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Resisting Erasure: The Practice of Learning from Maya Mam Narratives of
Survivance in Guatemala

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Abstract

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Through the implementation of innovative research methods and engagement with Indigenous scholarship, scholars of transitional justice and archival studies can learn important lessons from Indigenous scholars and communities who are working to build brighter futures in the shadow of conflict, violence, and genocide. In my doctoral research, here presented in three articles, I make this argument through exploring the case studies of Rwanda and Guatemala, providing methods of analysis, and identifying opportunities for collaborative research. In part one, “New Documents Shed Light: Why did Peacekeepers Withdraw During Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide?”, an article published in 2018 in *Genocide Studies and Prevention: an International Journal*, I utilize the “critical oral history method” and analysis of recently declassified United States government records that shed light on the failed international response to stop the genocide in

Rwanda. While methods used in this study elicit important information, the author finds that the study fails to include voices of people who suffered the consequences of these flawed policies.

In part two, “Collaborative Archival Analysis & Co-Producing Knowledge,” I discuss the use of innovative archival analysis and “critical oral history” to address the flaws in the Rwanda project, drawing on important lessons from Indigenous studies and decolonizing methodologies. I apply these lessons in the case study of a collaborative project with the small town of genocide survivors in Nuevo Amanecer in western Guatemala. I argue that by broadening access to documents from the U.S.’ “colonial archive” about the Guatemalan genocide, we subvert the colonial archive in important ways. While these methods provide promise, future research needs to further develop these approaches.

Finally, in part three, “Beyond Transitional Justice: Learning from Indigenous Maya Resistance in Guatemala,” I identify concrete lessons scholars and practitioners can learn from Indigenous scholarship when attempting to determine successes and shortcomings of the international community’s approach to transitional justice in the case of Guatemala. Through learning from the Indigenous studies concepts of refusal, survivance, and thriving, as well as ideas of “damage-centered research” and “desire-centered research,” non-Native scholars can fundamentally reconfigure ideas of how to do their work by centering the voices and projects of communities who are building brighter futures. Ultimately, I conclude that non-Native scholars and practitioners can learn many lessons from Indigenous scholars and communities who are doing innovative future-building work, especially in the field of archival studies and transitional justice.

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DEDICATION/DEDICACIÓN

A los miembros de la comunidad de Nuevo Amanecer: guerreros fuertes del pasado, presente, y futuro, mis maestros sabidores, mis guías, mi inspiración, mis héroes, y mis amigos.

To the community members of Nuevo Amanecer: fierce warriors of the past, present, and future, my wise teachers, my guides, my inspiration, my heroes, and my friends.

PART 1: NEW DOCUMENTS SHED LIGHT: WHY DID PEACEKEEPERS WITHDRAW DURING RWANDA'S 1994 GENOCIDE?

ABSTRACT

Why did the international community decide to withdraw United Nations peacekeeping troops from Rwanda during the 1994 genocide? Analysis of newly released documents and results from an international conference with former U.N. and government officials sheds further light on our understanding of what took place leading up to and during the Rwandan genocide. This article focuses on two key moments: 1) the United States' reluctance to support the peacekeeping mission from before its mandate began and prior to the killing of U.S. troops in Somalia in autumn 1993; and the United States' central role pushing the United Nations Security Council to call for a withdrawal of UNAMIR. It provides a greater understanding of international decision making in the U.N. security council, as well as foreign policy making within the U.S. government, contributing to more effective genocide prevention policy and advocacy efforts.

INTRODUCTION

The genocide in Rwanda in 1994, during which 800,000 to one million Tutsi and moderate Hutus were killed in 100 days, is infamous not only for how brutally and quickly the killing took place, but also because of the failure of the international community to act to stop the violence. Why did the international community fail to intervene in time? Extensive studies have been conducted to better understand how the genocide unfolded on the ground as well as why the United Nations

stood by as horror engulfed Rwanda.¹ However, questions still remain about the international community's response, in particular the role of the United States.

Newly declassified documents indicate that the United States took the lead in encouraging the international community to call for withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping troops who were on the ground when the genocidal violence started in April of 1994, a continuance of a larger policy shift away from United States involvement in peacekeeping.² These documents also further illuminate the political atmosphere in which the Clinton administration was pulling back from peace keeping, even prior to the Somalia crisis in October 1993. This paper reports findings of a research study to understand international decision-making before and during the Rwanda genocide, making four major contributions to scholarship about the Rwanda genocide in particular, and genocide studies and prevention literature in general.

Information obtained through newly declassified U.S. government documents and results from a “critical oral history”³ conference shed light on, firstly, the timeline of U.S. decision-making on peacekeeping in Rwanda. The evidence shows that United States was not in favor of supporting the United Nation's mission in Rwanda as of late September, prior to the United

¹ Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (Cape Town, London, and New York: Zed Books, 2000); Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (London and New York: Verso, 2006); Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide - The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002); Alison Des Forges, *“Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999); Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Matthew Levinger, “Why the U.S. Government Failed to Anticipate the Rwandan Genocide of 1994: Lessons for Early Warning and Prevention.” *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 9, no. 3 (2016): 33–58, accessed March 28, 2017, doi: 10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1362; Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke. “Early Warning and Response: Why the International Community Failed to Prevent the Genocide.” *Disasters* 20 (1996): 295–304; Grünfelt, Fred, and Anke Huijboom. *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders*. Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007; Krosiak, Daniela. *The French Betrayal of Rwanda*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008, among others.

² Tom Blanton and Emily Willard, “1994 Rwanda Pullout Driven by Clinton White House, U.N. Equivocation,” Electronic Briefing Book No. 511, Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, April 16, 2015, available from: <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/> (accessed March 28, 2017).

³ A research methodology that brings together policy makers and declassified government records, developed by James Blight and Janet Lang. See further discussion in methodology section of this paper.

Nations (UN) troops' arrival, and prior to the killing of U.S. troops in Somalia in early October 1993.⁴ To be sure, existing research acknowledges the overall draw down of U.S. peacekeeping missions after the end of the Cold War, however other scholarship and former political officials focus on the dominant role of "Somalia syndrome" as the reason for U.S. drawdown in peacekeeping participation.⁵ The decision to limit the Rwandan peacekeeping mission and general discussions of a shift in U.S. policy resulting in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) was made *prior* to the Somalia crisis. United States policy makers in the National Security Council (NSC) were looking for a reason to limit support, and the killing of U.S. troops in Somalia was the perfect opportunity. This paper, however, does not go so far as to suggest that there was no link between the Somalia crisis and the United States' decision to limit support for the peacekeeping mission in Rwanda.⁶ The records show that the movement to pull back on U.S. peacekeeping began prior to Somalia, and the killing of U.S. troops in October 1993 provided additional momentum for this cause.

Secondly, evidence suggests that the United States used the killing of Belgium to call for a full withdrawal of troops which resulted in the drawdown of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) instead of sending reinforcements, for which UNAMIR leadership on the ground and Belgium had originally requested. This is a continuation of the more general

⁴ National Security Archive, "International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994, Annotated Transcript, Day 2," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and National Security Archive, June 2, 2014, available from: <https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20150325-rwanda-transcript-day-two.pdf> (accessed March 28, 2017)

⁵ Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 36-37; Shattuck, John. *Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars and America's Response*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003, 22; Moose, George. Interview by PBS Frontline, November 21, 2003. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/moose.html> (accessed October 10, 2018); Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. Interview by PBS Frontline, January 24, 2004. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/ghali.html> (accessed October 10, 2018); Grünfelt and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent*, 142.

⁶ Flavia Gasbarri. "Revisiting the Linkage: PDD 25, Genocide in Rwanda and the US Peacekeeping Experience of the 1990s." *The International History Review*, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1354311>.

policy where the United States was looking for reasons to disengage from peacekeeping. New evidence further clarifies the argument against the scapegoating of Belgium and contradicts other arguments that the United States call for withdrawal was merely a defensive reaction due to the Somalia crisis, and a move to give Belgium cover in order to save face.⁷

Thirdly, this paper provides an example of the use of the critical oral history methodology in the study of historical events, leading to a better understanding of the event and suggests potential concrete changes to policy that can work to prevent genocide in the future. This paper calls for future utilization of this methodology and suggests ways to better include marginalized voices. Finally, the results of this study support scholarship that notes the weakness of the Department of State in U.S. foreign policy creation, and the argument that the NSC has “greater access to the president and more impact on strategic and crisis decision-making.”⁸ The results speak to the power struggle between U.S. agencies for influence in decision-making, and the complicated nature of what influences U.S. foreign policy creation.⁹

These are important findings because they contribute additional key information, further illuminating the historical record of the international response to genocide in Rwanda, particularly of the United States. With a better understanding of how important policy decisions are made, it may be possible to influence these decisions in the future, leading to better genocide and mass atrocity prevention policy generally. For example, this research shows that key foreign policy decisions were made within the NSC, as opposed to Department of State staff. This research

⁷ Grünfelt and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent*, 196; Adelman and Suhrke, “Early Warning and Response,” 300; Shattuck, *Freedom on Fire*, 34; Krosiak, *French Betrayal of Rwanda*, 207-210.

⁸ Steven Hook. “Domestic Obstacles to International Affairs: The State Department under Fire at Home.” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 36, no. 1 (January 2003): 23–29, 24, doi: 10.1017/S1049096503001641, accessed March 28, 2017

⁹ Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page. “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 1 (February 2005), doi: 10.1017/S000305540505152X, accessed March 28, 2017.; Salah Oueslati. “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Complex Factors of Decision-Making.” *Society* 51, no. 5 (2014): 472–81, doi: 10.1007/s12115-014-9813-y, accessed March 28, 2017.

therefore has implications for scholars of the Rwandan genocide, as well as those interested in United States and international response to mass atrocity, and the making of U.S. foreign policy.

RWANDA'S GENOCIDE UNFOLDS

In August 1993, members of the Rwandan government, made up of mostly Hutus signed a peace agreement, the Arusha Accords, with the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) a mostly Tutsi rebel group, ending decades of conflict that was rooted in Belgian colonialism and ethnic tensions. Both parties requested a U.N. peacekeeping operation to assist in implementing the provisions of the Arusha Accords, including establishing a transitional government and instituting a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program, among other goals.

Through a fraught process, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) debated the mandate and capacity of the peacekeeping operation. Eventually, this led to a narrow mandate for supporting the implementation of the Arusha Accords, and did not allow peacekeepers to use force.¹⁰ The UNSC passed a resolution to establish UNAMIR on October 5, 1993 with a small force of 2,548 troops and a narrow mandate that was “far short of what would have been needed to guarantee implementation of the Accords.”¹¹ UNAMIR was “constrained by the relatively small size of the force as well as by a determination not to repeat the mistakes made in Somalia.”¹²

While this debate about UNAMIR was taking place at the United Nations, the United States was engaged in a domestic political debate about the future of U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations. As such, the United States was reluctant to support UNAMIR from the beginning. Richard Clarke, the National Security Advisor for peacekeeping at the White House, felt that

¹⁰ Brendt Beardsley, interview by Michael Dobbs, April 30, 2013, Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive.

¹¹ Des Forges, *“Leave None to Tell the Story,”* 132.

¹² Des Forges, *“Leave None to Tell the Story,”* 132.

“news from Rwanda only confirmed a deep skepticism about the viability of UN deployments.”¹³ This political debate and eventual call for a drawdown of U.S. peacekeeping activities would gain more momentum in the aftermath of the Somalia crisis in which U.S. troops were killed in a failed military option, during which one of the bodies of the soldiers was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993, making nightly news across the United States.¹⁴ The reevaluation of the United States’ role in peacekeeping would eventually result in the creation of the PDD-25, providing criteria to guide U.S. decision making on support for peacekeeping operations. These criteria called for a decrease in United States’ involvement and restricted support for humanitarian intervention missions.¹⁵ While President Clinton did not sign PDD-25 until May 1994, the document influenced the United States’ strategy for decision-making in response to the genocide in Rwanda before it was officially released.¹⁶

In the autumn of 1993, Canadian General Roméo Dallaire was named force commander of the peacekeeping operation consisting of contingents from Bangladesh, Ghana, Belgium, and other countries. The first troops arrived in Rwanda in early November, and the bulk of the force arrived on the ground in December, less than six months before the start of the genocide.¹⁷ From the beginning Dallaire and his troops struggled with a lack of provisions and support, never having received approval of standard Rules of Engagement (ROE) which guide the daily procedures of the mission.¹⁸

¹³ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 364.

¹⁴ Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 37.

¹⁵ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 342; Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 41

¹⁶ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 342; Des Forges, “*Leave None to Tell the Story*,” 625.

¹⁷ Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 174

¹⁸ Beardsley interview, April 30, 2013; Emily Willard, “The Rwanda Sitreps,” EBB No. 455, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., February 3, 2014, available from: <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB455/> (accessed March 28, 2017).

Over the next months, in late 1993 and early 1994, the Rwandan government failed to implement major milestones of the Arusha Accords, most importantly the Broad-Based Transitional Government, which was the first step to implementing other main pieces of the Accords, such as the DDR program.¹⁹ Dallaire and his troops struggled with basic lack of supplies as recorded daily in his situation reports back to New York.²⁰ On January 11, 1994, Dallaire sent an urgent fax to New York about a weapons cache and possible plans of mass violence as reported by an informant.²¹ However, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) continued to deny Dallaire's requests for an expanded mandate, or needed supplies and equipment, despite the fax's warning.²²

Tensions continued to mount through the late winter and spring of 1994, erupting with the shooting down of a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira on April 6, 1994. That evening and the next day, April 7, Hutu extremists and Rwandan government forces started targeting Tutsi and moderate Hutu politicians, murdering them and their families in their homes. Soon, all Tutsis and moderate Hutus civilians became targets, leading to mass executions, torture, rape, and massacres of men, women, and children across Rwanda. Foreign governments, such as the United States, France, and Belgium

¹⁹ Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 192-195.

²⁰ Roméo Dallaire. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003); Emily Willard and Jake Freyer, "SITREPS detail Rwanda's Descent into Genocide 1994," EBB No. 466, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., April 7, 2014, available from: <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB466/> (accessed March 28, 2017).

²¹ Code Cable (fax) from Gen. Romeo Dallaire to Maurice Baril, UN DPKO, "Most Immediate," January 11, 1994. Available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB452/docs/doc03.pdf>; Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 150.

²² "International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994," Annotated Transcript, Day 1." National Security Archive and U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, June 2, 2014, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB508/docs/Rwanda%20Final%20Transcript%20Day%201.pdf>, 94-97. The scope of this paper does not include a detailed look into the international response to Gen. Dallaire's "genocide fax," however this topic was extensively discussed in the first day of this conference, the transcript of which is available in the link above.

quickly shut down embassies, and evacuated personnel and all their civilians, abandoning thousands of Rwandans to the fate of bands of Interahamwe, a Hutu militia, armed with machetes.

When ten Belgian peacekeeping troops were killed on the first day of the genocide, Belgium initially requested reinforcements, and many members of the UNSC called for an expansion of UNAMIR's mandate and to send reinforcements. On April 15, the United States representative to the UN dropped "a bombshell" on the UN security council calling for the full withdrawal of UNAMIR troops, despite a strong movement among non-aligned countries on the UNSC to extend the mandate and send reinforcements.²³ Weeks into the genocide on April 21, the UNSC passed a resolution to withdraw the majority of UNAMIR troops, leaving a "skeletal staff" of 270 down from approximately 2,500.²⁴ Further clarity is needed: How did the United Nations Security Council come to this decision to withdraw UNAMIR troops? What role did the United States play and why?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study utilized qualitative research methods of analysis of declassified U.S. government records, semi-structured oral history interviews, shorter reflective interviews, and a type of participatory action research known as "critical oral history." The author conducted this research between January 2013 and December 2016 which consisted of conducting oral history interviews with key stakeholders, submitting Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory

²³ Cable USUN 1588 from U.S. Mission to the U.N to U.S. Secretary of State, "TFRWOL: US Drops Bombshell on Security Council - 4/15," April 15, 1994, EBB No. 511, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%2016.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2018).

²⁴ Blanton and Willard, "1994 Rwanda Pullout."

Declassification Review (MDR) requests, and analyzing declassified documents. Additionally, the author was a participant-observer at the June 2014 critical oral history conference.²⁵

In preparation for the critical oral history conference, the National Security Archive and U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum filed a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) request with the Clinton Presidential Library²⁶ in November 2013 for a series of approximately 120 NSC documents. We identified the series of 120 documents out of lists of thousands of documents that were withheld under the B1 exemption in prior FOIA cases with the Library. The lists contained the date, office, and title of most of the documents, and the research team prioritized specific dates, titles, and incidents, often-times guessing due to lack of information. After a year and a half of multiple levels of bureaucratic review processes and sign-offs, including Obama administration officials at the White House, approximately 550 pages were released publicly on the Clinton Presidential Library website over several days starting on April 7, 2015.²⁷ A selection of the released documents along with initial analysis are available in the National Security Archive electronic briefing book, “1994 Rwanda Pullout Driven by Clinton White House, U.N. Equivocation” published on April 16, 2015.²⁸ The twentieth anniversary of the genocide and the preparation for the conference provided the key catalyst to push for this release of documents, however this collection of documents were not released until nearly a year after the June 2014 conference, and are thus not a subject of the conference conversation.

²⁵It is not within the scope of this research paper to thoroughly analyze additional resources such as the Belgian senate hearings, and official reports from United Nations, African Unity, Belgian Senate, and U.S. State Department. It is the focus of this paper to report on the results of the June 2014 conference and recent declassification efforts of U.S. government records.

²⁶ The Clinton Presidential Library is part of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

²⁷ The document releases are available from the Clinton Presidential Library at the following URLs: <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36587>; <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36636>; <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36616>. The author thanks the archivists at the Clinton Presidential Library, and National Archives and Records Administration for their extensive work and cooperation on this request, and the larger declassification efforts associated with this project.

²⁸ Blanton and Willard, “1994 Rwanda Pullout,” <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/>.

Critical oral history is a participatory action research method developed by James Blight and Janet Lang, which brings together former high-level government decision makers to discuss how they made key policy decisions, drawing upon the declassified documents the officials created as reference points to frame and direct the conversation. Scholars analyze the documents and pose questions to the former officials regarding specific policy decisions and chronology of events. This builds on traditional archival and oral history research because the conversation among the participants and scholars often bring to light new information about how policies and documents are created, and how decisions were made.²⁹

The documents bring evidence directly into the conversation and prevents merely a recollection or discussion about past events, but pushes participants to answer for past actions, decisions, and writings. Ann Stoler writes that, “whether documents are trustworthy, authentic, and reliable remain pressing questions, but a turn to the social and political conditions that produced those documents...has altered the sense of what trust and reliability might signal and politically entail.”³⁰ The critical oral history methodology illuminates the specific contexts, motivations, and informal conversations during which key policy decisions are often made, though not recorded in official records, often advancing scholarship to new understandings of long-researched historical topics.³¹ Stoler argues for the importance of “critically reflecting on the making of documents and how we choose to use them...not as sites of knowledge retrieval but as

²⁹ James Blight, Janet Lang, Hussein Banai, Malcolm Byrne, and John Tirman. *Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012).

³⁰ Ann Laura Stoler. “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance: On the Content in the Form.” In *Archives, Documentation, and Institutions of Social Memory: Essays from the Sawyer Seminar*, edited by Francis X. Blouin and William G. Rosenberg. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 268.

³¹ For example see: Blight, James G., and Janet M. Lang. *Dark beyond Darkness: The Cuban Missile Crisis as History, Warning, and Catalyst*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018.

sites of knowledge production.”³² Critical oral history conferences can provide the space to produce conversations of critical reflection and lead to new knowledge production.

The convening of a critical oral history conference is often the first time that officials from different countries and intuitions are brought together since the time the events took place, or possibly the first time they are ever meeting in one room together. These conferences can often be the place where former officials find healing and reconciliation in light of past events, however they can also bring back painful, traumatic memories.³³ Coinciding with the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, the conference created a space and an opportunity to push for additional declassification of government records, building upon extensive work from previous research projects and declassification efforts.³⁴ As officials were invited, they were inspired and encouraged to bring declassified documents from their own governments, some of which were included in the conference briefing books. Conference attendees provided documents from New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic.³⁵ Prudence Bushnell provided a personal notebook from the time, and several other attendees brought additional primary and secondary material such as publications, working papers, and reports to circulate.³⁶

The National Security Archive, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and The Hague Institute for Global Justice convened a critical oral history conference on the Rwandan genocide

³² Stoler, “Colonial Archives,” 268.

³³ Author’s informal conversations with conference participants, The Hague, Netherlands, June 2014.

³⁴ The International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda archives and proceedings (<http://ictrcaselaw.org/>); Will Ferroggiario’s FOIA research at the National Security Archive (<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/index.htm>); the United Nations, Belgian, and French government reports, the Mitterand Archive (<http://www.mitterrand.org/-Les-archives-.html>), and the U.S. Department of State collections, among others.

³⁵ Dobbs, Michael. “Inside the UN Security Council: April–July 1994.” Electronic Briefing Book, #472. Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, June 2, 2014. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB472/>.

³⁶ Willard, Emily. “Key Diplomat’s Personal Notebook Sheds Light on Inner Workings of US Government Response to Genocide Unfolding in Rwanda in 1994.” Electronic Briefing Book, #500. Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, January 30, 2015. <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB500/>; Kovanda, Karel. “The Czech Republic on the UN Security Council: The Rwandan Genocide.” *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 5, no. 2 (2010): 192–218, among others.

in June 2014 in The Hague, the Netherlands titled, “International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994.” Conference organizers invited 35 former officials, high level decision-makers, journalists, and scholars, representing 14 countries and the United Nations. Participants included UNAMIR Force Commander Roméo Dallaire and his deputy Henry Anyidoho, genocide survivor and civil society leader Monique Mujawamariya, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) representative Dr. Jean-Hervé Bradol, journalists such as Colette Braeckman and Jean-Philippe Ceppi, and renowned Rwandan and genocide scholars and academics such as Linda Melvern, Andre Guichaoua, and Michael Barnett, among others. The critical oral history portion of the conference took place over two days and was ordered chronologically and broken into thematic segments. The participants were given bound copies (briefing books) of 160 declassified documents to reference during the conference. The conference briefing books were prepared by researchers after extensive analysis of the documents which were chosen based on themes and chronology of events to be covered during the conference discussions. Simultaneous interpretation was provided in both English and French. The conference was audio taped and transcribed, and a rapporteur’s report, the document collections and an annotated transcript were published electronically in April 2015.³⁷

1. UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO UNAMIR FROM THE BEGINNING

The United States’ decision to oppose the implementation of UNAMIR in the fall of 1993 was part of a larger shift in U.S. foreign policy at the time, away from supporting peacekeeping missions due to the political context at the time, and the crisis in Somalia was the perfect opportunity that

³⁷ Conference materials including the briefing book, transcripts, interviews, conference report, and list of participants and staff are available on the conference website hosted by the National Security Archive: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ageofgenocide/> (accessed May 18, 2018) and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, available from: <https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-events/rwanda-conference> (accessed June 4, 2018).

policymakers were looking for to obtain public support for limiting UNAMIR's mandate. Existing scholarship points to this broad policy change, and its implications in the United States' policy in autumn 1993, however other research and former officials place an emphasis of the Somalia crisis as the main reason for the policy shift.³⁸ Grünfelt and Huijboom write that "after Somalia, the Republican Party wanted the United States to get less involved in the peacekeeping missions of the United States, which was shown in the development of PDD-25."³⁹ At the critical oral history conference in June 2014, Ambassador John Shattuck explained that "the hangover with Somalia produced a new peacekeeping directive, Presidential Decision Directive 25, which came out in early May 1994."⁴⁰

However, recently released documentation supports the argument that the United States' apprehension to supporting UNAMIR from the beginning was part of the larger trend in U.S. peacekeeping *prior* to the Somalia crisis, not as a result of the Somalia crisis. To be sure, this article does not go as far to claim that the Somalia crisis had very little impact on U.S. policy at the time, as one recent study claims.⁴¹ The killing of U.S. troops in Somalia certainly had a chilling effect on U.S. policy towards peacekeeping, and greatly informed the PDD-25 final document, however it was not the central factor in causing this policy change; it provided more reasons for the United States to continue strengthening the policy. The following section will explore the broader shift in U.S. policy towards peacekeeping, as well as how this policy played out in a debate between the NSC and Department of State regarding support for UNAMIR, both before and after the killing of U.S. troops in Somalia in early October 1993.

³⁸ Shattuck, *Freedom on Fire*; Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*; Grünfelt and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent*; Krosiak, *The French Betrayal*.

³⁹ Grünfelt and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent*, 142.

⁴⁰ "International Decision-Making, Day 1," annotated bibliography, 120.

⁴¹ Gasbarri, "Revisiting the Linkage."

Change in United States Peacekeeping Policy

The development of U.S. policy changes concerning peacekeeping operations is an example of policy that sheds light on United States' decision-making process. We see the existence of tension in power relations between the NSC and Department of State in that the NSC led the policy shift away from involvement in peacekeeping, and this shift was often in conflict with information and policies coming from the Department of State.⁴² Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Prudence Bushnell described that the prevailing political climate leading up to the Somalia crisis in early October 1993 created the context for whether the United States would support UN peacekeeping troops in Rwanda and minimize existing ones.⁴³ Bushnell explained that President Clinton won the presidential election in 1992 and was inaugurated in January 1993 with a strong platform of economic reform. The post-Cold War foreign policy and domestic political pressures about the economy called for the opening of new embassies in former soviet bloc states, but without spending more money.⁴⁴ At the time the U.S. was debating the future of the Rwanda peacekeeping mission, the Department of State was "looking for money to fund the new embassies," so the agency made the choice to make cuts to missions in African countries, explained Bushnell. This resulted in tension in the Department of State as the government was "in the process of moving out, closing down AID programs, [and] closing down...CIA stations."⁴⁵ Bushnell's job was to "postpone the decision to cut off funding, or the other way is just get a little bit of funding" and that she was relieved that "at least the door was open to a peacekeeping operation."⁴⁶ U.S. foreign policy had already begun to shift in 1993, and Department of State officials like Prudence

⁴² Hook, "Domestic Obstacles to International Affairs," 23.

⁴³ Bushnell, Prudence. Interview by Michael Dobbs, November 22, 2013. Washington D.C.: U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.

⁴⁴ Bushnell Interview, November 22, 2013.

⁴⁵ Bushnell Interview, November 22, 2013.

⁴⁶ Bushnell Interview, November 22, 2013.

Bushnell felt the political pressures for the United States to disengage from peacekeeping missions, especially in Africa. United States support for peacekeeping missions “became an even harder sell in October ’93” after to Somalia crisis.⁴⁷ Even prior to the Somalia crisis, officials in the NSC were struggling to find a way forward amid the lack of resources.

Tony Lake, National Security Advisor at the time, explained that in Clinton’s late October 1993 speech to the U.N., “the president began by calling for stronger peacekeeping operations by the U.N. -- not say no, but learning how more effectively to say yes...In other words, to make the U.N. more effective in all this, but at the same time, to recognize that you have to make choices, that the U.N. cannot do everything.”⁴⁸ This policy shift is evident in the Department of State documents where there is an effort to support the peace process in Rwanda, however the documents also show the pushback from the NSC, particularly Richard Clarke who is looking for opportunities to say “no.”

In a newly released document dated August 2, 1993 from Susan Rice, a member of NSC peacekeeping staff in 1993 and 1994, to Tony Lake described the challenges facing United States support of peacekeeping at the time, even prior to the Somalia crisis in early October 1993.⁴⁹ She wrote that while the United States has “interest in resolving” the five upcoming peacekeeping operations, “we do not have funds to pay for them.” She continues: “The reality is that the U.S. must begin immediately to make tough choices among new as well as existing operations, while we fight strenuously to obtain sufficient funds from congress and support from the American

⁴⁷ Bushnell, Prudence. Interview, November 22, 2013.

⁴⁸ Lake, Tony. Interview by PBS Frontline, December 15, 2003. Available from: <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/lake.html>. (October 17, 2018).

⁴⁹ National Security Council Memorandum from Susan Rice to Tony Lake, “Five Imminent New UN Peacekeeping Operations,” August 2, 1993. Available from: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/2014-0278-M_19930802.pdf (accessed October 10, 2018). When the author indicates the document is “newly released,” it is from the collection of records released by the Clinton Presidential Library in April 2015, described in the methodology section of this paper.

public” (emphasis original). Rice clearly explains the dilemma, indicating the interest in supporting the peacekeeping, citing the “strenuous” fight, but also the lack of political will in congress, and lack of public support. She identifies the specific financial concerns in “finding offsets to pay for new operations since obtaining brand new money is obviously unlikely in the near term.” Rice cites the “current hostility among congressional appropriations to peacekeeping” particularly in “regions of little public interest” and indicates that “obtaining a budget amendment...could be difficult and require, at a minimum, high-level administration lobbying.”

Rice explains that there are two main choices the U.S. must choose from when facing these upcoming peacekeeping operations and what she cites as the United States’ “\$1 billion” debt to U.N. peacekeeping: “voting for mission which we cannot pay for, or; vetoing resolutions because we lack sufficient funds.”⁵⁰ She sees that the first option is “irresponsible” because of the damage it would cause to U.N. infrastructure, but also sees the second option as concerning as other permanent-five (P5) member nations might follow suit. This document further illuminates explanations of the political climate leading up to the Rwanda genocide, even before the Somalia crisis as one that was generally moving away from United States involvement in peacekeeping, mainly due to economic concerns, and lack of public support, particularly from congress.⁵¹

Scholar Michael Barnett identified challenges the U.N. faced in a post-Cold War where powerful states such as the United States “were openly questioning the U.N.’s role in world politics.”⁵² He argues that this was then exacerbated by the crisis in Somalia and that the “United States scapegoated the U.N. for its own policy failures,” causing a “positively poisons”

⁵⁰National Security Council Memorandum from Susan Rice to Tony Lake, “Five Imminent New UN Peacekeeping Operations,” August 2, 1993. Available from: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/2014-0278-M_19930802.pdf (accessed October 10, 2018).

⁵¹ Shattuck, *Freedom on Fire*, 34.

⁵² Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 162-163.

relationship between the United States and the U.N.⁵³ Barnett explained at the conference in June 2014, that U.S. lack of support for UNAMIR was “part of the broader climate...of that period...that the US [was] impoverishing the U.N.,” and the United States was looking for any reason “to shut down the operation.”⁵⁴ The memo from Rice to Lake from August 2, 1993 clearly illustrates the pre-Somalia crisis lack of support for the U.N., which then became further constrained after Somalia, and continued through the genocide.

During the June 2014 conference, Former Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck remarked that the political context in which the United States was moving away from humanitarian intervention “began to evolve very rapidly after the Somalia crisis.”⁵⁵ The United States’ involvement in and support of peacekeeping missions was being reevaluated, somewhat in response to the disaster in Somalia, explained Shattuck, but also a general “hardening of views in the U.S. Pentagon about peacekeeping operations.”⁵⁶ In his book, Shattuck explained that President Clinton was skeptical of the Department of Defense and Pentagon, never having served in the military. Prior to Somalia, the President’s relationship “with the Pentagon brass were strained during the early period of his presidency” due to “the question over his draft service and his handling of the issues of gays in the military.”⁵⁷ By renegotiating the United States’ stance on peacekeeping missions globally and placing strict requirements on U.S. involvement, as outlined in PDD-25, President Clinton hoped to gain more credibility with the defense agencies. Shattuck explained that as the architect of PDD-25, NSC advisor Richard Clarke was attempting to save

⁵³ Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 163.

⁵⁴ “International Decision-Making, Day 1” Annotated Transcript, 119.

⁵⁵ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 21.

⁵⁶ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 22.

⁵⁷ Shattuck, *Freedom on Fire*, 26.

U.S. involvement in peacekeeping by preventing further tragedies which would make the United States even less likely to support future operations.

Clarke was the lead in creating the new, more limited U.S. policy toward humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, and as the documents show, had considerable influence on the final decision-making on the U.S. support for non-intervention.⁵⁸ Samantha Power wrote that “what is most remarkable about the American response to the Rwandan genocide is not so much the absence of U.S. military action as that during the entire genocide the possibility of U.S. military intervention was never even debated.”⁵⁹ Power’s assertion is logical because the NSC was looking to drawdown the Rwandan peacekeeping operation from the very beginning, and U.S. intervention would thus have never debated once the genocide started because of political pressures to reduce U.S. peacekeeping. While the killing of U.S. troops in Somalia certainly had an impact on the United States’ decision to only reluctantly support UNAMIR, these new documents point to a more complex narrative of policy at the time, rather than seen as a predominantly defensive action to withdraw support for peacekeeping operations in reaction to the Somalia crisis, which many scholars and former U.S. officials favor.⁶⁰ These documents support the argument of some scholars and former officials that see the United States’ resistance to UNAMIR as part of a larger context of change in U.S. policy on peacekeeping, which was exacerbated by, but existed prior to, the Somalia crisis.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 364.

⁵⁹ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 367.

⁶⁰ Kroslak, Daniela. *The French*, 207-208; Adleman and Surke, “Early Warning and Response,” 303.

⁶¹ Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 162-163; Lake, Interview by PBS Frontline.

Internal Debate over Support for UNAMIR

This broader change in peacekeeping had a clear impact on the discussion within the State Department, and within the NSC, as well as a debate between the two organizations prior to the Somalia crisis in early October 1993. This debate between the NSC and Department of State also shows the tension between the two offices over the final say on U.S. foreign policy-making.

In a newly released document from September 28, 1993, U.S. representative to the United Nations (USUN), Madeleine Albright reported that the Rwandan peacekeeping operation (PKO) “is one of the better-organized PKOs we have seen” writing that it clearly fits the six points of criteria discussed that would guide U.S. policy toward supporting PKOs. Two days later on September 30, a U.S. intelligence assessment reported that “the United Nations peacekeeping plan for Rwanda has excellent prospects for success” and warned that “failure to provide a peacekeeping force” would be “adverse to U.S. interests.”⁶² The intelligence assessment went on to say that in the case of UNAMIR in Rwanda, “support of UN operations should be inexpensive, uncomplicated, and far less demanding than the PKOs...elsewhere in Africa.”⁶³ High levels of the U.S. government not only expected UNAMIR to be a success, but failure to support UNAMIR would result in “increased regional instability” and a “breakdown of the peacekeeping process.”⁶⁴ It seemed as though U.S. support for the peacekeeping mission would be clear. However, members of the NSC had already made up their minds that UNAMIR was not worth supporting.⁶⁵

⁶² Secret Memorandum, “Assessment: Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda,” September 30, 1993, EBB No. 511, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%203.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2018).

⁶³ Secret Memorandum, “Assessment: Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda,” September 30, 1993.

⁶⁴ Secret Memorandum, “Assessment: Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda,” September 30, 1993.

⁶⁵ Cable USUN 4735 from Madeleine Albright U.S. Mission to the U.N. to U.S. Secretary of State, “Rwanda and Criteria for New UN PKO,” September 28, 1993, EBB No. 511, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%201.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2018).

In a newly released Department of State cable from September 29, 1993 from USUN to the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C., Albright wrote that “Dick Clarke intimated that Rwanda may be the case the NSC is looking for to prove that the US can say “no” to a new peacekeeping operation.”⁶⁶ Despite the intelligence assessment from September 30, NSC advisor Tony Lake, Richard Clarke and aide Susan Rice wrote in an October 1, 1993 email “while this operation may have a better of success than some others, the Security Council vote [on UNAMIR’s mandate] comes at a difficult moment for us given our stated reluctance to say ‘yes’ to every proposed operation.”⁶⁷ Clearly, the NSC’s opposition to UNAMIR was not simply a reaction to the Somalia crisis which would erupt into the killing of 18 U.S. soldiers two days later on October 3, 1993.⁶⁸ Additionally, this opposition went against government intelligence which supporting UNAMIR would be in the national interest of the United States, showing a disagreement between NSC and Department of State on policy towards UNAMIR.

It is important to note these two different, but concurrent lines of thinking. The Department of State had high hopes for the success of UNAMIR and saw that a successful mission would be crucial for promoting regional stability. At the same time, we see a more general concern from the NSC about the difficult economic and political situation the U.S. faced in developing peacekeeping policy, as we see in Rice’s August 1993 memo. In a 2003 interview with PBS, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose explains that he had received “guidance” from “senior people in the administration” to support the Rwanda peace processes because it “had

⁶⁶ Cable State 297511 from U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Mission to the U.N., “Evening Notes 9/28,” September 29, 1993, EBB No. 511, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%202.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2018).

⁶⁷ Memorandum from Richard Clarke and Susan Rice to Tony Lake, “Draft Message to General Quesnot on Rwanda Peacekeeping,” October 1, 1993, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%204.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2018).

⁶⁸ Barnett, *Eyewitness to Genocide*, 37.

great potential, not only for Rwanda, but the entire region.”⁶⁹ He continued by explaining there was certainly concerns from within the NSC, parts of the Department of State, and the Department of Defense about “about adding yet another major peacekeeping operation to a very long list of peacekeeping operations we had in Africa alone.” He explains that there were not only concerns in the Clinton administration, but also in congress: “[it was] a burden about cost, a question about how you justify and rationalize all this to the appropriators and the committees on the Hill, many of whom didn't think we needed to be there at all.”⁷⁰ There was strong resistance to support any new peacekeeping mission, including Rwanda specifically due to economic issues and lack of political will.

This tension between different parts of the government was discussed during the June 2014 conference. Scholar Michael Barnett, who was working for the U.N. at the time of the genocide explained his viewpoints on the state of U.S. policy in 1993 and leading up to the genocide in early 1994. Shattuck spoke to the tension among different parts of the U.S. government, in response to remarks by Barnett:

I do not think there was a unified position within the U.S. government that we had to pick off peacekeeping operations and shut them down. I think there were parts of the U.S. government that had a different position, the State Department in particular. President Clinton had done a lot to contract out certain U.S. activities and obligations to the UN. There was an ambivalence in the U.S. government about peacekeeping.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Moose, Interview by PBS Frontline.

⁷⁰ Moose, Interview by PBS Frontline.

⁷¹ “International Decision-Making, Day 1,” annotated transcript, 120. Shattuck’s response to Barnett’s views on the state of U.S. government policy making regarding peacekeeping in 1993 and early 1994, see full conversation on pages 118 to 121 in the annotated transcript of “International Decision-Making, Day 1.”

We see this lack of a unified position between the Department of State and the NSC, particularly around this issue of whether or not to approve the peacekeeping mission for Rwanda.

Despite the NSC's opposition, on October 5, 1993, the UNSC authorized UNAMIR with reluctant support from the United States, commissioning 2,548 U.N. troops to the mission in Rwanda.⁷² While the aftermath of the killing of U.S. troops and the graphic images of them being dragged through the streets certainly had an impact on U.S. foreign policy, the United States' opposition to UNAMIR was not simply a reaction to the Somalia crisis. The policy stance was the result of a growing political climate to move to decrease the United States' role in international humanitarian intervention.

The disagreement among U.S. agencies about intervention in Rwanda and the "lack of trust" in the Department of State is clear in these documents. Steven Hook wrote that this lack of trust results in a situation where "the State Department is routinely neglected in each of its primary areas of responsibility: the development and articulation of foreign policy; the conduct of private and public diplomacy; and the transfer of foreign assistance."⁷³ This tension between the NSC and the Department of State viewpoints influenced the United States' and subsequently the United Nations' final policies towards Rwanda, from the months leading up to, and throughout, the genocide. The United States had a strong voice in putting limits on UNAMIR's mandate in order to minimize the likelihood of a military or expanded intervention, affecting the capabilities of Dallaire on the ground in Rwanda. As the UNSC debated the funding and mandate of the would-be peacekeeping operation, Dallaire recalled during the June 2014 conference that he was frustrated by "the impossible scenario of reducing [his] troop level request even before [he] started

⁷² Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, 130.

⁷³ Hook, "Domestic Obstacles to International Affairs," 23.

to deploy.”⁷⁴ Prudence Bushnell, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs explained that “UNAMIR was dead on arrival.”⁷⁵

As evidence presented shows, the larger political context of U.S. policy to move away from supporting peacekeeping operations prior to the Somalia crisis. The tension among agencies in the U.S. government about this policy clearly influenced the U.S. stance on Rwanda throughout the peace process and ensuing genocide. This policy stance eventually led to the decision to call for a withdrawal of UNAMIR in April 1994. This shift in policy had consequences leading to an underfunded UNAMIR, which eventually contributed to Rwanda’s descent into genocide, and the failure of the international community to respond to stop the violence.

2. UNITED STATES IN THE DRIVER’S SEAT

The United States’ move to reduce support for peacekeeping fueled the U.S. government’s strategy and efforts to limit and “pull the plug” on UNAMIR. This course of action in opposition to the peacekeeping operation continued unabated even with the start of the genocide on April 7, 1994. Looking closely at the international community’s decision to withdraw UNAMIR troops provides a clearer understanding of the making of U.S. foreign policy, as well as international decision-making in the U.N. Evidence from newly declassified documents and conversations from the June 2014 critical oral history conference provide further illumination to what was going on behind the scenes in the first weeks of the genocide, further clarifying the central role of the United States in pushing to call for a withdraw of UNAMIR troops in April 1994.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 24.

⁷⁵ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 29.

⁷⁶ It is understood that many other factors were at play, such as French, UK, and other Security Council members (permanent and rotating) government interests, and politics within the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council, however the scope of this paper is limited to the results of this research project, and a focus on the role of the United States.

Existing literature and former officials paint the picture of the decision to withdraw UNAMIR peacekeeping troops as Belgium's defensive reaction to the killing of their 10 peacekeeping troops, and the United States call for withdrawal as a symptom of suffering from "Somalia syndrome."⁷⁷ Other research considers a more complicated series of events, challenging the oversimplification of Belgium's role in the withdrawal of UNAMIR troops. Grünfelt and Huijboom write, "many authors, political and military leaders indeed have interpreted the Belgian role in this way with some disgust, making Belgium an easy scapegoat for a world-wide failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda."⁷⁸ New evidence supports the argument that UNAMIR troop withdrawal was not simply Belgium's defensive reaction to the killing of ten of their peacekeeping troops. Documents show that pressure from the United States via the NSC to find a reason to pull back on peacekeeping missions resulted in stonewalling the U.N. security council despite well-organized Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) efforts to expand the UNAMIR mandate and send reinforcements. In a puzzling move, Belgium switched from calling for reinforcements to calling for a full withdrawal, lobbying strongly for other governments to join them.⁷⁹ Within the U.S. government tension mounted between the NSC and Department of State regarding who makes the final call on U.S. decision-making regarding the future of UNAMIR in early April 1994. This incident clearly shows how eventually, the NSC made the final call on U.S. foreign policy to call for the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops as the genocide in Rwanda raged on. The following section will explore the debate within the United States government and its actions within the U.N.

⁷⁷ Krosiak, *The French Betrayal*, 50-51, 207-208, 210; Adelman and Suhrke, "Early Warning and Response," 300; Shattuck, *Freedom on Fire*, 25-26, 34; Boutros-Ghali, PBS Frontline interview.

⁷⁸ Grünfelt and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent*, 196

⁷⁹ Gambari and Swinnen, "International Decision-Making, Day 2," annotated transcript, 19-21.; Grünfelt and Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent*, 196; Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 162.

regarding the decision to withdraw UNAMIR, as well as the aftermath of this decision, both in the U.N., and on the ground in Rwanda.

To Withdraw UNAMIR or Not?

Madeleine Albright, U.S. representative to the U.N. at the time, wrote that the U.S. decision to withdraw was largely a response to the Belgian request to the U.S. to support its decision to withdraw the UNAMIR troops.⁸⁰ Power explained that the U.S. responded to Belgian requests to provide “cover” and “support for a full U.N. withdrawal.”⁸¹ It was less of the United States wanting to help out Belgium, and more that the NSC saw an opportunity to pull out which it had been looking for since before day one. Melvern wrote that the United Kingdom and the United States were set on the conclusion that the peacekeeping mission was no longer functioning under its current mandate, and that the two nations were “considering whether or not to pull out UNAMIR completely.”⁸² A newly released document from April 9, 1994 shows that the NSC was pushing “to terminate [the] U.N. mission,” because as NSC official Richard Clarke explained, the mission is “not working” and should be withdrawn.⁸³ He continues, “we make a lot of noise about terminating U.N. forces that aren't working. Well, few could be as clearly not working. We should work with the French [sic] to gain a consensus to terminate the U.N. mission.”

The United States consistently refused any expansion in mandate or force size, in a continuation of the policy of the preceding six months. The killing of the Belgian troops was a convenient reason to further U.S. policy to pull support for the Rwanda peacekeeping mission. As

⁸⁰ Madeleine Korbelt Albright. *Madam Secretary*. New York, N.Y.: Miramax Books, 2003, 150-151.

⁸¹ Power. *A Problem from Hell*, 366-367.

⁸² Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 139.

⁸³ Memorandum from Richard Clarke to Donald Steinberg, “Rwanda: Next Steps for Sunday and Beyond,” April 9, 1994, EBB No. 511, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%209.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2018).

mentioned previously, Clarke was looking for a reason to “say no” to UNAMIR, and this time his efforts were successful.⁸⁴ U.S. and U.N. officials ignored requests from Dallaire and his second in command, Henry Anyidoho, leaving the peacekeepers confused and lacking desperately needed support: “The normal practice is that if you are in an emergency situation, and you come under pressure, you are reinforced” explained Anyidoho.⁸⁵ Nigeria’s representative Ibrahim Gambari found it “baffling that at a time of crisis, by act of omission or commission, the council supported the reduction option.”⁸⁶

Meanwhile, the NAM caucus in the UNSC vociferously called for reinforcements for UNAMIR and an expansion of its mandate.⁸⁷ The NAM caucus lead by Nigerian permanent representative to the U.N. Ibrahim Gambari wrote a non-paper making the argument for expansion and was supported by the permanent representatives of New Zealand and the Czech Republic, Colin Keating and Karel Kovanda, respectively. Gambari explained that “The Africans on the Council, Djibouti and Nigeria, supported of course by Brazil and the Czech Republic, argued forcefully that the idea of cutting and running was totally unacceptable...there was a deliberate proposal to reduce and that was the option that was finally allowed.”⁸⁸ However, despite pressure from the NAM caucus, the United States maintained a firm stance in opposition to UNAMIR creating a chain reaction which then resulted in the United Nation’s Secretary General to call for a full withdrawal of UNAMIR troops.

Through political maneuvering, the United States was able to obtain a group decision to withdraw UNAMIR, keeping in alignment with the consistent policy of opposition to international

⁸⁴ Cable State 297511, “Evening Notes 9/28,” September 29, 1993.; Memorandum, “Draft Message to General Quesnot on Rwanda Peacekeeping,” October 1, 1993.

⁸⁵ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 16.

⁸⁶ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 18.

⁸⁷ Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 105.

⁸⁸ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 18

humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. The U.S.'s lobbying and refusal to reinforce UNAMIR resulted in the Belgian's withdrawal of its peacekeepers, leading the UNSC to call for a nearly full withdrawal of UNAMIR.⁸⁹ Without reinforcements, Belgian officials felt that the threat to their peacekeepers was too great. Belgian Ambassador to Rwanda, Johan Swinnen explained that "it was difficult, if not impossible, to justify keeping Belgian troops in Rwanda any longer."⁹⁰ He explained that "the Belgian Minister [Willy Claes] would not have called for withdrawal if we could have rapidly revised the mandate to produce a stronger mandate for UNAMIR."⁹¹ Subsequently, without Belgian troops, officials at the United Nations felt that the entire UNAMIR force was no longer viable. In a letter to the UNSC, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali called for a withdrawal because without Belgian troops, "it will be extremely difficult for UNAMIR to carry out its tasks effectively."⁹² In this case, because the U.S. was so vehemently against the expansion of UNAMIR, Belgium was pressured to call for a pullout. Either UNAMIR need to be reinforced, or it would fail, and considering that a large number of the UNAMIR forces were Belgian, Brussels could no longer support the mission.

Once Belgium announced the withdrawal of its troops from UNAMIR, the U.S.'s public position moved from an opposition to the reinforcement of the peacekeeping mission to the public call for full withdrawal of UNAMIR. The NSC took the lead on formulating a public statement, as documented in notes from a top-level meeting of U.S. Official on April 11, 1994 in which Richard Clarke directs the International Organization office of the Department of State to draft the

⁸⁹ Boutros-Ghali, PBS Frontline interview.

⁹⁰ "International Decision-Making, Day 2," Annotated Transcript, 19-20.

⁹¹ "International Decision-Making, Day 2," Annotated Transcript, 19-20.

⁹² Cable NZUN 2430 from New Zealand Mission to the United Nations to Wellington, N.Z., "Security Council: Rwanda," April 13, 1994, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. Available from: <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1392939/footnote-141-nzun-2430.pdf>. (accessed October 21, 2018).

resolution to withdraw UNAMIR.⁹³ Prudence Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of State recorded in her personal notebook (made public in 2014), that the "NSC requested IO to draft resolution to pull UNAMIR" and recalled that the NSC request came from Richard Clarke.⁹⁴

Madeleine Albright, U.S. permanent representative to the U.N. wrote in an April 12, 1994 cable, that "it is worth considering taking the lead in the Security Council to authorize the evacuation of the bulk of UNAMIR while leaving behind a skeletal staff."⁹⁵ However, the NSC was set on calling for a full withdrawal. In a newly released document from April 14, Richard Clarke is quoted saying in a teleconference, "there will be a short delay while we seek a mechanism to terminate UNAMIR."⁹⁶ When that decision was made, Bushnell said she knew "that we had just signed the death warrant of people."⁹⁷

United States "Drops Bombshell" Calling for a Full Withdrawal

On April 14 the United States put the plan to publicly call for a full withdrawal into motion; however, there was heated disagreement between the Department of State and the NSC. United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote in a cable that "the greatly changed circumstances in Rwanda have rendered untenable the continued presence of UNAMIR forces in

⁹³ Prudence Bushnell, Personal Notebook No. 3, "[UNAMIR Troop Withdrawal]," April 11, 1994, EBB No. 511, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB500/docs/NB%20Excerpt%20-%20UNAMIR%20Troop%20Withdrawal.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2018).

⁹⁴ Bushnell, Personal Notebook No. 3, "[UNAMIR Troop Withdrawal]," April 11, 1994; Bushnell Interview, November 22, 2013.

⁹⁵ Cable USUN 1503 from Madeleine Albright U.S. Mission to U.N. to Secretary of State, "TFRWOL: Future of UNAMIR and French Roles in Rwanda," April 12, 1994, EBB No. 511, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%2014.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2018).

⁹⁶ Memorandum from MacArthur DeShazer to Tony Lake et. al, "Rwanda Update," April 14, 1994, EBB No. 511, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%2015.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2018).

⁹⁷ Bushnell Interview, November 22, 2013.

the country. We support a rapid but orderly withdrawal of UNAMIR forces.”⁹⁸ As the United States’ public narrative shifted from being against an expansion of UNAMIR to a full withdrawal of the peacekeepers, Secretary Warren delivered instructions to the U.S. representative at the U.N. to “approach senior secretariat officials urgently” and gain support. The cable also instructed the U.S. embassy in Belgium to “urge the GOB [Government of Belgium] to make a similar approach to the SYG [Secretary General] or his senior representatives.”⁹⁹ The US embassy in Paris was to “inform the French government of our position and seek support.”¹⁰⁰ The United States wanted to gain support from a coalition of nations in the Security Council to pull the peacekeeping troops. These records suggest that the United States requested support from Belgium to call for a full withdrawal, contrary to the prevailing idea that the United States responded to Belgium’s request for support to withdraw the troops.

Belgian Foreign Minister Willie Claes spoke to both Czech and Argentine officials, notifying them of Belgian’s pullout of UNAMIR, and recommending a full withdrawal of UNAMIR troops from Rwanda.¹⁰¹ Melvern described this lobbying by the Belgians as “a diplomatic blizzard.”¹⁰² During the June 2014 conference, Nigeria’s Ibrahim Gambari recalled that Belgium “had the right to decide to withdraw, but they went beyond withdrawing. They canvassed strongly to bring to an end UNAMIR entirely.”¹⁰³ He said, “I do not understand how they went from the position of calling for a strengthening in UNAMIR’s mandate in February 1994 to completely bringing down UNAMIR, when a horrendous situation of genocide was going on.”¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ Cable STATE 98085, “TFRWO1: Approach to UN Secretariat on UNAMIR” April 14, 1994.

⁹⁹ Cable STATE 98085, “TFRWO1: Approach to UN Secretariat on UNAMIR” April 14, 1994.

¹⁰⁰ Cable STATE 98085, “TFRWO1: Approach to UN Secretariat on UNAMIR” April 14, 1994.

¹⁰¹ Kovanda, “The Czech Republic,” 199.

¹⁰² Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 162.

¹⁰³ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 18.

¹⁰⁴ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 21.

Karel Kovanda of the Czech Republic also recalled the morphing of Belgian policy from withdrawing its own troops to “intensive efforts to scuttle UNAMIR as a whole.”¹⁰⁵

Even after the murder of the 10 Belgian peacekeepers on April 7, Brussels was still calling for an expansion of UNAMIR on April 8.¹⁰⁶ Then, by April 12, Brussels was lobbying hard, “the Belgians had spoken to USUN about this and expected shortly to send instructions to Belgian embassies in UNSC permanent member capitals to ask for speedy decision on this issue.”¹⁰⁷ The Belgians had abruptly determined that the UNAMIR “should be suspended for the time being as it no longer corresponds to the circumstances on the ground.”¹⁰⁸ The NSC was looking for a reason to withdraw UNAMIR, and the killing of Belgian troops provided the reason.

During this time, the NAM caucus was launching a fierce argument in support of expanding UNAMIR. At the conference in June 2014, Nigerian permanent representative Ibrahim Gambari recalled the debate in the Security Council that day and explained that “There had never been an interest on the part of the [permanent members] ...or even to some extent the U.N. Secretariat, in taking very seriously the positions of the non-aligned movement or the Africans who, after all, are elected by the African constituencies to defend Africa’s position. The Africans are closest to the events.”¹⁰⁹ Gambari explained in frustration that even at a time when the NAM caucus was considered powerful with six votes, their views were not taken seriously.¹¹⁰

A newly released Department of State cable from April 15 titled “U.S. Drops Bombshell on Security Council” reported a member of the NAM caucus saying “while Belgian concerns are

¹⁰⁵ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 26.

¹⁰⁶ Powers, *A Problem from Hell*, 332; Cable BRUSSE 03953, “Claes asks SYG for change in UNAMIR mandate,” April 8, 1994.

¹⁰⁷ Cable BRUSSE 04128 from U.S. Embassy Brussels to U.S. Secretary of State, “WGRWO1: More on Belgian Position on UNAMIR,” April 12, 1994. State Department Electronic Reading room. (accessed April 22, 2018).

¹⁰⁸ Cable BRUSSE 04128, “WGRWO1: More on Belgian Position on UNAMIR,” April 12, 1994.

¹⁰⁹ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 17.

¹¹⁰ Ibrahim Gambari, interview with the author, June 3, 2014, The Hague, Netherlands.

understandable, they should not dictate the Council on the future of UNAMIR. UNAMIR should not repeat not withdraw,” but still gave instructions for Albright to call for a full withdrawal.¹¹¹ Albright wrote in her autobiography that her orders read: “Our opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda is firm...It is based on our conviction that the Security Council has an obligation to ensure that peacekeeping operations are viable...and that UN peacekeeping personnel are not placed or retained, knowingly, in an untenable situation.”¹¹² There was, however, disagreement within the U.S. government. Albright recalled that hearing Gambari’s presentation of the NAM’s arguments and draft resolution to expand UNAMIR’s mandate and reinforce the troops encouraged her to rethink the United States’ position.¹¹³ She considered that the U.S. was perhaps on the wrong side and that the U.S.’s stance was being seen as obstructionist. In a 2004 interview with PBS Frontline, Albright explained, “I had the instructions which made no sense at all.” She left the meeting to go into the hall to phone Washington. Albright notes that while her orders officially came from the Department of State, she thought she “might be able to get faster action from the NSC.”¹¹⁴ “I decided not to call the State Department from whence my instructions really came, but the National Security Council, because they were dealing with this on a very imminent basis...they said... ‘we’re worrying about this, and these are your instructions.’ I actually screamed into the phone. I said, ‘they’re unacceptable and I want them changed’,”

¹¹¹ Cable USUN 1588 from U.S. Mission to the U.N to U.S. Secretary of State, "TFRWOL: US Drops Bombshell on Security Council - 4/15," April 15, 1994, EBB No. 511, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%2016.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2018). While this document contains redactions regarding U.S. actions at the April 15 UNSC meeting, declassified documents from the UN office of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as from the Czech Republic, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom explain what happened at the meeting. Comparison of documents available here: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/panels.jpg>.

¹¹² Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 150.

¹¹³ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 150.

¹¹⁴ Albright, *Madam Secretary*, 150.

Albright explained.¹¹⁵ This reinforces the view that the NSC had “more impact on strategic and crisis decision making” than the Department of State.¹¹⁶

The United States’ hard stance in opposition to UNAMIR continued to influence the Security Council’s decisions. Once Albright received more flexible instructions, the Security Council was eventually able to pass a resolution on the fate of UNAMIR that decreased its mandate but did not fully withdraw the troops. In a recently released document from April 19th, NSC official Eric Schwartz wrote to Susan Rice and Donald Steinberg at the NSC to report that Human Rights Watch was “pleading that we oppose a quick UNAMIR pull-out from Rwanda” and if pulled out, “the Rwandans will quickly become victims of genocide.”¹¹⁷ He asks, “Is this true? If so, shouldn’t it be a major factor informing high-level decision-making on this issue? Has it been?” The Security Council passed a resolution on April 21 drawing down troops from around 2,000 to 270.

General Henry Anyidoho, in command of 800 Ghanaians on the ground as part of UNAMIR, questioned the reduction of troops down to 270. He explained at the June 2014 conference, “We were also on the ground and did not show any indication of leaving Rwanda. We were still ready, doing our job, all over the country. So why 270?”¹¹⁸ Anyidoho and his troops remained in Rwanda after the resolution was passed, as Gambari pointed out, technically in violation of the UN Security Council decision on April 21.¹¹⁹ Anyidoho emphasized that in response to the drawdown: “we on the ground felt it went against all logic that in an emergency situation, instead of being reinforced, our force was reduced... It was as if the mission was being

¹¹⁵ Albright, Madeleine. Interview by PBS Frontline, February 25, 2004. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/albright.html> (accessed October 21, 2018).

¹¹⁶ Hook, “Domestic Obstacles to International Affairs,” 24.

¹¹⁷ National Security Council Memorandum from Eric Schwartz to Susan Rice and Donald Steinberg, “Pull-out of UNAMIR,” April 19, 1994. Available from: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/2014-0278-M_19940419.pdf

¹¹⁸ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 15.

¹¹⁹ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 18.

abandoned.”¹²⁰ Colin Keating, the permanent member from New Zealand explained at the June 2014 conference that “the only reason the authorized level went to 270 was because this was the only figure which the U.S. team in New York would accept.”¹²¹

Eventually, the U.N. labored to assemble an intervention force. Barnett writes that “at this point, the United States government was alone in publicly denying that the killing in Rwanda constituted genocide and was virtually isolated in opposing intervention.”¹²² A newly released May 16, 1994 memorandum for Executive Secretary of the NSC William Itoh, lays out the variety of options possible under the recently implemented PDD-25, making it clear that the United States will not support a strengthening of UNAMIR.¹²³ In a recently released June 15 memo from Steinberg, regarding talking points for President Clinton, suggesting that “it would do the President well to stand up for himself and say that genocide has occurred in Rwanda. Period.”¹²⁴ Steinberg continues, saying: “We have every reason to believe that [acts of genocide have] [genocide has] occurred in Rwanda, as defined under the 1948 convention” (brackets original). If asked about obligations, Steinberg notes, “The Genocide Convention does not impose a responsibility on the part of any government to take any specific action.”¹²⁵

CONCLUSION

The United States formed a policy in opposition to UNAMIR as the United Nations Security Council Members debated its mission, and as discussed previously, Richard Clarke at the NSC

¹²⁰ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 16.

¹²¹ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript. 30.

¹²² Barnett, *Eyewitness to Genocide*, x.

¹²³ National Security Council Memorandum to William Itoh, “Discussion Paper for the Deputies Committee on Peacekeeping in Rwanda,” May 16, 1994. Available from: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/2014-0278-M_19940516.pdf (accessed October 12, 2018).

¹²⁴ National Security Council Memorandum from Donald Steinberg, “Points for POTUS with Members,” June 14, 1994. Available from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB511/docs/DOCUMENT%2020.pdf> (accessed October 12, 2018).

¹²⁵ Steinberg, “Points for POTUS with Members,” June 14, 1994.

determined it would fail from the beginning, despite other U.S. intelligence suggesting it was viable, and likely going to be a successful mission. The United States' lack of support for UNAMIR was present *before* the murder of U.S. troops in Somalia, where as existing scholarship argues that the main reason for the United States' lack of support for UNAMIR was in response to a drawback of United States humanitarian intervention due to the disaster in Somalia in October 1993. This policy then continued as the genocide unfolded, documents showing the U.S. maintaining a strong stance and through political maneuvering was able to get the UNSC to vote for the withdrawal of UNAMIR troops.

The documents show that the United States' hard stance on foreign policy issues are often influenced by actors outside of the Department of State, and often for complex reasons, supporting existing scholarship on the creation of U.S. foreign policy.¹²⁶ The documents provide supporting evidence to the theory that often the NSC makes the final call on U.S. foreign policy in crisis situations. This is important for lobbyists, civil society members, and concerned citizens who may want to influence U.S. decision-making and response regarding mass atrocity. It is an important consideration for those working toward supporting better policies to prevent mass human rights violations and genocide in the future.

While this paper analyzed the role of the United States in the U.N.'s decision to withdraw UNAMIR troops, this was only one of the many pieces of the international community's response to the genocide in Rwanda. For example, France played a large role in international decision-making in response to the genocide in Rwanda, however access to declassified government information from the French government is extremely limited to non-existent. During the June 2014 conference, former Secretary General of the French Presidency Hubert Védrine said called

¹²⁶ Jacobs and Page, "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?"; Oueslati. "U.S. Foreign Policy."; Hook, "Domestic Obstacles to International Affairs."

for the release of French government records relating to the genocide in Rwanda: “France has already made a lot public through the Quilès inquiry, but there are obviously many other documents [still to be released]. I would like to improve access to the archives of all the protagonists.”¹²⁷ Additional declassification of French documents could greatly contribute to existing scholarly work on the role of the French in the genocide. It would be beneficial for other scholars to push for declassification of information from other governments and do similar studies to better understand international and foreign policy decision-making, especially for nations who were present in the U.N. Security Council during the genocide in Rwanda.

It would also be beneficial for scholars to heed Nigerian Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari and more closely look at the roles, influence, and position of the non-permanent members and the NAM caucus. He said that a failure to consider the perspectives of states other than the permanent five will cause a continuation of the same issues that led to the failure of the international community's response to Rwanda in 1994.¹²⁸ He stated at the June 2014 conference: “[W]hy is Africa’s role always downplayed? It is as if we were ghosts...It is a mindset that continues, I am sorry to say, in the Security Council even today...If we reduce discussion in the Security Council to the preferences of the P5 or the P3, a lot of the issues that we are discussing here will continue. I feel very strongly and passionately about this because I have seen it elsewhere, beyond Rwanda.”¹²⁹ Further research and genocide prevention work should more fully consider the role of states beyond the permanent members to the UN Security Council.

While the use of critical oral history as a method of participatory action research is an important research tool to more deeply engage the archival record of past conflict and policy in

¹²⁷ “International Decision-Making, Day 1,” Annotated Transcript, 128.

¹²⁸ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 19; Ibrahim Gambari, interview, June 3, 2014.

¹²⁹ “International Decision-Making, Day 2,” Annotated Transcript, 18-19.

response to genocide, further advancements can be made. Future research using the critical oral history conference methodology could include a wider variety of actors, including members of civil society, allowing for a perspective that is often excluded from national and international levels of policy making. It was an important step in this critical oral history conference to invite the participation of Monique Mujawamariya, a survivor of the genocide and a civil society leader, however, additional voices at the table, and a wider discussion of civil society forces on the ground in Rwanda would have been beneficial to understanding alternative responses to the genocide and possible opportunities for prevention. These viewpoints could lend a further critical eye and deep discussion of the documents themselves, and the context in which the documents were created, leading to a richer understanding of the archives and their historical context of how policy was made and potential alternatives. This could then lead to more successful prevention efforts.

It is also important to note that while the United States government released this large and important new collection of documents in April 2015 about U.S. foreign policy in response to the genocide in Rwanda, important information remains classified. Many of the newly released documents can help us better understand the complicated intricacies of U.S. domestic and foreign policy at the time, but key pieces of information are still not accessible. The U.S. and other foreign governments need to place a high priority on the release of key information related to mass atrocity, genocide and human rights violations that will allow a better understanding of how government policy is made. A better understanding of how policy is created can lead to creating better preventative policy in the future.

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PART 2: COLLABORATIVE ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS & CO-PRODUCING KNOWLEDGE

ABSTRACT

By learning from Indigenous scholarship and utilizing innovative approaches to archival analysis and the “critical oral history” method, scholars can engage in collaborative research relationships leading to the co-production of knowledge with individuals and communities who are often excluded from the research process. In this paper, I take lessons learned from a project studying the international community’s response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and seek to improve the method of “critical oral history” within a collaborative relationship with the small Indigenous Maya town of Nuevo Amanecer in western Guatemala. By learning from Indigenous scholarship about knowledge production, and decolonizing methods of analyzing archival records, I work with the community of Nuevo Amanecer to develop a new approach to the method of “critical oral history.” Instead of bringing together scholars and former government officials and policymakers who wrote government records as is the typical approach to conducting “critical oral history,” I sought to bring translated copies of declassified U.S. government documents to those who directly experienced the policies enumerated in the documents. Community members who were part of resistance movements during the conflict, for the first time, get to see the behind-the-scenes view of U.S. policy making during the Guatemalan genocide, of which the community members are survivors. The author argues that important lessons can be learned from the community members unique expertise and perspective. Ultimately the author concludes that further research needs to be conducted to fully assess the usefulness of the methodologies proposed.

INTRODUCTION

There have been important methodological as well as conceptual innovations in the analysis of archives, especially approaches that provide a critical lens to not only the content of archival material, but also the structure of the archive itself. Scholars from various disciplines have considered the motivations behind the creation of archives, what even constitutes an archive, and what has been left out of the archive.¹³⁰ These innovations in archival analysis have been particularly important in the study of colonial and imperial archives in the era of European colonization around much of the globe. I argue that by looking to debates in Indigenous studies and the study of settler-colonialism, archival studies can push these innovative tools even further, applying lessons learned from Indigenous studies about knowledge production.

Debates within Indigenous studies and decolonizing methodologies recognize the need to shift “away from more traditional and vertical forms of engagement toward more symmetrical, horizontal approaches or counternarratives.”¹³¹ While the field has made progress, some scholars recognize the need to develop more methodologies that “nurture collaborative relationships that respect the rights of Native people and their cultural experts to make decisions about the use of which their knowledge is put as well as their right to be recognized as coauthors or participants in the production of knowledge.”¹³² This paper suggests a method for archival analysis that meets

¹³⁰ Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance: On the Content in the Form.” In *Archives, Documentation, and Institutions of Social Memory: Essays from the Sawyer Seminar*, edited by Francis X. Blouin and William G. Rosenberg. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006; Ranajit Guha. “Prose of Counter-Insurgency.” In *Writings on South Asian History and Society*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983; Lisa Lowe, “Intimacies of the Four Continents.” In *Haunted By Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History*, edited by Ann Laura Stoler. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006; Marisa Fuentes, *Dispossessed Lives: Enslaved Women, Violence, and the Archive*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.

¹³¹ Florencia Mallon, ed. *Decolonizing Native Histories: Collaboration, Knowledge, and Language in the Americas*. Durham, (NC: Duke University Press, 2012), 3.

¹³² Mallon, *Decolonizing Native Histories*, 3.

this call for methods that provide opportunities for developing collaborative relationships, as well as co-knowledge production.

The method builds upon existing innovative archival analysis tools, such as “reading along the grain” and “critical oral history.”¹³³ The method of “reading along the grain,” calls for a reading of the colonial archive not simply as a source, but as a subject itself.¹³⁴ Critical oral history brings policy makers into dialogue with declassified documents, scholars, and each other to elicit new understandings of historical events.¹³⁵ I argue that by using these tools in collaborative research, scholars can learn from the expertise of communities often excluded from these conversations, provide greater access to information, and by doing so subvert the colonial archive.

In this paper, I explore the possibilities and limitations of these methodological approaches through the case study of a collaborative project developed with a small Indigenous Maya Mam community in western Guatemala, Nuevo Amanecer. As a part of a larger collaborative research project, I engaged in a workshop-style discussion with community members to analyze declassified U.S. government documents related to the history of the town. The records, translated into Spanish, include details of Guatemalan military counterinsurgency operations during the 1970s and 1980s, during which the United Nations found the Guatemalan government to have committed acts of genocide against the Maya people.¹³⁶ While this workshop provided important lessons and discussion, the author found, ultimately, that more collaborative work is needed to improve the method before making further conclusions about its effectiveness. The purpose of this

¹³³ Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009; James Blight, Janet Lang, Hussein Banai, Malcolm Byrne, and John Tirman, *Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988*. First paperback edition. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012.

¹³⁴ Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*.

¹³⁵ Blight, et al., *Becoming Enemies*.

¹³⁶ “Commission for Historical Clarification.” Truth Commission. Guatemala: United Nations Mission in Guatemala, February 29, 1999. <http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-guatemala>.

paper is to share lessons learned and areas for further research and development of the method proposed.

This paper seeks to make three central interventions, the first of which is to recognize various forms of knowledge production. Indigenous scholars have written extensively about knowledge production and the importance of valuing knowledge created by people not often recognized by existing power structures.¹³⁷ This paper highlights an opportunity for possible co-knowledge production through the development of a collaborative project in which scholars can learn from the expertise of communities and individuals who have directly experienced the policies and events described in government archives. This approach serves as a way to engage in collaborative research, particularly in the analysis phase of research.¹³⁸ This collaboration on the analysis of the records can provide access to information that otherwise people would likely not be able to access, and by doing so, subverts the colonial archive.

Secondly, this paper provides further development of innovative archival analysis tools that study the archive as a subject itself, not simply as a source of information. Building on the research conducted by Ann Stoler, Lisa Lowe, and Ranajit Guha on colonial and imperial archival records from the 19th century and earlier, I argue that we can apply these same methods of analysis to United States records about interventions and foreign policy in Latin America in the 20th

¹³⁷ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*. 2nd ed. London and Dunedin, N.Z.: Zed Books and University of Otago Press, 2012; Robina Anne Thomas, "Honoring the Oral Traditions of the Ta't Mustimuxw (Ancestors) through Storytelling." In *Research as Resistance: Revisiting Critical, Indigenous, and Anti-Oppressive Approaches*, 177–98. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2015; Gerald Vizenor, *Native Liberty: Natural Reason and Cultural Survivance*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009; Dian Million, "Felt Theory." *American Quarterly* 60, no. 2 (June 2008): 267–72.

¹³⁸ Ruth Nicholls, "Research and Indigenous Participation: Critical Reflexive Methods." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 12, no. 2 (April 2009): 117–26; Kim TallBear, "Standing with and Speaking as Faith: A Feminist-Indigenous Approach to Inquiry." *Journal of Research Practice* 10, no. 2 (2014); Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*; Bishop, Russell. "Freeing Ourselves from Neo-Colonial Domination in Research: A Maori Approach to Creating Knowledge." *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 11, no. 2 (1998): 199–219; Kuni Jenkins, and Alison Jones. "Rethinking Collaboration: Working the Indigene-Colonizer Hyphen." In *Handbook of Critical and Indigenous Methodologies*, edited by Norman K. Denzin, Yvonna S. Lincoln, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith, 471–86. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2008.

century. While a mainstream understanding of the U.S. – Latin American relationship is not one of a colonial nature, I argue that because a similar asymmetry of power exists, the application of a similar method of analysis is useful.

Finally, the study of mid- to late-20th century records allows a unique opportunity to engage in dialogue with people who lived through the events, unlike the study of colonial archives in previous centuries. This provides an opportunity to adapt the critical oral history methodology in a new way that includes perspectives from a variety of actors, not just policy makers at the highest echelons of political power. I argue that we can instead engage the people who were the subject of the policies and events described in the documents and learn from their expertise, a perspective that is often left out of the critical oral history method. Instead of simply talking to those who were in power making the decisions, we are able to speak with the people who were on the receiving end of the policies and decisions, learning from their personal, lived experiences and expertise.

Questions emerge about what an archive is. These interventions challenge traditional understandings of archives as physical pieces of paper in boxes in a temperature-controlled room and instead suggests an opportunity to move toward a more expansive understanding of knowledge production that includes inter-generational storytelling and embodied memory. Should this knowledge be considered part of the archive? Or do these ideas encourage us to challenge some of the field's basic assumptions and epistemologies, and move into other ways of thinking?

This research is informed by my experience conducting human rights research and analysis of U.S. government records about U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America for over ten years, with a particular focus on Guatemala, as well as analysis of the limited number of Guatemalan military records available publicly.¹³⁹ This research is informed by my commitment to access to

¹³⁹ While millions of pages of records from the archive of the Guatemalan National Police are available to the public, access to other Guatemalan government records is extremely limited. Two of the central Guatemalan

information as a human right, and the importance of holding governments accountable of human rights violations, in particular the U.S. government. As an academic and human rights practitioner from the United States, I recognize my own responsibility and privilege in this work. I am learning from Indigenous scholars and activists who call for the decolonization of research relationships and to engage in collaborative relationships in this work. Aspects of my identity have both foreclosed and opened opportunities to build relationships with the communities with whom I work. My main audience for this paper, whom I identify as the collective “we,” is non-native researchers and practitioners, mainly from the Global North.

METHODOLOGY

Over a period of four years, I have developed a collaborative relationship with the Maya Mam community Nuevo Amanecer. The founding community members fled genocidal violence in the 1980s from various areas of western Guatemala to seek refuge and live in exile in Mexico. After the signing of peace accords in 1996, community members started to organize their return to Guatemala, and in 1998 they founded the new town of Nuevo Amanecer located in Western Guatemala, near the border with Chiapas, Mexico. This collaborative project was developed by a shared interest in understanding, recording, and preserving the history of the town, and the building of a bright future for the community’s children and future generations. A key part of this relationship is for me as an outsider to be committed to learning about and sharing with others in my own community the history of the town, including their continued political, economic, and

documents are *Operación Sofía* and the *Diario Militar*, leaked and smuggled out of Guatemala and are now a part of the collections of the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. They are available digitally: *Diario Militar*: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB15/>; *Operación Sofía*: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB297/index.htm>. Millions of pages of Guatemalan National Police archives are available through the *Archivo Historica de la Policia Nacional*, and digitally through the University of Texas, Austin archive: <https://ahpn.lib.utexas.edu/>

social struggles. This process of education is considered a raising of consciousness or *concientización*, a central part of which is the expectation that I will take this information I learn back to my community in the United States. I am expected and encouraged to share the town's story and about how it fits into the broader history of Guatemala, and the relationship between the United States and Guatemala. The hope is that if more people in the U.S. know the history of their struggle, U.S. policy that harms Guatemalans might change.¹⁴⁰

In this relationship, I am sensitive to the ways in which my nationality and citizenship, access to resources, and race as a non-Indigenous person place me as an outsider. In the specific context of the history between the U.S. and Guatemalan governments, my role as an outsider, and a citizen of the aggressor and exploitative nation puts a further imbalance of power on our relationships. This is particularly challenging regarding the issue of access to U.S. government information in the many ways that I have privileges that allow me access that community members do not, such as language, technology, resources (especially through my university library), basic literacy skills, skin color, citizenship, and geographic location. In fact, I found that I had better access to Guatemalan government information than community members do, for the same reasons and privileges. In this work, due to the extensive imbalances in power, issues of the outsider attempting to become the “savior” can easily crop up, especially in areas of access to information, and how mainstream narratives of history are recorded. The risk is that the outsider is seen (by themselves and collaborators) as the arbiter of the historical record. This goes directly against

¹⁴⁰This became clear through conversations with community members who readily shared their stories of how and why they got involved in the resistance movement, and how the Guatemalan government against which they were fighting, was benefiting from U.S. funding. We also discussed current U.S. immigration policy and I fielded questions about the motivations behind this policy. During my summer 2017 visit, one child asked me why my president thought he was a bad person and did not like him. I responded to these questions by explaining the deeply entrenched racism in my society, and the fact that most people in the United States do not know the history of the relationship between our two countries. We then discussed how if more people in the U.S. knew the history, and the stories of the community, they might have different views on immigration.

project goals of co-production of knowledge and honoring the expertise and authority of the lived experience of community members. Despite best efforts, colonial structures and power imbalances persist, as do aspects of “irreconcilable alterity.”¹⁴¹

1. DIVERSE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

Indigenous scholars call for the use of decolonizing research methodologies that recognize the various ways that Indigenous communities engage in knowledge production.¹⁴² One of the central tenets of decolonizing methodologies is engaging in collaborative research and the importance of doing research in relationship with collaborators.¹⁴³ Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate scholar Kim TallBear argues for working alongside communities in a way that challenges the traditional ideas of how and where knowledge is created. TallBear argues that it is important to break down the barriers in the relationship of the studied and the researcher, which she argues, is embedded in the idea of “giving back” and reciprocity in research, and instead suggests adopting the idea of “standing with.”¹⁴⁴

The recognition of diverse forms of knowledge production and the centering of those that tell the stories of people on their own terms are an important part of decolonizing methodologies.¹⁴⁵ Salish scholar Robina Thomas looks at storytelling as a research methodology, recognizing that

¹⁴¹ Nicholls, “Research and Indigenous Participation,” 118.

¹⁴² While there are current debates in Indigenous studies about the usefulness in engaging with settler-colonial literature in the various contexts in Latin America, it is clear that there are opportunities for learning across the hemisphere. For more, see Volume 69, No. 4 of *American Quarterly*, published by Johns Hopkins University Press in December 2017, <https://muse-jhu-edu.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/issue/37735>. Especially see Shannon Speed, “Structures of Settler Capitalism in Abya Yala,” *American Quarterly* 69, no. 4 (December 21, 2017): 783–90; and M. Bianet Castellanos, “Introduction: Settler Colonialism in Latin America,” *American Quarterly* 69, no. 4 (December 21, 2017): 777–81.

¹⁴³ Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*; Margaret Kovach, *Indigenous Methodologies: Characteristics, Conversations and Contexts*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009.

¹⁴⁴ TallBear, “Standing with and Speaking as Faith.”

¹⁴⁵ Smith, *Decolonizing Methods*; Kovach, *Indigenous Methodologies*; Vizenor. *Native Liberty*; Kirsten Anker, “The Truth in Painting: Cultural Artefacts as Proof of Native Title.” *Law Text Culture* 9 (2005).

often stories from the past are not just in the past, but continue to play out in people's everyday lives. She argues that in her case study of her family, members of the Coast Salish people of Canada, “many stories from [I]ndigenous people tell a counter-story to that of the documented history of [I]ndigenous peoples in Canada.”¹⁴⁶ She also argues that telling stories is a form of resistance to colonization, explaining that “they put voice to a story that has not been fully told,” and “use their own voices to tell their stories on their own terms.”¹⁴⁷

Thomas also highlights the importance of recognizing the value of knowledge produced through oral storytelling, challenging mainstream ideas that often place a higher value of knowledge captured in textual form. Many people in Nuevo Amanecer, particularly women, do not know how to read and write, and generally there is not a lot of textual material available. As such, the majority of the town's communication, records keeping, and preservation of historical memory are through oral means. Storytelling is the fundamental mechanism of community education and is practiced across generations.

Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes that history in its vernacular is “facts of the matter and a narrative of those facts, both ‘what happened’ and ‘that which is said to have happened’.”¹⁴⁸ History is not simply facts, but the sociohistorical process of interpreting what we know and don't know about the past. He argues that “the distinction between what happened and that which is said to have happened is not always clear,” and that the muddling between the two can itself be historical.¹⁴⁹ Trouillot writes that Western approaches to studying history assumes that “history requires a linear and cumulative sense of time that allows the observer to isolate the

¹⁴⁶ Thomas, “Honoring the Oral Traditions,” 183.

¹⁴⁷ Thomas, “Honoring the Oral Traditions,” 184.

¹⁴⁸ Michel-Rolph Trouillot. *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1995, 2.

¹⁴⁹ Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 3.

past as a distinct entity.”¹⁵⁰ This assumption about the linearity of time deeply influences ideas of what is fact, what is fiction, how we know what we know, and who has the right to produce knowledge.

North American Indigenous studies scholar Mark Rifkin argues that “[r]epertoires of shared stories of all sorts, transmitted and added to across generations, provide a means of engaging with extant circumstances in ways that generate continuity while remaining open to addition, revision, and adaptation.”¹⁵¹ It is argued by some that due to the shared transmission and adaptability of oral record-keeping adds a dimension of accuracy that textual records do not because of the ability to maintain an understanding of the context of the information, context that is often lost with textual records.

Diana Taylor further challenges traditional concepts of knowledge production by considering “the archive and the repertoire.”¹⁵² Taylor’s approach provides an important call to acknowledging diverse forms of knowledge production and non-traditional forms of preservation of the archive, and historical memory in general. She explores how performance, activities, and ritual behavior embody and transmit historical memory, pushing scholars to think beyond the “material” aspects of the archive (documents, buildings, bones), and the “ephemeral repertoire of embodied knowledge and practice” such as dance, spoken language, sports, rituals, and oral storytelling.¹⁵³ She points out how performance is both the object of study, and the methodology that allows for analysis.¹⁵⁴ These ideas expand the understanding of knowledge production, especially in contexts where written material and preservation is not accessible and/or highly

¹⁵⁰ Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 7.

¹⁵¹ Mark Rifkin, *Beyond Settler Time: Temporal Sovereignty and Indigenous Self-determination*. (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2017), 34-35.

¹⁵² Diana, Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.

¹⁵³ Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*.

¹⁵⁴ Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*.

valued. Through the practices of Nuevo Amanecer, we can see how these “ephemeral repertoire” are the central forms of knowledge production and preservation. Taylor’s arguments help to challenge the often-assumed supremacy of written material and raises question the about what an archive even is.

Most of the members of Nuevo Amanecer were directly or indirectly involved in the leftist resistance movements during the internal armed conflict. Community elders and adults place a high value on the importance of education the town’s young people and international visitors about the story of the town. The town’s story includes a history of *la lucha*, or the struggle, of the leftist political movement and armed guerrilla groups. *La lucha* includes stories of great suffering, sacrifice, and triumph. The story of the town also includes the success, achievements, and challenges faced by the town since its founding. Of high priority among town elders and leaders is the process of *concientización*, or consciousness raising, in which young people learn about the political motivations behind *la lucha*, which includes a history of colonization, Indigenous and popular resistance, U.S. intervention, and an understanding that *la lucha* continues today, and will continue in the future. Community leaders and adults place a high value on primary, secondary, and professional education, as well as this process of community education, *concientización*. Community leaders have a wealth of knowledge about politics, history, and economics in relation to *la lucha*, and the motivations and goals of the various resistance movements being fought today in Guatemala. The elders relay this information to the younger generations with the hope and expectation that the young people will continue *la lucha* and place on them the responsibility to continue telling the stories to future generations.

Each year the community commemorates their return to Guatemala with an anniversary celebration that consists of a day full of activities including a Catholic mass of thanksgiving, a

communal meal, basketball and soccer tournaments, and the main event, the *noche cultural*. The youth are charged with planning, organizing, and hosting the *noche cultural*, a variety show that includes traditional dances, youth created and choreographed dances, spoken word poetry, jokes, singing, and storytelling about the history of the town. The youth leaders teach the younger children the dances and songs, and they tell the stories of the town's history in their own words for the audience, which is mostly their friends, families, and neighbors. It is through these celebrations that the community's history of suffering and triumph is preserved for future generations. These community practices of embodied historical memory and youth education provide an important counter narrative to the colonial archive, and challenge traditional understandings of what it means to preserve history and produce knowledge.

By recognizing diverse forms of knowledge production, scholars may consider the ways in which communities are producing their own history and memory projects that do not fit a conventional definition or understanding of what archives are. How can we account for the diverse forms of knowledge the community of Nuevo Amanecer produces through storytelling, performance, community education, ritual, and even the physical buildings and the road built by hand by the community members upon their return from Mexico? Just because the community of Nuevo Amanecer does not have boxes of papers in temperature-controlled rooms, does that mean they do not have an archive?

The Workshop: Collaborative Analysis & Co-Producing Knowledge

Motivated to learn from the expertise and perspective of those community members who were a part of leftist resistance movements, I worked with the community to develop a workshop to share records related to Nuevo Amanecer's history with those who were interested. My goals were to engage in collaborative knowledge production by learning from community members' analysis of

U.S. government documents. I wanted to learn from the expertise of the community members' lived histories of the conflict and understand their unique perspectives that are not represented in the documents themselves. Through engaging the textual records, I wanted to see what value can be derived from them through a process of critical analysis. Trouillot argues that in regard to history, "the ways in which what happened and that which is said to have happened are and are not the same may itself be historical."¹⁵⁵ I wanted to learn from those who experienced the events described in the textual records, and saw this engagement as a way of creating an alternative narrative to those being recorded in the documents. While it can be argued that engaging the records of a colonial and imperialist state is not useful, I wanted to take the opportunity for the community members to determine if they found any value themselves. While this workshop centers the textual record, it was one part of a larger collaborative project which, as a whole, centers the voices and narratives of community members. Other parts of this collaborative project will be explored in part three.

My main focus was to share U.S. declassified documents due to the extensive number of documents available to me in the United States, and the community's lack of access to those records. Prior to one of my visits to the town, I prepared a document reader of eight declassified documents related generally to the history of Nuevo Amanecer explaining general U.S. policy, as well as information about specific Guatemalan military operations that I knew were geographically relevant to battles and towns people in Nuevo Amanecer had spoken about.¹⁵⁶ I translated the documents either partially or fully into Spanish, and included a complete copy of the original

¹⁵⁵ Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 4.

¹⁵⁶ Link to document reader shared with the community: <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1tAeMSqY0QHbybqNwvIUu5yX7XfsbvxV2?usp=sharing>. A copy is also included in appendix C. The documents in the reader were obtained from the National Security Archive website, the Digital National Security Archive, a ProQuest database, as well as the U.S. Declassified Documents Online, a GALE database. All documents U.S. government are not subject to copyright and may be published freely.

English for reference. I included a description of the content of the reader, and explained where the documents came from, and my contact information if anyone had questions in the future. I created several copies of the reader with the intention to donate the copies to the town's library. I also brought a digital copy in case people preferred a digital copy, and wanted to share it more widely, or make additional copies in the future. Upon my arrival to the town, I spoke with the community association and community leaders to gauge interest in viewing the documents, and to develop a workshop to share them with the larger community. I worked with a few elders and youth leaders to organize the details of the workshop, and to carry it out.

I was motivated to find a way to have interested community members analyze declassified U.S. government documents that were related to the history of Nuevo Amanecer, and possibly people's own personal stories. I wanted to learn from their expertise, lived experience, and stories that are not represented in the documents. I also sought out to specifically include women because they are often the voices least recognized at the decision-making table. I wanted to better understand women's roles in and strategies for navigating conflict. The community members could provide a unique perspective, and alternative narratives in response to the mainstream narratives afforded to government archives. From my understanding based on conversations before and after the workshop, community members were motivated to participate because of my existing relationship to them and they were invested in our other shared projects, they wanted to learn more about the history of Guatemala, and a few were keenly interested in seeing documents produced by the U.S. government about military operations they experienced and were involved in during the conflict.

North American scholar Kristen Weld writes about former Guatemalan political prisoners analyzing the Historical Archives of the National Police (AHPN) documents in the police facility

where they themselves or their friends and family were held and tortured. Through the experience of these workers, we can see the unique knowledge produced through the relationship between the archives—the physical records—and the person who is interacting with the records. Weld writes:

These survivors' embodied encounters with state documents occasioned new and sometimes frustrating forms of engagement with their pasts. Not only did they reread their own histories from the "Other's" perspective; they worked to write new chapters with an eye toward justice, finally confirming with documentation experiences long denied by the state's 'double discourse.'¹⁵⁷

The embodied memory and relationship between the person looking at the document, and the document itself provides unique perspectives for understanding the past, but also creating new imaginings for the future. We are able to recognize the unique knowledge produced through this embodied interaction, only possible by certain people in a specific physical location and moment in time.

By valuing the knowledge produced by the community members of Nuevo Amanecer, I also wanted to challenge the ideas of what archives are, pushing back against the idea that because the town does not have a building with boxes of paper, controlled at a certain temperature, they do not have archives. By bringing community members and the documents together, I wanted to further explore the embodied experience of engaging with the texts, expanding on Weld's work about the relationship with physical space and the embodied relationship with the records themselves.¹⁵⁸ I wanted to explore further the difference between resistance fighters and genocide survivors sitting in an open-air *sala* looking through copies of declassified U.S. documents in

¹⁵⁷ Kristen Weld, *Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala*. American Encounters/Global Interactions. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 155.

¹⁵⁸ Weld, *Paper Cadavers*, 154-155.

Nuevo Amanecer in rural western Guatemala, and me clicking through digital copies on my computer in Seattle, Washington. What is the value added of the embodied interaction with the documents and the geographic significance? What is the knowledge produced by these specific people in this place and time with these records? What can we learn from embodied encounters revisiting the events through analysis of the documents, perhaps an embodied process of remembering? What about non-textual records? What about embodied processes of remembering through storytelling and performance?

2. SUBVERTING THE COLONIAL ARCHIVE

Recent archival analysis scholarship looks into the context in which documents were created, as well as a critical analysis of what is included in the archive and what is left out. The idea of “reading along the grain” was developed by Ann Stoler in her study of the archives of Dutch colonial rule in the 19th century.¹⁵⁹ Stoler argues that in the critical analysis of archives, “whether documents are trustworthy, authentic, and reliable remain pressing questions, but a turn to the social and political conditions that produce those documents...has altered the sense of what trust and reliability might signal and politically entail.”¹⁶⁰ Lisa Lowe considers writes about the connections between the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Europe during the era of slavery, and post slavery and how imperial archives were created as a bureaucratic tool of colonialism.¹⁶¹ In her study of Peruvian notarial records from the 1800s, Kathryn Burns how the context of who created archives and why they created them lead to a better understanding of the human relations and political context of the “official record” and how and what was transmitted.¹⁶² Instead of making a

¹⁵⁹ Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*, 2009.

¹⁶⁰ Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” 286.

¹⁶¹ Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2015.

¹⁶² Kathryn Burns, *Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010.

judgement about whether information contained in documents are true or not, we can critically engage with the archives to understand what the existing information, or lack of information, tells us.

Other scholars consider who and what are left out of the archives. Marisa Fuentes argues that the construction of the archives is a colonial project about power, and that the construction of the archives “marks women’s bodies” in life and death in the way that the stories and experiences of women are left out of, and thus silenced in archives.¹⁶³ Guha speaks specifically about colonial counter-insurgency efforts, considering the way in which the empire chooses to label, and erase resistance movements in its own records, especially when created by “authors committed to colonialism.”¹⁶⁴ He argues that that through administrative record keeping, there can be change to the narrative for political reasons.¹⁶⁵

These methods were generally developed to analyze colonial and imperial records and archives from the 19th century and earlier. The above-mentioned scholars write about the way that archives can be used as tools of colonial empires to run and orchestrate mechanisms of colonization—organizing and managing information to carry out colonization—as well as archives created in such a way that preserves the dominant narrative. The colonial empire is able to control the narrative in the way that it portrays events in seemingly benign bureaucratic records, and also by what is left out of the archives entirely. I argue that these methods can also be useful in analyzing United States records about U.S. foreign policy in Latin America during the 20th century infamous “Dirty Wars.” In the study of U.S. foreign policy in the hemisphere during the Cold War, we can use this method to analyze the ways that the U.S. organized, for example, intelligence

¹⁶³ Fuentes, *Dispossessed Lives*.

¹⁶⁴ Guha, “Prose of Counter-Insurgency,” 53.

¹⁶⁵ Guha, “Prose of Counter-Insurgency.”

gathering and reporting, and global counter-insurgency policy. It is helpful to understand the Cold War-mindset of policy makers in the 1960s – 1980s when analyzing U.S. intelligence reports about the threat of “communist terrorists,” counterinsurgency tactics, and “elimination of subversives.” While the U.S. government’s archive of the mid-to-late 20th century may not fit the traditional definition of the colonial archive, it can be argued to serve a similar purpose, particularly in its foreign relations with various countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. When considering the colonial archive in the context of the Cold War in the western hemisphere, it is important to consider the role of the United States as a collector and disseminator of intelligence information for the purposes of conducting U.S. foreign policy, but also to share among friendly dictators and governments throughout the hemisphere, through bilateral relationships with states and militaries, but also through more complex schemes involving multiple nations such as Operation Condor in the South America.¹⁶⁶ This form of U.S. foreign policy was motivated by national economic and political interests, with a desire to maintain a dominant influence over culture, politics, religion, and economics in order to defend against what the U.S. perceived as soviet, communist imperialism through the “domino effect.” The U.S. need to assert its authority in the hemisphere before soviet influence washed over the region, like a cascade of falling dominos, in what the U.S. saw as an existential threat.¹⁶⁷ United States businesses such as the United Fruit Company (currently by the name of Chiquita) used and still use deeply extractivist methods through mining, agriculture, and apparel industries.

By “reading along the grain,” scholars can better understand the functioning of U.S. bureaucracy and how records-keeping can be an important tool of maintaining empire. Considering

¹⁶⁶ Lars Schoultz. *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.

¹⁶⁷ Schoultz, *Beneath the United States*, 334-341.

the way that the archive can be used as a tool of colonization, we can begin to understand the importance in subverting this colonial archive through access to the information contained in the archive.

Subverting the U.S. Colonial Archive through Access to Information

In the context of Guatemala, the U.S. colonial archive is complex and multilayered. Considering the relationship between the United States and Guatemala during the Cold War, extensive amounts of information about the conflict in Guatemala is documented in U.S. government records. From the U.S. orchestration of the coup against Guatemalan President Arbenz in 1954 and the installation of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas in his place, to direct U.S. support of the Guatemalan military's genocidal counter-insurgency efforts in the 1980s and 1990s, thousands of pages of records exist. In fact, as Weld notes, the U.S. contributed to both the form and content of Guatemalan government records particularly the National Police Archives—how they were created and organized, as well as record of government repression contained in the documents.¹⁶⁸ The U.S. government has an extensive amount of information about Guatemala's conflict because the U.S. supported the Guatemalan military, both financially and materially, and through sharing intelligence information. Therefore the U.S. government documents have details about the violence committed, by whom, when and where, and the intended targets of the violence.

In addition to the U.S. government records, there are also the Guatemalan government archives, which include records of the military and police, two entities which often collaborated in counter-insurgency operations, surveillance, and efforts to "eliminate subversives." The question of how to define the colonial archive in the case of Guatemala is a complex one, and

¹⁶⁸ Weld, *Paper Cadavers*, 93.

certainly up for debate. For the purposes of this paper, I define the colonial archives in the case of Guatemala as U.S. government records produced during the Cold War, as well as Guatemalan military and police records.¹⁶⁹ The Guatemalan military and police records document scorched earth and counter-insurgency operations during the internal armed conflict from the 1954 coup through the 1990s which overwhelmingly targeted Indigenous Maya populations, policies and operations which have been found to have racist motivations.¹⁷⁰

In the case of government information about the internal armed conflict in Guatemala, some information produced by the U.S. government has been made available through the Freedom of Information Act, as well as limited preemptive releases by the government. In addition, there are a limited number of Guatemalan military documents which were leaked, most notably the *Diario Militar*, and the records of Operation Sofia.¹⁷¹ Many of these documents are digitally available via U.S. government websites, and academic databases.¹⁷² Nearly 10 million of the 90 million Guatemalan National Police documents are available digitally through the University at Texas, Austin library.¹⁷³ These records were also available at the Historical Archives of the National Police in Guatemala City for about fifteen years before the its sudden and politically

¹⁶⁹ See more information about U.S.-Guatemala relations and “building counterinsurgency archives” in Weld, *Paper Cadavers*, chapter 4.

¹⁷⁰ See Marta Elena Casaús Arzú’s expert witness testimony in the Guatemala genocide trial in 2013, notes available in “Genocide on Trial, Day 10: Expert Witnesses Testify, ‘Racism Facilitated the Extermination of the Ixil...’” NISGUA. Accessed April 7, 2020. <https://nisgua.org/genocide-on-trial-day-10-expert-witnesses-testify-racism-facilitated-the-extermination-of-the-ixil/>. Also see: Marta Elena Casaús Arzú, “El Genocidio: La Máxima Expresión Del Racismo En Guatemala: Una Interpretación Histórica y Una Reflexión.” *Nuevo Mundo - Mundos Nuevos*, September 1, 2009. <https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.57067>.

¹⁷¹ Guatemalan *Diario Militar* or “Military Diary” available here: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB15/>; Operation Sofia records available here: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB297/index.htm>.

¹⁷² National Security Archive website; Digital National Security Archive database by ProQuest; U.S. Declassified Documents Online, a GALE database; Department of State online reading room; Central Intelligence Agency online reading room; and various paper collections at the National Archives, and various Presidential Libraries.

¹⁷³ AHPN digital collection at the University of Texas, Austin: <https://ahpn.lib.utexas.edu/>

motivated near closure in 2019.¹⁷⁴ Additional Guatemalan military archives were made available in 2011, however the access and quality of the documents are highly questionable, as will be discussed later in this paper. As has been seen through the analysis of the AHPN documents and the *Diario Militar*, Guatemalan records have specific details about the locations of massacres, mass graves, scorched earth military operations, and the fate of disappeared loved ones, such as the date and location of disappearance and extrajudicial execution.¹⁷⁵ In some cases, the declassified and leaked records have been used, along with forensic exhumations, to locate and identify the remains of disappeared loved ones.¹⁷⁶ In sum, for those who suffered the most and lived through the policies and human rights violations enumerated in these documents, access to information is limited.

Access to this information is a human right, particularly in the case of forced disappearances. International law has recognized the right to access to information in certain cases as it is closely intertwined with the right to justice, particularly in the case of state-sponsored human rights atrocities.¹⁷⁷ Without access to information about details of the crimes, physical evidence and remains, identities of perpetrators and victims, and the fate of missing loved ones, the right to justice cannot be fully guaranteed. In many cases, governments use the denial of this information to cover up, oppress, and continue to perpetrate crimes against humanity. Kovras

¹⁷⁴ Kate Doyle, "Imminent Threat to Guatemala's Historical Archive of the National Police (AHPN)." *National Security Archive*, May 30, 2019. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/guatemala/2019-05-30/imminent-threat-guatemalas-historical-archive-national-police-ahpn>; Kate Doyle, "Joint Declaration on the Guatemala Police Archive." *National Security Archive*, November 18, 2019. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/guatemala/2019-11-18/joint-declaration-guatemala-police-archive>.

¹⁷⁵ Emily Willard, and Kate Doyle. "27 Years Later, Justice for Fernando García." *Electronic Briefing Book*, #337. Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, February 18, 2011. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB337/>.

¹⁷⁶ Kate Doyle, "Two of Guatemala's Death Squad Diary Victims Found in Mass Grave." *Electronic Briefing Book*, #363. Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, November 22, 2011. <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB363/index.htm>.

¹⁷⁷ The Inter-American Court and Commission for Human Rights have heard and ruled on several cases, developing over time the right to access government information: <https://unredacted.com/2011/12/16/one-year-since-landmark-ruling-a-call-to-action/>

explains, “[t]he crime of enforced disappearances was used instrumentally to terrorize the broader population beyond the immediate victims and their families.”¹⁷⁸ The motivation for governments to perpetrate forced disappearances is to not only eliminate a dissenter and deter the activities of those who organize against the government, it is also to erase the existence of the person.¹⁷⁹ When loved ones approached government security forces to seek out information about loved ones, it was the government strategy to deny that the person was ever arrested, detained, or killed, thereby denying critical information about the fate of the loved one. By sustaining fear in public spaces as well as the most intimate recesses of peoples’ homes, governments often violated habeas corpus protections and engaged in creating cognitive dissonance as a form of psychological warfare.¹⁸⁰ The United States government taught these tactics to military officers across the American continents for decades through U.S. government training programs, such as those offered by the infamous School of the Americas (now known as WHINSEC).¹⁸¹

In most cases of forced disappearance, families have never received information about the fates of their loved ones, and the suffering of not knowing continues through today. The lack of closure and lack of access to information causes extreme psychological damage and distress.¹⁸² The open wound and lack of closure causes intergenerational trauma due to “the inability to enter into a mourning process” due to “the absence of a body to mourn,” and there by leaving relatives “trapped in limbo for decades” and “in ‘frozen’ or ‘ambiguous’ grieving.”¹⁸³ In perhaps the most

¹⁷⁸ Iosif Kovras, *Grassroots Activism and the Evolution of Transitional Justice: The Families of the Disappeared*. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 85.

¹⁷⁹ Patricia Weiss Fagen. “Repression and State Security.” In *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America*. Berkely: University of California Press, 1992

¹⁸⁰ Fagen, “Repression and State Security.”; Carlos Sluzki, “Deception and Fear in Politically Oppressive Contexts: Its Trickle-Down Effect on Families.” *Review of Policy Research* 22, no. 5 (September 2005).

¹⁸¹ WHINSEC – Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. For more about The School of the Americas, see Lesley Gill, *The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.

¹⁸² Sluzki, “Deception and Fear in Politically Oppressive Contexts.”

¹⁸³ Kovras, *Grassroots Activism and the Evolution of Transitional Justice*, 85.

extreme consequence of a government's denial of access to information, the crime of enforced disappearance—and the psychological suffering—continues to be perpetrated. Facilitating access to information in communities where families continue to suffer from not knowing the fate of their loved ones can be an important form of resisting government repression and subverting the colonial archive.

I wanted to attempt to address some of these issues of lack of access to information through the workshop. In addition to sharing the translated documents with the community, I also wanted to offer the opportunity for community members to request additional information specific to their and their family's interests and needs, a key part of the collaboration. As a part of the workshop, I explained how the documents came to be declassified and the process of using the Freedom of Information Act. I asked if people had specific research interests in general or wanted to request access to more specific information, related to the history of the conflict, U.S. foreign policy, or possibly information about disappeared loved ones. I offered to file FOIA requests on their behalf, carefully explaining the declassification process and the fact that we might not get any responsive information. Due to the sensitive nature of the requests and the information sought, I wanted to make sure to proceed carefully and be clear about the process and expectations about the potential outcomes of the requests. One person asked for information about the U.S. government funding to the Guatemalan government during the conflict and currently. Two families asked for specific information about their disappeared loved ones. One woman asked me to request information about her town where the government perpetrated a scorched earth massacre in which nearly her entire family was killed. She explained her motivation for seeking information: "I want to have some documents to leave my grandchildren."¹⁸⁴ In response, I submitted a series of Freedom of

¹⁸⁴ Personal conversation, July 14, 2018.

Information Act requests for the information requested by the families. I worked with undergraduate students to research and write a report about U.S. funding to the Guatemalan government. The following year (Summer 2019), I was able to deliver the report during a community association meeting, and to the families, the most recent correspondence (translated into Spanish) from the U.S. Department of State, and CIA.¹⁸⁵ Knowing that community members often like to share resources with those who visit the community, I provided them with a copy of the report in English as well as Spanish.

Discussing the state of access to information about the conflict in general, the role of the United States, and my personal responsibility as a U.S. citizen opened ground for rich dialogue about what our collaboration could look like. Through discussions about the specific needs and interests of individuals, families, and the community as a whole, we were able to identify priorities for research and dialogue in our collaborative project.

3. COLLABORATIVE ANALYSIS

While the works of Stoler, Lowe, Guha, Burns, Fuentes, and others engage archives from centuries past, collections of records which detail the foreign activities of the United States provide a unique opportunity to better understand the context in which the documents were produced. One way of better understanding the context in which the documents are created is to speak with those who created them and who lived through the outcomes of the policies and results chronicled in the documents. By working with former government officials and policy makers who wrote the documents, scholars can gain a better understanding of what was happening around tables in meeting rooms when the documents were being written. In the cases of colonial history from earlier

¹⁸⁵ See Appendix B for a copy of the report, in both English and Spanish.

times, we don't have the opportunity to speak to living people. However, with more recent cases, we have the opportunity to speak with former officials and decision makers who produced the records. James Blight and Janet Lang developed the methodology "critical oral history" that brings the documents in conversation with the officials who wrote them.¹⁸⁶ This methodology has been used extensively by the National Security Archive in analysis of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, and has conducted dozens of conferences around the world to discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis, other Cold War topics, and the international response to genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia.¹⁸⁷

Conveners of a critical oral history conference first conduct in-depth research on the topic of the conference, and obtain related government records from government archives, or through freedom of information laws. In the case of the conference on the Rwanda genocide organized by the National Security Archive in 2014 "International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994," information was obtained from the governments of the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, and France.¹⁸⁸ Researchers also obtained documents from the United Nations. From these collections of records, a set of specific documents are curated and provided to conference participants in "briefing books."¹⁸⁹ Key decision-makers of the policies leading up to and during the Rwanda genocide are invited to be conference participants, as well as noted scholars of the issue area who act as discussants. In the Rwanda genocide critical oral history conference, key players were invited such as Canadian Gen. Roméo Dallaire, Iqbal Riza, former United Nations Assistant to the Secretary General for

¹⁸⁶ Blight, et al., *Becoming Enemies*.

¹⁸⁷ James Blight, *Dark beyond Darkness: The Cuban Missile Crisis as History, Warning, and Catalyst*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018; Carter-Brezhnev, see <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/>; Nunn-Lugar, see <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/project/nunn-lugar/>; Rwanda, see <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ageofgenocide/>; Bosnia, see <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ageofgenocide/2015/Srebrenica-1993-1995-conference-press-release.html>.

¹⁸⁸ Conference website: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ageofgenocide/>

¹⁸⁹ Example of Rwanda Genocide critical oral history conference briefing books here: Volume 1, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ageofgenocide/VOLUME%201.pdf> and volume 2, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ageofgenocide/VOLUME%202%20COMPLETE.pdf>

Peacekeeping , former Secretary General of the French Presidency Hubert Védrine, U.S. Assistant Deputy of the Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador Prudence Bushnell, and Ambassador Colin Keating from New Zealand who served as president of the U.N. security council during the beginning of the genocide in April 1994, among others.¹⁹⁰

During the conference, the participants were seated around a table, with the document readers, and are guided through a series of discussions about different topics, such as leading up to and during the incident in question.¹⁹¹ The discussion was guided by questions presented by the scholars, as well as questions from the former officials for each other. The discussion is moderated by the conference conveners, and audio recorded. The audio recording was kept confidential, and a transcription prepared. The original transcription was sent out to participants who were allowed to edit their own words for clarity and accuracy. An edited, annotated transcript was prepared as an output of the conference, as well as a rapporteur's report summarizing the conference proceedings.¹⁹² The conference was not open to the public.

While this innovative methodology has produced invaluable research and learning opportunities, we need to take it further to include the voices of people who experienced the implications of these policies. This became clear during the critical oral history conference about the Rwandan Genocide in which only one genocide survivor was in attendance, human rights activist Monique Mujawamaria.¹⁹³ The central goal of the conference was to learn about the

¹⁹⁰ See full list of participants and staff here:

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ageofgenocide/Hague%20Conference%20Bios%20Final.pdf>

¹⁹¹ See agenda for Rwanda genocide conference with different sessions here:

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ageofgenocide/Hague%20conference%20draft%20agenda%20May%2014-1.pdf>

¹⁹² See rapporteur's report for Rwanda genocide conference here:

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB508/docs/Rwanda%20Rapporteur%20Report%20-%204-3-15%20FINAL.pdf>; See annotated, edited transcript for first day of Rwanda genocide conference here:

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB508/docs/Rwanda%20Final%20Transcript%20Day%201.pdf>

¹⁹³ Emily Willard, "New Documents Shed Light: Why Did Peacekeepers Withdraw during Rwanda's 1994 Genocide?" *Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal* 12, no. 3 (2018)

mistakes made by the international community in response to genocide as a way to learn and create better prevention policies. While bringing together the records and people who experienced the outcome of the policies in the documents certainly produces new information and knowledge, the absence of other voices of people who lived through this period of history was clear.

My experience with this conference illuminated the stark absence of people in the conversation who had actually experienced the violence and the result of the genocidal policies. By working on the collaborative project with Nuevo Amanecer, I saw the opportunity to build upon the critical oral history model in important ways.¹⁹⁴ Instead of getting U.S. government officials to be in conversation with the records they created, I saw a unique opportunity to actually speak to the people who were represented in very narrow, often harmful ways. By engaging community members, especially women, I had an opportunity to learn from their expertise and unique insights from people who are often excluded from the archives entirely.

Critical Oral History in Nuevo Amanecer

In applying lessons learned from utilizing the critical oral history methodology, I saw this as an opportunity to share declassified documents about the history of the town, and the revolutionary work to which many people in the town had committed their life.¹⁹⁵ I was interested in finding a way to share the information with people who were interested and whose access would otherwise be very limited due to technological, language, and literacy obstacles. During my many years of work with declassified U.S. government documents, there were several conversations among my colleagues about who has “ownership” over these records and who should have access to these documents. Once declassified the records are legally open to the public, to anyone, without

¹⁹⁴ Blight, et al., *Becoming Enemies*.

¹⁹⁵ Willard, “New Documents Shed Light,” 159.

limitation or copyright concerns. However, many of the largest organizations requesting and digitizing the documents publish them through academic databases owned by publishing companies that have a paywall.¹⁹⁶ Many of these records are feasibly only accessible to people in the United States who have an affiliation with a university library that chooses to purchase the institutional membership.¹⁹⁷ In several cases where documents are made available to the public for free, it requires access to internet, and ability to read English. In most cases, when the National Archives and Presidential Libraries declassify records and make them available to the public, they are only accessible by visiting the respective reading rooms in person and viewing the documents in hard copy. By engaging in this collaborative analysis, I planned to provide to the town's library hard copies of the material, along with Spanish translations, so that people could have permanent access to the records.

Another reason to share U.S. government records is due to the limited access to Guatemalan archives. While the military archives of Guatemala were ostensibly open to the public in 2011, anecdotal evidence suggested that the number of records available were very limited, and their location in a military installation in the capital city made it unlikely that the majority of those who suffered violence would seek access to them. Additionally, the quality of the documents was questioned. A handful of people who had visited reported that the majority of documents were not related to state perpetrated violence during the early 1980s, documents which were of most interest to those who sought access to them. I was able to confirm these initial conclusions and concerns by attempting to visit the military archives in the summer of 2018. Due to my own challenges in

¹⁹⁶ *Digital National Security Archive*. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest Information and Learning, 1998; and *U.S. Declassified Documents Online*. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Cengage Learning, 1998.

¹⁹⁷ The lack of access to this information is extensive, even to relatively privileged people in the United States because of publishing behind a paywall and the reliance on costly institutional memberships. Despite the fact that I helped to create and produce two of these document collections, once I lose my university affiliation, I will no longer have access to the work that I helped produce.

locating the proper building, gaining access to the offices, officials' problems locating the documents, the poor organization of the records, and the content of the documents, I conclude that the records are effectively inaccessible to people who would most benefit from accessing them: people searching for their disappeared loved ones.

My attempt to access the Guatemalan military archives was an important opportunity to strengthen the collaborative relationship with the community by utilizing my privileges to become an accomplice in accessing information they would not otherwise have access to. This was most apparent when I was related my experience of visiting the Guatemalan military installation in Guatemala City in an attempt to locate military archives that were supposedly available to the public. I shared the story at the workshop. One of the participants, a former guerrilla fighter chuckled and laughed saying that I had "infiltrated" the military installation for them. I told them there was a point where I was nervous, and they all laughed, agreeing and said, "you weren't sure that you would get out!"¹⁹⁸ I was able to share with the group the limited information I was able to access, but I explained that my conclusion of the visit was that the records were not effectively accessible to most, if not almost all, people. By investigating the access to these records, and reporting to the town my findings, I was able to contribute to the further building of the solidarity relationship with the community. While this was an important opportunity to build the collaborative relationship, it relied on, and in some ways, reified the unbalanced powers structures which allowed me access to Guatemalan records that Guatemalans themselves do not have access to. Their access relies on me as a middle person being a conduit of information, a dynamic that should not exist in the first place but is an element of the existing structures of colonization and imperialism.

¹⁹⁸ Fieldnotes of conversation during workshop, July 2018.

Approaching these questions and possibilities also raised several concerns and challenges, mainly about whether or not people even wanted to see and engage with U.S. government documents, navigating the logistics of access, and long-term sustainability of the project. It was likely that community members might not have interested in engaging with the documents for a variety of reasons, potentially for revisiting or reopening trauma wounds, exercising refusal of not wanting to engage with state records, simply not seeing the value in accessing the information, and having other priorities in the community. Additionally, I was concerned by the ways that focusing a workshop on declassified U.S. government documents would continue to center the perspective the U.S. in the history of Guatemala's struggle. Was it worthwhile to spend time and energy discussing the archives of the oppressor? Would the time be better spent learning from and discussing the town's existing historical memory projects and production of knowledge about the history of the town and the conflict?

Prior to the workshop, I shared with one of the community members who was very active in one of the armed guerrilla groups, copies of several of the documents, explaining that they were U.S. military and CIA documents. He was immediately very excited about the records which bore the CIA seal. As we looked through them briefly, he recognized the names of battles and geographic areas. He was eager to share a copy of the records with one of his friends who was also involved in the guerrilla movement. The U.S. government, and especially the CIA and other intelligence agencies, maintain a high level of secrecy, and power, having been key supporters of the Guatemalan military during the time of the conflict. The CIA is has had near mythical status as epitome of the financial, military, and intelligence power which wrought so much destruction

and suffering to the Guatemalan people, particularly those resisting the government.¹⁹⁹ By having access to records from the U.S. government, particularly the CIA, the shroud of secrecy was somewhat pulled aside, and there was a small sense of balancing of power. This interaction was clear evidence of the way that access to information can subvert the colonial archive.

This ability for community members to see themselves through the perspective of the creators of the documents provides an important opportunity to shift power relations as the community members have power of access, and power to interpret the information according to their own lived experiences and create new knowledge. The collaborative work with Nuevo Amanecer in an attempt to facilitate access to information and produce knowledge through the analysis of the records is certainly a start toward subverting the colonial archive and providing a set of concrete tools for decolonizing methods. Further work must be done to develop the methodology.

LEARNING FROM: RESULTS OF THE WORKSHOP

While certain community members were clearly interested, it was difficult to gauge the overall level of interest in the workshop. After announcing the date, time, and location of the workshop at a community meeting, and advertising the opportunity to participate in a workshop to discuss the declassified documents for a week, fifteen people participated, including a young person, and a child. It was unclear whether or not there were other people who were interested but who were unable to come. It was also unclear whether I clearly explained what the workshop was, and if people knew what to expect.

¹⁹⁹ Jennifer Harbury, *Truth, Torture, and the American Way: The History and Consequences of U.S. Involvement in Torture*, Boston: Beacon Press, 2005, 56. Also see Dianna Ortiz, and Patricia Davis. *The Blindfold's Eyes: My Journey from Torture to Truth*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2002.

To start the workshop, I explained how I obtained copies of the documents, and answered questions from the participants about where the documents came from. We went through each document, and I read aloud parts of the translated copies while the original copy in English was projected on the screen. Some documents generated more discussion than others. During the discussion of an intelligence memorandum, “The Communist Insurgency Movement in Guatemala” from September 1968, community members provided important reflections.²⁰⁰ One man explained that it was not until after the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutionary triumphs that people in Guatemala started to talk more about communism. One woman explained that she was thirteen or fourteen years old when she first started to hear about communism.

In a U.S. embassy cable with the subject heading “Village in San Marcos Department reportedly terrorized leaving at least 38 dead; Guerrillas maintain a high level of violence in the country” from January 1982, participants explained the misleading information in the document about those responsible for carrying out a massacre.²⁰¹ They explained that they knew of the massacre described in the document, El Tablón. The document said no information was known about the attackers, and that “the town was taken over by approximately 200 unidentified armed men.” However, the community members explained that this phrase “*personas desconocidas*” or “unknown people” was a euphemism for military actions. As former members of the guerrilla, they explained that when it was the guerrilla attacking, it was “100% clear.”²⁰² Often times, they explained, the military would dress as guerrillas in order to confuse the population. The community members also made a clear connection between Guatemalan military tactics during that time

²⁰⁰ Intelligence Memorandum, “The Communist Insurgency Movement in Guatemala,” Central Intelligence Agency, 20 September 1969, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SFbNmnTdNZIpFwXrRVNqDwl3ieuVAq-9/view?usp=sharing>.

²⁰¹ Cable GUATEM 00248 from U.S. Embassy in Guatemala to Secretary of State, “Village in San Marcos Department Reportedly Terrorized Leaving at least 38 Dead,” 12 January 1982, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/17s40Jq8KFH03mzl9Gqh8OjuB0Lw3ARBU/view?usp=sharing>.

²⁰² Fieldnotes of conversation during workshop, July 2018.

period, and on-going repression in Guatemala today. The document later speculates that the operation could have been conducted by the “extreme right,” likely supporters of the right-wing government. Several community members explained that the government continues to use similar tactics today, “they keep using the same strategy, it’s still happening. It’s another kind of terrorist now, but the same strategy. It’s a tool against the people.”²⁰³ One woman explained that it was a form of psychological war, and a man made the connection to a person who was killed the day prior while resisting mines in another part of the country.

One of the strongest reactions to the documents was the use of the term *indio*, “Indian” in English. Community members reacted strongly and viscerally to the use of the term, identifying it as extremely racist, and used as an insult. This prompted a long discussion about this history of European conquest and colonization, United States imperialism, and the suffering of the Indigenous Maya peoples. One woman explained: “When the Spanish came and our people didn’t understand the European language, and we didn’t know all of the things they brought from Europe, and they couldn’t understand our language or speak to us, they thought we were stupid. But we weren’t.” The repeated use of this term in a series of the documents confirmed the community members’ experiences of racism and oppression, as well as adding validation to their continued struggles—from the time of the conquest, through the internal armed conflict, to today—against imperialism and colonization. They see this as a continuation of the same struggle over hundreds of years.

While there is an opportunity to collaborate in the analysis of the records, it is also important to collaborate in an evaluation of the method. I spoke with several community members after the workshop to get their feedback, and we have already developed ways to improve the

²⁰³ Fieldnotes of conversation during workshop, July 2018.

workshop.²⁰⁴ For example, one participant suggested that instead of a presentation format, it would be better to have it as more of casual conversation, everyone seated in a round table. More in line with original critical oral history conferences, participants would have access to the records ahead of time with the time to also come up with their own discussion questions. It would be important to explore possibilities to have more preparation time, and perhaps longer and more meetings for more participation. It is also important to ensure that everyone have copies of the documents in front of them. Another participant reflected that it was important to have information, and to know that other people know what happened, good that the documents are being published and made available.

A young person explained that the best parts were when the documents generated discussion, and she was able to learn from the older people who had been a part of the struggle. She said it was valuable to have the documents to be able to look at as a family (her mother was present). She also shared: “There were things I didn’t know clearly, or didn’t know at all, it is important to have this information and to remember especially the way the U.S. intervened.” While she had grown up hearing of the town’s history and her parents’ involvement in the struggle, she found value in seeing the information on paper, and it further solidified her understanding of the conflict, and the role of the United States. One community member reflected after the workshop that it is important to have access to the records, and copies of them so she has something to leave her grandchildren.²⁰⁵ Even though she is not able to read or write, she saw value in the records as a physical, tangible thing for future generations.

Several challenges persist. Due to the geographical location and digital nature of some of the repositories, the information will remain inaccessible without an internet connection. There

²⁰⁴ Personal conversations, summer 2018.

²⁰⁵ Fieldnotes of feedback from community members during and after workshop, July 2018.

exist low levels of literacy whereas most older women cannot read or write, and other than conversations at the workshop, this method does not adequately address the issue with people who cannot read. In the future, it is important to provide full translations because almost no one in the town reads can read English. Due to time and resource constraints for this project, I could not provide full translations of the documents. There remain questions about how to translate the information, especially when considering meaning lost through direct translation, especially in regards to sensitive topics. Community members explained that there is not much of a culture of reading books, lack of access, and textual material in general raising questions about if there is a way to make information more accessible, beyond paper copies.

Another limitation is the general limitation of the use of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain information. To date, nearly all of the access to information requests submitted for this project have not yielded documents. In fact, in one of the cases, I have engaged in an over year-long process simply to get the Central Intelligence Agency to even accept my request, going back and forth between my requests being overly burdensome, and yielding no responsive documents. This is a long, drawn-out process in which there is a low likelihood of obtaining documents about specific massacres and forcibly disappeared families. When I presented the translated FOIA correspondence to an older woman, she thanked me for giving her something that she could leave to her grandchildren. One young woman said that she was grateful to even be able to ask for the records about her disappeared family members, and that it was important to her family someone actually cared to listen to their story.²⁰⁶ Despite the lack of success in these requests, family members have expressed the value and importance in simply making the request, even if information is not released. While submitting FOIA requests is important, it cannot be the

²⁰⁶ Personal conversations, summer 2019.

only tool used in order to locate the remains or find information about disappeared loved ones. It is essential that the U.S. government maintain a presumption of disclosure and proactively release information related to human rights cases, especially those of forced disappearance.

In future iterations of the workshop, I would provide multiple sessions to allow for additional participation, and continued conversation if people were interested, and to continue to build relationships with each other, and the material. I would also work to make the sessions more informal, as a casual conversation. I would work more closely with youth leaders and teachers in the town to co-facilitate the sessions, brainstorm different ideas about how to engage the documents more effectively and discuss any goals and outcomes we would hope to achieve. If people were interested, I would like to have more explicit, in-depth discussions about archives, preserving history, storytelling, and their decision-making process as a town about memory projects. I would like to have more extensive conversations about what archives mean to them, how they see their own memory work, and what they think of the value of engaging government documents, or textual records at all. I would like to speak with them more about the role, if any, they see for themselves in creating and preserving the history of the conflict, *la lucha*, and Guatemala itself.

For others utilizing this methodology, or a similar one, I recommend that it be a part of a larger project or series of projects, otherwise it could succumb to pitfalls and risk engaging in research that reinforces colonial structures and perspectives. This kind of project should only be done as a part of a deeply collaborative and committed relationship, and part of a larger project that ultimately centers the voices, narratives, experiences and desires of community members and collaborators.

REFLECTIONS & CONCLUSIONS

Ultimately, this methodology in general is not sustainable because it relies on an outside researcher to be the middle person in accessing, translating, and providing copies of the documents. While it is important to engage in this type of work, it is essential that further collaborative research find innovative and new ways for communities to access information. This is especially true because many of the documents are only accessible through a paywall, require geographic proximity to access them, or at the very least internet access and English language ability. We need to engage with communities to find ways to make information more accessible to those who want access to it that does not rely on others to provide it. Ultimately, it is essential that governments, researchers, and practitioners work to engage in more extensive collaborative work to find out what information people are most interested in, and the way that people most want to access it.

One challenge to engaging in more collaborative work and learning from community-based memory projects is an issue of funding. As a researcher studying archives and interested in doing field work to learn about the town's history, wording and expectations of funding was very limited, did not recognize non-traditional approaches to archives. Calls for applications include limitations such as, requiring a description of "repositories" and "collections" and prohibiting interviews during a research trip.

While it is important to consider ways to improve access for people like those in the community of Nuevo Amanecer to government information, it is also important to find more opportunities as researchers to learn from communities doing important memory work. In the case of Nuevo Amanecer, a key factor of developing a solidary relationship in order to engage in collaborative work is the community expects the collaborator to share the community's story more

widely. It is important to find ways to engage in more collaborative research and knowledge production to enable more opportunities to learn from community-based memory projects.

It is important to continue developing this methodology. While it can be argued that engaging with colonial archives and textual records in contexts like *Nuevo Amanecer*, further research needs to be done to determine if there is any possible value. Angelina Godoy and her team at the Center for Human Rights at the University of Washington is currently conducting research with partners in El Salvador to better understand the opportunity for psycho-social healing through workshops to share declassified documents with survivors of the El Mozote Massacre. Godoy found that “although the documents seldom contain answers to victims’ most urgent questions about the ultimate fate of individual loved ones, the contextual information they provide about counterinsurgency campaigns can be useful in validating victims’ experiences and in dispelling long-standing sources of ongoing suffering.”²⁰⁷ There does seem to be some value in discussing the archives of the oppressor—additional research needs further explore possibilities.

Due to the legacies of colonization and current day imperialism, this methodology could be used in myriad contexts globally to gain perspectives of those often farthest from the decision-making tables and who resisted and suffered from the policies the most. It also provides the opportunity to engage in collaborative research and provide access to government information which people would otherwise likely not have access to.

²⁰⁷ Angelina Godoy. “Access to Information for Victims of Mass Atrocities in Latin America.” *LASA Forum, DOSSIER: VERDAD, JUSTICIA Y MEMORIA EN AMÉRICA LATINA*, 51, no. 1 (Winter 2020): 61–64. <https://forum.lasaweb.org/files/vol51-issue1/Dossier-12.pdf>.

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PART 3: BEYOND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: LEARNING FROM INDIGENOUS MAYA MAM RESISTANCE IN GUATEMALA

ABSTRACT

The international transitional justice movement, while making great strides in achieving justice and uncovering the truth of what happened during the decades-long internal armed conflict, ultimately constructs a narrow understanding of the conflict and post-conflict in Guatemala. Domestic and international human rights trials and truth commission reports focus, sometimes necessarily, on stories of suffering and the costs of war, often leaving out stories of resilience, ‘survivance,’ and triumph. Through the lens of Indigenous studies, I argue that non-native scholars and practitioners need to shift fundamental assumptions and move beyond traditional approaches to transitional justice. By engaging Indigenous scholarship and concepts of refusal, desire-centered work, survivance and thriving, the transitional justice field can learn from what communities of survivors are doing to build a brighter future, on their own terms. A collaborative research project with a small Maya Mam Indigenous town in western Guatemala brings to the fore voices often missing from mainstream narratives about the conflict centering the community’s grass-roots development, and self-governance projects through which genocide survivors are building new, vibrant futures for themselves and their children.

INTRODUCTION

The cumbia beat bounces from the D.J.’s speakers as people’s bodies match the rhythm under the flashing colored lights in the darkness in a small town in western Guatemala. The community members of Nuevo Amanecer are dancing late into the humid heavy night, a culmination of the

twenty-first anniversary celebration of the founding of their town. Many had fled the U.S.-supported genocidal violence of the 1980s perpetrated by the Guatemalan military against Maya Indigenous people and leftist political groups. The mostly Maya Mam community members found refuge across the border in Chiapas, Mexico, and lived there in exile as *dispersos*, dispersed refugees, for nearly 15 years before returning to Guatemala in 1998. Every one of the 52 original founding families suffered loss of family members through massacres, direct violence, or forced disappearance. Over the years, the community members have worked tirelessly to build a *paraíso*, or “paradise,” for their children and future generations.

One of the dancing pairs is two widows. Other widows sit alone, and with each other, watching the mostly young people dance. The costs of war are visually represented by empty seats, the sacrifices of the community’s struggle starkly present. However, the resilience of the community is also evident by how women step into the empty spaces of loved ones lost in each other’s lives. While lost loved ones cannot be replaced, the community members have figured out how to continue *la lucha*, the struggle, and build something new, like the two widows dancing with each other. Groups of children and young people laugh and dance all night long. One young couple, a husband and wife, joyfully dance late into the night with one of their small children: a triumph of *la lucha*.

The goals of transitional justice are often to make sense of the past, hold perpetrators accountable for crimes, obtain reparations for victims and survivors, prevent future atrocities, and/or determine the “truth” of what happened and have a public acknowledgement of this truth.²⁰⁸ These methods

²⁰⁸ Cyanne Loyle, and Christian Davenport, “Transitional Injustice: Subverting Justice in Transition and Post conflict Societies.” *Journal of Human Rights* 15 (2016): 126–49; Ruti Teitel, *Transitional Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000; Jamie Rowen, *Searching for Truth in the Transitional Justice Movement*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 3.

often focus on the costs of war, and the “failures to advance accountability for individual, high-profile violations, and high-profile violations to the [physical human] body.”²⁰⁹ As a result, transitional justice efforts primarily focus on the narrative of tragedy and suffering of human rights violations. This focus on the costs of war often relies on “static notions of victimhood” and the “political economy of victimhood.”²¹⁰ These limitations restrict the understanding of dynamic experiences of conflict and provide a narrow understanding of people’s experiences of conflict, particularly of women who are often seen simply as victims of sexual violence.²¹¹ Setting a clear record of crimes and culpability is especially important in the context of genocide denial, disinformation, and when perpetrators maintain political, economic, and social power. Yet while understanding and listening to the narratives of tragedy and suffering are fundamental to truth and memory efforts, this is only part of the story.

Many scholars have identified the limitations of various, widely implemented transitional justice methods and mechanisms.²¹² Some scholars have documented the ways in which more

²⁰⁹ Eilish Rooney, and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “Transitional Justice from the Margins: Intersections of Identities, Power and Human Rights.” *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 12, no. 1 (March 2018): 1.

²¹⁰ Tatiana Sanchez Parra, “The Hollow Shell: Children Born of War and the Realities of the Armed Conflict in Colombia.” *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 55-56.

²¹¹ Sanchez Parra, “The Hollow Shell.”; Rooney and Aolain, “Transitional Justice from the Margins,” 2018.

²¹² Irma Alicia Velasquez Nimatuj, “Struggles and Obstacles in Indigenous Women’s Fight for Justice in Guatemala.” *PORTAL: LLIAS Benson*, July 29, 2016. <https://lilasbensonmagazine.org/2016/07/29/struggles-and-obstacles-in-indigenous-womens-fight-for-justice-in-guatemala/>; Rachel Hatcher, “Truth and Forgetting in Guatemala: An Examination of Memoria Del Silencio and Nunca Mas.” *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 34, no. 67 (October 2009); Roddy Brett, “Peace without Social Reconciliation? Understanding the Trial of Generals Ríos Montt and Rodríguez Sánchez in the Wake of Guatemala’s Genocide.” *Journal of Genocide Research* 18, no. 2–3 (2016): 285–303; Carlota McAllister, “Testimonial Truths and Revolutionary Mysteries.” In *War By Other Means: Aftermath in Post-Genocide Guatemala*, 92–115. Durham and London: Duke University Press Books, 2013; Elizabeth Oglesby, “Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala: Historical Memory, Genocide, and the Culture of Peace.” *Radical History Review*, no. 97 (2007): 77–98; Kimberly Theidon, “Gender in Transition: Common Sense, Women, and War.” *Journal of Human Rights* 6 (2007): 453–78; Victoria Sanford, “Why Truth Still Matters: Historical Clarification, Impunity, and Justice in Contemporary Guatemala.” In *In the Wake of War : Democratization and Internal Armed Conflict in Latin America*, edited by Cynthia Arnson. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012; Alison Crosby, and M. Brinton Lykes, “Mayan Women Survivors Speak: The Gendered Relations of Truth Telling in Postwar Guatemala.” *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 5, no. 3 (November 1, 2011): 456–76; Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1998.

traditional approaches to transitional justice neglect, or even erase the diversity of stories told by survivors, particularly marginalized groups such as women and Indigenous people.²¹³ In an effort to challenge mainstream approaches to transitional justice and imagine new ways forward, this paper calls non-native practitioners and researchers, especially those situated in the global north, to learn from Indigenous scholars and grassroots resistance work, moving beyond what we²¹⁴ know as “transitional justice,” questioning basic assumptions about our work, and even our roles in this work.

Existing transitional justice scholarship has made some attempts to rethink the field’s initial focus almost exclusively on truth commissions and trials, and has even identified alternative approaches to justice such as Gacaca Courts in Rwanda and protest performance in Argentina.²¹⁵ In a similar vein, I argue that we can push our understanding even further by learning from the work that communities are already doing themselves. In post-genocidal Guatemala, the work of Indigenous communities not only focuses on understanding and preserving the past, but also building a brighter future, rooted in Indigenous ways of knowing and experiencing the world. By learning from the every-day work of Indigenous resistance and from Indigenous scholars, I argue that transitional justice scholars and practitioners can deconstruct colonial and imperial structures that continue to operate and oppress people globally. By engaging in collaborative projects,

²¹³ McAllister, “Testimonial Truths and Revolutionary Mysteries.”; Oglesby, “Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala.”; Theidon, “Gender in Transition.”

²¹⁴ In this article, my main audience is non-native practitioners and scholars of transitional justice, particularly those in the global north, and this is to whom I refer to when using the collective “we.” As a researcher from the U.S. collaborating with Maya Mam women in Guatemala, I am calling other non-native scholars and practitioners of transitional justice to recognize and learn from the important work that Indigenous scholars and practitioners are already doing in the field, and to engage in critical solidarity with Indigenous projects for self-determination.

²¹⁵ Wendy Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence.” *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 3, no. 1 (2009): 28–48; Diana Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003; Jamie O’Connell, “Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?” *Harvard International Law Journal* 46, no. 2 (2005): 295–345; Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*.

building solidarity relationships, and working to deconstruct our own thinking about justice and justice work, I argue that we as practitioners and scholars can increase the capacity and possibility of our work and invite creative imaginings of how to build a brighter future.

In this paper I argue that by engaging with Indigenous scholarship we can recognize 1) important acts of refusal, and 2) daily practices of survivance and thriving, learning lessons we might otherwise miss. By learning from these practices, we can move beyond the traditional approaches to transitional justice and address some of the limitations we confront in our field. I argue that by learning from the concept of refusal, we see the ways in which the community refused participation in the government-sponsored repatriation program, and instead enacted with their own agency to create their own method of return and self-governance, and practice of self-determination. By engaging in desire-centered work, we can learn from community's every-day practices of survivance and thriving and see the ways that the community of Nuevo Amanecer moves out of the more narrowly defined idea of victim and works to build a vibrant future for future generations. We are able to challenge our assumptions and expand beyond what traditional approaches to transitional justice understands as methods for achieving justice. We have the opportunity to think more expansively about what the concept of justice even means, and critically assess our own roles in this work.

This paper will start with a brief synopsis of the successes and limitations of transitional justice in Guatemala, a discussion of the research methodology, or "the practice of learning from" and will then explore lessons learned from the past and current projects of Nuevo Amanecer. The first important lesson to be learned is through examining how and why the community refused to participate in government programs, and their method of self-governance. Secondly, by engaging in desire-centered research, we can learn about the community's practice of survivance and

thrivance, which provides an important alternative to damage-centered work. The paper concludes with a reflection on lessons learned, limitations of the work, and recommendations for future research.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN GUATEMALA: SUCCESSES AND LIMITATIONS

Guatemala suffered a genocide against its majority Mayan population in the 1980s perpetrated by the Guatemalan military government supported financially and politically by the U.S. government. In an effort to recover the “truth” of the conflict, the Catholic Church and the United Nations conducted investigations into the violence and produced reports on the findings in 1998 and 1999, respectively. Since the early 1990s, Guatemalan domestic courts have been hearing cases aimed at holding perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for their crimes, from low-level material authors such as in the *Dos Erres* massacre case, to high level intellectual authors, such as in the genocide case against former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt.

By the measure of many scholars, Guatemala has had an unusually successful series of criminal prosecutions in domestic courts, including the unprecedented conviction of a former head of state, Efraín Ríos Montt, for genocide in the country’s own courts.²¹⁶ It is argued that the genocide trial “plays a critical role in the construction of collective memory” in Guatemalan society and serves as official recognition of the crimes, an important “symbolic significance for victims.”²¹⁷ An important impact of this trial, was that “for the first time, the voices and the testimony of survivors of the genocide were given national press coverage,” providing a counter

²¹⁶ Brett, “Peace without Social Reconciliation?”; Elizabeth Oglesby and Diane M. Nelson, “Guatemala’s Genocide Trial and the Nexus of Racism and Counterinsurgency.” *Journal of Genocide Research* 18, no. 2–3 (July 2, 2016): 133–42; Jo-Marie Burt, “From Heaven to Hell in Ten Days: The Genocide Trial in Guatemala.” *Journal of Genocide Research* 18, no. 2–3 (2016): 143–69.

²¹⁷ Jo-Marie Burt. “From Heaven to Hell in Ten Days,” 145.

to the popular state-supported narrative that the security forces and army are to be celebrated as national heroes.²¹⁸ Another emblematic case was the *Sepur Zarco* trial which set precedent nationally and internationally with Guatemalan domestic courts “accepting sexual violence against Indigenous women as a weapon of war.”²¹⁹

In addition to a series of trials in domestic courts, Guatemala has benefited from two separate truth commissions – one sponsored by the Catholic Church, published in 1998, and another by the United Nations published in 1999. The far-reaching, broad scope and complex findings of the U.N. Truth Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) in Guatemala compare favorably to the experiences of other Latin American truth commissions, which were more limited in scope.²²⁰ Despite controversy and challenges through its tenure, when the report *Memory of Silence* was published on February 25, 1999, “the public was shocked at its strength.”²²¹ Perhaps most notably, the truth commission found the Guatemalan government to have committed “acts of genocide.” This finding directly contributed to the eventual charges of genocide against Efraín Ríos Montt in Guatemalan courts in 2013.²²² Much of the truth commission’s success was attributed to the fact that, “the truth commission was forced (by the communities of people most affected by the violence) to be brave enough to interpret its mandate for the benefit of the victims,” rather than special interests.²²³ Beyond simply establishing a story of the past, some scholarship indicates that both reports produced “more than histories,” and also “make recommendations as to how similar violence can be avoided in the future” as well as “...bring about social reconstruction

²¹⁸ Velásquez Nimatuj, “Struggles and Obstacles,” 24-25.

²¹⁹ Velásquez Nimatuj, “Struggles and Obstacles,” 24.

²²⁰ Greg Grandin, “The Instruction of Great Catastrophe: Truth Commissions, National History, and State Formation in Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala.” *The American Historical Review* 110, no. 1 (2005): 46–67.

²²¹ Amy Ross, “Truth and Consequences in Guatemala.” *GeoJournal* 60, no. 1 (2004), 76.

²²² Ross, “Truth and Consequences in Guatemala,” 2004, 77.

²²³ Ross, “Truth and Consequences in Guatemala,” 2004, 77.

[and] to contribute to the construction of a different country.”²²⁴ Scholars and activists have noted the ways that the trials and truth commissions initiated important conversations about truth and memory in the country, and play an important role against the growing genocide denial movement in Guatemala.²²⁵

For all of these reasons, then, Guatemala would appear well-positioned to deliver on the promises of transitional justice such as truth and reconciliation, violence prevention, increased democratization, and social reconstruction.²²⁶ Yet by many accounts, these approaches to transitional justice have had limited effects on the everyday lives of Guatemalans.²²⁷ The Indigenous majority remains largely marginalized, and the country’s rule of law is fragile at best: Guatemala still suffers from high levels of impunity, corruption, and one of the highest homicide rates in the world.²²⁸ An estimated 80% of Guatemalans, “particularly [I]ndigenous people and women,” experience the country as a failed state, “lacking access to basic services such as health care, education, security, and basic infrastructure.”²²⁹ Structures of violence such as colonization, racism, and social and economic exclusion of the majority Maya population, persist in what Guatemalan scholar Demitrio Cotíj Cuxil calls a “racist state.” Cotíj Cuxil explains that Guatemalan “state and its officials perpetuate colonialist and racist stances against Indigenous

²²⁴ Hatcher. “Truth and Forgetting in Guatemala.”

²²⁵ Burt, “Heaven to Hell in Ten Days.”; Velásquez Nimatúj, “Struggles and Obstacles.”; Pamela Yates, *500 Years: Life in Resistance*. Skylight Pictures, 2017.

²²⁶ Loyle, and Davenport, “Transitional Injustice,” 127.

²²⁷ Roddy Brett, “Peace Stillborn? Guatemala’s Liberal Peace and the Indigenous Movement.” *Peacebuilding* 1, no. 2 (2013): 222–238; Joy Agner, “The Silent Violence of Peace in Guatemala.” *NACLA Report on the Americas*, May 14, 2008; Velásquez Nimatúj, “Struggles and Obstacles,” 24.

²²⁸ William Stanley, “Business as Usual? Justice and Policing Reform in Postwar Guatemala.” In *Constructing Justice and Security after War*, edited by Charles Call. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2007), 113–155; Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, *Popular Injustice: Violence, Community, and Law in Latin America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.

²²⁹ Edgar Gutiérrez, “Guatemala Fuera de Control: La Cicig y La Lucha Contra La Impunidad.” *Nueva Sociedad*, no. 263 (June 2016): 81–95, 82.

nations” and that “no substantial steps have been taken since 1944 to combat colonialism and racism directed towards the Maya, Xinca, and Garifuna.”²³⁰

In recent years, Guatemalans have seen many attempts to roll back political advancements for human rights and justice efforts. Guatemalans elected a series of right-wing, pro-military presidents who have been investigated for corruption.²³¹ There has been an attempt to pass an amnesty law for “grave crimes,” restricting access to the Historical Archive of the National Police, and a dismantling of the CICIG (International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala), a U.N.-supported anti-impunity investigation commission.²³² In September 2019, the internationally lauded CICIG formally closed, after the Guatemalan Congress failed to renew its mandate after more than a year-long battle, and with the support from the country’s president, Jimmy Morales.²³³ Throughout this period, Guatemala has seen a strengthening of the genocide denial movement, fueling the fears and realities of right-wing and military achievements in politics at the local and national levels.²³⁴

²³⁰ Demetrio Cojtí Cuxil, “Indigenous Nations in Guatemalan Democracy and the State: A Tentative Assessment.” *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice* 51, no. 2 (2007), 125.

²³¹ Burt, *From Heaven to Hell*, 144; Rachel Nolan, “Guatemala’s Civil Hangover.” *NACLA Report on the Americas*, November 4, 2015. <https://nacla.org/news/2015/11/04/guatemala%27s-civil-hangover>.

²³² Eric White, “International Prosecutors Fighting Corruption in Guatemala Have Been Ordered Out.” *International Justice Monitor*, January 11, 2019. <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/01/international-prosecutors-fighting-corruption-in-guatemala-have-been-ordered-out/>; Jo-Marie Burt, and Paolo Estrada, “Who Benefits If the Guatemalan Congress Passes a Blanket Amnesty?” *International Justice Monitor*, January 25, 2019. <https://www.ijmonitor.org/2019/01/who-benefits-if-the-guatemalan-congress-passes-a-blanket-amnesty/>; Kate Doyle, “Imminent Threat to Guatemala’s Historical Archive of the National Police (AHPN).” *National Security Archive*, May 30, 2019. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/guatemala/2019-05-30/imminent-threat-guatemalas-historical-archive-national-police-ahpn>.

²³³ Sandra Cuffe, “Guatemala’s Anti-Corruption CICIG Body to Shut down: What to Know.” *Al Jazeera*, September 1, 2019. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/guatemala-anti-corruption-cicig-body-shut-190830225625800.html>.

²³⁴ Irma Alicia Velásquez Nimatúj and María Aguilar. “The Inhabitation of Loss: A Transnational Feminist Project on Memorialization.” Translated by Susan Murdock. Unpublished, n.d, 7; Yates, *500 Years*; “Anniversary of Guatemala’s Genocide Verdict Marked by Denial and Polarization.” *ICTJ Justice Truth Dignity*, May 16, 2014. <https://www.ictj.org/multimedia/audio/anniversary-guatemala-genocide-verdict-marked-denial-and-polarization>.

In light of these poor outcomes, some scholars have pointed out specific limitations in the Guatemalan transitional experience. For example, McAllister argues that the U.N.-sponsored truth commission conducted by outsiders focused mainly on the “therapeutic narrative,” silencing and erasing more diverse narratives of experiences of conflict such as the “historical narrative,” and the “heroic narrative.”²³⁵ Oglesby argues that Guatemalan’s truth commission process left out victims’ identities as social actors “involved in projects of social change.”²³⁶ She explains that the narrow frames of historical memory produced are limited to “tales of death” or “*relatos de la muerte*”. The main critique of most scholars is that traditional approaches to truth commissions often only elicit a narrow understanding of the conflict, seeking out limited narratives that tell a specific story about violence, suffering and the costs of war, neglecting other diverse perspectives from survivors.

Irma Alicia Velásquez Nimatúj, a Maya K’iche’ scholar, notes that among several Indigenous Maya towns across Guatemala, she found that some of the most successful memorialization projects are those that were initiated by the community members themselves, and the projects initiated by international organizations or outsiders are the ones that fell into disrepair.²³⁷ Considering the limitations of trials and truth commissions, particularly in addressing the experiences of Indigenous women, the questions for the field become: what does the path forward look like? How can we think and move beyond these more traditional approaches to traditional justice? What are people doing in their own communities to build brighter futures?

²³⁵ McAllister, “Testimonial Truths and Revolutionary Mysteries.”

²³⁶ Oglesby, “Educating Citizens in Postwar Guatemala,” 79.

²³⁷ Velásquez Nimatúj and Aguilar. “The Inhabitation of Loss.”

THE PRACTICE OF “LEARNING FROM”

In the Guatemalan context, I have sought to understand what kinds of work communities are doing to remember the past and build vibrant futures as survivors of mass human rights violations on their own terms. This paper is based on work with a small Maya Mam town, Nuevo Amanecer²³⁸ in western Guatemala to develop a collaborative research project focusing on women’s experience of conflict, inter-generational transmission of memory, and self-driven community development projects. I sought out this relationship to understand the following questions: how do community members, specifically women, understand their past? What work are they doing to rebuild their communities? What are their priorities, and what are their dreams and plans for the future?

This article draws on over a decade of my experience as a transitional justice practitioner and scholar working in the United States to support international human rights trials and grass-roots advocacy movements, generally focused on Latin America, and specifically focused on Guatemala. My co-collaborators, the community members and leaders of Nuevo Amanecer (including youth), bring decades of political and community organizing experience in Guatemala and in Mexico. They have extensive knowledge about democratic processes, self-governance, agricultural and construction skills, political mobilization, environmental sustainability, youth leadership development, and education.²³⁹

I first visited the town, which has a population of approximately 350 people and is about 40km from the border with Chiapas, Mexico, in 2016. I was invited to observe and participate in community projects, meetings, and the *aniversario*, an annual event celebrating the community’s return from exile, at the end of every July. When not staying in the town’s guesthouse and sharing

²³⁸ “New Dawn” in English.

²³⁹ I have not individually named any of my co-collaborators due to privacy concerns and peoples’ wishes to not be named publicly.

meals with families, I maintain close contact with community leadership and youth, and volunteer with a non-profit in Seattle, Washington which is closely connected to supporting Nuevo Amanecer's scholarship and water sustainability projects. Over the course of the project, I have lived in the town for a total of four months, and after four years, the project is ongoing. I maintain regular contact with community members through social media and phone calls. I have participated in and supported the development of the community's *visitantes solidarias*, or visitors in solidarity program. Through storytelling, and cultural sharing, visitors are encouraged to develop a solidarity relationship with the community in which they share the story of the town with friends and family back in their home country, and that they provide economic support by paying for room and board while staying in the town.²⁴⁰

As a part of this collaborative project, I conducted open-ended interviews with women about their experience of violence in Guatemala which drove them to leave, their time in exile in Mexico, the return to Guatemala, and their hopes and plans for the future. I spoke with the daughters of these women about their time in Mexico, the return to Guatemala, and their plans for the future.²⁴¹ This work also included numerous informal interviews and conversations as friendships developed, both during my time in the town, as well as from a distance. I spoke most extensively with women because women's voices are often the farthest from the decision-making

²⁴⁰ One of the community's main goals in this project is to have more people, particularly North Americans, know the history of the town. The town's history includes the participation of the United States in perpetrating the violence they suffered in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the continuing negative impact of U.S. foreign policy and U.S. corporations on their lives. There is an expectation from community members that visiting North Americans and Europeans consent to *concientización*, or the practice of raising awareness or consciousness, and learning about the political, economic, and military relations between the U.S. and Guatemala, both historically and currently. There is also an expectation that outsiders would share this story with other North Americans and Europeans back in their home communities. These elements are key in developing a solidarity relationship.

²⁴¹ The "mother generation" is defined as women who were over the age of 18 when they left Guatemala in the early 1980s (at the time of the interview, aged 50s and older). The "daughter generation" is defined as women who were born in Guatemala and under the age of 18 when they left Guatemala, those who were born in Mexico during the exile years, or those who were born in Guatemala upon the return (ages at time of interviews ranging from 16 through 30s). (See Appendix A for chart of interview codes, generations, and dates of interviews.)

table, and especially in mainstream transitional justice and human rights circles, women are often only seen as survivors or victims of sexual violence.²⁴² I wanted to listen to women's stories in a way that gives space to allow for their own narratives to emerge. By conducting interviews with women and their daughters, I was able to better understand complex intersectional identities that are often lost in the "one-dimensional capture of 'womenandchildren,'" as well as challenging "victim homogeneity."²⁴³ The idea is that women are often placed in to the monolithic, one-dimensional category of "women and children," flattening their experiences as homogenous. By separating out the analysis of women's experiences, and those of children, we can gain a richer, nuanced understanding of the diverse experiences of women and of children as separate entities. I was able to learn from the nuance of Maya Mam women's experiences as adults and mothers, and as adult daughters speaking about their experiences as children. This helped me better understand and learn from the inter-generational transmission of memory and the community's process of educating youth.

Additionally, due to my identity as a woman, I was able to pursue more deep and close relationships with other women to a degree which would have not been culturally appropriate to do with men.²⁴⁴ While my gender helped me develop relationships with other women, my race, nationality, and being an outsider brought challenges of power dynamics and limitations into our relationships. As a white, U.S. citizen, and non-native Spanish speaker, my relationships with the women were influenced by what we discussed as the problematic current and past relations

²⁴² Theidon, "Gender in Transition," 2007; Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay, and Meredith Turshen, *The Aftermath : Women in Post-War Transformation*. London and New York: Zed Books, 2001; Mary Moran, "Gender, Militarism, and Peace-Building: Projects of the Postconflict Moment." *Annual Review Of Anthropology* 39 (2010): 261–74. Mónica Acosta, et. al., "The Colombian Transitional Process: Comparative Perspectives on Violence against Indigenous Women." *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 108–25.

²⁴³ Rooney and Aolain, "Transitional Justice from the Margins," 2018, 5-6; Sanchez Parra, "The Hollow Shell."

²⁴⁴ Sarah Bronwen Horton, *They Leave Their Kidneys in the Fields: Illness, Injury, and Illegality Among U.S. Farmworkers*. (University of California Press, 2016), 191-192.

between our countries. This complicated relationship includes the United States' historical and current policies of colonialism, imperialism, racism, extraction of labor and resources, and xenophobia towards Guatemala as a country and Guatemalans as a people. Particular extractive industries and xenophobic immigration policies were, and continue to be, highly contentious topics at the time we were engaging in discussions for this project, and certainly influenced our relationship, and our work together. My status as an outsider both foreclosed and opened opportunities for connection and relationship while working with the community.

Based on my rich conversations with the people of Nuevo Amanecer through the aforementioned encounters, I suggest that there are two central concepts transitional justice scholars should consider incorporating from Indigenous scholarship: refusal and thrivance. I discuss these, incorporating related ideas of desire-centered work, in the following pages.

1. REFUSAL: “¡SOMOS RETORNADOS! WE ARE RETURNEES!”

An important concept developed and practiced by Indigenous scholars and every-day Indigenous people around the world is refusal, the specific action of choosing not to engage with colonial structures, including government, research, and a variety of other settler institutions. Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson writes that refusal is “the very deliberate, willful, intentional actions people [make] in the face of the expectation that they consent to their own elimination as a people. That they consent to having their land taken, their lives controlled, and their stories told for them.”²⁴⁵ She writes that “they refuse to consent to the apparatuses of the state.”²⁴⁶ Carole McGranahan

²⁴⁵ Audra Simpson, “Consent’s Revenge.” *Cultural Anthropology* 31, no. 3 (August 18, 2016), 327-328.

²⁴⁶ Simpson, “Consent’s Revenge,” 328.

writes that refusal “is an effort...to redefine...expectations or relationships. It is...to challenge authority or structure or the rules of engagement in the first place.”²⁴⁷

By recognizing the instances where communities exercise refusal to engage with the state, or with international or external organizations and institutions, transitional justice scholars and practitioners can learn the ways in which mainstream approaches to achieving justice fail to serve the needs, priorities, and desires of many communities. By recognizing these limitations, we are given the opportunity to instead learn from communities’ strategic decision-making about self-governance and enactment of self-determination in order to focus on their own priorities for building a brighter future.

Retornados: *Returned Refugees*

When the people of Nuevo Amanecer fled Guatemala, they were so wary of government institutions, they refused to live in refugee camps and instead they lived as *dispersos*, or people dispersed throughout the region of Chiapas, Mexico that borders with Guatemala. The *dispersos* feared both the Mexican immigration officials who would immediately deport them, as well as the Guatemalan military, who made frequent incursions by across the Mexican border to attack fleeing refugees and refugee camps. During the late 1980s, however, the Guatemalan government, newly under civilian rule “sent delegations to woo the refugees home, promising among other things, that they could resettle their land.”²⁴⁸ Many people, for good reason, didn’t trust the government’s promises, and instead “advocated returning in collective groups in order to maximize their security and attract maximum (mostly international) aid.”²⁴⁹ Refugees returned to Guatemala from Mexico

²⁴⁷ Carole Mcgranahan, “Refusal and the Gift of Citizenship.” *Cultural Anthropology* 31, no. 3 (August 2016), 334.

²⁴⁸ Worby, “Security and Dignity,” 17.

²⁴⁹ Worby, “Security and Dignity,” 18.

via three main ways, either as *repatriados* (repatriated refugees), as *retornados* (returnees, upon their own volition), or as *desmovilizados* through the formal demobilization process for members of the leftist armed groups, supported by the United Nations, and the Guatemalan state.

When planning for their return from exile in Mexico, the people who went on to found the town of Nuevo Amanecer didn't return through the repatriation program for three key reasons. First, they did not trust the government, most of them being directly or indirectly involved in the guerrilla movement. People feared putting their names on government lists, and in fact, people were so wary of being detected by the Mexican and Guatemalan state during the conflict and in exile in Mexico they lived under pseudonyms, and some people continue to use them today. Secondly, they did not have places to return to. They could not go back to homes of origin because their homes were destroyed, family and the larger community had ostracized them, it was too painful to return because of the suffering they had originally escaped, or their land was no longer available, having lost claim or ownership of it while they were gone.²⁵⁰ Finally, they wanted to return as a group, not individually, because of power in numbers. They felt that by staying together as a group and organizing a formal self-government structure, they would be able to more successfully acquire outside financial support and resources to rebuild their lives on their own terms.

When discussing the point of *repatriados* vs *retornados* in the interviews and in informal conversations, many people spoke with pride when identifying as *retornados*. People were proudly insistent in explaining the difference, and clearly explaining that they made the choice to return on their own terms. One woman explained: "We returned to Guatemala by our own effort, by our own

²⁵⁰ These experiences were explained by numerous people in Nuevo Amencer through formal interviews, and informal conversations. Many families did not return to their towns of origin for multiple of these reasons. More information on access to land of origin here: Paula, Worby "Security and Dignity: Land Access and Guatemala's Returned Refugees." *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* 19, no. 3 (2001), 18-19.

will.”²⁵¹ As opposed to engaging with the state, and formal transitional justice mechanisms such as a demobilization²⁵² or repatriation program, the people of Nuevo Amanecer chose to forge their own path forward. Through this refusal, they were also able to continue *la lucha* against the Guatemalan military which scholars have found used “controlled resettlement as a military strategy to gain an upper hand on the guerrillas’ real or potential social base.”²⁵³ Refusing to participate in the repatriation program was a refusal to participate in an aspect of Guatemala’s military strategic plan of social control.

Instead of returning to their homes of origin as individual families, they organized themselves to return as a group, with the support of the Catholic Church, and Padre Juan Jose Aldas. Most of the women with whom I spoke proudly declared, “*¡Somos retornados!*” (We are returnees!). They explained with pride their refusal to participate in the repatriation program, using agency and self-determination to return on their own terms. In order to do this, they formed the *Asociación Nueva Concepción de Alba*, a formal community association. The formal association gave them an organized governance structure to make decisions, as well as reputability when seeking external support and recognition. Women and community leaders explained that this organization allowed them to apply for funding as a unified entity, which resulted in successfully obtaining financial support from Catholic dioceses in Mexico, Guatemala, and Spain (Padre Juan Jose’s country of origin). Through this financial support, they were able to purchase a piece of land collectively, and build what many explain are *casas dignas* or “dignified houses” of cement,

²⁵¹ Interview 001. Original Spanish: “regresamos a Guatemala por nuestro propio esfuerzo, por nuestra propia voluntad.”

²⁵² The demobilization program was similar to the widely recognized post-conflict strategy of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). See more on DDR and critiques here: Kimberly Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,” *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, Volume 1, Issue 1, March 2007, Pages 66–90; Robert Muggah, “No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts.” *The Round Table* 94, no. 379 (2005): 239-52.

²⁵³ Worby, “Security and Dignity,” 17.

as opposed to houses of wood and corrugated metal with dirt floors.²⁵⁴ This exercise of refusal allowed them to develop important self-governance tools allowing them to make decisions on their own terms, set their own priorities and paths to achieving their goals, and by doing so address the limitations that they found in the repatriation program. They engaged with the Catholic Church on their own terms to obtain the necessary resources to rebuild, and have since then, carefully navigated and negotiated relationships with international organizations in order to achieve their goals, centering their own priorities.

Upon returning to Guatemala they used their self-governing structure, the community association, to organize the physical building, or constructing of the town. They started out living on the land in tents made of tarpaulin, and cooked communal meals in large pots. They organized themselves into two construction groups and collectively built each cement home, starting at either ends of the piece of land. They built the cobblestone road, and a *carpenteria*, or carpentry shop, which now serves as the *sala* or main meeting space. They constructed the church and school, and over the years installed electricity and indoor plumbing, and repaired the existing well. They also created a variety of economic development programs such as bee keeping and honey production, as well as fish, pig, and chicken businesses. As will be discussed in further detail later, the town celebrates this community development work at the anniversary celebration every year, marking the community's return to Guatemala on July 27, 1998.

Existing scholarship on repatriated refugees suggests that the experience of Nuevo Amanecer is an exception to the rule when it comes to the successes enjoyed by communities of former refugees who have migrated back to Guatemala by different means. Paula Worby writes

²⁵⁴ As discussed in one of the anniversary celebrations, and in an interview with one woman (interview #014), officials of international organizations wanted to provide supplies for simple houses of wood and corrugated metal, but Padre Juan Jose insisted that the community had fought so hard and suffered so extensively, that the community should be given funds to construct *casas dignas*, or “dignified houses” out of cement, with solid roofs and floors.

that despite promises of “access to land, development projects, and strong international support,” returned refugees experienced a “gap” between their expectations and the reality that awaited them upon their return.²⁵⁵ In her study of returned communities, Worby found that returned refugees may have found unity around common hardship and oppression, and were able to develop short term goals, but the communities’ cohesiveness usually unraveled upon return.²⁵⁶ The majority of the returned communities, she explains lacked a “clear and necessarily shared vision of the future.”²⁵⁷ On the other hand, by exercising agency and self-determination, Nuevo Amanecer was able to advocate for themselves, and make important strategic decisions about achieving a common vision for the future. This common vision of the future outlasted more short-term goals of simply returning to Guatemala and gave them a way to achieve their long-term goals even when the official programs failed to deliver on promises.

It is important for transitional justice scholars to look at the way in which communities refuse to participate in formal programs. Instead of trying to find ways to convince communities and individuals to participate in international and state-sponsored post-conflict and transitional justice programming, it is essential for scholars and practitioners in the field to ask the questions about why people are not participating in the first place, seek to understand the limitations, and learn from the ways that people and communities that are caring for themselves on their own terms. Transitional justice rights scholars must recognize the ways in which more traditional approaches to transitional justice do not meet people's needs and follow the lead of communities who are succeeding in rebuilding after conflict.

²⁵⁵ Paula Worby, “A Generation after the Refugees’ Return: Are we there yet?” In *War by Other Means: Aftermath in Post-Genocide Guatemala*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013.

²⁵⁶ Worby, “A Generation after the Refugees’ Return.”

²⁵⁷ Worby, “A Generation after the Refugees’ Return,” 332.

2. NARRATIVES OF THRIVANCE: “¡¡SOMOS DESCENDIENTES DE GUERREROS FUERTES!! WE ARE DECENDENTS OF FIERCE WARRIORS!!”

As discussed previously, traditional approaches to transitional justice are often necessarily focused on recording stories of suffering and violence in order to prove that human rights violations did occur, and to identify and hold the perpetrators accountable. Despite the important work in which these transitional mechanisms engage, it is important that we also consider the damage to which this type of an approach may contribute. By learning from indigenous scholarship on desire-centered work, and the concepts of survivance and thriving, I argue that we can start to question the perhaps unintended consequences of what Unangax scholar Eve Tuck describes as “damage-centered” research and work. In the use of transitional justice methods that focus on narratives that narrowly understand experience of conflict to be limited to suffering, violence, victimhood, and defeat, we run the risk of producing “damaging research,” that reifies colonial structures.²⁵⁸ Tuck writes that:

[I]n damage-centered research, one of the major activities is to document pain or loss in an individual, community, or tribe...it looks to historical exploitation, domination, and colonization to explain contemporary brokenness, such as poverty, poor health, and low literacy. Common sense tells us this is a good thing, but the danger in damage-centered research is that it is a pathologizing approach in which the oppression singularly defines a community.²⁵⁹

By the nature of the goals and expectations of traditional approaches to transitional justice, our work is often damage-centered. Instead, Tuck argues the need for engaging in desire-centered work

²⁵⁸ Tuck, Eve. “Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities.” *Harvard Educational Review* 79, no. 3 (2009): 409–428.

²⁵⁹ Tuck, “Suspending Damage,” 413.

“that upend[s] commonly held assumptions of responsibility, cohesiveness, ignorance, and paralysis within dispossessed and disenfranchised communities.”²⁶⁰ Tuck writes that desire-centered work “accounts for the loss and despair, but also the hope, the visions, the wisdom of lived lives and communities.”²⁶¹ By applying this desire-centered approach to understanding the past, present, and future of Nuevo Amanecer, transitional justice scholars and practitioners can learn from both the challenges and successes of the town, and a better understanding of their vision for the future. As discussed in the previous section, this cohesive vision for the future was in fact what helped Nuevo Amanecer succeed while other communities in a similar situation did not.

In this section, I argue that we need to move away from damage-centered work and engage in desire-centered work in order to make a fundamental shift in our understanding of peoples’ experiences of conflict. We need to shift beyond a narrow understanding of experiences of conflict, learning from peoples’ own narratives and how they tell the stories in their own words. We can better listen to and learn from these alternative narratives by understanding the concepts of “survivance” and “thrivance,” developed by Indigenous North American scholars Gerald Vizenor (Anishinaabe) and Dianne Baumann (Blackfeet), respectively. By engaging in desire-centered work that recognizes suffering, but also the town’s vision and work to build a brighter future, we learn important lessons that we might otherwise miss when doing damage-centered work. We look to the community members of Nuevo Amanecer to learn from their every-day and daily lived experiences demonstrating the concepts of survivance and thrivance.

²⁶⁰ Tuck, “Suspending Damage,” 417.

²⁶¹ Tuck, “Suspending Damage,” 417.

Survivance & Thrivance

Survivance is the idea that the very act of surviving is a form of resistance in the face of genocide, resisting the idea of a helpless victim. Anishinaabe scholar Gerald Vizenor writes that “the character of survivance creates a sense of native presence and actuality over absence, nihility, and victimry...Survivance stories are renunciations of dominance...the unbearable sentiments of tragedy, and the legacy of victimry.”²⁶² Blackfeet scholar Diane Baumann takes the idea behind the concept survivance even further, writing that while her peoples’ stories “may contain elements of pain, the focus centers on pushing beyond survivance to thrivance – a strong sense of self-assurance from appreciation of our own abilities, qualities, and identity.”²⁶³ Baumann pushes the idea of thrivance to be more than just surviving (continuing to exist or stay alive), but also to be successful and thriving in the face of efforts to eliminate the native, relying on oneself in order to achieve this success. Baumann argues: “This thrivance focus is important as it dives beyond the survival statement of ‘we are still here’ to ‘we are productive, vibrant, and contributors to today’s world’... the positivity of a thrivance focus can reset the narrative for the constructive contributions and everyday normalcy of Indigenous peoples today.”²⁶⁴ The key idea of thrivance acknowledges that through everyday acts, Indigenous people construct and contribute to projects of resistance, and that to succeed is itself a form of resistance.

Engaging with the concepts of survivance and thrivance provide us the opportunity to learn from work currently being conducted by the town of Nuevo Amanecer, lessons we might have otherwise missed while engaging in damage-centered work. By engaging in desire-centered work,

²⁶² Gerald Vizenor, *Native Liberty: Natural Reason and Cultural Survivance*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 86.

²⁶³ Dianne Baumann, “Blackfeet Men, ‘Toxic Masculinity’, and Gender Entanglement.” Doctoral Dissertation, University of Washington, (2019), 19.

²⁶⁴ Baumann, “Blackfeet Men,” 19.

we are able to learn from the important work the community is doing to build a common vision for a vibrant future: democratic self-governance; youth development and education; the water sustainability project; and the *aniversario*, an annual celebration marking the community's return to Guatemala from exile in Mexico. In the case of Nuevo Amanecer, the very fact that the community exists is a triumph as seen in the daily lives of the community's children that run, laugh, and play in the streets of the town, surviving and thriving. The fact that the children go to school, can obtain scholarships, inherit their parent's land, have a home, and participate in Maya cultural celebrations help us see that the community's work to build a brighter future for their children. Simply by working to ensure that they are happy, healthy children, is an important way the parents are continuing their struggle for justice. Acknowledging this narrative of thriving challenges mainstream narratives that would see the members of this town simply as victims or survivors of genocide who lost the war.

When asked directly about whether or not the leftist guerrilla movement “won” anything from the conflict, or had gained any triumphs as a result of the struggle, many community members spoke of the ways in which they were able to achieve some successes, and how the community continues *la lucha*. One woman, Alma,²⁶⁵ explained that the town of Nuevo Amanecer is *paraíso*, (paradise) as she gestured to the trees that bear mangoes, rambutan, papaya, and limes, and the corn and banana fields with lush foliage and mountains in the distance. “This was my mother's house, and now it is mine. It will be my children's” she explained. Alma was involved with supporting one of the leftist groups during the conflict. “This is what we fought for,” she explains. She and her husband have several children whom they educate about the political and social ideology of the leftist movement in which they both continue to participate. Her children are youth

²⁶⁵ Informal conversation with interviewee #017. Name and personal details changed to protect confidentiality/privacy.

leaders, and recipients of scholarships to continue their secondary and professional studies. When Alma shared stories about her exodus from Guatemala, her time in Mexico as a young person and her involvement in *la lucha*, she shared stories of painful loss, illness, and violence, but also shared stories about hope for the future of her children, and the better Guatemala they are building for future generations.

While Alma and her neighbors' lives are not without struggle and loss, her children's daily lives and their potential futures are closer to the dream that she and her comrades fought for during the conflict. The desire for a better future for their children including access to education, employment, cultural celebrations, land ownership, and deep connection to community is coming into reality. The community of Nuevo Amanecer is not only surviving but thriving. By recognizing the work that community members have done—and continue to do—on a daily basis to achieve their goals of building a better future and enable their children and future generations to thrive provides transitional justice scholars and practitioners can come to learn from this important work.

Aniversario: Narratives of Survivance

As discussed previously, damage-centered work often only focuses on a narrow understanding of suffering and oppression. Engaging in desire-centered work allows scholars and practitioners to recognize and learn from important work that communities are doing to build brighter futures for future generations, and their own narratives of the past. One of the most important events of the year in Nuevo Amanecer is the *aniversario* which is celebrated on July 27th every year, marking the community's return to Guatemala and serves as the town's central historical memory project. The town uses this celebration as the opportunity to preserve the town's history by educating the youth about the suffering of the community, as well as the successes and triumphs over the years. The *aniversario* is a day-long celebration that usually includes a Catholic mass of remembrance

and thanksgiving in the morning, a shared meal cooked collectively by the women, sports tournaments, and the main event, the *noche cultural*, or cultural evening. Youth leaders are charged with the responsibility of creating, organizing, and carrying out the *noche cultural* each year. Youth education and leadership are the central focus of the *aniversario*, and the *noche cultural* specifically. It is through the *aniversario* that young people learn about the history of the town, and are participants themselves in telling the story, which is often different from mainstream narratives of the past.

Young people hear from their elders, and then retell stories of the town which include sacrifice, loss, and suffering, as well as triumphs and the town's milestones, such as installing indoor plumbing and electricity.²⁶⁶ The anniversary is marked as a celebration of their return to Guatemala, their achievements as a community, and their vision for the future. The elders instill this sense of futurity and thrivance by putting the young people in charge of organizing and carrying out the *noche cultural*, and for telling the story of the town's history. By supporting youth leadership and empowering them to tell their own narratives of the conflict, and the town's history, they are ensuring survivance and thrivance, the continuance of *la lucha*, and a brighter Indigenous future.

These narratives, told by the community elders in order to educate the town's youth is an important way to counter mainstream narratives which focus on victimry, suffering, and loss. Oceania Fijian scholar, Epeli Hau'ofa argues that Native pasts are often constructed by Euro-American imperialism, and that "our histories are essentially narratives told in the footnotes of the histories of empires."²⁶⁷ Hau'ofa suggests a rewriting of histories of native peoples by native

²⁶⁶ Slide presentation of the accomplishments achieved over the years, *aniversario* 2017. Image on file with the author.

²⁶⁷ Hau'ofa, Epeli. *We Are the Ocean: Selected Works*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 62.

peoples themselves, focusing on different characters in the stories, by centralizing Indigenous actors, and minimizing colonists.²⁶⁸ Nuevo Amanecer communities are telling their own stories on their own terms, and encouraging the youth to tell their own stories is an important practice of survivance and thrivance. These practices of inter-generational storytelling counter the damage-centered, narrow stories often told by transitional justice efforts, and allow for Nuevo Amanecer to instead define its journey as a community, and define its past, present, and future on its own terms.

One youth leader posted a reflection on his Facebook page in recognition of the twenty-first anniversary celebration of the town in 2019. He acknowledged the sacrifices of past generations, as well as the triumphs and hopes for the future:

“Who would say that the efforts of our brothers would have had a reward, they sacrificed for a great purpose, that their children and grandchildren would live in a better environment than they lived, and it is true that the situation today is very unfortunate but we know that in a percentage of young people and children there is the desire to continue with the work of their parents and grandparents ... and yes, it is true, it was hard life, it was hard, the separation of families and having to leave your country because you were not sure, to reach another country where some saw you as an invasion and others would see you as brothers who suffered a lot. I know it was very difficult all this way. Nights of sorrows and tears to know that lives of many friends and family were lost is very hard ... but still, look around. Dad, mom look at the fruit of so much effort. The young generation—we are descendants of strong warriors!! Already there are 21 years of new life. As a community we have to

²⁶⁸ Hau’ofa, *We are the Ocean*, 64-65.

thank, cry, laugh, shout if you can! That we are growing stronger and with the same hopes ... to be happy.”²⁶⁹

The community of Nuevo Amanecer—both older and younger people alike—understand the key role of the town’s youth in preserving its history, as well as creating a vision for the future, and continuing *la lucha* towards this vision. This young person’s reflection on the aniversario shows the result of a narrative of the town’s history that recognizes both suffering and oppression, but pride and triumph, looking toward the future with hope. Moving away from damage-centered work toward desire-centered work allow us to recognize the importance of work that communities are doing to recover from conflict and build bright futures.

REFLECTIONS & CONCLUSIONS

When traditional transitional justice methods focus exclusively on preserving the truth of past violations, uncovering the historical contexts that create structural violence, and holding perpetrators accountable, we miss complex, enriching stories and opportunities for creative imagining. By learning from the innovative projects which communities produce, as well as the daily lived practices of survivance and thrivance, we can challenge our ideas of what justice is, and how people are making bright futures for themselves, their children, and their communities.

²⁶⁹ Facebook post by youth leader, 28 July 2019, republished with permission. Original Spanish: “Quien diría que el esfuerzo de nuestros hermanos tendría una recompensa, se sacrificaron por un gran propósito, que sus hijos y nietos vivieran en un ambiente mejor al que ellos vivieron, y es cierto que la situación de hoy en día sea muy lamentable, pero sabemos que en un porcentaje de jóvenes y niños está el deseo de seguir con la tarea de sus padres y abuelos. y Si es cierto fue dura la vida, fue dura la separación de familias y tener que salir de tu país porque no estabas seguro, el llegar a otro país donde algunos te veían como una invasión y otros te veían como hermanos que sufrieron mucho. Lo sé fue muy difícil todo este trayecto. Noches de penas y lágrimas al saber que se perdían vidas de muchos amigos y familiares es muy duro... pero aun así miremos a nuestro alrededor. Papá, mamá mira el fruto de tanto esfuerzo. la generación joven y somos descendientes de guerreros fuertes!! Ya son 21 años de vida nueva. Como comunidad hay que agradecer, llorar, reír. ¡Gritar si es posible!!! Que vamos creciendo más fuertes y con las mismas esperanzas...Para ser felices. #21aniversario #NuevoAmanecer2019.”

While the community of Nuevo Amanecer has enjoyed many triumphs, and continue to build their *paraíso* and thrive, they still face many challenges such as unemployment, pressures to immigrate north, and environmental degradation. While they are able to refuse to participate in certain government programs, imperial and colonial systems nevertheless remain intact. Systems of patriarchy, racism, and capitalism continue to make the journey towards building paradise a challenge.

If scholars and practitioners make a commitment to not engage in damage-centered work, and instead shift to desire-centered work, there remains unanswered questions about how this shift could have unintended consequences in certain political, economic, and social contexts. In the case of Guatemala, the political shifts in 2018 and 2019 with the election and tenure of President Jimmy Morales has seen the roll-back of many transitional justice and human rights advances, as discussed above. During the 2012-2015 presidency of Perez Molina—a former military officer widely acknowledged to have participated in the genocide—the nation’s genocide denier movement gained traction, power, and voice.²⁷⁰ Any critique of the domestic criminal trials, or the truth commission reports could conceivably be picked up by the genocide denier movement and utilized to nefarious ends. How, then, can we engage in desire-centered work that acknowledges survivance and thrivance and challenges narrow understandings of victimry, violence and suffering, but does not harm the important work that traditional truth and justice approaches produce? How do we constructively critique traditional approaches to transitional justice without adding fuel to the fire of genocide denier movements and regimes that maintain the political,

²⁷⁰ “Anniversary of Guatemala’s Genocide Verdict Marked by Denial and Polarization.” The International Center for Transitional Justice, May 15, 2014. <https://www.ictj.org/multimedia/audio/anniversary-guatemala-genocide-verdict-marked-denial-and-polarization>.

economic, and social power of perpetrators? Further research needs to continue to explore these questions, with care and consideration to potential unintended consequences of the work.

As practitioners and scholars, we need to continue to expand our idea of what justice is to include every-day life projects of living, succeeding, and celebrating. We need to look for opportunities to learn from communities that continue to grapple with the ongoing structural violence of colonialism and imperialism, but also continue to find innovative ways to build bright futures for their children and the coming generations.

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APPENDIX A

Formal Interviews

Each interview ID# corresponds to one individual I interviewed, for a total of 24 people. Names and personally identifying information were removed to protect personal privacy of participants.

Interview ID#*	Generation	Interview Date
001	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
002	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
003	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
004	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
005	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
006	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
007	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
008	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
009	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
010	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
011	mother	Phase 1: July 22-28
012	daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16
013	daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16
014	daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16
015	mother	Phase 2: August 7- 16
016	daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16
017	daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16
018	(grand) daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16
019	son	Phase 2: August 7- 16
020	daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16
021	(grand) daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16
022	daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16
023	daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16
024	daughter	Phase 2: August 7- 16

APPENDIX B

Report on U.S. Foreign Aid to Guatemala

This report was researched, written, and translated by undergraduate volunteers Melissa Blue and Maddie Coke in response to requests from the community for information about this subject. The request from the community came out of the critical oral history workshop conducted in Nuevo Amanecer in the summer of 2018.

Ayuda financiera de los Estados Unidos enviada a Guatemala en los años 80 y hoy

Los EE. UU. ha brindado ayuda militar y económica a Guatemala por décadas. La agencia por el desarrollo internacional de los EE. UU. ("USAID") se define la ayuda externa como asistencia militar y asistencia económica sumada.²⁷¹ En 1978, bajo la Administración Carter, los Estados Unidos suspendieron la ayuda militar enviada a Guatemala, pero continuaron brindando ayuda financiera de otras maneras. La suspensión de la ayuda militar tampoco interrumpió la ayuda militar directa o indirecta previamente prometida.²⁷² Entre 1978 y 1980, el ejército guatemalteco recibió \$ 7.9 millones a través del Programa de Asistencia Militar ("MAP") y el programa de Ventas Militares Extranjeras administrado por el Departamento de Estado.²⁷³

Según las estimaciones de la Oficina de Responsabilidad Gubernamental de los Estados Unidos ("GAO"), los Estados Unidos proporcionaron a Guatemala \$ 620.4 millones entre FY1981 y 1988.²⁷⁴

Según los datos de Asistencia Extranjera de los Estados Unidos publicados en el informe del Servicio de Investigación del Congreso ("CRS"), los Estados Unidos proporcionaron \$ 29.7 millones en ayuda no militar en el año fiscal de 1983. En el año fiscal de 1984, los Estados Unidos proporcionaron \$ 18.3 millones en ayuda. En 1983 y 1984, la ayuda financiera incluyó préstamos y subvenciones para proyectos de desarrollo, ayuda alimentaria, el Fondo de Apoyo Económico y otras ayudas económicas según lo definido en el informe de CRS.²⁷⁵

Mientras los EE. UU. no proporcionaron ayuda militar en 1983, sí permitieron al gobierno de Guatemala comprar \$ 6.3 millones en repuestos del Departamento de Defensa para equipar a su fuerza aérea y rehabilitar helicópteros de fabricación estadounidense.

La Administración Reagan buscó brindar ayuda militar a Guatemala porque argumentaron que ya no existía un patrón de abusos a los derechos humanos en el país, y en 1986 la administración otorgó una certificación de derechos humanos al Congreso que les permite financiar la ayuda militar. Aunque la certificación fue controvertida, se brindó ayuda militar a Guatemala a partir de FY1985. La ayuda financiera enviada a Guatemala aumentó en los años siguientes. Los EE. UU. Proporcionaron \$ 98.1 millones en el año fiscal de 1985, \$0.5 millones de los cuales se otorgaron

²⁷¹ U.S. Foreign Aid by Country, *Foreign Aid Explorer*, https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/GTM?measure=Obligations&fiscal_year=2019

²⁷² U.S. Congressional Research Service, *Guatemala: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts*, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19870331_IB85100_15e629787a4049804693b95249a1454f800555e4.pdf

²⁷³ Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, *Memoria del Silencio*, <http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/guatemala-memoria-silencio/guatemala-memoria-del-silencio.pdf>

²⁷⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Central America Impact of U.S. Assistance in the 1980s*, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/147879.pdf>

²⁷⁵ U.S. Congressional Research Service, *Guatemala: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts*, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19870331_IB85100_15e629787a4049804693b95249a1454f800555e4.pdf

como ayuda militar. \$114.2 millones se otorgaron en FY1986, de los cuales \$ 5.3 millones fueron de ayuda militar.²⁷⁶

Desde el año fiscal 1986 hasta 1988, Guatemala recibió \$ 19 millones en fondos del Programa de Asistencia Militar (MAP) para reparar o adquirir equipos militares, de ingeniería, transporte y comunicaciones no letales. Entre 1986 y 1987 se prohibió que Guatemala permitiera usar fondos de los Estados Unidos para comprar armas letales, pero la Ley de asistencia extranjera no impidió que Guatemala comprara armas letales de los Estados Unidos y otros países con sus propios fondos nacionales.²⁷⁷

A partir de marzo de 2019, bajo la Administración de Trump, toda la ayuda humanitaria a Guatemala se detuvo.²⁷⁸ La suspensión de la ayuda se ordenó como resultado de la "crisis migratoria". A pesar de la suspensión de la ayuda humanitaria directa, los Estados Unidos han enviado \$ 82,172,048 a Guatemala en forma de proyectos y costos operativos. Todos los fondos utilizados en el año fiscal 2019 se clasificaron como ayuda económica en lugar de ayuda militar. El Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos ha dicho que están terminando los programas de asistencia extranjera FY17 y FY18 para la totalidad del Triángulo del Norte. Antes de marzo de 2019, el Congreso ya había asignado \$ 527.6 millones para SFOPS (Estado, Operaciones en el Extranjero y Programas Relacionados) en el FY19 para toda América Central.²⁷⁹ Antes de los cambios de financiamiento, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos proporcionó \$ 177.8 millones en 2017 entre cuatro categorías de Fronteras y Control de Drogas; Crecimiento económico, seguridad alimentaria, desarrollo rural y social; Buen Gobierno, Transparencia y Derechos Humanos; Seguridad, Sector Justicia y Prevención de la Violencia.²⁸⁰

Este informe es una respuesta a una consulta de investigación realizada por Miembros de la comunidad de Nuevo Amanecer, Guatemala.

Editado por Emily Willard (eawillard@gmail.com)

Investigado y escrito por Melissa Blue and Maddie Coke

University of Washington, Seattle

2019

²⁷⁶ U.S. Congressional Research Service, *Guatemala: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts*, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19870331_IB85100_15e629787a4049804693b95249a1454f800555e4.pdf

²⁷⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Central America Impact of U.S. Assistance in the 1980s*, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/147879.pdf>

²⁷⁸ Christal Hayes "US cutting off humanitarian aid to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador," *USA Today*, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/03/30/united-states-cuts-aid-guatemala-honduras-el-salvador-migrant-crisis/3320401002/>

²⁷⁹ Christal Hayes "US cutting off humanitarian aid to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador," *USA Today*, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/03/30/united-states-cuts-aid-guatemala-honduras-el-salvador-migrant-crisis/3320401002/>

²⁸⁰ The Washington Office on Latin America, *Monitoring U.S. Assistance to Central America*, <https://www.wola.org/monitoring-assistance-central-america/?fbclid=IwAR35Ny2Lk2UDWOGjBE1Px-ztQFOfmkv3QEoKm55NlNh7Jgxv8wUE5tY9xi8>

U.S. aid sent to Guatemala in the 1980s and today

The United States has provided military and economic aid to Guatemala for decades. Foreign aid, in general, is defined by USAID as military and economic assistance added together.²⁸¹ In 1978, under the Carter Administration the United States halted military aid sent to Guatemala but continued to provide financial aid in other ways. The halt on military aid also did not cut off previously pledged direct or indirect military aid.²⁸² Between 1978 and 1980, the Guatemalan military received \$7.9 million through the Military Assistance Program and Foreign Military Sales program ran by the State Department.²⁸³

Per the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) estimates, the United States provided Guatemala with \$620.4 million between FY1981 and 1988.²⁸⁴

Per U.S. Foreign Assistance data published in the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) report, the United States provided \$29.7 million in non-military aid in FY 1983. In FY1984, the United States provided \$18.3 million in aid. In 1983 and 1984, financial aid included loans and grants for development projects, food aid, the Economic Support Fund, and other economic aid as defined by the CRS report.²⁸⁵

While the U.S. did not provide military aid in 1983, they did allow the Guatemalan government to buy \$6.3 million in spare parts from the Department of Defense to outfit their air force and to rehabilitate American-made helicopters.

The Reagan Administration sought to give military aid to Guatemala because they argued there was no longer a pattern of human rights abuses present in the country, and in 1986 the administration provided a human rights certification to Congress allowing them to fund military aid. While the certification was controversial, military aid was provided to Guatemala beginning in FY1985. Financial aid sent to Guatemala ballooned in the ensuing years. The U.S. provided \$98.1 million in FY1985, \$0.5 million of which was given as military aid. \$114.2 million was given in FY1986, of which \$5.3 million was military aid.²⁸⁶

From FY1986 to 1988, Guatemala received \$19 million in Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding to repair or acquire nonlethal military, engineering, transportation, and communications equipment. There was a prohibition in place from 1986-1987 from allowing Guatemala to use

²⁸¹ U.S. Foreign Aid by Country, *Foreign Aid Explorer*, [https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/GTM](https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/GTM;);
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/GTM?measure=Obligations&fiscal_year=2019

²⁸² U.S. Congressional Research Service, *Guatemala: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts*,
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs8842/m1/1/high_res_d/IB85100_1987Mar31.pdf

²⁸³ Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, *Memoria del Silencio*,
<http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/guatemala-memoria-silencio/guatemala-memoria-del-silencio.pdf>

²⁸⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Central America Impact of U.S. Assistance in the 1980s*,
<https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/147879.pdf>

²⁸⁵ U.S. Congressional Research Service, *Guatemala: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts*,
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19870331_IB85100_15e629787a4049804693b95249a1454f800555e4.pdf

²⁸⁶ U.S. Congressional Research Service, *Guatemala: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts*,
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19870331_IB85100_15e629787a4049804693b95249a1454f800555e4.pdf

U.S. funds to purchase lethal weapons, but the Foreign Assistance Act did not prevent Guatemala from purchasing lethal weapons from the United States and other countries with its own national funds.²⁸⁷

As of March 2019, under the Trump Administration, all humanitarian aid to Guatemala was halted.²⁸⁸ The discontinuation of aid was ordered as a result of the “migrant crisis.” Despite the discontinuation of direct humanitarian aid, the U.S. has sent \$82,172,048 to Guatemala in the form of projects and operating costs. All funds used in the 2019 fiscal year were categorized as economic rather than military aid. The U.S. State Department has said that they are ending FY17 and FY18 foreign assistance programs for the entirety of the Northern Triangle. Before March 2019, Congress had already appropriated \$527.6 million for SFOPS (State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs) in FY19 for all of Central America.²⁸⁹ Prior to the funding changes, the United States government provided \$177.8 million in 2017 amongst four categories Borders & Drug Control; Economic Growth, Food Security, Rural and Social Development; Good Governance, Transparency and Human Rights; Security, Justice Sector and Violence Prevention.²⁹⁰

*This report is a response to a research query by
members of the community of Nuevo Amanecer, Guatemala
Edited by Emily Willard (eawillard@gmail.com)
Researched and written by Melissa Blue and Maddie Coke
University of Washington, Seattle
2019*

²⁸⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Central America Impact of U.S. Assistance in the 1980s*, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/147879.pdf>

²⁸⁸ Christal Hayes “US cutting off humanitarian aid to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador,” *USA Today*, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/03/30/united-states-cuts-aid-guatemala-honduras-el-salvador-migrant-crisis/3320401002/>

²⁸⁹ Christal Hayes “US cutting off humanitarian aid to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador,” *USA Today*, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/03/30/united-states-cuts-aid-guatemala-honduras-el-salvador-migrant-crisis/3320401002/>

²⁹⁰ The Washington Office on Latin America, *Monitoring U.S. Assistance to Central America*, <https://www.wola.org/monitoring-assistance-central-america/?fbclid=IwAR35Ny2Lk2UDWOGjBEIPx-ztQFOfmkv3QEoKm55NlNh7Jgxv8wUE5tY9xi8>

APPENDIX C

Declassified Document Reader

I presented this document reader as a gift to the community of Nuevo Amanecer at a community meeting in July 2018. The document reader was also utilized in the critical oral history workshop conducted in July 2018. I obtained the documents from the National Security Archive's website at <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu>, *Digital National Security Archive*. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest Information and Learning, 1998; and *U.S. Declassified Documents Online*. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Cengage Learning, 1998. It is included here to increase access to this important information.

Colección de Documentos Desclasificados de Los Estados Unidos relatado a la historia del Caserío Nuevo Amanecer

Descripción:

Este es una colección de documentos desclasificados por el gobierno de los estados unidos a la respuesta de solicitudes de acceso a la información. Los documentos están en inglés, y con una traducción en español, algunas veces una traducción parcial.

Esta colección fue elegida por la posibilidad que estos documentos son relevantes a la historia de la comunidad Nuevo Amanecer. Hay muchos más documentos que hay en esa colección, pero fue decidido que estos son los más relevantes.

Estos documentos son de la colección de una ONG National Security Archive en Washington, D.C., y también de un base de documentos por la corporación Gale se llama "U.S. Declassified Documents Online."

Esta colección fue presentado a la comunidad de Nuevo Amanecer en Julio 2018, parte del Aniversario de 20 años.

Esta colección editado y traducido por Emily Willard, una investigadora y estudiante en la Universidad de Washington en 2018. Si usted quiere más información o tiene preguntas, puede contactar ewillard@gmail.com or +1-410-703-1918 por teléfono o Whatsapp.

Contenido de la Colección

DOCUMENTO 1

Fecha: 20 Septiembre 1968

Título: El Movimiento Comunista Insurgente en Guatemala // ("The Communist Insurgency Movement in Guatemala")

Agencia: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Páginas: 20

Traducción: parcial

DOCUMENTO 2

Fecha: 24 Marzo 1970

Título: Terrorismo y Actividades de las Guerrillas en Guatemala ("Terrorism and Guerrilla Activity in Guatemala")

Agencia: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Páginas: 1

Traducción: completo

DOCUMENTO 3

Fecha: 21 Febrero 1980

Título: Informe sobre violencia y derechos humanos, noviembre de 1979 // ("Violence and Human Rights Report November 1979")

Agencia: Departamento del Estado

Páginas: 8

Traducción: parcial

DOCUMENTO 4

Fecha: 5 Diciembre 1981

Título: Guatemala: Éxitos de Contrainsurgencia ("Guatemala: Counterinsurgency Successes")

Agencia: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Páginas: 2

Traducción: completo

DOCUMENTO 5

Fecha: 12 Enero 1982

Título: Aldea en el departamento de San Marcos supuestamente atemorizada, dejando al menos 38 muertos; Las guerrillas mantienen alto nivel de violencia en el país // ("Village in San Marcos Department Reportedly Terrorized, Leaving at Least 38 Dead; Guerrillas Maintain High Level of Violence in Country")

Agencia: Departamento del Estado

Páginas: 3

Traducción: completo

DOCUMENTO 6

Fecha: 3 Marzo 1983

Título: La guerrilla de Guatemala se Retira ante la Presión del Gobierno ("Guatemala's Guerrillas Retreating in the Face of Government Pressure")

Agencia: Departamento del Estado

Páginas: 36

Traducción: parcial

DOCUMENTO 7

Fecha: 1 Abril 1983

Título: Actividades de los Insurgentes guatemaltecos en México: Percepciones Versus Realidad // ("Guatemalan Insurgents' Activities in Mexico: Perceptions Versus Reality")

Agencia: Defense Intelligence Agency, Departamento de Defensa

Páginas: 25

Traducción: parcial

DOCUMENTO 8

Fecha: 1985 Octubre 31

Título: Operaciones Militares en ZM #18 San Marcos // ("IIR Military Operations in MZ #18 - San Marcos")

Agencia: Defense Intelligence Agency, Departamento de Defensa

Páginas: 3

Traducción: completo

AGENCIA CENTRAL DE INTELIGENCIA
DIRECCIÓN DE INTELIGENCIA

Memorando de Inteligencia

El movimiento de insurgencia comunista en Guatemala

Secreto
20 de septiembre de 1968

[PORTADA]

AGENCIA CENTRAL DE INTELIGENCIA
Dirección de Inteligencia
20 de septiembre de 1968

MEMORANDO DE INTELIGENCIA

El movimiento de insurgencia comunista en Guatemala

Resume

El movimiento de insurgencia comunista de Guatemala, que se distinguió el 28 de agosto al perpetrar el único asesinato en la historia de un embajador de Estados Unidos, sobrevive después de casi siete años de fortunas fluctuantes que van desde casi la impunidad hasta casi la aniquilación. La amenaza directa de los insurgentes es para la seguridad pública. Pero los insurgentes también disminuyen la estabilidad del gobierno al socavar la confianza del público en la capacidad de las autoridades para mantener el orden. La fuerza insurgente comunista, ya debilitada por el faccionalismo interno, fue diezmada por un gobierno sin límites durante 1967 y principios de 1968. El movimiento se encuentra aún en un período de reducción y reorganización, bajo una severa represión gubernamental y sometido a una pérdida continua de un liderazgo experimentado a través de las acciones de las fuerzas de seguridad. Sin embargo, continúa llevando a cabo operaciones de golpe y fuga bien planificadas y ejecutadas profesionalmente. Indicios tentativos de un creciente apoyo cubano a las Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) y la durabilidad demostrada de las FAR sugieren la posibilidad de continuar la inseguridad en Guatemala.

Nota: Este memorando fue producido exclusivamente por la CIA. Fue preparado por la Oficina de Inteligencia Actual y coordinado con la Oficina de Estimaciones Nacionales, el Servicio Central de Referencia y los Servicios Clandestinos.

Trasfondo

1. El 13 de noviembre de 1960, un grupo de jóvenes oficiales del ejército intentó sin éxito derrocar al gobierno de Ydígoras. El grupo desarrolló gradualmente un movimiento guerrillero basado en una zona de selva montañosa en el departamento nororiental de Izabal y llamó al Movimiento Revolucionario del 13 de noviembre. Con cierta asistencia de Cuba, la pequeña banda, bajo el liderazgo de Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, participó en actos terroristas esporádicos, incluido el hostigamiento de líneas de comunicación, autobuses y vías férreas, saqueos de puntos de suministro militar y plantaciones por dinero y armas, asesinato de colaboradores del ejército y ataques a instalaciones comerciales y oficiales.

2. El proscrito Partido Comunista Guatemalteco (PGT) se puso en contacto con la guerrilla, les proporcionó alimentos y medicinas, y les hizo propaganda. Algunos miembros del PGT trabajaron con la guerrilla, y algunos se volvieron muy críticos con el partido por no darles más apoyo a la guerrilla. Estos disidentes dentro del partido se vieron fortalecidos por el golpe militar que lanzó a Ydígoras en marzo de 1963. Con su relativa libertad de acción política restringida bajo el gobierno militar, el PGT dio más énfasis a la lucha armada y estableció un ejército comisión para emprender la guerra de guerrillas y el terrorismo urbano. La cuestión en el partido ahora se convirtió en si la violencia debería ser o no la principal forma de lucha, con los activistas en las colinas irritándose bajo lo que ellos consideraban ser una sumisión poco realista a la línea soviética.

3. A fines de 1963, el partido había logrado establecer un frente de guerrilla unido llamado Rebelde Fuerzas Armadas (FAR). Se incluyeron el grupo de 13 de noviembre de Yon Sosa (MR 13), un grupo de jóvenes comunistas "12 de abril" y un grupo "20 de octubre" dominado por los comunistas. El intento del PGT de controlar el movimiento fue resentido por Yon y otros revolucionarios, y su dominio también fue socavado por la capacidad de los guerrilleros de obtener fondos, equipo y entrenamiento por sí mismos.

4. En este momento, la contrainsurgencia bajo el gobierno militar fue relativamente ineficaz en

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el área noreste. Sin embargo, las fuerzas de seguridad lograron algunos éxitos importantes en la ciudad de Guatemala y dejaron al PGT desmoralizado y debilitado. La fiesta continuó dividida. Los disidentes rechazaron la tesis de algunos miembros de alto nivel que insistieron en que el compromiso mayorista con la violencia era un error. En 1964 surgió una mayor confusión con el surgimiento de un elemento trotskista o pro-chino entre las guerrillas.

5. Después del encuentro internacional de comunistas en La Habana en noviembre de 1964 que pidió la unidad entre las fuerzas "liberales" y una postura más activista por parte de los partidos ortodoxos en varios países, incluido Guatemala, el grupo del 13 de noviembre y el PGT parecieron reconciliarse. pero solo temporalmente. Después de analizar la caída de Khrushchev en octubre, el MR 13 elogió sin ambages a los chinos. Criticó el apoyo del PGT a una revolución nacionalista burguesa, y Yon Sosa retiró su grupo de las FAR. En enero de 1965, el MR 13 sufrió una división cuando Luis Turcios, el jefe de la banda guerrilla "Edgar Ibarra", atacó el control "trotskista" de los guerrilleros. En junio de 1965, colocó a su grupo bajo la dirección directa comando del comité central del PGT. Los miembros de las diversas facciones revolucionarias, particularmente los de las colinas, estaban confundidos y desmoralizados. La adopción por parte del PGT de una línea más dura y su adhesión a la lucha armada fueron demasiado pocas y demasiado tarde para algunos miembros de alto nivel. Algunos de ellos, disgustados con la indecisión y la debilidad de la política de PGT, se retiraron. Se informó que un grupo encabezado por un miembro del comité central [TACHADO] tenía la intención de formar un nuevo partido.

6. A pesar de esta disensión y división, las FAR alineadas con PGT bajo Turcios llevaron la inseguridad en Guatemala a su nivel más alto en 1966. La campaña de secuestro de los insurgentes aterrorizó al público y obtuvo un rescate estimado de \$ 2 millones.

[...]

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[PÁGINA 3]

[...]

[PAGINAS 4-11 y apéndices]

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

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By g, NARA, Date 9-18-90

Intelligence Memorandum

The Communist Insurgency Movement in Guatemala

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20 September 1968
No. 0624/68

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
20 September 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Communist Insurgency Movement in Guatemala

Summary

Guatemala's Communist insurgency movement, which distinguished itself on 28 August by perpetrating the only assassination in history of a US ambassador, survives after nearly seven years of fluctuating fortunes ranging from near impunity to near annihilation. The direct threat of the insurgents is to public security. But the insurgents also lessen government stability, by undermining public confidence in the ability of the authorities to maintain order. Communist insurgent strength, already weakened by internal factionalism, was decimated by a no-holds-barred government thrust during 1967 and early 1968. The movement is still in a period of retrenchment and reorganization, under severe government repression, and subjected to a continual loss of experienced leadership through the security forces' actions. Nevertheless, it continues to carry out well-planned and professionally executed hit-and-run operations. Tentative indications of growing Cuban support for the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the FAR's proved durability suggest the prospect of continuing insecurity in Guatemala.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates, the Central Reference Service, and the Clandestine Services.

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Background

1. On 13 November 1960, a group of young army officers tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Ydigoras government. The group gradually developed a guerrilla movement based in a mountainous jungle area in the northeastern Department of Izabal and called the 13 November Revolutionary Movement. With some assistance from Cuba, the small band, under the leadership of Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, engaged in sporadic terrorist acts, including harassment of communications lines, buses, and railroad tracks, pillaging of military supply points and plantations for money and arms, assassination of army collaborators, and attacks on commercial and official installations.

2. The outlawed Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) made contact with the guerrillas, supplied them with food and medicine, and propagandized for them. Some PGT members worked with the guerrillas, and a few became highly critical of the party for not giving the guerrillas more support. These dissidents within the party were strengthened by the military coup that ousted Ydigoras in March 1963. With its relative freedom of political action curtailed under the military government, the PGT gave more emphasis to armed struggle and established a military commission to undertake guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism. The issue in the party now became whether or not violence should be the major form of struggle, with the activists in the hills chafing under what they saw as unrealistic subservience to the Soviet line.

3. By late 1963, the party had managed to establish a united guerrilla front called the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR). Included were Yon Sosa's 13 November group (MR 13), a Communist "1 April" youth group, and a Communist-dominated "20 October" group. The PGT's attempt to control the movement was resented by Yon and other revolutionaries, and its domination was also undercut by the ability of the guerrillas to secure funds, equipment, and training on their own.

4. At this time, counterinsurgency under the military government was relatively ineffective in

the northeastern area. The security forces, however, achieved some important success in Guatemala City, and left the PGT there demoralized and weakened. The party continued to be divided. The dissidents rejected the thesis of some high-level members who insisted that wholesale commitment to violence was an error. Further confusion came in 1964 with the emergence of a Trotskyist or pro-Chinese element among the guerrillas.

5. Following the international meeting of Communists in Havana in November 1964 that called for unity among the "liberal" forces and a more activist stance on the part of the orthodox parties in several countries including Guatemala, the 13 November group and the PGT appeared to reconcile, but only temporarily. After analyzing the fall of Khrushchev in October, the MR 13 unabashedly praised the Chinese. It criticized the PGT's support for a bourgeois nationalist revolution, and Yon Sosa withdrew his group from the FAR. In January 1965, the MR 13 suffered a split of its own when Luis Turcios, the chief of the "Edgar Ibarra" guerrilla band, attacked "Trotskyist" control of the guerrillas. In June 1965, he placed his group under the direct command of the PGT's central committee. Members of the various revolutionary factions, particularly those in the hills, were confused and demoralized. The PGT's adoption of a harder line and its espousal of armed struggle were too little and too late for some high-level members. Some of them, disgusted with the indecision and weakness of PGT policy, pulled out. A group headed by central committee member [redacted] reportedly intended to form a new party. 1.3 (u)(4)

6. Despite this dissension and division, the PGT-aligned FAR under Turcios brought insecurity in Guatemala to its highest level in 1966. The insurgents' kidnaping campaign terrorized the public and netted an estimated \$2 million in ransom.

Intensified Disunity

7. A turning point was reached in 1966 as a result of two unrelated developments--the death of Turcios in October, which created a serious leadership crisis

for the FAR, and the government's adoption of clandestine counterterrorism. FAR members, especially recent returnees from Cuba, stridently opposed the PGT old guard leadership, and disunity intensified within the Communist guerrilla movement.

8. The organizational flux and changing alliances became even more intense from the end of 1966 to early 1968. To a certain degree, the incoherence stemmed from terminology. The formal "FAR," for example, included the Edgar Ibarra guerrilla group, PGT elements, and the Communist youth. Leaders from each of these combined to form the Revolutionary Leadership Center (CDR), which was designed to provide the movement with a single, unified command. Because the Edgar Ibarra group was, in fact, almost the entire active military and guerrilla forces of the FAR, however, the term "FAR" more often referred to just that group.

9. Criticism of the PGT by the active guerrillas seemed by late 1966 to point to an inevitable separation. Documents from that period admit that guerrilla reversals were related to the government's new offensive, but that the major cause for failure was miscalculation by the PGT leadership, particularly after Mendez Montenegro's civilian government took office in July 1966. The guerrillas claimed that the PGT's desire for legal political status led the party into the error of demilitarizing the movement. A paper signed by three leaders of the hard line or "red guard" of the FAR--Jose Maria Ortiz Vides, Gabriel Salazar, and Ricardo Ramirez de Leon--stated flatly that the old-line Communist leaders were incapable of understanding the concept of political-military leadership and that they were unable to direct the revolutionary process. Expressions of FAR disagreement with the PGT were published regularly by the Cuban press and radio.

10. A "FAR Declaration" dated January 1968 announced that the FAR guerrilla leaders had taken over the leadership of the revolution and were sharing it with Yon Sosa's MR 13 band, which had been inactive for nearly two years. In February, Yon Sosa and Cesar Montes stated that the 13 November Movement would return to the FAR. The PGT announced formation of a new military organization of its own under a slightly adjusted name--the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR/PGT). The FAR and the FAR/PGT were seriously damaged by the effective military campaigns against them throughout 1967 and 1968, and neither has fully recuperated from its internal splits. The FAR is a Cuban-oriented movement whose structure reflects pure commitment to guerrilla warfare. The FAR/PGT is an adjunct of the Soviet-oriented Communist Party, which recognizes violence as only part of the long-term revolutionary struggle. Because of the underground nature of both, their continual experimentation in reorganizing, the usual lack of timely access to documents, and the frequent changes caused by internal disruption or police action, there is relatively little information available which can be relied on as presenting a completely valid picture of the insurgency today.

11. What is clear, however, is that the FAR's determination to carry forward its campaign of subversion and violence is undiminished. Reports consistently point to strong resistance within the FAR, even to temporary lulls designed to permit regrouping, resupplying, and revising strategy. Although the FAR has suffered heavy losses recently and may be experiencing dissension within its ranks, it may still have both the intention and capability, including external support, to mobilize for a future coordinated campaign of rural insurgency on two or more fronts, with simultaneous urban terrorist acts. Operations in more than one rural front where road net and logistics will not support overland reaction of the government forces would significantly enhance the FAR's ability to damage security and, at least indirectly, political stability.

Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) Command Structure



FAR CHIEF
 Marco Antonio YON Sosa

FAR SECOND CHIEF
 Julio Cesar MACIAS Moyano

FAR Representative in Cuba
 Ricardo RAMIREZ de Leon

Cuban Embassy Officer in Mexico
 in Contact with FAR
 "Sergio"

Customs Encls Go-Between of
 Cuban Embassy and FAR in Mexico City
 "Javier Contreras"

EDGAR MARRA GUERRILLA FRONT (FGEI) (30)

Chief -

Deputy Chief - General MARRA
 aka "Androcles"

Supply Chief - Guillermo OLIVA

(The former chief of the FGEI was Ordonez. Since his transfer to the FRU and subsequent death, the FGEI has been temporarily united with the Central Front under Macias' command.)

CENTRAL FRONT (80)

Chief - Julio Cesar MACIAS Moyano
 aka "Cesar Morales"

ALEJANDRO DE LEON FRONT (ADELA)

Chief - Marco Antonio YON Sosa

Military Chief - "Securo" (30)

HUENHETENANGO DEVELOPMENTAL FRONT (20) (Formerly Western Regional Committee)

Chief - Pablo CHUY

Deputy Chief - Marco PAZ

CUBAN GUERRILLA ADVISORS

Two Cubans have been reported to be with the FRU and the ADELA Front

URBAN RESISTANCE FRONT (FRU) (14)

Chief - Carlos Francisco ORDONEZ Montenegro
 aka "Camilo Sanchez" - now deceased

Intel Chief - "Antonio" (8)

Finance Chief - "Juan"

Training Chief - "Milo" (8)

QUICHE-CHIMALTENANGO DEVELOPMENTAL FRONT (Formerly Southern Regional Committee) (24)

Chief - "Conce"

Deputy Chief - "Carina"

FRU-CHIMALTENANGO JOINT SUPPLY SECTION

Chief - "Leta"

SANTA ELENA GROUP (5)

SEBOL GROUP (10)

PANZOS GROUP (20)

RETALHULEU GROUP

ESCUINTLA GROUP

*Estimated Numbers

The FAR Under Yon Sosa

12. The FAR includes an estimated 200 men organized into guerrilla fronts, an urban resistance front, and support sections, all under the unified command (commandancia). Yon Sosa is the number-one man, and Cesar Montes is number two (see chart). The personnel changes in the Guatemalan Army during March which signaled a government pullback from its extralegal counterterror campaign, reinforced the FAR's decision to prepare carefully and to organize well before launching the guerrilla war. Throughout mid-1968, there were indications from clandestine sources that the offensive would be delayed at least until the end of the rainy season in November. They now plan to rob for funds and medicines, to engage in action to test training and weaponry, and to exploit targets of opportunity.

13. Throughout the spring, information on the FAR's activity [redacted] showed that preparations were continuing. The assignment of command personnel was often temporary, and experimental combinations of guerrilla bands were tried. By May, two "regional committees"--the western and southern--had been dissolved, with the personnel transferred to the northern departments of Huehuetenango and El Quiche (See map). The problem in the western zone was reported to be army pressure, and in the south there were difficulties between the FAR and the PGT. 1.3(6)(4)

14. The continual movement of units and personnel suggests that the guerrillas were engaged in area familiarization and were caching food and supplies in anticipated areas of operation. It also shows that plans to operate with tactical flexibility and mobility are being implemented. Descriptions of guerrilla camps observed by clandestine sources also point to emphasis on mobility. A camp in San Marcos reportedly had no tents or permanent shelters. Sheepskin sleeping bags, small propane stoves, and lanterns shielded to avoid their being sighted from the air, and short-range transceivers, probably for camp contact with guardposts,

The map illustrates the geographical distribution of guerrilla forces and their supply networks in Central America during 1968. Key locations and routes include:

- Supply Routes:**
 - A route from the north (Mexico/Guatemala border) to the south, passing through Santa Elena and Puerto Barrios.
 - A route from the north to the southwest, passing through a series of locations including a large black box near the border, a smaller box, and another large box.
 - A route from the northeast (Honduras/El Salvador border) to the south, passing through a large black box and another smaller box.
 - A route from the southwest to the south, passing through a large black box and another smaller box.
- Guerrilla Strength (Estimated 1968):**
 - Large black boxes indicate areas of high guerrilla strength, primarily in the north and southwest.
 - Smaller black boxes indicate areas of lower guerrilla strength, primarily in the south and east.
- Geographical Labels:**
 - MEXICO
 - GUATEMALA
 - HONDURAS
 - EL SALVADOR
- Legend:**
 - Guerrilla Supply Route (indicated by an arrow)
 - (O) Estimated Guerrilla Strength (indicated by a black box)

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[illegible]

were being used. The logistical aim is to achieve maximum self-sufficiency while on the move. By storing food in strategic places, the guerrillas hope to avoid the problem that arose in 1965 and 1966 when they fell prey to army attacks after they were forced from their strongholds in the mountains and their rural supply nets were destroyed.

15. The FAR often repeats its commitment to the "single command" for purposes of discipline and coherence, but an effective single command seems more fiction than fact. There are continual indications of considerable autonomy on the part of some of the guerrilla leaders, and frequent reports of dissent and calls for immediate action. []

1.3(a)(4)

[] the FAR lacked funds because the location of the reserve funds was known only to Cesar Montes, who was outside Guatemala, and to the acting chief, who had been killed. It is not clear whether such secrecy signifies security-consciousness, or distrust and rivalry.

16. The FAR's aims, as stated in captured documents, are to build up a guerrilla army while terrorizing commercial interests and sabotaging public installations in order to upset the economy, to push the military into a coup, or to cause US intervention. It is unclear whether the psychological vulnerability of a military regime is considered more important domestically, or internationally.

17. From all indications, the FAR move against Ambassador Mein on 28 August was intended to secure him as a hostage to obtain the release of Camilo Sanchez, the high-level FAR leader whom the government had captured four days earlier. There is no information to suggest that the action, which occurred following a fairly long period of relative quiet, has a deeper significance in terms of FAR strategy. Last March, Yon Sosa []

[] was ready to kidnap US citizens when he heard that one of his own men had been captured. []

1.3(a)(4)

[] The reported capture, however, proved to be a false alarm.

The FAR/PGT in 1968

18. The Communist Party remains an internationally recognized orthodox party oriented toward the Soviet Union. The PGT itself is organized along traditional Communist party lines and is completely underground. The PGT's commitment to violence remains within the context of Marxist-Leninist principles and definitions of the national "condition" or ripeness for revolution. Political theses, Communist dogma, party integrity and survival--the over-all Communist cause--are more important to the PGT than immediate guerrilla action. The PGT is respected in international Communist circles for its virtual take-over of the government in the early 1950s and for its subsequent survival under very difficult conditions. The party has an "annex" in Mexico where many Communist exiles act as liaison for it. The party also has important members in European Communist countries for training, meetings, or instructions. Like the FAR, the PGT has suffered severe damage from the government campaigns, has lost many members, and is trying to retrench.

19. Following the FAR's breakaway in January 1968, the PGT contended that guerrilla warfare should be one of several revolutionary developments. During a conference of its regional committees--called the Fourth National Conference of the FAR--last April, the decision was made to retain the initials "FAR" to identify the action arm of the PGT. A propaganda bulletin entitled "FAR" affirmed armed struggle as the only valid and correct means to achieve the revolution.

20. The National Command, selected by the National Conference, is the unit responsible for day-to-day direction of the FAR/PGT. The FAR/PGT will have regional committees to effect the armed struggle in their own areas. A clandestine source reports that these will be the old PGT regional committees. The party is said to be forming resistance units in Guatemala City and to be providing some military training, but the organization of a guerrilla front is being delayed indefinitely. Information on the personnel strength of the FAR/PGT is lacking.

External Assistance

21. Cuba began providing material assistance to the Guatemalan guerrilla movement in early 1962. Yon Sosa received guerrilla training in Cuba, and it is estimated that at least 260 other Guatemalans have received similar training during the period 1961-1968. Emissaries from Cuba and Mexico have delivered supplies and funds to the guerrilla bands. In addition, Communist propaganda media in Europe and Latin America have given considerable attention to the revolutionary movement in Guatemala, and the guerrillas have been in contact periodically with outside journalists who have publicized their cause widely.

22. Cuba has been a principal source of assistance and guidance to the guerrillas. As noted above, the temporary reconciliation between the FAR and the Communist Party may have stemmed from nudging at the Havana meeting in November 1964. Following the reconciliation, the PGT reportedly received word from Fidel Castro that if the FAR's revolutionary activity was intensified and sustained through 1965, Havana would give the party complete financial support. Other information also suggested that Cuban funds were largely contingent on an increase of violence and terrorism.

23. At the conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) in Cuba, in August 1967, one of those FAR members attending was elected vice president of the permanent organization. Since then, there have been several reports that funds have been passed to Guatemalan guerrilla representatives by members of the Cuban diplomatic staff in Mexico City. According to an unconfirmed report of last January, the FAR was receiving \$15,000 each month from Cuba via this Mexican channel. Other reports early this year indicated that several Cuban guerrilla instructors were operating with the FAR and that at least one FAR member had recently returned from training in either North Korea or North Vietnam. Again, confirmation is lacking.

24. The extensive unguarded frontiers of Guatemala permit the guerrillas to move back and forth with

relative ease, and the transshipment of arms and supplies from outside the country takes place with only minimal threat of interdiction by Guatemalan security forces. Early last May, however, a Guatemalan Army unit clashed with FAR elements near the Honduran border where they were alleged to be picking up a large arms shipment. Yon Sosa was then in Honduras to arrange the weapons delivery. There have also been reports that the guerrillas have bought arms from Mexican smugglers to be infiltrated across the border into the sparsely inhabited northern jungles. Some supplies destined for the guerrillas have been captured from time to time, but the flow probably has not been substantially interrupted.

The Context For Revolution--An Overview

25. At least part of the population that fared well in the revolutionary period of 1944-54, can be presumed in sympathy with the idea of revolution or a return to the "good times." Some of those disappointed in Mendez' "third government of the revolution" probably see the only hope for "progress" in the armed struggle being waged by the Communists. How many is a matter of speculation. The portion of the population is very small. The presumably moderate majority among this segment are probably not favorably impressed with the merits of the elected government. Under the constitutional Mendez administration, insecurity has been high, and tangible public benefit and national progress have hardly been spectacular. Even so, the number of revolutionary sympathizers is probably relatively low as a result of public disgust and fear of the war in miniature represented by the confrontation between the insurgents and the security forces.

1.3(a)(4)

26. ☐

☐ some students are attracted to the revolutionary movement and make up a substantial portion of the guerrilla bands.

27. The Communists can also secure some collaboration, though not sympathy, by extortion and threats.

~~SECRET~~
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28. An assessment of the raw appeal of the revolutionaries must also take into account the pervasive primitivism of the Guatemalan political system, in which the precedence of party, position, or nation over personal interest is at best rare. The comparatively "enlightened" liberal element in the society suffers no dearth of examples of corruption, maldistribution of wealth, exploitation, and lack of freedom or opportunity. The serious underdevelopment at all levels and in all fields and the absence of promise for a substantially different future provide would-be revolutionaries with considerable exploitable material. The relatively insignificant progress that the insurgents have made in seven years speaks for the basic conservatism, apathy, and unawareness of most of the Guatemalan society, as well as for the occasional effectiveness of the government's campaigns against them,

-11-

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AGENCIA DE INTELIGENCIA CENTRAL
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24 Marzo 1970

MEMORÁNDUM DE INTELIGENCIA

Terrorismo y Actividades de las Guerrillas en Guatemala

Introduccion

El problema terrorista en Guatemala puede volverse sustancialmente más severo en los próximos meses. Aunque las fuerzas comunistas siguen divididas, tienen objetivos comunes: mostrar que el gobierno no puede mantener la seguridad y forzar un golpe militar. Los comunistas han demostrado una mejor capacidad y pueden aprovecharse del gobierno débil y saliente antes de la inauguración presidencial el 1 de julio para organizar una operación terrorista concertada

Nota:

Este memorando fue producido exclusivamente por la CIA. Fue preparado por la Oficina de Inteligencia Actual y coordinado con la Oficina de Estimaciones Nacionales y el Servicio Clandestino.

3046

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 March 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Terrorism and Guerrilla Activity in Guatemala

Introduction

The terrorist problem in Guatemala may become substantially more severe in coming months. Although Communist forces remain divided, they have common objectives: to show that the government is unable to maintain security, and to force a military coup. The Communists have demonstrated an improved capability and may take advantage of the weak, lame-duck government prior to the presidential inauguration on 1 July to mount a concerted terrorist operation. Their primary immediate aim is to assassinate president-elect Carlos Arana, an act they are sure would create chaos.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Service.

MORI

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A: Departamento del Estado

[...]

Desde: La Embajada de los EEUU en GUATEMALA

FECHA: 21 Febrero 1980

TÍTULO: (U) Informe sobre violencia y derechos humanos, noviembre de 1979

[...]

[PÁGINA 1-4]

[...]

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[...]

Doce hombres vestidos con uniformes azul oscuro (uniformes no descritos o atribuidos a una autoridad oficial del gobierno) según informes de prensa se incautaron de ocho campesinos el 26 de noviembre cerca de La Reforma y El Quetzal en el departamento de San Marcos. El 29 de noviembre, se encontraron los cuerpos de ocho personas atadas a árboles y disparadas cerca de Nuevo Progreso, San Marcos. El juez ordenó que los cuerpos se tomaran las huellas digitales para su identificación. La prensa especuló que estos eran los cuerpos de ocho campesinos secuestrados antes.

El 30 de noviembre, un grupo de hombres armados secuestró a cinco campesinos de la finca Maza, cerca de Coatepeque, departamento de Quetzaltenango. Los cuerpos de los cinco aparecieron al día siguiente a lo largo de la carretera hacia Tilapa, con los ojos vendados y acribillado a balazos. En la parte posterior llevaba una nota: "Ejecutado por el Escuadrón de la Muerte". (Comentario: "Escuadrón de la muerte" ha sido generalmente una denominación para vigilantes de derecha que matan a repetidores criminales. No se suelen dejar notas. No hay nada que sugiera que los campesinos involucrado en actividades delictivas. Aparentemente, otro grupo consideró conveniente usar la cubierta del "escuadrón de la muerte").

[...]

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[PAGE 5]

[...] [PAGE 6]

[...]

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La Tarde estimó el 30 de noviembre que un centenar de campesinos dejaron sus hogares en los distritos de El Quetzal, La Reforma, Nuevo Progreso y San Cristóbal Cucho en el departamento de San Marcos debido a "secuestros y violencia en la zona". (Comentario: La nueva izquierda El grupo guerrillero, ORPA, ha estado activo en el área. El ejército irrumpió en sus campamentos cerca de San Cristóbal Cucho (ver más arriba bajo "gobierno") a principios de este mes.

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[PAGE 7]

[...] [PÁGINA 8]

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ORIGIN ACTION

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FROM AmEmbassy GUATEMALA

DATE: 21 FEB 80

SUBJECT (U) VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NOVEMBER 1979

REF

(LOU) STATISTICS FOR NOVEMBER. Tallies from the press and other sources of violent deaths which possibly involved human rights abuses in November continued to reflect in large measure extremist activities of the far right and left. The latter, emboldened no doubt by events in neighboring countries, attacked Army personnel on several occasions. While satisfactorily guerrillas killed by the Army show up as victims of the Army, clearly no one could categorize all such deaths as a consequence of government repression. We try to sort out those killed in clashes and those killed after being taken prisoner.

The tallies below cover three major categories and several sub-categories: (1) deaths for which political motive seems probable; (2) those which cannot be identified as political; and (3) those attributed to the never clearly defined anti-criminal "death squads," largely on the admittedly imprecise basis of circumstances of the death and the location of the body.

The "probable" category is subdivided into victims of the right and left extremists, as near as we can gauge them, and alleged or actual victims of the Army or police; a few fall under the "impossible to determine" category. For statistical purposes, all "death squad" or "possibly death squad" are counted in with the tallies for the right.

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Coauthors and Classification Approved by: DCM:MESinn

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(H 25)

P 1

November 1979 Deaths

Probably Political

Possibly Political

"Death Squad" (Anti-criminal)

*02

9

**12

TOTAL

EXCISE

* Includes 33 deaths in guerrilla/Army clashes

**Includes 6 probably "death squad" and 6 possible "death squad." The possible victims could also be gang war or ordinary criminal victims.

We catalog the 62 probably politically-inspired deaths as follows: two comisionados militares (unpaid police informants and recruiters), three police from the narcotics squad, one plantation administrator, 23 soldiers, 2 servants, 11 campesinos, 17 presumed guerrillas, one journalist, a farmer, and one unidentified young man believed to be either a guerrilla or an informer.

"Probable Political" Deaths, including
"Death Squad" victims, by action of:

Rightist extremists ("death squad" in parentheses)	26 (12)
Leftist extremists	31
Army	*15
Police	** 0
Impossible to determine	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	74

*Includes 8 killed in Army clashes with guerrillas

**See government section for incidents possibly involving police.

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(C) OSTENSIBLE GOVERNMENT-RELATED VIOLENCE. On November 25 the Army (according to its public relations office) attacked a unit of leftist guerrillas of the ORPA (Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms) band near San Cristóbal Cucho, San Marcos Department, killing seven. Three soldiers were wounded. (Comment: According to 17 soldiers and 14 guerrillas died. See 79 Guatemala 7921.) **B 1**

(U) On November 14 the Christian Democratic Party (DCG) denounced the beating and attempted abduction near Rabinal, Baja Verapaz, of a local party leader, Pedro CHEN, by gunmen, one of whom was identified as being dressed in the uniform of a municipal policeman. Neighbors helped Chen escape his would-be captors.

According to press reports, on November 11, men claiming to be police, shot down German FRANCO Cruz at his home in Guatemala City after he resisted their efforts to abduct him in a car with license plates covered up.

Another press report states that men claiming to be police took Aníbal REGALADO Monzón from his home in Atescatempa, Jutiapa Department, on November 15. The next day his body was found with signs of torture and bullet wounds near Asunción Mita.

OSTENSIBLE LEFTIST GUERRILLA VIOLENCE. On November 27 in San Juan Cotzal, El Quiché Department, an EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor) band attacked an Army mobile unit. The commander of the unit and two soldiers were wounded, but killed one of the guerrillas (79 Guatemala 7921).

On November 16 in Guatemala City, the EGP attacked a mobile unit of the National Police narcotics squad. They killed three detectives and seriously wounded the chief of the narcotics squad (79 Guatemala 7819).

The EGP ambushed an Army civic action unit in Chicamán (near Uspantán) in El Quiché Department on November 23. They killed 2 soldiers and wounded five (79 Guatemala 7849).

According to La Hora, the EGP tried on November 4 to seize the military outpost at Ixcán (not more specifically identified), Huehuetenango Department. Reportedly four soldiers and two women (cook and laundress) were killed. The Army denied the story and publicly warned against those spreading

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False reports, stating that only the Army can give an accurate account of incidents involving the Army. La Hora said the Army press office stalled when it asked for verification. (Comment: A high government source confirmed the incident privately to the Embassy. See 79 Guatemala 7651.)

Two comisionados militares and one ex-comisionado militar were killed in different parts of the country, one in San Marcos on November 9, one in Quezaltenango on November 10, and another in Baja Verapaz on November 21. Circumstances suggest that at least the first two were victims of leftist reprisals.

Guerrilla groups continued to occupy villages trying to recruit, distributed propaganda leaflets, and occasionally exploded bombs, some of which shoot leaflets up into the air. Significant incidents include the EGP occupation of San Juan Ixcay, Huehuetenango Department, on November 4. A contingent of the guerrillas detained Americans at the edge of town for several hours (79 Guatemala 7650). This is the first recorded instance of significant anti-foreign activity in Huehuetenango Department.

Later in the month the ORPA group took over San Cristóbal Cucho. The forty raiders were commanded, according to the Army, by two women, "Vilma" and "América." As noted above, the same group clashed with the Army on November 25. ORPA also took over Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán, Sololá Department, near Lake Atitlán, on November 4 where it delivered propaganda speeches to some 600 persons. The Army denied the takeover although the police confirmed the incident.

On November 12, presumed guerrillas assaulted an armored car in Quezaltenango, stealing an unspecified amount of money.

On November 23, the administrator of the Las Conchas plantation in Quezaltenango was robbed and killed. Presumed guerrillas stole, according to one report, \$100,000.

(U) OSTENSIBLE RIGHTIST EXTREMIST VIOLENCE. On November 13, the so-called CERO (zero) organization left a note on the tortured corpse of Miguel Angel MENDIZABAL Córdova near Ocós in San Marcos Department. It read, "Executed by CERO Southwest."

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On November 18 at El Tumbador, San Marcos Department, the tortured body of an unidentified man was found with the note, "Killed by CERO Southwest for being a member of the EGP." (Comment: CERO, probably a phantom group, had not resurfaced since January 1979 (79 Guatemala A-15). Many of the earlier killings attributed to it were of alleged criminal elements.)

The newspaper reporter and union leader (SIMCOS) José León CASTANEDA Juárez died in the hospital on November 16, apparently after a severe beating. His name appeared on an early "death list" of the Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA), another phantom group (79 Guatemala 7745).

Twelve men dressed in dark blue uniforms (uniforms not further described or attributed to an official government authority) according to press reports seized eight campesinos on November 26 from around La Reforma and El Quetzal in San Marcos Department. On November 29 the bodies of eight persons were found tied to trees and shot near Nuevo Progreso, San Marcos. The judge ordered the bodies fingerprinted for identification. The press speculated that these were the bodies of the eight campesinos kidnapped earlier.

On November 30 a group of armed men seized five campesinos from the Finca (plantation) Maza near Coatepeque, Quezaltenango Department. The bodies of the five turned up the next day along the highway to Tilapa bound, blindfolded and riddled with bullets. The back of one bore a note: "Executed by the Death Squad." (Comment: "Death squad" has usually been an appellation for rightist vigilantes who kill criminal repeaters. Notes are not usually left. There is nothing to suggest the campesinos were involved in criminal activity. Apparently another group found it convenient to use the "death squad" cover.)

(U) DEATH SQUAD ACTIVITY. The 12 presumed "death squad" victims were generally typical of such killings, that is, most were identifiable criminal repeaters; some had just been released from prison. In one case in Zacapa, the criminal, Carlos Humberto GARCIA Archila, was being transported in a police vehicle to a hospital when the vehicle was intercepted. Armed men took him away. We know nothing further about his status. The accompanying police were not reported as having been threatened or harmed.

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(U) IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE. Six men dressed in olive green, kidnapped from his home in Nuevo Progreso, San Marcos Department, the agricultor Tomás Francisco LOPEZ Rosales on November 21. His tortured body was found hours later in Coatepeque, Quezaltenango Department. (Comment: Both right and left extremists make use of the olive green uniforms. An agricultor could be a campesino or a better-off farmer.)

On November 30 on the Finca La Igualdad near San Cristóbal Cucho the body of a young man was hung on a rude cross, having been severely tortured. His fingers had been destroyed to prevent identification. The press speculated that the man was a guerrilla or may have informed on the ORPA unit attacked by the Army unit (see above under "government.")

(LOU) HUMAN RIGHTS ATMOSPHERICS. The rightist MLN party announcement of the formation of a national front against communist subversion caused much concern among moderate as well as leftist political groups. The MLN sought to embrace the Army, which quickly warned that it had constitutional responsibility to combat subversion, that the military was apolitical, and that paramilitary groups were illegal (79 Guatemala 7619).

Soon thereafter Nuevo Diario published a summary of the first bulletin from MANO (Organized Nationalist Anti-communist Movement) "of the second epoch." MANO (better known as the White Hand) denounced the various guerrilla groups in Guatemala, charged that university students were promoting crisis throughout Guatemala, stated that students Ciani (78 Guatemala 6712) and Cortez (79 Guatemala 7105) were alive and active in the EGP, and threatened the press if it failed to publish its communique.

Vice President Villagrán Kramer, closely associated with human rights pronouncements on Guatemala, told the press November 26 he was considering resigning as of January 1980 as a consequence of the Lucas government's having failed to achieve various human rights related goals (79 Guatemala 7840). Although this was not the first time the Vice President indicated he might resign, his audience seemed more inclined to take him at his word this time. Speculation began promptly as to his possible successor. To date he has not resigned.

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The radical CNUS labor organization asked that Amnesty International, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations investigate human rights violations here. It listed the names of 42 campesinos it said disappeared from villages in El Quiché Department, without specifying the period in question.

Campesinos from Chimaltenango Department on November 12 visited Prensa Libre and La Nación to complain of harrassment by "security forces." "Agents in olive green," they said, visited various homes asking "where are the guerrillas?" They also complained that their young men were "recruited by force" and the wives and children of these men were left without support. (Comment: Impressment is a common Army recruitment device in Indian areas.) They also told reporters that automobiles without license plates are "notorious" in the area and "carry plainclothesmen" whom they presume are "secret police."

La Tarde on November 30 estimated a hundred campesinos have left their homes in the districts of El Quetzal, La Reforma, Nuevo Progreso and San Cristóbal Cucho in San Marcos Department because of "kidnappings and violence in the area." (Comment: The new leftist guerrilla group, ORPA, has been active in the area. The Army raided one of their encampments near San Cristóbal Cucho (see above under "government") earlier in the month.)

Some positive events in the human rights area took place in November. Of particular interest was the interpellation of Minister of Government Donaldo Alvarez by Congress on November 19 on violence and human rights. The Christian Democratic (DCG) opposition requested he be interpellated, although this prerogative is usually not granted the opposition minority. Alvarez told the press he was very willing to appear and shortly thereafter did, to the surprise of many including the press. The DCG submitted "general" rather than "specific" questions which were easily fielded by the Minister. The DCG said it was not satisfied with the Minister's answers, but politically the Christian Democrats came off second best in the debate (79 Guatemala 7970).

Director of the Electoral Registry Walfre Orlando DEL VALLE assured the press there would be full guarantees for all the parties in the 1980 municipal elections. He did this in response to doubts expressed by the opposition about the

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legal processes (79 Guatemala 7536).

Transnational nickel mining and smelting company EXMIBAL came away from labor negotiations smelling like a rose. After a minor dispute got out of hand, company officials sat down with officials from the Ministry of Labor and workers' representatives and worked out a collective bargaining agreement that won plaudits from the workers. Included in the agreement was a provision to recognize whatever union the workers wanted to set up. The leftist CNT labor confederation in a unique step praised the contract as a victory for the workers. (Comment: Company officials visited the Embassy before and after the negotiations to discuss the labor situation in Guatemala. The local president of the company told us the company was pleased with the outcome of the negotiations, and gave us a copy of the contract to be made available to other companies seeking guidance. At a time when so many unions are complaining of repression, it is heartening to see serious effort by management and labor to resolve issues with good will.)

After an initial delay, the government authorized a demonstration requested by the leftist FUR party of the late Manuel COLOM Argueta. The demonstration, publicized as sponsored by the Democratic Front Against Repression, was held on November 7 without incident. Occasion for the demonstration was simply described as "repression," but included a protest over the disappearance of student Cortez Mejia (79 Guatemala A-77).

(U) STATISTICS. Of the 62 probable political deaths, 12 were in the Indian highlands, 4 in Guatemala City, and 36 in the Pacific lowlands.

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[...]

From: NFAC/Oficina de Operaciones Actuales
CONTENIDO:

1. Guatemala: Éxitos de la Contrainsurgencia
2. [TACHADO]

1. Guatemala: //La ofensiva más grande hasta la fecha llevada a cabo por el ejército guatemalteco aparentemente ha interrumpido un importante frente guerrillero en las tierras altas occidentales. //(C NF)

//El Jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército, Lucas, recientemente inició una operación de barrido importante en respuesta al aumento de los ataques de la guerrilla contra los centros de población en los departamentos de Chimaltenango y Quiché del Sur. El ejército afirma haber matado a 55 guerrilleros y, según informes, desmanteló varias áreas de base que incluían grandes depósitos de alimentos y armas y extensos túneles subterráneos.//

[TACHADO]

//Para obtener respaldo para su programa de contrainsurgencia, el ejército continúa tratando de mejorar su imagen con los civiles. Este esfuerzo está fortalecido por la violencia de la guerrilla, que está causando que los campesinos busquen cada vez más ayuda militar.

[TACHADO]

[PÁGINA 1]

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[TACHADO]

[PÁGINA 2]

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DIRHAVINVSERV WASHDC
USICA WASHDC
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IN; 8AF BARKSDALE AFB LA/INZE; 15AF HARCH AFB CA/INZE; 928MW
FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN, 12 TIS BERGSTROM AFB FOR INI.

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FROM: NFAC/OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

THERE WAS NO LAB 332 FOR 3 DECEMBER 1981

CONTENTS:

1. GUATEMALA: COUNTERSURGENCY SUCCESSES
2. [REDACTED]

1. GUATEMALA: //THE LARGEST OFFENSIVE CONDUCTED TO
DATE BY THE GUATEMALAN MILITARY APPARENTLY HAS DISRUPTED A
MAJOR GUERRILLA FRONT IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS. // (C NF)

//ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF LUCAS RECENTLY INITIATED A
MAJOR SWEEP OPERATION IN RESPONSE TO INCREASED GUERRILLA
ATTACKS ON POPULATION CENTERS IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF
CHIMALTENANGO AND SOUTHERN QUICHE. THE ARMY CLAIMS TO

PAGE 2 RUEAIIA 4577 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
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CINCUSNAVEUR
RUFIAAA/15TH AF HARCH AFB
NPIC
RUMMATA/928MW FAIRCHILD AFB
CMDR 193RD INF BDE
RULPAPA/24 COMPW HOWARD AFB
COMUSNAVSO FT AMADOR
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
FICEURLANT NORFOLK V
HQ MAC SCOTT AFB IL
CDR ITAC
DEPT OF LABOR
DIRNSA
USDOE FORRESTAL BLDG
RUEDGAA/21AD HANCOCK FLD NY
RUMBOA/24AD MALMSTROM AFB
RUWJBKA/25AD MCCORD AFB

PAGE 5 RUEAIIA 4577 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
HAVE KILLED 55 GUERRILLAS AND REPORTEDLY DISMANTLED
SEVERAL BASE AREAS THAT INCLUDED LARGE FOOD AND ARMS
CACHES AND EXTENSIVE UNDERGROUND TUNNELS. // (C NF)

//TO GAIN BACKING FOR ITS COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM,
THE ARMY IS CONTINUING TO TRY TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE WITH
CIVILIANS. THIS EFFORT IS BEING AIDED BY GUERRILLA
VIOLENCE, WHICH IS CAUSING PEASANTS TO LOOK INCREASINGLY
TO THE MILITARY FOR HELP.

PAGE 3 RUEAIIA 4577 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
RUWJBKA/26AD LUKE AFB ARIZ
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RUWTPGA/12TIS BERGSTROM AFB
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RUHJOFA/3 AD ANDERSEN AFB
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FOR LAB; CINCEUR FOR POLAD; CINCSO FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY
FOR STATE REP AND CIA REP; NAVY WAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT
REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN MRS BECK DADS; COMUSARMY FT MEADE FOR
SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ TAC FOR
TACOPS/INOI; HQS DSA FOR CIS; BERGSTROM AFB TEX FOR 67TH TRW
DO; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INOCH XPNH; HQ MAC SCOTT

PAGE 6 RUEAIIA 4577 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON

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CAS, Date 11/22/00

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GUATEM 00248 120008Z

12 2318Z ENERO 82

FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA

TO SEC STATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7268

[...]

SUBJ: Aldea en el departamento de San Marcos supuestamente atemorizada, dejando al menos 38 muertos; Las guerrillas mantienen alto nivel de violencia en el país

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 0210

1. (U)

Los informes de la prensa guatemalteca de los días 9 y 10 de enero reportan la tortura y muerte de hasta 50 personas de un área cercana a San Marcos y San Pedro Sacatepéquez, departamento de San Marcos. De los relatos algo contradictorios del incidente, parece que el 1 o 3 de enero, aproximadamente 200 hombres armados no identificados tomaron el pequeño pueblo de San Francisco El Tablon (incorrectamente identificado en algunas cuentas de prensa como San Francisco El Tablero). Los hombres armados prendieron fuego a la ciudad, incendiaron unas 20 casas y secuestraron, en una cuenta, a unos 60 de los aldeanos. Un informe dijo que las mujeres fueron violadas durante el incidente.

Lo que parece ser la mejor cuenta informada dijo que los incidentes no llegaron

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a la atención de las autoridades hasta el 9 de enero, cuando se encuentran 20 cadáveres en Sacuchun, Dolores, con signos de tortura y estrangulamiento. Se encontraron seis cuerpos quemados en San Francisco El Tablero, y más tarde se encontraron 12 cuerpos en las cercanías de San Cristóbal Cucho. Según los informes, una de las víctimas era un "comisionado militar". No hubo más informes sobre el resto de los 60 aldeanos originalmente reunidos. Se dijo que los sobrevivientes del incidente huían del área en masa.

2. (C) COMENTARIO: Ninguna información específica sobre los atacantes ha llegado a la embajada fuera de los informes de prensa, ni ha habido un comunicado de prensa oficial de GOG sobre el tema. De las víctimas identificadas hasta ahora, ninguna tiene nombres indios obvios. Los informes de tortura y estrangulamiento (y posibles incidentes de violación) sugieren el modus operandi de la extrema derecha. Si los guerrilleros fueran responsables, como podría indicar la muerte de un "comisionado militar", sugeriría un nuevo nivel de salvajismo por parte

de ellos con posibles connotaciones de la "guerra racial" largamente temida por la derecha. La muerte de un "comisionado militar" (es decir, un oficial de reclutamiento local del GOG) podría haber sido fabricada para hacer parecer que los guerrilleros eran responsables de estas atrocidades. El Ministro de Defensa Mendoza no adelantó esta hipótesis cuando el Embajador planteó el incidente anterior con él el 11 de enero. Fin del comentario.

3. (U) Los enfrentamientos entre las guerrillas y las fuerzas de seguridad han sido numerosos en los últimos días. El 8 de enero, 16 guerrilleros fueron asesinados en un encuentro con el ejército en una colina cerca de la ciudad de San José Poaquil, departamento de Chimaltenango, sin víctimas informadas del gobierno. El 9 de enero, se registraron cinco enfrentamientos en el departamento de Quiché, en o cerca de las localidades de Joyabaj, Zacualpa, Patzite, San Antonio Llotenango y Cunen. No se dieron cifras de bajas. Según los informes, el 10 de enero un enfrentamiento en la zona de Xesic, departamento de Quiché, dejó 24 guerrilleros muertos y ninguna víctima de GOG. El mismo día, se informó que aproximadamente 70 familias huyeron de la ciudad de Nenton, departamento de Huehuetenango, luego del hostigamiento de la guerrilla. En el este, se informó que un estimado de 70 guerrilleros cruzaron la frontera hacia

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Honduras después de que los campesinos notificaron a las autoridades de su presencia. (reftel proporciona detalles adicionales.) Se dice que las Fuerzas Especiales hondureñas se movilizaron en la zona de San Antonio La Paz, el departamento de El Progreso, el alcalde, el secretario, un policía y 2 transeúntes fueron asesinados durante un ataque al ayuntamiento por pistoleros desconocidos el 8 de enero.

4. (Lou) comento: a medida que el número y los incidentes de ferocidad aumentan, se está volviendo difícil que la embajada atribuya la responsabilidad de esa fuente en particular. Fin del comentario.
Chapin.

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FM AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7268
INFO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY BELIZE
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE IM/IPS/CR/TR # Date: 1/20/97
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☐ DENY IN PART

FOIA Exemptions _____ TS authority
PA Exemptions _____ ☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C Sec. _____
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C

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E.O. 12065: GDS 1/12/88 (GRAHAM, RICHARD C.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, ASEC, GT
SUBJ: (U) VILLAGE IN SAN MARCOS DEPARTMENT REPORTEDLY
TERRORIZED, LEAVING AT LEAST 38 DEAD; GUERRILLAS
MAINTAIN HIGH LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN COUNTRY

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 0210

1. (U) GUATEMALAN PRESS ACCOUNTS OF JANUARY 9 AND 10 REPORT
THE TORTURE AND DEATH OF UP TO 50 PERSONS FROM AN AREA NEAR
SAN MARCOS AND SAN PEDRO SACATEPEQUEZ, SAN MARCOS
DEPARTMENT. FROM THE SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTORY ACCOUNTS OF
THE INCIDENT, IT APPEARS THAT ON JANUARY 1 OR 3,
APPROXIMATELY 200 UNIDENTIFIED ARMED MEN TOOK OVER THE
SMALL VILLAGE OF SAN FRANCISCO EL TABLON (INCORRECTLY
IDENTIFIED IN SOME PRESS ACCOUNTS AS SAN FRANCISCO EL
TABLERO). THE ARMED MEN SET FIRE TO THE TOWN, BURNING
SOME 20 HOUSES AND KIDNAPPING, BY ONE ACCOUNT, SOME 60 OF
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THE VILLAGERS. ONE REPORT SAID THAT WOMEN WERE RAPED
DURING THE INCIDENT. WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE BEST
INFORMED ACCOUNT SAID THAT THE INCIDENTS DID NOT COME

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TO THE ATTENTION OF THE AUTHORITIES UNTIL JANUARY 9, WHEN 20 BODIES WERE FOUND IN SACUCHUN, DOLORES WITH SIGNS OF TORTURE AND STRANGULATION. SIX BURNED BODIES WERE FOUND IN SAN FRANCISCO EL TABLERO, AND LATER 12 BODIES WERE FOUND IN NEARBY SAN CRISTOBAL CUCHO. ONE OF THE VICTIMS WAS REPORTEDLY A "MILITARY COMMISSIONER". THERE WERE NO FURTHER REPORTS ON THE REMAINDER OF THE 60 VILLAGERS ORIGINALLY ROUNDED UP. SURVIVORS OF THE INCIDENT WERE SAID TO BE FLEEING THE AREA EN MASSE.

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2. (C) COMMENT: NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON THE ATTACKERS HAS REACHED THE EMBASSY OUTSIDE OF PRESS REPORTS, NOR HAS THERE BEEN AN OFFICIAL GOG PRESS RELEASE ON THE SUBJECT. OF THE VICTIMS SO FAR IDENTIFIED, NONE HAVE OBVIOUS INDIAN NAMES. REPORTS OF TORTURE AND STRANGULATION (AND POSSIBLE INCIDENTS OF RAPE) SUGGEST THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE EXTREME RIGHT. IF THE GUERRILLAS WERE RESPONSIBLE, AS THE DEATH OF A "MILITARY COMMISSIONER" MIGHT INDICATE, IT WOULD SUGGEST A NEW LEVEL OF SAVAGERY ON THEIR PART, WITH POSSIBLE OVERTONES OF THE "RACIAL WAR" LONG FEARED BY THE RIGHT. THE REPORTED DEATH OF A "MILITARY COMMISSIONER" (I.E. A LOCAL GOG RECRUITING OFFICER) COULD HAVE BEEN FABRICATED TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT GUERRILLAS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS OUTRAGE. MINISTER OF DEFENSE MENDOZA DID NOT ADVANCE THIS HYPOTHESIS WHEN THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE ABOVE INCIDENT WITH HIM JANUARY 11. END COMMENT.

3. (U) CLASHES BETWEEN GUERRILLAS AND SECURITY FORCES HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS. ON JANUARY 8, 16 GUERRILLAS WERE REPORTED KILLED IN AN ENCOUNTER WITH
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THE ARMY ON A HILL NEAR THE TOWN OF SAN JOSE POAQUIL, CHIMALTENANGO DEPARTMENT, WITH NO REPORTED GOVERNMENT CASUALTIES. ON JANUARY 9, FIVE CLASHES WERE RECORDED IN QUICHE DEPARTMENT IN OR NEAR THE TOWNS OF JOYABAJ, ZACUALPA, PATZITE, SAN ANTONIO LLOTENANGO, AND CUNEN. NO CASUALTY FIGURES WERE GIVEN. ON JANUARY 10, A CLASH IN THE AREA OF XESIC, QUICHE DEPARTMENT, REPORTEDLY LEFT 24 GUERRILLAS DEAD AND NO GOG CASUALTIES. ON THE SAME DAY, IT WAS REPORTED THAT AN ESTIMATED 70 FAMILIES FLED THE TOWN OF NENTON, HUEHUETENANGO DEPARTMENT FOLLOWING HARRASSMENT BY THE GUERRILLAS. IN THE EAST, IT WAS REPORTED THAT AN ESTIMATED SEVENTY GUERRILLAS CROSSED THE BORDER INTO

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HONDURAS AFTER CAMPESESINOS NOTIFIED THE AUTHORITIES OF THEIR PRESENCE. (REFTEL PROVIDES ADDITIONAL DETAILS.) HONDURAN SPECIAL FORCES ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED IN THE AREA. IN SAN ANTONIO LA PAZ, EL PROGRESO DEPARTMENT, THE MAYOR, SECRETARY, A POLICEMAN, AND 2 BYSTANDERS WERE KILLED DURING AN ATTACK ON THE CITY HALL BY UNKNOWN GUNMEN ON JANUARY8.

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4. (LOU) COMMENT: AS THE NUMBER AND FEROCITY OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS INCREASE, IT IS BECOMING DIFFICULT FOR THE EMBASSY TO ATTRIBUTE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM TO ANY PARTICULAR SOURCE. END COMMENT.
CHAPIN

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OFICINA DE
INTELIGENCIA
Y LA INVESTIGACIÓN

EVALUACIONES
Y INVESTIGACIÓN

(U) La guerrilla de Guatemala se retira ante la presión del gobierno

Resumen

Desde el comienzo de 1983, Guatemala ha disfrutado de un respiro de la insurgencia que ha envuelto al país por más de cuatro años. El éxito del gobierno con varias estrategias políticas y militares ha obligado a la guerrilla a hacer una pausa para reconsiderar la forma en que han estado operando. El gobierno ha demostrado a los guatemaltecos de áreas rurales, la mayoría de los cuales son indios, que sus intereses se benefician mejor al apoyarlo.

El presidente Ríos Montt ha caracterizado su enfoque de la insurgencia como uno de "fusiles y frijoles". Aquellos que se perciben como partidarios del gobierno son recompensados con alimentos por trabajo, vivienda si han sido desplazados y otras formas de generosidad gubernamental. Quienes perciben que no apoyan al gobierno se encuentran con la fuerza que se considere necesaria.

Ríos se ha movido hábilmente para sacar la carta india de la guerrilla al enfatizar la parte "frijoles" de su política. Él ha intentado rectificar la marginación política antiguo de los indios por nombrando 10 de ellos al Consejo de Estado de 30 miembros, que lo asesora en asuntos legislativos. Para mejorar su condición económica, ha organizado Consejos de Desarrollo Local en las ciudades principales del Departamento de El Quiché (ver mapa, página 2), donde históricamente la guerrilla ha sido más fuerte. De manera similar, su política de "3Ts" ("Techo, Trabajo, Tortilla" o "Housing, Jobs, Food") ha involucrado al gobierno en gran medida en programas sociales en las tierras altas (altiplano).

La organización de incluso las aldeas más remotas, la población indígena en las Fuerzas de Defensa Civil (FDC)

Reporte 565-AR
3 Marzo 1983

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es la clave del reciente progreso militar del gobierno. Las tácticas militares anteriores se caracterizaron por barridos a gran escala a través de las aldeas, y luego el reabandono a la guerrilla.

Los indios no tuvieron más remedio que ayudar a cualquier fuerza que estuviera en su región en ese momento. Las tácticas actuales son mantener a las fuerzas gubernamentales siempre presentes, ya sea FDC o pequeñas unidades patrullando desde muchas bases recién establecidas.

La presencia de FCD, junto con los programas de acción cívica del gobierno, ha afectado seriamente la disposición de los indios a extender el apoyo logístico, el refugio seguro y la buena voluntad a los insurgentes.

Aunque Cuba y Nicaragua han provisto a los insurgentes con algunas armas, y otros países del bloque [soviética] han proporcionado entrenamiento, los grupos insurgentes son esencialmente de carácter guatemalteco. El Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), de línea cubana, que tiene de 1,000 a 1,300 combatientes, opera principalmente en la porción norte del altiplano y hasta hace poco era considerada la organización guerrillera más fuerte. Actualmente su lugar está siendo desafiado por la organización menos marxista y profesional del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA), que tiene 600-800 combatientes y opera principalmente en la parte sur del altiplano.

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BY *amf* NARA, DATE 10/21/89

NSC-White House *GUATEMALA*
GREEN

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(U) GUATEMALA'S GUERRILLAS RETREATING IN THE
FACE OF GOVERNMENT PRESSURE

Summary

Since the beginning of 1983 Guatemala has enjoyed a respite from the insurgency which has engulfed the country for more than four years. Government success with several political and military strategies has forced the guerrillas to pause to reconsider the manner in which they have been operating. The government has demonstrated to rural Guatemalans, most of whom are Indians, that their interests are best served by supporting it.

President Rios Montt has characterized his approach to the insurgency as one of "rifles and beans." Those who are perceived to support the government are rewarded with food for work, housing if they have been displaced, and other forms of government largesse. Those perceived not to be in support of the government are met with whatever force is considered necessary.

Rios has moved deftly to draw the Indian card from the guerrillas by emphasizing the "beans" portion of his policy. He has attempted to rectify the longstanding political marginalization of the Indians by naming 10 of them to the 30-member Council of State, which advises him on legislative matters. To improve their economic condition, he has organized Local Development Councils in the principal cities of the Department of El Quiche (see map, p. 2), where the guerrillas historically have been strongest. Similarly, his "3Ts" ("Techo, Trabajo, Tortilla" or "Housing, Jobs, Food") policy has involved the government heavily in social programs throughout the highlands (altiplano).

Organization of even the most remote villages' Indian population into Civil Defense Forces (CDFs)

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Report 565-AR
March 3, 1983

is the key to the government's recent military progress. Previous military tactics were characterized by large-scale sweeps through villages, then reabandonment to the guerrillas. The Indians had no choice but to aid whichever force was in their region at the time. Current tactics are to keep government forces always present, either CDFs or small units on patrol from many newly established bases.

The presence of CDFs, coupled with the government's civic action programs, has impinged seriously upon the Indians' willingness to extend logistical support, safe haven, and good will to the insurgents.

Although Cuba and Nicaragua have supplied the insurgents with some weapons, and other bloc countries have supplied training, the insurgent groups are essentially Guatemalan in character. The Cuban-line Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), which has 1,000-1,300 combatants, operates primarily in the northern portion of the altiplano and until recently was considered the strongest guerrilla organization. Its place is currently being challenged by the professional and less Marxist Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), which has 600-800 combatants and operates primarily in the southern portion of the altiplano.

Because the army is focusing its efforts on controlling the EGP and ORPA, the Marxist-Leninist Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) also has seized the opportunity to challenge the EGP's recent supremacy. The FAR has between 150 and 300 very effective combatants located primarily in El Peten Department.

The only other group that has attempted to operate on any significant scale is the dissident wing of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT-D). The PGT-D has been almost destroyed by the army; it currently numbers far fewer than the 200 combatants it had in the summer of 1982.

These four groups in January 1982 formed an alliance known as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union. Beset by factional strife, it remains mostly a paper organization. Two other groups, the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT-O), and the People's Revolutionary Movement (MRP), play minor roles in the insurgency.

* * * * *

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URNG Alliance

Non-Functioning URNG Formed in Havana in 1982

The titular coordinating organization of the Guatemalan guerrilla groups, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), is little more than a paper organization. Bickering among its four members has consistently blocked any chance it might have had for development. The present decline in strength of the guerrilla groups has increased the strain within the URNG. It is unlikely that the URNG will ever act as a true command and control element for the Guatemalan guerrillas.

Union of the four guerrilla groups was first contemplated seriously in October 1980 in Managua. The Managua meeting established the URN, which was reworked into the URNG in Havana in January 1982.

The impetus for organization of the URNG was the Cuban desire to unify the Guatemalan armed left into a coherent national command structure similar to that of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador.

The URNG has not lived up to the expectations of its founders. Most URNG actions are so labeled after the fact; they are generally carried out by one of the groups without the assistance or foreknowledge of the others.


URNG's Four Member Organizations

The four insurgent organizations that make up the URNG are the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the dissident wing of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT-D).

The EGP operates primarily in the altiplano of the Departments of Huehuetenango and El Quiche. ORPA forces are concentrated to the south of the EGP in the mountains of San Marcos, Solola, and southwestern coastal Departments. The FAR focuses its attention on the northern Department of El Peten, and the PGT-D has operated primarily in Chimaltenango Department and Guatemala City.

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MEMBER GROUPS OF GUATEMALAN
NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY UNION (URNG)



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Command Structure Stillborn

The insurgents' goal of organizing a tactical command structure similar to the Managua-based United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) headquarters of the Salvadoran guerrillas never got beyond the planning stages. The URN/URNG's tactical command structure was to have been known as the General Revolutionary Command (CGR), comprising the leaders of each of the four member groups. Although the leaders have met occasionally in Managua, the CGR cannot be said to have become an organizational reality.

The reluctance of ORPA leader "Comandante Gaspar" (Rodrigo Asturias Amado) to attend regular meetings has made them impossible. FAR attendance has also been sporadic. As a result, the URNG has formed a Managua-based "commission" to act as its secretariat between meetings of the leaders. But no evidence has been received which would indicate that the URNG uses a dedicated radio network for transmission of orders from Nicaragua to Guatemala. Nor does it appear that URNG decisions promulgated in Managua (no matter how transmitted to the member organizations) are respected by the Guatemalan guerrillas.

In-Country Guerrillas Questioned CGR Right To Exist

The CGR's failure to become viable can be traced to guerrilla reluctance to receive direction from leaders who exchanged armed struggle in the field for the revolutionary good life in Managua or Mexico City. ORPA leaders and the in-country leadership of the EGP immediately questioned the decisions of the CGR and even its right to exist. Similarly, the political commission of the PGT-D questioned the right of its members to represent the PGT-D in the CGR.

Thus, the persons who organized the URN in 1980 and the URNG in 1982 have been de facto removed from authority for having deserted the field of battle. EGP leader "Rolando Moran" (Ricardo Arnoldo Ramirez de Leon) and PGT-D leader "Mario" (Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar) were "promoted" to the status of accredited representatives to Nicaragua, without any real command function. A similar fate could be in store for FAR leader "Pablo Monsanto" (Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia).

Personalismo Causes URNG Disunity

ORPA leader Asturias has been a primary contributor to the URNG's lack of success. Asturias is the only insurgent leader who has returned to the field since the 1980 Managua talks. His

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impatience with his URNG colleagues is such that he has repeatedly threatened to pull ORPA out of the URNG and go it alone. Nonetheless, he realizes the virtues of a unified armed opposition.

Asturias is not the URNG's only troublemaker. The official leaders of the three other guerrilla organizations, like Asturias, are classic Latin American caudillos. They are petty, brutal, egotistical strongmen who brook no dissent against their whims. The desire of each to be the Fidel Castro of Guatemala has made compromise and coalition extremely difficult.

URNG Member Groups Originated From PGT

All four URNG member groups trace their origins to the original Communist Party of Guatemala, the PGT, now known as the orthodox wing of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT-O). Nonetheless, their success as guerrilla organizations has been measured, at least until recently, by the distance they have come from the PGT on the issue of armed revolution and organization of the masses.

The PGT has always been an orthodox, Soviet-style communist party. It has consistently opposed armed struggle in Guatemala on the grounds that the masses "are not yet ready." It has not exploited the Indian issue or been successful in creating a mass base.

The PGT-D has moved one step away from the PGT-O by embracing armed struggle. It has, however, made little progress in the areas of Indian exploitation and mass support. The FAR has moved well forward with regard to mass support, but less so with regard to the Indian issue. ORPA has both integrated Indians into its units and obtained high levels of mass support.

The EGP until recently was clearly the leader among the insurgent groups because it has involved in its struggle all aspects of the Indian and rural societies. Only the EGP employs both Indian combatants and large groups of Local Irregular Forces (FILs) for logistical support. Also unique is its use of Indian languages for tactical communication. This integration of the Indian into EGP forces, while clearly the key to past successes, has turned out to be a double-edged sword. Recent government successes in regaining Indian support have injured the guerrilla groups in direct proportion to the extent to which they had depended on the Indians. Consequently, the EGP has been hurt most of all.

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The first group to split from the PGT was the FAR, in 1968. FAR leaders objected to PGT demands that the party's military wing (the FAR) be subordinate to the party's Central Committee, which felt that armed struggle was counterproductive if embarked upon prior to gaining sufficient mass support through political work. EGP founders split from the FAR the same year to form their organization "abroad" (the EGP returned to Guatemala in 1972). They had decided that the FAR's lack of appreciation of the Indian issue would always limit the possibilities for success. ORPA split from the FAR for similar reasons at about the same time, although it appears that ORPA leader Asturias also objected to the thorough-going Marxism of the FAR and the nascent EGP. The PGT-D, the most recent splinter group, separated from the PGT-O in 1978. The PGT-D's reasons for splitting off mirror those of the FAR; the PGT-D is, however, much less doctrinaire.

Weapons Obtained From Security Forces, Foreign Supporters

Guatemalan insurgents obtain many of their weapons through attacks on isolated national police posts and in-transit army units. Others are obtained from abroad. The type of weapon recovered from the guerrillas says a great deal about its source. Their attacks on the police would generally net them US-made M-1 rifles; their attacks on the army would yield Israeli-made Galil rifles.

American-made M-16 rifles are not used by the Guatemalan security services; hence, the guerrillas' are clearly imported. A few of them were in the US inventory in Vietnam. The Vietnamese probably did not ship these weapons directly to the insurgents. More likely, Cuba obtained them from Vietnam and then transferred them to the guerrillas. It is also possible that Vietnam sold some of them to international arms merchants to obtain foreign exchange and had no control over their subsequent transfer. Nonetheless, most M-16s probably are obtained by Cuba on the world arms market.

A Guatemalan Army report noting the number of weapons lost and recovered in recent months indicated that 30 "assault" rifles were recovered in the accounting period while 31 "Galil" rifles were lost. (The report does not indicate whether the rifles recovered were M-16s or Galils.) The same report notes that 15 M-1 rifles were lost and 3 recovered. Similarly, 83 grenades were lost and 129 recovered. In short, there appears to be a rough equilibrium between weapons lost by the government and recovered from the guerrillas.

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Numerous reports, particularly from government sources, state that imported guerrilla weaponry enters Guatemala from two primary supply lines, both originating in Cuba. One route is said to traverse Mexico, where it splits in two before entering Guatemala. The northern portion of this route would enter Guatemala in El Peten near the confluence of the Rio Usumacinta and the Rio de la Pasion, where weapons could be transferred to FAR guerrillas. The southern portion would enter Guatemala at several points, primarily in Huehuetenango, in order to supply EGP and ORPA guerrillas operating in the altiplano.

The other primary route, like the FMLN supply line, is believed to traverse Nicaragua and Honduras before entering Guatemala from the east. Although the British Forces Belize have stated repeatedly that no weapons enter Guatemala from Belize, it remains possible that a small number do, following shipment from Cuba or Nicaragua.

Two other sources of rifles for the insurgents have been the US and Mexico. In July 1982, the Guatemalan Army captured two American-made M-14 rifles. It was not possible to determine whether they came from Vietnam stocks. In August 1982, an attack on an ORPA camp netted several rifles of Mexican Army origin.

Government forces in the summer of 1981 attacked a Guatemala City arms trafficking center jointly administered by ORPA and the EGP. Documents found during the raid indicated that 28 vehicles modified to conceal weapons had been used by the insurgents to import weapons from Nicaragua and Mexico; the vehicles found at the scene obviously had traveled through both countries. Weapons found included US-made AR-15 rifles and Soviet grenades. All five guerrillas killed had been armed with M-16 rifles. Some of the center's weapons had been destined for the FAR.

Insurgents Regularly Use Mexican Territory for Supply, R&R

Three URNG member organizations make regular use of Mexican territory for supply and for rest and recuperation. In November 1982, a combined army/CDF patrol followed a guerrilla trail a short distance into Mexico and surprised 125 guerrillas in the act of unloading supplies from a twin-engine aircraft. Captured EGP documents included instructions on how to behave in Mexico in order not to jeopardize this safe haven.

Geographic proximity is the primary reason for the Guatemalan guerrillas' use of Mexican territory. All URNG members except the PGT-D operate in territory bordering Mexico.

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Ideology also helps explain guerrilla use of Mexican territory. For several years, Mexico has supported Central American "liberation movements" in international forums; recent information indicates that this policy will continue under President de la Madrid.

Guatemalan officials, including Rios Montt, regularly assert that Mexico condones large levels of arms smuggling through and guerrilla training centers on its territory. Repeated Guatemalan incursions into Mexico, however, have yet to yield solid evidence of this. What the Guatemalans consider guerrilla training centers are described by American Embassy personnel and international observers as refugee camps. It is likely that guerrillas residing in refugee camps cache their weapons in Guatemala and engage in training only at safe distances from the camps.

In January 1982, five FAR members were detained by the Mexican Army in the area of La Libertad, Chiapas State. Four of them were involved in purchasing food and medicine in Mexico and transporting it to El Peten. The fifth had entered Mexico to test the FAR's radio network to determine whether command and control could be established in Mexico should that become necessary.

The source of many problems related to the refugee camps has been their proximity to the border. Some are located within a few hundred yards of Guatemala. The Mexican authorities have started to reduce the potential for incidents by moving the camps back from the border.

Rifles and Beans Policy Guides Counterinsurgency

Since Rios Montt came to power on March 23, 1982, the government's counterinsurgency operations have been guided by his rifles and beans policy. Under this policy, persons who support the government are rewarded with food, work, and housing assistance from the National Reconstruction Committee. Those who oppose the government are met with force.

In much of 1982 the army guided its operations by labeling villages white, pink, and red. Friendly villages were white, enemy villages were red, and villages of uncertain allegiance were pink. Residents of red villages were warned to move to "strategic villages" or face the consequences when army operations were conducted in the area. This phase of the army's counterinsurgency operations has come almost to an end. The emphasis recently has been to move villagers back to the abandoned villages; the government hopes to finish the moves before the 1983 spring planting.

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In recent months the army has effectively blended food aid, civic action, and the formation of CDFs into its strategy for dealing with the various types of villages. Civic action programs and CDFs are readily organized in the "white" villages. In "pink" ones, exceptional care is spent in determining who should hold CDF leadership positions. Residents of the few remaining "red" villages no doubt would do well to leave them.

Both Sides Have Engaged in Massacres

Allegations that the army has regularly massacred every man, woman, and child in "red" villages are countless. Many of these reports are fabricated. Nonetheless, government responsibility for at least two such incidents is well established.

In September 1982, about 70 civilians, including women and children, were killed by army troops near La Estancia de la Virgen in Chimaltenango. In December, troops killed every one of the several hundred inhabitants of the region known as Los Dos R's in El Peten, including members of the recently formed CDF.

The guerrillas have committed similar atrocities. In June in El Quiche the EGP killed 120 men, women, and children in the village of Chacalte. In May, EGP members killed 20 people in the Alta Verapaz village of Salacuin; and a like number were massacred in April by insurgents in the Chimaltenango village of Chipiacul. Numerous other such incidents have been documented.

Both Sides Are Responsible for Depopulated Areas

Both the government and the guerrillas have carried out programs designed to depopulate contested areas. The army has often notified residents of remote villages that they must move to the nearest "strategic village" or be considered guerrilla sympathizers and face the consequences. The guerrillas likewise have ordered people to leave their villages and move to areas beyond the army's reach.

Recent government tactics, however, have aimed at repopulating villages abandoned during the fighting. This policy follows several months of repeated government successes in counterinsurgency operations. But when the government recently urged the 1,600 former residents of Barrillas, a village in northwestern Huehuetenango, to return to their homes, the EGP countered with propaganda urging the people to fight alongside the EGP, not

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
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against their brothers. Only some 60 people returned to their homes in the two weeks following this interchange.

Insurrection Led by EGP in Recent Years

EGP Most Hurt by Army Gains

In the past few years the most powerful Guatemalan insurgent organization was the Cuban-line Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP). Army gains in 1982, however, harmed the EGP more than its URNG comrades. As a result, ORPA appears to be the government's chief threat in 1983.



Although also active elsewhere, the EGP is based in the altiplano Departments of El Quiche and Huehuetenango. The EGP's 1,000-1,300 combatants are organized in six fronts (see chart, p. 10). Local Irregular Forces (FILs) of Indians and campesinos provide logistical support; some of them have received training in the use of firearms.

The EGP's success in recent years led the army during 1982 to focus most of its resources on containing EGP fronts. The Tigres task force was deployed in northern El Quiche and the Gumarcaj task force in the southern part of the province to deal with the Ho Chi Minh front. The last of the three original task forces, the Iximche task force, was deployed in Chimaltenango to combat the Sandino front. The task force concept, and the small-unit patrolling that accompanies it, has been so successful that the government has recently created two more to contain ORPA and another to deal with the FAR.

Inclusion of Indians Key to EGP Successes and Failures

The EGP has emphasized the value to the insurgency of the Indian and has occasionally used Indian languages in its tactical communications and propaganda. It has made considerable propaganda headway with its claims that the government is engaged in a campaign of genocide against the Indians.

As the government has gained Indian supporters through its rifles and beans policy, however, the EGP's dependency on the Indians has become a liability. EGP infrastructure has withered

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
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**THE GUERRILLA FRONTS
OF THE EGP**

1. SACATEPEQUEZ
2. GUATEMALA (capital)
3. SANTA ROSA
4. ESCUINTLA
5. CHIMALTENANGO
6. SUCHITEPEQUEZ

7. RETALHULEU
8. SOLOLA
9. TOTONICAPAN
10. QUEZALTENANGO
11. SAN MARCOS
12. HUEHUETENANGO


13. EL QUICHE
14. BAJA VERAPAZ
15. ALTA VERAPAZ
16. EL PETEN
17. IZABAL
18. ZACAPA
19. EL PROGRESO
20. JALAPA
21. CHIQUIMULA
22. JUTIAPA



- YON SOSA
- OTTO RENE CASTILLO
- AUGUSTO CESAR SANDINO
- TURCIOS LIMA
- ERNESTO GUEVARA
- HO CHI MINH

**MAP OF THE
INDIGENOUS POPULATION**

1. QUICHE
2. CAKCHIQUEL
3. TZUTUJIL
4. USPANTECO
5. MAM
6. AGUACATECO
7. JACALTECO
8. KANJOBAL
9. CHUJ
10. IXIL
11. KEKCHI
12. POCOMCHI
13. POCOMAM ORIENTAL
14. POCOMAM CENTRAL
15. ACHI
16. CHORTI
17. LACANDON CHOL
18. LACANDON NORTE
19. YUCATECO
20. MOPAU
21. ITZA
22. CARIBE ARAGUACO



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away as the Indians have enrolled in CDFs and received government largesse. Villages with competent CDFs have been particularly ill-advised targets for the EGP.

EGP Governed by National Directorate

The EGP has been governed since 1974 by a National Directorate. The Directorate is known to include Silvia Solorzano Foppa ("Rita" or "La Chapurra"), Victor Manuel Lopez Vasquez ("Vicente"), Jovita Isabel Ayula de Lopez ("Josefina"), and "Juan Jose." The Guatemalan Government believes that all members of the Directorate have fled Guatemala in the face of the army's 1982 offensive.

Julio Cesar Macias Mayora ("Cesar Montes"), age 40, founder of the EGP, was reported to have retired to Mexico in 1979 when his health failed after years of guerrilla life. The current official leader of the EGP, 52-year-old Ricardo Arnolde Ramirez de Leon ("Rolando Moran"), has not returned to Guatemala since attending the 1980 Managua talks. The EGP's forces are currently led by "Comandante Manolo," whose true name is not known.

EGP Headquarters Could Be in Ixil Triangle or Mexico

Little information has been received on the location of the EGP's operational headquarters, although it is well known that the EGP initiated its organizational phase near the Ixcan River in northeastern Huehuetenango Department in 1972. Considering the losses recently taken by the EGP, it is possible that its operational headquarters has been moved to Mexico.

Until recently, the EGP's strength was greatest in northern El Quiche. EGP headquarters probably was, and may still be, located there in the region known as the Ixil Triangle.

EGP Actions Began in 1975

EGP cadre spent three years organizing before their first combat action. On May 28, 1975, the EGP military phase began in earnest when cadre killed military commissioner Guillermo Monzon. This was followed in June by the killing of Luis Arenas, labeled by EGP forces as the "Tiger of Ixcan." The EGP asserts that marimbas were brought out in celebration of Arenas' death.

The Ixil Triangle takes its name from the Ixil Indians who people the area. The points of the triangle are formed by the cities of Nebaj, San Juan Cotzal, and Chajul. The Guatemalan Army

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has deployed troops in all three cities, imposed curfews, and issued special ID cards. It sends numerous patrols into the outlying districts. Pacification of the area has proved difficult to achieve, however, and resupply of the garrisons is accomplished by helicopter or heavily guarded convoys. Although the army has made great progress in this region, its patrols regularly engage EGP opposition.

Six EGP Fronts, Named for Revolutionaries, Span Guatemala

The EGP has organized guerrilla fronts in almost every Department in the country. Its strength is concentrated, however, in the Mexican border Departments of Huehuetenango and El Quiche.

All EGP fronts historically were governed by the "Front Directorate." A recent report indicates that each front now has been assigned a military command which reports directly to the EGP National Directorate rather than the Front Directorate.

"Che" Guevara Front Once Effectively Controlled 75 Percent of Huehuetenango. The Che Guevara front poses one of the strongest guerrilla threats to the government. Although the army's 1982 offensive pushed the front into Huehuetenango's northern reaches, it continues to attack villages considered friendly to the government and to harass government forces. As recently as spring 1982 the front was considered to control 75 percent of the Department.

The Che Guevara front is divided into three columns. The strongest column operates in the Cuchumatanes Mountains north of the city of Huehuetenango, between the border with El Quiche Department and the Pan American Highway. The rough terrain has helped it inflict heavy casualties on village CDFs. To aid the CDFs in these confrontations, the army recently has given them M-1 carbines.

The front's other two columns operate near Barrillas and Nenton. Although the government believes these two columns are very weak as a result of army actions, the people near Barrillas have yet to comply with the government request to move back to their village. Their refusal probably is related in part to EGP exhortations.

El Quiche's Ho Chi Minh Front Is EGP's Strongest. The Ho Chi Minh front, founded on January 19, 1972, is the oldest and strongest EGP front. It is under the command of former Jesuit priest Fernando Hoyos Rodriguez ("Carlos"). The front's area of

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operations includes "Indochina" (the frontier with Mexico), "Vietnam" (the eastern part of El Quiche), and "Hanoi" (the southern region of El Quiche which borders on the Sandino front).

Together with the Che Guevara front in neighboring Huehuetenango, the Ho Chi Minh front forms the backbone of the EGP. These two fronts are thought to comprise about 70 percent of the EGP's 1,000-1,300 combatants.

The Ho Chi Minh front is Guatemala's only insurgent organization to have mounted a sustained attack on a well-defended army post. Ho Chi Minh front forces killed three officers and nine soldiers in their January 1982 attack on the army post in San Juan Cotzal.

The low casualty figures of the San Juan Cotzal attack belie its importance. The government's immediate reaction was the Army Chief of Staff's decision to go to the scene personally to direct the defense effort. For the longer term, the lesson learned entered into the army's current strategy of deploying new task forces throughout the altiplano to combat the guerrilla threat through aggressive small-unit patrolling.

Chimaltenango's Sandino Front Currently in Decline. The army's 1982 offensive dealt the EGP severe blows in Chimaltenango. Here, as elsewhere, the formation of CDFs has been very effective in denying insurgents the logistical support they require, and the government's civic action program has shown villagers that the government is able to deliver on promises of food, housing assistance, etc. The level of army brutality toward villages considered to "belong" to the EGP and other insurgents also could have affected the decisions of villagers about which side to support. In any event, by the fall of 1982 EGP fortunes in Chimaltenango had waned to such an extent that the EGP requested the assistance of a FAR unit from El Peten.

The EGP front in Chimaltenango is named for Augusto Cesar Sandino. The EGP formed the front at the height of its fortunes on July 19, 1981. At the time, control of Chimaltenango, which lies between the capital and the altiplano, was the logical next step in the EGP's drive to take power.

The Chimaltenango Department is a difficult zone for guerrilla warfare because it has characteristics of all three of the politico/military/geographic environments into which EGP planners have divided Guatemala: urban, mountainous, and flatland. Its

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proximity to the capital permits relatively swift reaction by government forces. Similarly, the Department's deforested state grants greater mobility to the forces already there. Finally, the diversified labor force makes propagation of class consciousness difficult because of the varying interests of the workers.

Yet the EGP believed that certain factors in Chimaltenango would act in its favor. The dispersed population pattern of Chimaltenango is similar to that found in the altiplano; the isolated farms are good targets; and the excellent transportation facilities permit guerrilla units to use whatever level of logistical support is available from insurgents based in the capital. Most of all, the EGP hoped it could incite the largely Indian population into revolt merely by fanning traditional feelings of discrimination, without having to introduce the sometimes alienating Marxist-Leninist concept of class struggle.

Recent reports indicate that guerrilla activity in Chimaltenango has abated substantially. The EGP is now occupied with defending its home base in Huehuetenango and El Quiche.

Yon Sosa Front Targets Oilfields, Hydro Projects. The Yon Sosa front is found in Alta Verapaz Department, Baja Verapaz Department, and the southwestern corner of El Peten. The front is believed to have about 100 combatants and is active. The army has not yet deployed a task force to combat Yon Sosa, leaving the responsibility to the forces regularly stationed in the Coban military zone.

Yon Sosa is commanded by Mario Alberto Dominguez Morales ("Atilio"). Its primary mission is harassment and sabotage of the petroleum industry. It regularly burns farms in the area surrounding the Departmental Capital of Coban and threatens work on the region's hydroelectric projects.

The front is named for Lt. Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, a participant in the coup attempt of November 13, 1960. In that incident, dissident junior officers attempted to overthrow the government because of its rampant corruption and support of the use of Guatemalan territory for training the Bay of Pigs invaders. Rather than lay down his arms when it became apparent the coup was doomed, Yon Sosa organized an insurgency and fought the government in the eastern provinces.

In 1966 Julio Mendez Montenegro campaigned for the presidency as the candidate of liberal democracy. The guerrillas decided to

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support him, at the behest of the moderate communist party (PGT). The night before the election, however, the police arrested 26 communists, including the leader of the party, and tortured and killed them.

Upon taking office, Mendez quickly destroyed the by-then disorganized guerrilla resistance. Yon Sosa escaped to Mexico, only to be killed by Mexican internal security agents.

Turcios Lima Front Operates on South Coast. The "Luis Augusto Turcios Lima" front is found in the south coast Departments of Escuintla, Suchitepequez, and Retalhuleu. Although it conducts regular actions in Escuintla, including assassinations of government officials and the burning of public buildings, it numbers no more than 50-75 combatants and is not a great threat to the government.

The front is named for 2d Lt. Turcios who, like Yon Sosa, left the army for the insurgency in 1960. Turcios was killed in a sportscar accident in October 1966.

Castillo Front in Capital. Guatemala City is supposed to be the territory of the Otto Rene Castillo front. Heavy security, however, has kept the front from carrying out many actions in recent years. Its decline resulted initially from the EGP decision to detail the front's militants to Chimaltenango in the summer of 1981 to help inaugurate the Sandino front.

EGP operatives in the capital have not been completely inactive, however. On November 7, 1982, for example, two guerrillas attempted to bomb a police vehicle. The army killed one and captured the other. Both were armed with M-16 rifles.

The Castillo front is led by Mario de Jesus Payeras Solares ("Roque"), known as a founder of the EGP and the author of such EGP publications as The Days of the Jungle. Its political sector is led by Gustavo Adolfo Meono Brener ("Manolo").

Otto Rene Castillo was an acclaimed Guatemalan poet who was killed by the government in March 1967.

EGP Ideology Emphasizes Prolonged Struggle

The EGP views insurgency, which it calls Popular Revolutionary War, as a long-term struggle to bleed the strength from the government. Its strategy emphasizes simultaneous efforts of

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military action, mass organization, and mobilization of international support in four successive stages of warfare.

The first stage of the EGP's in-country activities was carried out near the Ixcán River in northern Huehuetenango between 1972 and 1975. EGP founders reentered Guatemala from exile and began to establish a base among the Indians. During this period, the EGP engaged only in political work following its inaugural act in 1972 of burning an airplane.

The second stage of the war, which began in 1975, was armed. Early EGP attacks were of a low-level nature, such as the burning of farm buildings and the murder of administrative personnel.

The third phase of the war was initiated in the late 1970s, when the EGP began to attack army units and convoys. This stage is still in effect. The EGP makes no attempt to hold territory or engage government forces in large-scale battles.

Only during the fourth and final stage of war does EGP doctrine call for the declaration of liberated zones and an attempt to hold them from government troops. In light of the EGP's current strategic retreat, it is not likely to call soon for a shift to the tactics prescribed for the final stage of the struggle.

Guerrillas View Present "Coyuntura" as Favorable

The EGP believes that the present conjunction of circumstances (coyuntura) in the class struggle is highly favorable to the insurgency. Profound Guatemalan social transformations have taken place over the past 20 years. The EGP feels that the introduction of new agricultural technology has increased the exploitation of rural workers.

Many small landholders have been fraudulently deprived of their land. Similarly, the unchecked population explosion among the Indians has caused the size of Indian landholdings to dwindle to the point where self-sufficiency is not possible.

EGP ideology calls for spreading the war throughout the country and inflicting the greatest number of casualties on government forces by creating new guerrilla fronts in new territory whenever possible. EGP organizational work among the masses aims at their broad participation in the insurrection. Its propaganda emphasizes the government's discrimination against and oppression of the Indians, workers' grievances, and the people's right to the land.

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EGP Tactics Call for Increasingly More Devastating Attacks

EGP military doctrine emphasizes small unit actions against targets from which the attacking unit can disengage at will and on short notice. In practice, this means that most EGP and other insurgent actions are more "terrorist" than "military" in nature. Most guerrilla attacks are made from hidden positions upon unsuspecting targets, such as convoys. The guerrillas seldom attack army patrols in the field.

The simplest guerrilla action is "armed propaganda," which means coercing villagers by force of arms to attend propaganda meetings. The next action is sabotage, wherein farm machinery and buildings owned by the large agri-business operations are burned or bombed.

Next are "military takings" of farms or towns. Generally, EGP forces will kill the owner of such a farm, an administrator "known for oppressing the workers," a spy, or a "hated" mayor, etc. These murders are termed "doing justice."

Attacks against military units are usually made while a unit is in transit. These are known as "ambushes" or "harassment attacks." Occasionally, EGP tacticians decide they have such an advantage of terrain, numbers, or surprise that they will undertake an "annihilation attack."

Foe of North American "Imperialism"

Anti-Americanism is a fundamental EGP tenet. EGP propaganda states that:


"After ten years of struggle we recognize all the more that North-American imperialism is our historic common enemy. We know that it will continue its attempt to drown the legitimate aspirations of our people for liberty and sovereignty in blood. But we are confident of victory and the justice of our struggle. For these reasons we demand that everyone continue doing what they can to further the cause of our people, whose solidarity is increasing at all levels, which contributes directly to the highlighting of the genocidal intentions of North-American imperialism and the governments which serve as its instruments. The victory of the Guatemalan people will be the victory over exploitation, oppression, discrimination, and repression."

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Less Marxist ORPA Approaching EGP in Strength

ORPA Based in San Marcos

The blows the EGP received from the army in 1982 have caused the traditionally second-ranked ORPA to be considered an equal threat to the government. While the EGP has been retreating into the remote regions of northern Huehuetenango and El Quiche, ORPA has continued to harass army forces throughout San Marcos, Quezaltenango, and the Lake Atitlan area of Solola. Nonetheless, ORPA did make an unprecedented public acknowledgment of its setbacks at the hands of government forces in Mexico City in October. In any event, the army has considered ORPA's threat great enough to merit the deployment of two new task forces to counter it.



ORPA is believed to have 600-800 well-armed combatants and numerous sympathizers. The region in which ORPA operates most freely is to the west and south of Lake Atitlan in Solola Department. Although it also has forces in the southeastern Department of Santa Rosa on the Tecuamburo Volcano, they recently have suffered great losses at the hands of the army. Although the ORPA contingent on Tecuamburo once agreed to provide leadership and logistical support for the PGT-D's bedraggled local contingent, it is now in like circumstances and has approached the FAR for assistance.

ORPA's leadership split from the FAR in 1971 but did not engage in armed action against the government until 1979. Exactly when ORPA was formed is not clear. After 1979, however, it quickly grew into a formidable insurgent group. It operates in heavily armed columns of about 50 combatants, most of whom have been trained in Cuba.

Although it has been reported that almost all ORPA members have M-16s, in January 1983 ORPA was engaged in what it called "The Campaign of 100 Arms" to increase its firepower. Its goal was to obtain weapons from the army. To that end, one of the larger operations included the ambush of an army convoy south of Lake Atitlan on the road between Quezaltenango and Retalhuleu. Fourteen soldiers were killed, and numerous government weapons were recovered. These would have been Galil rifles.

ORPA Less Marxist Than Other Groups

Although it is an offshoot of the FAR, ORPA is not considered by its three colleagues in the URNG to be a Marxist organization.

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It is more a nationalist group that has vowed to cleanse the country of the "corrupt elite" which it alleges oppresses the people.

Under the leadership of Rodrigo Asturias Amado ("Comandante Gaspar"), ORPA has focused its opposition to the governing regime on corruption and other abuses rather than on ideology. This outlook is reflected in the propaganda that ORPA distributes to local Indians, none of which contains Marxist rhetoric.

Of the URNG member organizations, only ORPA's organizational logo lacks Marxist symbolism. It uses a depiction of an exploding volcano, compared with the EGP's likeness of Che Guevara and the FAR's and PGT-D's hammer and sickle.

An indication of Asturias' intention to avoid becoming a Marxist pawn was his veto of the dispatch of a URNG delegation to Europe in early 1982, because the trip was to have been sponsored by the communist front World Peace Council. His action was based on the ORPA belief that no one tendency within the URNG should be able to dominate foreign contacts merely because it could draw on the financial support of "an external organization of a specific orientation."

ORPA Recently Reduced Primary Fronts to Two

Although ORPA has been doing better than the EGP in confrontations with government forces, it has taken its share of losses. As a result, it has reduced the number of its primary fronts to two. One of these commands operates in the vicinity of Lake Atitlan; the other is active in San Marcos. A third front on the Tecuamburo Volcano in San Marcos is in very poor shape and under severe pressure from the army.

ORPA's headquarters probably is in Mexico. Its former headquarters on the slopes of the Tajumulco Volcano northeast of the city of San Marcos was overrun by army forces in August 1982. Asturias and most of his men were able to escape. But Asturias' deputy, "Comandante Manuel," was one of 11 ORPA combatants killed in the engagement.

Prior to the recent consolidation, two ORPA fronts operated from the Tajumulco Volcano. Each had about 50 well-armed, Cuban-trained combatants. These fronts probably continue to operate under the aegis of the newly consolidated command structure. One, known as "Diego Tzoc," is under the command of "Comandante Anibal." The other, known as "El Brote," is commanded by "Captain Nay."

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ORPA's Lake Atitlan forces were led for quite some time by an allegedly brilliant mathematician named Ricardo "Dicky" Stein, whose father is a leading member of Guatemala's Jewish community. Although Stein may still lead a column in this vicinity, overall control is now in the hands of Pedro Pablo Palma Lau ("Poncho"). Palma is considered one of ORPA's best field commanders despite the fact that his chronic asthma weakens him to the extent that he needs assistance to leave the field following combat.

ORPA forces operating in San Marcos are led by "Comandante Isaias," an excellent tactician. His was the force that carried out the above-mentioned attack on the army convoy.

ORPA also has a limited urban front. It is led by "Raphael," whose true name is not known. His deputy is FNU Dary ("Agimael"), whose brother, Dr. Mario Dary, a former rector of the University of San Carlos, was killed in December 1982.

An indication of the level of army concern about the situation in the Lake Atitlan area was the January 1983 formation of a "regional command" in Retalhuleu under the direction of the army's Deputy Chief of Staff. This action had been preceded last fall by the formation of the "Quirigua" task force at Santa Ana Belin in San Marcos.

ORPA grew quickly following its inception in 1979. One of its early goals was to be able to operate in the capital as well as in rural areas. For this reason, ORPA embarked upon a rapid expansion of its urban safe-house network.

The speedy growth of ORPA's urban operation, however, was not accompanied by good security. As a result, in the summer of 1981 the army was able to destroy most of ORPA's urban apparatus with raids on more than 25 safe houses in which more than 30 cadre were killed. The army captured tons of weapons and supplies in that effort. By mid-1982 ORPA felt confident enough to attempt to reestablish its network of safe houses in the capital. This undertaking, however, has been rather effectively contained by heavy government security. Government control of traffic into and out of the city has made resupply of weapons from the few urban safe houses to rural cadre almost impossible.

Government successes against ORPA have also been quite marked in Chimaltenango. In the fall of 1981 ORPA had attempted to expand from its San Marcos base area into Chimaltenango. It took such heavy losses, however, that it was forced to leave Chimaltenango to the EGP's Sandino front.

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ORPA's forces on the slopes of the Tecuamburo Volcano in Santa Rosa also have been seriously affected by army attacks. The ORPA column based there had 55 combatants in June 1982 and only 30 three months later. It has ceased operations and concealed its combatants within the coffee harvest workforce on the volcano.

ORPA Leader Asturias Is Classic Caudillo Figure

"Comandante Gaspar," the son of Nobel Prize-winning author Miguel Angel Asturias, is a strong and persuasive leader who has great difficulty cooperating with others. Since the beginning of attempts to unify the Guatemalan opposition, Asturias has been the stumbling block. He almost believes his repeated contention that ORPA can win the war without the help of the other insurgent organizations.

Asturias has a long history of involvement in left-wing struggles to overthrow the Guatemalan Government. He joined the PGT while still a student but broke away in the late 1960s following a dispute with the leadership over its refusal to adopt armed struggle.

Asturias joined the FAR in 1971 to take part in its insurgency in El Peten. Almost immediately he developed an intense personal dislike for FAR leader Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia ("Pablo Monsanto"). This dislike, no doubt influenced by Asturias' coveting of Soto's leadership position, was also based on strong differences of opinion over strategy.

Asturias believes firmly in incorporating the Indians into the guerrilla war as combatants. Soto, however, at least until recently, has felt that Indians are unfit to be revolutionaries because they have yet to pass through the "proletarian" phase of class development.

Asturias dislikes EGP official leader Ricardo Ramirez de Leon ("Rolando"). Ramirez is Asturias' primary competitor to be Guatemala's Fidel Castro. Additionally, the EGP has mounted terrorist attacks in Guatemala City without coordinating them with ORPA. Asturias believes this threatens the fragile unity of the guerrillas.

Despite his adoption of the revolutionary struggle, Asturias retains much of the bourgeois lifestyle he lived as a youth in Paris and other European capitals. He is fond of expensive cognac and scotch and has a well-known weakness for women. He has recognized the leadership position of his subordinate commanders by giving them expensive Rolex watches and mini Pentax cameras.

ORPA was created by Asturias as his personal vehicle; as such, it reflects his social beliefs and military strategy. Some clues

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to Asturias' beliefs, and hence those of ORPA, are given by Asturias' adoption of the name "Gaspar" as his nom de guerre. "Gaspar" was one of the protagonists of the novel Hombres de Maiz (The Corn Men) by Asturias' father. The novel concerns the harsh struggle of the campesinos to survive in the face of rampant government corruption and excesses.

ORPA Uses Indian Combatants But Not Followers:

Asturias' long-held belief that Indians should be incorporated into the guerrilla movement as combatants was a factor contributing to his departure from the FAR. ORPA's use of Indians is tempered, however, by Asturias' view of ORPA as a disciplined military organization. ORPA troops are generally considered to be the best trained and armed in the guerrilla movement.

Because Asturias sees ORPA as a military organization, he does not permit the use of followers. Thus, ORPA has a much smaller base of supporters than the EGP, which makes extensive use of Indian logistical support. This smaller base is also due to ORPA's lack of a vision of a full-scale social movement akin to the Marxism of the EGP.

ORPA's Indian strategy, which once caused it to lag behind the EGP in strength, is currently enabling it to weather army pressure better than the EGP. Because ORPA did not depend on a broad-based network of Indian supporters for logistical needs, army neutralization of such supporters has hurt it less.

ORPA strongly objects to the current EGP strategy of attacking villages containing CDFs and engaging in wholesale human rights abuses. It is ORPA's view that such a policy will only cause more defections from the guerrilla cause. ORPA has continued its program of burning fincas, engaging in selective killings, and harassing the army and police. It does not single out CDFs as targets of opportunity. This aids its propaganda effort describing ORPA as the true friend of the people.

Two ORPA Spinoff Groups Have Been Thorn in Government's Side

The first group to split from ORPA was known as "Our Movement" (NM). It was led by current ORPA Comandante Pedro Palma's brother Edgar. Edgar Palma Lau, at one time also an ORPA comandante, left ORPA in 1979 with a third Palma brother, Minor, to found the NM. The brothers left ORPA because they felt it should have a political as well as military program. NM was thought to have gone into a dormant state after Edgar was killed by government forces in January 1982.

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In October 1982 Minor Palma Lau and a former ORPA comandante called Efrain broke away from NM to form the People's Revolutionary Movement (MRP). The MRP initiated its activities with the kidnapping of a nephew of Rios Montt. Its next action was the kidnapping of the Guatemalan daughter of Honduran President Suazo.

The MRP had hoped to use the kidnapping of the President's nephew to force the release of a fellow guerrilla, Ileana del Rosario Solares. But Ms. Solares died while in government hands. Before her death she provided considerable valuable information on the NM, which was larger and better organized than had been thought.

The President's nephew was released by a raid on the MRP safe house in which he was being held. The raid was planned by six Israeli advisers assigned to the Presidential Intelligence Service. The government's efforts to gain tactical intelligence through the interrogation of captured MRP cadre were directed by two of the Israeli advisers.

Two guerrillas were killed in the assault upon the safe house, and several weapons were captured. These included two Israeli-made Uzi submachineguns and three American-made Browning 9 mm pistols.

FAR Operates in El Peten

FAR Not Hurt by Current Offensive

Guatemala's intelligence community believes that the doctrinally pure Marxist-Leninist FAR is potentially the most dangerous of the Guatemalan guerrilla organizations. The FAR is a serious problem for government forces in El Peten and will continue to be so at least until the new task force recently organized to combat it becomes fully operational.



The FAR has engaged in relatively few military actions in the past three years compared with the EGP and ORPA. During this time it has built its forces to 150-300 combatants and sent many of them to Nicaragua and Cuba for training.

The FAR's El Peten forces have suffered little in the ongoing army offensive; reports are regularly received of FAR actions throughout the Department. Its success in El Peten led the FAR to detail a group of highly trained commandos to Chimaltenango to aid the EGP's ailing Sandino front.

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The FAR has inflicted the greatest number of casualties on the army in a single engagement in the conflict. This occurred in October 1982 when it killed 19 troops in an ambush initiated by the explosion of a claymore mine. The FAR confiscated the weapons carried by the detachment, presumably Galil rifles, and withdrew.

Shortly after this attack, the army responded by burning the homes and crops of two nearby villagers for their support of FAR activities. The FAR retaliated with an attack on a neighboring village. The army's massacre of the people of Los Dos R's came shortly thereafter.

The government is taking the FAR threat seriously. The army's newly formed strategic reaction force has been assigned to a new task force in El Peten for just this reason. After the task force has had an opportunity to organize patrol bases in remote reaches of its area of operations and CDFs in nearby villages, it should have the success that has crowned similar efforts in the altiplano.

An important aspect of the government's recent program has been its emphasis on combatting the latent insurgency created by government and societal abuses of the population. If similar progress is to be made in El Peten, the army will have to prevent incidents like the one at Los Dos R's. In that instance even CDF members who had demonstrated their loyalty to the government were slaughtered. Such incidents, outrageous enough in the abstract, are particularly unwise considering the crucial role the CDFs have played in the government's successes to date.

FAR Has Four Operational Zones

The FAR's national directorate is located in Guatemala City. From there, the activities of the forces in the other three zones are directed. FAR's other zones are El Peten, Chimaltenango, and the Santa Rosa area.

The FAR denominates El Peten as the Captain Androcolos Hernandez region, which has three fronts. The Raul Orlantes Trocoli front operates in central El Peten and near Melchor de Mencos on the border with Belize. The Feliciano Argueta Rojas front operates in the region between Flores and Poptun. The most active El Peten front is the Lucio Ramirez front, which operates in the western part of the Department near the Mexican border. It is the Turcios Lima column of the Ramirez front that is thought to be responsible for the Sayaxche ambush and many other recent incidents near Las Cruces.

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The focus of FAR's activities in its central region has been Chimaltenango, the territory of the Tecum Uman front. The forces now constituting this front were transferred from El Peten's Argueta Rojas front. The Tecum Uman front, though not as powerful as when it arrived, is the source of most of the army's remaining problems in Chimaltenango; the EGP's Sandino front has been effectively neutralized. The other FAR front in the central region is the Captain Sergio Anibal Ramirez front, which operates sporadically in Guatemala City and surrounding villages. It is only a minor irritant to the government.

The southern region of the FAR includes the Departments of Escuintla and Santa Rosa. The Capt. Santos Salazar front which operates in this region has traditionally lacked the support of the top FAR leaders and has never been very active. However, the FAR may have decided recently to invigorate the front. One report indicates that 45 combatants who have just completed training in Cuba will be assigned to the Santa Rosa region.

Confident FAR Now Intriguing Against Declining EGP

Recent activities of the FAR indicate that it considers EGP power to be waning. It also appears to concur in the army's assessment that ORPA is the greatest near-term threat to the government. As a result, it has sought to improve its position in Guatemala's revolutionary ranking. Its most ambitious effort has been to marginalize the EGP front in Chimaltenango. At the same time, however, it is making overtures to its estranged parent organization, the PGT-O, and offering its "support" to struggling ORPA forces on the Tecuamburo Volcano in Santa Rosa, where it would send the Cuban-trained combatants.

The EGP feels threatened by FAR activities in Chimaltenango. Although both organizations have been punished by the army's offensive, the FAR has been able to mount operations more easily than the EGP.

The FAR believes that the URNG will remain a paper organization until the members can learn to work together for their common good, presumably as defined by the FAR. Indeed, in the past the FAR has bowed to the ideal of URNG unity by refusing to have bilateral relations with the non-URNG member PGT-O, insisting that the PGT-O approach the URNG as a whole. In mid-December 1982, however, the FAR changed this policy and offered to establish bilateral relations with the PGT-O. The FAR cautioned the PGT-O not to make this approach known to the URNG.

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FAR Led by "Pablo Monsanto"

Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia ("Pablo Monsanto"), age 42, has led the FAR since the late 1960s. Only sketchy information is available on other FAR personalities. "Comandante Ramon" is a member of the National Directorate and in charge of international relations. Soto recently ordered that Nicolas Sis, FAR's representative on the URNG, be replaced by Ramon Ortiz of the Guatemala City unit.

Soto, described as a ruthless Marxist-Leninist terrorist, is said to have become a guerrilla at the age of 15. He is a rather inflexible person not known for strategic vision; primarily he is a tactician who leans heavily upon subordinates for political and ideological advice. Nonetheless, Soto has differed with subordinates on the question of recruitment of Indians which, until recently at least, he opposed. He has argued that recruits should come exclusively from the proletariat and non-Indian peasantry.

The FAR has long been strongly anti-American. In 1968, its operative Leonardo Castillo Johnson led the group that killed two American military personnel, Col. Webber and Lt. Cdr. Munroe. Castillo was bent upon vengeance for the death of his girlfriend Rogelia Cruz, a former Miss Guatemala, who was killed by the security forces. The FAR is also responsible for the 1968 murder of US Ambassador John Gordon Mein.

The FAR was formed in 1962 as the military arm of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT). It split from the PGT in 1968 because of differences over the party's reluctance to enter armed struggle.

PGT-D Is Junior Member of URNG

PGT-D Crumbling Under Government Pressure

The National Direction Nucleus (i.e., dissident wing) of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT-D) operates primarily in Guatemala City and Chimaltenango, although a bedraggled unit struggles to survive in Santa Rosa. The PGT-D has considerably fewer than the 200 combatants it was estimated to have in late 1982. It has had difficulty establishing meaningful contact with other Guatemalan guerrilla organizations, and by the end of 1982 was plaintively requesting aid from all comers, especially ORPA and the FAR. Its final humiliation, perhaps, is its indication that it is willing to merge once again with the PGT-O.



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The PGT-D in 1981 sent 19 militants to Cuba for training. As of late July 1982, none had returned. Although the party knew that three of its members had been killed attempting to enter Mexico without documents, the fate of the others was unknown.

The PGT-D was reported to have had more than 400 active members in the spring of 1982, but by the end of the summer the government had reduced that number to 200. Of the 200, the majority were said to be in Chimaltenango and the remainder in the capital and Santa Rosa. Many former PGT-D militants in Chimaltenango reportedly have joined CDFs.

Cardoza Formed PGT-D in 1978

The PGT-D split from the orthodox wing of the party in 1978 because of continued PGT unwillingness to embrace armed struggle as the tonic for Guatemala's social ills. Personality conflicts also entered into the decision. The PGT-D's founder, longtime communist Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar, age 64, had lived in Mexico in the 1973-77 period. He had been upset that he was not given a responsible assignment upon his return to Guatemala.

Cardoza's colleagues within the PGT-D also have recently shoved him aside. They were angered because Cardoza had not returned to Guatemala since late 1980, when he went to Managua and Havana for the early talks on unification of Guatemala's guerrilla organizations. The central committee of the PGT-D voted on July 29, 1982, to name Manuel Contreras ("Comandante Tino") as permanent Secretary General of the PGT-D and offered Cardoza the post of Secretary General for International Affairs on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. It has also been reported, however, that the PGT-D is now led by Carlos Gonzalez.

The losses incurred by the PGT-D last summer have caused it to explore the possibility of reunification with the orthodox wing of the party, the PGT-O. The PGT-D is even willing to accept a secondary role in a reunited party. Cardoza's ouster makes it more likely that a reunification will occur.

PGT-O; "Moderate" Soviet-Line Party

PGT-O Historically Reluctant To Embrace Armed Struggle

The final actor on Guatemala's revolutionary stage is the orthodox wing of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT-O). Although all four URNG member groups sprang from it, the PGT-O has

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never become a member of URNG. It has not initiated a program of guerrilla warfare because it believes that politicization of the masses must precede armed struggle. A careful analysis of the PGT-O's actions, or inactions, reveals that by the standards of American constitutional law it is basically a democratic party in that it does not advocate "immediate" violence as the solution to the country's political problems.

The PGT-O has, however, begun preparation for combat. In December 1981, it organized its military arm, the Popular Forces of the People (CFPP). Currently it is engaged in extensive training operations. Whether it will soon enter combat and the URNG or choose to participate in elections will be determined by the fortunes of party leader Ricardo Rosales Roman as he attempts to bow to the militants, with the support of military training, yet defer military action on the grounds that the time is not yet right.

Rosales no doubt will argue for participation in the elections. This could split the party again or terminate Rosales' career as leader.

Communist Countries Train PGT-O Cadres

As the "official" Communist Party of Guatemala, the PGT-O has received a great deal of aid and training from the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. Rosales has visited the Soviet Union and other bloc countries on numerous occasions in search of military aid and training.

Ten PGT-O militants received three months of medical corps training in East Germany in the spring of 1982. In September, the party sent nine members to the Soviet Union for six months of military training at the captain level.

Cuba has also provided assistance for the PGT-O. Thirty PGT-O members began two months of military studies there in June 1982. In addition, Cuba gave six party leaders 40 days of training at the general staff level and offered to train 12 others as company leaders. Czechoslovakia has made a gesture of support for the PGT-O by sending it a large offset printing press for its propaganda operation in Mexico City.

Other guerrilla organizations in Central America have aided the PGT-O. The Salvadoran insurgents organized a program for training 14 PGT-O members at a time and suggested that the program be expanded to 30 students by January 1983. The Salvadoran Communist Party in 1982 hosted a six-week course in Managua for four PGT-O members on the production and handling of explosives and mines.

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Sandinistas Cool to PGT-O

When Cuba directed several PGT-O members to avoid Mexico and travel through Nicaragua on their way to Havana in early 1982, the Nicaraguans refused to assist them, saying they had no lodging facilities. The Sandinistas have agreed, however, to permit Bulgarian arms to be transshipped from Cuba through Nicaragua to the PGT-O.

Nicaragua's unwillingness to be particularly helpful to the PGT-O was also illustrated in September 1981, when FSLN junta members Tomas Borge and Daniel and Humberto Ortega were unsuccessful in an attempt to aid the PGT-O. The Nicaraguan faction opposed to entry of the PGT-O into the guerrilla struggle was led by Jaime Wheelock. His faction supported ORPA, EGP, and FAR.

The PGT-O believes that this Nicaraguan preference for the other guerrilla organizations is based on the PGT-O's status as a party of intellectuals. PGT-O leaders believe that the Nicaraguans fear the PGT-O intellectuals would be able to dominate the other groups. More likely, however, the Nicaraguans fear that the action-oriented guerrilla organizations would be smothered into inaction by the tendentious rhetoric of the PGT-O.

PGT-O Sees Itself as Arbiter of Marxist Tenets

As the "orthodox" Communist Party of Guatemala, the PGT-O feels that it is the annointed interpreter of the Marxist gospel. It regards the other guerrilla forces as having combined a belief in old-fashioned communist dogma with only a half-understanding of Marxist-Leninist principles. This confusion, according to the PGT-O, results in internal frictions and the erroneous belief that socialist regimes can be established as soon as a military victory is achieved.

The PGT-O holds that there can be no instant socialism in Central America. Such fundamental social change can take place only after a long period of political indoctrination during good economic times. In order to build a strong economy in a revolutionary Guatemala, the PGT-O believes that aid and investment from the capitalist countries would have to be attracted. To do this, a policy of genuine nonalignment would have to be adopted.

Long discussions of Marxist philosophy appear to have enervated the party. As noted above, it only recently came to the decision that the politicization of the masses may be nearing the point necessary for the initiation of armed struggle. Such a decision, if put into effect, would come at the wrong time,

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considering the progress the Rios Montt government has made in social reform, i.e., in removing the root causes of the insurgency.

With just a few exceptions, perhaps including the kidnapping of newspaper owner Alvaro Contreras, the PGT-O has embarked only on training expeditions, not terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

PGT-O Leader Under Fire for Inaction

PGT-O leader Rosales is about 50 years of age. He is by nature a cautious and somewhat opportunistic person and is not considered to be a hardline Marxist-Leninist. He appears amenable to having correct, businesslike relations with the US should he come to power.

In June 1982 Rosales was the object of an intrigue led by Central Committee member Carlos Orantes Troccoli. The Orantes faction charged that Rosales had been delaying efforts to prepare the PGT-O to enter the military struggle in Guatemala. Rosales offered to resign if the committee so desired. That it did not make the request apparently was credited as much to Orantes' not being considered an able leader as to Rosales' popularity.

Rosales was once described by an Embassy Guatemala officer as a believer in "peaceful coexistence." He appears to have joined the JPT, a communist party youth group, in 1956. At any rate, he led it to victory in the student government elections at the University of San Carlos in 1962, when he was elected President of the University Student Association.

After the Revolution

URNG Statements on Postwar Government Positive

As recently as July 1982 the URNG was considered to have the capability to seize power by 1985. This no longer appears to be the case. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider statements by the URNG concerning the nature of the regime it proposes.

Most URNG propaganda focuses on the ongoing war rather than the nature of postwar society. When the URNG was formed in January 1982, however, it published its five-point program for a revolutionary government:

- I. The revolution will put an end to the repression of the people and guarantee them life, peace, and the supreme rights of humanity.

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- II. The revolution will lay the foundation for solving the fundamental necessities of the grand majority of the people, to reach the economic and political levels of the great repressive rich people, Guatemalans and foreigners, that govern Guatemala.
- III. The revolution guarantees the equality of indigenous peoples and ladinos, ending cultural oppression and discrimination.
- IV. The revolution guarantees the creation of a new society in which all the patriotic, popular, and democratic sectors are represented.
- V. The revolution guarantees the policy of nonalignment and international cooperation that all poor countries need to develop in today's world, pursuant to the guiding principle of self-determination.

Following each of the five points are paragraphs expanding upon them. The subparagraphs guarantee freedom of association, expression, thought, and religion. They state that the revolution will respect the right of the people to elect their local, municipal, and national authorities. They note that although the properties of the "great repressive rich" will be confiscated to help take care of the needs of the workers, small and medium-size entrepreneurs will be welcomed. Equal rights for women are guaranteed.

URNG Government Likely To Emulate Sandinistas

Despite the classically pluralistic and democratic promises of the URNG unity statement, it can be inferred that a URNG government would emulate the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. This observation stems primarily from consideration of the "anti-imperialist" rhetoric of the EGP, FAR, and PGT-D and their use of traditional Marxist symbolism. The EGP even decided to share a hero with the Sandinistas when it named its sixth front for Augusto Cesar Sandino.

There is of course the possibility that URNG non-Marxist supporters would be able to influence the course of a revolutionary government. For example, some member groups of the Democratic Front Against Repression (FDCR) and the persons who belong to the Guatemalan Committee of Patriotic Unity (CGUP) are not Marxists. Some of them represent religious groups. Again, the Nicaraguan model seems to argue powerfully against the ability of the

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non-armed groups to moderate the demands of those accustomed to operating with the force of arms.

The role of the Indians in a post-revolutionary society is also a point of interest. Would these descendants of the Maya be able to exercise a moderating influence upon the ladino leaders of the guerrilla organizations? Would their traditional and mystic religiosity act as a brake on those in power?

It is doubtful that the Indians could play such a role. To date they have been unable to mobilize their cultural resources in such a manner. If it is not the ladino military or finca owners who order them to behave in one manner or another, it is the ladino guerrilla leaders. Although the heritage of the Guatemalan Indians is dissimilar from that of the Nicaraguan Miskito, they do share the history of being an indigenous people caught in a civil war between warring groups of the dominant culture. Nothing in the post-revolutionary Nicaraguan experience suggests that such a group would play more than the most marginal role in a revolutionary society.

The member groups of the URNG have long accepted aid from East bloc countries and could be expected to continue to do so after gaining power. URNG leaders, as military people, could be expected to devote a considerable percentage of the national budget to the military. They would fend off calls for increased allocations to social programs with references to the imperialist threat, according to the Nicaraguan model.

The URNG achieved what political power it has from the barrels of guns. It would be naive to believe that the URNG would lay down its arms of its own accord and trust its fortunes to elections, particularly in light of the insurgent experience in the 1966 elections.

The Marxist tenet that religion is the opiate of the people would, however, pose a problem for a URNG government. Much of the URNG's support comes from Indians who believe strongly in their unique form of mystic Catholicism. Other supporters are more orthodox Catholics upset by government murder of their priests. A final group of Catholics are those who believe in the theology of liberation. Most evangelicals are thought to support the government.

It is highly unlikely that the URNG would be the first Marxist government to tolerate a center of power not coterminous with its own. Church-state relations in a revolutionary Guatemala

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probably would be similar to those in other socialist countries. To return again to the Nicaraguan model, the church in that country is the backbone of the opposition. The government has been, with some exceptions, relatively cautious in the steps it has taken against the church. Nonetheless, the church has accomplished little in its skirmishes with the government. A similar fate would be in store for Guatemalan religious organizations in a post-revolutionary society.

The URNG could be expected to organize the rural economy along cooperative lines. The primary reason for this would be Guatemala's status as a Third World country sorely lacking in economic infrastructure. To form a heavily centralized state-run economy where every remote farm was a state enterprise and every campesino was a state employee entitled to numerous benefits would be impossible. A much simpler method of coming through on revolutionary rhetoric would be to confiscate large economic units, agricultural or industrial, and transfer them to the workers.

A URNG government probably would tread more softly near foreign-owned industries. Castro has advised the Sandinistas to move slowly in this area in order not to jeopardize the availability of credit from Western sources. He could be expected to so advise the URNG.

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AGENCIA de
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Actividades de los Insurgentes guatemaltecos en México:
Percepciones Versus Realidad (U)

Abril 1983

Información corriente hasta: 20 septiembre 1982

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[...]

[PÁGINAS i-iv]

[...]

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(C) Las relaciones entre México y Guatemala (figura 1) se han deteriorado en los últimos meses. Guatemala asegura que México brinda a los insurgentes guatemaltecos un apoyo material considerable, incluidas armas, suministros y campamentos permanentes de entrenamiento. México niega estos cargos, contrarrestando que los excesos del ejército guatemalteco han impulsado a decenas de miles de guatemaltecos a México, y que las llamadas "bases guerrilleras" son campos de refugiados. En realidad, es probable que la verdad se encuentre en algún lugar entre las dos posiciones.

(C) Pequeños números de insurgentes guatemaltecos han usado territorio mexicano para una variedad de propósitos desde la década de 1960. Sus actividades incluyen enlace político con otros insurgentes y movimientos revolucionarios, pasos fronterizos para evadir la captura y la adquisición de suministros y armas pequeñas. Es probable que las guerrillas también usen los campamentos de refugiados en México como refugio para sus familias y, hasta cierto punto, para su propio descanso y recuperación.

(C) Armas pequeñas, municiones y explosivos están entrando a Guatemala desde México, introducidos por redes tradicionales de contrabando mexicano u organizaciones que simpatizan con la causa de los insurgentes. Los informes de armas militares suministradas por Cuba que ingresan por este medio, sin embargo, siguen escasos. Parece que la mayoría de las armas suministradas por Cuba aún llegan a las guerrillas por medio de Nicaragua y Honduras.

(C) El gobierno mexicano (GOM) apoya públicamente las actividades políticas de los grupos insurgentes centroamericanos, incluidos los guatemaltecos, y es probable que ocasionalmente haya optado por ignorar ciertas actividades operacionales de la guerrilla en México. Desde el punto de vista mexicano, la insurgencia refleja la falta de gobierno

representativo de Guatemala, que ha obligado a su pueblo a recurrir a las armas como el único medio para lograr un cambio. Los funcionarios mexicanos sostienen que los llamados “enclaves guerrilleros” en México son en realidad campos de refugiados, poblados con las víctimas de las atrocidades guatemaltecas. Ellos agregan que México seguirá dando asilo a los guatemaltecos que no pueden encontrar seguridad en su propio país. Sin embargo, el deseo de mantener la integridad del territorio de México y la estabilidad en los estados del sur, entre otras razones, limita este apoyo. En consecuencia, el GOM no aprueba oficialmente el uso del territorio mexicano para los campamentos insurgentes, el transporte de armas o como base para las operaciones de la guerrilla.

(C) Además, la presencia de la guerrilla en los estados fronterizos del sur es menos importante que el problema de los refugiados o las incursiones de los soldados guatemaltecos. Los guerrilleros operan en áreas remotas y generalmente evitan enemistarse con la población local. Sin embargo, los refugiados presionan la infraestructura local y se han convertido en problemas políticos. Pero el mayor problema desde el punto de vista mexicano se relaciona con las violaciones de las fronteras por parte de las fuerzas de seguridad guatemaltecas. La prensa local ha atribuido varios secuestros y asesinatos en México a estas fuerzas de seguridad, y algunos intereses comerciales han suspendido las operaciones en las áreas fronterizas, por temor a ser atrapados entre los insurgentes guatemaltecos y las fuerzas regulares.

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(C) Recientemente, el ejército mexicano ha centrado más atención en la región fronteriza del sur. Su presencia en estos estados, que son ricos en petróleo, en 4 años ha aumentado de tres a seis unidades del tamaño de un batallón. Parece que el GOM ha elegido aumentar su fuerza militar para proporcionar una autoridad gubernamental más visible en la región.

(C) A fines de septiembre de 1982, México envió una carta formal de protesta porque de las incursiones del ejército guatemalteco en México y los incidentes de disparos a través de la frontera que involucran la muerte de ciudadanos mexicanos. La respuesta inicial de los líderes guatemaltecos a la carta de protesta mexicana fue mixta, pero es probable que Guatemala adopte una postura un poco conciliadora con respecto a las demandas mexicanas. Es menos seguro si los incidentes fronterizos disminuirán como resultado. Si México se siente obligado a reforzar aún más la frontera, aumenta la posibilidad de incidentes entre los dos ejércitos. Sin embargo, ninguna de las partes desea participar en enfrentamientos armados; por lo tanto, ambos países probablemente limitarán sus actividades a la arena política, cada uno tratando de usar la publicidad que lo acompaña para desacreditar al otro.

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DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

Guatemalan Insurgents' Activities in Mexico: Perceptions Versus Reality (U)

APRIL 1983

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GUATEMALAN INSURGENTS' ACTIVITIES IN
MEXICO: PERCEPTIONS VERSUS REALITY (U)

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PREFACE

(U) This study describes the activities of Guatemalan insurgents in Mexico, and assesses the effect of these activities on the stability of the oil-rich border area. It explains the Mexican response to the Guatemalan guerrilla presence, and considers factors that might affect future decisions concerning the situation.

(U) The principal author is [REDACTED]. Several analysts of the Latin America Branch assisted in the preparation of this report, particularly [REDACTED]. Coordination and assistance were also provided by [REDACTED] (Current Intelligence, Latin America), [REDACTED] (Estimates), and [REDACTED] (Economic Support, Latin America). Word processing support was provided by [REDACTED].

(U) For comparative purposes and specific Order of Battle Information, see Ground Order of Battle: Mexico (U) DDB-1100-MX-82, April 1982; and Ground Order of Battle: Central America (U) DDB-1100-325-82, January 1982. For information on the Guatemalan insurgents see Intelligence Appraisal Guatemala: Support to Subversives (U) DIAIAPPR 49-81, 31 March 1981, and Guatemala: Insurgent Capabilities (U) DDB-2300-GT-82, November 1982. See also Military Intelligence Summary Vol. VIII, Latin America (U) DDB-2680-108-82, September 1982.

(U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-3E2) Washington, D.C. 20301. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA (ATTN: RTS-2A) using DD Form 1142, Interagency Document Request, in accordance with DIAM 59-3, DIA Reference Library.

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Figure 1. Mexico and Guatemala.

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SUMMARY

(C) Relations between Mexico and Guatemala (figure 1) have deteriorated in recent months. Guatemala claims that Mexico is providing Guatemalan insurgents with considerable material support, including arms, supplies, and permanent training camps. Mexico denies these charges, countering that Guatemalan Army excesses have driven tens of thousands of Guatemalans into Mexico, and that so-called "guerrilla bases" are refugee camps. In reality, the truth probably lies somewhere between the two positions.

(C) Small numbers of Guatemalan insurgents have used Mexican territory for a variety of purposes since the 1960s. Their activities include political liaison with other insurgents and revolutionary movements, border crossings to evade capture, and the acquisition of supplies and small arms. Guerrillas are probably also using the refugee camps in Mexico for refuge for their families, and to some degree for their own rest and recuperation.

(C) Small arms, ammunition, and explosives are entering Guatemala from Mexico, introduced by traditional Mexican smuggling networks or organizations sympathetic to the insurgents' cause. Reports of Cuban-supplied military weapons entering by this means, however, remain sketchy. It appears that the majority of Cuban-supplied arms still reach the guerrillas by way of Nicaragua and Honduras.

(C) The Mexican Government (GOM) publicly supports the political activities of Central American insurgent groups, including the Guatemalans, and it is likely that it has occasionally chosen to ignore certain guerrilla operational activities in Mexico. In the Mexican view, the insurgency reflects Guatemala's lack of representative government, which has forced its people to resort to arms as the only means of bringing about a change. Mexican officials maintain that so-called guerrilla enclaves in Mexico are actually refugee camps, populated with the victims of Guatemalan atrocities. They add that Mexico will continue to give asylum to Guatemalans who cannot find security in their own country. However, the desire to maintain Mexican territorial integrity and stability in the southern states, among other reasons, limits this support. Consequently, the GOM does not officially condone the use of Mexican territory for insurgent camps, the transport of arms, or as a base for guerrilla operations.

(C) Moreover, the guerrilla presence in southern border states is less significant than the refugee problem, or the incursions of Guatemalan soldiers. The guerrillas operate in remote areas and generally avoid antagonizing the local population. The refugees, however, strain the local infrastructure and have become a political issue. But the biggest problem from the Mexican standpoint concerns reported border violations by Guatemalan security forces. The local press has attributed several kidnappings and killings in Mexico to these security forces, and some business interests have reportedly discontinued operations in border areas, fearing being caught between Guatemalan insurgents and regular forces.

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(C) Recently, the Mexican military has focused more attention on this southern border region. Its presence in these oil-rich states has increased from three to six battalion-size units in 4 years. It appears that the GOM has chosen to increase its military strength to provide a more visible government authority in the region.

(C) At the end of September 1982, Mexico sent a formal letter protesting Guatemalan Army incursions into Mexico and cross-border shooting incidents involving the death of Mexican citizens. Guatemalan leaders' initial response to the Mexican protest letter was mixed, but it is likely that Guatemala will adopt a somewhat conciliatory stance with regard to the Mexican demands. It is less certain if border incidents will decrease as a result. If Mexico feels obligated to further reinforce the border, the possibility of incidents between the two armies increases. However, neither side wishes to engage in armed confrontation; therefore, both countries will probably limit their activities to the political arena, each attempting to use the accompanying publicity to discredit the other.

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1. INTRODUCTION

(C) Guatemalan guerrillas' use of Mexican territory has become an important issue for both of these governments. Guatemala accuses Mexico of harboring and supporting Guatemalan insurgents; the Mexicans, in turn, protest Guatemalan military incursions into southern Mexico. A major problem is to determine the truth of the Mexican-Guatemalan border situation amid the accusations and denials of both countries.

(C) This report addresses the key issues raised by the presence of Guatemalan insurgents in Mexico. It examines the actual extent of Guatemalan insurgent activities in that country, and explains the different Mexican and Guatemalan perceptions of these activities. The report evaluates the effect of the guerrillas' presence on the border states of Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and Quintana Roo, and notes other factors that could eventually contribute to regional instability. It also examines Mexico's ambivalent policy supporting the insurgents politically and rhetorically while strengthening its control of the southern border to curtail the use of the region by both Guatemalan factions. It then examines the factors underlying Mexico's pro-revolutionary bias toward the issue coupled with its apprehensions of a Marxist takeover near the oil fields. Finally, short-term (2 to 3 years) directions the problem may take are discussed, taking into account the probable consequences for Guatemala and Mexico.

2. Guatemalan Insurgent Activities in Mexico

(C) The extent of Guatemalan guerrilla activities in Mexico falls somewhere between the Guatemalan Government's (GOG) accusations and Mexico's denials. Small numbers of the insurgents have used Mexican territory for political and operational purposes since the 1960s. Their numbers have varied with the level of guerrilla activity in Guatemala and the amount of pressure applied by the Guatemalan military. The reported guerrilla presence in Mexico has increased in recent months as a result of new Guatemalan counterinsurgency operations currently being conducted near the border. There is minimal evidence, however, to support Guatemalan claims of permanent, government-sanctioned guerrilla training camps, or that Cuba is funneling significant quantities of weapons through Mexico.

a. Background

(C) The contemporary Guatemalan insurgent movement had its roots in a 1960 coup attempt by young army officers. After its failure, Lieutenant Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, a member of this group, refused to surrender and formed the nucleus of a guerrilla organization. Dissension between various factions within this unit was an immediate problem, and throughout the 1960s many splinter groups were formed, dissolved, or reformed into other organizations. By 1971, the two major insurgent organizations were the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Communist Party (PGT/FAR). Later that year, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) was formed, and it became a significant guerrilla force by the mid-1970s. By 1980, two other insurgent organizations had become active: the Revolutionary Organization of the People in

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Arms (ORPA), and the so-called Dissident Faction of the Communist Party (PGT/D). Since that time, the Orthodox Faction of the Communist Party (PGT/O) has also announced its intention to become an active participant in the insurgency.

b. Overt Political Activities in Mexico

~~(S/NOFORN/NNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ Both the PGT/O and the FAR established political support organizations in Mexico City during the late 1960s, and the EGP followed suit shortly after its formation. The newer guerrilla groups, ORPA and the PGT/O, probably have formed similar support units in the Mexican capital, although their activities have been less visible than those of the other groups. Mexico has welcomed political exiles and foreign dissidents since its revolution. Therefore, many political support organizations exist in Mexico City, including representatives of the Salvadoran Revolutionary Democratic Front (FMLN/FDR), and the Chilean and Argentine left.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ These political support groups have several important functions. First, they establish networks of international contacts and try to create sympathy abroad for their causes. Second, these organizations raise money and purchase weapons and supplies for their operational counterparts. They also provide liaison for the guerrillas with Cuba, Warsaw Pact countries, and other Latin American insurgents. The Cuban Embassy in Mexico City is the main channel for political liaison activities. However, since the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, some political activity was shifted to Managua, and the evidence suggests that the bulk of Cuban-supplied military equipment destined for Central American revolutionaries now is transported through Nicaragua, although other routes have also been reported. Many Central American guerrillas transit Mexico on the way to Cuba or elsewhere, and these political liaison offices are instrumental in arranging their safe passage. Of the Guatemalan groups, the support organization of the EGP has probably been the most successful in promoting insurgent interests.

c. Operational Activities

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Although the Mexican Army has uncovered a few Guatemalan safehouses in the Federal District, most of the insurgents' operational activities on Mexican soil have been concentrated in the southern border states (figure 2). Members of all the major Guatemalan guerrilla groups have at one time or another entered this region to evade capture; for rest, recuperation, or medical attention; or to procure supplies and small arms.

~~(S/NOFORN/NNINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ The EGP probably uses Mexican territory to a greater extent than the other Guatemalan insurgents; it is the largest guerrilla group and the one most active in the northern and western departments of Guatemala. During 1980, the EGP reportedly established large training and base camps in northern El Quiche and Huehuetenango departments, located near the Mexican border. During that time reports of guerrilla activity in adjacent Mexican territory increased. Recent reporting indicates that insurgent base camps still exist in this area of Guatemala.

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Figure 2. The Mexican-Guatemalan Border Region.

(S/NOFORN/NOINTEL/NOCONTRACT) Other insurgent organizations also occasionally use Mexican territory for operational purposes. In 1980, the various guerrilla organizations divided Guatemala into operational fronts and assigned territories to the four major groups. The FAR was charged with two fronts in El Peten Department, as well as a small portion of Mexico, and the ORPA was also assigned territory adjacent to Mexico (figure 3). Although the lines defining those areas of operation have been greatly blurred in the last year and a half, members of both groups have been reported operating in Mexico.

(S/NOFORN/NOINTEL/NOCONTRACT) There are indications that the Mexican Communist Party has provided operational support to the PGT/O. This guerrilla faction reportedly met with members of the Mexican Communist Party of

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


Figure 3. Territory Assigned Guerrilla Groups in Guatemala and Mexico.

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Chiapas (PCM) during November 1981 to discuss ways the PCM could be of assistance. A PCM leader said that his organization could provide ambulances, safe-houses, and places where arms could be stored, and arrange clandestine transport for people and material across the border into Guatemala. The PCM emphasized that the GOM would not know of these support activities, and the PCM in the Chiapas region had no contacts or relationship with the Mexican military. Although the PCM is willing to provide this aid to the PGT/O, it is less enthusiastic about the other insurgent groups. The PGT/O representatives have requested that only humanitarian assistance be given to members of the other guerrilla groups, the bulk of the aid being reserved for their own organization.

~~(S/NOFORN/NOINTEL/NOCONTRAST)~~ Guatemalan and Mexican sources disagree on the numbers of guerrillas involved, whether their camps in Mexico are temporary or permanent, and if these camps conduct regular training sessions. The Guatemalan military maintains that permanent base camps containing as many as 150 armed, uniformed insurgents exist in Mexican territory.

~~(C)~~ The Guatemalan Army invited American Embassy officials to view one of these alleged camps located 600 meters from the border. The Americans reported seeing the camp, but observed no identifiable guerrillas. The Director of the Mexican Refugee Commission later confirmed the presence of a refugee camp at this location, but stated that its inhabitants were mainly women and children, and were not armed.

~~(e)~~ Given such conflicting reports, it is difficult to ascertain the truth. However, it is likely that the refugee camps, which shelter some 18,000 to 30,000 Guatemalan Indians, do, in fact, harbor some guerrillas. Small groups of guerrillas have also been reported in the Lacantun jungle region of southeastern Chiapas and in eastern Tabasco (figure 2). It is probable that these groups occasionally establish temporary bases there, moving them frequently to avoid detection. Some training probably is conducted sporadically in these camps; however, there is little evidence to support the allegations of permanent training camps in Mexico. Although local officials may be aware of the guerrillas' occasional presence and ignore it, it is highly unlikely that the GOM supports the presence of insurgent training camps on Mexican soil.

d. Arms and Supply Routes

~~(e)~~ Sources on opposite sides of the border also disagree on the amount of arms entering Guatemala through Mexico, the origin of these weapons, and the type of equipment involved. The Guatemalan military maintains that the insurgents receive significant amounts of Cuban-supplied military hardware through Mexico. Mexican authorities naturally deny this. Mexicans have long smuggled small arms and other supplies to Central American insurgents for profit; leftist sympathizers probably also supply some arms for ideological reasons. Although several reports indicate various degrees of Cuban involvement in this traffic, the evidence is inconclusive. There is even less substantive evidence that Cuba is transporting infantry weapons (mortars, RPGs, heavy machineguns) across Mexico. Nicaragua, therefore, appears to be the principal Cuban arms conduit to Guatemala, as well as El Salvador.

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~~(C/NOFORN)~~ The Guatemalan Army claims to have documents captured in raids on guerrilla safehouses that prove the existence of arms trafficking through Mexico. According to one such document, the guerrillas were expecting from Cuba a shipment of 2,000 rifles, light artillery, mortars, and recoilless rifles to be infiltrated into Guatemala via the Mexican ports of Cancun and Chetumal during January 1981 (figure 1).

~~(S/NOFORN/NOINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ [REDACTED] Another arms route was allegedly identified to Guatemalan forces in March 1982. According to the source, the EGP received a shipment of several hundred rifles, munitions, and explosives brought in by truck via Mexican Highway 190. A number of other Guatemalan military reports cite instances of arms entering from Mexico, by means of various river and air routes.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Information on arms traffic from sources other than the Guatemalan military is scanty. Nevertheless, smuggling is a recognized tradition along the border, with traffic going in both directions. Local officials in the governments of Mexico and Guatemala are frequently bribed to tolerate these activities. Their smuggling networks probably include some members of the business community and local bureaucracy who smuggle for profit rather than for ideological considerations; in some cases they may include members of the military. It is unlikely that the large numbers of Guatemalan migrant workers or refugees in Mexico (discussed in Section 3) participate significantly in these organizations, as the Mexicans probably prefer to keep the profits to themselves.

~~(C)~~ Customs officials at border crossings also may occasionally receive bribes, but the Guatemalan-Mexican border is so permeable that they are probably not often necessary. Search techniques at the official checkpoints are generally haphazard, and many small airstrips exist on both sides of the border which can easily facilitate clandestine flights.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ It is known that the insurgent political support groups in Mexico City raise money to purchase arms; it is also highly likely that they transport them across the border into Guatemala. Some Mexicans smuggle arms because of ideological considerations--several reports have implicated members of the Mexican Communist Party and other leftist organizations in such activities.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Guatemalan insurgents have reportedly complained of the high cost of procuring arms in Mexico. There are indications that the supply is limited, the arms are costly to begin with, and many Mexicans must be bribed before the arms finally arrive in Guatemala. Given these difficulties, it is likely that the insurgents prefer to procure arms from a cheaper source.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Cuba has been a major supplier of arms to the Guatemalan insurgents, but there is no solid evidence to confirm allegations that large amounts of these weapons have been funneled through Mexico. Cuban-supplied military hardware uncovered in Guatemala has included Chinese and North Korean grenade launchers, Soviet Bloc grenades, and M-16s traceable to Vietnam. In a few cases the captured M-16s carried serial numbers sequential to those of similar weapons uncovered in Honduras and El Salvador. Although several routes

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exist, Nicaragua probably has been the principal conduit for Cuban-supplied arms to these countries, and as such, it is likely that the similar weapons in Guatemala entered via the same route.

~~(C)~~ There are two reasons why Cuba may prefer to use the established arms routes through Nicaragua and Honduras. First of all, Cubans would also have to deal with Mexican smuggling networks, which would increase the cost for them as well. Furthermore, Cuba values its friendly political relationship with Mexico and would not want to jeopardize it unnecessarily. However, if the governments of El Salvador and Honduras were successful in reducing arms traffic through their countries, the "Mexican Connection" would become more important.

3. GUATEMALAN EFFECT ON STABILITY OF THE BORDER STATES

a. Overview of the Border Region

~~(C)~~ The importance of the Mexican southern border states has increased tremendously in the last 5 years. Once viewed as a backward area, the region now produces 85 percent of all Mexican oil and is thought to possess vast petroleum reserves as yet untapped. Chiapas is Mexico's largest producer of natural gas and hydroelectric power. It is among the nation's leaders in other agricultural products, particularly coffee, and reportedly possesses large quantities of as yet unexploited high-grade uranium.


~~(C)~~ Although the decline in world oil prices, peso devaluations, high inflation, and high interest rates have slowed the Mexican economy and hurt business interests around the country, the Mexican national petroleum monopoly (PEMEX) is still expanding its operations in the southern region. The company announced in March the discoveries of giant reservoirs of light crude oil in the states of Chiapas and Tabasco. These finds, plus further work on light crude structures offshore from Tabasco and Campeche, substantially increase Mexico's proven reserves. (These finds are especially important, as light crude draws a higher price on world markets than heavy crude, which makes up much of Mexico's oil reserves.) PEMEX is currently engaged in development drilling and pipeline construction in order to exploit these new discoveries (figure 4).

~~(C)~~ The border states have benefited in some ways from the increased economic activity associated with the petroleum industry, but this development has also brought new problems to the area. Although employment has increased, a flood of workers from other parts of Mexico, who are more qualified and educated than the local population, have arrived to compete for the available jobs. Many other migrants from Central America have also crossed into Mexico seeking both refuge and economic opportunity; estimates of refugees range from 120,000 to 330,000. The influx of people has strained existing public services and the economic infrastructure, resulting in increased inflation and crime.

~~(C)~~ These relatively new difficulties have exacerbated the existing problems of unequal wealth distribution, and a large Indian population that remains for the most part unintegrated into the mainstream of Mexican society. Like the rest of Mexico, the southern border states suffer from land tenure

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Figure 4. Oil and Natural Gas Producing Regions, Area of Potential Reserves.

disputes, which occasionally have led to land seizures and the blockade of roads leading to oilfields. The existing social problems, combined with those introduced with the new immigrants, may make the population more susceptible to leftist political agitation.

(C) The government has been able to cope with these tensions through an occasional show of military force, coupled with a number of social programs. Government programs in the region include road construction, medical clinics, new government stores, and agricultural extension programs, although these may be cut back due to the economic crisis. The increase of a military presence in these states is probably also intended to have a stabilizing effect. Moreover, it is significant that as of November 1982, both Chiapas and Yucatan will have army generals as governors.

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b. Guatemalans in Mexico: The Basis of Conflict

(1) The Guatemalan View

~~(C)~~ From the Guatemalan viewpoint, the insurgents' presence in Mexico is a real threat to the success of the Army's present counterinsurgency campaign. Guatemalan military personnel believe that the lack of Mexican cooperation justifies occasional border violations in order to search out and destroy the guerrillas, who they are certain inhabit the refugee camps in Mexico.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Guatemalan Army in July began to implement a counterinsurgency plan called "Victoria 82." Over a 6- to 12-month period, unit operations are emphasizing continuous patrolling, ambushes, some large-scale sweep operations to keep the guerrillas from establishing permanent positions, and raids to destroy those encampments already in existence. Reportedly, Guatemalan intelligence officers expect the insurgent units to retreat from the northwestern departments of Quiche and Huehuetenango across the border into Chiapas, and then reenter Guatemala later, possibly through the department of El Peten.

~~(S/NOFORN/NOINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~



(2) The Mexican View

~~(C)~~ Most Mexican authorities do not consider the Guatemalan insurgents' activities particularly threatening. However, they are concerned with the floods of Guatemalan workers and refugees pouring into southern Mexico, who put extra strains on an already inadequate infrastructure. The Indian refugees are a special headache, as they have become a political issue for local farmers, state politicians, leftist agitators, and human rights groups. From the Mexican perspective, however, the incursions of the Guatemalan Army into Mexico and other cross-border incidents are the central issues.

~~(C)~~ There is little evidence to indicate that Guatemalan insurgents have ever directed acts of terrorism against Mexican targets. The great majority of guerrilla activities in Mexico provide support in order to continue the fight in Guatemala. The insurgent groups have generally avoided confronting the GOM and Army or attempting to radicalize the local populace.

~~(S/NOFORN/NOINTEL/NOCONTRACT)~~ No one knows how many Guatemalans are now living in Mexico. Every year over 100,000 seasonal agricultural workers

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come from Guatemala to harvest cotton, cocoa, and coffee. This year, however, some 20,000 did not return to Guatemala at the end of the harvest, adding their numbers to the thousands of other Central Americans who have settled in Mexico for political and economic reasons. This group is separate from the Guatemalan Indian refugees, who number from 16,000 to 30,000. Some 16 Indian villages have fled en masse to Mexico, setting up camps a few miles from the border in Chiapas. These refugees are concentrated in four encampments located in an area south and east of La Trinitaria, and further east at El Ixcán. During July 1982, these camps began to increase greatly in size (figure 5).



Figure 5. A Guatemalan Refugee Camp in Mexico.

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~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Mexico views these camps as a strain on the local economies, and during 1982, over 1,000 refugees were deported because they were in Mexico "for economic gain." Both Mexican leftist elements and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees criticized this action, stating that the Guatemalans were badly treated upon their return to Guatemala, and that the deportations violated Mexico's liberal political asylum policy. The GOM has since avoided massive deportations, but provides only a minimum of food and other supplies to the camps to discourage permanent settlement.

~~(C)~~ The great increase of refugees has drawn attention from other sources. The camps are located on Ejido lands, and the local farmers are worried that the refugees will settle permanently on their property. State politicians are carefully monitoring the situation to insure that the refugees do not receive more federal aid than their constituents.

~~(C)~~ Mexican leaders have become increasingly concerned over alleged Guatemalan Army incursions into Mexico. Once such incident occurred during the early part of this year in the southeastern border region of Chiapas, known as Marques de Comillas, which resulted in PEMEX removing exploration operations from the area (figure 2). A construction company was also reported to be leaving the region for fear that its personnel might become caught in the crossfire between guerrillas and the Guatemalan Army. The Governor of Chiapas has also publicly denounced alleged incursions following accusations in the local press that Guatemalan soldiers had been dumping bodies on the Mexican side of the Usumacinta River, and other disappearances of Mexican citizens have been blamed on the Guatemalan military. The Mexican press has reported the beating of three priests, and the murder of a fourth in Chiapas, all of whom were supposedly helping Guatemalan guerrillas. These deeds were attributed to Guatemalan "death squads." There have also been press reports of harassment of border Indian communities. Some of these reported atrocities, however, have not withstood investigation.

~~(U)~~ At the end of September 1982, the GOM sent a letter of protest to Guatemala concerning these incursions. The letter referred to the disappearance and apparent assassination of a Mexican Vice Consul in Guatemala, and two incidents in which Guatemalan troops allegedly fired on Mexican citizens. According to the letter, the first incident took place on 2 August, when Guatemalan troops entered into Mexico and fired on workers involved in clearing jungle along the border. The second incident took place on 30 August, when Guatemalan troops lined along the border and fired into Mexico, killing two Mexican peasants and a Guatemalan laborer who was working with them.

4. MEXICAN POLICY

~~(C)~~ Mexico's decision to formally protest Guatemalan military incursions marks a change in government policy. Until recently, the official stance has been to maintain correct, if cool, relations with Guatemala, give rhetorical support to the insurgents, and downplay the incursions of both groups into Mexico.

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(C) These seemingly contradictory policies are not inconsistent with the goals of recent Mexican leaders. The ruling elite takes seriously its commitment to revolution, and sees political advantages in supporting socialist regimes and insurgent movements. This support is balanced by other policy considerations, which include protecting the country's territorial integrity, regional ambitions, economic policies, and domestic stability.

(C) The GOM publicly supports the political activities of Central American insurgent groups, and possibly permits them some financial assistance through the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Mexican-sponsored Permanent Committee of Latin American Political Parties (COPPPAL). There is no evidence of formal government support for guerrilla operational activities, but it is possible that some Mexican leaders are aware of the aid some of the guerrillas have received in border states.

(C) There are various reasons for this support. The PRI's legitimacy rests on its claim of being the heir and guardian of the Mexican Revolution (1910-20); the Revolution is the foundation of modern Mexico and has become a centerpiece of Mexican identity. On the other hand, the ruling elite has opted for self-serving domestic development policies, which have created great inequalities in wealth distribution. The result has been a wide discrepancy between PRI rhetoric and social reality, which, in turn, has tarnished the government's revolutionary image.

(C) One means of refurbishing the ruling elite's credentials without interfering with domestic policies is to provide moral and political support to revolutionary movements in Latin America. For example, Mexico is the only nation in the hemisphere that has never broken relations with Castro's Cuba. It supported the Allende regime in Chile during the early 1970s. Mexico's breaking of relations with the Somoza regime and subsequent recognition of the Sandinistas added legitimacy to the 1979 insurgent victory in Nicaragua. A joint Mexican-French communique during 1981 expressed the need to include the Salvadoran insurgents in regional peace negotiations.

(C) Desire to demonstrate revolutionary commitment is only one facet of the government's decision to support regional insurgent movements. Mexican leaders believe they can influence these movements by supporting them, and turning their orientation toward Mexico. Further, Mexico desires to prevent outside assistance to would-be Mexican guerrilla organizations by preempting the efforts of Cuba and Nicaragua.

(C) Mexico also wants to counter US power in the Caribbean Basin by increasing its own prominence in the region. Because friendly relations with these revolutionary governments runs counter to US policy, Mexico can play upon anti-American sentiment and gain prestige by adopting an independent stance. This position also increases Mexico's chances of achieving an arbitrator's role in a regional peace plan, which would further enhance the country's international image.

(C) Mexican leaders realize, however, that too close an alignment with revolutionary governments and movements could backfire, jeopardizing these same

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foreign policy goals. Mexico's image as a nonintervening power would suffer if the government were to be exposed as permitting Cuban arms routes or guerrilla training camps in Mexico. Such actions would be in direct violation of Mexico's noninterventionist policy, and would destroy its chances of obtaining the arbitrator's role.

~~(C)~~ Economic well-being could also be endangered by providing too much assistance to the insurgents. Policymakers wish to avoid decisions that would adversely affect trade with the US. This trade comprises 63 percent of all Mexican exports and 66 percent of all imports. The recent financial crisis has created an even greater dependence on US Government loans; Mexican leaders have also had to increase oil sales to the US to help pay the debt.

~~(C)~~ Mexico must also consider its own territorial integrity and political stability in its decision to aid foreign guerrillas. The amount of support Mexico is willing to give appears to decrease relative to the insurgents' proximity. For example, Mexico has provided more assistance to the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and Salvadoran FMLN/FDR than it has been willing to give any of the Guatemalan insurgent groups. Some members of the Mexican economic sector and the military fear that an insurgent presence in the southern states gives the guerrillas the ability to launch an attack against them, or to convince the local peasantry to do so. Furthermore, a radical leftist government contiguous to its southern border would create a highly contagious environment the GOM chooses to avoid. Mexican leaders are also aware that some of the country's most profitable oilfields are only 100 miles from the Guatemalan border.

~~(C)~~ It is unclear at present why Mexican leaders have chosen this particular time to publicize the dispute with Guatemala, but several possibilities deserve consideration. As thousands of refugees and probably increased numbers of guerrillas have fled into Mexico in the wake of Guatemalan counterinsurgency operations, public attention has increasingly focused on the border. Reporters, members of religious groups, political opposition organizations, human rights commissions, and US Government officials have all visited the region on numerous occasions. The public clamor may have forced Mexico into taking a sterner stance on the issue.

~~(C)~~ It is also possible that the ruling elite were searching for an issue to draw public attention away from the current economic crisis. As the Lopez Portillo administration was largely responsible for the devastating economic burden facing the country, a political diversion might serve as a face-saving device for the President. The government also faces increased concern for territorial sovereignty, as well as accusations from the Mexican left that the US is supporting Guatemala in the dispute.

5. THE BORDER AND THE MILITARY

a. Background

~~(C)~~ As the policies of the GOM toward Guatemalan insurgents have changed over time, so have those of the military. During the Presidency of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-70), who was noted for his opposition to leftist move-

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ments, the Army was encouraged to conduct sweep operations along the border in conjunction with the Guatemalan Army. With the election of President Luis Echeverria (1970-76), Mexico increased support of leftist governments and revolutionary movements. One result was a decrease in cooperation on the part of the Mexican Army with regard to Guatemalan border sweep operations. By the inauguration of Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-82), who continued to a large extent the previous administration's foreign policies, the GOG had begun to accuse Mexico of aiding the insurgents.

~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Relations between Guatemala and Mexico became increasingly strained during 1980. In November of that year, the Guatemalan Army requested that the Mexican Army remove Guatemalan guerrilla enclaves that they believed existed on the Mexican side of the border. The Mexican Secretary of Defense responded by announcing publicly that the Army would conduct exercises in the area to prove that no such enclaves existed. Not surprisingly, no guerrilla camps were uncovered. The GOG was angry over this incident, and relations between the two governments continued to cool during 1981. The then Guatemalan Minister of Defense, General Luis R. Mendoza Palomo, requested a meeting with General Felix Galvan Lopez, the Mexican Secretary of Defense, and the two met twice during February 1982 to discuss the border situation. General Mendoza presented evidence of guerrilla camps in Mexico collected by Guatemalan military personnel. General Galvan promised to send Mexican military patrols to verify this information and dismantle the camps. Approximately 1 week later Galvan sent the Guatemalan minister a message stating that no "guerrilla camps" were in existence. Galvan added that he had been informed that there was an influx of refugees crossing into Mexico, but that there was no evidence that any of these groups were guerrillas. Although the Guatemalan military has been unhappy with the Mexican Army's response, talks between the two organizations have continued.

b. The Military Buildup in the South

~~(C)~~ In spite of Mexico's recent reluctance to aid Guatemalan counter-insurgency efforts, the Mexican Army has significantly increased its presence in the southern border region under the Lopez Portillo administration. Three battalion-size units were added to those already in the region: the 73d Infantry Battalion was formed and located in Tenosique, Tabasco; the 24th Cavalry Regiment was moved from Durango to Comitán, Chiapas; and the 74th Infantry Battalion was formed for deployment to Escarcega, Campeche (figure 6). In addition, recent reporting indicates that the Army may have filled some units stationed in border areas beyond authorized strengths, possibly in order to avoid the publicity that sending more units to the region would create. In effect, during the last 3 years, the Army has reinforced the border area with the equivalent of a brigade.

~~(C)~~ Other plans for increasing military strength in border states exist. They include the imposition of a brigade structure on existing units in the 31st Military Zone, Chiapas, and moving an artillery unit to that state from Mexico City. It is very unlikely, however, that any of these or other

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army plans will even be considered in the near term, as the current economic crisis will probably severely limit military expansion.

(C) There have been other indications of an increased army interest in the border region. The annual military exercises held in 1980 and 1981 allowed reaction units from Mexico City and the various military schools, as well as units in the jungle area along the southern border, to practice counter guerrilla tactics and the defense of such possible targets as the oilfields. By involving the Superior War College and other military schools, these exercises have focused attention on the southern border situation. The Mexican Army's use of IMET funds has demonstrated an interest in US courses involving patrolling and commando training, and there are indications of increased use of the Army's own combat patrol course. The Airborne Brigade, the unit that comes closest to being Mexico's quick-reaction force, has reportedly also increased emphasis on counter guerrilla training.




Figure 6. Military Dispositions in Southern Mexico.

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(C) The military and the government also appear to be making an effort to increase mobility in border areas. The military acquired some new helicopters during 1981, and some have been observed in use near the Guatemalan border. In addition, the GOM has reportedly begun construction on a frontier road which supposedly will parallel the length of the southern frontier. In spite of recent budgetary constraints, some 600 million pesos have been authorized so far for the project.

c. Reasons for Military Expansion in the Region

(C) There are several possible explanations for the military increase in the south. The official explanation is twofold. First, the buildup in the south is a manifestation of the overall modernization and expansion program that the Armed Forces have been undergoing the last few years. In this connection, the government is making an effort to bring the military up to the standards of the regional power which Mexico has become. The other official explanation is that the increase was needed to protect Mexico's vast oil resources. Before the petroleum boom, the area had been largely ignored, due to its low strategic priority.

(C) There are other possible explanations for the Army's buildup in southern Mexico. The conservative military hierarchy may be more concerned about an insurgency in the area than it is willing to admit publicly. The Armed Forces may also privately promote the need for an increased presence in the south in order to encourage increased allocation of funds for military spending. But whatever the reasons given, the effect has been the same--the GOM is strengthening its control of the border area and asserting its sovereignty in the region. Its intention appears to be directed equally against Guatemalan military incursions and use of the territory by guerrillas.

6. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

(C) The Mexican letter protesting the recent Guatemalan incursions and its accompanying publicity has changed the probable future directions of Guatemalan-Mexican policies concerning the border situation. Mexico has somewhat limited its options by sending the "protest" letter; the government can no longer ignore insurgent activities. Mexico is not expected to change its policy of providing support to Central American revolutionary movements, but it is expected that less support will be provided to the Guatemalan guerrillas. The publicity will also probably increase public demands for greater protection from incursions of both the Guatemalan military and the insurgents. In this connection, the Mexican Government may be obligated to take measures to convince its constituents that it is defending their interests, and further strengthen its military presence in the region. Given the Army's anti-insurgent stance, the increased presence would tend to limit guerrilla activities, but would also increase the likelihood of border incidents between the two armies.

(C) Both Guatemala and Mexico will probably try to avoid such confrontations; instead they will pursue their differences in the political arena. Guatemalan leaders will continue to accuse Mexico of providing material support

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to the insurgents, and lobby for the US to intervene on their behalf. In a similar vein, Mexico will continue to publicize Guatemalan Army excesses, incursions, and human rights violations in an attempt to pressure Guatemala into changing its practices.

~~(C)~~ Although different aspects of the Guatemalan-Mexican dispute could help or harm the insurgents' cause, the overall outcome of the guerrilla war in Guatemala will probably not be significantly affected by the conflict. If Mexican attempts to discredit the GOG are successful, it would be a political victory for the guerrillas, and their chances for success would be increased slightly. If Mexico reacts by significantly reinforcing the border, Guatemalan guerrilla activities in that country would be limited to an extent.

~~(C)~~ Finally, even if the Mexican Army were able to seal the border, it is not believed that this would greatly affect the Guatemalan insurgency over the long term because of its inherent socioeconomic roots, and continuing arms supply from other sources.

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312339Z OCT 85

[TACHADO]

TO DIA WASHDC//JSI-4B/B-3C2//

PAÍS: (U) Guatemala (GT); Mexico (MX)

TÍTULO: IRR [TACHADO] Operaciones Militares en ZM #18 San Marcos (U)

RESMEN: [TACHADO]

TEXTO: SITUACIÓN GENERAL: [TACHADO] La situación en ZM #18 es muy similar a la que había tenido durante la visita tres meses antes. Las fuerzas del grupo guerrillero ORPA todavía están activas en el departamento y el ejército continúa operaciones ofensivas para mantenerlos equilibrados durante el período electoral. Las fuerzas militares parecen tener el control general del departamento mientras que las guerrillas pueden montar operaciones exitosas y limitadas en los momentos y lugares que elijan.

2. OPERACIONES ACTUALES:

A. OPERACIONES MILITARES: El ZM actualmente opera dos instalaciones en San Marcos, al menos tres destacamentos remotos y una fuerza de combate involucrada en una operación ofensiva. La antigua sede de ZM actualmente alberga solo las secciones S-2 y S-5 y algunas fuerzas de seguridad. El comandante y el resto de su personal están ocupando las nuevas instalaciones de base cerca de la pista de aterrizaje. La construcción considerable todavía está en curso allí y la construcción [TACHADO] está completa en un 70 por ciento. Los edificios restantes parecían ser predominantemente cuarteles. Los tres destacamentos de avanzada señalados [TACHADO] estaban ubicados en El Porvenir [TACHADO], El Ferrol [TACHADO] y Finca Navidad [TACHADO].

B. Las operaciones en curso en 851022 incluyeron una incursión del tamaño de una compañía en el supuesto campamento de guerrilleros y barridos a lo largo de la carretera Panamericana que corre de este a oeste. Tres pelotones intentaban converger en el campamento sospechoso ubicado al este del volcán Tajumulco. Los barridos de combate estaban siendo conducidos por fuerzas en el proceso de rotación hacia los destacamentos de destacamento. Un batallón estimado se mudó de San Marcos y, según los informes, se desplazó de este a oeste, justo al norte de la carretera de Panamericana al llegar a un lugar de separación, debía dejar la unidad de reemplazo allí y continuar hacia el oeste. Esto continuaría hasta Finca Navidad, el lugar más distante. Parecía que las unidades relevadas barrerían de oeste a este a lo largo de la carretera en el lado sur hasta que regresaran a San Marcos.

C. ZM # 18 continúa operando un centro de entrenamiento local en o cerca de Finca Navidad. Según el CDR de ZM, las tropas se someten a entrenamiento modificado de Kaibil (Ranger) allí. Luego reciben tres días de R y R en la playa. Después de las vacaciones en la playa, vuelven al combate. El CDR siente que esto ha elevado la moral entre las tropas.

D. En el sector sur de San Marcos, a lo largo de la frontera con Quetzaltenango, el ZM #17 Quetzaltenango estaba operando cuatro destacamentos de destacamento para que ZM #18 pudiera concentrar sus esfuerzos en las áreas críticas de Tajumulco y en la carretera Panamericana.

E. FUNCIONAMIENTO SUBVERSIVO: Según el ZM S-3, todavía hay dos frentes activos de ORPA que operan en San Marcos. El Comandante Manuel Front se basa en Tajumulco, pero según informes, ha cambiado el énfasis de sus operaciones hacia el sur, hacia los centros de población a lo largo de la carretera Panamericana. El Frente Luis Ixmata opera al sur de la carretera y supuestamente ha incrementado sus actividades allí. Se dice que son muy activos en el cinturón cafetero del sur de San Marcos.

F. Parece que, en San Marcos, ORPA ha aumentado su actividad política. [TACHADO] han estado estableciendo barricadas y entrando a aldeas y fincas. A punta de pistola, los subversivos transmiten su mensaje político de que las elecciones carecerán de sentido y que la ciudadanía no debería participar. en un caso, algunos "subversivos" indicaron que la gente debería votar por el Partido Demócrata Cristiano [...]

CONFIDENCIAL

[PÁGINA 1]

si el ejército sucede en la escena como ocurrió en Finca El Perú [TACHADO] alrededor del 13 de octubre de 85. Los guerrilleros dejan un destacamento en contacto mientras los otros huyen. En el caso de El Perú, los subversivos intentaron quemar la finca. Fue dañado pero estaba en operación en 851022.

G. Se dice que el armamento subversivo incluye ametralladoras MAG, ametralladoras M60, rifles FAL, M-16, AR-15 y rifles GALIL. Los documentos subversivos capturados implican que también tienen un mortero de 60 MM, pero no lo han empleado en San Marcos desde un ataque en abril de 1985 contra la sede de ZM. También usan minas Claymore caseras, especialmente como seguridad perimetral para sus campamentos.

H. Los documentos subversivos brindan largos detalles sobre el uso de campamentos base subterráneos. Los oficiales en ZM # 18 creen que puede haber tales instalaciones en San Marcos. Han escuchado rumores de que existen tales bases, pero hasta ahora no han tenido éxito en descubrir tales ubicaciones.

I. Recientemente (NFI) una patrulla de defensa civil en el oeste de San Marcos había descubierto un alijo de armas y equipos para cuatro personas a lo largo de la frontera del MX-GT. La patrulla de defensa civil encontró huellas y las siguió hacia la frontera MX. Solo dentro del territorio de GT en [TACHADO]. Encontraron tierra suelta. Encontraron cuatro armas y equipos enterrados allí [TACHADO].

3. PERSONALIDADES:

A. Col. Jorge Rene ((Isaacs)) Rodríguez: continúa como ZM CDR. Es un oficial muy amable y parece ser Pro-U.S. No es bullicioso acerca de su comando, pero parece estar tranquilamente seguro de su capacidad y las capacidades de su comando. Durante unas cuatro visitas a ZM # 18 [TACHADO] lo encontró positivo y optimista a pesar de la falta de éxitos notables contra los guerrilleros. Col Isaacs está convencido de que el ejército controla la mayor parte de San Marcos y que la mayoría de los residentes son antisubversivos progubernamentales. Col Isaacs está firmemente comprometido a celebrar elecciones exitosas en San Marcos. Considera que

la democracia es esencial para la nación y un beneficio para el ejército en su lucha contra la subversión.

B. LTC Guillermo ((Portillo)) Gómez: ahora es el segundo comandante en ZM # 18 San Marcos. Acababa de llegar a San Marcos en 851022 y anteriormente había sido el 2d CDR en ZM # 13 Suchitepequez. LTC Portillo fue muy franco y abierto en las conversaciones [TACHADO] y otros oficiales de ZM presentes. LTC Portillo tiene una reputación entre otros oficiales de GT como casi fanático antisubversivo. LTC Portillo disfruta corriendo para mantenerse en forma.

C. CPT Joseph Arthur ((Gonzalez)) Cabrera es el oficial de operaciones S-3 de ZM # 18. CPT Gonzalez acababa de regresar de un programa de intercambio en los EE. UU. Pasó un año como asistente BN S-3 en un batallón de infantería de la 101ª división AMBL de Ft. Campbell, Kentucky. Estaba programado para pasar dos años allí, pero las dificultades económicas debido a la tasa de cambio desfavorable obligó a su regreso temprano. CPT Gonzalez nació en Texas y habla inglés con fluidez. Él parece ser pro-U.S. y disfruté mucho su estancia en los Estados Unidos. CPT González reemplazó al MAJ Alvaro Gabriel ((Rivas)) Cifuentes como el S-3. MAJ Rivas es el S-2 del BDE Aerotransportado en San José.

D. Coronel Oscar Rene ((Guzmán)) Alvarado: Según los informes, saldrá de ZM # 18 donde estaba sirviendo como DCR 2D. Se rumoreaba que iría a ZM # 13 para reemplazar a LTC Portillo como CDR 2D. Col Guzmán, un oficial de ingeniería, fue ascendido a coronel el 1 de octubre de 85 y los coroneles llenos rara vez se usan como CDR 2D. Dado un reciente levantamiento en las actividades de guerrilla en ZM # 13, es posible que el puesto haya sido actualizado para merecer un coronel.

COMENTARIOS: 1. [TACHADO]

~~CONFIDENCIAL~~

[PÁGINA 2]

3. La implementación de un programa de R y R por parte de Col. Isaacs es interesante. Los oficiales generalmente reciben un fin de semana de tres días cada dos semanas [TACHADO] no conoce ningún programa de este tipo para las tropas. El nuevo enfoque del coronel Isaacs podría ayudar a mantener la moral alta en ZM # 18.

4. [TACHADO]

5. El descubrimiento de un caché en el borde MX-GT confirma los rumores que se habían escuchado anteriormente de que los guerrilleros escondieron sus equipos en GT y luego ingresaron a MX como "refugiados" desarmados.

~~CONFIDENCIAL~~

[PÁGINA 3]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTINE
R 312339Z OCT 85

ZYUW RUEHGT1284 3042345

TO DIA WASHDC//JSI-4B/DB-3C2//

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LNOFORN

SERIAL: (U) IIR

PASS: (U) DIA PASS TO AIG 11888

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT); MEXICO (MX).

SUBJ: IIR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MZ #18
SAN MARCOS (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

DOI: (U) 851022

REQS: (U)

SOURCE: (U)

SUMMARY: (U)

TEXT: 1. (U) GENERAL SITUATION: THE
SITUATION IN MZ #18, MUCH THE SAME AS IT HAD BEEN
DURING VISIT THREE MONTHS EARLIER. FORCES FROM THE
GUERRILLA GROUP ORPA ARE STILL ACTIVE IN THE DEPART-
MENT AND THE MILITARY IS CONTINUING OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS TO KEEP THEM F BALANCE DURING THE
ELECTORAL PERIOD. THE MILITARY FORCES APPEAR TO HAVE
OVERALL CONTROL OF THE DEPARTMENT WHILE THE GUERRILLAS
CAN MOUNT SUCCESSFUL, LIMITED OPERATIONS AT TIMES AND
PLACES OF THEIR CHOOSING.

2. (U) CURRENT OPERATIONS:

- A. MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE MZ IS CURRENTLY
OPERATING TWO FACILITIES IN SAN MARCOS, AT LEAST THREE
REMOTE DETACHMENTS, AND A COMBAT FORCE ENGAGED IN AN
OFFENSIVE OPERATION. THE OLD MZ HEADQUARTERS CURRENTLY
HOUSES ONLY THE S-2 AND S-5 SECTIONS AND SOME SECURITY
FORCES. THE COMMANDER AND THE REST OF HIS STAFF ARE
OCCUPYING THE NEW BASE FACILITIES NEAR THE AIRSTRIP.
CONSIDERABLE CONSTRUCTION IS STILL UNDERWAY THERE AND
CONSTRUCTION AS 70 PERCENT COMPLETE. THE
REMAINING BUILDINGS APPEARED TO BE PREDOMINANTLY
BARRACKS FACILITIES. THE THREE FORWARD DETACHMENTS
NOTED WERE LOCATED IN EL PORVENIR
EL FERROL AND
FINCA NAVIDAD

- B. ONGOING OPERATIONS ON 851022 INCLUDED A COMPANY
SIZED RAID ON A SUSPECTED GUERRILLA CAMP AND SWEEPS ALONG
THE PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY RUNNING EAST-WEST. THREE
PLATOONS WERE ATTEMPTING TO CONVERGE ON THE SUSPECT
CAMP LOCATED TO THE EAST OF TAJAMULCO VOLCANO. THE
COMBAT SWEEPS WERE BEING CONDUCTED BY FORCES IN THE
PROCESS OF ROTATING TO THE DETACHMENT OUTPOSTS. AN
ESTIMATED BATTALION MOVED OUT FROM SAN MARCOS AND WAS
REPORTEDLY MOVING EAST TO WEST JUST NORTH OF THE PAN
AM HIGHWAY. AS IT REACHED A DETACHMENT LOCATION IT WAS
TO LEAVE THE REPLACEMENT UNIT THERE AND CONTINUE TO THE
WEST. THIS WOULD CONTINUE TO FINCA NAVIDAD, THE MOST

DISTANT LOCATION. IT APPEARED THAT THE RELIEVED UNITS
WOULD THEN SWEEP WEST TO EAST ALONG THE HIGHWAY ON THE
SOUTH SIDE UNTIL THEY RETURNED TO SAN MARCOS.

- C. MZ #18 CONTINUES TO OPERATE A LOCAL TRAINING
CENTER AT OR NEAR FINCA NAVIDAD. ACCORDING TO THE MZ
CDR THE TROOPS UNDERGO MODIFIED KAIBIL (RANGER)
TRAINING THERE. THEY ARE THEN GIVEN THREE DAYS OF
R AND R AT THE BEACH. AFTER THE VACATION AT THE
BEACH THEY RETURN TO COMBAT. THE CDR FEELS THIS HAS
BOOSTED MORALE AMONG THE TROOPS.

- D. IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR OF SAN MARCOS, ALONG THE
BORDER WITH QUETZALTENANGO, MZ #17 QUETZALTENANGO WAS
OPERATING FOUR DETACHMENT OUTPOSTS SO THAT MZ #18 COULD
CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS IN THE CRITICAL AREAS OF
TAJAMULCO AND ALONG THE PAN AM HIGHWAY.

- E. SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS: ACCORDING TO THE MZ S-3
THERE ARE STILL TWO ACTIVE FRONTS OF ORPA OPERATING IN
SAN MARCOS. THE COMANDANTE MANUEL FRONT IS BASED AROUND
TAJAMULCO BUT HAS REPORTEDLY SHIFTED THE EMPHASIS OF ITS
OPERATIONS SOUTH TOWARD THE POPULATION CENTERS ALONG
THE PAN AM HIGHWAY. THE LUIS IXMATA FRONT OPERATES SOUTH
OF THE HIGHWAY AND HAS ALLEGEDLY INCREASED ITS ACTIVITIES
THERE. THEY ARE SAID TO BE VERY ACTIVE IN THE COFFEE
BELT OF SOUTHERN SAN MARCOS.

- F. IT APPEARS THAT, IN SAN MARCOS, ORPA HAS
INCREASED ITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY. THEY HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHING ROADBLOCKS AND ENTERING
VILLAGES AND FINCAS. AT GUNPOINT THE SUBVERSIVES
THEN DELIVER THEIR POLITICAL MESSAGE THAT THE ELECTIONS
WILL BE MEANINGLESS AND THAT THE CITIZENRY SHOULD NOT
PARTICIPATE. IN ONE CASE SOME "SUBVERSIVES" INDICATED
THAT THE PEOPLE SHOULD VOTE FOR THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC BT

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TO DIA WASHDC//JSI-4B/DB-3C2//

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SERIAL: (U) IIR

PASS: (U) DIA PASS TO AIG 11888

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT); MEXICO (MX).

SUBJ: IIR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MZ #18 PARTY (DCG). IF THE ARMY HAPPENS ON THE SCENE AS OCCURRED AT FINCA EL PERU ON OR ABOUT 13 OCT 85, THE GUERRILLAS LEAVE A DETACHMENT IN CONTACT WHILE THE OTHERS FLEE. IN THE CASE OF EL PERU, THE SUBVERSIVES ATTEMPTED TO BURN THE FINCA. IT WAS DAMAGED BUT WAS IN OPERATION ON 851022.

- G. SUBVERSIVE WEAPONRY IS SAID TO INCLUDE MAG MACHINEGUNS, M60 MACHINEGUNS, FAL RIFLES, M-16'S, AR-15'S, AND GALIL RIFLES. CAPTURED SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS IMPLY THAT THEY HAVE A 60-MM MORTAR, ALSO, BUT THEY HAVE NOT EMPLOYED IT IN SAN MARCOS SINCE AN APRIL 1985 ATTACK ON THE MZ HEADQUARTERS. THEY ALSO USE HOMEMADE CLAYMORE MINES, ESPECIALLY AS PERIMETER SECURITY FOR THEIR CAMPS.

- H. SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS PROVIDE LENGTHY DETAILS ABOUT THE USE OF SUBTERRANEAN BASE CAMPS. OFFICERS IN MZ #18 BELIEVE THAT THERE MAY BE SUCH FACILITIES IN SAN MARCOS. THEY HAVE HEARD RUMORS THAT SUCH BASES EXIST BUT THEY HAVE BEEN THUS FAR UNSUCCESSFUL IN UNCOVERING ANY SUCH LOCATIONS.

- I. RECENTLY (NFI) A CIVIL DEFENSE PATROL IN WESTERN SAN MARCOS HAD DISCOVERED A CACHE OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT FOR FOUR PERSONS ALONG THE MX-GT BORDER. THE CIVIL DEFENSE PATROL FOUND TRACKS AND FOLLOWED THEM TOWARD THE MX BORDER. JUST INSIDE GT TERRITORY AT THEY FOUND LOOSE DIRT. THEY FOUND FOUR WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT BURIED THERE

3. ~~(C/NF)~~ PERSONALITIES:

- A. COL JORGE RENE ((ISAACS)) RODRIGUEZ: CONTINUES AS THE MZ CDR. HE IS A VERY FRIENDLY OFFICER AND APPEARS TO BE PRO-U.S. HE IS NOT BOISTEROUS ABOUT HIS COMMAND BUT HE APPEARS TO BE QUIETLY CONFIDENT ABOUT HIS ABILITY AND THE CAPABILITIES OF HIS COMMAND. DURING SOME FOUR VISITS TO MZ #18 FOUND HIM POSITIVE AND UPBEAT DESPITE THE LACK OF MOTEWORTHY SUCCESSES AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS. COL ISAACS IS CONVINCED THAT THE ARMY CONTROLS MOST OF SAN MARCOS AND THAT MOST RESIDENTS ARE PRO-GOVERNMENT AND ANTI-SUBVERSIVES. COL ISAACS IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO HOLDING SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS IN SAN MARCOS. HE VIEWS DEMOCRACY AS ESSENTIAL TO THE NATION AND AS A BENEFIT TO THE ARMY IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST SUBVERSION.

- B. LTC GUILLERMO ((PORTILLO)) GOMEZ: IS NOW THE SECOND COMMANDER IN MZ #18 SAN MARCOS. HE HAD JUST ARRIVED IN SAN MARCOS ON 851022 AND HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN THE 2D CDR IN MZ #13 SUCHITEPEQUEZ. LTC PORTILLO WAS VERY FRANK AND OPEN IN CONVERSATIONS AND

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INFO CJCS(4) NIDS(*) J5(2) JAD:CSD(1) SECDEF(*)
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OTHER MZ OFFICERS PRESENT. LTC PORTILLO HAS A REPUTATION AMONG OTHER GT OFFICERS AS AN ALMOST FANATIC ANTI-SUBVERSIVE. LTC PORTILLO ENJOYS RUNNING TO STAY IN SHAPE.

- C. CPT JOSEPH ARTHUR ((GONZALEZ)) CABRERA: IS THE S-3, OPERATIONS OFFICER, FOR MZ #18. CPT GONZALEZ HAD ONLY RECENTLY RETURNED FROM AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM IN THE U.S. HE SPENT ONE YEAR AS AN ASSISTANT BN S-3 IN AN AIRMOBILE INFANTRY BATTALION OF THE 101ST AMBL DIVISION, FT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY. HE WAS SCHEDULED TO SPEND TWO YEARS THERE BUT THE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP DUE TO THE UNFAVORABLE EXCHANGE RATE FORCED HIS EARLY RETURN. CPT GONZALEZ WAS BORN IN TEXAS AND SPEAKS FLUENT ENGLISH. HE APPEARS TO BE PRO-U.S. AND VERY MUCH ENJOYED HIS STAY IN THE U.S. CPT GONZALEZ REPLACED MAJ ALVARO GABRIEL ((RIVAS)) CIFUENTES AS THE S-3. MAJ RIVAS IS THE S-2 OF THE AIRBORNE BDE AT SAN JOSE.

- D. COL OSCAR RENE ((GUZMAN)) ALVARADO: WILL REPORTEDLY DEPART MZ #18 WHERE HE WAS SERVING AS 2D CDR. RUMOR HAD IT THAT HE WOULD GO TO MZ #13 TO REPLACE LTC PORTILLO AS THE 2D CDR. COL GUZMAN, AN ENGINEER OFFICER, WAS PROMOTED TO COLONEL ON 1 OCT 85. AND FULL COLONELS ARE ONLY RARELY USED AS 2D CDRS. GIVEN A RECENT UPSWING IN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN MZ #13, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE POSITION HAS BEEN UPGRADED TO MERIT A COLONEL.

COMMENTS: 1. ~~(C/NF)~~

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SERIAL: (U) IIR

PASS: (U) DIA PASS TO AIG 11888

COUNTRY: (U) GUATEMALA (GT); MEXICO (MX).

SUBJ: IIR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MZ #18

3. (U) COL ISAACS' IMPLEMENTATION OF AN R AND R PROGRAM IS INTERESTING. OFFICERS ARE TYPICALLY GIVEN A THREE-DAY WEEKEND EVERY TWO WEEKS. KNOWS OF NO SUCH PROGRAM FOR THE TROOPS. COL ISAACS' NOVEL APPROACH MIGHT AID IN MAINTAINING HIGH MORALE IN MZ #18.

4. ~~(C/NF)~~

5. ~~(C)~~ THE DISCOVERY OF A CACHE ON THE MX-GT BORDER CONFIRMS RUMORS PREVIOUSLY HEARD THAT GUERRILLAS HIDE THEIR EQUIPMENT IN GT AND THEN ENTER MX AS UNARMED "REFUGEES".

PROJ: (U) NONE

//IPSP: PGW2310//

//COMSOBJ: 11//

INSTR: (U) US

PREP: (U)

APPR: (U)

EVAL: (U) NO

WARNING: (U) NO RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

DECL: (U) OADR DT

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VITA

Emily Willard is a doctoral candidate at the University of Washington Jackson School of International Studies. She currently works as a public defender investigator at the King County Department of Public Defense, Associated Council for the Accused Division. Previously she worked as a graduate research fellow at the University of Washington Center for Human Rights from 2015-2019 where she used, and taught others to use the Freedom of Information Act to advocate for human rights by supporting grassroots justice movements in El Salvador, and monitoring immigration enforcement in Washington State. She served as an intern for the ACLU of Washington's Campaign for Smart Justice in 2019.

Prior to arriving at the University of Washington, Emily worked at the National Security Archive at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C. from 2009 to 2015 where she utilized the Freedom of Information Act to obtain declassified U.S. government records about U.S. foreign policy in Guatemala, El Salvador, Mexico, and Colombia. Documents obtained through the FOIA were used as evidence in human rights trials around the world. At the Archive, Emily helped found the Genocide Documentation Project, and conducted research on the international response to the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia. She also served for 4 years on the board of directors of the Guatemala Human Rights Commission-USA. Emily earned her BA and MA from American University, School of International Service in Washington, D.C. focusing her studies on human rights, conflict, Latin America, and Spanish language. Emily is a 2014 Rotary International Peace Fellow. She can be reached at eawillard@gmail.com.