



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FORN~~
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301



TRANSLATION

REQUESTER (b)(3) 10 USC 424	TRANSLATOR'S INITIALS (b)(3) 10 USC 424; (b)(6)	TRANSLATION NUMBER	DATE COMPLETED 19 Nov 84	ENCL(S) TO IR NO.
LANGUAGE SPANISH	GEOGRAPHIC AREA (If different from place of publication) EL SALVADOR			
ENGLISH TITLE OF TRANSLATION MEMORANDUM			PAGE NOS: TRANSLATED FROM ORIG DOC. 16	
FOREIGN TITLE OF TRANSLATION MEMORANDUM				
AUTHOR(S)		FOREIGN TITLE OF DOCUMENT (Complete only if different from title of translation)		
PUBLISHER		DATE AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION		
COMMENTS				
TRANSLATION				

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORM~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

/handwritten note:/ No action taken.

M E M O R A N D U M

FOR:

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)

FROM:

DATE: 15 JULY 1983

SUBJECT: Analysis of Intelligence No. 0124 about possibilities of attack on towns of Chalatenango, Colima and Acelhuate bridges.

1. SITUATION/INFORMATION

- a. Order of battle situation, general area of Chalatenango, including places surrounding the Colima and Acelhuate Bridges. (See Annex.)
- b. The T. have developed the following activities in the area, and during the period between 16 June 1983 and 14 July 1983.-
 - 1) 16 July 83, T. distributed propaganda of the FMLN in the public transport between Tejutla and La Palma, Chalatenango.
 - 2) 16 June 83, T. during the early morning hours, raided military checkpoints located in the peripheral zone of the city of Chalatenango.
 - 3) 19 Jun 83, T. raided the DM-1 checkpoint located to the west of the city of Chalatenango, resulting in one of our troops killed in action and one wounded.
 - 4) 22 June 83, T. are trying to supply themselves, by helicopter, between the 22nd and 23rd of June 1983, with arms and ammunition which they will send to Las Tablas housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) Nueva Concepcion Chalatenango/J.
 - 5) 30 June 83, T. moved in groups of approx. 50 from Comalapa toward Concepcion Quezaltepeque, Chalatenango.
 - 6) 2 July 83, T. from the general area of Chalatenango have threatened the owners of vehicles not to travel on the North Trunk highway after 9 July

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORM~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

83, or they will burn the vehicles.

- 7) 2 July 83, T. are moving in undetermined force from the Volcancillo (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) Comalapa, Chalatenango/J toward the zone between Los Prados (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) and El Ocotalito (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) in the same J.
- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) 8) 4 July 83, T. distributed propaganda on fliers on Tepultepeque ranch (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) Guazapa, San Salvador/J with the legend, "Do not collaborate with the Civil Defense."
- 9) 5 July 83, T. moved from the general area of Morazan toward the general area of Las Vueltas, Chalatenango.
- 10) 5 July 83, T. moved from La Laguna housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) Las Vueltas/J toward El Comun canton and housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) Dulce Nombre de Maria, Chalatenango/J and toward Guazapa Hill, San Salvador.
- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) 11) 5 July 83, Ex-soldier (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) who reported to the DM-1, taking shelter under the Decree of Amnesty, having deserted, stated that the FES have moved from the encampment at La Laguna (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) to the El Comun encampment and the U.V.Z. toward Guazapa Hill.
- 12) 6 July 83, T. are intending to dynamite on 12 July 83 the Colima and Acelhuate bridges to prevent the Armed Forces from sending reinforcements, and to capture the department of Chalatenango.
- (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) 13) 7 July 83, T. in undetermined force moved between El Barrancon housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) and Tilapa canton (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) La Reina, Chalatenango/J.
- 14) 7 July 83, T. by means of a Claymore bomb ambushed DM-2 personnel in the town of San Antonio la Cruz, Chalatenango.
- 15) It has been observed that when the enemy has scheduled the destruction of a profitable objective, they develop the tactics of try-outs, raiding the objective however many times are necessary in order to establish escape routes, avenues of approach and effectiveness in the development of the project.

c. The indications, which are known from reports, about the possibility that the T. may attack, are the following:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

- 1) 6 July 83 - We have indications that the T. will transport war materiel toward Los Apoyos canton and housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); and Gavilan canton and housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(c) Nueva Concepcion, Chalatenango/J, for which they will utilize the Santa Ana/San Pablo Highway, Tacachico/J.
- 2) 10 July 83, T. raided the Colima Bridge and the bridge on the Acelhuate River, located on the North Trunk Highway.
- 3) The T. have shown on several occasions that with the destruction of the Colima and Acelhuate bridges, they would have total control of the department of Chalatenango.

d. The vulnerabilities of the T. currently are the following:

- 1) The T. group which predominates in the area of Chalatenango is the FPL. With the death of their main leader, Salvador Calletano Carpio, certain lack of control arose as regards the command, causing disorganization in the planning and execution of their objectives.-

2. POSSIBILITIES.

A. To attack at any time from now on the following places:

- 1) Colimba bridge (short range)
- 2) Acelhuate bridge (short range)
- 3) 4th Infantry Brigade (medium range)
- 4) 1st Mil. Dist. (medium range)
- 5) 5th of November dam and Cerron Grande dam (medium range)
- 6) Any town in the area.

3. CONCLUSIONS.

a. According to what was reported in the Order of Battle annex and in paragraph 1.b.- the enemy is reinforcing logistically and in terms of effective troops, which indicates that achievement of their objectives according to the possibilities is probable.

b. In order to obtain a political image as belligerent forces both on the national and on the international level, the enemy has always undertaken to isolate the north and the east zones of the country, however, with the pressure to which the enemy is being subjected in the eastern zone, they are trying to reorganize their cadres in the area of Chalatenango, trying

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

of course to achieve their objective of isolating a zone of the country, therefore the possibilities we have listed take on specific form in this sense.

c. The most likely possibilities are the following:

- 1) To attack the guard detachment of the Colima and Acapulco bridges until they destroy them.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec.
1.4(c)

⁴
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

ENEMY SITUATION NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE COLIMA BRIDGE, EL PARAISO/J

1. Disposition

a. Locations of encampments.

1) CONFIRMED ORGANIZED OR PERMANENT ENCAMPMENTS:

	Approx. no. T.
a) El Tronador canton and housing project	100
b) El Astillero housing project	unknown
c) El Jicaron canton and housing project	unknown
d) Las Ventanas canton and housing project	30
e) El Zapote canton and housing project	200
f) Mirandilla canton and housing project	unknown
g) Buena Vista canton and housing project	unknown

(b)(1); Sec.
1.4(b); Sec.
1.4(c)

2) TEMPORARY, MOBILE ENCAMPMENTS:

a) El Trapichon ranch
b) Potrero Grande canton and housing project
c) San Rafael ranch
d) Pueblo Viejo housing project
e) San Cristobal ranch
f) San Cristobal canton & housing project
g) Las Penas housing project
h) El Susto housing project
i) Las Delicias canton & housing project
j) Consolacion canton & housing project
k) Los Palitos housing project
l) El Senetal housing project
m) Valle Verde ranch and housing project
n) San Antonio ranch
o) La Asuncion housing project
p) San Jose Los Sitios canton & hous.proj.
q) El Salitre canton and housing project
r) San Jose canton and housing project
r) Macacio Hill

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b);
Sec. 1.4(c)

3) RECENT, UNCONFIRMED ENCAMPMENTS

a) Palo Verde housing project
b) Chachaco Hill
c) Ojo de Agua canton and housing project
d) El Jute housing project
e) La Pava Hill

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b);
Sec. 1.4(c)

b. MOVEMENTS.

1) 8 July 83, terrorists coming from the western zone moved in undetermined force in the direction of Guazapa

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORM~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

Hill, passing through the Pishishapa canton and housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) and El Pinalito canton and housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) Aguila-
res/J.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b);
Sec. 1.4(c)

2) Terrorists are currently moving from the Guazapa Hill toward El Trapichon ranch (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) Aguila-
res/J, San Rafael ranch (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) and they are moving in the direction of El Jicaron canton and housing project, from this place they return to the Guazapa Hill where they cross the North Trunk Highway where they carry out any activity.

3) T. in undetermined number are moving from one place to another along the highway which goes from Tejutal to La Palma, placing roadblocks near El Barrancon housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) of El Jardin canton and housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c), also they have a base of operations in El Jardin canton and housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) La Reina/J.

2. FORCES.

In this area it is believed that about 500 to 600 armed terrorists are located in the following areas:

a. AREA NORTH OF COLIMA BRIDGE

- 1) San Jose los Sitios canton & h.p.
- 2) El Salitre " "
- 3) Macasio Hill
- 4) Palo Verde housing project
- 5) Chachaco Hill
- 6) Ojo de Agua canton and hous. proj.
- 7) El Jute housing project
- 8) La Pava Hill

(b)(1); Sec.
1.4(b); Sec.
1.4(c)

b. AREA SOUTH OF COLIMA BRIDGE

- 1) El Tronador canton and housing project
- 2) El Jicaron " " " "
- 3) Las Ventanas " " " "
- 4) El Zapote " " " "
- 5) Mirandilla " " " "
- 6) Buena Vista " " " "
- 7) El Astillero housing project
- 8) El Trapichon ranch
- 9) Potrero Grande canton & hous. proj.
- 10) San Rafael ranch
- 11) Pueblo Viejo housing project
- 12) San Cristobal ranch

(b)(1); Sec.
1.4(b); Sec.
1.4(c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORM~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

- 13) San Cristobal canton & housing project
- 14) Las Penas housing project
- 15) El Susto housing project
- 16) Las Delicias canton & housing project
- 17) Consolacion canton & housing project
- 18) Los Palitos housing project
- 19) El /illeg./ housing project
- 20) Valle Verde ranch
- 21) San Antonio ranch
- 22) La Asuncion housing project

(b)(1); Sec.
1.4(b); Sec.
1.4(c)

3. LOGISTICS

- T. are supplying themselves with provisions and personal belongings which they steal from drivers of vehicles and buses which travel on the North Trunk highway, near Km. 28, Potrero Grande canton and housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) Aguilares/J.

- T. got themselves livestock (38) which they stole at Km. 30 1/2, on the North Trunk highway and drove them toward the encampment which they supposedly have at Tres Ceibas housing project (b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c) Aguilares/J.

- The T. in the Guazapa area are supplying themselves with provisions and munitions which arrive to them through San Jose Las Flores colony and Tonacatepeque.

- T. are supplying themselves by robbery which they commit along the highway which goes from Apopa to Tejutla.

- The T. who are located in the North zone of Guazapa have as a supply point Las Pe. ./rest of word lost/ housing project.

1.- PLANS AND INDICATIONS

a. POLITICAL:

In this aspect, the T. have scheduled the following activities which they will execute in accordance with a plan previously established and listed according to the latest events with political repercussions:

- 1) They will exploit nationally and internationally the death of the T. Melida Anaya Montes.
- 2) Confrontation with the Belloso Battalion which caused them 40 casualties.
- 3) The FMLN-FDR will reactivate the function of the labor unions on the national level.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3), 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

- 4) They maintain the struggle to get the "Dialogue".
- 5) International propaganda about their declaring a "liberated zone" in the east of the country.
- 6) The FMLN-FDR will develop a campaign of propaganda attack against the government because it advanced the date of the elections.

b. MILITARY:

- 1) To attack small military garrisons and to reactivate terrorism in urban areas, especially in Santa Ana and San Salvador. In the city of Santa Ana they have already given clear indications.
- 2) To increase to a national scale the acts of sabotage, kidnappings, assassinations, threats, in short, everything related to the destruction of the national economy. The T. announced this due to their objection to the death of the T., Melida Anaya Montes.
- 3) Possibilities of attack and raids from now on at any time, on the following places:

a) Western War Front:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|
| (1) Miramundo repeater station | Santa Ana/J |
| (2) RASA Acajutla installations | Sonsonate/J |
| (3) Izalco earth station | Sonsonate/J |
| (4) Ausoles geothermal installations | Ahuachapan/J |
| (5) Guajoyo hydro-electric plant | Santa Ana/J |
| (6) City of Santa Ana | Santa Ana/J |
| (7) City of Coatepeque | Santa Ana/J |
| (8) Ciudad Arce | Santa Ana/J |
| (9) El Congo | Santa Ana/J |
| (10) Santo Domingo de Gusman | Santa Ana/J |
| (11) San Antonio del Monte | Ahuachapan/J |
| (12) Jujutla | Ahuachapan/J |
| (13) Guaymango | Ahuachapan/J |

b) Central War Front:

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------|
| (1) Nueva Concepcion | Chalatenango/J |
| (2) La Reina | " |
| (3) Tejutla | " |
| (4) San Ignacio | " |
| (5) Citala | " |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3) 10 USC 424, (b)(6)

(6) San Fernando	"
(7) San Francisco Morazan	"
(8) Dulce Nombre de Maria	"
(9) Santa Rita	"
(10) El Paraíso	"
(11) Puente Azambio (Azambio bridge)	"
(12) Puente Colima (Colimba bridge)	"
(13) El Carrizal	"
(14) Comalapa	"
(15) Ojos de Agua	"
(16) Concepcion de Quezaltepeque	"
(17) Las Vueltas	"
(18) San Antonio los Ranchos	"
(19) San Jose Cancasque	"
(20) San Luis del Carmen	"
(21) San Francisco Lempa	"
(22) Azacualpa	"
(23) Potonico	Chalatenango/J
(24) San Isidro Labrador	"
(25) San Jose las Flores	"
(26) Nueva Trinidad	"
(27) Arcatao	"
(28) San Antonio de la Cruz	"
(29) Nombre de Jesus	"
(30) 5th of November and Cerron Grande dams	"
(31) Tenancingo	Cuscatlan/J
(32) El Paisnal	San Salvador/J
(33) Aguilares	"
(34) Guazapa	"
(35) San Jose Guayabal	Cuscatlan/J
(36) Apopa	San Salvador/J
(37) Nejapa	"
(38) La Esperanza retreat center	"
(39) Mejicanos	"
(40) Ayutuestepeque	"
(41) Cuscatancingo	"
(42) Ciudad Delgado	"
(43) Soyapango	"
(44) Ilopango	"
(45) San Salvador	"
(46) Saragoza	"
(47) Huizucar	La Libertad/J
(48) Santa Cruz Michapa	"
	Cuscatlan/J

c) Para-Central War Front.

(1) Zacatecoluca	La Paz/J
(2) Santo Domingo	San Vicente/J
(3) Tepetitán	"
(4) San Cayetano Istepeque	"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

(5) San Vicente	"
(6) San Sebastian	"
(7) San Lorenzo	"
(8) San Esteban Catarina	"
(9) Apastepeque	"
(10) Santa Clara	"
(11) Tecoluca	"
(12) Fenadesal bridge	"
(13) Cuscatlan bridge	"
(14) El Pajal canton (1169)	La Paz/J
(15) Santa Lucia Benefice (1569)	"
(16) Santiago Nonualco	"
(17) San Pedro Nonualco	"
(18) San Rafael Obrajuelo	"
(19) Guadalupe	San Vicente/J
(20) San Isidro	Cabanias/J
(21) Dolores	"
(22) Sensuntepeque	"
(23) San Ildefonso	"
(24) La Herradura	La Paz/J

d) Eastern War Front:	
(1) Carolina	San Miguel/J
(2) San Antonio	"
(3) Ciudad Barrios	"
(4) Gualococti	Morazan/J
(5) Guatajiagua	"
(6) Yamabal	"
(7) Sensembra	"
(8) San Francisco Gotera	"
(9) Lolotiquillo	"
(10) Cacaopera	"
(11) San Agustin	Usulután/J
(12) San Francisco Javier	"
(13) Jiquilisco	"
(14) Puerto el Triunfo	"
(15) San Dionisio	"
(16) Ozatlan	"
(17) Usulután	"
(18) Berlin	"
(19) Santiago de Maria	"
(20) Mercedes Umana	"
(21) Santa Elena	"
(22) Alegria	"
(23) California	"
(24) Ereguaiquin	"
(25) Concepcion Batres	Usulután/J
(26) Jucuaran	San Miguel/J
(27) Chirilagua	"
(28) Intipuca	"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

- | | |
|--|------------|
| (29) San Miguel | " |
| (30) Torola | Morazan/J |
| (31) San Fernando | " |
| (32) Perquin | " |
| (33) Lolotique | " |
| (34) Meanguera | " |
| (35) Joateca | " |
| (36) Corinto | " |
| (37) Sociedad | " |
| (38) Nueva Esparta | La Union/J |
| (39) Anamoros | Morazan/J |
| (40) Santa Rosa de Lima | " |
| (41) La Union | La Union/J |
| (42) The T. have the intention of developing the plan they have designated "SOMPOPO" which consists in the ERP-FARN attacking on a large scale in the eastern zone, specifically Santa Rosa de Lima, for the purpose of which they will reinforce T. concentrations in the general area of Santa Rosa de Lima with T. coming from the general area of Conchagua and/or west of Berlin. | |

c. ECONOMIC:

1) Some of the many ways which the T. utilize for developing their actions oriented toward the destruction of the country's economy are: sabotage, burning of crops, burning of collective transport, destruction of government buildings, destruction of towns, destruction of bridges, telephone booths, poles and towers for electricity, etc.

In view of the current situation the T. possibly are trying to increase their actions in these areas.

There are several reasons; some of them are: the death of the T. commander Melida Anaya Montes, the problem Nicaragua is experiencing, possibly there is migration of Salvadoran terrorists toward that country, it can be expected as a corollary and a demonstration of their force, that they may develop a campaign of total destruction, for this there are already some situations which can be presumed on the basis of the indications to be developing; we refer to the increase in actions in the urban area of Santa Ana; possibly in San Salvador.

d. SOCIOLOGICAL:

1) One of the plans which the T. are developing with great caution but with precision, is that of converting the masses who have "escaped" from their countries of origin into agents provocateurs, in order to form encampments of refugees in the different parts of the republic.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

It has been confirmed that T. elements have been visiting these encampments, with the imminent danger that by means of previously established plans they may undermine the mentality of these people, that generally is easy to do.

2) It is worth mentioning also that the T. may possibly be penetrating into the labor union sector, as they had already announced, occurring as a consequence of the agitation of some of them there through the month of January and February of this year, as well as during October, November and December of last year, a short recess having occurred up to the present moment, which may signify preparation within the labor union activity.

e. PSYCHOLOGICAL:

1) In view of the results, the T. will increase their actions on the national level, in terms of propaganda, especially directed toward the soldiers and non-coms of the Armed Forces, in such a way that when they are in combat, they surrender much more easily.

2) When the T. kidnap members of the armed forces, they will continue to return them to public view, generally in the central park of some town, for the purpose of course of psychologically penetrating to the mentality of the Salvadoran people.

f. INTELLIGENCE:

1) The T. will continue developing intelligence actions with regard to infiltration of T. elements into the Armed Forces on all its levels.

2) They will continue kidnapping Armed Forces personnel, since it is one of their information sources.

g. ORGANIZATIONAL:

In this aspect the T. have not done much in recent days - until about three or four months ago they have been reinforcing their cadres, kidnapping children, young men and women; but currently they are somewhat disorganized due to the pressure which the Armed Forces have applied to them, moreover, lack of supplies in all aspects and the flight of T. elements have somewhat unbalanced their designs.

This does not mean that in some sectors the T. can not offer resistance to attack, above all in San Vicente, Chalatenango, Usulután and Morazan.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3), 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

NOTE WITH REFERENCE TO PLANS AND INDICATIONS OF MILITARY NATURE

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)

Commander "Edgard" is heading toward the south of San Vicente, accompanied by three platoons, FAL-FPL. Their objective is to carry out operations in the area mentioned.

2. PARTICULARITIES AND PECULIARITIES:

a. PERSONAL:

- 1) As far as possible the T. when they are in combat, try to recover their casualties, in order to conceal from the Armed Forces the number killed in the engagement.
- 2) In places where the T. exercise a certain amount of control they plant marijuana, as they utilize it to drug themselves when they go into combat. They also use another type of stupefiers or pills like diasephane. /doubtful spelling/
- 3) When the T. occupy a town, whether or not there real resistance, they stage fiestas in order to create an atmosphere of confidence in the town.
- 4) In order to raise their morale, the T. in rest periods celebrate their birthdays and the anniversaries of T. fallen in combat.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

b. LOGISTICS AND FINANCES:

- 1) With the recent decrease, to some degree, in the logistical support coming from Communist countries through Nicaragua, the T. have engaged in attacking small military garrisons in order to obtain arms.
- 2) The T. are engaged in open robbery on the highways, trying to obtain: personal belongings, money, goods, etc., as well as watching paydays on the farms and/or ranches steal the workers' money.
- 3) For their subsistence they steal cattle, e g g s and chickens anywhere they can.
- 4) They invade small towns in order to rob defenseless people of their few belongings and

c. COMMUNICATIONS:

- 1) The T. prepare their own rudimentary communications systems. However they also have technically prepared codifiers.
- 2) Having stolen a good bit of the communications equipment from the Armed Forces, it can be considered that they are able to develop a satisfactory system of communications.
- 3) They utilize what is known as the "Postal vice" for interpersonal communications.
- 4) They also utilize the social means of communication for their own communications, especially in explanatory and classified announcements.
- 5) They utilize signals from the ground, by and reflectors, for purposes of supplies being by air.

3. VULNERABILITIES:

a. MILITARY:

- 1) The T. fear air fire. This has been confirmed by declarations made by captured T. deserters.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3), 10 USC 424, (b)(6)

- 2) Desertions of T., especially from the peasant ranks, which of course are their main support.
- 3) They can not have continuous re-supply when the T. are in combat. This does not allow them to keep up the combat indefinitely.
- 4) The disagreement which currently exists between the combatants and above all on their organization, causes unbalance in the military field.
- 5) Currently they have serious problems as regards supplies management. /some doubt what they mean by last term/

b. POLITICAL:

- 1) Currently one of their international political problems is the result of the situation in Nicaragua.
- 2) Politically the great majority of the Salvadoran people do not accept the ideology of the T., nor the pursuit of their objectives by means of the work of national destruction.
- 3) The fact that the T. have allowed foreigners to become involved in the armed struggle damages them politically, above all in the international field, that is, in the eyes of those organizations which closely follow the process in this country.

c. ECONOMIC:

- 1) The T. are encountering serious problems in this sense, as the sources of economic aid are giving priority to solving their own problems.
- 2) In order to satisfy their economic necessities, they must utilize the tactics of robbery, assault, etc.. This represents a certain amount of risk for them.

d. PSYCHOLOGICAL:

- 1) To a certain extent, the enemy morale is low, as a result of numerous losses in combat.
- 2) On the combatant level there is discontent, because of their entrusting some of the operational direction of the T. to foreigners and this causes reluctance

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~

(b)(3); 10 USC 424; (b)(6)

to accept orders.

- 3) Lack of aid in all their endeavors, with the disputes among combatants and commanders and the problem in the social order within the organizations, causes psychological unrest. This interferes with the successful development of their projects.

e. ORGANIZATIONAL:

- 1) The continual deceit to which the T. have been subjected and their frustrated aspirations have caused desertion of their personnel, this causes disorganization of their cadres.
- 2) Also the lack of necessary support in economic and logistical terms, of supply management, etc. cause disorganization among the T.
- 3) The problem of /psychological-social?/ relations the T. have internally also disorganizes their cadres.
- 4) Air bombardment disorganizes the T., although temporarily.

(b)(1); Sec. 1.4(b); Sec. 1.4(c)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FORN~~