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Urban Revitalization Tools:
Assessing the Impacts of Sports Stadia at the Microarea Level

Timothy Stewart Chapin

A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

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
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Abstract

Urban Revitalization Tools:
Assessing the Impacts of Sports Stadia at the Microarea Level
Timothy Stewart Chapin

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Central cities throughout the United States have seized upon sports facilities as a means to revitalize specific districts within their downtowns. Not to be outdone, suburban cities have also invested millions in sports facilities to illustrate their "coming of age" and to focus development into designated districts. During the planning and development stages of these projects, stadium proponents noisily argue that these projects generate employment opportunities, attract private investment, and provide significant image benefits to the cities that invest in them. Governments justify their expenditures upon these claims of economic development at both the metropolitan and local levels. Despite these claims, mounting evidence suggests that sports stadia have only marginal positive impacts upon the metropolitan economy. However, most of these studies of sports facilities have focused upon the economic impacts at the metropolitan level. Those very few studies that have attempted to assess the local district, or "microarea", impacts of sports facilities have so far generated mixed results. This dissertation addresses the "microarea gap" in the literature by refocusing the analysis to the microarea level. Using a comparative case study approach, this paper identifies, quantifies, and assesses the microarea impacts of recently opened sports stadia in three cities: Baltimore, Cleveland, and Arlington (TX). The study centers on parcel-level land use data collected for the district surrounding these stadium projects. Demographic data and interviews with local stakeholders augment the study to provide a more complete assessment of impacts at this level. This study has far-reaching implications for future large scale tourism and recreation-oriented development projects. Research results provide cities with a better understanding of the microarea benefits and costs associated with sports stadia projects.

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"A stadium is a project to stoke the most insanely inflated of egos. It is the biggest thing America is still building. Future generations will gauge the culture by our ballparks... which is something of a disconcerting thought."

--Peter Richmond, Camden Yards biographer

Moments later [Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell] spoke with Marcia Hale, in charge of intergovernmental affairs for the White House, and he said something to her that he never would have said in public because it would have undercut all the bread and circuses, all the confetti throwings and summer pool submergings and roof nailings and mascot fightings and menorah lightings and Mickey Mouse appearances that were, more than anything else, sustaining the city. There were times, many times, when the mayor postured to make a point, exaggerated because he thought exaggeration was the only way to make people understand, but this wasn't one of those times. Alone in his office he spoke from the place where he always spoke best and most clearly, from an unclouded heart.

"Putting aside my mayor's hat for a second, we're dying," he said over the phone. "We're dying," he repeated with a little more emphasis this time. "Forget all the good things I've done; Philadelphia is dying. It's happened a lot more slowly since I took office, but we're dying."

--Buzz Bissinger in A Prayer for the City

Chapter 1

An Introduction to the Stadium Game

"The proverbial field of dreams is emerging as a new vehicle for urban revitalization and civic identity..."

—Architecture critic Barbara Koerble[1]

For the past several decades urban America has been under attack. Initially this was an insidious attack, one unforeseen and largely unrecognized once underway. The changing economics of the country made the employment base of these cities obsolete and endangered. Increasing accessibility to outlying areas altered mobility and settlement patterns, allowing upper income and middle income families to escape to the suburbs. Changes in production patterns and the shift to an information economy fueled the growth of placeless business models, ones no longer relying upon central places, also known as center cities and downtowns. As families and jobs left the central city, the cycle of decline quickened and inner cities found themselves in even worse trouble. Crime increased, poverty increased, teenage pregnancy increased, children born out-of-wedlock increased, the list of urban ills goes on and on. As population has shifted to the suburbs, so has political power. Now cities fight battles on a political landscape that ridicules the welfare state and proclaims that cities must learn to help themselves. No longer are federal handouts central to urban recovery.

So, what have America's major cities done to help themselves? What tools are being used to galvanize economic revitalization? What strategies have mayors across the country grasped onto to foster urban recovery? Why, they have given the people bread and circuses; stadiums, arenas, museums, and so on.

In response to their debilitating problems American cities have subscribed to a "bricks and mortar" strategy of urban revitalization, one that equates economic

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[1] Koerble, Barbara (1994). "Double play." *Progressive Architecture*, July: pp. 21, 25.

development with new construction and generated activity in different districts of the city. This strategy is evident from the litany of projects most American cities have constructed in the past thirty years; office/hotel complexes, aquariums, festival marketplaces, downtown shopping malls, convention centers, and sports facilities, all staples in the "recovery toolkit" of urban areas. In the 1960s and 1970s the trend was to build huge office/hotel complexes to anchor new development. Downtown convention centers became popular redevelopment tools during this same time. In the later 1970s and 1980s, festival marketplaces like Faneuil Hall Marketplace in Boston and Harborplace in Baltimore became the project of choice in many cities.

In the past fifteen years, however, the single most popular downtown redevelopment project to emerge in urban America has been the sports stadium. To be sure, central cities throughout the United States had previously seized upon sports facilities as a means to revitalize specific districts within their downtowns. In the 1960s, many cities invested in huge, multi-purpose stadia to attract investment to specific districts in their central cities (St. Louis and Pittsburgh for example). In the 1970s and early 1980s, domed stadia became the preferred ticket to sports facility fame and downtown revitalization (Seattle's Kingdome and Minneapolis' Metrodome). Since 1985, though, sports stadia have moved past festival marketplaces and convention centers to become the major focus of downtown development strategies in hundreds of American cities, large and small. The majority of these are in downtown areas, many in formerly blighted districts or old industrial areas that are in need of an economic boost of some kind. In major-league and minor-league cities these projects have been hailed by downtown proponents as the centerpiece of central city renewal, with the ability to bring suburbanites and tourists into the city and to spur investment in areas desperate for new money.

Not to be outdone, suburban cities have also invested millions in sports facilities to illustrate their "coming of age" and to focus development into designated recreation districts within their bounds. Leading the way in the 1970s, facilities in suburban New

York, Buffalo, and Detroit illustrated to growing suburban areas that they could host major league sports and gain national recognition and prestige as "major league places". Even in the 1990s the occasional team will relocate from the central city to a new suburban facility, as the NFL's Redskins moved out of Washington, D.C. to a suburban Maryland site in 1997. While the trend in recent years has been for teams to return back downtown, suburban areas are still very active players in the sports facility game. Suburban leaders invest in these projects in part because of the perceived image benefits of becoming a "major league city", but also because they believe that sports facilities can anchor an emerging recreation district in the same ways outlined for downtown districts.

How can cities with such massive problems justify their investments in these sports palaces? Strangely enough, public officials have traditionally rooted their defense in these very problems. Public investments into sports stadia have long been justified on economic development grounds. For years it was argued that the revenues from a new facility and the spin-off benefits generated by the facility were sufficient to pay for the public costs. Officials would state that, in the long run, the local government would turn a profit on the stadium and more money would therefore be available to address pressing urban problems. Over time this justification has had to react to evidence questioning this line of reasoning. Consequently this economic development justification has evolved into a related, but still different claim that development benefits necessarily follow a new stadium or arena. The most recent excuse for public spending on these projects is that they help further downtown redevelopment goals and spur central city revitalization.

Concurrent with this desire to revitalize central cities has been the tremendous growth of the professional sports industry. Within the past twenty years, the four major professional sports have grown into a multi-billion dollar industry. Expanding leagues and franchise relocations have become a part of the sports landscape. With the coming of player free agency in the 1970s the stage was set for skyrocketing player salaries. For example, the average major league baseball salary has grown from $45,000 in 1975, to

over $400,000 in 1985, all the way to an astounding $1.4 million in 1998. The rise in player costs has driven the sports industry to search for new revenue sources. For years television revenues provided this source, but in recent years teams have targeted new sports facilities as the means to pay players and generate profits. As a result, within the last fifteen years almost every team without a new facility has clamored for a publicly financed stadium, even threatening to leave town if they didn't see their demands met.

The result of the confluence of money-driven professional sports with cities desperate for revitalization and suburban areas hungry for major league status has been astounding. North America is in the midst of a stadium-building craze never before seen on this planet. Between 1985 and 2000 over seventy new sports facilities will have been built in North American cities to host major professional sports teams.[2] Within this fifteen year period the vast majority of major professional sports teams have received or will soon receive a new sports facility, with the majority of funding coming from public coffers. In addition, the trend in recent years has been for these facilities to be located downtown, as downtowns seem to be "hot markets" again. Estimates for the costs of this most recent building boom have been placed at between $9 billion and $14 billion. These estimates do not include the costs of requisite infrastructure investments which would likely add at least another $2 billion to the total.

To listen to the rhetoric spouted by politicians in support of each new stadium project, convention center, aquarium, and waterfront development, it is clear that America's cities have hung their hats on the hope that these projects can become the economic development engines that can sustain the urban economy over the long run. For example, at the opening of Philadelphia's new Convention Center in 1993 Vice President Al Gore proclaimed "It's more than just a convention center, it's a building block for the

---

[2] The Major League Sports are represented by the "big four": Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL). This study does not include facilities for minor league teams, college and university teams, nor for other sports like soccer and tennis.

revitalization of Philadelphia."[3] Similar comments from public officials in the three case cities are littered throughout this dissertation; statements that tout the benefits of new sports facilities that are draining precious dollars from public coffers. The Governor of Ohio and the Mayor of Cleveland promised that a downtown stadium/arena project offered the Cleveland region "more than a stadium", with original estimates placing the employment impact at 28,000 jobs. You will read about a long-time Baltimore Mayor and later Maryland Governor Schaefer whose reversal on that city's sports stadium debate led to a $500 million giveaway to two separate franchises. Not to be outdone, the mayor of our suburban case, Arlington, compares his city's new baseball stadium to the Colosseum in Rome, envisioning a day when this small Texas town is on the international map in part because of a new ballpark.

Sports Stadia and the Economic Development Rationale

Since professional sports stadia began to be subsidized back in the 1950s, public officials and the civic elite have justified public expenditures on these projects on the grounds that they make economic sense for a city. To the great misfortune of the politicians, teams, and downtown boosters that support these projects, there is a growing collection of research into the economic benefits of sports facilities. This research has begun to question the economic development claims surrounding these projects.

A growing mountain of research findings has concluded that metropolitan economic development and professional sports are not a particularly powerful mix. Originally these projects were touted because they attracted jobs, generated new businesses, and served as a solid anchor for the reorientation of the metropolitan economic base towards the post-modern services-based economy. However, analysis has shown that none of these claims hold. To wit:

- The number of jobs created by these facilities is insubstantial, especially given the massive public investments into these projects. As a job-creation strategy, the local

[3] Quoted in Buzz Bissinger's *A Prayer for the City* (1997). Vintage Books: New York, p. 219.

government would be much better off simply handing the money out to unemployed workers.

- In terms of new business creation, while regular crowds of 30,000 seem like a powerful economic force, the majority of their spending occurs inside the stadium or arena. In addition, these crowds do not occur every day, but only on a set number of event days a year. Some new businesses will be supported, but certainly not in large numbers.
- While sports facilities can help push the economy towards the service and tourism industries, these sectors provide jobs that pay less, have fewer benefits, and have a higher percentage of part-time jobs than the industrial sector. Cities that have transitioned into this new economy have not been able to address many of their most pressing problems even given a successful transition to the post-modern economy.
- Finally, there is the question of whether or not any of the positive benefits generated by a sports stadium represents economic "development". A number of analysts have questioned whether or not spending in a stadium represents "new money", or an economic impact on the city that would otherwise have not occurred. Evidence shows that most of this spending actually would have occurred elsewhere, in places like theaters, bars, and symphony hall. So instead of economic development, these projects actually generate an economic redistribution as spending shifts from one recreation option to another.

Due to this growing evidence stadium boosters have grasped onto a new justification for public investments into these projects. An argument for most stadium-projects in the 1990s is that sports facilities can help cities address physical development goals for portions of the city. As the Koerble quote that opens this chapter states, sports stadia are now considered "urban revitalization tools", or projects that can be targeted to address specific renewal needs and goals. Rather than serving a broad economic development purpose, there is now a pervasive view in America's cities that sports stadia

can serve as the primary anchor in the redevelopment of downtown or the centerpiece in the development of a suburban district. Cities across America have climbed aboard the stadium bandwagon, quick to believe that the positive experiences of Baltimore (with Camden Yards), Cleveland (with Gateway), and Arlington (with their Ballpark) is something they too can capture in their city.

To help these projects achieve this newly identified revitalization goal, the sports facility has undergone a substantial number of changes during the most recent building boom. In previous decades a stadium was simply a large structure with thousands of seats surrounding a playing field, including necessary concession and restroom spaces. Occasionally a roof (dome) was added to the mix, driving up the costs, but also guaranteeing that a game would never be rained or snowed out. Sometimes even team offices would be included in the facility, providing cheap space and another perk for the local sports teams. These facilities were usually surrounded by huge surface parking lots and sizable arterials to speed traffic to and from the stadium. Even urban stadia like Seattle's Kingdome and Atlanta's Fulton County Stadium were sited in a sea of parking, which minimized impacts on nearby areas but also guaranteed an environment unfavorable to new development. In addition to their single use orientation and sea of parking, the sports facilities of the 1960s and 1970s have been criticized for their dreadful design and lack of neighborhood context. Gershman writes that the domes and concrete doughnuts of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were constructed "to shut out the unpleasant realities of the [times]; the slow, painful death of the inner cities; the wildfire spread of drugs; the loss of America's industrial superiority..."[4]

Within the past fifteen years, almost every facet of sports facility design and context has changed. Now almost every new sports facility includes team offices, restaurants, and retail space. The restaurants and retail space are open on non-event days

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[4] Gershman, Michael (1993). *Diamonds: The Evolution of the Ballpark.* Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, p. 214.

in an effort to generate activity every day of the year. One of the retail spaces is invariably a large team shop that carries the full line of apparel and souvenirs for the home town franchise, with sales proceeds going directly into the coffers of the team. In addition, extra office space is often constructed and leased out to companies interested in having offices within a sports facility. For example, Baltimore's Camden Yards project renovated the Warehouse, a huge, old warehousing structure, for over 300,000 square feet of leaseable office space, several restaurants, and a team shop for baseball's Orioles. From the teams' perspective all of these extra retail, office, and restaurant spaces are very popular as the lease payments are often part of the facility revenues the teams collect. On the local development front, all of these additional uses help the facility to address one of the traditional shortcomings of these projects, the limited number of sports event days during a calendar year.

In addition to broadening the uses contained in sports facilities, there has also been a revolution in the design of modern sports stadia. No longer are placeless and unattractive domes or arenas on the sports development agenda. Instead, teams want unique stadia and arenas that reflect the local character and are a part of the environment, rather than an imposition on it. Instead of constructing a huge facility that destroys the local street grid and overpowers the surrounding neighborhood, the trend in sports facilities is to create a low rise stadium, within the existing street grid, that complements and reflects its environment. Building materials, color schemes, and architectural elements are chosen to fit with nearby buildings. The history of the surrounding neighborhood is now embraced, rather than discarded as unpalatable.

The two most highly acclaimed examples of this trend are Baltimore's Oriole Park at Camden Yards and Cleveland's Jacobs Field, both of which have won numerous urban design and architectural awards for excellence. Camden Yards has been hailed as

"arguably the most significant urban design intervention in America in the past ten years."[5] Its asymmetrical design, old-fashioned touches, and use of a steel superstructure all recall the classic ballparks of the first half of the century. The masterstroke was the inclusion of old historical structures as part of the project, linking Baltimore's railyards past and its tourism future. Jacobs Field has been touted for both "its humanistic reinvigoration of modern ballpark design and [for] the concurrent urban redevelopment efforts" of the city.[6] As part of Gateway, Jacobs Field is an excellent fit with the surrounding mid-rise office and warehouse buildings. The pedestrian-centered project invites the city into the stadium, along with over 40,000 screaming Indians fans on event days.

While the urban design and architectural elements are part of the success of these projects, most important for the research at hand is the expectation that these projects would serve explicitly as urban revitalization tools for their cities. The multi-use design and the welcoming of the city represent a decidedly different strategy than the defensive bunkers that were built during previous decades. Most of the newest set of sports facilities requires interaction with the surrounding environment, which, planners and designers hoped, would lead to the reclamation of a large portion of the city. It was hoped that milling crowds, tourists and visitors spending money, and the retail and restaurant spaces would generate sufficient activity to enliven a number of downtown blocks, making these areas more attractive to investment. Even in suburban areas this same logic was applied. Arlington hoped that their new Ballpark would help to establish their still emerging entertainment district as an attractive, walkable space throughout the year.

So, while research has concluded that sports stadia are poor investments as job creation programs and metropolitan development tools, and, further, that sports do not serve as a viable economic base for a city, the sports industry and project boosters have come to rest their justification of public investment in these projects on the idea of sports

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[5] Prowler, Donald (1992) "Baltimore Hits Home with New Baseball Park." *Progressive Architecture*, p. 26.

stadia as micro-level development catalysts. Rather than serving very broad economic development goals that are unlikely to follow from an expensive, but regionally insignificant project, these facilities have been reoriented to address more specific micro-level goals. What does existing research have to say on the likely success of sports stadia in generating district-level renewal? Very little actually. Almost all studies of the impacts of sports teams and sports stadia have occurred at the city or metropolitan level. In addition, these studies have focused upon tracing revenue flows, tax impacts, and job creation, not on physical development and district character. Finally, the existing research has also focused primarily on older sports facilities and not this newest wave of stadia and arenas.

What little evidence there is on the urban revitalization abilities of sports stadia is primarily anecdotal. Johnson studied several minor league baseball cities and concluded that successful communities have applied a "development logic" when siting their facilities.[7] In some cases the use of a sports stadium to further this development logic was successful and in others it was not. There is no indication as to what factors played into the successful and unsuccessful cases. In his work, Rosentraub has indirectly discussed this question, with some attention paid to the micro-level impacts of Gateway in Cleveland[8] and the sports facilities of Indianapolis[9]. Probably the most directed discussion of the micro-level development possibilities comes from Baade and Dye.[10] Their 1988 article outlines the likely impacts of sports stadia on area development, providing a number of "rules of thumb" for sports projects. However, their conclusions are rooted primarily in their experience with stadium projects and not any in-depth research results.

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[6] Koerble (1994), p. 21.

[7] Johnson, Arthur T. (1991). "Local government, minor league baseball, and economic development strategies." *Economic Development Quarterly*, 5(4) November: pp. 313-324.

[8] Austrian, Ziona and Mark Rosentraub. (1997). "Cleveland's Gateway to the Future" in Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist's (Eds.) *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums*. Brookings Institute: Washington, D.C.

[9] Rosentraub, Mark (1997a) *Major League Losers: The Real Costs of Sports and Who's Paying for It*. Basic Books. See Chapter 6.

While ample research has addressed the other economic development rationales for public investment into sports stadia, the urban revitalization rationale remains largely untested.

Outlining the Dissertation

The central point of this project is to begin the process of assessing the impacts of sports facilities on their surrounding areas. Using a comparative case study approach, this project identifies and assesses the district level, or microarea, impacts of recently opened sports stadia in three cities: Baltimore, Cleveland, and Arlington (TX). The study centers on the ability of these facilities to address three central objectives of special activity generators outlined in a paper on downtown revitalization strategies[11]: 1) the generation of spillover spending benefits for the surrounding district 2) the generation of new construction in the surrounding district and 3) district-level revitalization. These objectives are central to the pro-stadium argument that these facilities can be catalysts of urban redevelopment.

The dissertation begins with a discussion of the extent of this most recent stadium building boom. Chapter 2 outlines the history of public investment into sports facilities, tracing the increase in public expenditures over time. A glance into the crystal ball showcases that this building boom is far from over, with a number of new projects planned for other major league cities across the continent. Chapter 3 attempts to come to grips with why this most recent building boom has occurred. Rather than simply pointing the finger at the greedy sports leagues or targeting rising player salaries as the principal reason for the boom, I attempt to illuminate the public sector's role in this boom. While many cities have been held hostage by footloose sports franchises, many others have willingly spent hundreds of millions on sports facilities to address development goals or in vain attempts to arrest central city decline. Most analysts have portrayed public officials as the

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[10] Baade, Robert and Richard Dye (1988). "Sports stadiums and area development: A critical review." *Economic Development Quarterly*, August: pp. 265-275.

[11] Robertson, Kent (1995). "Downtown redevelopment strategies in the United States: An end-of-the-century assessment." *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Autumn: pp. 429-437.

victims of the sports leagues while, in reality, these officials have been quick to support sports projects because they are perceived as good for image-building and for showing signs of downtown renaissance.

The following chapter summarizes the existing sports facility literature in much more detail than provided above. In the past fifteen years, a number of scholars have established their reputations with a long list of studies that have attempted to come to grips with North America's fascination with sports teams and sports stadia. The four economic development rationales for these projects are laid out in more detail and the key findings from this research are distilled. Chapter 5 outlines the data and methodology brought to bear on this project. A discussion of the case study choices, including a justification of these choices, is included. Essential to this study and a centerpiece of this chapter is the introduction of the concept of the "microarea". Unlike previous studies that utilize widely understood and well-defined boundaries like counties, cities, and metropolitan statistical areas, the focus of analysis to a smaller geographic level requires a special unit of analysis. Essentially the microarea is that area most impacted by the sports facility. The microareas for the three case studies were arrived at through a detailed process including site visits, interviews with local experts, and analysis of maps, aerial photographs, and transportation networks.

Chapters 6 through 11 represent the heart of the research project. Each case study is discussed in two chapters. For each, the first chapter provides a brief discussion of the conditions of the cities in demographic and political terms. This chapter also provides an analysis of why each stadium project was originally proposed and eventually developed in these cities. A final section outlines the impacts of the new facilities on the teams that call them home. The second chapter for each of the case studies outlines the microarea impacts of these facilities. Discussions of zoning, land use, district character, parking, and new development within the microarea are included. Intertwined with this analysis are political factors and planning efforts for these areas.

The final chapter represents an attempt to bring together the lessons learned and the pitfalls to be avoided when investing in these projects. Rather than adding my voice to the long list of researchers that insist that these projects represent economic folly and corporate welfare (which oftentimes they do), I have purposefully organized and written this chapter with an eye towards helping the public sector to maximize the micro-level benefits of these projects. It is very likely that sports stadia and arenas will continue to be a staple of downtown redevelopment efforts. While citizens, lobbyists, and researchers should continue to fight public spending on these projects, sports are too important to us as a culture and public officials are too closely tied to the constituencies that want to see these projects proceed for the stadium building boom to come to an abrupt end. Therefore, rather than concluding that these project must not be built, this chapter points the way for the public sector to maximize the localized benefits. Lessons for planners, project architects, and public officials are laid out, the most important of which are that an overriding project vision and district-level planning are the hallmarks of successful projects. Sports stadia cannot cure what ills urban America, but they can be an opportunity to get portions of cities on their feet again.

Chapter 2

The Sports Facility Development Game: Extent and Prospects

"...before the decade is out at least 45 stadiums and arenas will have been built at a cost of over $9 billion. That's more than the IRS' $7.46 billion budget last year."

-USA Today, Special Report: The Stadium Binge[1]

"During the 20th century, more than $20 billion has been spent on major league ballparks, stadiums, and arenas. This includes a minimum of $14.7 billion in government subsidies that has gone to the four major league sports."

-Raymond Keating in his report on "Sports Pork"[2]

Since the inception of professional team sports, franchises have been very interested in playing in a profitable facility with substantial revenue generating opportunities. Sports stadia have long been an important component of the revenues generated by a team. Features like the number of seats in the facility, the number of concession and souvenir stands, and nearby land uses like parking, restaurants, and hotels brought in revenue to sustain the operating expenses of the team as well as provide a tidy profit to team owners. Further, the location of these facilities on important transportation lines, particularly subways and/or highways, was necessary to insure a steady stream of fans to games and any other events at these facilities.

In the first half of this century almost all sports facilities were privately built and privately owned. However, some form of public support was often a part of the deal surrounding these facilities. Public investments in the form of infrastructure, land assembly, and land acquisition were a means of insuring that team owners remained pleased with their situation and that professional sports remained a part of the diversity that is city life. These investments usually were indirect and did not involve public dollars

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[1] USA Today (1996a). "Special report: The stadium binge." September 9.

[2] Keating, Raymond (1999) *Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship Between Major League Sports and Government*. The Cato Institute, Policy Analysis Number 339.

being spent specifically on the structures themselves. To be sure, some cities did construct new sports facilities themselves, but these stadia were often tied to other events like World's Fairs or the Olympics. For example, Cleveland's Municipal Stadium, recently demolished and long known as the "Mistake by the Lake", was completed in 1938 in an unsuccessful effort to lure the Olympics to that city. Both Chicago and Los Angeles also built new stadia at public expense in an effort to attract the Olympics. In this early period of the sports facility development game, team owners usually built and operated facilities at their own expense but always with an eye towards securing public funding and other help for these projects.

Since 1950, the sports development game has changed dramatically. Whereas the pre-1950 landscape saw privately financed stadia with some small level of indirect public support, the post 1950s have seen public dollars poured directly into these projects at a rate that has even surprised team owners and the leagues. As will be discussed in more detail shortly, local and state governments have been investing hundreds of millions of public dollars into sports stadia and sports arenas for the past forty years. Despite harsh criticism from sports facility analysts, protests from neighborhoods in most affected cities, and inquiries by Congress, the sports facility development game has ballooned into a multi-billion dollar business. From the early days of baseball when Fenway Park in Boston was built with private money for less than a million dollars, to the current times in which two new stadiums in Seattle will cost almost $1 billion combined, most of which is public money, the sports facility development game has seen radical changes in costs, financing mechanisms, and sources of capital.

What accounts for these significant changes, particularly those that affect the public pocketbook? Why have governments become so willing to invest hundreds of millions into these projects? Before addressing these questions, it is also important to outline the extent and future prospects of the sports facility development game. For example, how much money has actually been spent on or allocated towards the

construction of sports facilities in the 1990s? What percentage of these costs were borne by the public sector? What of the future? Is there an end to the sports facility development game in sight? This and the following chapter will attempt to address these important questions. In this chapter an assessment of the current state of the sports facility development game is presented. A review of the estimated costs of sports facilities in the 1990s reveals some startling and rather staggering results. As will be seen, two significant "building booms" have forever altered the landscape surrounding sports facilities. The chapter also provides a look into the near future to identify the prospects of the "game". The available evidence suggests that the sports facility game of the 1990s will continue well into next century as well, with many large projects planned, most backed by public dollars.

However, before entering into a discussion of the extent and prospects of the sports facility development game, a brief history of this game is provided to present and summarize the three key factors behind the radical shift from the privately financed stadia of the pre-1950s to the publicly financed complexes of the 1990s. These factors will be explored in significantly more depth in the following chapter. For now, it is important to recognize that both "push" and "pull" factors are at the heart of this phenomenon.

A Brief Review of the Sports Facility Development Game Since 1950

As noted above, prior to 1950 most stadia were financed and built by private interests, usually the team owner, often with some level of indirect public assistance. The sports facility development game began to change in the 1950s and 1960s. Emerging metropolitan areas, particularly those in the South and West, began to utilize professional sports as a means to establish their "major league image". Older industrial cities of the Midwest and Northeast wanted to retain their teams at a time when jobs and population were fleeing the city for the suburbs and other metropolitan areas. This competition between metropolises provided existing teams with a steady stream of suitor cities for their franchises. Teams continued to demand increasing incentives from cities when

negotiating for a new or remodeled facility with the underlying threat of relocation always present in the discussion. The Oakland/Los Angeles/Oakland Raiders have proven to be masters of this strategy as they have played Oakland, Los Angeles, and Los Angeles' surrounding suburbs against each other when negotiating stadium deals in the 1980s and 1990s.[3] Prior to acquiring a MLB team, the city of Tampa courted several teams, including Seattle's Mariners and Chicago's White Sox, who utilized the threat of relocation to demand (and eventually acquire) new stadia financed almost exclusively by public sources.[4]

Concurrent with the increase in the number of cities that demanded major league sports was the migration of people and jobs out of most inner cities. This flight of employment and population from the urban core led, in part, to a rise in crime, increasingly minority and poverty stricken populations concentrated in the inner city, and falling tax revenues for city governments. The deterioration of the downtown core in most Midwestern and Northeastern cities, coupled with a perceived lack of diversity and vitality in Western and Southern cities, led most cities to aggressively pursue downtown revitalization strategies during this period. At the behest of city officials, the federal government developed a wide array of downtown revitalization programs between 1950 and 1980 including "paint-up, fix-up" campaigns, urban renewal, urban development action grants, and President Johnson's well-intentioned, but ill-fated War on Poverty. Most of these programs can best be summarized as "bricks and mortar" strategies that linked revitalization to physical changes to the city.

Perhaps the single most popular downtown revitalization strategy has been the large scale development project, which has traditionally included huge developments like office/hotel towers, shopping centers, and what Robertson has termed "special activity

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[3] Euchner, Charles (1993) *Playing the Field: Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them*. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Maryland. Chapter 4.

[4] Euchner (1993), Chapter 6; Andelman, Bob (1992). *Stadium for Rent: Tampa Bay's Quest for Major League Baseball*. McFarland and Company: New York.

generators" or SAGs.[5] SAGs are large developments that attract suburbanites and conventioneers to the downtown for special events or special attractions. Included in the wide variety of SAGs are convention centers, aquariums, specialty museums, and sports stadia. It was (and is still) argued that SAGs and other large downtown projects bring suburban dollars back to the inner city for these special events, thereby strengthening the urban economy. Further, SAGs also help to make the inner city more attractive as a place to live and a place to do business. Proponents also note that SAGs help to keep downtown property values at a high level because the inner city is perceived as a more safe and attractive place for investment and business. Since the mid 1960s the sports stadium or arena has shown to be a very popular and widely applied SAG in many North American cities.

No less than twenty cities have utilized sports facilities as downtown revitalization tools in the past thirty years. St. Louis represents an excellent example of this strategy. That city has built downtown sports stadia for baseball and football in the 1960s and the 1990s, respectively, and an arena for hockey in the 1990s, with the explicit goal of retaining and enhancing the vitality of downtown.[6] Rosentraub *et al* discuss Indianapolis' focus upon a sports development strategy that attempted to bring jobs to that city and establish the identity of a city better known as "Indiana-No-Place".[7] Chapin has discussed how Seattle's downtown powers manipulated the stadium provision process on two occasions to build new stadia at public expense in the expressed effort to strengthen that city's downtown core.[8]

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[5] Robertson, (1995), pp. 429-437.

[6] Phares, Donald and Mark Rosentraub (1997). "Reviving the Glory of Days Past: St. Louis's Blitz to Save Its Image, Identity, and Teams" in Mark Rosentraub's *Major League Losers*. BasicBooks: New York.

[7] Rosentraub, Mark et al. (1994). "Sport and downtown development: If you build it, will jobs come?" *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 16(3): pp. 221-239.

[8] Chapin, Timothy S. (1996b). "Deja view: Seattle undertakes the stadium provision process again." A paper presented at the *International Symposium on Sport in the City*. Memphis, Tennessee, November.

Parallel to the ascension of suburbia and the decline of inner cities, the past thirty years have also witnessed the remaking of the economics of professional sports. Whereas sports have long been economically viable, the internationalization of the economy, the rise in player salaries, and the revenues generated from broadcasting (particularly television) contracts, merchandise sales, and advertising have all turned professional team sports into a multi-billion dollar business. Economist Andrew Zimbalist notes that Major League Baseball's revenues were over $1.4 billion in 1990.[9] Financial World magazine calculated the professional sports industry's total revenues at almost *$7 billion* in 1996 alone. Franchise values for all professional sports teams were estimated, on average, at $146 million in 1996, which represented an increase of 18% from the previous year.[10] The days when professional teams were bought and sold by local business-people for the good of the community are no more. Clearly, the sports business has become *really* Big Business.

An increasingly important component of team revenues are those generated by sports facilities. Unlike broadcast and merchandising revenues, stadium and arena revenues are not shared by teams.[11] All revenues from a team's facility are kept by the team itself. For example, the NFL's Dallas Cowboys had venue revenues of over $40 million in 1996. At the other end of the spectrum, the Washington Redskins and Cincinnati Bengals each earned less than $1.5 million from venue revenues in the same year.[12] Therefore, the owner of the Cowboys has over $38 million more in income than the Redskins and Bengals owners which he can choose to spend on players for the team, upgrades to the franchise in other areas, or pocket as profits from his investment. These figures illustrate the huge divergence in revenues that can be generated by sports facilities.

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[9] Zimbalist, Andrew (1992). *Baseball and Billions*. BasicBooks: New York, p. xvii.

[10] Badenhausen, Kurt and Christopher Nikolov (1997). "More than a game: An in-depth look at the raging bull market in sports franchises." *Financial World*, June 9.

[11] Zimbalist (1992); Quirk, James and Rodney Fort (1992). *Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.

[12] As an interesting side note, the Redskins moved into a new stadium in 1997 and the Bengals have secured financing for a new downtown stadium set to open in 2000.

In short, then, every team owner wants to maximize revenues from their sports facility, mainly by having lucrative luxury boxes or keeping all parking and concession revenues, and to minimize facility costs, mainly by transferring responsibility for debt payments and operations and maintenance costs to the other sources, like the public sector. The changes in the sports facility development game is, in part, due to these changes in the economics of professional team sports.

The Sports Facility Building Booms

The three factors outlined above, 1) a larger and more aggressive pool of cities competing for sports teams, 2) the deterioration of inner cities and the physical development response by government agencies, and 3) the changing economics of professional team sports, have led to two prolonged booms in the construction of sports facilities. Figure 2.1 illustrates these building booms. The figure shows the period of opening and the type of facility for all current sports facilities in use in the NFL, MLB, NBA and NHL.[13,14] (Refer to the Appendix for a list of the current stadia and arenas currently in use in these four leagues.)

[See Figure 2.1 on page 40]

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[13] Note that these totals place renovated facilities in their "grand reopening" time period. For example, Seattle's Key Arena underwent $125 million in renovations and reopened in 1995. Therefore the NBA's SuperSonics play in an arena that is considered to have opened in the 1990s. Similar situations exist for stadia or arenas in New York, the Madison Square Garden underwent $200 million in renovations and reopened in 1991; Oakland, the Coliseum and Arena are currently undergoing $225 million in renovations and reopening in 1997; Edmonton, the Coliseum has had renovations totaling $40 million in 1987; and Jacksonville which spent $135 million to upgrade their stadium for their NFL expansion franchise to begin play in 1995. Each of these facilities is considered to have opened in the 1990s, except Edmonton which opened in the 1980s.

[14] A renovation was considered to constitute a "grand reopening" if the costs were similar to what a new facility would cost during that time period. For example, Buffalo spent $23 million on upgrades to Rich Stadium in 1994. Dallas spent $5 million for upgrades to their arena in 1987. However, a new major league stadium could not be built for only $23 million dollars in 1994, nor could a new arena be built for $5 million in 1987. In the 1980s, as noted, Edmonton spent over $40 million for upgrades to their arena, which would have been enough to finance a new facility during that time period. Therefore, Edmonton is considered to have a "new" arena as of 1987.

To summarize Figure 2.1, the most recent boom of the 1990s has so far witnessed fourteen new stadia and twenty-two new arenas built to house professional sports franchises. The earlier boom period, between 1960 and 1976, saw upwards of forty new facilities built to house many of the same teams that received new stadia and arenas just twenty short years later. A few other comments about Figure 2.1 are in order. First, these totals omit "duplicates" in the data. For example, the NFL's Giants and Jets play in the same stadium, but that stadium is only included once in this figure. Second, a word of caution is necessary: the totals for earlier decades can be a bit deceiving. There were many more facilities built in the 1960s and 1970s than are represented in Figure 2.1. Many of the facilities built during the earlier building boom have been replaced by newer, more economically viable facilities. For example, Baltimore, Cleveland, Atlanta, and Texas each have new baseball-only ballparks that replaced stadiums from earlier time periods. Similarly, Washington, Portland, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, and numerous other cities have new arenas that replaced facilities of the older building boom as well.

Figure 2.1 shows the two boom periods for facility construction in North America. The 1970s and 1990s have proven to be very active periods of sports facility construction. In the 1970s a total of twenty facilities were built that are still utilized by major league sports teams. Upwards of ten other facilities were built during this period that are not shown in this figure because they were replaced by more recently constructed facilities. This earlier building boom was in part due to the expansion of the sports leagues, competition between cities and suburbs for teams, and growing demands by franchises for new facilities.

League expansion, in particular, was a primary cause of the building boom of the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1960 and 1980 MLB went from sixteen to twenty-six franchises, while the NFL went from twenty-one to twenty-eight teams. Even more explosive was the growth of the NBA and NHL. The NBA added fourteen teams and the NHL added fifteen teams between 1960 and 1980. So between 1960 and 1980 major

league sports added a total of forty-six new teams. Most of the arenas that opened in the 1970s were constructed for new franchises and not to retain existing franchises. For example, Washington, D.C., Indianapolis, Denver, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles were among the cities that built a new arena to host an expansion or relocated NBA or NHL franchise. Many of the stadia built during this period also were built for expansion franchises. Seattle, Tampa, Toronto, and San Diego were among a number of cities to build new stadia for major league sports teams.

As noted above, the 1990s witnessed the construction of thirty-six new sports facilities at the major league level. To be sure, part of the boom of the 1990s is also attributable to the expansion of the various leagues. Since 1980 MLB has added four teams, the NFL has added two teams, the NBA has added seven teams, and the NHL has added five teams (with an additional four teams set to begin play by 2001). Of these, only ten play in facilities that have opened since 1990. In sum, the number of teams added to the major leagues since 1980 totals only fourteen compared to the forty-six between 1960 and 1980. Therefore the more recent sports facility boom appears primarily due to factors other than league expansion.

Of further interest, the most recent sports facility building boom has not been experienced solely at the major league level. The proliferation of minor league sports, particularly minor league baseball and hockey, have led to a similar building boom for tier three and tier four cities across North America. Petersen notes that sixty-eight new facilities were built for minor league baseball between 1985 and 1995.[15] Of these, forty-eight were built in the 1990s. These stadia usually cost less than $20 million, much of which has proven to be from public sources. For example, Erie, Pennsylvania spent $8.7 million on a new minor league stadium that opened in 1995. Durham, North Carolina also invested in a new downtown ballpark to retain their much-beloved Bulls at a cost of $16.1

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[15] Petersen, David (1996) *Sports, Convention, and Entertainment Facilities*. Urban Land Institute: Washington, D.C., p. 16-18.

million. As for sports arenas, minor league cities have also invested heavily in new or upgraded facilities for teams. For example, Spokane, Washington opened their Spokane Arena in 1995 as a home for their minor league team the Chiefs. Other facilities for minor league hockey have been built or are planned in Birmingham (AL) and Louisville (KY).

Other investments into sports facilities include new or remodeled arenas and stadia for college sports teams and new facilities for special events like tennis, auto racing, and even bowling. Penn State and Michigan State each constructed a new area to house basketball and other events for $52 million and $43 million, respectively. As for automobile events, Homestead, Florida and suburban Los Angeles each built new motor sports facilities at substantial direct and indirect public cost. Johnson and Sack's excellent study of New Haven, Connecticut notes that that city spent $21 million on a new downtown tennis facility to host an international tennis tournament.[16] Reno, Nevada even spent $45 million on a National Bowling Stadium.[17] Clearly, then, this boom in sports development has also been felt at the lower levels of professional sports, as well as in other sports rather than those confined to arenas and stadia.

Changes in the Source of Financing of Sports Facilities

As was noted above, the post-1950 period has seen the public sector become the primary source of capital for the huge projects. If most of these sports facilities had been financed exclusively by private sources the debate surrounding these projects would be significantly diminished. However, as Figure 2.2 shows, this has not been the case. The source of financing for all current major league sports facilities by time period is shown in Figure 2.2. All facilities have been classified as predominately publicly or predominately privately financed. In almost every case the source of financing is clearly one or the other.

[See Figure 2.2 on page 41]

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[16] Johnson, Arthur and Allen Sack (1996). "Assessing the value of sports facilities: The importance of noneconomic factors." *Economic Development Quarterly*, 10(4): pp. 369-381.

[17] Korman, Richard (1995). "Full house: Big pro projects top off steady demand for minor league, college jobs." *ENR*, June 10: pp. 22-28.

A quick glance at the figure suggests that the boom of the 1970s was even more problematic for governments than the more recent boom. Almost all facilities that opened during the 1970s were publicly financed. As Figure 2.2 shows, of the twenty arenas still utilized by major league sports built in the 1970s, nineteen were predominately financed by public sources. Of those facilities built in the 1960s that are still in use, eight of eleven were primarily publicly financed. In comparison, the 1990s have seen a substantial increase in the number and percentage of facilities financed by private sources. It would appear that the public has been successful at transferring construction costs to the private sector. Unfortunately, a more in-depth analysis shows that the situation is much more complex than that. As will be seen, the private sector has begun to take on some of these construction costs, but only in cases where the return on their investment appears to be significant. In fact, the level of public investment remains significant, particularly when indirect costs are also considered.

Let's make an important distinction between *indirect public investment* and *direct public investment*. Public resources have always been a part of the sports facility development game. In the early years of baseball cities provided incentives and indirect assistance to teams building new stadia and arenas through land assemblage, infrastructure provision, and the sale or grant of land to the individual or team building a new facility.[18] These are *indirect public investments* because they did not involve the provision of public dollars for construction of the stadium or arena. *Direct public investment*, then, is the provision of public funds for facility construction.

Direct public investment into sports stadia and arenas was not widespread until the 1960s. As of 1960 only a handful of baseball and football teams played in publicly financed stadia, including MLB's Dodgers, Brewers, and Indians and the NFL's Bears and Packers. Most NBA and NHL teams also played in privately financed arenas or in publicly financed facilities originally built for uses other than professional team sports. Contrast this with the

current situation in professional team sports. Of the thirty teams planned for or playing in each league, twenty-four MLB teams and twenty-six NFL teams play in publicly financed stadia. In the NBA and NHL, thirty of fifty-five teams play in publicly financed arenas. Since 1960, the public sector has not only financially entered the sports facility development game, it has come to dominate it. Clearly, since 1950, and especially 1960, professional sports have successfully transferred the construction costs of new facilities to the public sector.

A preliminary look at the last three decades in Figure 2.2 suggests that the public has been successful, at least partially, in transferring the costs of new sports facilities to private interests. Only 5% of in-use facilities built in the 1970s were privately financed. The 1980s show that 29% of in-use facilities built in that decade were financed by private sources. A quick calculation reveals that of those facilities built in the 1990s 43% were privately financed. Clearly, then, there is some evidence to suggest that the private sector is beginning to invest in sports facilities in greater numbers. As many analysts have argued, the costs of these facilities should be borne by teams and leagues because they retain almost all revenues from these facilities.[19] Rosentraub has gone so far as to deem direct public investment into sports facilities "corporate welfare" because public dollars are spent on arenas and stadia used by millionaire players who play for millionaire owners.[20] A cursory analysis suggests that the public has been able to transfer some of the stadium and arena costs incurred by the public in the 1960s and 1970s to the private sector in the 1990s.

However, the conclusion that cities are actually better off now than they were in the 1970s must be tempered by several other facts. Almost all of the private investment into sports facilities in the 1990s has been poured into sports arenas and not sports stadia. Arenas have proven to be substantial money-makers because they can host a greater

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[18] Gershman (1993).
[19] Euchner (1993); Rosentraub (1997a).

number and a wider range of events than sports stadia. Further, NBA and NHL team owners have recognized the economic viability of these facilities and have invested heavily in their construction and operation, particularly in recent years. Owning an arena and franchises in both the NBA and NHL is a means of achieving an economy of scale in professional team sports.[21] Currently, twelve facilities are shared by NBA and NHL teams and one, Toronto's Skydome, is shared by MLB and NBA teams. Of these twelve, seven of the facilities are owned and managed by one or both of the franchises that play in them. Facilities with a significant number of guaranteed events, approximately ninety for hockey and basketball alone, can be substantial money-makers

In contrast to the current arena situation, sports stadia have continued to be financed almost exclusively by public sources. The percentage of existing stadia financed by private sources has changed little between the 1970s and the 1990s; 8% in the '70s (one of thirteen), 25% in the '80s (one of four), and 14% in the '90s (two of fourteen). These projects are invariably more expensive than arenas and their ability to turn a profit has been shown to be limited. A study by Baim of fifteen sports stadia found that sports stadia have trouble covering their operations and maintenance expenses, much less pay for their debt payments.[22] The large size of sports stadia limits the range and number of events they can host and therefore limits their money-making potential. Also, the trend of the 1990s towards single-purpose stadia, particularly baseball-only stadia, has further limited whatever ability these facilities had for hosting events like concerts or trade shows. In short, sports stadia are not the cash cows that arenas can easily become.

This economic reality is best illustrated by the reluctance of the private sector to invest in sports stadia. Unlike arenas, which appear to be economically sound investments (as evidenced by the growing participation of the private sector in their financing), sports

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[20] Rosentraub (1997a), p. 3.
[21] Ozanian, Michael (1995). "Suite deals: Why new stadiums are shaking up the pecking order of sports franchises." *Financial World*, May 9: p. 48, 50.
[22] Baim, Dean (1994) *The Sports Stadium as a Municipal Investment*. Greenwood Publishing Group.

stadia by themselves are usually economic sinkholes that appear to require some level of public investment to get them built. Of course, many analysts have noted that the willingness of the public sector to invest in these facilities also serves to keep the private sector uninvolved. What team owner would want to invest several hundred million dollars into a facility when the same result and similar revenue streams can be achieved through public spending? However, this point must be tempered with the recognition that the private sector appears very willing to invest into sports arenas, but not into stadia. Perhaps, then, some level of direct public investment is required to make these projects economically viable.

Differences Between Public Financing of Arenas and Stadia

The *means* of public financing for arenas versus stadia is also important for this discussion. Generally speaking, public investment into sports arenas has been done using revenue bonds that retire the construction debts by linking public expenditures to revenues generated by or because of the facility; general taxes are rarely used for sports arenas. Because of the economics of arenas, governments are able to pay for the arena construction costs with user fees and special taxation schemes that explicitly link the facility to its costs (which is desirable both politically and economically). For example, public investments into recently completed arenas in both Portland and Seattle are being repaid through ticket surcharges and parking deck revenues. In each case, the city expects to earn back their original investments plus some extra funds for maintenance or special projects in the neighborhood near the arena.[23] Clearly, the movement of the private sector into the arena development game illustrates that these facilities are not only economically viable, but that they are likely to provide a substantial return on one's investment.

Contrast the above with the financing of sports stadia. These facilities are often financed using general taxes, like property and sales tax increases. Another recent

innovation has been the use of "sin taxes" (taxes on liquor or tobacco products) for sports stadia.[24] Other jurisdictions have utilized special lotteries to pay for these large projects. Perhaps the most popular method of financing sports stadia is the ubiquitous hotel-motel and/or car rental tax that, proponents argue, falls upon primarily tourists and visitors to the city and not the local citizenry. However, as each city continues to use these taxes to pay for convention centers, stadia, and other developments, we are all in effect paying for sports facilities in other cities.

Beyond the inefficiency of taxing all persons for a "good" that is used only by specific groups, the use of general taxes leads to another problem. General taxes, for example an increase in the local sales tax, are "regressive" because they cost lower and middle income families a higher proportion of their incomes than higher income families. This is particularly noteworthy because the increasing costs of attending sporting events is pricing out many of the lower and middle income fans that once were the primary spectators of professional team sports.[25] In effect, facilities are built for wealthy owners and well-paid athletes to play in front of suites of equally wealthy corporate executives and season ticket holders. The middle and lower class fans that were the original audience for professional sports are slowly being priced out of attending games.

The most recent innovation in sports stadia financing has been Personal Seat Licenses (PSL). PSL's charge season ticket holders and luxury suite holders a fee for the right to purchase these tickets. This financing scheme is desirable because it raises money for construction costs from the actual "users" of the facility, the fans who attend sporting events at these new stadia and arenas. PSL's originated in Charlotte in the early 1990s and this financing scheme paid for the entire cost of that city's new stadium. No direct public

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[23] Chapin, Timothy S. (1996a). "A new era of sports in the Northwest: Sports facility location as a local economic development strategy in Seattle, Portland, and Vancouver." A paper presented at the *International Symposium on Sport in the City*. Memphis, Tennessee, November.

[24] Rosentraub (1997a), p. 258-259.

investment was required for the construction of Charlotte's Ericsson Stadium which opened in 1996. PSL's have become very popular financing tools and cities throughout North America have turned to PSL's as a means of limiting the public investment into new stadia. However, cities attracting a team from another city or gaining a new franchise have had much more success in raising money through PSL's than cities building a stadium for an existing franchise.

An unexpected drawback to PSL's has been that sports franchises are substituting PSL money for out-of-pocket money for their share of the construction costs of new facilities. In other words, PSL's have become a means for teams to claim private investment into new facilities when their investment is really limited to PSL dollars and not direct investment into new stadia.[26] Therefore, the "golden goose" that is PSL scheme has actually been manipulated by professional sports so that it is not an independent and new financing source for new sports facilities. Instead, this money is now considered to be "private investment", thereby alleviating the teams of any direct investment of team funds into new facilities.

In general, then, unlike the financing of sports arenas governments have had to use much more general tax measures to finance sports stadia. The substantial costs of these projects necessitates financing packages that generate millions of dollars per year for a facility that may host only ten to eighty-five events per year. This rules out the sole use of revenue bonds that could not be financed by ticket and parking surcharges of some kind. Consequently, a general tax, like sales or property tax increases, or a wide ranging "package" of taxes, like sin taxes or special lotteries, are necessary for these projects.

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[25] Danielson, Michael (1997). *Home Team: Professional Sports and the American Metropolis*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.; Euchner (1993).

[26] For example, Seattle is building a new stadium for both their football and baseball teams. In each case the team is "investing" into the project any PSL money raised and then claiming this money as "private investment" into the new facility. In this way each team can claim that substantial private investment is being poured into the new stadium, but, in reality, very little out-of-pocket money is paid by each of the teams.

PSL's, which initially appeared to be a panacea for the stadium problem, have proven to be of limited use in cities building a new stadium for an existing team.

The Cost of the Recent Sports Facility Boom

The costs of the most recent sports facility building boom are staggering. It has been estimated that upwards of $9 billion will be spent on sports facilities for teams at the major league level during the 1990s.[27] In a study of recent construction contracts awarded for sports facilities, Korman estimated that contracts for stadia and arenas topped $1.3 billion in 1994.[28] This total was up 30% from contract awards of about $850 million in 1993.

Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarize the costs and estimated public percentage of these costs for completed stadia and arena projects in North America in the 1990s.

[27] USA Today (1996a).
[28] Korman (1995).

Table 2.1: The Estimated Costs for Stadia Opening in the 1990s

Facility	*City*	*Tenant(s)*	*Opened*	*Cost*[1]	*Public % of Costs*[2]
SunCoast Dome	Tampa/St Pete	MLB	1990	$120	100%
Comiskey Park	Chicago	MLB	1991	$137	100%
Camden Yards	Baltimore	MLB	1992	$205	100%
Georgia Dome	Atlanta	NFL	1992	$214	100%
Jacobs Field	Cleveland	MLB	1994	$180	65%
Ballpark at Arl.	Arlington	MLB	1994	$191	70%
Coors Field	Denver	MLB	1995	$215	93%
Jacksonville Stad.*	Jacksonville	NFL	1995	$135	92.2%
TWA Dome	St Louis	NFL	1995	$293	100%
Ericsson Stadium	Charlotte	NFL	1996	$185	0%
Ted Turner Field	Atlanta	MLB	1997	$232	0%
Oak. Coliseum*, **	Oakland	NFL, MLB	1997	$225	100%
J.K. Cook Stadium	Washington DC	NFL	1997	$185	0%
BankOne Ballpark	Phoenix	MLB	1998	$330	77%
TOTAL COST	$2.77 billion	*AVERAGE COST*		$198	

* These facilities have received or are receiving upgrades equivalent to the construction of a new stadium. They originally opened decades ago.

** Oakland is spending a total of $225 million on renovations to both their stadium and arena. For calculations, 2/3 of these costs will be assumed to be stadium costs.

[1] Figures in millions. This represents the estimated *construction costs* for these facilities. These figures *do not* include ancillary costs for these facilities like road and sewer improvements. These figures also represent the costs at the opening of the facility and are *not* standardized to any year.

[2] The public percentage includes those funds that are backed by public sources. Ultimately, the public is responsible for this percentage of the construction costs.

Table 2.2: The Estimated Costs for Arenas Opening in the 1990s

Facility	*City*	*Tenant(s)*	*Opened*	*Cost*[1]	*Public % of Costs*[2]
Target Center	Minneapolis	NBA	1990	$85	100%
Mad Sq Garden*	New York	NBA, NHL	1991	$200	0%
Delta Center	Salt Lake City	NBA	1991	$168	12%
Amer. West Arena	Phoenix	NBA, NHL	1992	$89	100%
Alamodome	San Antonio	NBA	1993	$182	100%
The Pond at Ana.	Anaheim	NHL	1993	$120	100%
San Jose Arena	San Jose	NHL	1993	$162.5	82%
United Center	Chicago	NBA, NHL	1994	$175	0%
Arena at Gateway	Cleveland	NBA	1994	$157	77%
Kiel Center	St Louis	NHL	1994	$135	0%
Fleet Center	Boston	NBA, NHL	1995	$160	0%
Key Arena*	Seattle	NBA	1995	$125	84%
Rose Garden	Portland	NBA	1995	$235	15%
GM Place	Vancouver	NBA, NHL	1995	$160	0%
CoreStates Center	Philadelphia	NBA, NHL	1996	$200	6.5%
Marine Mid Arena	Buffalo	NHL	1996	$122	37%
Molson Centre	Montreal	NHL	1996	$184	0%
Corel Centre	Ottawa	NHL	1996	$160	0%
Ice Palace	Tampa	NHL	1996	$153	100%
Nashville Arena	Nashville	NHL	1997	$140	100%
Oakland Arena*, **	Oakland	NBA	1997	$225	100%
MCI Center	Washington DC	NBA, NHL	1997	$175	0%
TOTAL COST	$3.36 billion	*AVERAGE COST*		$153	

* These facilities have received or are receiving upgrades equivalent to the construction of a new stadium. They originally opened decades ago.

** Oakland is spending a total of $225 million on renovations to both their stadium and arena. For calculations, 1/3 of these costs will be assumed to be arena costs.

[1] Figures in millions. This represents the estimated *construction costs* for these facilities. These figures *do not* include ancillary costs for these facilities like road and sewer improvements. These figures also represent the costs at the opening of the facility and are *not* standardized to any year.

[2] The public percentage includes those funds that are backed by public sources. Ultimately, the public is responsible for this percentage of the construction costs.

The total construction costs of stadia opening in the 1990s are a whopping $2.77 billion. Arena construction costs are estimated at an even more impressive $3.36 billion in the 1990s. Therefore, total construction costs for sports facilities in the 1990s have, to date, totaled over $6 billion ($6.13 billion). As shown in the tables, the average stadium cost $198 million and the average arena cost $153 million. Of the fourteen new stadia, eight required at least 80% public financing and only three were fully privately financed (with substantial indirect public investments). In contrast, of the twenty-two new arenas, only nine required 80% or greater public participation while eight were fully privately funded and another two needed 15% or less public funding.

Of the $6.13 billion total estimated construction costs, $3.26 billion, or 53%, were paid for or backed by public sources. However, as discussed earlier, an important difference exists between money spent on arenas and money spent on stadia. Recall that, generally speaking, arenas are much more viable as economic enterprises than stadia. Of the $3.36 billion spent on arenas, $1.32 billion, or only 39%, came from public coffers. In a stark contrast, of the $2.77 billion spent on stadia, $1.95 billion, or 70%, came from public sources. Clearly, as suggested earlier, the private sector has become very active in arena development, but far less active in stadium projects.

Public sector dollars solely for construction costs in this most recent facility boom to date total over $3.2 billion. These totals do not include ancillary costs like infrastructure improvements. These costs, almost always paid for through public funds, can be substantial. For example, over $60 million was spent on infrastructure improvements in Charlotte's stadium district.[29] Prince George's County, outside of Washington, D.C., is investing $71 million into infrastructure improvements surrounding the Redskins new stadium. St Louis did not spend any money on the construction of their new arena, the Kiel Center. However, the city did spend $35 million on parking and infrastructure improvements. The city also agreed not to have any events at the city-owned arena that

might compete with events at the Kiel Center, effectively ending the usefulness of that city-owned arena.[30] In each case these figures represent public expenditures that would not have been made without these new facilities. Using a conservative estimate of $30 million in indirect public costs per facility, the total ancillary costs for the thirty-five facilities that have opened in the 1990s would total $1.05 billion. This would bring the total public investment for these thirty-five facilities to over $4.25 billion dollars.

A Continuing Boom: Projected Costs of Future Sports Facilities

Unlike the years following the building boom of the 1960s and 1970s, there does not appear to be any slowing to the ongoing boom in the number of new sports facilities. Already, at least eleven metro areas have firm commitments for at least one new stadium and another five have commitments for new arenas (and the Miami area is building two new arenas). In almost all of these cases the majority of financing is from public sources. Notable exceptions to this are the two new stadia that have secured private financing in San Francisco, the privately-financed arena in Columbus, and the new downtown arena in Miami and the football stadium in Detroit which will see a split of the costs between public and private sources. (see Table 2.3)

The projected costs for future facilities are equally as shocking as the $292 million paid by St. Louis and the state of Missouri for a new football stadium for the NFL's Rams. For example, in New York City estimates have placed the costs for a new baseball stadium for the Yankees at over *$1 billion*. Construction costs for a new baseball stadium in Seattle have been placed at over $500 million, while a new baseball stadium in Detroit will cost at least $250. Not one, but two new arenas in the Miami area will cost $185 million and $165[31]. Football stadia planned for San Francisco and Seattle will cost well over $300

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[29] Batten, Taylor (1996). "Taxpayers have big stake in stadium." *The Charlotte Observer*, July 31.
[30] Phares and Rosentraub (1997).
[31] Miami's current arena opened in 1988, but is already considered obsolete by its two tenants, the NBA's Heat and the NHL's Panthers. Discussions for a downtown arena for both teams ran into problems over

million. These figures will almost certainly inflate as sports facilities (like most large construction projects) are notorious for costing far more than originally estimated. For example, the construction costs for Phoenix's new retractable roof baseball stadium were originally estimated to be around $260 million in early 1996, but have since risen to $330 million by July 1997 with the likelihood that costs would increase even further. Rosentraub discusses how Montreal's Olympic Stadium, a $100 million project that originally opened in 1976 but without a working retractable roof until 1988, has cost that city and the surrounding province over $750 million by the early 1990s.[32]

In a recent development trend, many cities are replacing older multi-purpose stadia with not one, but two new stadia for their professional franchises. In the earlier building boom of the '60s and '70s, most stadia were multipurpose facilities that could and did host both football and baseball teams. The twelve stadia built between 1960 and 1971, like the Astrodome in Houston and Three Rivers Stadium in Pittsburgh, all fit this bill. Contrast this with the trend of the 1990s. Atlanta has already built two new stadia (one financed by money from the Olympics) and Baltimore is now beginning construction on a new downtown football stadium next to their already completed baseball stadium. Seattle, Cincinnati, San Francisco, and Detroit are all building two new stadia for their MLB and NFL franchises, mainly at taxpayer expense. There have been discussions in Philadelphia, Minneapolis, and Boston for similar multiple stadium sports complexes. Houston will soon begin building a new baseball stadium (although financing is still up in the air), but they have lost the NFL's Oilers to Nashville because they would not build a new stadium for that franchise.

Table 2.3 lists the cities and estimated costs of new stadia and arenas planned in cities across North America.

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revenue streams, so the Panthers convinced a neighboring county to build them a new arena. Therefore Miami is not only tearing down an arena only ten years old, but building two new arenas to replace it!

[32] Rosentraub (1997a), pp. 321-343.

Table 2.3: The Sports Development Pipeline: Planned Sports Facilities in North America as of Summer 1997[1]

Facility Type	*City*	*Tenant(s)*	*Opening*	*Cost (in millions)*	*Pub/Priv Financing[2]*
Stadium	Tampa	NFL	1998	$170	Public
Arena	Miami/Broward	NHL	1998	$185	Public
Stadium	Baltimore	NFL	1998	$200	Public
Stadium	Seattle	MLB	1999	$320	Public
Stadium	Detroit	MLB	1999	$240	Public
Arena	Raleigh, NC	NHL	1999	$120	Public
Stadium	Nashville	NFL	1999	$238	Public
Stadium	Cleveland	NFL	1999	$247	Public
Arena	Atlanta	NBA, NHL	1999	$215	Public
Stadium	Cincinnati	NFL	2000	$270	Public
Stadium	Milwaukee	MLB	2000	$250	Public
Stadium	San Francisco	MLB	2000	$262	Private
Stadium	Houston	MLB	2000	$265	Public
Arena	Miami/Dade	NBA	2000	$165	50/50
Arena	Columbus, OH	NHL	2000	$125	Private
Arena	St. Paul, MN	NHL	2000	$130	Public
Stadium	Seattle	NFL	2001	$325	Public
Stadium	San Francisco	NFL	2001	$325	Private
Stadium	Cincinnati	MLB	2002	$235	Public
Stadium	Detroit	NFL	2005	$225	50/50

[1] These facilities have all been financed or have actually begun construction as of July '97. Other metropolitan areas have discussed options and even drawn up plans for new facilities, but they are not included here.

[2] Because many of these plans continue to change even as this is written, this simple designation notes whether or not the majority of financing is public or private.

Summing the costs of these planned projects suggests that at least $4.51 billion will be spent on new sports facilities in North America the next several years. As before, these costs do not include ancillary costs like infrastructure improvements which can be substantial. Also, these figures do not include other related developments that are tied to the above projects. For example, San Francisco will also see a privately financed regional mall developed in conjunction with the new football stadium. This will add at least $200 million to the construction costs for this project, but it is unrelated to the football stadium

construction costs. Similarly, Seattle's football stadium project will demolish the existing stadium in that city and add a new exhibition hall at a cost of $126 million on top of the stadium cost of $325 million.

Numerous other projects loom on the horizon as well. Both the NFL and MLB have floated the idea of further expansion early next century. The NBA has also been very aggressive in expanding their league in recent years. Invariably these expansions will lead to new stadia and arenas. Some cities with existing teams and relatively young facilities have also heard rumblings about relocation from their franchises. Charlotte's NBA team and Minneapolis' MLB team have each made known their desire for a new facility despite the fact that their current arena or stadium is less than twenty years old. Other teams that have expressed desires for new facilities include Buffalo's NFL Bills, New York's MLB Yankees and Mets, Pittsburgh's MLB Pirates, and all of Denver's teams except MLB's Rockies. There also exists the open NFL market in Los Angeles that will undoubtedly see a new stadium built despite the existence of three local stadia that can and have hosted NFL and college football games. Lastly, many tier two and tier three cities that wish to establish their "major league image" have considered and are building new sports facilities in an effort to attract an unhappy franchise or one of expansion teams. Nashville successfully lured the NFL's Oilers from Houston using this strategy. Other Sun Belt cities like Birmingham (AL), Memphis (TN) and New Orleans have been active suitors of sports teams in recent years. As the success of Tampa and Nashville have shown, a new stadium or arena can be a successful ticket to the major leagues.

Conclusion

North America has been building new sports facilities at a shocking rate since the 1960s. In the 1990s alone over $6 billion has already been spent on the thirty-five completed projects. Another twenty-one projects are in the development cycle now and these facilities will probably add another $3-$4 billion to the bill. While not all of these construction costs are borne by the public sector, public sources have been responsible for

over half of the construction costs for these facilities. The above estimates place the total construction costs for the most recent building boom at $10.64, with approximately 53%, or $5.64 billion, the responsibility of the sector public. Adding in the estimated ancillary costs brings the public responsibility to almost $10 billion.

What is perhaps most disturbing about this building boom is that city after city with high poverty rates, rising crime rates, substantial social problems, and an increasingly marginalized inner city population continue to invest in sports facilities to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars. For example, Baltimore and Cleveland, each of which has substantial social and economic problems in their inner cities, have chosen to invest well over $200 million into sports palaces for teams whose franchise values and total revenues continue to rise to unprecedented levels. Each of these cities has also begun construction on new $200 million stadia for their football franchises as well. Other older industrial cities, like Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati have set up financing packages or have laid out plans for new facilities provided mainly at public expense. Cities in the West and South, with fewer problems perhaps, but with substantial social and economic obligations nonetheless, have also shown a propensity to pursue this strategy. Phoenix will soon open a new baseball-only ballpark that cost the public at least $250 million just for construction costs. Los Angeles and her suburbs are fighting over who gets the "right" to build a new stadium for an NFL team that has yet to be found for that metropolitan area (and despite the existence of at least three stadia that could host professional football).

Why might this be? To address that question in detail, in the next chapter we turn to a discussion of the three main factors influencing these sports facility booms. It should be no surprise that one of these main factors is directly related to the mercurial economics of professional teams sports. More interesting, however, is the realization that cities and suburban areas are not just competitors for professional sports, nor are they simply pawns in the sports development game. Rather, governments have historically been eager participants and active players in a game in which they incur most of the costs and

negotiate away many of the benefits. Unlike the conclusions of several analysts, it is suggested next chapter that the sports stadium building booms cannot be and should not be laid entirely at the feet of an industry, professional sports, with profound economic problems. The public sector has long provided immense subsidies to the private sector to reach specific goals (like downtown development). Sports stadia and arenas simply represent one of the newest means of continuing this historical trend.




Figure 2.1: Period of Opening and Type of Facility for Active Major League Sports Facilities, 1997




Figure 2.2: Financing Source for Active Major League Sports Facilities, 1997

Chapter 3

Factors Influencing the Sports Facility Boom

"Of all items on the current development agenda, sports stadiums best illustrate the uneasy mix of image building, boosterism, and economic purpose that keep city governments hustling."

-Downtown experts Bernard Frieden and Lynne Sagalyn[1]

Metropolitan areas throughout North America continue to finance and build sports facilities at an alarming rate and at staggering cost to the public. As the tables in Chapter 2 showed, between 1990 and the year 2005 at least fifty-six new sports facilities will dot the North American landscape. In other words, by 2005 approximately 75% of *all* major professional sports franchises will likely be playing in a facility that was built since 1985. Of these facilities, a majority will have been publicly financed, although participation of the private sector in the construction of these facilities appears to be on the rise. Also noteworthy are the indirect public expenditures on these facilities which are usually not included in project costs. These costs can be substantial and therefore should be included in this analysis. Again, using a conservative estimate of $30 million in public money for all ancillary costs for new sports facilities, the above fifty-six facilities have required and will require an additional $1.68 billion in public funding to see them completed. When all the indirect and direct costs are considered, the total costs for these fifty-six planned and built facilities are (conservatively) estimated to be at least $10 billion dollars.

Academic interest in the financing and development of sports facilities is at an all-time high. A cottage industry surrounding these projects has emerged in the past decade as conferences have been organized to help cities attract teams and build facilities[2], sports leagues have developed guidelines and strategies for lobbying governments for greater

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[1] Frieden, Bernard and Lynne Sagalyn (1991). *Downtown Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities*. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA; p. 277.

[2] The National Council for Urban Economic Development convened the first annual "If You Build It, Will They Come?" conference on stadiums, arenas, and convention/conference centers in January, 1996.

incentives and new facilities[3], and a significant number of individuals from both academic and commercial spheres have written books on sports stadia and arenas. Local and national newspapers report almost daily of the rumblings of a team in some city to relocate to a new home (and a new stadium or arena) or of the grand plans of a team and metropolitan area for a new facility that can only lead to the "revitalization" of that city's downtown. Similarly, the construction and architecture industry has seen the emergence of several firms that specialize in sports facility development, including HOK Sport and Ellerbe Beckett. Design and construction contracts for these facilities are hot commodities that generate a substantial level of competition with free consultations, lobbying efforts by firms, and with multimedia presentations in front of public officials becoming the norm.

At the heart of the ongoing discussion have been the following questions: Why has the most recent sports facility boom been so strong and persistent? What are the root causes of this boom? Indeed, why have so many cities and states invested hundreds of millions of public dollars into sports facilities? Are sports facilities such economic generators that cities would be foolish to not invest millions into these projects? As will be seen in Chapter 4, evidence supporting the argument that sports facilities generate substantial economic benefits is very scarce. In fact, some authors have unilaterally concluded that public investment into sports stadia is bad policy and a waste of vital resources.[4] So, if economic reasons appear to be few, why the recent boom in sports stadia and arenas?

It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that the most recent building boom is not due to league expansion and the aging of existing facilities. Instead the boom can be linked to three main factors: 1) heightened competition between cities and states for professional

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Similarly, the Urban Land Institute offered a seminar in April of 1996 on "Developing Sports, Convention, and Entertainment Facilities".

[3] The NFL formed a special committee in 1995 to deal specifically with stadium situations in their franchise cities.

sports teams, 2) the deterioration of the inner city and the reliance upon physical development strategies by governments at all levels, and 3) changes in the economics of professional team sports. These factors converged in the late 1980s and in the 1990s to provide a very powerful set of circumstances that lead city after city down the road of publicly funding a new sports palace for millionaire owners and players. This chapter, then, centers on a more in-depth discussion of these three forces. Of importance for the central thesis of this work is that local and state governments are not simply pawns in the sports facility development game. While the economics of professional sports and the competition between jurisdictions for sports teams have been major factors in the most recent building boom, the public sector has also been very active in developing these projects as well. Similar to the sports franchises they negotiate with, the public sector is also pursuing a specific set of goals, usually ones tied to the physical redevelopment of the city.

Intercity and Intrametropolitan Competition for Sports

As Danielson notes, "professional team sports are a product of urbanization."[5] Teams can only survive and thrive in urban areas with a sufficient population from which to draw fans. In the early decades of professional sports (pre-1950) this population was almost always to be found within cities. Sports stadia and arenas were located in downtowns in close proximity to the pool of fans that were likely to attend games. Since 1950, though, the expansion of American and Canadian metropolises transformed the sports market from an urban one to a regional one. Sports facilities have come to be located throughout metropolitan areas, including suburban centers like Irving and Arlington, Texas or even midway between cities as in Foxboro, Massachusetts (between Boston and Providence, Rhode Island).

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[4] Baade, Robert (1996a). "Professional sports as catalysts for metropolitan economic development." *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 18(1): pp. 1-17.; Rosentraub (1997a).

[5] Danielson (1997), p. 19.

In the past forty years professional sports have come to be a very desirable recreational commodity for urban areas of all sizes. Metropolitan areas see professional sports as a means to develop or enhance their "major league image"[6] and to restructure the metropolitan economy (particularly the downtown economy) around post-modern industries like tourism and recreation. Sports are also seen as "clean industries"[7] that meet the recreation and business demands of downtown interests and also serve as a focal point for downtown redevelopment. Lastly, local economic development agencies and political officials remain convinced that professional sports are an essential ingredient for a modern and vibrant metropolitan area. These stadium and arena proponents argue that a city must have major league sports to help attract relocating businesses and to illustrate to the region and to the country as a whole that {your city name here} is a good place to do business.

Within this local political and economic environment it becomes more clear as to why government is so fond of economic development through professional team sports. However, if this were the only factor driving public involvement in the sports development game, then public investment into sports facilities would likely be much less than the hundreds of millions usually poured into sports-related projects today. A second factor has increased the magnitude of public investment in recent times. Intercity competition has proven to be a very powerful factor in driving up the costs of public investment. Up until 1965 this competition existed between cities in the same region or different regions. Competition between cities was the norm. However, the recent development of suburban areas, coupled with their desire to be seen as major players in the region, have led to a rise in intra-metropolitan competition as well.

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[6] For example, Clarence Stone discussed how in the 1960s Atlanta's business and political leaders located a new stadium on land originally set aside for low income housing so that the city could house MLB and NFL teams. (1989, p. 63) Similarly, Chapin discusses how Seattle's leaders tried for fifteen years to publicly finance a new stadium so that that city could finally become "major league". (1996b)

[7] Rawn, Cynthia Dunn (1990). "From smokestacks to stadiums." *American Demographics*, October: pp. 49-50.

A very brief look at the spread of the North American population since 1950 is informative to development of this competition. In 1950, coinciding with this slowly emerging belief in the economic and image-related benefits of sports facilities was the full scale migration of population to new regions and the emergence of new cities, particularly in the West and South. Prior to 1950 most of the major cities in North America were located in New England, the Midwest, and these same areas in Canada. Consequently, most franchises in the first half of this century were also located in these same areas. These teams relied upon these larger markets for the necessary fan base for professional sports. Many of these cities, like Boston, Philadelphia, and New York even hosted multiple franchises in leagues that in 1950 were more regional than national.

As researchers of population and migration have meticulously documented, the older industrial regions of the Northeast and Midwest have experienced a substantial out-migration in recent decades, both away from their urban cores and into new regions of the country. Metropolitan areas such as Detroit, Baltimore, and Buffalo have been losing population to growing areas such as Atlanta, San Diego, and Phoenix for decades. These emerging cities became competitors for (and even raiders of) existing and emerging firms of all stripes and colors. While cities have for centuries been competitors for jobs, culture, and other forms of development, the emergence of these new regions scrambled the pecking order of North American cities in a rather short period of time. The South's very aggressive economic development strategy that combined low taxes, free infrastructure, and anti-union legislation was a major factor in the movement of population and jobs to cities like Dallas and Atlanta. Rutheiser's entertaining history of Atlanta and Elkins case study of Dallas offer detailed accounts of how those cities focused almost exclusively upon economic development as a means to gaining national and international prestige, as well as fattening the purses of local land owners and businesspersons.[8]

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[8] See Charles Rutheiser's *Imagineering Atlanta* and Stephen Elkin's *City and Regime in the American Republic* (specifically Chapter 4).

As of 1950 the competition between urban areas for franchises was not very fierce because sports were seen as marginal businesses and because leagues and teams proved to be very fluid prior to 1950.[9] A few franchises did relocate during this period, but they were attracted primarily by an untapped market, rather than by local incentives. For example, Boston's MLB Braves moved to Milwaukee in 1953, St. Louis' MLB Browns moved to Baltimore in 1954, and Philadelphia's Athletics moved to Kansas City in 1955. Except for the move of the Browns (now Orioles) to Baltimore, these moves represented the beginning of the shift to the West and South into the fast-growing cities in those regions. Teams that moved to new cities during these early periods were lured primarily by markets that these teams would not have to share with another franchise.[10] The franchises that moved during this period were generally the weaker of two franchises in their old cities as the Braves were secondary to the Red Sox, the Browns were secondary to the Cardinals, and the Athletics were secondary to the Phillies. However, Milwaukee, Baltimore, and Kansas City also built publicly funded stadia that certainly helped to attract these teams and convince major league baseball that these cities were ready for the big leagues.[11] In the case of Milwaukee and Kansas City, their success in this intercity competition was short-lived as both the Braves and Athletics moved on to even better deals in Atlanta and Oakland in less than fifteen years.

The regional competition for business and economic growth soon turned into competition on the playing field of professional sports. The relatively uncontested moves of the Braves, Browns, and Athletics between 1953-1955 quietly marked the beginning of the modern wars for sports teams. The big bang was shortly to follow. The infamous move of baseball's Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles in 1958 (as well as the New York Giants move to San Francisco) were the first major shots in an ongoing war between the "old world" of the Northeast and the Midwest versus the "new world" of the South and the West. Over the past thirty years older urban areas like Washington, Milwaukee,

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[9] Danielson (1997), Chapter 2; Quirk and Fort (1992), pp. 5-41; Rosentraub (1997a), pp. 79-89.
[10] Danielson (1997), p. 139.

Winnipeg, Buffalo, Hartford, St. Louis, and Quebec have lost teams to places like Dallas, Atlanta, Phoenix, San Diego, Raleigh, Oakland, and Denver. Most expansion franchises since 1960 have also been placed in Western or Southern areas. The leagues, in particular the NFL and MLB, were quick to recognize and take advantage of these emerging markets to strengthen their presence in all regions of North America. It should also be noted that the proliferation of jet plane air travel also helped to foster the spread of the leagues to these formerly distant areas of the country.

Table 3.1 shows location of NFL, MLB, NHL, and NBA franchises by region for the period 1950-2000. Note first that the total number of sports franchises has shown periods of tremendous growth and periods of almost no growth. Between 1960 and 1970, thirty-three new teams were added to these leagues. Growth was also steady during the 1970s, but much slower than in the previous two decade. The 1980s were by far the slowest period of league expansion with only four new teams added, all of these in the NBA. However, by the end of this decade, the 1990s, the leagues will have again experienced another active period of expansion with a total of seventeen new franchises, of which over half (nine) will begin play in the fast-growing NHL. Recalling the earlier discussion of the influence of expansion on the sports facility development game, the first building boom coincided very closely with the very active period of league expansion in the 1960s and first half of the 1970s. In contrast, the most recent building boom is only partially attributable to the most recent round of expansion.

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[11] Gershman (1993). pp. 162-174.

Table 3.1: Location of Major Professional Sports Franchises by Region 1950-2000

Year	*Northeast*	*Midwest*	*South*	*West*	*Total*
1950	23 (54.7%)	17 (40.5%)	0 (0.0%)	2 (4.7%)	42
1960	22 (43.1%)	19 (37.3%)	3 (5.9%)	7 (13.7%)	51
1970	29 (34.5%)	27 (32.1%)	9 (10.7%)	19 (22.6%)	84
1980	33 (33.7%)	27 (27.6%)	13 (13.3%)	25 (25.5%)	98
1990	33 (32.4%)	27 (26.5%)	15 (14.9%)	27 (26.5%)	102
2000	33 (27.7%)	28 (23.5%)	25 (21.0%)	33 (27.7%)	119

Of primary importance for this discussion, though, is the regional location of sports franchises. It has been suggested that intensifying competition between metropolitan areas has been greatly influenced by the rise of metropolitan areas in the South and West after 1950. Evidence for this argument is presented in Table 3.1. Whereas in 1950 the North and Midwest were home to almost all professional sports franchises, by 2000 all regions will have almost an equal number of franchises. In 1950 there were only two franchises located in the West and none located in the South. This represented less than 5% of all existing major professional sports franchises at that time. By 1970, the expansion of baseball and football, coupled with the migration of teams to these emerging regions, brought the number of Southern and Western franchises to twenty-eight, representing almost 35% of all franchises. The West, in particular, saw a sharp rise in the number of franchises prior to 1970. The 1990s have been especially prosperous for these regions as the South will see an addition of ten new teams and the West will add six new franchises. In contrast, the Northeast and Midwest have added only one new franchise since 1980. Mirroring the movement of population and employment, the professional sports leagues expanded into and moved existing teams into these regions, thereby enlarging the pool of cities that might compete for their individual teams.

In sum, Table 3.1 illustrates very clearly that the sports industry has been very responsive to the demand for professional sports in the South and West. The growth of professional sports since 1950 has been experienced by all regions, but most prominently in the South and West. The emergence of these regions has broadened the competition for sports franchises and helped to create an environment in which teams have many more metropolitan suitors than they had in previous decades. With the validation of the West and South as regions that could sustain professional sports, the competition for sports franchises became even more frenzied and cutthroat.

As suggested earlier, the fights for professional sports teams have not been limited to regional and intercity competition, though. Suburban areas also became adept competitors for sports franchises most interested in finding the best possible stadium or arena deal. Similar to the central cities, these suburban areas saw professional sports as their ticket to the major leagues and the myriad of (perceived) benefits that being "major league" entails. Older industrial cities like Buffalo, Detroit, Boston, and New York have all seen franchises leave urban facilities for greener suburban pastures. Southern and Western cities have not been immune to competition from their suburbs. Los Angeles has four of its six major league teams in suburban Inglewood and Anaheim. In probably the most competitive intra-metropolitan environment, Dallas has lost a team to both Arlington and Irving, two growing suburban bedroom communities. In the cases involving Dallas teams, the suburban areas each had an explicit goal of acquiring a team to demonstrate their major league status and to advertise their prosperous economic environment.[12]

Even when not actually acquiring a franchise, suburban areas can drive up the price for retaining a franchise in a metropolitan area. In an unsuccessful attempt to lure the NFL's Raiders to suburban Irwindale, city leaders paid the Raiders' owner $10 million for exclusive negotiating rights with the team and several other suburban areas were very

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[12] Rosentraub, Mark and Samuel Nunn (1978). "Suburban city investment in professional sports." *American Behavioral Scientist*, January/February: pp. 393-414; Rosentraub (1997a), Chapter 11.

active in the negotiations surrounding a new home for that franchise.[13] The team used both intercity and intra-city competition to obtain millions more in incentives from Oakland when they moved *back* to that city in 1996. Atlanta's MLB and NBA franchises also successfully used the threat of relocation to the suburbs to coax significant concessions from their host city. In Cleveland, the loss of their NBA team to suburban Richfield was a factor in that city's decision to spend hundreds of millions on a new baseball stadium and basketball arena in downtown.[14] As of 1997, there were twenty franchises located in suburban areas throughout North America. However, of these twenty suburban teams, five were moving to new facilities in the central city. But these central city gains are balanced by plans for at least three teams to move to new suburban facilities.

The conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that between 1950 and 1975 franchise moves were usually linked to untapped markets (like Southern or Western cities) or relocating populations (like growing suburban areas) rather than to new facilities. During the most recent building boom, however, franchise moves have generally been linked to facility deals rather to changing or emerging markets. Similar to what happened in the general economic development field, Southern and Western cities that had long been known for raiding older industrial cities now found themselves on the losing end of this intercity competition. Los Angeles lost both their NFL teams to Oakland and St. Louis. Atlanta lost their NHL team to Calgary. Industrial cities also began to raid each other for franchises. Indianapolis stole Baltimore's NFL team in the early 1980s. In turn, Baltimore broke the bank to get Cleveland's NFL team. Emerging cities have also become very active players in the sports in this era of team free agency. Nashville is building a new stadium for Houston's former NFL team. Raleigh attracted Hartford's NHL team and Sacramento became home to Kansas City's NBA team.

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[13] Euchner (1993), Chapter 4.
[14] Rosentraub (1997a), Chapter 7; Austrian and Rosentraub (1997).

To summarize then, the emergence of Western and Southern cities and the ascent of suburban areas have had two primary consequences for the sports facility development game: 1) unlike the pre-1950 period, both urban and suburban areas compete for sports franchises and 2) since 1960, the number of urban areas in competition for these teams has increased substantially. The addition of franchises to the various leagues through expansion and merger has helped to compensate for this increased demand, but, despite this, the competition for sports teams is at an all time high. Competition for sports franchises between cities and within metropolitan areas can best be summarized as antagonistic, brutal, expensive, and on the rise.

Competition and the Sports Facility Boom

How does this tremendous increase in competition affect the sports stadium boom of the past fifteen years? Simply put, "arenas and stadiums are the focal point of the relationship between places and major league teams."[15] Urban areas and their suburban offspring can most clearly compete for sports franchises through the financing and construction of new facilities or the upgrading of existing ones. Unlike other businesses, sports franchises are not usually attracted by tax abatements, improvements to the education system, or workforce training programs. The normal methods for an area to attract a footloose firm simply do not apply to a sports team that has only minor interest in local tax rates or the quality of the local workforce. Instead, the best and really the *only* means of attracting an existing/expansion franchise or of retaining an existing franchise is through the provision of a sports facility that promises substantial revenues to the team and minimizes any costs for that same team. With the number of cities and suburban areas that desire a sports team at an all-time high (and continually on the rise) there exists a market in which the sellers (the teams) can and do demand exorbitant payments from an ample supply of buyers (cities or suburbs). Within this market, the teams can now go to the many metropolitan buyers and demand ever-increasing compensation for their services.

As an example of how this competition has taken place, let's briefly review the recent experience of baseball's Chicago White Sox.[16] In the mid-1980s the team announced its intention to build or get a new stadium because its current home, Comiskey Park (the team's home since 1910) was too old to compete economically in the modern Major Leagues. The team wanted a stadium with more revenue generating possibilities. The team looked very seriously at several suburban sites and even acquired land and drew up plans for a ballpark in Addison, a suburb of Chicago. Also, St. Petersburg, Florida was planning a new domed stadium and they desperately wanted a baseball team to call their own. Within this competitive environment, the White Sox began negotiating with the city of Chicago and the State of Illinois for public funding for a new baseball stadium. Further, the mayor of Chicago was very strongly behind utilizing a new stadium as an economic development tool for a yet-to-be chosen neighborhood in the city. After making a public display of negotiating with their suburban suitors and St. Petersburg, the team convinced the state and city to spend $137 million on a new stadium (as well as millions for other costs). Further, the team used this intercity and intra-metropolitan competition to secure almost all revenues from the publicly-financed facility, including a guarantee of payments to the team from the stadium authority should total attendance levels fall below given levels! Clearly, the White Sox recognized a seller's market when they saw it and geared their tactics towards securing what was by far the most lucrative deal in professional sports at that time.

In the past twenty to thirty years the competitive environment necessary for the most recent sports facility boom has developed and continued to expand, much to the benefit of the professional sports leagues. Teams now can and do demand skyrocketing subsidies from cities that feel compelled to compete for the tangible and intangible benefits related to professional sports. The emergence of suburban areas has only clouded the picture further. No longer must Chicago compete with St. Petersburg or Sacramento, but

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[15] Danielson (1997), p. 218.
[16] This story is best summed by Euchner (1993), Chapter 6.

with her suburbs as well. This highly competitive environment is one of the major forces behind the recent construction boom. The mantra for those cities that desire a team is now "If you build it, They will negotiate with you", and for those cities that want to keep their team it is "If you build it, They will not leave."

Downtown Revitalization through Sports Stadia and Arenas

Another important factor in the substantial level of public investment into sports facilities has been their role in downtown "revitalization" or "redevelopment". In the 1990s, in particular, sports stadia and arenas have become the most popular downtown redevelopment project in the United States. This section will discuss this phenomenon and the causes behind it. To do so, we must again travel through the past half-century to examine federal and local strategies for maintaining North America's inner cities. To preview the major conclusion, the vast majority of programs and funding for inner city redevelopment and maintenance has focused upon physical solutions, usually in the form of large development projects, ones very popular in local business circles. Prior to this discussion, though, a quick review of the state of North America's inner cities is in order.

The Decline of North America's Inner Cities

North American downtowns were vibrant, diverse, polluted, and crowded places as the 20th Century dawned. Most cities had very dense downtown cores that radiated rail lines and other transportation corridors to surrounding bedroom communities. Business and commerce were centered downtown, as were the growing range of recreational opportunities that the "big city" offered. Retail and entertainment districts developed and thrived as the only option available for shoppers. Business that took place outside of the city was likely related to agriculture or other industries required to be in rural areas. In 1920, for the first time the United States became more than half urban as about 52% of the population lived in urban areas.

Trouble lay on the horizon, though. The development and mass production of the automobile gave families greater mobility, thereby allowing them to live further away from work. The rise of the automobile (and the provision of roads upon which to drive them) coupled with the availability of cheap land in the soon-to-be suburbs would in the coming decades empty most inner cities of much of their middle class and upper class populations. After World War II, the suburban deluge began. A combination of "pull factors", like cheap housing and favorable home ownership policies, coupled with "push factors" like rising inner city minority populations and aging urban buildings and infrastructure combined to empty urban cores of most of their remaining middle class residents.[17] Inner cities slowly came to be dominated by lower income families and minority groups unable to "escape" the city because of racism or the high costs of living in the suburbs. These trends tended to reinforce themselves, creating a vicious circle in which the middle class saw no hope in living in the city and consequently left, while the lower class had little hope of helping itself without the economic and political clout of the middle class.

It is important to note that residential mobility was far from the only factor in the emptying of urban cores. The commercial and industrial sectors also were lured by pull factors like cheap land and pushed out of the city by factors such as crumbling urban infrastructure. Over time, changes in manufacturing technology required large open spaces for factories, spaces available in suburban areas and not in cities. Regional malls in suburban areas proved to be very successful; shoppers stopped coming downtown and instead spent their money at these very efficient shrines to conspicuous consumption. These forces led retail stores and manufacturing/industrial operations to move to suburban and exurban areas. In recent times, the results of these changes have been termed "edge

[17] See Kenneth Jackson's seminal *Crabgrass Frontier* (especially Chapters 11, 12, 13 16) and J. John Palen's *The Suburbs* (especially pp. 49-100) for excellent discussions of these factors.

cities" or "technoburbs" as most metropolitan areas now have many subcenters of industry and commerce resulting in a multi-nucleated city.[18]

To illustrate the suburban shift in numeric terms, between 1940 and 1970 the percentage of the American population living in suburban areas doubled to almost 40%, with more people living in suburban areas than in central cities (38% to 31%) for the first time in 1970. Between 1950 and 1970 the suburban population grew from 35 to 84 million, a 140% increase. The 1970s proved to be even worse for America's central cities. In that decade central cities experienced a net loss of 13 million people as the "rural renaissance" seemed to pull people to both suburban and exurban residences. As for the retail sector, Robertson notes that in 1954 downtown retail sales were still 20% of the metropolitan total, but by 1977 they represented only 4% of this total.[19] As of 1990, the percentage of all Americans living in suburban areas had increased to 48%. As summarized so nicely by Palen, "In a change virtually unheralded during the last quarter of a century, North America has gone from being a continent of city dwellers to a continent of suburbanites."[20]

Certainly this discussion presents a somewhat simplified picture of the decline of inner city North America. Some cities have maintained viable and livable downtowns despite these changes (such as New York, San Francisco, or even Seattle). Many cities of the South and West, in fact, developed after 1950 and therefore did not really experience a "decline" of the inner city. Instead, Sun Belt cities never really developed a 24-hour downtown that is lamented as lost by many writers. These areas may have disproportionately poor and minority inner cities, but not of the magnitude of older industrial cities like Detroit or Buffalo. In contrast to the dire times of the '70s, the 1980s

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[18] "Edge City" was coined by Joel Garreau in his well-known book of the same name (1990). Robert Fishman (1987) uses the term "technoburb" to characterize the concentrations of retail and commercial development in the suburban landscape.

[19] Robertson, Kent (1983). "Downtown retail activity in large American cities 1954-1977." *Geographical Review*, 73(3): pp. 314-323.

saw a return to the inner city by many businesses and some industries only a few years after many downtowns had been pronounced dead. Some metropolitan areas have even seen a return of middle class residents back to the city, but their numbers have been relatively small and the image of these gentrified neighborhoods have been more notable than their actual economic and redistributive effects.

Government Responses to Inner City Decline

The substantial changes in the spatial distribution of people and jobs outlined above have been harshly criticized by many analysts, some of who yearn for days that cannot be recaptured[21] and other who worry about the economic and equity aspects of these changes.[22] Other analysts have pointed out the dire consequences of these changes on minority groups, especially blacks, that have been hit especially hard by the combination of these changes and pervasive racial prejudice.[23] What is of interest for this discussion, however, is not the equity aspects, but rather the responses of federal and local governments to these changes. Recall that government policy was an important force in the movement of people and jobs to the suburbs. The federal highway system, federally backed home loans, and low taxes in suburban areas have all been cited as factors in the accelerated growth of suburbia.

As the 1950s dawned the US federal government was quick to recognize the dilapidated state and the growing problems of inner cities. Concern focused primarily upon the loss of population and falling property values because these were directly linked to the tax revenues of governments. As a result, strategies to address inner city decline have focused upon ways to increase or at least maintain tax revenues within the city. What is essential to understand here is that government officials and local leaders "viewed this

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[20] Palen (1995), p. 1.
[21] See James Kuntsler's *Geography of Nowhere* (1993)) and *Home from Nowhere* (1998).
[22] See Anthony Downs' *New Visions for Metropolitan America* (1994) or the work of Dean Rusk, *Cities without Suburbs* (1993) or *Baltimore Unbound* (1996).
[23] Rusk (1996); Also see the work of Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton or Edward Blakely.

decline of the central cities largely as a physical rather than a social problem. ...Since the perceived problem was one of physical structure rather than of social organization, the perceived answer was physical rejuvenation and reconstruction."[24] Rising crime and poverty, falling tax revenues, and the flight of the middle class to suburbia were linked to the decay of the inner city and not to changing lifestyles or new ways of organizing ourselves spatially. As will be seen below, from the very first days of "downtown revitalization", government has attempted to address the myriad of urban problems through the physical rehabilitation of the central business district.

Within this physical redevelopment perspective, government's first response was the large scale clearance of blighted inner city areas and the preparation of these areas for new construction. Congress developed urban renewal policies that allowed local governments to acquire and clear land and then sell these lots at substantially lower costs to private developers for large projects that usually took the form of hotel and/or office complexes. In addition, large low income housing projects, now known in many American cities as "The Projects", were also pushed by the federal government during this period. Much of the costs of land acquisition and land clearance were paid for by federal funding. By publicly incurring these costs, it was assumed that private development, and therefore jobs and people, would return to the city. Policy proponents argued that these projects would build up the downtown employment base and help to keep shoppers downtown. By extension, the rejuvenated city would then be more attractive for residential uses and the city could quickly return to its vibrant pre-World War II days. While there are certainly some examples of successful urban renewal projects, the overall policy has been severely criticized for creating "dead spaces" where developers didn't want to build, transforming the city into a pedestrian unfriendly place, and dispossessing and removing minority

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[24] Teaford, Jon (1990) *The Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985*. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Maryland: p. 11.

groups at an alarming rate.[25] Urban renewal was also terribly unpopular with blacks and it came to be known in many cities by a different name, "Negro Removal".[26]

Between the birth of urban renewal in 1949 and the riots and continued decline of inner cities in the 1960s, federal and local governments slowly learned from their downtown redevelopment mistakes. Large office and hotel projects did not "revitalize" the city and often only served to fragment it further. Another problem plaguing urban renewal was the substantial number of empty lots in the inner city that were never able to attract private investment and development. Cities were actually becoming less dense and less pedestrian friendly through urban renewal, clearly unintended and disastrous consequences for downtowns. Analysts suggested that what the city needed was a more diverse set of shopping and entertainment options to complement the set of office and hotel projects in the inner city. It was suggested that federal policies should be designed to accomplish these goals.

What followed urban renewal, then, were related, but very different funding and development programs. Substantial dollars were still transferred from federal coffers to local coffers, but the level of federal oversight was decreased and the variety of projects backed by these funds was substantially increased. Two cornerstone programs, the Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), provided federal funding to local governments but with fewer strings attached than under the urban renewal program. The UDAG and CDBG funding programs placed more power and discretion in the hands of local governments allowing them to work more closely with downtown developers to meet their capital and property needs. Resulting from this greater local discretion was a much wider range of projects like the festival marketplaces of the 1970s and 1980s (like Inner Harbor in Baltimore and Faneuil Hall in Boston), downtown shopping centers that broke the conventional mold for retail projects

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[25] Robertson (1995); Frieden and Sagalyn (1991).
[26] Frieden and Sagalyn (1991), p. 51.

(like Horton Plaza in San Diego), and a wide range of the aforementioned special activity generators. These two funding programs are generally held up as relatively successful policies that have helped to restore some vitality to inner city America. Their success is due, in part, to the flexibility that both UDAG's and CDBG's allow local governments when designing projects and the ability of government to remain involved in projects throughout the full development cycle. However, the large projects resulting from these programs have been harshly criticized by analysts who question their aesthetic and/or community building abilities[27] and by many authors who question the economic and social benefits of building business-oriented megastructures and recreational projects when inner city poverty, unemployment, and crime are on the rise.[28]

These federal programs have always been linked to an array of local policies and programs that also target physical redevelopment as the primary means of revitalizing inner cities. Tax abatement programs have been mainstays in most American cities for twenty years. Tax increment financing (TIF) or business improvement districts (BIDs) are other popular programs that focus investment into specific districts in a city. In the 1980s the concept of Enterprise Zones was developed by Republicans to focus investment into special districts through lower taxes and other incentives. The Democrats have re-termed the concept "Empowerment Zones" and recently awarded several cities special funding for these districts in their inner cities.[29]

Note that most of the projects and programs mentioned above focus exclusively on redevelopment for business interests and not residential interests. From day one, urban revitalization has focused almost exclusively on the redevelopment of the central business district (CBD) and not residential neighborhoods. Government could just have easily

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[27] See Michael Sorkin's (1992) book *Variations on a Theme Park*.

[28] See the body of work by Susan Fainstein; her book *The City Builders* (1994) is an excellent look at mega-projects in London and New York. See also *Urban Revitalization* (1995), by Wagner, Joder, and Mumphrey (eds.).

poured money into residential neighborhood revitalization and attempted to stem central city decline via a different set of investments. Residential areas were equally decimated by the aging and crumbling of the inner city. Funding for these areas might have lessened the out-migration of the middle class thereby retaining solid tax base and keeping a market for downtown shopping nearby. However, neighborhood revitalization has always received significantly less political and financial backing than downtown revitalization. Federal housing programs in cities have usually taken the form of low income housing, with huge housing projects concentrating poor households in given portions of the city and often separating them from the city's economy.

The reasons for this broad range of strategies that focus upon the singular goal of the physical redevelopment of the central business district have been debated for twenty years. These projects offer a very visible commitment to the inner city which therefore makes them popular among elected officials. They also have the support of downtown businesses and real estate interests that stand to gain from new downtown development. Some scholars suggest that the close ties between government and business are at the root of substantial public involvement in downtown revitalization.[30] Others suggest that structural forces in the way we govern ourselves leads government, particularly the local sector, to be responsive to business wants and needs.[31] What is important for this discussion is to recognize that for half a century local and federal government have focused their effort and, more importantly, their dollars on large scale projects that serve business needs and tourist needs. Office towers, downtown malls, symphony halls, hotels, the litany of downtown revitalization projects goes on. The physical reinvention of the inner city has and continues to be the guiding purpose behind much of government's urban policy.

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[29] Wilder, Margaret and Barry Rubin (1996) "Rhetoric versus reality: A review of studies on state enterprise zone programs." *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Autumn: pp. 473–491.

[30] See Harvey Molotch's *The City as a Growth Machine* (1976), Molotch and John Logan's *The Political Economy of Urban Place*, or Clarence Stone's *Regime Politics* (1988) for their ideas on how and why connections between government and business develop.

Downtown Revitalization and the Sports Facility Boom

Now what might all of this have to do with the number of sports stadia and arenas built in recent years? Specifically, city after city has turned to sports facilities as a means to continue their investment into inner cities. As with office towers or convention centers, these projects have proven to be popular with politicians, whose constituents have very short memories and always seem willing celebrate the opening of a new sports facility. Business and civic elites back these projects because they improve the image of the downtown and can help to bring people back to the city for short periods of time. Especially in the 1990s, sports facilities have become the "signature structure" for a successfully revitalized inner city. Previous decades saw cities follow the trend to build convention centers, festival marketplaces, or pedestrian plazas, but the era of the sports facility is clearly upon us. Even cities whose downtowns appear healthy, like San Francisco, Seattle, and Boston are falling over themselves to build new downtown stadia and arenas at great public cost.

Table 3.2 lists those cities that have utilized sports facilities as a downtown redevelopment tool since 1960. The table lists a total of thirty-six cities, but does not include the number of minor league cities that have used the same strategy. Also, many of these cities have built more than one sports facility over the past thirty-five years with the singular goal of downtown revitalization driving the location of the facility. For example, Atlanta will have built three stadia and two arenas in their downtown by the year 2000 all with the expressed goal of retaining the vitality and diversity of the central business district.

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[31] Peterson, Paul (1981). *City Limits*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Table 3.2: Cities that Have Utilized Sports Facilities for Downtown Redevelopment

Atlanta	Denver	New Orleans	Salt Lake City
Baltimore	Detroit	New York City	San Antonio
Boston	Edmonton	Orlando	San Francisco
Buffalo	Houston	Ottawa	San Jose
Charlotte	Indianapolis	Philadelphia	Seattle
Chicago	Miami	Phoenix	Tampa
Cincinnati	Milwaukee	Pittsburgh	Toronto
Cleveland	Minneapolis	Portland	Vancouver
Dallas	Montreal	St. Louis	Washington, D.C.

The implications of this "downtown development through sports" strategy are far reaching. Danielson notes that the high costs of CBD land substantially drive up the costs of these facilities often costing the public more money than would be necessary for a suburban site.[32] Sports facilities have also acquired an image as the panacea for distressed downtowns, despite substantial evidence to the contrary.[33] Lastly, these large developments do not provide solely positive economic benefits to their surrounding district. Sports stadia and arenas generate substantial traffic for short periods, disrupt neighboring land uses, and displace the previous occupants of the land on which the facility is to be located.

Probably the most important point to be taken away from this subsection is that the political sector is not simply a pawn in the sports development game. Many analysts of sports facilities have painted a picture of a public sector that is fleeced by the sports leagues and their individual franchises for millions of dollars with little or no return on this investment. The public sector is portrayed as a naïve investor who winds up being talked out their share of the profits and into paying more of the costs by the cunning and underhanded teams and leagues. While this certainly happens and the leagues and teams do use their monopoly status to drive up the investment of the public sector, it is also the

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[32] Danielson (1997), pp. 107-110.

[33] Rosentraub (1997a); Baade and Dye (1988); Chema, Thomas (1996). "When professional sports justify the subsidy, a reply to Robert Baade." *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 18(1): pp. 19-22.

case that many cities are willing participants in the sports development game. Local politicians can earn substantial political capital by supporting a large project that will employ substantial numbers of people, serve as a monument to their administration, and, most importantly, please the local business sector. Cities can "fill holes" in their central business districts or surrounding districts by building these projects.

Substantial investment into urban districts and a very visible commitment to the inner city are strong "pull factors" that drive public investment into sports facilities. For fifty years federal and local policies have focused billions of dollars into downtown redevelopment. This history has engendered a public policy environment in which "bricks and mortar" programs have become the *de facto* means to urban revitalization. An understanding of this history adds another piece to the puzzle that is the sports facility development game. Sports facilities fall nicely into the litany of downtown revitalization projects that combine local initiative, mayoral and downtown business support, and big money for a project that is meant to arrest the decline of the central city. Despite what some critics contend, this "new trend" of spending inordinate amounts of money on large scale projects is not a new one at all. In the 1950 and 1960s urban America built office and hotel complexes. In the 1970s and 1980s urban America built downtown shopping malls and festival marketplaces. In the 1990s, the symbol of central city vitality (and suburban maturation) is clearly the sports stadium. The "success" of new stadia in such troubled cities as Baltimore, Cleveland, and St. Louis have done nothing to dispel that myth.

The Economics of Professional Teams Sports

As late as 1950, most sports franchises were marginal operations owned primarily by people of moderate wealth that owned a professional sports franchise because of a love for the game or a commitment to their city. The majority of teams earned very small profits, if any profit was in fact to be made, as professional sports were still working their way into the North American cultural fabric and teams had yet to capitalize on the spread

of television into homes across the continent.[34] Player salaries were still depressed because of the reserve clause[35] which gave the teams (and owners) the power to set the salary for players. At this time very few teams played in publicly financed facilities, but local government was usually called upon to provide low cost land or infrastructure as part of a new stadium or arena deal. Franchise values were generally quite low (often only a few hundred thousand dollars) reflecting the low profitability of team sports and the uncertain future of an industry that saw many franchise failures in the 1940s. Expansion of the leagues and relocation of teams[36] to new cities was becoming a more pressing issue in the 1950s, particularly in the NFL and MLB. Expansion didn't really begin in earnest until the 1960s and then the four leagues experienced vigorous expansion until 1980. In 1950, however, team relocation to new cities was on the rise as franchises jockeyed to acquire their own metropolitan market and the leagues wanted to place teams in the fast-growing regions of the West and South.

All of this is not to say that teams and leagues were not in the business of making money when possible in 1950. Teams used gimmicks and special events to bring people out to games and to increase attendance. Years of good team performance usually increased attendance, while poor performance years usually saw a drop in attendance. Teams also made money through concessions, parking, and through some media contracts (especially radio). However, as of 1950, the primary means for teams to make money was through total attendance at games and through some advertising at the stadium or arena. The days of substantial television revenues and other arena or stadium revenue were still years away.

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[34] Quirk and Fort (1992), Chapter 1.

[35] The reserve clause allowed teams to retain players at the end of their contracts at a salary set by the team. Players were the "property" of a single team unless traded or their rights were renounced by the team. Under this system, players were not free to negotiate with any team at the end of their contracts; no free agency existed.

[36] Expansion refers to the creation of new teams within a league. Expansion usually occurs to cities that have never had a franchise before. Relocation refers to the movement of a franchise from one city to another, usually because of a lack of support from their old city or because of an attractive "relocation package" offered by the new city.

Fast forward twenty years to 1970. By this time all four of the major leagues had started expanding to new cities, especially those in the West and South. The first sports facility building boom was underway and teams were beginning to actively court public dollars when building or renovating their facilities. Substantial television dollars were now an important component of the incomes of the NFL and MLB. Team owners were slowly turning over from a local business leader with an interest in the sport as a hobby, to a businessperson or corporation with an interest in using the sports franchise to make money or to help minimize their tax burden through the sheltering of money made in other pursuits in the financial losses of a sports team. An excellent example of this change is the purchase of the New York Yankees in the mid 1960s by the media corporation CBS.

By 1970, professional sports had truly begun its transformation from an era of sports as a regional and low profits industry to the age of sports as "big business" where potential profits and losses were much greater. As of 1970 player salaries were still depressed by the reserve clause, but overall salaries had started creeping up as players witnessed the huge profits that owners were reaping and, in response, began to use their sole weapon, a work stoppage, to push salaries up. Similar to player salaries, in 1970 franchises were still undervalued, but their value began to increase with the onset of corporate ownership and the spread of sports on television.[37]

Another twenty years forward, to 1990, finds the industry in the golden age of professional team sports; a period in which television and stadium/arena revenues have turned sports into the multi-billion dollar business that it is today. As for television, national broadcast revenues in the NFL totaled almost $1 billion in 1990, or almost $36 million per team. Team ownership had by this time almost completely turned over from individual, local owners to large, usually media related corporations or ownership groups with the capital assets necessary to operate in the very expensive realm of modern professional team sports. Player salaries had skyrocketed, primarily because player free

agency had come to professional sports in earnest. Because players had much greater freedom to sell their skills to the highest bidder owners could no longer artificially depress their single largest operating expense, team salaries. Consequently, team owners were forced to pursue other potential revenue sources to cover these increasing operating costs. Among these potential revenue stream were luxury boxes, club seats, and increased advertising opportunities at their stadia and arenas. As with player salaries, franchise values had also soared during the 1980s as still growing television revenues attracted diverse ownership groups, media corporations identified professional sports as a cheap programming option for their television and radio stations, and stadium revenues also grew by leaps and bounds. All of these factors made the fixed number of professional sports teams very hot properties that led to large leaps in franchise values.

Table 3.3 summarizes these changes in the economics of professional team sports between 1950 and 1990. Also provided are some snapshot figures and examples to highlight these changes.

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[37] Ibid. Chapter 2.

Table 3.3: The Economic Changes in Professional Team Sports 1950-1990

	1950	*1960*	*1970*	*1980*	*1990*
Team Ownership	Local Owners, Moderately Wealthy	Early Corporate Ownership, Era of Sports as Big Business Begins	Wealthy Owners, Beginning of Out-of-Town/Corporate Ownership	Wealthy Owners, Out-of-Town/ Corporate Ownership Continues	Very Wealthy Ownership Groups, Corporate Syndicate Ownership
Examples	*Rooney Family in Pittsburgh*	*Anheuser Busch in St. Louis*	*George Steinbrenner in New York*	*Edward B. Williams in Baltimore*	*Disney Corporation in Anaheim*
Franchise Relocation	Very High: Intercity Competition is on the Rise, Movement to South/West	Team Relocation is Very Low	Relocation to Suburbs is High, Some Inter-Metropolitan Relocation	Team Relocation at All-Time Low	Relocation on the Rise: Teams Attracted by New Stadia, Suite Deals
Examples	*Brooklyn to LA*	*None*	*Detroit's Lions to Pontiac, MI*	*None*	*Houston's Oilers to Nashville*
League Expansion	None	Begins in Early 1960s and Booms in the Late 1960s	More Expansion, but Slower than in late 1960s	Leagues Stable, Expansion on the Rise in late 1980s	Leagues Expanding Rapidly Again: Now into Tier Two Cities
Examples	*None*	*San Diego, Atlanta, Montreal*	*Seattle, Tampa*	*Orlando, Miami, Anaheim*	*Columbus, Nashville, St. Paul*
Player Salaries (in constant 1991 $$)[1]	Depressed Because of Reserve Clause	On the Rise, but Slowly	Slowly Increasing with some Player Freedom	Booming Salaries with the Onset of Free Agency	Booming Salaries in All Sports
Examples	*MLB Avg $70,000*		*MLB $100,000* *NFL $100,000* *NBA $120,000*	*MLB $225,000* *NFL $110,000* *NBA $300,000*	*MLB $800,000* *NFL $475,000* *NBA $975,000*

Table 3.3: The Economic Changes in Professional Team Sports 1950-1990 (Continued)

	1950	***1960***	***1970***	***1980***	***1990***
All Media Revenues (in absolute $$)[2] ***Examples***	Very Limited	National Contracts in Late 1960s *NFL $5.8 million (1962)*	Very Slow Rise in TV Revenues *NFL $49 million MLB ~$40 million (1970)*	Continued Slow Rise of Revenues *NFL $167 million MLB ~$100 million (1980)*	Media is a Major Revenue Source *NFL $940 million MLB $615 million (1991)*
Facility Factors (in absolute $$)[3]	Privately Built Stadia; Revenues Dependent upon Capacity of Facility	Beginning of the First Building Boom Driven by Expansion and Competition for Teams	Continuation of First Building Boom; Capacity Still the Key to Revenues	Slowdown in Facility Construction; Late 1980s see Advent of "Luxury Boxes"	Public/Private Financing; Parking, Concession, Advertising Revenues
Stadia Examples	*Milwaukee Stadium cost $7 million, no luxury boxes or club seats Capacity: 53,000*	*Houston's Astrodome cost $36.5 million Some luxury suites Capacity: 60,000*	*Seattle's Kingdome cost $67 million Some luxury suites Capacity: 60,000*	*Miami's New Stadium cost $115 million, over 30 luxury suites Capacity: 70,000*	*St. Louis' TWA Dome cost $275 million, 120 suites,$30M Naming Rights Capacity: 66,000*
Arena Examples	*LA Sports Arena cost $8 million, no suites Capacity: 16,000*	*Portland's Memorial Coliseum built for $3 million, no suites Capacity: 12,000*	*Denver's Arena cost $10 million, Some luxury suites Capacity: 17,000*	*Detroit's New Arena cost $80 million, 180 luxury suites Capacity: 21,500*	*Tampa's Ice Palace costs $153 million, 71 luxury suites Capacity: 19.500*
Franchise Values (in absolute $$)[3] ***Examples***	Depressed *(1955 Values) MLB $4 million NFL $600,000 NBA $250,000*	Slowly Growing *(1965 Values) MLB $7.5 million NFL $5 million NBA $1.5 million*	Growing *(1975 Values) MLB $11 million NFL $24 million NBA $6.5 million*	Booming *(1985 Values) MLB $40 million NFL $70 million NBA $22 million*	Booming *(1996 Values)*[5] *MLB $134 million NFL $205 million NBA $148 million*

[1] Information Derived from Quirk and Fort's *Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports* (1992) Chapter 6.
[2] Information Derived from Quirk and Fort's *Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports* (1992) pp. 9-16.
[3] Information Derived USA Today *Special Report on The Stadium Binge* September, 6, 1996.
[4] Information Derived from Quirk and Fort's *Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports* (1992), Table 3.4, p. 122.
[5] Information Derived from *Financial World* Estimates of Team Values, July 11, 1997.

An examination of the Player Salaries and the Media Revenues sections of Table 3.3 most clearly shows the transformation of professional sports into big business. Between 1970 and 1990 player salaries have more than quadrupled in the NFL, MLB, and NFL. This is the result of player free agency and the demise of the reserve clause in professional sports.[38] Player salaries have continued to boom throughout the 1990s, with professional athletes regularly signing deals that pay several million dollars per year over a number of years. Top athletes in the NBA have begun signing contracts that will pay over $100 million over the course of seven or eight years, more than twice the price of an average baseball or football franchise ten years ago. There is no need to worry for the poor owners of these franchises, though, as media revenues have grown at an even faster rate than salaries. The NFL's media revenues grew from $49 million in 1970 to $940 million in 1991, an increase of over 1,800%. MLB and the NBA have had similar media revenue increases. Only the NHL had yet to acquire a big time television contract as of 1991, although they have since acquired one through FOX Television. The leagues have also become experts at mining other sources of revenue as well. Merchandise revenues, naming rights[39] for stadia and arenas, and a wide array of advertising revenue are now a substantial part of the revenue streams for professional sports teams.

The movement of professional sports into what I am terming "big business" is perhaps most apparent in the growth of franchise values in the period examined. As of 1950, an individual interested in owning a professional sports franchise probably only needed a million dollars in capital assets to acquire a franchise. This did not preclude local families of moderate wealth from owning a team. Even as late as 1975 a wealthy individual could buy into professional sports for less than $15 million in the case of baseball, basketball, and hockey. But rising franchise values soon made it very unlikely that a single

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[38] Ibid. Chapters 5 and 6.

[39] Beginning in the 1970's corporations, individuals, or families have paid to have their name associated with a stadium or arena. These deals are usually for tens of millions of dollars over a period of twenty years or so. Bank One Ballpark in Phoenix, MCI Center in Washington, TWA Dome in St. Louis, and GM Place in Vancouver are all examples of the use of naming rights.

individual could own a team. With the explosive increase in television revenues and the concomitant rise in player costs, professional sports had to attract a new breed of owners who could afford to buy into the industry. Corporate owners became more common as did ownership groups made up of individuals who alone could not afford to own a team. Between 1975 and 1985 the average NFL team values increased over 190%, whereas the MLB and NBA saw franchise value increases of 263% and 238%. However, this was only a precursor to the golden era of sports in the 1990s. Between 1985 and 1996 franchise values absolutely skyrocketed. The average NBA franchise went from $22 million to $148 million, an increase of 572%. NFL average franchise values grew by 193% and MLB average values by 235%. Even the NHL was showing signs of joining the big leagues. Average NHL team values in 1996 were $90 million, more than twice an estimated average value of $44 million in 1991.

Since 1950, but especially since 1980, the revenues and costs of professional team sports have increased at a rate that has surprised even the leagues themselves. The NFL became the prototype of the professional sports league in the 1970s and 1980s with huge television deals, league and franchise stability, steadily growing but controlled player salaries, and increasing franchise values. MLB has had a much more checkered past with player strikes, rising salaries, and a declining share of television revenues and ticket sales. Despite these problems, Major League Baseball still has franchise valuations that continue to rise and, with the number of new baseball-only stadia, MLB's future revenues now appear more secure than they did five years ago. Similar to MLB and the NFL, the NBA and NHL have each experienced a period of prosperity unknown to either sport. Each of these leagues has emerged as truly "continental" league with teams located throughout the continent. The NBA, in particular, has seen the best of times. Whereas the NFL was the prototype of the 1980s, the NBA now leads the way for the other leagues. The NBA has led the way in merchandising, marketing the stars of the league, and in getting new facilities for its teams. Average NBA franchise values have even surpassed those of baseball, which was unthinkable for a league that almost folded in the 1970s. In sum, from

the humble beginnings of regional leagues early this century, through expansion to new areas in the 1960s and 1970s, and into the most recent golden era, professional sports has now entered the economic big leagues.

A primary factor in the transformation of sports into a multi-billion dollar business has been the revenue streams offered by sports facilities, especially those built since 1985. Why are these revenues so important to teams? Simply stated, facility revenues are so important because most of them go directly into the pockets of the team. The majority of stadia and arena revenues are not shared by teams with their leagues. The only stadia and arena revenues shared by teams are gate revenues[40], which are usually shared equally or by using a formula of 60% for the home team, 40% for the visiting team. Luxury box revenues and club seat revenues are not part of this pool. Unlike national television revenues or merchandise revenues, which are shared equally by all members of the league, revenue from luxury boxes, naming rights, facility advertising, parking, and concessions are retained by the home team. Therefore, for a team to be profitable and for it to be able to afford the high priced salaries of today's superstars, teams want and need to maximize their unshared (read stadia or arena) revenues. An analyst of sports facility financing has concluded that "we have a situation developing in sports where market size isn't the most important factor in determining a team's ability to make a profit."[41] As a consequence a premium is put upon having a stadium or arena that generates millions in revenues and that also costs the team as little as possible in principal and interest payments or operations and maintenance costs.

To illustrate the importance of facility revenues, we turn our attention to the excellent work of *Financial World* magazine. *Financial World* magazine has studied and estimated team franchise values, team revenues, and team costs for all franchises in the four major leagues since 1991. The magazine has been under great fire from the sports

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[40] Gate revenues are the income generated from ticket sales.

leagues for undertaking these studies and publishing the rather startling results, but the study authors remain convinced that their estimates are rather close to the actual costs and revenues experienced by these teams.[42] In just this short period of time their studies have highlighted the importance of stadium and arena revenues for sports teams. A May 1995 cover story on the "Suite Deals" highlights that new facilities have been deemed essential to competing in the modern sports industry. Baseball teams like Baltimore's Orioles and Denver's Rockies and football teams like St. Louis' Rams and Atlanta's Falcons have shown tremendous increases in franchise value related directly to a new stadium and not performance on the playing field.

Table 3.4 illustrates the value increases determined by *Financial World* for several franchises that have moved into new facilities since 1992. Note that these increases have occurred in all four sports. Also note that hockey franchises are significantly less valuable than the other three sports. However, new arenas are driving up the average NHL franchise value very quickly.

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[41] Marie Fioramonti, a financial analyst for Prudential Power Funding Associates, quoted in Ozanian (1995), p. 47.

[42] The professional sports leagues have been very secretive regarding their actual revenues and expenses. The only team that actual figures are known for is the NFL's Green Bay Packers, because that franchise is publicly owned. *Financial World's* figures represent their best estimates of team revenues and expenses.

Table 3.4: Franchise Value Increases after New Stadia and Arena Openings (Dollars in Millions)[1]

Team	*League*	*Year Facility Opened*	*Assessed Value Prior to Opening*	*Assessed Value After Opening*	*Percent Change*
San Jose Sharks	NHL	1993	$43 (1992)	$66 (1994)	53%
Cleveland Indians	MLB	1994	$100 (1993)	$125 (1995)	25%
Chicago Bulls	NBA	1994	$149 (1993)	$178 (1995)	19%
Chicago Black Hawks	NHL	1994	$80 (1993)	$122 (1995)	53%
Texas Rangers	MLB	1994	$123 (1993)	$138 (1995)	12%
Colorado Rockies	MLB	1995	$117 (1994)	$184 (1996)	57%
St. Louis (LA) Rams	NFL	1995	$153 (1994)	$243 (1996)	59%
Portland Trail Blazers	NBA	1995	$132 (1994)	$179 (1996)	36%

[1] All franchise values are taken from *Financial World* magazine's analyses of team values. Issue dates are: July 9, 1991; July 7, 1992; May 25, 1993; May 10, 1994; May 9, 1995; May 20, 1996; and July 11, 1997.

In each of these cases franchise values increased substantially in the years after the opening of a new facility. Changes in team value related to new facilities, like those shown, in Table 3.4 have led *Financial World's* analysts to conclude that in professional sports of the 1990s "a new facility is a necessity rather than a luxury."[43] No longer is market size the determinant of team revenues. New arenas have allowed teams in smaller markets to compete financially with teams in much larger markets. While in previous decades a New York or Chicago franchise could expect greater revenues than teams in Baltimore or Dallas because of their substantially greater market, the modern professional sports landscape is now more dependent upon the revenues generated by sports facilities. The increasing importance of revenue streams related to sports facilities and not market

[43] Starr, Jason. (1994) "If You Build It...", *Financial World*, May 10, p. 64.

sizes has several important implications on the relationships between teams and their home cities. These implication include:

1) Teams want a new facility now and not in ten or twenty years.

Now that the huge revenues that new facilities can produce are evident to all, most teams want a new stadium or arena in the very short term, even if they received a new facility or substantial upgrades to their existing facility ten or fifteen years ago. The new wave of stadia and arenas offer much greater revenue potential than those facilities built fifteen years ago. Older facilities simply do not have the luxury boxes, advertising space, and concession options of newer facilities. Some cities and teams have turned to remodeling existing facilities, including Irving's Cowboys Stadium, Edmonton's Northlands Coliseum, and Oakland's stadia and arena. However, remodeled facilities are not as attractive to teams because it limits their options and they do not generate the excitement and publicity that a new stadium or arena do.

A consequence of these facility demands is that many teams are moving out of facilities less than twenty years old. In fact, Miami's arena has been deemed economically obsolete because of its small capacity and small number of luxury suites despite opening in 1988. As a result, that metropolitan area is now building not one, but two new arenas to replace a structure that has at least ten years remaining on construction payment schedule. Similarly, Charlotte's ten year old arena might soon be replaced by a new arena with more luxury boxes and better concessions. As for stadia, Minneapolis' Metrodome, which opened in 1982 at a cost of $75 million, is cited by its tenants as economically obsolete. Both the MLB's Twins and the NFL's Vikings each want a new stadium to replace a facility that was promised to solve these teams revenue problems during a decade long debate in the 1970s.[44] In short, the desire for new facilities and the revenue streams attached to them is one principal reason behind the most recent building boom. It remains

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[44] Klobuchar, Amy (1982). *Uncovering the Dome*. Waveland Press, Inc.: Prospect Heights, Illinois.

to be seen whether this most recent spate of facilities will have a longer shelf life than those built in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

2) Teams are more willing to turn to the public sector to take on the costs of new facilities to minimize their costs.

If teams can transfer the costs of constructing and operating a stadium or arena to the public sector, then they will have greater profits or at least have more revenues for their operations. Principal and interest payments for construction costs of a new facility are usually several millions of dollars a year so the transfer of these payments to the public sector is highly desirable. What business would turn down a public sector agreement to provide most of the funding to build a new facility, with the full range of amenities, and then asks for a rental fee well below the market value for that facility? Clearly, professional sports teams have been very successful at transferring these costs to the public sector. The previous chapter illustrated this by noting that the public share of the construction costs of sports facilities has been very high since the 1960s.

3) Not only do teams want new facilities, but they want very luxurious facilities with the full range of amenities to increase their revenues through luxury boxes, more advertising space, facility naming rights, better concessions, etc.

Stadium and arena revenues are now the main source of potential revenue growth available to most professional sports teams. Television revenues will continue to grow, but at a much slower rate than in previous years. Ticket prices can only rise so much before people begin to spend their money on other activities. Merchandise sales continue to rise, but fans can only buy so many t-shirts, caps, or other knick-knacks. Therefore, teams want (or need if you listen to their arguments) a new stadium or arena with the full range of amenities to continue reaping substantial profits and pay rising player salaries.

Some commentators have recognized that the stadium or arena now seems to be taking the place of the sporting event as the central attraction itself.[45] The newest set of facilities now offer much more than just a day at the ballgame. Instead, these facilities include restaurants, play areas for children, team shops, game arcades, other retail spaces, and even a hotel all under a retractable roof that guarantees access to the sun on those warm days in Seattle, but closes out the oppressive heat of Phoenix or the bitter cold of Milwaukee. Plans for the new San Francisco football stadium call for a regional mall to be connected to that playing facility. There is now a booming business for stadium tours in which people pay to travel and visit these new stadia and also happen to see a baseball or football game while there. The facilities are the lure for these trips, not the teams. The stadium or arena is now part of the act, rather than simply serving as the setting for it.

Why is this important? As evidence has shown, team attendance and revenues have been historically tied to team performance.[46] Although attendance has generally been on the rise over the past half century, one generality holds: when a team plays well, people come out to see them win; when a team plays poorly, people tend to stay away. The most recent incarnation of stadia and arenas attempt to make team performance secondary to coming out to a game and experiencing an event at a modern, attractive facility with a variety of attractions related to, but not dependent upon the two teams competing on the field, court, or ice. These "extras", teams argue, are necessary to insure that attendance and revenues remain high in championship years and in years where the team is well down in the standings.

However, these "extras" come at substantial cost, usually ones passed on to the public. The stadium and arena construction costs in Tables 2.1-2.3 show that these new facilities cost hundreds of millions of dollars. In Table 3.3 the facility factors section shows that arena construction costs for the typical arena were less than $20 million as late as

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[45] Bale, John (1993). *Sport, Space, and the City*. Routledge: New York; Danielson (1997).
[46] Quirk and Fort (1992), Chapter 2.

1967, the year that Los Angeles' Great Western Forum opened. Arenas now cost in the range of $120 to $240 million. Stadium costs have also doubled, tripled and, in some case, even quadrupled. Seattle built its stadium for $67 million in 1976, but a new stadium will cost a metropolitan area a minimum of $200 million today. Sports facilities are no longer the simple, functional buildings that they once were. New stadia and arenas now must have large replay screens, at least one-hundred luxury boxes, wide concourses, restaurants, and other amenities to be "financially viable".

4) Teams are unwilling to share revenues from facility amenities, because then, they argue, they will be unable to compete in this new era of sports as big business.

Despite the increased revenues that are generated by these modern facilities, teams are paying less rent and less of the operations and maintenance costs than they were back in the 1960s and 1970s. Even with substantial public investment in new facilities, as in the case of Chicago White Sox discussed earlier in this chapter, teams have been successful at negotiating lease arrangements that guarantee most revenues to the teams and have allocated most costs to the public.[47] The threat of relocation or claims of financial losses have driven down the franchise costs in lease arrangements with public facilities thereby costing taxpayers even more money, albeit indirectly. Further, the cumulative effects of leases have been of great advantage to the sports teams. Each successive lease arrangement heightens the expectations of teams for their leases.[48] For example, an NFL team can point to the very generous lease deal in St. Louis and make clear that their franchise cannot compete unless they receive a similar deal. These lease arguments are further strengthened by the situation at the negotiating table; negotiations for facility leases place almost all advantages with the teams. "Lease terms reflect the scarcity of teams, interdependence of teams in a league, control over the supply of teams by leagues, and competition among places for major league franchises, all of which tend to drive prices

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[47] Danielson (1997), pp. 230-234.
[48] Ibid. p. 231.

down."[49] In sum, places are building more facilities, paying more for these facilities, and receiving far less in rent and other payments for these facilities than they were twenty years ago.

5) Teams are much less place-bound and are more than willing to move to acquire the revenue streams offered by new modern facilities.

In the 1950s and 1960s, franchises moved in response to open markets or to escape crowded markets. New facilities provided some incentives to footloose teams, but relocation was generally a function of market size. This is no longer the case. The NFL has experienced a number of franchise relocations in recent years in which teams moved from larger markets to smaller markets in response to a very lucrative stadium package. Examples of this include moves from Los Angeles to St. Louis, Los Angeles to Oakland, Baltimore to Indianapolis, and Houston to Nashville. In this golden era of professional sports, facility revenues and a generous lease arrangement can overcome the limitations of a mid-size or smaller market. The footlooseness of teams is therefore on the rise as the determining factor in financial viability can be offered by areas previously regarded as too small for professional sports, like Nashville, Columbus, or Raleigh.

It is also important to recall that these moves may just as easily be intra-metropolitan relocations as well. Central cities have been particularly active in luring teams back to the central business district through the offer of new, modern, money generating facilities at little or no cost to the teams. Cleveland, Detroit, Boston, Washington, and San Francisco have brought or will soon bring teams back downtown. However, suburban jurisdictions in Miami and Washington have successfully attracted teams from central city sites to suburban locations. Every one of these moves, be they intercity or intra-metropolitan, are directly linked to a new or remodeled facility. The modern economics of professional sports have created a situation in which a new stadium or arena is the defining characteristic of success. Within this environment teams demand new facilities, demand

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[49] Ibid. p. 231.

lease concessions, and prepare to move if these demands are not addressed in a timely fashion.

Conclusion

In Chapter 2 it was clearly shown that investment into sports stadia and arenas is not something that began in the past ten to fifteen years. While metropolitan areas have for decades been major investors in the basic infrastructure of the city, have continuously provided a wide array of services to businesses and homes, and have also built and operated many of the recreational amenities that these urban areas offer, the historical level of public investment into sports facilities has remained pretty small, especially when compared to today's levels. When the level of investment into major league sports facilities since 1950 was investigated, some interesting findings were encountered. Direct public investment into sports facilities is a recent development, with some early publicly built stadia in the 1950s, but without any significant and widespread investment into sports facilities until the first building boom that began in the 1960s. The level of public investment that originated with a few cities in the 1950s now is commonplace in most major urban areas and many smaller ones. What is most disturbing is that the high level of public investment in the 1960s and 1970s shows no indication of subsiding, even with the growing participation of the private sector in the construction of highly profitable sports arenas. Sports facilities in the 1980s and 1990s cost much more than in earlier building periods, in part due to inflation, but mainly due to the "extras" deemed necessary by teams and their landlords. These costs are more often than not being borne by public agencies and financed with sources of money linked to public coffers. What is at the heart of this substantial public investment and why haven't metropolitan areas given up on what has been termed a "zero sum game"?[50]

This chapter has focused upon just this question. Three primary forces behind the high level of public investment into sports facilities were identified and discussed.

Competition between cities, the reliance of most inner cities upon a bricks and mortar redevelopment strategies exemplified by the sports facility, and the changing economics of professional team sports have created the monster that today is the second sports facility building boom. These forces have come together in the 1990s to the tune of at least fifty-six new facilities at a total cost of around $10 billion.

Competition between older industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest first began in the 1950s when cities like Milwaukee and Kansas City were able to lure teams from Boston and Philadelphia. However, the emergence of metropolitan areas in the South and West upped the bidding war substantially. In the 1970s a new threat arose as suburban areas wishing to distinguish themselves from their central cities offered new stadia and arenas at little or no cost to teams that were more than happy to move to a new arena or stadium outside of the crumbling urban core. This competition, be it regional, intercity, or intra-metropolitan had two important consequences for the level of public investment into sports facilities. First, the number of suitors for footloose teams was increased substantially. Teams could now shop around at all levels of geography for the best deal on a new stadium or arena by looking across the country, throughout the region, or even within the metropolitan area. Second, related to the first, the increased number of would-be-suitors naturally led to an increase in the bids and level of public incentives offered for these teams. The 1960s saw teams demand new facilities, but agree to share the operation and maintenance costs of these facilities. By the 1990s new facilities were only part of financial packages that included other revenue streams like parking and concessions, facility naming rights, and luxury box revenues for these facilities in addition to no responsibility for operations and maintenance costs. Competition between city and suburban suitors has increased the power of the teams to demand and negotiate more lucrative offers at almost every turn.

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[50] Danielson (1997); Rosentraub (1997a).

However, if competition between cities was the only factor, then certainly some cities would have opted out of a game that demanded hundreds of millions of dollars to play. An equally important, but more insidious force was clearly at work as well. Downtown redevelopment in older industrial cities has always relied upon sizable, expensive, and politically visible projects to restore the urban core to its days of glory. Mirroring the physical development strategies of their older cousins to the North, emerging cities in the South and West that wished to establish their downtowns as the cultural and economic hearts of their metropolitan areas also invested heavily in these same large projects. Since 1950, cities across North America have built an amazing array of projects, each of which has promised to rebuild the city and bring jobs and people back downtown. Despite the startling lack of success of most of these projects, they have continued to be popular among mayors, city councils, and particularly with downtown business interests (to whom mayors and city councils are usually beholden). A look at the suburban political landscape reveals a comparable "edifice complex" as local officials insist that a new stadium or arena will "put our city on the map".

What is implied by this urban revitalization strategy and this suburban development strategy is that most governments are not the dimwitted victims of the amoral, money-grubbing professional sports business. While certainly some areas have negotiated dreadful deals that promise little direct return on their investments, most have entered into the negotiating process with their eyes wide open and their priorities clear. The extent of the sports facility boom must also be linked to the (re)development goals and economic development strategies of the public sector. The spread of the North American population to new urban areas and into the suburbs may have created a highly competitive environment that highly favors the footloose sports franchise. However, within this competitive environment jurisdictions must still choose to compete and enter into these bidding wars. When they do so with a politically popular and long-relied upon strategy like bricks and mortar development, then hundreds of millions of public dollars no longer seems to be such an insurmountable obstacle.

Despite the establishment of a competitive environment and the propensity of urban and suburban jurisdictions to arrive at project-oriented economic development strategies, one last factor is necessary to the most recent sports facility boom. Competition has led areas to bid for teams and offer substantial subsidies for teams. Downtown revitalization or suburban development goals help to push jurisdictions to build facilities in specific areas and provide sizable dollars to address their specific goals. These are the pull factors that attract cities to invest into sports stadia and arenas. What is missing in this discussion is the "push factor" from the professional sports teams themselves. To summarize from earlier, the modern economics of professional sports, best understood as rising costs and the leveling off of revenue traditional sources like television, have led teams to clamor and demand new sports facilities at an alarming rate. To compete in this golden era of professional sports, teams require the substantial revenue streams and minimal costs that a new, publicly funded arena or stadium offer. Teams push for new facilities, not simply because the high level of metropolitan competition allows them to do so, but because they must be in these high revenue, low cost facilities to compete in the modern era of professional team sports. In the 1960s and 1970s, teams and leagues could have pushed for greater subsidies and better facilities, but they did not because the franchises were very profitable and income streams from television, merchandise, and ticket sales were on the rise. With free agency driving player costs through the roof, these traditional revenue streams cannot maintain income levels like they once did, so the teams have turned to new facilities to address their revenue needs.

The modern sports stadia and arena has evolved from its early days as a cathedral, through the 1960s and 1970s when it was a "municipal investment", to recent years when it is cited as a sports palace or amusement park built to attract people back downtown or to convince locals and visitors alike that a suburban area really has become a big league place. Whatever the description, sports stadia and arenas have now become a very desirable property for the places that help build them and the teams that play in them. Sports facilities represent one of the best examples of one of the tenets of the post-modern

economy; the marriage of public and private interests (and dollars). Because of this and because of the huge level of public investment into these facilities, a great deal of academic research, government studies, and private money have focused upon this topic over the past thirty years. It is to this research that we turn in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Sports and Economic Development: Grand Promises, Little Return

"Most arguments for building stadiums and hosting professional baseball and football teams depend on a promise of economic development."

-Charles Euchner, author of Playing the Field[1]

"The studies in this volume uniformly conclude that metropolitan and central city development is not likely to be affected by a sports team or facility... These results are in sharp contrast to the claims of dozens of promotional studies that have been performed by consulting firms under contract with the affected city or team."

-Sports economists Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist[2]

"As the focus for justifying the public's investment in sports facilities has shifted from a reliance on regional development to one that stresses the enhancement of downtown, it seems important to determine if nostalgic ballparks, futuristic domed stadiums, or luxurious high-technology arenas, located in a downtown area, can enhance the centrality of core cities..."

-Mark Rosentraub, author of Major League Losers[3]

The sporting arena has long been a fertile ground for authors and scholars interested in depicting and studying the struggle of man against man, team against team, or city against city. Unlike many other recreational pursuits, the playing fields of team sports offer an immediate glance into the rousing, competitive, and contentious nature that is the human condition. From these contests an author can utilize such age old story lines of winners and losers, heroes and goats, and great struggles for victory and devastating stories of defeat. Many authors and scholars have come to realize that sports offer insight into the economic, social, and cultural relations of the human species. Within the past fifty

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[1] Euchner (1993), p. 54.

[2] Noll, Roger and Andrew Zimbalist (Eds.) (1997) *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums*. Brookings Institute: Washington, D.C., p. 496.

years, the development of the professional sports industry and the proliferation of publicly financed sports facilities have provided a growing circle of scholars with a new set of cultural, social, political, and economic relationships to explore. The viability of the sports industry has long been a favorite setting for research for economists. Political scientists and community power scholars have been investigating the relationship between teams and the local power structure for years. These more scholarly works have been augmented by works from the commercial press that depict the cultural and social effects of franchise relocations or team championships.

Prior to 1950 there was very little study of the sports industry outside of a handful of ethnographic studies and the usual wealth of newspaper accounts of key sporting events. However, with the expansion of the industry in the 1960s and 1970s came an explosion of work. The economics of professional sports have proven to be an especially popular topic of study since the early 1960s. The growth of the industry, the marketing of players, the determination of player salaries, and the rise in team values have made the reputations of many scholars, most of them economists. Another ground well-covered by writers has been the legal intricacies of the various leagues and their ability to maintain a near monopoly in their respective sports. The legal boundaries of professional team sports have long been cloudy and since early this century lawsuits have been a regular part of the sports landscape. Even to this day economic and legal studies of the industry account for the majority of studies undertaken and completed.

The study of sports facilities mirrors the above in that very little was written on this topic until recent decades. Within the past twenty years, however, political scientists and public policy researchers have come to realize the fertile ground that professional sports provide to researchers interested in the political relationships between cities or political relationships within the local power structure. Further, the growth in cooperation

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[3] Rosentraub, Mark (1997b). "Stadiums and Urban Space" in Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist's (Eds.) *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums*. Brookings Institute:

between the public and private sectors, more completely understood as the economic and political relationship between a private enterprise (the team) and a public entity (usually a city or county), provide a textbook "laboratory" to investigate the processes and outcomes when these two sectors come together to pursue different, but tightly interwoven goals. Recent work has moved beyond a general study of public-private partnerships to address the broader question of whether or not public investment into a facility explicit benefiting a private enterprise is in the public interest.

Despite their popularity with cities as redevelopment projects and the recent boom in their numbers, there is surprisingly little research from planning scholars on sports arenas and stadia. In cities of all sizes these projects have been touted as the linchpins of many redevelopment strategies, yet few urban planning-oriented studies exist. The leading minds on this subject are usually economists and political scientists more interested in tracing income flows and documenting policy outcomes than the effects of these projects on the built form. While planning scholars have largely turned a blind eye towards sports facilities, a great wealth of planning-oriented information does exist in the form of publicly-commissioned studies of proposed or existing projects by planning departments and consultants. It is this "urban planning gap" that this study attempts to address.

The task at hand, then, is to outline this rather broad range of work and distill key findings from it. I will begin by outlining the research into the three major economic development rationales for public investment into sports stadia. Investigation into these three rationales represents a significant portion of the literature on sports facilities. In the following section I review literature surrounding the micro-level, or microarea impacts of professional sports stadia. This is an emerging area of study and a growing issue in local debates about sports stadia. As American cities have attempted to revitalize their downtowns through a set of physical development strategies, both intended to generate activity and spur development in the central city, research has attempted to assess the

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Washington, D.C., p. 180.

success of these strategies and point the way towards more efficient and more equitable means of restoring inner cities. Finally, I close the chapter by linking this body of work to the study at hand. In this final section I outline the goals and central questions of the dissertation, laying out a basic structure that leads into the methodology review of the following chapter.

Economic Development Rationales for Public Investment into a Sports Facility

When a government investigates the prudence of investing millions of dollars into a sports facility, pro-stadium forces usually offer up a number of economic development related reasons that, from their view, clearly support public investment into a new facility. The pro-stadium argument usually centers on three economic development related rationales: 1) the ability of the public sector to realize a net profit from the revenues generated by a new facility, 2) the ability of a sports facility to generate spin-off benefits in the local economy sufficient to cover the construction and operation costs of the facility, and 3) the ability of a sports facility to generate enough overall image-related benefits for the surrounding region to cover facility costs.

The Stadium as a "Good Investment"

In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s the first line of argument for building a new stadium or arena is that a jurisdiction can actually recognize a net profit from a new facility. This argument holds that when considering construction costs and land costs and comparing those to the revenue streams from the facility (including concessions, advertising, and lease payments), net profits are possible from the stadium itself. [4] These profits would be on top of any indirect benefits generated by the facility. For years there has been a belief that over time facility revenues will more than cover the costs for a new facility, provided that certain conditions hold.

By far the best study investigating the potential of sports stadia to generate net profits for the public was by Dean Baim in his book *The Sports Stadium as a Municipal Investment.*[5] Baim studied fifteen stadia, thirteen publicly owned[6], most built during the building boom of the 1960s and 1970s. Baim investigated the profitability of these municipally owned facilities; over their economic life were these facilities money makers for their municipality? In his calculations of public costs Baim considered construction costs (where applicable), foregone property taxes, operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, and other related costs. Revenues included lease payments by teams, concession/advertising/parking revenues (where applicable), and other related revenues. Baim's analysis found that in only three (and perhaps a fourth) of the fifteen stadia did a facility generate enough revenues to cover the *operating costs* of the facility.[7] That is, over their economic life most of these facilities were not able to generate enough direct revenues to cover their O&M costs. This finding was attributed to underestimated operating expenses and also to the renegotiation of existing leases with the professional sports teams that resulted in lower lease payments from these stadium tenants.

For example, Anaheim's Stadium cost in the neighborhood of $16 million to construct, with an additional $4 million for land costs for a new baseball facility that would hold approximately 43,250 persons.[8] In six years of the study period 1967-1991, the revenue streams from that facility were more than adequate to cover the O&M costs of the facility; Anaheim Stadium realized a (healthy) profit for the city in those years. Baim even goes so far as to characterize Anaheim Stadium as "one of the most successful facilities of its kind", because the city attracted a baseball and football team to the stadium

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[4] It is important to note that this argument does not consider indirect costs, like infrastructure, when attempting to balance the books. When these are considered this argument can even more quickly be dismissed.

[5] Baim (1994).

[6] The two privately financed stadia were Dodger Stadium, in Los Angeles, and Foxboro Stadium, in Foxboro a suburb of Boston. However, in each case the teams received substantial subsidies in cheap or free land and major infrastructure improvements.

[7] Baim (1994), pp. 165-168.

[8] Ibid, see Chapter 8.

and Anaheim is now "on the map" of professional sports cities. However, despite all of these benefits, the ANPV of Anaheim Stadium was a negative $4.27 million over the study period, with no hope of ever reaching a positive ANPV because of lease restrictions.

Perhaps more important for the discussion at hand, Baim found that in every one of these cases the *facilities were unable to generate enough direct revenues to cover their construction costs*. In none of the cases where the city or county government paid for the stadium were the revenues from the facility enough to cover the O&M costs and the construction costs of the facility. In fact, in none of these cases were the direct revenues even close to achieving this. In his closing remarks, Baim concludes that subsides to professional teams typically "takes the form of unrecovered construction costs."[9] Baim's findings largely resemble those of an earlier study published by Benjamin Okner. [10] Okner found that in 1970-1971 of thirty publicly owned facilities, only five were turning a profit when total expenses were compared to facility income.[11] Those that were turning a profit were generally older arenas that had low amortization payments and larger numbers of events. Those facilities that were losing money were newer baseball and football stadia, with six of the thirty losing over $1 million in the 1970-1971 season. Similarly, a more recent Quirk and Fort study of twenty-six publicly owned facilities determined that all of them experienced a net operating loss when construction costs and foregone property taxes were also included in the analysis.[12] In fact, four of the facilities were found to have an estimated annual subsidy of over *$10 million* in 1989 dollars, with the Superdome in New Orleans requiring an annual subsidy of a whopping $42 million![13]

There are two limitations to these studies that are important for the discussion here, although they do not affect the central conclusion. First, these studies focused mainly

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[9] Ibid. p. 217.
[10] Benjamin Okner (1974). "Subsidies of Stadiums and Arenas" in Roger Noll's (Ed.) *Government and the Sports Business*. Brookings Institute: Washington, D.C.: pp. 325-347.
[11] Ibid, pp. 346-347.
[12] Quirk and Fort (1992), pp. 168-172.

upon sports stadia with little consideration of sports arenas. Sports stadia are 40,000-60,000 seat (and larger) facilities that usually host a limited number of events during a year, usually between fifty and one-hundred, but occasionally as many as one-hundred and fifty. Sports arenas are smaller, 15,000-22,000 seat facilities that host a much wider array of events, including concerts, circuses, and community events, usually totaling well over one-hundred and fifty events per year. Arenas usually cost less to construct (although their costs are rising), demand less in terms of land and infrastructure, and can play host to more events.[14] For these reasons, arenas can more easily turn a profit than stadia, even going so far as to cover their construction costs. Okner's findings support this conclusion; those facilities that were turning a profit were generally sports arenas and not stadia.

For example, the city of Seattle recently spent upwards of $100 million to renovate their existing sports arena for their NBA tenant, the SuperSonics. In so doing, they increased the capacity from 15,000 to over 17,000 which includes 1,700 club seats and 58 new luxury boxes. Due to their lease agreement with the Sonics the city retains a substantial percentage of the revenue streams and these revenues more than cover the amortized renovation costs incurred by the city. In fact, the city realizes an annual profit of approximately $1 million that it invests into the Seattle Center. Perhaps the strongest evidence that sports arenas can be profitable is the number of facilities that have been built by private funding in recent years. Of the twenty-two new arenas opening between 1990 and 1997, twelve were predominately financed with private funding, with eight of the twelve financed entirely privately. In these cases NBA and NHL team owners recognize that the full range of revenues generated by a new arena can cover construction and O&M costs, with ample revenues left over to generate a substantial profit for the owner. Whereas stadia have proven to be poor investments when the full range of costs are considered, sports arenas offer governments an opportunity to turn a profit on large scale, crowd generating projects.

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[13] Ibid. pp. 170-171, Table 4.16.
[14] Petersen (1996), pp. 8-9.

A second shortcoming is that these studies focused on sports stadia built in an earlier era, pre-1990. Some stadium proponents have suggested that studies of stadia built in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s greatly misrepresent the financial picture of newer stadia. They argue that the most recent building boom has produced facilities so unlike their cousins of twenty years ago that those studies should be ignored and new studies need to be undertaken.[15] The stadia studied by Baim did not contain many of the major revenue sources that are included in all new facilities built today; these include club seats and luxury boxes[16], pouring rights[17], and a wide array of advertising opportunities, like the naming rights to the stadium.[18] This set of revenue streams affects the possible profitability of any stadium built in the 1990s. Stadium naming rights alone are generating upwards of $5 million a year for a new facility.[19] Club seats and luxury boxes can easily account for tens of millions of dollars a year to whoever controls those dollars. Add into this advertising revenue, which is on the rise due to more signage and other trends that promote advertising (like electronic signage), concession revenue, and parking revenue and modern sports stadia appear to be capable of generating enough revenue to cover their total costs. For example, *Financial World* has estimated that MLB's Baltimore Orioles, Cleveland Indians, and Texas Rangers all pulled in more than $20 million in venue

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[15] For example, see Chema (1996).

[16] Club seats are separate seating areas that usually include wait service, a wider range of food and gift items, and separate bathroom facilities from that of the general audience. For these extras patrons usually pay a yearly premium of up to a few thousand dollars. Luxury seating, or "skyboxes", are separate seating areas that usually include ten to twenty seats, a separate bathroom for the box, a stocked bar, and cable televisions. Luxury boxes are marketed to corporations and sell for anywhere between $50,000 and $200,000 per season.

[17] Major soda and beer vendors purchase exclusive rights to vend their products in a new facility. These rights insure that a vendor, like Coca-Cola, has exclusive access to fans a those events. These rights are usually worth several million dollars to the facility annually.

[18] A major revenue source for new or existing stadia is the name of the facility. The owner of the facility sells the name to a corporation (usually) who will enjoy the name recognition for their products and services. Airlines and Communication firms have been major purchasers of these rights in recent years. For example, Anaheim Stadium is now know as Edison International Field of Anaheim, for which communications firm Edison International paid Disney (the owner of the Anaheim Angels MLB team) approximately $28 million. Source: *Inside the Ownership of Professional Team Sports* (1998) Team Marketing Report.

[19] Los Angeles' Staples Center has a naming rights deal with the Staples office superstore for $100 million over twenty years.

revenues for 1996 alone.[20] At over $20 million a year, these new facilities could likely cover their O&M costs and their annual payment for the construction costs of these facilities. When the revenues from the newest sports stadia are analyzed, it is clear that the modern sports stadium[21] can easily generate enough revenues to cover the construction costs and the operation and maintenance costs for that facility.

The above figures indicate that sports stadia might actually be wise investments for the public sector. However, one major caveat quickly ruins any possibility of this. The ability to generate these revenues is different from the disbursement of these revenues. The current market conditions in both Major League Baseball and the National Football League allocate almost all facility revenues to the sports teams. As discussed in Chapter 3, teams require new facilities so that they can compete economically in the modern era of professional team sports. The public may finance and build a new facility that generates huge sums of money, but these revenues are signed over to the teams during lease negotiations. Most critics point to the near monopoly status of the sports leagues as the principal reason this occurs.[22] It might be useful to look at a sample lease arrangement to understand the full impact of these giveaways to teams in new sports facilities. A look at the lease agreement between the Baltimore Orioles and the Maryland Stadium Authority provides a typical example of the disbursement of stadium revenues. (Table 4.1)

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[20] Badenhausen and Nikolov (1997).

[21] Again, by "modern sports stadium" I mean to suggest those stadia that include the full range of revenue generating sources like club seating, luxury boxes, and naming rights.

[22] See Euchner (1993), Danielson (1997), Noll and Zimbalist (1997) and Rosentraub (1997a).

Table 4.1: Stadium Lease Arrangement Between the Maryland Stadium Authority and the Baltimore Orioles

Stadium Revenue Source	*Orioles Share*
Admission Revenues	93.0% of net revenues
Concession Revenues	92.5% of net revenues
Parking Revenues	50% of net receipts
Advertising Revenues	75% of net revenues
Luxury Suite Revenues	90% of net revenues
Club Level/Seat License Revenues	92.5% of revenues
Naming Rights	0%, name to Camden Yards not sold

Source: *Inside the Ownership of Professional Team Sports.* (1998) Team Marketing Report: p. 44.

The Orioles receive the lion's share of all revenues generated by their new stadium, despite the fact that the team covered far less than 10% of the construction costs for the ballpark. The state of Maryland gets very little of the most lucrative of these revenue streams, receiving only 10% of luxury suite revenues and 7.5% of club seat revenues. Most teams in Major League Baseball have similar lease agreements in which the teams receive a far greater share of stadium revenue streams than the public sector. In the National Football League similar lease arrangements for publicly owned facilities are also the norm, as most teams get the majority of luxury box revenues.[23] What Table 4.1 and the preceding discussion are meant to show is that although modern sports stadia generate revenue streams well above $20 million (and well over $40 million if gate receipts are included) per year, the vast majority of these revenues are bargained away in lease negotiations with the teams. The sports leagues hold a near monopoly position and, as a result, they hold significant power in the lease negotiation process; the teams have many suitors, but the cities must deal with a set number of teams.[24] Further, as each new lease arrangement (or "suite deal") allocates a higher percentage of these stadium revenue streams to the teams, the leagues set the minimum standard for an "acceptable lease" at a level that guarantees almost all facility revenues to the teams.

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[23] Quirk and Fort (1992), pp. 149-152.
[24] Ibid, pp. 144-145; Danielson (1997), pp. 230-234.

What all of this information points to is the rather distasteful conclusion that sports facilities have the *ability* to be money-makers for the public, but that this ability is greatly diminished by the economic realities of professional team sports in the 1990s. What is most disturbing is that the recent high costs of the stadia themselves is not the problem.[25] In fact, the advent of most of these new revenue streams in modern sports stadia actually should make the sports stadium a *more attractive* investment for a public agency. The primary factor that turns the possibility of a good investment into a clear monetary loser is the ability of the sports teams to demand and receive the lion's share of the revenue streams from the palatial facilities. Because of the powerful position of the sports teams at the negotiating table, these revenue streams are bargained away by the public and as a consequence the public is left to pay the construction costs through indirect (and often regressive) measures like sales tax increases or even higher hotel-motel taxes.

The argument that the public should invest in sports stadia because of an opportunity to realize a profit from the facility itself is seriously suspect. In fact, this argument, although a common one in the 1960s and 1970s, is not offered up anymore when stadium proposals are publicly debated. Sophisticated economic analyses have determined that sports facilities, and in particular sports stadia, are difficult to turn into revenue generators. These facilities are now recognized as the subsidies to sports teams that they have always been. With that, stadium proponents have turned their attention to a second economic development rationale for public investment into sports facilities.

Sports Stadia as Economic Development Engines

In recent years the "stadium as a good deal" rationale has been replaced by the newest mantra for stadium proponents, one best summed up by Rosentraub with the oft-quoted statement "if you built it, they will come" with the 'they' being new jobs, new

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[25] Notwithstanding some recent facility "innovations" that teams argue are necessary, like retractable roofs, swimming pools, and in-stadia sports pubs that add tens of millions to the final price tag while doing little more than lining the pockets of the teams themselves.

development, and expanding tax revenues.[26] Rather than directly turning a profit on the facility itself, it is argued that the public will receive a substantial return on their investment via a strengthened economy, spin-off development surrounding the stadium, and increased tax revenues, including increased property tax revenues, sales tax revenues, and business tax revenues. Pro-stadium advocates argue that the total economic development impacts of a sports team and a sports facility make an investment of several hundred million dollars in a new facility well worth it to a city. The franchises generate activity in the local economy by bringing fans to the stadium to spend their money on food, souvenirs, and hotel rooms. This spending, particularly that of tourists from faraway places, is captured in the local economy and local businesses prosper, districts are invigorated, and tax revenues rise.[27] The direct economic benefits of the stadium are expected to generate such a windfall to the local economy as to cover the costs associated with hosting a baseball or football club. This argument is akin to the argument for "tax increment financing" in which public dollars are spent up-front on redevelopment projects, usually in the form of infrastructure improvements. These public costs will then be offset, or even returned at a net profit, by tax revenues generated as a result of this initial investment.

The economic development benefits promised by sports teams are most clearly expressed in the economic impact analyses prepared by consultants usually hired by the team or by the local government. These consultants attempt to quantify the total economic impact of a sports team and of a new sports facility on the metropolitan economy, usually in the form of a per year estimate. For example, to determine the importance of the Seattle Mariners to the local economy, King County (WA) hired a consulting firm that estimated the club's total annual economic impact at $142 million to the state economy, $111 million

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[26] Rosentraub *et al* (1994).

[27] Johnson, Arthur (1995). *Minor League Sports and Local Economic Development*. University of Illinois Press: Chicago, pp. 1-4.

to the county economy, and $98 million to the city economy in 1993.[28] In addition, this level of economic activity supported 2,249 jobs, which translated into total tax revenues of $7.2 million for the state. A similar 1984 study of the team helped the Mariners acquire a much more favorable lease, when that club was struggling to attract fans to their stadium. The most recent study was a major factor in the development of political support for a new stadium, support that was eventually necessary to provide public financing for a stadium over the expressed will of the local electorate.

Similar studies are carried out in every city that investigates the prudence of investing in a new stadium. Rosentraub reports studies that place the impact of MLB's Orioles in 1992 to be $117 million, the NBA's Timberwolves to be $57.5 million in 1994, and MLB's Rangers to be $98 million in 1990.[29] An often cited 1985 study of Philadelphia's four sports teams placed their combined direct and indirect impacts at over $576 million for the metropolitan area.[30] Single events like the Super Bowl, the All-Star Game, and the NCAA Final Four generate economic impact estimates of well over $100 million (occasionally up to $250 million) for the local economy.[31] With great fanfare, the local newspaper reports these figures in a front page article, clearly suggesting that failure to finance a new stadium would be a major blow to the local economy. When provided with the "opportunity" to invest $200 million on a new stadium that generates a $100 million annual impact on the economy these reports make it seem foolish for a city not to invest in a new facility.

Euchner writes that these reports give "the campaign for a new stadium an aura of scientific objectivity and legitimacy" and he refers to this process as "the politics of

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[28] Conway, Richard and William Beyers (1994). *Seattle Mariners Baseball Club Economic Impact*. Report prepared for King County.
[29] Rosentraub (1997a), pp. 153-154.
[30] Danielson (1997), p. 105.
[31] Ibid, p. 106.

numbers".[32] Economists have studied the use of economic impact studies to justify sports stadia and determined that more often than not these studies are "inaccurate, misleading and unnecessary".[33] These studies have concluded that data limitations, the use of survey data, and the determination of multipliers make these studies very difficult to undertake and the results often overstate the impacts of a given project. These reports often include dubious assumptions and do not utilize correct accounting techniques in generating their findings. For Baltimore's Camden Yards, separate economic impact analyses purposefully underestimated the project's cost and did not include the cost of financing the project over thirty years to generate very positive total impact estimates.[34] These studies regularly include assumptions of very high visitor spending on food, hotels, and souvenirs and they do not account for the fact that much of this revenue goes to the teams and players, money that may not be re-spent locally. In addition, almost universally the client for these reports is the sports franchise or a combination of the government and a sports franchise, groups usually very interested in constructing a highly visible project like a sports stadium. Finally, these reports often fail to identify the full range of costs and benefits (and beneficiaries) of a project and the financial risks inherent to a project, risks that usually fall upon the public sector.[35]

Robert Baade has spent much of his career debunking the central conclusion of these reports, that a sports franchise of stadium is an economic engine, by emphasizing the illogical assumptions and techniques used to generate findings that support a new stadium.[36] For years Baade argued that total economic impact and the impact of "new

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[32] Euchner (1993), pp. 53-55, 116-118..

[33] See William Hunter's (1988). "Economic Impact Studies: Inaccurate, Misleading, and Unnecessary" and Frank Hefner's (1990) "Using economic impact models to measure the impact of sports on local economies".

[34] Euchner (1993), pp. 116-117.

[35] Danielson (1997), pp. 105-107.

[36] Baade and Dye (1988); Baade, Robert and Richard Dye (1990). "The impact of stadiums and professional sports on metropolitan area development." *Growth and Change*, Spring: pp. 1-14; Baade, Robert (1994). *Stadiums, Professional Sports, and Economic Development: Assessing the Reality*. Heartland Institute: Chicago; Baade (1996); Baade, Robert and Allen Sanderson (1997a). "Minor League Teams and Communities" in Roger Noll's and Andrew Zimbalist's (Eds.) *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The*

money" were very different impacts. New money represents dollars brought into the local economy from a new source and not simply redirected from another activity. At the center of the debate, argue Baade and Dye is "the extent to which the stadium causes a net increase in area activity rather than a mere allocation or redistribution of the same level of activity."[37] When you account for new money in these analyses, the overall economic impact of a team or a stadium is substantially smaller; the vast majority of money spent for tickets, food, and souvenirs at a stadium would have been spent locally in any event. For example, the total economic impact of the Mariners falls from $142.0 million to $42.9 million when only new money is considered.[38] Money previously spent at the movie theater or symphony is now spent at the stadium resulting in the redistribution of money into different pie slices rather than an increase of the total size of the economic pie.

By far the most research into sports facilities has focused upon the question of the impact of sports facilities on the local economy. These studies have generally attempted to measure the number of jobs and amount of tax revenues that are generated by a new facility. Almost to the last, these studies have found that sports facilities are not the economic development engines that they claim to be.[39] Research has concluded that sports are "small potatoes" in the regional economy, equivalent to a single large department store like Macys or Nordstrom's.[40] Other research has found that the number of jobs generated by these facilities is much smaller than proponents had suggested and that the quality of this employment is seasonal and poorly paid.[41] Comparisons of cities that have invested in sports facilities indicate that this development strategy is no better than any other strategy,

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Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums. Brookings Institute: Washington, D.C. Baade, Robert and Allen Sanderson (1997b). "The Employment Effect of Teams and Sports Facilities" in Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist's (Eds.) *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums*. Brookings Institute: Washington, D.C.

[37] Baade and Dye (1990), p. 6.

[38] Conway and Beyers (1994).

[39] Baade and Dye, (1990); Euchner (1993); Johnson (1995); Baade (1996); Baade and Sanderson (1997a); Baade and Sanderson (1997b); Rosentraub (1997); Noll and Zimbalist (1997).

[40] Euchner (1993); Rosentraub (1997).

[41] Baade (1994); Baade, (1996); Austrian and Rosentraub (1997).

and in some cases somewhat worse.[42] For example, Rosentraub's studies of the city of Indianapolis have found that while that city is no longer Indiana-No-Place, the city has not grown as fast as other regional cities and has specialized in industries that actually have lower wages and lesser benefits.

A recent volume, *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes* edited by economists Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, should once and for all end the debate about sports facilities as wise economic investments for cities. Their book brings together key researchers of the sports and economic development nexus in a volume that assesses the ability of sports projects to create jobs and generate taxes for their host jurisdictions. Echoing and summarizing much of the previous research on the topic, the book concludes that sports teams and sports stadia are simply too insignificant to generate measurable economic benefits. Even studies of smaller areas that are home to minor league teams and spring training camps yield no evidence that professional sports is a viable economic development engine. Noll and Zimbalist summarize the last fifteen years of research into the economic impact of sports teams and stadiums when they write:

> "The studies in this volume uniformly conclude that metropolitan and central city development is not likely to be affected by a sports team or facility... These results are in sharp contrast to the claims of dozens of promotional studies that have been performed by consulting firms under contract with the affected city or team."[43]

In sum, then, the wealth of literature on the economic impacts of sports facilities indicate that stadia and arenas are not the economic engines that they purport to be. To date, no credible research has produced a shred of evidence to support these claims. Consequently, in recent years stadium proponents have been less vocal in touting the economic benefits generated by a sports franchise and a new sports stadium as the central reason to invest public funds into a project. Certainly, an official report that outlines the

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[42] Rosentraub (1997); Rosentraub *et al* (1994); Baade (1996).
[43] Noll and Zimbalist (1997), p. 496.

economic impact of the team and the facility is still part of the process in generating support for a new stadium. However, these studies are now viewed much more skeptically and stadium-opponents are quick to round up critics of these studies to denounce them as another example of "voodoo economics". In recent years, then, pro-stadium groups have moved to the third economic development rationale to buttress their claims that sports facilities are a good economic investment; the belief in "major league city" status.

Sports and Image-Related Benefits

The third economic development rationale produced by stadium proponents is that these facilities confer substantial image-related benefits to their host cities that eventually translate into economic benefits. There is a firm belief by the elite of most cities that professional sports convey an image of a city that has "made it". Consequently, the belief holds, a city is more easily able to attract footloose businesses and families that want to live in a "major league" city. For example, Rosentraub has documented Indianapolis' quest to become a major league city through professional team sports.[44] Then mayor of Denver Frederico Pena stated that "any great city in this country has to have a major league baseball team. It's just part of the American tradition."[45] In Arlington, Texas, a publicly financed baseball stadium has driven that city to tout itself as "The Big League Address for Business". Nashville, Tampa, and Charlotte represent other cities that have vigorously pursued professional team sports as a means of establishing their national reputations.

Two assumptions lie at the heart of the image-related benefits claim. First, it is believed that a new stadium or arena makes a city more attractive to footloose businesses. It is argued that a new stadium pulls new business to an area because of the "major league status" conferred by the facility and the franchise that plays in it. Second, it is argued that tourists and conventioneers are more likely to want to visit a city with new sports facilities. Therefore, a new stadium will help to increase the number of out of town visitors

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[44] Rosentraub *et al* (1994); Rosentraub (1997).
[45] Quoted in Frieden and Sagalyn (1991), p. 277.

and conventions in a city, generating "new money" for the local economy. In the long run, the line of thinking goes, the benefits of new business and increased visitors are translated into new jobs and new development for the city. Therefore, the multi-million dollar public investment eventually pays off in tangible ways related to the "big league" image produced by professional sports teams and the venues they play in.

On a more romantic level, famed author James Michener wrote about the image-related benefits of sports stadiums in his 1976 book *Sports in America*. In it Michener penned words that are likely hanging on the wall of every stadium advocate the country over. These words read:

> "A city needs a big public stadium because that's one of the things that distinguishes a city. I would not elect to live in a city that did not have a spacious public building in which to play games, and as a taxpayer I would be willing to have the city use my dollars to help build such a stadium, if that were necessary. I am therefore unequivocally in support of public stadiums...
>
> I believe that each era of civilization generates its peculiar architectural symbol, and that this acquires a spiritual significance far beyond its utilitarian purpose. First we had the age of Pyramids... Those societies that built in this age of massive structures are well remembered... Then came the Age of Temples, symbolized by the Parthenon, followed by the Age of Stadia, symbolized by the Colosseum. Then came the glorious Age of Cathedrals, and much later the Age of Bridges when flying arches were thrown across all the rivers of the world. One of the best periods, architecturally, was the Age of Railroad Stations... Quickly came the Age of the Skyscraper, then the Age of the intricate Traffic Circle, the sprawling Airport, and the splendiferous Shopping Center... But now we are once more in the Age of the Stadium..."[46]

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[46] Michener, James (1976). *Sports in America*. Random House: New York, p. 348.

The beauty of this image-related claim is that it is almost impossible to measure these benefits. Tracing the relocation of individual firms and tying these relocations to a new stadium is tremendously difficult at best. Similarly, linking convention traffic to a new stadium is equally difficult. To provide an example of the difficulty of unraveling the impact of a ballpark on a specific firm or household, let's take the city of Baltimore. If a firm relocates to that city in the years after Oriole Park opened or if convention traffic increases between 1992 and 1999, can we attribute these changes to the stadia at Camden Yards? What about the success of the Inner Harbor and other downtown redevelopment initiatives? What about government incentives to relocating businesses? What about expansions to the Convention Center in the mid-1990s? Separating out the individual effects of a new sports facility is nearly impossible, yet in part because this analysis is so difficult proponents can claim that Oriole Park was a factor in these changes. Unlike reviews of a stadium's balance sheet or the number of jobs created due to spending at a facility, the image-related benefits of these facilities are difficult to assess. As a result proclamations of becoming a "big league city" and all of the benefits that this entails still represent one of the hallmarks of the pro-stadium campaign.

Rosentraub, one of the staunchest critics of public investment into sports facilities, concedes that there are likely image-related benefits of hosting major professional sports teams.[47] Millions of facility patrons in a central city and national television air time provide a city with exposure not offered by a symphony, a new library, or a wonderful park. However, Rosentraub is also quick to point out that these benefits are economically spurious, unlikely to produce substantial amounts of new jobs or new money.[48] Further, his studies of Indianapolis suggest that that city's extensive sports-centered downtown development strategy has had at best mixed results for that city's long term economic health.[49] Business owners routinely cite workforce quality, local education systems, tax levels, climate, and the personal preferences of executives as the key factors in a firm's

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[47] Rosentraub (1996).
[48] Ibid.

location, not the existence of a professional sports franchise in a city.[50] In his research on minor league baseball cities, Johnson finds that "these communities perceive professional baseball as making positive contributions to the local quality of life and to the economy", but "these perceptions... do not appear to be based on any objective study of the impact of their teams."[51] Finally, Baade and Dye report one of their own studies that tested the hypothesis "that sports-based development creates a 'big-league' image for the city that acts as a magnet for business location decisions."[52] This study found no evidence to support this hypothesis.

Despite protestations to the opposite, then, stadium proponents have yet to offer any evidence that sports facilities offer image-related benefits that are translated into economic development and growth for a city. There is no evidence that Nashville or Tampa or Charlotte are better off economically because they have spent hundreds of millions on sports stadia. Similarly, there is no evidence that Houston or Hartford or Los Angeles are any worse off economically because they lost a sports franchise. Danielson concludes that there is "little evidence that the presence of professional sports is a determining factor" in the relocation of footloose firms to an area.[53] However, this area still represents a fertile topic for future research into the stadium game.

Sports Facilities and District Revitalization

From "the stadium as a good deal", to "if you build it, they will come", and finally to building the stadium to become a "big league city", proponents have insisted that in the long run an investment in a stadium will yield a positive economic return to the investor. As these rationales have first been questioned and then slowly dismantled stadium proponents have moved on to successive economic development rationales to bolster their

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[49] Rosentraub *et al* (1994).
[50] Danielson (1997), p. 108.
[51] Johnson, Arthur (1990). "Professional baseball at the minor league level: Considerations for cities large and small." *State and Local Government Review*, p. 96.
[52] Baade and Dye (1988), p. 272.

claims for public sector financing of sports facilities. Even given the abundance of research questioning these rationales, in city after city pro-stadium groups still tout the economic benefits of sports facilities and the image benefits that a new stadium can bring to an area. However, these arguments are no longer presumed to be true, rather citizens and even the newspapers have begun to investigate these claims more fully. As a result, stadium proponents have identified a new economic development rationale to hang their hopes on; the stadium as a micro-level development catalyst.

The development of this fourth rationale is rooted in a criticism of research into the effects of sports stadia made by the sports industry. Stadium proponents have argued that previous research has overlooked the geographic area most likely to be impacted by a new facility, the surrounding neighborhood or micro-level.[54] Almost all existing research has focused upon larger geographic levels like the Metropolitan Statistical Area or the city and not the micro-level when assessing facility impacts. Stadium proponents argue that studies at these larger geographic levels dilute any positive benefits that the facility brings to a small section of the city. They also suggest these studies fail to account for the local development impacts of a sports stadium, thereby overlooking the possibility that a sports facility might advance a city's development agenda. Even critics of public investment into sports facilities have suggested that a new sports facility can have a significant impact at a smaller geographic level.[55]

The newest economic development rationale is positioned to exploit this gap in the literature. It is centered on the belief that sports facilities can serve as a catalyst for new development and a key anchor in development strategies for city or suburban areas. Danielson writes that "Arenas and stadiums are seen as magnets that will bring business and tourists into a particular area, revitalizing decaying neighborhoods, enhancing the

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[53] Danielson (1997). p. 108.
[54] Chema (1996).
[55] Baade (1996); Rosentraub (1996); Danielson (1997).

appeal of downtown to investors, or fostering economic development in the suburbs."[56] The sports facility is seen as a means to generate investor interest and new construction while also solidifying a district's economic base and long term future. Just as convention centers or shopping malls can anchor a district it is now argued that a sports stadium can fill the same role.

In his piece entitled "Downtown Redevelopment Strategies in the United States" Robertson discusses the reasons for public investment into a set of facilities he calls Special Activity Generators, or SAGs.[57] A sports facility is one of a number of SAGs, facilities intended to create (generate) activity by offering special events or attractions to visitors. Robertson identifies the three broad micro-level objectives of these projects:

1. *Generate spillover spending benefits for the surrounding district.* Visitors spend money at nearby hotels, restaurants, and other commercial establishments and also enliven the district to make it more exciting and attractive for visits on non-event days. This helps to create new businesses and solidify existing ones that are a good fit for this economy.
2. *The generation of new construction in the district.* A SAG is usually expected to generate new construction in conjunction with the new facility (for example, a new hotel located on site). Further, the facility is expected to help make the district more attractive for further development, resulting in subsequent rounds of construction as the district matures as an entertainment center.
3. *The facility's location can be used to rejuvenate a blighted area.* Related to the above two objectives, often the primary objective of public investment in many SAGs is to revitalize a blighted district by bringing visitors (and dollars) to the district, leveraging further investment in the district, and remaking the character of the neighborhood. For example, cities often use SAGs to attempt to turn a run-down industrial or warehouse

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[56] Danielson (1997), p. 108.
[57] Robertson (1995).

district into a thriving entertainment center with shops, restaurants, and a sense of vitality.

Stadium proponents have argued that research into sports facilities has not assessed the ability of stadia to meet these micro-level objectives. While evidence has shown that sports facilities do not create enough new businesses and jobs to serve as an economic development engine at the metropolitan level, the question of micro-level impacts has gone largely unaddressed. Still unanswered is the question of whether or not sports facilities can serve as a primary anchor for redevelopment (or new development in the case of suburban stadia). Chema suggests that these facilities can, but that "the key to sports venues being a catalyst for economic development is locating them in an urban setting and integrating them into the existing city infrastructure."[58]

To date research has only broadly discussed the linkages of sports facilities to micro-level development. The only two consistent conclusions reached are 1) that development-related goals should be central to the debate over public investment in a sports facility and 2) facility "context" is likely a key factor in any impacts. To address the first, researchers have suggested that instead of attempting to sell a sports facility on its dubious economic merits, stadium supporters should link these projects to development and revitalization objectives and generate support as part of a larger strategy for growth. Baade and Dye argue that the potential for increased development in the neighborhood is an important part of the stadium debate and the ability of a project to address micro-level goals should be a central part of this debate.[59] Johnson goes so far as to conclude that "if a development logic is used in planning a stadium project, the facility can help achieve such outcome goals as downtown revitalization, new development, enhancement of community image, and recreational infrastructure improvement."[60] The suggestion is that sports

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[58] Chema (1996), p. 20.
[59] Baade and Dye (1988).
[60] Johnson (1991), p. 313.

facilities might be able to address and meet the micro-level goals, but no research has yet been undertaken to determine if this is the case.[61]

As to the idea of facility context, Chema writes that sports venues "value as catalysts for economic development depends upon where they are located and how they are integrated into a metropolitan area's growth strategy."[62] He continues, those "cities which recognize that sports venues and events can fit into an overall vision of strategic growth" are the ones that will thrive and succeed well into the next century.[63] Baade and Dye, noted public sports subsidy critics, have also discussed the ability of sports stadia to anchor a district and generate nearby development.[64] In their article the authors point out that microarea development is predicated on the regular use of the facility, the linkage of the project to other nearby activity centers, the capture of spending in the "microarea", and limiting the spread of surface parking. Despite an excellent set of recommendations, this article serves primarily as a set of summary observations and not findings of in-depth research. This work only points to future research avenues to determine the success (or lack thereof) of stadia in revitalizing portions of the city.

As for directed research into microarea development, there are only a very few studies that assess the effects of sports stadia at the micro-level. By far the best of these is a piece by Ziona Austrian and Mark Rosentraub that assesses the impact of Cleveland's Gateway $460 million sports stadia and arena project.[65] The focus of their study is on jobs creation in the area surrounding Gateway. They used a state of Ohio dataset to track the elimination and creation of jobs in the Gateway area and in the surrounding area. They found that Gateway did realize some job growth, but that this growth was actually slower

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[61] It is important to note that while these writers indicate that microarea benefits are possible, they emphasize that these benefits are rarely, if ever, sufficient to justify investments of hundreds of millions of dollars.
[62] Chema (1996), p. 19.
[63] Ibid, p. 20.
[64] Baade and Dye (1988).
[65] Austrian and Rosentraub (1997).

than the county and metropolitan area.[66] They also identified several nearby projects that were undertaken as the Gateway project came online, hinting at the relationship between the new sports facilities and micro-level development. Their work is a landmark in micro-level research because it pioneered the use of an identified "microarea" to measure the benefits of sports facilities. The microarea concept will be fleshed out more fully in Chapter 5.

In addition to the above study a great deal of anecdotal evidence of successful cases of micro-level development related to sports stadia also exists to help promulgate the sports stadium building boom. Busch Stadium, built in the mid 1960s in declining downtown St. Louis, has been identified as a facility generally believed to have generated development and a new wave of investment in that central city.[67] The pervasive view is that the Coors Field ballpark in Denver has helped revitalize that city's SoDo district, although no analysis of this ballpark's success yet exists. The New Orleans Superdome is another sports facility that is believed to have helped fuel that city's downtown convention and entertainment boom. Finally, the two urban case studies of this work, Baltimore and Cleveland, are also widely held to be examples of sports facilities as successful micro-level engines of development.[68] However, in none of these cases has an in-depth case study been prepared that investigates these claims and assesses the impact of the sports facility on its surrounding neighborhood.

So, unlike the other touted benefits of sports facilities described above, very little research has investigated the ability of sports facilities to "revitalize" their surrounding microareas. Instead primarily anecdotal evidence has documented the ability of these facilities to revitalize an area. These stories and visits by politicians and teams to the

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[66] Austrian and Rosentraub (1997), pp. 379-380.
[67] Phares and Rosentraub (1997); Danielson (1997), p. 109.
[68] Chema (1996); Hamilton, Bruce and Peter Kahn (1997). "Baltimore's Camden Yards Ballparks" in Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist's (Eds.) *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums*. Brookings Institute: Washington, D.C.

"success story" cities remain the standard by which politicians and citizens must make their decisions on sports stadium investments. This study is an attempt to bridge this gap.

Sports Stadia and Microarea (Re)Development: Outlining the Dissertation

Over the past thirty years the justifications for public investment in sports facilities have jumped from rationale to rationale in an attempt to keep ahead of research findings on the likely impacts of professional sports stadia. Pro-stadium interests have been desperate to keep these projects on the public agenda and ultimately win approval for their construction. The latest of these justifications is that these sports projects can achieve development goals for portions of the city. Just as downtown malls, festival marketplaces, aquariums, and convention centers have been financed and constructed to drive micro-level development, so, too, are stadia and arenas used to focus public resources and generate private sector development in specific portions of a city, usually downtown. In his piece entitled "Stadiums and Urban Space", Rosentraub writes:

> "In trying to keep some central business districts integral to their region's economic and social life, many public officials have latched onto sports strategies through the building of downtown sports facilities to reverse or retard certain elements of suburbanization. In some ways, these new facilities and the development policies linked to sports and recreation have become the latest hope for emphasizing urban life, bringing jobs back to downtown areas, and invigorating people's interest in both visiting and living in downtown areas...
>
> Today, justifications for the public's investment in the building of sports facilities incorporates a discussion of both the redevelopment efforts that can be led or jump-started by ballparks and arenas and the micro-level impacts of sports facilities and events on downtown areas...
>
> As the focus for justifying the public's investment in sports facilities has shifted from a reliance on regional development to one that stresses the enhancement of downtown, it seems important to determine if nostalgic ballparks, futuristic domed

stadiums, or luxurious high-technology arenas, located in a downtown area, can enhance the centrality of core cities..."[69]

As with each of the previous three economic development rationales justifying sports facility construction, careful research must be aimed at assessing this latest claim of stadium advocates. As of yet, very little research has been undertaken to measure the development impacts of sports stadia at the micro-level. This study attempts to fill that gap. This study is an attempt at uniting Austrian and Rosentraub's microarea concept with the three objectives of special activity generators laid out by Robertson. This research assesses the ability of three widely praised sports projects to produce spin-off businesses, generate new construction (or building re-use), and revitalize blighted districts at the micro-level.

The Purposes and Core Questions of the Dissertation

The central element to this study is tracing the political history and development history surrounding three of the most important sports facility projects of recent decades. More specifically, the underlying purposes of the dissertation are:

1) To address the "microarea gap" in the sports stadia literature by addressing the claim that these facilities generate substantial micro-level impacts for a city. How might researchers investigate and fill this gap? How does this research fill this gap and what future studies are necessary to assess this latest economic development rationale?
2) Identify and catalogue the actual microarea impacts of these three SAGs. Do sports stadia have measurable microarea impacts and, if so, what is the nature of these impacts? Do these projects offer evidence that cities can use sports facilities as revitalization "poles" or anchors upon which to redevelop an area?
3) Provide insights to cities, generally, and project planners, specifically, as to the characteristics of successful projects and the pitfalls of less successful projects. What common elements went into the successful experiences of these cases that can help

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[69] Rosentraub (1997b), pp. 179-180.

cities to maximize the micro-level impact? How might these be replicated? In contrast, what obstacles or factors limited the impact of a stadium to generate microarea redevelopment? How can these be avoided in other cities?

4) Weigh in on the debate surrounding this latest economic development rationale. Are there microarea development justifications for public investment into sports stadia?

With the delineation of this core set of questions guiding the dissertation, a number of hypotheses can be constructed to assess the microarea impacts of sports facilities on the surrounding district. The first hypothesis represents an "umbrella" under which the following three hypotheses fall. These hypotheses are:

Hypothesis # 1

The Measurable Impacts Hypothesis: This hypothesis states that there will be measurable differences at the micro-level when comparing the pre-construction and post-construction periods. After the completion of the stadium, it is hypothesized that significant changes in land development, land uses, and district character will be experienced by the surrounding microarea.

Hypothesis #2A

The Land Development Hypothesis: Land surrounding a sports stadia will become more intensively developed after the opening of the facility. Due to crowds at events and investments in surrounding infrastructure it is hypothesized that vacant parcels will be utilized for higher uses and new development will be generated in the microarea after the completion of the stadium.

Hypothesis #2B

The Land Use Transition Hypothesis: Land uses surrounding the stadium will transition from "incompatible uses" (such as light manufacturing or low density residential) to "compatible" uses (such as commercial or industrial). Crowds and traffic generated by

sports events lend themselves better to certain uses than others, therefore it is hypothesized that the new facility will affect local land use designations and actual uses.

Hypothesis #2C

The District Character Hypothesis: A district's character is significantly altered by the siting of a sports facility within the district. It is hypothesized that the influx of millions of visitors per year to sports stadia will create a new entertainment character, one that spills out into surrounding areas.

Chapter 5 outlines the comparative case study methodology and the data sources used to evaluate the above hypotheses. It is expected that this study will only serve as the first salvo in what is likely to be a heated debate over the ability of these projects, or even other SAGs, to produce notable, significant, and useful changes for a portion of a city. Our attention now turns to the case studies and the data and methods utilized for this study.

Chapter 5

Project Methodology: Case Studies and Microareas

> *"There are two basic ways to evaluate the stadium rationale. First, a skilled researcher can evaluate in detail the data and assumptions of a promoter's impact study. Second, ...the debate can be served by a retrospective look at the development experience of different cities."*
>
> *—Noted stadia researchers Robert Baade and Richard Dye*[1]

This study attempts to unite the microarea concept of Austrian and Rosentraub with the objectives of special activity generators (like stadia) as set out by Robertson. Sports stadia have a hypothesized set of impacts on their surrounding neighborhood. Included in these hypothesized impacts are new spin-off businesses in existing buildings, new development/construction to house new businesses, and a substantially altered (read improved) neighborhood character. It is these localized benefits that are the focus of this study. Unlike the vast majority of studies of the economic development impacts of sports facilities, the focus of this project is not upon the city or region, but upon the neighborhood level. This project attempts to assess the ability of new sports stadia to generate new construction or the re-use of existing structures in their surrounding districts.

What is important to recognize is that these perceived changes to the district serve as a major factor in the decision of public officials to expend precious public dollars on sports facilities for millionaires. City mayors and city or county councilpersons see the opening of a sports stadium as a means to revitalize blighted districts, thereby aiding helping the city to recover from shifts in the national economy. In addition, public officials see these projects as an excellent example of their "success" as political leaders and they regularly remind voters of these successes when running for office. Further, in many cases voters are sold on these projects because of the localized, district-level benefits described

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[1] Baade and Dye (1988), p. 271.

by stadium proponents. An excellent example of this is a new San Diego ballpark project, approved by voters in that city in November, 1998. Voters in San Diego were asked to approve the $411 million project (70% publicly financed) whose major selling point was the concurrent revitalization of that city's Gas Lamp District. Cleveland, Baltimore, and Arlington all sold their sports projects in part on this district revitalization argument.

The study of sports stadia and their economic development impacts on their host jurisdictions, both positive and negative, has focused almost exclusively on jobs and taxes. Almost all of these studies have utilized large statistical databases, including a myriad of economic and social variables, to calculate the net economic benefit (or cost) of a facility for their city or region. These studies have proven to be statistically valid, quite precise in their measurement, but wholly ineffective in deterring city after city from investing in what seem to be unwise investments. While these authors proclaim to the heavens "Stadia do not make economic sense!", cities continue to finance and build them at an alarming rate.

When researchers have turned their interest to the political process surrounding these mega-projects, they have used a different method of approach, the case study. These in-depth investigations into the political maneuverings showcase a mix of huge egos among public and private actors, big money financing the pro-stadium effort, and what appears to be an inevitable result to the process, a new stadium. However, what these studies have not covered quite as well are the factors that sway politicians to build these projects. Certainly the power of the local growth machine is a major factor, but these studies overlook other, more benign factors such as a concerted effort at localized economic development and the desire of a set of politicians to leave behind a legacy of progress, represented by a more vibrant downtown or a list of completed projects that provide images of success for a city. Most previous studies of sports facilities have focused upon two factors that I deem insufficient at identifying a major push-factor in the public financing and development of these projects; 1) city-wide or metropolitan-wide benefits and 2) jobs and taxes. Both of these factors are very important and probably even

better at determining the cost-benefit of these projects. However, these factors cannot convey the importance of visible and experiential district-level changes that do indeed provide powerful evidence of political "success" and of a city on the rise.

To turn to the task at hand, then, this chapter provides an overview of the methods, data sources, and case study choices for this project. This chapter begins by outlining the research process for this project. The methodological approach utilized in this study, a *comparative case study approach*, is then presented. A brief outline of the three chosen case cities and their sports projects follows. Included in this is a discussion as to why these cases were chosen and why they serve as important benchmarks for the design, construction, and neighborhood impacts of sports-related projects. Following this introduction to the case studies, some mention of a "microarea" and the definition of this concept is required. Provided is a discussion of the microarea concept including the characteristics of and key factors that help to delineate the microareas that surround the case projects. Lastly, the wide range of data sources utilized for this study are outlined. A data source checklist is provided as a comprehensive guide to the data used for this project.

The Research Process

The generalized research process for this study is outlined in Figure 5.1. As in most studies, the Theoretical Work of the first phase centered upon the grounding the proposed study in existing theory and research results. From this literature review existing gaps in the thinking surrounding sports facilities were identified. From these gaps emerged the research questions outlined in previous chapter. Once phase one was completed, the second phase of the study, Case Study Work, began. Note, however, that the Theoretical Work of phase one continues to inform the Case Study Work of phase two and that findings in the Case Study Work informed the theoretical grounding of phase one. In short, phase one did not just stop once work began on the second phase of the study.

[See Figure 5.1 on page 138]

Phase two of the study is best understood when divided into certain stages. Stage one involved the selection of case cities and projects, the identification of a suitable microarea surrounding these facilities, and a review of the literature surrounding these case cities and projects. Stage two centered primarily upon data collection, including nationally available sources like newspaper accounts and census data and site-specific sources like GIS data, government documents, and interviews. This stage also involved site visits of one week at each site, which provided time for interviews, in-depth microarea surveys, and further data collection. The next stage involved analyzing these data sources, generating maps and other output, and "hole-filling", or augmenting existing data. The final stage, identifying findings and fine tuning the analysis, is best represented by this lengthy document.

The Research Approach

This project utilizes a *comparative case study approach* to identify and understand the impacts of sports stadia on their surrounding neighborhoods. The case study approach was chosen because it allows for an in-depth analysis of three cities that are widely held to be successes in revitalizing their downtowns (Baltimore and Cleveland) or have developed their cities as specialized regional entertainment and recreation destinations (Arlington). Further, the case study approach allows for a broader set of data, both quantitative and qualitative, to be brought to bear on the research questions.

A traditional case study "explores a single entity or phenomenon ('the case') bounded by time and activity and collects detailed information by using a variety of data collection procedures during a sustained period of time."[2] This approach allows the researcher to go into great detail for a given case, exploring a fuller range of data rather than capturing and studying a single set of data. Further, in studying a given case for a longer period of time the implication is that the researcher can come to a more complete

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[2] Creswell, J. (1994). *Research Designs: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Sage: Thousand Oaks, California, p. 12.

understanding of the phenomenon of interest and better capture and explain what is to be learned from the case. Gall, Borg, and Gall state that the case study approach is generally undertaken for a combination of three reasons; 1) to provide a detailed description of a phenomenon, 2) to attempt to explain a given phenomenon, and/or 3) to evaluate a given phenomenon.[3] Generally speaking, almost all case studies meet Gall *et al's* first reason for this method, as a detailed description of the studied phenomenon is invariably included in the analysis.

While case studies were originally undertaken a single case at a time, over time researchers began using a comparative approach when analyzing more than one case for a given phenomenon. The comparative case study approach allows researchers to investigate more than one case and to compare their findings across these cases. While no two cases are exactly alike, the comparisons between people, organizations, or cities that have experienced similar events or utilized similar approaches can allow for more generalizable findings than from a single case. When similar phenomena are found for cases that have experienced similar events, stronger evidence can be provided in support for the major findings of the analysis.

In the sports facility literature, case studies have become a common methodological approach, with excellent studies including Rosentraub *et al's* study of Indianapolis, Klobuchar's fascinating look at Minneapolis, and Johnson and Sack's more qualitative approach towards Hartford.[4] Similarly, the comparative case study approach has become accepted as an important means of generalizing findings to a broader set of cities. In his 1993 book Euchner analyzed three cities when investigating the political economy surrounding sports stadia.[5] Similarly, Johnson's research into the economic

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[3] Leedy, Paul (1997). *Practical Research: Planning and Design*. Merrill: Columbus, Ohio, p. 157; Gall, M., W. Borg, and J. Gall (1996). *Educational Research: An Introduction*. Longman, White Plains, New York.

[4] Rosentraub *et al* (1994); Klobuchar (1982); Johnson and Sack (1996).

[5] Euchner (1993).

development effects of minor league baseball included chapters on over ten different cities and their experiences with minor league baseball.[6] All of these studies focused upon a single case or a set of cases to investigate sports stadia and their effects upon local politics, local economic development, or the broader benefits and costs of these facilities.

While a case study approach provides the researcher with breadth and depth it is clearly limited by its focus upon a single case or a small number of cases. While Klobuchar's look at Minneapolis describes a city intent upon retaining its major league image, government officials desperate to retain major league sports, and a well-oiled growth machine pushing heavily for a new stadium, her findings would be moot if the experience of Minneapolis was nothing like other cities. The fear when using the case study approach is that the findings will be so case-specific that they are not generalizable to any other cases. The use of a comparative case study approach is meant to address this possible flaw. By studying more than one case a firmer set of conclusions can be drawn because they are founded upon a larger base of cases. By looking for similarities and commonalities across cases, the researcher can identify common bonds and provide firmer evidence that they will occur in most cases.

Another potential pitfall of this method is the replicability of methods. A hallmark of good research is that your findings would be replicable by other researchers that make use of the same datasets and methods. In most quantitative research, a statistical dataset yields one and only one answer when appropriate statistical techniques are applied. While researchers might quibble over the interpretation of the results or the use of variable A instead of variable B, the calculation of a given value should be replicable given the same dataset and same statistical methods. In contrast, the case study approach is based upon the collection and analysis of a wide variety of data. These datasets come from a variety of sources and can take quantitative forms, like census data, or qualitative forms, as thorough

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[6] Johnson (1995).

interviews and content analysis. Invariably, the researcher must interpret some significant portion of this data, translating it into useful findings and conclusions.

What can researchers do to protect themselves against this pitfall? First and foremost, by grounding their work in the extant literature researchers can set their work in an established theoretical base. By linking the collection and use of data, the interpretation of results, and the findings to already established and published findings, researchers can utilize existing research to legitimize their own. Second, researchers have the responsibility of documenting at great length their data sources in an effort to provide for the replicability of their work. Detailed and meticulous case notes, full listings of data sources, and the use of widely available data sources all offer a traceable path for the work you hold in your hands. For this project I have gone to great lengths to employ both of these safeguards in an effort to correctly utilize a comparative case study approach.

The Case Cities and Stadia

The cities of Baltimore, Cleveland, and Arlington (TX) were chosen as cases for this project. Each case is home to a baseball-only facility that opened between 1992 and 1994 and is widely agreed to be among the best baseball stadiums in the country. The Baltimore and Cleveland stadia are multi-use stadia projects located on the edges of their respective downtowns. Baltimore's Camden Yards consists of a baseball stadium, a football stadium, buildings reused for office and commercial space, and substantial surface parking. Cleveland's Gateway Project consists of the Jacobs Field baseball stadium, Gund Arena, home to an NBA franchise, an office building, and a parking deck. Arlington's stadia is located in a suburban city located midway between Dallas and Fort-Worth. The Ballpark in Arlington also opened in 1994, does not contain any other sports projects, but does have a large office building, huge surface parking lots, and large public park space, including two lakes and miles of walking paths. (See Table 5.1)

Table 5.1: City and Stadium Case Study Choices

City	*Facilities*	*Year*	*City Setting*	*Stadia Urban Setting*
Baltimore, Maryland	*Oriole Park, Raven's Stadium*	1992 1998	An older northeastern city, Baltimore has recast itself as a national tourism and convention city.	Southwestern Edge of Downtown; A few blocks from the Inner Harbor redevelopment
Cleveland, Ohio	*Jacobs Field, Gund Arena*	1994 1994	A rust belt city long in decline, Cleveland has used Baltimore as a model for redevelopment.	Southern Edge of Downtown; Located within walking distance of most of the CBD
Arlington, Texas	*The Ballpark at Arlington*	1994	A suburban edge city, Arlington has grown by leaps and bounds in the past thirty years.	Northeastern Portion of the city; Part of a major regional recreation district

These cases were chosen for three key reasons. First and foremost, since their opening these stadia represent the model for almost all new sports facilities constructed in North America. This model is based upon the idea of using a sports facility as an anchor for a district's redevelopment, with the activity at the facilities themselves serving to generate the critical mass of visitors and tourists necessary for a recreation district to thrive. In particular, Camden Yards in Baltimore has become *the* model for all baseball stadia (and many football stadia and hockey/basketball arenas). Planning staff in Baltimore stated that they regularly receive calls and visits from cities across the continent building new sports facilities because of the perceived success of their ballpark.[7] Cleveland's Gateway project has also been studied closely by other cities, while Arlington has served as a model for suburban jurisdictions considering investment in sports facilities. Current sports facility projects in San Diego, Pittsburgh, Seattle, Detroit, Cincinnati, and Indianapolis have used as their model the urban projects in Baltimore and Cleveland.

[7] Interview with James French and Joyce Leviton of Baltimore's Planning Department, August 1998.

Similarly suburban stadia projects in Washington, D.C. and Ottawa, Canada have utilized Arlington's Ballpark as a model for appropriate development.

Second, these stadia have design elements that have become standard for all sports facilities recently constructed or currently under construction. Each of the case studies includes single-use stadia, with professional baseball franchises now having their own ballpark, which is the trend in stadium design now.[8] These facilities also contain multiple uses that serve to make the area more vibrant and active than with the previous generation of stadia and arenas. Office space for the teams (in all cases) and office space for rent (Baltimore and Arlington) are located in these projects. Team stores to sell apparel and souvenirs are located on site (in all cases), as are restaurants (all) that are often open on non-game days to lunch traffic and visitors to the stadia. Ample public spaces also litter the sites of the projects. Reflecting this multi-use design all three were busy with foot traffic during site visits on gamedays and non-event days.

An additional design element that has been lauded by urban designers and architects has been the "fit" of the stadia into their districts.[9] The stadia generally conform to their surrounding street grids. Previous generations of stadia required "blockbusting", or destroying the existing street pattern for mega-projects that imposed upon the city. In addition, the size of the stadia do not overpower their neighborhoods. Baltimore and Cleveland's stadia seem a natural part of the urban fabric rather than an intrusion upon it. In addition, these stadia have an external orientation that invites the city into the stadium, rather than closing itself off to the city as the domes and the concrete doughnuts of the 1960s and 1970s did. Other key design features include street level entrances for the facilities, numerous public spaces that actually invite use, and the use of architectural elements reminiscent of nearby buildings.

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[8] Cleveland's Gund Arena is also home to one major league franchise, the NBA's Cavaliers. It also plays host to a wide variety of other events including minor league hockey, arena football, and concerts.

[9] Gunts, Edward (1992a). "Grand stand." *Architecture*, June: pp. 64-71; Hirzel, David (1993). "Cleveland Gateway." *Urban Land*, May: pp. 34-37; Koerble (1994).

Third and last, these stadia were chosen because they represent the "success stories" of sports stadia in recent decades. Stadium historians, architects, planners, sports fans, developers, and the press have anointed each of these stadia as models of how large projects can positively benefit a region, a city, and a neighborhood. Therefore, rather than hunting for any possible neighborhood benefits in cases that are widely agreed to be major failures (Chicago's new Comiskey Park for example), these stadia represent an attempt by the author to inventory the range of microarea benefits under the best possible conditions. These cases are widely considered to be "the best" sports facilities that have been built in North America in decades. It is expected, then, that the full range of positive microarea benefits will be revealed in these cases. This methodology mirrors the "if you can't find benefits here, you can't find them anywhere" rationale used by Rosentraub in his studies of Indianapolis.[10]

Establishing the Microarea Concept

The concept of the neighborhood (or district, or microarea, or sub-city area, etc.) has been at the heart of much of what has served as planning in North American cities since the emergence of the profession in the early decades of the 20th century. From the development of neighborhood plans like Radburn in the 1930s, through the rise of suburban neighborhoods like Levittown in the 1950s, through the heyday of neighborhood planning in the 1970s, planners and planning agencies have grappled with this ambiguous, often poorly understood, but fundamental geographic level of analysis. Whereas most local geographic levels of interest to planners are legally defined or administratively determined, like county and city limits or electoral districts, the neighborhood level presents a bit more of a moving target to planning agencies.

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[10] See Rosentraub *et al* (1994); Rosentraub (1997), Chapter 6. Rosentraub has studied Indianapolis because it has been the foremost proponent of sports as a development strategy. "Indianapolis, more than any other city, developed an articulated economic development strategy for its downtown which emphasized amateur and professional sports."

Why is this neighborhood level often so difficult to grasp? It would appear that most local residents have a good grasp of their local neighborhoods, with an ability to provide its name and discuss its attributes. However, one major problem arises when these same residents are asked to draw their neighborhood on a map. Where does "our neighborhood" end and theirs begin? So, the first problem with analyzing changes at a neighborhood level is one of delineating the neighborhood boundaries. In addition, the terminology used for this geographic level also often hampers investigation of changes at these smaller geographic levels. Are districts the same as neighborhoods? How does a district differ from a neighborhood, if at all? A neighborhood is usually conceived of as a functional social and economic area, with an emphasis upon social relations. A district of a city is usually a more official designation for a given portion of the city. Another problem with this geographic level of analysis is that of data availability. Urban planners and other government agencies have long grappled with planning for and measuring changes at a geographic level poorly captured by most datasets. Some datasets are too geographically large for easy translation to the neighborhood level, like data on employees or firms collected at the county. Even given a solid dataset with accurate local data, the problem remains that neighborhood boundaries still need to be drawn. Despite its detailed geographic hierarchy, even the United States Decennial Census presents problems at the local level as "neighborhoods" often spill over the boundaries of census tracts and blockgroups.

Given these problems, the establishment of a "stadium impact area" surrounding each of the case studies is quite difficult. One of the major methodological challenges has been the delineation of that area in each of the case cities in which the impacts of a new sports development are most greatly felt. Certainly this geographic area is functionally different than even the ambiguous neighborhood level. As noted above a neighborhood is usually conceived of as a social and economic area while a district of a city is usually an official designation for a section of the city. Often historical forces lead to a common understanding of a waterfront district, a financial district, a warehouse district, or an

entertainment district that are more or less understood as subsets of a city (usually inner cities) where certain land uses, building types, or economic activities takes place. In contrast to these, stadium impact areas are predicated more upon the use of city space and the diffusion of people throughout the area as a result of the facilities themselves. Like a financial district or waterfront, the stadium district is defined in large part by the central activity or attraction in the district. Complicating matters, the impact area of a sports stadium can overlap different districts of the city (like the CBD or an industrial district),

So, given the ambiguity of smaller geographic areas like neighborhoods and districts, how were stadium impact areas for the three case studies determined? As with most research journeys, this one started with a glance to the past. A review of the stadium literature reveals two important articles that address this sub-city level. Baade and Dye, in their seminal 1988 piece "Sports Stadiums and Area Development: A Critical Review", reviewed the literature of the time on area development and determined that local benefits related to sports stadia are possible, but that local costs must also be assessed.[11] They also list a number of factors that they consider important to local area development, including a consideration of transportation corridors, the spread of nearby parking, and the importance of planning for ancillary development. As we shall see, each of these observations will factor into the definition of the case study impact areas. What is most interesting about Baade and Dye's article is that despite their recognition that "the potential for increased development in the neighborhood is an important part of the stadium debate"[12], only a very few other researchers have attempted to analyze these changes at this geographic level.

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[11] Baade and Dye (1988).
[12] Ibid. p. 270.

The second major piece is the Austrian and Rosentraub chapter that looked at job creation related to Cleveland's Gateway Project at a micro-level.[13] In their paper the authors asked;

> *"Can a scheme to attract millions of visitors to a section of the downtown area stimulate development and reinvigorate a small portion of a central business district? That is to say, do sports teams and the facilities they use have an impact on economic development at a micro level?"*

In attacking the impacts of sports stadia in this way, the authors do well to refocus the geographic level of analysis to the local level. In their article, Austrian and Rosentraub have termed this geographic level the "microarea". Unfortunately, the authors do not define nor outline their definition of this geographic region; rather their methods discussion focuses on their employment dataset. An interview with Professor Austrian indicated, generally, that the microarea refers to that geographic area that is most heavily impacted by activity generated by the sports facility.[14] Further, this area is best understood in terms of pedestrian activity, shaped in large part by available vehicle parking and transportation corridors that funnel the social and economic activity generated by the sports facilities.

Before beginning the process of determining a microarea for the three case cities, then, a better understanding of the concept of the microarea is in order. Relying heavily on the work of both Baade and Dye and Austrian and Rosentraub, I have utilized their microarea concept to focus the analysis to a smaller geographic region. In doing so I have had to develop a firmer definition of the concept of the "microarea". For this study, a microarea is defined as *that area surrounding the new project that is most impacted by crowds attending events at the facility and most impacted by the activity, both economic and social, generated by the project.*

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[13] Austrian and Rosentraub (1997), p. 358

[14] Interview with Ziona Austrian, May 1998.

This definition informs the analyst in a variety of ways. First, the primary determinant of the microarea is the infusion of crowds into a district to attend or enjoy events at the sports facilities themselves. It is these crowds, their activity prior to and after events, and their spending that most easily indicate the spread of a microarea. It is also these crowds and the economic benefits attached to them that stadium-proponents regularly invoke when pushing for a new facility. However, the impact of these crowds on event days is not the only impact of these facilities. New sports facilities have begun to include a variety of uses in the stadium complex including team stores, restaurants, and office space that impacts the surrounding district on non-event days. This activity also must be considered when determining the microarea.

As in traditional location theory, the impacts of the stadia are expected to be greatest immediately surrounding the sports facilities with a diminishing effect the further from the stadium one travels. (See Figure 5.2) However, these impacts diminish more quickly in cases where barriers (physical or psychological) block the spread of pedestrian traffic and fan spending. In other cases, other major attractions, like malls or museums, may lessen the slope of the impacted area, thereby stretching the microarea in a given direction. (See Figure 5.3) As indicated by the work of Baade and Dye and Rosentraub and Austrian, the configuration and size of the microarea is not a simple function wholly dependent upon distance to the sports stadium. Instead, other factors influence the layout and orientation of a given microarea.

[See Figure 5.2 on page 139]

[See Figure 5.3 on page 140]

For example, in downtown Cleveland the area surrounding Cleveland State University was not included in the Austrian/Rosentraub Gateway microarea. While this area most certainly sees some level of game-related activity because there is some parking available in the district, it is not part of the most impacted area surrounding the stadia. Rather, the majority of event-goers park closer to the stadia and socially and economically

impact portions of the downtown closer to Gateway. So, neighboring downtown districts that experience only a trickle of game-related pedestrian traffic do not qualify for the microarea. In contrast, the Tower City mall is a major "pull factor" that stretches the Gateway microarea far to the west. Tower City is home to the regional rail transit hub and hundreds of shops and numerous restaurants, many heavily impacted on event days. Figure 5.4 illustrates the Austrian-Rosentraub Microarea, showing that their "stadium impact area" is nothing like a circle centered on the Gateway project.

[See Figure 5.4 on page 141]

As we will see when we investigate Camden Yards in Baltimore, Gateway in Cleveland, and the Ballpark in Arlington, the size and orientation of the case study microareas are not simple circular regions centered on the sports facilities themselves. Instead, their layout is greatly affected by a number of other factors. The primary factors affecting the size and orientation of the case study microareas are summarized as follows:

- *Physical Barriers-Natural*: Natural barriers, like lakes, streams, and ravines can serve to limit the spread of pedestrian activity to areas surrounding a sports facility. These barriers keep the economic and social activity attributable to the new facilities from spilling into areas, even if those areas are within a very short walk of the stadium. In both Cleveland and Baltimore, large water features served to cut off portions of the city to possible microarea impacts.
- *Physical Barriers-Human-made*: Similarly, large transportation features, like interstates, major roads, or rail lines, can serve to sever a nearby set of land from possible microarea impact. In all three cases, transportation lines provided a visible and effective barrier to spillover effects on certain nearby areas. However, as we will see in Baltimore and Arlington a combination of good pedestrian connections and promoted districts served to overcome what at first glance could be deemed impassable barriers to microarea impacts.

- *Transportation Factors-Parking*: The vast majority of attendees of sporting events travel by car to the stadium district. The location of nearby parking, both on-street and deck parking, is a major factor in determining the origination and departure of pedestrians into and out of the microarea. Baade and Dye make special mention of the location and type of parking as a major factor in the effects of sports stadia on their surrounding district. In all three cases, parking location is a major factor in the orientation and spread of the microarea.
- *Transportation Factors-Mass Transit Nodes*: Although most people attending events arrive by car, the location of mass transit nodes is an important factor in the spread of the microarea. In both of the urban cases, existing or planned nearby mass transit lines were factors in choosing the site for new sports facilities in those cities. Baltimore and Cleveland heavily promote mass transit usage for travel to and from events. The location of these transit nodes provide major entry and exit points for the microarea, generating significant levels of pedestrian traffic at regular intervals on event and non-event days.
- *The Location of Nearby Activity Centers*: The location of other nearby tourism and entertainment oriented projects can greatly effect the size of a stadium microarea. These projects "pull" pedestrian traffic to their various attractions, stretching the microarea and heavily influencing pedestrian traffic. In all three cases, nearby malls, museums, and amusement parks stretch the individual microareas and generate impacts on nearby streets that would at first glance seem far out of the most heavily impacted areas. The best example of this is Baltimore's Inner Harbor, a combination festival marketplace, shopping district, and hotel district that pulls Camden Yards' visitors as much as a mile east of the sports stadia.
- *Promotional Districts*: An important factor in the delineation of a given microarea is the extent to which the city or the teams promote the surrounding district as a place to spend the hours prior to attending an event at the sports stadium. More specifically, the boundaries of this promoted area have an effect on the microarea. Tourists and

other new visitors to a district consult promotional materials and use these to identify safe and interesting places to visit. Therefore, the layout of these promotional districts were considered when drawing the case study microareas. In all three cities, city government, the local Chambers of Commerce, and other tourism/recreation groups have identified entertainment districts on promotional maps that influence the size and orientation of the stadium microareas.

- *Barriers of Perception*: In contrast to promoted districts, there are also certain areas of the city that serve as perceptual barriers to the spread of the microarea. More specifically, perceptions of high crime and/or cultural unfamiliarity can limit the impact of a stadium on its nearby neighborhoods. These "barriers of perception" keep most pedestrian and automobile traffic out of these areas and serve as surprisingly firm barriers to microarea development. A prime example of this is the Pigtown neighborhood in Baltimore, a poorer, primarily black neighborhood just west of Camden Yards that sees little event-day pedestrian traffic. The combination of a major arterial and perceptual barriers have severely curtailed the impacts of the new stadia on this neighborhood, although it is less than a quarter of a mile from Camden Yards.[15]

Data Utilized in this Study

One of the primary strengths of the case study approach is that it utilizes a variety of data and an array of data gathering approaches. This variety is essential to developing a more complete understanding of the phenomenon of interest and better capturing and explaining what is to be learned from the chosen case(s). In this tradition, this study has utilized a remarkably broad set of data types and data sources in an effort to capture the district level impacts related to sports stadia in the three case cities. These data sets include:

- *Parcel level data*: The initial data source of interest was parcel level information gathered from each local city. Ideally, this data was to include important information on zoning, land use, parcel ownership, built form, and other characteristics about the

ownership, use, and condition of each parcel. In addition, this data was to be tied to a GIS-ready set of parcel polygons allowing for mapping and analysis in a geographic information system. Some form of this data was gathered for each case, with the Maryland State Office of Planning providing the Baltimore dataset, the Northern Ohio Data and Information Service (NODIS) providing the Cleveland dataset, and the city of Arlington providing the Arlington dataset. Unfortunately, the quality of the data varied greatly, ranging from Arlington's excellent data set, including parcel polygons, to Baltimore's uneven set of parcel data represented by data points rather than the more desirable polygon form. In addition, it became immediately clear that in all cases the accuracy of the digital data was suspect as parcels were zoned incorrectly, land uses were erroneous, and ownership and property data were unavailable or indecipherable. However, this dataset was updated and augmented by a walking survey of each microarea (see the Site Visit section below).

- *Land Use and Zoning Maps*: To check the accuracy of the parcel level data and to measure changes over time, zoning maps and land use maps were collected from each city. These maps provided insights into changes to the district over time, as land use and zoning changes could be visually identified and mapped. The availability of these maps differed by type and by city, with zoning maps a regular fixture in all cases, but land use maps being available only in Arlington and Cleveland as part of a comprehensive plan or some other major planning effort.
- *Aerial photographs*: Aerial photographs were also utilized to check the accuracy of the parcel level data set. In addition, these photographs were used to create maps of the microarea built form at different points in time. The aerials were collected from local governmental agencies, like planning departments or public works departments, and online sources, like the North Central Texas Council of Government WWW home page.[16]

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[15] Interview with Leviton and French, August 1998.
[16] NTCOG Home Page, *http://www.nctcog.dst.tx.us/*.

- *US Census data*: A widely available and regularly utilized data set for urban planning, United States Census data was gathered for a variety of geographic levels for each of the case cities. Data from the 1990 census was the primary source year, but some data was gathered from 1980 and 1970 as well. Data at the county level and city level was collected to compare Baltimore, Cleveland, and Arlington to their surrounding regions. Data at the tract level and blockgroup level was also collected for each host city/county. This helped to establish the demographics of the microarea and the surrounding portions of the city in 1990. Maps for population, median family income, poverty and other key statistics yielded insights into district character prior to the opening of these facilities in 1992 and 1994.
- *Planning Documents, Comprehensive (Comp) Plans*: An essential source of information in this study were the official comprehensive planning documents produced by the case cities in recent years. Cleveland's 1988 Downtown Plan and 1991 Citywide Plan provided essential information on district character, land use, zoning, and proposed or planned projects for the downtown area and for Gateway. Arlington's 1992 Comprehensive Plan Update and their 1987 Comprehensive Plan provided similar information for the Ballpark district. Unfortunately, Baltimore is currently undertaking the comprehensive planning process, with a draft expected by mid-1999. Their last comprehensive plan is well over twenty years old. Where available, these documents provided measures of existing conditions in these districts at the time of the studies, insight into the city's overall vision for these districts, and plans/proposals for each of the districts.
- *Planning Documents, Other Planning Documents*: In addition to local comp plans, a wide array of other planning documents were consulted for this study. These documents included sector/district level studies and special project plans. The city of Arlington has a very active planning department, with recently completed "sector plans" for portions of the city, documents for proposed projects in the Ballpark microarea, like a Johnson Creek Plan, and documents describing the enterprise zone

program in the area. Baltimore also has documents on a nearby enterprise zone program. These documents provided additional information on the district or portions of the district.

- *Stadium Project Documents*: An essential set of documents for this study were the huge set of studies surrounding each individual stadium project, from the very initial planning phases through the actual design and implementation documents. In particular, the Baltimore and Cleveland cases had a high quality set of documents covering the site plans, linkages to the city, and design features of the facilities. These documents were primary sources for assessing each jurisdiction's plans for the sports projects, as well as their integration into the district and the overall fabric of the city.
- *Site Visits*: Perhaps the single most useful data gathering exercise of this study was the site visit phase. For each case city, I spent one week visiting the city, walking the district several times at different times of the day, attending events at the facilities, visiting the facility during non-event days, conducting interviews, and generally coming to understand the orientation of the facilities and their integration (or lack thereof) into the surrounding district. Whereas the other phases of the analysis relied upon the analysis of "remote" data, like looking at maps, photographs, and documents, this phase actually put the researcher on the ground, in the environment being studied. During site visits extensive walking tours of the microarea were undertaken. These tours involved checking the accuracy of the parcel level data by visually mapping the land uses and built form of these districts. In addition I spent a great deal of time watching how visitors to the stadium districts utilized these spaces and interacted with their environment on event and non-event days. While the other sources of data provide insights into the district in quantitative forms, these site visits provided a chance to talk with local shopkeepers, watch gameday crowds, and assess the parking and transportation networks with a depth and clarity available only through first-person experience.

- *Interviews*: When designing this study, it became immediately clear that despite my interest and expertise in these sports-related projects, there would be no way for me to learn and synthesize the amount of information about each of these cases without talking with local stakeholders and experts on portions of these projects. Consequently, a set of interviews were conducted with these local experts. Important public, quasi-public, and private organizations were identified, including city agencies, neighborhood groups, and merchants associations. For example, representatives of the planning department were contacted and interviewed, as were representatives of other relevant agencies. Representatives of other nearby development projects (like the Convention Centers) or of the local neighborhood groups were interviewed in each city. Academics who have studied the project, the district, or the city were also identified and interviewed. In short, these interviews allowed me to gather a variety of perspectives on these projects, test and refine my ideas and initial conclusions, and get insights into the local politics and processes that fueled these projects and continue to shape their "success".
- *Newspaper Accounts*: Another major source of information on the planning, construction, and aftermath of each of these projects were the local newspapers. A review of newspaper archives from the initial planning phases of each case through current times provided a great deal of information into the financing, politics, and related developments surrounding these sports facilities. In addition, the local business journals in each city (or region in Arlington's case) also provided descriptions of proposed new hotels, restaurants, and other projects in the stadium microareas.
- *Other Project Studies*: Lastly, as noted earlier, a review of the literature on sports stadia revealed several other studies of these projects. As the recent "success stories" in sports facility planning and construction, Camden Yards, Gateway, and The Ballpark have been looked at in rigorous and not-so-rigorous studies. These studies also provided important information on all phases of these projects, although each of

these studies usually focused on one narrow aspect of a project, like their financing or political history.

In sum, this study has combined a wide array of data sources and data sets in an effort to attain the depth and comprehensiveness that is the hallmark of a successful and useful case study approach. In addition, every attempt was made to collect similar data sets for each case, thereby allowing for comparisons between these cases and generalizations to other special activity generating projects. A core set of agencies were contacted, similar documents were gathered, aerial photographs and site surveys provided the necessary refinements to the parcel level data, and interviews with individuals centered on a similar set of questions.

Unfortunately, these three cases had different strengths and weaknesses in their data sources. The city of Arlington has a huge amount of city-generated data and reports that usually come from a growing, fast-changing, successful edge city on the rise. The city of Arlington has a wealth of information on new projects, land use, and local planning effort. Much of the changes to their city have occurred in the form of new development on previously undeveloped land, making the tracking of any changes easier. Where the Arlington data set falls short is in their newspaper resources and in their documentation surrounding the new Ballpark.

In contrast, Cleveland and Baltimore have much more limited parcel data sets, in part because they are just now translating their data into more computer friendly and GIS-ready formats. In addition, as older cities in decline these cities have severe budgeting problems and their planning departments, while active and well-regarded, have limitations in the data they collect and the reports they can produce. For example, Baltimore is just now undertaking the comprehensive planning process, updating a plan almost thirty years old. Cleveland's comprehensive plan is less of a planning document and more of a guideline and vision for future development. In short, when compared to suburban

Arlington, Baltimore and Cleveland had much less data available from city agencies. Where Cleveland shined, however, was in their detailed documentation of the Gateway project from its early days as the "domed-stadium project". In addition, the local development agency and local newspapers had detailed accounts of the project, including articles on the numerous projects related to Gateway's opening in 1994. In contrast, Baltimore's strengths lay in their very active neighborhood planning process within the planning department and within their active neighborhood groups. The Baltimore data set also had ample resources available from the agency that oversees the Camden Yards project, the Maryland Stadium Authority.

Table 5.2 provides a summary assessment of these data sets for all three cities. In general the Arlington case is strongest on government documents and weakest on project information and local newspaper accounts. Cleveland provided the most balanced of the datasets, with generally good data across the full set of data sources and types. Lastly, Baltimore had by far the most interesting, yet most frustrating dataset. The city of Baltimore is just now getting their GIS data up and running and the lack of a comprehensive plan made data gathering very difficult. However, the set of interviews conducted for the Camden Yards case study were excellent, as were the local newspaper and business journal accounts of the project.

Table 5.2 Data Source Assessment

Data Source	*Baltimore*	*Cleveland*	*Arlington*
Census Data	XXX	XXX	XXX
Parcel Data	X	XX	XXX
Aerial Photos	X	XX	XXX
Zoning/Land Use Data	X	XX	XXX
Comprehensive Plan		XXX	XXX
Stadia Project Development Documents	XX	XXX	X
Microarea Development Data	X	XXX	XX
Other Planning Documents	XX	X	XX
Other Microarea-Related Reports			XX
Interviews-Local Academics	XX	XXX	XX
Interviews-Local Planners	XXX	XX	XXX
Interviews-Neighborhood	XXX	X	
Interviews-Development Agencies	XXX	XXX	
Newspaper Accounts	XXX	XXX	XX
Business Newspaper Accounts	XXX	XXX	X

XXX = *Excellent Data Quality/Quantity*
XX = *Adequate Data Quality/Quantity*
X = *Poor Data Quality/Quantity*
No Value = *Unavailable, Non-existent*




Figure 5.1: Overview of the Research Process




Figure 5.2: The Distance Decay of Microarea Impacts Prior to the Effects of Local Factors




Figure 5.3: How "Push" and "Pull" Factors Can Affect the Layout of the Microarea




Figure 5.4 Austrian-Rosentraub Microarea for Cleveland's Gateway

Chapter 6

Baltimore's Revitalization: An American Blueprint?

—"Powerless to prevent deindustrialization and recession, [Baltimore's urban elite] have tried to create a profitable growth machine that has focused on tourism, leisure, and conspicuous consumption as an antidote to falling profits and urban decline. In limited ways the strategy has worked- though mainly for them."

—David Harvey on Baltimore in "A View from Federal Hill"[1]

In an era of renewed interest in downtowns, perhaps no city has garnered more attention for its successful central city revitalization strategy than Baltimore.[2] From the very early days of central city decline in the 1950s, Baltimore has undertaken a number of programs aimed at the revitalization of downtown and other nearby districts. Included in this list of successful programs were the "paint up, fix up campaign" of the 1950s, the massive Charles Center project of the 1960s, the dollar housing program of the 1970s, and the Inner Harbor festival marketplace of the 1970s and 1980s, widely considered the holy grail of downtown revitalization. Just a few short years ago, downtown Baltimore added Camden Yards to the mix, a stadium project considered the crown jewel of sports complexes by the sports industry and with fans of professional team sports. With the wildly successful tandem of Inner Harbor and Camden Yards, along with an expanded convention center and some very nice in-city neighborhoods, the city is perceived to have staved off the problems and decay experienced by all other Rust Belt cities and even in many Sun Belt cities like Atlanta, Dallas, Tampa, and San Diego.

Certainly other cities can list a number of successful downtown revitalization projects, many mirroring or mirrored by Baltimore's experience. Boston's Faneuil Hall and the numerous historic districts in the central city are well-known for helping to

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[1] Harvey, David (1991). "A View from Federal Hill" in Elizabeth Fee, Linda Shopes, and Linda Zieman's (Eds.) *The Baltimore Book: New Views of Local History*. Temple University Press: Philadelphia, p. 240.

[2] Levine, Marc (1987a). "Downtown redevelopment as an urban growth strategy: A critical appraisal of the Baltimore renaissance." *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 9(2): pp. 103-123; Kelly, Brian and Roger Lewis (1992). "What's right (and wrong) about the Inner Harbor." *Planning*, April: pp. 28-3.

eliminate blight and develop Boston's downtown.[3] Similarly, New York City's wealth of interesting and vibrant urban districts, many built on tourism and entertainment, have received a great deal of attention for recapturing portions of the central city and making them safe and accessible for visitors and tourists.[4] However, most cities with aged and decaying downtowns aren't Bostons or New York Cities, but rather mid-sized metropolises (or smaller) without the sheer size or the social and economic resources of these two cities. In addition, in part because of their size and advantages neither Boston nor New York have ever been in quite as much trouble as other Rust Belt cities desperate to save their central cities or the newer Sun Belt cities that are attempting to create an urban downtown in a very few short years.

Baltimore, however, is a very different city than Boston and New York. In recent decades the city of Baltimore has been overshadowed by the nation's capital, Washington D.C., to the south and the city of Independence, Philadelphia, to the north. A regional metropolis, Baltimore is a mid-sized city that is considered to have experienced success in reshaping its downtown, restructuring the city's economy, and capturing tourism and entertainment dollars through its choice of downtown redevelopment strategies. Because Baltimore has so stridently pursued downtown revitalization over the decades and because these strategies have been perceived as such successes, the city has become a model for other cities desperate to make their downtowns destinations again. Baltimore is considered to be an ordinary city, with no particularly striking advantages, that has survived and thrived in the post-modern economy.

Across the United States (and even Canada) city after city has tried to replicate Baltimore's success by investing in a string of similar projects and assuming that what worked in that city will work in theirs.[5] Neal Peirce, in a 1986 piece for *Baltimore Magazine*, stated that Baltimore "is the town cities unabashedly seek to copy to revive

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[3] Frieden and Sagalyn (1991).
[4] Fainstein (1994).

their own decaying downtowns."[6] For example, New Orleans constructed a waterfront festival marketplace that has met with decidedly mixed success. As we shall see in the next case study, Cleveland has overtly followed Baltimore's model of downtown revitalization, attempting to redevelop its waterfront on the Inner Harbor model and focusing on downtown entertainment projects as the principal means to central city revitalization. Smaller cities such as Toledo, Norfolk, and Flint have also used the festival marketplace model of redevelopment, but with much less success.[7] Other large cities like Atlanta, Houston, and even New York have also built festival marketplace projects to spruce up their downtowns, with some success, but nothing to the degree of Baltimore's. For example, Underground Atlanta, a festival marketplace on some of that city's old streets, has long struggled even with the addition of other nearby attractions like a large Coca-Cola museum and additional upgrades coinciding with the 1996 Olympics.

The most recent large scale project that has furthered the perception of Baltimore as having "survived and thrived" is the Camden Yards sports complex, which opened in 1992 with the gorgeous baseball-only Oriole Park at Camden Yards and was completed with the new football stadium in 1998.[8] Almost entirely paid for by public dollars, the two stadia cost the state of Maryland well over $600 million when infrastructure costs are included in the total price tag. This project, located on the western edge of downtown, has become the new terminus for this edge of the central city, extending pedestrian activity a few blocks to the west on event days. Since the opening of Camden Yards, cities of all sizes have been building neotraditional ballparks in an attempt to capture the "magic in a bottle" that the Baltimore stadia seem to have provided to downtown. Visitors to events at these facilities see downtown streets filled with tourists and suburbanites, visitors who are spending freely, staying in hotels, and fueling the downtown entertainment economy. The leap that these visitors make is that Camden Yards is the engine for these crowds and

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[5] Levine (1987a).
[6] Peirce (1986), quoted in Levine (1987a), p. 105.
[7] Harvey (1991), p. 240.
[8] The football stadium still awaits a corporate sponsor as of early 1999.

for the restaurants, hotels, and businesses that have succeeded in downtown Baltimore. What makes downtown Baltimore so successful, the thinking seems to be, is the success of Camden Yards and its linkages to Inner Harbor. To take this thinking a step further, the principal ingredient in the success of Baltimore has been the sports stadia.

Seattle, Louisville, Detroit, Durham, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Houston, San Diego and a host of other cities have seen the "success" of Baltimore's Camden Yards and attempted to emulate that success by building a new baseball stadium or sports complex in the hopes of experiencing the same level of social and economic success. As we shall see in this case study, the dirty little secret behind Camden Yards is that the "success" of the sports complex is in large part a result of the success of Baltimore's downtown revitalization strategy, *not* an important causal factor in that success. Certainly Oriole Park at Camden Yards is a beautiful facility and on gamedays Eutaw Street is one of the most vibrant of streets in all of America. Similarly, the Ravens Stadium is an excellent football facility with great views of the city. Both Major League Baseball and the National Football League hold up Baltimore's Camden Yards as an example of how to undertake stadium development. The architectural and historic preservation communities have also lauded these facilities and design elements, use of historic structures and motifs, and the public spaces created as part of these facilities. In short, Camden Yards is perceived to be a resounding success for the city, both economically and socially. But, as we shall see this perception is seriously threatened when we turn our attention to the microarea impacts of the complex.

We begin our review of the Camden Yards case study with a look at Baltimore's decline and the city's responses to this decline. Baltimore's "corporate sector strategy"[9] has been effective in renewing much of the central city, but critics have been vocal in

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[9] Levine (1987a), p. 104.

suggesting that this strategy only seems to create "islands of renewal in a sea of decay"[10]. Following this demographic and historical outline, we turn our attention to the Inner Harbor area. The Inner Harbor has been at the center of much of Baltimore's renewal efforts and it has long served as the principal anchor in the city's downtown redevelopment strategy.

From there we move to a discussion of the Camden Yards area, a former rail yard that now is home to the most celebrated urban ballpark in decades. The Camden Yards complex was a project that took over twenty years to evolve and only happened after Baltimore's much-beloved football team departed for Indianapolis in 1984. The behind-the-scenes political machinations surrounding the project are discussed, with an emphasis upon what the city of Baltimore hoped to get from the siting of new sports stadia at Camden Yards. Finally, an outline of the "suite deals" that are the primary reasons MLB and the NFL are such proponents of complexes like Camden Yards is provided. Setting a trend for the three case studies, both the Orioles and the Ravens have experienced substantial financial success in the years after their respective moves into a new stadium. If there is any clear winner with Camden Yards it is no doubt the billionaire owners and the millionaire players that call these facilities home.

A Brief History of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area 1950-1995

Baltimore is a city whose history is intertwined with two means of transporting goods and people across large spaces. Shipping via water and across land by rail originally helped to develop the economic base of the city, providing good jobs and an industrial character to much of downtown, and acting as central strands in the city's development. Ships traveling by sea, up the Patapsco River, and into Baltimore's Inner Harbor have been an important legacy for the city, bringing goods, people, and creating jobs for local residents. Even to this day the city has an active shipping and sea trade, with many

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[10] Berry, Brian (1985). "Islands of Renewal in Seas of Decay" in Paul E. Peterson's (Ed.) *The New Urban Reality*. Brookings Institute: Washington D.C.

residents dependent upon manufacturing and industrial jobs related to the port. Baltimore also developed as a very important east coast rail center over the decades and its Camden Yards railyards were a bustling, active place for the better part of a century. In recent decades the waterfront and old railyards have been redeveloped to aid the city in the efforts to re-orient downtown to better fit the post-modern economy. As will be discussed shortly, the Inner Harbor and the railyards have become tourism and entertainment destinations of national stature, bringing dollars and jobs to the central city and providing employment for city residents all in an attempt to stave off central city decline. While these projects have been successful, the following sections will illustrate that Baltimore is a city still in desperate trouble.

The Baltimore Metropolitan Area 1960-1996: A Brief Demographic Look

Table 6.1 illustrates the city of Baltimore's population changes during the period 1970-1990. Figure 6.1 provides a reference map for the Baltimore Region as a whole.

Table 6.1: Baltimore City and Metropolitan Area Population Changes 1970-1996

Area	*1970*	*1980*	*1990*	*1996*
Baltimore City	905,759	786,759	736,014	675,401
Baltimore PMSA	2,089,092	2,199,531	2,382,172	2,474,118

Area	*Percent Change '70-'80*	*Percent Change '80-'90*	*Gross Change '70-'96*	*Percent Change '70-'96*
Baltimore City	-13.0%	-6.4%	-230,358	-25.4%
Baltimore PMSA	5.3%	8.3%	385,026	18.4%

Source: *United States Census Bureau, The State of the Cities Data Systems Home Page, Maryland Office of Planning Home Page.*

As with many Rust Belt cities of the northeast and midwest, Baltimore has been steadily losing population since its high water mark of 1950 when the city had approximately 950,000 residents. In fact, between 1970 and 1996 the city lost over 230,000 residents, or over a quarter of their population. This happened despite a set of projects aimed at sprucing up downtown and home ownership incentive programs aimed

at keeping residents in the city. City leaders would point to the slowing of losses in residents in later periods as a sign of the success of these programs, but even given the city's strong national image and vibrant downtown Baltimore still has lost an estimated 60,000 residents since 1990. Projections by the Maryland Office of Planning for the city place the 2020 Baltimore city population at 622,800, representing a further leakage of almost 8% of the city's population.[11]

[See Figure 6.1 on page 189]

What is most troublesome is that these central city losses are coupled with substantial gains in population in the suburbs, indicating the flow of middle class residents out of Baltimore City and into the surrounding suburban counties. Since 1970 the city of Baltimore has lost well over 200,000 people while surrounding suburban areas have gained almost 500,000 new residents. Projections place the regional population at over 2,700,000 by 2020, an addition of another 200,000 residents to the suburbs coupled with further central city losses. In his highly regarded book *Baltimore Unbound*, David Rusk details the consequences of these shifts in population and jobs.[12] His analysis shows that the city of Baltimore is becoming increasingly poor, with almost 60% of city residents African American, and with less and less economic power to help pull the city out of trouble. Rusk characterizes the city as "gripped relentlessly by a process of slow economic and social decline", a decline that shows no signs of reversing itself without a regional approach to solving these problems.[13]

Table 6.2 underscores Rusk's conclusion that the city is increasingly worse off relative to the much wealthier suburban counties. The table provides comparisons between

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[11] Maryland Office of Planning, State Data Center Home Page (1998). http://www.inform.umd.edu/UMS+State/MD_Resources/MSDC/msdchome.html

[12] Rusk (1996). Rusk's thesis is that the inelasticity of the city, the inability to annex surrounding lands and to disperse dependent populations throughout the region, have doomed Baltimore to become the "warehouse of the region's poor blacks". Rusk argues, rather persuasively, that a regional approach to dealing with poor households is necessary for the long term health of both Baltimore and the surrounding region.

Baltimore City, Baltimore County, and the remaining counties of the 1990 PMSA. Unlike other metropolitan areas, Baltimore City is a separate entity in census data terms, so the data represent separate jurisdictions and not parts of a single census geography. The city boundaries contain the traditional city center and all of the in-town neighborhoods and major industrial areas, including the port. Baltimore County is a mixture of older suburban cities and wealthy neighborhoods that have resisted annexation over the years. The other four counties surrounding Baltimore County make up the remaining portion of the Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) as defined by the Census Bureau. These counties, Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford, and Howard, are all truly suburban in character, with strip development, large interstates and highways, and with many workers commuting into Baltimore and Washington D.C.

Table 6.2: Comparison Statistics for Baltimore City and the Metropolitan Area

Area	*Pop 1980*	*Pop 1990*	*Pct Poverty (persons) 1979*	*Pct Poverty (persons) 1989*	*Median Household Income 1979*	*Median Household Income 1989*
Baltimore City	786,775	736,014	22.9%	21.9%	$15,721	$24,045
Baltimore County	655,615	692,134	5.3%	5.5%	$24,413	$38,837
Remaining PMSA	731,633	920,071	6.0%[1]	4.2%[1]	$25,284[1]	$50,953[1]
Total PMSA	2,199,023	2,382,172	11.9%	10.1%		$36,529

[1] Weighted values for remaining counties in the PMSA; Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford, Howard Counties.
Source: *United States Census Bureau. Some values derived from Census figures.*

Baltimore in Decline: 1950-1980

In 1950, the city of Baltimore reached the apex of its development, in population terms and in terms of the city's national importance. With a population nearing one million, in that year Baltimore was a

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[13] Ibid, p. xxi.

major manufacturing and industrial center, home to an active port and the city's railyards served as an origination point for a large percentage of the shipped goods in the nation. Downtown Baltimore had evolved as the place to work and shop, enjoy cultural events, and the busy downtown was surrounded by seemingly strong (although heavily segregated) neighborhoods. The city was soon to achieve "major league status" with two new top flight professional sports franchises. Like most Rust Belt cities at the time, Baltimore had no idea that the next thirty years would see an emptying out of the city of residents and jobs and a major shift in the national economy from a manufacturing-based to service and information-based.

Major national and international trends were to impact Baltimore in the coming years. For decades prior to 1950, Baltimore's economy was very closely tied to the world economy and its demand for shipping, steel, and ships. In particular, Baltimore's steel industry and shipping industry was thrown into action in times of war leading one local historian to write that city's "economic motor purred at any outbreak of war and stalled at any threats of 'disasters of the peace'."[14] After World War II the local economy began to diversify, at first because of the decline of the rail industry and later because local leaders pushed the city to develop a service-based economy that was clearly growing in importance throughout the country. Baltimore's energy industry grew to service much of the mid-Atlantic region. In addition, because of its status as a regional city downtown emerged as a financial and government center for the metropolitan area.

In addition to these economic shifts, between 1940 and 1970 Baltimore experienced a major demographic shift as significant numbers of southern blacks migrated north to industrial cities. In a cruel twist of history, these southern blacks moved to these industrial centers to work in blue-collar industrial jobs that in a few short years began leaving the city for suburban or overseas operations. These blacks moved into in-city

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[14] Olson, Sherry (1997). *Baltimore: The Building of an American City*. The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, Maryland, p. 347.

housing being vacated by middle class whites who began leaving the city in droves, in part because of the influx of blacks, but also to take advantage of suburban opportunities. Blacks pushed their way into manufacturing jobs and developed vibrant, close-knit communities, but the shift in the economy after World War II left many unprepared for the new service-economy and overt and covert racism kept blacks from moving easily into this new economy. A major result of this migration for Baltimore and other northern cities was the bringing to the fore problems of race and problems of poverty, especially among the black poor, that have informed and influenced much of Rusk's work on Baltimore. As whites continued to leave Baltimore, blacks had little choice but to remain in the city where the number of jobs was falling and the job skills for the new economy were unavailable to them. The city would, over time, become poorer, more black, and more troubled, with few options seemingly available to decision-makers. When we turn our attention later to the Camden Yards Microarea, we will see this thread of race strongly influence the impacts of that project on the city of Baltimore.

Speeding the flight of whites to the suburbs and speeding the growth of those suburbs were changes to and additions to the local transportation infrastructure. The highway building boom of the post World War II period changed Baltimore just as it changed almost every other American city. The engineering solutions to central city traffic congestion were applied with great zeal in Baltimore, all with the unintended consequence of making the city that much more easily escaped or bypassed. Downtown Baltimore changed their street signals so that trips through downtown would require as few stops as possible, making vehicular travel faster and easier, but making the walking city a more uncomfortable and more dangerous place. Downtown streets were set to one-way only, perhaps helping traffic flow, but harming the rhythm of the city. Huge ribbons of concrete cut into suburban areas, helping small cities to mushroom and bloom into sprawling suburban areas, with arterial roads stemming from the highways and pushing development further into the surrounding areas. The Interstate system began to develop, at huge federal expense, but with little direct impact on the local pocketbook.

These changes only made it easier for those could leave the city (whites) to do so. As the buying power of the middle class left the city, so did the shopping and later many of the businesses that employed these same people. Shopping malls, with their modern, air conditioned, and covered artificial environments, sprouted up all around the city slowly sucking the commercial life out of the central city. Large department stores, once located only in the retail districts of the big city, opened up branch stores in these malls and later closed their downtown stores. Industries that once required rail access and workers available in a dense urban environment now realized that cheap, clean, available land was abundant in the suburbs. On this land industries could build sprawling, one story plants that could be more easily retrofitted or rebuilt to adapt to fast-changing advances in technology.

So, what transpired in Baltimore as the highways were built, the middle class fled the city, and southern blacks poured north by the millions? As we saw earlier, through 1970 the city fared rather well when compared to many other peer cities. The city still had over 900,000 residents in 1970, representing a significant, but not massive loss in population during this difficult transition period. The industrial base remained rather strong, with over 82,200 jobs still in the city and only 4.6% unemployment in that year (compared to 2.5% in the suburbs). However, other indicators pointed to trouble. Poverty rates were certainly a concern, with a 18.0% city poverty rate in 1969 compared to 5.6% in the suburbs. The percent of families in the highest income brackets were substantially lower in the city (16.2%) than the suburbs (29.0%), clearly indicating the slow leaching of buying power from the city. So, unlike Cleveland which we'll visit in the next case study, prior to 1970 Baltimore had experienced some decline, but not the massive exodus witnessed in other Rust Belt cities.

Between 1970 and 1980, however, the bottom dropped out on Baltimore. In that ten year period the city lost almost 120,000 residents while the region gained over 100,000. Poverty levels increased to 22.9% in the city, while dropping to 5.5% in the

suburbs. Most disconcerting, employment in the city fell from 366,000 to 307,000, with manufacturing jobs falling by over 30% between 1970 and 1980. Baltimore's percent unemployed more than doubled to 10.7%, compared to 4.6% in the suburbs, related in part to the national recession, but also related to the loss of industrial work in the city. By 1980 the city was 54.4% black, compared to only 8.4% in the suburbs. Baltimore had fought the good fight until 1970, straining to retain residents and jobs, but throughout that decade the massive demographic and economic shifts had overcome the best efforts of the city. Rusk concludes that by 1980 Baltimore had "passed the point of no return" and that the only approach that might solve the city's problems was a regional approach towards helping and housing the region's poor.[15]

Charles Center: The Beginnings of Baltimore's "Corporate Center Strategy"

What is most interesting about all of this is not that Baltimore has had trouble dealing with these massive economic, social, and demographic changes over the post war period. All American cities have struggled and continue to struggle with these major shifts. No, Baltimore's story is interesting because city and civic leaders recognized very early on how all of these changes might impact the city, especially downtown. As early as 1954 downtown merchants began meeting to determine how downtown might be saved.[16] In the years throughout the 1950s a number of organizations and boards were formed to draw up plans for downtown, centering on the vitality of the central business district. The Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC), a group of "100 downtown-oriented corporate executives" began meeting in 1955 soon followed by the Urban Renewal Study Board, a group of outside experts convened by city government to develop a strategy of downtown survival.[17] What resulted was a corporate center strategy that emphasized the physical redevelopment of two areas of the central city, the first centered in downtown around a new civic center project named the Charles Center and the second along the shoreline of

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[15] Rusk (1996), p. xiv.
[16] Dorsey, John and James Dilts (1997). *A Guide to Baltimore Architecture*. Tidewater Books: Centerville, Maryland, p. 44.
[17] Ibid.

the city's harbor, soon to be officially dubbed Inner Harbor.[18] This plan was typical of the early center city redevelopment plans, funded and backed by the elite and resting on a combination of offices, hotels, and other development aimed at higher income groups that had long ago fled the city.[19]

The Charles Center project was a planned civic center that would incorporate a new round of pedestrian plazas, underground garage parking, office buildings, a theater, hotels, and mixed-use retail and businesses with several existing buildings. Begun in 1959, the Charles Center was a $180 million, 33 acre complex meant to tie the existing government center to the shopping district along Howard Street to the west. Funding for the public portion of the project, approximately $40 million, came from Urban Renewal funds, city bonds, and some state money. Charles Center eventually led to a number of new downtown buildings, including One Charles Center, the Mechanic Theater, the Baltimore Arena, and several other office buildings. Baltimore Sun reporters and architecture critics John Dorsey and James Dilts conclude that Charles Center is one of the more successful civic center projects built in any American city.[20] Contrasting views of Charles Center come from David Levine and David Harvey in their separate discussions of Baltimore's downtown growth machine and their attempts at remaking downtown Baltimore into a theme park in an effort to boost center city property values.[21]

In their discussion of Charles Center, Dorsey and Dilts focus upon the large public spaces, the underground parking, the architectural gems, and the coming together of public and private interests to make a positive statement about downtown Baltimore. These writers emphasize the physical changes to the city and the rise in investor confidence that accompanied the project. Downtown Baltimore did experience a wave of new construction related to Charles Center, including the pentagonal World Trade Center

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[18] Levine. (1987).
[19] Frieden and Sagalyn (1991), Chapters 2 and 3.
[20] Dorsey and Dilts (1997), pp. 45-48.
[21] Levine (1987a); Harvey (1991).

on the waterfront, the Sun Life Building, and the apartments of Two Charles Center, but land values in downtown held steady rather than took off as predicted.[22] Levine concludes that despite the new buildings and public spaces, Charles Center simply recast downtown as a "profit center" and did little to address Baltimore's larger problems of population and job loss. Harvey also criticizes the plan for its domination "by corporate and business interests" and concludes that "the city as a whole received very little benefit from it."[23] While Charles Center did leverage some private investment (around $145 million according to Harvey) over the next fifteen years, the project certainly did not stem the tide of population and employment losses to the suburbs. In addition, despite Charles Center's goal of linking the central business district to the city's older shopping district, the once-thriving Howard Street retail core declined very quickly in the 1960s. This area has yet to recover from the combination of suburban malls and perceived central city danger that killed many traditional central city shopping districts.

What both sides of the coin do agree upon is that the Charles Center plan set the stage for a number of large, bricks and mortar projects that were generated by public-private partnerships over the next thirty years. The "corporate center strategy"[24] was pursued with great vigor in Baltimore, leading to a nationally recognized and celebrated downtown surrounded by slowly decaying neighborhoods, "an island of renewal in a sea of decay". The success of Charles Center in leveraging some new development in downtown, in providing a positive image of the city throughout the difficult period of the 1960s, and in bringing together very aggressive private interests with a city government willing to try anything to stem the decline of downtown, led to a litany of projects that have since become the envy of most cities in America. After the Charles Center was

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[22] It not until 1975, with a major reappraisal of downtown properties, that Charles Center began to reap substantial property tax benefits for the city. Until then, many of the Charles Center properties actually had *lower* property values than prior to construction began on the project. (Harvey, p. 233)

[23] Ibid, p. 243.

[24] Levine (1987a), p. 104. Levine notes that many authors have touted this strategy as the "linchpin" behind the redevelopment of many Rust Belt cities. Levine points to the work of Frieden and Sagalyn

essentially built-out by 1970, the downtown coalition came together again and focused their attention on the old waterfront area, an area no longer suitable for shipping because it is too shallow for the huge modern ships of the industry. At the time, few could imagine that a run-down waterfront, one surrounded by surface parking lots and home to decaying remnants of an earlier industrial era, would become one of the most successful urban entertainment districts in the world. The Inner Harbor was afoot.

Baltimore's Inner Harbor: From Shipping to Shopping

As the Charles Center began to lose momentum and the area became largely developed as planned, the downtown coalition turned its sights to the old waterfront area to the south. Once a thriving port that provided thousands of jobs and served as the entrée into America of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of goods and raw materials each year, the district had become a depressing mixture of large parking lots, dilapidated old warehouses, and a tangle of rail lines and beat up streets. With the "success" of Charles Center, downtown proponents would be quick to note that there were many new buildings and the city had received a good deal of positive press from the project, the GBC began to mobilize support for doing something with the waterfront district that was a short walking distance from the newly revived city center. However, initial interest in the project was lacking and the idea languished in boardrooms and clubs for several years. After the turbulent 1960s, a decade in which race riots in portions of the city had followed the assassination of Martin Luther King and in a period when suburbanites increasingly began to see the city as an unsafe place, confidence in inner city Baltimore (and most other Rust Belt cities) was very low. Racial tension and economic restructuring had begun to make their mark via uprisings and protests. What was required to get the Inner Harbor project off the ground were two separate, but intertwined ingredients; 1) a charismatic champion for the project that could muster public and private support and 2) evidence for investors

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(1986) or Ganz (1986) as examples of this. The Cleveland case study provides another example of a "comeback city" that has relied heavily on this strategy.

that downtown was a place that suburbanites and tourists might come to if the climate was right.

In 1971, the champion for Inner Harbor and downtown Baltimore as a place for tourism and entertainment entered the fray. Donald Schaefer, a Democrat long ensconced in that party's "political machine", was elected to the Baltimore Mayor's office promising (as all mayors do) better times for all, stronger neighborhoods, and a vibrant center city. Schaefer was elected to four consecutive terms as mayor and later became Governor of the state of Maryland. Schaefer is widely recognized as an effusive, obstinate, aggressive downtown backer, always quick to tout the city's strengths and downplay the city's weaknesses. He had a firm grasp of the immense problems facing the city and believed the way out was through fostering economic growth through public-private partnerships that would create new development, bringing jobs and dollars back into the city. Over the next sixteen years, Schaefer pushed, prodded, and funded initiatives for the Inner Harbor area that brought millions of visitors and dollars to the city and reshaped the downtown economy into an entertainment and services-based machine. The champion of Baltimore's downtowns (and later of all downtowns) had arrived, and arrived with vigor.

The second ingredient required was proof that a market existed for the downtown as a playground. In the spring of 1970 a big downtown festival, the Baltimore City Fair, was held downtown at Charles Center to illustrate that the economic and racial strife of the 1960s had not overcome the city. Harvey comments that "340,000 came during the weekend fair... proving that disparate neighborhoods and communities could come together around a common project."[25] By 1973 the fair had boomed, attracting over two million visitors, and the event had been relocated to the waterfront area; "the city fair proved that large numbers of people could be attracted downtown without having a riot."[26] Over the next few years the city added more events to their annual set and more

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[25] Harvey (1991), p. 236.
[26] Ibid.

and more people came to the central city to watch street performers, buy t-shirts and other kitschy items, and eat grinders, gyros, baklava, satays, and a wide variety of other ethnic festival foods. With these events the market for a downtown "festival marketplace" was established and the city of Baltimore successfully re-established itself as a safe and fun place to enjoy community events.

In the coming years, Mayor Schaefer led a downtown renaissance that saw the construction of the whole range of entertainment and tourism-oriented activity generators that would help support this new urban economy. Between 1975 and 1982 the waterfront was reconstructed and revitalized into the form that stands today. To prepare the area the city used federal UDAG, and CDBG funding, other federal grants, and city funding to clear much of the district and construct a harbor promenade. Over 30 acres of new land along the shore was created to provide more opportunities for development and for more pedestrian space. (See Figure 6.2) In 1976 the bunker-like, windowless Maryland Science Center became the first major addition to the Inner Harbor area, on the southeast corner of the waterfront. Harvey suggests that because this facility was "built in the wake of the 1968 riots", it originally functioned as a "strategic outpost" that would be protected from property damage (and help protect surrounding properties) if the large African-American population of South Baltimore were to riot again.[27] Its drab, inward architecture certainly supports his claims, yet the gentrification of both the rest of Inner Harbor and areas to the south, including the now quite expensive Otterbein neighborhood, never resulted in a test of his hypothesis.

[See Figure 6.2 on page 190]

Following on the heels of the Science Center were a remodeled World Trade Center (1977), a new Convention Center in 1979, and the nationally emulated National Aquarium which opened its doors in 1981. Of course, the most important addition was Baltimore's now internationally known festival marketplace, named Harborplace Pavilions

and developed by James Rouse, which opened in 1980. In the year Harborplace opened fully 18 million visitors poured into Inner Harbor to celebrate the city and to enjoy this center of conspicuous consumption. As a whole, these projects were a substantial success, bringing in millions of visitors a year and helping to flesh out the entertainment-based economy of downtown with new restaurants, gift shops, and other businesses that could milk money out of suburban and out-of-town visitors.

Unlike other cities that spent millions on huge entertainment projects, Baltimore's massive public investments did generate a huge tidal wave of new construction, much of it a perfect fit for the new downtown economy. Several new hotels were built as a result of Inner Harbor's success, tripling the number of hotel rooms in downtown between 1980 and 1986.[28] The Hyatt Regency, a new Sheraton, and a hotel in the mixed-use project the Gallery were all major additions adjacent to the harbor. To be fair, not every project proved a financial success. The Power Plant, an old electric plant, has been redeveloped at least three times now, the most recent incarnation coming in 1997. Previous incarnations had failed miserably. Projects located further into downtown away from the harbor, like another marketplace named Hutzler's Palace, have failed to attract tourists into the city, likely related to barriers of perception that have hindered the development of the city's interior for years.

A final disappointment with the Inner Harbor has been the inability of Baltimore to include a great deal of affordable housing as part of the project. By affordable housing, I do not mean to imply low income housing, but rather middle income housing that might allow the city to recapture some of the middle class households lost to suburbs in the last few decades. Inner Harbor was originally conceived as a truly mixed-use district, with retail, offices, entertainment, and residential development. Less than half of the housing units planned for Inner Harbor were built, with entertainment attractions quickly placed in

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[27] Harvey (1991), p. 247.
[28] Levine (1987a), p. 109.

these gaps on the water.[29] Some condominiums were built, but much of it is high-priced and unaffordable by middle income families. Certainly the gentrification of Otterbein and Federal Hill in South Baltimore, Fells Point to the east, and even the tiny Ridgely's Delight neighborhood west of Inner Harbor can be related to the establishment of the waterfront as a safe, attractive, and bustling place.[30] However, Otterbein has become an upscale in-town neighborhood and most middle class residents have been priced out. Ridgely's Delight is still largely middle class, it even includes some low income housing, but it is so small as to have only a small impact on the microarea economy. Other nearby downtown neighborhoods have seen even less impact from Inner Harbor, Sharp-Leadenhall to the south having experienced some gentrification and with Pigtown to the west still looking very much like an urban warzone. The failure of the downtown to include a great deal of housing has made Inner Harbor much less of a total neighborhood concept and more of a theme-parked district, albeit an extremely successful one. In addition, the poor linkage between the successful redevelopment of the waterfront and the redevelopment of surrounding neighborhoods has been a major failure of Inner Harbor.

Evaluating the Baltimore "Renaissance"

On several fronts, Baltimore's approach to central city revitalization and citywide economic retrenchment has been a resounding success. In purely superficial terms, Inner Harbor went a long way towards establishing Baltimore's reputation as a city that "had 'broken out' of the downward economic trajectory of older, manufacturing cities."[31] In 1981 *Time* magazine heralded Baltimore as a "renaissance" city and Mayor Schaefer was lauded as the architect of the city's revival. *Esquire* magazine named Schaefer the best mayor in America, largely due to the spectacular success of Inner Harbor. Visitors from throughout the country come to Baltimore specifically to visit the Inner Harbor (and now

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[29] Dorsey and Dilts (1997), p. 62.
[30] These neighborhoods were also part of the "dollar housing" program in Baltimore in the mid-1970s. Homes were sold for a dollar with the promise that the new owner would refurbish and live in the residence for a given number of years.
[31] Levine (1987a), p. 109.

Camden Yards), bringing in millions of dollars a year. Convention traffic in the city has been on the rise, despite increased competition from other cities, leading to an expansion of the Convention Center in 1996.

As a microarea development approach, Baltimore's Charles Center and Inner Harbor projects have been colossal successes for the city. Dorsey and Dilts report that over $4 ***billion*** has been invested in construction projects for the various harbor-related projects alone.[32] Between 1975 and 1995 almost the entire Inner Harbor area was built-out with only a very few vacant sites, now serving as surface parking, still available to developers. Over time, Inner Harbor has spread to both the east and west (including the new Camden Yards complex) leading to a completely remodeled downtown and a seemingly successful post-modern central city economy. Although the city had to make tremendous up-front investments through local bonds and redirecting federal dollars into the renovation of the waterfront and the construction of many of the first round of projects, over the long run the percentage of public dollars for the entire Inner Harbor project is surprisingly small. Levine cites two articles by the *Baltimore Sun's* architecture critic that places the public percentage at 10% for investments in Inner Harbor.[33]

Even critics like Levine and Harvey describe the Inner Harbor as a massive success... but only for a selective segment of Baltimore's citizens. Levine characterizes the Inner Harbor as a "glittering example of physical redevelopment", one that has created over 14,000 jobs, quadrupled the downtown tax base between 1960 and 1985, and generated massive "ripple effects" in the district and in surrounding areas.[34] The usually skeptical Harvey notes that almost all of the ventures on the harbor have been financially successful and that the national and international press has been a boon to Baltimore's downtown hotels and businesses. Even David Rusk writes admiringly of Inner Harbor as

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[32] Dorsey and Dilts (1997), p. 62.
[33] Levine (1987a), p. 109. (Also see Gunts 1985a and 1985b)
[34] Levine (1987a), p. 110.

he notes the desperate circumstances for city leaders and residents of the city.[35] But all of these critics are equally quick to point out that despite the massive investments, the fortunes made, the positive press, and the thousands of jobs, Inner Harbor has not halted the city's inexorable decline.

A quick glance back at Table 6.1 reveals that despite the glowing center city successes, the city still lost over 6% of its population in the 1980s and an estimated further 8.2% between 1990 and 1996. Table 6.2 shows that poverty did fall in the city between 1979 and 1989, but only from approximately 23% to 22%. When measuring city median income versus suburban median income, the statistics paint a very depressing picture. In 1979 the city's median household income was roughly 62% of that of the suburbs, compared to roughly 90% in 1950.[36] By 1989, the city of Baltimore's median family income had fallen to only 55% of that in the suburbs. Levine, Harvey, and Rusk all stress that the downtown revitalization strategy undertaken by Baltimore has poured profits into the pockets for downtown developers and other businesses, but the population of the city is getting increasingly smaller, increasingly poorer, and with a population made up increasingly of poor blacks.

The Levine article goes a long way towards illustrating that as of 1987 Baltimore's image as a city that has made it is simply not supported by any available evidence. He notes that the Congressional Joint Economic Committee identified Baltimore as the fifth neediest city in the nation using 1980 census data. He calculated that the vast majority of Baltimore's neighborhoods worsened between 1970 and 1980 despite the massive investments in the central city. Finally, he shows that the disparities between black neighborhoods and white neighborhoods have only worsened in recent years.[37] Levine writes that "despite the omnipresent rhetoric of renaissance, Baltimore's basic economic

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[35] Rusk (1996), pp. 18, 20.
[36] Ibid, p. xiii.
[37] Levine (1987a), pp. 110-113.

problems- the loss of quality jobs, lagging per capita income, deteriorating city neighborhoods- remain unsolved."[38] Baltimore's renaissance is a pyrrhic victory, at best.

Of course, it might be argued that Baltimore's renaissance really took flight in the 1980s, so assessing this strategy in 1987 is unfair and a bit premature. Is there any evidence that over a longer period of time the corporate center strategy has been a broader success for the city? Unfortunately for Baltimore, the simple answer to this question is no. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s Baltimore has continued to slide, still losing people, still bleeding jobs, falling behind the suburbs, and not faring appreciably better than other Rust Belt cities in demographic and economic terms. While the Inner Harbor continues to generate spillovers to the east into Little Italy and to the west into Camden Yards, Berry's "island of renewal in a sea of decay" metaphor still is appropriate in describing the city. Other authors have used terms like the "dual city"[39] or "uneven development"[40] to describe cities with glittering downtowns benefiting predominately white landowners surrounded by decaying, desperate neighborhoods made up largely of poor minorities. Baltimore continues to be a textbook example of these cities.

What can account for this failure? Why hasn't $4 billion in investment in downtown and the redirection of the local economy into the growing sectors of tourism and services had more of a positive effect on the entire city? David Rusk's thesis is that Baltimore's inelasticity, originally its inability to expand its boundaries and later its inability to grow economically along with surrounding suburban areas, has made the city the warehouse of poor families, particularly poor black families. While downtown can be made into a glittering spectacle, replete with walkable streets, trendy restaurants, and innumerable attractions, this does little to help the surrounding poor neighborhoods other

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[38] Levine (1987a), p. 118.
[39] Goldsmith, William and Edward Blakely (1992). *Separate Societies: Poverty and Inequality in U.S. Cities*. Temple University Press: Philadelphia.
[40] Swanstrom, Todd (1985). *The Crisis of Growth Politics: Cleveland, Kucinich, and the Challenge of Urban Populism*. Temple University Press: Philadelphia

than providing low wage, low impact jobs. While the central city thrives, the poor neighborhoods do not have an opportunity to improve, the best that can be hoped for is that a neighborhood staves off physical decay.

While Rusk takes a regional approach when assessing Baltimore's problems, Levine looks more closely at the corporate center strategy and its failure to do more for the entire spectrum of Baltimore's residents. Levine identifies three key reasons for the failure of Inner Harbor and Charles Center to foment broader economic development[41]:

- *Deficiencies of a Tourism-Services Strategy*: These employment sectors provide jobs that are very poor replacements for entry level blue-collar jobs that were once the hallmark of most Rust Belt cities. Incomes from these jobs are much lower and benefits are much fewer. In addition, the tourism industry is intimately tied to economic cycles, feeling economic busts particularly strongly. Finally, while these sectors are growing, they no longer are specialized to certain cities; Baltimore now has immense competition from New York, Philadelphia, Washington D.C. and a host of other cities competing for tourism dollars.
- *Flaws in the Public-Private Partnerships*: As in Baltimore (and as we shall see with the Orioles), these partnerships usually mean "the corporate domination of municipal policy". Decision-making often rests with private interest dominated quasi-governmental agencies, not with a public agency directly accountable to elected public officials. In addition, instead of jointly underwriting the risks and sharing the benefits of given projects, the public sector has been on the hook for the majority of the risks and not received a fair share of the benefits.
- *Inadequate Linkages Between Downtown Redevelopment and Neighborhood Economies*: The corporate center strategy rests on the idea that what is good for the central city is no doubt good for the surrounding neighborhoods. The old adage "a rising tide raises all ships" would be an appropriate summary of this strategy. What proponents argue is that downtown redevelopment will no doubt lead to job

opportunities, civic pride, and greater investments in the city. However, in Baltimore very few explicit linkages have been made between the physical development and neighborhood revitalization to insure that this would result. The rising tide of Inner Harbor has raised many downtown ships, but the surrounding neighborhoods are still covered by the sea of decay.

As we move into a discussion and an analysis of the impacts of the Camden Yards sports complex in the coming pages, keep in mind this discussion of why downtown development has done so little for the surrounding district. The uneven development that occurred on a large scale for the entire Baltimore central city has again occurred at the micro-level with Camden Yards. As with Baltimore's entire corporate center strategy, Camden Yards is a project in which the public undertook the major risks, the team received the majority of the benefits, and the surrounding area has lost an opportunity for redevelopment because of poor linkages between the stadium and the neighborhoods. At Camden Yards, the political economy of downtown (re)development has indeed trickled down, but not in a manner hoped for by project planners.

From Railyards to Ball Yards: The Story of the Camden Yards Complex

Once one of the busiest and most important railyards in the nation, Camden Yards has been transformed into the home of the most celebrated modern ballpark in America and one of the most attractive and fan-friendly football stadiums in the county. The Camden Yards complex has also been a major factor in fueling the stadium building boom and upping the ante in stadium-projects. By showing the way to millions in revenues for sports franchises, even teams located in mid-sized or smaller markets, this complex has pushed team after team to want a stadium and a lease deal "like the ones in Baltimore". Architects and urbanists love the complex because it allows visitors to feel they are a part of the hustle and bustle of the city and provides a (themed) glimpse into Baltimore's history. Fans and families enjoy the stadia and the surrounding urban places over one-

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[41] Levine (1987a), pp. 115-118.

hundred days a year, pouring millions into the local economy and furthering the image of the city as having "made it". On the political front, city and state leaders have lauded the stadium complex as a tool for urban revitalization and for economic development for the city. Political leaders supporting the project have enjoyed great success, despite promises from anti-stadium groups of severe political repercussions. Indeed, because of the perceived success of Oriole Park at Camden Yards, the state of Maryland has become a leading investor in sports facilities, helping to build two new football stadiums and investing in minor league facilities across the state.[42]

Despite these perceptions, the prevailing evidence on Camden Yards is that the stadium is a drain on the city's and state's resources. In a story all-too-familiar to anti-stadium forces, the facilities came in over-budget and the job and economic impacts have fallen far short of projected levels.[43] In analyses of the public benefits and costs surrounding the stadia, both Oriole Park and Raven's Stadium come up major economic losers for the state, the government level ultimately underwriting the project. On the field neither the Orioles nor the Ravens have come close to a world championship since their respective stadia opened. However, off the field the teams are rolling in stadium-related income and players continue to make ever-increasing obscene amounts of money. So given all of the above, what drove the construction of these facilities? Why would public officials invest several hundreds of millions of dollars in a project that seems such a poor investment? What did these public officials expect to receive for their investment? Baltimore's Camden Yards experience has been termed an episode of "defensive politics" because the public sector was not originally a willing participant in a new stadium venture.[44]

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[42] In addition to building the Raven's Stadium, the state of Maryland also paid for infrastructure upgrades for the new Redskins stadium in the suburbs outside of Washington D.C.
[43] Hamilton and Kahn (1997).
[44] Euchner (1993), Chapter 5.

Strangely enough, the Camden Yards complex (and many subsequent sports facilities) owe their birth to the NFL franchise now located in Indianapolis. When the Colts left Baltimore in 1984 they set the ball rolling on one of the most important and most influential sports projects in the history of cities. A recap of the Colts' move, the Orioles' unhappiness, and a grand welcome for a new football team will be addressed first. However, the loss of the Colts was only the first step in generating Camden Yards. The political factors and the role of the Orioles in demanding and getting an urban ballpark are also covered. While the ballpark has been lauded as a majestic achievement in sports facility design, we shall see that the maneuverings and decision-making behind the project were simply business as usual in Baltimore. Like the Charles Center and Inner Harbor, Camden Yards is another project where "the corporate domination of public policy" has undermined the possible impacts of the project on area residents and businesses.

Professional Sports in Baltimore: The Beloved (and Departed) Colts, Winning "O's", and the New Kid on the Block

The city of Baltimore has long been a bastion of professional team sports, having played host to a number of baseball teams, at least four football teams, and teams from various other sports. Over the years the city has constructed three sports stadia and an arena to serve as venues for professional team sports. A little known fact is that Baltimore is the original home of the New York Yankees franchise, who left town in 1903. Also, strangely enough the city has successfully lured two franchises nicknamed the Browns to the city with new stadia, built at public expense, and generous lease arrangements guaranteeing a large percentage of the facility revenues to the teams. The St. Louis Browns became the Orioles in 1954 and the Cleveland Browns became the Ravens in 1995.

The history of major league sports in Baltimore is a classic case of a city working very hard to become a "big league city". After their major league baseball franchise moved to New York in 1903, the city played host to a very successful minor league baseball team

for decades. The minor league Orioles originally played in Oriole Park, but moved to Municipal Stadium in 1944, a football stadium located north of downtown that was built in 1922.[45] The International League's Orioles drew tremendous crowds and major league baseball grew very interested in locating a team in the market. In preparation for their return to the majors, between 1944 and 1953 Municipal Stadium was transformed into a modern, major league ballpark by public funding authorized through several local referenda.[46] Renamed Memorial Stadium, the facility became a 50,000 seat, football/baseball facility ready for major league professional sports. By 1950 the city of Baltimore considered itself a major league city, but it was not yet home to a major league team.

Major league professional football came to Baltimore in 1953 when the bankrupt Dallas Texans franchise was relocated to Baltimore to play in the almost new Memorial Stadium. The following year, baseball's St. Louis Browns moved to Baltimore also because of tremendous financial problems. The Browns had long been the second favorite team in a market that could not support two teams.[47] The process undertaken by Baltimore in the early 1950s was soon to be repeated time and again by cities in pursuit of major (and minor) league franchises. The city had marketed a publicly financed sports facility to attract sports franchises to the city, setting the stage for decades of similar fights between cities for professional sports teams.

Almost immediately the Colts were successful both on the field and in the team ledger. The Colts competed for and won the league championship in both 1958 and 1959, establishing themselves as the city's beloved franchise, regularly fielding winning teams. Miller writes that by that time the Colts "were the city's darlings"[48], which seems strange

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[45] Gershman (1993), p. 168.
[46] Gershman (1993), p. 173
[47] Hamilton and Kahn (1997), p. 247.
[48] Miller, James (1990). *The Baseball Business: Pursuing Pennants and Profits in Baltimore*. The University of North Carolina Press: London, p. 75.

considering the current status of the Orioles in Baltimore and the departed Colts in Indianapolis. The Colts went on to win four division titles in both the 1960s and 1970s, playing in two Super Bowls, winning one of them. Over the years the city had become strong backers of the franchise, although team ownership regularly complained that Memorial Stadium was inadequate for an NFL franchise. The repeated calls for a new stadium went unmet, although the city provided subsidies to the team over the years to placate ownership. Throughout the 1970s the Colts ownership had meetings with other cities about the possible relocation of the franchise. Phoenix and Indianapolis actively courted the team, leading the city to provide subsidies directly to the team. Team ownership insisted they didn't want to move the team, yet all signs indicated that the Colts were not long for Baltimore. In March of 1984, the unthinkable happened and the Colts were spirited away in the night to Indianapolis. The city sued (unsuccessfully), the NFL was displeased, and the Colts were apologetic, but Baltimore had lost their NFL football franchise.

Illustrating their love for the sport between 1984 and 1995, Baltimore pined for and actively courted the NFL for years. The city was even home to financially successful and locally supported United States Football League and Canadian Football League franchises, both teams regularly playing before sell-out crowds at Memorial Stadium. The city worked very hard to earn one of the NFL's two expansion teams in the early 1990s, becoming more and more confident that the league would choose the spurned city. However, Jacksonville and Charlotte won the expansion battle (beating out Baltimore, Memphis, and another spurned city, St Louis). With promises of a new stadium built at public expense and a significant relocation package, the Baltimore market proved too large an enticement. In 1995 Baltimore's active bidding for a new football team finally lured the Browns from Cleveland.

In contrast to the Colts, the early years of the Orioles were rocky at best. The team did not break through with a winning season until 1960 and by then the Colts established

themselves as the city's team. Between 1965 and 1983, though, the Orioles prospered on the field, winning six American League pennants and three World Series titles, the last in 1983. In those years the Orioles were the model baseball organization, with talent developed within their minor league system and a business approach that emphasized the team as an integral part of the greater Baltimore community. Despite the on-the-field success, though, the team was not a huge financial winner. Until 1978, the team relied upon playoff revenues to turn a profit.[49] After 1983, the team fell upon very difficult times on the field as Major League Baseball became increasingly ruled by teams that could afford free agent players. Not until after the opening of Oriole Park at Camden Yards did the Orioles return to the playoffs, a direct result of the immense revenues generated by the facility for the team.

Like the Colts, the Orioles lobbied hard for a new stadium, with proposals for a new stadium at the Camden Yards site in downtown as an accessible, fan friendly location as early as 1967.[50] The team even succeeded in getting a referendum for a domed stadium at Camden Yards on the ballot in 1973, but the vote wasn't even close. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s the team worked behind the scenes to get a new stadium, but the city only offered direct subsidies or lightened the terms of the team's lease for the use of Memorial Stadium. Elected in 1972, Baltimore's Mayor (and later Governor) Donald Schaefer became a proponent of the Camden Yards site, but would not warm to the idea of a publicly funded stadium. In response, the Orioles signed a series of short leases for Memorial Stadium, each one a slightly better deal for the team. Over time the Orioles also made threats to leave town, although they didn't quite have the list of suitors that the Colts had. What was required was a major event that would either convince either the Orioles or the city/state to foot the bill for a new stadium. The flight of the Colts to Indianapolis provided just such an event. In leaving Baltimore, the Colts forever altered not just Indianapolis, but the physical form of downtown Baltimore *and* the landscape of

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[49] Hamilton and Kahn (1997), p. 248.

professional sports. It is to this fascinating story of political wrangling, "me-tooism", and a perfect downtown site that we now turn.

The "Necessity" of Camden Yards

Memorial Stadium was a true neighborhood facility, something akin to Wrigley Field in Chicago. The stadium was located about five miles north of Baltimore's downtown district, sitting in a middle class, predominately residential neighborhood with tree-lined streets and two-story rowhouses. Parking around the stadium was limited, so the neighborhood opened their driveways, church parking lots, and any other free spaces to the inundation of vehicles on event days. In addition, local entrepreneurs and young kids made money selling peanuts, drinks, and team paraphernalia, with the rather pretty canopied streets lined with these vendors As a child my father would take me to Orioles games in Baltimore and we would invariably end up paying someone $5 to park our car in their driveway. I have very powerful and fond memories of the neighborhood, steeped in nostalgia, recalling Orioles' games as a time when the entire neighborhood would come out and celebrate wins and commiserate over losses for the beloved home nine. Despite the horrible traffic, the neighborhood around Memorial Stadium embraced the crowds and games at the stadium were a community event enjoyed by all.

Of course, all of these attributes that made Memorial Stadium so fun to me as a child made both the Colts and the Orioles unhappy tenants from very early on. The constrained neighborhood setting made access to the stadium and parking around it a major problem. No major highway provides easy access to the stadium, rather traffic plodded to and from the stadium via open access two and four lane streets. Baltimore's rail lines did not serve the area either, so mass transit was not a major means of transportation to and from Memorial Stadium. A total of 5,000 spaces were located nearby, with very little surrounding parking available, hence the local "parking economy"

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[50] Richmond, Peter (1993) *Ballpark: Camden Yards and the Building of an American Dream*. Simon and Schuster: New York, pp. 49. 126.

generated by the stadium.[51] In addition to poor access and limited parking, the lack of commercial development in the area constrained the economic impact of the team on the city and also limited the revenues for the teams more generally. As an older stadium located in a residential neighborhood, the facility could simply not generate the parking, advertising, and other intangible revenues for the teams. The lack of lucrative club seating and luxury boxes in Memorial Stadium certainly didn't help matters either. For these financial reasons, both the Colts and Orioles became regular petitioners for a new facility.

Although old, Memorial Stadium was regularly touted as one of the best ballparks in baseball and a good football facility.[52] For years both the city and the state regularly rebuffed the team's lobbying efforts, but they did regularly appease the teams with indirect subsidies. Concessions were made on the team's leases at Memorial Stadium, lowering rental payments and increasing facility-related revenue shares. As Memorial Stadium was owned by the city, this turned the facility into a loss leader, with city leaders willing to lose money on the stadium in return for the perceived economic and psychic benefits conferred by the facility. Whereas Memorial Stadium originally was capable of generating enough revenues to pay for maintenance and capital costs, the economics of professional sports soon guaranteed that the city could not make money on their stadium.

From the teams' perspectives, these years were spent building up political capital and city interest in a new facility. The constant lobbying slowly won over converts, but appeasement and inaction by the public sector was to remain the rule. What was required was a major event to push the city (or state) to get involved. This major event almost happened in 1979 when Washington D.C. lawyer Edward Bennett Williams bought the Orioles.[53] Baltimore has long been afraid that the Orioles would be bought and moved to

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[51] Hamilton and Kahn (1997), p. 250

[52] *Sports Illustrated* called Memorial Stadium the second best baseball park in the American League in 1985, a league that includes Yankee Stadium Fenway Park, and Tiger Stadium, all considered classic ballparks.

[53] Richmond (1993), Chapter 3.

the nation's capital, leaving Baltimore a second-class city without a Major League Baseball team. Washington D.C. has lost both of its baseball franchises (one to Arlington, Texas that we'll hear more about in that city's case study) and the city has long pursued a major league franchise. It seemed that Baltimore's worst fears were realized when "EBW", as Williams was known, bought the team. However, while EBW made thinly veiled threats of relocation, no overt negotiations were ever held with Washington and even EBW stated regularly that he never intended to move the team. As it turned out, EBW's political connections and skills with oratory were a major aid in the push for a new stadium for the beloved "O's" of Baltimore.

Strangely, one would have thought that Mayor Schaefer's aggressive push to redevelop and revitalize the central city around Inner Harbor and the teams' lobbying for a new downtown stadium would have made these two groups fast friends. In many other cities, the mayor has become a major backer of a downtown stadium as a means of further revitalizing the central city and returning suburbanites to the city. However, despite Schaefer's bricks and mortar strategy of central city revitalization, the Mayor was not a stadium-proponent. The teams remained unable to convince the Mayor that stadia at Camden Yards (or elsewhere) made sense as part of this strategy. As late as 1983, Schaefer is quoted as saying "We're not going to build a new stadium. Unless private enterprise builds it, we won't build it."[54] Schaefer argued that Memorial Stadium was more than adequate as a facility and that the city had many more pressing needs than building a new football or baseball stadium (or both). Hamilton and Kahn argue that Schaefer and other public leaders knew that a stadium would be a very poor financial deal for the city and that these politicians simply were protecting the public interest by not investing public dollars in a stadium complex at Camden Yards.[55]

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[54] Quoted in Euchner (1993), p. 115.
[55] Hamilton and Kahn (1997), pp. 270-271.

As noted above, the "seismic event" that eventually led to the Camden Yards complex was the flight of the Colts to Indianapolis in 1984. Not only had Baltimore lost its NFL franchise, it had lost it to Indiana-no-place, a piddly little midwestern city with all the history of a new suburban shopping mall. Desperate efforts to keep the team, including tactics such as lawsuits, outright bribes for team owners, and promises of a new stadium, were not successful in keeping the Colts. What it did do, however, was place the Orioles in the enviable position of being the only (major-league) game in town. With promises of a new stadium having been made to a team that actually had left town swirling about, the team that had stayed now found itself bargaining from a wholly new position. Rather than directing the debate and protecting the public interest, the role of city leaders had now evolved into a reactionary one where Oriole team demands were to be taken much more seriously and addressed with all due speed. Euchner terms this new role "defensive politics". It would aptly describe the relationship between the team and the public sector in the coming years.[56]

In a few short years most political leaders in the city and state were proclaiming loudly and longly their support for a new baseball stadium for the O's. By the time he was elected to Governor in 1986, Schaefer had become one of the most vocal supporters of a sports complex that would keep the Orioles in Baltimore and serve as an enticement for a new football team.[57] Schaefer's turnaround has been attributed to three main factors all of which are inter-related.[58] First, Schaefer didn't want to lose another franchise on his watch. He feared being politically and historically stigmatized as the politician that let both the Colts and the Orioles get away. Schaefer was likely correct in figuring the Orioles would leave town without a new stadium, so this was a well-founded fear, if not necessarily an economically logical one. Second, Camden Yards was to be a several hundred million dollar public works project. Ever the machine politician, Schaefer saw Camden Yards as a useful political vehicle, with numerous public contracts to be awarded

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[56] Euchner (1993), pp. 114-115.
[57] Ibid, p. 115.

to political friends and kept from political enemies. Third, and last, Schaefer finally became convinced that a new stadium (or two) would be a wonderful boost to the image of Baltimore as a city continuing its upward ascent out of economic and social depression. Rather than bleating about past successes of the 1970s (like Harborplace and the Aquarium), this project would allow the Governor and the new mayor to trumpet Baltimore's greatness to the country. As it turned out, a photo opportunity with the President of the United States and other major political leaders at the opening for Oriole Park at Camden Yards didn't hurt either.

Unsurprisingly, the former Baltimore mayor backed the Orioles contention that a new ballpark at Camden Yards would be the best site for the team, the city, and for fans. The site had excellent freeway access, particularly to the southern Washington market, along with possible linkages to the Inner Harbor area. Parking opportunities were much better at Camden Yards, with approximately 5,000 spaces surrounding the new ballpark and upwards of 30,000 spaces within walking distance of the stadia. In addition, the city's planned light rail line would run along the edge of the site and provided excellent mass transit access to Camden Yards. On the political front, Euchner notes that the Camden Yards site was also home to a warehouse recently purchased by a group of investors "including Schaefer's leading fundraiser".[59] While several suburban sites were also considered and studied as possible sites for the twin stadia, it was clear to anyone involved in the process that if a new facility was to be built, it would be built at Camden Yards.

So, after decades of unsuccessful lobbying for a new home, the Orioles found themselves riding a wave towards a new stadium. A very popular new Governor was enthusiastically on board and financing for the project was being pushed through the legislature. Early in 1987, Governor Schaefer leveraged his landslide gubernatorial win into state funding for a "Twin Stadium" package, one that would fund a new baseball

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[58] Ibid, p. 119.
[59] Ibid.

stadium for the Orioles and a new football stadium once the city had attracted a new team. Important aids in pushing the funding package through were the usual set of economic impact reports that portrayed the twin stadia in such a light as to make it seem foolish for the city and state not to invest in the project.[60] For example, a joint report by Peat Marwick and the Regional Science Research Institute determined that the total current value (1987) economic impact for the state's originally estimated $201 million investment would be $1.1 billion, with the value added calculated to be just over $784.6 million.[61]

In short, then, by 1987 the necessary ingredients to generate a stadium project had been identified. A needy and now much beloved team, the O's, was all too happy to help promote plans for the proposed new ballpark. A popular public champion, Governor Schaefer, had become a stadium convert and was now publicly espousing the economic, social, and image related benefits of the project. Finally, important public purposes, including economic impacts and downtown development, were identified and supported with ample quantitative "expert" evidence, all pointing to the folly that *not* investing in the project would result. From this point only a deal had to be negotiated between the public sector (the state) and the remaining team (the Orioles) as to the lease arrangements and disbursement of the revenue streams on the project. As with most deals, the "devil is in the details". In Baltimore this proved to be all too true. And, oh, what a devil those details turned out to be.

Camden Yards: Evolution from Stadium to Ballpark

It is important to understand the purpose of the Camden Yards project, especially when compared to Cleveland's Gateway and Arlington's Ballpark. The state of Maryland and the city of Baltimore invested in Camden Yards to address two primary purposes. The first was to insure that the Orioles would not leave town for a new stadium in another city. Camden Yards has proven very successful in meeting this and the Orioles don't seem

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[60] Ibid. p. 116-118.

likely to leave Baltimore anytime in the foreseeable future. The second underlying purpose was to help attract a new NFL franchise to the city. From the first day after the Colts left Baltimore, the city and the state vigorously pursued a new NFL team, finally luring the Browns from Cleveland. A new football facility at Camden Yards was a major incentive in the relocation of the Browns, so the project can be considered a success on this front as well. Only after these two main purposes had been identified and acted upon did civic leaders and facility planners begin to act to maximize the other advantages of the Camden Yards site. The proximity of the site to Inner Harbor and to the old shopping district to the north was seen as a boon, but not as an overriding reason for investing in a stadium. The connections might be strengthened, but the city did not see the ballpark and the new football stadium as a means to district level revitalization. In other words, unlike Cleveland's Gateway, Baltimore did not invest in Camden Yards as a district development tool, but rather simply as part of their strategy of "defensive renaissance". As we shall see, this has been an important factor in the microarea development (or lack thereof) that has accompanied Camden Yards. Figure 6.3 shows a generalized site plan for the Camden Yards complex.

[See Figure 6.3 on page 191]

From the beginning of the negotiations, the Orioles understood that they were dealing with a public agency, named the Maryland Stadium Authority (MSA), whose bargaining position is summarized nicely by Euchner's "defensive politics". For years the O's had pursued a stadium and the departure of the Colts and the ensuing fallout had finally laid a new stadium at their feet. Their quick recognition of the situation led them to bargain a deal that essentially insured the team the majority of revenues from the stadium (see the lease details later in this chapter), guaranteed at least 5,000 surface parking stalls controlled by the MSA and the Orioles, and final say over *any decision* related to the construction of the ballpark. Recall that the Orioles were not spending money on the new

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[61] Peat Marwick and the Regional Science Research Institute. (1987). *Report on the Economic and Tax Impacts of the Camden Yards Stadium Development.*

stadium, but because of two words in the negotiated lease, "design concurrence", the team had the ultimate say in the design and the construction of the new stadium.[62]

What happened in Baltimore is the *de facto* experience of every other public entity that builds a new sports facility. In Baltimore's case, the state's special purpose government, the MSA, was bargaining with the perception that they had very little power in the negotiations. Forget that the Orioles were desperate for a new facility; overlook the fact that the state was to be paying for the stadium and the Orioles were only to be tenants in the ballpark; disregard the fact that Baltimore still carried on with no visible damage after the Colts departed; and ignore the evidence that Inner Harbor still thrived and downtown still appeared as glittering as ever. No, the MSA negotiated from a place of weakness despite all of the above. In so doing they guaranteed almost all revenues from the stadium to the team. They also guaranteed parking levels that would later hinder new development in the microarea. Finally, they gave the ultimate power behind the design and development of the stadium to the tenant of the facility, giving away the public's right to insure the linkage of the stadium to the surrounding districts. The negotiations surrounding Camden Yards mirrors the city's experience with downtown development in which private interests dominate public goals, even when the public is footing the bill.

As it turned out, many of the decisions ultimately laid at the feet of the Orioles turned out to be excellent ones, with Camden Yards becoming the most loved and best known example of the neotraditional ballpark. The Orioles organization pushed very strongly for a stadium that would break the mold of the suburban stadium or the large, domed stadium that had proliferated major league cities over the previous four decades. As outlined in a previous chapter, these stadium projects of a previous era were "blockbuster" developments in which the area was essentially razed and a new stadium surrounding by sprawling parking lots was placed in the center. These projects paid little

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[62] Richmond (1993), p. 148.

attention to the physical layout and history of the surrounding environment, instead funneling resources solely into the sports facility.

In his book *Ballpark*, Camden Yards biographer Richmond introduces key Orioles and MSA personnel that developed the overall scheme and refined the vision for Camden Yards as the project progressed from 1987-1992. Richmond's book details the interplay and behind-the-scenes maneuvering that ultimately yielded what is almost unanimously considered to be a jewel of a sports facility. A key part of this process was the Orioles decision-maker's voracious appetite for information and design specifications of beloved old ballparks like Shibe Park, Ebbets Field, and the Polo Grounds. Throughout the design and construction process, the Orioles held fast to their intention to build a neotraditional ballpark, not a stadium, one that emphasized the unique character and quality design of the older ballparks. For this discussion, the main point to be derived from this highly readable and enjoyable book is that the Orioles dominated the proceedings almost from day one, pushing the project architects and the MSA to build a shrine to baseball and not a cost-efficient, cookie cutter stadium with a downtown location.

A major consequence of the Orioles' demand for a ballpark and not a stadium was a significant increase in the total cost of the project. Back in March of 1987, the Maryland state legislature originally allotted $74 million for the baseball stadium construction, to be paid for by state lottery money. However, by June of 1989 the MSA realized that the project was at least $100 million over budget. How did this occur when a public agency was closely overseeing the project? The costs for land acquisition and environmental clean-up of the site were substantially more than initially expected. In addition, the Orioles pushed for several design elements, like a steel structure and detailed brickwork, that quickly drove up the price of the construction work. Design concurrence insured that their wishes were met. Finally, as with any project that is having portions redesigned while construction is ongoing, many costs were incurred because work had to be redone to fit

new plans. Final costs for the construction of Oriole Park were placed at $106.5 million, or 44% over the original $74 million budgeted.

In addition to the construction costs for the baseball stadium, over $170 million was required for land acquisition, environmental clean-up, and business relocation on the Camden Yards site. Infrastructure improvements, rail connections, and renovations to the historic structures totaled another $66.8 million. Construction costs for the football stadium have been pegged $223 million. When all was said and done, the total bill for the two stadia came in at $502 million, over twice the first estimates for the entire project back in 1986.[63] As we shall see shortly, in both cases design decisions and lease arrangements were tremendously beneficial to the teams, once again underlining the conclusions of Levine that downtown development in Baltimore is dominated by corporate interests.

Project Specifications

From very early in the process, it was clear that a new stadium for the Orioles would be paid for almost exclusively by public funds. The often unspoken, but implied threat by the Orioles of relocation to Washington, D.C. had pushed the process along with very little debate on the club's financial input into a new stadium. Similarly, the almost fanatical desire of the state of Maryland and the city of Baltimore to acquire a new football team guaranteed that public dollars would finance a new football stadium. In addition, Camden Yards began construction in a time when new stadia were almost entirely financed by public funds. For these reasons, it is no surprise to see in Table 6.3 that the public was on the hook for almost the entire cost of the Camden Yards complex.

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[63] Morgan, Jon (1998a). "Football stadium cost put at $223M." *Baltimore Sun*, August 11.

Table 6.3 Camden Yards Project Specifications

	Original Specifications	***Current Status***
Financing: Total Project Costs	$435 million	$502.5 million
--Total from Public Sources	$435	~$473.5
Percent of Total	100%	94%
--Total from Private Sources	$0	$29.0
Percent of Total	0%	6%
--Cost of the Ballpark/Land	$235	$279.5
--Cost of the Football Stadium	$200	$223.0
Project Specifications		
--Ballpark	Yes	Yes
--Football Stadium	Yes	Yes
--Surface Parking for 5,000	Yes	Yes
--Restaurants in Project	Yes	Yes
--Offices in Project	Yes	Yes
--Renovate Warehouse	Yes	Yes
--Renovate Camden Station	Yes	Not Yet
--Urban Entertainment Complex/ Parking Structure	No	Planned

Sources: Team Marketing Report (1998), pp. 44-45, 168-169; Morgan (1998a).

When all is said and done, $502.5 million for two new stadia can be seen as a pretty good deal, especially given the recent spate of half-billion dollar stadia in cities like Seattle and San Francisco. The lower costs of these stadia are attributable to a relatively simple design (with no retractable roofs) and very close oversight of the construction process by an active quasi-public agency, the Maryland Stadium Authority. In addition, while the total costs for the project rose by over 15%, the overruns are not as bad as in some cities, like Phoenix, Seattle, and Cleveland where overruns have been upwards of 40%. This is by no means meant to suggest that Baltimore's costs were unsubstantial or reasonable, as the public paid almost entirely for the new stadia. However, given the costs of projects in other cities, Baltimore's new stadia have proven to be less costly and better received than many other stadia.

In addition to new facilities paid for almost exclusively by public expense, both the Orioles and the Ravens negotiated lease arrangements among the most generous in all of professional team sports. The lease details are shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. In the case of the Orioles, their lease calls for almost all of the immensely profitable luxury suite and club seating revenues to go to the team. The Orioles pay rent on only a small percentage of admission revenues, leaving their other stadium-generated revenues untouched. While this lease was a very profitable arrangement for the Orioles, it did not approach the deal struck by the newly arrived Cleveland Browns, now Baltimore Ravens. The State of Maryland and the Maryland Stadium Authority had to offer significant incentives to the team in order to induce relocation, but the deal negotiated promises almost all revenues to the football team. All advertising, concession, luxury suite, and parking revenues go to the team. In addition, the Ravens pay no rent on the stadium. The only money generated by the stadium for the MSA is a 10% admission tax, one that does not cut into the team's bottom line (but could possibly act as a disincentive to ticket purchases). Not surprisingly, upon the revelation of this suite deal, the Orioles have made it clear that they want to renegotiate their lease arrangement to achieve parity with the Ravens.

Table 6.4 The Orioles' Camden Yards Lease Agreement

Revenue Streams	*Recipient*
--Facility Owner	Maryland Stadium Authority
--Advertising Revenues	75% to Orioles
--Parking Revenues	50% to Orioles
--Luxury and Club Seating Revenues	90% of net revenues, 92.5% of licenses to Orioles
--Concession Revenues	92.5% to Orioles
--Facility Rental Fee	Orioles pay 7% of net admission revenues
Lease Details • The Orioles signed a thirty year lease from 1992-2022. • A guarantee that 5,000 parking spaces will be controlled by the MSA.	
Notes • The Orioles stopped the development of a parking area between the two stadia as an urban entertainment complex in 1997. • Orioles owner Peter Angelos has an option to construct a hotel on city-owned parcels north of Camden Yards.	

Source: Team Marketing Report (1998), pp. 44-45.

Table 6.5 The Ravens' Stadium Lease Agreement

Revenue Streams	*Recipient*
--Facility Owner	Maryland Stadium Authority
--Advertising Revenues	100% to Ravens
--Parking Revenues	100% to Ravens for football events, 50% other
--Concession Revenues	100% to Ravens for football events, 50% other
--Luxury and Club Seating Revenues	100% of Luxury Boxes to Ravens, with up to a $5 million payment to MSA if net revenues go above $75 million.
-- Facility Rental Fee	None, 10% Admission Tax to State
Lease Details • The Ravens signed a thirty year lease from 1998-2028.	
Notes • The Ravens bought the naming rights from the MSA for $10 million in July 1997.	

Source: Team Marketing Report (1998), pp. 168-169.

Tables 6.6 and 6.7 illustrate the total seating capacity and the types of seating available at the Camden Yards stadia. Upon moving from Memorial Stadium, the seating capacity for Orioles games actually decreased from 60,000 to just over 48,000. Similarly, when the Browns moved to Baltimore they moved out of an 80,000 seat stadium and into their soon-constructed 68,000 seat home. In moving, though, the teams gained hundreds of extremely profitable luxury boxes and thousands of equally profitable club seats. At Oriole Park at Camden Yards just the luxury boxes and the club seating generates well over $18 million per year in revenues for the team. This revenue is separate from regular ticket revenues which must be shared with the league. The Ravens earn at least $25 million per year from this premium seating, also separate from league-shared revenues.

Table 6.6 Seating Totals and Prices: Camden Yards, 1997

Seating Type	*Number of Seats (or Suites)*	*Price per Seat (or Suite)*
Total Capacity of Ballpark	48,262	--
Regular Seating	(approximately) 43,600	$15.66 (Average)
Luxury Suites	72	$65,000-$190,000
--seasonal rental	68	per season
Club Seating		
--Club Level	3,800	$2,930 per season

Source: Team Marketing Report (1998), pp. 44-45.

Table 6.7 Seating Totals and Prices: Ravens Stadium, 1998

Seating Type	*Number of Seats (or Suites)*	*Price per Seat (or Suite)*
Total Capacity of Stadium	68,400	--
Regular Seating	(approximately) 58,000	$37.44 (Average)
Luxury Suites	108	
--seasonal rental	99	$55,000-$200,000 per season
Club Seating		
--Club Level	7,900	$1,075-$2,975 per year

Source: Team Marketing Report (1998), pp. 168-169.

In dollar terms, what do these stadia mean to the teams? In 1997, Oriole Park at Camden Yards generated $21.4 million in stadium revenues for the team, ranking it fifth in

the league. From the opening of the stadium in 1992 through 1996, the team had ranked second in stadium revenues. In 1997 the league average for stadium revenues was $12.6 million, meaning the Orioles raked in almost 70% more in facility revenues than the average team. The Ravens move to their new city and stadium has been equally profitable for the franchise. Although *Financial World* magazine has ceased gathering information on the teams, it is apparent that Ravens Stadium would place the team well in the top five in stadium revenues, perhaps as high as second behind the Dallas Cowboys. As a point of reference, the league average in stadium revenues was $7.6 million in 1997 and, as noted above, luxury boxes/club seating generate at least $25 million for the team per season.

These revenue streams have had mixed impacts for the teams. The Orioles have become one of the more profitable and more aggressive franchises in professional sports, regularly among the highest spending franchises in baseball. The Ravens have also increased spending, but the combination of ownership debts and moving costs and the NFL salary cap have combined to constrain team spending to some degree. The immense revenues generated by Camden Yards have turned the once modest and conservative Orioles into one of the most free-spending franchises in all of professional sports, despite operating in a mid-sized market. The team had the highest payroll in baseball in 1998 and in other years has been among the top few in player salaries. The Orioles have also become very aggressive in the free-agent market, paying tens of millions in long-term contracts and helping to drive up player salaries throughout the league. Despite this spending spree, the Orioles have yet to return to the World Series, although they are regularly touted as playoff contenders. In contrast, the Ravens have been much less successful on the field, despite their financial success off it. Since moving to Baltimore, the Ravens have not been particularly aggressive in their pursuit of free agents, nor have they done very well on the playing field.

So in their league competitions the teams have not yet achieved the championships they said would follow from the revenues generated by a new stadium. Although their on-

the-field performance has been a bit disappointing, Camden Yards has proven a winner for each franchise's estimated team value. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show the franchise values for the Orioles and Ravens in comparison to the league average and with their respective rankings within the league.

Table 6.8 Estimated Franchise Values for the Baltimore Orioles and the Mean MLB Franchise 1991-1998 (in millions)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995[1]	1996	1997	1998[2]
Orioles Value	$200	$140	$130	$129	$164	$168	$207	$323
Mean MLB Value	$103.5	$116	$109	$108	$111	$115	$134	$194
Percent of Mean	193%	121%	119%	119%	148%	146%	154%	166%
Rank of Orioles[3]	4th	6th	6th	8th	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd

[1] 1994 was a strike year in baseball and this resulted in generally depressed team values in 1995.
[2] This value was reached using a different methodology, but it still indicates the relative value of the Orioles.
[3] This represents the ranking of the team's estimated value in Major League Baseball in that year.
Source: *Financial World* for 1991-1997 values and *Forbes* for 1998 values.

Table 6.9 Estimated Franchise Values for the Baltimore Ravens and the Mean NFL Franchise 1991-1998 (in millions)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998[1]
Ravens Value[2]	$145	$125	$133	$165	$163	$201	$235	$329
Mean NFL Value	$132	$125	$129	$153	$160	$174	$205	$288
Percent of Mean	109%	100%	103%	108%	102%	116%	115%	114%
Rank of Ravens[3]	6th	11th	9th	5th	9th	3rd	6th	6th

[1] This value was reached using a different methodology, but it still indicates the relative value of the Ravens.
[2] The Ravens moved to Baltimore in 1995, so Baltimore franchise values start in 1996.
[3] This represents the ranking of the team's estimated value in the National Football League in that year.
Source: *Financial World* for 1991-1997 values and *Forbes* for 1998 values.

At first glance, the Orioles' team values do not show a remarkable increase in the years covered by the estimates. However, *Financial World's* estimation of franchise values included Camden Yards when they began studying team values back in 1991. Instead, pay attention to the team's ranking and the percentage of the mean MLB team value. The Orioles have been the second highest valued baseball franchise, behind the New York Yankees, for the past four years. This is remarkable for a team that plays in a mid-sized market and generates only moderate sized media revenues. Baltimore's baseball team is worth more than both Chicago teams, the New York Mets, and other large market franchises. In addition, the success of Camden Yards has allowed the Orioles to remain well above the mean team value, even increasing in recent years. As of 1998, the Orioles were estimated to be the ninth most valuable franchise in all of major professional sports.[64] Much of this financial success is directly attributable to Oriole Park, a ballpark that produces revenues in excess of $20 million annually.

The Ravens team values much more clearly reflect the impact of their new stadium. While in Cleveland (up to 1995) the team was highly valued, even ranking as high as fifth among NFL franchises in 1994, the percent of the mean NFL franchise value never was above 108%. Since their move to Baltimore and into a new stadium the team's value has jumped substantially, showing a 42% increase between 1994 and 1997. The average franchise value increased 34% in the same period, in large part because of a generous new national television contract, so the Ravens value is not solely due to their new facility. Equally impressive, the Ravens team value as a percent of the mean NFL franchise value has increased to around 115%, well above its years in Cleveland. The Ravens' franchise value has placed them above many large market teams including the two New York franchises and the Philadelphia Eagles. The Ravens were estimated to be the seventh most valuable franchise in all of sports in 1998.[65] All of this indicates that team owner Art

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[64] Ozanian, Michael (1998). "Selective Accounting." *Forbes*, December 15.
[65] Ibid.

Modell made a very wise financial decision in moving from Cleveland to Baltimore in 1995.

The above financial benefits set the tone for the rest of the case studies, as we shall see that the Cleveland teams and Arlington's Rangers have also reaped tremendous financial benefits from their new facilities. If there is one guaranteed winner in the stadium game, it is clearly the sports franchises themselves, not the city and not the taxpayers. So what can the public sector expect in return for their massive investments? Championships? In Baltimore, not yet as neither the Orioles nor the Ravens have yet to bring a league or world championship to Baltimore. Economic benefits? Measurements of economic impacts suggest that neither team creates enough jobs, taxes, or indirect revenues to justify this investment.

What about microarea development? Could the successful redevelopment of a dilapidated district help justify the public costs of the twin stadia at Camden Yards? That is the focus of this study. Like many other cities, as the stadium provision process progressed then Governor Schaefer and Baltimore's leaders began to claim that the Camden Yards project was justifiable in part because the stadia would revitalize an area of the city long decayed and in need of an economic boost. The siting of two new facilities in Camden Yards was expected to help expand the vibrant city life of Inner Harbor to the west, helping to generate investment in neglected areas surrounding the complex. It is to this district-level, or microarea, revitalization that we turn our attention in next chapter. If the city and state have not reaped financial benefits because of their $502 million investment, has downtown Baltimore at least experienced some level of physical renewal related to the new stadium? Have these facilities, nationally perceived as urban revitalization tools, generated substantial positive physical changes to their surrounding districts? The answer might surprise you.




Figure 6.1 Baltimore Metropolitan Area





Figure 6.2 Baltimore's Inner Harbor and Charles Center 1990



From RTKL Associates
Master Plan Progress Report

Figure 6.3 Camden Yards Complex Site Plan

Chapter 7

Baltimore's Camden Yards: Breaking the Mold or Business as Usual?

—"The accepted wisdom is that municipal professional sports stadiums are a bad economic deal for cities, except for Oriole Park at Camden Yards."

-Bruce Hamilton and Peter Kahn on Baltimore's Camden Yards Ballparks[1]

—"There is a strong sense that tomorrow's official opening of Oriole Park at Camden Yards will uplift Baltimore's image over the next few years and spark a dramatic transformation in the immediate vicinity of Camden Station. These changes could be every bit as sweeping as the face lift in the Inner Harbor that heralded Baltimore City's impressive downtown renewal."

-Baltimore Sun editorial, April 5, 1992[2]

On April 6, 1992 major league professional sports was forever changed by a new stadium, or, more accurately, a new "ballpark", in downtown Baltimore. Located west of the immensely popular and financially successful Inner Harbor development, the stadium pointed the way towards reintroducing baseball (and by extension professional sports) to downtowns across America. While many cities had built stadia in their central cities, this new stadium was an urban ballpark, relating much more to the classic facilities of the first half of the twentieth century like Ebbets Field and Shibe Park than to the recent spate of domes and suburban facilities masquerading as downtown facilities. Fitting into the existing street grid and incorporating a plaza along Eutaw Street between the park and the Warehouse, the stadium provided some wonderful pedestrian spaces that helped to generate social and economic activity in this portion of the city. From within the stadium, visitors had wonderful views of downtown Baltimore and the massive Warehouse. The ballpark seemed to truly welcome the city as part of the whole experience rather than excluding the outside world as an unfriendly, dangerous place.

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[1] Hamilton and Kahn (1997), p. 245. They also note that Cleveland's Gateway project is considered another exception.

[2] *Baltimore Sun* (1992c). "Tomorrow's downtown renewal." April 5, 2G.

On that glorious sunny day in April, project champion Governor Schaefer and Baltimore mayor Kurt Schmoke welcomed President George Bush to throw out the first pitch for the inaugural game at Camden Yards.[3] Politicians were as numerous as the vendors outside the stadium as each tried desperately to claim some credit in making the project happen. The national press was there in droves and soon the entire country was hearing about this gem of a ballpark, one that clearly showed the way for building sports facilities that respected and enhanced the urban environment. Given the rather cumbersome appellation "Oriole Park at Camden Yards"[4], the facility had even generated a great deal of pre-opening buzz, with very positive profiles in the *New Yorker Magazine*, the *New York Times*, architectural magazines, and praise from veteran baseball personnel. Some commentators went so far as to call Camden Yards "arguably the most significant urban design intervention in America in the past ten years."[5] Not only was Oriole Park successful in keeping the Orioles in Baltimore, it also seemed that the ballpark was providing a windfall of positive press for the city and for the downtown. The project was to win a prestigious American Institute of Architects Urban Design Award for Excellence (1992) and the ballpark is regularly held up as an exemplary combination of urban design, historic preservation, and downtown development.

This positive press was not limited to national writers. Baltimore's hometown paper *The Sun* glowed with praise for the project. In a March 29th editorial, the paper outlined the excitement and hopes surrounding the project:

> "[P]erhaps the grandest tribute we can give Oriole Park at Camden Yards is that for once government spent taxpayers' money wisely: On April 6, officials will deliver, on time and at the promised cost, a top-quality, nationally recognized

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[3] Technically, the first game was an exhibition played earlier, but this qualifies as the first official game at the new ballpark.

[4] This represented one of the many compromises made for the ballpark. The Governor wanted the new facility named Camden Yards, while the Orioles, naturally, pushed for "Oriole Park". Previously there had been some discussion of naming the stadium Babe Ruth Field as The Babe's birthplace sits only a few blocks from the Camden Yards site.

[5] Prowler (1992).

architectural gem that could prove as big a bonanza for Baltimore - and Maryland - as the Inner Harbor.

We suspect that this endeavor will quickly silence skeptics. As an economic development effort, this massive project could spur rapid growth west of the Inner Harbor. As a revenue-producer for the city and state, the new stadium could far exceed expectations. And as a symbol of a resurgent Baltimore and a resilient Maryland, Oriole Park at Camden Yards sends a message to the entire country that this is, indeed, a state willing to create for its citizens facilities that are second to none."[6]

Local planning and architecture critic Edward Gunts cited Oriole Park at Camden Yards for "engendering near-ecclesiastical rapture" because the project "blends the urban quirkiness of classic ballpark shrines of the early 1900s with the high-tech creature comforts of the 1990s."[7] Elsewhere Gunts has likened the impact of the project to the pavilions at Harborplace, the enormously successful James Rouse built festival marketplace that put Baltimore back on the national map again.[8] Like Harborplace, it was suggested Camden Yards would act as a magnet to attract people and dollars to the district, driving new development in the area. A second Sun editorial proclaimed that the new ballpark might "spark a dramatic transformation in the immediate vicinity of Camden Station" that could be "every bit as sweeping as the face lift in the Inner Harbor."[9] *The Sun* noted the underutilized old retail district to the north of the stadium along Howard, Eutaw, and Paca streets as a prime candidate to feel the positive impacts of the stadium. As the excitement built and the park opened there was a growing expectation that, beyond its success as an architectural gem and its wonderful urban design elements, Oriole Park at Camden Yards was going to be *the* catalyst for new development in the area and for

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[6] *Baltimore Sun* (1992a). "Stadium splendor." March 29, 2F.
[7] Gunts, Edward (1992b). "Stadium and marketplace: Milestones in development." *Baltimore Sun*, April 5, 1G.
[8] Ibid.
[9] *Baltimore Sun* (1992c).

overall district-level revitalization. As with Inner Harbor, it was believed the area west of downtown would be revitalized because of the activity and interest created by Camden Yards.

What is interesting about much of this praise is that it largely misrepresents the original purpose of the facilities. Recall that Oriole Park at Camden Yards and the soon-to-be-built football stadium were financed not as economic development tools, but because the state and city wanted to keep the Orioles and attract an NFL team. As Hamilton and Kahn point out, if the city and state thought these stadia were such great engines of development, they would have built them years ago. They conclude that "public officials understood that Camden Yards was not an engine of economic revitalization", but they chose to invest in the stadia for other reasons, mainly to keep the teams.[10] What some of this amounts to is a rationalization on the part of the downtown growth machine for having spent $235 million for a baseball team that was set to reap millions in benefits from this publicly-financed project. It also represents the ongoing justification of the project to the public sector (the voters). Finally, as with Inner Harbor, a great deal of the speculation on the part of the local press and politicians is the typical "spin" generated around a new project in an attempt to attract investment and new development to the area. What all of this cannot change is the simple fact that Camden Yards was not intended as much more than a west-end anchor for downtown from day one.

Despite the underlying purposes of the project, first hopes and then expectations developed that Camden Yards would be the economic engine for this portion of the city. The very point of this study is to determine the amount of district-level (or microarea) revitalization that can be generated by these stadia. By all accounts Camden Yards has been a massive success for the city of Baltimore. The team is taking in millions and the stadium is still considered to be the best in baseball. Convention and tourism business in Baltimore is still going strong despite increasing competition from regional and national

rivals. As the quote leading off this chapter states, Baltimore's Camden Yards stadium experience is considered to be "the best" the recent sports stadium boom has to offer, so the question to be addressed is what has "the best" project done for Baltimore's western edge? As forecast by *The Sun* and by Gunts has micro-level development followed the new ballpark? In physical and land use terms, have the surrounding neighborhoods been positively (or negatively) influenced by the sports stadia? Was "Tomorrow's Downtown Renewal", to borrow from *The Sun's* editorial headline, to be found in the Camden Yards project?

We begin our quest for this answer with a tour of this portion of Baltimore's central city. Camden Yards is surrounded by a rather engaging mix of small, attractive, gentrified residential neighborhoods, poorer, predominately minority neighborhoods, an industrial park, and a combination of the city's old and new retail cores. Our tour will include mention of major transportation lines and other important features on the surrounding landscape. We also need to discuss a bit of the history of the site, largely because Camden Yards and its location are so central to the city's development and the character of the surrounding areas. Attention then turns to the planning efforts surrounding Camden Yards. Unlike the groundbreaking architectural and urban design elements of the facilities, we will see that planning for Camden Yards more reflected a traditional "place the stadium and hope for the best" mentality of 1960s-1980s sports facility planning. After defining our area of study, the Camden Yards Microarea, we move into the heart of the study, a discussion of the physical and land use changes to the district. We close by providing an overall assessment of Camden Yards' ability and success as an urban revitalization tool.

A Brief Tour of the Camden Yards Area

While most commentators on Camden Yards have extolled the "urban-ness" of the site of the two stadia, the truth of the matter is that much of the site borders on the

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[10] Hamilton and Kahn (1997), p. 271.

combination of a lower density industrial setting and several key transportation corridors. While to the north of the project sits the old shopping district and to the east sits the mass of humanity and development that is Inner Harbor, the dingy but busy low-rise warehouses and surface parking lots to the south and southwest west of Camden Yards still provide a decidedly industrial setting that strikes an imbalance with the tourism and entertainment orientation of the project. In more than just visual ways, these incongruities are a central factor in shaping impacts of Camden Yards and these frictions set the tone for my microarea findings for the ballpark and football stadium. To give an overview of the area before we begin our tour, Figure 7.1 illustrates the major features in the Camden Yards district.

[See Figure 7.1 on page 245]

A glance at the map reveals what initially would seem to be a major limit to the Camden Yards impact area, the I-395 spur that strikes into the central city from the south. This major highway provides the quickest exit out of the city to the south and serves as the central vehicular artery to Washington D.C. Between the two sports stadia sit a tangle of on-ramps and off-ramps connecting the city to this highway. In addition, along this corridor runs the north-south light rail line, further bisecting the district along this axis. However, a number of design decisions and physical factors have come together to lessen the impact of these transportation lines. First, for the most part I-395 is on pilings that set the highway well off the ground. In fact, many of Camden Yards surface parking lots sit underneath the interstate, providing links (albeit unattractive and rather desolate ones) between the project and the neighborhoods to the east of I-395. In addition, at-grade pedestrian walkways have been enhanced to link the Camden Yards project to the Inner Harbor via Pratt and Conway streets. Finally, the light rail line is also at grade in much of the district, so this corridor doesn't physically bisect the district either. As we will see in the next case study, unlike Cleveland, Baltimore has successfully bridged the interstate and this huge transportation corridor does not irreparably damage the functioning of the district.

North of Conway Street, I-395 becomes Howard Street. Howard Street was once the regional retail epicenter, home to shop after shop, numerous department stores, and activity at all times of the day. With the rise of suburban malls and the flight of the middle class, Howard Street declined very quickly and the corridor is now home to more decayed and vacant buildings than almost any other corridor in the city. Despite the success of Charles Center and the Inner Harbor, all efforts at revitalizing Howard Street have failed. With the construction of the twin stadia at Camden Yards and the addition of a light rail line running along the street, it was hoped that Howard Street would see new development and investment for the first time in decades.

Another important north-south transportation corridor is Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard, a major arterial that helps to relieve downtown of traffic and link I-395 to the northern parts of the city. It also serves to divide the glittering downtown from the poorer, predominately black neighborhoods of West Baltimore. Harvey likens MLK Jr. Blvd to the defensive bunker that is the Science Center, calling it "an example of strategic building... creat[ing] an easily patrolled line of defense" between downtown and those neighborhoods.[11] Immediately across this arterial to the west is the Pigtown neighborhood, a depressingly poor and decaying inner city neighborhood, one originally hoping to capitalize on the Camden Yards stadia as a means to revitalization. Unfortunately, we will see shortly that MLK Jr. Blvd is a major barrier in the microarea, effectively limiting any positive effects for Pigtown despite the proximity of the sports stadia.

The major east-west arterial for the entire downtown is Pratt Street. Pratt is best described as the pulmonary artery for the entire central city, linking Little Italy (and Fells Point beyond) on the east of downtown to Inner Harbor and continuing on the east-west axis into the neighborhoods of West Baltimore. Located along Pratt Street are major landmarks like the Galleria, the Harborplace pavilions, the World Trade Center, and a number of other key downtown projects, including the Convention Center. The street is

always busy with traffic, both vehicular and pedestrian, and it is as vibrant and interesting an urban street as you will find in any American city. To the north of Pratt Street are other important downtown roads, including Lombard, Baltimore, and Fayette streets. However, none of these matches Pratt Street in vitality or importance as a symbolic and functional downtown avenue.

South of Pratt Street is Conway Street, a key arterial interrupted by I-395. Conway Street provides a "backdoor" link between Camden Yards and Inner Harbor, but because of the difficulty in crossing the off-ramps of I-395 and the lack of commercial development, Conway is not nearly as busy as Pratt. At the southern end of the Camden Yards project is Ostend Street, a two to four lane street that runs below I-395 and connects the industrial district to the South Baltimore neighborhoods south of Inner Harbor. This road also provides a backdoor entrance to the Camden Yards project and to Camden Industrial Park. With the migration of surface parking into the industrial area Ostend Street and Russell Avenue (running south to I-95) are increasingly important entryways into the Camden Yards microarea.

South of Pigtown is the Camden Industrial Park (CIP), home to one of the older industrial and manufacturing centers of the city. This district grew up in tandem with the old Camden railyards, providing labor, materials, and goods for the rail industry and providing solid, blue-collar employment to city residents. Originally established as a thirty-five acre industrial park in the 1960s, CIP developed as a heavy manufacturing and industrial area that saw twenty-five properties develop between 1964 and 1973. Over the years CIP has been pushed to the south and west by Inner Harbor related development and by the twin stadia at Camden Yards. Despite the shift in the economy away from manufacturing jobs, this area still operates successfully as an industrial center, with many active businesses and streets busy with large trucks and belching machines on working days. This area has been marketed by the city (and state) as a vibrant, viable industrial area

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[11] Harvey (1991), p. 247.

and the city desperately wants to protect many of the jobs and businesses located there. Unfortunately, many old dilapidated buildings exist in the area and many lots have already been cleared, making way for surface parking and other uses that may not be the best fit for this industrial district.

Sitting between Pigtown and Oriole Park is the Ridgely's Delight neighborhood. Ridgely's Delight was part of the dollar housing program of the 1970s and it has successfully gentrified and stabilized as a quaint inner-city rowhouse neighborhood. Residents of Ridgely's Delight were very concerned about the new sports stadia at Camden Yards, but the facilities have actually had little impact upon this district, in part because of aggressive towing by the city during events and in part because the neighborhood is a rather impenetrable maze of streets that don't provide easy ingress or egress to visitors. Across I-395/Howard Street to the east of Camden Yards sits the Otterbein neighborhood, a beautiful upper middle class district home to some of the nicest in-city housing you will find in any city. In addition to street after street of restored rowhouses, this area is home to hair salons, upscale boutiques, and a number of nice restaurants. Otterbein has prospered along with Inner Harbor, relying on the success of the waterfront to help drive up property values and gentrify the district. Otterbein was another residential district quite worried about the new stadia, but it too has been largely unaffected due to maze-like streets and towing programs for non-residents.

A final residential neighborhood that has been somewhat affected by the Camden Yards project is the Sharp-Leadenhall neighborhood located south of Otterbein. While Otterbein, Ridgely's Delight, and Federal Hill (west of Otterbein) have all gentrified and become largely white enclaves, the Sharp-Leadenhall area is a predominately black neighborhood in which many small businesses, churches, and strips of rowhouses still subsist. While Pigtown is desperately in need of investment, the Sharp-Leadenhall area has endured despite rough edges and perceptions among suburbanites and city leaders that the district is perilously close to irretrievable decline. In recent years it has been unclear which

direction Sharp-Leadenhall would tip, either towards gentrification (like Otterbein) or towards massive disinvestment and consequent decline (like Pigtown). There was some hope that the Camden Yards complex would push the neighborhood towards gentrification, but evidence suggests that the district continues on as it always has.

A strong economic and physical relationship was fully expected to develop between the Inner Harbor area and the Camden Yards complex. Within a half mile of Oriole Park sit the Harborplace pavilions, Rouse's festival marketplace that is home to eateries, restaurants, shops, and entertainment. Because the Inner Harbor is explored and enjoyed almost exclusively by foot, a great deal of pedestrian activity between the waterfront and the sports stadia was expected. As Pratt Street has the best pedestrian pathways and most of the entertainment-oriented uses, this corridor was expected and has proven to capture most of the foot traffic between these activity generators. Along Pratt, between the waterfront and Oriole Park is another activity generator, the Convention Center, spilling even more pedestrians (and dollars) into the downtown mix. Ringing the rest of the Inner Harbor are other major projects including the Science Center, the Aquarium, and the recently added Gallery mixed-use project.

Finally, two very different districts of interest for this project sit north of Pratt Street, on either side of Howard Street. To the east sits the Charles Center and the surrounding central business district. Home to banks, office towers, hotels, and some government buildings, the district showcases the usual mix of uses and the typical post-work level of inactivity of most CBD's. While a great deal of investment has been introduced into this district over the years, it still has functioned as a very quiet, business-like CBD, attractive, boring, and somewhat under-appreciated.

In contrast, to the west of Howard Street is an interesting mix of hotels along Pratt, vacant buildings, and university buildings. The University of Maryland at Baltimore campus owns a great deal of land between Paca Street and MLK Jr. Boulevard. Over the

past several decades the city has been pushing the university to invest in their holdings and add new buildings to the central city skyline. To the city's great pleasure, in the 1990s this has finally occurred as the UMB has built a new library, a new student center, and several other large new buildings to establish a firmer presence downtown. In addition, the university has brought a demand for student and staff housing in the district and their investment in other large buildings and the perception that the district is on the move have prompted a few new housing developments in the area. In addition, the addition of the stadia to the south have helped to stabilize the area, and increased foot traffic has improved perceptions about the area's safety. Between UMB and Howard Street the streets become a bit more rough about the edges, with many vacant buildings, large parking decks, few businesses, and limited street life.

Figure 7.2 provides an overview of these sub-areas, showing their location and their relationship to the Camden Yards complex. The areas are color-coded to indicate the type of subarea as well. Yellow boundaries denote residential areas, blue boundaries are industrial/manufacturing areas, red indicate retail areas, and green are institutional (government or park) areas.

[See Figure 7.2 on page 246]

The History of the Camden Yards[12]

"Not long ago - on a glacial timetable - Baltimore was the driving wheel of the nation's economy", writes Peter Richmond in his profile of Camden Yards.[13] The city was the eastern terminus of the first interstate highway system, back then called the "National Road", with the actual starting point sitting in downtown Baltimore. With the coming of the rail travel and rail shipping to the United States, Baltimore quickly positioned itself as the most important eastern rail center, outdistancing key rivals like New York and Philadelphia. Construction on the Camden Railyards began in 1828 and soon trains were

[12] Much of this historical material is derived from Peter Richmond's book *Ballpark*, more specifically the chapter "To the Camden Station" pp. 83-101.

running out of the Pratt Street Station in downtown. Located over 100 miles west of most other major ports of the 1800s, Baltimore's railyards offered shippers a much shorter overland route to cities located in the interior of the country. Soon the Baltimore and Ohio (B & O) Railroad was shipping goods and people west through Cincinnati and as far as St. Louis. Other major rail companies operated out of the city including the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad and the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad companies.

As Camden Yards became the pre-eminent rail district in the city, the B & O railroad decided to construct a huge rail terminal that would rival others in New York and Philadelphia for their size and architectural daring. Camden Station, which still stands next to Oriole Park and the Warehouse, was the largest rail station in the world at the time. This station has witnessed its fair share of historical moments over the century it stood. Camden Station welcomed both Lincoln's inaugural train in 1861 and his funeral train in 1865. It also was the site of the first deaths related to the Civil War as Massachusetts troops fired on a mob that had engaged in rock throwing, killing a total of thirteen soldiers and civilians. The station would later welcome the major league Orioles to the city for the first time in 1954. Its reopening as a retail and restaurant project in 1999/2000 is a fitting symbol of Baltimore's move into the post-modern economy.

Ancillary facilities filled out much of the rest of the Camden Yards. A beautiful European-style train shed filled much of the area behind the station and allowed passengers to board trains in style. The now famous B & O Railroad Warehouse opened in 1898 to provide storage space for goods awaiting transport out of Baltimore. At 1,016 feet long and only 51 feet wide, the Warehouse is the longest structure on the East Coast, a huge structure that is as much a part of the success of Oriole Park at Camden Yards as the ballpark itself. Other railroad buildings were scattered throughout the remainder of the

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[13] Ibid. p. 83.

area, including low rise warehouse space and baggage handling facilities, many of which were demolished as the railyards slowly lost importance for the city and the nation.

As the nation's transportation needs switched to automobiles and as population flooded west in the 1900s, both Baltimore and Camden Yards began their slow decline. The first to feel the economic and demographic shifts was Camden Yards. Although the new Orioles baseball team arrived at Camden Station from their opening series in Detroit in 1954, the huge crowds that were there to greet them immediately escorted them in gleaming new convertible automobiles (the car!) to their baseball home Memorial Stadium, north of the downtown. In doing so the team, the crowds, and the city "turned their backs on Camden Yards, as did the rest of the nation soon after."[14] In 1951 and 1952 the European train sheds were razed, as were many other buildings during this and the following decade. Camden Station saw its last passenger leave the station in 1970 and the baggage handling station closed in 1971. By 1988 even Camden Station itself, once the most important train station in the nation, was closed; "The heartbeat of the site of the nation's once-busiest rail hub had been reduced to a murmur - along with, in large part, the heartbeat of the city."[15]

As far back as 1967 the railyards were identified as a possible site for a new stadium for both the Orioles and Colts (back when multi-purpose stadia were still acceptable to teams). In 1973 a referendum for funding a stadium on the site was held, but it failed miserably at the polls. As Baltimore began its downtown renaissance it became more and more clear that the old Camden Yards would be the site for some major project that fit into this new image of the city. As the Orioles and Colts grew more and more unhappy it also became clear that a new stadium (or two new stadia) might very well be that major project. Mayor Schaefer long considered Camden Yards as the best possible site for a new facility, with excellent vehicular access and an attractive downtown location.

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[14] Ibid. p. 86.
[15] Ibid. p. 87.

As detailed in the previous chapter, once the Colts left Baltimore it became very clear that a new sports facility would be financed with public dollars and that the site for this project would likely be Camden Yards. Official site selection studies were commissioned, but little doubt remained that Camden Yards would be the ultimate site of the new (as it turned out) facilities.

Downtown backers viewed the railyards area as a district desperate for reinvestment thereby bringing it in-line with the new downtown entertainment-based economy. Also, it was perceived that the eyesore the railyards presented was a factor in limiting the spread of development west, out from Inner Harbor. In furthering the corporate center strategy and the marriage of history and economy that worked so well at Inner Harbor, Camden Yards made sense to downtown leaders and to Schaefer, now Governor of the state. In a more romantic notion, Richmond suggests that the return of baseball to Camden Yards brings together two of the social forces that have shaped America, baseball and the railroad. He writes, "At Camden Yards, the game returns, then, to its logical home and its favored means of transportation. The train mirror's baseball's pace – its rhythms of start and stop, rushing and frantic one moment, slowed to a crawl the next. Baseball has always been a train-age game, ever since teams crossed the countryside by rail, the engine's whistle carving somber, tuneful bites out of the American night..."[16]

"The Yards" in the Late 1980s

As of 1985 "The Yards" area was not very attractive to the type of investment and development that was a good fit to the new tourism-based downtown economy. The Warehouse and Camden Station were crumbling, pitiful reminders of the great rail era of the city. The streets and sidewalks were potholed and also in desperate need of repair. Tourist traffic was not a factor in the district, with only a few attractions, like Babe Ruth's birthplace, located nearby. Because of its high profile location and its dilapidated state, it

seemed natural that the area would be added to the expanding tourism stock of the central city. However, two factors countered the argument that Camden Yards might be a natural extension for the new downtown economy; existing businesses and physical linkages to the area

What downtown backers and Richmond fail to account for in their economic plans for and romantic notions of Camden Yards is that the district was not quite the wasteland that it was portrayed to be. Although the area was considered an industrial sinkhole, many thriving businesses were located in the area up until the new sports stadia forced them out. Into the 1980s the Camden Yards area operated as an industrial district, home to many blue-collar jobs that were once the lifeblood of the Baltimore's economy. Even into the 1990s the industrial character of much of the area to the southwest of the project carried on in the adjacent Camden Industrial Park (CIP). (See Figure 7.3) For almost four decades the Industrial Park has provided solid blue-collar employment to local citizens, making it a priority for protection by the city. A fundamental weakness of the site was that it did not provide good fit for entertainment oriented development that prefers walkable, attractive streets and small shops catering to diverse tastes.

[See Figure 7.3 on page 247]

Second, despite the proximity of the district to Inner Harbor, Camden Yards was visually and physically separated from much of Inner Harbor by I-395/Howard Street as it drives north into the city. This large, important transportation corridor was also home to rail lines serving the old Warehouse and Camden Station. Finally, the addition of a planned at-grade light rail line in the early 1990s would also physically and symbolically cut off the Camden Yards area from the established portions of the downtown entertainment economy. All of these transportation lines made connecting the proposed new stadia to downtown a thorny issue. Early planning for the project determined that this disconnect

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[16] Ibid. p. 85.

would hamper linkages between the Inner Harbor and this district ultimately requiring substantial investments to successfully bridge this gap.

Despite these two site limitations, the state of Maryland provided a funding package for the "twin stadia" at Camden Yards in 1987. Work immediately began on acquiring land, demolishing buildings, and putting together a plan for the two single-purpose facilities. The first order of business was to acquire the necessary parcels on the site and begin clearing them for the new sports facilities. The MSA bought the eighty-five acres for the project and relocated numerous firms, including manufacturing and industrial operations related to furniture, foodstuffs, and the old railroad. A junior high school was relocated as was a local musical landmark, Hammerjacks nightclub. The MSA was required to pay fair property value for the property and also reimbursed businesses for relocation costs, so the state did go a long way towards softening the blow on existing businesses. The point to be made, however, is that the Camden Yards area, while not attractive or as vibrant as it once was, was still an active industrial/manufacturing district throughout the 1980s. At a time when the city purported to be desperate for blue-collar employment, the forced transition of this area to a tourism-based economy was not painless.

So by the late 1980s, despite these district-level warts, two new sports facilities were on their way at the Camden Yards site. The district had been slated for redevelopment to better fit the downtown economy and the past successes of Charles Center and Inner Harbor, combined with the sheer force of will of now-Governor Schaefer, pushed the spread of the downtown "corporate sector strategy" into surrounding districts. To the east of Camden Yards sat Inner Harbor and the gentrified areas of Otterbein and Federal Hill, to the north was the old retail core, to the west was the successful Ridgely's Delight neighborhood and the less-successful Pigtown area, and to the south was part of Baltimore's old industrial economy. Into this environment millions of spectators and visitors would spill into the streets and, it was hoped, magic would

happen and the new downtown economy of tourism and entertainment would help to revitalize this blighted portion of the city. Before we turn our attention to whether or not this happened, we should ask the question; into what type of environment were these visitors going to find themselves? What do the data indicate as to the economic health and the social make-up of the areas around Camden Yards? United States census data from 1990 can give us some indication of the area's demographics and economic situation in the period before the district was transformed. Figures 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7 illustrate the number of people, median household income, percent white and percent poverty of the central city (including Camden Yards) at the blockgroup level in 1990.

[See Figures 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7 on pages 248-251]

Figure 7.4 reveals that in 1990 the southern portion of the Camden Yards site was not home to any people in that year, reflecting the site's industrial past and the longtime incongruity of residential development in this district. The map also showcases the failure of Inner Harbor to include any residential development, as the waterfront is home to hotels, restaurants, and attractions, but no residential development as originally planned. Not surprisingly, many of downtown's blockgroups have very few residents, although a number of tracts do house between 2,000 and 3,500 people, including the Otterbein neighborhood. However, unlike what we will see in Cleveland, the central city of Baltimore is home to thousands of residents, with Camden Yards surrounded by a number of well-known and strongly identified neighborhoods like Otterbein, Sharp-Leadenhall, Ridgely's Delight, and Pigtown. Whereas Cleveland's Gateway project was sited in a residential ghost town, Baltimore's Camden Yards was located in a somewhat settled, residential section of downtown.

What was the fiscal health of these residential areas in 1990? The median household income map (Figure 7.5) provides one indicator. The areas around Camden Yards are clearly bisected by I-395, with the Otterbein neighborhood directly to the east and other blockgroups to the southeast having median household incomes of above

$42,000, well above the city's median household income of $28,217. However, on the eastern side of I-395 you can see that the gentrification has not crept into all areas of this portion of the city. Sharp-Leadenhall and other neighborhoods of South Baltimore that have yet to gentrify are clearly revealed with median incomes of less than $14,000 (for Sharp-Leadenhall) and less than $28,000 for adjacent blockgroups. In contrast, all areas to the west of the stadium, including Ridgely's Delight and Pigtown have median household incomes below the citywide value. What accounts for these income differences?

Reflecting the discussion in Chapter 6 and the conclusions of Rusk, race plays a major part in the distribution of income throughout the central city areas surrounding Camden Yards. Map 7.6 shows the percent white by blockgroup for these central city blockgroups. The areas to the east of I-395 are predominately white and most of these areas also have higher median incomes than the citywide value. The only predominately black blockgroup, the Sharp-Leadenhall neighborhood, is by far the poorest of all blockgroups in this area. To the northeast and northwest of Camden Yards we see that the blockgroups are predominately black and very poor. The most complex area is the blockgroups to the west and southwest of Camden Yards. These areas are more heterogeneous than the rest of the district with a mix of incomes, but still had a lower median household income than the city value in 1989.

The racial divide is shown even more clearly when we also consider Map 7.7, percent poverty by blockgroup. Again, to the east of I-395 the Otterbein, Federal Hill, and other neighborhoods experience much lower poverty levels. This reflects, in part, the success of the Inner Harbor in helping to revitalize these areas and prepare them for gentrification. Again, only the Sharp-Leadenhall area stands out as the poorer section of this portion of the city. To the west of I-395 the percent living below poverty is a much more mixed-bag. The blockgroups immediately adjacent to Camden Yards on the west and southwest have between 25% and 40% poverty, indicating the obstacles faced by these inner-city neighborhoods.

As a whole, these maps indicate that in 1990 Baltimore's central city was a clear case of "haves" versus "have nots", but with the evidence suggesting that further investments could make the central city attractive to more residents and businesses, thereby strengthening the downtown. Across the Camden Yards landscape these maps showcase a number of revitalized and gentrified neighborhoods that have accompanied downtown's resurgence as an attractive place to visit and enjoy the city. However, in other areas revitalization has not taken root and household incomes of below $14,000 and poverty rates of well above 25%, some even as high as 85%, are accompanied by massive disinvestment and crumbling buildings and streets. In large part because of their corporate sector strategy centered upon Charles Center and Inner Harbor, evidence suggests that Baltimore had developed a thriving "island in a sea of decay", one envied throughout the Rust Belt. It was hoped that the addition of Oriole Park at Camden Yards and a later football stadium would expand this island and provide yet another indication that Baltimore was indeed a renaissance city.

Planning Efforts for the Camden Yards Area

When Oriole Park at Camden Yards opened it was proclaimed a national success because it harkened back to the ballparks of yesteryear with its asymmetry, its architectural flourishes, and its incorporation of the city in the overall experience. Urban designers, architects, and historic preservationists were quick to proclaim that the facility was groundbreaking in showing the way towards a new paradigm of sports facility design. While not quite as important a landmark, the new Ravens Stadium has also been hailed as a beautiful football stadium set in the city, one that incorporates both the economic and social criteria necessary for a memorable facility. However, while all was well in the design and attention to detail for the two new stadia, Baltimore's urban planning approach to the new stadium was not as singular. While Baltimore's Camden Yards most certainly broke the mold in sports stadia architecture and urban design, we shall see that planning for the two stadia can unfortunately be summarized as "business as usual". Because the facilities that were finally built were not intended as economic development engines, but rather as a

"defensive" response to mobile sports teams, the approach used in planning the facilities was one of simply locating the facilities and assuming (hoping) development would follow. Contrast this with the Cleveland case study where the new sports facilities were from day one intended to anchor a portion of the city and spur new development in the form of hotels, restaurants, and related uses.

It was not always this way. The original plans for Camden Yards in the 1970s called for the facility to be the western anchor for downtown. Much as Seattle and Atlanta used their 1970s sports stadia to anchor one end of the downtown core, Baltimore also saw a new mixed-use stadium at the railyards as the natural terminus to an entertainment-oriented, pedestrian friendly central city. Originally conceived as part of a convention/stadium complex, the sports stadium at Camden Yards, likely to be a domed stadium as that was the trend at the time, was to be home to both the Orioles and Colts. As originally conceived this would have been a truly joint venture in which the teams would get a new playing facility and the city would address specific downtown goals with the project. With the defeat of a referendum for the facility in 1973, though, public money for a stadium at Camden Yards was unavailable and the city turned its attention completely to Inner Harbor.

In the late 1970s the Convention Center was added to the city's long list of downtown activity generators. The original Convention Center opened in 1979 and a major addition came in 1996. The facility, located along Pratt Street, has developed a synergy with Inner Harbor, giving a major boost to downtown development by providing business for hotels and restaurants. It was also hoped that another nearby sports and entertainment facility, the Baltimore Arena, would also help to anchor this portion of downtown. The Baltimore Arena was part of the original Charles Center plan and it opened in the 1960s. It was hoped that the 14,000 seat facility would generate activity in downtown and help to buoy other Charles Center projects. However, the design of the Arena has certainly hindered its impact. Like the Science Center, the Arena is a defensive

bunker of a facility, with an entire blank wall fronting the once vibrant Howard Street on its west side. The main entrance is on Baltimore Street, helping to tie the facility into Charles Center, but turning its back on the surrounding area.

A 1973 report commissioned by the city that studied the convention/stadium west-side anchor concept provides a glimpse into the original intention of the stadium project.[17] This report was part of the development of a district-level plan that would tie the old railyards and the rest of the western edge of downtown into the still emerging entertainment economy of Inner Harbor. In a report for the project the consultants concluded that "the proposed sports/convention complex can be woven both physically and functionally into the existing CBD and proposed renewal projects."[18] However, NBBJ cautioned that several details must be attended to for this to occur. These detail included:[19]

- *A suitable pedestrian environment*: "An appealing pedestrian system" that "goes beyond a utilitarian level and enhances CBD pedestrian circulation both on event and non-event days". To generate district impacts pedestrians must be a focus of the project.
- *Lessen the impacts on the Camden Industrial Park*: Changes in traffic patterns were deemed necessary because of the incompatibility between pedestrians and heavy trucks.
- *Provision of parking in a parking deck*: The parking deck would be in accordance with downtown goals and would provide suitable parking for event attendees. The unwritten implication is that surface parking might impact the character of the project and of the area.
- *Visual character and the facility as a "gateway*: The "visual character of the development should include appropriate landmark qualities." In addition, mirroring

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[17] NBBJ Architects (1973). *Feasibility Study for Maryland Sports Complex Authority: Final Report.*
[18] NBBJ Architects (1973), p. II-48.
[19] Ibid, pp. II-48, II-49.

what occurred in Cleveland twenty years later, the consultants wrote that, as a significant project, the stadium "should be a CBD 'gateway' for vehicular entry into the City from the south."

This attention to the surrounding district also appears in another equally important 1973 study of the micro-level impacts of a sport stadium west of Inner Harbor. Entitled *Potential Impacts of Proposed Downtown Stadium-Convention Complex on Surrounding Areas*[20], this report could have been the first piece to one of the great urban planning projects in Baltimore's history rather than a forgotten element of one of the great urban design interventions in decades. This study examined two proposals for downtown Baltimore, 1) a convention center addition to the south end of Baltimore Arena, north of Pratt, including a huge 4,500 space parking garage along the southern edge of Pratt, and 2) the above plus a domed stadium situated south of the parking garage between Howard and Greene streets (just north of where Oriole Park now sits). This study took a district-level approach to the two projects, assessing the "direct and indirect impact" of the proposed projects on the "surrounding areas of downtown Baltimore, both in terms of short-term marketability for specific proposed projects and in terms of long-term economic gain for the city."[21]

In their study, the consultants assessed land use characteristics, district-level character, and transportation connections in determining the possible impacts of both proposals on the surrounding district. Germane to this study is their discussion of the impact of the projects on the (at the time still proposed) Inner Harbor redevelopment, surrounding residential areas, and Camden Industrial Park. As to the overall impact of the complex on Inner Harbor, underscoring the belief of most pro-stadium interests, the study states that construction of the complex "is likely to influence significantly the magnitude,

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[20] Morton Hoffman and Associates. Inc. (1973). *Potential Impacts of Proposed Downtown Stadium-Convention Complex on Surrounding Areas.*

[21] Ibid, p. AII-36.

type and timing of nearby development, both existing and planned."[22] The consultants foresaw a very strong synergy developing between the Inner Harbor, the Charles Center, and the proposed complex. They indicate that the stadium/convention complex would generate substantial need for hotel rooms, restaurants, and that the complex is likely to increase the viability of any new development along the waterfront. In short, they supported the claims of downtown development interests that the triumvirate of projects would support an entirely new downtown economy.

At the microarea level, though, the consultants identified some problems for nearby neighborhoods and the industrial park. Foreshadowing the findings of my Camden Yards case study, the study found that the South Baltimore communities (Otterbein, Sharp-Leadenhall, Federal Hill) "function independently of the Central Business District" and that they are constrained from expanding because of industrial uses on the west and the proposed Inner Harbor project on the north.[23] In short, these neighborhoods were not expected to feel much impact at all from the project, even including a sports stadium. Through a combination of land use factors and transportation factors (I-395) these neighborhoods had developed and continued to operate as separate districts, outside of the downtown economy. Unlike the South Baltimore neighborhoods, significant negative impacts upon the Camden Industrial Park (CIP) were projected by the consultants. First and foremost, part of the stadium/convention project would be sited on CIP land, necessitating the demolition of the first structure built in the park and the relocation of a downtown market. Second, negative impacts upon truck traffic were expected, necessitating some form of mitigation of particular benefit to the industrial park. It was hoped that the new Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard, the same one vilified by Harvey, would provide the necessary barrier between the entertainment-oriented Inner Harbor and the manufacturing-based west side.

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[22] Ibid, p. AII-45
[23] Ibid, p. AII-51

Unaddressed by either NBBJ or this study was the means of dealing with the entertainment-industrial interface that would develop at the border of these two uses. However, the attempt by the consultants to address district-level development related to the proposed stadium/convention center project illustrates that the original intention of the sports stadium was to serve as an important development anchor for downtown to the west. Unfortunately, as it turned out planning for Oriole Park and the new football stadium paid attention primarily to the design elements of these early studies and not the planning elements that were stressed in these reports. Instead of contextualizing the facility within the surrounding districts and linking the project to nearby activity generators, planning for the two Camden Yards stadia became an exercise in "planning between the lines".

After the 1973 plans for a domed stadium and convention center were left unfunded by the failed referendum the city turned its full attention to Inner Harbor. Over the next ten years the Inner Harbor filled out with new retail projects, new office towers, and new hotels. Millions of visitors poured into downtown every year to see each successive new project; first the Science Center, later the Convention Center, then Harborplace, and the Aquarium. To downtown interests throughout the United States Inner Harbor shines as perhaps the most successful central city redevelopment project. The success of the Charles Center and the Inner Harbor projects fueled the city of Baltimore's belief that a new downtown stadium was not really necessary to help prop up the downtown economy. Instead, city leaders regularly fought off the Colts' and Orioles' demands for a new domed stadium. Plans for a stadium at Camden Yards languished on the back-burner despite team efforts to push the project to the fore of public sector interest in downtown revitalization.

As detailed in Chapter 6 the catalytic event behind Camden Yards occurred in 1984 when the Colts left town. This event changed the stadium landscape, driving politicians to push for and pass public funding for a new stadium in almost record time.

The departure of the Colts not only pushed the city and state to arrive at a financial package for two new sports stadia, but it also shifted the entire focus of the Camden Yards project. Recall that in 1973 the stadium/convention center project was seen as a major catalyst for redeveloping the western edge of downtown. These projects were intended to be the linchpin behind the revitalization of these areas. By 1987 when the Camden Yards stadia were finally approved and funded, the project had become a means of keeping professional sports in Baltimore, not as a means to help redevelop downtown. To be sure, economic development goals were part of the official justification for the project, but the central goal was keeping the Orioles in town and obtaining a new football team for the city.

This shift in focus can be seen in the *Master Plan*[24] for the Camden Yards complex developed in the late 1980s. The 1986 legislation providing funding for the stadia and empowering the MSA called for two sports stadia, one for the Orioles and one for a new football team. Baltimore's Camden Yards presaged the trend towards single-use facilities (or perhaps drove the trend) by calling for two separate stadia, each providing better sightlines for fans and better (and separate) revenue streams for the individual teams. By 1988 the project had been fleshed out and the *Master Plan* recommended placing the baseball stadium on the northern portion of the site and the football stadium to the south. The two stadia were to be surrounded by sprawling surface parking lots. Much of the project was to be located on prime industrial land with excellent freeway access, displacing many businesses and requiring substantial land acquisition funding and business relocation fees. The plan outlined a project much that was more intrusive into an industrial area long protected by the city as a vital employment center for city residents. In addition, the *Master Plan* was much more interested in the development of the Camden Yards site and not its impact on surrounding neighborhoods.

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[24] RTKL Associates Inc. (1988). *Camden Yards Sports Complex Development Plan for the Maryland Stadium Authority: Master Plan Progress Report.*

To be fair, the 1988 *Master Plan* did recognize the unique setting for the Camden Yards stadia. The consultants note that Camden Yards sits at the intersection of a very diverse set of uses, including heavy industry, residential development, and the expanding Inner Harbor. There are numerous references to placing the stadia in context within the diverse surroundings, although the means of doing so rest almost exclusively on architectural elements and urban design solutions. In the preface to the report the consultants write that the report should be "the beginning of a responsible look at broader implications for this area just as the earlier Inner Harbor master planning efforts had guided long-range development in that area."[25]

Project planners also recognized that the Camden Yards stadia had an opportunity to shape the surrounding area for years to come and this should occur in accordance with the city's overall plan for these areas. In the Project Overview the consultants wrote:

> "The selection of this urban location... provides a wealth of access and design opportunities for both baseball and football facilities. ... The site features elements of Baltimore's railroad and industrial past and is bordered both by historic residential neighborhoods and by the city's revitalized Inner Harbor. ... The Sports Complex will occupy a key land area where three very different and distinct uses come together: Central Business District, residential neighborhoods, and industrial zone. ... Therefore, the master planning of Camden Yards should be sensitive to these existing uses and anticipate future impacts to and by those land uses."[26]

To integrate the two sports stadia into this very complex urban environment, the *Master Plan* called for a number of urban design interventions that would link the stadia to the Inner Harbor, but not overwhelm the surrounding neighborhoods. For example, the Warehouse and Camden Station were identified as means of capturing new spin-off development generated by the sports facilities. Pratt Street was identified as the principal

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[25] Ibid, preface.
[26] Ibid, p. 1.2.

connection between the sports stadia and the waterfront, consequently upgrades to sidewalks and street crossings were recommended. To insure that the surrounding neighborhoods were not overwhelmed by event crowds and parked cars, the plan recommended strict parking restrictions to minimize vehicular impact upon the gentrified neighborhoods of Ridgely's Delight and Otterbein. The report also goes into great detail for the need to create project edges that invite pedestrian activity and provide a soft transition to surrounding neighborhoods.

In assessing the local environment for the two stadia the consultants looked at traditional measures like zoning, generalized land use, the location of historic structures, and the status of the current and planned transportation network. Also included were brief discussions of the nearby residential neighborhoods and the industrial areas. However, unlike the 1973 project study, planning for the stadia in 1988 did not assess the potential for new development in the surrounding area. Other than the Warehouse, Camden Station, and the surface parking lots located within the boundaries of the project, possible sites for related redevelopment projects were not identified and vacant or underutilized buildings were not studied for re-use. Also disquieting is the failure to link the project to the Howard Street corridor to the north and to Sharp-Leadenhall and Pigtown, neighborhoods desperate for new investment and any sign of revitalization. As for the former downtown retail center, Howard Street, the *Master Plan* identifies that corridor only as an area from which pedestrian traffic will come from a number of parking decks in that area. There is no discussion for linking the stadium more completely to this area through urban design elements or through the identification of parcels or buildings available for redevelopment. As for Pigtown and Sharp-Leadenhall, these areas go almost unmentioned in the entire report.

The message to take from the above discussion is that the planning surrounding Camden Yards changed between the initial plans for a domed stadium in the early 1970s and twin stadia package of the late 1980s. The more recent planning package was typical

of most sports-related projects that develop a site plan but take little account of the surrounding district outside of how these areas may impact the stadia. Thousands of dollars were spent on designing the facility and creating useful and attractive urban spaces *within the boundaries of the project*. In contrast, little time and money was spent on linking the project to the surrounding districts. The planning for Baltimore's Camden Yards followed the "planning between the lines" model almost all cities have utilized when investing in these mega-projects. The failure to link the sports stadia and its carnival like events and large crowds to surrounding areas represents a missed opportunity for the city. A district level plan that identified the larger goals and aims of the project was not budgeted for and not prepared. In short, it was assumed the stadium would be good for the district, but no means of insuring this were established.

Fortunately for the city, unlike Chicago and its experience with Comiskey Park the on-site investments in Camden Yards have paid off. For example, Eutaw Street between the Warehouse and Oriole Park is a wonderful urban space, busy on event days and many non-event days during the summer. Also, the edges of the project do provide a soft transition from the massive stadia into the surrounding area. Baltimore has done better than other cities in creating a project that "fits" into the downtown, but as we shall see this "fit" has not resulted in substantial district-level revitalization. The failure to link the project to neighboring areas specifically and to neighborhood development more generally has effectively minimized the size of the "island of renewal" in the central city's western neighborhoods.

Camden Yards has truly broken the typical stadium mold in combining traditional and modern architectural and urban design elements to create landmark sports facility that will likely shape sports stadium design for decades to come. However, Camden Yards should not go down as a major change in the way these facilities have been planned and incorporated into the city. While it was hoped that the Camden Yards sports facilities would generate some ancillary development after they opened, district level revitalization

was never an underlying goal of the project, operationalized through related programs or even project goals. Planning for the twin stadia largely stopped at the edges of the facility, focusing money on making attractive and functional borders, but not on determining how to maximize opportunities for new development or enhancing nearby neighborhoods. The urban planning experience of the Baltimore stadia was very much business as usual, with very little attention paid to how the facility might drive the district-level economy.

What is most distressing about this is that the original plans for Camden Yards in the 1970s did emphasize microarea development as a central goal of the project. The original domed stadium was viewed as the linchpin for the intersection of downtown, the industrial sector, and the nearby neighborhoods. However, over the intervening years between the original plans for the project and the opening of Camden Yards the environment changed which greatly impacted the project. Between 1973 and 1992 the Inner Harbor boomed, becoming a national symbol for urban revitalization and, as a result, city and civic leaders no longer pushed for a stadium as a district revitalization tool. In 1984 the Colts bolted for Indianapolis and the city and state became a reactive group interested in keeping the Orioles, rather than a proactive group interested in using a stadium to further downtown development goals. Instead of a domed stadium as an urban revitalization tool, the sports stadia at Camden Yards became a defensive response to the Colts departure from the city and a fear that the Orioles might also depart. Consequently the primary goals of the project became keeping the Orioles happy and attracting a new football team to town, not using a mega-project as the means to integrate West Baltimore into the burgeoning downtown economy. This change in the purpose of the project has been a factor in the surprising lack of impacts of the Camden Yards stadia.

Microarea Effects of Baltimore's Camden Yards

As indicated by the quotes at the beginning of this chapter, Baltimore is widely considered to have broken the mold and created a sports project that is a winner socially *and* economically for the public sector. There is a persistent belief that the Camden Yards

stadia have been a major force in reshaping the western edge of downtown and in generating new development in a portion of the central city that had long been separated from the new downtown economy. Proponents of Camden Yards cite the huge crowds, the busy downtown, and the numerous restaurants and retail outlets littering the central city. This case study is centered on evaluating the widely held belief that Camden Yards has been a successful urban revitalization tool.

Before I begin detailing the microarea impacts of the facilities I want to first identify and describe the area of analysis for this case study, the Camden Yards Microarea. While Camden Yards is part of a larger corporate center strategy of development, it was hoped that the project would "spark a dramatic transformation in the immediate vicinity of Camden Station" serving as the catalyst for new development in the railyards area and binding together the different uses in the surrounding districts.[27] It is necessary to identify the surrounding area that has been impacted by these new facilities. To arrive at a "line on a map" that delineates the Microarea I utilized a combination of planning data, interviews with local experts, and site visits to determine that part of the city impacted by events at these two sports facilities. The Camden Yard Microarea is shown in Figure 7.8

[See Figure 7.8 on page 252]

A look at the Camden Yards Microarea reveals it to have a long east-west orientation, with very little area to the southeast and west of the stadia deemed part of the area impacted by events at the facilities. Not surprisingly, Pratt Street is the key east-west corridor for the Microarea, pulling pedestrians away from the waterfront towards the Convention Center, the Arena, and to the Camden Yards stadia. Pratt Street is by far the most lively street in downtown Baltimore, anchored by Inner Harbor at one end and the University of Maryland at Baltimore and Camden Yards at the other. As envisioned by downtown planners, this street is the major social and economic corridor for all of downtown and it is routinely busy at all times of the day, even if no events are happening

at the ballpark or football stadium. This pathway and the level of activity generated by this mix of projects represent part of the allure of Camden Yards to visitors. The excitement, the vibrant atmosphere, and the sheer number of people enjoying the city is contagious, one that helps to push city after city to try and duplicate the success of Baltimore's downtown revitalization. The MSA and the city have successfully added the new stadia to this mix of downtown projects and on event days there is a tremendous flow of pedestrians back and forth between Camden Yards and the Inner Harbor, most carrying bags of bought items and/or consuming their food purchases from the myriad of eateries along the waterfront. Because there is such a strong relationship between the stadia and the Inner Harbor the portions of the waterfront have been included in the Microarea.

Between Inner Harbor and Camden Yards sits the Otterbein neighborhood that, given its central location and accessibility to both Inner Harbor and Camden Yards, would seem a likely addition to the Microarea. However, as outlined in the Master Plan for Camden Yards and as pushed for vehemently by the local neighborhood planning group, this neighborhood has been closely protected from stadium crowds through strict parking enforcement for local residents only and by a maze of streets that make ingress into and egress out of the area difficult for vehicles (and even pedestrians). In addition, Otterbein is not home to any tourism-oriented businesses, instead a mix of local businesses litter the neighborhood. Remaining areas of South Baltimore, including Federal Hill and Sharp-Leadenhall also have been excluded from the Camden Yards Microarea. Discussions with the MSA indicated that while a number of restaurants and other retail businesses are located along the Light Street corridor running north-south through South Baltimore, this commercial district is also oriented more towards locals rather than tourists. Site visits during pre-event and post-event periods also indicated this as there was not much traffic between these areas and the sports stadia. Over the years an economic relationship might develop between these adjacent areas, but for now the large surface parking lots, the rail lines, and the I-395 corridor all serve to limit the interaction between South Baltimore and

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[27] *Baltimore Sun* (1992c).

Camden Yards. For Sharp-Leadenhall this represents somewhat of a lost opportunity to help create businesses and economic activity in a poorer, predominately black area.

To the northeast and to the immediate north of Camden Yards sits the downtown office district and the once thriving retail center of the city. Local experts indicated that there are no major attractions in either of these districts, so entertainment-related pedestrian activity is not a major factor on either event or non-event days. However, portions of both the central business district and the Howard Street corridor were included in the Microarea because they serve as pass-through areas for pedestrians on their way to the Inner Harbor and to Camden Yards. These areas warranted inclusion, not because of a number of restaurants or attractions visited by event goers, but rather because of the sheer weight of pedestrian activity generated by the large number of parking decks that provide the necessary number of parking spaces for the over 40,000 people at baseball games and over 60,000 people at football games. In addition, Howard Street is home to the city's street level, light rail service providing an important north-south mass transit link to Camden Yards and Inner Harbor. Unfortunately, this pedestrian activity has not translated into much new development, especially for the once vibrant Howard Street corridor.

Unlike the sprawling eastern portions of the Microarea, to the west the Microarea spreads only a few blocks from boundaries of the Camden Yards complex. Much of the University of Maryland at Baltimore campus has not been included in the Camden Yards Microarea primarily because this area is only minimally impacted by events at Camden Yards. The large library, student center, and hospital are all relatively new and attractive developments, but none is tied to the entertainment economy of downtown. Like Otterbein, the Ridgely's Delight neighborhood is another quaint, middle class neighborhood that sits in the shadow of the two sports stadia and would seem an important part of the Microarea. However, unlike Otterbein and the other South Baltimore neighborhoods which are still largely unaffected by the stadia event on event days, the proximity of Ridgely's Delight to Oriole Park and the easy pedestrian access to and

through this neighborhood requires that it be included in the Microarea. Residents of Ridgely's Delight indicated that pedestrian traffic through the area is very heavy on event days and the local businesses have attempted to attract activity to the area to capitalize on their prime location. Despite the heavy pedestrian traffic, though, Ridgely's Delight has also been protected from crowd impacts by strong policing and towing policies.

The western boundary of a portion of the Microarea is Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard, an important arterial for the central city because it serves as a very strong dividing line between middle class downtown Baltimore (mostly white) and lower class downtown Baltimore (mostly African-American). Across Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard to the west, the neighborhood of Pigtown represents another missed opportunity for the sports stadia to positively impact a distressed portion of the central city. As predicted by Harvey, MLK Boulevard effectively acts as a "line of defense" that keeps the troubled areas of West Baltimore separate from the revitalized central city. The experience of Camden Yards is no different as MLK Boulevard provides a very solid perceptual and physical barrier to any economic spillovers generated by the two stadia. Traffic through Pigtown on event days is light and interviews with locals made it clear that the neighborhood is perceived as dangerous after dark.

Finally, the southwestern portion of the Microarea contains a portion of the Camden Industrial Park, an industrial area slowly being displaced by the new Ravens Stadium and surface parking lots. This portion of the district is dominated by Russell/Greene Street, a large north-south arterial that separates the football stadium from the industrial uses to the west. Across Russell Street from the football stadium a number of surface parking lots have been created to serve event-goers and to provide the 5,000 parking spaces required in the lease agreement between the MSA and the teams. The teams have been pressuring the city and the MSA to provide even more surface parking in the industrial district, taking land out of the development cycle and negatively impacting existing industrial and manufacturing businesses in the area. In contrast the city has been

attempting to minimize the impacts of the sports stadia on this industrial district, with mixed success so far.

Taken as a whole, the Camden Yards Microarea is approximately 330 acres in size with the Camden Yards complex taking up 85 of these acres, or just over 25% of the Microarea. The furthest point from the center of the stadia complex to the edge of the Microarea is just over nine-tenths of a mile as the crow flies or just over 1.1 miles to the far eastern edge of the Microarea by street and sidewalk. The entire Microarea is within a very easy ten to fifteen minute walk from Camden Yards. Sidewalks and other pedestrian amenities are prevalent in almost the entire district, although they are fewer and sparser in the industrial areas to the southwest.

Zoning Changes in the Microarea

Zoning designations are one means of controlling development and attempting to insure that a parcel is developed in a way that approaches the goals of a district or even the entire city. Through zoning cities can also attempt to stop incompatible uses from developing next to each other, like a heavy industry plant next to a pedestrian-oriented office complex. Figure 7.9 illustrates zoning for the Camden Yards microarea over the development cycle for the two sports facilities. It is important to note that, because the two stadia are a state-sponsored development, the entire project is exempt from any local zoning requirements.[28]

[See Figure 7.9 on page 253]

As noted in the *Master Plan*, this area of Baltimore represents a confluence of three very divergent sets of land uses; residential development in the in-town neighborhoods, commercial and entertainment development of the Inner Harbor and the rest of downtown, and industrial/manufacturing development for the heavy industry areas west of I-395. These very different uses are reflected in the mix of zoning designations in

Map 7.9. Within the microarea alone are two different manufacturing/industrial zone designations, three different commercial/tourism designations, an office designation, and a spate of residential zones all collapsed into one category to simplify the map. From this simplified zoning map it is clear that the Camden Yards project is at the intersection of the new downtown Baltimore economy, with a healthy mix of older residential development thrown in.

Map 7.9 reveals that almost the entire Camden Yards complex is zoned Manufacturing/Light Industry, a legacy of the earlier days of the property as an active railyard. This zoning has not needed to change because the MSA has the ability to override local zoning designations. The character of the area reflects this zoning designation, with a sparse set of trees, weathered streets and sidewalks, low-rise warehouse and manufacturing buildings, and trucks traveling into and out of the district at regular periods. The Heavy Industry zoning to the southwest of the stadia is also related to the legacy of the railyards and the more recent creation of the Camden Industrial Park. This area is zoned M-3, intended for the heaviest of industrial uses in the city.

To the north, northeast, and along the Inner Harbor to the east the CBD and evolving tourism economy are indicated by the appropriate zoning designation. The commercial/tourism designation along Pratt Street and ringing the Inner Harbor nicely indicates the extent of that type of development out from the waterfront. Over the past thirty years Pratt Street has specialized as the most important tourism corridor in the city, linking the convention center (and now stadia) to the Inner Harbor and further east to Little Italy and Fells Point. The office designation for the government center and financial districts of the central city can also be seen quite clearly on the map. These uses are buffered from the waterfront by an intermediate zoning designation, Office/Commercial which allows for a softer transition from the office towers of downtown into the mixed-use retail/office/activity generators along the Inner Harbor.

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[28] RTKL and Associates Inc. (1988), p. 2.12.

Finally, the long established, but recently thriving inner-city neighborhoods of Otterbein, Ridgely's Delight, and Federal Hill can be seen constricting the sports facilities immediately to the east and west of Camden Yards. These neighborhoods are dominated by row upon row of townhouses (hence "rowhouses") that attain densities of up to 80 dwelling units per acre. The success of these well-organized neighborhoods in establishing themselves and in protecting themselves from encroaching office, commercial, or industrial development has effectively crowded out other zoning designations, although small patches of industrial or non-neighborhood commercial zoning does exist. There are major corridors of property zoned Neighborhood Commercial along Light Street running south between Otterbein and Federal Hill and to the west along Washington Boulevard through Pigtown. These commercial areas offer truly neighborhood-oriented commercial development, including small retail businesses like drycleaners and food marts and restaurants, the vast majority of which are not franchises.

The Master Plan for the Camden Yards project made clear that this intersection of zoning designations and the clash of a very divergent set of uses offered planners a delicate opportunity to bring together all the most interesting parts of the city around the two stadia. Local neighborhoods wanted to be better connected to the vitality and excitement of downtown, without being overwhelmed by an increased level of activity. Planners also hoped to more completely integrate the old railyards into this new economy, without damaging these fabulous in-city neighborhoods. In addition, there was an unspoken but clearly indicated push that the city and the MSA wanted to recapture some of the existing industrial areas for this new downtown economy, spreading the "island of renewal" further west and south. However Baltimore did not use changes in zoning to help accomplish these goals.

Physical Changes to the Camden Yards Microarea

As plans for the twin stadia project progressed, stadium-backers, including the Governor and Mayor, began to tout Camden Yards as a catalyst for a new round of

construction on the western edge of Baltimore's downtown. By 1992, in addition to the soon-to-open Oriole Park, two other projects in the district were soon to come online. The University of Maryland at Baltimore was working on several new buildings and the new light rail line linking the area to the Howard Street corridor had opened. In addition, plans for an expanded Convention Center were being prepared. All of these changes seemed to point towards a new round of development for the area including hotels, restaurants, and retail. Each of these projects would bring visitors and dollars to the district pointing the way to rising land values and another revitalized district for the city. In April, 1992, then, the grand hopes for Oriole Park at Camden Yards expressed by the *Baltimore Sun* seemed well founded and the microarea seemed well on its way towards experiencing a building boom similar to the one along the Inner Harbor.

So, since Oriole Park opened what have the intervening years wrought for the Camden Yards Microarea? Have the new stadia and other nearby projects provoked a "dramatic transformation" in this district? The simple and direct answer to this question is no. A review of planning documents, planning data, aerial photographs, and targeted interviews reveal that the "success" that is Camden Yards is not one of new development for the district. Despite the international acclaim for the project, very little new construction has accompanied the ballpark and the new football stadium. There is not one major new hotel in the area, or in downtown, and new buildings have not sprouted up on vacant land in the area. In fact, due to a shortage of parking spaces a number of old structures have been torn down over the years and turned into surface parking. (See the section on parking below) To be fair, almost all of these buildings were part of the original site plan and they had long been slated for demolition once the new football stadium was built. However, a survey of the area reveals that very little vacant land has been built on in the intervening years resulting from the sports stadia.

Now certainly there have been some major new construction projects in the Microarea during this time. These major additions to the area are shown on Map 7.10.

The Maryland Stadium Authority began work on a Baltimore Convention Center expansion in 1993 and the $150 million project was finished in 1996. The amount of exhibition and meeting space was more than doubled and the Convention Center has enjoyed a very strong symbiotic relationship with the Camden Yards stadia since the opening of those facilities. However, the Convention Center expansion would almost certainly have been built without Camden Yards, so this construction cannot be directly attributed to the stadia. Over the past decade the University of Maryland at Baltimore has made major investments in its campus, including building a new library, a student center, and additions to existing buildings. These projects have given UMB an even bigger influence on the area, for example bringing students and staff to the district to live, but, again, these construction projects cannot be directly attributed to Oriole Park or the new football stadium. The best that can be said is that the sports facilities and these other projects have helped to stabilize the district, but little new ancillary development has followed.

[See Figure 7.10 on page 254]

What of the near future? Are there plans for new development in the coming years? For the past several years the city of Baltimore has been negotiating with several developers for new hotels in downtown. Two of these planned hotels sit in the Camden Yards Microarea. The first would sit on city-owned land immediately north of Oriole Park, between Paca and Howard Streets. Current plans call for the hotel to be built by the Orioles' owner Peter Angelos, but the project is stalled because Angelos wants city help with the project. As you would expect from a hotel developed by the Orioles' owner, this hotel would be oriented to the ballpark, perhaps including Camden Yards in the name. A second hotel is planned for just west of The Gallery, facing Pratt Street between South and Commerce Streets. (See Figure 7.10) This hotel is Inner Harbor-oriented, but the success of Camden Yards and its synergy with the waterfront makes this hotel indirectly related to the new stadia.

Other proposed development in the Microarea is related to a central city parking shortage. The city of Baltimore currently has major downtown parking problems and there has been some discussion of constructing new parking decks in the Camden Yards area to help relieve some of the parking crunch. The proposed new hotel north of Oriole Park will almost certainly include a parking deck or an underground garage. A proposal by the MSA for a mixed-use project, including a large garage, between the two stadia is on hold because of a dispute with the teams over the impact of this project. In sum, though, even given future projects which might or might not be built, Camden Yards has generated surprisingly little new development in the Microarea.

Changes to Uses in the Microarea

Despite the above findings on the lack of changes to the built form of the Microarea, Camden Yards could still be a major factor in generating microarea revitalization through other means. Perhaps instead of new development, Camden Yards has been a major generator of the re-use of existing structures in the Microarea. If the ballpark and football stadium have allowed the city to recapture and re-use a number of old structures and generated spin-offs in these buildings, then the microarea revitalization goal might be better met. Instead of new construction the redevelopment legacy of the Camden Yards complex might be the renovation of under-utilized or vacant buildings. Figure 7.11 illustrates Microarea land uses for the area in 1990 and 1998.

[See Figure 7.11 on page 255]

Two major on-site renovation projects that have been hailed as national successes, the Warehouse and Camden Station. The old B & O Warehouse is as much a part of the success of Camden Yards as the sports stadia. The MSA has taken a landmark warehousing building, one of the largest buildings in the United States, and transformed it into 300,000 square feet of office and restaurant space at a cost of $13.5 million. Once the building is fully leased up it is expected to bring in $2.5 million annually in lease payments. When Oriole Park opened in 1992, only the Orioles and a few restaurants were located in

the Warehouse. Also located in the building is the Camden Club, an Orioles' run club for season ticket holders and luxury suite buyers, and banquet facilities both with windows overlooking Oriole Park. In 1994 the MSA relocated their offices to the Warehouse and by 1997 the building was fully leased.[29] On the ground floor of the Warehouse sit retail and restaurant uses including the Orioles team shop, Bambino's pub, and Pastimes Restaurant. Tenants of the Warehouse include a mix of high tech and consulting firms, as well as a printing press and other team facilities.[30] Along with the sports stadia the massive building provides a resplendent gateway to the city as you travel into downtown from the south. The Warehouse has received a great deal of national press as a unique historic preservation project that brings together Baltimore's railyards past and its tourism future.

Camden Station has met with much less success, primarily because renovation and re-use are still in the works, despite millions already invested in building renovations. The 31,000 square feet train station has been restored to its 19th century look and will fit in nicely with the light rail and commuter trains that bring patrons to the nearby transit stops. Camden Station, projected to open in 2000, will eventually house the Babe Ruth Museum, a new restaurant, and perhaps some smaller retail uses.[31] The holdup for this project has been a combination of slower than expected fund-raising by the museum and a fight between the O's and the MSA over the restaurant tenant in the station.[32] This building also brings together the city's past and future. Once completed, it is expected to be a financial success for the MSA and for the building's tenants.

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[29] Harrison, David (1997a). "State seeks developer to fill baseball-football middle ground." *Baltimore Business Journal*, July 28.

[30] Harrison, David (1997d). "New tenants fill up Camden Yards warehouse." *Baltimore Business Journal*, September 22.

[31] O'Hara, Terence (1999). "Camden Yards stories." *Baltimore Business Journal*, April 5.

[32] Orioles' owner Peter Angelos was worried that a crab house originally planned for the stadium "wouldn't create the right tone and that the crab-house odor would create the wrong ambiance for baseball history lovers." (O'Hara, 1999)

Another major renovation project in the Microarea has been undertaken on the former "Power Plant" development at the eastern end of Inner Harbor.[33] The newest incarnation of the Power Plant includes the first of cable sports network ESPN "ESPNZone", a Barnes and Noble bookstore, and a Hard Rock Café. This latest renovation is another in a long line of attempts to renovate this structure and capitalize on the new downtown tourism based economy. Clearly, the Power Plant development is predicated more on the overall success of Inner Harbor and not specifically on Camden Yards. However, the ESPN Sportszone would likely not have come to Baltimore without the success and national recognition of Oriole Park at Camden Yards.

As for restaurant development, there are a handful of new eateries throughout the Microarea, particularly surrounding the stadia, but not as many as might be expected given the huge crowds. When Oriole Park opened a few restaurateurs opened sports bars and pubs to take advantage of the crowds at baseball games, but those located in Ridgely's Delight, along Howard Street, and in other non-Inner Harbor areas have struggled. Interviewees indicated that clearly most people spend their money in the existing entertainment areas of Inner Harbor and even as far east as Fells Point, not in the surrounding district. My site visits confirmed this as the traffic back and forth between the Inner Harbor and Camden Yards was heavy for hours before weekday and weekend games. The existing restaurants along Pratt Street, those ringing the Inner Harbor, and the eateries in the Warehouse were terribly busy throughout the day, while smaller pubs in Ridgely's Delight, along Howard Street, and even one or two in the industrial area were much less busy.

To address the point of Microarea redevelopment and re-use more specifically, very little development has moved north of the baseball stadium, across Pratt Street, along Howard, Paca, Eutaw, and Greene streets. These areas remain largely devoid of life on

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[33] The Power Plant has seen at least two previous attempts at reusing this large, old power station in Inner Harbor. Interviewees indicated that this project seems to be doing quite well and long term forecasts look

non-event days and foot traffic travels from parked cars to the established entertainment areas of the Inner Harbor and Camden Yards. In fact, after consultations with locals and site visits it was clear that north of Pratt Street had experienced almost no new businesses related to the ballpark. The "dramatic transformation" around Camden Station had yet to creep north. There are some indications this might change, however. Developers are beginning to recognize the potential of Howard Street and some apartments and shops are being discussed for the area.[34] A federal office building, the City Crescent, was developed in 1993 and it is now home to over 1,000 employees. With the success of downtown loft housing in New York, Philadelphia, and now Cleveland (see the next case study), the city has become very interested in seeing many of the vacant office and warehouse buildings of Howard Street redeveloped as residential space. So, with Camden Yards as a southern anchor and the University development pushing east there is some hope that the synergy of projects can help revive once thriving Howard Street.

To the further west, there is a dearth of new development, or redevelopment, that can be attributed to Camden Yards. The combination of Ridgely's Delight, the line of defense that is MLK Jr. Boulevard, and the worries of crime in Pigtown and points west put up a staunch barrier to any spin-off to these areas. The only development of note is along Pratt Street as it travels west. Some buildings have been developed as university housing and restaurant and retail uses litter the first floor. However, much of this development is related more to the University than the stadia. While these western areas have seen little spin-off development, the industrial park to the southwest has seen a great deal of spin-off development, but not the kind wanted by the city or the district. A growing army of surface parking lots has been infiltrating this area since the opening of the Ravens Stadium. While the city, the MSA, zoning designations, and land use conflicts have successfully kept out retail and restaurant businesses, they have been unable to keep out the demand for cheap parking.

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promising.

[34] Harrison, David (1997b). "Howard Street project eyed." *Baltimore Business Journal*, August 11.

Like the additions to the built form of the area, the redevelopment of the Camden Yards Microarea in the past ten years has been something of a mixed-bag. The Warehouse, Camden Station, and some new restaurants point the way towards some district-level impacts. However, the district certainly has not experienced the dramatic changes hoped for by facility planners. In particular, those areas that seem ripe for redevelopment, Howard Street and west into Pigtown, have seen almost no changes despite their proximity, easy access, and substantial pedestrian traffic traveling through these areas. In the concluding section of this chapter and in Chapter 12 we turn our attention to why Camden Yards has not been the seismic event it was hoped to be and has been portrayed to be. The next section on parking provides one insight into why this has been the case.

Transportation Changes in the Microarea

With a dense urban location constraining the size of the Camden Yards complex, MSA planners and the teams were very attuned to the parking needs for the facilities. With a baseball stadium with a capacity of over 48,000 and a football stadium with a 68,000 seat capacity, there was a major concern that cars would overwhelm the surrounding area when the facilities hosted events. Recall that the 1973 Camden Yards plan called for a massive parking garage along Pratt Street. That garage was not built, instead the Convention Center and some city owned surface parking lots currently sit on that land. In the days prior to the first ever events at both Oriole Park and Ravens Stadium, there was a great deal of speculation and worry that the influx of crowds would produce hours of gridlock and massive unhappiness in downtown.[35] Much to the relief of all involved, these dire circumstances did not develop although the district is certainly quite congested immediately before and after events at Camden Yards.[36]

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[35] Encina, Eduardo (1998). "Game plan: Ease commuting pain." *Baltimore Sun*, July 22.
[36] Morgan, Jon (1998b). "Second down easier on fans." *Baltimore Sun*, August 25.

An important part of these concerns was the prior experience of the Orioles and their years of parking problems at Memorial Stadium. The team made it very clear in negotiations with the MSA that ample nearby parking must be identified *and controlled* by the MSA and the team. The Orioles wanted to insure that attendance at games was not hurt by inadequate and unsafe nearby spaces. After decades of watching fans circle the neighborhood streets around Memorial Stadium in search of parking, the team wanted to be very sure to get guarantees of ample nearby parking. Parking problems experienced by the Colts at Memorial Stadium, where the larger crowds for football games presented an even more acute problem, would certainly be a factor in attracting a new football team, so the MSA recognized that this obstacle would need to be overcome in order to secure a football franchise at Camden Yards.

Beyond simply providing parking accessibility to the sports stadia, ample nearby parking offered three other key advantages to the teams. First, nearby parking would guarantee parking spaces for the Orioles' (and later the Ravens') suite holders and club seat holders, a group that pays top dollars for the best seats and often receive special parking privileges for events. Second, by controlling these lots (through the MSA) the Orioles and Ravens increase their facility revenues, revenues not shared with the leagues. As per their lease agreements, the Orioles get 50% of all parking revenues and the Ravens get 100% of parking revenues for football games and 50% of parking revenues for other events. Clearly, the teams have a direct economic reason to desire more parking. Third, with nearby parking making the sports stadia more accessible, spending inside the stadium on concessions and souvenirs can be maximized, further increasing the revenues to the teams (almost all concession revenues goes to the teams). Unlike the city and the MSA, the teams want patrons to spend their money inside the stadium so that revenues flow into the coffers of the franchises, not into restaurants and retail outlets outside the stadia.

The lease negotiated between the Orioles and the MSA called for 5,000 parking spots controlled by the MSA. In the years prior to the construction of the football stadium

(remember Oriole Park opened in 1992, the Ravens Stadium in 1998) these parking spaces were to be provided on the remainder of the Camden Yards site in large surface parking lots. (See Figure 7.12) When Camden Yards opened in 1992 the MSA controlled approximately 5,600 spaces in the surrounding district. Most of these lots were to the south of the facility on land slated for the new football stadium. In addition, large parking lots made use of some land under I-395 and areas next to Camden Station and the Warehouse. Several buildings on the land under I-395, including the Hammerjacks rock club, were not demolished and turned into surface parking lots until the parking crunch of a few years later. These huge swaths of parking were unattractive and certainly did not help promote development along the southern, eastern, and western edges of the sports facility. However, as much of the complex abutted industrial and manufacturing areas, this was not a major problem for the city. In fact, the surface parking acted as a buffer between the stadium and the industrial areas.

[See Figure 7.12 on page 256]

Another means of minimizing the impact of vehicles on the microarea was the development of numerous mass transit options for event-goers. Two new light rail stops were planned along Howard Street across from the Warehouse and further south across to the football stadium. These stops, part of the city's new light rail line that runs north-south through the region, opened in tandem with the sports facilities. The Oriole Park at Camden Yards stops operates on all days and serves the Convention Center and the Inner Harbor as well. The stop for the Ravens Stadium is used almost exclusively for events at that stadium. The new football rail station cost $6 million, $1 million coming from the Ravens. Also, commuter trains from Washington D.C. and other points south provide additional access for attendees from these areas of the region. Finally, buses are another important addition to the mass transit options, with eighteen bus routes passing within walking distance of the stadia in addition to special charters. It was hoped that these alternatives to cars would be a significant portion of the travel modes for event attendees. In fact, the campaign to get attendees of the inaugural Ravens game to use mass transit

was so successful that the light rail line was so overloaded that riders waited for hours after the game just to catch a train, setting a ridership record in the process.[37]

Upon the NFL's Browns move to Baltimore in 1995, the parking situation was drastically altered. Construction of the new football stadium took away approximately 2,600 spaces bringing the MSA's total well below the 5,000 required by the Orioles lease. As a consequence the MSA had to reimburse the Orioles for lost revenue.[38] In addition there were pressures on the neighborhoods and industrial areas to provide parking on event days. Local businesses or land owners used any vacant land as parking for events, making a few extra dollars but spilling crowds and traffic into areas previously not impacted by the complex. In response to this parking shortage the MSA demolished the final four buildings in the Camden Yards complex in 1996, paving over these sites for surface parking thereby adding an additional 1,400 spaces to the MSA's total. However, this still left the authority almost 1,200 short of the required 5,000 spaces. In both 1997 and 1998 the MSA continued to add surface parking lots by leasing land from local businesses, eventually bringing their total to above the required 5,000. The current state of parking in the Camden Yards area is shown in Figure 7.13.

[See Figure 7.13 on page 257]

In July 1997, in an effort to more fully develop the Camden Yards site and to provide more on-site parking the MSA announced plans to market two large parcels between Oriole Park and the Ravens Stadium as sites for a mixed-use retail complex with large parking garages.[39] The unofficial request for proposals called for a mix of smaller retail and food shops and large retail/entertainment stores, like Niketown, to be built in tandem with large parking garages. The garages would actually have added to the total

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[37] Morgan (1998b).

[38] Harrison, David (1996). "Stadium sites count weeks to takeover." *Baltimore Business Journal*, October 28.

[39] Harrison (1997a); and Team Marketing Report (1998). *Inside the Ownership of Professional Sports Teams*. Team Marketing Report: Chicago, p. 45

number of spaces controlled by the MSA. The MSA hoped that a mixed-use complex might help Camden Yards to become more of a year-round, non event day attraction. It also would allow the MSA to actually increase their overall parking total without using public funds and without further encroaching on surrounding areas. Immediately the Orioles responded that the urban entertainment complex would not be acceptable to the team and that they would sue to stop the development of the project. The Orioles owner called the project "stupid" and argued that a mixed-use complex would "do violence to the aesthetics" of the site.[40] It soon became apparent that the real reason the Orioles were upset is that the complex might hurt the Orioles concession sales, thereby lowering their facility revenues. The Orioles have regularly rattled their sabers and the complex is currently on hold. In part because of the failure of these parking garages to win approval the MSA has had to purchase and lease land in the surrounding area for more surface parking lots.

In addition to the failure of the on-site retail/parking garage project, interviews with the City of Baltimore Planning Department revealed that the Orioles and Ravens had inquired about tearing down a large retail complex across Russell Street from the football stadium and creating another large surface parking lot. This complex is home to an office superstore and numerous other smaller businesses. Its proximity to the sports stadia is very desirable to the teams because it would offer another large, accessible surface parking lot that would allow patrons to pour directly into the sports stadia without coming into contact with Inner Harbor. This, in turn, would likely add to the concession and souvenir revenues of the teams and pull more money out of the local economy. The city made it very clear that this would be unacceptable and the proposal has since been dropped. However, this also underscores the conflicting goals and points of view of the franchises, the MSA, and the city in providing parking for the stadia complex.

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[40] Harrison, David (1997c). "Angelos decries 'stupid' parking plan." *Baltimore Business Journal*, August 25.

Over the years, then, the franchises (particularly the Orioles) have been very concerned about accessible and controllable parking. The Orioles made parking an important part of their lease agreement. Consequently the MSA has been very aggressive in acquiring land for surface parking lots and stadia-related parking has slowly spread into the surrounding areas. To the great relief of the neighborhoods, this parking spillover has not been a problem for the residential areas because of clear signage and aggressive towing policies. In addition, parking originally acted as something of a buffer between the entertainment uses of the baseball stadium and the industrial area to the south. However, once the new football stadium was added to the mix this situation changed.

From a microarea development perspective, what is most disconcerting about the parking situation in the Camden Yards areas is the incidence of what I am calling "parking creep" into the surrounding district. Over the years the project has slowly acquired or leased surrounding land and turned it into surface parking lots, lots which are used primarily on event days. While the lots immediately surrounding Camden Yards are used by downtown workers and tourists, the lots in the industrial areas are dead spaces most of the year. The spread of parking has driven out businesses over the years, particularly on land owned by the MSA. The influx of pedestrians and cars into the industrial area also creates a difficult business climate on event days. The growing unease at the interface of these two very different uses will likely continue as the MSA continues to look for properties to turn into parking for events at the sports stadia.

Lastly, the ability of the sports teams to demand more surface parking, stop mixed-use projects that would actually add to the parking total, and to request the razing of viable and important nearby businesses all to aid their bottom line further underscores the direct and indirect subsidies provided to these sports teams. Both the Orioles and the Ravens are playing in publicly funded stadia with lease arrangements that guarantee the lion's share of revenues to the teams, yet they continue to have the ability to minimize public benefits, this time in the form of district-level development, because it *might* affect

their revenue streams. This is a classic case of the "tail wagging the dog". To be precise, the client for the Camden Yards complex was (and is) the State of Maryland, not the sports teams. Yet the professional teams continue to demand and receive subsidies that minimize public benefits and maximize revenues to the franchises. As we shall see in Cleveland, a much better solution is to make clear from day one that new parking garages and existing nearby parking will be used to meet parking needs during events. If microarea development is an important goal of the project, then this item should be non-negotiable for the public sector.

Additional Impacts to the Microarea

While Camden Yards has not spurred a great deal of new development, it has generated a few changes at the micro-level worth noting. First and foremost, as would be expected, the twin stadia have helped to change the character of the district from run-down industrial to post-modern services and entertainment oriented. Rather than an aged and decrepit railyards, albeit with a number of vibrant businesses, the project has hooked this end of the city into the downtown entertainment economy. Sizable crowds filter into and out of the project on event days, effectively stretching the "Baltimore Renaissance" a few blocks west. Some activity is even present on non-event days as workers go to their businesses in the Warehouse and people take tours of what is considered to be the best ballpark in baseball. Investments in signage, in pedestrian infrastructure, and in renovating historic structures have all helped the district to become another attraction in the downtown theme-park that is Baltimore.

In addition to character impacts Camden Yards has physically changed the Microarea. Despite the neotraditional design of the ballpark, the surrounding street network has been altered by the sports stadia. Between Oriole Park and the Warehouse, Eutaw Street was turned into a pedestrian plaza. This areas proved to be a tremendous success as an urban space on event days. Ramps to and from I-395 were redone, providing better access into and out of the district and also playing up the gateway vista into the city

offered by the new stadia. A number of pedestrian path improvements have been added to service the huge number of event attendees. In making these changes the walkability of the district has been immensely improved. Included in these upgrades were bridges over the railroad and light rail tracks to connect parking lots to the football stadium, better footpaths between the stadia and the Inner Harbor along Pratt Street, a pathway between the two stadia, and repaved, tree-lined streets surrounding the project on the western edges.

Among those investments not present in Baltimore, but a part of the stadium projects in both Cleveland and Arlington, were the creation of numerous public spaces and parks for use on all days. Both Cleveland and Arlington used portions of their sites for public spaces, including parks with green spaces, that attract families and visitors during lunch periods and on summer days. These public spaces make the facility that much more of a community facility, one that invites visits and provides public spaces for those visitors, even in a dense, urban setting like Cleveland. While Baltimore's Eutaw Street is a wonderful urban setting on event days, it is essentially a private space at its most vibrant times. Eutaw Street is open only to ticket holders during baseball events, keeping the general public out of the mix during those times. Instead, the public spaces that would attract activity during non-event periods are confined to the Inner Harbor and small green spaces in nearby Ridgely's Delight and Otterbein.

Camden Yards Microarea Impacts: Conclusion

James French of Baltimore's city planning office stated in an interview that "Primarily, what Camden Yards has done [for the city] is to extend Inner Harbor a few blocks west and to make the existing businesses more successful and more efficient."[41] This statement summarizes very nicely the impacts, or more correctly, the lack of physical impacts Camden Yards has had upon its surrounding areas. In the late 1990s the Camden Yards Microarea looks and operates strikingly similar to ten years earlier. The insulated

neighborhoods of Ridgely's Delight and Otterbein still serve as very nice in-town neighborhoods. Inner Harbor still thrives, with the addition of a few new projects, and the area still rests on the economic engine of recreation and tourism dollars. The Convention Center brings in large numbers of out-of-town guests, priming the local economy and filling local hotels. The University now serves as the western terminus of downtown, with Camden Yards now also helping to fulfill that role. Camden Yards is a nice fit to all of this, bringing millions of sports visitors a year to Inner Harbor, but not really influencing and physically revitalizing the surrounding portions of the city.

The evidence indicates that, much like the convention center, crowds at Camden Yards help to fuel the economy, strengthening Inner Harbor, but have done little in terms of creating new development and spreading the wealth into those nearby areas most in need of any spillover benefits. So, notwithstanding the national press and public adulation for Oriole Park and the Ravens Stadium, the record should indicate that Camden Yards has not served as a "district revitalization tool" for Baltimore. Despite the gushing of local politicians, Major League Baseball, and downtown interests over the success of Camden Yards, much of the vibrant, urban energy in the district would be present with or without baseball and football for one-hundred days a year. Certainly, the infusion of over four million sports per year fans has been a boon to the existing businesses, but in Baltimore's case this has resulted primarily in greater *efficiency* of existing business rather than new development and new opportunities in the microarea.

Certainly some new businesses have been created, but most of these are in the existing Inner Harbor area and very few have sprung up in the western and northern edges of the microarea. Also, Camden Yards has led to the successful re-use of two cherished old buildings, but other vacant or under-utilized properties still remain largely unchanged. In terms of new construction, downtown Baltimore's western edge has been strikingly unaffected by the new stadia in downtown. Plans exist for new hotels, but the area has

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[41] Interview with James French of Baltimore's Planning Department, August 1998.

seen more demolition or clearing of land for large surface parking lots than new projects springing from the ground. Plans for new development along Howard Street are also slowly emerging. Overall, though, the much touted "dramatic transformation" of the surrounding area has yet to occur.

Despite these lack of physical changes, however, project proponents can confidently and correctly state that the district has been successfully absorbed by the new downtown entertainment-based economy. The character of the Camden Yards Microarea has certainly changed when comparing the pre- and post-stadia eras. No longer a dilapidated railyards, littered with warehouses and a fascinating mix of industrial and commercial uses, the district is now a much better fit for the reoriented downtown Baltimore economy. Camden Yards certainly has extended the success of Inner Harbor a few blocks, but primarily only on event days. While a wonderful, exciting, pedestrian-oriented, urban space during events, Camden Yards should be recognized for what it is and not what its boosters claim it to be; a landmark, an architectural gem, an important entertainment facility, but *not* an example of a sports stadium as an urban revitalization tool.

So, what can the Baltimore case study teach us about sports stadia and their role as urban revitalization tools? Does the city's experience with Camden Yards offer further evidence that these facilities represent folly on the part of public officials? Recall that one of the few reasons pro-stadium forces can call on for support for these projects is the belief that they can anchor revitalization for a district. If Baltimore is supposed to be the foremost example of a sports stadium as a district-level revitalization tool and this study has shown that this is not the case, then might we conclude that microarea development is simply not a viable reason to invest public dollars in sports stadia? This case study certainly points to such a conclusion. However, as we will see in the next case study, Cleveland's Gateway project suggests an entirely different conclusion. That city *has* seen a great deal of new development in the Microarea surrounding the stadium. Their

stadium/arena project has been a major rallying point for developers and hotels, restaurants, retail establishments, and residential development are popping up all over the Gateway area.

The answer to our central question is not a simple Yes or No, then, but rather one that is rooted in an array of decisions concerning facility design, power, and district planning negotiated between governments, the sports teams, and the neighborhoods. Rather than unilaterally concluding that sports stadia offer little opportunity for district revitalization, Camden Yards should serve as a more general reminder that nothing is guaranteed to the public sector in the stadium game. Instead of seeing the crowds walking the streets, enjoying events at these truly remarkable sports stadia, and looking upon the city of Baltimore with envy, visitors should see Camden Yards as an ambitious, but flawed attempt to use a publicly financed activity generator to further revitalization efforts for the city. Instead of "breaking the mold" in the planning of sports facilities, Baltimore has simply continued "business as usual", a business where the private sector is guaranteed financial benefits and the public is guaranteed the majority of the costs. The corporate domination of municipal policy would seem to continue, unabated.




Figure 7.1 Camden Yards Major Features




Figure 7.2 Camden Yards Conceptual Land Use Map




Figure 7.3 Camden Industrial Park,1990




Figure 7.4 Central City Population by Blockgroup, 1990




Figure 7.5 Central City Median Household Income by Blockgroup, 1989




Figure 7.6 Central City Percent Black by Blockgroup, 1990




Figure 7.7 Central City Percent Living Below Poverty by Blockgroup, 1989




Figure 7.8 Baltimore's Camden Yards Microarea




Figure 7.9 Camden Yards Microarea Generalized Zoning, 1992-1998




Figure 7.10 Major Projects in the Camden Yards Microarea, 1990-1998




Figure 7.11 Camden Yards Microarea Generalized Land Use, 1990 and 1998




Figure 7.12 Camden Yards Microarea MSA Surface Parking Lots and Area Parking, 1993




Figure 7.13 Camden Yards Microarea MSA Surface Parking Lots and Area Parking, 1998

Chapter 8

Cleveland in the 1990s: Truly "The New American City"

"If a downtown is not healthy, the suburbs will not be healthy. If you have a frail heart, the extremities will suffer—if not immediately, then definitely someday."

-Indians owner Richard Jacobs on the city of Cleveland's efforts to revitalize downtown through destination projects like Gateway

When a visitor arrives at Cleveland's Hopkins Airport they are immediately assailed with evidence of Cleveland's renaissance. The airport bustles with activity and the regular set of businesspersons and families on vacation rush to catch planes, make meetings, and continue on with the business of the day. In addition to the regular sights of a busy airport, a visitor to Cleveland would note the large numbers of construction equipment and workers in hard-hats that litter the area as the airport undergoes an expansion and modernization intended, not only to upgrade the airport, but also to illustrate a city and a region on the move.

Almost as prevalent as the workers and the construction equipment are huge signs proclaiming Cleveland as "The New American City". Huge white signs, with red and blue lettering, these signs proudly proclaim that the airport is being redeveloped under the direction of Mayor Michael White, the Cuyahoga County Council, and a host of other public officials. Within Cleveland itself, any new construction project of any significant size is guaranteed to generate at least one spin-off development, that of a large white sign, with patriotic colors, insisting that the viewer understand that Cleveland is a "comeback city", not only recovered from its tough times, but well on its way towards establishing a national reputation for greatness again.

These signs are intended to remind anyone visiting the region that this Cleveland is no longer the city whose river caught fire in 1969; nor is it the city that went bankrupt in the late 1970s. This Cleveland is not the city whose schools had to be placed into

receivership because of fiscal problems. It isn't even the city that had a corporate revolt in the first half of the 1980s that remade local government and was lauded in a *Fortune* magazine article in 1989.[1] No, rather, Cleveland of the 1990s represents a city model all too familiar to students of urban America. This is a Cleveland with a recently "revitalized" downtown. This is a Cleveland with an increasingly clean Cuyahoga River. This is a Cleveland where local government is gently, but overtly guided by the CEO's of fifty in-city corporations. These signs, with their big, bold, American letters, clearly state to all who see them that Cleveland has reinvented itself as the prime example of "The New American City".

Perhaps the foremost symbol of this New American City is the Gateway Project, a $460 million (and counting) sports and office development completed in 1994. Within Gateway is the glowing baseball-only stadium Jacobs Field, home to the resurgent Indians of Major League Baseball, and Gund Arena, a sports and entertainment arena that returned the NBA's Cavaliers back downtown and also hosts a wide array of other events, including hockey games and concerts. Despite the revitalization of Playhouse Square (Cleveland's decades old theater district), the construction of numerous office towers and hotels, and two new downtown malls, the project that has brought the most national attention to the city has been Gateway and, more specifically, the retro-ballpark Jacobs Field. Built on the site of an old inner city market, Gateway was completed only after ten years of planning and only after public dollars were poured into what was originally intended to be a largely private venture.

Gateway has had a significant effect upon downtown Cleveland in its few short years and its success has no doubt been a factor in a new round of plans for downtown Cleveland. Downtown backers point to the millions of visitors pouring into downtown to attend Indians and Cavaliers games. Once a ghost town after dark, the city center now has two or three vibrant urban districts, one attributable to Gateway. The district surrounding

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[1] Magnet, Myron (1989). "How business bosses saved a big city." *Fortune*, March 27.

the project has witnessed something of a revival, with numerous new restaurants and a handful of hotels planned for the area. This and the following chapter are directed towards analyzing the "success" of the Gateway project, particularly at this district level.

While Gateway proponents cite these changes to Cleveland's downtown as evidence of the project's success, critics have lined up to counter the wisdom of this public investment. Critics have been quick to note that Gateway indeed represents just that kind of project being built in downtown America in the 1990s. These projects require huge public subsidies, both direct and indirect, in return for a dubious set of benefits, many now best described as "intangible". For example, Gateway's final price tag has continued to rise and the public sector is on the hook for these overruns. Numerous analysts have noted that the economic benefits of the project have been far below those originally projected.[2] In perhaps the greatest injustice, property tax abatements have led to decreased revenues for the city school district, thereby worsening an already critical financial situation. The economic shortcomings of the project aside, critics of Gateway have suggested that the city and the county could have spent their funds more wisely and with better effect on jobs programs or projects that more directly benefit Cleveland's increasingly impoverished inner-city residents.

To understand why Cleveland so proudly proclaims their rebirth and their continued "revitalization", we must travel back in time a bit. Like many Rust Belt cities, the public psyche of Clevelanders and, more importantly, the psyche of downtown business interests have been instrumental in shaping public responses to overwhelming social and economic problems. This chapter begins by describing the decline of Cleveland from a major national metropolis to a struggling regional center. Elements of this decline include irresistible national and international economic trends, growing racial tensions, as

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[2] Keating, W. Dennis (1996). "Cleveland: The 'Comeback City': The Politics of Redevelopment and Sports Stadiums Amidst Urban Decline" in Mickey Lauria's (Ed.) *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory: Regulating Urban Politics in a Global Economy*. Sage Publications: London; Rosentraub (1997a), chapter 7; Austrian and Rosentraub (1997).

well as self-inflicted political wounds. Cleveland's decline as a national city has been matched by a decline in the city's role in the metropolitan structure. This decline is also outlined.

While Cleveland's decline was no doubt largely related to international and national trends, contentious and ineffective city leadership was also a contributing factor in the flight of jobs and people from the city. In response, the corporate sector became much more consistently and heavily involved in city operations. "The corporate hand" became much more active and much more visible in the form of Cleveland Tomorrow, a permanent organization designed to advise local government and motivate public and private interests. This partnership, heralded by city leaders, the corporate sector, and the national press, has been at the heart of much of the city's strategy towards stemming Cleveland's decline and restoring the region's confidence. Numerous downtown projects, including Gateway, provide evidence of a renaissance, but increasing poverty levels and staggering social problems have led others to question this development strategy.[3] With our regional and city environment set, our attention then turns to the history of the Gateway project. Much like Baltimore's Camden Yards, Gateway was an idea that took years to develop and several more years to complete. A detailed project history is presented, with an emphasis on the political maneuverings behind it. Lastly, despite the political and financial turmoil surrounding the project, Gateway has meant financial boom times for Cleveland's sports franchises.[4] Any discussion of Gateway must discuss the benefits of a new facility to the teams playing before an increasingly white collar and corporate crowd.

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[3] Krumholz, Norman (1995). "Has the comeback city really come back?" Presented at the *Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning Conference*. Detroit, Michigan; Bartimole, Roldo (1995). "Who Governs: The Corporate Hand" in W. Dennis Keating, Norman Krumholz, and David C. Perry's (Eds.) *Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader*. Kent State University Press: London; Keating (1996).

[4] Gateway is also no doubt related to the financial success of the former Cleveland Browns (now Baltimore Ravens) NFL franchise. The public and private sectors willingness to build a new baseball stadium coupled with the initial lack of support for a new football stadium led the team to move to Baltimore, a move that included huge financial incentives for the Browns/Ravens owner (including a new stadium at public cost).

A Recent History of the Cleveland Metropolitan Area

The Cleveland Metropolitan Area 1960-1990: A Brief Demographic Look

Table 8.1 illustrates the city of Cleveland's population changes during the period 1960-1990. Figure 8.1 provides a reference map for the Cleveland Region as a whole.

Table 8.1: Cleveland City and Metropolitan Population Changes 1960-1996

Area	*1960*	*1970*	*1980*	*1990*	*1996*
Cleveland City	876,050	751,046	573,822	505,616	498,246
Cleveland PMSA		2,419,274	2,277,949	2,202,069	2,233,288

Area	*Percent Change '60-'70*	*Percent Change '70-'80*	*Percent Change '80-'90*	*Percent Change '90-'96*	*Gross Change '70-'96*	*Percent Change '70-'96*
Cleveland City	-14.28%	-23.60%	-11.89%	-1.46%	-252,800	-33.66%
Cleveland PMSA		-5.84%	-3.33%	+1.42%	-185,986	-7.69%

Source: *The State of the City Data Systems Home Page (except 1960 statistic from Miller and Wheeler (1997), App. A)*

As seen in these tables, the vibrant, economically healthy Cleveland of the 1950s deteriorated very quickly in the following decades. Between 1970 and 1996 alone, Cleveland lost over 250,000 residents or approximately one-third of its total population. Nationally, this represented a fall from the eighth largest city in 1960 all the way to twenty-third by 1990. While the bleeding was stanched some in the 1980s, the city still lost almost 12% of its population in that ten year period. As the city experienced significant declines during these decades, the metropolitan area also fared quite poorly as the 1970-1990 period reveals a region with a net loss of almost 190,000, representing an 8% decline in total population. During this period the city of Cleveland was losing population to its suburbs, but perhaps most disturbing was the loss of population from the region as a whole. While most urban areas were losing population to their suburban areas between 1970 and 1990, the flight of people from the region was evidence that the entire metropolitan economy was suffering through Cleveland's hard times.

[See Figure 8.1 on page 297]

Despite these hard times at the regional level, by far the area to suffer most during these decades was the city itself. The flight of middle class citizens from the central city left an increasingly poor population in the center city. Table 8.2 provides comparisons between Cleveland City, Cuyahoga County, and the remaining counties of the 1990 CMSA. Note that Cleveland city falls within Cuyahoga County. The remaining portions of Cuyahoga County are a mixture of older suburban cities and wealthy neighborhoods that have resisted annexation over the years. The six counties surrounding Cuyahoga County make up the remaining portion of the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) as defined by the Census Bureau.

Clearly shown in the Table 8.2 is a central city falling further and further behind the surrounding suburban areas. In particular, the percentage of persons living in poverty in Cleveland is striking, as greater than one in every four Clevelanders were classified as living in poverty in 1989. However, like the flight of the middle class from the city, Cleveland's poverty stricken have also moved to surrounding areas as evidenced by the increase in poverty levels in non-Cleveland Cuyahoga County and the remaining CMSA counties. Highly correlated with poverty levels is median household income. The median income of Cleveland households is only 61% of that of all households in the CMSA, while non-Cleveland Cuyahoga County and the remaining CMSA counties all have median household income figures very close to the CMSA figure.

Table 8.2: Comparison Statistics for Cleveland City and the Metropolitan Area

Area	*Pop 1980*	*Pop 1990*	*Pct Poverty (persons) 1979*	*Pct Poverty (persons) 1989*	*Median House-hold Inc. 1979*	*Median House-hold Inc. 1989*
Cleveland City	573,822	505,616	22.1%	28.7%	$15,991	$22,448
Rest of Cuyahoga County	924,578	906,524	4.9%	5.5%	$22,071[1]	$35,749[1]
Remaining CMSA	1,335,662	1,347,683	7.7%[2]	9.8%[2]	$22,701[2]	$37,223[2]
Total CMSA	2,834,062	2,759,823	7.9%	11.8%		$36,529

[1] This represents the figure for all of Cuyahoga County.
[2] Weighted values were calculated for the remaining counties.
Source: *United States Census Bureau. Some values derived from Census figures.*

These figures suggest several things about the city of Cleveland. First, Cleveland has been in free fall for decades, losing almost a third of its population between 1970 and 1990 alone. Income and poverty indicators illustrate a central city increasingly occupied by ever poorer households, surrounded by wealthier suburbs not wanting to deal with these dependent populations. Second, not only was the city in decline, but the region was also stagnating. The region lost population between 1970 and 1990 and rising poverty levels are in evidence throughout the region. Third, despite the decline of the central city and poverty creeping into the suburban areas, the surrounding counties continued to grow between 1980 and 1990, further diminishing the city's role in the region. Whereas Cuyahoga County has always been the largest county in the region, the combined populations of the surrounding suburban counties will surpass Cuyahoga in total population sometime in the 1990s, further eroding the power of this central place to dictate regional policy. How and why these changes occurred is a common story, one involving international and national economic trends and changes in the ways Americans organize their lives across the regional landscape.

Cleveland in Decline 1950-1980

In 1950 the city of Cleveland had a population of 914,808, the high water mark for that city's total population count. After World War II the city's economy had continued to thrive, with the automobile and steel sectors representing the healthy industrial foundation of the local economy. The city's industrial base provided employment for hundreds of thousands of Clevelanders in blue-collar jobs that paid well and helped to support a thriving downtown. In 1950, 42% of employed Clevelanders worked in manufacturing jobs.[5] The center city was home to several department stores, the Playhouse Square area was one of the nation's best downtown entertainment areas, and the city's major sports teams, the Indians and the Browns, were regularly competing for titles. In those heady days, Cleveland was a happy member of the "Heartland of America", with sister cities like Detroit and Pittsburgh experiencing the economic good times of the post-war economy.

By 1980, all of this had changed. Cleveland's population had fallen to just over 500,000 and the city's economy had experienced major changes leaving inner-city residents searching for employment in the modern economy. Downtown Cleveland was largely deserted at night and the shopping and recreational options to those suburbanites willing to travel downtown were limited to a very few. Over the course of these few decades, Cleveland and her sister Heartland cities had become better known as the "Rust Belt", relics of an age when inner-city factories employed thousands and downtown department stores represented the shopping standard for most Americans.

Even as recently as 1960, the city of Cleveland still appeared to be a picture of economic health, with a population of 876,050 that ranked the city as the nation's eighth largest. However, cracks in the local economy had begun to develop as local factories began to reduce their workforce, with some plant closures harkening a darker future for the traditional blue-collar workforce.[6] In some cases industries were relocating to suburban Cuyahoga County and in other cases the factories were leaving the Cleveland

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[5] Miller, Carol and Robert Wheeler (1997). *Cleveland: A Concise History 1796-1996.* (Second Edition) Indiana University Press: Indianapolis, Indiana, p. 159.

area altogether for destinations in the southern United States or overseas. The emerging post-industrial international economy, slowly developing over the next several decades, began the process of making Cleveland's industrial base outdated and unable to compete in the modern economy. The former industrial Heartland of America began its degeneration into the Rust Belt, as Detroit, Pittsburgh, Dayton, Cleveland, and most cities in this region of the country began losing population and jobs to other regions of the country.

In tandem with these inexorable economic changes, middle class Clevelanders began their flight from the city, in pursuit of new homes, relocating jobs, and racial homogeneity. This flight, often referred to as "white flight" because middle class minorities were unable to participate in this relocation until decades later, was caused by a combination of pull factors, like guaranteed mortgages and excellent suburban transportation systems (read highways), and push factors, like racial tension and deteriorating inner city neighborhoods. The relocation of population, and, more importantly, the buying power of this population had tremendous multiplier effects on the city. An increasingly impoverished population was left behind, a large percentage of whom were minorities that faced the additional obstacle of racial segregation and discrimination. Local businesses, no longer supported by the steady incomes of the middle class, began to close shop and relocate, leaving behind empty buildings, thereby furthering the decline of inner-city neighborhoods.

In response to the early indications of decline in the 1950s, Cleveland began aggressively pursuing two federal programs that have had lasting effects on the city, as well as most other American cities that were seeing early signs of decline in the 1950s.[7] Each of these programs were well-intentioned, but ultimately quite damaging for inner-city America. The interstate building boom and the revitalization of inner cities under the guise

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[6] Ibid, Chapter 12.
[7] Ibid, pp. 160-162.

of urban renewal in the 1950s ultimately served to wipe out many urban neighborhoods and speed the decline of Cleveland in the coming years.

President Eisenhower returned from World War II having traveled firsthand on the *autobahns* of Germany, marveling at the speed and ease of travel over long distances. Upon election as president, Eisenhower pushed for the construction of huge highways to all corners of the country, connecting cities and citizens more easily, but also having major consequences on the way Americans spatially organize their social and economic lives. City planners have long lamented the aggressive highway building of the 1950s as being environmentally unsound, socially damaging, and economically disastrous for urban America. The interstate highway boom of the 1950s made it easy, even attractive, for middle class families to relocate to suburban homes, on quarter acre lots, surrounded by their white picket fences. Soon after the population exodus came the malling of America, as shopping centers and strip malls began sprouting up all over these newly populated areas, thereby reducing the retail sales of inner-city merchants. Lastly, jobs that were formerly located in downtowns began their relocation to suburban areas to be closer to their workforce and to take advantage of inexpensive land at the urban fringe. In addition to these effects, the construction of highways in dense downtown areas and urban areas could only occur by displacing (or erasing) existing neighborhoods, thereby laying to waste large swaths of land in the city. Cleveland participated heavily in the interstate system, constructing numerous in-city highways that in some cases eliminated blighted areas, but in others created them. According to Miller and Wheeler, by 1975 the construction of the interstate highway system had displaced 19,000 residents, "resulting in significant losses not only of people but of income and property taxes as well."[8]

In addition to the construction of numerous interstates criss-crossing downtown, the city of Cleveland also participated heavily in the urban renewal program of the 1960s and 1970s. The city "renewed" over 6,000 acres of the city via this program, making

Cleveland the largest participant in urban renewal in the country in terms of acreage. Almost all projects were abysmal failures, with new residential complexes unable to attract sufficient residents to make them profitable and industrial projects unable to stem the flight of jobs and businesses to the suburbs. In addition, in displacing poor residents from their existing neighborhoods into surrounding neighborhoods, urban renewal further spurred the flight of middle class Clevelanders and spread the degeneration of the urban landscape.

The 1960s and 1970s saw little respite from these trends as the city continued to lose jobs and population at an alarming rate. Despite new office towers in downtown and other public works projects intended to stem these declines, Cleveland was now officially a city in trouble, with government leadership and corporate leadership growing increasingly exasperated with their inability to counter these trends. Like most American cities experiencing these losses, the city attempted to build their way out of these troubles, opening a new downtown Convention Center in 1964 and a score of new hotels and office projects all intended to return the inner-city to its vibrant, pre-1950 days. However, this physical development strategy did little more than position downtown Cleveland as the center for the emerging services sector.

The late 1970s saw Cleveland reach their nadir as a city. The election of Dennis Kucinich as mayor in 1977 on a pro-neighborhood platform led to disaster as Kucinich was unwilling to work with local corporate heads on key issues and unable to marshal his grassroots support beyond that of his election to the mayor's office.[9] At loggerheads over the sale of the city's electrical utility to private hands, local banks refused to roll over the city's debt and Cleveland became the first American city to go into default. Kucinich barely survived a recall election, but did not survive the 1979 mayoral election, where he lost to George Voinovich, who has since risen to Governor of Ohio and the Senator from the state in 1998.

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[8] Ibid, p. 162.

The "Comeback City": 1980-1990

Cleveland's precipitous decline had a significant effect upon the local governing structure, one that went beyond the very friendly relations between Voinovich and the corporate world in the early 1980s. Mayor Voinovich "ushered in an unprecedented ten-year era of cooperation", allowing corporate heads to analyze city operations and streamline city services in an effort to address the city's budget problems.[10] With relations between government and the business community repaired the city was then able to turn its attention to downtown redevelopment which appealed to a corporate sector that longed for some positive news for the city. Voinovich worked closely with corporate heads to generate a new round of large scale projects in downtown in an effort to illustrate to the country that Cleveland remained a viable and attractive place for business.

Economically, the city began a comeback in the 1980s as the local economy steadied and began the slow process of converting to a form better suited to a post-industrial economy. Studies by Edward Hill, an economist from Cleveland State University, conclude that Cleveland's regional economy "is more diversified today that it was before 1979, but the region's economy still rests on manufacturing for its health and survival."[11] However, Hill also notes that the service sector is growing increasingly important to the local economy, particularly that of the city.[12] Large office towers in downtown Cleveland employ thousands of white collar workers, almost all of whom leave for their suburban homes at the end of the work day. Hill concluded that the Cleveland economy has indeed "restructured", but that this restructuring has had negative impacts on the city's working population because their skills are increasingly outmoded and their earnings are less than in previous decades.

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[9] For a wonderful look at Kucinich's ill-fated years as Cleveland mayor, turn to Todd Swanstrom's excellent book *The Crisis of Growth Politics* (1985).

[10] Swanstrom, Todd (1985). *The Crisis of Growth Politics: Cleveland, Kucinich, and the Challenge of Urban Populism*. Temple University Press: Philadelphia., p. 182.

[11] Hill, Edward (1995). "The Cleveland Economy: A Case Study of Economic Restructuring" in W. Dennis Keating, Norman Krumholz, and David C. Perry's (Eds.) *Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader*. Kent State University Press: London, p. 67.

This combination of pro-downtown governance and the restructuring of the local economy, in tandem with the office construction boom of the 1980s, resulted in a downtown Cleveland vastly different in 1990 than it was at the beginning of the Voinovich era. New downtown shopping malls sprang up, in the festival marketplace mold, as did office towers and hotel properties. Clevelanders rediscovered their city center and downtown festivals and parades became fashionable as the region celebrated the successful "comeback" of the city. Even *Time* magazine proclaimed Cleveland the "comeback city" at the end of this decade.

So, by 1990 Cleveland had come full circle, at least according to government leaders and corporate heads. Although the city still lost jobs and population, the gaping wounds of the previous decades were being healed and city residents and the even the region had regained confidence in Cleveland. From the financial disaster of the late 1970s the city had remade itself, riding a construction boom and a restructured economy towards a better future. The sun shined a little brighter, the winter seemed a little shorter, and the downtown was most certainly more attractive. Cleveland had indeed positioned itself as "The New American City", one that ignored its immense social problems and continued to tout its renaissance. These changes were no doubt the result of a new form of governance for the city. Whereas corporate leadership had always been involved in public policy and development politics in particular, their role was largely played behind the scenes with overt displays of power rarely part of the proceedings. The rise of Cleveland Tomorrow in 1980s changed all that.

The Corporate Hand: The Development of Cleveland Tomorrow

From their perches in urban renewal-generated office towers, the real estate and corporate heads recognized that the 1960s and 1970s were a disaster of immense proportions for the city of Cleveland. Huge population and job losses, race riots, default on loans by city government, a burning river; all of these factors indicated that this

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[12] Ibid. p. 67-68.

formerly national metropolis was in freefall, becoming little more than a regional center, and, with the rise of Indianapolis, Columbus, and Cincinnati throughout this period, a declining one at that. While residents were leaving the city in droves, more worrisome for the business sector was the closing of department stores, the loss of smaller businesses, and the decline in city property values. For the city these developments meant decreased property taxes, but for business and land interests these factors resulted in huge losses and decreasing assets.

As would be expected, throughout this troubled period the corporate sector had increased their involvement in local and regional politics, pushing for their large downtown office and hotel projects, like Erieview Tower (opened in 1964) and Park Centre (1973). Each of these huge projects followed the Erieview Plan of the early 1960s, Cleveland's urban renewal plan that centered on eliminating urban blight and returning business, shopping, and residents to downtown.[13] In addition, the business sector pushed the city and county towards providing significant subsidies in futile efforts to attract private investment in the city. Cleveland passed a tax abatement ordinance in 1976, with significant support from the business sector. Tax abatements were subsequently given to numerous office and hotel projects in the late 1970s, providing subsidies for service-sector projects that likely would have been constructed anyway and producing minimal benefits for the city far below those projected by tax abatement proponents.[14] These projects produced white collar jobs, often for suburban residents, lowered the city's property tax revenues, and did little to stimulate the industrial and manufacturing sectors, despite the city's predisposition towards blue-collar employment. Further, the city was in effect subsidizing major corporations at the expense of small businesses, as tax burdens were shifted away from new multi-million dollar office towers to older properties, housing smaller firms.

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[13] Miller and Wheeler (1997), pp. 163-165.
[14] Swanstrom (1985), pp. 136-153.

Despite this level of involvement, common in most American cities, "the larger business community of Cleveland remained largely invisible or played traditional roles throughout this period" of decline.[15] City government was allowed to address the most pressing problems and to coordinate renewal efforts, with only indirect input from the corporate sector. For example, throughout the 1970s Cleveland's Planning Department, under the direction of Norman Krumholz, focused its energies on "equity planning", which emphasized enabling and empowering impoverished and minority groups not normally included in the planning process. The department produced a report in 1974[16] that "identified social problems and recommended city policies to address the housing, income, and transportation problems faced by the city's poorer residents."[17] These planning efforts, while beneficial to Cleveland's citizens, were decidedly different than the goals of the real estate and corporate sector that firmly backed more traditional planning efforts at altering land uses and increasing land values as a means of revitalizing the city. As of the late 1970s then, the city was still in freefall, city government was unable to arrest the flight of businesses and population to the suburbs, and the corporate sector remained relatively hands-off as regarding local politics. This was to change in the period 1977-1979.

In 1977 Dennis Kucinich was elected mayor in Cleveland, after running a campaign that focused on neighborhood, not downtown, development, ending tax abatement, and stopping the sale of the city-owned electrical utility to a private utility company.[18] Swanstrom, in his detailed case study of the Kucinich administration, labeled this political strategy "urban populism" and summed it as "growth politics turned inside out".[19] Kucinich believed that, "The limited resources of city government... should be distributed to the people in the neighborhoods in the form of public works and basic services.

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[15] Shatten, Richard (1995). "Cleveland Tomorrow: A Practicing Model of New Roles and Processes for Corporate Leadership" in W. Dennis Keating, Norman Krumholz, and David C. Perry's (Eds.) *Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader*. Kent State University Press: London, p. 322.
[16] Cleveland City Planning Commission (1974). *Cleveland Policy Planning Report*.
[17] Keating, W. Dennis and Norman Krumholz (1991). "Downtown plans of the 1980s: The case for more equity in the 1990s." *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 57(2): pp. 136-152.
[18] Miller and Wheeler (1997), pp. 175-176.

Equality should be stressed over growth."[20] To this end, Kucinich pushed for redistributing resources out of the downtown and focusing upon neighborhood redevelopment via improved social services, upgraded citywide infrastructure, and denying government funds targeted to large downtown projects.

The new mayor's support among the people of Cleveland was strong when first elected as he successfully vilified the corporate sector for demanding abatements for multi-million dollar developments and fought for the retention of the electric utility in public hands. However, these conflicts with the private sector led very quickly to disaster. Kucinich's refusal to sell the utility led to a lengthy battle and ultimately pushed the city into default on their loans when local bankers, at the behest of the corporate sector, refused to rollover loans to the city.[21] Further battles led to a police strike, a failed recall election, and "political paralysis".[22] Kucinich's administration was a constant battle, largely because the mayor was unwilling to play the political game by the established rules, rules that had long been assumed by and complied to by past mayors.

For the study at hand, the importance of Kucinich's troubled term of mayor is not in its unsuccessful attempt to break from the urban growth mold, but rather in the ripple effect it had upon local government in Cleveland. The city's continued decline and the disastrous flirtation with urban populism of the 1970s led the corporate sector to conclude that enough was enough. No longer was government able to address the major problems in the city and no longer was the private sector going to remain quietly involved in finding solutions to these problems. What followed in the 1980s was the rise of the corporate sector as an overt participant in the governance of the city of Cleveland. As part of this participation, the private sector bankrolled major planning efforts for the city and jump started several huge downtown projects, including a little project initially known as

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[19] Swanstrom (1985), p. 7.
[20] Ibid. pp. 7-8.
[21] Bartimole (1995), pp. 168-170; Swanstrom (1985), Chapter 7.
[22] Swanstrom (1985), p. 9.

"Domed Stadium", but later thankfully identified as the much more pleasant sounding "Gateway Project". The rise of the corporate hand began with the mayoral election of 1979.

Kucinich ran for mayor again in 1979, but lost handily to Republican and former Lieutenant Governor George Voinovich. Voinovich, with substantial backing from the business community, had little trouble defeating Kucinich, whose few successes were overshadowed by the city's default and the police strike during his term as mayor. Voinovich immediately "patched up relations with the business community" even going so far as to "persuad[e] it to donate the services of top executives to analyze city operations."[23] Whereas Kucinich had operated on a confrontational style, Voinovich developed strong ties to the corporate sector, inviting them to participate overtly in city operations. He also firmly backed their creation of a new "unit of corporate organization... called Cleveland Tomorrow, which pioneered new practices of economic development, creating a new role for corporations to build upon existing institutions and bring weight and energy to the community agenda."[24]

Cleveland Tomorrow, officially founded in 1982, was launched in the early 1980s when eight corporate heads got together and quickly concluded that action and organization were necessary because of the disasters of the late 1970s and because the new mayor could not be counted on to stimulate urban redevelopment. Originally intended as a temporary ad hoc group, Cleveland Tomorrow grew to include fifty members from major corporations (members had to come from corporations generating at least $300 million a year), with regular meetings, a stated agenda, working committees, and a budget and staff to further the goals of the organization.[25] According to Shatten, former Executive Director of Cleveland Tomorrow, the group was intended as a "development organization run not by politicians, but by the very highest levels of the private urban

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[23] Miller and Wheeler (1997), p. 182.
[24] Shatten (1995), p. 322.

economy."[26] Cleveland Tomorrow has been heavily involved in Cleveland's "renaissance", helping to spearhead the redevelopment of Playhouse Square, pushing the idea for a new domed stadium throughout the 1980s, and financing over $2.8 million in studies of the city and its development possibilities.

Cleveland Tomorrow has also been heavily involved in the city's planning process since its inception. The development of Cleveland's two Comprehensive Plans, the 1988 *Downtown Plan for 2000* and the 1991 *Citywide Plan for 2000* were financed in part by Cleveland Tomorrow funds and funding from other downtown development groups. [27] Cleveland Tomorrow also was quite involved in the visioning portion of the planning process for these important planning documents.[28] Included in the vision for Cleveland in 2000 was a new stadium, several new downtown hotels, a rock and roll hall of fame, downtown shopping centers, new office towers, and a vibrant waterfront development. *Planning* magazine awarded these planning documents with the Comprehensive Planning Award in 1992, citing the plans as examples of "sound planning and planning implementation."[29] Keating and Krumholz disagree suggesting that "the plan represents a typical, pro-growth vision" that "avoids discussion of controversial subsidies to spur downtown development".[30] Indeed, the plan only roughly estimates total costs for these proposed projects and makes little mention of the ancillary costs likely to accompany these developments.

As a testament to the success of Cleveland Tomorrow, a glance at the Cleveland landscape reveals that many of their proposed projects have been realized. Shatten reports

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[25] Ibid, p. 323-325.
[26] Ibid, p. 324.
[27] Keating and Krumholz (1991) report that "the [downtown] plan cost $1.5 million, was over four years in the making, and was discussed at almost 50 public meetings...", p. 142.
[28] Keating, W. Dennis, Norman Krumholz, and John Metzger (1995). "Postpopulist Public-Private Partnerships" in W. Dennis Keating, Norman Krumholz, and David C. Perry's (Eds.) *Cleveland: A Metropolitan Reader*. Kent State University Press: London, p. 336.
[29] Gallagher, Mary Lou (1992). "Cleveland Citywide Plan and Downtown Plan: Comprehensive Planning Award." *Planning*, March: pp. 8-10.

in 1991 that over $700 million in funds has been invested in "Cleveland Tomorrow priorities".[31] As we know from the subject of this and the following chapter, a beautiful new urban ballpark and sports arena opened in 1994. In addition, several new hotels and office towers litter the downtown, as do two huge shopping developments, Tower City Center and the Galleria. (See Figure 8.2) Cleveland's waterfront has also been redeveloped with the Rock-n-Roll hall of fame and the new Great Lakes Science Center attracting visitors to the city. However, much of the waterfront remains largely underutilized and Cleveland Tomorrow's vision of this area is still largely unrealized. In 1998 Cleveland Tomorrow updated their plans for downtown, with their new vision including a larger and even better waterfront design based upon Baltimore's Inner Harbor model and including an expanded Convention Center to attract more visitors to the new hotels and tourist developments built during the "renaissance" of the 1980s and 1990s.

[See Figure 8.2 on page 298]

This discussion of Cleveland having experienced a renaissance is no doubt related to the above changes to downtown, which is certainly more attractive and more vibrant than in the 1970s and early 1980s. However, these changes would likely only be news locally if it weren't for efforts by Cleveland Tomorrow and other corporate entities to promote Cleveland's renaissance after the disasters of the 1970s. Bartimole attributes the perception of a Cleveland Renaissance to "the New Cleveland Campaign", a group that advertised widely in national magazines and journals and spearheaded a public relations campaign to promote the positive changes to Cleveland's central business district.[32] *Time* magazine had illustrated the positive effects of such a campaign when, in 1980, they proclaimed that "Cleveland is making a comeback."[33] In addition to these national

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[30] Keating and Krumholz (1991), p. 142.
[31] Shatten (1995), p. 327. The completion of the Gateway project added another $350-$400 million to this total.
[32] Bartimole (1995), p. 172.
[33] Time magazine (1980). "Fatter city: Cleveland makes a comeback", *Time*, Dec 29. Other magazines wrote of Cleveland's renaissance including *Town and Country* (October, 1981) and *Reader's Digest* (March, 1983).

advertisements proclaiming Cleveland's renaissance, a 1989 *Fortune* magazine article, entitled "How Business Bosses Saved a Sick City", details the development of Cleveland Tomorrow and its positive effects on the city of Cleveland. [34] In this piece, Magnet outlines how the corporate revolt, centered around Cleveland Tomorrow, led to Cleveland's economic turnaround and culminated in a building boom for downtown. The author attributes Cleveland's comeback to the efforts of corporation heads that understood that the only means of saving the city was to "take their civic fate in their own hand[s]."

This renaissance has catapulted those politicians willing to participate and orchestrate the revival of downtown Cleveland to greater political heights. Former mayor Voinovich has been lauded as the "principal architect of Cleveland's renaissance"[35] and was later elected to the Governor's Mansion in Ohio and then the United States Senate. Voinovich is seen as a rising star in the Republican Party and a possible national political leader, with whispers of possible future Vice Presidency opportunities. Following Voinovich, Michael White was elected mayor. Of interest, White ran for mayor on a platform of neighborhood development, proposing strategies that refocused resources on areas surrounding downtown and not the CBD. In practice, however, White has operated in the Voinovich mold, supporting large downtown projects (like Gateway and the new Browns football stadium) and failing to realize his original plans for addressing major problems like homelessness and unemployment.[36] To use the title of Bartimole's work, the author concludes that White quickly learned "Who Governs" and by recognizing that it is largely "The Corporate Hand", White too has been tagged as a competent mayor and rising star in Ohio politics.[37]

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[34] Magnet (1989).
[35] Ibid.
[36] Bartimole (1995), pp. 173-174.
[37] Ibid.

Critics have been quick to point out the fallacy that is Cleveland's renaissance. Bartimole refers to the "fiction of the 'Comeback City'", concluding that this comeback really was attributable to massive subsidies in the form of tax abatements for large downtown projects.[38] Clearly the building boom of the 1980s was in part related to a national economic recovery and a downtown building boom experienced nationwide. Krumholz has argued that this "comeback" has come only to specific sections of the city and only to very narrow subsets of Cleveland's residents; specifically downtown land owners, downtown businesses, and other groups part of the business sector.[39] Dennis Keating writes of the "uneven development" in Cleveland, one that has resulted in the development of a "dual city, in which downtown areas can thrive, and the white collar sector mostly employing white suburban commuters can grow, whereas poor neighborhoods and their working class and poor residents, especially blacks and Hispanics, do not share in this growth and must cope with high rates of poverty, unemployment, and other social problems."[40]

While downtown is prettier, livelier, and littered with upscale shopping and recreational opportunities, the simple fact is that Cleveland still experienced tremendous losses throughout the 1980s. As seen earlier, despite the renaissance of the 1980s almost 70,000, or about 12%, of the city's population fled the city. Poverty and unemployment continued at staggering levels, almost 30% poverty in 1990, with little relief in sight. A tour of the inner ring of neighborhoods finds burned out buildings, vacant lots, marginal businesses, and little sense of hope. To the dismay of neighboring cities, poverty and unemployment are creeping into the surrounding area, turning formerly middle-class neighborhoods into strips of urban blight. These changes have led political leaders from various jurisdictions to seriously consider joint attempts at economic recovery, rather than the piecemeal approach normally undertaken by the various cities.

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[38] Ibid. p. 172.
[39] Krumholz (1995).

This discussion has important bearing for the Gateway Project in large part because the idea behind the new sports facilities were born in the meetings of Cleveland Tomorrow in the early 1980s. As we shall see shortly, Cleveland Tomorrow was an early proponent of a "Domed Stadium" project, largely because it fit well into their long range plans for the city. Further, the success of this private sector organization in galvanizing new investment in downtown and national interest in the city clearly illustrated that city politics, especially city development, was now at the direction of the private sector, with public input, rather than the reverse. In addition, the much ballyhooed success of Cleveland and the "renaissance" of the city suggested to political leaders and to the business sector that large scale tourism and recreation developments were the path to prosperity for this formerly blue-collar city. As we shall see, though, critics have leveled the same complaints at Gateway as they have at other attempts at revitalization; massive public subsidies for projects benefiting private interests, uneven development that does little for populations most in need of economic development efforts, and little change from the political and economic status quo.

From Domed Stadium to Gateway

The story behind the Gateway project and its metamorphosis from a suburban-style domed stadium meant to host baseball and football to a pedestrian friendly ballpark/arena project is worthy of a book in itself. Suffice it to say that the city of Cleveland was in some ways fortunate that the Gateway project took so long to germinate. Instead of a domed bunker set downtown amidst parking lots, the project eventually took shape as a mixed-use, year round facility meant to generate activity in a district better known for empty buildings and jeopardy after dark. However, these design changes and the decision to add an arena to the mix did not come without costs (literally). Initial cost projections for the facility were around $100 million, but final construction costs for Gateway have come in at well over $450 million. How and why these design changes, and the resultant skyrocketing costs, came about are an important part of the Gateway story.

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[40] Keating (1996).

This fascinating story begins in 1980 soon after the election of Voinovich as Cleveland's mayor. After the disasters of the Kucinich administration and with the coming together of Cleveland Tomorrow, city leaders were looking for a succession of projects to help revitalize the central business district and to illustrate to the region and nation that Cleveland was not a city on its death bed. Among the identified goals of this new regime were new downtown hotels, a convention center, and downtown shopping malls. As in may other cities, an addition to this list was a new sports stadium.

To their great pleasure and in large part because of massive subsidies, in the 1980s the city was able to leverage the construction of several new office towers, a revamped convention center, and a few new hotels; in addition, two new downtown malls planned in the 1980s opened in the early 1990s. One major piece of the downtown puzzle remained, though. Despite significant efforts, well-financed plans, and public referenda, a new stadium had yet to be added to the mix. However, before discussing the rise of Gateway from the ashes of Domed Stadium, it is important to set the professional sports stage in Cleveland. The histories of these teams, their host facilities as of 1980, and their location within the metropolitan area have all factored into the process that resulted in Gateway.

Professional Sports in Cleveland: The Dreadful Indians, Competitive Browns, and Suburban Cavaliers

The Cleveland sports scene in the early 1980s was one of mixed fortunes. The Cleveland Indians baseball team was in the midst of one of the worst runs of losing seasons in major league history. Decades before, the Indians were the darlings of the city, having regularly competed for the postseason, playing in the World Series in 1948 and 1954(winning in '48), and producing Hall of Fame players like Bob Feller and Lou Boudreau. The city was galvanized by these great baseball clubs and huge crowds turned out for big games. However, since the 1954 season the Indians had not been back to the Series and had usually finished the season well below the .500 mark. The Indians became

known as one of the worst franchises in baseball, with poor draft choices, dreadful trades, and small crowds becoming more associated with the club than their past glories.

One of the primary problems the Indians faced was their stadium arrangement. The club played in cavernous Municipal Stadium (nee Lakefront Stadium), a facility that held over 80,000 patrons, compared to the trend in current stadia to hold approximately 40,000. The facility was designed primarily as a football facility, configured poorly for baseball, with awful sightlines and seats located far from the field of play. As a result of a poor lease arrangement the team received very little in revenue from concessions, parking, and other game-related income. According to Toman the stadium lost money for the team every year except 1948, the year the team won the World Series before crowds of over 80,000.[41]

Perhaps more importantly, the stadium was an awful place to watch baseball. Built in 1932 in an attempt to attract the Olympic Games to Cleveland, the stadium was publicly funded with a $2.5 million bond issue that passed in 1928 during the "Roaring Twenties".[42] Built on landfill that extended the shoreline into Lake Erie, the huge steel structure was constructed on top of over 2,500 piles driven into the marshy lakefront fill. Like the city itself, Municipal Stadium became known over the years as the "Mistake by the Lake" because of its cold, wet setting, a succession of terrible baseball teams, and because it was simply one of the worst stadiums ever built that played host to major league baseball.

The NFL's Browns were by far the more popular team in this blue-collar city, regularly playing before sell-out crowds. Since joining the NFL in 1950, the franchise had become the city's favorite home team because they were competitive and because Municipal Stadium served as a much better venue for professional football. The Browns

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[41] Toman, James (1991). *Cleveland Stadium*. Cleveland Landmarks Press: Cleveland.
[42] Gershman (1993), pp. 142-143.

regularly competed for divisional and conference championships, winning the division six times in the 1950s, five times in the '60s, once in the '70s, and five times in the '80s, although they have yet to reach the Super Bowl. The team regularly played before sellout crowds, leading the team's owner to take over control of the Stadium in the 1970s. Unfortunately, this disastrous decision drained money out of the team's coffers and eventually helped lead to the movement of the franchise to Baltimore to the shock and dismay of the fans and the NFL community.[43]

A third franchise, the NBA's Cavaliers, began play in 1970. Originally, the team played in the Cleveland Arena, a small downtown facility. However, the team fled the city in 1974 for a team-financed and owned arena in suburban Richfield, a full forty minutes from downtown. This move came about in the era of sports suburbanization of the 1960s and 1970s. Team owners constructed the facility in a largely undeveloped area that was expected to boom and grow into a regional center with office buildings and perhaps a mall. Unfortunately for team owners this development never came about and the team was left playing in a nice arena, surrounded by parking lots and green space, with nothing else to offer fans except a game or concert. The Cavaliers have also been a relatively successful franchise, being a fixture in the playoffs, but never seriously competing for a conference or league title.

The Original Plans for a Domed Stadium

According to Walsh, "In 1983, rumors of a movement involving civic and business leaders who were going to propose a plan for a new domed stadium circulated throughout Cleveland. ... In the clubs and corridors where Cleveland's business leadership gathered, there indeed was conversation about the need for a new stadium."[44] This discussion grew

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[43] Poplar, Michael with James Toman (1997). *Fumble!: The Browns, Modell, and the Move*. Cleveland Landmarks Press, Inc.: Cleveland; Morgan, Jon (1997). *Glory for Sale: Fans, Dollars, and the New NFL*. Bancroft Press: Baltimore, Maryland.

[44] Walsh, Edward (1994). *Gateway: Blueprint of the Future*. Gateway Press Incorporated: Cleveland, p 23.

despite major renovations to Municipal Stadium throughout the 1970s. There was a growing consensus that the "Mistake by the Lake" could no longer serve the needs of the city's downtown professional franchises. In addition, the death of the Indians owner raised fears that the team would be sold to out-of-town interests and moved to a new location. In response, the business community, through Cleveland Tomorrow, began to build political and community support for a new domed stadium that would host both the Browns and the Indians. As with most other projects in Cleveland's recent history, the beginnings of this new downtown project were founded in a public-private partnership spearheaded initially by the business sector.

The "Domed Stadium Project", as it came to be known, called for a new retractable roof domed stadium that would hold approximately 50,000 for baseball and 72,000 for football. The retractable roof was to be the first of its type in the nation and was to serve as an illustration to all that downtown Cleveland was back on the right track. Located on the old Central Market site, just north of the junction of several major freeways, the stadium would serve as the gateway into downtown from almost all directions, a monument to Cleveland's recovery from default just a few short years before.

Recall the timing of these initial plans. When Cleveland seriously began its pursuit of a new sports complex in 1983, multi-purpose domes were very much in vogue. The recently opened Metrodome in Minneapolis and the soon to open Hoosier Dome in Indianapolis were the "state of the art" in sports facility design. Seattle, Montreal, Houston, and Detroit all had domes and a functional and economic retractable roof stadium was considered the next great step in stadium design.[45] Further, the shared facility, now understood to be economically infeasible for the sports of baseball and

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[45] Montreal had built a retractable roof stadium for the Olympics in 1976. This project turned into an economic disaster with the facility ultimately costing over $1 billion. Unfortunately for that city, the roof rarely worked correctly and the current tenants, MLB's Expos, are now trying to leave that facility for a new downtown ballpark.

football, was still popular among stadium architects and even the leagues themselves. A shared facility seemed most economical.

In May of 1984 a referendum for a 0.9 mill property tax was placed on the Cuyahoga County ballot. This increase was to be collected over 25 years and dedicated solely for the $150 million domed stadium project. In a heated campaign, the pro-stadium campaign trotted out the regular arguments that the dome would be good for business and a positive step for downtown. The anti-stadium forces focused primarily on the general tax increase and the misuse of public funds. In a resounding result of approximately two to one, the initiative failed miserably. Cuyahoga County voters had clearly stated that a new domed stadium was not to be financed by a general property tax increase. While anti-stadium forces concluded that the region didn't want a new stadium, the pro-stadium groups determined that the financing and timing of the new facility was the primary obstacle, not the stadium itself. Ohio's Governor concluded, "I can't really call it a defeat for the dome," but rather, "more of a defeat for the property tax issue."[46]

Despite the referendum defeat the coalition of business and city leaders pushed on for a new stadium. In 1985 an ad-hoc committee officially organized themselves as The Greater Cleveland Domed Stadium Corporation (GCDSC) with a $100,000 start up grant from the state of Ohio that was soon matched by funds from downtown businesses.[47] The GCDSC began raising funds and buying up land in Central Market district of downtown. Another $2 million grant from the state, accompanied by $4 million in state loans, helped to leverage $18 million in low interest bank loans for further land acquisition and clearance. Slowly the necessary money was being raised, land was acquired, buildings were razed, and the site was being cleared for a new stadium.

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[46] Quoted in Walsh (1994), p. 25.
[47] Much of this history is taken from Walsh (1994), p. 24-30.

The Dome Becomes a Ballpark

Throughout this process, the major players in the domed stadium project were operating under the assumption that by acquiring the site and generating enough interest in the business community, a predominately privately-financed stadium could be built. However, by 1987 it became apparent that the costs of land and construction for a new stadium were far above what the GCDSC could successfully leverage. In addition, the extra costs for a domed stadium were deemed too large to justify this cost. The GSDSC came to recognize that substantial public money was required for the project, whatever form it would take. In response, the state of Ohio agreed to let Cuyahoga County levy an excise tax on themselves to help pay for a new stadium, but this would require public approval. In 1988, the GSDSC concluded that a domed stadium was likely not feasible, so the Corporation changed its named to the more generic and open-ended "New Stadium Corporation".

In addition to these developments, a new owner for the Cleveland baseball team was finally found after years of speculation and maneuvering by several ownership groups. In 1986 it was announced that the Jacobs brothers, major shopping mall developers with headquarters in the Cleveland suburb of Westlake, would be purchasing the Indians. Although a local ownership group, the Jacobs brothers were considered outsiders to the downtown business establishment and there were concerns that a new lease agreement might be difficult to negotiate. What was clear, however, was that the Jacobs brothers wanted a new stadium for the Indians and that if a new stadium was not forthcoming the Indians might very well leave town for greener (monetarily) pastures.

While the Indians made known their intentions to have a new ballpark, the Browns increasingly became disillusioned with the project. The Browns were housed in a huge stadium that they controlled, had invested millions in the *Mistake by the Lake*, and were playing in front of large crowds to great success. While the team was interested in a better financial arrangement with the city, they were not so much interested in a new stadium

that was looking more and more like a baseball-first facility. Further, team ownership understood that once the Indians were taken care of the city and the state would then turn their attention to the Browns.[48] So over the course of a few years the shared baseball-football domed facility was now taking shape as an open-air baseball-only facility.

The Ballpark Becomes a Gateway

From the ashes of a domed stadium rose a ballpark project that would keep the Indians in town. However, new plans called for a major change to the project's design. An arena was proposed for the site that would return the Cavaliers to downtown after a twenty year absence. According to Walsh, the architect of much of this plan was Thomas Chema, the head of the Development Corporation for the stadium project and later the Gateway Economic Development Corporation. Chema sold the now named "Gateway Project" project as a year-round entertainment center and the project was shaping up as less of a sports development and more of a district revitalization tool. Chema presented this revised plan to city and business leaders and they very actively supported these changes. In particular, the biggest new ally for Gateway was the newly elected mayor of Cleveland, Michael White. White was interested in making his mark on Gateway and in furthering the impact of the project on downtown Cleveland. In particular, White was interested in seeing the project generate jobs and create new development, following the model laid out by Voinovich in his time as mayor. So, with the backing of White and with the assent of the business sector, project leaders pursued the Cavaliers as a second tenant for the fast changing stadium project.

[See Figure 8.3 on page 299]

With the Indians and Cavaliers on board and the Browns seemingly happy in Municipal Stadium, the Gateway Project was taking shape. A baseball only stadium, an arena for basketball, other sports, and concerts, and some on-site parking facilities were to be constructed on 28 acres of land, most of which had already been purchased and cleared

[48] Poplar (1997), Chapters 10 and 12.

prior to 1990. The project price was set at $344 million, to be split approximately 50-50 by public-private funding sources. The last step was putting together a complex public-private financing package that would go before the voters in May of 1990. As originally proposed, $174 million was to come from private sources like luxury box sales, a Cleveland Tomorrow grant, and property loans.[49] The public portion was to come from a fifteen year excise tax on alcohol and cigarettes (a "sin tax") that would have to be approved by voters.

The financial details surrounding Gateway were troubled from day one of this new proposal. Almost immediately it became apparent that the $344 price tag was very conservative and that the project would almost certainly cost substantially more than that. In addition, lease agreements with the Indians and Cavaliers had yet to be signed. There were indications that the $99 million in luxury box revenues originally dedicated to stadium construction costs would never be directed to that purpose as the teams made it clear that they planned on reaping the benefits of that huge revenue stream. Lastly, no area development plan had been begun by the city despite promises of district revitalization. So, as Rosentraub summarizes so nicely, "Prior to the election, then, it appeared no one knew what would be built, how much it would cost, and how much the teams had contributed to the final cost...", but despite this "a vote was scheduled for May 8 [1990] for a substantial public investment in a public/private partnership for two facilities that had yet to be designed, and no agreement with the private partners had been established."[50]

What the pro-stadium forces offered to voters were a great deal of promises.[51] Project propaganda promised 28,000 new jobs because of Gateway. The mayor promised a revitalized district and, by extension, a revitalized downtown. The Indians owners and MLB's commissioner promised that the team would not be in Cleveland past the millennium if the stadium was not approved. Other promises included huge tax revenues

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[49] Rosentraub (1997a), pp. 259-260.
[50] Ibid, pp. 260-261.

for the city to help fund schools and social services and new neighborhood housing, especially low income housing. Over $1 million from local businesses and $300,000 from the Indians and Cavaliers fueled the pro-Gateway campaign. In addition, the Gateway camp developed a slogan for the project "More than a Stadium", which implied that Gateway offered much more than new sports facilities for the city. Almost all of the county's political and business leaders vocally and visibly supported the project and the local newspaper wrote articles and editorials espousing the benefits of the project and minimizing concerns about project costs and actual benefits. The opposition fought the good fight with a poorly financed campaign that focused on the dubious benefits of the project and attempted to more clearly identify the actual costs to the public sector.

The combination of a clever financing scheme, the conservative price tag, scare tactics by the Indians and Cavaliers, and the coming together of the growth machine behind this project was almost not enough to see Gateway through. On May 8, 1990 over 383,000 votes were cast to decide the issue; in a very close election only 51.7% of the voters approved the Gateway project. In fact, city residents, those most likely to feel the direct impacts of the project, voted down Gateway. Instead, suburban voters passed Gateway with a 55%-45% margin that carried the day. In his analysis of Gateway through the urban political economy approach, Keating concludes that "powerful private interests, supported by elected local officials for whom they provide financial support, virtually dictate the municipal agenda...," and through this vote, "urban regime theory is confirmed."[52]

Gateway Project Specifications

So how exactly did the city of Cleveland pay for this over $400 million project and what did it get for this substantial investment? Table 8.3 illustrates the project's specifications as they were originally laid out in 1990 and how they have, to date, played

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[51] Keating (1996), p. 199.
[52] Ibid, p. 200.

out. The 1998 figures for the public and private shares of these projects are estimates because much of the private revenues are tied to attendance levels at Gund Arena and Jacobs Field. Two things are of note, 1) the total price tag for the project has skyrocketed from $343.5 million to $467 million and 2) the public's share of this project has grown substantially since 1990 as well, from 49% to 60%. These developments are typical for these sports projects, in part because the financing is usually secured before architectural plans can be completed, the construction is usually "fast-tracked" to meet an opening date that fits the teams' schedules and not the project's schedule, and because lease agreements with the teams are often negotiated after the public financing has been arranged. For example, the original project specifications did not include luxurious food facilities and free office space for the teams in the facilities.[53] These extras were negotiated into the agreement by a baseball team threatening to move and a basketball team with an existing team-owned facility.

Table 8.3 Gateway Project Specifications

	Original Specifications (1990)	***Current Status (1998)***
Financing: Total Project Costs	$343.5 million	$467 million
--Total from the "Sin Tax" (Public)	$169.5 million	~$282 million
Percent of Total	49.4%	~60.4%
--Total from Private Sources	$174 million	~$185 million
Percent of Total	50.6%	~39.6%
--Cost of the Ballpark	$128 million	~$175 million
--Cost of the Arena	$75 million	~$152 million
Project Specifications		
--Ballpark	Yes	Yes
--Arena	Yes	Yes
--Parking Deck	Yes	Yes
--Restaurants in Project	No	Yes
--Offices in Project	No	Yes

Sources: Team Marketing Report (1998), pp. 54-55, 110-111; Rosentraub (1997a), pp. 269-279; Austrian and Rosentraub, pp. 358-365.

[53] Austrian and Rosentraub (1997), p. 363.

Tables 8.4 and 8.5 outline the deals struck by the teams for their swanky new facilities. In addition to office space and expensive restaurants in the facilities, both teams are to receive all parking revenues for the project's parking deck on event days, all concession revenues, and all advertising revenues. In addition, the Indians get to keep all of their luxury box and club seating revenues in return for a rental fee of only $2.95 million a year. In contrast, the Cavaliers rent comes out of a percentage of luxury box and club seating revenues. These "suite deals" earmark almost all of the major revenue streams to the teams and lock out the public from sharing in these streams even though they paid for 60% percent of the direct construction costs (and all of the indirect costs).

Table 8.4 The Indians' Jacobs Field Lease Agreement

Revenue Streams	*Recipient*
--Facility Owner	Gateway Economic Development Corporation
--Advertising Revenues	100% to Indians
--Parking Revenues	100% to Indians
--Luxury and Club Seating Revenues	100% to Indians
--Concession Revenues	100% to Indians
--Facility Rental Fee	1) Indians pay $2.95 million per year to Gateway 2) Indians pay additional moneys for tickets sold above certain levels $0.75 for each ticket 1.85-2.25 million $1.00 for each ticket 2.25-2.5 million $1.25 for each ticket 2.5 million and up
Lease Details • The Indians signed a twenty year lease from 1994-2014.	
Notes • The Indians and Cavaliers bought the rights to a parcel owned by Gateway for $2.6 million with the intention of developing the site as a hotel.	

Source: Team Marketing Report (1998), p. 54-55.

Table 8.5 The Cavaliers' Gund Arena Lease Agreement

Revenue Streams	*Recipient*
--Facility Owner	Gateway Economic Development Corporation
--Advertising Revenues	100% to Cavaliers
--Parking Revenues	100% to Cavaliers
--Concession Revenues	100% to Cavaliers
--Luxury and Club Seating Revenues	72.5% of Luxury Boxes to Cavaliers 52% of Club Seating to Cavaliers
--Ticket Surcharge	Cavaliers pay additional moneys for tickets sold above certain levels: $0.75 for each ticket 1.85-2.5 million $1.00 for each ticket 2.5 million and up
Lease Details • The Cavaliers signed a thirty year lease from 1994-2024.	
Notes • The Indians and Cavaliers bought the rights to a parcel owned by Gateway for $2.6 million with the intention of developing the site as a hotel.	

Source: Team Marketing Report (1998), p. 110-111.

Tables 8.6 and 8.7 illustrate the seating totals and estimated prices for seats and luxury suites at Jacobs Field and Gund Arena as of the 1997 season. The revenues from the luxury boxes and club seating alone are estimated at over $14 million per season for the teams. Clearly these facilities generate substantial revenues for the teams. Recall that the Indians control all of these revenues, while the Cavaliers pay a share of their luxury box and club seating revenues.

Table 8.6 Seating Totals and Prices: Jacobs Field, 1997

Seating Type	*Number of Seats (or Suites)*	*Price per Seat (or Suite)*
Total Capacity of Ballpark	42,865	--
Regular Seating	(approximately) 39,355	$15.29 (Average)
Luxury Suites	122	
--seasonal rental	122	$36,000-$100,000 per season
Club Seating		
--Club Level	2,064	$3,802 per season

Source: Team Marketing Report (1998), p. 54-55.

Table 8.7 Seating Totals and Prices: Gund Arena, 1997

Seating Type	*Number of Seats (or Suites)*	*Price per Seat (or Suite)*
Total Capacity of Arena	20,562	--
Regular Seating	(approximately) 17,490	$32.28 (Average)
Luxury Suites	92	
--seasonal rental	88	$85,000-$150,000 per season
Club Seating		
--Club Level	2000	$75-$92 per game

Source: Team Marketing Report (1998), p. 110-111.

In financial terms, these facilities have been overwhelming financial successes for teams that call them home. A review of *Financial World's* 1997 analysis of professional sports shows that Jacobs Field generated almost $23 million in stadium revenues for the Indians. This represented the third most in Major League Baseball in that year and approximately 82% greater than the league's average facility revenues of $12.6 million.[54] Similarly, the Cavaliers were estimated to receive approximately $13.8 million from Gund Arena, ranking them fourth in NBA facility revenues and almost double the league average of $7.5 million. These revenues have allowed these teams to compete for free agents with large market cities such as New York and Chicago. The Indians, in particular, have become among the most active free agent-signing franchises since the opening of Jacobs Field in 1994. Their payroll regularly ranks among the highest in baseball, despite a history (prior to 1994) of losing teams and empty seats.

Perhaps most importantly, these facilities had tremendous impacts on the competitiveness of the teams in their leagues. The Indians have become one of the wealthiest and most successful teams in baseball in the 1990s. They have regularly earned a playoff birth, despite not seriously competing for a pennant for several decades. Twice the Indians have won their way to the World Series, in 1995 and 1997, and for the first time since 1954 the city of Cleveland witnessed October championship baseball in front of packed houses and an international television audience. All of this success is directly attributable to Jacobs Field and the revenues generated by the facility for the team. To be fair, team owners have translated million of dollars in stadium revenues into free agent signings and the retention of young stars developed in the team's minor league system. While the Cavaliers have not had quite the success of the Indians, they remain a regular playoff team and among the wealthier teams, in facility revenues and in overall franchise values. The team has also continued to play in front of packed houses and their move from the suburbs has returned the team symbolically and physically to the city of Cleveland.

To illustrate the financial impacts of Jacobs Field and Gund Arena on the teams, Tables 8.8 and 8.9 compares the franchise values of the teams to the league mean franchise values. Clearly, the Indians have benefited most from their new facility. The team's value has skyrocketed from a pre-Jacobs Field level of $81 million to $175 million in 1997 ($322 million using *Forbes* methodology). Equally important the team's franchise value rank has climbed to sixth, ahead of large market cities like Chicago (both MLB teams), Boston, San Francisco, and New York (the Mets). In relation to the average MLB franchise value, Jacobs Field has helped propel the Indians well above the mean since 1996, the first full-year estimation of franchise values after the baseball strike of 1994. Of all the teams affected by the three case studies, none has seen more financial impact from their stadium than the Indians.

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[54] Badenhausen and Nikolov (1997).

Table 8.8 Estimated Franchise Values for the Cleveland Indians and the Mean MLB Franchise 1991-1998 (in millions)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995[1]	1996	1997	1998[2]
Indians Value	$75	$77	$81	$100	$103	$125	$175	$322
Mean MLB Value	$103.5	$116	$109	$108	$111	$115	$134	$194
Percent of Mean	72%	66%	74%	93%	93%	109%	131%	166%
Rank of Indians[3]	22nd	24th (Tie)	26th	13th	13th	13th	6th	3rd

[1] 1994 was a strike year in baseball and this resulted in generally depressed team values in 1995.
[2] This value was reached using a different methodology.
[3] This represents the ranking of the team's estimated value in Major League Baseball in that year.
Source: *Financial World* for 1991-1997 values and *Forbes* for 1998 values.

Table 8.9 Estimated Franchise Values for the Cleveland Cavaliers and the Mean NBA Franchise 1991-1998 (in millions)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998[2]
Cavaliers Value	$61	$81	$81	$118	$133	$151	$180	$161
Mean NBA Value	$70	$70	$71	$99	$113	$127	$148	$167
Percent of Mean	87%	116%	114%	119%	118%	119%	122%	96%
Rank of Cavaliers[2]	8th (Tie)	6th	7th	6th	6th	6th	6th	13th

[1] This value was reached using a different methodology.
[2] This represents the ranking of the team's estimated value in the National Basketball Association in that year.
Source: *Financial World* for 1991-1997 values and *Forbes* for 1998 values.

The Cavaliers have also seen a huge increase in their franchise value from $81 million to $180 million, but this is more attributable to the rise of the NBA rather than the success of Gund Arena. The team's value ranking has held steady at sixth for between 1994-1997, which seems unremarkable. By 1998, Forbes estimated the team's value had slid to thirteenth. However, when the huge number of recently opened sports arenas that house NBA teams are taken into account, these figures rankings make more sense. As a

percentage of the average NBA franchise value, the figures show that the Cavaliers have done reasonably well, but not nearly as well as the Indians. Recall that the Cavs moved out of a team-owned suburban arena when they returned downtown, so the facility-economics that were so beneficial to the Indians have not proven quite as profitable for the Cavaliers. Gund Arena has allowed the Cavaliers to remain one of the league's more wealthier franchises, although this has yet to translate into a powerhouse on the court.

Like the Orioles, then, the Indians and Cavaliers are extremely happy tenants in facilities financed largely by public sources. The teams pay rents that do not reflect the tremendous revenue streams generated by these facilities. In fact, these rents do not even reflect inflation as the costs are fixed sums or tied to attendance levels. The revenues generated are poured into the team and into the owner's pockets, even as the value of their franchises continue to rise in the increasingly competitive world of sports ownership. As a result of Jacobs Field, the Indians are now a perennial playoff team and the franchise is now the darling of the city. Similarly, the Cavaliers have returned downtown to recapture the interest of the city, although the financial benefits of this move are not as clear-cut as those for the Indians.

One unintended consequence of Gateway was the loss of Cleveland's long-beloved NFL franchise, the Browns. The owner of the Browns was upset with the deals given to the city's other major league teams despite years of spending millions for the upkeep of Municipal Stadium. Although original plans for Gateway included the Browns, the city and the county were slow to generate support for a new football stadium for the team. As a result, the Browns left Cleveland for Baltimore in 1996. Just as when Baltimore lost their beloved Colts and subsequently seriously began the process that led to Camden Yards, the loss of the Browns galvanized the region. Consequently a new team and a new stadium are on the way for 1999. This stadium is to be built on the site of the old "Mistake by the Lake", with the public bearing most of the cost of the new facility and with almost all revenues promised to the owner of the new NFL franchise.

Of course, the object of this study is not to outline the tremendous benefits of these facilities to the teams that call them home, but rather to establish what benefits these facilities have on the cities and, more specifically, the districts that host these projects. In the case of Baltimore we have seen that the Camden Yards complex has done surprisingly little for its surrounding neighborhood. In contrast, the Gateway Project has been a tremendous boost for a district of Cleveland's downtown that had been abandoned as unsafe and unrecoverable in the 1970s. As we shall see in the next chapter, Gateway has been the major anchor for a district now evolving into a regional entertainment destination. In addition the district is slowly emerging as residential area, housing middle and upper-middle income families in condominiums and apartments located in formerly empty warehouses. However, all of this is not to say that Gateway has been an unequivocal success. As critics have pointed out, the over $450 million investments into the Gateway Project has been coupled with immense infrastructure investments and targeted incentives that bring the cities investment into the district into the $750 million range, if not higher. What the Cleveland case will help to illustrate is that large sports projects can serve as sufficient anchors for development, but only when a good site, good design decisions, district level planning, and a little luck come into play.




Figure 8.1 Cleveland Metropolitan Area





Figure 8.2 Downtown Major Features Map



From Sasaki and Associates Gateway Project Notebook

Figure 8.3 Cleveland Gateway Project Site Plan

Chapter 9

Cleveland's Gateway: "More than a Stadium"

—"In every respect, Gateway is the tether tying all the economic hopes and dreams of downtown Cleveland together."

-Edward J. Walsh, author of Gateway: Blueprint of the Future[1]

—"When Jacobs Field and Gund Arena opened in 1994, they served as a giant ember slowly kindling a fire."

-Stan Bullard, Crain's Cleveland Business reporter[2]

As the sun rose over a hazy Cleveland on May 9, 1990, Cuyahoga County residents opened their newspapers to find that the Gateway Project had indeed convinced enough voters of the project's benefits to become an officially sanctioned and funded project of the county. While previous years had seen city, county, and state resources poured into a project not officially sanctioned by voters or even local political leaders, Gateway was now to officially begin the process of land acquisition, demolition, and the construction of a downtown sports complex unlike any other in North America. In return for an unspecified amount of money, original estimates were placed at least $340 million, Cleveland and Cuyahoga County would retain the Indians, return the Cavaliers back downtown, create a sparkling new sports complex, and... and, well, transform the city into the exciting, vibrant center that it was only fifty years before; return Cleveland to lofty national heights as a desirable place to live and do business; and help continue the rise of the Mistake by the Lake to respectability and even envy in the eyes of other cities.

Now, clearly a single project like a stadium, a convention center, or even a stadium-arena complex cannot achieve such lofty goals. However, you'll recall that the revitalization of downtown was indeed promised by Gateway supporters in the weeks leading up to the election. Pro-stadium leaders regularly proclaimed that Gateway offered

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[1] Walsh (1994), p. 103.

[2] Bullard, Stan (1998). "Gateway draws business to once-dismal district." *Crain's Cleveland Business*, March 23, pp. 6-8.

Cleveland "more than a stadium" to the newspapers, to local television media, and to anyone else who would listen. The mayor of Cleveland, county commissioners, folks from Cleveland Tomorrow, Indians and Cavaliers representatives all suggested that Gateway could and would go a long way towards returning suburbanites downtown to shop, eat, and enjoy the city. Of course, they did not promise that all blight would be eliminated and all poverty would be eradicated because of Gateway. However, they did promise 28,000 jobs and a project that would lift spirits and raise confidence in the city to levels not seen in decades. Gateway was a project whose effects on Cleveland would be felt for years, these leaders promised. In election propaganda, in newspapers editorials, in news conferences, and on the local television news these leaders made lofty promises and many of the voters took them at their word. Unlike previous efforts at downtown development, Gateway was, they believed, actually going to be different.

Of course, as noted last chapter, many of these promises were simply part of the "shell game" of downtown development. Recall that Gateway fell "only" 26,000 jobs short of its lofty employment promise of 28,000. Recall also that Cleveland is still losing population and the city still has tremendous urban poverty and square miles of depressing blight. The level of misinformation in the stadium campaign was shocking, suggesting that political leaders supporting the project would likely be thrown out of office at the next opportunity. Surprisingly, since Gateway has opened many of these leaders have instead been hailed for supporting the project. For example, Mayor Voinovich was later elected Governor and then Senator. Voinovich is now considered a rising star in the Republican party. Other key political leaders have not witnessed the voter backlash one would expect from a bloated, over-budget project that has required additional public dollars to stave off creditors, and a project that fell about 93% of its projected employment impacts. Why did this happen?

Strangely, despite the huge problems surrounding Gateway, most locals and many national leaders extol the project as an overwhelming success for the city of Cleveland.

Gateway has indeed been a major force in the revitalization of Cleveland's downtown. As we will see shortly, new hotels are popping up all over. New retail and residential projects are springing up in Gateway, returning a trickle of middle class residents to that portion of the city for the first time in decades. Cleveland now has two trendy, growing districts that bring nightlife and activity to a central city long desperate for any sign of hope upon which to base their renaissance. Nationally the attitude towards Cleveland seems to have been reversed as the city has slowly shed its image of the burning, bankrupt city and emerged as a success story and a city on the move again. Cleveland's experience has become so heralded that many other cities like Detroit, Buffalo, and St. Louis, look to the city for the recipe, the "magic in a bottle" for central city revitalization.

Of course, important questions surrounding the project arise. Does all of the above suggest that Gateway was the best way to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in public funds and thousands of precious hours in building public and private commitment to the project? Could the over $400 million have been spent in a more effective and more equitable manner? These are important questions, but not the focus of this study. Instead, what I am attempting to ascertain is what did Cleveland get for their investment at the microarea level? What exactly has transpired in Cleveland that makes Gateway appear to be such an overwhelming success? Most importantly, what lessons can Cleveland teach us about building these projects and maximizing the benefits from them? As we shall see, what Gateway should teach us is that given proper circumstances and sensible, but visionary planning decisions, mega-projects like stadia can be successful tools for generating investment in dilapidated districts, for leveraging private investment, and for reversing perceptions about a district and even the city as a whole. In a later chapter I outline the key circumstances and decisions that are a part of successful SAG projects, but for now our attention will remain with Gateway.

Our discussion of Gateway begins with a tour of the area, with particular attention paid to key features of the landscape including transportation lines and important nearby

buildings and projects. The chapter continues by outlining the history of this district, tracing its metamorphosis from an urban market to a downtown sports complex. What follows is a discussion of the planning efforts that have helped to shape Gateway and drive its success. Then our attention turns to the effects of Gateway on its surrounding district and on downtown more generally. An analysis of parcel level changes is presented, with an emphasis on zoning changes, changes to the physical form, and the impact of Gateway on future development patterns. In addition to these parcel level changes, a host of other effects at least partially attributable to the complex are discussed. Finally, an assessment of the full range of these effects is presented, pointing towards some implications for other areas that choose to replicate the Gateway model.

A Brief Tour of the Gateway Area

The Gateway project sits in a truly urban district, under the shadow of skyscrapers, a stone's throw from several major retail centers, and criss-crossed by many important downtown arterials. Once the home of a thriving downtown market, aside from Gateway the area now is home to many older warehouse and office buildings, several large parking lots, and a curious mix of stores, apartment buildings, and entertainment uses. Map 9.1 shows the location of important features in the microarea.

[Insert Map 9.1 here]

Two major barriers serve to constrain the Gateway Microarea on the western and southern edges. Immediately to the west of the site is the infamous Cuyahoga River, crossed by the Hope Memorial Bridge, but serving as a very staunch barrier to any spillover benefits in that direction. Very few patrons park across the river when attending events at Gateway. Along this edge runs several rail lines that serve the older industrial district and the waterfront and also are a part of the regional rail system feeding downtown. To the south sits an equally firm barrier, the confluence of Interstate 90 and Interstate 75. The right of way for this huge man-made feature has created a sizable no-man's land of on-ramps and off-ramps. Some of the land beneath the overpasses serves as

surface parking for events at Gateway, but the combination of poor pedestrian connections and active manufacturing and industrial uses south of I-90 have pushed any spillover benefits to the northern and eastern directions.

The microarea is served by a number of important arterial streets, most of which are four to six lane roads heavy with traffic, with stoplights at all intersections, and busy with pedestrians at all times during the day and increasingly in the evenings. Of these streets, the most important is Euclid Avenue, which served as the principal thread in Cleveland's older shopping district. At the western terminus of Euclid Avenue sits Public Square and a drive east will take you through the city's wonderful theater district, Playhouse Square, and into Cleveland State University, which sits at the eastern end of downtown. For decades Euclid was home to most of the city's major department stores as well as The Arcade and the Colonial Arcade, two 1890s shopping and office centers with glass enclosed arcades that protected shoppers from the harsh Cleveland weather. Paralleling Euclid to the south is Prospect Avenue, another key east-west arterial that has also had a long symbolic history linked with the success and decline of the city.

Bordering the microarea on the northwestern edge is Superior Avenue, an important arterial that separates the government-dominated uses to the north from the retail and office uses to the south. Superior Avenue bisects Public Square as it continues west into the Warehouse District and the Flats, a revitalized district also based upon an entertainment-tourism orientation, but which in recent years has seen the conversion of old warehouses into residential development. The eastern edge arterial of note is E. 14th Street. This street separates Gateway from uses more oriented towards the University, including a recently opened Convocation Center. Paralleling 14th Street is E. 9th Street, an arterial that slices through the microarea and which serves as an important link to the Interstate system from downtown. Finally, the western arterial of note is Ontario Avenue which sits between Gund Arena/Jacobs Field and the Cuyahoga River. Ontario continues

north past the Tower City complex, a major downtown mixed-use redevelopment project, and bisects Public Square running roughly north-south.

Of those portions of the microarea that have seen a synergy develop with Gateway, probably the most active has been Tower City district to the northwest. Adjacent to Tower City sits Public Square, a four block public park with fountains and statues of famous citizens that serves as the "physical and symbolic heart of Cleveland".[3] Tower City is home to the usual mix of office, hotel and retail uses, but this rather typical mix belies the importance of this district to Cleveland. Within Tower City is Terminal Tower, one of Cleveland's oldest and most important landmarks. Terminal Tower was built in the 1920s, at a time when Cleveland was prospering and was considered to be a growing international city. Terminal Tower came to symbolize the city, akin to the Empire State Building in New York City. Below Terminal Tower sits the Cleveland Union Terminal, a gorgeous train terminal built in an era when train travel was still a major means of transit to and from work. In the 1970s and 1980s, as Cleveland lost employment and population to the suburbs (and other regions), Tower City fell upon very hard times. In the 1980s, Forest City Enterprises, a major developer of downtown malls and office projects, bought Terminal Tower. After years of planning and the acquisition of public help, Forest City constructed (or to be more correct reconstructed) the newly renamed Tower City Center, a huge underground mall that is at the center of downtown's retail core. The development of Tower City Center led to the Higbee's department store renovation, the renovation of the Stouffer Hotel, and the addition of a new Ritz Carlton Hotel. At first glance this area would seem somewhat isolated from Gateway, with a major arterial, Ontario Avenue, separating these major projects. However, an underground pedestrian tunnel was constructed to link the projects, a corridor that has been very successful in getting visitors to spend their dollars in Tower City Center and experience more of downtown when attending events at Gateway.

To the east of Tower City Center, between Superior Avenue and Huron Road sits the old retail center of Cleveland. This cramped, bustling area still has an interesting mix of restaurants, pawn shops, bookstores, and other commercial uses on the first floor, with offices (or in many cases, vacant office space) upstairs. The Arcade and Colonial Arcade, two historic, locally beloved indoor shopping areas fill the block between Euclid and Prospect and connect Gateway to the retail core. As we shall see, planners have attempted, with mixed success, to explicitly link the Gateway project to Euclid through the Arcades. Unlike the blocks between Euclid and Prospect, the parcels between Euclid and Superior Avenue are home to huge skyscrapers, including the BP America Building, formerly the Sohio Building, a massive forty-five story, 1.2 million square foot office building that opened in 1985 but only after receiving massive subsidies in the form of tax abatements from the city. This Euclid-Superior area is part of the business district in downtown. From Prospect Avenue south to Huron Road are a number of dilapidated, formerly vacant warehouse/office buildings that the city was long interested in seeing re-used or demolished to make way for new development. Gateway has been a major impetus in getting many of these properties renovated as restaurants, new hotels, and condominiums.

Lastly, the eastern portion of the district between E. 9th Street and E. 14th Street is far different than the Tower City Center and shopping/office district outlined above. Home to the large, pretty Erie Cemetery, this area has a mix building of much smaller size and bulk than the gargantuan towers of the central downtown. Littered with surface parking and a few two and three story parking decks, this section of city has not experienced a significant building push for decades, in part because so much land is tied up in the cemetery and in part because the university and interstate have crowded out many development opportunities. Along E. 9th sit a number of restaurants, many of them new, that clearly are oriented towards the visitors to Gateway. Some immediate spin-off development is apparent, particularly at the intersection of E. 9th and Prospect. As for the

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[3] AIA Cleveland (1997). *Guide to Cleveland Architecture*. AIA Cleveland, p. 26

relationship between Gateway and this area, E. 9th-E. 14th has served primarily as a parking center for events at the arena or stadium. However, there has been a big push in the past one or two years to redevelop this area as a set of hotel and retail/restaurant developments that are tied into the Gateway economy. To summarize the orientations of all of these sub-areas, Figure 9.2 illustrates the generalized character of the subareas in the Gateway Microarea.

[See Figure 9.2 on page 349]

The History of the Central Market/Gateway Area[4]

Gateway's Microarea has experienced a fascinating history including close linkages over the years with death, with fruits and vegetables, office towers built during the boom period of the early 1990s, urban renewal (another type of death perhaps), and finally the rebirth of the area as an entertainment destination focused upon the ballpark/arena complex. The history of the Gateway area provides a glimpse into the history of Cleveland, mirroring the city's rise from a small regional city in the middle 1800s to an international metropolis of the late 1800s and first half of the 20th century, then experiencing the fall from this vitality into a Rust Belt city in decline, and finally through the attempts of the past forty years to recapture the city and reshape the downtown for the emerging service economy. What the history of Gateway can do is to broadly detail the experience of districts throughout downtown and neighborhoods throughout the city over the past almost two-hundred years.

Located within easy walking distance of downtown, the Ontario/E. 9th Street area (now Gateway) became an integral part of the city way back in 1826 with the purchase of land for the Erie Street Cemetery. Erie Cemetery served as the city's principal cemetery until almost thirty years later. Sitting between Erie Avenue and Summit Avenue, the cemetery still serves as an island of quiet greenspace in the hectic urban environment of

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[4] Much of this history is derived from the *Cleveland Civic Vision 2000 Downtown Plan*, published by the Cleveland City Planning Commission (1988), pp. 121-123.

downtown. Around this quite pretty downtown cemetery the city grew south away from Lake Erie and land around the cemetery began to be used for a variety of purposes including small shops and later, two important markets that defined the district well into the 20th century.

In 1857 Cleveland's city council constructed a public market in the district that lasted, in various forms, until 1949. Though a well-loved public marketplace, the Central Market did suffer from rather ramshackle construction and appearance and it also was considered a major barrier to good traffic flow in the surrounding district. In 1891, a private market was added to the area, on the site of what is now the parking deck across from Gund Arena on Bolivar Road. The Sheriff Street Market "featured two six-story towers providing cold storage facilities between them, [and] a block-long market pavilion under a great domed skylight."[5] In 1950, the most recent and last Central Market was constructed on the site of this second market, still serving as a principal gathering place and place to buy foodstuffs in downtown Cleveland. With the orientation of much of the district towards these markets, much of the surrounding land was also utilized for cold storage firms and food wholesaling and distribution businesses. Most of these buildings were mid-sized structures (four to six stories), many with retail uses on the bottom floors. This development was concentrated between Ontario Avenue on the west, Carnegie Avenue on the south, E. 9th Street on the east, and Huron Road to the north.

In addition to the development of the area as a food-based economy, a number of office towers were constructed in the area during the boom period of the early 1900s including the Caxton Building (1903) and the Ohio Building (1927). These office buildings still house many local businesses, including the Gateway Economic Development Corporation, the organization that manages the Gateway project, and the Historic Gateway Neighborhood Corporation, an important merchants association and the lead stakeholder for the district. Since Gateway has opened there has been renewed interest in

the structures, with firms moving in to take advantage of the prestige address of the Gateway District. One of the nicest hotels in Cleveland, the Hotel Winton, was constructed in the area in 1927. Over the years it was refurbished and renamed, but did not survive Cleveland's fall from grace. In the 1970s the old hotel was converted to elderly housing, thereby preserving the structure, but providing a clear indication that Cleveland was not quite the vibrant, active city center in demand of luxury hotel space that it once was.

As Cleveland began its slow, painful decline in the post-WWII era, the Gateway area also began to decline. Gateway's buildings were vacated as the city saw a flood of jobs and residents leave the city for the surrounding suburbs and for other parts of the country. Despite a still vibrant Central Market the area became less and less active, the streets less and less busy, and the cold storage and food-related business moved out of the district. Buildings were demolished over the years and huge surface parking lots took the place of many of the warehousing buildings that were the hallmark of the Gateway area. Like many other cities in the 1950s and 1960s, Cleveland responded to these problems with extensive urban renewal projects aimed at making the downtown more accessible with major freeway investments and with huge housing projects aimed at keeping middle class residents in the city. As history has shown, neither approach proved effective. In fact many have argued that these policies actually sped the decline of the city.[6]

At the micro-level, the construction of the freeways in this period effectively cut off downtown from areas to the south and provided, for this study, the firm southern barrier of Interstate 90 for the microarea. The other important effect these highways had was to make the Ontario/9th Street area the true "gateway" into Cleveland from the south. In the 1970s and 1980s, when entering the city from the south or even driving through the

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[5] Ibid, p. 121.
[6] Miller and Wheeler (1997), Chapters 12 and 13.

city along Interstate 90, the image of Cleveland was one of large tracts of vacant land that now served as parking lots, with existing buildings in tremendous disrepair.

As of 1980, then, the Gateway area was largely vacated, despite its excellent location and its long emotional and symbolic importance for downtown as a gathering place, a place to celebrate life and mourn death. The district fit the definition of a blighted area and, even more painfully, the high visibility of the district did not provide a good image of the city to residents and visitors alike. What resulted, of course, was the Domed Stadium project turned Gateway outlined in the previous chapter. The big push came from Cleveland Tomorrow in the early 1980s as they saw a new sports stadium as a means to develop this portion of the city and provide a much better entrée into the city than surface lots and crumbling buildings. In addition to its symbolic advantages, the area offered excellent vehicular access via the freeways, good rail access via Tower City, joint parking arrangements with nearby decks, and excellent pedestrian access to what was hoped to be the re-emerging Euclid/Prospect shopping core.

Cleveland's Central City in 1990

In land use and physical development terms, the Gateway area was certainly ripe for redevelopment as of 1990. Many of the lots in the area had been cleared in the previous ten years and were awaiting new construction, many for the Gateway project, but also because many speculators were waiting to see what would happen with Gateway and with other major downtown projects that were placed on the drawing board with the Comprehensive Plan of 1988. In addition to the vacant land, the Gateway Microarea also had a significant number of underutilized buildings, much like the rest of downtown's older shopping district, with a sporadic mix of tenants oriented towards the Monday through Friday day traffic generated by the offices in the central business district. Despite these circumstances, city leaders were confident that downtown was on the way back because of a litany of completed or planned center city projects like the Tower City Center

renovation, several new hotels, an expanded convention center, a planned Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, and, of course, Gateway.

What of the overall health of the central city, however? How healthy (or unhealthy) was Cleveland's central city as of 1990? The United States Census of 1990 provides some insight into Cleveland's central city in this very busy time for the downtown. Using this data, Figures 9.3, 9.4 9.5, and 9.6 display some key indicators of the demographic character of inner city Cleveland in the years before Gateway officially was funded and construction began.

[See Figures 9.3, 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6 on pages 350-353]

Figure 9.3 shows population by blockgroup for central city Cleveland. In this map the emptying out of the inner city is immediately apparent as very few blockgroups in downtown and in the areas surrounding it have more than 500 people. Those downtown areas with more than five hundred persons are in part related to Cleveland State University or to large housing projects, rather than vibrant, attractive in-city neighborhoods. The median household income map (Figure 9.4) bears this out. Again, the low income character of the central city is immediate as almost all blockgroups in the central city have a median household income of $12,500 or less. Income levels slowly increase as you travel outward from the central city. However, there are clear differences between the eastern and the western/southern portions of the city outside of downtown. To the east, low median incomes predominate, while the western and southern portions of the city show higher median income levels.

Strongly correlated with the spatial pattern of incomes is the percent white by blockgroup as shown in Figure 9.5. The western and southern areas of the city are predominately white with almost all blockgroups having a majority of white residents. In contrast, the areas with the lowest median household incomes are predominately minority, which in Cleveland's case means predominately African-American. This trend is not

surprising; we saw this same pattern in Baltimore and we will see it again in suburban Arlington. Most American cities show a strong positive correlation between income and percent white, as the percentage white increases, so does income. The point here is not to hold up Cleveland as a city far different from sister cities throughout the Rust Belt, one that exhibits unique racial/income characteristics. Most Rust Belt cities, indeed, most American cities of all regions reveal similar patterns. Rather, the map is intended to illustrate the racial and income segregation that is present in central city Cleveland despite policies and programs directed towards addressing this. However, as we shall see in Cleveland race doesn't play as important a part at the microarea level as it did in Baltimore.

Finally, Figure 9.6 illustrates that while whites and blacks may be living in different areas of the central city, both groups do experience significant levels of poverty. The Percent Living Below Poverty map shows that while predominately black blockgroups experience poverty at greater levels than predominately white blockgroups, poverty is still a significant factor in central city white areas. Most of Cleveland's central city tracts have a poverty rate between 25% and 50%, which was expected given that almost 29% of all Cleveland residents were living in poverty in 1989. Many of the predominately black blockgroups have astonishing poverty levels, well above 75%. Again, Cleveland is not alone in experiencing this. Detroit, Buffalo, Washington D.C., and Baltimore have shocking poverty rates, rates that have only worsened in recent decades in central city areas. The main image to take away from this map is that Cleveland's central city, white and minority areas both, was experiencing severe poverty as of 1990.

Taken together, these maps paint a picture of a central city that was bereft of residents in 1990 despite desperate efforts to return middle class families to the city. Those residents that remained were predominately low income, with consequent high poverty, and with high levels of segregation between the races. What was worse is that these areas had continued to decline since 1980, despite the "comeback" of the Comeback City.

Existing residents needed jobs and hope. There was also a strong belief that an infusion of middle class dollars and stability might go a long way towards stemming the decline, providing some jobs, and perhaps most importantly providing some hope.

As for the Gateway Microarea, its blockgroups had almost no residents, and those that lived there were poor, with many elderly residents as well. While the physical form of the district was one of decay and waiting to see what would happen, as it would turn out the social and residential form was quite similar. It seemed that the microarea needed a little investment to make it vibrant again. Strangely enough, it seemed that this investment was enough to bring people back downtown again, too.

Planning Efforts for Gateway

The single most important factor that sets Gateway apart from the Baltimore and Arlington case studies is the sheer amount of planning and in-depth study of the area that occurred prior to and during the stadium-building process. Unlike Baltimore, which planned largely for the Camden Yards site with only very generalized plans for the surrounding area, Cleveland's development and planning community understood very early the unique opportunity for the city to create a showcase project in downtown, intimately linked to existing activity generators. From day one of the process, Cleveland developed a vision of the district, with concrete goals and explicit linkages to Tower City Center and to the Euclid-Prospect retail district. As outlined in the previous chapter, discussions about using the Gateway for a new stadium began in the early 1980s. With the Indians very unhappy with their Memorial Stadium arrangement, private leaders and city leaders began to forge a plan for the domed-stadium project.

The planning for what was to become Gateway began in 1982 as the domed-stadium idea just began to get off the ground. In that year the *Downtown Cleveland Development Handbook*, commissioned by the Greater Cleveland Growth Association and

the Greater Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, laid the core concepts for much of what was to come in the Gateway microarea. This document, which was prepared primarily as a marketing document for businesspeople and potential investors in the central city, developed the idea of Ontario Avenue and E. 9th Street as "gateways" into the center city that should be developed into more attractive entrances into the city, perhaps through the development of the area as a commercial, retail, and residential district.[7] At the heart of the outlined plan was the linkage of the separate elements of downtown Cleveland (Tower City, Euclid-Prospect, Playhouse Square, and the Central Market area) via pedestrian connections "to increase the comfort, safety and pleasure of moving about downtown".[8]

Another key part of this plan was the creation of an "efficient, convenient system of parking structures."[9] Rather than having sprawling, inefficient surface parking that is anathema to pedestrian activity, this early plan called for large parking structures that would hold cars and preserve the compactness and density of downtown. A system that relied upon parking garages and excellent pedestrian linkages would:

> "put people into the heart of the downtown area, rather than on the fringes. They will then be able to walk to their destinations while enjoying and contributing to the vitality of street life. This composition is made possible by the compactness which permits reaching the heart of downtown quickly."[10]

This early plan clearly laid the foundation for Gateway, a foundation lauded nationally and which has helped the project to be considered a success despite very minimal employment impacts. As we shall see, these concepts, a pedestrian oriented district, one that marginalizes large parking lots and places cars in parking decks, and develops the area as a mixed-use district, including both retail and residential

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[7] Richard Fleischman Architects, Inc. (1982). *Downtown Cleveland Development Handbook*. Published by the City of Cleveland, "Gateway" section.
[8] Ibid, "Concept" section.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.

development, have come to pass in Gateway. However, the failure of the 1984 referendum on the Domed Stadium project pushed back these plans for over ten years.

With the failure of Domed Stadium, the now-named Gateway District experienced a holding pattern for a number of years. During these years, pro-stadium forces marshaled money and information to make their case to the voters again sometime in the future. A 1985 blight finding survey was undertaken to assess the physical decay of the buildings in the district.[11] This study found almost all of the structures in the area to be substandard, with major structural problems. By documenting the amount of blight in the area, stadium proponents had further evidence to the push for a completely new district rather than a redeveloped one. During these years, private money and state money was raised to acquire and clear much of the land in the district, but this only served to create more surface parking lots and hasten the district's decline. However, it also served as a visual push for a spectacular plan for a mega-project to revitalize the area.

Perhaps the most important planning document that contributed to the success of the Gateway project was the *Cleveland Civic Vision 2000 Downtown Plan*[12], prepared by the city planning commission, but financed largely by the ever-present Cleveland Tomorrow. In this document, the Gateway area is identified as the long time "backdoor to the city", but one that needs to be redeveloped because it is a "highly visible and readily accessible site" in close proximity to the CBD.[13] Much like the 1982 Downtown

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[11] Richard Fleischman Architects, Inc. (1985). *Central Market Redevelopment Area and Euclid-Prospect Redevelopment Area Blight Finding Survey*. Published by the City of Cleveland.

[12] Cleveland's *Downtown Plan* has had its share of backers and critics, each focusing on different aspects of the plan and process. The Citywide and the Downtown Plan won an American Planning Association Award for Comprehensive Planning for being an example of "sound planning and planning implementation". (Gallagher, 1992) APA praised the plans for their planning process, one that emphasized participation in over 50 neighborhood meetings, and for setting a vision of the city that better fit a metropolis that was much smaller and with a different set of strengths and weaknesses than fifty years ago. Norman Krumholz, former Cleveland City Planning Director, and Dennis Keating have criticized the plan for not linking physical development to improving the lives of city residents; to these critics, these plans ignore the realities facing the city and fail as a plan that emphasizes "equity" and development. (Keating and Krumholz, 1991)

[13] Cleveland City Planning Commission (1988), p. 121.

Development Handbook, the Comprehensive Plan calls for the revitalization of the area as a retail and commercial district, oriented towards pedestrians and not just as through-way for cars going to the CBD. Further, the plan discusses the use of a new stadium to further these goals. Of particular importance, however, is the vision outlined and the language used in discussing the use of a stadium in Gateway. An extensive quote is required to illustrate that Cleveland's vision for the district was set very early in the process. In discussing the "Future Development Issues" of the Gateway area, the Comprehensive Plan reads as follows:

> "Successful development of a new stadium... will require that careful attention be given to the design of the facility in order to insure that it is well integrated into the existing urban fabric of downtown and that issues of pedestrian and vehicular circulation within and around the site are properly addressed. The new stadium should be designed as an inviting, exciting urban building and not a concrete pillbox better located on a rural site. Second-level pedestrian connectors must be developed to link the stadium to the adjacent Tower City Center and the rapid transit station within it.
>
> Should a new stadium not be built... A well-designed mixed-use district, which may include an arena and related hotel facilities as well as office, retail, and residential uses, would be preferable to a district consisting only of office buildings and limited support retail."[14]

What eventually was built in Gateway actually turned out to be a rather fascinating combination of the two scenarios outlined above. The stadium and arena fit into the surrounding urban areas quite well, with excellent pedestrian connections (including the link to Tower City Center) and many parking structures to minimize the number of surface parking lots. In addition, the district developed in mixed-use form, including retail and residential uses.

Recall also that the Comprehensive Plan was completed in 1988, years before Camden Yards was completed and the neotraditional stadium became the rage in sports projects. The point to be made here is that *very early in the process city and civic leaders laid out a vision for a sports facility that was part of downtown*, generating pedestrian activity, with linkages to surrounding projects, and contributing to the micro-level economy. Equally important is that this vision was laid out in the Comprehensive Plan, a document that requires planners to place projects in context not just with the surrounding district, but with all surrounding areas. Rather than focusing simply upon the facility itself, like in Baltimore, the vision for Cleveland's Gateway project was from day one grounded in the larger context of downtown. So, while Gateway's employment effects might be marginal and while costs for the project have soared, the vision for Gateway has never wavered. The central components of this vision, connections to downtown and micro-level effects on district development, were among the guiding forces of the project from day one.

In the years after the Comprehensive Plan a number of documents, prepared specifically for Gateway, began to enhance and solidify the ideas laid out in that planning document. A 1990 *Preliminary Development Program* for Gateway was prepared by the City Planning Commission.[15] In this document the commission again underscores that Gateway was intended to be a project that develops linkages between the facility, the Euclid-Prospect area, and the E. 9th Street area. Included in this document were key urban design concepts that, if implemented, would help to realize the broad goals of the Gateway project.[16] These concepts were:

- *A Field of Dreams, A Field of Green*: The ballpark and the surrounding area were to develop green spaces that would "reduce the harshness" of the huge streets in the area

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[14] Ibid.
[15] Cleveland City Planning Commission (1990). *Gateway: Preliminary Development Program and Urban Design Concepts.*
[16] Ibid, pp. 8-12.

and provide a more "parklike setting" for the facility. This would make the area more attractive and more comfortable for pedestrians in the area.

- *More than a Stadium*: The primary goal of generating new development in the microarea is implied by these four simple words. The document called for identifying and marketing suitable sites for new office, hotel, retail, and residential development.
- *A Conversation Among the Generations/4. Remember the Markets*: While new development is an important goal, the development program offers very strong support for some level of historic preservation and collective memory. In particular, the program calls for protecting and enhancing the Arcades and the legacy of the markets.
- *Parking Can Pay*: The program calls for developing parking structures to provide enough parking for all of the new development expected downtown. "By strategically locating new garages, the needs of downtown workers could be met on a daily basis, as well as provide close parking for events at the stadium or arena."[17] The concept of a mixed-use district with parking garages has now been linked to downtown parking needs, thereby reducing the number of necessary structures and lessening the need for large surface parking lots that can kill central cities.
- *"Gateways" to Gateway*: An important emphasis of this document is on the separation of pedestrian pathways from vehicular pathways, thereby insuring an enjoyable and safe pedestrian experience.

In 1991 the official *Urban Design Guidelines* for Gateway were prepared by Sasaki and Associates, a Boston firm hired to develop a site plan for the area. Unlike the Baltimore site plan, however, Gateway's site plan contained explicit linkages to the surrounding district and plans for the area's development rather than a "locate the stadium and hope for the best" approach to microarea development. In short, then, these guidelines began the process of operationalizing the overall concepts outlined in the 1988 Downtown Comprehensive Plan. Instead of very broad goals of improving pedestrianization,

eliminating surface parking, and developing the district, the project now called for very clear measures to achieve these goals. This level of planning helped to insure ample connections between the project and the district, an appropriate parking mix with an emphasis of garages, and nearby development because of identified and marketed sites, all while remaining true to the history of the district. At first glance this seemingly abstract document reveals itself to be a key step in the translation of the grand vision of the Comprehensive Plan into ground-level policies and measures that actually are put in place with the development of the district.

The final key document in Gateway's development was the *Programming, Planning, and Urban Design Project Notebook*.[18] This represents an account of the actual ground-level work and ongoing genesis of the Gateway project over time. A major part of the notebook were discussions concerning the programming elements and district level development that was likely to accompany the project or could be drawn to the district after completion of Gateway. Memos from consultants on the project indicated that restaurants, retail, office space and hotels were possible spinoffs, but that the city had to market the site and tie Gateway into the surrounding area to maximize any benefits to the district.

For the discussion at hand, the most important section of the Project Notebook is the "site development goals" portion of the document. The outlined goals are clearly derived from the earlier studies and they represent the officially sanctioned plan for the Gateway site. Among the seven goals laid out, the most important were:

- Provide on-site public open space suitable to provide for safe and pleasing spectator movement, accommodate other large civic events, provide a suitable balance of open space to buildings, and to provide an appropriate "gateway" statement for entry to the City.

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[17] Ibid. p. 11.

- Maximize pedestrian and open space connections with adjacent City streets, sidewalks, the Arcades and open spaces to assure the Gateway site is strongly linked to downtown.
- Establish a distinctive and consistent image and level of quality for the entire Gateway site that considers the historic use of the site as markets, using materials and site improvements that are appropriate to the climate and context of downtown Cleveland.
- Provide for on-site economic development by identifying and reserving sites for future development.

These goals harken back to the original plans for the district, all the way back to the Domed Stadium in 1984. The Gateway project is clearly an outward oriented one, aimed at making the surrounding district an integral part of downtown. Some non-urban design measures are also now proposed, including reserving certain sites for suitable development and developing large open spaces for festivals and other public events that make cities the vibrant places that they are. By this stage planners involved in the project had begun to translate the outward-orientation of the project into feasible, attainable mechanisms that would generate the much-desired district level changes envisioned years ago.

Again, the major point is that throughout the planning for Gateway the central microarea development goal of the project was carried through from stage to stage in the process. While certain concessions were made to team owners (more luxury boxes, team offices, sweetheart leases), the design and orientation of the facility remained squarely upon developing synergies with downtown and revitalizing the Gateway district. In fact, the city resisted a push by the teams for more parking structures close to the stadium and arena, which would have maximized access to the facility, but also minimized development impacts within the district. While an additional parking structure was built to the northwest of the facilities, on land originally identified as a possible hotel site, this structure also doubles as parking for downtown offices and for Tower City Center. In

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[18] Sasaki Associates Inc. (1991). *The Gateway Project: Programming, Planning, and Urban Design. Project Notebook.*

fact, the location of this parking structure actually helps to bridge the area between Tower City Center, Euclid-Prospect, and Gateway with an accessible parking garage linked by skybridge to Gateway and by a short walk to both of the shopping areas.

Important parts of the success of this strategy have been the Gateway Economic Development Corporation (GEDC), the non-profit corporation that began as the Domed Stadium Corporation and was responsible for putting together the financial package for the Gateway project, and the Historic Gateway Neighborhood Corporation, a merchants group that has been involved in marketing the area and in developing a unified approach towards taking advantage of opportunities and dealing with problems at a district level. As detailed in Chapter 8, the GEDC was responsible for generating interest in Gateway, raising private funds to push the project along, and then overseeing the project through construction and opening. This organization has also been involved in marketing the area and in selling off available land owned by Gateway to developers interested in constructing a new hotel as part of the project. The GEDC came under fire over the years, in large part because of Gateway's major cost overruns, culminating in the executive director's resignation in 1995. The GEDC still manages the project, oversees the collection of fees from the teams and other project tenants, and is in charge of administering the substantial debt for Gateway. Its role has principally been confined to the borders of the project itself, but it has served an important role in promoting the area and insuring that the available site just east of the parking garage is to be developed as a hotel.

The Historic Gateway Neighborhood Corporation (HGNC) was formed in 1992, as a result of the Gateway project, by combining two existing merchant groups, the East 4th Street Local Development Corporation and the Prospect Avenue Merchant Group.[19] This group came together to insure that a district level approach was taken in contextualizing Gateway and to provide a "unified approach" to redeveloping the

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[19] Historic Gateway Neighborhood Development Corporation (1997). *The Historic Gateway Neighborhood: All Star Neighborhood*, p. 3.

Gateway area.[20] The HGNC is responsible for marketing the area, identifying sites and/or buildings for new development, and generating press and providing information on the district. In the planning stages of Gateway, there was an emphasis on generating neighborhood level revitalization through the identification of possible sites for new development and through the marketing of the area. The HGNC has become increasingly active in this role, producing materials showcasing the district and providing information to developers interested in pursuing opportunities in the Gateway area. The HGNC has also put together a Storefront Renovation Program and helped to generate a streetscape plan, both of which emphasized improving the appearance of the district and preparing the area for redevelopment.

To underscore the central point, one of the major successes with the Gateway project was linking very general project goals to specific actions through explicit measures or, in the above cases, through organizations whose primary purpose was maximizing microarea development opportunities. Both the GEDC and the HGNC have helped the district to become hooked into the downtown community, bringing in dollars for special projects and forming relationships with potential project developers. With a very small geographic orientation, these organizations have been attuned to microarea development from the start, insuring good relationships with existing businesses and promising a localized view of opportunities and problems confronting the district.

So, unlike Baltimore, Cleveland succeeded in contextualizing and fitting their project into the greater urban fabric through a variety of measures. The public spaces created by Gateway are truly public, unlike Eutaw Street in Baltimore which is a private space on gamedays. The connections between downtown and the facility are numerous, safe, and well-used even on non-event days. Baltimore's Camden Yards, on the other hand, is poorly connected to surrounding areas, generally ending at the boundaries of the site, and rather quiet on non-event days. From all indications, then, a major reason for

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[20] Ibid.

Cleveland's success was the vision laid out early in the process and the subsequent planning undertaken at each stage in the process that carried this vision through to the end. Planning the facility in context, which means not only providing nice walkways or ample parking, but linking the project to nearby activity generators, identifying and promoting sites or existing buildings for redevelopment, and insuring a good fit between the facility and downtown was an important factor in Gateway's success in Cleveland.

Microarea Effects of Cleveland's Gateway Project

Despite the national clamor over Baltimore's Camden Yards stadia and the relationships that have developed between these facilities and the nearby Inner Harbor, it was concluded that the Baltimore case is one in which the positive press for the facility far outstrips the actual microarea impacts of the two new stadia. Very few new businesses have resulted and new construction has been almost non-existent in the immediate area. For a number of reasons, like the timing of the stadia in relation to other projects, the capture of new development in existing structures, parking decisions, and important perceptual barriers, Camden Yards is not the example of a project's success at the microarea level, given that microarea development is a primary goal in the stadium provision process.

Instead, if a city wants to investigate a microarea "success" (albeit at tremendous public cost), then attention should turn to Cleveland's Gateway project. As we shall see shortly, Gateway has been the linchpin in the microarea revitalization of this portion of Cleveland's central city. New hotels, new restaurants, new retail businesses, and, most exciting perhaps, new residential development are all directly attributable to the Gateway project, its contextualized design, and the traffic generated by the over two-hundred and fifty events occurring at the facility every year. In return for a hefty investment of public dollars, the city of Cleveland has revitalized another downtown district, leveraged hundreds of millions in private investment into this area, seen new plans arise for redeveloping the Arcades, and hooked the project into the downtown economy.

Before turning our attention to these changes, though, a word must be given over to outlining the Gateway district, or microarea, that was studied in this research project. With all of the "successes" in downtown Cleveland, for example Tower City Center, the revitalized Playhouse Square, and the recent success of the Warehouse District as an entertainment and residential district, the boundaries of a Gateway Microarea can be difficult to determine. Unlike many cities with a few successful downtown districts, Cleveland has done very well in linking these projects together and blurring the boundaries between these districts. Instead of several "islands of renewal in a sea of decay", Cleveland has interconnected their successful projects and created what might be called a growing "continent of renewal in a sea of decay". Although, to be fair, it must be noted that the sea of decay still exists and continues to get rougher for the residents trying to stay afloat in it. More on this later.

With these interconnections having been created it becomes difficult to establish a microarea in which to determine Gateway's impacts. For example, should Playhouse Square and/or Tower City Center be included in the microarea being studied? What about the Galleria mall in downtown, located north in the Government Center area? As discussed in Chapter 5 a variety of factors were considered and a variety of methods were utilized when establishing the Gateway Microarea. Discussions with local experts, an analysis of site plans, transportation corridors (both vehicular and pedestrian), and visits to the areas during events and during non-event periods provided insight into the functioning of Gateway Microarea. In addition, the pioneering work of Austrian and Rosentraub[21] in their analysis of a Cleveland microarea, not only established the microarea as an important geography for study, but also pointed the way towards determining a suitable microarea for the Gateway case.

The Austrian/Rosentraub Gateway microarea is shown in Figure 9.7. Note that their microarea includes Tower City Center and much of the Playhouse Square area, but

not the theaters themselves. They also include the properties across Superior Avenue to attempt to capture any possible jobs attributable to Gateway. Also shown in Figure 9.7 is the Historic Gateway Neighborhood as defined by the Historic Gateway Neighborhood Corporation (HGNC). The Historic Gateway Neighborhood is much smaller than the Austrian/Rosentraub microarea, not including Tower City Center or any of the Playhouse Square district. These areas fall under separate merchants groups so, unsurprisingly, they are not part of the historic neighborhood.

[See Figure 9.7 on page 354]

In determining the Gateway Microarea for this study, a combination of some very simple decisions and some very difficult ones led to the Gateway Microarea shown in Figure 9.8. To begin with the simplest of decisions, as discussed earlier, the confluence of the interstates and the Cuyahoga River provide very "hard barriers" on the southern and southwestern edge of the microarea, so little debate can be offered over Gateway's impacts on areas outside of those boundaries. Very few people park and walk across the river or traverse the interstate, so spillovers into those areas are non-existent (and were not expected when the facility was planned). Therefore, the interstates and the river provide very firm boundaries for the impacted area on those borders. Similarly, Superior Avenue on the northwestern edge provides another firm barrier for the Gateway Microarea. This street has traditionally separated the Government Center and the Warehouse District from the southern part of downtown Cleveland, which includes Tower City Center and most of the older retail core of downtown, including Euclid and Prospect Avenues. Unlike Austrian and Rosentraub, the parcels on the northern side of Superior Avenue were not included in the Gateway Microarea because site visits and discussions with local experts indicated that these areas were not greatly affected by event traffic. In addition, most people attending events at Gateway park and walk from areas to the south of Superior or arrive at the transit station in Tower City Center.

[See Figure 9.8 on page 355]

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[21] Austrian and Rosentraub (1997).

As for Tower City Center, it has been included in the Gateway Microarea, not because it inflates the results of the analysis (in fact it actually minimizes the impacts because Tower City Center is a project that happened without Gateway), but rather because an important explicit linkage was made between these two mega-projects. Recall that in the planning phases it was suggested that a tunnel or pedestrian walkway be constructed to connect the two projects. Just such a connection was built as a spacious pedestrian-only tunnel runs under Ontario Avenue linking Tower City Center to Gund Arena. Although the tunnel is usually open only on event days, this tunnel is a major passageway between the two projects that increases the economic and social synergy, but also links Gateway to the major rail transportation center in downtown. In addition, during the colder, wetter late fall, winter, and early spring months (during basketball and hockey season) the tunnel also insures comfortable foot travel between these projects, insuring a certain level of interplay not likely if only outdoor connections existed. Without the tunnel, Tower City Center would be much less likely to be included in a Gateway Microarea primarily because Tower City Center is oriented towards Public Square and above ground connections are difficult at best with the level of traffic along Ontario Avenue. However, the tunnel requires Tower City Center to be a part of the microarea, again underscoring the successful linkages between projects that is a part of Cleveland's success. Finally, the location of the principal rail transit station in Tower City Center makes this development a major transportation center for all of downtown, including Gateway.

The above represent the more straightforward decisions regarding the layout of the Gateway Microarea. The main difficulty in defining this microarea is in determining its eastern edge. As seen in Figure 9.7, Austrian and Rosentraub included much of Playhouse Square, as far east as E. 13th Street, but they did not include the actual theaters which are located on the eastern side of E. 13th St. However, they did include the relatively new (completed in 1990) Renaissance Building located across Euclid Avenue just to the south of the Playhouse Theaters. The Renaissance Building is a fifteen story building with accompanying parking garage that represented the first new construction in the Playhouse

Square area in over sixty years.[22] The inclusion of this new building, clearly oriented towards the theaters and not Gateway, was done primarily to capture as generous an employment impact as possible for their study.

Figure 9.8 shows that I have chosen to include much less of the Playhouse Square area than Austrian and Rosentraub, primarily because site visits on gamedays and non-event days showed that there was not a lot of pedestrian traffic generated between the two districts. Pedestrian linkages between the areas are not very well developed, most pedestrians use Euclid Avenue to travel between Tower City and the playhouses. However, the level of traffic between these two areas did not suggest that many people shop and eat in Playhouse Square before attending events at Gateway. Discussions with local experts generally confirmed this conclusion. So, a substantial portion of the eastern boundary as identified as the Historic Gateway Neighborhood is used to define the Gateway Microarea for this study. However, some additional areas outside the HGN boundary are deemed part of the Microarea, including the Halle Building and parking deck between Euclid Avenue and Huron Road, east of E. 9th Street. This area was included because a substantial number of Gateway attendees park in this area and the Halle Building food court and parking garage are marketed to Gateway patrons.

The Gateway Microarea is approximately 200 acres in size, with the Gateway Project taking up 28 of these acres, or 14% of the Microarea. The furthest point from the center of the Gateway project to the edge of the Microarea is about six tenths of a mile to the far corner of the Tower City Center project. The entire Microarea is within a very easy ten minute walk from Gateway.

Zoning Changes in the Microarea

Zoning is an important physical planning measure that can be utilized to allow or prevent certain uses in an area. Zoning has traditionally been a means for local government

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[22] AIA Cleveland (1997), p. 109.

to guarantee compatibility between local land uses and as a way to link land use policies to public purposes. As we shall see in Arlington in the next case study, zoning can be used at the microarea level to send clear indications to the private market, to push a district towards a certain development orientation, and to phase out incompatible uses in future years to further cement the character of the district. Cleveland's recent and current downtown zoning is shown in Figure 9.9.

[See Figure 9.9 on page 356]

As seen in Figure 9.9, a rather intriguing mix of Retail/Business, Semi-Industry, Industry, and Institutional zoning has existed in downtown in recent years. Cleveland's zones are "Euclidian" in character, meaning that there is a pyramid of uses in which all "higher" uses can be built in all "lower" zoned areas. For example, a "higher use" like retail can be built in all areas, but a lower use like industry can only be built in industrial areas. The Downtown Plan of 1988 pointed out that this often led to incompatibilities in land uses and provided mixed signals to developers as to the desirable mix of development for the city.[23] In response, the plan proposed that the city revise the zoning ordinance to better fit the post-modern central city. Also, included in their general recommendations are better signage and landscaping regulations, the identification of new districts, and changes in parking standards.[24] Despite these recommendations, these zoning changes have not been implemented.

A glance at the Zoning Map reveals a picture of Downtown Cleveland of the past forty years. The traditional retail core of the city is clearly evident along the Euclid, Prospect, and Superior corridors. To the northwest of Gateway you can easily identify the Government Center by the Institutional zoning designation, as well as the Warehouse District to the west. Across the Cuyahoga River to the west is the traditional heavy industry areas of the city, set off from downtown by the river and the interstates. The

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[23] Cleveland City Planning Commission (1988), p. 135.
[24] Cleveland City Planning Commission (1988), pp. 136-137.

Gateway site is zoned for Semi-Industry, a very broad designation that allows for retail, manufacturing, and other "higher uses". Recalling Gateway's history as a public/private market, with an orientation towards warehousing and cold storage, the semi-industry zoning designation makes sense.

The reorientation of much of downtown Cleveland towards service jobs and their concurrent needs for office space, and towards tourism and entertainment and their requirements for hotels, retail, and public spaces suggests a mismatch between existing zoning and the changing city. Again, the Downtown Plan of 1988 recognized this and called for new zoning designations as retail for almost all of downtown Cleveland. However, as of the writing of this case study, these zoning changes had yet to be implemented in downtown. Therefore, similar to the Baltimore case, Cleveland's zoning has changed very little in the pre-Gateway and post-Gateway eras. In fact, as explained to the author by planners with the city, Cleveland's zoning has not changed in the Gateway Microarea at all in recent years. It was determined that there were no incompatibilities between the planned stadium/arena development and existing zoning for the district, so zoning has played no role in Cleveland's case, although it is apparent that some changes might be necessary for Gateway and for downtown Cleveland more generally.

Physical Changes to the Microarea

One of the most important goals of the Gateway project was to generate new development and activity in the neighborhood surrounding the facility. Gateway was sold to voters on the idea of "More than a Stadium" and planning for the project emphasized district level (microarea) development. The Downtown Plan of 1988 cited a new stadium complex as the linchpin for the district, one that was expected to generate hotels, new parking structures, and retail uses linked to this vision of a new downtown entertainment

district. All of this recalls the objectives of SAGs discussed by Robertson in his review of downtown redevelopment strategies.[25]

What of the Cleveland case, then? Has the Gateway Microarea experienced all of the benefits expected from a new sports project? In terms of *new construction*, to date Gateway can be considered a mixed success. The Gateway complex itself is a huge new structure in downtown, including team offices, restaurants, team shops, as well as the stadium and arena. In addition, new parking garages and planned new hotels are the major new projects in the area. A new hotel did open after Gateway, but it is oriented more towards Playhouse Square rather than the ballpark. In many ways this mirrors the (lack of) new construction in Baltimore, where a few new structures have been completed, but many lots still remain underutilized. Unlike Baltimore, however, there has not been pressure to create large surface parking lots surrounding the facilities, in part because the land is too valuable to do so and in part because ample parking on-site and nearby has been identified for visitors to the complex. Where Gateway has been truly successful as an urban revitalization tool is in the re-use of older, vacant buildings. As will be detailed, a number of old warehouse buildings have been and are being renovated for new hotels, new retail development, and for residential development.

Figures 9.10 and 9.11 illustrate the changes in the built form in the Microarea between 1991 and 1998. Recall that much of the Gateway site had been cleared in the years prior to 1991, so much of the area that the stadium and arena sit on were parking lots in 1991.

[See Figures 9.10 and 9.11 on pages 357-358]

As was expected in the planning stages several new parking garages have been built as a result of Gateway. A large parking deck constructed as part of the Gateway complex provides parking to season ticket holders for the Indians and Cavaliers. Across

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[25] Robertson (1995).

Huron Road from Gateway, a second parking garage was constructed to provide more parking for events at the complex. A new garage also opened up in the Tower City Complex in the intervening years. In addition, these garages also provide parking for downtown workers and visitors, nicely meeting the strategy of incorporating the project into the fabric of downtown. As for new construction of retail and hotel buildings, little has occurred in the time period 1991-1997. As mentioned earlier, one hotel, the Wyndham, opened on the edge of the Playhouse Square district in 1995, oriented much more towards the theaters than the sports complex. Plans exist for two new hotels, directly attributable to Gateway it should be noted, one on the site next to Jacobs Field and the parking structure along E. 9th Street (that was sold by GEDC) and one across Carnegie Avenue and E. 9th Street to the southeast of Jacobs Field. Evidence clearly indicates that these projects, with estimated price tags of $29 million and $16 million respectively, would not be happening so quickly, if at all, without the success of Gateway. Other than these construction projects, however, no large new construction projects (i.e. new buildings) have occurred in the Gateway area. Of course, the dense urban environment and the dearth of suitable sites for new development hinders the amount of new development in the microarea. It should be noted that there still exist a few other possible sites for new development (the surface lot between Gateway and the arcades is a prime example), so there are still some opportunities for new development in the district.

In dense, almost built-out environments like downtown Cleveland, actual new-from-the-ground-up construction is an unreasonable goal, even for the most successful of projects. Cleveland's Gateway Microarea was littered with many buildings only partially utilized, with completely vacant floors above ground, vacant retail spaces on the ground floor, or available office space for rent. In addition to the partially utilized buildings, a number of old warehousing and cold storage buildings, remnants from decades earlier, stood awaiting re-use. In choosing the Gateway site for a new stadium, city and civic leaders hoped to see many of these buildings remodeled and re-used in any fashion that would return social and economic activity to the district. What has transpired has likely

outstripped even their highest of hopes. Since the opening of Gateway, a litany of new projects have been undertaken in these formerly vacant buildings. Table 9.1 lists some of these projects.

Table 9.1: Major New Commercial/Hotel Projects in the Gateway Microarea

Project Name	*Year Completed*	*Estimated Cost*
Colonial and Euclid Arcades	1999/2000	$30 million
Marriott Residence Inn (part of Arcades)	1999/2000	(In Arcades)
National City Bank Building (Hotel/Offices)	1999/2000	$11 million
Radisson Hotel at Gateway	1999/2000	$11 million
Gateway Parking Garage	1994	N/A
Pointe at Gateway (Commercial/Residential)	2000	$12 million
Courtyard by Marriott Jacobs Field (planned)	2000	$29 million
Hilton Garden Inn (planned)	2000	$16 million
Wyndham Renaissance Hotel	1995	N/A

Originally thirteen new restaurants moved into the area during the construction and soon after the opening of Gateway. Many of these have since gone out of business, but others have taken their places and several new restaurants are planned for the area. Also as expected, several new retail businesses in the district, t-shirt shops or sports souvenir shops oriented towards Gateway visitors, also followed the Indians and Cavaliers to the area. Two new hotels in the Euclid/Prospect area to the north of Gateway are locating in old, run down buildings, including the arcades between Euclid and Prospect. The $11 million Radisson Hotel recently opened across Huron Road from the Gateway parking garage. A Marriott Residence Inn is also set to open summer 1999 as part of a $30 million renovation to the Colonial and Euclid Arcades, located between Euclid and Prospect Avenues. These redevelopment projects have in turn spurred more renovations of formerly

vacant areas as restaurants have located in spaces on either side of the Marriott Hotel to take advantage of the traffic generated by Gateway and the hotel itself.

Figure 9.12 shows the location of these projects in the Gateway Microarea. Note that most of these projects have occurred in the Euclid-Prospect area, indicating the reawakening of the traditional retail district of the city. In the coming years, more development is expected to occur in the area to the east of Gateway and south of the cemetery, with two new hotels planned for that sector expecting to open the way for related development. In addition, there is some indication that the combined successes of Gateway and Playhouse Square may lead to more residential and retail development north of the Erie Cemetery at the intersection of these two entertainment districts.

Residential Development in the Microarea

While the above changes were hoped for and to some degree expected as a spin-off from the Gateway project, the infusion of a number of new residential developments in the district in the years since Gateway opened has been a pleasant surprise to even the staunchest of downtown proponents. In the late 1980s, the Warehouse District to the northwest of Gateway became the first downtown neighborhood to attract new middle class and upper-middle class loft housing to the central city for decades. These projects gave downtown proponents hope that a trickle of households would help resuscitate the central city and make it a twenty-four hour place again. Since Gateway opened in 1994, at least five new loft housing projects have opened or begun renovation to make the district a second downtown neighborhood. (See Table 9.2 and Figure 9.12) In 1996 the Buckeye Building opened with thirty-six new units. Soon to follow are the fifty-two unit Windsor Block, forty-two units in the Finance Building and adjoining buildings, 737 Bolivar's twenty-six units (and brew-pub), and two vacant office buildings that will be made into the Gateway at Playhouse Square residential development.[26] The possibility of the district becoming an urban neighborhood, once considered a pipe dream, now seems attainable

with further investments into the district, careful planning decisions, a focus upon safety and accessibility, and strengthened linkages with other acceptable and desirable areas like the Warehouse District, the Flats, and the emerging Cleveland Waterfront.

Table 9.2: Major New Residential Projects in the Gateway Microarea

Project Name	*Year Completed*	*Estimated Cost*
Gateway at Playhouse Square	1999	$14 million
Gateway Place Condominiums	1996	$2 million
737 Bolivar	1999	$8.5 million
Finance Building	1997	N/A
Buckeye Building	1996	$3.4 million
Windsor Block	1997	$5.2 million
Pointe at Gateway	2000	$12 million

[See Figure 9.12 on page 359]

To be fair, though, even at build-out all of the above projects will total only several hundred units of housing, representing only the slightest trickle of returning residents against the flood that have left the city in the past five decades. With all the excitement surrounding these projects, these projects alone are unlikely to stem the tide of population losses to the suburbs. It is also unclear whether these projects are enough to generate their own neighborhood economy, with a grocery store, dry cleaner and other uses requisite for a fully functional neighborhood. As for the impact of Gateway on these projects, Dennis Keating and Norm Krumholz at Cleveland State University pointed out in interviews that much of this residential development was likely influenced by incentives and subsidies given to developers of housing in the Gateway area. The implication is that the level of new residential development was tied to other programs and not the success of Gateway in making its microarea a safer, more attractive and more vibrant place.

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[26] Bullard (1998).

In addition to the above factors, some of these residential projects had begun planning prior to the public referendum on Gateway, suggesting that Gateway's success did not "make them happen". Indeed, the success of residential projects in the Warehouse District also indicates that there was some demand for downtown housing without a new stadium/arena complex in an area. Underscoring this is a 1995 study spearheaded by Thomas Bier at The Urban Center at Cleveland State University which estimated that there was a pent up demand for between 20,000-40,000 new units of urban housing in the city of Cleveland.[27] Survey respondents interested in living downtown indicated strong concerns about safety, lack of day to day retail (grocery stores), and parking as obstacles that needed to be overcome before they would move downtown. Interestingly, Gateway was one of the less popular areas identified as a possible downtown neighborhood in the 1995 study.[28] Other downtown areas (the Warehouse District and the Flats) were much more popular among survey respondents interested in living downtown.

Despite these factors, the Gateway project has been instrumental in the establishment of the Gateway Microarea as an emerging residential area. Austrian and Rosentraub point out the two underlying impacts Gateway has had in making the area more disposed to residential development: 1) improvements in streets, sidewalks and pedestrian connections as part of the Gateway project made the area much more desirable for developers and prepared the area for new development and 2) the area is now perceived as a safe district, only a few short years removed from a perception of the area as infested by drugs, gangs, and other undesirable goings-on.[29] While some of these residential projects would likely have been a part of the landscape at some point in Cleveland's future, the investment in Gateway has speeded the pace of development and certainly attracted a level of investment far above a "do-nothing" strategy for the district.

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[27] Bier, Thomas (1995). *Market Demand for New Housing in Cleveland: A Survey of the Cleveland Region, Downtown Report*. The Urban Center, Cleveland State University.

[28] Respondents were surveyed in November of 1994, after the opening season for the Indians in Jacobs Field.

[29] Austrian and Rosentraub (1997), p. 382.

Further, with additional residential development in the Gateway area or in nearby districts, it is conceivable that downtown Cleveland can achieve a critical mass of residents to support neighborhood-oriented retail, which would provide jobs and an infusion of dollars not tied to the peaks and valleys of a tourism and recreation-based economy.

Changes to Land Uses in the Microarea

In Baltimore, an analysis of land use changes in the Camden Yards Microarea revealed that the new stadia had surprisingly little impact on the parcels surrounding the facilities. Some nearby land was "developed" as surface parking and a few retail spaces became restaurants, but overall Camden Yards was found to have a very minor impact on land use patterns in the area. Baltimore's stadium-proponents had hoped that Camden Yards would help to spread the success of the Inner Harbor to the west into Pigtown and north into the older retail center of the city, but these changes simply did not occur. This finding was attributed to the fragmentation of the microarea and the development of a tourism/entertainment core of the Inner Harbor years before Camden Yards came along. In addition, the reliance upon surface parking, still demanded by team owners, and the lack of an overall vision as to how the complex would relate to the city hampered the impacts of the stadia upon the microarea.

In comparison Cleveland's Gateway project offered a number of advantages over the Camden Yards case. The Gateway site offered much better connections to a variety of downtown districts than Camden Yards. Related to this, the site was not partially blocked off from downtown by large roadways nor did it have intervening upscale neighborhoods protecting themselves from any negative crowd impacts. In addition, Cleveland had a much more developed vision for Gateway than Baltimore had for Camden Yards, a vision rooted in neighborhood level development and downtown synergy. Finally, unlike Camden Yards in an already "revitalized" downtown Baltimore, Gateway came along at a time when Cleveland was still in the early stages of its downtown "comeback" with many other mega-projects having only recently opened (Tower City Center and Galleria) or still on the

drawing board (Rock & Roll Hall of Fame and the Cleveland waterfront). Given all of this, we should expect to find much greater impacts upon the land use of the Microarea in relation to the Gateway project. As indicated in the previous two sections, this is precisely what occurred.

What is most striking about Gateway's impacts on the surrounding district is the number of vacant properties that have been renovated or are being renovated as a result of the success of Gateway. As detailed above, a number of new residential projects, new businesses and restaurants, and hotels have come to a district that for years had been desolate, decayed, and perceived (quite rightly) as an unsafe place to experience the city. Not only has the Gateway project itself brought new development to the area, in the form of restaurants, team shops, offices and a parking deck (as with Camden Yards in Baltimore), but nearby buildings are now abuzz with business on event days and even on non-event days.

In the longer term, the Gateway Microarea is expected to continue to specialize not only as an entertainment and shopping destination, but also as one of Cleveland's emerging downtown neighborhoods. The addition of more hotels will certainly lead to new restaurant and retail possibilities and the successful linkage of the area to Tower City Center and improving connections between Gateway and Playhouse Square will likely result in continued growth of this continent in a sea of decay. With the city's big push to develop 10,000 new housing units in downtown by the end of the decade, further development of vacant or underutilized properties as housing is likely to continue. Finally, there are strong indications that the few surface parking lots in the area will be built out, further cementing the new entertainment/retail/residential character of the Gateway district. A prime example of this is the large surface parking lot between Huron Road and Prospect Avenue just north of Gateway. All old buildings except one have been cleared from the lot and its excellent location will almost certainly lead to development as a residential/retail use in the foreseeable future.

Changes to Parking in the Microarea

A very important difference between the Gateway Microarea and the microarea's of the other two cases was the strategy towards parking provision for event patrons. In the suburban Arlington case (outlined in the following chapters), large surface parking lots surrounding the stadium were constructed to handle parking demand. In fact, no parking decks were constructed at all for that area, in large part because ample vacant land was available upon which the necessary surface lots could be constructed. As seen in Baltimore, large surface lots can also be provided in dense, urban environments. Certainly, Baltimore utilized mass transit lines and existing parking decks to capture some of the parking demand, but a number of surface lots have been added as part of the project over the years. Of course, the drawback of these lots is that they remove this land from the development cycle for a period of time, if not for the life of the sports facilities. These lots also have greatly hampered the pedestrian character desired for the Camden Yards area and for the Ballpark in Arlington area. In addition, both Baltimore and Arlington have experienced "parking creep", in which surface parking lots moved into manufacturing areas that were being protected for this type of development or into areas of vacant land that were expected to yield new construction related to the new stadia.

Unlike these other cases, Cleveland's approach to the parking dilemma was to rely upon existing parking in the downtown in tandem with two new parking structures linked directly to the Gateway project. Rather than constructing surface parking lots or indirectly encouraging them by clearing more land than was needed for the complex, Gateway planners made it clear that the complex was going to be urban in character, integrated into the city fabric, and not surrounded by sprawling parking lots. In the years prior to Gateway downtown planners had witnessed firsthand what surface parking would do to the area. In the 1980s as the Central Market area was cleared for redevelopment, the area had become a surface parking wasteland, with thousands of cars parked on-site daily, to the great detriment of pedestrian activity and business life in the district. It was evident that these large lots, while providing cheap parking, substantially detracted from the

character and vitality of the area. As discussed in the planning section earlier, a decision was made very early in the process to rely upon a combination of existing parking and a few new parking decks to handle demand during events.

Figures 9.13 and 9.14 show the location of surface parking and parking decks in the Gateway Microarea in 1990 and 1998. Also shown is the location of the mass transit center in the Tower City Center, as well as the pedestrian tunnel connecting Tower City Center to Gateway. While this parking captures a significant share of the demand for event attendees, foot traffic does come from all over downtown Cleveland, in large part because Gateway is so well-integrated into the city. Some districts outside the Microarea, like Government Center and the CSU area, generate a small level of foot traffic on Gateway event days as downtown workers and students leave their cars and walk over to events at the stadium or arena. Given this, though, the parking and transit connections within the Microarea provide the majority of the necessary parking infrastructure for Gateway. What is also important to note is that the amount of parking has changed very little since Gateway opened. Parking creep, originally a major concern with Gateway's planners, has proven to not be a problem in Cleveland.

[See Figures 9.13 and 9.14 on pages 360-361]

Additional Impacts to the Microarea

Other than the detailed impacts to the physical form and physical uses of the parcels and buildings in the district, Gateway has also brought a set of additional impacts to the surrounding microarea. Among these additional impacts were additional alterations to the physical surroundings (the street network and the pedestrian network), the creation of public spaces and public artworks, and the development of a new district character that had been hoped for by Gateway's architects. These impacts were an instrumental part of the planning process behind Gateway and these additional impacts are actually equally important when considering the overall effect the project has had on the surrounding district.

The most obvious of these additional impacts has been the changes to the street layout of the district. While neotraditional sports facilities pride themselves on fitting stadia into the existing street grid, these ballparks certainly do alter the local network in substantial ways. Interviews with Gateway critics led to the observation that Gateway essentially turned over public rights of way in the entire project area to a private development agency (the Gateway Economic Development Corporation).[30] In so doing streets were moved to make room for the facilities, some streets were eliminated, and other streets were widened and/or landscaped to provide a more attractive "gateway" into downtown Cleveland. While critics lament the lack of accountability in these decisions, as the GEDC was a quasi-governmental agency buffered from public oversight, its decisions have generally been accepted as auspicious ones, even by these same critics. Traffic around the facilities is heavy during event days and during major commute times, but the changes and additions to the street grid successfully funnel traffic out of the area despite the reliance upon mid-rise parking structures for the majority of the nearby parking.

Related to the street network changes have been major changes to the pedestrian network. As discussed earlier, one of the hallmarks of the success of Gateway was the creation of a $14 million pedestrian tunnel connecting Gateway and Tower City Center, further linking these projects and indirectly encouraging mass transit travel to and from events at Gateway by simplifying travel when using the regional transit station. In addition, a new pedestrian walkway connecting the Gateway site to the Colonial and Euclid Arcades was part of the project. This lighted, clearly marked walkway is underutilized, but with the addition of hotels on this block and with the eventual build-out of the surface parking lot adjacent to the walkway, the longer term outlook of this pedestrian corridor should improve. Coupled with these higher visibility improvements are a number of smaller projects that include larger sidewalks, better marked street crossings, and street furniture which, unlike many urban design projects, actually have substantially improved

[30] Interviews with Cleveland State University's Norman Krumholz and George Zeller from the Council for Economic Opportunities in Greater Cleveland, May, 1998.

the district for walkers and are used by visitors on event days and non-event days alike. Again reflecting the orientation of the neotraditional sports facility towards the pedestrian, Cleveland's Gateway is an excellent example of coupling substantial street level improvements with a major urban project.

Another important, but less desirable set of pedestrian bridges link the Gateway parking garage directly to Jacobs Field via two L-shaped bridges. This parking deck allows club seating and luxury suite ticket holders to park and enter the stadium without interacting with the surrounding district. A third bridge connects this deck to the arena and a fourth bridge crosses Huron Road to connect to the northeast parking garage, again providing event attendees the option of never actually having to set foot on downtown streets if they so choose. In Chicago's new Comiskey Park, the use of a number of similarly laid out pedestrian bridges linking parking garages to that stadium has been identified as one of the major reasons why that stadium has had such little impact on its surrounding district. In both Cleveland and Chicago these bridges were demanded by the teams who want fans to be safe, comfortable, and inclined to spend their money inside the arena or stadium.

A final physical impact upon the district has been the creation of several public spaces, including public art displays, within the Gateway Project that serve another downtown gathering place for office workers and local residents. Of the 28 acres of the project, 8.5 are dedicated to public open space. These "elastic public spaces" were a major component of linking the pieces of the project together, as well as integrating Gateway into the central city.[31] Gateway Plaza, situated between Jacobs Field and Gund Arena, is a magnet for office workers enjoying lunch outside on sunny days in Cleveland. It also serves as an outdoor concert venue and gathering place for other public events and festivals. Other public spaces litter the site, some of which attract activity on most nice days.

What all of these improvements have translated into is a rather odd mixture of a publicly-funded, essentially private development (with security guards) that has been embraced by city residents and workers and has done more to rebuild the Cleveland's image as a safe, fun, and vibrant place than any other major downtown project. This claim can be supported by two brief anecdotes as part of the author's site visit in May of 1998. While at Gateway on a sunny afternoon the author witnessed busloads of schoolchildren, who had come to see the project, frolicking on the lawn of the plaza, playing tag and "duck, duck, goose" before enjoying a tour of Jacobs Field. These students had come to the central city to learn a little bit about their home city and to see the ballpark where their heroes play. These students were not planning on visiting Tower City Center, the expanded Convention Center, or the new CSU Convocation Center, but they had come to downtown to visit Jacobs Field and in so doing were exposed to an urban environment that was attractive, inviting, and safe. Clearly, other projects like the Science Center or the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame might bring these students to the city, but these projects are not "downtown", nor do they convey the power and importance of the city the way Gateway does in Cleveland.

Later on the site visit, on a team-sponsored tours of Jacobs Field, the tour leader asked where people were from. Most of my group was made up of suburban Clevelanders who were getting a personalized tour of "their ballpark", before walking around downtown and experiencing the city. In discussions with a few of these suburbanites, it became clear that they did not come downtown very often, but that the ballpark and their successful experience with what was previously perceived to be an unsafe area had been a rousing success. Each successful visit to the ballpark and to "the city" led them to broaden their urban experiences and had led them to come downtown to shop, attend a show, and even just visit the city for the city's sake. Gateway provides an entrée to the city to many suburban families who had longed viewed the city as an unsafe, unattractive, uninteresting place.

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[31] Walsh (1994), pp. 81-82.

Gateway's Microarea Impacts: Conclusion

All of the above project-related impacts clearly point to why Gateway, despite its tremendous cost overruns and its lukewarm direct economic (jobs) impact, has been considered such a substantial success for the city of Cleveland. What this project has done and continues to do for Cleveland, even admitted by the sternest of critics, is helped to remake the image of the city and return suburbanites and tourists to the city's old market district for the first time in years. The Gateway Microarea, Playhouse Square, and the Warehouse District have combined to make downtown Cleveland hot again. This image of revitalization has translated into huge downtown investments, substantial demand for new downtown housing, and a civic pride not felt for decades. The perception is that the Mistake by the Lake has been transformed into the "New American City", a city that is on the way towards developing a residential heart in tandem with a revitalized central city.

Strangely enough, downtown proponents have begun to worry that their formerly devastated central city may be going too well, too fast.[32] For example, developers and planners in Gateway worry that the current status of the area as a very desirable and "hot" district might drive out existing businesses because of increasing property values and demand for market rate housing. There is some concern that the only downtown department store, long a part of the Tower City Center project, might be priced out of a strong downtown market. Another concern is that downtown is overbuilding the number of hotel rooms. Almost 2,000 new hotel rooms are expected from the most recent set of hotel renovations and construction projects, giving downtown Cleveland almost 5,000 total rooms. Even given the success of Gateway, Playhouse Square and other downtown projects, the long term viability of all of these new hotels has raised eyebrows throughout the development community. What is so striking about this is only fifteen short years ago the city was desperate for signs of hope for downtown and now the central city has come so far as to worry that things might be going too well.

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[32] Michelow, Raizel (1998). "Downtown hotels like idea of competition." *Crain's Cleveland Business*, November 2, p. 40.

Now certainly all of these described impacts cannot be attributed solely to Gateway. Only the biggest of stadium supporters would try and make that claim and the sheer number of recent downtown projects would likely quiet even these stadium-champions. As we saw in Chapter 8, Cleveland has coupled the Gateway project with a number of other large tourism and entertainment-oriented projects like the renovation of the theaters in Playhouse Square, the investments in the lakefront, Tower City Center, and the emergence of the Flats area as an entertainment district. Each of these projects has contributed to the revitalization of the central city by bringing activity to the city and redirecting dollars away from the suburbs and back into downtown. The current thinking in downtown redevelopment is that a synergy needs to be developed between various downtown projects to achieve long term success for the projects individually and for the downtown more generally. Cleveland's massive investments in a wide variety of projects, including Gateway, give every indication of succeeding in this.

More importantly for the discussion at hand, though, is the simple fact that the evidence clearly points to the success of the Gateway project as a microarea revitalization tool. Unlike Baltimore's Camden Yards, Gateway has been a significant factor in generating new development in the district and in creating a micro-economy based on events at the sports stadia. Gateway is the linchpin, the underlying reason for the successful redevelopment of the area surrounding the sports complex. New hotels, renovated buildings, and even renewed interest in the downtown shopping core have been greatly influenced by this complex. The investments into Gateway have redefined this area of the city as a downtown destination and this success has spilled over into nearby blocks. In addition, money spent on the surrounding infrastructure has made the area attractive as a residential district, a positive result unforeseen when planning Gateway. While some of this development would likely have occurred without Gateway, for example the city had been pushing for new hotels downtown for years, local stakeholders state unequivocally that the activity generated by the stadium and arena has been the catalyst behind most of

the changes to the district. In Cleveland, then, a sports complex has been the anchor upon which to revitalize a district, and even to reshape the image of downtown.

So, what can other cities learn from Cleveland? Having investigated the success of Gateway, what broader lessons can we point to? Well, to address the main point being studied, Cleveland tells us that a sports complex can be an anchor for district level revitalization. The crowds generated by the over two-hundred and fifty annual events at Gateway are enough to support some level of restaurant and retail business, but only when this development is accessible to visitors to the complex. Unlike Baltimore, which has seen minimal new development, Cleveland's Gateway has generated a micro-economy, hooked into the larger downtown economy. Whereas Camden Yards sits apart from downtown, both visually and economically, Gateway is largely part and parcel of downtown. Further, Gateway's microarea impacts were along the lines expected to accompany these types of projects with new hotels, restaurants, and retail making up the majority of the changes to the area. Major factors in the successful revitalization of this district in downtown Cleveland include a district-level approach, the contextualization of the stadium, and the reliance upon garage rather than surface parking. Chapter 12 will discuss these factors in much more detail.

This success must be counter-weighted by the massive public investments that were a required part of this success. Even given all of these wonderful changes to the microarea and downtown as a whole, over a half billion in total investments in infrastructure, costs for the Gateway structures, and other related programs was required from public coffers, money that could have been mobilized to address other pressing needs. In a city where the school system had to go into receivership and where most of the city's residential neighborhoods continue in their decades-long decline, an infusion of dollars into an entertainment project for millionaires and billionaires might seem to be an unfair and unwise investment.

Further, despite the very positive national press garnered by this tremendously successful project, the success of Gateway must be tempered by the reality of the situation in Cleveland. While Gateway and a host of other projects have reinvigorated downtown, to the great pleasure of the city's growth machine, Cleveland is a city that still sits precariously on the precipice of irretrievable decay. While downtown can point to the litany of projects and the slow, but steady stream of new downtown residents, the social problems of a Rust Belt city have not disappeared. Poverty, joblessness, crime, and drug use all still plague much of the city. The inner ring of city neighborhoods are still decaying and the job prospects of a whole generation of city residents are dim, given the poor state of the city's school system and the declining number of blue collar jobs. Despite the interest in downtown housing, residents still seem to be fleeing the city faster than new residents can be attracted back to the glittering city center. The city of Cleveland, the "Comeback City", the "New American City", still is in such great danger of becoming overrun by tremendous social problems that all of this focus upon the revitalization of downtown seems quite overblown. Despite this, as of the late 1990s Cleveland is a city that is widely considered to be on its way back. From the days of the 1970s when the Cuyahoga River was on fire, the city was on the brink of default, and the corporate class revolted to essentially overthrow the city government, Cleveland has seemingly reinvented itself as a destination city. In so doing, the city has catapulted a former mayor to Governor and later Senator.

On sunny days this summer, then, Cleveland will continue to experience the growth and the loss that accompanies the "New American City". Construction cranes will be busy augmenting the downtown skyline, helping to continue the rise in downtown land values. Over in the Warehouse District young couples will move into their new lofts, or perhaps even into their new Gateway condominiums. Next fall the waterfront will welcome a new Cleveland Browns football team in a glittering new $300 million dollar stadium meant to help spur new development. On those same summer nights, in other parts of town, homeless people will beg for change and look for places to sleep that night.

Along some streets local businesses will decide they can no longer make it in the city and new "Going Out of Business" signs will pop up in storefront windows. In nearby in-city neighborhoods additional families will decide they cannot live with the instability and higher taxes of the city and Cleveland will lose more middle class families to the suburbs.

On those warm summer evenings when the Indians are playing in Jacobs Field before a full house, when the downtown is abuzz with patrons shopping at Tower City Center, and a slowly returning Euclid-Prospect corridor and Playhouse Square are busy with middle and upper class foot traffic, it must be remembered that Cleveland has done some things right in reinventing itself, but, despite these wonderful changes, there is still much work to do. Cleveland may have got "more than a stadium", but it seems necessary to ask, Did they get enough?




Figure 9.1 Gateway Major Features Map




Figure 9.2 Gateway Area Conceptual Land Use Map




Figure 9.3 Central City Population by Blockgroup, 1990




Figure 9.4 Central City Median Household Income by Blockgroup, 1989




Figure 9.5 Central City Percent Black by Blockgroup, 1990




Figure 9.6 Central City Percent Living Below Poverty by Blockgroup, 1989




Figure 9.7 Austrian-Rosentraub Microarea and the Gateway Historic Neighborhood Boundaries




Figure 9.8 Cleveland's Gateway Microarea




Figure 9.9 Gateway Microarea Zoning, 1990-1998




Figure 9.10 Gateway Microarea Built Form, 1991





Figure 9.11 Gateway Microarea Built Form, 1998



Gateway at Playhouse Square	1	R
737 Bolivar	2	R
Pointe at Gateway	3	R
Finance Building	4	R
Buckeye Building	5	R
Windsor Block	6	R
Parking Deck	7	P
Marriott Residence Inn (Arcades)	8	H/C
National City Bank Bldg (Inn)	9	H
Radisson Inn	10	H
Wyndham Park Hotel	11	H

Figure 9.12 Major Projects in the Gateway Microarea, 1992-1998




Figure 9.13 Gateway Microarea Parking, 1990




Figure 9.14 Gateway Microarea Parking, 1998

Chapter 10

A Stadium in the 'Burbs: The Case of Arlington

"I think it's terrific. When they talk about the Colosseum in Rome, you know what they're talking about. This will have the same significance [for Arlington]."

-Arlington Mayor Richard Greene's reaction to the naming of the new baseball stadium in his city The Ballpark in Arlington[1]

In 1994 the city of Arlington, Texas proudly opened *The Ballpark in Arlington*, the first suburban facility built on the pseudo-historical, multi-use facility model that had become prevalent in sports facility design in the 1990s. Located on part of a "sprawling three-hundred acre site"[2] adjacent to Interstate 30, the Ballpark represents a prime example of the suburban stadium; excellent freeway access, ample on-site parking, very poor (in this case non-existent) public transportation links, low density nearby development, and substantial land available for development. Financed largely by an increase in the local sales tax, the Ballpark has clearly been a financial success for the team that calls it home, MLB's Texas Rangers, and, in many ways, for the city of Arlington as well.

For the discussion at hand, though, the "sprawling" site that the Ballpark sits on represents a major part of the story. As suggested above, unlike the stadia in Baltimore and Cleveland, The Ballpark in Arlington is not an urban facility, situated in a dense, busy, messy downtown core. Rather, the Ballpark is located in a suburban district long under-utilized despite an existing baseball stadium on the site. Recall that Baltimore's Camden Yards and Cleveland's Jacobs Field were built downtown in an effort to generate the many spin-off developments associated with sports facilities, perhaps the most important of which was attracting suburban dollars back to inner cities in great danger of succumbing to the problems inherent to most urban cores of the northeast. Camden Yards was located

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[1] Quoted in Erik Garcia's (1993). "A simple statement: Rangers pick name for park that explains what it is, where it is." *Dallas Morning News*, September 13: pp. 1A, 24A.

[2] Tarricone (1994), p. 60.

in close proximity to other special activity generators in a downtown district that had already successfully remade itself from an industrial waterfront and railyards into a popular tourist and suburbanite attraction. Similarly, Cleveland's Jacobs Field was shown to be an extension of that city's attempts at an overall revitalization strategy for downtown, a strategy that focused upon large scale recreation- and tourism-oriented projects. Jacobs Field's location in close proximity to the central business district helps to anchor that district as well as providing an attractive and engaging "gateway" into the city from the south.

In contrast, the Ballpark is located in a section of Arlington situated between their downtown core (truly a suburban downtown core, with most buildings only a few stories tall) and a huge amusement park, Six Flags over Texas. This area was home to the old Arlington Stadium, the original home of the Rangers. In the 1980s this district was identified as a promising entertainment area, in part because of the excellent freeway access, a lack of existing development, and low land costs.[3] Despite excellent access from all directions, the presence of major tourist attractions, such as Six Flags and the old stadium, a major General Motors plant less than two miles away, and a major shopping mall nearby, this area was home to only sporadic development throughout the 1980s. As of 1990, the district surrounding the future Ballpark was best described as hugely underdeveloped given its locational advantages.

Since the 1987 City of Arlington Comprehensive Plan, however, this district has begun to take shape as a regional center for tourism and as a home to numerous new hotels, restaurants, and tourism-related development. It is these changes to this district and The Ballpark in Arlington's role in these changes that represent the focus of this and the next chapter. However, prior to understanding the microarea effects of a suburban sports stadium some discussion of related issues must come first. First and foremost, the actions of the City of Arlington cannot be understood without a look at the regional environment

that shapes local policy and local development. An introduction to the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex provides a glimpse into the economic development environment that the city and even the Rangers themselves must operate in. Coupled with this regional perspective is a discussion of the city of Arlington, a boomtown of almost unknown proportions. The astounding growth of Arlington has been fueled in part by decisions of local leaders, decisions like investing in a new ballpark to the tune of over $200 million dollars.

Following these discussions, an introduction to the Rangers and the facilities that they have called home is warranted. A timeline of the Rangers history in Arlington is presented, as is an overview of the political process that generated the Ballpark. The aforementioned financial success of the Ballpark itself is also examined. Because facility design is part of the underlying thesis, some mention of the reaction of the architectural community to the facility is also provided. Only then can our attention turn towards the new Ballpark and its still-changing environs.

The Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex

The Dallas-Forth Worth "Metroplex" (see Figure 10.1) is one of the best examples of the rise of a southern city to national and international prominence. The metro area is now the eighth largest media market in the country; the Dallas-Forth Worth (DFW) Airport is the world's second busiest airport in terms of takeoffs and landings; high technology companies, like National Semiconductor and Dell Computers, have flocked to the area, bringing well-paying jobs and substantial spin-off development to the region. Even the local sports teams have been very successful, as the NFL's Cowboys have been three time Super Bowl Champions this decade, the MLB's Rangers made the playoffs for the first time in their history in 1996, the NHL's Stars have been successful on and off the ice since their move to Dallas in 1995, and the NBA's Mavericks – well, the Mav's have had less success on the court, but their fortunes may turn with a new arena that is currently being planned for downtown Dallas.

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[3] City of Arlington (1987). *1987 Comprehensive Plan.*

[See Figure 10.1 on page 402]

Unlike the Cleveland and Baltimore metropolitan areas, the population of the Metroplex has grown steadily since 1970, incomes have continued to remain high, poverty has remained relatively low, and the region is experiencing continued good times, all of this despite problems in the oil industry that shook the state economy several years ago. Dallas and Fort Worth are among a number of Sun Belt cities that continue to experience significant growth, while many Northeastern and Midwestern cities grapple with metropolitan-wide population loss. A comparison of census data for the CMSA's and the home counties for the three case cities is presented in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1. Metro Area Comparison: Baltimore, Cleveland, and Dallas-Fort Worth

Statistical Area	*Pop 1970*	*Pop 1980*	*Pop 1990*	*Percent Change 70-90*	*Percent Change 80-90*	*Median Family Income 1989*	*Pct Poverty 1989*
Baltimore[1]							
-PMSA	2,089,092	2,199,531	2,382,172	14.03%	8.30%	$36,550	10.1%
-City	905,759	786,775	736,014	-18.74%	-6.45%	$24,045	21.9%
Cleveland							
-CMSA	2,999,811	2,834,062	2,759,823	-8.70%	-2.62%	$30,332	11.8%
-Cuyahoga	1,721,300	1,498,400	1,412,140	-17.96%	-5.76%	$28,595	13.8%
DFW							
-CMSA	2,430,152	2,933,293	3,885,415	20.70%	59.88%	$32,825	11.7%
-Tarrant	715,587	860,880	1,170,103	63.52%	35.92%	$32,335	11.0%

[1] Baltimore City is separate from Baltimore County for Census purposes. Baltimore City, for all extents and purposes functions as a county, statistically.

--Sources: *United States Census Bureau, The State of the Cities Home Page*

This table illustrates the decline in population experienced by both Baltimore and Cleveland, both at the county level and at the larger metropolitan level. These population losses are compounded by high poverty levels, despite 1989 median household incomes comparable at the metropolitan level. The populations remaining in these central cities are increasingly poor and therefore largely unable to escape a cycle of poverty that has been created. In contrast, the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex has grown substantially between

1970 and 1990, although poverty levels are not far different from those of the Cleveland CMSA and the Baltimore MSA. This suggests that even those areas that are booming economically, like the Metroplex, still must not overlook their impoverished populations. Even areas that are growing very quickly and appear to be quite healthy economically still have a significant number of impoverished people. Indeed, it would appear that a rising tide does not raise *all* ships, perhaps just those ships that can escape the central city harbor.

While the Cleveland and Baltimore CMSA's have struggled to retain their position in the national economy, the Metroplex has emerged as one of the leading metropolitan areas in the country, with continued economic good times and fast-maturing suburban areas. A major player in the inter-metropolitan economic development wars, the Metroplex has been very successful in efforts to attract new businesses and to diversify its economy, no longer relying on single industries like natural resources (oil) and banking. The state of Texas has also invested heavily in the area, building the DFW Airport, locating a new state university in Arlington, and pushing the area as a growing retail and entertainment destination for tourists.

Of course, all of this is not meant to suggest that the Metroplex has found the elusive formula to economic prosperity for all. In fact, the urban cores in Dallas and Fort Worth have each experienced the urban decay seen in most inner cities throughout the United States. As seen above, the metropolitan area has poverty levels not far below those of the Cleveland and Baltimore metro areas. Minority populations[4] in Dallas and Fort Worth have become increasingly marginalized as the middle class (primarily whites) have moved to suburban jurisdictions, like Arlington. In addition to population shifts, suburban jurisdictions have also been very successful in luring jobs and firms away from these major cities with an aggressive range of incentives including tax abatements, low cost

infrastructure and facilities, and expensive marketing campaigns. Despite these shifts, typical of American metropolitan areas, Dallas and Fort Worth remain relatively healthy and vibrant cities.

As shown in Table 10.2, economic problems in Dallas and Fort Worth, represented here by levels of median family income and percent living below poverty in 1989, are not as serious as those in Baltimore and Cleveland. The city of Arlington, also shown in the table, represents an urban paradise compared to the poverty in the other cities. The three Metroplex cities show a significant increase in population, even the central cities of Dallas and Fort Worth, while Baltimore and Cleveland are both desperate to staunch the flow of population to the suburbs and to other urban areas. Further, the median family income and percent poverty figures of Dallas and Fort Worth are substantially better than those of Cleveland and Baltimore. Again, though, the young, prospering city of Arlington must be seen as an urban oasis when compared to these older, far larger cities. In sum, then, the Metroplex represents an excellent example of the rise of Sun Belt cities, often at the expense of older urban areas in the north.

Table 10.2: Comparison of Metroplex Major Cities and Baltimore and Cleveland

City	*Pop 1980*	*Pop 1990*	*Percent Change 1980-1990*	*Median Family Income, 1989*	*Percent Poverty, 1989*
Baltimore	786,775	736,014	-6.5%	$24,045	21.9%
Cleveland	573,822	505,616	-11.9%	$22,448	28.7%
Dallas	904,078	1,006,831	+11.4%	$31,295	18.0%
Fort Worth	385,164	447,619	+16.2%	$30,967	17.4%
Arlington	160,113	261,721	+63.5%	$35,048	8.2%

Sources: *United States Census Bureau*

[4] As in most Texas cities, minority populations are a mix of African Americans (a racial category) and Hispanics (an ethnicity). In both Dallas-Fort Worth CMSA, minority populations are primarily concentrated in the inner cities of those major cities.

So the question begs, what has contributed to the success of the Metroplex? Well, quite clearly the general migration of population and employment in the United States from older northern cities to southern areas has been a major factor. Despite the sheer size of New York City and the success of Boston in transitioning its local economy from manufacturing based to service and technology based, the vast majority of northern cities have lost population, not only to their suburban cities but to emerging southern metropolises like Atlanta, Charlotte, Phoenix, and, yes, Dallas and Fort Worth. Southern cities like Orlando and Phoenix, which forty years ago were little more than swamplands and arid plains, are now major metropolitan areas. The location of the Metroplex in the Sun Belt alone accounts for a substantial portion of the growth of that region.

Sun Belt cities have also been very successful (and fortunate) in preparing themselves for the modern, service and technology-based economy. Sun Belt metro areas had the advantage of acres and acres of developable land available, unburdened by existing structures. In contrast, the northeastern industrial centers like Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and even Baltimore had outdated production facilities and crumbling infrastructure better suited to the economy of fifty years ago. With land available in all directions and a largely clean slate upon which to develop, southern cities provided companies with the ability to escape the cramped, vertical working environments of the northern city and create new, sprawling projects upon which factories could be laid out or office campuses could be developed. In short, the southern areas offered firms one of the most desirable attributes to the American firm in abundance: a blank slate upon which to help remake the American economy. Northern cities could offer this only at great cost; their urban areas were still programmed for the industrial economy.

The Entrepreneurial City

The above locational advantage and developmental advantage were coupled with a third important variable that is particularly important for the discussion of Arlington's Ballpark. Decades ago southern cities declared economic warfare upon northern cities by

refining the model of economic development that has become the way of doing business today: often summarized by the term "smokestack chasing".[5] Smokestack chasing referred initially to the ceaseless pursuit of heavy industry by southern politicians in the first half of this century. These local leaders founded their economic development efforts on attracting industry to these southern areas in an effort to provide a steady foundation (or economic base) for the local economy. Economic base theory posits that the local economy must be built upon industries that export their goods and services to non-local areas. In this way, new money is brought into the local economy, more local jobs are generated, and the economy can be built up around this "economic base".[6]

This theory of economic development led southern cities to develop a broad set of incentives that were intended to attract firms, and all the positive effects that come with new jobs, to their jurisdictions. Included among these programs were extensive tax incentives, job training and other educational programs, low cost infrastructure, and a host of other programs directly intended to lower the costs of doing business in that jurisdiction. All of these techniques were intended to reduce the costs of doing business in these areas, thereby increasing company profits and making the area more attractive to business.

Coupled with the implementation of economic base theory in economic development efforts country-wide was a second key component of this model of economic development, summarized by Blakely under the title "Attraction Models".[7] While southern cities were attempting to develop their "economic base" through wide-ranging economic incentives, these same areas also very smartly and expertly marketed themselves as

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[5] See Bernard and Rice (Eds.) (1983) *Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth Since World War II* and Abbot's (1987) *The New Urban America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities* for far more extensive discussions of this idea. For insight into what economic developers do today, see the article by Rubin (1988).

[6] Klosterman notes that economic base theory was developed in its modern form by Homer Hoyt in the 1930s. It has since been refined and new statistical techniques have been applied, but the core concept of an "economic base" driving the local economy has remained. Klosterman (1990), pp. 113-115.

[7] Blakely, Edward (1989). *Planning Local Economic Development*. Sage Publications: London, pp. 65-67.

excellent locations for business activity. Blakely summarizes this model by writing: "Communities are products. As such, they must be 'packaged' and appropriately displayed."[8] While the marketing of cities to outsiders has long been part of the urban experience, this new model of economic development, the entrepreneurial city, brought this concept to a new "high" (or perhaps "low" is a better term). Southern cities have been particularly successful at using this model, touting themselves as being particularly "business friendly", providing flashy information packets, and having public officials act more like entrepreneurs than public servants.

An excellent example of the "entrepreneurial city" has been Arlington's experience with General Motors since 1950. Originally, GM selected Arlington as the site of a new manufacturing plant in 1951, after intensive lobbying from then Chamber of Commerce President Thomas Vandergriff.[9] When courting General Motors, Vandergriff downplayed the small size of the city (only about 8,000 at the time) and highlighted Arlington's excellent location at the center of the fast-growing Metroplex. GM's plant helped to establish Arlington as an employment center, rather than just a simple bedroom community, and the location of this plant in the city helped to drive the local economy through the rest of the decade. This early success with the attraction model also had the effect of securing Vandergriff's political future in the city. The location of General Motors in Arlington was one of the major turning points in the city's development and for shaping its overall policy for decades to come.[10]

Arlington's employment of this economic development strategy when dealing with General Motors did not end in the 1950s. In the late 1980s, GM announced that they would be closing numerous plants nationwide, indicating that Arlington's plant was one of those to be closed. In response, Mayor Richard Greene cobbled together local, state, and

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[8] Ibid. p. 66.
[9] Darovich, Donna (1994). *Arlington: Center Stage in the Metroplex*. Jostens: Dallas, p. 17.
[10] Ibid. p. 17.

national support to lobby GM to keep the Arlington plant open.[11] Further, Greene also developed a package of financial incentives for General Motors, including designating the GM site and the surrounding area an Enterprise Zone, thereby lowering GM's costs of doing business in Arlington. Consequently, General Motors invested $260 million to reconfigure the plant to produce trucks and sport utility vehicles, thereby retaining approximately 2,000 well-paying manufacturing jobs in the city.

Now, I do not intend to suggest that southern cities invented the concept of marketing in economic development, nor do I mean to suggest that cities did not compete for jobs and people until recent decades. Inter-metropolitan competition has always been an important part of a local government's responsibility; protecting existing jobs and attracting new jobs has been an essential element of a successful tenure for any local officials. The construction of extensive transportation and information networks, as well as cultural and recreational facilities like symphony halls and museums have always been justified, in part, as a means of strengthening the local economy. For centuries mayors and other local leaders have served as local "cheerleaders" as much as they have served to formulate new policies or direct the city in new directions.

So, while southern cities did not invent this model of economic development, that they certainly have refined it and moved it to the next level. Southern areas marketed themselves heavily in northern areas, promising lower costs, higher profits, free infrastructure, fewer environmental regulations, anti-union regulations, and any other pro-business incentives that could be developed. The smokestack chasing model of economic development had arrived and, despite ample evidence in the literature that this model is inefficient and generally unsuccessful[12], this model still governs much of what passes for

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[11] Ibid. p. 28.

[12] See Rubin (1988); Wolman, Harold (1988). "Local economic development policy: What explains the divergence between policy analysis and political behavior?" *Journal of Urban Affairs* (10)1: pp. 19-28; Marlin, Matthew (1990). "The effectiveness of economic development subsidies." *Economic Development Quarterly* 4(1): pp. 15-22; Grant, Jane (1990). "Making policy choices: Local government and economic development." *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 26(2): pp. 148-169; and Loveridge, Scott (1996). "On the

economic development today. Extensive marketing packages are *de rigeur* for any city these days. Most cities pour hundreds of thousands of dollars into local Chambers of Commerce and other economic development agencies. Mayors and councilpersons are expected to develop business contacts and market the city in a much more explicit form than in any previous era, including such techniques as extensive visits to foreign countries with the stated goal of exploring business opportunities.

A prime example of a southern city that has utilized this model of economic development is the city of Atlanta. In that city, this model has been applied to transform Atlanta from a regional city in the 1950s into an international metropolis of the 1990s, one capable of winning the bid for and then hosting the largest single event in the world, the Olympics. Stone has written extensively on Atlanta's decades long pursuit of economic growth and prosperity, often at the expense of programs that would be directed towards an increasingly poor inner city population.[13] Hunter's earlier study of Atlanta's power structure, a classic of the literature, illustrated the not-so-hidden hand of business in the workings of government in that city in the 1950s.[14] As for the Dallas area, Elkin's study of that city in his book *City and Regime in American Politics*, paints a picture of a city directed towards the single goal of attracting investment, jobs, and people.[15] He identifies Dallas as an "entrepreneurial political economy" in which there is a "relatively unimpeded alliance at work composed of public officials and local businessmen, an alliance that is able to shape the workings of city political institutions so as to foster economic growth."[16]

The "alliance" between businessmen and the political machine that exists in Dallas is replicated across the Metroplex. Inter-jurisdictional squabbles are *de rigeur* for that

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continuing popularity of industrial recruitment." *Economic Development Quarterly* 10(2): pp. 151-158; for studies of the success (or lack thereof) of local economic development incentives.

[13] For the most comprehensive example of this, see Stone's *Regime Politics* (1989). For an update of the Atlanta saga, turn to Charles Rutheiser's fascinating book *Imagineering Atlanta* (1996).

[14] Hunter, Floyd (1953). *Community Power Structure*. University of North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

[15] Elkin (1987).

region as the major cities of Dallas and Fort Worth fight with the surrounding suburban communities over state and federal dollars, proposed development projects like the new airport, and over firms that express interest in the region. One look at the extensive economic development machine that exists in Arlington illustrates this point. Between 1989 and 1992 Arlington spent over $1.2 million on an Economic Development Foundation created specifically to develop a new wave of economic strategies for the city.[17] This foundation exists separate from the local Chamber of Commerce, providing Arlington with yet another economic development marketing machine. In fact, the city works so closely with the Chamber of Commerce that they have never developed an in-house economic development department within the Planning Office.[18]

Rosentraub notes that since the early 1970s Arlington's mayors have been particularly active and adept at economic development tactics, resulting in Arlington's prolific growth (to be outlined shortly).[19] In particular Rosentraub notes two major successes; the city-constructed Arlington Lake, securing water for business and providing an amenity for local residents and firms, and Arlington's successful strategy of convincing the state to locate a major new university in the city, an educational institution that is now the second largest employer in the city.[20] Arlington, it would seem, appears to be particularly adept at playing the economic development game, even in as competitive an environment as the Metroplex.

In addition to fights over regional facilities and state dollars, sports franchises in the region have become particularly coveted as well. Dallas, Arlington, and Irving (another suburban city) have promised and provided millions of dollars for sports facilities for the Rangers, Cowboys, Stars, and Mavericks. Irving built a new stadium for the Cowboys in

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[16] Ibid. p. 61.
[17] City of Arlington (1992). *1992 Comprehensive Plan*, p. 3.6.
[18] Government and Chamber documents indicate this and interviews with Arlington Planning Staff and the Chamber of Commerce confirm this.
[19] Rosentraub (1997a), pp. 425-429.
[20] Arlington Chamber of Commerce (1997). *Major Employer List.*

the early 1970s enticing them out of Dallas and their aging Cotton Bowl. When the Rangers made known their desire for a new stadium, Dallas offered them extensive incentives to move to that area's downtown. Despite this siren's call, the Rangers remained in Arlington. Lastly, a new arena has been demanded by the Stars and Mavericks. The city of Arlington was a very active bidder for the Stars and Mavericks, perhaps in retaliation for Dallas' pursuit of "their" Rangers. However, Dallas came up with an acceptable financing package for a new arena, so the Stars and Mavericks will remain in Dallas. In all of these cases it is clear that the incentives necessary to keep these teams were increased by the bidding between local jurisdictions.[21]

The point to be made from the above discussion is that the economic development model that now permeates all areas of the United States is particularly pertinent for the Arlington case. The economic development environment of the Metroplex is perhaps one of the most competitive and active in the United States, with all major political decisions having substantial economic repercussions. As will be shown, this competitive environment has produced a new suburban stadium that pours millions into the coffers of the Rangers, while providing largely indirect benefits to the city even at the neighborhood level. The pressure to finance a stadium with public dollars came from the Rangers, but the pressure to make the stadium an economic development tool for the city, in ways only partly related to image benefits, came from the city itself. Without understanding this economic development environment, then, the Ballpark in Arlington can too quickly be dismissed as another suburban stadium with few microarea impacts.

Arlington in the Metroplex

The city of Arlington was founded in 1876 and named in honor of Robert E. Lee's hometown of Arlington, Virginia. Located midway between Dallas and Fort Worth in the north-central Texas, the city was a sleepy suburban enclave, home to less than ten thousand persons as late as 1951. As recently as 1970, Arlington was "little more than a

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[21] Rosentraub (1997a), Chapter 11.

footnote to the Dallas/Fort Worth area."[22] Since that year, though, Arlington has transformed itself from a sleepy bedroom community into a major regional employer and national tourist destination. Several factors, including an active government leadership, a pro-planning orientation, and extensive economic development programs, have helped Arlington to become the third major city of the Metroplex by 1990, outdistancing rival suburban cities like Irving, Garland, and Plano.

The primary result of Arlington's tenacious pursuit of the golden goose has been phenomenal growth, establishing the city as one of the fastest growing jurisdictions in the entire United States. Between 1970 and 1990, the population grew by over 170,000 persons, an increase of over 185%, from approximately 90,000 to over 261,000. There is no sign of a slowdown as the city is projected to have 336,400 residents in the year 2010 and 366,750 by 2020.[23] In addition, Arlington's employment levels are projected to increase over 43% between 1996 and 2010, from 87,650 to 125,250.[24] The Arlington Chamber of Commerce was reporting that 1995 retail sales in the city were over $3.2 billion and property values were $8.5 billion, new hotels were being planned in the city, and numerous local employers were discussing expansions of their plants[25]. Just a few years ago, the city successfully convinced General Motors to invest over $250 million in their existing plant, saving thousands of jobs for the city. On the tourism front, Arlington's Ballpark brought in almost three million visitors in 1997, while Six Flags hosted over three million patrons in that same year as well. All of these statistics point to a suburban area that is becoming less "suburban" each year, as the economy develops, land is utilized for its highest use, and the population continues to grow at an amazing rate.

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[22] Ibid, p. 425.
[23] North Central Texas Council of Governments (1996). *North Central Texas 2020*, p. 12.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Arlington Chamber of Commerce (1998), p. 5.

Rosentraub, a former faculty member at the University of Texas-Arlington, attributes Arlington's success to a number of factors:[26]

- *Location*: Perhaps the most important factor in Arlington's success is its location. Arlington is situated midway between two vibrant and growing cities, Dallas and Fort Worth. Further, two major east-west Interstates cross Arlington, providing the city with excellent transportation access to the region. The siting of the airport only minutes from the city in the 1970s helped to establish the city as an ideal location for new airport-related businesses. In addition, several rail lines also cross Arlington from east to west, further strengthening Arlington's role as an important regional hub. The city's location between two growing major cities and these excellent transportation links provide an ideal set of ingredients for major population growth. However, other local cities also had these advantages, so location was not the sole factor in Arlington's success.
- *Political Leadership*: As noted earlier, the Metroplex has been a particularly energetic and successful region in economic development activity. Arlington, however, has been among the leaders of this economic development push, even in this environment of "market oneself or wither away". Rosentraub singles out Thomas Vandergriff, first elected Arlington's mayor at age 25 in 1952 and mayor of Arlington spanning the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Vandergriff was a truly regional leader who turned a city of 8,000 at his election into a city of over 160,000 by 1980. Vandergriff used as his model the city of Anaheim, California, another suburban city that in many ways outshines its central city.[27] He believed that a low density auto-oriented metropolis was the future of America and he stayed true to this vision throughout his years in office. Vandergriff tirelessly promoted the city and attracted public and private dollars to the city as mayor and city leader. Among Vandergriff's most notable achievements were helping to locate the new state university in Arlington, convincing the Senators

[26] Rosentraub (1997a), pp. 425–429.
[27] Darovich (1994).

(now Rangers) to move to Arlington, and helping to site the regional airport very close to Arlington's borders.

- *Professional Acumen*: In addition to forward thinking political leadership, the city has also consistently hired only the best professionals to man major city posts. In 1954 a Comprehensive Plan was adopted by the city, an illustration of the city's commitment to proactive rather than reactive planning. This tradition of planning has continued as regular city-wide plans have been turned out by the city and the auto-oriented vision of Arlington has been refined since that first plan. As Rosentraub also points out, the city's World Wide Web site is another excellent indication of the city's commitment to excellence.[28,29] This professional expertise and strong intra-departmental leadership no doubt was a factor in bidding for and winning the University of Texas at Arlington and has also heavily contributed to the city's attractiveness to firms interested in locating in the Metroplex. From 1950 on, the city has had consistently professional and proactive leadership within city government, a legacy that continues today.
- *Tourism/Recreation Related Economic Development Policy*: Arlington was very quick to recognize the potential of recreation and tourism as a major force in the local economy. Six Flags Amusement Park, originally developed to advertise an industrial park being developed in the city, illustrated to city leaders that tourist dollars could help fund economic development initiatives and serve as a major source of revenues to the local economy. The attraction of a Major League Baseball team fit nicely into this strategy as well, bringing even more regional and national dollars to the city through professional baseball. In recent years, this strategy has culminated in the creation of a Festival district that is home to Six Flags, several other theme parks, and the Ballpark in Arlington.

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[28] Rosentraub (1997a), p. 427.

[29] I, too, can attest to the usefulness and excellence of the web site. When gathering background information for this project, the city of Arlington's web site provided a very useful guide to the city and links to major departments. More importantly, the city often provided data or descriptions of products available from the city online. In comparison, the city of Cleveland's web site is a "barebones" effort, mainly with text listings of phone numbers and departments with some very small sets of data online. Baltimore's web site, on the other hand, was almost non-existent at the time of this project.

In addition to the above, Arlington has utilized other, more dubious policies to retain a population that is wealthy and attractive to footloose firms. For example, Rosentraub notes that Arlington is the largest city in the United States with no public transportation, a policy "robustly supported by residents and their public officials", in large part because it makes it difficult for low income families to live in the city, protecting the image and fiscal status of the city.[30] The city has also raided other cities regularly, seen in the sports arena by Arlington's attracting the Senators from Washington D.C. to become the Texas Rangers and very actively attempting to lure the Stars and Mavericks out of Dallas. While this activity is part of the culture of the region, Arlington has refined their "smokestack chasing" abilities to a level unseen in most metropolitan areas. This intensive commitment to the attraction model of economic development discussed earlier is also evidenced by the slogan seen on most city stationary and business cards; "Service is Our Business".

Arlington's recent history is similar to many other suburban communities throughout the United States that originally developed as small bedroom towns located far from the bustling big cities. Inexorable suburbanization of these outlying communities brought population increases to these areas, increases that would have occurred even with local opposition. Growth in terms of more homes and more people was, therefore, inevitable. But not content to be simply a bedroom community, many of these small cities began to aggressively market and position themselves as important regional *employment centers* as well. Much like Bellevue (Washington), Oak Park (Illinois), Reston (Virginia), and Mayor Vandergriff's model Anaheim, Arlington was certain to grow because of the suburbanization process, but the nature of this growth was greatly impacted by conscious public policy decisions and growth strategies enacted by local leaders. These cities grabbed the proverbial "bull by the horns" and attempted, as best they could, to direct, shape, and enhance this growth.

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[30] Rosentraub (1997a), pp. 426–427. Rosentraub's conclusion was supported by comments from Planning Staff and academics at the University of Texas-Arlington as well.

So in Arlington we see the convergence of many important forces that have helped to shape suburban areas of the United States. Inevitable growth via suburbanization, proactive governance attempting to augment and shape this growth, subtle and not-so-subtle economic development strategies to attract more of the "right" growth, and intra-regional and inter-regional competition for people, jobs, and, by extension, tax revenues are major parts of this story. Arlington's overall story, then, is not one that is unique in its overall form. However, the manner of growth and the immense success that the city has had does present a unique combination of vigorous pursuit of growth and professional/political acumen that many comparable suburban areas did not have. The economic development environment of the Metroplex pushed the city in ways that other suburban areas might not have been pushed.

Similar to the background information on the Metroplex environment, this background information on Arlington helps us to understand the strategy behind the city's original pursuit of a Major League Baseball team. As we will see, the city initially "bought" the Senators/Rangers to augment their image as a city and to cement their place in the Metroplex. Their decision, twenty years later, to finance a new ballpark for the Rangers is also rooted in this economic development legacy, but only after the city very smartly linked this project to a new round of economic development strategies. With that, let's turn our attention to the Ballpark; its history, its design, its financial success, and the team that calls it home, the Rangers.

The History of Baseball in Arlington

The story of the Ballpark in Arlington begins, not with the Rangers announcement in the early 1990s that they desired a new stadium or else, but rather over twenty-five years ago when the very active Arlington city government convinced a baseball team in our nation's capital to move to a sleepy town in central Texas. In 1972, this city of less than 100,000 could now call themselves "major league" as they had successfully engineered the relocation of the former Senators from Washington D.C. The success of

Arlington in attracting a new baseball team was due to the Mayor Vandergriff's tireless work and the growing attractiveness of the Metroplex as a home to professional sports.

The Rangers Move to Arlington

Prior to the newly-named Rangers arrival in 1972, Arlington had opened their new minor league baseball facility, Turnpike Stadium, in 1965 just west of Six Flags. (See Figure 10.2) Original plans for a baseball stadium were made in the late 1950s when Tarrant County and Dallas County agreed to cooperate on the construction of a new baseball stadium. In 1961, Arlington voters passed a $750,000 bond issue for a new baseball stadium and later that year they purchased the 135 acre site of the future stadium. Because of this arrangement, Arlington's stadium was home to the region's only minor league baseball team and because of that the city had positioned themselves as the likely home to a Major League team, if one could be acquired. The region had been pursuing sports heavily in the late 1950s and 1960s as it grew to become a major metropolitan area while the sports leagues themselves began to recognize that the Metroplex was an excellent location for league expansion.

[See Figure 10.2 on page 403]

The region's first big league sports team was the Dallas Cowboys, a National Football League expansion franchise that began play in the Cotton Bowl in 1960. The financial success of the Cowboys seemed apparent from the early days as the team generally did well financially and on the field the Cowboys developed into a regular league power. The team's long term financial success was guaranteed by suburban Irving's construction of a new facility for the team in the early 1970s. With shrewd management and regular upgrades, this facility is now the leagues most profitable.[31] However, even the financially successful Cowboys have made plans to increase their revenues through a

[31] Badenhausen and Nikolov (1997).

possible move to Arlington or through an expansion of their current stadium to over 100,000 seats.[32]

Despite the attractiveness of the Metroplex, in 1968 Major League Baseball awarded new franchises to San Diego and Montreal, a bitter disappointment to Metroplex leaders, especially Mayor Vandergriff, who had lobbied the lords of baseball strongly for a new franchise. In response to these developments, the city and the region mobilized to attract an existing team to the untapped Metroplex market. Vandergriff, with the support of leaders in nearby cities, began pursuit of the Washington Senators, a team whose lack of success on and off the field made them a likely candidate for relocation. By investing in a baseball stadium years earlier, Arlington had garnered the region's approval and support to vigorously pursue major league baseball for the region.

Prior to their move to Texas, the Washington Senators played in the District of Columbia's RFK Stadium to small crowds and to even less success from 1962 to 1971. In their last few years, the Senators attracted fewer than one million fans to RFK, in part because these teams were awful, losing over 60% of the games they played in most seasons. Zimbalist suggests that the failure of the Senators in Washington D.C. was in large part due to the incompetence of Bob Short as an owner, for which "he was rewarded by being able to move after the 1971 season to Arlington, Texas, which offered him a $7 million loan and a rent-free stadium."[33] At any rate, the Senators were unhappy in Washington and Arlington presented an opportunity for "greener" pastures (especially money-wise).

Interestingly, this was not the first time a Senators team had moved from Washington, D.C.. The original Senators first started playing in the nation's capital in 1901. However, the team relocated to Minneapolis to become the Twins after the 1960

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[32] Team Marketing Report (1998), pp. 179-180.
[33] Zimbalist (1992), p. 251, note 69.

season, a move similarly due to poor fan support and an excellent deal on a stadium in suburban Bloomington. In each of these cases the Senators moved from Washington to a suburban city (Bloomington in 1961, Arlington in 1972) that provided an untapped metropolitan market, an excellent stadium deal, and a promise of increased attendance to a team struggling at the gate and on the field. Further, in each case the suburban city proceeded with the blessing of the region, thereby arresting intra-metropolitan squabbling for a time.[34] In a fascinating twist, in neither case did the suburban city garner the name recognition offered by the naming of the franchise upon the relocation to their city limits; the Twins and Rangers were each named after their home states, not their home cities. So although the teams played in suburban Bloomington and Arlington, the Minnesota Twins and the Texas Rangers to this day remain the official names of the teams.

The move of the Senators from an established city like Washington, D.C. to the small city of Arlington was prompted by several factors. These included;

- *An untapped Metroplex market*: Other than the Cowboys, the fast-growing Metroplex was home to no other major league franchises in 1972 when the Rangers relocated. Since then the Metroplex has added both an NBA franchise (in 1980) and an NHL franchise (in 1993).
- *The city of Arlington's offer*: As noted above Mayor Vandergriff promised to Short a major league stadium with 50,000 seats, a facility with a no-rent lease, and a $7 million loan from the city. These incentives promised to make the Rangers a money-maker, with foregone stadium rent alone totaling several million a year. Further, the newness of Major League Baseball to the region guaranteed attendance increases for several

[34] Both Bloomington and Arlington were subsequently pushed by neighboring jurisdictions when the time came for a new stadium. In Bloomington, Metropolitan Stadium was abandoned by both the Twins and the NFL's Vikings for a new downtown Minneapolis dome that opened in 1982. In Arlington, Dallas pursued the Rangers for a time before the suburban city "won" the right to increase their sales taxes to keep the team in town in the new Ballpark.

years during a "honeymoon period" between the team and the region.[35] Attendance for the Rangers was significantly higher than in Washington, even topping two million by the late 1970s.[36] Estimates have placed the total bill for the relocation of the Senators to Arlington at $44 million for the city.[37]

- *Mayor Vandergriff's dealmaking skills*: The dealmaking skills of Mayor Vandergriff cannot be overstated here. Recall that Vandergriff successfully offered Arlington as a suitable compromise site for a new Metroplex university. He also built a new minor league baseball stadium in Arlington and convinced the region to back Arlington as the site for Major League Baseball in the region. In pursuing the Senators, Vandergriff successfully outlined the (albeit substantial) positive qualities of the city to Short, convincing the owner of the Senators to grab the opportunity before some other team came along. In Arlington, Vandergriff is widely accepted as being the single person responsible for major league baseball in that city. Reportedly, the name for the new stadium in Arlington was proposed to be Vandergriff Stadium, but (the now Judge) Vandergriff turned this honor down.[38] Instead, a pedestrian plaza (the irony!) in center field of the Ballpark is named Vandergriff Plaza and a statue of Vandergriff stands there, usually with a child or two hanging onto it on game days.

Again, as with the growth of Arlington as a city, the move of the Senators to this booming suburban city was a combination of larger national trends, proactive planning, and local political persuasion. The Metroplex market would likely have been filled by any future baseball expansion, simply because the market was too attractive to pass up. So, baseball was no doubt coming to Dallas-Fort Worth eventually. However, the location of

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[35] The "honeymoon period" is the theorized five to ten year period that usually results in higher attendance figures and greater interest in a team when a new facility opens up, when a team relocates to an area, or when an expansion franchise is granted.

[36] Quirk and Fort (1992), p. 81.

[37] Rosentraub, Mark (1977). "Financial incentives, locational decision-making, and professional sports: The case of the Texas Ranger baseball network and the city of Arlington" in Mark Rosentraub's (Ed.) *Financing Government: New Approaches to Old Programs*. Western Social Science Association: Ann Arbor, Michigan, pp. 30-59.

[38] Garcia (1993).

the franchise in Arlington resulted from the city's foresight in financing and constructing a new minor league facility in the 1960s, thereby placing it at the head of the line for any new franchise. After being passed up by the expansion process in 1968, Arlington's leaders, particularly Mayor Vandergriff, began the process of attracting an existing franchise to the city. A not-so-subtle sales job convinced the ailing Senators to relocate, and Arlington suddenly found itself with a Major League Baseball team.

Arlington's Reasons for Pursuing the Rangers

The above discussion does not address an important question pertinent for this case study: Why would a city of only 100,000 pursue a major league baseball franchise? What benefits did hosting a franchise offer to the city? Arlington's almost desperate pursuit of professional baseball, building a minor league stadium, enduring the failure to capture an expansion franchise in 1968, and finally spending over $40 million to attract the Senators from Washington D.C., was rooted primarily in the belief that the city required a big-league team to become a "big-league" city. Even today, locals refer to the city's "big league image" and official government documents have subtitles that refer to the location of the Rangers in Arlington. The cover of the *1993 Strategic Plan for Economic Development* prepared by the Arlington Economic Development Foundation showcases the local saying "The Big League Address for Business". The primary goal of attracting the team to Arlington, then, was an effort to capture that elusive "major league city" status, a status that most studies have suggested does little for a jurisdiction.

In addition to the goal of putting Arlington on the regional map (and later the national map), the attraction of major league baseball was also expected to redirect some leisure spending out of Dallas and Fort Worth into Arlington, thereby infusing the local economy with even more non-local dollars. These dollars were expected to translate into local businesses and local jobs, furthering Arlington's development as a city, rather than just a bedroom community. With a population of only about 100,000 at the time of the Senators relocation to Arlington, the vast majority of the two million fans per year that

would attend events at Arlington Stadium would come from the surrounding region. A recent study by the Convention and Visitors Bureau estimates that over 70% of people visiting the Ballpark, Six Flags, and Hurricane Harbor (another theme park) come from outside of the Metroplex.[39] However, as will be discussed shortly, there is evidence that a significant portion of these tourist dollars escaped the local economy, lowering the impacts of this strategy. Despite the inability of Arlington to capture many of these benefits, the spectacular growth of the city suggests that the stadium did not harm their growth as a city.

Lastly, with the success of Six Flags as a tourist and recreation destination, in the 1960s the city of Arlington stumbled across an industry that is at the heart of many local economies on the 1980s and 1990s. Tourism/recreation has proven to be a very viable industry in the postmodern economy, serving as an important economic base in many cities, and able to generate businesses and jobs for the local economy. The choice of the Six Flags area for the site of the stadium proved to be a useful strategy as, over a period of almost thirty-five years, this district has evolved to become a powerful regional entertainment destination. The location of the Rangers at Arlington Stadium served the long term goal of developing that portion of the city as an entertainment area. This strategy was not fully understood at the time of the Rangers move, but it did appear in later land use plans for that district.

The Arlington Stadium Neighborhood

Despite the success of Arlington's franchise-attraction strategy and the team's newfound success at the gate, this relocation did not come without its problems. First and foremost was Turnpike Stadium, renamed Arlington Stadium when the Rangers moved-in in 1972. Arlington Stadium was originally built for minor league baseball, with a capacity of only 10,000 at its opening in 1965. Capacity was doubled to 20,000 in 1970 and then

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[39] Arlington Convention and Visitors Bureau (1997a). *Arlington Convention Industry*. From a tourism impact study by Decision Analyst, Inc.

again to approximately 36,000 in 1972 when the Rangers moved in. The problems with this arrangement were many. Turnpike/Arlington Stadium was truly a minor league ballpark, with the majority of the seating in the outfield and beyond first and third base, areas not desirable for ballpark patrons because of lengthy sight lines to the infield, nor for the Rangers who could charge higher prices for seats between first and third base. As noted above, the city invested millions in renovations, adding a second deck to increase capacity and provide thousands more of the most desirable seating, but the stadium remained a minor league stadium charading as a major league ballpark until it was demolished in 1995.

Further, when the Rangers relocated to Arlington, they did so with the promise that, at buildout, the stadium would seat at least 50,000 people. Despite their significant investments in seating capacity, Arlington Stadium never contained more than 44,000 seats. The failure to meet this seating requirement dogged the city from day one of the team's existence as the Rangers. Although the city had provided ample concessions to the team, they never did provide the facility they promised to the team.[40] This failure was a major factor in the team's demand for a new facility in the early 1990s. They made it clear that, despite their overall happiness with Arlington and the Metroplex, the city never did meet all its obligations to the team. Last, having been built prior to the lucrative luxury box/club seating revolution, the stadium could not generate the revenues that the Rangers desired. As discussed in earlier chapters, the advent of luxury boxes and club seats is a major factor in the stadium boom and the Rangers were just one of many sports franchises driven by these revenues.

From an economic development perspective, Arlington Stadium had some significant shortcomings as well. Located on a site along I-30 and near the Six Flags amusement park, the stadium seemed ideally located for the creation of a huge entertainment district, one focused upon attracting tourists to Arlington and redirecting

dollars from surrounding jurisdictions into Arlington. Recall that Six Flags was originally constructed to advertise a huge industrial park, now called the Six Flags Business Park, located in the city, an area that city leaders hoped would soon be overflowing with industrial firms, well-paying jobs, and all the benefits accompanying a district like this. Six Flags was originally intended as a temporary operation. However, the success of Six Flags and the mixed success of the Business Park led to the rethinking of this strategy. City leaders recognized the opportunities related to recreation and tourism and Turnpike/Arlington Stadium was located in the area. So the economic development approach for this area of the city was transformed into a two-pronged strategy of pro-industry *and* pro-tourism. While the stadium fit this overall strategy, the stadium did not generate significant spin-off development in the surrounding district. The surrounding district still lay largely under-utilized well into the 1980s.

The lack of direct economic development benefits related to the stadium (and nearby development) was due to several factors. First, the stadium was constructed in the traditional suburban model, with the stadium surrounded on all sides by sprawling parking lots. This design decision was no doubt related to the lack of public transportation in the city and from the site's accessibility via the I-30. Further, the Anaheim development model that Arlington had pursued from its early days, one focusing upon low density development that promoted vehicular access over pedestrian activity, was a major factor in the lack of development of this neighborhood. By surrounding the facility with acres and acres of asphalt, any possible development impacts on the surrounding parcels of land were minimized. Stadium patrons were able to travel to the stadium by car, park in huge lots, attend the game, and return to their car for the return trip home. There was no reason to explore the city, patronize local establishments, or spend time (and money) outside of the stadium. The car was the sole means of transportation and pedestrian links to the surrounding areas were almost non-existent. In addition, despite Arlington's hopes that the stadium would help make the city "major league", visually Arlington Stadium still

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[40] Rosentraub (1997a), pp. 434-435.

looked like a big minor league stadium situated in the middle of nowhere next to an Interstate.

Second, studies of Arlington Stadium have concluded that while the city of Arlington spent millions on the stadium, they were largely incapable of capturing the benefits associated with the stadium. In a 1978 study of Arlington and Irving[41], Rosentraub and Nunn stated that the city of Arlington "made a series of financial policy decisions that brought economic benefits to the area. These benefits, however, are *regional*, not local." (emphasis in original)[42] They concluded that any positive benefits are too spread out over the region to justify investment into a new stadium by a single city. This inability to capture these benefits was likely due, in part, to the economic immaturity of the city of Arlington at the time Arlington Stadium opened. Arlington was a city of about 100,000 when the stadium opened and it is possible that the city had yet to develop the local economy (restaurants, hotels, etc.) to the point that it was able to capture many of the benefits from the stadium. Planning staff, the Chamber, and the Convention and Visitors Bureau indicate that this is still a problem for the city, one that is being rectified by the huge number of restaurants and hotels that continue to sprout in the surrounding area.

A more recent study was undertaken by the same authors, in part to address the possibility that Arlington and Irving had matured since the first study and were now better able to capture any benefits generated by the stadium.[43] Again studying the cities of Arlington and Irving (as well as Dallas) the authors reached a similar conclusion regarding the ability to capture these benefits at the local level. In this study, the authors looked at

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[41] Irving, another suburban Dallas city, built a new stadium for the Cowboys that opened in 1971.

[42] Rosentraub, Mark and Samuel Nunn (1978). "Suburban city investment in professional sports." *American Behavioral Scientist*, January/February: pp. 393-414.

[43] Nunn, Samuel and Mark Rosentraub (1995). "Sports wars: Suburbs and center cities in a zero sum game." *Indiana University Center for Urban Policy and the Environment*. Publication Number 95-U17. This paper also appears in slightly modified form in Rosentraub's (1997) *Major League Losers*, Chapter 14: pp. 418-447.

changes in population levels, fiscal benefits, and the attraction of high skill employment and determined that the experiences of the investor cities (Arlington, Irving, and Dallas) were not any better than non-sports facility investing cities. Nunn and Rosentraub used these findings to push for a regional financing scheme for sports facilities, a recurring theme for Rosentraub.[44] It is important to note that in both of these studies the authors focused solely upon changes in employment, population, and tax revenues and *not* changes to the built form or to the microarea.

Lastly, while the city had for years based much of their success on proactive planning and even master planning, Arlington was found itself in a very different position with the stadium and the Rangers. The city had built a nice minor league stadium, hoped for a major league team, and, with a great amount of marketing and some luck, they attracted an existing franchise. It was at this point that the city went from proactive planning to reactive measures.

First, in the 1960s, the city refocused their overall strategy for the district from entirely industrial to a joint industrial/tourism emphasis. This original decision took foresight, but also required a new round of planning for the district, planning that didn't really occur until the 1980s. Second, the city was continually reacting to team displeasure with Arlington Stadium, providing major upgrades to the stadium, but providing little investment to the area surrounding the stadium. In short, then, the city had developed an overall vision for the district, but had provided little in the way of programming to progress towards that vision. The failure of the city to capitalize on its "major league" luck is no doubt related to the astounding growth that the city was experiencing in the 1970s and 1980s. It would seem that pressing issues, like infrastructure provision, incompatible uses, and other day to day matters interfered with long range planning and programming for the stadium district. As will be seen, this shortcoming was partially addressed in the

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[44] Swindell, David and Mark S. Rosentraub (1998). "Who benefits from the presence of professional sports teams? The implications for public funding of stadiums and arenas." *Public Administration Review*,

late 1980s and into the 1990s with the new Ballpark. In sum, then, from very early on the city of Arlington has been playing catch up in planning for both the stadium and the district that surrounds it.

The above factors all point towards an important consideration for suburban cities that choose to invest in a new sports facility. When the Rangers moved to Arlington, the city was wholly incapable of capturing many of the neighborhood-level benefits associated with a new stadium. Very little development existed nearby, the design of the stadium hindered rather than helped any spin-off development, and planning for the district progressed little beyond the overall goal of "more development". Suburban cities that invest in sports facilities and other special activity generators like convention centers or aquariums should be sure to address these three factors; facility design, existing and potential neighborhood development, and district level planning and programming.

The Push for a New Stadium

Despite their success on and off the field, the Rangers were never wholly satisfied with Arlington Stadium. The facility capacity promised by the city of Arlington was never reached. The stadium was recognized by the team and league as a minor league stadium, one that happened to host a major league team. While Arlington Stadium itself was not a suitable facility for a major league team, the location of the stadium was rarely questioned. The site midway between the region's two major cities offered the Rangers a huge and accessible market. The freeway access offered fans easy travel to the games and ample parking made traffic jams and parking shortages a rarity. Former owner Eddie Chiles recognized the value of the site and made efforts to consolidate the franchise and the stadium in the mid 1980s. He finally purchased Arlington Stadium and the surrounding land for $17.7 million in 1987.[45] Chiles put the team up for sale later in 1987.

January/February 58(1): pp. 11-20.

[45] Bedell, Doug (1990). "Stadium was shaky from start." *Dallas Morning News*, October 25, 6B.

In the first shot of stadium negotiations, the team gave indications to the region that they were interested in getting a new stadium. A 1985 report prepared for then owner Eddie Chiles projected that the Rangers would be losing money by 1993 if they stayed in Arlington Stadium. Prospective buyers of the team criticized the stadium's profitability and cited this as a principal reason for their choosing not to buy the team.[46] These events opened the door for offers from surrounding jurisdictions and the city of Arlington for new facilities.[47] In 1988, a Dallas Councilman advised that city's council that the Rangers should be pursued by offering the necessary incentives to lure the team to that central city.[48] In response, Arlington began marshaling its forces and began making overtures to the team.

In 1989 the Rangers were sold to a group of investors, led by George W. Bush (son of President George Bush and current Governor of Texas) and Rusty Rose. The new owners clarified these requests for a new stadium upon their purchase of the ballclub in 1989. Bush and Rose stated their intent to replace Arlington Stadium while remaining in the Metroplex area. These calls for a new stadium were met by scrambling from local communities to attract the Rangers to their jurisdiction. In July of 1989, Tom Schieffer, a member of the Bush ownership group, was appointed as head of the search committee for a new stadium. It was at this point that the vague requests of the team coalesced and things began to move swiftly.

Other suburban communities, including Irving and Plano, as well as the city of Fort Worth, had preliminary discussions with the Rangers.[49] Despite the interest of neighboring jurisdictions, very early in the process two major suitors for the Rangers were identified; the team's current host city Arlington and Metroplex's largest city Dallas. Dallas offered

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[46] Ibid.
[47] Ringolsby, Tracy (1990a). "Stone's report five years ago showed need for new stadium." *Dallas Morning News*, October 25, 7B.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ringolsby, Tracy (1990b). "Team decided not to hold cities hostage." *Dallas Morning News*, October 25th, 1A, 21A

land and tax abatements, but never presented a financing package that took the majority of the construction costs away from the team. In Schieffer's meetings with then Arlington mayor Richard Greene, the city expressed broad support for the idea and also lined up support from Tarrant County and the State for transportation improvements to the area.[50] Arlington's offer substantially upped the ante and effectively eliminated Dallas from consideration for the new stadium. After announcing their decision to remain in Arlington, reports indicated that many Dallas "insiders" felt that the Rangers used the city as leverage to gain a better offer from Arlington, their desired home all along.[51]

Arlington offered to pay for the vast majority of the construction costs of the new stadium and site preparations, $135 million of an estimated $165 million. This was to be paid for via a 0.5% sales tax increase, but only after voters approved it via a referendum. Schieffer is quoted as saying, "The city of Arlington was very aggressive [in their pursuit of the Rangers and a new stadium]. The city of Arlington wanted to make a deal, and we got it all fit together."[52] On January 19, 1991 voters in the city of Arlington overwhelmingly approved the financing plan for the new stadium almost 21,924 yes votes and 11,936 no votes. The almost 34,000 votes was a record turnout for an Arlington election, topping the 18,431 that turned out for the mayoral election of 1987.[53] In a familiar scenario, in the debate preceding the referendum pro-stadium forces emphasized the economic impacts of the stadium and the team and also suggested the possibility of losing the Rangers and the image benefits that the team provides in their attempts to sway voters.[54] Stadium proponents also noted that the huge number of out of town visitors to Arlington's many entertainment attractions would carry a heavy portion of the tax burden, thereby lessening the impact on local residents. Mayor Greene staunchly supported the

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[50] Ringolsby (1990a).

[51] See Sherrington, Kevin (1990). "Dallas fails to get to bat on stadium." *The Dallas Morning News*, October 26, B5; Jackson, David (1990). "Dallas officials unsure what Rangers wanted." *The Dallas Morning News*, October 26, 1A, 22A.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Lewis, Melanie (1991). "Arlington voters OK tax hike to build stadium." *The Dallas Morning News*, January 20, 1A, 16A.

proposed stadium and his political maneuvering is cited as a major factor in the relatively easy victory for the stadium.

The Financial Arrangements of the New Ballpark

On September 28, 1991 the new stadium was christened with the moniker *The Ballpark in Arlington* to much fanfare and debate. Some people had requested the stadium be named after former Mayor Vandergriff, others pushed for Nolan Ryan Stadium in honor of one of the Rangers' best players. However, Schieffer, the driving force behind the stadium, came up with The Ballpark in Arlington and the support of his fellow owners and that of Mayor Greene clinched the decision. Mayor Greene's support for the facility's name was no surprise as it offered the city continued name recognition via the new facility. The mayor went so far as to say, "I think it's terrific. When they talk about the Coliseum in Rome, you know what they're talking about. This will have the same significance."[55] As noted earlier, Vandergriff's name does appear regularly in the stadium, particularly in the centerfield plaza named after him. Nolan Ryan also has his name attached to a new "expressway" that plows through the site. In appreciation for his efforts, Greene received the honor of having a new nearby linear park named in his honor.[56]

The financial details and specifications for the Ballpark in Arlington is shown in Table 10.3. This table shows both the original plans of the site as of 1990 and the status of those plans as of Summer, 1998. Note that the original plans for the site included an amphitheater and a Riverwalk, including restaurants and retail shops outside the stadium, that have yet to be built. While each of these additional projects is still planned, only the Riverwalk appears to have secured the extra public funding necessary for the completion of this portion of the site.

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[54] Ibid.

[55] Garcia (1993).

[56] Texas businessman Thomas Hicks recently announced his intentions to purchase the Rangers. He also announced that he is willing to sell the naming rights to the facility, possibly terminating the name The Ballpark in Arlington. (Team Marketing Report (1998), p. 96)

Table 10.3 The Ballpark in Arlington Project Specifications

	Original Specifications	*Current Status*
Financing: Total Costs	$165 million	$191 million
--Total from City of Arlington	$135 million	$135 million
--Total from Texas Rangers	$30 million	$30-$50 million
--Total from Ticket surcharge	--	$26 million
Site Specifications		
--Little League Ballfield	Yes	Yes
--Amphitheater	Yes	No
--Hall of Fame Museum	Yes	Yes
--Retail as part of Ballpark	Yes	Yes
--Retail on surrounding site	Yes	No
--Restaurants in Ballpark	Yes	No
--Restaurants on surrounding site	Yes	No
--Linear Park	Yes	Yes
--Riverwalk	Yes	No

Sources: Team Marketing Report (1998), pp. 95-96.

Table 10.4 shows the major revenue streams and to whom they are earmarked, as per the lease agreement between the Rangers and the City of Arlington. Note that the Rangers control almost all of the revenues generated by the stadium. In addition to these, the Rangers have constructed an office building as part of the Ballpark and they control all of these revenues as well. Also, the original deal negotiated by the city called for a rental fee of $5 million per season. Further negotiations between the team and city lowered the team's annual rent to $3.5 million. In large part because of this very generous lease arrangement, The Ballpark in Arlington generated over $25 million in facility revenues for the team in 1996, the most in baseball.[57]

[57] Badenhausen and Nikolov (1997).

Table 10.4 The Rangers' Ballpark in Arlington Lease Agreement

Revenue Streams	*Recipient*
--Facility Owner (see Lease Details)	City of Arlington
--Advertising Revenues	100% to Rangers
--Parking Revenues	100% to Rangers
--Luxury and Club Seating Revenues	1) 95% to Rangers Year 1-4 2) 100% to Rangers in Year 5 and beyond
--Facility Rental Fee	1) Rangers pay $2 million per year to the City 2) Rangers pay an additional $1.5 million per year until the bonds are retired
--Ticket Surcharge ($1 per ticket)	100% to City of Arlington
Lease Details • The Rangers signed a thirty year lease from 1994-2023. • In addition, the team can purchase *The Ballpark in Arlington* at the end of this period for $60 million which would then lock them into the stadium for an additional 10 years.	
Notes • Reports of the original stadium deal placed the Rangers annual rent at $5 million per year. • Tarrant County invested at least $2.5 million in road improvements to the area. • The City of Arlington invested at least $10 million in local road and streetscape improvements.	

Source: Team Marketing Report (1998), p. 95-96.

Lastly, Table 10.5 shows the seating totals and estimated prices for seats and luxury suites at The Ballpark in Arlington as of the 1997 season. Recall that the maximum capacity of the demolished Arlington Stadium was approximately 43,100, with zero luxury boxes and zero club seats. The revenues from the luxury boxes and club seating alone are estimated at over $15 million per season. Note that this total is separate from regular ticket sales. As noted earlier, the Rangers control almost all of this revenue.

Table 10.5 Seating Totals and Prices: The Ballpark in Arlington, 1997

Seating Type	*Number of Seats (or Suites)*	*Price per Seat (or Suite)*
Total Capacity of Ballpark	49,166	--
Regular Seating	(approximately) 41,070	$13.28 (Average)
Luxury Suites	121	
--seasonal rental	100	$40,000-$200,000
--special rental	21	per season
Club Seating	5,306	$2,000-$5,000 per
--Club Level	4,274	game
--Terrace Club	1,112	$1,328 per season (or $30 per game)
		$1,215 per season (or $20 per game)

Source: Team Marketing Report (1998), pp. 95-96.

Ballpark Design

The Ballpark in Arlington opened in 1994 to rave reviews from the baseball community for its inclusion of features of some of the most famous ballparks (not stadiums) of baseball history. From the home run porch in right field reminiscent of Detroit's endangered Tiger Stadium, to the facade arches recalling Chicago's Old Comiskey Park, and to the sizable left field wall bringing to mind Fenway Park's Green Monster in Boston, Arlington's Ballpark attempted to recapture the best elements of some of the most-beloved baseball facilities ever to host a Major League Baseball game.[58] Located adjacent to Interstate 30, in the East-Central section of the city, the Ballpark was sited only a short distance south of the team's original home, Arlington Stadium. Vehicular access to the site is excellent, as in addition to the connections to I-30, a second Interstate (I-20) lies only a few miles due south of the stadium. Further, major arterials criss-cross the area on both the east-west and north-south axes. Parking for stadium patrons is provided in nine lots spread out around the stadium on all four sides, as no public transportation options are available for stadium patrons. (See Figure 10.3)

[58] USA Today (1996b), p. 87.

[See Figure 10.3 on page 404]

In true Texas fashion, the Ballpark also exudes the Lone Star State's sense of style (and sense of self). Lone Star emblems dot the backs of ballpark seats, over thirty cast-stone Longhorn steer heads adorn the outside of the facility, as do twenty-one cast-stone Lone Stars, and the stadium itself is surrounded by a Texas Walk of Fame. From I-30 the stadium conjures up images of a castle across fields of asphalt, accessible only via a bridge across the two lakes that front the facility. This design was chosen by the Rangers after an invitation-only architectural competition, and the team has been quite pleased with the results, with owner Schieffer concluding that the Ballpark "just looks like Texas".[59]

While the baseball community has been pleased with the new stadium, holding the 1995 All-Star game in Arlington, and while fans have flocked to the Ballpark in record numbers, the architectural community has been far less kind to the design. Koerble, in her review of The Ballpark, takes shots at the location, calling the site "contextually challenged" and noting that the stadium is surrounded on almost all sides by "encroaching parking lots", and dismisses the attempts at nostalgia by concluding that the facility is "so self-consciously reverent and referential... that even as it attempts to recycle the memories of old ballparks, it undercuts its own unique sense of place."[60] Even a generally benign stadium guide published by travel experts Fodor's and the USA Today notes that the Ballpark "is in the suburbs, so there's no downtown view. No matter: The Rangers built one, and what they built looks like a block of buildings out of New Orleans."[61] The office building in center field, while attempting to replicate the urban view that was incorporated so successfully in the ballparks in both Baltimore and Cleveland has instead cemented the feeling that this kitschy, albeit attractive stadium could be in Milwaukee or San Diego, much less Texas.

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[59] Quoted in Tarricone (1994), p. 60.
[60] Koerble (1994), p. 25.

The Rangers in Arlington

The Rangers experience in Arlington has been one of tremendous success off the field coupled with less than spectacular success on it. Prior to moving to Arlington, the Senators had been drawing less than a million customers per season to RFK Stadium. On the field the team was equally poor, having only one winning season in their time in Washington. In fact, when the team was moved to Arlington there was much less public displeasure than when the original Senators moved to Minneapolis in 1960. Prior to the final move a group of local investors was put together to buy the team, but only after extensive efforts by the commissioner of baseball to get a local group together.[62] However, this investment group was unable to cobble together the funding to keep baseball in the nation's capital.

Upon moving to Arlington, the team began to experience a financial success that clearly justified the team's relocation to Texas. The Metroplex continues to grow and provide an increasing fan base for the team and increasing the team's revenues from media contracts. For example, the Rangers have drawn over one million fans in every year after the move and since 1985 the team has regularly drawn over 2 million fans. On the field the team has had mixed success, with periods of winning baseball usually followed by a similar period of losing baseball. Despite some years where the team was in contention for the playoffs, the team had the longest non-playoff drought for an expansion team. In 1996, however, the jinx was broken when the team won the West Division Title and made the playoffs for the first time, in the process attracting almost three million fans to their new Ballpark.

The new Ballpark has been particularly kind to the Rangers and owners of the team. Since the opening of the Ballpark, the team has drawn no fewer than 2.5 million in a non-strike year. As for the financial impact on the team, recall that the current ownership

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[61] USA Today (1996b), p. 87.
[62] Danielson (1997), p. 165.

group bought the team for $46.4 million in 1989. *Financial World* magazine[63] placed the value of the franchise in 1993, prior to the opening of the Ballpark, at $106 million dollars. League-wide the mean franchise value in 1993 was $109 million. Since the opening of the Ballpark in 1994, the Rangers have seen an increase in their estimated value reaching $174 million in 1997 ($254 million if the *Forbes* methodology is used). In 1997 the league mean franchise value was $134 million, meaning the Rangers were worth an estimated 130% of the average MLB franchise. (See Table 10.6)

Table 10.6 Estimated Franchise Values for the Texas Rangers and the Mean MLB Franchise 1991-1998 (in millions)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995[1]	1996	1997	1998[2]
Rangers Value	$101	$123	$106	$132	$157	$138	$174	$254
Mean MLB Value	$103.5	$116	$109	$108	$111	$115	$134	$194
Percent of Mean	98%	106%	97%	122%	141%	120%	130%	131%
Rank of Rangers[3]	16th	10th	10th	7th	3rd	9th	7th	6th

[1] 1994 was a strike year in baseball and this resulted in generally depressed team values in 1995.
[2] This value was reached using a different methodology.
[3] This represents the ranking of the team's estimated value in Major League Baseball in that year.
Source: *Financial World* for 1991-1997 values and *Forbes* for 1998 values.

The opening of The Ballpark in Arlington has clearly been a financial boon to the team's financial fortunes. The Rangers overall value vaulted from a ranking of sixteenth in the Major Leagues in 1990, prior to any agreement for a new facility, all the way to third in 1994. In fact, the jump in the Ranger's overall value in 1991 suggests that the agreement for a new facility, finalized in that year, drove up the team's value, prior to the opening of the new facility. Since their peak at a ranking of third in 1994, the Rangers have fallen a few spots in the overall value rankings, mainly because other teams have opened new stadia (Atlanta Braves and Colorado Rockies) and big market teams have been estimated to have higher franchise values because of media revenues (New York

[63] Recall that these are estimates of team values and should not be seen as actual values. *Financial World*

Yankees, Chicago White Sox, Chicago Cubs). Further, *Financial World* estimates that revenues attributable to the Ballpark totaled approximately $25.5 million in 1997 which ranked the Rangers number one in terms of venue revenues, greater than even those of Baltimore, Cleveland, and Colorado.[64] In fact, The Ballpark in Arlington provided more revenue to the team than any other baseball stadium in 1997 and more than any other sports facility other than the NFL's Dallas Cowboys Texas Stadium, which generated over $41 million in revenues to that team.[65]

Clearly, then, the Rangers have experienced a financial success likely surpassing even their greatest hopes. The team is now one of the highest valued MLB franchises, despite a market that is the eighth largest in the nation and on-the-field performance that has never brought the Rangers a pennant. This financial success off the field has translated to success on the field as these venue revenues allowed the Rangers to bid for free agents that they had previously had to bypass because of the high cost of their salaries. High-priced free agents are usually among the best players in baseball and the commitment of millions to them often spells the difference between a winning season and the playoffs. These revenues also allowed the team to keep their own star players, despite escalating player salaries. All of this came together in 1996 when the team made the playoffs for the first time with a team made up of free agents such as Will Clark and local stars Pudge Rodriguez and Juan Gonzalez.

In sum, The Ballpark in Arlington has restructured the Rangers both financially and competitively. The team will likely now be a regular contender, with their newfound ability to pay the salaries required to field a top-flight squad. After making the playoffs in 1996, the Rangers competed for a division title in 1997, but fell short of making the

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estimates these franchise values from industry information, interviews, and available public information.

[64] Badenhausen and Nikolov (1997). Note that these totals include luxury suite revenues, parking revenues, concession revenues, advertising revenues, but *not* revenues from regular seating and club seating.

[65] Ibid.

postseason for a second time. However, the team was able to sign important free agents, such as reliever John Wetteland, and prospects in coming seasons for the Rangers appear quite good. In the Rangers boardroom changes also appear imminent as businessman Thomas Hicks, owner of the NHL's Dallas Stars, has put together a group to buy the team, the Ranger's office facility in the Ballpark complex, and approximately 40 acres in the surrounding area for approximately $250 million.[66] Hicks has also announced that he is willing to sell the naming rights to the Ballpark, possibly ending Arlington's enduring presence in the name of their team's facility. As for the current owners, their commitment to the building of a new facility has translated to an amazing return on their investment. From an initial investment of $48.4 million in 1989, the current owners will receive $250 million for the franchise as well as any profits from the team in their ownership years. A better deal is hard to find, even in a booming stock market.

As we have seen, financial and on-the-field success for the Rangers was guaranteed by the construction of the new stadium and the generous lease arrangements between the team and the city. Unfortunately, the success of the Ballpark for the Rangers has not been as clear-cut a success for the city of Arlington. While the surrounding area has seen some changes, including some small projects directly attributable to the new stadium, the immediate area is still covered by acres of asphalt, rendering the site a lonely, largely desolate place, even when covered by 13,000 cars. However, despite the presence of this ocean of asphalt, the new Ballpark *has* been more effective in generating localized, neighborhood-level benefits than the old Arlington Stadium. The positive benefits to the city and, more important for this study, to the microarea are quite broad despite some curious design decisions and a number of yet to be completed collateral projects like the proposed amphitheater. As we will see next chapter, these benefits are due to a combination of factors, including a more comprehensive economic development strategy for the area and a more mature city of Arlington. It is to the effects of The Ballpark in Arlington on Arlington that we now turn.

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[66] Team Marketing Report (1998), p. 96.




Figure 10.1 Dallas-Fort Worth Metropolitan Area




Figure 10.2 Ballpark Area Major Features Map




Figure 10.3 The Ballpark in Arlington Complex

Chapter 11

Arlington's Ballpark: An "Entertainment District" in the 'Burbs

—"The Ballpark in Arlington stands apart, though, because it is part of a larger concept. The Rangers... wanted a facility that would be used 365 days a year and not just on those days when Major League baseball would be played."

—Dan Langendorf, local commentator[1]

—"We wanted to build a place to play baseball, but we also wanted to build something that would become the center of the community."

—Tom Schieffer, Rangers Team President[2]

The Texas Rangers hosted Major League Baseball's All-Star Game in July of 1995, a coming out party of sorts for the city and an introduction of the Ballpark to all of Major League Baseball. The focus of North America's oldest professional sports league was on Arlington, Texas, a city that forty years ago was a sleepy little town of twenty thousand and that just twenty-five years earlier was little more than a suburban bedroom community for Dallas and Fort Worth. In the intervening years, the city had acquired a major league baseball team, grown at an amazing pace to become the seventh largest city in Texas, and emerged as an important regional employment and entertainment center. The media attention and fan spending from the All-Star Game poured millions into the local economy and helped to slowly change the view of Arlington, one summarized by that city's convention center director as "we're the other Arlington, without the big cemetery."[3] Shown on television sitting on top of a small rise, next to a man-made lake, The Ballpark in Arlington sparkled and the game was a resounding success for the Rangers, the Ballpark, and the city of Arlington.

At one point during the telecast of the All-Star Game, the broadcast cut to the ubiquitous "blimp view" of the stadium and the surrounding district. This shot was taken

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[1] Langendorf, Dan (1994). *Ballpark in Arlington Opening Day Commemorative Program*. April 11.
[2] Quoted in Langendorf.
[3] Interview with Joyce Odom, Director of the Arlington Convention Center, April 1998.

from a blimp hovering above the Ballpark and it is supposed to give viewers nationwide a glimpse of the environment outside of the stadium and the city that the local team calls home. In Baltimore the huge Warehouse and the bustling Inner Harbor is showcased, in Washington D.C. the nation's capital or maybe the Mall is captured by the camera, and in New York Manhattan's towering skyscrapers are shown. When recalling this shot of the Ballpark district during 1995's All-Star game, one local observer remarked, "It was kind of embarrassing. Here's this beautiful stadium surrounded by cars, next to an Interstate. The area is covered by parking lots and it doesn't look like there's any development nearby. The Ballpark could have been anywhere."[4]

Despite Arlington's phenomenal growth in the 1970s and 1980s, prior to that summer night 1995 the neighborhood containing the new Ballpark, Six Flags, and Hurricane Harbor (another amusement park) remained largely undeveloped, with acres of parking, a mish-mash of local land uses, and a still-developing district character. The Metroplex viewed the area as a regional entertainment focal point, one best accessed by car and experienced on foot as little as possible. Clearly, Arlington can not compete in the same way with the beauty of Washington D.C.'s Mall, New York's financial district, or even Baltimore and Cleveland's urban ballpark settings. Those other places are very urban in character, with a history and identity that a low density, suburban city like Arlington can never attain. However, while the neighborhood surrounding The Ballpark in Arlington will likely never become a high density, pedestrian-oriented, truly urban place, the district does have an opportunity to mature into an interesting, attractive, and more complete economic engine for the city.

The city of Arlington has long recognized that its entertainment district is in need of definition, identity, and a common vision. This chapter will investigate the city's attempts at transforming this district from its original industrial roots into a thriving

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[4] Interview with Rod Hissong, Professor of Urban and Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Arlington, April 1998.

regional recreation center. From public-private plans that began in the 1980s, through the financing of the Ballpark in the early 1990s, this "stadium in the 'burbs" represents an excellent example of a suburban city attempting to reap the full range of benefits from a new sports facility. A fascinating combination of planning tools, urban design guidelines, facility design decisions, and a partially untapped recreation market have all combined to slowly remake this district. As a consequence, a common vision for the district is now pervasive, investments into local infrastructure and facilities have been undertaken, and some private development has been stimulated. Despite these positive changes, the Ballpark district still remains a rather odd place, littered with vacant land, abutting an important industrial area, and still with a mish-mash of land uses.

This chapter begins by defining the boundaries of the Ballpark microarea, a difficult task given the phenomenal growth of the city and its orientation towards the automobile. The chapter continues by outlining the recent history of this district, placing it in the context of the rest of the city of Arlington. Following that, a discussion is presented of the efforts of local government and public-private partnerships (as seen in the previous chapter, a hallmark of Arlington's development) to enhance and develop the district. Within the last ten years, city government has finally found the time and energy to plan for this district, resulting in a better vision of its future. Our attention then turns to the actual effects of the Ballpark on the surrounding district. An analysis of parcel level changes is presented, with an emphasis on zoning changes, changes to the built form, and a look at local parcel values representing the core of this work. In addition to these parcel level changes, a host of miscellaneous effects on the district that are at least partially attributable to the new ballpark are discussed. Finally, an assessment of the full range of these effects is presented, pointing towards some implications for suburban areas that choose to invest in sports facilities.

A Brief Tour of the Ballpark Area

The original Arlington Stadium was located less than half a mile south of Interstate 30, one of two east-west superhighways that cross Arlington. As we have seen this site offered stadium-goers excellent vehicular access and helped to fill out an area of the city that Arlington had long promoted as an industrial area. Figure 11.1 presents this area in simplified form, showing the location of the original Arlington Stadium, the Ballpark, major arterials and highways, and major local employers like Six Flags and General Motors.

[See Figure 11.1 on page 441]

To begin our tour, to the west of Arlington Stadium and the Ballpark lies a major north-south arterial, Collins Street, that also provides access to the Interstate 30. By 1990 Collins Street had developed as a major retail/commercial strip, with many fast food restaurants, strip malls, and shopping centers. The whole length of Collins in that area is littered with these developments, although a few multi-family housing projects also can be found along the street. Across Interstate 30 to the north lies a fascinating area, with a mix of housing, retail, and office developments. The primary east-west arterial for this area is Lamar Boulevard, a divided four lane road, along which are a number of large apartment projects, numerous hotels, and a growing set of office and business parks. In addition, a large set of vacant or under-developed land can be found along Lamar, making this area one of the fastest growing areas in Arlington. Lamar also has access to SH 360, the major north-south highway for the area.

The principal highway along the eastern side of the area is State Highway 360 (SH 360), formerly a four lane arterial that has been expanded into a six lane, limited access, divided highway for much of the length of Arlington. SH 360, for all purposes, serves as a major highway for the city, in large part because it is one of the principal routes to the DFW Airport to the north. Along the southern edge of the area lies Division Street, another east-west arterial for Arlington, one with access to SH360 to the east and a direct

feeder into downtown Arlington to the west. Division Street is another four to six lane arterial, along which travels a great deal of truck traffic that serves the Six Flags Business Park. Rail lines serving the industrial portions of this district run along much of Division Street as well.

In addition to these major roads at the district boundaries, there are a number of other important arterials and collectors that serve this very busy area. Randol Mill Road is yet another major east-west arterial that traverses Arlington and continues west to Fort Worth. Two collectors link Collins Street to Stadium and Ballpark parking areas; Copeland Road, a service road that runs along the southern side of Interstate 30, and The Road to Six Flags West, a four lane road with reversible signals allowing traffic to enter and exit the Ballpark area more quickly. Running north-south are collectors with baseball-related names; Pennant Drive, Ballpark Way/Stadium Drive, and Nolan Ryan Expressway. Six Flags Drive is a principal collector for the Six Flags Business Park. Lastly, a service road for SH 360 runs along the western edge of that highway, providing access to the minor roads serving the Ballpark area, Six Flags, and the Six Flags Business Park.

Also criss-crossing the area is Johnson Creek, an important waterway for the city because it serves as a major collector of runoff during the area's many thunderstorms. The creek runs from northeast to southwest, usually with low water levels and a great deal of unused capacity. Johnson Creek has become increasingly important as a storm water management device as more development has sprouted up in Arlington's north and northeast, and this development has led to increases in runoff that must flow through this waterway. The Army Corps of Engineers and the city have upgraded the waterway a number of times over the years in attempts to increase Johnson Creek's capacity, thereby minimizing any flood damage that might occur to the area. Flooding problems in the Ballpark area have been particularly few, in part because of upgrades to the waterway as a result of the new Ballpark. The role of Johnson Creek as an important storm water

management tool has served as both an amenity to the area and as an obstacle to development on the site.

Figure 11.2 presents a conceptual overview of the area's land use, illustrating the commercial strip along Collins Street, the commercial development along SH-360, the entertainment uses of Six Flags and the water park, and the Stadium/Ballpark at the center of the district. To the north and northeast of the ballpark sit a number of vacant parcels and an interesting mix of multi-family developments and commercial/retail development. To the northwest is a fast-growing office park. The southern edges of the microarea find a long-standing industrial/warehousing area that is a hallmark to the district's industrial roots.

[See Figure 11.2 on page 442]

The History of the Ballpark Area

The neighborhood surrounding The Ballpark in Arlington is one best described as a district with an identity crisis. In this district you can find flashy new restaurants such as Fridays, Cozymels, or Pappadeaux's, shopping centers containing national chains like Barnes and Noble, The Limited, and CompUSA, and numerous hotels, including Courtyard by Marriott, Fairfield Inn, and the Arlington Hilton. In addition to the Ballpark, the district has numerous other tourism and recreation related projects; Six Flags, Hurricane Harbor, a Funplex, and an Antique Mall. In contrast to these uses, which are compatible and in many ways complementary, located nearby are acres and acres of nondescript warehouses and manufacturing centers that are accompanied by large trucks rumbling in and out of the district delivering and receiving goods throughout the day. Other industrial and manufacturing-related office and retail developments litter the area, housing furniture outlets, small corporate centers, and snack shops for local workers. The character of this portion of the neighborhood is decidedly different from the theme park and twenty-four hour a day recreation feel.

If the differences between these areas weren't enough, the center of this district is best described as an asphalt sea, interspersed with trees, a small lake, and, oh yes, a Ballpark. Despite this lack of identity and the existing schizophrenic character, when seen from an economic development perspective this area represents an ideal situation for any district within most jurisdictions. The Ballpark microarea currently has two vibrant economic bases, industrial/manufacturing and tourism/recreation, ones that have coexisted and thrived, though not entirely without local conflicts. As we will see shortly, the city of Arlington has long walked a tightrope for this area, promoting both of these bases with a combination of incentives, zoning designations, and siting decisions.

Beginning in 1950, this area was intended to be a major industrial area, one centered around one of Arlington's most important employers, General Motors. In 1954 General Motors opened their plant in Arlington, bringing jobs to the city and initiating a period of amazing growth for that sleepy bedroom community. The plant was located along an important east-west rail line and between what would turn out to be major east-west Interstates through the Metroplex. In addition to the siting of the GM Plant in this area, a sprawling business and industrial park was created to help further develop the area as a manufacturing and industrial center. As a means to promote this business park, the city and state invested in an amusement park, intending it as a temporary operation that would draw attention to the city and the area. However, the surprising success of this amusement park permanently altered the landscape of this microarea.

Six Flags over Texas opened in 1961 to huge crowds and almost immediate financial success. Regionally the booming Metroplex was starving for recreational opportunities, so the amusement park became a regional recreation attraction. Further, the warm Texas climate helped the Metroplex to become a popular tourism destination and the park did well as an attraction for national tourists as well. As a result of the success of the park, Six Flags remained open and in recent years has regularly drawn upwards of three million visitors a year. However, the success of the amusement park did not translate

into complete success for the business park that Six Flags was meant to promote. The area saw some spin-off development, with much of the early business related to the existence of the GM Plant. With the opening of the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport in the early 1970s the business park also saw new airline and airport service related development.

In 1965 the city of Arlington debuted its minor league baseball stadium on a site just west of the Six Flags amusement park. It was hoped that the stadium would mirror the success of Six Flags, serving as a regional attraction, thereby bringing dollars to Arlington and further fueling its growth. The location of the stadium made sense because of its proximity to Interstate 30, but it also signaled a shift in local policy for the district. No longer was the area intended solely as an industrial and manufacturing park, but it now had been identified as an emerging recreation and tourism center. In 1972, with the relocated Rangers now a permanent tenant for the stadium, the district had fully begun its transformation into a district based on two divergent industries.

Since the early 1970s this district has seen a great deal of new development, some related to the older industrial roots of the district and some clearly suited for the new recreation model. The business park to the east and southeast continued to fill out, although substantial vacant land remained. The parcels immediately surrounding the GM Plant developed to take advantage of the auto plant and the proximity to the railroad. To the west, along Collins Avenue, commercial and retail development sprouted up, although much of it was oriented towards locals rather than tourists. To the east, the fast growing State Road 360 corridor was also developing as a commercial route, with numerous restaurants, a mall, and related development cropping up. As an illustration of the city's commitment to this area as an entertainment center, in 1984 the Arlington Convention Center opened immediately east of Arlington Stadium, between the stadium and Six Flags. This facility has steadily attracted more events and attendees since its opening, further establishing the area as an entertainment area. In addition to the Convention Center, a

large hotel was also built on site, further pushing the area towards an entertainment-based economy.

Arlington's Ballpark Area in 1990

As of 1990, the Ballpark area had evolved into a multifaceted, decidedly mixed-use district. The city had begun to fully invest in the district as an entertainment center (to be described shortly) and the demographic and land use data reflect this orientation. Using data from the 1990 United States Census, Figures 11.3, 11.4 11.5, and 11.6 display the demographic character of Arlington, just a year before the agreement for the new Ballpark was reached. This provides benchmarks for the district and illustrates the fit of the microarea into the overall organization of the city of Arlington.

[See Figures 11.3, 11.4, 11.5 and 11.6 on pages 443-446]

Figure 11.3 shows the distribution of population in the city, clearly indicating Arlington's pattern of low density sprawl. As for the Ballpark area, the district has a lower population density than almost all other areas of the city, but this is related in large part to the presence of the city's railyards in the area and the location of the GM Plant, both of which have tended to keep new housing developments from locating nearby. As for median household income, Figure 11.4 reveals that Arlington has grown to have problems similar to many other urbanized areas, with lower incomes clustered about the downtown and industrial centers of the city. Not surprisingly, the newer suburban areas at the outskirts of the city have higher incomes, a pattern we saw previously in Baltimore and Cleveland. Figure 11.5 also presents a familiar picture, with whites living largely outside of the "downtown" core[5] and minorities clustered about the central city. Lastly, Figure 11.6 illustrates the percentage of households living below the poverty line in 1990. This map largely mirrors the median household income map, with higher poverty areas clustered primarily about downtown Arlington and in the industrial areas of the city. The Arlington

data indicate that that city has experienced some growing pains, ones unavoidable even in cities that eschew mass transit and promote other strategies that attempt to minimize the number of lower income households (like zoning out mobile home parks and looking unkindly upon multi-family housing).

All of the above maps support the conclusion that, unlike Cleveland and Baltimore, Arlington chose to locate the new stadium in this district not as a means to *revitalize* the area, but rather to further develop it as an entertainment district. Arlington was not pursuing a "revitalization strategy", but rather an entertainment strategy, one begun accidentally over thirty years earlier. Census data indicate that the Ballpark microarea generally has fewer people, lower median household incomes, more minorities, and somewhat higher poverty than most of the rest of the city. However, the most depressed areas of the city are located in the old downtown and surrounding this area. If the new Rangers stadium had been located in the downtown, then a "revitalization" strategy would have been more relevant. Instead, the location of the new Ballpark was related to the city's long term goal of transforming the Ballpark district into a regional and national entertainment center.

In 1990, the North Central Texas Council of Governments (NCTCOG), a regional agency aimed at promoting regional strategies and solutions, undertook a land use survey of urbanized areas for the region. This survey was done at the census tract level and further supports Arlington's intentions of specializing the Ballpark microarea as an entertainment complex. Figures 11.7 and 11.8 are taken from this land use survey.

[See Figures 11.7 and 11.8 on pages 447-448]

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[5] Despite Arlington's decidedly suburban and auto-oriented setting, the "downtown core" is still considered an important part of the city by local leaders. They have been actively discussing and pursuing strategies to revitalize this portion of the city.

Figure 11.7 shows the percent of land in retail or lodging uses for the city of Arlington. The map shows that the area surrounding the old stadium had begun to be developed for entertainment uses, illustrating that the process of transforming this district from industrial to tourism/recreation was well underway. Not surprisingly, the co-location of the original Arlington Stadium, Six Flags, and the Convention Center since 1961 had served to push this district towards retail and lodging land uses. There is also evidence that there was some spillover to surrounding tracts as well, with retail and lodging uses locating in the largely industrial district to the southeast. However, the transformation of this district into Arlington's most active entertainment area and the spillover of retail and lodging into surrounding districts did not come without costs.

Figure 11.8 presents the percentage of land in industrial uses in 1990. The census tract housing the General Motors plant and the business park, established in the late 1950s, is clearly Arlington's industrial engine, with fully 60% of the land in that tract in industrial use in 1990. Only one other tract in the city, a few miles to the southwest has over 15% of its land in industrial uses. Two tracts outside of Arlington's city limits to the east (in the city of Grand Prairie) also have high percentages of their land in industrial use at the time of the survey, suggesting that some industrial spin off development was lost to these areas. All of this suggests that the transformation of the Ballpark microarea into an entertainment district has pushed some industrial development into neighboring jurisdictions.

So as of 1990 the city of Arlington was dealing with the following factors: a baseball team unhappy with its current facility and openly discussing its options with neighboring jurisdictions; a district of the city that is neither terribly poor, nor terribly well off, but one that has clearly been developing into an entertainment center; and an adjacent district long identified as the industrial engine of the city, but that has been constrained and encroached upon by the entertainment district. To this mix we must add the Arlington's very active government and the local Chamber of Commerce. These two entities came

together in the 1980s and early 1990s to more clearly define the Ballpark district and push this district towards its new identity.

Planning Efforts for the Ballpark Area

As outlined in the previous chapter, Arlington has a long history of active government, proactive planning, and public-private partnerships. The attraction of General Motors in the 1950s and the Senators in the 1970s illustrates the city's long commitment to serving business needs. The first Comprehensive Plan and the litany of citywide and sector specific plans that have followed point to the importance of planning for the city's development. Related to these is the city's commitment to working with the private sector to solve problems, address needs, and keep businesses in town. The Ballpark microarea represents an excellent example of the convergence of these three legacies, with leadership from the Mayor's office, district-level planning, and joint commitments from the public and private sectors having solidified the Ballpark neighborhood as a vibrant and still growing entertainment center.

Despite the presence of Six Flags and the old Arlington Stadium, the Ballpark area was still littered with vacant properties and largely under-utilized, even as late as 1990. Although the area had become an important regional entertainment center, many of the benefits of this distinction were lost by Arlington as the surrounding neighborhood had not developed the full range of hotels, restaurants, and other recreational opportunities that would insure that these benefits stayed with the city. It is true that the city had begun to fill out, with Collins Street further developing as a major retail arterial and portions of the area north of I-30 beginning to develop, but the district still largely was unable to capitalize on its significant advantages.

In response to these (lack of) developments, the city began to martial its resources and invest in the district. Their first major attempt at increasing the productivity of the district was the siting of a convention center/hotel complex just west of the old Arlington

Stadium. The Convention Center opened in 1985 with almost 57,000 total square feet of exhibition and meeting space. The facility has generally been a success for the city, earning enough income to cover its operating expenses, while bringing over 300,000 attendees to events at the center since 1990.[6] This investment continued the development of this district as an entertainment center, pouring convention dollars into the area and helping to push the specialization of the surrounding district.

With these convention visitors added to the mix of visitors generated by Arlington Stadium (2 million) and Six Flags (3 million) the district had clearly become big business for the city, rivaling the impacts of any other industry in Arlington. Yet, even with the opening of the Convention Center in the mid 1980s, a guiding vision and plan for the district still was not in place. The district had developed as a major entertainment center, at first by accident, then by other siting decisions, but a comprehensive approach to the district was still missing. Even relatively simple unifying elements, like distinct signage, common landscaping elements, or even a clear name for the area were still not a part of the district as late as 1987. For example, at that time the area surrounding Arlington Stadium and Six Flags was referred to as the entertainment area, the entertainment district, or the Six Flags/Stadium area. No single name for the district existed. It was at this point that the convergence of the three identified elements, active leadership, proactive planning, and public-private partnerships, began in earnest.

While work progressed on the 1987 City of Arlington Comprehensive Plan, government officials and the private sector came to recognize that this entertainment area had fully evolved into a major employment center, but one that remained largely untapped by the city. So, in tandem with the Comprehensive Plan, an "Economic Development and Marketing Plan for Arlington, Texas" was prepared by the city and the Chamber of Commerce.[7] This document called for a more comprehensive approach to marketing the

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[6] Interview with Odom; City of Arlington (1992), p. 3.10.
[7] City of Arlington (1992), p. 3.6.

city and for further developing the city's economic base, including tourism. In addition, the Marketing Plan also called for the creation of an "Economic Development Foundation", a joint partnership between the city and Chamber of Commerce. Between 1989 and 1992, the city poured over $1.2 million into the foundation. This Foundation focused its efforts upon "a major economic development program promoting both business retention and attraction."[8] A public-private partnership in this form is not uncommon in most cities, as most cities willingly invest in foundations whose sole focus is upon economic development initiatives. However, this partnership is important for this study because it represents Arlington's recognition that it could not simply rely upon its locational advantages or sporadic development projects to develop the city (and this district). Although the foundation has since ceased to exist, its creation was an early part of the process that ultimately generated a comprehensive strategy for the Ballpark district.

The comprehensive planning process was also instrumental in the creation of another public-private group, one whose effect upon the Ballpark area cannot be overstated. Between 1985 and 1987, an informal group came together to discuss economic development potential of the Johnson Creek Corridor between Division Street and I-30. Initially this group was interested in exploring ways to more fully develop and visually enhance Johnson Creek corridor, in an effort to develop it as a neighborhood level amenity and not just a functional city waterway. In 1987 the group was formally designated the Johnson Creek Committee by the City Council and was charged with the task of developing a "conceptual plan" for the area. Members of this advisory group included local landowners (including major landowners like Six Flags and the Rangers), major developers, local residents, and members of city government. The Committee identified three primary goals for its work:[9]

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[8] Ibid.

- To make Johnson Creek more attractive and accessible for the general public.
- To enhance existing development in the entertainment district by creating a sense of unity through the establishment of visual and transportation links between the principal activity areas.
- To encourage economic development of the district by attracting entertainment and tourism related businesses which would complement existing activities.

Reflective of Arlington's past planning experience, this group was initially developed to address a single problem, developing and enhancing the Johnson Creek Corridor. However, while tackling these design issues and developing its conceptual plan, the group came to recognize that a more important issue than just the development of the creek corridor lay before them; the district as a whole was lacking an identity and, further, an overall plan for the district was clearly needed. To quote from the 1992 Comprehensive Plan, "it was during the development of this conceptual plan that the focus shifted from Johnson Creek itself to the Entertainment Area of which the creek was a part."[10] Committee members moved beyond a specific programming question, "How to best develop Johnson Creek?", to a larger, more strategic pursuit, "How should the entire district be developed and promoted?". To address its primary goals, the Johnson Creek Committee developed an overall conceptual plan for the district, presenting their final recommendations to the city in July of 1989. Among these early recommendations were improving the local transportation system, developing a set of urban design guidelines for the area, and developing a mixed-use, entertainment-related center.

It is essential to note that this early effort represented the first clear effort of any government sanctioned body to formulate larger strategies and possible policy options for this district. Recall that the district had been slowly developing as an entertainment center since the success of Six Flags in the 1960s. The addition and subsequent upgrades of

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[9] The foregoing description and the following goals are taken from the 1992 Arlington Comprehensive Plan, p. 3.14.

Arlington Stadium throughout the 1970s served to solidify this economic base. Add to this dynamic mix the Convention Center in the mid 1980s and the district was clearly establishing itself as a year round tourism and recreation destination serving the local community, the Dallas-Fort Worth region, and, increasingly, a national audience. Despite these developments, no neighborhood level planning had been undertaken and no guiding policies had been developed for the area during these twenty-five years. Although it was clearly understood that the district was to develop as an entertainment center, no distinguishable efforts to shape this district as such were undertaken, other than the siting of complementary facilities in the district. Despite Arlington's long history of proactive planning, economic development planning was regularly bypassed by other types of planning including citywide comprehensive plans or problem specific water management or transportation plans. Even in this case, the Johnson Creek Committee initially came together to address a specific task (the creek itself), but its attention soon turned to a larger task, that of the development of the entire district.

After receiving the Johnson Creek Committee's report in 1989, the city asked the Committee to develop a set of measures that could be implemented in the short term to enhance the appearance and marketability of the district. Their second report, titled "Design Guidelines and Standards for the Entertainment District", was completed by August 1990. Included in this document was an eight step action guide for the district. These eight recommendations were:[11]

1. Adopt an official name for the area
2. Award a design contract for unified signage for the area
3. Adopt and construct unified signage for the area
4. Identify and secure funding for a design contract for a prototype streetscape with unique lighting, banners, landscaping, etc. for the area

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[10] City of Arlington (1992), p. 3.14.
[11] Ibid, pp. 3.14-3.15.

5. Identify and secure funding for a design contract for the three primary gateways into the area
6. Identify and secure funding for streetscape improvements and other capital improvement projects in the area
7. Encourage the major property owners in the area to incorporate into a non-profit association to further enhance the area
8. Consider developing an overlay zoning district for the area to more easily implement the above urban design recommendations.

Of the eight major recommendations made by the Johnson Creek Committee, all but one was implemented, as the non-profit corporation (#7) never took flight. The City Council officially adopted the name "Arlington's Magic Mile" for the district soon after these recommendations were made and money was allocated for a streetscape plan for the area. Since 1991, as part of the new Ballpark project, major upgrades to the transportation network were made and extensive urban design improvements were implemented, upgrading the look of the district and providing a set of unifying visual clues to visitors to the "Magic Mile". In addition, a number of these recommendations were incorporated into the 1992 Comprehensive Plan, thereby ensuring institutional support and possible funding for these efforts.[12] Lastly, a major overhaul to the city's zoning system was implemented in 1993, including the creation of a new overlay zoning district for the Magic Mile area.

However, these efforts have not had the full range of effects intended. As for Arlington's Magic Mile, the name has never really taken hold in the local lexicon. Locals refer to this district as the "Entertainment District", despite signs in the district referring to it as the Magic Mile. One observer suggested that the problem was not the name, but the mile they chose to identify as "magic". Hissong commented that, "They chose the mile between SH360 and Stadium Drive as the "Magic Mile", but that area was largely industrial and not likely to be developed as a retail corridor. Why they didn't choose

Copeland or even Randol Mill as the "Magic Mile", I'm not sure."[13] When I visited the Ballpark for research on this project, during interviews I often referred to the district as the "Magic Mile", but upon receiving quizzical looks usually had to clarify myself by saying that I meant "the district by the Ballpark" or "the Entertainment District". While the identification of the district as "Arlington's Magic Mile" has never taken off, there is the sense among locals that the district has developed an identity and that the name for this district is the rather unimaginative (but correct) "Entertainment District".

In addition to the failure of the name to take hold, most of the other improvements to the district have turned out to be largely cosmetic in nature. Clearly, the major transportation improvements, including the widening of some roads (Randol Mill), the creation of others (Nolan Ryan Expressway), and the building of a new set of ramps connecting I-30 and Ballpark Way (formerly Stadium Drive), have helped traffic circulation during events and during the daily commute. However, the urban design improvements were largely only band-aids on some greater problems. The addition of unique signage, banners, and some streetscape improvements have made the roads a bit more attractive, but functionally, these places are still entirely built for cars, used by cars, and to be avoided by pedestrians, the group most likely to enjoy these changes. These measures have produced some changes to the Ballpark environment, but these changes have only served to make a dull, unfriendly landscape a little more attractive. Recall, though, that the City Council had requested some immediate measures to improve the district, so these changes may be seen as having their intended effect.

Of the eight original recommendations, the change that has likely had the greatest effect on the neighborhood was the creation of a zoning overlay district for the area, one that governs the use of most of the nearby land. A new "Festival" zoning overlay district was created and implemented in 1993 as part of a restructuring of the existing zoning

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[12] Ibid. pp. 15-17.
[13] Interview with Hissong.

designations of the city. The simplification of the zoning ordinance was undertaken to pursue "performance based" zoning, one that maximizes uses and simplifies the system in an effort to promote further development.[14] The new Festival Zoning District is shown in Figure 11.9.

[See Figure 11.9 on page 449]

Another planning technique has also been applied to parts of this district. In 1992 the "Great Southwest Enterprise Zone" was established by the state of Texas and the city of Arlington. This enterprise zone was developed as part of the package developed to keep General Motors in Arlington, but it was also created to protect the old Six Flags Business Park established back in the late 1950s. Because of the success of the Entertainment District, this Enterprise Zone also serves to protect this area from encroachment by the entertainment uses. A number of parcels in the northwest portion of the Enterprise Zone have already become hotels and restaurants, clearly better suited for Six Flags and the Ballpark than rail lines, warehouses, and eighteen wheelers. Incentives for this Zone include lower tax rates, outright tax abatements, lower development fees, and low or no-cost capital improvements on a case by case basis. The Great Southwest Enterprise Zone is also shown in Figure 11.9. In addition, a second Enterprise Zone, covering Arlington's decayed central business district was created in 1994. However, the boundaries for this district do not overlap the Entertainment District.

What is important to take away from the above discussion is the recency of the planning efforts for this Entertainment District. All of the planning efforts described occurred within the past ten to twelve years, despite the emergence of this area as a regional entertainment center in the late 1970s and through the 1980s. While programming decisions like the siting of the Convention Center clearly indicated an overall understanding of the area as an entertainment center, the district lacked an identity and an overall vision until these planning efforts began. While others have suggested that

[14] Interview with City of Arlington Planning Staff, April 1998.

Arlington was unable to capture many of the benefits associated with this industry because of the relative immaturity as a city, I think that the above evidence also suggests that the district was unable to capture some of these benefits due to a poorly expressed strategy for the area. The implementation of design improvements, transportation improvements, the creation of an "identity" for the district, and an overall plan for development have helped Arlington to more fully capture the spin-off impacts and spending impacts of a district that sees more than six million visitors a year. Prior to the late 1980s, the city largely followed the "if you build it, they will come" strategy adhered to in most cities. Only after bringing together local land owners, developers, citizens, and city officials was a coherent, single vision for the district developed. The following section outlines the microarea level effects of this strategy.

Microarea Impacts of the Ballpark in Arlington

Before addressing these questions, one formality remains. I have written at great length about a number of overlapping districts; the entertainment area, the Ballpark area, Arlington's "Magic Mile", a Festival zoning overlay district, and, finally, the unimaginative, aptly titled, and commonly used "Entertainment District". What is needed here is the delineation of the area of study for this project. What is needed is the definition of the Ballpark Microarea. As with the microareas in Baltimore and Cleveland, the delineation of a Ballpark microarea in Arlington is complicated by a number of factors. Man-made barriers, like transportation lines, can act as boundaries for an area. Natural barriers like water features and sloping topography can also serve to delineate a district. In both Baltimore and Cleveland we saw that the microareas in those cities were largely determined by pedestrian activity and barriers to the flow of stadium-goers into the surrounding streets.

However, the case of Arlington is quite different than our urban cases. Arlington has from the 1950s oriented itself towards automobile travel, with the most important public official in the city's history, Mayor Vandergriff, explicitly pushing the city to pursue

a development pattern that is low density and auto-oriented. The microarea in Arlington, therefore, cannot be delineated by pedestrian activities or patterns. People do not walk to the Ballpark in Arlington. In fact, on several occasions I witnessed people eating at a restaurant that offered free game parking about half a mile from the Ballpark for dinner prior to the game. Upon finishing their meal, they got into their car, drove a quarter of a mile closer to the Ballpark, paid $7.00 for parking, and then walked from the parking lot to the stadium. As a group they paid for the privilege of driving a quarter mile closer to the stadium and parking in the stadium parking lot. In Arlington, if the microarea were determined by pedestrian patterns, then the microarea would consist almost entirely of the Ballpark and the numerous parking lots surrounding it.

In addition to using vehicular rather than pedestrian patterns to determine a microarea, a second factor, unique among the case cities, was utilized to define a microarea. As noted above, there have been a number of recent planning efforts focusing upon Arlington's Entertainment District. These efforts have identified a large area of land that is likely to be impacted by the attractions in this district. The Festival overlay zoning district was created by the city to identify those parcels that are desirable for new recreation and tourism related development. A great deal of this land is accessible from the Ballpark only by car, as approximately one-third of this land is located across I-30 to the north. However, this fits nicely with the local development patterns and auto-culture of the region. Further, when in Arlington doing research for this project, I witnessed many people visiting the restaurants and retail establishments in this area prior to attending Ranger games at the ballpark. Although this land is separated from the Ballpark by an Interstate, it does indeed function as part of the overall Entertainment District and part of the Ballpark Microarea. For these reasons, then, The Ballpark in Arlington Microarea contains all of the Entertainment District as defined by the city.

In addition to using the Entertainment District as the starting point for the microarea, I have also included portions of the Six Flags Business Park to the southwest.

The block bounded by The Road to Six Flags on the North, Watson Road on the east, Randol Mill Road to the south, and Six Flags Drive to the west has been included in the Microarea. On-site study indicates that these parcels have been greatly impacted by the new Ballpark. Specifically, game attendees often park in these areas during games and some of the office space in these areas market themselves as part of the Ballpark district. Second, the Planning Department indicated that this area has been impacted by the new stadium, in part because a great deal of traffic now enters the entertainment district from the east, rather than almost exclusively from the north as with the old stadium.

The Ballpark in Arlington Microarea (from now on referred to as the Ballpark Microarea) is shown in Figure 11.10. Generally, the Ballpark Microarea is bounded by Collins Street on the west, Lamar Boulevard and Brookhollow Plaza Road to the north, SH360 to the east, and a combination of Randol Mill Road, Stadium Drive, and Road to Six Flags East to the south. The microarea surrounding the Ballpark is significantly larger than those around Camden Yards and Jacobs Field. At a total size of approximately 1,240 acres, the Ballpark Microarea is almost four times larger than Baltimore's and over six times larger than Cleveland's. The Ballpark development itself is 285 acres in size, comprising approximately 22% of the entire Microarea. Also unlike the two other cases, the Ballpark Microarea crosses a major Interstate (I-30) and includes several major arterials that criss-cross the area, man-made barriers that acted as boundaries in the urban cases.

[See Figure 11.10 on page 450]

Zoning Changes in the Microarea

One of the recommendations of the Johnson Creek Committee, implemented by the city, was a zoning overlay district for the entertainment area surrounding Six Flags and Arlington Stadium. The Festival overlay zoning district was created and implemented in 1993, or about a year before the Ballpark in Arlington opened, but well after it was financed and under construction. Discussions with city staff indicated that the new

Ballpark was a major impetus for the rezoning of this district. The city was attempting to couple the new Ballpark with a makeover for the district and the new zoning district was an important part of this. Therefore these changes are attributable to the new facility.

Zoning was determined for the Ballpark Microarea for 1992 and 1998. These designations are taken from the official city zoning maps for these years. Discussions with planning staff indicated that zoning in 1992 is indicative of conditions through the 1980s and early 1990s, so the zoning map from 1988 would look very similar to that of 1992. These conditions are shown on Figure 11.11. Generally speaking, zoning designations in the Ballpark Microarea changed a great deal between 1992 and 1998.

[See Figure 11.11 on page 451]

Figure 11.11 showcases Arlington's auto-oriented planning approach. Prior to 1993, Arlington had a large set of zoning classifications, with small sets of differently zoned parcels scattered throughout the city, often in a rather scattershot pattern. Next to the General Motors plant to the south, for example, is a residential development that could be found anywhere in suburban America. Along Collins Street to the west is a mix of Local Business and Business uses, with the Local Business designation suggesting retail uses oriented towards local residents, not visitors. Littered among this business zoning are residentially zoned parcels, some single family and multi-family.

As for the Ballpark Microarea, in 1992 most of the land immediately surrounding Arlington Stadium and the new Ballpark was zoned Business, with acceptable uses like hotels, restaurants, and other businesses given a priority for these areas. However, to the southwest and to the northwest of the entertainment district large areas of land were zoned as Heavy Manufacturing, with acceptable uses like warehousing, factory production, and similar uses having the priority. This designation was a legacy from the original Six Flags Business Park that was initially planned for this area, but that had since been replaced by the tourism-based economy generated by Six Flags, the Stadium, and the

Convention Center. To the southeast of the Stadium site, outside of the Microarea, is a large set of residentially zoned land that still exists in 1998.

In turning to 1998 Zoning Map, the huge changes that the Festival zoning overlay district have brought to the area can be seen quite clearly. Festival zoning dominates the great majority of the Ballpark Microarea, with only a few blocks zoned Manufacturing that are clearly more related to the Ballpark than General Motors.[15] Note also that much of the Ballpark Microarea zoned Manufacturing in 1992 has been rezoned Festival, including all of the land north of I-30. Further, the Festival district has also crept south and east, encroaching further into the Six Flags Business Park. The expansion of the entertainment related area to these southern and eastern parcels is no doubt related to the new location of the sports facility to the south.

Clearly, zoning for the Ballpark Microarea has changed significantly between the pre-opening time period (1992) to the post-opening time period (1998). Not only was a new zoning classification system implemented, due in part to the new Ballpark, but a sizable expansion of the entertainment area was also part of this major rezoning. The expansion of the entertainment district into the surrounding area, especially into the manufacturing areas of the city, was furthered by the new zoning system. Further, whereas zoning for the Ballpark Microarea was much more disjointed in 1992, after the implementation of the Festival zoning district in 1993 the surrounding area became much more cohesive and identifiable in terms of zoning designation. Reflecting the plans of the Johnson Creek Committee, the Ballpark Microarea was becoming more connected, visually and administratively.

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[15] The "Special Use Permits" (SUP's) are three year zoning exemptions, due to run out sometime in 1998, given to incompatible uses to enable land owners to investigate their options prior to being given a Festival zoning designation. A majority of the parcels given SUP's are multi-family housing developments. These properties will be allowed to retain their current uses at their current densities, but will be phased out when the properties are redeveloped.

Physical Changes in the Ballpark Microarea

After consummating their deal for the Ballpark in 1990, the Rangers and Mayor Greene painted a picture of a beautiful stadium sitting in the midst of a vibrant entertainment district. The pro-stadium argument that extensive new development would accompany a new stadium was an important part of the pro-Ballpark campaign in Arlington. Plans called for the site to include a ballfield, a museum, an office building as part of the stadium, and retail establishments on lots surrounding the stadium.[16] An amphitheater was also to be located on-site, bringing in concerts, plays, and other shows that would make the area even more diverse in terms of its entertainment options.[17] Figure 11.12 shows the original site plan for the Ballpark area, including the site of retail/restaurant projects, the amphitheater, and the proposed Hall of Fame museum. In all, the initial plans for the stadium presented a picture of a more dense, pedestrian oriented, park-like stadium that would generate numerous spin-off developments in the entertainment district. Not only would Arlington and regional residents be acquiring a world-class new ballpark, but, in the process, the transformation of the old industrial park into an exciting entertainment district would be completed.

[See Figure 11.12 on page 452]

To analyze changes to the built form in the Microarea, aerial photos from 1988, 1993, and 1997 were examined. In addition, discussions with planning staff and a review of recently built projects identified major changes to the Ballpark Microarea. Figure 11.13 illustrates changes to the built form between 1990 and 1998. The most important change, quite obviously, is the new stadium and the new office building that is part of the facility. Any mention of the changes to the immediate area must recognize that some of the demand for new development, particularly office space, has been captured by this new office building. Fully leased, this building is also home to a restaurant and a handful of commercial enterprises directly related to the Rangers baseball club.

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[16] Fraley, Gerry (1990) "Rangers plan new stadium in Arlington." *Dallas Morning News* 1A, 20A.
[17] Ibid.

[See Figure 11.13 on page 453]

For those parcels immediately surrounding the new Ballpark and the now demolished Arlington Stadium, analysis indicates that more land was cleared for parking than was developed for new buildings. Very few new structures are located in the immediate area surrounding the new Ballpark. To the north of the stadium, the planned retail/restaurant complex along the lake was never built. Planning staff indicate that this project is not ever likely to be built, because much of the land immediately surrounding these lakes is in the floodplain for Johnson Creek. To the west of the Ballpark the amphitheater has yet to be built; in fact it is planned as an eventual part of the complex, but no funding has been allocated and no timeline exists for this facility. Fortunately, this land has not been paved over for parking lots, but rather a strange, rolling hump of grass covers the site, perhaps visually suggesting the look of the amphitheater.

Directly east of the Ballpark, there has been one addition to the built form of the immediate area, with the new Arlington Visitor's Center opening in late 1997. In addition to the visitor's center, a restaurant is also located in this building as well. A stop in at the Convention and Visitor's Bureau, on the top floor of the Visitor's Center, determined that the location of the Ballpark was directly responsible for the new Visitor's Center. Previous plans had called for the Center to be located further west along SH360 or along I-30 to the north. However, while the Ballpark influenced the location of this Center, it did not create the new development. The Visitor's Center would have been built regardless of the new Ballpark, just in a different location within the Entertainment District. To the north of the Ballpark, where Arlington Stadium once sat, there is now a large traffic circle and additional parking, all serving the Ballpark. Also north of the lake is a small little league ballfield, with a to scale steel and brick seating area, that is a wonderful community amenity that was being used every day I was in Arlington.

In the larger microarea, however, a substantial amount of new development has occurred since 1992. The majority of these projects have been built in the northeastern and eastern portions of the microarea reflecting the district's orientation towards SH360 and the I-30/SH360 interchange. Between 1992 and 1998 a total of ten new hotels have been built (or are finishing construction) in the microarea. Further, plans exist for at least two new hotels in the microarea.[18] While Planning Staff and the Visitors Bureau could not directly link the new Ballpark to these developments, they did indicate that these projects were, at least in part, the result of a Ballpark that attracts three million baseball fans a year. These developments will bring Arlington's hotel room capacity up to 6,375 from the current (1997) level of 5,783.[19]

In addition to this new hotel development, eight new restaurants have been built since 1992. These restaurants are larger, tourism and recreation oriented establishments, catering to families and businesspeople visiting the Ballpark, Six Flags, and the Convention Center. Again, local officials would not state that these restaurants were built solely because of the new stadium, but they did state that the Ballpark was an important factor in their construction. Recall also, that many of the new hotels built between 1992 and 1998 brought new restaurants to the area as well. While these eating establishments are also tenuously related to the Ballpark, they do add to the total restaurant capacity of the district, further cementing the district's character and economic impact. Figure 11.14 shows the location of new projects in the microarea between 1992 and 1998.

[See Figure 11.14 on page 454]

Changes to Land Uses in the Microarea

Equally important to additions to the built form in the microarea are changes in land use for the neighborhood surrounding a new stadium. Does a new stadium lead to changes in land use to the microarea? As we saw in both Baltimore and Cleveland,

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[18] Arlington Convention and Visitors Bureau (1997b). *Arlington Hotel Update*.
[19] Ibid.

changes in land use were better indicators of changes to the microarea (or lack thereof) than zoning changes and changes to the built form. This was the result of the urban environments of these stadia which were located in portions of the city that were largely built out. Therefore, measures of land use provided more insight into changes in these neighborhoods than looking at the built form or zoning.

A look at changes to the land use in The Ballpark Microarea between 1992 and 1998 further illustrates the building boom experienced by this district in recent years. Figure 11.15 illustrates changes in land use for the microarea in those years. In these maps we see quite clearly that a large amount of vacant land was developed in the few short years studied. However, as discussed above, this development occurred primarily at the periphery of the microarea and not surrounding the stadium. In addition, we see that much of the land south of the new Ballpark was turned into parking and some land west of the stadium was developed into a park and recreational area. In particular, those areas surrounding the new lakes transitioned from large parking areas into a park.

[See Figure 11.15 on page 455]

To the east, along SH360, a number of parcels were developed into new hotels and new restaurants, reflecting the orientation of the district towards recreational uses. To the north and northeast across I-30, a glut of new hotels have opened in recent years (with more on the way), in part due to the new Ballpark and the success of the amusement parks, but also in response to an office building boom in that area. These new hotels have been accompanied by several new restaurants in the area, most of which are very busy with baseball fans on gamedays. Along Collins to the west, a handful of vacant parcels have also been developed as commercial properties, perhaps suggesting that the Ballpark has been a part of the growth of this commercial strip as well. However, many of these new businesses seem distinctly unrelated to the new Ballpark, with a new K-mart, bookstores, jewelers, and small establishments representing the bulk of the new development along this strip. City planners indicated that Collins had long been developing

as an important commercial strip well before the new Ballpark and these businesses seem to conform to previous development patterns.

In sum, the changes to land use in the microarea indicate that Arlington's new Ballpark has been an important factor in the location of new hotels and restaurants in the entertainment district. Numerous hotels and restaurants, several sporting names referring to the new Ballpark or a more general sports theme, have been constructed in the few short years since the Ballpark development began. A tour of the area and discussions with the Convention and Visitor's Bureau reveals that several new hotels are currently under construction or in the permitting process. Additional hotels likely will result in more restaurants and the further specialization of the area as the pre-eminent recreation center in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.

To reiterate, though, there are clear indications that many of these land use changes would have occurred with or without the presence of a new stadium. The development along SH360 and to the north of I-30 is no doubt related to the office building boom in the area and the emergence of Arlington as an important regional center. Collins Street has been developing for years as a commercial strip wholly unrelated to the new Ballpark. Despite these factors though, local experts stated over and again that the Ballpark was a major factor in the continued development of the neighborhood. The image benefits conferred by the stadium, the synergy of the Ballpark, Six Flags, and the convention center, and the impact of three million baseball fans on the district are clearly responsible for some of this development. A tour of the area presents the picture of an "edge city" clearly in a boom period, with construction trucks regularly mingling with traffic, public works crews upgrading the local water and sewer infrastructure, and numerous "{Your Business Here} Opening Soon" signs dotting the landscape. The Entertainment District in Arlington continues to boom and the Ballpark has been a substantial factor in these changes.

Changes to Parking in the Microarea

While the above impacts to the built form and the land use of the microarea are desirable to the city and expected in this analysis, there are also important negative impacts that may be associated with the new Ballpark. Foremost among these negative impacts is the spread of surface parking lots. A new stadium invariably brings significant requirements for parking, and in suburban settings, demand for large surface parking lots for the thousands of vehicles on gamedays. As seen in Baltimore, the demand for ample and accessible parking that results in the demolition of existing structures and the relocation of existing businesses can negatively impact the microarea. Rather than adding to the existing stock of buildings in which business can occur and from which taxes can be collected, a new stadium can actually reduce the building stock. The Arlington case illustrates that this situation is not limited to urban stadia. Arlington has also experienced "parking creep", the infiltration of large surface parking lots into previously undeveloped or sparsely developed areas, as a result of their new facility. Figure 11.16 shows the location of major stadium parking lots for Arlington Stadium in 1990 and The Ballpark in 1998.

[See Figure 11.16 on page 456]

The spread of sprawling, inefficient surface parking lots in the Ballpark Microarea is easily seen in this map. Whereas parking for Arlington Stadium was largely bunched about the stadium, the new Ballpark has seen a substantial expansion in these fields of asphalt. Most troubling was the demolition of a full block of low-rise office buildings to the southeast of the Ballpark for the creation of a new parking lot. Further the transformation of large tracts of vacant land to the south and east of the Ballpark into parking lots has effectively eliminated their development prospects in the near future. Similar to Baltimore's Orioles, the Rangers have made it clear that they desire large lots of surface parking surrounding the stadium, maximizing access to the new Ballpark, but also minimizing the economic impacts to the immediate area. To be fair, however, proposals have been floated for new office buildings on the northwest lot (along Copeland St. and

Rangers has an option to purchase up to 227 acres surrounding the Ballpark, perhaps suggesting that the future bodes well for new development in the immediate area surrounding the Ballpark.[20]

Additional Impacts to the Microarea

In addition to the above changes to the physical form and to the land use of the microarea, the Ballpark in Arlington has also been a factor in several other changes to this district. First, the Convention Center, located immediately north of the Ballpark, has clearly been positively impacted by the new stadium. Plans call for almost doubling the existing space in the Convention Center by Summer 1999, with a 30,000 square foot "Grand Hall" and a 6,000 square foot "Lakeview Terrace" looking south over the lake towards the Ballpark. Director Joyce Odom noted that the expansion of the Convention Center was indeed influenced by the new stadium. Odom made clear that the Ballpark determined the direction and the form of the expansion, but also pointed out that an expansion for the Center was long overdue with its success in attracting events. However, Odom did attribute some of the success of the Convention Center to the Ballpark[21], in part because it allows her to offer "more than just a facility, but also entertainment, a 'destination'" that makes the Convention Center much more marketable to event organizers.

Another major impact to the microarea attributable to the stadium has been additions to the transportation network of the district. Major upgrades to the interchanges at Collins Street and Ballpark Way (formerly Stadium Drive) have resulted in new roads and the separation of a large parcel of land from Six Flags proper. Further, the construction of Nolan Ryan Expressway, cutting north-south through the immediate area around the stadium has allowed for the spread of parking to the south of the Ballpark.

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[20] Team Marketing Report (1998), p. 96.

[21] "The Ballpark has helped to raise the awareness of Arlington and helped to market the Convention Center. We don't have to tell people about Arlington anymore, they often recognize the city because of the Ballpark." Interview with Odom, April 1998.

around the stadium has allowed for the spread of parking to the south of the Ballpark. There have also been substantial upgrades to surrounding east-west arterials, including Randol Mill Road, The Road to Six Flags, and Copeland Road.

The creation of a set of parks along the Johnson Creek waterway has been yet another tangible impact attributable to the stadium. Visually, the most significant change to the immediate area has been the creation of the two lakes north of the Ballpark and the walking trails surrounding these water features. Plans for an amphitheater on the site will help add to the character of the immediate area. To the west, a new park (named after former Mayor Greene) has been constructed and walking trails follow Johnson Creek as it winds to the south. Part of this set of parks is the aforementioned little league ballpark, a well-used community facility.

Impacts to the City as a Whole

A look at major projects permitted by the city since 1992 cements the impression of a city, and a microarea, riding a boom period. Figure 11.17 shows the location of major commercial projects[22] in the city between 1992 and 1995. This map illustrates that there are two areas of the city witnessing a huge number of new projects; the Ballpark area and an area in south-central Arlington, along Interstate 20. This second area is perhaps the hottest development locus in the Metroplex, because of the access to the area and because the city of Arlington is growing towards the southwest, with new homes going up on an almost daily basis. The map classifies these projects by type (Entertainment, Manufacturing, Retail, Office, and Warehouse[23]). In 1992 and 1993, the Ballpark area was clearly overshadowed by the development along I-20. However, in 1994 and 1995 saw the Ballpark area rival the I-20 area in terms of number of projects. A look at these projects by type reveals, unsurprisingly, that the Ballpark Microarea has seen almost all of its new

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[22] These projects represent those projects with an estimated value of $250,000 in 1992, over $350,000 in 1993 and 1994, and over $500,000 in 1995. Source: City of Arlington, Building Inspection Division.

[23] The Entertainment category includes only restaurants and hotels while the retail category includes clothing stores, drug stores, grocery stores, and other retail outlets.

development best classified as entertainment, with some retail development as well. In contrast, I-20 area has seen a fuller range of projects, including more retail than entertainment projects, as well as some manufacturing projects.

[See Figure 11.17 on page 457]

What this map indicates is that the Ballpark has been a short term factor in reorienting development within the city away from the southwestern district to the Ballpark Microarea. In 1993 and 1994, the year prior to and the year of opening for the Ballpark, there was a significant spike in development in the Microarea. A number of new restaurants and retail projects were permitted for this area in those years, with their opening coinciding with the opening of the new Ballpark or opening soon afterward. Many of these projects were explicitly tied to the Ballpark, with new sports bars and new hotels oriented towards the new facility being a part of this mini-boom. The I-20 corridor remains a very hot area for new development, but the Ballpark Microarea is still capturing a large share of new development, particularly development that fits nicely into the district's now firmly established entertainment image.

Microarea Impacts: Conclusion

An initial glance at this data would suggest that The Ballpark in Arlington has created a great deal of new development, resulting in jobs, tax revenue, and a more mature entertainment district for the city. Stadium advocates would look at these results and conclude that the stadium was an excellent investment because of the new development generated by the new facility. The entertainment district is now better able to capture the economic benefits of the Ballpark. The stadium area, even with a huge amount of parking surrounding the facility, now has some linear parkland, a sparkling new lake, an expanding Convention Center, a wonderful little league ballfield, a community pavilion (for rent!), and the feeling that the district is really on the move. However, all is not well in the area and despite this impressive list of accomplishments, the Ballpark has not been a complete success for the city.

First, much like Odom's assessment of the expansion of the Convention Center, paraphrased as "the Ballpark has helped market the facility, but the expansion would have happened anyway", it is clear that the Ballpark alone was not responsible for the development of many of these projects. Planning staff, Odom, Hissong, and the Arlington Convention and Visitors Bureau all indicated that Arlington has been severely under-served in terms of hotel and restaurant development. The city had been losing dollars simply because its hotel bedroom capacity and restaurant table space were not meeting local demand. New restaurants were needed to serve these hungry patrons and new hotels were desperately needed to house these worn out visitors. In short, the vast majority of these projects would have been built whether the Ballpark was built nearby or not. For example, the hotels along Lamar Boulevard are more oriented towards a large office development than towards Six Flags and the Ballpark. Similarly, the restaurants along SH360 rely as much upon traffic from the highway as they do on visitors to the Ballpark. The excellent highway access for the Microarea and the specialization of this district as a retail, restaurant, and hotel center had generated an economy that was impacted by the Ballpark, but not dependent upon it.

Now all of the above is not to say that the Ballpark has had no effect upon the Microarea. Clearly the Ballpark is part of the larger entertainment dynamic that is generated by the co-location of Six Flags, the Convention Center, Hurricane Harbor, and the sports facility. The current success of this district as an entertainment center is related to the legacy of the demolished Arlington Stadium and the new Ballpark. The Rangers draw well over 2.5 million fans a year and these visitors come from all over the region, willingly spending their money in the nearby restaurants and spending the night in hotels. The Ballpark and these fans certainly help to make the area more vibrant, more attractive, and more busy. However, to reiterate, *the Ballpark alone did not generate most of this new development*. Rather, the addition (or retention) of a sports stadium has helped further this district's development as the pre-eminent entertainment center in the Metroplex. As suggested by the little research into the location of these facilities and

echoing the Baltimore findings, despite the claim of stadium proponents, these facilities are most successful when they are paired with other entertainment or tourism-related projects. Synergy continues to be the key.

Another important finding of the Arlington case study is that the promises of pro-facility forces often fall short in terms of actual new development. In Cleveland we saw that the job projections (over 28,000 promised) were shockingly short of the actual number of jobs created (2,000 at the most). In Arlington the promised Ballpark project impact has also fallen far short of the original projections. As we saw, the initial plans for the stadium complex were put together largely for political reasons, with little eye towards the feasibility of any planned projects. The Mayor and the Rangers promised a largely remade district when the original plans were outlined, but much of this planned development has not yet taken place. The grand plans for a pedestrian-friendly, commercial district centered on a new lake and the Ballpark have seen all those projects that bring money to the Rangers completed (the stadium, the office building, the pavilion), but many of the other projects have not been built because of a lack of funding and because of a preliminary scheme that promised new retail projects on unbuildable land. Whereas many authors have pointed to the rather optimistic assumptions and numbers generated by economic impact analyses[24], Arlington's experience also points to an equally optimistic document, the preliminary site design that promises much more than is actually delivered when the site is finally developed.

As expected, within the Microarea the vast majority of new construction is oriented towards entertainment uses, such as Six Flags and the Ballpark. To the east of the Ballpark, new hotels and restaurants have also gone up along the edge of SH360. However, much of this development has continued to encroach upon the old Six Flags Business Park that was the original economic engine for the area. Nearby vacant land, currently zoned for manufacturing uses, likely will be developed for the expanding

entertainment-based economy, not as a site for manufacturing firms. Not only has "parking creep" been a problem for the district, the infiltration of retail and commercial businesses into this formerly industrial area has not only changed the character of the district, but also negatively impacted the industrial and warehousing businesses that call it home. As with Baltimore, the metamorphosis of the Ballpark Microarea from industrial to entertainment hastens the decline of the existing manufacturing/industrial sector by bringing large influxes of traffic and pedestrians into areas that require easy access for receiving and shipping materials. In both Baltimore and Arlington, local city government is marketing these areas as industrial centers at the same time that they subsidize and promote the stadium districts as family-friendly entertainment districts. In many ways these strategies work at cross-purposes, with the more attractive and seemingly more vibrant entertainment option often winning the day.

As with Baltimore and Cleveland, the Arlington case has much to teach us about what is right and what is wrong with these projects. Arlington has centered the development of this portion of the city on entertainment and successfully galvanized development in the area. Through an intentional synergy of related projects and a district-level plan that changed the zoning designation for the district, which helps to market the district towards the type of development best suited for this new image, Arlington has successfully reshaped this formerly industrial area into a model of a suburban entertainment district. However, in so doing the city has come upon three major limitations of this strategy; 1) the stadium cannot leverage this development alone, other nearby projects are indeed necessary, 2) parking remains a very thorny issue, one regularly handled by inefficient and district-killing surface parking lots, and 3) microarea changes have major impacts on surrounding districts that are not always those desired. The battle between an industrial area and an entertainment district usually finds the industrial district as the loser.

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[24] See Danielson (1997) pp. 105-107; Rosentraub (1997a); and Noll and Zimbalist (1997).




Figure 11.1 Ballpark Area Arterials and Highways




Figure 11.2 Ballpark Area Conceptual Land Use Map




Figure 11.3 City of Arlington Population by Blockgroup, 1990




Figure 11.4 City of Arlington Median Household Income by Blockgroup, 1989




Figure 11.5 City of Arlington Percent White by Blockgroup, 1990




Figure 11.6 City of Arlington Percent Living Below Poverty by Blockgroup, 1989





Figure 11.7 Percent of Land Used for Retail/Lodging by Tract, 1990



Source: North Central Texas Council of Governments

Figure 11.8 Percent of Land Used for Industry by Tract, 1990




Figure 11.9 Arlington's Great Southwest Enterprise Zone and Festival District




Figure 11.10 The Ballpark in Arlington Microarea






Figure 11.11 Ballpark Microarea Zoning, 1992 and 1998




Derived from news reports on the new stadium.

Figure 11.12 The Ballpark in Arlington Original Site Plan



1992

Demolished Buildings pre-1998
Building Footprints, 1992




1998

N
W E
S

New Buildings post-1992
Building Footprints, 1998

0.5 0 0.5 Miles

Figure 11.13 Ballpark Microarea Built Form, 1992 and 1998



Cozymels	1	R
Friday's Sports Grill	2	R
Sports Bar	3	R
Trail Dust Steakhouse	4	R
China Coast Restaurant	5	R
Humperdinck's	6	R
Owens Family Restaurant	7	R
Le Peep	8	R
Marriot Fairfield Inn	9	H
Wingate Inn	10	H
Residence Inn	11	H
Boulevard Motel Corp	12	H
Budget Inn	13	H
Amerisuites Hotel	14	H
Arlington Express Hotel	16	H
Candlewood Suites	17	H
Fairfield Suites	18	H

New Developments

Hotel

Restaurant

Other

N

W

E

S

Figure 11.14 Major Projects in the Ballpark Microarea, 1990-1998






Figure 11.15 Ballpark Microarea Land Use, 1992 and 1998



1990

Stadium
Stadium Parking Lots, 1990
Johnson Creek



1998

N
W
E
S

The Ballpark
Ballpark Parking Lots, 1998
Ballpark Lakes
Johnson Creek

0.5 0 0.5 1 Miles

Figure 11.16 Ballpark Microarea Parking, 1990 and 1998




Figure 11.17 City of Arlington Major Commercial Projects, 1992-1995

Chapter 12

Sports Stadia as Urban Revitalization Tools: An Evaluation

—"Approving a stadium, then sitting back to wait for promised growth is naïve public policy. If a stadium is to have an economic impact on the city, it needs to be part of a package of planned and balanced development. Good planning is still better than great promises."

—Robert Baade and Richard Dye[1]

When the Ballpark in Arlington opened in 1994, the city of Arlington had hopes that the new stadium would help to drive a new round of development in their still emerging entertainment district. The old baseball stadium itself had never been much of an attraction for the region, rather the promise of major league baseball had pulled people into the district only for events. On the other hand, the Ballpark, with its restaurants, offices, shops, and huge public spaces, promised to bring visitors to the district most days throughout the year. A few short years later it appears that Arlington is well on their way towards reaping micro-level benefits from their new facility. Numerous new hotels and restaurants dot the landscape and the specialization of this district as the entertainment epicenter of the region continues unabated. While the Ballpark has certainly been only a single piece to an entire development puzzle, it has helped to galvanize developer interest and prodded the city to establish a vision and plan for the district. Other suburban cities intent on spending millions on a sports facility should look to the Arlington case when planning their stadia.

In Cleveland, as hoped for, event-days at Gateway bring thousands of tourists and suburbanites to a portion of downtown Cleveland that had been desperate for activity for decades. Patrons at local bars and restaurants overflow onto sidewalks and the district is alive with excitement and promise of another win for the Indians or the Cavaliers. A once vacant, dingy, unsafe district has been transformed, seemingly overnight, into a bustling,

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[1] Baade and Dye (1988), p. 274.

hustling entertainment area. In addition, the city has seen new hotels and residential space developed in old warehouse buildings once thought lost to economic and geographic obsolescence. In the next few years even more development is planned for the district and the repercussions are being felt in nearby districts, including Playhouse Square and as far away as the waterfront. Cleveland's Gateway is rightfully held up as the pre-eminent example of a sports project driving the revitalization of a downtown district. While their success might seem singular[2], it needn't be. Gateway offers several lessons to downtowns in both older Rust Belt cities and newer Sun Belt cities in how to plan for and incorporate a "special activity generator" project into an overall vision for the central city.

Despite the national press, the same micro-level success cannot be attributed to Baltimore's Camden Yards. Although a truly masterful urban design intervention and the home of two of the most attractive sports stadia in the country, Camden Yards' positive impacts on Baltimore should not be measured in development terms. Howard Street is still sagging, Pigtown and other western edge neighborhoods remain economically and socially separated from the thriving downtown, and Sharp-Leadenhall still teeters at the precipice of gentrification and decline. Instead, the twin stadia continue to prime the pump of the entertainment economy previously established by the litany of projects ringing the Inner Harbor. Does this make Camden Yards a failure? Absolutely not. Instead, it makes Camden Yards an excellent case from which cities must learn to contextualize their projects and realistically anticipate impacts on a case by case basis.

Perhaps the question that immediately springs to mind is given that both urban cases had downtown-edge sites, close to other shopping and tourism projects, why did Cleveland's Gateway succeed as an "urban revitalization tool" whereas Baltimore's Camden Yards appears to have failed? In addition, how does Arlington's experience fit into these findings? These questions will occupy the second section of this chapter. Prior

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[2] Perhaps Denver's Coors Field and the revitalization of the SoDo area in that city rivals Cleveland's success.

to addressing these questions, though, I want to briefly summarize the micro-level impacts for each of the case studies. Included in this will be an assessment of the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 4 for each case. Then our attention turns to the comparison of the three case studies. A final section outlines the lessons learned and the pitfalls identified in these sports projects. Particular attention will be paid to Baade and Dye's conclusion that "good planning is still better than great promises."

Sports Stadia as Urban Revitalization Tools

In Chapter 4 I laid out the four central hypotheses that I wanted to assess in the course of this research project. The case study chapters provide the detailed evidence for assessing these. Below is a very brief summary assessment of each of the hypotheses.

Hypothesis #1: The Measurable Impacts Hypothesis: This hypothesis states that there will be measurable differences at the micro-level when comparing the pre-construction and post-construction periods. After the completion of the stadium, it is hypothesized that significant changes in land development, land uses, and district character will be experienced by the surrounding microarea.

Arlington's Ballpark

Between 1990 and 1998 The Ballpark Microarea changed significantly, with some very positive changes and some negative ones. A great deal of new restaurant and hotel development has occurred in recent years with a number of other projects planned for the area. The addition of miles of trails, other parks, and green spaces have made the Ballpark one of Arlington's community gathering places on all days, not just when the Rangers play. On the negative side, the spread of surface parking lots onto formerly vacant land and into the industrial district eliminated some buildings and also makes for an uneasy entertainment/industrial interface.

Cleveland's Gateway

The Gateway area is remarkably different from the harsh, dangerous, vacant-building years of the 1980s. Once dilapidated and desperate, the district is now one of

downtown Cleveland's hottest real estate markets. Most exciting is the influx of hotels and residential development which will bring activity at all hours to an area of the city once thought unrecoverable. This renewed vitality has driven and been driven by the comeback of other downtown areas like Playhouse Square and the Warehouse District.

Baltimore's Camden Yards

Camden Yards presents a rather curious set of circumstances. The portion of the microarea along the Inner Harbor is as vibrant as ever, with millions pouring into the city each year and new projects planned or underway on the few vacant properties still available for development. Clearly the Camden Yards project has changed the micro-level landscape and brings sports fans to the stadia for over one-hundred days a year. However, those areas the city had hoped to experience some level of revitalization have experienced much new investment. The district operates strikingly similar to the previous decade, only now the renaissance of the Inner Harbor has extended a few blocks west.

Hypothesis #2A: The Land Development Hypothesis: Land surrounding a sports facility will become more intensively developed after the opening of the facility. Due to crowds at events and investments in surrounding infrastructure it is hypothesized that vacant parcels will be utilized for higher uses and new development will be generated in the microarea after the completion of the stadium.

Arlington's Ballpark

This hypothesis is supported by the Ballpark case. New development litters the district, in part because the new facility led to improved roads, better freeway connections, and marketability for the district. Of course, all of this new development is not solely attributable to the new baseball stadium. Other nearby projects contribute to the entertainment economy, as does the regional location of this district. However, an analysis of recent development in the area shows that the Ballpark provided a boost to local development.

Cleveland's Gateway

Gateway has seen a tremendous round of new development attributable to the new sports facilities, the amount of which is likely unparalleled by any other recent stadium project. As a microarea development tool, Gateway can be considered nothing but a resounding success. New hotels, new restaurants, and new residential development is sprouting up throughout the district, exceeding the pace of even the highest expectations. Infrastructure investments and district visibility as a result of Gateway have allowed the district to capitalize on suppressed demand for new downtown office and residential space.

Baltimore's Camden Yards

New development in the area surrounding Camden Yards has been sparse since 1990, with new projects planned for the waterfront and some new development along Pratt Street. A planned hotel north of Oriole Park would represent a significant addition to the microarea. However, much of this new development is not attributable to the twin stadia. The city has successfully re-used some older buildings, but the minimal amount of actual new development is surprising given the massive accolades given to the twin stadia.

Hypothesis #2B The Land Use Transition Hypothesis: Land uses surrounding the stadium will transition from "incompatible uses" (like light manufacturing or low density residential) to "compatible" uses (like commercial or industrial). Crowds and traffic generated by sports events lend themselves better to certain uses than others, therefore it is hypothesized that the new facility will affect local land use designations and actual uses.

Arlington's Ballpark

The Ballpark Microarea has experienced some land transition from incompatible uses to entertainment uses since the stadium opened in 1994. A number of vacant properties have been developed and some industrial park buildings were demolished to make way for surface parking near the new facility. In addition, the industrial area is

slowly being infiltrated by hotels and restaurants that serve visitors to the Ballpark, Six Flags, and the water park, using land originally zoned for industrial uses. Finally, the creation of the Festival zoning district guarantees that future development in the area fits this vision for the district, effectively eliminating future incompatible uses.

Cleveland's Gateway

Land uses around Gateway have been in almost monthly transition since the project was originally discussed back in the 1980s. Originally many properties were torn down and land was paved over for surface parking. In the 1990s land use transitions have been primarily from vacant properties to commercial/residential development. Projects are in the works for the few surface parking lots remaining in the area and a continued orientation of land uses to fit this entertainment economy appears certain. Unlike Arlington, though, zoning has not played a factor in Gateway's changes.

Baltimore's Camden Yards

Baltimore has also witnessed a number of land use transitions that provide a better "fit" for the new district economy. On the positive side the Warehouse and Camden Station have been refurbished to house offices and restaurants. On the negative side, a number of buildings have been demolished and land is now used for surface parking. Most distressing is the spread of parking creep into the industrial district to the south. For Baltimore, land use transition has occurred, but not necessarily as hoped or expected.

Hypothesis #2C The District Character Hypothesis: A district's character is significantly altered by the siting of a sports facility within the district. It is hypothesized that the influx of millions of visitors per year to sports stadia will create a new entertainment character, one that spills out into surrounding areas.

Arlington's Ballpark

The character of the Ballpark Microarea has not been significantly altered with the addition of the Ballpark. With Six Flags and the water park long a fixture in the district

and with the old baseball stadium sitting nearby, the district has served an entertainment area for years, one frequented by visitors throughout the day. However, the district's entertainment character has become more entrenched since the Ballpark was originally proposed. New signage, better roads, expanded public spaces, and a zoning overlay have all pushed the district to more fully develop as the Metroplex's regional entertainment center. This has helped to drive more development, which further fuels district specialization. However, this new character has driven out some industrial uses and seems likely to continue to do so.

Cleveland's Gateway

Walking the Gateway district at almost any hour was unheard of years ago. Once a crime-ridden, crumbling warehouse district, Gateway is now Cleveland's pride and joy, an example of a successful urban revitalization project. Because the district has seen the redevelopment of the district with a variety of uses, not just with bars and t-shirt shops, the area is much more vibrant and active at all hours of the day than it might have been. With the influx of residents and hotel visitors, the district should continue to evolve as an entertainment district, but one not solely tied to events at Jacobs Field or Gund Arena. Additionally, the area is also emerging as a hot retail area, with plans for the refurbishment of the Arcades and portions of Euclid Avenue. Did Gateway do this alone? No. But to borrow from Bullard it was indeed the "ember that slowly kindled a fire."

Baltimore's Camden Yards

There is no doubt that Camden Yards has helped to spread downtown Baltimore's renaissance a few blocks west. Over four million sports fans visiting two stadiums can do that. However, the twin stadia have only had minimal impacts upon the character of the surrounding district. The nearby gentrified residential neighborhoods have been pleasantly surprised at the lack of impacts from these SAGs. Unfortunately, those areas hoping for a boost have not received it and the spillover from the stadia is confined to existing entertainment spaces. As expected, Inner Harbor's economic engine has been primed by

the stadia, but little new entertainment space has been created. While the character of portions of the Microarea has been impacted, it has occurred in ways neither preferred (the infusion of parking into the industrial areas) nor hoped for (the lack of development of Howard Street).

Micro-Level Development is No Guarantee: Considering the Experience of Baltimore

In each of the three case studies it was found that the sports facilities induced some impacts in their surrounding districts, although not necessarily as expected. Land uses and existing buildings seem influenced by the massive infrastructure investments and huge event-day crowds, leading to re-use and new development more inline with an entertainment economy. District specialization appears to be proceeding quite quickly in Arlington, while Cleveland has done well to develop the Gateway area more comprehensively. Baltimore's Camden Yards, on the other hand, is much better classified as "icing on the cake" of Inner Harbor's massive success. These findings should not be a surprise given that these three projects are considered among the most successful sports facility projects in recent decades.

In urban revitalization terms, though, the project widely considered the smashing success of downtown stadium projects, Oriole Park at Camden Yards, was found to have done little for the city of Baltimore's physical form, except to pull people a few blocks further west on event-days. Certainly the downtown economy is primed by the millions of visitors to Camden Yards. Certainly the visibility created by the stadia has helped fuel Baltimore's image as a renaissance city. But in micro-level development terms, the twin stadia have not sparked the dramatic transformation of the central city's western edge that was anticipated by city leaders. Rather than a second Inner Harbor, Baltimore's Camden Yards simply serves as another special activity generator in the central city.

Baltimore's experience leads to one of the central findings of this study: *micro-level development is by no means guaranteed by a several hundred million dollar*

investment in a sports facility. A major project like a sports stadium cannot be considered an urban revitalization tool on price tag alone. Major infrastructure upgrades and large crowds at regular, predictable times are beneficial conditions for engendering new development, but these factors alone are not *necessary and sufficient* to do just that. Sitting back and waiting for local development after plunking down a new stadium somewhere in a city is simply "naïve public policy". Unfortunately, what has occurred in city after city across North America is just that. Decision-makers have operated under the assumption that infrastructure upgrades and large crowds are sufficient to act as micro-level development catalysts. The message must continue to be disseminated that new development is simply not guaranteed by investing in and constructing a new sports venue.

The experience of Baltimore with Camden Yards must be considered in light of several project attributes that have combined to minimize the impacts of the twin stadia on the surrounding microarea. The *timing* of the project, the *constrained Camden Yards site*, issues of *parking*, and the *capture of new development* have all combined to limit the micro-level impacts of the stadia on the Camden Yards area. Lastly, the *goals* of Camden Yards, Gateway, and the Ballpark must also be discussed as they provide perhaps the most important planning lesson for these massive projects.

Project Timing

Since the late 1970s, Baltimore's Inner Harbor has been established as an entertainment district, one visited by millions of visitors a year. Over the years the numerous hotels, retail centers, and bars/restaurants have been constructed or leased space in existing buildings to service this thriving entertainment economy. Because the twin stadia at Camden Yards were among the last of the major downtown entertainment projects, their measured physical development impacts are minimized. The millions of tourists and event-goers visiting Camden Yards are already served by the substantial number of existing eating, drinking, and spending options in the central city. The tourism and entertainment "infrastructure" already existed in Baltimore by the time Oriole Park

and the Ravens Stadium came along. There was no need for the stadium to serve as the principal generator of new development. Baltimore has not experienced the micro-level development boost from their sports stadia because the demand for hotels, restaurants, and retail had already been met.

In contrast to Baltimore, Cleveland's Gateway came along relatively early in their ongoing downtown revitalization process. Although Tower City Center, the Galleria, and a few other large downtown projects had already been completed, Gateway was the project that captured the attention of suburbanites and tourists and brought millions of visitors to the central city. Gateway has been the catalyst for substantial new development for downtown Cleveland much as the Harborplace Pavilions were the original anchor for Baltimore's waterfront revitalization. What this implies for cities that attempt to use a stadium as a revitalization tool is that the larger context of the downtown must be considered when developing these sports stadia. If a new stadium is sited close to an established entertainment district, then the facility is not as likely to generate spin-off development. A mature entertainment center like the one in Baltimore will soak up demand for entertainment-oriented uses, thereby minimizing micro-level development. The principal lesson: *The timing of the project in relation to other nearby entertainment projects has a major impact upon the likelihood and extent of microarea development.*

Project Setting

Nearby existing anchors, surrounding residential neighborhoods, and an active industrial district have effectively limited the ability of the Camden Yards stadia and their corresponding crowds to generate new construction in the microarea. The Camden Yards complex was squeezed into eighty-five acres surrounded by a complex mix of land uses, many of which were not interested in seeing a significant amount of new development in the immediate area. The powerful gentrified residential neighborhoods of Ridgely's Delight and Otterbein fought to limit the negative impacts of crowds and cars, limiting spillover development in their environs. In addition, the city has fought hard to protect the

industrial district to the south, worrying that new development would further unbalance that area of the city. This constrained development on almost the entire western edge of the microarea. Finally, the firm transportation barriers along the eastern edge of Camden Yards minimized any flow between the stadia and the neighborhoods of South Baltimore. These barriers effectively removed these areas from the Microarea and guaranteed that impacts would be spread along the Pratt Street corridor.

While the Gateway project was also somewhat constrained by physical factors (the Cuyahoga River and the Interstates), the remaining areas surrounding this project were largely a blank slate waiting (hoping, to be more correct) for a shift in the real estate market. Gateway provided just that shift. Unlike the vibrant, active mix of uses around Camden Yards, Gateway was surrounded by empty warehouses, vacant office buildings, and unoccupied storefronts all ready for new development. Rather than focusing a great deal of energy on minimizing the negative impacts on surrounding neighborhoods, as in Baltimore, Cleveland's site enabled planners to focus upon micro-level development from very early in the process.

Downtown sites for sports stadia present opportunities for micro-level development. However, what also must be understood is that these same sites offer substantial obstacles to this development. A site constrained on most sides by incompatible land uses will not generate substantial microarea (re)development. Instead, to maximize microarea development opportunities, cities need to identify sites that offer a compatible mix of land uses, with additional opportunities to make connections to other activity generators. The principal lesson: *All downtown sports stadia sites are not created equal.*

Parking Issues

Because of parking problems at Memorial Stadium, lobbying by the Orioles insured that the stadia at Camden Yards rely heavily upon large surface parking lots to provide a substantial amount of parking for events. In addition, the MSA has bought land

in recent years and "developed" it as surface parking, with lots creeping into the industrial areas to the south and southwest, creating an uneasy mix between heavy industry uses and pedestrians visiting the stadia and Inner Harbor. Baade and Dye summarized the problems with surface parking when they wrote, "Surrounding the ballpark with a parking lot is not only a poor use of valuable urban real estate, especially if the parking is not convenient for other urban uses, but such a parking lot minimizes the exposure of stadium traffic to other areas of commercial activity."[3] Surface parking lots are anathema to pedestrian activity, creating dead space and hindering street level retail development. In addition, valuable downtown real estate is removed from the development cycle, effectively limiting any micro-level development.

Arlington's Ballpark has the same problem as Camden Yards. Huge parking lots have sprawled to all sides of the facility, sabotaging the original intention to develop the project as a pedestrian-oriented retail and entertainment center. However, in part because Arlington's microarea is much more auto-oriented than Baltimore's, the larger Ballpark Microarea has been able to capture new development generated by the synergy of the stadium and the amusement parks. Cleveland, in contrast, relied heavily on existing parking, especially downtown parking structures, to provide the necessary spaces for events at Gateway. In doing so, the footprint of the project on downtown is much smaller and provides for much better linkages between the stadia and other districts of the central city. If Gateway similarly relied on large surface parking lots, the microarea impacts of the project would certainly be much less.

Of all issues relating to the micro-level impacts of sports stadia, parking issues are second only to district-level planning. How to account for the thousands of vehicles that bring fans to events is a major factor in the eventual micro-level success of these projects. The major advantage of surface parking is that it is cheap. However, as outlined by Baade and Dye, surface parking is wasteful, unattractive, and inconducive to economic

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[3] Baade and Dye (1988), p. 273.

development in urban environments. Deck parking, on the other hand, offers the opportunity to reserve more land for development and to even use the decks for ground level retail. Decks also do not ruin the pedestrian spaces that are essential to a successful urban environment. As discussed in the Baltimore case study, the MSA attempted to address this with their plans for decks between the twin stadia, but their plans were thwarted by the self-seeking Orioles. The principal lesson: *An approach to parking that maximizes development opportunities and minimizes surface parking is essential to a microarea development strategy centered on sports facilities.*

Capturing New Development

In Baltimore, the Warehouse and the soon to open Camden Station, with office space, commercial space, and restaurants, have captured some of the spin-off development generated by a new stadium. Rather than capturing development in nearby structures or newly constructed buildings, a significant amount of spin-off development was captured by the mammoth Warehouse. The decision to save these structures has proven to be a brilliant urban design decision for the city and one of the central attractions of the ballpark. These buildings help tie the project to the site's railyards history and provide a truly unique experience for events at Camden Yards. However, they also have soaked up some of the spin-off development created by the project. Therefore, a smaller factor in Camden Yards minor micro-level impact has been the capture of new development in the Warehouse.

Certainly claims can be made for a similar limiting factor in both Cleveland and Arlington. Gateway contains an office building home to Indians' team offices, other office space, and a team shop. The Ballpark also has an office building that is home to team offices and other office space. In addition, both facilities have restaurants and a shop or two that are open on non-event days. However, these projects are not quite the same size as the Warehouse, a structure that is home to over 300,000 square feet of office space.

Both Gateway and the Ballpark have much smaller office spaces, much of it reserved for the teams themselves.

The trend in sports facility design is to include multiple uses within a new stadium or arena. Team offices, a team shop, and a restaurant or two are now standard amenities for almost all projects. These additions have important consequences for microarea development. A restaurant or retail space within the stadium likely lowers the demand for at least one similar business in the surrounding microarea. Office space is likely not as heavily impacted by space within the stadium. Another hidden impact is that the teams usually control the revenue generated from these leaseable spaces, thereby taking money out of the pockets of other real estate projects. The new trend in facility design might actually pump even more money out of the local economy and into the team's pockets. On the other hand, it might also be argued that these additional office and retail spaces add activity to the microarea, actually generating a net positive impact on the local economy. No studies exist yet on this topic. The principal lesson: *Too much office and retail space might actually soak up demand for micro-level development.*

Project Goals

The final piece to the puzzle that is Baltimore's Camden Yards is the most important. Camden Yards was a project born out of defensive politics. A downtown stadium project had been bandied about for years, but the Orioles and Colts had been unable to garner enough political support for public funding to make the project happen. After the Colts departed for Indianapolis the political wheels began to spin at an amazing pace. Camden Yards quickly became a twin stadia project almost entirely financed by public dollars. Further, it appeared the Orioles held almost all of the negotiating cards and, as a result, they were able to bargain a very profitable lease arrangement and parking guarantee. Camden Yards was a project that from day one was intended to address two goals: 1) keep the Orioles in Baltimore and 2) help attract a new NFL team to the city. The project was not conceived of as an urban revitalization tool until well into the

construction phase of the project. In part to justify the massive public subsidies for the project, Baltimore's leaders and the state's leaders began to tout the economic development possibilities surrounding the stadia. The city bought into the concept that a sports stadia alone guarantees micro-level development. Because of the proximity of Inner Harbor, a brief glance at the Microarea might suggest that the city has been rewarded with micro-level development. However, the Baltimore case study found this is simply not the case.

In contrast, Cleveland's Gateway has long been part of that city's downtown development strategy. While Gateway was clearly intended to keep the Indians in Cleveland and return the Cavaliers downtown, it also was planned as a micro-level anchor from its conception as a domed stadium back in the early 1980s. A sports project was the key to recasting this district as an entertainment center, one emphasizing pedestrian connections and the excitement and vitality that only a big city can offer. The city targeted other investments and programs to take advantage of the spark that Gateway has provided. Pedestrian linkages were strengthened between Gateway and other activity centers. Concurrent programs for downtown housing were established. Local quasi-public agencies were utilized to help identify sites for new development and market the area to prospective investors. Unlike Camden Yards, Gateway was oriented to micro-level revitalization from the start, with the project serving as part of a larger strategic plan for downtown Cleveland.

Arlington's Ballpark represents an interesting mix between the two extremes of Baltimore and Cleveland. The stadium was originally intended to insure the Rangers didn't leave Arlington for another Metroplex city. However, as plans proceeded, the city recognized that the new stadium could be useful in further establishing that district of the city as the region's pre-eminent entertainment center. Consequently, the Ballpark was used to leverage investment in infrastructure and urban design improvements that solidified the character of the district. In addition, the new stadium was the major impetus

behind the creation of a new Festival zoning district that outlined the long term strategy for the district. This zoning designation insures compatible development in the microarea and sends a clear message to developers as to the desired form and function of a fast-changing area of the city. Arlington, then, didn't originally expect the Ballpark to serve as a micro-level catalyst. However, as the project progressed they recognized that a highly visible project, with concurrent infrastructure improvements, offered the city a chance to implement a district-level strategy originally discussed in the 1980s.

A *district-level approach to planning a project* and the *establishment of microarea development as a central goal of the project* are essential to successfully utilizing a sports stadium as an urban revitalization tool. Johnson has termed this attention to local development strategies a "development logic". He writes that "a minor league stadium, like a major league stadium, can promote targeted economic growth or revitalization, if planned with an explicit development logic. In the absence of such a logic, there is no evidence that a team or its stadium will contribute to [local economic development]."[4] The days of naïve public policy must end if cities truly want to reap maximum benefits from the massive investments into these projects. Simply siting a sports facility in an area in need of redevelopment is insufficient to insure this development will occur. Cleveland's Gateway should demonstrate that a stadium can be an anchor for district revitalization, but only when brought to bear in a planned, intelligent, and purposeful way. Even in cases where the primary goal of a project is to retain a franchise, as in Arlington, micro-level development goals can be addressed if the project is linked to broader economic development strategies. The principal lesson: *"Good planning is still better than great promises."*

Sports Stadia as Urban Revitalization Tools: Lessons for Cities Large and Small

The prevailing view of professional sports facilities is that they can serve as micro-level development engines. For decades cities have used these facilities to spur

redevelopment in dilapidated districts or to catalyze new development in emerging suburban areas. What I have shown with this study is that sports venues can serve as urban revitalization tools, but only when certain obstacles are addressed, extensive district-level planning is undertaken, and proper design decisions are made. The three case studies provide some very useful insights for cities that think to use sports stadia as urban revitalization tools. The range of micro-level impacts found in these cases offers planners and architects in cities of all sizes insights into what makes for a successful sports stadium project. While the previous section outlined five lessons from the Baltimore case this section seeks to distill the more general insights from the entire set of cases.

Project Visioning: Establishing a Development Logic

The only clear winner in the sports stadia game are the sports teams and the leagues themselves. New facilities are built with tremendous public subsidies. The teams are granted a huge share of the revenue streams from the facility. Increasingly the teams are negotiating for additions to the sports stadium, like restaurants and office space, that line their pockets and minimize the local impact of the facility. Even given the huge revenues generated by modern sports stadia, the current economics of professional sports virtually guarantees that the public sector will not turn a profit on these facilities.

What the public sector can make a priority of is using these facilities to address local economic development goals. Johnson writes that targeted development goals can take on two very general forms: 1) urban redevelopment and 2) opening new lands for development.[5] We have seen both of these in play with the three case studies. Cleveland wanted to revitalize an urban district, one that was the principal gateway into the city from the south. Arlington, in contrast, wanted their new ballpark to help push development in their entertainment district, an area still largely under-developed. At the heart of both of these cases was a "development logic", one that guided decision-making and led to other

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[4] Johnson (1991), p. 322.
[5] Ibid. p. 318.

programs, investments, or policy options to help further this logic. With Gateway we saw how the city used concurrent programs to leverage new housing in the district, additional infrastructure upgrades to link the project to other activity centers, and existing parking to service the facility. Despite getting a late start in addressing their development logic, Arlington utilized a new zoning overlay, urban design elements, and new public spaces to create an entertainment district that brought together a formerly divergent set of recreation projects.

What is essential for planners to understand is that *this development logic must be determined early on in the process*. Attempting to graft a development logic onto the project after construction is under way and public funds have been spent is not likely to prove successful. Baltimore's belated attempt to make Camden Yards a development catalyst failed, in part, because this belated vision was never translated into any other programs or investments. If micro-level development is a goal of the project, and it should be in just about every case, planners must insure that the development logic is well understood by all parties at the outset of the project. In addition, they must insure that this logic informs decisions at every stage of the project. Finally, public officials must make it clear that the development logic is a non-negotiable item when lease and parking agreements are being arranged.

The Three Most Important Factors in Sports Stadia: Planning, Planning, Planning

There is an ancient saying that identifies the three most important factors in real estate as "location, location, location". A similar saying can be applied to the use of sports stadia, or any other special activity generator, as an urban revitalization tool. The three most important factors are "planning, planning, and planning". Whenever I discuss sports facility projects with a city interested in knowing the likely set of impacts from their sports facility I always try to emphasize that these impacts will be somewhat in proportion to the level of planning and "contextualizing" that goes into the project. It amazes me how quickly city after city will invest $200 million to construct a new stadium (or $5 million in

a small minor league city), a project intended to serve as a major downtown anchor or the centerpiece of a new suburban entertainment district. Yet, these same cities will not budget as part of this financing package the $10,000-$100,000 needed for an in-depth study of the environment that the new stadium will be thrust into. This represents the extension of the naïve public policy that has guided most stadium projects for decades. In Baltimore this was termed "business as usual".

Now to be fair, studies of larger areas are undertaken when a facility is being sited in a metropolitan area. In-depth studies of the size, availability, cost, and access of possible sites are a part of the stadium provision process. These studies attempt to identify the most attractive and/or the most economically and environmentally feasible site for a new stadium. However, these studies have two failings; 1) they are disregarded once a site has been chosen and 2) they rarely include an "economic development" component that assesses the possible impacts of the stadium on the surrounding area, even when these impacts are an explicit part of the siting decision.

In addition to siting studies, every new sports project requires an environmental review of some kind. Usually this takes the form of an "environmental impact assessment" (EIS) that includes discussions of how crowds, traffic, and even the construction of the facility will impact air quality, water quality, viewsheds, and other environmental variables. These lengthy documents usually provide quite detailed looks at how a stadium will affect its surrounding environment. However, EIS's have a limitation similar to siting studies; they do not investigate the economic development impacts of a project. Of course, it can be argued, quite rightly, that an "economic development" section is not appropriate for an environmental review of a project.

For this reason, what needs to become part of the stadium provision process is something like a *district-level "economic impact assessment"*. This document would focus upon the full range of economic impacts, both positive and negative, that follow

from a stadium project. Rather than just tracking spending flows in the metropolitan economy, this document would look at expected pedestrian flows, existing land uses, and existing parking at the district level. In particular, this document would trace the possibilities and outline the options for implementing the identified development logic within the surrounding district. The document could identify possible sites for new development, look for land use incompatibilities, and assess the current and future states of the pedestrian and vehicular networks for gaps and opportunities for additions. An essential feature of this document is that it occur at the micro-level, an area much smaller than the city level, but much larger than just the site of the stadium itself. The starting point would be the identification of a stadium microarea, or that area that planners expect to be most impacted by events and crowds at the stadium.

The advantages to the preparation of this document are many. First, it begins to get the stadium planners and architects to think "outside the lines". Instead of focusing the entire project upon just the sports facility and the land inside the project boundaries, the activity generator is now viewed as part of something larger, part of the surrounding neighborhoods, even as part of the entire central city. Second, by focusing upon economic development goals, rather than usual suspects like traffic flows and environmental impacts, the project can better address the development logic laid out earlier in the process. Third, the determination of an impact area pushes project planners to consider investments outside the lines, investments that can more completely link the surrounding microarea to the development catalyst. Fourth, because a development logic has been identified and an impact area has been determined, a more complete set of programs, investments, and policy options can be called upon to drive local economic development towards desired outcomes.

An Obstacle to Micro-Level Development: Parking Creep

Although this was discussed earlier, an additional consideration of the importance of dealing with parking issues is required. Large sports stadia attract huge crowds and,

even given excellent mass transit linkages, these crowds usually arrive at events in thousands and thousands of vehicles. How cities deal with these cars and buses is a major factor in the micro-level success of a given facility. In two of the case studies we witnessed the incidence of what I termed "parking creep", or the spread of surface parking lots into the surrounding microarea. Parking creep is very harmful to micro-level development, as it removes land from the development cycle and kills the pedestrian character of an area.

Ideally a sports facility should make use of existing nearby parking to serve event-day traffic. Most sports events occur during evening or weekend periods when workers do not require parking. The second most desirable option from a micro-level development perspective is parking decks. Deck parking can include retail establishments on the ground floor and they usually prove more walkable and interesting than large surface parking lots. Parking creep can also be addressed in other ways. First and foremost, the identification of existing nearby parking can reassure teams that ample nearby parking exists. This was done quite successfully in Cleveland. Second, a moratorium on the development of new surface parking lots can be imposed until it is determined whether more parking is required for events. Third, the agency overseeing the project should be pushed not to include significant amounts of surface parking as part of the project. Lastly, mass transit options should be explored and aggressive ridership goals should be established. Baltimore's Camden Yards has been successful on this front.

An Obstacle to Micro-Level Development: Organizational Issues

There is a trend in sports facility management to create special districts or other quasi-governmental agencies to oversee the construction and management of a new stadium or arena. In both the Cleveland and Baltimore cases a quasi-governmental agency was established for just this purpose. There was a fundamental difference in the orientation of these two agencies and this difference has proven to have important consequences for micro-level development.

The Gateway Economic Development Corporation (GEDC) was established to put together land and capital for Gateway, oversee the construction of the project, and help push initiatives for the surrounding district. As a localized agency oriented specifically to developing the Gateway project and the Gateway area, the GEDC has been an active player in promoting the district, helping to fund local programs, marketing the area, and pushing for the further development in the district. To be fair, the GEDC's primary mission was the development of a successful stadium project, but closely linked to this mission was the development of the microarea. A micro-level focus was institutionalized in this agency, further pushing the project towards the city's development logic for this district. In Cleveland, every facet of the project was oriented to micro-level development, even within the organizational structure of the oversight agency.

Contrast the above with the Baltimore case. The Maryland Stadium Authority (MSA) was the agency empowered to oversee the construction of the twin stadia and manage the operation of the new facilities. Like the GEDC, the MSA was established by the state and their primary mission was the successful completion of the project. However, unlike the GEDC the MSA did not have a concurrent mission of microarea development. As a state agency with little local input, the MSA has not been interested in addressing the city of Baltimore's goals. Rather, they have been singly oriented to a successful stadia project. Recall that the MSA has actively been buying and leasing nearby land to turn into surface parking lots, with much of this land located in an industrial area the city wants to protect. Indeed, the MSA and the city have clashed over a few items, most relating to the infiltration of parking into the surrounding areas. Unlike the GEDC, the MSA is solely committed to Camden Yards and not to the surrounding district.

The form and function of the oversight agency for these projects and the establishment of a micro-level development mission are essential when a city wants to use a stadia project as an urban revitalization tool. Ideally, the oversight agency will be an extension of the local government, with a dual focus on completing the project

successfully and driving local economic development. Even when an agency is established and run by the state, this organization can and should have a local focus. In these cases some representation by city government is essential and an open and regular dialogue between the agency and the city planning department is a must.

An Obstacle to Micro-Level Development: Conflicting Goals

Baltimore presents a classic case of the "tail wagging the dog" as the Orioles, tenant but not owner of Oriole Park at Camden Yards, have dictated terms of local development from day one. The Orioles made it clear they want to maximize their revenues, including parking and concession revenues. Consequently the team has pushed for more nearby surface parking and no mixed-use parking/retail structures between the two stadia. This has effectively minimized micro-level development by requiring unattractive surface parking lots as a major land use element of the project. In addition, the Orioles were responsible for removing land from the development cycle, land owned by the MSA and not by the team. The stance of the Orioles has been that micro-level development will hurt their concession and souvenir sales, thereby reducing their revenues. By bullying the MSA to acquire more land for surface parking and not to develop the land between the stadia, the Orioles have pushed microarea spending into the Inner Harbor and/or redirected this spending into the stadium, which was their intention. The Orioles interest in maximizing stadium revenues are in direct competition and contradiction with the goal of seeing microarea development in the surrounding district. So far, the team's interests have carried the day in development disputes.

Cities pursuing sports stadia as microarea development tools must recognize the conflicting objectives of the sports franchises versus those of the city. The franchises want to pull as much game-day spending into the confines of the stadium as possible, thereby maximizing their revenues as almost all stadium revenues go to the team. In contrast, the city might want to see new hotels, restaurants, and retail outlets established as a result of the crowds generated by a sports facility. The public sector's goal is to pull spending out

of the stadium, producing micro-level development and spurring the revitalization of a given district. As a result, the two groups are in direct competition for fan and visitor spending. In Baltimore, because the MSA had negotiated from a position of weakness and because they were a state agency not as focused on local development, the Orioles were able to dictate the local development agenda, going so far as to veto a retail/parking project that would have helped to spur new development in the microarea. What the public sector must insure is that the teams do not have the ability to dictate this agenda. In negotiations the teams regularly receive the majority of facility revenues, so the local development agenda should not be on the list of negotiable items.

Conclusion

After all the studies have been read, all previous research has been digested, and all the evidence has been assessed, the overall conclusion to be reached is that sports stadia can serve as urban revitalization tools, but that this result is by no means guaranteed even given a half-billion dollar investment. Public leaders, local planners, project architects, and even the teams themselves must deal with several key issues to arrive at this desired result. Included in this set of issues are the determination and implementation of a development logic, the creation of a district-level plan, and accounting for the thorny issue of parking. The days of naïve public policy and assumed economic development outcomes must come to an end. If cities insist on investing in sports stadia and sports arenas, then they should do so with a better understanding of the requisite planning work and overall development logic inherent to successful projects.

Not the focus of this dissertation, but equally important to the success of a given project is a more complete understanding of what professional team sports can and cannot do for a city. Years of excellent research have distilled the likely impacts of these projects, yet stadium proponents still claim far greater benefits than these projects offer. What is required is an honest appraisal of these projects. If proper perspective can be kept, then the public benefits of these projects can be maximized and public acrimony can be

minimized. Below, I summarize those impacts that cities can and cannot expect from a new sports facility.

Recognizing What a Stadium Cannot Provide for a City

A mountain of evidence has shown that sports are not a viable economic base for a city of any size. Other studies have shown that sports teams and sports stadia do not create much new money for an area, instead they simply redistribute local spending into a different set of pockets. Simply put, massive economic development is not likely to result from these projects. Despite this, every new stadium project makes economic development promises that cannot be kept, resulting in public anger, resentment and growing distrust of local government. Therefore, it must be clearly laid out what a stadium project cannot do for a city. As these findings have been summarized elsewhere, I will not go into detail on these here.

- *Sports Stadia are not money-makers for a city:* A sports stadium is not a good economic investment. Only very rarely can a city, a region, or a state realize a net profit from these facilities once all costs and all revenues are considered.
- *Sports Stadia are not anchors for regional development:* A new sports facility is simply not substantial enough to change regional economic patterns. There is simply no evidence that sports facilities affect the location decisions of firms or families.
- *Sports Stadia don't create many new jobs:* A new sports stadium is not an effective approach to job creation. In Cleveland, stadium proponents promised 28,000 new jobs and only about 2,000 were created. All things considered, Cleveland fared better than most. If job creation is a primary goal, don't build a sports stadium. Spend the money elsewhere.
- *Sports Stadia don't guarantee new development:* The central finding of this study has been that a sports facility can serve as an urban revitalization tool, but only given certain conditions. Alone, a new stadium simply is not substantial enough to generate substantial microarea development.

Recognizing What a Stadium Can Do for a City

If a stadium does not bring massive economic development benefits to a city, what does it bring? What are the public benefits that are a likely outcome from a new project?

- *Infrastructure improvements*: Almost every sports facility project brings a concurrent upgrade of local infrastructure to better serve the large crowds that attend events. These infrastructure upgrades usually take the form of road improvements, highway interchange improvements, better pedestrian pathways, and even some water and sewer upgrades. While these upgrades are targeted at improving ingress and egress for the district, they also provide cities with a wonderful opportunity to target these improvements towards other local needs. Perhaps the road and interchange upgrades make an industrial area more accessible. This would offer an opportunity to expand or strengthen this area. The pedestrian improvements may help to establish linkages to surrounding districts, spreading the impact of event crowds to other nearby areas. For example, Cleveland coupled the road improvements for Gateway with significant investments in pedestrian connections that have been an important part in linking Gateway to nearby activity centers like Euclid-Prospect and Tower City Center. In short, the massive infrastructure upgrades that accompany most projects can be and should be utilized to address other needs within that portion of the city.
- *Visibility/Marketability:* The development and opening of a new sports stadia is a major regional and often a national event. The visibility given to a city district by a new facility may make it more attractive to new development or the re-use of existing space. The local and national press generated by the opening of the facility provides a brief, but invaluable opportunity to further the local development agenda. In Arlington, the new Ballpark has been a major marketing tool for the city in attracting new hotels and restaurants to the entertainment district. In addition, the Convention Center markets itself in conjunction with the Ballpark, a strategy that has proven successful over the years and has recently led to an expansion of the center.
- *Programmed/Regular Events:* The one benefit that most stadium-proponents point to is the large crowds attracted to events at these facilities. There is no denying that the

40,000 people that attend ballgames at Oriole Park and Jacobs Field are a powerful economic and social engine for a city. The overall image of the downtown and the vitality of a district are greatly enhanced by these crowds that come at regular, predictable intervals. These crowds can support a few new businesses and the activity and energy they bring are sometimes enough to push a troubled district towards redevelopment. While these crowds are wonderful additions to the urban character of a city, it must be emphasized again that they are not an economic engine in and of themselves. These crowds are only a first step towards recapturing a district and cementing the long-term health of a portion of the city. However, they do represent a solid first step.

- *Opportunity to Galvanize the Planning Process:* Large projects like a sports stadium offer cities opportunities to push the local development agenda and to institute the long-term vision for a district through an in-depth planning process. Major investments into the facility and nearby infrastructure provide a superb opportunity to review local zoning codes, land use patterns, and transportation linkages with an eye towards changing these to better match this long-term vision. In addition, these projects invariably bring all the major players to the negotiating table, guaranteeing input from all sides and requiring some level of agreement on how the stadium project will impact the entire district. For example, Arlington used the new Ballpark as the catalyst for a major zoning change and a set of urban design improvements to better accommodate their long-term vision for their growing entertainment district. Similarly, Cleveland used Gateway to address long-term planning goals for the microarea and for the entire downtown.
- *District Specialization:* Lastly, a sports stadium offers the public sector the opportunity to specialize a district as an entertainment and tourist destination. City after city is climbing aboard the tourism bandwagon and sports facilities are an excellent fit to this new image of the city. Large crowds, carnival-like events, and consumerism in action are all a central component of any sports project. In those cities interested in developing a recreation base or augmenting an existing one, a sports

stadium offers the chance to specialize a district as an entertainment center, one comfortable for locals and out-of-towners alike. In all three case studies the new sports facilities were intended to help fold a portion of the city into this new entertainment-based economy. While micro-level development was not a primary result of Camden Yards, the sports stadia did stretch the entertainment economy several blocks further west of Inner Harbor. Of course, district specialization should be predicated on a solid development logic, a strategic district-level plan, and an understanding that the stadium alone cannot establish and sustain this entertainment economy.

Caveat Emptor: The Lukewarm Impacts of Sports and Sports Stadia

Despite my love of sports, sports stadia, and cities, and given the general findings of this study, at the end of this lengthy paper I am faced with laying out the single most important finding of the entirety of the sports facility literature. While a possible district-level catalyst of change, a wonderful boost to the image of the city, even an opportunity to resurrect interest in a dying downtown, *a sports stadium is not actually an urban revitalization tool.* In no area has a stadium served to help reverse the flood of middle class families and footloose businesses from cities. There is not a single governmental entity that has seen a net positive impact on tax revenues resulting from a sports stadium. Even the most acclaimed of this newest round of sports stadia have not helped children to learn any better, reduce crime city-wide, or help local residents become better citizens. The "best of the best" have not reduced poverty levels and transitioned thousands of people back into the workforce. The Camden Yards, Gateways, and Ballparks have not generated thousands of livable wage jobs required to pull families out of poverty. These are the changes that are really required for urban revitalization to occur. When all is said and done, professional sports teams and sports stadia have only lukewarm impacts on America's cities.

Even in the best of our three cases, microarea development surrounding Gateway has only brought a small flow of new investment back into downtown Cleveland. That city still has tremendous economic problems, a failing school system, and astounding poverty levels. Gateway may make the residents of Cleveland feel a little better about themselves. The project may bring millions of suburbanites into the city throughout the year. The Gateway area is now thriving with new businesses, new residences, and new hotels. But at the end of the day, the Cleveland metropolitan area has spent upwards of half-a-billion dollars on a project that hosts millionaire players playing before crowds made up of middle and upper middle class suburbanites.

If cities insist on investing their precious public dollars in sports facilities, they should do so with their eyes wide open. No longer should these projects be sold on regional or even city-wide economic development terms. Instead, district development can be offered as one possible benefit from these projects, albeit a costly one. It is important to recognize that the latest justification for sports facilities, micro-level development impacts, is possible, but not guaranteed by these projects. If the expense of a new stadium or arena is to be incurred, the public sector must act to maximize the return on their investment by staying away from defensive politics and establishing a local development agenda that addresses their needs and not the needs of the teams. It is hoped that this dissertation is one element in helping cities to do just this.

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APPENDIX
Current Sports Stadia and Arenas, 1999

MLB Baseball Franchises

Team	*Stadium, 1999*	*Year Opened*	*Stadium Situation*
Arizona Diamondbacks	Bank One Ballpark	1998	New
Atlanta Braves	Turner Field	1997	New
Baltimore Orioles	Oriole Park at Camden Yards	1992	New
Boston Red Sox	Fenway Park	1912	Planning
California Angels	Edison Field	1966	Upgraded
Chicago Cubs	Wrigley Field	1914	Upgraded
Chicago White Sox	(New) Comiskey Park	1991	New
Cincinnati Reds	Cinergy Field	1970	Opens 2000
Cleveland Indians	Jacobs Field	1994	New
Colorado Rockies	Coors Field	1995	New
Detroit Tigers	Tiger Stadium	1912	Opens 2000
Florida Marlins	Pro Player Stadium	1987	Planning
Houston Astros	Astrodome	1965	Opens 2000
Kansas City Royals	Kauffman Stadium	1973	Upgraded
Los Angeles Dodgers	Dodger Stadium	1962	Planning
Milawaukee Brewers	Milwaukee County Stadium	1953	Opens 2000
Minnesota Twins	HHH Metrodome	1982	Planning
Montreal Expos	Olympic Stadium	1976	Planning
New York Mets	Shea Stadium	1964	Planning
New York Yankees	Yankee Stadium	1923	Planning
Oakland A's	Oakland Coliseum	1997	Upgraded
Philadelphia Phillies	Veterans Stadium	1971	Planning
Pittsburgh Pirates	Three Rivers Stadium	1970	Financed
San Diego Padres	Qualcomm Stadium	1967	Under Construction
San Francisco Giants	3Com Park	1960	Opens 2000
Seattle Mariners	Kingdome, Safeco Field	1976	Opens 1999
St Louis Cardinals	Busch Stadium	1966	Upgraded
Tampa Bay Devil Rays	Tropicana Field	1990	New, Planning
Texas Rangers	The Ballpark in Arlington	1994	New
Toronto Blue Jays	SkyDome	1989	New

NFL Football Franchises

Team	*Stadium, 1999*	*Year Opened*	*Stadium Situation*
Arizona Cardinals	Sun Devil Stadium	1958	Planning
Atlanta Falcons	The Georgia Dome	1992	New
Baltimore Ravens	PSINet Stadium	1998	New
Buffalo Bills	Rich Stadium	1973	Upgraded
Carolina Panthers	Carolinas Stadium	1996	New
Chicago Bears	Soldier Field	1924	Planning
Cincinnati Bengals	Riverfront Stadium	1970	Financed
Dallas Cowboys	Texas Stadium	1971	Upgraded
Denver Broncos	Mile High Stadium	1948	Financed
Detroit Lions	Pontiac Silverdome	1975	Under Construction
Green Bay Packers	Lambeau Field	1957	Upgraded, Planning
Indianapolis Colts	RCA Dome	1984	No Plans
Jacksonville Jaguars	Jacksonville Stadium	1995	New
Kansas City Chiefs	Arrowhead Stadium	1972	Upgraded
Miami Dolphins	Joe Robbie Stadium	1987	New
Minnesota Vikings	HHH Metrodome	1982	Planning
Nashville Titans	Vanderbilt Stadium	1965	Opens 1999
New England Patriots	Foxboro Stadium	1971	Planning
New Orleans Saints	Louisiana Superdome	1975	No Plans
New York Giants	Giants Stadium	1976	No Plans
New York Jets	Giants Stadium	1976	No Plans
Oakland Raiders	Oakland Coliseum	1997	Upgraded
Philadelphia Eagles	Veterans Stadium	1971	Planning
Pittsburgh Steelers	Three Rivers Stadium	1970	Planning
San Diego Chargers	Qualcomm Stadium	1967	Upgraded
San Francisco 49ers	3Com Park	1960	Financed
Seattle Seahawks	Kingdome	1976	Financed
St Louis Rams	St Louis Dome	1995	New
Tampa Bay Buccaneers	Raymond James	1998	New
Washington Redskins	Redskins Stadium	1997	New

NBA Basketball Franchises

Team	*Arena, 1998-1999*	*Year Opened*	*Stadium Situation*
Atlanta Hawks	The Omni	1972	Opens 1999
Boston Celtics	Fleet Center	1995	New
Charlotte Hornets	Charlotte Coliseum	1988	New, Planning
Chicago Bulls	United Center	1994	New
Cleveland Cavaliers	The Arena at Gateway	1994	New
Dallas Mavericks	Reunion Arena	1980	Planning
Denver Nuggets	McNichols Arena	1975	Financed
Detroit Pistons	The Palace at Auburn Hills	1988	New
Golden State Warriors	Oakland Coliseum Arena	1966	Upgraded
Houston Rockets	The Summit	1975	Financed
Indiana Pacers	Market Square Arena	1974	Under Construction
Los Angeles Clippers	Memorial Sports Arena	1959	Opens 1999
Los Angeles Lakers	Great Western Forum	1967	Opens 1999
Miami Heat	Miami Arena	1988	Under Construction
Milwaukee Bucks	Bradley Center	1988	New
Minnesota Timberwolves	Target Center	1990	New
New Jersey Nets	Brendan Byrne Arena	1981	Planning
New York Knicks	Madison Square Garden	1968	Upgraded
Orlando Magic	Orlando Arena	1989	New
Philadelphia 76ers	CoreStates Center	1996	New
Phoenix Suns	America West Arena	1992	New
Portland Trail Blazers	Memorial Coliseum	1995	New
Sacramento Kings	ARCO Arena	1988	New
San Antonio Spurs	Alamodome	1993	Planning
Seattle Super Sonics	Key Arena	1995	New
Toronto Raptors	Air Canada Centre	1999	New
Utah Jazz	Delta Center	1991	New
Vancouver Grizzlies	General Motors Place	1995	New
Washington Bullets	MCI Center	1997	New

NHL Hockey Franchises

Team	*Stadium*	*Year Opened*	*Stadium Situation*
Anaheim Mighty Ducks	The Pond of Anaheim	1993	New
Boston Bruins	Fleet Center	1995	New
Buffalo Sabres	Marine Midland Arena	1996	New
Calgary Flames	Olympic Saddledome	1983	No Plans
Carolina Hurricane	Greensboro Coliseum	1975	Financed
Chicago Black Hawks	United Center	1994	New
Colorado Avalanche	McNichols Arena	1975	Financed
Dallas Stars	Reunion Arena	1980	Planning
Detroit Red Wings	Joe Louis Arena	1979	Upgraded
Edmonton Oilers	Skyflash Centre	1974	Upgraded
Florida Panthers	National Car Center	1999	New
Los Angeles Kings	Great Western Forum	1967	Opens 1999
Montreal Canadiens	Molson Centre	1996	New
New Jersey Devils	Brendan Byrne Arena	1981	Planning
New York Islanders	Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum	1972	Planning
New York Rangers	Madison Square Garden	1968	Upgraded
Ottawa Senators	Corel Centre	1996	New
Philadelphia Flyers	CoreStates Center	1996	New
Phoenix Coyotes	America West Arena	1992	New, Planning
Pittsburgh Penguins	Pittsburgh Civic Arena	1961	Planning
San Jose Sharks	San Jose Arena	1993	New
St Louis Blues	Kiel Center	1994	New
Tampa Bay Lightning	Ice Palace	1996	New
Toronto Maple Leafs	Air Canada Centre	1999	New
Vancouver Canucks	General Motors Place	1995	New
Washington Capitals	MCI Center	1997	New

Timothy S. Chapin

CURRICULUM VITAE

June, 1999

CURRENT STATUS:

Assistant Professor
Department of Urban and Regional Planning
Florida State University
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CURRENT ADDRESS:

Department of Urban Design and Planning
410 Gould Hall, Box 355740
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington 98195
(206) 543-4190
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DEGREES:

Ph. D. in Urban Design and Planning, Department of Urban Design and Planning, University of Washington, Seattle, July 1999. Dissertation: *Urban Revitalization Tools: An Assessment of Impacts of Sports Stadia at the Microarea Level.* Dissertation Committee: Richard Morrill (chair), Dennis Ryan, Hilda Blanco, Avery Guest, Gunter Krumme. GPA: 3.9/4.0

Master of City Planning, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta June 1994. *Dimensions of Transportation Demand Management: A Factor Analysis and Evaluation of Transportation Management Associations in the United States of America.* Advisor: Erik Ferguson. GPA: 3.8/4.0

Bachelor of Sociology, Emory University, Atlanta, May 1992. Double-major in Sociology/Psychology.

GRADUATE FIELDS:

Community and Urban Economic Development
Land Use
Geographic Information Systems
Urban Politics

PUBLICATIONS:

Refereed Journals

Morrill, R. and T. Chapin, 1997. "Spatial Inequality in Higher Education in Washington." Applied Geographic Studies, 1(2): pp. 95-114.

Chapters

Chapin, T., 1997. Identifying X Factors: Other Explanations for Public Investment into Sports Facilities. Sport in the City: Cultural, Economic and Political Considerations, R. Wilcox, D. Andrews, R. Irwin, and R. Pitter (eds.), (Forthcoming).

Book Reviews

Chapin, T., 1999. Book Review: *Developing Urban Entertainment Centers* by Michael D. Beyard et al. and *Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums* by Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, eds. Journal of the American Planning Association, Forthcoming.

Chapin, T., 1998. Book Review, Briefly Noted: *Sports, Convention, and Entertainment Facilities* by David C. Petersen. Journal of the American Planning Association, v.64, 2: pp. 378-379.

Newsletter Articles

Chapin, T., 1999. "Sports Facilities and Economic Development." News and Views: The Newsletter of the Economic Development Division of the American Planning Association (July).

Chapin, T., 1998. "Facility Location as an Economic Development Strategy." For the Record: The Official Newsletter of the National Sports Law Institute (June/July): pp. 3-4.

Chapin, T., 1997. "The Planning Methods Conundrum: Student Roles in the Debate". The New Planner (Spring): pp. 3, 5.

Chapin, T., 1995. "Planning Cities: When Did We Forget How?" The New Planner (Winter): pp. 1, 6.

Reports and Monographs

Chapin, T., 1994. Georgia Institute of Technology Campus Safety Report: Traffic Accident Analysis. Prepared for the Georgia Institute of Technology's Police Department in preparation for the Centennial Olympic Games.

Chapin, T., 1994. Georgia Institute of Technology Campus Safety Report: Criminal Incident Analysis. Prepared for the Georgia Institute of Technology's Police Department in preparation for the Centennial Olympic Games.

Unpublished Manuscripts

Chapin, T., 1996. Facility Location as an Economic Development Strategy in Seattle, Portland, and Vancouver.

Chapin, T., 1996. Deja View: Seattle Undertakes the Stadium Provision Process Again.

Chapin, T., 1995. Computer Edutainment in Planning Education: The Case of SimCity 2000.

GRANTS:

American Institute of Certified Planners Continuing Education Grant. "Internet Technology for Planners", Co-Principal Investigator with Chang-Hee Christine Bae, $9,000, 1999-2000.

TEACHING AND RESEARCH POSITIONS:

Course Instructor/Teaching Assistant. University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Department of Urban Design and Planning, Community and Environmental Planning Program. September 1995-March 1999.

Graduate Research/Teaching Assistant. University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Interdisciplinary Ph.D. in Urban Design and Planning Program. September 1994-June 1995.

Graduate Research Assistant. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Institute of Technology Police Department. July 1993-July 1994.

Graduate Research Assistant. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia. Department of City Planning. September 1992-June 1993.

AWARDS AND HONORS:

1999 Best of ACSP Award "An Assessment of the Microarea Impacts of Sports Stadia." Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning and the American Institute of Certified Planners, 1999.

Teaching Fellow, University of Washington Interdisciplinary Ph.D. in Urban Design and Planning Program, Spring 1998.

Student Recognition Award, University of Washington Department of Urban Design and Planning, 1997.

Merit Award, University of Washington Community and Environmental Planning Program, 1997.

National Student Project of the Year Award, American Institute of Certified Planners, 1996. *City of Hahira Town Plan.*

Honor Award, American Planning Association, 1996. *Reflecting in Action Planning Studio.*

Outstanding Student Award, University of Washington Department of Urban Design and Planning, 1996.

Merit Award, University of Washington Community and Environmental Planning Program, 1996.

Student Recognition Award, University of Washington Department of Urban Design and Planning, 1996.

Ronald L. Davidson Memorial Scholarship Award, The Georgia Planning Association. 1993.

COMMUNITY AND UNIVERSITY SERVICE AND PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS:

Project Co-Director, Site Designer, and Content Developer for the EPPROC (Electronic Planning Professionals Council) Planning Methods Web Site. University of Washington Department of Urban Design and Planning, 1997-1998.

Member of the College of Architecture and Urban Planning Geo-Spatial Data Sharing Group, 1997-1998.

Consultant with various cities and regions investigating sport facility development issues including Louisville, Kentucky Birmingham, Alabama and Prince George's County, Maryland, 1996-1998.

Member of the Crown Hill/Ballard Neighborhood Planning Association, 1996-1998.

Member of the Community and Environmental Planning Colleagues Group, 1996-1998.

Member of the American Planning Association, 1995-1998.

Editor *Transportation Planning* A Newsletter for the American Planning Association, 1992-1993.

INVITED PRESENTATIONS:

International and National Events

American Planning Association, Annual National Conference, Seattle, Washington, 1999. Paper: *An Assessment of the Microarea Impacts of Sports Stadia* as part of the "Best of ACSP" session.

Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Annual National Conference, Los Angeles, California, 1998. Paper: *An Assessment of the Microarea Impacts of Sports Stadia.*

Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Annual National Conference, Los Angeles, California, 1998. Paper: *Teaching Planning Methods via Website Communication with Professional Planners.*

The Freedom Forum. The Freedom Forum Pacific Coast Center: San Francisco, California, January 1998. *Reporting on New Stadiums: Is There a Payoff for the Public?.* Invited panelist on improving the reporting of issues surrounding sports-related developments.

International Symposium of Sport in the City. University of Memphis: Memphis, Tennessee, November 1996. Paper: *A New Era of Professional Sports in the Northwest: Facility Location as an Economic Development Strategy in Seattle, Portland and Vancouver.*

International Symposium of Sport in the City. University of Memphis: Memphis, Tennessee, November 1996. Paper: *Deja View: Seattle Undertakes the Stadium Provision Process Again.*

Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Annual National Conference, Detroit, Michigan, 1995. Paper: *Computer Edutainment as an Innovative Teaching Tool.*

Regional Events

Olympia Economics Club. Olympia, Washington, June 1997. *The Sports Facility Game: Recognizing the Spatial Ingredient.*

Seattle Central Community College/Earth On-the-Air Independent Media. Seattle, Washington, June 1997. *Stadiums in Seattle: A Community Democracy Forum.*

Pacific Northwest Regional Economic Conference, Spokane, Washington, April 1997. Paper: *Facility Location as an Economic Development Strategy in Seattle, Portland and Vancouver.*

American Institute of Certified Planners Exam Review, Seattle, Washington, March 1997, March 1998. Presentation: *Demographics and Population Projections.*
University of Washington Interdisciplinary Ph.D. Program Summer, Seattle, WA, Summer 1995. Paper: *Why Study Stadia? Seattle Undertakes the Stadium Provision Process.*

MEDIA INTERVIEWS:

The Spokane Spokesman-Review. "Football stadium won't offer return on investment, economist predicts." Grayden Jones. April 26, 1997.

The Charlotte Observer. "Taxpayers have big stake in stadium: Charlotte area's costs still well below what is paid in some NFL cities." Taylor Batten. July 31, 1996.

The San Antonio Express-News. "Privacy invasion: Stadium finance plans getting more complicated- and less public." David King, March, 1996.

TEACHING:

Course Instructor:

Database Systems Planning Analysis
Up to 25 graduate and undergraduate planning students. A lecture and computer based course introducing the core concepts and skills of relational database management and utilization. Fall 1996, Fall 1997, Fall 1998.

Introduction to Geographic Information Systems
Up to 25 graduate and undergraduate planning students. A lecture, project, and computer based course introducing the core concepts and skills of geographic information systems. Summer 1996, Summer 1997, Summer 1998.

Survey of Planning Methods I
Up to 25 graduate planning students. Course coverage focuses upon core planning methods and tools among them statistics, economic base analysis, and population projections. Winter 1996, Winter 1999.

Infrastructure Planning and Local Finance
Up to 25 graduate planning students. A lecture and project-oriented course that introduces students to the basics of infrastructure provision in urban areas. Course coverage includes a discussion of major urban services, project financing, and plan budgeting. Winter 1999.

Introduction to Community and Environmental Planning
Up to 60 undergraduate students from all disciplines. This course utilizes group discussions, small group exercises, and service learning to introduce students to core issues surrounding their communities, the environment, and the justifications for intervention in the form of planning. Fall 1995, Spring 1996, Fall 1996, Spring 1997.

Research Workshop
Up to ten undergraduate community and environmental planning students. This course was developed to meet the University's goals of introducing students to and involving students in the development of academic research. Fall 1997.

Computer Laboratory on PC ARC/INFO and ArcView GIS III
Up to 25 graduate planning students. Course coverage included the methods and practice of using *PC ARC/INFO* and *ArcView GIS III* for planning-related projects. Winter 1997.

Introduction to PC Computer Applications
Up to 15 graduate planning students. This two credit mini-course allows students to develop and enhance their computing skills. The wide range of applications covered in the course included *Windows*, *Excel*, *Access*, and *ArcView*. Fall 1995.

Computer Laboratory on Spreadsheet Modeling and Applications
Up to 25 graduate planning students. The lab section for the core methods sequence, this mini-course introduced and utilized spreadsheet models of various stripes, including Demographic models, Lowry models, and Input-Output models. Winter 1997, Spring 1997.

Online Course Resources:

Database Systems Planning Analysis Home Page
http://weber.u.washington.edu/~introgis/udp420.htm
Introduction to Geographic Information Systems Home Page
http://weber.u.washington.edu/~introgis/
Electronic Planning Professionals Council (EPPROC) Home Page
http://weber.u.washington.edu/~methods/

Course Teaching Assistant:

Applied Planning Studio: Reflecting in Action
Ph.D. Seminar III: Local Planning Challenges and Opportunities
Survey of Planning Methods
Planning Applications of Spatial Information Systems