

The Catholic Imagination of Czeslaw Milosz

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Abstract

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This dissertation will argue, using a unique hermeneutic model, for interpreting the poetic work of Nobelist Czeslaw Milosz as thoroughly permeated by a Catholic imagination. The introduction will outline a general theory of the imagination and how it has swerved from analogy (classically Catholic) into several types of analogy (Protestant, scientific, and literary) because of historical epistemological failures. The body of the

argument consists of three chapters that argue, following arguments made by the poet in his works, for the continuity of a religious poetic voice throughout his career. It does so by demonstrating the continuity of theological interest in the poems of Milosz's early, middle, and late period. Besides being a contribution to Milosz studies, the foregoing argument will also show how much contemporary literary theory is permeated by historically conditioned theological assumptions that are neither clearly acknowledged nor well understood.

The elaboration of an expanded conception of imagination in the introduction hinges on the recognition that "imagination" is not sufficiently apprehended as a psychological power or function nor an epistemological premise, since it is inculcated through many elements and practices to constitute a worldview. Central to this conception is a parallel expansion of the idea of the liturgical, not restricted to elements of commonly identified as religious, but including them as indexical and accessible, playing multiple roles in axiological contexts, circumstances of reflection or judgment, and the inhabitation of a world as communally constituted and continued. The historical dimension is treated, albeit schematically, to illustrate that there is no contradiction in there being *multiple* imaginations, with the primary focus for the subject of concern here the Catholic imagination.

The focus on the example and the work Nobel laureate Czeslaw Milosz is crucial. My central claim is that Milosz, an unmistakably powerful and influential poetic voice in the modern world, is very commonly read and critically commented upon without sufficient attention either to his life-long concern with religious, frequently theological

issues, but to an encompassing Catholic imagination that is a major shaping element throughout his career.

The chapters in this dissertation take on multiple critical purposes, to frame the issues so as to make clear both how a specifically Catholic imagination can be discerned and understood, and to provide critical commentary and analysis of selected major poems, from his earliest to his latest. In the concluding chapter, the subject is Milosz's long poem, late in his career, "A Treatise on Theology", itself possibly unique in recent literature. My concern will be to show that this is *not* as the title appears, a mixing of genres, but an explicit and eloquent address to the union of poetry and religious life, neither doctrinaire nor defensive in embracing the historical community and communion of Catholicism. It exemplifies poetry not as merely craft, but as a profound way of thinking.

Chapter One, "Visibility and the Catholic Imagination," starts with an extended account of the visual culture of the dialectical-Protestant imagination. Such an account helps to flesh out the analogous structures involved in forming both Catholic and Protestant imaginations and proves that the latter has a rich historical imagination. This then leads into an explanation of how and why the Catholic imagination differs from dialectical imaginations (Protestant, scientific, and literary) in the emphasis it puts upon man and the world as immanent analogues of the transcendent. This unique accent upon the visible world as an analogue for God is explored in the following early Milosz poems: "Encounter," "The Sun," "Faith," "Hope," "Love," "The Spirit of History," and "*Esse*."

Chapter 2, “Breakdowns of Analogy and Cafeteria Manicheanism,” discusses poems of Milosz’s middle period and their interpretation of breakdowns in the analogical imagination caused by developments in the sciences, literature, and theology. It pays special attention to the poet’s development of the category of Manicheanism. It argues that Milosz is not a Manichean himself, even though his writing, especially in this period, is colored by Manichean categories. The analysis of the poems “Veni Creator,” “To Robinson Jeffers,” “To Raja Rao,” and “The Accuser” (a section from the poem “From the Rising of the Sun”) demonstrates how the poet picks and chooses Manichean categories in order to highlight the areas where analogical thinking is breaking down. His selectively descriptive, rather than prescriptive, use of Manicheanism is the reason why this chapter resorts to calling him a “Cafeteria Manichean.” Special attention is paid to Milosz’s use of Eucharistic images that counter what he calls “Neo-Manichean” historical trends.

Chapter 3, “Analogy and the Problem of the Good,” discusses Milosz’s late poems with an emphasis upon the problem of the good. These poems tend to thematize the goodness of the world and man much more frequently than the poems from the poet’s early and middle periods. The poems “Bypassing Rue Descartes,” “Realism,” “Unde Malum,” and “Presence” are analyzed from this angle with special emphasis put upon the theological concept of the communion of saints.

The Conclusion, “Yet I Sing With Them,” is an analysis of the last two sections of the late poem “Treatise on Theology.” This work is singled out because it is Milosz’s final poetic treatise. As such, it gathers up all the theological themes we have discussed in poems from his middle, early, and late periods and thereby confirms the poet’s thesis that

there is a specifically religious thematic continuity to all of his poetry. The “Treatise on Theology” also advances the importance of participating in a historical religious community and the power of beauty to foster an analogical imagination. These last two themes were only present rarely or implicitly in the earlier poems.

Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my loving wife Monika for her unfaltering love and saintly strength.

I would also like to dedicate this work my parents, Anna and Adam Rosman, for all the invaluable help they've provided along the way.

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Introduction:

How Does the Catholic Imagination Supplement Literary Theory?

Anyone who has read more than one book by the Polish Nobel laureate Czeslaw Milosz (1911-2004) is familiar with the following words from another Nobel prize winner, the Russian Joseph Brodsky: “I have no hesitation whatsoever in stating that Czeslaw Milosz is one of the greatest poets of our time, perhaps the greatest.” This statement appears on the back cover of just about every volume of Milosz’s poems and essays. This praise is a bald assertion, but one might ask, given the absence of context for Brodsky’s statement, “How and why is Milosz one of the greatest poets of our time?” This study will argue that Milosz’s poetry is a form of thinking—as serious as any philosophy, theology, or literary theory—that carries a heavier intellectual load than competing forms of thought. Milosz was aware of this and said in his *A Treatise on Poetry*,

Novels and essays serve but will not last.

One clear stanza can take more weight

Than a whole wagon of elaborate prose.¹

Carrying weight for the sake of carrying weight might be satisfying for aficionados of weightlifting, but it remains to be seen just *what sort of weight* Milosz’s poetry carries.

What this study will argue is that the poetry of Czeslaw Milosz attempts to carry the burden of discussing profound changes in the intellectual landscape of the last five hundred years, particularly as they continue to be manifest in the present. It systematically returns to problems caused by the collapse of the thought-world of medieval Catholicism and the

¹ Czeslaw Milosz, *A Treatise on Poetry*, trans. Robert Haas and Czeslaw Milosz (New York: Ecco, 2001) 1.

emergence of the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, and the development of literary studies. Here is how the Milosz outlines the scope of the problems he diagnoses:

Instead of leaving to theologians their worries, I have constantly meditated on religion [in my poetry]. Why? Simply because *someone* had to do this... I lived in a time when a huge change in the contents of the human imagination was occurring. In my lifetime Heaven and Hell disappeared, the belief in life after death was considerably weakened [and so on]... After two thousand years in which a huge edifice of creeds and dogmas has been erected, from Origen and Saint Augustine to Thomas Aquinas and Cardinal Newman, when every work of the human mind and of human hands was created within a system of reference, the age of homelessness has dawned. How could I not think of this?²

From this it becomes apparent that the story Milosz irrepressibly wants to tell about modernity, roughly the period that emerges with the Protestant Reformation and the Scientific Revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries, will be tied up with the collapse of the Catholic “system of reference,” what we will later call a “Catholic religious imagination.”³

One of the things that Milosz criticism has consistently overlooked is how much Milosz writes from within this system of reference; in other words, his poetry is pervasively marked by a Catholic imagination. Above he said, “I have constantly meditated upon religion,” but this makes the relationship between his work and theology sound too extrinsic. The introduction, “A

² Czeslaw Milosz, *Roadside Dog*, trans. Robert Hass and Czeslaw Milosz (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998) 105.

³ We will shortly explore how we are using the concept of the imagination, with citation of sources, especially in note 8, upon which I have drawn, because it differs considerably from the theories of Kant, the German Romantics, and Coleridge, which have received almost exclusive attention in recent academic research.

Footnote, Many Years Later,” to his *Selected and Last Poems: 1931-2004* gives us an essential corrective. There he asserts an “internal logic that connects [the] earliest poems [I] wrote [from] the age of twenty with [the] poems of [my] maturity and old age.”⁴ He explains this internal logic as the outworking of a “Catholic upbringing [that] implanted in [him] a respect for all things, visible, connected by the property of being, or *esse*, that calls for unceasing admiration” (xix). We will explore this in more depth as this introduction unfolds. Early and late, he is working from a Catholic analogical imagination that puts unusually heavy emphasis upon the presence of God in the world in a way that is perhaps unique among world religions—at the very least, unique among Western Christian traditions. These reflections from “A Footnote, Many Year Later” ultimately lead Milosz to characterize his poetic enterprise as theological:

The history of the twentieth century encouraged many poets to seek images that could convey their moral protest. Yet it is very difficult to bear the knowledge, the weight, of facts and not yield to the temptation of becoming a reporter. A certain astuteness is called for in choosing our means, and a sort of distillation of materials, so as to acquire the perspective that lets us contemplate the things of this world without delusions. I wouldn't be exaggerating if I said that, for me, such contemplation acquired a religious dimension (xix).

The topics and symbols Milosz “distills” from the “weight of facts,” are the result of an imagination shaped within a specific tradition and the worldview it inculcates. This aspect of his

⁴ Czeslaw Milosz, *Selected and Last Poems: 1931-2004*, trans. Anthony Milosz et al. (New York: Ecco, 2011) 94. NOTA BENE: All subsequent passages from Milosz's poetry will be taken from this volume with the page number cited in parentheses within the body of the text. Poems taken from other collections will receive standard footnoting.

poetic output has not received due attention in either Polish or English criticism. Polish studies of his work often tend to take this fundamental dimension of his poems for granted, while American studies ignore it for the most part.⁵ One of the other major aims of this study is to confirm Milosz's theological-continuity-thesis by analyzing poems from three periods of his life: early (1936-1959), middle (1960-1979), and late (1980-2004). Our analysis will seek to confirm that the thematic unity Milosz proposed in this late essay reflects what is found in the poems themselves from beginning to end, rather than being a projection of old age and fear of death. The approach of confirming a theological continuity throughout all the Polish poet's work has not been tried, so far as I know, in any previous study of his poetry.

At this point, the reader might be rightfully tempted to ask the following questions: 'How does such a study belong within the discipline of comparative literature? Can we not stick to the poems themselves and explain their linguistic intricacies and affective power? Perhaps this study ought to be submitted to a theology department, or at least a comparative religion department?' These are all fair questions. Answering them will take us through a description of a long historical arc that will explain how the partial collapse of medieval Catholicism not only led to the Reformation, but also the Scientific Revolution, *and* the 19th century emergence of literary

⁵ Lukasz Tischner, *Sekrety Manichejskich Trucizn [Secrets of Manichean Posions]* (Krakow: ZNAK, 2001) is typical of Polish studies. He concentrates upon the Manichean leitmotifs in Milosz work and how they relate to the problem of evil. What Tischner's argument ignores is the Catholic background of the poet's work. If the book were to be done from the perspective proposed in this study then it would argue for a "Cafeteria Manicheanism" in Milosz's poems. That is, Milosz picks and chooses Manichean motifs (heavily dialectical) in order to show the places where the Catholic analogical imagination is breaking down. The most representative American study is Leonard Nathan and Arthur Quinn, *The Poet's Work: An Introduction to Czeslaw Milosz* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991). Like most American studies this one is largely biographical. This study accentuates the poet's unique historical experience and subordinates the poems to the historical experience. It therefore does not foreground the unfamiliar but constant theological component of the poems and the imagination behind them.

criticism as disciplines independent of the older theological tradition.⁶ Milosz is clearly aware of this historical arc, because his poems and essays, as we have already glimpsed, are an exploration of its origins and the problems that have emerged from them.

Before we can proceed to explore the historical arc, we first need to flesh out the concept of the “imagination.” This concept will be used in this study to describe how Czeslaw Milosz treats the collapse of medieval Catholicism and the subsequent emergence of the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, literary studies, and finally, the state of contemporary Catholicism. Our working definition for the concept of the “imagination” is as follows: *an imagination is a liturgically inculcated worldview that structures a way of life.* The concept of “liturgy,” as it will be used throughout this study, denotes a set of normative beliefs and practices that are inculcated through repetitive *praxis*, within a community.⁷ By this definition the imagination is not insulated against doctrine and practice into some fanciful imaginary realm; instead, those two dimensions of existence are integrated into our understanding of what the imagination is. The imagination always includes doctrine, because there is always a dynamic interplay between beliefs, practices, and creativity. They play off of each other.

Our definition of liturgy also swerves from commonplace definitions of liturgy, because it does not limit itself to religious ritual. Although it very much includes religious ritual, it also includes secular liturgies. For example, the curriculum of graduate students in humanities departments is one example of a secular liturgy. The students participate in practices that form

⁶ My analysis owes a great deal to one particular book: Brad S. Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2012), especially the final chapter where he summarizes his findings, “Conclusion: Against Nostalgia,” 365-388.

⁷ Later on in this introduction it will become apparent that the beliefs and practices change over time as they adopt to new historical moments, however, for the most part, they maintain some ideational and practical identity with earlier manifestation. Hence, we can speak of a development of imaginations much in the same way as John Henry Newman talked about the development of doctrine. It should become more obvious that the development of doctrine is contained within the notion of imagination as defined for the purposes of this study.

their imaginations into a worldview with definite contours. This is accomplished through students reading, discussing, and writing about an implicit canon of texts (i.e. de Saussure, Adorno, Foucault, Derrida, Kristeva, Said, Butler, and so on) in graduate humanities programs across the United States and elsewhere. The habits of mind acquired by graduate students are then applied to writing conference papers, other publications, and ultimately in the pursuit of tenure. But the whole complex of these practices shapes the imagination which is then applied to life outside the text, for example, in certain types of community organization, coffeehouse culture, political protest, and choices made in family formation, and so on: the list is virtually endless.

The training of a soldier's imagination through a military liturgy is perhaps a more obvious example. It includes specific beliefs and codes of conduct that spill outside the barracks and the battlefield. They modulate the everyday life of a soldier whose mannerisms, ways of comporting him or herself in the civilian world, ways of dressing and grooming, can be readily recognized by those who have never partaken in military training. In summary, the combination of continual liturgical training and practice creates a worldview—any worldview; it is only most apparent, and perhaps most conscious, in religious liturgical formation. The training of an imagination aims at a liturgically inculcated worldview that leads to a “distillation of materials” as Milosz called it. This distillation privileges certain sets of actions and ways of thinking, which constitute a worldview that is potentially recognizable in word, deed, and even bodily comportment of a person who is shaped by a particular imagination. It is more than a set of beliefs, it is a way of life.⁸

⁸ The understanding of the imagination as a liturgically shaped worldview owes its inspiration to the work of religious scholars James K.A. Smith, William T. Cavanaugh, and the historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot. See: Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995)

Finally, there is the training of the scientist. Science involves an inculcated worldview as much as religion, graduate study, and soldiering. Note, however, that calling attention to what is an obvious parallel with “liturgy” can easily become a flashpoint for controversy. In *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* Thomas Kuhn explains these underpinnings of scientific practice:

“Normal science” means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice.⁹

In his “Postscript-1969”, Kuhn goes on to remark that adherence to a paradigm includes not only such foundational concrete achievements, but a “disciplinary matrix” as “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community.”¹⁰

Most of the controversy connected with this book had to do with Kuhn’s account of paradigm changes. Kuhn said about this process that “the transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced.”¹¹ The word conversion seems to

and William T. Cavanaugh, *Migrations of the Holy: God, State, and the Political Meaning of the Church* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011). James K.A. Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013) 31-32 gives a formulation of the imagination that is in line with the one we will be working with in this study on Milosz, “Much of our action is not the fruit of conscious deliberation; instead, much of what we do grows out of our passional orientation to the world—affected by all the ways we’re been primed to perceive the world. In short, our action emerges from how we *imagine* the world. What we do is driven by who we are, by the kind of person we have become. And that shaping of our character is, to a great extent, the effect of stories that have captivated us, that have sunk into our bones—stories that ‘picture’ what we think life is about, what constitutes the ‘good life.’ We live *into* the stories we’ve absorbed; we become characters in the drama that has captivated us. Thus, much of our action is acting out a kind of script that has unconsciously capture out imaginations. And such stories capture our imagination precisely because narrative trains our emotions, and those emotions actually condition our perception of the world.”

⁹ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2012) 10.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 175.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 150.

have been a particular stumbling block for Israel Scheffler who charged that Kuhn's account of the "adoption of a scientific theory an intuitive or mystical affair."¹² The aversion to applying religious categories is typical among those who responded to Kuhn critically. Yet once brought to the foreground, notice how much Kuhn's description of "normal science" is analogous to the workings of religious liturgy, that is, how much "achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice" are a liturgically inculcated worldview which is changed in a scientific revolution, a point Kuhn explicitly makes.¹³

The liturgies of the scientist, graduate student, and of the soldier are analogous in how they function and how they inculcate a world view about the optimal way of proceeding through life by repetitive actions and ways of thinking. In addition, there is no reason why they cannot meet within one person who might a graduate student in the sciences within an ROTC program. Things can get even more complicated when the same person is a religious believer as well. Milosz's poetry demonstrates that due to historical developments, different liturgies either harmonize or compete with each other for the heart and mind of the person they inculcate. For example, in "A Treatise on Poetry" he says,

Many a man will concede, if he knows himself,
That he was like one who hears a chorus
Of voices and doesn't know what they mean.
Thence, fury. A foot to the accelerator, as if
Speed could save us from voices and phantoms.
We trailed everywhere an invisible rope

¹² See: Israel Scheffler, *Science and Subjectivity* (Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 1982) 18.

¹³ Kuhn, *Structure*, chapter X: "Revolutions as Changes in World View," 111-135.

And felt its hook deep inside us every moment.¹⁴

The influence of the “chorus of voices” is like the influence of various liturgies that inescapably influence an individual’s way of life and cannot be escaped. This is the case because they bind a person to an invisible rope that goes into the very marrow of their being, into their fleshly existence like a hook attached to an “invisible rope.” Liturgies transform our being and therefore cannot be evaded; they are the furniture of our minds. At most, new liturgies can be consciously chosen and cultivated while struggling against the influences of the other liturgies. The challenge of negotiating the demands of competing liturgies, a process that is called discernment in religious practice, is one of the main challenges of our hyper-pluralistic late modern culture.

What we have outlined above is a synchronic account of how an imagination works. The model is analogical because it accounts for the fundamental structural similarities in how imaginations are shaped. However, each imagination, or combination of imaginations, will shape an individual uniquely. This means that an individual would be a different person if they were subject to the inculcation of a different liturgy, or sets of liturgies. Ultimately, the differences in the worldviews and practices liturgies inculcate are fundamental for the shaping of personhood.

It is a testament to Milosz’s poetry, however, that it is also concerned with the diachronic development of imaginations. His poetry provides a genealogy of the contemporary situation and its roots in medieval Catholicism’s partial collapse and the problems these developments pose for a contemporary Catholic imagination. Once again, it might seem strange to the reader to put so much emphasis upon questions of belief in a comparative literature study. However, there is good reason for this emphasis: there is both a theological background to literary criticism and

¹⁴ Czeslaw Milosz, *A Treatise on Poetry*, trans. Czeslaw Milosz and Robert Hass (New York: Ecco, 2001) 59.

there is also an implicitly theological dimension to it. It is, in this respect, already a part of our religious as well as our intellectual and cultural history.

We must take the long diachronic road of establishing a genealogy before we can fully explain from where this theological dimension of literary criticism and our contemporary pluralistic situation originates. Milosz can help here as well. The stanza from “A Treatise on Poetry” we analyzed above for its explanation of the synchronic dimensions of the imagination is preceded by a stanza that gives us a wider diachronic vista,

There is much with which to reproach us.
 Given the choice, we rejected peaceful silence
 And long meditation on the structure of the world
 Which deserves respect. Neither the eternal moment
 Attracted us as it should, nor purity of style.

He continues by explaining the motivations behind this civilizational choice,

We wanted, instead, to move as words move,
 Raising the dust of names and of events.
 We didn't care enough that they disappear
 In a thousand sparks and we with them. Even
 The disrepute we have taken on ourselves
 Was not completely far from our designs,
 And so, though unwillingly, we pay the price.¹⁵

¹⁵ Ibid., 58-59.

This is the poet's rough outline of what the transition from the medieval world to the modern world entailed. It involved a choice against the "long meditation on the structure of the world" and a movement into properly modern historical consciousness "Raising the dust of names and of events." Note how this passage is analogous to the passages in "A Footnote, Many Years Later," where Milosz talks about his "Catholic upbringing [that] implanted in [him] a respect for all things, visible, connected by the property of being, or *esse*, that calls for unceasing admiration" (xix). The respect that calls forth admiration is what "A Treatise on Poetry" calls "meditation upon the structure of the world," which is related to the "eternal moment," that is, epiphanies of the transcendent (God) within the very immanence of this world. This close interplay between the transcendent (God) and the immanent (man, world) is one that calls forth analogies between these realms. These are the hallmarks of what we will call the Catholic imagination.

The Catholic analogical imagination will be our diachronic starting point, simply because it chronologically precedes the Reformation, Scientific Revolution, and literary studies. We will also argue that the emergence of the latter movements came from a long series of dialectical responses to the abuses of analogy. These responses are characterized by a dialectical emphasis upon transcendence (God) over and against the immanent (man, world). The Reformation was a dialectical response to medieval Catholicism, in the sense of emphasizing God's transcendence in order to protest against immanent moral, institutional, and epistemological failures. The success of the Scientific Revolution was in part the result of a dialectical response to the post-Reformation (and Counter-Reformation) Wars of Religion (1524-1648). Finally, the emergence of literary studies was a dialectical response to the Scientific Revolution. We will do our best to fill out the complicated details of these dialectical responses

when we describe each of them. We shall call this intricate process of deploying dialectical responses to perceived moral, institutional, and epistemological failures “the weaves of transcendence.” Lastly, our phenomenology of the weaves of transcendence—the successive transitions from the pre-modern to the modern and lastly to the late modern—will use the categories God, man, world to help us characterize how the imaginations that emerged from these weaves function. These three categories despite, but also by virtue of, their broadness will help us build up a picture of each of the four successive imaginations by what they emphasize and also what they deemphasize.

The Catholic imagination closely relates the three categories of God, world, and man through analogies. Analogies should not be confused with complete one-to-one identification of these three categories. A complete identification would result in a pantheistic system. However, unlike the dialectical imagination, which stresses the differences between the transcendent and the immanent, the analogical imagination puts emphasis upon the similarities between God, world, and man. The theological reading of the creation accounts in Genesis 1 and 2 is what undergirds this imagination. If creation (man and world, the immanent sphere) emerges, is sustained, and continually participates in God, then it is in some way analogous, that is, stamped with his imprint and presence. That is the reason why somebody like Milosz, shaped by a Catholic imagination might say that *esse* (being) is worthy of admiration.

Thomas Aquinas, the most representative figure of the Catholic theological imagination, and a decisive figure in the intellectual development of Czeslaw Milosz,¹⁶ says the following about God and being, “So God is present everywhere in everything... Since existence itself is what God is by nature, he it must be who causes existence in creatures. Now existence is more

¹⁶ This will become apparent in our discussion of the poems in the body of this study.

intimately and profoundly interior to things than anything else; everything else is potential compared to existence.”¹⁷ In the late poem “Presence,” which we will fully analyze in the last chapter of this study, Milosz combines this insight from Aquinas (via St. Paul) when talking about his experience of the world and the communion of saints as “rising within one enormous unknowable Being” (273). The capitalization of “Being” is a clear sign that he is invoking the most characteristically Thomistic name for God. Along with this, he signals his Catholic imagination by emphasizing God’s constant presence to man and the world precisely *through* man and the world.

Since we have mentioned the communion of saints, we should talk about its roots. According to Genesis 1:27 human beings are made in the “image and likeness” of God; therefore they are eminently connected to the divine, through an explicit, though often muted, anthropomorphism present in the Old Testament. This anthropomorphism grows exponentially with the incarnation of God in a man, Jesus, in the New Testament. The anthropomorphism of the Catholic imagination, which grows out of this scriptural tradition, expresses itself in a set of practices and a material culture that give shape and historical density to particular frameworks for imagination. This point is particularly important, since the impact of a Catholic imagination upon poetry, while not itself a direct exercise in theological or ecclesiastical discourse, does allow, and in the specific case of Milosz, insists upon the continuity between poetry and religious issues and observance as the most direct and fully grounded way to link both to the broader analogies by which poetry and religion give communal extent and historical depth to a comprehensive and expandable way of life.

¹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation*, trans. Timothy McDermott (Westminster, MA: Christian Classics, 1989) 22.

This Catholic liturgy is most closely associated with the notion of a “communion of saints.” The communion of saints is a belief that highlights the lives of certain individuals who are held out as examples for the religious community at large to imitate.¹⁸ Usually, these are people who are singled out after their death in a long process of canonization that confirms the exemplary nature of their witness. Saints function as mediators of grace to those who are still living. In this way, the human community of believers in Catholicism extends beyond the boundaries of earthly time through the mediation of the saints, instead of being an unmediated relationship between the believer and God, as it tends to be in most forms of Protestantism. It should be added that there are also extraordinary examples of individuals who unofficially are believed to possess saintly status even while they are alive.¹⁹ Mother Theresa of Calcutta is the most conspicuous recent example of such a person. Here is how Milosz contrasts the Catholic imagination with the Protestant imagination:

In Protestant Christianity, there is no place for them [the departed, their presence, their examples], and no one turns to the dead with a plea for intervention.

Catholicism, however, by introducing the intercession of the saints and multiplying the number of saints and beatified people, presumes that these good spirits are not separated from the living by an impassible boundary. That is why Polish All Souls’ Days, although its origins are located far back in the time of

¹⁸ There is, of course, much more elaborate discussion of other ways of considering both the communion and adoration of the saints, still a very lively subject of scholarly discussion. See especially Eamon Duffy’s review essay, “The Intense Afterlife of the Saints” in *The New York Review of Books* LXI, no. 11 (June 19, 2014), 59-62.

¹⁹ Czeslaw’s uncle Oscar was an example of a living saint. Milosz also put a lot of store in the words of deceased people who were not officially recognized as saints, individuals such as Simone Weil and Fyodor Dostoevsky. There is a third class of saints, ordinary anonymous people whose actions (usually ritual) whose example was upbuilding, to whom Milosz turned in his poems.

pagan animism, received the blessing of the Church as a great ritual intercession.²⁰

Since in this essay Milosz was concerned with describing the Catholic imagination he did not go into the details why Protestant Christianity found “no place” for the communion of saints.

We can fill this lacuna by explaining the first, and most crucial, weave of transcendence: the emergence of a Protestant imagination was a dialectical response to medieval abuses of the communion of saints, the ecclesial institutions connected to it, and the epistemological consequences of their failures. Even though the Reformation occupies a central role in the West’s self-understanding, there was nothing inevitable about the emergence of churches that came to identify themselves as Protestant, “No one seems to have anticipated the revolution. And perhaps this is because, whatever it subsequently turned into, and whatever unfolded in its wake, it was not—at least at first—intended as any kind of revolution at all.”²¹ It was not intended to be a revolution, because even Luther’s seemingly radical gesture of nailing his theses to the Wittenberg cathedral door was part of a long medieval tradition of initiating disputes about doctrine and church practice. Many theses had been nailed to cathedral doors long before Luther did so. The whole controversy began over abuses related to the sale of indulgences. In other words, the communion of saints whose deposit of grace was packaged out through indulgences was the bone of contention between various factions within the Catholic Church. The inflexibility of the Vatican led to the hardening of positions and ultimately a break between the

²⁰ Czeslaw Milosz, *Milosz’s ABC’s*, trans. Madeleine Levine (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2001) 312.

²¹ Jonathan Wright, *Heretics: The Creation of Christianity from the Gnostics to the Modern Church* (New York: Houghton Milton Harcourt, 2011) 161.

Roman Church and a loose unaffiliated collection of groups that came to be called, collectively and polemically, by the Roman Catholics as Protestants.

The earliest phase of the Reformation, the Lutheran, rejected the communion of saints, instead opting for a more direct, unmediated connection to God. There was a corresponding crackdown, but not a total rejection, of images in churches, because most of those were related to the communion of saints. Luther's understanding of the priesthood of all believers also further cut ties with the world and man, instead proposing to individual believers a simplified, less mediated relationship to God. Scripture alone was to be the authority of Christian conduct. Correspondingly, clergy lost most of their mediatory functions, because the laity could address a more transcendent God directly. A wholly other God did not need human institutions to reach believers. He could thereby circumvent what Milosz called "the structure of the world." Luther's concept of God, and even more so Calvin's, stressed God's transcendence dialectically over and against a sinful world and humanity. This opposition between the transcendent (God) and the immanent (man, world) is what we will call the dialectical (or Protestant) imagination. Because the Reformation was a gradual process that developed at different speeds and with specific histories, the remnants of analogy and emphasis upon dialectics still vary from Protestant denomination to denomination. For example, the Anglican Church maintains a surprisingly large amount of the following: veneration of images, devotion to saints, and priestly privileges that are usually associated with Catholic clergy. On the other hand, most of the Christians associated with Calvinist traditions and the Zwinglian Radical Reformation retain almost none of those. Therefore, Milosz is not entirely correct in claiming there is "no place" for the dead and the saints in Protestant traditions. There is in some, even if it is to a lesser degree than in Catholicism.

Our brief and necessarily incomplete description of how this internal reform turned into a revolution should already hint at the processes that have led to the proliferation of Protestant denominations down to our day. They unleashed a complicated set of unexpected processes. As Brad S. Gregory puts it, “The unintended problem created by the Reformation was therefore not simply a perpetuation of the inherited and still-present challenge of how to make human life more genuinely Christian, but also the new and compounding problem of how to know what true Christianity was. ‘Scripture alone’ was not a solution to this new problem, but its cause.”²² Instead of leading to unity “scripture alone” led to sets of incompatible readings that produced incompatible confessional imaginations and liturgies. This Protestant fissiparousness was further compounded by opposition from Rome, all of which created an extremely volatile political situation that led to the bloody Wars of Religion (1524-1648). The end result of the Wars of Religion was a thoroughgoing skepticism about religious claims among the political and intellectual elites of Europe. This is where another swerve of transcendence occurs. It ironically paves the way to the partial eclipse of God in the Western collective imagination.

Great scientific advances simultaneously complicated and intensified religious turmoil on the Continent, in the gradual emergence of a competing world view, from what we now too simply call ‘The Scientific Revolution.’ The elegance of universally applicable mathematical formulas for harnessing the power of the world and offering mechanical models of it, starkly contrasted with the messy particularities of religious parties that only weakened the political consensus. In the poem “Bypassing Rue Descartes,” ironically named after one of the main theoreticians of 17th century, Milosz captures, and recapitulates in his own biography, some of the power that these advances must have had for those who were first encountering them, “I had

²² Brad S. Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation*, op. cit., 368.

left the cloudy provinces behind, / I entered the universal, dazzled and desiring” (175). Leaving the “cloudy provinces” behind is in fact a type of transcendence. It is the act of cutting oneself loose from the troublesome particularities of specific societies.

What Milosz describes is actually a double transcendence comparable to the effect of the Scientific Revolution. First, the Scientific Revolution desired to transcend the imponderable questions about God (the ultimate transcendence) by methodically bracketing them out only to eventually completely abandon them—even though, many of the principal figures (including Descartes) presumed that the way ahead would require no such abandonment. Second, to some extent, science also aimed to transcend the world of men (within the immanent sphere according to our model) by positing a universally verifiable method that everyone could agree upon, with the difficult irony that a search for complete generality and therefore the universality of ‘scientific’ truths preserved the desire for a universality clearly analogous to the desire for knowledge of God, while setting up human reason as if it could take the form of intellectual intuition—and thereby displace the ambiguities of faith. The following passage from Descartes’ *Meditations on First Philosophy* can remind us how profound an epistemological crisis touched the 17th century, “I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that what my memory tells me lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever happened. I have no senses. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras. So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain.”²³ Here we have a thoroughgoing skepticism that grows out of religious historical trends we have explored above. The combination of scientific examination of regular natural laws through mathematical quantification was proposed as the solution to these problems. It paid dividends in the form of immense technological

²³ Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 16. Not that philosophy has managed to overcome these doubts in subsequent centuries. The problems have become even more acute.

advances that eventually trickled down and helped to transform and prolong the lives of millions, then billions. But it led more immediately to Descartes' more celebrated pronouncement in his *Discourse on Method*, that the one thing certain was the existence of the cogito as a "thinking substance." The proviso that allowed development, however, was the corresponding 'ontological proof' of the existence of God as an inherently rational creator who would not attempt to deceive us when we sought "clear and distinct" ideas. So in parallel with the benefit of scientific and technological progress came an embedded and fundamentally obscured reiteration of ancient problems, originally theological, that became instead the content of professional philosophy in the development of Transcendental Idealism from Fichte through Schelling to Hegel.

The dialectical solution of bracketing off all knowledge that does not conform to the canons of science in turn led to its own set of problems. This new *détente* started to collapse toward the latter part of the 19th century. Human power was at first flattered by the ability to devise regular mechanical laws that applied to all of nature only to realize that it did not have a metaphysic to inoculate itself from these mechanical laws. After all, human beings are also part of nature. Given the Post-Reformation philosophical and theological constraints: what resources were there to marshal an account of what is unique about humanity? Milosz's "The Spirit of History" captures the dilemma of how this methodological principle (science's bracketing off of metaphysics) turned in Milosz's view, into a straightjacket for humanity, because humanity was inserted into the mechanistic and rationalist formulas that were initially applied only to nature, while on the Cartesian side, the human mind and human history were somehow inexplicably (almost apophatically, mystically) immune to them:

Where wind carries the smell of the crematorium
 And a bell in the village tolls the Angelus,
 The Spirit of History is out walking.
 He whistles, he likes these countries washed
 By a deluge, deprived of shape and now ready.
 A worm-fence, a homespun skirt is pleasant to him,
 The same in Poland, in India, Arabia.²⁴

This scene dramatizes with immediate potency a naturalized historical process in a deluge of identity. It is also a poetic recasting of World War II Warsaw. Here nothing is able to maintain its own uniqueness in the face of a history, abetted by military advancements also made possible by the Scientific Revolution, as it levels all differences into a rubble of identity. And this “Spirit of History” is not the beneficent genius of progress, but instead walks, whistles, like “these countries washed / by a deluge. . .” For what, exactly, are these countries “ready”? The answer is simply, because of the emptying out of metaphysics through naturalism, nothing in particular, meaning, everything levelled down to the same. Milosz lived through the occupation of Warsaw and saw it leveled to the ground. He is not merely reducing the progress of history into intellectual commonplaces. The question is (to play upon Immanuel Kant’s famous expression), what to do when we have the starry skies above and *no* moral law within is deadly serious. There is an implicit parochialism in the inability to appreciate differences, which is perhaps why the spirit whistles.

This brings us to the swerve that literary studies attempted in the face of the abuses allowed, or encouraged, by scientific encroachment upon the human realm, presuming that its

²⁴ Czeslaw Milosz, *A Treatise on Poetry*, op. cit., 30.

methodology was not only certain but sufficient. Literary studies came to treat the literary text as dialectically opposed to cold scientism and an answer to the moral dilemmas caused by the collapse of metaphysics in the wake of interminable Christian squabbling. At its dawn as a separate discipline, literary study was understood as an imagination that would liturgically inculcate a worldview with quasi-salvific aims, in this celebrated remark by Matthew Arnold:

The whole scope of the essay is to recommend culture as the great help out of our present difficulties; culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world, and, through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we now follow staunchly but mechanically, vainly imagining that there is a virtue in following them staunchly which makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically.²⁵

The literary canon of the best of what has “been thought and said in the world” has always been difficult to determine, but through both T. S. Eliot and I. A. Richards, the view that literary study would by some means answer a crisis of faith and values in the century following Arnold produced first the liturgy of the New Criticism, and after it, Cultural Studies and Literary Theory that show themselves as liturgies in a precisely parallel way. Analogously to religious traditions, rejecting works (or “approaches”) not suited for the canon is still of utmost importance. What is more, this sifting process involves the mediation of a group analogous to the clergy: professors who have gone through a process of training of the imagination as rigorous as a Jesuit or Dominican that involves practices that parallel monastic asceticism. The clergy of culture are in

²⁵ Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009) 5.

charge of sifting out unsuitable texts that do not meet their stringent ethical criteria. Their work of compilation continues in the sub-disciplines of literature departments such as colonial studies, gender studies, post-colonialism, post-structuralism, and so on. The heated debates in departments and conferences about what belongs (and what does not) show how high the stakes are.²⁶ In order to be fair, we should remember that it usually takes any new religious tradition anywhere from several hundred years, up to a millennium, to settle its canon. The soteriological tone of Arnold's words, and the traditions that have followed them, also betray a further analogy with religion: the roots of philology in the antecedent discipline of biblical criticism.

There is another dialectical tendency in Arnold's words and how they have played out in the history of literary criticism. In an almost Puritan vein he proposes the pursuit of a "total perfection" against "present difficulties." Seen in this way literary studies become a principled enterprise of overcoming present difficulties. The choice is starkly posed as one between culture and chaos. Literary texts are expected to produce "a stream of fresh and free thought." Now if the collapse of Catholicism destroyed the unity of God, man, and the world; if the Reformation tried to salvage God through dialectically opposing him to man and world, both of which had been compromised by medieval Christianity's inability to live up to its high standards; if the Scientific Revolution dialectically opposed the world to post-Reformation God and man; then literary studies dialectically proposed the liturgy of the human engagement with texts to the exclusion of a scientifically conceived world and the God of religion. Instead, what looms is a derivative ideological vision of politics and society, too often historically truncated and lacking

²⁶ See especially: John Guillory *Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1995). For a summary of current debates see the chapter "Canonical and Noncanonical: The Current Debate" (3-84).

any foundation for communal assent, except the practice of dialectical debate which guarantees only its own continuation, without either end or actual solace.

This schematic genealogy gives some guidance for seeing how the discipline of literary studies is intimately connected to the questions of belief. In many respects, the enterprise of literary theory is grounded on debates over doctrine and contests concerning practice. So too, the issues under debate are often much less about theory (as it might be discussed, for example, in philosophy or science) than about politics and moral issues, such as social justice, freedom of expression, and the impacts of political and economic policy. By following the weaves of transcendence we encounter, not far below the surface, the theological underpinnings of literary studies, which along the lines indicated, take up a strictly analogous array of issues. They are an outgrowth of a long experiment with the dialectical imagination that has its roots in the Protestant Reformation's response to Catholicism. If we are beholden to narratives of progress then it might be easy to forget that Catholicism did not disappear from the face of the earth in the intervening years, and strikingly, did not abandon moral positions on all these and other practical issues. Milosz's significance lies in writing from within this religious imagination with an appreciation of the critiques leveled against it during the four hundred years of dialectical critique. But he does not abandon his own liturgy; instead, he is perhaps one of the best guides for understanding the vicissitudes of contemporary Catholicism. His poetry is also perhaps the best prolegomena for any future Catholic theology, because of his clarity about how much the challenges posed by Protestantism, the Scientific Revolution, and literary studies matter for the Catholic imagination. Just so, his work is exemplary of the kind of analogical thinking that can serve, perhaps, as a prolegomena to further literary studies. His poetry is imbued with these

problems, where the formal strength of poetic traditions is itself also resolutely and essentially *analogical* and not dialectical.

Several recent trends in Protestant theology suggest the possibility that Protestant dialectical theology is not adequate to account for the analogical practice of Protestant poets, or even believers. The Catholic analogical imagination that sees God, man, and world has been proposed on a popular level by the Emergent Christianity movement in the United States in Evangelical circles. Several authors, such as Brian McLaren, Phyllis Tickle, and Shane Claiborne have proposed the recovery of Catholic liturgical practices (in both the ecclesial and the special sense we're using here) in what's become known as the Emergent Church movement. What is emerging from it is a more Catholic analogical imagination among American Evangelicals. On a much more sophisticated intellectual level the members of Radical Orthodoxy such as John Milbank, Graham Ward, Catherine Pickstock, and Michael Hanby have written sophisticated analogical recoveries of modernity while drawing inspiration from pre-Reformation thinkers, especially Aquinas. All the while they have not shied away letting literary texts take center stage in their arguments. The movement is broadly ecumenical. Its members are predominantly Anglicans and Catholics, but also includes members of other Protestant traditions.

The sphere of political resistance is the third sphere where Milosz's engagement with the analogical imagination might prove to be a valuable resource for bridging gaps between communities that are not usually thought of as belonging together. This is suggested by the last page of a much circulated book by Hardt and Negri:

There is an ancient legend that might serve to illuminate further the future life of communist militancy: that of St. Francis of Assisi. Consider his work. To

denounce the poverty of the multitude he adopted that common condition and discovered there the ontological power of a new society. The communist militant does the same, identifying in the common condition of the multitude its enormous wealth. Francis in opposition to nascent capitalism refused every instrumental discipline, and in opposition to the mortification of the flesh (in poverty and in the constituted order) he posed a joyous life, including all of being and nature, the animals, sister moon, brother sun, the birds of the field, the poor and exploited humans, together against the will of power and corruption. Once again in postmodernity we find ourselves in Francis's situation, posing against the misery of power the joy of being.²⁷

First of all, note how this passage, which is the final rhetorical gesture in *Empire*, uses an analogical imagination to account for how man, world, and possibly God are intimately tied. Second, speaking of St. Francis as an "ancient legend" that still might "illuminate further the future life of Communist militancy" makes it seem as if these "legends" are not still operative within a world-wide community of over one billion whose leader is also named Francis. Why should political theorists build everything from the ground up if St. Francis, and other radical members of the communion of saints like Dorothy Day, are already mobilized in a worldwide religious imagination that embodies the values Hardt and Negri propose for the Communist international to come? This is another area of life where Milosz's poetic practice, and even his own political leanings, points to where bridges can be built between dialectically segregated areas of practice and theory by looking for and engaging analogies.

²⁷ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2000) 413.

This picture of the Catholic imagination would be too optimistic if our contemporary account of it ended with these three areas of rapprochement. Milosz is too much of a hard-headed Augustinian realist to permit his readers to rest on their analogical laurels:

I apologize, most reverend theologians, for a tone not befitting
the purple of your robes.

I thrash in the bed of my style, searching for a comfortable position,
not too sanctimonious, not too mundane.

There must be a middle place between abstraction and childishness
where one can talk seriously about serious things.²⁸

This disconnect is something toward which we already gestured in the fragment from *Roadside Dog* on the first page of this introduction. It is the reason why Milosz strives to locate his poetry in the “middle place” mediating between the positions of contemporary theology (“abstraction” and “sanctimonious”) and unthinking religious practice (“childishness” and “mundane”). The opposition between these two sets of labels indicates a dialectical space that is problematic for an analogical imagination. He is more than willing to point out these spaces of incongruity not only here, but in many other poems.

Czeslaw Milosz frequently uses the label “Manichean” to describe those places where analogy, “the middle place,” is failing.²⁹ Manicheanism was a diverse set of ancient religious traditions that were at various points at odds with Christian orthodoxy and suffered for it by

²⁸ Czeslaw Milosz, *Second Space*, trans. Czeslaw Milosz and Robert Haas (New York: Ecco, 2004) 49.

²⁹ He also uses the label very ambivalently to characterize his own intellectual tendencies.

being actively persecuted by the Church. Manicheanism is so diverse that recent research has convincingly argued that it is not fair to lump all these groups together. However, the various schools of Manicheanism did share one quality: they all posited a radical dialectical break between a Wholly Other God and immanent reality (man and world). The Manichean God is so pure that he does not soil himself by participating in the creation of the world. The job of creation falls to a semi-demonic demiurge. Therefore, the general hallmark of Manicheanism is an extreme dualism between body and spirit. It is so much so that it sees the whole material universe, especially the body, as fallen and ultimately unredeemable (only the pure spirits of a small band of elect survives). Note how this imagination is partially replicated in the Cartesian dualism between extension (including one's body) and the mind. It is also notable that Protestant Reformation polemics against Rome sometimes identified medieval Manichean movements as being proto-Protestant, because of their opposition to the corruption of the Church. Milosz uses the "Manichean" label interchangeably with the label "Gnostic."³⁰ These concepts are deployed in several ways that we will track throughout our analyses of individual poems.

Such complex use of concepts, images, and historical examples is not unique in Milosz's work. The intensity of intellectual condensation can be best suggested and explained with the following lines from "A Treatise on Poetry,"

You often ask yourself why you feel shame
Whenever you look through a book of poetry.
As if the author, for reasons unclear to you,
Addressed the worse side of your nature,

³⁰ Manicheanism and Gnosticism mostly overlap in their meanings for modern commentators who use these categories. They are always used in the abstract, because there are almost no substantial religious groups in the world that might historically be identified with those ancient heresies (by Christian lights).

Pushing aside thought, cheating thought.

Seasoned with jokes, clowning, satire,

Poetry still knows how to please.

Then its excellence is much admired.

But the grave combats where life is at stake

Are fought in prose. It was not always so.

And our regret has remained unconfessed.

Novels and essays serve but will not last.

One clear stanza can take more weight

Than a whole wagon of elaborate prose.³¹

His poetry does not push aside the complexities of thought. Even though Milosz's poetry can be comical at times, it has no time for cravenly pleasing the reader with "jokes, clowning, satire."

The poems instead dare to enter into the fray of "grave combats where life is at stake." They do so by stanzas taking on "more weight" than is usually associated with contemporary poetry. For this reason it is well-nigh impossible to neatly break these poems up into the categories we have proposed in this introduction. Many of them are simultaneously deployed analogically on the level of the poem, or even stanza. Therefore we will proceed with a poem by poem analysis. Proceeding chronologically has the practical advantage of helping us to confirm Milosz's thesis that all these theological quandaries of his Catholic imagination were with him

³¹ Czeslaw Milosz, *A Treatise on Poetry*, op. cit., 1.

from the first poems he published. The deployment of the analogical imagination (between God, man, world) is the sole thing in Milosz's poetic practice that is always unequivocally affirmed.

Chapter 1: Visibility and the Catholic Imagination

The argument of the introduction boils down to three main components. First, it proposes the imagination as a fruitful way of going forward in analyzing not only poetry, but also theology, and literary studies within the context of significant historical developments. Second, the imagination is an essential tool for testing Milosz's claim that his own work is consistently motivated, from beginning to end, by the same religious Catholic worldview. Third, the imagination model also gives us analogues for describing the complex interactions of the Catholic imagination with the imaginations (Protestant, scientific, and literary) that have historically emerged after the collapse of medieval Catholicism.

The reflections in this chapter will proceed by adopting a method that Milosz himself used in his poems: a melding of autobiography with theory that gives existential credence to what is being discussed. I will begin with an experience of my own that will organically build up a new angle on the discussion of the theory of the imagination we proposed in the introduction. Imaginations do not work in the abstract; they shape concrete subjects who then reflect upon God, man, and the world from their own liturgically-shaped worldview. In such accounts subjectivity is not excess baggage, because the shaping of subjectivity is the point of the formation process we have called the imagination.

One of my own earliest experiences in comparative religion occurred when I was about twenty years old. I was brought up in Communist Poland. Its borders had been so redrawn and ethnically cleansed by the Germans and Soviets after the War that, for the first time in its history, Poland was a religiously homogeneous country. The various methodologies used to track

religious belonging generally measure Roman Catholics as constituting around of 80% of the population. My first direct experience of Protestantism came in the United States when I was twenty years old. It occurred on a day when I walked into a Baptist church that was located right behind our house. It had never caught my attention before. Now I was inside the church, for a Ukrainian-Orthodox wedding. The contrast of religious cultures was surprising to me, as I wondered, “Where is all the stuff inside the church?” On the other hand, the extravagant vestments, long beards, icons, and copious amounts of candles of the Orthodox liturgy presented me with immediate analogies to my own experience, even if they were still a little unfamiliar. I note particularly that this small episode is characteristic in that one may not, ordinarily, even be aware that one *has* a “Catholic imagination,” but it comes to the fore at such times with a sharp shock of recognition. Years went by and this lasting impression remained in the back of my mind, lacking a frame, and collecting dust. Yet it was one of the motivating factors behind my decision to pursue an undergraduate degree in comparative religion.

The whole event was a prime example of the differences between dialectical (Baptist) and analogical (Orthodox) imaginations. It would take me nearly a decade to discover the work of David Tracy on the differences between those imaginations. It took me another five years to discover the work of James K. A. Smith, a Protestant scholar who was educated in Catholic universities, to find a thinker who develops a credible account of how and why those religious imaginations develop differently through their unique liturgical practices and histories. Discovering William Dyrness’ *Reformed Theology and Visual Culture: The Protestant Imagination from Calvin to Edwards* was a partial culmination to this an on-going process. This book is the most sustained effort to date of describing the Protestant imagination from within that imagination. To be more precise, it is an effort to describe the Calvinist variety of that

imagination. Dyrness briefly engages several theoreticians of the Catholic imagination. He takes exception to them, because he misreads them as saying that Protestants do not have an imagination. Thus he launches into his own argument with the following, “Clearly the common assumption that Protestants lack imagination begs the question this book seeks to address. Is it the case the Protestant tradition has not encouraged a creative imagination, or has it encouraged a different and equally creative way of shaping the world?”³² He is correct in point out that the issue is not whether Protestants have an imagination, because every worldview produces an imagination from within its specific liturgical inculcation,³³ but how and why it differs from a Catholic one.

Dyrness’ understanding of the Protestant imagination is in line with what we have laid out so far in the introduction. Before we launch into his phenomenology of the Calvinist imagination, it might be helpful to cite some passages from *Reformed Theology and Visual Culture* just to remind ourselves how and why a religious imagination is not imaginary, in the sense of a flight of fancy that is disconnected from the world and humans and God. What is more, the imagination is intimately connected the most mundane everyday dealings with the world, because it provides the frame for navigating them. One gets a sense of the omnipresence of the imagination from the following passage: “We will use *imagination* then in the general sense of the way people give shape to their world, in particular through the images and practices that express this shape.” He continues,

In the present work of historical and practical theology we will seek to demonstrate how Reformed Protestants, in ways analogous to other religious

³² William Dyrness, *Reformed Theology and Visual Culture: The Protestant Imagination from Calvin to Edwards* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004) 2.

³³ Because of this fundamental structure all liturgies are analogous.

traditions, developed an ‘imagination’ that is a characteristic way of laying hold of the world and of God that comes to expression in their material (and especially their visual) culture.³⁴

What are the main manifestations of this imagination and what is its driving force? A dialectical movement that sets God’s majesty against the sinfulness of the world and man.

The Catholic abuses of the 16th and 15th centuries meant that this dialectical movement was met with understandable enthusiasm among many local populations. Dyrness claims that by emphasizing a dialectical relationship between the transcendent and the immanent the Calvinist movement tapped into an ancient tradition,

The Protestant suspicion toward images and the external mediation of grace connects with the ancient apophatic tradition in the Church. Since God is separate from the world, and those created in the divine image have their eyesight so severely damaged, one must treat all human constructions of God with suspicion.³⁵

Notice how sharply God is “separated” out from the world and how the image and likeness we discussed in connection with Aquinas is said to be “severely damaged.” The different emphases of this liturgical formation ought to produce different subjects than ones formed by a more analogical tradition.

³⁴ Ibid., 6.

³⁵ Ibid., 302. The problem with this historical account is that in the most ancient Christian traditions apophatic discourses (ones that say what God is not) are always combined with a cataphatic discourses (ones that affirm what God is). Analogy is the mutual interaction between these two theological discourses about God.

According to Dyrness, Protestantism, despite the common prejudices, did not dispense with visual culture at all. The written word, certain landscape painting, and portraiture, became the expressions of one recognizably Protestant culture of modesty that was suspicious of decadent Roman Catholic visual extravagance. Note how these, especially portraiture, could be read as being analogous to practices associated with the communion of saints. That is the case even if these Calvinist analogues lost their directly religious status, because of the urgency of responding to abuses of the communion of saints. In fact reading, hearing, and preaching of the word were the main foci of the Calvinist ecclesial imagination.³⁶ Correspondingly, traditional sacramental visual culture, as a worldly mediation of God to man, nearly disappeared altogether and was replaced by paintings of everyday objects and portraits of people associated with an industrious piety.³⁷ This turn toward the world in the arts simultaneously severed the world's analogical relation to God. It was the dialectical consequence of emphasizing the transcendence of God in response to historical abuses.³⁸

Before we move onto Milosz's reaction to one form of this dialectical form of religious imagination, we should take a look at one last passage from *Reformed Theology and Visual Culture*. The following passage is a reminder that the one-to-one identification of the dialectical imagination with Protestantism, and identifying the analogical imagination with Catholicism, is problematic because the Reformation's rejection of analogy ran at different speeds. Simply put, a

³⁶ See especially: the chapter "England and the Visual Culture of the Reformation" (90-141).

³⁷ The Wheaton art historian Matthew Milliner has written on Protestant visual culture in many scattered essays. He has also made the interesting argument (in a handful of unpublished lectures) that Calvinist Protestantism displays signs of analogy, but in ways that are drastically different (portraiture, landscape painting, and still life) from traditions such as Catholicism and Orthodoxy that are usually taken as the standard of what constitutes analogy. It would seem to me he is actually arguing that in some cases dialectics can be a form of analogical thinking.

³⁸ The Protestant theological aversion to analogy is best demonstrated by an early 20th century debate between Protestant theologian Emil Brunner and Karl Barth. Brunner proposed a qualified Protestant return to analogy. Barth's response to Brunner was a manifesto entitled "Nein!"

complete turn to dialectical thinking did not occur in all the Protestant traditions. Continuing the thread he began about the “Protestant suspicion of images” that grows out of its stress of the transcendence of God and its correlate of human and worldly fallenness, Dyrness says,

If one accepts this [dialectical] view of things, Calvin’s scruples would have been more realistic than Luther’s tolerance. For Calvin understood that in a sinful world patterns and practices often coalesce into particular images, and if health is to be restored, these images must not only be denounced but they must also be destroyed. For the reformers knew that much more was at stake than cultural products alone.³⁹

What is sought is a health that will lead to religious salvation. What is implied is that a world-affirming analogical imagination is a sign of disease and a distraction from this ultimate religious liturgical goal. On the margins Dyrness also suggests there is a dialectical diversity across Protestant denominations, reflecting a wide range of commitment to dialectic, sometimes allowing some leeway for the analogical imagination, as in Lutheranism, and a lot, I might add, within the High Anglican tradition. The praise Dyrness has for iconoclasm might sound somewhat shocking to those who are outside religious liturgies. Yet, one can appreciate the consistent inner logic of his liturgical (in the sense outline in the introduction) position. It makes sense. But, the analogy he does point out is that Calvinists shared the Catholic belief in the power of certain cultural productions to shape one’s imagination into a particular way of inhabiting and viewing the world. The difference is that Calvinism saw the world as a potentially dangerous impediment to God, whereas the Catholic tradition tended to see the world as frequently (not always) leading man to God.

³⁹ William Dyrness, *Reformed Theology and Visual Culture*, op. cit., 302.

Milosz connects with these insights in a fragment from a poem written during his middle period entitled, “I Sleep a Lot.”⁴⁰ The poem begins mischievously with:

I sleep a lot and read St. Thomas Aquinas

or *The Death of God*⁴¹ (that’s a Protestant book) (73).

But why would he say that the death-of-God theology is a Protestant book? For starters, because the “death of God theology” is one of the most significant original theological movements to emerge among Protestants in America. It grows from the same dialectical Reformation tradition Dyrness describes. This is how Thomas J. J. Altizer summarizes the aims of the death-of-God movement in a programmatic statement:

By transforming its original faith [during the Catholic Middle Ages], Christianity has become a “world-affirming” religion. Since that time, Christian theology—at least in its orthodox and dominant forms—has been non-dialectical.⁴²

This dialectical theological imagination severely criticizes the tendencies of an analogical tradition. The word “transforming” is used in the sense of “distorting.” The world is the point of critique, because, like in Dyrness, and the early Reformers, it is unhealthy to concentrate upon the world in its present state, any analogies would only be misleading, perhaps idolatrous. Altizer then continues somewhat unexpectedly:

⁴⁰ Nota Bene: Throughout this study the numbers given in parentheses correspond to page numbers in Milosz’s *Selected and Last Poems*.

⁴¹ A tome written by Gabriel Vahanian [*The Death of God: The Culture of our Post-Christian Era* (New York: George Braziller, 1957)]. Vahanian’s book is slightly more descriptive than the prescriptive passage we will cite shortly from Altizer. Ultimately, Vahanian seems to have embraced the more prescriptive impulses of Altizer and what became the “death of God” movement.

⁴² Thomas J. J. Altizer, *Radical Theology and the Death of God* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966) 102.

Yet now the Christian God is dead! The transcendence of Being has been transformed into the radical immanence of the Eternal Recurrence: to exist in our time is to exist in a chaos freed of every semblance of cosmological meaning or order.⁴³

Note how this dialectical move first cuts God off from the world by stressing his transcendence, but in this instance it did not lead to orderly cosmos still tenuously tethered to God; instead, it led to an affirmation of the primeval chaos, the *tohu-bohu* of Genesis 1:2. The ironic (theological) danger when God becomes too transcendent and not “world-affirming” enough is that the dialectical imagination is left behind with affirming the world in its uncanny independence from God. These then are among the reasons why Milosz identifies the death-of-God movement with Protestantism.

One of the patterns that emerges from the analyses of Milosz’s earliest poems that follow this discussion is how much they cut against these descriptions of the dialectical imagination. For the most part we find Milosz affirming the world in its connection to God. He sees it as a creation that is a largely reliable analogue for God and therefore in “The Sun” he calls the Earth a poem. He delights in beings being a mirror of Being, even though his poems were mostly written during World War II and its ghastly aftermath. Moreover, nearly all these poems greatly emphasize vision and the experience of seeing. Visual perception, the very element of experience Dyrness says the Calvinist revolution distrusted and sought to regulate, becomes, one might say in a Catholic analogical fashion, the primary metaphor for the theological virtues in Milosz’s poems, especially in “The World.” On the other hand, Milosz is usually distraught whenever he senses the “world-affirming” vision failing. He struggles against its breakdown.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 102.

1.1 I Ask Not Out of Sorrow

ENCOUNTER

We were riding through frozen fields in a wagon at dawn.

A red wing rose in the darkness.

And suddenly a hare ran across the road.

One of us pointed to it with his hand.

That was long ago. Today neither of them is alive,

Not the hare, nor the man who made the gesture.

O my love, where are they, where are they going

The flash of a hand, streak of movement, rustle of pebbles.

I ask not out of sorrow, but in wonder (12).

Vilnius, 1936

Milosz nearly always gives the place of composition and completion date at the bottom of his poems. "Encounter" was written in Vilnius in 1936. The date is significant on a personal level, because it comes after his second visit to Paris in 1935 when he studied French at the Alliance Française.⁴⁴ More importantly for our purposes, Andrzej Franaszek notes Milosz also attended Fr. Daniel Lallement's lectures on Thomism at the Institut Catholique de Paris.⁴⁵ As we

⁴⁴ The Alliance is located near Rue Raspail. This fact will take on a greater significance when we analyze the eminently Thomistic poem, "Esse" (51). The poem is situated in the Rue Raspail metro station.

⁴⁵ Andrzej Franaszek in the definitive *Milosz: Biografia* [Milosz: A Biography] (Krakow: ZNAK, 2011) 212 notes, „Z sakralną wizją świata, jaką mógł odczuć na płótnach niektórych przynajmniej dawnych mistrzów, doskonale łączyła się myśl świętego Tomasza, zgłębianą podczas porannych zajęć w Institut Catholique przy rue d'Assas,

shall see, this poem displays an analogical imagination that is consistent with such Thomistic interests.

We will now directly explore why and how “Encounter” is ultimately a poem of analogical relation. It moves from a description of a panorama to a consideration of details human, animal, and vegetative. These lead the narrator to metaphysically reposition his own place in the world with a play on Greek philosophical (and New Testament) vocabulary. Such an itinerary is somewhat reminiscent of the *exitus-reditus* scheme Church Fathers both East (Gregory of Nyssa) and West (Augustine, especially in the *Confessions*) adopted from the *Enneads* of Plotnius.

The opening line has a communal tinge as it describes a group of people, a “We” who are riding a wagon at dawn, noting a bird, the red wing, which is a species of thrush. *Turdus iliacus* is a common bird, a thrush, without any overt mythological, Polish national, or literary significance, other than being the national bird of Turkey (12). The peaceful and ordinary scene of travel is interrupted in the next stanza by a hare running across the road. This leads to a cinematic zoom-in on the scene, from the general landscape, to a single animal within a confined space, and finally to a human gesture, “One of us pointed to it with his hand” (12). The readers are then distanced from the scene when the author averts them to the passage of time in the next

prowadzonych przez księdza Lallementa, kreślącego na tablicy koncentryczne koła, hierarchię bytów. Wkrótce właśnie kategorii zaczerpniętych z tomizmu Miłosz zacznie używać w esejach o sztuce, chodziło tu jednakże o coś bardziej osobistego niż wartościowanie twórczości: o antidotum na pustkę.” [The sacral vision of the world that Miłosz could sense on the canvasses of some of the Old Masters connected very well with the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, which he explored during morning classes on Thomism taught by Fr. Lallement at the Institute Catholique near Rue d’Assas. The priest would draw concentric circles on the board, hierarchies of being. Shortly after this Miłosz started to use categories derived from Thomism in his essays on art. By doing this he was concerned with something more personal than evaluating art: it was about finding an antidote to emptiness.] Gabriel Flynn notes that Lallement was a strict Thomist, although he supported the more modern personalist Neo-Thomism of Jacques Maritain in *Yves Congar’s Vision of the Church in a World of Disbelief* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2004) 4.

stanza, “That was long ago,” which is then compounded by a lament of sorts, a kind of *memento mori*: “Today neither of them is alive, / Not the hare, nor the man who made the gesture” (12).

The catholicity of the sorrow is important: it is directed analogically at both human and animal protagonists without an exaggerated Cartesian or extreme Calvinist (not all currents of Calvinism are so extreme) dualism separating them. The concern, that is to say, is not singularly restricted to man, or any doctrinal conception of the soul, but to the immediately present and enduring analogy itself.⁴⁶

The final stanza concludes with what looks like a lament, because of the phrase “O my love.” However, the phrasing is not typical of the *Lamentations of Jeremiah*, as one would expect in a poem that seems to be creeping toward the *memento mori* register. The phrasing instead seems to be lifted straight out of the *Song of Songs*, where the narrator says “I have compared thee, O my love, to a mare of the chariots of Pharaoh.” (Song 1:9, KJV). The same phrasing recurs elsewhere in the *Song of Songs*. For example, “Thou art beautiful, O my love, as Tirzah, comely as Jerusalem, terrible as an army with banners”.⁴⁷ The equine characteristic of the first biblical use of the “O my love” phrase has a curious echo with “Encounter’s” initial horse and carriage setting, plus it is an analogical blurring of the distinctions between the human and the animal—again the Catholic imagination’s world is peopled with analogies.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the erotic setting of the prototype, the *Song of Songs*, makes sense within a

⁴⁶ The extended poem “From the Rising of the Sun,” especially §II, “Diary of a Naturalist” (111-120) is another notable place where the boundary between the human and animal is slightly erased. The problem of animal pain and how it is analogous to human pain is a constant theme running through Milosz’s poems and essays. This is a concern he shares with Witold Gombrowicz, most notably in his *Diary*, trans. Lillian Vallee (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2012).

⁴⁷ *Song of Songs* 6:4.

⁴⁸ The same phrasing recurs across any number of Bible translations. I will mostly resort to quoting the KJV because of its continuing influence upon English poetry, and therefore, I assume, also upon the minds of Milosz’s co-translators.

Catholic imagination that does not see the world human desire and the body, as being wholly unhealthy. Andrew Greeley describes this non-dialectical understanding of the body, the world, and human closeness to not only the animal, but also the inanimate, all factors present in Milosz's "Encounter," in his classic study entitled *The Catholic Imagination*:

Grace, then, lurks everywhere — in brickyards and back alleys, in the snow and the wind, in the sun and the stars, in the waters and the fire, in the tiny flower, and in the volcano. It is in the branches of trees, in weeds, in the chirping of birds, as well as in the roar of an elevated train, and in the desirable body of another. The environment is a sacrament, and to ruthlessly exploit it is a sacrilege. The world is a chalice of grace, and to treat it with disrespect is blasphemy. The world is grace, and not to appreciate it is ingratitude.⁴⁹

Sure enough there are dangers in what Greeley says. Identifying the world with grace borders upon a form of pantheism that abolishes analogy with identity. The Reformers also thought that the medieval Church overstepped this boundary, which is why they reacted with a dialectical theology. Milosz, as we shall see shortly while analyzing "The World," is much more careful in his poetic practice about respecting this distinction between pantheism and analogy.

Finally, in the poem "Encounter" the erotic-hidden-in-a-lament prepares the reader for the last lines of the poem. There the following questions fall, although without a question mark:

where are they, where are they going—

The flash of a hand, streak of movement, rustle of pebbles (12).

⁴⁹ Andrew Greeley, *The Great Mysteries: Experiencing Catholic Faith from the Inside Out* (London: Sheed & Ward, 2007) 109.

The dash seems to take the place of a question mark and extends into an explanation of what is being asked about. What is in fact being asked about is the fate of the humans and animal together and concentrated into the most basic motions and gestures (“flash of hand” and “streak of movement”) from the opening scene of the poem. What has happened is that Milosz has managed to cinematically zoom in from a landscape into a synecdoche that verges upon the archetypal within the short span of four skinny stanzas. The endpoint of this maneuver is the symbolization (or perhaps we should say “sacramentalization”) of an ordinary scene into almost mythical dimensions, because that is what analogy allows.

The concluding line completes the confounding of the reader’s expectations for lament by going through the erotic, understood as the desire for the world and knowledge (not only sexually), directly into metaphysics. Even though the setup leads one to expect sorrow or even despair, the narrator says, “I ask not out of sorrow.” No, not in sorrow, “but in wonder” (12). Here we are recalled back to the foundations of Greek philosophy when Plato says in *Theaetetus* (155d), “. . . a sense of wonder--is perfectly proper to a philosopher: philosophy has no other foundation, in fact.”⁵⁰ Aristotle concurs with him when he says in the *Metaphysics* (982b), “For it was because of wonder that men both now and originally began to philosophize.”⁵¹ The Catholic imagination of Milosz claims the Greek tradition in its own peculiar way. Whereas a dialectical imagination might concentrate upon Platonic dualism, the emphasis throughout this poem has been upon participation and analogy. Both emphases are legitimate in their own ways.

Here is how Adriaan Peperzak attempts to pin down the meaning of the all-important word “wonder” in Greek beyond what is familiar to most readers:

⁵⁰ Plato, *Theaetetus*, trans. Robin H. Waterfield (New York: Penguin, 1987) 37.

⁵¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (New York: Penguin, 1999) 9.

Thaumazein means to wonder or to marvel, to be amazed or astonished, and sometimes to admire or to honor. Although the verb is not used very often in the texts of Plato and Aristotle, both authors state the primordial importance of wonder for *philosophia*.

This is general knowledge, but Peperzak then continues by mentioning surprising correlate uses elsewhere:

The use of the word *thaumazein* in the New Testament points in another direction. Amazement here does not introduce us to philosophy in the Greek sense of the word; rather it confronts us with a very different, twofold possibility: faith (*pistis*) or disbelief (*apistia*).⁵²

The term occurs in crucial passages in St. Mark's Gospel (5:20; 6:6; 15:5, 44) and throughout St. Luke's Gospel. These two traditions (wonder in Greek and the Gospel) are not mutually exclusive. They are analogical in the sense that there are several ways of reconciling them, as we shall see in other Milosz poems.

After this excursion into the history of language and philosophy a parenthetical note about Milosz's background is fitting. After all, skepticism might arise if one steps back and remembers that "Encounter" was written by a twenty-five year old man. But this need not be the case if we carefully consider the biographical details of Milosz's robust Catholic education as he recalls it in *Native Realm*.⁵³ High school gave him a thorough background in theology, Church

⁵² Adriaan T. Peperzak, *Philosophy Between Faith and Theology: Addresses to Catholic Intellectuals* (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame UP, 2005) 106.

⁵³ See: Czeslaw Milosz, *Native Realm: A Search for Self-Definition*, trans. Catherine S. Leach (Berkeley: California UP, 1981), especially the chapter "Catholic Education" (69-90).

doctrine, philosophy, literature, and ancient languages. Milosz said the following about his education in his interviews with Czarnecka:

[During the interwar period] Poland created a system of primary schools and high schools throughout the country that ran extremely well and were on a high level—an enormous achievement. I consider my high school, a very good school. And if I was later to succeed as a university professor, more thanks are due to my high school than to my university.⁵⁴

This background, buried within the margins of this poem, helps us to lay the groundwork for the continuity of theological interest we argued for in the introduction. We shall do so by exploring the explicitly theological sections of an early poem cycle whose title, “The World,” falls under Altizer’s dialogical critique of “world-affirming,” because of its Thomistic understanding of the analogies between the world and religion.

⁵⁴ Ewa Czarnecka and Aleksander Fiut, *Conversations with Czeslaw Milosz* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1987) 20.

1.2: Look at Light Reflected

THE SUN

All colors come from the sun. And it does not have

Any particular color, for it contains them all.

And the whole Earth is like a poem

While the sun above represents the artist.

Whoever wants to paint the variegated world

Let him never look straight up at the sun

Or he will lose the memory of things he has seen.

Only burning tears will stay in his eyes.

Let him kneel down, lower his face to the grass,

And look at light reflected by the ground.

There he will find everything we have lost:

The stars and the roses, the dusks and the dawns.

Warsaw, 1943

We now turn to selections from Milosz's "The World: A Naïve Poem" (22-32). We will limit ourselves to four of the poems in this twenty poem cycle, concentrating upon the poems "Faith" (28-29), "Hope" (29), "Love" (29-30), and "The Sun" (32). For reasons that will soon become apparent we shall proceed in reverse chronological order, starting with "The Sun."

On a purely narrative level the cycle consists of children coming home from school, roaming through the house, getting lost in a forest, and, after a period of fearing being lost, returning home. Most of these events occur under the benevolent gaze of their father. The poem cycle as a whole dramatizes the Plotinian schema of going out and returning to God that was quickly Christianized by the Church Fathers. The posing of a choice between the theological virtues and fear under duress⁵⁵ (wonder in the New Testament sense outline by Peperzak) are the constituents of the drama in the four poems between the ones on the theological virtues (28-30) and “The Sun” (32). The names of the “in between” poems suggests the danger and fear that are their topic and contrast greatly with the safe scenes at home and its surrounding humanized nature that occupy the earlier poems in the cycle.⁵⁶ These “in between” poems are the only ones where the benevolent father of the children, like a God the Father who has abandoned the world in Altizer, recedes into the background as they make their way through the forest—only to return in the poem “Recovery,” which precedes “The Sun.”

The didactic character of “The Sun”—as it paternally unwinds the meanings of its metaphors—also justifies its place as the first poem analyzed here even though it appears last in the cycle. It is a Rosetta Stone for the rest of the cycle, especially if we keep in mind the following counterintuitive injunction: “But many that are first shall be last; and the last shall be first” (Matthew 19:30). Nietzsche was probably correct in noting that Christianity transvalued

⁵⁵ It is difficult to tell whether the threat is real or imagined, but that does not take anything from the drama. It is important to keep in mind this is a “naïve poem.” Children react as drastically to real as they do to imagined threats.

⁵⁶ The names of the fear-themed poems are suggestive: “Excursion into the Forest” (30) “The Bird Kingdom” (30-31), “Fear” (31), and “Recovery” (31-32) which begins with the benevolent father of the children saying, “Here I am—why this senseless fear?”

many of the traditional values of ancient Greece.⁵⁷ Such biblical passages suggest the final things will run counter to conventional opinions (para-doxa) about valuing and ordering.⁵⁸ The last poem in “The World” cycle also transvalues the earlier poems by claiming that the world itself is a “poem” whose most minute details should be read with utmost care just like a poem (32). If the reader is willing to make the effort of carefully reading through the cycle again after reading the final poem, almost each and every one of these earlier poems contains a legion of liturgical, biblical, theological, Polish, pagan, Lithuanian, and mythological references. As many readers will notice, these correlates of religious elements are didactic but not assertive, not in any exclusive way *doctrinal*, and that is a major point in Milosz’s consistent poetic practice: they fit, they provide a generous yet precise mode of thinking and writing that can connect the reader to the world and to a fully elaborated religious world view, without coercion, using analogy as a pathway of assent.

George Ferguson’s benchmark guide to Christian symbols in art says the following about the sun as Christian metaphor:

The sun is symbolic of Christ⁵⁹, this interpretation being based on the prophecy of Malachi 4:2: 'But unto you that fear my name shall the Sun of righteousness arise with healing in his wings.' The sun and moon are used as attributes of the Virgin Mary, referring to the 'woman clothed with the sun, and the moon under her feet' (Revelation 12:1). The sun and moon are often represented in scenes of the

⁵⁷ See: Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin, 1990) 130-132.

⁵⁸ By this logic Eve is the pinnacle of creation since she was created last in both Genesis narratives.

⁵⁹ As in the *Sol Invictus* tradition that reaches back to the Roman tradition of worshiping the Emperor as a sun-god. that Gerhart B. Ladner in *God, Cosmos, and Humankind: The World of Early Christian Symbolism* (Berkeley: California U, 1995) 26, describes as: “In an early-fourth-century mosaic from the Vatican necropolis under Saint Peter’s, a Christlike figure with a nimbus of rays rises up to Heaven in a chariot drawn by two horses—like a new Helios, but also a new Elijah.”

Crucifixion to indicate the sorrow of all creation at the death of Christ. St.

Thomas Aquinas is sometimes depicted with a sun on his breast.⁶⁰

The last sentence of the above passage is a surprising coincidence, given how much emphasis we have put on the significance of Aquinas for Milosz's analogical imagination already.

But instead of letting all these other details blind us at the start of this analysis we should take a closer look at "The Sun." At first blush, Milosz's use of the sun analogy seems to run counter to these iconographic conventions. After all, "The Sun" parcels out the following advice,

Whoever wants to paint the variegated world

Let him never look straight up at the sun.

Or he will lose the memory of things he has seen.

Only burning tears will stay in his eyes. (32)

This seems like fairly good ophthalmological advice. But is this poem also suggesting one should ignore God (Christ as *sol invictus*) in one's poetic endeavors? The theological implications of Milosz's use of the sun analogy are more complex than this.

This is because the next few lines offer a curious theological redirection. They continue in a prescriptive, didactic, and paternal tone. In some ways it seems as if the narrator has taken on the role of the father in the poem cycle. If we follow this staging then the readers are asked to take on the role of children the poet is leading through a temporarily confusing world. The narrator dispenses the following advice:

Let him kneel down, lower his face to the grass,

⁶⁰ George Ferguson, *Signs & Symbols in Christian Art* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1961) 45.

And look at light reflected by the ground.

There he will find everything we have lost:

The stars and the roses, the dusks and the dawns. (32)

Kneeling down and lowering one's face is easily recognizable as a gesture of prayer to the practitioner of just about any religion. In fact, the bowing of the head in prayer is a sign of faith that the one requesting such a gesture of obedience will not abuse his power. Such submission will lead to salvation, in the sense of "find[ing] everything we have lost." What we have lost is the world itself, "The stars and the roses, the dusks and the dawns." The instructions do not welcome liberating oneself from the world, instead, they anticipate a salvific recovery of it.

The human vulnerability is also duplicated by divine vulnerability in the next line. The praying gesture will lead to seeing "light reflected by the ground." There are two New Testament echoes here. The first has to do with light, "Then spake Jesus again unto them, saying, I am the light of the world: he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life" (John 8:12, KJV). "The light of life" is not entirely an end in itself; it sheds light upon the darkness that is present in the world, helping to make sense of it, rather than abandoning it. Darkness is not absolute. Second, the effects of the light as it hits the ground reflects a major trend in 20th century Catholic, Orthodox, and Lutheran theology—to various degrees these are all analogical theological traditions—their focus upon the *kenosis*, self-emptying of God into creation through entering it as a servant:

Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: But made himself of no

reputation [or in most modern translations “nothing”, *kenóō*], and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men (Phil. 2:7).

The conception of God whose suffering servanthood and nothingness are analogues to the human experience of suffering is something that Milosz will address more directly in his “To Raja Rao” (See: Chapter 2). The implications of this theological assertion for the Catholic imagination can be summed up with the following passage by the American poet Dana Gioia:

The Catholic worldview does not require a sacred subject to express its sense of divine immanence. The greatest misunderstanding of Catholic literature is to classify it solely by its subject matter. Such literalism is not only reductive; it also ignores precisely those spiritual elements that give the best writing its special value. The religious insights usually emerge naturally out of depictions of worldly existence rather than appear to have been imposed intellectually upon the work.⁶¹

The palpable sense of “divine immanence” in Milosz’s poems, his appreciation for the potential sacredness of both the human being and nature, is the reason why he still does theological reflection then even though he does not frequently directly name the persons of the Trinity. The paradox of an analogical imagination is that the immanent presence of God is potentially so thoroughgoing that there is no immediate need to use proper names, especially when so many analogies are at hand; the presence manifests itself as a pregnant absence. But these absences will not speak unless they are read as carefully as one reads a poem.

The passage below from a major 20th century Catholic theologians—approvingly describing how *kenosis* functions in the work of Origen—suggests this paradox might also be at

⁶¹ Dana Gioia, “The Catholic Writer Today,” *First Things* 238 (December, 2013): 35.

work in the passages we are analyzing from Milosz. Hans Urs von Balthasar says the kenotic movement of the incarnation is like “a wave of the sea which, rushing up on the flat beach, runs out, even thinner and more transparent, and does not return to its source but sinks into the sand and disappears.”⁶² The disappearance itself is predicated upon a presence that empties itself out into the world. This is different from a dialectical cutting of ties with immanence; which is not to judge whether it is more theologically adequate, even if Milosz thinks so.

The blurring of boundaries through the emphasis upon immanence seems to have yet another analogy in Milosz’s own biography. There is a striking passage in his autobiographical *Native Realm: A Search for Self-Definition* whose images almost verbatim repeat the contents of “The Sun”:

I could reduce all that happened to me then to a few things. Lying in the field near a highway bombarded by airplanes, I riveted my eyes on a stone and two blades of grass in front of me. Listening to the whistle of a bomb, I suddenly understood the value of matter: that stone and those two blades of grass formed a whole kingdom, an infinity of forms, shades, textures, lights. They were the universe. I had always refused to accept the division into macro- and micro-cosmos; I preferred to contemplate a piece of bark or a bird's wing rather than sunsets or sunrises. But now I saw into the depths of matter with exceptional intensity.⁶³

Here we find Milosz in 1939 caught between borders, political alliances, and being bombed. We have the grass, the micro- and macrocosms interrelating, and the aversion to direct sunlight just as in the poem. There are echoes of this biographical experience in “The Bird Kingdom” poem,

⁶² Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Introduction,” *Origen: Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings*, trans. Robert J. Daly, SJ (Washington, DC: Catholic UP, 1984) 18.

⁶³ Czeslaw Milosz, *Native Realm*, op. cit., 204.

one of the “in between” poems, mentioned earlier, from this cycle. The birds in “The Bird Kingdom” take on an aggressive, almost military demeanor. When juxtaposing them with the autobiographical passages, it is difficult not to see them as thinly veiled allegories for this war experience. For example, “Flying high,” very much like a bomber, “the heavy wood grouse / slash the forest sky with their wings” (30). Even more direct is the following, “And a raven gleams with airplane steel.” “The World” cycle was written four years after the experience recounted in *Native Realm*. The autobiography was published much later, only in 1959. And if “the whole earth is a poem” then why should Milosz’s biography (of his theological concerns) be out of bounds for poetry? For this reason it is difficult to assume, following literary theory conventions, that these poems are “texts” whose “narrator” cannot be identified with the voice of the poems. Milosz’s voice is recognizably consistent in what it says. Whenever he uses other voices, as he sometimes does, they are recognizable as not his.

1.3: Whenever You Look

FAITH

Faith is in you whenever you look

At a dewdrop or a floating leaf

And know that they are because they have to be.

Even if you close your eyes and dream up things

The world will remain as it has always been

And the leaf will be carried by the waters of the river.

You have faith also when you hurt your foot

Against a sharp rock and you know

That rocks are there to hurt our feet.

See the long shadow that is cast by the tree?

We and trees throw shadows on the earth.

What has no shadow has no strength to live (28-29).

Warsaw, 1943

The foregoing discussion brings us to the poems on the theological virtues that precede “The Sun” in “The World: A Naïve Poem,” specifically here, “Faith.” They set up the Thomistic materialism of that poem by having faith in the trustworthiness of the senses, especially sight. The privileging of vision in the theological virtue poems might seem a little off key when there are plenty of passages in Paul, if not a preponderance of them, about faith, hope and love that

tend toward dialectical readings and ultimately toward transcendent invisibility.⁶⁴ Be that as it may, Robert Louis Wilken points out that the Church Fathers definitely gravitated toward sight, “[W]hen speaking of how God is known early Christian thinkers favored the metaphor of seeing, not hearing,” adding that, “Beauty is the corollary of seeing.”⁶⁵ Beauty will become an especially important topic in Milosz’s late poetic explorations, especially in poems of the middle period. The emphasis upon sight and its trustworthiness is prevalent throughout his oeuvre.

All the theological-virtue poems begin with statements that either sound like a Credo (I believe in one God...) or the catechism. This is because they address the reader with simple propositional second-person statements, “Faith is in you whenever you look...” (28), “Hope is in you when you believe...” (29), “Love means to look at yourself...” (Ibid.). In light of not only “The Sun,” but most of the rest of the poems in this cycle, the benevolently paternal credos, explaining complex ideas in a simple pictorial manner, forms a continuity that is briefly broken in the “in between poems” only to be restored, saved. In fact, “Faith,” “Love,” and “Hope” are a fortification for the journey into the forest, which is classically seen in European literature and Christian iconography as the antithesis of ordered human culture. Yet, the forest is not excluded from analogy. It is enfolded within it, because these poems are a guide through its challenges, which can be navigated only if read correctly, again, “like a poem.”

The poem “Faith” sets up the discussion of its namesake theological virtue through an analogy of looking at the ordinary things such as a “dewdrop or a leaf.” The poem proposes seeing the necessity in the existence of these classic symbols for the ephemeral as an act of faith.

⁶⁴ Most representatively in Hebrews 11:1, “Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.”

⁶⁵ Robert Louis Wilken, *The Spirit of Early Christian Thought: Seeking the Face of God* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2003) 20.

Faith is a belief in their reality that is not disturbed, is resistant to, the bracketing off conducted when one closes one's eyes. All in all, the world "will remain as it has been" because it has ontological weight (28). The following image caps off the stanza, "And the leaf will be carried by the waters of the river." What the reader sees here is the addition of another image of the ephemerality of life, a river, carrying away the leaf. However, within the context of the stanza, the impermanence that could be symbolized by the river (a symbol of time) moving on and carrying away a leaf is given permanence because the river is permanent within its constant mutation and flowing.

The next stanza takes on the vexing topic of human pain, another phenomenon associated with worldly impermanence. There is a kind of necessity, order, maybe even providence here, because we are told "rocks are there to hurt our feet" (28-29). One wonders here whether the poem is in dialogue with the extreme idealism of Bishop Berkeley, because this line bears a great deal of resemblance to Samuel Johnson's response to Berkeley's world less idealist epistemology with a kick to a rock and the words, "I refute it [Berkeley's idealism] thus."⁶⁶ The reliable solidity of the world, as an analogue of faith, is further reinforced in the remainder of the stanza by a line resembling a call to direct confirmation through sensory experience, as if the reader were actually standing next to the narrator, "See the long shadow cast by the tree?" (29). What follows appears to be yet another play on a fundamental Platonic metaphor: shadows. Shadows throughout Plato's work signal unreality, mere copies of the ideal world, or copies of copies in the case of poets. The aim is to get beyond the shadows in the

⁶⁶ See: Benjamin Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (New York: Penguin, 1979) 122: "After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it -- 'I refute it thus.'"

noumenal realm that they inchoately symbolize. Milosz's poem is inundated with shadows, besides the tree "We and the flowers throw shadows on the earth" (29). However the takeaway from this visual metaphor is not a depreciation of the everyday world, rather, it is an appreciation of its visible ontological weight and vigor, "Whatever has no shadow has no strength to live" (29). Meaning, that visual experience of even such ephemera is significant because it is a cipher of the "light reflected by the ground" of the Earth-poem, and ultimately its "artist" (32).

1.4: The Earth is Not a Dream

HOPE

Hope is with you when you believe
The earth is not a dream but living flesh,
that sight, touch, and hearing do not lie,
That all things you have ever seen here
Are like a garden looked at from a gate.

You cannot enter. But you're sure it's there.
Could we but look more clearly and wisely
We might discover somewhere in the garden (29)
A strange new flower and an unnamed star.

Some people say that we should not trust our eyes,
That there is nothing, just a seeming,
These are the ones who have no hope.
They think the moment we turn away,
The world, behind our backs, ceases to exist,
As if snatched up by the hand of thieves.

Warsaw, 1943

Next, Milosz's tackling of the theological virtue of hope builds upon and includes the insights covered in "Faith." Hope is present when "you believe / the earth is not a dream but living flesh" (29). Again, despite the apparent simplicity of the diction the poem "Hope" is yet

another engagement with debates that have vexed modern philosophy and science since their foundation. This time we seem to have a less opaque reference to a key philosopher and his favorite metaphor: Descartes' nightmare thought experiment at the end of the first meditation suggesting the possibility that the world is just an illusion, because it is a deceptive dream placed in our minds by a malicious demon.⁶⁷ The "brains in the vat" scenario is the most contemporary reincarnation of this fundamental puzzle of modern philosophy. Its persistence in neuroscience demonstrates how much the dialectics of radical skepticism and idealism still haunt our minds with their frightening possibilities. What the Milosz poem proclaims instead is the stubborn reality of the flesh. There are more than a few Eucharistic overtones in such an assertion, which is called the "flesh and blood" of Christ. The sheer number of connections here is another demonstration of how poetry, as an analogical practice *par excellence*, is able to carry more weight than "novels and essays."⁶⁸ It creates a wide network of connections that force the reader to think through either several problems at once, or to actually see them as related problems. This is a far cry from the clear and distinct ideas that Descartes proposed.

"Sight, touch, and hearing," the very sensual incarnate fleshiness whose deceptions made Descartes and other fathers of modern philosophy and science bracketed off in their unreliability, according to Milosz, "do not lie" (29). Not that he denies the very possibility, or even necessity of some sort of cognitive dissonance. The last line of the first stanza posits that all things we see "Are like a garden looked at from a gate" (29). The space between stanzas visualizes the distance between those standing in front of the gate and the distance that separates them from the garden that is behind the gate. This is no flaming sword of the cherubim in Genesis 3:24, but there still is a strong analogy with the expulsion from Eden.

⁶⁷ Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 15.

⁶⁸ See our discussion of "A Treatise on Poetry" in the Introduction.

The next lines continue this suggestive connection by positing a human cognitive dissonance, although not total depravity as in the most extreme dialectical theologies. Milosz follows Augustine's legitimately Pauline approach toward human fallenness that can be best summarized with the following ocular and almost shadowy metaphor from 1 Cor 13:12, "For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known." Thus, in the stanza following the break we are abruptly told in a short sentence, as if by the forbidding cherubim with a flaming sword, "You cannot enter." However, in the same line we are reassured by yet another deliberately definitive short sentence, "But you're sure it's there" (29). The depravity is there, but it is not total, it is reflected in the intellect's ability to see shadowy copies of reality clearly.

The following lines hinge upon a conversion of sight, a new imagination, the discovery of a world that was there, but not clearly seen at first, "Could we but look more clearly and wisely / We might discover in the garden a strange new flower or an unnamed star" (29). Thus, the possibility of seeing less darkly is held out to the reader. The possibility of seeing more than is apparent at first, the possibility of discovery, is also left tantalizingly within reach. Alternatively, if we assume that "Could we but look" means that we initially either cannot (or do not) look in such a way, then the reality of the contingently invisible things is still dangled before us by the poem.

The last stanza of "Hope" reads like a direct attack on Cartesianism and other forms of (crudely interpreted) Platonism, rationalism, and idealism. It starts out by outlining its opponents, "Some people say we should not trust our eyes / That there is nothing, just a seeming." It follows this up with an *ad hoc* attack against these detractors of visibility and the world as "living flesh"

by claiming “These are the ones who have no hope.” The final three lines lampoon them roundly with,

They think that the moment we turn away,

The world, behind our backs, ceases, to exist,

As if snatched up by the hands of thieves. (29)

The thief motif might be an ironic conflation of Berkeley and Descartes with several New Testament passages that compare the Second Coming and the coming of the Kingdom (which amounts to much the same thing) to a thief, “For yourselves know perfectly that the day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night” (1 Thess 5:2). Yet, these early Christian expectations did not come to fruition and later generations of Christians came to terms with the incarnational and analogical solidity of the passing world.

1.5 The Way One Looks at Distant Things

LOVE

Love means to learn to look at yourself

The way one looks at distant things

For you are only one thing among many.

And whoever sees that way heals his heart,

Without knowing it, from various ills—

A bird and a tree say to him: Friend.

Then he wants to use himself and things

So that they stand in the glow of ripeness.

It doesn't matter whether he knows what he serves:

Who serves best doesn't always understand.

Warsaw, 1943

Milosz honors the Pauline ordering of 1 Cor. 13 by concluding his theological virtues cycle in “The World” with “Love” (29-30). Paul considers love to be “the greatest of these” (1 Cor 13:13) and therefore it is listed last, reflecting the Gospel adage that the last shall be first. “Love” internalizes the trope of looking at objects as the practice of the theological virtues in an unusual way. A turn inwards is signaled by the first line, “Love is to learn to look at oneself” (29), which sounds a lot like the Cartesian introspection that followed upon Post-Reformation skepticism. Sight is once again privileged, and even though the poem instructs the reader to look at themselves, they are asked to look at themselves analogically, to look “The way one looks at distant things” (29). This mode of looking gives one the necessary distance to see themselves as

a part, or line, of a greater Earth-poem,⁶⁹ “For you are only one thing among many” (Ibid.). This operation, we are told, leads to something like a conversion, because “whoever sees that way heals his heart.”⁷⁰ The heart is a ubiquitous metaphor throughout the Bible and the change of heart (μετάνοια), or a healing of it, is one of the most basic metaphors for conversion.

“Love” then takes another unexpected turn by highlighting the lack of knowledge in such a maneuver. The healing can come “without knowing it” and leads to “A bird and a tree say[ing] to him: Friend.” This mysterious change leads to a new, or renewed, imagination where the one undergoing it “wants to use himself and things / so that they stand in the glow of ripeness” (30). In other words, this sort of approach is supposed to lead to a way of seeing that will allow oneself and the things of this world reach ripeness, the fullness of being. Note how man and the world are interwoven here in lines that suggest the transcendent that both transcends yet enfolds them, promising a glow of ripeness. Finally, comes the surprising finale, “It doesn’t matter whether he knows what he serves: / Who serves best doesn’t always understand” (29). The lack of clarity can probably be attributed to the exile from the garden and its attendant cognitive dissonance as described in the poem on “Hope” that preceded “Love” (29). Furthermore, the lack of understanding is not total blindness, because “doesn’t always understand” implies that one *does* sometimes understand. Perfect clarity would be inconsistent with the rather complicated picture of human understanding painted in these poems on the three theological virtues. It would

⁶⁹ See: The discussion of “The Sun” above.

⁷⁰ This poem curiously has some interesting overlaps with the work of Simone Weil whom Milosz encountered and translated only after the war. One of her most famous sayings is that “Distance is the soul of the beautiful,” which she unpacks [*Gravity and Grace*, trans. Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr (New York: Routledge, 2002) 149-150] with an ocular metaphor that nonetheless reads dialectically, “The attitude of looking and waiting is the attitude which corresponds with the beautiful. As long as one can go on conceiving, wishing, longing, the beautiful does not appear. That is why in all beauty we find contradiction, bitterness and absence which are irreducible.” Milosz’s own vision most frequently (but not always) much more analogical than Weil here.

also not fit into the highly mediated analogical picture of the world painted in “The Sun” (32).

After all, “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known” (1 Cor 13:12).

1.6: What Heaven Will See Us Reunited?

From THE SPIRIT OF HISTORY

Under a linden tree, as before, daylight

Quivered on a goose quill dipped in ink.

Books were still governed by the old rule,

Born of a belief that visible beauty

Is a little mirror for the beauty of being.

The survivors ran through fields, escaping

From themselves, knowing they wouldn't return

For a hundred years. Before them were spread

Those quicksands where a tree changes into nothing,

Into an anti-tree, where no borderline

Separates a shape from a shape, and where,

Amid thunder, the golden house of *is*

Collapses, and the word *becoming* ascends.

Till the end of their days all of them

Carried the memory of their cowardice,

For they didn't want to die without a reason.

Now He, expected, for a long time awaited,

Raised up the smoke of a thousand censers.

They crawled on slippery paths to his feet.

—"King of the centuries, ungraspable Movement,
You who fill the grottoes of the ocean
With a rolling silence, who dwell in the blood
Of the gored shark devoured by other sharks,
In the whistle of a half-bird, half-fish,
In the thundering sea, in the iron gurgling
Of the rocks when archipelagoes surge up.

"The churning of your surf casts up bracelets,
Pearls not eyes, bones from which the salt
Has eaten crowns and dresses of brocade.
You without beginning, you always between
A form and a form, O stream, bright spark,
Antithesis that ripens toward a thesis,
Now we have become equal to the gods,
Knowing, in you, that we do not exist.

"You, in whom cause is married to effect,
Drew us from the depth as you draw a wave,
For one instant, limitless, of transformation.
You have shown us the agony of this age

So that we could ascend to those heights
Where your hand commands the instruments.
Spare us, do not punish us. Our offense
Was grave: we forgot the power of your law.
Save us from ignorance. Accept now our devotion.”

So they forswore. But every one of them
Kept hidden a hope that the possessions of time
Were assigned a limit. That they would one day
Be able to look at a cherry tree in blossom,
For a moment, unique among the moments,
Put the ocean to sleep, close the hourglass,
And listen to how the clocks stop ticking.

When they put a rope around my neck,
When they choke off my breath with a rope,
I'll turn around once, and what will I be?

When they give me an injection of phenol,
When I walk half a step with phenol in my veins,
What wisdom of the prophets will enlighten me?

When they tear us from this one embrace,
 When they destroy forever the shaft of tender light,
 What Heaven will see us reunited? (38-39)

*Brie-Comte-Robert, 1956*⁷¹

Milosz's *A Treatise on Poetry* is one of three major poetic treatises he wrote during his lifetime. The ambition that the poet envisioned for his poetry can be gleaned from their titles: "Treatise on Morals" (1947), "A Treatise on Poetry" (1956), and "Treatise on Theology" (2002).⁷² These poetic presentations of serious philosophical topics are meant to bring poetry out of its intellectual cul-de-sac. The following is from the introduction of "A Treatise on Poetry"

⁷¹ The tome *Selected and Last Poems* [op. cit., 39] incorrectly lists the date of composition for "The Spirit of History" as 1939-1945 in Brie-Comte-Robert. This is impossible because Milosz was in Warsaw between 1939 and 1945. Only the action of the section "The Spirit of History" from the larger poem "A Treatise on Poetry" takes place in 1939-1945, but in Warsaw. The *New and Collected Poems: 1931-2001* [op. cit., 151] lists the date of composition as 1956. This is the date we shall follow.

⁷² The first treatise was not translated into English during Milosz's lifetime. I know of no attempts to translate it by any of his surviving translation collaborators. *A Treatise on Morals* deals with the difficulties of trying to act morally within a chaotic postwar world. This was a time when Milosz collaborated with the Communist government of Poland, working within its diplomatic corps as a cultural attache. Some readings would have the reader believe that *A Treatise on Morals* is a self-justification on the part of the poet. It is written in a highly ironic tone that defies any simple interpretation. It also employs rhyme schemes and Polish idioms that make it difficult to pin down a determinate meaning for the poem. They also make translation extremely difficult.

The last several lines of the poem can give you a sense of its convoluted, despairing, but perhaps also darkly incarnational tones:

Na dziś nie daję ci nadziei,
 Nie czekaj darmo treuga Dei,
 Bo z życia które tobie dano,
 Magiczną nie uciekniesz bramą.
 Idźmy w pokoju, ludzie prości.
 Przed nami jest
 – 'Jądro ciemności'.

[Hope I cannot give you today,
 Don't wait vainly for the treuga Dei
 Because from the life given to you,
 there is no magic gate with which to escape through.]

You often ask yourself why you feel shame
 Whenever you look through a book of poems.
 As if the author, for reasons unclear to you,
 Addressed the worst side of your nature,
 Pushing thought aside, cheating thought.⁷³

Milosz ventures these extended poems, because he believes poetry can make an important contribution to serious intellectual debates, as already noted: “Novels and essays serve but will not last. / Once clear stanza can take more weight / Than a whole wagon of elaborate prose” (Ibid.). Thanks to its compression, and extensive use of analogy, poetry can yoke the heavy burden of reality as if it were light.⁷⁴ On this account, prose lacks the ability to carry weight, because it lacks the analogical compression of poetry.

Even though “A Treatise on Poetry” is a long poem, at sixty-two pages, it is a study in compression. It is composed of four main sections that summarize about fifty years of Polish, Western European, and American history and literature. The four sections—along with their geographical and historical locations—are as follows: “Beautiful Times” (Krakow, 1900-1914),

Simple people let us go in peace
 Before us is
 The Heart of Darkness. (my translation)]

Czeslaw Milosz, *Traktat Moralny, Traktat Poetycki* [Treatise on Morals and A Treatise on Poetry] (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1998) 50.

Its writing coincides with Milosz’s study of Hegel under a Marxist philosopher to whom Milosz gave the pseudonym “Tiger.” Tiger’s influence is documented in the last two chapters of *Native Realm* “Tiger 1” and “Tiger 2” (258-300). Tiger advocated a stance of irony that served to dissimulate any clear formulation of political and philosophical ties with frequently shifting power blocs. His high estimates of philosophers as the ultimate interpreters and levers of history who work behind the scenes has some similarities with stances advocated by Leo Strauss.

⁷³ Czeslaw Milosz, *A Treatise on Poetry*, trans. Robert Haas and Czeslaw Milosz (New York: Ecco, 2001) 1.

⁷⁴ The echo of Matthew 11:30 is a very distant possibility, but not an impossibility, given Milosz’s immersion in biblical and liturgical idioms.

“The Capital” (Warsaw 1918-1939), “The Spirit of History” (Warsaw again, 1939-1945), “Natura” (Pennsylvania, 1948-1949). When taken together they give the reader an idea of how much trouble literature, both in Poland and in the rest of Europe, despite the hopes that literary theory put in it, had catching up with rapidly changing historical events: military, political, social, and technological revolutions. Milosz accomplishes this task by taking over, incarnating if you will, the styles and voices of the poets he critiques. Milosz’s parodies expose the inadequacy of early 20th century literary resources to the gravity of the historical situation. It is a survey of how the poetry of his time has “cheated thought.”

The poem’s critical approach to the practice of poetry means that it attempts to carry the full load of reality on its shoulders. Milosz does not limit himself to only the negative work of criticism. There are sections of the poem where he lets his own voice speak in collision with historical events. The section we will consider here, a selection from “The Spirit of History,” is one such example. Milosz thought it important enough that he excerpts a two page selection of that poem in his *Selected and Last Poems* (38-39). On a philosophical level, or what we’ve called the level of the imagination, this selection is also an excellent example of various cultural liturgies colliding with each other.

At first there seems to be no doubt that the *Zeitgeist* in the poem’s title is Hegel’s spirit of history. But we would only be scratching the surface if we remained there. Milosz puts Hegel in an intense dialogue with Goethe’s “Earth-Spirit,” makes an analogy with Darwin’s evolutionary findings, then finally presents this concoction as a mock religious liturgy (in the ecclesial sense).

It might be useful to cite Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) since it was published before *Faust I* (1808) and *On the Origin of Species* (1859) and frames the others in Milosz's poem and in its historical influence, especially in Eastern Europe:

Since the Substance of the individual, the World-Spirit itself, has had the patience to pass through these shapes over the long passage of time, and to take upon itself the enormous labour of world-history, in which it embodied in each shape as much of its entire content as that shape was capable of holding, and since it could not have attained consciousness of itself by any lesser effort, the individual certainly cannot by the nature of the case his own substance more easily.⁷⁵

These are the bare bones of Hegel's evolutionary scheme of human history. The World-Spirit incarnates itself progressively in different human forms (individuals and social institutions) and advances through history. This collective process is through moments mysteriously the substance of the individual. What could be offensive about such an account of historical progress?

Milosz starts out his critique of what could, and did, go wrong with such a philosophy of history with a *Faust*-like summoning and questioning of the spirit of the times in the section just before the one excerpted in the *Selected and Last Poems* we will be discussing shortly (we need this setup in order to understand what goes on later), "Who are you, Powerful One? The nights are long. / Do we know you as the Spirit of the Earth?"⁷⁶ These words are an almost verbatim recapitulation of Faust questioning the Earth-Spirit in the "Night" section of *Faust I* (lines 460-

⁷⁵ G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1977), 17.

⁷⁶ Czeslaw Milosz, *A Treatise on Poetry*, op. cit., 31.

515).⁷⁷ Milosz explains the complexity of his borrowing in the extensive notes provided at the end of the English language edition of this treatise.

In the notes the poet draws out Hegelian and Darwinian implications of *Faust I* that Goethe probably would not, even could not, have made: “In Goethe’s *Faust* the Spirit of the Earth was Nature.” That is in line with Goethe, however, the German pre-Romantic poet would definitely not have made the following inference from it: “which [nature is] governed with the law of universal necessity.” Milosz then makes another analogic jump by tying both these in his notes (and in the poem) with Hegel’s spirit of history as it embodies itself in various shapes: “If the Spirit of History is just another name for the Earth Spirit, then the law of necessity, of strict determinism, applies to history as well.”⁷⁸ Back in the poem he then further naturalizes the Hegelian dialectic of history by combining it with a pessimistic reading of Darwinian evolution spiked with a healthy dose of entropy:

...It will cool,
 our blood, and we, touched by rust, dressed
 In our cloaks of fading purple, will fall
 Down into the dust of a million years, mingled
 at last with our cousin pithecanthropus
 Who’s been waiting. And you, is it just that you,
 in a reasonable frock like Hegel’s,
 Have chosen for yourself a different name?⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Goethe, *Faust: A Tragedy*, trans. Walter Arndt (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998) 14-16.

⁷⁸ Czeslaw Milosz, *A Treatise on Poetry*, op. cit., 102.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

It is crucial to remember that the decomposing of form in this section of *A Treatise on Poetry* takes place in Warsaw 1939-1945, meaning, the most severe occupation of World War II. The occupation of Warsaw might be the place where the process of history naturalized itself into a battle of all against all, or more accurately, of some against all, where the powerful destroyed the weak with impunity, thereby reversing the evolutionary process by reducing everything “into the dust of a million years.” Warsaw’s downtown was literally reduced to rubble, dust. This can also be read as a reversal of the creation account in Genesis 2:7 where man is created out of dust. Furthermore, Genesis 3:19, situated just after the Fall, pronounces that to dust we shall return. Therefore there is an element of aping divine judgment in saying that we will, notice the verb, “fall into the dust of centuries.” Moreover, the purple of the “fading cloaks” is a reference to the liturgical color of purple that signifies suffering and is usually worn during Lent. The fading of the color means that suffering, once taken up into a naturalistic system, will no longer be humanly significant. When suffering is taken to be natural, then there is nothing to protest; it just is. Because of all these connections with dust there is heavy sarcasm in saying that the history of World War II could be an expression of the Spirit of History that is cloaked “in a reasonable frock like Hegel’s.” What could be more unreasonable than accepting such carnage as the working out of the human spirit in history? The situation calls for protest not acceptance.

Milosz begins the excerpt in the *Selected and Last Poems* we’ve been setting up by evoking an anthropomorphic nature friendly to humans that is especially familiar to readers of Polish poetry. The reference to Jan Kochanowski’s (1530-1584) linden tree is almost automatically recognizable to them, “Under a linden tree, as before, daylight / Quivered on a

goose quill dipped in ink” (38).⁸⁰ The next few lines are a commentary on what Kochanowski’s still medieval universe represents within the frames of this poem: a stable set of interchangeable transcendentals which include being, beauty, truth and goodness. Milosz chooses to put stress, not surprisingly from what we’ve seen, upon visible beauty as a reflection (limited but real)⁸¹ of *esse*: “Books were still governed by the old rule, / Born of a belief that visible beauty / Is a little mirror of being” (38). This is consistent with the medieval maxim: *ens et verum et bonum et pulchrum convertuntur* [being, truth, good, and beauty are convertible]. We have explored how and this harmoniously structured universe did not collapse in the 20th century, or Hegel’s 19th century, but during the Reformation, because it did not practice the harmony it preached.

Then everything rapidly collapses within the very same stanza. The lack of a structural break within the poem, like the start of a new stanza, might signal the rapidity of the collapse. Within that same stanza the poem pans onto a battle scene where “survivors [run] through the fields.” They run for hundreds of years, while the landscape around them, which appears to

⁸⁰ Here is Kochanowski’s poem “On His Linden” in full:

Now seat thyself beneath my leaves, O guest,
And rest.
I promise that the sharp-beaming sun
Here shall not run,
But ‘neath the trees spread out a heavy shade;
Here always from the fields cool winds have played,
Here sparrows and the nightingale have made
Charming lament.
And all my fragrant flowers their sweets have spent
Upon the bees; my master’s board is lent
That honey’s gold.
And I with gentle whisperings can fold
Sweet sleep upon thee. Yea, ‘tis true I bear
No apples; yet my Lord speaks me as fair
As the most fruitful trees
That graced the gardens of Hesperides.

Jan Kochanowski, *Poems* (Berkeley: California UP, 1928) 117.

⁸¹ See: discussion of the poem “Hope” in section 1.3 of this chapter above.

include the linden tree, starts to rapidly decompose under the influence of some (with apologies to Daniel Dennett) universal acid:

...where a tree changes into nothing,
 Into an anti-tree, where no borderline
 Separates a shape from a shape.⁸² (38)

Here there is no space for the transcendentals to convert themselves, because there are no stable transcendentals to speak of: instead, “Amid thunder, the golden house of *is* / Collapses, and the word *becoming* ascends” (38). This is a whole new universe and it seems to be touched by the disintegration of form as rapid as the destruction of the human form in a crematorium.

What follows upon this salvo is the attempts of the survivors to make peace with Movement (quasi-divinized by the capitalization) by engaging in something that looks a great deal like a liturgy. They are clearly engaged in a groveling propitiation ritual for the godlike monster of history: “They crawled on slippery paths to his feet” (38). Crawling is usually associated with not only obedience, but also the punishment of the serpent in Eden for inciting the first couple to eat the fruit from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. Not only is the spectacle judged as an evil, a fall to the level of the serpent, but the “thousand censers waving” give it a mock liturgical (ecclesial sense). Amidst the smoke, the aftereffect of reducing everything to dust, the worshippers anticipate an Advent through history as if some new birth of Christ is upon them, “Now He, expected, for a long time awaited / Raised up the smoke of a thousand censers.” (38). Milosz further makes a connection with WWII and the faux liturgy of the “thousand censers” in his extensive notes in *A Treatise on Poetry* by equating the scene with

⁸² Milosz uses the trope of alarmingly collapsing differences, although as a sign of a Divine judgment, in the poem “Oeconomia Divina.”

the human waste of the Holocaust and the failed General Warsaw Uprising.⁸³ The parallels with Yeats's "Second Coming" are very suggestive. Yeats even uses the notion of a *Spiritus Mundi*, close to the Spirit of History (and the demonic), although one suspects without the Hegelian connotations, and in any case much too soon to have in mind anything like the radical evil of World War II crematoria, or the brutal putting down of the General Warsaw Uprising in 1944, as bad as World War I might have been.⁸⁴

The shape of the excerpted section also has other ecclesial liturgical undertones. Not only is the liturgy to the god of history framed within a threefold, divided into three stanzas, but it is also noteworthy that the doubts expressed by the narrator, who sits outside the whole process and comments upon the faux-liturgy, are also formulated in a three-stanza form. Threefold repetition is a common religious convention used in rituals. More germane to our discussion here, the baptism ceremony involves a threefold exorcism where those attending renounce the Devil in the name of the child.⁸⁵

Further on in the poem the worshippers of the *Zeitgeist* renounce their identity and illusions about stability ritually. Their *mea culpa* runs as follows:

You without beginning, you always between
 A form and a form, O stream, a bright spark,
 Antithesis that ripens toward a thesis,
 Now we have become equal to the gods,
 Knowing in you, that we do not exist (39).

⁸³ Czeslaw Milosz, *A Treatise on Poetry*, op. cit., 107-108.

⁸⁴ W.B. Yeats, *The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats* (New York: Scribners, 1996) 187.

⁸⁵ See: Joseph Matros, *Doors to the Sacred: A Historical Introduction to Sacraments in the Catholic Church* (Liguori, Missouri: Liguori, 2014).

Calling the monstrous historical dialectic as it plays itself in wartime Warsaw “without beginning” means attributing a name to it that is traditionally reserved for God. “O stream” has echoes with Heraclitus, but the language of “thesis” and “antithesis” gives it a decidedly Hegelian spin. Granted, Hegel did not have this sort of historical meat-grinding in mind when he talked about the substance of the individual, the World-Spirit, passing through shapes in the labor of world-history. But Milosz makes one see how the jump into the history of the twentieth century is progressive only in a very ironic sense. The destructiveness of this whole process is portrayed in the conclusion of the faux-prayer that has biblical echoes with the promise of the Serpent in the Garden from Genesis 3:5, “ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.” Like in the garden the knowledge gained by the devotees in the poem is beyond good and evil, “Knowing in you that we do not exist,” because nature is indifferent to such distinctions. They come to know the pure negativity. The ceaseless and abstract movement of negativity is what the French Hegelian School, the forefathers of much contemporary theory, following Kojève, argued to be the motor of the Hegelian system. In Milosz’s poem the negativity of the historical movement moves from abstraction into actual historical events as Milosz pushes his readers to watch as naturalized history crushes its subjects in its wake. All they can think of to do is to beg, “Accept now our devotion.” By putting so much emphasis upon ironically theologizing Hegelian philosophy Milosz gives recent history, and the theory that has been used to interpret it, a theological genealogy for an age that thinks itself secular. In this way, Milosz’s theological readings might be called post-secular, because they see theological categories operating within what we usually call secular history.

Now, as we have already mentioned, this example of a collective bad faith is then interrupted by a threefold commentary. The narrator says “so they foreswore,” however “every one of them / Kept a hidden hope that the possessions of time / were assigned a limit” (39). Milosz suggest that the secret hope of those caught between the armies of World War II was to return to some semblance of a Kochanowski-like stability in a world filled with significance, rather than remain in pure progression. They pined “For a moment, unique among moments” to “Put the ocean to sleep, close the hourglass” when they can “listen to how the clocks stop ticking” (39). But the poet follows history by not permitting these worshippers an apocalyptic respite from the ravages of time. The whole spectacle becomes even more painful as he switches into a series of three questions about death (through hanging, phenol, and through separation from loved ones) formulated in the first person. He asks, what he will be after dying, what prophets will enlighten him, and “What heaven shall see us reunited?” (39). These are eschatological questions without an answer. Even if history has destroyed the theological imagination that preceded it, the questions that drove that older way of seeing things are still germane. They remain so because they are the only ones that can be asked in the face of radical evil. This-worldly answers, the only ones left after the limitations imposed on metaphysics in the wake Post-Reformation squabbling, will not do because they are not radical enough, they do not reach far enough to redeem the wreckage of history. Whether classical theological answers are still adequate to these questions is something Milosz continued to explore throughout his poetic career.

1.7: I Looked at That Face, Dumbfounded

ESSE

I looked at that face, dumbfounded. The lights of métro stations flew by; I didn't notice them. What can be done, if our sight lacks absolute power to devour objects ecstatically, in an instant, leaving nothing more than the void of an ideal form, a sign like a hieroglyph simplified from the drawing of an animal or bird? A slightly snub nose, a high brow with sleekly brushed-back hair, the line of the chin - but why isn't the power of sight absolute? - and in a whiteness tinged with pink two sculpted holes, containing a dark, lustrous lava. To absorb that face but to have it simultaneously against the background of all spring boughs, walls, waves, in its weeping, its laughter, moving it back fifteen years, or ahead thirty. To have. It is not even a desire. Like a butterfly, a fish, the stem of a plant, only more mysterious. And so it befell me that after so many attempts at naming the world, I am able only to repeat, harping on one string, the highest, the unique avowal beyond which no power can attain: I am, she is. Shout, blow the trumpets, make thousands-strong marches, leap, rend your clothing, repeating only: is!

She got out at Raspail. I was left behind with the immensity of existing things. A sponge, suffering because it cannot saturate itself; a river, suffering because reflections of clouds and trees are not clouds and trees. (51)

Brie-Comte-Robert, 1956

If there is a quintessential sight-centered poem in Milosz's oeuvre that Thomistically celebrates the wonder of being, then it would have to be "*Esse*" (51). The use of the Latin and

the italicization in the title doubly adverts to this technical word's significance. "Esse" is perhaps *the* single most important Thomistic category as we've already discussed in the introduction and in our analysis of the poems in this chapter. The very shape and versification of the poem itself reflect its preoccupation with being and with the inadequacy of human perception to it. It alternates between short ejaculations such as the opening sentence, "I looked at that face, dumbfounded," followed by another short sentence, then a whole series of run on sentences, followed by some similar shorter exclamations, only to return to run on sentences. The text itself is shaped into a solid rectangle that takes up about three-quarters of a printed page. Whether intentionally or not, it mirrors the narrator's comparison of human consciousness to a sponge that's oversaturated by the reality around it.

The frenzy of "*Esse*" also has significant parallels with that of the excerpt from "The Spirit of History" we just analyzed. But clearly the anxiety here is not associated with the closing off of a world; instead, it is marked by an overwhelming human openness to the generosity of existence. It also overcomes the dichotomy between the being and becoming. Milosz accomplishes this through a description of the being of an anonymous woman seen in the Paris metro. Being, through the experience of her particular being, is shown to be substantial in its dynamism—the two do not seem to be mutually exclusive here.

After describing the woman's features the poem then goes on to express the manifold forces and desires that are aroused⁸⁶ through such an encounter, "To absorb that face but to have it simultaneously against the background of all spring boughs, walls, waves, in its weeping, its laughter, moving it back fifteen years, or ahead thirty" (51). All of this potentiality is pregnant in the encounter with a single human being. Human being is given pride of place here, but without

⁸⁶ The sexual description of the scene is entirely appropriate as we shall see shortly.

continually gushing forth. It also mirrors, indirectly, a Catholic analogical sense of the dynamism of the divine immanence.

