Making and Transcending Boundaries:

The Effect of Ritual on the Nationalism among Dominant and Subordinate Ethnicities in the Near East

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Abstract

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Researchers have examined the role of dividing factors such as occupational structure, economic discrimination, competition, and political recognition of ethnicities on the level of dominant and subordinate ethnicities' national pride. However, the mediating impact of solidarity factors such as ritualistic interactions on this process is understudied. Investigating the mediating effect of Shia and Sunni rituals, I find that knowing the characteristic of rituals could explain the gap between dominant and subordinate ethnicities' national pride, as an indicator of subjective belonging to a national state. The collectively practiced, emotionally intense Shia rituals create social situations which lead to interethnic solidarity and alleviation of ethnic grievances. This solidarity spillovers into national pride and facilitates the formation of supra-identity, while individually practiced rituals fail to do so and as a result the gap between the national pride of ethnicities widens. To understand the role of religious rituals in ethnically diverse and predominantly Muslim-populated Turkey and Iran, I develop a theory of interethnic solidarity. I find that the absence of cross-ethnic ties forged through intense rituals results in lower levels of Sunni Kurds national pride and a wider gap with the national pride expressed by Turks in Turkey. However, practicing frequent intense rituals that transcend ethnic boundaries and alleviate ethnic grievances increases the national pride of Shia Kurds in Iran and reduces the national pride gap with members of the dominant Persian ethnicity. The descriptions of the rituals come from sociological, anthropological and religious works. In the statistical analysis, I mainly use data from the sixth wave of Social Values Survey (2011) for Turkey and the third wave Iranian Attitudes and Values (2015) to explain the determinants of national identification.

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INTRODUCTION

Countries have different level of ethnic diversity. The diversity can lead to various socio-political and economic consequences under different conditions (Kunovich 2009, Wimmer 2017, Chapman et al. 2007). While in some countries people from different ethnic background are integrated under the wider national collective identity, in some other countries national identity fails to unite ethnicities and the failure can lead to even war, ethnic conflict, massacre, and so on. Depending on their status, ethnicities' national pride or the strength of national identities differs from each other. Ethnicities which are politically, culturally, and economically dominant in a country hold a superior status compared to ethnic minorities and the national identity primarily represents dominant ethnicities.

Over the years, an enormous amount of research has been conducted to determine the factors that impact the strength of national identity of ethnic majorities and minorities. Considerable research attention has been directed to the relation between status of ethnicities and their national pride (Masella 2011, Staerklé 2010, Wimmer 2017). However, there are contrasting findings on the association between minority/majority status and the strength of the sense of belonging to a nation state.

A line of research tries to explain the difference in the level of national pride by focusing on the level of ethnic diversity of a nation. The argument of this research line is that there is a negative association between level of ethnic diversity and national pride of individuals for ethnic minorities. "In countries with low level of ethnic diversity, individuals from minorities tend to show stronger national sentiments than individuals from majorities" (Masella 2011). Another research contradicts this finding by arguing that, indeed, majorities endorse the national identity of the nation more than minorities and the difference becomes wider in ethnically diverse countries

(Staerklé et al. 2010). This contradictory findings are themselves indicator of other important variables.

Some social scientists have supported the argument that the process of modernization such as urbanization, mass printing, industrialization, universal education brought forth national identity in countries and reduced the importance of ethnic identity (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1991, Hechter 2000, Robinson 2014). Indeed, the researchers consider modernization as a process that created a shared network of people or a " unified field of exchange" (Anderson 1991) which has been used to promote a shared national identity. However, some arguments have suggested that modernization can also lead to competition between ethnicities over scarce resources in a nation state (Olzak 1994) and discriminations against some "culturally marked" groups (Hechter 2000) and, in fact, modernization under this condition will increase subgroup solidarity at the expense of national identity.

Another line of research emphasizes that one of the important factors which may impact national pride of ethnic group is ethnopolitical inequality in countries. Andreas Wimmer (2017) has a significant contribution in understanding this type of ethnic inequality. Wimmer (2017) in his great work goes beyond the previous explanations, such as demographic and modernization process approaches, and introduces exchange theoretic and power-configurational model of national pride. In his model, the level of national pride dependents on political recognition and representation of individuals from ethnicities in national-level government. "Meaningful exchange relationships with the state lead individuals to embrace the nationalist narrative" (Wimmer 2017). Otherwise, individuals become less proud of their nation state in the lack of political representation (Cederman 1997).

Although ethnopolitical inequalities and other forms of inequalities are important determinants of national pride of ethnicities, the impact of these inequalities on level of national pride is not same for all in all multiethnic nations. Theorizing and modeling the impact of political representation and inequalities have helped to build generalizable theory across cases, however, to the best of my knowledge scant attention has been paid to the role of moderating contextual factors such as religious interactions in the formation of overarching collective identities. Indeed, many studies including those who examined the impact of cultural, economic, and political modernization on national identity, "neglected or saw it [religion] as being replaced by nationalism" (Brubaker 2012). However, some studies show that religion has influenced the formation of nationalism in both western (Gorski and Türkmen-Darvişoğlu 2013) and non-western countries (Friedland 2001).

Even those studies which have addressed the role of religion in the formation of multi-ethnic nations (Turchin 2018, Henrich 2020), did not discuss the characteristics of religions that may differently impact the strength of national identity. The argument in the line of research is that sharing religion by multiple ethnic groups leads to formation cross-cutting supra-identity or meta-ethnic boundaries(e.g., Sunni Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Theravada Buddhist, etc.) and then it paves the way for the formation of meta-ethnic nation(e.g., Turk, Russian, Thai, etc.).

My argument in this paper is that sharing a religion by multiple ethnicities in a country does not necessarily lead to the successful formation of cross-cutting supra-identity and multi-nation. The success of the formation of supra-identity in nations through shared religion in countries where non-dominant ethnicities are discriminated depends on the intensity of religious rituals. Individuals have hieratically nested identities (Simmel 1955) such as ethnic and national identities. In order to form an encompassing supra-identity religion through its intense rituals

should alleviate the ethnic grievances. Otherwise, political underrepresentation, experiencing discrimination, competition over public goods and resources can make the identity of ethnic minorities salient (Wimmer 2017, Olzak 1994, Hechter 2000) and decrease the national solidarity and the sense of national belonging.

So, this paper contributes to our understanding of the strength of national pride and belonging by drawing attention to the impact of ritualistic interactions between people of different ethnicities. This is an important area of inquiry because intense ritualistic interactions as a uniting power can alleviate ethnic grievances and decrease the gap between national pride of dominant and subordinate ethnicities. So, my argument is that in the absence of uniting shared intense rituals, dividing factors such as lack of political representation, socio-economic, and cultural discriminations more easily widen the gap between national pride expressed by members of different of ethnicities occupying the same polity. So, the size of gap between national pride of dominant and discriminated ethnicities cannot be understood without taking into account the factors that may transcend ethnic identity boundaries and unite individuals under a supra-identity. This study has been focused on religious interactions as a social factor that offer a network of interethnic relation, not as a measurement of piety.

For doing so, I've compared the effect of religious-ritualistic interactions on national pride of one ethnic minority in two comparable countries with predominantly Muslim population, Iran and Turkey, and compared them to dominant ethnicities national pride in these countries. Namely, dominant Shia Persian and subordinate Shia Kurd ethnicities in Iran and dominant Sunni Turk and subordinate Sunni Kurd ethnicities in Turkey are the subjects of this study. These two cases are similar in terms of historical background, ethnic relations, power configuration of ethnicities in government, ethnic diversity of country, the level of economic inequality, and ethnic grievances.

The main difference between the cases, which is the reason for selecting them, is that the ethnicities in Iran are predominantly Shia Muslims, but in Turkey they are Sunni Muslims. These cases have allowed me to naturally control many variables and explore the impact of intense Shia and non-intense Sunni ritualistic interactions on national pride.

In order to explain the role of religious rituals, I develop a theory of religious rituals to link rituals to national identities. I use qualitative evidence to compare the two countries and the two religious traditions. I then test the propositions I draw from my theory using two datasets, the sixth wave of Social Values Survey (2011) for Turkey and the third wave of Iranian Attitudes and Values (2015). I have found that the absence of cross-ethnic bounding through intense rituals results in low level national pride of subordinate Sunni ethnicities e.g. Kurds in Turkey. However, intense rituals through transcending ethnic boundaries alleviates ethnic grievances and facilitates interethnic solidarity and promotion of national identity for ethnic minorities in Iran. This study contributes to understanding the dynamics of interethnic conflicts, identity formation, and nationalism.

PREVIOUS LITERATURE

Demographic Explanations

A number of scholars have conducted research on association between the level of ethnic diversity and the level of dominant and subordinate national pride in countries (Masella 2013, Staerklé et al. 2010). However, there is no consensus on the impact of ethnic diversity on the strength of national pride. Masella (2013) has put forward the hypothesis that ethnic minorities can be less or more proud of national identity depending on the level ethnic diversity in a country. The hypothesis is that in more diverse countries ethnic minorities are less proud of national identity

and vice versa. However, Staerklé et al. (2010) in their multilevel analysis have shown that majorities are more proud than ethnic minorities, and the magnitude of the difference depends on country level characteristics. They have concluded that ethnic diversity and low inequality can increase the difference between national pride of ethnicities.

The contradictions in these findings suggest that other important variable have to be included in the analysis. Although it is widely accepted that majorities are more proud than minorities, the definitions of majority and minority are not consistent in all studies. Because in some cases, it possible be demographically minority, but socio-politically dominant (Wimmer 2017). In contrary to the most demographic explanations, the level of national pride of dominant and subordinate ethnicities are very similar in more diverse case of this research, Iran.

Double-edged Impact of Modernization

Scholars who have examined the impact of modernization process extensively have written on the mechanisms which led to the emergence of national identity and its salience. This argument range from the role of war, tax collection, mass printing, universal school, economic modernization, and so on (Hechter 2000, Anderson 1991, Tilly 1996). Most of these theories have one thing in common: all of them discusses the mechanisms which create a network of people either through mass printing or newspaper which allowed diffusion of national identity to people in a network or "shared field" or through universal school which provides state the opportunity to promote "imagined community" (Anderson 1991).

While it is generally agreed that modernization processes create a "shared field", however, modernization particularly economic modernization can also lead to competition and conflict in the context of ethnic heterogeneity (Nagel 1995). Hechter (2000) and Olzak (1994) in their studies

have demonstrated how economic modernization can be resulted in interethnic coemption and conflict. Olzak (1994) has asserted that increasing intergroup interaction under conditions which group compete over scarce economic opportunities can lead to more identification with the subgroup identity (Olzak 1994).

In cultural division of labor, Hechter (2000) has drawn our attention to the position of "culturally marked individuals" (ethnic, racial, or religion groups) and their distribution in occupational structure. He asserts that the cultural division of labor have two dimensions; hierarchy, which is "variance in average occupational prestige of culturally distinct groups", and segmentation, "which is variance in groups' corresponding occupational specialization" (Hechter 2000). Hechter maintains that "strong social identities are by products of hierarchy and segmentation" (2000). Although economic factors and inequality are important, it does not justify downplaying the influence of cultural factors.

It is obvious that modernization processes may have double-edged effect on national pride of ethnic majorities and minorities. On the one hand, modernization can lead to emergence of an "imagined community" and promotion of national identity. On the other hand, it can be resulted in conflict and gap between dominant and subordinate ethnicities. However, as I mentioned earlier, this approach is problematic because of neglecting the importance of religion as a cultural factor (Brubaker 2012).

Ethnopolitical Inequality and National Identity

One of the most influential studies on national identity has been done by Andreas Wimmer and his colleagues. Wimmer and his coauthors' works on boundary making processes and on the impact of ethnopolitical inequality on national pride are very insightful in in terms of

understanding the strength of national identity of dominant and subordinate ethnic groups (Wimmer 2008, Wimmer et al. 2009, Wimmer et al. 2010, Wimmer 2013, Wimmer 2017, Kroneberg et al. 2012).

Following the logic of Exchange theory, Wimmer in "Power and Pride" has stressed that national identification of the ethnic group depends on political exchange of the ethnic individuals with national-level government (Blau 1986, Wimmer 2017). If in this exchange with state, ethnic groups have gained political recognition and representation in national government, it will positively impact national identification and pride of the ethnic members. He explicitly argues that "domestic politics and power are more relevant for national pride than are the factors considered by past research"(Wimmer 2017). Benefitting from Tilly's polity model (1975), Wimmer has modeled exchange theoretic and power configurational model to understand the level of national pride with the position that each ethnicity holds in power configuration.

The issue is that even ethnicities which have similar status in power configuration of a country, can have different level of national pride due to moderating factors. The extent to which exclusion from national political power may impact national pride depends not only on the factors which divide ethnicities but also those which keep them together. This is why ritualistic interactions are an important in this context.

Linking Religion and Nationalism through Ritualistic Interactions

By relying on economic determinism of ethnic inequality, some theorists tend to ignore cultural factors such as religion (Brubaker 2012, Gorski and Türkmen-Darvişoğlu 2013). The role of rituals, as a cultural factor, is important in studying national identity. Given the importance of culture, sociologists have studied the socio-political impact of rituals in wide range of areas, from

sport (Cottingham 2012) to social movement (Pfaff and Yang 2001). Indeed, new social movement theorists have also stressed the importance of culture (Buechler 2011, Melucci 1981, 1988). Rituals in some cases can transcend ethnic and class boundaries and alleviate ethnic grievances such as political exclusion or social and economic discriminations and increase the sense of national belonging.

One important point here is distinguishing between piety and practicing rituals. Practicing rituals does necessarily means that participants have a higher degree of piety. Ritual participation can be motivated by social considerations and not just by piety. The greater the degree of communal involvement in a ritual, the more that we would expect people to take part even if not highly religious. We can compare piety of the societies by comparing indicators such as mosque attendance, rate of drinking alcohol and so on. In this study, rituals are important due to providing a network of interaction for individuals from different ethnic background and the quality and intensity of the interactions and frequency of interactions, not for the level of religiosity. Rituals as a form of interaction with certain characteristics can create solidarity regardless of being religious or secular rituals. So, in this research ritual has been used in a broadest sense. This means that in different context, different forms of interaction such as nationalist rituals, traditional and folkloric rituals, sport fans rituals, or political rituals can be the subject of study.

In this research, I've investigated national pride in Turkey and Iran and to the best of my knowledge, this is the first comparative-historical work which has taken the moderating impact of rituals into account in comparing the level of national pride. For doing so, I've benefitted Collins' Interaction Rituals theory, Chwe's (2013) theory of Common Knowledge, and Stryker's Identity theory(1968, 1980, 2008) in this study (Figure 1).

Since Durkheim's work on the religious rituals, rituals have been in the focus of some sociologists. When Durkheim presented most of his discussion on rituals of Australian Aborigines, he primarily wrote about religious rituals and social production of the rituals (Collins 2004). Following Durkheimian tradition, Collins (2004) elaborated and extended Durkheim's thoughts on rituals. He uses the term of ritual in more broad sense, not merely for referring to ceremonial, traditional, or religious practices. We encounter with chain of rituals when we talk to each other, as we go to a stadium to watch a football game and so on.

In his discussion on rituals, Collins (2004) has emphasized on the importance of *physical assembly of the group.* For him, bodily co-presence is a necessary condition for practicing rituals, gathering together in the same place brings emotion and feelings. "Once the bodies are together, there may take place a process of intensification of shared experience, which Durkheim called, collective effervescence, and the formation of collective conscience or collective consciousness" (Collins 2004). Shared emotion and *shared action and awareness among the participants* result in collective effervescence which "is a momentary state, but it carries over into more prolonged effects when it becomes embodied in sentiments of group solidarity, symbols or sacred objects and individual emotional energy" (Collins 2004). Built on Durkheim's theory on rituals, Collins (2004) proposes the four rituals ingredients in his model; group assembly, barrier to outsiders, mutual focus of attention, and shared mood. He argues that the outcomes of the rituals depend of the intensity and combination of the ingredients (Appendix, Figure 1).

Identity theories can help us to understand impact of rituals on national identity. The salience and strength of identity have been studied by many identity theorists (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1982, Hogg 1995, Stryker 2008, Stryker and Serpe 1994, Gamson 1992, Turner 1969, Klandermans 1984, Klandermans and Weerd 2000). Among them, Sheldon Stryker (2008) has

maintained that commitment determines the salience of one's identity. His definition of commitment is ties that an individual has to others in social networks. According to Stryker (2008) commitment can be measured by considering two factors: 1. interactional commitment: "the number of relationships linked to a given identity and ties among networks of relationships. 2. affective commitment: emotional attachment to others in network relationships" (Stryker et al. 2005). The importance of identities can change as a result of change in interactional and affective commitments.

Another characteristic of ritual which is important for the intensity and effectivity of rituals is inward-facing circle (Chwe 2013). Chwe argues that common knowledge is the result of coordination among the practicing people and since practicing rituals in the form of inward-facing circles provides maximum eye contact, they can be coordinated with each other (Chwe 2013). In other words, inward facing rituals allow individuals to transmit emotion and knowledge through the network of eye contacts, and as a result, the rituals can create common knowledge. So, if rituals are practiced in the form of inward facing circle, the ritual will be more effective.

Figure 1: Model of Intense Rituals



Based on the discussed theories, I've hypothesized that in general practicing religious rituals more frequently can increase national pride (H1). However, as discussed, intensity and the characteristics of practiced rituals are important indicators of their impact. So, there is a big difference on the impact of practicing intense compared to non-intense rituals by dominant and subordinate ethnicities on their national pride. Since practicing intense rituals leads to high level of interethnic solidarity, even under the condition which the national identity is built on dominant ethnicity's cultural heritage, still subordinate ethnicity can be proud of the national identity. This situation not only can lead to strong relationship between frequency of practicing rituals and national pride (H2), but also it can make the gap between national pride of two ethnicities narrower and vice versa (H3).

H 1: The more citizens practice religious rituals, the higher their national pride.

H 2: The more intense the practiced rituals are, the stronger the positive relationship between frequency of practicing ritual and national pride.

H 3: The more intense the practiced rituals are, the less the gap between national pride of individuals from dominant and subordinate ethnicities and vice versa.

In order to test these hypotheses, I've examined two aspects of the rituals. First, I've compared qualitatively the nature of Sunni and Shia rituals and their level of intensity. By intensity I mean rituals which have all characteristics of the model; bodily co-presence, shared mood, mutual focus of attention, barrier to outsider, and more importantly inward-facing circle. Second, I've tested quantitively the relation between frequency of an intense and a non-intense ritual with national pride in two cases.

Two Comparable Cases: Iran and Turkey

For testing the theorized hypotheses, I've selected two ethnically diverse Muslim countries as my cases. These two cases are very similar in many respects. Along with the similarities, there is one crucial difference in the characteristics of rituals between these countries which allow me to test my hypotheses. These two countries are similar in terms of the percentage of Muslim population; Iran 99.4% and Turkey 98%. The overall population of the both countries also are almost identical; each country ~80 million (table 1). In term of historical background, Iran and Turkey, prior to creation of nation states, were the center of empires for centuries.

Table 1: Comparing two cases

Country	Population (2016)	GDP USD (2017) Per Capita	Percentage of Population that is Muslim	Percentage of World Muslim Population	Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Shia	Approximate Percentage of Muslim Population that is Sunni	Dominant ethnicity	Ethnic Minorities
Iran	80.28 million	5,593	~99%	4.7%	**90 - 95%**	**5 – 10%**	Persian	Azerbaijani, Kurds, Arabs, Balochs, Lors, Gilaks, Mazanis, Turkmens, and others.
Turkey	79.51 million	10,546.2	~99%	4.7%	Alevi-Shia **5.73%**	Shafii (9.06%) Hanefi (81.96%) Other Sunnis(.4%) **91.4%**	Turk	Kurds, Zazas, Circassians, Bosniaks, Georgians, Albanians, Arabs, Pomaks, and others

Sources of the data: PEW Research Center, World Bank, Third Wave of Iranian Values and Attitudes (2015), World Values Survey (2011), CONDA (2006)

In addition to other contextual similarities, the similarities in ethnic diversity and ethnic minorities' grievances between cases are crucial for the case selection. In the each of the countries, one ethnicity is dominant over other ethnicities: the Persian ethnicity in Iran and the Turkish ethnicity in Turkey. The dominant ethnicity's language is the official language in each nation. Dominant ethnicities' languages also are the language of instruction in schools and ethnic minorities in both countries are not allowed to use their mother languages for official purposes. Beyond, the cultural grievances, ethnic minorities share economic and political grievances.

In each of these countries most of the ethnic minorities share the same religious denomination with the dominant ethnicity. In Iran, the dominant Persian ethnicity is predominantly Shia. Non-Persian ethnicities such as Shia Kurds, Azerbaijanis(Turkic), Gilaks, Mazandaranis, and Lors also believe in Shia Islam. In Turkey, the dominant ethnic Turks and non-Turkish minorities such as the Kurds, Zazas, and Circassia are predominantly Sunni Muslims.

While all these similarities give the opportunity to control more measurable and unmeasurable variables, the main difference between these two cases, religious denomination, allows to assess the impact of the focal variable, practicing rituals, and their impact on national pride. Turkey is a predominantly Sunni country (85-90%) and Iran is a predominantly Shia country (90-95%). The rituals of these two religious denominations of Islam differ in terms of intensity and the other aforementioned characteristics. Therefore, the dominant and subordinate ethnicities in each country share same rituals. But there are important difference between rituals in Turkey with rituals in Iran.

In order to have more contextual control over my cases, I've decided to focus on comparing the level of national pride of the same ethnic minority to the dominant ethnicity in each country. I've compared Sunni Kurds to Turks in Turkey and Shia Kurds to Persians in Iran.

DEVELOPMENT OF RITUALS AND SHIA-SUNNI DIVIDE IN ISLAM

Development of some rituals in Islam is closely related to Shia-Sunni Divide. The divide has formed following the death of the prophet Mohammad in 632 CE over succession of Mohammad. The full formation of this divide took several centuries after the death of prophet Mohammad (Aghaie 2004, Chelkowski 2010, Momen 1985). The main issue in this crisis was "who should succeed the prophet and in what capacity. Also, unclear was who had the right to select a successor" (Aghaie 2004). The dispute over the succession has finally divided Muslims into two sects, Sunni and Shia. The main difference was Sunnis belief in *caliphate* and Shias belief in *imamate*. While Shias have believed that, starting from his son in law, a chain pious descendants from the prophet family who are infallible imams should succeed him, Sunnis have believed that the legitimate successors to Mohammad were caliphs who were selected based on political

processes after prophets and not by the prophet. Caliph were not considered to have supernatural power or infallibility (Aghaie 2004, 2010, Louër and Rundell 2020). The culmination of the Sunni-Shia conflict was the battle of Karbala between the grandson of the prophet, imam Hussein, and the second Umayyad caliph, Yazid, in 680 AC which resulted in massacre of men, the martyrdom of the third imam in the tenth day of the battle which is called Ashura, and the captivity of women and children who were direct descendants of prophet Mohammad (Aghaie 2004, 2010).

16th century was turning point in the history of Iran. Although Iranians were predominantly Sunni, Shah Isma'il the founder of Safavid dynasty in 1501 declared Shia Islam as official state religion and implemented policies which have converted almost all population to Shia Islam. The major development in Shia rituals happened in this period. Most of Shia specific rituals which are related to the tragic battle of Karbala systematically evolved and promoted in these years(Chelkowski 2010, Momen 1985, Keddie 2006). This was important for the legitimacy of Safavid empire infront of its ideological alternative and rival Sunni Ottoman Empire with caliphate system (Louër and Rundell 2020).

Regardless of the Muslims sectarian identities, some of the ritual practices are common among all Muslims, sometimes with minor differences (Momen 1985). Unlike Sunni Muslims who were in power in the Muslim world, Shia Muslims historically were in minority position and not a mainstream branch. Developing intense rituals and symbolic boundaries for sects with inferior status are essential to maintain solidarity and the sense of belonging within community (Iannaccone 1994, Smith et al. 1998). So, in addition to Shia rituals' function in Safavid-Ottoman competition and conflict, they've played a significant role in maintaining Shia solidarity since then. Still the rituals have unintended consequences for ethnicities in Iran and for the region in general.

Common Rituals

Some of the common rituals are obligatory for all Muslims who are financially and physically able to practice them. The obligatory rituals are called "five pillars" in Islam. These rituals are faith (Shahadat), daily prayer (salat or namaz), fasting during the holy month of Ramadan (sawm); annual almsgiving to assist the poor or needy (zakat); and participation in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca at least once during one's lifetime (hajj). However, some common rituals which are not obligatory.

Daily prayer (Salat or Namaz): Daily prayer is an obligatory ritual for all Muslims. Muslims are supposed to practice five times a day; sunrise, noon, afternoon, evening and night. The are some minor differences in preparation and content of the prayer between Sunni and Shia versions. For instance, while Sunnis practice daily prayers in five separate occasions, "Shias consider it permissible to run together the noon and afternoon and the evening and night prayers…" (Momen 1985).

Friday Prayer: Friday prayer is congregational (Jama'ah) praying in mosque or mosella each Friday. The Friday prayer is more important for Sunni Muslims compared to Shia Muslims. At least five persons are required to hold a Friday prayer.

Fasting (Siym, Sawm): All physically able Muslims are obligated to fast. During the whole of the month of Ramadan, food, drink, smoking and sexual intercourse are forbidden from dawn to sunset. "The physical abstentions are only symbolic of an inner purification of the character. The fast of the Shias is a little longer than the Sunni fast in that they wait until the sun has completely set" (Momen 1985). According to PEW Research Center (2020), 82% of Iranian Muslims and 84% of Muslims in Turkey practice this ritual.

Annual Almsgiving (Zakat): Annual almsgiving is practiced during Ramadan. The alms or poor-rate is levied on crops, livestock, gold, silver and cash. It is not payable by anyone whose debts exceed his assets. The formula for deriving how much is levied is complicated in the case of livestock and grain. With respect to gold, silver and cash, it is approximately two and one half percent once a minimum threshold of assets is exceeded (Momen 1985). The aim of the almsgiving is to assist those in need; the poor, those in debt and travelers or for ransoming captives of war. While Sunnis pay this tax/alms to the state and state should supervise its disbursement, Shias pay it to their grand Ayatollah, the highest level of Shia authority.

The One-Fifth Tax (Khums): Khums or the annual tax of one-fifth, historically was common between Shia and Sunnis, now widely practiced by Shias. This is levied by Shias on net income, net increase in land holdings, stored gold, silver and jewelry, mined products, items taken from the sea and war booty. This tax is to be spent on the Prophet, his family, orphans, the needy and travelers. Among Shias, half of the khums is considered to be the share of the Imam, being the Imam's inheritance from the Prophet. This share of the Imam is paid by the believers to their marja'at-taqlidin his capacity as the representative of the Imam. (Momen 1985). In Sunni sect, khums' 20% tax is applicable on ghanayam (property, movable and immovable) booty seized in any raid or as a result of actual warfare, and buried treasure or resources extracted from land, sea, mines of any kind (Jalili 2006). So, unlike Shia sect, khums is not applicable to net income.

Pilgrimage (Hajj): Hajj or pilgrimage is a ritual once in a life time for the Muslims who are financially able to afford it.

Kandil(candle)/Milad: This is a ritual that has been practiced with different names and frequency in Turkey and Iran. In Turkey, Kandils are for five special nights in the life of prophet Mohammad. Mevlid Kandili (The birth of Prophet Mohammad), Regaip Kandili (The night of Muhammad's

conception), Miraç Kandili (Prophet Mohammad's rising to heaven), Berat Kandili (The forgiveness of the sins), Kadir Gecesi (The Quran's first appearance to Prophet Mohammad). These nights, Muslims recite special prayers, worship and sing the Mevlit, an epic poem written to praise the Prophet Mohammad. Shias practice similar rituals for the birthday of all Fourteen Shia infallibles[1].

Qurban: Qurban is one of the important common rituals in Islamic world which has been practiced by those financially able to do so. Sacrificing an animal has been recognized as a form of worship during the three days of the month Zul hajjah, namely the 10th, 11th, and 12th. Iranian Muslims practice it in one day.

Shia Specific Rituals

In addition to the common rituals, Shia Muslims including Iranian Shias practice the Shia specific rituals. Indeed, after the division, Shia Muslims have adopted and developed Shia specific rituals. The majority of Shia specific rituals are associated with the battle of Karbala.

Mourning Procession (Persian: Dasteh-ye Azadari): Mourning procession is a ritual in which mourners hold a procession in public places such as alleys and streets to to show their lamentation for the Shia Imams and the especially the victims of Karbala tragedy in the Muharram month. Studies show that this rituals has been practiced at least since 10th century(Aghaie 2004). During processions mourners recite elegies (Nawhakhwani), and practice rituals such as self-flagellation, and chest-beating, moving a banner around, and distributing food to others, Tughbandan, 'Alamgardani (moving the 'Alam), Nakhlbandi (tying the palm), Mash'algardani (moving torches), Sangzani, parade of horses or camels as sighs Karbala events and the captives of the tragic battle.

[1] In Twelver Shia Islam, the Islamic prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatima Zahra; and the Twelve Imams are considered as the Fourteen Infallibles.

Like other Shia rituals this ritual is very liberal ritual and everyone regardless of their class status, religious rank, and position dress in black and equally join to commemorate the events of Karbala through a public sinehzani, a predominantly male ritual of self-flagellation and mourning. Participants march through the streets and bazaars during the ten days of Muharram. At the head of the parade is a coffin or shrouded effigy representing the martyred Imam Hussein. The men chant eulogies and beat their chests and backs rhythmically, often with chains, sticks, or swords (Momen 1985).

Visiting Shrines (Ziyarat): Visiting Shia shrines is one of the intense rituals. Since the distance and the cost of pilgrimage to Mecca are barriers to the Shias who live in Iran and other countries like Iraq, visiting Shia shrines is affordable. These factors increases the rate of visiting shrines. Visiting the Shrines of Ali at Najaf, Hussein at Karbala, the Seventh and Ninth Imams at Kazimayn, of Imam Reza at Mashhad and of Fatima Ma'suma, the sister of the Imam Reza at Qum are the important visiting of Shias. Recitation of the prayer of visitation (Ziyarat-Nama) is a part of this ritual. Depending the she visited shrine, The people who practice these rituals are also given titles such as Karbala'i and Mashhadi in the community, which is also an alternative to calling Haji the practitioners who pilgrimage to Mecca (Momen 1985). These titles have symbolic values in societies and could encourage people to practice the rituals to gain the status. Shias also visit the shrines of minor saints which there are in a large number in Iran (Momen 1985).

According to Iranian officials, annually 30 million visit the shrine in Mashhad. 25 million of the visitors are domestic and 5 million from 20 foreign countries(Hajj 2019). This is very big number comparing to number of pilgrims to Mecca which was 2.37 million which comprises 1.76 million foreign pilgrims and .61 million domestic pilgrims (General Authority for Statistics Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2018). Just the number of people who visit shrine in Mashhad is roughly

13 times more than annual number of pilgrims to Mecca. Given that Shias comprises 10-15% of Muslims in the world, this is very big number. This ritual has implications for identity salience and ethnic and national identities among different social groups.

The visitation of Hussein's tomb in Karbala particularly on the occasion of the 10th day of the month of Muharram (ziyarat Ashura) and the 40th day after the battle (ziyarat arbaeen) are highly practiced rituals among Shia Muslims. Visiting shrine in the 40th of the martyrdom of Hussein in Karbala, Iraq, is one the sacred rituals which millions of Shia Muslim gather to mourn for Hussein.

Rowzeh khani: there is a dramatic narration of the life and the suffering of the saints, the rowzeh khani. This is a social gathering of relatives, neighbors, and guild members at one's garden or house. A mullah (in the men's hall) or a female mullah baji (in the women's hall) recites the tragedy of Hussein or mourns the events of Karbala, using passages from a sixteenth-century book, known as The Garden of the Martyrs. The audience laments and grieves in memory of Ali and Hussein. Meanwhile, the host serves tea and coffee, and sometimes there are a few rounds of water pipes. Eventually, the guests are entertained with a lavish feast (Momen 1985). People from different classes come together. Mostly people who can afford the cost of Rowzeh khvani invite people from different classes.

Ta'ziyeh performance: Ta'ziyeh performance is similar to Christian passion plays and was influenced by them. It is a theatrical representation of the Karbala events. Ta'ziyeh is one of the oldest forms of theater in the region, and ordinary citizens eagerly anticipate the annual performances. This highly melodramatic performance, which is a fusion of the first two traditions mentioned above with European theatrical ones, is staged by local groups throughout the country before large audiences. The performances single out the suffering of Hussein's entourage,

especially that of the women and the children, on Ashura day. The narrator and the actors describe in great detail the thirst of the besieged community in the heat of the desert of Karbala and the deviousness of Yazid, who chose Friday at noon, the time of Muslim communal prayer, to slaughter his rivals. The audience weeps bitterly during the last scenes of the play and is reminded of the treachery and guilt of the Kufan community, which did not side with its savior Hussein, thereby allowing the tyrant Yazid to commit his dastardly deed. These rituals of Muharram, much more than a single belief or dogma, define Shi'ite communities (Halm 1997, 41; Mahjub 1979, 142; Momen 1985, 240; Fischer 1980).

Theatrical performance has been traced to the sixteenth century, Safavid dynasty. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the mourning rituals had developed into a new form of theatrical performance (Chelkowski 1991, 214).

Chest Beating (Persian: Sinehzani): Chest-beating is one of the most common rituals performed in mourning ceremonies of Shi'ite Imams especially for Imam Hussein. It is performed with mourning while people are beating on their chests. Chest-beating is the most common mourning ritual among Shi'ite Muslims in husayniyyas in Iran as well as other countries. Chest-beating has different rhythms, the most important ones are: Wahid (single): chest-beating with slow rhythm, one hard beat with seconds of intervals. Sangin (heavy): chest-beating with moderate rhythm, a hard beat with short intervals. Shur (passionate): chest-beating with fast rhythms, gentle beats without intervals. Double beats, triple beats and four beats: two, three or four continuous beats with fast rhythms, while it has a short pause between each time. Different types of chest-beating are performed based on different type of ceremonies. It can be performed while standing, sitting and moving in circles around Nawha Khan (the person who is reciting elegies).

Some regions have their own special type of chest-beating, for example in southern regions of Iran it is common that people form circles, put their left hand on the back of the person on their left and beat on their chests with slow rhythms. Another type is called Qatari (Train-like) Cheat-beating which is performed in Larestan and other types which are performed in different regions (Mazahiri 2016, Wikishia).

Self-flagellation (Zanjirzani): Self-flagellation or zanjirzani is another collectively practiced Shia ritual. İn this ritual, Shia Muslims rhythmically beat their back with a metal chain in order to experience the pain inflicted on their beloved Imam and his family during the Battle of Karbala. This ritual as a way of mourning is performed in Mourning Procession, Taziyeh performance, and during visiting shrines. Similar to Sinezani or chest-beating, recitation and rhythm are important components of this ritual because the speed of self-flagellation is orchestrated with drums and the rhythm of the recitation. There are some regional differences in the performance of this ritual, however, rhythm and practicing collectively with recitation are shared features in all regional versions of the ritual (Aghaie 2004, Chelkowski 2010, Momen 1985).

RITUALS THE LEVEL OF INTENSITY

Collectively versus Individually

One of the main characteristics of the most of the common rituals is that they are performed individually or in small groups. From the common rituals, the daily prayer generally is performed individually. Fasting also is an individually practiced ritual and the Muslims are synchronized the period of fasting and the eating iftar, meal after sunset. The eat iftar meal, mostly, with their family members. Although in practicing some of the common rituals such as annual almsgiving, khums, and qurban the Muslim have limited interaction with others. Common rituals such as pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), kandil/milad, Friday prayer rituals are performed collectively. In other words, the

common rituals do not have strong co-presence ingredient of the Interaction Rituals Models which is an important factor in forming a shared collective identity (Collins 2005).

Despite performing Hajj ritual collectively, the number of Muslims who annually perform Hajj is not significant in comparison with total number of Muslims in the world (1.57 billion). In the most years, around 2 million out of 1.57 billion Muslims preform hajj. Based on the survey of Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey, only 6.6 percent of the respondents said that they performed hajj in their lifetime(2014). Although hajj could play a role in solidarity of Muslims around the world, since the numbers of Iranian and Turkish people who perform hajj are not high, at least, it is not reasonable to expect strong interethnic solidary as an outcome of the pilgrimage.

Shia Rituals differ significantly from the common rituals. First, unlike the common rituals, almost all Shia rituals are performed collectively. Second, the number of participants in Shia rituals are very high, taking into account that only 10-15% of the world Muslims are Shia(Aghaie 2004, 2010, Nasr 2007). For instance, the number of Shia pilgrims for Arbaeen within ten days was around 20 millions while for Hajj it was 2 million Muslims. All the aforementioned Shia rituals are performed by Shia groups with different ethnic, race, gender, social class or economic statuses.

Iranian Shias from different ethnic and social class perform the same rituals together. Even they are together when pilgrimaging outside Iran. For Arbaeen pilgrimage in Iraq, Shia people from different countries come together to attend the World's Biggest Pilgrimage(Huffington Post 2015). Shia Muslims, primarily Iranian Shias, also visit the shrines inside Iran, in the cities of Qum and Mashhad. According to Iranian officials, annually around 25 million domestic pilgrims and 5 million from other countries make a pilgrimage to the shrine of Imam Reza, the eighth Imam of Shias, in Mashhad, northeastern province of Khorasan Razavi (Hajj 2018) The number of 17 million for another shrine in Qom(Hawzahnews 2015). This is an important factor because “it is

the big, intense religious gatherings that bring forth the emotion and the shift in membership attachment" (Collins 2005). This situation also increases commitment of individuals because they interact with people from different ethnic and class background in emotionally intense situation which result in their affective and interactional commitment to the group(Stryker 2008). These commitments also transcend their class and ethnic identities.

Inward-facing Circles and Barrier to Outsiders

Looking closely to the Shia rituals shows that in all of the Shia rituals, except Rowzehkhani, inward facing circles can be observed. Especially, chest beating and self-flagellation rituals, which are practiced along with other rituals, are mainly performed in the form of inward facing circles. The practicing groups synchronize their chest-beating and self-flagellation rhythm when they practice in the face-inward circles. Taziyeh performance is also practiced in inward-facing circles. The scene of the Taziyeh performance is in a circle shape and people stay or sit around the circle scene and watch the theoretical performance of the day of Ashura. So, when people in inward-facing circle mourn and cry, they see each other's emotional moments. The participants of Shia rituals become aware of each other's emotional reaction. Because the eye contacts, they coordinate their action as practicing the rituals. This common knowledge and coordination produced by inward facing circles have some essential implications. Chwe (2013) asserts that common knowledge not only lead the coordination, but also could generate collective identity. The generation of collective identity is crucial in terms of augmenting what Anderson called "imagined communities"(2006) for Iranian Shias. Inward facing rituals also create greater commonality among members by breaking down social hierarchy and dissolving the difference between clerics and other participants. So, the equality of the members in the ritual

facilitated the internalization of this Shia and Iranian identity among those who practice.

Indeed, inward-facing circles can also contribute to creating what Collins called "barrier to outsiders", one of the four ingredients in Collins' model (Collins 2004). On the one hand, practicing rituals in the form of inward-facing circle coordinate people and create an inclusive atmosphere for the practicing people, which Chwe considers it as a source of solidarity and formation of collective identity (2013). On the other hand, the inward-facing circle also create barrier to outsiders and exclude others who do not practice the rituals.

Shared Mood and Mutual Focus of Attention

Practicing intense, rhythmic, and frequent shared rituals requires participants' mutual focus of attention and create a shared mood. "As the persons become more tightly focused on their common activity, more aware of what each other is doing and feeling, and more aware of each other's awareness, they experience their shared emotion more intensely, as it comes to dominate their awareness" (Collins 2004). Since participants are actively involved in practicing Shia rituals, it reinforces the mutual focus of attention. Merely practicing collectively is not a sufficient condition to produce this shared emotion if the ritual does not engage people horizontally and emotionally. Liturgy – the order of divine service and its practical dimensions matters enormously when we consider the experience of religion (see Riesebrodt 2010). Many rituals feature an audience facing a clerical professional who performs the rites while the laity remains relatively passive. Examples include the traditional Roman Catholic Mass and the Friday sermon in a mosque. For this reason, common rituals such as Friday prayers lack heightened emotional engagement. They are more like what Collins calls "formal rituals" in which people do not typically experience intense emotions. Indeed, the most important point is the that "collective consciousness", in Durkheimian terminology, is a shared emotional / cognitive experience and the

result of participants' active participation, mutual entrainment of emotion, and attention to the same focal point. Since the Shia rituals have the intensity, Shia Muslims acquire the "collective consciousness"(Collins 2004) or "affective commitment" to strengthen their collective identity (Stryker 2008). Shia rituals are very emotional, visceral, physical and communal. Lay people are not only involved but can take it upon themselves to engage in all kinds of ritual actions. Shia rituals are all liberal in the sense that all Shias regardless of their religious rank or position can actively participate in the practice. This inclusive nature of the Shia rituals increases their impact too.

Frequency of Interactions and the strength of belonging

Shia and common rituals also differ in the number and frequency of practicing rituals. The number and frequency of Shia rituals are far more than common rituals. In addition to practicing common ritual and visiting shrines throughout year, Shia calendar have events and rituals for 40 days of a year (See Appendix B). Although Muharram ceremonies are the most intense Shia rituals, there is no month without some Shia rituals (Momen 1985). This frequency and the high number of interactions lead to "interactional commitment" (Stryker 2008). Repeating rituals periodically intensifies and strengthens participants' commitment and the sense of belonging. Interaction of annually 25 million pilgrims to Mashhad and 17 million pilgrims to Qom in a country with roughly 80 million population has important consequences in the formation of religious solidarity and national identity. Each year, people from different ethnic and class background come together to practice the intense rituals. The emotional attachment of the rituals (affective commitment) along with the frequency (interactional commitment) explain the strength of belonging to religious and national solidarity in micro or individual level in Iran. So, the emotions are transformed and revitalized in the process of the practicing rituals. The shared emotions lead to what Durkheim

calls “collective Effervescences” and then other outcomes such as solidarity. In order to understand the outcome of practicing intense rituals, knowing the chain of rituals is important. In this sense, in terms of intensity the Shia ritual chains are more intense than the Sunni rituals. In Shia rituals the flow of emotion continues from a ritual to another one throughout each year, and maintains the shared emotions among the Shia Muslims. Shia symbols also play an important role in maintaining and activating the shared emotions. Even without practicing rituals for a period, seeing the symbols such calligraphy of imams’ names in public places recalls the rituals and the attached emotions.

Table 2: Comparing Two Sets of Rituals

	RITUAL INTENSITY	***Collectively***	***Barrier to Outsiders***	***Inward-facing Circles***	***Shared Mood and Mutual Focus of Attention***	***Frequent***
COMMON RITULS	Daily Prayer	0	0	0	0	1
	Friday Prayer	1	1	0	1	1
	Fasting	0	0	0	0	0
	Annual Almsgiving	1	0	0	0	0
	The one-fifth Tax	1	0	0	0	0
	Pilgrimage	1	1	1	1	0
	Kandil/Milad	1	1	1	1	0
	Qurban	1	0	0	0	0
SHIA RITULS	Mourning Procession	1	1	1	1	1
	Visiting Shrines	1	1	1	1	1
	Rowzeh Khani	1	1	1	1	1
	Ta’ziyeh	1	1	1	1	1
	Chest-beating	1	1	1	1	1
	Self-flagellation	1	1	1	1	1

Spillover of Religious Solidarity to National Pride

The characteristics of the two sets of rituals provide evidence that the Shia rituals compared to the Sunni rituals are very intense (See table 2) and due to the intensity Shia rituals have the power to produce a strong sense of national belonging and successfully forming a supra-identity reducing the gap between national pride of both ethnicities in Iran. While the intuitive expectation is that religious rituals can strengthen religious collective identity, this study has shown clear evidence of strengthening national pride of dominant and subordinate ethnicities in Iran. So, the question is how the religious rituals can impact not only the religious belonging, but also the national belonging and pride of the discriminated ethnicities and how it can explain the gap between national pride of two ethnicities when national identity primarily represents dominant ethnicity.

Turchin (2018) rightly argues that after the formation of a supra-identity or meta-ethnie in a multiethnic society the boundaries of the dominant ethnic identity becomes blurred. So, the domination continues with blurred boundaries. Bluredness of the ethnic boundaries of dominant group masks the superiority of the dominantion group in a country and even equalizes the dominant ethnic identity with national identity. For insance, Persian language considered by many as “glue” in nation making process (Elling and Harris 2021) or Persian ethnicity was not presented as an ethnicity neither in state run media, school neither in by nongovermental media or organizations. I argue that in countries where majority of population share same religion, depending on the intensity of ritual, these interactions can impact national identity through different processes; First of all, as I discussed earlier, practicing shared religious rituals by dominant and subordinate ethnicities can produce collective effervescence, solidarity, and strengthen the sense of belonging to the supra-identity. Since the sense of belonging transcends the nested ethnic identity and

strengthens the ties between individuals of dominant and subordinate ethnicities, it can alleviate the impact of ethnic grievances on minorities' national pride. In other words, individuals have a set of nested identity, as Simmel argued (1955). Practicing intense rituals frequently creates a situation which raises salience of religious identity at the expense of ethnic identity and then results in a strong supra-identity and masking the superiority of dominant ethnicity under supra-identity. Indeed, the close level of national pride between Shia Kurds and Persians in Iran is a result strengthened supra-identity through practicing shared intense rituals. Unlike Iran, Turks and Sunni Kurds do not practice intense rituals. Due to the lack of intense rituals and the absence of strong interethnic solidarity the gap between national pride of these two ethnicities widens. In other words, the formation of supra-identity making fails and the nested ethnic identity becomes salient.

Practicing intense rituals can also lead to higher national pride if the network of religious community inside a country is almost equivalent to the national community of the country. Those who practice rituals together in Iran are predominantly Iranian Shias. Even when they practice with citizens of other countries they deal with barriers in communication such as language barrier. In addition to these factors, Shia rituals can increase national pride in Iran because Iran with Shia of over 90% of its population has been considered as the main Shia country. So, Iranian Shias can also be proud of being an Iranian because of seeing Iran as the center of Shiism in the world. Indeed, anthropological works show that Shi'ism and Shia rituals have always played important roles in Iran, even long before the Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Chelkowski 2010, Keddie 1983, 1995, Momen 1985). A concrete example of role of religion on national identity can be observed with even more clarity in 8 years of Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). In the period, Iran has used Shia motives to mobilize its people and portrayed the war as the battle of Karbala. In fact, the Iranian patriotism is combined with religious elements too. This is why practicing intense rituals

frequently increases national pride of dominant Persian ethnic members too. For instance, in some cases the ratio of those who sacrificed their lives in the war, in some non-Persian Shia populated provinces are close or even higher than Persian populated provinces (ISNA 2019).

Religion is important for Turkish people too; however, merely religiosity is not sufficient to transcend ethnic boundaries or to strengthen the sense of national belonging. Not only Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's conservative party, but also nationalist parties such as the Nationalist Movement party have historically an emphasis on religion (Landau 1982, Akşit et al. 2012). The majority of Turkish people think that a strong link between religious identity and national identity of Turkish people must exist. A representative survey on Turkey shows that more than half of the respondents believe that Turkish citizen must be Muslims (Konda 2006). Another survey shows that around 94% of constituents of oppositional parties like National Movement Party and Great Unity Party categorize themselves as moderately (35.2%) or highly religious (59.1%) individuals (Akşit et al. 2012). The constituents of Justice and Development party, Erdoğan's party, are even more religious. However, in the absence intense forms of interactions, rituals, does not unite Turkey's different ethnicities into a shared sense of nationality. Under this condition, discrimination and communal divisions make ethnic boundaries more prominent and ethnic minorities more aware of their grievances. I think this is why Kurdish people are less proud of the national identity which mainly represent the dominant Turkish ethnicity. Even the shared history of living in Ottoman empire as Sunni Islamic polity has not decreased the gap between national pride of the two ethnicities in Turkey.

So far, I've discussed qualitatively the characteristics of rituals. Fortunately, existing datasets allow us to test quantitatively the impact of the frequency of intense and non-intense rituals in both cases.

DATA AND METHOD

For testing the hypotheses, I've used logistic regression in my analysis. The data for this research come from two different sources; for Iran, the Third Wave of Iranian Values and Attitudes (2015) and for Turkey the Sixth Wave of World Values Survey (2011). Both datasets are nationally representative and collected by conducting in-person surveys in each country. For the sake of comparability, I have standardized the variables in the datasets and then I ran models separately for each dataset.

Dependent variable: Measuring National Pride

I've used *national pride* to operationalize belonging to a country. In both surveys, there is a question to measure the level of national pride. The question is "how proud are you to be an Iranian/a Turkish?" In the survey this variable is ordinal, however, it seems because of social desirability bias the distribution was skewed toward "being very proud", I transformed the variable and coded values as a binary variable. So, for this variable 1 stand for "being very proud" and 0 indicates "not very proud". Indeed, recoding National Pride as a binary variable can be a method to deal with social desirability bias too.

Individual Level Independent Variables

For both Social Values Survey and Iranian Values and Attitudes Survey *employment status* has been recoded as binary categories of employed and unemployed. After standardization of *education*, there are four categories of education; illiterate, primary and lower, university preparatory and lower, at least some university education. The dataset on Iran also includes *religious education* as a category of education variables. I also standardized *class* variables. The self-rated class variable consists of three categories; lower, middle and upper classes. *Age* variable is in year. The mean ages of the cases are almost identical, the mean for Iran is 38.6 and for Turkey

is 38.4 years. *Gender* is this research is a binary variable and female is the reference category. I included *marital status* variable with categories of single, married, divorced, widowed, and separated.

Ethnicity variable also is included in the models. Ethnicity is a binary variable with the categories of dominant and subordinate ethnicities. The dominant ethnicity is reference category in both cases. For Iran, the Persian ethnicity and for Turkey Turk ethnicity are reference categories. Shia Kurds in Iran and Sunni Kurds in Turkey are coded as 1 in the datasets. Since, the ethnic identity of the respondents was not asked in the survey for Turkey, I created dummy based on the regions and coded Kurds-populated region as 1, and the rest of Turkey as predominantly Turkic-populated regions with 0. Indeed, the problems of the dataset on Turkey was not asking respondents' ethnic identity and their religious denominations. However, having a variable about the regions that survey had been conducted and the availability of ethnic and religious composition of the regions allowed me to specify ethnic identity of the respondents with their region.

The Focal Independent variable: Frequency of Practicing Religious Rituals

The focal independent variable in this analysis is *the frequency of practicing religious rituals*. In order to operationalize this focal independent variable, I've focused on frequency of practicing two rituals; attending mosque in Turkey and visiting shrines in Iran.

Attending mosque is one of the common rituals that Sunni Muslims in Turkey practice. Muslims attend mosque to daily prayer, Friday prayer, or on holy days. In both surveys there are questions about frequency of practicing rituals; "how often do you attend mosque/ visit shrine?" I standardized the frequency of attending mosque and coded categories as never, rarely, sometimes, often and always. Never is the reference category for this ordinal variable. I've chosen *visiting*

Shrines (Ziyarat) among other rituals because of specificity factor. Unlike many other rituals, visiting shrines requires traveling to cities that have shrines. This is more specific measure comparing to rituals that individuals can attend in their neighborhoods.

Using logistic regression, I have ran 4 models to estimate the overall relationships between the frequency of practicing rituals and national pride for dominant and subordinate ethnic ethnicities in Iran and Turkey. First, I 've presented the results of the analyses without ethnicity and ritual variables. Next, the binary variable of ethnicity has been included into model (Model 2). in Model 3, the focal independent variable of the frequency of practicing rituals is a variable in model. In the last model (Model 4), interaction term between ethnicity and frequency of practicing rituals is included in the model.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Religious rituals are highly practiced in both cases. 80 percent of the Iranian respondents and 65 percent of Turkish respondents at least *sometimes* practice rituals (table 3). This ritual can impact the national pride of ethnicities in different ways. The presented logistic regression models for Iran and Turkey (respectively table 4 and table 5), allows us to test the proposed hypotheses.

I ran the first model, with some demographic variables, without ethnic identity of the respondents. In the first model, there is a statistically significant positive association between age and being proud. Some levels of education for both cases are statistically significant. Although the coefficients for education levels in Iran mostly indicate negative association, the coefficient for religious education is positively associated with national pride compared to the reference category of education level, illiterate. In the first model for Turkey, all the educational levels compared to the reference category are positively associated and positive associations are statistically significant, except university level category.

Model 2 includes ethnicity variable in addition to the variables in the model 1. After adding frequency of practicing ritual variable into the analysis (model 3), while being Shia Kurd in Iran is positively associated with national pride, being Sunni Kurd is negatively associated with national pride in Turkey with same level of statistical significance in model 2 ($p < 0.001$). In the case of Iran, as expected, the coefficients of the focal independent variable of practicing ritual increase as the frequency of the practicing increases. It clearly shows that there is a positive relation between frequency of practicing ritual and national pride in Iran. This steady increase confirms H1 and H2 hypotheses about the positive relation between increase in frequency of intense rituals and national pride. In the case of Iran, the coefficients for *often* and *always* categories of ritual are statistically significant which again indicates the importance of frequency in the population.

In the case of Turkey, the categories of frequency of attending mosque, comparing to the reference category of *never* attending mosque, are positively associate with national pride in model 3. However, the there is no steady increase in the coefficients of the categories. For instance, the relations between *sometimes* and *often* categories of ritual and national pride are stronger than the relation between the *always* category and national pride which means the increase in the frequency of attending mosque does not increase the log odds of being proud. These coefficients are also statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). Unlike the steady positive relation between frequency of practicing rituals in Iran and national pride, the relation between the two variables does not hold in the case of Turkey. So, the finding does not support H1, the positive relation between frequency of practicing rituals and national pride in this case. However, since the ritual of Turkey is not an intense ritual, the general picture emerging from the analysis is that the strength of the association between frequency of practicing rituals and national pride relies on the intensity and characteristics of rituals (H2). As I noted the two categories *sometimes* and *often* of ritual in Turkey have stronger

association with national pride compared to the category of *always*. A possible reason for this finding might be the importance of attending mosque on Friday and holy days in Turkish politics. So, those who attend mosque on Friday and holy days probably support the state and are proud too. In standardizing ritual variable of Turkey, frequency of attending mosque, I merged some of the categories in order to have same categories with Iran's case. The categories of always, often, sometimes, rarely, and never stand respectively for attending more than once a week, attending once a week or once a month, only on special holy days, attending once a year or less often, and never. Since *often* and *sometimes* categories include Friday and holy days mosque attendance, this can explain the stronger associations of these categories with the dependent variable, national pride.

Model 4 includes interaction term between minority and ritual for both cases. I've created predicated probability plots to have more intuitive interpretation. Unlike Turkey's case, Iran's case confirms H1, a positive association between frequency of practicing rituals and national pride. The figures of predicted probabilities show the positive association between practicing intense rituals in Iran and national pride which supports H 2. I found statistically significant association for the most frequent categories of ritual, *often* and *always*, in Iran. The patterns of increase in the probability of national pride by the increase in the frequency of practicing rituals for both dominant Persian and Shia Kurd minority are almost same. The never category for both ethnic groups have a wider confidence interval. Given that only 2.3% of the respondents never practice the rituals, in my analysis I've focused on categories with narrower confidence intervals. The figure for Iran shows a steeper line as we go from less frequent category of *rarely* toward the most frequent category of *always* for both dominant Persian and subordinate Shia Kurd ethnicities. The probability for Shia Kurds goes respectively from 63% to 75% and for Persians from 48% to 74%.

Given the steeper line for more frequent categories of ritual in Iranian case, this figure suggests the importance of frequency of intense rituals and its impact on national pride.

The pattern for Turkey is very different than Iran's case. Although practicing ritual with some level of frequency compared to never practicing increases the probability of national pride for the dominant ethnicity, the increase does not depend on the frequency of practicing. *Never* and *rarely* categories of ritual variable have an identical association with national pride. Then, there is a sharp increase for *sometimes* category, the category that includes attending mosque on holy days. The probability of national pride remains almost same for the category of *often*, the category that includes attending mosque on Friday, and finally *always* category has a slight decrease. I obtained statistically significant coefficients for *sometimes*, *often*, and *always* categories. As I mentioned already, the higher predicated probability of *sometimes* and *often* categories might be due to the characteristics of that portion of respondents, state policy to use this ritual for propaganda, and attending mosque to support state in these days. To avoid the risk of bias, comparting the predicted probability of *never* and *always* categories indicates that practicing ritual compared to not practicing ritual increases the probability of national pride for the dominant ethnicity, but the increase is not as high as increase to Iran's dominant ethnicity.

The predicted probability for Sunni Kurd minority in Turkey shows the same pattern for *sometimes* and *often* categories and very wide confidence interval for all categories. The important finding here is that there is no difference between predicted probability of *never* practicing ritual and *always* practicing ritual. Both the least and the most frequent categories respectively have predicted probabilities of 22% and 21% for Kurds while it is 73% and 83% for Turks. Not only the plot shows that there is almost no difference between predicted probabilities of these two categories for Kurds in Turkey, it also demonstrates that the gap between national pride of

dominant Turk and subordinate Kurd ethnicities is very wide by 50% to 60% . Being from subordinate Sunni Kurd ethnicity in Turkey is also negatively associated with national pride and statistically significant with the P value of less than 0.001.

Although all categories of ritual variable in interaction with Kurd ethnicity suggest a positive association compared to the reference category, none of them are statistically significant. Unlike Turkey, in Iran the gap between the probability of the dominant and subordinate ethnicities is very narrow, varies from 1% to15% in different frequencies. Practicing intense rituals frequently in Iran also does not lead to a wide gap between national pride of the two ethnic groups. This finding supports H3 which predicts lesser gap between national pride of dominant and subordinate ethnicities.

My criteria for selecting model 3 for both cases was due to their lower AIC. The model 3 of Iran has the lowest AIC among the models, AIC = 9604.889. Likewise, AIC of the model 3 in Turkey is the lowest, AIC =1545.653. The predicted probabilities are based on these models.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Iran				Turkey			
	Mean	N	%	N and % of Missing	Mean	N	%	N and % of Missing
National Pride		7672		171 (2.23%)		1605		9(0.56%)
Very Proud		4321	57.6%			1202	75.3%	
Not Very Proud		3180	42.4%			394	24.7%	
Practicing Rituals				156(2%)				25 (1.56%)
Always		719	9.6%			426	30.6%	
Often		1887	25.1%			131	4.0%	
Sometimes		3442	45.8%			476	30.1%	
Rarely		1296	17.2%			131	8.3%	
Never		172	2.3%			426	27.0%	
Ethnicity								
Minority		1041	13.6%			166	10.3%	
Majority		6631	86.4%			1439	89.7%	

Gender								
Male		3737	48.7%			825	51.4%	
Female		3935	51.3%			780	48.6%	
Age	38.2 (Min. 15, Max. 84)				38.4 (Min. 18, Max. 86)			
Self-rated Class				57(0.7%)				26(1.62%)
Lower Class		2500	32.8%			459	29.1%	
Middle Class		5015	65.9%			1089	69.0%	
Upper Class		100	1.3%			31	2.0%	
Marital Status								
Single		2018	26.3%			435	27.1%	
Married		5316	69.3%			1054	65.7%	
Divorced		72	0.9%			46	2.9%	
Widowed		255	3.3%			62	3.9%	
Separated		11	0.1%			8	0.5%	
Employment Status				29(0.4%)				
Employed		3397	44.4%			839	52.3%	
Unemployed		4246	55.6%			766	47.7%	
Education Level				20(0.3%)				
Illiterate or some Unofficial education		622	8.1%			91	5.7%	
Primary and lower		1125	14.7%			509	31.7%	
Secondary uni-preparatory and lower		3559	46.5%			694	43.2%	
Some university with or w/o degree		2330	30.4%			311	19.4%	
Religious education		16	0.2%			-	-	
Sample Size		7672				1605		

Table 4: Regression Coefficients for Iran

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	-0.001	-0.099	-0.266	-0.362
	(0.253)	(0.254)	(0.299)	(0.308)
Male(dummy)	0.007	0.000	0.013	0.013
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Education Level (Reference = Illiterate)				
Primary and lower	-0.096	-0.082	-0.090	-0.085
	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Uni.-prep. lower	-0.107	-0.077	-0.068	-0.059
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.111)
University Level	-0.301 **	-0.261 *	-0.249 *	-0.235 *
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Religious Education	1.065	1.118	0.949	0.947
	(0.652)	(0.652)	(0.660)	(0.661)
age	0.017 ***	0.017 ***	0.016 ***	0.016 ***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Marital Status (Reference = Single)				
Married	0.083	0.089	0.084	0.082
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Divorced	0.166	0.163	0.202	0.194
	(0.254)	(0.255)	(0.260)	(0.261)
Widowed	0.016	0.042	0.060	0.061
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.168)	(0.169)
Separated	1.301	1.353	1.322	1.325
	(0.787)	(0.787)	(0.791)	(0.792)
Self-rated Class (Reference = Upper class)				
Middle Class	-0.142	-0.141	-0.164	-0.165
	(0.210)	(0.211)	(0.217)	(0.217)
Lower Class	-0.252	-0.277	-0.267	-0.272
	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.219)	(0.220)
Employed(dummy)	-0.123	-0.124	-0.126	-0.129
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Kurd(dummy)		0.356 ***	0.332 ***	0.879 *
		(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.444)
Rituals: Visiting Shrines (Reference = Never)				
Rarely			-0.079	-0.031
			(0.169)	(0.185)
Sometimes			0.074	0.165
			(0.163)	(0.178)
Often			0.456 **	0.564 **
			(0.167)	(0.182)
Always			0.917 ***	1.040 ***
			(0.182)	(0.199)
Kurd x ritual(Rarely)				-0.254

				(0.474)
Kurd x ritual(Sometimes)				-0.570
				(0.456)
Kurd x ritual(Often)				-0.701
				(0.466)
Kurd x ritual(Always)				-0.780
				(0.504)
N	7402	7402	7256	7256
logLik	-4960.517	-4947.946	-4783.444	-4780.062
AIC	9949.034	9925.893	9604.889	9606.124

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Column names: names, Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, Model 4

Table 5: Regression Coefficients for Turkey

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	0.020	0.948	0.526	0.471
	(0.666)	(0.687)	(0.707)	(0.713)
Male(dummy)	-0.272	-0.214	-0.488 **	-0.489 **
	(0.151)	(0.157)	(0.175)	(0.175)
Education (Reference: Illiterate)				
Primary and lower	0.954 ***	0.303	0.299	0.343
	(0.282)	(0.315)	(0.321)	(0.323)
Uni.-prep. lower	0.912 **	0.188	0.255	0.308
	(0.299)	(0.334)	(0.340)	(0.343)
University level	0.577	-0.141	-0.072	-0.013
	(0.319)	(0.353)	(0.360)	(0.364)
age	0.027 ***	0.024 ***	0.025 ***	0.026 ***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Marital Status (Reference = Single)				
Married	0.206	0.195	0.141	0.145
	(0.160)	(0.166)	(0.171)	(0.171)
Divorced	0.535	0.513	0.384	0.345
	(0.443)	(0.459)	(0.465)	(0.462)
Widowed	0.443	0.208	0.056	0.064
	(0.457)	(0.470)	(0.480)	(0.483)
separated	0.640	0.407	0.503	0.497
	(1.101)	(1.102)	(1.114)	(1.114)
Self-rated Class (Reference = upper class)				
Middle Class	-0.872	-0.737	-0.706	-0.704
	(0.550)	(0.551)	(0.562)	(0.562)
Lower Class	-0.726	-0.476	-0.430	-0.424
	(0.560)	(0.562)	(0.574)	(0.573)
Employed(dummy)	0.175	0.002	0.046	0.055
	(0.155)	(0.163)	(0.168)	(0.168)
Kurds(dummy)		-1.919 ***	-2.013 ***	-2.162 ***

		(0.196)	(0.201)	(0.395)
Rituals: Attending Mosque (Reference = Never)				
Rarely			0.024	-0.026
			(0.235)	(0.243)
Sometimes			0.851 ***	0.799 ***
			(0.175)	(0.189)
Often			0.803 ***	0.760 ***
			(0.195)	(0.206)
Always			0.471 *	0.556 *
			(237)	(0.255)
Kurds x Ritual(rarely)				0.663
				(0.882)
Kurds x Ritual(sometimes)				0.350
				(0.503)
Kurds x Ritual(often)				0.322
				(0.544)
Kurds x Ritual(always)				-0.709
				(0.740)
N	1571	1571	1548	1548
logLik	-836.177	-784.740	-754.327	-752.723
AIC	1698.354	1597.481	1545.653	1549.446

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Column names: names, Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, Model 4

Figure 2: Predicted probability of dominant and subordinate ethnicities' National Pride in Iran and Turkey by the frequency of practicing religious rituals



The analysis has provided convincing evidence in favor of the positive impact of frequency of intense Shia rituals on national pride of both the dominant and subordinate ethnicities. These rituals also play key role in reducing the gap between national pride of two ethnic groups and promoting national belonging. Applying the theories not only could reveal the differences between the common rituals and Shia rituals, but it also can explain the mechanism behind the spillover of practicing intense and frequent religious rituals on national belonging. Since the common rituals affect both societies, their effect in Turkey's Sunni society and Iran's Shia society would be similar. So, the effect of common rituals is naturally controlled in this research design. Discussing the characteristics of these two sets of rituals makes clear their varying impact on national pride. Examining the relationship in other Shia ethnicities in Iran such as Azerbaijani Turks, Lors, Arabs, Gilaks, and Mazanis clearly reveals the same pattern and support the hypotheses on the positive relation between intense rituals and national pride(Figure 3).

Figure 3: Predicted probability of Shia ethnicities' national pride in Iran by the frequency of practicing religious rituals



Data from 2015, 3rd Wave of Iranian Values and Attitudes



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

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

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

Data from 2015, 3rd Wave of Iranian Values and Attitudes

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

In this paper, I've analyzed the role of religious rituals, an understudies factor, on the formation of supra-identities and the strength of national identity among dominant and subordinate ethnicities in two multiethnic countries, Turkey and Iran. My assertion is that merely sharing a religion by majority of ethnicities in a country does not necessarily lead to the successful formation of supra-identity. Some religious traditions because of their liturgies and theologies emphasize different kinds of rituals and ritual performances. When these are intensive, cross-class, and cross-ethnic, they produced strong solidarity and strong identification (pride) in the multi-ethnic nation. So, the success of the formation of supra-identity in multiethnic countries with shared religion depends on the intensity of religious rituals.

As demonstrated in this study, the magnitude of the effect of discriminations against ethnic minorities on their national pride also depends on the strength of cultural bonds between dominant and subordinate ethnicities. This is why taking the effect of religious rituals as an uniting factor into account is crucial to understand the ethnicities' level of national pride.

Intense religious rituals and the formation of supra-identity can preserve ethnic domination through different mechanisms. Strong supra-identity blurs and masks the boundaries of dominant ethnicity. This makes domination less visible and facilitates maintaining ethnic domination. Intense ritualistic interactions between ethnicities can alleviate the impact of ethnic discriminations for nested ethnic groups through promoting interethnic solidarity, stressing on religious collective identity, and as an unintended consequence this condition can facilitate state's capability to promote national identity among citizens. Indeed, increasing level of national pride by frequency of practicing intense rituals in Iran is an evidence to show how interactions and the strength of uniting factors are important and may have different implications for a society. Strong national

solidarity may have positive impact on welfare state (Eger 2009), good governance (Ahlerup and Hansson 2011). However, strong national identity can be a barrier for social movements that try to mobilize subordinated groups (Klandermans 1984, Klandermans et al. 2000). Therefore, solidarity in some cases may perpetuate ethnic or racial inequalities by deterring anti-discriminative social movements and hampering positive social changes.

In addition to statistical analysis of Sunni Turk and Kurd ethnicities in Turkey and Shia Persian and Kurd ethnicities in Iran, I've tested the relationships in other Shia ethnicities in Iran and relationships holds in those cases as well. In order to assess the external validity of intense rituals' impact on national identity studying some non-Muslims multiethnic cases might be insightful. In addition to this, there are other forms of interactions associated with collective identities which may impact the identity salience. For instance, the ritualistic interactions might be religious, national, sport fandom, or ethnic or folkloric. Examining the networks of these types of interactions together and comparing their strengths may give even more insight on how these network interact, compete and influence collective identities.

This study has also social and geopolitical implications. Recent surveys show that subjective secularization has increased among Iranian people. In a representative survey, around 65% of respondents said that people have become less religious compared to five years ago and will become even less religious after five years (Iranian Values and Attitudes 2015). The state control over the religious affair may turn religious rituals to empty rituals (Collins 2004) and reduce their impact on the practicing people. This situation may challenge the national identities which are backed by religion and the lack of strong cross-ethnic ties can lead to the rise of ethnic rights movements and ethnic conflicts.

Since the supra-identity backed by Shia rituals are not bounded to Iranian borders, it has

geopolitical importance too. Iran uses religious rituals to deepen its political impact in the countries with Shia population. From Hezbollah in Lebanon to Houthis in Yamen to other countries such Iraq, Georgia, Republic of Azerbaijan, and Saudi Arabia. In some cases, Iran even sends its citizen to other countries Shia communities to promote practicing Shia rituals. So, Shia rituals in countries with Shia communities bring soft power to Iran. However, since Shia rituals result in higher level of solidarity. This becomes a serious barrier for social integration of countries with Shia minority. Many near eastern countries with Shia minority suffers from the lack of the integration.

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Appendix A: Randall Collins' Interaction Ritual Chains model



Appendix B: Calendar of Religious Commemorations

Muḥarram	1–10	Martyrdom of the third Imam, Husayn at Karbalā
	9*, 10*	Tāsū'ā and 'Āshūrā, culmination of Karbalā commemorations
	11†	Death of fourth Imam, Zaynu'l-'Ābidīn
Ṣafar	3†	Birth of fifth Imam, Muḥammad al-Bāqir
	7	Birth of seventh Imam, Mūsā al-Kāẓim
	20	Arba'īn (fortieth day after death of Husayn)
	28*	Death of the Prophet Muhammad and second Imam, Hasan
	30†	Death of eighth Imam, 'Alī ar-Riḍā
Rabī' I	8	Death of eleventh Imam, Ḥasan al-'Askarī
	9	Death of 'Umar the second Caliph (a joyful occasion for Shi'is)
	17*	Birth of Muhammad (Sunnis celebrate this on 12th) and of sixth Imam, Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq
Rabi' II	8†	Birth of eleventh Imam, Ḥasan al-'Askarī
Jamādī I	5	Birth of Zaynab, sister of Imam Husayn
	13†	Death of Fāṭima
Jamādī II	20*†	Birth of Fāṭima
Rajab	3	Death of tenth Imam, 'Alī al-Hādī
	10†	Birth of ninth Imam, Muḥammad at-Taqī
	13*	Birth of first Imam, 'Ali
	15	Death of Zaynab, sister of Imam Husayn
	25	Death of seventh Imam, Mūsā al-Kāẓim
	27*	'Īd al-Maba'th (commemoration of the start of the Prophet's mission)
Sha'bān	3†	Birth of third Imam, Husayn
	5†	Birth of fourth Imam, Zaynu'l-'Ābidīn
	8†	Occultation of twelfth Imam, al-Mahdī
	15*	Birth of twelfth Imam, al-Mahdī
Ramaḍān	Whole month	Month of fast – frequent religious gatherings
	15	Birth of second Imam, Hasan
	19	Stabbing of first Imam, 'Ali
	21*	Death of first Imam, 'Ali
Shawwāl	1*	'Īd al-Fiṭr (commemorates end of fast)
	25*	Death of sixth Imam, Ja'far aṣ-Ṣādiq
Dhu'l-Qad'a	11*	Birth of eighth Imam, 'Alī ar-Riḍā
	29	Death of ninth Imam, Muḥammad at-Taqī
Dhu'l-Ḥijja	7	Death of fifth Imam, Muḥammad al-Bāqir
	10*	'Īd al-Qurbān (Feast of Sacrifice)
	15	Birth of tenth Imam, 'Alī al-Hādī
	18*	'Īd al-Ghadīr (celebrates Muhammad's designation of 'Ali as his successor at Ghadīr Khumm,

* These more important commemorations are public holidays in Iran.
† These dates are variable from one Shi'i community to another; the dates given in this table are the ones generally used in Iran.

Source: *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrine of Twelver Shi'ism*