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TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFC

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1. CONCUR IN DISSEM. SUGGEST FOLLOWING COMMENT: IN OUR VIEW THERE IS REASON TO DOUBT OCHOA'S REPORTED WILLINGNESS TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE INSURGENTS, GIVEN THAT HE HAS A WELL-DESERVED REPUTATION FOR EFFECTIVENESS IN DIRECTING MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE INSURGENTS AND HIS CLOSE TIES WITH THE RIGHTIST, NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE PARTY (ARENA). HOWEVER, WE DO NOT DISMISS THE POSSIBILITY THAT OCHOA, WHO HAS AN INFLATED EGO AND ENJOYS NOTORIETY, MAY SEE IN SUCH A ROLE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REGAIN HIS PROMINENCE.

2. NO FILE.

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