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 Document [redacted] -0000 52753 Subject: MODERATING THE MILITARY HARDLINERS C 09402 [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
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TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

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[redacted] SUBJECT: MODERATING THE MILITARY HARDLINERS

REF: DIRECTOR 207458 (b)(1)

1. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
 HAS VARYING DEGREES OF INFLUENCE WITH THE FOLLOWING SALVADORAN OFFICERS WHO COULD BE APPROACHED IN CONJUNCTION WITH PLAN TO DISCOURAGE HARDLINERS FROM EMBARKING ON COUP PLOTTING: [redacted]

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[redacted] FINALLY, WE COULD GO DIRECTLY TO THE INFAMOUS COL. OCHOA--NEARLY EVERYONE'S TOP CANDIDATE TO LEAD OR PARTICIPATE IN ANY EVENTUAL COUP ATTEMPT, ALTHOUGH THIS COULD BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE.

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 2. OF ABOVE, [redacted] WOULD RECOMMEND THAT INITIAL APPROACHES BE CONFINED TO [redacted] BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO GET THE MESSAGE ON THE MILITARY WIRE. [redacted]

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3. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SALVADORAN MILITARY IN GENERAL IS DISPOSED TO SUPPORT ARENA IS ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY IN THE RANKS OF MAJOR AND ABOVE. NOTE THAT D'AUBUISSON IS NOT (RPT NOT) THE REASON FOR ARENA PARTY PREFERENCE BY THE MAJORITY OF THESE MILITARY OFFICERS; IT IS THE CONSERVATIVE/TRADITIONAL VALUES INHERENT IN THIS POLITICAL PARTY WHICH CONFORMS TO AND ATTRACTS LIKE MINDED SALVADORAN MILITARY. D'AUBUISSON REPRESENTS THE ARENA PARTY'S RADICAL ELEMENT. HE IS ADMITTEDLY A VERY CHARISMATIC FIGURE, BUT HE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE A FULLY UNITED POLITICAL PARTY BEHIND HIM. IN FACT, HE MAY BE ON TENUOUS GROUND IN TRYING TO MAINTAIN HIS LEADERSHIP POSITION WITHIN THE PARTY. SOME "EXTREMIST" RIGHT-WING MILITARY OFFICERS ARE CLOSE PERSONALLY AND POLITICALLY TO D'AUBUISSON, BUT WE THINK THEY REPRESENT A RELATIVELY SMALL

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PERCENTAGE OF THE CORPS. AT THE UPPER LEVELS OF THE MILITARY HIERARCHY, BOTH MOD VIDES CASANOVA AND VICE-MOD FLORES LIMA HAVE SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO ATTEMPT TO MODERATE EXTREMIST INFLUENCES ON MORE SUCCEPTIBLE MILITARY OFFICERS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THEY ARE "PRO-DUARTE" AT THE EXPENSE OF BEING "PRO-MILITARY," BUT THIS DOES PROVIDE MORE SENSITIVE, BALANCED LEADERSHIP AT THE TOP.

4. NO FILE.

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