Hiding the Scars of War:
Hiroshima's Atomic Slum and the Peace Memorial City Construction Law

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If one were to have surveyed the city of Hiroshima from the apex of Hiroshima castle in mid-August 1945 the view would have been of a vast radius of destruction with almost no buildings left intact. Leaping forward in time to the present day, surrounded by high-rises, the visitor is now visually aware of the city's rebirth as a modern regional metropole. To the east and south lie the vast complex of public administrative buildings (national, prefectural, and city), and beyond the multi-story buildings of Hiroshima's commercial heart. To the southwest are the buildings of the city's cultural hub: Central Park (*chuō kōen*), the city's public and children's libraries, the City Art Museum, the Green Arena, public pool, and the former Municipal Baseball Stadium.[1] Perhaps most prominent, due to both its size and proximity is the massive Motomachi Chojuen High-rise Apartment Complex (*motomachi chojuen kōsō apāto*), a vast and strikingly designed housing project. As impressive as these buildings may be, they physically and figuratively cover up a highly contentious and tragic past.

From the early 1950's, the view from the top of Hiroshima Castle to the south and west would have been dominated by the rows of temporary housing units and densely packed maze of poorly constructed illegal residences that locals derogatorily referred to as the Atomic Slum. The residents of the slum were mostly victims of the war: A-bomb survivors (*hibakusha*), ethnic Koreans, and the poor. These victims, reminders of Japan's wartime past, became an impediment to the city's plan for redevelopment. Not only was the slum physically in the way of construction, those who lived there were living proof of the city's inability to rebuild. Then, by the mid 1970's, the slum and its residents were gone, replaced by the thriving city center we see today.

Hiroshima's reconstruction from nuclear devastation, its journey from what Hiroshima native and A-bomb survivor Ōta Yōko called a "city of corpses" (*shitai no machi*) to an

[1] Incidentally these buildings mask the view of the A-bomb dome (*genbaku dōmu*) and peace park from the rest of the city

international symbol of peace, is a process that has largely been overlooked.[2] Far from simply putting up buildings and planting trees, Hiroshima's reconstruction was in many ways emblematic of the move to reconstruct the memory of the city. By tying the reconstruction efforts to the national movement for peace, the city would prioritize bright future over bleak past at the expense of the city's war victims who continued to suffer. It would eliminate or control the reminders of war, be they place or person.

The Vision

Urban planning in modern Japan has largely been a centralized project. Controlled by the Home Ministry up until the end of the war, urban planning then fell under the purview of the independent War Damage Rehabilitation Board and finally the Ministry of construction in 1948.[3] While local municipalities were dependent on the central government for reconstruction guidelines, funding for project completion was reliant almost entirely on local resources. As a result scholars have commented on how this contentious relationship led to the piecemeal nature of postwar reconstruction, which largely ignored local vision.[4] Hiroshima represents an unusual case where a locally initiated concrete vision and urban plan was given the opportunity to come to fruition. Architectural historian Carola Hein notes that Nagoya has also been portrayed as enacting a visionary plan for reconstruction, but that the focus on infrastructure and land readjustment still fit largely within preexisting patters of urban planning.[5] Hiroshima's vision is particularly unique because of its link to Japan's postwar ethos of peace.

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[2] For a more detailed discussion see bibliographic essay
[3] Ishmaru Norioki. "Reconstructing Hiroshima and Preserving the Reconstructed City." Rebuilding Urban Japan After 1945. Ed. Carola Hein, Et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.93.
[4] Ishida Yorifusa. "Japanese Cities and Planning in the Reconstruction Period: 1945-55." Rebuilding Urban Japan After 1945. Ed. Carola Hein, Et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.29.
[5] Carola Hein. "Change and Continuity in Postwar Urban Japan." Rebuilding Urban Japan After 1945. Ed. Carola Hein, Et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.242

Plans for Hiroshima's reconstruction began within months of the end of the war. Even with the death of the mayor and other figures central to local government and planning, the city council established the Committee for War Reconstruction (*senzai fukkō iin kai*) in November of 1945, which soon developed into the Restoration Bureau (*fukkō kyoku*) in January of the next year. Tasked with "the job of unified implementation of a concrete reconstruction," the Restoration Bureau would provide the driving force behind plan implementation.[6] These "concrete" plans for the future initially developed along two paths. The first was at the prefectural level. Under the direction of Takeshiga Teizō, a former bureaucrat from the Home Ministry's City Planning Department, the Hiroshima Prefecture Urban Planning Department (*toshi keikakuka*) oversaw reconstruction plans for all the war damaged cities in the prefecture (including Hiroshima city, Kure, and Fukuyama).[7] The city began to develop its own plans starting with the first meeting of the Hiroshima City Reconstruction Council (*Hiroshima fukkō bangi kai*) on February 25, 1946. The council would meet twenty two times over the next two years, but plans were largely in place by July of 1946.[8] The lack of continuity between the two plans as they developed would be the source of frequent conflict. In most cases the central government was forced to step in and mediate until the creation of a unified system under the Peace Memorial City Construction Law.

With the division of the reconstruction plans at the administrative level, it is not surprising, then, that visions for Hiroshima's future were varied even among city residents. While some were able to directly voice their opinions on the city's redevelopment directly to city and prefectural authorities, residents and non-residents of varying levels of influence went on

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[6] Hiroshima-shi. *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*. (Hiroshima: Hiroshima-shi, 1983), p.17.
[7] Ishimaru, "Reconstructing Hiroshima," p.93.
[8] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.17.

record to put forward their visions for the future.[9] Many of these plans were overly ambitions and idealistic. One plan had proposed abandoning the existing city and moving to an entirely new location. Another plan called for maintaining the destroyed portion of the city as a ruin and focusing reconstruction of the city around it. An illustration of this design shows the view looking down on a radius of open space surrounded by modern buildings with the A-bomb Dome in the center.[10] Foreign influence on planning has also been noted. According to architectural historian Ishimaru Noriaki:

> Tam Deling, a park planner and consultant in the USA, was the first to suggest in June 1947…that a Peace Memorial Monument should be constructed, and bombed buildings situated near the hypocenter should be preserved. Miles Born, the vice president of the United Press, suggested in July 1947 that Nakajima Park [part of the plan developed the previous year and today's Peace Park] should be converted to some sort of memorial or war-damage memorial park ('*Pika-don* memorial park').[11]

While some level of public input is evident, the plans devised by the city and prefecture were largely set by the end of 1946. Among the features of the plan were the creation of a 100 meter road, a large central park covering the Nakajima and Motomachi districts, and green zones along the riverbanks.[12]

The ultimate problem at this stage was the general inability of the city or the prefecture to fund these plans. The devastation brought by the atomic bomb not only destroyed the city's business economy, but killed or displaced a large portion of the city's tax base.[13] Like most other municipalities in Japan at the time, the central government's guidelines dictating local funding for redevelopment placed a heavy burden on the local government.

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[9]For a comprehensive list of these plans see: Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen,* p.20-29.
[10] Ishmaru, "Reconstructing Hiroshima," p.90.
[11] Given the level of sensitivity to the issues of Hiroshima, it is somewhat surprising that these kinds of opinions were coming from Americas, particularly those not affiliated directly with the occupation, at such an early stage. Thus far, I have been unable to find evidence of the level of SCAP involvement before 1949. It is possible that by this time the Peace City concept was already coming into being and that these off hand opinions were some how connect to ideas already floating in the redevelopment discourse. Ibid., p.96.
[12] Ibid., p.94.
[13] Ibid., p.95.

> In June 1946, the City Restoration Bureau calculated the money needed for complete restoration. The total cost of public works projects was ¥2.043 billion, with more than ¥937,580,000 going to roads. Adding the expense of various cultural buildings, the total was a massive ¥2.277 billion. To put this amount in perspective, the city's total initial budget for 1946 was ¥9,614,114; for 1947, it was ¥47,252,891.[14]

With little hope for funding the reconstruction on their own, the city needed to convince the central government for support. But while the city had a definitive plan for reconstruction, it lacked a unique quality that would enable it to stand out from the hundreds of other war-damaged cities vying for a share of the same small pot. They needed a vision that would enable the nearly bankrupt Japanese government (and until 1952 the American occupation forces behind them) to justify putting up the expense. The solution to this problem lay in Hiroshima's unique position as the first a-bombed city and in the "Peace City" ethos.

The idea of the "Peace City" was not well defined initially. An early instance of the concept was in Kusunose Tsunei's 1945 use of the term "a memorial city for peace" (*heiwa e no kinen toshi*). And from about the first anniversary of the bomb the phrase "Hiroshima is the memorial city of world peace" (*Hiroshima wa sekai heiwa no kinen toshi*) came into common use.[15] The idea of Hiroshima as a symbol of peace has several origins, not the least of which was the movement for the abolition of nuclear weapons that developed in the city during the late 1940's. The connection to reconstruction initially was more tenuous. City planners were far more concerned with rebuilding the city as a cultural or industrial hub.[16] One noted exception was Tange Kenzō, an architect for the War Rehabilitation Board who volunteered for assignment on Hiroshima's reconstruction. Tange's plan in 1946 was to make "Hiroshima a city symbolic of the

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[14] "The Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law 3." Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum WebSite, <http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/Peace/E/pHiroshima2_3.html>, (5 May 2012).
[15] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.55.
[16] Ibid., p.54.

human longing for peace."[17] Nonetheless it, it was only with the successive failures at getting funding that city planners began to see the "Peace City" concept as an effective lobbying route to completing the project.

The plan as submitted to the Japanese Diet in February of 1949 approached the meaning of Hiroshima from two strains: national, and international. On the national side, the bomb had saved the country from total devastation and the death of countless civilians. Future goals should pursue eliminating the internal problems that had led to the war and caused the bombing to happen in order to keep it from happening again. On the international side, the bombing provided a new opportunity for peace. The world's renewed interest in peace necessitated the creation of a "Peace Center." These two strains combined to provide a direction for Hiroshima's reconstruction. Reconstruction was to be a national project, which, because of the city's unique position, required special assistance and unquestioned access to national resources. Through the Peace Memorial Construction Law (*heiwa kinen toshi hō*), Hiroshima was to be the symbol of world peace and the new direction for the nation.[18]

The plan had broad appeal to both the national government and the US occupation forces although they appear to have understood the meaning of the Peace City concept differently. For the Japanese government the Peace City would mark the turning point in the country's history, encapsulating the memories of the country's wartime past and turning toward a brighter future. The US opinion seems somewhat more complicated. There are several opinions as to why MacArthur went along with the idea. One theory is that he preferred the image of a "peace" city

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[17] Quoted in Cherie Wendelken. "Japanese Architectural Culture in the 1950s." Rebuilding Urban Japan After 1945. Ed. Carola Hein, Et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.193.
[18] For a visual representation of this logic see: Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.55.

to a "resentful bombed city."[19] Another was that he felt the concept would perpetuate the idea of "nuclear peace," that is legitimate the use of the bombs for effecting lasting world peace.[20] There is little evidence to indicate MacArthur's personal opinion, but the active participation of SCAP in the passage of the law gives some indication that he must have approved. Thus, the stage was set for a national law, which would provide the direction and funding to rebuild the city as planners had envisioned it. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law was passed by the Japanese legislature in May of 1949. In July of the same year it passed a local referendum and came into effect August 6, the fourth anniversary of the bombing.[21]

In a mere seven articles, the law would have a significant impact on the future of city planning in Hiroshima as well as the city's relationship with its citizens. Article 3 stipulated that the building of the peace city would be a consolidated effort by local, prefectural, and national governments essentially creating a unified plan across the various levels of government. Article 6 stipulated that the mayor and the entire population of the city were to "establish a program of continuous activity toward completion of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City."[22] These two articles would fully inculcate the Peace City concept as the prime directive for Hiroshima's future. It was to be a broad-based movement in which all levels of the community, from nation to city, were to be held accountable. But perhaps the most important article to the issue at hand, at least on practical terms, was article 4 which transferred, at no cost, 65 hectares of military land to the city and prefecture for the completion of the plan. Included in this land transfer was the entire Motomachi District.

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[19] Shinoda Hideaki. "Post-war Reconstruction of Hiroshima as a Case of Peacebuilding." Post-war Reconstruction of Hiroshima: From the Perspective of Contemporary Peacebuilding. IPSHU English Research Report Series 22. (Hiroshima: Institute for Peace Science Hiroshima University, 2008), p.13.
[20] Lisa Yoneyama. Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p.19-20.
[21] Ishmaru, "Reconstructing Hiroshima," p.95.
[22] Hiroshima City Planning and Coordinating Department General Affairs Bureau. Town Planning in Hiroshima. (Hiroshima: Hiroshima City Planning and Coordinating Department General Affairs Bureau, 2000), p.17.

With the vision and the funding now in place, the following three years would see another round of planning, this time by newly created inter-agency committees. Not surprisingly, however, the plans would be surprisingly similar to those that had been drawn up in 1946. Adopted in March of 1952, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Plan (*heiwa kinen toshi keikaku*) called for a vast increase in the amount of park land on riverbanks and three large parks within the city. The already planned Nakajima Park had already been repurposed as the Peace Park (*heiwa kōen*), with a peace memorial designed through an international competition.[23] Furthermore, the newly secured military land in the Motomachi District would become the site of Chuō Park, a massive park in the center of the city that would have both green space and "recreational and cultural facilities."[24] It would be the heart of the city's rebirth.

Parkland would play a crucial role in planners' attempts to reshape the city. The planned parks and green spaces increased the amount of designated parkland to over ten percent of the total city land with the majority concentrated in the central region. While this area had previously seen some of the highest concentrations of housing, the new city would see housing move out into the periphery especially on new land being reclaimed in the delta.

It deserves mention that all throughout the planning process few expected or desired the kind of population growth that the city would see in the postwar period. With a population of roughly 400,000 residents before the bomb, few envisioned expansion beyond that number. Most believed that the city should be rebuilt to accommodate roughly 300,000-400,000 residents. Some more extreme opinions advocated a much smaller city of 100,000 or less.[25] Yet while

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[23] The competition would be won by Tange Kenzō, the architect who had been working on Hiroshima's reconstruction for the Japanese government. The plan would become one of his most well know works and propelled him to international fame. For more on Tange see: Wendelken, "Japanese Architectural Culture in the 1950s," p.190-198. Also Yoneyama has an interesting discussion on the relationship between Tange's plan and an earlier plan of his promoting the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces, p.1-4.
[24] Hiroshima City Planning and Coordinating Department, Town Planning in Hiroshima, p.19.
[25] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.33-34.

planning along these lines was commencing, the population was already growing at a rapid rate. By 1950, even with the increase in radiation related deaths, the city had already recovered to around 150,000 residents.[26] The population would surpass 500,000 by 1960.[27] Unprepared for such rapid population growth, the perpetual housing crisis throughout the 1950's and 1960's is unsurprising.

The stage was now set for a conflict between vision and reality. By the time plans were completed and funding secured, the Motomachi District, the heart of the city's future, was filling up with thousands of residents in temporary and illegal housing. Furthermore, these residents were largely victims of the war: living reminders of the very thing that the Peace City vision sought to eradicate. However, the city could not simply evict everyone from the slum. To do so would be both practically and politically impossible. Neither could the slum be allowed to continue if the city planner's hard fought plans were ever to be realized. The city would deal with this problem in a piecemeal fashion delaying the formation of a permanent solution until the Atomic Slum had become such a threat to the city's vision and image of recovery that drastic measures had to be taken and plans had to be adjusted.

The Slum[28]

For decades the area around Hiroshima Castle, the Motomachi District, was the military center of the city. Headquarters of the 2nd Army, the flat land within the castle grounds and immediately outside the castle moat was a vast complex of barracks, stables and parade

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[26] Hiroshima-shi Nagasaki-shi Genbaku Saigaishi Henshū Iinkai. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings. (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p.365.

[27] Ishmaru, "Reconstructing Hiroshima," p.94.

[28] The definition of the boundaries of the Atomic Slum is open to interpretation. The distinction between the *motomachi jūtaku,* legally constructed emergency housing and apartments, and *dote,* the area along the Ota riverbank that had the highest density of illegal housing, was frequently made between the residents of these two areas. *Motomachi jūtaku* residents would likely place themselves outside of the slum for social reasons, but there were other distinctions in terms of available services and quality of life. Nonetheless, outsiders tended to be less discerning and classify the entire area as a slum. Furthermore, the eviction issues raised by the city were fairly uniform across both areas. For this reason I am using the broadest definition of borders.

grounds.[29] This immediately changed on August 6, 1945 with the explosion of the atomic bomb over Shima Hospital, almost directly across the street from the southern edge of the military base. Like the rest of central Hiroshima, the Motomachi District lay in ruins. About 60,000 houses, roughly 80% of all houses in the city, were damaged or destroyed by the blast.[30] Recovery began almost immediately and the need for housing was a major concern. Close to the center of the city, relatively flat, and largely free of debris, the Motomachi District was a prime location for emergency housing. In June of 1946 the city completed the first set of barracks for 480 families.[31] A photo dated May 10, 1947 shows rows of neatly organized low-rise housing units spread out between the western castle moat and the Ota river.[32] By 1949 the district was home to over 1,815 emergency housing units constructed or owned by an assortment of agencies from the city, prefecture, and private construction companies.[33] Known by residents as the Motomachi Housing Complex (*motomachi jūtaku*), these government-approved units contrasted with the hastily constructed illegal housing units that came to define the Atomic Slum.

Illegal housing (*fuhō jūtaku*) was concentrated mainly in an area called *dote* (literally "the riverbank") or Aioi Street (*aioi dōri*).[34] Stretching from the eastern edge of Aioi Bridge to the eastern edge of Misasa Bridge, the strip of land along the shore, at its peak, housed roughly 1,000 units and more than 2,500 people in an area about 1.5 kilometers long and no more than a

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[29] Makoto. "*Gunto Toshite No Kei.*" arch-hiroshima, 13 June 2007, <http://www.arch-hiroshima.net/arch-hiroshima/city/militarycity/militarycity.html>, (5 May 2012).
[30] Ishmaru, "Reconstructing Hiroshima," p.89.
[31] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.119.
[32] Chūgoku Shinbunsha, The Meaning of Survival, p.65.
[33] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.112.
[34] This should not be confused with the current Aioi Street which runs from Hiroshima Station to Ue Tenma Cho which was not constructed until 1981. Ibid., p.110.

couple hundred meters wide.[35] The first units began to appear in the spring of 1946 and within a year there were roughly 20 buildings visible along the riverbank.[36]

Residents were largely drawn by the availability of land which for all intents and purposes was free. Soon the number of buildings expanded rapidly, tripling by the end of 1945 and growing to over 900 by 1960.[37] As one of the residents described the development:

> If someone puts up a house, and someone comes along and sees he'll think this is as good a place as any. He'll say "You're here. Well then I guess I'll go right next to you. Is it ok if I build here?" "What does it matter to you if I say yes or no" the first man responds. And that is how a street is born.[38]

Another resident noted that construction was frequently begun on Saturday nights, so that by the time city inspectors came back to work on Monday morning, where there once had been a patch of grass would now be a hastily constructed, fully inhabited shack.[39] As space became more compacted, the same type of construction spread into parts of the Motomachi Housing Complex. On seeing the change in the organized layout of the temporary housing units, author Ōta Yōko relates the following dialogue:

> 'What happened? Another house has been built between those two'...
> 'That's a night house...they build them someplace else and bring them in the middle of the night. In the morning you look out and plop, there's a building there.'
> 'Where do they come from?'
> 'I wonder where they're being driven from. I'm not sure where they come from, but they end up living here.'[40]

It is likely that most of these people never intended for these to be permanent residences, but few were in a position to be able to move elsewhere.

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[35] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.111,127
[36] Ibid., p.121
[37] Ibid., p.124
[38] Ibid., p.124
[39] Ibid., p.124
[40] Ōta Yōko. "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To.*" *Ōta Yōko Shu*. Vol. 3. (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1982), p.10.

Many residents of the slum came from a number of disadvantaged, and sometimes overlapping, groups. These groups, ethnic Koreans, *hibakusha*, and the poor, were in many ways the most visible victims of the war. Koreans were in Japan because of Japanese colonialism. *Hibakusha* were living reminders of the city's atomic destruction. The poor and jobless were often there as a consequence of wartime displacement or economic hardship derived from wartime experience. While the circumstances of their victimization often led them to take up residence in in the slum, the concentration of these victims in the center of the city was a constant and visible contradiction with the vision the city was moving toward.

Ethnic Koreans (*chōsen jin* or *zainichi kankoku jin)* were an important and often overlooked group. The population of ethnic Koreans by August of 1945 is estimated at around 50,000, mostly arriving in the previous five years as mobilized or itinerant workers for the city's war industries. With an estimated 30,000 killed in the atomic bombing, of the 20,000 survivors, roughly three quarters returned to Korea within the first five years. The remaining 5,000 clustered together in communities as the city rebuilt.[41] Others ended up in Hiroshima attempting to find passage back to Korea, but rumors of ships sinking and lack of money compelled some to stay.[42] Some of these ended up in the Atomic Slum making up roughly 20% of the population.[43]

Ethnic Koreans had several distinct disadvantages compared to Japanese residents in the city that made them more prone to taking refuge in the slums. Many of them were there as mobilized workers, in many cases forced, and their incomes were entirely dependent on war industries. The targeting of these industries before the end of the war, and their subsequent dismantling, left many Koreans jobless or severely impoverished. Similarly, those who had been

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[41] Hiroshima-shi Nagasaki-shi, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, p.468. There is some debate particularly over the number of Korean deaths. For discussion see same p.473.
[42] Fumizawa Ryuichi. "*Aioi Dōri*." *Kono Sekai No Katasumi De*. Ed. Tomoe Yamashiro. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965), p.3-4.
[43] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.129.

conscripted into military service also came out of the war jobless and homeless. Many Koreans had not been provided with adequate housing to begin with and the opportunities for more space, especially in the initial phase of slum development, were a compelling reason to locate there. One of the most distinguishing factors for Koreans was simply that most of them had nowhere else to go. Many Japanese residents had relatives or friends living outside the city who could help them evacuate and resettle elsewhere. Koreans, already displaced and lacking ties outside their own community, could either return to their homeland at considerable cost and risk, or stay where they were.[44]

Koreans in the slum, as in other parts of the country, were subject to discrimination and generally looked down upon by Japanese residents. Unlike other parts of the city, Koreans in the Atomic Slum were not concentrated in an exclusive area, but their immigration and economic status meant that most resided in illegal housing along the riverbank. As a result, city residents, even those in the Motomachi Housing Complex, described the Koreans of the riverbank area as strange, and dangerous. Author Ōta Yōko paints a picture of the area that, while clearly exaggerated, is emblematic of Japanese opinion at the time:

> They were all Korean (*chōsen jin*). Even though there were Japanese mixed in, they seemed to be Japanese who had some sort of connection to a Korean…You could see straight into the Korean's houses…the men would be drinking even in the morning or afternoon. The milky-white liquor bottles would be lined up in front of every house. As you watched the bottles would be emptied one by one…[45]

Likely because of this discrimination, Koreans appear to have been somewhat more politically active. The two main organizations for ethnic Koreans in Japan had a presence in the slums, but these organizations were divided much like Korea itself. The Association of Korean Residents (*chōsen sōren kai* or *ch'ongryŏn*), a North Korea affiliated organization, counted

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[44] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.353.
[45] Ōta, "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To*," p.13.

roughly one third of the Koreans in the slum as members.[46] While author Fumizawa Ryuichi was surveying the slum he interviewed the vice chairman of the organization who was pursuing the construction of a Korean School (*minzoku gakkō*).[47] The Korean Residents Union (*kankoku kyoryū mindan* or *teahan min'guk kŏryu mindan*), a South Korea affiliated organization, had a district office in the slum. Fumizawa described it in the mid-1960's as a meeting place for local Koreans often showing Korean movies and South Korean Army propaganda. He also noted that the younger generation of Koreans at these meetings spoke little Korean and showed minimal interest.[48] The division between these organizations was clear, and while both were instrumental in pressing for Korean rights, particularly in the case of Korean atomic bomb victims, political infighting commonly prevented them from being effective.

Atomic bomb victims (*hibakusha*), both Korean and Japanese, made up a large part of the slum. In the riverbank area, even as late as 1970, over one-third of households reported having one or more *hibakusha.*[49] While being a *hibakusha* did not necessarily mark one as destined for the slums, their health and labor situation drove many there out of economic necessity. In the mid-1950's when Hiroshima's economy began to improve, the income level and employment rate of *hibakusha* increased at a much slower pace. Discrimination in employment left many to work in low paying unskilled labor.[50] Also the health side effects of radiation exposure and habitual hospitalization made it difficult for many to maintain fulltime employment. For all residents of the slum, day labor was the highest category of employment, at 19.5%. For *hibakusha* the rate was likely much higher because of discrimination and health issues. One slum

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[46] Fumizawa, "*Aioi Dōri*," p.2.
[47] Ibid., p. 27-29.
[48] Ibid., p.11.
[49] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.129. Steinberg in 1965 puts the number at 15%, but it is unclear what his source for this number is: Rafael Steinberg. Postscript from Hiroshima. (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 50.
[50] Hiroshima-shi Nagasaki-shi, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, p.458.

resident who, along with her husband, was perpetually too ill to work described making money by doing odd jobs at home: "We did things like pasting labels on bags of salted bonito (60 yen for 1000), assembling boxes for saba sushi (120 yen for 1000), putting the front boards on chairs (350 yen for 50)."[51] Barely able to make a living, many *hibakusha* found themselves either in the cheaply rented apartments of the Motomachi Housing Complex, or in poorly constructed shacks along the riverbank with little hope of getting out.

Employment was a general problem for most living in the slum. A 1970 survey of the slum showed a 14.6% unemployment rate, well above the rate for the city at the time. The largest portion reported working in day labor and construction indicating the difficulty slum residents had in finding permanent, high-paying jobs. The same survey showed roughly one third of households reporting an income less than 60,000 yen per month.[52] While surveys are silent on the matter, there is anecdotal evidence that the lack of permanent employment sent some residents into criminal activity.[53] Still, the slum was also home to a number of small businesses operating outside of the purview of city regulation that were run either from small illegally constructed shops, or from people's homes.[54] Even for those who were able to make a living, however, life in the slum presented several other challenges.

Perhaps the greatest issue for most living in the slum was access to water and sewer. While the electric companies were quick to provide electricity to anyone who would pay for it, water presented a larger challenge.[55] Expanding the infrastructure for water and sewer to the Motomachi District was a project that necessitated city involvement. While the city proceeded to

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[51] Fumizawa, "*Aioi Dōri*," p.25
[52] Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen p.128-129
[53] Evidence of criminal activity can be found in: Ōta, "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To*," p.20; Fumizawa, "*Aioi Dōri*," p.10; Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces, p.50. Lifton provides anecdotal evidenc to the contraray claiming that the "gangland" was concentrated in the areas that were not damaged by the bomb: Robert Lifton. Death in Life Survivors of Hiroshima. (New York: Random House, 1968), p.265
[54] Fumizawa, "*Aioi Dōri*," p.10.
[55] For more on electricity in the slum see: Ōta, "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To*," p.77-78.

upgrade the system, it was done with the larger development plans in mind. As a result, the Motomachi Housing Complex and other government-approved housing units were provided with limited access to water, usually in the form of outdoor spigots. On the other hand, illegal housing areas, especially in the riverbank area, were never part of the plan. For those without access there was the option of drilling a well. Due to high overhead costs, this often involved pooling money from several households.[56] Fumizawa noted that the quality of water from these wells was appalling, largely due to the simple fact that the ocean was less than two kilometers away. "From the first sip," he said "I suddenly wanted to vomit. The tepid salt water entered my mouth leaving behind a lingering stench."[57] Nonetheless, with such limited access, water became a valuable commodity. Stealing water became commonplace to the degree that some with access began locking their spigots and wells.[58]

Issues related to sewage were not much better. With no access to city sewer lines and limited space for the construction of private outhouses, most were forced to use communal restrooms and washing facilities or seek out other alternatives. Fumizawa described his experience:

> The communal restroom was surrounded only by a short cement barrier beyond which your complete upper torso, as well as your feet, were clearly visible. There was a restroom behind the pigpen in back of the house where I was staying. However, with people watching and a pig's nose right in front of me, I found myself unable to perform. I had no choice but to use the river or the public restroom next to the A-bomb Dome. It took ten minutes to walk there. Because of the distance, I felt like I should take advantage of the opportunity whenever I happen to be in the area. I often saw people eyeing the line to the communal restroom from the corner of the pigpen during the morning rush.[59]

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[56] Ōta, "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To*," p.82.
[57] Fumizawa, "*Aioi Dōri*," p.9.
[58] Ōta, "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To*," p.78, 211
[59] Fumizawa, "*Aioi Dōri*," p.9-10. Also Ōta, "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To*," p.158

The issues with sewage went beyond the slum itself. Besides the obvious public health risk, the use of the river as a dumpsite for waste upstream from the city's emerging downtown and Peace Park was a source of pollution and embarrassment.

Fire was also a major issue. With the proliferation of high-density poorly constructed wooden housing, the potential for massive fires was always a threat. Ōta describes the ease with which a fire could spark: "He drank a bottle of rice wine (*shōchu*), arrived home after midnight and went to sleep smoking a cigarette. The lit cigarette came to rest on the tatami floor mats. It took until morning, but by then his whole house with him inside was aflame."[60] Fires often spread quickly and the narrow streets made it nearly impossible for fire engines to respond to the blazes. One of the largest fires occurred in 1967. According to the Chūgoku Shinbun, "the flames spread rapidly and kept burning for about two hours. One person was killed and 171 families (532 people) were left homeless in the blaze which destroyed 61 homes completely and 21 partially."[61] Smaller fires also occurred with relative frequency. The year 1970 saw the destruction of 35 houses in May, 15 houses in August, and another 11 houses in December.[62] Yet destruction by fire only saw the return of new illegal housing usually by the same residents who having lost everything, had no other choice but to rebuild on the same spot.

Clearly the Atomic Slum was an undesirable living situation and for most choosing to live there was a matter of necessity not desire. Indeed most would have preferred to live elsewhere. As a slum resident told Fumizawa: "All we want is to be given the right opportunity to get out of here."[63] Unfortunately as the city developed and executed its plan for reconstruction it persistently ignored the needs of the slum residents and never gave them the "right

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[60] Ōta, "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To*," p.145.
[61] Chūgoku Shinbunsha, The Meaning of Survival, p.192.
[62] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.130.
[63] Fumizawa, "*Aioi Dōri*," p.6.

opportunity." Rather than seek a resolution to the bleak reality, the city instead proceeded with a vision of a bright future through the elimination of the slum.

The Disappearance of the Slum

In the early 1950's the Atomic Slum remained largely ignored. Construction progressed more rapidly on higher priority projects such as the 100 meter road (today's *Heiwa Ōdōri*), and the Peace Park and memorial. These projects faced similar hurdles. During the years of planning, residents had moved back into the Nakajima District and rebuilt. Unlike the case of the Atomic Slum, however, these residents frequently could claim property rights as the district had once been a highly concentrated residential and commercial area. Under the city's land readjustment law, these residents were to be offered land of equal value in another part of the city for rebuilding, but many refused. Construction of the park began anyway and pictures from the park's early years clearly show shacks lined up behind the memorial cenotaph.[64] All houses were removed from the park grounds by 1959 with the residents dispersed. Ironically many of those evicted ended up in the Atomic Slum, just up river.[65]

During the same time, evictions in the Atomic Slum were approached in a similar manner. The idea was that slum residents would be provided with land or space in apartments in another part of the city. Newly reclaimed land in the Eba District was the area most commonly proposed, but few residents found this an acceptable solution. Far removed from the center of the city, it would increase the travel time for those residents working in the city's downtown areas. For those with shops in the slum it would mean transplanting their businesses to a region with fewer people and thus less demand for their services.[66] Cost seems to have been the most important factor, as most residents simply could not afford to move elsewhere. For those renting space

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[64] Ishmaru, "Reconstructing Hiroshima," p.99.
[65] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.125.
[66] Ōta, "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To*," p.38.

from the city or prefecture in the Motomachi Housing Complex's temporary units, going from a monthly rent of 70-90 yen to more than 1,500 yen at newer public housing facilities was an impossibility.[67] Since the city lacked a way to force residents out, the slum remained.

No concerted effort was made toward eliminating the slum until the 1960's. By that time, the area had already begun to develop a reputation among the larger public as housing an obstinate group of freeloaders and criminals. This was especially prevalent after the attempts by slum residents to stop the construction of the highly popular Municipal Baseball Stadium (*Shimin Kyūjo*) in the mid 50's.[68] Slum residents organized in an attempt to challenge the plan and build more housing, but they were largely unsuccessful in the face of overwhelming support from the rest of the city. As one city resident complained:

> You people (*anatagata*) may be against it...but meanwhile we citizens of Hiroshima (*Hiroshima shimin*) have more or less had to bear the burden of completing this modern city plan. To that end, we've built comfortable roads and pleasant parks where we can enjoy the trees. But you people have continued to pay minimal rent and reside illegally on our planned parkland well beyond the postwar period as if you own it...The other people have been evicted from Nakajima and the train station area according to plan, but you people have gathered together not realizing that your opposition has no force behind it.[69]

The Peace Memorial City Construction Law, which made all levels of community responsible for creating the Peace City, was thus disenfranchising the slum residents who's continued existence ran counter to the law. The call for elimination of the slum was growing, and had broad public support. In the 1955 mayoral election Watanabe Tadao pledged to change the planned Chuō Park into a housing district. His plans were significantly scaled back after his election, but he did succeed in getting a portion of the planned park on the far northern edge allocated for

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[67] Ōta, "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To*," p.74.
[68] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Shimin Seikatsu Hen*, p.155-157.
[69] Ibid., p.158-159.

public housing.[70] Between 1958 and 1968 units for 930 families were constructed.[71] Priority was given to legal residents of the Motomachi Housing Complex, who again protested the increased cost.[72] The addition of these units did little to resolve the larger problem of illegal housing, and if anything exacerbated the problem by forcing more residents into densely packed areas on the riverbank.

By 1968 the atomic slum proved to be the city's biggest problem. Nearly all other elements of the initial reconstruction plan had been completed. Even Hiroshima Castle, at the center of the slum, had been rebuilt. Furthermore fires starting in the slum continued to be a major threat to public safety. It was in May of that year that the city assembled a special committee to resolve the issue once and for all. The Committee to Further the Reconstruction of the Motomachi District (*Motomachi chiku saikaihatsu sokushin kyōgi kai*) devised a plan which would see the construction of a massive public housing project with buildings as high as twenty stories and 4,500 family units. With a timetable of seven years, the project aimed to clear the slum by the end of 1977. Work on the park and cultural facilities would progress simultaneously as areas of the slum were cleared.[73]

The design for the Motomachi Chojuen High-rise Apartment Complex was the brainchild of Ōtaka Masato. A member of the modernist architecture collective known as "metabolism" (*metaborizumu*), Ōtaka was chosen because he had experience working on slum clearance projects in the past.[74] The design concept was architecturally distinct from the simple public

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[70] Watanabe served only one term as mayor. His predecessor, Hamai Shinzō, who had been mayor while the Peace Memorial City Construction Law was being formulated, replaced him in 1959. Hamai served another two terms as mayor, from 1959 to 1967 and was a strong advocate for following through with the original plan.
[71] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Shimin Seikatsu Hen*, p.161-162.
[72] Steinberg, Postscript from Hiroshima, p.49.
[73] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Shimin Seikatsu Hen*, p.161
[74] Interestingly Ōtaka was chosen without a formal design competition, unlike almost all other design projects in the city at the time. The likely reason for this exception is that the city strongly desired to complete the project as

housing units being constructed at the time and, in retrospect, ahead of its time. Rather than focus on the bleak reality of the slums, Ōtaka sought to produce an ideal community of the future. The buildings were laid out in a pattern resembling the Japanese character *ku* (く) to allow wind and light to flow freely through the structure. Rooftop gardens would provide recreation and relaxation space for residents and a central shopping area would allow residents with businesses to provide for the community.[75]

At the same time, the design had a number of flaws that demonstrate Ōtaka's ignorance towards the needs of slum residents. One notable flaw was the fact that elevators only stopped every other floor. For the aging slum residents, the fact that half the residents would have to climb stairs to reach their apartment was a physical challenge.[76] The biggest flaw, however, was the location of the complex itself. Surrounded by the new Central Park, Hiroshima Castle, and the Ota River, the apartment complex was centrally located, yet isolated from the rest of the city. Residents could easily travel back and forth to the city center, but the park became a barrier preventing non-residents from approaching the apartments unless they had a specific reason. This was one of the major reasons that most of the shops in the central shopping area soon shut down.

Ignorant of design flaws and eager to push ahead, constructed with an almost frantic pace.[77] The Motomachi Chojuen High-rise Apartment Complex was completed in October of

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quickly as possible. Selecting a designer with experience in similar types of projects would eliminate the time lost in a drawn out competition.

[75] Makoto. "*Motomachi Chojuen Kōse Apāto.*" arch-hiroshima, 19 Sept. 2009, <http://www.arch-hiroshima.net/arch-hiroshima/arch/delta_center/m_apartment.html>, (5 May 2012).

[76] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.196.

[77] The speed with which the complex was constructed inevitably led to corners being cut in the construction. Subsequent analysis of the concrete revealed that improperly processed sea sand had been used in the mix leading to faster than expected deterioration. As a consequence the life expectancy of the complex has been significantly reduced. Makoto, "*Motomachi Chojuen Kōse Apāto.*"

1978.[78] An architectural feat, it was called the "first high-rise high-density project of its kind in Japan."[79] Considerable effort was made to force slum residents into moving. Anti-reconstruction movements assembled by slum residents again raised the issue of cost saying "even if it's a little narrow, or dirty, we want our cheap rent as it is."[80] In the end, the city and prefecture succeeded in convincing slum residents to move into the new high-rise, or relocate entirely. By the apartment complex's official completion there were only a handful of structures left standing on the riverbank. Where once had existed the largest slum in the city, now stood the Prefectural Gymnasium and Archery Grounds, a youth center, the Prefectural Exhibition Hall, the Central Library, the City Art Museum, and the Children's Culture and Science Center.[81] By the end of the decade the Atomic Slum would exist only in memory.

Conclusion

The appearance and disappearance of the Atomic Slum is in many ways similar to reconstruction projects throughout postwar Japan. Jeffry M. Diefendorf notes that other cities in Japan had the same issues with slum tenements and property rights.[82] What makes Hiroshima unique was the vision used to justify the reconstruction movement. In some sense the adoption of the "Peace City" vision was a pragmatic marriage that allowed city planners to carry out their preexisting plans. However, the vision also promised a psychological transformation. Shinoda Hideaki notes:

> [T]he task of stabilizing and developing people's lives after a war cannot be systematically and fully achieved without a vision to reconstruct an identity of the entire society. The case of Hiroshima may have been a rare case in which the idea of the peace memorial city was clearly linked to a physical reconstruction plan. In any event, however,

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[78] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.181.
[79] Itō Nobuo. A Guide to Japanese Architecture. Rev. ed. (Tokyo: Shin Kenchikusha, 1975), p.238.
[80] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.139.
[81] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Shimin Seikatsu Hen*, p.162.
[82] Jeffry M Diefendorf. "War and Reconstruction in Germany Japan." Rebuilding Urban Japan After 1945. Ed. Carola Hein, Et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.228.

> it is essential to have a policy vision to *navigate the lives of survivors in a certain constructive direction*. The history of Hiroshima shows a role of such power of human ideas or visions in a chaotic situation of post-conflict society. [83] (emphasis added)

The adoption of the Peace Memorial City Construction Law expanded that vision to the nation and in some sense the world, and carried such broad appeal that it has continued to inform development projects in the city to this day. At the same time, it excluded the victims of the war who were unable or unwilling to head in that "certain constructive direction."

The Peace City vision was at once temporal as well as spatial. By rebuilding along a progressive city plan the city would eliminate the traces of war allowing it to revive free of the weight of its wartime past. The traces that did remain were incorporated into the Peace Vision where they could be explained and controlled to promote peace while hide the underlying history of war.[84] In essence, it promised that when complete, the plan would bring about an end (or at least a containment) to the war; to put behind, as one local businessman put it, "a tragic past, which should be forgotten."[85]

In this sense, the slums came to represent not only a barrier to completing the city planner's construction projects, but a barrier to the community's desire to forget the war and move on. The large numbers of *hibakusha* were a constant reminder of the devastating effects of bomb, which could not be fixed.[86] The elimination of the slums was inevitable, but the manner in which the slums were cleared was done for the benefit of the city not the slum residents. The rallying cry for the redevelopment of the Motomachi District centered on the idea that without

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[83] Shinoda, "Post-war Reconstruction of Hiroshima," p.23. The concept of reconstruction as a social engineering project is also discussed by Scott Kirsch in the context of the American Civil war although with different conclusions. Rather than a positive act, they see this as a form of continued destruction which blurs the boundries between conflict and post-conflict. Kirsch, Scott. Reconstructing Conflict Integrating War and Post-War Geographies. (Farnham: Ashgate Pub, 2011), p.8-12.

[84] Yoneyama notes the absolute denial of the association with the atomic bomb in explanations of the Peace Memorial City Construction law. Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces, p.19.

[85] Steinberg, Postscript from Hiroshima, p.27.

[86] Ethnic Koreans were reminders of Japan's colonial violence. Integration of these people into the narrative would come in time, but always contested and on government terms

the clearing of the slum "Hiroshima's postwar will never end" (*Hiroshima no sengo wa owaranai*).[87] The city's solution favored keeping the existing plan (with minor adjustments), while forcing out some and relocating the rest to a massive public housing project which simultaneously enhanced the city's skyline and isolated the slum residents from the rest of the city. The city we see today is the city we are meant to see. Meanwhile the scars of war, the unauthorized memories, remain hidden beneath ground or behind the walls of this modern metropolis, this city of peace.

[87] Hiroshima-shi, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen*, p.148.

Bibliographic Essay

The Atomic Slum and its relation to postwar development in Hiroshima, and Japan in general, are two threads that have not generally been tied together. Finding sources on the Atomic Slum is particularly difficult, as almost nothing has been published on it in English outside of passing references to its existence. Nonetheless, information on the slum and redevelopment is available, but sources are dispersed across a broad field of government agencies and individual reportage, as well as traditional academic work in both Japanese and English.

One of the most valuable resources on the subject is the *Hiroshima Shinshi* series published by the city of Hiroshima in the mid-1980's. While the contents of most volumes seem rather straightforward official history, *Hiroshima Shinshi Toshibunka Hen* contains a wealth of information on issues that would appear to be particularly sensitive, yet highly relevant to the subject at hand. The chapter on "*Aioi Dōri*" (part 1, ch I, section 1), the strip of illegal housing along the Ota river, is one of the most comprehensive descriptions available. The chapter summarizes data from a number of surveys as well as information gleaned from personal interviews of residents and news reports. Also included are several dozen pictures, and highly detailed maps of the riverbank area over multiple decades, which provide a visual insight into the lives of slum residents. Somewhat surprisingly, the unnamed author presents a certain level of analysis (perhaps due to hindsight) about the elimination of the slum. While the author does not seem ready to condemn the city for its actions, there is ample implication that the city did not proceed with slum resident's best interest in mind. The chapter, however is somewhat lacking in that it focuses primarily on the riverbank area, which was a minor part of the slum

geographically and accounted for only about one third of the population. Information on the larger Motomachi Housing Complex (*Motomachi jūtaku*) is mentioned only in passing.

Also relevant in the same volume are the sections on redevelopment and creation of the Peace Memorial City Plan (part 1 ch I). This chapter also contains the most complete and detailed narrative of urban planning in the immediate postwar period in Hiroshima. It is especially useful for its detailed descriptions of the various reconstruction plans that were floating around at the time and showing how they developed into the final plan. The connection to the Peace City concept is also valuable, however there seems to be some ambiguity as to where the concept actually originated. The chapter provides some evidence of printed statements by individuals, but does not seem ready to attribute the concept to an individual or organization. I have found no evidence in other sources, so it may be that the specific origin of the concept has been lost. More likely, however, the concept had multiple origins making the threads too diffuse to separate.

The section on the Motomachi Chojuen Apartments (part 1, ch II, section 3) along with a second volume in the series *Hiroshima Shinshi Shimin Seikatsu Hen* also contain pertinent information on the clearing of the slums. The latter has some of the clearest descriptions of how plans developed for clearing the slum as well as statements by city residents voicing their opinions about the slum. Both tend to take a rather pro-development stand. However, the section on the apartment complex construction contains data from a number of surveys of residents outlining their feelings about the building, which were largely negative.

One of the biggest problems with this series is the lack of citations. With no bibliography and only reference to direct quotations, usually from news media, the series easily confounds the researcher attempting to trace back certain pieces of information back to the original source. It

took considerable effort to determine what information came from what surveys. Also, as a city publication, the writer(s) doubtless had access numerous city documents. Further investigation might reveal more useful accounts or documents, but the fact that the city does not provide a roadmap for its own conclusions is rather frustrating. Considering the level of research that clearly went into the project, one gets the sense that the city is still attempting to present an official narrative: the "end of the line," so to speak, for research on the subject.

A somewhat less related government report, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings, is useful particularly for gaining an understanding of *hibakusha* related issues. While it does not directly talk about the slum, it does discuss health, poverty, and discrimination which *hibakusha* faced in society. It also contains a surprising amount of information on Korean *hibakusha* with discussion on the controversy over numbers and acknowledgement of the special circumstances they faced over Japanese *hibakusha*.

Two pieces of reportage provide valuable first hand descriptions of life inside the slum. Fumizawa Ryuichi's chapter "*Aioi Dōri*" in *Konosekai no Katasumi De* is an account of his time living in the slum. His anecdotes describe the hardship that residents faced, as well as their motivations and desires. He also has some of the most extensive descriptions of ethnic Koreans living in the slum. The most important piece of reporting on the slum, however, is Ōta Yōko's "*Yūnagi No Machi To Hito To*." Ōta, a victim of the bomb herself, returned to Hiroshima in 1953 to visit her family in the Motomachi Housing Complex and write about life in the slum. Published as an autobiographical novel, the book details her encounters with slum residents as well as her own experiences there. Aware of her background, it is not surprising that Ōta takes a particularly antagonistic position towards the city. Despite her obvious biases, however, the book

still provides a wealth of imagery and characters that do not come through from official surveys and statistics.

More academic work does not appear to exist on the Atomic Slum, but does for postwar redevelopment in Japan. An edited volume, Rebuilding Urban Japan After 1945, contains several chapters about the reconstruction of Japanese cities. The most relevant is Ishmaru Norioki's "Reconstructing Hiroshima and Preserving the Reconstructed City." Ishimaru provides the most in depth historical account of Hiroshima's redevelopment plans in English. He also has several pages on legal issues surrounding land requisition and demolition of bomb-damaged buildings, which, though more contemporary in scope, demonstrate a consistent pattern in the city's urban development. Cherie Wendelken's "Japanese Architectural Culture in the 1950s," in the same volume, has an analysis of the work of Tange Kenzō. Tange's involvement in urban planning in Hiroshima, as well his winning design for the Peace Park and museum, make him an important figure in the redevelopment story. Wendelken provides some insight into the origins of Tange's vision for the city as a symbol of peace. At the same time Lisa Yoneyama's Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory presents interesting contradictions. According to Yoneyama, the design for the park was based off a Tange's previous idea for a park commemorating the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This highlights an important flaw in Rebuilding Urban Japan After 1945. As a work of architectural history, the chapters tend to focus on the technical aspects of design and urban planning and not the underlying social implications. References to slums are usually presented as legal or logistical issues to be overcome with little reference as to how cities dealt with these people.

One interesting, and somewhat more balanced analysis of Hiroshima architecture can be found at the arch-hiroshima website < http://www.arch-hiroshima.net/>. While the usefulness of

web content is often deserving of criticism, quality material deserves credit. Author "Makoto," an urban planner in Tokyo and Hiroshima native, writes about the history of architecture and urban planning in the city with pages on various buildings. His page on the Motomachi Chojuen Apartments has a very good overview of the design concept by the architect, as well as links to his other projects. At the same time, the author acknowledges that the slum was the raison d'etre for the apartment complex and gives some background on the slums development. He also provides a brief, but important criticism of the apartment complex's design flaws.

Finally, some mention should be made of a part of the narrative that is generally lacking on all fronts. Notably missing from all sources is detailed information about the involvement of US occupation forces in the development of the Peace Memorial City concept, law, and plan. Allusion to US involvement is quite frequent, but direct citations are few and insufficient. For the most part, conclusions about what the occupation forces did or did not think are usually assumptions. I suspect that there would be records made, but further investigation on this matter is necessary.

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