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AN "IDEALIST" FORMULA FOR KOSOVO

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The war in Kosovo has once again divided liberal-realists and liberal-idealists and, as is ever the case, the would-be "realists" offer unrealistic and dangerous advice.

"Realists", who would be more accurately called "materialistic isolationists", want to avoid any entanglement in foreign lands except where the flow of vital commodities is directly threatened (oil and chrome being the commodities most frequently cited by "realists"). Under the slogan: "we are not the world's policeman", they advocate the abnegation of any U.S. responsibilities within NATO, or even the abolition of NATO altogether. Other "realists" look to volatile Russia to rescue NATO from its conflict with Yugoslavia, though it is Yugoslavia, not NATO, which is sliding down to defeat. Almost all "realists" dismiss morality as an irrelevant criterion for political action.

Liberal-idealists, however, emphasize the universality of the liberal dream, the universality of human rights and duties, and the danger which tyrannical systems pose not only to their own populations, but also to the international community more broadly. For liberal-idealists, thus, the moral imperative to fight tyranny is clear and ineluctable. Unless we are prepared to shrug off our 200-year-old commitment to the liberal-democratic order and embrace the dubious notion that repression is a matter of indifference, the imperative to press the campaign until Milošević falls from power is clear.

The West has indulged, for too long, in illusions that Milošević is the "key" to peace in the Balkans. The truth is exactly the reverse: Milošević and his nationalist collaborators are the reason for the never-ending crisis. Only their removal and the establishment of a liberal order in Belgrade can bring genuine peace to the region. Nor should we imagine that all Serbs are somehow rallying to Milošević. His critics may be quiet for now, but they are still there, and at least some of them are anti-nationalist liberals at heart.

Three and a half years ago, when the Dayton Peace Accords were being drawn up, there might still have been time to "save" Kosovo for Serbia. But that time has passed. The atrocities committed by Serbian forces since the spring 1998, and intensifying in December (three months before the NATO strikes began), have been so brutal, so cruel, so widespread that it will take at least two generations to heal the psychological wounds that have been inflicted. In the meantime, however much we may want to encourage multiculturalism, the continued subordination of Albanians to a Serb national state must be considered at best a dangerous idea. An independent Kosovo has become, at this point, a practical and moral necessity. One may hope, of course, that non-nationalist Serbs wishing to live in peace in an independent Republic of Kosovo will be welcomed by local Albanians, but the Rambouillet formula of restoring Kosovo's autonomy within a tyrannical Serbia, was a bad idea to begin with.

The Rambouillet formula was, in fact, a typical "realist" formula, tinkering with the problems, rather than solving them. The very formula of an autonomous zone within a tyrannical system

CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS IN KOSOVO

1389 - Serbs lose a key battle against the forces of the invading Ottoman Empire on the fields of Kosovo. The defeat marks the beginning of the end of Serbia's Medieval Empire. Kosovo becomes part of the Ottoman Empire. In the centuries that follow, the battle becomes the key event in Serbian national history.

1815 - Serbian uprisings secure limited autonomy from the Ottoman Empire.

1830-1833 - Serbia gains formal autonomy.

1912 - Serbs gain control of Kosovo in a war against the Ottoman Empire. Fearing they, too, would be partitioned, Albanian leaders in Albania declare an independent state in November 1912. Borders for the new Albanian state are drawn in 1913. The disputed region of Kosovo becomes part of Serbia.

1914-1918 - The First World War.

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involves at least two self-contradictions. First, the notion that a group of people enjoys a right to autonomy within a tyrannical system entails the absurd notion that people may have a "right" even a "duty" to live under a tyranny, a notion that flies in the face of classical liberalism. Second, any autonomous arrangement can only be founded upon the mutual goodwill and mutual trust between the parties to the arrangement; yet these dispositions are most obviously lacking between Albanians and Serbs.

NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade has, without question, complicated the diplomatic context. It is essential that the NATO powers enter into a dialogue with Beijing on this matter, and that the U.S. offers financial compensation to the Chinese for damages. At the same time it would be ill advised for NATO to allow this incident to deflect it from the imperative of removing the nationalists from power in Belgrade.

There are several miscalculations which NATO ministers need to avoid in the coming months:

1. Do not rely exclusively on NATO ground troops to clear Kosovo of Serbian forces. It is imperative that the KLA forces be trained and supplied with appropriate weaponry so that they might play a role in this. KLA troops are highly motivated and know the terrain all too well.

2. Do not trust any peace offers from Milošević. Milošević's regime

has been tyrannical in nature, and only the collapse of his regime can be counted as a satisfactory outcome.

3. Do not allow nationalists to sit in a post-Milošević government. The problem which has bedeviled the region for more than a decade is Serbian nationalism. Only the replacement of the nationalists by local liberals can offer the prospect of real peace.

4. Do not be misled by Serb talk about the medieval Serbian State being centered in Kosovo or about historic monasteries. Greece has learned to live without Constantinople and western Anatolia (in spite of Prime Minister Venizelos' efforts to annex those regions after World War One). Russia has learned to live without Kiev (the capital of the medieval Kievan Russian State). Germany has learned to live without Breslau (Wroclaw), Danzig (Gdansk), and Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad). Democracy should respect the wishes of the living, not the preferences of by-gone generations.

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November 1918 - In the war's aftermath, both Albanians and Serbs lay claim to Kosovo. The newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes regains control of Kosovo. As a minority, Albanians are promised extensive rights by minority rights treaties. The Albanians, however, claim the guarantees are never implemented and that the Serbs engage in widespread massacres and repression in the 1920s. The Serbs also accuse Albania of fomenting discontent in Kosovo.

1939-1945 - The Second World War.

April 1941 - German attack on Yugoslavia. Throughout the war there is strong cooperation between Albanian and Yugoslav communist parties. Josip Broz Tito leads communist partisans to victory in a war with German and Italian occupying forces but also a civil war with non-communist opponents. With the victory of communist parties in Yugoslavia and Albania, there are hopes that the Kosovo question can finally be resolved. Albanian communists first call for the inclusion of Kosovo into a new Albania. However, under pressure from the stronger Yugoslav movement, the Albanian communists settle for Kosovo's re-inclusion into Yugoslavia.

1946 - New constitution for the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia) gain relative equality in the country. The Albanians in Kosovo hoped they too would be granted republic status. Instead, Kosovo becomes an autonomous region within Serbia.

1946 - 1966 - Albanians claim widespread repression by the Yugoslav authorities. At the same time, Albanian numerical superiority increases, becoming roughly 70 per cent of Kosovo's population because of a higher birth rate and the migration of many Serbs from Kosovo.

1969 - After riots in Kosovo and wide-

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KOSOVO: DECADE OF CRISIS

Vjerran Pavlakovic

The crisis in Kosovo is not new to the Balkans, but the nature of media and information in this country has brought attention to this region only recently in the United States. The NATO military actions against Yugoslavia have caused considerable damage to the infrastructure and have left many civilians dead, but the escalation of the conflict can be traced back to the policies of Belgrade since the late 1980s and the failure of the United States, along with the European Community, to adequately respond to those policies. This was made apparent during the Yugoslav War (1991-1995), when the international community was slow to respond to the atrocities being committed primarily by Serb forces, resulting in the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of communities and the displacing of over four million people.

Common excuses for this war were that they were due to ethnic hatreds (also attributed to the Kosovo conflict) and that recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the European Union accelerated the war. These excuses merely serve to portray the war as inevitable and place the blame on external forces (such as Germany's insistence on recognition). A more plausible reason for the war was that Yugoslavia's deteriorating economic system in the late 1980s led to the rise of nationalist politicians who blamed the problems on other republics and ethnic groups. While Croatia and Slovenia wanted a more democratic political system, economic reform based on the western capitalist model, and less control from Belgrade (they had proposed a "confederal" system), the political strong man in Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, was determined to follow a centralist policy that would increase the power of Serbs in Yugoslavia, who felt they had been weakened by Tito's 1974 Constitution. The events in the 1990s revealed that

Milošević's solutions to crises did not involve negotiation or concessions, but rather reliance on the military, special police forces, and propaganda that incited hatred and fear of other ethnic groups.

Milošević rose to power based on his promises to Serbs in Kosovo, who claimed the Albanians were waging a war of genocide against them. The population of Serbs in Kosovo had been declining steadily during the twentieth century, despite efforts by Belgrade to colonize Kosovo (during the interwar period and after World War II) with Serbs from other regions of Yugoslavia. The decline was in part due to Serbs leaving for economic reasons (Kosovo was the poorest region in Yugoslavia with the highest population density) and the high birth rate of the Albanians (the highest in Europe). Serbian media, however, painted a picture of Albanians terrorizing Serbs into leaving, depicting every crime against a Serb as being ethnically motivated, and claiming that the Albanians were systematically raping Serbian women (even though a 1990s study, conducted by Belgrade lawyers, found that in the 1980s cases of rape in Kosovo (.96 per 100,000 men) were less than that of Serbia proper (2.43 per 100,000 men) and 71% of rapes occurred between members of the same ethnic group).

Milošević then changed the Yugoslav constitution in 1989, effectively stripping Kosovo of its autonomy and enacting numerous laws that violated the rights of Albanians, the most immediate result being the firing of over 100,000 Albanians from government, medical, educational, and security jobs. Albanians were subject to arbitrary arrests, beatings, torture (which occasionally resulted in the death of subjects in police captivity), abolishment of Albanian language instruction in the school system, random searches of houses for alleged weapon stockpiling, persecution of intellectuals and journalists, and living conditions which amounted to a state of martial law. The

spread discontent surfaces, Albanians gain greater control in Kosovo.

1974 - New Yugoslav constitution creates the autonomous province of Kosovo. Albanians gain almost complete control over their affairs. The new constitution, however, falls short of making Kosovo a republic, which would include the right of secession.

4 May 1980 - Death of Tito.

1981 - Wide-scale demonstrations in Kosovo.

1986 - Slobodan Milosevic becomes leader of the Serbian Communist Party.

March 1989 - Milosevic pushes through laws that eliminates Kosovo's autonomy. The Albanian population takes to the streets.

May 1989 - Slobodan Milosevic becomes president of the Republic of Serbia.

June 1989 - 600 year anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. Milosevic delivers a threatening speech that warns that Serbs have fought for their rights in the past and a fight for them in the future should not be excluded.

December 1989 - The ethnic Albanian Democratic League of Kosovo is formed led by the literary scholar Ibrahim Rugova.

March/April 1991 - Thousands of ethnic Albanians demonstrators demand that Kosovo become a republic.

September 1991 - Kosovo's clandestine parliament declares Kosovo a sovereign and independent state. A month later, a national referendum sees overwhelming approval from the Albanians for the decision.

1992 - Albanians organize multiparty elections which are declared illegal by the Serbs. The Democratic League

strongest political movement during the early 1990s was Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), which advocated a non-violent approach to solving the problems in Kosovo.

It is amazing that the Albanians in Kosovo had endured the repressive conditions for as long as they had, and then saw their efforts go to waste as the authorities in Belgrade refused to seriously negotiate, instead increasing the military presence in the province. The fact that Serbia will not grant Kosovo full autonomy while at the same time demanding the autonomy of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia (which was the Serbian justification for the wars in those two countries) reveals the Serbian attitude towards the Albanian population. The political crisis in Albania in 1996 led to the looting of military stockpiles, flooding Kosovo with cheap weaponry and giving strength to guerrilla movements that believed negotiations with Belgrade were leading nowhere. The Albanians in Kosovo had also watched the developments in Bosnia carefully, but were ignored during the Dayton peace making process.

The failure of the US administration to guarantee Albanian rights in the Dayton Accords was a big mistake because it not only gave Milošević a green light to continue his discriminatory policies but also portrayed Milošević as a peace maker rather than a cause of the war in the former Yugoslavia. The actions of the Serbian government in Kosovo during 1998 made it clear that Milošević was responding to this crisis as he had in the previous war, which was the use of military force on primarily civilian targets. The US government also did not give enough support to anti-Milošević political forces which had staged massive demonstrations against him in 1997 and almost removed him from power. Extensive financial support (which would amount to a fraction of what is being spent for the current military campaign) could have strengthened liberal democratic

forces in Serbia that have further weakened by the state of war. Some misconceptions about the Kosovo crisis:

1. NATO bombing is the cause of the refugee problem: While NATO bombs certainly triggered the exodus of some refugees, there is overwhelming evidence that Serb forces are carrying out tactics well honed in the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts. Regular army forces coordinated with detachments of paramilitary units systematically emptied entire communities of non-Serbs during the previous war, using fear, beatings, rapes, and murder to change the demographic composition of certain areas. There is overwhelming evidence that this was a deliberate and carefully planned strategy, organized from Belgrade, with the goal of capturing territory by attacking civilian rather than military targets. It would not be ludicrous to conclude that many of the units involved in previous conflicts would use the same tactics as before in Kosovo, especially since the poor economic conditions in Bosnia and Serbia make serving in military units profitable. There is also the fact that Serbian military actions in the summer of 1998 resulted in the displacement of 241,000 Albanians in Kosovo, according to statement by the UN High Commissioner on Refugees on 8 September 1998. A statement last week in the New York Times from the UNHCR also confirmed that the majority of more than 800,000 displaced persons had fled because of Serbian military tactics.

2. Serb civilians are the only victims: It is true that many innocent people have been killed by NATO's bombing campaign. However, the number of sorties being flown by NATO is miniscule compared to previous conflicts (the number of sorties flown during the first thirty days, about 4,000 combat missions, is close to the number flown in ONE DAY during the Gulf War), and NATO has taken extreme measures to minimize civilian casualties. This is a drastic difference compared to Serbian military tactics throughout the Yugoslav war, during

wins 96 out of 140 seats and Rugova is elected president. He opts for passive resistance to Serb rule and warns his fellow citizens not to provide the Serbs with a pretext for a violent crackdown in Kosovo. Civil war comes to Bosnia.

1995 - Dayton Peace Accord ends the war in Bosnia. Albanians had hoped the West would use the opportunity to impose a settlement for Kosovo.

1997 - Growing frustrated with the pace of change under Rugova's rule, some Albanians choose violence to force concessions from Belgrade. A shadowy group calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerges.

February 1998 - Full scale war comes to Kosovo as Serbian forces launch a bloody crackdown against the KLA.

October 1998 - After eight months of intense fighting, with more than 2000 dead and thousands made homeless, under the threat of NATO bombing, Serbia pulls back its troops and a cease-fire is proclaimed.

January 1999 - Peace talks are held near Paris.

March 24, 1999 - NATO commences bombing attacks on Yugoslavia.

May 8, 1999 - Accidental NATO bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES ON KOSOVO FOR K-12 TEACHERS

A resource on NATO/Kosovo (including a four-day lesson plan) is the new website developed by the East European, Russian, and Eurasian NRC at Columbia University. The address:

[http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/
REGIONAL/ECE/
teachers.html#Special](http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/teachers.html#Special)

which hospitals, libraries, homes, and religious structures were deliberately targeted. The Serbian population also condoned, by re-electing Milošević and supporting the previous war, the siege of Sarajevo which lasted more than one thousand days. Serbian snipers specifically shot at civilians (including large numbers of children and the elderly) who were desperately attempting to get food and water, and the city was under constant bombardment by heavy artillery, conveniently given to the Bosnian Serbs by the Yugoslav Army. The Serbian population also does not seem to show any remorse for the thousands of Albanians who have become displaced, as if the activities of Serbian military forces (operating in Kosovo long before any NATO intervention) did not exist.

3. Not enough time was given for negotiation: NATO and the European Community had tried since early 1998 to find a negotiated settlement for Kosovo, but the disdain for a peaceful solution by Belgrade was evident when Milošević himself did not participate in the Rambouillet talks and in fact steadily increased the number of forces in Kosovo (which were already in violation of the peace agreement that had been reached at the end of 1998) during the negotiation process, months before NATO bombing. The tactics of using overwhelming military force (heavy artillery, tanks, well armed special forces) against civilians during the time of negotiations made it difficult for the Albanians to accept any agreement from Milošević while their people were being brutally attacked. In addition to displacing civilians, Serb tactics include the burning of villages, looting, and destruction of property, which can not be justified as part of anti-terrorist tactics.

The position of NATO is currently a difficult one, since it was apparent that Milošević would continue his military policy in Kosovo regardless of negotiation results. By starting the bombing campaign, it will be difficult either to strike a deal with Milošević (who

has been demonized by the media) or to wage a ground assault (which does not have the support of the American public nor Congress) necessary to push the Serbian forces out of Kosovo and allow the refugees to return. Unfortunately, the bombing campaign seemed the only option when inactivity would merely replay the Bosnia scenario as long as the authorities in Belgrade pursue a military solution to every problem in the former Yugoslavia.

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**ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
RELATED TO KOSOVO**

**The Scout Report, May 14, 1999 /
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
***Erasing History:
Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo***

http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnic_ksvo_toc.html

Released this week by the US Department of State, this report chronicles Serbia's violations of human rights and humanitarian law following the departure of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission on March 19, 1999. The report documents Serbian attempts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of its approximately 1.7 million ethnic Albanian residents. Abuses cited in the report include forced expulsions, looting and burning, detentions, summary execution, violations of medical neutrality, and identity cleansing.

KUDOS

Glennys Young has been awarded an Honorable Mention by the Hans Rosenhapt Memorial Book Award of the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation for her book entitled *Power and the Sacred in Revolutionary Russia*. Congratulations!



Congratulations also go to Sabrina Ramet whose book, *Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe* (Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), has been named an Outstanding Academic Book by Choice magazine. In addition, Dr. Ramet's edited volume, *Eastern Europe: Politics, Culture, and Society since 1939*, was just released by Indiana Press in March.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo

Bruce Kochis

The current catastrophe in the Serbian province of Kosovo can be viewed from one or more familiar points of view: historical, political, philosophical, economic, etc. I would argue, however, that one of the most productive might be that of human rights because it defers the almost futile search for causes and focuses instead on policy, in fact, on policy that could end the crisis and prevent a recurrence in Kosovo proper and a spread of the problems to neighboring regions. But to understand the human rights perspective, it is necessary to keep some caveats in mind.

First, a human rights agenda rejects an explicitly nationalist application of human rights conventions, covenants, and laws. Though we may adopt short-hand terms like "the rights of the Kosovar Albanians," or the "rights of the Serbian people", we do not mean to imply that these rights exist only in that group or that other groups do not have the same rights. People have a right to a nationality but the nationality itself does not have a right.

Secondly, human rights work does not address crime *per se*, but usually only that crime committed or permitted by governments. For example, if a paramilitary group commits an atrocity, that act would fall under the purview of human rights work only if they were ordered to perform the atrocity, or if the government fails to prosecute the perpetrators or does not take steps to prevent the crime from being committed again.

Third, the human rights agenda is not the same thing as pacifism; it does not automatically mandate non-intervention. Human rights are a moral/legal order that ultimately is backed up by force. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia arrests and imprisons. To be sure, on balance the human rights movement favors non-violent approaches to solving problems, and the less violent over the more violent when the first alternative is not available, but that does not automatically preclude armed intervention in extreme cases.

With these caveats in mind, what would a human rights analysis say about the situation in Kosovo?

The first thing it would say is that there are no heroes here. This does not imply an amoral relativism. It just means that a Serbian individual has the exact same rights as a Kosovar individual and the violations of these rights is equally condemned. Torture, summary execution, rape will be prosecuted in exactly the same measure, regardless of the reasons leading up to the violation. A human rights perspective does not tolerate a winner's mentality or legality.

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been guilty and continues to be guilty of numerous violations of basic human rights and humanitarian law. It has on numerous documented occasions denied people their right to life through summary executions, compounded in some instances with torture.

The number of Kosovar Albanian men of military age who are missing or remain unaccounted for, is nearly 100,000.

Violations of the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees are now numbered in the hundreds of thousands.

Violations of civil and political rights include: illegal detention, violations of privacy and personal security, violations of freedom of thought and conscience, and the promulgation of propaganda for war. These violations have been made against all populations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Serbian.

The Kosovo Liberation Army emerged in 1996 in response to the FRY's ethnic apartheid and in part out of frustration with the non-violent policies of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova. The KLA opted for violent confrontation and set about arming itself with the help of interests in Albania. According to HRW, "By early 1998, the KLA was taking credit for a series of attacks on policemen and ethnic Albanians it considered collaborators." Credible reports also accuse the KLA of violations of the rights of the Roma minority.

Credible reports indicate that the KLA has been involved in the taking of hostages, summary executions, torture, and disappearances. Near Glodanje FRY officials discovered the bodies of 39 individuals, some of them ethnic Albanians.

There were also allegations by FRY officials that the KLA was responsible for the death of 22 people near Klecka; at this site a kiln was also discovered purportedly used by the KLA to cremate the bodies.

On more than one occasion the Montenegrin government has closed its border to refugees. This is in clear violation of the Convention and Protocol Relating to Refugees. So also was their forced expulsion of 3200 Kosovo refugees to Albania. Like Montenegro, Macedonia has also violated the rights of refugees by closing its borders, expelling Kosovars to Albania, and refusing relief agencies access to the refugees.

The nineteen nations of NATO are also accused of human rights abuses in Kosovo.

It is alleged that NATO has violated Article 2 of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force against sovereign states not engaged in outside aggression; in its threats to the FRY at Rambouillet it has violated the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties forbidding the use of force to compel any state to sign an international agreement; and the Helsinki Accord Final Act guaranteeing the boundaries of European states.

In particular, the US has committed military forces without invoking the War Powers Act, and certainly in defiance of some of the democratic traditions of the U.S.

"Collateral damage," sometimes a euphemism for the death of innocent civilians, is in violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and has been documented in Belgrade, Aleksinac, Juzna Morava, Surdulica, Nis, and now most notoriously the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Estimates of the deaths of innocent civilians might be as high as 300.

What might a human rights policy look like in respect to this war?

The first action would be to call on all parties to adhere to Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199, which call for a cessation of all hostilities and compliance with all agreements reached in the negotiations of the crisis.

Second is to call on all parties to the dispute to adhere to the human rights and humanitarian law as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Geneva Conventions, and the conventions relating to torture, refugees, discrimination against women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Taken in total, these constitute a "robust" human rights regime that is growing sharp teeth each new day.

In addition, policy would call on all parties to submit their complaints to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and allow its jurisdiction to prevail in cases of violations of human rights and crimes against humanity. Vigilante action on the part of any country is forbidden.

The refugee crisis dictates that all parties immediately cease military operations around displaced persons and instead offer all food, shelter, and medical assistance necessary for their survival and well being. These are just a minimum.

What can one do? From a human rights perspective, there are several things that a university community can do.

1. Intensify the promotion of international studies. The ignorance of U.S. citizens in global issues is astounding and needs to be reversed because ignorance in world affairs is as dangerous as ignoring global warming.
2. Familiarize ourselves with the international law of human rights and hold governments accountable to its provisions. Build this knowledge into our curriculum.
3. Argue for the financial, political, legal support of those international institutions created for the express purpose of monitoring and enforcing human rights.
4. Donate to any charity helping the victims of the crisis and lobby for as much government humanitarian aid as it takes to restore the dignity of all those who have suffered in another catastrophe of a catastrophic century.

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NATO: KOSOVO, ENLARGEMENT AND RUSSIA

Christopher Jones

NATO has bet its future on the outcome of its war in Kosovo. The resolution of the Kosovo crisis war will almost certainly determine whether NATO continues to expand its membership eastward. And the fusion of the questions of Kosovo and enlargement will in turn determine NATO's relationship with Russia into the coming century.

A NATO decision not to become involved in Kosovo would have raised the same issues. NATO has reluctantly discovered that it cannot hoard the political capital amassed during the Cold War. The multiple crises in the former Yugoslavia pose unavoidable and painful choices for NATO. Each possible choice runs tremendous risks, highly disproportionate to the particular military or economic significance of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. This disproportion is matched by that between the military power of Serbia and the military power at the disposal of NATO.

NATO has discovered that the basis for the internal cohesion of the alliance changed over the course of the Cold War, a change that NATO publics are slow to recognize and that Moscow simply does not believe. The former communist states of central Europe may have been the first to recognize the transformation: NATO has become the military guarantor of a trans-Atlantic civil society, organized into separate states but ultimately held together by a set of common democratic/multi-cultural values.

These values are respect for human rights on the levels of the individual citizen, ethnic, religious and other minorities. These values have come to constitute an "acquis communautaire" — a common legacy, just as surely as the European Union has amassed an "acquis communautaire" of overlapping commitments to practical standards for

economic, social, environmental and other policies. These commitments have transformed the economic and legal systems of each EU member.

The NATO commitment to the human rights of citizens and minorities, first codified in the Helsinki Agreements of 1975, has both recognized and contributed to the domestic political transformations in its member states, including the United States, in regard to treatment of minorities that in the recent past had been denied full civic equality despite formal legal guarantees. The condition for NATO membership for former communist states set out specific standards for human rights issues that very few of the original NATO members could have met in 1949.

The rule of law in the democracies of NATO has come to be a tangible expression of abstractions about human rights. In turn, the rule of law across national boundaries of NATO/EU members has become the legal substructure of the multiple economic, cultural, scientific and security ties of the NATO states.

To put the argument in its most extreme form: the NATO states can remain indifferent to the deliberate persecution of ethnic and religious groups in a European state, such as Muslims in Bosnia or Kosovars in Kosovo, only at the cost of undermining their own social contracts concerning the treatment of their domestic minorities. For NATO states, the preservation of democratic multi-culturalism at the domestic and alliance levels has required multi-lateral defense of multi-culturalism in the states immediately bordering NATO. Perhaps the best indication of this shift has been the fact that British and German leaders have taken much of the political responsibility for articulating NATO's goals.

It is hard to imagine that the founders of NATO ever envisioned the kind of campaign being fought over Kosovo. Their alliance was primarily an alliance against a common foe rather than an alliance of states to protect common

domestic values. From 1950 to 1990 the *raison d'être* of NATO was collective defense against a clearly identifiable enemy.

The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) posited such a residual enemy in establishing a 1:1 force ratio among major weapons systems between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Within the Warsaw Pact, the USSR was allotted 2/3 of the total weaponry covered by the Treaty. But the Warsaw Pact had for all practical purposes vanished by the time of the treaty signing in November of 1990. And 13 months later the USSR disintegrated, leaving Russia as the principal successor of the Soviet army. But the Russian military and the Russian Federation were so drastically weakened by the upheavals of 1989-91 that the prospect of conventional war between NATO and Russia virtually disappeared.

The sudden absence of a collective defense mission for NATO generated a wide-ranging discussion about various schemes and institutions to bring NATO and Russia into a system for "collective security" in Europe. The concept of collective security, dating back to the creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the League of Nations in 1919, sought to enlist states without regard to domestic systems into several organizations for enforcing regional peace and stability in Europe. The principal argument for a new European system "collective security" is that such a system would pre-empt the exclusion of Russia from "Europe", and thus prevent any reprise of the alliance systems of World War I, World War II and the Cold War. Just as important, such a system instead would bring Moscow in as a partner for maintaining arms control regimes, especially in regard to nuclear weapons. But the unwritten essence of collective security was non-interference in the internal affairs of each member state.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Continued on page 9

established in 1990, bid for such a role. NATO created a series of overlapping bodies that appeared to address issues of collective security: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991), the Partnership for Peace (1994), the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council (1997), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (1997) and the Special Consulative Agreement between Ukraine and NATO. The United Nations remained a potential organization for the conduct of collective security in Europe because every European body for regional security based itself in part on certain provisions in the UN Charter.

But none of these collective security structures—in particular, the OSCE and the UN proved capable of an effective response to the series of crises that led to the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Serb-Croat war, and the Bosnian conflict. That is to say, none of these organizations have proven capable of dealing with the problems of democratic resolution of intra-state ethnic conflicts, the principal problem faced by several post-communist states in central and eastern Europe.

In 1995, the US led NATO into the conduct of a short air war against the Bosnian Serbs, supplemented by conventional forces of Bosnian Muslims and Croats. The result was the imposition of the Dayton agreements, president over by a NATO-led coalition, first named SFOR and then later IFOR. The critical dynamic was a partnership between NATO and Russia, which made possible an international military force that included other non-NATO European contingents plus some non-European forces drawn from several Islamic states.

As the Yugoslav crises developed in the early and mid 1990s, NATO responded to pressures from the "Visegrad states" (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) for formal membership in NATO. They sought membership mainly as a proof to their own citizens and to foreign economic partners that these states were going to become part of "Europe"

—and were on the fast-track to membership in the European Union. They accepted a definition of "Europe" as being democratic politically, market-oriented economically, and respectful of every dimension of human rights, at both the domestic and multi-lateral levels.

NATO rejected the Slovak application on the grounds that its authoritarian Prime Minister (until October 1998), Vladimir Meciar, was engaged in fomenting ethnic conflicts between Slovaks and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In March 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary officially joined NATO. The practical effect of membership has been to preempt the possibility of a fusion of nationalism and militarism under the auspices of a ruling political party in these states. The terms of NATO membership have placed national defense ministries under the dual surveillance of their respective national parliaments and NATO agencies.

Russia had protested the enlargement of NATO—and warned that it could not accept NATO expansion to include states that had been components of the USSR—in particular, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. But in 1996 it agreed to participate in the multi-national SFOR operation in Bosnia and in 1997 it accepted the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, even as NATO extended membership offers to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In other words, Russia found common interests with NATO, even as NATO expanded its membership and its involvement in the former Yugoslavia. But this practical cooperation did not directly confront the question of whether NATO was a collective security organization or a federation of states sharing common political values.

At the celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary in April 1999, for all practical purposes the question of future enlargement became fused with the question of the Kosovo war. The alliance announced a Membership Action Plan, intended to speed the applica-

tions of states bordering the former Yugoslavia. And the alliance also affirmed its commitment to defend the Kosovars against the Milosevic regime. This fusion put NATO on a possible collision course with Russia, opposed both to NATO actions in Kosovo, and to the intensified demands of the the Baltic states for NATO membership as the only reliable security organization in Europe. President Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia recently argued in Prague that the Baltic need for NATO membership was even more urgent, given the tensions between Russia and NATO over Kosovo.

The outcome of the NATO campaign over Kosovo is by no means clear. Milosevic has held Serbia hostage to NATO airstrikes, just as he has held the Kosovars hostage to his paramilitary and security forces. These units have driven nearly 700,000 people out of Kosovo and displaced several hundred thousand more within Kosovo. Milosevic has gambled his survival on the willingness of Serbs to support ethnic warfare against Kosovars and their would-be NATO protectors. NATO has bet its survival as an alliance on its capacity to defeat Milosevic. And it is also betting its survival on its capacity to export democratic values to its prospective members.

For Russia now, the NATO action in Kosovo is not NATO defense of human rights or minority groups but NATO aggression against state sovereignty. In the views of Russians across the political spectrum, such actions and the prospect of further enlargement of NATO portend the infringement of the sovereignty of the successor states of the USSR, including Russia itself.

For its part, NATO members are at a loss to define the outer limits of the zone in which it feels compelled to act in defense of human rights. And at the same time, officials of both NATO and Russia are aware of the possible outbreak of domestic conflicts over human rights and minority rights in several states presently members of

NATO membership have intensified.

The initial NATO response to such possibilities has been to accelerate the program for NATO enlargement, particularly in regard to the Balkan states that have supported the NATO campaign in Kosovo: Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria. In addition, the members of NATO, plus the members of the European Union as well, have virtually committed themselves to a major economic and political reconstruction of the greater Balkan region as well. Albania and Macedonia will probably be the major economic beneficiaries of this tacit commitment, and perhaps even Montenegro, a member of the present Yugoslav federation.

The costs of war and reconstruction in the Balkans will probably be well over ten billion dollars, a sum roughly equal to half the annual state budget of the Russian Federation. And the costs of Balkan reconstruction could run much higher if NATO accepts financial responsibility for rebuilding the infrastructure of Serbia. Russia will no doubt find such "security" expenditures an insult, given the domestic needs of Russia and the Western stake in Russian cooperation on weapons of mass destruction.

There may be a rough analogy between the war in Kosovo and the Korean War. The Korean conflict had the accidental effect of converting the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 1950. At the time, the economic and political costs of the Korean conflict seemed grossly disproportionate to the importance of Korea—and provoked enormous controversy both within the Atlantic Alliance and within the US itself. But the final impact of the Korean War in Europe was the consolidation of NATO, the admission of three new members (Greece and Turkey in 1952 and West Germany in 1955) and the division of Europe into two zones.

Christopher Jones, Associate Professor, JSIS; author of *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe* (1981); co-author, *The Warsaw Pact Vols. I, II III* (1985-16). Recent articles include: "NATO Enlargement: Brussels as the Heir of Moscow", *Problems of Post-Communism*, July 1998.

The Animated Film, "Anastasia": Giving False Impressions of Russian History

Reviewed by Kurt Engelman and James Brewczynski

A troubling aspect of modern filmmaking involves the distortion (both deliberate and accidental) of historical events. In their rush to create entertainment, filmmakers often perpetuate erroneous and misleading interpretations of historical events and personalities. This was the case with the Twentieth Century Fox animated film, *Anastasia*. Supposedly based on a true story about Tsar Nicholas II's youngest daughter, *Anastasia* follows a young Russian princess from her happy childhood through the perils of the Russian Revolution to her travels in France. Along the way she is tormented by "Rasputin", a ghoulish, half-dead, former court advisor with evil, magical powers who is literally decaying before the audience's eyes.

The film introduces numerous falsehoods. There is no evidence that *Anastasia* survived the execution of the Romanov family, much less traveled to Paris and was reunited with her family. She wasn't at the Winter Palace when it was stormed by revolutionaries. Nothing in the historical record indicates that Rasputin incited the Russian Revolution or put a curse of the Romanov family. Instead of attempting to murder any of the Romanovs, Rasputin was brutally murdered by members of the Russian court.

To combat these false interpretations, the Russian, East European, and Central Asian (REECAS) Center at the University of Washington has produced a list of resources that present the facts honestly at: <http://weber.u.washington.edu/~reecas/outreach/romanov.htm>. Included is a list of web sites:

- My Name is Anastasia (<http://www.alexanderpalace.org/anastasia/index.html>)
- Biography of Grigori Rasputin (<http://www.alexanderpalace.org/palace/Rasputin.html>)
- The Alexander Palace Time Machine (<http://www.alexanderpalace.org/palace/index.html>)
- Biography of Tsar Nicholas II (<http://www.alexanderpalace.org/palace/AlexPalaceNRbio.html>)

The REECAS Center outreach collection includes the following documentary films:

**Anastasia (60 min.),
The Mad Monk (a film on Rasputin—50 min.),
Nicholas and Alexandra (100 min.), and
Red Empire-episode one (54 min.)**

Each of these videos contains archival and original film footage along with well-researched commentary appropriate for high school and advanced middle school. (Caution: the first three describe the details of murder of Rasputin and the Romanovs, which may not be appropriate for younger viewers.) By viewing these films, students will be better equipped to judge the representation of *Anastasia* and Rasputin found in Hollywood productions.

Contact the REECAS Center, 203B Thomson Hall, Box 353650, University of Washington, 98195-3650, phone: (206) 543-4852, email reecas@u.washington.edu to borrow one of these films. Include a complete school address and phone number, and the video will be mailed to you.

**“Globalization and Local Responses: Teaching about the
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A Seminar for Educators Grades 6-16

Monday & Tuesday, June 28-29, 1999

Husky Union Building (HUB) 200ABC

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The increase in global connections and global interactions over the past several decades has allowed for the diffusion of Western economic, cultural, and political traits and the development of a single world system. These processes have prompted, in turn, reactions by local communities and societies to adapt and protect their cultural, political, economic, and environmental destinies. The tension between outside forces and local responses is the focus of a two-day event for educators grades 6-16 featuring lectures, panel discussions, and seminars by leading specialists on globalization. The event, sponsored by the UW's Jackson School Outreach Centers, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, and the Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER), School of Business Administration, focuses on the following themes:

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Coordinators

*Kurt Engelmann, Associate Director, Russian, East European, Central Asian, Studies Center
Gigi Peterson, Assistant Director, Latin American Studies, Jackson School of International Studies*

(Continued from previous page)

“Globalization and Local Responses: Teaching about the World of the 21st Century”

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Husky Union Building (HUB) 200ABC
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The REECAS Center has placed orders for the following items to be added to its outreach collection. All items should be available for checkout by summer 1999.

Videos

- **The Face of Russia**; a three-part series offering an unprecedented exploration of the hearts and minds of the Russian people through their art and culture.
- **Genghis Khan, Terror and Conquest**; explores the life of the great Mongol leader and his exploits.
- **Cold War, the Making of History**; the entire series as aired on CNN. This massive eight-tape set explores the people, events, and issues that made the cold war such an explosive episode in history.
- **The Making of Russia: 1480-1860**; this history of the development of Russia show how a few million Muscovites came to occupy one sixth of the World's land surface. Contrasts the barbarism of Ivan the Terrible with the achievements of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.
- **Lonely Planet: Kirghizstan and Uzbekistan**; a travel video exploring the sites and cultures of these two newly independent Central Asian states.
- **Bosnia: Peace without Honor**; traces the roots of the Bosnian conflict from 1992 to 1995. Special attention is drawn to the efforts of American and British diplomats to establish a lasting peace settlement.
- **Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation**; this award winning documentary traces the war in the Balkans from its beginning in 1987 to its escalation and uneasy peace settlement. Includes detailed description of ethnic cleansing and its impact on civilian life.
- **The Baltic States**; part of the PBS series "One World", this documentary examines how the newly-independent states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are facing the challenges of freedom and reform.

Lesson Plans and Teachers' Aids

- **"Choices in International Conflict"**; six lesson plans developed by Stanford University that teach secondary-level students about international security, diplomacy and conflict resolution. Students will examine issues surrounding conflicts between Russia and Japan, the two Koreas, and China and Taiwan.
- **"The Revised Soviet Union"**; assists instructors in grades 4-8 in teaching the history and culture of the Soviet Union. Written by Susan Finney.

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Students who wish to live in a Russian-speaking environment may apply to live in the Russian House, located just across the street from the campus. The Russian House has its own modern kitchen facility, and residents may opt to prepare their own meals or to buy a meal plan. The Russian House is a focal point for extracurricular events, which may include Russian singalongs, folkdancing, plays, poetry reading, lectures, films, weekend bike rides, and hiking trips. The Russian House may also host Russian visitors in the fields of art, science, business, etc. Priority to live in the House is given to those with the strongest Russian language background. All students in the summer program are welcome to participate in activities held at the Russian House or just to visit. (Applications for the Russian House are due by April 26, 1998.)

Housing is also available on the Russian floor of the main dormitory, where Slavic Department students will be grouped together. Applications for the Russian House are available through the Slavic Department: (206) 543-6848. Applications for housing in the dorm will be available in April through Housing and Food Services: (206) 543-4059. Be sure to indicate RUSSIAN on your housing application.

SCHOLARSHIP

The Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures will offer one full-tuition scholarship this summer to an undergraduate returning to the UW for the Summer Russian Program.

APPLYING AND REGISTERING

Call (800) 543-2320 to request a Summer Quarter Bulletin. Telephone registration begins late April. Applications by mail accepted through June 1. Later applications accepted in person only. No transcripts or letters of recommendation necessary. Application materials should be sent to Admissions Office, University of Washington, Box 355840, Seattle, WA 98195-5840. Course fees billed in early July.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

For further information on course offerings or the Russian House, contact: Shosh Westen, Slavic Department, University of Washington, Box 353580, Seattle, WA 98195-3580
 (206) 543-6848, fax: (206) 543-6009 or e-mail: shoshw@u.washington.edu

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