

Representation and Merit in the Military: Explaining the Origins and Persistence of Recruitment
and Promotion Patterns in the Turkish Officer Corps

(1848-2015)

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Abstract

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This research offers a systematic study of the sources of inequality and merit in the military. It explores the origins and persistence of representation and promotion patterns in the military's officer corps. Going beyond prevailing approaches emphasizing the role of interethnic and ideological rivalry, my dissertation reveals resilient organizational and social mechanisms persistently reproducing the original ethnic make-up of the officer corps. Drawing on about 150 years of original historical recruitment and promotion data from the Turkish case, my research findings show that the initial stages of state-building are pretty impactful for the long-term trajectories of promotion and recruitment. Demographic patterns that crystallize at the initial stages of state building tend to be quite durable. Quantitative and qualitative evidence from the Turkish case elucidates how recruitment networks and autonomous promotion patterns specific to the officer corps ensure the perpetuation of promotion and ethnic representation patterns by mitigating the effects of major political and socio-economic shifts and the demographic designs of political and military leaders. My dissertation embraces a mixed methodological approach combining ethnography and archival work with statistical analysis. It draws on extensive field research in Turkey between 2016 and 2019, in which I held in-depth interviews with military officers, academics, journalists, and politicians and collected archival and library data to construct three original datasets of the ethnic background and career paths of close to 25,000 officers serving in the Turkish military from 1848 to 2015.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

What factors affect officer recruitment and promotion, and by extension, ethnic representation, in a multiethnic military? Specifically, how do violent ethnic conflict, coups, and coup-prevention efforts affect officer representation and promotion patterns? After decades of discussion about the systemic and epistemic sources of ethnic and racial inequalities and exclusionism, many state institutions remain unrepresentative of their societies. Ethnic and racial minorities continue to face overt and subtle forms of discrimination daily and are largely barred from access to state power even in well-established democracies. Scholars have studied diversity in the military but focused mostly on its implications, especially political stability. The sources of inequality and exclusionism in the military have received scant attention. And the limited scholarship on diversity in the military ignores that most armies are flawed by design and disregard the divergent demographic characteristics of different status groups within the military, therefore, reaching misleading conclusions with limited internal and external validity. Scholars presume that a “compulsory inclusiveness” at the level of rank and file due to human resources pressures, especially during the war, automatically applies to higher status groups ignoring that demographic dynamics at the top and bottom of the military hierarchy often do not match. Similarly, scholars largely overlook inequality and exclusionism in the officer corps, which are common in militaries worldwide. This research offers an in-depth analysis of factors affecting recruitment and promotion patterns, specifically ethnic representation in the officer corps in a multiethnic army, with specific attention to the influence of violent conflict and civil-military affairs.

My dissertation theorizes the mechanisms through which recruitment and promotion patterns persist in the officer corps. Empirical and ethnographic evidence from the Turkish case offers strong initial empirical support to the theory of organizational suspension mechanisms by demonstrating the limited effect of violent conflicts, including war, ethnic conflict, and military coups. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Turkish case reveals that neither war automatically leads to the ethnic integration of the officer corps, nor does ethnic conflict necessarily undermine ethnic representation. States may embrace reform strategies that can ensure the extraction of local military capacities without integrating the minority populations during the war and ethnic conflict. My findings also show that coups have a negligible effect on ethnic representation and only a provisional effect on promotion patterns. I argue that the organizational and social processes specific to the officer corps insulate officer recruitment and promotion patterns from major political shocks and dramatic institutional shifts, including reforms and ethnically motivated demographic engineering efforts.

Drawing on organizational theory and historical institutionalism, I identify two mechanisms explaining the durability of officer demographics: (1) an internal mechanism: the autonomous promotion regime; (2) an external mechanism: recruitment networks. These interlocking mechanisms often serve as shock absorbers insulating the recruitment and promotion patterns from the immediate and long-term influences of external political shocks and internal reform efforts. Officer recruitment networks refer mainly to province-based interpersonal relationships through which information about military school admission and training is shared and utilized. Officer promotion regime, on the other hand, refers to such characteristics specific to officer promotion as (1) promotion from within, which I call endo-promotion, (2) opaqueness at the entry and mid-grade level, (3) incremental and relapsing nature, and (4) professional

socialization and networks. The Turkish case shows that recruitment and promotion patterns, and by extension, ethnic representation in the officer corps, often emerge and crystallize during the initial phase of institution-building and reproduce through mainly these two organizational-social mechanisms. External and internal shocks and exclusionary or inclusionary policies are less likely to be effective at shifting officer recruitment and promotion patterns once they crystallize.

To answer the puzzle of durable officer representation patterns, I present an in-depth single-case study based on original evidence from Turkey for the period between 1848 and 2015. With long-standing civil-military problems and ethnic conflict, Turkey offers a valuable case to test well-established hypotheses on the influences of violent intrastate and interstate conflicts, including especially coups and ethnic conflict on officer representation and promotion patterns. A single case approach allows testing these relationships in the same army over time and across its different components. My research is concerned about the entire period between 1848 and 2015 but focuses specifically on the episodes of war, ethnic conflict, coups, and various types of regimes since the late Ottoman period.

The dissertation research embraces a mixed methodological approach combining ethnography and archival work with statistical analysis. It draws on extensive field research in Turkey between 2016 and 2019, in which I held in-depth interviews with military officers, academics, journalists, and politicians and collected archival and library data to construct three original datasets of the ethnic background and career paths of close to 25,000 officers—including all general staff officers and general officers—serving in the Turkish military from 1848 to 2015.

The dissertation makes unique theoretical and empirical contributions to debates on the relationship between conflict and democracy, civil-military relations, and institutional change.

First, it challenges well-established arguments about ethnic representation that point to the role of ethnic competition for state control (Enloe, 1980; Horowitz, 1985; Chandra & Wilkinson, 2008; Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009; Harkness, 2016), the state's security concerns (Peled, 1998; Hoyt, 2007; Lyall, 2010; Roessler, 2011, Talmadge, 2015), and resource pressures (Tilly, 1990; Downing, 1992; Mann, 1993; Porter, 1994; Centeno, 2002) during the war and ethnic conflict. My findings revise these views by revealing how organizational and social mechanisms specific to officer promotion and recruitment mitigate the effects of violent conflict and ethnic competition on demographic representation. It offers supportive evidence for works arguing war's provisional impact on democracy (Kier & Krebs, 2010; Kier, 2021).

Second, my research findings challenge the common scholarly perception emphasizing the role of civilian and military leaders' ethnically motivated interferences on the composition of officer corps in military organizations (Brooks, 1998; Quinlivan, 1999; Pilster & Böhmler, 2012; Talmadge, 2015). I show that the influence of civilian and military leaders' interventions on officer recruitment and promotion patterns is often tangential and transient due to the opaque, incremental, and relapsing nature of officer promotion patterns and the impermeability and resilience of established recruitment networks. My findings confirm the claims of recent studies emphasizing the long-term consequences of past events and institutions (Moore, 1966; Ertman, 1997; Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson, 2012; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012, Kadercan, 2013). My research reveals how initial demographic configurations shape subsequent trajectories of ethnic representation.

Third, my research also challenges the conventional view in the literature suggesting that coups and coup prevention efforts undermine military effectiveness due primarily to ethnically and politically motivated interventions in the military's internal affairs, specifically its

recruitment, promotion, and appointment procedures (Quinlivan 1999; Brooks 2003, 2006; Biddle and Long 2004; Pilster and Bohmelt 2011; Talmadge 2015; Narang and Talmadge 2017). I find that coups and post-coup military regimes have a negligible effect on officer promotion patterns in the long term. In the short run, coups instigated by the official command have merit enhancing effect on officer promotions owing to, I argue, the performance-sensitive coup-proofing efforts of post-coup military regimes. I show that military regimes, unlike other autocratic forms of governments, pursue a balanced approach to reforming and purging the military due to inherent rivalries in the officer corps, given the extraordinarily uncertain and conflict-prone nature of the post-coup period. Finally, by identifying organizational and social processes sustaining ethnic inequality and exclusionism in the military, this dissertation contributes to practical efforts to address persistent problems of inequality and exclusionism in security organizations.

This dissertation proceeds as follows: First, I present an original theory of organizational suspension mechanisms and self-persistent officer representation and promotion patterns and discuss the existing explanations about the determinants of ethnic representation in the military (Chapter 2). In the following chapter, I establish the puzzle of durable ethnic representation patterns by presenting empirical evidence from Turkey for the negligible influence of war, ethnic conflict, coups, and reform efforts between 1848 and 2015 (Chapter 3). The following chapter tests the theory of self-persistence by investigating the influence of coups and regime types on the merit-based nature of officer promotion patterns in the Turkish army through an event history analysis (Chapter 4). The concluding chapter (Chapter 5) summarizes arguments and research findings and discusses their implications.

Chapter 2: Origins and Persistence of Officer Demographics

2.1 Theory of Organizational Suspension Mechanisms and Self-Persisting Officer Representation Patterns

This chapter presents the mechanisms through which recruitment and promotion patterns persist in the officer corps. Two sets of organizational-social mechanisms specific to the officer corps mitigate the effects of major political shocks and dramatic institutional shifts and aid officer recruitment and promotion patterns to perpetuate: (1) recruitment networks (external mechanism) and (2) autonomous promotion regime (internal mechanism). Officer recruitment networks refer mainly to local (province-based) interpersonal relationships through which information about military school admission and training is shared and utilized. These resilient networks facilitate or impair local populations' ties with the officer corps. On the other hand, the officer promotion regime refers to characteristics of officer promotion ensuring the durability and perpetuation of preexisting and existing patterns. These interlocking external and internal mechanisms often serve as shock absorbers insulating the recruitment and promotion patterns from the immediate and long-term influences of external political shocks and internal reform efforts. They work together to create positive feedback loops that reproduce the initial ethnic makeup of the officer corps, which have usually formed in the early state-building phase.

2.1.1 Officer Recruitment Networks

Officer recruitment networks are the primary mechanisms ensuring the resilience of officer demography by, first, connecting certain social and ethnic groups to the military and estranging others from the officer corps, and second, isolating the effects of external shocks on representation patterns. Recruitment networks refer to loose-knit social networks that span the civilian population and the military, especially the officer corps, and include at least one military professional, whether a family member, a co-ethnic, or just an acquaintance of the civilian members in the network. They are often regional but can span across geographic regions through family-, clan-, ethnic-, and religious-based ties. They are essential for the ethnic and geographical composition of officer corps because groups lacking access to these networks hardly find representation. Officer recruitment networks play an important role in who is included or excluded in the officer corps and to what extent each ethnic group or geographic region is represented. The permeability, flexibility, and expansiveness of the officer recruitment network considerably influence the composition of the officer corps and its resilience.

Officer recruitment networks are hard to establish and dislodge. They typically emerge during a critical juncture, often the initial phase of state-building, upon entering at least one individual from a particular locality, family, or ethnic group. They enlarge gradually through subsequent recruitments from the same group with the help of the first entrant/s. Once these networks are created, subsequent political, social, and institutional shocks and shifts, like war, ethnic conflict, civil war, and coup, negligibly affect the networks and how they operate. They may freeze temporarily after a significant external and internal shock but revive shortly. They tend to be quite resilient, hard to disrupt, and able to regenerate quickly. It is often quite difficult for any social and ethnic group excluded in the initial demographic configuration of the military to develop or become part of these networks.

Recruitment networks are not necessarily the same as military family networks, usually considered the primary mechanism of endorecruitment and refer to the recruitment of officers restrictively from military families. Recruitment networks represent a broader category, encompassing military family networks but not confined to them. Recruitment networks are often loosely connected and remain passive until someone's enlistment or application for military schools becomes a consideration. Although they may cut across ethnic, religious, geographic, and class boundaries, officer recruitment networks operate more effectively within each ethnic group as in-group communication and collaboration are often more intense and more impactful.

Ethnic groups which are cut off from officer recruitment networks or lack their own networks are often persistently underrepresented in the officer corps. On the contrary, an ethnic group well-integrated into existing networks is more likely to be represented persistently irrespective of political shocks and institutional shifts that are normally expected to heighten ethnic tensions and undermine ethnic representation of ethnic minorities, even when this group is deemed as a threat. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that while recruitment network deprivation operates as the primary mechanism of ethnic exclusion, historically established connections to recruitment networks, even when limited in scope, ensure a certain level of representation, preventing complete disenfranchisement from the officer corps.

The influence of recruitment networks transcends the admission stage. They provide an important advantage to candidates during military training and the initial stages of a military career. This is important given the competitiveness and opaqueness of officer admission and training processes and the military profession. Mentorship provided by networks is critical for a newly admitted cadet during the initial, often the most difficult, phase of officer training. Similarly, for newly commissioned officers, regional networks provide the much-needed

guidance in the initial years when their career tracks and trajectories irreversibly form.

Throughout all three phases, recruitment networks feed insider tips to help individuals navigate the military's professional and cultural particularities. Overall, access to recruitment networks allows not only admission to officer training programs and military schools but also makes a promising start for the career. However, it does not necessarily affect an officer's prospects of career advancement, as professional socialization offers opportunities for participation in new networks useful for officer promotion and appointment.

2.1.2 Autonomous Officer Promotion Regime

The officer promotion regime refers to characteristics, rules, and procedures that govern officer promotion. They constitute the primary organizational suspension mechanism ensuring the durability and perpetuation of preexisting promotion patterns by absorbing the immediate and long-term influences of external political shocks and internal reform efforts.

The autonomous promotion regime specifically refers to four intra-organizational mechanisms: (1) Endopromotion or promotion from within, (2) opaqueness at the entry and mid-grade level, (3) incremental and relapsing nature, and (4) professional socialization and promotion networks.

Endopromotion: Unlike many organizations, the military exclusively promotes from within, making it often impossible for a civilian expert, academic, diplomat, or bureaucrat to be appointed to military posts such as a brigade commander or the chief of the general staff in most modern armies. Merely military officers trained by the institution and socialized into its professional norms are eligible for appointment to a military post. Wartime mobilization may

offer an exception, but even then, these appointments from the civilian population are limited to junior officer cadres. The consequences of endopromotion are more pronounced in senior-level appointment and promotion decisions. When political leaders seek to interfere in senior-officer promotions, they are often confined to a preexisting pool of candidates who have become eligible through an opaque and incremental promotion process. Ethnically or ideologically motivated decisions are possible to the extent that the pool of promotion-eligible candidates allows. The cumulative promotion decisions often predetermine senior military leadership at the mid-grade and junior levels, which are typically much more autonomous and isolated from external influences. In a nutshell, endopromotion significantly mitigates political leaders' impact on promotions and institutional reform efforts.

During even radical reform periods, it is often impossible to replace an entire military leadership with a new one with desired characteristics and qualifications. That is to say, senior officers in decision-making positions would always be the products of the previous system. They continue to play a critical role in the politics of the new regime. Even when the inevitable remnants of the old regime seem to conform to reformers' designs, they may return to older habits and practices at the earliest convenience, spoiling reform efforts. Endopromotion makes radical transformations difficult. The men of the ancient regime almost always survive in the military and may influence the new direction of the institution.

Opaqueness: The second characteristic contributing to the self-persistence of officer demographics is the opaqueness of entry and mid-grade level officer promotions and appointments. Junior and mid-grade level officer selection and promotion decisions are highly self-regulating and governed mainly by institutional norms and regulations. They are inaccessible to both political and senior military leadership. Political leaders and senior officers

often have little interest in interfering in mid-grade level officer selection and promotion processes. Even when they do, their influence is restricted and provisional. The effect of patronage is also limited because officers at this level are usually too insignificant to be a vital part of any network that can influence career advancement prospects. Paradoxically, middle-grade officer demographics are more opaque and harder to influence, especially in a military with higher institutionalization, transparency, and accountability. Professional concerns, peer pressure, and legal appeals limit nepotism, favoritism, and ethnically and ideologically motivated top-down interventions on promotion and appointment decisions.

Incremental and regressive nature: The third organizational-structural mechanism is officer demographics' gradual and relapsing nature. Advancement in the military hierarchy is often a long process of cumulative promotion decisions, typically spread across three to four decades. It makes demographic patterns highly resilient and prone to reappear, a phenomenon applicable to most closed bureaucratic systems. An interference in officer promotion patterns at the junior level, for instance, bears product several decades later. And most importantly, unless a particular policy is sustained for an extended period, it would be hard to observe a marked change in the promotion patterns at the senior level. The composition of the senior leadership appears immune to major political shocks and intra-institutional developments that can incur non-merit influence on promotion and selection processes.

Established patterns tend to relapse. Even when there is a sustained politically or ethnically motivated effort to reform the senior officer demography, long-established practices tend to reappear as soon as this exogenous leverage disappears. An outlier to this pattern is a revolution that introduces a widely celebrated ideology embraced by the military and a sequence of governments that can pursue a persistent personnel policy. French revolution, Bolshevik

revolution, and Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman empire can be listed as some examples of shock with lasting influence on the officer demography. A long-term sustained effort that seeks to recreate the officer corps at all levels can be impactful. Even then, demographic change is complex and contingent upon several geopolitical, domestic political, and institutional factors. The incremental and relapsing nature of officer demographics tends to absorb the influence of instantaneous external shocks, short-lived institutional reforms, or ideologically or ethnically motivated demographic engineering efforts. In short, a slow-moving and regressive character renders the existing demographic structure highly resistant to change.

Officer socialization and professional networks: Lastly, officer socialization is a peculiar intra-organizational mechanism absorbing the effects of internal and external shifts. Officer socialization helps create familiarity and a common institutional identity among officers cutting across ethnic, religious, and ideological lines. The impact of socialization is commensurate to the length and content of the socialization process. The earlier in an officer's lifetime the socialization begins, the more successful it is at creating a common bond. This is not to deny the limits of the professional socialization process and the resiliency of officers' local, religious, and ethnic identities. Military schools and academies serve as important spaces of officer socialization, creating lasting ties, memories, and imaginations among officers. Officer socialization is important not only for eliminating differences and creating a shared identity but also for teaching officers from minority communities the institutional norms and codes, helping them navigate professional life even when they are unwilling to internalize formal and informal institutional norms. Socialization affects the internal distribution of power and goods, which in the military typically corresponds to branch assignments, appointments, and senior promotions. When political context magnifies threat perception or ethnic bias toward a particular minority

group, professional socialization can minimize the effects of exclusionary practices or indiscriminate repression targeting them.

Professional socialization also enables the formation of patronage networks. Throughout their career, officers become part of single or multiple informal networks. These informal networks play an essential role in officers' entire career trajectories, but they tend to play a more important role in senior officer promotion decisions. While these networks may undermine merit-based promotions, they can mitigate the effect of ethnic bias as they usually cut across ethnic and religious groups. Specific organizational designs can alleviate the non-merit effects of patronage by constraining promotion-eligibility to a group of officers selected based on strict merit criteria at an early stage of their career. In such models, patronage networks originate and operate mainly within a highly qualified selected group of officers, yet they can expand beyond it.

Overall, an autonomous promotion regime constrains ethnic imbalances in the officer corps but, at the same time, hinders reform efforts to improve representation in the officer corps. It helps reproduce exclusionary representation patterns arising from a flawed recruitment policy or past promotion practices crystallizing in the early years of institution-building in particular. Important to note that an autonomous promotion regime helps the demographic makeup of junior officer corps to be carried over to higher ranks over time, allowing established patterns to replicate.

2.2 Existing Explanations

Most scholars expect the military to be more representative of the broader society and tend to harbor relatively fewer ethnic and racial disparities compared to the civilian components of the state apparatus (Lundquist, 2008; Quester & Gilroy, 2002; Nordile, 1987; Burk & Espinoza, 2012) owing in part to its unique functional and structural characteristics and relationship with the broader society it is drawn from. Still, some contend that the armed forces inevitably reflect a country's population's prevalent ethnic cleavages and inequalities (Lyll, 2020). In general, existing literature focuses primarily on four factors accounting for the recruitment and promotion patterns and representativeness of the military: (1) the ethnic bias and ethnic competition for the control of the state, (2) the state's security concerns, (3) socio-economic structures, and (4) the nature of civil-military relations.

2.2.1 Ethnicity-Centric Approach

Most scholars interested in understanding the dynamics of military demographics focus on ethnicity and its implications for the state's attitude toward minority participation in the military. Ethnic-based recruitment and promotion policies are widely seen as important factors affecting the military's demography, representativeness, or unrepresentativeness. Ethnicity offers a valuable template for rulers to institute states in favor of politically or demographically dominant groups through its ascriptive marks imposing categorical boundaries (Horowitz, 1985; Wimmer, 2018). Excluding particular ethnic groups from access to the state, power has become a widely employed political strategy for rulers to gain or maintain authority and control of the state, especially after the genesis of nationalism and nation-states (Enloe, 1980b, 11).

Ethnic exclusion may mainly result from the problem of ethnic power-sharing and competition for state control (See Wimmer, 2002; Roessler, 2011). The military appears strategically crucial in the calculus of state control. Seizing the army's control through exclusionary recruitment and promotion policies have been common and critical components of ethnonationalist state-building. Political leaders widely resort to ethnic exclusion and prefer ethnically skewed militaries to consolidate state power and secure or increase the political authority and privileges of dominant groups within the state.

In ethnically biased contexts, where military recruitment decisions are made based on ascriptive ethnic attachments rather than merit, the military's demography is often ethnically imbalanced. It is commonsensical to expect in such contexts that ethnic discrimination should lead to the complete exclusion or underrepresentation of ethnic minorities, especially in the officer corps. In practice, however, ethnic or racial minorities may often be proportionately or over-represented in junior officer cadres, as in the rank and file.

The state's ethnic bias tends to be more pronounced in the internal provision of goods and distribution of power within a state institution. Ethnicity's assumed "stickiness" makes it an ideal criterion for the selective intra-institutional distribution of power and benefits in leaders' eyes (Rothchild, 1981, 222; Fearon, 1999; Tilly, 2007; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). This manifests in practice as the exclusion of ethnic minorities from combat branches, elite units, special forces, and, most importantly, from senior decision-making positions in the military (Burk & Espinoza, 2012). In addition to demographics and internal provision of goods, pejorative nicknames, mottos, and imbalanced court-martial demographics are common indicators of racism and ethnic bias.

2.2.2 Security-Centric Approach

The second group of scholars embraces a security-centric approach to explaining the military's imbalanced demographic composition. According to this approach, an ethnic minority group's underrepresentation in the military is related to the state elite's security concerns or threat perception toward this ethnic group. Leaders may prefer to exclude certain ethnic minorities from the state and the military for fear of (1) ethnic-based coups, (2) "fifth column" activities during the war, or (3) intra-state conflicts such as civil war, insurgency, or secessionist rebellion. They may justify exclusionary military recruitment and promotion policies through these existing or invented threats.

Ethnically motivated coups are common (Harkness, 2015). Leaders who anticipate a putsch in ethnically divided societies may exclude ethnic groups capable of orchestrating a coup from the military (Roessler, 2011; Talmadge, 2015). Additionally, state leaders may resort to exclusion for fear that ethnic minority groups in the military can cooperate with the enemy or defect to the enemy side (Peled, 1998) during the war. In that case, state leaders may prefer to employ or justify ethnic stacking as a measure against foreign enemy intervention (Hoyt, 2007). Concentration camps and labor battalions exclusively designed to control, suppress, or exterminate "suspicious" ethnic groups have been common manifestations of the state's fear of fifth column activities since the early twentieth century. Finally, intra-state conflict risks, like civil war, ethnic rebellion, and insurgency, may motivate state leaders to resort to ethnically based exclusionary recruitment policies (Horowitz, 1985; Chandra & Wilkinson, 2008). Leaders may use ethnic stacking to preempt or win an ethnic conflict by demographically dominating the security forces, especially crucial positions and critical operational units.

The security-centric approach implies that the state's exclusionary attitude toward minorities is context-dependent and tends to increase during war and ethnic conflict or when and where civil war and coup risks are higher. From this realist line of reasoning, the more a particular ethnic minority population is perceived as or associated with a threat, the lesser the likelihood of its proportional representation in the military. Ethnic minorities are more likely to be underrepresented, especially when and where the threat perception about them intensifies, whether due to fifth column activities, ethnic rebellion, conflict, or ethnically driven coups. Especially during the ethnic conflict, the state may perceive more threat from an ethno-mobilized minority group, leading to its underrepresentation in the state demography. During the ethnic conflict, the state's recruitment and promotion relationship with a ethnic group may show location- and time-sensitive characteristics and variation. An ethnic group's representation may vary across different subnational units where the ethnic population congregates and over time, depending on the perceived threat level.

Conversely, the war may lead to the integration of ethnic minorities into the military. Especially, human resources demand generated by wartime mobilization may compel the military to recruit from previously excluded groups (Armor & Gilroy, 2010; Burk & Espinoza, 2012; Segal, Segal, & Reed, 2015; Thurber & Johnson, 2020). When it overweighs the established state view and attitude during the war, expediency may open up new space for marginalized ethnic minorities to penetrate the core demographics of the military. In the American context, for example, World War II, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have had considerable influence on the gradual diversification of the US military's racial and gender demography, leading to increased representation of Blacks,

Hispanics, and women.¹ Although it is hard to extend this argument to the officer corps, international conflict is commonly viewed as a catalyst of military integration, as has been for national integration. The war may encourage socioeconomically underprivileged minorities to join the military at both group and individual levels due to its economic opportunities. Similarly, it may serve as a platform for minorities previously estranged from the state to prove their loyalty and usefulness.

Like the war, ethnic conflict may lead to military integration under certain circumstances. The standard scholarly assumption is that conflict hardens ethnic identities (Allen & Seaton, 1999; Peterson, 2000) and aggravates state discrimination against ethnic minorities. This presumption often results from a primordial view of ethnicity that treats the ethnic group as a unitary and rigid entity (Biddle, 2006; Kaufmann, 1996) and considers ethnic identities fixed and unsurmountable during especially the conflict. However, as constructivists suggest, ethnicity can be fluid. It may fail to predict individual political behavior, especially when the state is willing to replace the ethnicity-based identification of its population with that of “loyalty” (Kalyvas, 2008). The state may selectively recruit the insurgents’ co-ethnics during an ethnic conflict to undermine the saliency of insurgency. Similarly, it may seek to co-opt the members of potentially rebellious or defector ethnic groups during the war to prevent “fifth column” activities or the opening of an additional internal front. Such a cooptationist state approach during ethnic conflict can encourage ethnic integration within certain limits.

¹ For World War II, see H. S. Milton, ed., *The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army*, ORO-R-11 (Chevy Chase, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), 562; for Korean War, see Charles C. Moskos, *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today’s Military* (New York: Russell Sage, 1970), 239-40; for Vietnam War see Thomas Gates, *Report of the President’s Commission on an All-volunteer Armed Force* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970); for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan see S.J. Armor and C. L. Gilroy, *Changing Minority Representation in the U.S. Military*, *Armed Forces & Society*, 36(2), 2010, 223-246.

The state's threat perception, hence, its recruitment attitude toward an ethnic minority group during the war and ethnic conflict, may be related to the state's knowledge about the minority populations, which James Scott frames as the legibility of the local population to the state (Scott, 1998). If the local population is "illegible" to the state, leaders may resort to indiscriminate violence and collective banishment from access to state resources, including the military (Scott, 1998). Conversely, the legibility of the population can be expected to ameliorate state attitude toward an ethnic group. Previously established connections between the local population and the state through the state's military or bureaucratic recruitment activities may alleviate the information disadvantage of the state (Lyll 2010). Suppose the state possesses sufficient information to distinguish the members of its ethno-mobilized minority population according to the degree of their loyalty to the state. In that case, it may embrace a selective cooptation or integration strategy, which may, in turn, lead to a more inclusionary attitude toward the minorities. When the state's information on minority populations is location-specific, ethnic representation patterns should covary geographically with the degree of local knowledge and collaboration or ethnic violence in each locality. The state should be more likely to recruit from collaborative localities and conversely, less from "illegible" and less cooperative localities. From this line of thinking, the state is expected to perceive less threat from provinces with more demographic and political information available. In short, one would expect a negative geographical association between local information, threat perception, and ethnic representation in security forces.

2.2.3 Socio-Economic Approach

Some scholars focus on structural factors in explaining the military's demographic characteristics. Scholars, focusing primarily on economic and educational deprivation, seem to be divided on the effects of socio-economic factors on the military's demography, specifically ethnic representation. While some scholars, especially those prioritizing economic factors, suggest that ethnic groups with lower socioeconomic standing tend to be overrepresented in military organizations (Kleykamp, 2006; Armor & Gilroy, 2010), others, who highlight educational dynamics, expect minorities to be underrepresented (Segal et al., 2007; Gifford, 2005; Burk & Espinoza, 2012).

According to the proponents of the economic deprivation approach, ethnic groups with lower socio-economic standing in society should be better represented in the military. Burk and Espinoza suggest that the social context and economic factors are considerably consequential (2012) and offer various examples from the American context for the socioeconomic deprivation approach. As a derivative of this approach, some scholars posit that minorities' predilection to joining the army increases during economic recessions and declines during recovery and growth (Kleykamp, 2006; Gorman & Thomas, 1993; Kearl & Nelson, 1992; Petersen, 1989; Dale & Gilroy, 1983). However, scholarship is unclear whether the economic deprivation approach is applicable to only rank and file or if it extends to the officer corps.

The educational deprivation approach anticipates the underrepresentation of the socioeconomically underprivileged ethnic groups in the officer corps based on the assumption that participation in the officer corps is related to the educational performance of the minority population. Scholars hold that the underprivileged minority youth, who usually are undereducated and show relatively more unsatisfactory academic performance, are less likely to be included in the officer corps, which is often merit-based membership (Segal et al., 2007;

Gifford, 2005; Burk & Espinoza, 2012). Educationally disadvantaged ethnic groups may experience difficulty meeting security institutions' selection requirements with merit-based principles/. For example, in the American context, the persistent underrepresentation of Hispanics in the military during the all-volunteer force era is widely explained through the educational and linguistic underperformance of Hispanic youth in aptitude tests (Segal et al., 2007; Gifford, 2005). It is important to note that the educational deprivation approach seems more applicable to the officer corps than the rank and file, for which selection often requires various physical, medical, and aptitude tests.

2.2.4 Civil-Military-Relations Approach

Lastly, ethnic representation in the armed forces may be related to civil-military relations specific to each context. The civil-military relations literature discusses the military's representativeness mainly within the context of the military-society gap or integration debate, the origins of which can be traced to Huntington and Janowitz's earlier works (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1960). The gap debate, which received more attention after the 1990s (See Ricks, 1997; Feaver & Kohn, 2001; Dempsey, 2010; Urban, 2013; Schake & Mattis, 2016; Liebert & Golby, 2017; Burbach, 2019), focuses on the demographic disparity between the society and military as an independent variable and analyzes its implications for civil-military relations. Scholars interested in explaining the reasons for growing demographic asymmetry between the military and society emphasize the lack of civilian oversight and the absence of effective monitoring mechanisms (Feaver & Kohn, 2001; Cohen, 2000; Burk, 2001). Conversely, some scholars posit that the military's autonomy should result in better ethnic representation because

the military leaders may be more open to integrating minorities in the armed forces (Peled, 1998). Despite some disagreements, the common view in the civil-military-relations literature is that civilian control should improve ethnic representation, whereas the military's autonomy should undermine or maintain it.

In sum, in explaining the determinants of the military's demography and ethnic representativeness, existing scholarship focuses mainly on ethnicity- and security-related state attitudes, collective preferences of each ethnic group, and social and economic structures while ignoring the military's organizational and social dynamics. In civil-military relations literature as well, although political and professional implications of the military's organizational culture, including coups (Taylor, 2003), war-time violence (Hull, 2006), and military doctrine (Kier, 1997), have been well researched, its consequences for the military's own social and ethnic composition, especially the minority representation patterns have received scant attention. Also, most works fail to discern the dynamics of ethnic representation in the officer corps from that of the rank and file even though different factors may be at play in each of them. Another important problem is that most works focus on short periods due in part to access and data availability issues, leading to inconclusive or contradictory results.

Overall, existing scholarship reveals little about the determinants and internal mechanisms of officer recruitment and promotion. Ethnic representation in the officer corps during peacetime and conflict may be related to the military's organizational characteristics and sui generis dynamics of officer recruitment and promotion. Organizational theory and path dependency framework offer better theoretical tools to investigate representation patterns in the armed forces.

2.3 Data & Research Design

This research embraces a multimethod research strategy combining original quantitative datasets on officer recruitment and promotion with extensive fieldwork involving in-depth interviews and archival work between 2016 and 2019 in Turkey.

2.3.1 Datasets

The research introduces three original and overlapping datasets drawn from archival and library sources in Turkey: The Turkish Armed Forces Senior Officer Corps (TAFSOC), Military High School (MIHIS), and Historical Officer Career Advancement (HCA) datasets. Two undergraduate research assistants from Turkey helped me digitize the data and create the datasets. The qualitative chapters of the dissertation rest on the TAFSOC and MIHIS, while the quantitative chapter draws primarily on the HCA dataset. Each chapter's data and research design section provide detailed information on each relevant dataset and how they are utilized.

2.3.1.1 Turkish Armed Forces Senior Officer Corps (TAFSOC) Dataset

The TAFSOC dataset contains biographical information about two types of power holder groups in the Turkish military hierarchy: general staff officers and flag officers (generals and admirals). It consists of all 10,589 general staff officers and 2,150 general officers who served in the three main services of the Turkish armed forces—the army, navy, and air force— during the late Ottoman and republican period between 1848 and 2015. In this sense, the dataset represents

the complete universe of the Turkish military's senior/elite officer corps. The TAFSOC data has been drawn from General Staff College (GSC) yearbooks and graduation albums. I visited the GSC Library and second-hand bookstores in Istanbul and Ankara to collate a complete series of yearbooks and albums since the foundation of the GSC in 1848. I gathered some of the yearbooks from retired officers.

2.3.1.2 The Military High School Dataset (MIHIS) Dataset

The MIHIS dataset contains biographical information about 11,450 individuals, roughly one-fifth of the officer corps, who were commissioned in the Turkish army and the air force between 1900 and 2002. Data in the MIHIS dataset was extracted from the yearbooks of the Bursa Işıklar Military High School (1858-1998), one of three military high schools in Turkey along with Kuleli in Istanbul and Maltepe in Izmir.² I have primarily used two collated albums published by the Işıklar Military High School Press containing alumnus lists and their career information for each cohort from the first year of education until 1998.³

2.3.1.3 Historical Officer Career Advancement (HCA) Dataset

The HCA dataset contains biographical and professional information about approximately 17,000 officers at the individual level. The dataset comprises information about

² The graduates of the Kuleli, Işıklar, and Maltepe High Schools constituted the primary officer source of the Turkish army since the 19th century. After military high school, the cadets attended the military academy and commissioned as an officer after 2 to 4 years of training depending on the period.

³ *Işıklar Askeri Lisesi Mezunları (1852-1993)* (The Alumni of the Işıklar Military High School), Işıklar Military High School Press, Bursa 1994; *Işıklar Askeri Lisesi 1993-1998 Mezunları* (The 1993-1998 Alumni of the Işıklar Military High School), Işıklar Military High School Press, Bursa 1999.

each individual's ethnic-geographical background, military branch, service, and educational performance. It also includes information on promotion decisions and dates about each individual based on the Supreme Military Council (SMC) evolutions at five senior levels, from brigadier general promotions to service chief appointments. The dataset encompasses information about all generals and general staff officers serving in the Turkish army from 1923 to 2015. Career advancement data in the dataset includes specific information on each officer's early career performance—the Military Academy and General Staff College graduation rankings—and senior-level career achievements—the highest rank and office achieved, and the time of promotion, appointment, and retirement based on approximately 35,000 individual-level Supreme Military Council (SMC) decisions. The SMC decisions have been published annually in the official gazette and national newspapers, typically involving lists of senior promotions and appointment decisions for each officer. I accessed them using the online databases of the Turkish Official Gazette and National Assembly and collections of Turkish daily newspapers via the University of Washington Libraries.

2.3.2 Measuring Ethnic Representation

Identifying and measuring ethnic identity is a challenging task. First, it is hard to come by an agreed-upon definition. The task becomes more daunting in states like Turkey, where the state does not collect ethnic data. Drawing on the most common approach in the Turkish scholarship, I use the officers' hometowns as a proxy of ethnic identity to identify Kurds.⁴ This approach has obvious limitations. Yet, it is the most viable given constraints on data on state demographics.

⁴ Both Uyar (2013) and Tezcur & Gurses (2017) embrace a similar approach in their recent works regarding Arab officers and Kurdish governors, respectively.

The Ottoman and Turkish official state records avoid using ethnic references when identifying state employees, especially in the military.⁵ First and last names are unhelpful in detecting one's ethnic identity as article 3 of the 1934 law prohibits using Kurdish names and surnames. In short, using hometown as a proxy of ethnic identity remains the most reliable and practical approach to identifying ethnic identity despite its shortcomings.

Another justification for using hometown as a proxy of ethnic identity is that the Turkish military relies heavily on this geographic reference in its internal affairs. Per the Internal Service Code of the Turkish armed forces, assignments to specific critical duties have to be made by considering the servicemembers' hometowns.⁶ For instance, two conscript soldiers from the same province are not allowed to be on duty at the same location and time.⁷ Also, conscript soldiers must recite their hometowns in each oral introduction during their military service.⁸ The military's internal regulations and practices reveal that it is vigilant about its members' geographical origin for practical administrative considerations and ethnic and political concerns that underlay this practice. Geographic origin helps make inferences about individuals' sectarian, ethnic, and political identities.⁹

Finally, specific emphasis on hometown, which refers to the geographical origins of an individual's paternal ancestors, instead of a place of birth in military records justifies the use of hometown as a reliable proxy. Military records in Turkey interestingly register hometown alongside the place of birth, and the military prefers the former as a reference. The military's

⁵ This is not to deny that the Turkish state conducts ethnic profiling, as several lists of ethnically, religiously, and ideologically profiled names have frequently leaked into the national media, but the military academy registry logbooks often only include name, father's name and profession, date of birth, and hometown.

⁶ This principle is widely appreciated in the military because of the belief that it encourages professionalism during duty and prevent creation of and rivalry between regional cliques.

⁷ The. Turkish Armed Forces, Internal Service Code, Article 47.

⁸ It is important to note that this does not apply to professional soldiers as they are expected to detach themselves from their local identities.

⁹ Interview with Ret. Major General Selahattin Kisacik, April 2019.

preference of hometown results potentially from the concern that birthplace alone may mask individuals' geographic, accordingly ethnoreligious, origin, as it is common that people give birth in different localities than their geographical origin for various reasons.

2.3.2.1 Determining Ethnic Kurdishness at the Subnational Level

Another measurement problem concerns identifying and measuring Kurdishness at the subnational level. A strict association between ethnic identity and each province and district is hard to prove, given the absence of an official identification of which towns should be considered Kurdish. I embrace two approaches in the dissertation's qualitative and quantitative sections.

In the qualitative part, which focuses on recruitment and ethnic representation, I follow a common approach in demographic scholarship on Kurds. I consider individuals from 16 provinces located in eastern and southeastern Turkey with a significant Kurdish population based on the Turkish Statistical Agency's (TUIK) census results as ethnically Kurdish.¹⁰ These provinces remain within the boundaries of the geographic region historically referred to as Kurdistan.¹¹ This approach may raise concerns about ecological fallacy. It might be that when a province's population is overwhelmingly Kurdish, there is still a chance that a recruit from this province may be of non-Kurdish descent. I acknowledge this bias in my methodology. However, such a bias would not overshadow the significance of my qualitative and descriptive statistical findings because it could only lead to the overestimation of Kurdish representation. In other

¹⁰ The names of these provinces are as follows: Diyarbakir, Van, Şırnak, Batman, Bitlis, Mus, Hakkâri, Agri, Bingöl, Tunceli, Mardin, Siirt, Kars, Adiyaman, Sanliurfa, Iğdır.

¹¹ The phrase 'Kurdish officers' throughout the article refers to 'officers from 16 predominantly Kurdish provinces.'

words, the province-based representation scores regarding these 16 provinces would represent the highest values possible because we consider every individual from these provinces Kurdish. There may be Kurds joining from other provinces and ignored in my analysis. But this introduces some bias for the post-1980 period as the Kurdish presence in Western parts of the country remained very low until urban migrations and forced displacements.

In the quantitative part, I embrace a more complex approach. I quantify ethnic identity by assigning a value to each officer, indicating their probability of Kurdishness. Instead of automatically accepting an individual from a majority-Kurdish province (one of the 16 provinces) as ethnically Kurdish, I use the ratio of the Kurdish population to the total population in each of Turkey's 81 provinces. To construct probability values for each province for the entire period under concern, I have estimated Kurds' ratio to total population for each province and year between 1923 and 2015, using the extant estimation models and figures in the secondary literature, specifically borrowing from Mutlu (1995) and Koc (2008), and each population census administered in Turkey's republican period. The method of estimation is explained in detail in APPENDIX-II.

2.3.2.2 Measuring Provincial Representation in the Officer Corps

To operationalize province-based officer representation in the armed forces, I focus on how each province is represented in each GSC cohort and its relative share in the country's total population.

Scholars have employed various coefficients to measure ethnic representation in the state bureaucracy and army, but none of them is helpful in the case of the Turkish military.¹² Because most importantly we have no exact information about the ethnic breakdown of the population. We have information only about Kurds and Turks. Building on Chandra and Wilkinson’s Ethnic Composition Index (ECI) and Lyall’s Military Inequality Coefficient (MIC), I introduce Provincial Representation Index (PRI), which captures the province-based ethnic representation effectively. Unlike the ECI and the MIC, the PRI is useful when two ethnic groups (like Turks and Kurds) have a clear majority over other ethnic groups in a country’s population and when only those two groups are compared. Also, the PRI is efficient in contexts where the use of the subnational unit (birthplace or hometown) is the most reliable proxy of ethnic identity.

$$\text{Provincial Representation Index (PRI)} = \frac{\text{Provincial Officer Ratio}}{\text{Provincial Population Ratio}}$$

Provincial Officer Ratio = Number of officers from a province in each cohort/ Total Number of Officers in each cohort.

Provincial Population Ratio = Provincial Population / Total National Population

(PRI=1: Proportionate Representation; 0 < PRI <1: Underrepresentation; PRI > 1: Overrepresentation)

The PRI captures each province’s representation relative to the total size of each cohort and the provincial population relative to the national population each year. It compares the share of officers from a particular administrative province in the entire officer corps compared to the

¹² Chandra and Wilkinson (2008)’s ECI is unhelpful in the Turkish case, because the shares of all ethnic groups in population at the national and sub-national level are unavailable. Lyall (2000)’s MIC similarly measures the military’s level of inequality across its several constituent ethnic groups (Lyall, 2020). Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset may be useful but focuses on executive political power only (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010).

percentage of the provincial population in the national population.¹³ A PRI value of 1 indicates a perfect representation, whereas values below and above 1 point to underrepresentation and overrepresentation, respectively.

I have computed different PRI scores for generals/admirals, general staff officers, and junior officers (military high school graduates) in each service (the army, navy, and air force) for each province and year between 1923 and 2015. It requires estimating the population for each province and year throughout the period under concern. This data is not readily available in the Turkish case as the databases of the Turkish Census Bureau or Statistical Institute. Therefore, I have estimated the provincial population per annum using quinquennial census data and growth rates for the republican period (1923-2015) by using estimation models available in the related literature (See APPENDIX- II for an in-depth discussion of my methodological approach). The population estimation and the PRI score computation is not possible for the late Ottoman period (1848-1922) due to, first, the lack of reliable census data, and second, starkly different administrative organizations and sub-national boundaries.

2.3.3 Ethnographic Research

I also conducted in-depth interviews and spoke with 102 retired officers in Istanbul and Ankara while holding some focus groups.¹⁴ I mostly talked with officers who had served in the military academies and high schools in the student supervisor and instructor roles, as well as those from Kurdish-populated provinces. The networks I had developed during my military service as an army officer allowed me hard-to-gain research access.

¹³ For census data, I have used the Turkish Statistical Institute's database.

¹⁴ I received my IRB authorization from the University of Washington's Human Subject Division for my fieldwork.

In my interviews, I have sought to understand recruitment and promotion dynamics and minority experience in the military from the perspective of recruiters, instructors, and officers of different branches, services, and geographical-ethnic origins, as they each had potentially distinct views and experiences. My questions have focused on the reasons for Kurdish underrepresentation, recruitment, training, and promotion processes, and institutional and individual level attitudes toward Kurds at the officer level within the military. Additionally, I have aimed to learn the details of promotion procedures, customary practices, exceptions, and intra-institutional politics around it.

My field research was unexpectedly obstructed by an abortive coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016. Because of the political sensitivity of the post-coup period, when mass arrests, probations, and discharges became standard practices, many interviewees understandably spoke only on the condition of anonymity. In most cases, I was not allowed to record interviews, leaving me with only the option of post-interview note-taking. Another limitation in my ethnographic research is that I could mostly interview army officers and NCOs. Without a preexisting contact in the Navy and Air Force, it was hard to convince individuals for an interview in the post-coup period. Throughout the article, I have used generic Turkish code names to identify my interviewees, except for high-profile retired generals, who have permitted the disclosure of their identities. My identity as a new researcher in an American higher education institution and a former member of the Turkish officer corps posed added challenges for my fieldwork. It was not possible, even as a former member of the Turkish military, to speak with an officer without a reference from another. A list of interviewees and interview locations can be found in APPENDIX – III.

Chapter 3: Explaining Resilient Representation Patterns in the Turkish Officer Corps

3.1 Introduction

What factors affect ethnic representation in the Officer Corps? How do violent conflict and civil-military relations affect officer recruitment and promotion patterns, specifically the representation of ethnic minorities in a multiethnic army? This chapter addresses these questions by focusing on Kurds' representation in the Turkish officer corps between 1923 and 2015. In examining the ethnic representation in the Turkish armed forces, the chapter employs a multimethod research strategy resting on three-year ethnographic research and data collection in Turkey between 2016 and 2019. It draws on TAFSOC and MIHIS datasets containing biographical information about 23,150 officers, including the entire general staff and flag officer corps serving between 1848 and 2015, and 102 in-depth interviews. Using qualitative and quantitative data, I investigate the impact of, first, violent conflict and, later, civil-military affairs on ethnic representation patterns in various episodes of the Late Ottoman and Republican Turkish history.

The chapter tests proposed causal mechanisms specific to officer demographics focusing on the Turkish case. The chapter's findings support the theory of organizational suspension and self-persistence mechanisms. It reveals that ethnic exclusion in the armed forces results more from early recruitment structure and practices and persists through an autonomous promotion regime than the military's political and institutional autonomy, violent ethnic mobilization, and socioeconomic factors. Threat perception and ethnic bias play a limited role in the emergence and persistence of minority underrepresentation, contrary to the conventional

view. Chapter's findings show that neither the war improves ethnic representation as widely believed, nor does ethnic conflict generates extra exclusionism challenging the realist view. The Turkish case elucidates that recruitment networks and opaque, incremental, relapsing, and autonomous officer promotion patterns mitigate the influence of external political shocks and civilian and military leaders' interventions, generating a self-perpetuating pattern of ethnic underrepresentation. The chapter highlights the lasting impact of starting conditions, i.e., early institution-building practices, and the importance of recruitment and early and mid-grade level promotion practices in the officer corps.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section discusses current literature and hypotheses, and the second briefly discusses the theoretical framework and argument. The third section presents my research design. The fourth section presents empirical findings, followed by a section in which the relationship between conflict and ethnic representation and organizational and social mechanisms of demographic persistence are analyzed in three periods of international and intra-state conflict in modern Turkish history—the late Ottoman period, early republican period, and the post-1984 period. Another section investigates the relationship between civil-military relations and ethnic representation in civilian dominant and military dominant episodes of Turkey's republican period. The concluding section discusses the implications of the chapter for a broader debate on ethnic representation in state institutions. It provides some policy recommendations to increase the military's ethnic representativeness.

3.2 Existing Explanations of the Conflict-Representation Relationship

Scholars disagree about international and intrastate conflicts' effects on ethnic integration. While some emphasize their integrationist effects, like the expansion of social and democratic rights, the rise of inclusive and representative institutions, and the development of egalitarian policies, others highlight their divisive consequences, like deepened social and ethnic inequality, discrimination, and repression.

3.2.1 War and Ethnic Integration

Since Max Weber, scholars taking a sociological perspective have drawn a relatively optimistic picture about the effects of international conflict on social and political progress. In particular, the bellicist theorists of the state widely see war and preparation for war as the prime drivers of the emergence of the modern state and democratic institutions (Tilly, 1990; Downing, 1992; Porter, 1994; Centeno, 2002). Similarly, since the early 20th century, the war has been widely expected to lead to a more representative military. For instance, scholars often point to World War II and the Korean War as integration-generating international conflicts, for they increased the representation of Blacks and women in the US army (Thanner et al., 2007).

In contrast, skeptics emphasize the provisional nature of the integrationist effects of war. For them, persistent class differences, racial inequalities, and discrimination in the military and broader society testify to the misleading promises of war as a means for social integration (Kier & Krebs, 2010). They suggest that democratic and social reforms and political concessions often phase out quickly after the war's conclusion (Skocpol, 1979; Downing, 1998). Skeptics maintain that military service, widely seen as "a school for the nation," may deepen existing social hierarchies instead of blurring them (Krebs, 2004). To them, war and military service exacerbate

discrimination rather than lessen it. For instance, Vagts (1937) and Hull (2004) show how mass conscription and war can become mechanisms for state repression and cultural militarization. Taking this scholarship one step further, Kier's work elucidates that only under a specific set of conditions can war-time labor mobilization strategies lead to sustainable postwar democratic reform (2021).

Finally, realists focus on threat perception to explain the relationship between conflict and ethnic integration, arguing that violent and non-violent conflict magnify threat perception toward ethnic minorities. That heightened threat perception aggravates state discrimination against minorities. During the war, fear of "fifth column" activities, cooperation with the enemy, and defection to the enemy side associated with certain ethnic groups drive discrimination in and exclusion from state institutions (Peled, 1998; Hoyt, 2007).

3.2.2 Intrastate Conflict and Ethnic Representation

The literature focusing on the link between intrastate conflict and ethnic integration reverses the causal arrow. Works emphasizing the contributions of ethnic exclusion to insurgency and civil wars (Horowitz, 1985; Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010; Fearon, Kasara, & Laitin, 2007; Kalyvas, 2008) dominate the literature. Scholars often identify ethnically imbalanced armies as the main source of ethnic conflict, civil wars, and coups (Chandra & Wilkinson, 2008; Harkness, 2016; Wilkinson, 2016; Tezcur & Gurses, 2017).

The relatively limited scholarship on intrastate conflict's effect on ethnic integration usually focuses on threat perception. Civil war, ethnic insurgency, secessionist rebellion, and ethnic-based coups or countercoups are considered to be the prime drivers of ethnic

discrimination and ethnic exclusion. Ethnic competition and conflict are widely viewed as a major source of ethnic-based exclusionary military personnel policy (Horowitz, 1985; Chandra & Wilkinson, 2008). This realist line of reasoning anticipates that the degree of ethnic exclusion should vary according to the intensity of ethnic conflict and its risk.

Skeptics maintain a nuanced view of the effect of intrastate conflict on ethnic representation. They hold that states may seek to co-opt ethnic minority populations to undermine the saliency of the ethnic conflict (Kalyvas, 2008; Scott, 1998), which may, in turn, lead to the ethnic integration of the state and the military in the long run. This implies that states may avoid an indiscriminative approach in their exclusion policies and recruit selectively if they are sufficiently knowledgeable about their local populations. In this scenario, the state's behavior toward minorities would be expected to vary geographically and temporally depending on the degree of the perceived threat and the "legibility" of the local population. In a spatial sense, this points to a selective military personnel policy through which the state recruits and promotes from provinces and districts deemed more trustworthy or less threatening.

Also, the risk of ethnic-based coups and countercoups and mass protests are thought to lead to ethnic exclusion, though this applies specifically to an autocratic scenario. Leaders anticipating a military coup in authoritarian regimes often resort to ethnic stacking through exclusionary recruitment or promotion policies and purges toward ethnic groups deemed capable of conspiring a putsch (Roessler, 2011; Talmadge, 2015, 2016; Harkness, 2016). Similarly, the military's potential defection or insubordination during mass protests may encourage leaders to turn to ethnic stacking (Bou Nassif, 2015; Brooks, 2017; Johnson, 2017; Grewal, 2019). In short, reforms regarding the ethnic composition of the military are often discussed restrictively within

the context of military defection, coups, and autocratic leaders' coup prevention tactics. The origins of ethnically unrepresentative armies in democratic settings are less theorized.

Overall, existing literature overlooks the influences of the military's distinct organizational characteristics and its direct ties with local populations, overestimating the effect of reforms to include minority groups in the core demographics of the state institutions. Even when the leaders seek to create an inclusive officer corps, organizational and structural barriers may undermine their efforts. Also, officer recruitment and promotion, and therefore ethnic representation in the officer corps, possesses its own dynamics distinct from the rank and file. Second, organizational change is a slow-moving process. Demographic shifts, specifically ethnic integration, take place at a slow pace, which calls for a research agenda with a broad temporal focus. A limited temporal breadth often leads to inconclusive and misleading results, as in the case of scholarship on racial integration in the US military. It is no coincidence that the optimistic and celebratory tone of the 1990s (Moskos & Butler, 1997) has recently been superseded by a highly critical stance (Armor & Gilroy, 2010; Burk & Espinoza, 2012).

The chapter addresses these gaps in the literature. Its theoretical and methodological approach offers generalizable conclusions and a new theory about the distinct dynamics of ethnic representation in officer corps, applicable to many bureaucratic institutions in different contexts.

3.3 Theoretical Framework & Argument

3.3.1 Path Dependency and Officer Recruitment and Representation Patterns

Path dependency is helpful in examining resilient social phenomena which are hard to dislodge once entrenched (Thelen, 1999, 390-91; Pierson, 2000a, 74-5; 2004, 51; Mahoney, 2000, 12; 2001, 6-7). It may aid in understanding the demography of closed bureaucratic organizations like the military. According to the path dependency framework, the demography of these institutions should be "open" and "permissive," i.e., easier to reform, during critical junctures like the initial stages of institution-building and war, and it should be opaque and resilient in later stages. Once officer recruitment and promotion patterns crystallize, we should expect ethnic representation patterns to become increasingly hard to change affirmatively or adversely.

3.3.2 The Mechanisms of Self-Persistence in Officer Demographics

I identify two sets of mechanisms to explain the static nature of officer demographics, specifically ethnic representation patterns: (1) intra-organizational mechanisms and (2) external social mechanisms. These mechanisms serve as organizational suspension mechanisms that absorb the influences of external factors and internal reform efforts. External social mechanisms refer to the relationship between the military and local populations, specifically, officer recruitment networks and their accessibility to local populations. Intra-organizational mechanisms, on the other hand, relate to the structural characteristics specific to officer promotion. While external mechanisms serve primarily to cling ethnic groups to the officer corps, internal mechanisms absorb the effects of external political shocks, cultural change, and top down demographic engineering efforts on the preexisting level of ethnic representation. They

work together to create positive feedback loops that reproduce the initial ethnic makeup of the officer corps, which have usually formed in the early state-building phase.

3.3.2.1 Officer Recruitment Networks

Officer recruitment networks are the primary mechanisms that ensure the resilience of officer demography by, first, connecting certain social and ethnic groups to the military and distancing others, and second, isolating the effects of external shocks. Recruitment networks refer to loose-knit social networks that span the civilian population and the military, especially the officer corps, and include at least one military professional, whether a family member, a co-ethnic, or just an acquaintance of the civilian members in the network. They are essential for officer demographics because groups lacking access to these networks hardly find representation in the officer corps. The permeability, flexibility, and expansiveness of officer recruitment networks significantly shape the composition of the officer corps, affecting who is included or excluded and to what extent.

3.3.2.2 Autonomous Patterns of Officer Promotion

Four intra-organizational characteristics specific to officer promotion contribute to the resilience of the military's officer demography: (1) Promotion from within (endo-promotion), (2) opaqueness at the entry and mid-grade level, (3) incremental and relapsing nature, and (4) professional socialization and networks. Autonomous patterns of officer promotion imply that ethnic imbalance in the officer demography tends to originate at the recruitment level and

replicate throughout the upper echelons of the military hierarchy. If ethnic or racial minorities are underrepresented at the entry-level officer ranks, it is challenging to reverse this pattern or remedy under-representation at the senior levels. However, all outcomes are possible in a contrasting scenario where ethnic minorities are proportionately represented at the entry-level.

3.4 Data & Research Design

The chapter embraces a mixed-methodological approach using quantitative and qualitative data collected between 2016 and 2019 in Turkey. It draws on in-depth interviews, archival and library sources, and the TAFSOC and MIHIS datasets. Its primary focus rests on the general staff officers and flag officers (generals and admirals) and their geographical and ethnic backgrounds. Since the early twentieth century, these two intersecting groups dominated the positions of power in all areas of the Turkish military, from operational, intelligence, and logistical to the educational, judiciary, and foreign mission posts. The temporal scope of my research ends in 2016 when an abortive coup introduced drastic changes to long-standing institutions and practices of officer recruitment, training, and promotion. The implications of these reforms have yet to be seen. In the pre-2016 period, the influence of the generals and GSOs usually extended beyond the barracks and military headquarters. They have remained a significant power broker in Turkey's political and bureaucratic affairs. Generals and GSOs have continuously interfered in domestic politics, staging five coups and issuing three memorandums since 1960 (See Hale, 1994; Sakallioglu, 1997; Jenkins, 2001). Until 1989, all of Turkey's presidents except one were army generals of general staff officer origin.

3.4.1 Measuring Ethnic Representation

In identifying and measuring ethnic identity, this chapter uses the officers' hometowns as a proxy of ethnic Kurdishness.¹⁵ A major problem concerns identifying and measuring Kurdishness at the subnational level. Following the widely embraced approach in the literature on Kurds, I focus on 16 provinces with a significant Kurdish population.¹⁶ These provinces remain within the boundaries of the geographic region historically referred to as Kurdistan.¹⁷

There may be concerns about ecological fallacy with this approach. Although I acknowledge this bias in my methodological approach, it is essential to note that such a bias would not overshadow the significance of the chapter's findings because it could only lead to the overestimation of Kurdish representation. In other words, the estimates regarding Kurdish representation presented in the chapter reflect the highest values possible. Also, Kurdish presence in Western parts of the country remained very low until the migrations and displacements of the 1980s. That means it is improbable for a Kurdish officer to be born outside of the 16 Kurdish-populated provinces, at least in the pre-1980 period.

3.4.2 Measuring Provincial Representation in the Officer Corps

¹⁵ Both Uyar (2013) and Tezcur & Gurses (2017) embrace a similar approach in their recent works regarding Arab officers and Kurdish governors, respectively.

¹⁶ The names of these provinces are as follows: Diyarbakir, Van, Şırnak, Batman, Bitlis, Mus, Hakkâri, Agri, Bingöl, Tunceli, Mardin, Siirt, Kars, Adiyaman, Sanliurfa, Iğdır.

¹⁷ The phrase 'Kurdish officers' throughout the article refers to 'officers from 16 predominantly Kurdish provinces.'

To operationalize province-based officer representation in the armed forces, I focus on how each province is represented in each staff academy cohort and its relative share of the country's total population.

I use Provincial Representation Index (PRI), which captures the province-based ethnic representation when two ethnic groups (like Turks and Kurds) have a clear majority over other ethnic groups in a country's population and when only those two groups are compared.

$$\text{Provincial Representation Index (PRI)} = \frac{\text{Provincial Officer Ratio}}{\text{Provincial Population Ratio}}$$

Provincial Officer Ratio = Number of officers from a province in each cohort/ Total Number of Officers in each cohort.

Provincial Population Ratio = Provincial Population / Total National Population

(PRI=1: Proportionate Representation; 0 < PRI <1: Underrepresentation; PRI > 1: Overrepresentation)

The PRI captures each province's representation relative to the total size of each cohort and the provincial population relative to the national population each year. It compares the share of officers from a particular administrative province in the entire officer corps to the percentage of the provincial population in the national population.¹⁸ A PRI value of 1 indicates a perfect representation, whereas values below and above 1 point to underrepresentation and overrepresentation, respectively.

3.5 Historical and Geographical Patterns of Officer Representation in the Turkish Military

¹⁸ I have used the Turkish Statistical Institute's database for census data.

My first important empirical finding is that geographical representation in the Turkish officer corps is uneven. Kurdish-populated provinces have been distinctly and persistently underrepresented in the Turkish officer corps at both junior and senior levels since the early twentieth century. Table 3.1 exhibits the historical patterns of general staff and flag officer representation from provinces with a significant Kurdish population between 1923 and 2015. Although Kurds' relative representation slightly increased in the 1960s, it remained well below "1," indicating a steady pattern of underrepresentation.

Table 3.1 The temporal variation of Kurdish Representation in the Turkish Senior Officer Corps

	GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS					GENERALS/ADMIRALS				
	1923-1950	1951-1960	1960-1980	1980-2002	2002-2015	1923-1950	1951-1960	1960-1980	1980-2002	2002-2015
AVERAGED PRI VALUES FOR 16 PROVINCES WITH SIGNIFICANT KURDISH POPULATION	0.21	0.27	0.44	0.35	0.40	0.14	0.38	0.35	0.32	0.37

Data Source: TAFSOC Dataset

Map 2.1 visualizes the distribution of general staff officers' geographical origins across Turkey's 81 administrative provinces by their share of the local population throughout the republican period using average PRI scores. It reveals the uneven representation patterns at the subnational level. Kurdish-populated provinces, clustered at the lower-right corner of the map, appear to have been distinctly underrepresented.



Map 2.1: Provincial distribution of General Staff Officers (Army only) based on average provincial representation value (PRI) for the period between 1923 and 2015. (Data Source: TAFSOC Dataset)

Kurdish underrepresentation is not unique to the senior level and the army. A combined analysis of geographical patterns in all services (army, navy, air force) at the junior and senior level throughout the entire republican period (See Figure 2.1) evinces similar patterns.




Figure 2.1: Geographical distribution of juniors, general staff officers, and admirals/generals based on average provincial representation value (PRI) for the period between 1923 and 2015 (Data Source: The BIMHS and TAFSOC Datasets)

Two inferences can be made from historical and geographical trends regarding Kurdish representation in the Turkish officer corps: First, various political shocks, like regime changes, coups, wars, and especially long-standing ethnic conflict seem to have had little effect on

Kurdish representation. Kurdish representation patterns offer initial evidence for the “stickiness” of the officer corps’ ethnic makeup.

Additionally, the consistency of Kurds’ historical representation rates across the junior, mid-grade, and senior levels in the officer corps implies that Kurdish individuals seem to have experienced little or no career advancement problems once they entered the military and socialized into the Turkish officer corps’ ethos and norms. Historical intra-institutional representation trends suggest that an ethnically imbalance officer composition originates at the recruitment level and replicates throughout the upper echelons of the military hierarchy.

3.6 Explaining the Origins and Persistence of Kurdish Representation in the Turkish Officer Corps

This section investigates how ethnic conflict and civil-military relations affect officer recruitment and promotion patterns in several critical episodes of Turkey’s late Ottoman and republican history. It draws on the TAFSOC dataset, secondary literature, and ethnographic research in Turkey. The periodization reflects critical historical junctures concerning Turkey’s civil-military relations and Kurdish ethnic mobilization. I investigate the impact of civilian superiority and oversight in two periods of political demilitarization when the civilian government holds considerable sway over the military: The Democrat Party (DP) period between 1950 and 1960 and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era between 2002 and 2015. I discuss how military interventions and the military’s political and institutional autonomy influenced the composition of the officer corps by focusing on the period between 1960 and 1982 when Turkey experienced a cascade of coups and coup attempts. Regarding the relationship

between ethnic mobilization and ethnic representation, I focus on the late Ottoman period, rebellions in the early republican period, and the armed conflict period between 1984 and 2015.

Chapter’s findings, in summation, show that officer recruitment and promotion practices are mostly immune to major political shifts like democratic transition, coup d’états, constitutional reforms, and the influences of civilian and military leaders. Most surprisingly, I find that ethnic conflict has a negligible effect on ethnic representation in the Turkish officer corps. Kurdish underrepresentation that emerged in the late Ottoman period has reproduced over time at both general staff officer and flag officer corps despite major political and institutional shifts and shocks. Neither did such adverse shocks as ethnic conflict and coups hurt existing patterns, nor could reform efforts could improve Kurdish representation beyond certain short-lived effects. Figure 3.1 presents a historical variation of Kurdish representation based on the periodization explained above.




Figure 3.1: Historical variation of representation Rates (PRI) of general staff and flag officers from Kurdish provinces in the Turkish armed forces (Source: TAFSOC Dataset).

3.6.1 Violent Conflict and Persisting Patterns of Kurdish Underrepresentation

Given the long-standing troubles between the Kurds and Turks, Kurdish underrepresentation may seem unsurprising. However, its historical persistence and occasional upward trend are certainly puzzling. Kurdish representation appears to be impacted neither by conflict and civil-military crises nor the Turkish state's reform efforts seeking to co-opt and integrate Kurds into the military before and during major conflicts.

I will present and discuss empirical, ethnographic, and archival findings in three critical periods of Turkish-Kurdish relations— (1) the late Ottoman period between 1876 and 1918, (2) the early republican period between 1923 and 1950, and (3) the period of armed conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK from 1984 to 2015. This section's findings, in summation, demonstrate that conflict and military reform have a negligible effect on ethnic minority representation. I show that intra-organizational and social mechanisms specific to officer recruitment and promotion absorb the effects of ethnic tensions, conflicts, and reform efforts, helping established patterns of Kurdish representation that emerged in the early institution-building phase as a result of inclusive yet ineffective recruitment policy to persist.

3.6.1.1 Late Ottoman Wars, Reforms in Military Education, and Ethnic Integration (1876-1918)

War and reform characterize the late Ottoman period of Turkish history, particularly the empire's last decade, when it waged three major wars—the Turco-Italian War (1911-12), the

Balkan Wars (1912-13), and the First World War (1914-18)— and simultaneously grappled with several internal rebellions in the Balkans and Arabian Peninsula while trying to reform its military and bureaucracy. Throughout this troubled period, the Ottoman government was under constant resource pressure to man and equip its army and realize its reforms due to incessant war mobilizations. But neither the wars nor the reform efforts during the late Ottoman period ensured the Kurds' integration into the officer corps.


Theoretically, the conditions were ripe for the ethnic integration of the military or to lay the foundations of an inclusive institutional framework in most of the late Ottoman period. From a realist lens, the Kurds, given their military skills, population size, and geographic location, which had long been under Russian threat from the north, were an ideal group for military recruitment. Kurds' participation in the army could have substantially improved Ottoman military capabilities and averted their potential collaboration with the enemy or disaffection with the state.

From a constructivist perspective too, the Kurds' integration into the military was crucial for the Ottomans, who had long been exposed to the disruptive effects of ethnic nationalism in the Balkans and the Middle East. The last six decades of the Ottoman Empire were marked by reforms to modernize and strengthen the loyalty of various ethnic, religious, and tribal groups that had previously remained at the political and geographical periphery of the empire. Cultivating a common imperial identity and incorporating peripheral groups into imperial politics remained a priority for the Ottomans. Specifically, the integration of Kurds, along with Albanians and Arabs (Uyar, 2013), appeared as a critical component of Ottoman modernization, especially under Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), according to whom an Islamic imperial identity

built around the personality cult of the Sultan was the only viable way to re-coalesce the ethnically and religiously fracturing Ottoman society.

Expanding the geographic and ethnic base of the army to include previously excluded Muslim groups offered an optimal solution for addressing the overlapping issues related to novice imperial belonging, center-periphery integration, and human resources needs arising from recurrent war mobilizations in the late Ottoman period. At the officer level, the Ottomans adopted a recruitment strategy relying on a vast network of military schools encompassing the core and peripheral regions of the empire (Uyar, 2013; Provenca, 2017); at the rank-and-file level, they sought to establish a universal conscription system (Zürcher, 1997).

Between 1876 and 1896, Abdülhamid II founded about 26 provincial military middle schools (*Rüşdiye*) across the empire, intending to integrate previously excluded Sunni Muslim populations into the army and civilian bureaucracy (Griffiths, 1966, 18; Mizrakci, 2000, Uyar, 2013; Provenca, 2019, 27). The Kurdish and Arabic-speaking provinces with historically resilient tribal and religious structures were given special attention. Three of military middle schools were established in Kurdish-speaking areas—Diyarbakir (1881), Van (1882), and Bitlis (1895) (Uyar, 2013; Provenca, 2017, 29), which remain within the boundaries of modern-day Turkey (See APPENDIX -I for a complete list). Additionally, the Imperial Tribal School (*Asiret Mekteb-i Humayun*), offering military and civil education exclusively for the scions of Kurdish and Arab tribal notables, was founded in Istanbul in 1892 (Rogan, 1996; Akpınar 1997) with the aim of opening another channel for integrating the local elite into the empire (Uyar, 2013). Provincial military schools remained in service until the end of World War I, whereas the School for Tribes closed in 1907.



Map 3.1: Provincial military schools founded in the Ottoman Empire between 1875 and 1896

The overall impact of both wars and reform efforts was limited on Kurdish representation in the officer corps. The Ottomans' unique network of provincial military schools failed to integrate Kurdish provinces due primarily to the relatively limited time they were in service. Also, Kurds' long-standing autonomy and the resilience of local social structures made their integration challenging and slower.

The Kurdish provinces' human resources contributions to the officer corps gradually increased in the first decades following the creation of the provincial schools. But the general staff officer corps remained mostly outside this trend. One reason was that the provincial military schools provided only a symbolic number of students to the military academy in Istanbul (Griffiths, 1966, 40). Local military schools effectively recruited Kurdish youth but did not

prepare them for the Military Academy and General Staff College.¹⁹ Additionally, Kurds, unlike other ethnic groups, were devoid of a strong regional clique in the Military Academy, which would have helped newcomers from small provincial towns to adapt to the school's high academic standards and life in a big metropolis like Istanbul. These "regional friendship groups," an extension of officer recruitment networks and an in-built element of the military academy culture since its inception, were critical for the newly recruited cadets' successful completion of the academy training (Uyar, 2003). The inefficiency of those military schools in Kurdish-populated provinces and the lack of Kurdish regional cliques in the academy were visible in the general staff college enrollments, indicating that only 12 officers were admitted from Kurdish-populated provinces between 1876 and 1910.²⁰ Throughout this period, Diyarbakir provided three, Van and Mardin two, and Kars, Bingöl, Batman, Urfa, and Bitlis only one officer. In contrast, Istanbul alone provided 187 officers for the General Staff College, which admitted about 660 officers in total.

Ottoman officers from Arab provinces present a contrast. Military secondary schools in these relatively more accessible areas were more effective in recruiting and preparing for the military academy. The number of military academy cadets from Arab provinces steadily improved during the same period: 5 in 1876, 24 in 1886, 65 in 1896, and 113 in 1905 (Uyar, 2013). After 1890, Arab cadets comprised about 15 percent of each cohort (Uyar, 2013). Entry into the military academy in larger groups and the establishment of influential regional cliques allowed higher rates of retention for Arab cadets in contrast to Kurds. This trend was reflected in

¹⁹ Until the republican period, military academy cadets who graduated in the top 5-10 percent of their cohort were automatically selected for the Staff College (*Erkan-ı Harbiye Mektebi*) and received three years of additional education.

²⁰ Out of the 12 admitted, only 6 graduated as general staff officers. The remaining 6 graduated with the title of "distinguished," (*Mumtaẓ*) representing a second-tier group in the officer-corps after general staff officer. This short-lived practice was discontinued after 1923.

the demography of general staff officers as well. Between 1876 and 1920, the total number of officers from Iraq and Syria who graduated from the general staff college was 30 and 69, respectively.²¹

Three major wars in the 1910s failed to improve Kurdish representation. During this period, the GSC admitted only two officers from the predominantly Kurdish region in total: one officer from Van and another from Bitlis. The percentage of officers from Kurdish provinces remained significantly below that of those from areas around major urban centers. Most of the GSOs in each cohort were drawn from specific areas in the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Levant, but the greatest percentages were from Istanbul, indicating the region-based resilience of officer demographics and the slow growth of the recruitment networks underlying them.

The Ottoman's flexible approach in their general military recruitment policy when it comes to the Kurdistan was a major contribution to the failure of integration efforts in the officer corps. During war mobilizations throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the government had to offer several concessions and exemptions to the Kurds. Kurds were used as auxiliary forces in ethnically cohesive volunteer tribal units, which were often deployed within their home regions and disbanded when the mobilization ended (Kasaba, 2011, 112; Klein, 2011, 2; Besikci, 2012, 179-82), rather than being conscripted into the regular army.²² The Ottomans appointed local notables as the chiefs of Kurdish tribal units. These local chiefs' term of service was confined to the war mobilization period and their transfer to the regular officer corps was not permitted.²³ Especially during the Great War, the Ottoman government extensively benefited

²¹ Harp Akademileri Devre Yıllıkları, Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Basımevi, Istanbul. (Staff College Yearbooks, General Staff College Press, Istanbul)

²² These volunteer units were given different names in each period. In the mid-nineteenth century they were called Tribal Regiments (*Asiret Alayları*); in the Abdulhamid era, Hamidian Light Cavalry Units (*Hamidiye Süvari Alayları*); during World War I, Tribal Regiments (*Asiret Alayları*).

²³ The relations between the chiefs of volunteer units and regular army officers were almost always tense (See Besikci, 2012, 198).

from Kurdish volunteer units against Russian forces and local Armenians, both military and civilian. However, this old-fashioned imperial approach to military recruitment, often attributed to the late Ottoman state's weak capacity and inability to penetrate the Kurdish provinces (Kasaba, 2011; Besikci, 2012, 116), undermined efforts of centralization and modernization, strengthening the autonomy of the region (Kasaba, 2011, 11), consequently, helping Kurds to remain outside of the Ottoman army's general recruitment base.

In sum, Kurdish underrepresentation in the late Ottoman officer corps can be explained by the historical disconnect between the military and Kurdish population, the incremental nature of officer demographics, and the impermeability and slow-paced expansion of recruitment networks. A gradual increase in Kurdish representation during this period shows that creating recruitment networks and establishing ties between the local population and the officer corps was possible, but a slow-moving process. This process is likely to be lengthier in regions with resilient local structures like Kurdistan, as illustrated by the better performance of similar military schools in recruiting and providing officers in more accessible Arab-populated regions like Iraq and Syria.

Additionally, the scarcity of transfers from the provincial military schools to the military academy points to the expansive influence of recruitment networks beyond the recruitment phase. It means that network deprivation can undermine the educational and early career success of new recruits as well. The influence of regional cliques in the military academy during this period presents convincing evidence for the effect of network deprivation. During military education, which is typically quite opaque and bears sui generis characteristics, these region-based networks provide the much-needed mentorship to navigate the difficulties of military life at an early age. Members of groups, like Kurds, which have yet to develop these networks are

less likely to graduate or make a successful start to their military career, even if admitted to the military academy.

Finally, although Ottoman reform efforts in the periphery created some dynamism in the relations between the local populations and the officer corps, they were too short-lived for this interaction to mature and come to full fruition. The incremental nature of officer demographics prevented any immediate benefits from becoming apparent. Given that an eleven-year-old cadet in the first cohort of the provincial middle schools would join the general staff officer corps about fifteen years later, one would start to see the impact of provincial military schools in the mid-1910s.

Overall, wartime pressures, nation-building opportunities, and military reforms failed to generate a durable ethnic and religious integration of the late Ottoman officer corps. Despite the immense manpower needs of the empire, Kurds were able to become part of the military only to a limited degree. The Ottomans devised a makeshift cure to pressing manpower needs by extracting military capacity from the Kurdish region through volunteer units, which in turn contributed to their exclusion from the regular army. Ottoman integration efforts through provincial military schools, on the other hand, were too recent to produce any observable outcome. In a nutshell, Kurds' historical disconnection from state demographics, lack of access to newly emerging officer recruitment networks, and the slow-moving nature of officer demographics mitigated the effects of both war and reform on inclusion.

3.6.1.2 Local Rebellions, a Unified Officer Education System, and Ethnic Representation in the Early Republican Officer Corps (1923-1950)

After the creation of modern Turkey in 1923, the founders embarked on drastic state and nation-building reforms. However, the war-torn military was mainly kept outside of this transformation except for minor changes in the officer recruitment and education system. The Turkish army maintained its previous officer cadres, organization, doctrinal orientation, and educational institutions.

The early republican leadership sought only to simplify and unify the army's training and education structure among a few other reformative touches, which would incur lasting effects on the Kurdish representation in the officer corps. The aim of this limited reform was to achieve professional, ideological, and ethnical homogeneity through a single-channeled officer education system. Except for three military high schools in Istanbul, Izmir, and Bursa and two middle schools in Erzincan and Konya, all secondary-level military schools remaining within the new boundaries of modern Turkey were shut down in 1924 per the 5th article of the Unification of Education Law (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*), while the military academy and the general staff college continued to serve as the two higher educational institutions of officer training. Essentially, the law foreclosed the possibility of non-schooled individuals' commissioning to officership from the rank and file. Drawing officers from the rank and file had long been referred to as a major problem in both professional and political circles.

An immediate consequence of this minimalist design on Kurdish representation was that it automatically disqualified the leaders of Kurdish volunteer units, who often had no formal officer education and training, from the new schooled class of officers. Some of these Kurdish officers joined rebellions after their titles and ties with the military were terminated (Klein, 2011, 172-8). Most importantly, this renewed centralization in military education disrupted the newly emerging officer recruitment networks in eastern Anatolia, which Abdulhamid II's provincial

military schools had been gradually weaving. The closure of provincial military schools would have abiding consequences on Kurdish representation. Until 1950, the recruitment base of the Turkish officer corps was constrained to a handful of provinces, almost replicating the geographic patterns in late Ottoman Anatolia and Thrace. The General Staff College cohorts were comprised of officers from certain provinces like Istanbul, Bursa, Erzurum, Erzincan, and Edirne (See Figure 3.5). As records of the Bursa Military High School suggest, the patterns in junior officer demographics were similar.

In the first two decades of the republican period between 1923 and 1937, fourteen local rebellions broke out in Kurdish-populated provinces (See Table 3.2). Realists would anticipate that rebellions would be expected to amplify the state's threat perception toward local Kurds and to undermine Kurdish representation. However, historical representation trends counter this expectation: Kurdish membership in the general staff college mostly maintained its existing trajectory during and immediately after the period of rebellions.

From 1923 to 1950, the number of officers from these provinces admitted to the general staff college was 21, and 2 officers were promoted to the flag officer level. The PRI scores of the Kurdish-populated provinces averaged 0.21 and 0.14 for general staff officers and flag officers, respectively. (See Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1). Local rebellions seemed not to have further undermined the representation of Kurds. Kurdish representation even increased slightly during this period. This puzzling upward trend resulted probably from the delayed effects of the late Ottoman provincial military schooling and the survival of recruitment networks inherited from that period. Only after the late 1910s and early 1920s did the cadets recruited in the late Ottoman period start to ascend to senior

Table 3.2: Local rebellions in the Kurdish populated provinces of Turkey, 1923-1937

	<i>Location</i>	<i>Start Date</i>
<i>Dersim</i>	Tunceli, Elazig, Bingöl	1937
<i>Oramar</i>	Yüksekova	1930
<i>Zeylan</i>	Van, Agri	1930
<i>Savur</i>	Mardin	1930
<i>Agri 3</i>	Agri	1930
<i>Asi Resul</i>	Eruh	1929
<i>Bicar</i>	Silvan, Lice, Genc	1927
<i>Mutki</i>	Mutki	1927
<i>Agri 2</i>	Agri	1927
<i>Kocusagi</i>	Hozat, Cemisgezek	1926
<i>Agri 1</i>	Agri	1926
<i>Rackotan & Raman</i>	Siirt, Garzan, Diyarbakir	1925
<i>Seikh Said</i>	Diyarbakir	1925
<i>Nasturi</i>	Hakkâri	1924

ranks and recruitment networks start to bear fruit. Another indicator of the resilience of recruitment networks can be seen in the persistence of intra-regional geographical patterns. In both the late Ottoman and early republican eras, most officers came from Diyarbakir and Van, where two of the military middle schools were located (see Figure 3.2).

The persistence of Kurdish underrepresentation in the early republican period was related mostly to Kurds' exclusion from officer recruitment networks, which the closure of military schools in Kurdish provinces in 1924 aggravated. By disrupting the expansion of burgeoning recruitment networks, the unification of officer training incurred lasting harm to Kurdish representation and the ethnic integration of the Turkish officer corps in general.

Late Ottoman Period (1876-1920)

Early Republican Period (1923-1950)




Figure 3.2: Intraregional variation of Kurdish Representation (Source TAFSOC Dataset)

In short, the modern Turkish nation-state had inherited an ethnically unrepresentative officer corps from its predecessor, and the closure of the local military schools ensured that this imbalanced demographic heritage persisted in subsequent decades. The absence of any concrete step by the early republican leaders to create an ethnically and religiously representative military helped exclusionary demographics at the senior level to crystallize.

3.6.1.3 Ethnic Conflict, Ambivalent Integration Efforts, and Ethnic Representation in the Post-1980 Turkey (1984-2015)

After a relatively peaceful period between 1950 and 1980, the early 1980s became a watershed in the Turkish state's relations with Kurds. A few years after the 1980 military takeover, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), an armed group with Marxist revolutionary ideology, launched its first assault against Turkish forces at a small military outpost in Eruh, a provincial district in Southeastern Turkey, in 1984. Since this initial raid, around forty-five thousand lives have been claimed from both sides. Realists would expect this violent ethnic

conflict to heighten the state's threat perception and undermine Kurdish representation in the officer corps during this period from a realist lens. After all, the Turkish state has repeatedly closed the pro-Kurdish political parties, censored Kurdish media outlets, and imposed harsh sanctions on any type of expression of Kurdish language and culture.

Fine-grained empirical data on conflict and officer demographics from this period challenge this argument. My findings show that conflict and state-led ethnic repression negligibly affected Kurdish representation. First, average PRI scores of Kurdish-populated provinces were consistent throughout the entire armed conflict period between 1984 and 2015 compared to the earlier periods of relative stability. Second, Kurdish representation in the officer corps was unresponsive to temporal and spatial variation in threat perception and the intensity of the violent conflict. Finally, ethnographic research shows that the Turkish army attempted to integrate local Kurds into its officer corps in parallel with its cooptation efforts during this period, revealing that the state attitude is not solely driven by ethnic concerns or threat perception and that the officer demographics are highly resistant to internal reform efforts.

Between 1980 and 2015, PRI scores for 16 Kurdish-populated provinces averaged 0.38 and 0.35 for general staff officers and flag officers, respectively. It was not very different from the previous three decades when the average scores were 0.39 and 0.36 (See Table 3.1). Historical trends indicate that ethnic conflict does not seem to have undermined Kurds' representation in general.

A detailed temporal and spatial analysis of TAFSOC and conflict data from this period offers further evidence of the weak relationship between conflict and ethnic representation. Figure 3.3 provides a historical comparison of annual general staff college admissions from 16 Kurdish-populated provinces versus the PKK's annual combat fatalities, as a measure of the

degree of ethnic conflict, including critical junctures in the armed conflict period between 1980 and 2015. Representation rates react immediately to extraordinary developments like the incarceration of the PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan, the declaration of ceasefire in its aftermath in 1999, and the peak of the intensity of conflict between the PKK and the Turkish security forces in 1992. But their effects have been temporary. Kurdish representation quickly returns to its preexisting levels, revealing the incremental and relapsing nature of officer demographics.




Figure 3.3: Conflict vs. Ethnic Representation in the Officer Corps: Temporal Variation of General Staff Officers from Kurdish majority provinces versus the PKK Fatalities During the Armed Conflict Period (1980-2015) (Data about officers were drawn from the TAFSOC dataset, and insurgent fatalities data were drawn from Tezcur and Gurses (2017)).

A spatial approach can offer further insight into the relationship between conflict and ethnic representation in the military. Although the Kurdish region as a whole has been the least represented in the Turkish officer corps, the PRI scores substantially vary across Kurdish-

populated provinces. Could the incidence or intensity of conflict in each province, and accordingly, the state's location-specific threat perception, account for this profound intra-regional variation?

It is possible that the Turkish military has embraced a spatially sensitive selective strategy in recruiting and promoting local Kurds depending on the intensity of conflict and the level of threat perception. Or Kurds might have developed an adverse attitude toward joining the Turkish officer corps. However, my research findings show that there is no spatial meaningful relationship between conflict and representation. Scatterplots in Figure 3.4a visualize the relationship between the incidence and intensity of conflict in each province, measured by conflict-inflicted fatalities, including government forces, the PKK, and the civilian population, and Kurdish representation in general staff and flag officer corps measured by each province's average PRIs. It indicates no association between ethnic conflict and ethnic representation in the post-1980 officer corps.

A more direct and reliable measure of the state's threat perception might be the number of security forces the Turkish state has employed in each province. Data about the province-based density of local village guards could be helpful in this sense. In 1985, shortly after the PKK's first raids on Turkish security forces, the Turkish state created local self-defense forces comprised of volunteer Kurdish village guards as part of their military strategy against the PKK-led ethnic conflict. The number of state-employed Kurdish village guards, which approached sixty thousand in the early 2000s, varied across provinces in the region. A realist view would anticipate this variation to result from the threat perception specific to each province: i.e., the




Figure 3.4a: Conflict vs. Ethnic Representation in the Post-1980 Period (Data Source: The number of total fatalities (x-axis) includes insurgent, government, and civilian deaths. It was obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The average PRI values of General Staff and Flag officers (y-axis) were drawn from the TAFSOC dataset.)

state would recruit more village guards in provinces where it anticipated a higher threat level due to increased Kurdish militant presence, geographical characteristics, or pro-insurgency attitude of the population. From this line of reasoning, one would anticipate a limited Kurdish representation in locations where the state enlisted village guards at higher rates.

However, the scatterplot in Figure 3.4b, comparing the number of village guards per 100,000 rural inhabitants and the PRI scores for general staff officers and generals in each province, points to a weak relationship between the state's threat perception and ethnic minority representation in the military. (A list of conflict-inflicted fatalities, local village guard ratios, and PRI scores by province can be found in Table A.5 in APPENDIX-I)



Figure 3.4b: Threat Perception vs. Kurdish Representation in the Post-1980 Period. (The number of village guards per 100,000 rural inhabitants (x-axis) was obtained from Balta 2004. It combines the number of voluntary and temporary guards (Drawn from Belge’s data (2016).

The chapter’s empirical findings offer strong evidence that neither recruitment nor promotion patterns of Kurds are affected by the state's threat perception and its repressive policies toward Kurdish cultural expression and political representation during this period.

The modern Turkish state, like its predecessor, blended cooptation and integration in its recruitment efforts: while fielding a vast network of volunteer-based local village guard units from the local Kurdish population, the Turkish state also sought to integrate young Kurds into the officer corps. However, just like the Ottoman reforms a century ago, integration efforts in the post-1980 period have been short-lived and half-hearted and therefore mostly ineffective. The lack of variability in promotion patterns despite ethnic conflict and reform efforts offers further evidence for the stickiness and autonomy of officer demographics.

In an interview, Colonel Ahmet Kanar (retired), a military historian and former instructor at the Turkish military academy, noted that “the general staff issued an internal executive memo

in the late 1990s calling for geographical diversification of the officer recruitment base, attempting to seek proportional representation for each province.”²⁴ Col. Kanar emphasized that “the memo aimed particularly at increasing the representation of Kurdish-majority provinces, although not openly specifying [this goal].”²⁵ Two other officers confirmed the Turkish general staff’s ethnic integration efforts in the 1990s and 2000s. Colonel Kemal Karacan (retired), a former cadet supervisor in Işıklar Military High School, reported that the Turkish Training and Doctrine Command routinely organized informational conferences in eastern provinces to encourage Kurdish students to apply to military high schools and academies.²⁶ Another officer, Major Semih Cengiz, attests that the practice of informational conferences was still in place when he was a student supervisor in the Kuleli Military High School in the late 2000s.²⁷ Regarding the effectiveness of these missions, Colonel Mahmut Poyraz, a professor at the Turkish military academy, reports that the military academy cohorts in the 2010s were relatively more representative of Kurds; however, he suggests that these cadets were recruited through Gülenist networks and that their religious identities were more pronounced than their ethnic or tribal identities.²⁸

The recruitment conferences in the Kurdish-populated provinces reportedly continued in the 2000s, but their effects would only have been able to be observed in the general staff officers in about two decades. However, owing to the massive purges in the officer corps after the failed 2016 coup, we will probably never be able to fully assess the impact of these efforts. Given the

²⁴ Interview with Colonel Ahmet Kanar, Cankaya/Ankara, September 20, 2019.

²⁵ Despite several inquiries, I failed to acquire a copy of this memo.

²⁶ Interview with Colonel Kemal Karacan, WhatsApp interview, April 2019.

²⁷ Interview with Major Semih Cengiz, Skype, April 2020, Cengiz noted during the interview that he had never participated in any of these recruitment missions.

²⁸ Interview with Colonel Mahmut Poyraz, Ankara, September 4, 2019.

incremental nature of officer demographics, the absence of a long-term commitment to integration efforts diminishes the possibility of comprehensive ethnic integration.

The organizational characteristics of the officer recruitment and promotion have been influential in absorbing the potential adverse effects of ethnic conflict and positive effects of integration efforts. While professional socialization and the slow-moving nature of officer demographics minimized the intra-institutional influences of heightened threat perception and ethnic bias, especially regarding promotions, previously established recruitment networks ensured continuity in officer recruitment.

Historical patterns of branch assignments in the Turkish officer corps portray how micro and meso-level social processes moderate threat perception and ethnic bias. Branch distributions are widely considered to be an indicator of institutional ethnic bias and discrimination against minorities (Burk & Espinoza, 2012). In the Turkish case, from 1923 to 2015, out of 214 general staff officers of Kurdish origin, only six belong to technical/service branches in the army. Between 1980 and 2015, during the armed conflict period, the Turkish army recruited 124 general staff officers from the Kurdish-populated provinces, and only four were part of noncombatant service branches. According to the MIHIS data as well, the patterns for Kurdish and non-Kurdish officers were quite similar. Out of 177 officers recruited from Kurdish provinces, only 26 (about 14 percent) were assigned to noncombatant branches (See the details of historical branch assignments in APPENDIX-I). These figures show that branch assignments were made objectively in the Turkish officer corps.

It is fair to infer that once the Kurds entered the military ecosystem and were socialized into institutional norms, their chance of assignment to combat branches and critical units would be no different from ethnically Turkish officers. Branch assignments during armed conflict are

consequential as each officer assigned to a combat and combat support branch would need to make at least two tours to the conflict region and be involved in armed combats against the PKK. The military did not keep the Kurdish officers from the frontlines of ethnic conflict.

Qualitative evidence supports the presence of similar patterns in selection for critical units like special forces. Lieutenant Colonel Ozan Kus, a Batman Kurd and a battalion commander in the Turkish special forces, said that he had faced no difficulties joining the Turkish special forces or being promoted.²⁹ One cannot know if Col. Kus represents the majority, but his testimony aligns with the empirical patterns.

Interviews also offer evidence for the limited influence of integration efforts and, conversely, the importance of preexisting recruitment networks. Two junior officers of Kurdish descent whom I interviewed were unaware of the cadet recruitment fairs the Turkish military had been organizing.³⁰ They both confided that they learned about the military academy application procedures and the nuts and bolts of the military profession from another officer from their hometowns. Their enrollment stories were no different from that of many Turkish officers recruited since the mid-nineteenth century. For most individuals, it has been another officer or NCO from the extended family, neighborhood, village, or hometown who sets an example or becomes a source of inspiration and encouragement and, more importantly, helps them in the application and admission process of the military academy. Recent research shows that about 40 percent of officers between the rank of captain and colonel had at least one officer acquaintance amongst family or friends (Gurcan, 2015).

The historical patterns of endorecruitment in the Turkish military provide further evidence for the influence of and workings of previously established officer recruitment

²⁹ Interview with Ozan Kus, Ankara, 2019.

³⁰ Interview with Ahmet Keser and Cevat Uzum, Ankara, 2019

networks. Endorecruitment is a common factor affecting military demographics worldwide. Military family networks account for an important part of officer recruitment networks. As Table 3.3 indicates, it has been common in Turkey throughout the republican period as well. Between the early 1970s and early 2000s, around 12 to 30 percent of officers had a parent serving as an officer or non-commissioned officer in the military. Col. Karacan confirms that the ratio of cadets with military parents was around 20 percent at the Bursa Işıklar Military High Schools in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.³¹ Major Cengiz asserts that about 20 percent of the cadets in each cohort in the Istanbul Kuleli Military High School in the early 2010s had military parents.³² According to Akyurek, and researcher and a former officer, the gradual increase in endorecruitment in the recent period might have resulted from the enhanced prestige of the military profession in the 1990s and incentives offered to military families in the form of bonus points in military school entrance exams, a practice introduced after the 1980 coup and abandoned in 2005 (Akyürek, 2010).

Data obtained from the secondary literature and interviews with Turkish officers suggests that officers with endorecruitment have continued to account for about 20 percent of each recent cohort. Endorecruitment is possibly more extensive than these figures suggest, as they disregard the siblings, secondary relatives, and marriage-related ties. If family ties with civilian bureaucrats and civil servants are also considered, endorecruitment would possibly account for about 50 percent of each officer cohort.

³¹ Interview with Col. Karacan, 2019.

³² Interview with Maj. Cengiz, 2020.

Table 3.3: The occupation the fathers of Turkish officers (in percentages)

	1971 ³³	1983 ³⁴	2002 ³⁵
<i>Freelance</i>	20.8	13.8	9.4
<i>Artisan/ Small Business owner</i>	13.3	NA	10.7
<i>Military</i>	11.7	25.5	18.2
<i>Civil Servant</i>	34.7	24.3	26.5
<i>Worker</i>	5.0	16.2	22.9
<i>Farmer</i>	14.2	11.3	10.2
<i>Businessmen</i>	7.9	(8.1) ³⁶	(0)
<i>Unemployed</i>	-	0.8	2.1

In sum, historical empirical and ethnographic evidence demonstrates that organizational characteristics specific to officer promotion and recruitment have more influence on the representativeness of the officer corps than threat perception and ethnic bias. Demographic trends in the Turkish officer corps in the post-1980 period leave no doubt that conflict has little or no effect on ethnic representation in the Turkish case. Preexisting recruitment networks and the autonomy of officer promotion mechanisms absorb the effects of conflict to an important extent. Historical consistency in the representation rates across provinces within the Kurdish region offers further evidence for the influence of recruitment networks on officer demographics and ethnic minority representation. Similarly, the proportionate distribution of combat branches across ethnic groups in junior and senior officer corps before and during the violent ethnic mobilization of Kurds points to the impact of social processes in absorbing the impact of external

³³ Data is drawn from Kislali (1974) based on his survey of 770 officers and non-commissioned officers (1978)

³⁴ Data is drawn from Agca (1983)

³⁵ Data is drawn from Akyurek (2010, 254). It relies on 2002 data in (Bıçaksız & Ayaz, 2004).

³⁶ The values in parenthesis were originally lacking and calculated by the author.

and internal factors. As the recent armed conflict illustrates, the state's efforts to integrate ethnic groups prove ineffective unless they mature into an institutionalized policy across successive governments. The incremental nature of officer demographics makes short-term changes highly prone to relapse.

3.6.2 Civil-Military Relations and Persistent Patterns Ethnic Representation

Civil-military relations literature extensively discusses the effect of military demography, especially the military's ethnic composition, on the relationship between the military and government. However, the opposite, civil-military affairs' effect on the military's demography has been largely glossed over. How do civil-military relations affect the military's ethnic composition? Specifically, how does the military versus civilian dominance in a political regime affect the military's ethnic representativeness?

This section discusses the effect of the military's autonomy and civilian and military leaders' influences on military demography by focusing on the persistent Kurdish underrepresentation in the Turkish officer corps. It compares the periods of military dominance and civilian dominance as well as the consequences of purges orchestrated by both military and civilian leaders. This section's main finding is that neither civilian nor military dominance has a meaningful influence on the military's officer demography. I find that the ethnic composition of the officer corps persists due mostly to the autonomous nature of officer recruitment and promotion patterns. Neither does civilian dominance improve Kurdish representation, nor do the military's political interventions or dominance undermine it.

The impact of civil-military relations on the military is largely discussed within the context of military effectiveness (Kier, 1998; MacCoun, Kier, & Belkin, 2006; Lyall, 2020) in especially authoritarian regimes where leaders often resort to ideological or ethnic staffing for fear of coups at the expense of the military's combat performance (Posen, 1986; Brooks, 1998; Quinlivan, 1999; Feaver & Kohn, 2001; Belkin & Schofer, 2003; Biddle, 2004; Pilster & Böhmler, 2012; Talmadge, 2015). Beyond that, we still have little understanding of how civil-military relations affect the military's representativeness except for a common, but misleading presumption, that democratic civil-military relations automatically breed a representative army, whereas military autonomy leads to skewness in military demography. Similarly, the military leadership's influence on the intra-military processes, including the military's demographic composition, has widely been taken for granted. This section in the chapter uniquely contributes to the bridging of this gap in the literature by both unveiling the intra-military dynamics of ethnic representation in the officer corps as well as showing the limits of civilian and military leaders' influence on the military's internal affairs, especially its demography. It shows how the military's organizational dynamics make its demography immune to external and internal top-down interventions.

The demography of officer corps in military organizations possesses unique characteristics. First of all, it is self-persisting and resistant to change, and highly immune to both civilian and military leaderships' interferences as well as political and institutional shifts. Officer demography often takes shape autonomously under the influence of organizational culture and previously established social relationships between the military and the local population.

Second, unlike in other bureaucratic organizations, the military promotes from within. The top leadership in military organizations is drawn exclusively from the larger pool of senior

officers that rise to the level of candidacy for these positions as a result of successive promotion decisions spanning over an extended period—typically around three to four decades—after their initial recruitments and commissioning as an officer. It means that the senior leadership demography in military organizations forms and evolves incrementally and at an extremely slow pace.

Third, although civilian and military leaders are often involved in the senior-level promotion and appointment decisions in varying degrees depending on the nature of the political system and the degree of institutional autonomy of the military, neither civilian nor military leaders have control over the junior and mid-grade level officer and promotion decisions. They often draw little or no public attention and are mostly inaccessible both to civilian and military leaders except for extraordinary circumstances. Even when the civilian or military leaders engage in social engineering efforts in the military, their influence is absorbed by these three unique characteristics—the power of organizational culture and social networks, isolated and incremental promotion dynamics.

In light of the unique characteristics of officer demographics, the following sections examine how Kurdish representation patterns have persisted in the Turkish officer corps despite major intra-institutional and political developments regarding, especially civil-military relations. It focuses, first, on the impacts of political demilitarization and civilian oversight on the Kurdish representation during the DP (1950-1960) and the AKP (2002-2015) periods, and second on how the military's domestic political interventions and institutional autonomy affect its officer demography between 1960 and 1980.

3.6.1.1 An Exclusionary Diversification Trend in the Officer Demography during The Democrat Party Period (1950-1960)

Critical junctures, like early state-building and transition to democracy, are crucial for creating representative and inclusive institutional designs due to their “permissive” characteristics, which grant leaders some leeway to introduce organizational changes that are otherwise impossible. The early reform period after the genesis of the Turkish republic in 1923 can be considered the first critical juncture for our analysis. The Turkish leaders in this period appear uninterested in diversifying the geographic and ethnic base of the officer corps, at least at the level of general staff officers and flag officers. As Figure 3.5 demonstrates, the general staff academy cohorts were made up of officers primarily from certain provinces like Istanbul, Bursa, Erzurum, Erzincan, and Edirne in the first two decades of the republic. The number of officers from Kurdish-populated provinces of southeastern Anatolia who joined the general staff officer corps or were promoted to the level of brigadier general or above during this period was ignorable. Average PRI scores for the 16 southeastern provinces were around only 0.21 and 0.14 for general staff officers and generals, respectively, a value significantly below the proportionate representation score of 1 (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1). This natal demographic defect reproduced itself over time, creating a self-persisting sequence or path dependence, despite a strengthening geographic diversification trend in the senior officer corps.

A critical juncture and a possible path-breaking moment in the republican period was the Democrat party’s rise to power in 1950, marking the transition from a single-party regime to multi-party democracy. This period is significant for our analysis as it saw an increasing government influence over the military, widely seen as the guardians of the single-party

(Kemalist) regime until then. The impact of this transition is clearly visible in the military's demographic trends of the era. By 1955, the number of provinces represented in the general staff officer demography drastically increased, jumping from around 25 to around 60.³⁷ As Figure 3.5 illustrates, many individuals from the peripheral provinces of Anatolia, which had long been excluded from the general staff officer corps, started to graduate from the general staff college after this date. This diversification was in part related to the increase in the cohort sizes of the general staff college. Rather, it may be interpreted as a reflection of the political inclusivity of the early democratic period in the military and officer ethos. Puzzlingly, however, the novel wave of inclusion and the military's expanding recruitment base in this period encompassed Kurdish-majority provinces in a limited fashion.³⁸ This exclusionary diversification trend is clearly visible in Figure 3.5, in which Turkey's 81 administrative provinces are vertically clustered based on the degree and continuity of their representation from the highest and most persistent to the lowest and most sparse. Provinces with a significant Kurdish population appear at the bottom of the heatmap—shaded with gray color— indicating that they have consistently been the most underrepresented among all provinces.

Similarly, as Figure 3.1 demonstrates, during the first democratic decade between the transition to multi-party democracy in 1950 and the 1960 coup d'état, Kurds continued to appear sparsely in the senior officer ranks, averaging a PRI value of 0.27. It can be inferred that the transition to democracy did not lead to Kurds' integration into the Turkish military and its elite cadres. Persisting Kurdish exclusion during this period despite such a major political shift, a significant diversification in officer demographics, and relatively peaceful relations between the

³⁷ The gap between 1950 and 1953 results from the shrinking of the duration of education from 3 to 2 years.

³⁸ Research examining the military's personnel policies and government's involvement could elucidate the reasons of this sudden demographic change as well as the exclusion of the Kurds from this trend.

Turkish state and Kurds is indicative of the resilience of the officer corps geographical and ethnic composition. It may also be an indicator of ethnic bias embedded in state ethos.




Figure 3.5: The temporal-spatial patterns of access to senior ranks in the Turkish military (1923-2015). Each row on the heatmap corresponds to one of the 81 provinces in Turkey, and each column represents a cohort of the general staff college. Color shading is based on the number of officers (Source: TAFSOC dataset)

A unique characteristic of this early democratic period is that the newly elected D.P. leadership managed to establish substantial control and superiority over the military, which itself was requesting democratic reform (See Hale, 1996; Ozdag, 2000; Akyaz, 2002). The D.P. leaders introduced various military reforms, repeatedly shuffled the military leadership, and purged the officer corps as Turkey was forging a new military relationship with the United

States.³⁹ A striking example was the June 6 purge movement, during which around 250 generals and colonels were sent to retirement immediately after the D.P. ascended to power (Özdog, 2000; Ipekci & Cosar, 2010; Cimenli, 2018). As importantly, the D.P. elite seemed to have embraced more accommodating views toward Kurds than their predecessor, the Republican Peoples Party (CHP). Given the civilian governments' marked control over the military and its relatively liberal and accommodating views toward previously marginalized segments of the society, during at least the initial years of their rule, Kurdish representation would be expected to improve throughout the DP era. Yet, my findings reveal that representation trends shift only marginally.

The persistence of Kurdish underrepresentation during this period is a strong indicator of the exceptionally autonomous and self-regulating nature of officer recruitment and promotion patterns, despite substantial civilian oversight and interferences in the military's internal matters. In addition to the military's organizational culture, social factors like network and motivation deprivation might have been other factors hampering the demographic diversification trend of the early democratic period to include Kurds. It is viable to think that Kurds, who had long lacked a previous connection to the officer corps, might have difficulty in establishing a new relationship with the military given the high entry costs of officership, language problems, and the scarcity of motivation to be part of the military. On the part of the government, it is fair to suggest that a personalist approach to governance and failure to develop a sustainable oversight mechanism over officer recruitment and mid-grade level promotions could be the factors that eliminated the possibility of a lasting and more comprehensive demographic change regarding Kurds' representation, presuming that the government had such an intention.

³⁹ See Guvenc and Uyar's recent article, titled "Lost in translation or transformation? The impact of American aid on the Turkish military, 1947–60," for a comprehensive analysis of the implications of Turkey's military alliance with the United for the Turkish Military.

3.6.1.2 The Limited Effect of Civilian Supremacy on the Officer Corps'

Ethnic Composition During the AKP Rule (2002-2015)

The Turkish military's senior officer corps remained unrepresentative also during the AKP period despite a government-led peace process with the PKK, the European-Union-imposed structural reforms regarding civil-military relations, and an unprecedented level of civilian control over the military. After its rise to rule in 2002, the AKP government introduced drastic improvements to the cultural and political rights of the Kurds, followed by a daring peace initiative, also known as the opening or resolution process, between 2012 and 2015, during which the government sought a political solution for Turkey's long-standing Kurdish question. An important agenda of the AKP elite as part of the peace process was improving the Kurdish presence in party ranks and state institutions. Since the early years of the AKP rule, influential party members repeatedly emphasized their vision of resolving the ethnic conflict including plans for improving Kurds' electoral and nonelectoral political representation. In light of this political vision, the AKP held up prominent figures of Kurdish origin, like Mehmet Şimşek, then the minister of finance, as examples of the shifting state attitude toward Kurds in their term. However, it is hard to suggest that the AKP elite's inclusive discourse translated into a concrete policy and practice. At least, the annual PRI scores for general staff officers and generals from Kurdish-majority provinces during this period portray an opposite view. The PRI scores of the 16 Kurdish-populated provinces remained around 0.4 on average during the AKP term (See Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1). Notwithstanding the significant shift in state behavior and positive

steps toward granting better cultural and political rights to Kurds between 2002 and 2015, Kurdish underrepresentation in the Turkish officer corps persisted.

The unresponsiveness of the recruitment patterns to external political changes in the armed forces appears to have stemmed mostly from the military's autonomy and especially the insulation of military recruitment and mid-level promotion decisions from civilian oversight. However, puzzlingly similar demographic trends continued even when the military's autonomy disappeared almost entirely in the second half of the AKP term. Particularly after 2007, the Turkish politics demilitarized at an unprecedented pace and degree, coupled with the military's rapid loss of its political and institutional prerogatives (Heper, 2011; Satana, 2011). In this era, the government was apt at dictating its preferences about senior-level critical promotions at the Military Supreme Council (YAS) Meetings.⁴⁰ Regarding the junior level promotions and appointments as well, which often remain outside of the government's domain of influence, it is widely claimed that officers with ties to or under the influence of the Gülen movement, the erstwhile ally of Erdogan, established strict control over the junior and middle-grade level officer promotions, including the general staff academy admission process (Yavuz & Balci, 2018). In short, it is fair to assume that civilian leadership exercised close oversight over the selection process of general staff officers and senior promotion and assignment decisions during especially the second half of the AKP term.

Puzzlingly enough, this period of unprecedented civilian dominancy and comprehensive control over the military's personnel policy and practices failed to improve Kurdish representation in the officer corps. On the contrary, the representativeness of the military deteriorated under the AKP-Gülen dominancy between 2007 and 2015. The PRI score of

⁴⁰ The make-up of the YAS has been changed significantly, reducing the number of soldier members through an executive decree in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt. 25/7/2016-KHK-669/45.

Kurdish-populated provinces remained around 0.35 on average for both general staff officers and flag officers. The resilience of Kurdish underrepresentation despite significant political demilitarization and government-led institutional reforms during the AKP period shows the uniquely sticky nature of the military demographics.

Given the evolutionary nature of the senior-level promotion patterns, it may still be early to conclusively observe the demographic implications of the AKP era reforms. Although my analysis suggests that there has been no improvement in the number of Kurds in senior officer corps so far, I find during my interviews with instructors and administrators from the military academies and high schools that there have been some efforts to diversify the social base of officer corps by increasing the number of cadets from Kurdish-populated provinces. For instance, in an interview I held in the Turkish Military Academy Campus in Ankara, Colonel Hasan Petek, a professor at the school of administrative sciences, stated that some measures were put in place to improve the representation of the Kurds in the officer corps at the turn of the 2010s under the influence of Gülenist cadres.⁴¹ Colonel Petek pointed out that he remembered new group of students who are of Kurdish origin and barely speak Turkish language. However, this practice probably would not take hold as most of the cadets and young officers, who studied in the Military Academy during the post-2010 period, were discharged in the wake of the abortive coup of 2016. This massive purge movement will make a sound analysis about the recent trends impossible, at least for now.

3.6.1.3 The May 27 Coup and the Period of Military Interventions (1960-1983)

⁴¹ Interview with Hasan Petek, Ankara, June 2019.

The period after the DP period, from the May 27 coup of 1960 to the end of the September 12 military rule in 1983, is marked by the military's political dominance, institutional autonomy, and recurring interventions. During this period, successive military leaderships actively sought to shape the demography of the officer corps, through various demographic engineering strategies, including but not limited to purges, which took place before or/and after almost every military intervention. Historical data at hand shows that Kurdish representation was mostly unaffected by the Turkish officers' demographic engineering efforts. Historical representation trends of Kurds derived from the TAFSOC data indicate that change in Kurdish representation in the Turkish general staff and flag officer corps in this period was ignorable. Kurds continued to be underrepresented from 1960 to the early 1980s.

In the immediate aftermath of the May 27 coup, the military junta, composed mostly of middle-ranking and junior officers, orchestrated one of the most dramatic military purges of Turkey's Republican history. According to some accounts between 4000 and 7200 officers were forced out of the service.⁴² The purged personnel made up 90 percent of all flag officers and 50 percent of general staff officers.⁴³ Primary motivation behind the post-1960 coup purge, in the beginning, was young officers' frustration with the traditional hierarchy and the older generation of generals, who had long been resistant to reform and to leave their posts (See Akyaz, 2002; Hale, 1994; Esengin, 1978; Ipekci & Cosar, 1962). However, given that the purge was unlimited to flag officer corps, one could suspect the presence of other motivations, which are still somewhat unclear. Historical demographic data at hand can offer some insight regarding its

⁴² There are conflicting accounts on the number of officers discharged or forcibly sent to retirement. A detailed account of the post May 27 coup purges can be found in Kenan Esengin, *27 Mayıs ve Ordudaki Kiyimler*, Istanbul, 1978.

⁴³ EMİNSU'nun Yuvaya Dönüş Davası (npp, np, 1972), 20 in Guvenc & Uyar (2021, 18).

ethnic motivations. If, for instance, military leaders were worried about the ethnic composition of the officer corps, we would expect to see a visible decline in the number of officers from Kurdish-populated provinces.⁴⁴ Historical data shows that this was not the case. In the post-1960 coup period, the number of Kurds did not diminish in the flag officer and general staff officer corps majority of which were purged.

The military's demographic engineering efforts on the Turkish officer corps continued in the 1960s and 1970s. In the wake of two failed coups in 1962 and 1963, military leaders discharged around 1650 officers and military academy cadets. After the 1971 military memorandum, around 600 left-leaning cadets and officers were sacked. Similarly, the 1980 coup gave way to the purge of about 1000 officers and military academy cadets.⁴⁵ Primary motivation in these purges was widely considered to be ideological. TAFSOC data confirms the lack or short-lived effect of ethnically motivated interventions on officer demography. Historical representation trends show that military leaders, neither the junta of May 27 nor the succeeding leaderships, openly pursued an ethnic agenda despite the wider crackdown on the Kurdish political movement. Even if they had done, historical representation trends indicate that it had no indelible effects.

Puzzlingly, a closer inspection of representation trends during this period (Figure 3.1) suggests that the representativeness of the Turkish officer corps slightly increased from 1960 to 1980. The PRI score for Kurdish-populated provinces reached 0.44 on average for the duration of these two decades. The trends are indicative of the resilience and slow-changing nature of Turkish officer demography and the Kurdish representation within it. Recruitment and promotion

⁴⁴ An analysis of the geographical distribution of purged officers too could give a sense of whether an ethnic motivation behind the purge movement was present, at least to some degree.

⁴⁵ There is no in-depth scholarly research or official documentation providing exact figures on military purges in Turkey between 1960 and 1980. Figures are collated from various Turkish newspapers and memoirs.

patterns have proven resistant to the growing ethnic nationalism and intolerance during this period.

The slight improvement in Kurdish representation might be indicative of, first and foremost, a gradual shift in broader officer ethos, which came under the influence of the liberal and leftist political ideologies with which also Kurds identified themselves at the time. The Turkish officer corps, especially the junior and middle-grade officers, was deeply drawn into politics in the 1960s, reflecting the growing ideological polarization of 1960s global politics. Officers' growing entanglement with politics prepared the ground for a cascade of coup and coup attempts as well as an unprecedented political activism and factionalism within the officer corps. Recent works and various officer memoirs suggest that Marxist ideology made substantial inroads into the Turkish officer corps and its ethos during this period (Ulus, 2011; Akyaz, 2002).⁴⁶ This may be the first reason accounting for the relatively more inclusive attitude toward Kurds, who remained at the center of the political left at the time. Additionally, it may be suggested that the pluralist socio-political context in the 1960s, embodied in the declaration of the 1961 constitution which was widely recognized as the most politically progressive constitution of Turkey's republican period, contributed to this positive yet short-lived inclusionary trend by both affecting the military's attitude toward Kurds and Kurds' motivation to participate in the state institutions, including the military.

Despite an upswing in Kurdish representation from 1960 to 1980, the average PRI score for Kurdish-populated provinces remained considerably below the proportionate representation value of 1. During this period, the relatively stagnant representation rates illustrate the stickiness

⁴⁶ Many retired officers who experienced this tumultuous period as a young officer confirmed the presence of deep political divisions and rivalry in the military academies and among young officers during interviews. An interesting testimony is the memoirs of Orhan Savasci, founder of the Air Force Proletarian Revolutionary Organization, published by Ayrinti Press in 2015 with the title of "*Cepheden Anilar* (Memoirs from the Front)".

of recruitment and promotion patterns, the significance of the previously established recruitment and promotion networks, and the slow-changing nature of officer demography. Given especially the difficulty of accessing information about the application process for the military academies, joining the officer corps for Kurds, most of whom lived in the rural and lacked sufficient personal acquaintance with the military and its members, was a significantly challenging endeavor.⁴⁷

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter's findings challenge well-established realist arguments centering on the threat perception and civil-military relations. My in-depth geographical and temporal analyses unveil that the relationship between conflict and ethnic representation is weak in contrast to the common view. Neither pressures arising from war mobilization automatically ensure the ethnic integration of military as widely believed, nor do violent ethnic conflict and rebellions necessarily undermine ethnic minority representation in the officer corps. As States may embrace strategies to ensure the extraction of local human resources without integrating minority populations. This often manifests as a strategy of cooptation that seeks to undermine the saliency of the ethnic conflict. Irrespective of their motivation, the impact of such reforms is also usually

⁴⁷ Several officers emphasize the difficulty of the application process in their memoirs. Halistin Kukul's experience narrated in Mustafa Onsel, *1 Köy, Üç Adam, 6,5 Darbe*, (Gelati, Ankara, 2017) 50-2, reflects how these recruitment network worked in practice. Kukul, who lived in Vardalli village of Erzincan, wanted to become a military officer under the influence of Atatürk's image. Living in a typical Anatolian village where the connection to the world was only a radio which only a handful people had at the time, Kukul got the information about the military school from another villager, Ziya Yücesan, who was accepted to the military high school a few years ago. Ziya similarly learned about the military life and how to become an officer from another villager, Asim Sen. They were luckier compared to most rural residents of Anatolia in the sense that their village was close to a city where there was a Military High School. Most Kurds neither had these connections and proximity to a military school, nor had sufficient education or language skills to be accepted into the prestigious military high schools.

limited or transient in the absence of a long-term commitment. Organizational and social processes specific to officer promotion and recruitment absorb and isolate the effects of both conflict and reform efforts.

The chapter's findings in summation are as follows. First, it reveals an uneven geographical representation in the Turkish officer corps. A subnational level geographical analysis shows, Kurdish-majority provinces, clustered in the east and southeast of Turkey, are distinctly underrepresented in the officer corps at the junior, mid-grade, and senior levels. In academic, bureaucratic, and journalistic circles in Turkey, representation problems concerning Kurds in general have been widely explained by the long-standing armed conflict and historically tense relations between Kurds and the Turkish state. However, long term trends of representation elucidate that Kurdish underrepresentation in the officer corps predates the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military. Its origins date back to the late nineteenth century, a period when the educational and organizational structures of the modern Turkish army gradually took shape. In-depth geographical and temporal analyses focusing on the post-1984 period and investigating the relationship between threat perception show also that violent and non-violent conflict have had no meaningful effect on Kurdish representation in the officer corps. It is also widely believed that coups have exacerbated Kurds' relations with and representation in state institutions in Turkey. My analysis shows that neither coups nor oppressive policies of military dominant political regimes in post-coup episodes have adversely affected Kurdish representation in the officer corps. In parallel, representation trends show no improvement in periods of civilian dominance like the DP period (1950-60) and AKP era (2002-2015).

Second, the chapter offer evidence for how organizational and social factors are more consequential on representation than threat perception or civil-military relations. I find that Kurds' underrepresentation is related mostly to recruitment problems, specifically Kurds' lack of regional recruitment networks and isolation from existing ones. Quantitative evidence shows that they face negligible career advancement problems once they join the officer corps and socialize into the institutional norms. My findings highlight the importance of recruitment-related obstacles underlying representation problems in the officer corps. Although there have been intermittent efforts to address representation problems through various recruitment strategies in the Turkish context since the late nineteenth century, these integration efforts have remained ineffective due to their half-hearted and short-lived nature, showing the need for a sustained and systematic reform strategy.

The chapter's third important finding is that Kurdish representation rates have been quite stable throughout Turkey's republican period (1923-2015), despite major political shifts, recurrent civil-military relations crises, and international and intrastate conflicts. This is quite puzzling. I show that Kurdish underrepresentation in the officer corps emerged and crystallized in the late Ottoman period during the initial institution-building phase despite major integration efforts and wars that could have helped Kurd's representation. The initial ethnic makeup of the officer corps has been reproduced through social and organizational mechanisms, specifically officer recruitment networks and autonomous promotion regime.

Overall, this chapter shows that persistent representation problems in the officer corps can be explained by exclusionary institution building efforts, resulting ethnic imbalance, and the organizational mechanisms that sustain this initial imbalance. The Turkish case offers empirical and ethnographic evidence confirming the autonomous nature of officer promotion and the

importance of geographically centered officer recruitment networks for bonding ethnic minority groups to the officer corps and how they reproduce exclusionary officer demographics by absorbing and limiting the effect of external political shocks and reform efforts. The chapter challenges the common scholarly perception that leadership composition in military organizations can be reconstituted with top-down reform efforts, and it explicates that the influence of civilian and military leaders on officer demographics is quite minimal and short-lived.

Chapter 4: Explaining Promotion Patterns in the Turkish Officer Corps

4.1 Introduction

How do coups and coup prevention affect officer promotion patterns in a multiethnic army? This chapter focuses specifically on senior officer promotion patterns in the Turkish officer corps. Previous research emphasizes that coups and coup prevention efforts lead to ethnically and politically motivated interventions in the military's internal affairs, specifically its recruitment, promotion, and appointment procedures, undermining military effectiveness (Quinlivan 1999; Brooks 2003, 2006; Biddle and Long 2004; Pilster and Bohmelt 2011; Talmadge 2015; Narang and Talmadge 2017). However, existing scholarship has focused either on personalist autocracies, mainly discussing the implications of autocrats' reforms to safeguard their regime from coups, or on democracies, debating whether military autonomy or civilian oversight would ensure a military that is effective but at the same time subordinate to the civilian government. Officer selection and promotion practices in military-dominant autocracies, specifically in post-coup military regimes and military tutelary regimes where a group of military officers or the military as an institution remains the dominant political actor, have received scant attention.

I argue that promotion patterns are resilient, and coups have a negligible lasting effect on them. The autonomous nature of promotion patterns absorbs the effects of coups. Intriguingly, the chapter's findings show that coups may have a merit-enhancing effect on promotion patterns. I suggest that this results from the extraordinary uncertainty and conflict-prone nature of the post-coup period. Owing to increased rivalries and competition for power within the officer

corps in the immediate wake of the coups, military leaders may emphasize professionalism and prioritize merit criteria in officer promotions in order not to provoke an inter-military conflict. The performance-sensitive coup-proofing approach in military-dominant regimes often restricts fratricidal violence, like purges, executions, imprisonments, exiles, etc. Military leaders purge the officer corps, mostly for fear of politicization and factional coups or countercoups prior to and posterior to military interventions, but they shy away from ethnically or politically motivated promotion choices in order not to undermine the military's effectiveness and cohesion.

As the instability and uncertainty of the post-coup period wears off, extra attention to professionalism, and accordingly, merit-enhancing effect of coups gradually disappears. The opaque, incremental and relapsing nature of officer promotions mitigate the effects of coups helping earlier promotion patterns to resuscitate. Also, in tutelary regimes or militaries with high political involvement, professionalism and a performance-sensitive “coup proofing” may become a long-term strategy for persisting fear of factional coups and politicization and divisions in the officer corps helping promotion patterns to remain merit-based.

Drawing on approximately 35,000 senior-level promotion decisions about 17,000 general staff officers between 1923 and 2015 from the Turkish case and extensive in-depth interviews with officers, scholars, and politicians, I investigate short and long-term effects of coups on officer promotion patterns and ethnic representation in the military. Using an original event-history dataset and interview data, I examine first the relationship between early career performance—the military academy and general staff college graduation rankings—and senior-level promotion decisions; second, how coups and regime type impact this relationship.

Turkey has a long history of troubled civil-military relations, but, puzzlingly, its military has performed persistently well in almost all international and intra-state conflicts it has

participated in in the same period. The Turkish armed forces have been continuously involved in domestic politics and instigated about eight military interventions since the 1950s, yet, at the same time, managed to remain to be a highly deterrent force and was widely found quite successful in the Korean War (1953-4), Invasion of Cyprus Island (1974), and fight against the PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party) since 1984 despite significant technological and material limitations. Most recently, after a traumatic coup and post-coup experience when it lost most of its officer corps to a government-led purge, the Turkish military was able to conduct successful military operations in Syria, Iraq, and Libya between 2016 and 2021. So, how can we make sense of an army that has been actively part of domestic political affairs but is also highly effective in combat? I argue that Turkish military has remained to be relatively effective in combat due to a well-trained officer corps that is recruited and promoted based chiefly on merit.

Scholars have often studied promotion patterns about the concept of military effectiveness through a comparative approach by focusing on different regime types with divergent civil-military relations and coup incidence (Quinlivan 1999; Brooks 2003, 2006; Pilster and Bohmelt 2011; Talmadge 2015). While these studies substantively informed our understanding of the relationship between civil-military relations and military effectiveness in different regime types, single-case studies permit investigating the same military's promotion patterns and performance over time in the same political context that oscillates between democracy and various forms of military-dominant regime types which can help isolate various contextual and military-specific confounding factors.⁴⁸ But, single case studies are sparse due mainly to the unavailability of fine-grained promotion data or the lack of a sufficient number of concurrently occurring civil-military events and conflicts in a single context.

⁴⁸ For exception, see Risa Brooks (2006) investigating Egyptian military performance under Nasser and Sadat regimes.

Remedying these empirical and practical problems, my research findings from the Turkish case challenge existing explanations by demonstrating that first, officer promotion patterns can primarily be merit-based in a military that is constantly involved in politics; second, military interventions, such as memorandums and coups, do not necessarily undermine the merit-based nature of promotions, on the contrary, may even enhance it on the short run; third, coups and coup-related purges may have no immediate or long-term effects on the officer corps' ethnic composition.

The chapter continues as follows. The next section briefly evaluates the literature and lays out my hypotheses, followed by a section explaining my argument. The third section discusses my data and research design. And the last section discusses my findings and the Turkish military's institutionalization efforts under post-coup and military tutelary regimes.

4.2 Existing Explanations

4.2.1 Promotion Patterns and Military Effectiveness

Scholars disagree about the definition and indicators of military effectiveness. I focus on promotion patterns as a critical indicator of the military's human resources management and overall effectiveness. Promotion patterns "generate the military's human capital, which influences virtually everything else it does..." (Talmadge, 2016, 13). Promotion patterns in the officer corps influence every military-effectiveness-related criterion, from individual motivation, unit cohesion, and combat leadership during wartime to operational performance, strategic assessment, and doctrinal and organizational innovation in peacetime. Contemporary research

highlights the vital role of leadership in inspiring soldiers on the battlefield (Kier). An army without able military leaders is more likely to face defeat in war. Incompetent leaders inadequately prepare the military for war and show poor combat leadership at the tactical level. They also underperform in operational and strategic planning and commanding complex operations. From Sun Tzu to Alexander, strategists and generals emphasize that the officer corps' competence is the key measure of an army's overall quality.

Just as military leadership remains at the nexus of victory and defeat in war, it is a critical determinant of harmonious and fraught civil-military relations, organizational efficiency or dysfunction. The officer corps' competence captures several issues related to military effectiveness from the military's overall discipline, professionalism, the quality of its training and education programs, and war preparedness, in addition to its performance on the battlefield. An army with well-trained and objectively selected military leaders is more likely to produce effective solutions for problems related to military organization, technology, logistics, and operations in peacetime as during the war. They are also more likely to perform better in various unconventional military tasks, including counterinsurgency, peace support operations, and military-diplomatic negotiations. As importantly, able military leaders are more likely to develop a healthier relationship with civilian leaders, even if this does not necessarily mean one that is conflict-free. Overall, a qualified officer corps as a product of merit-based promotion patterns is not only an important indicator of effective human resources management but also plays a key role in translating a state's material resources into military power

Despite the vital importance of promotion patterns for an effective military and military leadership, they haven't received sufficient scholarly attention yet.⁴⁹ An approach focusing on

⁴⁹ We must admit that limited attention on promotion patterns, at least in an empirical sense, results, to an important extent, from the data availability and access problems, especially in the case of non-democratic regimes. Needless to add,

promotion patterns allows us to bypass several methodological challenges and conceptual tautology pertaining to the definition and the measurement of military effectiveness. First, it encompasses both wartime and peacetime effectiveness. Second, it captures performance, at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Third, it does not necessitate making a conventional or unconventional war differentiation. Fourth, it allows capturing variation across services and branches if the data is available for all services. Finally, it permits assessing the direct impacts of several time-variant and -invariant external factors on the military.

On the other hand, it is hard to deny the limitations of a quantitative approach to promotion patterns as a proxy for military effectiveness. War's ambiguous nature comes into play here once again, especially on matters that pertain to individual and tactical level efficacy. Merit-based promotion patterns may not automatically translate into superior military performance. After all, it is hard to quantify every aspect of leadership. Professionally successful officers based on certain measurable metrics may not always show superior organizational skills, prescient strategic planning, heroic combat leadership, or staying power during the war. People show different reactions to different circumstances. It is not uncommon that an officer with a mediocre resume in peacetime can appear as a war hero. Additionally, organizational culture may influence the performance of the best and brightest both in peacetime and war. But these isolated and exceptional cases explain little about the broader performance of an army or a country's military effectiveness. Also, although the culture considerably matters, merit-based promotion patterns remain critically important for the military's overall effectiveness in war and peace.

security organizations are the least accessible institutions to researchers even in democratic regimes, especially when it comes to personnel records for the recent past.

4.2.2 Civil-Military Relations and Promotion Patterns

Promotion patterns loom large in debates on the links between civil-military relations and military effectiveness. Scholars question how civilian interventions on promotion patterns influence military effectiveness. (Talmadge, 2015; others.). They have problematized the ways and the degrees to which civilians intervene in military personnel policy in an effort to address civil-military literature's central puzzle, i.e., how to build a military that is professionally effective and subordinate to civilian leadership. Both excessive interventions and complete non-involvement have been widely viewed as detrimental to military performance, if not for the obedience of the military.

Several comparative studies focusing on autocracies find that civilian leaders' excessive involvement in the military's internal affairs, specifically recruitment and promotion procedures, undermines military effectiveness (Biddle & Zirkle 1996, Brooks 1998, 2006; Quinlivan 1999; Belkin & Schofer 2003). Authoritarian leaders' such interferences prioritizing regime survival has widely been conceptualized as "coup-proofing" or "coup-prevention tactics." Militaries in regimes with weak institutionalization per se are plagued by ethnic stacking, politically motivated surveillance and purges, and politicized training in the officer corps owing to leaders' fear of internal threats, such as coups (Talmadge 2016; Narang & Talmadge 2017). In short, autocracies have been widely associated with excessive civilian interventions, thus with non-merit promotions, and accordingly poor military performance.

In contrast, democracies are commonly associated with harmonious civil-military relations, specifically minimal or constructive civilian interventions, and higher military performance. They are considered to be apt in managing their human resources more effectively

and possess merit-based promotion patterns. Scholars think that the armies of democratic countries fight more effectively and are more likely to win their wars (David Lake 1992, Van Evera 1994, Reiter & Stam 2002). Because democratic governments tend to grant more autonomy for implementing doctrines (Reiter and Meek, 1999, 370) and avoid coup-proofing (Pilster & Bohmelt 2012), they are expected to use their human capital more wisely, promote individual initiative and enhance leadership performance (Biddle & Long 2003), and field armies capable of implementing complex tactics and operating sophisticated weapon systems (Biddle & Zirkle 1996).

Despite some critical voices arguing for professionalism (Huntington 1957, Feaver 2011), most scholars view civilian intervention as useful for the alignment of military capabilities, doctrine, and broader grand strategic goals (Posen 1984; Van Evera 1984, Kier 1997), creation of high-quality strategic assessments (Brooks 2008), effectiveness in military operations (Avant 1994), and effective decision-making during the war (Cohen 2002). Without close oversight and guidance of civilian leadership, many scholars contend, the military would develop parochial views and challenge the government's decisions about when, where, and how to use force, which would undermine military strategy and performance (Betts 1991, Avant 1997, Feaver & Gelpi 2005).

Existing scholarship almost entirely ignores post-coup military regimes and military tutelary regimes, i.e., political orders in which the military is the dominant actor and rules behind the scenes if not openly governs. At best, both types of military-led authoritarian regimes have recently been bundled together with personalist regimes based on the presumption that their organizational concerns and practices are identical (Talmadge 2016 Page?; Narang & Talmadge 2017 Page?) despite their stark structural differences, especially regarding their cohesion, and

resilience (Geddes, 1999, 2014). Extant literature views the relationship between regime type and military effectiveness from a dichotomous view, associating democratic regimes automatically with merit-based practices and superior military performance (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2012) and autocracies with corrupt-organizational practices and poor military performance (Talmadge, 2016) when we face a much more complex picture in reality. We tend to ignore that democracies significantly suffer from similar organizational problems to autocracies, especially regarding the representativeness of their military officer corps, and engage in coup-proofing reforms, while autocrats, similar to democracies, are compelled to build a merit-based army once they secure their regime. We also tend to associate coup proofing with poor military performance automatically.

This partly results from a realist approach that dominates the military effectiveness literature, highlighting the role of threat perception in shaping military organizational practices. Almost without exception, democracies are considered to be exclusively concerned with external threats, while personalist autocracies are inherently internally focused and associated with corrupt or regime-survival-seeking approaches due to intrinsic sensitivity to internal threats they face. This is best illustrated in Talmadge's (2015, 2016) recent works probing how internal threat perceptions, specifically the threat of a military coup, lead autocrats to embrace self-serving military organizational practices, like non-merit-based promotions, ineffective training regimens, overly centralized command & control structures, and how these practices, which she terms as "coup prevention" tactics, eventually result in poor conventional army performance at the tactical level. In reality, all types of regimes are concerned with external and internal threats, and their military performance records are mixed. Also, the so-called "coup proofing" tactics may not be inherently in conflict with superior military performance. Coup-proofing, mainly

attributed to autocracies, is linked with non-merit appointments and ethnic stacking, and inferior military performance. However, especially when the causal arrow is reversed, military effectiveness often appears to be the best coup proofing method. High military performance, and success, remedies cohesion problems, enhances professionalism, and cultivates good relations across different generations of officers within the military and between civilians and officers, alleviating the possibility of civil-military troubles. At best, we lack conclusive evidence that threat perception and regime types are the best predictors of organizational practices and conventional military performance.

Also, existing literature disregards organizational factors resulting from organizational structure and culture that can independently govern organizational practices and long-term patterns and influence military performance irrespective of regime type and threat perception. As an exception, Lyall's recent work (2020) contributes to filling this critical gap by going beyond threat-centric and regime-type-focused approaches and focusing on the effect of pre-war management of human resources, specifically the treatment of minorities on military effectiveness irrespective of the regime type. Taking organizational practices as an independent variable, Lyall looks at the link between human resources management and military effectiveness. He finds a strong correlation between prewar treatment of minorities, including fratricidal violence, and battlefield performance in modern war. Drawing on Lyall's findings but in contrast to his approach, I take promotion patterns as a dependent variable and a proxy of military effectiveness.

With its theoretical focus on the relationship between civil-military relations and promotion patterns and empirical orientation, this research helps bridge important gaps in the literature. It theorizes the promotion practices of military regimes and militaries with high

political and institutional autonomy which have long been overlooked or taken for granted for their corrupt practices and poor military performance in the literature. Geddes (1999, 2009) and Geddes et al. (2014) studied military regimes, but they focused on their survival strategies and power sharing dynamics in relation to their organizational characteristics, specifically their cohesion rather than their post-coup activities. Secondly, with its in-depth single case approach, it allows investigating the performance dynamics of the same army under varying threat environments and regime types which helps isolate the effect of several context-specific confounding factors. Third, with its empirically driven approach and broad temporal focus, the chapter allows comparing distal and proximate effects of various types of coups, various regime types, and conflicts on promotion patterns ignored in the literature. Last, it unveils the persistent effect of the military's organizational characteristics on promotion patterns while acknowledging the merits of the threat-centric view.

4.3 Hypotheses

Overall, I test two well-established hypotheses derived from extant literature:

Hypothesis 1: Coups and coup prevention reforms are expected to undermine merit-based promotion patterns in the officer corps.

Hypothesis 2: Regime type affects promotion patterns. The military's political dominance and post-coup military regimes should lead to non-merit-based officer promotions, while democratic/civilian control of the armed forces is expected to enhance merit-based promotions.

4.4 Theory: Coups' Role in Organizational Change and Continuity

Historical institutionalism aids in investigating the temporal patterns of officer promotion. It helps explain the immediate and long-term effects of critical events, such as external shocks and intra-institutional shifts. Path dependence emphasizes the lasting effect of starting conditions (Moore, 1966; Ertman, 1997; Pierson, 2000). Radical moments of historical junctures, such as coups, revolutions, interstate wars, and intrastate conflicts may entail drastic changes, but they also set the basis of continuity that emerges after this change through their lasting effects. And the historical recurrence of these shocks helps further crystallize and augment the results of the preceding shock. Long-established institutional frameworks can help regulate and mitigate the effects of these recurring shocks and their accumulating effects. I am not specifically referring to the phenomena of increasing returns because the effects of the previous event may be steady and decreasing. I suggest that they may just be revived or magnified only upon the recurrence of the event. Overall, I contend that dramatic historical events like coups can prepare the starting conditions and serve as critical junctures not only for radically shifting national political trajectories but also for incremental stable intra-institutional patterns.

4.5 Argument

Officer promotion patterns are highly resilient due to their autonomous nature. Like officer recruitment patterns, officer promotion patterns gradually crystallize during the early institution-building phase and self-perpetuate thereafter. Major political shocks and intra-military

reform efforts hardly change these patterns once locked in. A coup, however, is an unusual shock for the military with its exogenous and endogenous effects. On the one hand, it serves as an external political shock owing to the power-grabbing/aspiring group's potential ties to civilian politicians and, more importantly, drastic changes it incurs on the legal, social, and political background surrounding the military as an institution. On the other hand, it serves as an internal shock as it may drastically upend long-established procedures, alter priorities and practices, and invite massive reforms. Although officer promotion patterns are largely immune to the long-term effects of a military intervention due to officer promotions' uniquely autonomous nature, a coup often incurs a puzzling short-lived effect on promotion patterns. In contrast to conventional wisdom, a coup may enhance the merit-based nature of officer promotions because of two mutually reinforcing factors that motivate military leaders to adopt a balanced and performance-sensitive coup-proofing approach: (1) the officer corps' cohesion problems (predisposition to fractionalization) and (2) the uncertain and conflict-prone nature of the post-coup period.

4.5.1 Self-Persisting Officer Promotion Patterns

Early institution-building phases are critical for promotion patterns. Although it may require time and effort, once a merit-favoring model is established, merit-based promotion patterns tend to reproduce over time. Four mechanisms render promotion patterns resilient by mitigating the effects of external shocks and institutional shifts: (1) Promotion from within (endopromotion), (2) incremental and relapsing nature, (3) isolated nature at the junior and mid-grade levels, (4) professional socialization and networks. These four mechanisms substantially suspend the long-term effects of coups. The incremental and isolated nature of officer promotion absorbs coups' immediate adverse or positive influences on promotions. Professional

socialization, networks, and endogenous promotion prevent indiscriminate approaches in post-coup purges.

The officer corps' organizational design is crucial in ensuring merit-based promotions at the senior level. Especially organizational measures to prevent nepotism and clientelist influences from plaguing officer promotions are important. General Staff Officer (GSO) system seems useful in that regard. It helps safeguard the lower segments of the officer corps from politicization, limits the non-merit influences of nepotism and clientelist networks on promotions, and helps sustain a merit-based model while, as a downside, permitting the senior leadership to stay engaged with national politics and facilitating orchestration of coups.

The GSO model requires a highly qualified small group of elite officers from whom senior leadership is drawn. GSOs are selected through a meticulous process and receive rigorous training at a very early stage of their career. A selection and training occurring at an early career stage constrain the adverse effects of patronage networks, nepotism relationships, and ethnically or politically motivated interferences on promotion processes. In this model, non-merit interventions are not absent but confined to an objectively selected and well-trained group. Even officers promoted through subjective interventions meet a certain level of merit criteria. Therefore, such a design appears as an organizational device assisting merit-based promotion patterns to persist.

4.5.2 Merit-Enhancing Coups

The conventional view in the literature is that coups and coup prevention efforts undermine merit-based promotions. Focusing overwhelmingly on personalist regimes or democracies, existing scholarship overlooks military-dominant regimes and their post-coup

activities. Contrary to the conventional view, I argue that coups may enhance officer promotions due to the officer corps' propensity to fractionalization and the post-coup period's volatile and conflict-prone nature. These two mutually reinforcing characteristics specific to the officer corps and the post-coup military regimes encourage military brass or the power-grabbing group to adopt a performance-sensitive coup-proofing approach, which relies on objective criteria in officer promotion. At the same time, they limit the extent of fratricidal violence such as imprisonments, exiles, purges, executions, etc. Professional socialization, networks, and in-depth knowledge of military personnel help avoid indiscriminate violence. A history of civil-military history conflict may galvanize the performance-sensitive coup-proofing approach in military regimes. Military regimes are far more likely to abstain from self-destructive and violent methods and maintain a balanced coup-proofing approach. This premise is more applicable to the coups instigated by the official military leadership. In factional and junior officer coups, survival and regime security concerns may outweigh long-term professional concerns. Regardless, even junior officer juntas are often compelled to consider preexisting intra-military power balances and professionalism to some extent to ward off or not provoke a counter putsch.

As a type of military-led autocracy, military regimes, in which leadership lies with a group of high and/or low-ranking officers rather than a single military officer who concentrates all power and authority in their personality, are very fragile (Geddes 1999, 2009; Geddes et al. 2014). Because power is shared among officers forming a junta, these regimes of the post-coup period are more susceptible to internal rivalry and conflict than any other regime type (Geddes et al. 2014). Given the military's perceived cohesiveness, the historical record confirms the army's and military regimes' fragility, as much a puzzling assumption as this might sound. Dissent and fratricidal violence, including infighting, desertion, purge, execution, exile, and rebellion, are

more common than one might think, hinting at an intrinsic cohesion problem in the military (Grewal, 2016; Lyall, 2020). More importantly, officers have been far more likely to overthrow military regimes' leadership than any other form of autocracy (Geddes, 2014, Franz & Ezrow, 2011; Gandhi, 2008, 176-7). Even when officers topple democratic leaders and dictators, military brass and incumbent regime's loyalists in the officer corps, who possess the potential to resist or retaliate, automatically become a target of post-coup violence.

The post-coup period is tumultuous and rife with uncertainties for a newly formed military regime. Rivalries within the power-grabbing group and potential challenges by officers excluded from the power are common (Geddes 2009). Coup plotters who seize both the political power and the military's leadership immediately face the urgent issue of managing these intra-military rivalries and dealing with the threat of a countercoup that can ouster them in a context where preexisting rules and legality are abrogated and delegitimized by the power grabbers themselves. In the absence of preexisting regulations to help manage power distribution among officers in such an environment, the possibility of intra-military conflict or a challenge to power-grabbing groups or the military leadership is higher than ever.

In such a context of uncertainty and instability, coup leaders seek to consolidate power but are confined to a risk-averse behavior not to upset delicate balances within the officer corps. Disruptive practices can easily aggravate preexisting or potential intra- and inter-group tensions and provoke a putsch. Such a worst-case scenario can embroil the officer corps into a vicious cycle of coups and countercoups, which would be very costly first and foremost to the power seizure group. Most senior officers unsurprisingly find such a perilous scenario alarming as it may also be dangerous to the country's security and defense.

Some direct results of over-cautiousness in a high-risk postcoup environment are impartial and fair practices in intra-military affairs. Concerns about cohesion problems (intra-military divisions and factional coups) lead the military regime to prioritize professionalism and abstain from nepotistic interferences, favoritism, and ethnic or political stacking. In short, professionalism becomes a survival strategy for the postcoup military regime, through which threats from within the officer corps are warded off and military effectiveness enhanced. The presence or frequency of fair practices in a military regime is often commensurate to the military's degree of preexisting institutionalization (Talmadge, 2016) and professionalism (Geddes, 2009).

Military leaders do not completely shy away from purging the military and introducing reforms in the post-coup period. However, they adopt a performance-sensitive approach reconciling two seemingly overlapping priorities: eliminating coup threats and maintaining professionalism. The post-coup personnel policies of military regimes stand in sharp contrast with those of personalist regimes or single-party dictatorships, which tend to be more cohesive and act more aggressively in coup-prevention reforms and purges. Personalist and single-party dictatorships ultimately prioritize the survival and sustainability of the existing regime at the expense of professionalism. In contrast, military regimes often keep the scope of purges confined only to senior figures and young officers actively and visibly involved in coup plotting or political activity. Their detailed knowledge of the institution and the officer corps helps them distinguish potential violators and minimize indiscriminating approaches in disciplining the military through various violent methods like a purge, exile, and imprisonment. An indiscriminating and violent approach can quickly destabilize the institution, undermine cohesion, and downgrade military effectiveness in the short and long term by legitimizing and

sowing the seeds of violent revanchism. The legibility of the military population to the leaders of the military regime is a crucial factor in permitting performance-sensitive purges and reforms in the aftermath of coups.

Finally, as a destabilizing shock, coups temporarily stun the preexisting patronage networks (clientelist and nepotic) within the officer corps, which have customarily undermined merit-based promotion patterns. The momentary paralysis of patronage networks absolves recruitment, selection, and promotion patterns of the non-merit influences of nepotic and clientelist relationships. Relieved from these negative pressures, officer promotions gained an instantaneous merit-based trajectory in the post-coup period. This can be interpreted as an inspection effect of coups on the officer promotion system.

4.5.3 Coups' Transient Effect on Promotions

As the post-coup uncertainty wanes, the extraordinary emphasis on professionalism often wears off, letting patronage networks within the officer corps resume undermining merit-based patterns. Also, military regimes are concerned about their own survival but, unlike other forms of autocracy, not so much about the sustainability of their direct rule. Because military leaders know that the army's direct and continuous engagement with politics may come with a heavy price and involve enormous professional and political risks; thus, they tend to relinquish the direct rule to civilians at the earliest convenience. Military regimes' limited lifespan helps constrain coups' effect to a limited period. Finally, promotion patterns' autonomous nature, especially their incremental, relapsing, and isolated characteristics, render coups' effect transient.

4.5.4 Merit-Based Promotions as a Long-Term Coup-Proofing Strategy

After devolving power to civilian government, military regimes rarely withdraw from the political stage entirely. They often establish tutelary rules through which they seek to maintain their grip over politics using various formal and informal mechanisms. In military tutelary regimes or tutelary democracies, a group of elected politicians governs the country, but military officers hold on to actual power. Some militaries in South Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and North Africa fall into this category (Bünthe 2021, Jenkins 2018, Cook 2007, Fitch 1998, Mango 1983, Schneider 2010). Because of their continuous involvement in politics, military tutelary regimes must deal with an enduring trilemma: How to steer politics and maintain the political power without politicizing the officer corps or while depoliticizing it; and how to coup-proof the military and depoliticize the officer corps without undermining the military's professional competence.

In military tutelary regimes, senior leaders see professionalism as an optimal strategy to address this trilemma. To a certain extent, it allows senior leadership to stay engaged in politics while helping pacify and depoliticize the bulk of the officer corps, especially the lower ranks. An emphasis on professionalism alleviates non-merit influences on recruitment and promotion procedures and augments military effectiveness.

Military leaders' concerns about intra-military divisions and military ineffectiveness usually transcend the immediate postcoup period. A performance-sensitive coup-proofing approach emphasizing stability through professionalism and aiming to ward off coup threats while maintaining military effectiveness crystallizes into the organizational procedures and culture. As the urgencies and uncertainties of the postcoup period vanish, patronage networks and nepotistic and clientelist relationships start to reappear and resume undermining merit-based

promotion patterns. Nevertheless, persisting concerns about coups and emphasis on professionalism mitigate their influence, allowing the military to maintain merit-based promotions in military regimes.

4.6 Data and Research Design

4.6.1 The Historical Officer Career Advancement (HCA) Dataset

This chapter introduces the original Historical Officer Career Advancement (HCA) Dataset. The HCA dataset contains biographical and professional information about approximately 17,000 army officers at the individual level. The dataset comprises military educational performance, ethnic-geographical background, branch and service information, and promotion decisions and dates at five levels, from brigadier general to service chief appointments. The dataset encompasses all army generals and general staff officers who have served in the Turkish army from 1923 to 2015. Career advancement data in the dataset includes specific information on each officer's early career performance—the military academy and general staff college graduation rankings—and senior-level career achievements—the highest rank and office achieved, and the time of promotion, appointment, and retirement based on approximately 35,000 individual-level Supreme Military Council (SMC) decisions.

Biographical and educational performance information is drawn from General Staff College (GSC) yearbooks, graduation albums, and promotion information is derived from the SMC decisions. I visited the GSC Library and second-hand bookstores in Istanbul and Ankara to collate a complete series of yearbooks and albums dating back to the GSC's foundation in 1848.

Due to constraints on administrative boundaries and census-related problems, I focus only on the republican period (post-1923). The SMC decisions have been published annually in the official gazette and national newspapers, typically involving lists of senior promotions and appointment decisions for each officer. I accessed them using the online databases of the Turkish Official Gazette and National Assembly and collections of Turkish dailies via the UW library. For the laborious works of digitization and dataset creation, I received assistance from two undergraduate research assistants from Turkey between 2016 and 2019.

The HCA dataset is in an event history data format. Each row in the dataset represents an evaluation (promotion decision) in the SMC for an individual in a given year. In an event-data form, each Individual appears in the dataset for each year when they were exposed to the risk of an event like assassination, death, birth, etc., in this case, only when they are evaluated for promotion. They do not appear only once or for all years throughout the period the study is concerned.⁵⁰ The frequency of each officer's appearance in the dataset is, thus, commensurate to the number of times they are evaluated in the SMC. Each time an individual is assessed in an annual meeting of the SMC, they receive a promotion score (1,0). In the years they are not evaluated, during the standard wait period between rank transitions or after retirement, they disappear from the dataset. Keeping only the years when an officer is evaluated for promotion and eliminating others from the dataset is called right censoring or truncation in event-history analysis.

For instance, in an event-data format, if a colonel promotes to brigadier general in their third evaluation, they appear three times in the dataset and leave until they reappear in the year they are evaluated for promotion to the subsequent rank (major general), typically after four

⁵⁰ I borrowed the terminology from demographic studies, in which it is used as the exposition to the risk of death, assassination, etc.

years. If they fail to be awarded a promotion after maximum wait and extension times in the SMC evaluations for this rank, they are dropped from the dataset for good. If they are promoted one more time, they reappear in the dataset in their next evaluation period after another four years for the promotion evaluation for the rank of lieutenant general. Although exceptions exist, a colonel is customarily evaluated up to six times on average, and general officers up to two times for each relevant rank.⁵¹ My dataset censors also any potential evaluations beyond this average evaluation times.

4.6.2 Interviews

I conducted in-depth interviews with officers, scholars, journalists, and politicians of military background in Istanbul and Ankara to support my archival work and quantitative analysis. My interviews in this chapter mainly focused on understanding the details of promotion procedures, customary practices, exceptions, and intra-institutional politics around it.

Before explaining my dependent and independent variables in depth, a brief review of the Turkish military's officer recruitment, training, and promotion model might be helpful.

4.6.3 Officer Recruitment, Training, and Promotion in the Turkish Military

The Turkish Armed Forces' officer recruitment, training, and promotion model consist of four critical stages (See Figure 4.1):

(1) Recruitment and Military High School Training,

⁵¹ Interviews with Colonel H.G. Major T.B., Lt.Col. M.G., Lt. Col. A.L. (WhatsApp, 2021)

- (2) Military Academy Training and Commissioning as an Officer,
- (3) Entry into General Staff Officer Corps,
- (4) General Officer and Service Chief Appointments.




Figure 4.1: Officer recruitment, training, and promotion model of the Turkish Armed Forces

Military High Schools: Military High Schools (MHS) constitute the recruitment and early training phase through which most officers enter the system and receive their first military-academic training under the uniform.⁵² In the republican period of Turkish history, mostly three MHSs existed, while in the late Ottoman period, the number of Military Middle and High Schools reached 26. Some of the Ottoman-era schools remained outside of Modern Turkey's borders, and most of those remaining within current borders were shut down by founding leaders

⁵² Until a certain period some Military Middle Schools existed as the remnants of the Late Ottoman Model but disappeared over time.

via the Education Unification Law of 1924.⁵³ Only Istanbul-Kuleli MHS, Izmir-Maltepe MHS, and Bursa-Işıklar MHS continued to serve as primary sources of early officer training and education.⁵⁴ The MHS cadets have been selected through a centrally administered and highly competitive nationwide exam, composed of aptitude and physical tests, and interviews. The MHS admission process has often been considered merit based. Acceptance rates of MHSs ranged between 2 and 10 percent over time depending on the condition of the economy and the popularity of military profession among the public.⁵⁵ The MHSs have offered rigorous science and foreign-language-focused curricula akin to the highly competitive Anatolian and Science public schools and some prestigious private schools in Turkey.

Service Academies: After completing the MHS training, cadets join the Army or the Air Force Academies. The Navy has had a parallel system: After graduating from the Naval High School in Heybeliada, Istanbul, officer candidates attend the Naval Academy in Tuzla, Istanbul.

Concurrently, all service academies have directly admitted cadets from civilian high schools through the centrally proctored university exam and some physical tests and interviews that take place annually. In all military academies, cadets receive four-year academic, military, and leadership training and are awarded bachelor's degrees in various academic disciplines (mostly engineering) depending on the needs of their services since 1974. The academy education was 2 years prior to this date except for brief period of three-year education immediately before 1974.

Upon graduation from the military academy, a cadet receives their commission as a second

⁵³ 3 March 1924 date and 430 numbered Education Unification Law (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*). This law transformed military middle schools into high schools. Another law passed in 1925 placed military schools back under Ministry of Defense.

⁵⁴ These three schools were shut down via a presidential decree after the July 2016 coup attempt.

⁵⁵ Interview with BK and LC, who served as Student Supervisors in two different MHSs in the early 2000s (WhatsApp, 2019).

lieutenant,⁵⁶ and participates in one of the branch schools scattered around the country for about a year depending on their assigned branch. For instance, infantry officers attend the Infantry School in Tuzla, Istanbul; artillery officers go to the Artillery and Missile School in Polatli, Ankara.

Early Career of an Officer: After completing Military Academy and the branch training, all second lieutenants receive their first assignment orders and disperse across the country to assume their first professional roles as an officer. After six years of field service, typically in a few different units and bases, officers reach a watershed moment: Continue their career as a branch officer or join the General Staff Officer (GSO) corps. A small percentage of each cohort of officers (between 5-10) are allowed to become GSO. Between the 6th and 12th years of their career, each officer is eligible to take the General Staff College (GSC) entrance exam up to six times.⁵⁷ Successful candidates are admitted to the GSC as the first critical step to joining the Turkish military's distinguished GSO corps from which the military's ruling elite has been drawn. Entry into the GSC has been voluntary based. It has been widely considered an indicator of an officer's commitment to a military career, if not a complete approval of institutional norms. This is important to note because it alleviates the effect of self-selection bias in assessing the dynamics of promotions in the following career stages. In the GSO model, we can assume that promotion or retirement decisions at the senior level often belong to the institution, not to the individuals.

⁵⁶ Before 1974, cadets were commissioned as reserve officer and promote to the rank of the second lieutenant after one year of service in this rank.

⁵⁷ In the pre-republican model, GSOs were selected based only on candidates' performance in the military academy. Top performers of each cohort were automatically qualified to enter the GSC. In the Ottoman period military academy graduation ranking was the sole criterion. Only those who graduated within the first 10th percentile were eligible to follow the staff officer track which over time became the rite of passage to generalship.

General Staff Officer (GSO): After finishing the GSC training,⁵⁸ officers qualify as GSOs. As a rite of passage to a successful career in the Turkish military, GSO membership means becoming part of an elite group of officers with distinct privileges like the assignment to important commanding and military-diplomatic posts, working in prestigious headquarters under the supervision of and in close coordination with prominent general officers, thereby gaining access to highly exclusive networks of the political, business, and bureaucratic elite of the country. More important, membership in the GSO corps is a critical gateway to becoming a general or admiral as about 95 percent of general officers are selected from among GSOs but a necessary condition for promotion and assignments beyond the rank of major general.

General Officer Promotions and the Supreme Military Council: General officers, commonly referred to as Pashas (*Paşa*) following the common usage in the Ottoman period, have historically enjoyed enormous social prestige and political power in Turkey. Therefore, promotion into the general officer ranks—Brigadier General, Major General, Lieutenant General, and Full General—in the army has been the most significant career milestone for Turkish officers, to the extent that it was described by an officer as “transferring from one world to another” (Birand 1990).⁵⁹

The career pathway for becoming a general in the Turkish military has been increasingly institutionalized and standardized since the mid 19th century. The primary institutional

⁵⁸ The duration of GSC training varied over time. It was 3 years before the Second World War when the Turkish Military was under the influence of German Military Doctrine. The staff education was reduced to two years in the late 1940s with the suggestions of American Military Advisors.

⁵⁹ Unlike in some European and North American military traditions, the rank of Colonel (or Captain in the navy and coast guard) is not difficult to achieve in the Turkish military and almost all officers who complete standard wait times and reach sufficient seniority are promoted to this level.

arrangement helping this gradual standardization process is the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which was created in 1925 and reformed in 1972.⁶⁰ Convening twice a year, the SMC evaluates eligible cohorts of officers for promotion to the general officer cadres and associated posts. Council decides their appointment to specific roles and posts. Senior military officers have dominated the composition of the council throughout most of the republican period, a major factor ensuring the autonomy of the Turkish military. As Posner states, “Power [in military organizations] is won through influence over who is promoted to positions of senior command. Control over the promotion of officers is the source of power in the military. (Posner, 1991, 20) From 1972 to 2018, statutory SMC members included thirteen full generals, the prime minister (chair), and the minister of defense.⁶¹ The makeup of the SMC significantly reduced the influence of civilian leaders on the military. Overall, the SMC plays a critical role in shaping the senior military leadership composition.

According to several scholars and officers I have interviewed, every single detail of an officer’s professional, social, and private life has been weighted in the SMC evaluations.⁶² A small question mark in any aspect of an officer’s professional and private life could cause a red flag.⁶³ My informants suggest also that patronage networks and ideological and political loyalties may affect the decisions as well.

⁶⁰ The Law about the Organization and Duties of the Military Council, 22 April 1924, No: 636; The Law about the Foundation and Duties of the SMC, 17 June 1972, No: 1612.

⁶¹ The Law about the Foundation and Duties of the SMC, 17 June 1972, No: 1612. Traditionally officers dominated the SMC in Turkey as a marker of the autonomy of the Turkish officer corps. The structure of the SMC was altered with a presidential decree in 2018. The number of generals reduced to four and additional cabinet members replaced other generals.

⁶² General Hifzi Cubuklu, Former Judge Advocate General of the Turkish General Staff, (Ankara, April 2019); See also Birand’s, *Shirts of Steel*, 1990, Pg.

⁶³ Interview with General (R) Ahmet Yavuz, a former Superintendent of the Army Staff College (Istanbul, 2019).

Service Chiefs: Customarily, service chiefs are appointed from among the most senior full generals. The selection and appointment process of service chiefs is quite complex as civilian politicians may also be involved in the process depending on the degree of the military's autonomy or the civilian government's political power. Especially the selection of the Army Chief (Land Forces Commander) is critical, because, unless their age and military tenure-time impede, Army chiefs have been customarily appointed as the Chief of General Staff (CGS) upon the end of the incumbent's term. There are strict age and time limits regulating the service terms of the Turkish military's top leadership. These rules gradually took shape after the transition to the democratic period in 1950 and especially after the 1960 coup.⁶⁴ During the single Party Period (1923-1950), General Fevzi Cakmak served as the CGS for 23 years, followed by short tenures of three other generals. After 1950, the length of each CGS's term ranged between 1 to 6 years, and from the 1980 coup until recently, it remained consistently 4 years. Despite some periods of exception, until 2016, the CGS has occupied a critical place in both political and military spheres with its direct commanding authority on all services, status above minister of defense, and critical influence in the National Security Council and SMC decisions.

4.6.4 Dependent Variable: Promotion Decision (0,1)

My dependent variable concerns promotion dynamics at the five different ranks of the general officer corps, specifically those who have been drawn from the GSO corps. I collected and coded promotion information for all Turkish GSOs by examining the SMC decisions at the brigadier general level and above between 1924 and 2015. Promotion information, including the

⁶⁴ 926 numbered TAF Personnel Code.

highest rank achieved by each officer, is provided in graduation albums published by the GSC allowing me to crosscheck the veracity of promotion information. I coded my outcome variable, “promotion,” as “1” if an officer is promoted in an SMC evaluation at a certain year and “0” if they were forced to retire or received an extension.

It is important to know if a person voluntarily retires or is forcibly sent to retirement. Most voluntary retirement decisions in the Turkish officer corps come in the early career stages. We can make a similar assumption for ethnic minorities regarding their voluntary retirement decisions on ethnic grounds. Promotion in a military organization is commensurate to the degree of acknowledgment and following the established institutional norms if not internalizing them. I assume that the more a person stays in the system the lower the likelihood of maintaining his Kurdish identity, or conversely the higher the likelihood of his embracement of institutional norms and ethos. Also, even if a member maintains his ethnic identity and openly portrays it, his promotion above the rank of colonel is highly unlikely. Although we can’t know this for sure without empirical evidence, the army’s general posture and attitude towards Kurdish self-expression can be telling. So, voluntary retirement above the rank of colonel is often for professional grounds and rare (I assume it here). So, one assumption of my study, and it is a limitation, is that nobody retires voluntarily after the rank of colonel.

A challenge for constructing a dataset in the event format is that it requires the year of evaluation/promotion information in addition to the promotion decision information for each individual. For the 1990-2015 period, my promotion data is observational, namely includes the exact years for SMC evaluation (promotion or no-promotion decision) for each officer at five rank levels. I manually entered these years and associated promotion decisions using Turkey’s SMC decisions. Extracting promotion data is a laborious task and I have had limited time and

resources to locate and scrutinize the SMC decisions for the remaining years. Instead, for the 1924-1989 period, I have developed a simple model to estimate the year of the first and subsequent evaluations. This model estimates the years of evaluation for each officer and rank with a small margin of error based on the standard wait times and extension clauses in the TAF Personnel Code.⁶⁵ I also held several interviews with retired officers from different ranks to make sense of the how the law and regulations are practiced, what kind of factors influences decisions, how political and intra-institutional events effects them, and especially, what the established practices are beyond the law.⁶⁶ My findings show that although some unwritten appointment patterns have existed, the officer promotions are made according to the law, with elasticity usually within the boundaries of law. These patterns are to an important extent established after the 1960 coup. If law openly dictates a rule, there is little example of violation. This is most visible in age or term limits imposed on the Chief of General Staff. No violations of law occurred so far.

The Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Code designates different standard wait times for each rank from the second lieutenant to the full general. Table 4.1 provides an overview of adjustments in standard wait times for each rank per amendments to the Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Code. As shown in the table, the standard wait time for each rank varies over time. Since 1975, the total standard service time for each general staff officer from his commissioning as a second lieutenant until his first evaluation in the Supreme Military Council (SMC) for promotion to the Brigadier General level has been 26 years, on average. Before 1975 when the

⁶⁵ Law No: 926, TAF Personnel Code, Article 38/b.

⁶⁶ Interviews with HG, WhatsApp 2020; T.U., WhatsApp, 2020; BK, WhatsApp, 2020; T.F., WhatsApp, 2020; Gen. H. Cubuklu, Ankara, 2019; Gen. A. Yavuz, Istanbul 2019; Gen. S. Kisacik, Ankara 2019; Gen. E. Karakus, Ankara 2019; H.Y, Ankara, 2019; A.V. Ankara, 2019.

military academy education was two years, the total standard wait time was accordingly two years longer, about 28 years.⁶⁷

Table 4.1: Standard wait times for each rank and their variation over time.

	1942 ⁶⁸	1950 ⁶⁹	1967 ⁷⁰	1971 ⁷¹	1975 ⁷²	1982 ⁷³	1989 ⁷⁴	1993 ⁷⁵
<i>2nd Lieutenant</i>	0.5 +3	0.5 +3.5	3	3	3	3	3	3
<i>1st Lieutenant</i>	3	6	6	6	3	6	6	6
<i>Captain</i>	6	6	6	6	9	6	6	6
<i>Major</i>	4	6	6	6	6	6	5	5
<i>Lt. Colonel</i>	3	6	4	3	3	3	3	3
<i>Colonel</i>	3	3	4	4	6	6	5	5
-----Total	22	31	29	28	30	30	28	28
<i>Brig. General</i>	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	4
<i>Maj. General</i>	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	4
<i>Lt. General</i>	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	4
<i>General</i>	3	3	3	4	4	4	3	4
-----Total	35	43	41	44	46	46	41	44

⁶⁷ For each general staff officer, the standard wait period was automatically reduced by 3 years, making the wait time as they are awarded 3-year early promotions. My estimation ignores other early promotion possibilities for which typically 5 per cent of each cohort qualifies.

⁶⁸ Law No: 4273, 19.06.1942, O.G.: 25.06.1942, Sayı 5141 (Newly commissioned officers serve as a reserve officer (*astegmen*) in their first six months and later as a second lieutenant three years. We consider this period as 4 years for the easiness of calculation)

⁶⁹ Law No: 5611, 26.01.1950, O.G.: 24.11.1950, Number 7465 (Air Force: 1+3+5+5++5+5+3+2+3+3+3 years; Navy: 1+3+5+6+5+5+3+3+3+3+3 years) – Newly commissioned officers serve as a reserve officer (*astegmen*) in their first six months and later as a second lieutenant three and half years.

⁷⁰ Law No: 926, 27.07.1967, O.G.: 21.08.1967, Number 12670 (Officers are started to be commissioned as second lieutenant by this law)

⁷¹ Law No: 1424, 07.07.1971, O.G. 14.07.1971, Number 13895

⁷² Law No: 1923, 03.07.1975, O.G. 11.07.1975, Number 15292

⁷³ Law No: 2642, 26.03.1982, O.G.: 30.03.1982, Number 17649 (General staff Officers could receive an outstanding performance promotion only once)

⁷⁴ Law No: 3593, 07.12.1989, O.G.: 15.12.1989, Number 20373

⁷⁵ Law No: 3909, 06.05.1993, O.G.: 12.05.1993, Number 21579 (Reserve Officer standard wait time is 9 months) (Officers are started to be evaluated in the SMC one year before they complete their standard wait time. Officers who were promoted before completing standard wait time were considered as they completed their standard wait time)

To estimate the year a Colonel’s first evaluation for the rank of Brigadier General, I add the total standard wait time to the Military Academy Graduation Year. For pre- and post-1974 periods, I consider different cumulative standard wait times using Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: The minimum required total service time for initial SMC evaluation for each rank.

	<i>1942</i>	<i>1950⁷⁶</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1993</i>
<i>Brigadier</i>	22	31	29	28	30	30	28	28
<i>Major G.</i>	25	34	32	32	34	34	32	32
<i>Lt. G.</i>	28	37	35	36	38	38	35	36
<i>Full G.</i>	31	40	38	40	42	42	38	40
<i>S. Chief</i>	34	43	41	44	46	46	41	44

The formulas I use for estimation can be seen below:

(1923-1974) Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Colonel-to-Brigadier = MA Graduation Year + 28

(1975-2015) Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Colonel-to-Brigadier = MA Graduation Year + 26

The subsequent evaluation for a Brigadier General for promotion is upon completing their rank’s standard wait period, which is three years before 1974 and four years as of 1975. This applies to all ranks within the category of generals. Namely, each general officer in the HCA dataset has been evaluated for promotion by the SMC with 3- or 4-year intervals. In case a general officer is not promoted in their first evaluation, there are specific and complex rules as to how many more times they could be assessed by the SMC for the same rank, or put differently, how many extensions they could receive before being sent to retirement.⁷⁷ For the sake of

⁷⁶ Between 1960-1967 the cumulative service time before first eval in SMC is 25, as of 1960 total early promotion year was dropped from 4 to 3.

⁷⁷ See the Personnel Code (Law 926), article 49/d (am. KHK/681 1.2.2017) and article 49/f (am. KHK/499 8.9.1993)

simplicity, if the promotion date of an officer is unknown, I assumed that they were promoted in their first evaluation, and if they could not, were forced to retire after their second evaluation with a “no-promotion” decision.

My formulas for estimating the promotion years for these ranks are as follows:

(1923-1970) Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Brigadier-to-Major G. = MA Graduation Year + 28 +3

Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Major G.-to-Lit. G. = MA Graduation Year + 28 +6

Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Lit G.-to-Full G. = MA Graduation Year + 28 +9

(1971-1974) Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Brigadier-to-Major G. = MA Graduation Year + 28 +4

Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Major G.-to-Lit. G. = MA Graduation Year + 28+8

Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Lit G. -to-Full G. = MA Graduation Year + 28 +12

(1975-2015) Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Brigadier-to-Major G. = MA Graduation Year + 26 +4

Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Major G.-to-Lit. G. = MA Graduation Year + 26 +8

Estimated Year of First Evaluation for Lit G. -to-Full G. = MA Graduation Year + 26 +12

4.6.5 Independent Variables

4.6.5.1 The Military Academy Graduation Ranking (MAGR)

As my primary independent variable, the MAGR helps operationalize each officer’s early career performance at the individual level relative to other officers in their cohort. It is the primary merit criteria I am using in my analysis. When the MAGR has a significant positive effect on promotions, officer promotions can be said to be merit-based. It means that officers with better military academy performance are more likely to be selected or promoted all else is equal. A negative or no significant relationship between the MAGR and promotion would

support Hypothesis 2, reflecting the dominant view in the literature suggesting that promotions in armies with strong political influence and entanglement tend to be non-merit based.

The MAGR is calculated using the five criteria below measured throughout a cadet's four-year military academy education and training per the Military Academies Law (*Harp Okulları Kanunu*):⁷⁸

- (1) **Average Academic GPA** (% 60), based on 4-year cadet performance in a standard engineering curriculum approved by Turkey's Higher Education Council.
- (2) **Average Physical Training score** (% 10), based on cadet performance through quarterly evaluations in each academic year covering the topics of basic and combat physical training.
- (3) **Average Military Training Score** (% 10), based on intensive individual, squad, and company-level military training and drills during the academic year and summer camps.
- (4) **Average Leadership Performance Score** (% 10): Cadets start taking on various roles in the cadet command chain and are evaluated based on their performance by their peers, senior cadets, and supervisors.
- (5) **Disciplinary Score** (% 10): Each student starts the academy with a full score and as they commit any disciplinary violations or infringements, their score decreases based on scores associated with each violation explained in the Military Academy Law or Cadet Penal Code.

The MAGR offers a compelling operationalization of each officer's early career performance because it (1) offers a composite metric capturing an officer's different skill sets

⁷⁸ The Military Academies Law, 1991, Article 111. For earlier periods, calculations were similar and based on academic, military, and physical training averages.

critical for a successful military career; (2) allows interpersonal comparison without further need for standardization; (3) is based on evaluations of several academics, physical training instructors, military trainers, and peers; therefore, it is largely free from subjective influences; (4) addresses the question of consistency and minimizes the risk of incidental success by taking in to account average scores for a period of four years.

The values refer to the raw rankings in the dataset. Using percentiles could be a better metric allowing easier comparison across years due to the changing size of cohorts over time. However, because the Turkish military academy's cohort sizes have shown limited variation over time, the raw graduation ranking data can be considered a reliable and comparable metric for an individual professional performance despite its limitations.

4.6.5.2 General Staff College Graduation Ranking (GSCGR)

In addition to the military academy graduation ranking, I gathered data on general staff college graduation rankings (GSCGR). This information is reflective of the performance of an officer in the early years of their professional career in their late twenties and early thirties. Like the MAGR, the GSCGR is an important measure of merit. Therefore, a positive significant relationship between the GSCGR and Promotion would offer evidence of merit-based promotion patterns, and a negative would offer evidence of non-merit-based promotion patterns.

The GSCGR is bound by important practical constraints as an effective measure of merit-based promotions because academy albums contain data for only the highest performers in each cohort. Until 1960, only those who graduated at the top of their cohort were recorded.⁷⁹ After

⁷⁹ For the Navy, this transition occurred in 1970.

1960, the highest three performers have been identified. Although this data is not entirely useful for statistical analysis, it can help us make some inferences. If the top performers of GSC achieved higher ranks over time, we can consider it as both a viable sign of an officer's continuing early career performance and a predictor of (if not statistically) senior-level career achievements. It is insufficient alone for making inferences for broader promotion patterns yet should be considered a supplementary factor.

4.6.5.3 Perceived Estimated Ethnicity (Kurdishness)

Ethnic identity is often an important non-merit criterion affecting promotion decisions in practice, even if not openly mentioned in regulatory documents or despite laws aiming to prevent its influence. I specifically look at the impact of having a Kurdish ethnic origin on the likelihood of an officer's promotion. A positive or negative significant relationship between ethnicity and promotion would offer support for the thesis that ethnicity matters in promotions in multiethnic armies thereby their non-merit-based promotion patterns. A positive relationship would indicate that Kurdish ethnic background helps an officer's career advancement, whereas a negative relationship implies that it would hurt the probability of promotion.

The HCA dataset contains information about each officer's home province. I use hometown as a proxy of ethnic identity. But for sake of more compelling quantitative analysis and alleviation of ecological bias, I quantify ethnic identity by assigning a value to each officer indicating their probability of Kurdishness. Instead of accepting an individual from a majority-Kurdish province as ethnically Kurdish automatically, I use the ratio of the Kurdish population to the total population in each province. The main problem with this approach is the availability of census data showing ethnic distributions in each province in each census. Since especially 1965,

the Turkish state consciously avoided collecting ethnic-based census data. So, my approach requires the estimation of Kurds' ratio to total population for each province and year between 1923 and 2015. Using the extant estimation models and figures in the secondary literature, specifically borrowing from Mutlu (1995) and Koc (2008), and each population census administered in Turkey's republican period, I have come up with 92 probability values for each of the 81 provinces in Turkey. In short, each individual in the dataset is assigned a value of Kurdishness (perceived estimated ethnicity) based on his province of birth and year of promotion. The method of estimation is explained in detail in APPENDIX-II.

My approach assumes ethnicity as a dynamic phenomenon because Kurdishness value is associated with the ethnic makeup and population size of each province and in a given promotion year. The Kurdishness value of each individual may change over time depending on variation in a province's population and its ethnic distribution. For instance, the perceived estimated Kurdishness value for a colonel from Diyarbakir in 2000 can be different in 2004 when he is evaluated for his next promotion.

Below are my other assumptions regarding the estimated ethnicity variable:

- a. I coded the estimated ethnicity of those born in formerly Ottoman states or nearby countries like Macedonia, Greece, Albania, etc. as "0", as these countries have no Kurdish population.
- b. I coded the ethnicity of those born in Iraq, Iran, and Syria as .25 for all years, as these countries have a significant Kurdish population. (More accurate approach would be to gather historical, ethnic distribution data for each of the three countries, which happen to be former Ottoman provinces)

- c. The analysis excluded Western European states as the ethnic composition of immigrants from Turkey to these countries is unknown but includes a sizeable number of Kurds.

4.6.5.4 Military Branch

In a military career, officers' professional branch usually matters. It may affect individuals' involvement in actual combat scenarios, technology, and administrative duties, therefore their likelihood of promotion, depending on an army's culture, organization, and participation in various forms of conflicts. In a GSO model, however, this information matters less because all the officers admitted in the GSC are trained to gradually assume all staff and commanding roles in combat and combat support units ranging from the battalion to the army. Branch differences are expected to diminish over time. However, it is common in the militaries using the GSO model that certain branches dominate the senior posts. This may be related to several factors, including military culture, organizational culture, and the importance of a branch for the extant military doctrine of the time. Also, the popularity of a branch among military academy cadets may affect their choices, and therefore the distribution of high-performing cadets across military branches. Most successful officer candidates may concentrate in popular branches without institutional measures to ensure a balanced distribution.

In the Turkish case, artillery officers have long dominated the highest posts. Some in the Turkish military circles explained this by the fact that most successful cadets always chose the artillery branch in the military academy. In other words, it has been their credentials that helped them reach the top ranks, not their branch type. But others suggest that socialization in branch

schools and networks developed in their early career allowed artillery officers to dominate the commanding positions continuously. Recently, in the post-cold war period, we have observed the rise of the infantry branch, especially with a rising global emphasis on unconventional conflict types, in which the Turkish military has also been involved since 1984. Currently, all the highest positions in the Turkish army and Turkish General Staff are occupied by Signal and Automated Information Processing Officers, maybe reflecting the growing importance of communication and data processing in modern warfare. It is too recent to reach a conclusion as it is hard to predict if this new phenomenon will be reflected in broader promotion patterns. It may just be a coincidence or provisional conjecture. Regardless, I use a control for the military branch in case there are any differential effects on promotion patterns.

4.6.5.5 Coups and Memorandums

A primary concern of my analysis is to make sense of how major historical events influence promotion dynamics. I specifically focus on the impact of military intervention, regime change/type, and violent conflict on promotion patterns between 1950 and 2015.

Since the early years of the democratic period, the Turkish military has continuously been involved in politics, playing mostly a dominant role and routinely staging coups and issuing memorandums, I investigate the impact of the Turkish military's domestic political interventions on its officer promotion patterns listed below.

Domestic Political Interventions:

- (1) 1960 (factional coup)
- (2) 1962 (failed attempt - factional)
- (3) 1963 (failed attempt - factional)

- (4) 1971 (failed attempt – factional)
- (5) 1971 (military memorandum)
- (6) 1980 (Coup within the chain of command)
- (7) 1997 (military memorandum)
- (8) 2007 (failed attempt- military memorandum)

First, I measure the implications of different types of military interventions. I expect coups that occurred within the official chain of command and junior officer coups have divergent effects on promotions, at least temporarily, because different type of power-grabbing groups may have different internal characteristics and different priorities even though they both constitute military regimes.

Second, I measure whether a coup occurred in the one-, two-, three-, or four-year period and then lag that by one year. Such an approach allows capturing if and how the effects of a coup persist or wear away over time. It also mitigates the effects of potential estimation errors regarding promotion dates for the pre-1990 period for which I used a simple estimation model drawing on the legal procedures and customary practices.

The coup-related variables I utilize are as follows:

- (1) ‘**CoupWhier**’ refers to coups staged under the official chain of command.
- (2) ‘**CoupOhier**’ refers to coups staged outside of the military’s official hierarchy.
- (3) ‘**CoupMemo**’ refers to military memorandums issued by the chief of general staff and service chiefs warning the civilian government.
- (4) ‘**CoupSuccess**’ refers to a coup successful at replacing the incumbent civilian government.
- (5) ‘**CoupFail**’ refers to an attempted coup failing to replace the incumbent government or achieve targeted political or military goals.
- (6) ‘**Coupthisyear**’ refers to a year when any type of military intervention listed above occurred.

- (7) ‘**Couplastyear**’ includes the year following the one when any type of military intervention happened.
- (8) ‘**Coupwithin2years**’ encompasses the two years following a coup year.
- (9) ‘**Coupwithin3years**’ encompasses the three years following a coup year.
- (10) ‘**Coupwithin4years**’ encompasses the four years following a coup year.

The direct influence of coups on a promotion decision sounds not very meaningful at first glance when a dependent variable is a binary outcome (0,1), yet a positive significant relationship between a coup and promotion implies that an officer's likelihood of promotions increases after a coup simply because coups lead often to a major change in command structure and senior leadership positions allowing higher chances for officers to promote and fill these ranks.

Coups' influence on merit-based promotion can be best understood through the investigation of the interaction between coups and the MAGR. It captures how coups impact the relationship between the MAGR and Promotion. A negative significant relationship would imply that coups would undermine merit-based promotions, in other words, decrease the likelihood of an officer with superior MAGR to promote at the general officer level *ceteris paribus*. Contrastingly, a positive significant effect would mean that coups would enhance the merit-based nature of promotions. The first would support the established view in the literature (Hypothesis 1) and the latter would offer evidence for my theory of performance-sensitive coup proofing in military regimes.

Similarly, coups' interaction with ethnicity allows for exploring whether coups have any impact on the existing relationship between ethnicity and promotion. A positive statistically significant result would mean that after coups ethnicity becomes a more impactful criterion for one's promotion. Regarding the case at hand, it would imply that when a coup occurs an increase

in one's probability of Kurdishness would enhance their likelihood of promotion. It would offer support for Hypothesis 1.

4.6.5.6 Regime Type

An important goal of this research is to assess the impact of regime type on promotion patterns. I particularly investigate how post-coup military regimes, compared to other regime types, affect the relationship between MAGR and promotion patterns. As a full democratic period is lacking in the Turkish case, I first distinguish between periods of civilian dominance and military dominance and then investigate the effects of each post-coup period. It helps capture the influence of civilian versus military dominant periods as well as periods following different types of military interventions. These periods I control for are as follows:

(1) Single Party Period (1923-1949): The period starts with the pronouncement of the republic and ends with the transition to democracy in 1950. Because elections were held before the SMC meeting of 1950, I end the period in 1949.

(2) Civilian Dominance (1950-1959; 2007-2015) includes two periods when the civilian government had clear control over the military in the democratic period. I have adjusted the cutoff points based on the exact date of SMC and the occurrence of the coup/memorandum. 27 May Coup in 1960 and 27 April Memorandum in 2007 were before the SMC meetings in those years.

(3) Military Dominance (1960-2006) covers the period when the military enjoyed dominance over civilian governments and has substantial autonomy over promotions. I have also created different sub-categories of coups to measure the impact of periods after different types of interventions.

(4) **Post1960** (1960-1970) encompasses the period from the May 27 coup in 1960 to March 12 Memorandum in 1971. Because the memorandum came before the SMC meeting, I left 1971 for promotion decisions outside of this period.

(5) **Post1971** (1971-1980) This period covers the entire 1970s and 1980 as the SMC met before the 1980 coup, on September 12.

(6) **Post1980** (1981-1996) This post-September-12 coup period continues until the Memorandum of February 28, 1997.

(7) **Post1997** (1997-2006) covers the years from the February 28 Memorandum to April 27 Memorandum in 2007. The period ends in 2006 because the 1997 SMC meeting was after the memorandum.

(8) **Post2007** (2007-2015) encompasses the years between the 2007 Memorandum and the failed coup of July 2016. The last SMC before the July 15 coup attempt met in August 2015.

I am particularly interested in the interaction of each period with the MAGR. This interaction captures how each regime type affects the MAGR-Promotion relationship, namely the merit-based nature of promotions. A regime type's negative significant effect would imply that it would undermine merit-based promotions (Hypothesis 2), in other words, decrease the likelihood of an officer with better MAGR to promote at the general officer level *ceteris paribus*. In contrast, a positive significant result would mean that it would enhance the merit-based nature of promotions.

4.6.5.7 Violent Conflicts (International and Intrastate Conflicts)

The Turkish military has been involved in various international and internal conflicts while staying involved in politics. These conflicts may have confounded the coups' influence on promotions, as much as they have autonomously affected which officer has been selected and promoted for critical posts. Conflict may shape officer promotion patterns in two ways: First, as a threat, it can undermine the merit-based nature of promotion patterns due to discriminatory policies toward officers who are part of ethnic or religious minorities that are associated with the existing internal or external threat. Second, conflict may have an inspection effect on the military and “meritocratize” it. It can provide officers with normally impossible promotion opportunities under duress by mitigating cultural biases or breaking patronage networks. Instead of ethnic stacking, political and military leaders may feel compelled to assign the best and brightest to critical posts to win the conflict. In sum, the conflict variables allow for capturing and controlling for the effect of internal and external threat perception. Therefore, I control for the effect of two violent conflict types: international conflicts and intrastate conflicts (ethnic conflict and rebellions).

Intrastate (Ethnic) Conflict: With regards to the ethnic composition of the senior officer leadership and promotion patterns in Turkey, the most important intrastate conflicts are the still-continuing violent conflict between the Turkish security forces and the PKK as well as ethnic rebellions in the early republican period in the 1920s and 30s. Regarding the recent armed conflict, I have created a binary conflict variable, coding each conflict for each year and province between 1984 and 2015, using province-based conflict data from the UPSALA conflict database. For the early republican rebellions, I have coded conflict information (location and year) drawing on the secondary literature, mostly historical sources. The intrastate conflicts I coded in the Turkish case are as follows:

1. Kurdish Rebellions - 1930s (The Turkish forces managed to quell these uprisings in various Southeastern Provinces)
2. Dersim Operation – 1938 (The Turkish forces managed to quell these uprisings in the Southeastern Province of Tunceli—formerly named Dersim)
3. Armed Conflict with the PKK– 1984-2015 (If not able to end the uprising, the Turkish army has been generally successful against the PKK)

International Conflicts (Wars): The Turkish military mobilized and prepared for three major international conflicts between 1923 and 2015. I control for the effect of international conflicts is listed below:

1. World War 2 (Even if the Turkish Military did not actively participate in the war, it felt various effects of war through mass mobilization, exercises, and preparations.)
2. Korean War -1950-53 (Turkish brigade and soldiers were praised internationally for their combat performance)
3. Cyrus Operation – 1974 (The Turkish military successfully planned and conducted its first combined arms operation using air force, naval, airborne and amphibious units)

4.6.6 Model

For my event history analysis of the historical promotion patterns in the Turkish officer corps, I use a hazard dataset with person-years as the units of analysis. In a hazard dataset of promotion, individuals are censored when they're not exposed to the risk of promotion. I use logistic regression as a statistical model to analyze the effects of the time-variant and time-

invariant (merit and non-merit) covariates on officer promotion. Because the primary concern of this study, coups, take place at particular points in time, changes in promotion patterns can also occur at particular points in time. Therefore, when analyzing changes in promotion patterns, I treat the time-variant factors as discrete variables.

In a dataset prepared for even history analysis, each individual appears in the dataset for each year when they were exposed to the risk of an event like assassination, death, birth, etc. In my analysis, they appear in the dataset only when they are evaluated for promotion in the SMC. Namely, they do not appear only once or for all years throughout the period the study is concerned.⁸⁰ The frequency of each officer's appearance in the dataset is, thus, commensurate to the number of times they are evaluated in the SMC. Each time an individual is assessed in an annual meeting of the SMC, they receive a promotion score (1,0). In the years they are not evaluated, during the standard wait period between rank transitions or after retirement, they disappear from the dataset. Keeping only the years when an officer is evaluated for promotion and eliminating others from the dataset is called right censoring or truncation in event-history analysis.

4.7 Findings

4.7.1 Historical Promotion Patterns in the Turkish Officer Corps

4.7.1.1 Relationship between the MAGR and GSC Admissions

⁸⁰ I borrowed the terminology from demographic studies, in which it is used as the exposition to the risk of death, assassination, etc.

As explained before, admission to the GSC marks the beginning of membership in the GSO corps and is a rite of passage to a successful career in the Turkish military. Since the late Ottoman period, an overwhelming majority of generals have been of GSO origin (95 percent), and only the members of the GSO corps have been allowed to advance beyond the rank of Major General. The top military leadership has always been made up of the members of this group. Although there are specific and clear rules about the admission process of GSC, no research has been conducted on whether this privileged elite group is selected based on merit or if subjective factors have been at play. In the Ottoman period, the selection process was based directly on MAGR. The top 25 percentile among military academy graduates automatically gained the right to attend the GSC. And almost half of the attendees were allowed to become a GSO upon graduating from the GSC. The selection process in the republican period has been slightly different. In addition to military academy performance, Officers have been evaluated based on an exam they have to take between the sixth to twelfth years of their career, and average professional performance in the years before the entrance exam is taken based on supervisor evaluations. One could argue that the latter method is more sensitive to subjective influences. Regardless, my research finds that the selection process for the GSC throughout the republican period has remained mostly merit-based, even though the GSC has not admitted always the military academy's top-ranking graduates. The selection patterns seem to have gradually become more merit-based over time.

Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of GSC admits' MAGRs annually. Each data point on the graph represents an officer in each cohort of the GSC, which appears as a column on the figure. Most GSC admits are concentrated at the lower end of the x-axis indicating that most of the admitted officers in each GSC cohort are high performers in their cohort in the military

academy. Each cohort in the military academy has typically included about 1000 officers on average. Most admits seems to have been within the first 10th percentile of their cohorts based on their MAGRs. Another important pattern in Figure 4.2 is that the spread of performance in each cohort contracts sharply after especially the coups in 1960 and 1980 indicating a sharp upswing in merit-based selection. While such an effect is unobservable after the 1971 and 1998 memorandums such, selection patterns seem to improve again in the post-2007 memorandum period when the officer corps was divided among different factions. The graph also shows that this sharp contraction relapses gradually elucidating coups' short-lived effect on selection processes. On the other hand, despite considerable expansion over time, the spread stays below the level of the pre-coup period every time, indicating some persisting and additive influence of coups although to a minimal degree. The historical trajectory of GSC admissions confirms the resiliency of the selection and promotion patterns and offers initial support for the theory of performance-sensitive coup proofing and performance-enhancing yet a short-lived effect of coups due to cohesion problems specific to military regimes.

Findings from the first chapter show that although the GSO corps suffers from representation problems, the origins of these problems predate the republican period and are mostly related to the failures in implementing an effective and inclusive recruitment strategy. The Kurds have historically been underrepresented in the GSC cohorts, but their level of representation has been proportional to their representation in the Military High Schools and Service Academies. It can be inferred that Kurds' ethnic origins do not prevent them from being admitted to the GSC based on their home provinces. Coups seem to have had a negligible effect on the ethnic composition of the GSC cohorts.




Figure 4.2: The MAGRs of the GSC Admits between 1923 and 2015

4.7.1.2 Relationship between The MAGR and General Officer Promotions

My research establishes that the GSO corps in the Turkish military is composed of officers selected primarily based on merit criteria, and the coups have enhanced the merit-based nature of admission processes. What about the selection and promotion process at the subsequent career stages? Are officers with a better military academy and/or GSC performance more likely to promote to and advance in the general officer ranks? Does ethnicity play a role in promotion decisions at this level? Does Kurdishness constitute a disadvantage for membership and advancement in the general officer corps? Finally, how do the military's interventions and post-coup military regimes affect promotion patterns?

My analysis shows a significant positive relationship between academic performance and career advancement in the Turkish army throughout the republican period between 1923 and 2015. My statistical analysis, summarized in Table 4.3, reveals a significant positive relationship between GSOs' MAGRs and their likelihood of promotion when the effects of ethnicity, coups, ethnic conflict, and war are controlled. In other words, when ethnicity, coups, and intra- and inter-state conflicts are controlled, a general staff officer with a superior MAGR is more likely to become a general officer. For every unit increase in the MAGR (MARanking), the maximum likelihood of a GSO's promotion to any general officer rank increases by 0.004 when the effects of ethnicity, conflict, and coup are controlled (see Table 4.3).

This pattern applies to Brigadier General promotions and a lesser degree to Major General promotions under the same controls. I have created different data frames and tested the same models for Supreme Military Council evaluations regarding each of the five stages of general officer promotions—Brigadier, Major, Lieutenant, and Full General—and Service Chief appointments. My results show that the MAGR's effect on the likelihood of a GSO's promotion above the rank of major general is not statistically significant (see Table 4.4). The MAGR appears as a crucial criterion for membership to the GSO corps and the general officer corps but not for career advancement beyond the rank of major general. This is unsurprising because intra-military politics, patronage, and interferences of civilian politicians play increasingly more determining roles as the rank under consideration for promotion increases. This does not mean that promotions beyond the rank of major general are non-merit-based, as posts at this level may require more diverse skill sets, but it indicates that the MAGR becomes increasingly less impactful.

Table 4.3: Coups, the MAGR (MARanking), and General Officer Promotions.

	Dependent variable:									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Promotion		(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
coupthisyear	0.313*** (0.084)									
couplastyear		0.194** (0.080)								
coupwithin2years			0.160** (0.070)							
coupwithin3years				0.122** (0.062)						
coupwithin4years					-0.059 (0.058)					
coupWhier						0.526*** (0.115)				
coupOhier							0.154 (0.119)			
coupMemo								-0.043 (0.140)		
coupSuccess									0.359*** (0.101)	
coupFail										0.143 (0.122)
MARanking	0.004*** (0.0005)	0.004*** (0.0005)	0.003*** (0.0005)	0.003*** (0.0005)	0.003*** (0.0005)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0005)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)
Estimated_Ethnicity	0.0003 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.0001 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)
Conflict	-0.255 (0.160)	-0.258 (0.160)	-0.257 (0.160)	-0.257 (0.160)	-0.240 (0.159)	-0.260 (0.160)	-0.250 (0.159)	-0.250 (0.159)	-0.257 (0.160)	-0.254 (0.159)
War	0.446*** (0.102)	0.438*** (0.102)	0.425*** (0.103)	0.398*** (0.103)	0.480*** (0.103)	0.439*** (0.102)	0.434*** (0.102)	0.414*** (0.102)	0.443*** (0.102)	0.426*** (0.102)
coupthisyear:MARanking	0.005*** (0.002)									
couplastyear:MARanking		0.004** (0.002)								
coupwithin2years:MARanking			0.005*** (0.001)							
coupwithin3years:MARanking				0.006*** (0.001)						
coupwithin4years:MARanking					0.005*** (0.001)					
coupWhier:MARanking						0.013*** (0.003)				
coupOhier:MARanking							0.003 (0.002)			
coupMemo:MARanking								0.008*** (0.003)		
coupSuccess:MARanking									0.006*** (0.002)	
coupFail:MARanking										0.006** (0.002)
Constant	-1.548*** (0.032)	-1.538*** (0.032)	-1.538*** (0.033)	-1.533*** (0.035)	-1.476*** (0.036)	-1.539*** (0.031)	-1.522*** (0.031)	-1.505*** (0.031)	-1.539*** (0.031)	-1.519*** (0.031)
Observations	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173
Log Likelihood	-7,422.643	-7,426.313	-7,422.486	-7,414.123	-7,401.646	-7,417.010	-7,428.967	-7,420.627	-7,423.467	-7,425.932
Akaike Inf. Crit.	14,859.290	14,866.620	14,858.970	14,842.250	14,817.290	14,848.020	14,871.930	14,855.250	14,860.930	14,865.860

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are presented as maximum likelihoods/log odds. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

4.7.1.3 Relationship between Ethnicity and Promotion

Given especially the long-standing armed conflict between the Turkish army and the PKK, it would normally be convenient to anticipate a negative relationship between ethnicity and promotion, which would mean that ethnic Kurdish identity would undermine the likelihood of a GSO's becoming a general and advancing in the general officer corps. Nevertheless, my findings show that ethnic Kurdishness and general officer promotions have neither a meaningful nor a statistically significant relationship when ethnic conflict, wars, military academy performance, and coups are controlled (See Table 4.5 below). This applies to the four levels of general officer promotion, from the brigadier to full general. This finding offers indirect support to, or at least does not contradict, the previous result, which establishes that promotion patterns have been historically merit-based in the Turkish officer corps under similar controls.

However, general officer promotion patterns do not apply to service chief appointments. Although ethnicity plays a minor role in general officer promotion decisions, my results evince a significant negative relationship when it comes to the relationship between estimated ethnic Kurdishness and the army chief appointments when the effect of the coup, the MAGR, conflict, and coup-ethnicity interaction is controlled. It means that one unit increase in the probability of a full general's Kurdishness reduces the maximum likelihood of their appointment by nearly 0.008 (See Tables in Appendix-IV). In other words, the higher the proportion of Kurds in a Full General's home province, the less likely they would be appointed as an army chief or land forces commander.

Table 4.5: Coups, Ethnicity, and General Officer Promotions.

	Dependent variable:									
	Promotion									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
coupthisyear	0.148** (0.073)									
couplastyear		0.074 (0.070)								
coupwithin2years			-0.008 (0.061)							
coupwithin3years				-0.107** (0.054)						
coupwithin5years					-0.290*** (0.049)					
coupWhier						0.083 (0.097)				
coupOhier							0.040 (0.104)			
coupMemo								-0.339*** (0.119)		
coupSuccess									0.118 (0.087)	
coupFail										-0.043 (0.104)
Estimated_Ethnicity	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.0005 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
MARanking	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)
Conflict	-0.252 (0.159)	-0.253 (0.159)	-0.251 (0.159)	-0.254 (0.160)	-0.232 (0.160)	-0.270* (0.160)	-0.246 (0.162)	-0.253 (0.159)	-0.257 (0.160)	-0.262 (0.160)
War	0.449*** (0.102)	0.441*** (0.103)	0.429*** (0.103)	0.404*** (0.103)	0.463*** (0.102)	0.440*** (0.102)	0.435*** (0.102)	0.415*** (0.102)	0.444*** (0.102)	0.427*** (0.102)
coupthisyear:Estimated_Ethnicity	-0.002 (0.005)									
couplastyear:Estimated_Ethnicity		-0.002 (0.005)								
coupwithin2years:Estimated_Ethnicity			-0.001 (0.004)							
coupwithin3years:Estimated_Ethnicity				0.002 (0.004)						
coupwithin5years:Estimated_Ethnicity					0.002 (0.003)					
coupWhier:Estimated_Ethnicity						0.008 (0.006)				
coupOhier:Estimated_Ethnicity							0.001 (0.007)			
coupMemo:Estimated_Ethnicity								0.002 (0.007)		
coupSuccess:Estimated_Ethnicity									0.005 (0.006)	
coupFail:Estimated_Ethnicity										-0.005 (0.008)
Constant	-1.532*** (0.032)	-1.523*** (0.032)	-1.511*** (0.033)	-1.480*** (0.034)	-1.376*** (0.037)	-1.519*** (0.031)	-1.515*** (0.031)	-1.496*** (0.031)	-1.523*** (0.031)	-1.510*** (0.031)
Observations	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173
Log Likelihood	-7,427.887	-7,429.546	-7,430.014	-7,428.042	-7,408.844	-7,427.963	-7,429.966	-7,424.766	-7,427.501	-7,429.484
Akaike Inf. Crit.	14,869.770	14,873.090	14,874.030	14,870.080	14,831.690	14,869.930	14,873.930	14,863.530	14,869.000	14,872.970

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are presented as maximum likelihoods/log odds. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

This can result from two potential reasons. It can be a sign of discrimination when it comes to the most critical appointments in the Turkish military, as these positions have major strategic and political influence. The Army Chief appointments are particularly critical because historically, Chiefs of General Staff have exclusively been appointed after serving as an Army Chief or the Land Forces Commander. Senior leadership and political leaders might be shying away from appointing individuals with a higher probability of Kurdishness. Alternatively, we can consider the service chief appointments unreflective of and outside the general officer promotion patterns as civilian politicians tend to interfere in service chief selections more often, as opposed to lower-ranking senior officer promotions. Map 4.1 below displays the geographical origins of full generals from which army chiefs are drawn relative to the provincial population between 1980 and 2015. Historical trends demonstrate that Full Generals from provinces with relatively lower Kurdish population percentage than those shown on the map are more likely to be appointed as an Army Chief when ethnic conflict, wars, military academy performance, and coups are controlled.

4.7.2 Coups' Effect on Promotion Patterns


4.7.2.1 Coups' Effect on the MAGR-Promotion Relationship

How do coups affect promotion patterns, specifically the relationship between MAGR and the likelihood of promotion? It is possible to assess the impact of coups on this relationship through their interaction with the MAGR as a time-invariant independent variable. My findings reveal that coups enhance the positive relationship between MAGR and senior-level promotions with a high statistical significance. My findings evince similar patterns for most types of coups: As

MAGR increases, the maximum likelihood of promotion to any general officer rank increases between 0.004 and 0.013. My findings show that coups plotted and implemented within the official chain of command (coupWhier) have the strongest effect on merit-based promotions with a coefficient of 0.013, followed by memorandums (coupMemo) with a coefficient of 0.008, and failed attempts (coupFail) conspired by a faction within the military with a coefficient of 0.006. Contrastingly, successful factional coups (coupOhier) orchestrated by a faction outside the official chain of command have no statistically significant influence on merit-based promotions.

Variation across military intervention types is unsurprising in that power-seizing military leadership arising from a factional coup may prioritize internal threats instead of professionalism, especially in the immediate wake of the coup. Whereas, when the military stages a coup in unison under the leadership of the official military command, leaders tend to pursue a performance-sensitive coup-proofing approach, as my findings suggest. Similarly, because an official senior leadership remains in power after a botched factional coup, an upswing in merit-based promotions is expected as military leaders would emphasize professionalism and utilize objective criteria in promotion decisions. Overall, findings from the Turkish case offer strong initial support to the chapter's argument while disconfirming Hypothesis 1, which reflects the established view in the literature. Coups and memorandums enhance merit-based promotions, especially when staged or issued by the official military command.

An important finding of my quantitative analysis, which further supports the dissertation's central argument emphasizing the resilient nature of officer recruitment and promotion patterns, is that promotion trends tend to gradually return to their original trajectory within about five years after each intervention. This trend appears in GSC admission (Figure 4.2)



Map 4.1: Geographical distribution of army (full) generals' home provinces (1980-2015)

and general officer promotion patterns (Table 4.4). Like in the GSC admissions, the merit-enhancing effect of coups resulting from extra attention to professionalism gradually wears away as post-coup uncertainty and urgency disappear. Less worried about intra-military divisions, politicization, and a factional coup, military leaders slowly turn their attention away from officer promotions, allowing long-established non-merit practices and patronages to reappear and take their toll on merit-based promotions to a certain degree. Table 4.4 presents model coefficients showing the short-lived (gradually declining) merit-enhancing effect of coups. Coup coefficients in Table 4.4 become smaller and lose statistical significance over time after coups.

Table 4.4 also presents coup coefficients (maximum likelihood of the effect of coups on promotion) at different rank categories of general officer promotions portraying a similar pattern: As the rank increases, coefficients get smaller and lose statistical significance. The models run at different rank categories show results that are quite similar to those of the MAGR-promotion relationship. Coups have a significant positive effect on merit-based promotions at the level of Brigadier General and, to a more minor degree Major General. Yet, they have no statistically significant effect on Lieutenant and Full General promotions and service chief appointments.

Table 4.4: Variation of Coup Coefficients across ranks and over time in the post-coup period

Models	All promotions	Brigad. Gen.	Major Gen.	Lituen Gen.	Full Gen.	Service Chiefs
lastyear	.18***	.23**	.25	-.16	-.023	.57
within2years	.14**	.13*	.17	.02	.22	.19
within3years	.10*	.04*	.29*	.11	.37	-.37
within4years	.10	-.10	.04	.18	.31	-.31

Note: Coefficients are presented as maximum likelihoods/log odds.

Why does not a coup have a merit-boosting effect on promotions beyond the rank of major general? First, it may be because the MAGR already has no significant relationship with promotions above the rank of Major General. As explained earlier, the declining influence of MAGR is unsurprising at the higher ranks in the sense that intra-military politics, patronage, and politicians' influences tend to play more important roles, especially above the rank of major general. Coup-generated performance emphasis should have a limited influence at this level or remain insufficient to bring the MAGR-promotion relationship to a level of statistical significance. Also, the highest-level military appointments are more political in nature and require skill sets beyond academic and professional performance. It may not just make sense to expect coups to improve or establish a positive MAGR-promotion relationship at this level. Last, the number of promotions subject to the analysis above the level of Major General is significantly smaller than the size of the sample for the ranks below it. So, the small sample size might be another reason.

4.7.2.2 Coups' Effect on the Ethnicity-Promotion Relationship

My findings show that coups have no significant effect on the relationship between ethnicity and promotion (Table 4.5). It means that coups negligibly influence the Turkish general officer corps' ethnic composition when ethnic conflict, war, and the MAGR are controlled. This finding applies to all levels of general officer promotions (see the result tables in APPENDIX-IV).

A result of no ethnicity-promotion relationship challenges Hypothesis 1 implying that coups should undermine merit-based promotions because ethnically motivated promotion

decisions are a common non-merit intervention in military policy. Although indirectly, it offers empirical support to the performance-sensitive coup-proofing approach in military regimes. My findings provide empirical support also to the main theory the dissertation proposes: self-persisting officer promotion patterns. Kurds have been underrepresented in the Turkish officer corps, however, because promotion patterns are quite autonomous, coups, just like ethnic conflict, do not necessarily affect the Kurds' representation at the senior levels. Even when the military regime adopts a discriminatory policy and cracks down on ethnic minorities deemed threatening in the wake of coups, the officer from ethnic minority communities, and more broadly officer promotion patterns, tend to be isolated from the effects of ethnic antagonism and discriminatory policies. In the Turkish case, military juntas of post-1960 and post-1980 took deliberate steps to crack down on Kurdish opposition but according to historical officer promotion trends, military leaders' repressive policies targeting civilian Kurds had no statistically significant effect on officers from Kurdish-populated provinces.

4.7.3 Regime Type and Promotion Patterns

Regime type looms large in debates on the relationship between civil-military relations and military performance. As noted earlier, military dominant political regimes, including post-coup Juntas and military tutelary regimes have received little empirical attention and been lumped together with personalist autocracies and single-party dictatorships. The Turkish case allows for comparing and contrasting the effect of single-party rule and different types of military-dominant political orders that emerge after divergent forms of military interventions on promotion patterns. I pay special attention to the influence of these political regimes on the

relationship between the MAGR and promotion while controlling for the influence of ethnicity, ethnic conflict, and war. Regime type's interaction with the MAGR (MARanking) allows us to investigate its influence on merit-based promotions.

4.7.3.1 Single-Party Period (1923-1950)

My findings show that single-party rule in Turkey between 1923 and 1950 undermined merit-based promotions, confirming the findings of earlier literature on regime type and military performance. Under the single-party rule, a GSO's maximum likelihood of promotion declines by 0.006 with high statistical significance for each unit increase in his/her MAGR (See Table 4.6). This is expected in the sense that single-party autocracies tend to be concerned most about the officer corps' loyalty to the party, so they may prioritize political loyalty over merit, especially in the face of preexisting civil-military relations problems. The new Turkish republic inherited the entire military organization and infrastructure as well as an officer corps with troubled civil-military relations history from the Ottoman Empire with only minor changes.

The Turkish leaders' solution in a period of extensive radical reform was to entrust the army's leadership to a trustworthy figure, Marshall Fevzi Cakmak, and his companions and stick to them for an extended period given the existing divisions and propensity to re-politicization in the officer corps (Hale, 1994; Özdag, 2002). Cakmak remained as the Chief of General Staff for 21 years from 1924 to 1944. A side effect of this quick fix was that it obstructed the promotion possibilities for the newer generations of officers from 1923 to 1950, undermining long-established merit-based patterns in the officer corps.⁸¹ As my findings also demonstrate, it undermined merit-based selection and promotion patterns that had gradually been established in

⁸¹ This is widely referred to as one of the reasons of officer radicalization before the 1960 coup orchestrated by a group of junior and mid-grade officers (See Ipekci-Cosar 1965, Hale 1994, Cizre 1997, Ozdag 2002, Akyaz 2002)

the late Ottoman period. This can be seen both seen in GSC admissions (See Figure 4.2) and General Officer promotions (See Table 4.5) In short, the single-party rule had significantly undermined the merit-based nature of general officer promotion patterns.

4.7.3.2 Civilian Dominance and Democratization (1950-1960, 2007-2015)

A period of democratization and civilian control of the military succeeded the single-party period. The Democrat Party (DP)'s election victory against the Republican People's Party (CHP) ended the single-party period in 1950. GSC admission and general officer promotion patterns under the DP remained more or less the same. My findings show that this period of civilian dominance, along with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) period between 2007 and 2015, had a negative and statistically insignificant effect on promotion patterns. The DP government started with a purge of about 250 officers in 1950 (Cimenli 2019) and continued to intervene in officer promotions throughout the decade it stayed in power. A similar interventionist attitude could be ascribed to the AKP period between 2007 and 2015. In both cases, civilian interventions seem to have not improved merit-based promotions, despite the common view in the civil-military relations literature. Even if the Turkish case does not completely disconfirm the benefits of civilian intervention, it offers some counterevidence without statistical significance.

4.7.3.3 Military Dominance (1960-2006)

With the May 27 coup in 1960, a period of military interventions and dominance started in Turkish political history. Conventionally, it is expected that military regimes, like other forms of autocracies, resort to political and ethnic stacking in recruitment, promotion, and appointment decisions and undermine merit-based patterns with various non-merit interventions. My findings challenge this common view in the literature. I find that promotions become more merit-based in military-dominant autocratic periods when the influence of ethnicity, ethnic conflict, and war is controlled. In the Turkish case, military dominance has a statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of promotion of a GSO with a superior military academy performance (MAGR). In other words, when the military becomes the dominant political actor, which means more political and institutional autonomy, for each unit of improvement in a GSO's MAGR, the likelihood of their promotion increases by .8 percent (See Table 4.6).

Looking at different periods of military dominance in the wake of different types of military intervention between 1960 and 2007, I find that promotion patterns become more merit-based in periods following coups and memorandums instigated and issued by the military's official leadership. In the post-1980 coup period and post-1971 and post-1998 memorandum periods, one unit increase in a GSO's MAGR leads to 0.011, 0.007, and 0.007 increases in the maximum likelihood of this officer being promoted, respectively (Table 4.6). The period after the 2007 memorandum, which can be considered a failed attempt as it was ineffective in shaping the Turkish government's behavior before a constitutional change and presidential election, stands as an exception as it has no significant effect on the relationship between MAGR and promotion. This may be related to the growing civilian influence on military politics, along with severe factionalism and internal rivalries plaguing the Turkish officer corps at the time, which

distinguishes the 2007 memorandum from a typical post-coup/memorandum military regime in Turkey.

Similarly, factional coups orchestrated by a group of officers outside the military's official hierarchy have no statistically significant effect on promotion patterns. This is unsurprising because power-seizing groups after factional coups may prioritize internal threats as much as professionalism, especially in the immediate wake of the coup. These periods of substantial divisions and power struggles seem to have neither statistically significant enhancing nor degenerating effects on promotion patterns.

Findings from the Turkish case offer initial support to the chapter's argument of performance-sensitive coup-proofing due to the typical dilemma military leaderships in military dominant political systems—post-coup military regimes or military tutelary regimes—face: steering national politics while keeping the broader officer corps apolitical. This argument seems to be more applicable to post-coup regimes and post-memorandum periods emerging in the wake of official military leadership's interventions, rather than putsches instigated by an intra-military faction or junior officers. Intense rivalries and power struggles among different factions within the officer corps seem to obstruct performance-enhancing approaches especially when the power-grabbing group lacks complete control over the officer corps.

4.7.4 Professionalism and Performance-Sensitive Coup Proofing in the Turkish Officer Corps

Turkish military leaders' extensive efforts to reform and depoliticize the officer corps while dominating the political stage after each military intervention since 1960 offers several

supportive evidence to my statistical analysis on promotion patterns. Facing the typical dilemmas of military regimes, successive military leaderships sought to create a professional and competitive officer corps while dealing with the threat of coups, politicization, and divisions among officers. Behind the idea of radical reform in the post-coup period were also the experiences of single-party and Democrat Party periods and the traumatic experiences of senior generals during the 1960 coup. The emerging consensus and priority among Turkish generals and politicians seemed to be the establishment of an effective and fair personnel management regime.

The post-1960 coup period marked the beginning of the military reforms that sought to reinstate merit-based promotions through various reforms that seek to standardize and institutionalize rules, procedures, and practices governing officer promotions and appointments. A rules-based power transition within the military, consistent turnover in the senior ranks and posts in predetermined intervals, structural restraints on nepotism and clientelist influences, and autonomy from the influence of civilian politicians appeared as some of the consensual goals within successive senior military leaderships. Immediately after retaking power, military leadership focused on organizational reforms aimed at disciplining and depoliticizing the officer corps and establishing the authority of the official military leadership.

These reforms included (1) the reorganization of the status of the office of the Chief of General Staff vis-à-vis the prime minister and ministry of defense, (2) the establishment of the National Security Council, which would ensure that generals would steer the national security and foreign policy as well as many other areas of domestic politics, (3) the creation of the Military Assistance Fund (OYAK), to improve the social and economic standing of officers

Table 4.6: Regime Type's Effect on Merit-Based Promotions

	Dependent variable:							
	Promotion							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
MilitaryDominance	0.088 (0.057)							
CivilianDominant		-0.157** (0.063)						
SingleParty			0.872*** (0.098)					
Post1960				0.100 (0.071)				
Post1971					-0.223** (0.087)			
Post1980						0.581*** (0.071)		
Post1997							-0.113 (0.080)	
Post2007								-0.530*** (0.079)
MARanking	0.0003 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.003*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0004)	0.004*** (0.0005)
Estimated_Ethnicity	-0.001 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.0003 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Conflict	-0.220 (0.160)	-0.251 (0.159)	-0.138 (0.160)	-0.248 (0.160)	-0.308* (0.160)	-0.302* (0.161)	-0.215 (0.160)	-0.237 (0.159)
War	0.385*** (0.102)	0.445*** (0.102)	0.520*** (0.103)	0.439*** (0.103)	0.638*** (0.107)	0.476*** (0.102)	0.379*** (0.102)	0.339*** (0.103)
MilitaryDominance:MARanking	0.008*** (0.001)							
CivilianDominant:MARanking		-0.001 (0.001)						
SingleParty:MARanking			-0.006*** (0.001)					
Post1960:MARanking				0.001 (0.001)				
Post1971:MARanking					0.007*** (0.002)			
Post1980:MARanking						0.011*** (0.002)		
Post1997:MARanking							0.007*** (0.002)	
Post2007:MARanking								-0.001 (0.001)
Constant	-1.524*** (0.048)	-1.475*** (0.034)	-1.502*** (0.032)	-1.532*** (0.033)	-1.475*** (0.032)	-1.608*** (0.033)	-1.472*** (0.032)	-1.422*** (0.032)
Observations	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173
Log Likelihood	-7,379.416	-7,426.872	-7,308.394	-7,429.069	-7,396.313	-7,395.582	-7,409.072	-7,391.023
Akaike Inf. Crit.	14,772.830	14,867.740	14,630.790	14,872.140	14,806.630	14,805.170	14,832.140	14,796.050

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Coefficients are presented as maximum likelihoods/log odds. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

within the society, and (4) the preparation and passage of a new Internal Service Code in 1961⁸² and the Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Code in 1967⁸³, and creation of Disciplinary Courts by another law in 1964.⁸⁴

The influence of reforms in the 1960s on promotion patterns was limited, firstly because the power struggles within the officer corps persisted throughout the decade, and second, the period was too short for them to come to full fruition. In 1962 and 1963, for instance, a colonel and his close circle attempted to topple the government. Although the merit-based selection and promotion patterns saw a sharp upswing immediately after the coup, the positive effects of military dominance were not seen in promotions for the entire 1960s, as divisions and fractionalizations in the officer corps continued throughout this decade. This is visible in both GSC admissions and general officer promotion patterns in the 1960 period, which indicates no significant influence on the MAGR-Promotion relationship. The passage of the new Internal Service and Personnel Codes were major institutional steps toward regulating and standardizing officer recruitment, training, and promotions and ensuring discipline in the officer corps but the remaining period in this decade was too short to reap their effects. In short, major reforms in this period failed to bear fruit but prepared the ground for improvement in promotion patterns in the subsequent decades (Akyaz, 2002; Cizre, 1993; Birand, 1991)

The 1971 memorandum marks the beginning of military leaders' establishment of their authority over the officer corps as well as direct attempts to regulate officer promotions. The memorandum had political goals and gave a clear message to the civilian government but also intended to discipline the officer corps which became under the influence of left-leaning politics.

⁸² Internal Service Code, 9 January 1961, Law No: 211.

⁸³ Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Code, 10 August 1967, Law No: 926.

⁸⁴ The Law about the Foundation of Disciplinary Courts, adjudication methods, and Disciplinary Crimes and Punishments, 26 June 1964, Law No: 477.

Shortly after the memorandum, on July 27, 1972, a new law about the organization of the Supreme Military Council was accepted.⁸⁵ Together with the new personnel code, this law established the standards and autonomy of officer promotions from civilian influence in clear terms. Except for the two civilian members, the prime minister and the ministry of defense, the council consisted completely of soldiers, to be more specific, all 13 full generals in the armed forces. Decisions in the council were to be taken by majority rule. The legal appeal of the SMC decision was not possible.

In addition to the reformation of the SMC, the Supreme Military Administrative Court was created in 1972.⁸⁶ Creation of this court aimed to minimize the influence of civilian government and courts on intra-military processes, strengthen discipline, and ensure the absolute authority of military leadership by blocking the legal appeal process of servicemembers regarding any kind of military transaction about military personnel through a semi-legal structure composed mostly of officers. Based on the promotion patterns in the post-1971 memorandum period, it is fair to suggest that the reforms of the 1960s and early 1970s helped enhance merit-based promotions as my analysis evinces a significant positive relationship between MAGR and the likelihood of promotion in this period (see Table 4.5).

Military leaders made further adjustments to the principles and rules governing officer promotions after the 1980 Coup in the 1980s and 1990s based on the problems in the practice of existing laws. After especially the 1980 coup, it is fair to suggest that generals were able to crystallize their power and authority both in the officer corps and in the political system in general. The threat of a junior coup significantly reduced, and promotion patterns have become increasingly merit based.

⁸⁵ The Law about the Foundation and Duties of the SMC, 17 June 1972, No: 1612.

⁸⁶ Law no:1602, 20 July 1972.

Accompanying reform efforts, military leaders undertook comprehensive purges in the officer corps after each military intervention from 1960 to 1997. But given both the GSC admission patterns and general officer promotions, these purges have no effect on the competitiveness of the Turkish officer corps. Figures related to these purges are as follows:

- After the 1960s coup, 235 generals and 4,171 officers were discharged or forced to retire.
- After the failed attempt of 1963, 200 officers and 1459 military academy cadets were discharged.
- After the 1971 memorandum, about 600 military academy cadets and junior officers were tried and discharged from the service.
- In the immediate wake of the 1980 coup, 387 officers, 176 non-commissioned officers, and 447 military academy cadets were discharged.
- Before and after the 1997 memorandum, about 569 military personnel and 639 civilian staff were dismissed from the Turkish armed forces.⁸⁷

Overall, Turkish generals' performance-sensitive coup proofing approach which included reforms and purges since the 1960 coup allowed them to gradually reinstate their authority and power inside and outside the military. They were able to discipline and depoliticize the officer corps and stayed as a dominant actor in politics. Between 1960 and 2016, the Turkish military's all political interventions occurred under the official chain of command, under the leadership of the Chief of General Staff. Emphasis on professionalism and institutionalization of promotion and appointment procedures

⁸⁷ There are conflicting figures in different sources, I rely on Dogan Akyaz (2002), Haksoz Haber (April 24, 2012, and Milli Gazete (February 28, 2013).

4.8. Conclusion

Overall, the findings from the Turkish case show that coups and the military's political dominance and involvement undermine merit-based promotions and ethnic representation in the military. On the contrary, I find strong empirical support for the chapter's argument: post-coup military regime's performance-sensitive coup-proofing approach. My findings also offer support for the theory of self-persistence pertaining to officer promotion and representation by revealing (1) negligible effect of coups on the ethnic composition of the officer corps or the likelihood of a GSO's promotion based solely on their estimated ethnic Kurdishness; (2) the short-lived positive impact of coups on the GSC selection and General Officer promotion patterns.

My findings on the relationship between coups and promotion patterns in the Turkish officer corps challenge the general view that coups and coup-proofing efforts undermine merit-based promotions. The Turkish case elucidates that due to concerns about divisions and politicization in the officer corps and fear of a factional or junior officer coup, military regimes may prioritize professionalism as a short and long-term strategy of coup-proofing that also ensure military effectiveness through merit-based promotions. An officer corps selected and promoted based on merit seems to ensure a certain level of military success for the Turkish military in its international and intra-state conflicts despite the military's persistent entanglement with politics and resultant civil-military-relations crises.

My analysis of regime type's influence on promotions offers further support to my argument highlighting the military regimes' performance-sensitive coup-proofing and post-coup emphasis on professionalism. It reveals that promotion patterns become more merit-based after

coups and memorandums instigated and issued by the military's official leadership such as the post-1971 memorandum and post-1980 coup periods.

Finally, my analysis of promotions at different rank categories offers support to the theory of autonomous officer promotions proposed in the first chapter. The Turkish case shows that while officer promotions and appointments at the most senior levels (from Lieutenant General promotions to Service Chief appointments) are relatively more exposed to civilian leaders' influence and intra-military politics, the selection and promotion decisions for tactical- and operational-level ranks and positions (from the GSC admission to the Major General promotions) are largely autonomous and governed by long established procedures and practices.

Since the 1960 coup, several new laws were passed to reform the officer recruitment, training, and promotion system. Many institutional arrangements were created to ensure the military's continuous influence in politics while at the same time establishing and maintaining the discipline and order within the Turkish officer corps. This institutionalization process reflects the immediate and long-term effects of coups on promotion patterns. Since the first days of the traumatic post-coup period instigated by a group of junior and middle-ranking officers, Turkish generals put significant effort to address typical dilemmas of post-coup military regimes and ensuing tutelary regimes. As persistently meritocratic officer promotion patterns and several reform efforts show, emphasis on professionalism has remained the central pillar of short- and long-term coup-proofing strategy. It allowed the Turkish generals to gradually establish order and discipline within the military and maintain a hegemonic influence on domestic political affairs. After a cycle of coups and countercoups in the early 1960s, the Turkish military's all interventions occurred under the official chain of command since 1971.⁸⁸ During this period of

⁸⁸ The 2016 coup attempt broke this long-standing trajectory of within -hierarchy coups in the Turkish case.

troubled civil-military relations, The Turkish military managed to perform well in all conflicts it has participated in. A well-trained officer corps selected and promoted based on merit as a result of the continuing emphasis on professionalism and the performance protecting organizational design has been vital for this success.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

Creating representative and merit-based state institutions is a common and persisting challenge for leaders worldwide. My dissertation focuses on the question of representation and merit in security institutions, with specific attention to the officer corps, yet it offers extensive insight into problems and reform efforts regarding diversity, inclusion, and effectiveness in all types of organizations, within and outside of state bureaucracy. The army possesses unique characteristics and enjoys unique ties to society and government. Its unrepresentativeness and non-merit nature, which are usually related, come with a heavy price for a country's domestic politics and international affairs, not to mention its security and defense. Unrepresentative and non-merit armed forces carry the seeds of political instability domestically, regionally, and internationally. The most recent example is Syria. A divided army has been a prime driver of the Syrian civil war and resulting geopolitical, political, and humanitarian crises in the region with severe global implications since 2011.

Most militaries across the world are ethnically heterogenous, but when it comes to their officer corps, they remain to be quite unrepresentative of their societies. And there has been little research exploring the sources of ethnic and racial inequality in the military officer corps. Similarly, military recruitment and promotion patterns, although widely considered a key component of a military's effectiveness and representativeness, received scant in-depth attention. My dissertation seeks to help fill this gap with its theoretical and empirical contributions drawing on the Turkish case. It probes factors affecting recruitment and promotion patterns, and by extension, representativeness of the officer corps in a multiethnic military.

In examining the dynamics of officer promotion and representation patterns, scholars have primarily focused on violent conflict, namely internal and external threats, and civil-military relations. In both strands of literature, there have been conflicting perspectives, but dominant views have been that the war should help the integration of ethnic groups into the army, whereas ethnic conflict and coups should undermine the representativeness of the military. Similarly, coups and the military's institutional autonomy are expected to undermine merit-based promotions, whereas civilian control in democratic settings is expected to lead to a representative and merit-based military.

My research findings from the Turkish case challenge these well-established views about the implications of conflict and civil-military relations on officer recruitment and promotion patterns. My findings show that the relationship between conflict and ethnic representation is statistically insignificant. Neither human resources pressures arising from war mobilization do not automatically lead to ethnic integration in the officer corps nor does intrastate conflict necessarily undermine ethnic minority representation in the military. States may embrace strategies that can ensure the extraction of local human resources without integrating minority populations. This often manifests as a strategy of cooptation that seeks to undermine the saliency of the ethnic conflict. Irrespective of their motivation, the impact of such reforms is also usually limited or provisional without a long-term commitment.

I argue that officer recruitment and promotion have unique intra-organizational and social characteristics, making officer demography in an army highly immune to major political shocks, like war, ethnic conflict, and coups which may heighten threat perception toward ethnic minority groups. It also limits the influence of civilian or military leaders. Going beyond prevailing approaches emphasizing the role of interethnic and ideological rivalry, my dissertation reveals

resilient organizational and social structures persistently reproducing exclusionism in the officer corps. Ethnicity and ethnic identity matter in intra-military politics, but organizational and social processes specific to officer promotion and recruitment mitigate their effect just as they absorb the impact of both conflict and civil-military relations.

My dissertation identifies two sets of mechanisms explaining the resilience of promotion and ethnic representation patterns: (1) an autonomous promotion regime and (2) officer recruitment networks. These interlocking mechanisms often serve as shock absorbers insulating officer demography from external and internal shocks' immediate and long-term influences and ethnically motivated demographic engineering efforts. Officer recruitment networks refer to province-based regional interpersonal relationships through which information about military school admission and training is shared and utilized. They mainly help local populations to cling to or remain disconnected from the officer corps. Recruitment networks are essential, especially for understanding the origins of ethnic unrepresentativeness. On the other hand, an autonomous promotion regime serves as the primary organizational stasis mechanism. It refers to such characteristics specific to officer promotion as (1) promotion from within, which I call endo-promotion, (2) opaqueness at the junior and mid-grade level, (3) incremental and relapsing nature, and (4) professional socialization and networks making officer demographics highly resilient. This bears utmost importance. Unlike in other organizations, in the military, appointments from other institutions, even across different services and branches, are impossible. Governments can pick their own men for certain critical posts with various motives but only from a pool of candidates previously selected through incremental and isolated intra-institutional mechanisms. These unique

characteristics specific to the officer corps render early institutional designs and demographic make-up in a military highly critical, as they would be reproduced over time.

My dissertation draws on qualitative and quantitative evidence from the Turkish case collected during two-year fieldwork in Ankara, Istanbul, and some other small Anatolian towns between 2016 and 2019. I introduce three original datasets, including biographical and professional information about generals and general staff officers drawn from cadet yearbooks, graduation albums, and the SMC decisions. To measure ethnic representativeness in the officer corps, I also introduce an original provincial representation index permitting how each province is represented in each GSC cohort relative to other provinces and its population's ratio to the total population. My dependent variable in my qualitative section measures ethnic representation using PRI scores. In my statistical analysis, my dependent variable is the SMC's promotion decisions for each person and year. My periodization considers critical junctures and periods of civil-military relations and violent conflict in the Turkish case.

The Turkish case offers robust qualitative and quantitative evidence for the autonomous nature of officer promotion and the importance of officer recruitment networks connecting society to the officer corps. I reveal that the ethnic-centric view emphasizing the role of ethnic bias and state-sponsored discrimination as the causes of minority underrepresentation in state institutions is incomplete. Eliminating ethnic bias may not be a panacea to the lingering problems of ethnic inequality and inclusion in state institutions. Military-specific organizational structures and social processes can continue to feed inequalities and encourage subtle forms of discrimination even after a cultural reform. Without recognizing self-persistence mechanisms in officer recruitment and promotion, it is hard to cultivate representative and inclusive institutions.

My dissertation also challenges the conventional view on the regime type's influence on officer promotion patterns and, by extension, military effectiveness. Democracies and civilian dominant political systems are not free of organizational flaws and non-merit practices. My research finds that military dominant political regimes may adopt professionalism and merit-enhancing promotion practices, especially after coups, due to military-specific structural factors, i.e., inherent cohesion problems and the threat of junior officer coups. As the Turkish case shows, a historically merit-based officer promotion model is an important criterion helping ensure a certain level of military effectiveness even in a country plagued by frequent civil-military crises. The most revealing example is probably Turkey's military performance in Syria since 2016 despite the gravest civil-military affairs trauma the Turkish military has ever experienced.

My first primary finding reveals an uneven geographical representation in the Turkish officer corps. Particularly, Kurdish-majority provinces, clustered in the east and southeast of Turkey, are distinctly underrepresented in the officer corps at the junior, mid-grade, and senior levels. Historical trends elucidate that Kurdish underrepresentation in the officer corps predates the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military; its origins date back to the late nineteenth century, a period when the educational and organizational structures of the modern Turkish army gradually took shape. Although Kurds have been persistently underrepresented in the officer corps at all levels, their underrepresentation is related mostly to recruitment problems, specifically their lack of regional recruitment networks and isolation from existing ones. Quantitative evidence shows that Kurds face negligible career advancement problems once they join the officer corps and socialize into and accept the institutional norms. My findings highlight the importance of recruitment-related obstacles underlying representation problems in the officer

corps. Although there have been intermittent efforts to address representation problems through various recruitment strategies in the Turkish context since the late nineteenth century, these integration efforts have remained ineffective due to their half-hearted and short-lived nature, showing the need for a sustained and systematic reform strategy.

My second important finding is that Kurdish representation rates have been quite stable throughout Turkey's republican period (1923-2015), despite major political shifts, recurrent civil-military relations crises, and international and intrastate conflicts. This is quite puzzling. I show that Kurdish underrepresentation in the officer corps emerged and crystallized in the late Ottoman period during the initial institution-building phase despite major integration efforts and wars that could have helped Kurd's representation. The initial ethnic makeup of the officer corps has been reproduced through social and organizational mechanisms. My qualitative and quantitative findings elucidate that several rebellions in the early republican period and a long-standing violent conflict between the PKK and Turkish had an ignorable effect on Kurds' representation. Similarly, several coups and ensuing military-dominant political regimes since 1960, some of which were followed by draconian measures to suppress the Kurdish movement, have also had negligible influence on Kurds' representation in the officer corps.

My last important finding concerns officer promotion patterns. My quantitative analysis offers strong empirical support for the resilience of officer promotion patterns. It challenges the conventional view in the literature, especially regarding the influence of coups and post-coup military regimes on promotions. The results of my logistical regression about the relationship between military academy performance and the likelihood of promotion between 1923 and 2015 show that Turkish generals and GSOs are selected and promoted based mostly on merit. This pattern is quite persistent even after coups and during periods of military dominance, contrary to

conventional wisdom. A puzzling finding of my quantitative analysis is that coups have a merit-enhancing effect on officer selection and promotion patterns. Coups enhance the existing positive relationship between military academy performance and senior-level promotions with a high statistical significance. My findings evince similar patterns for different types of coups except for factional and junior officer putsches.

Nevertheless, the merit-enhancing effect of coups is short-lived. Both GSO selection and general officer promotion trends tend to return to their original trajectory within about five years of each intervention. Similarly, the meritocratic structure and post-coup improvements wane as one moves up the military hierarchy. Coups have a significant positive effect on merit-based promotions at the level of Brigadier General and, to a minor degree Major General. Yet, they have no statistically significant impact on Lieutenant and Full General promotions and service chief appointments.

This research reveals that officer recruitment and promotion patterns are quite resilient. They are governed by autonomous mechanisms absorbing the effects of major political shocks and the interferences of civilian politicians and military leaders. The Turkish case strongly supports how recruitment networks, endopromotion, and the opaque, incremental, and regressive promotion patterns ensure organizational stasis. As opposed to the conventional view, my findings demonstrate that threat perception and civil-military relations, including coups, have a negligible effect on the ethnic composition of the military. Neither war generates ethnic integration, nor ethnic conflict necessarily undermines the military's ethnic representativeness. Similarly, coups have a negligible and non-lasting influence on promotion patterns.

My dissertation confirms the findings of earlier research emphasizing the lasting influence of starting conditions. Demographic designs and recruitment practices in the early

institution-building phase are critical and have path-dependent effects. Once particular recruitment and promotion patterns crystallize, it becomes increasingly harder to dislodge them at the latter stages. This is not to say that no political shocks provide opportunities for demographic engineering, whether aimed at inclusion and equity or ethnic stacking. In either case, reforming recruitment and promotion patterns and the ethnic composition of the military is extremely difficult. Civilian leaders have limited control over promotion patterns, especially in armies with high institutionalization, including democracies. Reforming officer recruitment and promotion patterns needs a sustained and systematic effort.

The causes and consequences of inequality in public institutions remain a critical yet understudied topic. Future research could extend the scope of this research to include other bureaucratic organizations like the judiciary and foreign service. At the individual and group level, a comparative or single-case study investigating the motivation of ethnic minorities to join the military academies and other bureaucratic organizations can also add to our understanding of the origins of persistent problems regarding diversity and inclusion in state institutions. Additionally, new research investigating the relationship between conflict and ethnic representation under different regimes can also generate important insights into the internal and external validity of the theory proposed by this chapter. Finally, the impact of military aid and foreign military training on democracy, specifically the ethnic integration of the state, remains another relevant unexplored area for future research.

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APPENDIX – I

1. Branch Distributions in the Turkish Army, Navy, and Air Force

Table A.4a indicates that combat and technical branches have been proportionately distributed across ethnic groups in the Turkish general staff officer corps during and before the armed conflict period. Ethnic-based proportionality and fairness in branch distribution could be seen at the junior level as well. Table A.4b offers the breakdown of combatant and non-combatant branches for the period between 1923 and 2002 for officers who graduated from Işıklar Military High School.⁸⁹

Table A.4a: Branch distribution of general staff officers from 16 provinces with a significant Kurdish population.

1923-1980			
	Army	Navy	Air Force
Combat & Combat Support Branches	88	5	15
Service Branches	2		1
Total	90	5	16
1980-2015			
	Army	Navy	Air Force
Combat & Combat Support Branches	120	34	35
Service Branches	4	2	3
Total	124	36	37

Data Source: TAFSOC Dataset

⁸⁹ In BIMHS dataset branch information unavailable for many cohorts. Data in the Table-3 drawn from cohorts for which branch information is recorded in the BIMHS data.

Table A.4b: Branch distribution of İşıklar Military High School Graduates from provinces with significant Kurdish population for the period between 1923 and 2002.

	ARMY	AIR FORCE
TOTAL COMBAT & COMBAT SUPPORT BRANCHES	146	32
SERVICE BRANCHES	31	0
TOTAL	177	32

Data Source: MIHIS Dataset

2. Local Village Guards versus Officer Representation in Kurdish Populated

Provinces

Number of village guards per province is obtained from Balta 2004. It combines the number of voluntary and temporary guards (Drawn from Belge's data (2016)). The PRI values of General Staff and Flag officers have been drawn from the TAFSOC dataset.

Table A.5: Local Village Guard and Officer Comparisons (Post-1980)

	VG per 1,000 Rural Inhabitants	Staff Officer (PRI)	Flag Officer (PRI)
Hakkâri	75.8	0.14	0.54
Şırnak	67	0.03	0.00
Siirt	38.8	0.52	0.41
Bitlis	36.8	0.29	0.49
Batman	26.5	0.00	0.00
Van	20.2	0.15	0.17
Bingöl	16	0.47	0.20
Muş	15.7	0.24	0.14
Mardin	14.8	0.29	0.30
Diyarbakır	12.8	0.32	0.28
Elazığ	11.2	1.60	1.70
Tunceli	5.7	1.25	0.81

Adıyaman	5.2	0.39	0.45
Iğdır	4.3	0.28	0.54
Ağrı	4.2	0.50	0.30
Malatya	4.2	1.79	1.70
Kars	2.6	1.25	1.79

3. List of Military Middle Schools

Below is a list of military middle schools (*rüşdiyes*) founded in provincial regions of the Ottoman Empire by Sultan Abdulhamid II between 1876 and 1896.

Table A.6: Military Schools opened in the late Ottoman period.

Name	Location	Year Built⁹⁰
Şam	Damascus	1877
Beyrut	Beirut	1877
Bağdat	Bagdad	1886
Edirne	Edirne	1879
Bursa	Bursa	1881
Manastır (Bitolj)	Bitola	1881
Erzurum	Erzurum	1881
Trabzon	Trabzon	1881
Erincan	Erzincan	1881
Mamurat-ül Aziz	Elazig	1881
Diyarbakir	Diyarbakir	1881
Sivas	Sivas	1883
Kastamonu	Kastamonu	1884
Haleb	Aleppo	1882
Selanik	Thessoliniki	1884
Trablusgarp	Tripoli	1886
Sana'a	Sanaa	1889
Van	Van	1890
Bitlis	Bitlis	1890
Süleymaniye	Soleymaniah	1892

⁹⁰ Uyar, Provence, and Griffiths have conflicting accounts of the dates when these military schools were opened.

Bingazi	Benghazi	1892
Üsküp	Skopje	1893
Musul	Mosul	1893
Ta'iz	Ta'izz	1893
Asir	Abha	1896

APPENDIX – II

1. Census Data and Ethnic Distribution of Population In Provinces

My project required the collection, tidying, and transformation as well as the estimation of census data and the ratios of ethnic groups to the total population for each one of Turkey's 81 provinces for a 92-year period (1923-2015). This daunting task demanded meticulous analysis of census reports published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) and secondary literature on Turkey's demographics to reach the most accurate results. Annual population estimates for provinces are needed to calculate the provincial representation indexes which show each province's level of representation in the Turkish officer corps. Ethnic group ratios for each province per annum are used to overcome the ecological fallacy problem when exploring the Kurdish representation in the Turkish officer corps.

2. Estimating Population for Each Year and Province

Calculating the provincial representation index (PRI) scores for each year and province requires annual population estimates for each one of Turkey's 81 provinces for a 92-year period (1923-2015 this study focuses. This estimation requires the collection, tidying, and transformation of census data. Such a task demands meticulous analysis of quinquennial census reports published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) and the secondary literature on Turkey's demographics to reach the most accurate results.

Census data for provinces have been drawn primarily from the database of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). The TUIK provides precise populations for each province per annum only for the post-2000 period. For the pre-2000 period, the estimation of annual changes in provincial populations, which is necessary for the calculation of the PRIs, requires some data estimation and manipulation because of, first, the repeated shifts in the boundaries of some provinces, second, inconsistencies in census methods and results, and third, unavailability of data for years between quinquennial censuses.

The first census in Turkey's republican period was conducted in 1927. The Turkish state exercised its second census in 1935 and repeated it in five-year intervals thereafter. There have been several issues that cast doubt on the validity of statistics in the early census reports. Especially regarding the Kurdish-majority provinces, but also some other rural areas as well, the problems of over and under-reporting have appeared as a major problem. Another important challenge has been that the provincial boundaries and number of provinces have considerably changed since the first census. In the first census of 1927, the total number of provinces counted was 63 and, in the second, 57.⁹¹ The number of provinces has gradually increased thereafter, eventually reaching up to 81 in 2010, which is the number of provincial units in Turkey today.

Dealing with New Provinces and Shifting Provincial Boundaries

Modern Turkey has seemed quite uncertain about how to administratively organize its provinces. There were significant drawings and redrawing of boundaries since the early years of

⁹¹ See Milletvekili Genel Secimleri (General Elections for the Members of Parliament) (1923-2011), The Turkish Statistical Institute Report, Ankara, 2011

the republic. I focused on boundary shifts regarding 16 provinces with a significant Kurdish population.

The late 1920s and 1930s: In entering data and annual population estimation for the period between 1926 and 1936, I treated each province uniquely and took measures accordingly.

Bingöl	Bingöl remained a county of Elazig (Elaziz then) until 1929 and of Muş until 1936 before acquiring the status of province. Officers reporting Bingöl as their hometown are registered to Elazig until 1929 and Muş until 1936. The census data for Bingöl prior to 1936 is recorded as unavailable.
Bitlis & Muş	Bitlis included the Muş as its county until 1929 until Muş was declared as the provincial center and Bitlis was made its county. Bitlis remained under Muş until 1936 they both acquired the status of province.
Hakkâri	It was counted as a province in 1927 but kept as the county of Van between 1929 and 1936.
Tunceli	Tunceli (Dersim) remained a county of Elazig (Elaziz) between 1926 and 1935. It gained the status of province in 1936. (The law of December 25, 1935; goes into effect on January 4, 1936)
Rize & Artvin	Rize and Artvin were counted as separate provinces in 1927 census yet, they became and remained part of the Coruh Province, which was created in 1933, until 1936 (November 2, 1936). For the sake of consistency, I considered them separate provinces and calculated their populations in 1935 census by summing their county populations and drawing on their declared growth rates in 1940 census report.
Hatay	Hatay was annexed and gain the status of province in 1939.

The Early 1950s: Adıyaman gained provincial status in 1954. It broke off from Malatya incorporating some newly created counties like Samsat and Tut. An officer, who reported one of these locations as their hometown, are considered from the province within which these units were a part of.

Usak	1953, Kutahya (incorporated one county also from Manisa)
Adıyaman	1954, Malatya
Sakarya	1954, Kocaeli
Nevşehir	1954, Nigde and Kirsehir

Kirsehir	1957, Nevsehir (Kirsehir was a province until 1954, when it was declared a county and attached to the newly created Nevsehir province. It regained its previous status in 1957)
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The 1990s: New provinces that were created in the late 1990s are listed below along with their dates of gaining provincial status as well as provinces from which they broke off. For these provinces, I recorded their provincial data as unavailable (N/A) in the dataset. Correspondingly, an officer, who reported one of these locations as their hometown or birthplace, are considered from the province within which these units were a part of.

Aksaray	1989, Niğde (Aksaray had a status of province until 1933. So, for the 1923-33 period, its annual population was estimated based on the 1927 census)
Bayburt	1989, Gümüşhane
Karaman	1989, Konya
Kırkkale	1989, Ankara
Batman	1990, Siirt and Mardin
Şırnak	1990, Siirt and Mardin
Bartın	1991, Zonguldak
Ardahan	1992, Kars
Iğdır	1992, Kars
Yalova	1995, Istanbul
Karabük	1995, Cankiri and Zonguldak
Kilis	1995, Gaziantep
Osmaniye	1996, Adana
Düzce	1999, Bolu

3. Estimation of Provincial Ethnic Group Ratios

The Ratio of Kurds to Total Population by Province

As much as the census itself, counting and estimating the number and percentages of ethnic groups within a country is a political act and a politicized procedure by nature. For this study, a major challenge was to disaggregate the provincial population into its ethnic components, firstly, because the Turkish state has avoided collecting ethnic data during censuses. Therefore, identifying the ratio of Kurds to the total population for each province required an in-depth study of each census results throughout the republican period, the scholarly literature on Turkey's demography and its ethnic components, as well as devising basic mathematical formulas to estimate the annual demographic shifts.

Although the Turkish state persistently abstained from counting the population of ethnic groups, census officials were instructed to gather language-related (mother tongue, second language, domestic language) data. This practice also continued only until 1980. Even worse, the TUIK stopped sharing the results after 1965. Drawing on this language-based census data collected by the state between 1935 and 1965, scholars have estimated the size of the Kurdish population and its distribution across Turkey's administrative provinces for the post-1965 period. (See Mutlu 1995, 1996, Dundar 2014, Koc 2008, Koc and Hancioglu 1993, Koc et al 2000, Zeyneloglu et al. 201). The historical census data (1923-2015) on provincial Kurdish population ratios and estimation methods I employ in this study are primarily drawn from this secondary literature. It is important to note, however, existing estimates in the literature are still incomplete. Especially, figures for provincial population distribution for the pre-1965 and post-2003 periods are unavailable. Therefore, emulating the mathematical estimation models used by the demographers in the existing scholarship, I calculated the provincial ethnic ratios (for Kurds per se) for the non-reported years through interpolating and extrapolating from the available data.

As we noted before, although the Turkish state gathered language data in the censuses from 1935 to 1965, there were inconsistencies in the methods used and survey questionnaires employed. The problems of under- and over-reporting for various reasons including benefitting a larger share from the state budget or underplaying the non-Turkish ethnic components of the population to show the success of assimilation policies were some other things that led to incongruencies and undermined the credibility of census data, especially regarding the language-based surveys. In order to compensate for these problems, Servet Mutlu calculates adjusted provincial figures for the 1965 census and estimates the ones for 1990 by factoring in inter-provincial population movements, the fertility and mortality rates across provinces and ethnic groups, and international migrant inflows and outflows (Mutlu 1996). Mutlu provides a well-rounded analysis of the spatial redistribution of ethnic groups, Kurds per se, across Turkey's 67⁹² provinces and regions from 1965 to 1990.

Although he primarily takes issue with the question of 'mother tongue' and Turkey's assimilation policies, Fuat Dundar also reaches similar results in terms of the rates for the year 1965 when he examines the 'mother tongue' data in Turkish censuses between 1927 and 1965 (Dundar 2014). Primary findings of these works can be summarized as follows:

- Kurdish population doubles from 1965 to 1990.
- Kurds move from southeastern provinces to Western and Southern Provinces in massive numbers after 1960.

⁹² Turkey had 67 provinces until 1988. The number of provinces has reached 81 by 1999. Aksaray, Bayburt, Karaman, Kirikkale was declared as new provinces in 1989, Batman and Sirnak in 1990, Bartin in 1991, Ardahan and Igdır in 1992, Yalova in 1995, Karabuk, Kilis, and Osmaniye in 1996 and Duzce in 1999.

- While the ratio of Kurds to total population in western and southern provinces increases drastically, 6-10 times, their relative size in southeastern provinces increases in small increments.

In a more recent study, Ismet Koc finds that Kurdish population further increases in the West (Ege and Marmara Regions), South (Mediterranean Region), and the East (Southeast and Eastern Anatolia), while decreasing in central Anatolia and stagnating in Black Sea region (Koc 2008).

In my analysis I draw on the estimates of provincial ethnic group ratios of Mutlu for the years 1935, 1965 and 1990 and regional estimates of Koc for the year 2003. For the years in between and after 2003, I estimate the ratio of Kurds to total provincial population following Mutlu and Koc's estimation techniques and the proportional shifts they employ.

1923-1965

The literature considers 1935 as a reliable census. However, ethnic distribution within each province or growth rates for each ethnic group are unavailable in the official census report. According to this report, the Kurds account for 9.2 percent of Turkey's total population compared to 9.98 percent according to Mutlu's estimation. Given that there were no large-scale population movements in the 1923-1965 period, I assume that this period saw minimal and negligible changes in terms of the distribution of the Kurdish population across provinces. Most Kurds (around 82 percent) lived in the eastern and southeastern provinces. Therefore, I estimated the ratio of Kurdish to total population for the eastern and southeastern provinces in 1935 as commensurate to the national level change (0.68 percent) and kept the ratios in the remaining provinces the same.

1965-1990

Mutlu's estimation of provincial ethnic ratios for the year 1990 and his adjusted ratios for the 1965 census set the basis for my estimation of the ratio of the Kurdish population for each province for this period. In estimating the provincial ethnic figures for the years between 1965 and 1990, I primarily draw on the natural growth rates of the population by provinces from census reports as well as from Mutlu's estimates. Because no annual data is available for the years between 1965 and 1990, I estimated the provincial Kurdish ratio for each province for each year between these dates, by equally dividing the difference between the estimated ratios for each province for 1965 and 1990 and adding it incrementally to each year after 1965.

1990-2003

I used a similar method in estimating the provincial ratios of Kurds for the period between 1990 and 2003. The challenge here was that there was no provincial level ethnic data available for the year 2003 but only regional figures estimated by Koc (2008). Drawing on Koc's regional estimations for 2003, I applied the regional percentage change in the ratio of Kurds to total population from 1990 to 2003 to each province to find the provincial ratios of Kurdish population. Applying regional averages to provinces assumes that demographic shifts occurred in equal rates for each province within each region. In other words, the Kurdish population in all provinces in the same designated region has grown or shrunk in same rates and proportional to the region where they are located.

Another problem was that Mutlu (1996) and Koc (2008) use different but overlapping regional clusters in identifying regional rates. I, therefore, disaggregated Koc's regional rates (east, west, south, north) into sub-regional rates—the west into Aegean and Marmara, the east

into Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia embraced by Mutlu. After estimating the sub-regional rates for the year 2003, I further disaggregated them into provincial rates applying the difference between sub-regional changes equally to each province within the same region. (See Table below)

REGION	SUB-REGION ^e	Ratio of Kurdish to Total Population in		
		Censuses		
		1965 ^a	1990 ^a	2003 ^a
West	Marmara	1.24 (0.9) ^b	6.09 (5.3) ^d	7.08 ^c (6.2) ^b
	Aegean	0.36	3.93	4.66 ^c
South	Mediterranean	4.98	8.95	9.5
Centre	Central Anatolia	4.13	5.53	3.7
North	Black Sea	0.51	0.50	0.50
East	Eastern Anatolia	38.87 (47.6) ^b	41.96 (51.5) ^d	45.60 ^c (56.1) ^b
	Southeastern Anatolia	64.24	64.98	65.73 ^c
TOTAL		(9.2←) 9.98 ^e	12.6	14.5 (→ 16)

^a Sub-regional and national level estimates are from Mutlu (1995); regional and national level estimates are from Koc (2008).

^b Aggregated regional estimates (in parenthesis) in Koc (2008)—Note that regional and sub-regional categories overlap for the Centre, South, and North.

^c Sub-regional values for the West and East are author's calculation.

^d Regional aggregate values in parenthesis are author's calculation through interpolation of the 1965 and 2003 data.

^e Official census report shows that Kurds account for the 7.6 per cent of the population in 1965. But because the method of calculation is highly problematic, I adopted Mutlu's adjusted figure (9.98).

^f Provinces in each sub-region are the following:

Marmara Region : Balikesir, Bilecik, Bursa.

Aegean Region : Afyonkarahisar, Aydin, Denizli, Izmir, Kutahya, Manisa, Mugla, Usak

Mediterranean Region	: Adana, Antalya, Burdur, Gaziantep, Hatay, Isparta, Icel, Kahramanmaras
Central Anatolian Region	: Ankara, Cankiri, Corum, Eskisehir, Kayseri, Kirsehir, Konya, Nevsehir, Nigde, Sivas, Yozgat
Black Sea Region	: Amasya, Artvin, Bolu, Giresun, Gdmuishane, Kastamonu, Ordu, Rize, Samsun, Sinop, Tokat, Trabzon, Zonguldak
Eastern Anatolia Region	: Agri, Bingol, Bitlis, Elazig, Erzincan, Erzurum, Hakkari, Kars, Malatya, Mus, Tunceli, Van
Southeastern Anatolia Region	: Adiyaman, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa

2003-2015

Turkish statistical institute has revealed no recent data about the ratio of Kurds or their spatial distribution within and across Turkey's provinces. No recent scholarly work presents any estimation regarding the recent period. The most credible statistic at hand is offered in a report published in 2019 by KONDA, an independent research institution in Turkey. According to the report, the ratio of Kurds to the total population is 16 percent.⁹³ This research measures how the participants perceive themselves or to which ethnic group they feel they belong. Per Koc's research Kurds accounted for 14.5 percent of the population in 2003 (Koc, 2008). These results indicate that there has been 1.5 percent increase in the share of the Kurds in Turkey's population since 2003. Assessed together with TUIK's recent census reports providing details about the provincial demographic trends which show modest shifts occurred compared to what was experienced between 1965 and 2003. The demographic patterns of the 1990-2003 period seem to

⁹³ KONDA, "Türkiye'de Toplumsal Cinsiyet Raporu (Societal Gender in Turkey Report)," 2019.

have continued with much more alleviated tone, the results of which, we can suggest, have negligible effects on the results of the study. We can infer that the spatial distribution of ethnic groups remained largely the same between 2003 and 2015. Therefore, I assume that the proportion of provincial Kurdish populations remained the same after 2003 for the easiness of calculation and apply the 2003 ratios to the ensuing years. By doing so, I may be underestimating the Kurdish population. This can lead to overestimation of representation index. So, my findings will reflect the highest possible Kurdish representation.

New Provinces

There are 14 new administrative provinces that were created between 1989 and 1999 in Turkey. How can we estimate the ratio of Kurds to the total population in these newly created provinces? The most accurate and commonsense method could be to use county and district-level data. Ethnic figures for the counties in which these new provinces were incorporated could help us determine the ratio of Kurds to the total population in the new provinces, however, county or district-level data is unavailable. Therefore, I used the ethnic distribution in the ‘mother provinces,’ from which new provinces were broken off. I assumed that the newly created province reflects the ethnic distribution of the province of which it was previously a part. If the new province broke off from two different provinces like in the case of Batman, I used the mean of the ratio of Kurds to the total population of the two mother provinces, Siirt and Mardin.

Percentage of Kurds in Total Population: Provincial Distribution

	1935 ⁹⁴	1965 ⁹⁵	1990 ⁹⁶	2003 ⁹⁷
Total Pop	16,157,450	31,391,421	56,473,035	68,860, 539
Perc Change	18.6	13.1	11.5	4.1 (2007)
Annual Growth Rate		2.46		
Kurdish Pop	1,480,246	2,370,233		
KurdPop Gr. Rate		4.98		
Kurdish%	9.2	9.98	12.6	14.5
Kurdish to Total Reg	81.00	65.00	69	
%				
Provinces in Turkey				
Adana	4.58	4.58	10.05	10.60
Adiyaman		46.40	43.69	44.43
Afyonkarahisar	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
Ağrı	70.45	70.45	70.45	74.11
Amasya	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76
Ankara	3.84	3.84	6.74	4.91
Antalya	0.04	0.04	3.22	3.77
Artvin		0.02	0.02	0.02
Aydın	0.27	0.27	4.07	4.82
Balıkesir	0.08	0.08	2.48	3.47
Bilecik	0.12	0.12	3.93	4.92
Bingöl	76.52	76.52	76.63	80.29

⁹⁴ Author's estimates using the 1935 Census.

⁹⁵ Mutlu's adjusted data based on the 1965 census (Mutlu 1996)

⁹⁶ Mutlu's adjusted estimation (Mutlu 1996)

⁹⁷ Reverse application of Koc's estimation of the regional ethnic distribution for the year 2003. (Koc 2008)

Bitlis	64.03	64.03	64.03	67.69
Bolu	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61
Burdur	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Bursa	0.07	0.07	4.47	5.46
Çanakkale	0.13	0.13	0.13	1.12
Çankırı	1.26	1.26	1.26	1.26
Çorum	3.89	3.89	3.89	2.50
Denizli	0.06	0.06	3.08	3.83
Diyarbakır	72.78	72.78	72.78	73.53
Edirne	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Elazığ	43.17	43.17	43.15	46.81
Erzincan	19.74	19.74	19.74	23.40
Erzurum	15.78	15.78	16.22	19.88
Eskişehir	0.54	0.54	3.10	3.10
Gaziantep	12.09	12.09	13.22	13.77
Giresun	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
Gümüşhane	2.07	2.07	2.07	2.07
Hakkari	89.47	89.47	89.47	93.13
Hatay		2.12	5.48	6.03
Isparta	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
Mersin	1.51	1.51	9.71	13.77
İstanbul	2.77	2.77	8.16	9.15
İzmir	1.04	1.04	6.91	7.66
Kars	22.36	22.36	19.02	22.68
Kastamonu	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25

Kayseri	2.11	2.11	4.56	3.23
Kırklareli	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
Kırşehir	6.61	6.61	6.61	4.78
Kocaeli	0.49	0.49	7.94	8.93
Konya	3.97	3.97	5.42	4.09
Kütahya	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Malatya	17.19	17.19	17.20	20.86
Manisa	0.06	0.06	3.48	4.23
Kahramanmaraş	15.37	15.37	15.37	0.27
Mardin	74.90	74.90	74.84	75.39
Muğla	0.04	0.04	2.06	2.81
Muş	67.65	67.65	67.75	71.41
Nevşehir		2.10	2.10	1.00
Niğde	3.02	3.02	2.59	1.26
Ordu	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Rize	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06
Sakarya		0.54	2.82	3.81
Samsun	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58
Siirt	78.78	78.78	78.78	79.53
Sinop	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80
Sivas	11.73	11.73	11.72	10.00
Tekirdağ	0.20	0.20	3.30	4.29
Tokat	1.71	1.71	1.71	1.71
Trabzon	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Tunceli	55.81	55.81	55.90	59.54

Şanlıurfa	47.84	47.84	47.84	48.59
Uşak		0.22	0.21	0.21
Van	70.70	70.70	70.70	74.36
Yozgat	2.26	2.26	2.25	2.25
Zonguldak	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13

APPENDIX – III

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

ELITE INTERVIEWS (10 + 4)

Generals (5+4)

1. S.Kisacik (R.Mj.Gen.), 19.02.19, 27.02. 19, Necatibey, Ankara
2. H. Cubuklu (R.Mj.Gen.), 20.02.19, 08.03. 19 Necatibey, Ankara, 24.04.19 Canakkale
3. E.Karakus (R.Lt.Gen.), 12.12.18, Kizilay, Ankara
4. M. F. Sengun (R.Lt.Gen.), 12.12.18, Kizilay, Ankara
5. A. Yavuz (R.Mj.Gen.), 21.05.19 Kucuksu, Istanbul
6. A.Dincturk (R.Mj.Gen.), 18.05.19, Sogutozu, Ankara

Politicians (5)

1. Ilhan Cihaner (CHP), 18.04.19, Business office, Cankaya, Ankara
2. Mehmet Ali Celebi (Then CHP, now Independent), National Defense Commission Member in the Parliament ,08.05.2019, TBMM, Bakanliklar, Ankara – No response to questionnaire
3. Ozgur Ceylan (CHP), National Defense Commission Member in the Parliament, 08.05.2019, Party Main HQ, Sogutozu, Ankara
4. Umit Ozdag (Then IYI P., now Zafer P.) (Remote), 2019. Incomplete.

NON-ELITE INTERVIEWS WITH OFFICERS AND NCOS (40+23)⁹⁸

1. Lt.Col. Ferdan, 12.05.17, 11.10.18, Balgat, Ankara
2. Maj. Gunbatan, 13.4.17, 27.07.18, 17.01.19 (Whatsapp)
3. Maj. Arbay, 13.10.18, Cukurambar, Ankara
4. Maj. Sevik, 09.10.18, Bahcelievler; 15.05.19 Anittepe, Ankara
5. Maj. Kurt, 27. 04.17 Oran, Ankara
6. Maj. Ilgin, 190817, 12.04.17, 19.08.17, Anittepe, Ankara
7. Maj. Cetin 07.10.18 Besevler, 13.11.18, 22.01.19 Cankaya, Ankara
8. Maj. Guvenmez 14.03.19 Yildiz, Ankara
9. Capt. Karadayi, 17.07.17 Bakanliklar, 24.05.19, Etlik, Ankara
10. Capt. Nehir 29.07.17, 09.03. 18, 02.05.19 Levent, Istanbul
11. Capt. Ozdar 03.05.19 Esenler, Istanbul
12. Capt. Birgun, 12.05.17, 06.12.18, Bahceli, Ankara
13. Capr. Genisgoz, 12.4.17, Ankara
14. Capt. Ucan, 12.11.17, Kizilay, Ankara
15. Capt.Cenk, 19.01.19, Bilkent, Ankara

⁹⁸ Codenames and alternate dates used

16. Capt. Ziviye, 26.07.27, Bahcelievler, Ankara.
17. Capt. Akagac, 19.12.18, Bahceli, Ankara
18. Capt. Pasak, 14.07.17, 08.10.18 Bahcelievler, Ankara
19. Capt. Akitler, 22.02.19, Kizilay, Ankara
20. Capt. Yavuz, 12.06.17, 17.07.17, 12.11.17, Etlik, Ankara, 13.05.19 Kaleici, Ankara
21. Capt. A. Selim, 15.01.19, Levent, Istanbul
22. Capt. Coskun, 12.10.18, Kizilay, Ankara
23. Capt. Gun, 11.10.18, Kizilay, Ankara
24. Lt. Karatay, 17.07.17, Devlet Mah., Ankara
25. Mst. Sg. Gurcan 26.07.18, Canakkale
26. Mst.Sg. UC 10.08.2018, Gokceada, Canakkale
27. Mst.Sg. Ali (E.B.) 05.10.2018 Etimesgut, Ankara (Recorded)
28. Col. Gunes. 11.10.2018, 05.12.18, 11.12.18, 23.12.18, 16.03.19, 18.05.19, Cukurambar, Ankara
29. Col. Ozden, 28.02.19, Bahceli, Ankara
30. Col. Altin, 03.07. 17, 07.07.17, Canakkale; 21.12.18, Izmir (Remote)
31. Col. Cilgin, 11.10.18, Balgat/Ankara
32. Col. Koker, Bahcelievler, 12.03.2019
33. Maj. Aydin, 10.10.17, Remore (Ankara)

34. Maj. Serkan, 09.09.17, Unites States, (Remote)
35. Capt. Fersan, 10.08.17, United States (Remote)
36. Capt. Uner, 23.05.17, Seattle; 17.05.19 Tepe, Ankara
37. Capt. Ince, 12.04.19, Sogutozu, Ankara
38. Capt. Duzen, 28.07.18 (WhatsApp)
39. Capt. Ozkurt, 03.08.17, Tekirdag (Remote)
40. A.Degirmen, 19.08.17, 04.10.2018, Balgat, Ankara

CONVERSATIONS WITH JOURNALISTS, AND AUTHORS (4+2)

1. M.Gurcan, 20.7.17, Bakirkoy, Istanbul; 26.02.19 Tunali, Ankara
2. M.Onsel, Anittepe, Ankara
3. M.Yildiz, Kizilay, Ankara
4. Y.Aksakaoglu, 22.01.2018, Besevler, Ankara

GROUP CONVERSATIONS WITH RETIRED OFFICERS (12)

1. DE and ZC, 02.05.19, Levent, Istanbul
2. TL and FL, 07.05.19, Cempa, Ankara
3. UL and UZ, 27.02.19, Bahceli, Ankara
4. DC and ITL, 14.12.18, Akkopru, Ankara
5. UZ and UL, 21.12.18, Bahcelievler, Ankara

6. BPD and TD, 21.12.18 Kizilay, Ankara
7. CH and BPD, 15.11.18, Oran, Ankara
8. UZ and FH 08.10.18, Bahcelievler, Ankara
9. UZ, FH, and NL 18.10.18, Bahcelievler, Ankara
10. CZ and MD, 12.10.17, Etimesgut, Ankara (informal)
11. BPD and CH and BJ, 22.10.17, Oran, Ankara
12. BJ and BPD, 17.08.17, Anittepe, Ankara
13. CE and ZC ,02.05.19, Levent, Istanbul
14. M. Onsel, Retired Judge, and 2 Retired Cols, 15.10.18, J.Sos. Tes., Anittepe, Ankara
15. H. Cubuklu, S. Kisacik, and Colonel A., 27.02.19, Necatibey, Ankara
16. Four Gendarmerie Officers (BP, DT, SD, and AA), 12.04.19, Tunali, Ankara

INTERVIEWS WITH ASSOCIATIONS

1. TESUD: The Retired Officers Association 12.03.2018, Kizilay, Ankara
<http://www.tesud.org.tr>
2. TEMAD: The Retired NCOs Association -**Canceled** <http://temad.org>
3. EMUZER: The Retired Specialists Association, 20.12.18, Kizilay, Ankara (Recorded)
<http://www.emuzder.org.tr>
8. 76LILAR ALUMNI ASSOCIATION- Interview held

APPENDIX -IV

Model Tables by Rank Category

Brigadier (Coups-MAGR-Promotion)

	Dependent variable:									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Promotion		(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
coupthisyear	0.296** (0.115)									
couplastyear		0.230** (0.105)								
coupwithin2years			0.127 (0.094)							
coupwithin3years				0.043 (0.084)						
coupwithin4years					-0.105 (0.078)					
coupwithin5years						-0.183** (0.075)				
coupWhier							0.600*** (0.166)			
coupMemo								-0.290 (0.211)		
coupSuccess									0.468*** (0.144)	
coupFail										0.003 (0.160)
MARanking	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
SCRanking	0.554*** (0.076)	0.555*** (0.076)	0.553*** (0.076)	0.551*** (0.076)	0.549*** (0.076)	0.550*** (0.076)	0.550*** (0.076)	0.553*** (0.076)	0.551*** (0.076)	0.551*** (0.076)
Estimated_Ethnicity	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Conflict	-0.337 (0.215)	-0.338 (0.215)	-0.335 (0.215)	-0.332 (0.214)	-0.318 (0.214)	-0.305 (0.214)	-0.338 (0.215)	-0.326 (0.214)	-0.341 (0.215)	-0.331 (0.215)
coupthisyear:MARanking	-0.006** (0.002)									
couplastyear:MARanking		-0.002 (0.002)								
coupwithin2years:MARanking			-0.004** (0.002)							
coupwithin3years:MARanking				-0.004*** (0.002)						
coupwithin4years:MARanking					-0.004*** (0.001)					
coupwithin5years:MARanking						-0.002* (0.001)				
coupWhier:MARanking							-0.022*** (0.006)			
coupMemo:MARanking								-0.009* (0.005)		
coupSuccess:MARanking									-0.013*** (0.004)	
coupFail:MARanking										-0.002 (0.003)
Constant	-2.113*** (0.044)	-2.114*** (0.044)	-2.102*** (0.045)	-2.084*** (0.047)	-2.030*** (0.049)	-1.984*** (0.053)	-2.100*** (0.042)	-2.062*** (0.042)	-2.107*** (0.043)	-2.081*** (0.042)
Observations	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467
Log Likelihood	-4,534.753	-4,536.305	-4,535.479	-4,532.283	-4,525.139	-4,525.503	-4,527.120	-4,527.428	-4,531.051	-4,538.143
Akaike Inf. Crit.	9,083.506	9,086.611	9,084.957	9,078.565	9,064.277	9,065.006	9,068.240	9,068.855	9,076.102	9,090.286

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Major General (Coups-MAGR-Promotion)

	Dependent variable:									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Promotion		(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
coupthisyear	0.134 (0.211)									
coupthisyear		0.253 (0.221)								
coupwithin2years			0.167 (0.178)							
coupwithin3years				0.285* (0.156)						
coupwithin4years					0.042 (0.141)					
coupwithin5years						0.033 (0.135)				
coupWhier							0.371 (0.271)			
coupMemo								-0.051 (0.307)		
coupSuccess									0.182 (0.242)	
coupFail										0.240 (0.347)
MARanking	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
SCRanking	0.234 (0.148)	0.235 (0.148)	0.233 (0.148)	0.231 (0.148)	0.226 (0.148)	0.225 (0.148)	0.243 (0.148)	0.237 (0.148)	0.237 (0.148)	0.233 (0.148)
Estimated_Ethnicity	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Conflict	0.141 (0.383)	0.103 (0.383)	0.131 (0.383)	0.121 (0.384)	0.150 (0.384)	0.126 (0.384)	0.135 (0.383)	0.133 (0.383)	0.143 (0.383)	0.140 (0.383)
coupthisyear:MARanking	-0.003 (0.005)									
coupthisyear:MARanking		-0.002 (0.005)								
coupwithin2years:MARanking			-0.003 (0.004)							
coupwithin3years:MARanking				-0.007** (0.003)						
coupwithin4years:MARanking					-0.004* (0.002)					
coupwithin5years:MARanking						-0.004* (0.002)				
coupWhier:MARanking							-0.005 (0.006)			
coupMemo:MARanking								0.0003 (0.006)		
coupSuccess:MARanking									-0.006 (0.005)	
coupFail:MARanking										-0.004 (0.010)
Constant	0.202*** (0.078)	0.185** (0.078)	0.189** (0.080)	0.160* (0.084)	0.218** (0.087)	0.217** (0.091)	0.189** (0.077)	0.215*** (0.076)	0.203*** (0.077)	0.204*** (0.076)
Observations	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394
Log Likelihood	-952.752	-952.246	-952.546	-950.306	-950.767	-950.562	-952.065	-953.003	-952.365	-952.775
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,919.505	1,918.492	1,919.093	1,914.612	1,915.534	1,915.124	1,918.129	1,920.006	1,918.731	1,919.550

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Lieutenant General (Coups-MAGR-Promotion)

	Dependent variable:									
	Promotion									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
coupthisyear	0.378 (0.326)									
couplastyear		-0.157 (0.249)								
coupwithin2years			0.022 (0.223)							
coupwithin3years				0.106 (0.200)						
coupwithin4years					0.180 (0.193)					
coupwithin5years						0.214 (0.181)				
coupWhier							0.590 (0.431)			
coupMemo								0.597 (0.646)		
coupSuccess									0.423 (0.381)	
coupFail										0.613 (0.535)
MARanking	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
SCRanking	0.363* (0.194)	0.354* (0.194)	0.359* (0.194)	0.352* (0.194)	0.342* (0.194)	0.333* (0.194)	0.363* (0.194)	0.363* (0.194)	0.364* (0.194)	0.362* (0.194)
Estimated_Ethnicity	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)
Conflict	0.399 (0.519)	0.335 (0.516)	0.348 (0.516)	0.348 (0.517)	0.420 (0.520)	0.407 (0.519)	0.413 (0.523)	0.370 (0.515)	0.412 (0.522)	0.387 (0.516)
coupthisyear:MARanking	-0.006 (0.009)									
couplastyear:MARanking		0.002 (0.004)								
coupwithin2years:MARanking			0.002 (0.004)							
coupwithin3years:MARanking				-0.0005 (0.004)						
coupwithin4years:MARanking					-0.005 (0.004)					
coupwithin5years:MARanking						-0.004 (0.003)				
coupWhier:MARanking							-0.012 (0.012)			
coupMemo:MARanking								0.001 (0.017)		
coupSuccess:MARanking									-0.010 (0.011)	
coupFail:MARanking										-0.001 (0.016)
Constant	-0.195* (0.102)	-0.142 (0.104)	-0.169 (0.106)	-0.191* (0.110)	-0.200* (0.114)	-0.233* (0.120)	-0.190* (0.101)	-0.184* (0.099)	-0.186* (0.101)	-0.189* (0.100)
Observations	794	794	794	794	794	794	794	794	794	794
Log Likelihood	-539.746	-540.190	-540.249	-540.273	-539.527	-539.539	-539.463	-539.397	-539.784	-539.175
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,093.493	1,094.381	1,094.498	1,094.546	1,093.053	1,093.078	1,092.927	1,092.794	1,093.568	1,092.349

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full General (Coups-MAGR-Promotion)

Dependent variable:										
	Promotion									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
coupthisyear	0.286 (0.346)									
coupthisyear		-0.023 (0.354)								
coupwithin2years			0.222 (0.301)							
coupwithin3years				0.367 (0.273)						
coupwithin4years					0.311 (0.260)					
coupwithin5years						0.377 (0.257)				
coupWhier							-0.228 (0.438)			
coupMemo								0.221 (0.738)		
coupSuccess									-0.060 (0.377)	
coupFail										0.652 (0.680)
MARanking	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
SCRanking	0.214 (0.292)	0.173 (0.290)	0.198 (0.292)	0.209 (0.291)	0.199 (0.291)	0.210 (0.292)	0.164 (0.291)	0.196 (0.290)	0.181 (0.291)	0.191 (0.290)
Estimated_Ethnicity	0.003 (0.012)	0.002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)
Conflict	-0.728 (0.936)	-0.679 (0.928)	-0.699 (0.930)	-0.783 (0.936)	-0.731 (0.933)	-0.746 (0.934)	-0.642 (0.929)	-0.754 (0.947)	-0.678 (0.932)	-0.663 (0.928)
coupthisyear:MARanking	0.001 (0.005)									
coupthisyear:MARanking		-0.001 (0.006)								
coupwithin2years:MARanking			-0.003 (0.005)							
coupwithin3years:MARanking				-0.003 (0.005)						
coupwithin4years:MARanking					-0.002 (0.004)					
coupwithin5years:MARanking						-0.003 (0.004)				
coupWhier:MARanking							0.002 (0.011)			
coupMemo:MARanking								0.021 (0.047)		
coupSuccess:MARanking									0.003 (0.005)	
coupFail:MARanking										-0.028 (0.036)
Constant	-0.514*** (0.162)	-0.458*** (0.162)	-0.518*** (0.169)	-0.595*** (0.180)	-0.598*** (0.188)	-0.652*** (0.199)	-0.441*** (0.157)	-0.494*** (0.154)	-0.456*** (0.160)	-0.487*** (0.155)
Observations	373	373	373	373	373	373	373	373	373	373
Log Likelihood	-245.208	-245.720	-245.482	-244.867	-245.052	-244.689	-245.623	-245.270	-245.578	-245.293
Akaike Inf. Crit.	504.415	505.439	504.964	503.735	504.104	503.378	505.246	504.541	505.156	504.587

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Army Chiefs (Coups-MAGR-Promotion)

	Dependent variable:									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Promotion		(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
coupthisyear	-0.957 (0.964)									
couplastyear		0.570 (0.600)								
coupwithin2years			0.188 (0.552)							
coupwithin3years				-0.371 (0.554)						
coupwithin4years					-0.314 (0.523)					
coupwithin5years						-0.185 (0.487)				
coupWhier							0.433 (1.146)			
coupMemo								2.577 (3.518)		
coupSuccess									-0.233 (0.963)	
coupFail										-40.035 (3,727.563)
MARanking	0.005 (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.008** (0.004)
SCRanking	0.775 (0.507)	0.688 (0.494)	0.704 (0.490)	0.727 (0.495)	0.755 (0.498)	0.758 (0.497)	0.629 (0.500)	0.710 (0.504)	0.715 (0.499)	0.639 (0.489)
Estimated_Ethnicity	-0.050 (0.035)	-0.051 (0.034)	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.050 (0.035)	-0.050 (0.035)	-0.049 (0.035)	-0.049 (0.034)	-0.048 (0.033)	-0.051 (0.035)	-0.050 (0.034)
Conflict	-13.923 (1,336.138)	-14.335 (1,304.725)	-14.210 (1,326.760)	-14.145 (1,348.036)	-14.146 (1,346.253)	-14.142 (1,338.381)	-14.394 (1,321.016)	-14.251 (1,339.869)	-14.093 (1,330.979)	-16.256 (3,635.939)
coupthisyear:MARanking	0.053 (0.039)									
couplastyear:MARanking		-0.003 (0.010)								
coupwithin2years:MARanking			0.008 (0.011)							
coupwithin3years:MARanking				0.015 (0.012)						
coupwithin4years:MARanking					0.018 (0.013)					
coupwithin5years:MARanking						0.017 (0.012)				
coupWhier:MARanking							-0.021 (0.061)			
coupMemo:MARanking								-0.801 (1.030)		
coupSuccess:MARanking									0.027 (0.031)	
coupFail:MARanking										1.476 (145.992)
Constant	-0.905*** (0.321)	-1.076*** (0.317)	-1.000*** (0.329)	-0.888*** (0.333)	-0.909*** (0.346)	-0.948** (0.374)	-0.998*** (0.303)	-0.975*** (0.305)	-0.936*** (0.314)	-0.927*** (0.308)
Observations	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145
Log Likelihood	-77.893	-79.699	-79.384	-79.070	-78.593	-78.616	-80.099	-79.409	-78.829	-77.292
Akaike Inf. Crit.	169.787	173.399	172.767	172.140	171.185	171.232	174.199	172.818	171.659	168.583

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Brigadier General (Coups-Ethnicity-Promotion)

	Dependent variable:									
	Promotion									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
coupthisyear	0.127* (0.073)									
couplastyear		0.053 (0.070)								
coupwithin2years			-0.030 (0.061)							
coupwithin3years				-0.130** (0.054)						
coupwithin5years					-0.283*** (0.049)					
coupWhier						0.064 (0.097)				
coupOhier							0.022 (0.104)			
coupMemo								-0.358*** (0.119)		
coupSuccess									0.099 (0.087)	
coupFail										-0.061 (0.104)
Estimated_Ethnicity	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.0005 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
MARanking	-0.004*** (0.0004)	-0.004*** (0.0004)	-0.004*** (0.0004)	-0.004*** (0.0004)	-0.004*** (0.0004)	-0.004*** (0.0004)	-0.004*** (0.0004)	-0.004*** (0.0004)	-0.004*** (0.0004)	-0.004*** (0.0004)
Conflict	-0.272* (0.160)	-0.271* (0.160)	-0.270* (0.159)	-0.270* (0.160)	-0.253 (0.160)	-0.289* (0.160)	-0.266 (0.162)	-0.271* (0.160)	-0.276* (0.160)	-0.282* (0.160)
coupthisyear:Estimated_Ethnicity	-0.002 (0.005)									
couplastyear:Estimated_Ethnicity		-0.002 (0.005)								
coupwithin2years:Estimated_Ethnicity			-0.001 (0.004)							
coupwithin3years:Estimated_Ethnicity				0.002 (0.004)						
coupwithin5years:Estimated_Ethnicity					0.002 (0.003)					
coupWhier:Estimated_Ethnicity						0.008 (0.006)				
coupOhier:Estimated_Ethnicity							0.001 (0.007)			
coupMemo:Estimated_Ethnicity								0.002 (0.007)		
coupSuccess:Estimated_Ethnicity									0.006 (0.006)	
coupFail:Estimated_Ethnicity										-0.005 (0.008)
Constant	-1.512*** (0.031)	-1.504*** (0.032)	-1.490*** (0.032)	-1.458*** (0.034)	-1.362*** (0.037)	-1.502*** (0.031)	-1.497*** (0.031)	-1.479*** (0.030)	-1.505*** (0.031)	-1.493*** (0.031)
Observations	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173	17,173
Log Likelihood	-7,436.766	-7,438.109	-7,438.106	-7,435.215	-7,418.276	-7,436.547	-7,438.339	-7,432.440	-7,436.231	-7,437.588
Akaike Inf. Crit.	14,885.530	14,888.220	14,888.210	14,882.430	14,848.550	14,885.090	14,888.680	14,876.880	14,884.460	14,887.170

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Major General (Coups-Ethnicity-Promotion)

	Dependent variable:								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Promotion (5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
coup _{lastyear}	0.205** (0.091)								
coup _{within2years}		0.025 (0.081)							
coup _{within3years}			-0.106 (0.072)						
coup _{within4years}				-0.246*** (0.068)					
coup _{within5years}					-0.253*** (0.066)				
coup _{Whier}						-0.025 (0.136)			
coup _{0hier}							0.108 (0.136)		
coup _{Success}								0.063 (0.120)	
coup _{Fail}									0.003 (0.139)
Estimated_Ethnicity	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
SCR _{Ranking}	0.553*** (0.076)	0.549*** (0.076)	0.549*** (0.076)	0.550*** (0.076)	0.552*** (0.076)	0.551*** (0.076)	0.552*** (0.076)	0.552*** (0.076)	0.549*** (0.076)
MAR _{Ranking}	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Conflict	-0.334 (0.215)	-0.327 (0.215)	-0.322 (0.214)	-0.307 (0.215)	-0.289 (0.215)	-0.338 (0.215)	-0.345 (0.217)	-0.332 (0.215)	-0.349 (0.215)
coup _{lastyear} :Estimated_Ethnicity	-0.010 (0.007)								
coup _{within2years} :Estimated_Ethnicity		-0.008 (0.006)							
coup _{within3years} :Estimated_Ethnicity			-0.002 (0.005)						
coup _{within4years} :Estimated_Ethnicity				-0.001 (0.005)					
coup _{within5years} :Estimated_Ethnicity					-0.003 (0.004)				
coup _{Whier} :Estimated_Ethnicity						0.006 (0.008)			
coup _{0hier} :Estimated_Ethnicity							-0.006 (0.011)		
coup _{Success} :Estimated_Ethnicity								0.003 (0.008)	
coup _{Fail} :Estimated_Ethnicity									-0.014 (0.012)
Constant	-2.110*** (0.044)	-2.084*** (0.044)	-2.048*** (0.046)	-1.986*** (0.048)	-1.956*** (0.051)	-2.079*** (0.042)	-2.086*** (0.042)	-2.085*** (0.042)	-2.081*** (0.042)
Observations	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467	14,467
Log Likelihood	-4,536.106	-4,537.675	-4,536.642	-4,529.331	-4,527.032	-4,538.441	-4,538.334	-4,538.320	-4,537.703
Akaike Inf. Crit.	9,086.211	9,089.349	9,087.285	9,072.663	9,068.064	9,090.881	9,090.667	9,090.641	9,089.406

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Lieutenant General (Coups-Ethnicity-Promotion)

	Dependent variable:								
	Promotion								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
couplastyear	0.264 (0.201)								
coupwithin2years		0.179 (0.162)							
coupwithin3years			0.115 (0.144)						
coupwithin4years				-0.070 (0.132)					
coupwithin5years					-0.052 (0.127)				
coupWhier						0.202 (0.243)			
coupOhier							0.095 (0.299)		
coupSuccess								0.025 (0.217)	
coupFail									0.232 (0.292)
Estimated_Ethnicity	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.0002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)
SCRanking	0.238 (0.148)	0.239 (0.148)	0.240 (0.148)	0.236 (0.148)	0.235 (0.148)	0.242 (0.148)	0.236 (0.148)	0.237 (0.148)	0.234 (0.148)
MARanking	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Conflict	0.162 (0.398)	0.211 (0.392)	0.169 (0.396)	0.206 (0.396)	0.204 (0.392)	0.125 (0.386)	0.118 (0.390)	0.136 (0.383)	0.129 (0.384)
couplastyear:Estimated_Ethnicity	-0.006 (0.011)								
coupwithin2years:Estimated_Ethnicity		-0.011 (0.009)							
coupwithin3years:Estimated_Ethnicity			-0.004 (0.009)						
coupwithin4years:Estimated_Ethnicity				-0.005 (0.009)					
coupwithin5years:Estimated_Ethnicity					-0.009 (0.008)				
coupWhier:Estimated_Ethnicity						0.001 (0.014)			
coupOhier:Estimated_Ethnicity							-0.005 (0.016)		
coupSuccess:Estimated_Ethnicity								-0.002 (0.012)	
coupFail:Estimated_Ethnicity									-0.011 (0.017)
Constant	0.180** (0.078)	0.176** (0.081)	0.181** (0.084)	0.238*** (0.088)	0.233** (0.092)	0.196** (0.077)	0.207*** (0.076)	0.210*** (0.078)	0.200*** (0.076)
Observations	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394	1,394
Log Likelihood	-952.139	-952.153	-952.693	-952.325	-951.911	-952.488	-952.958	-953.006	-952.675
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,918.279	1,918.305	1,919.385	1,918.651	1,917.822	1,918.975	1,919.915	1,920.011	1,919.350

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Full General (Coups-Ethnicity-Promotion)

	Dependent variable:								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Promotion (5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
coupLastyear	-0.314 (0.423)								
coupwithin2years		-0.052 (0.320)							
coupwithin3years			0.143 (0.279)						
coupwithin4years				0.141 (0.267)					
coupwithin5years					0.119 (0.264)				
coupWhier						-0.484 (0.470)			
coupOhier							-0.366 (0.619)		
coupSuccess								-0.189 (0.406)	
coupFail									-0.907 (0.995)
Estimated_Ethnicity	0.0002 (0.012)	-0.0002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.015)	0.001 (0.012)	0.001 (0.012)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.001 (0.012)
SCRanking	0.166 (0.291)	0.190 (0.292)	0.210 (0.291)	0.194 (0.291)	0.202 (0.292)	0.161 (0.291)	0.193 (0.290)	0.181 (0.291)	0.192 (0.290)
MARanking	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Conflict	-0.603 (0.933)	-1.047 (1.063)	-0.871 (0.978)	-0.801 (0.948)	-0.883 (0.957)	-1.091 (1.102)	-0.605 (0.929)	-1.108 (1.100)	-0.596 (0.929)
coupLastyear:Estimated_Ethnicity	0.046 (0.054)								
coupwithin2years:Estimated_Ethnicity		0.030 (0.029)							
coupwithin3years:Estimated_Ethnicity			0.019 (0.023)						
coupwithin4years:Estimated_Ethnicity				0.013 (0.022)					
coupwithin5years:Estimated_Ethnicity					0.023 (0.022)				
coupWhier:Estimated_Ethnicity						0.036 (0.034)			
coupOhier:Estimated_Ethnicity							0.188 (0.154)		
coupSuccess:Estimated_Ethnicity								0.034 (0.032)	
coupFail:Estimated_Ethnicity									0.308 (0.249)
Constant	-0.441*** (0.161)	-0.479*** (0.168)	-0.521*** (0.180)	-0.527*** (0.190)	-0.530*** (0.203)	-0.425*** (0.158)	-0.479*** (0.156)	-0.454*** (0.159)	-0.474*** (0.156)
Observations	373	373	373	373	373	373	373	373	373
Log Likelihood	-245.384	-245.090	-244.744	-245.020	-244.414	-245.065	-244.464	-245.214	-243.909
Akaike Inf. Crit.	504.769	504.181	503.488	504.039	502.827	504.130	502.928	504.428	501.819

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Army Chiefs (Coups-Ethnicity-Promotion)

	Dependent variable:								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Promotion (5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
coupLastyear	-0.069 (0.688)								
coupwithin2years		-0.040 (0.626)							
coupwithin3years			-0.434 (0.593)						
coupwithin4years				-0.146 (0.565)					
coupwithin5years					0.202 (0.551)				
coupWhier						0.725 (1.538)			
coupOhier							-0.711 (1.686)		
coupSuccess								0.920 (1.044)	
coupFail									-0.434 (1.748)
Estimated_Ethnicity	-0.077* (0.043)	-0.078* (0.045)	-0.081* (0.046)	-0.072 (0.046)	-0.053 (0.045)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.051 (0.035)	-0.045 (0.036)	-0.050 (0.034)
SCRanking	0.732 (0.514)	0.714 (0.507)	0.722 (0.514)	0.698 (0.503)	0.694 (0.493)	0.668 (0.496)	0.702 (0.495)	0.627 (0.485)	0.644 (0.491)
MARanking	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)
Conflict	-14.505 (1,194.233)	-14.367 (1,213.465)	-14.257 (1,224.409)	-14.219 (1,258.744)	-14.314 (1,353.952)	-13.916 (1,329.102)	-14.157 (1,337.501)	-14.172 (1,337.430)	-14.241 (1,337.921)
coupLastyear:Estimated_Ethnicity	0.086 (0.066)								
coupwithin2years:Estimated_Ethnicity		0.074 (0.067)							
coupwithin3years:Estimated_Ethnicity			0.085 (0.066)						
coupwithin4years:Estimated_Ethnicity				0.057 (0.067)					
coupwithin5years:Estimated_Ethnicity					0.010 (0.069)				
coupWhier:Estimated_Ethnicity						-0.093 (0.224)			
coupOhier:Estimated_Ethnicity							0.738 (0.778)		
coupSuccess:Estimated_Ethnicity								-0.056 (0.126)	
coupFail:Estimated_Ethnicity									-0.107 (0.466)
Constant	-0.948*** (0.327)	-0.941*** (0.341)	-0.857** (0.346)	-0.941*** (0.362)	-1.093*** (0.393)	-1.025*** (0.309)	-0.986*** (0.316)	-1.050*** (0.313)	-0.941*** (0.309)
Observations	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145
Log Likelihood	-78.954	-79.153	-79.382	-79.719	-79.948	-80.022	-79.038	-79.701	-79.863
Akaike Inf. Crit.	171.908	172.306	172.764	173.437	173.895	174.044	172.076	173.402	173.725

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

VITA

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