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TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

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1. CONCUR IN DISSEMINATION OF REF REPORT. SUGGEST

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TO PARA TWO REF.

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2. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE INSURGENTS INTENDED TO EMBARK ON THEIR JANUARY MILITARY CAMPAIGN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OCHOA PROBLEM AS OCHOA'S REACTION TO GENERAL GARCIA'S ORDER OCCURRED ON 6 JANUARY AND CAME AS A SURPRISE TO MOST SALVADORANS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN JANUARY THE INSURGENTS INITIATED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MORAZAN, CHALATENANGO AND SAN SALVADOR DEPARTMENTS, WHICH ARE STILL IN PROGRESS.

3. NO FILE.

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