos Pascual state, “There is an unprecedented acknowledgement throughout the world of the need to work together to prevent or manage state failure...”.⁶¹ This chapter and this report concur that there is a need to address state failure. The goal of this report is to ensure that the US government has the knowledge and the tools to address it appropriately.

⁶¹ Krasner, Stephen D. and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 4 (July–August 2005), p. 159

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Engaging with Conflict in Fragile States

**The Importance and Significance of a Non-
Violent Approach**

Shannon O'Neill-Creighton

Introduction: Background and US Interests

Humanitarian intervention in failed states has consistently employed military force as a primary means to resolve conflicts. As a result, the US and international community's multiple attempts to successfully shift violence and conflict towards peace and resolution in these states have continually failed. "Conflict resolution" is an ambiguous term. Most definitions allude to a process of resolving dispute or disagreement. The implementation of this vague definition is subjective and the West has often exploited this ambiguity to legitimize military intervention in failed states, usually tagging on the word "humanitarian." "Humanitarian intervention" and "conflict resolution" have in many cases come to indicate military intervention. There have been a number of attempts to restore stability and secure peace in failed states, usually with a heavy reliance on military intervention, and the track record is mediocre.

Military intervention is not only ineffective; it is costly. A recent report estimates that the US spends a quarter of a trillion dollars every year to maintain its international military presence.¹ Military intervention, although necessary in some situations for security purposes, has drastically overextended itself by additionally seeking to solve deeply rooted historical, societal, economic, and political issues in failed states. At the core of violent conflict, which appears endemic in many failed states, are complex histories, tensions, and rivalries that are exacerbated by extreme poverty and, often, natural resource deficiencies. The US needs to re-conceptualize methods for managing and mitigating conflict and building lasting peace in failed states.

Dynamic conflict resolution, when broadened beyond military intervention and tailored to culturally specific contexts,

¹ Feffer, John. "How Much Does the US Empire Cost?" *The Huffington Post* 14 July 2009. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/how-much-does-the-us-empire_b_231903.html>.

incorporates local customs and traditions as a foundation for developing strategies and tools. As this chapter will demonstrate, when communities feel they have agency (in the form of an organization, network, skills etc.) to resolve their own conflict, civil society – the space between families and the state – is strengthened or cultivated. When civil society is strong, social capital – the norms and values that emerge in cohesive societies – is strengthened. Social capital and civil engagement often stand out as the most important explanations for the difference between peace and violence in local communities.² When dynamic conflict resolution methods are used, conflict does not have to evolve into violence, and peace can be fostered and/or sustained. It is in the interest of the US to explore and employ alternative methods of conflict resolution, especially since these approaches have proven to provide a long-term, sustainable alternative to

² Varshney, Ashutosh. "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond," *World Politics* 53, 3, April 2001, pp. 362-398. 375-76. 374.

military intervention in a number of cases.

With these more ambitious goals covered by other groups and approaches, the military could focus on what it does best - security and stability. If the US plans to continue committing time, money, energy, and lives to the resolution of conflict in failing states, it is in our interest to find *effective* approaches that work with, not against, local populations.


Dynamic conflict resolution would foster and encourage local investment and ownership of communities' own well being, resulting in the overall betterment of their society.

Recent History of “Conflict Resolution:”

Military Intervention and the “Liberal Peace”

Overview of Military Intervention

After the Cold War, no longer threatened by the fear of communism, the US and inter-governmental organizations began to engage in “benevolent” interventions, as opposed to purely strategic operations – often claiming to use their power for the betterment



of the third world, when in reality the interests of the West remained the central objective.³ Until the 1990s, military intervention in fragile and failed states was mainly an extension of Cold War politics.⁴ The international community chose where to intervene based largely on how a country affected the international balance of power, and thus, the root of the conflict in these states often went overlooked. As a result, strategic interventions often worsened already bad situations across the globe.

The term “military intervention” is broadly defined, encompassing everything from “peacekeeping” to “counter-insurgency.” William Easterly states that “external intervention can be justified as instrumental to development in three instances. These include: the restoration of order, maintaining post-conflict peace, and

³ Easterly, William. *The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and so Little Good.* New York: Penguin Press, 2006. 333.


⁴ Collier, Paul. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 124.

preventing coups.”⁵ He does not outline political or economic interest as a legitimate form of intervention, and for good reason. When objectives are about anything other than simply providing security for the people in order to ensure the creation of sustainable development projects, the true causal issues are overlooked. To examine how the the US has chosen whether or not to intervene militarily in failed states with strategic interest as the central motivation, we will examine the past cases of Somalia and Rwanda.

US Intervention in Somalia

After the backlash of the UN mission to deliver food aid to the starving people of Somalia, the US decided to intervene. The American public stood behind supportively, acknowledging the need for US assistance in response to images of starving children. In reality, the mission was not so benevolent. The goal was political – to remove the leading Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aidid,

⁵ Easterly,



from power. On October 3, 1993, when US troops attempted to seize two of Aidid’s lieutenants, Aidid’s fighters in Mogadishu responded by shooting down two American helicopters. Eighteen US soldiers were killed and 77 others were wounded.⁶ Later, the American public felt the aftershock of the retaliation when they watched on television elated Somali’s drag two naked dead American troops away. This image far outweighed the image of starving children, and from there, the intervention lost all public support. “The American public thought its troops were in Somalia on a humanitarian mission – that is, to do good, not to kill, and certainly not to get killed.”⁷ The media-circus led the public to realize that US troops were serving Washington’s political agenda and *not* simply retrieving aid

supplies to give back to the starving Somalis. From there the intervention was doomed. The US pulled out immediately, wanting nothing more to do with the war in Somalia.⁸

Lessons from Somalia

In actuality the mission was far more complicated than originally thought; it was

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Frankly, the US was ignorant of the deep historical and cultural context of the situation in Somalia
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overly idealized. It was politically driven from the moment the US committed more troops to remove Aidid’s stranglehold on Mogadishu.⁹ Unfortunately, removing Aidid

from power was not the answer. Aidid was certainly a main player, but part of a complex web of warlords and rivaling clans.¹⁰ Military intervention was used in Somalia for political reasons, and as a result failed as a mode of “conflict resolution.” The tensions between clans had been brewing since the collapse of

⁶ Rieff, David. *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*. New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 2002. 36.
⁷ Rieff, 35.

⁸ Rieff, 36-37.
⁹ Rieff, 36.
¹⁰ Colleta, Nat J., and Michelle L. Cullen. *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia*. Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Washington D.C. World Bank. 2000.

the central government in 1990.¹¹ It was over-ambitious of the US to assume it could fix the civil war by removing a single warlord. Frankly, the US was ignorant of the deep historical and cultural context of the situation in Somalia. Furthermore, the US was not willing to sustain its commitment to Somalia. It took a leading military approach, but then failed to provide the support beyond the initial intervention.

Genocide in Rwanda

The media-hyped and evident failure in Somalia ultimately led to the indecision of the US and international community surrounding the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, which led to the mass murder of nearly a million people. The genocide could have been prevented with military assistance, especially considering that the mass killing only ended when current Rwandan president Paul Kagame used military force to stop the Hutu extremists.¹² There had been a UN


Peacekeeping mission stationed in Rwanda since 1993, UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda), commanded by General Romeo Dallaire, to oversee the peace accord between government and the Tutsi-led rebels.¹³ General Dallaire had received intelligence that the Rwandan government was plotting a preemptive campaign of mass murder against the Tutsis in late 1993.¹⁴ Yet when the genocide began, the UN Security Council gave clear instructions for General Dallaire and his troops to stay out of the violence. The peacekeeping mandate in Rwanda illuminates the severe limitations of peacekeeping missions, acknowledging that had UNAMIR's rules of engagement been different, the stationed peacekeeping troops could have helped to prevent the genocide. In the aftermath, it became clear that the US failed to fulfill its responsibility, despite credible inside intelligence exposing the events

¹¹ Colleta

¹² Collier

¹³ Rieff, 156

¹⁴ Rieff, 157



unfolding in Rwanda. What the US claimed as ignorance or confusion was really a complete lack of interest or intent.¹⁵ As David Rieff, author of *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*, states, "...if any slaughter in the 1990s justified military intervention, it was the one in Rwanda."¹⁶ The West essentially remained in denial, and continued to refer to the conflict as African "savagery" far removed from home.¹⁷

Lessons from Rwanda

The genocide in Rwanda emerged when complex historical grievances combined with the escalation of ethnic tensions. This serves as a poignant example for other situations, as these ethnic and societal tensions certainly exist in other failed and fragile states. The international community was well aware of the long history of oppression and tension between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes, yet, due to the lack of Western strategic interest, no committed efforts were


taken to prevent the outbreak of violence before it happened, nor, for that matter, to stop it once it had begun. Western powers failed to implement alternative conflict resolution as a preventative measure, just as they failed to follow through with military action, when it was clearly the right approach to take.

In contrast to the leading role the US took in Somalia, the UN peacekeepers took a purely "supportive" role in Rwanda. The mandate of the UN soldiers was to *keep* the peace, not restore it. Consequently, when tension evolved into violent conflict, the purely "supporting" role did nothing to stop the mass violence. The limitations of the peacekeeping mandate proved to be a large problem in Rwanda, providing an example for future interventions. Despite the individual commanders and soldiers' commitment to stay and help, the UN ordered that they depart, since direct military intervention went

¹⁵ Rieff, 160

¹⁶ Rieff, 162

¹⁷ Rieff, 170



beyond their rules of engagement.¹⁸ In the aftermath of Rwanda’s genocide, it has become evident that the cost of failing to intervene – in terms of lost lives and resources – was much higher than acting when we had the chance to *prevent* the

• • •
Regardless of how it is carried out, military intervention is extremely costly
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genocide, especially given that UN peacekeeping troops were already stationed on the ground. In 2002, a total of \$356 million worth of development aid was given to Rwanda, making up 20 percent of Rwanda’s gross national income.¹⁹ In 2003, the US alone provided over \$29 million in aid; Britain provided \$65 million.²⁰ Evidently, the failure to intervene lead to a guilty-conscience that was quite costly.

The Cost of Military Intervention

¹⁸ Rieff, 159
¹⁹ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Rwanda,” <<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/19/1878421.gif>>.
²⁰ USAID, “Rwanda,” <<http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/afr/rw>>.

Regardless of how it is carried out, military intervention is extremely costly. As stated earlier, the US spends a quarter of a trillion dollars every year in international military operations.²¹ MSNBC reported in 2006 that it cost roughly \$200 million per day to sustain the war in Iraq and nearly \$1.05 trillion had gone to Iraq and Afghanistan.²² Recent reports have emerged claiming that a single gallon of gasoline costs approximately \$400 in Afghanistan.²³ Furthermore, it is estimated that the surge of 30,000 troops in Afghanistan will cost about \$30 billion.²⁴ Clearly, the incentive to find an alternative to

²¹ Feffer.
²² Wolk, Martin. "Cost of Iraq war could surpass \$1 trillion - Eye on the Economy- msnbc.com." *Breaking News, Weather, Business, Health, Entertainment, Sports, Politics, Travel, Science, Technology, Local, US & World News- msnbc.com*. 17 Mar. 2006. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11880954/>>.
²³ "Afghanistan: Pentagon Reveals that Afghanistan Fuel Costs Average \$400/Gallon. - Free Online Library." *News, Magazines, Newspapers, Journals, Reference Articles and Classic Books - Free Online Library*. Euclid Infotech Pvt. Ltd., 2009. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.thefreelibrary.com>>.
²⁴ Barnes, Julian E., and Christi Parsons. "Pricing an Afghanistan troop buildup is no simple calculation The White House estimate is twice the Pentagon's. Some see politics at play." *Los Angeles Times*. 23 Nov. 2009. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <<http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/23/nation/la-na-troop-costs23-2009nov23>>.

military intervention is strong, and a different approach would redirect taxpayers' dollars to sustainable modes of conflict resolution and development. However, it must be emphasized that if military intervention is in fact necessary, as it was in Rwanda, it is imperative that soldiers and commanders be given the appropriate mandate to ensure the protection of the people.

The "Liberal Peace"

Conflict resolution has not consistently been confused with military intervention. The "liberal peace" methodology has been the primary alternative to military assistance.²⁵ This approach is based strongly in Western ideology and operates in a highly standardized format, similar to development and aid projects endorsed by the "Washington Consensus," using set templates to achieve "resolution" or "stability." The list of Western prescriptions includes: cease-fire monitoring and agreements, formalized peace

²⁵ Mac Ginty, Roger. "Indigenous Peace-Making versus the Liberal Peace." *Cooperation and Conflict*. 43. 2 (2008): 139-163. 143.

negotiations, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration" (DDR), and "Security Sector Reforms" (SSR).²⁶ All of these peace-support interventions become cursory and standardized, and ultimately, according to Roger Mac Ginty, "...fail to reflect the precise needs of the recipient society."²⁷ Furthermore, these approaches are unlikely to be impactful when there is no security, or, in some cases, no central government. These approaches work more to berate individuals and societies than they do to involve and incorporate them.

The Future of Military Intervention:

Although it often lacks public support, and for good reason, military force cannot simply be scratched off the list of potential intervention approaches in failed states. Past examples demonstrate the severe complications in utilizing military. Yet, security is a central component to change, be it social, economic, or political. Terrorism and

²⁶ Mac Ginty, 144.

²⁷ Mac Ginty, 145.

extremism within conflict-ridden regions threaten not only US security, but also surrounding areas of failed states. Clearly, without addressing security in failed states, development cannot be sustained and alternative modes of addressing conflict will potentially go in vain. The questions of when and how to provide security abroad are some of the most challenging issues faced by the international community, and they must be addressed. There are certain situations where military intervention should be utilized. The clearest examples are in times of genocide or ethnic cleansing (however, the international community seemed to forget their own post-Holocaust mantra of “never again” when it came to Rwanda). Beyond certain specific crimes against humanity, however, it is impossible and unwise to create a concrete and static set of criteria determining when and how to intervene. This approach would completely obscure the emphasis of this chapter; *each situation is different and any*

form of intervention or aid must be context specific. Humanitarian military intervention should not attempt to resolve historical, societal, economic, or political issues. However, when military intervention is used in failed states, the historical context and cultural complexities need to be taken into consideration and the principles of sustainability and accountability must be at the forefront of the mission. There must be a “continuum” of military intervention which takes on both a leading and supporting role, if necessary. To better understand how this can be applied, we will look at the successful British intervention in Sierra Leone.

British Intervention in Sierra Leone:

In 2000, the United Nations intervened in Sierra Leone after the RUF rebel movement took five hundred peacekeeping soldiers hostage and stole all of their military equipment. A few months later, Operation Palliser was put into action. British military troops (less than a thousand) arrived

in Sierra Leone and in response, almost immediately, the rebel army collapsed. Security was enforced and maintained, and the mission was extremely inexpensive, as far as military interventions go.²⁸ Paul Collier asserts, “Operation Palliser was brilliant, and the British army can be proud of its contribution to the development of Sierra Leone. It also serves as a model for military intervention in the bottom billion: cheap, confident, and sustained. It was welcome, too – the people of the country were truly thankful.”²⁹ In Sierra Leone, the government invited the British forces and the population was in support of the intervention. Additionally, there was no alternative strategic interest that complicated or interfered with the efficiency of the British mission. This military intervention was there to provide and maintain security. Operation Palliser should be used as a model for successful military intervention.

²⁸ Collier, 128

²⁹ Collier, 128

Thinking dynamically: Alternative

Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Less explored is the use of conflict management and mitigation among individuals and communities, which can be used *dynamically* and *flexibly* to support local populations in failed states. Often, these populations have endured generations of violence, persecution, and marginalization, which ultimately effect how the people, groups, and governments within these societies communicate with each other and invest in the betterment of their societies.³⁰ Innovative approaches to conflict resolution create a number of positive outcomes. First, they require working within locally specific contexts, taking into account cultural particularities, histories, customs, and traditions, which can often lead to an established foundation for implementing goals and explaining other development projects. Second, these methods motivate

³⁰ Jacobs, Gerard A. "The Development and Maturation of Humanitarian Psychology." *American Psychologist*. 62. 8 (2007): 932-941.

local participation and provide sustainable practices that will work long after military troops have left. Lastly, they strengthen social capital and build strong foundations, which ultimately foster the development of prosperous civil society.³¹

Recent History of Alternative Conflict

Resolution: Background and Case Studies

The Development of Humanitarian

Psychology & Psychological First-Aid

The introduction and use of alternative modes of conflict resolution, which address the extensive complexities of ethnic, cultural, territorial, and/or religious conflict situations, coincided with the growing rights of indigenous communities. As proof, the UN created the International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples, the UK Department for International Development began a project dedicated to working with indigenous communities, and the InterAmerican Development Bank established


the Indigenous Peoples and Community Development Unit.³²

On the other end of the humanitarian assistance spectrum, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) headed some initial projects dedicated to conflict resolution, based on psychological support in the form of assistance to victims of trauma caused from natural disasters or sustained conflict zones that led to large refugee populations. Their projects helped people deal with emotional, cognitive, physiological, and behavioral reactions to traumatic events.³³ The initial efforts were met with some resistance due to culturally different approaches in dealing with emotionally challenging situations. In response to these difficulties, the IFRC began to adapt their projects to include locally based customs and traditions. For example, the idea of a therapist seemed incredibly foreign to a person living in a rural village in Somalia,

³¹ Colleta, 4

³² Mac Ginty, 140

³³ Jacobs



where people are far more likely to seek support from their families and friends. With this in mind, the IFRC began to play a more removed, third party role as opposed to the facilitator, or “therapist.”³⁴

Case Study – ‘Gacaca’ and ‘Ingando’ in Rwanda

After the genocide in 1994, Rwanda was in deep need of conflict resolution tools to help heal the wound from the mass murder of nearly a million people. In response, the Rwandan government resurrected the custom of Ingando. The word, *Ingando*, derives from the verb *Kugandika*, literally meaning to take time from daily activities to look at problems within the community. After the National Unity and Reconciliation Committee was established, it was required that militants returning from the DR Congo pass through ‘solidarity camps’ where individuals learn to act “...as peaceful citizens again.”³⁵ Ingando was adapted by the national government to

meet the needs of the post-genocide Rwandan society, with the ultimate goal of reintegrating returnees, who had fled during the genocide, back into society while fostering a sense of nationalism.³⁶


Ingando camps differ slightly depending on which group is participating. For example, they can run from several days to several months. However, there are themes central to all Ingando camps; they all discuss unity and reconciliation, teach history classes that highlight defects of the genocidal regime, and include information on present government programs and policies that encourage a sense of nationalism and emphasize the “democratic” elements of the current government.³⁷ In an interview, the Program Officer of Advocacy for the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission in Kigali, Alex Rusagara, reflected on Ingando,

³⁴ Jacobs

³⁵ Official Ingando Website

³⁶ Mgbako, Chi. "Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda." *Harvard Law School*. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss18/mgbako.shtml#fn59>>.

³⁷ Mgbako



saying, “we thought that if we could remove these people from their daily lives and bring them together to share a common dish—to eat and sleep together—this would build confidence in the diverse population of repatriated Rwandans, confidence that we could in fact live together.”³⁸ There has been criticism from the West that the resurgence of Ingando is merely an attempt of the national government to legitimize their political power.³⁹ Regardless, the government has taken an active role in healing the national trauma of genocide.

In addition to the process of Ingando, ‘Gacaca’ tribunals were re-established post genocide to seek justice for atrocities committed. These informal judicial hearings are, like Ingando, based on a traditional custom of Rwandan culture and are used to prosecute those who participated in the genocide of the Tutsis. The objectives of the

Gacaca tribunals are as follows: to reveal the truth about what happened, to speed up the genocide trials, to eradicate the country of impunity, to reconcile the Rwandans and reinforce their unity, and to prove that the Rwandan society has the capacity to settle its own problems through a system of justice based on a Rwandan custom.⁴⁰


In the opinion of Stephen Kinzer, author of *A Thousand Hills*, the Gacaca trials are “...group therapy sessions as much as judicial proceedings...nowhere else do Rwandans have a chance to mourn together while confronting those who terrorized them.”⁴¹ The Gacaca trials, too, have gained skepticism from the West, mainly because they do not require legal representation, and thus go against Western models of justice. This goes to show how Western conceptions of conflict resolution are not always justified.

³⁸ Interview with Alex Rusagara, Program Officer of Advocacy, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 8, 2004).

³⁹ Mgbako

⁴⁰ Gacaca - Objectives." *INKIKO-GACACA*. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnObjectives.htm>>.

⁴¹ Kinzer, Stephen. *A Thousand Hills: Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It*. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2008. 256.



The Rwandan government has built on what they know, and as a result, the International Criminal Court and USAID have supported the Gacaca process.⁴²

Case Study – Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in Northern Uganda

The conflict in Northern Uganda between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) movement emerged from the political and economic marginalization of the Acholi population. Violent conflict has persisted between this population in the North and other parties in the South since the outbreak of violence in 1986.⁴³ In an attempt to stop the cycle of violence, religious leaders from Northern Uganda, coming from Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant faiths, came together to organize a

forum to facilitate mediation between the government and the LRA.⁴⁴


In 1998, the ARLPI met with President Museveni and created a memorandum, "A Call for Peace and an End to Bloodshed in Acholiland," which signified the formal inauguration of the intervention. The intervention's immediate goal was to assist in the process of establishing peace and stability in Acholiland through "...effective mediation, consensus building, participatory involvement of all parties, and the cessation of hostilities."⁴⁵ The central themes in the intervention that appealed to the Museveni government were the points of forgiveness and reconciliation, which were deemed crucial in the campaign for a peaceful approach to conflict. Museveni was praised for working dynamically with the ARLPI to resolve conflict, shifting away from past practices of militarism.

⁴² Kinzer, 260.

⁴³ United States. USAID. The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM). *Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project: The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace*. By Larry S. Benya, Michael Lund, Stacy S. Stacks, Janet Tuthill, and Patricia Vondal. Washington D.C.: Management Systems International, 2001. *USAID Website: Conflict Related Publications*. Web. 23 Feb. 2010. <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/publications/other_usaid.html>. 18.

⁴⁴ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 18.

⁴⁵ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 18.



Since the ARLPI efforts, there has been a decrease in rebel activity and an increase in government willingness to seek a nonmilitary solution to the conflict. Furthermore, LRA rebels have lessened their opposition and have increasingly expressed a greater desire and openness for reintegration into Ugandan society. Due to the success of this approach, the Ugandan government is adopting this model in other parts of the country with rebel activity.⁴⁶

Case Study: Traditional Elders' Peace Process in Wajir, Kenya

Dating back to the 1990s, the Wajir region in Kenya experienced extensive political marginalization. As a result, local communities developed a significant amount of autonomy from the national government. The lack of attention from the state, however, drove some state functionaries to innovatively engage local actors on pertinent issues. Wajir had long dealt with inter-clan warfare, exacerbated by issues of water scarcity and

⁴⁶ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 18.

grazing land, but when administrative issues emerged in 1990s, the conflict took a violent turn. The violence escalated during the 1992-1993 drought, which killed 12,000, and intensified resource competition.⁴⁷

Efforts to resolve and manage the conflict were extremely dynamic and, as a result, very successful. Much of the success was a result of collaborative effort between state actors and the local community, which developed a “Rapid Response Team composed of the army, police, and local activists.”⁴⁸ Beyond the initial effort, a growing and evolving partnership between the community-based organizations (CBOs) and the local government institutions directly contributed to stability and peace in Wajir. The community also developed a Peace Forum that worked directly with youth, elders, and women to create and maintain a

⁴⁷ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 19.

⁴⁸ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 19.

peace process, also involving the local government.⁴⁹

Evidently, a number of positive relationships and communication networks were established during this initiative and they proved to be very sustainable. This came, in part, as a result of the strong support of the clan elders, who met to negotiate a framework declaration, which created a peace settlement between the rivaling clans. Since the declaration, the violent activity that directly affected the local communities has subsided. In recognition of the success of the peace initiative, neighboring communities requested the help of the Wajir group in mediating their own similar conflicts.⁵⁰

The local initiative taken on by the Wajir community exemplifies the power of locally-based conflict resolution. The community took ownership of their own problems, and knowing more about the nature of the conflict than any international


organization, utilized dynamic conflict management networks and forums to resolve the dispute. Through information gathering, the creation of an early warning system, and development of new norms of behavior, the initiative has directly contributed to the peace in Wajir. And the support of the local government is so strong, the likelihood of sustainability is very high.

Building Social Capital and Civil Society:

All of the mentioned case studies demonstrate how conflict resolution was used to unite communities and societies. The connection between engaging with conflict resolution and building civil society and social capital may not seem critical at first, but the resolution of most daily conflict involves some sort of pre-existing forum. Family, friends, neighbors, religion, ethnicities, and communities all serve as foundations for the networks that compose civil societies and promote the growth of social capital. They also act as safe

⁴⁹ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 19.

⁵⁰ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 19.



environments where people can share and exchange knowledge, information, and thoughts. In most failed states, conflict and violence that in some cases has endured for decades severely undermines and weakens the composition of a society. War undermines interpersonal and communal trust and demolishes norms, values, and social relations, all of which connect communities to each other and link communal groups to the state.⁵¹

Civil society (also referred to as “civic” society) refers to the space between family and government, which makes interconnections between individuals or families possible. It is independent of the state, and attends to the cultural, social, economic, and/or political needs of citizens. These definitions are very general, and it is important to recognize that the purposes of activity are more important than the form or presence of the organizations that compose


civil society.⁵² *Social Capital* refers to the values, norms, and systems that emerge from civil society, “...such as, worldviews, trust, reciprocity, informational and economic exchange, and informal and formal groups and associations.”⁵³ To build social capital means to create opportunity and agency for individuals and communities. In order to create and encourage collective participation, the power and importance of social capital and civil society must be further emphasized, and can only help in reaching other development goals.

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Conflict resolution works to create stability prior to, during, or after conflicts. But it also works to create social capital by providing tools for communication, dispute resolution, and understanding where

⁵¹ Colleta, 4

⁵² Varshney
⁵³ Colleta, 6



intervention is most needed. These are tools that are invaluable and will remain useful for decades to come. And their potential for success is maximized when they are adapted to culturally specific norms.

Case Study – Civil Society in India

A study conducted by Ashutosh Varshney explored the significance of civil society in promoting peace within ethnically contentious areas. The study specifically examined the relationship between India's Hindu and Muslim communities, which have often been in conflict. Varshney defines civil society through two forms of engagement, associational and everyday. Both types of engagement produce peace in a number of ways. They promote communication between members of different religious communities and allow people to come together in times of tension. In a number of populated cities in India, 'Peace Committees' were formed, which consisted of members from multiple communities that worked to police

neighborhoods, dispel false rumors, and provide information to the local administration.⁵⁴ Furthermore, when civil society works to build social capital through alternative conflict resolution means, these "organized civil networks withstand exogenous shocks, [and] also constrain local politicians in their strategic behavior."⁵⁵

Although this study was specific to India, the findings of the research demonstrate the importance of conflict resolution in building social capital.

Varshney also emphasizes the difference between associational engagement and everyday engagement. Associational forms of engagement prove much stronger in managing conflict and tension. When the vibrant social, economic, cultural, and social needs of two different communities exist interdependently, support for cross-communal peace is not only strong, but also verbalized

⁵⁴ Varshney, 375

⁵⁵ Varshney, 378

and expressed regularly.⁵⁶ Violent conflict impedes growth and creates incentive to partake in potentially lucrative illegal activity.⁵⁷ Therefore, if communities are economically intertwined through associational forms of engagement, the incentive to resolve and manage conflict, and thus remain peaceful, is much stronger.⁵⁸

The Future of Alternative Approaches to Conflict Resolution:

The need to think differently about conflict resolution strategies has become apparent not only to the international community, but to multilateral and US organizations. To see how these approaches have become more integrated into policy, this section will examine the specific steps that the World Bank and USAID have taken.

World Bank Initiatives

The World Bank has taken initiative in shifting their efforts towards recognizing community-oriented needs, exemplified in

⁵⁶ Varshney, 377


⁵⁷ Collier, 17

⁵⁸ Varshney, 377

their “Community Driven Development” (CDD) projects. A pivotal component of CDD is the “Social Capital and Implementation Framework” (SCIF), an arrangement that works to incorporate social capital into development initiatives. The framework of SCIF emphasizes the following points: “Groups and Networks, Trust and Solidarity, Collective Action and Cooperation; Social Cohesion and Inclusion; and Information and Communication.”⁵⁹

The World Bank has also taken initiatives to incorporate culturally specific conflict resolution approaches into CDD projects. In their training video, “Building Social Capital through Peacekeeping Circles,” Molly Baldwin and Sayra Pinto, founders of the organization Roca, Inc., were invited to the World Bank to share the process of peacekeeping circles, which they employ in their organization to help youth in Chelsea, Massachusetts. The practice is derived from

⁵⁹ “Social Capital in Operations.” The World Bank. 25 Feb. 2010.



the traditional customs of the Clinget people in British Colombia and has been used both on the local level and on a large-scale level, helping to create governance structures and environmental policies.⁶⁰ CDD projects now incorporate “an instrument for building empowerment,” acknowledging that “...breakdowns in trust and social cohesion risk inflaming tensions and provoking more violence.”⁶¹ This is a great beginning for the World Bank, a multi-lateral institution that has spent the majority of its existence imposing Western development strategies on a great number of third world countries.

USAID Initiatives

The USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) has recognized the importance of finding and utilizing alternative approaches to conflict

resolution. Their main mission is to incorporate conflict resolution into traditional development policy.⁶² The “Peacebuilding and Conflict Management” department within CMM works with local groups and organizations to “...address the legacy of violence through activities such as support to local and regional peace processes, restorative justice programs, ethnic dialog, inter-faith peace building, and grassroots reconciliation.”⁶³ The methods the department uses to facilitate such activities are as follows:

- Mediation of specific disputes and facilitation of peace negotiations
- Training in peace-building, conflict management, mediation, and conflict analysis
- Peace media and peace education
- Community-based reconciliation
- Reintegration of militia groups into communities
- Mechanisms for restorative justice, such as truth and reconciliation commissions or shared history projects
- Psychosocial and trauma counseling
- Conflict research and analysis

⁶⁰ "Training Presentation: Building Social Capital through Peacekeeping Circles." World Bank Group. Web. 10 Feb. 2010. <<http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/voddocs/536/1037/hi.htm>>.

⁶¹ Maynard, K. "Community-Driven Conflict Recovery: From Reconstruction to Development." World Bank: Community Driven Development. <Siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSF/Resources/395669.../CDR-CDD.pdf>.

⁶² "USAID - Conflict Management and Mitigation: Home." *US Agency for International Development*. Web. 23 Feb. 2010. <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/>.

⁶³ USAID - CMM: Peace Building and Conflict Management

- Early warning models and response protocols
- Future scenario/instability development and planning⁶⁴

In June of 2001, CMM conducted a study in the Greater Horn of Africa to address the “...seemingly endemic nature of violent conflict” in the region.⁶⁵ The study sought to discover what kinds of approaches are actually effective in conflict prevention, conflict management, or peace building.⁶⁶ The survey examines three approaches to managing conflict through building civil society. First, it analyzed the effectiveness of local peace processes, which use traditional dispute resolution methods and institutions [Case studies included: Wajir Peace and Development Committee in Northern Kenya, Inter-tribal Peace Conference in Southern Sudan, New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC)⁶⁷]. Second, it studied “Middle Level”

dialogs centered on national conflicts and controversial political and policy issues [Case studies included: Faith Based Facilitation of the Constitutional Review, National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), the Apostles for Peace (CAP) Project in Political Dialog in Burundi, and the War Torn Societies Project in Somaliland⁶⁸]. And third, it explored the success of a new institution, “Peace Radio” [Case studies included: Studio Ijambo, “Search for Common Ground” show in Burundi and HornAfrik in Somalia⁶⁹].⁷⁰

In summary, the study discovered a number of general lessons in how conflict management and peace building processes can be most effective. There are four outlined lessons that are very relevant to our discussion of conflict resolution in failed states. First, conflict prevention practices are often predetermined by the state and location of the conflict itself. It is important to know at what level the shift needs to occur in order for

⁶⁴ USAID – CMM: Peacebuilding and Conflict Management

⁶⁵ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 1.


⁶⁶ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 2

⁶⁷ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 4

⁶⁸ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 4

⁶⁹ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 4

⁷⁰ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 2-3




conflict to be managed effectively. Second, traditional forms of conflict management (i.e. local customs, traditions, etc.) work best when they are adapted to innovative approaches so that they do not exclude segments of the population (something that can happen with traditional customs). There should be an emphasis on enlisting people from different parts of the community to work in tandem with existing practices and institutions in new, dynamic ways, which can lead to achieving sustainable conflict management solutions and outcomes. Third, the importance and helpfulness of religious leaders and religious organizations should not be underestimated, since they can often be seen within the community and between communities as a neutral source, resulting in the likelihood of uniting different faiths. Religious leaders and organizations have been effective in holding mediation forums, engaging with government leadership in high-level dialogues, and creating peace efforts through community

oriented civil education. And fourth, due to the regional nature of many of these conflicts, peace building initiatives through the traditional community authority may be more successful, as the confining characteristics of “states” and “borders” limit our understanding of where and how conflict emerges. This is especially helpful in working with clan related conflict.⁷¹

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The overall findings of the study showed that the local peace processes approach was comparatively more successful than the “middle level” dialogues or the “peace radio” approach. The local peace processes were more appropriate for the degree and type of conflict addressed (i.e. cattle raids versus violence between organized armies) and a higher degree of cooperation was possible

⁷¹ USAID – Effectiveness of Social Capital, 8



between the study and the governing authorities because the major duties (i.e. policy making, security, justice, and the economy) of the authority were within the jurisdiction of local actors.⁷²

The other two approaches in the study proved to be too far removed from the source of the problems, which resemble many of the past Western efforts to resolve conflict. However, the authors emphasize that local peace processes are not suitable for all forms of conflict management. Ultimately, the local peace processes built on existing civil society and the approaches analyzed were successful in strengthening communication and organizational networks, which fall outside the realm of the governmental, economic, and political processes.⁷³

The Obama administration should recognize the importance of studies like this and further support the efforts of USAID. USAID's budgetary resources for 2008 were

just over \$15 billion.⁷⁴ Given the US' near \$700 billion military budget,⁷⁵ USAID, and specifically the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, should be given more financial support.

The Use of Dynamic Conflict Resolution in Somalia – Recommendation


As illuminated earlier in the report, Somalia has seen the blunt end of US military intervention. The state has lacked a central government since the early 1990s. Since then, Somalia has been governed by both a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was installed after the peace negotiations in 1996, and the Islamic Courts Union, which has now implemented sharia law throughout the country. The conflict in Somalia is heavily clan based and the competition for resources and aid has

⁷² USAID – Effectiveness of Social Capital, 14

⁷³ USAID – Effectiveness of Social Capital, 14-15

⁷⁴ United States. USAID. *Fiscal Year 2008: Agency Financial Report - Managing for Development Results*. 17 Nov. 2008. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/afr08/usaidfy08afr_lowres_508.pdf>.

⁷⁵ United States. The White House. Office of Management and Budget. *President Budget - Historical Tables*. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/>>.



continually served as a source of rivalry.⁷⁶ As the international community has seen traditional conflict resolution approaches (peace agreements, formal negotiations, military interventions, etc.) fail time and time again, it is time to take our cue from Somalia itself, and support the emerging efforts to use locally-developed conflict resolution methods [For more information, see chapter on Somalia].

The region of Puntland has seen more success than the rest of the country, and much of this can be attributed to a committed process of mediation, reconciliation, and negotiation between clan leaders. Somaliland has also seen improvement, which reflected in the War-Torn Society's Project, examined by CMM's study in the Horn of Africa.

Somaliland has struggled with similar conflicts as the rest of Somalia. It has wrestled with challenges to resolve violent internal conflict, build sustainable peace between the various groups within the

population, and build a state that will support and sustain peace. The War-Torn Society Project (WSP) examined the reconstruction process of Somaliland under the objectives to ensure that international assistance contributes to building peace and does not exacerbate or renew conflict.⁷⁷ The Participatory Action Research (PAR) program developed in Somaliland helps to:


...[democratize] development and [empower] communities and disempowered groups such as women, strengthening the capacity of national and local government and civil society organizations to contribute to state-building and reconstruction, and building the capacity and ensuring the sustainability of a successor body, namely the Somaliland Center for Peace and Development (SPCD)⁷⁸

The WSP has created a neutral forum where reconstruction activities can safely take place. The WSP is committed to researching policy and supporting local community efforts, while also extending their reach to the state level. The SCPD further helps communities in taking responsibility for their political needs.

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⁷⁷ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 21.

⁷⁸ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 22



This forum for dialogue has significantly assisted communities who have much to contribute to the development of political, economic, and social policy that will help to achieve sustainable peace.⁷⁹ The WSP exemplifies the kinds of projects that could and should be utilized in Somalia. In constructing intervention strategies and deciding on our level of involvement in Somalia, the US government should also examine the initiative in Wajir, Kenya as an example for how locally based conflicts born out of clan warfare can be solved.

Conclusion: The Power of Non-Violence


In the 1920s, a prominent leader emerged at a pivotal time in India's history. Mahatma Gandhi believed that India's independence would be hollow unless the social evils that plagued Indian society were addressed. He emphasized the importance of Hindu-Muslim unity, self-reliance and self-responsibility, uplifting women and tribal

⁷⁹ USAID – Effectiveness of Civil Society..., 22.

communities, and above all the importance of confronting social evils with non-violent practices.⁸⁰ Gandhi is regarded as one the most influential figures not only in India, but throughout the world. The power of non-violence speaks to people, organizations, and governments across a multitude of ethnicities, borders, religions, and beliefs. India's recent social, economic, and political success is a testimony to the influence of non-violence and its capacity to alter dramatically dark situations, thus spreading the message and importance of *peacefully* addressing conflict.

Despite Gandhi and other prominent leaders' wide recognition, violence has continually been fought with more violence. This chapter has shown that these militaristic methods have not worked to resolve decades of suffering based in deep historical, societal, political, and economic strife. As a welcomed alternative, the United States and the international community have begun to shift their focus towards dynamic conflict

⁸⁰ Varshney, 370.




management, mitigation, and peace building. In this approach, the importance of local actors, knowledge, and history has become an increasingly central theme to conflict resolution projects. New, innovative approaches are emerging in the most needed of situations. As an added benefit, these dynamic approaches work to build and reinforce pre-existing civil society and strengthen social capital within communities

– without which, societies would be left handicapped and violence-ridden. This chapter has illuminated why it is in the best interest of the US to continue to support these initial efforts and work to move away from militarism and towards dynamic conflict resolution and peace building.

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
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Advancing Growth

**Where US Intervention Policy Coincides
with Development**

Taryn Elledge




Introduction

As the Obama administration scales back its involvement in Iraq, embarks on renewed efforts in the war in Afghanistan, and examines involvement with the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, US intervention in failed and collapsed states has again inevitably pushed its way to the forefront of foreign policy debates. The current discussions surrounding intervention policy highlights elements of past state-building and development efforts, mainly illuminating the failures, and raises questions about how to more effectively approach failing states and how to better utilize our limited time and resources. When formulating appropriate US intervention strategy, it is also critical to analyze the current US aid system and development policy, given that these concepts are intrinsically connected. Any dialogue aimed at formulating long-term solutions in failed states must look beyond short-term (and possibly long-term) military

interventions, and onto creating more sustainable development solutions. To make aid and development policies effective and dynamic, they must be built on a framework which incorporates local actors. Without their support, any intervention by the US or international community is bound to fail.

Background

Unsuccessful past efforts to alleviate poverty and transform developing countries have illuminated the overall weaknesses of the aid regime and the absence of effective development policies. Historically the US, along with the international community, has adopted an overarching development model based primarily on a top-down approach. This seeks to impose its foreign “knowledge” and “expertise” in a standardized and static fashion to a wide range of situations across a diverse array developing countries. Under this systematized approach, the so-called developed countries, along with the large international organizations and financial



institutions, have often implemented a “one size fits all” methodology which allows for the West to pursue its own interests and impose its own values, rather than addressing the well-being of the supposed recipients. Although the face of development policy has evolved over the last several decades, the internal mechanism has retained some key characteristics. From Cold War politics, to the Structural Adjustment economic reforms, to the Washington Consensus Model, US development policy has failed to successfully bridge the gap between the rich and the poor and, as a result, has done very little to increase the standards of living for those most in need. Failing to reform ineffective development policy and refusing to learn from past mistakes, the US and key international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF, have frequently misguided their efforts to identify and/or invest in key components of long-term economic growth. Despite trillions of dollars dumped into aid


projects, vast regions of the world, most notably sub-Saharan Africa, have failed to escape a cyclical web of extreme poverty leading to massive human suffering. If there is any hope to successfully improving the lives of the global poor, aid money must be redirected towards development projects that promote sustainable economic growth, and stop creating further dependency and stagnation. In addition, intervention efforts need to refocus substantial time and resources towards effective and fluid bottom-up development solutions.

The “Planners” of the Aid Regime

As William Easterly asserts in his assessment of the aid regime,

Voters in the rich country and their representatives are the ones who choose the actions of the foreign aid agency. They love the Big Plans, the promises of easy solutions, the utopian dreams, the side benefits for rich-country political or economic interests, all of which hands the aid agency impossible tasks.¹

¹ Easterly, William. *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and so Little Good.* New York: Penguin Press, 2006. p.169




The so-called “experts” who design development schemes are typically far removed from those who are being affected by their decisions, and hence miss their intended goal of helping those in extreme need. In an attempt to impose comprehensive reforms and formulaic responses to problems of development, the US, and the international community end up missing the key components of effective, sustainable solutions to growth and poverty reduction. Being so far removed from the effects and outcomes of policies not only leads to a lack of awareness, but also encourages and reinforces a lack of accountability and transparency on both ends of the aid spectrum. Over the last sixty years, development policies have recycled the same inefficiencies, and without an effective system of checks and balances, the myriad of agencies, organizations, and governments have been caught up in an unproductive viscous cycle. In a critique of the aid regime, Paul Collier suggests that the system is

inherently flawed in its approach because it is currently “designed for instrumentalism, not for structural change,” which results in only a “modest payoff,” as it is repeating the same unproductive methods. Collier continues by stating that in order “for aid to promote structural change in countries it requires structural change in agencies.”²

Instead of structuring foreign policy around the need to appease US leaders and domestic interests, foreign policy must be shaped by a cohesive, revamped approach, which puts each country’s unique issues at the center. A new approach must be based on an educated understanding of the regional context and must involve key local actors. Including local communities in restructuring efforts provides incentives for the intended beneficiaries and also creates accountability. Another critical element of restructuring the aid regime would entail concentrating more power and resources into a select agency or a

² Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 122




small group of select agencies (such as the Office of the Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which was created by the White House in 2004 to assist in state building efforts). This would result in securing new, more effective and consistent routes for aid to travel by reducing the infinite number of obstacles set up by agencies and their donors that result in unnecessary overlap and extensive overhead costs that could otherwise be utilized for the projects they were originally intended for. Better organized development efforts would mean that the US could work more productively in concert with local communities to address the root causes of the crisis, and to formulate long-term sustainable solutions for problems.

The Pitfalls of Charity Aid

Glenn Hubbard and William Duggan from Columbia Business School represent a camp of academics who believe that it is precisely the misguided efforts of the aid regime that have inhibited development

policy from truly lifting people out of poverty. This group suggests that the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, for example, which have defined development efforts over the last decade, “are a vehicle for charity” that has succeeded in making the lives of the world’s poor “a little bit better,” but has created a “trap” that “crowds out or corrupts the business sector.”³ According to Hubbard and Duggan, boosting the market and creating jobs is the only path for poor countries to reach prosperity. Those that fall into the charity trap have not acknowledged the economic history that has led some poor countries, most recently India and China, to prosperity. To support their argument the authors highlight three countries, Sao Tomé, Guinea-Bissau, and Malawi, which received the highest amount of aid per local dollar, yet are ranked by the World Bank as 163rd, 176th, and 127th out of 178, in terms of easiest places to start and run a business. “Instead of

³ Hubbard R. Glenn, and William Duggan, *The Aid Trap: Hard Truths About Ending Poverty*. New York: Columbia Business School, 2009. p. 3-7



struggling to start a business, citizens of these countries aspire to work for the government and NGO agencies that deliver the aid. Working as a driver for an aid agency makes you many times more money than working as a farmer or trader.”⁴ Aid money that has traditionally flowed through governments in developing countries has also provided incentive for the state itself to resist taking the initiative that is necessary to open the markets and promote healthy industrialization and productive economic development.

By directly or indirectly reinforcing barriers to business, the current aid mechanisms are obstructing the development processes or, at the very least, failing to address the true root of the issue. “Poor countries remain prisoners of an abnormal aid system, where government agencies and NGOs create jobs, foreign aid substitutes for tax revenue, and aid development projects substitute for the tax-spending initiatives of

⁴ Hubbard R. Glenn, and William Duggan, The Aid Trap: Hard Truths About Ending Poverty. New York: Columbia Business School, 2009. p. 7

local, regional, and state governments.”⁵


According to many academics and development specialists, low incomes and slow growth are key contributors that keep poor countries in the poverty rut, and consequently create a welcoming environment for chaos and continued conflict. US and international funding need to not only rethink “charity aid,” but also emphasize the building of strong infrastructure and opening up resources for the business sector and thus creating a more hospitable environment for businesses to flourish.

The Cold Hard Facts

Over the last sixty or so years, the total amount of aid given to poor countries amounts to the extraordinary sum of 2.3 trillion dollars. Currently the annual sum amounts to around half a trillion dollars per year.⁶ As proof of the ineffectiveness of the aid system most of these resources have failed to produce the intended results. If poverty and

⁵ Hubbard and Duggan. p. 93

⁶ Hubbard and Duggan. p. 87



lack of development are known contributors to state failure and massive amounts of human suffering, then aid effectiveness and successful development strategies demand a central focus in all US intervention and state-building efforts from this point forward.

Iraq: A Chance to Learn From the Past

As the US begins to scale-down its efforts in Iraq, the US government has an opportunity to look back and learn from the various strategies that have made up the controversial mission over the last seven years. After an estimated \$50 billion spent on reconstruction efforts in Iraq as of February 2009 (carried out mainly by private and US contractors),⁷ the US has a responsibility to investigate past inefficiencies and shortcomings in order to productively refocus its efforts in Afghanistan. The US government has been accused of wasting a great deal of time and resources on efforts that were misguided,

poorly researched, and consequently, lacking in overall cohesiveness and efficiency.

Critics of the US intervention in Iraq also note that the lack of cultural sensitivity and necessary feedback of projects, only helped to fuel resentment of a Western presence. Some even claim that Americans played a hand in instigating the extremist insurgency in Iraq by taking advantage of their military capabilities and ignoring Iraqi culture and traditions.

“This strategy failed in Iraq just as it had earlier failed in Iran...It provoked an anti-colonial opposition to American occupation, which eventually took on the colouration of radical Islam.”⁸ By disregarding critical opinions of local leaders and community members, the population was not only disenfranchised, but a wide range of development projects also went without a solid foundation for growth and sustainability.

Despite the fact that most American

⁷ DeYoung, Karen, and Walter Pincus. "Iraq Auditor Warns of Waste, Fraud in Afghanistan." *The Washington Post* 2 Feb. 2009. 22 Jan. 2010 <www.washingtonpost.com>.

⁸ Judis, John. "War on Global Terrorism was Destined to Fail." *The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*. 09 Sept. 2005. Web. 16 Feb. 2010.


companies have been paid for their contracts to rebuild Iraq, many reconstruction efforts have either failed to surface, or have proved unsustainable. The inspector general for Iraq reconstruction has asserted that his agency had “regularly raised concerns about the potential waste of U.S. taxpayer money resulting from reconstruction projects that were poorly planned, badly transferred, or insufficiently sustained by the Iraqi government.”⁹ Tens of thousands of hospitals, schools, water treatment plants, and electricity substations that lack the necessary resources, skilled personnel, and equipment, are functioning at either partial capacity or not at all.¹⁰ The US approach in Iraq demonstrates the risk of taking on development endeavors that lack a sustainable, contextual framework..

⁹ Williams, Timothy. "US Fears Iraq Will Not Keep Up Rebuild Projects." *The New York Times* 20 Nov. 2009. 26 Jan. 2010 <www.newyorktimes.com>.

¹⁰ Williams.

Structural Change-From the Bottom-Up

Regardless of whether aid is being directed towards meeting people’s basic needs or towards encouraging growth in the economic sector, the framework needs to embrace successful, existing structures and foster development that emerges organically through grass-roots efforts. This bottom-up approach would require a significant shift away from the outdated “Washington Consensus” model that has dominated development efforts since the 1990s, and has often imposed a generic list of policy prescriptions in a uniform, expedited fashion to all developing countries. According to William Baumol, Robert Litan, and Carl Schramm authors of *Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity*, development policy structured around a model like the “Washington Consensus” “provides no guidance to countries about the *relative* importance of the different prescriptions on the list or about



their timing or sequence.”¹¹ The institutions that prescribe these “laundry lists” do not prioritize their extensive policy demands, nor do they provide any structure or context for the governments and consumers on the receiving end. The authors argue that since economics and growth are not static, “the specific policies that are appropriate will vary for different countries at different times. Context, culture, and history all matter. There is no single detailed blueprint that can or should be imposed on every country.” As a testament to this fact, “...various countries have achieved rapid growth rates with somewhat different institutional structures.”¹² Whether US intervention is justified through a humanitarian mission, or under the auspices of ensuring US security interests, the US, along with the international community, has an obligation to approach intervention and development in a manner that acknowledges

country-specific information and cultural context, something that has seriously been lacking from the variations in development models over the last sixty years. Not only is there a responsibility to tailor strategies to regional environments, but long-term, sustainable progress requires that local expertise, knowledge, and existing local structures be the very foundation on which any development process begins, yet they are often bypassed.

In his book *The Bottom Billion*, Paul Collier addresses the often unacknowledged complexity of issues surrounding development, and the need to move beyond past failures. According to Collier, moving “beyond the headless heart” (implying altruistic yet uniformed liberals), in order to implement effective development policies will require change “from within the societies of the bottom billion,” increasing the potential for success with help of Western policies.¹³

¹¹ J., Baumol, William, Robert E. Litan, and Carl J. Schramm. *Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity*. New York: Yale UP, 2007. p. 56-57

¹² Baumol, Litan, Schramm. p.59

¹³ Collier, Paul. *The Bottom Billion*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 12



Shifting from top-down to bottom-up requires that US policies and ideals no longer act as the drivers of development policy, but that information gathered by the people being affected, be the primary input used to structure US plans, and determine appropriate and effective implementation processes on the ground. In the aid bureaucracy, oftentimes the political incentives that are driving development policy do not always line up with what is best for the poor. “The needs of the poor don’t get met because the poor have little money or political power with which to make their needs known and they cannot hold anyone accountable to meet those needs.”¹⁴ By including the global poor in the development process, we are giving them the opportunity to utilize their own knowledge and skill to build a solid foundation and encourage accountability on both ends through creating a feedback mechanism.


¹⁴ Easerly, William Russell. *White Man’s Burden; Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and so Little Good*. New York: Penguin P, 2006. p. 17

Thereby offering a better chance at success and sustainable transformation. Under a newly directed approach, that places local communities and experts at the focal point of reconstruction and intervention efforts, the US agencies can better employ services and resources towards effective, long-term solutions to development.

Opportunities for Bottom Development in Haiti – Case Study

In the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti, one of the more devastating natural disasters in recent history, the US and the international aid community are faced with an incredible responsibility to formulate not only a rapid disaster response effort, but also the critical question of what will follow as Haiti begins to pick up the pieces. With an estimated death toll between 170,000 and 230,000, thousands of injured survivors, and around 280,000 homes and commercial buildings have been left in ruins.¹⁵ the heavily

¹⁵ Bajak, Frank, and Paisley Dodds. "Haiti Gives Conflicting Counts for Quake Deaths." New York



populated capital of Port-au-Prince not only begs immediate attention, but also offers an opportunity to create an up-to-date model for successful humanitarian intervention, following with sustainable development efforts. Without widespread conflict, and with the watchful eye of the international community mobilizing to contribute aid workers and resources, Haiti offers a prime opportunity to do things the right way, from the bottom-up. The local leaders and community members are willing and able to pull together their efforts to help rebuild their country. Once aid resources have served to address emergency medical care, and basic needs, the US should take the lead to implement creative reconstruction efforts that foster positive structural changes, as well as sound political and economic restructuring. In the process however, the US should set an example for how effective development policy can be pursued without imposing

foreign, top-down schemes. Instead, we should embrace local actors in Haiti who can help to develop home-grown models, that work with existing local institutions, infrastructure, and cultural norms. Post-war Tokyo offers an example of how piecemeal development, supported by local actors, can play a major role in the rise of the middle class. "A decentralized and highly participatory urban development process produced areas of low-rise, high-density structures built with local skills and material...which strengthened communities, and stimulated local economies."¹⁶ Whatever development projects formulate, they need to respect and embrace the local Haitian social networks and livelihood and work to incorporate models that rebuild neighborhoods, while also rebuilding economic opportunity.

Times 10 Feb. 2010. 16 Feb. 2010
<www.newyorktimes.com>.

¹⁶ Echanove, Matias, and Rahul Srivastava. "Eight Ways to Rebuild Haiti." New York Times 16 Jan. 2010. 25 Jan. 2010 <www.newyorktimes.com>.

Social Capital and Community Driven

Development

Building Social Capital

Social Capital is perhaps one of the more critical and often overlooked elements to achieving successful development. Social Capital refers to the norms and networks that create the foundation of a community, and allow local actors to work collectively towards addressing problems.¹⁷ There is a large group of analysts who believe that economic policy alone is not enough to ensure development in poverty-stricken countries. This is precisely why the central planners of the Washington Consensus failed to produce sustainable economic growth in poor countries through their neoliberal reforms. Many economists and specialists regard certain elements of the “Washington Consensus” approach as necessary for long-term growth and development. However ultimately, liberalization policies fail to


¹⁷ [The World Bank-Social Capital](#). The World Bank. 28 Jan. 2010 www.worldbank.org.

acknowledge existing political, social, and economic structures, nor do they account for cultural predispositions, all of which can be seen in a society’s social capital. “Social capital directly affects the ability of people to organize for economic ends; it supports the creation of institutions and the rule of law; and it is a vital underpinning of democracy, which is the source of legitimacy for the political framework in which development increasingly takes place.”¹⁸ Social capital consists of cultural values and norms yet, has been consistently left out of past central planning efforts.

The World Bank and Community Driven Development

The World Bank has recognized how the role of social capital has improved the “quality, effectiveness, and sustainability” in Community Driven Development programs (CDD). The World Bank has created the

¹⁸ Fukuyama, Francis. "Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda." *School of Advanced International Studies Review*, at Johns Hopkins University XXII (2002): 23-36.




Social Capital and Implementation Framework (SCIF), as a tool to help identify and incorporate social capital into development projects. The five dimensions of SCIF, which demonstrate both the cognitive as well as structural forms of social capital, include: “Groups and Networks, Trust and Solidarity, Collective Action and Cooperation; Social Cohesion and Inclusion; and Information and Communication.”¹⁹ The World Bank has pursued several notable CDD projects which have produced sustainable benefits for poverty-stricken villages, based on a framework that embraces social capital. For example, in Balangiga, in East Samar the World Bank has sponsored local projects to build canals which channel floodwaters to the sea during monsoon season. Through the drainage projects, which employ locals, the projects in Balangiga have fostered collective participation of the local community, while giving them an opportunity to work together

¹⁹ “Social Capital in Operations.” [The World Bank](#). 25 Jan.2010.

to improve their livelihoods, health, and living conditions.²⁰

The World Bank’s Community Driven Development programs are a good example of a bottom-up approach to development, which rely on social capital to create a basic framework for infrastructure and growth. Instead of the traditional method of formulating an exogenous plan directed at serving the world’s poor, CDD aims to include the intended beneficiaries in the planning and implementation process. Community Driven Development attempts to utilize local institutions and assets and work from preexisting structures as the primary building blocks of future projects. In their own words, CDD “is an approach that gives control over planning decisions and investment resources to community groups and local governments.” The World Bank Community Driven Development programs use the following as guiding principles for

²⁰ “Philippines: Community-Driven Development Strategy Frees Poor Samar Town from the Scourge of Floods.” [The World Bank](#). 25 Jan.2010.



operation: “local empowerment participatory governance, demand-responsiveness, administrative autonomy, greater downward accountability, and enhanced local capacity.”²¹ At the heart of the CDD projects are a reliance on participation by local actors, giving them access to the resources of development and focusing on demand driven projects, rather than supply driven. While the majority of CDD projects focus on building infrastructure and improving basic standards of living, this grass-roots approach offers a model to US leaders, demonstrating how to effectively act in concert with local players to ensure a more holistic and country-specific application of growth and economic development projects.


A key component of CDD programs is to help decentralize authority, by empowering local governments and civil society, rather than relying on central governments, which are typically out of touch with the local needs

of people. Involving actors at the local level helps people to take action in shaping their own future and to work to implement strategic plans based on *their* existing structures, which work with *their* cultural norms. Furthermore, involving local actors encourages people to focus their efforts towards projects, which address prioritizing their needs, therefore better utilizing time and resources, while encouraging sustainability and peer accountability. CDD programs also create opportunities to strengthen partnerships between communities, local governments, and decentralized sector ministries and departments, emphasizing the need for collaborative efforts, which enhance dynamic and sustainable approaches.

Community Driven Development in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is an especially relevant place to examine how we can shift our development efforts for two reasons. First, the US has directly and indirectly been involved

²¹ The World Bank Community Driven Development Programs. The World Bank. 28 Jan. 2010 <www.worldbank.org>.




in the region throughout the years. Second, President Obama has recently decided to increase our commitment of time and resources. Although military intervention is at the forefront of US efforts, it is critical to examine the larger picture by beginning to explore long-term development strategy solutions. Without an effective plan for growth and development in Afghanistan, military efforts are likely to be short-lived once the US departs, opening the door for terrorist networks to expand their reach and enabling them to potentially pursue attacks on the US. Given the high level of US strategic interest in securing a peaceful and prosperous future for Afghanistan, it is of utmost importance to gain the support of local leaders and strategic players throughout the country, making sure to involve them in the reconstruction process.

The International Development Association, the World Bank's fund for the poorest countries, has utilized the skill and

capacity of local communities in Afghanistan and around the world, to address poverty reduction. The National Solidarity Program (NSP), which has benefited from World Bank's IDA assistance, exemplifies the sort of development projects the US should invest in, by demonstrating the sustainable benefits of CDD. The NSP incorporates building social capital, providing a dynamic approach, which is tailored to each specific community. The projects involve local players to identify the key challenges that their community faces, and then encourages participation in the implementation process. The National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan works to focus its efforts towards rural communities, especially those that are most vulnerable, and most in need of assistance. As of January 2009, the NSP had worked with 359 districts in Afghanistan, reaching at least one community in each of the 34 provinces throughout the country.²² The NSP's process

²² National Solidarity Programme. 2008. NSP Afghanistan. 28 Jan. 2010 <www.nspafghanistan.org>.




in working with communities highlights how local actors can truly be involved in development projects. The first step in working with a community begins with the assignment of an NSP facilitating partner (often an NGO) to a province, which then contacts the local community to educate them about NSP. Next, the facilitating partner holds a community election to select a council of local leaders who will act as representatives to speak on behalf of the community and voice their interests and needs. Once the council has collaborated with the community to create a list of project proposals, the proposed Community Development Plan is then submitted to NSP for review. Once approved, NSP supplies direct grants to the council to cover the various project costs. The council then forms individual committees which are designated to fulfill specific roles during the implementation process. The council is required to supply reports to NSP and the community, in order to assure that resources

are responsibly utilized and to monitor the overall effectiveness of the project, emphasizing accountability. NSP development projects range from building roads, and repairing schools and hospitals, to creating a platform for peer mediation and collaboration on projects.²³

In the small village of Jurm, located in Badakhshan, a north-east region of Afghanistan, village councils have successfully managed smaller-scale, grass-roots projects with the help and funding from the National Solidarity Program. The projects have worked to provide clean water and electricity, implement alternative crop methods, and build new schools. The large-scale projects that have lacked local input and knowledge, mismanaged funds and often ended in failure. In contrast, the NSP (funded by foreigners) has successfully implemented smaller projects, which gain the consent and request involvement of the local leaders, eliminating the middle men and unnecessary

²³ NSP Afghanistan.



overhead costs. Not only have the community driven development projects in Jurm been effective in improving the lives of locals, but they have also helped to create more support for Western-backed projects (which have otherwise been seen as unfavorable), showing locals an alternative to the Taliban. The framework that the National Solidarity Program has built its projects on rests on one simple rule: “Never start a project that is not backed by all members of the community, or it will fail.”²⁴ Jurm offers us a very useful model for how to more successfully direct funds towards sustainable, realistic projects, even if they occur on a smaller scale.

How to Alleviate Poverty through Economic Development

In a recent World Bank report on projected progress on the fight against poverty, Justin Lin, Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of Development and Economics at the World Bank, suggest that

²⁴ Tavernise, Sabrina. "Afghan Enclave Offers Model to Rebuild and Rebuff Taliban." New York Times 12 Nov. 2009. 09 Jan. 2010 <www.newyorktimes.com>.

most recent data suggests that there is a great deal of potential to meet the first Millennium Development Goals of halving poverty by the year 2015. The same report, however, also points to the fact that “poverty is more pervasive” than previously thought, leading to the conclusion that efforts must be “redoubled...especially in sub-Saharan Africa”²⁵ in order to meet this goal. This is not an entirely surprising conclusion, considering that the analysis shows that there are extreme regional disparities in poverty reduction between sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world, most notably with East Asia. The statistics show that poverty rates in East Asia have fallen 62 percent from 1981 to 2005, beginning in 1981 with 80 percent of the population living at or near poverty levels and dropping to an estimated 18 percent in 2005. By contrast, the poverty rate in sub-Saharan Africa has remained at relatively the

²⁵ World Bank. Development and Research Group. "New Data Show 1.4 Billion Live on Less than US\$1.25 a day, But Progress Against Poverty Remains Strong." Press release. 26 Aug. 2008. 3 Feb. 2010 <www.worldbank.org>.

same rate of 50 percent over the same period. The World Bank asserts that “given that poverty is so deep in Africa, even higher growth will be needed than for other regions.”²⁶

While it is glaringly obvious that sub-Saharan Africa has a much longer road towards growth than some of its Asian neighbors, it is not clear how that progress will occur. Yet, past failures in aid resuscitation in sub-Saharan Africa, and the recent successes in parts of Asia, outline some lessons to be learned. One of the most notable differences, especially within India and China, two of the leading powerhouses in Asia, is the adoption of a pro-business model for growth. This choice does not to rely on the crutch of the traditional aid system, like the majority of sub-Saharan Africa. There is a clear lesson to be learned from history if the World Bank’s agenda plans to once again double its aid to sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter should serve as a guide for how aid

²⁶ Ibid.


can refocus its efforts to more successfully stimulate growth and put development money to good use.

Microfinance: Setting the Stage for Pro-Business Development Aid

Microfinance lending has become one of the more widely recognized examples of how development aid can effectively be used to support a growing business sector at the bottom of the pyramid in developing countries. The year 2005 was declared “International Year of Microcredit” by the United Nations, and Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan was quoted as crediting business start-ups funded by microfinance in showing how the beneficiaries “are the solution, not the problem...it is a way to build on their ideas, energy and vision” and “allow[s] communities to prosper.”²⁷

Microfinancing helps groups of individuals in the developing world to obtain small loans with low interest rates, which are

²⁷ Boudreaux, Karol, and Tyler Cowen. "The Micromagic of Microcredit." *The Wilson Quarterly*. Winter 2008. 8 Feb. 2010 <www.wilsoncenter.org>.



then used for small business start-ups. Micro-credit has allowed the world's poor, including those who are most vulnerable and repressed, an increased capacity to earn income and gain access to means of survival. One of the reasons that microfinance has been so successful is in part because Muhammad Yunus, its creator, structured microfinance lending around encouraging locals to develop their own projects based on their own interests and needs, as opposed to the ideas and interests of the central planners at the multilateral institutions. Microfinance lending provides a framework for how aid can be productively redistributed towards building entrepreneurial activity in developing countries, while at the same time increasing chances of sustainability through projects that are developed and implemented from the bottom-up.

It is necessary to make sure that the lending establishments, namely banks, are not making a business out of microfinance by

exploiting the poor through charging unreasonably high interest rates and creating a mountain of debt for borrowers. As with other aid projects and development pitfalls that have siphoned off money at the expense of the poor, there needs to be a system of check and balances in place to assure that microfinance organizations and banks are not taking advantage of the poor they are claiming to serve. Another potential downfall of microfinance is the nature of small loans, which may not encourage enough growth in the normal business sector or provide substantial employment opportunity.

“Microloans make poor borrowers better off. But, on their own, they often don't do much to make poor countries richer.”²⁸ Still microfinance offers some ideas about successful options for the business sector in poor countries, and offers the US and the international community a base model for

²⁸ Surowiecki, James. "What Microloans Miss." *The New Yorker* 17 Mar. 2008. 05 Feb. 2010 <http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/03/17/080317ta_talk_surowiecki>.

reference when designing future, more expansive economic growth for the world's poor.

Meso-Finance: An Advanced Model for Growth

A fairly recent phenomenon in the world of micro-finance, is meso-finance, often referred to as the “missing middle.” Meso-finance is, in some sense, a graduated version of microfinance. It seeks to reach out to those beyond small enterprises that are also in need of funding. Unlike small and medium-sized businesses that can access the market for funding in industrialized nations, those in poor countries are often left without access to capital or the institutional guidance needed to expand their businesses. With increased funding, meso-finance allows for substantial resources to expand business and generate jobs. Employment opportunity provides an increased economic growth potential for the entire country, not just for a percentage of individuals within the country. “Sustained

economic growth requires companies that can make big investments...and that can exploit the economies of scale that make workers more productive and, ultimately, richer.”²⁹

By directing more domestic and international resources to the “missing middle,” meso-finance offers an opportunity to multiply the benefits of microfinance and promote prosperity and growth on a vast scale, by encouraging expansion of the normal business sector and opening up employment opportunities. Obviously extending loans into the \$10,000+ range creates additional risk but ultimately, there will have to be willing venture capitalists and investors to help build and support local infrastructure so that it can foster sustainable development. Still, in order for economic development to take place, capital needs to be built, and people need to invest; a certain amount of sacrifice and risk are necessary to

²⁹ Surowiecki, James. "What Microloans Miss." *The New Yorker* 17 Mar. 2008. 05 Feb. 2010
<http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2008/03/17/080317ta_talk_surowiecki>.

ensure future gains. Meso-finance will help small and medium enterprises grow, which could then form productive economic organizations that will expand into “complementary arrangements such that the product of the whole...[society]...exceeds the sum of what can be produced by its parts”—small micro-businesses.³⁰

A Model for US Aid to Effectively Promote Economic Growth

In their book *The Aid Trap*, Glenn Hubbard and William Duggan suggest that the Marshall Plan, which was implemented after WWII to resuscitate and rebuild an economic foundation for Europe, offers a model of how aid can be used to support the business sector and bring people out of poverty. This is not to dismiss the necessity of “charity” aid, which helps to meet peoples most basic needs in the most desperate times. It is simply to suggest that there is another crucial goal for aid that deserves attention,

³⁰ Bates, Robert H. *Prosperity and Violence The Political Economy of Development*. Boston: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. p. 101.

which is to promote sustainable economic development. Under the Marshall Plan the focus of the aid from the US government was to boost economic development and business sectors in order to stimulate industrialization and promote growth throughout European countries. In addition to transferring technical assistance and efficient business models, the US reduced trade barriers. The end result was an unprecedented period of growth and prosperity for all participants.

If the US could refocus some of its efforts on collaborating with local actors to locate viable business models based on local structures and find organizations to support entrepreneurial activity, a similar model to the Marshall Plan could be replicated in developing countries to promote growth and prosperity. Although Hubbard and Duggan recognize that most poor countries today are living in a very different environment than that which existed in post-WWII Europe, they argue that a similar model could be tailored to


the needs of poor countries today on a large enough scale to make a real difference in the lives of the global poor.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the ineffective approaches of the aid regime that have been primarily based on the “Washington Consensus” model. This model has failed to address the specific needs of local communities within the developing world by enforcing policies based on top-down approach. US development policy directed the overwhelming majority of resources towards “charity aid”, which fails to promote economic growth. There has been a recent trend, through Community Driven Development projects and micro/meso-finance to involve and give voice to local populations who are ultimately the real “experts” in sustainable growth due to their invaluable and irreplaceable local knowledge.

As the Obama Administration looks to increase its presence in Afghanistan, reaffirm

its commitment to the global fight against terrorist networks, and rebuild a shattered Haiti, it is critical that an assessment be made to evaluate the effectiveness of current development efforts. With a great deal of criticism, and perhaps lost faith in our intention and our ability, at the closure of the controversial occupation in Iraq, it is absolutely essential that from this point forward that our limited aid resources be utilized for projects that are not only effective in the short-term, but are also sustainable in the long run. We have learned from past efforts that without incorporating the local communities in which we implement our projects, and without gaining their support, the success rate dramatically decreases, and there is a much higher likelihood of wasted efforts. If the US hopes to effectively utilize our limited resources for the long-term betterment of the developing world, it must begin by adopting development policies that



place local interests and needs at the center of
intervention efforts in failed states.

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The Regional Dynamics Imperative

**Addressing the Exogenous Aspects of State
Failure**

Rachel Proefke



Introduction

As this report argues, it has become increasingly evident that the US must address the root causes of state failure as opposed to simply “treating its symptoms;” the greater incorporation of the analytics of regional dynamics in US policy towards failed states is an important element of this principle. Policy towards failed states has often treated state failure as monolithic and as isolated to a particular state, except when it spreads across borders. However, this treatment often does not reflect significant aspects of the *development* and persistence of state failure that extend beyond the traditional boundaries of the state. State failure is often in part produced and sustained by the regional dynamics that the state is immersed in. The US should incorporate considerations of the complex regional actuality of state failure into its policies in these instances.

The US must conduct multiple levels of analysis to distill the character of state

failure in each case, examining state failure at the sub-state level, the state level, and the super-state level. The super-state level has often been left out of this analysis. However, as the super-state level is an integral dimension in state failure, an examination of state failure on this level is critical to US attempts to ameliorate these situations. At the super-state level, the US must *consider and specifically address* the regional dynamics and regional political economies that engender, exacerbate, and perpetuate state failure. Regional dynamics of power often create political imperatives that extend beyond the borders of the failed state, implicating neighboring states. Similarly, regional political economies structure and restructure economic incentives within and beyond the failed state, creating direct disincentives for neighboring states to address and rectify state failure. It is vital that the US develop an analysis of the complex regional

dynamics that each case of state failure is implicated in.

Why Do We Care? The Regional

Dimensions of State Failure

The Regional Character of State Failure

Precisely because many instances of state failure involve regional dimensions, the US must give more attention to the complicated interconnections between failed states and their neighbors in addition to examining the instance of the passive entanglement of regional actors in state failure. Many aspects of state failure have regional dimensions that do not fit neatly into either an assessment of the failed state in isolation or an assessment of the region as a whole. Instead, state failure often represents complex, hybrid, regional issues that can be best thought of as transnational in character.¹ Essential to a comprehension of the character of state failure, the US must recognize that the

¹ Micheal E. Brown. "New Global Dangers," *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela AA (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2007) 43.


regional aspects of state failure cannot be separated from a state-level analysis. Because of this, the US must envision state failure in a manner that accounts for how regional dynamics are often implicated in state failure.

Instead, these complex, multidimensional problems must be addressed with multifaceted solutions, especially in the case of regional aspects of state failure.² This is an especially paramount consideration in the context of conflict in state failure but also bears relevance to the regional political economies that state

failure is enmeshed in. Currently, state failure and the war economies that are often related with such a condition are momentous in that

² Micheal E. Brown. "New Global Dangers," *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela AA (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2007) 48.

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
they are at once both local and dependent on transnational connection, built on chains and lines of plunder, black market transactions, and external assistance that extend beyond the borders of the state itself and implicating other surrounding states.³ An examination of the regional dynamics at work in and undergirding state failure is therefore a necessary element in addressing state failure in the present.

US Interests

Noting that state failure often involves the causal element of regional dynamics, the US must maintain a super-state level of analysis in the examination of state failure. Without this perspective, attempts at counteracting state failure neglect some of the integral reasons for its development and thus cannot fully resolve this problem. Without sensitivity to regional dynamics, US policy

towards failed states will miss crucial factors in state failure that remain unaddressed only to engender instability again and counteract US efforts. In addition, the US has other extenuating interests in addressing the regional causes of state failure and its persistence, especially because they imply a greater level of instability than that limited to the state itself. Regional instabilities create the potential for the “epidemic” spread of the elements of state failure - many of which directly jeopardize US security and economic interests. Containing the situation of state failure involves particularly an examination of the complex regional dynamics that state failure is immersed in and tends to spread along. Similarly, regions of instability create larger and more vulnerable areas for the scourges of humanitarian crises. This concern registers strongly with the US’s commitment to democratic and humanitarian ideals across the globe.

³ Cynthia J. Arnson. “The Political Economy of War: Situating the Debate,” *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed*, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), 2.



Regional Incentives

The US must work to understand state failure in its regional context if the roots of state failure are to be distilled and then dealt with. The US should internalize a dissection and address of the different motivations that neighboring states have in these situations.⁴ Only if the continued interests and incentives of neighboring states are addressed and counteracted in US policy can the perpetuation of state failure be arrested.

The US must utilize this examination of regional dynamics to extract the incentives of regional actors for the perpetuation of state

failure not only highlights the effects of external actors on the production of state failure but also begins to account for the complicated and consistent incursion of regional dynamics into instances of state failure. The incentives, capacities, and opportunities within failed state are structured strongly by other involved regional actors as well as through factors endogenous to the state itself.⁵ The US should recognize that such an analysis is necessary to disentangling state failure from its regional roots.

The US must internalize the political and strategic incentives that structure neighboring states' involvement in the propagation of instability and failure in examining these instances. Often, considerations for the political and strategic imperatives for involvement provided by some of the aspects of failing states condition


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failure. Without addressing these incentives, as has often been the case in previous attempts to

approach state failure, a number of the causes for state failure will persist and engender further instability and state failure. Examining the intersection of regional dynamics and

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ted Robert Gurr. "Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in the Twenty-First Century," *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007) 149.



the interactions of regional actors in state failure. While external forces are occasionally instrumental in engendering state failure, the deliberate actions of neighboring states in their own political and strategic interest are often of greater significance.⁶ In fact, this is often the rule as opposed to the exception; few instances of state failure are hermetically sealed. The vast majority both involve and affect neighboring states, as they are parts of larger regional dynamics.⁷ This stems precisely from the fact that state failure has palpable effects for neighbors as well.

However, while the effects of state failure on neighboring states provide these states with a stake in the situation, the responses are often not productive. Often neighboring states are as much active contributors to military escalation and

regional instability in the failed state.⁸ When permissive conditions for conflict already exist in the target country, especially where this is reflected as the commencement of state failure, the causal factors often involve the deliberate actions by other governments for political, economic, or ideological purposes of their own.⁹ Whether by direct action of the government such as in Rwanda in the DRC or via decisions that allow for other non-state actors and agents to continue to destabilize the region such as in Pakistan in Afghanistan, these policies must be addressed. Problems that precipitate failure therefore come from two directions that are mutually causal - from within the state and as a product of neighboring states and other supra-state regional actors,¹⁰ and each of these directions involve political and strategic incentives.


⁶ Michael E. Brown. "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 571.

⁷ Michael E. Brown. "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 572.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Michael E. Brown. "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 580.

¹⁰ Michael E. Brown. "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 600.



In addition the examination of the political and strategic incentives of regional actors engaged in the production and maintenance of state failure, the US must also account for economic incentives that war economies create for regional actors. In particular, the war economies that are often allowed by, and also help to produce, state failure implicate the motivations of and intersections with regional actors. In the war economy, the traditional objective of defeating the enemy militarily is replaced with economically-driven interests in continued fighting and the institutionalization of violence at what is, for the arbiters of violence and predation, a profitable level of intensity.¹¹ Similarly, war does not always involve the breakdown of a particular system but instead represents a mechanism for creating an alternative system of profit,

power, and even protection.¹² Instead of simply constituting the means to an end, the capture of resources and commodities in the regional political economies of conflict and state failure rather often represent the objectives or *ends* of involvement in the state failure, therefore creating incentives and disincentives. As regional actors become invested in the profit production generated by these war economies, so too do the economic incentives these economies involve function strongly in conditioning decision-making and creating the disincentive to furthering regional stability.

Therefore, the instance of entering into war and conflict might not immediately stem from anything other than political motivations; however, sometimes these original agendas have mutated into conflicts in which short-term economic benefits are the paramount consideration of some, if not all,

¹¹ Mats R. Berdal and David Malone. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2000) 2.

¹² David Keen. *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998): 11.

parties to the conflict.¹³ Therefore, multiple actors, including regional actors who have dipped their hands into conflict, often have more to gain from a continuation of conflict than peace. They have an interest in initiating and sustaining it.¹⁴ US policy towards failed states must therefore not only address the incentives of continued conflict within the state itself but must also be sensitive to the incentives of external actors to perpetuate state failure, or at least to continue to be involved in state failure. When these channels remain open, the actions of neighboring states continue to influence the possibilities for the reinstatement of stability in the failed state.

What Has Been Done? Cases of the Regional Dynamics of State Failure

The cases of state failure in the DRC and Afghanistan offer examples of not only the role of regional dynamics in the development and the persistence of state failure but also the necessity of considering

¹³ Arnson: 17.

¹⁴ Collier. "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective": 96.


the super-state dimensions of state failure if attempts to rectify state failure are to be successful. In each case, strong political, economic, and strategic incentives for neighboring states to interact with the failing state, as well as prior transnational connections, have structured the nature of state failure and thus its recourse. In both situations, these regional dynamics and regional political economies that are unaddressed on the super-state level have led to the persistence of certain dimensions of state failure and the possibility of further instability. Therefore, both of these cases demonstrate that in approaching state failure, especially in the context of conflict, the US must have an analytical perspective that incorporates this level of analysis.

Restructuring the Regional War Economy: Afghanistan and Central Asia

State failure in Afghanistan reflects more than simply endogenous factors of state capacity and willingness. The exogenous factors of regional economies and geopolitics

have also served to exacerbate and structure state failure in Afghanistan. Trade in narcotics, the transit trade, and other economic circuits throughout the region as well as the policies of neighboring nations, particularly those of Pakistan that allow for the porous borders that precipitate transborder illicit trade and spillover,¹⁵ have directly influenced Afghanistan's failure.

Afghanistan's current situation also involves and refracts the complex interaction of US and Russian policy, in influences of Iranian policy imperatives, and Pakistani and Saudi Arabian interests.¹⁶ Externally-induced state failure is prominent in the context of Afghanistan as regional and great-power actors are the principal cause of state failure; they have set up targeted countries for state collapse.¹⁷ Together this complex of historical



Source: "The World Factbook: Afghanistan". CIA. 14 Feb 2010 <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>>

and contemporary external influences in Afghanistan has helped to create and structure the challenges in Afghanistan at present.

These external dimensions of state decay in Afghanistan persist because they have not been addressed in the responses to state failure in Afghanistan in the past or the present.¹⁸ The US must focus more heavily on


¹⁵ Barnett R. Rubin. "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan" (*World Development* 28, 10, 2000): 1794.

¹⁶ Barnett R. Rubin. "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan" (*World Development* 28, 10, 2000): 1791.

¹⁷ Mohammed Ayoob. "State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure," *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A.

Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007) 108.

¹⁸ Arpita Absu Roy. *Challenges and Dilemmas of State-Building in Afghanistan: Report of a Study Trip to Kabul* (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2008) 63.



integrating an examination of the complex dynamics between Afghanistan and its regional neighbors into an analysis of state failure in Afghanistan. The lessons gained from such an analysis must also be reflected in the development of policies towards Afghanistan, not only restructuring Afghanistan itself but also addressing the incentives of its neighbors, such as Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, in perpetuating state failure.

Afghanistan is enmeshed in a larger economy of war that has its roots in a conflict that has been going on for over twenty years. A consequence of this economy of war together with the break-down of political stability in Afghanistan has been an increase of less formal economic practices that have been implicated in a larger regional economy that the US must internalize in its assessment of state failure in Afghanistan.¹⁹ This includes


¹⁹ Moonis Ahmar. *The Challenge of Rebuilding Afghanistan* (Karachi: Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Dept. of International Relations, Univ. of Karachi, 2006) 81-82.

but is not limited to an increase in the following economic activities: the spread of drugs, selling and smuggling of precious mineral materials, and the transit trade, which in particular has its roots in the demands of the Pakistani market. How Afghanistan fairs affects Pakistan's stability, mostly via trade circuits²⁰

In general, Afghanistan's geographic position and relations (both formal and informal) with neighboring states has posited Afghanistan as a trade bridge across the region, connecting the larger political economy of the region and thus heavily structured by it and especially by the entities that use it as a bridge. Therefore, the economic situation of Afghanistan often reflects this regional dimension²¹ and development must be planned as a regional affair. Such an engagement of regional actors and working from the existing entangling of

²⁰ Sumit Ganguly. "Conflict and Crisis in South and Southwest Asia," *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) 166.

²¹ Ahmar : 188.



the economics in the region interests provides an opportunity for greater regional integration of trade that benefits both Pakistan and Afghanistan in addition to its neighbors if this existing trade is channeled and retooled in the correct manner.²² In addition, such a regional perspective that hinges on opportunities beneficial to all neighbors will strengthen the stability of the region and create the incentive for continued stability and the reinforcing of such stability. The US should therefore support the greater integration of these transborder economies, channeled in more licit manners.

Regional dynamics factor so strongly in the condition of Afghanistan that regional cooperation must be the first step in the process of developing and reconstructing

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Afghanistan.²³ The historical and persistent roots of this regional element make such a focus an imperative as these factors have become entrenched in Afghanistan’s political economy by product of this extended period. Therefore, while considering economic reconstruction within this region, the US should involve a multilateral, regional effort, engaging all other actors who have the capacity to *and* have already influenced Afghanistan’s internal economics, politics, and security, such as Pakistan and Iran.

Regional economic dynamics that persist as unaddressed by Afghanistan reconstruction, regional powers, and international donors has thus contributed to the persistence of state failure in Afghanistan

²² Ahmar: 209.

²³ Barnett R. Rubin. *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) 145.

in a number of dimensions.²⁴ Notably, Pakistan, in addition to Afghanistan's other neighbors, has both indirectly and directly exploited the internal fragmentation and inter-group rivalry in Afghanistan to advance its own strategic interests.²⁵ In general, Pakistan's actions have fueled the complex enmeshing of the two states and produced the circular and mutual exchange of instability. For example, Pakistan's own actions served to restructure civil society relationships in both nations by sidelining its own civil society. This policy engendered a civil society that was politicized and alienated from the state as well as creating the circumstances for its incursion in Afghanistan.²⁶ More generally, Pakistan's foreign, military, economic, and domestic policy often impinge on Afghanistan as well in a manner that each of these elements has further exacerbated the untamed


parallel political economies both within and between the two. In this case then, an examination of the characteristics of Pakistan's policy that influence the state of Afghanistan must be internalized into US policy towards state failure within Afghanistan. The product of this enmeshed and mutually-effective relationship requires a policy attention that is not limited to Afghanistan alone. Instead, the US must treat Pakistan as both a cause of Afghanistan's failure and instability and as a source of future instability. However, by incorporating Pakistan and its incentives into the dialogues concerning Afghanistan, and extending this pattern to other stronger regional actors such as Iran, the US can capitalize on the fact that it is in the interest of both of these states to work for greater stability in Afghanistan²⁷ that is supported as opposed to antagonized by persistent regional dynamics.

²⁴ Paula R. Newberg. "Surviving State Failure: Internal War and Regional Conflict in Afghanistan's Neighborhood," *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed*, ed. Cynthia Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005) 225.

²⁵ Ahmar: 209.

²⁶ Newberg: 222.

²⁷ Barnett R. Rubin. "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan" (*World Development* 28, 10, 2000): 1799.



Complicated Regional Economic and Political Incentives: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central Africa




Source: "The World Factbook: Democratic Republic of Congo". CIA. 14 Feb 2010
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/drc.html>

Addressing the root causes of conflict and state failure within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) likewise requires a super-state level of analysis. The US's approach must reflect not only the incentives and interests of regional actors in state failure

but also reflect the dimensions and characteristics of how this state failure has manifested. Instead of addressing the DRC in the traditional sense, the historically regional character of state failure in the DRC must be internalized in the address of state failure in this case. What collapsed in the Congo in the early 1990s were not simply the formal state structures of the DRC but rather the complicated webs of patronage networks and links with external actors that the state functioning of the DRC was predicated on.²⁸ Therefore, the concept of merely state-level failure is not apt at describing state failure in this case or prescribing the methods of redress.

Therefore, as opposed to the isolated condition of state failure, the terms of state failure in the DRC reflect several factors that are not limited to the state itself or demarcated by the traditional boundaries of

²⁸ Boas and Dunn: 128. Boaz Atzili. "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict" (*International Security*. 31. 3, 2007) 158.



states. Instead, predominantly the most recent period of conflict in the DRC, spanning from 1998 to 2003, was characterized by unprecedented political and military involvement of outside forces, involving a multiplicity of states within the Central African region in a tangled web of incentives and intentions.²⁹ Additionally, even after the settlement of this conflict, these persistent and unaddressed regional dynamics continue to precipitate greater instability in the DRC and loom as dangers for further incursion of neighboring interests into conflict in the DRC. As the conditions of state failure in the DRC therefore reflect a more complicated situation above the national level, so too then must US responses to state failure in this region reflect a critical consciousness towards the regional dynamics of the Central African region.

In addition, from 1994 on external (and violent) actors have directly influenced and shaped political outcomes in the country,


²⁹ Morten Boås and Kevin C. Dunn. *African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine* (Boulder: L. Rienner, 2007) 113.

restructuring incentives and relations of power in manners that the US must address if state failure in this case is to be

“treated.” Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia, have all given material support to at least one side of the conflict, and Rwanda and Uganda have intermittently controlled portions of the DRC’s territory with their own armies. By intersecting with local and national processes, regional actors fomented the militarization of politics to a hitherto unprecedented degree, both exacerbating *and* perpetuating the dynamics of state failure within the DRC.³⁰ For example, the influence of these regional powers, particularly in the case of Rwanda, indirectly involved the exclusion of the DRC’s civilian political actors from any

³⁰ Ibid.

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The most recent period of conflict in the DRC, spanning from 1998 to 2003, was characterized by unprecedented political and military involvement of outside forces
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meaningful participation in shaping the country's future. These actions have thus perpetuated the militarization of politics within the DRC, a characteristic that engenders a fundamentally instable political system even into the post-conflict present. While Rwanda was supposed to withdraw its forces following the ceasefire agreement signed in Lusaka in 2002, the UN Mission (MONUC) has reported a continued Rwandan presence.³¹ Likewise, disarmament and repatriation of foreign groups, notably Rwanda and Uganda, was supposed to occur per peace terms but has not yet occurred.³² Despite the stated security concerns on behalf of these nations, this removal is an essential to fostering stability in the DRC.

The US should support this action by providing assistance and strengthening the capacity of regional organizations to do so and also to help police the borders of these states where state forces have either the

incapability or unwillingness to do so. The African Union's (AU) Peacekeepers could be an integral tool. Regional organizations, such as the AU and the Great Lakes Group, provide useful opportunities to counter the regional dynamics that engender state failure as these organizations both have the local knowledge required to address these situations and also cannot afford to ignore the problems at their doorsteps.³³ Also, the US should advocate for the increasing regional dialogue through these mechanisms as paralleled by regional partnerships among states. As well, the US should assist these organizations in upgrading and deepening their capacities - the crucial flaw (as opposed to having the mandate to engage in the situation of state failure in this context) of attempts to negotiate state failures through

³¹ Turner: 8.
³² Turner: 140.

³³ Paul F. Diehl. "New Roles for Regional Organizations," *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007) 539.

these organizations.³⁴ However, as these organizations often have limited resources and power, the US should support and assist their efforts.

In addition to prescribing a particular perspective for the US, the importance of these regional dynamics in the DRC's failure and conflicts mandates certain policies. Particularly notable is the possibility of traditional solutions to the partitioning of political power within the DRC. Often the political solution to conflict and state failure in Africa since 1989 has been power sharing. This is mostly a product of the conception of the lack of vital national interest at stake in the Central African region that structures the reluctance to intervene either coercively or non-coercively in these conflict and instead to create low-efficacy, low-effort policies


³⁴Chester A. Crocker. "The Place of Grand Strategy, Statecraft, and Power in Conflict Management," *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007) 362.

following previous models.³⁵ In post-1989 Africa power sharing as the ur-text of political solutions to state failure characterized by conflict has been a low-key and low-stakes engagement strategy in a region not always recognized for the imperative consideration it represents.³⁶ However, often in failing to address the organic dynamics of state failure, such a solution often serves to further complicate the problem of state failure as opposed to stabilizing it. In failing to address the incentives and causality of regional actors, power sharing does not address the factors of state failure. These considerations are a vital lesson on the imperative that the US instead work to incorporate all actors, not just national and sub-state, into the process of resolution.

In the DRC, power sharing has involved only the national dimensions of state failure, neglecting the addition levels of state

³⁵ David A. Lake and Donald S. Rothchild. *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998) 289.

³⁶ Bøås and Dunn: 129.




failure. Notably, regional players have been excluded and neglected in the process of crafting a political solution. In the DRC, political solutions of external conflict brokers have failed to address the most powerful player in the conflict, Rwanda.³⁷ Also, to some extent, the recurrent use of power sharing in the 1990s for the sake of peace has instead created an incentive structure for would-be insurgents to use violence to fight state power or at least to receive a seat at the bargaining table.³⁸ In addition, this incentive structure has meant that it is not even necessary often for insurgents to encode their struggles in ideological pretenses but rather allows for simply raw military power, magnifying the destruction of state failure in conflict. The same lessons on the impunity of actors that contribute to state failure are present in this solution in its exclusion of regional actors, neglecting to address how Rwanda's and Uganda's actions structured the

condition of the DRC. In failing to address these dimensions, these causes of state failure persist. Therefore, power sharing as a political tool not only reflects the ineptitude of such a prescription to solve the present crisis but also precipitates incentives to future conflicts as well. Instead, the political solutions for state failure must reflect a consciousness of regional dynamics within state failure; state failure must also be addressed above the vantage point of the state in isolation.

In addition to its lack of intention to relinquish its indirect political control in the Kivu province, the Rwandan presence in the DRC reflects the predatory economic objectives of remaining at least indirectly embroiled in the state failure of the DRC. Therefore, Rwanda's culpability has involved both political and economic spoils generated from the persistence of conflict in the DRC. Most recently, Rwanda benefited from the sharing of resources from violent resource exploitation per its links with the RCD rebel

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.



group in the DRC with Kigali. Reports have shown that Rwanda has gained more from exploitative mineral resource extraction under conflict than the insurgents it has supported, perennially deriving its junior partner of any significant share in resources and

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Access to the economic resources of illicit trade has played an important and observable role in the nature, duration, and intensity of conflict and state failure...
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prerogatives.³⁹ Rwanda's economic incentive in the DRC therefore involves not only engaging in the

conflict but also its persistence. Similarly, both Rwanda and Uganda have been cited as noting pressing security concerns for entering into and continuing their presence in the DRC. However, both nations have benefitted from the situation of state failure and conflict as an opportunity to indirectly yet materially capitalize on the plundering of gold, diamonds, and colombo-tantalite in the eastern portion of the DRC, particularly the

³⁹ Bøås and Dunn: 127.

Kivu province.⁴⁰ As such, the US's policy towards economic restructuring and development in the DRC must address these regional economic incentives in addition to determining a better character of mineral resource extraction and the siphoning of resource revenues within the DRC itself. The US should advocate for and support efforts to certify and privatize the DRC's natural resources. This process would wrest control from the grasping hands of neighboring states that profit from the DRC's instability.

In Summation

In the case of both the DRC and Afghanistan, state failure, particularly in terms of governance, has been militarily, politically (in terms of other state's actions), and economically feasible and profitable.⁴¹ Access to the economic resources of illicit trade has played an important and observable role in the nature, duration, and intensity of conflict and state failure, contested and/or

⁴⁰ Turner: 162-163.
⁴¹ Arnson: 10.

reinforced by the actions of regional actors at the super-state level as well as within the state itself.⁴² In fact, the capacity of actors within the state to realize income from legal and illegal primary commodities depends integrally on transborder relationships that extend beyond the state's porous boundaries.⁴³ These relationships implicate neighboring states in the region of state failure that the US must also address in policy to counteract the causes of state failure in these situations. This turns the continuation of failure into an avenue to self-enrichment and political ends.⁴⁴ Notably, if the opportunities that create incentives for war and state failure's continuation are unaddressed in the event settlement and recovery, these opportunities persist to shape, distort, and pervert the establishment of the postwar economic order.⁴⁵ The US must consciously

incorporate these dimensions therefore into tactics of recovery.

What Can Be Done Differently? Towards a Regional-Dynamics Approach

Options

While addressing the regional dynamics of state failure is imperative, the manner that the US structures its role in the response to these issues is malleable based on how the US conceives of the threat of each case of state failure to national security and US interests. The US may either take a leadership role in addressing the regional aspects of a case of state failure or may take a more indirect, but nonetheless pressing, approach by supporting, assisting, and encouraging the actions of others that reflect a sensitivity to the unique conditions that regional dynamics in state failure present. Where the US's interests and security are the vital consideration in a particular case the

⁴² Arnson: 7-8.

⁴³ Arnson: 8.

⁴⁴ Arnson: 11.

⁴⁵ Arnson: 12.

former of these approaches will be implemented; where the US's interests and security are a more marginal concern regarding a case of state failure, the latter of these will function more strongly.

Recommendations

To fully address the causes of state failure, the US must examine such cases at the super-state level in addition to the state-level and the sub-state level. The incorporation of the super-state level into the analysis of cases of state failure provides a set of causes for state failure's perpetuation as well as its development. If neglected, these conditions will only serve to further destabilize the regions in which state failure presents its, entrench state failure further, and counteract measure taken to ameliorate the condition of state failure. These causes therefore lend an additional set of recommendations to the US's approach to state failure.

General Recommendations

- As state failure does not always conform to traditional state boundaries, and as state failure often involves other regional actors, the US must give attention to the regional dynamics that in part cause and exacerbate state failure.
- As regional political economies structure and transform economic incentives within failed states, the US approach to failed states must involve sensitivity to, and a restructuring of, the counterproductive aspects of regional political economies to state stability. Such a consideration is vital to economic development, aid, and institution-building if these are to be successful at achieving their respective intended goals.
- In situations where state failure reflects larger regional dynamics, the US should work towards and support the greater integration of regional actors into political resolutions of state failure.
 - The US should address regional actors as factors in the development and persistence of state failure and therefore must consider these features in the amelioration of such a situation.
 - Also, the US should involve regional actors in partnering to turn around state failure. When integrally involved in such a process, they can be a source of continued support for the propagation of state stability, reinforcing the process of engendering state success.

- Containment of state failure and establishing basic security requires sensitivity to the manner in which state failure is enmeshed within regional dynamics. This characteristic of state failure enables the spread of failure to other states and jeopardizes regional stability more generally, and therefore the US should conduct such an analysis as an integral component of fighting state failure.


- Similarly, the US should work to more comprehensively integrate regional players, such as Iran, into efforts to address state failure in Afghanistan. The resources, incentives, and influence that Iran represents must be incorporated into a US strategy to address Afghanistan.

Case-Specific Recommendations Afghanistan-Pakistan and Central Asia

- Economic development within Afghanistan must take into account the larger war economy that Afghanistan is implicated in.
 - The US must account for regional trade circuits across and within and across Afghanistan and that characterize the economic incentives in the region.
 - The US should emphasize the useful tools of greater trade integration and harness and rechannel the capital of these preexisting trade circuits to address the regional war economy.
- Regional actors, such as Pakistan, that have a stake in Afghanistan must be integrated into attempts at supporting increased state stability in Afghanistan. This will both target the sources of state instability and buttress redress.
 - The US should work to develop the cooperation of Pakistan in these efforts by addressing Pakistan's economic and political incentives to perpetuate such as situation.

Central Africa

- The US should advocate for harnessing the DRC's mineral resources for the general population and for the nation with a focus on not only developing the capacity of the DRC to properly manage and police mineral resources but also prevent the predatory and militarized extraction both by internal and external actors.
 - The Kimberley certification process coupled with a privatization scheme modeled after Botswana's Debswana can also help to divest regional actors from profiting from the DRC's natural resources as well as decreasing internal instability and predation. (See DRC Case Study for further details.)
- In discouraging the continued unproductive interjection of neighboring states into the affairs of the DRC, the US should advocate for the increased engagement of these regional actors in the process of stabilizing the DRC.
 - As opposed to power sharing between insurgent groups and the official state government, the US should press for the involvement




of Rwanda and Uganda in all political negotiations and resolution tactics. Strengthening the position of these states in partnering for the increased stability of the DRC is essential to rectifying state failure in this case.

- The US should advocate for and support all attempts to hold Rwanda and Uganda accountable as actors who have both directly and indirectly acted to destabilize the DRC and perpetuate the violent conflict there. With their current impunity, there is no disincentive to capitalize on continued failure in the DRC. The US should therefore use its international and diplomatic position to work to hold these regional actors accountable for contributing to both state failure in the DRC and its persistence.
- Because the failure of the state in this case represents a distinctly regional complex of problems, the US should support the efforts of regional institutions to ameliorate the situation in the DRC. As the African Union (AU) has both the mandate and the interest to stabilize the DRC, the US should assist and strengthen the AU's capacity to address state failure there. Similarly, the US should work to strengthen the capacity of the Great Lakes Group and provide much-needed technical assistance.

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
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Looking Forward

**Grasping Opportunity in the Event of a
Failed North Korean State**

Amanda Shockley



North Korea lives apart from the world system, anchored in the fabrications invented by the propaganda machine of the Kim regime which suffocates its people and has forced the country to hang over the edge of complete failure. While prospects for the country are uncertain, the United States must be prepared for North Korea's failure, as the stakes in its own interests and for the international community are exceedingly great.


For this policy report on failed states, *Succeeding Failure : A Comprehensive Approach to Strengthening Fragile States*, North Korea has been included, despite the fact it has not yet failed. It shows the possibilities that exist for the United States to implement our described principles using this specific country as a theoretical case study. Although experts cannot predict what North Korea will do in the future, its position on our parabola is that of a country that threatens to descend in a downward spiral towards failure.

It is necessary for the United States to consider the actions it would take in the event of North Korea's failure, in particular because of the geopolitical situation of the Korean peninsula, and its strategic role in Northeast Asian affairs, in conjunction with the US interests in strategic and humanitarian concerns.

US interests in North Korea

The failure of North Korea presents a challenge, but also an opportunity for the United States to strengthen the economic and political situation of Northeast Asia, while simultaneously achieving its own interests. By American interests, this report refers to its primary concerns as:

- Ensuring the safety of the American people from weapons of mass destruction and a country with a foundation based upon aggressive militarization
- Eradicating poverty and securing the North Korean livelihood, in order to



lay the foundation for long-term development based upon American altruist ideals

- Strengthening ties with allies to maintain order and key relationships in the economically and geopolitically strategic area of Northeast Asia

Strategically North Korea is of primary concern to the US, and it is of interest to ensure the American people’s safety through disarmament and gradual demilitarization. Most Americans are aware of the dangers of the weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the Kim regime. Even more frightening is the possibility that upon failure, these terrifying weapons may end up in the hands of radical groups that could be a direct threat to the security of the people of the United States.

As one of the most militarized countries in the world, North Korea must be demilitarized in order to promote a greater peace in the Northeast Asia, but slowly to avoid any

dangerous externalities such as allowing millions of soldiers to exist in such an unstable country. However, rapid demilitarization would be at the cost of internal stability, and the United States must learn from the mistakes in Iraq. We must refrain from leaving such a large, skilled part of the population disenfranchised and unemployed.

Immense human suffering has occurred on the Korean peninsula. One of the United States primary concerns should be to increase in the standard of

living of North Korean citizens based upon universally accepted ideas that people have the right to live healthy and prosperous lives. Alleviating poverty is also an essential first step towards a developed society. It allows people to move away from merely focusing

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As one of the most militarized countries in the world, North Korea must be demilitarized in order to promote a greater peace in Northeast Asia...
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on their individual needs to survive, and permits for productive development as a nation.

The United States will have to be aware of their position in the delicate balance of powers that occupy Northeast Asia, in conjunction with following the United States' own interest. Consequently, the United States cannot act unilaterally. It is in our best interest that the leadership burden is led by the South Korea, a country that is not only our ally, but also the most knowledgeable, and can obtain the legitimacy needed to successfully intervene in North Korea. In addition, it is important to be mindful of China's position and desires in the process of stabilizing and rebuilding North Korea. The United States must not disregard its place in the process at the cost of hardening tensions with this powerful nation-state.

The ultimate goal of the United States in regards to North Korea is to create a stable and prosperous country while maintaining our

current relationships in the region. We also seek to eventually unify the North Korean peninsula, utilizing what our report, *Succeeding Failure : A Comprehensive Approach to Strengthening Fragile States* identifies as essential principles for assisting failed states, including:

- Create a sustainable and realistic timeline based on careful planning and an acute understanding
- Promote a strategy not only with the North Koreans, but one that focuses on international multilateralism and incorporates South Korea and China as leaders
- Establish security and stability through disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and gradual reduction of the North Korean military
- Alleviate suffering of the North Korean people through immediate humanitarian aid to lay the foundation for long term economic development

- Build a sustainable open economic structure that can provide an opportunity for investment and growth
- Incorporate local actors through demystifying the Kim regime and integrating the citizens into a reformed economic and political system

In order to effectively integrate these tools this paper separates the North Korean issue into two chronological periods: immediately after failure and after stability is established. In these two periods this case study will explain the application of these principles in recommendations throughout the paper as they can be catered to these situations.

Immediate Failure

Amidst concerns of the sustainability of North Korean dynastic authoritarian power, it appears the most likely trigger for the government's demise would be due to a failed succession of Kim Jong-il. Based on precedent from his father, Kim Il-Sung, it is logical to presume that Kim would try and

continue this dynastic legacy by passing on his position as North Korea's supreme leader to one of his sons. However, this transition will be complex because his sons were absent from much of the elite policymaking circle, and until recently, there was little public propaganda to set up such a transfer of power.¹ In such an event, it is imperative that the United States is prepared to act swiftly to ensure that North Korea quickly recovers from their collapsed state.


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In a country where propaganda has built a strong legacy that fuels legitimacy, a failed succession could be the event that leads to disorder the collapse of its fragile order.

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In the scenario of complete collapse, experts have predicted that country would quickly fall into disorder. Different factions within the North Korean military elite would compete for control as result of the political vacuum and upon being freed from the

¹ Marcus Noland and Institute for International Economics (US). Korea after Kim Jong-Il. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. (2004): 2



regime's grasp refugees would flood the borders.² After all, before development of the country can occur security must be established and the humanitarian issues must be brought to a point of stability. In this situation, the importance of multilateral cooperation cannot be stressed enough. The US must pay close attention to North Korea's geopolitical situation, working together with countries with a stake in the process, in order to effectively and efficiently lift North Korea out of failure and onto the path to development. Particularly, as South Korea is more knowledgeable about the region and has a direct stake in the health and progress of the North Korea, it is the natural leader of any multilateral effort. The initial collapse will be handled through a combined effort of the South Korean forces along with the US Pacific Command (PACOM) and US Forces

Korea "wearing blue UN helmets³." Though the United States will not take a leading role, it must remember to utilize its own talents and technology that may go beyond the capabilities of the other countries.

Military Stabilization

In the event of a collapse, pacifying the North Korea army will be one of the main concerns of a stabilization effort. The chief of staff of the US Special Operations in South Korea, Colonel David S. Maxwell, explained:

The regime in Pyongyang could collapse without necessarily its army corps and brigades collapsing...so we might have to mount a relief operation at the same time that we'd be conducting combat ops. If there is anybody in the UN who thinks it will just be a matter of feeding people, they're smoking dope.⁴


Not considering the effects of state collapse on the army would be a grave mistake, and efforts must be made immediately in order to avoid dangerous situations.

Another reason that South Korea would not be able to act unilaterally is that in

² R. D. Kaplan. "WHEN NORTH KOREA FALLS: The furor over Kim Jong Il's recent missile tests obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea's catastrophic collapse." ATLANTIC MONTHLY 298.3 (2006): 67

³ Ibid, 69

⁴ Ibid, 68



addition to the enormous magnitude of this burden, recent political sentiment in the country has led to plans to reduce the South Korean military by 30 percent in the next decade.⁵ American forces would have no choice but to aid their ally, and the amount of American troops necessary for this action would be quite large:

Based on previous experiences elsewhere, the rule of thumb for the number of troops required for a successful stability operations in a permissive environment is somewhere between five and ten per thousand people... successful operations would require between 115,000 to 230,000 military personal [sic].⁶

Even with these troop levels, the United States forces would confront a daunting task, as it is reported “as many as five million of North Korea’s citizens are under arms and have for six decades been devoted to an authoritarian regime.” Successful operations are contingent on the fact that the North would be cooperating with outside efforts,


⁵ Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. *Preparing for sudden change in North Korea* Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press, 2009): 21

⁶ *Ibid*, 21

and in the case of resistance a stronger presence would be necessary.⁷

The United States must also learn from their experience in Iraq and understand that dissembling a highly trained army may not be the best solution, as it makes millions of people unemployed and indigent. Unlike Iraq, North Korea has confirmed stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, and it is important to maintain order as much as possible in this initial period of chaos to protect against a potentially devastating disaster. Colonel Maxwell stressed the importance of communicating with the army before it becomes an impediment to development by explaining “a successful relief operation would require making contacts with KFR generals and various factions of the former North Korean military, who would be vying for control in different region”, he continues, “if the generals were not absorbed into the operational command structure of the occupying force, they might

⁷ *Ibid*, 20



form the basis of an insurgency.”⁸ It is essential that this be a main goal of the initial action, because these high ranking military officials could not only create an insurgency, but also capitalize on the disorder to lay the groundwork for continuing the brutal regime under their own power through the appeal to local authorities.⁹ Therefore, learning from mistakes in Iraq, the United States and its stabilization forces must bring these groups onto their side before they become their enemies. Although it will not be simple to win over these forces, which were under the strict control of the regime for so many years, interviews with North Korean defectors reveal that the bonds with the regime and Kim Jong-il might not be impossible to break. Robert Kaplan, noted correspondent for the *Atlantic Weekly*, interviewed a defector that explained that the soldiers might not be as tied to the

regime as feared, claiming “that while the special-operations forces live well, the extreme poverty of conventional soldiers would make their loyalty to Kim Jong-il in a difficult war questionable.”¹⁰ While the special-operations forces may provide to be more of a challenge for troops, the demise of the Kim regime could provide an opportunity to change the allegiance of the regular soldiers that would greatly assist any attempted efforts, and the United States should not ignore this opportunity to create a stable North Korean society.

Humanitarian Concerns

Immediately after collapse, in addition to facing difficulties providing stability and security, forces in North Korea would have to address the enormous humanitarian problems that already exist within the country, and would be inevitably intensify in the event of collapse. The issue that would be of biggest

⁸ R. D. Kaplan. "WHEN NORTH KOREA FALLS: The furor over Kim Jong Il's recent missile tests obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea's catastrophic collapse." *ATLANTIC MONTHLY* 298.3 (2006): 68

⁹ Scott Snyder. "North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the Future." *Pacific Affairs* 73.4 (2001): 525

¹⁰ R. D. Kaplan. "WHEN NORTH KOREA FALLS: The furor over Kim Jong Il's recent missile tests obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea's catastrophic collapse." *ATLANTIC MONTHLY* 298.3 (2006): 66

concern in the immediate aftermath of state failure would be dealing with the fragile food distribution system, which in all likelihood would collapse from the strain of political unrest.¹¹

Currently, North Korea is on the brink of famine, thus the failure of the state might be the final straw in tumbling the people back into dire conditions. In the nineties, North Korea underwent a devastating famine that was a direct result of the regime's ruthless policies and failed attempts to organize the economy and agriculture under a self-reliant communist system. Unfortunately for the regime, and more importantly for its people, government control of the food distribution system slowed delivery and productivity with devastating effects on the food supplies that led to the death of millions from starvation.¹²

While outside support was utilized for food,


North Korea determined to pursue its policy of self-reliance, requested for foreign nations to stop their humanitarian efforts, although the country has never completely recovered from the effects of the devastating famine.

Even now, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), reports that, "each year some 40,000 children under five are becoming acutely malnourished, out of which 25,000 are admitted to hospitals for treatment."¹³ These conditions are only an example of the remaining undercurrent problems in North Korea, which will be exacerbated with disturbance to the current system. These conditions were created through poor economic decisions based on the regime's strict policy of self-reliance coupled with nature's harsh weather conditions. Even under the strict Kim regime, public unrest has developed because of concerns for health and survival. One scholar contends that although

¹¹ Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press, 2009): 18

¹² Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland. "Famine in North Korea Redux?" *Journal of Asian economics*. 20.4 (2009): 385

¹³ At a glance: Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 6 November 2006, UNICEF, January 3 2010 <http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/korea_2760.htm>



these shortages fomented discontent within society, it was overwhelmed by the need for basic necessities, and the “1997 and 1998 [food shortages] had contradictory influences on North Korean stability, increasing unrest over food shortages while effectively eliminating the threat of political dissent in favor of the more immediate challenge of ensuring personal survival by foraging for food.”¹⁴ In any effort, the famine and the continuing food shortages are an important aspect to consider, as it is not possible to change Korean society without dealing with humanitarian concerns that will undoubtedly worsen in the case of complete failure, making it impossible for the North Korean people to focus on advanced development.

Border Tensions


In addition to the internal situation, the United States should be aware of military disturbances on the borders resulting from the heightened military alert. The risk of

dangerous incidents in these areas will undoubtedly increase.¹⁵ The fear among experts concerning border security is that the loosening of the tight political grip on the people would send a flood of refugees to the borders, threatening order in both China and South Korea. As South Korea has been an important ally since the end of the Korean War, it is vital that the United States does not ignore border conditions, and should prepare for any disturbances that may occur. In addition, the United States also maintains a delicate relationship with China, and should be wary of missteps that could result from an incorrect handling of initial border problems amongst the chaos.

For South Korea, while many would be excited by the prospect of moving closer towards a united Korea, others would continue to be suspicious of the North, and border tensions will be high during this initial

¹⁴ Scott Snyder. "North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the Future." *Pacific Affairs* 73.4 (2001): 520

¹⁵ Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009): 17



period. Years of an unsteady armistice have made many South Koreans suspicious of the North, and it is important to closely watch the borders in order to maintain peace. Although South Korea would seemingly be more accepting of North Korean refugees than other countries—many South Koreans have relatives across the border and are eager to see a united Korea—South Korean officials are also aware that this would put a great burden on the society. The Council on Foreign Affairs report on the matter remained pessimistic about how far their effort could go:

Although Seoul has made plans to provide care and housing using abandoned schools and other installations in the South Korean countryside and intends to harness the help of nongovernmental and private organizations, the difficult it has experienced in handling the few thousand refugees who have already left the North raises doubts about its ability to manage an influx of hundred of thousands.¹⁶

The United States must assist South Korea in controlling its border to prevent its citizens

from facing negative effects from the initial failure of North Korea from a surge of refugees that could later be an impediment to their eventual unification.

In addition to South Korea, the Chinese, who have maintained the closest ties to the Kim Jong-il regime, would also experience a surge in refugees. The Chinese have previous experience with North Korean refugees from the famine in 1996, as there was a surge in refugee crossing to the People's Republic at Intojilin and Liaoning provinces as they searched for food.¹⁷ The Chinese can draw from actual experiences with North Korean refugees during such times of crisis. Additionally, China holds the resources necessary to deal with humanitarian disasters, and a report on preparation for North Korea's failure by the Council on Foreign Affairs explains that "Beijing would have the option of accepting and taking care of these refugees, possibly by drawing on

¹⁶ Ibid, 24

¹⁷ Scott Snyder. "North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the Future." *Pacific Affairs* 73.4 (2001): 523

many of the same internal resources that allowed China to cope with its own natural disasters, such as the recent earthquake in Sichuan.”¹⁸ However, the United States and South Korea are suspicious of China’s strategic intentions over helping in a large scale, therefore it is essential to promote coordination at this time to avoid unnecessary disturbances. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether China would aid these refugees as it is unenthusiastic to help North Korean refugees amongst fears that “eventually [these refugees may] demand greater autonomy from the central government” as well as become a large economic burden.¹⁹ China has often accepted defectors from the North by claiming they would be sent back after a regime collapse "in order to build a favorable political base for China's gradual economic takeover of the Tumen River region — the northeast Asian river valley where China,


¹⁸ Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009): 18

¹⁹ Ibid, 20

Russia, and North Korea intersect, with good port facilities on the Pacific.”²⁰ Whether this is a legitimate concern remains to be seen, but the United States must be conscious of the power that China has in the region, and attempt to coordinate actions as much as possible, rather than make this situation an international power struggle. In addition, the United States’ force should be aware in North Korea that internal political factions might start border disputes in attempts to strengthen their power.²¹ Although this is not an exhaustive list of the issues that the United State would encounter in an attempt to stabilize a collapsed North Korean state, it highlights some of the concerns such an effort would immediately face.

²⁰ R. D. Kaplan. "WHEN NORTH KOREA FALLS: The furor over Kim Jong Il's recent missile tests obscures the real threat: the prospect of North Korea's catastrophic collapse." *ATLANTIC MONTHLY* 298.3 (2006): 68

²¹ Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009): 17



Undeniably, the issue of North Korean refugees will be of primary concern in the immediate aftermath of state failure, and the United States must keep these delicate situations in mind as they help build order. It is essential that from the beginning the United States promote a multilateral approach to fixing these problems, instead of relying on individual countries' actions. While sovereign countries should be able to determine the particular course of action within their own borders, the United States must do its part in helping ensure the security and order of the border in the initial aftermath to reach a point where development may begin.

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Korean peninsula upon regime change in the North, the resounding consensus among most scholars and officials from the United States, South Korea, and even, North Korea, is that the ultimate goal is reunification. Unfortunately, unification is a goal that will have to remain in the background, as the reality is that unification between the two Koreas cannot occur without significant reforms in North Korea even after stabilization.

Long-term goal: Unification

After the immediate concerns associated with the collapse of the North Korea state are dealt with the real challenge of development begins. Although there has often been discourse about the future of the

Bound by war history, the United States naturally must have a part in the unification process of the two Koreas. Although the combat of the Korean War has long ceased, sentiment in both Koreas still points blame in the direction of the American

aggressors that unwillingly separated the country for their Cold War aims. In both Koreas “it is an article of faith that the United States deserves the principal blame for the division of the peninsula and thus has a special responsibility for helping to restore national unity.”²² This conflict set the stage for the world’s emerging national order that seated the world’s superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, in a struggle for dominance of the international system. Korea was the first in several conflicts that would emerge during the period of the Cold War, but regardless of the supposedly noble intentions of the Americans, the brutal Korean War left scars that both Koreas feel they have the obligation to heal. North and South Koreans alike argue that the war was not conducted in their name, but rather to protect American strategic interests in East Asia, in particular the developing Japanese archipelago that


²² Selig S. Harrison. *Korean endgame : a strategy for reunification and US disengagement*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002: 102

caused Koreans so much trauma in the past.²³ While the North and South do not always agree on all issues, both remain intent placing blame for their broken ties upon the United States. Therefore, whether the United States agrees with their analysis or not, in order to maintain our valuable relationship with South Korea, it is essential that we help oversee the eventual unification of the peninsula.

While the international community will certainly be interested in any prospects for unification, South Korea has the legitimate claim, strengthened by international law, to legally absorb of its northern neighbor. It is written in Article Three of the South Korea constitution that it may exercise the right to reproduce the entire peninsula in order to start preparations for unification.²⁴ However, rather than immediately absorbing its the fragile neighbor, a more gradual approach to unification would be more realistic, as the

²³ Ibid, 102

²⁴ Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009): 25



Council on Foreign Relations report

Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea

writes:

Seoul, in conjunction with any residual authority remaining in the North, might choose to manage this in stages or at least to slow down the pace of absorption through an interim confederated political arrangement as a precursor to full union²⁵.

It makes logical sense that the United States and South Korea adopt this policy so that this process is dealt with multilaterally and with a practical timeline. To highlight further why unification must wait, a comparison of the differences between the levels of growth within the two countries provides staggering results:

In the case of South Korea, the growth rate of the economy steadily slows, averaging between 4% and 5% real growth for the period 1998-2007. In the case of North Korea, the rate at which the economy shrinks moderates, with the country averaging between -2% and -3% growth for the period.²⁶

Consequently, abrupt unification would also make the South face “the prospect of massive

²⁵ Ibid, 14

²⁶ Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Li-gang Liu. "The Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification: Alternate Scenarios." *Asian Survey* 38.8 (1998): 807

movements of people as well as

uncontrollable demands for economic aid and legal, administrative problems of absorbing a large and economically backward North.”²⁷

South Korea is currently unprepared for the vast set of changes that would occur would it quickly unify as in the case of post-Cold War Germany. Immediate unification would put too much of a burden on not only the South, but also the United States and international community that would be expected to aid in the process. Eventual unification is contingent on a sustained pace of absorption that would allow the North Korean government, economy, and people to adjust to the changes.

Forcing a completely different system may result in unforeseeable clashes within North Korean society as they attempt to comprehend the new world post-Kim regime.

²⁷ “Exploring the Implications of Alternative North Korean Endgames: Results from a Discussion Panel on Continuing Coexistence Between North and South Korea.” Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis (21 January 1998): 8

A combination of efforts from the United States and South Korea that would lead them onto the path to converging on the gradual development of the region. The most reasonable progression from failure would be for the South to either leave the country as a separate or confederated entity until it can be effectively absorbed without negative impacts in its own society²⁸.

In addition, unlike the German circumstances, the regime has been relatively successful in completely isolating its people—even from its Southern neighbors:

Since the North Koreans are considerably more isolated than the East Germans, they are presumably less familiar with South Korean consumer goods and may not have access to consumption transfers on the scale the East Germans did. All of these forces would have to encourage North Koreans to continue buying home goods, maintaining the value of the North Korean capital stock.²⁹


²⁸ Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009): 19

²⁹ Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang. "Modeling Korean Unification." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 28.2 (2000): 14

Upon the opening of the country it is natural that people would want to use superior Southern products than rely on emerging homegrown industries. It is important to remember that unification will not become a feasible economic option for the South until the North has experience its own growth. This would eliminate the fear of destroying these markets due to a lack of demand as better products are provided by external sources.

Development After Stabilization

Admittedly, rebuilding the country for eventual unification is a complicated process, nevertheless, several key points arise in the case of North Korea. First of all, a major concern for the American people would be to safely ensure that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are dismantled in order to prevent them from falling into more dangerous hands. In addition, it is important to demilitarize the country that has devoted so much of its resources to the military. In order for North Korea to proceed



onto the road of modernization it is essential that resources be taken away from solely devoting funds to the army, and into more economically productive activities. As previous explained, the unification process would not be able to proceed until it can avoid any negative affects on the South Korean population. Finally, the re-socialization of the North Korean people will be an important step in preparing them for the transition to an open society after being blinded by the rhetoric of their oppressive government for such a long time.


Eliminate threat of weapons of mass destruction

Securing the weapons of mass destruction is the primary object of the United States, and after the initial period of stabilization is complete, the eradication of this deadly threat can be achieved only through coordinated efforts of our own intelligence and cooperation with the former North Korean military. It is essential that the

United States not alienate these forces in order to effectively and efficiently locate and dismantle nuclear facilities. Unfortunately, a common theme among the study of North Korea is that even its weaponry is ridden with unknowns and dangerous misinformation, including the location of all the facilities and the amount of stockpiles already in existence.³⁰ Using only our own intelligence coupled with that of the South Korean military, the American forces would not be able to ensure the destruction of all stockpiles. It is of primary concern that the military obtain information as swiftly as possible, using information from the North Koreans themselves.

One facility that is commonly known to produce plutonium and develop nuclear weapons is the installation at Yongbyon. While this facility will be one of the first to be dismantled, the US-Korea Institute at John

³⁰ Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009: 18



Hopkins University offers the possibility of using its personnel for positive scientific research center:

[Yongbyon’s personnel] would not only assist with the dismantlement process but their skill sets could lend themselves to non-nuclear activities, such as working on electric, hydro and wind power stations as well as water, gas and oil pipelines.³¹

While the nuclear ambitions of the North are feared in international society, upon reconstruction these facilities can be converted from a source of terror into something beneficial for society. These facilities themselves and resources would not be wasted, while simultaneously they would cease to be a threat to the international order. In addition the US-Korea institute explains that if the United States could “refurbish the small, Soviet-supplied IRT research reactor at the site, enabling it to produce radioactive isotopes for export.”³² This in turn would bring in a significant amount of money into

the developing country, which could aid the development process. Eventually a united Korea would “have to be a party to relevant international agreements— the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Conventions, and the Biological Weapons Conventions—prohibiting signatories from possessing such weapons.”³³ This would eliminate any threat of recurrent dangers of nuclear weapons on the peninsula.


Economic reconstruction

Controlled by the iron fist of the Kim Jong-il regime, the North Korean economy relied on socialist economic controls that have devastated society, and must be changed in order to successfully integrate into the international economic system. Kim Jong-il’s economic aspirations revolve around the concept of self-reliance that would allow it to maintain its complete isolation while attempting to make North Korea the only

³¹ US strategy towards North Korea rebuilding dialogue and engagement, US-Korea Institute at SAIS. (2009): 51

³² *Ibid*, 52

³³ Paul B. Stares, Joel S. Wit, and the Center for Preventive Action. Preparing for sudden change in North Korea Council on Foreign Relations. (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Press, 2009):22



country that was completely self-sufficient. Going beyond a mere economic plan, the North Korean philosophy of self-sufficiency, *Juche* “has been used since the 1950s to perpetuate power by the central government and to build an aura of the supernatural around their supreme leaders Kim—both father and son.”³⁴ It will not be a simple shift and it is critical that the North Koreans are eased into a new system rather than forcing it.


One cannot expect that a nation can radically change everything simply with a quick fix, as it takes time and small incremental developments to make a difference. For example, the Soviet Union used “shock therapy” to force its failing communist system into a capitalist market with disastrous consequences that made it partially reject capitalism and caused some to revert back to the comforts of the old system

despite its flaws.³⁵ Instead, it is important to respect that the old governance and legacy of the traditional nation will continue to have a strong influence on society. Gradual change is a better solution in the long run, because it gives society time to adjust without threatening the old social order that could stop change altogether.

An example of a successful transition to the free market economy is Deng Xiaoping’s allowance of market economic elements into Chinese society. He did so under the realization that China could not remain closed off to the international system, and that foreign investment was needed to help develop its industry and manufacturing. Deng began to allow development on the periphery of Chinese society without “shocking” the entire system into a market economy. Although China has its own share of problems resulting from its

³⁴ Dick Kazuyuki Nanto and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, [The North Korean economy background and policy analysis](#). Congressional Information Service, Library of Congress (Washington D.C., 2004): 121

³⁵ William J. Baumol, Robert E. Litan , and Carl J. Schramm. [Good capitalism, bad capitalism, and the economics of growth and prosperity](#). (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007): 164



changing economic policies, particularly income disparity and overproduction, it serves as an example of a country that was able to gradually change its economic system into something completely different. In addition to China's model, the South Korean way of developing would be a conceivable path, and a familiar system would attract South Korean business:

If such socioeconomic transition in a partially deindustrialized, re-ruralized, extremely atomized, and semifeudal North Korean society were to proceed without civil strife, one might expect the formation of privatized chaebol-like economic conglomerates on the ruins of the North Korean socialistic economic edifice, with substantial government stakes in flagship industries.³⁶

Using such institutions like the South Korean *chaebol*, large, complex Korean business groups, in the North Korea, building upon what they are already familiar with, could also help it transition without completely forcing radical change upon society.


³⁶ Alexandre Mansourov. "The Hermit Mouse Roars: North Korea." *Asian affairs, an American review*. 30.2 (2003): 55

North Korea will not prosper without an open trade system and investment within its home industries. Experts have predicted that once cross-border trade is opened up, the economy will see rapid gains. As the article, *Modeling Korean Unification*, in the *Journal of Comparative Economic* explains, "the impact of economic integration with the North on the South Korean economy would be non-trivial once restrictions on cross-border labor and mobility were removed³⁷." In fact, even during the Kim regime, some bureaucrats have urged for the opening of trade between outside countries, as the country's economy was floundering:

According to a North Korean journal, in the mid-1990s, when the society was suffering from mass starvation, some pragmatic bureaucrats proposed policies for introducing foreign capital and promoting the people's motivation to work through material incentives in order to revive the economy.³⁸

³⁷ Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang. "Modeling Korean Unification." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 28.2 (2000): 24

³⁸ Jae-Cheon Lim. "Institutional Change in North Korean Economic Development Since 1984: The Competition Between Hegemonic and Non-hegemonic Rules and Norms." *Pacific affairs*. 82.1 (2009): 19



Even some in the strictly socialist government understood the value of promoting investment and trade to jump-start the failing economy.

Loosening government control over the system will encourage home markets to develop, and is essential to allowing the economy to grow to allow for eventual reunification with the South.

One of the strongest indicators of how changes to the economic system of North Korea will spur development is through the study of the black market under the Kim regime. Market activities were starting to form in North Korea, but were halted through the regime's relentless pursuit of strict socialist economic policies controlled by the central government. These black markets that emerged despite these conditions prove that the spirit of the market economy is alit within the bosom of the people, and was merely temporarily extinguished through the severely controlled environment of the old regime. If the market was able to exist despite the harsh

conditions imposed from above, than it is natural to assume that it is possible a legal market could form if the burden of the regime was removed. During the worst moments of the famine in the 1990s, North Koreans began to look for other options, and John S. Wit of John Hopkins University, explained that "growth and diversification of markets inside the country first developed during the famine of the mid-1990s as a grassroots response to the breakdown of the Public Distribution System³⁹." In fact, it is stated "nearly half the respondents reported that all of their income came from private business activities at the time they left North Korea."⁴⁰ Although the North Korean people have lived under the suffocating environment of Kim Jong-il, the spirit of an open market has not been crushed, and the United States must help encourage its unimpeded development.

³⁹ John S. Wit. US strategy towards North Korea rebuilding dialogue and engagement. (US-Korea Institute at SAIS 2009): 34

⁴⁰ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland. "Famine in North Korea Redux?" *Journal of Asian economics*. 20.4 (2009): 7

Resocialization

Holding onto power for more than 60 years, the Kim family has successfully created a propaganda machine that has completely brainwashed its citizens in order to gain legitimacy to rule. Separation from this system will not be simple, as North Koreans have had these myths ingrained in their minds for so many years, but is necessary in order to complete a shift into an unfamiliar system. The United States must first understand what these people have been taught in order to reconcile the façade these people have been living under with the truth.

More so than his son and North Korea's current leader, Kim Jong-il, the Korean people were trained to worship the supreme leader, Kim Il-Sung. Taught from a young age, the North Korean people are shown propaganda that teaches that god-like Kim Il-Sung is the savior of his country, and even Western historians cannot often separate the truth about Kim Il-Sung's life from the

propaganda created to influence the people.⁴¹


Often Kim Il-Sung is depicted as a god-like figure in their literature, and a common theme is the image of "a mature Kim, sometimes surrounded by children in tableaux reminiscent of the Sunday-school pictures that illustrate the words of Jesus, 'Suffer the little children to come unto me.'"⁴² Part of the reason that Kim Il-Sung was able to garner such verdant support from his followers, and eventually the rest of North Korean society, was the creation of his image as the glorious savior of the Korean people. He created a myth that after the Korean War he took it upon himself to rebuild North Korean society, and offered "solicitude toward war orphans... the state raised youngsters who had lost their parents, teaching them to think of Kim Il-sung as their father, themselves as his children."⁴³

Keeping strict control on society and access to the outside world, the Kim regime was able to

⁴¹ Bradley K. Martin. Under the loving care of the fatherly leader : North Korea and the Kim dynasty. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004: 11

⁴² Ibid, 6

⁴³ Ibid, 3



convince North Koreans that their society was envied throughout the world, and ingrained the vileness of their wartime enemies, Japan and America.⁴⁴ Although the United States does not often dwell on the issues of the Korean War, it remains a significant tool for the leadership in North Korea that will have to be overcome once society is free from the propaganda machine.

In order to maintain their fabricated worldview, the North Korean government developed an isolationist policy that completely blocked out foreign influence. Kim Il-Sung reasoned this was necessary to eliminate impure elements, which he explained were “spies, people trying to destroy the system... South Korean or American agents, including the saboteurs against whom rifle-toting soldiers were posted at highway and railway bridges.”⁴⁵ However strong this propaganda appeared, this extreme

form of isolation was only possible because Korea had been occupied or under threat for so much of its history. People truly believed that it was safer within their homeland than abroad.⁴⁶ Although limited contact had been allowed in more recent years, following Kim Il-Sung’s death in 1994, and after Pyongyang had to appeal to external forces faced with the famine in the mid-1990s, little progress has been made to free the North Korean people from the influence of its government.⁴⁷

Although during this brief period of access by the international community, the foundation of international understanding began to grow within North Korea, the United States must recognize that these people have been taught their entire lives to hate and fear Americans. It is essential that the population be gradually reeducated and opened to the international system. Although complete reconciliation

⁴⁴ Gordon G. Chang. Nuclear showdown: North Korea takes on the world. New York: Random House, 2006: 9

⁴⁵ Bradley K. Martin. Under the loving care of the fatherly leader : North Korea and the Kim dynasty. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004: 6

⁴⁶ Gordon G. Chang. Nuclear showdown : North Korea takes on the world. New York: Random House, 2006: 11

⁴⁷ John S. Wit. US strategy towards North Korea rebuilding dialogue and engagement. (US-Korea Institute at SAIS 2009): 35

with external powers will not come easily, slowly opening their isolated system and allowing their economy to be rejuvenated will help overcome the loss of ideological legitimacy. It will encourage a change in their way of thinking that will help lead to both long-term development and set North Korea on the path to uniting with the South.

Conclusion

Recommendations

Although the future of North Korea has not yet been written, the United States must be prepared for the event of sudden failure. This paper has made specific recommendations based on the two periods of initial failure and development after stabilization. Summarizing the main points of this paper, for the period of initial failure the United States is urged to:


- Allow South Korea to take the lead in all actions as it knows more about the region and has direct ties to the situation

- Create ties with high ranking officials and members of the North Korean military in order to aid the stabilization effort and avoid negative externalities of ignoring their importance in the reconstruction of the nation
- Alleviate the suffering of the North Korean population through aid and recognize that further development cannot occur without moving the North Koreans away from merely focusing on sustenance
- Work with both South Korea and China to ease border tensions and issues related to refugees that could threaten the security of these countries

After these objectives have been achieved the United States can turn to further development that will aid in what we have concluded to be the ultimate goal of unification of the Korean peninsula. In this time of transition, this paper recommends that the United States:

- Obtain knowledge from both South Korean and North Korean intelligence in order to successfully eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction
- Convert nuclear facilities into productive entities by exploring opportunities for non-nuclear activities using former nuclear facilities
- Set the foundation for North Korea to be able to join international organizations promoting non-proliferation
- Ease North Korea into an open economic system avoiding “shock therapy” tactics in favor of gradual change
- Promote an open trade system that can provide opportunities for the revival of home industry that can set the path to rapid growth that can lead to unification
- Encourage domestic markets that had existed under the Kim regime despite government controls
- Recognize the conditions under which the North Koreans have lived their lives under the Kim regime in order aid in their resocialization to an international society
- Introduce gradually knowledge of the world outside of North Korea to help break the people from their dependence on isolationist policies and fear of foreign societies

Although the failure of North Korea presents significant challenges, it also is an opportunity to break the control that the Kim regime has exerted over every aspect of North Korean society. Failing state countermeasures are difficult to implement in authoritarian regimes, particularly ones in which the people are kept completely isolated. Despite the current stalemate, the United States must consider North Korea’s place in




failed state policy by preparing for solutions to handling its failure.

While the fate of North Korea has not yet been determined, the United States must develop a realistic plan, such as the one outlined in this case study, to deal with countries in danger of failing. In the case of North Korea, successfully combating immediate security and humanitarian concerns will lay the foundation for the implementation of long-term development recommendations tailored to North Korea's situation in accordance with our policy report's principles. Using North Korea as an example, our principles will be able to foster realistic solutions to country specific issues, despite having universal significance for failed state policy. The case study of North Korea is an example of how countries that have not yet failed but remain in danger of doing so must still be considered in policy, so that the United States is effectively prepared to handle an emergency situation if it arises.

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
Wit, Joel S., Johns Hopkins University. School of Advanced International Studies. US-Korea Institute., and Weatherhead East Asian Institute. "US strategy towards North Korea rebuilding dialogue and engagement." *US-Korea Inst*

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Burma

A Case Study on Prevention

Brian Steyer



Issue

Burma is an example of a country where American foreign policy makers must focus on primary and secondary prevention of state failure. This case study emphasizes diplomatic engagement in sectors where public services and government protection are still in the very preliminary stages of collapse. Burma's military-controlled government provides an exceptional challenge because the US cannot directly intervene and must instead focus on diplomacy. Because of the regime's unresponsiveness, US government actions must be modified to operate effectively within the limitations posed by Burma.

Background


Burma's military-controlled government, known as the State Peace and Development Council, (SPDC) has recently become known for neglecting international norms and domestic obligations. In the FFP's 2009 Failed State Index, Burma placed 13 out of 177 countries whose governments were

assessed for signs of state failure—a five place increase from its previous ranking of 18 in 2006.¹ Even though the SPDC has not used direct military intervention recently to suppress its constituents, multiple conflicts in several weak domestic areas indicate that Burma's government is highly susceptible to a large-scale humanitarian crisis. One important distinction that influences Burma's failed state status is that Burma's government has not experienced foreign military intervention or comprehensive state failure. US actions now could help Burma avoid such crisis in the near future.

Recent Overview: Cyclone Nargis and the Saffron Revolution

In 2007, The SPDC dramatically increased the price of fuel and natural gas. This sudden decision caused a dramatic spike in the cost of living for Burma's local population. As public dissent against this government policy increased, Burmese monks

¹ The Fund For Peace. "Burma Country Profile." 2009. <http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=410&Itemid=573>



from around the country banded together with local community leaders to put pressure on the government to change its policies. This

multilateral action put a lot of pressure on the SPDC, which could not easily be ignored.

On May 2nd 2008, Cyclone Nargis caused substantial damage in the Irrawaddy Delta located along Burma's southern border.

For several days immediately following this event, Burma's government did not take the major steps needed to help the 2.4 million people put at risk during this disaster.³ While

a limited quantity of medical supplies were allowed into the country during the first few days, humanitarian aid workers were not

allowed to enter the country to provide basic health services to people affected by the storm. Poor infrastructure and lack of emergency services caused food shortages,

health problems, and refugee spillover in surrounding regions. As a result of this negligence, more than 800,000 people were

displaced and over 130,000 people were reported killed or missing.⁴ The heightened

• • •
The heightened degree of chaos that resulted from this natural catastrophe further demonstrated that Burma's government was unable or unwilling to meet the needs of people during periods of domestic crisis.
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event, termed by the media the Saffron Revolution, was one of the largest and most politicized protests in almost 20 years.²

Immediately following this

political incident, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) council issued a public statement calling for political reforms from the Burmese government. The Saffron Revolution set an important precedent of collaboration between major stakeholders. China and Russia's participation in the UNHRC helped legitimize the multilateral process of engagement. This decisive

² Selth, Andrew. "Burma's "Saffron Revolution" and the Limits of International Influence." Australian Journal of International Affairs 62 (2008).

³ S Seekins, Donald. "State, Society, and Natural Distaster: Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar." Asian Journal of Social Science 37.5.726 (2009).

⁴ Seekins 717-718

degree of chaos that resulted from this natural catastrophe further demonstrated that Burma's government was unable or unwilling to meet the needs of people during periods of domestic crisis. In this situation, the SPDC's indifference to human suffering was driven by the political interests of the ruling elite to maintain military control and stability of the region.

Throughout these conflicts, Burma's military leader, Than Shwe, has remained unreceptive, hostile, and often fanatical in response to the US and other foreign actors. In times of crisis, the SPDC has emphasized self-sufficiency and isolationism as primary modes of operation and ignored the needs of local community members. Burma's withdrawal from foreign affairs and strategic neutrality helps explain the hardening of Burma's leadership to available resources and outside support. Local and international actions have not been able to break through the political stalemate that has atrophied the

country's capacity to establish a stable political climate. Despite strong pressures from local and transnational sources, Burma's core political interests have remained the same. The durability and longevity of the SPDC's military regime over the last 40 years has been a product of these survival tactics. For effective governance in Burma, a strong security presence is required in order to consolidate control of the military and fortify the government's sphere of influence inside Burmese territory.

US Interests

The most salient political interests of the US government are ensuring the unconditional release of Burma's political stakeholders, including democratic activist Aung San Suu Kyi, convincing SPDC's leadership to take efforts to stop drug trafficking, and securing a long-term commitment from Burma's government to abstain from future human rights violations. In an annual report released by Transparency

International in 2009, Burma's government was ranked 3rd lowest for corruption and other indicators of poor governance.⁵ Without political legitimacy and accountability within the Burmese government, it will be extremely difficult to engage in constructive diplomatic relations. The first steps toward collaboration on these important issues will depend on sincere reciprocal gestures and long-term commitment from military leader Than Shwe.

America's Previous Policy Position:

Distancing and Isolation

In the past, The US has responded to crisis in Burma with selective targeting, distancing and limited engagement. Previous US administrations believed that the political tools of isolation were the most viable and effective strategies for putting pressure on the SPDC. In 2003, George W. Bush passed the US Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act. This legislation kept Myanmar's exports out

⁵ Transparency International. "Corruptions Perception Index 2009." 2009. <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table>.

of US markets, denied Burma loans from the World Bank and IMF, and put a freeze on Burmese leaders' assets in the US:


'The crisis between the United States and Burma arising from the actions and policies of the Government of Burma, including its engaging in large-scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma, that led to the declaration of a national emergency on May 20, 1997, and its expansion on October 18, 2007, and April 30 2008, has not been resolved. These actions and policies are hostile to the US interests and pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.'

-George W. Bush 2008⁶

Burma's Response to US Sanctions

This decisive policy decision in 2003 and subsequent denouncement in 2008 by President George W. Bush has made many Burmese officials fearful that the US government is a political threat whose objective is to overthrow Burma's current political leadership. In response to these pressures, the SPDC has moved in the opposite direction from what US policy

⁶ Bush, George. Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Burma. 2008.



makers anticipated. Economic sanctions were seen as a way to put pressure on the SPDC to adopt a new stance that would be in better alignment with US interests and would ultimately provide the country with more access to US goods, services, and other trade benefits. Instead, Burma's response to sanctions and threats of regime change has been to tighten its grip further and develop independently from the influence of western nations.

Options

In Burma, there is a tremendous need for decisive action to alleviate the suffering of local citizens. US principles and State Department priorities have placed several US policy options outside the scope of what is possible in Burma. When assessing the range of US policy decisions available in Burma it's essential that the US government focus on specific issue areas where US officials can make measurable progress. In order to be effective, US diplomatic engagement must

take small actions seriously and respond decisively during Burma's current stage of government collapse while the US government still has the capacity to influence the direction of the outcome. The advantage of this policy stance is that it allows the US government to negotiate many of the strict prerequisites that are often needed for governments and multilateral organizations to take action.

Previously, American policy towards Burma was based on sanctions and a loud call for regime change advocated by the United States and its western allies. An alternate approach has been to follow a more diplomatic form of engagement that involves subtle redirection of Burma's regime priorities. Diplomacy from regional stakeholders is likely to be more effective than US foreign diplomacy alone. This could take the form of cross-regional partnerships if the US government is willing work with

Japan and other regional allies to encourage a change in SPDC's priorities.

Sanctions in Burma

A World Bank Report issued in 2000 calculated that Burma receives about 2 US dollars per person each year in aid compared to 33 dollars in Cambodia and 53 dollars in Laos.⁷ Although Burma receives significantly less money from the US government, US sanctions have been unsuccessful in influencing the SPDC's ability to secure resources from neighboring stakeholders.

Sanctions have been ineffective because the SPDC is not dependent on US markets or the interests of the US governments to retain power. Attaining multilateral sanctions from regional powers remains challenging because regional players are already invested in sectors of Burma's economy. Economic relations with China represent a large part of Burmese trade, approximately 17% in 2002. (Bert 2004)

⁷ Holliday, Ian. "Rethinking the United State's Myanmar Policy." *Asian Survey* 45 (2005).

Sanctions need to be applied as a collaborative effort or not at all. When sanctions are a joint effort applied across a wide spectrum of countries, it sends a powerful message that prevents recalcitrant governments like the SPDC from seeking alternative methods of survival.

In the last several years, Burma signed a 2.9 billion dollar agreement with China to construct fuel transportation infrastructure that facilitates the transport of crude oil from Africa and the Middle East into China. These lucrative agreements have extended the longevity of the Burmese government and allowed the SPDC to function without the support of the United States. Burma's geopolitical and strategic importance for regional stakeholders makes it difficult for US policy measures to be effective. When the Burmese government joined ASEAN in 1997 it demonstrated another means of circumventing US pressure and generating a certain degree of power without western

involvement. Unless the US can influence regional economic trade policies with Burma's neighbors, the SPDC will continue to shrug off restrictive US policies.

When examining new policy options it is often helpful to look what policy decisions have been effective in fostering change elsewhere. According to US Senator and Vietnam veteran Jim Webb the removal of sanctions in Vietnam may have actually been one of the strongest factors in precipitating the fall of Vietnam's communist government. Loosening economic sanctions exposed the government and civil society to new ideas that undermined the conventional wisdom of the Vietnamese government.

'I believe the greatest factor in creating a more open society inside Vietnam was the removal of America's trade embargo in 1994'
-US Senator Jim Webb.⁸

This radical shift in American policies had a significant impact on Vietnam. If such

policies were implemented in Burma, Burma's strong domestic grip might soften.


Diplomacy from regional stakeholders is likely to be more effective than US foreign diplomacy alone.

Another tactic the US might consider is to establish contact with SPDC military personnel who are being trained outside of Burma. In Singapore, there are several training sites where US officers have a presence as well. This is an opportunity to influence emerging leaders outside of the SPDC's immediate purview.

The US also, should consider how it might work with the Tatmadaw, if not directly, then indirectly. Perhaps engagement can start small by planting long-term seeds. For instance, Burma currently sends officers to other countries in the region for military schooling and training. Singapore educates Burmese officers in its military schools, and US officers attending Singaporean military schools with Burmese officers can try to develop relations with their Burmese classmates in order to foster rapport for mil-to-mil cooperation 10-15 years in the future⁹

⁸ Webb, Jim. "We can't Afford to Ignore Myanmar." The New York Times 2009.

⁹ Heaney Page Number Heaney, Dennis. "Burma: Assessing Options for US Engagement." Master of



Regional Interests in Burma

Burma's poor record of governance and relative abundance of jade, teak, and natural gas make it a good place to do business. There is a strong need for stability but there are few incentives for promoting a positive business environment that would lead to a more progressive and responsible government in Burma. Many of Burma's regional stakeholders including China, Russia, and India have the capacity to help reform the SPDC's economic practices, but the political interests of these regional stakeholders is to minimize conflict and maintain their respective sovereign interests in Burma.

Scenario's for possible US intervention

Several events have occurred in the past few years that could indicate a need for US intervention in the future. In 2007, news was released that a nuclear research reactor


agreement was signed between Burma and Russia. The implications of this dangerous relationship remain unclear, but the US may be pushed to intervene militarily in the future if Burma were to obtain nuclear weapons. Several outbreaks of lymphatic filariasis, known informally as elephantiasis, have also been documented as a potentially serious threat that could lead to some form of direct policy intervention.¹⁰

Recommendations:

As suggested throughout this paper, small steps can be taken by the US to prevent state collapse. While Burma may not contain the high degree of political importance to American strategic interests, tactful engagement with Burmese leaders would plant seeds for improving future relations. In recent years, the Obama Administration has begun to engage diplomatically with the SPDC's leadership. In 2009 Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated: "We're seeking to see a

Science in Defense Analysis Naval Post Graduate School, 2009.

¹⁰ Heaney, 81



process inside Burma that would inspire and permit dialogue among all of the stakeholders so that there could be a growing consensus within Burma itself about the way forward."¹¹ The Obama Administration has started a new process of engagement by sending Jim Webb on a diplomatic mission to Burma—the first high level diplomatic visit to Burma in 10 years. (Webb 2009) During his visit in 2009 Jim Webb met with political leader Than Shwe to discuss mutual foreign policy concerns. Jim Webb also had the opportunity to meet with democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi to discuss future policy options in Burma.


In Burma, there are a number of possibilities for political change in the near future. A constitutional referendum and general election are planned to take place in 2010. These events will be an important time for the US government to comment and put

pressure on the SPDC. When the political stalemate lifts, Burma may emerge as a competent democracy capable of self-governance or the country's political structure may continue to unravel until a larger and more dangerous humanitarian crisis occurs that demands a stronger international response. While Burma's political future remains uncertain, new methods of policy persuasion will be essential to prevent future movements toward state failure in Burma.

¹¹ Clinton, Hillary. "Secretary Clinton's Remarks at APEC Conference." 2009. <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/11/12/secretary_clintons_remarks_at_apec_conference_97348.html>.

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
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A decorative graphic on the right side of the page. It features a thick blue horizontal line at the top. Several thin blue lines intersect at various points, creating a network of triangles. Three large, overlapping circles in shades of blue are positioned in the upper right and lower right areas. The circles are composed of concentric layers of different blue tones, creating a 3D effect.

Haiti

Opportunity in Disaster?

Laurel Severt



Issue

Even before the devastating earthquake on January 12, 2010, Haiti was considered a failed state. 80 percent of its population living below the poverty line, 54% in abject poverty, and the Haitian government that was providing virtually no political goods to its citizens.¹ Haiti already held the status of poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, with a GDP per capita of around \$1,300.² According to the International Monetary Fund, in 2007 76 percent of Haitians lived on less than two dollars per day, and 55 percent lived on less than 44 cents per day.³

The combination of extreme poverty, fragile democratic institutions, and the lack of legitimate economic opportunities has characterized Haiti as a failed state. To

rebuild the country and create a better functioning state, the United States needs to enter into an efficient multilateral effort to create jobs, build infrastructure, and promote a stable political and economic environment so that Haiti can begin the process of long-term development.


For the recovery effort to be successful, there must be an emphasis on multilateral coordination of

recovery efforts, sustainable institution building, community driven development, and the importance of lasting economic development.

The 7.0 magnitude shock that hit Haiti on January 12 was followed by 56 aftershocks of magnitude 4.5 or greater. The earthquake and its aftershocks killed an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 people and injured

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The combination of extreme poverty, fragile democratic institutions, and the lack of legitimate economic opportunities has characterized Haiti as a failed state.
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¹ "Haiti" *The World Factbook*, Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Jan. 2010, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html>>.
² "Haiti" *The World Factbook*
³ United States, Haiti's Development Needs: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, March 13, 2007(Washington: US G.P.O., 2007).



Source: USAID “Haiti Earthquake Program Map.” <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/haiti/eq/documents/01.15.10HaitiEarthquakeProgramMap.pdf>

hundreds of thousands others.⁴ With an epicenter only ten miles southwest of Port-au-Prince, the earthquake destroyed 70 percent of structures in extensive areas of the capital, with up to 90 percent destroyed in towns in closer proximity to the epicenter.⁵ Key official buildings, such as the presidential

palace, police headquarters, the parliament building, and thirteen of the government’s fifteen ministries, were destroyed.⁶ Around one million of Haiti’s inhabitants were left homeless, and approximately three million or more are in immediate need of food aid.⁷

In a country of 8.7 million people, these numbers are staggering. A study

⁴ “Haiti Earthquake_By the Numbers,” *CBS News* 26 Jan. 2010, 6 Feb. 2010 <<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/26/ap/latnamerica/main6143740.shtml>>.

⁵ “Haiti Earthquake_By the Numbers”

⁶ “The Challenge of Rebuilding Haiti,” *BBC News* 29 Jan. 2010 <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8482237.stm>>

⁷ Marc Lacey, “US Troops Patrol Haiti, Filling a Void,” *The New York Times* 19 Jan. 2010: A1.

released by the Inter-American Development Bank just over one month after the earthquake estimates that the total cost of the damages could be \$7.2 billion to \$13.2 billion, an early estimate based upon an analysis of data from 2,000 natural disasters in the last 40 years.⁸

The distribution of aid thus far has been impeded by a lack of infrastructure, including extremely poor roads. UN Humanitarian chief John Holmes has stated that efforts until this time have been poorly funded and coordinated, and there is still an enormous amount to be done in the nation.⁹ Following this statement, the United Nations issued a revised appeal on February 18, 2010 for \$1.44 billion to aid in Haiti's recovery, marking the largest humanitarian request following a natural disaster.¹⁰ The quickly approaching rainy season makes the issue of emergency relief even more timely and

⁸ Marc Lacey, "Estimates of Quake Damage in Haiti Increase by Billions," *The New York Times* 16 Feb. 2010: A8.

⁹ "Haiti Earthquake: UN Seeks Record Aid Donations," *BBC News* 19 Feb. 2010

<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8522732.stm>>

¹⁰ "Haiti Earthquake" *BBC News*

important to quickly address. It is evident that there is a great deal of need in Haiti, both due to preexisting conditions and the widespread destruction caused by the earthquake. The United States must develop a policy of how to deal with both the immediate basic needs of the population, and the long-term process of elevating the country from its status as a failed state.

Background

In considering actions to take in Haiti to improve its current condition, it is important to take into account historical context. Haiti is unique as the only nation in the world founded by slaves, and has undergone many drastic political changes and revolutions since gaining independence from France in 1804.¹¹ Since independence, Haiti has adopted twenty-one different constitutions and been led by forty-two heads of state, twenty-nine of whom were overthrown or assassinated, and nine whom declared

¹¹ Sidney W. Mintz, "Can Haiti Change?" *Foreign Affairs* 74.1 (1995): 73.

themselves heads of state for life.¹² The tumultuous nature of Haitian politics has led to numerous foreign interventions or attempts to create democracy in the nation, yet a nation-state that consistently acts in the interest of the Haitian people does not yet exist. Past international occupation, intervention, and failure are essential to understanding the political and economic culture of Haiti, and therefore must be discussed before developing strategy regarding whether to intervene in the present.

Independence and Early US Occupation

Due to the circumstances of Haiti's independence, viewed by much of the world as a menacing slave uprising in a global economy that still relied heavily upon slavery, Haiti was very isolated immediately following its independence. It was not recognized as a country by the United States until 1862.¹³ In 1915, the United States occupied Haiti for

frequently debated reasons ranging from protecting Chase National Bank assets to halting mob violence to preventing World War I related threats to American security.¹⁴ The US actively sought opportunities for investment in the country during this time period, and stated their intention to develop Haiti. However, techniques used included forcibly conscripting peasants into road crews and development projects. These actions were seen by the Haitians as reminiscent of slavery and led to resistance.¹⁵ Corruption persisted in Haiti's leadership, and the abuse of citizens and exploitation of the state's resources remained commonplace.¹⁶ The occupation, lasting until 1934, did have positive legacies, including the building of schools, hospitals, and roads; the development of a police force and army; and the centralization and increased efficiency of the Haitian government.¹⁷ Overall, the occupation did not

¹² John J. Curry, *Approaching Failed State Status: A Case Study of Haiti*, USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: US Army War College, 2005) 13.

¹³ Curry 6.

¹⁴ Mintz 73, 84.

¹⁵ Mintz 84.

¹⁶ Curry 6.

¹⁷ Mintz 85.

result in the establishment of accountable state institutions in the long-term, and instead was followed again by authoritarian regimes dependent on repression and coercion to control Haiti's resources.¹⁸

The next "stable" administration came with the 29-year Duvalier regime, a father-son leadership spanning from 1957 to 1986, that was characterized by human rights abuses and the extreme levels of corruption. However, US policy toward Haiti from 1934 to 1986 closely approximated total disengagement.¹⁹ Under this dictatorship, institutions were intentionally weakened at the expense of increasing and maintaining the power of the Duvalier administration.²⁰ A military junta eventually displaced the regime, repressing the population for three years until the democratic election of 1990 that placed Jean-Bertrand Aristide in power.²¹ The Duvalier

regime had a significant impact on the continued weakness of Haiti's infrastructure and the distrust of Haiti's population toward its political leaders. Foreign inaction allowed widespread human rights abuses and high levels of poverty to go unchecked.

Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Operation Uphold Democracy

Under the Clinton administration, the US began to again take a role in the management of Haiti. In September 1991, Haiti's first freely elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in a bloody military coup.²² This action was condemned internationally, and led to strong actions by the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). By imposing an extremely restrictive trade embargo, the United Nations managed to cut off nearly all contact between Haiti and the rest of the world, devastating the country's manufacturing sector and leaving millions of


¹⁸ Curry 7.

¹⁹ Curry 7-11.

²⁰ Terry F. Buss, Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It, National Academy of Public Administration (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2008) 2.

²¹ Buss 2.

²² Michele Wucker, "Haiti: So Many Missteps," World Policy Journal, 21. 1 (2004): 41.



Haitians in immediate danger of starvation.²³ Eventually, in September 1994, the Clinton administration, with UN authorization, sent 20,000 American troops in a mission titled “Operation Uphold Democracy” to restore Aristide to power. The nation, however, only

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Haiti ceased to be a frequently discussed news item and international aid decreased significantly.
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experienced democratic governance for a short eight months before the junta

took power.²⁴ The US mission was generally accepted as successful, and Aristide returned from exile to again lead the country. However, the United States was as abandoning Haiti as soon as it achieved its goal of restoring Aristide to power, instead of alleviating the significant humanitarian crisis that was worsened by the economic devastation of the trade embargo.²⁵

²³Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy As Social Work," *Foreign Affairs*, 75. 1 (1996): 21.
²⁴ John Sweeney, "Stuck in Haiti," *Foreign Policy* 102 (1996): 143.
²⁵ Philippe R. Girard, *Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 US Invasion of Haiti* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004): 162.

Following Aristide’s return to power and the February 1996 election of Rene Préval, Aristide’s former prime minister, Haiti’s focus turned to recovery of its export industry, still severely damaged by the 1991-1994 embargo. Haiti was forced to follow Washington-based economic reforms to ensure the inflow of foreign aid and support of international lenders.²⁶ This money was desperately needed to rebuild the long-neglected roads and infrastructure that could begin the process of economic recovery. Yet as the government spent its political capital in attempts to meet the international demands. The National Academy of Public Administration stated this period “was marked by donor-driven reform agendas and conditionality-based financing in Haiti...[which] contributed to poor commitment and ineffective implementation on the part of the government of Haiti and to

²⁶ Wucker, “Haiti” 44.

frustration and Haiti fatigue for the donor community.”²⁷

Directly following US intervention in 1995, Haiti received \$730 million from international donors, more than 10% of the country’s GDP. Within two years, however, total international aid dropped significantly, averaging under \$182 million annually from 1997 through 2002.²⁸ These funds were largely mismanaged, with little if any directed toward long-term investment projects to improve health care, education, or infrastructure. As Robert Maguire, the director of the Haiti Project at Trinity College, stated, “With fewer and fewer resources to manage, the government was left to manage scarcity and became increasingly desperate and corrupt”.²⁹ Corruption and ineffective government agencies and civil servants have dominated the country, without regard to the well being of the population. Because of this, international donors were

wary to trust government institutions in managing and distributing funds and taking into account the true needs of the Haitian population. Politically, Haiti has still not experienced long-term stable leadership. Aristide was reelected for another term as president in 2000, only to be overthrown in another violent coup and forced into exile in February 2004.³⁰ The United States, disappointed Aristide’s democratic record, did nothing to intervene as it had in 1994. Democratic elections in February 2006 placed Préval back in power, continuing a cycle of political confusion and violence in the country.³¹ The stabilization of Haiti needs to include the discontinuation of continual coups and juntas that disrupt the activities and intentions of Haiti’s governing powers. This will require strong and honest leaders that produce tangible development results in the country.

²⁷ Buss 18

²⁸ Wucker, “Haiti” 44.

²⁹ Wucker, “Haiti” 45.

³⁰ Buss 3.

³¹ Buss 3.

Recent Intervention

Recent US and international efforts have attempted to stabilize Haiti both economically and politically, creating an environment more favorable to development. In 2004, the United Nations, responding to a period of crisis in Haiti, created the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to establish credible security in the country.³² With this mission approximately 8,000 UN peacekeepers were stationed in the nation to create and maintain civil order.³³ In 2008, the enhanced security was complemented by US economic legislation under the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) II Act, giving Haiti preferential access to US markets for the next ten years.³⁴ This act had the intention, and initial success, of strengthening Haiti's apparel exports and investment. However, these gains were offset by external shocks even before the 2010 earthquake. An increase

in world food prices in 2008 triggered extensive riots across the country.³⁵ A series of four hurricanes in a time period of less than a month in 2008 destroyed infrastructure, homes, and livelihoods in all ten of Haiti's regions.³⁶ While there was a short period of time in which it looked as though Haiti may be in a position to launch lasting economic development, external shocks in the last several years have left Haiti in an even worse position than before.

A tradition of rulers that have siphoned surpluses and neglected to contribute to the development of the country have left Haitians with an inherent distrust in the abilities of the government to produce lasting change. Haiti ranked in the bottom one percent of all countries in corruption and government effectiveness in 2004.³⁷ Decades of unfulfilled promises have disillusioned Haitian citizens, who have little reason to believe that either the government or

³² Collier 3.

³³ "Haiti" *The World Factbook*

³⁴ "Haiti" *The World Factbook*

³⁵ Collier 3.

³⁶ Lacey, "US Troops".

³⁷ Buss 6.

international agencies will have any positive impact on their lives. United States policy towards Haiti was historically characterized by on-again, off-again foreign assistance, including embargos, and the restriction of charitable aid from American and multinational organizations.³⁸ The project of rebuilding Haiti is one that will take at least a decade. If the United States is to begin engagement in the country, a long-term commitment is necessary to garner the trust of the Haitian people.

US Interests

Haiti is both a humanitarian and strategic interest for US policymakers. Haiti has many distinct factors that make it a favorable area for reconstruction, and economist Paul Collier argues that Haiti “offers the American and Canadian governments a rare opportunity to demonstrate that their support can lift a

society decisively out of fragility”.³⁹ Unlike many failed states, the country has no real ethnic or religious divisions, and therefore no deep ideological factions that often lead to conflict and weakness.⁴⁰ The feasibility of economic development in Haiti places the country at a strategic as well as humanitarian advantage, as it has the opportunity to become the poster child for US-led development success.

Strategic

The National Academy of Public Administration in its report on foreign aid to Haiti concluded that “Haiti is of strategic importance to the United States because of its location, perpetual state of violence, and instability, its role as a base for drug trafficking, its potential as a trading partner, its strong ties to a large Haitian-American diaspora, and its relationship with the Latin American and Caribbean community.”⁴¹ The economic development of Haiti could thus

³⁸ Buss 5.

³⁹ Collier 4.

⁴⁰ Mintz 83.

⁴¹ Buss 1.

have a positive effect in the United States by lowering the amount of illegal migration of Haitians into the country and limiting the flow of illegal drugs from Haiti into the United States.⁴²

The George W. Bush administration linked illegal Haitian immigration with American vulnerability to terrorism, identifying the migration as “an area of interest for the Global War on Terrorism”.⁴³ More than two-thirds of the Haitian labor force do not have formal jobs, with some figures suggesting that as much as 95% of employment is in the underground economy, leading to a dependence on remittances and informal economic opportunities.⁴⁴ Because the Haitian state currently does not have the capacity to ensure functioning institutions, drug trafficking, especially in the cocaine industry, has flourished virtually unchecked. These elements may be considered to be

important strategic interests when deciding policy toward Haiti’s development.

Humanitarian

While the strategic importance of Haiti of relevance, the humanitarian interest in Haiti is more significant. With so much of the population living in extreme poverty even before the earthquake, the devastation caused by the recent disaster has left millions in need of immediate relief. Haiti’s proximity to the United States gives the country a position to be an appealing candidate for generating popular support. The recent crisis has drawn a great deal of American attention, and while this visibility is in danger as the earthquake becomes an event of the past, much can be established now while the issue is still in the public eye. Highly publicized US celebrity fund raising campaigns, such as “Hope for Haiti”, which raised over \$66 million, the remake of the song “We are the World”, and a widespread text messaging campaign, have generated large profits. These efforts have

⁴² Curry 10.

⁴³ Curry 10.

⁴⁴ “Haiti” *World Factbook*, Buss 5.

provided the opportunity to utilize funds to not only remedy the immediate problems of basic needs for the Haitian people, but to propose solutions and dedicate funds that will create long-term programs to stabilize Haiti and begin the process of development.⁴⁵ The earthquake is a unique opportunity to garner widespread popular support for American spending in a humanitarian crisis.

Options

Scholars, writers, government officials, and others have developed a number of proposals for how to deal with both the immediate and long-term needs of the Haitian people. It has been proposed that the Haitian government take the lead in rebuilding, yet others believe that its fragile history means that international agencies should virtually completely take over the reconstruction process. The disaster in Haiti demonstrates the overarching need to restructure the international aid regime to decrease waste and

⁴⁵ Stephanie Strom, "Haiti Crisis Prompts Fresh Talk of Pooling US Relief Money," *The New York Times* 1 Feb. 2010: A12.

corruption.⁴⁶ The opinions proposed by these scholars should be taken into account when considering options for expanding US policy toward the development of Haiti.


Role of the United States in Development



Source: USAID "USAID Food Distribution site in Petonville." <[://www.flickr.com/photos/usaid_images/4322120297/](http://www.flickr.com/photos/usaid_images/4322120297/)>.

The role of the United States in Haiti's reconstruction was heavily debated in the

⁴⁶ Clare Lockhart, "Focus on the Structure of Aid," *Foreign Policy* 19 Jan. 2010, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/19/how_to_help_haiti_rebuild?page=0,2>



weeks following the earthquake. After the earthquake, American troops took control of the international airport, becoming a more visible public presence than the Haitian government itself.⁴⁷ Some, such as Dr. Paul Farmer, founder of Partners in Health and deputy United Nation envoy, argue that our historical role in overthrowing or blockading

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Past aid has proved inadequate, or ineffective, so it is questionable what effect increased international presence or funds will have on the country.
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Haitian government has played a large role in the current trend of dysfunction

al government in the country.⁴⁸ This governmental instability has contributed to many of the ailments that Haiti faces today. The United States should, according to this school of thought, commit to a long-term


strategy developed with the Haitian government, rather than working above it. Others question the ability of the Haitian government to effectively develop and implement the necessary changes, given its history of corruption and the lack of legitimacy with the Haitian population.

Immediately following the crisis, American conservative politicians and commentators argued that the United States should not be taking as strong of a stance in the crisis, given our already extensive foreign policy commitments.⁴⁹ The United States, with costly involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan, may not have the means to engage to a great extent in another area in crisis. Past aid has proved inadequate, or ineffective, so it is questionable what effect increased international presence or funds will have on the country. William Easterly, a professor at New York University, is an advocate for the United States playing less of

⁴⁷ Lacey, "US Troops"

⁴⁸ Neil MacFarquhar, "Haiti is Again a Canvas for Approaches to Aid," *The New York Times* 30 Jan. 2010: A14.

⁴⁹ Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, "US Mulls Role in Haiti After the Crisis," *The New York Times* 17 Jan. 2010: A10.



a role in the country, stating, “[...] the whole idea of the earthquake being an opportunity for foreigners to do more aggressive interventions is really problematic and objectionable. We have tried basically everything in the book already in Haiti as far as grandiose plans, and those haven’t worked”.⁵⁰ Those in this manner of thinking promote modest, locally developed plans for reconstruction, with minimal international oversight or intervention. It must be considered whether the United States has the capacity to bring the necessary changes to Haiti’s population, either by itself or in coordination with international actors.

Multilateralism

Looking at the history of intervention both in Haiti and in other case studies of this report, it is evident that the United States will not be successful acting unilaterally. Strategy will most effectively be adopted with the consensus of all key actors, including but not

⁵⁰ MacFarquhar.

limited to the Haitian government, with mutual responsibility given to the contributing parties.⁵¹ On January 25, 2010, international donors met in Montreal to begin plans for a ten-year rebuilding commitment for Haiti.⁵² During this meeting, donor nations expressed concerns over Haiti’s historical mismanagement of aid and the government’s ability to manage such a large reconstruction project, which President Préval originally estimated will cost \$3 billion. While no detailed recovery plan was established, donors requested a comprehensive independent damage assessment, and agreed to meet again in March at the United Nations headquarters in New York to come up with a more concrete strategy.⁵³ This meeting was an important first step in the integration of international efforts to map the key priorities in reconstructing Haiti and developing a multilateral long-term development strategy.

⁵¹ Collier 9.

⁵² Marc Lacey and Ginger Thompson, "Agreement on Effort to Help Haiti Rebuild," *The New York Times* 25 Jan. 2010: A8.

⁵³ Lacey "Agreement".

Recovery Fund

Several prominent scholars, such as Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Collier, have proposed the development of a Haiti Recovery Fund.

The structure of this relief fund differs slightly between authors, but the consensus is the needs for a single, transparent multibillion-dollar recovery fund that addresses more than just immediate needs.⁵⁴

⁵⁵ This approach emphasizes the need for multilateral coordination between governments and international agencies working to aid in the reconstruction process. Currently, there are more than 10,000 NGOs working in Haiti, and therefore it is important that the efforts of these actors are harmonized instead of duplicated or complicated.⁵⁶ The

⁵⁴ Jeffrey D. Sachs, "After the earthquake, how to rebuild Haiti from scratch," *The Washington Post* 17 Jan. 2010
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/15/AR2010011502457.html>

⁵⁵ Paul Collier and Jean-Louis Warnholz, "Endow a Multibillion-Dollar Haiti Fund," *Foreign Policy* 19 Jan. 2010
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/19/how_to_help_haiti_rebuild?page=0,0>

⁵⁶ Michele Wucker, "Let Haitians Take the Lead," *Foreign Policy* 19 Jan. 2010
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/19/how_to_help_haiti_rebuild?page=0,1>

Inter-American Development Bank is seen as a possible venue for this fund, with management from the Haitian government, the United Nation, and major donors. The Inter-American Development Bank would be ideal for structuring this account, as it is already Haiti's largest development financier and is widely regarded as well run.⁵⁷ The fund would issue a single appeal to raise money, and then distribute money to organizations currently working in Haiti and community based organizations to assist in relief efforts. Sachs additionally emphasizes the long-term need for food security, encouraging the delivery of seed and fertilizer to strengthen the agricultural sector.⁵⁸ This fund is intended to be for lasting, sustainable change, and will be a means of communicating specific targets and monitoring progress toward these goals.

A model for a multi-donor fund is the reconstruction model used in Aceh, Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami, in which a single fund

⁵⁷ Sachs

⁵⁸ Sachs

distributed \$700 million to local rebuilding projects. Representatives from the World Bank and European Union, the largest donor, as well as an Indonesian representative, conducted the fund's oversight, and each were given one vote.⁵⁹ However, the major difference between the fund's success in Aceh and its implementation in Haiti is that Aceh represented a small section of a strong and wealthy Indonesian government, whereas Haiti does not have the same conditions.⁶⁰ This does not necessarily mean that a single relief fund would not be successful in Haiti, but the management structure would have to be modified to accommodate for these differences. Other models for pooled fund programs may be seen in the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Fund after Hurricane Katrina and the Disasters Emergency Committee in Britain.⁶¹ Former President Bill Clinton, the appointed UN special envoy for Haiti, has further proposed a UN sponsored

⁵⁹ MacFarquhar

⁶⁰ MacFarquhar

⁶¹ Strom

website in which donors could track where donations are being used, based upon the transparency process that worked in the tsunami area.⁶² To an extent, lessons can be taken from the successes of different relief models following the 2004 tsunami.

Institution Building and Infrastructure

Development

The importance of institution building is a frequently discussed topic in creating long-term development improvements. Authors Brinkerhoff and Garcia-Zamor argue that of the lessons learned from Third World economic development, the most important element is the need for effective institutions, which "provide the organizing framework for a country's capacity to solve its development problems."⁶³ Haiti's institutions and infrastructure need to not only be rebuilt physically, in terms of the actual structures of schools, roads, hospitals, and government

⁶² "Haiti Earthquake" *BBC News*

⁶³ Derick W. Brinkerhoff & Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, Politics, Projects, and People: Institutional Development in Haiti (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986): 3.

buildings, but also reworked from the previous inefficient and corrupt systems.⁶⁴ Institution building is difficult, as it takes a decade or more to establish fully functioning and self-sustaining institutions, and these gains will be largely undramatic and difficult to show quantifiable results.⁶⁵ Yet without these institutions, there is little chance that Haiti will experience the improvements in quality of life and governance that are necessary to raise itself out of fragility.

Before the earthquake, Haiti's institutions were characterized by a lack of trained personnel and an emphasis on top down management. Rebuilding the civil society of Haiti will need to remedy these past failures. This requires competent and honest Haitian leadership, including a legitimization of the government in the eyes of the Haitian people. With foreign aid pouring into Haiti by

the hundreds of millions, the government has not yet proved to be strong enough to harness it.⁶⁶

Education should be a key emphasis in the long-term investment into Haiti's infrastructure reconstruction. Before the earthquake, 40 percent of Haiti's youth were not in school, and of those who were, 80 percent were enrolled in private schools, paying for an education of questionable quality.⁶⁷ Because of the massive population growth in the country, the youth need to be a focus in creating policy to develop the nation. Four-fifths of Haiti's college-educated citizens reside outside of the country, and there is a large opportunity to reengage these previously dismissed expatriates.⁶⁸ According to Andrew Natsios, a professor at Georgetown University and former USAID administrator,


⁶⁴ James Dobbins, "Eight Ways to Rebuild Haiti: Skip the Graft," *The New York Times* 16 Jan. 2010: WK9.

⁶⁵ Andrew Natsios, "After Reconstruction: Rebuilding Haiti Means More Than Just Bricks and Mortar. It Means Building Institutions," *Newsweek* 22 Jan 2010.

⁶⁶ Marc Lacey and Ginger Thompson, "In Quake's Wake, Haiti Faces Leadership Void," *The New York Times* 31 Jan. 2010: A5

⁶⁷ Bernard Gwertzman, "Rebuilding Haiti: The Work of Decades. Interview with Mark Schneider," *Council on Foreign Relations* 19 Jan. 2010 <http://www.cfr.org/publication/21214/rebuilding_haiti.html>

⁶⁸ Buss 5



the most successful institution-building program used by USAID worldwide is their scholarship program, which brings 18,000 students to American universities to later return to their home countries as reformers.⁶⁹ Natsios recommends that this program be further utilized in helping Haiti erect a functioning civil society, stable economy, and legitimate government. If the need for improvements to the education system is not addressed, Haiti will most likely face continued and possibly worsening hardship in the future.

Economic stabilization and job creation will be key to a long-term recovery and development process. Economic strategy should be simple and realistic, with the attempts of stabilization to lure investment. Authors have proposed multiple areas of possibility for economic development, including most notably the expansion of the garment industry and mango exports.⁷⁰ For

⁶⁹ Natsios

⁷⁰ Collier 9

these export industries to be strengthened, it is necessary to again look at the infrastructure improvements that will need to be in place for Haiti to be competitive. Road systems need to be improved to more quickly transport items, electricity needs to be reliable and cover a larger portion of the country, and most importantly the port in Port-au-Prince needs to be run more efficiently.⁷¹ Port-au-Prince currently holds the highest cost port in the Caribbean, posing a significant detriment to the export industry. Proposals to remedy this cost inefficiency include placing the port under management contract or permitting the development of new private ports to lower costs.

In terms of job creation, the rebuilding process in Haiti should be used to provide immediate job relief in the reconstruction of infrastructure, combining two areas of need in the country. This option could enjoy both immediate results, appeasing both the Haitian people and the donors to these projects, and

⁷¹ Collier 9

long term impacts. The UN has begun a cash-for-work program already, paying roughly \$4.50 for six hours of labor to Haitians willing to provide services such as removing rubble from the streets, disposing of debris, and crushing and sorting reusable material.⁷² These efforts are a strong beginning, but job creation efforts need to be continued in some manner to include more work in the rebuilding of infrastructure and the development of effective institutions. Economic development, especially in job creation must be a consideration in developing a strategy for Haiti's reconstruction.

For all of these efforts to succeed in the long run, security in Haiti must be improved. Criminal gangs have ever-increasing power, and without the decrease in criminal activity, efforts to build lasting

⁷² "With Haiti's quake relief efforts going more smoothly, UN looks to longer-term goals," *UN News Centre* 1 Feb. 2010
<<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33641&Cr=haiti&Cr1=>>

institutions will more than likely fail.⁷³


Immediately following the earthquake, the United Nations Security Council approved sending 3,500 more peacekeeping forces and police officers to uphold public order and assist in the delivery of aid.⁷⁴ Combining these commitments with the previously in place MINUSTAH security assistance, it is difficult to know whether or not security will be adequate for the relief efforts and reconstruction process to develop. Security must be a focal point in the international strategy to rebuild, yet it may be too soon to know what additional resources will be needed to enforce order and eventually transition the Haiti police force into a self-sustaining, legitimate and trustworthy security entity.

Community Driven Development

In establishing the background of inconsistent foreign intervention and distrust of the Haitian government, it becomes evident

⁷³ Natsios

⁷⁴ Lacey, "US Troops"



there must be consideration given to community driven development rather than a top-down approach. Haitian peasants have not historically had a stable institutional manner of conveying their political interests or economic needs.⁷⁵ A community based approach to project development gives this previously voiceless group with the means to create projects to respond to the issues they see as most important. The World Bank began a project in January 2004 entitled the Community-Driven Development Project (CDD), or known in Haiti as PRODEP.⁷⁶ The CDD is a five-year, US\$38.6 million, since extended until 2014, aimed at strengthening community-based organizations by promoting the local planning and development of projects and allocation of public resources.⁷⁷ This project assumes that sustainable development is best achieved through local involvement and ownership, with priorities in

projects that focus on infrastructure development, and projects of a social nature, such as cultural centers and school construction.⁷⁸ Supporting the funding of local community organizations in poor rural communities allows for greater access to basic infrastructure, small-scale financing of income-generating activities, and the building of social capital through increased participation in the decision making process⁷⁹. It is necessary to include individual contractors to provide technical assistance and incremental management of the projects to the community based organizations.⁸⁰ In the aftermath of the earthquake, donors should again focus on these objectives in community driven projects, as they will be the most effective in generating lasting solutions to the deeper problems.

⁷⁵ Brinkerhoff 103.

⁷⁶ “Community Driven Development” *The World Bank* 14 Jul. 2008 <<http://go.worldbank.org/3A71L91KH0>>

⁷⁷ “Community Driven Development”

⁷⁸ “Community Driven Development”

⁷⁹ “Project Details: Community-Driven Development (CDD) Additional Financing” *The World Bank* 9 Jun. 2009.

<<http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=64290415&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P114775>>

⁸⁰ “Project Details”



Recommendations

International actors need to first provide and restore the basic services needed for survival in Haiti, but donors must soon shift focus to lasting improvements for the country. The focus of rebuilding the country should be placed on strengthening infrastructure and institutions, promoting economic development, and incorporating local actors into project development.


Programs must be developed on the basis of sustainability and the ability of the project to significantly alleviate the problems facing the Haitian population. The most effective way to coordinate the funds coming into Haiti is the development of a Haitian Relief Fund, organizing community-based projects with the aim of developing infrastructure, and building lasting governmental and economic institutions to stabilize the country.

International donors need to work in a cooperative and efficient fashion through the development of a single recovery fund

managed by members appointed by both the Haitian government and the largest donors.

Aid coordination in the relief effort must be a priority to avoid a situation where a large number of donors are distributing funds and organizing projects independently through hundreds of different organizations. It is important that this coordination happens both between donors themselves and between donors and the Haitian government. The contents of this relief fund should be directed towards community-run development projects, especially in the rural sector.

Infrastructure needs to be not only rebuilt, but also reconfigured to better suit the needs of the Haitian population. This fund should be organized by a board, including members appointed by President Préval, the UN secretary general, and major donors such as the United States government. The board will manage the development and execution of plans for the funds in the Inter-American Development Bank account, in which all




donors can deposit aid. Projects developed out of this recovery fund should first focus on emergency relief efforts, but need to quickly shift to reconstruction and development projects at the community level. In focusing on local, community-driven efforts, a focus may be placed on the rehabilitation of basic socio-economic infrastructure, as well as productive financing of income generating investment opportunities. A single recovery fund would ensure full transparency in tracking of funds to ensure a greater accountability in the use of aid.

Reconstruction projects should focus on providing jobs for Haitians in building what was destroyed in the earthquake and further infrastructure that the country was in need of before the natural disaster. Other possible areas of economic opportunity, such as the mango and garment industries, need to be explored and made more competitive on the global market by decreasing unnecessary cost inefficiencies. The government of Haiti

should serve as the front of the international effort to reconstruct the country, yet there needs to be a high degree of transparency and tracking of funds, as remedied by the single recovery account. Aid programs need built in performance assessment and evaluation elements to maintain a sense of accountability.⁸¹ These performance assessments must be done by an independent agency that will publish detailed information about both the successes and failures of projects, so as to learn from the consequences, both positive and negative, of each program.

The most important recommendation is that whatever strategy is developed, the United States must make a reasonable and lasting commitment to Haiti. Extreme fluctuations in international support and intervention have hurt Haiti's chances for development in the past, and the international community should make a dedicated effort to extend development past the period of initial rebuilding projects. The relief fund would be

⁸¹ Buss 150



an ideal manner to make this commitment, and the United States needs to take the lead in the follow-through of its implementation. The Haitian people and government need to be involved and see progress both in the short-term immediate relief and in real, lasting development. A single recovery fund provides a comprehensive solution that encompasses many of the principles covered in this report.

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Somalia

A Failed State with a Glimpse of Hope

Angelissa Savino

Introduction


With recent reports appearing in mainstream media of terrorist threats, humanitarian crisis, and piracy problems, Somalia is once again becoming a top priority of international policy makers. Somalia is considered a failed state by almost any recent development report and has remained in that category for over ten years. Its failure has caused thousands of deaths, the displacement of 1.8 million Somalis, and made 3.2 million dependent on food aid.¹ We have strategic interests in the region which include fears it will become a safe-haven for terrorist organizations, the emergence of aggressive piracy disrupting economic activity, and the many Somali lives that are being compromised.

Past United States interventions have consisted of failed military ventures,

¹United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. *Developing a coordinated and sustainable strategy for Somalia : hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, May 20, 2009*. Washington: U.S. G.P.O

humanitarian missions, and joint aid efforts with international organizations. The Obama administration has been handed this deteriorating situation and it must create a comprehensive policy to address the shortcomings of past strategies in a timely manner. To do so, we must draw on lessons learned from the past while utilizing successful tactics from interventions in other failed states.

The following case study will survey a history of the formation and demise of the centralized government of Somalia, touch on past US involvement, review US interests in the region, and present varying options for policy makers to consider. Lastly, it will recommend that policy makers collaborate with the international community, work with local communities to invest resources into training young Somalis for work, channel food aid through the central government, initiate inter-clan conflict resolution methods,



of their clan-loyalties through a number of social programs.³ Despite his temporary success in unifying the country, a series of droughts, multiple human rights abuses that earned him one “of the worst human rights records in Africa” by the United Nations, and surfacing clan disputes ultimately ended his rule in 1991.⁴ (See Figure 1 for overview of geographical clan composition.)

The country plunged into a civil war from which it has never fully recovered. Clan identities were amplified because of competition for power, extreme Islamist groups were formed, and Mogadishu became a prime target of conflict.

Battle of Mogadishu

³ One such program that Barre instituted was outlawing people asking each other which clan they belonged to. He even outlawed the question of which “ex-clan” you belonged to because it revealed prior identity. Barre also established a standardized written language that he forced the population to use. International Crisis Group. *Somalia : to move beyond the failed state*. Nairobi; Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2008. <http://worldcat.org>. Web.

⁴ UNHCR | Refworld | USCIRF Annual Report 2009 - The Commission's Watch List: Somalia , , 2/23/2010 2010 <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,USCIRF,,4a4f272bc,0.html>>.

The persistent fighting and a timely drought caused the agricultural lands to be destroyed and a famine swept throughout the country.⁵ Pictures flooded into the western world capturing the attention of the public and politicians alike.

In August of 1992, the UN Security Council

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The country plunged into a civil war from which it has never fully recovered.
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decided to take action and began Operation Provide Relief to bring food and medical aid to Somalia.⁶ To their dismay, the UN groups transporting the food were frequently looted and an estimated 80% of all food was stolen by warlords and sold to other countries to raise revenue to buy weapons.⁷ The UN called on the international community to provide military relief and President George Bush made the decision to commit 25,000 US

⁵ Frontline: ambush in Mogadishu: readings: the lessons of Somalia - not everything went wrong , , 2/24/2010 2010 <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/lessons.html>>.

⁶ Frontline: ambush in Mogadishu: readings: the lessons of Somalia - not everything went wrong, see interview with Senator Lugar

⁷ Ibid, see interview with Walter Clarke

soldiers to enable food to be delivered and distributed appropriately.⁸ He had hoped the troops would be out by Clinton's inauguration two month time following.

By the following May 1993, Clinton was finally able to scale troops down to 4,200 as UN officials replaced US soldiers.⁹ The UN officials were less politically attuned to the area and a miscalculation caused the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers. Wanting to send a strong signal that violence against UN forces was not acceptable, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) declared that whoever was responsible for the deaths was now considered enemies of the UN forces. The “enemy” was General Mohamed Farrah Aidid who had led the coup that forced Barre out of power and was seen as a hero to many Somalis. The United States had worked closely with Aidid while they were in command to establish some type of agreement to restore order.


⁸ Ibid, see chronology and interview with Ambassador Oakley

⁹ Ibid

However, with a \$25,000 bounty on his head, Aidid began attacking UN forces and gaining support of Somali clans by convincing them that the foreigners were trying to control the country.¹⁰ US soldiers in Somalia were then ordered to find Aidid. 17 US soldiers were killed, one captured, and pictures of Somalis dragging lifeless US soldiers through the streets streamed onto US televisions. Clinton responded by promising the American people that all troops would be out of the country within 5 months and started scaling back US presence. By the spring of 1995, all UN troops had exited and the mission was seen as a failed attempt to bring humanitarian aid to the country.

The horror of seeing US soldiers being dragged through the streets by those they were trying to protect remained in the minds of the Clinton administration as they decided to abstain from intervening during the Rwandan genocide and adopted a policy that hesitated to enter humanitarian ventures. This

¹⁰ Ibid, see interview with Ambassador Oakley



event also taught US foreign policy makers a few key lessons.

One of the lessons is that it is important to maintain as much peaceful dialogue as possible with warring parties. Before the US started scaling back troops, US Ambassador Oakley was meeting with affiliates of General Aidid on a daily basis and making diplomatic progress.¹¹ However, after the incident with the Pakistani soldiers, the UNSC's proceeding declaration towards Aidid stopped this dialogue and resulted in a very costly battle. If the UN peacekeepers had maintained dialogue with Aidid and not provoked him, this battle may have been avoided.

Another lesson learned from this incident is that it is imperative to maintain clear communication amongst actors. The catalyst incident involving the Pakistani soldiers could have been avoided if the US had clearly communicated to the UN officials

the means by which they were creating successful dialogue and maintaining peace so that the UN officials could follow their footsteps. Instead, the UN peacekeepers were much more hostile, less diplomatic, and this ultimately caused the clash which killed the Pakistani soldiers.

A third lesson that can be learned from the Battle of Mogadishu is that although time tables can be successful to ensure interventions do not turn into lengthy occupations, they must also allow a sufficient amount of time to achieve authentic security. Because the Clinton administration pulled out troops prematurely in response to the clash, much progress was lost and the US left the country in only a mildly better condition than when it had arrived. If the presence of American troops had been slowly scaled back, much of the progress made may have been preserved.

¹¹ Frontline: ambush in Mogadishu: readings: the lessons of Somalia - not everything went wrong, see interview with Ambassador Oakley

Transitional Federal Government

After the Battle of Mogadishu, the following years were spotted with several failed ventures by various clan leaders to form a central government. In 2004 they finally achieved the largest success in the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). It failed to bring complete stability to Somalia and fostered extreme corruption and anarchy. A loose coalition of clans then formed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and overthrew the TFG in Mogadishu and Southern Somalia. The group of moderate and extreme Muslims created a Sharia court system and was backed by a strong military branch the al-Shabaab.¹² With the help of the United States and Ethiopia, the TFG eventually reclaimed territory from the ICU

¹² Somalia is predominantly Muslim but is known to hold a much more moderate view of Islam. Many Somalis supported the ICU mainly because it was the only governing body since 1991 that was able to establish even a nominal sense of order. International Crisis Group.

and incorporated the more moderate ICU clans into the TFG government.¹³

In the beginning of 2009, the Transitional Federal Government elected a new set of politicians during a meeting in neighboring Djibouti and moved back to Mogadishu. A former leader of a more moderate branch of the ICU, Sheik Sharif, was elected President. Although Sharif declared Somalia an officially Muslim state under Sharia law, the former military wing of the ICU, al-Shabaab, countered by saying the TFG was too secular and declared its own goal to “oppose the TFG and turn Somalia into an Islamic state.”¹⁴ Since then, it has continued to engage in heavy fighting in Mogadishu and surrounding regions against the TFG. The al-Shabaab is the biggest threat

¹³ A major concern of Somalis was the presence of Ethiopian troops in their country. Al-Shabaab capitalized on this and is waging a campaign against foreign troops.

UNHCR / Refworld / USCIRF Annual Report 2009 - The Commission's Watch List: Somalia

¹⁴It is believed that Sheik will impose a less strict version of Sharia law which explains the al-Shabaab's intense opposition. *UNHCR / Refworld / USCIRF Annual Report 2009 - The Commission's Watch List: Somalia*

to the success of the TFG in establishing law and order in Somalia.

Somaliland

Somaliland consists of northern Somalia and was under British rule from 1884 until 1960 when it gained its independence. At this time it joined the Italian Somalia, present day Somalia excluding Somaliland and the region of Soog and Sanaal, and formed the Somali Republic. In 1991 when the country collapsed, Somaliland formed a congress and unilaterally “withdrew from the Union with Somalia to reinstate Somaliland’s sovereignty.”¹⁵ It has a fully functioning military, currency, education ministry, economic ministry, and foreign relations ministry. It is a successful state in comparison to the rest of Somalia and is seeking international recognition as a country.

Somaliland’s success should be seen as a source of hope for national reconciliation in Somalia. If Somaliland clans and citizens

are able to unite for the purpose of stability and form a parliamentary political system, the entire state can follow its example.

Puntland

The region of Puntland, including Bari, Nugaal, and Mudug, attempted to gain some autonomy from Mogadishu when it became apparent the TFG would fail.¹⁶ The leaders of the Puntland clans created a political system modeled after the United States with the exception that there is only one legislative making body; the House of Representatives. Citizens vote for their representatives in each region ensuring representation for all clans.

A new President, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud, was recently elected president in January of 2009. The proceeding transition of power was relatively peaceful, prompting one American observer, Michael Weinstein, to declare, “the success of the Puntland elections can begin to provide a

¹⁵ Puntland State Of Somalia , 4 Feb. 2010. <http://www.puntlandgovt.com/en/currentissues/information/further_information_add.php?id=61>.

¹⁶ *Puntland State Of Somalia*

model for the whole of Somalia. It actually worked.”¹⁷ Puntland is also working to provide its citizens with better health care, education, and benefits from working with multinational corporations. Puntland is rich with natural resources including oil and seafood and has a thriving livestock industry.¹⁸ In 2006, it also laid the foundation of the Bosaso International Airport, which is seen as a significant development venture.¹⁹

Unlike Somaliland, President Mohamud’s goal is to keep Puntland as a part of the Somali Union.²⁰ He stepped down from his previous government position because a decision was made to sign a contract without the approval of the central TFG. The President believes that although Puntland is relatively independent from Mogadishu, it is still part of the country and must have the TFG’s approval in international policies and

¹⁷ New Puntland President Faces Stiff Challenges News, 2/24/2010 2010
<<http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-01-15-voa51-68809987.html>>.

¹⁸ Puntland State Of Somalia

¹⁹ Puntland State Of Somalia


²⁰ New Puntland President Faces Stiff Challenges News, 2/24/2010

business contracts. It is also attempting to remain a part of the deliberation process in Djibouti to ensure it is given adequate representation in the central government.

The success of Puntland is attributed to the painstaking process of mediation, reconciliation, and negotiation amongst clan leaders. Like Somaliland, it serves as a beacon of hope to the Somali people and the TFG that peace and security can be established. For this peace to be secured the United States must be willing to invest more time and resources into the country. To receive funding from Congress, we must recognize our strategic interests in the country, to which we will now turn.

US Interests

The United States has invested billions of dollars and varying military and peacekeeping forces in the Horn of Africa because it is in our strategic interest for Somalia to rebuild and become a fully



functioning state.²¹ Our interest in this small country half way around the world rests on several aspects.

A prominent issue that motivated the first invasion during the Bush and Clinton administrations was the humanitarian concerns that arose from the thousands of Somalis being abused, displaced, and killed.²² Desperate faces were painted across western media screens and in the midst of sending donations, citizens contacted members of Congress who became allies to the Somali population and prompted our intervention. As these incidences of rape, torture, and starvation steadily continue to flow out of the country, the humanitarian concern also continues to be a motivating factor to investing resources into the region.

Additionally, Somalia is now a prime candidate to become a safe haven for terrorist

²¹ United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs.

²² Frontline: Ambush in Mogadishu: Readings: the lessons of Somalia - not everything went wrong , 2/24/2010 2010
<<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/lessons.html>>.,


organizations, mainly Al-Qaeda. This was thought unlikely until 2008 when videos were released by Saleh al-Nabhan, an East African al-Qaeda operative, “inviting foreigners to travel there for training.”²³ Al-Shabaab officially announced that it is aligning with Al-Qaeda’s global jihad this February.²⁴ US intelligence has confirmed foreign fighters in the region for some time but a public commitment to Al-Qaeda confirms the fear that militant Islamist groups in Somalia have expanded their goals from a national movement to a global focus. Because it is such a lawless area, Al-Qaeda would thrive and could possibly use it as a permanent location for its activities. This elevates the importance of stability in Somalia.

The United States also has national interest in the area because of increased piracy activity originating from Somalia.

There were over 200 occurrences of piracy in

²³United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs.

²⁴ Mohammed Ibrahim, : . New York Times Online. 8 Feb. 2010.



2009 that cost \$60 million.^{25,26} This concern is aggravated by recent surveys that 70 percent of Somalis "strongly supported the piracy as a form of national defense of the country's territorial waters."²⁷ This is because Asian and European countries are dumping

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If Somalia continues in this perpetual state of failure, it also poses a threat to the entire Horn of Africa.

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toxic waste on Somali shores and reaping huge benefits from fishing off

uncontaminated sections of their shores.²⁸ Although the international community is attempting to create solutions to stop the piracy, the Somali government needs to be

strengthened so that it can effectively bring these pirates to justice once they are on land with the hope of deterring future crimes.

. Somali refugees are fleeing the country and adding stress to their neighbors' already waning budgets. Additionally, unemployed refugees can also fall prey to insurgent groups in need of members that can further exacerbate domestic skirmishes in other countries. The threat to regional stability is particularly relevant because of strong clan-identities that make citizens more loyal to their clan than country, inviting the possibility for neighboring rebel groups to set up camp in Somalia across the border from their home state.²⁹

In particular, Ethiopia is a major point of contention. Ethiopia sees instability in Somalia as a threat because it could be used as a safe haven for Ethiopian insurgent groups. Additionally, direct Ethiopian involvement was characterized in the past by

²⁵AfricaNews - Pirates made \$60m in 2009: report - The AfricaNews articles of Muhyadin , , 2/24/2010 2010 <[http://www.africanews.com/site/list_message/25349?data\[source\]=rss](http://www.africanews.com/site/list_message/25349?data[source]=rss)>.

²⁶EU welcomes China's support against Somalia piracy | DefenceWeb , , 2/8/2010 2010 <http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6418:eu-welcomes-chinas-support-against-somalia-piracy&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106>.

²⁷Joann Hari and Johann Hari. *God Save the Queen: Monarchy and the Truth About the Windsors* . Totem Booksrefworks; ISBNDB.Com. Web.

²⁸Barack Obama's Afghan vision can work for Somalia -Times Online , 2/24/2010 2010 <<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article6944962.ece>>

²⁹United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs.

Somali extremist groups as an attempt to Christianize the Somalis and force them to renounce their Islamic faith because Ethiopia has a Christian government. A stable Somalia would decrease tensions on the Ethiopian border.


Options

After examining our interests in the region, we will now turn to our options for action. Because we have linked the Somali insurgents with Al-Qaeda terrorists, it is likely that we will have access to a substantial amount of funds through Congress, and a sizeable military force. Contributions of peacekeeping forces and aid are being provided by the African Union, United Nations, and neighboring countries. These multiple sources of aid mean we have adequate resources to embark on any course of action, but that we are still in search of an effective strategy to employ these resources.

Any proposal must recognize the importance of clan affiliations. Policies

should not attempt to undermine clan-loyalties but instead capitalize upon them to create a space that has nominal governance. Our actions would include facilitating meetings and encouraging leaders to uphold agreements. This is how the Somaliland and Puntland governments were formed as well as the standing TFG. Skeptics may argue this is futile, but with cautious politics it is more than feasible.

We could also begin funneling aid through more formal government ties instead of non-governmental organization (NGO) camps on the ground. This would strengthen the legitimacy of the governing bodies in the eyes of Somalis because they will be going to the government for aid as opposed to western NGOs. Although NGOs are making progress on the ground, they can undermine the government by causing citizens to become dependent on them. NGOs are only temporary solutions, whereas the government is a more permanent solution.



The current Somali President, Omar Sharmarke, has argued that some key policy recommendations be implemented in Somalia. These include training security forces, enforcing Somalia's rights over natural resources including oil and fishing, and “ launching a large- scale civil affairs programme [sic] to train our young people and establish legitimate commercial livelihoods.”³⁰ The last of these recommendations, to train the young people, is especially important in Somalia. Unemployed Somalis are targeted by insurgents to join their militias in exchange for basic necessities such as food and shelter. With minimal training these individuals could be contributing to the legitimate economy helping to bring stability as opposed to contributing to the breakdown of normalcy.

Concerning Puntland and Somaliland, there are different possibilities for how these

two areas will be incorporated into Somalia. Both have the option of becoming autonomous countries, states as part of a federal Somalia, or being wholly integrated into a pre-1991 Somali State. Before a decision is made concerning these regions, special attentions should be paid to the desires of the citizenry and leaders in the regions.

Another option to explore is engaging in dialogue with the leaders of al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups. Given that Al-Shabaab has aligned itself with the global jihad against the west, encouraging diplomatic efforts would be particularly challenging. In the current state of affairs, it does not appear to be feasible to engage with the core of this group of militants because they have declared war on the TFG. As the conflict progresses this may change and the TFG should be flexible and willing to work with them if afforded the opportunity. The US should encourage the TFG to continue to

³⁰ Barack Obama's Afghan vision can work for Somalia -Times Online , 2/24/2010 2010
<<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article6944962.ece>>

invite other insurgent groups to participate in dialogue and ultimately a unified government.

Recommendations

The state of Somalia has been in disarray since the fall of Barre's dictatorship.

Since then, the situation has deteriorated in Mogadishu where warring parties are still fighting for power. A solution to

the different issues facing the state are not easily defined, solved, or executed. However, there are some recommendations that the Obama administration should utilize in making policy decisions concerning Somalia.

Regional


To begin, the conflict in Somalia must not be viewed as an isolated incident. These countries are bearing the burden of thousands of refugees crossing their borders. Any comprehensive plan must include compensation for these countries as they attempt to care for the Somali refugees. Also,

past conflict with Ethiopia must be taken into consideration because there is deep mistrust between Ethiopia and the Somali people. A successful strategy will secure the border between the two countries. This will reassure the Ethiopian government that it does not need to engage in military ventures to secure itself and the Somali people that Ethiopian forces will not be allowed to intervene.

Time-sensitive

As discussed above, Somalia has taken steps to successfully bring stability in certain regions but we must make a long term commitment to aiding it in establishing complete order. Any direct involvement should be primarily aid. The US must give the TFG long-term commitments to give them the assurance that they can move forward in other areas knowing that their population will be fed. When Congress grants the quantity and type of aid for Somalia, it should be

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**The political disarray
in Somalia is
affecting neighboring
Ethiopia, Djibouti,
and Kenya.**
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accompanied with a comprehensive timeline, but any time-sensitive plan must be flexible to account for daily developments on the ground. This will prevent premature withdrawal of troops and/or aid and ensure that US interventions do not turn into physical or material occupations.

Recognition of Local Situation

Although it is painful to hear reports and see pictures of suffering Somalis, we must resist the urge to over-engage and escalate the problem with the presence of foreign troops. Any US involvement must have the complete support of the TFG. We must also be willing to work with the local governing bodies and be ready to engage in dialogue and support the different clans that have been successful in establishing order. These clans are the basis of identity for many Somalis and they should be encouraged to continue and maintain dialogue with one another. This could include offering economic incentives for clans that communicating with

the TFG and local governments, and those that are showing commitment towards diplomatic resolutions.

Another local issue that policies must be sensitive to is the fact that many young Somalis do not have means to provide for themselves and their families. As mentioned above, it is imperative that adequate foreign aid be committed to training and educating this sector of the population to empower them to contribute to local, legal economies, and care for themselves. Without this essential component, they will fall prey to the incentives of insurgent groups and only exacerbate the situation.

International Collaboration

The US must also collaborate with international and regional bodies, predominantly the United Nations and African Union. These organizations have similar goals to the United States and have made vast contributions as stated above. To ignore this fact would be to ignore our allies

and forfeit the opportunity to share the burden of providing resources and servicemen to the area.

Working with the international community should involve a renewed commitment to protecting the Somali coastline from being exploited by other countries. This would allow the Somali fishermen to once again use their natural resources to make a living and renew their ability to utilize one of their most valuable natural resources; seafood. This could also help alleviate the piracy problem as fishermen are able to make a living off of fishing as opposed to capturing foreign ships.

Multi-state solution


A more specific recommendation is that the US should encourage the TFG to grant Somaliland independence without the inclusion of the Sanaal and Soog regions.³¹ This involves mutual sacrifice for both parties

³¹These two regions are disputed because the original British territory of Somaliland included these regions, but the Italian Somalia also included them. Somaliland a way out of the electoral crisis, 2009, International Crisis Group.

since the greater Somalia will be losing their northern part, and Somaliland will be surrendering their claim on two regions that they believe are rightfully theirs. The importance of this recommendation is that it limits the conflict to a smaller area and rewards the success of regional government. Somaliland is already well established and any attempt to incorporate it back into the rest of Somalia is sure to bring conflict. Somaliland citizens who have enjoyed peace may fear that committing them to the rest of the country will welcome conflict back in their region. Somaliland citizens have labored to secure peace, and the United States and the international community should support this collaboration, not discourage it by forcing it to reunite with the rest of the country.

Conclusion

Somalia has been an unsuccessful state for over twenty years and has a complex history, political makeup, and cultural characteristics. As the Obama administration



reviews comprehensive policy recommendations for failed states, Somalia should always be included in the discussion and hopefully used as a case study to recommend or deter specific policies from being applied. Although currently a failed state, Puntland and Somaliland offer glimpses of hope that Somalia could be rising above its failed status and the United States of American should contribute to that progress.

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G.P.O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 2009. Web. <<http://worldcat.org>>.

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Democratic Republic of Congo

Ongoing Violence Calls for a New Approach

Rachelle French

Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is at the bottom of the parabola of state failure due to ongoing violence and the inability of the central government to expel the rebel groups that control portions of the country. Years of governance by an infamous dictatorship and two successive wars have caused the state to fail; ongoing violence indicates that it has yet to recover. The situation in the DRC is unique because the conflict there is linked to and in many ways propagated by its neighbors. Thus, the DRC is a good example of where a thorough understanding of regional dynamics and an incorporation of regional actors should be a key component of US strategy in the DRC. The crucial ties between the Congo's civil wars and its neighbors have caused some to argue that the conflicts on DRC soil have not been 'civil' wars, as much as they have been

the playing out of neighbor countries' conflicts on Congolese soil.¹

Also unique to the DRC is its vast natural resource wealth. It has prolonged the conflicts by allowing the development of a profitable and sustainable war economy. US policy toward the DRC should integrate the imminent need to wrest control of these resources from warring factions and funnel this revenue to the central government for infrastructure building and the provision of social goods for the Congolese.

Issue

An estimated 5.4 million people have died since 1998 as a result of the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.² Despite international aid and the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world (MONUC), the DRC remains fraught with

¹ Thomas Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality* (London: Zed Books, 2007) 8.

² Benjamin Coghlan, et al. "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis," *International Rescue Committee* (2007), 16.

violence.³ Portions of the country, particularly North and South Kivu, continue to be occupied by militia groups.⁴ Recently the Congolese government has stepped up its efforts to eliminate these rebel groups, resulting in over 100,000 displaced civilians fleeing the violence in recent months.⁵ This has prompted the UN to extend MONUC's peacekeeping mandate until May 31, 2010, pending further evaluation of effective tactics for civilian protection.⁶ As a result the DRC earned fifth place on the list of most failed state in Foreign Policy Magazine's Failed State Index – an improvement from its second place ranking in 2006 but a regression from

³ Danielle Beswick, "The Challenge of Warlordism to Post-Conflict State-Building: The Case of Laurent Nkunda in Eastern Congo," *Round Table* 98.402 (2009): 334.

⁴ "Background Note: Democratic Republic of Congo (01/10)," *U.S. Department of State*, Web, 26 Jan. 2010 <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm>>.

⁵ "UN assisting thousands uprooted by insecurity in eastern DR Congo," *UN News Service*, 26 January 2010, English ed. Web.

⁶ United Nations. Security Council. *Resolution 1906 (2009): Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo until 31 May 2010*. New York: United Nations, 2009. Web.

seventh in 2007 due to a resurgence in violence.⁷

Background

Throughout modern history the region that makes up today's Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) has been riddled with violence, inaugurated when King Leopold of Belgium declared it his personal protectorate in 1885.⁸ Leopold's Congo was marked by such brutality that it is known as "Congo's genocide." Anywhere from five to eight million Congolese lives were lost through brutal enslavement of the local people for resource extraction.⁹ This was the first instance of a recurring problem for Congo – foreign intervention out of a desire to access Congo's wealth of natural resources.

The DRC is extremely wealthy in natural

⁷ "2009 Failed States Index - Interactive Map and Rankings | Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy - the global magazine of economics, politics, and ideas*. Web. 19 Jan. 2010. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings>.

⁸ Ch. Didier Gondola, *The History of Congo*, (Greenwood Press: Connecticut, 2002) xxiii.

⁹ *Ibid.* 60

resources, which include diamonds, gold, oil, copper, cobalt, coltan and timber.¹⁰


The DRC gained its independence from Belgium in 1960. In 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko came to power by military coup

following the assassination of democratically elected nationalist Patrice Lumumba (supported by Belgian secret service and the CIA due to Lumumba's perceived sympathies with the Soviet Union).¹¹ Mobutu

was able to remain in power from 1965-1997, during which time both the Congolese people and the economy

suffered greatly. Mobutu was infamous for

using the national treasury as his personal bank account, and records from 1992 show that Mobutu designated 95% of the national budget for his own purposes.¹² As a result of his kleptocratic practices, the Congolese




Source: "Democratic Republic of Congo." Map. US Central Intelligence Agency. University of Texas Libraries. 22 Feb. 2010 <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/congo_demrep_pol98.jp>.

economy declined leaving the per capita GDP in 2000 at approximately one third what it

¹⁰ Theodore Trefon, Van Hoyweghen Saskia, and Stefaan Smis, "Editorial: State Failure in the Congo: Perceptions & Realities," *Review of African Political Economy* 29.93/94, State Failure in the Congo: Perceptions and Realities (Le Congo entre Crise et Régénération) (2002): 381.

¹¹ Gondola, 126-127

¹² Pierre Englebert, "Life Support or Assisted Suicide? Dilemmas of US policy toward the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Low-Income Poorly Performing States and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Brookings Institute Press, 2005) 4.



was in 1960. Mobutu was able to stay in power by playing both regional and Cold War politics to his advantage, garnering continued US support (both monetary and military) by

purposeful encouragement of anarchy through the halting of payment to soldiers.¹⁴ Unpaid soldiers began violently rioting and looting.

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“The five year ‘civil war’ that followed has colloquially called “Africa’s world war” ...It was the deadliest conflict since World War II, with an estimated death toll of 3.3 million people.”
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promoting his regime as a “stalwart of anti-communism.”¹³

Breakdown of the state and the First Congo War

When the

Cold War ended,

western aid to Mobutu quickly dried up and the dictator came under increasing pressure both domestically and internationally to hold democratic elections. In 1990, he finally conceded to hold elections and transition into democratic state structures. In actuality, however, he was determined to retain power at all costs, as demonstrated by his brutal repression of anti-Mobutu student protests at the University of Lubumbashi and his

In 1994, civil war broke out in Rwanda that resulted in the genocide of 1 millions Tutsis and moderate Hutus by more radical Hutus.¹⁵ This violence spilled over into eastern Zaire as first refugees and then, fearing reprisal, the Hutu militiamen responsible for the genocide took refuge there. Of the 1.2 million Hutu refugees that fled into eastern Zaire, as many as 100,000 belonged to the armed *interahamwe* militias.¹⁶ This massive influx of armed refugees further destabilized the Zairian state and amplified existing ethnic differences.¹⁷ The complex interactions between these indigenous ethnic groups and their Rwandan counterparts

¹³ Englebert 2-7

¹⁴ Gondola 157; Michael Nest, Francois Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of Congo (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006) 9.

¹⁵ Nest 20

¹⁶ René Lemarchand, *The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Collapse to Potential Reconstruction*, Occasional Paper (Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2001) 15.

¹⁷ Ibid. 159

provoked, and continue to provoke, violence in eastern DRC. The disconnect between Kinshasa and its remote provinces prompted William Reno, an expert on the region, to write in 1998, “Kivu in the east has closer contact with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda than with most of Zaire.”¹⁸

Mobutu’s inability to reassert central control over eastern Zaire proved fatal, as clashes between rival ethnic militias engulfed the region and insecurity spread. By 1996, Rwandan backed rebel group AFDL (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre) was marching on Kinshasa. With support from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and the US for the rebel group, the state of Zaire finally collapsed in 1997. The AFDL took control of the country, renamed it the Democratic Republic of Congo, and instated their leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila as

president.¹⁹ However, it quickly became clear that Kabila had no interest in restarting the democratization process and there was a sense of “Mobutuism without Mobutu” that stoked discontent domestically and internationally.²⁰

The Second Congo War: “Africa’s World War”

In August 2008, the second Congolese war began when Kabila’s expulsion of Rwandan military officers finally provoked action against him. Rwanda and Uganda backed an anti-Kabila uprising, in response to which Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia sent troops to defend Kinshasa. The five-year ‘civil war’ that followed has colloquially been called “Africa’s world war” because five of its neighbors were involved – Rwanda and Uganda in support of rebel groups and Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe in support of the

¹⁸ William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) 150.

¹⁹ Gondola 160; "BBC News - Democratic Republic of Congo country profile," *BBC NEWS / News Front Page*, Web, 3 Feb. 2010 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1076399.stm>.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 163; 167

central government.²¹ It was the deadliest conflict since World War II, with an estimated death toll of 3.3 million people.²²

This conflict speaks to the regional dynamics at play in the DRC's failure. The regional complexity can be seen in the shared ethnicities across state lines and in the development of a regional war economy that financed many of the fighting groups. There has been documented evidence that neighboring countries have used the ongoing conflict as a means to access the country's vast mineral wealth and may have gone so far as to provoke and prolong conflict for this reason.²³ Although most would agree that the Congo wars did not erupt solely out of economic interests, the war economy

²¹ "BBC News - Democratic Republic of Congo country profile," *BBC NEWS / News Front Page*, Web, 3 Feb. 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1076399.stm>.

²² Les, Roberts. "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide Survey." *International Rescue Committee* (2003).

²³ United Nations. Security Council. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. United Nations, 2001.

certainly funded and prolonged the conflicts.²⁴ In 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard and his son Joseph Kabila took over the presidency. A peace deal between the Kinshasa government, Uganda, Rwanda and the predominant rebel groups in 2002 formally ended the conflict, and was followed by an interim government period and democratic elections in July of 2006.²⁵ Despite these formal peace agreements, violence is an enduring problem in the DRC and the central government continues to struggle to exercise authority in the East Kivu provinces.

US Interests

Due to its size, location, and resource wealth, the DRC could play a strong role in Central African regional stability. For this reason, it is in US interest to formulate and implement a strategy that will finally end violence in the DRC and allow for a stable

²⁴ Nest 31

²⁵ "BBC NEWS | Africa | Country profiles | Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo." *BBC NEWS / News Front Page*. Web. 10 Feb. 2010.
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1072684.stm>>.

state. Conversely, if action is not taken, the humanitarian crisis will continue and the already fragile Congolese government could collapse.

National Security

Uncontrolled territory, such as the eastern territories, poses a national security threat for the United States by providing a haven from which terrorist groups can operate. This can be seen in countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia. In Somalia, these rogue actors have gained international recognition through their acts of piracy, which both endanger lives and impose a considerable economic cost to their victims.²⁶ In the DRC, the development of anti-western terrorist groups would prove dire. Among its many rich natural resources, the DRC is also home to a substantial supply of uranium, the same supply that was used in making the

²⁶ Raymond Gilpin, *Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy*, Working paper (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2009) 12.

bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.²⁷

This could become a major challenge to the US's nuclear non-dissemination efforts if left unregulated. The US government has already noted this threat; allegations have been made against Iraq (under Saddam Hussein) and Iran that they were seeking to acquire uranium from within the DRC.²⁸ There is valid cause for concern. Not only does the DRC provide uncontrolled territory and uranium, but polls also show that the USA is relatively unpopular among the Congolese, further magnifying the risk of the DRC becoming a base for anti-American terrorism. Since 1996, the USA has consistently placed within the top three least popular countries among the Congolese, according to public opinion polls.²⁹ This is largely due to allegations by the Congolese that the US assisted Rwanda in its 1998 invasion of the DRC and has since

²⁷ "DR Congo 'uranium ring smashed'" *BBC News*. 8 Mar. 2007.

²⁸ United States. Cong. House. *Declassified Excerpts from October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq*. By Peter T. King. H. Congressional Record.

²⁹ Englebert 22

been supporting a state partition that would benefit Rwanda.³⁰

National Economy

US interest in the DRC goes beyond national security interests, as a stable DRC would be a valuable trading partner and a valuable asset to the global economy. If the Congolese government were able to control its resources, it would weaken rebel groups by removing a large source of income, provide a powerful income to the DRC state, and open up these resources for global markets. The \$9 billion deal made between the DRC and China in 2008 in which China will build infrastructure in exchange for natural resource access shows the potential trading power that a fully functioning DRC would add to the global economy.³¹

Humanitarian Concerns

In addition to the reasons previously discussed, there is more than sufficient humanitarian cause for intervention/aid in the

³⁰ Ibid. 22

³¹ Tim Whewell, "China to seal \$9bn DR Congo deal." *BBC Newsnight*, 14 Apr. 2008.

DRC. Since 1998, 5.4 million people have

died in the DRC as

a result of the

conflict and

displacement.³²

This death toll is

staggering but

there are additional human costs of the war. It

has been widely reported that in the DRC,

particularly in the war torn eastern provinces

of Kivu, systemic raping of women and

children is occurring with startling frequency

and the number of victims have reached the

hundreds of thousands.³³ According to the

UN, members of rebel groups and the

Congolese army (the FADRC) itself raped

more than 8,000 women in 2009.³⁴ Men and

children as young as four are also falling

victim to this form of violence. These rapes

constitute a strategic "act of terrorism" that

³² Coghlan 16

³³ United States. Cong. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 111th Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. 2009. Web. <<http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate>>.

³⁴ "More than 8,000 women raped last year by fighters in eastern DR Congo." *UN News Service*. 8 February 2010. English ed.

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Sexual violence is used to "undermine the whole social structure" and "to weaken any opposition in the population".
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decimates communities and forces women out of villages, leaving them free for the extremist militias.³⁵ Sexual violence is used to “undermine the whole social structure” and “to weaken any opposition in the population”.³⁶ Hillary Clinton’s visit to the DRC regarding this sexual violence has shown an important commitment by the US government.³⁷ However, the brutal rapes continue unabated in eastern DRC. On January 26, 2010 the UN refugee agency stated that it is assisting over 100,000 civilians who have fled from eastern provinces “due to the ongoing military offensive against Hutu militants and banditry armed groups”.³⁸ A clear US commitment to improving conditions in the DRC would

³⁵ *A Doctor and His Patient*. Dir. Nicholas D. Kristof. *New York Times*. Web. 5 Feb. 2010. <<http://video.nytimes.com/video/2010/02/06/opinion/1247466911324/a-doctor-and-his-patient.html>>.

³⁶ “Eastern DRC: widespread sexual violence against women threatens families,” *International Commission for the Red Cross*, 20 Dec. 2007. Web. <<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/co-ngo-kinshasa-feature-201207>>.

³⁷ “Clinton Demand End to Congo Rape” *BBC News*. 11 August 2009. Web. <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8194836.stm>>.

³⁸ “UN assisting thousands uprooted by insecurity in eastern DR Congo,” *UN News Service*, 26 January 2010, English ed. Web.


demonstrate that it is indeed committed to promoting its democratic and humanitarian ideals.

US Options

The inability of the Congolese government and the international community to halt the ongoing violence in the DRC speaks to the need for renewed commitment and strategic reevaluation. Thus US policy toward the DRC must also be reassessed to reflect the recent escalations in violence and the inability of current approaches to establish stability there.

Military Intervention

Lack of security in the DRC is impeding development and perpetuating violence. This issue must be addressed if aid is to provide benefits for the Congolese. The US has the option of deploying a military force to the DRC in order to combat this problem. However, given the US’s current military commitments, it seems unlikely that the US would choose to engage in this way



with the DRC. Instead the US should seek alternative avenues for promoting security there. The US could choose to deploy a small number of military personnel to demonstrate its commitment to ending the violence and its desire to help protect the Congolese people.

Support UN Peacekeeping Mission MONUC

In response to the recent escalations in violence, the UN is reassessing the needs of the DRC. It has recently extended its mandate until May 10, 2010 with the likelihood of further extension following reevaluation of how best to protect civilians.³⁹ The current peacekeeping force of 20,000 troops has proven insufficient due to the size of the DRC and current levels of violence.⁴⁰ Though the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world, from the very beginning the MONUC mission has been criticized as having too few

³⁹ United Nations. Security Council. Resolution 1906 (2009): Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo until 31 May 2010. New York: United Nations, 2009. Web.

⁴⁰ Go Funai and Catherine Morris, “Disaster in the DRC: Responding to the Humanitarian Crisis in North Kivu,” Briefing, (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2008) 4.

resources to achieve its goals and as being unable to protect civilians. In an effort to remedy this, on December 23, 2009, the Security Council approved the use of force by peacekeepers and “to use all necessary means to protect civilians.”⁴¹ The US should use its position on the Security Council to encourage a sustained and reinforced commitment to peacekeeping in the DRC and an elevated commitment of troops. This would strengthen peacekeepers ability to protect both Congolese civilians and themselves from violent attacks.

In the past, US financial

contributions to the MONUC mission have been substantial. The US should continue its strong support for MONUC until violence ceases and a stable peace is obtained.

⁴¹ “DR Congo: UN peacekeepers to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians,” *UN News Service*, 23 December 2009, English ed. 23 February 2010.

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The US should use its position on the Security Council to encourage a sustained and reinforced commitment to peacekeeping in the DRC and an elevated commitment of troops.
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DRC Military Reform

Not limited to militia groups, the Congolese army (FADRC) has been implicated in human rights abuses. The US should encourage the DRC government to put an end to these abuses. A dependable and trustworthy security force is needed both for the protection of civilians and for the state to be viewed as legitimate. The US could assist the Congolese government in a couple manners to achieve this end. First it should insist that members of the FADRC be held accountable for human rights abuses through criminal charges. Establishing a system for accountability is key to preventing future abuses. Second, the US should provide resources for training the military in the protection of civilians. This could be done through the provision of monetary resources or by providing military officers who could assist in training that would professionalize the army and prevent further human rights abuses.

Development Aid

Although violence continues to be a prevalent problem in the DRC, a study conducted by the IRC estimates that violence is only directly responsible for an estimated .4% of deaths within the DRC. Most deaths have been caused by infectious disease, malnutrition and pregnancy related conditions due to the social and economic costs of war (e.g. displacement, breakdown in healthcare and food production systems).⁴² This emphasizes the importance and life-saving capabilities of aid programs to combat the other known killers of disease and malnutrition. The US has recognized the DRC's need for bilateral aid and in the year 2009 provided more than \$191 million to the DRC for humanitarian programs.⁴³ USAID's "Strategic Plan" for 2007-2012 in the DRC offers development assistance with six

⁴² Coghlan 14

⁴³ United States, USAID, U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. *Situation Report 31, Fiscal Year (FY) 2010: East and Central Africa Region*. Web. <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/drcongo/>.

targets: peace and security, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, economic growth, humanitarian assistance, and program support.⁴⁴ This comprehensive plan includes many important aid targets and should be targeted to areas where there is relatively less violence and insecurity.

A study published in 2007 found that while mortality was slightly decreased in the east, mortality has been increasing in central parts of the DRC that have been mostly conflict-free since 2002. This is because international aid and governmental efforts have been focused on the east, despite the fact that central Congo remains destroyed by past conflicts.⁴⁵ Much of eastern DRC remains consumed by violence and a certain level of security must be in place before development projects can be effective in these areas.

⁴⁴ United States. USAID. *Democratic Republic of Congo: FY 2007-2009 Foreign Assistance Appropriations*. Web. <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/drcongo/>.

⁴⁵ Lydia Polygreen, "Congo's death rate unchanged since war ended," *New York Times*, 23 January 2008 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/world/africa/23congo.html?pagewanted=1&r=2>>.

Development aid should be directed toward the more stable central and western regions, while the security measures discussed previously (namely support of MONUC) should be pursued in eastern Congo.


Additionally, history shows that DRC's natural resources have fueled and prolonged conflicts within its borders. Thus it is necessary to pursue a clear strategy to regulate natural resources and stop looting by rebel groups.

Technical Assistance

The situation in the DRC exemplifies the "resource paradox", in which natural resources fail to enrich their host countries, and instead trap them in a cycle of exploitation that attracts foreign intervention and destabilizes the country.⁴⁶ Historically the DRC's natural resources have proven to be an incentive for conflict with neighboring states.⁴⁷ The "resource paradox" continues to

⁴⁶ "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse" Michael L. Ross

⁴⁷ United Nations, Security Council, *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural*



destabilize the DRC, as its wealth of resources is controlled by and contributing to the rebel groups thereby provoking violence and instability in the country.⁴⁸ Thus controlling the DRC's natural resources is of primary importance. The USAID's 2005 strategy delineated the goal of providing technical assistance to the Congolese government for the purposes of resource management. This assistance would be through the evaluation of mineral resources and the improvement of systems that generate revenue for the DRC government.⁴⁹ As of February 2010 the mineral resources remain unsecured. This goal of technical assistance for urgent resource management should be reaffirmed as a way to promote both local and regional stability. Success in this aspect would also provide enormous revenue for the

Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, United Nations, 2001.

⁴⁸ Global Witness, "US Policy Recommendations to Combat Natural Resource Conflict and Corruption," (Washington DC: Global Witness, 2009) 1.

⁴⁹ United States, USAID, *Fragile States Strategy*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005) 14.

state, decreasing its need for foreign aid in the future.

Private Investment

If state control of resources proves incompatible within the current political and infrastructural context, another option for the harnessing of the DRC's resources would be through the involvement of multi-national natural resource corporations (MNC's).⁵⁰ This approach would only be beneficial insofar as the terms of their contracts were carefully crafted to ensure benefits to the state and society as a whole. However, with the proper conditions, these companies could use their expertise to effectively and efficiently protect and control the use of these resources, funneling money back into the state for use in infrastructure building and the good of the Congolese people. Foreign policy analyst Seth Kaplan argues that MNC's are the only actors with "sufficient incentives and capabilities to establish security and good

⁵⁰ Seth Kaplan, "The Wrong Prescription for the Congo," *Orbis* 51.2 (2007): 306.

governance in resource-rich areas.”⁵¹ Beyond providing steady revenue to the state, these contracts could go so far as to mandate that a specified percentage of revenues be used for social and security programs within the communities in which they work, with failure to do so being a violation of contract resulting in the loss of right to mine. While countries such as Nigeria provide an example of the failure of MNC’s to provide stability, Botswana serves as a counter example in which private investment has brought social good.⁵² Carefully crafted contracts and tax laws give the Botswana government between 75 and 80 percent of Debswana’s diamond profits (a company owned 50:50 by the De Beers diamond cartel and the Botswana government). Much of this money is then used to fund social spending, particularly in

health and education.⁵³ Botswana’s ability to harness its diamond industry for social good serves as an example of how the DRC could capitalize on its wealth of resources through using private enterprise.


Another option is through the signing of contracts such as the one with China in September 2007. In this contract, China gets 10 million tons of copper and 620,000 tons of cobalt. In exchange, China will build roads, railways, hospitals, health centers, and schools. To reduce risk of corruption and pilfering, the exchange will be a “straight swap: raw materials for infrastructure”. The projects will also employ and train local workers (although undoubtedly many of the workers will be Chinese).⁵⁴ This exchange has been criticized as an unfair trade, in which the DRC receives less worth than it gives.

⁵¹ Ibid. 306

⁵² O’Reilly, Finbarr. “Nigeria’s Oil Curse.” *Global Post*. 25 May 2009. <[http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/nigeria/090521/nigerias-oil-curse?>](http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/nigeria/090521/nigerias-oil-curse?); Le Billon P. "Diamond Wars? Conflict Diamonds and Geographies of Resource Wars." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. 98. 2 (2008): 356.

⁵³ Santosh Mehrotra and Richard Jolly, *Development with a Human Face: experiences in social achievement and economic growth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 116.

⁵⁴ Colette Braeckman, “Mining Multinationals Get Deal of Century,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, 18 July 2008, Originally in French, <<http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/corruption/49569>>.



However, the idea is sound. Utilizing the capabilities of foreign companies to build infrastructure, provide private security forces in mining areas, and employ local workers could be the long-sought-after solution. The US should encourage and assist the Congolese government in securing a combination of contracts that provide direct exchanges of resources for infrastructure, as well as contracts that will provide steady revenue to the state so that it can participate in reconstruction as well.

Controlling Access to Markets


Furthermore, the ability of natural resources to fuel conflict must be viewed within its larger geographical context. Global trade networks enable these resources to access markets and be converted into revenue for the warring parties.⁵⁵ Analysis of the geographical context of natural resource exploitation allows for the identification of intervention target points. Established in 2003, the UN's Kimberley Process

⁵⁵ De Billon 361

Certification Scheme has been working to ensure diamonds on the market come from conflict-free sources. This has provided important progress in vetting diamond sources, however, according to a recent report published by Global Witness, this process has been slow and had limited success in dealing with non-compliance. To assist in this process, the US should support legislation that requires transparency within natural resource companies and the disclosure of the precise sources of mineral goods coming from the DRC. The US should also insist that the DRC's neighboring countries prevent further importation of illegally mined minerals.⁵⁶ Additionally, the US government should support the development of a comprehensive strategy to break the link between armed conflicts and global trade in natural resources (other than diamonds).⁵⁷ This should include the development and implementation of

⁵⁶ Global Witness 5

⁵⁷ Ibid 6



source transparency processes for other non-diamond natural resources.⁵⁸

Decentralization/Building local governance capacities

Discussions of a decentralized state structure in the DRC point to Kinshasa's historically limited control over and limited interactions with parts of the DRC territory as proof of the incompatibility of the DRC with a strong, centralized government. Seth Kaplan proposes a "looser, more horizontal governing structure, in which municipal governments had full control over their budgets and full responsibility for most programs."⁵⁹ Pierre Englebert takes a similar stance arguing that by aiding the central Congolese government, the US is allowing for the continuation of a failed state structure. While acknowledging it as an unlikely course of action, Englebert instead argues that the US should support alternate sub-state regional actors, if proven to be trustworthy and

invested in the public good. He believes this would lead to a more sustainable federalized state structure, responsive to the varying needs of its different peoples.⁶⁰


While these are compelling arguments for decentralization of governance, political practicality dictates that this avenue is unlikely to be pursued in the near future, as it would likely conflict with the interests of the central DRC government. Instead, USAID should increase aid to localized grass-roots operations thereby distributing power over development aid throughout the country as a whole. One such organization is FOCHI (Foundation Chirezi), which works specifically to empower women and their children through microfinance loans, education and healthcare programs.⁶¹ Focus should be given to the development of local state administrative capacities, which would provide the infrastructure needed for further

⁵⁸ Funai 3

⁵⁹ Kaplan 308; Beswick 343

⁶⁰ Englebert 26-28

⁶¹ "A Word from the President." *Fondation Chirezi FOCHI ASBL*. Mineterère de la Justice. Web. 21 February 2010.



development. Aid funneled through the local governance structures would build local government capacities, increase social capital and enhance the sustainability of the development programs.

Post-Conflict Resolution: Work with the International Criminal Court (ICC)

To stop the conflict and heal the wounds of war, those that have committed and are continuing to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in the DRC need to be held accountable and prosecuted. The capture and trial of such people would serve both to diminish the reoccurrence of such crimes and to send a strong message to would-be-offenders that the international community will not tolerate such actions. The International Criminal Court is an entity dedicated to such purposes. In December of

• • •
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2000, Bill Clinton signed the ICC founding document (the Rome Statute).⁶² However, once in office, George W. Bush nullified Clinton’s signature and pursued an active policy of opposition to the ICC, saying that it would undermine the authority US national judicial authority by allowing for the trial of US nationals in the ICC.⁶³ In August 2009, Hillary Clinton said, “it is a great regret” that

the US is not a part of the ICC because it limits our ability to encourage and participate in the trial of war criminals.⁶⁴

The ICC has demonstrated success in trying war criminals, and commenced a joint trial of Congolese rebel leaders Germain

Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui for war

⁶² "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court," *United Nations Treaty Collection/Collection des trait*, Web, 10 Feb. 2010, <<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm>>.

⁶³ “US Renounces World Court Treaty,” *BBC News*. 6 May 2002, Web, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1970312.stm>>.

⁶⁴ “Clinton Regrets U.S. Not Part of Court,” *Washington Post*, 7 August 2009, Web, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/06/AR2009080603763.html>>.

crimes and crimes against humanity on November 24, 2009.⁶⁵ The ICC provides an important avenue for accountability and trial of those who have been and continue to be involved in human rights abuses and violence in the DRC. As such, the US should reconsider its involvement with the ICC. It is not necessary to join the ICC in order to offer its support, however, working directly with the IRC would substantiate US desire to assist in achieving an end to the violence in the DRC. More generally, this action would serve to reaffirm US commitment to judicial processes and human rights, and would demonstrate a willingness to participate in multilateral interventions.

Diplomatic Efforts


The US should also continue its diplomatic efforts in the DRC to assist in post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction, while working to incorporate

⁶⁵ “ICC/DRC: Second Trial of Congolese Warlords,” *Human Rights Watch News*, 23 November 2009, Web, <<http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/11/23/icc-drc-second-trial-congolese-warlords>>.

regional actors in the process. The US should encourage neighboring countries to secure their shared borders with the DRC and to eliminate the transport of illicitly mined goods across these borders. These regional diplomatic efforts should work in conjunction with the African Union to emphasize the regional cooperation toward peace, incorporating neighboring states as stakeholders in the agreements. In order to be successful these peace resolutions must recognize the economic and political incentives of that have confounded the peace process, such as access to natural resources. Personal diplomacy efforts, such as Hilary Clinton’s recent visit to the DRC, should also continue. Such efforts are a powerful way to lend political support to the state and help rebuild trust with the Congolese people.

Recommendations

The current situation in the DRC dictates the need for a renewed commitment by the international community to ending the




violence there. The US should play a pivotal role in this effort, as it is in its national security interest to do so and as it would prove the US to be an international leader in the support of human rights. To achieve this end, the US should focus its attention on the following:

- Actively promote the protection of the DRC's natural resources as a way to end the conflicts. This should be done by providing technical assistance to the Congolese government through the evaluation of mineral resources and the improvement of systems that generate revenue for the DRC government. Specifically, the US should encourage private investment of multi-national natural resource companies and should assist the Congolese government in crafting contracts that will provide substantial revenue to the state and require reinvestment of revenues into social

services. Botswana's contract with Debswana should be used as a model, in which the Botswana government owns the company 50:50 with De Beers diamond cartel of South Africa, and receives 75-80 percent of Debswana's diamond profits. This money should be specifically allocated for the building of state infrastructure and provision of social goods (e.g. health and education systems).

- Assist in the development of a comprehensive strategy to break the link between armed conflicts and global trade in natural resources. Great progress has been made in the diamond trade due to the UN's Kimberley Process Certification Scheme that works to ensure the sources of diamonds in international markets are not fueling violent conflicts. To further this progress, the US should support legislation that



requires transparency within natural resource companies and the disclosure of the precise sources of mineral goods coming from the DRC. The US should also work with the UN to develop similar vetting mechanisms resources other than diamonds.

- Engage in regional diplomatic efforts to procure peace. These should work secure state borders in an effort to stop illegal resource trade and border crossing by rebel/militia groups. Regional economic incentives that have perpetuated conflict must be addressed and incorporated into the peace process. This can be done through the privatization of DRC resources, emphasizing corporate transparency and accountability, and the strict enforcement of the Kimberley Process. Neighbor countries must be held accountable for their roles in sustaining the conflicts.


The US should insist on their shared responsibility for halting all activities that fuel the conflicts (to the extent that their own state capacity allows).

The African Union has the mandate to engage in this situation and the US should advocate for the strengthening of AU operational capacity to do so.

- Continue US support of MONUC peacekeeping mission and encourage a strengthening and extension of this mission beyond May 31, 2010.

Security is a prerequisite for development, particularly in reference to eastern Congo. MONUC has been widely criticized for having too few resources and being unable to protect civilians. The authorization of peacekeepers to use all necessary means to protect civilians, including the use of force, is a positive step.

However, even the ability to use of force may prove useless if the



peacekeepers are stretched too thin, and may endanger the peacekeepers. Thus, the strengthening of MONUC should include the commitment of additional peacekeepers in an effort to finally stop the violence and enable the success of reconstruction efforts.

- Encourage the building of local governance capacity through grass-roots development projects, particularly in the more stable regions. The persistence of high mortality rates in these regions speaks to the need for immediate development aid. These projects should focus on providing social goods (e.g. education, healthcare) to these areas thereby increasing social capital and sowing the seeds for long-term, sustainable development.


The situation in the DRC constitutes a massive humanitarian crisis. Thus far, efforts at ending the violence have been

unsuccessful. As such, we advocate that the US engage in the DRC in the five previously delineated ways.

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Afghanistan

**Addressing Ethnic Divisions and Regional
Dynamics Along the Road to Recovery**

Jessica Tarabay


Issue

Afghanistan has had the attention of the world and been a source of major political debate and discussion for the past eight years. The country is currently the site of an American-led occupation and has received a great deal of aid and attention from other international players like NATO. In addition to fighting terrorism, the US intervention in Afghanistan seeks to establish a sovereign, secure, and self-supporting state that can withstand the threat of extremism and insurgency internally and externally. In the most recent statement issued by the State Department regarding Afghanistan, President Karzai outlined an aggressive agenda for the country that would focus on “reintegration; economic development; improving relations with Afghanistan’s regional partners; and steadily increasing the security responsibilities of the Afghan security

forces”¹. The report states that the Obama administration is focused on reversing and changing negative trends commonly criticized in Afghanistan and has outlined a new policy that defines the main areas of focus for Afghanistan: reconstruction and development, improving governance, reintegration, regional diplomacy, and communications.

With this newly outlined agenda in mind, one of the major current issues in Afghanistan relevant to successful reconstruction and development is national security and stability. An analysis of the progress that has been made in Afghanistan up to the present shows that the deterioration and lack of security in Afghanistan has had negative affects on every aspect of the reconstruction effort. For example, the deterioration and lack of security has hindered the transition of refugees returning to

¹ United States of American. Department of State. Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. *Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy*. Web. 07 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf>>.




Afghanistan after two decades of war and strife. In regards to the repatriation program in Afghanistan, “voluntary organizations and UNHCR pointed out that the deterioration in the security situation in the country made it difficult for the refugees to return” to the country, most notably Pashtun refugees who attempted to return to the northern areas of Afghanistan². Repatriation is not the only part of the reconstruction effort that has suffered from an insufficient level of national security and stability in Afghanistan. This problem has also contributed to issues regarding opium drug trafficking, insurgency, and infrastructural development among other affects.

It is apparent that the national security and stability of Afghanistan is a primary concern that must be resolved in order to conduct a successful and effective reconstruction and nation building agenda in Afghanistan. In this chapter, the issue of

insufficient national security and stability is attributed to two cardinal factors: ethnic divisions within the state and external regional dynamics. Afghanistan is a multiethnic state with a long history of tribalism and ethnic tension. This has been exacerbated greatly by fratricidal civil wars that have consumed the country for nearly the past 30 years and the devotion of support and aid to specific ethnic groups within the state by various international actors. Consequently, a considerable amount of attention must be devoted to ethnic divisions and regional dynamics in Afghanistan in order to mitigate conflict and resistance.

Additionally, upon recognizing and understanding these ethnic divisions/tensions and associated regional influences, it is imperative that US foreign policy develop methods of conflict resolution and reconstruction of relations between ethnic divides in order to establish a foundation in Afghanistan upon which stronger governance

² Warikoo, K., ed. *Afghanistan the challenge*. New Delhi: Pentagon, 2007. Print. Pg 121.



and state institutions as well as economic development, reintegration, and state security can be built. This includes the creation of discussion forums and summit meetings at the international level between Afghanistan and regional actors to increase dialogue and to develop foreign policies that focus on establishing and maintaining Afghan national security and stability. On a more local level, domestic conferences and meetings can be established to promote dialogue and discussion between various ethnic groups within Afghanistan. This will promote and create better intra-ethnic relations and strengthen national identity and cooperation among all Afghani people.


This chapter will start by analyzing the effects ethnic divisions and regional dynamics have had on Afghanistan and will conclude with recommendations detailing methods that will improve and correct issues regarding ethnic divisions and regional

dynamics in order to increase security and stability in Afghanistan.

Background

Ethnic groups and tribes within the Afghan state are numerous and complex. These ethnic groups are rarely homogenous even within single ethnic affiliations, meaning that each general ethnic division is further divided by an allegiance to specific Afghan regions and then again by an affiliation with smaller cities or towns. The past, present, and future of Afghanistan has been and still is heavily influenced by ethnic divisions, conflicts, and interethnic relations. In this report, five different Afghan ethnic groups (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Turkmen) will be discussed and studied as they relate to an Afghan history of ethnic divisions and tensions, regional influences associated with each ethnic group, and the present status of interethnic relations in Afghanistan.

Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan



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Source: Photograph. Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan. The University of Texas at Austin - Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection: Afghanistan Maps (Thematic Maps). Web. 23 Feb. 2010. <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_ethnoling_97.jpg>.

Pashtuns

The Pashtuns represent the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan with an estimated majority of 50% to 54% of the Afghan population³. Concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the country, the Pashtuns have traditionally been identified as the ethnic base of the Taliban regime, since the Taliban is

³ Rais, Rasul Bux. *Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 29.

majority Pashtun⁴. Historically, the idea of an Afghan national identity was attributed to the Abdali Pashtun tribe that founded Afghanistan in the 16th century; they initially focused on the unification of Pashtun areas and eventually increased power to conquer Hazara, Uzbek, and Tajik areas as well⁵. In the past, this meant Pashtun groups generally identified more heavily with the idea of an Afghan

national identity than the other ethnic groups, due in large part to the fact that the construction of this national identity is credited to the Pashtuns and thus other ethnic groups viewed it as not theirs.

The Pashtuns can be divided into the Durrani and Ghilzai sects. Additionally there are smaller tribe divisions and sub-divisions that associate with local leaderships⁶. The status of interrelations between the various

⁴ Figure 1

⁵ Rais, Rasul Bux. *Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 30.

⁶ Ibid. pg 30.

Pashtun tribes vary at times bouncing between rivalry and allied integration and while the primary language of the Pashtuns is Pashto, the majority is able to speak Persian or Dari as well, which is the national language of Afghanistan⁷. Lastly, the Pashtuns were the main ethnic group to accept and follow the Taliban during the late 20th century due in large part to the underlying element of Pashtun ethnicity in the Taliban regime. This ethnic association of Pashtuns and the Taliban has proven to be an aiding factor in exacerbating ethnic divisions, especially in times of violence and conflict between the Taliban and other ethnic minorities in Afghanistan.

Tajiks

The Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, with an estimated population of 26% to 30% of the greater Afghan population⁸. The Tajiks have strong ties and affiliations with Tajikistan, a

country located to Afghanistan's north. Thus they identification as ethnically Tajik as opposed to Afghani. Their political/ethnic party, Jamiat-i-Islami, has been historically linked to Pakistan and other countries where the party could generate money and arms to support the Tajik resistance forces⁹.

In the Post-Taliban, US administered Afghan government, the Tajiks have been placed in a more dominate political position and they have main control over "the three 'power ministries,' Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, as well as intelligence services"¹⁰. Their new political power and higher political position has created tension between the Tajiks and the Pashtuns, who fear losing their previous political domination and majority. It has yet to be seen how new political positions between all the different ethnic groups in this new Afghan

⁷ Ibid. pg 30.

⁸ Ibid. pg 31.

⁹ Ibid. pg 31.

¹⁰ Fukuyama, Francis. *Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Forum on Constructive Capitalism)*. New York: Johns Hopkins UP, 2005. Print. Pg 111.

administration will be accepted and rectified amongst the various ethnic divisions.

Hazaras

The Hazaras are a much smaller ethnic minority in Afghanistan, representing about 7% of the total Afghan population¹¹. The Hazaras are not native to Afghanistan and it is believed that these people are descendants from Ghangis Khan and his men; the Hazaras have distinct Mongolian features and their ethnic language of Hazaragi has strong elements of both Turkish and Mongolian languages¹². These characteristics exemplify their relation to foreign people over indigenous Afghani people.

Over time, the Hazaras adopted Dari as their commonly spoken language and converted to Shia Islam as their religion. This allegiance with Shia Islam has put the Hazara ethnic community in close relations with Iran, who the Hazaras have turned to in times of

civil war for political support¹³. The Hazaras have been the poorest and most marginalized ethnic community in Afghanistan as they have continuously experienced inferior economic and social positioning in comparison to the other ethnic groups of Afghanistan.

Uzbeks

The Uzbeks in Afghanistan also compose a much smaller ethnic minority, representing 8% of the total population¹⁴. They are, like the Hazaras, not natives to Afghanistan and foster family and clan affiliations with Uzbekistan across the Afghan border. They also keep their ethnic language as their primary language but the majority speak Dari as their second language. The major Uzbek city in Afghanistan is Mazar-i-Sharif which had been occupied by the Taliban twice, leading to major conflict and violent atrocities during the Afghan civil war

¹¹ Rais, Rasul Bux. *Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. pg 33.

¹² *Ibid.* pg 33.

¹³ *Ibid.* pg 33.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* pg 32.

and instability¹⁵. Again, these acts of violence and conflict between the Uzbeks and the Pashtun associated Taliban contributed to rivalry and disdain between the two ethnic groups. In the post-Taliban administration, the Uzbeks have received better positions for national leadership giving them the ability to increase their power and resources as well as claim authority over their region.

Turkmen

This ethnic group is the smallest ethnic minority of all mentioned in this paper. They represent less than 4% of the Afghan population but are notable due to their relationship with Turkmenistan which influences regional dynamics as it relates to Afghanistan¹⁶. This close allegiance with Turkmenistan fosters a sense of ethnic identity among the Turkmen and therefore Turkmenistan plays a key role as one of the regional neighbors to Afghanistan that supports one ethnic groups above the others,

¹⁵ Ibid. pg 32.

¹⁶ Ibid. pg 33.

reinforcing ethnic divisions among the Afghani people. The majority of the Turkmen live in the north of Afghanistan near the Turkmenistan border¹⁷.

• • •
They are different not only ethnically but often religiously and linguistically
• • •

Ethnic Tension, Conflict and Relations: Past and Present

Provided with the previous information on several of the ethnic communities in Afghanistan, it is not difficult to see the issues that arise from the diversity and various allegiances, both internal and external, of the greater Afghan population. These ethnic communities differ on many identity markers such as a common lineage, sect, tribal history, languages etc. They are different not only ethnically but often religiously and linguistically. Although 99% of the Afghan population adheres to Islam, the general population may be divided as much as 20% to 80%, following Shia Islam

¹⁷ Figure 1.

and Sunni Islam respectively¹⁸. Although both sects follow Islamic faith, there is conflict and tension between the Sunni and Shia divisions, with the Shia followers being primarily Hazara in ethnicity. As a result of all this, these diverse ethnic groups have experienced a long and atrocious history of ethnic tension and conflict in Afghanistan.

From the time of the Cold War up until the beginning of the 21st century, Afghanistan has been engaged in one war or conflict after another, all the time carving ethnic divisions and rivalries deeper and deeper as the Afghani population continues to become more fragmented along ethnic and regional affiliations lines. Afghanistan was brought into the Cold War as a state in the middle of the two warring super powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. As a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States began an intervention from 1980 to 1989, in which

¹⁸ Rais, Rasul Bux. *Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 35.

the US backed and supported “mujahedeen freedom fighters” to combat the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the mujahedeen fighters were headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan¹⁹. It was clear that from the American stand point, the incentive to help the Mujahedeen warriors was to combat the spread of Soviet power in the region as well as fight the threat and spreading of the communist ideology at the hands of the Soviets. However, the Mujahedeen warriors had a slightly different agenda for Afghanistan then merely fighting against the communist invasion, “the Afghan mujahedeen, or ‘holy warriors’...came from nearly all ethnic groups and tribes in the country. ‘What united them was the will to resist the godless Soviets and their ‘servants’ in Kabul”²⁰. And in April of 1992, the resistance fighters successfully ended the

¹⁹ Fitzgerald, Paul. *Invisible history Afghanistan's untold story*. [San Francisco]: City Lights, 2009. Print. Pg 171-173.

²⁰ Mirdaq, Nabi. *Afghanistan political frailty and foreign interference*. New York: Routledge, 2005. Print. Pg 143.

Soviet invasion in Afghanistan with the aid of the US and Pakistan. But this was only the beginning of conflict between the Afghani people.

After the Soviets withdrew, the Mujahedeen and resistance freedom fighters wanted to seize power at the national level and Afghanistan fell into a bloody and violent civil war that had been unprecedented in the country's history as competing ideologies, ethnicities, religions, and resistance groups fought over the power and future of the state²¹. As the fighting and chaos of a fratricidal civil war continued and grew, the Taliban were able to rise above all the competing warlords and take power. The Taliban regime subjected many of the defiant ethnic minorities to violence and ethnic cleansing that has greatly harmed inter-relations between ethnic communities in Afghanistan to this day²². In response to the

Pashtun based Taliban that took control of Afghanistan resulting in oppression and violence against other Afghan ethnic minorities, these minorities formed a resistance group called the Northern Alliance. The notable thing about the Taliban versus the Northern Alliance is that "the Taliban army, mainly recruited from the majority Pashtun, was larger and better equipped with arms supplied by Pakistan. The Northern Alliance was an alliance of convenience composed of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other minorities like Turkmen and Nuristanis"²³. Therefore, conflicts based on ethnicity were continually reinforced as the Taliban and Northern Alliance were fiercely combating one another, viewing the conflict and violence between the two organizations in terms of ethnic differences and divisions and breeding hatred among the ethnic groups.

²¹ Ibid. pg 167-167.

²² Rais, Rasul Bux. *Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 44-47.

²³ Warikoo, K., ed. *Afghanistan the challenge*. New Delhi: Pentagon, 2007. Print. Pg. 114.

As a result of the civil war and the rise of the Taliban regime, the ethnic groups found great disparity with one another in the face of ethnic cleansing and inequality and therefore “the ethnic and social forces of Afghanistan are more conscious of their separate identities today than any time in the history of the country”²⁴.




Source: Photograph. Afghanistan. CIA- The World Factbook. Web. 23 Feb. 2010. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_af.html>. This image is a work of a Central Intelligence Agency employee. As a Work of the United States Government, this image or media is in the public domain.

²⁴ Rais, Rasul Bux. *Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 17.

Regional Dynamics and Influences

Afghanistan is a country that finds itself at the center of three strategic geographical regions: central Asia, south Asia, and southwest Asia. For this reason, international roles and regional dynamics have been very influential in the country’s history and will continue to play a role in the reconstruction of a post-failed state. The affiliations between the various Afghani ethnic groups and their international counterpart have made regional dynamics a significant issue in the case of Afghanistan mostly because there is a great deal of international interest and involvement in the country. Therefore, it is apparent that all bordering countries and countries in close proximity to the region, such as Russia and India, have some degree of influence over Afghanistan.

It is important to note that each ethnic group in Afghanistan has an international counterpart from whom they receive political



support, aid, arms etc. For example, the Pashtun are supported by Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province, both Pashtun regions in Pakistan²⁵. The Hazaras have found an alliance with Iran stemming from a common adherence to Shia Islam while the

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Each ethnic group in Afghanistan has an international counterpart from whom they receive political support, aid, arms etc.
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Hazara ethnic and political party, Hizb-i-Wahdat, remains under Iranian

influence²⁶. Uzbekistan allies with the Uzbek ethnic community in Afghanistan and Tajikistan allies with the Tajik-Afghan community. In addition, Russia and India hold significant role in the surrounding region and therefore have an interest in Afghanistan as well²⁷.

The important note about regional dynamics and international relations as they

pertain to Afghanistan and all the respective ethnic groups within the state is that “the support of neighboring states can have an important influence on the consolidation of weak and divided states”²⁸. Therefore, the regional dynamics and foreign policy of each state surrounding Afghanistan are important factors in establishing state security and stability. The role of regional dynamics and international actors in the case of reconstructing Afghanistan cannot be overlooked or diminished. The influence that the surrounding regional countries have on Afghanistan is vast and therefore special foreign policy should be established in order to determine a beneficial role that these international players will have in helping to secure the Afghan state and reconstruction effort.

²⁵ Rais, Rasul Bux. *Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 28.

²⁶ *Ibid.* pg 32-33.

²⁷ *Ibid.* 177-178.

²⁸ Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina. *America's role in nation-building from Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003. Print

US Interests

The United States has been involved in the reconstructing and nation building efforts in Afghanistan for the past 8 years, beginning in October 2001. During that period of time, the US interests and strategy regarding Afghanistan has changed and conformed to the present state of affairs in the reconstruction effort. Because efforts in Afghanistan have constantly wavered between success and failure, the United States has been forced to continually adjust its approach to rebuilding the failed state.


The United States' current presence and involvement in Afghanistan was initially sparked by the Al-Qaeda led terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. In a response to this infamous and horrific event, the United States demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden (who was, at the time, believed to be operating his terrorist organization out of Afghanistan) so that he could be tried for his

crimes outside of Afghanistan. After refusal from the Taliban to cooperate and comply with the US demands regarding bin Laden, the United State launched Operation Enduring Freedom²⁹. This operation commenced on October 7, 2001 with the operational goal to “eliminate Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan”³⁰. The US Operation Enduing Freedom was able to enter Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban within a few weeks of intervention. From this point forward, the United States and various other participating international players began to work towards rebuilding and reconstructing a sovereign, secure, and efficient Afghan nation.

In order to institute an interim government, a conference was held in Bonn, Germany during December of 2001. This conference “put in place a provisional administration headed by Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun...[and, in addition] three important departments of foreign affairs, defense and

²⁹ Ibid. 110.

³⁰ Ibid, pg 129.




interior went to the Northern Alliance...[o]ther ethnic groups were also accommodated in the cabinet”³¹ The goal the international community was aiming for at this point in time was to establish an administration that would lead to peace, security, and sovereignty for the Afghani state as well as incorporate all ethnic groups as state actors in order to mitigate interethnic conflicts . This is apparent in the appointment and representation of each ethnic group to a governmental position. While over the past several years US strategy in Afghanistan had depended on what progress Afghanistan was making in securing the nation, holding elections, developing infrastructure, and stabilizing the economy, among many other major factors of the reconstruction effort.

The most recent statement on US interests and strategy regarding Afghanistan was issued by the US State Department in January of 2010. This report states that “the

³¹ Warikoo, K., ed. *Afghanistan the challenge*. New Delhi: Pentagon, 2007. Print. Pg 117.

core US goal remains to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” In addition, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirms that civilian, political, diplomatic, and economic efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan will remain long-term goals even after US military intervention has ended³². With specific reference to Afghanistan itself, the report states that the US focus “is building the capacity of Afghani institutions to withstand and diminish the threat posed by extremism...focusing our support at the national level on Afghan ministries that can have the most direct impact on service delivery.” Additionally the report states that “we are also adapting our programs to account for local realities, and broadening our support and engagement at the provincial and

³² United States of American. Department of State. Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. *Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy*. Web. 07 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135728.pdf>>. pg 4.



district levels to enhance the visibility, effectiveness, and accountability of the institutions that impact Afghan lives the most.” Lastly, the main topics of focus as outlined in the report are: Reconstruction and Development, Improving Governance, Rule of Law, Reintegration, Regional Diplomacy, Communications, Focused Civilian Assistance, and Expanded Civilian Presence³³. There appears to be an increased effort in strengthening the state of Afghanistan as a whole at political, social, and economic levels.

Options

Many options have been proposed in order to address the issue of security and stability in Afghanistan and successfully reconstruct the failed state. Below are two different strategies proposed by David Kilcullen and Clare Lockhart:

- 1) In his book “The Accidental Guerilla”, David Kilcullen introduces the seven

principal characteristics of an effective strategy³⁴:

- i. Primacy of political strategy
- ii. A central role for the Afghan government
- iii. A region-wide strategy
- iv. A population-centric approach to security
- v. A comprehensive approach
- vi. Effectiveness, presence, and local partnerships
- vii. Prioritization

The strategy proposed by Kilcullen has many strong points. With the first principal, Kilcullen identifies the importance of political legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government; it is highly important in order to combat sympathy for insurgents. If the Afghan government is legitimate and effective, the people will have more faith in the institution and a good working governmental framework can easily be established along with an allowance for political reform and development. The second principle improves the sovereignty of the national government. Principle three incorporates the need to work with regional neighbors and international actors to mitigate

³³ Ibid. pg 4.

³⁴ Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla*. New York: Oxford UP, 2009. Print. Pg 109-114.

insurgency and disrupt insurgent safe havens. The fourth principle accounts for the need to provide citizens with security and establish security forces that protect the civilian population and the need to establish indigenous security forces who are deemed reliable by the local populations. The fifth principle seeks to promote counterinsurgency through closely integrated political, security, economic, and information components. The sixth principle highlights the importance of establishing effective governance at the local level. And the seventh principle focuses on prioritization. Kilcullen writes that reconstruction in Afghanistan should be concerned firstly with building up and strengthening the Afghan state, secondly with combating insurgency, and thirdly, dealing with illegal drug trade.


The outline strategy provided by Kilcullen is a well designed and though out plan to establish sufficient security in Afghanistan. The only point lacking is the he

does not pay enough attention to the rivalries between ethnic groups or the influence of international actors in exacerbating ethnic divisions. In addition to the above plan so carefully laid out by Kilcullen, it is imperative that the strategy include a more developed plan or method pertaining to ethnic divisions in Afghanistan and how to reconcile the deep rooted tensions and hatred these groups foster for one another.

- 2) In her article entitled, "Leaving Afghanistan is not an option. There is still much work to do"³⁵ Clare Lockhart establishes a three part system that builds security in Afghanistan and eventually allows for a safe exit. These three parts are as follows:
 - i. Government bound by rule of law
 - ii. Investment in the Afghan people
 - iii. Creation of Jobs

In Lockhart's explanation these three main points are essential in developing national security in Afghanistan. The first principle, a government bound by rule of law, is important in order to maintain public order

³⁵ Lockhart, Clare. "Leaving Afghanistan is not an option. There is still much work to do." *Guardian.co.uk*. 13 July 2009. Web. 20 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jul/13/afghanistan-british-army-withdrawal>>.



in the country. This would allow the government to create basic institutions that would enable Afghani people to live peacefully and protect the county's revenue. Overall this first principle strives for the establishment of a reliable and capable governmental institution for the Afghani people. Secondly, Lockhart writes that it is imperative we devote time and money to the education of the Afghani people so that they will be able to govern and control themselves without being dependant on foreign aid and intervention. Additionally, she stresses the need to invest in Afghanistan through universities, technical colleges and agriculture schools. And lastly, Lockhart stresses the need to create more jobs for the Afghani population.


While Lockhart presents strong principles for developing the post-failed state of Afghanistan, she appears to miss the importance of creating a strong political and social foundation that a secure Afghan nation

can rest upon. In order to create this foundation, ethnic conflict and international actors must be addressed and incorporated in the reconstruction process in order to work towards a secure and stable Afghan nation. Although her principles are well thought out and viable options for the reconstruction effort, they must be paired with other principles that address regional conflict and relations in order to successfully establish a secure and stable state.

Recommendations

Afghanistan is a country that failed in large part due to years of internal conflicts and wars that “have sharpened ethnic and regional identities that now present greater challenges than before to manage and govern a multiethnic society with each group having larger ethnic affiliations across then before”³⁶. Therefore, in addition to a well thought out and well rounded program like that proposed by David Kilcullen, the most effective way to

³⁶ Ibid, pg 5



establish a stable and sustainable nation state is to address the issues of ethnic divisions and regional dynamics at a local, national and international level. This involves establishing dialogue and conflict resolution programs between the various ethnic groups within Afghanistan, including the Taliban, and establishing the same programs at a national and international level. “Time and patience are needed to build the infrastructure and institutions to stabilize the Afghan state and root out the jihadi networks”³⁷. Such programs should include conflict resolutions and dialogue forums that lead to greater integration between ethnic divisions.

A major problem is that, “Individuals and social groups interact with the state not as citizens in any modern sense but as members of a tribe, ethnic community, religious sect, or


other kinship networks”³⁸. Therefore, an integration and conflict resolution program is imperative in this present reconstruction of Afghanistan so that the government at a national level can function as a cohesive unit with an Afghan national identity as opposed to a fragmented society allied with various ethnic communities.

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The most effective way to establish a stable and sustainable nation state is to address the issues of ethnic divisions and regional dynamics at a local, national and international level
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These options are not designed to ignore military intervention but to instead recommend a structured agenda to group military intervention with other forms of conflict resolution in Afghanistan. It is important to acknowledge that “military action or counterinsurgency operations in situations like that of Afghanistan are

³⁷ "International Crisis Group - B89 Afghanistan: New US Administration, New Dire." *International Crisis Group - Conflict prevention and resolution*. Web. 06 Feb. 2010. <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6007&l=1>>.

³⁸ Rais, Rasul Bux. *Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print.



essential but have to be linked to peace building, negotiations, and conflict resolution through a shared vision of good society and by integrating interests of all vital stakeholders”³⁹. Therefore, military intervention may be a start to nation building

but could be highly unsuccessful and even detrimental to the rebuilding effort if appropriate programs are not instituted to rectify the internal and underlying roots of conflict in a failed-state, which, in the case of

Afghanistan, is ethnic tensions and conflict.

Regional Dynamic Recommendation

Regional dynamics and relations between Afghanistan and the international community play a key role in the successful establishment of security and sovereignty in the United State’s nation building effort in Afghanistan. Therefore, foreign relations

³⁹ Ibid, pg 19.


between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as India, Russia, Iran and many Central Asian countries should be a primary concern and focus in rebuilding and reconstructing efforts, acknowledging that “if the insurgents find sanctuaries and support bases across the

● ● ●
Programs that encourage ethnic communities to work together at a local and national level on political, economic, and social agendas could be extremely beneficial in establishing a strong sense of national identity and unity.
 ● ● ●

borders with or without the connivance of governments, the postconflict societies find it extremely difficult to revive themselves”⁴⁰. Therefore, recommendations for nation-building efforts in Afghanistan as they pertain to the issue of regional dynamics and relations

begin with the establishment of regional dialogue programs. This will allow neighboring countries and key regional actors to convene with Afghanistan to institute productive policies that will aid the development of security and sstability in Afghanistan.

⁴⁰ Rais, Rasul Bux. *Recovering the frontier stage war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan*. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008. Print. Pg 177.




Writing about the rebuilding effort in Afghanistan, Marvin G. Weinbaum commented that, “Although none of Afghanistan’s neighbors have actively worked to undermine the Karzai government, all continue to hedge bets and remain patrons to those groups and individuals in the country with whom they have traditionally been associated”⁴¹. Therefore, the neighboring countries to Afghanistan and those in close regional proximity to the country are vital in aiding the establishment of state security and stability. It is essential, for example, that Afghanistan and Pakistan work to secure their common borders in order to mitigate the ability for insurgents to use uncontrolled zones as grounds for revitalize and regroup their insurgency efforts. Additionally, it is important that regional and international countries channel all support efforts for individual Afghani ethnic groups to a

collective effort in helping the Afghani population as a whole in order to strengthen the sentiment for a greater national Afghan identity over smaller ethnic and tribal identities in the country.

Concluding Recommendation

The recommendation of this chapter for establishing a secure and stable Afghan state is to combine Kilcullen’s seven principle strategy with extensive programs in conflict resolution and dialogue among local, national and international actors. The combination of a more general, comprehensive plan focused on social, political, and economic methods of state security, such as the Kilcullen strategy, with top-down and bottom-up conflict resolution and dialogue forums between ethnic groups, state actors and international state actors would allow the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan to address the most important and underlying threats to national security and actively work to establish a strong foundation and social, political, and

⁴¹ Fukuyama, Francis. *Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Forum on Constructive Capitalism)*. New York: Johns Hopkins UP, 2005. Print.



economic institutions that a stable and secure
nation could be built on.

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The background features a white page with a thick blue horizontal line at the top. Several thin blue lines intersect at various points, creating a geometric pattern. Three large, overlapping blue circles are positioned in the upper right and lower right areas. A smaller, similar circle is located in the center-right. The circles are composed of concentric layers of different shades of blue, creating a 3D effect.

Iraq

A Case Study

Aisling Underwood

Issue


Since the invasion of Iraq on March 19th, 2003, the United States has faced a multitude of obstacles and unforeseen challenges while deposing a dictatorial regime and building new infrastructure and governance systems. The problematic issues faced in Iraq are largely related to historical ethnic conflict and forms of government. Even prior to the Saddam Hussein dictatorship, Iraq never had a fully democratic or united governing body. Historic governance structures coupled with long-standing ethno-cultural tensions, laid the ground for a complicated and difficult US occupation. By looking not only at the history of Iraq as country but also as a group of ethnically diverse people, it becomes clear that there are many considerations that needed to be taken into account before the US took major action. While some of these factors were considered, many were ignored, and the resulting US action placed Iraq into the

category of a failing state. After the first few months of US occupation, Iraq was left with no real infrastructure, viable governing apparatus, and a lack of security that fueled and enabled sectarian violence.

Understanding the unique cultural and political history of Iraq lends insight into how some of the deciding actions made by the Coalition Provisional Authority during the first year of US occupation brought Iraq to its current state. By neglecting Iraq's unique situation as a country of ethnically divided people, and alienating the previous ruling class, the United States created a situation in which ethnic conflicts were exacerbated and sectarian violence thrived. In order for the US to continue progress towards a stable Iraqi state, cultural norms as well as regional differences need to be taken into account in government formation.

Background

Iraq is a country that is shaped by its long history of ethnic conflict. With three



distinct groups (Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds),

• • •
Understanding these ethnic groups, their beliefs and conflicts, is paramount to understanding Iraq as a nation and how the United States should have intervened.
• • •

opposing ideas and beliefs have played a major role in the direction of Iraq’s formation over the last five centuries. Understanding

these ethnic groups, their beliefs and conflicts, is paramount to understanding Iraq as a nation and how the United States should have intervened. It also may show how we can continue to improve our actions in the future.

The People of Iraq

Iraq is composed of three major factions: Shiite, Sunni and Iraqi Kurds. Iraq is ethnically between 75 percent and 80 percent Arab, 15 percent and 20 percent Kurdish and 5 percent other ethnic groups. Religiously, Iraq is 97 percent Muslim, between 60 percent and 65 percent Shia and

32 percent to 37 percent Sunni.¹ This makes Arabs the ethnic majority and Kurds the minority. Shiites are the religious majority, and Sunnis the minority. Iraqi Kurds are primary Sunni, but have been harshly treated in the past due to their Iranian heritage.² It is important to understand each faction in order to have a better conception of how these groups have interacted throughout history and how they currently come into conflict.

There are around 30 million Kurds worldwide, and this makes them “one of the largest ethnic groups without their own nation-state.”³ Historically Kurds have been repressed due to their minority status in most countries. The Iraqi Kurd population lives predominately in northern Iraq, although there is a significant population in Baghdad. Kurds are a distinct population with their own language, and have fought for an independent Kurdistan for years.

¹ CIA factbook
² David W. Riggins. *Ending the Conflict in Iraq: Is Partition the Answer?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2007), 4
³ Riggins, 4

Like the Kurds, Shia Muslims have also been historically repressed in Iraq. Concentrated in the southern half of the country, Shia Muslims religiously differ from Sunnis in their belief of who holds power

after the death of

Muhammad. Shiites

believe that

Muhammad's son-in-

law Ali should have

held power after the

death of the prophet.⁴

This means that Shiites

believe their rulers

should be the direct

descendants of


Muhammad, and

selected by Allah as

opposed to secular governmental methods.

In contrast to Shiites, Sunnis believe that their ruler should be an oligarchic-elected

caliph.⁵ Because of the origin of Sunnis and Shiites differences, they have diverged into two distinct groups with their own theologies, practices, laws, and history. Sunni Arabs have been the ruling ethnic group since the



Source: "Religious and Ethnic Groups in Iraq." Map. BBC. 21 Feb. 2010. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/reports/international/media/IRAQ_ethnic_map.jpg>.

Ottoman Empire, and there are a number of important considerations when viewing Sunnis as a part of the Iraqi whole. Sunnis don't perceive themselves as just one of the factions of Iraq, they view power is inherent

⁴ Riggins 5.

⁵ Riggins 5.

and rightfully theirs.⁶ Sunni Arabs are generally concentrated in the northern half of Iraq, excluding Kurdish areas.

For a good visual of ethnic and religious concentrations, the map below illustrates the ethnic/religious demographics of Iraq; it also shows where these groups are concentrated.


The Ottoman Empire

Since the 1500s, Sunni-Shia conflict has played a key role in shaping Iraqi history. Between the 16th and 20th centuries, the Shia Islamic Safavid Empire of Iran sought to control Iraq due to its religious and historic importance to Shia Muslims. Iraq housed holy places in Karbala and An Najaf, and Baghdad was the old seat of the Abbasid Empire. The Ottoman Turks of Iraq feared Shia control of Asia Minor and tried to maintain a Sunni-ruled “buffer state” in Iraq. Between 1509 and 1638, a series of battles were waged between the Safavids and the Ottomans and control vacillated between the two, until the Safavids

were ultimately expelled in 1638. The Safavid-Ottoman conflicts created great tension between Sunnis and Shias. Both Islamic sects were used to mobilize their respective domestic support, and as a result both groups suffered under the opposing rulers reign. The constant fighting between Safavids and Ottoman Turks weakened the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottomans began to lose control over its provinces. As a result, Iraqi tribal organization became more powerful.

Tribal migrations had a large effect on the political and ethnic divides within Iraq. In central Iraq, the Sunni Saadun family controlled the Muntafiq tribal confederation. In the South, the Shia Madan and Shammar tribes gained control. In the north, the Baban Dynasty held Kurdish power, and made it difficult for the Ottoman Empire to maintain any power over the Iraqi Kurdistan. In the early 1700s, the Mamluks began to gain authority over the Ottoman Empire, and

⁶ George Packer. *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq*. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005) 416.



eventually came to control Basra and the river valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, which reached from the hills of Kurdistan to the Persian Gulf. The Mamluks were able to effectively rule Iraq and instated many improvements and advancements, including: creating an army, clearing canals, starting industries as well as establishing a printing press. Despite this period of success, the period of Mamluk control ended in 1831 after a flood and plague ravaged Baghdad.

Ottoman rule was reinstated in 1869 through the rule of governor of Baghdad Midhat Pasha. By establishing a provincial representative system along with elected municipal assemblies, Pasha was able to change the tribal-urban power balance. By secularizing the school system, children of varying social classes were able to climb the social ladder. In 1908 the newly ruling Young Turks began to try to make a unified Ottoman Empire. The 1876 constitution was reinstated


and elections were held. This introduced Iraq to self-governance.⁷

By the early 1900s, the power of the Ottoman Empire in modern day Iraq began to weaken as western influences became increasingly powerful. It is important to note that while the Ottomans ruled Iraq, Iraqi Sunnis held political power and as a result gained experience governing. During this time, Sunnis were able to utilize new educational and economic opportunities, while the neglected Shias were effectively excluded from all economic, educational or political opportunities. The position of power held by Sunnis is an important trend up to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government in 2003.

British Control in Iraq

At the turn of the 20th century, the territories of the Ottoman Empire attracted European interest for commercial possibilities. When Turkey entered World

⁷ Metz



War I on the side of the Germans, the British tried to take Basra for fear of German presence in the Middle East. Although they failed to capture Basra, the British eventually won Baghdad in March of 1917, and Mosul the following November. In 1919 the Paris Peace Conference was held. It was at this conference that Iraq was made a Class A mandate entrusted to Britain.⁸ During the conference, European diplomats effectively created modern day Iraq by combining Mosul, Baghdad and Basra.⁹ The British intended to give Iraqis back their power, separate from Ottoman rule. However, as in most cases, it was hard for the British to take control and create a form of government that the people would accept. Tribal disputes were a common issue during this time. Tribes wished to confirm and expand their power while having other tribes restrained. Aside from conflicting tribal interests, the paternalistic attitude with which Britain governed Iraq fueled

insurgency. Fatwas were issued condemning non-Muslim rule in a Muslim country as it is against Islamic law.¹⁰ From the beginning, British commissioners in charge of Iraq felt that the country was too fragmented to be a viable independent state. The Kurds that came from Mosul expected to become an independent Kurdish state after the end of the war and were not happy to learn that they would once again take a minority role to a ruling party.¹¹ As fragmentation continued to cause revolts and costly insurgency, the British turned power over to the Iraqis while still maintaining indirect control. Prominent Sunni and Shia tribes fought for power in the new government, however the unprecedented “democratic” government had little legitimacy with the Iraqi people.

In 1932 Iraq was inducted to the League of Nations when it became a sovereign state as a monarchy. Despite its independence, Iraq was reoccupied until after

⁸ Metz

⁹ Packer 333.

¹⁰ Metz

¹¹ Packer, 333

World War II in order to control oil supplies. Following World War II the monarchy was able to bring some economic success, but ultimately continued pattern of shaky Iraqi leadership.¹²

The Saddam Hussein Regime

In 1963 the first of a series of military coups occurred when the Baath party overthrew then ruler Qasim. These military coups continued until 1979 when Saddam Hussein became President of Iraq. Saddam's Baathist government alienated many of the Gulf States and sparked tension with countries such as Iran. The Baath party in Iraq was composed of mainly Sunni Arab intellectuals with strong socialist ideologies. In order to be successful during the Saddam regime, it was almost essential to be a member of the Baath party.¹³

From a US perspective, the most important aspect of Saddam Hussein's 24 year reign as President of Iraq was his

¹² Metz

¹³ Metz

extreme brutality and humanitarian violations. Throughout his presidency Saddam constantly question the allegiance of Iraqi citizens, and would erratically lash out at groups he thought were being disloyal. This included purging the Baath party, filling jails with political prisoners, and even killing 5,000 Kurds in 1988 by in a poison gas on their village. In 1980, Saddam tried to overthrow Iran's Islamic government, with support from the US. The war ended eight years later after the deaths of more than 200,000 Iraqis. Following the war, US support for Iraq waned until the US ultimately suggested that the Iraqi people overthrow Saddam themselves. This was unsuccessful and resulted in more Iraqi deaths. Saddam's tyrannical ruling united Iraqi factions in their oppression until 2003, when the US ordered Saddam to step down and invaded Iraq.¹⁴

¹⁴ Neil MacFarquhar. *Saddam Hussein, Defiant Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence and Fear, Dies*. The New York Times. December 30, 2006. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/30/world/middleeast/30saddam.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1>

The US in Iraq


The history of the United States in Iraq is complicated. While occupying Iraq, the United States has made multiple decisions that have fueled ethnic conflicts. It is important to understand how these actions served to perpetuate violence and conflict between ethnic groups. In order to understand how sectarian violence has played a large role in Iraq in the last seven years, it is necessary to look at the decisions made by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) during 2003-2004 and the Iraqi elections of 2005.

The first important US decision in Iraq was barring the Baathist party. Due to their historical connections to the Saddam Hussein government, the US chose not to hire current or former Baath party members. While this may have helped to avoid a new government with strong ties or alliances to Hussein, in many ways it also crippled the economy and infrastructure of Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld explained that, “it was possible that Iraqis

installed in official jobs could be removed after their initial appointment if a subsequent review by American authorities found that an official had been a senior Baath Party member.”¹⁵ In many cases these people were the most qualified candidates. Additionally, many professionals, in order to move ahead professionally, had to cooperate with the Baathist party and often join it. Frequently this affiliation with the Baath party had nothing to do with the person’s actual beliefs or political ideologies and was simply a business decision. In other instances, though members of the Baath party may have liked to denounce their membership to the party, the fear of the backlash against them and their families was too strong.

An assassination campaign was held against former Baathists who cooperated with the US occupation, and there were instances of assassinations of Baathists without any ties

¹⁵ Schmitt, Eric. *AFTEREFFECTS: RUMSFELD; Top Baathist Officials to Be Barred From Government*. New York Times. May 9, 2003.



to the US efforts. Unemployed and fearing for their lives, there was an exodus of professional Iraqis, including teachers, engineers and doctors. As if the exclusion of Senior Baathists was not harmful enough, when Paul Bremer became head of the CPA he, “[i]ssued a sweeping ban of the Baath Party: all senior party members were barred from public life; lower-level members were also barred, but some could appeal. In effect, Bremer had fired the entire senior civil service.”¹⁶ After banning Baathists, what was left at the Iraqi public disposal was mainly bottom-tier workers, with little knowledge or experience compared to those who were no longer allowed to work. “The problem with the blanket ban is that you get rid of the infrastructure; after all, these guys ran the country, and you polarize them. So did these decisions contribute to the insurgency?

¹⁶ Anderson, Jon Lee. Out on the Street. New Yorker. November 15, 2004. <http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/11/15/041115fa_fact>, 1

Unequivocally, yes.”¹⁷ Essentially firing the entire professional class was a misguided move by the United States if they hoped to keep Iraq’s power in the hands of Iraqis. By completely alienating the previously ruling class, the United States effectively stripped the Baathists of their duty to uphold the law. The US created and fueled the lawlessness that followed the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

In May of 2003 the United States ordered the disbandment of the Iraqi army through the head of the CPA Paul Bremer. This US decree left approximately 500,000 armed and trained Iraqi men unemployed and resentful.¹⁸ With half a million bread-winners out of work, Iraqi men needed to find alternative means of supporting their family. Joining insurgencies was one way to find temporary employment. The fact that these men were angry and indigent was not the only issue. Iraqi soldiers had access to weapons

¹⁷ Anderson, 2

¹⁸ No End in Sight

stockpiles, and in the weeks following the disbanding of the army, these fired soldiers began to collect weapons that were formerly owned by the Iraqi government. Allowing the army to dissolve in this way was not only harmful to Iraqi national security, it also eliminated a ready-made resource for the United state. Had they chosen to, the US could have utilized the army to quell sectarian violence following the invasion. Instead, the US turned this resource over to insurgents. According to Jay Garner, who served as the Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) at the beginning of the US invasion, “[b]y abolishing the army, we destroyed in the Iraqi mind the last symbol of sovereignty they could recognize and as a result created a significant part of the resistance.”¹⁹ The last symbol of security in Iraq was lost with the disbanding of the army.


¹⁹ Axe, David. Was Disbanding the Iraqi Army a Good Idea? Defense Tech. November 2nd, 2006. <<http://defensetech.org/2006/11/02/disbanding-the-iraqi-army-a-good-idea/>>

Following the firing of the Baathists and the disbanding of the Iraqi army, there a large increase in looting and organized violence. Looting became a means of protection and livelihood. In the city of Al-Qaqaa alone, 380 tons of powerful ammunition went missing.²⁰ Unemployment not only weakened the morale of the Iraqis, it destroyed their livelihoods and shifted their perception of Americans.

Another mistake the US made was rushing the formation of the Iraqi constitution. By sticking to such a strict deadline, certain aspects of the drafting of the Iraq constitution fueled ethnic conflicts. Sunnis felt marginalized by negotiations in August when they “were moved from the Constitutional Committee to an informal forum of Shiite and Kurdish leaders.”²¹ Sunnis felt that the draft that was accepted from these negotiations “threatens their existential interests by

²⁰ Anderson, 2

²¹ Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry, Middle East Briefing N°19 < 26 September 2005
<<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3703&l=1>>



implicitly facilitating the country's dissolution, which would leave them landlocked and bereft of resources."²² The second error was in the actual content of the draft. Certain passages, like those that dealing with taxation power and decentralization, are not specific enough and therefore may lead to future conflict. By leaving such ambiguities, the constitution will allow those who take power the ability to shape the document to their desires.

Another main issue was that the United States favored Shia political exiles in the formation of the new government. Figures such as Chalabi were brought back to Iraq. The Sunnis felt that the people being elected to government were pawns of Iran and the United States,²³ and many Iraqis in general felt that those shaping their government were out of touch with the needs of modern day Iraqis. Sunnis also felt that de-Baathification did not distinguish between Sunnis and

Baathists, and as a result felt rejected from the new government. One of the largest Sunni political parties boycotted the 2005 election, thus giving the Sunnis a low voter turnout rate.²⁴

It is important to look to the effects of US actions on Iraqi sectarian violence. Understanding the gravity of sectarian violence in Iraq is essential as it, "continues to take an enormous toll, averaging over 1,000 Iraqi civilian and security force fatalities per month and over 50 US military fatalities per month."²⁵ The Iraqi insurgency is perhaps the most troubling concern to the United States currently, because it may foreshadow an Iraqi civil war.

Just like the history of the US in Iraq, the history of insurgency in the last seven years is complicated. There have been large-scale and small-scale occurrences of sectarian violence. The main insurgency that has been

²² Unmaking Iraq

²³ Packer, 417

²⁴ Graaeme Herd. Weak Authoritarianism and Iraqi State Building. Defense Academy of the UK October 2005 5.

²⁵ Riggins, 2

present since the fall of Baghdad is the Sunni Arab insurgency.²⁶ After losing power and being disenfranchised from the government, the Sunnis had and continue to have strong reasons to rebel. Aside from the Sunni insurgency, Shiites and Kurds have been sources of violence. Ethnic groups have exacted revenge on one another, as well as fought each other for power. The root of sectarian violence in Iraq is the struggle for power in the new government, whether it is fighting the US troops or fighting one another, major Iraqi ethnic groups wish to attain representation and power in the new Iraqi government. Since the power of the interim government was passed to Iraq in June of 2004, Iraqi insurgency has grown in both size and sophistication.²⁷

According to the International Crisis Group, in the last year levels of violence have fallen in many areas of Iraq. However, while some tensions may be easing, the conflict

²⁶ Packer, 335

²⁷ Herd 1.

between Arabs and Kurds is intensifying.

Both the Kurdistan regional government and the Iraqi federal government contest control over gas and oil resources in disputed territories, specifically Kirkuk.²⁸ Regardless of increasing or lessening sectarian violence, the fact remains that as long as sectarian violence continues in Iraq, permanent growth and governmental legitimacy will not be achieved. In order for Iraq to make social, political, and economic progress, sectarian violence needs to be stopped.

US Interests

While the initial US interest in Iraq was based on a national security issue, that reasoning no longer holds up. There were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, as was asserted in the compelling argument to go to war with Iraq. The lack of security resulting from the US occupation, and increasing ethnic rifts have actually increased sectarian violence and terrorist activity.

²⁸ (International Crisis Group-Conflict History- Iraq)

There are a couple interests that the US currently has in Iraq. The first is to finish what was started. The US invaded Iraq, and removed the former government; the US has the responsibility to deal with the aftermath. After weapons of mass destruction were dismissed as a reason for war, bringing democracy to the Iraqi people was implemented as a new driving force for the occupation. In order to gain international respect, the US needs to make good on its promises. It is not in the interest of US foreign relations to leave Iraq a weak and violent state.

The US also needs to keep in mind that the lack of security in Iraq, along with the ethnic tensions that have reemerged in full force, create a hot bed for terrorism and violence.²⁹ Perhaps now more than ever, the status of Iraq causes a national security problem. Until violence in Iraq has subsided and the US intervention is viewed in a more

²⁹ Eizenstat, S., J. E. Porter, and J. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." FOREIGN AFFAIRS - NEW YORK-. 84 (2005): 134-147.


positive light, there is the possibility that Iraq will not only descend into civil war, but host anti-American terrorist groups.

Options

There are a wide range of options for the US in Iraq; these range from intensive structural changes to more minor peacekeeping efforts. While some of these options are more feasible and practical than others, it is important to keep in mind that there is more than one path to success. It is also important to note that any US action taken at this point needs to focus on easing ethnic tensions, generally placating the three major factions, and increasing Iraqi security so as to quell sectarian violence.

One possible option for lessening sectarian conflict in Iraq is to partition the government. This plan would divide Iraq into "three mainly autonomous federated regions with a 'strong' central Iraqi government."³⁰ These regions would be divided based on the

³⁰ Riggins 1



three Iraqi majorities: Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. These three ethnic groups have remained at a fairly consistent levels within their respective majority regions, have been moderately geographically secure, and have historically fought for political power and relevance. Partition may be an option to represent 99 percent of the Iraqi population. Because each ethnic group has been in conflict with at least one of the other two majorities, partitioning may also be a way to lessen ethnic-warring. Through partitioning, cases like the Hussein regimes ethnic minority ruling ethnic majorities may be eliminated.


This idea of partition is supported by international relations theorist Chaim Kaufmann's findings regarding ethnic conflict,

First, in ethnic wars both hyper nationalist mobilization rhetoric and real atrocities harden ethnic identities to the point that cross-ethnic political appeals are unlikely to be made and even less likely to be heard. Second,

intermingled population settlement patterns create real security dilemmas that intensify violence, motivate ethnic 'cleansing,' and prevent de-escalation unless the groups are separated.³¹

By understanding that mixing ethnic groups causes conflict, it becomes clear that forming a cohesive and fully inclusive government may not be the best or most effective method of governance. This may be especially true in a country with a tribal history. During the Ottoman Empire and even through British occupation, Iraq's social and political structure was strongly influenced by tribal structure. These more local and specialized forms of government are better suited to diverse ethnic groups. The Iraqi tribal structure allowed conflicting groups to be semi-autonomous and as a result lessened some of the ethnic power struggle. Although on a larger scale, partitioning Iraq may have the same effect as the historical tribal structures.

³¹ Chaim Kauffman. "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars." *International Security*. 20.4 (1996): Print. 160



Another main option for the US is to promote diplomatic discussions between warring factions in Iraq. This may include bargaining over disputed territories, but more importantly should involve coming to a consensus on a new constitution in which each ethnic and religious group feels fairly represented in the government.

Finally, the United States has the option to send more troops to Iraq, in order to suppress insurgencies and stabilize the country. For Iraq to progress politically, it needs to be secure, and if the US were to provide a surge of troops it may allow the necessary level of stability for the 2010 elections to have equal ethnic voter turnout.


Recommendations to US:

The recommendations to the US government as we continue our involvement in Iraq revolve around the recognition of cultural differences within the Iraqi people and between Iraqis and the United States. It is important to keep in mind that Iraq is a

fundamentally different society from our own. Deep ethnic and religious cleavages may prevent a divided society from ever functioning as a cooperative whole. Though this is discordant with the United States goal of Iraqi democracy, similar to our own, it is a truth that must be accepted in order to move forward with development. By

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For Iraq to progress politically, it needs to be secure.
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understanding these fundamental differences, US policy makers may be able to start to think outside the box when it comes to developing an effective form of Iraqi governance. By keeping in mind the historic conflicts between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, the US can hopefully begin to lessen these Iraqi divides, and quell insurgency. As with any case, understanding the basics of a country is of utmost important before forming any plans of development. The lack of foresight and understanding of the Iraqi people has cost the US years, thousands of US and Iraqi lives,



• • •
The lack of foresight and understanding of the Iraqi people has cost the US years, thousands of US and Iraqi lives, and billions of dollars..
 • • •

and billions of dollars.

Although partitioning is an interesting and possibly beneficial

option for Iraq, it holds too much risk and uncertainty for the US to implement. As the US has already poured billions of dollars into the current political structure in Iraq, it would not only seem retroactive to the international community, it would place an even larger economic burden on US tax payers. The better course of action for the United States is to take a stronger position on equal representation in the Iraqi government. The United States needs to proctor diplomatic discussions in disputed territories such as Kirkuk, and help to blend the needs of the three major ethnic groups. The culmination of these efforts should be a redrafting of the constitution. By doing this without such a strict deadline, and led by Iraqis, Iraq may be

able to draft a constitution that represents the needs of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds.

Using overwhelming force in Iraq is also not the most practical or favorable option. While there is the potential to control sectarian violence, sending more forces to Iraq is unpractical given the push to leave Iraq. Sending more US troops will cost more tax payer dollars and may make it hard to withdraw soon, if newly found peace is due to the stabilization of US troops. Although this is not the best option for proceeding in Iraq, it is an option to remember in future interventions. Providing more troops early in an occupation allows for increased levels of security and added structure. It would be easier for the US to send more troops over initially and then withdraw if needed, and this will help to prevent initially damages and squash startup insurgent groups.

The best recommendation for the US as we proceed in Iraq is to support one political group and to promote their control over Iraq.


By gaining a singular source of governance in Iraq, control could be more easily harnessed. Instead of attempting to have equal representation in the government, it is more important to have the values of all ethnic groups represented in the constitution. If the fundamentals of the Iraqi government meet the needs of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, a less representative government will not only be more feasible, but will make governmental action and decisions easier. Having the governmental power divided between ethnic groups, pins the interests of these groups against one another. With one group in power, the needs of all Iraqis can be better met, without and intergovernmental struggle for power.

The case study of Iraq lends some universal lessons that can be applied to other instances of US intervention. These lessons include, but are not limited to:

- **Using local resources.** In the case of Iraq this would include Baath party members.

When the US enters a foreign country it needs to utilize the resources at hand. This will not only help to keep costs lower but will also be more sustainable. It is not feasible for the United States to govern a foreign country and then try to pass the power off. Had the US used the trained and experienced Baath officials, there may have been more collaborative work and a better outcome. This also applies to disbanding the Iraqi army. Using existing knowledge and experience is more productive and effective.

- **Do not alienate large groups. This may apply to ethnic groups or simply organized groups.** By banning Baath party members from the new government, the US not only threw away capable and qualified resources, but also alienated the previously ruling class. This only heightened cultural rifts between Sunni and Shias. By alienating the ruling Sunni class, balances of power were



dramatically shifted and some degree of chaos was bound to result.

- **Do not favor certain groups.** By favoring the Shia political exiles during the Iraqi elections, the US slighted other ethnic groups and as a result appeared to press their own agenda in Iraq. This discredited the US presence in Iraq and led to a lack of equal representation.

- **Learn from past examples.** The British tried to implement a novel form of government in the 1900s and failed as a result of the historically fragmented population. The U.S. could have used this historical attempt as a strong lesson to not force foreign government structures on another country.

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Bosnia

The Crisis in the Balkans

Eric Thesen

Issue

This case study examines the conflict in the Balkans that took place between 1991 and 1995, including both the Bosnian War and the conflicts that broke out in other Balkan states. The study focuses more specifically on the war in the Balkans in the context of American interests and perceptions, the role of the United States in mediating the conflict and the principles and lessons learned for future interventions. The disintegration of the Republic of Yugoslavia, which began in 1991, precipitated Europe's worst conflict since World War II, resulting in roughly a quarter million deaths and a massive refugee crisis. American interests were not self-evident in the crisis, provoking a poorly implemented United Nations Peacekeeping force, but prolonging more substantive American involvement until NATO bombings in 1995.

The war in the Balkans is a valuable case study, offering a variety of lessons that

can and should be applied to American intervention in failed states in the future. More specifically, the American experience in Bosnia calls into question the efficacy of UN peace keeping operations and diverging perceptions of exactly what degree of human suffering constitutes sufficient justification for American intervention. Additionally, the case of Bosnia reaffirms the need to not oversimplify conditions on the ground, both in terms of causes and solutions, and demonstrates the effectiveness of prevention over delayed involvement in failed states and the necessity of clarity of objectives during intervention.

Background

The crisis in the Balkans in the 1990's is and always has been enigmatic to many in the West. The region is anomalous in nature, and few scholars or policy makers are able to fully grasp the complexities of its inhabitants and their politics. When the crisis eventually gained the attention of the world, many

looked to the past for an explanation for the sudden bloodshed. While many factors were at play, some roots of the conflict are distinguishable in the region's long history.

The Pre-State Period

The Balkans is a region in southeastern Europe, bordered by the Black, Adriatic and Mediterranean seas, and consisting of the modern day nations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and arguably Romania and Slovenia as well. More than fifteen different ethnic groups have lived in the region for centuries. The largest groups in the former Yugoslavia are the Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims, Macedonians and Montenegrins.¹ As Mark Almond writes of the region's notoriously complex past, "anyone daring to step into the disputed minefield of Yugoslav history is likely to face sniping from all sides... Any history of the Balkans and foreign involvement in the politics of the


¹ Cox

peninsula cannot avoid depressing the reader."²

The region's history of ethnic strife contains a diverse array of allegiances, identities and meta-narratives. Many in the West described the events of the 1990's as simply inevitable manifestations of "ancient hatreds," glossing over the idiosyncrasies of the region's convoluted history. Former Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, sardonically described the popular usage of the term ancient hatreds as "a vague but useful term for history too complicated (or trivial) for outsiders to master, made it impossible (or pointless) for anyone outside the region to try to prevent the conflict."³ A highly detailed analysis of the region's history is beyond the scope of this study but it is fair to say that the various ethnic groups experienced long stretches of both peace and war, living since the Middle Ages until 1918 under the rule of different empires. Slovenes

² Almond (1994): ix-xi

³ Holbrooke (1998): 22



and Croats lived mostly under the rule of the Hapsburg Empire from Vienna while the Bosnian Muslims and the majority of Serbs lived predominantly under the rule of the Turkish Ottoman Empire.⁴

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**Religious fault lines
 are a crucial
 component of Balkan
 dynamics...**
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Religious fault lines are a crucial component of Balkan dynamics; the Serbs have a celebrated Christian Orthodox heritage, Croats are predominantly Roman Catholic, and much of Bosnia is inhabited by Bosniaks, who are generally Muslim.⁵ Bogdan Denitch comments that, for the Serbs, “a separate religion was both grounds for discrimination and a basis for maintaining a distinct national identity. It is very unlikely that the Serbs would have maintained a separate national identity from the Croats in the Austrian Empire if it had not been for the Serbian Orthodox church.”⁶ It is worth noting that the role of religion was particularly

complicated in Bosnia, an extremely heterogeneous territory. Steven Burg and Paul Shoup write that “language, historical experiences, economic conditions and other elements of culture were nonetheless shared, if not always experienced in identical ways, by the three religious communities.” Yet these commonalities never equated to a common idea of a Bosnian nation.⁷

The Formation of Yugoslavia

Composed of the current states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, Yugoslavia was amalgamated into a kingdom in 1918 following the disintegration of the Austrian Empire at the end of the First World War (See Figure 1). It quickly became clear that the Serbs, Yugoslavia’s most numerous ethnic group, were not interested in a completely balanced power scheme and that ethnic divisions would be extremely

⁴ Cox
⁵ Bert (1997): 23
⁶ Denitch (1996): 24

⁷ Burg and Shoup (1999): 19

politicized.⁸ The political structure of Yugoslavia was highly contested, with “the Serbs wanting a strong centralized government, where they would have the most influence, while the Slovenes and Croats preferred a federation that gave local units

most of the political authority.”⁹ Since its inception, Yugoslavia failed to spawn political parties that transcended ethno-nationalist self-identification. Mark Almond writes that

“from the start, Serbs supported Serb-led parties and Croats followed their own leaders. It was much the same with other nationalities, in so far as they participated in politics at all.”¹⁰

Denitch writes that, “the lack of thorough negotiations about unification meant that major differences on how the new state was to be organized were hastily papered over” and that, while the Croats, Slovenes, and Bosniaks thought of Yugoslavia as “a

voluntary federation of equal peoples who would jointly construct a new state,” the Serbs “basically regarded the new state as an extension of Serbia.”¹¹ This

Serbian understanding of the meaning of

Yugoslavia would come back to haunt the region in the 1990’s. The basic imbalance of power and divergence in perceptions is one of the most significant roots of the eventual collapse of Yugoslavia. It is also worth noting that for the first twenty years after 1918,



Source: “Former Yugoslavia.” Map. US Central Intelligence Agency. 22 Feb. 2010 <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/fm_yugosl_yugo_pol96.jpg>.

8 Almond (1994): 118

9 Brune (1998): 65

10 Almond (1994): 119

11 Denitch (1996): 24-5

“Bosnia-Herzegovina remained under the administrative control of Belgrade” (the capital of Serbia) while Muslims “enjoyed *de facto* autonomy with respect to religious matters and education.”¹² While these various ethnicities, religions, and cultures had achieved a degree of unity under a single flag, what Yugoslavia should be remained highly contested.

The Second World War

For Yugoslavia, like every other country in Europe, World War II was a greatly destabilizing crisis. However, perhaps in the Balkans more than any other part of the world, what happened during the War never left the collective psyche of the region’s peoples. The atrocities committed during the war are remembered distinctly by all sides in the former Yugoslavia and the ethnic cleansing campaigns of the 1990’s were viewed by many as a natural continuation of the horrors of World War Two.

Adolf Hitler ordered the invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941 and after the ruler at the time, King Peter, fled to England, the Germans established puppet governments in Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia.¹³ While brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing were conducted against Slavs, Jews and Gypsies by Hungarians, Bulgarians, Italians and Albanians, the most atrocious campaigns were conducted by “Croatia’s pro-Nazi Ustashe, led by Ante Pavelic, who used racial, religious, personal and irrational excuses to kill or deport non-Croatians.” Estimates of Ustashe victims ranging from 350,000 to 750,000 deaths and another 300,000 deportees.¹⁴ While all parties were responsible for some level of brutality during World War Two in the Balkans, the Serbs arguably more than any other group have integrated suffering they withstood during the War into their collective identity.

¹² Burg and Shoup (1999): 36

¹³ Brune (1998): 66-7

¹⁴ Brune (1998): 67

The deputy mayor of Prijedor, a town in Bosnia where Croats and Muslims were put to death in camps in the 1990's, said that "there is a direct connection...during World War Two the Croats killed us; this time it was the other way around, we killed them. Perhaps in fifty years, it will happen again to us."¹⁵ To many, the genocide in Bosnia in the 90's was just a matter of picking up where things left off. As Wayne Bert writes of World War Two, "that period has become a major reference point for the demonization, historical distortion and ethnic stereotyping that is central to ethnic conflict."¹⁶

Rule under Tito

Yugoslavia's future leader, Josip Broz Tito became influential conducting guerilla operations against the German occupation and at the conclusion of World War Two Tito and the Yugoslav communists came to power in Yugoslavia. "The inauguration of the new regime was marked by a massacre of its

enemies" as occupiers and their collaborators were exterminated during a Tito-directed death march in 1945 which killed between 20,000 and 30,000 people.¹⁷ Yugoslavia emerged from

• • •
Rule under Tito masked ethnic animosities under highly centralized and aggressive leadership, and Tito managed to create a relatively successful socialist system.
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World War II and the constitution of 1946 made it a socialist federated republic where "a one-party government restricted political dissent, violated civil liberties, conducted 'rigged' elections, and sacrificed individual rights to the 'greater good' of the state."¹⁸


Tito went on to rule Yugoslavia for 34 years, from 1946 until his death in 1980. Rule under Tito masked ethnic animosities under highly centralized and aggressive leadership, and Tito managed to create a relatively successful socialist system, claiming neutrality during the Cold War and receiving

¹⁵ Oberschall (2000): 989

¹⁶ Bert (1997): 24

¹⁷ Almond (1994): 150

¹⁸ Brune (1998): 68



aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union. Tito had managed to effectively discourage the nationalist sentiments of Yugoslavia's opposing ethnic groups, something made much easier by the fact that the Serbs, the republic's largest ethnic group, did not comprise more than forty percent of the population.¹⁹

"Tito's scheme was to create six national republics which theoretically had autonomy, but owed primary loyalty to Tito and the party."²⁰ Tito created a concentration camp on the island of Goli Otok and dealt extremely violently with those who opposed his policies in Yugoslavia, suppressing ethno-national sentiments through cooperation, power balancing, and the terror of persecution.²¹

The Post-Tito Period

Immediately following the death of Tito in 1980, concerns over the economy, democratization and integration with Europe

seemed to marginalize ethno-nationalist sentiments. But ethnicity slowly began to play a greater and greater role in politics.²² Tom Gallagher describes a Yugoslavia in which "civil society remained stillborn, along with those political initiatives which might have enabled successful mobilizations against destructive forms of nationalism to have taken place in the 1980's. Citizenship lacked effective means of expression. Collective identities prevailed over individual ones."²³ With the death of Tito, the imposition of Yugoslavian identity waned and political allegiance was increasingly determined by ethnic identification. George Schopflin comments that "Tito's enormous prestige, authority and power brought with it the major disadvantage that it was all but impossible for a reasonably open-minded and sophisticated successor generation to take its place."²⁴

Bogdan Denitch writes that "by 1990 Yugoslavia was irreversibly on the road to

¹⁹ Denitch (1996): 36

²⁰ Bert (1997): 25

²¹ Almond (1994): 158

²² Denitch (1996): 38

²³ Gallagher (2003): 11

²⁴ Schopflin (2006): 24

multiparty pluralism as the framework within which both the fate of democracy and the future of the Yugoslav federation itself would be determined.”²⁵ As a result of the combination of long dormant ethno-nationalist yearnings and the inability of the Yugoslav government to resolve a variety of pressing economic and political issues, the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia began in 1991 with Slovenia and then Croatia declaring independence from Yugoslavia. By April 1992, Yugoslavia had fallen apart. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia became independent states and the union of Serbia and Montenegro maintained the name of Yugoslavia.²⁶

Small conflicts had broken out before the complete disintegration, and continued to intensify as the new nations fought for territory. Serbia’s extremely aggressive and now notorious leader, Slobodan Milosevic, was able to maintain control of much of the

Yugoslavian National Army following the breakup of Yugoslavia because the majority of its officers were ethnic Serbs.²⁷ In June of 1991, Milosevic sent forces to Slovenia in an attempt to preclude their secession. The conflict was short-lived however, and after ten days of fighting Milosevic withdrew his forces.²⁸

More substantive fighting broke out in August between the Serbs and the Croats in Croatia. At first isolated to local incidents, it escalated with the support of Milosevic in Belgrade and within weeks it had spread through Croatia.²⁹ A peace agreement was signed between Croatia and Serbia by the end of 1991 but did not last and in early 1992 full scale ethnic cleansing broke out in Bosnia. As seen in Figure 2, ethnic group dispersion in the former Yugoslavia was messy and did not cohere to the newly formed national boundaries, particularly in Bosnia.

²⁵ Denitch (1996): 42

²⁶ Brune (1998): 78

²⁷ Brune (1998): 78

²⁸ Holbrooke (1998): 29

²⁹ Holbrooke (1998): 30

Wayne Bert notes that, “the status of the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia was the most important issue standing between peace and war” and Serbia was intent on unifying its peoples as states were rapidly seceding from Yugoslavia (Serbs made up 32 percent of the Bosnian population and 12-14 percent of the Croatian population at the outset of the war).³⁰ As Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman, Croatia’s leader, vied


cleansing campaigns were conducted, leaving the Bosnian Muslims, without an external state’s support, particularly vulnerable.

US Interests

At first, an analysis of American interests in the region and the conflict is striking in that very few interests appear self-evident beyond humanitarian exigencies. Like other major

As Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman, Croatia’s leader, vied for territory and the protection of their own, Bosnia was cut up and full-scale ethnic cleansing campaigns were conducted

humanitarian crises that occurred during the war in Bosnia - Rwanda, Haiti, and Somalia for example - it was unclear to US policymakers whether or not they had any relevant interests in the crises. The Balkans are not resource rich; no American lives were at risk; an over-arching war on terror was not yet an issue; and, most importantly, intervention in failed states was no longer seen in the context of the Cold War. In 1991, Secretary of State



Source: “Yugoslavia Ethnic Divides.” Map. Dan Kiser: US Department of State. 22 Feb. 2010 <<<http://www.srpska-mreza.com/MAPS/Ethnic-groups/map-State-Dept.html>>>.

for territory and the protection of their own, Bosnia was cut up and full-scale ethnic

³⁰ Bert (1997): 32-4

James Baker famously said of American interests in Bosnia that “we don’t have a dog in that fight.”³¹

Ultimately, American interests in the conflict can be boiled down to three major subjects. The first is purely humanitarian, a factor that to many observers was more than enough to justify intervention in the genocide. Many policy makers and analysts were hopeful that the conclusion of the Cold War signified an opportunity for the United States to make the promotion of human rights and the alleviation of human suffering central to its foreign policy. In 1993 John Shattuck, the assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, said “with the passing of the Cold War, all of its negative impact has changed. The basic principles of human rights and democracy must no longer be debased with impunity. Nor should they be blinked at for the sake of some larger geostrategic goal. Rather, they must be

restored to their rightful primary place in the relationship among nations.”³²

Second, the crisis in the Balkans was seen as a major test of the reliability of the United States, the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and their willingness to demonstrate an intolerance for aggression and human rights abuses, as well as the coherence of NATO as a whole. Wayne Bert writes “the argument goes that if NATO shows that it is not up to the challenge of an appropriate response to the Yugoslav crisis, then it will not have a future as a military organization.”³³ John Thompson, Britain’s UN ambassador in 1993, said that the United Nations and NATO, which were meant to provide security, were “weakened by the success with which the Serbs and the Croats have called their bluff. As a result, the assumption that there is some sort of collective global security has been undermined, making international chaos a real

³¹ Shattuck (2003): 119

³² Forsythe (1997): 257

³³ Bert (1997): 66

possibility.”³⁴ In *The Road to the Dayton Accords*, Derek Chollet argues that the strengthening and enlargement of NATO was President Clinton’s chief policy priority in Europe and this objective was threatened by NATO’s perceived impotence in Bosnia.³⁵

Finally, the United States had a strategic interest in containment of the conflict and stability in Europe. In *The Reluctant Superpower: United States’ Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95*, author Wayne Bert writes that “the potential involvement of other former Yugoslavian republics seemed significant in the early phases of the Bosnian War” and describes fears over the potential for the conflict in Bosnia to provoke a Serb or Greek invasion of Macedonia and the involvement of Bulgaria or Hungary in the conflict.³⁶

A poll of the American public in the summer of 1992 offers in part a reflection of the perceived lack of American interests in

the conflict, showing that only “43 percent favored the use of ground troops to

provide humanitarian relief in Bosnia” and over two-thirds of the public were against the use of ground troops for the sake of ending the violence.³⁷ Ultimately, none of these previously discussed interests proved overwhelmingly compelling to American policymakers, obfuscating the debate over involvement and prolonging heavy-handed American intervention until 1995.

American involvement in the conflict was reluctant and indecisive

Options


Reflecting its limited interests, the simultaneous developments in Somalia and Haiti and budgetary woes, American involvement in the conflict was reluctant and indecisive. The United States’ chose to act primarily through the United Nations and NATO while not pushing in either of these forums for aggressive engagement, essentially

³⁴ Gallagher (2003): 128

³⁵ Chollet (2005): 185

³⁶ Bert (1997): 66

³⁷ Herrmann and Peterson (1997): 302



equating to a major lack of involvement in the crisis as it developed. Focused on more pressing matters at the time, “the United States decided to dump the problem on the United Nations—to act only multilaterally. It seems that, by this time, it was already clear to American policymakers that the United Nations might not be up to the task, and that this move was meant merely to sweep the problem under the UN carpet.”³⁸

In 1991, the United States supported the United Nations arms embargo of the former Yugoslavia and the deployment of peacekeepers to maintain the ceasefire between the Croats and Serbs. When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 713 that supported an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, it was at the request of its Serb-dominated government.³⁹ While the imposition of an arms embargo on a region in conflict was ostensibly a good idea, the international community was unaware of the local


conditions, with grievous results. Serbs had asked for the arms embargo because they already had control over the majority of the weapons in the region and were attempting to limit the ability of the Croats and Bosniaks to import arms and resist the formation of Greater Serbia in self-defense.

The United Nations successfully mediated a cease-fire and peace agreement in late 1991, signed by Tudjman and Milosevic and enforced by the deployment of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) of 14,000 soldiers which arrived in January of 1992, predominantly from Britain and France, with no American soldiers involved.⁴⁰ Cease-fire zones in Croatia were finalized and maintained and the conflict shifted quickly to Serbian and Croatian attempts to carve out territory and influence in the hapless Bosnia. Bosnia had voted for independence in February of 1992, but this was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs who soon declared Serbian autonomous regions within Bosnia and began

³⁸ Popovic (2006): 45

³⁹ Bert (1997): 34

⁴⁰ Brune (1998): 89



the campaign of ethnic cleansing to create homogenous pockets of Serbs, to which Croats and Bosniaks responded with as much force as possible.⁴¹

The United Nations reacted to the shifting nature of the conflict by imposing economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, airlifting aid to Bosnia and deploying UN forces in Bosnia. Lester Brune writes that “while Bush opposed NATO air strikes, he did accept collective action to establish no-fly zones and a tighter

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...bureaucratic regulations went so far that the peacekeeping forces were able to do very little to protect innocent civilians in Bosnia.
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naval blockade to enforce the UN arms embargo and economic sanctions.”⁴² The role of the UN in supplying aid to Bosnia is seen as an unequivocal success, as “over 2,000 metric tons of stores a day were delivered to

even the remotest parts of Bosnia along roads built by the UN and using airfields operated by the UN.”⁴³

While the aid supplied to Bosnia was effective, the UNPROFOR forces deployed there did little to curb ethnic cleansing campaigns and frequently in fact worsened the situation. The impotence of UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia is due primarily to the unclear and severely constrained mandate with which they were deployed and secondarily to a lack of manpower. The United Nations, with the support of American policy makers, stipulated that the UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia must adhere to the principles of impartiality and could use force only if fired upon or to support humanitarian objectives.

The UN’s desire for its peacekeeping forces to remain noncombatants is understandable, but the bureaucratic regulations went so far that the peacekeeping forces were able to do very little to protect

⁴¹ Bert (1997): 147

⁴² Brune (1998): 94

⁴³ Rose (1998): 156

innocent civilians in Bosnia. The UN peacekeeping forces were so committed to neutrality that they “were reluctant to use force against Serb aggression even when the Serbs blocked aid convoys, refused to move heavy weapons away from Sarajevo’s airport, and violated the no-fly zones and safe havens.”⁴⁴ Sir Michael Rose writes of peacekeeping forces that “if it is to deliver aid, maintain the regime of a total exclusion zone or deter attacks against Safe Areas then it will have to adopt a very forceful approach to peacekeeping indeed. To be credible, a peacekeeping mission must be in a position to escalate...to peace enforcement.”⁴⁵

In 1993, President Clinton, who had campaigned on a platform of heightened military involvement in Bosnia, initially failed to understand the idiosyncrasies of the conflict and to act more effectively through the UN and NATO.⁴⁶ After minor successes with airlifts and safe havens, on May 1

Clinton shifted course and unsuccessfully encouraged NATO air attacks against Serbs, partly as a result of the President’s distaste for the newly developed Vance-Owen peace plan.⁴⁷ The Vance-Owen plan, negotiated by the European Community and the United Nations, called for the division of Bosnia into “provinces which were then allocated according to a dominant ethnic group” but many American policymakers, and the President himself, felt that the plan “went too far in legitimizing Serb gains and ethnic partition.”⁴⁸

As *The New York Times* reported, a Security Council resolution proposed by the British and the French to offer the full support of the international community for the Vance-Owen plan was rejected by the Clinton Administration for rewarding Serbian aggression and leaving the Serbs in control of 43 percent of Bosnia.⁴⁹ Bert writes that “what such a plan added up to was a kind of hybrid

⁴⁴ Brune (1999): 91

⁴⁵ Rose (1998): 157

⁴⁶ Bert (1997): 164-7

⁴⁷ Brune (1999): 98

⁴⁸ Bert (1997): 191

⁴⁹ Lewis (1993)

state where a weak central government maintained a façade of multi-ethnicity, but the provinces in effect segregated people according to ethnic group or religion.”

Clinton refused to endorse the plan but also failed to offer many constructive alternatives for it and declined to take military action.⁵⁰

After prolonged inaction and the intensification of conflict in Bosnia, President Clinton finally settled on a more aggressive stance towards ending the violence in the Balkans. “The evolution of this involvement apparently was driven by the White House’s gradual realization that Balkans problems could be resolved and European security reestablished only if the US exerted a major role in directing the peace effort.”⁵¹ The massacre of Srebrenica in the summer of 1995, in which Serb forces over-ran a UN declared safe haven in the town of Srebrenica in Bosnia and killed thousands of Bosnian

Muslims, was perhaps the greatest catalyst for action.⁵²

In late August 1995, President Clinton successfully prodded NATO into extensive bombing campaigns against Serbian weapons, air defenses, munitions stores, and communications infrastructure in Bosnia and “for the first time in the war had taken military action that had a decisive impact on the Serbs and their ability to fight the war.”⁵³

Clinton however stubbornly continued to support the arms embargo on Bosnia, going so far as to veto twice congressional legislation that would end American participation in the embargo.⁵⁴

Clinton’s new commitment to aggressive and direct diplomatic engagement, in conjunction with NATO bombing campaigns against the Serbs, quickly yielded results in the form of the Dayton Peace Accords. The presidents of Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and leaders of Bosnia’s

⁵⁰ Bert (1997): 193-5

⁵¹ Brune (1999): 100

⁵² Cushman and Mestrovic (1996): 1

⁵³ Bert (1997):220-4

⁵⁴ Purdum (1995)

factions engaged in negotiations for three weeks in Dayton, Ohio and reached an agreement on November 21 of 1995, later signed in completion on December 14 in Paris.⁵⁵ The Accords stipulated that Bosnia would be a unified country divided between a Muslim-Croat federation and a Serbian republic and would have a “weak central government that ultimately lacked authority over the ethnically based entities.”⁵⁶

Although Dayton is widely regarded as an overwhelming success and, as Richard Holbrooke points out, over 30 ceasefires and agreements in Bosnia existed and failed before the success of the Dayton Accords, and many academics and politicians were critical of the plan.⁵⁷ The most prominent critique was that, by accepting the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines, the Accords legitimized Serbian aggression. It is worth noting that President Clinton rejected the 1993 Vance-Owen plan largely because he felt that it

rewarded Serbia’s hostility in Bosnia, which would have given the Serbs 43 percent of Bosnian territory, and two years later accepted the Dayton Accords that left the Serbs with 49 percent of Bosnian territory.⁵⁸ Thus with Dayton, the US under Clinton not only supported the precedent of benefiting from aggressive land grabs and ethnic cleansing, but also lacked a clearly defined understanding of what outcomes were and were not acceptable.

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

The United States’ role in the conflict is now widely regarded as being terribly inadequate. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1995, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke referred to the former Yugoslavia as “the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930’s.”⁵⁹ What lessons can be learned from America’s role in a conflict that took the lives of hundreds of thousands?


⁵⁵ Brune (1999): 108

⁵⁶ Silber (2005)

⁵⁷ Holbrooke (2005): ix

⁵⁸ Bert (1997): 195

⁵⁹ Holbrooke (1998): 21



One major criticism is that . Many in the Bush and Clinton administrations portrayed the Bosnian War as a natural manifestation of ancient religious and ethnic hatreds occurring in the context of a civil war in which all sides were equally guilty. Thus, the severity of the conflict was underestimated and the implementation of genocidal policies and aggressive tactics by Milosevic were not identified. Many in the West failed to fully appreciate the degree to which Milosevic was committed to a campaign of ethnic cleansing and the extent to which Bosnian Muslims were vulnerable to these policies.

Marko Prelec writes that the West’s role in the Balkans was “a failure of understanding: the Western world did not, or would not, fully come to grips with the nature of the war and its combatants, and therefore has been unable to craft a constructive response.”⁶⁰ This lack of sensitivity to local dynamics was a major obstacle to a more


⁶⁰ Prelec (1993): 191

effective role for the United States in the former Yugoslavia, complicating its involvement there and sometimes causing unintentionally deleterious results despite good intentions. As a principle, the United States must be acutely aware of local dynamics when attempting

to intervene in a failed state and acknowledge that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to American involvement in failed states is destined to fail.

American support for the United Nations arms embargo imposed on all of the states of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 is a strong example of the United States’ inattention to local conditions and the following regrettable consequences. Ostensibly, an arms embargo on states engaged in civil conflict seems like an

• • •
American policymakers over-simplified conditions on the ground to their own detriment... the United States must be acutely aware of local dynamics when attempting to intervene in a failed state
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intelligent policy, and perhaps in a prototypical civil conflict this policy would have led to success. However in Bosnia, Serbians were in control of the majority of arms at the outset of the war, having maintained control of Yugoslav military supplies, while the Croats, and to an even greater extent the Bosnian Muslims, were left without the means to adequately defend themselves.⁶¹ In future conflicts, the United States must pay special consideration to the potential existence of an arms imbalance that could lead to a situation of defenseless slaughter before imposing arms embargoes.


Another major lesson learned is that United Nations' peacekeepers are futile unless they have an adequate mandate to keep order and defend civilians. Many critics suggest that a UN force with restrictions like 'fire only when fired upon' is in fact worse than no international intervention at all because local civilians are given the impression that they are safe in certain areas when they are not.

⁶¹ Brune (1999): 78

This principle is seen most horrifically in the massacre of Srebrenica in 1995 in which Bosnian civilians sought safety in a UN proclaimed "safe haven." When Serb forces overran the safe haven, the undermanned and overregulated UN forces were forced to sit and watch as over 7,000 Bosnian civilians were executed by Serb forces.⁶² While some level of neutrality and bureaucratic regulation is necessary for UN peacekeeping forces, the United States should not support the deployment of peacekeeping forces that are not adequately prepared, both in terms of force size and operational capacities, to effectively execute their missions.

In general, the United States should try to act multilaterally in dealing with failed states, but must avoid supporting policies that are poorly thought out or employing institutions like NATO and the United Nations as a substitute for substantive involvement. Bogdan Denitch argues that, "here we must remind ourselves that the

⁶² Chollet (2005): 24



limitation of the powers of the UN forces is mostly the result of US and West European policies, just as the passivity of the European Community and NATO is in good part, although not exclusively, the result of the absence of an energetic and clear US policy.”⁶³ It is apparent that in Bosnia, for the majority of the conflict, the United States was content to obscure debate over a more significant American role in the conflict by pawning the problem off onto international institutions, a practice which must be avoided.


Additionally, clarity of objectives and acceptable costs was lacking during the United States’ involvement in the Balkans. Uncertainty concerning US goals and acceptable costs in failed states seriously undermines any attempt at foreign intervention. This is seen in Bosnia in a variety of manifestations. At first the United States considered NATO airstrikes as undesirable and later pushed NATO to engage in them. In 1993, 43 percent of Bosnia

⁶³ Denitch (1996): 195

controlled by Serbia was unacceptable, but in 1995, 49 percent Serbian-controlled was permissible.⁶⁴ Fluctuations like these undermine international American credibility and the ability of politicians and military personnel to assess and carry out missions. Whenever possible, the American government should establish very clearly defined objectives and costs when intervening in failed states.

Finally, the United States should emphasize prevention in failed states before full-scale conflict breaks out. A variety of scholars and policymakers, including ambassador Warren Zimmerman, have commented that Milosevic and Tudjman may well have interpreted American passivity during the escalation of hostilities in Bosnia as an acceptance of all manners of aggressive policies and that if even a small fraction of the bombing campaigns conducted in 1995 had occurred in 1991 the war may have been

⁶⁴ Bert (1997): 195



precluded entirely.⁶⁵ Eventual decisive action in the form of air strikes in this case was clearly effective as Serbs were anxious to bargain at Dayton following NATO bombing campaigns, when years of soft American diplomacy had done little to encourage negotiations. This is seen again in the failure of the Vance-Owen plan, which was not supported by the United States in 1993, and allowed for the intensification of bloodshed in Bosnia before the US showed support for a similar treaty. American policymakers should be acutely aware that it is much more practical to prevent a state from failing than it is to reinstitute peace and order in a state that has already failed.

⁶⁵ Brune (1998): 93

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A decorative graphic on the right side of the page. It features a thick horizontal blue line at the top. Below it, several overlapping circles in various shades of blue (dark, medium, and light) are arranged in a descending pattern from top-right to bottom-right. Thin, light blue lines connect the centers of these circles, creating a series of triangles and a larger, irregular shape that frames the text area.

Lebanon

**An Analysis of Post-Conflict State
Reconstruction Strategies and
Implementations**

Ryan Torpie

Issue

Last year, the Republic of Lebanon celebrated the twenty-year anniversary of the Lebanese Parliament's approval of the Ta'if Accord on 4 November 1989. The Ta'if Accord marked the end of a fifteen-year civil war that is estimated to have killed 144,240, wounded 197,506, and caused a third of the population to emigrate.¹ Moreover, the war destroyed much of Lebanon's economy and infrastructure and inflicted heavy social costs. The most striking aspect of the Lebanese Civil War is that the warring factions were not merely the state and a well-defined rebel group, but a complex, multi-dimensional mix of parties fighting each other simultaneously and even fighting amongst themselves.² The dynamic nature of the Lebanese civil war makes an interesting case study for multi-

¹ Barak, Oren. "Don't Mention the War? The Politics of Remembrance and Forgetfulness in Postwar Lebanon." *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2007): 49-70. 52

² Makdisi, Samir A. *The Lessons of Lebanon: the Economics of War and Development*. I.B. Tauris Publishing, 2004. 42

ethnic/religious conflict resolution. In retrospect, important state reconstruction lessons can be learned. By tracing Lebanon's progress through the last two decades, one can examine the difficulties of heavy foreign involvement and time necessary for rebuilding states and infrastructure. Lebanon is generally no longer considered a failed state, but important lessons for other failed states can be learned from its history and transition out of weakness.

The social tensions derived from the salient sectarian divisions in Lebanese society played an enormous role in destabilizing the state and accelerating it into civil war. Such entities and groups, present before the founding of the state of Lebanon, have been a major obstacle to Lebanese nationalism and the development of a peaceful, cohesive Lebanese society. Since the inception of the state, these groups have been entrenched in the political system, often requiring representational quotas in relation to

population proportion.³ Thus, significant tensions in Lebanese politics and society are derived from not only historical conceptions defining group relationships but also the debate over how Lebanese nationality should be accomplished and portrayed. Lebanon is characterized by an institutionalized definition of identities, both political and social; the identity of individuals is determined by birth into a sectarian political community.⁴ Since the end of the civil war, instead of lessening, the sectarian identities have heightened.⁵

Additionally, the state, no doubt negatively influenced by the social conflicts, became reliant on outside support. Lebanon started under French influence following the First World War and many of its institutions reflected foreign concepts and organizations incongruous with Lebanese culture and

³ Safa, Oussama. "Lebanon Springs Forward." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, No. 1

(January 2006): 22-37. 25

⁴ Traboulsi, Fawwaz. *A History of Modern Lebanon*. Pluto Press: London, 2007. 174

⁵ Makdisi 149

needs.⁶ Already fragile because of its sectarian nature, the Lebanese government could not withstand the socio-political impact of the influx of displaced Palestinian Muslims who established camps in the south of the country.⁷ In addition to various socio-economic disparities within the Lebanese population, the effect of the Palestinian refugees and the PLO severely destabilized the government and rendered it susceptible to civil war.

Partially caused by the weakness of the Lebanese state, regional dynamics leading up to 1975 also took a toll on Lebanese political and civil society. In October 1973, an outbreak of hostilities with Israel brought renewed vigor to Israeli attacks on Southern Lebanon targeting the PLO but placing Lebanese citizens in the crossfire.⁸ These Israeli attacks not only made further problems for the Lebanese government, but prompted

⁶ Safa 25

⁷ Khalaf, Samir. *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon*. Columbia University Press: New York, 2002. 220

⁸ Khalaf 225

angry expressions of Arab nationalism, heightening already present tensions between Muslim and Christian groups in Lebanon.

Background

The major divisions in Lebanese society are religions, which were constantly perpetuated by the nature of sectarian quotas in government and administrative positions. The three major groups are Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shi'a Muslims. According to Badredine Arfi, Maronite identity involves four main dimensions: the historic role of Maronite religion, the ethnic and civilizational origin of the Maronites, the group memory of the massacres in the nineteenth century, and historical ties between the Maronites and the West.⁹ A significant factor in Maronite identity is the social construction of a sense of siege within the Arab world and a heightened

⁹ Arfi, Badredine. *International Change and the Stability of Multi-ethnic States: Yugoslavia, Lebanon and the Crisis of Governance*. Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2005. 184

awareness of stark religious differences.¹⁰ In November 1936, prominent Maronite leader Pierre Jumayyil created the Phalange (*Kataeb*) party “as a paramilitary youth organization to preserve and promote the Maronite sense of community and interests.”¹¹

The Sunni Muslims are of Arab origin and have always been the majority in the region. In Lebanon, they compose the second largest Muslim sect.¹² Under French preferential treatment of the Maronites, the Sunni sense of community was heightened.¹³ The Shi'a Muslims are the largest Islamic group in Lebanon. They live mostly in West Beirut and in its southern suburbs, southern Lebanon, and in the Biq'a Valley.¹⁴

Ottoman Empire (1516-1919)


¹⁰ Arfi 186

¹¹ Arfi 186

¹² Collelo, Thomas: editor. *Lebanon: a country study*. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. United States Government, Washington D.C.; 1989. 265

¹³ Arfi 189

¹⁴ Collelo 265



The area of contemporary Lebanon was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to the end of World War I. As a result of the diversity of the empire, the Ottomans institutionalized the millet system of governance that allowed religious groups and communities some measure of autonomy in local administration and legal operations.¹⁵ However, Ottoman rule was still characterized by the persecution of conspicuous religious minorities, rendering religious identification paramount in the region.¹⁶ And despite local autonomy, the Ottomans employed several renditions of “divide-and-conquer tactics” to control the different groups, promoting certain rivalries that remain today.¹⁷ Thus, the sectarian tensions of today are imprinted in groups’

¹⁵ Stewart, Dona J. “Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in Post-War Beirut” *Geographical Review*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Oct., 1996): 487-504. 489

¹⁶ Bieber, Florian. “Bosnia – Herzegovina and Lebanon: Historical Lessons of Two Multi-religious States.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr. 2000): 269-281.

¹⁷ Safa 24

memories and create a certain “legacy of bitterness.”¹⁸

Between 1860 and the First World War, the Ottomans created a provincial council in the territory known as ‘Mount Lebanon’ that achieved some measure of stability.¹⁹ This social and political stability was in part a result of the prototypical consociational apportionment of ruling positions based on sectarian groups, a system that would become cemented into Lebanese political culture.²⁰ Moreover, this exogenous rendition of political organization has had profound effects on contemporary Lebanese structure, encouraging and legitimizing the heavy role of outside influence in determining domestic affairs.²¹

French Mandate (1919-1943)


Following World War I, the League of Nations issued France a mandate to control

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Safa 25

²¹ *Ibid.*



Lebanon and Syria.²² Under French influence, Mount Lebanon expanded to include parts of Syria, adding more Shi'a and Sunni Muslims to the 'Lebanese' population.²³ The French modeled the Lebanese constitution after that of France's Third Republic, thus continuing the trend of outside dictation on internal affairs in Lebanon.²⁴ It was under the French constitution that the 6:5 Christian to Muslim ratio was institutionalized, and following the subsequent demographic changes leading up to 1975, caused salient grievances in the Lebanese Muslim community over accurate representation.²⁵ Harking to Christian similarities, the French favored the Lebanese Maronites and such promotion was reflected in the institutions of the French mandate period. This relationship effectively forged a connection between Europe and the Middle East, a connection cited often by Lebanese

Christians and denied by Lebanese Muslims.²⁶

From Independence to Civil War (1943-1975)

With sectarian divisions deeply ingrained in both society and political structures, the difficulty of creating a cohesive national identity was exponentially more difficult. Agreed upon by Sunni and Maronite leaders, the National Pact of 1943 was an unwritten agreement that shaped Lebanese politics for decades leading up to the

state's collapse in 1975.²⁷ It stipulated that both the Christian and Muslim communities identify with Lebanese state rather than the West or a pan-Arabism.²⁸ Additionally, it outlined a consociational political system in

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It was under the French constitution that the 6:5 Christian to Muslim ratio was institutionalized, and following the subsequent demographic changes leading up to 1975, caused salient grievances in the Lebanese Muslim community over accurate representation

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²² Stewart 488

²³ Safa 25

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Stewart 488

²⁷ Arfi 191

²⁸ *Ibid.*

which no single sect would be able to dominate.²⁹ But by institutionalizing the sects, the system solidified the identities without addressing the already nascent concerns and tensions between them.³⁰ According to the Pact, the president would always be Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi'ite.³¹ Moreover, the Pact stipulated near unanimity in national decisions, which later severely hindered the Lebanese government.³²

The creation of Israel in 1947 compromised the religious balance in Lebanon as a large influx of Palestinian refugees settled in southern Lebanon; by 1975, more than 350,000 Palestinians lived in Lebanon.³³ As the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) increased its activity in Lebanon, it started to support Lebanese

parties that opposed Maronite political hegemony, parties that “demanded a change in the political set-up in favor of more equitable power-sharing.”³⁴

In 1958, Lebanon experienced political and social turmoil in a war that stemmed from Lebanese Muslims’ desire to see Lebanon integrated in the newly founded United Arab Republic; it represented the “first major breakdown in political order after nearly a century of relative stability.”³⁵ Moreover, it rendered Lebanon more reliant on international actors as Lebanese President Camille Chamoun had to ask President Eisenhower to send troops to fight the Muslim rebels.³⁶ The fighting ended with Shihab’s presidency and through his “reputation for evenhandedness” and minor reforms in governance, religious divisions were temporarily healed.³⁷

²⁹ Safa 25

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Traboulsi 110

³² Safa 26


³³ Stewart 488; Hallenbeck, Ralph A. *Military Force as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982-February 1984*. Praeger Publishers: 1991. 2

³⁴ Makdisi 39

³⁵ Khalaf 142

³⁶ Khalaf 144

³⁷ Collelo 186



In 1970, the PLO was expelled from Jordan and moved into southern Lebanon, determined to continue the resistance against Israel from that location.³⁸ The weakness of the Lebanese state was evident as it was unable to take action against the PLO operating from within the Lebanese state.³⁹ Israel continued its reprisals against the PLO, sometimes injuring Lebanese villages and citizens.⁴⁰ And the presence of Muslim insurgents fighting against oppression served as inspiration to Lebanese Muslims who considered themselves cheated by the unequal representation in the state government.

October 1973 marked the start of a second Arab-Israeli War, necessitating a renewed friendship between the Lebanese and Syrian presidents, Franjiyah and al-Assad.⁴¹ This alliance engendered a treaty which required Syria's involvement in Lebanon's defense against Israel should another Israeli

attack occur.⁴² This marked a significant reliance on outside forces for domestic protection, a reliance that remained in place throughout the fifteen-year civil war. Throughout this brief war, the PLO continued to stage attacks from southern Lebanon, prompting a massive Israeli retaliation.⁴³ Ultimately, Israeli action effectively heightened the tension in southern Lebanese villages and in Beirut's suburbs, aggravating Lebanon's domestic issues. By June 1976, Syrian President al-Assad had sent a total of 15,000 Syrian troops to Lebanon. Syrian support engendered an Arab League meeting in Cairo in which the members agreed to send an Arab Deterrence Force (ADF) to Lebanon to highlight pan-Arab support.⁴⁴

Economically, the period leading up to 1975 witnessed the oil-boom that placed the Middle East at the apex of foreign capital and investment.⁴⁵ This influx of foreign economic

³⁸ Khalaf 221

³⁹ Khalaf 220

⁴⁰ Khalaf 165

⁴¹ Traboulsi, 182

⁴² Traboulsi, 182

⁴³ Khalaf 225

⁴⁴ Traboulsi 199

⁴⁵ Khalaf 163

activity in the region placed wealth in the hands of business owners and upper classes instead of the Lebanese national economy as a whole.⁴⁶ Thus, this period was also marked by significant economic disparity in Lebanese society.⁴⁷

The Civil War (1975-1990)

The 1975 -1990 Civil War in Lebanon was far from mono-causal. Sectarian strife was not a new phenomenon leading up to 1975; several other factors exacerbated the already fragile links composing the national Lebanese identity. The plural society, the weakness of the state, and regional dynamics all contributed to a war that lasted fifteen years.

On February 26, 1975 widespread violence in Lebanon began.⁴⁸ In Sidon, a group of fisherman protested against Protein, a corporate fishing company partially owned by Camille Chamoun, prompting the Lebanese army to open fire, killing several

protestors.⁴⁹ President Franjiyeh condoned the attack by blocking an investigation questioning the army's legitimate use of force.⁵⁰ Violent contacts between the PLO, various sectarian militias, and the Lebanese Army began to spring up and the government was slow to respond.⁵¹ Moreover, the Lebanese Army fell apart along confessional lines, rendering the state itself domestically defenseless.⁵² The violence between groups escalated through the spring of 1975, marked by the killing of civilians in a Phalange congregation outside a church and a Phalange retaliation, which killed 21 Palestinians.⁵³

After the Army opened fire on the protestors in February 1975, Franjiyeh formed a military cabinet on 23 May headed by Muslim Brigadier Nur ad Din Rifai, the retired commander of the Internal Security Force.⁵⁴ In September 1975, a new cease-fire

⁴⁶ Khalaf 163

⁴⁷ Collelo 94

⁴⁸ Traboulsi 183

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Khalaf 228

⁵¹ Traboulsi 183

⁵² Safa 27

⁵³ Traboulsi 183

⁵⁴ Traboulsi 188

was declared and a twenty-member committee called the Committee for National Dialogue (CND) was created to discuss reforms. During its tenure, the fighting in the country did not stop, but the committee did provide some hope for the people and exhibited some willingness and effort – at least by some parties – to stop the war.⁵⁵ The CND addressed the complicated conflict that was

‘sectarian in form and social in content and demands’ and held the system of ‘free enterprise’ responsible for the ‘social inequities, covered by sectarian packaging’ and consequently the prevailing violence.⁵⁶

A unanimous vote to reform the Lebanese system of sectarian quotas in parliamentary representation and administration was overridden by the ruling troika: Camille Chamoun, Suleiman Franjiyeh, and Pierre Jumayyil.⁵⁷

The founding of the Amal movement in 1975 by Shi’a leader Musa al-Sadr marked a significant solidification of armed militias

operating outside the context of the state and along sectarian lines and remained a powerful militia throughout the fifteen years of fighting.⁵⁸

Additionally, Hezbollah began in 1982 in response to

heavy and severe Israeli attacks on Southern Lebanon in search of PLO terrorists.⁵⁹

Throughout the civil war, Hezbollah gained both social and political momentum by providing a network of social services in Southern Lebanon, ultimately gaining the respect of much of the population there.⁶⁰

Such insurrection by Lebanese citizens of the state indicates a lack of consensus over the form of government and the identity of the country itself.⁶¹ The Lebanese state was severely weakened by the political grievances

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Throughout the civil war, Hezbollah gained both social and political momentum by providing a network of social services in Southern Lebanon
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⁵⁵ Traboulsi 190

⁵⁶ Traboulsi 191 (quoting Edmond Rabbath)

⁵⁷ Traboulsi 191

⁵⁸ Traboulsi, 192

⁵⁹ Safa 28

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Bieber 272

in some sects of the population from unequal representation in the government.⁶²

As the state collapsed into civil war, Lebanon was divided into smaller units characterized by multi-religious fighting for the control of the state.⁶³ These para-states “ensured social services, provided their respective population with food and other basic needs, developed their own administration and army.”⁶⁴ Some of these structures, interspersed throughout the country outside Beirut, even exercised the power to levy taxes from the territories under their control. Most notably, the Biqa’ Valley in the south was a prominent producer of hashish early in the conflict but later moved towards opium production for greater revenues.⁶⁵ While the semblance of a single state remained, the institutionalized fractionalization rendered the state all but powerless and represented a major difficulty

⁶² Makdisi 39
⁶³ Bieber 270
⁶⁴ Bieber 275
⁶⁵ Collelo 120

in ending the war, especially as some groups profited from the protracted fighting.⁶⁶ By the mid-1980s, the central government had lost the ability to effectively control the population and the escalation of the conflict. Various para-states hindered any national efforts to supply state services and terrorism, most notably through car bombs, became a daily occurrence to undermine whatever authority the state had claim to.⁶⁷

The Document of National Understanding (Ta’if Accord), discussed and signed in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia in September and October 1989, was “based on the reaffirmation of the principle of sectarian power-sharing, albeit according to a modified formula.”⁶⁸

In terms of regional influence on this particular pact, Syria played

⁶⁶ Makdisi 73
⁶⁷ Collelo 226
⁶⁸ Makdisi 79

• • •
While the semblance of a single state remained, the institutionalized fractionalization rendered the state all but powerless and represented a major difficulty in ending the war...
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a major role in both support and implementation of the Accord's stipulations.

The Ta'if Accord "recalibrated political power among Lebanon's various confessional communities" and represented a product of elected officials who were not, in most cases, belligerents in the war.⁶⁹ The Accord allowed certain members of the elite to remain in power but also granted some warlords and militia chiefs some decision-making power for postwar Lebanon.⁷⁰ Moreover, the Ta'if Accord stipulated a power-sharing structure of governance with the intent of promoting moderate and cooperative behavior among contending people.⁷¹ Ideally, such a power-sharing scheme would have allowed the different groups an arena for dialogue and

⁶⁹ Norton, Augustus Richard. "Lebanon after Ta'if: is the civil war over?" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991): 457-473. 460

⁷⁰ Safa 28

⁷¹ Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie. "Institutionalizing the Peace: Power Sharing and Post-civil war Conflict Management." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr. 2003): 318-332. 318

transparency. In Reality, it readjusted the sectarian power sharing by requiring equal representation for the Muslim and Christian communities, a change from the previous organization where the Maronite Christians claimed that they were the majority of the Lebanese population.⁷² Another change was in the dispersion of power among the three heads of state forming a ruling troika: the Sunni Prime Minister and the Shi'ite Speaker of Parliament gained greater powers while the Maronite President's constitutional powers were diminished.⁷³ And each position had the ability to veto one another, opening more opportunities for political stalemates and tug-of-wars.⁷⁴

Postwar Reconstruction (1990-2010)

Despite the ability of the Ta'if Accord to end the civil war and stave off massive civil violence for two decades, the political reconstruction based off the Ta'if Accords still has not been democratic; equal rights are

⁷² Makdisi 79

⁷³ Safa 27

⁷⁴ Safa 27; Makdisi 92

not enjoyed by each group of the population. Sectarianism is still firmly rooted in Lebanese political culture. thus, removing “the sectarian nature of the system [would] require a gradual cultural and political break with past modes of behavior.”⁷⁵ While the Ta’if Accord held the necessary elements to ending the civil war, it did not necessarily translate to contemporary Lebanese society.

State economic reconstruction efforts focused heavily on infrastructure such as factories and business centers in Beirut, the largest urban center in the country.⁷⁶ This has encouraged a socio-economic polarization in society because of the concentration of development in urban centers and lack of resources and development in the rural sector. Following the Ta’if Accord, the government expanded its role in the economy drastically from the war levels but did not implement necessary institutional reforms: transparency,

⁷⁵ Makdisi 167

⁷⁶ Makhoul 613

eradication of corruption and nepotism, and greater independence of the judicial system.⁷⁷

In 1977, the barraged Lebanese government founded the Council for Reconstruction and Development (CRD) as an entity responsible for drafting a plan for the comprehensive development of the state.⁷⁸ Its conception was derived from the belief that the war had mostly ended and it was necessary to start outlining drafts for national economic reconstruction.⁷⁹ However, once the fighting escalated again in 1983, financial and economic conditions deteriorated quickly, including the severe depreciation of the Lebanese pound, rendering any of the planned efforts mute.⁸⁰ After 1989, the new government planned the reconstruction of the state through two phases: short-term and long-term goals.⁸¹ The initial goals included a concerted effort to repair the “built environment,” which concerned commercial

⁷⁷ Makdisi 163

⁷⁸ Stewart 496

⁷⁹ Makdisi 66

⁸⁰ Makdisi 67

⁸¹ Stewart 495

and residential buildings and services of telephone lines and sewage systems.⁸² And the CDR developed certain long-term plans concerning investment programs with the intent of “restoring economic activity and alleviating social hardship.”⁸³ However, many of its proposed reforms fell short of its announced targets.⁸⁴

As the global economy becomes more important to individual nations’ economic success, a major challenge for Lebanon will be to integrate its own economy into the global system. A plan must be devised to “maximize [Lebanese] welfare by ensuring that the benefits of integration in the world economy outweigh, to the greatest possible extent, its associated costs.”⁸⁵ Thus, Lebanese political economy should focus on phases to open up to globalization. Essentially, this phasing will allow “viable national industries

to adapt to the conditions of open markets by becoming efficient and competitive.”⁸⁶

Since the end of the civil war, Lebanon has implemented numerous restoration projects in tandem with increased economic activity. Most notably, the Lebanese banking sector has substantially progressed and modernized.⁸⁷ There is certainly room for improvement, however, namely in bank monitoring.⁸⁸ And large public debt from the war years represents a major threat to further improvements and progress in the Lebanese economy.⁸⁹ Regional instability deters a large foreign direct investment (FDI) in Lebanon. Up to 2002, the relative price and exchange rate stability has largely been restored.⁹⁰ Moreover, the estimated GDP of Lebanon in 2001 ranked first among the non-oil producing Arab countries.⁹¹

⁸² Stewart 495

⁸³ Makdisi 118

⁸⁴ Makdisi 119

⁸⁵ Makdisi 171

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*


⁸⁷ Makdisi 92

⁸⁸ Makdisi 116

⁸⁹ Makdisi 92

⁹⁰ Makdisi 161

⁹¹ *Ibid.*



Socially, the reconstruction effort of Lebanon has been hindered by the fact that sectarian identities have gained more prominence after the end of the civil war.⁹² Because the war destroyed many public spaces, such as parks, market places, and neighborhoods in general, many places associated with inter-sectarian interaction disappeared.⁹³ Also, the sectarian nature of the civil war was at the expense of an overall Lebanese national identity. The war

The war provoked a mass exodus of affluent Lebanese citizens and an element of the post-war recovery plan was to entice Lebanese nationals living abroad to return.⁹⁵ In addition to the affluent, the war displaced a large population of the Lebanese middle and lower classes.

The United States' Actions and Interests

Over the years, the United States' general strategy and goals in the Middle East have been defined by three general principles: the Truman Doctrine (1945) and the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), which sought to contain Soviet Union influence in the area, the continued commitment of support for the state of Israel, and the determination to protect a continued availability of military bases and communication.⁹⁶ During Lebanon's 1957-58 conflict, the United States responded to President Chamoun's request for intervention and protection by sending 14,000 troops. Lebanon had signed the Eisenhower

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Socially, the reconstruction effort of Lebanon has been hindered by the fact that sectarian identities have gained more prominence after the end of the civil war.
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ultimately heightened sectarian identities and simultaneously emphasized conflicting sectarian aspirations.⁹⁴ Even

before the war, such salient cleavages were recognized and suggestions were made to help eradicate the stark divides between the groups.

⁹² Makdisi 149

⁹³ Stewart 494

⁹⁴ Makdisi 73

⁹⁵ Stewart 494

⁹⁶ Arfi 158

Doctrine and Chamoun argued that the Lebanese Muslims were being helped by Syria, who was in turn supplied by the Soviet Union.⁹⁷ In this conflict, the official US motivation was

to protect American lives and property and to preserve Lebanon's territorial sovereignty while influencing the Soviet and Egyptian images of the United States and enhancing the credibility of US commitments around the world.⁹⁸

Armed with machinery and such good intentions, the US marines waded ashore in Beirut "among sunbathers and swimmers" and the conflict ended without US Marines' direct involvement.⁹⁹

During the 1975-1990 civil war, the United States led by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger supported Syria's role within Lebanon and approved the constitutional document signed in Damascus by Franjijeh and Karami.¹⁰⁰ However, when actual intervention came to fruition in March 1976,

the US expressed concern for Israel's borders. Israel itself responded to an eminent Syrian intervention by covertly sending Israeli forces into Lebanon.¹⁰¹ The multiple parties involved and the switching of alliances complicated the dynamic nature of the civil war. In the beginning of the war, Syria entered Lebanon at the behest of the Lebanese president on the side of Christian militias fighting the PLO.¹⁰² However, the Syrians eventually switched to the side of the Muslim militias, prompting the Lebanese Christians to employ Israeli support.¹⁰³ In reaction to the changing elements of the conflict, United States Secretary of State under President Reagan, Alexander Haig, proposed three main objectives in Lebanon and the region: withdrawal of all foreign forces (including Israel), emergence of a sovereign Lebanese

⁹⁷ Collelo 24

⁹⁸ Arfi 162

⁹⁹ Collelo 186

¹⁰⁰ Traboulsi 195

¹⁰¹ Traboulsi 196

¹⁰² Nedzi, Lucien N. "Lebanon's Contemporary Significance." *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol 17, No. 4 (Fall 2006): 1-12. 10

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

government, and the security of the Lebanese/Israeli border.¹⁰⁴

Following the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in June 1982, the United States more actively engaged in diplomacy in Lebanon and the region.¹⁰⁵ Months later, in August 1982, President Reagan announced that United States Marines would be sent to Lebanon to help stabilize the Lebanese Army and support the insubstantial Lebanese government. However, on 1 September, Reagan announced that the Marines could withdraw within two weeks, cutting his original thirty-day commitment in half as the fighting had appeared to lessen.¹⁰⁶ By removing military means to obtain the US objectives towards the situation in Lebanon, President Reagan made clear that the US would pursue the objectives non-militarily.¹⁰⁷

However, following the assassination of president-elect Bashir Jumayyil on 14

September 1982, the Israeli Army moved again into Beirut in violation of the Habib agreement in search of PLO militiamen.¹⁰⁸ In subsequent days, Lebanese Christian militiamen attacked and killed thousands of men, women, and children at two Muslim refugee camps located outside the city.¹⁰⁹ The massacres at the camps involved both Israeli complicity (as the killings occurred as Israeli forces surrounded the camps) and the open violation of the US-brokered Habib agreement.¹¹⁰ Following these events, on 20 September, the Lebanese Prime Minister Wazzan sent President Reagan a formal request to resend US troops to Lebanon.¹¹¹

The attack on the Marine barracks outside Beirut on 23 October 1983 prompted the figurative and literal US withdrawal from the Lebanese Civil War.¹¹² The act of terror that killed 241 US Marines, soldiers, and sailors sleeping inside the headquarters struck

¹⁰⁴ Hallenbeck 11

¹⁰⁵ Hallenbeck xi

¹⁰⁶ Hallenbeck 16

¹⁰⁷ Hallenbeck 18

¹⁰⁸ Hallenbeck 21

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ Hallenbeck 22

¹¹² Nedzi 11

a horrifying psychological chord in the US attitude toward Lebanon.¹¹³ Following a letter from President Reagan to Congress on 30 March 1984 to remove all US forces save 100 Marines to help secure the US and United Kingdom's embassy in Beirut, by 2 April, the government of Lebanon terminated the Multinational Force (MNF).¹¹⁴

By the time of the Ta'if Accord in 1989, the United States supported Syrian influence in Lebanon and even supported the Lebanese/Syrian forces' coup against General Aoun in October 1990.¹¹⁵ However, as the protracted Syrian influence in Lebanon began to exhibit signs of unilateral control, the United States took a position against continued Syrian intervention in Lebanon. With the United Nations, the US supported United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 of 2 September 2004 which called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops inside Lebanon and supported

the sovereignty of the independent state of Lebanon.¹¹⁶ Moreover, the UNSCR 1559 advocated the disarmament of all militias, including Hezbollah operating in Southern Lebanon.¹¹⁷

Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on 14 February 2005, nonviolent protests in the subsequent months solidified the United States' position against Syrian intervention in Lebanese domestic affairs.¹¹⁸ After Syrian withdrawal in 2005, the political power vacuum was filled by Hezbollah, which appeared as a legitimized political force in the 2005 parliamentary elections.¹¹⁹

Options

The US should consider the effects of Lebanon's domestic situation in the Middle East and be ready to deal with the potential worsening of stability in the entire region should Lebanon descend into another civil

¹¹³ Hallenbeck 108

¹¹⁴ Hallenbeck 169

¹¹⁵ Makdisi 80

¹¹⁶ Safa 29

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Safa 33

¹¹⁹ Safa 35

war. To keep Lebanon on the ‘right track’ for democratic stabilization, the United States should continue its support of the government, encourage free elections and Lebanese national identity, and discourage support of Hezbollah by multilaterally encouraging peace-talks with Israel. As Lucien Nedzi observes,

Rather than delving into the intricacies of Islam for answers to the terrorism encouraged by Hezbollah and other such organization, it is more productive to deal with underlying secular causes – cultural, economic, psychological, and social – that provide young, willing recruits for those who build their political power on the shaky foundations of widespread popular alienation.¹²⁰

Thus, it is an option for the United States to proactively seek the roots of the attraction to terrorism and avert the evils to which they may tend. Such efforts might include advancing bottom-up development throughout the communities and villages in Lebanon, a tactic that would allow for case-specific attention to the individual problems each community faces. With the improvements of

¹²⁰ Nedzi 8

the Lebanese state’s social component, the endogenous growth and legitimization of national Lebanese sentiment would eclipse the sectarian divides which continue to cause social and political strife.

The meeting between

Lebanese President Sleiman and President Obama last December reinforced the relationship between Lebanon and the United States and elements such as continued support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to strengthen the government’s control over its borders and territory.¹²¹ Additionally, President Obama promised a “commitment to resolve [the regional] issues through dialogue and negotiations as opposed through

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Domestic security in Lebanon is a strategically important goal for the United States because the country’s domestic instability has historically proven to negatively impact stability in the entire Middle East region.
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¹²¹ Obama, Barack H. “Remarks Following a Meeting with President Sleiman.” *Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents 12/14/2009: Special Section; Speech: 1-3. 1*

violence.”¹²² Domestic security in Lebanon is a strategically important goal for the United States because the country’s domestic instability has historically proven to negatively impact stability in the entire Middle East region. In turn, President Sleiman pledged to “keep cooperating and coordinating with the United States on issues related to the world” to “reach better solutions.”¹²³

In dealing with Hezbollah, the United States has two main options: straight disarmament or integration of Hezbollah’s forces into the Lebanese national defense structure.¹²⁴ Many in the Middle East consider Hezbollah a legitimate political group. And it remains an active part of Lebanese society, especially for the Shi’a community.¹²⁵ Thus, in dealing harshly with Hezbollah, the United

States faces the risk of alienating many and damaging the image of the United States in the Muslim world. The US should distinguish the armed presence of Hezbollah from its political representation and support the disarmament of its militia while actively trying to integrate it into the Lebanese political system. In December 2009, the Lebanese Parliament approved a national unity government allowing Hezbollah to retain its weapons.¹²⁶ This indicates that disarming Hezbollah will be complicated and may even infringe upon Lebanon’s domestic sovereignty. By supporting LAF and Hezbollah integration through leadership and officer training, the United States can attempt to ease sectarian divisions and possibly de-radicalize Hezbollah.

Lessons and Recommendations

United States’ Intervention

One valuable lesson learned from Lebanon is the merit of a clear timetable. The


¹²² Obama 3

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ Salem, Paul. “The Future of Lebanon.” *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 85, No. 6 (Nov-Dec 2006): 13-22. 20

¹²⁵ Talbot, Brent and Heidi Harriman. “Disarming Hezbollah.” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Fall 2008): 29-53. 31

¹²⁶ The Associated Press. “Lebanon Vote Lets Hezbollah Keep Weapons.” *The New York Times*. 10 December 2009



United States should in the future have a clear consistent approach to involvement. President Reagan's decision to send US troops only to call them back two weeks later hindered the efforts of the US to stabilize the country. Moreover, US intervention in Lebanon exhibits the importance clear strategies pertaining to the achievement of each individual objective. In general, during intervention in Lebanon, the US suffered from not only a lack of organization pertaining to concrete timelines and steps to achieve specific goals but also a lack of knowledge pertaining to the causes of the war.

During the Lebanese Civil War, when multiple parties were involved, the United States was not sensitive enough to the complicated situation. Instead of helping to treat the causes of the Lebanese civil war, the US efforts in Lebanon focused mainly on addressing the symptoms, namely inter-confessional fighting, through military action. In the future the United States should do a

better job of proactively dealing with conflict situations instead of merely reacting to elements it cannot fully comprehend.

State Building

Lebanese society's multi-confessional nature renders it very difficult, but not impossible, to build and maintain a stable state structure. With salient historical memory of persecution from one group or another, the sects have limited past examples to draw upon in constructing means and methods of cooperation on a political and social level. For example, the Lebanese Army crumbled along sectarian lines soon after the fighting started in 1975.¹²⁷ This not only rendered the state defenseless but also indicates that at times of tension, identification was not with the nation, but with the sub-groups composing the nation. A state is not only composed of the structures and institutions that organize and improve lives but also a collective idea embodied in nationalism. The Lebanese state may be strengthened and bolstered against future

¹²⁷ Safa 27

internal attacks by a stronger sense of national identity rather than with the sectarian groups composing the country.

The Ta'if Accord did not address the concrete steps necessary to unify society besides abolishing sectarian quotas in civil service posts, the judiciary, the police and army;¹²⁸ it is the duty of the Lebanese government, in tandem with international support, to provide an example of inter-confessional cooperation and Lebanese national identification. This development of a national rather than confessional civil society would take time to grow, but the Lebanese state can promote it by encouraging cooperation between groups that compose the government. Such nationalism may indeed be possible; in the nation displayed a rare show of unity when demonstrators in the rallies held after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in the spring of 2005 carried Lebanese cedar-

tree flags rather than different group banners.¹²⁹

In terms of the Lebanese state's stabilization in the postwar period, there has been much controversy concerning the role of Syrian intervention in Lebanon. The Ta'if Accord legitimized substantial Syrian involvement in Lebanese domestic affairs, namely the presence of Syrian troops to maintain order and stability. The international community, in the voice of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and in 2005, the last Syrian troops left. However, the departure of Syrian involvement has led to the rise of Hezbollah as a legitimate political entity in Lebanon. Hezbollah itself in the past has cited the weakness of the government as a reason to continue its barrage against Israel.¹³⁰ The Lebanese state must gain the capacity and the collective will to "fully exercise its writ and

¹²⁸ Traboulsi 244

¹²⁹ Safa 33

¹³⁰ Salem 20

provide services outside the capital;” it was the government’s failure to provide services in the south which lead to overwhelming support for Hezbollah in the area, especially among poor Shi’ite communities.¹³¹

In Lebanon’s effort to rebuild, the international community has focused largely on supporting the LAF. Such plans are aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of the government by improving the execution and practices of the LAF for defending the state as a whole. The United Nations’ attempts to supply better coordination between UN offices, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the LAF, pledging a “holistic and integrated approach.”¹³² Continued support of Lebanon’s security sector and the maintenance of power-sharing settlements are integral to the success of Lebanon’s postwar recovery.

¹³¹ Mooney, William K., Jr. “Stabilizing Lebanon: Peacekeeping or Nation-Building.” *Parameters*, Vol. 37, Issue 3, (Fall 2007): 28-41. 29


¹³² Mooney 34

And finally, the Ta’if Accord embodied the solution to end the civil war in 1990, but may not have the same significance in a Lebanon two decades removed from the problems of the times. Thus, the international community, in tandem with the Lebanese government, should readdress the stipulations of the Accord and the subsequent organization of the Lebanese government to more adequately fit the contemporary situation. Perhaps readdressing the need for the sectarian nature of the system will allow for civil society to identify with the good of the nation as a whole rather than fighting for the power of each individual sect. However, this endeavor will necessitate both time and conscientious planning.

Development

In the social reconstruction, there has been a failure to address the needs of the poor.¹³³ Beirut has gained the brunt of economic development and infrastructure while the country’s rural areas have received

¹³³ Stewart 495



little.¹³⁴ If the Lebanese government hopes to control Southern Lebanon and mitigate the effects of Hezbollah, it will need to actively compete with Hezbollah as a provider of services and security, especially against the threat of Israeli attacks.¹³⁵

Much of the humanitarian aid going to Lebanon has been through various Non-governmental Organizations that have little or no connection to the Middle East.¹³⁶ These Western NGOs, while cost-effective and expedient, represent an “almost exclusive reliance on western aid organizations [that] does little to enhance the Lebanese government’s capacity or its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens.”¹³⁷ Working in tandem with the Lebanese government to promote anti-corruption and accountability will make the government more legitimate and culturally adept.

¹³⁴ Mooney 30

¹³⁵ Mooney 30

¹³⁶ Mooney 33


¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

And, lastly, the Lebanese case highlights the importance of integrating religious factors in development planning and implementation. In a study of two separate Lebanese villages, Makhoul and Harrison advocates even development among all sectors of the state, including cultural and social development. Specifically, they found that

Islam defines development in a comprehensive way to incorporate spiritual as well as material elements... Society should strive toward human resource development, equitable availability of useful products, and the evolution of indigenous technology.¹³⁸

Lebanon has not done enough to incorporate all sectors of society in the plans of development. With the rural areas lagging far behind urban centers, society is more susceptible to future conflict. It is the duty of the Lebanese state, with international aid, to implement balance in development strategies. Moreover, the aid that is given should reflect the needs of the specific community. With

¹³⁸ Makhoul 620



multi-religious communities, Lebanon's national development cannot expect an immutable panacea to work.

As a multi-faceted society, Lebanon reflects the challenges of development compounded by socially competing interests. However, the majority of Lebanese society has exhibited the will to improve and move beyond sectarian conflict. With the help and support of actors in the region and the international community, Lebanon could stabilize and grow to become a much stronger state.

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
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Intervention in Failed States

Policy Recommendations to the US

Clarke Reid



During the past decade, the US launched two massive military interventions – one in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. Congress has approved \$1.05 trillion dollars to date for the military operations involved in these interventions.¹ Based on the financial investment and the attention of the media, the American public, and the international community, these interventions have practically defined and singularly encompassed the United States’ recent policy toward failed states and strategy for reconstruction and stabilization. They provide prime examples of some of the problems with the current US policy toward intervention in weak and failed states. Primarily, they demonstrate a lack of coordination and foresight in the planning and execution of reconstruction efforts. They have also been enormously expensive. Shortcomings and failings indicate areas where costs could have

been reduced with better planning and organization.

In this section, we will give specific policy recommendations to the US government with special attention to integrating the principles and lessons learned of this report, namely: 1) commitment to sustainable, well-funded, and well planned and organized interventions 2) the incorporation of local and regional actors in problem states, 3) the involvement of the UN, NGOs, other states, and other international organizations, 4) the importance of security, not as a primary strategy, but as support for broader reconstruction goals, and 5) fostering economic growth and sustainability.

First, we recommend the promotion and expansion of the existing Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. We also recommend that the office be structured so that attention and effort can be directed toward certain principles of this report.

Second, we recommend that the US reduce

¹ United States. Congressional Research Service. *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. By Amy Belasco. 28 Sept. 2009.

the role of the military in reconstruction efforts in weak and failed states in favor of shifting resources to more appropriate agencies. Third, we recommend that the US unwaveringly support the UN and other relevant multilateral organizations whenever possible when dealing with weak and failed states.

Recommendation # 1: Empower the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization

As many scholars, politicians, and reporters have pointed out, one of the biggest reasons for failures of intervention in both Iraq and Afghanistan has been a lack of appropriate organization, planning, and coordination between government agencies involved in the interventions.² The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) was created as a stand-alone agency within the Department of State


² Diamond, Larry. *Squandered Victory The American Occupation And the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*. (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2006). Kem, Jack D. "Stability and Reconstruction Efforts: Connecting the Dots Between Military and Civilian efforts." (*Small Wars Journal* 7 2007). Others

in December 2005 by the Bush administration in response to such criticisms, especially in Iraq.³ The office's mission is "to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy".⁴

The CRS has a number of divisions. The Office of Civilian Response Operations organizes the Civilian Response Corps, a collection of civilian federal employees and volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments who are trained and equipped to be deployed in countries in crisis to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance. Funding is currently being

³ United States. The White House. *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*. (By George W. Bush. 7 Dec. 2005.)

⁴ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) : Mission Statement." (*Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization*. Web. 01 Mar. 2010. <<http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4QXJ>>.)



requested to increase the Corps to 250 active members, 2000 standby members, and 2000 reserve members. The Office of Conflict prevention coordinates with other agencies to identify states at risk of instability, provide intelligence for the rest of CRS, and develop preventative strategies with foreign countries, NGOs, and private sector actors. The Planning Office leads the planning and conduct of US Government reconstruction and stabilization operations in specific countries.⁵ CRS has sent a number of personnel to different countries recently to help coordinate stabilization and reconstruction efforts. For example, CRS just received an award for a strategic plan drawn up by a group in Bangladesh to help the country continue a transition to democracy.⁶

While the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization was an important step toward a more organized

⁵ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

⁶ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

approach to US intervention in failed states, the office is still small and weak. In 2006, the office had a minuscule budget of \$16.6 million and a staff of 25.⁷ The President's 2010 budget has requested \$323.3 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which would substantially increase the capabilities and resources of CRS, but the office is still not getting the attention or funding it needs.⁸ By comparison, the department of defense's proposed budget for 2010 is \$663.8 billion, only a small portion of which is designated for civil affairs.⁹ The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization has the potential to be the lead agency for US intervention in failed states but it does not yet have the necessary resources or the power and mandate to play such a role. We recommend the following:

⁷ Charles Oleszycki "Update on Department of State and Department of Defense Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance". (Army Lawyer)

⁸ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

⁹ United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. *DoD Releases Fiscal 2010 Budget Proposal*. 7 May 2009.

*The CRS should be raised to a cabinet-level agency that reports directly to the President of the United States. This promotion would bestow the office with a status reflecting its importance and undoubtedly garner more attention from the government, the media, and the public. It would, as Stuart Eizenstat puts it, give the US reconstruction, stabilization, and development agenda toward failed states a single strong voice within the government.*¹⁰

The CRS should be given the authority to lead (or more accurately be the primary advisor to the president concerning) reconstruction and stabilization efforts that are not already specific mandates of other departments. While the Department of State conducts diplomacy and the Department of Defense is in charge of national security, CRS should be put in charge of civilian reconstruction efforts in weak and failed states. This would have, for example,

included leading the reconstruction and political transition in post-war Iraq on the ground. With a fully staffed Civilian Response Corps and large body of information and intelligence concerning weak and failed states, CRS would have been the most qualified department for this effort.

The CRS budget should be greatly increased. In order to recruit the necessary staff to make such important decisions and gather necessary information, CRS requires more resources. Some of these funds could be redirected from existing programs dealing with reconstruction, stabilization, and development, for example within the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense's Civil Affairs, the State Department, and USAID. Personnel and other resources within these agencies could also be assimilated into the proposed DRS. The efficiencies gained from planning and organization provided by a stronger and better funded CRS would certainly be worth


¹⁰ Eizenstat, Stuart E., John Edward Porter, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Rebuilding Weak States." (*Foreign Affairs* 84.1 (2005): 133-46)

more than the \$320 million currently budgeted. We believe that, once it is up and running, the newly proposed DRS should have a budget at least equal or similar to that of USAID. To justify tax money going toward such a budget increase, the government would have to make a clear case to the American public about the importance of failed states to the US, and to Congress about the benefits of consolidating resources into a single agency.

Additionally, we recommend the formation of a three different specific offices within the proposed Department of Reconstruction and Stabilization to direct attention and resources toward some of the main principles of this report. We recommend an Office of Internal Coordination, an Office of Intelligence and Information, and an Office of Implementation.

Office of Coordination – The most important role of the proposed Department of Reconstruction and Stabilization would be to

coordinate with different agencies in charge of different elements of reconstruction and stabilization. The Office of Coordination (OC) would work primarily with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other US agencies involved in reconstruction or development. The OC would convene regular interagency meetings of top decision-making officials and organize panels involving experts (scholars, practitioners, etc.) on reconstruction and stabilization. The OC would also be responsible for providing these departments and agencies with pertinent information generated by the Office of Intelligence and Information. Such coordination would be useful because experts and officials from different fields and departments could provide insight unique to their particular field but relevant to the decisions and strategies of all departments. For example, diplomats or anthropologists could explain regional




dynamics that might affect how military force is accepted in a particular weak or failed state.

The Office of Coordination would also be responsible for working with NGOs and agencies based in other countries that deal with aspects of reconstruction and stabilization, including the European Union, the World Bank, the United Nations, and regional organizations such as the African Union. Its role would involve coordinating and opening lines for information sharing. Information could range from innovative conflict resolution strategies to new agriculture technologies that could help development efforts. The OC could additionally organize panels of international experts and politicians or sponsor collaborative reports on topics relevant to reconstruction and stabilization.

Office of Intelligence and Information – The Office of Intelligence and Information (OII) would be the clearinghouse for all information and intelligence relevant to

reconstruction and stabilization efforts. It would provide information to all involved actors and departments before, during and after interventions. Such information could take the form of detailed warnings of imminent crises in weak states gleaned from data mining programs on the internet, more typical reports on political and social dynamics pertinent to interventions, real-time updates on the successes and shortcomings of ongoing interventions, and a variety of other mediums. The OII would also coordinate with the Intelligence community (the CIA, the Air Force’s ISR, the INR, which gathers and analyzes intelligence for the purposes of diplomacy, etc.) to obtain and relevant information and make it pertinent to the needs of reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

Before the US decides to intervene in a country, the OII would be in charge of providing reports on the feasibility and costs of different intervention strategies and provide evidence-based, case-specific




recommendations. Before the US went to war in Iraq, the State Department commissioned a report entitled, “The Transition to Democracy in Iraq,” that detailed a comprehensive, relatively quick plan for reconstruction and democratization post-war. It was directed by career officer Thomas Warwick and included a number of diverse and important contributors including thirty-two Iraqi exiles. In retrospect, the strategy outlined in the report would likely have worked better than strategies eventually used, but due to squabbling between executive departments and with the leadership of the military, the report was almost completely ignored.¹¹ With the increased visibility and power of the proposed Department of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its OII, such a report would be less likely to be ignored.

The OII, with the help of the CIA and other agencies, would also be able to provide comprehensive real-time information covering interventions. Such information

could be especially useful in situations like that of the US in Lebanon in 1982-83 (see Lebanon case study) where events are happening quickly and the US needs to make a variety of major decisions (such as whether to deploy troops) rapidly. A rapid response division of the OII could assemble and provide necessary information quickly and concisely when needed. While the DRS and the OII would usually help adherence to following timelines by providing better information for planning in the first place, in this case, the OII would allow for more flexible, realistic, and still cost-effective plans and timelines.

Office of Implementation – The Office of Implementation (OI) would be in charge of leading and coordinating civil, political, and economic reconstruction efforts during interventions (i.e. conflict resolution, democracy building, development). The department would have to be informed of important local dynamics and develop

¹¹ Diamond 27



nuanced, case-specific strategies for involving all local actors in mediation and ultimately the political and economic reconstruction process. It would call on the expertise and capacity of USAID, the State Department, and the military when needed and work with other agencies on the ground. Programs would range from aid distribution to sustainable development projects to conflict resolution to capacity building when needed.

The OI would also be in charge of the Civilian Response Corps, and must keep its ranks up to date with qualified, ready-to-deploy experts. The Corps will be the civilian task force for interventions. It would include administrators to help organize and implement elections, engineers to help local groups build clean water systems, translators and anthropologists to communicate, provide local knowledge, and mediate conflicts. In the interest of minimizing costs and empowering everyday people within weak and failed states, the OI and the Civilian Response

Corps should provide as much funding and assistance as possible to proven local actors as opposed to creating its own distribution, construction, etc. policies and structures. If local groups have proven their commitment to rebuilding and governing in a manner consistent with US values, they deserve support and financial aid for projects and plans as they see fit.

In the Congo (see Congo case study), where violence between different regions and groups is rampant and poverty is high, while also striving for greater security, we recommend the US work with sub-state groups and local governments in more stable areas to create innovative development plans. We also recommend that the US encourage the government of the Congo to partner with international corporations to reap benefits from the abundance of natural resources in the country, and suggest that the US or relevant multilateral institutions oversee the distribution of these resources through

avenues within the (hopefully growing) infrastructure of the country to local level projects.

While not necessarily fragile or failed, Burma represents a different challenge because it has a number of humanitarian deficiencies but the government is generally not willing to work with the international community to help change them (see Burma case study). We recommend that the US work with ASEAN and other regional actors to provide economic and political incentive for the ruling Burmese junta to build infrastructure and respond to constituent needs and possibly allow outside groups like the OI to work with sub-state actors on things like development projects in the future.

Recommendation #2: Reduce the role of the military in reconstruction

The military is clearly an important part of reconstruction and stabilization mostly because of the security it can provide. But as detailed above, military power is only one

element of reconstruction. In both Iraq and Afghanistan in the past decade, the military was given almost complete control over affairs and efforts on the ground, including those involving post-war reconstruction. One of the primary blunders of the intervention in Iraq was the decision to put the military in charge of post-war reconstruction. It was the first time since World War II the State Department would not be in charge of a post-war reconstruction.¹² In his book, *Squandered Victory*, Larry Diamond details how reconstruction efforts in Iraq faltered from the beginning because the Department of Defense and the military operation in Iraq under General Garner did not have the experience or the tact to organize or implement the elaborate civil reconstruction required.¹³

Advice was ignored, plans were simplified or short-sighted in the first place, important Iraqi actors were alienated, chaos heightened, and

¹² Gordon, Michael R. "The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War," (*New York Times* October 19, 2004)

¹³ Diamond 25-52

deadlines were extended many times at great expense.

The US Government planned on intervention in Afghanistan being short and sweet. After a short war against the Taliban with minimal investment of troops, the military thought the enemy had been decimated and the country was on its way to becoming a peaceful, successful state. But some, including R. Nicholas Burns in the State Department were skeptical.¹⁴ Now Afghanistan is again embroiled in conflict and Taliban insurgency. It was short-sighted of the military to think that Afghanistan could be righted by a simple military intervention. Military security has been and will continue to be necessary for reconstruction in Afghanistan, but other forms of conflict resolution should also be utilized (see Afghanistan case study). Failure in Afghanistan is partially defined by regional and ethnic conflict and dynamics and

¹⁴ Rohde, David, and David E. Sanger. "How a 'Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad." (*The New York Times* 12 Aug. 2007.)

reconstruction efforts must address these root causes.

The military does some things very well; it uses force to accomplish specific goals and in the case of failed states, it is usually necessary to provide stability and security so that political and economic reconstruction can commence. But the military does not have the expertise to plan long-term interventions that take into account many factors or carry out the kind of infrastructural or developmental work needed in many weak and failed states. Overuse of the military is also probably the easiest way to alienate the population of a state during an intervention. In Iraq, the military made a lot of enemies by having soldiers barge into civilian houses in full attire looking for insurgents. On top of all this, military intervention is expensive. *While the military is sometimes necessary, we recommend that the US use other means of conflict resolution when possible and to always leave civil*

affairs during interventions to non-military departments and agencies such as USAID, the State Department, and the proposed Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Far removed from military action, conflict resolution can also take the form of local customs and practice (see Conflict Resolution chapter). In Rwanda after the genocide, informal judicial hearings based on old customs called, ‘Gagaca tribunals’ were used to try those who participated in the genocide. While they were criticized by many for not following western judicial procedure, they were generally forgiving and they worked remarkably well for the specific Rwandan context.

Recommendation #3: Defer to multilateral institutions when possible

While the proposed Department of Reconstruction and Stabilization would focus on and strengthen US reconstruction and stabilization efforts in weak failed states, the US should give precedence to multilateral

action. Unilateral action is generally more expensive (because it is only funded by one state) and often engenders antagonism from weaker states and actors because it lacks legitimacy. Unwavering US support of multilateral actions and organizations also shows a commitment to multilateral actions, which sets an example for other states. *Whenever feasible, the US should encourage and support the UN, NATO, the African Union, ASEAN, and other multilateral organizations in reconstruction and stabilization efforts.*

In the past, the US approach to failed states has often been regionally short-sighted. While most efforts focus specifically on single states, many failed states are enmeshed in regional systems that perpetuate their situation (see Regional Dynamics chapter). We recommend that the US consider other regional players and involve them in the reconstruction process. For example, the entire Central African region is involved in

the system of porous borders and population movements that has kept the Congo weak. We recommend the US work with and when necessary defer to regional multilateral organizations like the African Union and the Great Lakes Group when dealing with reconstruction in the Congo.


Haiti is a perfect example of a country in need of reconstruction where a united, multilateral effort would work well (see Haiti case study). All the rich donor countries sending aid to Haiti have roughly the same agenda and strategies; their efforts should be unified so different aid agencies and reconstruction efforts aren't covering the same ground or even working against each other. We recommend that the US encourage the creation of a single recovery fund organized by the UN with a board of representatives from major donors. USAID and the proposed DRS would still be involved in implementation of reconstruction on the

ground but the fund board would make overarching decisions and distribute funds.

Concluding Remarks

During the twentieth century, the most visible and pressing of the world's problems were characterized by conflicts between great states. Now, the world's most pressing and visible international problems are civil wars, natural disasters, terrorism, humanitarian crises, and nuclear weapons security. As recent events have demonstrated, state weakness and failure, that is, the inability of governments to control and provide for their constituents, is a very important cause of these modern-day international problems. And the US, the richest country in the world and also the country with the largest military and aid programs¹⁵, is in the best position to help weak and failed states. US policy towards failed states is thus one of the most important issues in the world today. It has enormous potential to improve international


¹⁵ Steven, Radelet. "Think Again: U.S. Foreign Aid." Foreign Policy (2005). Feb. 2005. Web.



security and the well-being of people domestically and around the world. But intervention in weak and failed states is also very complicated and easy to make a mess of. If the US wishes to make a difference in the world and consequently promote US interests and security, it must reform its strategies for intervention in weak and failed states and commit appropriate effort and resources.

In this report, we have outlined and supported a number of specific and general policy recommendations to the US government in dealing with weak and failed states. We have also demonstrated with case studies how a variety of factors, such as regional dynamics and war economies, can perpetuate state failure and make it very difficult for failed states to stabilize and reconstruct, and illustrated this phenomenon with the metaphor of the parabola. Thus we have also recommended that the US focus on prevention of state failure whenever possible and recognize and plan for the enormous

commitment required when full-scale interventions are necessary. Our primary recommendations stem from five main principles: US interventions in failed states in the future should 1) commit to sustainable, well-funded, and organized efforts supported by pre-intervention planning and information from a variety of sources during all steps of the process; 2) incorporate local and regional actors in problem states to help make decisions and to implement strategies and provide development assistance; 3) involve or defer to the UN, NGOs, other states, and other international organizations whenever such actors would be more suitable or legitimate; 4) provide security, not as a primary strategy, but as support for the efforts of other agencies and actors for broader reconstruction; and 5) foster economic growth and sustainability by alleviating poverty, harnessing natural resources, promoting private enterprise, and supporting local communities.



Intervention in failed states and the reconstruction and stabilization involved has been a large part of US foreign policy for the last few decades and will probably continue to grow in importance in the future. Intervention in the past has sometimes been characterized by poor planning, indecisiveness, unilateralism, and military control. It has also been expensive. In order to improve its intervention record and hopefully use resources more efficiently, the US must adopt a comprehensive strategy that can incorporate lessons learned from mistakes quickly. The US needs a powerful, unified voice in government, the proposed Department of Reconstruction and Stabilization, to bring together disparate actors involved in interventions and provide necessary coordination, information, planning, and attention to detail. The US must recognize that situations in failed states are always difficult and complicated and that

interventions must be far-sighted, comprehensive, sensitive, and properly-led.

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