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CINC's Semiannual
SITREP 1 Oct 81 -
31 Mar 82

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3

NW 58743

By DF/m, NARA, Date 10/1/18

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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA**

SCJ3

3 September 1982

SUBJECT: USSOUTHCOM Semi-Annual Commander's SITREP

- ✓ Commander, 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama), ATTN: DPT, Ft Clayton, PN
- Commander, USAF Southern Air Division, ATTN: CC, Howard AFB, PN
- Commanding Officer, US Naval Station Panama Canal, ATTN: 30, Ft Amador, PN

1. Reference:

- a. JCS Pub 6, Volume II, Part 2, Chap 5, 1 MAY 74.
- b. USSOUTHCOM REG 525-1, dtd 8 FEB 80.

2. Request component commands submit input required by reference b for the USSOUTHCOM Semi-Annual Commander's Situation Report (SITREP) to J-3 O&E by COB 5 OCT 82.


3. Report should summarize operational activities and factors which significantly affect the operational readiness of the command. To the extent possible, report deficient items in quantifiable terms.

4. Reporting period is from 1 APR 82 to 30 SEP 82.

5. Request name, rank, and duty phone number of your POC be telephonically reported to USSOUTHCOM POC, MAJ Fox (82-4905) NLT 15 SEP 82.

6. POCs should be familiar with above references and knowledgeable of operational readiness conditions which impact on your command's ability to implement JCS approved plans.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


 WILLIAM C. COMEE, JR.
 Colonel, USA
 Director, J3

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MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN //SCJ3//

TO: AIG 751

USCINCARRED FT MCPHERSON GA

USCINCAFRED LANGLEY AFB VA

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SUBJ: COMMANDER'S SEMINANNUAL SITREP, 1 OCT 81-31 MAR 82 IUI

- A. USCINCSO 152300Z OCT 81
- B. JCS PUB L, VOL II, PART II, CHAP 5
- C. PANAMA CANAL TREATIES OF 1977 AND RELATED AGREEMENTS
- D. SM 356-75 (UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN)
- E. (C3) COMMANDER'S SUMMARY: USSOUTHCOM REMAINS PREPARED TO ACCOMPLISH ALL MISSIONS ASSIGNED IN JCS APPROVED PLANS. THE COMMAND CAN READILY PERFORM THE MISSIONS OF DISASTER ASSISTANCE RELIEF AND THE SCHOOLING OF LATAM MILITARY PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, THIS COMMAND CONTINUES TO REFINE PLANS COVERING A WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES AND THREAT SITUATIONS. MAJOR EMPHASIS CONTINUES TO BE PLACED ON MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN THE CANAL AREA AT PEAK READINESS. IN THE EVENT OF A SERIOUS OR SUSTAINED THREAT TO THE PANAMA CANAL, OPLAN 4501 COULD BE SATISFACTORILY EXECUTED PROVIDED RAPID AUGMENTATION BY

FULL STAFF

F. FOX, MAJ, USA
O&E DIV, J3/4402
13 APR 82

FOX

COORD:

- J1- *J 4/15/82*
- J2- *4/11/82*
- J3- *18 Apr 82*
- J5- *4/15/82*
- CE- *4/15/82*

GIAC P. MODICA, COL, USA, DIR, J3/4602

San J. Modica

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BY SELECTED AIR DEFENSE, COMMUNICATIONS, SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE UNITS IS EFFECTED. THE LACK OF AN INPLACE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY CONTINUES TO BE AN AREA OF CONCERN PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE POTENTIAL REGIONAL THREAT POSED BY AN INCREASING SOVIET/CUBAN ABILITY TO PROJECT MILITARY AIR POWER. PROJECTED LEAD TIMES REQUIRED FOR DEPLOYMENT OF CONUS BASED AIR DEFENSE ASSETS RENDER USSOUTHCOM VULNERABLE TO MINIMUM WARNING AIR THREATS. THE PRESENT USSOUTHCOM AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY CONSISTS OF AN EXTREMELY LIMITED SURVEILLANCE/ACQUISITION RADAR SYSTEM, FOUR AIR GUARD A-7D FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, WHICH WERE DESIGNED PRIMARILY AS A CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SYSTEM, AND ORGANIC REDEYE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES. WITH REGARD TO THE ON STATION A-7 AIRCRAFT, THE WEAPON SYSTEM IS UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED AS HAVING LIMITED CAPABILITY IN A COUNTER-AIR ROLE. RECOMMEND, THEREFORE, THAT EXISTING A-7 AIRCRAFT BE REPLACED BY SIX AIR GUARD F-4 AIRCRAFT. THE F-4 AIRCRAFT WOULD SATISFY BOTH AIR DEFENSE AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS. CONTINUING ANALYSIS OF THE REGIONAL INSURGENT THREAT INDICATES THAT THE USSOUTHCOM FORCE STRUCTURE/CAPABILITY IS SEVERLY LIMITED IN ITS ABILITY TO CONDUCT FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LIMITED FORCE PROJECTION MISSIONS. THE

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PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE CONTAINS LIMITED UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCES, VIRTUALLY NO LONG RANGE AVIATION ASSETS AND ONLY ONE AIRBORNE COMPANY. IN VIEW OF THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TYPES OF CONTINGENCY MISSIONS THIS COMMAND MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE CALLED UPON TO PERFORM, THE FOLLOWING IS RECOMMENDED FOR CONSIDERATION: DEACTIVATE THE HEAVY INFANTRY UNIT IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE AS IT HAS A LIMITED MISSION IN PANAMA AND IT IS PRESENTLY NOT COST EFFECTIVE. RECONFIGURE PRESENTLY ASSIGNED INFANTRY UNITS TO ENHANCE FORCE PROJECTION CAPABILITY I.E. CONVERT TO AIRBORNE OR AIR ASSAULT TYPE UNITS. ADDITIONALLY, RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESENT SPECIAL FORCES BE UPGRADED TO A GROUP AND THAT A NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE UNIT WITH SEAL, SPECIAL BOAT AND MOBILE COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES BE INCORPORATED INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURE. PERSONNEL SHORTAGES WITHIN THE COMPONENT COMMANDS CONTINUE TO EXIST. MOST SERIOUSLY HAMPERED BY THESE SHORTAGES IS THE COMBAT/HARBOR PATROL CRAFT OF OUR NAVY COMPONENT COMMAND. THE RECENT LOSS OF TWENTY-TWO PERSONNEL FROM THAT DEPARTMENT, SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITED THIS COMMANDS ABILITY TO PERFORM ROUTINE HARBOR/CANAL APPROACH SURVEILLANCE. IN OCTOBER 81, USSOUTH-COM ESTABLISHED A JOINT RECONNAISSANCE CENTER (JRC) IN RESPONSE TO

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THE INTRODUCTION OF VARIOUS RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS INTO THE REGION. WE VIEW THE OVERALL MISSION AS BEING CRITICAL TO OUR COMMAND/NATIONAL INTERESTS AND HEARTILY ENDORSE CONTINUED AND PERHAPS EXPANDED OPERATIONS OF THIS TYPE. PANAMANIAN GUARDIA NACIONAL ACTIONS CONTINUE TO BE FAVORABLE AND PROMISE TO ENHANCE COMBINED COOPERATION.

2. {U} FACTORS WHICH IMPACT SIGNIFICANTLY ON READINESS TO EXECUTE JCS APPROVED PLANS AS OF 31 MARCH 82 ARE DISCUSSED BELOW:

A. {U} PERSONNEL:

{I} {C} HQ USSOUTHCOM.

{A} {S/NOFORN} THE HEADQUARTERS STAFF CONTINUES TO BE SEVERELY CONSTRAINED DESPITE RELIEF AFFORDED BY FY82 INCREASES IN AUTHORIZATIONS. THE DYNAMIC POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA CONTINUES TO EVOLVE AT AN ACCELERATING RATE. ALL DIRECTORATES ARE EXPERIENCING RAPIDLY GROWING NEEDS TO DEVELOP BOTH CONCEPT AND OPERATIONAL PLANS TO MEET NEW REGIONAL CHANGES AND NATIONAL LEVEL TASKINGS. THESE FACTORS ARE ALSO DRAINING MANY ADDED TDY MANDAYS INTO IN-THEATER SUPPORT AND EXTRA-THEATER INTERFACE WITH JCS, RDJTF, AND CINCLANT, AMONG OTHERS. THE FUTURE WILL LIKELY SEE THESE TRENDS CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY.

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{B} {U} RAPID FILL OF ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED AUTHORIZATIONS IS NEEDED. PLANNING BILLETS IN ALL FUNCTIONAL AREAS ARE CRITICAL, TOGETHER WITH OPERATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE BILLETS. TO DATE, ONLY THREE OF TEN SPACES HAVE BEEN FILLED FOR THE CONGRESSIONALLY-DIRECTED TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES {TIARA} FUNCTION, WHICH WAS APPROVED AS OF 1 OCT 81. SIX OF THE REMAINING SEVEN BILLETS ARE PROJECTED FOR FILL; CONTINUED ATTENTION IS NEEDED TO ASSURE THE MOST TIMELY POSSIBLE FILL.

{C} {U} THE ADDED SPACES REQUESTED IN OUR FY83 HEADQUARTERS JOINT MANPOWER PROGRAM {JMP} REPRESENT A HARD-CORE REQUIREMENT NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION AT HAND AND IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AGAIN, SUPPORT IS ESPECIALLY NEEDED FOR PLANNING BILLETS IN ALL FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND FOR OPERATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

{2} {U} SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS {SAOS}.

{A} {U} THE FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS {FAOS} IN OUR SAOS ARE INCREASINGLY VITAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT, EXECUTION, AND SUPPORT OF LONG-RANGE U.S. STRATEGY IN LATAM. THESE OFFICERS CAN SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE FOREIGN POLITICO-MILITARY LEADERS. WE NEED A CONTINUED HARD FOCUS ON MANNING THESE CRITICAL POSITIONS WITH THE HIGHEST-CALIBRE OFFICERS

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AVAILABLE. PCS GAPS MUST BE AVOIDED. SUCH GAPS ERRONEOUSLY CONVEY TO FOREIGN LEADERS A SENSE OF U.S. INDIFFERENCE AND CAN ALSO CAUSE SERIOUS PROGRAM LAPSES IN THE THINLY-MANNED SAOS.

{B} {S/NOFORN} MILGP EL SALVADOR. THE MILGP CONTINUES TO HAVE AN URGENT NEED FOR AN ARMY O4/O5 INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND THREE NCOs: ARMY E-7 TRAINING/COMMUNICATIONS NCO; ARMY E-7 LOGISTICS NCO; AIR FORCE E-7 LOGISTICS NCO. THESE REQUIREMENTS WERE PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED IN OUR FY82 SAO MANPOWER REQUEST AND WERE SUPPORTED BY JCS, DOD, AND STATE DEPARTMENT. HOWEVER, CONGRESS DID NOT APPROVE THE OVERALL MILGP STRENGTH INCREASE {FROM 6 TO 10 SPACES} NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE ACTION. WE MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS ISSUE. THE SPECIFIC BILLETTS MENTIONED, TOGETHER WITH THE OVERALL INCREASED STRENGTH CEILING FOR THE MILGP, ARE CRUCIAL TO OUR EFFORTS IN EL SALVADOR.

{B} {C} 193D INFANTRY BRIGADE {PN} ASSIGNED STRENGTH {INCLUDING TENANT ACTIVITIES} ROSE TO AN AVERAGE OF 104.5% DURING THE PERIOD 1 OCT - 31 MAR 82. HOWEVER, THE STRENGTH IN THE 193D ROLL-UP READINESS REPORTING UNITS VARIED BETWEEN 88% AND 92% AND NOW STANDS AT 85%, DOWN FROM LAST PERIOD'S 89%. BRIGADE OFFICER STRENGTH IS AT 98% OF THE FORSCOM ODP, WHICH IS 94.5% OF AUTHORIZATIONS. THE ENLISTED

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STRENGTH OF THE 3D SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION, 7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, HAS AVERAGED 100.8%, BUT THE UNIT IS EXPERIENCING PROBLEMS DUE TO A LACK OF LANGUAGE-QUALIFIED PERSONNEL. LOCAL LANGUAGE TRAINING IS BEING CONDUCTED. HOWEVER, THE UNIT IS A PRIMARY SOURCE OF PERSONNEL NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH USSOUTHCOM'S SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN LATIN AMERICA. IT, THEREFORE, NEEDS TO RECEIVE AS MANY PEOPLE AS POSSIBLE WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED AT THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE.

{4} {C} THE CRITICAL SHORTAGE OF UNRESTRICTED LINE {URL} OFFICERS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. NAVY HAS SEVERELY IMPACTED BOTH THE U.S. NAVAL STATION PANAMA CANAL AND THE U.S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATION BALBOA. NAVSTAPANCANAL CURRENTLY HAS SIX {30%} VACANT URL BILLETS AND NAVCOM-MSTA BALBOA HAS ONE {25%} VACANT URL BILLET. THESE VACANCIES ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS. NAVAL STATION ENLISTED MANNING IS 89%. COMBAT READINESS OF THE COMBAT CRAFT SECTION HAS BEEN AFFECTED BY THE RECENT DEPARTURE OF 22 PERSONNEL: SOME REPLACEMENTS HAVE ARRIVED, BUT IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THREE MONTHS OF LOCAL TRAINING WILL BE NEEDED TO PROVIDE COMBAT READY PATROL CRAFT CREWS. U.S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION BALBOA IS CURRENTLY MANNED AT 91%; HOWEVER, AUTHORIZED RADIOMAN BILLETS ARE BEING MANNED BY NON-DESIGNATED SEAMAN

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RECRUITS WHICH ADVERSELY AFFECTS OPERATIONAL READINESS. AN ESTIMATED SIX TO EIGHT MONTHS OF TRAINING WILL BE NEEDED BEFORE NAVCOMMSTA BALBOA CAN ATTAIN THE REQUISITE LEVEL OF PROFESSIONAL PROFICIENCY.

{S} {S} USAFSO ABILITY TO SUPPORT USCINCSO CONTINGENCY PLANS CONTINUES TO BE LIMITED BY THE SAME PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS CITED IN THE 1 APR-30 SEP 81 SITREP. CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED O2A PILOT STRENGTH LIMITS O2A CONTINGENCY SUPPORT TO A PERIOD OF A WEEK OR LESS. CURRENT ROMAD MANNING {AFSC 275X0} IS 58% {7 FOR 12}: A MINIMUM OF 10 ROMAD POSITIONS MUST BE FILLED IF USAFSO IS TO PROVIDE CONTINGENCY SUPPORT TO THE 193D INF BDE; FULL ROMAD MANNING IS NOT PROJECTED UNTIL SEPTEMBER, 1982. RADIO MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY FOR COMBAT CONTROL TEAMS REMAINS EXTREMELY LIMITED; LOCAL ASSETS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION AND THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN REFERRED TO THE MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND.

{B} {U} INTELLIGENCE:

{I} {S} THE VOLATILE SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN/CENTRAL AMERICA CONTINUES. IN EL SALVADOR, INSURGENTS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE WEAPONS INFILTRATED FROM CUBA AND NICARAGUA THROUGH PANAMA, COSTA RICA, AND HONDURAS. THE SALVADORAN MILITARY REMAINS LIMITED BY

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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS, WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR INABILITY TO DEFEAT THE INSURGENTS, WHO STRIKE AT TIMES AND TARGETS OF THEIR CHOICE. THE BATTLE FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT REMAINS CRITICAL, WITH THE GOES SCORING A SIGNIFICANT VICTORY IN THE TURNOUT FOR THE ELECTION. THE POLITICAL ARENA HAS TEMPORARILY BECOME THE FOCUS, AS THE PARTIES STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT AND DEFINE THEIR ROLES AND POWER. NICARAGUA CONTINUES TO BUILD ITS ARMED FORCES, AND CLASHES BETWEEN HONDURAN AND NICARAGUAN FORCES ARE AGAIN HIGH. THE DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY AND DEDICATION OF ALL RESOURCES TO DEFENSE AND PRODUCTIVITY, AS WELL AS CONTINUED DELIMITATION OF "PLURALISM" MAY BE THE PRELUDE TO EVEN GREATER FSLN CONTROL. SOVIET, CUBAN, AND BLOC INFLUENCE/PRESENCE IS BECOMING MORE ENTRENCHED, AND NICARAGUA REMAINS A CENTER OF TRAINING AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL GUERRILLAS. HONDURAN ARMED FORCES REMAIN APPREHENSIVE OF THE POTENTIAL THREAT POSED BY REGIONAL INSURGENCY AND NICARAGUA. EQUALLY, THEY ARE DIRECTING GREATER ATTENTION TO THEIR OWN GUERRILLA GROUPS IN THE INCIPIENT STAGES OF MILITANCY. COSTA RICA IS LARGELY AN UNWILLING ACCOMPLICE OF INSURGENT GROUPS OPERATING THROUGHOUT THE REGION, AND IT IS PRESENTLY UNDERGOING SEVERE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

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WHICH ARE DESTABILIZING. PRESIDENT-ELECT MONGE HAS STATED HIS INTENTIONS TO TAKE FIRM MEASURES TO CORRECT THESE SITUATIONS. IN GUATEMALA, FOLLOWING A MARCH COUP LEAD BY JUNIOR OFFICERS, A JUNTA HEADED BY GEN RIOS MONTT ASSUMED CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. GUERRILLAS HAVE STATED THEY ARE NO HAPPIER WITH THIS NEW LEADERSHIP THAN THEY WERE WITH THE LUCAS REGIME. CONSEQUENTLY, INTENSE, AND EVEN INCREASED, VIOLENCE WILL FURTHER DEGRADE INTERNAL STABILITY. IN PANAMA, COL PAREDES ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE NATIONAL GUARD (GN) BY OUSTING THE FORMER COMMANDER. AS A RESULT OF THIS, USSOUTHCOM-GN RELATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE OVER THE LONG TERM. THE GN LEADERSHIP IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT THE REGIONAL TURMOIL MAY ULTIMATELY SPREAD TO PANAMA, AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO MODERATE PRESIDENT ROYO'S MARXIST TENDENCIES. COLOMBIA CONTINUES TO EXPERIENCE ACTIVE INSURGENCY, ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE A SECURE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE MAY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. INCREASED TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN PERU APPEARS BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE POLICE FORCES, AND THE BELAUNDE GOVERNMENT MAY BE FORCED TO BRING THE MILITARY INTO THE BATTLE. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES CONTINUE TO BE A CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN SOUTH AMERICA. THE ECUADOREAN GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCED INTERNAL

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TURMOIL IN JANUARY RELATED TO ITS BORDER DISPUTE WITH PERU. VENEZUELA HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL NOT RENEW THE PORT OF SPAIN AGREEMENT WITH GUYANA THAT EXPIRES THIS JUNE, AND BILATERAL TENSION WILL PROBABLY INCREASE. THE ARGENTINE SEIZURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS MAY RESULT IN A MAJOR MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.K., AND THE RESULT OF THAT ISSUE COULD IMPACT ON THE ARGENTINE/CHILEAN BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE.

{2} {C} SHORTFALLS IN INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED, AND A NUMBER OF INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED ON TEMPORARY DUTY TO ALLEVIATE MANPOWER SHORTAGES, PENDING THE SCHEDULED ARRIVAL OF INCREASED PERMANENT MANNING-LEVEL PARTIES. AN AD HOC INTELLIGENCE/OPERATIONS TEAM IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES AS A SORT OF EMBRYONIC NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER. A DEFENSE ATTACHE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO BELIZE THIS SUMMER, WHICH WILL UPGRADE OUR COLLECTION CAPABILITIES. THE TASK FORCE FOR SPECIFIC COUNTERTERRORISM AND EVACUATION PLANNING HAS BEEN INSTITUTIONALIZED, AND STUDIES ON BOLIVIA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

C. {U} OPERATIONS

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1. {C} THE GROWING SOPHISTICATION OF INSURGENT PSYOP PROGRAMS WITHIN THE REGION, CLEARLY PLACES THE US ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THIS VITAL AREA. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT A DEDICATED LONG TERM EFFORT BE MADE TO COUNTER INSURGENT ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOP/IMPLEMENT REGIONAL PROGRAMS. THE DEPLOYMENT OF A PSYOP ASSESSMENT TEAM TO DETERMINE REGIONAL REQUIREMENTS STILL EXISTS AND IS CONSIDERED A CONTINUAL PROCESS. EXPANSION OF OUR PSYOP EFFORT SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE PLANS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF PSYOP MTT'S THROUGHOUT THE USSOUTHCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.
2. {C} GUARDIA NACIONAL {GN} CONTINUED THEIR INTEREST IN COMBINED EXERCISES AND TRAINING DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. THE MOST NOTABLE ACHIEVEMENT TO DATE IN THE COMBINED DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP HAS BEEN THE PARTICIPATION OF THE GN IN THE RECENTLY COMPLETED ANNUAL CANAL DEFENSE EXERCISE, KINDLE LIBERTY. THIS MARKS THE FIRST TIME THE GN ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN A CANAL DEFENSE EXERCISE. BESIDES STAFF REPRESENTATION IN THE EXERCISE CONTROL GROUP, THE COMBINED BOARD, US-SOUTHCOM STAFF, AND EACH OF THE COMBAT BATTALION COMMAND POSTS, THE GN PARTICIPATED WITH ONE MP PLATOON AND ONE LIGHT INFANTRY PLATOON WHICH SERVED WITH THE US OPPOSING FORCE.

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3. {C} FROM OCT-DEC 81, THE GN CONTINUED THEIR PARTICIPATION IN PLATOON STRENGTH (APPROXIMATELY 50 PERSONNEL) AT THE JUNGLE WARFARE SCHOOL AT FT SHERMAN. POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF THE EXPENSE OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN KINDLE LIBERTY AND THE RECENT CHANGES IN THE GN HIERARCHY, THE GN HAVE NOT ATTENDED JUNGLE WARFARE SCHOOL IN 1982. THE GN ALSO TOOK PART IN A COMMAND POST EXERCISE WITH THE 193D INF BDE IN DECEMBER 1981.

4. {C} AFTER A VERBAL PRESENTATION OF ITS FORCE DEVELOPMENT GOALS TO THE USSOUTHCOM J3 IN APRIL 1981, GN INTEREST IN FORCE DEVELOPMENT WANED UNTIL RECENTLY WHEN THE GN, FOR THE FIRST TIME, PROVIDED USSOUTHCOM WITH AN EQUIPMENT LIST DENOTING ITS FORCE DEVELOPMENT IDEAS. THE GN IS CONTRACTING WITH CADILLAC GAGE COMPANY TO PURCHASE 13 ARMORED VEHICLES WITH RELATED EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION. THE GN IS ALSO CONSIDERING PURCHASING 2 TWIN ENGINE HELICOPTERS TO PROVIDE MOBILE AND SECURE TRANSPORTATION FOR THE GN COMMANDER AND THE PRESIDENT. AN ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT PACKAGE FOR A SMALL BATTALION IS ALSO BEING DEVELOPED AS THE GN CONSIDER CIVIC ACTION TO BE A HIGH PRIORITY ITEM WITH EMPHASIS ON PENETRATION ROADS TO THE INTERIOR. #5 MILLION OF AVAILABLE FY82 FMS CREDITS UNDER THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY

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MAY BE USED AS DOWN PAYMENTS FOR THE PURCHASES DISCUSSED ABOVE. SOURCE OF THE REMAINING FUNDING IS NOT KNOWN. THE GN IS ALSO AWAITING DELIVERY OF TWO 65' FOOT PATROL BOATS IN JUNE 1982 FROM SWIFT SHIPS IN THE US. CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF THE EQUIPMENT PURCHASES, IT APPEARS THAT THE GN MAY BE MODELING ITS FORCES IN CONSONANCE WITH USSOUTHCOM FORCE DEVELOPMENT RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WERE PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED TO THE GN.

5. (C) HALCON VISTA - HONDURAS WAS CONDUCTED ON 7-9 OCT 81. U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THIS EXERCISE WAS A CLEAR SIGN OF U.S. INTEREST AND COMMITMENT TO THE REGION. IT ALSO PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP GOOD WILL AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY RAPPORT. C-3, AS PROGRAMMED IN USSOUTHCOM CONTINGENCY PLANS, WAS SUCCESSFULLY EXERCISED AS WAS THE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF A USSOUTHCOM JOINT TASK FORCE AND THE INTEGRATION OF CINCLANT NAVAL UNITS IN SUPPORT OF USSOUTHCOM. HONDURAN HEADQUARTERS STAFF PERSONNEL AND BOAT COMMANDERS RECEIVED VALUABLE TRAINING IN THE CONDUCT OF JOINT/COMBINED INTERDICTION OPERATIONS. THIS WAS THE FIRST COMBINED/JOINT EXERCISE THE U.S. HAS PARTICIPATED IN WITH A CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRY IN OVER A DECADE.

6. (C) HALCON VISTA - VENEZUELA WAS CONDUCTED 23-28 OCT 81. THE

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EXERCISE INVOLVED NAVAL AND AIR FORCES IN A COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND INTERDICTION SCENARIO. HALCON VISTA - VENEZUELA EXERCISED COMMAND/CONTROL/COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES AND EVALUATED OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF DETECTING AND INTERCEPTING HOSTILE COASTAL INCURSIONS OF VENEZUELAN COASTAL WATERS.

7. {C} UNDER AN EXPANDED JOINT/COMBINED EXERCISE CONCEPT, USSOUTHCOM HAS RECENTLY OFFERED LATAM COUNTRIES AN OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN A NEAR TERM {FY82-83} EXERCISE PROGRAM. THE GOAL IS TO INCREASE REGIONAL PARTICIPATION FROM THE PRESENT THREE COUNTRIES TO A PROJECTED TEN COUNTRIES. RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSED EXERCISE PROGRAM HAS BEEN FAVORABLE. OVERALL PROGRAM OBJECTIVES ARE MEANT TO ENHANCE REGIONAL COOPERATION, INCREASE U.S. INFLUENCE AND SIGNAL OUR COMMITMENT TO THE LATAM REGION.

8. {C} KINDLE LIBERTY-82, THE ANNUAL PANAMA CANAL DEFENSE EXERCISE WAS CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD 10-19 FEB 82. KINDLE LIBERTY WAS THE MOST SUCCESSFUL PANAMA CANAL DEFENSE EXERCISE YET CONDUCTED. THE EXERCISE SUCCESSFULLY EVALUATED JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONS REQUIRING ACTIVE PARTICIPATION, BETWEEN HQ USSOUTHCOM, ITS SERVICE COMPONENTS, THE PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION, THE AMEMBASSY AND THE PANAMA GUARDIA NACIONAL.

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{D} {U} PLANS, POLICY AND POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS

{I} {C} THIS COMMAND HAS UNDERTAKEN A MAJOR PLANNING EFFORT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE USCINCSO OPLAN 6150. THE SCOPE AND URGENCY OF THE PLAN DICTATED A NEED FOR PLANNING ASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE THE COMMAND. AS REPORTED LAST PERIOD, OUR OPERATIONAL PLANNING STAFF CONTINUES TO BE SERIOUSLY UNDERMANNED AT A TIME WHEN PLANNING REQUIREMENTS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.

{2} {C} THE FIRST MILITARY LIAISON OFFICE INPUTS TO THE USCINCSO 6104 CONPLAN IN JANUARY 1982 HAVE BEEN FORMATTED INTO CONCISE, READILY USABLE MATRICES. SUBSEQUENT THREE YEAR PROJECTIONS PROMISE A MATURATION OF THIS CONCEPT WHICH SHOULD HAVE WIDE THIRD WORLD APPLICATION. WE ARE VERY OPTIMISTIC.

{3} {C} THE USSOUTHCOM REGIONAL TRAINING STUDY WAS COMPLETED IN NOV 1981. LATAM MILITARY TRAINING SHORTFALLS IDENTIFIED IN THIS JCS DIRECTED STUDY OFFER A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S. TO INFLUENCE THE REGION POSITIVELY. THE REGIONAL MILITARY TRAINING SHORTFALL FOR 1982-1990 IS CONSERVATIVELY ESTIMATED AT 300,000 TRAINING SPACES COSTING \$1.2 BILLION. THESE TRAINING SHORTFALLS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED COLLECTIVELY BY ALLIES IN AND OUT OF THE REGION...A NATURAL BUILDING

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BLOCK FOR THE HEMISPHERIC COALITION.

{4} {C} TWO MAJOR OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. POLICY VICTORIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA OCCURRED IN MARCH...THE ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND THE COUP IN GUATEMALA. THE IMPACT OF BOTH THE CIVILIAN DEMOCRATIC DECLARATION IN EL SALVADOR AND THE MILITARY ATTEMPT TO CLEANSE ITSELF IN GUATEMALA IS RAPIDLY DIFFUSING AND THE U.S. HAS NOT RESPONDED DECISIVELY TO EITHER OPPORTUNITY.

{5} {U} MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS {MTT}: THE FOLLOWING MTT'S WERE COORDINATED BY USSOUTHCOM DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD.

COUNTRY	DESCRIPTION	DURATION	COMPOSITION
{A} {C} BARBADOS	FIELD MEDICAL MTT	16 JAN-12 MAR 82	4 NCO
{B} {C} COLOMBIA	M113 MAINTENANCE/ MECHANIC OJT	15 NOV-12 DEC 82	4 NCO
	TOW OPS TAT	22-28 FEB 82	2 NCO
	CO-B OAF		
	AIR DEF SURVEY	31JAN-4 FEB 82	3 OFF
	A-37 TEST STAND	05-16 OCT 81	1 EM
	A-37 EGRESS	22 SEP/06 OCT 81	1 EM
	A-37 WEAPONS	06-20 OCT 81	1 EM

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		RMEL SURVEY	21-27 FEB 82	1 EM
{C}	{C}	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	SPECIAL MILITARY OPS	3 FEB-30 APR 82 1 OFF/5 NCO
{D}	{C}	ECUADOR	4.2 MORTAR MAINT	26 JAN-25 APR 82 3 NCO
			WATER PURIFICATION	26 JAN-22 FEB 82 1 NCO
			MTT SURVEY	8-13 FEB 82 1 NCO
			AVIATION IP	21 MAR-15 SEP 82 4 OFF
			FMS-TAY SURVEY	9 JAN-16 JAN 81 1 OFF/3-EM
{E}	{C}	EL SALVADOR	MEDICAL MTT	1 AUG-31 DEC 81 4 NCO
			TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL ESTABLISHMENT MTT	18 AUG 81-16- JAN 82 3 OFF
			UH-1H CREW CHIEF	22 AUG-20 OCT 81 1 NCO
			INSTRUCTOR MTT	
			UH-1H PRODUCTION	6 SEP-4 NOV 81 1 WO
			CONTROL MGT MTT	
			MTT OTHER (LIAISON)	13 SEP-7 NOV 81 6OFF/1NCO
			SMALL UNIT TNG NO.2	16 OCT-19 DEC 81 10FF/9NCO

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UH-1H ENGINE/POWER 16 OCT-15 DEC 81 2 NCO
 TRAIN INSTRUCTOR MTT
 NATIONAL STRATEGY 13 SEP-07 NOV 81 9 OFFS/1 NCO
 TEAM MTT
 LOG/COMMO/MAINT MTT 6 NOV 81-5 APR 81 3 NCO
 BAILEY BRIDGE MTT 23 JAN-15 FEB 82 1 OFF/2 NCO
 UH-1H STANDARDIZA- 27 AUG 81-26 AUG 82 1 NCO
 TION & SAFETY TAFT
 SURVEY ASSISTANCE 3-18 FEB 82 1 OFF/3 NCO
 INF BN INDIV TNG 4 JAN-7 MAY 82 5 OFFS/2 NCO
 ADMIN/LOG/MEDICAL 4 JAN-7 MAY 82 1 NCO
 UH-1H HELICOPTER 22 JAN-MAY 82 1 OFF/4 NCO
 UH-1H INSTRUCTOR 19 MAR-MAY 82 1 OFF
 PILOT
 UH-1H HELICOPTER 8-12 MAR 82 4 NCO
 RECOVERY [TAT]
 ELECTRONIC WARFARE 22 MAR-1 APR 82 2 NCO
 COMMUNICATIONS MTT 17 MAR-2 APR 82 PN 1 NCO
 2 APR-28 SEP 82 ES

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OPS PLANNING	13 MAR-12 APR 82	1 OFF
COMMO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE	4-31 MAR 82	1 OFF
AIRCRAFT	27 JAN 82	2 EM
STRUCTURAL REPAIR SURVEY		
AIR BASE SECURITY SURVEY	3-10 FEB 82	1 EM
COAST GUARD MTT	21 JAN-15 APR	3 OFF
{F}{C} HONDURAS ARMS INTERDICTION MTT-HO-SDD-38-82X	15 OCT 81-30 MAR 82	2 OFF/10 NCO
CIVIL DISTURBANCE SURVEY HO-S0053-82X	22-27 OCT 81	1 OFF/1 NCO
UH-1H PILOT/TECH	2 NOV 81-19 APR 82	1 OFF/INCO
INSP MTT HO-F0022-82X		
ARMS INTERDICTION	11 OCT-18 DEC 81	1 OFF/1 NCO

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LIAISON	11 OCT-18 DEC 81	1 OFF/1 NCO
ARMS INTER-	6 JAN-12 APR 82	3 OFF/8 NCO
DICTION MTT	6 JAN-5 APR 82	2 NCO
MILITARY FREE	9 FEB-22 MAR 82	1 NCO
FALL	13 FEB-26 MAR 82	2 NCO
LOGISTICS	19 MAR-1 APR 82	2 OFF
SURVEY		
TRI-SERVICE	5 MAR-1 APR 82	4 OFF {2 ARMY}
COMMO SURVEY		{1 AF}
		{1 NAVY}
MILITARY	18-31 MAR 82	1 OFF/2 EM
AVIATION SURVEY		
MILITARY	18-31 MAR 82	1 EM
AVIATION SURVEY		
{G} {C} JAMAICA RANGER SCH.	18 FEB -25 MAR 82	1 OFF/5 NCO
{H} {C} PERU PSYOPS MTT	10-23 DEC 81	2 OFF
PE-F0618-82X		
INTELLIGENCE	13-28 FEB 82	1 OFF
MTT		

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{II} {C} VENEZUELA C-123 RECOVERY 16-19 MAR 82 2 OFF

E. {U} LOGISTICS

{I} {U} SUSTAINABILITY REPORT. THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SM 646-80, DATED 17 NOV 80, AS MODIFIED BY J4DM 217-81, DATED 9 PAR 81.

{A} {S} ARMY COMPONENT

CLASS DOS OH RATING NOTES

I 50 S-1

II {BULK}

MOGAS 600 S-1

DFM 250 S-1

JP4 33 S-1

JP5 100 S-1

V {U} 50 S-1

VII 24 S-4 1

{B} {S} NAVY COMPONENT

CLASS DOS OH RATING

I 50 S-1

II {E} 60 S-1

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{II} {C} VENEZUELA C-123 RECOVERY 16-19 MAR 82 2 OFF

E. {U} LOGISTICS

{I} {U} SUSTAINABILITY REPORT. THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SM 646-80, DATED 17 NOV 80, AS MODIFIED BY J4DM 217-81, DATED 9 PAR 81.

{A} {S} ARMY COMPONENT

CLASS	DOS OH	RATING	NOTES
-------	--------	--------	-------

I	50	S-1	
---	----	-----	--

II {BULK}

MOGAS	600	S-1	
-------	-----	-----	--

DFM	250	S-1	
-----	-----	-----	--

JP4	33	S-1	
-----	----	-----	--

JP5	100	S-1	
-----	-----	-----	--

V {W}	50	S-1	
-------	----	-----	--

VII	24	S-4	1
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{B} {S} NAVY COMPONENT

CLASS	DOS OH	RATING
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I	50	S-1
---	----	-----

II {E}	60	S-1
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III {BULK}

MOGAS 31 S-1

DFM 447 S-1

JP4 18 S-1

JP5 31 S-1

NSF {138 MBBLs-PACFLT RESERVE}

V {W} 70% S-1

IX 30 S-1

{C} {S} AIR FORCE COMPONENT

CLASS	% OH	RATING	NOTES
I {A}	0	S-1	2
II	75	S-2	
JP4	100	S-1	
PACKAGED	44	S-4	
V	33	S-4	3
MK-82	33	S-4	
20 MM	33	S-4	
VII	100	S-1	
GP VEH	100	S-1	

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TRP 100 S-1

VII 78 S-2

IX {A} 100 S-1

{D} {S} NOTES

1. RATING IS HAMPERED BY SHORTAGES IN LINE ITEMS WHICH CANNOT BE EFFECTIVELY ROTATED AND BY TREATY-MANDATED REDUCTION IN STORAGE CAPACITY.

2. IN-FLIGHT RATIONS ARE NOT POSITIONED AT HOWARD AFB; HOWEVER, ADEQUATE QUANTITIES ARE STORED BY ARMY COMPONENT AND CAN BE AVAILABLE FOR USE WITHIN THREE HOURS. THUS, S-1 RATING IS APPROPRIATE.

3. SUFFICIENT SECURE STORAGE AREA IS NOT AVAILABLE AT HOWARD, AFB FOR ALL AUTHORIZED AIR MUNITIONS. PROPOSALS TO REMEDY SITUATION ARE PENDING APPROVAL/FUNDING AT HQTAC.

{2} {U} REMARKS/PROBLEM AREAS

{A} {C} PIERS 1 AND 2, USNAVSTA PANAMA CANAL, WILL BE UNDER REPAIR COMMENCING APRIL 1982. UNTIL THE FEBRUARY 1983 SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE, PIER CAPACITY WILL BE REDUCED BY 30%.

{B} {C} REFUELING CAPABILITY IS THE SINGLE MOST LIMITING FACTOR AFFECTING TURN-AROUND TIME FOR AIRCRAFT OPERATING AT HOWARD AFB.

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THIS COULD BE CRUCIAL FOR BOTH AIRLIFT OPERATIONS AND TACTICAL SUPPORT/AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS.

{1} {C} FUEL TRUCK FILLSTAND. A CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE READY ACCESS TO A TRUCK FILLSTAND AT THE HYDRANT SYSTEM PUMPHOUSE, NEAR THE FLIGHT LINE, IS CURRENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION IN JULY 1982. THIS WILL PROVIDE LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FILL A TRUCK AND REFUEL AN AIRCRAFT SIMULTANEOUSLY. A MODIFICATION TO THE PUMPS/SEPARATORS HAS BEEN FUNDED AND WILL, UPON COMPLETION IN FY83, ALLOW MORE RAPID SIMULTANEOUS TRUCK FILL/AIRCRAFT REFUEL.

{2} {C} RAMP FUEL HYDRANT SYSTEM. THE EIGHT LATERAL REFUELING PITS AT HOWARD AFB RAMP ARE SERVICED BY ONLY ONE PUMPHOUSE. IN ITS CURRENT CONFIGURATION, THE SYSTEM ALLOWS ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT AT A TIME TO BE REFUELED. THE REQUIREMENT TO MODIFY THE HYDRANT SYSTEM TO PERMIT SIMULTANEOUS AND INDEPENDENT OPERATION OF MULTIPLE PITS IS PROGRAMMED. THE PROJECT SHOULD BE FUNDED AND COMPLETED IN FY83.

{3} {C} AIRCRAFT PARKING. HOWARD AFB HAS LIMITED RAMP SPACE, WHICH IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT ONLY ONE-THIRD OF IT IS CONCRETE AND CAN SUPPORT AIRCRAFT WITH HEAVY FOOTPRINTS. A GOOD PORTION OF THIS SAME AREA, HOWEVER, MUST BE RESERVED FOR ACCESS TO AND

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FROM THE REFUELING PITS. THE NUMBER OF FIGHTERS WHICH CAN BE SUPPORTED ON THE OTHER TWO-THIRDS OF THE RAMP IS LIMITED BY THE UNAVAILABILITY OF REVETMENTS.

{D} {C} RUNWAY REPAIR CAPABILITY. HOWARD AFB POSSESSES NO IN-PLACE RUNWAY REPAIR CAPABILITY. ALTHOUGH A RAPID RUNWAY REPAIR KIT IS INCLUDED IN USCINCSO OPLAN TPFDD'S IT IS IDENTIFIED AS A SHORTFALL. WITHOUT AN IN-PLACE REPAIR CAPABILITY, RUNWAY REPAIR MAY TAKE 24 HOURS OR MORE, DEPENDING ON THE LOCAL PURCHASE AVAILABILITY OR THE EMERGENCY AIRLIFT SUPPLY OF MATERIALS.

{E} {S} PURMS LEVELS ARE MAINTAINED FOR IN-PLACE FORCES ONLY. ACCOMPANYING SUPPLIES FOR AUGMENTATION FORCES AND PURMS ON HAND WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT FORCES UNTIL THE AIR LOC OPENS FOR RESUPPLY AND BUILDUP.

{F} {U} COMMUNICATIONS

{I} {C} SECURE HF VOICE COMMUNICATIONS, USING SUNAIR HF TRANSCEIVERS AND KY-65 E1 MODEL PARKHILL EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN USSOUTHCOM AND MLO'S IN COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA. THE KY-65 E1, OR PREPRODUCTION PARKHILL MODEL, WHICH IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE KY-65 PRODUCTION MODEL, IS

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BEING USED TO NET THESE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

{2} {C} A KY-3/KY-65 INTERFACE DEVICE HAS RECENTLY BEEN INSTALLED AT THE USSOUTHCOM MISSION RADIO SYSTEM {MRS} NET CONTROL STATION AT HOWARD AIR FORCE BASE. THIS INTERFACE DEVICE HAS ALSO BEEN EQUIPPED WITH THE PARKHILL E1 MODEL WHICH PERMITS EXTENSION OF THE AUTOSEVOCOM TO MLO'S IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

{3} {U} THE ONGOING PROJECT TO REPLACE OUTDATED AN/FRC-93 {COLLINS KWM-2} RADIO EQUIPMENT WITH SUNAIR HF TRANSCEIVERS CONTINUES. A NEW TARGET DATE OF 1 JUNE 82 HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AT WHICH TIME ALL THE REMAINING CARIBBEAN AND SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY MLO'S WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH THE SUNAIR EQUIPMENT.

{4} {C} INSTALLATION OF KG-81 EQUIPMENT TO PROVIDE BULK ENCRYPTION OF THE DIGITAL MICROWAVE LINKS IN PANAMA HAS BEEN COMPLETED ON BOTH THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC SIDES OF THE ISTHMUS. THE REQUIREMENT STILL EXISTS TO CONVERT THE INTERCONNECTING TRANSISTHMIAN ANALOG MICROWAVE LINK TO A DIGITAL SYSTEM. THIS WILL ALLOW COMPLETE BULK ENCRYPTION OF THE ENTIRE DCS MICROWAVE SYSTEM IN PANAMA AND WILL BE COMPLETED BY DECEMBER 82.

{5} {C} THREE AN/URC 101 MOBILE RADIO SATELLITE TERMINALS TO SUP-

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PORT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED. THIS EQUIPMENT ALONG WITH LIMITED KY-65 ASSETS PARTIALLY SATISFIES THIS HEADQUARTERS DEPLOYABLE SINGLE CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENT. UPON RECEIPT OF THE JOINT CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY {JCMC} LATE THIS YEAR, AUGMENTED BY USAFSO ASSETS CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION, OUR SHORT RANGE SINGLE CHANNEL SATELLITE CAPABILITY WILL BE SATISFACTORY. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED A CONTINGENCY SUPPORT REQUIREMENT FOR MULTI-CHANNEL CAPABILITIES STILL EXISTS.

{B} {C} A SURVEY TEAM FROM DCA COMMAND AND CONTROL TECHNICAL CENTER CONDUCTED A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF REQUIREMENTS TO UPGRADE THIS HEADQUARTERS JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER {JOC} COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY. THE UPGRADE PLANS CALL FOR CONSOLIDATION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE EXISTING FACILITY AS WELL AS INSTALLATION OF UHF/VHF/FM SECURE RADIOS, RADIO TELETYPE AND SATCOM CAPABILITIES.

{B} {U} DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD {DES} EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED FOR USE ON THE USCINCSO'S VHF COMMAND NET AND A SEPARATE EQUIPMENT PACKAGE FOR USE IN CONTINGENCIES. DIRNSA HAS APPROVED THE USE OF THIS TYPE EQUIPMENT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INFORMATION.

{B} {U} AS THE TEMPO OF ACTIVITY WITHIN USSOUTHCOM CONTINUES TO

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INCREASE, THE URGENCY OF ESTABLISHING A CBS DIRECTORATE AS OUTLINED
IN FY83 JMP BECOMES MORE CRITICAL. CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THE JCS
AND SERVICE AO'S IS BEING MAINTAINED TO ENSURE THAT PRIORITY SUPPORT
IS GIVEN TO OUR REQUIREMENT.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, 193d INFANTRY BRIGADE (PANAMA)

APO MIAMI 34004

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

AFZU-DPT-OR

SUBJECT: Commander's Semi-Annual SITREP, 1 October 1981 - 31 March 1982

THRU: Commander in Chief
United States Southern Command
ATTN: SCCS
Quarry Heights, Panama

TO: Commander in Chief
United States Southern Command
ATTN: SCJ3
Quarry Heights, Panama

1. (U) Personnel:

a. (C) Total military personnel strength (including tenant activities) averaged at 104.5% during the period 1 Oct 81 - 31 Mar 82. During the same period, the personnel strength in the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) roll-up readiness reporting units varied between 88-92%.

b. (C) Currently the Brigade is at 107% of its authorized strength (readiness roll-up units at 85%).

c. (C) During the period covered by this report, enlisted strength fluctuated between 98.9% to 110.5%. Our strength peaked in Nov and we are now projecting a gradual decline through normal attrition, unprogrammed losses, (which average approximately 30 per month) and a tough policy on FST extensions coupled with a liberal policy on curtailments on over-strength MOS. We should be in the management window by the end of the 3d quarter. Aggregate enlisted strength for 3/7th Special Forces has averaged 100.8%. Problems are being experienced due to the lack of language qualified personnel. Although we are conducting language training locally, it is not the same as receiving language qualified personnel trained at the Defense Language Institute. This has an impact on mission accomplishment based on the current/projected unrest in LATAM.

d. (U) During the current calendar year (CY) the Brigade has been operating with a FORSCOM imposed Officer Distribution Plan (ODP) that supports 94.5% of the Brigade's current Commissioned and Warrant Officer authorizations (AUTH 483 - ODP 456). Current total officer operating strength is 449 with a projected operating strength of 454 through the end of this calendar year.

CLASSIFIED BY: Cdr, 193d Inf Bde (Pan) EXTENDED BY: Cdr, 193d Inf Bde (Pan)
ON: 30 March 1982 REASON: Para 2-30k, DOD 5200.1-R
DECLASSIFY ON: 29 March 1988

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2. (U) Intelligence:

a. (C/NOFORN) Past Six Months. Overshadowing all other events of the past six months was the 3 Mar "minicoup" (dubbed a real coup by the opposition press) within the Guardia Nacional (GN) in which the GN Commandant, COL Florencio Florez; the G-4, LTC Armando Bellido; and the head of Transportation, LTC Manuel Arauz, were suddenly "retired" and command of the GN assumed by LTC (simultaneously promoted to COL) Ruben Dario Paredes.

(1) (C/NOFORN) Particulars of GN "Minicoup": With none of the three retirees in attendance at the announcement ceremony at the Presidencia, Aristides Royo, on 3 Mar, made known the concurrent promotion to Colonel and Commandant of the GN of former Chief of Staff, COL Ruben Dario Paredes. Also announced in the surprising 3 Mar developments were the ascensions to Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, respectively, of LTC's Armando Contreras (former G-3 and Deputy Chief of Staff) and Manuel A. Noriega (who retains his position as G-2). During the afternoon of 3 Mar, the promotions of four majors to the rank of LTC were announced, along with a list of changes in assignments of those promoted and those moving to positions vacated by retirements and promotions. Also announced were the retirements of a group of eligible majors. The LTC promotions resulted in a net gain of one (there are now 10 LTC's in the GN).

(2) (C/NOFORN) Expected Impact of the "Minicoup" Upon US/GOP/GN Relations: G-2, 193d Inf Bde (Pan) believes that the overall impact of the 3 Mar "minicoup" upon US/GOP/GN relations will result in closer ties and improved combined training cooperation between US Forces stationed in PN and the GN. Anti-Communists public statements made by COL Paredes since assuming command, in particular his 20 Mar speech in Santiago, have been enthusiastically received by business, religious and community leaders in PN. Those statements, coupled with Paredes' concern expressed on 13 Mar to the visiting chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the course of events in Nicaragua (NU), presage a definite move by PM toward closer cooperation with US aims in the area. On this occasion, COL Paredes asked the chairman when the US was going to "do something about Cuba instead of just warning everyone". He (Paredes) chidingly referred to the US as "the little boy who cried wolf". The recently-appointed GN G-3 and Chief of the Security and Defense Commission, LTC Roberto Diaz, advised the chairman that PN would continue to work with Cuba but would make "advance coordination" with the US in PN's dealings with Cuba, Central America, and the Caribbean.

(3) (C/NOFORN) Significance of GN Changes: The most significant aspects of the 3 Mar changes in the GN were the "Banana Republic" style in which they were made and their as-yet-undetermined possible effects upon the scheduled 1984 national elections. The continued absence from the scene of COL Florencio Florez

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(reportedly detained incommunicado at his home), and the widely disbelieved official reasons for the sudden retirements, were the most negative aspects of the reshuffle; they constitute continuing liabilities to the reputations of the GOP, GN and principals involved. COL Florez is universally regarded as the most honest official in the GN, and the one who most sincerely wished to withdraw the GN from political control over the GOP. The official reason given for the retirements - that each individual had reached the required 25-year continuous (or 30 year interrupted) service - disregarded the fact that LTC Contreras is already eligible for retirement, as is LTC Pedro Ayala, the new G-5.

b. (C/NOFORN) Outlook for Next Six Months: Of particular interest to Panama watchers will be: the progress of the expected candidacy for President of COL Paredes in the May 84 elections and the expected succession to Command of the GN of LTC Noriega. COL Paredes has already publicly stated that he would not remain in his present post for more than a year. There are two schools of thought on what is to follow his departure. The first is that LTC Contreras will precede Paredes in departing from the GN (some qualified observers believe in the near future). The other school of thought is that Contreras will be allowed to succeed Paredes as a figure-head Commandant with the strings being pulled by LTC Noriega, and to some extent by LTC Diaz. In any case, LTC Noriega is expected to be Commandant of the GN, at least by the time of the 1984 elections, and to remain in that post until the late 1980's. Although the occasion (1 Apr) is ripe for possible displays of excessive chauvinism, as evidenced by several press notices concerning the day, no serious trouble is expected. Overall, in the days ahead, COL Paredes' stronger leadership, his popularly-received anti-Communist public statements, and his private assurances to senior US Military officials, comprise favorable indicators for an improved climate of friendliness and cooperation between US Forces and the GN.

3. (U) Operations:

a. (U) Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Activations:

(1) (U) The TOC and TAC CP were activated 30 Sep 81 - 8 Oct 81 for the Tactical Field Exercise (TFE) for the Brigade Units.

(2) (U) The TAC CP was activated during the period, 15-17 Nov 81 to support 2/75th Ranger's participation in the third week JOTC FTX. The Ranger Battalion was moved from JOTC Fort Sherman to secure a Remote Marshalling Base (REMAB) site on Pacific side. Simultaneously, the Battalion Commander and Staff were given Joint Task Force Operation Orders by staff of 193d Inf Bde (Pan).

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The Search and Rescue Mission Operation order was not given until the units were well into the planning phase of their mission. This was done to test the battalion staff's ability to react to changing situations. Rehearsal sites were built on similar terrain by 518 Engineer Company to resemble actual objective sites. The FTX for 2/75 consisted of three modules: airborne raid against an enemy C³ facility, search and rescue mission, and VIP snatch mission. The 3/7 SFG(A) provided AST Teams and in conjunction with the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) developed target folders for the snatch, raid, and POW liberation missions. The TAC CP was activated 13-15 Dec 81 to support 1/75th Rangers participation in the third week JOTC FTX. The FTX for 1/75 consisted of four modules: raid against C³ facility, search and rescue mission (live fire), VIP snatch mission, and POW liberation. The 3/7 SFG(A) provided AST Teams and in conjunction with the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) developed target folders for the snatch, raid, and POW liberation missions.

(3) (U) 193d Inf Bde (Pan) under the banner of US Army School of the Americas (USARSA) and in conjunction with the Guardia Nacional of the Republic of Panama, hosted a Jungle Operations Conference (JOC) from 16-20 Nov 81. It was conducted at the Jungle Operations Training Center, Fort Sherman, Panama. Its purpose was to establish an interchange of views, concepts, and philosophies on military operations in Latin America with emphasis on jungle operations. The conference far exceeded the most optimistic expectations for success, with 16 of the 20 invited countries attending: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Mexico declined the invitation. Paraguay responded after the fact, in spite of numerous correspondence and the attendance of their military attache to the introductory one-day seminar. Haiti's MILGroup acknowledged receipt of the invitation but did not attend. Trinidad never responded. The total number of foreign guests in attendance was 31. Additionally, the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) CAPSTONE unit, 92d Inf Bde Sep (PR), the Permanent Secretariat of the Inter-American Defense Board and the United States Army Infantry School also sent representatives. In-country personnel in attendance included representatives from USSOUTHCOM's Combined Board and representatives from the 193d Inf Bde (Pan). The total number of participants numbered in excess of 50. Presentations were conducted in Spanish and translated to English. They served to stimulate discussion at the seminars, displayed capabilities of the US Army in Jungle Operations, and demonstrated goodwill toward all the LATAM Armies. All attendees expressed satisfaction and pride in their country's participation. The response from the various delegations was both enthusiastic and complimentary. All expressed a desire to see the conference become an annual event.

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(4) (U) A JTX Kindle Liberty '82 planning conference was held 3-4 Dec 81 with all ARRED participants. Interim coordination was effected and a support site survey was conducted. FORSCOM provided controller/evaluator support from throughout CONUS.

(5) (U) The TOC was activated 18-20 Jan 82 for the Command Post Wargame (CPW) Cutting Edge VI.

(6) (U) An Operations Seminar was conducted 4-5 Feb 1982, just prior to JTX Kindle Liberty '82. The purpose of the seminar was to familiarize commanders and staff on new doctrine found in FM 100-5 (Draft) and its application to the mission of the 193d Inf Bde (Pan). Because of the turnover in battalion commanders and battalion S-3s, a Threat Briefing followed by a OPLAN 6501 briefing was presented to the assembled commanders and staff. The TF 1/502 Inf Commander presented a short briefing on the capabilities of an air assault task force, and was followed with a presentation by MAJ Carey, USMC, on planning considerations for an amphibious assault. Several realistic tactical situations were presented to battalion commanders and staffs for their solution and brief-back. The purpose of these exercises was to enhance commander and staff interaction and get the players' "heads in the ball game". It was an extremely worthwhile and beneficial seminar.

(7) (C) From 10-19 Feb 82 the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) participated in Joint Training Exercise (JTX) Kindle Liberty, '82, a JCS coordinated, USSOUTHCOM sponsored joint air, ground, and naval exercise designed to exercise and evaluate existing plans for the defense of the Panama Canal. Selected portions of OPLAN 6501-81, the augmentation force reception plan, and employment of both in place and augmentation forces were tested and evaluated to standard. Army units OPCON to the Brigade for the conduct of the JTX were: TF 1/502 Inf, Ft Campbell; 1/504 Inf, Ft Bragg; staff of the 53d SIB, FLARNG; elements of the 58th ATC, Ft Bragg; and soldiers from the 7th Transportation Group, Ft Eustis. The Panamanian Guardia Nacional participated with one platoon of MPs augmenting LEA and one platoon augmenting the OPFOR. Extensive logistical support operations to include logistics-over-the-shore operations (LOTS) and evaluation of the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) Emergency Evacuation Plan (BEEP) were also conducted. As in the past, live fire lanes were incorporated into exercise play.

(8) (C) Conduct of this year's exercise emphasized operations against both conventional and unconventional forces. Operations emphasized not only security of vital installations and critical facilities, but projected the battle outside the immediate canal operating area into the Brigade area of influence. Extensive use of air cavalry, airmobile forces, and a battalion amphibious assault using US Army assets supported by the Air Force and Navy combined to accomplish this "deep thrust" within the maneuver confines of the exercise.

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(9) (C) The identification and solution of joint operational problems was among the greatest benefits of the exercise. Problems inherent in our current OPLAN in command and control, control of fires within the canal operating area, and the necessity of centralization of command and control of the ground war are being addressed both with the other components and USSOUTHCOM.

(10) (U) Unit training weaknesses have been identified and training to correct these weaknesses was incorporated into future training plans.

(11) (U) The TAC CP was activated 16-25 Mar 82 for a Brigade Tactical Field Exercise (TFE). Units from the Brigade were evaluated to standard during the March TFE.

(12) (C) Brigade continues to support project Royal Duke with personnel and equipment resources.

(13) (C) Twenty-five SM, one CH-47, one OH58, and three UH-1H helicopters deployed to Costa Rica on 8 Mar 82 to conduct annual high altitude training. The training emphasizes pilot development and provides realistic "hands-on" training in the area of high altitude flying. Civic action projects are secondary to the overall training and are supported on each of the three weekends during the training period. Personnel and equipment will redeploy to Panama on 31 March 1982.

b. (U) Contingency and Disaster Relief:

(1) (U) A four man team from 36th EOD deployed to Venezuela on 30 Sep 81 - 4 Oct 81 to provide EOD support for the Vice President's visit.

(2) (U) A six man team from 36th EOD deployed to Colombia 11 Oct 81 for support of the Vice President's visit. Two of the service members returned to Panama on 15 Oct 81 and the remaining four members deployed to Rio de Janeiro to support the Vice President's visit there. They returned to Panama on 18 Oct 81.

(3) (U) A four man team from 36th EOD deployed to Mexico 21-26 Nov 81 for support of the Secretary of State's visit.

(4) (U) A two man team from 36th EOD deployed to St. Lucia, West Indies on 27 Nov 81 - 5 Dec 81. Their mission was to provide support for the Secretary of State's visit.

c. (U) Mobile Training Teams: The following MTTs were provided during the period, 1 Oct 81 - 31 Mar 82:

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(1) (S) El Salvador: Medical MTT deployed 1 Aug 81 - 17 Dec 81, (four SM); MILGroup assistant deployed 1 Jul 81 - 1 Oct 81, (one SM); Staff Assistance MTT deployed 28 Sep 81 - 3 Oct 81, (two SM); UH-1H Production Control MTT deployed 6 Sep 81 - 4 Nov 81, (one SM); UH-1H Engine/Powertrain Instructor MTT deployed 16 Oct 81 - 14 Dec 81, (two SM); Small Unit Training Phase II MTT deployed 16 Oct 81 - 17 Dec 81, (ten SM); Infantry Battalion Individual Training MTT deployed 4 Jan 82, (twenty-six SM); Admin/Log/Medical MTT deployed 4 Jan 82, (one SM); UH-1H Helicopter Maintenance MTT deployed 21 Jan 82, (three SM); (S) Survey Assistance Team deployed 3-18 Feb 82 (four SM); and Helicopter Recovery TAT deployed 8-12 Mar 82, (five SM).

(2) (U) Honduras: Arms Interdiction Phase II Liaison MTT deployed 11 Oct 81 - 19 Dec 81, (two SM); Arms Interdiction Phase II MTT deployed 16 Oct 81 - 19 Dec 81, (twelve SM); Civil Disturbance Survey deployed 22 Oct 81 - 27 Oct 81. Civil Disturbance MTT deployed 1 Nov 81 - 22 Nov 81, (twelve SM); Arms Interdiction Liaison MTT deployed 6 Jan 82, (two SM); Arms Interdiction MTT deployed 6 Jan 82, (twelve SM); and Military Freefall MTT deployed 13 Feb 82 - 28 Mar 82, (three SM).

(3) (U) Dominican Republic: SMUT MTT Survey deployed 10-16 Jan 82, (three SM); and SMUT MTT deployed 3 Feb 82, (eleven SM).

(4) (U) Ecuador: 4.2 in Mortar Maintenance Survey deployed 8-15 Dec 81; 4.2 Mortar Maintenance MTT deployed 26 Jan 82, (three SM); MC3 Parachute and Oxygen Console System Survey deployed 8-12 Mar 82, (one SM).

(5) (U) Barbados: Field Medical MTT deployed 16 Jan-12 Mar 82, (four SM).

(6) (U) Jamaica: Ranger School Establishment MTT deployed 18 Feb - 25 Mar 82, (six SM).

(7) (U) Venezuela: C-123 Operations Survey deployed 16-19 Mar 82, (two SM).

4. (U) Training:

a. (U) Basic Airborne Course commenced 15 Mar 82 with a completion date of 2 Apr 82. The cadre is provided by 3d Special Forces Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). There are 43 students participating in the class.

b. (U) FORSCOM Commanders Company Level Marksmanship Competition (FCCLMC): Second iteration completed 30 Dec 81. Forty company level teams participated. 83.2% of the personnel fired an average score of 33.21. High unit 3-7 SFG(A) with an 82.2%.

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c. (U) Battalion Training Management System (BTMS): The Battalion Training Management System has reached its sustainment phase. The Brigade has gone from one workshop per week to two workshops per week. This has almost doubled the number of BTMS trained individuals. Improvements in the quality of instruction for both initial training and instructor's military training cadre training have been dramatic. A second instructor was added in Nov 81. A total of 1177 SMs have undergone training during CY81.

d. (U) Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC): During the first and second quarter FY82 six Bn and one USMC Battalion trained at JOTC.

5. (U) Communications: The following factors significantly affect the operational readiness of the Brigade:

(1) (U) Lack of Tactical Telecommunications Center: The 396th Signal Company is authorized one terminal, telegraph (AN/TSC-58). This was authorized as of 1978 and has been on order since 1978. Requisition number is 8172-0001. The shortage of the terminal telegraph (AN/TSC-58) authorized to 396th Signal Company reduces the command control C-E capability of the Brigade. The Brigade currently has no tactical communications center capability and must rely totally on a single radio teletype net for all record traffic. This situation is unsatisfactory owing to the volume of traffic and typical percentage of daily reliability with radio teletype.

(2) (U) Shortage of Communications Secure Equipment: The current Brigade fill for secure voice (FM) equipment for vehicles is 84%. This situation coupled with only 20% fill of secure voice (FM) equipment for aircraft impacts on the C-E command and control of the Brigade. Through coordination with Communications Security Logistics Activity, Fort Huachuca, no requisition for the short equipment has been made due to the pending availability of these items.

(3) (U) Shortages of C-E Officer Personnel: The Brigade currently has four C-E officers scheduled to PCS between the May-Jul 82 time frame. The current status of the Brigade includes two vacant C-E officer billets and one warrant officer billet. There are currently three C-E officers and two warrant officer replacements scheduled for the Apr-Sep 82 time frame. Based on the Brigade's mission requirement, three officer billets going unfilled for approximately 3-4 months is unsatisfactory.

(4) (U) Lack of Mobile Long Haul Communications Maintenance Equipment: The arrival of three AN/URC-101 man-pack satellite terminals in

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Nov 81 provides a significant improvement in secure long-haul communications for contingency operations. The lack of mobile communications maintenance test equipment to support the AN/URC-101 satellite terminals and other Brigade communications systems could be corrected by procuring a commercial designed test set. Fort Bragg and Fort Campbell units that have AN/URC-101's are currently considering buying a Motorola communications analyzer model R-2002. The communications analyzer is a lightweight test set designed to convert over twelve individual maintenance tests into one test set. The communications analyzer is also designed to be operated by utilizing AC or battery power and costs approximately \$15,000.00.

6. (U) Logistics:

a. (S) PWRS	DOS	S-RATING
Class I (Subsistence)	50	S-1
Class III (Bulk)		
MOGAS	600	S-1
JP5	100	S-1
DFM	250	S-1
JP4	33	S-1
Class V (Ground)	50	S-1
Class VIII	24	*S-4

*Ratings in Class VIII are hampered by shortages in lines which cannot be stored because they cannot be effectively rotated. Additionally, the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977 have required US Army MEDDAC-Panama to move from their warehouse in Curundu. Their new warehouses in Corozal have reduced storage capacity.

b. (S) Operational Project for this command is as follows:

FDR-P-01-81-A (PRJ) - Supports OPLAN 6501-81 and CONPLAN 6100-81.

c. (U) With the exception of the Class VIII status, there are no logistical problem areas which can be expected to deter accomplishment of the assigned mission of the 193d Inf Bde (Pan).

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7. (U) Force Development: During the period 1 Oct 82 - 31 Mar 82 FD actions affecting unit readiness follows:

a. (U) In order to absorb the 256 space civilian manpower reduction assessed by FORSCOM and at the same time avoid unnecessary turbulence, a detailed evaluation was conducted of the overall impact of the reduction on the command. Both controlled and non-controlled accounts as well as treaty and non-treaty allocations were examined. The 256 spaces have been identified and were submitted to FORSCOM for TDA inclusion during the window which closed in mid-Feb 82.

b. (U) The command has assessed the reduction of one TDA warrant officer authorization, which has been identified.


c. (U) The concept plan for the 193d Inf Bde (Pan) Logistics Support Command was resubmitted to FORSCOM on 4 Dec 81. It is currently being staffed.

d. (U) The concept plan to change the name of the command from 193d Inf Bde (Pan) to US Army Forces, Panama was not favorably received by DA. FD is now awaiting DA correspondence on this subject.

e. (U) In response to a FORSCOM request, the command has identified an Engineer Officer position for inclusion in the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). The position identified is a Platoon Leader position in the 518th Engineer Company. An enlisted instructor position in the Jungle Operations Training Center was also identified for PEP consideration.

f. (U) Eleven of the 23 MTOE's underwent changes during the reporting period. In addition, a new augmentation TDA for the Brigade was effective 16 Mar 82. The TDA reflects the manpower survey results but not the further reductions of authorization by FORSCOM. All MTOE changes were minor with two significant changes. They were B Battery, 22d Field Artillery changing from ALO 1 to ALO 2 based on increased requirements and the 193d Military Intelligence Company. The 193d Military Intelligence Company will go under a new MTOE in Sep 82. In the opinion of the unit commander and G2, 193d Inf Bde (Pan) the 193d Military Intelligence Company will suffer a degradation in mission if the MTOE is implemented without some change made necessary by the unique location and missions of the unit. These changes are being staffed and will be forwarded to FORSCOM for consideration.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


E. L. STEVENS
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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G. (U) Medical Support Capability: The only tactical medical support unit assigned is the 601st Medical Company. No physicians or dentists are assigned to this unit. Only field medical facilities are available. Major medical support to include supply and evacuation is provided by US Army MEDDAC.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



E. L. STEVENS
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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