


# REEU NEWSLETTER

AUTUMN 1991



ЗАГОРСК

### A Word from Our Acting Director

*James West, Professor of Slavic Language & Literature, has been serving as Director of the REEU Program while Daniel Waugh is in Tashkent.*

The new academic year is beginning for the Russian and East European Studies Program in an atmosphere of change. We have a new director, Professor Daniel Waugh, of the Department of History, who assumed his duties in May, but left in July for a three-month stay in the Soviet Union, little suspecting that he would be witnessing the most momentous changes in the region that we study in more than half a century. Professor Waugh returns at the end of October, and meanwhile faculty and students alike are still mopping their brows from the effort of keeping track of the summer's events. Academically and in other ways, this promises to be an exciting year for the Program. Speculative discussion of the potential for change in the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence has been replaced by the more exciting business of watching it happen, with more opportunities available than ever before for study and travel in the region. The next few years will probably see some far-reaching changes in the Program. A great deal of what we have done in the past, and the way in which we did it, derived from our sense that we were dealing with one of the world's more depressingly stable and outwardly cohesive geopolitical entities. In the future our curriculum will to some extent have to "devolve" like the Soviet Union itself, to take separate account of peoples, cultures and economies that will be enjoying at least some degree of autonomy. The recent (and continuing) changes have organizational implications, too. Two years hence, when it is time to apply again for an area studies Center Grant, the "area" will almost certainly have been redefined for federal funding purposes, and this in itself is bound to have some impact on how we organize ourselves. However, all of this will unfold in future newsletters. For now, we offer you an interesting program of lectures and other events, and some early reactions to the changes in the Soviet scene.

### Visiting Research Scholars

Vladislav Arzhanuhin, with REEU until late January, is Chairman of the Department of History of Religion at Herzen Pedagogical University, Leningrad. Here he will be doing research on the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian religious philosophy from the 17th to 19th centuries and on religious emigration from Russia during the 18th-19th centuries. Having recently visited the Library of Congress, he is now revising an article on the first Russian Orthodox seminary in Alaska (19th century). During the latter part of October he will travel to Fairbanks to pursue this topic. An interesting note is that Professor Arzhanuhin was the first educator in Leningrad to teach the history of religion in a middle school. Now his university offers programs for teaching about the history of Russian Orthodoxy and of Christianity at the middle school level. Professor Arzhanuhin can be reached at 525-4866.

Anne Cahn is a Senior MacArthur Scholar from University of Maryland's Center for International Security Studies, who will be at the UW's Political Science Department until Thanksgiving. She is involved in a study of non-governmental dialogues between American and Soviet scientists on nuclear weapons issues. Ms. Cahn can be contacted at 524-5378.

Alexander Nagorny at REEU 1991-92

by Matthew Ouimet, Ph.C., History

Amidst the numerous international experts and persons of note who pass through the portals of Thomson hall this year to share their insights on the lands beyond the Puget Sound, the REEU program is distinctly privileged to have Dr. Alexander Nagorny of the RSFSR Parliamentary staff as a visiting professor until June 1992.

Dr. Nagorny is a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Foreign Relations linguistics program and spent the early part of his career in the 1970s as a TASS correspondent. After taking his Ph.D. in History and doing post-graduate research at the Institute of USA and Canada (ISCAN) he remained at ISCAN as a senior researcher from 1978-1990. His field specialty is the history of international relations, with an emphasis on the Soviet role in the Pacific. He has published both in the USSR and abroad, including *The Evolution of Soviet Strategic Interests* (Seoul, 1991) and *Sino-American Diplomatic Interaction* (Moscow, 1989).

When in 1990 Russia held its first ever public elections for positions in the RSFSR Parliament, Dr. Nagorny began a part-time political career as campaign manager for a number of the Democratic Platform's candidates. Perhaps in testimony of a job well done, all of his candidates were elected to the Parliament. Moreover, in a move which would certainly surprise no one in our own capitol, as three of his candidates received positions on the Parliament's newly created Foreign Economic Relations Subcommittee, Dr. Nagorny was appointed special advisor to this committee. Meanwhile, in 1990 he left his position at ISCAN to work as senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies. So, his time in Moscow is split between his position at IOS and his part-time consulting responsibilities in the Russian Parliament.

Dr. Nagorny will focus his research in the US on the question of attracting foreign investors to Russia. Much of his work for the Russian Parliament has addressed this crucial issue. As a framework for this research, he has begun a reassessment of the role played by Russian national interests in the history of Soviet foreign policy. Of particular concern to his work is the exploitation of the republic's now diminishing natural resources to comparative advantage in international trade. As foreign investment is likely to be the key in this, measures are being taken by the Parliament to pass laws which will attract rather than deter investors from Russian ventures. Though not yet passed, laws on economic activity in Russia, the creation of free economic zones, and the exploitation of Russian natural resources have been prepared by the Foreign Economic Relations Subcommittee as a crucial step toward this goal. Based on the earlier success of similar legislation which he helped to draft establishing free economic zones in Nakhodka and Sakhalin, Dr. Nagorny is optimistic about the success of the current initiatives before the Parliament.

Dr. Nagorny is teaching a course on Soviet Society during the autumn quarter. His schedule for the rest of the year has not yet been solidified. Please check with Karen in the REEU office for further information on his course offerings this year.

### Professor Treadgold Leading Soviet Tour When Coup Occurs

Donald W. Treadgold has been a Professor with the REEU program since 1949, teaching courses on Russian history and Soviet society.

In August my wife and I took a Soviet trip that turned out to be more exciting than anticipated.

I was leader of a group of 34 alumni of the UW, out of a total 272 from several different U.S. universities, and served as one of four lecturers to explain the mysteries of Russia's past and present. The other three were from Ohio State (James Scanlan), Illinois (Marianna Choldin), and Brigham Young (David Hart; I didn't know him before, but have known the other two for many years). A ship, the *Gleb Krzhizhanovsky* (mangled into *Kerzanovsky* in English) carried us from Moscow to Leningrad entirely by water (Moscow-Volga canal, Volga river, Rybinsk reservoir, Sheksna river, Lake Onega, Svir river, Lake Ladoga, Neva river, Leningrad). We never saw the inside of a Soviet hotel, thank goodness. Chief sights: Uglich, where the real Prince Dmitri was killed in 1591 (three false Dmitris subsequently appeared and one became tsar for a short time); the Kirillo-Belozerskii monastery, now about to be restored to the church; Kizhi (with its 22-cupola church); Valaam island (where a monastery is again functioning and the main church is under restoration)--in addition to the two capitals (a pre-1917 expression, to be sure). I never expected to live to see the places I've listed. At every site were boys and young men selling lacquer boxes, Matrëshka dolls (they even have a set of Bush dolls now, 4 in number, tho we looked in vain for a set to buy), sometimes caviar, postcards, paintings. In contrast to earlier trips, no one wanted to buy anything, only to sell. The ruble is now officially 32 to the dollar; you can get 40 to the dollar on the black market but it's scarcely worth trying to get that rate; most of what one would want is available only with dollars anyhow.

One sunny afternoon in Leningrad my wife and I played hockey from the tour and simply wandered around the center of town; we bought ice cream bars of generous size for a total of about a nickel for two (in rubles, of course).

On Monday morning, as our boat was traveling from Petrozavodsk to Valaam island, ending a final presentation the four of us lecturers made together as a question-and-answer panel, I took the last question and closed by saying, "And we can all be glad things have developed as they have" (or words to that effect). At that very moment the tour director, an Englishman, came up to the stage and announced that the first officer had heard on the ship's radio that: "President Gorbachev has resigned because of ill health and has been replaced by Yanayev, a follower of Eltsin." I was sure there were three mistakes in that sentence (Gorbachev certainly had not resigned, he had no "ill health," and Yanayev was no supporter of Eltsin) but there had indeed been a coup. When we arrived at Valaam it was we who told the Russians what had happened.

The next morning we docked in Leningrad, quite uncertain of what lay ahead; the day's posted schedule, after "Breakfast," was entirely blank. But we started out by bus for the Peter and Paul fortress (the first building in St. Petersburg) nevertheless, and then St. Isaac's (could it be the richest church in the world?). Mayor Sobchak had called a strike in everything but essential services, and the city was almost entirely shut down; he also called for a demonstration in front of the Winter Palace. We saw people streaming in from all corners of the city on foot (and bus); 200,000 were there. We were on the edges of it, and one of the interpreters who plunged into the crowd came

back later with a poster and gave it to me: "Sudit' putchistov s ikh partiei!" The meaning: "Bring to trial the putschists and their party [guess which one?]" The first glimmer of hope came when the commander of the Leningrad Military District was reported to have announced his support for Sobchak and opposition to the coup (however, the Leningrad city council's investigation now says he played an "ambiguous role" during those days). From that point on we received news and rumors hourly, from BBC, Moscow radio, and new arrivals from Moscow or abroad. By the time we were ready to fly from Leningrad to Berlin, the coup was clearly collapsing, and we saw Gorbachev's strange, painful press conference on his return from the Crimea live on TV (CNN) in the Steigenberger Hotel.

Two days of decompression in Berlin were welcome. Alva and I walked through the splendid zoo, only a step from our hotel; the incredible 6th floor of KaDeWe, entirely devoted to food of every conceivable kind, cheeses, breads, meats, fish, game, wines, fruits & vegetables--we planned to spend 5 or 10 minutes and spent two hours just gawking; a fine tour of the reunited city, the Pergamon museum, the Brandenburg gate, the remnant of the wall. I wonder what the Soviet tourist makes of Berlin, or indeed what the East Berliner makes of West Berlin (no longer administrative but only geographical designations).

Clearly the changes that began then in the USSR are not over; *Time* (the issue which, incidentally, carries my student David Aikman's interview with the new Archbishop of Canterbury as well as some Russian reporting of his) has on its cover "The Russian Revolution," and the phrase is apt. Jim Billington's *New York Times* article does not say outright, but the inserted blurb phrase says (accurately with respect to his views and, in my opinion, also with respect to reality): "democracy has at last taken root among the [Russian] people." Perhaps the most striking thing to me was from the moment the coup was reported that the Russians we encountered stated their opinion openly--and unanimously, opposed to the coup. No wishy-washy prudential "wait and see" replies à la Mitterand, or indeed Bush at first. Next come China, Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea. Maybe Hong Kong won't simply face destruction in 1997.

My unserious solution to the world's problems is the following. Take Kaliningrad, which has no history (Königsberg's was almost entirely wiped out) and no inhabitants with any real attachment to the place, and evacuate it to Russia. Bring the population of Hong Kong to replace the evacuees; let them then fan out and show the population of Eastern Europe, including the USSR, how to run a free-market economy. Possibly an imaginative but certainly impossible idea.

I am going back to the USSR (or whatever it is called by then) leading a delegation of 40 or so American historians who are to visit with their Soviet counterparts on a People-to-People program. That will be October 25 to November 9. I hope the place has not totally fallen apart by then. Russia is without doubt going through a revolution. A young Tatar who was showing us around parts of Moscow said, "this is our fourth revolution this century" (meaning 1905, February and October 1917, and the one beginning with Gorbachev's reforms); this was *before* the coup. The coup and counter-coup greatly accelerated the pace of change, but it is not over yet. All friends of Russia may rejoice at what has happened and still be concerned about the distance the country (or countries, depending on the outcome) has to go before democracy and a successful free-enterprise (or mixed) economy are consolidated.

## CENTRAL ASIA

### Contacts with Tajikistan

In February 1991, the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilization signed an agreement of cooperation with the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Dushanbe. The immediate goal of this agreement was to ensure the assistance of our Tajik colleagues in developing intensive Tajik language courses as part of the Department's Central Asian languages Summer programs.

During Summer 1991, Intensive Elementary Tajik was taught by Professor Leonard Herzenberg, Institute of Linguistics, Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg. The well-known and outspoken Tajik poet, Bozor Sobir, founder of the Tajik Democratic Party and member of the Tajik Parliament, participated in the Tajik language program, lectured on Tajik literature and gave readings of his poetry.

In September 1991, Professor Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, a member of the Department's faculty, travelled with his family to Dushanbe, where he will teach and do research during a three months stay, sponsored by the Tajik Academy of Sciences.


Following invitations of Professor Herzenberg and Mr. Bozor Sobir, Mr. Randall Olson, a graduate student in the Department, also travelled to Dushanbe. He witnessed and videotaped the demonstrations in Dushanbe during the last week of September 1991. Mr. Olson will give an account of the events on October 29, 1991, 3:00-4:00 p.m. in Denny 216.

### Summer Program 1992: Central Asian Languages: Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik

The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilization is planning its second national summer program in Central Asian languages. Courses to be offered are Intensive First, Second, and possibly Third Year Uzbek, Intensive First and Second Year Kazakh, and Intensive First Year Tajik.

The Program will also offer a rich cultural program. In addition, a lecture series is being planned, focusing on the topic of "Central Asia in Transition." High-level representatives from Central Asia are expected to deliver keynote addresses and discuss issues of their respective republics.

For fellowships and other information, please contact Professor Ilse Cirtautas, Chair, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilization, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195. Tele: (206) 543-6033.



Бухара

## News from Alma-Ata and Tashkent

Professor Ilse Cirtautas, Chair of the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilization, just returned from a trip to Central Asia where she visited Alma-Ata and Tashkent. In Alma-Ata, she discussed with the President of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences a program of cooperation which will allow students of Kazakh to improve their knowledge of the language and engage in research while living in Alma-Ata. She also met with the president of the Kazakhstan State University, Alma-Ata, had discussions with a number of Kazakh writers, scholars, journalists and high government officials. Kazakh newspapers favorably commented on the Department's Summer Kazakh Language program, the establishment of the Alatau Organization and carried lengthy interview articles on Professor Cirtautas during her stay in Alma-Ata.

In Tashkent, Professor Cirtautas participated in the festivities of the 550th Anniversary of the great poet and statesman Alisher Nava'i, which were joint with celebration of Uzbekistan's independence. She was given the honor to address the opening session of a Symposium on Alisher Nava'i and she was again received by His Excellency, the President of Uzbekistan, Islom Karimov.

### Alatau: International Society for the Study of Kazakh Culture

Students from Columbia, Harvard, Philadelphia, Berkeley, and the UW who participated in last summer's intensive Kazakh program at the UW founded a Society for the Study of Kazakh Culture. The name chosen for the society is "Alatau," which is a mountain range venerated by both Kazakhs and Kirghiz.

The purpose of the Alatau Society is (1) to promote research on Kazakh culture; (2) to disseminate information about the Kazakhs; (3) to promote international cooperation in Kazakh studies; (4) to initiate and support translation of Kazakh literary materials into English and other Western languages; (5) to support scholarly exchanges; and (6) to establish a Kazakh studies informational fund/data bank.

Membership is open to all interested persons or institutions. The yearly membership fee is \$15.00 for individuals or \$30.00 for institutions. Membership includes a copy of the *Alatau Newsletter*, which will come out in December/January, and May/June of each year.

For information, please contact Alatau Society, National Headquarters, Dept. of Near Eastern Languages and Civilization, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 or Jo Ann Conrad, Treasurer/Secretary, Alatau Society, 833 San Luis Road, Berkeley, CA 94704 Tele: (415) 524-3033.

### Kazakh-English Dictionary

As a result of this year's intensive language program, a 60-page, double columned *Kazakh-English Student Dictionary* has been prepared, which includes all the vocabulary introduced in the course. The dictionary will be expanded to about 200-250 pages. For further information, please contact: Dr. Paul Buell, Seattle, Tele: 522-2720 or Jo Ann Conrad, Treasurer/Secretary, Alatau Society, 833 San Luis Road, Berkeley, CA 94707 Tele: (414) 524-3033.

### Meeting of American and Polish Economists at UW

Kazimierz Poznanski of the Jackson School and Judith Thornton of the Economics Department organized the first U.S.-Polish Economic Roundtable June 7-9, 1991, Seattle. The meetings were sponsored by the International Research Exchange Board (Princeton, N.J.), the Provost's Office, University of Washington, and Mr. and Mrs. Anatole Dekaban.

The purpose of the Roundtable was to initiate regular annual meetings of economists, American and Polish, on a rotating basis in Seattle and Warsaw. Discussion was organized into nine panels, three papers given in each. The two main topics selected for the gathering were: assessment of the stabilization program and progress in privatization of state industry/banking.

The results of the roundtable are being published with *Economics of Planning* (special issue edited by Kazimierz Poznanski with seven selected papers), and in a book collection: *Transition to Capitalism: Initial Experience of Poland, 1988-1992* (edited jointly by Kazimierz Poznanski and Judith Thornton, and supported by IREX).

The session participants and their topics were as follows:

Session 1: Sebastian Edwards (University of California, Los Angeles): "Stabilization and Liberalization Policy in Eastern Europe: Lessons from Latin America"; Grzegorz Kolodko (Institute of Finance, Warsaw): "Economics of Transition: From Shortageflation to Stagflation"; Keith Crane (PlanEcon, Washington, D.C.): "Overview of the Macroeconomic Situation in Poland: 1990."

Session 2: Ronald McKinnon (Stanford University): "Stabilization Programs in Post-Communist Eastern Europe"; Jan Mujzel (Polish Academy of Science, Warsaw): "An Examination of Anti-Recessionary Policy in Poland"; Marcin Rybicki (Central Office of Planning, Warsaw): "Stabilization and Structural Adjustment: Production Figures, Financial Situation, and Investment."

Session 3: Jozef Brada (Arizona University): "International Environment of Economic Transition in Eastern Europe"; Dariusz Rosati (Foreign Trade Institute, Warsaw): "Trade Restructuring and Trade Destruction: Initial Assessment"; Kaz Poznanski (UW): "Path Dependence in East European Trade: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland."

Session 4: Jadwiga Staniszkis (Warsaw University): "Political Dilemmas in Polish Transition to Capitalism"; Mira Marody (Warsaw University): "State and Society: Societal Framework of Economic Reform in Poland"; Sigrid Meuschel (Free University, Berlin): "On the Revolution in the G.D.R."

Session 5: Andrzej Topinski (National Bank of Poland): "Approaches to Privatization of State Banks"; Jacek Bukowski (Ministry of Ownership Transformation, Warsaw): "Poland's Experience with Privatization: Domestic Agents and Foreign Participation"; Wolfgang Quaisser (University of Frankfurt): "Institutional and Structural Change in Polish Agriculture."

Session 6: Miroslav Jovanovic (United Nations): "Privatization and Transnational Corporations: Central and Eastern Europe"; Judith Thornton (UW): "Official and Unofficial Privatization"; Nicholas Lardy (UW): "Development of the Non-State Sector in the Chinese Economy."

Session 7: Jacek Kochanowicz (Warsaw University): "Conditions for Restoration of Capitalism in Poland: An Historical Perspective"; Grazyna Skapska (Cracow University): "Concepts of Privatization and the Possibility of a New Social Contract"; Peter Murrell (University of Maryland): "Privatization of the State Sectors Versus Expansion of the Private Sector."

Session 8: Wojciech Charenza (Leicester University): "Demonopolization, Contestability and Missing Markets: Some Aspects of Privatization in Eastern

Europe"; Przemyslaw Gajdeczka (International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.): "Inflation Tax, Household Wealth, and Privatization in Poland"; John Litwag (Stanford University): "Property Rights and Government Commitment Problems."

Session 9: Inderjit Singh (World Bank, Washington, D.C.): "The Response of Polish Enterprise to Stabilization Policy: Results of a Field Study"; Witold Walkowiak (Institute of Finance, Warsaw): "Rolling Back of the Socialist Enterprise: Constraint and Alternative Responses"; Marek Dabrowski (Ministry of Finance): "Economic and Political Dilemmas of Privatization in Polish Industry."

#### DEPARTMENT OF SLAVIC LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE

##### Memorial Service for Professor Swayze

Friends, colleagues, and former students gathered at the Faculty Club on Monday, October 7 for a memorial service in honor of Professor Harold Swayze, who passed away on August 19, 1991. Karl Kramer, Department Chair, introduced five speakers. Brian Oles, an undergraduate student who had maintained close contact with Professor Swayze by correspondence during his last illness, spoke eloquently of his attributes. Nora Holdsworth and Willis Konick recalled their memories as long-time colleagues and friends of the late professor. Marilyn Hoogen talked of his inspiration during her early days as a graduate student and Charlotte Wallace read the poem "Hamlet" from by Boris Pasternak.

Meta Lytle and Elizabeth Martin, a former student, played a Mozart sonata for piano and violin. Florence Riddle, a close friend of Hal Swayze, sang perhaps his favorite Okudzhava ballad, "The Blue Balloon," and Swayze's niece, Cathleen O'Connell--claiming she never could get him interested in medieval Irish folkmusic--played in his memory a Bach fugue on the Irish harp. About fifty attended the gathering.

##### East European Fulbright Scholars at Slavic Department

Three professors from Eastern Europe are teaching for the Slavic Department this year as Fulbright Scholars sponsored by the Council for International Exchange of Scholars.

Professor Rada Proca comes from Iasi, Romania, where she headed the Foreign Languages Department for the Polytechnic Institute. She has taught for many years and is very interested in language pedagogy, having published several textbooks and a number of articles in the field, as well as work on Romanian and English literatures.

Professor Cleo Protochristova comes from Plovdiv, Bulgaria, where she has worked with both English and Bulgarian literature. She has taught at Plovdiv University for many years and has published extensively on comparative literature themes, including a book on Bulgarian literature and another on intertextuality.

Professor Frantisek Uher comes from Brno, Czechoslovakia, where he has distinguished himself with interesting work in Czech morphology. Professor Uher has taught at Masaryk University for many years and has extensive publications in Czech linguistics and stylistics, as well as textbooks on both Czech and Slovak.

Reflections on the August Revolution of 1991

by Stephen Hanson, Assistant Professor, Political Science

As I write this, the last symbolic strongholds of the Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in the USSR have been destroyed. Felix Dzerzhinsky has been carted off on the back of a flatbed truck; exhilarated Russians are painting swastikas on the headquarters of the KGB; the prerevolutionary Russian flag is being carried triumphantly through the streets of Moscow. Paralleling these expressions of the popular mood are critical changes in the political institutions of the old regime: the party is banned from activity in the army and secret police; the Baltic republics have won their long battle for independence; and the other non-Russian republics are maneuvering to enhance their influence in the post-Soviet order. The failed revolutionary experiment imposed on the peoples of the Soviet Union is at last at an end.

At a time like this it is hard not to suspend one's analytic disbelief and simply bask in the joy of the moment. I cannot deny my bias in this situation. I happen to prefer Boris Yeltsin to Boris Pugo. I happen to prefer self-determination for the former republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the continued existence of a decaying and corrupted Marxist-Leninist empire. But in times of political upheaval such as this, it is incumbent on the analyst to maintain a degree of scholarly detachment. Political life--like other natural phenomena--tends to proceed cyclically. Order tends to reemerge from the breakdown of order, though in a qualitatively different form. Social science can't predict the precise content of the institutions that will emerge in the territory currently known as the Soviet Union in the months and years to come. But it can at least indicate the primary political, economic and cultural issues which will emerge as the key foci of debate in the post-Leninist social environment.

**Political Issues.** The most obvious consequence of the failure of the hardliners' coup is that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will disintegrate rapidly. With the CPSU's control over economic and military policy gone, and its legitimacy wholly destroyed, there will be neither ideological nor instrumental reasons formally to remain a party member. Gorbachev, the last true Leninist believer in the party leadership, lacks any coherent vision of the post-Leninist order. His August 22nd press conference, in which he referred to Lenin's view that socialism is based on the "creativity of the masses," should finally put to rest the idea that he was somehow really a "pragmatist" who just used the slogans of Leninism "to placate the hardliners"! A few party stalwarts may remain in Gorbachev's camp, and this could pose some problems if enough members of the KGB and the Interior Ministry waver in their loyalties between Gorbachev's emphasis on preserving a "reformed" Soviet Union and Yeltsin's decisively Russia-centered populism. The role of Bakatin, the new head of the "reformed" KGB, will be particularly crucial here. In addition, the party apparatus at lower levels remains in many places the only effective government; just as tsarist officials remained in place long after the collapse of tsarism and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, we can expect former party cadres to play an important and even crucial political role in the months and years to come. But the August Revolution certainly signals the end of the old form of Soviet Leninism.

Another consequence of the collapse of the coup--and one with rather frightening implications--is that there will likely be no "Soviet Union"

within a very short period of time. The Union Treaty that was about to be signed before Gorbachev became "ill" was a compromise document that left the most critical questions of power distribution between the republics and the center unresolved--primarily because the "center" still controlled the instruments of coercion and could potentially crush movements for full independence. Now that center is gone and only the republics are left. The compromise new name for the USSR--the "Union of Soviet Sovereign [no longer Socialist] Republics"--will itself come under attack. Which republic is going to want to be called "Soviet" at this point? Despite George Bush's paeans to the heroism of the "Soviet people," there are probably fewer self-identified "Soviets" in "Soviet" territory than there are "Yugoslavs" in "Yugoslavia."

The point is not merely a semantic one. If there are no Soviet citizens and no Soviet Union, then all the formal institutions of Soviet Leninism will become incoherent rather rapidly. Despite Yeltsin's mass support in Russia, it remains to be seen how he (or the other republican leaders) can construct a functioning military out of the fractured "Soviet" army (with its massive nuclear arsenal), a functioning diplomatic corps out of the anachronistic "Soviet" embassies around the world, or, most importantly, a functioning economy out of the wheezing toxic citadels of the "Soviet" planned industrial economy. But it is simply a flight from reality to pretend that these old forms of central control can be salvaged in the post-Soviet environment.

The most salutary outcome of the August Revolution would, in my opinion, be the quick rejection, in Moscow and in the West, of even the pretense of the "Union" in favor of a legally-enacted declaration of full political independence for all 15 republics. There is no inherent reason, after all, why Lithuanians, Moldavians, Armenians, Uzbeks and Russians should all inhabit the same country. My guess is that the only practical choice now is between decentralizing the empire in a relatively peaceful way, or of watching the USSR follow the Yugoslav example. Of course, many if not most of the new states emerging from such a process will face enormous ethnic tensions and economic hardships--but this is hardly an unusual state of affairs in the contemporary world.

It should be stressed that the question of political statehood for the republics must be kept logically separate from questions concerning the proper future economic relationship between them. It is of course impossible to ignore the impact of the decades of Stalinism which welded the ex-USSR into a highly interdependent, though in many ways dysfunctional, economic unit. But this by itself is no reason to delay the process of politically institutionalizing republican independence. The sooner the republics are granted international status as sovereign states, the sooner they can be integrated into international organizations which might provide crucial symbolic and material support for pro-Western republican elites in future political struggles. But if the inevitable post-Leninist economic crisis (which will hit this winter or next, in all likelihood) occurs while the Soviet Union is still ambiguously torn between the old centralism and the new republican autonomy, it will be nearly impossible to achieve reasoned and reasonable solutions to the immensely complicated problems surrounding the breakup of the USSR. Republican elites facing simultaneously escalating ethnic conflicts, worker unrest, and border disputes with neighboring republics are hardly going to be in a position to negotiate procedural norms for integration into the international community.

Thus, it is in the interest of the West to declare itself unambiguously in favor of dealing with republican elites rather than Soviet ones. Such a declaration could be followed up by proposals for international conferences, involving republican leaders and leaders of the Western states, on issues such as the redeployment of the "Soviet" nuclear arsenal in Russia alone, the admission of Russia to the UN Security Council in place of the old USSR, the diplomatic recognition of the non-Russian republics, and the possible printing of separate republican currencies in place of the old Soviet ruble.

**Economic Issues.** However glorious the events of the August Revolution, they do not change the desperate economic situation confronting the leaders of the ex-Soviet Union. Gorbachev's *perestroika*, despite its encouragement of cooperative enterprises and joint ventures, did little to restructure the core of the Soviet military-industrial complex. The existence of this military-industrial complex, it must be stressed, is in no way an advantage to the emerging elites of the former USSR. Contrary to the predictions of modernization theory, we are about to discover--as indeed is already evident from the experience of Eastern Europe--that urbanization and industrialization under Stalinist auspices do not create the preconditions for a smooth transition to liberal democracy or capitalism. The type of urbanization and industrialization experienced in Marxist-Leninist regimes, in fact, creates enormous social obstacles to even the sorts of measures commonly taken to stabilize economies in the less developed areas of the Third World.


Most critically, because Soviet economies were built on a basis of concentration camp-style collectivized agriculture and "heroic" but polluting and inefficient megafactories, at least two-thirds of the ex-Soviet population are working at jobs which economic reform based on the criterion of pure efficiency would eliminate. Yeltsin and his advisers may speak now about the "marketization" of agriculture, but it is probable that what they have in mind is more a restoration of the bygone social relations of NEP than the invasion of the Russian heartland by domestic and international agribusiness. In the United States, only 2-3% of the population works in the agricultural sphere; in the former USSR, the figure is closer to 30%. A pure market solution to the dilemmas of decollectivization will thus obviously result in massive social dislocation as unnecessary agricultural labor is eliminated. Something like the Japanese model, with its hefty price supports for domestic rice production, could perhaps be tried in the more agriculturally-rich republics, but unfortunately the new republican elites will be operating on a shoestring budget which probably precludes such a solution.

The situation is perhaps even more dire as regards industrial production. The ex-Soviet working class, long one of the most protected groups in the generally-impooverished Soviet system, will now be faced with the threat of massive unemployment as inefficient and substandard Stalinist production is curtailed. Without a drastic cutback in state subsidies to inefficient enterprises in the former USSR, it will be impossible to stabilize whatever currency or currencies emerge on the all-Union or republican level. Allowing for unemployment, however, may well destabilize the existing center and republican governments and give rise to autocratic nationalist or even fascist movements mobilizing dissatisfied workers for wartime production and ethnic crusades. Such an outcome would set back the process of economic recovery enormously. But this fact may not be decisive in determining the actions of people who are already furious at their exploitation under the Stalinist system, and who are only now beginning to realize what it means to

live in a free-market economy on an average salary that amounts--at current rapidly worsening exchange rates--to about seven dollars a month. For them, rage may well seem a more plausible response than reason.

Is there any hope for the recovery of the economies of the ex-Soviet republics? If expectations are scaled back considerably, there are areas of comparative advantage almost every republic can exploit. Some republics are rich in raw materials, some in agriculture, some (the Baltics) have ties to the affluent Scandinavian countries which will ease the transition process. Well-timed aid from the West could also play a crucial role in easing the tragic consequences of the dismantling of Stalinism. What the West must *not* do, in my opinion, is predicate all aid to the ex-Soviet Union on the emergence of one comprehensive, coherent "reform strategy" for transforming the entire Soviet empire into a bastion of *laissez-faire* capitalism. Social and political pressures on republican elites would make such a strategy probably unsustainable, even if attempted. Our choices, to reiterate, are either to do what we can to support the *relatively* peaceful breakup of the USSR into *relatively* viable new nations, or to watch the chaotic and bloody disintegration of the Stalinist system. The emergence of a unified democratic elite successfully implementing a consistent "reform" strategy throughout the old Soviet Union is simply not a plausible outcome. If Western leaders wait for this to happen before they act, they will be waiting a long, long time.

Cultural Issues. The effects of the imposition of Stalinism on previously-traditional cultures are clearly massive. But they are not as unambiguously positive as modernization theory has tended to presume. There is, indeed, an educated and essentially "Westernized" elite in most of the ex-Soviet republics today, and this group played a decisive role in the events of the coup and its aftermath. But such elites exist in nations throughout the world, simply because of the extraordinary charisma and power of the liberal capitalist West as a cultural reference point; by itself, the existence of a Westernized elite does not necessarily predetermine the victory of liberal capitalism. Indeed, in many ways, Russia and most of the other ex-Soviet republics are still peasant and/or clan-based societies, despite the undeniable impact of Stalinist industrialization and urbanization on people's life patterns in the old USSR. Such Western cultural values as individualism, proceduralism, and rational time-discipline are not at all widespread among the former Soviet populations; in this respect they are hardly unusual in



historical and comparative perspective, since Western cultural values--though one may happen to favor them--must be seen as the rather deviant product of the particular historical legacy of Western Europe, not as simply "universal" human norms.

But if the peoples of the ex-Soviet Union have not exactly been transformed by Stalinism into cultural equivalents of middle-class Protestants, neither have they been left untouched by the brutal legacy of Bolshevik rule. Various informal cultural mechanisms which have emerged in response to the formal institutions of the Stalinist system are now part of the day-to-day life of millions of people in the former USSR. Workers and peasants have developed informal ties with regional party secretaries and enterprise managers to protect local economic interests at the expense of center priorities; intellectuals have developed informal networks of friends and confidants who could be trusted not to betray to the authorities dangerous information expressed in private. Though these cultural patterns originally developed to resist the type of domination imposed by the party-state on Soviet society, they are now valued on their own terms by crucial social groups, and this creates an important obstacle to smooth "transitions" to democracy and capitalism in the ex-Soviet republics. Political liberalism presupposes a form of impersonal party organization that tends to violate the sense of communal and personal solidarity existing in small "circles" of seven or eight intellectuals; the tendency is for such informal groups to split off from the formal "democratic movement" into a multiplicity of warring political factions. Similarly, economic capitalism presupposes a form of impersonal market organization that tends to tear apart the personal networks existing in every Soviet economic enterprise, and to reward entrepreneurial types--who often happen to be either former members of the corrupted party *nomenklatura*, or the very people who were considered "norm-busters" and traitors to worker solidarity in the recent past. For this reason, the primacy of the profit motive will not be established in the former USSR without a fight--any more than it was in Western Europe.

Of course, cultural patterns are not inviolable, and culture can be radically transformed--as the apparent success of liberal capitalism in places like Catholic Spain and Northern Italy demonstrates. But it is hardly a foregone conclusion that the belief systems which prove to be capable of attracting adherents in the wake of the collapse of the USSR will be decisively legal-rational in character. Indeed, the potential for ethnicity to emerge as the most powerful basis of cultural identity in the post-Leninist environment is quite high.

Conclusion. Obviously, this rather brief excursus through the morass of political, economic and cultural issues emerging out of the August Revolution is hardly comprehensive. Events continue to develop more rapidly than dispassionate analysis can manage to encompass. A few issues are clearly going to be critical to watch in the next few months: the nature of the relationship between the Ukraine and Russia, the question of how to create a workable currency or currencies on the former territory of the USSR, the role of the KGB in defending what is left of Leninist privilege, and the enormous problem of what to do about the Russian minorities existing in every non-Russian republic and autonomous region. Beyond identifying key loci of conflict such as this, it is wise to be circumspect about one's ability to predict outcomes. What is needed now is a combination of analytic creativity and freedom from overt bias in making sense of what is truly a revolutionary moment in world

history. Above all, we must neither assume that the ex-Soviet Union is going to "transit" rapidly to Western European liberal capitalism, nor panic when (not if) the more idealistic hopes for human freedom raised by the August Revolution fail to materialize. For the collapse or corruption of ideals is the essence of political life.

#### New Books from Our Faculty

- Daniel Chirot, ed. *The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left: The Revolutions of 1989*. University of Washington Press, 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed. *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economics and Politics from the Middle Ages Until the Early Twentieth Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, paperback ed.
- Sabrina Ramet. *Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Meaning of the Great Transformation* (Duke University Press, 1991).
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia*. Westview Press, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991*, 2d ed. Indiana University Press, 1992 (first published in 1984).
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed. *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union*. Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed. *Adaptation and Transformation in Communist and Post-Communist Systems*. Westview Press, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_, ed. *Protestantism and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia*. Duke University Press, 1992. (Third vol. of *Christianity Under Stress*).
- Galya Diment. *Between Heaven and Hell: The Myth of Siberia in Russian Culture*. Coming out in 1992 from St. Martin's Press in New York and MacMillan in London. Co-edited with Yuri Slezkine.
- Elisa Miller. Chapter "Doing Business Outside of Moscow," in James Hecht, ed., *Rubles and Dollars: Strategies for Doing Business in the Soviet Union*, HarperCollins, September 1991.

#### UW Extension Baltic Series

"Baltic Renaissance," a lecture discussion series, will examine present issues, trends and future prospects for the Baltic region. Following is the schedule of lecture topics, all Monday evenings, 7:30-9:00 p.m.:

- Oct. 7: Latvia Today (Gundar King, former Dean, Business Adm, PLU)
  - Oct. 14: Historical Context of Baltic Present (Prof.D.Treadgold, JSIS, UW)
  - Oct. 21: Poland, S.U.: Regional Concerns (Prof.L.Eliason, Scand.Studies,UW)
  - Oct. 28: Lithuania Today (S. Lozoraitis, Lithuanian Ambassador to US)
  - Nov. 4: Estonia Today (E-J Kolde; M. Kask, T. Laevastu)
  - Nov. 18: Environ. Issues, Scand. Concerns (Prof.C.Zumbrunnen, Geog.,UW)
  - Nov. 25: The New Germany & Its Baltic Seaboard (Prof.W.Spohn, JSIS, UW)
  - Dec. 2: Regional Security Issues of Baltic Nations (Prof.C.Jones, JSIS,UW)
  - Dec. 9: Baltic Renaissance? Concluding Panel (Moderator: Prof.L.Eliason)
- You can register with University Extension, 543-2300, over the phone with Visa or Mastercard. Course # EDP:914-20472. \$79 subscription for all nine lectures or \$10 for single lectures on a space-available basis.

## Local Croats Organize in Support of Homeland

by Ana Munk, member, Croatian American Alliance for Democracy

Three months ago the idea of a war raging in Croatia, in the very heart of Europe, was unthinkable to us. Yugoslavia had always been regarded as the most democratic country in East Europe. In particular, the events of May 1990 gave us great hope that transition to the new post-communist era would be peaceful. Then, Slovenia and Croatia, followed by other Yugoslav republics, democratically and peacefully elected their governments. With national flags waving, the future seemed to be in the hands of the people of Yugoslavia.

As power shifted from Belgrade to the republics' Parliaments, the need for a looser confederation of Yugoslavia's six republics became evident. Last year political activity could be summarized as a process of constant but unsuccessful negotiations over the nature of unification. Proposals made by Slovenia and Croatia were all rebuffed by Serbian strongman Milosevic, insisting that all Serbs should live in one state. This translates in practical terms to the creation of a greater Serbia which would include the territories of Croatia and Bosnia, where the Serbian minority lives (the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and Republic of Montenegro were silently annexed along the way). The fact that Serbs in such an enlarged Serbia would become a minority in their own country apparently did not occur to those Serbs who in a nationalistic fervor voted for Milosevic.

Now, a year later, after a period of unsolved tensions and failed negotiations, the Yugoslav Army has made the complex issue of federation versus confederation into a dramatically simple one. The Serbian government backed by the Yugoslav Army has chosen force as their unique argument and simplified the choice for Slovenes and Croats. Confederation in view of the present aggression became impossible. Milosevic didn't give much choice to Croats but to vote for a complete and unquestionable independence within its present borders. On the June referendum 94% out of the 88% of those who voted chose the option of an independent state of Croatia.

The price that they are paying for such a choice is (as of Oct. 1991) close to 2000 killed, over 200,000 refugees, one third of Croatian territories occupied, and 164 monuments and churches destroyed. And while their determination came as no surprise to the Croatian community in Seattle and across the nation, we were unprepared to try to counter the disinterested stand on the issue by the present American administration. Whereas other ethnic communities worked on both a cultural and political level, Croats are at least 10 years late in the promotion of their quest for statehood. In the past, political immigrants that worked for the right of self-determination of the Croatian nation suffered greatly from the negative image spread by communist propaganda in their homeland and active persecution by the Yugoslav secret police. Although decisively anti-communist, the immigrants divided over the issue of to what degree Yugoslavia was a voluntary and desirable form of unification of the South Slavs. The active support by the United States of a unified Yugoslavia made promotion of separatist ideas yet more difficult. On his visit to Belgrade in July of this year, Secretary of State James Baker reinforced the 50-year old American support for a Titoist Socialist and Federative Yugoslavia. Such a short-sided position gave the green light to the expansionistic politics of Serbia, creating the nickname "Baker's war."

A side effect of the present aggression of the Serbian-run Yugoslav army was that the Croatian immigrant community felt forced to urgently consolidate and reunite on the basis of common political interest, thus mirroring the move

of the present Croatian government, which on its side strengthened its position by forming a coalition with the opposition parties.

For us here, it is moving to witness the human drama of the community. People from all walks of life, "closet Croats," old and new immigrants, friends and sympathizers, are going through a very emotional process of ethnic and political awakening. For all of us it is a shock similar to that Eastern European nations experienced in the 50s during the Russian occupation. In comparison, the pictures of destruction, massacres of the civilian population and unanimous opposition of Croatians to Federal army occupation make the events of Prague Spring seem like a "clean job." We went through several psychological states: complete despair and a sense of hopelessness, followed by the urge to act, to organizing ourselves and putting our resources to work toward the liberation and creation of an independent Croatia.

The Croatian American Alliance for Democracy (CAAS), established symbolically on the 4th of July 1991, thus started as a kind of support group for people who now found themselves unable to work, flipping through the channels to catch the latest news, waiting on the porch past midnight for the New York Times delivery, burdened by the "unbearable heaviness of the situation." Once we picked up the glove thrown in our face we found great relief in action. We organized rallies, went after the media, which soon became aware of the large number of Croatian Americans in the area.

Our primary activity was to raise public awareness about the nature of the war escalating in Croatia and its historical background, still largely unknown to the American public. We are trying to influence the moves of the United States government by organizing mail campaigns in support of favorable initiatives. Our upcoming letter writing campaign will support bill S 1737, submitted before the Senate on 20 September by Senator Robert Dole, the leading pro-Croatian voice in Washington. This bill will prohibit the U.S. from purchasing any items from the Yugoslav defense industry. While this trade is not large, it would be the first substantive U.S. legislation since the war in Croatia began. In the future, creation of a network of politically active groups across the nation is in order. We want to see United States recognition of an independent Croatia and peace in that country. For more information, call CAAD, 525-5450, FAX 236-5229.

#### LIBRARY NEWS

After several months of planning, the Slavic and East European Section moved into a suite of offices in the renovated Administrative Offices space on Suzzallo second floor (Room 264). Previously housed in one large area, the Slavic suite now occupies four individual offices. The International Studies Conference Room is also located in the Slavic Suite. In conjunction with the move, and in response to growing demands for information, we have increased our public service hours from four to six hours per day, 10 am-Noon, 1-5 pm.

There are some new and returning faces in the Section. Leslie Linn joined the staff in June as the new Office Assistant III. The library expanded this position from 50 % to 100% in recognition of the growing need for staff support in the Slavic Section. Anastasia Nelson rejoined our staff in September as Library Technician III. Susan Burke, Assistant Slavic Librarian and George Klim, Head of the Slavic Section, will answer your questions and provide general research assistance. We can be reached by phone: 543-5588 or electronic mail: George - jerzy@hardy; Susan - sburke@milton.

### New Videotapes

The REEU Program has purchased an exceptionally fine series of videos for its Outreach Program. Produced by Films for the Humanities, 1988, these programs share an awareness that local problems are universal problems and that damage to the world is the same as self-undoing. Each runs about 50 minutes, and is available to educators in the community by contacting our program, 543-4852.

*Face to Face.* Latvian resentment at Russians; Armenian outrage at Azerbaijanis. Film ends with priest noting this century's ever escalating violence and the need for a stronger spiritual base if we are to survive.

*Baikal* (in two parts). Films of extraordinary sensitivity and beauty. Formed over 50 million years ago, Baikal is the oldest and most isolated lake on the planet, though now threatened by housing projects and factory discharges. Writer V. Rasputin urges that it be placed under U.N. protection. "Must this non-replicable resource be sacrificed to the God of progress?"

*Chernobyl: The Taste of Wormwood.* In Revelations 8:10-11 a burning star plunges into the rivers, causing a third to become wormwood and bitter and many people to die. The film tracks the dispersion of radioactive material to "hot spots"--areas that both lay in the path of the wind and got rain.

*Awakening.* In the USSR, 1000 years of Russian Orthodox Christianity is now being recognized, and Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner can openly discuss changes in the political climate. More freedom and less fear has brought a resurgence of nationalism in Latvia and ethnic tension in Nagorny Karabakh.

*Soviets: Do You Hear Us?* Focus on Afghan vets, about 80-90% of whom, claims one, feel the war was in vain. Next, a pop opera composer talks about society fragmenting, losing any harmony of beliefs. The scene shifts to directionless teens, hippies in Latvia, Pam'yat, Democratic Peoples' Front.

*Soviets: Red Hot.* Turmoil in Soviet society today--dissatisfaction with Gorbachev, ethnic violence in Uzbekistan, earthquake in Armenia. Composer Alexei Rybnikov at work on his opera "Holy Communion for Nonbelievers." Wretched working conditions for women at an engine factory in Yaroslavl; near Chernobyl art historian tries to save precious art works now contaminated.

*The Wall.* Power structures that won't bend: Cruelty and persistence of tradition as an Uzbek girl is shunned by the community for alleged impurity. Biochemical plant poisons the air of Kirishi (near Leningrad), where high incidents of asthma and other ailments are found. Finally, Boris Yeltsin on why the entrenched power structure (apparatchiks) must be made to give way.

*Lenin and his Legacy.* Good overview of Lenin's rise to power, political events during his leadership, and continuation and evolution of the communist government in the years following his death. Fast-moving and highly factual.

*Stalin* (in 3 parts). Stalin's abused childhood, his accumulation of power, and Lenin's growing concerns about his colleague's methods. Later segments look at massive industrialization projects, forced collectivization of the peasants, famine, and the death of at least 20 million people.

### Community Events

Hon. Yuliy M. Vorontsov, Soviet Ambassador to the U.N. will be the featured speaker at the 1991 Mayor's Annual United Nations Day Luncheon on Oct. 24, 12:00 noon at the Stouffer Madison Hotel. For reservations call 545-7873.

The Russian Orthodox Cathedral of St. Nicholas (located at 1714 - 13th) will hold its annual pre-Christmas bazaar Oct. 26th & 27th, Noon-6 Sat., Noon-7 Sun. Ethnic items, raffle tickets, and your favorite Russian foods. Admission free. You might come early and attend the beautiful Russian Orthodox service (10 or 10:30 Sun. morning) followed by a tour of the cathedral.

The Polish Home will serve as a polling place for Polish citizens who wish to vote in the Parliamentary elections in Poland on Oct. 26.

Stasys Lozoraitis, Chargé d'Affaires at the Lithuanian Legation in Washington D.C. for 15 years, will be guest of World Affairs Council Oct. 29, 7-9 p.m. at the Sheraton Seattle Hotel & Towers. Call 682-6986. \$15 per person.

Professor Stephen Hanson, Political Science Department, UW, will speak on the theme "Is There a Soviet Union?" at Covenant House, 4525 19th Ave NE, on Oct. 30, 1991, 6:00 p.m. Possibly a religious leader from Russia as well. Program to be followed by dinner. For info., call Rev. Jean Kim, 524-7900.

The Polish Home (1714 18th) will have its annual bazaar the weekend of Nov. 2-3, Noon-7 p.m. Pierogi and other foods, arts and crafts for sale. Traditionally, the first evening there is a performance by Polish folksingers.

Nov. 14, Professor Ilse Cirtautas, of the Department of Near East Languages and Civilization, will talk on her recent visit to Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, in Denny Hall 215, 12:30-1:30 p.m.

Nov. 19, the Jackson School will initiate the Andrei Sakharov Memorial Lecture on Human Rights. Dr. Elena Bonner, widow of Nobel laureate Andei Sakharov, will give the inaugural address in Meany Hall at 7:30 p.m. Event open to the general public. For more information, call 685-3877.

The Firebird will continue to play at Poncho Theatre (at Woodland Park Zoo) through Nov. 3. The production is a collaborative effort between Novosibirsk State Children's Theatre and the Seattle Children's Theatre, with costumes made in Russia from 15th century designs and with sets constructed here.

### Lithuanian Language Course Offered Locally

The Montlake Community Center is currently offering a ten-week course in Lithuanian, taught by instructor Arynys Gaurys. Classes began September 20 and will run through November 22, Friday evenings from 7-9 p.m. There is a \$25 fee for the series. Call 684-4736 or come in to register (1618 E. Calhoun Street, near the Montlake bridge).

WELCOME TO NEW REEU GRADUATE STUDENTS

REEU is pleased to welcome seventeen new students to our program this fall. Listed below, with the universities where they received their degrees:

East European Studies

Paulina Bren  
Goro Onojima

Russian Studies

Kathryn Brown  
James Davis  
Vincent Dreyer  
Jeffrey Eberhardt  
Delfina Ely  
Megan Ensminger  
Amanda Floan  
Michelle Fuqua  
Kyle Hafar  
Leslie Jackson  
Marcellyn Martin  
Michelle Mills  
Bianca Plank  
Alison Radl  
Stephen Reilly

Wesleyan University  
Ehime University

University of Wisconsin  
Oberlin College  
US Military Academy  
Univ of Wisconsin/Eau Claire  
Willamette University  
Carleton College  
Florida State University  
University of California/Davis  
University of Washington  
Vassar College  
University of Houston  
University of Arizona  
University of Washington  
University of Washington  
Duke University

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