Diversity, Temporality, Population: The Securitization of the Democratic Pastorate and the Rise of the Racial Liberal Security State

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Abstract

Diversity, Temporality, Population: the Securitization of the Democratic Pastorate and the Rise of the Racial Liberal Security State

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Reading across the domains of disciplinary knowledge formations, public educational initiatives, governmental documentation, and social movement discourses, this dissertation examines emergent meanings of security as the antiracist renovation of the liberal tradition conjoins with questions of social and national security during the U.S. "encounter with totalitarianism" in the years leading up to WWII. In the development of the ethnicity paradigm in the social sciences, the principles of neutrality that governed the administration of New Deal state programming, and the advent and proliferation of public and private educational initiatives to promote cultural pluralism, this dissertation identifies and traces a series of interrelated and co-constitutive "racial security logics" that create new parameters of intelligibility (and governance) for subjects of and for a purportedly antiracist state. The purportedly antiracist state form that liberal progressive narratives claim is achieved later during what Michael Omi and Howard Winant have famously referred to as "the period of the racial break," is a state form that is simultaneously imagined as "achieved" and

perpetually "coming into being" in the postwar period. This dissertation locates and names the material and epistemic preconditions for this shift in the immediate prewar period. Central to this new state form coming into being, I argue, was the production of a progressive telos for the nation that both constructed racial liberals as a "democratic pastorate" and conducted them as mangers of the general population to work toward the "common good" of a progressive, inclusive future secured through the monitoring, surveillance, and policing of the disorganizing potentialities of race. Through the securitization of the democratic pastorate, a new form of state rationality developed that could secure both a still thoroughly racialized stratified population, as well new material relations for the racial state, while simultaneously disavowing those relations of violence through the rise of race relations knowledge industries. At its core, this dissertation examines how the U.S. racial liberal state state extended and transformed its modes of racial violence *precisely through* purportedly antiracist progressive social, political, and intellectual movements that understood liberal progress as the achievement of cultural identity through the universalizing rubrics of procedural neutrality and inclusive diversity.

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Since a significant portion of this dissertation was thought out during an extended period of time when I was living in my van and traveling, I also want to thank the many

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Introduction

Rethinking Security in "The Long Shadow of Racial Fascism"

In the months leading up to the 2020 U.S. presidential election, concerns about the U.S. state's potentially irrevocable slide into bona fide fascism under a second Trump term had once again migrated from Left progressive blocs to the liberal mainstream. After a flurry of concern had first risen in the months leading up to the 2016 election, and slowly died down as the series of decidedly illiberal executive orders and rapid fire tweets announcing new governance measures daily became normalized, cable news pundits from MSNBC to CNN once again gravely reported on a series of tweets in which the President had gone too far in breaking democratic norms, this time, preemptively casting doubt on and challenging the legitimacy of a potential Biden electoral victory. Calling into question the security of mail-in voting expansions which had been implemented to ensure voters could safely cast ballots as the global COVID-19 pandemic raged unchecked with no coordinated federal public health response, the President raised additional alarm by refusing to agree to concede if he were not named the victor, claiming that a loss could only be the result of massive, widespread voter fraud. On August 8th 2020, a popular CNN's Sunday program *Reliable Sources* with Brian Stelter, which claims to investigate, "the story behind the story," brought on Yale philosophy professor and author of *How Fascism Works*, Dr. Jason Stanley, to weigh in on whether the President's rhetoric pertaining to the upcoming election signaled a point of no return for American democratic institutions. Dr. Stanley, demonstrating denominative due diligence, assured Stelter, and the American public more broadly, that we had indeed not yet seen the rise of a properly fascistic governmental regime. He carefully elaborated, however, that what the American public *was* witnessing was the rise, growth, and consolidation of a fascist *political and social movement* with the rise of Trumpism generally. He

went on to argue that this movement had successfully converted the Republican National Committee into a party that adhered to a "cult of the leader" politics that remained a central hallmark of a properly fascistic regime, and, if conditions allowed, could certainly result in the establishment of a full-blown fascist regime if the spread and consolidation of Trumpism were left unchecked, and allowed a second term. And in a cautionary, erudite tone reminiscent of Sinclair Lewis' famous 1935 novel, Dr. Stanley seemed to assure the American public that it hasn't happened here *yet*, but it certainly *could*, and stressed with the utmost seriousness that it was our duty as Americans to remain vigilant and ensure democracy prevailed, namely, by casting votes on the right side of history in the next presidential election. It was up to the better elements of the American public—namely, individual citizens—it seemed, to ensure the continued security of the storied democratic way of life against this new fascist threat to democracy, ("Expert compares Trump's politics to fascism").

And so as another chapter in the seemingly perpetual crisis of democracy for the U.S. state unfolded at an increased fever pitch as the election neared, the more learned circles of public intellectual debate took up the pressing question of whether or not it was appropriate or useful to label Trump and Trumpism as fascist in the first place. Responding to the renewed debate over whether it were factually accurate or politically responsible to use the dreaded "F-word," Alberto Toscano's October 8th *Boston Review* essay, "The Long Shadow of Racial Fascism," intervened in the predominantly comparative and historiographic debate, noting its hyper-focus on definitional accuracy and countering with an (actually) useful perspective. In the essay's opening, Toscano muses that while the likes of Peter E. Gordon, Samuel Moyn, and Sarah Churchwell expectedly took to the *New York Review of Books* to ponder the accuracy and political utility of "the F-word," it was enjoying

also even more "unusual forays" into mainstream discourse through avenues like CNN, the *New York Times,* the most unlikely of "dependable neoliberal cheerleader[s]" like Thomas Friedman, as well (Toscano). To course correct this rapidly growing public discursive narrative that attended the F-word's re-entrance onto the grand stage of mainstream political discourse, relying almost exclusively on intra-European models as its mode of comparative analysis, Toscano offers an important suggestion to productively reformulate the parameters of the discussion. Toscano suggests that interested parties look not to the dustbin of European history, but the annals of the Black radical tradition in the U.S.—in both nationalist and internationalist iterations—to arrive at a more precise description of America's unique relationship with fascism that is not nearly as new as its current entrance into the limelight under Trumpism, and the worried discourse over its meaning and damaging effects, might suggest. Providing an overview of the contemporary state of the discussion, Toscano succinctly sums up the proscriptive and analogic nature of the debate:

> Notwithstanding the changing terrain, talk of fascism has generally stuck to the same groove, namely asking whether present phenomena are analogous to those familiar from interwar European dictatorships. Skeptics of comparison underscore the way in which the analogy of fascism can either treat the present moment as exceptional, papering over the history of distinctly American forms of authoritarianism, or, alternatively, be so broad as to fail to define what is unique about our current predicament. Analogy's advocates point to the need to detect family resemblances with past despotisms before it's too late, often making their case by advancing some ideal-typical checklist, whether in terms of the *elements* of or the *steps toward* fascism.

As this dissertation will explore, however, the topic of whether or not, and in what ways, and by whose hands the U.S. liberal democratic state and its institutions have the potential to, or potentially already have, and to what extent, succumbed to modernity's worst fascist impulses is one of the most enduring (and endeared) of U.S. cultural traditions that has dominated national political discourse for over half of its relatively brief existence as a nation-state. While Euro-centric models of comparison and analogy provide engaging fodder for formalist inclined historicists, Toscano suggests such analyses in their contemporary iteration inevitably lead to a dead end, and argues that a more productive strategy for providing both an account of and defensive strategy against this unequivocally dangerous rising political movement in the contemporary moment – or as James Baldwin might posthumously suggest "the fire" this time – would be to dislodge this debate from its current analogic/formalistic parameters that look to European history for their basis of comparison and focus instead on the more materially and experientially grounded consideration of what Cedric Robinson termed a "Black construction of fascism" (as quoted in Toscano). The Black construction of fascism, growing out of the long history of the transnational Black radical tradition, has served as a counterpoint to the postwar historically manufactured notion that intra-European fascisms were a negation of the ideals and protocols that define and structure liberal political modernity. Where a white European and American perspective might view Nazi violence as a new, exceptional form of violence that finds legitimacy and expression through a wholly "new" nationalist ideology and state form, Black radical thinkers such as George Padmore (*How Britain Rules Africa*, 1936), W.E.B. Du Bois (*Black Reconstruction in America*, 1935), and C.L.R. James, (*The World Revolution, 1917-1936*) for example, instead viewed the interwar rise of global fascism as merely a *continuation and logical expression of* an ongoing history of colonial dispossession and racial slavery.

In the U.S., in particular, the debate over the threat that the interwar rise of global fascism posed to the democratic institutions of the U.S. reached a feverish pitch on the eve of the U.S.'s entrance into WWII. Questions over whether the U.S. form of democratic government, imagined as distinct from the terrors of racially motivated, autocratic regimes now being witnessed across Europe, could withstand the threat of global fascism and the steps, both big and small, taken by the federal government in response to this perceived threat, historian David Ciepley has argued, led to "a redefinition of the very 'meaning' of America….[that] significantly altered the course of U.S. cultural and institutional development, to the point where we can speak of the encounter with totalitarianism as marking a rupture in the American liberal tradition" (1). Indeed, while political leaders argued over whether the massive expansion of the U.S. federal government under Roosevelt's New Deal constituted a totalitarian grab for consolidated power akin to Hitler or Mussolini, academics and public intellectuals participated in conferences to discuss and build a plan of action for the academy and the disciplines' role in preserving the democratic way of life amidst the growing threat of global fascism, such as, for example the 1941 *Conference On Science, Philosophy and Religion* at Columbia University. Prominent Black Radial thinkers of the era such as W.E.B. DuBois and Langston Hughes, whose progressive careers simultaneously straddled and existed on the margins of mainstream academic and literary discourse, on the other hand, had already made clear that to be Black in America meant having an already intricate understanding and direct lived experience with the forms of chauvinism, racial violence, and social and political state control that many in popular discourse were worriedly claiming as the very antithesis, or in Ciepley's terms "photographic negative," to U.S. democracy and its purportedly "free" social and political institutions. While Du Bois famously named the racial fascism of the "color line" that dominated not only the U.S.'s

political, social, and intellectual institutions, but those of an expanding global capitalist sphere of influence as the greatest problem of the 20th century, Hughes remarked directly at the Second International Writers Congress in Paris in 1937, "We Negroes in America do not have to be told what fascism is in action. We know. Its theories of Nordic supremacy and economic suppression have long been realities to us." Certainly, in the violent dismantling of Black Reconstruction in America, Chinese immigration exclusion (1882), the forcible privatization and dispossession of Native American lands through the Dawes Act (1887), the abolition of so called dissident ethnic foreigners with 1903 "Anarchist Exclusion Act," and the formal establishment of Jim Crow and attendant white terror campaigns against Black citizens and businesses, to name just a few of the more well known formal legal mechanisms used to build racialized rightlessness as a core feature of a political and social system predicated on the inalienable rights and freedoms of man, the U.S. democratic way of life and its most cherished of cultural, social, and political institutions were intimately familiar with, and indeed, generative of, the forms of racial violence, rightlessness, and state control that actually served as a blueprint for Hitler and the Nazi party's burgeoning fascist state (Katzelton; Whitman).

At the time, and especially in the postwar push to consolidate a new Americanism in the victory of liberal democracy over European fascisms, the analyses of Du Bois, Hughes, and other Black radical contemporaries were delegitimized, sidelined, or sanitized and selectively incorporated into a mainstream narrative of triumphantly diversifying academic, political, historical, or literary discourse that spoke once again to the great genius of the American experiment (Aldon). By the mid 20th century, however, after a thorough purging of Leftist political dissidents under McCarthyism and the House of Un-American Activities

Committee trials that saw Stalin, Mao, and the spectre of global communism replace Nazism as the number one totalitarian threat to the democratic way of life, a bloody and ongoing Movement for Civil Rights for Black Americans, and a nation-wide movement against an imperial war of U.S. aggression in Vietnam, members of the Black Panther Party played a pivotal role in popularizing the notion that America, indeed, was already and had always been a fascist, "pig-ridden" state. Famed political prisoner George Jackson, who was murdered by sniper during an escape attempt, portentously remarked in his posthumous collection of prison letters, *Blood In My Eye,* that "Fascism has established itself in a most disguised and efficient manner in this country. It feels so secure that the leaders allow us the luxury of a faint protest. Take protest too far, however, and they will show their other face. Doors will be kicked down in the night and machine-gun fire and buckshot will become the medium of exchange" (as quoted in Toscano). Citing another famous letter on fascism in which Jackson remarks on the extent and materiality of the surveillance apparatus that surrounded him during an interview session with a member of the Old Guard, Toscano posits that Jackson encourages us—along with other Black radicals of the 20th and 21st centuries—to "consider what happens to our conceptions of fascism if we take our bearings not from analogies with the European interwar scene, but instead from the materiality of the prison-industrial complex, from the 'concrete and steel,' from the devices and personnel of surveillance and repression."

While Toscano points to the productive avenues for reckoning with U.S. racial fascism that the Black construction of fascism within the Black radical tradition in the U.S., in particular, provide, even more recent and earnest efforts to trace the longstanding presence of racial fascism in U.S., such as Bill Mullen and Christopher Vials' important *The*

US Antifascism Reader (2020), have fallen into the formalistic framings of contemporary debate on the question of fascism in America. In the reader's introduction, while recognizing the Black construction of fascism more broadly as the major contributor to a longstanding, and vibrant antifascist tradition in the U.S., a heavy emphasis is placed on differentiating forms and types of fascism, this time however, in relation to the regimes of "fascisms proper" versus the lived experiences of those made rightless under their official protocols:

> For people of color at various historical moments, the experience of racialization within a liberal democracy *could have the valence* of fascism. That is to say, while a fascist state and a white supremacist democracy have very different mechanisms of power, the experience of racialized rightlessness within a liberal democracy can make the distinction between it and fascism murky at the level of lived experience. For those racially cast aside outside of liberal democracy's system of rights, the word 'fascism' does not always conjure up a distant and alien social order. (as quoted in Toscano, my italics)

The assessment provided here to legitimate the experience of racialized rightlessness is certainly not wrong, nor ill intended. However, the careful fixation and cautionary vocabulary to distinguish and differentiate a "fascist state" from a "white supremacist democracy" that have distinct "mechanisms of power" seems ultimately to do more harm than good, and obscure the broader reality that the U.S. state form has been and continues to be built on an ever rearticulating foundation of systemic and longstanding racialized rightlessness. To fully reframe the discourse and debate of American fascism around a Black radical construction of fascism would seem to require on a deeper level the necessity of disabusing our critical frameworks for evaluation and action that they construct of the

primacy of definitional or analogic due diligence based on the historically inaccurate narrative that intra-European fascisms of the interwar year provide the ideal types and forms of "fascism proper" upon which all other possible permutations must be measured and assessed. First, this framework indebted to definitional or analogic primacy, as Toscano rightly recognizes, traps our thinking in the (incorrect) baseline assumption that intra-European fascisms of the interwar period are social and political formations so wholly distinct, separate, and antithetical to American white supremacist democratic practices as to warrant separate trajectories of development and analysis within political modernity. Moreover, such approaches rely so heavily on positivistic modes of analyses—the outcome may be somewhat similar, but the form which generates the somewhat similar outcome are wholly distinct, etc., etc., ad nauseum—that are themselves deeply embedded with the very onto-epistemic frameworks that give shape and form to the very disavowals the authors seek here to identify. To take as "Truth," in a Du Boisian sense, the Black construction of fascism seems to suggest an altogether different set of insights entirely, namely, that, alongside its intra-European contemporaries, imagined as photographic negative in one period and litmus test for analogic comparison in another, "U.S.-style fascism is a kind of perfected form—all the more insidiously hegemonic because of the marriage of monopoly capital with the (racialized) trappings of liberal democracy" (Toscano). In short, when the frame of analysis is adjusted to perceive that both white supremacist liberal democracy *and* intra-European "fascisms proper" are performing the work, on behalf of a modern state form, to reproduce racialized rightlessness in renewed and insidious forms, we can more accurately identify and narrate the similarities across purportedly "liberal" and "fascistic" states, and see both as iterations of a continuing history of colonial dispossession and racial slavery. To do otherwise, is to reproduce the very forms of disavowal that allow racial fascism within a

liberal democratic state to grow, unacknowledged by a white mainstream, for example, into a police and carceral state that strips of rights, imprisons, and forces labor upon more of its citizens than any other nation-state on the globe, the vast number of whom are Black, brown, and poor in alarmingly disproportionate number of the U.S. prison population compared to the overall U.S. population (Alexander). While many Americans celebrated nationalist narratives of triumph over a "troubled past" of racial oppression and emergence as a multicultural democracy that ought to serve as a beacon for the rest of the world in the purportedly "post"- Civil Rights era, many, such as the "swathe of the Old and New Lefts…Asian American, Chicano, Puerto Rican (Young Lords) and white Appalachian (Young Patriorts Organization)" (Toscano) organizers who had had attended the Black Panther-organized United Front Against Fascism conference in Oakland in 1969, needed little reminder that the battle against U.S. racial fascism was not ending, but indeed merely changing forms. As scholars such as Jodi Melamed and Roderick Ferguson have detailed, the modes and mechanisms of racial state power employed within the U.S. in the postwar period had simply taken on a new veneer in the era of burgeoning racial liberalism, and eventually, neoliberal multiculturalism. Where the once explicitly exclusionary practices of racialized rightlessness were deployed in the form of immigration exclusion and separate but purportedly equal socio-economic practices codified into law on state and federal levels, from roughly the 1970s onward U.S. racial fascism began a twin operation that coupled the mass criminalization of racial and ethnic minoritized subjects with modes of selective affirmation and incorporation into the mainstream of U.S. liberal capitalist logic, a significant hallmark of which included increased representation for marginalized groups in government (and to a significantly less extent corporate) jobs, advertising and entertainment industries, and in academic disciplines with the emergence and explosion of Black and Ethnic Studies

programs across U.S. universities (Melamed, Ferguson). While it might seem counterintuitive to insist that U.S. racial fascism persists in both overtly white supremacist and progressive, repressive and affirmative state forms, this dissertation seeks to illuminate precisely the preconditions for that "perfected" coupling of forms, so that we might more adequately take inventory of the particular historical moment of U.S. racial fascism's mainstream "resurgence" that we presently find ourselves in.

U.S. Racial Fascism and the Tactics of Racialized Security

This dissertation, *Diversity, Temporality, Population: the Securitization of the Democratic Pastorate and the Rise of the Racial Liberal Security State*, explores this broader question of racial fascism in American political, social, cultural, and economic life from the somewhat familiar lens of racialized security. At its core, this dissertation considers seriously, and takes as a starting point for inquiry, the Black radical tradition's contention that racial fascism is a longstanding, ever endeared, and enduring constitutive core of the storied "democratic way of life" in the U.S. However, rather than focusing on the well-known historiography and formation of repressive apparatuses that make up both the "pre-modern" white supremacist liberal democratic state, the Cold War national security state, and the mass carceral state of the post-Civil Rights era, I seek to explore the onto-epistemic and material preconditions that facilitated these transitions for U.S. racial fascism across these perceived divides to illuminate the forms of disavowal that are baked in the DNA of the U.S. nation-state. As the title suggests then, "diversity" thinking itself, I demonstrate, has helped facilitate the disavowal of racial fascism as a constitutive component of the political economy of the U.S. state. In particular, I examine the preconditions for a decisive shift in thinking about race that had significant consequences for state formation in the New Deal era, which allowed

the U.S. state to slowly transition from an overtly racist to a purportedly anti-racist state during the period of its ascendance to global hegemony in the postwar period. Rather than focusing on historical flashpoints of the long Civil Rights Movements and landmark legislative shifts that have often codified this shift to "official antiracism" (Melamed) in the postwar period, however, I focus on identifying the epistemological and material preconditions of this new state formation in my examination of paradigmatic shifts in knowledge production about race within the academic disciplines, forms of national sovereignty, and modes of governance that rationalize and later legitimate claims of anti and post racialism in the years preceding the U.S.'s entry into WWII. In the emergence of the ethnicity paradigm in the social sciences, the principles of neutrality that govern the administration of New Deal state programming, and the advent and proliferation of public and private educational initiatives to promote cultural pluralism, I work throughout this dissertation to identity and trace a series of interrelated and co-constitutive "racial security logics" that create new parameters of intelligibility (and governance) for subjects of and for what will eventually become known as a purportedly antiracist state. This purportedly antiracist state form that comes to be across what Michael Omi and Howard Winant have famously referred to as "the period of the racial break," is a state form that is simultaneously imagined as "achieved" and perpetually "coming into being" in the postwar period, and indeed, are still in the processes of formation as we look uncomfortably on our crisis ridden moment in the present day. I suggest that in the years leading up to the U.S.'s entrance into WWII, the promotion of a particular understanding of diversity and the careful calculation and management of that diversity by a democratic pastorate class through a series of public private partnerships, became a guiding telos for the racial liberal state. And significantly, that keeping this arena for "managing difference" distinct from the procedurally neutral state,

created a new form of state rationality that at once, (and at face value), representationally promoted a "plurality of cultures" as a progressive goal to be attained for the future state through the work of a democratic population, while leaving intact the set of material relationships that reproduced racial inequality and violence within that state.

In my examination of shifting forms of racial fascism in this key transitional period for the U.S. nation-state, rather than focusing primary attention on the repressive state apparatuses or procedures of security that contemporary analogic thinkers may point to as indices of an implementation of or step toward ideal intra-European fascist types, I focus instead on how certain progressive developments in the disciplines, new forms of governance, and the state form itself that arose served the biopolitical function on the level of the population to ultimately secure the "perfected form" of U.S. fascism to which some architects of a Black construction of fascism speak. In this way, I hope to make murkier still the definitions of fascism that dominate contemporary debate – ideally to the point that we might, in popular discourse and elsewhere, rid ourselves of the moot question of whether or not "calling Trump a fascist is useful or correct" entirely, and instead focus our attention and action on how to effectively dismantle the forms and institutions that normalize, invisibalize, and disavow racial violence, past and present, that continue to structure and condition liberal political modernity both state side and abroad.

To do this, I analyze the production and circulation of racialized security logics across various sites of cultural production in the U.S. in order to make visible the forms of disavowal that condition, structure, rearticulate, and sustain the U.S. state as a racialized national security state across the purported transition into racial liberal progressive modernity in the postwar period. Bridging the fields of critical American ethnic studies, critical race theory, critical university studies, and critical security studies, my project re-

theorizes the period before the racial break not only as a shift in dominant paradigms for thinking and administering race in the 20th century U.S., but significantly, also as a recalibration of the means through which U.S. state sovereignty is reproduced through temporal securitization after territorial securitization ceases to serve as the primary site for the reproduction of state sovereignty in the beginning of the twentieth century. As such, the project makes an important interdisciplinary intervention by interrogating the meaning and significance of the racial break as a temporal marker and onto-epistemic category of knowledge production within the field of critical American-Ethnic Studies. While widely remarked upon in scholarship on the racial break, the racialized security logics that produce and sustain the racial break as the telos for racial liberal progressive modernity have yet to be thoroughly examined in a manner that can illuminate how forms of racial liberal disavowal continue to organize the production of knowledge about race, security, and the nation-state within this liberal progressive temporal order and the social scientific and humanistic disciplines more broadly. If the "closing of the frontier" and U.S. imperial expansion following the Spanish-American War ushered in an ongoing crisis for the reproduction of territorial sovereignty for the U.S. nation state, this dissertation looks to the emergence of what social scientists, public intellectuals, and policy makers deemed the "racial-cultural situation in the U.S." as both an object of knowledge and site for racial liberal state intervention as a means for reproducing state sovereignty after these crises. Addressing the racial-cultural situation in the U.S. while expanding federal power according to strict adherence to the principles of procedural neutrality, became a new means, as my dissertation title suggests, to produce state sovereignty through temporal securitization and population management. I reconsider the preconditions of the racial break, then, as the emergence of a new form of state rationality that temporalizes the careful calculation, management, and

promotion of "racial and ethnic inclusive diversity" as *the* object *and* mechanism of state sovereignty which promises security for U.S. liberal progressive modernity. The project overall elaborates an account of the rise and consolidation of the U.S. state as a formally antiracist, yet thoroughly racialized national security state in the postwar period precisely through the promotion of liberal rights-based inclusionary politics as a telos that "promises security" for a national population constructed as individual, economized subjects working toward the progressive telos of the state to name, understand, promote and respect racial and ethnic differences understood as *culture*. By examining the particular micromechanics of power and the material infrastructures that actualize this promise of security, however, the forms of disavowal that reproduce the violent conditions of this form of U.S. sovereignty through formally antiracist governance strategies become visible.

I situate this transitional period as a part of a longer project of racialized security that has been the dominant, if ever shifting, mode of governance and organizing principle for the U.S. state since its inception as a colonial settler state to its elaboration as a global empire. A more comprehensive study of racialized security in the U.S. might historicize racialized security, for example, across changing state formations in the following periods: First in the long period in which the U.S. settler-colonial state existed in various permutations as an overtly white supremacist state whose economic core was racialized slavery; then during the period of Abolition, Reconstruction, and retrenchment of racialized rightlessness with the advent of Black Codes and Jim Crow; then within the period of transition in which overtly white supremacist governance tactics remained legally enforceable while at odds with the transforming nationalist renditions of cultural pluralism and principles of procedural neutrality—the first iteration of a racial break; then an officially antiracist phase following the Civil Rights Movement where formally deracialized governance tactics accelerated with the

rise of neoliberal multiculturalist values in both political and economic life; finally leaving us with the particularly perplexing period of racialized security, or U.S. racial fascism, we find ourselves in.

Security and Race in US Modernity

In contributing to a genealogy of U.S. racial fascism that focuses on the epistemic and material preconditions for the official antiracisms of the postwar epoch, I locate, identify, and trace the logics of racialized security that rationalize and legitimate that continually, formally deracializing postwar state form in the disciplinary developments and expanded New Deal State form of the interwar years. Building from a larger body of "governmentality studies" (Foucault xviii) inspired by Michel Foucault, I use the foundational concept of liberal security in a decidedly different register than what has largely become recognized within the broader body of governmentality studies as the field of critical security studies (Neocleus). However, rather than focusing critical attention on the oppressive state apparatuses of the burgeoning cold war national security state and its procedures of racialized governance during the time period I examine, I look instead to systems of power that govern precisely through forms of inclusion and affirmation that both secure particular racialized subjects for an ostensibly "color-blind" liberal-democratic population and this population's relation to the "neutral" governing institutions and procedures of the purportedly anti-racist state that reproduces it. In his 1977-1978 lecture series *Security, Territory, and Population*, Michel Foucault elaborates a theory of liberal security's role in the formation of the modern state, which becomes particularly important on the level of population after territorialization ceases to serve as a legitimate means to reproduce state sovereignty. After there is no more physical territory to secure on behalf of a colonial or

imperial state, Foucault, argues, sovereignty must instead be reproduced on the level of population – namely, by constructing a "population" for the state to manage, and manage well so as to secure, or seem to secure, the best possible outcome for the most significant portion of the population as possible. To secure the population, Foucault argued, was to secure a *raison d'etre* for the state. In an earlier and less widely cited work, Foucault's *The Order of Things* produced a voluminous archaeology of the human sciences, the development and extensive elaboration of which were required to produce the notion, shape, and form of a human population for the state to manage. In the onto-epistemic construction of the modern human, writ large to the level of population for the purposes of biopolitical management, the modern liberal state discovered its most effective form of elaboration and reproduction to date. To construct and secure this human and reproduce it at the scale of a state (and eventually global) population would become the work of modern governance in its co-constitutive repressive and affirmative manifestations. Security, then, within this dissertation, marks multiple registers of security that are at once material and tangible, as well as onto-epistemic, in an attempt to demarcate how an order of knowing and being within the racial liberal state came to be secured. Within the new form of state rationality that this dissertation attempts to identify, security is not a keyword that denotes a form of imperiled life (for individuals, or the state), but denotes security more broadly as a conception of expertly managed economies as well as the rights of individuals within those expertly managed economies. Security here, then, does not suggest that the individual or state are imperiled, but refers instead to the sense that individuals aught to have the right to live free in a managed economy. Central to reconfiguring security in this manner after territorial securitization ceased to be a means to reproduce state sovereignty, however, was for knowledge industries to, indeed, establish precisely what the national economy is – what

constitutes a resource, how such resources are to be felicitously managed by a "neutral" state form under the guidance of "objective" expertise. In the rise of an expert managerial class that fills these infrastructural roles, which I refer to throughout this dissertation as "the democratic pastorate," we see the material production of class relations that effectively rewrite the economy, not as primarily a lever of profit, but as a neutral, objective means through which goods and services are provided *within but not by* the state. As chapters 1 & 2 will demonstrate, the social sciences more broadly, and the expert practitioners of those disciplines working in tandem with federal initiatives, were essential to this process. It is not surprising, then, that this is the precise moment that the field of economics loses its Leftist strains of thought, which become eclipsed instead with natural law theories of political economy that validate this new form of state rationality.

Eli Jelly-Schapiro, professor of English and author of *Security and Terror: American Culture and the Long History of Colonial Modernity*, has argued that "'Security' is the keyword of contemporary governance: "economic security, financial security, national security, food security, social security, border security, job security, human security environmental security, energy security, homeland security, and so on—security pervades political discourse" (Jelly-Schapiro 801). If what Jelly-Schapiro, borrowing from critical security studies scholar Michael Dillon's thesis, has termed the "dialectic of security-insecurity" that is "central to the philosophy and form of the modern state" is, indeed, an "enduring truth of modern political order" (802), this project in the broadest possible sense aims to interrogate the production of racialized security by exploring the relationship between security and knowledge in the production of modern epistemes of knowledge and the subjects of security such epistemes produce for transitioning state forms in the U.S. Diverging from the disciplinary parameters and methodological fixations of contemporary critical security studies, however, this project

looks specifically to locate the promotion of diversity as the central site through which such subjects of and for security are produced in order to secure the modern state after state sovereignty in colonial modernity could no longer be secured through the acquisition of territory. As such, this dissertation tells the story of the rise and promotion of diversity as a public good for the U.S. state—in disciplinary knowledge formations, liberal progressive social movements, state policy and administration—as a dominant mode of modern power and governance—that produces and delimits the horizons of socio-political possibility in U.S. liberal political modernity. By examining the relationship between security, race, and knowledge formations in the interwar years, I look to the ways in which security became normalized as "A basic human want, a normative social good, security …[as] a mode of power" (Jelly-Schapiro 801). The focus on the interwar years is particularly important for investigating this phenomenon, because as Jelly-Schapiro points out:

> Despite the reciprocal emergence of security thinking and the modern state, the absolute saturation of social and political discourse with security rhetoric is a twentieth-century phenomenon. In the United States, Social Security acquired its rhetorical power and bureaucratic form in the 1930s. The postwar years witnessed the emergence of National Security as an organizing principle of governance and "Homeland Security" in post-911 world. (802)

If political science and political philosophy scholars sought to mark a moment of historical rupture in the post-9/11 War on Terror world, and articulate this world as a new state form, others have sought to stress and map instead the continuities and central place of security thinking over the long duree of modern governance. Jelly-Schapiro, building significantly on the political philosophy of Michael Dillon, has elaborated one such genealogy of security and modern governance, which provides a useful framework stressing the continuity of racialized

security across transitions in state form that this dissertation seeks to elaborate. While distinctly different in its focus on the repressive parameters of security thinking across what he terms the long history of colonial modernity in the U.S., Jelly-Schapiro's work is significant and helpful for this dissertation in that it "[resists and redresses the] assumption of historical rupture" (2) and examines "the relationship between contemporary security formations and the longer history of the modern security project" (3). Furthermore, Jelly-Schapiro's work is especially productive in its formulation of three temporally-materially specific paradigms of "security" over the long duree of colonial modernity in the U.S. Jelly-Schapiro suggests three primary analytical relations to productively think through the machinations of the modern security project, which are security and property, security and race, and security and emergency. If "property is the principle object of security governance" for a liberal democratic order, he argues, "race delimits and structures the security state," while emergency becomes a primary "governmental tactic through which a multifarious politics of security is legitimated and enforced" (803). It is within the production of subjects of and for a racial liberal security state on the level of population, I argue, that race as a function of liberal security can be clearly delineated, both on the level of emergency governance, and as Michael Dillon has suggested, on the level of knowledge production itself in that "security has always been concerned with securing the very grounds of what the political itself is" (13). The interwar years of New Deal statecraft that lead to the postwar period of the racial break in the U.S. are particularly illuminating of the central role that security play in reshaping the American liberal tradition, its state form and tactics of racialized governance precisely because it is the period in which "the securitization of the social went hand in hand with its capitalization" (Jelly-Schapiro 806). In the wake of the Great Depression and the rise of New Deal State "Security became," Jelly-Schapiro argues,

> not simply something provided by the government, but something purchased on the market. The biocapitalist functions of life and health insurance emerged in concert with the biopolitical functions of the Social Security state. One object of security for both state and business, in other words, became life itself—an evolution which enabled the broadening and deepening of security governance, the intensification of its effect upon the individual and the social body. (806)

In fully economizing subjects within a state population that could now be secured not only through government programs, but the market itself, a momentous and neutralizing shift in the tactics of how subjects were rendered legible to securitization practices of the state had occurred. Though, as Lisa Gordon's essential work *Pitied But Not Entitled* brilliantly illuminates, the landmark of legislation for Roosevelt's New Deal state form, the Social Security Act of 1935, merely naturalized racial and gender discrimination into the neutralizing parameters of thoroughly economized subjects of the U.S. population. Indeed, borrowing from Gordon's work, Jelly-Schapiro notes that

> From its inception in the United States, Social Security was highly racialized and highly gendered, reproducing the prevailing gender and racial norms of the time, which confined women and racial minorities to unpaid—as in the case of household work—or low-paid labor. Agricultural and domestic workers, of whom the vast majority were women and minorities, were not included in the original Social Security Act; nearly two thirds of black workers and more than seventy percent of women workers were not covered by the 1935 legislation. And, of course, 'illegal' immigrants and the nonworking population were left out altogether. (This is not to paint the greatest innovation of public services in US history as a reactionary development, but rather to highlight that the content of the original Act did little to

> challenge—and in important ways even reinforced—the gendered and racialized organization of labor in particular and society more broadly.) (813)

In this sense, Jelly-Schapiro argues, "the New Deal moment—the private insurance companies that emerge therein, the appropriation by corporate entities of Social Security rhetoric—prefigured one defining aspect of the neoliberal order: the subjection of the social sphere to market rationality, market calculation" (809). Whereas Jelly-Schapiro ultimately sees securitization as a process of fabrication in which "an issue, concept, asset, or geography" is transformed into a security concern and subjected to the processes of capitalist accumulation and market logics, social security legislation, and, as I argue, other forms of New Deal resource and population management very effectively "enacted processes of exclusion through incorporation" (813). Indeed, "Social Security is one way of separating the citizen sphere from its outside, and one way of dividing the inside into racial and gender hierarchies, both symbolic and real. Like the security project more broadly, Social Security is simultaneously about social inclusion and social exclusion" (814) and "the emergency declared by Roosevelt in 1933 marked the beginning of an unbroken line of emergency governance that remains continuous today" (820).

However, prior to the advent and implementation of social welfare programming and other resource and population management tactics through the New Deal State form, a decisive shift within the disciplines occurred that enabled the economized subject of and for New Deal state intervention and planning. While recognizing racialized security as a foundation and structuring condition of U.S. liberal political modernity, however, I argue that the period before the racial break marks a particular and uneven transition in the forms of power and state rationality that reconstituted the U.S. as a racialized security state most importantly and precisely through the affirmation, promotion, and elaboration of new

knowledges about the meaning and significance of racial and ethnic difference that sought to displace paradigms of scientific racism. I argue that the emergence and eventual dominance of the ethnicity paradigm, which elaborated theories of race as culturally rather than scientifically significant or, *economically and politically actionable* through the neutralizing procedures of the market through the New Deal Welfare state, laid the epistemological groundwork for the shift and elaboration of affirmative, normalizing techniques of racialized security that would work later then in concert with the purportedly "deracialized" criminalization and terroristic "exception" (Agamben, Jelly-Schapiro) of repressive state apparatuses to become the dominant mode of governance for the U.S. state in the postwar period.

Methods & Chapter Overview

As an interdisciplinary project across the field formations of American Ethnic, Critical University, and Critical Security Studies, this dissertation explores questions on the U.S. liberal tradition, racial state formation, knowledge production, and security governance through an emphasis on critical interdisciplinary approaches to American literary and cultural studies. My research examines the interrelations of race, knowledge production, and security governance as they pertain to shifts in the U.S. state form over the long 20th century to the present. In this vein, my dissertation, *Diversity, Temporality, and Population: The Securitization of the Democratic Pastorate and the Rise of the Racial Liberal Security State* examines the prodigious writings of American liberal intellectuals such as Margaret Mead, Robert E. Park, Louis Adamic, George Schuyler, Alaine Locke, and Gunnar Myrdal, among others, to interrogate how a fixation on security informed antiracist renovations of the liberal tradition across the decades that mark the U.S. state's ostensible transition from a white supremacist past to a progressive future. This significant transition in both the U.S. state's form and governance

strategies prior to what critical race scholars refer to as "the racial break," marks both transformations in dominant paradigms for understanding the meaning and significance of race within the disciplines and the U.S. state's uneven adoption of formally antiracist policies in response to pressures from liberal progressive, Left, decolonial, and other race radical social movements of the early to mid twentieth century. Across the dissertation's three chapters, I trace the renovation of the U.S. liberal tradition in the interwar years through New Deal Welfare State programming, disciplinary transformations in the humanities and social sciences, and the rise of race relations knowledge industries, arguing that the form of what I term racial liberal security state rationality that arises through these relationships allowed liberal progressives to disavow the forms of racialized governance that constituted the U.S. state's previous configuration of a racial-capitalist political economic order while simultaneously crafting anew forms of racialized governance at the site of and outside the state form that would both legitimize and organize a postwar racial liberal order still predicated on racial violence and exploitation. Ultimately, I argue, this form of state rationality would expand its influence on a global scale as the promise of liberal democratic freedom/security for the "world's population" in the era of globalization.

My dissertation joins a body of Critical Race and Critical Ethnic Studies scholarship that interrogates how the hegemonic rise of liberal antiracisms across the racial break helped secure U.S. global ascendency and curtailed—and criminalized—the democratizing possibilities of more robustly materialist antiracisms of Left, decolonial, and other race radical movements in the postwar period.[1] However, in exploring questions of race,

[1] Some examples include Penny Von Eschen's *Race Against Empire*: *Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957* (1997), Mary Dudziak's *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (2000), Nikhil Singh's *Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (2004), Roderick Ferguson's *The Reorder of Things: the University and Its Pedagogies of*

knowledge production, and governmentality at the intersections of critical security and critical university studies, my intervention expands the field's interrogation of "security" beyond the various domestic surveillance and war making apparatuses of the Cold War National Security State that ostensibly sought to secure the nation and its citizens from communist threat to a conception of security that arose through the rise of the ethnicity paradigm in social sciences and the mass expansion of state sovereignty under the New Deal Welfare state as this state and the disciplinary formations and apparatuses that elaborated it promised security as the right of economized citizens to work toward a progressive future within managed economies. Indeed, if scholars of postwar racial liberalism have separately emphasized how postwar liberals crafted security as the first civil right[2] and that federal support for civil rights legitimized the rise of the Cold War National Security State,[3] my intervention retheorizes security as a form of state rationality that transitions the U.S. from an overtly racist, to a formally antiracist state form. As I argue, the classical liberal discourse of security as primarily a concern over territorial sovereignty shifts in the late 19th century to questions of population management in the 20th century, and this shift intensifies in the U.S. as movements for decolonization and desegregation challenge regimes of racial state power on global and domestic scales. I locate the preconditions of this new form of security governance as population management in what I term Racial Liberal Security State Rationality, and I demonstrate how security became a primary cultural episteme within U.S.

Minority Difference (2012), Chandan Reddy's *Freedom With Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the U.S. State* (2011), and Jodi Melamed's *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (2011).

[2] See Naomi Naomi Murakawa's essential *The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America*, (2014).

[3] See Von Eschen, Penny, *Race Against Empire*: *Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957*(1997); Duziak, Mary, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (2000); Singh, Nikhil, *Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (2004).

political modernity that allowed the U.S. state to manage both its domestic and global crises of sovereignty without fundamentally altering its constitutive basis as a racial capitalist state across the racial break. I argue that the hegemonic rise of liberal antiracisms evidences, not just an antiracist renovation of the liberal tradition, but a new form of racial liberal security state rationality that looked to the careful calculation, proliferation, and management of racial and ethnic difference as the primary means for legitimating state sovereignty at the level of population management and temporal securitization. I suggest, in particular, that temporal securitization of a progressive future becomes a key tactic of population management across the racial break in order to better distinguish liberal from totalitarian forms of racialized governance and to conduct the disorganizing potentialities of these movements toward forms of sociality that selectively affirmed and incorporated challenges to racial state power.

Reading across seemingly disconnected domains of disciplinary knowledge formations, public educational initiatives, federal law, and social movement discourses, I deploy a hermeneutics of racialized security to make visible emergent meanings of security as the antiracist renovation of the liberal tradition conjoins with questions of social and national security. I read racial security across these texts as the production of a progressive telos for the nation that both constructs racial liberals as a "democratic pastorate" and conducts them as mangers of the general population to work toward the "common good" of a progressive, inclusive future secured through the monitoring, surveillance, and policing of the disorganizing potentialities of race. Through the rise of race relations knowledge industries, I argue, the democratic pastorate secures new material relations for the legitimation of state and burgeoning forms of neoliberal sovereignty precisely by proliferating and policing racial difference through universalizing rubrics of inclusive diversity limned by the requirements of

loyal citizenship, civic duty, and free market economism that defined Cold War nationalism. My project organizes its interrogation of the cultural episteme of racial security across these seemingly discrete domains, and each chapter explores a specific deployment of the hermeneutics of racial security to make visible the disavowals that condition and elaborate it.

Chapter 1, "The Social Scientific Restructuring of Race: Cultural Pluralism and the Problem of Value in the Shadow of Global Fascism," builds on Roderick Ferguson's contention that the academy has served "as the laboratory that produces truth and political economy's relation to it" (11) within the twentieth century U.S. state. However, rather than examining these relations of power in the mid-late 20th century university, I look to the onto-epistemic preconditions for this shift in the emergence of the ethnicity paradigm to examine how its key practitioners shaped subjects and objects of knowledge through the lens of culture and cultural pluralist analyses in particular. Exploring the relationship between knowledge production and U.S. racial liberal state formation, I argue that the social scientific restructuring of race as a cultural, rather than biologistic, category for both the object of knowledge and site of state intervention in the early twentieth century created the condition of possibility for the rise of the racial liberal security state of the post-war period. I begin this chapter with an overview of the early emergence of the ethnicity paradigm in the social sciences, what Michael Omi and Howard Winant term "the modern sociology of race," particularly the rise of "cultural pluralist" thinking, and consider the consequences of this new paradigm for thinking race in relation to the rise of the New Deal Welfare state in order to examine how and in what ways race became a site for and object of racial liberal state intervention. To elaborate the connection between the new sociology of race and the burgeoning racial liberal security state, I examine several key presentations prepared for the second meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in 1941 to examine

how knowledge workers in the professionalized social scientific disciplines theorized the discipline's role in preserving "the democratic way of life" in a manner that ultimately "[liquidated] racial difference…, denied deep historical injustice, and insisted on universalizing the dominant—white—culture" (Omi & Winant 23). After establishing the ways in which cultural pluralist thinking secured new parameters for knowing and acting upon the modern "truth" of race for a burgeoning racial liberal security state under the New Deal state form, I offer a broader critique, then, of what I term the racial security logics of cultural pluralism, in particular, and the universalizing procedures it produces in order to neutralize race as an arena for political-economic struggle, highlighting how such procedures become a foundational cornerstone of the racial liberal security state. I close the chapter with a brief consideration of Gunnar Myrdal's *American Dilemma*, highlighting the ways in which the value of "objectivity" in the social sciences helped facilitate racial liberalism's disavowal of its perpetuation of racial violence, highlighting how the promotion of such scholarship eclipsed more radical possibilities for the social sciences as the ethnicity paradigm rose to prominence.

Chapter 2, "New Deal Liberalism: Planning for Security Across the Racial Break," analyzes the coterminous ideological and material transformations of (de)racialized security through the rise of the New Deal Liberalism and the administrative-managerial governance apparatuses of the New Deal Welfare State. I argue that the "nationalization of security" through New Deal state planning projects provided the philosophical rationale, material infrastructures, and race-class power relations to enact new forms of state rationality and racial governance procedures across the period of the racial break precisely through universalizing formal procedures that wrote white supremacy of out of the equation and calculation of liberal security, and suggest that the neutralizing terrain of universal security

effectively set the stage for the state's transition from overtly white supremacist, to officially, formally antiracist state in the postwar period. By expanding federal authority to intervene in and conduct resources within and across spheres previously imagined as private such as employment, housing, healthcare, and insurance in the name of the universalizing category of security, the rearticulations of the liberal tradition and U.S. state form that occurred throughout the New Deal effectively instituted the race neutral parameters and procedures for intervention at the very moment that federal sovereignty expanded its authority into the direct coordination and management of resources within various "private" spheres of the U.S. nation-state. I analyze the nationalization of social security through a hermeneutics of racialized security that reads *universalizing procedures and forms as modes of racialization that obscure and disavow the racializing procedures of whiteness* in order to illuminate how these logics facilitated a mass transformation in state form and rationality that required co-constitutive nation building and state building projects. To tease out the logics of the nationalization of security as a national and state building project under the New Deal, I closely read the National Resource Planning Board's (NRPB) 1934 Report "A Plan for Planning," which outlined a rationale for the purpose and function of a federal planning board that would administrate and manage natural and human resources of the U.S. state for "the public good," in tandem with the NRPB's 1943 "Economic Bill of Rights." I read the articulations of universal security across these texts as constitutive of the period of the racial break both in state form and rationality and modes of power that produce subjects of/for security of the U.S. state. I argue that it signals the rise of a new form of state rationality in which procedural "neutrality" and personal interest and investment become ensconced as democratic values that frame and delimit institutional intervention in what race radical and leftist intellectuals and movement participants named as the continuing operations of racial capitalism. In

looking at both the reconfiguration of the meaning and deployment of security within liberal statist discourse and how subjects of and for security are produced within and across the emergent systems of social welfare as national security, I situate these transitions amidst public policy debates that express concern over totalitarian overreach of New Deal legislation to demonstrate how social and national security become indistinguishable under New Deal Liberalism.

Chapter 3 looks at a specific Carnegie Foundation funded public educational initiative, the Common Council for American Unity, examining its implementation of pluralist educational paradigms to construct national belonging based on revised nationalism. I argue this initiative evidences a recalibration of racial state governance strategies that produce newly racialized populations and the explosion of industries for their management, surveillance and proliferation through tactics of confession/disclosure. More specifically, "Securing *Common Ground*: Cultural Pluralism and the Making of the Democratic Pastorate Across the Racial Break" closely reads the imbrication of cultural pluralist discourse and racialized national security logics in the Popular Front Era Carnegie Foundation funded public educational initiative *Common Ground* to argue that the racial break is predicated on the shift of pastoral forms of power to a newly emergent "democratic pastorate," which creates the material conditions of democratic sovereignty for the racial liberal state in the postwar period. I closely read several essays in *Common Ground* to illuminate how the micromechanics of power operate through the self-disclosures of a democratic pastorate that becomes the material racial-class basis for the racial break, arguing that the temporalization of individual and group conduct toward the goal of securing state sovereignty in and through "neutral" intervention in the racial cultural situation in the U.S. and establishes the micro mechanisms of racialized security for the individual that dominate the postwar racial liberal state.

In this dissertation's coda, I consider the Trump administration's executive order to ban the teaching of "Critical Race Theory" in any institution that receives federal funding in the waning hours of his presidency, as well as the right wing war that led the charge to wholly misname and malign the body of scholarship and critical practice of that social, intellectual, and political formation. I close by considering the broader implications of the Biden administration's immediate reversal of this order, and the public rhetoric celebrating the reinstitution of a neoliberal multiculturalist political order and its institutionalized procedures of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion initiatives in both public and private commercial and educational spheres, suggesting that in the sphere of antiracist state and privately sponsored antiracist programming, this return to "normal" leaves intact the very episteme and forms of disavowal this dissertation seeks to illuminate, albeit in (once again) newly renovated form.

My intervention traces a genealogy of racialized security, then, as a cultural episteme that broadly saturates domains as different as disciplinary knowledge formations, social movement rhetorics, pedagogy, economics, state law and public policy, and national security. This episteme, I would suggest, illuminates the structuring logic for both the continuation and elaboration of forms of racial fascism as they are simultaneously enacted and disavowed. In indicating these various domains in the disavowals that reconfigure the U.S. into a formally antiracist state across the period of the racial break, I insist that racial security's material consequences persist, and indeed, continue to saturate precisely those domains that refuse to recognize its promiscuous presence in both liberalizing and overtly neo-fascist rhetorics, governance tactics, and political practices of the U.S. state to the present day.

Chapter 1

The Social Scientific Restructuring of Race: Cultural Pluralism and the Problem of Value in the Shadow of Global Fascism

Chapter Overview:

Building from Roderick Ferguson's contention that the academy has served "as the laboratory that produces truth and political economy's relation to it" (*The Reorder of Things* 11) within the twentieth century U.S. state, the first chapter of this dissertation explores the relationship between knowledge production and U.S. racial liberal state formation, arguing that the social scientific restructuring of race as a cultural, rather than biologistic, category for both the object of knowledge and site of state intervention in the early twentieth century created the condition of possibility for the rise of the racial liberal security state of the post-war period. I begin this chapter with an overview of the early emergence of the ethnicity paradigm in the social sciences, what Michael Omi and Howard Winant term the modern sociology of race, (13-23) particularly the rise of "cultural pluralist" thinking, and consider the consequences of this new paradigm for thinking race in relation to the rise of the New Deal Welfare state in order to examine how and in what ways race became a site for and object of racial liberal state intervention. To elaborate the connection between the new sociology of race and the burgeoning racial liberal security state, I examine several key presentations prepared for the second meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in 1941 to examine how knowledge workers in the professionalized social scientific disciplines theorized the discipline's role in preserving the democratic way of life in a manner that ultimately "[liquidated] racial difference…, denied deep historical injustice, and insisted on universalizing the dominant—white—culture" (Omi & Winant 23). After

establishing the ways in which the ethnicity paradigm secured new parameters for knowing and acting upon the modern "truth" of race for a burgeoning racial liberal security state under the New Deal state form, I offer a broader critique, then, of what I term the racial security logics of cultural pluralism, in particular, and the universalizing procedures it produces in order to neutralize race as an arena for political-economic struggle, highlighting how such procedures become a foundational cornerstone of the racial liberal security state. I close the chapter with a brief consideration of Gunnar Myrdal's *American Dilemma*, highlighting the ways in which the value of "objectivity" in the social sciences helped facilitate racial liberalism's disavowal of its perpetuation of racial violence, highlighting how the promotion of such scholarship eclipsed more radical possibilities for the social sciences as the ethnicity paradigm rose to prominence.

Reconstructing Disciplinary Histories: The Emergence and Rise of the Ethnicity Paradigm

In the 19th century U.S., before the advent of the modern liberal democratic state and the public research university that proliferated the production of disciplinary knowledge formations and (ostensibly) democratized access to the disciplinary knowledge of experts for the formation of a democratic pastorate, two spheres of intellectual thought and socio-cultural influence, Puritanism and Social Darwinism, dominated the discursive production and circulation of racial theory. These strains of thought and influence circulated widely as common sense knowledge about race, and served to rationalize forms of racial domination and hierarchy that defined the political economy of the early republic, into its first major phase of formalized state formation leading up to its first period of imperial expansion: notably racial slavery, policies of territorial dispossession and removal of Native Americans from ancestral lands, Asian exclusion, immigration quotas for southern and eastern

Europeans, and the territorial expansion of U.S. the state and the advent of new forms of liminal citizenship for occupied territories leading up to and following the Spanish-American War.[4] Puritanical theories of race were grounded in the Judeo-Christian binaries of "civilized" and "savage" expounded upon within the Old Testament, and tended to circulate more through popular forms of folk-knowledge, whether by word of mouth, or politico-religious tracts, pamphlets, or sermons, and worked to justify, for example, the institution of racial slavery by citing the benevolence of Christian masters in providing "care" and "religious guidance" to slaves. Northern abolitionists also ascribed to the theories of racial inferiority grounded in the civilizing force of Christian piety, but expounded their doctrines of racial-paternalism toward ostensibly progressive ends. Social Darwinist theories, on the other hand, adopted a decidedly more "modern" approach in their justification of institutions of racialized dominance, and grew from the burgeoning field of evolutionary biology within the natural and human sciences, now applying "the laws of nature" to human populations and forms of social, political, and economic organization (Omi & Winant 10). Most famously influenced by Charles Darwin's infamous *On the Origin of Species*, Social Darwinist theories of the inferiority/superiority of racial groups were grounded in theories of evolutionary biology and employed new, pseudo-scientific methodologies like phrenology and early genetic "science" that validated the legal adjudication of racial identity through lineage upon the "one-drop" rule, for example (Omi & Winant 14-15).[5] This "scientific" racial knowledge circulated widely in learned academic circles as part of the growth and expansion of the natural sciences, becoming a founding object of study for the burgeoning

[4] See Ronald Takaki. *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in 19th Century America*. U of Washington Press, 1979.

[5] See also Thomas S. Gossett *Race: The History of an Idea in America* (1968) for a longer history of the biologistic paradigm's predominance in the 19th century, and Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916) for a key example of this type of race thinking.

human sciences[6], and became particularly widespread within a growing private university system that was almost exclusively reserved for the progeny of the white U.S. aristocratic classes (Omi & Winant 14-15).[7]

It is no surprise then that as the modern U.S. university system expanded its reach to a growing proportion of the white population in the U.S., Social Darwinist theories of race gained more traction in the U.S. academy than their Puritanical counterparts and enjoyed increasing circulation as state-sanctioned knowledge. Indeed, by the early twentieth century, fueled by a new waves of xenophobic white responses to mass immigration, labor organizing, and the much touted spectre of social equality for free Black Americans, a robust Eugenics movement—the foundational precepts and social engineering policies of which were later adopted by Nazi Germany—had bloomed in the U.S. and had begun gaining a strong foothold throughout the U.S. academy within emergent human and social sciences departments. In fact, as early as 1904, the *Journal of American Sociology* published articles that staunchly argued for a Eugenicist approach to race in social engineering such as "Eugenics:

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[6] See Michel Foucault's *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (1966) for a discussion of the human science's adoption of these discourses and configuration of the subject of the modern human in and through these frameworks.

[7] See also Christopher Newfield's study on the history of development of the research university in the 19th and 20th centuries in the United States, *Ivy & Industry: Business and the Making of the American University, 1880-1980* (2003). An important exception to this generalization about the state and form of educational institutions in the 19th and early 20th century U.S. can be found in the public schools and black colleges of the South, which were founded by Freedmen with the help of Northern abolitionists during the period of Reconstruction and grew exponentially in the years after Emancipation to form the first public school system in the U.S., a fact often overlooked in even the progressive historical record.

Its Definition, Scope, and Aims" by Francis Galton, the self-proclaimed father of the "science" of Eugenics.[8]

By the time Robert E. Park and Earnest Burgess – who would go on to establish the Chicago School of Sociology that would become widely recognized as the "birthplace" of modern sociological theory and practice -- published the field's first recognized textbook, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* in 1924, Galton's Eugenicist school had gained enough circulation and scholastic acclaim that Park and Burgess reprinted the article in the discipline's founding textbook (Morris 19). If the so-called founding fathers of the modern sociology of race, Park and Burgess, whose assimilationist perspectives closely aligned with that of Social Darwinists and the Eugenicist counterparts theoretically at least, welcomed Eugenicist thought into the broader field of approaches that defined the discipline of sociology, a growing number of scholars working across the fields of sociology, cultural anthropology, and psychology, arguably part of a "second wave" of social scientific intellectuals who worked to combat and displace hegemonic biologistic conceptions of race. The work of Horace Kallen and Oliver C. Cox, for example, worked from pluralist and Marxist lenses, respectively, to question some of the field's naturalized assumptions about the race relations cycle and its emphasis on assimilation. This second wave of social scientists within the ethnicity paradigm eventually unseated the assimilationist models of the original Chicago School of Park and Burgess, and sought to displace social scientific theories that rationalized both the social Darwinist based Eugenics movement *and* cultural assimilationist strains of the burgeoning ethnicity paradigm—such as Park's "race-relations cycle"—that

[8] For in depth histories of the eugenics movement in the U.S. and abroad, see Allen Chase's *The Legacy of Malthus* (1977) and Daniel J. Kevles' *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (1985).

validated continuing practices of overt, state-sanctioned white supremacy in political, economic, and social life (Omi & Winant 15).

The concept of cultural pluralism was first developed by German-born American philosopher Horace Kallen as he taught and circulated the concept in Harvard classrooms while teaching and completing his PhD throughout 1906 and 1907. Kallen's first attempt to formalize the theory came with the publication of his 1915 essay "Democracy Versus the Melting Pot." While Kallen continued to develop, refine, and elaborate his theory of cultural pluralism throughout the remainder of his career as an academic, he initially conceived of his theory of cultural pluralism as a means to address and correct the problem of "Americanization" that assimilationist social science so heavily fixated on by reconfiguring the population not as a melting pot, but as a set of unincorporated diverse cultural identities and practices unified *formally and practically* through common appeal to a set of universal values and practices of the U.S. liberal democratic state. White nativist panic over the "preservation of American identity" in response to mass immigration from non-Anglo-Saxon European countries, increasing labor organizing, and the spectre of social equality for Black Americans dominated public discourse, many white social scientists believed that programs to fully and rigorously "Americanize" the nation's "others" was essential to the preservation the democratic way of life. Assimilationist projects insisted that to solve the problem of "difference" within the U.S., all within America's shores must adopt the values of possessive individualism, hetero-patriarchal family structures that tied individual and collective value to property ownership, and adherence to a belief that social relations based on a capitalist economic model were moral, valid, and meritocratic (Ratner). In their seminal work, *Racial Formation in the United States*, Michael Omi and Howard Winant provide an account of this paradigmatic shift in dominant understandings of race in the early twentieth

century U.S. and define a theory of racial formation in the United States. This collective work importantly traces the ethnicity paradigm, emerged as "the modern sociology of race" in response to social Darwinist, eugenicist, and Puritanical paradigms that dominated 19th century popular accounts of race. Omi and Winant trace the development of the ethnicity paradigm through three specific stages throughout the twentieth century. The first of which, as previously mentioned, largely (and somewhat dubiously) attributed to the Chicago School of Sociology, thus granting the paradigm's name, is "a pre-1940s stage in which the emergent paradigm challenged the biologistic (and at least implicitly racist) view of race which was dominant at that time" (14). The Chicago School of Sociology and its students widely fixated on and indeed worked to produce disciplinary understanding of the racial cultural situation in the U.S. with studies that naturalized conflict between racial and ethnic groups, and posited theories to explain these conflicts in terms of recurrent patterns or natural processes, both on an individual/psychological level and socio-culturally. Eric Stonequists' *Marginal Man: A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict* is just one such example of the form of ethnographic self-discourse of racialized experience that was sought out and examined as an object of study. While I will elaborate on this sociological genre of "self-disclosure" and its role in producing what I term "a democratic pastorate" more fully in the dissertation's final chapter, such studies highlight the racial-affective parameters of belonging for the subjects and objects of this modern sociology of race after the culturalist turn, and also intimate the material infrastructures that are made available for the elaboration and proliferation of the new racial liberal temporal order, and the "democratic pastorate," who will become its diverse population—and state sovereignty—managers. In a chapter titled, "The Life-Cycle of the Marginal Man,"[9] for example, Stonequist argues that "the responses of the American

[9] This "life cycle," as Stonequist maps out, is highly indebted to Robert E. Park's

Negro depend in part upon his colour. The light person may 'pass' for white, but the dark man must conform. Indeed parents may define the situation for the child in advance and so shape the child's responses into some role of racial adjustment or social reform," and includes "the following account written by a Negro girl of eighteen" to speak to the role of parental guidance in navigating the vexing issues of racial-cultural marginality:

> Ever since I noticed more and more that I belonged to another race. Sometimes I wish that I belonged to some other race because it seems that the poor Negro has a

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theorization of the culture contact cycle. Stonequist explains the life cycle of the marginal man as such and while not central to this chapter's argument, is worth quoting at length: "The connection between the particular type of marginal situation and the responses of the individual has been described in part in preceding chapters. In general these situations favour individual evolution in one of three major directions: (1) assimilation into the dominant group; (2) assimilation into the subordinate group; or (3) some form of accommodation, perhaps only temporary and incomplete, between the two groups. Since the situation itself is dynamic, the individual may chance his responses from one time to another. When the racial and cultural barriers between the two groups are not felt to be impassable, assimilation into the dominant culture is the characteristic form of response. This is especially true of immigrant populations who do not differ widely in racial type or in culture. The very fact that they have migrated to a new country, and settled there, indicates that they have taken the intial step toward a cultural readjustment. An effort toward assimilation is expected of them as the price of living in the country; and it is likewise taken for granted in their children. In such conditions the conflicts of the marginal man represent the pains of transition from one culture to another. It is quite different in the case of those indigenous societies which have been subjected to outside control or imperialism. The first wave of Western culture diffusion and dominance led to imitation and partial assimilation; but Westernization itself provided the stimulus, the concepts, and the methods for a movement of protest, of revolt. Westernization, then, gives way in part to a movement of cultural differentiation and political nationalism. As this movement develops, the marginal man, previously poised on the great divide of West and non-West, turns more and more against his earlier tendencies and becomes an ardent nationalist. Even the mixed blood sometimes finds this to be his salvation. But there are other situations which are not so clear-cut as the two just described. The 'assimilated' Jew awakens in a Hitlerized Germany to discover that he is not really a German; the American Negro is disillusioned to learn that Emancipation and Constitutional Amendments have not made him a full-fledged citizen; the Americanized son of the Oriental is baffled when he is still regarded as an Oriental; and from the side of the 'dominant' group the apprehensive statesman at the helm believes that he cannot count upon the loyalty of the discontented national minorities within the ship of state. The marginal persons in such instances have a more complex situation to which to respond" (130-132).

> difficult time. Mother has always said that she is glad that she is a Negro, she doesn't have any use for white people. I will or would be content in this race if I could do and have the same privileges that the white man has. Mother has always taught us to respect white, and in order to get along with them we must stay in our place by attending to our own business.
>
> I have governed myself by my mother's instructions, and it seems that I get along with the white race fine. Since I have been able to read and discuss the Negro I see that it is far better to be white because the white man always comes first. I see that the southern Negro is no more than a "dog" in the sight of the white man. When we lived in a white community, just because we had a passable house, and carried ourselves as we should, people (white) would call us "niggers" and would always try to cause some disturbance but we would never pay any attention. Some Negroes in the city where I lived were so dirty, and carried themselves in such a way that whites could not respect them. The homes of some Negroes were so filthy that I always said I wish I could help the conditions. When I finished high school I said I would go to college and take a special course in sociology and probably would be able to remedy the conditions to some extent. I am now a Junior in college, and my greatest ambition is to get a good job doing social work, and to enter a graduate school. (Stonequist 132-33)

While buying into and helping to reproduce what I discuss in chapter 3 as the new economy of faults and merits for the racial liberal state and conducting oneself accordingly toward the security of the population by common identification with the temporality of the democratic pastorate created material avenues for the upward mobility of ethnic foreigners and model racial minorities as a means of changing the significance of race, the limits of the promise of

security through participation in genres of self disclosure become clear in the persistence of the color line—and new state economies for assessing and intervening in the color line—throughout the 20th century. For example, in her chapter on the postwar racial liberal moment in her book *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism*, Jodi Melamed discusses in depth how the promises of liberal security through literary and other cultural representations of racial and ethnic difference merely worked to rationalize the continuing violences of racial capitalism. This second stage[10] of the ethnicity paradigm is "a 1940s to late 1960s stage during which the paradigm operated as the left/liberal 'common sense' approach to race, and during which two recurrent themes—assimilationism and cultural pluralism—were prominent" (Omi & Winant 21). Swiss sociologist Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* is perhaps the most widely influential and oft cited work of the second phase period. The study, which will be considered in more depth at this chapter's close, is widely noted for its insistence that white racism must be addressed through education, and for its pathologizing of Black culture as

[10] The final stage of the ethnicity paradigm is operative in the contemporarily recognizable guise of post-racialism. It began to take shape in the post-1960s, and is the period "in which ethnicity-oriented accounts of race focused," counter intuitively, "on defending conservative (or 'neoconservative') individualism against what was perceived as the radical assault of group rights" The most recent chapter in the life of the ethnicity paradigm poses an especially perplexing dynamic, given the paradigm's history as a vehicle for ostensibly progressive intellectual thought and social action. Omi and Winant explain that "Since the early 1970s, neoconservative approaches to race have fueled the racial reaction in the United States, operating in an effective although at times uneasy alliance with the new right. Under the banner of 'colorblindness' this alliance has attempted to forge a new 'post-racial' hegemony…." (21) that, particularly in the so-called "era of Obama," became the new "common sense" of race. While I will not be treating the contemporary "colorblind" period of the ethnicity paradigm (and its equally perplexing more recent permutations) until the final chapter of the dissertation, it is nonetheless significant for the purposes of this chapter's argument to note that the very paradigm that initially developed as a challenge to implicitly racist theories of dominance, nearly a century later, was as easily adaptable as a vehicle for neoconservative thought and policies of "raceless" racism as it was to liberal progressive thought and initiatives that sought racial equality in the early to mid-twentieth century.

malformed, or "unassimilable," in response to decades of institutionalized and culturally sanctioned racism.

This chapter's examination of the ethnicity paradigm is situated across the period of transition between the first and second stages of the paradigm's growth, when the contestation over assimilationism and cultural pluralism was well underway and sedimenting into the main competing strains of thought within liberal-progressive racial politics, both of which, however unevenly, developed as a response and repudiation of the previously dominant paradigms of Puritanism and Social Darwinism. According to Omi and Winant, the underlying principle of the modern sociology of race was an ontological shift from that of a moral or biologistic, to a cultural category of inquiry and consideration. "To treat race as a matter of ethnicity," they argue, "is to understand it in terms of *culture*" (22), and several key shifts occurred in racial theory when the concept was no longer understood through a biologistically deterministic lens, to quite ambiguous effect. Indeed, during the hegemonic rise of ethnicity paradigm, it became increasingly more incomprehensible in the mainstream of the U.S. academy, for example, to justify policies of Jim Crow with methodologies that based their disciplinary truth claims on skull measurements, blood percentages, or reference to the evolutionary theories of *Origin of the Species*. However, posing race as a function of culture importantly shifted the question of race from being a recognized function of the political economy to something operating altogether outside of it – a category and question that floated murkily in the realm of the ideas, beliefs, values, and social practices. This decisive ontological shift affected how and in what ways theories of race could be used as an officially acknowledged rationalizing principle for or function of forms of unequal political, social, and economic power that had since its inception, organized the U.S. state. Race, considered culturally within in the ethnicity paradigm, Omi and Winant contend,

> is conceptualized in terms of attitudes and beliefs, religion, language, 'lifestyle,' and group identification. In ethnicity-based approaches, the race-concept is thus reduced to something like a preference, something variable and chosen, in the way one's religion or language is chosen. Racism too is reduced in importance: It is seen as a mere matter of attitudes and beliefs, involving such issues as prejudice, beliefs about others, and individual practices…. (22)

While doing important work to unseat materially grounded racial paradigms that were expressly racist and circulated to provide "scientific" evidence and justification for numerous forms of racial subordination that were central pillars of the political economy of an overtly white supremacist racial capitalist state, the ethnicity paradigm's shift of theories of race into the realm of culture had the unintended effect of denying the material reality of race as a function of the political economy, and deemphasized or ignored entirely its continued operative significance as a formalized, state-sanctioned means of social organization and official policy of subordination and exploitation for an expressly racist state. As Omi and Winant note, the ethnicity paradigm's drive to downplay the political-economic significance of race also had the effect of marginalizing contemporary scholars who centralized questions of political economy in their work:

> The approach was largely ethnographic, and tended to downplay conflict, not to mention racial politics. This limited the early work in numerous ways and reflected a large-scale neglect of black scholarship, notably that of W.E.B. Du Bois but also work by Alain Locke, William Monroe Trotter, Kelly Miller, Anna Julia Cooper, Monroe Work, and numerous others. (26)

While recent revisionist scholarship has sought to rewrite the history of the development and growth of the discipline of sociology to consider the important contributions of these

scholars and displace Park, Burgess, and their Chicago School of Sociology as the epicenter of development for modern sociology, the school's centrality (warranted or not) in defining the parameters of the emergent field none the less had long lasting consequences on the form and direction the new sociology would take. Particularly, in how its expert knowledge would be put to use to identify, define, analyze, and address forms of racial dominance upon which the now expanding U.S. state was built. Omi and Winant suggest, in particular, that

> Park's aversion to political sociology and insistence on value-free methodology—always a chimera in social scientific research—inhibited the effectiveness of Chicago sociology as racial critique. Racial inequality and injustice were not seen as outcomes or objects of state policy, but as phenomena of civil society. Lacking a focus on the racial state, Park (and to varied extents the Chicago researchers he mentored) argued that racial conflict itself would generate egalitarian and inclusive pressures; this was the essence of the 'race relations cycle' (Park 1950; Lyman 1972, 27-51). Political alliances with progressives, immigrant groups, feminists, the labor movement, or among people of color themselves were not considered viable. (26)

The modern sociology of race under the newly emergent disciplinary parameters of the ethnicity paradigm, therefore, insisted that race was *not* a key factor for organizing labor markets or meting out rights based protections or social welfare under the New Deal State form. Instead this renovation to race thinking in the U.S. academy shifted its attention towards the much murkier, universalizing, and abstract question of how racial differences significantly and negatively impacted *national unity*. The significance of this cultural shift in racial theory, which was the first ostensibly antiracist theory of race to rise to hegemonic status in the U.S. academy, and its implications for racial state formation in the twentieth century, therefore, are quite monumental.

"A philosopher's deception, the children of a ruse": the Academy and the U.S. State

In the burgeoning public research university of the New Deal Welfare state, the new sociology of race, expanding its legitimacy and hegemonic status through the professionalization of the disciplines, was uniquely positioned for the task of mediating race as an object of knowledge for an increasingly interventionist state. This claim, however, requires a revision of dominant perceptions of the university's purportedly derivative role in state formation and political economy. Several works in the field of critical universities studies have taken up this task. Critical university studies scholar Christopher Newfield has worked to correct what he considers a common misconception that the university is and always have responsive to the demands of a capitalist state. In his history of the modern research university in the U.S., *Ivy & Industry: Business and the Making of the American University, 1880-1980*, Newfield's overarching argument is that capital and the academy effectively "grew up together," (3) each serving as a central state apparatus that worked in conjunction to define the parameters and cultures of the U.S. political economy from the period of industrialization onward. While Newfield's work makes an important contribution to the field of critical university studies to redefine understandings of the relationship between the academy and the economy in the U.S., the analysis does not substantially treat the specific ways in which the university and capital worked in conjunction to produce racial meanings for the functioning of the political economy of the U.S. state.

In *The Reorder of Things: the University and its Pedagogies of Minority Difference*, however, Roderick Ferguson has argued for the centrality of the U.S. academy as the key institutional site that produces both dominant and insurgent knowledge about race for state and capital. A seminal work within the field of critical university and critical race studies, one of the

primary concerns of Ferguson's study of insurgent student movements of the 1960s, and the incorporative modes of power that developed in response to those movements, is to "revise a reigning assumption about the academy—that as a social institution, it is always secondary to and derivative of state and capital" (8). In revising the notion of the academy as a site and institution that merely enacts state power and operates on its behalf, Ferguson "demonstrate[s] the ways in which power," understood in a diffuse, biopolitical sense, "enlisted the academy and things academic as conduits for conveying unprecedented forms of political economy to state and capital, forms that would be based on abstract—rather than redistributive—valorization of minority difference and culture" (8), arguing that often times, the university actually socializes the state to new forms of political economy. While Ferguson's argument generates from a close examination of the post-student movement, post-1960s U.S. university and the ways in which minority difference became selectively affirmed and incorporated for the purposes of state and capital through the rise of the interdisciplines and multicultural education programs, his theorization of the archival power of the modern university and its imbrication with, and indeed, generation of state and economic power illuminates the ways in which, even in earlier formations of the U.S. academy and state, the university is, in fact, a social institution that actually "*socializes state and capital* into emergent articulations of difference" (9). The hegemonic rise of the ethnicity paradigm within the modernizing U.S. academy of the 1930s and 40s, in particular, is a particularly striking instance in which this process of socializing state and capital into emergent articulations of race takes place.

To elaborate the unique positioning of the university as a co-constitutive apparatus of the modern U.S. state and key site for producing and mediating its relations of power through the production of legitimate knowledge, Ferguson provides a critique of Derrida's

Eyes of the University, which traces the genealogy of modern power relations between the university and state to Kant's famous blueprint for securing academic freedom for the lower faculties in the Prussian State, "Conflict of the Faculties," which was sent to King Ferdinand II as a petition to warn of the potential dangers of censuring the production of new knowledge in the Prussian university. Ferguson claims that Derrida's seminal study, foundational to contemporary critical university studies, misses a subtle, yet key contradiction at work within Kant's letter that illuminates the unique mediatory role of the disciplines in producing truth for and on behalf of the state. Even as Kant commits his loyalty to the King and insists that the university serves the state in the production of obedient subjects, Ferguson argues, he also carves a space for the university's role, in general, and the lower faculties, in particular, to produce future leaders and engineers of civil society as the producers and guardians of "truth," detached as they are from the material, political affairs of the state that are "useful." In the subtlety of this contradiction lies the unique space the university occupies; at once obedient to state needs and directed by them, but also actively producing and directing those very governance strategies through the production of ethical, moral subjects (10). Ferguson argues,

> Contrary to the idea that the lower faculties internalize the elements of a preexistent and fully formed state, the lower faculties internalize the interests of government only after they have articulated those interests for the state and its constituents. Contrary to the presumption that the academy is a mere reflection and derivation of state and civil society, Kant suggests…that the academy—as the laboratory that produces truth and political economy's relation to it—is a primary articulator of state and civil society. (11)

Following the logic of Ferguson's reading of Kant's critique, I suggest that the cultural pluralist frameworks of the ethnicity paradigm begin doing the conceptual, ideological, and onto-epistemic foundational work of incorporation that Ferguson highlights in the post student movement university of the 1960s much earlier in the work of cultural pluralists in the 1930s and '40s. In fact, while Ferguson is focused on "operations of power [that] were emerging [to] discipline through seemingly alternative regard for difference and through a revision of the canon, national identity, and the market" in the post-1960, post-student movement university, he suggests these operations of power are a significant paradigmatic shift away from previous formations of the U.S. academy that "disciplined difference in the universalizing names of canonicity, nationality, or economy" (6). It is precisely the operations of power that arise from this period where racial and ethnic difference was first positively promoted on a mass scale—and disciplined as a function of culture—to serve the purposes of national unity and economic security that this dissertation seeks to explore.

The paradigm shifting work to rearticulate the meaning and significance of race in the academy and the renovations to the U.S. state form under the New Deal were simultaneously occurring as both the academy and the state worried incessantly over how to secure the democratic way of life against the threat of global fascism. This particular conjuncture rearticulated the truth of race in relation to the state with the progressive proliferation and incorporation of difference articulated with national security logics that rationalized the political suppression of racialized dissent. I argue that the operations of power at work in this prior formation of the U.S. academy disciplined difference for the New Deal Welfare state in a manner that would redirect and secure dominant conceptions of race that deemphasized its material reality and functioning within the political economy of the U.S. state, while relegating alternative theories of race that examined the materiality of

race as a key organizing principal of the U.S. political economy—like those of Du Bois, et al—to the academic margins. In effect, I argue that the emergence of ethnicity paradigm in the academy, at a time that witnessed unprecedented collaboration between federal state programming and disciplinary experts for the purposes of social, economic, and natural and resource planning, redirected discussions of race from a central material component of national planning under the New Deal state form into the abstract, universalizing, and ultimately neutralizing terrain of culture. What resulted is a decades-long fixation on race as a *cultural problem*—significant for its effects on national (dis)unity—that could be addressed and solved primarily through educational means and programs of racial uplift (and surveillance) within the field of social work. In short, the purveyors of the ethnicity paradigm, at the expense of more radically visionary articulations of race that sought to unseat its centrality as a means of organizing unequal social relations under racial capitalism, trained the New Deal Welfare State and its post-war permutations to see and read race as a question of education, monitoring, and uplift, in short, *socio-cultural re*-engineering, rather than *political* or *economic* re-engineering.

Indeed, to pose race as a question of culture, was to entangle its continued social formation anew in the increasingly complex web of universalizing notions of democracy, freedom, and possessive individualism at a time when the New Deal Welfare state was working diligently to distinguish its expanding state form and interventionist role from European forms of fascism. Placing race as a question of culture, then, moved it outside of the purview of direct federal political, economic, territorial, and resource intervention and squarely into the socio-educational realm.[11] Moreover, the cultural shift, and the schools of

[11] It is, however, important to note that this shift of "race matters" to the educational realm subtended the extensive and ongoing practices of settler colonial violence practiced by the

thought it blossomed, became laboratories for producing truth about race in a manner that would ensure its continued activation as site for limited and particular kinds of state intervention that focused heavily on programs of uplift, discipline, and surveillance. During the interwar years and immediate pre-WWII period, when questions of national unity and defining and preserving the "democratic way of life" were paramount in political, academic, and public discourse, the new sociology of race offered an answer to the critical problem of racial and ethnic difference in forming an ostensibly coherent American culture that could withstand the threat of fascism from without. According to Omi and Winant, there has continued to be an "undeniable affinity between the concept of race as a cultural phenomenon and such ideas as assimilation, cultural pluralism," and in later iterations, "diversity, and multiculturalism." These concepts, in their respective socio-historical formations, have served as key "solutions" at various crisis points in U.S. history when racial and ethnic difference was perceived as a threat to national unity. Indeed, throughout the twentieth century in the U.S. the academy has often and in new forms responding to the crises of that particular moment, made the "connection between ethnicity theories of race and the democratic ideals with which the United States has always identified itself, however much these ideals were (dis)honored in reality" (22) as a means of addressing the pressing problems of the day.

U.S. state. FDR's ongoing campaigns of indigenous removal and the expansion of "Indian schools," and the incarceration of Japanese Americans during WWII, are two such striking examples of the limits of which populations would be included through the American pluralist imaginary during this period.

The Division of Knowledges and the Problem of Cultural Value During the Rise of Global Fascism

The connection between ethnicity paradigm theories of race, specifically those being purported by cultural pluralists against more assimilationist schools of thought, and the democratic ideals of the U.S. state became a key focus of inquiry and concern for intellectuals seeking to theorize the relationship between knowledge production and democratic forms of government during the period under question, as the U.S. encounter with totalitarianism and expansion of the New Deal Welfare state produced an epistemological crisis of defining democratic theory and practice amidst the perceived fascist threat to the democratic way of life. The impact of the cultural turn in the social sciences, underway within the significant paradigmatic shifts, disciplinary developments, and professionalization of the social science disciplines, on the new forms of state rationality that would later constitute the racial break became particularly evident by the immediate prewar period as intellectuals, politicians, and the public grappled with the now seemingly more possible entrance of the U.S. into WWII. At the three day Conference on "Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life" held at Columbia University in September of 1941, for example, leading religious and ethical philosophers and left/liberal scholars across the social and natural sciences met to collectively make a case for positivist humanism's role in preserving and progressing the American Democratic tradition amidst broader societal, state, and global transformations that had dislodged certainty in precisely what distinguished liberal democratic from totalitarian forms of governance. The organization of the conference in and of itself is a fascinating study of liberal democratic ethos and the epistemological frameworks in flux during the period, and included interrogations of the puritanical religious roots of democratic practice in the U.S., and

mediations on the role that philosophy, the natural sciences, social sciences, the Arts, and Humanities should play in the preservation of "the democratic way of life" amidst the perceived existential threat of global fascism. In this sense, conference participants offer a unique articulation of the relation of the disciplines to the truth produced in and for the state and identify a proscriptive program of influence to preserve that form of truth in and through its cultural, political, and social institutions.

The conference itself was organized around four themes, including "The Natural and Social Sciences in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life," "Philosophy and Jurisprudence in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life," "The Stake of Art and Literature in the Preservation of the Democratic Way of Life," and "The Religious Background of Democratic Ideas." The organization of conference response themes in and of themselves illuminate the attempt being made by and across the disciplines and institutions of higher learning that sustained them to define and name their place within this broader set of relationships being recalibrated under the new form of state rationality that defined the democratic pastorate (individuals working in conjunction to guarantee the promise of security through participation in the state's progressive telos) and its relationship to a changing state form for the racial liberal security state. Perhaps most significantly, the organization of the conference and the presentations of individual contributors illuminate, as well, how the division of knowledges across the disciplines, particularly those aligned across the scientific naturalist and ethnical rationalist debate, helped to structure the epistemological framework that secured racial and ethnic difference as an object of knowledge and site of state and disciplinary intervention within the realm of culture. I argue that by securing racial and ethnic difference as a particular type of cultural knowledge object within the social science disciplines of the expanding public research university in the U.S., procedures for

administrating race within the New Deal Welfare state were dictated by these new strains of pluralist thought and influenced the new form of state rationality that would usher the U.S. state into the period of what Omi and Winant have termed "the racial break." I argue that the racial security logics embedded in state rationality through this process gained particular vogue because of their framing as both an intellectual and practical antidote to the "monism" and "dogmatic" thought and practice of authoritarian regimes.

I turn now to a close reading of several key contributions from cultural pluralist theorists and practitioners of the day to elaborate how these new principles of pluralist thought, constrained as they were by a continued insistence on the importance of the division of knowledges, created (perhaps) unintended procedures for both knowing and acting upon racial and ethnic difference within the interventionist state form that arose from the expansion of the federal government throughout the New Deal and partnered closely with experts in the professionalizing social sciences for social engineering program administration, in short demonstrating the epistemological basis for the adoption of the first officially antiracist paradigm to imagine anew modes of governance for the U.S. racial liberal security state across the racial break. In this close reading, I do not claim that selected conference presentations held a direct material impact on specific New Deal state programming, but however, use these readings to illuminate how the modern sociology of race and its pluralist intellectual underpinnings indicate a relationship, on an epistemological basis, to the broader shifts in the form of state rationality that would structure the onto-epistemic mechanisms that facilitated the U.S. transition from an overtly racist to a formally antiracist state in the postwar period. I also suggest that theorists of the new pluralism played a key role in developing the intellectual and political frameworks that would be adopted by

the emerging racial liberal security state as authorizing and generative epistemes for its practices of procedural neutrality.

The conference proceedings, later collected and published as an edited collection of conference presentations and respondent commentary, includes a preface from the editors, that I quote here at length, because it lays out both the impetus and constructive goals of the conference in a manner the illuminates the academy's work to construct truth and its relation to the state, specifically through establishing a progressive telos and procedure for responding to the present crisis:

> The members of the Conference feel that their concern for the definition of the ultimate objectives and basic principles of civilized life, is profoundly relevant to the problems of our day. If the present war is largely ideational, the future peace must have secure ideational foundations. However, in order to be effective, ultimate objectives must be translated in terms of available human and material resources. Perhaps one of the greatest obstacles to efforts to create a rational world order has been man's inability to apply all his intellectual and spiritual resources to the complex task. We will approach problems blindly, unless we can create a mechanism by which scholars can, across differences of interest and training, freely exchange information. One theoretical question which must affect our consideration of immediate problems is the relationship between our period and that of 'the decline of the ancient world.' That is a term frequently used by historians, philosophers and other scholars, with different connotations. There is no consensus of opinion among scholars as to the components of 'the decline of the ancient world,' the correctness of the term, or the existence of any basic resemblance between that general period and our own. Confusion regarding one of the most significant phenomena in human

> history has in large measure come from the failure of scholars to integrate all the known facts from different fields of study. We hope the 1942 Conference will shed some light on the subject.
>
> To understand and cope with the immediate problems of the present, requires information at least as broad and varied as that needed for an appreciation of the end of the Roman Empire of the West. It has been suggested that because of its broad representation, the Conference is well qualified both to consider current problems and effective means for their solution. Accordingly, an effort is being made to create informal groups in various college and university centers, to meet regularly for discussion of various problems of peace and reconstruction. (xiv-xv)

The Structural and Intellectual Pluralism of Margaret Mead and Alaine Locke

One of the most well received conference presentations was delivered by Margaret Mead, famed cultural anthropologist who received her training by Ruth Benedict and Franz Boas, both of whom were pivotal in developing the theoretical and methodological model for ethnography based on the principles of cultural relativism. Mead developed theories of cultural relativity through a structuralist lens and presented a paper on "The Comparative Study of Culture and the Purposive Cultivation of Democratic Values" during the conference. Mead had famously applied these theories to her ethnographic fieldwork studies of the systems of cultural value of "primitive" cultures of the South Pacific islands of Samoa and Papua New Guinea, producing two of her most famous early works, *Coming of Age in Samoa* and *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*. Both studies were influential for their innovative approaches to the study of gender in family structures and child rearing practices across cultures and attempted to correct attempts to universalize and naturalize Western

concepts of gender, family and childrearing practices. The theoretical framework of comparative culture developed through her ethnographic fieldwork in the South Pacific, Mead argued, could be applied practically to present crisis in the U.S. as a means for preserving and truly cultivating a democratic populace and their governing institutions.

In her paper's opening remarks, Mead makes clear the distinction between cultural relativist and assimilationist perspectives, and also clarifies misconceptions of the cultural relativist approach by foregrounding their basis in structuralist analysis. Stressing the need to develop modes of intellectual habit, inquiry, and in the context of the conference, forms of social organization that can serve for the furthering of democratic ends amidst the perceived threat of global fascism, Mead insists that "One of the pressing problems in democratic living is the need to develop ways of thinking together which shall not result either in the formation of slavishly imitative schools around leaders, the elimination of all individuality in an attempt to find a least common denominator of theory," and cautions as well against the lionization of "an arid individualism in which each speaks for himself alone" (56). The form of her presentation itself, Mead suggests, is designed to "give the fullest expression to my belief that the most productive and most democratic procedure results from the orchestration of the ideas of several individual thinkers working on the same problem, rather than from the simple merging or boiling down of these ideas" (56) and can be read as an interesting slight to practitioners of assimilationist strains of ethnicity theory, and by proximity insinuates the fascist underpinnings of such approaches in their desire for monism and doctrinal adherence. Despite her warning against the lionization of an arid individualism, however, Mead still follows the dictate of the conference that "'modern civilization can be preserved only by a recognition of the supreme worth and moral responsibility of the individual human person'" (57). In response to the question: what can the comparative study

of cultures signify for those (of this conference) who are committed to putting cultural institutions to work in order to increase/preserve democratic way of life, Mead suggests that

> …it can demonstrate, from data on other cultures (and, by virtue of their relative simplicity and the extent to which they differ from our own culture and represent parallel developments rather than ancestral or divergent forms of our own culture, particularly from primitive cultures) that every culture must be seen as a whole, with its value system as an inextricable component. It can refute and brand as unscientific, irresponsible, and dangerous the use of cross-cultural data for purposes of devaluating any given cultural system by the demonstration that other cultures have placed different emphases and different values on some isolated detail of behavior. (57)

Mead, as a cultural anthropologist who practiced and promoted the principles of cultural relativity in her fieldwork and scholarship, stresses the structural-materialist underpinnings of her cultural pluralist approach in order to clearly distinguish both the form and application of the cultural relativist approach: "This mischievous and uninformed use of cultural material is often mistakenly called cultural relativity, but that is exactly what it is not, for cultural relativity demands that every item of cultural behavior be seen as relative to the culture of which it is a par, and in that systematic setting every item has positive or negative meaning and value" (58). Because cultural traits take on meaning within the system of value that gives those traits their meaning in context and practice, "The science of culture can insist, therefore, that when we consider contrasting types of behavior we shall attend always to the complete system," and clearly distinguishes that "random, indiscriminate citations of cultural contrasts in detail be strictly recognized for what they are, iconoclastic polemic material, ammunition for agitators, but with no scientific validity" (58). "Such a

consideration of cultural data" she goes on to suggest, "may lead to a recognition of the extent of our problem, that the system of values involves in the end the whole culture" (58) The applications of the method, then, are practical for Mead in terms of their ability to serve as a basis for social engineering and planning. "By insisting upon he systemic inter-relationship of different elements of culture," Mead insists,

> anthropology can warn against any planning which disregards essential components whose relevancy may not be immediately apparent to those whose eyes are directed along more special lines. It can provide an underpinning and groundwork for an understanding, which must otherwise remain intuitive, of the importance of certain social trends, of the relevancy of certain moves. It can insist upon the necessity of devising psychological-cultural equivalents for traits of practices which social thinking decides should be altered or abolished. (59)

To illustrate the method in which Mead proposes the cultural anthropologist can be made useful in the cultivation of a democratic way of life, she draws on her earlier work to present two key examples to make the case for her method. The first is both an ethical and policy consideration of compulsory sterilization of the unfit, the legislation for which was widely adopted throughout most U.S. states at the time. While compulsory sterilization is seen "as a measure to save the community the expense and social waste of a large subnormal population," Mead insists that the legislation "remains almost entirely uninvoked" (59). Despite Mead's minimization of the impact and extent of forced sterilization programs that largely targeted Native American and Black women deemed "unfit" by social reformist programs, she uses the debate surrounding such programs to delineate how a pluralist perspective can appropriately subtend democratic decision making practices. Mead acknowledges that "Controversies have tended to rage about the absolute right or wrong

involved in such a measure," insisting that "A comparative science of culture would shift the issue to the relationship, in the year 1941, between the attempt to save and augment the emphasis upon the 'supreme worth and moral responsibility of the individual human person' and the forces within our society which seek to put the efficiency, economy, and rationale of the state above the importance of the individual" (59). In effect, Mead sets the stage to delineate "controversies over right and wrong" as ultimately cultural questions of value in a formalistic sense. That is to say, that Mead, rather than tackling the question of the right or wrong of forced sterilization itself, instead shifts the focus and frame of the debate to the impropriety of *legislating and formally administering* questions of cultural value that remain contested in the forum of public debate. In fact, Mead goes on to insist that it is indeed anti-democratic for a governing body to adjudicate questions of cultural value that remain "popularly uncertain" and up for continued debate based on "differences of opinion and belief":

> Legislation permitting any governmental body to exercise such a discretionary power in a region where there is still such popular uncertainty and difference of opinion as to the ethics involved will be seen as dangerous—at present—and the cost of maintaining institutions for the feeble-minded as a most minimal individual tax, when seen in the light of what be endangered by this method of their abolishing them. Such legislation, with its arbitrary character and its emphasis upon sacrificing the admittedly innocent for the sake of Society—and particularly of Society's pocket—opens the way for the types of state euthanasia which are preached, if not extensively practiced, as part of the Fascist dogma….But such a judgment as this would have nothing whatsoever to say about the ultimate rightness and wrongness of putting legislation of this type into full practice at some other time. It would consider

> as quite possible that our culture may develop a form of society in which government is so morally responsible, and so committed to the furtherance of democratic values, that the exercise of such governmental power might have no morally detrimental effect upon those who exercised it…. (59-60)

By way of formal structuralist analysis informed by the tenets of pluralist thought, Mead suggests a slippery slope argument that allowing the adjudication of unsettled issues of public debate by the state—questions of cultural value, as it were—opened the door to the types of horrors committed by the very fascistic states those legislative bodies were concerned with not emulating.

The second ethnographic case study that Mead elaborates on to proffer the important role that cultural pluralist thought can lend to the cultivation and maintenance of a robust democratic culture, is the question of rebellion in youth and the modes of childrearing that cultivate democratic character and values. Mead suggests that, rather the viewing the current insubordination and misunderstanding between generations in the normative American family structures as a "crisis," the "increased" incidences of rebellion of youth might more properly be attributed to a growing democratic character that values choice and progress. "The line between this position and the authoritarian one of a single ethical system, ruthlessly enforced upon each generation," Mead suggests,

> is a difficult one to draw. But it is possible that a system of childrearing, essentially democratic, in which the child is left free to choose, but is left in no doubt as to the moral necessity of choice, can develop more easily out of the older system of complete parental control than if we wait for the development of a system in which the parent has abrogated all sense of moral responsibility. (62-63)

"The moral necessity of choice," and refusal to adhere to dogmatic principles, here, is posited as the very essence of democratic character, inviolable as the individual itself, and necessary for the healthy functioning of a democratic populace. As Foucault suggested that the analogy forming epistemes of 16th century, which sought reflection and similarity from the micro to the macrocosm of the heavens, so Mead elaborates through the differentiation of individual man a blueprint and program for the culture as a whole. In proper 19th century form, so from the individual in relation to its family unit, derives the sovereignty of the state. The goal of the anthropologist, for Mead then, must be to "take into account even the special value of seeming discrepancies, infelicities, and contradictions in the culture which we are seeking to shape" (63). "Adolescent revolt against the parental values, which appears to be a minus value in our civilization," Mead argues, "might then be seen as a nevertheless necessary component of a belief in progress and an impetus to work actively for a better world" (63).

It is this basis of relation, infused with the habits of thought and practices of the cultural pluralist that can maintain a democratic way of life from the level of the family through to the state form, with the expertise of the anthropologist (or social scientist) leading the way:

> In all the contributions which I have sketched so far, the anthropologist has played the role of placing items of culture in proportion, of relating disparate items to whole systems, utilizing the comparison of one system with another to enhance appreciation and knowledge of the way in which such systems are internally consistent and inter-related, issuing warnings and pointing out the implications of various changes or trends within the chaotic, heterogeneous culture which the

> members of the Conference seek to lead and change in the direction of greater democracy. (64)

The inscription of a telos for progress for this democratic populace is especially interesting, and Mead closes with a consideration of the ethics involved in social engineering, and much like Kant's slight of hand in arguing for a special, autonomous role for the lower faculties in *Conflict,* carves out a place for the disciplines and the purveyors of those disciplines to ensure the sovereignty of state adjudication is hemmed in and derived from the right of scientifically informed knowledge producers, the experts of the academy: "The leaders say: These are the values which we would foster. The anthropologist then places them in their cultural context and makes his contribution accordingly" (65). Mead goes on to elaborate this special role for the social scientist in great detail as the final pitch in her presentation's close:

> So far, in this role for which we have been casting the anthropologist, there has been no conflict between the idea of free moral responsibility for the individual and the contribution of the scientist. If, however, we push the question one step further and say: 'We have established the direction in which we want to move. Now you social scientists, specialists in culture, tell us how to get there. You implement our spiritual program for us!' Have we then reached a point at which freedom of the individual will and scientific procedure clash? Does not the implementation of a defined direction call for control, and does not control—measured, calculated, definite control; control which really attains its ends—by its very existence invalidate democracy, necessarily raising up some ment to exercise the control and degrade all others to be its victims? You can implement loyalty to the state, or rigid conformity to law, habits of uncomplaining industry or absolute obedience to a religious functionary. This has often been done without the aid of science. Fascism is showing

> us how much more efficiently it can be done with scientific aid….But to implement moral responsibility for the individual means, in effect, the development of a kind of social order within which moral responsibility will be developed in every child and given free flexible play in the adult. This task is a far more complicated one, yet I think it is possible. (65-66)

The shape and form that this social engineering will take, however, is precisely not an adherence to a set of dogmatic, fixed principles, but a flexible, ever changing framework and praxis that will allow for the continual renovation of democratic practice. The blueprint, in short, is not an ideology, but a structural *practice and process* that can, by definition, never be "finished" or completed. This point is especially important in recognizing the significant of the cultural pluralist paradigm in cultivating a democratic populace and institutional practices that are driven by this progressive telos. The microcosmic democratic individual within the broader macrocosm of the democratic populace and its governing institutions will no longer be disciplining the self in order to achieve a state of being, but rather will align its energies to participating in the never complete process of democratic pluralist practice – and the sovereignty of this particular individual and by extension the U.S. state writ large, is secured precisely through the individual's participation toward the, importantly, never ending, the telos of progressive renovation and inclusion. In short, Mead's proposition is the cultivation of a democratic pastorate and the progressive telos as its guiding principle—shifting the emphasis to moral responsibility of the properly pluralist individual because to actually implement policy on things where "opinions don't align" would mean to implement authoritarian social engineering. But to properly participate one must, indeed, have and share those opinions in order to secure this future:

> This leads us to a further step in cultural relativity, which is too infrequently taken, to the realization that were the world we dream of attained, members of that new world would be so different from ourselves that they would no longer value it in the same terms in which we now desire it. In order to implement a spiritual future which transcends our present cultural values, we need humility to realize that we would no longer be at home in such a world; that we who have dreamed it could not live it. The very imperfections which gave impetus to our dream would unfit us for its execution. (67).

Baked into this progressive telos is the idea that for each and every generation, the world will be made "anew" based on the renovation of cultural values, and that these cultural values, across generations, will be forever contested, unresolved, and frighteningly new the generation whose actions thought up, but ultimately proceed it. And here Mead hits on a dilemma for the purportedly, through the formalistic, structural objectivity of the scientist who is the "executant as well as the planner, for he is, of necessity, a part of his culture and its aspirations, at the same time that he would bend his skill to serve it" (67). Being of the culture themselves, "means that implementation can never take the form of finished blue prints of the future, but must involve direction, an orientation of the culture in a direction in which new individuals, reared under the first impetus of that direction, can, and *will*, take us further" (67). For Mead, this means that

> the student of culture realizes that culture is limited in its development by the individuals who must administer it, and so makes his plans for an inter-action between altered institutions and altered individuals, which will proceed slowly enough to maintain the direction which he has determined upon. He must lay his hand upon a process with a control none the less sure, non the less adjusted to

> everything that he knows of the processes of culture and the peculiar nature of his own culture, for all that he cannot, nay he must not, envisage the end toward which he is setting that process in motion. (67)

Margaret Mead's presentation provides a fascinating blueprint for the cultivation of a democratic pastorate, which cannot, in accordance with the principles of moral responsibility of the individual so central to the democratic ethos to which the Conference participants were committed, socially engineer through governmental or administrative procedures the social inequities arising from racial difference in the U.S. state. Racial and ethnic difference, rather than being considered a functional component of the political economy, here are squarely aligned as a question of culture—and thus, a values question—and to administrate or engineer on behalf of a values question would be tantamount, as Mead suggests throughout her presentation, to implementing a fascist program of social engineering made more efficient by the advances of science. Mead insists,

> For a detailed picture of the end, a finished blue print of the future of the absolutely desirable way of life, has always been accompanied by the ruthless manipulation of human beings in order to fit them, by the use of wrack, torture and concentration camp if necessary, to the decreed pattern. When such attempts have been merely the blind intuitive gropings of the fanatical and the power-driven, they have been sufficient to destroy all the values upon which the democratic way of life is based. Implemented by science, as they could be implemented, a new hideousness is created unguessed at in the darkest torture chambers of the past. The victims of such a process become progressively more apathetic, passive and lacking in spontaneity. The leaders become progressively more paranoid." (67-68)

Importantly, Mead suggests, that "Only by devoting ourselves to a direction, not a fixed goal, to a process, not a static system, to the development of human beings who will choose and think the choice all important and be strong, healthy and wise in choosing can we escape this dilemma" (68).

And so Mead concludes that, within the cultural pluralist framework, the individual is beholden to the culture and the culture as a whole to the individual. Within the framework I designate the first inklings of formation for what I term and fully elaborate in the next chapter, a "democratic pastorate," borrowing from Foucault's theorization of pastoral forms of power. To cultivate a democratic pastorate denotes the moral obligation of the individual to culture as a whole, and by implication, defines the individual as the guarantor of the continued growth and *direction* of the progressive state. As Mead suggests, "The comparative science of character formation demonstrates the dependence of the child upon the culture which is mediated to it by those who handle it in infancy, and the absolute dependence, therefore, of any cultural system upon those who transmit it" (68). However, due to the individual's, and in particular, the "expert's" imbeddedness within that cultural system, they are at best imperfect guarantors who cannot secure a particular outcome—to do so, would indeed, be akin to fascism, but instead can secure a direction for development toward more progressive goals for the culture, or population, as a whole. It is a role and process, that never attains an end point, but finds in its raison d'etre, the commitment to the process of pursuing a never attainable goal. "The most complete implementation that social science can then offer those who aim is to increase in appreciation of the supreme worth and moral responsibility of every individual human person," Mead argues, "are techniques for preserving the spontaneity and initiative of each new generation. That is, within a cultural frame progressively better suited to the realization of the ideals which they are progressively

better suited to live out and pass on, with moral impetus, to their children" (68). Mead leaves audience participants with the following four action items for the culturally pluralist, social scientific program to cultivate properly cultivate individual habits of democratic practice:

1. Affirm and document the importance of an integrating system of values as almost n abstract synonym for the culture as a whole.
2. Document the extent to which any single item of behavior has ethical significance only when seen in relationship to a whole cultural system.
3. Place present and proposed institutions of our culture against the total cultural perspective and scientifically assay their relationship to the avowed democratic ends of the sort to which this Conference is devoted.
4. Implement plans for altering our present culture, by recognizing the importance of including the social science *within* his experimental material, and by recognizing that by working toward defined *ends* we commit ourselves to the manipulation of persons, and therefore to the negation of democracy. Only by working in terms of values which are limited to defining a *direction*, is it possible for us to use scientific methods in the control of the process without the negation of the moral autonomy of the human spirit. (68)

And so Mead maps the onto-epistemic parameters that the ethnicity paradigm deploys through the social sciences, specifically, as a disciplinary formation with, as we will see in the following chapter, the institutional power to develop and enact projects for the social engineering of a democratic populace that will manifest this progressive telos for the burgeoning racial liberal security state. This methodology succinctly highlights the neutralizing parameters of ethnicity paradigm and the imposition of the universal subject of knowledge while elaborating the flexible parameters for their practice to ensure direction in

process rather than material result. And also, as stated, provides a fascinating blueprint for the formation of a democratic pastorate and the progressive telos that guides them, and by relation, the state, as the parameters for each are defined by their differentiation from the spectre of global fascism and its dogmatic adherence to monism. And so, I suggest, it is with the form and process, and not the material reality or effects, that the cultural pluralist paradigm would secure, on an onto-epistemic level, the foundational relation of the democratic pastorate and racial liberal security state during the period of transition under consideration.

If Mead's presentation tows the social scientific line for soft "directional" engineering with the fuzzy progressive goal of achieving incremental cultural, which will translate naturally, to institutional, change over time as a guiding principle for the burgeoning racial liberal security state, Alaine Locke's conference presentation "Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy" takes a decidedly more results-oriented approach to promoting pluralist frameworks for the preservation of the democratic way of life. Locke's presentation, at face value, attempts to reiterate the "vital connection between pluralism and democracy" amidst the "present culture crisis" initiated by the U.S. encounter with totalitarianism (196). Mapping out the ethical rationalist/moral absolutist divide across the disciplines that, Locke argues that intellectuals across the "practical" and "values based" disciplines are in a gridlock in terms of creating feasible paths forward for knowledge production that can promote a truly democratic practice, and proffers intellectual pluralism as anecdote to the seeming inalterable division between the sciences and the values-oriented disciplines. Ignoring the divisions of positivistic and values driven disciplines entirely, Locke engages a truly interdisciplinary critique in order to bend this pluralist paradigm into an actionable argument against bigotry. Unfortunately, however, the onto-epistemic parameters of the pluralist

paradigm disallows such a move, and the landing point of his argument results in making a strong case for the necessity of "tolerant debate" as a practice that will preserve the sanctity of democratic institutions against the cultural crisis posed by the supposed imposition of values as a hallmark of fascistic governance.

In attempting to make the case, however, Locke opens up a fascinating avenue of inquiry into the epistemic foundations of modern democratic practice. Locke begins by suggesting that, in the present moment of crisis, an honest observer must note the uncomfortable parallels between the rise of authoritarian sentiments across the globe and those homegrown dogmatisms in Americans' own historical backyard. He insists that while "absolutism has come forward again in new and formidable guise, social and political forms of it, with their associated intellectual tryannies of authoritarian dogmatism and uniformitarian universality," observers should also be "warrantably alarmed to see these vigorous, new secular absolutisms added to the older, waning metaphysical and doctrinal ones to which we had become somewhat inured and from which, through science and the scientific sprit, we acquired some degree of immunity" (196). In framing his authoritarian moment as a new form of longer genealogy of absolutist sentiment and governance that democratic societies believed to have advanced past, however, Locke is careful to distinguish that such sentiments are imbedded within modern democratic culture. "Though alarmed," he argues, "we do not always realize the extent to which these modern Frankensteins are the spawn of the older absolutistic breeds, or the degree to which they are inherent strains, so to speak, in the germ plasm of our culture" (196). Locke identifies these modern Frankensteins as spawning from older absolutistic breeds of nationalism that have risen at different points throughout the formation of the U.S. state, and suggests that the keen observer can see these manifesting once again in "the zeal of culture defense" that seeks "to bring about…a united

front" against the new authoritarian threat, suggesting that "we do not always stop to envisage the danger and inconsistency of a fresh crisis uniformitarianism of our own" (197). The corrective – and by implication more truly democratic, response – to this new moment of uniform nationalism that is uncomfortably fascistic, Locke argues, can be found in a "sounder and more permanent alternative," which would arise from "the possibility of a type of agreement such as may stem from a pluralistic base" (197). Locke believes that "Agreement of this common denominator type would, accordingly, provide a flexible, more democratic nexus, a unity in diversity rather than another counter-uniformitarianism" (196-197).

In posing calls for national unity in times of crisis as a fascistic mode of response, Locke implicates not only politicians and those directly involved in governance and mass mediated public sentiment, but the academy and the disciplines themselves, as well, and elaborates this almost reflexive response as more deeply imbedded in the structures of thought that govern democratic ethos and practice. If radical empiricism had once offered a curative to intellectual absolutism, this corrective too, as various forms of behaviorism and positivism had grown dogmatic, had fallen "increasingly into the hands of empirical monists, who, in the cause of scientific objectivity, squeezed values and ideals out completely in a fanatical culture of 'fact'" (197). In the ethical rationalist and scientific naturalist divide that Locke identifies as site of contestation over values and fact that he believes breeds forms of intellectual monism that allow for fascistic sentiment to take hold, however, he projects a compromise and coming to agreement of sorts through pluralistic methods as a way forward. He suggests that

> not all the recalcitrance, therefore, was on the side of those disciplines and doctrines, which, being concerned with the vital interests of 'value' as contrasted with 'fact,' are

> after all functionally vital in our intellectual life and tradition. Today, we are more ready to recognize them and concede these value considerations a place, though not necessarily to recognize or condone them in the arbitrary and authoritarian guise they still too often assume. (197)

Indeed, as Locke remarks on the renovation of values based disciplines in moving away from absolutist creeds tied to nation states, or religious dogmas, he sees also the hard empiricisms of the scientific naturalist camp also loosening their "arbitrary hardness and toning down intransigent attitudes" (197) and cites Professor Morris' conference paper, which redefines "a more liberal and humane empiricism, which not only recognizes 'values,' but provides, on the basis of sound reservations as to the basic primacy of factual knowledge, for reconcilable supplementations of our knowledge of fact by value interpretations and even by value systems and creeds" (197). Taken together, Locke reads in these intellectual developments a pluralizing of thought in both camps and avenues for collaboration and interdisciplinarity, which he proposes as evidence of a new pluralistic way forward for the disciplines and the academy overall. He argues that this trend toward collaboration "reverses the previous tactic of empiricists to deny any validity to values and so to create a hopeless divide between the sciences of fact and the value disciplines" (197), and begins the task of more clearly delineating what an intellectual pluralism that serves the purposes of democracy might look like:

> Here again, in this more liberal empiricism, pluralism, and particularly value pluralism, has a sound and broadly acceptable basis of rapprochement to offer. Such rapprochement being one of the main objectives as well as one of the crucial problems of this conference, it is perhaps relevant to propose the consideration of pluralism as a working base and solution for this problem. This would be all the

> more justified if it could be shown that pluralism was a proper and congenial rationale for intellectual democracy. (197-198)

After providing a thorough intellectual history of the divide between ethical rationalists and scientific naturalists, and the absolutist strains of both camps, Locke suggest that pluralistic frame of reference provides a curative for the absolutistic strains of value consideration, as well as the values-barren and dogmatic adherence to a cult of facts, and insists that "It is here that a basic connection between pluralism and intellectual democracy becomes evident" (201). "In the pluralistic frame of reference," Locke argues, "value dogmatism is outlawed…[and a] consistent application of this invalidation would sever the trunk nerves of bigotry or arbitrary orthodoxy all along the line, applying to religious, ideological and cultural as well as to political and social values" (201). Locke carves out a pluralistic, flexible model for the implementation of value considerations in democratic intellectual, political, and social practice:

> Value profession or adherence on that basis would need to be critical and selective and tentative (in the sense that science is tentative) and revisionist in procedure rather than dogmatic, final and en bloc. One can visualize the difference by saying that with any articles of faith, each article would need independent scrutiny and justification and would stand, fall or be revised, be accepted, rejected or qualified accordingly. Fundamentalism of the 'all or non' or 'this goes with it' varieties could neither be demanded, expected nor tolerated. Value assertion would thus be a tolerant assertion of preference, not an intolerant insistence on agreement or finality. Value disciplines would take on the tentative and revisionist procedure of natural science. (201)

The "practical corollaries" for implementation of this flexible, revisable model for value implementation (rather than imposition), however, Locke identifies as "tolerance and value reciprocity" (201). While he sees tolerance and value reciprocity as a "sturdier intellectual base for democracy" (201), he cautions, this requirement for implementation poses a significant challenge within a culture and democratic system fraught with inequalities stemming from the entrenchment of fundamentalist cultural and political views:

> We know, of course, that we can not get tolerance from a fanatic or reciprocity from a fundamentalist of any stripe, religious, philosophical, cultural, political or ideological. But what is often overlooked is that we cannot, soundly and safely at least, preach liberalism and at the same time abet and condone bigotry, condemn uniformitarianism and placate orthodoxy, promote tolerance and harbor the seeds of intolerance. I suggest that our duty to democracy on the plane of ideas, especially in time of crisis, is the analysis of just this problem and some consideration of its possible solution. (201-202)

And interestingly, Locke herein begins to set the stage for a latent critique of racial fascism in the U.S. by identifying the absolutist basis of "traditional loyalties" that have shaped much of the academic and public discourse on "Americanism" throughout different waves of nationalist sentiment:

> we are for the most part unaware of the latent absolutism at the core of many of our traditional loyalties, and of the fact that this may very well condition current concepts and sanctions of democracy. The fundamentalist lineage of 'hundred per-centism,' for all its ancient and sacrosanct derivation, is only too obvious. It is a heritage and carry-over from religious dogmatism and extends its blind secretarian

> loyalties to the secular order. So hoary and traditional is it that one marvels that it could still be a typical and acceptable norm of patriotism, political or cultural. (202)

In the case of "my country right or wrong" arguments and sentiments, he draws a direct parallel to Nazism:

> Far too much of our present democratic creed and practice is cast in the mold of such blind loyalty and en bloc rationalization, with too many of our citizens the best of democrats for the worst of reasons—mere conformity. Apart from the theoretical absolutistic taint, it should be disconcerting to ponder that by the same token, if transported, these citizens would be 'perfect' Nazis and the best of totalitarians. (202)

Locke draws these conclusions from less obvious instances, as well, in the divide between the American impulse to blindly adhere to universalistic principles in their ideal, abstract form, and the refutation of their full embrace when materially manifested through practical application. In the case of "democratic tolerance," for example, a virtue stemming largely from early republic discourse of religious tolerance that was throughout the 19th and 20th century quite unevenly applied to population groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin, particularly through practices of land seizure, the adjudication and denial of rights of citizenship, and immigration law more broadly, Locke identifies a particularly thorny contradiction, and suggests that the underlying foundation for espousing democratic tolerance as a virtue at all rests on shaky intellectual grounds that breed fascists just as easily as democrats:

> democratic tolerance—of whose uniqueness and quantity we can boast with some warrant, seems on close scrutiny qualitatively weak and unstable. It is uncritical because propagated on too emotional and too abstract a basis. Not being anchored in any intellectual base, it is too easily set aside in time of stress and challenge. Some

> is tolerance only in name, for it is simply indifference and *laissez faire* rationalized. We are all sadly acquainted with how it may blow away in time of crisis or break when challenged by self-interest, and how under stress we find ourselves, after all, unreasonably biased in favor of 'our own,' whether it be the mores, ideas, faiths or merely 'our crowd.' This is a sure sign that value bigotry is somehow still deep-rooted there. Under the surface of such frail tolerance some unreconstructed dogmatisms lie, the latent source of the emerging intolerance. This is apt to happen to any attitude lacking the stamina of deep intellectual conviction, that has been nurtured on abstract sentiment, and that has not been buttressed by an objective conception of one's own values and loyalties. (202-203).

Ultimately, in highlighting that tolerance in creed, and bigotry in practice defines the current "democratic way of life," Locked both interrogates the intellectual foundations for this contradiction in a divide between form and material content that he has mapped on to the ethical rationalist, and scientific naturalist divide. "Democratic professions to the contrary, there is a reason for all this shallow tolerance, this grudging and fickle reciprocity, this blind and fanatical loyalty persisting in our social behavior," he suggests, and argues that, "Democracy has promulgated these virtues and ideals zealously, but as attitudes and habits of thought has not implemented them successfully" (203). Here, Locke remarks that the pluralizing ideal values of democratic governance have not been implemented beyond the level of national dogma and rhetoric, and makes the case that these ideals must be made concrete and put in practice through cultural adoption, that certainly, would require training.

> First, they have been based on moral abstractions, with vague sentimental sanctions as 'virtues' and 'ideals,' since, on the whole, idealistic liberalism and good-will humanitarianism have nursed our democratic tradition. Rarely have these attitudes

> been connected sensibly with self-interest or realistically bound up with a perspective turned toward one's own position and its values. Had this been the case, a sturdier tolerance and a readier reciprocity would have ensued, and with them a more enlightened type of social loyalty (203).

A project of social engineering that ties the self collectively to the whole, he posits, is the project of pluralism, and will ensure a "less bigoted national and cultural tradition." Democratic liberalism as a set of universal principles and ideals fails to manifest a truly democratic culture because it is "limited by the viewpoint of its generation and by its close affiliation with doctrinal religious and philosophical traditions" whose rationale was modeled, unfortunately, "too closely [on] authoritarian patterns," which "made a creed of democratic principles" (203) where they should have been lived as a daily practice. Not only is the dogmatism of democratic liberalism ineffective, Locke also argues that it is indeed outmoded, and unfit for tackling the challenges of the modern world: "Outmoded scientifically and ideologically today, this dogmatism is the refuge of too much provincialism, intolerance and prejudice to be a healthy, expanding contemporary base for democracy." He insists that "Our democratic values require an equally liberal but also a more scientific and realistic rationale today. This is why we presume to suggest pluralism as a more appropriate and effective democratic rationale" (203-204). He goes on to argue that

> We must live in terms of our own particular institutions and mores, assert and cherish our own specific values, and we could not, even if it were desirable, uproot our own traditions and loyalties. But that is no justification for identifying them en bloc with an ideal like democracy, as though they were a perfect set of architectural specifications for the concept itself…. So the only way of freeing our minds from such hypostatsizing, from its provincial limitations and dogmatic bias, is by way of a

> relativism which reveals our values in proper objective perspective with other sets of values" (204).

Locke's proposition then, is the institution of an objective framework and perspective from which individual and group values can be properly held in check. "Toward this end," he argues,

> value pluralism has a point of view able to lift us out of the egocentric and ethnocentric predicaments which are without exception involved. This should temper our loyalties with intelligence and tolerance and scotch the potential fanaticism and bigotry which otherwise lurk under blind loyalty and dogmatic faith in our values….Since the relativist point of view focuses in an immediately transformed relationship and attitude toward one's own group values, it is no rare and distant principle, but has, once instated, practical progressive applicability to everyday life. It has more chances thus of becoming habitual. *Most importantly perhaps, it breaks down the worship of the form—that dangerous identification of the symbol with the value*, which is the prime psychological root of the fallacies and errors we have been discussing. (204-205, my italics)

And here, Locke fully elaborates his materialist critique of democratic liberalism, in that it uncritically operates as political and social hermeneutic that disfigures material realities into form based abstractions, or symbolic values. He does not, however, believe in the abandonment of those ideals, per se, but their transposition as symbolic values in practical, lived values. He suggests that an "enlightened value loyalty" would required the clear distinction between "the symbol and form of its loyalty and the essence and objective of that loyalty" (205). In short, Locke suggests a reversal of the hermeneutic of democratic liberalism to be grounded first, in terms of its practical material effect on achieving concrete

democratic ideals, of tolerance, freedom, etc., in actual social and political practice. Elevating the result over the ideal, as the pluralistic intellectual frame suggests, can properly do the work of actualizing democratic character and collective practice, and can be applied to the microcosm of negotiating values differences within a collective, democratic whole. On a theoretical level, he suggests:

> Such critical insight, for example, would recognize a real basic similarity or functional equivalence in other values, even when cloaked in considerable superficial difference. Nor, on the other hand, would it credit any merely superficial conformity with real loyalty. And so, the viewpoint equips us not only to tolerate difference but enables us to bridge divergence by recognizing commonality wherever present. (205)

The practical application of this theory, however, is of the upmost importance as well, and has "high practical consequences for democratic living, since it puts the premium upon equivalence not upon identity, calls for co-operation rather than for conformity and promotes reciprocity instead of factional antagonism" (205). If properly applying pluralistic methods to the question of value negotiation within a democratic society, he argues, "authoritarianism, dogmatism and bigotry just cannot take root and grow in such intellectual soil" (205).

If the first part of Locke's paper outlines the divide between ethical rationalists and scientific naturalists over questions of truth as they pertain to democratic idealism and practice in order to make the case for a pluralist intellectual basis – or episteme – for materializing the ideals of democracy into a sound intellectual practice, the close of his paper takes the case of cultural pluralism as one such case example through which these ideals can be realized, materially, in disciplinary practice: "…the campaign for the re-vamping of democracy has already put special emphasis on what is currently styled 'cultural pluralism' as

a proposed liberal rationale for our national democracy" (206). Locke reads cultural pluralism as a both corollary and derivative manifestation of the broader project of intellectual pluralism that he has been proposing, but locates the domain of cultural pluralism in particular as an apt disciplinary site for the practical application of this intellectual model most up to the challenge of the vast project of social re-engineering required to achieve a truly democratic culture. Under cultural pluralism, he argues "much can be done toward the more effective bridging of the divergencies of institutional life and traditions which, though sometimes conceived as peculiarly characteristic of American society, are rapidly becoming typical of all cosmopolitan modern society" (206). As a key tenet of cultural pluralism calls for the promotion and respect of differences while "safeguarding respect for the individual" Locke believes it can adequately correct "the submergence of the individual in enforced conformity, and for the promotion of commonality over and above such differences" (206). In this sense, cultural pluralist practice, he posits, holds the capacity to not only negotiate differences of value on the level of culture to promote tolerance as a lived democratic practice, but also will allow for the realization of intellectual freedom in a more robust capacity. "On the intellectual side," he argues,

> additional motivation is generated for the reinforcement of all the traditional democratic freedoms, but most particularly for the freedom of the mind. For it is in the field of social thinking that freedom of the mind can be most practically established and no more direct path to that exists than through the promotion of an unbiased scientific conception of the place of the national culture in the world. (206)

The implications for a nascent globalist sentiment here are evident. And Locke goes on to make the case, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the adoption of intellectual pluralism

generally and cultural pluralism specifically are the best hope of preserving democracy against the now differentiated threat of global fascism:

> Democracy has encountered a fighting antithesis, and has awakened from considerable lethargy and decadence to a sharpened realization of its own basic values. This should lead ultimately to a clarified view of its ultimate objectives. This crisis holds also the potential gain of a more realistic understanding on the part of democracy of its own shortcomings, since if totalitarianism is its moral antithesis as well as its political enemy, it must fight internally to purge its own culture of the totalitarian qualities of dogmatism, absolutism and tyranny, latent and actual. (206)

The implications for the foundations for the form of pluralistic democratic that would be used as a rationale to accelerate the U.S.'s global ascendancy as an imperial power in the postwar period are quite stark here. Not only is pluralism offered as a defense to preserve democratic government against the global fascist threat, it is also offered as an offensive move to ensure its expansion of influence on a global scale.

> It is here that the defective perspective of our patriotism and our culture values reveals its seriously limiting character. This is intellectually the greatest single obstacle to any extension of the democratic way of life on an international scale. Surely here the need for the insight and practical sanity of the pluralistic viewpoint is clear. There is a reasonable chance of success to the extent we can disengage the objectives of democracy from the particular institutional forms by which we practice it, and can pierce through to common denominators of equivalent objectives. (207)

And so, unbeknownst to Locke, his presentation surprisingly closes with a practical blueprint informed by the tenets for intellectual pluralism he outlines for precisely how the U.S. state can leverage a cultural pluralist framework to legitimize its global ascendency as an imperial

power in the postwar period, positing, portentously, that "the intellectual core of the problems of the peace, should it lie in our control and leadership, will be the discovery of the necessary common denominators and the basic equivalences involved in a democratic world order or democracy on a world scale" (207). It is important to distinguish, however, that in this proposal, Locke envisions a pluralistically guided democratic world order that is materially actualized through cultural pluralist practice, and goes to great lengths to define the precisely, the forms of tolerance and inclusion that must guide such democratic practice. "A reasonable democratic peace (like no other peace before it)," he cautions, "*must integrate victors and vanquished alike, and justly*. With no shadow of cultural superiority, it must respectfully protect the cultural values and institutional forms and traditions of a vast congeries of peoples and races—European, Asiatic, African, American, Australasian" and insists that cultural pluralism can "yield a touchstone for such thinking" (207-208, my italics). Furthermore,

> Direct participational representation of all considerable groups must be provided for, although how imperialism is to concede this is almost beyond immediate imagining. That most absolutistic of all our secular concepts, the autonomous, sacrosanct character of *national sovereignty*, must surely be modified and voluntarily abridged. Daring reciprocities will have to be worked out if the basic traditional democratic freedoms are ever to be transposed to world practice, not to mention the complicated reconstruction of economic life which consistent reciprocity will demand in this field. On suspects that the practical exigencies of world reconstruction will force many of these issues to solution from the practical side, leaving us intellectuals to rationalize the changes *ex post facto*. (208, my italics)

Locke is hopeful in his radical imagining of a truly democratic potentialities of pluralist thought and practice, insisting that "Out of the crisis might yet come the forced extension of democratic values and mechanisms in ways that we have not had courage to think of since the days of democracy's early eighteenth century conception, when it was naively, but perhaps very correctly assumed to have validity at all democracy must have world vogue" (208). Locke sees it as the special task of the intellectual to coax such an extension of democratic values and mechanisms to meet the present crisis, and suggests that their role must be to "discipline our thinking critically into some sort of realistic world-mindedness. Broadening our cultural values and tempering our orthodoxies is of infinitely more service to enlarged democracy than direct praise and advocacy of democracy itself" (208). He goes on to argue that

> until broadened by relativism and reconstructed accordingly, our current democratic traditions and practice are not ready for world-wide application. Considerable political and cultural dogmatism, in the form of culture bias, nation worship, and racism, still stands in the way and must first be invalidated and abandoned. In sum, if we refuse to orient ourselves courageously and intelligently to a universe of peoples and cultures, and continue to base our prime values on fractional segments of nation, race, sect, or particular types of institutional culture, there is indeed little or no hope for a stable world order of any kind—democratic or otherwise. Even when the segment is itself a democratic order, its expansion to world proportions will not necessarily create a world democracy. The democratic mind needs clarifying for the better guidance of the democratic will. (208-209)

In a closing argument that in many ways echoes the third chapter of this dissertation, Locke sees this crisis as an opportunity, and a call to action on the part of intellectuals to begin the task of imagining a new culturally pluralist state into being:

> the same correctives needed for the sound maintenance of democracy are also the most promising basis for its expansion. The hostile forces both within and without are of the same type, and stem from absolutism of one sort or another. The initial suggestion of a vital connection between democracy and pluralism arose from the rather more apparent connection between absolutism and monism. But so destructive has pluralism been of the closed system thinking on which absolutist values and authoritarian dogmatisms thrive that it has proved itself no mere local antithesis but their specific intellectual antidote. In the present crisis democracy needs the support of the most effective rationale available for the justification and defense of its characteristic values. (209)

In a fascinating, and wholly unintentional, manner, Locke's radical imagining and argument for the potential of a truly democratic state brought into being through, and guided by the tenets of cultural pluralism lays out quite precisely how the U.S. state, leading up to and during the period of the racial break, would, indeed, successfully expand its ideational forms of democracy in the abstract on a world scale. Indeed, Locke's hopeful imaginary fails to fully wrestle with the extent to which the confusion of the symbol for its contents, was not in fact an error in U.S. democratic practice in need of correcting, however, but a key feature of its most enduring episteme that hermeneutically translates material relations into abstract symbols of democratic value that could act as guiding principles for disciplining a pluralistic populace.

Closing: *An American Dilemma* and the Problem of Disciplinary Objectivity

If academic activity and discourse on the eve of the U.S.'s entrance into WWII belied a particular set of preoccupations with preserving and extending a democratic status quo – politically, institutionally, intellectually, and, now, culturally—as a necessary precondition to attacking fascism on a global scale, the shape and form that the new progressive ethos of the democratic status quo would take in its key institutional incubational site, the social sciences of the U.S. academy, was solidified by the most extensive study of white and Black race relations to date, Gunnar Myrdal's nearly 3,000 page, two volume sociological tract, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. This oft-cited work, conducted over a ten-year period and published in 1944 at the height of U.S. involvement in WWII, was lauded by progressives as a landmark piece of scholarship that had importantly shifted the conversation and analysis of racial tension in the U.S. to a problem of white racism after decades of pseudo-scientific race and social science had been devoted to producing theories of racial inferiority to justify the denial of the rights of citizenship and social equality for the Black population in America. Myrdal, a Swedish sociologist with an ostensibly clear view of America's most complex of social ills, defined the "Negro Problem" in America as stemming from the atavistic racist beliefs of the white populace, however, and importantly, insisting that these irrational beliefs in the inferiority of the Black population on behalf of whites had caused the maladaptive development of a pathological Black culture out of step with the American mainstream. In short, The Negro Problem, according to Myrdal and later adopted as gospel across the social sciences, was decidedly a problem of *culture* so endemic that its ill effects permeated every American practice and institution to its core, creating a perpetual storm and social dynamic that would forever be at odds with the American Creed of equality and causing perpetual cycles of social and political upheaval.

In Gunnar Myrdal's Preface to the 20th Anniversary Edition of *An American Dilemma*, he writes at length of the exceptionalism of the US State and the peculiarity of its institutions, remarking, astonishingly, that its greatest moment of self-evaluation as a nation culminated at the very moment of its greatest crisis in the height of US involvement in WWII. Myrdal reflects,

> Only to a nation dedicated to democratic ideals and convinced of its own basic soundness and strength could have it occurred to invite a foreigner—particularly one from a country entirely spared of racial problems and, moreover, a social scientist who, if anything, was certainly not renowned for a willingness to pass over or conceal uncomfortable facts—to review this most sensitive and serious national problem (xxxv).

Myrdal's marking of his identity as a Swedish sociologist operates interestingly here in that it implicates the various permutations of the global universalizing discourses of whiteness perpetuated through the social sciences and the ethnicity paradigm. Here, Myrdal both recognizes the potential for his foreign perspective to perceived as a potential threat to the national body as an "outsider" meddling in the most sensitive of internal affairs, while also touting how that positionality generates the "scientific objectivity" of his study, having come from a country "innocent" of racial animus. Rather than this lack of first-hand knowledge serving to disqualifying his assessment of the conditions on the ground, his complete personal removal from racial problems in America and the world more broadly is that which imbues his perspective with the unbiased, scientific objectivity required of rigorous and truthful social scientific study. Myrdal's lack of learned "personal values, beliefs, and cultural attitudes" toward the *object of study*, as the ethnicity paradigm would hold, is that which allows a value-free judgment and rigorous assessment of the problem at hand without the "taint" of

personal bias. One need read no further than reviews, reception, and publishing history, for example, of Black American social scientists of the period – Du Bois, Wright, Carey Williams – to determine how the universalizing frameworks brought forth by the ethnicity paradigm worked actively discredit as valid analyses and studies produced by Black intellectuals on the basis that their identity muddied objectivity. But interestingly, in Myrdal's framing of the exceptional nature of the American Creed, he argues that it is precisely this very facet that allows for an unbiased analysis of America's most pressing *cultural* dilemma:

> As the study was continued after the outbreak of World War II and America's involvement in it, the problem it dealt with became, of course, an even more acute source of national worry. Nevertheless, the book was published during the most anxious months of the war. I know of no other country where such a thing could have happened. Americans as citizens have much greater reason to feel intensely proud of the initiation, pursuit, and publication of this study during a time of national emergency than I have for being chosen as an instrument of a nation's urge for objective self-scrutiny (xxxv).

Myrdal's model that focused on "white prejudice and educational reform" (Schryer 63) was not without its contemporary detractors, however, but the eclipsing of other perspectives on the subject in favor of Myrdal's model as the ethnicity paradigm rose to ascendancy in the mid-twentieth century is telling of the particular forms of epistemic violence carried out by the social sciences in the name of progress and underwritten by the various projects of racialized security in the immediate pre and post-war period in the U.S. In a review of Myrdal's much celebrated tome, Ralph Ellison, invoking the Du Boisian concept of double consciousness, asserts that "it is not unusual for a Negro to experience a sensation that he does not exist in the real world at all" (303). Existing instead, he suggests,

"in the nightmarish fantasy of the white American mind as a phantom that the white mind seeks unceasingly, by means both crude and subtle, to lay to rest," (303) Ellison underscores the ways in which Myrdal's work constructs blackness as an object of knowledge within the discipline of sociology by fixating on how black Americans exist as an object within the white mind. Ellison suggests that in locating the Negro problem "in the head of the [white] American," "the main virtue of An America Dilemma lies in its demonstration of how the mechanism of prejudice operates to disguise the moral conflict in the minds of whites produced by the clash on the social level between the American Creed and anti-Negro practices." But he warns also of a danger in this manner of formulating the "problem" within academic and public discourse. Myrdal, like many white sociologists of the day, sought to elucidate that problematization of blackness was, in fact, a function of whiteness, which was to be viewed as a progressive sentiment and perspective. However, while locating the Negro problem as a problem of white racism instead of a failure of the black population to integrate and adapt to "freedom" worked to undercut assimilationist paradigms that misnamed the material, political, and social mechanisms of white supremacy as "black failure," Ellison notes that there is "danger in this very virtue" that reconstitutes blackness as a problem object within a white framework perpetuates the epistemic violence of white supremacy by other means, which gets perfectly illustrates the success the second wave of the ethnicity paradigm had in effectively neutralizing race as a function of the political economy. Ellison insists,

> For the solution of the problem of the American Negro and democracy lies only partially in the white man's free will. Its full solution will lie in the creation of a democracy in which the Negro will be free to define himself for what he is and, within the large frame-work of that democracy, for what he desires to be. Let this

> not be misunderstood. For one is apt, in welcoming *An American Dilemma's* democratic contribution, to forget that all great democratic documents—and there is a certain greatness here—contain a strong charge of anti-democratic elements. Perhaps the wisest attitude for democrats is not to deplore the ambiguous element of democratic writings, but to seek to understand them. For it is by making use of the positive contributions of such documents and rejecting their negative elements that democracy can be kept dynamic. (308)

Indeed, in seeking to understand the "ambiguous element of democratic writings" such as Myrdal's, Ellison is able to point to an essential component of the U.S.'s long history of racial fascism, race as an elemental component of the political economy, and points to how it became operative in progressive form within the modern sociology of race:

> Since its inception, American social science has been closely bound with American Negro destiny. Even before the Civil War the South-ern ruling class had inspired a pseudoscientific literature attempting to prove the Negro inhuman and thus beyond any moral objections to human slavery. Sociology did not become closely concerned with the Negro, however, until after Emancipation gave the slaves the status-on paper at least—of nominal citizens. And if the end of the slave system created for this science the pragmatic problem of adjusting our society to include the new citizens, the compromise between the Northern and Southern ruling classes created the moral problem which Myrdal terms the American Dilemma. (310)

To Myrdal's credit, Ellison notes that he had, at the very least, successfully "used his science to discredit all of the vicious non-scientific nonsense that has cluttered our sociological literature," (310) taking important steps to shore the discipline of some of its most cherished mythologies. Such mythologies resulted from the unquestioned adoption and

naturalization of the precepts of biologistic racial science of the 19th century into the burgeoning field of social science, which Ellison importantly traces to the era of Reconstruction. To "trace the connection between social science and the Negro a bit further" Ellison elaborates:

> Usually when the condition of Negroes is discussed we get a morality-play explanation in which the North is given the role of good and the South that of evil. This oversimplifies a complex matter. For at the end of the Civil War, the North lost interest in the Negro. The conditions for the growth of industrial capitalism had been won and, according to Myrdal; the Negro 'stood in the way of a return to national solidarity and a development of trade relations' between the North and the South. This problem was not easy to solve. Groups of Negroes had discovered the effectiveness of protest and what Myrdal shows to be the Negro's strongest weapon in pressing his claims: his hold upon the moral consciousness of Northern whites. (311)

By situating the development of social scientific fixation with Black Americans in the fuller historical context of the Civil War and the period of Reconstruction, Ellison is able to illuminate how addressing "the Negro Problem," which would later be translated into a central component of "the racial cultural situation in the U.S." became a central object of intervention for racial liberals. Ellison explains that the North, to alleviate its conscience and administer first attempts to "solve" this dilemma, took four steps:

> it promoted Negro education in the South; it controlled his economic and political destiny, or allowed the South to do so; it built Booker T. Washington into a national spokesman of Negroes with Tuskegee Institute as his seat of power; and it organized social science as an instrumentality to sanction its methods. (311)

While Ellison acknowledges that "it might be said that this explanation sounds too cynical, that much of the North's interest in Negro education grew out of a philanthropic impulse, and that it ignores the real contribution to the understanding of Negroes made by social science" (312). "But," he stresses, "philanthropy on the psychological level is often guilt-motivated, even when most unconscious. And here, again, we have the moral conflict" and "When we look at the connection between Tuskegee and our most influential school of sociology, the University of Chicago, we are inclined to see more than an unconscious connection between economic interests and philanthropy, Negroes and social science" (312). Ellison importantly notes the co-constitutive relationship between white Northern liberal's moral crisis over the Negro Problem and Washington's "Tuskegee Machine," which he argues "on the black side of the color…served to deflect Negro energy away from direct political action, on the white side of the line the moral problem nevertheless remained" (312). "It does not, therefore, seem quite accidental that the man responsible for inflating Tuskegee into a national symbol, and who is sometimes spoken of as the 'power behind Washington's throne,' was," Ellison suggests, "none other than Dr. Robert E. Park, co-founder of the University of Chicago School of Sociology" (312). While Ellison goes to lengths to acknowledge the positive contributions of Dr. Park and the Chicago School ecosystem, noting that "American Negroes have benefited greatly from their research, and some of the most brilliant of Negro scholars have been connected with them," (312) he nonetheless begins an important critique against the school of thought for first its "timidity" and second, its falling victim to the "imposed limitations of bourgeois science" (312). Ellison critiques the earlier works from Park and the Chicago school, but notes that "certainly their recent works have moved closer and closer toward the conclusions made by Myrdal" (312). "Indeed," he insists, "without their active

participation, *An American Dilemma* would have been far less effective. Nevertheless, it was Myrdal who made the most of their findings" and proffers that "Perhaps it took the rise of fascism to free American social science of its timidity. Certainly it was necessary to clear it of some of the anti-Negro assumptions with which it started" (313). Ellison elaborates those assumptions fully with a short review of Park's infamous statement that Black Americans were a "lady among the races," and importantly draws the connection between such sentiments and those of classical liberal political scientists such William Graham Sumner:

> Dr. Robert F. Park was both a greater scientist and, in his attitude toward Negroes, a greater democrat than William Graham Sumner. (It will perhaps pain many to see these names in juxtaposition.) In our world, however, extremes quickly meet. Sumner believed it 'the greatest folly of which man can be capable to sit down with a slate and pencil and plan out a new social world,' a point of view containing little hope for the underdog. But for all his good works, some of Park's assumptions were little better. The Negro, he felt, 'has al-ways been interested rather in expression than in action; interested in life itself rather than in its reconstruction or reformation. The Negro is, by natural disposition, neither an intellectual nor an idealist, like the Jew; nor a brooding introspective, like the East Indian; nor a pioneer and frontiersman, like the Anglo-Saxon. He is primarily an artist, loving life for its own sake. His *m'tier* is expression rather than action. He is, so to speak, the lady among the races.'" (313)

Ellison assesses the damaging effects of "Park's descriptive metaphor" in that it "is so pregnant with mixed motives as to birth a thousand compromises and indecisions. Imagine

the effect such teachings have had upon Negro students alone! Thus what started as part of a democratic attitude, ends not only uncomfortably close to the preachings of Sumner, but to those of Dr. Goebbels as well" (313). The linkages Ellison draws between racial liberal social science, social Darwinist political thought, and Nazi racial science are telling, and his critique also importantly lays out a broader critique of American social planning and its habitually forgetting of Black Americans that will be the topic of the next chapter:

> One becomes impatient with those critics who accuse American capitalism of neglecting social planning. Actually its planning lay in having the loosest plan possible, and when it was economically expedient to change plans it has been able to do so. During the Abolitionist period the moral nature of the Negro problem was generally recognized, but with the passing of the Reconstruction the moral aspect was forced out of consciousness. Significantly, Booker T. Washington wrote a biography in which he deliberately gave the *coup de grace* to the memory of Frederick Douglass, the Negro leader who, in his aggressive career, united the moral and political factions for the anti-slavery struggle. (313-314)

Continuing to trace the historical development of liberal fixation with the Negro Problem to the interwar years, Ellison notes that

> Following World War I, under the war-stimulated revival of democracy, there was a brief moment when the moral nature of the problem threatened to come alive in the minds of white Americans. This time it was rationalized by projecting into popular fiction the stereotype of the Negro as an exotic primitive, while social

> science, under the pressure of war production needs, was devoted to proving that Negroes were not so inferior as a few decades before. (314)

This period presented a significant opportunity for the social sciences to disabuse their disciplinary considerations of the anti-Black sentiments that had for so long driven much of their research, Ellison contends, but ultimately, it was not until Myrdal was hired by the Carnegie Foundation in 1937 to conduct the study of America's great dilemma that the rest of the discipline followed suit. Ellison finds the timing of this deliberate and swift shift away from biologistic race mythology perplexing. Ellison recounts how the Carnegie Foundation came to the moral imperative of the projects, and highlights both stated and unstated goals in doing so: to tackle this problemto situate itself squarely as a central material institutional site within a reconfiguring state form. Ellison notes:

> According to F. P. Keppel, who writes the foreword for the trustees of the Carnegie Corporation: "The underlying purpose of these studies is to contribute to the general advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding." There was, Mr. Keppel admits, an-other reason, namely "the need of the foundation itself for fuller light in the formulation and development of its own program." Former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, target of much Negro discontent over the treatment of Negro soldiers during the last war, suggested the study, and the board agreed with him that "more knowledge and better organized and interrelated knowledge [of the Negro problem] were essential before the Corporation could intelligently distribute its own funds," and that "the gathering and digestion of the material might well have a usefulness far beyond our own needs." (314)

In Keppel's account, we can see how the Carnegie Foundation was able to tackle this problem, surely as a moral imperative, but an imperative that also in so tackling, presented a unique opportunity to situate the foundation squarely as a central material institutional site and key player within a reconfiguring state form. Ellison acknowledges these "good" albeit "a bit vague" reasons for commissioning Myrdal nonetheless evidence that in this postwar period, "a need was felt for a new ideological approach to the Negro problem" (315). General though this need was, two main groups—"the left-wing parties and the New Deal—…showed the greatest concern with the Negro problem during the period between the Depression and the out-break of the war," and Ellison argues that through these two parties "we are able to see how the need expressed itself" (315).

While, as Ellison notes "both the Left and the New Deal showed a far less restrained approach to the Negro than any groups since the Abolitionists" they "Nonetheless, for all their activity,…neglected sharp ideological planning where the Negro was concerned" (315). According to Ellison, "both…went about solving the Negro problem without defining the nature of the problem beyond its economic and narrowly political aspects. Which is not unusual for politicians, only here both groups consistently professed and demonstrated far more social vision than the average political party" (315). Ellison continues,

> The most striking example of this failure is to be seen in the New Deal administration's perpetuation of a Jim Crow army, and the shamefaced support of it given by the Communists. It would be easy-on the basis of some of the slogans attributed to Negro people by the Communists from time to time, and the New Deal's frequent retreats on Negro issues–to question the sincerity of these two

> groups. Or, in the case of the New Deal, to attribute its failure to its desire to hold power in a concrete political situation, while the failure of the Communists could be laid to "Red perfidy." But this would be silly. Sincerity is not a quality that one expects of political parties, not even revolutionary ones. To question their sincerity makes room for the old idea of paternalism, and the corny notion that these groups have an obligation to "do something *for* the Negro." (315)

If neither New Deal progressives or the Communist Left, the two political stalwarts for competing visions of progress in the interwar era, both largely condoned the continued racialized rightlessness and racialized social, economic, and political stratification of the Black population in the U.S. state, Ellison points to an underlying blind spot that infects both modes of thinking and political organization:

> In Europe it was the fascists who made the manipulation of myth and symbol a vital part of their political technology. But here at home, it was only the Southern ruling class that showed a similar skill for psychology and ideological manipulation. By contrast, the planning of the Northern ruling groups in relation to the South and the Negro has always presented itself as non-planning and philanthropy on the surface, and as sociological theory underneath. Until the Depression the industrial and social isolationism of the South was felt to offer the broadest possibility for business exploitation. But attempts at national economic recovery proved this idea outdated; Northern capital could no longer turn its head while the Southern ruling group went its regressive way. Hence the New Deal's assault upon the ignorance and backwardness of the Southern "one-third of a nation." There was a vague recognition that the economic base of American capitalism had become dislocated

> from its ideological superstructure. However, the nation, so technologically advanced and scientifically alert, showed itself amazingly backward in creating or borrowing techniques to bring these two aspects of social reality into focus. Not that the nature of the problem was not understood. Writers ranging from Earl Browder, to Max Lerner, to the New Deal braintrusters had a lot to say about it. Lerner especially emphasized the technological and psychological nature of the problem, stressed the neutrality of techniques, and suggested learning even from the Nazis, if necessary. But for the most part, both New Deal and the official Left concentrated more upon the economic aspects of the problem, important though they were, than upon those points where economic and psychological pressures conflicted. (316)

As the Negro Problem becomes a key moral, psychological, and economic fixation of various emerging institutions of the new racial liberal security state form, Ellison is able to elaborate how the elaboration and management of this problem becomes a key site to actually work to produce this state form and its new sets of epistemic and material relations. He notes:

> There is a certain ironic fittingness about the fact that these volumes, prepared with the streamlined thoroughness of a *Fortune* magazine survey, and offering the most detailed documentation of the American Negro's humanity yet to appear, should come sponsored by a leading capitalist group. I say this grudgingly, for here the profit motive of the Right-clothed, it is true, in the guilt-dress of philanthropy-has proven more resourceful, imaginative and aware of its own best interests than the overcautious socialism of the Left. Not that we expect the Left to have at its

> disposal the funds-some $300,000-that went into the preparation of this elaborate study. But it has failed even to *state* the problem in such broadly human terms, or with that cultural sophistication and social insight springing from Marxist theory, which, backed by passion and courage, has allowed the Left in other countries to deal more creatively with reality than the Right, and to overcome the Right's advantages of institutionalized power and erudition. (316)

And so Ellison is able to articulate the strange bedfellows that emerge and intersect in the monumental undertaking and achievement of Myrdal's great work. While "reviewers have made much of Dr. Myrdal's being a foreigner, imported to do the study as one who had no emotional stake in the American Dilemma," he insists that the extent of "his objectivity…[is] overplayed," (317) but nonetheless makes for dramatic storytelling:

> A young scholar-scientist of inter-national reputation, a banker, economic adviser to the Swedish government and a member of the Swedish senate, is invited by one of the wealthiest groups in the United States to come in and publicly air its soiled democratic linen. Bearing this set of circumstances in mind while we consider the writing problem faced by Myrdal, we can see how the various social and economic factors which we have discussed come to bear upon his book.
>
> First, Myrdal had to delve into those areas of the American mind most charged with emotion; he had to question his hosts' motivation and present his findings in such a way that his hosts would not be too offended. He had also to tell the South some unpleasant things about itself; he had to present facts unacceptable to certain reactionary sections of the capitalist class, and, in the words of Mr. Keppel, he had, "since the emotional factor affects Negroes no less than whites," to present his material in such a manner as not to "lessen the confidence of the Negroes in the United States."

> And when we consider the great ideological struggle raging since the Depression, between the Left and the Right, we see an even further problem for the author: a problem of style, which fades over into a problem of interpretation. It also points to the real motivation for the work: An American Dilemma *is the blueprint for a more effective exploitation of the South's natural, industrial and human resources.* We use the term "exploitation" in both the positive and negative sense. In the positive sense it is the key to a more democratic and fruitful usage of the South's natural and human resources; in the negative, it is the plan for a more efficient and subtle manipulation of black and white relations, especially in the South. (317)

Finally, Ellison notes how Myrdal's study, while in its thoroughness made quite the case for the Marxist perspective of social and economic exploitation, works diligently to discredit the concept of a class struggle and instead reframe the Dilemma as a series of competing social pathologies playing out in the terrain of the political and the economic, which are imagined as neutral domains. Ellison sees precisely the problem with this thinking, and closes by suggesting that,

> What is needed in our country is not an exchange of pathologies, but a change of the basis of society. This is a job which both Negroes and whites must perform together. In Negro culture there is much of value for America as a whole. What is needed are Negroes to take it and create of it "the uncreated consciousness of their race." In doing so they will do far more; they will help create a more human American. Certainly it would be unfair to expect Dr. Myrdal to see what Negro scholars and most American social scientists have failed to see. After all, like most of its predecessors, *An American Dilemma* has a special social role. And while we do not quarrel with it on these grounds necessarily, let us see it clearly for what it is. Its positive contribution is certainly greater at this time than those negative elements-hence its uncritical reception. The time element is important. For this period of democratic resurgence created by the war, *An American Dilemma* justifies the desire of many groups to see a more democratic approach to the Negro. The military phase of the war will not, however, last forever. It is then that this study

might be used for less democratic purposes. Fortunately its facts are to an extent neutral. This is a cue for liberal intellectuals to get busy to see that *An American Dilemma* does not become an instrument of an American tragedy. (317)

Chapter 2

New Deal Liberalism: Planning for Security Across the Racial Break

"It is hardly possible to refrain from asking what liberalism really is; what elements, if any, of permanent value it contains, and how these values shall be maintained and developed in the conditions the world now faces" (2)

--John Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (1935)

Chapter Overview

The previous chapter argued that the social scientific restructuring of race as a cultural rather than biologistic category in the early twentieth century played a central role in constructing "the racial cultural situation in the US" as a possible site of state intervention that effectively directed race and ethnicity from a question of political economy to primarily a cultural problem for state educational apparatuses to resolve under the auspices of cultural education or racial uplift. This chapter builds on this insight, and traces the continued "neutralization" of race in the U.S. state form through an examination of the coterminous ideological and material transformations of (de)racialized security that occur within the rise of the New Deal Liberalism and the administrative-managerial governance apparatuses of the New Deal Welfare State. I argue that the "nationalization of security" through New Deal state planning projects provided the philosophical rationale, material infrastructures, and disavowal of race-class power relations to enact new forms of state rationality and racial governance procedures across the period of the racial break precisely through universalizing formal procedures that, in adopting cultural pluralistic principles through abstracting liberal epistemes, wrote white supremacy of out of the equation of state planning, resource management, and calculation of liberal security for an expanding state form. I suggest that the neutralizing framework of universal security established here effectively set the stage for

the state's transition from overtly white supremacist, to a formally antiracist state in the postwar period. By expanding federal authority to intervene in and conduct resources within and across spheres previously imagined as private such as employment, housing, healthcare, and insurance in the name of the universalizing category of social security, the rearticulations of the liberal tradition and the U.S. state form that arose during the New Deal effectively instituted race neutral parameters and procedures for intervention at the very moment that federal sovereignty expanded its authority into the direct coordination and management of resources within various "private" spheres of the U.S. nation-state. I analyze the nationalization of social security through a hermeneutics of liberal security that reads its universalizing procedures *as modes of (de)racialization* that obscure and disavow the US state's continued reliance on the reproduction of racially stratified classes to secure state sovereignty through this pivotal transition in state form and rationality.

To tease out the racialized logics of the nationalization of security under the New Deal, I closely read the National Resource Planning Board's (NRPB) 1934 Report "A Plan for Planning," which outlined a rationale for the purpose and function of a federal planning board that would administrate and manage natural and human resources of the U.S. state for "the public good," in tandem with the NRPB's 1943 "Economic Bill of Rights." I read the articulations of universal security across these texts as constitutive of the period of the racial break both in state form and rationality and modes of power that produce subjects of/for security of the U.S. state. I argue that it signals the rise of a new form of state rationality in which procedural "neutrality" and personal interest and investment become ensconced as liberal democratic values that frame and delimit institutional intervention in what race radical intellectuals and movement participants named as the continuing operations of racial capitalism. In looking at both the reconfiguration of the meaning and deployment of security

within liberal statist discourse and how subjects of and for security are produced within and across the emergent systems of social welfare as national security, I situate these transitions amidst public policy debates that express concern over totalitarian overreach of New Deal legislation to demonstrate how social and national security become indistinguishable under the New Deal state form, and indeed, evidence, a significant and enduring renovation of the Liberal tradition in the U.S. Ultimately, the conflation and universalization of social with national security becomes a means to legitimate New Deal policy initiatives as "democratic" rather than totalitarian while simultaneously neutralizing their democratizing potentialities, and sets the stage for the political neutralization of materially grounded movements against racial capitalism.

As the previous chapter argued, within this emerging hegemonic ideological and state framework, more robust conceptions of race as a political economic category operationalized for governance and capitalist exploitation are eclipsed and neutralized precisely through the promotion and affirmation of race as a site of *cultural* –not political or economic-- contestation and production, which channeled public considerations of racial and ethnic difference into the spheres of education or the neutralizing political terrain of interest group pluralism. I build on this insight within this chapter by examining how New Deal Liberalism, and its conflation of social and national security, adopted universalizing administrative and subjective forms that effectively safeguarded the continued operation of white supremacy within state governance practices while formally adopting "race neutral" administrative and governance procedures to lay claim to a progressive, pluralist ethos for the state as the promise of universal security became codified as the raison d'etat of the racial liberal state across the racial break.

New Deal Liberalism and the Reconfiguration of Security

By the time Franklin Roosevelt delivered his infamous 1935 State of the Union address declaring that it was the sacred duty of the President to use the "full powers" of the office and federal government to ensure the "security of the men, women, and children of the nation," significant transformations in the meaning and significance of "security" to the liberal tradition in the U.S. were already well underway (Brinkley 73; Gordon 3). Representatives, when introducing plans and projects seeking to mitigate the socioeconomic precarity of the Great Depression, no longer looked to ground the exercise of state sovereignty primarily through the ideals of liberty or equality, but instead based their appeals for broad sweeping reform on a rapidly transforming yet malleable ideal of *security*. As Alan Dawley notes, security, indeed, served as the primary rationalizing principle and "watchword" of the state building projects proposed and put in place by New Deal legislation (4, 77). If, during the previous decade, the relative market boon of the 1920s was leveraged by laissez-faire, reform minded liberals to claim the pre-break order of things provided relative security for the majority of white(ning) American citizens against protests for increased political and economic power for racial minorities, women, and laboring classes, the crash of 1929 and subsequent decade long economic depression created a significant and ongoing crisis of legitimacy not only for free market logics of corporate-finance capital, but for the U.S. liberal democratic mode of government itself.

In *New Deal Modernism*, a study of the actuarial forms of risk management instituted in literary and political culture during the period of the New Deal, Michael Szalay interrogates this crisis of legitimacy of the U.S. state and the forms of rationality that arose to manage the crisis of state legitimacy on multiple fronts, noting,

> Roosevelt's grandiose rhetoric is evidence enough that, in the years leading up to 1935, the modern American state had experienced a profound crisis in its social legitimacy. Unable to safeguard the security of either the working or middle classes, threatened at the poles and pickets lines by elements of both, government set out to reinvent itself. The Social Security Administration was to be Roosevelt's principal contribution to this process. At bottom, Social Security made the state not an instrument of coordinated economic planning but rather a system of exchange essentially compensatory for human experience. The New Deal thus embraced actuarial models of governance that revolved around the statistical construction of population groups, the calculation of probabilities for such groups, and the varied application of these probabilities to individual persons. (2)

And so, as Foucault has suggested in his lectures on modern security governance *Security, Territory, and Population*, the malleable concept of security transformed from primarily a concern over the securitization of territory or property, to securitization as raison d'etre for the modern state that could be actualized through the careful calculation, assessment, and management of risk in an attempt to secure the best possible outcome for the greatest portion of the population. For the New Deal Welfare State, this radical shift in governance tactics and strategies that sought for the first time in the history of the U.S. state the large scale federal management and coordination of human and natural resources to provide universal security to citizenry required the mass coordination, planning, and development of partnerships amongst the executive branch, institutions of knowledge production, private industry, and the managerial and administrative governing bodies that would be required to oversee such wide scale planning.

However, such a shift in the function, size, and reach of the state required philosophical and moral justification to stay in line with traditional liberal ideologies of a free market and democratically governed society. Navigating what would constitute "universal security" on behalf of the "public good" was especially fraught at a time when the administration's political opposition on both the left and right was quick to sound the alarm of what David Ciepley terms "the spectre of totalitarian" government, in that a variety of governance forms deemed "interventionist and regulatory" were conglomerated as the symbolic "photographic negative" of free market liberal democratic orders despite the disastrous consequences laissez faire practices enacted at the end of the previous decade (1-10). The political climate and public discourse surrounding New Deal state planning and expansion was certainly rife with all too familiar red baiting tactics from the right, but critics on the left likewise called foul on Roosevelt's plans for coordinated federal state planning by drawing comparisons to the then rising European fascist governments of Italy and Germany. These critics warned that such wide scale, centralized state planning projects could quickly accelerate into fascism. Within a climate of intense political division and opposition to New Deal legislation that variously conjured the spectre of totalitarianism as a means to negotiate and frame these significant rearticulations of the liberal tradition and state form in the U.S., Szalay notes that "an ideologically diverse group of writers from the left as well as the right were active participants in the reinvention of modern governance" that took shape and form in the rise of the New Deal Welfare State (13).

Szalay's broad survey and examination of modernist literatures in relation to the reinvention of the form and governance tactics of the U.S. state through the period of the New Deal evidences a broader underlying set of logics that were actively in a period of rearticulation across conservative, liberal, and left political and intellectual formations across

the period of the racial break. Likewise, in her study of how New Deal liberalism affected the rise of voluntary private insurance during the period of the New Deal, historian Jennifer Klein suggests "The politics of the New Deal put security at the center of American political and economic life. The enactment of federal mortgage assistance, bank deposit insurance, minimum wages, Social Security, and laws bolstering labor's right to organize created social and economic entitlements *that legitimatized the modern state*" (3). Though noting that such entitlements "initially [excluded] many women, Latinos, and African Americans," Klein insists that ultimately the ideology of security produced in and through debates over New Deal policies was a boon for democratic governance in that "the entitlement to security was capable of being expanded upon, and indeed would be, as various groups of Americans mobilized to demand inclusion and full citizenship rights" (3-4, my italics). I concur with Klein in this point, however read the promise of universal security as the institution of a racial liberal temporal order that operates on the "as of yet unfilled" promise of neutralizing, universal security, which functions as a new mode of governance that produced new forms of state rationality to, in effect, de-racialize the state formally as that same state intensifies its racializing procedures for resource management and distribution. In designating the promise of security as a guiding telos for this new form of state rationality, very particular parameters are instituted to limn in the materially transformative potential of that work. For example, the ability to mobilize for inclusion and full citizenship rights is significantly delimited by the proscribed formal channels of interest group pluralism, in that formal bodies can lobby for competing group interests, where incremental change is normalized as the goal of liberal progress that occurs over time and is never fully actualized. While not recognized as such, this guiding telos is evident when Klein insists that "the New Deal did not simply create the

welfare state; it launched a new economy of welfare in which the ideology of security proved a powerful construct" (4). Indeed, as Klein elaborates,

> The New Deal's politics of security set in motion a rapid expansion of the insurance, health care, and income maintenance options offered by nonstate institutions…. Life insurance companies would have to compete with a whole range of players who were stimulated by the politics of security. Labor unions, consumer cooperatives, hospitals, and new nonprofit agencies and alliances had begun experimenting with programs that would meet the demand for income support beyond the wage relation. Mobilized citizens and social movements had played a critical role in pushing security to the center of American politics in the 1930s. New Deal legislation, in turn, stimulated further citizen engagement, as workers and community residents took action *to make these policies a living reality in their communities*. (4)

While I do not wish to underplay the important role that increased citizen engagement, spurred by the new "economy of security" promoted by New Deal legislation, played in encouraging workers and community residents to actualize security policies, I do wish to note several important factors pertaining to whom precisely and in what forms subjects are included within this securitizing population that the accounts of Ciepley, Szalay, and Klein do not address. This economy of security that undergirds the new form of state rationality very specifically posits subjects as citizens and workers, and promotes direct community engagement to ensure the policies of securitization take material shape and form, and the universalization of these working citizens as active agents of community securitization effectively deracializes the population formally while doing nothing to address the material differences in access to security. Moreover, this economy of security, and the universal population on the community level that it conjures into being, promotes direct community

engagement to ensure the policies of securitization take material shape and form as lived realities within communities. Klein's work, in particular, symptomizes the degree to which discussions of the New Deal and its democratizing potential don't take questions of how this state form worked to secure a racial order as a central component to the New Deal project. Indeed, this economy of security posits a particular universal subject, imbued with agency and community belonging, as both the subject and guarantor of liberal security, who will be both guided and secured by this promise of security as an organizing telos for progress. It is, in effect, a deracializing of the universal subject of security in form only that does nothing to materially alter the differential material conditions for subjects outside of the universal embrace of protective categories of citizenship, employment, voting rights, etc. I suggest that universal security is the fulcrum around which these divergent political and intellectual formations conjoined to form the ideological and material basis for the formally antiracist, racial liberal security state that would ascend to global hegemony in the postwar period. While a practical agreed upon definition of what precisely constituted "security as such" remains elusive, it certainly clear in the fact that security, in all its malleable and diffuse definitions, became an abstract, essential, and indeed, foundational, part of the American creed/dream that would manifest and dictate a variety of seemingly incoherent public and private spheres that crafted the racial liberal order of the postwar period.

By the mid 1930s, security had in public debate, legislation, and popular and academic discourse became the agreed upon raison d'etat even while political formations from the left to the right disagreed on exactly what constituted security. It seemed clear that security was no longer being considered, however, as form of imperiled life, but as a conception of how managed economies and the rights of individuals within managed economies could mitigate risk against imperiled life. On both the left and right, security had

become effectively translated into the belief that individuals aught to have the right to live free in a managed economy. The malleability of security as an abstract concept that fit both conservative and liberal political projects allowed for the creation of a neutral, universalist terrain upon which the "moderate" could so effectively vacillate in the postwar period. "Critics on the left and the right frequently insisted that sticking with the center (not yet 'vital') was a willful evasion," and this, perhaps more than any reason, Szalay insists, has caused contemporary critics to shy away from the New Deal as a site of critical interest and intervention, in that "the hodgepodge of often conflicting dogmas that inform the welfare state—from socialism to regulatory corporate liberalism—has not offered literary critics the kinds of antihegemonic politics they have so often wanted in the past three decades" (4). Indeed, "the New Deal has baffled its critics on the left as well as the right," (4) and is often retroactively cast in scholarship as a leftist state building project that ultimately caved to pressure from the right, giving up, essentially, on the possibilities that its state interventionist and resources coordination and planning projects could have held for the mass redistribution of wealth. What such accounts nostalgically miss, however, is that the New Deal did indeed redistribute power and wealth through the formation of new forms of sovereignty and resource coordination and redistribution, but that its programs seemed by divine intervention of the market seemed only to place the authority and resources of those redistributions to those deemed "deserving" of the state's pity or those willing to get ahead who found paths to upward mobility through cooperation with the new tactics of racial security governance.

The malleability of security as a powerful, yet amorphous concept opened up a neutral, universalist terrain in the broad sphere of public discourse upon which the "moderate" could so effectively vacillate on questions of freedom and security in the

postwar period. The formal structures and universalizing logics of security in New Deal Liberalism, while often not considered as such, are precisely those (de)racializing procedures that facilitated the shift from an overtly white supremacist, to a formally antiracist state across the period of the racial break. While Szalay argues literary formations are an important site of cultural production for the U.S. nation-state, I look beyond literary formation to extend his assertion that "…writers justified their work by situating it with respect to the legitimation crisis then facing the state" and assessment of "the extent to which [these justifications] internalized the procedures of governance within literature itself" to suggests the significance of these formalizing/universalizing procedures within the discursive rationality of those institutions of governance responsible for the nationalization of security as well (Szalay 5-6). Indeed, the fact that "writers" (and here I would suggest of both literary and non-literary spheres) "engaged the risk management procedures of the modern state regardless of their relationship to the political divisions often fetishized by present day critics" demands that the particular valence of "traditionally liberal centrist political convictions" that emerged across political, intellectual, and literary sites during the period were not merely drifting to the center as acts of "willful evasion," (Szalay 6) but evidence of a powerfully developing set of cultural logics and governing procedures that would, through their interdependent relations, recalibrate the operations and dominant governing procedures of the racial state to give rise to a new racial liberal order that writers across the political spectrum participated in building.

If the previous chapter argued that the social scientific restructuring of "race" as a cultural rather than biologistic/evolutionary category in the early twentieth century played a central role in redirecting "the race question" from the sphere of political economy to primarily a cultural/educational problem for state educational apparatuses to resolve under

the auspices of cultural education or racial uplift, I address here how New Deal Liberalism's promise and development of an ideology of universal security codified this in its neutralizing administrative governing procedures and structures. In effect, the ideology of security and its burgeoning economies were operative at the level of the universal individual citizen-worker who was bound to actively participate in their national community in order to secure the population. The ideology of security, which, while amorphous, focused attention on the careful calculation, assessment, and management of risk to secure the best possible outcome for as many as possible, developed throughout the period of the New Deal and wrote race out of the category of legitimate direct liberal state intervention and resource coordination/redistribution while indeed directly redistributing state resources to whites, which set the parameters for liberal security's neutral forms that recognized "race" while simultaneously quelling forms of left and radical dissent. Ultimately, the restructuring of universal security and the expansion facilitated the shift of the U.S. state from a white supremacist past, to a formally antiracist progressive future through race as a political category within of universal security that occurred through New Deal rearticulations of liberal security. This reconfiguration of security not only authorizes the mass expansion of an interventionist state form while hedging against critiques of totalitarian overreach by ostensibly avoiding a governmental imposition of values by leaving the remediation of the racial cultural situation in the U.S. up to educators and other cultural workers, but it also reconfigures security as the neutralizing procedures that both sanction and operationalize state racism that mask the state's complicity in constructing racial orders anew after overtly white supremacist state sanctioned policies were being challenged and displaced with liberal progressive inclusionary practices.

Amidst public debates, and internal reviews and discussions of federal administration and management as New Deal policies took shape in the form of governing administrative bodies, "center-leaning" liberal security as a universalizing category would become nationalized as a state priority, objective, and set of governance tactics under the newly created National Resources Planning Board. In the following section, after providing a brief overview of the history and development of the NRPB, I highlight how their report "A Plan for Planning" creates a blueprint for securing citizen workers within managed economies for the newly recalibrated racial liberal security state. The first section of the report, I argue, elaborates a philosophical justification for coordinated national planning against political and economic opposition that is occurring in public policy debates over New Deal programming. To deflect criticism, the authors of the Plan argue that planning is 1) necessitated by profound economic crisis and exceptional present conditions, 2) consistent with the foundational principles and history of U.S. liberal democratic government (re: against various claims of totalitarianism), and 3) consistent with and indeed informed by free market principles—going so far as to suggest that the free market can be expanded precisely through its securitization. Overall, the first section makes a compelling case for the rearticulation of political economy that will revise the liberal tradition into New Deal Liberalism. If the first section of the Plan takes a defensive mode against political opposition and other public critique, the second section takes an offensive mode of elaboration/construction to map out and give shape and form to both the logistical rational behind the Plan and the new material relationships between the expanding executive branch, disciplinary experts, experts in new governing/administrative bodies, private industry/business leaders and the forms of power/sovereignty that will be retained and materialized through these new material relationships defined by collaborative, coordinated

planning amongst various experts, mangers and administrators, and the executive branch. The state rationality of security governance and forms of power that take shape within the Plan, however, ultimately calls into being new kinds of subjects for management and surveillance within the nation-state as well as objects/sites of intervention within this new set of material relationships devoted to governing on behalf of the public good. I turn at the chapter's close to the NRPB's "Economic Bill of Rights," to offer an account of how this new political rationality produces subjects of/for security (an economized political subject) that can be hailed/administered/managed within this new set of the material apparatuses and relationships on behalf of the state that is expanding in order to better promote universal security for the public good.

Nationalizing Security: State Rationality in the National Resources Planning Board's "A Plan for Planning"

A 1934 report submitted to President Roosevelt by the National Resources Planning Board mundanely titled, "A Plan for Planning," illustrates not only a philosophy of New Deal Liberalism that sought to felicitously coordinate expertly informed, decisive social action to respond to the current conditions that were producing a plethora of crises for the American liberal democratic order, but also decisive shifts in state rationality that New Deal state building projects justified through the collapsing of social with national security into the egalitarian and universalizing rubric of decisive action on behalf of and toward the promotion of securing the public good. This new state rationality married coordinated state intervention and planning with the principles of free market economism while carving out a new sets of managerial relationships that would redefine notions of the public good and the proper role of government in preventing crises that affected the national body by

establishing a new rationality of security. This rationality of security economized the individual in terms of national and group interest, effectively producing formally deracialized subjects of/for security of the state, while nonetheless instituting procedures of risk management that naturalized already existent racial power relations by transposing these power relations into the neutralizing domain of national security for the promotion of the public good. Conspicuously absent from the NRPB's "A Plan For Planning" is any mention of race, ethnicity, and other forms of difference within their articulation of security state rationality. I argue, however, that it is precisely through such elision and simultaneous adoption of flexibility/changeability as a foundational principle of coordinated planning – reminiscent of course, of the pluralistic turn in social scientific disciplinary frameworks elaborated on in chapter one—in relation to current present conditions that the newly recalibrated security logics of the racial liberal state—which seeks to manage through the promotion and affirmation of difference rather than suppressing or denying difference—take neutralizing form and shape within the universalizing rubrics of national security.

The National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), initially and named The Natural Resources Planning Board until founding "citizen board member" Wesley Mitchell suggested, tellingly, that "humans were perhaps the nation's most important resource," (Ciepley 123) emerged in 1933 as "the nerve center of the developmental governance project" (Ciepley 120) that sought to coordinate the expertise of the social sciences with burgeoning New Deal administrative agencies that would seek to felicitously manage and conduct human and natural resources toward practical solutions to the contemporary crises, both material and ideological, plaguing the nation-state. The NRPB was formed with the intent to "help evaluate and prioritize the public works proposals coming before the Public Works Administration (PWA), the national executive's first major program of direct, large-

scale public investment" (Ciepley 121). Its three original board members—Charles Merriam, Wesley Mitchell, and Delano Roosevelt—brought to the planning committee an intricate array of institutional connections and investments that shaped the NRPB's form, direction, and purpose, and speaks to "planning" as a broader technology for governance that married both nation and state building projects in its rearticulation of political economy. Of particular interest, in relation to my preceding chapter's argument, are the "unrivaled set of connections to the world of professional social science" brought to the board by Merriam, as these connections, in tandem with Roosevelt's administrative access and Mitchell's concern for stabilizing economic cycles, (Ciepley 121) not only granted the social sciences a new level of responsibility in democratic governance indicative of shifts in forms of pastoral power that mark that racial break, but put them in a direct advisory role with an action and planning oriented administration. Ciepley, writing on the NRPB, provides an overview of the Board's organizational structure, goals and areas of influence/impact, and, significantly, interdependent relationship with the professionalized social sciences, noting that from the onset, the board's work focused on four explicit categories: "planning and programming of public works; stimulation of city, state, and regional planning; coordination of federal planning activities; and research on such matters s natural resource use, demographics, social trends, and socioeconomic conditions" (123). "Befitting their respective biographies," he goes on to explain,

> Delano Roosevelt was most interested in the first task, Merriam and Mitchell most interested in the last. Because the board membership remained so small, it relied heavily on outside assistance. Much of its research program was farmed out to academic consultants and social science peak organizations like the Social Science Research Council (SSRC); much of its planning and programming work was

> undertaken by the growing number of regional, state, and local planning boards that spring up with NRPB encouragement. What remained was the job of better coordinating the overlapping and often contradictory planning efforts of these and other governmental bodies, which the board managed by maintaining beneath it a growing office staff. Funding for these various activities came from the government's emergency relief funds and from philanthropic foundations. The board was thus a natural extension of the interwar pattern of associational planning, although over time it exhibited the usual bureaucratic evolution toward larger staff and the development of in-house experts in need of external assistance. At the height of the board's development, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the central office staff hovered between 140 and 155 persons, with an increasing proportion engaged in socioeconomic research. (123)

Scholarship on the NRPB is sparse, with more attention being paid to the larger overall plan for restructuring public administration that came under harsh attack with the Committee on Public Administration, or Brownlow Committee, report, which interrogated the proper exercise and use of executive branch power in relation to New Deal administrative plans, and this paucity of research speaks both to the ideological incoherence mentioned by Szalay as well as to the Board's temporary presence and impact throughout the period of the racial break. However, I turn the attention and focus of this chapter to the NRPB because their plans for state planning precisely evidence the shifts in forms of state rationality that constitute the state as formally antiracist across the period of the racial break, and outline the new sets of relationships and forms of power that will be adopted in order to calculate, manage, administer, and surveil racial and ethnic difference—posited as a social scientific object of inquiry and site of educational intervention—for the racial liberal state. Writing

what is perhaps one of the most comprehensive, if brief, histories of the development of the NRPB in 1969, New Deal historian Byrd L. Jones describes the Board, which was officially appointed on July 20, 1933 by Harold Ickes of the Emergency Administration of Public Works, as marrying interventionist governance strategies of the progressive era with the tradition of laissez-faire liberalism in a move indicative of the shifts in forms of state rationality that facilitated the racial break while maintaining a racially stratified political economy through the rise of New Deal Liberalism. Byrd notes,

> … the Board was to develop 'comprehensive and coordinated plans for regional areas' based upon scientific surveys and analyses of federal projects." Not proponents of some blueprint for recovery, the Board sought an institutional arrangement which would bring planners into government service. Presumably, men trained in various social sciences would advise the President about future trends, institute research, help coordinate executive programs, and generally apply their knowledge to problems of government at all levels. (525)

The board carved out a unique advisory role for social scientists in the New Deal Welfare State that indicates the decisive shifts in the dominant form of state rationality that struck a balance between "Roosevelt with his administrative heads and Congress with its hypersensitivity to executive power" while convincing "the public they would not regiment, dictate, or otherwise limit freedom of choice….[Thus showing] the practicality of science and at the same time [revealing] how such expertise could be used without contradicting democratic choices" (529). If, Byrd suggests, the American public had time and time and again denounced the "sound ideas of scientific planners as "arrogance," the Board navigated this distinctly "American" aversion to scholastic expertise and crafted a middle road for the practical implantation of social scientific data under the rubric of the benefit of the public

good toward the furtherance of equality. Adopting the language social scientists had long used to frame their programs for social reform, the Board "[rephrased] the equality of men" that stood as a guiding principle for nation building into the "quantifiable form" necessary for New Deal state building projects that sought to make felicitous direction and administration of material and human resources for the public good. With citizen workers now elevated under security state rationality as economic and national resources at the level of population, the social sciences were able to become a much more significant lever in the administration of those human resources on behalf of securing the nation state. Now that communities of citizen workers could be calculated and managed as a population, or human resource, for the state, the social sciences become the body of knowledge that shaped the apparatuses of New Deal state security, while these security apparatuses also worked actively to shape that knowledge. Indeed, as Byrd notes, NRPB was imagined as,

> An institutionalized brain trust, it would bring scientific training—both analytic techniques and a body of information about society—into the government. That position met the President's need for a larger staff and the social scientists' desire for influence. The President had an incentive to appoint the best men—not only able scholars but also persons who understood the possibilities of executive decision-making. While the arrangement did not free experts from political pressures, it gave them as national and as comprehensive an outlook as any post in government. (532)

Where Byrd simply enumerates the configuration of a governing and administrative body made up of private industry representatives, social scientists, and government representatives in the executive branch, I argue that this creation and reconfiguration of governing bodies evidences that transposition of pastoral forms of power into the actual material relationships that worked in conjunction to reconfigure state sovereignty directly through the executive

branch through representation to the expert management of a democratic pastorate variously "qualified" to intervene in the private lives of citizens on behalf of felicitous management of national resources toward the promotion of the "public" good. Without directly addressing these shifts in sovereign power and governance techniques, Byrd highlights the configuration that made such shifts possible:

> The Planning Board had particular reason to appreciate the genius of Merriam's idea for placing planners on the presidential staff. During the 1920's, they had served on independent commissions without power, but they recognized that the influence they sought required some responsibility to the people—a responsibility which inhered only in elected officials. Also they had experienced the gap between the generalizations of economics and political science and the immediate, often minor, situations confronting administrators. (533)

Their expertise of the coordinated members of the board was to be put to action, specifically, on behalf of the population as natural/human resource that it would be tasked with calculating and managing. Now that technocratic planning had conjoined forces with the knowledge formations and expertise of social sciences and be granted an actionable seat of power to administrate on the federal level, we begin to see the formation of the professional-administrative branch of what I term, the democratic pastorate. I refer to this community of economized citizen-workers managing and managed at the level of population as a "pastorate" because it is imbued with both the right and responsibility, at this level, of calculating, assessing, and managing risk in order to provide for the security of the population as a whole. While my concept of a democratic pastorate and its role in securing the sovereignty within the New Deal State form will be explored more thoroughly in the next chapter, it is important to note that at this federal administrative level, the new relations

established between planners and social scientific experts created the material infrastructure to, on a cultural level, define the economy as the source of securing individual and community needs, rather than primarily, as many Leftist leaning economists of the decade would argue, an engine of social stratification and profit.

The technical execution of the plan is notable as well in that it set a new standard and form to produce the new security thinking that was central to (de)racializing resource and population management as a key tactic of security governance within the New Deal State form. If Szalay argues that the literatures of New Deal Modernism internalized the procedures of risk management, the elaborate and thorough "advisory governmental report" of the expert-administrative class created a new standard for government reports that actively worked to produce the subjects and objects the state and its security apparatuses sought to calculate and manage. Though easily dismissed as mere technocratic documentation, the administration's new found ability to leverage sovereignty through planning and social scientific experts, on behalf of securing the public good, should not be underestimated, and further evidences the role that expert administration and management could lend to the credibility of a state in the midst of a legitimation crisis. As Byrd notes, the thoroughness and seeming objectivity of this new form of governmental report appealed to a broad and often contentious audience of stakeholders:

> Both the Final Report finished in June, 1934 and the Report of December 1, which the three men prepared as the Advisory Committee to the National Resources Board, established a high standard for subsequent publications….Working quickly, the Board organized widely scattered information about the question of how the government could improve the national environment. Even critics who favored

> laissez-faire found little to complain about in those factual, but reform-oriented reports to the President. (530)

The comprehensiveness of the plan for planning calls into being forms of authority that are indicative of the shift of authority and responsibility for nationalizing social security, the new basis for state sovereignty, onto the expert managerial class of the democratic pastorate (who occupied a unique liaison position between the governing and the governed), while also vastly extending federal power through this shift and making the case for the role it could play in granting legitimacy to the state and its New Deal policy objectives:

> The board described sufficient projects for any foreseeable public works programs. Among a long series of recommendations they included such things as state and county zoning for better land use and open spaces, compensation for farm tenants and consolidation of commercial agricultural units, tax reforms to encourage reforestation, federal cooperation and aid in preserving historical sites, better treatment for Indians both on and off reservations, a time table for erosion control by areas, limitations on water and air pollution, consideration of river basins as a unit for flood control and hydroelectric power, connection of electric systems for efficiency and to prevent area-wide blackouts, and a permanent PWA with provision for a six-year shelf of public works. Thirty-five years later it would still be an impressive agenda of national needs. If the Board had not succeeded on that practical level, its case for ongoing national planning would have been much weaker. (530-31)

The NRPB's easy vacillation between natural resource and population management tactics that blurred the line between human and natural resources—and read the 'human' as resource to be felicitously managed on behalf of legitimizing the state—worked to construct

the state's managerial role while increasing the spheres of intervention and influence it could lay claim to while simultaneously defining subjects and relations of subjects to the state within this new configuration. Indeed, the NRPB's imagined role demonstrates the budding new Racial Liberal Security State Rationality par excellence:

> In functional terms, national planning required general agreement upon at least three elements: the right mix of goals, the appropriate policies to be coordinated to those ends, and some social and economic theories which related the various parts. Accordingly, the core of planning lay in balancing competing aims and policies *in order to maximize the national welfare within a general equilibrium of social and economic forces*. Hence, the detail possible in a plan depended upon the preciseness of goals and the definiteness of knowledge about social interrelationships. Planning in the modern world required measureable guidelines, quantitative knowledge about current conditions, projections, and repeated refinements of statistical and analytic practices…. A Plan for Planning" dealt with major policy issues: the history of American planning, current types of planning in the United States, critical summaries of national planning in other countries, a definition and justification of national planning, a future vision of an abundant society made possible by planning, and specific recommendations for creating a permanent planning board. If American national planning had a bible, "A Plan for Planning" was it. FDR's planner saw national planning as a continuously changing policy-making process led by the federal government working in cooperation with other organized groups while drawing on the research expertise of social scientists. (532, my italics)

While the NRPB enjoyed a short lived career and limited success in achieving its far reaching goals for felicitous management of state resources toward the promotion of the public

welfare and security of the nation-state, "A Plan For Planning," actually provides an extensive and incisive case for the institutionalization of professional managerial sovereignty of the democratic pastorate in a manner reminiscent of Immanuel Kant's bid for autonomy, political influence, and ultimate academic freedom for the lower faculties in his infamous letter to King Ferdinand II, "On the Conflict of the Faculties." Despite the NRPB's failure to materialize and secure a long term centralized position of operational power for itself as a governing administrative board because the turn to Keynesianism and the rise of Cold War McCarthyist logics made continued large scale expansion of New Deal Welfare State programming politically unviable, the document nonetheless serves as a fascinating and, despite its claims to the contrary, disturbingly prescient blueprint for precisely how shifts in state rationality during this period secured a new racial liberal order predicated on the transfer of forms of pastoral power from the centralized state to the populace—in which the "state" becomes materialized through the rise a professional managerial class I am calling the democratic pastorate—through the rubric of the public good in the name of nationalized security. I draw parallels between NRPB's "A Plan for Planning" and "Conflict of the Faculties" in terms of functionality, in that "A Plan for Planning" evidences and actively constructs the newly emergent socio-political formation of the democratic pastorate, providing a definitional rationale and its relationship and function within the broader network of a liberal democratic state in the process of shifting into a rationality of security that looks to the careful calculation, assessment, and management of resources to mitigate risk on the level of the population.

Banal as it is, "A Plan for Planning" is an expertly crafted blueprint for the forms of power and rationality that will organize this new state form and bid for material power in the newly emerging administrative/managerial state by negotiating an interim role for the

democratic pastorate across "public" Government, "public and private" education, and private industry. It is worthwhile to emphasize yet again that the formalizing organizational structures and universalizing logics of security rationality are, in fact, racializing procedures of whiteness that obscure and disavow their racializing procedures through appeal to universal/ ideal/neutral "forms", even as these procedures that appeal to objective organizational form and abstract and universalizing subjective categories appear to write race as a political economic category out of the calculation and management equation. The first section of the document begins by establishing crisis—both political and economic—as the precedent that necessitates this transformation of state rationality and forms of executive and managerial sovereignty that will be required in order to attain order and well being amidst the disorganizing current conditions. In making their bid for the expansion of federal sovereignty/direct state intervention in the economic and social realms previously deemed private, however, the authors forefront the practice of "planning" as consistent with the tradition of American liberalism and likewise distinguish the NRPB's interventionist role as separate from and retaining the sovereignty of private business to continue to operate according to the principles of the free market. In establishing the exceptional circumstances that require this level of state intervention and planning and navigating the complexities and inconsistencies of various liberal approaches to state sovereignty and economy, a picture of the distinct role the NRPB is carving out for the democratic pastorate across the period of the racial break begins to emerge. Responding to the immediate dire conditions of economic insecurity wrought by the Great Depression, the document begins by naming the problem of disorganization and inefficiency a coordinated program for state planning can solve for the current state amidst a crisis of legitimation:

> A review of the problems encountered in the examination of land, water, minerals, and other natural resources, and of a public-works program indicates the necessity of advance planning in these fields, if the best results are to be obtained. When attention is directed to other aspects of national policy the same conclusion becomes increasingly apparent. It is important, then, to consider the most practical forms of organization for dealing systematically with national resources, both natural and human. (80)

Here, with the document's introduction, the author's of the report elaborate quite succinctly what Foucault has named as a security state rationality, in that the promotion of well-being through the felicitous, efficient, and total management of human and natural resources to be conducted toward the public good at the level of the population is the reason d'etat. No longer preoccupied with the securitization of territory in order to elaborate the nation-state, the report evidences a shift in state priorities and function through the development of coordinated state planning as the primary mode of governance and exercise of state sovereignty. This mode of sovereignty tasked itself with creating and securing new sets of material relationships on the level of population management. Through expert management and administration, the systematic coordination of land, water, mineral, and human resources in conjunction with public works programs effectively establish sovereign claims to these resources as property or purview of direct federal-state intervention, and also construct the set of relationships amongst and between these natural and human resources and the public works programs that will materialize these labor relationships. Indeed, the felicitous coordination of state resources, both human and natural, as a new exercise and function of state sovereignty, was directed toward and justified on the common good of the American people: "In 1931, Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt, when addressing the New York

State Agricultural Society on the subject of agricultural planning, declared that 'in the long run, State and national planning is essential to the future prosperity, happiness, and existence of the American people'" (80). However, the authors navigate potential opposition to this form of power through insistence that such coordinated planning is not directive and fixed—so as not to confuse such expansive and total exercise of state sovereignty with totalitarian forms of governance—but will follow an open, changeable pattern to be determined by a diffuse set of experts who will be granted and share power to determine and delineate proper plans for various projects as they arise and are needed. President Roosevelt, "made it clear that the planning needed is cooperative planning for the common good that does not force industry or citizens into a fixed pattern of conduct" (80). Indeed, change, flexibility, and adaptability to current conditions and trends were hallmarks of the formal organizational structure underlying a national planning agenda for New Deal Liberalism:

> The report of President Hoover's Research Committee on Recent Social Trends, published early in 1933, considered at great length the developments in the United States during the last quarter of a century, observed especially the uneven role of advance in our social growth, and concluded by emphasizing the dangers of a policy of drift in the face of confusion and distress.
>
> 'Unless there can be more impressive integration of social skills and fusing of social purposes than is revealed by recent trends', said the committee, 'there can be no assurance that the alternatives of force and violence, with their accompaniments of violent revolution, dark periods of serious repression of libertarian and democratic forms, the prescription and loss of many useful elements in the present productive system, can be averted.'

> 'Fully realizing its mission, the committee does not wish to assume an attitude of alarmist irresponsibility, but on the other hand it would be highly negligent to gloss over the stark and bitter realities of the social situation and to ignore the imminent perils in further advance of our heavy technical machinery over crumbling roads and shaking bridges. (80)

Cast against a backdrop of rising fascist regimes in Europe, the spectre of "violent revolution" is linked with crumbling national infrastructure (roads and bridges which facilitate the transportation of goods/resources/commerce) and flexible planning is posited as means to avert such "immanent perils" to the present productive system. Flexibility, interestingly, is marked simultaneously as a defense measure as well as a governance strategy that distinguishes liberal democratic forms of governance—and the forms of violence these societies deploy—over totalitarian ones. Indeed recognition of the complexity the social situation and the dire necessity of responding flexibly to present dizzying conditions is cast as a responsibility the nation must take up in order to preserve itself from disorder and disintegration. In this sense the equation of the crumbling material infrastructure and the moral-ethical foundation upon which the nation is build is not accidental, but instructive. The implications for domestic disorder wrought by the triple threats of economic depression, aging infrastructure, and political instability are made clear and are used as a justification for expanding executive branch sovereignty and immediate and direct state intervention in order to quell the potential for present conditions to result in infrastructural collapse, economic relapse, and violent unrest:

> Since the publication of that report, events have moved rapidly and sharply in the dangerous direction of which the committee gave warning. In Germany and Austria the parliamentary and democratic balance of authority have been violently

> overthrown, and an entirely different system substituted. In the United States the financial crisis of 1933, with the closing of every bank in the land, with 13 millions of unemployed, and with the general prostration of industry and agriculture, brought the Nation face to face with stern realities. Prompt and bold action to prevent complete collapse was necessary, and was taken by President Roosevelt and Congress. (80)

In establishing the case for coordinated state planning and expansion of state sovereignty into direct social and economic engineering, the authors again and again insist on a clear mandate for adaptive flexibility to meet the myriad of interconnected and rapidly changing material, social, and economic spheres in which "present conditions" are threatened by collapse, relapse, disorder. "Bold direct action" necessary for the prevention of collapse are to be coordinated, calculated, and adaptive—not set on an unchanging set of inflexible principles or dictums, which, as was noted in Locke's treatise on intellectual pluralism in the previous chapter, was seen as valuable, and indeed necessary, for preserving the democratic way of life. In the sense, the co-constitutive relationship between the pluralist framework that inform the modern sociology of race and the new security thinking of New Deal Liberalism come into sharper relief as a broadly foundational episteme that accelerated the transformation of the U.S. state form and its primary modes of security governance across the racial break. In fact, the argument for state planning casts the set of social, political, and economic relationships that construct the U.S. state as an organism in motion that must be comprehensively *studied* in order to better coordinate its functioning, which casts the disciplinary expert as a neutral, objective administrator of truth who can then provide proper recommendations for the state, ensuring that state intervention in resource and population management remains properly democratic, rather than totalitarian, in nature. The authors

argue that "The series of measures, national and local, commonly characterized as the 'New Deal', indicate, however, more vividly than ever before the importance of a deliberate study of our basic national policies as a whole and their relations to one another," insisting against opposition that sees expanded federal sovereignty at the level of population management as anti-liberal and anti-democratic, that "Planning is a distinctly American idea" (80).

After recounting the luminous history of "American Planning" from the Revolutionary period to Reconstruction in a move quite similar to John Dewey's recounting of the liberal tradition in the U.S. as consisting of decisive social action to meet changing conditions, the authors intimate that crisis is and has served as the ongoing precondition for expansion of state and now executive and managerial sovereignty:

> The great financial crisis and the policies of the 'New Deal' called for hasty improvisation of ways and means of action, and the inevitable consequence has been the rise of a number of unrelated planning agencies put together as speedily as possible in order to meet the urgency of the situation. (80)

To elaborate this point and circumvent opposition from laissez faire minded critics in government and industry alike, the authors marry free market logics with liberal democratic practice and state intervention, recasting "planning" as a historic and natural function of private enterprise:

> This emphasis upon planning by public agencies should not obscure the fact that, at least in modern times, business has been the stronghold of economic planning, and the 'center diffusion' from which that practice has spread to activities organized in governmental units on the one hand, and in family units on the other hand. Accounting provides an admirable method of ordering complicated activities insofar as the values can be expressed in dollars. Aided by this technique, the business man

> has become the world's most systematic and inveterate planner. His incentive is supposed to be pure self-interest, but it is self-interest enlightened by the teachings of experience. He learns to count costs, to look ahead, to provide against contingencies. As his opportunities have grown larger, his technique has improved and the scope of his planning has expanded. Dr. Frederick W. Taylor's pregnant scheme of 'scientific management', enlarged by the work of Gantt, Emerson, and others, is becoming a widely inclusive art of 'management engineering' that calls for continual reviews of current practice and adjustments to meet anticipated conditions. (81)

Acknowledging the "genius of planning" as originating within the free market sector, the author's quite cunningly carve out a space of recognition for industry minded individuals while still laying claim to the federal government's right—in coordination and cooperation with industry and expert knowledge—to intervene in the economic sphere in order to better secure, expand, and sustain that sphere.

That the authors couch "state planning"—understood within the context of this chapter's argument as a governing procedure to expand the exercise of executive sovereignty in conjunction with expertly staffed state management and administrative boards and agencies as a broader sleuth of the democratic pastorate—as both "a distinctly American tradition" and consistent with the tenets of free market liberalism, demonstrates the extent to which the new form of racial liberal security state rationality that arose across the racial break was contingent on the renegotiation of public and private distinctions. The solution to economic and social insecurity, previously held to be matters of private industry as well as private individuals, could be meliorated, the NRPB suggested, by flexible and coordinated, expertly informed public intervention and planning, which required also the formalizing of

new material relationships between various public and private sector institutions. The role of the expert here, granted a particular advisory role in fascinating renegotiations of state to managerial sovereignty, is incredibly important in drawing out the material relationships amongst professionalized knowledges, state resource planners/managers, the executive branch, that would become the hallmark of the security state as it shifted from white supremacist to racial liberal governance tactics of resource and population management. It was especially important for the authors of the NRPB's Plan to distinguish their role as managers from that of executive branch as well as insist on the sovereignty and expertise of private industry and "the businessman as expert planner." Indeed, various forms of expertise are cast not only as prudent, but a foundational requirement for this form of state rationality to fully penetrate, manage, and administer natural and human resources across public and private spheres: "…in trying to find solutions for these problems the Government would not be making inexpert attempts to do what business accomplishes. So far as government succeeded in finding solutions, it would be broadening and making safer the field of private enterprise" (82). The argument for state planning is cast then, in terms of making business more expansive and secure. Coordination of experts and resources, however, would be the key to clearly delineating spheres of interest and influence and exercise of power so public and private interests could retain autonomy while coordinating and collaborating in their efforts to govern effectively and to profit.

In a section titled "Coordinated Planning," the authors insist on the importance of formalizing these new sets of relationships for the felicitous management of state resources that could simultaneously leave principles of the free market untouched:

> The weakness of our American planning in the past has been the failure to bring the various plans and planners, public and private, into some form of concert with one

> another, to develop public interest planning in concert with planning in the private interest. The plans of business, the plans of labor, the plans of agriculture, the plans of science and technology, the plans of social welfare, the plans of government, have not heretofore been aligned in such manner as to promote the general welfare in the highest degree attainable. Much of the unbalance, insecurity, and suffering which our country has experienced in the past might be avoided in future by a more perfect coordination of the knowledge which we already possess. (82)

In order to avoid the potential for "grave danger of heavy loss from the lack of planning among the planners themselves" (83) the NRPB posits that the careful calculation, projection, and management—quite similar to insurance actuarial models of risk management—must be implemented by bringing together expertly produced knowledge which the disciplines and private industry ostensibly already possess. In defining precisely what this coordinated state planning will look like, the author's likewise place a heavy emphasis on instituting a temporal order for projection and intervention, claiming that it is both possible and the proper role of liberal government, to follow the natural patterns of planning that universally apply across the spheres of influence deemed private and public:

> Planning consists in the systematic, continuous, forward-looking application of the best intelligence available to programs of common affairs in the public field, as it does to private affairs in the domain of individual activity. In every well-directed home, in every business, in every labor or agricultural group, in every forward-looking organization, social planning goes on continuously, and in the world of government is no exception. (83)

The interpenetration of public and private, individual and social life coordinated and directed toward a progressive, "forward-looking" future collapses the distinctions of public and

private, individual and social in order to extend a diffuse sovereignty and state rationality across these spheres to produce subjects and proper spheres of influence in order to more completely and efficiently govern/administer/manage them. In imagining the nation-state as made up of innumerable, flexible, and ever changing parts, the crafters of a new rationality of state security produce a more total object for governance and diffuse the right of governance across a larger portion of the population that will take up the responsibility of the expert.

If the first section of the document navigates public opposition on the fronts of totalitarian overreach and private industry's opposition that sees planning as a threat to free market enterprise by crafting planning and the role of planners as both a public and private good, the second section of the document explains the material relations that will arise from felicitous partnerships amongst experts across the private and public spheres. It is within the last half of the report that the authors move from a defensive reframing of planning to an offensive, productive posture that fully elaborates the state rationality of security. Take, for instance, the author's assertion that these "several conditions are important in looking at plans for planning":

(1) The necessity and value of coordinating our national and local policies, instead of allowing them to drift apart, or pull against each other, with disastrous effect.

(2) The value of looking forward in national life, in advance rather than afterward, *of preventing the fire rather than putting it out*.

(3) The value of basing plans upon the most competent collection and analysis of the facts.

The proscriptive and anticipatory nature of "preventing fires" through coordinated cooperation and evaluation of present knowledge and trends imposes a universality on the

practice of state governance in conjunction with private industry, however, limns this centralized state control by insisting that it is the logic and practice of planning—rather than a centralized state authority and body—that is universally applicable to the variety of fires that may need preventative intervention. They go on to qualify the totality of governance implied by their planning rationale by indicating again, the flexibility of the model of planning must be in order to adequate assess and address present conditions:

> In any case, not all planning is or should be national planning. There is local and State planning, and planning by quasi-public and private agencies and institutions all over the land. The city planning boards thus far chiefly concerned with the physical plans and the State planning boards just beginning their work, to say nothing of scores of industrial and other organizations, will continue to develop their special points of view. The centralization of all planning in Washington is not contemplated, and even if possible would not be desirable, since planning is an attitude and practice that must command the confidence and cooperation of wide groups of people to ensure successful operation, must come from the bottom up as well as the center. (83)

The neutralizing flexibility as the structural foundational logic of this form of state rationality coupled with its comprehensive application and reach, then, is what allows the authors to claim, that they are not proposing planning as "a comprehensive blueprint of human activity to be clamped down like a steel frame on the soft flesh of the community, by the United States Government or by any government" (83). Indeed, the authors argue such "planning does not involve setting up a fixed and unchangeable system but, on the contrary, contemplates adjustments and revision, as new situations and problems emerge" insisting that it "is a continuous process, and necessitates the constant reexamination of trends,

tendencies, policies, in order to adapt and adjust governmental policies with the least possible friction and loss. The national life is like a moving wave in which a new equilibrium must constantly be found as it sweeps forward" (83). The temporal implications should not be lost here. The adaptability to a progressive onward marching telos and planning as a governance tactic to predict and give order to the promise of a more secure future in order to direct material relations within the present is a hallmark of racial liberal progressivism that marks forward and backward thinking as a means to account for past wrongs, failings, inefficiencies, and imagine into being a guiding telos for present conditions as a movement away from the wrongheaded conditions that defined the past. A forward thinking ethic remained central to a national progressive plan, and the authors were sure to demarcate this temporal distinction, interestingly enough, in terms of fixity to a set of principles and ideas:

> Stubborn adherence to an outworn plan is not a mark of intelligence but stupidity, whether in the life of individuals or of nations. Prudence would, of course, dictate that reasonable stability should not be endangered by capricious or arbitrary shift of plans, but would with equal force insist that policies must be promptly modified as emerging trends and new situations necessitate recasting. (83)

It is worth noting the Plan's fixation with "fixity" as a backwards looking model/approach, and promotion instead of "forward looking" modification according to emerging conditions, is that the fixed model that would produce misinformed/outmoded plans makes no actual reference the material historical conditions of racial capitalism that have led to the present crisis. Their notion of fixity and attention to emerging conditions instead operates on the neutralizing terrain of dematerialized history, plans, and conditions fit within a formalistic framework that's value is measured and deduced by its ability to adapt and change. The emphasis winds up, as it were, being placed precisely on the notion of fixity itself as being

outmoded, which, as we will see in the next section/chapter, has significant consequences for the rise of subjects of/for security and their ability to elaborate a robustly materialist critique of the continuing operations of racial capitalism in the postwar period. The refusal of fixity and regimentation—outmoded organizational logics to be sure—are also leveraged in order to negotiate the distinction that will remain between autonomous private subjects and the public sphere that will be coordinated for the benefit of their private interests:

> …it is false and misleading to assert that all planning involves wholesale regimentation of private life. Sound planning on the contrary brings about a fresh release of opportunities rather than a narrowing of choice. Street planning and traffic regulation operate for freer use of the highways than unplanned streets and uncontrolled traffic. Laws regulating unfair trade practices release the energies of fair-minded men for other activities than that of guarding against fraud and trickery. (83)

The authors go so far, in fact, as to suggest that planning in the form of regulation secures freedom for the individual and the corporation alike:

> The modern type of nation was set up in order to break down the old private or semiprivate tyranny over roads, justice, taxation, and to establish public and national control over robber-baron situations that became unendurable. An individual business man may be absolutely regimented by a ruthless monopoly, just as an individual worker would be helpful against terms dictated by an employer. Over and over again in the United States, as elsewhere, the community has been obliged to intervene to protect the weaker against the insolence and oppression of private citizens who perpetrated injustice and outrage on their weaker brethren. (83)

Here, the authors suggest those most vocally denouncing planning as regimentation are those seeking to take advantage of others in modes that are incommensurate with the new forms of egalitarian state governance that seeks the benefit of the population as a whole. Again, the authors stress the connection that "genuine planning"—flexible, coordinated, informed by expertise, and directed toward the promotion of the public good—is the proper means through which to produce and maximize freedom for private subjects:

> In the excited discussion over this subject, it is often forgotten by both sides that genuine planning really includes planning to preserve and even create noncontrolled free areas of activity. Planning is not an end, but a means, a means for better use of what we have, a means for emancipation of millions of personalities now fettered, for the enrichment of human life in ways that will follow individual interest or even caprice. We may plan indeed for fuller liberty and are so planning now. (84)

Planning, they argue in order to redefine it against opposition, is liberal ideals put pragmatically into action. As a hermeneutic tool, liberal planning will translate the raw materials of the nation into more perfect form that promises more security, more freedom for the individual once they commit to the security and freedom, or "public good," of the population as a whole. Indeed, the authors insist "When men express sincere opposition to all governmental planning, it can only mean a grave misunderstanding of what planning really is, or an opposition to some special detail of planning that seems undesirable, rather than to the general principle" (84). The new general principle that would organize an emerging racial liberal order, as it were, was precisely what the authors the authors were conjuring into being. Michael Szalay's study of New Deal Modernism is again instructive in highlighting how New Deal policy initiatives and project proposals were just one arena in

much broader transforming social, political, and economic landscape in which the new formal structures of security governance were taking shape:

> The concept of social security was as valuable as it was to the welfare state because it addressed more than simply financial dislocation. By 'social security,' I make obvious reference to the Social Security Administration, the heart of what Roosevelt in 1935 called his 'new order of things,' of which 'every major legislative enactment of…Congress,' he urged, 'should be a component part.' Almost without exception, historians bring coherence to the New Deal through what Alan Brinkley calls its 'single most important contribution to the creation of the modern welfare state—the Social Security System.' Linda Gordan agrees, calling Social Security 'the central legislation of the U.S. welfare state,' as does Alan Dawley, who writes, 'If there was a watchword covering the reforms of the time, it was neither liberty nor equality, but security.' Dawley observes that 'bit by bit, [this] new ideal would be built into social policy until it was enshrined at the highest level of the state in the Social Security system of the 1930s, the cornerstone of the welfare state.' But even as my use of the phrase social security makes reference to the New Deal program, I am also interested in the extent to which New Deal invocations of social security were, as the epigraph from Roosevelt suggests, part of a broader state effort 'to wipe out the line that divides the practical from the ideal. (9)

Indeed, a Plan for Planning is indicative of this state effort to collapse the practical from the ideal and this happens as national and social security are made indistinguishable through the forms of governance that arise in order to produce new, manageable subjects of/for security for the U.S. state. Whether "planning" as a hermeneutic tool was translating the raw materials of life into liberal ideals of the nation or vise versa, remains open for

question. Either way, security provided the antiseptic for the crises of uncertainty and economic disorder that faced the day: "In its 'ideal' form, social security had as much to do with modernist alienation as it did with financial uncertainty; it was the New Deal's answer not simply to unemployment and other economic exigencies, but far more broadly, to the displacing conditions of modern life in a rapidly evolving capitalist society" (9).

After the authors lay out their philosophical defense against opposition to planning, the second section takes an offensive mode of elaboration to map out and give shape and form to both the logistical rational behind the Plan and the new material relationships that it conjures into being amongst the executive branch, experts in new governing/administrative bodies, private industry/business and the forms of power/sovereignty that will be retained and materialized through these new material relationships defined by collaborative, coordinated planning amongst various experts, state administrators, and the executive branch. This new structure of power is rationalized as a cooperative, flexible, working system:

> Wise planning is based on control of certain strategic points in a working system—those points necessary to ensure order, justice, general welfare. It involves continuing reorganization of this system of control points from time to time. The number of controls is never as important as their strategic relations to the operation of the society in which they work. At various times, the community has found it necessary to deal with landowners, with slavery, with the church, with the army, with industrial or labor captains, with racial groups, adjusting control points to meet special situations, and restricting some privileges at one point while releasing other forces at other points. (84)

What is so important to notice is the neutralizing function that universalizing, flexible system elaborated by this vision of planning has in producing various dematerialized subjects as equally operable within the a universal structure/system. Vast differentials in material history and power relations are subsumed into neutral "points" that are interchangeable—which again, is a value for the new state form of security rationality as "flexibility and adaptability to changing conditions"—and made relative to "the community," here, American public, common good, or more materially, the U.S. nation-state. The author's insist on that such a flexible structure for planning is indeed the history of the U.S. liberal democratic state: "It is this shift in the form of planning, the change in strategic planning points, as social and economic conditions change, that leads some to the erroneous conclusion that we have never planned before in America, when in point of fact our planning has been continuous and varied as conditions varied" (84). To make best use of plans in the new conditions arising, however, the authors insist on liberal forms of not only affirmation, but collaboration and expert persuasion:

> The essence of successful planning is to find these strategic points as new situations develop, without too great delay, and without seizing more points than are necessary for the purpose—or for longer time than is necessary for the purpose. Insight, sagacity, inventiveness, cooperative spirit, are far more important at this point than the club. (84)

If "the club" defined the planning of a white supremacist state, here we one can note the decisive shift in governance tactics that is being elaborated for the racial liberal state. Though the authors do not note this explicitly, the shift from overt violence and suppression to flexible coercion and affirmation (within "acceptable" parameters, of course, which be addressed within the following chapter) required the production of newly rearticulated

national subjects for neutral management and administration that could subsume "emerging issues of national significance" ranging from "land and water utilization, conservation of natural resources, flood control, regulation of public utilities, unfair trade practices; still more recently to the banking and financial structure of the Nation, to industrial insecurity, both on the part of worker and investor, to unemployment, to social insurance and welfare problems, to un-American living standards" (84) under the diffuse forms of federal, state, local, public, private, and expert managerial sovereignty that define the rise of New Deal Liberalism and its transition into a racial liberal security state. And here we begin to see the central role that a rising democratic pastorate will take in instituting these new material relationships and telos for the nation-state:

> The cooperation of the social scientists with their research in the field of human behavior should correspondingly facilitate the making and perfecting of social inventions, keeping pace with those in natural sciences. The memoranda presented by those organizations are impressive in nature and full of promise for technical cooperation in the national planning of the future. (84)

Technical cooperation institutes here a collaborative negotiation of various arenas of power, influence, and control, promising security through more diffuse and totalizing forms of governance through which state sovereignty can be transposed to new governing institutions, subjects, and sites/spheres and exercised in order to actualize that promise of security on the level of population. The project of planning itself is imagined as a thoroughly "American" endeavor that will serve as the "new frontier" for American development and elaboration of the nation state after territorial securitization ceased to produce sovereignty for the nation-state:

> It cannot be too strongly stated that we do not approach the planning of natural and other American resources in any spirit of defeatism. The present emergency may have hastened the growth of systematic planning, but the careful inventory and appraisal of our resources, and the consideration of how we may most effectively utilize these resources, could not in any case have been long delayed, after our frontier had closed and the progress of mechanical invention established as a permanent factor in our civilization.
>
> We do not stand at the broken end of a worn-out road, but look forward down a broad way to another era of American opportunity. Among the nations of the world, America has stood and still stands for discovery, for pioneering across a great continent, for fearless experiment in directions where others had failed, for achievement in mechanism and management, for ready adaptation to new conditions and easy adjustment to new ways of life. When we are resigned to drifting and too weary to plan our own American destiny, then stronger hands and stouter hearts will take up the flag of progress and lead the way out of difficulties into attainment. (85)

National planning, and the diffusion and exercise of state sovereignty across the various new material relations that institutionally structure the democratic pastorate will provide each new problem for planning as an entry point and opportunity for "the nation" to reproduce itself on behalf of the population/public good. In this sense we might pause to consider the correlation and between the rise of the New Deal welfare state and its social and economic interventionist strategies and white settler colonialism, racial slavery, industrial development and the process of emancipation and reconstruction that proceeded it. National planning, construed as such, takes up the notion of "righteous social action" and lumps that social action in reference to human relations alongside but separate and distinct from labor,

agriculture, and industry in order to create a totalizing, yet expertly differentiated, object "the nation," "the public good," to secure. The managerial *and* surveillance roles of the democratic pastorate are made evident, as well as their role as producers of this logic and the subjects that will be managed within it, when the authors argue that "Effective technical planning must be related to social directives. The interests of all groups can be furthered only if there is intimate experience of the needs to be served" (85). Indeed, the authors insist that the "The personnel of the board should bring together insight, experience, and judgment in the analysis and interpretation of national planning policies, skill in the invention of ways and means of utilizing the national resources in material and men, and social vision in the fusion of American interests, techniques, and ideals into sounder and more satisfactory national policies" (85). Organizationally/Structurally speaking, the diffuse and orchestrated nature of material power relations becomes evident as managerial efficiency that keeps intact the autonomy and relation of the singular unit to the whole:

> …the board should be in close touch with a great variety of agencies engaged in research pertinent to the problem of planning. Among those are the universities and research institutions, the occupational groups, business, labor, agriculture, and the professions interests in special lines of inquiry, and the planning and research agencies of other governmental jurisdictions, State and local or regional. (85)

Intimate contact amongst these various apparatuses, newly imbued with the authority not only of the state, but the more publically and privately amorphous notion of 'planning' for the security of the population, will ensure, the authors suggest, that their plans for felicitous management of state resources can be carried out:

> The Board and its staff would serve as a clearing house for significant plans of many types developed in Federal, State, or local service—by public or private or quasi-

> public agencies. Appropriate powers of fact-finding and facilities for plan analysis would be granted to the Board. At present no such national agency exists and there is often serious difficulty in obtaining the necessary data regarding important plans or projects in actual operation among 175,000 governmental bodies and many other quasi-public groups, industrial, research or otherwise. (86)

With such broad reaching plans laid bare, the authors close their blueprint for a new form of security state rationality with a discussion of the Board's relationship to representative elected government officials, insisting that the sovereignty of elected officials who are "actual decision makers" will remain intact so as not to upset the rules of order for liberal democratic governance. The NRPB and its affiliate institutions and governing bodies will play an explicitly advisory role—as experts in fields of study, bodies of knowledge and managerial coordination and efficiency—so that they can make best decisions and successfully implement plans to better secure the population, and therefore, the nation-state. Indeed, the authors insist that a permanent, centralized federal planning board "…might become of great importance and value in helping to find the difficult way toward the realization of that union of popular control in Government and wide-spread diffusion of welfare and well-being which has been the promise of American life, not yet attained but constantly the goal of undaunted American endeavor" (87). "Such a board," they suggest,

> if composed of men gifted with the rare qualities necessary for such high enterprise, amply supported by indispensable staff and equipment, might well prove an important factor in the difficult period of transition through which we pass—a period in which there is reason to believe that change will be more rapid than ever before in human history, that social adjustment will be more urgent than ever before.

> But by the same logic, a period in which the possibilities of human advancement are greater than ever before.
>
> A planning board might facilitate the interchange of experience and information regarding a wide variety of planning devices in many lines and on many levels; it might help to bring together planners and their plans, lest they drift apart or fall afoul of each other; it might reach out in pioneering spirit and explore new possibilities or suggest new devices by which America might advance more swiftly and surely.
>
> Standing apart from political and administrative power and responsibility, but in close touch with the chief executive and under the control of the political powers that be, such a group of men would have large opportunity for collecting the basic facts and for mature reflection upon national trends, emerging problems and possibilities, and might well contribute to those in responsible control, facts, interpretations and suggestions of far-reaching significance. (88).

In closing, the authors ominously insist, "It is easy to underestimate the possibilities of the wise use of a competent general staff for our Government in peace as well as in war" (88).

Overall, the NRPB's actual reach and impact as new advisory, management, and planning board was short lived and they were unable to establish themselves as a permanent addition to the infrastructure of liberal democratic government as New Deal policies faced increasingly hostile public and congressional criticisms of government overreach comparing the NRPB and Roosevelt's expanding executive powers as akin to dictatorship and state control. The spectre of totalitarianism congealed quickly into a potent cultural and political symbol over the decade of the 1930s and proved an effective means of hemming in executive power and federal expansion and interventionist strategies of governance as

outlined in "A Plan for Planning." Indeed, as Byrd states in his conclusion on NRPB's short run as the federal government's wing of the democratic pastorate, "Neither the National Planning Board nor its successors revolutionized government through their systemic appraisal of the long-run national interest." However, the NRPB did show "how such a function could fit into government," concluding,

> That lesson kept its successors going and indicated how to establish a Council of Economic Advisers which could both function with professional expertise and maintain responsibility in the President. In time the Council would use sophisticated tools of forecasting and specific targets for various components. It would gain power and prestige in the executive establishment. But Americans would accept planning only after it demonstrated its usefulness. Thus the quiescence of the political debate over planning ideas during the late New Deal did not indicate their final defeat, but reflected a shift from propaganda to the hard tasks of planning. Far from abandoning its use of expert advice to balance its goals in an efficient administration, the New Deal assimilated that function into the bureaucracy. (534)

If the wide reaching goals of establishing the NRPB as a permanent fixture of the federal government that could materialize national plans through coordinated cooperation between private industry, universities, and various national, regional, and local agencies was cut short, the governing functions and structural logics that informed such wide reaching goals did not. Though the NRPB technically failed in its goals to become a permanent fixture/component of the *US state* as such, the form of rationality and governance tactics it enumerated proliferated significantly across the period of the racial break across the new material relations and began to shape the production of new national, manageable subjects of/for security in the pre and postwar period.

NRPB's "Bill of Economic Rights" and the Production of a National Subject of/for Security

Though intimated in NRPB's Plan for Planning, the Board did not fully enumerate that the security that planning would bring to bear across the U.S. population was as a natural/civil right of citizenship and national belonging until the U.S. had entered WWII. The creation and insistence on imagining into being a universal subject whose private interests could best actualized through national securitization of the "public good" held significant consequences as the U.S. state unevenly shifted from "the club" to the careful calculation, management, and administration across the racial break. If the regime of security in the discourse of state planning demonstrates how social and national security became indistinguishable as tactics of governance first elaborated for the defense and elaboration of New Deal programs, the advent of interest group pluralism and procedural neutrality became particular points of control for channeling the political components of what social scientists had deemed "the racial cultural situation in the U.S." Despite the work and activism of sociologists such as W.E.B. Du Bois and Carey McWilliams who demonstrated how race was a central function of the political economy under liberal capitalism, the displacement of scientific racism by pluralist paradigms that recrafted race as a cultural issue had succeeded in severing race from discussions of political economy and New Deal collapsing of social and national security had successfully recalibrated "freedom as economic security"—an uneven process that solidified as "principles of procedural neutrality" in law and governance in the postwar period—and became the conditions of possibility for the rise of what scholars have termed the professional managerial class in the postwar years, or what this dissertation names as "the racial-liberal democratic pastorate." As Ciepley argues, beginning in the 1930s,

> … with the rise of the totalitarian enemy…. a critical mass of the intelligentsia—academics, lawyers, artists, journalists, and New Deal reformers, including the president—brought civil liberties into the progressive mainstream. Roosevelt, the master political strategist and rhetor, had already initiated the change to the vocabulary of freedom in his salesmanship of the New Deal. Reviving Jefferson's dictum that necessitous men are not free, Roosevelt defined economic security as a part of freedom and an American birthright. In line with this, he dropped the label 'progressive' in favor of 'liberal' to describe himself and his social welfare programs, effectively co-opting a term traditionally associated with policies of laissez-faire. And he began substituting 'industrial freedom' and 'the rights of free labor' for the progressive term 'industrial democracy,' in expressing his support for collective bargaining and labor laws. (236)

This rearticulation of liberal freedom, as "totalitarianism's photographic negative," reoriented communal conceptions of the public good to a reemphasis on the Bill of Rights—reconceptualized by NRPB as "The Economic Bill of Rights" in their *National Resources Development Report for 1943*—as a site for the production of citizens whose freedoms would be protected not by state intervention and economic regulation, but free market enterprise, a judiciary branch committed to principles of constitutional neutrality, and a neutralizing pluralist democratic practice that encouraged the development and incorporation of associations and organizations organized by the abstracting principles of "interest" to pressure state policy while claiming to maintain structural administrative and judicial neutrality in face of competing group interests. Newly legitimized welfare capitalist regimes that struck a neutral ground between public good and private interest within the

insurance industry played a significant role in the nationalization of subjects of/for security as well.

In her study of "the historical emergence of a system of voluntary insurance and effects on the public social insurance system" Klein argues that "strategic decisions about insurance benefits and income support were embedded within contests to define the ideological meaning of security—job security, health security, economic security—as this concern gained legitimacy in the wake of the New Deal" (3) Klein argues that "… liberal journalists, welfare administrators, social workers, economists, and social insurance theorists had begun to link the concept of security integrally with the federal government and the political right of citizens to be free from economic insecurity" (81) In fact,

> Since the late nineteenth century, American employers have relied on a program of welfare capitalism to deflect incursions into the workplace from the regulatory state or organized workers. Welfare capitalism encompasses social welfare benefits and health, safety, or leisure programs offered through the workplace, programs established and directed by the employer. In periods of labor upheaval and social reform American firms have relied on workplace social welfare as a private, managerial response to political pressure from the state and workers, especially when workers sought to use the state to improve the working conditions and guarantee economic security. (2)

Foucault's discussion of the production of biopolitical subjects of security are already well established via studies of governmentality in arenas ranging from health, welfare programs, the carceral state, etc., however, such considerations of subjective production for the nation-state has not been connected to the particular forms that arise to neutralize and incorporate racial and ethnic difference, which I argue generate in security discourses of New Deal

Liberalism. If the previous chapter highlighted the reconfiguration of "race and ethnicity" within the social sciences and the division of knowledges provides the cognitive/epistemological architecture to privatize and operationalize difference toward security, NRPB's "A Plan for Planning" and "Economic Bill of Rights" illuminate how the expanding interventionist state, through a model of planning, required the production of economized, that is newly universalized, national citizen subjects to properly conduct, administer, surveil and manage.

This economized subject would be able to recognize and make claims to the terrain of the political through the neutralizing frameworks of interest group pluralism. "Despite presenting itself as a positivist science," pluralist theory in its various applications, Ciepley contends, "had the consequence of legitimizing the ever greater influence of well-organized, well-funded interest groups in American government—indeed, of apportioning public authority among them—and of whitewashing the inequities and inefficiencies that this system institutionalized" (216). A brief review of the NRPB's *National Resources Development Report for 1943's* Economic Bill of Rights, for example, illuminates how these coterminous developments and the burgeoning logics they evince effectively laid the blueprint for the postwar global order that simultaneously restructured yet disavowed the racialized and racializing contours of U.S. domestic and foreign policy in the postwar period. The Economic Bill of Rights enumerates:

1. The right to work, usefully and creatively through the productive years;
2. The right to fair pay, adequate to command the necessities and amenities of life in exchange for work, ideas, thrift, and other socially valuable service;
3. The right to adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care;

4. The right to security, with freedom from fear of old age, want, dependency, sickness, unemployment, and accident;
5. The right to live in a system of free enterprise, free from compulsory labor, irresponsible private power, arbitrary public authority, and unregulated monopolies;
6. The right to come and go, to speak or be silent, free from the spyings of secret political police;
7. The right to equality before the law, with equal access to justice in fact;
8. The right to education, for work, for citizenship, and for personal growth and happiness; and
9. The right to rest, recreation, adventure, the opportunity to enjoy life and take part in advancing civilization.

This preamble to the six-hundred-page report, Ciepley argues, "marks the post-World War II return to rights-based liberalism" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with two important innovations. First, the mark of the totalitarian encounter and concerns over the imposition of state control is evident throughout, particularly in the obvious concerns over compulsory labor and secret political police. Second, and perhaps most significantly, the Economic Bill of Rights rearticulates liberal freedom as actualized through a system of free enterprise, effectively restructuring the acquisition and implementation of liberal rights based protections against an encroaching state as a function of a free market economy. This "bill of rights for the individual" emphasizes "free enterprise, free speech, freedom of association, and privacy, in place of the old emphasis on straightening out social disorder and 'economic imbalance'" (Ciepley).

The Bill of Economic Rights is not significant in that it was adopted as official national policy—indeed the NRPB itself was effectively dissolved a mere ten weeks after publishing the report—but because it illuminates so concisely the (de)racialized security logics at play in the restructuring of postwar notions of liberal freedom that became the rationalizing grounds of postwar global ascendancy around principles of a pluralist-democratic, neutral free market economism that effectively privatized racial difference at the very moment social scientific knowledge frameworks began institutionalizing cultural constructivist accounts of racial and ethnic difference that could have become the rationalizing grounds for a restructuring of so-called "natural grounds" of a racially stratified capitalist economy. Not only does this Economic Bill of Rights evince a turn away from a restructuring of the national economy that the labor movement, Marxist economists and intellectuals, and New Deal policy makers had vehemently argued and organized for in the wake of the economic collapse of the Great Depression, but it signals also a restructuring of citizen as an individualized, economistic unit that easily translated material differences in life chances (economic security) under early twentieth century racial capitalism and its systems for producing and maintaining racially stratified classes into the equalizing discourses of democratic pluralist theories of "competing group interests." Racial and ethnic difference, within these economically neutralizing frameworks, became, interestingly enough, a privatized matter that laid the burden of redress for employment, housing, and voter discrimination inherent in the racial capitalist order in the hands of atomized, economized individuals to organize and develop free associations that could lobby for their own "group interests," and effectively laid the ground work for dematerializing and universalizing those interests as one of many in the common flock. Finally, and most significantly in relation to the next chapter's argument about the transposition of pastoral forms of power to educated

sectors of the population who would form the material-racial-class basis for the racial break as the postwar professional managerial class, or racial liberal democratic pastorate, this ethic of obligation and responsibility of "the people" to organize on behalf of their self and group-determined interests that gave structure and form to interest group pluralism is indicative of a broader reconfiguration of the ideological and material conditions for the production of U.S. state sovereignty through racialized security practices. Though, epistemologically speaking, the democratic pastorate had been inculcated in and through the adoption of knowledge frameworks that imagined as separate (rather than co-constitutive) and split neutral "forms" from value-laden "content," this did not mean that the imposition and inculcation of values was left behind. In fact, the privatization of race as a value laden question of administering "content" through neutral forms—bureaucratic administrations of education, health, and social welfare industries and as researchers in the disciplines themselves—merely conducted the democratic pastorate to take up the question of racial equality and race relations more broadly in particular manner and as a moral imperative. This structuring contradiction is both materially conditioned by and elaborative of racial liberal state security practices that ideologically and materially structure the racial break in the pre and postwar period. The next chapter will consider more fully the establishment of a democratic pastorate within the community of citizen workers, rather than the expert administrative class discussed in this chapter, by looking specifically to the sphere of public educational initiatives designed to address the racial-cultural situation in the U.S. through public-private partnerships spurred by the New Deal administration.

Chapter 3

Securing *Common Ground:* the Making of the Democratic Pastorate Across the Racial Break

"What did prove to be in its interest, and what it did invest, was not the fact that they were excluded, but the technique and procedures of their exclusion. It was the mechanisms of exclusion, the surveillance apparatus, the medicalization of sexuality, madness, and delinquency, it was all that, or in other words the micromechanics of power that came at a certain moment to represent, to constitute the interest of the bourgeoisie….At a given moment, and for reasons that have to be studied, they generated a certain economic profit, a certain political utility, and they were therefore colonized and supported by global mechanisms and, finally, by the entire system of the State."[12]

—Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*

Chapter Overview

This chapter closely reads the emergent racial security logics of the racial break through several essays appearing in the inaugural issue of *Common Ground* (1940), the official journal of the Carnegie Foundation funded Popular Front Progressive Era public educational initiative of the Common Council for American Unity. Broadly speaking, this chapter reconceptualizes "the racial break" as the process of emergence of a new order of state rationality premised by the rearticulation of racial state practice in response to the twin developments of the U.S. encounter with totalitarianism and the emergence of the racial-cultural situation in the U.S as an object of knowledge and site for liberal state intervention that have been explored in chapters 1 & 2. I resituate the racial break, not only as the paradigmatic shift in dominant knowledge formations for explaining the meaning and significance of race and the state's adoption of those paradigmatic shifts in the form of various racial liberal state projects and practices, but as the emergence of new forms of state rationality that temporalize the careful calculation, management, and promotion of "racial

[12] Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 32.

and ethnic inclusive diversity" as *the* object *and* mechanism of state security for U.S. liberal political modernity. In this sense, this chapter reads the racial break as both a crisis in the means of securing state sovereignty ushered in by the period of U.S. imperial-territorial expansion, as well as a reconfiguration of the means of securing state sovereignty through new forms of population management as the physical securitization of territory ceased to create the conditions for establishing sovereignty in an era of global capitalist expansion. The specific forms of population management that arise through the racial break and the temporalization of individual and group conduct toward the goal of reestablishing state sovereignty in and through these mechanisms of security will be the subject and focus of this chapter.

To develop this argument, I closely read three essays from the inaugural issue of *Common Ground* in light of Foucault's theorization of security developed across the 1975 and 1977 lecture series *Society Must Be Defended* and *Security, Territory, and Population* to theorize the naming, proliferation, promotion, surveillance and management of forms of racial and ethnic difference as *the* object *and* mechanism of security within both repressive and biopolitical security apparatuses of the U.S. state that mark the racial-break. In reading University of Chicago President Robert M. Hutchins' 1940 convocation address "Democracy and Defense," I situate Hutchins' admonishing remarks on the loss of humanistic principle within debates in university intellectual culture of 1930s across the ethical rationalist and scientific rationalist divide. I argue that his call for the rediscovery of democratic principles from an imagined democratic past not "marred" by the interventions of various strains of modernist thought illuminates the temporal-epistemic ground upon which a telos of "racial liberal inclusion as defense" is forged. In *Common Ground* co-founder Louis Adamic's "This Crisis Is an Opportunity," I examine how Adamic's call for "inclusive diversity as an offense

for democracy" recalibrated the parameters of national belonging according to the affective-behaviorally conducting disciplines that form "the modern sociology of race" in a manner that can be read as a blueprint for a newly recalibrated "economy of faults and merits" that transfigures the citizen into "the nation-democracy's keeper." Here, I examine a decisive shift in resurgent forms of a micromechanics of pastoral power that are displaced from a question of the responsibilities and obligations of the state to its populace (epitomized by the New Deal Welfare State) onto the level of the individual and the group as a manifestation of affective "belongingness" that organizes interest group pluralism in the postwar period. Each individual of the state, in relation to the group and the whole of the national population, is tasked with the responsibility of securing the nation by performing this sense of belongingness, and also, and most significantly, actively participating in the reproduction of the state by policing the aberrant edges of national belonging. It is the willing participation of the individual, on behalf of the group and the population/nation as a whole in the forms of naming, surveilling, and managing of individual, group, and national "interest" that I argue for an extension of "the wages of whiteness" beyond the psychological wage to the promise of security. This economy of faults and merits that establishes proper conduct as the "promise of security" would inform the co-terminous development of repressive, educational, and managerial security apparatuses for the new state rationality of the racial liberal security state of the postwar period. Ultimately the promise of economic and social security for those who would participate in the administration of the racial liberal security state would produce a robust professional managerial class, which I term "the racial liberal democratic pastorate" in the postwar period whose key functions included the proliferation, surveillance, and calculated management of racial and ethnic difference. Finally, in journalist and novelist George Schuyler's "Who is 'Negro'? Who is White'?" I examine his critique of

the "statistical superstition" of race that manifests in the adjudication of race on the state level. Through this critique that frames race as a mystic, irrational superstition, however, I argue that Schuyler's text offers evidence to the forms of disavowal that substantiate a new temporality of salvation for racial liberalism that seeks "right and justice," in racial "un-belonging" as Schuyler simultaneously names the political economic function of the color line *and* calls for a post-racial universalism as the only salvation for a progressive U.S. state. Through these close readings, this chapter addresses the decisive shift in the dominant mechanisms and modes of power that ushered the U.S. state into progressive modernity as it aberrationalized and imaginatively denominated white supremacy as the nation's "past" by "crossing over" the racial break into progressive, newly recalibrated rights-based inclusive modernity.

While the racial break is most often understood as conditioned by both the emergence of what Michael Omi and Howard Winant have termed the ethnicity paradigm for understanding race as culturally, rather than biologically[13] significant, discussed in chapter 1, and through the rise of racial liberal governance projects in the immediate pre and postwar period, discussed in chapter 2, this project resituates the racial break by considering the twin emergence of new knowledges about the meaning and significant of race and ethnicity and new forms of state rationality predicated on those new knowledges in the interwar decades. Resituating the racial break as a question of the mechanisms of security that produce state

[13] Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue in their classic study *Racial Formation in the United States* that the emergence of the ethnicity paradigm as the "modern sociology of race" gradually displaced without ever completely obscuring paradigms of scientific racism and use this gradually displacement as a foundational principle for establishing their notion of "the racial break" within their broader theory of processes of racial formation. My account of the racial break extends their argument by considering more extensively the racial break not only as a shift in paradigms and state practices in relation to race, but in broader terms of forms of rationality and power that are made available through these shifts and displacements.

sovereignty allows for a more thorough understanding of the intimate links amongst seemingly disparate (de)racialized state governance projects, institutions of higher learning, privately funded public educational initiatives, and national security apparatuses that provided both the material/infrastructural and rational/ideological bases for this shift and contributes to the dissertation's larger project of illuminating the epistemic conditions of disavowal that structure U.S. liberal political modernity. Examining the circulation of racial security logics across these sites also allows for a greater understanding of why and how, as Jodi Melamed has expertly interrogated in *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism*, postwar formations of racial liberalism were able to so successfully displace and, in many cases, criminalize, materially robust, economically grounded critiques of racial capitalism, emphasizing instead the elaboration of "race" as a *cultural* matter that could be overcome through concerted public educational initiatives designed to educate a whitening ethnic public about difference through increased consumption of literary and other formal representations of racial and ethnic difference.[14] Melamed's understanding of racial liberalism not as a social movement ushered in by the racial break, but as a hegemonic project of "social engineering" that, through literary, social scientific, official governmental cultural productions, produced a "governing narrative of race reform" in order to "institute a massive and multifaceted program of national education designed to dispel prejudiced belief, replace it with accurate knowledge about African American lives and conditions, and popularize new images, histories, and narratives attesting to the racially inclusive nature of U.S. citizenship," (22) helps to illuminate the significance of *Common Ground*'s educational project. My reading of *Common Ground* builds off Melamed's insights into literary studies

[14] See in particular the "Introduction" and Chapter 2: "Killing Sympathies" in Jodi Melamed's *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (2011).

discourses and the reading practices they promote as a technology of race, but shifts the focus from the form of the "race novel" and its modes of sympathetic identification that work to construct normative codes along a black/white color line to consider how public educational initiatives such as *Common Ground*, dedicated as they are to the promotion of diversity and inclusion that is achieved precisely through the proliferation and consumption of aestheticized, dematerialized representations of racial and ethnic difference, similarly yet distinctly call forth subjects, readers, authors, and mediative objects through newly recalibrated racialized frames of knowing that provide avenues for inclusion through the public disclosure of racialized and ethnic experience. The forms of disclosure that take shape within Common Ground's pages illuminate the reconfigured parameters of a new economy of faults and merits through which to evaluate the belongingness of the plural-mass citizen-subject that would facilitate the U.S. state's racial liberal "break" from its white supremacist "past" while maintaining unequal relations under racial capitalism during its period of postwar global ascendancy. Take, for example, the point made by social psychologist Everett V. Stonequist in qualifying the ethnographic literatures collected from racial and ethnic minorities that provide the primary source material for his study of cultural hybridity in *The Marginal Man: A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict* (1938):

> Those immigrants who have written and published their stories are probably not entirely typical of the average immigrant. Obviously they are more articulate, superior in their gifts of expression. Perhaps they have also been more successful, and so feel themselves examples of the American ideal: the "self-made man." *The very process of*

> *telling their stories gives them recognition and confirms their identification with America.* (94, my italics)[15]

By paying attention to the mediative dynamics of ethnographic disclosure that, through a variety of modes, make minoritized experience[16] visible, transparent, and known within the national imaginary default of a universal, white liberal progressive American public, we can begin to outline a broader picture of the mediative modes used to translate ethnic and racialized experience into an object of knowledge and mechanism of state security that diffusely proliferated through the burgeoning field of race-relations throughout the mid-twentieth century. In the pages of *Common Ground*, this will to disclosure takes the form of the diatribe, confession, reportage, and spying/snitching, and through participating in these modes of disclosure, material avenues were made available for the figures of "ethnic foreigners" and "model minorities" to claim the promise of security through adherence to a newly recalibrated economy of faults and merits of loyal citizenship precisely through naming their ethnic-cultural difference and marking acceptable paths for its articulation in

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15 Stonequist was a social psychologist who was a careful student of Robert E. Park and the Chicago School of Sociology. His elaboration of the theory of "marginal man"—those whose race consciousness causes them to live "between worlds" in a manner that, the study claims, produces acute psychocolgical unsettledness and maladjustment according to normative models of psychological well-being. In many ways, we can read the underlying temporal structures of these social psychological models for their desire to situate "normative" subjects "comfortably" in a temporal-social order that does not read the *political economic* contours of that order along raced, classed, gendered, or sexed lines that produce "discomfort" for the individual. To "read these" and experience them as such, within these frameworks, constitutes a whole field of pathology of individual behavior. The marginal man theory, within the field of race relations studies, gained considerable currency in social scientific thought and develops a quite specific and comparative framework for an overarching assessment of racial, ethnic, religious, and national difference against the universal normalized category of "white Americanism."

16 See also Roderick Ferguson, *The Reorder of Things: The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference* (2012).

relation to the public good and security of the U.S. state.[17]

Common Ground and the Cultural Technological Securitization of a "Plural" Mass Public

On the eve of the U.S.'s entrance into WWII, the Common Council for American Unity launched its Carnegie Foundation funded public educational initiative through the publication of the inaugural issue of *Common Ground*, committing to create "among the American people the unity and mutual understanding resulting from a common citizenship, a common belief in democracy and the ideals of liberty, the placing of the common good before the interests of any group, and the acceptance, in fact as well as in law, of all citizens, whatever their national or racial origins, as equal partners in American society."[18] The Common Council for American Unity believed that the nation had to begin fostering an "all inclusive" American identity that could retain a plurality of "racial-cultural" differences while rallying around a Popular Front nationalism that sought the common defense of the U.S. democratic state and its promise of egalitarian citizenship in order to fortify itself against the "fascist revolutions"[19] sweeping the globe. *Common Ground* was cofounded by Louis Adamic and Margaret Anderson in 1940 and published by the Carnegie Foundation-sponsored Common Council for American Unity until 1949. Building on the work of left cultural formations of the previous decades, this California-based journal and the left progressive

[17] This framework for mapping the mediative modes of disclosure that proliferated the early to mid-twentieth field of race-relations reflects Foucault's argument about the role of confession in the production of sexuality as an object of knowledge in the 19th century, with the important revision of this theory by Roderick Ferguson, who argues against the universality of the confessional mode, arguing that "confession" is indeed, a racially marked mode of mediation and proliferation that illuminates racial contours of biopower. See Foucault, *History of Sexuality* and Ferguson, *Aberrations in Black: Towards a Queer of Color Critique*.

[18] *Common Ground* (1940).

[19] Adamic's term, "This Crisis Is an Opportunity"

intellectual culture it promoted would become key cultural technologies for disseminating cultural pluralist visions for an Americanism unified around the affirmation of racial-ethnic difference.[20] In its attempt to address the "racial-cultural situation" in the U.S. as an object of knowledge and site of racial liberal social engineering, *Common Ground* is a particularly fascinating racial liberal security state governance project that indexes private and state investment in and promotion of education as a strategy for population management that suppresses robustly material, and redistributive critiques of political economy in racial capitalism. Focusing its efforts instead on the sphere of "cultural production," *Common Ground* offered the proliferation of aestheticized representations, or what this chapter terms "disclosures,"[21] of racial-ethnic experience as the way to inform, educate, and conduct individuals and groups toward common understanding for the purposes of national cohesion and defense.

Because conceptions of racial and ethnic difference had become increasingly understood in the early to mid-twentieth century through the social scientific frames of sociology and cultural anthropology as primarily socially and culturally, rather than biologically, determined and significant, *Common Ground* 's message and project was uniquely positioned to continue the displacement of scientific racism by educating the American

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20 For further information on the Common Council for American Unity, see Michael Denning, *The Cultural Front*, (New York, NY: Verso, 1997), 447; for interesting critiques of cultural pluralist paradigms that my chapter builds from see Walter Benn Michaels for a critique of its inherent racialist logic and Elizabeth Rooney for a take on its paternalistic, disingenuous common ground.
; for a liberal recovery project that just so happens to be the most extensive look at *Common Ground* and Louis Adamic to date see David Shiffman *Rooting Multiculturalism*.

21 I use the term "disclosure" as a means to build off Foucault's notion of confession as a mode of proliferating sexuality as an object of knowledge. Here, "disclosure" means to designate the specific mode of aestheticized representation as making a previously unknown but conjectured upon form of difference known through various modes of confession that ultimately interpellate subjects within normative codes of meaning—for this chapter's purposes, normative codes of meaning within U.S. liberal political modernity.

public about the social-cultural nature of diversity through its circulation in public libraries, private subscriptions, and the public educational programs it facilitated. As part of its educational strategy, *Common Ground* featured a wide array of exposés, editorials, cultural criticism, short stories, and poems by writers from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds, as well as advertisements for upcoming community events (Denning 11). The journal's publication of these writers and the promotion of interracial, interethnic community events sought to introduce the public to the benefits of "American diversity." Racial and ethnic diversity in the U.S., as a founding educational principle for the Common Council for American Unity, served as the cornerstone of America's success as a "nation of nations," and *Common Ground* sought to make the racial and ethnic difference that defined America "known" to the public under the common register of a revised, inclusive nationalism, and new temporal order for racial liberal progress. This informational and educational approach to addressing what co-founder Louis Adamic termed the "racial-cultural situation" in the U.S. is indicative of how social scientific and anthropological paradigms explained race as a social (rather than biological) category and assumed racism and racial-ethnic tensions resulted from irrationality, intolerance, or lack of knowledge that could be overcome through education that promoted common understanding across difference. Indeed, essays and creative work by Mexican Americans, Black Americans, Asian Americans, new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europeans, and "older stock" white Americans committed to the project of forging an inclusive, racial liberal progressive Americanism were presented as evidence of the "beautiful tapestry" of American identity and its possibilities for an inclusive, progressive future that would secure the interests of all Americans through providing for their common defense. The contours, limits, and productive parameters of this project—that evidence cultural pluralism's recalibration of

racialized security logics in the period of the racial break more broadly—however, are evident through the categories of racial-ethnic representation and the very ontological framing of the project. Productively absent in this "beautiful tapestry" of American identity is the presence of indigenous, Native American acts of representation/disclosure. And the educational project imagined as a response to the "racial-cultural situation" also evidences the slippage between culture and ethnicity that would posit particular groups of racialized subjects—"ethnic" foreigners from Southern and Eastern Europe, or the "New Immigration" most immediately in this case—as possessing of ethnic-cultural difference, rather than *racial* difference. While over the course of its publication run, *Common Ground* would more robustly tackle the political-economic contours of "race" under the editorship of sociologist Carey McWilliams beginning in 1947, for the majority of the journal's print history race and ethnicity's relation to political-economy remained on the sidelines.

To examine explicitly the co-constitutive biopolitical and repressive mechanisms of this project and think through how they evidence decisive shifts in the strategies for the management, surveillance, and governance of the population groups in the racialized security state that facilitate the racial break, it is helpful to think through the production of new knowledge about racial and ethnic difference in *Common Ground* as participating in the broader field of documentary projects during the Depression and Popular Front periods that, as Paula Rabinowitz has suggested, "[sought] to account for—but more importantly, to change. . .reality" (5). While much has been written about how the cultural technologies of the camera, the film projector, and visual culture more broadly actively produced mass culture by capturing and representing "the real," scholars have recently begun to explore more rigorously how popular periodical culture participated in the production of mass

culture during this period.[22] Moreover, popular periodical culture is an especially apt site for investigating mass cultural production in U.S. and global modernity due to the genre's capacity to produce a decentered, polyvocal subject for both the representation and reception of new racial and ethnic knowledge within its pages, as well as the processes of racial formation unfolding through the periodical's serialized forms.[23] In recognizing *Common Ground* as a print documentary project within the broader cultural field of documentary practices that arose in the 1930s U.S., (which were also the chief strategy for knowledge production and dissemination under New Deal cultural programs such as AWP and AWP staffed projects such as *Survey Graphic*), this analysis draws heavily, if implicitly, on Rabinowitz's contention that as various individuals and associations sought to account for and change the "real," they effectively produced the very subjects and objects such documentation sought to capture within its frames. When *Common Ground* and other progressive projects that explored issues of race and ethnicity "documented" through forms of disclosure the racial-cultural situation in the U.S., the new knowledge of race and ethnicity these efforts produced was authorized through epistemes that informed the modern sociology of race and its use of "scientific" documentation to account for, organize, and name "the real."[24] This convergence of mediation and seemingly objective documentation

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22 The work of the University of Tulsa and Brown University in founding the Modernist Journals Project is indicative of this turn.

23 Sonalia Perera has similarly argued that periodical form, specifically in relation to the women's socialist magazine *Dabinu*, produces "a concept of non-individual subjectivity" that "brings [the writers in *Dabinu*] together under the rules of a different sociology of form." Sonali Perera, "Rethinking Working-Class Literature: Feminism, Globalization, and Socialist Ethics," *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 19, no. 1 (Spring2008 2008), 1-31. Shelley Streeby also compellingly tracks the production of radical mass culture through visual and periodical culture. Shelley Streeby, *Radical Sensations: World Movements, Violence, and Visual Culture,* (Durham, NC: Duke, 2013).

24 The WPA stands as a particularly powerful example of this process of cultural production through documentation. Other projects that took a more stringently assimilationist stance

has particular relevance for *Common Ground*'s project because it produced new racial and ethnic knowledge, new subjectivities for the reception and manifestation of this knowledge, and a logics for managing the new subjects and objects within an all-inclusive nationalist framework grounded in the discourses of pluralism and national security.

Common Ground's political and ideological frame for producing subjects and objects of the new racial knowledge called forth a plural mass subject that could accommodate the paradoxes that increased inclusion and the conflation of social and national security posed. It also fascinatingly illuminates through its serial form the temporal order as a process of reproducing the racial break as the "as of yet incomplete" promise of security through social engineering that incisively indexes the transposition of pastoral obligations and responsibilities of the public to secure the state according to the new economy of faults and merits that erase the politics of racial and ethnic difference through common citizenship.[25] Even as the project dismissed stringent assimilation, it preserved and unified difference under a revised nationalism that nonetheless produced a new set of parameters for liberal-subjective intelligibility that rendered the more radical potentials of such a pluralized rearticulation of the mass subject mute. Consider, for example, the mission statement of the Common Council for American Unity, which appeared as front matter in all issues of *Common Ground*:

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include the YMCA/YWCA, Jane Addam's Hull House, the Ford Motor Company's sociology department, or government programs such as citizenship education classes and the banning of foreign language instruction in schools. See David Ciepley, *Liberalism in the Shadow of Totalitarianism*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 15, 62-64.

[25] I here refer to Walter Benjamin's mass subject. In periodical culture, in particular, I argue, this subject takes on a polyvocal, multicultural dimension. More specifically, the "American" represented within the journal is at once all nations and cultures brought together into a coherent, plural whole within the bindings of the "American" periodical.

> This organization (formerly the Foreign Language Information Service), publisher of Common Ground, has these purposes:
>
> To help create among the American people the unity and mutual understanding resulting from a common citizenship, a common belief in democracy and the ideals of liberty, the placing of the common good before the interests of any group, and the acceptance, in fact as well as in law, of all citizens, whatever their national or racial origins, as equal partners in American society.
>
> To further an appreciation of what each group has contributed to America, to uphold the freedom to be different, and to encourage the growth of an American culture which will be truly representative of all the elements that make up the American people.
>
> To overcome intolerance and discrimination because of foreign birth or descent, race or nationality.
>
> To help the foreign-born and their children solve their special problems of adjustment, know and value their particular cultural heritage, and share fully and constructively in American life.[26]

Here, the refutation of "cultural" assimilation legitimates "political" assimilation and produces a formally consistent logic for the articulation of diversified mass subjectivity. While such a project affords cultural and political recognition to previously excluded subjectivities under the beacon of "national belonging through inclusive citizenship," its rhetoric depoliticizes difference through appeals to a "common," abstract citizenship that constitutes the "liberty" and "freedom" of the U.S. liberal-democratic state. Such splitting of

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[26] Common Council for American Unity, *Common Ground*.

the subject into distinct public and private registers succeeds in obscuring the conditions upon which the unfreedoms of U.S. liberal modernity are based and is especially indicative of how the U.S. state could grow more "inclusive" while maintaining unequal social relations as the state adopted liberal antiracism as its official stance.[27] In the statement's insistence on "placing of the common good before the interests of any group," the rhetorical frame is set to obscure how difference, here in regards to racial and national origins, has been and continues to be produced and instrumentalized by the state.[28] "Difference" in this positioning is something to be accepted, appreciated as *representative modes of culture*, but not instrumentalized by the masses as a subjective site from which to wage political and/or economic struggle. Indeed, the new nationalism based on "inclusive diversity" and common defense would serve as the symbol and parameters under which political and economic struggle could legitimately be waged and through which the plural/multicultural mass subject could be made intelligible.

"Democracy and Defense": Robert M. Hutchins and the Search for a Principled Temporality

Amidst essays speaking to the particularity of American racial and ethnic minority experience in navigating the socio-political and economic climate on the eve of the U.S.'s entrance into WWII, the inclusion of white liberal progressive University of Chicago

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[27] I refer here to a genealogy of critique first elaborated in Marx's fundamental challenge to liberal rights and subjectivity in "On the Jewish Question." My analysis, here and throughout, is informed by Chandan Reddy's contribution to one genealogy of liberal critique, specifically that the condition of possibility for liberal modernity's promise of "freedom from violence" is racial violence that is continually disavowed and displaced. *Freedom with Violence* (2011).

[28] Examples of such instrumentalization, though outside the purview of this analysis, include the histories of legislating immigration and citizenship inclusions and exclusions and the racialization of labor forces throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

President Robert M. Hutchins'[29] convocation address to the 1940 graduating class of the University of Chicago in the inaugural issue of *Common Ground* is particularly striking in its call to reestablish universal principles upon which democratic governance—and defense against the rising totalitarian threat—should be grounded. Hutchins levels a major claim that America's inability to know precisely what it is fighting for is the result of the populace's inability to concretely differentiate between democratic and totalitarian forms of government, which he blames on a loss of moral principle that he tasks the 1940 graduating class of the University of Chicago with rediscovering. The convocation address, portentously titled "On Democracy and Defense," begins with a clear warning and caution to students being conducted into, not the work force, but a new—and explicitly moralized—liberal progressive state rationality that situates and inducts these members of the newly emergent professional-managerial class as key agents of securing liberal state progressive temporality. Where contemporary leadership, corrupted as Hutchins believed they were by their inability to understand the constitution of democratic government and their adherence to tenets of technocratic efficiency and specialization, had failed in creating a principled ground from which to wage war, Hutchins asks of the graduating class to take up this very question and problem as a matter of life and death:

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[29] Hutchins was a prolific educational philosopher in the U.S. and began his career as part of the Legal Realist school but following the inability of the contemporary social sciences to successfully address social problems arising from the Great Depression and the totalitarian encounter later made a decisive conservative turn to secular perennialism and the promotion of Aristotelian-Thomist educational principles. As University of Chicago president from 1929-1945 and chancellor from 1945-1951, Hutchins instituted a series of sweeping educational and curricular reforms to push against what he saw as the problem of increased specialization and focus on vocational training that was not preparing students to be responsible citizens in the morally fraught and complex modern age. Reforms included the disbanding of the school's football team and a massive overhaul in the curriculum to institute a "great books" curriculum and socratic teaching methods, both of which he believed worked against the technocratic logics that he believed created the conditions for the spread of fascism throughout modern societies.

> What I have to say comes down to this: if you are going to prepare for war, you must know what you are willing to fight for. If you are going to defend territory, you must know what territory you are going to defend. If you are going to defend principles, you must know what your principles are and why you hold them. America's preparations for war, like the arguments of those who want the country to enter this one, seem directed to territorial problems, such as the imminent danger to the U.S. from an attack on the Dutch East Indies or Brazil. Though these issues are important, they are not as important as the issues of principle involved. We may be faint-hearted, even in defense of our native land, if we believe that the enemy is just as right as we are or that we are just as wrong as he. The attention now being lavished on territorial questions and the general indifference to questions of principle suggest that those who talk of preparation for war either have no principles, or none they can communicate to others, or no such understanding of their principles as a life-and-death struggle for them would demand. (57)

In framing his opening remarks with an assertion that the principles that guide a state to make war (or peace) are more important than the bare facts of territorial defense, Hutchins narrates an acute crisis in both the *ideological* and *material* basis for the reproduction of U.S. state sovereignty. Moreover, Hutchins' illumination and admonishment of those responsible for this crisis in U.S. sovereignty is not merely in that it poses the question of a rediscovering of those "lost principles" upon which U.S. territorial sovereignty can be secured in and of itself, but in that the address, in both form and content, decisively shifts the obligation and responsibility for determining anew those principles onto the audience to whom his speech act is addressed. This shift in the obligation and responsibility of determining and administering the principles of sovereignty onto a particular class of the populace—the

newly emergent professional managerial class—is precisely the mechanism through which the new state rationality of the racial break's temporal order is secured. Contemporary leaders "who talk of preparation for war," Hutchins admonishes, have failed in providing a properly moralized *temporal order* upon and for which to "defend the territory," meaning that they have not situated the defense of territory and of their particular order of government within a framework that knows and can name its foundational principles, history, and future goals in any meaningful way. Instead, these failed leaders offer defense as its own rationale and means, with no conception of how defense for the sake of defense serves to construct a past, present, and future for the nation. The audience of this address, the 1940 graduating class of the University of Chicago—to be sure one of the premiere institutions of higher learning and foremost purveyor of the new knowledge of race and ethnicity in the United States—are tasked with not only recognizing the current form of state rationality as a failure of principle that cannot give the nation a proper organizing telos, but also with *actively righting this failure* by committing themselves to the task of building a newly principled temporal order for U.S. democracy. Hutchins cautions, however, that mere "talk" of democracy has not and will not suffice for the particular challenges of sovereign governance and state building in the modern era:

> We do not seem to get very far by talking about democracy. We know that Germany is not one. She says so. We know that Russia is not one, though Stalin says she is one. We are not sure about some elements of England. We are not altogether sure about this country. The reason is, of course, that we do not know what a democracy is or grasp the fundamental notions on which it rests. We set out in the last war to make the world safe for democracy. We had, I think, no very definite idea of what we meant. We seemed then to favor a parliamentary system. No matter what the

> system concealed, if the system was there, it was democracy, and we were for it. Though Hitler is infinitely worse than the Kaiser, though the danger to the kind of government we think we believe in is infinitely greater than in 1917, we have less real, defensible conviction about democracy now than we had then. (57)

Hutchins critique of the abstract ideological foundations of U.S. liberal democracy illuminates not only the ways in which liberal democratic theory in the abstract has allowed ideologically for the disavowal of its violent conditions of possibility and reproduction—(continued settler colonialism, racial slavery, the exploitation of racialized laboring populations, imperial expansion and territorial occupation, a domestic system of Jim Crow segregation and disenfranchisement are conspicuously absent from consideration)—but also that this signals a crisis in knowing what and how precisely to name the state and governance form of the U.S. state without a properly principled temporal frame of reference. What is the U.S. state in relation to other competing forms of government and upon what grounds might such a situatedness take place? Hutchins begins answering that question through comparison that yields no specific answer on the functional basis of military-territorial defense or the technocratic administration of state forces, and suggests this is precisely the site of the current crisis in U.S. liberal-democratic rationality as it prepares anew for a war to "make the world safe for democracy":

> Too many so-called democracies have perished under the onslaught of an invader whose technical and organizing ability commands the admiration of a people brought up to admire technical and organizing skill. With our vague feeling that democracy is just a way of life, a way of living pleasantly in comparative peace with the world and one another, we may soon begin to wonder whether it can stand the

> strain of modern times, which, as our prophets never tire of telling us, are much more complicated than any other times whatever. (57)

"The vague feeling" of democracy as a "way of life" that allows for "pleasant living" conceals the violence upon which the U.S. state, its institutions, economic relations, etc., are built and simultaneously, and most significantly leaves the U.S. unsettled in a temporal order that uses guiding principles as a means to measure where it is in relation to where its been and calculate where it might go in the future and toward what end, and open to Hutchins asks, quite seriously: "Is democracy a good form of government? Is it worth dying for? Is the U.S. a democracy?" insisting that "If we are to prepare to defend democracy we must be able to answer these questions. I repeat that our ability to answer them is much more important than the quantity or quality of aeroplanes, bombs, tanks, flame-throwers, and miscellaneous munitions that we can hurl at the enemy" (57). The lack of a telos for the nation, one grounded in what Hutchins ultimately deems as "moral principle," is precisely the crisis the nation faces as it prepares again for world war without knowing why or what it is fighting for, which, as Hutchins suggests, makes it all the more difficult to determine what it is fighting against with any certainty. Here, Hutchins proffers that it is the unsettling of territorial sovereignty justified on the basis of liberal notions of right and justice, opting instead for a positivist rationality of result and efficiency, that leaves the U.S. without a proper sense of what precisely its form of democratic governance stands for and that leaves it open to totalitarian persuasion. The complicatedness of the times in a rapidly changing world requires a refashioning of a temporal order that can morally situate the U.S. state within new forms of rationality that do not sacrifice principle for technocratic efficiency, positivist truth, and a relativist moral frameworks. To a large extent, Hutchins locates the "decay" of "principle" in the ethical rationalist and scientific naturalist debates that had been

waged in intellectual culture over the previous decades,[30] and posits that the solution to this epistemological crisis must be found in renewing a sense of "truth worth fighting for…outside the laboratory" (59). Such truth, Hutchins argues, should actualize democratic freedom by regrounding its commitments in stable notions of a moral temporal order that is, indeed a pursuit of a future through particular forms of democratic commitment and practice. Though the audience cannot know for certain what form such truth will take, they will nonetheless actualize its temporal order through the conferral of pastoral power onto themselves, and properly conduct themselves to carrying out the task of securing the moral temporality, and example of creating freedom through liberal security:

> Since this freedom is the end of human life, everything else in life should be a means to it and should be subordinate to it as means must be to ends. This is true of material goods, which are a means, and a very necessary one, but not an end. It is true of the state, which is an indispensable means, but not an end. It is true of all human activities and all human desires: they are all ordered to and must be judged by the end of moral and intellectual development. (60)

Here, the transferal of pastoral power, the collective power of this class of the population to work toward and actualize a moralized temporal order is most clearly illuminated and

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[30] For a thorough account of these debates, see Gary Peller "Neutrality Principles in the 1950s." In the essay, Peller reviews the historical development of these debates within and across the disciplines from the late 19th to the early 20th century, and argues that "the key to understanding this apparent paradox [of principles of neutrality] is to grasp the ideological/cultural complex of the 1950s within which mainstream American intellectuals in law and in other disciplines came to terms with the disintegration of the traditional, 'old order' paradigms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by means of an intense and overriding distinction between controversial issues of values and noncontroversial questions of framework and structure within which substantive conflict would take place. On that distinction rested their conviction that their own work, and intellectual work generally, transcended ideology and politics" (565).

conjoined with the felicitous management of state forces. It is indeed, the suturing of state and economic power to the realm of the biopolitical by imbuing the populace with not only the moral obligation and means of producing sovereignty through the moral functioning of "all human activities and all human desires" toward the common goal of freedom, but to situate "human life" within this particular temporal trajectory of right and justice. This, a morally guided population working collectively for the advancement of *liberal* freedom is the essence and telos of modern democracy and that which will both differentiate its order of rationality and defend its operations from totalitarianism. However, Hutchins continues, "The political organization must be tested by its conformity to these ideals. Its basis is moral. Its end is the good for man. Only democracy has this basis. Only democracy has this end. If we do not believe in this basis or this end, we do not believe in democracy. These are the principles which we must defend if we are to defend democracy" (60). The defense of democracy, then, entails the human's—or liberal democratic subject—situation and obligation as an agent of security for the state. It becomes the means and end of self and liberal-democratic state actualization. It becomes the promise of security through obligation, responsibility, and commitment to liberal democratic freedom—the material basis of which remains undefined except as an ideal temporalized as a pastoral relation of power imbued within the population itself. Within the context of this convocation, accepting this proposition and placing oneself squarely within this telos—understanding that to be free one is obliged and responsible for taking up the task of redirecting democracy toward moral means and ends rather than efficient, or self-interested ones—becomes a means of actualizing the transition to self-possessed adulthood and full liberal progressive citizenship through the actualization of its temporal order as the grounds for a new state rationality. It is a temporal order that must constantly interrogate and create itself anew.

The problem of the pursuit of individual interest not tethered to this common goal, Hutchins argues, can be found in the technocratic efficiency and positivist social sciences, which are undermining this sense of universal morality and collective commitment toward the common democratic goal of progressing toward freedom for "the good of man." In this sense, it is knowledge production untethered from a moral, universal commitment to abstract ideal forms that breeds fascism through an inability to differentiate the moral "rightness" of various forms of "truth":

> Thus we come much closer to Hitler than we may care to admit. If everything is a matter of opinion, and if everybody is entitled to his own opinion, force becomes the only way of settling differences of opinion. And of course, if success is the test of rightness, right is on the side of the heavier battalions. In law school I learned that law was not concerned with reason or justice. Law was what the courts would do. Law, says Hitler, is what I do. There is little to choose between the doctrine I learned in an American law school and that which Hitler proclaims.
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> Precisely here lies our unpreparedness against the only enemy we may have to face. Such principles as we have are not different enough from Hitler's to make us very rugged in defending ours in preference to his. Moreover, we are not united and clear about such principles as we have. We are losing our moral principles. But the vestiges of them remain to bother us and to interfere with a thoroughgoing commitment to amoral principles. Hence we are like confused, divided, ineffective Hitlers. In a contest between Hitler and people who are wondering why they shouldn't be Hitlers the finished product is bound to win.

> To say we are democrats is not enough. To say we are humanitarians will not do, for the basis of any real humanitarianism is a belief in the dignity of man and the moral and spiritual values that follow from it. Democracy as a fighting faith can be only as strong as the convictions which support it. If these are gone, democracy becomes simply one of many ways of organizing society, and must be tested by its efficiency. To date democracy looks less efficient than dictatorship. (61)

If Hutchins convocation address elaborates a blueprint for the new form of state rationality, its moral-temporal order, and the requisite shift of pastoral power onto the emergent professional managerial class that will secure it through strategies of population management, the specific operations and management strategies of this new state rationality ushered in through the racial break is made visible, and creates the conditions of a new state sovereignty grounded not by territory but *a particular temporality*, through an examination of what Foucault terms "the micromechanics of power" that secure this temporal order, both materially and ideologically.

"This Crisis Is an Opportunity": Louis Adamic and the Micromechanics of Racialized Security through National Belonging

In the essay "This Crisis Is an Opportunity," Slovene immigrant and Popular Front progressive era writer and *Common Ground* co-founder and editor-in-chief Louis Adamic[31] set forth his strategy for forging an inclusive American identity in response to what he termed

[31] Louis Adamic served as editor in chief of *Common Ground* from 1940-1947, and was a prolific author committed to promoting the principles of cultural pluralism. Adamic was a stringent critic of assimilationist programs and paradigms and dedicated his career to uplifting immigrant voices through literary texts and popular media. He wrote multiple biographical accounts of his personal experience in acculturating to "the American way of life" and set the stage for the promotion of ethnic literatures that spoke to the particular experiences, challenges, and successes of American immigrants in creating a "beautiful and diverse tapestry of cultures" that collectively, he believed, defined America. See, for example, his 1932 autobiography *Laughing in the Jungle: The Autobiography of an Immigrant in America.*

"the unfortunately named 'Melting Pot' situation" that had dominated early-twentieth-century nativist discourse on how to address what numerous social scientists, public intellectuals, and policy makers had deemed "the racial-cultural situation in the U.S" (63). In so doing, Adamic elaborates a blueprint for how the micromechanics of power will operate through "the people" imbued with pastoral power of right and obligation through the management of racial and ethnic difference that becomes both the object and mechanism of state power across the racial break. Adamic's cultural pluralist project situates the management of racial and ethnic difference precisely within the temporal order of the racial break that Hutchins' convocation address elaborated:

> Our cultural and spiritual materials and powers are enormous, potentially well-nigh beyond calculation, and we have an opportunity to create—not easily, but with an effort of which we are capable, not quickly but in measurable time—a great culture on this continent; a culture which could approach being universal or pan-human and more satisfying to the inner human makeup than any culture that as yet appeared on this earth. (64)

Indeed, even as Adamic's project rejected the stringent assimilationism of both nativist and liberal progressive Americanization discourse, the cultural pluralism it espoused became intimately entangled with emergent national security logics that rationalized the reordering of racialized subjects within the political economy. Furthermore, the imbrication of cultural pluralism and national security created strict parameters for "acceptable" difference and cast suspicion on "unknowable" others its rhetoric called into being. Adamic indeed argues that the "racial-cultural situation" in the U.S. was "one of our greatest weaknesses" because of the "divisions" "it" fostered, but was "at the same time, one of [the U.S.'] great sources of strength" (60), and he devoted his career to imagining an America that would be

strengthened rather than weakened by its diversity. More significantly, however, in his attempt to cast American diversity as a source of strength, Adamic simultaneously sounded a warning that the ineffective management of racial and ethnic difference held grave implications for the security of the U.S. state as it materially and ideologically prepared to fight a global war against its imagined photographic negative, European totalitarianism. Adamic's essay and the *Common Ground* documentary-disclosure project that employs confessional modes of representation more broadly elaborates concisely the production of a new "economy of faults and merits" that suppresses and displaces race for ethnic culture, carving out discursive ground for "ethnic-foreigners" of the New Immigration and, later, "model minorities" to claim what this chapter terms "the promise of security" through racial-ethnic disclosure, surveillance, and management.

"This Crisis Is an Opportunity" opens with Adamic's assertion that "The world is not only at war" but that as global citizens, "we are also witnessing a tremendous and, so far, very successful attempt at world revolution of a peculiar kind." In articulating the relevance of this peculiar revolution to the U.S. context, Adamic positions the rise of fascism as a globally encompassing threat, a "revolution of nihilism" that is "against *everything*." He warns that "whether or not we are pulled into the vortex of actual hostilities, the immediate and long-range effect of these events upon the U.S. will be drastic and profound…because we are intricately enmeshed with the rest of humanity and, more important…because we are not free internally of many of the subtle ills, weaknesses, and disorders that afflict other lands recently crushed or still under attack." With this warning, Adamic frames his argument for cultural pluralism as essential for national defense. The project he proposes to fortify the nation against the threat of global fascist revolutions, Adam notes, is a different from what Roosevelt and others termed a "total defense" militarily and politically. In fact, in suturing

his cultural pluralist program to preexisting national defense rhetorics, Adamic calls for, instead, an "inclusive defense" that will serve as the foundation for a generative, productive, "*offensive for* democracy," an offensive that will produce a revised sense of inclusive national identity that all *citizens* can collectively fight for. Adamic argues the military and political logics of total defense will surely fail if such a defense was not made inclusive and all encompassing from the start. Indeed, Adamic's argument pushes past mere military inclusion, insisting that "inclusive defense" as a culturally productive offensive must also be "based on a firm realization that U.S. is not primarily a big, rich hunk of geography, but an idea, a body of idealism, a way of life, a promise as yet largely unfilled." After activating his call for a renewed sense of national identity and purpose with which to properly enfold various racial and ethnic subjectivities within the as of yet unrealized American ideal, Adamic then explains the process through which such an idealized America can be achieved:

> All of us, all the people of the country, will have to be *drawn*, not forced in any way, but drawn, inspired into full participation in the effort ahead, which will include armament, of course, but also—in fact, especially—a wide-flung and deep-reaching offensive for democracy *within our own borders and our own individual makeup*. We must defend ourselves not with a mere 'against' program, but by starting and carrying out action for positive developments which will preserve and enhance what is right and good in our national life, and which, to a large extent, will automatically displace the negative facts and forces. (62-63, my italics)

This offensive strategy and the new multicultural mass subject it calls into being have significant implications for the role that biopolitical power will play in the production and consolidation of this new inclusive formation of the mass subject as it seeks to draw diverse participants into the temporal promise of an inclusive, egalitarian, and unified future. By

replacing the current tensions and fixation with the social problems and inequities wrought through the crucibles of racial and ethnic difference in the U.S. with "positive developments which will preserve and enhance what is right and good in our national life," Adamic attests to the power of narratives within the national imaginary to "automatically displace the negative facts and forces" that are, he argues, currently the greatest threat to American security. At this point in the essay, Adamic has yet to explicitly articulate that the "ills and weaknesses" that make America vulnerable to fascist aggression are the tensions arising from the "unfortunately named 'Melting Pot' situation," but it becomes quite clear through this introductory framing that the project proposes to "produce the people" anew. The surest strategy for inducing this cultural production, according to Adamic, will be to found this revised nationalism from the beginning on "inclusive diversity" (the emphasis on "All of us") to which "the people" must be "drawn" and willingly submit. Such submission, Adamic insists, can occur through the writing oneself into a new story of a racially and ethnically diverse, yet unified America. However, as he develops his educational program of sharing diverse experience that will create the conditions for such a "positive" restructuring of national belonging, he effectively outlines the parameters for a biopolitical, racial-liberal temporal regime to regulate the self and others for the security of the state.

This initial framing of Adamic's cultural pluralism becomes especially important when considering that sociological and cultural anthropological paradigms for assessing race relations assumed racism and racial tensions were the result of ignorance or irrationality that could be effectively "corrected" through educational and informative measures. In Adamic's project, the logics of national defense create the conditions upon which to build new structures of belonging that, because of the dire nature of the threat to the body politic as a whole, can intervene in and overcome the "irrational/ignorant beliefs" regarding racial and

ethnic difference that purportedly perpetuated racial-cultural tensions in the U.S. Adamic argues, "If we do not or cannot produce an all embracing defense, a replacement of our weaknesses with strength and our tensions with unity, then Goebbels and Hitler will have little difficulty in "softening" the U.S. into impotence…" (63). Adamic further elaborates on why America's racial and ethnic diversity, if not managed properly, will fall prey to fascism's "softening" drive:

> Briefly our weakness lies in a kind of psychological civil war, which is being waged among groups of various backgrounds within our population; our strength, in the emotions, motives, and impulses that have brought us here, or most of us, in the past three centuries….Our problem is to stop the psychological civil war and begin to draw on the inner power of the story of this country; and the current moment of crisis presents, I believe, both the necessity and the opportunity to do this. (63)

The proper methods for waging this "psychological civil war" within the epistemological frameworks that produce the modern sociology of race, for Adamic, are informational, educational, culturally and temporally productive:

> The central educational or cultural effort, both with youth and adults, should be not toward uniformity and conformity to the prevalent, as it was in the "Americanization" drives of twenty years ago, and as it still is to an entirely too great extent, but toward accepting and welcoming and *exploiting* diversity, variety, and differences *which do not, and cannot conceivably ever, come into conflict with our national ideals and safety*. The Fifth Column has to be eliminated, but, in doing that, we must not imitate, however mildly, Hitler's own and his fellow dictator's frenzy for uniformity and regimentation, and for stamping out the diversity; and we must not succumb to their idea of the superiority of one group of humanity over the others. If we force

> uniformity and conformity, and create superiority on the one hand and inferiority on the other, we shall likely swamp the U.S. with general fear-ridden mediocrity and democratic disability, and thereby play directly into the hands of Hitler and Goebbels, who expect us to do just that. (65, my italics)

Here, Adamic's argument that embracing "diversity" domestically is precisely the mechanism through which the U.S. domestic and global security will be achieved. The promotion of diversity, indeed, the exploiting of diversity and the abolition of hierarchies based on racial and ethnic difference will not only serve to clearly differentiate American democracy from European totalitarianism, but is in fact the very mechanism through which the nation can secure itself from that disabling threat. However, important to note in relation to the new economy of faults and merits that will organize such a promotion and exploitation of diversity as totalitarianism photographic negative and key mechanism of security are the parameters for articulating acceptable difference that Adamic draws as "anything" that could "conceivably. . .come into contact with our national ideals and safety." That the condition of possibility for this revised structure of "inclusive" national belonging is a dire necessity to fortify the nation against an external threat that could become internalized exposes a central paradox of this inclusivity as Adamic articulates further how Americans must fortify the nation "within our own borders and our own individual makeup." Such an educational offensive variously reproduces known and unknown subjectivities within its logics in a manner that forecloses the possibility of radically activating difference for political struggle. This paradox effectively constructs new parameters for the maintenance of mass plural/multicultural subjects through "knowable" frames conditioned by that subject's alignment within the new, inclusive nationalism so that it cannot "conceivably" produce an oppositional politics grounded in or arising from racial or ethnic difference. Such logics not

only promote increased inclusion on racial and ethnic grounds while foreclosing possibilities for dissent, but also simultaneously increase the state's legitimacy as it displaces old forms of racial violence and exclusion with new structures for the surveillance, regulation, and management of racialized and ethnic populations. Such displacement is a hallmark of contemporary multiculturalism, and we find here its troubled roots in Adamic's cultural pluralism. As Adamic explains:

> If we invite diversity, and are interested in it and use it we will produce unity—automatically—and make it dynamic, bring out the basic sameness of people, and break down both the superiorities and inferiorities which oppress large sections of the population, and which are equally bad—two ends of the same stick, the source of one of Goebbels' greatest "tensions" in the U.S., a tool with which he means to "soften" this continent. (66)

This biopolitical project temporally situates the promotion of diversity in America within the new order of rationality outlined by the racial liberal progressive project and enlists everyone, with the promise of collective security, into the work of the racial liberal democratic pastorate. Adamic suggests that if individuals, communities, and state practice more broadly would adopt this invitation and acceptance of diversity it would immediately, automatically diffuse the tensions that destabilize democratic governance in the U.S. making it susceptible to fascist aggression because its temporal order organized on hierarchies and homogeneity are indistinguishable from current democratic practice. "Automatic unity," of course, was to be founded upon and fortified through the guarantee of protection by and appeal to "common," abstract citizenship, which renders the political significance of racial or ethnic identity mute for the masses, even as state agencies and departments instrumentalized these

categories of difference overtly in their policies of surveillance and suppression of political opposition and immigration restriction more broadly.

In short, what is produced by this revised structure of national belonging is not a wide-ranging appreciation for and freedom to be "different"—culturally, racially, or otherwise—but instead a logics that poses "unknowable difference" as an internal threat that can be managed by inclusion within narrowly defined parameters of personhood secured through abstract citizenship. This abstract citizenship protects cultural difference privately while ensuring that publicly, Americans conform to the common ground of "American ideals, values, and beliefs." Most significantly, it demands unwavering belief in and support of a democracy that can no longer within its logics activate the radical potential of difference for effective political struggle against unequal social relations in racial capitalism. More revolutionary or race radical critiques of capitalism that analyze the centrality of race to the maintenance of unequal social relations in capitalism, for example, are labeled as internal threats to the unity of the body politic deemed so necessary to national security. Moreover, the imbrication of pluralism and national security also regulates the parameters of intelligibility within the new "inclusive" America and polices just who and what "belonged" and could be made "secure" within this inclusive framework.

To elaborate more fully the induction of citizen as agent of security for the racial liberal state, it is important to consider Adamic's mediative perspective and positioning within the essay. About halfway through the essay, Adamic's narrative position shifts from straight reporting to what Rabinowitz has termed the "fitting emblem" of "the spy" as documentarian that can "call forth suspicions that what you see is not what you get" (75). This formulation of spy as documentarian who can disclose the full story American difference becomes particularly resonant considering the "common ground" upon which

Adamic proposes this racial and ethnic difference could be negotiated and developed into a diverse, inclusive, culturally pluralist nationalism. By framing his call for a revised nationalism as a necessary offensive against the threat of fascist aggression, Adamic begins establishing the basis for new structures of national belonging that are founded on the promise of protection against external threats to the security of the nation-state. In the next section of the essay, Adamic fully elaborates his cultural pluralist project and the structures of national belonging that inform this project in a manner that highlights the *internal* threat that disunity poses to American democracy. Here, it also becomes most evident how this rendering of cultural pluralism strikes a paradoxical bargain with racial liberal statist logics of national security as it works to construct an affective foundation upon which all Americans can come to know, accept, and ultimately regulate the parameters through which the plural mass subject can be made publically intelligible and politically viable.

In line with the transposition of pastoral power onto sectors of the population, Adamic, acting as concerned and loyal citizen-spy[32], enlists the populace in the project of monitoring and policing who is and is not properly conditioned by its inclusive nationalism by alluding to the presence of potentially dangerous and unknowable others within the U.S. body politic. "Suddenly," Adamic argues, "the U.S. is conscious of a vague but great danger." The nature of this danger is starkly framed by its "unknowability," specifically the inability to "know" where "racial and ethnic others" stand politically in relation to the promise of American citizenship, U.S. transnational capitalism, and liberal democracy more broadly. Here, the depoliticization of racial and ethnic difference that is central to this revised structure of national belonging comes full circle, in that within this framework, the

[32] I borrow this term from Joshua Reeves recent book on cultures of surveillance in the U.S. that promote surveillance as a mechanism for performing civil responsibility. *Citizen-Spy* (2017).

public, political registers of racial and ethnic difference are rendered intelligible only as potential national security threats. The potential of this threat engenders a climate and posture of paranoia and suspicion and encourages a watchful eye to root out and name such uknownability. Adamic writes:

> There is anti-Fifth column hysteria. It brought on the Alien Registration Act. This Act and its current execution give the less discerning citizenry the illusion that the Government 'is doing something' to protect the country; that illusion momentarily helps to keep them from undesirable activity, which gives alien registration a certain justification. But fear and worry continue, especially among the intelligent, who know that the aliens are not the great danger, nor the bunds and other openly pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist groups, *for these are known and can be dealt with*. What bothers many Americans are intangible and unknown factors, the ambiguities, the *ifs* and *maybes* in the situation. (68, my italics)

The "ifs" and "maybes" in Adamic's cultural pluralist project are none other than very racial and ethnic minorities his project for a nationalism founded on inclusion seeks to draw into the promise of security through the common ground of abstract citizenship:

> the thoughts and feelings, the attitudes and responses of the people down the street with whom they have no contact, the people in the immigrant slums and, if they are new-immigrants, the folks in the favored and restricted old-stock districts of our cities. Many Americans wonder and worry what 'they' may be saying among themselves. They recall our past experiences with one another. They realize that, for the most part, we do only tolerate one another. They suspect that if so-and-so happens some of the people in their immediate proximity probably will not stand up in the face of the situation. The atmosphere in which they live and move is suddenly

> a maze of question marks What? Who? Where? How soon? They know or feel that the responses and attitudes of many people are delicately balanced, and apt to swing or swerve this way or that, depending on events in Europe, or how the Depression develops, or how the election goes in this country. (68)

Through speculation, this configuration frames not only individual racialized and ethnic subjects, but also whole communities as potential threats to national security. The nature of this threat, however, is inarticulate, unknowable because it is constructed as a proposition, a frame that places a question mark on this otherness without ever specifying just what might come of these divided loyalties. With such a vague reference to what political beliefs and loyalties immigrant others might harbor, this framework renders politics that operate outside of or adjacent to a strong nationalist identification as threatening, divisive. The bargain struck, therefore, is that inclusive diversity requires also an "All American" posture of suspicion toward racialized and ethnic communities that do not make themselves knowable—or secure themselves through full disclosure—, recognizable as loyal citizens fully "drawn" into this revised nationalist framework. If members of these communities do not demonstrate they are willingly drawn into the revised nationalism, this framework renders their unknowability as a fluid, inarticulate, but ever- present threat to national unity, which will purportedly exacerbates external threats to the security of the nation-state. "These…the real ingredients of the American fears and worries these days" are further substantiated by an encounter that particularizes this unknowable other, who, if not brought into his "Americanization through inclusive diversity" project, may pose an even greater threat than self-proclaimed Nazis and fascists already within America's borders: "On the street in New York I meet an acquaintance who is a well known man, an immigrant; he asks me what I am about; I tell him that I am busy with this magazine; and he warns me I should

give it up—'there is going to be hell to pay in this country, and the thing for us immigrants to do is to lay low'." In this spy reportage, Adamic, educates Americans via his intimate encounter with an unknowable other within the nation's midst, an as of yet politically undefined representative of an ethnic immigrant community whose pliability is his, and by extension his community's, hallmark. Adamic's position as a newly "white-ethnic" American authorizes him to act as a spy who can at once gain "insider" knowledge from ethnic immigrant communities and report back to Anglo-Euro America the real dangers unknown others can pose to American democracy. As not just a spy, but a purveyor of the new social scientific knowledge on race and ethnicity, his claim that this man "Scared, on the defensive, is typical of many immigrants and also a vast number of their American born children" is additionally authorized by social scientific epistemes of knowledge production that qualify, quantify, and pathologize individual cognitive processes and "cultural" traits of entire communities (68). Indeed, Adamic diagnoses that the political threat posed by the unknowability of the immigrant's loyalties results from a psychological deficiency:

> They have never had a firm sense of what psychiatrists call 'belongingness,' necessary for a full, balanced development of character and personality and for effectiveness in a creative way within a culture and in a time like this many bend to the wind. Behind this lack of "belongingness," this current tendency to duck and hide, is the whole story of the mistakes made in connection with and by the New Immigration. (68-69)

Though Adamic does not cite the particular school of psychology concerned with the affective "belongingness" and immigrant populations, a perusal of journals published by the American Psychological Association demonstrates a keen fixation on the question of "immigrant maladjustment" to the American environment throughout the period of New Immigration. The remedy for such "duck and hide" tendencies, according to Adamic, will be

to make these unknowable others knowable, of their own volition, as an offensive for democracy that intimately entangles inclusive diversity with national security. The necessity of turning unknowable difference into a knowable and manageable private difference fortified by the promise of common, abstract citizenship within the liberal democratic state renders the radical potential of Adamic's project for cultural pluralism mute. Such logics can no longer account for the ways in which, despite the promises of inclusive diversity, the racial-cultural situation in the United States will continue to produce and maintain unequal social relations along axes of difference that have served as the motor for racial capitalist development and expansion. Most importantly, the imbrication of cultural pluralism with national security logics produces a climate of suspicion toward racial and ethnic difference that proposes alternative or oppositional politics within racial and ethnic communities as disloyal, a threat to national unity and security. Such a climate of suspicion tasks loyal citizens with an ever going inclusive project of not only welcoming, promoting, and celebrating difference, but also an ever going project of vigilance to keep a close eye on said difference and do one's work as part of the racial liberal democratic pastorate to conduct questionable difference toward the never quite secure, continually under threat principles of democratic unity. With any radical potential for Adamic's brand of cultural pluralism effectively foreclosed, Adamic ends the essay with a list of community outreach activities that the Common Council for American Unity established to begin producing the new plural mass subjects who would be both the representatives and recipients of this inclusive offensive for American democracy:

> It will be the purpose of this publication to use this moment of crisis, this opportunity, and the moments which are to follow, to help crystallize—directly and indirectly—some of the imperatives and convictions essential to an America worth

> living in and dying for, and to suggest and urge action through which those imperatives and convictions may be translated into living reality. (73)

To "crystallize—directly and indirectly—…an America worth living in and dying for" is precisely the actualization of a temporal order whose biopolitics of security conduct the population to live for the common defense of the nation, which, as Adamic suggests, requires the careful calculation, management, and promotion of racial and ethnic difference as the means and object of state security. To situate the population within this project of temporalizing racial and ethnic difference in relation to the state—what I have refered to throughout this essay as the "new temporal order" instituted through the racial break—is to situate the population within a present material moment from which they can accurately know the past and effectively predict, but more importantly to *change and build a future* [of their own design], imbued as they are now with the moral obligations and responsibilities of a racial-liberal democratic pastorate. It is the establishment of a new terrain (or territory, if you will) upon which to wage the battle for the security not only of the individual and the group, but of the state itself, and this racial liberal temporality inculcates a new set of actors as sovereign agents who will develop the power within themselves and in common the power, as it were, to translate this temporal order into a living reality. Here, indeed, we can see how this newly emergent professional managerial class of "The People," are tasked quite literally with securing the future, and what the racialized contours of those micromechanics of securitization are.

Adamic's essays makes clear how *Common Ground*, as periodical that adapted genre conventions of 1930s documentary realism, served as a cultural technology for producing new structures of national belonging by making ethnic and racial diversity both "known" and thoroughly "American." The form of plural mass subjectivity articulated through Adamic's

Common Ground educational project, building from sociological and psychological disciplinary fixation on "immigrant maladjustment," "criminality," and "the Negro problem," ultimately depoliticizes the public articulation of racial and ethnic difference as part of a broader trend in disciplinary and juridical practice as a means of instituting "principles of neutrality" that would supposedly promote unity and national security after the encounter with totalitarianism in the inter, and postwar years. Adamic positions the production and management of this subject as a primary defensive and offensive strategy for securing the nation against the dual threats of totalitarianism and internal disunity. Ultimately, Adamic's cultural pluralism adopts "inclusive diversity" as the privatization of racial and ethnic difference, a privatization that neutralizes the public, political registers of such difference and casts oppositional politics within newly racialized frames that make dissent intelligible only as a threat to national security. The suspicion this articulation of cultural pluralism called forth profoundly and disturbingly influenced the continued rise and consolidation of the modern U.S. national security state in the twentieth century, particularly in relation to those what activities and subjects that would become targets of suspicion as regimes of Cold War cultural and political consensus conditioned the parameters of national belonging.

"Who Is 'Negro'? Who Is 'White'?": George Schuyler and the Telos of Progressive (de)Racialized belonging

If Hutchins and Adamic produce blueprints for the new racial liberal temporal order and the micromechanics of power that will instrumentalize the tenets of cultural pluralism to vigilantly secure this new form of state rationality and its temporal order across the racial break, neither explicitly address the most vexing cause of "tensions" that create U.S. democracy's purported susceptibility to fascist aggression. The crux of the racial cultural

situation in the U.S. that will impede the 'successful' implementation of this new order is indeed the persistence of the color line as a foundational ontology for the political, economic, and juridical order of the U.S. state. In literary satirist, journalist, and black conservative writer George Schuyler's essay "Who Is 'Negro'? Who Is 'White'?," Schuyler situates the production of the American color line within the new racial liberal temporal order and interestingly posits that the end goal of this temporal order is not progress for "the good of man" or "automatic unity," but material equity in life chances achieved through the adoption of a state of racial un-belonging. Schuyler's critique of the "statistical superstition" of race that manifests in the adjudication of race on the state level clearly demarcates race as a aberration and superstition of a pre-progressive, pre-modern past that the racial break—in Schuyler's formulation, a moving past race as a meaningful category of social organization. Through this critique that frames race as a mystic, irrational superstition, I argue that Schuyler's text offers evidence to the forms of disavowal that substantiate this new temporality of salvation for racial liberalism that seeks "right and justice," in racial "un-belonging" as Schuyler simultaneously marks race as a function of political economy *and* calls for a post-racial universalism as the only salvation for the U.S. state. Schuyler begins his essay by disrupting notions of progress grounded in the old religiously and scientifically based, racial order:

> No superstition is so prevalent in the U.S. as that pertaining to race, and no set of beliefs has so warped our thinking and so profoundly influenced the course of our history. The word "Negro" conjures up a horde of ridiculous responses and unfounded suppositions, at once flattering and fearsome, yet so powerful as a conditioning force that the whole pattern of our life is shaped by it. When it enters, reason flees and absurdity is enthroned. Because of it we have retarded our social

> and economic development, fought a war, and conducted ourselves in a manner that would amaze a visitor from Mars. Any equally groundless set of beliefs in a Congo or Borneo tribe we point to as evidence of retarded cultural development; here it all seems somehow quite sane" (53)

Highlighting the irrationality and absurdity of race through a counterpoint of "any equally groundless set of beliefs" as evidence of cultural development that the new modern sociology of race would recognize, Hutchinson marks U.S. democratic adjudication of race as evidence of "retarded cultural development." Here, it becomes clear that Schuyler's remarks, while providing a more materially grounded critique of the production of race as a function of the political economy later in the essay, grounds this critique within the new modern sociology of race that would be adopted as official state practice through racial liberal security state governance projects. First, however, he conducts a thorough debunking of the "false science" of race and its "backwards" ontologies of human value:

> We believe that humanity is divided into rigidly definable groups called races; that some are inferior and others superior; that the superior are recognized by lack of pigmentation and certain physical features; that the darker groups have contributed nothing to civilization while the lighter groups have contributed everything; that mating of the darker and lighter peoples would be socially and culturally calamitous . . . and for this reason we have established an ingeniously cruel caste system based allegedly on color—a standing mockery of both democracy and reason. (53)

In his critique of the scientific ontologies of race and their production of human value, Schuyler aberrationalizes through temporalizing these scientific ontologies as error in a system of modern rationality. In short, he places this kind of race thinking grounded on

pseudo-science as an atavistic hold on a pre-rational order, a "superstition" that American science and government have bent the laws of reason and rationality to accommodate with dire consequences for the nation's secure future:

> Our preoccupation with this racial superstition may ultimately bring about the social debacle we are professedly eager to avoid. Lincoln's view that "A nation divided against itself cannot stand," holds more than geographical implications. It is as true of colored and white, new-immigrant and old-stock as it was of North and South. Here I want to restrict myself almost entirely to the color situation. (53)

In Schuyler's account, it is precisely American's desire to bend the logic and reason of modern sciences toward the atavistic end of race thinking that sacrifices the security of the U.S. state in contemporary times. Unlike Hutchins and Adamic who do not draw clear distinctions between between race and ethnicity, and proffer culturalist modes of inviting diversity and difference, Schuyler clearly demarcates the "color line" as the important distinction that organizes the political economy in the U.S. even while contemporary social science, legal rationality, and common sense has failed to determine precisely what the nature of that line actually entails. He notes that "An alien precisionist would assume that a word so influential in our thinking as 'Negro' would be clear in its meaning and exact in its definition; but neither anthropology, jurisprudence, nor common understanding is agreed upon it. 'Negro' means black, yet there are as few really black people as there are actually white people" (53). Schuyler insists that indeed, no natural basis exists for these strictly defined ontologies of racial belonging and notes the well-known fact of miscegenation in order to further demonstrate the socio-political point:

> This confusion is understandable when we realize that despite the much advertised "natural aversion" of one "race" to the other, there has been continuous

> miscegenation in the U.S. for 320 years until there are few "full blooded Negroes" left and much of the old "white" stock is slightly tarbrushed. Indeed there was great consternation in Virginia when the Racial Integrity Law was passed in 1927, and it was discovered many Virginian's as "white" as their neighbors no longer "belonged." They had boasted of their Indian ancestry until it was disclosed there had not been an Indian unmixed with "Negro" on the Atlantic seaboard since Revolutionary times. (53)

Though it becomes clear through this adjudication of "the facts" that modern science is precisely *misnaming* what race is and basing an entire socio-political and economic structure on this imprecise calculation of human value that remains stubbornly indeterminate despite attempts to adjudicate a set definition through ever changing racial science, it stands, Schuyler argues as an irrational, premodern, and certainly unprogressive basis from which to determine one's belongingness within a socio-political system of value:

> If the anthropologists are confused, despite their measurement of skulls, nostrils, jaws, noses, and heels, and their solemn statistical compilations buttressed by pontifical guesses, the lawyers are more so. After three centuries of peppering the law books with the word "Negro," American legislatures and courts have not definitely and uniformly decided who is a "Negro."
>
> It is indicative of the humorlessness with which Americans coddle their pet superstition that legislators and jurists spend time and money delving into the mysticism of blood percentages, while one-third of the nation is "ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed. (54-55)

Schuyler's focus specifically on the color line, allows him to sidestep questions of acculturation and unifying diversity through national belonging, as he insists instead the issue is socioeconomic, political. His critique of the absurd mysticism mixed with statistical, positivistic science as the practice of adjudicating racial "belonging" begins to lay the groundwork for an alternative conception of the racial-cultural situation in the U.S. that is more in line with what Omi and Winant have termed class-based paradigms for understanding the meaning and significance of race and ethnicity:

> An intimation that the basis of American superstition may not be "racial" but primarily social is suggested by a decision handed down in 1819 by a South Carolina court, which held that the word "Negro" had the fixed meaning of "a slave." If we accept this premise, our social, legal, and "scientific" attitudes make sense. The racialistic propanganda which arose simultaneously with the lucrative chattel slave traffic and raged in its defense was intended to soothe any misgivings about the righteousness of the business. It has continued because the economic exploitation of the "Negro" caste has continued. (55-56)

Unlike "cultural" explanations proffered by Hutchins and Adamic, Schuyler puts forth the position that Race not "cultural" but social—political-economic, and his perspective allows for a keen understanding of the reproduction of race as a category to differentiate and rank the social-economic sectors of laboring population under a liberal capitalist state. Interestingly, Schuyler's critique maps out quite succinctly, what David Roediger would famously term "the wages of whiteness" or the psychological wage of belonging to a racial group given more value and privilege with a socio-political and economic order:

> This exploitation was and is "justified" by traducing its victims. And since it is flattering to be "better than" somebody else, most of "white" America has taken

> kindly to the superstition of "racial differences" and the myth of "Negro inferiority." It is at once a psychological defense and a conscience-bracer. The more "Negros" there are, the more the position of the "white" man is enhanced; hence the inclusive "one drop" theory. Here is some mysterious voodooistic force which, even though invisible to the eye, nevertheless separates the saints from the sinners, the sheep from the goats, the "Negroes" from the "whites." No wonder racialism has supplanted Christianity as the great American religion, and the "white" Church yesterday condoned slavery, and today supports the color caste system. (56)

Though the wage provides a psychological benefit in order to ensure that one's security through belonging to a valued racial-class appears justified and earned, Schuyler succinctly maps the bare facts of population management and control—in terms of restricting access to political participation and the control of bodies circulating in space—that are easily identifiable as totalitarian mechanisms of power. He continues:

> So we have worthless "Negro" statistics defying all statistical rules, statistics that have enabled great insurance companies to grow rich by demanding higher rates from these unfortunate people than "white" people pay. So we have patriots bellowing for the defense of democracy while millions of "Negroes" are barred from the polls by terror. So we have "Negro" schools, "Negro" railroad coaches, "Negro" streetcar and bus compartments, and "Negro" waiting-rooms. So, by "understandings" between realtors and "restrictive covenants" between land-lords, we keep the "Negro" in a clearly demarcated Ghetto similar to that which we condemn Hitler for establishing. So we pay the cost of maintaining a dual school system in two score states which are the poorest of the lot and can scarcely afford to run one system adequately. So we criticize "Negroes" for not attaining the "white"

> man's standard of living, while barring him laregely from skilled and professional work except among his own. So we point derogatorily at his higher sickness and death rates while barring his ambitious youngers from most medical schools, and excluded him from the skilled military and naval services while taxing him for their upkeep. (56)

Schuyler lays bare the material facts of the color line as a function and mechanism for producing white supremacist power within the nation state as means of securing territorial sovereignty through the internal management and restriction of racial-classes to the means of social and economic security, and brilliantly demonstrates the racial science's role in naturalizing what is, at face value, an enactment of state power. His critique exposes racialism as a means of restricting the movement and access to both the material and ideological resources that purportedly enhance social and economic security. If security through racial belonging was the avenue through which this "pre-modern" order of government was maintained, however, the racial break with this amoral past demanded both the exposing of these facts and the irrational racial logic that was their basis, as well as a new means for securing the new order. Interestingly, Schuyler posits that in the abolition of the conditions that create this fault in modern reasoning and governance, the key to salvation for a new progressive order based on belonging through right, justice, and, importantly material equity can be grounded:

> Were we a rational people and our leaders really courageous, we would abolish "Negro" and "colored" and "race" from our vocabulary and our literature, and deal with all Americans alike—old stock, new-stock, white, and colored—as individuals with individual outlooks, ambitions, and problems. We would stop teaching Hitlerian racialism in our schools and eliminate it from our laws. We would stop breeding

> humiliation and hatred that make mock of our vaunted democracy. We would stop fostering separatism when the need is for unity, and, attaining at last a vision of a great people of the future welded together by indissoluble bonds, we would practice here the human brotherhood we preach in sermons addressed to Europe. (56)

Though Schuyler's proposition for salvation through racial unbelonging would not take hold as a dominant strain of thought and argument in popular discourse and policy debates for nearly 40 years, the importance of its emergence through discourses on racial cultural situation in the U.S. across the racial break is significant as it maps out an alternative path for security through racial unbelonging that would quite effectively shape the contours of the new economy of faults and merits in the postwar years.

As discussed in the previous chapter, fears that federal intervention and regulation of the economy and private life would lead to the establishment of a totalitarian state profoundly determined the form the expanding progressive interventionist policies of the New Deal Welfare State—and its plural mass subjects—would take. Articulations of liberal freedom shifted decisively in the postwar period toward what U.S. intellectual, critical legal, critical race, and U.S. policy scholars have termed a governance strategy of "procedural neutrality" over the direct intervention in the imposition of values in regards to issues of economic and social security. Quite perplexingly, a mere ten years after unregulated free enterprise had collapsed the national economy into a decade long depression, economists, intellectuals, public officials, and policy makers astonishingly began arguing once again for a regrounding of laissez faire principles of economic development as necessary for maintaining "America's freedom" in the face of the totalitarian threat as the U.S. prepared to enter WWII, and their efforts effectively laid the course for U.S. global ascendancy and the rearticulation and intensification of racially stratified classes in the U.S. under the auspices of

"race-neutral" policy initiatives and judicial procedures in the postwar period. In this cultural milieu, Academics, public intellectuals, and grassroots practitioners of the increasingly pluralist social sciences engaged in public educational initiatives effectively neutralized race and ethnicity as a legitimate sites of state intervention precisely through their acceptance and affirmation of culturalist modes of education. This affirmation elided and in some cases facilitated the criminalization of alternative forms of cultural critique and political dissent while producing an elite class of "well meaning liberal progressives" whose imperatives of "tolerance and open debate" and "principles of procedural neutrality" effectively rearticulated the meaning and significance of race to American politics and created new parameters for race and ethnicity as sites of mass political struggle that would dominate U.S. state and economic development for at least two generations.

If, as discussed in chapter 1, the totalitarian encounter defanged the transformative potential of the shift from scientific racism to cultural pluralist and social constructivist theories of racial and ethnic difference in the disciplines, the attendant shifts in racial liberal state security practices had equally devastating consequences for the criminalization of movements of those organizing outside the rationality and structure mapped out through the transition to privatized difference, economic freedom, and interest group pluralist democratic practice that marked the racial break. William Preston Jr.'s classic history of the rise and consolidation of U.S. national security apparatuses in response to labor radicalism, immigration, and internal migration gives a detailed accounting of the processes through which various governmental and state agencies worked in collaboration to suppress labor radicalism and political dissent and enact restrictive immigration and deportation policies. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, Preston argues, the Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, and the Departments of Labor and Justice, most significantly,

shared resources and strategies to suppress labor radicalism and enforce immigration restrictions, and this collaboration fully solidified when these apparatuses enforced the Alien Registration Act and to investigate and deport labor radicals and anarchists in the Palmer Raids in the 1920s.[33] As the world prepared for war again in the late 1930s, these newly consolidated national security apparatuses and the passage of the Smith Act, or Alien Registration Act of 1940 (and later, the McCarren, or Internal Security Act of 1950) were poised to secure the nation against the threat that global fascism ostensibly posed to domestic unity at home. In the name of national defense, alternative or oppositional politics of racial minorities and ethnic foreigners were rigorously suppressed throughout this period, as already well-established discourses of foreign contagion were mobilized anew to target and try radicals. The nation's leading public newspapers and national security apparatuses worked jointly to promote a climate of suspicion and paranoia about radical, racialized otherness in the U.S., and demonstrated clearly what the costs of adherence to such politics and organizing practices could be, and created both the ideological and material apparatuses for a concerted campaign against radical, redistributive oriented politics through the highly publicized Communist Cases until the act was finally overturned in 1957.

Indeed, in less than a decade after *Common Ground*'s 1940 inaugural issue articulated its project for developing a newly inclusive American identity, the U.S. would witness perhaps that most intensive era of political surveillance and suppression in its history with

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[33] See William Preston, Jr., *Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933*, (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1963). More recently, historians Alfred McCoy and Moon Ho-Jung have begun to investigate how strategies for surveillance and political suppression that punctuated the rise of the modern U.S. national security state generated in the "test labs" of the U.S. colonial territories of the Philippines, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. See McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: the United States, the Philippines, and the rise of the Surveillance State*, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009) and Ho-Jung, "Seditious Subjects: Race, State Violence, and the U.S. Empire," *Asian American Quarterly,* 14, no. 2, (2001): 221-247.

the rise of McCarthyism, J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, and its COINTELPRO operations. On the eve not only of the U.S.'s entrance into WWII, but also of the rise of the modern U.S. national security state, *Common Ground's* project of articulating a culturally pluralist, racial liberal approach to managing—and indeed monitoring—American racial and ethnic difference took shape. Whereas the progressive projects of the previous decade were more thoroughly grounded in a left-oppositional politics that were closely, if at times uncomfortably aligned with broader socialist and communist critiques of capitalism, by the 1940s, the "Left" had to a large extent entered the mainstream with the various cultural work of the Popular Front and New Deal political discourse, forming what Michael Denning famously termed "The Cultural Front." *Common Ground* and the Common Council for American Unity was a left-liberal progressive cultural formation that did not espouse a radical critique of capitalism as central to its project of accounting for and addressing the racial cultural situation in the U.S. The cultural pluralist paradigms *Common Ground*'s project espoused depoliticized difference by marking such difference as an explicitly "private" concern with significant national consequences as public discourse shifted toward more inclusive narratives of national belonging. The structures of national belonging that informed *Common Ground*'s project are more broadly indicative of how, according to Rabinowitz, ". . .the political and cultural activities developed to encompass the widely diverse political perspectives gathered within the Popular Front downplayed revolutionary critiques of capitalism and stressed the unity of democratic peoples and institutions fighting a common enemy—fascism" (76). The inaugural issue of *Common Ground* illuminates this previously unexamined component of this complex process of racial and state formation that constitutes the racial break: namely, the close articulation of "inclusive" structures of

national belonging with the logics and reading practices of the emergent modern national security state in the U.S.

Coda

"The Propaganda of History": Critical Race Theory and the Shadow of Racial Fascism After the Racial Break

In 2019, Fox News and the broader right wing media propaganda machine began what seemed at the time to be a somewhat predictable and frivolous campaign of attack against the recently launched *New York Times*'s *1619 Project*. The *1619 Project* provided an account of the nation's founding that centered the history of the transatlantic slave trade and establishment racial slavery in the U.S., beginning with the first enslaved Africans who were brought to American shores in 1619, and was designed to tell a true accounting of the nation's founding that could offer insights into the persistence of racial inequity in the present day. Taking particularly vitriolic aim at the credentials and character of leading author Nicole Hannah-Jones, an inordinate number of programming hours were devoted to challenging the central framing of the project as un-American, and in fact, *racist*. With the *1619 Project* as its key anecdote, a broader propaganda campaign commenced to inform the republican party's conservative base of a growing threat to American democracy. Talking heads of the right claimed that a nefarious ideology, which had formerly lurked in the college classrooms of liberal professors, was now moving into the mainstream, infecting corporate and federal employment sectors with a scourge of required "diversity trainings," as well as primary and secondary school curriculum that treated seriously the history of racism in America. This amorphous threat began to take shape in right wing discourse and the underlying culprit was identified as stemming from Critical Race Theory, an intellectual formation that sprung from critical legal studies in the 1980s and addressed how racism was imbedded in U.S. law. Early Critical Race theorists such as Kimberle Crenshaw, Cheryl Harris, Neil Gotanda, Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, and Kendall Thomas sought to

illuminate how race was not a natural fact, but socially constructed through law and social practice, as well as the ways in which white supremacy was codified into U.S. law from the nation's founding. This body of scholarship was essential as well in explicating the ways in which this codification of whiteness persisted because of and in spite of the passage of the Civil Rights Act through the presumption of a universal subject of liberal rights, who if no longer de jure, was certainly de facto still grounded in white supremacy. According to the editors of the field defining 1995 anthology *Critical Race Theory*, "CRT…embraces a movement of left scholars, most of them scholars of color, situated in law schools, whose work challenges the ways in which race and racial power are constructed and represented in American legal culture and, more generally, in America society as a whole" (xiii). While the editors stress CRT has "no canonical set of doctrines or methodologies" and that the intellectual formation's "scholarship differs in object, argument, accent, and emphasis," it nonetheless shares two key interests. First, "to understand how a regime of white supremacy and its subordination of people of color have been created and maintained in America, and in particular, to examine the relationship between the social structure and professed ideals such as 'the rule of law' and 'equal protection'" (xiii). Secondly, "is a desire to not merely understand the vexed relationship between law and racial power but to *change* it" (xiii). If critical legal studies can be understood as the disciplinary birthplace of Critical Race Theory as a formally recognized intellectual formation, scholars committed to changing how racial power operated in the United States extended those modes of inquiry into other cultural terrain outside of legal studies proper. Kimberle Crenshaw's paradigm shifting "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color," for example, first articulated how modes of power were differentially and overlappingly operative through the intersections of race and gender. Crenshaw's concept of

intersectionality served as a watershed for opening fields of cultural studies that would continue to interrogate how categories of race, gender, sexuality, class, and other intersecting identities were constructed and operative within social, political, economic, and cultural contexts, posing a significant critique, and indeed, threat, to white heteropatriarchal rule that structured the U.S. state and its social, political, economic, and cultural institutions. A particular offshoot of these modes of inquiry has developed through scholarship that interrogates the many modalities of racial power that are operative through the liberal tradition in the U.S., and a significant body of work has sought to undo the binary of right (regressive) and left (progressive) that supports a liberal version of the progress narrative that have dominated liberal political and cultural discourse, and been weaponized by the right, in post-Civil Rights Era America. Scholars such as Jodi Melamed, Roderick Ferguson, Naomi Murakawa, and Chandan Reddy, for example, have investigated how renovations to the liberal (often democratic) tradition in the U.S. have worked to reinvent and perfect anew forms of racial inequity and violence as the mechanisms of white supremacy from a previous era become outmoded, are challenged, and relegated to the regressive "past."

For any serious students of American history, or contemporary Critical Race theorist, highlighting the central role that racial slavery played in the founding and development of the early republic, and suggesting that the history of racial slavery has had lasting effects on how American society functions seems so obvious a point as not to warrant significant elaboration. For practitioners of Critical Race Theory who interrogate how the vast majority of contemporary diversity trainings and antiracist pedagogies are derived not from the race radical social movements and traditions that first sought to articulate the relationship of race to capitalism—or later in the case of CRT race to U.S. law and other social institutions—but from a longer history of racial liberal incorporation in the U.S. that sought specifically to

address race as a question of culture, targeting the *1619 Project* seemed at first an odd foe to hang the media attack campaign on—The *1619 Project*, after all, is a liberal project designed to educate the general public, which, if this dissertation's argument holds true, significantly curtails its radical potential. Moreover, in relation to diversity and inclusion trainings that are prevalent in corporate and federal employment sectors, contemporary Critical Race theorists are more apt to interrogate the underlying assumptions of those industries and expose how, in many cases, such trainings and curriculum often merely reproduce the power structures that uphold, rather than undo, white supremacy. That Fox News and the broader conservative propaganda machine would inaccurately represent Critical Race Theory was not surprising, however, but it did then seem odd to pick such mild targets for their assault when there was certainly scholarship out there that seeks to literally to undo the foundations of the white supremacist nation-state. Strange, that is, until one takes into view the full scope of the contemporary racial fascist project to reinstitute an overtly white supremacist state using the same universalizing language and procedurally neutral frameworks that first delivered formal Civil Rights in 1964. When considering and taking quite seriously this aim, Critical Race Theory, the very intellectual formation that first articulated how the legal wing of the liberal tradition worked to construct, reinvent, and maintain white supremacy, appears an apt target for socio-juridical-educational terrains of attack to align the public against, once it can be properly misunderstood by the public.

Indeed, the coordinated and concerted transformation of Critical Race Theory into a key cultural boogeyman that threatened to undo the racial neofascist promise to "Make America Great Again" had become a key tactic for energizing the conservative base. Seattle-based neofascist Christopher Rufo, a key architect of the assault on Critical Race Theory,

explained precisely the strategy and goal of this propaganda campaign:



Figure 1

in a series of tweets right before the election, and highlighted the efficacy of this strategy in reference to a Virginia house race, where Glen Youngkin succeeded in gaining office in a blue state by fomenting racist fears about the growing threat of CRT in that it is a key cultural engine fueling a broader movement for "white replacement" (Gellman).



Figure 2

In a recent article commemorating the one year anniversary of the January 6th 2021 coup attempt by Trump and supporters, who stormed the Capitol in an attempt to stop the ratification of the 2020 election results, *Atlantic* staff writer Barton Gellman warns that the events and rhetoric leading up to that act of white mob violence were merely a warm up for outright stealing the 2024 election. Usefully, Gellman examines Trump's speech prior to the insurrection in the broader context of fascist modes of affective identification to incite racially motivated political violence. Citing political violence scholar and director of the University of Chicago's Project on Security and Threats Robert A. Pape—who considers Trump's "Make America Great Again" rhetoric with a manner of seriousness and historical insight that few in even the liberal media sphere are willing to acknowledge, even after the white mob attack on the Capitol—the article draws disturbing parallels between Trump and Serbian genocide architect Slobadan Milosevic, who "inspired bloodshed by appealing to fears that Serbs were losing their dominant place to upstart minorities." Milosevic, Pape recounts, "fomented years of genocidal war that destroyed the hope for a multiethnic democracy, casting Serbs as defenders against a Muslim onslaught on 'European culture, religion, and European society in general.'" The grand narrative at play here, and one that is evident in Trump's January 6th speech—in which Trump claimed "Our country has been under siege for a long time, far longer than this four-year period," assuring the white crowd of thousands that "You're the real people. You're the people that built this nation," "And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don't fight like hell, you're not going to have a country anymore"—is what Pape alludes to as the theory of the "Great Replacement." While the term and ideology originates in pre-modern Europe, its most recent iteration as a racist trope in the U.S. dates, not surprisingly, back to the period of Reconstruction. According to Pape, "Replacement ideology holds that a hidden hand (often imagined as Jewish) is encouraging

the invasion of nonwhite immigrants, and the rise of nonwhite citizens, to take power from white Christian people of European stock." He notes that during the tikki bearing white supremacist march in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017, participants chanted "Jews will not replace us!" Pape's U of Chicago project on Security and Threats has painstakingly catalogued how the rise of Trumpism, in rhetoric and tactics, has borrowed heavily from the Great Replacement playbook.

Indeed, if the racial liberals of the postwar period and their neoliberal multiculturalist inheritors successfully hemmed in the transformative potential of the modern sociology of race by cordoning the consideration and administration of the racial-cultural situation in the U.S. as primarily a cultural issue for the democratic pastorate to address through extensive research, educational initiatives, and personal and communal vigilance, the neoconservative and now overtly racially fascist right has not surprisingly responded by inculcating their own class of democratic "defenders," energized now by the threat that Critical Race theory and its many murky manifestations are posing to accelerate white replacement. However, as Rufo's tweets baldly stated, white replacement this time is wholly recodified, disturbingly, in the language and procedures of Civil Rights. Employing the very logics of procedural neutrality and its economized universal subject that ushered in the racial break, the architects of what some gingerly call "the new right" have targeted precisely that liberal cultural terrain and its production of knowledge about race on a variety of legal and educational fronts. As Gellman rightly stresses, that political base has also been affectively encouraged to take an active and overtly politically violent role in the defense of white supremacy as the only legitimate basis for American democracy. While the so-called "new right"—what I would term an alignment of white interest—however, is as old as the nation itself, the current period of political instability witnessed under the rise of Trumpism can arguably be most immediately traced to

the conservative backlash to the *liberal* Civil Rights victories of mid-20th century, and the aim is quite literally to undo those victories, limited as contemporary critical race theorists have argued that they were. If the preceding chapters of this dissertation index how racial liberal renovation of the liberal tradition in the immediate pre and post war years restructured the racial state for the postwar and post Civil Rights period, this coda suggests that what resulted also provided fertile universal ground for the contemporary racial neofascist movement.

Where the 70's, '80s, and '90s witnessed subsequent attacks on the Black Power Movement (from liberals and conservatives alike), Affirmative Action, and "political correctness," as well as a mass mobilization of propaganda around the criminality of poor Black and brown Americans leading to the rise of the mass cercal state (again, headed by conservatives and liberals alike), the new politics of white resentment fomenting since the passage of the Civil Rights Act and subsequent steps toward affirmation action to redress racial inequity in federal and state sectors are not alarming for their novelty, but in their organization in the present moment into a mass popular movement under the banner of Trumpism. Amid this legitimate threat to democracy—as many on the Left have warned in the year following Biden's victory—there is a decisive lack of will and ability to challenge an overtly racially fascist mass political movement from the neoliberal multiculturalist inheritors of the racial liberal tradition in the Democratic establishment. This, I suggest, is in part, because the forms and structures of the racial break are precisely those being weaponized to attempt to reinstitute a formally white heteropatriarchal state. What's more, and more easily recognizable as racial fascisms of yesteryear and today, this Democratic establishment has worked diligently to not only hem in the transformative potential of the modern sociology of race, but worked actively to contain the race radical critiques of Critical Race Theory within the confines of the university, while criminalizing the very social and community movements

that inform, and indeed, actualize Critical Race theories lessons as praxis in the ongoing fight against U.S. racial-liberal capitalism. In many ways, from the COINTELPRO operations against and assassination of Civil Rights and Black Power leaders of the '60s and '70s, to the bipartisan, Clinton administration authored 1994 Crime Bill, to Biden administration's aggressive targeting and prosecution of Black Lives Matter and "Antifa" activists as domestic terrorists, the democratic establishment that imagines itself as the democratic pastorate, the true protectors of the telos of progressive liberal modernity is, indeed, doing the fascist right's work for them in directly suppressing those individuals and social organizations that would mount a substantial material attack against the racial fascist populist movement that now has roughly half the population of the U.S. under its sway. Clearly, the codification of the doctrine of liberal Civil Rights, and a—rhetorical at least—profession of their value in securing a multiracial democracy have not proven an effective measure for distinguishing liberal from neoconservative governance, as the liberal iteration of that doctrine requires a wholly universalized, individual liberal rights bearing subject, as well.

Understanding the longer historical context of Civil Rights as a key site contestation over racial formation in the U.S. is necessary to understand why, at the very least, a return to "normal" color-blind multiculturalism will not provide the security the liberal American public hoped would be ushered in with a Biden victory. Indeed, the right assault on Civil Rights has come to serve as perhaps the defining feature of what Omi and Winant designate as the third period of the ethnicity paradigm's reign, and the cultural turn of the ethnicity paradigm promoted first by racial liberals of the postwar period, as has been made clear, has provided quite fertile ground for once more overt racial fascist governance. The final stage demarcated by Omi and Winant was, prior to the era of Trump, operative most conspicuously in the guise of both neoconservative and neoliberal multiculturalist driven

post-racialism that served both liberal incorporative and neoconservative dismantling agendas. This contemporaneous period of racial formation began to take shape in the post-1960s socio-political landscape, following the formal legal victories of the Civil Rights and race radical student movements, as well as the subsequent violent suppression of the Black Power Movement. Omi and Winant have noted how these more recent "ethnicity-oriented accounts of race" counter intuitively focused on "defending conservative (or 'neoconservative') individualism against what was perceived as the radical assault of group rights." The most recent chapter in the life of the ethnicity paradigm poses an especially perplexing dynamic, given the paradigm's prior history as a vehicle for ostensibly progressive intellectual thought and social action in that, within the contemporary phase, this paradigm has served as the primary fulcrum around which the continued cultural and political battle over the relation of race to political economy in the United States has been waged. Not surprisingly, the results of this battle have remained quite ambiguous given their shared material and epistemic foundations that this dissertation has illuminated. Omi and Winant explain that "Since the early 1970s, neoconservative approaches to race have fueled the racial reaction in the United States, operating in an effective although at times uneasy alliance with the new right. Under the banner of 'colorblindness' this alliance has attempted to forge a new 'post-racial' hegemony…." (21) that, particularly in the so-called "era of Obama," became the new "common sense" of race. The new common sense of a postracial America, while ideologically driven by neoconservatives, was warmly and widely accepted by a liberal democratic establishment, as well, oftentimes overtly joining forces to shame or criminalize the poor when it was politically expedient.

While most liberal progressives in the era of Obama failed to recognize their affective identification with colorblind ideology as an alignment with neoconservative and

neofascist values and tactics, in believing in and celebrating the purported achievement of a post-racial America with the election of the country's first Black president, they had indeed found common ground (once more) with regressive political movements that architected the rise of the mass carceral state, the overturning of affirmative action, and the privatization of the university that sought to defund and defang the transformative potential of Humanities and Social Science departments under the banner of defeating the twin threats of "identity politics" and "political correctness." From a (bad faith) neoconservative/neofascist perspective, to "fixate" on race was to perpetuate the very racial animosity that stoked divisions that had already been settled, which had now created a social and cultural landscape where whites were now the victims of purported "reverse discrimination." From a neoliberal perspective, so much ground had been gained in the great march toward progressive equality that the "dream" of racial equality had, in fact, been mostly achieved through the hard work of the democratic pastorate, so one ought not to fixate on "differences" and instead, celebrate that which unites Americans toward a common goal of continued liberal progress. As should be apparent, rhetorically at least, both perspectives share an underlying ethos and teleological goal that is functionally similar, if decidedly different in its preferred tactics of expression: to untether race from political economy at key historical junctures when the social, legal, and political construction of race is once again understood on a mass scale to be an enduring engine of a disavowed, yet inherently racialized state. If a postracial society driven by the principles of equality and free market individualism is the historical fantasy and avowed teleological goal of the democratic pastorate, the univeralist logics upon which this fantasy and goal rely function equally as well for the reestablishment of a white supremacist state.

The Executive Order to Combat Race and Sex Stereotyping

While concern over the Trump administration's refusal to accept a potential Biden victory reached a fever pitch and dominated news cycles and pundit chatter in the liberal media sphere, the Trump administration not so quietly took up the mantle of fighting the Great Replacement that the right wing propaganda machine had so thoroughly convinced its base was underfoot. In a televised address on September 17th, Trump announced a soon to be issued Executive Order that would address the growing spectre of Critical Race Theory and its practices of antiracist education that were behind the movement for white replacement in the U.S. This speech alarmed even liberals committed to the ideals of tolerant debate for, of course, what they saw as an explicit and direct attack on freedom of speech and thought. And as promised, on September 22, 2020, Trump signed and announced the dubiously titled "Executive Order to Combat Race and Sex Stereotyping," further energizing a racist voting base with the promise to formally reinstitute a white supremacist state in the guise of color and sex blind governance. While the specific target of the order was to ban "diversity trainings" within the Federal government and any entity that receives federal funding, the broader historical context of this order's issuance can be found in the right's longer, and now overtly neofascist, assault on the broader social, political, and intellectual movements arising from the Civil Rights Movement, Black student-led campus and community organizing, and Black Power Movements of the '60s and '70s. While Roderick Ferguson has brilliantly examined the liberal incorporation of these race radical movements through "the university's pedagogies of minority difference," the then neoconservative right sought not incorporation, but the wholesale dismantling of these new intellectual and cultural formations with coordinated attacks on Civil Rights, Affirmative Action, and now,

the cultural educational shifts that have been ushered in by neoliberal multiculturalist incorporation of race radicalisms of yesteryear and today. Indeed, as a close reading of the order taken in concert with Trump's remarks will make clear, the underlying power structure of white heteropatriarchal rule that Critical Race Theorists across the disciplines have so painstakingly enumerated is precisely what the "Executive Order to Combat Race and Sex Stereotyping" seeks to preserve and protect, using the universal language of liberal rights as its basis for disavowing its central aim.

Citing Martin Luther King Jr.'s "dream"—a favored tactic of racial liberals, neoliberal multiculturalists, and neofascists alike—the order, in effect, promises to protect white male federal employees and contractors from the race and sex stereotyping it argues is a central feature of diversity trainings. In order to "promote economy and efficiency in Federal contracting, to promote unity in the Federal workforce, and to combat offensive and anti-American race and sex stereotyping and scapegoating," the order proceeds to write a heroic, if patently false, narrative of American exceptionalism, claiming that the evil of America's racist *past* has been valiantly defeated by "heroic Americans" from the "battlefields of Gettysburg to the bus boycott in Montgomery and the Selma to Montgomery marches." These heroic victories, as the narrative goes, have ensured that contemporary America is a country living out the creed that "All men are created equal," and insists that any suggestion to the contrary is dangerous and unpatriotic. While the rhetorical strategies of borrowing the language of Civil Rights to effectively undo Civil Rights protections that the order employs are not new, the crafting of a national narrative that imagines a past that has already witnessed and achieved collective triumph over racism is perhaps the document's most egregious, and overtly fascistic feature. In a complete flaunting of historical facts and flagrant

disregard for the truth when recounting the nation's founding and subsequent struggles for racial equality in the U.S., the document insists that

> It was this belief in the inherent equality of every individual that inspired the Founding generation to risk their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor to establish a new Nation, unique among the countries of the world. President Abraham Lincoln understood that this belief is "the electric cord" that "links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving" people, no matter their race or country of origin. It is the belief that inspired the heroic black soldiers of the 54th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment to defend that same Union at great cost in the Civil War. And it is what inspired Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to dream that his children would one day "not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.

Rewriting the intent of the founding documents of the nation, erasing entirely indigenous removal and land appropriation, marking the Civil Rights Movement as the effective "end" of a history of racial violence in America, and quite conspicuously, given the order's title, leaving out any mention of any wave of feminist political action entirely, the order constructs parallel symbolic figures of Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr., phantasmically presenting each as champions whose labors have secured the post racial world order that Americans purportedly enjoy today. Such historiographical reframing is egregious, not only for its blatant disregard for the historical record, but also in its implicit suggestion that the ultimate goal of the nation's founding documents—and any subsequent steps taken to address racial disparity in the U.S.—was to achieve a society in which a universal, raceless subject reigned supreme. Indeed, even within the document's focus on key flashpoints in the ongoing struggle for Black liberation in the U.S., the abolition of slavery, and the

achievement of formal equality under the law with the passage of the Civil Rights Act are significant not as victories for ending particular forms of oppression for Black Americans, but for their symbolic value as indices of steps taken toward achieving a color blind society that could symbolically celebrate universal equality while leaving intact the social relations that reproduce racial inequality in the first place. Borrowing from the language of Civil Rights, the document very clearly delineates equality as the individual rights of white men (propertied or not, lest the administration stoke the ire of its base) to remain free of guilt, acknowledgement, critical thought, or accurate historical knowledge. Centering yet disavowing the raced and gendered nature of the universal subject of this decree, the Order claims to be in accordance with driving telos of liberal progress, insisting it has already have been achieved, "particularly in the 57 years since Dr. King shared his dream with the country." This narrative sets the stage, then, for the direct attack on those who contemporarily seek to name and address the new institutions of racial inequity and violence that have persisted and transformed in the neoliberal era. The order claims that, in a direct attack on the universal equality purportedly achieved in the post-Civil Rights era,

> many people are pushing a different vision of America that is grounded in hierarchies based on collective social and political identities rather than in the inherent and equal dignity of every person as an individual. This ideology is rooted in the pernicious and false belief that America is an irredeemably racist and sexist country; that some people, simply on account of their race or sex, are oppressors; and that racial and sexual identities are more important than our common status as human beings and Americans.

As mentioned, in a strategy first perfected and operative since neoconservative attacks began on affirmative action since the Bakke decision of 1978, the order does not directly name, but

nonetheless presents white men as the real victims of racial discrimination, capitalizing on the universalist language of Civil Rights to wholly evacuate the historical and material reality of how racism has and continued to operate through "neutral" frameworks since the racial break. Moreover, however, the order baldly fabricates the historical record to reimagine the present goal of colorblind society as the teleological goal for earlier iterations of the republic, and its founding documents. The order goes so far as to suggest that

> This destructive ideology is grounded in misrepresentations of our country's history and its role in the world. Although presented as new and revolutionary, they resurrect the discredited notions of the nineteenth century's apologists for slavery who, like President Lincoln's rival Stephen A. Douglas, maintained that our government "was made on the white basis" "by white men, for the benefit of white men." Our Founding documents rejected these racialized views of America, which were soundly defeated on the blood-stained battlefields of the Civil War. Yet they are now being repackaged and sold as cutting-edge insights. They are designed to divide us and to prevent us from uniting as one people in pursuit of one common destiny for our great country.

The order argues that this "malign ideology" is "migrating from the fringes of American society" threatening to "infect core institutions of our country" with diversity trainings that teach "that men and members of certain races, as well as our most venerable institutions, are inherently sexist and racist." As evidence, they cite a recent Department of the Treasury seminar training in which arguments that "'virtually all White people, regardless of how 'woke' they are, contribute to racism'" and where attendees were encouraged to "'avoid 'narratives' that Americans should 'be more color-blind' or 'let people's skills and personalities be what differentiates them.'" Citing additional training materials from

Argonne National Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and a Smithsonian Institution museum, the order rewrites the language and aim of critiques of systemic racism, individualizing these critiques on the level of population and nation, and argues that saying the "nation is inherently racist," and "certain races are inherently racist," consciously or unconsciously, is "contrary to the fundamental premises underpinning our Republic: that all individuals are created equal and should be allowed an equal opportunity under the law to pursue happiness and prosper based on individual merit." "Such ideas," they argue, "reinforce stereotypes…and use subtle coercive pressure to ensure conformity of viewpoint," and while they "may be fashionable in the academy…they have no place in programs and activities supported by Federal taxpayer dollars." Finally, they add, "research also suggests that blame-focused diversity training reinforces biases and decreases opportunities for minorities," however, they do not cite the specific studies to which they are referencing.

Not surprisingly, in a move that has become textbook for the right's assault on Civil Rights during the dismantling of Affirmative Action law since the 1970s, the order offers its legal grounding and precedent by selectively quoting and misrepresenting the Federal civil service system "Merit System Principles" codified in 5 U.S.C. 2301, an affirmative protections clause to ensure equal opportunity hiring and promotion in Federal civil service. While initially instituted to stop political hiring, appointment, and advancement due to one's political connections, the Merit Systems Principles expanded to explicitly mimic the protections offered by Title VII of the *Civil Rights Act of 1964* in that

> All employees and applicants for employment should receive fair and equitable treatment in all aspects of personnel management without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or

> handicapping condition, and with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights. (US Merit Systems Protection Board)

As numerous critical race scholars have outlined, the abstract form of liberal rights designed to protect the universal liberal subject is woefully inadequate at securing in a materially significant manner, the rights and protections offered here for employment, and elsewhere in regards to various forms of discrimination.

The facility with which neoconservative and neofascist bad faith adoption of the language of liberal rights translates to overtly, and intentionally discriminatory practices should give anyone pause as to considering their continued utility as a political, social, or cultural goal or aim of liberal progress. Section 2 of the order, which provides a thorough list of definitions for the categories of "divisive concepts" and what it refers to as "stereotyping," illuminates precisely this point. First and foremost, the order describes the "divisive concepts" that are to be banned from federal or federal fund receiving programs. These include:

> (1) one race or sex is inherently superior to another race or sex; (2) the United States is fundamentally racist or sexist; (3) an individual, by virtue of his or her race or sex, is inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously; (4) an individual should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment solely or partly because of his or her race or sex; (5) members of one race or sex cannot and should not attempt to treat others without respect to race or sex; (6) an individual's moral character is necessarily determined by his or her race or sex; (7) an individual, by virtue of his or her race or sex, bears responsibility for actions committed in the past by other members of the same race or sex; (8) any individual should feel discomfort, guilt, anguish, or any other

> form of psychological distress on account of his or her race or sex; or (9) meritocracy or traits such as a hard work ethic are racist or sexist, or were created by a particular race to oppress another race. The term "divisive concepts" also includes any other form of race or sex stereotyping or any other form of race or sex scapegoating.

While the terms race and sex are never themselves defined, it is clear here that the authors of the order are protecting a universalized conception of the subject, and an individualized notion of how racism and sexism operate. This is a key contribution of the ethnicity paradigm in that it has individualized racism—and by default, sexism—as a matter of personal value, beliefs, and opinions. The order terms even those individualized conceptions as "divisive" and wholesale bar any consideration of systemic racism or sexism with the misrepresentation of those critiques as making claims of the "inherent nature of things." The order, however, does not propose to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Indeed, discrimination does exist within the world the order constructs. The forms of discrimination that are permissible to identify come in the order's identification of "race and sex stereotyping," which it defines as "ascribing character traits, values, moral and ethical codes, privileges, status, or beliefs to a race or sex, or to an individual because of his or her race or sex" and "race or sex scapegoating," defined as

> assigning fault, blame, or bias to a race or sex, or to members of a race or sex because of their race or sex. It similarly encompasses any claim that, consciously or unconsciously, and by virtue of his or her race or sex, members of any race are inherently racist or are inherently inclined to oppress others, or that members of a sex are inherently sexist or inclined to oppress others.

While the language of the order is cloaked in univeralist categories of "race" and "sex," the subjects protected—from blame, guilt, and other forms of "scapegoating"—are by no means universal. And so the logic of the order reinstitutes formally, the white male subject as the universal subject of the order, and effectively insists that mention of racism or sexism that addressed actual agents of racism and racism, is prohibited. Indeed, the document articulates a form of "reverse racism and reverse sexism," where there aren't any racists or sexists in the first place, but real injury exists, nonetheless, from the insinuation thereof. What's more, in a final act to undo Civil Rights legislation, Trump's Justice Department also sought to formally alter the legal interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which is responsible for prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin by any entity receiving federal funding. Under Title VI, "actions are considered discriminatory if they have a discriminatory effect, what's known as 'disparate impact,' on protected groups." Under the new interpretation proposed by the Justice Department, "only intentional discrimination would be prohibited" (Seattle Times). Alas, Trump's bid to overthrow the results of the 2020 election and continue a full scale assault on "un-American" history, progressive diversity education programming, and Civil Rights did not come to pass when his supporters failed to successfully stop the certification of the elections results by Congress on January 6th. It was not, however, for lack of effort, and the, at first appalled, then apologetic, and finally, willfully forgetful collaboration of media and members of the Executive, Legislative, and Legal branches from both sides of the aisle.

On his first day in office, President Biden announced the repeal of the "Order to Combat Race and Sex Stereotyping," and answered with his own Executive Order 13985 "Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government" which established that "affirmatively advancing equity, civil rights, racial

justice, and equal opportunity is the responsibility of our Government," which affirmed the federal government's commitment to Civil Rights, and programs of diversity, equity, and inclusion. "To further advance equity within the Federal Government," the Biden administration announced a follow up order on June 25th, the "Executive Order on Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal Workforce," that established as policy within his administration to "cultivate a *workforce* that draws from the full diversity of the Nation" (my italics). The order promised affirmative action toward that goal, announcing a host of federal and state "programming and resources" to ensure that the Federal Government would "strengthen its ability to recruit, hire, develop, promote, and retain our Nation's talent and remove barriers to equal opportunity" to work, because "As the Nation's largest employer, the Federal Government must be a model for diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility, where all *employees* are treated with dignity and respect" (The White House, my italics). And so with much celebration, a majority of the 80+ million American citizens who had cast votes for Joe Biden and Kamala Harris to defend democracy in the 2020 election breathed what they believed a much earned sigh of relief. The democratic pastorate—its economized subjects and neutral if affirmative procedures of resource and population management to ensure equal opportunity to the promise of security that liberal progressive governance claimed to deliver—had, for now at least, lived to fight another day. But in the return to normal that followed the reestablishment of liberal democratic governance in the White House in those first winter months of 2021, a storm was, indeed, still blowing in from paradise.

Rethinking the Racial Break: "The Propaganda of History" and a Second Reconstruction in America

In 1935, as debate raged over totalitarian overreach in New Deal state programming and the Roosevelt administration successfully codified a new form of progressive (de)racialized security governance with the passage of the Social Security Act, famed sociologist, writer, and public intellectual W.E.B. Du Bois published his magisterial revisionist historiography of the Civil War and period of Reconstruction, *Black Reconstruction in America*. Recounting the history of the Civil War and Reconstruction with Black Americans at the center, Du Bois' materialist historiography and analysis of the relationship between knowledge production and racial state building remain unceasingly relevant for the present day. The closing chapter, "The Propaganda of History," which, Du Bois notes, "in logic should be a survey of books and resources, becomes of sheer necessity an arraignment of American historians and an indictment of their ideals" because, as his survey of historiography on Reconstruction demonstrates "… the mass of American writers have started out so to distort the facts of the greatest critical period of American history as to prove right wrong and wrong right" (725). Providing a review and scathing critique of how white Southern and white Northern sympathizing historians had so distorted the facts of the period of Reconstruction as to render the tremendous victory for democracy Reconstruction signaled as useless as a guiding principle for right action in the future, Du Bois notes that this distortion is "more than mere omission and difference of emphasis" but a "deliberate attempt so to change the facts of history that the story will make pleasant reading for Americans" (713). "War and especially civil strife," he remarks, "leave terrible wounds…." and so "It is the duty of humanity to heal them" (714). In "The Propaganda of History," Du Bois attempts to do just that, importantly, not by providing a conciliatory assessment that seeks common ground, but by demanding that a standard of ethics be established in the documentation of the past and a fully accounting of the roles that multiple historical actors

and knowledge producers played in disfiguring the historical record of perhaps the most pivotal period for the nation state.

In reviewing the mass distortion of the history of the Civil War and the period of Reconstruction by both the South and North, Du Bois illuminates how the choice was made to minimize the controversy of slavery as the true cause of the war, and to settle on the collective agreement that Reconstruction be passed over with "a phrase of regret or disgust" (714) in order to move the nation forward after those "four long and fearful years the South fought to perpetuate human slavery" (715). Du Bois laments that, rather than telling a true accounting of this history so that the nation might accurately acknowledge the "morally wrong and economically retrogressive" institution of racial slavery and work to build a truly democratic nation, it was instead "soon conceived as neither wise nor patriotic to speak of all the causes of strife and the terrible results to which sectional differences in the United States had led" (714). Significantly, in Du Bois' arraignment, he holds not only the South accountable for its immoral attachment to slavery, but also the North for going "to war without the slightest idea of freeing the slave," insisting that "the great majority of Northerners from Lincoln down pledged themselves to protect slavery, and they hated and harried Abolitionists" (719) and the role Northern historians, particularly those from the Dunning School, had in crafting demonstrably false historical accounts that included "first, endless sympathy with the white South; second, ridicule, contempt or silence for the Negro; third, a judicial attitude towards the North, which concludes that the North under great misapprehension did a grievous wrong, but eventually saw its mistake and retreated" (719). Du Bois notes that "…in propaganda against the Negro since emancipation in this land, we face one of the most stupendous efforts the world ever saw to discredit human beings, an

effort involving universities, history, science, social life, and religion" (727), and warns of the dire consequences that such "lies agreed upon" bring forth:

> This, then, is the book basis upon which today we judge Reconstruction. In order to paint the South as a martyr to inescapable fate, to make the North the magnanimous emancipator, and to ridicule the Negro as the impossible joke in the whole development, we have in fifty years, by libel, innuendo and silence, so completely misstated and obliterated the history of the Negro in America and his relation to its work and government that today it is almost unknown. This may be fine romance, but it is not science. It may be inspiring, but it is certainly not the truth. And beyond that it is dangerous. It is not only part foundation of our present lawlessness and loss of democratic ideals; it has, more than that, led the world to embrace and worship the color bar as social salvation and it is helping to range mankind in ranks of mutual hatred and contempt, at the summons of a cheap and false myth. (723)

Du Bois' warning still rings true nearly a hundred years after its publication, and an all too familiar pattern of omission, fabrication, and disavowal can be seen in the continuing circulation of progressive historical narratives that drive the democratic pastorate—notably in the goals of a colorblind society, and the establishment of legal Civil Rights as the apex of achievement and means toward attaining that goal. And this disfiguring of the Truth of which Du Bois speaks remains just as dangerous. Currently such narratives are as easily instrumentalized by a neoliberal desire for a return to the normalcy of democratic governance as the overtly fascist right's desire to wholly undo Civil Rights and reestablish a formally white supremacist state. This fact should give those bearing witness to and narrating the new present moment of democratic crisis serious pause, and perhaps encourage them to interrogate further how the structuring conditions of present day progressive governance

have formed strange bedfellows across the period of the purported "racial break." In framing this longer duree of racial liberal security state rationality as the racial break's material and epistemic antecedent, I close by suggesting that we might reconsider more fully what precisely constitutes the racial break. Certainly, looking to our own national histories of upheaval and racial fascist violence—rather than those of Europe—provides a much more productive context for considering the continuing rise of fascism in the U.S. and globally. From the state by state assault on voting rights to the passage of educational bills dictating "patriotic curriculum" in Texas and Florida that, rhetorically, at least, promise to protect the nation's school children from the pernicious threat of Critical Race Theory, a battle to undo Civil and Voting Rights, playing out on the state and federal level in a manner reminiscent of the first Reconstruction in America has been, since the immediate post-Civil Rights period, underway. That the neutralizing frameworks, procedures, and selective incorporation and surveillance of diverse economized subjects under the inclusive umbrella of racial liberal progressive governance first ushered in the decades preceding the racial break have been both unwilling and unable to prevent blatantly fascist breaches to the promise of security is telling. It demands a full reckoning with the failures of the democratic pastorate and the racial liberal state that solidified their forms of rationality into dominant strategies for governance in the postwar era leading up to the present day. Within this frame, we might also more accurately assess that what we're currently experiencing is not quite a break from a racist past at all, but another period of reconstruction in America that—despite both the neoliberal and racial fascist desire to claim otherwise—is very much still in the process of being written.

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