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(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct  
Document [redacted] Subject: [redacted] - MESSAGE FROM D/COMPTROLLER [redacted]

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D COMET 840822 [redacted] 1  
FRP: . . . . .

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

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TOR: 222112Z AUG 84 [redacted] ~~SECRET~~ 221955Z

AUG 84 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct  
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct  
TO: WASHINGTON. (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct


[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct  
SUBJECT: WMINTEL - MESSAGE FROM D/COMPTROLLER

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct  
1. FOLLOWING IS MESSAGE FROM D/COMPTROLLER TO [redacted] BASED ON  
FORMER'S PARTICIPATION IN DISCUSSION WITH [redacted] (b)(6)  
PER REF. (b)(3) CIAAct

2. FOLLOWING BRIEFING BY [redacted] IN (b)(6) OFFICE BEFORE MY TRIP TO  
CENTRAL AMERICA, I MET WITH OTHERS IN MY TRAVELING TEAM AND  
CINCSOUTH ON TWO OCCASIONS. THE FIRST WAS HIS 0815 HRS INTELLIGENCE  
BRIEFING. OF INTEREST HERE WOULD BE [redacted] CONTINUED----- (b)(6)  
ENTHUSIASM FOR RAW INTELLIGENCE AND FINISHED INTELLIGENCE.  
OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED ITSELF TO ASK HIM ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT  
THE SALVADORAN MILITARY WERE BEING TOO CAUTIOUS IN ANTICIPATION OF  
THE FALL OFFENSIVE. HE ACCEPTED THE IDEA THAT WASHINGTON ANALYSTS  
MIGHT BE CONCERNED IN THIS AREA AND PREFACED HIS NEXT 20 MINUTES OF  
VERY ANALYTICAL REMARKS WITH THE STATEMENT THAT WASHINGTON SOMETIMES  
ABOUT 10 DAYS OUT OF DATE. HE REPORTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY  
RETURNED FROM A MEETING WITH DUARTE AND HIS MILITARY COMMANDERS AND  
THAT IN THE PRESENCE OF IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE FROM THE U.S., THE  
SALVADORAN FORCES WERE AGAIN READY TO TAKE THE FIELD AGGRESSIVELY.  
HE ALLUDED TO SEVERAL IMPENDING CHANGES IN COMMAND OF ONE YOU ARE  
PROBABLY NOW AWARE, INDICATING THAT IN EACH CASE THE NEW COMMANDER  
WAS BOTH STRONG AND RESPECTED BY HIS UNIT AND THAT MORALE AMONG THE  
TROOPS WAS ON THE UPSWING. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE FACT THAT "INFAMOUS  
OCHOA" WOULD ASSUME COMMAND IN ONE DEPARTMENT. CINCSOUTH SAID THAT  
DUARTE AND THE DEFENSE MINISTERS WOULD PERSONALLY KEEP OCHOA OUT OF  
POLITICS. HE SEEMED TO RESPECT OCHOA AS A MILITARY FIGURE IF HE WAS  
MORE RESERVED ABOUT HIM AS A PERSONALITY. CINC WENT ON TO DESCRIBE  
A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES OF A CIVIL MILITARY NATURE THAT HE WAS  
CONTEMPLATING AS HELPFUL TO THE SALVADORAN ECONOMY. SINCE NONE  
OF THESE ARE YET APPROVED, YOU MAY READ ABOUT THEM IN THE NEWSPAPERS  
OR ELSEWHERE BEFORE I RETURN. IF NOT, I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS  
THEM WITH YOU WHEN I RETURN. IN CLOSING HIS DISCUSSION, GENERAL  
GORMAN REMINDED ALL OF HIS UNITS TO PREPARE MORE TIPPERS FOR  
DISSEMINATION TO HONDURAS AND SALVADOR, HOPING THAT THEY WOULD

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PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES TO  
MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO KEEP THE GUERRILLAS OFF BALANCE. HIS  
PART OF THIS BRIEFING WAS GENERALLY VERY UPBEAT AND HOPEFUL.

3. NO FILE.

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