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Christopher Towler

Reactionary Or Traditional Conservatism?:
The Origins And Consequences
Of The Far Right Movement Of The 1960s

Christopher Towler

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Reading Committee:

Christopher Parker, Chair

Luis Fraga

Matthew Barreto

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:
Department of Political Science

University of Washington

Abstract

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Christopher Towler

Chair of Supervisory Committee:
Associate Professor Christopher Parker
Department of Political Science

The emergence of the Tea Party movement is a reminder that the Far Right can be a powerful political force in America. Yet, scholarship on the Far Right pales in comparison to work on left-wing social movements. My project examines the Far Right by revisiting the 1960s, a critical time because of the ideological realignment that shapes America today. Scholars explain that far-right movements are motivated by a commitment to retain social prestige, and unlike traditional conservatives, sympathizers with the Far Right are reactionary conservatives who resist social change at all costs. However, work on the Far Right and reactionary conservatism, especially work focused on the 1960s, fails to place the movement in its appropriate historical context, theorize and subsequently test the theory. My project first grounds reactionary conservatism in the political context of the 1960s. I examine the driving forces behind the Far Right's resistance to social change in relation to the progress of the Civil Rights movement and the ever-present Cold War. Through a comparison of Far Right literature to mainstream conservative thought, the Far Right's anxiety toward social change stands out. Moreover, an analysis of 1964 National Election Study data suggests that anxiety toward social change goes above and beyond other explanations to explain sympathy for the

movement. Far-right sympathy is also a powerful predictor of political participation, negative attitudes toward integration and out-group antipathy. Finally, I use panel data to examine the power of reactionary conservatism over time, and test whether or not the anxiety of the Far Right is a long-standing, stable attitude acquired early in life. I find that reactionary conservatism is an important explanation for political behavior and attitudes in times of clear social change and years into the future.

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Introduction

THE FAR RIGHT AND AMERICAN POLITICS

“On floor of house waitin on ‘Kommandant-In-Chief’ ...the Socialist dictator who’s been feeding US a line or is it A-Lying?”

- *Tweet by Texas State Representative Randy Weber in response to Barack Obama’s 2014 State of the Union Address.*¹

“President Obama and the Washington elite are driving our great nation right into the ground... From ignoring the Constitution to drowning our children and grandchildren in unbearable debt, President Obama and Washington politicians on both sides of the aisle are destroying everything that America stands for.”

- *Senator Rand Paul in response to President Obama’s 2014 State of the Union Address.*²

“[Communism] is the driving danger which should determine our thinking about almost everything else, and most of our actions too, for the foreseeable future. For unless we can win that battle, the war for a better world will again be carried on through long and feudal Dark Ages, after we have been killed, our children have been enslaved, and all that we value has been destroyed. That is not rhetoric, and it is not exaggeration. It is a plain statement of the stark danger that is rapidly closing in on us right now.”

- *Robert Welch, Founder of the John Birch Society, 1958*³

The 2008 election of President Barack Obama, the nation’s first non-white president, sparked both joy and outrage across America. Among the President’s dissenters arose a movement claiming to be all about traditional conservative principles, such as small government and individual freedom. A speech by the co-founder of the Tea

¹ Weber, a favorite of the Tea Party, tweeted from the House floor moments before President Obama’s speech. The tweet text is from an article by Keith Brekhuis (2014) on Politics USA.

² Senator Rand Paul, a Tea Party darling, released a ten-minute video response to the President’s 2014 State of the Union. The quote is from a piece by Alex Newman (2014) in *The New American*.

³ Quote appears on pages 107-108 of *The Blue Book*, a John Birch Society (JBS) publication by Robert Welch (1959) chronicling the founding meeting of the JBS at a two-day conference in Indianapolis, IN.

Party Patriots, one of the largest factions of the broader Taxed Enough Already (TEA) movement, summed up the movement's vision for the future of America: "a constitutionally limited, fiscally responsible government where free markets thrive."⁴ However, Tea Party claims of a traditionally conservative focus are under constant attack. Much of the criticism directed toward the Tea Party stems from Tea Partiers' tendency to refer to Obama in "plainly racialized terms" (Parker & Barreto, 2013, pg. 2). For instance, Tea Party leaders are also on the record straying from the movement's conservative elements, and instead propagating racism and conspiracy. More specifically, the head of the Richmond, Virginia Tea Party aimed a joke at the President: "A politician, a Muslim and an illegal alien walk into a bar, and you know what the bartender said? Good evening, Mr. President."⁵

Certainly, a paradox exists when trying to discern the true motivations behind support for the Tea Party, and many scholars have taken a closer look at the Tea Party and its followers. Due to the political influence the Tea Party has secured in both local and national politics, it comes as no surprise that scholars are working to understand the movement. However, the Tea Party is not an entirely new phenomenon in American politics. The Tea Party follows a long line of Far Right movements, stretching as far back as the Know-Nothings, to the second-era Ku Klux Klan, and the Far Right movement that swept over America in the 1960s. By considering some of the Far Right's characteristics in past movements, we can gain a better understanding of their present dynamics.

A debate about the role of government similar to today's Tea Party's assertions also raged on in American politics not so long ago – a debate that rang of consistent racial undertones in the turbulent wake of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s. As it turns out, the Far Right movement in the 1960s is arguably the most successful far-right

⁴ The quote appears in a speech by Jenny Beth Martin at CPAC 2013. The full text is found on the Tea Party Patriots website at <http://www.teapartypatriots.org/all-issues/news/tea-party-patriots-co-founder-jenny-beth-martins-speech-at-cpac/>

⁵ Quoted text appears in Olympia Meola's (2014) article for the *Virginia News*.

movement in American history; simply put, for the first and only time, the Far Right's first choice candidate, Barry Goldwater, successfully won the Republican nomination for President. Thus, even as scholarship offers clues as to the motivation behind support for the Tea Party and the consequences of movement support, little scholarship uses a similarly rigorous approach, both theoretically and methodologically, to examine Far Right movements in America's past. Because the present emanates from the past, previous influential Far Right movements warrant attention. Through their careful study, perhaps we can gain a clearer perspective of today's political tensions.

I turn my attention to the 1960s Far Right because of the striking similarities between the 1960s movement and the Tea Party, and I explore the sources of sympathy for the movement as well as the consequences of movement sympathy.⁶ Just as with the Tea Party today, the 1960s Far Right movement gained strength on the basis of conservative values: small government, the rule of law and fiscal responsibility. Goldwater, the national candidate backed by the 1960s Far Right, proclaimed these values central to his cause many times, starting with his speech announcing his candidacy for Presidency, "I've always stood for government that is limited and balanced and against the ever increasing concentrations of authority in Washington... we must now make a choice in this land and not continue drifting endlessly down and down for a time when all of us, our lives, our property, our hopes, and even our prayers will become just cogs in a vast government machine."⁷

On the other hand, the 1960s Far Right was also known for its anti-Communism and opposition to the Civil Rights movement, as it reflected a general sense of intolerance. For example, leaders of the 1960s Far Right described civil rights protests as

⁶ I consider the 1960s Far Right a social and political movement because of its national presence as well as its sizable membership, organized chapters, political candidates and policy platform.

⁷ Quoted text is from Senator Barry Goldwater's 1964 announcement of his candidacy for President. The full transcript is found at <http://www.4president.org/speeches/1964/barrygoldwater1964announcement.htm>.

riots attempting to divide the nation, and constantly claimed the Civil Rights movement was part of a larger Communist scheme to destroy America (Epstein & Forster, 1966). This suggests that far-right sympathy in the 1960s might also have been about a general intolerance, characterized by racism and anti-Communism. This dissertation explores the sources of far-right sympathy in the 1960s in order to provide clarity to a movement with which the Tea Party is often associated. Furthermore, this research also considers the consequences of sympathy for the Far Right on both political behavior and attitudes in America. Finally, this research investigates the enduring effect of far-right sympathy over time, offering a preliminary analysis that helps connect Far Right movements across American history.

My argument builds upon work by Christopher Parker and Matt Barreto (2013) on the Tea Party that claims sympathy for the Far Right derives from the anxiety individuals feel as they perceive rapid changes in America threatening their comfortable way of life. In other words, certain individuals have come to view America as a heterosexual, Christian, middle-class, male, white country. When social change threatens to displace privileged individuals from their position in society, they turn to the Far Right for comfort. The Far Right movement thus becomes a way to resist social change perceived as destroying everything these individuals know and love about America.⁸ In short, far-right sympathizers believe social change is “subverting their way of life,” and they will do anything in their power to stop it (Parker & Barreto, 2013, pg. 3). I argue that individuals contending that the Civil Rights movement and the Cold War, among other

⁸ Much has been written on what is considered American and un-American. See, Parker and Barreto, 2013; Devos and Banaji, 2005; Canaday, 2009.

events that signaled social change, represented changes in America too great, they took refuge in the Far Right movement of the 1960s.

I use the Tea Party as my initial reference point; however, even the most nuanced work on the Tea Party does not present an entirely new argument. Historian Richard Hofstadter, in his 1964 book *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, and sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset (1970), in *The Politics of Unreason*, claimed that modernity threatened the 1960s Far Right, and individuals who perceived social change as a danger to their own social prestige would go to great lengths to resist such change. Central to both Hofstadter's and Lipset's examinations of the Far Right was a Grand Conspiracy Theory, used to undermine any and all social change. The Grand Conspiracy Theory could explain the entirety of human history, and identified conspirators as agents of social change as a way to label uncomfortable social change as illegitimate and dangerous to America. Similarly, Parker and Barreto's (2013) analysis of the Tea Party rests upon the same theoretical claims and follows in the same vein as Hofstadter's description of the Far Right as pseudo-conservatives by identifying supporters of the Tea Party movement as *reactionary conservatives*.

Hofstadter and Lipset helped set the stage for Parker and Barreto's work, as all understand the Far Right as a regular occurrence throughout American history. They point as far back as the nativist Know-Nothing Party of the 1850s, followed by the second-era Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s, leading to the 1960s Far Right (characterized by the John Birch Society and the New Right of the 1970s) and, finally, the Tea Party movement today. Each Far Right movement is described as a reaction to rapid social change: the Know-Nothings were reacting to a rapidly growing immigrant population, the

Klan was reacting to expanding freedom for blacks and women, the John Birch Society and its allies saw the Civil Rights movement and the Cold War as destroying America, and the Tea Party perceives Barack Obama, the first African-American President, as a sign of America devolving at a reckless pace.⁹

Even though American history suggests that a long line of Far Right movements existed in reaction to rapid social changes, the rigorous examinations on the various Far Right movements in American history are few and far between. Most notable is Parker and Barreto's (2013) aforementioned work on the Tea Party. In their book, Parker and Barreto examine personal-interview data, content from Tea Party websites, and individual responses from public opinion surveys to examine Tea Party support and its consequences. However, as comprehensive as Parker and Barreto's work is, it is limited to the current political context shaped by the election of President Obama. Furthermore, their work relies upon Hofstadter and Lipset to set the stage for the Tea Party movement, and rather than examine the Far Right over time, their work assumes that the anxiety toward social change they claim motivates Tea Party support is an enduring worldview learned early in life. I address both of these limitations in this dissertation.

Conversely, some scholarship examines the Far Right in the 1960s in great detail. Namely, an edited volume by Daniel Bell (1963) entitled *The Radical Right* is considered one of the most comprehensive works on the 1960s movement. However, the contributors to Bell's edited volume echo the historical approach of Richard Hofstadter, and rarely used advanced methods to analyze survey data as a way of examining the 1960s Far

⁹ A number of scholars suggest that a long-line of Far Right movements exist in American politics. Namely, Lipset and Raab (1970) explain the 1960s Far Right as a manifestation of previous Far Right movements. An essay by Author Schlesinger (1969), echoed in Parker and Barreto's (2013) analysis, recognize the emergence of the Far Right during times of great change in America.

Right. Furthermore, even the few examinations that do rely upon survey data are limited. Most notable is the work of Lipset and Raab (1970) and James McEvoy (1972), but neither Lipset and Raab nor McEvoy present more than descriptive associations in their analyses. My dissertation work fills this gap by using rigorous statistical methods to examine Far Right sympathy and the consequences of movement sympathy using individual survey responses.

Ultimately, I argue that far-right sympathizers in the 1960s perceive social change as subversion, and aim to undermine such change to preserve their own position in society. The 1960s are characterized by momentous social change, namely the Civil Rights movement, the Cold War and international movements for independence across the world. The historical context entering the 1960s, as best described by Lipset (1970) was,

On the one hand, the growing uneasiness of the American people in the face of gathering changes on the domestic front – the initial civil rights revolution was in full flower; and on the other hand, the fact that a Republican administration had been in power for six years without serving the serious preservative interests of economic ultra-conservatives (pg. 248).

In short, Lipset suggests that the mounting Civil Rights movement coupled with Republican leaders failure to appease the ultra-conservative faction of their base created a political environment where people were faced with too much change for their comfort level, and they could not turn to their Republican leaders for comfort.

Modern-day work on the Tea Party suggests that the above claim accurately describes Far Right support. Parker and Barreto (2013) point to the combination of the

nations first black President, the first female speaker of the house, the first Latina Supreme Court Justice and an openly gay Congressional committee chairman as symbols of changes too great in America, and pose threats to individuals who perceive “their country is being stolen from them...the connection to their beloved America rapidly dissolving” (pg. 5). Yet, no matter how meticulous research on the Tea Party movement is, existing scholarship is limited to the current historical and political moment shaped by Obama’s symbolic presidency.

If people attracted to the Far Right really are people who fear social change of any kind, or *reactionary conservatives*, then anxiety toward social change should also drive far-right sympathy in the 1960s, another time of great social change. Moreover, scholarship on the Tea Party suggests *reactionary conservatism* shapes individuals’ views of the political world and is a product of social learning early in life. However, existing research lacks an examination of the enduring strength of reactionary conservatism over time. The question remains whether or not the anxiety experienced by far-right sympathizers is part of a deeper socialization process, one that goes far beyond a backlash to President Obama and current changes in America.

In this dissertation, I address these various gaps in the scholarship, starting with an examination of why individuals sympathized with the Far Right in the 1960s. My examination continues by exploring the political and social consequences of far-right sympathy, and I take time to differentiate reactionary conservatives from more traditional conservatives. My project explores the contours of Far Right sympathy during a time when the Far Right’s Grand Conspiracy Theory labeled civil rights leaders, Supreme Court Justices and sitting Presidents subversives and traitors.

Reactionary Conservatism or Something Else? Motivations behind Sympathy for the Far Right

Upon listening to the 1960s Far Right's justification for its opposition to progressive policies and social change in America, it would be difficult to disregard their claims of upholding traditionally conservative values: a preference for small government, the rule of law and fiscal responsibility. However, there are a number of other explanations for sympathy for the 1960s Far Right in addition to traditional conservatism. Political factors, such as trust in government and partisan identity have long divided America, and the 1960s is no exception. The rise of the Dixiecrats in 1948 signaled a partisan divide in America around issues of race and segregation, and McCarthyism in the 1950s only added fuel to the fire. By the 1960s, a significant segment of America was fed up with the leadership in both the Democratic and Republican parties for compromising on civil rights and wavering in the face of Communism (Lowndes, 2008). *A conservative revolt* brought together those who felt ignored by the mainstream Republican Party and those who mistrusted the current political regime (McMillen, 1971).

Furthermore, group relations have also divided America into in-groups and out-groups throughout history, and the 1960s saw its fair share of group intolerance. The 1960s Far Right maintained an official record of respect for African Americans; however, anonymous questionnaires of the John Birch Society (JBS) members failed to reveal one black member (Lipset & Raab, 1970).¹⁰ The Far Right's record was less pure when it

¹⁰ Here, Lipset and Raab reference Frederick Grupp's (1966) study, "Political Activists: The John Birch Society and the A.D.A."

came to the Civil Rights movement and African Americans' struggle for equality. Civil rights legislation was attacked for removing the "do-it yourself spirit" from the black community, and African American rioters were often shockingly described as "indigenous animals" who would "riot, loot, bomb, and burn" (Lipset & Raab, 1970, pg. 267). Moreover, the Far Right was determined to label the "Negro Revolution" as a Communist plot, and Robert Welch, the founder of the JBS and leading voice propagating the conspiracy, described the Black Panthers as Communist agents used to "beat their breasts and make loud noises, like the gorillas whom they so much resemble" (Lipset & Raab, 1970, pg. 267). In all, additional investigation is required to disentangle the role of racism in motivating the 1960s Far Right.

If racism was merely apparent within the ranks of the 1960s Far Right, anti-Communism could have defined the movement. Growing from the anti-Communism of McCarthyism of the 1950s, the Far Right found itself the primary vehicle to combat Communism throughout the 1960s. Fitting with their conservative claims, the 1960s Far Right emphasized individualism and local government in response to a rapidly growing American social welfare system amidst the Cold War (Lipset & Raab, 1970). The Far Right rested upon the idea that "despotism can come only when local self-government is destroyed," and took hard-lined political stances against the income tax, social welfare programs and any expansion of federal government at all that failed to address the looming threat of Communism (Lipset & Raab, 1970, pg. 249).¹¹

Considering the rhetoric and messages espoused by the 1960s Far Right, even a casual observer can see why politics and intolerance may motivate sympathy for the

¹¹ Much of the growing conservative backlash against the welfare state is attributed to the Republican failure to curb government expansion during Eisenhower's years as president.

movement. Even so, additional evidence suggests that there is something more that merits consideration. In other words, the 1960s Far Right, although seemingly cut from the same cloth as other conservative agencies created to oppose the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt, espoused a comprehensive conspiracy theory used to explain away social change in the 1960s, and anything else that the Far Right disagreed with in the entirety of American history. Although the conspiracy itself had no boundaries, Communism became the specific phenomenon used to vilify agents of social change as conspirators hell-bent on destroying the country (Hofstadter, 1964; Lipset & Raab, 1970; Parker & Barreto, 2013).

So amidst the 1960s Far Right's politics and intolerant social and political positions, both Democrats and Republicans were labeled Communist infiltrators. Eisenhower served as the highest ranking traitor, and the leaders of the Civil Rights movement were nothing more than Communist pawns set forth to incite race riots, divide the nation upon itself and aid in the destruction of America. The Far Right's conspiracy in the 1960s is a manifestation of their anxiety toward social change, and their attempt to resist it.

Therefore, it appears that there is some evidence, even if anecdotal, that suggests the anxiety associated with the social change in the 1960s might meaningfully inform far-right sympathy beyond politics and intolerance. In other words, if my claims hold, individuals will be driven to sympathize with the 1960s Far Right by their adverse reaction to the Civil Rights movement, the Cold War and the great social change of the time. Scholarship on the Tea Party adds value to this claim, demonstrating that the anxiety surrounding President Obama's election influences support for the Tea Party

above and beyond alternative explanations, such as racism and politics (Parker & Barreto, 2013). Still, my analysis is the first to rigorously test motivation for the Far Right in a historical and political context void of President Obama and all that he represents.

Moreover, I am also interested in whether or not far-right sympathy in the 1960s can affect contemporary American politics; once again, scholarship on the Tea Party suggests that it can.¹² Nevertheless, my examination departs from scholarship on the Tea Party as well as work on the 1960s Far Right in at least one very important way: my research is the first examination to explore both the causes and consequences of sympathy for the 1960s Far Right while also accounting for the bulk of theoretically relevant alternative explanations.

America Takes Notice: The Far Right and America Politics

As previously mentioned, the rise of the Tea Party movement garnered the full attention of contemporary mainstream American politics. An unprecedented number of Americans sympathize with Tea Party activists who criticize both the left and the moderate right.¹³ Even as the Tea Party finds itself to the right of mainstream conservatism, considered by some extremist and intolerant, the movement is influencing American politics. In 2010, a number of Tea Party-backed candidates successfully won election to both the House of Representative and the U.S. Senate.¹⁴

¹² Parker and Barreto (2013) find that support for the Tea Party is significantly associated with patriotism, attitudes toward civil liberties, out-group antipathy, perceptions of President Obama and political participation.

¹³ According to Parker and Barreto's (2013) comprehensive book on the Tea Party, approximately 350,000 Americans are official members of the Tea Party movement, while over 45 million Americans support it.

¹⁴ In addition to the 10 Republican Senators and 85 members of the House backed by the Tea Party in the 2010 midterm elections, the Tea Party is also credited with successfully vying for a piece of the Presidential political pie by hosting a 2011 CNN debate during the Republican Presidential primary race (Parker & Barreto, 2013).

Additionally, the Tea Party is effectively influencing the national Republican Party's agenda. In 2008, conservative thinker William F. Buckley, Jr. warned his readers of the growing paranoia he first experienced in the 1960s, emphasizing its rightful place outside of right wing politics today.¹⁵ Buckley suggests that the current political times have opened the door for right wing movements of the past to resurface. In June of 2012, the John Birch Society reentered the political discussion by claiming victory when the Georgia State House passed legislation securing farmers' lands from international invasion in response to plots of "global political control."¹⁶

The Tea Party's mounting influence in American politics alongside the reemerging influence of past right wing movements begs for scholars to revisit the Far Right in American political history. While it is clear that Goldwater lost spectacularly in 1964, his candidacy marks the success of the Far Right on a number of fronts. Capitalizing on feelings of anxiety towards change, the Far Right succeeded in nominating one of their own as the Republican presidential candidate in 1964, forever cementing their voice in the national political conversation (Lowndes, 2008).

The 1960s Far Right movement also set in motion a political realignment that characterizes American politics to this day (Lowndes, 2008; Kabaservice, 2012). Some argue that the racial conservatism that swept the nation in the 1960s was the root of contemporary party stances on issues of race in America (Carmines & Stimson, 1992). There are even clear links between the far right of the 1960s and American politics today. For example, the brothers David and Charles Koch, a force behind the Tea Party

¹⁵ Buckley, Jr., William F. (March, 2008). "Goldwater, the John Birch Society, and Me." *Commentary Magazine*: <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/goldwater-the-john-birch-society-and-me>.

¹⁶ Nelson, Leah. (June, 2012). "Alabama Defeats Anti-Communism with Anti-Sustainability Law." *Salon*: http://www.salon.com/2012/06/23/alabama_defeats_communism_with_anti_sustainability_law.

movement, are the sons of a founding member of the John Birch Society.¹⁷ In short, the influence of the 1960s Far Right on American politics was anything but short-lived, making a historical reexamination of the Far Right a necessary and important venture.

Why this Project?

This research not only builds upon the existing scholarship on Far Right movements, it offers a new perspective on the 1960s Far Right through a rigorous examination of movement sympathy, subsequent political consequences and the enduring strength of far-right sympathy over time. To start, my research departs from recent work on the Far Right focused on the Tea Party because it aims to provide historical perspective. Few scholars have produced thought provoking work similar to Parker and Barreto's (2013) research on the Tea Party that looks toward the 1960s Far Right for conceptual guidance. One such work, however, is Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson's (2012) book, *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism*. Skocpol and Williamson also rely upon Hofstadter's paranoid style to explain Tea Party supporters' perceptions of President Obama.

Similarly, the work of Jill Lepore (2010) depicts the Tea Party movement as motivated by an aversion to change, confirming Hofstadter's impressions. Still, although the work on the Tea Party is rather comprehensive and some even empirically rigorous, Tea Party scholarship relies upon interpretations of past Far Right movements, namely the 1960s Far Right, that do not encompass the same theoretical or empirical rigor. In short, even though work on the Tea Party suggests that Hofstadter is at least partially

¹⁷ Accusations by past generations of right-wing activists of training and funding the Tea Party movement are hardly rare. For more, see Andrew Reinbach's (2011) *Huffington Post* article entitled, "The John Birch Society's Reality."

correct, it remains unclear whether the 1960s Far Right movement is truly motivated by the theories that describe it. My dissertation research also fills this gap.

In other ways, the scholarship on the 1960s Far Right has its own limitations. I have already pointed out the limited empirical rigor of the work on the 1960s Far Right; this dissertation speaks to this weakness by completing the most rigorous empirical analysis of the 1960s Far Right to date. However, much of the work on the 1960s Far Right also focuses on specific organizations, such as the JBS or the Christian Anti-Communist Crusades, limiting their findings to Far Right elite and activists.¹⁸ Many reasons might explain why an individual would remain sympathetic to a movement rather than become an official member or activist. For instance, an individual may “take a particular stance” in agreement with the movement, but not be part of the movement’s official network (Parker & Barreto, 2013, pg. 17). Moreover, it may be the case that the perceived costs of joining the movement’s ranks outweigh the benefits (Oegema & Klandermans, 1994). Whatever the reason, social movement sympathizers tend to outpace membership by a factor of twenty, and I look to movement sympathizers in order to consider the broader social and political implications of the movement.¹⁹

¹⁸ Almost all of the empirical work that appears in R.A. Schoenberger’s (1969) edited volume, *The American Right Wing: Readings in Political Behavior*, specifically examines the JBS or the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade. Even McEvoy (1972), in one of the most comprehensive empirical examinations of the 1960s Far Right, limits his implications by identifying Far Right supporters as early Goldwater supporters who voted for him prior to his winning the Republican nomination for President

¹⁹ This approach follows the work of Parker and Barreto (2013) on the Tea Party. Parker and Barreto focus on Tea Party sympathizers in order to move their examination beyond “those who have the time, resources, and availability to become activists or members” (pg. 12). Also see, Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema (1987), “Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps towards Participation in Social Movements.”

Broader Contributions

In addition to the value the current research project adds to the study of the Far Right, I am also contributing to a broader scholarly discussion in at least three ways. First, this research advances our understanding of reactionary conservatism by revisiting a time period scholars deem essential to understanding the development of politics today. Some scholars insist that anxiety and paranoia towards change are rampant in the rhetoric and ideas of the JBS. Others demonstrate that the same attitudes must be considered when examining right wing movements across time. This project connects 1960s far-right sympathizers and activists to one overarching movement and examines the driving forces behind movement attachment. This research aims to show that the two groups are both reliant, at least in part, on a similar worldview.

Second, this research project contributes to scholarship suggesting that ideology is an important factor in determining attitudes and behaviors. For instance, Angus Campbell's (1960) seminal work on voting finds that ideology is critical in understanding how individuals form their attitudes about American politics. Moreover, John Zaller (1992) explains that ideology is central to politics as individuals rely upon a "common predispositional" lens to formulate their opinions (pg. 328). My research adds to these broad claims by examining the power of reactionary conservatism. As scholarship suggests, attachment to a reactionary worldview should separate individuals who subscribe to anxiety toward social change from those less captivated. Therefore, I am examining the power of ideology beyond the basic liberal-conservative scale, adding nuanced perspective to the far end of the political spectrum.

Lastly, my research also joins the literature on socialization and political learning. Work by Kent Jennings (1981) shows how political predispositions and attitudes are

learned from one's parents and passed from one generation to another. Jennings' work echoes the scholars who contributed to Davis and Sandra Schwartz's (1975) edited volume that shows time and time again the importance of childhood in forming how a person views of the world. Similar to other predispositions, I argue that reactionary conservatism is a way of viewing the world throughout a person's life. I claim that anxiety toward social change informs a person's political perceptions throughout their life, and is thus a dominant force behind far-right sympathy in the 1960s. My test of the concept's durability over time evaluates whether or not reactionary conservatism fits alongside other predisposed attitudes, and offers greater insight into reactionary conservatism.

Chapter Plan and Final Thoughts

My research project begins with a historical and theoretical exploration of the Far Right, upon which the subsequent chapters rely. Chapter 1 expands upon the theoretical argument I briefly outlined, laying the groundwork for an examination of the ideas and rhetoric that characterize reactionary conservatism. In Chapter 1, I also explore the political messages of the Far Right; through an in-depth content analysis, the anxiety of the Far Right dominates, shedding light on the political ideology with which so many Americans sympathized.

Chapters 2 through 4 establish the empirical foundation for the dissertation. Chapter 2 explores the predictors of reactionary conservatism, pitting anxiety toward change against alternative explanations for attachment to the Far Right. Then, Chapter 3 explores the predictive power of reactionary conservatism by examining its relationship to political participation. Chapter 4 further examines the power of reactionary

conservatism, this time predicting attitudes towards integration and out-group animosity. Lastly, Chapter 5 examines the power of reactionary conservatism over time; the enduring influence of reactionary conservatism gives the concept more utility as a political predisposition. The Conclusion summarizes the study's main findings and revisits the hypotheses.

Just as 2010 saw the Tea Party movement seize the attention of the nation, the far right movement that pushed Barry Goldwater to the Republican nomination for President also captured the attention of millions of Americans. Both movements, along with the Far Right movements that preceded them, are predicated upon resisting a changing world that threatens their prestige and social position, while constantly looking for comfort. The rise of the Tea Party today may have even opened the door for the John Birch Society and other extremist groups to re-enter the political conversation decades after they seemed to fade away. This research looks back to the 1960s with a watchful eye, telling a story about anxiety and paranoia that sounds all too similar to politics today.

Additionally, this research provides empirical evidence that builds on a theory of right wing movements that scholars have only begun to explore. If what I argue is correct, reactionary conservatism will not only account for the movement behind Barry Goldwater, it will also emerge as an essential mechanism driving many political actions and attitudes. This research also investigates how anxiety towards social change, rampant with conspiracy, shapes individuals' views of the world and formulates their political beliefs as a predisposition. In sum, this research project provides a historical framework for scholarship on right wing movements in the past, present and future.

Chapter 1

ANXIOUS OF A CHANGING WORLD: THEORIZING THE FAR RIGHT

In March of 2009, America was starting to realize the growing strength of the Tea Party movement. The Tea Party had just identified the song titled, “American Tea Party” as its movement anthem.¹ The song, directed at newly elected President Obama, begins:

Mr. President!

Your stimulus is sure to bust

It's just a socialist scheme

The only thing it will do

Is kill the American Dream

The song goes on to criticize President Obama for “taking from achievers” and redistributing to folks who “won’t get out of their easy chair.” In true Tea Party fashion, the real American patriots should “boot” anyone who tramples the constitution out of the country. Days after its release, the song was performed live at a Tea Party event in Orlando, Florida. Over the next two years, the song played at over 300 different Tea Party events.²

The sentiments expressed in the Tea Party’s unofficial anthem are important for three reasons. First, the anthem exemplifies the Tea Party movement’s rhetoric. Second, the anthem appeared in media outlets such as the *Huffington Post* and Fox News,

¹ The song, by Tea Party spokesperson Lloyd Marcus, was noted for recognizing the movement in such media outlets as *World News Daily*, *Huffington Post* and Fox News. The lyrics come from a 2009 article on Bob McCarty’s website found at <http://bobmccarty.com/tag/tea-party-song-lyrics>.

² March 20, 2009, *World News Daily*, <http://www.wnd.com/2009/03/92321>; “Tuning in, Turning out: Tea Party Finds its Music,” October 10, 2011, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/10/10/tuning-in-turning-out-tea-party-finds-its-music>.

demonstrating national presence of the Tea Party's political voice. Finally, the song also offers a glimpse into the past. The Tea Party's anthem parallels a previous time when a significant segment of America embraced a far-right movement. Over fifty years ago a song by the folk band Chad Mitchell Trio recognized the John Birch Society in an eerily similar fashion.³ The song, simply titled, "The John Birch Society," identified many of the same dangers to America as its contemporary counterpart:

Oh, we're the John Birch Society, the John Birch Society

Here to save the country from a Communist plot

And again, like the Tea Party anthem, anyone who was against the movement was a traitor as "there's no one that [they're] certain the Kremlin doesn't touch." The song continues:

Do you want Justice Warren for your Commisar?

Do you want Mrs. Krushchev in there with the DAR?

You cannot trust your neighbor or even next of kin

If mommie is a commie then you gotta turn her in

The two musical characterizations suggest that there are similarities between the two movements when it comes to their underlying sentiment and motivation, and beg for a historical examination of the Far Right. In my analysis, I claim that the far-right movement in the 1960s was a predecessor of the Tea Party movement, and exists in a historical timeline of far-right movements. Moreover, I posit that the musical

³ The song, originally released on Kapp Records in 1962, quickly became a national anthem for the far-right movement. J. Allen Broyles (1964) recognizes the song's importance as an accurate characterization of the movement in his work on the JBS, *The John Birch Society: Anatomy of a Protest*. The song lyrics are from metrolyrics.com, <http://www.metrolyrics.com/the-john-birch-society-lyrics-chad-mitchell-trio.html>; album info is from discogs.com, <http://www.discogs.com/Chad-Mitchell-Trio-Golden-Vanity-The-John-Birch-Society/release/4033867>.

characterizations do offer a glimpse into the motivations behind the Far Right, and that individuals anxious about social change turn to the Far Right for comfort. In this dissertation, I complete the first theoretically and methodologically rigorous examination of the Far Right in the 1960s, and argue that the commitment to resist any and all change during the 1960s is an enduring worldview learned early in life, or a predisposition. I draw upon the theoretical framework political scientists Christopher Parker and Matt Barreto (2013) present in their work on the Tea Party. In their analysis of contemporary politics, they argue that individuals who attempt to prevent social change are reactionary conservatives.

This chapter uses a reactionary framework to understand the far-right movement of the 1960s. In doing so, I answer one of the overarching questions in my dissertation: what drives sympathy for the 1960s far-right movement? I challenge scholarship suggesting that traditional conservative principles, such as economic individualism and a belief in limited government, motivate far-right sympathy in the 1960s. In other words, I challenge the assumption that the Far Right's negative views toward significant social change in the 1960s, such as the Civil Rights movement and integration, are attributed to traditional conservative values.

In this chapter, I have three objectives. First, I develop a theory that explains why individuals sympathized with the Far Right in the 1960s. I argue that social change and progress created feelings of anxiety, which in turn drove sympathy for the movement. That is, social change in the 1960s made significant numbers of individuals in positions of cultural status (predominantly white, Protestant males) anxious about losing their social prestige.

My work is not the first to situate the Far Right in a reactionary model; however, unlike scholarship focusing on the 1960s Far Right, my project is the first to both theorize and subsequently test the theory with methods that withstand today's rigorous standards. Furthermore, the methodologically rigorous work on the Far Right examines the Tea Party and President Obama as the catalyst for the movement. Conversely, in my work, the Civil Rights movement, the perceived conciliatory nature of American foreign policy during the Cold War and the Vietnam War, and international freedom and independence movements across the world are examples of the primary catalysts for reactionary conservatism. I claim that individuals reacting to social change and progress while trying to preserve the past generate the anxiety of the Far Right in the 1960s.

Furthermore, my analysis focuses on the presence of conspiracy in the 1960s Far Right movement. Scholarship suggests that the anxiety of the Far Right manifests as grand conspiracy theories, spanning multiple historical periods, in which the beloved Nation is under attack.⁴ The Far Right's conspiratorial messages went beyond insinuating that foreign powers were a dangerous threat, suggesting that the threat had already infiltrated America's borders and was working to destroy the country from within (Hofstadter, 1964). The conspiratorial discourse of the Far Right becomes the central focus of a content analysis that concludes the chapter. To be clear, I am not arguing that anxiety toward social change is the only factor determining far-right sympathy in the 1960s, just an important one. Later in the dissertation, I examine sympathy for the 1960s

⁴ Specifically, Parker and Barreto (2013), who also draw from the work of Richard Hofstadter (1955), rely upon the work of Theodore Adorno (1950), which argues that far-right movements are "pseudo-conservative" and rely upon an anti-democratic conspiratorial discourse charging that society is being destroyed.

movement, comparing the influence of anxiety toward social change to ideals grounded in partisanship and ideology.

Second, I use Chapter 1 to set the Far Right of the 1960s in historical context. Although few examinations illustrate how the far-right movement of the 1960s fits into a larger historical narrative of far-right movements over time, Hofstadter (1964) and Bell (1963) link the Far Right of the 1960s with other historical periods, and Lipset and Raab (1970) as well as Parker and Barreto (2013) take the time to trace the far-right throughout history. Echoing these scholars, I detail how the Far Right of the 1960s, led by the John Birch Society, follows from the Know-Nothings of the 1850s who were anxious about new immigrants, and the Klan of the 1920s who believed that Catholics, Jews and blacks were enemy infiltrators. Further, I explain how these far-right movements are precursors to the Tea Party movement, which believes that President Obama is destroying America. Each movement, within its own historical and political context, shares a common thread: anxiety toward a new and changing America.

Chapter 1 closes with an analysis of the elite messages of the Far Right in the 1960s by comparing content of the John Birch Society's national bulletin to that of the *National Review*, one of the most influential conservative publications of the era.⁵ I examine the elite messages and frames for conspiratorial content because the use of conspiratorial messaging and rhetoric as a direct response to perceived social change is indicative of reactionary conservatism. By comparing the content of the literature of the Far Right to that from mainstream conservatism, I can assess whether the Far Right's elite informational cues fit within traditional conservatism, or represent something more

⁵ Kersch (2011) explains that the *National Review* was and still is a major influence in conservative politics.

extreme. My content analysis serves as a preliminary test of the theory, while subsequent chapters in this dissertation present a broader examination of far-right sympathizers in the 1960s.

As the chapter progresses, I make a clear distinction between the two ideological frameworks of traditional and reactionary conservatism because I empirically test for separate and unique effects later in the dissertation. That is, if the Far Right of the 1960s is merely a conservative movement, then its elite messages should reflect the standard conservative values of limited government, stability and maintenance of order. However, if what I argue is correct, that far-right sympathy is the product of anxiety toward social change, then the elite messages of the Far Right should reflect the anxiety of the Far Right and conspiratorial in nature. Thus, the following analysis begins by exploring why Americans find far-right movements enticing.

What Explains the Far Right?

Christopher Parker and Matt Barreto (2013) describe the Tea Party as a movement full of anxiety, reacting to the election of America's first non-white president; however, their analysis is centered around President Obama and his symbolic meaning. Moreover, Parker and Barreto's reactionary framework used to examine the Tea Party draws on the work of historian Richard Hofstadter and sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, who focus on the Far Right in the second half of the twentieth century.⁶ According to Lipset, the political and historical context of the 1960s was one of "growing uneasiness...in the face of gathering changes" on both the domestic and international fronts (Lipset & Raab,

⁶ See Lipset (1955); Lipset and Raab (1970); Hofstadter (1964); Parker and Barreto (2013).

1970, pp. 248). The uneasiness of the Far Right manifests itself as anxiety toward social change and progress.⁷ For Hofstadter, simply put, modernity threatened the Far Right. Hofstadter's work relies upon pseudo-conservatism, for which he uses Theodore Adorno's work in Adorno's (1950) book, *The Authoritarian Personality*. As Adorno explains, pseudo-conservatives "profess a belief in the tenants of traditional conservatism," but are willing to destabilize traditional American democracy and "abolish the very institutions" with which we identify in order to resist social change (Adorno, 1950, pg. 50).

My work argues that, just as the Tea Party is currently reacting to the election of the first black president, the Far Right of the 1960s pushed back against many different types of social progress and change. Unlike the Tea Party, the 1960s Far Right is not confronting their first African American President. However, I argue that other events of social change, such as the Civil Rights movement, were great enough to make a significant segment of America anxious and uncomfortable. For example, in addition to the Civil Rights movement, reactionary conservatives viewed the U.S. as weak and conciliatory because of Kennedy and Johnson's handling of the Vietnam War. Far-right sympathizers saw the country embracing egalitarian rationality over established customs to best deal with the increasing complexity of the nation and its issues (Bell, 1963).⁸ In short, my project argues that with the Cold War in full swing, some anxious individuals turned to the Far Right for comfort.

⁷ The concept of anxiety often focuses on an individual's personality. In this case, the concept relies upon social bases of anxiety. For example, social structures can threaten the basic motives for competence and control, making powerless individuals anxious. For a full explanation see Fiske, Morling and Stevens (1996), "Controlling Self and Others: A Theory of Anxiety, Mental Control and Social Control."

⁸ This interpretation of Bell's work echoes Hixon, Jr.'s (1992) comprehensive summary of the American right wing, which also draws upon one of Bell's (1962) earlier essays on the same topic.

For the most part, scholarship on the Far Right is in agreement that, having grown anxious, the Far Right then expresses its anxiety as fearful attitudes toward agents of social change. Importantly, the anxiety of the Far Right draws from fear of change, and differs from economic or class anxieties insofar as the former stem from a threat to social prestige.⁹ Culture and morality determine social prestige, which then serves as justification for societal position. Even though social prestige is closely related to economic status, it rests in the value of certain characteristics that describe an individual or group, such as race, religion or cultural beliefs. Therefore, the issues that differentiate the Far Right from other groups in society are not synonymous with economic standing.¹⁰

Symbolic politics also helps explain what the Far Right represents for a significant number of Americans. Political symbols, such as the American Flag or even the President, are important cues individuals use to interpret and create their own political reality (Edelman, 1965). For many people, including individuals anxious about social change, politics becomes a way of expressing hopes and fears (Parker & Barreto, 2013; Edelman, 1965). Thus, it may be the case that the anxiety of the Far Right is projected onto political authorities and issues, and politics becomes more about what political

⁹ Scholars have discussed what are called the “politics of class” and “of status” in great detail. Unlike class politics, where the conflict is centered on material goals, status politics appeal to “resentments of individuals or groups” who “desire to maintain” social standing. Additionally, far-right movements have often occurred at times of great prosperity, when there is little the government can do to improve conditions. The focus of reform movements then turns to cultural differences to explain necessary subordination and is deemed “cultural politics.” For an extended discussion, see Hofstadter (1963), “Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited: A Postscript – 1962” and Lipset (1955), “The Sources of the Radical Right”.

¹⁰ The difference between social prestige and economic standing is a long-standing debate within the literature. For a more complete explanation, see Gusfield (1963), Bell (1962, 1963) and Hofstadter (1963), who each elaborate on the differences between status anxieties and economic anxieties. Hofstadter goes as far as claiming that “cultural politics” may be a necessary supplementation for “status politics,” as issues of culture, faith, morality and freedom are all worth fighting over in American political life (pp. 82-83).

officials and issues symbolize than what and who they actually are (Elder & Cobb, 1983; Sears, 1993).

I argue that the changes taking place in the 1960s, namely the Civil Rights Movement and the Cold War, represent both symbolic and real change which the Far Right and its sympathizers were unable to tolerate because the change threatened the superior social position of white, middle-class, middle-aged men.¹¹ Put another way, the perceived progress of African Americans and Communist sympathizers, both in America and around the world, threatened to displace those who turned to sympathize with the Far Right in the 1960s.

As we have seen, scholarship suggests that far-right movements are a reaction to a perceived loss in social prestige. However, it is important to differentiate far-right movements from a backlash. Far-right sympathy is not a temporary reaction to an isolated incident or time. The anxiety driving reactionary conservatism is an ideological way of thinking, or a predisposition. A predisposition is an orientation of mind, acquired early in life, which causes an individual to interpret the world in a particular way (Sears & Funk, 1999). In the case of far-right sympathizers, their worldview relies on a comfortable and secure position in society, and a perceived loss in social prestige materializes as anxiety. Thus, my analysis posits that far-right sympathizers are predisposed to dislike the political authorities and issues that symbolize social change, and such worldview epitomizes reactionary conservatism.

¹¹ Work by James McEvoy (1971) suggests that supporters of the far-right movement behind Barry Goldwater were overwhelmingly white, upper-middle class and middle-aged. Lipset and Raab (1970) draw similar conclusions about members of the Know-Nothing movement, and if anything, claim that members the Know-Nothings may have been less affluent. Conover and Gray (1983) describe the New Right as white, older and economically advantaged, and Parker and Barreto (2013) characterize Tea Party sympathizers as “mostly white, middle-class, middle-aged men” (pg. 11).

In an effort to preempt a critique of my analysis, it is necessary to briefly explain how a predisposition can also be a reaction. Logically, a predisposition informs action. Nonetheless, predisposed attitudes may also lay dormant and need to be explicitly primed or activated. Certain attitudes require a “salient stimulus that can be cognitively linked” to attitudes learned earlier in life (Sears & Funk, 1999, pg. 3). Like partisanship and ideology, reactionary conservatism is acquired early in life; however, its long-term persistence relies upon the perceived stability of the political environment. Times of social upheaval challenge the position of reactionary conservatives, triggering anxiety and fear.

Although I have referenced a multitude of scholarship that places anxiety toward social change at the center of far-right movements, I also consider other explanations for social movements in my examination. One such explanation is political malcontent, namely dissatisfaction with an election or policy changes. For example, losing or winning a competitive election can be a powerful mobilizing event (Campbell et al., 1960; Rosenstone & Hansen, 2003; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). Furthermore, mistrust in government, beyond partisan ties, can leave individuals feeling politically isolated and searching for a new political movement (Finifter, 1970; Easton, 1975; Citrin & Muste, 1999).

Others argue that the historical context of the 1950s and 1960s, namely partisan shifts towards progressive views (by both Democrats and Republicans), produced a right wing faction of suburban conservatives who organized around values of small government and economic freedom (McGirr, 2001; Kruse, 2005; Lassiter, 2006). The mid-twentieth century was a turning point in American politics. From the start of his

political career, Barry Goldwater demonstrated a strict adherence to limited government, and used his beliefs about limited government to justify his criticism of civil rights legislation. In sum, Goldwater epitomized the Republican Party's stance of "racial conservatism" adopted in the mid-twentieth century and the Republican Party never looked back, embracing the support of the Deep South for the first time since reconstruction and changing the political landscape for generations to come (Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Lowndes, 2008). The Far Right had no small hand in shifting the Republican Party further from compromise in the early 1960s, and sympathizers used staunch conservative principles to justify their attachment.¹² Thus, it is imperative that I consider traditional conservative values as a possible explanation for far-right sympathy.

I also account for intolerant attitudes in my examination of the Far Right. Scholars argue that the Far Right uses conservative principles as a mask, and intolerance is the driving force behind movement sympathy. Research claims that intolerance was driving anti-communist attitudes in the 1960s, and the Far Right perceived minority groups as communist subversives (McEvoy, 1971; Johnson, 1983; Hixon, Jr., 1992; McGirr, 2001). However, the many arguments about the Far Right are not mutually exclusive. Scholarship characterizing the Far Right as traditionally conservative acknowledges extremism has its place in the movement, and vice versa. Even as much of the existing scholarship on the Far Right during the Goldwater era describes a complex, multi-faceted movement, it fails to identify anxiety as a common thread.

¹² Scholarship on political parties and party realignment clearly identifies the 1960s and Goldwater's nomination as a historical shift from moderation in the Republican Party. For a detailed account of party activists and party formation, see chapter 6 in Aldrich's (1995) book, *Why Parties*.

In addition to anxiety toward change, conspiracy theories also characterize far-right movements. As individuals struggle to understand their changing world, their frustration with their ability to grapple with these changes leads to “social misperception” and the belief that they are under attack. In other words, as anxiety builds around new social environments, the Far Right perceives agents of social change as conspiring against their privileged group.¹³ Far-right sympathizers “become anxious when they perceive their desire to belong to social groups is threatened” (Parker & Barreto, 2013, pg. 32). As individuals feel that their group position is slipping away, their perceived loss of control leads to conspiratorial thinking (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). The Far Right is able to justify their often-unpopular positions by undermining social change with conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy theories are prevalent within but not distinct to the Far Right. Some scholars argue that conspiracy theories are central to American politics. For example, Professor of Law Mark Fenster (1999) argues that conspiracy theories represent a critical element to populist concerns about American government. Also, conspiracy theories exist across the political spectrum, not only on the right. Lionel Lokos (1967) work catalogs the fear campaign by the left against Barry Goldwater’s presidential bid.¹⁴ Despite conspiracy theories’ common residence in politics, scholars do not link far-right conspiracy theories to traditional conservatism. Far-right conspiracy theories claim that

¹³ Parker and Barreto (2013) apply this logic to the Tea Party movement’s preoccupation with conspiracy. For more on the psychology of paranoia and conspiracy see, Roderick Kramer’s (1998) work, “Paranoid Social Cognition in Social Systems: Thinking and Acting in the Shadow of Doubt.”

¹⁴ Additional scholarship argues that conspiracy theories are not necessarily good or bad, and constitute a significant part of American politics. David Davis (1969) argues that conspiracy theory was an essential force leading to the civil war in his book, *The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style*, and Michael Rogin (1988), in *Ronald Reagan: The Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology*, further states the importance of conspiracy in American political demonology and the creation of evil political foes.

cherished American values and even the country itself are under attack. In other words, the conspiracy theories of the Far Right derive from an inability to comprehend new and tradition-threatening social environments.

This section presented a theoretical framework that suggests anxiety toward change and conspiracy is characteristic of far-right movements throughout history. The following section traces far-right movements from the mid-nineteenth century to contemporary America, stressing the importance of anxiety toward social change and the ever-present far-right conspiracy theories. The presence of far-right conspiracies is central to my examination of far-right sympathy. For nearly two centuries, far-right movements have centered on a need to protect against threats to social prestige and a specific “way of seeing the world” (Hofstadter, 1964, pp. 4). I now turn back in time to examine the role of anxiety toward social change and conspiracy theories in both past and present Far Right movements.

Far-Right Movements: Past to Present

In order to situate the far-right movement in the 1960s in its appropriate historical context, it is important to understand how the Far Right fits into a larger intellectual framework. In the following section, I trace the Far Right through American history. I start in the 1850s with an examination of the Know-Nothing movement. I then examine the second-era Ku Klux Klan of the 20th century, the John Birch Society and the New Right and end with an examination of the Tea Party movement. Other movements throughout history have contained elements of reactionary conservatism, but I choose to focus on these specific movements for two reasons.

The first reason for selecting these movements is that they each captured the attention of the nation, and, in most cases, successfully lobbied for real political change. Also, throughout American history the Republican Party has incorporated the policy stances of the Far Right in order to unite conservatives at a national level (Kabaservice, 2012). Thus, the ideologies of these movements have significantly influenced national politics through the Republican Party's platforms. Second, these movements were all well organized, national movements. Although many different right wing movements occur in American history, either alongside the movements I have identified or at a different time altogether, the movements that I have selected all had (or have) sizeable memberships, organized chapters, political candidates and a policy platform.

In addition to providing a historical framework to examine the Far Right, examining the Far Right over time also illuminates how anxiety and far-right conspiracy fit into the larger theory of movement sympathy. The following discussion emphasizes anxiety and conspiratorial thought in American history. A detailed historical analysis provides the context necessary to conduct a preliminary examination of far-right sympathy in the 1960s.

The Far Right of the Nineteenth Century: The Know-Nothing Movement

The nineteenth century observed considerable population shifts in America. While the country experienced relatively little immigration up to 1830, the number of new immigrants nearly doubled from 1820 to 1830, and quadrupled from 1831 to 1840.¹⁵

¹⁵ Aside from the Chinese exclusion, legislated in 1882, immigration to the United States was unrestricted prior to 1920. Mae Ngai (2004) provides a comprehensive examination of immigration laws throughout American history in her book, *Impossible Subjects*. Also see tables 2.2 and 2.3 in chapter 2 of Judd and Swanstrom's (2012) *City Politics* for a closer look at immigration to America between 1820 and 1919.

Following the easing of Great Britain's travel restrictions, large numbers of Irish immigrants, many of whom were Catholic, immigrated to the United States during this time (Judd & Swanstrom, 2012). By the mid-eighteen hundreds, a new sense of American nativism swept across the country with the significant influx of new immigrants. The emergence of the American Party in the 1840s marked the rise of a powerful nativist movement determined to protect the social standing of native-born, Protestant whites (Higham, 2004).

Nativism flourished as immigration increased, and native-born Americans, predominantly Protestant, found themselves increasingly discontented as a result. The working class viewed the immigrant population as economic competition and a threat to their jobs. New immigrants also created an untapped voting block that strengthened the Democratic Party (Lipset & Raab, 1970). Irish immigrants' strong attachment to Catholicism, coupled with their growing population within the U.S., made many Americans anxious about the way the country was changing. At their core, nativists believed that "some influence originating abroad threatened the very life of the nation from within" (Higham, 2004, pg. 4). The Know Nothing movement became a home for those profoundly discontented.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the issue of slavery took center stage. The Democratic and Whig parties, whose political control dominated the early nineteenth century, slowly lost ground to the Know Nothing movement in the 1850s. The Know Nothings prospered as the Whigs and Democrats failed to take a firm stance on abolishing slavery and temperance (Anbinder, 1992). Furthermore, the Whigs dissolved because of their failure to express the forceful anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic attitudes

of their Protestant constituents (Anbinder, 1992; Levine, 2001). By the 1850s, the nativist third party group, the American Party, had grown into the Know-Nothings and firmly supplanted the Whig Party among northern Whigs and Southern Democrats. Born in New York City, the Know-Nothing Party accounted for one fourth of the popular vote for president in 1856 (Lipset, 1955). Local political victories in 1854 and 1855, in both the North and the South, marked the height of a movement that was able to garner the moral support of the working-class Protestant community around an anti-Catholic cause.

As the Whigs disintegrated, the Northern roots of the Know-Nothings created a movement that prospered at the local level, winning state and local elections in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Hampshire (Anbinder, 1992). As the 1850s rolled on, divisions over slavery split the Know-Nothing Party, driving many northern members into a newly forming Republican Party. The Know-Nothings attempted to regain support by promising sectional cohesion, but their presidential candidate in 1856, Millard Fillmore, only carried 22 percent of the popular vote, losing in a landslide.¹⁶ By 1860 the Know-Nothings had all but disappeared from national politics.

Despite their virtual disappearance, the Know-Nothings' political agenda secured a place in national politics as the Republican Party relied on anti-Catholicism during the antebellum period and after the Civil War (Lipset & Raab, 1970). These were foundational tenets that the Republican Party adopted after the Know Nothings' dissolution. Moreover, the Know-Nothings' conspiratorial imagery of Catholic

¹⁶ Anbinder (1992) argues, in one of the few comprehensive examinations of the Know Nothing Party, that the issue of slavery meant more to the party's demise than Republican concessions. According to Anbinder, most northerners abandoned the Know Nothings and joined the Republican Party when the Know Nothings wavered over the extension of slavery.

immigrants as dangerous criminals carried on long past the demise of the movement. Republican-led debates raged on about Catholics' role in the assassination of President Lincoln, going so far as to claim that Lincoln himself believed that "Catholics were plotting against the Republic" (Lipset & Raab, 1970, pg. 73). As northern Catholics continued to gain political power, the strain of anti-Catholicism planted in the Republican Party in the mid-nineteenth century remained into the twentieth century.

The Know Nothing movement represents an era in American political history in which politically discontent individuals sympathized with a movement determined to return America to its traditional, "native" roots. The changes that accompanied immigration in the early nineteenth century, namely the influx of Catholic immigrants tied to the Church and the Pope, were unacceptable. The nativism of the Know Nothings was rooted in conspiracies linking Catholic immigrants to plots against the nation. The conspiratorial nativist sentiments of the Know Nothings reappear alongside racism and bigotry sixty years later when the Far Right once again takes the national stage.

The Ku Klux Klan in the Early Twentieth Century

In 1915, America witnessed the release of the first full-length motion picture film, *The Birth of a Nation*. The enormously popular film depicted a conquered American South saved from unruly Union soldiers and freed slaves by hood-wearing Klan members. Viewed by more than fifty million Americans at that time, the film caused an inspired William Joseph Simmons to found the second-era Ku Klux Klan, pledging allegiance to the Invisible Empire and Klansmen of two generations earlier (Jackson, 1967). Relying upon the same organizational name and hooded clothes as the previous

movement, the second-era Ku Klux Klan began as a fraternal organization destined for far more than the violent, racist reputation dawned by the Klan of the nineteenth century.

From 1915 to 1920, the Klan struggled to reach the national stage. The Klan began to flourish when leaders decided to emphasize fraternity, and identified enemies of America as Catholics, Jews, Orientals, immigrants, and blacks. The Southern Publicity Association offered its assistance to the Klan, and launched a campaign to sell the Klan, leading to partnerships with other organizations such as the Anti-Saloon League (Jackson, 1967). By the mid-1920s the Klan reached national prominence, with membership numbers reaching five million across all forty-eight states (Parker & Barreto, 2013). At its height, the second-era Ku Klux Klan accounted for 15 to 20 percent of the total adult male population, and 25 to 30 percent of Protestants (Lipset & Raab, 1970, pg. 111). Clearly, its numbers were fierce and its influence powerful.

The Klan preached “100% Americanism,” and challenged the modernism sweeping the entire nation (MacLean, 1994). More specifically, the growing social and political power of perceived subversive groups (blacks, Jews and Catholics) threatened the Americanism of the Klan. The Klan informed the country of the danger these subversive groups posed. Specifically targeting blacks, the Klan lectured that “The negro...is more dangerous than a maddened wild beast and he must and will be controlled” (Jackson, 1967, pg. 22). Blacks were to remain subservient in order to preserve white supremacy. In the 1920s, the Klan achieved their goals in the South as blacks either accepted their place in the old social order or moved to the North. Thus, for the time being, the Klan succeeded in its efforts to submit the black American population to an existence of subservience in the South.

In addition to black Americans, the Klan also perceived Catholics as threatening because of the organizational structure in place (Jackson, 1967). To the Klan, Catholics' strong attachment to the Pope and the Vatican put them "at odds with political freedom" (Parker & Barreto; 2013, pg. 25). Furthermore, Catholics remained attached to their native dialects and supported political machines that depended on the immigrant vote (Chalmers, 1987; MacLean, 1994). As was the case with the Know-Nothing movement, the Klan's anxiety about a perceived loss in social prestige and cultural standing accompanied irrational economic angst. The Klan, concerned with perceived Jewish economic prosperity, made unfounded claims that Jewish economic success limited white-Protestant upward mobility (Cohn, 1967).

Specific underlying tenets drove the Klan's actions. Far-right conspiracy laced the Klan's bigotry. The Klan charged Jews with coopting multiple ideologies, including Communism and Bolshevism, in a plot to control the world. According to Klan literature, Jews controlled "the money markets of the world" in an international scheme later propagated by figures as prominent as American industrialist Henry Ford (Lipset & Raab, 1970, pg. 139).¹⁷ The Klan also exploited ready-made links by exaggerating the relationship between white ethnic immigrant groups and Communism and Socialism. Social progress was deemed radicalism, and the Klan used propaganda about ethnic immigrant culture, such as foreign language use, to power the conspiracy (Lipset & Raab, 1970). Moreover, the bigotry of the Klan rested upon the perceived displacement of traditional Protestants. The return of black World War I veterans as assertive "New

¹⁷ Although few studies examine the Ku Klux Klan as a durable right-wing movement because of its open appeal to racial and religious hostility, Lipset and Raab's (1970) historical work, *The Politics of Unreason*, discuss the Klan within a broader right-wing social movement framework. For more on the Klan and right-wing scholarship, see also, Hixon, Jr. (1992), *The Search for the American Right Wing: An Analysis of the Social Science Record, 1955-1987*.

Negros” became cause for concern to the Klan, who had ensured black subservience in the South; also, blacks’ exposure to French egalitarianism provided another clear connection to exploit an international conspiracy (Parker, 2009; Parker & Barreto, 2013).

However, as the twentieth century progressed, the second-era Ku Klux Klan lost momentum and the national movement dissipated. Although mainstream American politics opposed the Klan’s overt bigotry, the movement experienced victory in its defeat. Restrictive immigration legislation in 1924 marked a political victory for the Klan, and prohibition and fundamentalism swept the country. As World War I ended, and fears of black revolt subsided, and the South returned to white, Protestant male control. Most importantly, by combining anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiment with bigotry and anti-Communism, the Klan opened the door for future far-right movements to build on traditional nativist sentiments of the past.¹⁸

The John Birch Society and the New Right

Following the decline of the second-era Ku Klux Klan in the mid-twentieth century, the 1960s saw the rise of another far-right movement, again focused on preserving traditional values and the traditional American way of life. In protection of the southern way of life, the Dixiecrats emerged as a states’ rights faction of the Democratic Party in 1948 (Lowndes, 2008). The Dixiecrats wanted to preserve Jim Crow and racial segregation under the guise of states’ rights. Although short lived, the Dixiecrats firmly planted racial conservatism in national politics. What started as a regional revolt against

¹⁸ Building upon an early essay by Lipset (1962), “Three Decades of the Radical Right,” Lipset and Raab (1970) make a clear connection between the Klan and subsequent far-right movements in *The Politics of Unreason*. However, they are not the only scholars of their time to reach this conclusion. More specifically, the work of Authur M. Schlesinger (1965), “Extremism in American Politics,” identifies the appearance of Goldwater as a remanifestation of the extremism of the Know Nothings, the Klan and McCarthyism.

integration developed into a campaign of massive resistance. By mid-century, the far-right wing of the Republican Party separated from Republicans searching for votes from newly migrated northern blacks. Leaning on support from the White Citizen Council, far-right Republicans adopted racial conservatism as their own (Lowndes, 2008).

Additionally, by late 1950, Joseph McCarthy had propelled himself onto the national stage with his efforts to uncover Communist subversives. However, McCarthyism failed to mature into an outright political movement, given that McCarthy's followers never amounted to organized chapters with members, political candidates, or an established political platform.¹⁹ Although McCarthy was merely a "soldier in the Republican campaign to regain power," he fought to remake American institutions (in order to abolish Communism). He wanted to eliminate any and all threats to traditional American values, and his followers became the catalyst for the massive far-right movement that followed (Hixon, Jr., 1992, pg. 10; Lipset, 1955).

As the 1960s approached, revolutionary change threatened traditional American identity both abroad and at home. Militant black veterans returning from World War II forced the "race question" upon a nation that had just finished fighting a war against a racist enemy (Parker, 2009). Emerging from war victorious, the country soon found itself facing another powerful force, Communism. If the 1950s represented a small shift to the right for conservatives, then the 1960s became a full-fledged sprint. The 1960 Republican Party convention marked a decline of moderate Republican influence, reflecting increasing extremism instead. The years leading up to the Republican Primaries of 1964

¹⁹ Lipset and Raab (1970) offer a detailed examination of McCarthyism's failure to become a political movement.

drastically departed from the moderate political consensus characterizing the previous decade, and the Far Right gained control of the Grand Old Party (Kabaservice, 2012).

Building upon strict fiscal conservatism developed in opposition to New Deal policies and the symbolic anti-communism of McCarthyism, a far-right movement of tremendous proportions snatched the spotlight. The movement consisted of many groups, such as Americans for Constitutional Action in favor of the repeal of socialist laws, and the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade best known for its anti-Communist schools across California.²⁰

Still, other far-right groups paled in comparison, both in size and influence, to the John Birch Society (JBS). Created by Robert Welch in 1958, the JBS was recognized on a national level by 1961, and the term “Bircher” became a clear political description with which members identified (Westin, 1962, p. 202). Welch, a wealthy candy manufacturer from Massachusetts, believed in limiting government intervention in individual affairs, and the doctrine of the JBS reflected major elements of traditional conservative ideology. Yet, the JBS also rested upon a second ideological center in order to justify an unwavering resistance to social change: sweeping far-right conspiracy (Lipset & Raab, 1970, pp. 249-50).

The conspiracy of Welch and the JBS was grand, stretching back in time and across the globe, drawing upon the subversions that dominated American life in the 1960s.²¹ The JBS professed angst and fear toward almost all substantial change that

²⁰ Lipset and Raab (1970) detail the rise of Americans for Constitutional Action, and Wolfinger et al. (1969) examine the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade in “America’s Radical Right: Politics and Ideology.” Each highlight the organizations concern with Anti-communism, and like the John Birch Society, a preoccupation with conspiracy.

²¹ Lipset and Raab (1970) expand upon the grandiose conspiracy that Welch developed for his Society, going so far as to claim that his work has become “the very model of conspiracy theories” (pg. 250).

occurred domestically and abroad. Attempting to undermine change that could be perceived as progress, the JBS identified conspirators, starting with Karl Marx. Welch and other contributors wrote about Marx in the JBS's national newsletter, *American Opinion*. They claimed that Marx wrote the Communist Manifesto as an agent of the Illuminati. The grand conspiracy, dating back to 1776, declared that the Illuminati founded Communism in a tyrannical attempt to rule the human race (Lipset & Raab, 1970, pg. 252). With over eighty thousand members at its height, and a sympathetic group of four to six million Americans, the JBS's accusations were not falling on deaf ears (McGirr, 2001, pg. 76; Parker & Barreto, 2013, pg. 26).

As evidenced in speeches by Welch and note-worthy Birchers, as well as the pages of the *American Opinion*, the group found much of the 1960s social upheaval unsettling. Almost all of the JBS's conspiracy theories centered on Communism as the grand conspiracy. Following a divide-and-conquer strategy, the accused conspirators sought to separate America based on religious, racial, ethnic and national lines. This way, the conspirators could attack America from within, destroying the traditional values that made American great. The JBS argued that Communist subversives were behind the racial conflicts of the time and were responsible for both world wars, the Russian Revolution, the end of colonialism and the formation of the United Nations (Lipset & Raab, 1970, pg. 252-253).

According to Birchers, Communist subversives had infiltrated the American government and accusations of treason went as far as sitting presidents and Supreme Court Justices. To the JBS, Eisenhower was a traitor because of his calls for wartime peace in Korea, Kennedy was a Communist dupe because of his deliberate effort to

protect Fidel Castro during the Bay of Pigs, and the Courts, especially Chief Justice Earl Warren, were communist agents in the plot to incite race riots and divide America (Lipset & Raab, 1970). The JBS believed that American weakness abroad and racial tolerance at home threatened to destroy American economic, political and social life.

Unlike previous far-right movements, the JBS and the Far Right of the 1960s failed to embrace anti-Catholic nativist bigotry. In fact, the JBS had clear connections with prominent Catholics (Lipset & Raab, 1970). However, JBS conspiracy theories did employ religious targets, and incorporated anti-Semitism. Even as Welch and the JBS felt that anti-Semitism, along with bigoted nativism, would harm the movement, the JBS considered Jews Communist.²² Although the JBS's official platform forbids racism, anti-Semitism and bigoted nativism, the society was intent on maintaining social prestige at any cost. Communism endangered the fabric of American life, as rising crime rates, feeble wartime policies, disrespect for authority and social welfare all threatened to deteriorate, and eventually destroy America.²³

As the 1960s rolled on, the JBS and the other far-right movements of the time, lost steam.²⁴ Just like the majority of conservatives, the Far Right thrust itself behind Barry Goldwater for president in 1964. Johnson's landslide victory quickly halted the Far Right, as Goldwater had lost electoral ground with every constituency outside of the South (Kabaservice, 2012). However, Goldwater's defeat, as great as it was, was not in

²² Lipset and Raab (1970) explain that although overt anti-Semites were dropped from the Birch Society, the society's impulsive attachment to American traditions and values attracted anti-Semites looking to use the Birchers' far-right conspiracy to propagate strict nativism.

²³ See Welch (1961), *The Blue Book of the John Birch Society* for a description of JBS platform. Also see Broyles (1964), *The John Birch Society: Anatomy of a Protest*, for a detailed interpretation of the JBS.

²⁴ Scholars argue that Goldwater's campaign actually brought a number of the far-right organizations in the 1960s together as they threw their support behind him. Thus, many of the far-right organizations of the time declined after Goldwater's defeat. See, W.B. Hixon, Jr. (1992), *Search for the American Right Wing*.

vain. His supporters had effectively pulled the conservative movement in America far to the right of its moderate center. The fall of Goldwater and the decline of the far-right movement opened the door for moderate Republicans to retake power at a national level. That door, however, closed quickly as Alabama Governor, George Wallace, reignited the reactionaries and staunch conservatives, building on the politics of the Dixiecrat Revolt and the Goldwater antistatist movement (Hixon, Jr., 1992).

Wallace's ultraconservative politics ultimately limited his mainstream appeal, but he had made enough noise that Nixon worked to appease the far-right sympathizers behind Wallace.²⁵ Nixon identified a "silent majority" of patriotic, working-class white Americans whose opponents were broader enemies of America, giving conservatives a new mainstream political identity to rally behind (Lowndes, 2008). After easily winning reelection in 1972, Nixon moved further from the moderate conservative middle as he continued to present himself as a reformer and got tough on "the social issue" (Kabaservice, 2012, pg. 342).²⁶

As the Republican Party reached enormous strength in 1972, predominantly on the support of conservatives in the South and the West, a New Right movement would divide the Republican Party throughout the rest of the decade. Once the threat of Communism subsided and racial progress became inevitable, the Far Right found new changes in society on which to focus its energy. Amidst economic stagnation and declining American power abroad, a far-right movement deemed the New Right found

²⁵ Nixon was also aided by a failed assassination attempt on Wallace that left him paralyzed and less than full strength as a political competitor. For further details on the political relationship between Nixon and Wallace supporters, see Kabaservice's (2012) book, *Rule and Ruin*.

²⁶ Nixon's social issues were crime, drugs and morality, all of which had been vital to Republican politics throughout the 1960s. For a detailed examination of Nixon, see R. Perlstein (2008), *Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America*.

the women's movement, the gay movement and the "sexual revolution" intolerable (Hixon, Jr., 1992). As 1980 approached, the New Right capitalized on the values Nixon used to build his "silent majority," including traditionalism, limited government and law and order.

The social changes of the late 1960s and 1970s threatened the maintenance of order and Christian values, and the New Right movement emerged to restore order, stability, religion, home, morality and freedom (Conover & Gray, 1983). The New Right chose to emphasize the restoration of public morality, and the Equal Rights Amendment symbolized a threat to cultural values and life-style choices.²⁷ More to the point, the feminist movement stood in opposition to long-standing family and cultural values because it challenged woman's traditional role in household. The New Right believed that the "long-term result of a weakened society is socialism" (Conover & Gray, 1983, pg. 72), echoing previous Far Right movement's belief that social change signified the destruction of America

However, with goals so broadly defined, divisions kept a cohesive far-right movement from developing. New Right groups differed on the specific goods they saw as threatened, with three different sectors of the New Right developing between 1970 and 1980 (Conover & Gray, 1983). The first sector, the secular New Right, maintained that freedom from government intervention was paramount. Comparatively, the second sector, the Religious Right, sought to maintain traditional conceptions of religion, family and morality. Finally, the "pro-family" movement prioritized the protection of the

²⁷ Conover and Gray (1983) provide an exhaustive analysis of the conflict over the American family, and the importance of symbolic politics to the New Right movement.

traditional American family.²⁸ Due to their differences, the three segments of the New Right failed to gain enough popular support to enact sustained political change during the 1980s.²⁹ Even as the religious factions of the New Right partnered to form of the Moral Majority heading into the 1980 presidential election, few Americans sympathized with the movement (Hixon Jr., 1992). Instead, the economy and issues of foreign policy took center stage in 1980, and cultural issues – even on hotly debated topics such as abortion – played a minor role (Conover & Gray, 1983; Mueller, 1983).

Although the New Right failed to achieve a national presence similar to its far-right predecessors, the New Right continued to pull the Republican Party to the right. The latter half of the twentieth century proved to be a defining moment in American politics. The post-World War II Far Right “redefined the center of American politics” and solidified a place in modern conservatism by appealing to different segments of America that felt unnecessary and uneasy change was upon them.³⁰ Not surprisingly, almost fifty years later, the Far Right is again seizing the nation’s attention as the Tea Party movement confronts new social change it views as threatening to destroy America.

The Tea Party in the Twenty-First Century

America went through the first eight years of the twenty-first century under the watch of President George W. Bush. During Bush’s Presidency, the Bush tax cuts limited

²⁸ Conover and Gray (1983) provide a detailed historical account of each segment of the new right in chapter 4 of their book, *Feminism and the New Right*.

²⁹ Although the New Right movement takes credit for the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, scholars have found little evidence that the New Right actually had the ability to mobilize the American masses. See, Wilcox (1992), *God’s Warriors*; Hixon, Jr. (1992), *Search for the American Right Wing*.

³⁰ In the conclusion to his book, *From the New Deal to the New Right*, Lowndes (1992) eloquently summarizes the influence that right wing movements had on American politics, and the significance of Nixon’s election to the political realignment in America at the time. The quoted text is from page 160.

revenues available to the federal government, and although benefiting certain segments of America, the cuts led to an expansion of the federal deficit of historic proportions. Bush doubled discretionary spending to twice that of the Clinton era and increased the federal budget ten times over, turning a \$700 billion surplus to a \$1.3 trillion deficit.³¹

One might think that Bush's record on fiscal conservatism would be enough to ignite a political movement united around "limited government and the rule of law, free-market capitalism, and fiscal and personal responsibility" (Parker & Barreto, 2013, pg. 1). However, it was not until the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, the first non-white president of the United States, that the Taxed Enough Already (TEA) Party materialized. Like far-right movements before, the Tea Party spearheaded a movement that was, and still is, reacting to unsettling social and cultural change in America.

Prior to the election of President Obama, the country was already in the midst of monumental demographic shifts. Not only is a younger generation of voters coming of age, but Latino voters over-represent the youngest age cohorts. For the first time ever, census projections estimate a majority-minority American population by the mid-twenty-first century with Latinos making up as much as 33 percent of the population by 2100 (Fraga et al., 2010, pg. 4). Furthermore, gay and lesbian rights have gained momentum over the past two decades as twelve states now allow same-sex marriage.³²

In their exhaustive examination of the Tea Party movement, Parker and Barreto (2013) argue that the election of President Obama was the tipping point for reactionary

³¹ Parker and Barreto (2013) expand a great deal on Bush's presidency, and make a convincing case that President Bush's policies were far from fiscally conservative. They note that Bush is considered by some to be, "The biggest spender since LBJ" (pg. 251). See also, Chris Edwards (2009), "George W. Bush: Biggest Spender Since LBJ," available at <http://www.cato.org/blog/george-w-bush-biggest-spender-lbj>.

³² In some cases, the final legality of same-sex marriage laws is pending Supreme Court decisions. For a detailed list of all of the same-sex marriage decisions, see the National Conference of State Legislators website: <http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx#1>.

conservatives. Or, as the authors put it, “the changed witnessed in America... is simply too much change for some people,” and President Obama symbolizes the dissolution of the nation (pg. 5). Just as the Know-Nothings of the nineteenth century and the Klan and the JBS of the twentieth century, the Tea Party and its sympathizers view social change as subversion. Individuals sympathize with the movement because they feel anxious about their country slipping away, and fear they are losing the “real” America. Tea Partiers want to return to a time in which the cultural dominance of their group, white, Protestant, middle-aged men, went unchallenged, reversing any progress made. As Parker and Barreto (2013) point out, this remains consistent with the Tea Party’s rhetorical charge to “Take their country back” (pg. 6).

Furthermore, similar to past far-right movements, the Tea Party is rife with conspiracy theories. Even balanced accounts of the Tea Party take pause at the ease with which movement members accept and perpetuate conspiratorial rumors and stories (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012). The Tea Party’s discomfort with President Obama manifests as charges of socialism and tyranny that suggests Obama is an agent of social change whose intent is to destroy American traditions and values. Additional themes identify blacks, immigrants and gays and lesbians as Obama’s co-conspirators in a plot to destroy the Constitution.³³ These themes ring true throughout the rhetoric of the Tea Party, marking the movement and its members as conspiracy theorists.

Unlike examinations of the Far Right of the nineteenth and twentieth century, Parker and Barreto’s (2013) examination of the Tea Party provides a rigorous empirical

³³ Parker and Barreto (2013) identify the agents of social change perceived as co-conspirators in a detailed analysis of Tea Party elite rhetoric in a content analysis of mainstream Tea Party websites in chapter 1 of their book, *Change We Can’t Believe In*.

examination of survey data to reinforce their historical and qualitative arguments. Their work demonstrates that sympathy for the Tea Party drives anti-democratic attitudes toward patriotism and freedom, intolerance toward Latino immigrants and gays and lesbians, and hostility toward President Obama. In their empirical analysis, Parker and Barreto are able to assess Tea Party sympathy while accounting for other explanations, such as principled conservatism and racial resentment. Their findings substantiate what many have theorized: Tea Party sympathy is not only driven by anxiety toward social change, but Tea Party sympathizers participate in politics at higher rates than other Americans and are more likely to report intolerant views.

The Tea Party is merely a modern-day reflection of far-right conspiracy theories. For each major far-right movement in the last two-centuries, I have highlighted the centrality of anxiety toward social change, and consequently conspiracy. Each movement is acting on behalf of an advantaged social group (white, middle-class, middle-aged males), and each movement is attempting to return America to a time where the privilege and prestige of that advantaged went unchallenged.³⁴ Yet, all American far-right movements are not identical. For example, the Know-Nothings and the second-era Klan were tremendously anti-Catholic, while the JBS welcomed Catholic members. In addition, the Know-Nothings were consumed by religious nativism, and both religious and racial intolerance drove the Klan. On the other hand, the JBS was concerned with government expansion and Communism, and Welch knew that overt racial and religious

³⁴ Sociologist Rory McVeigh (2009) defines a right-wing movement as a social movement that acts to preserve the advantaged position of its group members, often at the expense of other groups in society. Each of the movements described in Chapter 1 fits McVeigh's characterization.

intolerance would damage the movement (Broyles, 1964). Each movement, however, practiced intolerance in defense of liberty.

As I turn my attention back to the 1960s, the final section of Chapter 1 presents a preliminary test of the mechanisms driving sympathy for the Far Right. Throughout my introduction and chapter 1, I have emphasized the importance of traditional conservative principles, limited government and individual rights in the Far Right's call for action. I have also questioned traditionally conservative intentions by suggesting that anxiety toward social change motivated the Far Right of the 1960s. Now, using a content analysis comparing the literature of the Far Right to the literature of mainstream conservatism, I test my initial claim. As I anticipate, I find that the literature of the Far Right is inconsistent with that of mainstream conservatism.

Not Your Average Conservative:

An Examination of the Literature of the Far Right

At the beginning of this chapter, I argued that far-right movements are, at least in part, a reaction to rapid social change and progress. As individuals perceive a loss in their social prestige or cultural position, they become increasingly uncomfortable with a changing America. They then turn to the Far Right to quell their growing anxiety. The final section of chapter 1 offers a preliminary test of the mechanisms by which individuals sympathize with the Far Right. Thus far, I have outlined a theory that broadly explains the rise of far-right movements in America. However, I have yet to explain, in great detail, the mechanisms behind the rise of the Far Right of the 1960s. Similar to recent work on the Tea Party, I use a symbolic politics approach to understand the

sources of far-right sympathy. Parker and Barreto (2013) explain Barack Obama's election as symbolic change in America, and I identify symbolic events of the 1960s, such as the rising threat of Communism and the Civil Rights movement, as threats to the Far Right's understanding of the world.

The following analysis takes the first step in testing why the Far Right and its sympathizers come to begrudge a changing society. Rooted in anxiety, sympathy for the Far Right stems from the perception that subversive forces are destroying America. Conspirators exist in any movement that attempts to upset the traditional ladder of social prestige, undermining social progress. For example, the Far Right accused racial minorities of working to divide the country in a grand Communist scheme aimed at world domination (Lipset & Raab, 1970). Again, I argue that these unsettling attitudes are only part of a larger story describing the Far Right, albeit a major part. Next, I revisit the alternative explanations for far-right sympathy in the 1960s. To make my argument clear, I pay particular attention to the possibility that far-right sympathizers truly are ordinary conservatives. After a brief discussion of traditional and reactionary conservatism, I turn to my content analysis. By examining the literature of movement elites, I am able to assess the extent to which traditionally conservative values concerned the Far Right.

The Far Right as Traditional Conservatives

As mentioned previously, there are a number of explanations for why an individual might sympathize with the Far Right. Of the many explanations, traditional conservatism has gained the most scholarly traction (Parker & Barreto, 2013). An incessant need to limit, or altogether prevent government intervention into one's own life

describes much of conservative politics, and in turn, is a description often applied to the Far Right. Traditional conservatism is used to justify the arguments of the Far Right on issues that define the 1960s. In his rich examination of Southern suburban politics in the mid-twentieth century, Matthew Lassiter (2006) argues that a “color-blind” ideology based on strict market forces and individual meritocracy defined white resistance to school integration. Similarly, western libertarianism characterizes the Far Right in Lisa McGirr’s (2001) work on Orange County, California. These interpretations put traditional conservatives at the center of the Far Right movement in the 1960s.

If accounts of right wing politics in the 1960s use traditional conservatism to explain issue and policy stances, where does my interpretation of the Far Right as a reactionary movement fit? To begin, reactionary conservative movements are not void of traditionally conservative elements. Traditional conservatism reflects a commitment to “a discriminating defense of the social order against change and reform (Rossiter, 1955, pp. 12). Showing the utmost respect for the past, traditional conservatism tends to defend the institutions and values of the West. Following WWII, traditional conservative Christian ethic (rooted in community) and Protestant morality came into tension with a new conservatism concerned with individualism, materialism and the free market. The latter of the two, termed *laissez-faire* conservatism, outpaced its dated counterpart.

The post-war conservatism that followed rested in the belief that, “free, happy, effective government recognized the true nature of man and society and interfered as little as possible with the quest for success” (Rossiter, 1955, pp. 132). Having recognized that popular government is here to stay, *laissez-faire* conservatives accepted the advance of democracy, and instead worked to control government as it stands. In doing so, post-

war conservatism embraced three pillars: a preoccupation with individual freedom and government deregulation, an acceptance of foreign policy as a necessary evil so long as national security is a priority, and an emphasis on traditionalism, community and family values (Rossiter, 1955).

Comparatively, reactionary conservatives also embrace and champion individualism, materialism and the free market, but remain on the fringe of traditional conservatism because of their attitudes toward social change. Like traditional conservatives, reactionary conservatives are wary about social change and progress. However, the uneasiness of the Far Right manifests as anxiety toward even slight social progress as they look to the past for comfort and security. Moreover, unique to reactionary conservatism is the feeling of dispossession and a will to do anything to take back America and preserve a specific way of life (Hofstadter, 1964, pp. 23). Constantly looking toward the past as a period of prosperity and comfort, reactionary conservatives will go to great lengths to regain that security.

Traditional conservatives, on the other hand, fear revolutionary change, but realize that incremental change is necessary to maintain stability recognizing that society is never static.³⁵ For traditional conservatives, properly guided change is a process of renewal.³⁶ Reactionary conservatives sacrifice social bonds for individual autonomy, and

³⁵ Clinton Rossiter (1955) explains how recognizing that society is an ever-changing entity is a key point of traditional conservatism. Hofstadter and Lipset further distinguish the Far Right's anxieties from those of traditional conservatives by emphasizing the Far Right's reliance on conspiracy theories and immense paranoia. Finally, the work of Parker and Barreto (2013) on the Tea Party builds upon Hofstadter's realization that the Far Right is less concerned with the maintenance of stability, and is willing to go to any length to fend off threats to their well-established way of life, even if it means inciting conspiracies that run counter to societal stability.

³⁶ The work of Russel Kirk expresses a similar sentiment, and Kirk relies upon Edmund Burke to express the relationship between conservatism and change. Kirk understands that Burkean change is a slow process that simply adjusts the order of things, and individuals must allow the "natural processes to take their course while cooling the heels of those infatuated with instant reform" (Kirk, 1985, pg. 45).

avoid change at all costs. They prioritize the individual, even at the peril of time-tested institutions necessary to conserve stability and order (Parker & Barreto, 2013). The Far Right's indictments against political authorities, sitting presidents and time-tested political institutions (such as the Supreme Court) go against traditional conservative notions of maintaining stability. Moreover, grand conspiracy theories provide a reason to attack anyone who fails to share their vision of America.³⁷

In summary, although reactionary conservatism shares some of the ideals that traditional conservatives value, reactionary conservatives will stop at nothing to resist social change. In their attempts to return America to a time when its past traditions went unchallenged, reactionary conservatives portray the agents working toward social change as subversive traitors destroying the country. In order to further examine the relationship between social change, conspiracy and the Far Right, I examine the periodicals of the far-right movement in the 1960s.

Interpretive Frames and Far Right Opinion Leaders

In light of the (brief) definition of traditional conservatism provided above, a case for or against the Far Right of the 1960s can be made. To start, civil rights legislation did represent an extension of federal power, and Communism was a looming threat to national security. However, the Far Right perceived the Civil Rights movement as subversion and race riots as intent on dividing America. Additionally, Communist spies had infiltrated American institutions, such as the Office of the Presidency, Congress and

³⁷ Hofstadter (1964) argues that the Far Right's conspiracy theories are grand because they tend to perfectly explain historical events, and are made up of conspiracy theories that encompass the whole course or the main course of history.

the Supreme Court. Was the Far Right working to conserve what's "good" about American social and political life, or was the Far Right trying to preserve their social prestige, fighting against social change and progress that threatened their lifestyle and worldview? To answer these questions, I turn to an analysis comparing the content of the *American Opinion* to content from the *National Review*.

The *American Opinion*, the JBS's primary national newsletter, was edited and published by Robert Welch, the founder of the JBS. Bircher ideas circulated for years as the society and Welch himself published materials since the formation of the JBS in 1958. The JBS had an estimated core of nine and a half million supporters in 1962, and this number failed to waver in the face of continuous criticism nationwide (Westin, 1962). With such notoriety, due to both the strong internal organization of the JBS and Welch's national reputation, it is fair to assume that sympathizers with the movement were at least familiar with the general themes contained in the movement's literature.

Therefore, an examination of the *American Opinion* allows for the identification of multiple interpretive frames that help movement sympathizers make sense of their political environment (Snow & Benford, 1992). Elite ideas, identified as frames promoted in the *American Opinion*, provide shortcuts to interpret a complicated world (Zald, 1996). In other words, as John Zaller (1992) suggests, elite frames are informational cues that influence public opinion and shape political action. I will examine all of the content from the *American Opinion* from 1960 through 1964, marking the heyday of the movement that backed Goldwater's nomination.

I compare the content from the *American Opinion* to content from the *National Review*, a conservative news magazine founded by William F. Buckley, Jr. In the early

1950s, the erupting Cold War spurred a young group of conservative intellectuals energized by anti-collectivism – among them was Buckley.³⁸ A former debate champion, Buckley had made a name for himself by criticizing his alma mater, Yale University, in multiple books for its “hostility towards capitalism” (Kersch, 2011, pg. 97). His frustration with his books’ lengthy publishing time led him to publish the *National Review*, which quickly became the lifeblood of conservative politics in America. The magazine became a crucial organism in American conservatism by “cultivating conservative intellectual talent” and “disseminating conservative political ideas” (Kersch, 2011, pg. 98).

By analyzing the *National Review* alongside the *American Opinion*, I am able to compare the prevalence of content frames in the JBS’s monthly newsletter to the content of what was, and still is, considered the mainstay for mainstream conservative thought.³⁹ If reactionary conservatism truly is the main driving force behind the Far Right, then the elite members of the movement should be preoccupied with conspiracy theories as their world changes in uncomfortable ways. In an attempt to reclaim an America of the past, movement elites will go to any length to undermine the new social changes taking place. If anxiety toward social change is, ultimately, absent from the movement, then alternative explanations (limited government, national security, racism, anti-communism) will overshadow theories of conspiracy. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

³⁸ This conservative cohort also included Ayn Rand, Leo Strauss, Milton Friedman and Russel Kirk, among others. For a full description of the rise of conservative intellectualism following WWII, see Kersch (2011), “Ecumenicalism Through Constitutionalism: The Discursive Development of Constitutional Conservatism in *National Review*, 1955–1980.” Rossiter (1955) also offers a detailed analysis of post-war conservatism.

³⁹ Recent work by Political Scientist Mark Smith (2007) on the emergence of the Republican Party squarely places the *National Review* at the center of mainstream conservative dialogue.

H1.1: The majority of the content in the American Opinion will be conspiratorial, whereas the content in the National Review will reflect traditional conservative themes, such as limiting government intervention.

Content Frames and Examples

In order to ascertain evidence to support the theory and test this hypothesis, I examined content from January 1960 through December 1964 in both the *American Opinion* and the *National Review*. These five years are important for a few reasons. First, by the early 1960s, the far-right movement, headed by the JBS, was in full motion. The masterful organization behind the JBS was a well-known force by 1961, and Welch's salesmanship had made the group a rallying point for far-right organizations across the country (Westin, 1962). Second, the political influence of the JBS continued to expand, and the society saw its greatest political victory in the Republican nomination of Goldwater for president. Goldwater's defeat in 1964 marked the decline of the JBS's national presence. For these reasons, the period between 1960 and 1964 is crucial to my content analysis.

I specify ten content frames to guide my analysis of both *American Opinion* and *National Review* (Please see the Chapter 1 Results in the Appendix for a detailed explanation of content theme selection, coding and sampling). I identified frames that reflect the many competing explanations for far-right sympathy in the 1960s.⁴⁰ In order to capture traditional conservatism, I rely upon my description of post-war conservatism in

⁴⁰ I use thematic units to distinguish content on conceptual grounds. Although it can be difficult to reliably identify thematic units, they are useful for exhaustive coding schemes. Additionally, tests can increase the reliability of such units. The content analysis presented has an intercoder reliability of 0.82. For more on thematic units and reliability, see chapter 5 in Krippendorff (1980), *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*.

my first three frames: limited government, foreign affairs and national security, and religion and morals. For instance, literature that reflected limited government criticized “the expansion of federal government.” The literature would even go as far as stating that the expansion of the federal government is a threat to “personal freedom.”⁴¹ In any case, literature reflecting traditional conservatism characterized government as “big, bad – and steadily getting bigger and worse.”⁴²

Content frames for ‘foreign policy’ and ‘national security’ as well as ‘religion and morals’ capture the remaining elements of post-war conservatism. ‘Foreign policy’ and ‘national security’ content describes literature about international conflict and protecting America from both internal and external threats. The content within the frame ‘religion and morals’ is about attitudes toward right and wrong, and the overall importance of religion in America. Together, these three content frames account for post-war traditional conservatism in the literature.

To compete with traditionally conservative explanations, I also use a content frame to capture ‘far-right conspiracy.’ Conspiracy is an indication of reactionary conservatism because the Far Right attempted to undermine social change through the identification of subversion. Even as traditional conservatives may be weary of social change, they still accept change as an organic process; incremental change is necessary to maintain order. Rapid change can quickly turn revolutionary, destroying the institutions that traditional conservatives covet. Unlike traditional conservatives, reactionary conservatives believe that social change of any kind is unacceptable. Reactionary conservatives are quick to identify agents of social change as subversives and traitors to

⁴¹*National Review*, April 9, 1963.

⁴²*National Review*, July 3, 1962.

protect the prestige of the dominant group. In sum, reactionary conservatives are alone in their belief that social change conceals subversion.

To illustrate, the literature captures far-right conspiracy theories about many different types of social change in the 1960s. Communism received the full attention of the Far Right and was the centerpiece of the Far Right's grand conspiracy. According to far-right conspiracy, Communist subversives were everywhere and had already compromised America's most treasured institutions:

Communist infiltration into our government, and the recruiting and planting of Communist traitors in spots of vital control in every important branch of our economic, political, and cultural life, has already gone far beyond the wildest guess of the average American citizen.⁴³

Dedicated "patriots" had already lost America to an intricately organized criminal conspiracy that could be divided into two parts: racketeers and traitors.⁴⁴

Additional targets of the Far Right's conspiracy were progressive social movements, with particular focus given to the Civil Rights movement. More specifically, the Civil Rights movement was nothing more than a race war and "an internal attack on the United States."⁴⁵ Furthermore, the Far Right connected progressive social movements to Communism and the grand conspiracy theory. For example, the Civil Rights movement was not acting alone; Communist subversives set out to divide, conquer and eventually destroy America.

⁴³ *American Opinion*, January 1960.

⁴⁴ *American Opinion*, October 1962.

⁴⁵ *American Opinion*, January 1963.

Along with the content frames described, I use four additional frames to capture the remaining explanations for far-right sympathy: ‘anti-Communism,’ ‘racism and discrimination,’ ‘personal criticism of political leaders and authorities,’ and ‘mistrust in government.’ Aside from the internal Communist conspiracy, literature also expressed a general distaste for Communism, often informing the readers of the dangers associated with Communist ideas. I identified content with bigoted or derogatory language as racist or discriminatory.


Content containing personal attacks of specific political leaders, authorities and elites were coded as such, and I accounted for content expressing mistrust in government. Finally, content frames for ‘history and education’ as well as ‘patriotism’ capture the remaining literature. A good deal of literature retraced historical events or provided biographical information for political figures, and additional literature expressed pride in America and love for one’s country.

When categorizing content, I coded both a primary theme and three sub-themes. Through the sub-themes, I can assess the prominence of certain content frames, and whether content frames are related to one another or appear together in the literature. Further, the sub-themes add depth to my examination because I can assess which sub-themes are most commonly associated with which main content themes. The following section presents my content analysis results, focusing on the main theme and secondary theme.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Although interesting, the tertiary and quaternary content themes are not presented in detail for two reasons. First, not all of the content was extensive enough to allow for secondary and tertiary theme coding. Additionally, the reliability of such themes declines as the specific nature of the coding scheme increases. In other words, due to the limited content the secondary and tertiary themes rely upon, they are more subjective.

Conspiracy and Anti-Communism: The Literature Speaks for Itself

To begin my discussion of elite far-right messaging, I present my findings of content frames in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1 compares the frequency of content frames in the *American Opinion* to the *National Review*.




As my prior suspicions suggest, the majority of the content in the *American Opinion*, almost 30 percent, is conspiratorial, compared to less than 10 percent of the content in the *National Review*. On the other hand, only 3 percent of the content in the *American Opinion* is about limited government, a standard conservative tenet, while limited government accounts for over 20 percent of the content in the *National Review*. Additionally, 26 percent of the content in the *National Review* is about foreign policy and national security, further confirming the periodical's traditional conservative aims. With almost 6 percent of the content dedicated to religion and morals, over 50 percent of the

National Review reflects traditional post-war conservatism. Although close to 10 percent of the content suggests intolerance to Communism, less than 1 percent is conspiratorial.

Contrary to the *National Review*, the content in the *American Opinion* is dominated by far-right conspiracy and anti-Communism. Overall, almost 30 percent of the *American Opinion* is conspiratorial, and 26 percent is intolerant to Communism. Comparatively, less than 4 percent of the *American Opinion* is concerned with limited government, and traditional conservative themes account for less than 20 percent of the total content. Only a small amount of racist or discriminatory content appears in both the *American Opinion* and *National Review*. This is not surprising, as both Welch and Buckley understood the damage that bigotry could do to their movements. The bulk of the remaining content in both the *American Opinion* and *National Review* consists of personal criticisms as well as historical and educational material.

So far my analysis suggests that the dominant themes expressed in the literature of the Far Right differ from traditional conservatism. Coding for multiple sub-themes of content adds nuance to the initial trends observed. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 present the frequency of the secondary and tertiary content themes in *American Opinion* and *National Review*. As Figure 1.2 suggests, the trends observed in the main content themes continue to resonate throughout the literature. Although anti-Communism is a key sub-theme for both the *American Opinion* and *National Review*, the *National Review* falls short in the amount of conspiratorial content when moving beyond the main content theme. Moreover, traditional conservative frames remain absent from the *American Opinion* as secondary themes. On the other hand, traditional conservative frames comprise one-third of the secondary content themes in the *National Review*.



As suggested in Figure 1.3, I find similar trends in a deeper, more detailed examination.




Figure 1.3 illustrates that the literature of the *American Opinion* still separates itself from that of the *National Review* when it comes to conspiracy and traditional conservatism. Furthermore, the *American Opinion* shows signs of mistrust in the government when examining tertiary content themes while the *National Review* continues to commit 28 percent of its material to traditional conservatism. Even as my analysis progresses beyond main and secondary content themes, the *American Opinion* is still distinct from mainstream conservative thought.

To summarize, my results suggest that the content in the *American Opinion* is consumed by far-right conspiracies and anti-Communist themes. The *National Review*, on the other hand, contains anti-Communist sentiments, but fails to embrace far-right conspiracy theories. Figure 1.4 offers a final presentation of the difference in content in the *American Opinion* and *National Review*.




Figure 1.4 shows the amount of conspiratorial content in the main content theme, the secondary content theme, and finally, the amount of conspiratorial content in any content theme for both the *American Opinion* and the *National Review*. The differences are striking as the gap between the *American Opinion* and *National Review* is a minimum of 28-points.

From here, additional analysis of the content of the *American Opinion* provides insight into the themes associated with subversion and far-right conspiracy. Far-right conspiracy theories and anti-Communism dominated the main content themes in the *American Opinion*, but is there a relationship between the two types of content? Figure 1.5 suggests that themes of far-right conspiracy and anti-Communism in the *American Opinion* are related. As mentioned, conspiratorial content identifies subversives by linking individuals and groups to an international Communist plot to control the world.





Figure 1.5 exemplifies the association between the main content theme of far-right conspiracy and the secondary content theme of anti-Communism. To the point, a secondary content theme of anti-Communism accompanies a main theme of far-right conspiracy 63 percent of the time.

Finally, the targets of the far-right conspiracy theories are on full display throughout the literature in *American Opinion*. Figure 1.6 presents the frequency of far-right conspiratorial content as a main content theme from 1960 through 1964.⁴⁷ Turning to the content itself, I can examine what the *American Opinion* was reacting to by analyzing the months in which conspiratorial content was most frequent. According to Figure 1.1, far-right conspiracy accounted for close to 30 percent of the content in *American Opinion*; however, certain months throughout the five-year analysis were more conspiracy-laden than others. A brief analysis of the conspiratorial content in the month's overwhelmed by far-right conspiracy shows that the Far Right was reacting to historical events perceived as endangering America.

⁴⁷ Although a monthly magazine, the *American Opinion* was produced eleven months out of the year. Additionally, the summer months were often combined into one large issue. To account for missing and combined issues, the months of July, August and September were combined for the analysis presented in Figure 1.6. Please see the Chapter 1 Results in the Appendix for a detailed explanation.

Figure 1.6. Far Right Conspiratorial Content in *American Opinion* by Month (1960-1964)



In a follow-up to the *American Opinion*'s initial "Communist Scoreboard" published in 1958, the 1960 edition offered a composite socialist scoreboard for over 100 countries. The content in the *American Opinion* from the summer of 1960 (one issue contained the months July through September) solely focused on socialist control across the world.⁴⁸ According to the scoreboard, the recent election of President John F. Kennedy was pushing America towards socialism, and the U.S. was now 40-60 percent socialist compared to 20-40 percent socialist in 1958.⁴⁹

In July 1961 the *American Opinion* was reacting to the May 30th assassination of the president of the Dominican Republic, General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, a staunch critic of Communism. The content accused the American "liberal" media of engaging in a plot to paint Trujillo as a warmonger and criminal, again falling into the International Communist Conspiracy.⁵⁰ Further updating his readers on the condition of America, Welch wrote, "Today the process has gone so far that not only our Federal Government but some of our state governments are to a disturbing extent controlled by Communist sympathizers."⁵¹

As the Civil Rights movement gained momentum and national attention in 1963, I again find the *American Opinion* reacting. The November 1963 issue of *American Opinion* focused on Civil Rights in the wake of the March of Washington (August, 1963), Freedom Marches in New Orleans (September, 1963) and the Freedom Ballot Movement

⁴⁸ Once removing administrative and informational content, far-right conspiratorial content accounted for 100 percent of the content in the *American Opinion* from July to September of 1960. Please see the Chapter 1 Results in the Appendix for the full content analysis.

⁴⁹ *American Opinion*, July-September 1960.

⁵⁰ *American Opinion*, July 1961.

⁵¹ *American Opinion* July 1961, pg. 15.

in Mississippi (October, 1963), among other events.⁵² The issue included a piece critical of Martin Luther King, Jr. entitled, “King of Slick,” and other content arguing that bigotry is nothing more than “devotion to a belief or opinion.”⁵³

Lastly, the March 1964 issue of *American Opinion* was reacting to the Warren Commission finding no connection between Kennedy’s assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, and Communism. The content, published in the midst of Jack Ruby’s murder trial for killing Oswald (Ruby was sentenced to death on March 14th, 1964), included pieces entitled, “Marksmanship in Dallas” and “The Assassination Story.” Both pieces condemned the Warren Commission for disregarding Oswald’s Communist ties, and accused the government of an attempted cover-up to further the International Communist plot to control the world.⁵⁴

The evidence from my content analysis demonstrates that far-right literature was conspiratorial in the early 1960s. Moreover, the literature of Far Right was consistently reacting to events of social change perceived as dangerous to America. Unlike the content in the *National Review*, the content in the *American Opinion* suggests a movement concerned with defending America from Communist subversives and conspirators set on destroying the country. Even as some scholars may express concern about my reliance on conspiracy theories to identify the divergence of the Far Right, conspiracy still remains inconsistent with traditional conservatism.

⁵² For an in-depth telling of the Civil Rights movement in 1963, see Harvard Sitkoff (1981), *The Struggle for Black Equality*, Chapters 4 and 5.

⁵³ *American Opinion*, November 1963. Quoted text is found on pg. 14.

⁵⁴ *American Opinion*, March 1964.

Concluding Thoughts

In Chapter 1, I aimed to complete three objectives. First, I introduced a theory as to why individuals sympathize with the Far Right in the 1960s. Contradictory to traditional conservative claims, I argued that individuals sympathized with the Far Right of the 1960s because they felt that their country was slipping away -- that dramatic social change was threatening to displace their position atop the social ladder. The Far Right of the 1960s was reacting to uncomfortable social change that took the form of escalating Cold War pressure, the Civil Rights movement and international freedom movements across the globe. The changing world failed to match the perceived social reality that far-right sympathizers had grown to know and love. Anxious about confronting a new reality, individuals turn to the Far Right for solace and comfort.

Second, I place the Far Right of the 1960s in its appropriate historical context and I identify anxiety toward social change as a powerful mechanism driving far-right sympathy. While focusing on conspiracy, I suggest that the Far Right of the 1960s fits into a larger historical timeline of far-right movements reacting to uncomfortable social change. Each of the far-right movements I explore relies upon similar rhetoric and attracts sympathizers to a grand conspiracy declaring that America is under attack. By applying the same theoretical framework to the Know Nothing movement, the second-era Ku Klux Klan movement, and the New Right and Tea Party movement, I am able to confidently move forward with my analysis of the Far Right in the 1960s.

Lastly, I examined the elite messaging of the 1960s by analyzing content in the *National Review* and *American Opinion*. My content analysis serves as a preliminary test of the theoretical framework. Considerable differences separate the *American Opinion*

from the *National Review*. I found the literature of the Far Right filled with conspiracy theories and preoccupied with identifying communist subversives. The literature in the *American Opinion* fervently undermined social change and consistently reacted to events perceived as destroying America.

My preliminary analysis supports my initial claims. However, I must remain cautious in making definitive conclusions from my Chapter 1 analysis for a number of reasons. First, even though scholarship suggests that elite rhetoric influences how masses of people form their opinions and decide how to behave, I have yet to test if this is the case for the Far Right in the 1960s. In other words, are the messages of far-right elites actually influencing the attitudes and behaviors of movement sympathizers?

In addition, there are a number of other factors that might explain far-right sympathy that I have yet to take into account. My content analysis suggests that traditional conservative issues are anything but a main concern of the Far Right; still, there are other factors, such as sociodemographic characteristics and partisanship that I have yet to test. In order to draw confident conclusions about the relationship between anxiety toward social change and sympathy for the Far Right of the 1960s, I must consider a number of alternative explanations. As I have stated, I expect the story behind far-right sympathy to be a complicated one, and a rigorous analysis may find that anxiety toward social change is not as important as my initial results suggest. I turn to Chapter 2 to address these concerns.

Chapter 2

ANXIETY, RACISM OR ANTI-COMMUNISM: UNDERSTANDING SUPPORT FOR THE FAR RIGHT MOVEMENT OF THE 1960s

“Now, my fellow Americans, the tide has been running against freedom. Our people have followed false prophets. We must, and we shall, return to proven ways - not because they are old, but because they are true. We must, and we shall, set the tide running again in the cause of freedom. And this party, with its every action, every word, every breath, and every heartbeat, has but a single resolve, and that is freedom - freedom made orderly for this nation by our constitutional government; freedom under a government limited by laws of nature and of nature's God; freedom - balanced so that liberty lacking order will not become the slavery of the prison cell; balanced so that liberty lacking order will not become the license of the mob and of the jungle.”

- *Barry Goldwater, 1964 RNC Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speech*

In Chapter 1 I introduced reactionary conservatism as the appropriate framework to understand sympathy for the Far Right movement of the early 1960s. I also detailed multiple accounts using reactionary conservatism to explain sympathy for Far Right movements spanning American history, from the Know Nothings to the Tea Party today. In doing so, I argue that sympathizers with the Far Right in the 1960s were unlike traditional conservatives, and instead were reactionaries consumed by anxiety and conspiracy. Furthermore, my initial examination of the literature of the Far Right confirms my claims, and suggests that the 1960s Far Right movement elite were anything but traditional conservatives.

However, my analysis tells us little about mass sympathy for the Far Right of the 1960s, and has yet to examine other possible explanations for far-right sympathy aside from anxiety toward social change. The literature on the Far Right offers some clues as to other possible explanations for far-right sympathy. For example, historical accounts of the Far Right in the 1960s by Matthew Lassiter (2006) and Lisa McGirr (2001) suggest that the movement was made up of older, wealthier, educated Americans, echoing the

earlier work of James McEvoy (1972) that relied upon survey data from 1964. Others suggest that ideological and social psychological factors are important in understanding the 1960s movement, namely political ideology and intolerance. Work by Alan Elms (1969) and Ira Rohter (1969) find evidence suggesting a strong association between both conservatism and intolerance with far-right attachment in the 1960s.

Despite the work on the Far Right in the 1960s, it fails to match the empirical rigor of recent work on sympathy for the Tea Party that evaluates the relative strength of different competing explanations.¹ My examination is the first to use rigorous methodological tests, such as multiple regression analysis, to examine the 1960s Far Right.² On the other hand, recent work on the Tea Party fails to test the sources of support for Far Right movements that materialized and are void of President Obama, at whom much of the Tea Party's discontent is directed. My work aligns with contemporary examinations by focusing on movement sympathizers instead of members and activists. In sum, my examination is uniquely positioned to utilize refinements in methods and approach to offer a broader yet nuanced assessment of far-right sympathy in the 1960s.

The purpose of the present chapter is to answer the following research questions: *Who* were the supporters of the Far Right in the 1960s and *why* did they sympathize with the movement? When accused of extremism, Far Right leaders of the 1960s championed traditional conservatism as the source of their support. Conversely, detractors argued that the movement consisted of intolerant Americans and individuals reluctant to accept the historical changes taking place, such as the Civil Rights movement. In this chapter, I

¹ See Parker and Barreto's (2013) exhaustive book on the Tea Party, *Change They Can't Believe In*.

² Although regression analysis is not part of the analysis in his book, McEvoy (1972) does include regression coefficients in the Appendix (pp. 142-143). However, McEvoy's models only predict support for George Wallace, so my project remains the first and only to use multiple regression techniques to examine the Far Right movement behind Barry Goldwater in 1964.

examine the sources of sympathy for the Far Right, and, although my earlier results show that the cues imbedded in Far Right elite discourse were different from mainstream conservative thought, I consider the possibility that many different explanations may be working simultaneously.

Before I explore the sources of far-right sympathy in the 1960s, I first describe the characteristics of those sympathetic to the movement. I then examine the extent to which anxiety toward social change, such as the Civil Rights movement and the rise of Communism, explain sympathy beyond other explanations such as intolerance, sociodemographic factors and politics. Altogether, I find that Far Right sympathizers tend to be socially and economically privileged (white, educated, upper-middle class men), and are driven to sympathize with the Far Right for reasons including intolerance and political ideology. Yet, above all, I find evidence supporting the original claim I made in Chapter 1, that anxiety toward social change is associated with sympathy for the Far Right movement of the 1960s above and beyond other explanations.

Exploring Movement Sympathy as Reactionary Conservatism

Preceding my examination of far-right sympathy is a brief discussion of *how* I identify movement sympathizers, and subsequently *who* actually sympathized with the Far Right in the 1960s. In Chapter 1 I explained in detail what it meant to support the Far Right in the 1960s, and highlighted similarities between far-right sympathy in the 1960s and other Far Right movements, such as the Know-Nothings, the second-era Ku Klux Klan, the New Right and the Tea Party. Just as the Far Right in the 1960s condemned Communism, the Civil Rights movement and freedom movements abroad aimed to

maintain their way of life, the Know-Nothings railed against new Catholic immigrants, the Klan propagated bigotry and hatred toward blacks, Catholics and Jews, and the New Right vehemently opposed women's rights and homosexuality (Lipset & Raab, 1970; Conover and Gray, 1983). Today, the Tea Party is the leading voice against President Obama and his "Socialist" agenda, immigration and gay and lesbian rights (Parker & Barreto, 2013).

Additionally, my content analysis exposed stark differences between the Far Right and mainstream conservatism, at least in terms of their elite dialogue and literature. I found Far Right elite messages were full of anxiety, marked by the overwhelming presence of conspiracy atypical of traditional conservatism, rather than tenets such as a belief in small government and economic individualism. Furthermore, the anxiety of the Far Right elite was distinct from overt racism, although an undertone of racial intolerance was common throughout. As we again place the Far Right movement of the 1960s into a larger timeline, my content analysis serves as a useful reminder of the commonalities between Far Right movements throughout American history. Each of the movements was tremendously concerned with the subversion and destruction of the American way of life, and ultimately, the country that far-right sympathizers knew and loved.

*Goldwater for President: Shifting from Activists and Elites
to Movement Sympathizers*

Thus far, the evidence suggests that the Far Right movement of the 1960s was about anxiety and conspiracy, and the movement fits into a timeline of Far Right movements that are far from traditionally conservative. The historical evidence and my

content analysis make a strong case; however, I now expand my argument by examining sympathy for the Far Right beyond movement elites, activists and members. My analysis expands our understanding of the 1960s Far Right because much of the scholarship on Far Right movements focuses on specific far-right organizations and their members; and, even though my content analysis captures Far Right elite messages directed at the masses, further analysis can capture the actual sentiments of movement sympathizers.

I turn to the 1964 American National Election Study (ANES) to examine the depth of support for the 1960s Far Right. The use of this survey data aids my examination in two ways. First, I am able to explore the attitudes of Americans who are not intimately involved with the movement. I have argued that the influence of the Far Right in the 1960s stretched beyond movement elites and activists, and the following analysis allows for me to examine the full extent of far-right sympathy. Additionally, examining survey data allows for a deeper exploration of *who* far-right sympathizers were in the 1960s. I am not only able to identify the socio- and political characteristics of far-right sympathizers, but I am also able to examine the influence of different, competing explanations for far-right sympathy.

Before I begin my examination of the 1964 ANES, I first need to identify how I will measure anxiety toward social change and sympathy for the broader Far Right movement in 1964. In order to measure anxiety toward change and far-right sympathy, I identify two proxies in the survey data. The elite rhetoric of the John Birch Society (JBS) was central to my examination of content, and I found that unlike the content in the *National Review*, conspiracy overwhelmed the *American Opinion*. Just as I hypothesized, the Far Right's anxiety toward social change manifested itself as grand conspiracy

theories used to undermine any and all social change. Moreover, agents of social change, such as civil rights leaders and political authorities, were accused of treason and labeled subversives aiming to destroy the country. Thus, Americans' attitudes toward the JBS serve as an appropriate measure for anxiety toward social change and conspiracy.

In addition, the rhetoric of the JBS serves as a decent pulse for other branches of the Far Right movement. Although the number of official due-paying members of the JBS varies from 20,000 to 80,000, the organization's message reached far more Americans. By 1962, national surveys show JBS sympathizers between four and six million. The Far Right was conducting over 500 radio broadcasts each week and the JBS's newsletter *American Opinion*'s total circulation exceeded 500,000 copies each month (Rohter, 1969).³ The JBS even opened its own "Birch Bookstores" that served as local headquarters for meetings and distribution centers for flyers, films, rally tickets and bumper stickers (Epstein & Forster, 1966, pg. 213).

Furthermore, other Far Right organizations were not only propagating the same rhetoric and messages as the JBS, they were also directing their members to the *American Opinion*. For example, the California Republican Assembly (CRA), an organization instrumental to the Far Right's gains in Orange County and Los Angeles, constantly advertised articles from the *American Opinion* in their own local newsletter (McGirr, 2001). Moreover, other regional right wing newspapers, such as the *Register* in the Midwest, Texas and California, thrust their support behind the JBS and its overarching

³ Circulation records for the *American Opinion* are few and far between; however, Epstein and Forster (1966) note that circulation continued to grow throughout the early 1960s with an average press run of 52,272 copies in 1966, an 18% increase from the year before. Additionally, Lisa McGirr (2001) details the dissemination of information through far-right knowledge networks in work on Orange County, California, describing copies of the *American Opinion* being passed around at book club meetings and social events. Furthermore, research suggests that readership, with the average readership being 4 or 5 readers per copy in circulation for many monthly magazines, and could be as high as 20 readers per copy. For more, see Michael Brown's (1999) book, *Effective Print Media Measurement: Audiences and More*.

message.⁴ If nothing more, by the early 1960s, the *American Opinion* had become the mouthpiece for both the JBS and the broader Far Right movement that it represented. Therefore, based on my content analysis and the wide-ranging reach of the *American Opinion*, attitudes toward the JBS serve as an appropriate proxy for anxiety toward social change and conspiracy.

Next, I identify a proxy for far-right sympathy at a national level. In order to examine sympathy for the Far Right, I move beyond the JBS and other individual far-right organizations in the 1960s and rely upon support for Barry Goldwater for President in 1964 as my proxy for the national Far Right movement. My analysis extends the influence of the Far Right in the 1960s beyond the current scholarship by identifying individuals who voted for Barry Goldwater in 1964 as movement sympathizers. Barry Goldwater serves as appropriate proxy for far-right sympathy for a number of reasons. First, the John Birch Society was one of many far-right organizations in the 1960s, and JBS sentiments reached far more than members and activists. So, when the JBS identified Goldwater as the movement's candidate, America was listening.

From the beginning of his presidential campaign, Barry Goldwater became the face of the far-right movement because of his strict fiscal and social conservatism (whether he asked for it or not), and continued to represent what many considered extremism (Perlstein, 2001). A vigorous Republican campaign searching for a clear alternative to President John F. Kennedy had been underway for years before Barry

⁴ The California Republican Assembly (CRA) *Enterprise* was a newsletter established to highlight Orange County CRA activities and even directly linked itself to the *American Opinion* by carrying articles by contributors to the JBS periodical such as Tom Anderson. The owner and editor of the *Register*, commended the JBS for the battle they were waging against Communism, and proudly publicized readers who became new members of the Birch Society. Lisa McGirr (2001) describes the activism of the CRA in detail in Chapter 3 of *Suburban Warriors*.

Goldwater had formally considered running for President in 1964. Goldwater, then a Republican Senator from Arizona, flew onto the Republican radar because of his likely ability to carry the solidly Democratic South, and maybe even win California in a national election (Perlstein, 2001).

By June of 1963, the student-centered far-right organization, Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), organized a “Draft Goldwater” campaign for the 1964 New Hampshire presidential primary. Shortly thereafter, the New Hampshire YAF announced a state Draft Goldwater committee that gained the national support of the John Birch Society at the Young Republican national convention later that month (Perlstein, 2001, pg. 215-16). Goldwater was now the candidate of the Far Right movement, and his name was trumpeted by Far Right leaders across the nation.

The John Birch Society applauded Goldwater in the *American Opinion*, and by 1964 the Far Right’s support for Goldwater was nationally recognized. The JBS treasured the opportunity to highlight the importance of the Far Right in Goldwater’s political viability and the possibility of a conservative takeover in America:

The Goldwater movement seems to derive its growing strength not only from philosophical and economic conservatism but also from its alien fringes. Conservatives may rejoice about this political development because it may bring political victory, even the election of Barry Goldwater to the Presidency (*American Opinion*, September, 1964, pg. 58).

By 1964, the JBS had thrown themselves behind Goldwater for President, and anyone familiar with the group or their newsletter was aware of their allegiance. Even after his

defeat, the JBS praised Goldwater for his strength and conviction, leaving room for the possibility of another run for the White House in the future:

By the Grace of God, this Republic has been raised up and, in times of peril, preserved by uncommon men. Let us hope that Americans remember that fact before, let us say 1984. If they do, they will then judge no man more worthy than Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona (*American Opinion*, December, 1964, pg. 97).

While the Far Right was elevating Goldwater, both liberal and conservative political leaders were distancing themselves from JBS founder Robert Welch and Barry Goldwater. The American left was scared of a Goldwater nomination, and worked to convince America that “[Goldwater] would take various steps that actually would damage [liberals] or their interests.”⁵ Furthermore, even conservatives, such as William F. Buckley, the editor of the *National Review*, also feared a Goldwater nomination. Buckley believed that Goldwater’s ties to the Far Right would doom him in the general election (Perlstein, 2001). Buckley steamed at the possibility of a Republican nominee bending backwards to appease the Far Right, and even suggested that if Goldwater lost the nomination, “he might take up the assembled forces of the extreme right as *his* fascist army” (Perlstein, 2001, pg. 154).

As the 1964 Republican National Conventions approached and conservatives realized that Goldwater may in fact become their nominee for President, Buckley agreed to focus the attacks in the *National Review* on Welch instead of the JBS supporters. (Much of this compromise was organized by Goldwater himself, who convinced Buckley

⁵ Lionel Lokos (1967) goes into great detail to expose the liberal smear campaign against Barry Goldwater in his book, *Hysteria 1964*. The quoted text is from a statement on Goldwater by *New York Times* reporter Tom Wicker and appears in *Hysteria 1964*, page 25.

to paint Welch as a “crazy extremist” but maintain that the John Birch Society itself was “full of fine, upstanding citizens working hard and well for the cause of Americanism” (Perlstein, 2001, pg. 156).) Still, it was clear that no matter how much Buckley tried to redirect his support toward Goldwater once he was the Republican nominee Goldwater remained the Far Right’s candidate.

Additionally, whether or not Goldwater ultimately agreed with the anxious and conspiratorial perspective of the Far Right, he knew that he needed their unconditional support to achieve national political victory. Goldwater made constant appeals to the Far Right while on the campaign trail, and Goldwater’s campaign rhetoric suggests that his appeals went farther than simply “hunting where the ducks [were],” as he attested that, “a lot of people in my home town have been attracted to the [JBS], and I am impressed by the type of people in it. They are the kind we need in politics” (Perlstein, 2001, pg. 118). Moreover, to the chagrin of many conservatives hoping that Goldwater was simply pandering to the Far Right in order to secure the Republican nomination, Goldwater applauded his loyal far-right followers in his acceptance speech for the Republican Presidential Nomination on July 14th, 1964:

Anyone who joins us in sincerity we welcome. Those who do not care for our cause, we do not expect to enter our ranks in any case... And let our Republicanism, so focused and dedicated, not be made fuzzy and futile by unthinking and stupid labels. Let me remind you: *Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice!...Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.*

(McGirr, 2001, pg. 140).

Goldwater’s defense of extremism at the 1964 Republican National Convention gave the

John Birch Society, and the Far Right movement as a whole, a new degree of respect. It was undeniable that the Far Right was now part of the national conversation, and Barry Goldwater had become the leader of a movement that was previously relegated to radicals and extremists (Epstein & Forster, 1966).

I now turn to my analysis of support for the 1960s Far Right with clearly defined measures of anxiety toward social change and far-right sympathy. The John Birch Society's preoccupation with conspiracy theories in their monthly newsletter suggests that the group was about anything but traditionally conservative values. Thus, I rely upon attitudes toward the JBS to understand an individual's agreement with the primary message of the organization: subversive forces are attacking our way of life and ultimately the country we know and love. In order to extend my examination beyond the JBS and explore far-right sympathy at a national level, I rely upon individual level support for Barry Goldwater for President in 1964. By all accounts, Goldwater was adored by the Far Right and embraced their support. Goldwater was the face of the Far Right movement, and I rely upon support for Goldwater for President in 1964 to measure sympathy for the Far Right on a national scale. Now that I have identified my measures for anxiety toward social change and far-right sympathy, I offer the following hypothesis:

H2.1: Anxiety toward social change (JBS) will explain far-right sympathy (voting for Goldwater) in 1964 after accounting for other political and sociodemographic factors.

My examination of sympathy for the Far Right at the national level is advancing work on the Far Right in the 1960s in many ways. To start, most examinations of the 1960s Far Right focus on members of a specific political organization, such as the JBS,

and I argue that formal membership in these organizations fails to capture the full magnitude of the Far Right's influence. Moreover, even James McEvoy's (1972) rather expansive examination the 1960s Far Right movement limits movement sympathizers to individuals who supported what he considered a more extreme Goldwater prior to his Republican Party nomination for President in 1964.⁶

The ensuing analysis explores the many different factors that may drive sympathy for the Far Right in the 1960s, and the final section of this chapter pits the various possible explanations for far-right sympathy against my chief claim: that individuals sympathized with the Far Right in the 1960s because they felt anxious about the changes underway in America, and feared the destruction of their way of life and the country they loved. It may be the case that anxiety toward social change, and the conspiracy theories that derive from it, are unassociated with far-right sympathy once other explanations are considered. However, if I am correct, that anxiety toward social change will drive far-right sympathy beyond other factors, and the alternative explanations that I present will fail to explain sympathy for the Far Right in its entirety.

Anxiety toward Change or Something Else? Understanding

the Depth of Far-Right Sympathy

Having defined my measure for anxiety toward change and conspiracy as support for the JBS, and my measure of far-right sympathy as voting for Barry Goldwater for

⁶ If McEvoy (1972) is correct in assuming Goldwater's primary campaign is the most accurate measure of Far Right support, then expanding my analysis to Goldwater voters in the general election should actually reduce the likelihood of finding significant differences based on anxiety toward social change. On the other hand, significant differences when predicting a vote for Goldwater in the general election suggest that the anxiety of the Far Right was more expansive and powerful than even McEvoy thought. Moreover, my analysis might even be underestimating any effect of anxiety toward social change because of the limitations associated with my Goldwater proxy.

President in 1964, I now turn to the task of understanding *who* far-right sympathizers were and the depth of their support. Literature suggests that far-right sympathizers represent a privileged class in American society: older, white, upper-middle class men. But the question remains of whether these sociodemographic characteristics in and of themselves can explain attachment to the Far Right movement in the 1960s. Furthermore, other explanations beyond sociodemographics must also be considered. Can far-right sympathy in the 1960s be explained by political considerations, such as ideology or partisan attachment; alternatively, perhaps intolerance, such as racism and anti-Communism are the driving factors? The following explores *who* individuals were that sympathized with the 1960s Far Right by presenting multiple explanations for far-right sympathy.

Social and Political Explanations or Far-Right Sympathy in the 1960s

Before I begin my empirical assessment of far-right sympathy, it is important to briefly discuss some of the sociodemographic and political factors that might cause a person to sympathize with the Far Right. Scholars have gone to great lengths to distinguish anxieties about economic status from social anxieties, but an individual's economic position remains an important factor worthy of examination.⁷ In other words, it is entirely possible that someone would support the Far Right because they were unsatisfied with their economic standing. Work on the contemporary Far Right suggests that middle and upper class Americans are the most avid supporters, but is this the case

⁷ See Gusfield (1963), Bell (1962, 1963) and Hofstadter (1963) for an elaboration of the differences between status anxieties and economic anxieties. Hofstadter goes as far as claiming that "cultural politics" may be a necessary supplementation for "status politics," as issues of culture, faith, morality and freedom are all worth fighting over in American political life (pp. 82-83). Hixon, Jr. (1992) does an exceptional job of summarizing the debate in his book, *Search for the American Right Wing*.

for the far-right movement in the 1960s? Further, what role do different measures of economic standing, such as income, education and homeownership play, if any?

In addition, race and gender are important to my analysis. If, as scholars suggest, the Far Right in the 1960s is dominated by white men, are issues of white male identity driving attachment to the movement?⁸ Similarly, scholarship suggests that supporters of Far Right movements are older as well. Could age be the defining mechanism of movement sympathy as middle-aged and older Americans become less comfortable with change when they settle into their lives?

Also, religiosity and region play important roles in understanding the Far Right, especially in the 1960s. Goldwater's appeal to Southern Democrats is undeniable, and much of the Far Right's national political success is attributed to support from the South (Kabaservice, 2012). Moreover, the Far Right is often described as largely comprised of religious zealots, and religious leaders who found their way into the ranks of the Far Right movement in the 1960s (McGirr, 2001). In addition, the Manichean approach to conflict (the simplification to a battle of good versus evil) that often characterizes evangelical Protestantism is in line with the super-patriotism of the Far Right (Dochuk, 2011; Hofstadter, 1964; Parker & Barreto, 2013). So, could region or religiosity overshadow other factors in explaining far-right sympathy?

Simply a Group of Disaffected Conservatives?

On the other hand, many different political factors may also influence support for

⁸ Parker and Barreto's (2013) work on the Far Right suggests that the white male domination of the Tea Party is characteristic of other, past far-right movements. McEvoy's (1972) and Hixon, Jr.'s (1992) work on the Far Right in the 1960s also shows a movement dominated by older, white men; and, although empirical work on earlier Far Right movements is limited, historical accounts by Lipset and Raab (1970) suggests that the Far Right is most accurately defined by older white men.

the Far Right. To start, we must consider the influence of politics and ideology.⁹ Similar to the Tea Party's arguments against government expansion, such as in health care, the Far Right in the 1960s maintained that much of their resentment toward the Civil Rights movement was due to their beliefs in the maintenance of small government.¹⁰

Similarly, conservative ideology is fundamentally about tradition and stability guaranteed through long-standing American institutions, so changes in American society may simply disagree with conservative principles.¹¹ Furthermore, Angus Campbell (1960) and his co-authors place partisan identity at the center of political preferences and vote choice in *The American Voter*. In other words, might individuals support the Far Right merely because it was a conservative movement under the Republican Party brand?

In addition to ideology and partisan identity, political trust and political knowledge must also be considered. Scholarship suggests that individuals who mistrust their government feel as though their political representatives are disconnected from them, ignoring them or lying to them, and can lead to people searching for a new political movement for comfort (Finifter, 1970; Miller, 1974; Citrin & Muste, 1999). Could mistrust of the current political regime, namely Lyndon B. Johnson and progressive

⁹ Since contemporary measures of self-identified liberal and conservative identities were not available in ANES data until 1966, I needed to create a proxy to measure conservatism. Drawing from conservative thinkers, such as John Kekes' (1998) work, *A Case for Conservatism*, which suggest that conservatism is at once a moral and emotional bond between individuals that forms part of their identity (pg. 108), I created an index for conservatism that combines attitudinal measures of conservatives, farmers, the military, Southerners and big business. According to Kekes, in order to evaluate morality, conservatives form emotional attachment to objects that inform their moral sensibility. It is through their evaluation of certain objects in society that they can assess whether or not society is "morally healthy" (Kekes, 1998, pg. 107). Moreover, the work of Conover and Feldman (1981) suggests that individual evaluations of conservatives are based on symbols – groups, ideas, and even policies. Thus, individuals will consider themselves conservative due to their perceived closeness with other conservative symbols, such as the NRA, churches and business leaders. This scale is explained in detail in the Appendix to the dissertation.

¹⁰ Parker and Barreto (2013) explain that the Tea Party claims issues of limited government are at their philosophical core, and Matthew Lassiter's (2006) work on right wing resistant to school integration rely upon the same logic.

¹¹ The work of Clinton Rossiter (1955) outlines American conservatism in great detail.

Democrats, explain support for the Far Right in the 1960s? Political knowledge is also important to our understanding of sympathy for the Far Right. It is possible that far-right sympathizers fail to understand the anxiety and conspiracy central to the movement in the 1960s, and they were sympathizing with a movement they failed to fully understand. Put another way, are individuals sympathizing with the Far Right ignorant of politics and simply lacking an understanding of the politics or ideology of the movement communicated by movement elites and activists?

Intolerance and Anti-Communism

Finally, the association of racism and anti-Communism with far-right sympathy in the 1960s must also be considered. To begin, the Far Right of the 1960s rose to prominence on the heels of McCarthyism, arguably one of the most outspoken anti-Communist movements in American history. The 1950s witnessed massive support for anti-Communist McCarthyism, and although the phenomenon is consistently characterized as a tendency and not a movement, scholars suggest that McCarthy supporters translated their anti-Communist nativism into the far-right organizations of the 1960s, such as the JBS (Schlesinger, 1969; Lipset & Raab, 1970, McEvoy, 1972).¹² Therefore, could sympathy for the Far Right in the 1960s be nothing more than organized McCarthyism?

In addition, the 1950s experienced groundbreaking moments in the fight for civil rights and racial equality. In 1954, the Supreme Court decided that separate but equal schools are inherently unequal in the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, and 1955

¹² Lipset and Raab (1970) explain that although McCarthy was “widely approved,” he symbolized a sentiment in America and not an actual, organized movement. In fact, they highlight that an opportunity to join a movement was never even provided (pg. 289).

saw the Montgomery Bus Boycott in Alabama gain national attention. In 1957, Alabama Governor Orval Faubus blocked the entry of nine African American students to Little Rock High School, and Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which created the Civil Rights Commission and authorized the Justice Department to investigate cases of voter obstruction in the South.¹³ By 1960, a “liberal consensus” described much of American politics, and the issue of civil rights was at the top of the nation’s political agenda (Kabaservice, 2012).

Considering the racial tension sweeping the nation at the time, it comes as no surprise that scholarship has explored the association between far-right support in the 1960s and racial intolerance. Work by James McEvoy (1972) suggests that supporters of the Far Right in the 1960s are uniquely opposed to integration and the Civil Rights movement, and Lipset and Raab (1970) find that support for the JBS was associated with support for the Ku Klux Klan in 1965 and also question whether or not the Far Right in the 1960s originated from the same racism and outspoken bigotry that characterized the movement behind George Wallace in 1968.¹⁴ Therefore, I also consider the role of racial intolerance in understanding sympathy for the Far Right.

Up to this point, I have highlighted numerous factors that may be associated with sympathy for the Far Right in the 1960s. These factors include sociodemographics, politics and intolerance. Since each factor also serves as competition to my claim that anxiety toward social change drives far-right sympathy, the remainder of this chapter

¹³ For a detailed description of the Civil Rights movement throughout the 1950s see, Sitkoff (1981), among many others.

¹⁴ In his analysis, McEvoy defines supporters of the Far Right as individuals who supported Goldwater prior to his presidential nomination; however, McEvoy’s results suggest that the differences in opinion persist among those who also supported Goldwater for President when compared to other Americans. Failing to include these respondents as far-right sympathizers is a major limitation of McEvoy’s work, along with the limited bivariate analysis in which he is unable to take into account other factors that might explain the relationship between Far Right support and intolerance.

takes on the various explanations for far-right sympathy in detail. The evidence from my content analysis supports my chief claim: that the Far Right is far from traditionally conservative, and stems from anxiety about social change that manifests as conspiracy theories. Still, it may be the case that other sociodemographic or political factors account for far-right sympathy instead of anxiety toward social change. However, if I am correct, anxiety toward social change will drive far-right sympathy, even after considering other explanations. I now turn to the 1964 American National Election Study (ANES) to complete my examination.

A Look at the Data: Far-Right Sympathy in 1964

In June of 1964, Barry Goldwater was announced as the Republican Presidential Candidate after pulling off an incredible victory in the California Republican Primary. Although backed by the Far Right and a strong showing in the South, Goldwater's showing in the 1964 Presidential Election was less than ideal. Winning 38.5% of the popular vote and only 52 votes in the Electoral College, Goldwater lost in humiliating fashion.¹⁵ However, his election was a victory for the Far Right movement that had showed their strength by putting one of their own on the Presidential ballot and commandeering the Republican Party. As I explore the depth of support for the Far Right, I rely upon Goldwater as a symbol of sympathy for the Far Right movement because of his importance to the Far Right movement as a national figure.

In the 1964 ANES survey, Goldwater voters accounted for less of the sample than the 38.5 percent of the nation that voted for him. According to Table 2.1, 22 percent of Americans voted for Goldwater in 1964, representing far-right sympathizers in my study.

¹⁵ See, *The National Election of 1964* (Cummings, 1966), for a detailed examination of the 1964 election.

Table 2.1. Voting for Barry Goldwater for President in 1964


	Vote for Goldwater	No Vote for Goldwater	Total N
(All Respondents)	22% (326)	78% (1,163)	1,489

Below, Figure 2.1 presents the sociodemographic and political characteristics of far-right sympathizers, and the association between intolerance and anti-Communism with far-right sympathy. Of all the factors associated with far-right sympathy, a few stand out more than others. To start, anxiety toward social change is significantly associated with far-right sympathy. (Respondents considered anxious about social change are those who rated the JBS at 50 or higher on a 100-point scale, with 100 equal to very warm feelings toward the organization.) Specifically, 64 percent of respondents who felt anxious toward social change also sympathized with the Far Right, compared to only 20 percent of individuals who failed to express similar anxiety – a difference of 44 percentage points.¹⁶

In addition, 50 percent of individuals who felt that government was too powerful also sympathized with the Far Right, compared to only 11 percent of those who considered the government’s size acceptable. Finally, 60 percent of Republicans identified as far-right sympathizers, compared with only ten percent of individuals who identify as either Democrats or Independents. My results suggest that individuals who sympathized with the Far Right in 1964 were not only anxious of social change, but also racially intolerant, anti-Communist, Republican and believed that the government needed to be limited.

¹⁶ Although my results suggest that there is a difference between Goldwater voters and other Americans when it comes to anxiety toward social change, I would ideally want more than 64 percent of individuals anxious about social change to have voted for Goldwater. On the one hand, this speaks to the limitations of the proxy. However, by identifying anxious respondents as individuals who rated the JBS as 50 or greater on a scale of 0-100, I am actually presenting a conservative estimate. I do this to maintain a useful number of individuals in each category. If I were to identify anxious individuals as those who rated the JBS as 80 or higher on the same scale, close to 70 percent of anxious individuals voted for Goldwater.

**Figure 2.1. Sociodemographic and Political Characteristics, by Far-Right Sympathy
(Voting for Goldwater in 1964)**



Note: Data = 1964 ANES; * Relationships significant at χ^2 $p < 0.01$; all feeling thermometers were coded such that High > 50 with the exception of pro-Communism, which was coded such that High > 40 in order to ensure enough observations existed in each category of analysis.

A number of other factors are also significantly associated with far-right sympathy, although the differences between far-right sympathizers and other Americans are less pronounced. For example, Figure 2.1 illustrates that Americans who were wealthy, older, educated, white and conservative tend to sympathize with the Far Right at higher rates. The same goes for individuals who were knowledgeable about politics and mistrustful of the government and its current political leaders. Furthermore, 14 percentage points separate the number of far-right sympathizers that are racially intolerant from other Americans, and 9 percentage points separate far-right sympathizers from other Americans when it comes to attitudes toward Communism. Surprisingly, there are no significant patterns when it comes to religiosity and living in the South, and only a small proportion of far-right sympathizers appear racially intolerant.¹⁷

So far, much of what scholarship says about the Far Right in the 1960s is validated through my findings, but my analysis permits me to not only describe who constitutes far-right sympathizers, but to also examine the extent to which anxiety toward social change might be associated with movement sympathy. Clearly, far-right sympathizers are overwhelmingly Republican and believed that the government was too powerful. Yet, anxiety toward social change embodied by the JBS and its conspiracy is also significantly associated with far-right sympathy. In fact, the 44-point gap separating anxious far-right sympathizers from those less anxious dwarfs group differences based on anti-Communism, racial intolerance, political trust, political knowledge and ideology.

My results suggest that an explanation for far-right sympathy is complex and

¹⁷ The bivariate results regarding attitudes toward Communism and racial intolerance may also be a product of scaling. Although few respondents strongly supported racism or Communism, when either racism or Communism are scaled such that those who responded 80 degrees or warmer are considered supporters, the relationship between racism or Communism and attitudes toward JBS is even more pronounced.

multi-faceted. I find that a number of factors, specifically racism, attitudes toward Communism and the size of government as well as partisan identity are all related to far-right sympathy. However, I also find that an individual's feelings toward the John Birch Society, a physical manifestation of anxiety toward social change and conspiracy, are undeniably part of the story. As my analysis stands, my results suggest that anxiety toward social change is one of many factors associated with far-right sympathy in some capacity. However, it may be the case that anxiety toward social change (JBS) really is nothing more than conservative ideology or partisan identity.

In light of the existing limitation, the final step of my analysis is to examine the relationship between the factors I have identified as possible explanations for far-right sympathy in a multivariate setting.¹⁸ If I am correct, then anxiety toward social change and conspiracy will remain significantly associated with far-right sympathy even after taking into account the power of other possible explanations. In other words, anxiety toward social change will predict far-right sympathy above and beyond other alternative explanations, such as racism, attitudes towards Communism, ideology and partisanship. The final section of this chapter presents my multivariate results.

Anxiety toward Social Change or Something Else?

To this point, I have found that many different factors are significantly associated with far-right sympathy in 1964. Still, a more rigorous analysis of all of the various

¹⁸ Multivariate regression modeling allows for an assessment of the relationship between an independent and dependent variable while also holding other independent variables constant at their mean. For an introductory guide to multivariate regression and a brief introduction to the methods prominent in social science research, see Paul D. Allison's (1999) book, *Multiple Regression: A Primer*. I use a logistical regression model to estimate the association between a vote for Goldwater in 1964 and all of the other factors discussed in the chapter.

explanations for far-right sympathy can help further an understanding of what truly drives reactionary conservatism. As mentioned, scholarship relies upon a number of explanations to explain attachment to the Far Right in the 1960s. For instance, if far-right sympathy is really nothing more than adherence to a belief in small government, then accounting for a person's belief in small government might also account for the relationship between anxiety toward social change and far-right sympathy. The same will be true if other explanations such as racism, attitudes toward Communism, politics or sociodemographics are really to blame for far-right sympathy. In other words, once one or all of these other explanations is taken into account, anxiety toward social change – attitudes toward the JBS – might fail to predict sympathy for the Far Right in 1964. A more rigorous test allows for the isolation of the association, if any, between anxiety toward social change and far-right sympathy.

Table 2.2 presents my regression results.¹⁹ Accordingly, anxiety toward social change remains significantly associated with far-right sympathy after controlling for alternative explanations. I also find that other explanations are significantly associated with far-right sympathy as well, suggesting that sympathy for the Far Right is a complex attachment. For example, racism and attitudes toward Communism are also significantly associated with far-right sympathy. Furthermore, politics and sociodemographics are also critical. Political trust, attitudes toward limited government, partisan identity and ideology are crucial to our understanding of far-right sympathy. Similarly, whether or not a respondent lived in the South, their education, and race are all associated with far-right sympathy.

¹⁹ For full results from my regression analysis, see Table A2.1 in the Chapter 2 Results in the dissertation Appendix.

Although the regression results are useful for identifying significant relationships, the regression table itself is less useful when further interpreting my results.²⁰ Thus, for ease of interpretation I turn to changes in the predicted probabilities of the most theoretically relevant explanations for far-right sympathy. Figure 2.2 displays these results by presenting the change in the predicted probability of sympathizing with the Far Right as values of each predictor move from the lowest to the highest point. After accounting for several alternative explanations (displayed in Table A2.1 in the Appendix), anxiety toward social change, measured as attitudes toward the JBS, increases the likelihood of sympathizing with the Far Right by 33 percent.

²⁰ The results of a logistical regression model are difficult to interpret just by examining the strength and direction of the coefficients because the outcome variables are only measured from zero to one. The limited scales of the outcome variables make comparisons across coefficients far less useful. Instead, I use predicted probabilities to examine the power of different predictors when an outcome variable is set to a value of either zero or one. For more, see David Hosmer (2000) et al., *Applied Logistic Regression*.


Table 2.2. Predicting A Vote for Goldwater in 1964

	Goldwater Vote in 1964
Anxiety and Far Right Conspiracy (JBS)	0.02* (0.005)
Racism (KKK)	0.01* (0.006)
Pro-Communism	-0.02* (0.008)
Political Trust	-1.55* (0.499)
Political Knowledge	0.57 (0.466)
Limited Govt.	1.00* (0.249)
Republican	3.23* (0.329)
Independent/other	1.79* (0.340)
Ideology (Conservative)	1.17* (0.341)
Constant	-7.60* (1.276)
Observations	764
% Pred. Correctly	86%

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; logistical regression model; model also controls for married, education, age, home owner, female, white, income, church attendance and living in the South;
* $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

This substantial change associated with anxiety toward social change is even more telling when we consider the changes in predicted probability assigned to other explanatory variables. As shown in Figure 2.2, only Republican Party identity predicts a greater change than anxiety toward social change in the probability of sympathizing with

the Far Right with a 52 percent increase. Other common explanations for far-right sympathy, such as racism, attitudes toward Communism, political trust and attitudes toward the size of government fail to predict an increase in the likelihood of sympathizing with the Far Right that exceeds 26 percent.



Still, although other predictors are less powerful, I can report that various factors significantly inform our understanding of far-right sympathy. For example, Figure 2.2 illustrates that racism increases the likelihood that an individual sympathized with the Far Right by 21 percent, and pro-Communist attitudes decreased the likelihood by 11 percent. Furthermore, trust in government decreases the likelihood that an individual sympathized with the Far Right by 18 percent while holding beliefs in support of small government increases the likelihood by 11 percent. Undoubtedly, the explanation behind far-right sympathy in 1964 is multifaceted and complex, but it also remains clear that anxiety toward social change is central to understanding reactionary conservatism.

The fact that anxiety toward social change remains a powerful predictor of far-

right sympathy even after accounting for a multitude of alternative explanations provides strong support for my central theoretical claim: reactionary conservatives are anxious of a changing world that challenges their place in American society. Put another way, there is something unique about Americans who expressed warm attitudes toward the John Birch Society and its conspiratorial view of the world. I have argued that the JBS represents something more than another wing of the mainstream conservative movement in America – it represents a movement determined to resist the social change of the 1960s - and my results suggest that there is strong evidence for my claim.

Nonetheless, my results suggest that we must also consider other, more conventional explanations for far-right sympathy. A preference for small government also significantly predicts far-right sympathy, along with Republican partisan loyalty and conservative ideology. My findings do in fact substantiate claims that the Far Right in the 1960s contained elements of traditional conservatism; however, I also find that elements of intolerance are part of the story. In sum, my findings echo other scholars who claim that the 1960s movement is far to the right of mainstream conservatism as both racism and anti-Communism drive far-right sympathy in 1964. Yet, I also find that anxiety toward social change significantly predicts far-right sympathy above and beyond other explanations.

My findings add to a broader understanding of right wing social movements and the Far Right. No other work on the 1960s evaluates the power of multiple alternative explanations. In doing so, I show that anxiety toward social change is one important factor driving far-right sympathy, along with conservative ideology, Republican partisan attachment and intolerance. I have advanced our understanding of the 1960s Far Right

movement by highlighting the value of describing the movement as multidimensional, where anxiety toward social change is one of many different elements driving sympathy, albeit a powerful one.

Furthermore, my examination is the first rigorous test exploring the sources of far-right sympathy in a political context void of President Obama. Although President Obama represents a monumental first in America as its first African American president, the 1960s offers an opportunity to evaluate the role of social change at a time when civil rights concerns swept across America. Examining the Far Right as a reaction to a progressive movement encompassing day-to-day threats to privilege and prestige in America at both the micro-level (i.e. sit-ins, boycotts, etc.) and the macro-level (i.e. the Voting Rights Act and Civil Rights Act) allows the conversation surrounding reactionary conservatism to extend beyond President Obama and his detractors.

In other words, although scholars suggest the Tea Party is a modern day manifestation of earlier far-right movements, analyses on the Tea Party and President Obama fail to offer evidence that this is actually the case. By going back in time, I have provided evidence that verifies claims suggesting we must situate reactionary conservatism in a theoretical framework that looks beyond the election of President Obama. My analysis suggests that we should consider President Obama's symbolic victory alongside other moments in American history when evaluating the threat he represents to the Far Right.

The 1960s: A Time of Too Much Social Change?

In this chapter, I moved beyond my analysis of elite Far Right content and examined the factors that motivated many individuals to sympathize with the Far Right movement in the 1960s. I found that people sympathized with the Far Right for many different reasons, including racism, anti-Communism, partisanship and ideology. Yet, as I suspected, I also found that the anxiety toward social change that overwhelmed the far-right periodical *American Opinion* was also central to understanding mass sympathy for the movement. I argue far-right sympathizers' concerns with the Civil Rights movement and the Cold War leads them to believe that agents of social change are conspiring against America in an attempt to undermine their social prestige. Moreover, I found that anxiety toward social change remains a powerful explanation of far-right sympathy even after accounting for many different alternative explanations.

My findings also have broader implications for the study of Far Right movements in general. Much of the work on the Tea Party portrays a movement that is part of a larger historical timeline of Far Right movements reacting to momentous social change. However, although scholarship on the Tea Party may convincingly show that animosity toward President Obama is central to understanding movement sympathy, these examinations are forced to assume that past movements are reacting to uncomfortable changes in ways similar to how the Tea Party is reacting to the election of President Obama. In other words, it may be the case that Obama's election is a unique phenomenon that only explains the Tea Party, and past movements are really motivated by factors other than anxiety toward social change. However, at the very least, my findings suggest that the Far Right movement of the 1960s is also reacting to social change unique to the

historical moment.

In closing, two important claims that drive the remaining chapters of the dissertation merit noting. First, through my content analysis I suggested that attitudes toward the John Birch Society could serve as a reasonable proxy for understanding an individual's anxiety toward social change and their propensity to accept (even tacitly) the conspiracy theories that follow. Second, I also highlight the use of Barry Goldwater's Presidential bid as a measure of reactionary conservatism. Although imperfect, I have shown that a substantial number of individuals who supported the JBS were also Goldwater voters, and that relationship remained significant even after accounting for other theoretically important factors.

From here, the remainder of the dissertation examines the consequences of reactionary conservatism. Furthermore, I build on scholarship examining the Tea Party and posit that reactionary conservatism should be considered a predisposition that informs how individuals view and act in the world.²¹ Thus, the final chapter of the dissertation further advances this claim and offers the first analysis that tests the power of reactionary conservatism over time. Understanding both the consequences of reactionary conservatism and its enduring influence is essential to grasping the full power of not only the 1960s Far Right, but Far Right movements throughout time.

²¹ Namely, the work of Parker and Barreto (2013) suggests that reactionary conservatism is a predisposed worldview that guides an individual's social learning since its inception during their early childhood (pgs. 100-101).

Chapter 3

A SEAT AT THE TABLE: THE FAR RIGHT AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

“In a political system where nearly every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials, and other resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs?”¹

- *Robert A. Dahl*

In a representative democracy, the elected representatives are supposed to be a reflection of the policy preferences and opinions of the public. The public, however, is often divided into those who are informed and politically active, and those who are uninformed and disconnected from the political process. Scholarship suggests that public preferences influence policy decisions and policy outcomes, but the “public” is often defined as the segments of the America that turnout to vote at the highest rate and voice their policy preferences in ways such as campaigning and writing letters to their representatives (Wlezien, 1995).² Scholarship on government responsiveness goes on to suggest that representatives are most receptive to those who are voicing their political preferences the loudest and who are also highly mobilized (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). In other words, representatives pay attention to the issue stances of politically active constituents because of their power to influence elections.

We must look no farther than the Tea Party movement to see representatives, especially at the state and local level, catering to the political demands and preferences of

¹ The quotation is found on page 1 of Robert A. Dahl’s (1961) book, *Who Governs*.

² Through his “thermostatic model” of American public preferences, Christopher Wlezien (1995) suggests that the public behaves like a thermostat, such that when the actual temperature a public assigns to a policy differs from the policy temperature preferred by a political representative, the public would send a signal to the representative to adjust the policy accordingly.

a group that is highly politically engaged.³ Scholarship on the Tea Party shows that movement sympathizers are more attentive of and engaged in politics than other Americans (Parker & Barreto, 2013). Moreover, their engagement led to substantive results. In the 2010-midterm elections, 10 of 16 Tea Party-endorsed candidates won statewide elections, and 63 percent won in the U.S. House. Although 2012 saw less success for Tea Party candidates in the U.S. Senate, they fared even better in the House that year, with Tea Party-endorsed representatives winning over 80 percent of the time.

Clearly, state representatives who champion the Tea Party platform are rewarded, especially in elections with homogeneous districts where the Tea Party is able to drown out other political voices.⁴ However, is the engagement of the Tea Party a unique phenomenon, or is their engagement representative of reactionary conservatives in the past? Considering the 1960s, the nomination of Barry Goldwater stands out as a historical win for the Far Right. Yet, little scholarship examines whether or not far-right sympathizers in the 1960s were politically engaged at higher levels than other segments of America, leaving room to speculate about the influence of the Far Right's political voice.⁵

In this chapter, I examine the political engagement of Far Right sympathizers in the early 1960s, a group that catapulted to the national political stage. Previously, I examined many different factors that were associated with sympathy for the Far Right in 1964. I found that ideology, partisan identity, attitudes toward limiting government, anti-

³ In chapter 5 of their book, *Change they Can't Believe In*, Parker and Barreto (2013) find that Tea Party sympathizers are more likely to not only vote, but also to be interested in politics in 2010.

⁴ For a full report on the electoral success of Tea Party-endorsed candidates, see D. Burghart (2012), "Tea Party Endorsed Candidates and Election 2012."

⁵ Although the scholarship on the political engagement of the Far Right of the 1960s is limited, Parker and Barreto (2013) overstate the lack of scholarship that "empirically scrutinizes" the John Birch Society (JBS) (pg. 219). My examination highlights the work on the political engagement of the JBS, and then explains the limitations of these studies in detail prior to offering my own analysis.

Communism and racism were all important in understanding why Americans may sympathize with the Far Right, confirming what other scholars have suggested. Most importantly, my chief claim was also confirmed: far-right sympathy in 1964 is significantly associated with anxiety toward social change. Recall that the 1960s saw the Civil Rights movement, a perceived threat to the status quo. In other words, anxiety toward social change remains a powerful explanation of far-right sympathy even after accounting for important political and sociodemographic factors.

My earlier findings also suggest that there is something unique about individuals that sympathized with the Far Right; reactionary conservatism goes beyond traditionally conservative political views, overt racism and anti-Communism. My evidence suggests that individuals sympathize with the Far Right because they are confronted with a world that is undergoing great change, and as their anxiety grows, so too does their attachment to a movement centered on resistance to perceived threats to the status quo and their place in society. Having identified the mechanisms that drive far-right sympathy, the remaining chapters explore the political consequences of sympathy for the Far Right. As a reminder, I would like to reemphasize that far-right sympathy is a stand-in for reactionary conservatism, and support for Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential election serves as my proxy.

Thus far, I have identified the Far Right in the 1960s as a group highly dissatisfied with changes taking place in America and abroad. Their dissatisfaction was with both Democrats and Republicans, and accusations of treason and subversion reached all corners of the country. Americans have the power to replace political authorities if they feel that their interests are not accurately represented, as we recently witnessed with the

2010 midterm election of over 85 Tea Party-backed state representatives.⁶ Furthermore, other types of political action can have a major influence on America, such as public policy and political agenda setting. For example, if a significant number of individuals are working for or donating to a political campaign, they may influence politics without having to cast a single vote.

Accounts of the Far Right in the 1960s suggest that the movement was politically engaged, with the Republican Presidential nomination of Barry Goldwater serving as the primary example.⁷ In addition, although Republican gains across the country were small, the Republican Party rode Goldwater to substantial statewide and local political victories in the South. The “Goldwater Republican” wins in the South were often the first Republicans elected in Southern states since Reconstruction, and represented the realignment of Southern Democrats to the Republican Party.⁸ The scholarship on Far Right political action fits within a larger discussion surrounding social movements and political participation. Social movements have been tied to political participation throughout American history, as movement leaders often pledge to elect key allies of the movement (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2002). Accounts of the 1960s describe Far Right movement members as “by far the most active and engaged segment of the electorate,” placing the Far Right squarely in the social movement

⁶ Parker and Barreto (2013) detail the gains made by the Republican Party in the 2010 midterms, often with the backing of Tea Party constituents that was a relatively small section of the overall voting public. They note the successes of Tea Party candidates in Florida, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, all states with no more than 12,000 self-identified Tea Party members. Yet, as sympathy for the Tea Party spread beyond the immediate membership, the Tea Party movement garnered enough support to witness real political results.

⁷ Barry Goldwater was perceived as ultra-conservative and the candidate of the Far Right. I detail these claims later in the chapter. However, much has been written about Goldwater and his ties to the Far Right; specifically, see the work of McEvoy (1972) and Perlstein (2001).

⁸ Goldwater Republicans won seats in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi and South Carolina. See, *The National Election of 1964* (Cummings, 1966), for a detailed examination of the 1964 election.

literature.⁹ To the point, scholarship explains that early Goldwater supporters were in actuality more concerned and interested in the 1964 campaign, and wrote more letters to elites and the media than any other segment of the electorate.¹⁰

Although the literature on the political engagement of the Far Right in the 1960s seemingly represents a consensus – the Far Right was very active – the examinations I have alluded to are limited in at least two ways. First, aside from the select pieces of scholarship I have specifically referenced, a preponderance of the work on the Far Right in the 1960s relies upon personal and historical narratives and anecdotal accounts of Far Right political activity. The media and scholarly attention devoted to the most active segments of the Far Right movement behind Goldwater seemed “to be entirely out of proportion to the actual percentage of the electorate that supported the Republican candidate” (McEvoy, 1969, pg. 259). Second, the anecdotal examples and research on the Far Right focuses on either the members of individual far-right organizations, such as the John Birch Society, or individuals considered early Goldwater supporters, who supported Goldwater prior to him securing the Republican presidential nomination. Although their findings suggest important differences between the Far Right and other Americans, the limited scope of these analyses may underestimate the implications of sympathy for a Far Right movement that garnered support from a broader segment of America.

I build upon the aforementioned research by first moving beyond both individuals who were identified as members of far-right organizations and those considered early

⁹ Quote is from page 259 of James McEvoy’s (1969) piece, “Conservatism or Extremism: Goldwater Supporters in the 1964 Presidential Election.”

¹⁰ See P.E. Converse, A.R. Clausen and W.E. Miller (1965), “Electoral Myth and Reality: The Election of 1964.” McEvoy (1969) also points out that Converse et al’s findings represent “absolute numbers” of letters written and sent. Also see, J. McEvoy (1971), *Radicals or Conservatives? The Contemporary American Right*.

Goldwater supporters by identifying individuals who supported Goldwater for President in 1964 as sympathizers with the broader Far Right movement in 1964. As my analysis in Chapter 2 makes clear, individuals who voted for Goldwater in 1964 did so because they were anxious about the ways America was changing, and sympathized with a conspiratorial narrative designed to undermine agents and movements of social change, such as African American leaders and the Civil Rights movement. Moreover, my analysis confirmed that individuals who voted for Goldwater were influenced by their anxiety toward change even after accounting for other explanations, and identified them as reactionary conservatives.

My present analysis contributes to our understanding of far-right political engagement because I aim to show that the political engagement of movement sympathizers, not just movement members and activists, differs from the rest of America. In sum, I posit that individuals who sympathized with the 1960s far-right movement – or voted for Barry Goldwater for President in 1964 – were more politically engaged than other Americans.

If examinations of the Far Right are limited to individuals directly involved in the movement at its earliest stages, the real power of the movement is unobserved. The limited numbers of individuals identifiable under such constraints will always minimize the implications of this research. A broader examination of far-right sympathy forces consideration of the consequences of Far Right movements on normative questions of political equality, democracy and majority rule.¹¹ It may be the case that far-right

¹¹ In *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, R.A. Dahl (1956) explains that social prerequisites are far more important to the maintenance of democracy than institutional restraints. The tension between political equality and majority rule cannot be controlled through political institutions, as the majority will always be able to act. Therefore, we must focus on neglected social checks and balances, which are ultimately more

sympathizers are more like the rest of America than those who strongly attach to the movement. However, if my argument stands and far-right sympathizers are more likely to participate in politics than individuals with no attachment to the movement, then the movement must be considered much more powerful than originally thought. In this case, the Far Right represents a political movement powerful enough to mobilize far more of the American electorate than only activists.

In addition to examining far-right sympathy through a broader lens, I also utilize multivariate regression analysis so that I can account for factors that may explain political engagement instead of reactionary conservatism. The foundational works *Who Votes?* (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980) and *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960) suggests that a multitude of political and socioeconomic factors must be considered when examining voting behavior and political participation. Yet, few studies of the 1960s Far Right rely upon survey data, and those that do fall to the same constraints I have mentioned: they fail to examine far-right sympathy and/or fail to use multivariate regression techniques.

For example, James McEvoy provides the most extensive empirical examination of the Far Right in the 1960s, concluding that the Far Right participated in politics at higher rates than other Americans (McEvoy, 1969). Still, McEvoy's analysis only identifies early-Goldwater supporters as the Far Right and fails to present results beyond bivariate cross tabulations. Furthermore, McEvoy even finds differences between all Americans that supported Goldwater and those who did not, yet he still chooses to focus

important than institutional ones. Dahl's conclusions speak to the importance of my examination of far-right sympathizers as the Far Right represents a socially prestigious and privileged segment of society determined to halt social change, often by suppressing the rights and political voices of others.

his analysis on the differences between early and late Goldwater supporters, limiting the consequences of his results to roughly 6 percent of his total sample.¹²

Although limited, McEvoy's examination is the most comprehensive analysis of Far Right political action that relies upon empirical analysis. For example, Wolfinger et al (1969) and Koeppen (1969) collected personal interviews and mail questionnaires in their analysis of political efficacy and campaign activity, but they again limit themselves to the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade primary located in San Francisco Bay region as a representative of the Far Right. Similarly, Fred Grupp, Jr. (1969) examines the association between the John Birch Society and political engagement using the 1964 National Election Study, notwithstanding his acknowledgement that less than 3 percent of the national sample identified themselves as members of the organization.¹³

Most recently, examinations of the Far Right in the 21st century find that even after accounting for other factors, far-right sympathizers are more likely to participate in politics.¹⁴ However, my analysis of Far Right political engagement answers questions that recent research is unable to tackle due to the unique historical circumstances that surround the Tea Party movement. Put another way, is their analysis simply a product of the time and historical context? The nomination and subsequent election of President Barack Obama, the nation's first non-white president, are unique political events central to their analysis. Thus the question remains as to whether the political engagement of Tea Party sympathizers is exclusive to a movement galvanized by President Obama's

¹² McEvoy (1969) identifies 105 early-Goldwater supporters of 1,547 total respondents, making his analysis of the Far Right encompass only 6.8 percent of his entire sample. The same analysis appears in his 1971 book, *Radicals or Conservatives? The Contemporary American Right*.

¹³ Grupp (1969) explains this limitation in the third footnote on page 84 of his analysis.

¹⁴ Most notably Parker and Barreto's (2013) work on the Tea Party.

election, or if the Far Right's anxiety toward social change is enough to mobilize movement sympathizers in very different historical and political contexts.

Furthermore, even the broadest analyses of far-right sympathy measures sympathy as "support" for a Tea Party movement that is a collection of at least ten smaller factions (Burghart, 2014a).¹⁵ Unlike the 1960s movement, the Tea Party is without a presidential candidate, or any other national political figure, and examinations of the Tea Party are forced to rely on a survey question that asks whether or not an individual "supports" the Tea Party movement to measure far-right sympathy.¹⁶ For example, without a national figure to rally behind, Parker and Barreto's (2013) analysis is forced to assume that Tea Party factions are comparable, such that a respondent who supports the Tea Party movement in Arizona is supporting the same Tea Party movement in North Carolina, and other parts of the country.¹⁷

My research benefits from the presence of Barry Goldwater as a national figure the Far Right rallied behind. Goldwater was able to sympathize with the Far Right throughout his political campaign without having to also publicly embrace the extremism and paranoia associated with some of the movement's factions. In sum, Goldwater's ascension to the nation stage as the Republican presidential candidate provides a clear measure of sympathy for the Far Right movement of the 1960s and all of its parts.

¹⁵ Although many different studies rely upon survey responses that require an individual to relay their "support" for the Tea Party, I am directly referring to the work of Parker and Barreto (2013).

¹⁶ Issues of ambiguity in survey measures are well documented, and Parker and Barreto's (2013) operationalization of Tea Party sympathy as those who "support" the Tea Party is arguably ambiguous. For more on ambiguity and survey measurement, see R. Tourangeau, L.J Rips and K.A. Rasinki (2000), *The Psychology of Survey Response*. For more on the challenges of measuring Tea Party sympathy as "support" for the movement, see D. Burghart (2014b), "Special Report: The Status of Tea Party – Part Two,"

¹⁷ Although Parker and Barreto (2013) attempt to account for differences in Tea Party sympathy among the various states in their sample through hierarchical modeling techniques, they fail to discuss how their results may change at the state or local level, and how Tea Party sympathizers in states excluded from their sample may also be similar and/or different, especially when considering political participation. For more on the regional differences in Tea Party support and activity, see D. Burghart (2014b), "Special Report: The Status of Tea Party – Part Two, which highlights the South as a region of special importance.

In the remainder of this chapter I explore the consequences of far-right sympathy, or reactionary conservatism, on political engagement. I first discuss the relationship between social movements and political engagement, and understand the political engagement of the Far Right of the 1960s as a product of anxiety toward social change. I then present my results. If far-right sympathizers are more politically engaged than other Americans, it adds significance to the Far Right movement, and to the political attitudes of movement sympathizers because of the political voice that accompanies an expanded understanding of the movement's influence.

On the other hand, although the Far Right undoubtedly influenced national politics in the 1960s with the nomination of Goldwater to the Republican ticket, the political presence of the movement wasn't enough to land Goldwater the White House. This alone leads many to discount the movement's efforts as an unsustainable grass-roots movement. However, if far-right sympathizers are more politically engaged beyond Goldwater's nomination, and in modes of participation that require more time and resources than voting, it is unfair to characterize the political influence of the Far Right by Goldwater's monumental loss. Moreover, an examination of the political attitudes and policy positions of far-right sympathizers becomes even more important if I find that sympathizers may have a disproportionately large influence in political activities essential to agenda setting, such as campaigning, donating money and writing letters to political representatives. Following my results and analysis, I offer a few concluding thoughts.

Social Movements, Political Mobilization and the Far Right

The scholarship on social movements and political mobilization reflects the two as intrinsically connected. Social movement participation is a type of political participation, but it is often examined separate from other forms of political participation, such as voting, writing to a political representative, or donating to a political campaign (Parker & Barreto, 2013). In contrast, social movement activity is most associated with protest, relying on the theoretical approach of resource mobilization. For a long time, the questions surrounding social movements and political mobilization were centered on the resources available to the movement, the organization of the movement and the role of the state and political institutions in facilitating the movement. Only recently has scholarship begun to focus on the deprivation and grievances of movement actors, factors central to understanding the Far Right (Mueller, 1992).

The initial move away from deprivation and grievances was in part due to an assumption that the costs and benefits of participating in a movement were more important than the deprivation and grievances of movement members, especially when the scholarship on social movements already worked from an assumption of deprivation. Yet, as research on social movements developed, the absence of deprivation and grievances in the resource mobilization framework became problematic (Mueller, 1992, pg. 5). For example, the resource mobilization framework does little to explain the emergence of far-right social movements where the majority of its members are affluent, educated and often believe in the existing political institutions because they attribute much of their success to the current political structure.

It is only when we turn back to group perceptions of deprivation (or future deprivation) and grievances that we can understand the motivation driving Far Right movements. The perceived deprivation and grievances of the Far Right create conditions from which a group identity emerges strong enough to mobilize individuals to act, even when action would seem otherwise irrational (Schwartz & Paul, 1992). Moving beyond the resource mobilization model allows for our analysis of social movements to center on ideas and beliefs, two concepts instrumental in understanding the association between Far Right movements and political participation. The Far Right in the 1960s had more than enough reasons to feel frustrated with American politics and the progressive social policy agenda marked by the Civil Rights Act and the looming Voting Rights Act. Certain Americans felt anxious about the ways their country was changing, and feared that they would lose possession of a country and way of life that they loved. The American political structure was at a point of change, and the grievances among those anxious of change were growing, creating an opportunity for the Far Right to rally support.¹⁸

Although the opportunity might exist to mobilize anxious individuals who feel alienated from the political system, it is not always the case that alienated individuals become politically engaged. Actually, it is quite often the opposite and alienated individuals find themselves withdrawing from politics, overwhelmed by a sense of apathy (Riesman, 1954; Rosenberg, 1954; Citrin et al., 1975). Even when individuals are able to maintain a healthy level of efficacy after feeling alienated, research suggests that protest is the most common retaliatory activity (Citrin, 1977; McDill & Ridley, 1962; Mangum,

¹⁸ Parker and Barreto (2013) use the “opportunity structure model” to explain how movement leaders were able to successfully rally individuals. Leaders, according to the model, are most successful “at key-intervals during which the political system is most open to change” (pg. 221). Also see Doug McAdam’s (1996) edited volume entitled, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*.

2003).¹⁹ As a result, the question remains of why individuals alienated from politics would choose to participate in formal political activities, let alone at rates higher than other Americans.

On the one hand, it is easy to describe the Far Right of the 1960s as politically alienated. The push for Goldwater for president was an indictment of the growing Democrat and Republican consensus surrounding civil rights and containment (Lowndes, 2008). However, instead of removing oneself from politics, Americans who felt politically disaffected (re)engaged the political process. One way to make sense of this reality is to disentangle the concepts of political alienation and political trust. Political alienation is directed at the political system as a whole, and is an indictment of the long-standing political institutions that represent American government. On the other hand, political trust (or mistrust) is directed at the specific political authorities or institutions, and the political actors that represent political institutions at a specific time (Easton, 1975; Muller et al., 1982; Schwartz, 1973).²⁰ Distinct from political alienation, political trust is unstable over time because the specific actors and authorities that are the object of distrust are continuously changing.

In addition, work by Fredric Templeton (1966) argues that alienated individuals are disconnected from networks engaged in politics. But, as Templeton acknowledges,

¹⁹ Efficacy is separated into both internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy describes the belief that one can understand, and therefore participate in politics; external efficacy refers to the belief that one's participation in politics will actually effect real change. For more on internal and external efficacy, see R. G. Niemi, S. C. Craig and F. Mattei (1991), "Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study."

²⁰ Political support is divided into specific and diffuse support, where specific support refers to attitudes toward the perceived performance of current political authorities and diffuse support emphasizes what a political object or institution represents, and is less fixated on what it does. Political allegiance is considered diffuse support, as compared to the specific targets of political mistrust. Specifically, see the work of Easton (1975) and Miller (1974), as well "Trust in Government," a chapter in Citrin and Muste's (1999) anthology, *Measures of Political Attitudes*.

most of the research on alienation focuses on groups that are relatively deprived compared to other segments of society, and are less likely to be connected to networks of highly engaged individuals. That being said, the Far Right's success within the Republican Party and Republican primary in 1964 suggests that connections existed in order for the Far Right to remain politically engaged. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Far Right had given up on the American political system and become politically alienated due to their privileged status.

Lastly, Parker and Barreto (2013) offer one final mechanism that pushes the Far Right to engage politics instead of feel indifferent. They argue that far-right sympathizers engaged in politics to save their way of life, and participation becomes a way to resist political and social changes perceived as subversive and dangerous to America (pg. 224). If indeed the Far Right's dissatisfaction rests with the specific political authorities and institutions at the time, then political action may be way for the Far Right to unseat or resist what they perceived to be illegitimate political power. To this end, scholarship suggests that perceived illegitimacy is a force that can mobilize disaffected individuals (Lammers et al., 2008). If political participation becomes a symbolic action against a perceived illegitimate power, then a new sense of activism can mobilize an individual beyond any costs or material benefits that might be associated with political action (Citrin, 1977).

Scholarship suggests that the Far Right of the 1960s relied upon voter mobilization and political engagement in an attempt to affect the political process through formal means of action, and, for this reason, the Far Right movement of the 1960s is said

to represent the blueprint which right wing political movements have used to this day (Hixon, 1992). A glance at other far-right movements reinforces this claim.

In addition to staging large-scale protest events, the Tea Party movement also has “a long-term agenda that expressly deal[s] with voter mobilization” (Parker & Barreto, 2013, pg. 225). We look no further than the 2010 midterm elections to find the mass political participation of the Tea Party in full swing. Moreover, historical examples of other Far Right movements offer points of comparison. The second-era Ku Klux Klan was instrumental in the election of state representatives in Georgia, Oregon and Maine, as well the election of at least one United States senator (Parker & Barreto, 2013; McVeigh, 2009). Going back even further, the Know Nothing Party of the 1850s challenged the Democrats on the national political stage and controlled state governments in Philadelphia and Massachusetts (Anbinder, 1994). If nothing else, history suggests that far-right social movements can successfully influence politics through the mobilization of individuals who we might otherwise characterize as politically disaffected.

In sum, I am arguing that the political mobilization of far-right sympathizers in the 1960s is motivated by reactionary conservatism. As I argued in Chapter 2, far-right sympathy is motivated by an anxiety toward change that transcends ideology and partisan identity. Thus, the following analysis extends my argument to political engagement, and, if I am correct, far-right sympathizers will be mobilized by the anxiety they feel toward illegitimate political authorities and subversives destroying their way of life. In other words, the changes in America in the 1960s prompted reactionary conservatives to take action and engage politics.

Conventional Wisdom Behind Why Americans Participate in Politics

A great deal of scholarship examines the mechanisms that might drive an individual to participate in politics. In *The American Voter*, Angus Campbell and his co-authors (1960) identify many different sociodemographic characteristics that are important in understanding why we might expect someone to participate in politics. They identify age, class and political knowledge as important predictors of political engagement, focusing specifically on voting behavior. In *The American Voter*, the authors argued that older, educated individuals with higher incomes participated in politics at higher rates because they were invested in the political system.

Furthermore, in *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Anthony Downs (1957) also explains that the costs associated with voting, such as the time it takes to cast a ballot and become an informed voter, also matter.²¹ Downs' analysis of voting behavior also emphasizes the sociodemographics highlighted by Angus Campbell and his co-authors as the costs to vote are less for individuals who are already educated or have the extra time to participate in politics. Similarly, a preexisting knowledge about politics also significantly lowers the information costs associated with voting. Having identified far-right sympathizers as older, educated and upper-middle class in the previous chapter, we should expect that they are more likely to participate in politics because of their sociodemographics.

In addition, scholarship on political engagement identifies factors that must be considered aside from sociodemographics, such as perceived political threats and social

²¹ Downs (1957) argues that the costs outweigh the actual benefit of voting, and it is irrational to vote all. Downs' argument, though, has been challenged by a number of scholars who suggest that voting is not a rational act at all, and other, social-psychological factors must be accounted for in examinations of voting behavior. For a survey of the research on rational theories of voter turnout, see B. Geys (2006), "'Rational' Theories of Voter Turnout: A Review."

capital. Research suggests that political discrimination, or threats to political freedom, can mobilize (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1992; Tate, 1993). Although accounts of political threat most often describe the mobilization of minority groups in the face of discrimination, the Far Right in the 1960s may fit a similar model because both the Civil Rights movements and Communism were perceived as political threats; racism specifically directed at the Civil Rights movement, or anti-Communism amidst the Cold War could push far-right sympathizers into action. Furthermore, institutions, such as the church, can help individuals overcome the costs associated with participating in politics, and can even provide the political networks needed to foster civic engagement (Peterson, 1992; Smidt et al., 2003).

After considering the scholarship examining the sources of political engagement, we can conclude that we should expect far-right sympathizers to be active in politics. However, we do not know if they are participating because they are older, educated and have higher incomes, or because they are anxious about gathering changes in America. This paradox drives the rest of this chapter. I turn to the 1964 National Election Study to first examine whether or not far-right sympathizers were more engaged in politics than other Americans, and then to further examine the relationship between far-right sympathy and political engagement while also accounting for the influence of other important factors, such as age, class and political interest.

Understanding the political engagement of the Far Right is essential to identifying the importance of far-right attitudes that diverge from mainstream America. Far-right sympathizers may be participating in politics simply because they are older and more informed; the anxiety of the Far Right may stop at their political rhetoric and their

endorsement of Barry Goldwater. However, if I am correct, they are participating in politics as a way to resist new and uncomfortable social change.

Political Engagement and the Far Right in 1964

Drawing from a number of survey questions asking respondents about many different forms of political engagement, my analysis focuses on: political interest, attendance at political meetings, involvement in political campaigns, monetary political donations, distribution of campaign literature and writing to a political official. My analysis focuses on these non-electoral, yet formal forms of political participation for two reasons. First, my measure of far-right sympathy involves formal electoral participation, so I have already identified far-right sympathizers as voters. Furthermore, the costs associated with other forms of formal political participation, such as attending a meeting or writing a letter to a representative, arguably have higher costs associated with them because individuals must do more than cast a ballot.

Second, I focus on formal forms of political action because of the profound influence a mobilized segment of the electorate can have on the political agenda and policy preferences of political representatives and political parties. As I have already mentioned, an active electorate demands the attention of representatives who must worry about election and re-election (Wlezien, 1995). Additionally, scholarship suggests that formal political participation, when compared to non-formal acts such as protest, lead to the incorporation and even institutionalization of political interests (Browning, Marshall & Tabb, 1990). Although protest activity is important, especially for groups too small to substantially change elections, protests unaccompanied by formal political action all too

often result in very little lasting political power. On the contrary, the Far Right movement of the 1960s gained control of the Republican Party and forced a policy agenda focused on anti-Communism and limited government intervention (especially concerning civil rights) into mainstream conservative politics.²²

I commence my investigation by exploring the relationship between far-right sympathy and political participation. After an initial look at political participation in 1964, I examine whether or not far-right sympathizers are more politically engaged than other Americans. I then limit my analysis to self-identified conservatives to assess whether or not far-right sympathizers out-perform other conservatives. Finally, I use multivariate regression analysis to examine the relationship between far-right sympathy and political engagement while also accounting for other explanations. It may be the case that far-right sympathizers are politically engaged because they are older or more knowledgeable about politics. However, if I am correct, far-right sympathizers are more likely to engage in politics because they see political action as a way to resist uncomfortable and threatening social change. The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses:

H3.1: Far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other Americans to both have interest in politics and participate in politics.

H3.2: Limiting my examination to self-identified conservatives, Far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other conservatives to both have interest in politics and participate in politics.

²² Browning, Marshall and Tabb (1990) suggest that formal political participation is instrumental for a group to become part of a coalition that can actually effect real political change. Although the authors focus on the incorporation of racial minority groups, their argument is still important when considering how other groups attempt to gain political power. For more, see Chapter 1, “Minority Mobilization in Ten Cities: Failures and Successes,” in *Racial Politics in American Cities*.


H3.3: After controlling for alternative explanations, Far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other Americans to both have interest in politics and participate in politics.

Are Far-Right Sympathizers Distinctly Engaged in Politics?

My analysis starts by assessing the political interest of far-right sympathizers. I then move to forms of political engagement that are more demanding and require an individual to actually act, such as attending a political meeting, working for a political campaign, donating to a political campaign, distributing campaign literature and writing to a public official.²³ If far-right sympathizers truly were anxious about the changes in their current political environment, then the political acts I have identified are ways in which sympathizers might express their opposition. However, if far-right sympathizers are not driven to action by their anxiety toward social change, then their level of political activity should be indifferent from other Americans.

²³ Knowing about and having interest in politics are considered less demanding precursors to other forms of political action. Therefore, understanding the political attention of far-right sympathizers is an important initial step in understanding the political engagement of the group. Parker and Barreto's (2013) analysis on the Tea Party follows a similar logic. Also see Sidney Verba, Kay L. Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady (1995), *Voice and Equality: Civic Volunteerism in American Politics*.

Figure 3.1 displays how politically engaged Americans were in 1964.²⁴



As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, aside from asserting an interest in politics, most Americans do not take the time to engage politics in more demanding ways. Less than 20 percent of Americans wrote to a political official or displayed campaign literature in 1964. Moreover, less than 10 percent of Americans donated to a campaign, worked for a campaign or attended a political meeting. The fact that so few Americans said that they participated in politics in the ways I have identified suggests that even a slight increase in action on the part of the Far Right might be enough to get the attention of a political representative or group. Also, the Far Right had a well-established reputation for engaging politics in ways that seem to be unlikely modes of action, at least for most Americans in 1964 (Converse et al., 1965; McEvoy, 1972).

²⁴ Limited engagement in acts beyond voting is still common in politics today. For comparison, Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) find that in 2004 only 7 percent of Americans attended a political meeting, 21 percent wore a campaign button, 3 percent worked for a campaign and 9 percent contributed to a campaign. Their results (from Table 5.1 on page 84) suggest that these political acts are still atypical of most Americans.

A closer look at the political interest and action of far-right sympathizers illustrates that they are significantly more engaged than other Americans. Figure 3.2 displays the political engagement of far-right sympathizers compared to the rest of America.




Figure 3.2 demonstrates that over ten percent more far-right sympathizers are very interested in politics. Following a similar pattern, when compared to other Americans, over ten percent more far-right sympathizers attended a political meeting and worked for a campaign. A gap of over 15 percentage points separates far-right sympathizers from other Americans when it comes to donating to a political campaign and writing to an official. Finally, over six percent more of far-right sympathizers displayed campaign literature in one way or another. Thus, even though it may seem Americans were less inclined to engage in more demanding political action, sympathizers with the Far Right in 1964 went above and beyond the rest of the country in terms of political engagement.

Lastly, Figure 3.3 presents the relationship between far-right sympathy and political engagement for only self-identified conservatives.²⁵ Although many different explanations may account for the heightened political engagement of the Far Right, limiting my analysis to self-identified conservatives helps to understand the role of ideology. It may be the case that conservatives were more politically engaged than other Americans in 1964, and the initial difference observed between far-right sympathizers and the rest of America is symptomatic of ideological differences. Yet, my results displayed in Figure 3.3 suggest that differences remain even when far-right sympathizers are compared to other self-identified conservatives. In other words, reactionary conservatives separate themselves from other self-identified conservatives when it comes to political engagement.

²⁵ Just as in Chapter 2, I needed to create a measure for conservatism since questions probing what we now consider standard measures of liberal versus conservative ideological stances did not yet exist. I looked to measures of objects that are symbolically conservative since conservative thinkers, such as John Kekes (1998), in his work *A Case for Conservatism*, suggest that conservatism is at once a moral and emotional bond between individuals that forms part of their identity (pg. 108). According to Kekes, in order to evaluate morality, conservatives form emotional attachment to objects that inform their moral sensibility. It is through their evaluation of certain objects in society that they can assess whether or not society is “morally healthy” (Kekes, 1998, pg. 107). Thus, I created an index of attitudinal measures for conservatives, farmers, the military, Southerners and big business to measure conservatism. This scale is explained in detail in Chapter 2 and in the Appendix to the dissertation.




Figure 3.3 demonstrates that self-identified conservatives were not necessarily any more active than everyone else. When compared to far-right sympathizers, over 10 percent less self-identified conservatives affirm a high level of political interest or participation in any of the demanding political acts. Strikingly, almost 30 percent of far-right sympathizers donated to a political campaign while less than 7 percent of self-identified conservatives did so, leaving a gap of 23 percentage points. Similarly, when it comes to having worked for a campaign, a gap of close to 14 percentage points separates reactionary conservatives from other conservatives. These results not only highlight the differences in political engagement between reactionary conservatives and other conservatives, but the results also support my earlier claim that reactionary conservatives are different from traditional, mainstream conservatives. While Figure 3.3 might provide reason for us to believe that conservative ideology is failing to drive the political engagement of far-right sympathizers, I have yet to account for other explanations that may still matter.

Far-Right Sympathy, Political Engagement and Alternative Explanations

Similar to my previous analysis, I need to move beyond the descriptive figures and examine the relationship between far-right sympathy and political engagement in 1964 while accounting for alternative explanations. I use multiple regression analysis to determine whether or not far-right sympathy is independently associated with higher levels of political engagement after taking into account other factors that may influence political engagement. Thus, my analysis examines the relationship between far-right sympathy and political engagement while also considering the effect of sociodemographic and resource-based factors, political and ideological factors, and factors that help identify perceived threats, such as racism and anti-Communism. I find that, even after accounting for other explanations, far-right sympathy is significantly associated with higher levels of political engagement. Table 3.1 presents my results.

Table 3.1. Predicting Political Engagement

	Attention to Politics [^]	Attend a Meeting	Campaign	Donate to Campaign	Display Campaign Literature	Write Official
Goldwater Vote in 1964	0.45* (0.199)	0.25 (0.313)	0.97* (0.407)	0.86* (0.294)	0.75* (0.256)	-0.24 (0.254)
Racism	-0.00 (0.004)	0.00 (0.006)	-0.01 (0.009)	0.01 (0.006)	0.00 (0.005)	0.00 (0.005)
Pro-Communism	-0.01* (0.004)	-0.00 (0.008)	-0.00 (0.010)	-0.01* (0.009)	0.00 (0.005)	-0.00 (0.006)
Political Trust	-0.01 (0.284)	-0.62 (0.460)	-0.80 (0.578)	0.39 (0.459)	-0.01 (0.359)	-0.25 (0.375)
Political Knowledge	0.77* (0.221)	0.89* (0.476)	-0.11 (0.555)	0.88* (0.476)	0.44 (0.304)	0.39 (0.343)
Limited Govt.	0.48* (0.168)	0.33 (0.273)	0.19 (0.353)	0.31 (0.261)	0.14 (0.215)	0.33 (0.216)
Republican	-0.26 (0.199)	0.15 (0.307)	0.28 (0.389)	0.41 (0.293)	-0.52* (0.258)	0.23 (0.253)
Independent	-0.35* (0.191)	-0.49 (0.361)	-0.89* (0.527)	-0.45 (0.343)	-0.64* (0.267)	0.36 (0.248)
Constant		-4.39* (0.689)	-4.06* (0.833)	-4.55* (0.713)	-1.63* (0.457)	-3.75* (0.553)
Cut1	-1.02* (0.364)					
Cut2	0.90* (0.363)					
Observations	878	881	881	879	881	893
% Predic. Correctly	52%	88%	93%	87%	76%	80%

Standard errors in parentheses; all models logistical regression unless otherwise notes; ^ ordered logistical regression; models also control for ideology, church attendance, marital status, gender, race, education, age, income, home ownership and living in the South; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed


Table 3.1 shows that sympathy for the Far Right goes beyond other factors to explain attention to politics, work for a political campaign, donating to a political campaign and displaying campaign literature. Although far-right sympathy fails to significantly predict attendance at a meeting or writing to an official in a multivariate setting, my results suggest that reactionary conservatives were engaging politics for reasons beyond the most widely accepted explanations. In other words, reactionary conservatives were driven to pay attention to politics, work for and donate to campaigns and display campaign literature as a way to resist changes perceived as threatening and

destructive. While interesting, the results in Table 3.1 are only useful in understanding the significance and the direction of the relationships presented.²⁶ I turn my attention to predictions of the probability of a politically engaged respondent to better understand the power of far-right sympathy.

Figure 3.4 displays changes in the probability of a politically engaged respondent. Specifically, Figure 3.4 presents the change in the predicted probability of having a politically engaged respondent as values of each predictor move from the lowest to the highest point. From the change in predicted probability, I conclude that far-right sympathy is a significant predictor of interest in politics, working for or donating to a campaign and displaying campaign literature. In sum, far-right sympathy is one of the most powerful predictors of political engagement.

²⁶ The results of a logistical regression model are difficult to interpret by only examining the strength and direction of the coefficients because the outcome variable is measured from zero to one. The limited scale of the outcome variable makes comparisons across coefficients less useful. Instead, I rely on changes in predicted probabilities to examine the estimated influence of various predictors when an outcome variable is set to a value of either zero or one. For more, see David Hosmer (2000) et al, *Applied Logistic Regression*.

Figure 3.4. Association between Voting for Goldwater in 1964 and Political Engagement



*Significant at $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

Figure 3.4 shows that far-right sympathizers are 11 percent more likely than other Americans to be very interested in politics and 5 percent more likely to have worked for a political campaign. Comparatively, a respondent who believes in limiting the federal government is 12 percent more likely to be very interested in politics and, when it comes to working for a political campaign, the power of an individual’s views on limited government is insignificant. Furthermore, far-right sympathy is the most powerful

predictor of donating to a political campaign and displaying campaign literature; when compared to other Americans, far-right sympathizers were 9 percent more likely to donate and 14 percent more likely display literature.

My findings also echo the scholarship on political engagement as other sociodemographic and political factors are significantly associated with political engagement, such as education, race and attitudes toward Communism. Individuals who sympathized with Communism in 1964 are significantly less interested in politics and less likely to donate than other Americans (24 percent and 7 percent less, respectively). On the other hand, educated individuals are significantly more likely to feel interested in politics, to attend a political meeting, to work for or donate to a campaign and to write to a political official. White individuals are also more politically engaged and more likely than non-whites to feel interested in politics, attend a political meeting, work for or donate to a campaign and distribute campaign literature. Additionally, as the literature also suggests, politically knowledgeable respondents are more likely than other Americans to feel interested in politics, or to have attended a political meeting or donated to a political campaign. However, even after accounting for all of the aforementioned factors, far-right sympathy still works above and beyond these other, accepted explanations to explain political engagement in 1964.

Far Right Sympathizers and the American Electorate

My findings suggest that although far-right sympathizers are unsatisfied with changes taking place in America and the progressive political agenda in the 1960s, sympathizers were engaging in politics as opposed to abstaining. Recent work on the Far

Right agrees with my findings. For example, work on the Tea Party movement by Parker and Barreto (2013) asserts that the enhanced political engagement of the Far Right indicates that anger is the most prevalent emotion amongst movement sympathizers. They draw from the scholarship of Richard Lazarus, who asserts that a disruption in a particular goal produces anger, especially when the goal is designed to enhance an individual's sense of self through the validation of their group identity (Lazarus, 1991). In other words, far-right sympathizers are angry – as opposed to scared – about the changes in America that threaten the social prestige of the group and its individual members alike.

Identifying far-right sympathizers as angry, as opposed to scared, is an important distinction for two reasons. First, fear is associated with physical threat and personal safety and subsequently leads to flight, which would suggest withdrawal from politics (Lazarus, 1991). Anger, on the other hand, especially combined with anxiety about a loss in social prestige, motivates far-right sympathizers to confront and challenge perceived threats by participating in politics at higher levels (Parker & Barreto, 2013; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2001).

Furthermore, the enhanced political engagement of the Far Right suggests that their anger is directed at specific political authorities and the current political leadership, and not the political institutions and governmental processes that constitute the American political system. Moreover, once I have accounted for other explanations, political trust fails to significantly predict political engagement in any capacity. From my results alone, it is hard to claim that Far-right sympathizers in 1964 are alienated from the American political system, and the influence of political trust is nonexistent. In fact, only education

and race are significantly associated with four different types of political engagement, the same number of acts that far-right sympathy predicts. However, far-right sympathy is capable of sustaining political engagement beyond the various costs required to participate in politics, such as education and knowledge of politics. This finding is consistent with scholarship that suggests group membership may help individuals overcome barriers to political participation.²⁷

Although far-right sympathizers are more likely than other Americans to pay attention to politics, work for or donate to a political campaign and display campaign literature, their attachment to the Far Right is not associated with attending a political meeting or writing to a campaign official. This finding flies in the face of scholarship on the Far Right of the 1960s, specifically work on the John Birch Society that details their constant political meetings and letter writing campaigns (Converse et al., 1965). Further analysis offers a few possible explanations for this discrepancy. To start, my analysis focuses on far-right sympathizers while the existing work on the participation of the Far Right in the 1960s focuses on the specific groups and organizations. Still, additional analysis confirms my results when sympathy for the John Birch Society is examined instead of far-right sympathy.²⁸

Another explanation for my non-findings that gains empirical traction is that the political meetings and letter writing campaigns were location specific, and my

²⁷ The work of both McCarthy and Zald (1978) and McAdam (1982) emphasizes a social movement's ability to mobilize resources, specifically claiming that cost-reducing mechanisms are essential to understanding collective behavior.

²⁸ Model specifications that examine the power of favorability toward the John Birch Society (JBS) in place of far-right sympathy, while also accounting for other factors, also fail to show a significant relationship between support for the JBS and attending a political meeting or writing to a representative. If anything, this non-finding suggests that my proxy for far-right sympathy (voting for Goldwater in 1964) is a close representation for the individual far-right groups and organizations in addition to sympathizers of the broader movement.

examination of far-right sympathy across America fails to capture these isolated acts. It could be that the excessive meetings and letter writing campaigns of the 1960s were specific to areas of the country that the Far Right deemed especially important. In this case, additional analysis suggests that far-right sympathy is associated with attending a political meeting and writing to a political official in 1964 when limiting the examination to either California or the South.²⁹ Nonetheless, my examination of far-right sympathy across the nation in 1964 suggests that sympathizers were far more engaged in politics than the average American.

Political Engagement and American Democracy

Robert A. Dahl explains in his essays on Democratic theory that external checks are essential to protect a republic from tyranny. In doing so, however, Dahl explains that both majorities and minorities “are weighed on the same scales,” as the size of the ruling group is far less important than the group’s propensity to “impose severe deprivations on the ‘natural rights’ of citizens.”³⁰ The Far Right conspiracy theories of the 1960s suggest that the movement would go to great lengths to limit change and social progress in America, even as far as dismantling political institutions, such as the Supreme Court, and discrediting movements aimed at expanding civil rights.

²⁹ I find that both far-right sympathy and support for the John Birch Society (JBS) approach a statistically significant and positive relationship with attending a political meeting when models are specified for only the South or only California. Similarly, I find a significant and positive relationship between support for the JBS and writing to a political official in the South and in California. Scholarship suggests that the JBS was very politically active in both California (leading up to and following the Republican National Convention) and throughout the South. For more on the regional presence of the JBS see, Fred Grupp, Jr., “The Political Perspectives of Birch Society Members.” For a description of JBS Chapters and regional leaders see Chapter 5 in J. Allen Broyles, *The John Birch Society: Anatomy of a Protest*.

³⁰ Dahl’s (1956) *A Preface to Democratic Theory* goes to great lengths to examine the strength of external checks to tyranny in the United States. The quoted text appears on pages 9 and 10.

In the case of the Far Right, the fact that the movement constituted less than a majority of the country is far less important than the extraordinary level of political engagement among movement sympathizers. Similar to Dahl's (1961) analysis of patricians in New Haven, Connecticut in *Who Governs*, the Far Right movement was already made up of individuals who possessed the resources needed to actively engage in politics: wealth, social position and education. Again, like the patricians, the Far Right only lacked the actual numbers to maintain their social prestige without a political movement. However, the level of anxiety toward social change that certain Americans felt drove them to not only sympathize with a larger, like-minded political movement, but to engage politics above and beyond other Americans.

Finally, the political engagement of far-right sympathizers in 1964 is of ultimate importance because political representatives must listen to their constituents, especially those most active, or else their elected position may be in jeopardy. In his examination of democratic accountability, Christopher Wlezien (1995) explains that "a responsive public provides guidance to electorally motivated politicians and a basis for removing politicians who defy the public's will" (pg. 982). Wlezien admits his model demands a well-informed and highly mobilized public in order for officials to rely upon them as a policy thermostat, and my analysis suggests that far-right sympathizers in 1964 fit his model perfectly because of their relatively affluent position in society. More to the point, it is very likely that political representatives considered the discontent of the Far Right.

That said, understanding the political engagement of the Far Right in 1964 is important in understanding Dahl's overarching question of "*who governs?*" The enhanced political engagement of the Far Right helped them secure control of the

Republican Party, and demanded the attention of political representatives across the country. As Dahl laments, in spite of the institutional constraints intended to protect political minorities, certain groups will always have the resources and social position to (at the very minimum) voice their preferences more loudly than others, even if their preferences entail the subjugation of other groups. Put another way, the enhanced political engagement of reactionary conservatives in 1964 forces political authorities to at least acknowledge their political preferences. The question of whether far-right sympathizers were less inclined to actually support policies and social groups that they perceived as threatening and destroying America must be addressed. The following chapter takes on this question by closely examining the political preferences of far-right sympathizers.

Chapter 4

HOW FAR TO THE RIGHT? FAR-RIGHT SYMPATHY, INTEGRATION AND OUT-GROUP ANTIPATHY

“What is integration?...historically analyzed [*sic*] and on the basis of the facts which we can see before us, it is a strategic campaign of the *world communist movement*. It is just that – nothing more and nothing less.”¹

- Medford Evans, Managing Editor for ‘*The Citizen*,’ the official publication of the Citizens Council of America in Jackson (MS).

In Chapter 2, I found that several factors, such as intolerance, conservatism and partisan identity, were associated with sympathy for the Far Right in the 1960s. Moreover, I established anxiety toward social change as a powerful explanation even after accounting for other popular explanations, such as intolerance and ideology. Additionally, in Chapter 3 I discovered that far-right sympathizers, or reactionary conservatives, were more likely than other Americans to engage in politics in 1964. Furthering my earlier findings, I established that the relationship between far-right sympathy and political engagement held fast even after accounting for other factors traditionally associated with political engagement.

To contextualize the information I present in Chapter 4, it is important to highlight the elevated political engagement of the 1960s Far Right for at least two reasons. First, understanding far-right sympathizers in the 1960s as a group engaged in

¹ Quote is originally from the article, “Forced Integration Is Communism in Action,” which appeared in the *The Citizen* in 1962, a prominent White Citizens Council publication in Mississippi, but is also cited on page 197 of Neil McMillen’s (1971) book, *The Citizens’ Council*. Evans, who received a PhD from Yale University, was also a frequent contributor to *American Opinion*, the John Birch Society’s monthly newsletter. For more details about Evans and his political contributions, see McMillen (1971).

politics helps us fully appreciate the political voice and influence of a movement that lacked the volume of support needed to influence politics at the national level. Although Barry Goldwater, the Far Right's national figure, convincingly lost in his bid for President, political victories within the Republican Party and at the state and local levels forced politicians on both sides of the aisle to acknowledge the Far Right's political interests and agenda.² Furthermore, the enhanced political engagement of the 1960s Far Right calls for an understanding of how sympathizers' view of the world influences their political attitudes and preferences. In other words, understanding what informs far-right sympathy as well as its power to motivate political engagement is an important first step; the consequences of far-right sympathy become essential to fully understanding the movement's significance.

Once again, I am identifying far-right sympathy as a proxy for reactionary conservatism, which I ultimately consider a predisposition. A predisposition is distinct from other attitudes because it is long-standing, stable and based on values often formed during early childhood socialization (Parker & Barreto, 2013, pg. 103). Therefore, I argue that anxiety toward changes in America that challenge reactionary conservatives' worldview is the lynchpin that informs and structures their political attitudes and preferences. Thus, reactionary conservatives' support for or opposition to certain political policies would be a product of their anxiety. As such, this chapter focuses on the relationship between far-right sympathy and two matters that were especially contentious throughout the 1960s: racial integration and out-groups. To do so, I explore the attitudes

² While mainstream conservatives attempted to incorporate enough of the Far Right's political agenda to avoid a politically damaging split within the Republican party, liberals worked to distance themselves from the Far Right's political preferences and agenda. Geoffrey Kabaservice (2012), in his book *Rule or Ruin*, provides a detailed account of the Republican Party's attempt to reincorporate far-right sympathizers into the mainstream conservative base in the 1960s.

of the Far Right toward employment integration, housing integration, neighborhood integration and school busing. I also examine Far Right perceptions of broad out-groups, such as Catholics, Jews, and Blacks, and groups specifically associated with the Civil Rights movement such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE).

So far, my earlier findings suggest that sympathy for the Far Right is motivated, at least in part, by anxiety about new and uncomfortable changes in America. In my analysis of content, it was clear that although the Far Right was not overtly racist, racial progress was a cause of angst among the Far Right's leadership. An examination of Far Right attitudes toward integration and out-groups will lend insight into whether or not far-right sympathizers are distinctively opposed to the actual social policies and groups that represent social change in America.

In Chapter 2, I debunked the commonly held claim that sympathy for 1960s Far Right was only about small government and individual freedoms. Yet, the extent to which these assertions explain sympathizers' attitudes toward racial integration and groups perceived as traditionally un-American remains unclear. If we rely upon the rhetoric of movement leaders and elites, the Far Right's vehement opposition to the Civil Rights movement and the movement's organizational arms stems directly from the Far Right's commitment to conservative principles. For example, Goldwater explained his vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by stating that the bill would "require the creation of a federal police force of mammoth proportions..." and would also create an 'informer psychology' where people would "harass their fellow citizens for selfish and

narrow purposes” (Perlstein, 2001, pg. 364). In this way, Goldwater reinforced the Far Right’s commitment to traditionally conservative values.

However, it may also be the case that there is something *sui generis* about far-right sympathy; far-right sympathy may explain attitudes toward integration and out-groups beyond other explanations, such as sociodemographics, intolerance and politics. In short, I suggest that reactionary conservatism will predict opposition toward racial integration and antipathy toward out-groups because both represent uncomfortable changes in America that provoke anxiety among sympathizers with the 1960s Far Right.

Identifying the sources of the Far Right’s opposition to racial integration and their perceptions of out-groups in America is important for a number of reasons. To start, even though the Far Right movement was unsuccessful in its attempt to capture the presidency in 1964, the movement is credited with pulling mainstream conservatives further to the right on issues of racial integration and political incorporation.³ The right pointed to the Civil Rights and Voting Rights acts as victories for the movement, and argued that there was no need for a continued emphasis on racial equality in America. Moreover, after Goldwater’s defeat, Far Right activists rallied behind George Wallace for President in 1968 even though Wallace did little to hide his segregationist views (Lowndes, 2008).

Today, the same racial conservatism that describes the 1960s Far Right manifests in characterizations of the Tea Party. The Tea Party is often accused of racism and intolerance, and is a leading voice in opposition to immigration reform and gay

³ Specifically, Joseph E. Lowndes (2008) argues that the Far Right played a major role in establishing racial conservatism as the platform of the Republican Party in his book, *From the New Deal to the New Right*. Moreover, Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson (1992), in their book *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*, identify the 1960s as a time when conservatives embraced oppositional stances to race based policy in the wake of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act.

marriage.⁴ Yet, just as in the 1960s, the Tea Party's opposition is often explained through their commitment to conservative principles, namely small government. The fact that the same arguments are still used today to justify opposition to social change and progress add value to my examination of the Far Right in the 1960s. In other words, understanding the driving forces behind the 1960s Far Right's attitudes toward integration and various out-groups helps construct a historical perspective on Far Right opposition to social progress and change today.

This chapter first explores the ways in which far-right sympathy is associated with attitudes toward racial integration and perceptions of out-groups in America. Subsequently, I present a preliminary analysis exploring the relationship between far-right sympathy and two areas of historical social contention: attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups. Lastly, I offer a final test of my claim that sympathizing with the Far Right uniquely influences individuals' attitudes towards employment, school and neighborhood integration, school busing and their perceptions of out-groups. In sum, my analysis explores whether or not reactionary conservatism significantly influences attitudes toward integration and out-groups.

Change too Great: Integration and Group Antipathy in the 1960s

The 1960s was a time of great social change, not only domestically but also internationally with the Cold War and international freedom movements around the world. However, the struggle for civil rights and racial equality occupies a special place

⁴ For example, a 2010 NAACP report claimed racism within the ranks of Tea Party members, and the Tea Party was a major voice of opposition toward the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell and the DREAM Act. Parker and Barreto (2013) highlight the Tea Party's opposition to racially and sexually progressive policies in Chapter 4 of their book, *Change They Can't Believe In*.

in American society. Past disagreements about racial progress have continued to shape American politics throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with contemporary political polarization stemming from diverging attitudes around racial integration and the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s (Camines & Stimson, 1992; Kabaservice, 2012). The Democrats' embrace of civil rights and racial integration, along with a vehemently oppositional Far Right, led to a Republican Party that relied upon a solid Southern voting bloc that still votes overwhelmingly Republican today (Lowndes, 2008). The changes embodied in the 1960s have far-reaching implication and strong influences on today's political culture.

Thus, understanding the driving forces behind 1960s Far Right opposition to racial progress is at the center of my Chapter 4 analysis. One account of these forces suggests that the Far Right's tenets derive from a desire for a reduced federal government and a commitment to states' rights (McGirr, 2001; Lassiter, 2006). These core conservative principles fit well within traditional American politics. However, my earlier analysis suggests that the 1960s Far Right is also about something more. In my analysis of content, I found that Far Right elite rhetoric was mostly conspiratorial. The Far Right labeled agents of social change, such as civil rights leaders, as traitors and subversives destroying America; the Far Right attempted to undermine the change that threatened the societal order they wanted to preserve. In Chapter 2 I confirmed the powerful role of anxiety toward change in determining far-right sympathy among the masses; however, the relationship between the anxiety of the Far Right and attitudes toward racial integration and out-groups in America remains unclear, and is the subject of this chapter.

How Did the 1960s Far Right Perceive Integration and Out-Groups?

A brief look at anecdotal evidence from the political statements, speeches and publications of the 1960s Far Right and their leaders suggests that the Far Right opposed the racial integration proposed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The national leader of the Far Right, Barry Goldwater, was outspoken against the *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) Supreme Court decision that ruled separate black and white schools were inherently unequal. Goldwater felt that the decision represented abuses of power by the court, and stated:

[I am] not prepared...to impose judgment...on the people of Mississippi or South Carolina...That is their business not mine. I believe that the problem of race relations, like all social and cultural problems, is best handled by the people directly concerned...[and] should not be effected by engines of national power.⁵

Furthermore, although less outspoken about the Civil Rights Act itself, Goldwater voiced his opinion loud and clear with a vote against the act in 1964.

Goldwater was hardly alone in his opposition to racial integration, and often took his cues from other Far Right political organizations and leaders. The John Birch Society (JBS) actively campaigned against the Civil Rights movement in their monthly periodical *American Opinion* with articles such as, “Civil Rights: A Communist Betrayal of a Good Cause and Liberal Front: How Minorities Control America” and “The Invasion of

⁵ Quote appears in the article by David Farber, “Barry Goldwater on the Civil Rights Act: The Antecedent of Rand Paul.” Farber’s article is part of George Mason University’s *History News Network*.

Mississippi.” These and similar articles in the *American Opinion* painted the movement as nothing more than a Communist rouse.⁶

Further exemplifying active far-right voices against social equality, the *American Opinion* described the Selma March as “organized by the International Conspiracy of Evil,” and also explained the Jim Crow South as containing a “very, very tiny amount of injustice” (Epstein & Forster, 1996, pg. 102-103). Additionally, a 1965 pamphlet written by Robert Welch, the founder of the JBS, entitled *Two Revolutions At Once*, explained the Civil Rights movement as part of a “world-wide, Communist-dominated, anti-colonialism revolution...against capitalism and the United States itself” (Epstein & Forster, 1966, pg. 96). With a distribution of over half million copies, the pamphlet made the campaign against the civil rights movement “the single most important undertaking of the John Burch Society in its seven year history” (Epstein & Forster, 1966, pg. 95-96).

The John Birch Society (JBS) also masterfully incorporated the rest of the American Far Right into its campaign against civil rights. To start, the 1960s saw the publication of multiple books by well-established JBS members that continued to propagate Welch’s conspiracies. The JBS also established a national umbrella organization, Truth About Civil Turmoil (TACT), to facilitate the creation of local front groups across the country. The TACT committees provided a springboard for a number of other Far Right organizations against civil rights, such as The Detroit Committee for the Prevention of Civil Disorder, Citizens for the Support of Law and Order in La Puente, CA and the Committee for Better Understanding in Selma, AL (Epstein & Forster, 1966). Finally, the JBS even produced a 75-minute anti-civil rights film entitled *Anarchy USA* as

⁶ The articles mentioned appear in the February 1964, and the November 1963, issues of *American Opinion*, respectively.

a teaching tool for TACT committees and other organizations sympathetic to the organization's cause.⁷

Furthermore, the Far Right's anxiety and conspiracy is also evident in White Citizens' Councils' opposition to school desegregation and busing (Lipset & Raab, 1970; McMillen, 1971). With a main objective of maintaining the racial status quo, the collection of organizations that identified as White Citizens' Councils justified their position through their assertion that the growth of the federal government "was a radical departure from the guidelines set down by the framers of the constitution" (McMillen, 1971, pg. 189). Following the *Brown* decision, school desegregation had begun in each of the Border States in the South and a number of the states of the Old Confederacy in some form or another.⁸ Even though a wide-variety of organizations made up White Citizens' Councils across the South, they all remained united in their goal of denying socio-political equality to blacks, identifying school desegregation as their primary battleground (McMillen, 1971).

The Councils worked hard to maintain an identity separate from white supremacist groups of the time. Their reliance on a traditionally conservative belief in small government to oppose racial integration allowed for the Councils to position themselves squarely within the larger conservative movement in America (McMillen, 1971). However, many of the various Councils' political views aligned closer with the Far Right than traditional conservatism. The reactionary views of the Citizens' Councils

⁷ Epstein and Forster (1966) describe the film as being "dangerously effective," even after non-Birchite observers described the film as outright "labeling the Civil Rights movement as Communist, with Rev. Martin Luther King as its Lucifer" (pg. 101-102).

⁸ The states of the old Confederacy consisted of the seven signatory states that seceded from the union – South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas, as well as the four additional slave-holding states – Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee and North Carolina. McMillen (1971) describes the progress of school desegregation in Chapter 1 of his book, *The Citizens' Council*.

were especially apparent in the formation of their national umbrella organization in 1956, the Citizens' Councils of America.

The national organization selected the Mississippi tabloid, *The Citizen*, as the “voice of the entire movement,” which offered a vehicle by which a national audience was privy to the Councils' wide array of political perspectives (McMillen, 1971, pg. 191). As the Councils' strength grew as a national organization, they continued to align closer with the Far Right; the Councils were not only in agreement with the Far Right when it came to opposing racial integration, but they saw the Far Right as part of the same conservative revolt against an ever-growing moderate Republican Party (McMillen, 1971). In the years following the creation of Citizens' Councils of America, the Councils embraced the anti-Communist conspiracy championed by the Far Right, as seen in *The Citizen* with articles such as “U.N. Plans to Brain-Wash World Youth,” which expanded its focus from the “National Association for the Agitation of Colored People” to include Communist “dupes” working to aid in the “tyranny of big government” (McMillen, 1971, pg. 191).⁹ If nothing more, the Councils serve as an example of the reactionary attitudes toward school desegregation and busing that characterize the Far Right, begging an exploration of the relationship between far-right sympathy and attitudes toward race in the 1960s.

The anecdotal evidence I have presented above suggests that the Far Right fervently opposed racial integration, at least among the ranks of their elite and activists. However, attitudes toward integration among the masses of far-right sympathizers remain

⁹ McMillen (1971) goes to great lengths to highlight the Councils' attachment to Far Right rhetoric and the belief of a *world Communist movement*. Most telling is the work of William J. Simmons (the founder of the second era Ku Klux Klan), who often wrote about the “Communist inspired and Communist-dominated” integration movement in *The Citizen* (pg. 199).

unexplored. Furthermore, the Far Right's traditionally conservative claims fall contradictory to the reactionary attitudes that are apparent in the literature. This disparity lends even more importance to my examination of whether or not far-right sympathizers opposed racial integration in the 1960s because they were anxious of the change it represented. Thus, I pose the following hypotheses:

H4.1: Far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other Americans to oppose racial integration.

H4.2: Limiting my examination to self-identified conservatives, far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other conservatives to oppose racial integration.

H4.3: After controlling for alternative explanations, far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other Americans to oppose racial integration.

The Far Right and Out-group Antipathy

The previous section offered anecdotal evidence suggesting that the 1960s Far Right was a leader in the movement against racial integration. Less obvious is whether or not far-right sympathizers held negative attitudes toward either African Americans as a group, or other out-groups in America. Although there was a conscious effort within the Far Right to eliminate racism and intolerance from both its internal ranks and the broader movement tenets (mostly because movement leaders such as Goldwater understood the harm bigotry could do to the movement's national appeal), there are copious examples that suggest otherwise.

To start, the Christian Crusade, a wing of the Far Right movement founded in Tulsa, Oklahoma by JBS member Billy James Hargis, harbored many staunch segregationists in its leadership. The Christian Crusade produced propaganda and books filled with conspiracy and racism, arguing, “the negro is innately inferior to the white man” (Epstein & Forster, 1966, pg. 37-38).¹⁰ Similarly, the New Jersey faction of the student arm of the Far Right movement, Young Americans for Freedom, was on record gleefully chanting at events, “Where has all the welfare gone? ... Gone to the niggers” (Epstein & Forster, 1966, pg. 56).

Similarly, even though the JBS did not officially place race and civil rights at the center of their political agenda, the Society was considered an “unofficial vessel” for resistance to “the lower-class negro” (Lipset & Raab, 1970, pp. 268-269). Furthermore, the JBS was quite careful about publishing or allowing blatant racism to represent the organization, but the organization was far less concerned about anti-Semitic representations (Epstein & Forster, 1966; Lipset & Raab, 1970). Revido P. Oliver, a founder of the JBS and Associate editor of the JBS’s monthly periodical *American Opinion*, was a constant anti-Semitic presence within the movement. Oliver would speak of a Jewish conspiracy to control the world, and even discussed a “beautiful vision” of earth if “all the Jews were vaporized at dawn tomorrow...” (Epstein & Forster, 1966, pg. 113).¹¹ Perhaps owing in part to Oliver’s blatant anti-Semitic rhetoric, the JBS attracted many anti-Semitic sympathizers. A 1965 investigation by California’s Senate Fact

¹⁰ Billy James Hargis was infamous for his support for segregation, and his personal attacks directed at Martin Luther King Jr. whom he accused of being Communist-educated. Hargis, a Christian Evangelical preacher, often cited scripture to support his views, offering, “that God ordained segregation” (Epstein & Forster, 1966, pg. 38).

¹¹ Although Oliver’s resignation from the JBS is largely attributed to these comments, neither Welch nor the JBS would ever repudiate Oliver, or even publically criticize him. Epstein and Forster (1966) explain Oliver’s role in the JBS and the influence of his anti-Semitism in great detail in their book, *The Radical Right*.

Finding Committee on Un-American Activities reported a “dangerous increase of anti-Semitism” among the membership of the JBS (Epstein & Forster, 1966, pg. 132).

Evidence that suggests that the Far Right’s antipathy might extend beyond policy issues and also encompass different groups in America that represent a threat to the social order.

Moreover, as considerable social change challenges the comfort of the Far Right, reactionary conservatives identify various groups as subversives and traitors attempting to destroy the country. Therefore, social change is perceived as an assault on America and its historically white, Protestant, working class, heterosexual identity (Smith, 1997; Devos & Banaji, 2005). Scholarship shows that individuals who strongly consider themselves American believe that true Americans are white, middle-class, Protestant and native-born (Theiss-Morse, 2009; Parker & Barreto, 2013), leaving other groups such as Jews, Catholics and African Americans outside of the prototypical definition of real Americans. If far-right sympathizers really felt threatened by perceived un-American out-groups in the 1960s, then they should hold unusually cold feelings toward Catholics, Jews and blacks. It may also be the case that other factors actually explain what may seem like Far Right antipathy toward out-groups, such as racism, sociodemographics or politics. To investigate this question, I propose the following hypotheses:

H4.4: Far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other Americans to hold negative attitudes toward Catholics, Jews and blacks in America.

H4.5: Limiting my examination to self-identified conservatives, far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other conservatives to hold negative attitudes toward Catholics, Jews and blacks in America.

H4.6: After controlling for alternative explanations, far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other Americans to hold negative attitudes toward Catholics, Jews and blacks in America.

Along with the association between far-right sympathy and perceptions of broad out-groups in America, I also examine the relationship between reactionary conservatism and perceptions of specific organizations that stood for social change and racial progress in the 1960s: the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Whether or not a relationship exists between far-right sympathy and perceptions of broad groups in America that the Far Right may perceive as threatening (Catholics, Jews and blacks), I expect far-right sympathizers to hold the NAACP and CORE in low regard because of their immediate attachment to the civil rights movement and their organizational missions centered on enacting social change.

Founded in 1909, the NAACP is considered a cornerstone of the Civil Rights movement in America with the stated goals of securing for all people the rights guaranteed in the 14th, 15th and 16th Amendments to the Constitution and the elimination of racial hatred and racial discrimination (Sullivan, 2009). The NAACP focused on combating oppression through legal action, and played a major role in challenging voter disenfranchisement and racial segregation (McAdam, 1982).¹² The landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) decision firmly put the NAACP on the national map as an organization capable of powerful social change.

¹² As early as 1915 the NAACP successfully challenged the grandfather clause in Oklahoma in *Guinn v. United States*, and in *Buchanan v. Warley* (1917), the court ruled in the NAACP's favor arguing that prohibiting the sale of property in Louisville, KY to blacks violated the 14th Amendment. For more on the history of the NAACP, see Patricia Sullivan's (2009) book, *Lift Every Voice: The NAACP and the Making of the Civil Rights Movement*.

CORE, founded in Chicago in 1942, sought to apply non-violent tactics to fight against racial segregation (Meier & Rudwick, 1975). In 1947, CORE sent a group of eight white and eight black men through Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky in an effort to desegregate interstate travel. In 1961, James Farmer, a co-founder of CORE, joined volunteers and repeated the journey in what has come to be known as the *Freedom Ride* (Farmer, 1985). CORE was also actively working to desegregate the Chicago Public Schools throughout the 1960s (Meier & Rudwick, 1975). By 1963, the organization helped in planning the famous March on Washington, and in coordination with the NAACP (and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) organized the *Freedom Summer Campaign* in Mississippi to help register African-Americans to vote and establish educational programs in black communities (Farmer, 1985). By 1964, CORE was a decisive part of the Civil Rights movement.

Examining perceptions of social change groups along with perceptions of broad out-groups allows an understanding of how far-right sympathizers may have perceived specific social change organizations differently from individual members of groups traditionally considered un-American. Just as with attitudes toward broad out-groups, far-right sympathy may fail to explain individual attitudes toward the NAACP and CORE when other factors are also considered. Still, due to the specific missions of social change that drive the NAACP and CORE, I expect that far-right sympathy will predict negative feelings toward both organizations, and thus hypothesize:

H4.7: Far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other Americans to hold negative attitudes toward the NAACP and CORE.

H4.8: Limiting my examination to self-identified conservatives, far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other conservatives to hold negative attitudes toward the NAACP and CORE.

H4.9: After controlling for alternative explanations, far-right sympathizers in 1964 were more likely than other Americans to hold negative attitudes toward the NAACP and CORE.

Far-Right Sympathy, Integration and Racial Antipathy among the Masses

After a brief examination of the literature regarding far-right sympathy and both attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups, it appears that the 1960s Far Right was outspoken in their opposition to civil rights and integration. Furthermore, historical evidence also suggests that the Far Right's disapproval of integration may extend to their perceptions of blacks, among other out-groups, and social change organizations in America. However, the historical record is primarily concerned with the views and statements of Far Right elites and activists, leaving much to be desired when considering the attitudes of individuals who sympathized with the national movement.

The following analysis uses data from the 1964 American National Election Study (ANES) to examine the relationship between far-righty sympathy and attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups at the individual level. Before I present my results, empirical examinations of the Far Right at the individual level warrant mentioning. The work of Raymond and Barbara Wolfinger and their co-authors (1969) as well as the work of James McEvoy (1972) use survey data to examine Far Right attitudes toward race and civil rights in the 1960s. In their analysis, Wolfinger et al. find that over

one-third (35 percent) of Christian Anti-Communist Crusaders believed the South was correct in their opposition to integration, and the percent of Crusaders who agreed with the South jumps to 44 percent when only asked of Crusaders who see Communist influence in both the Democrat and Republican Parties (pg. 24).

Moreover, McEvoy finds that close to 70 percent of Far Right supporters opposed employment integration and 66 percent opposed school integration, compared to 34 percent and 33 percent of Johnson supporters, respectively. He also finds that that over 28 percent of Far Right supporters favor segregation and over 70 percent perceive the Civil Rights movement as mostly violent, again compared to 19 percent and 59 percent of Johnson supporters. In addition, McEvoy also finds distinct differences between far-right supporters and Johnson supporters when it comes to perceptions of Jews, Catholics and blacks. In each case, at least five percent more far-right supporters report negative perceptions of each out-group (less than 50 on a 100 point thermometer scale) than their Johnson-supporter counterparts.¹³

As a final example, Christopher Parker and Matt Barreto 's (2013) study of the Tea Party finds that far-right sympathy is associated with anti-immigrant and anti-gay and lesbian attitudes in America today. Their results suggest that sympathy for the Tea Party predicts negative attitudes toward minorities above and beyond other explanations, such as ideology and partisan attachment. Although the empirical scholarship examining Far Right attitudes at the individual level is limited, the studies that do exist suggests that we should expect the Far Right to be uniquely opposed to integration and hold distinctively negative perceptions of out-groups.

¹³ These findings are found in Tables IV.1 and IV.2 in McEvoy's (1972) book, *Radical or Conservatives? The Contemporary American Right* (pp. 73-75).

Yet, while Wolfinger et al.'s and McEvoy's studies offer valuable information, both are limited by the way they define far-right supporters and the rigor of their analysis. Neither Wolfinger et al. nor McEvoy extend their analyses to sympathizers with the national Far Right movement in 1964; Wolfinger et al. only examine the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade and McEvoy limits his definition of far-right supporters to individuals who supported Goldwater prior to him winning the Republican Presidential nomination. Furthermore, both studies fail to account for factors that might explain attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups either alongside or instead of far-right support.

On the other hand, Parker and Barreto's work on the Tea Party does find that sympathy for the far-right influences how people view minorities while also accounting for alternative explanations. Still, their analysis is limited to the political and historical conditions in contemporary American society, and they concentrate on anti-immigrant and anti-gay and lesbian attitudes instead of attitudes toward African-Americans. That said, my examination is the first to offer a methodologically rigorous analysis of the individual attitudes of far-right sympathizers in the 1960s.


To start my analysis, I explore the attitudes of Americans in general regarding integration. For this step, I use ANES data to examine individual level attitudes toward integration in 1964. I then examine the association between far-right sympathy and attitudes toward integration, isolating differences between far-right sympathizers who are conservative and those who are not.¹⁴ Then, I complete my analysis by examining the

¹⁴ As a reminder, because self-identified ideological measures were not part of the 1964 American National Election Study, I created an index of attitudinal measures toward conservatives, farmers, the military, Southerners and big business to measure conservatism. This scale is explained in detail in Chapter 2 and in the Appendix to the dissertation.

relationship between far-right sympathy and attitudes toward integration while also accounting for other alternative explanations. Finally, in a similar fashion, I examine the association between far-right sympathy and perceptions of out-groups and social change organizations in America. This analytical design will lend insight to whether or not reactionary conservative plays a unique role in predicting attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups.

Are Far-Right Sympathizers' Attitudes toward Integration Distinct?


Although the evidence I have presented paints a picture of a right wing America that opposed civil rights and integration, the attitudes of individuals across the country were relatively split. Figure 4.1 displays attitudes toward integration for Americans in 1964.



As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, with the exception of school busing, 50 to 60 percent of all Americans support integration even when the government plays a major role. To be clear,

over 50 percent of Americans believed that the government should ensure employment integration and agreed with neighborhood integration, while just under 50 percent believed that the government should ensure school integration as well. School busing, on the other hand, was far more controversial with the support of only 26 percent of Americans.


A close look at far-right sympathizers' attitudes toward integration suggests that significant differences separate them from the rest of the country. Figure 4.2 displays the attitudes of far-right sympathizers compared to other Americans.



According to Figure 4.2, a minimum of 15 percentage points separate far-right sympathizers, or individuals who voted for Barry Goldwater in 1964, from the rest of America when it comes to support for integration. Only 20 percent of far-right sympathizers believed that the government should ensure employment integration and less than 30 percent believed the government should ensure school integration. Comparatively, almost 60 percent of the Americans unsympathetic to the Far Right

supported employment integration and 54 percent supported school integration. Similarly, while 50 percent of far-right sympathizers supported neighborhood integration, over 67 percent of the rest of America reported support, yielding a 17-point gap. When it comes to school busing, support dwindled compared to other forms of integration; yet, 14 percent fewer far-right sympathizers supported school busing when compared to those unsympathetic.

Although significant differences emerge when comparing attitudes toward integration among far-right sympathizers with Americans, conservative ideology may explain these disparities. Figure 4.3 takes a closer look at the role of conservatism by presenting the relationship between far-right sympathy and attitudes toward integration for only self-identified conservatives.



In spite of the Far Right’s claims of traditionally conservative values, the attitudes of far-right sympathizers, or reactionary conservatives, significantly differ from traditional conservatives. For example, Figure 4.3 indicates that while only 20 percent of reactionary

conservatives supported employment integration, almost 50 percent of traditional conservatives reported support. Similar differences exist for other forms of integration and school busing, with a gap of no less than 12 percentage points separating reactionary conservatives from their traditional conservative counterparts. In all, Figure 4.3 reinforces my claim, first made in Chapter 1, that reactionary conservatives are different from traditional conservatives. However, although Figure 4.3 suggests that conservative ideology was not behind the 1960s Far Right's opposition to integration, intolerance and sociodemographics remain unconsidered.

Far-Right Sympathy of Something Else? Explaining Attitudes toward Integration

To account for factors that might explain attitudes toward integration aside from, or instead of far-right sympathy, it is necessary to move beyond the descriptive figures to a more rigorous analysis. Just as in Chapter 3, I use multiple regression analysis here to determine whether or not far-right sympathy is independently associated with attitudes toward integration in 1964. On the other hand, alternative explanations may really drive the differences between far-right sympathizers, traditional conservatives and the rest of America.

Thus, I also consider the effect of politics, sociodemographics and intolerance on attitudes toward integration. While Figure 4.3 suggests the influence of traditional conservative ideology, it fails to account for the effect of far-right sympathy on attitudes toward integration. I now also account for other political attitudes, such as a belief in limited government, political trust, political knowledge and partisan attachment. As white middle-class families accumulated wealth during the post-WWII economic boom and

moved to the suburbs, these families believed that they had earned the right to decide the composition of their neighborhoods and the educational conditions of their children (McGirr, 2001; Lassiter, 2006; Kruse, 2007). They often refused to allow African Americans into their neighborhoods and schools, and expressed staunch opposition to busing their children to the inner city (Lassiter, 2006). Whites justified their resistance to integration with an argument that government should interfere as little as possible in personal matters, a belief that is far from new in American politics (Lassiter, 2006).¹⁵

Moreover, the Republican Party platform relied upon a traditionally conservative justification for their opposition to Civil Rights legislation: that a large federal government was dangerous (Kabaservice, 2012). I thus account for attitudes toward limited government and partisan identity. Scholarship also suggests that sociodemographic factors, such as age, income, gender, marital status and education, are associated with policy preferences. Additionally, political knowledge, mistrust in the American political system and church attendance are also associated with policy preferences.¹⁶

Furthermore, I also consider intolerance, such as racism and anti-Communism in my analysis. In addition to blatant racism as a rationale for integration opposition, the threat of Communism was also used as justification (Lipset & Raab, 1970). Finally, living in the South is an important control because of Southern animosity toward racial integration. Even after accounting for alternative explanations, far-right sympathy

¹⁵ James Madison argued that a system of checks and balances was necessary to avoid tyranny in Federalist No. 51.

¹⁶ Angus Campbell (1960) and his co-authors find that sociodemographics and political knowledge are directly associated with policy preferences in *The American Voter*. In addition, Mark Hetherington's (2005) work suggests that trust in government is also associated with beliefs about government expansion. Finally, church attendance, encompassed by a broader sense of religious attachment in the work of Legee and Kellstedt (1993), has been shown to influence attitudes toward political freedom and civil liberties.

remains significantly associated with opposition to integration in 1964. Table 4.1 presents my results.


Table 4.1. Predicting Support for Integration

	Employment Integration	School Integration	Neighborhood Integration	Busing
Goldwater Vote in 1964	-0.65* (0.226)	-0.46* (0.213)	-0.36 (0.227)	-0.55* (0.243)
Racism	-0.01* (0.004)	-0.02* (0.004)	-0.03* (0.004)	-0.00 (0.004)
Pro-Communism	0.01 (0.005)	-0.00 (0.005)	0.00 (0.005)	0.01* (0.004)
Political Trust	0.59* (0.332)	0.67* (0.295)	0.54* (0.321)	0.32 (0.314)
Political Knowledge	-0.18 (0.277)	-0.57* (0.244)	0.31 (0.262)	-0.09 (0.245)
Limited Govt.	-0.70* (0.189)	-0.75* (0.174)	-0.38* (0.185)	-0.33* (0.192)
Republican	-0.05 (0.223)	0.40* (0.218)	0.87* (0.237)	0.30 (0.225)
Independent	0.56* (0.223)	0.12 (0.206)	0.21 (0.216)	-0.21 (0.220)
/Cut1	-2.43* (0.467)	-2.50* (0.416)	-3.91* (0.542)	-0.92* (0.391)
/Cut2	-1.97* (0.465)	-1.77* (0.413)	-3.04* (0.537)	-0.39 (0.390)
Observations	806	861	881	880
% Predic. Correctly	65.6%	61.2%	68.9%	67.4%

Standard errors in parentheses; all models are ordered logit regression; models also control for ideology, church attendance, marital status, gender, race, education, age, income, home ownership and living in the South; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

Table 4.1 shows that far-right sympathy remains significantly associated with opposition to integration, with the exception of neighborhood integration, even after accounting for other factors. In other words, reactionary conservatives opposed employment integration, school integration and school busing as a way to resist social change perceived as threatening their position in society and destroying the country. From Table 4.1, we can derive the factors significantly associated with attitudes toward integration, but the

magnitude of the effect is less clear.¹⁷ Accordingly, I turn to changes in predicted probability to examine the predictive power of far-right sympathy alongside other significant predictors. Figure 4.4 presents the change in predicted probability of supporting integration as values of each predictor move from their lowest to their highest point.



As Figure 4.4 shows, far-right sympathizers are 16 percent less likely than other Americans to support employment integration and 11 percent less likely to support school

¹⁷ The results of an ordered logistical regression model are difficult to interpret by only examining the strength and direction of the coefficients because the outcome variable is measured from on an ordinal scale, making comparisons across coefficients less useful. I rely on changes in predicted probabilities to examine the estimated influence of various predictors when an outcome variable is set to a specific value. For more, see David Hosmer (2000) et al., *Applied Logistic Regression*.

integration. Furthermore, far-right sympathizers are 9 percent less likely than other Americans to support school busing. In addition to far-right sympathy, both racism and a belief in limited government are significantly associated with opposition to integration. Specifically, racist individuals are 30 percent less likely to support employment integration and 35 percent less likely to support school integration; a belief in limited government decreases the likelihood that an individual supports employment and school integration by 17 and 18 percent, respectively. Still, far-right sympathy independently predicts opposition to integration above and beyond other explanations, and the power of far-right sympathy is only overshadowed by the predictive power of racism.

Interestingly, far-right sympathy fails to significantly predict neighborhood integration, but both racism and a belief in limited government are associated with opposition to neighborhood integration. Additionally, pro-Communist attitudes are associated with support for school busing, which may reflect Communist groups' eventual support for school busing as part of a historical fight against oppression.¹⁸ However, even after accounting for many different alternative explanations for attitudes toward integration, far-right sympathy still predicts attitudes above and beyond other factors, suggesting that the Far Right's anxiety toward social change is uniquely predicting their political attitudes. In other words, even after accounting for intolerance, politics and sociodemographics, far-right sympathy remains uniquely associated with opposition to integration.

¹⁸ The anti-busing movement eventually adopted an anti-Communist rhetoric to accompany the powerful anti-government rhetoric, leading to support for busing from Communist groups, such as the Progressive Labor Party. For more on busing and anti-Communism see, Formisano (2012), *Boston Against Busing: Race, Class and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s*. Specifically, the Communist Youth Organization voiced their support for school busing in Boston and Los Angeles in Paul Saba's (1976) article, "Communist Youth Get Organized," referencing the socialist newspaper *The Call*.


Beyond Integration: The Far Right and Out-Group Antipathy

My results suggest that there is something unique about far-right sympathy with regard to predicting opposition to integration. Far-right sympathizers oppose integration because they believe integration will displace them from their comfortable position of power in American society. It remains unclear, though, if the 1960s Far Right's opposition to integration was part of a larger antipathy toward African Americans and other groups historically considered un-American. The final step of my Chapter 4 analysis examines the association between far-right sympathy and perceptions of Jews, Catholics, blacks and two organizations that stood for social change, the NAACP and CORE. The Far Right perceives social change as an attack on cherished American values, and labels agents of social change as traitors and subversives. Considering American identity is often held to be white, middle-class, Protestant, native-born straight men (Parker & Barreto, 2013), it comes as no surprise that American Jews, Catholics and blacks, and their related organizations, are the primary targets of the Far Right's accusations.¹⁹

To start my analysis, I examine the perceptions of Jews, Catholics, blacks, the NAACP and CORE among all Americans. Figure 4.5 displays the percent of Americans who reported very warm feelings toward each group or organization.²⁰


¹⁹ In my analysis of out-groups, I am limited by the questions available in the data. Ideally, my analysis would include perceptions of other groups based on class, gender and religion as well.

²⁰ Very warm feelings constitute a score of >80 on a 100 point feeling thermometer scale.



Generally, in 1964, Americans were reluctant to report very warm feelings toward any of the out-groups, especially Jews, the NAACP and CORE. Figure 4.5 illustrates that while over 30 percent of Americans felt very warm toward Catholics and blacks, and close to one-quarter of Americans felt very warm toward Jews and the NAACP, less than 20 percent felt very warm toward CORE. Considering the political correctness of acknowledging support for underrepresented groups during the civil rights era, it is somewhat surprising that no more than one-third of Americans reported very warm feelings toward any; however, it is less surprising to see support dwindling for the NAACP and CORE, in part because of their prominent role in social disorder across America.

Still, the question remains as to whether or not far-right sympathizers' view of the aforementioned out-groups differs from the rest of the country. Figure 4.6 compares far-right sympathizers' perceptions of out-groups to all other respondents.




According to Figure 4.6, far-right sympathizers' perceptions of Catholics, blacks, the NAACP and CORE are significantly different from other Americans. While far-right sympathizers failed to differ from the rest of America in their perceptions of Jews, while they are more likely to report negative perceptions of Catholics and blacks. Only 31 percent reported very warm feelings toward Catholics and 23 percent reported very warm feelings toward blacks. In comparison, 36 percent of other Americans reported very warm feelings toward Catholics and 38 percent reported very warm feelings toward blacks, differences of 5 and 15 percentage points, respectively.

However, Figure 4.6 shows the starkest difference between the views of far-right sympathizers and other Americans when asked about the NAACP and CORE. Less than 5 percent of far-right sympathizers reported very warm feelings toward either of the social change groups, while 32 percent of the rest of America reported very warm feelings toward the NAACP and 22 percent reported very warm feelings toward CORE. These findings suggest that far-right sympathizers are less likely to perceive most out-

groups in a very positive light. However, the relationships presented in Figure 4.6 fail to consider any factors that might serve as powerful explanations for out-group antipathy.

One possible explanation is conservative ideology. Just as the Far Right relied upon principled conservative argument to defend their opposition toward the civil rights movement and integration, it is plausible that traditionally conservative values could also influence an individual's view toward groups that may be perceived as taking advantage of other Americans' hard work through policies such as welfare and government assistance.²¹ Figure 4.7 compares reactionary conservatives, or conservatives who sympathize with the Far Right, to other, traditional conservatives when regarding their perceptions of out-groups.



²¹ Scholarship suggests that Americans often prescribe stereotypes to minority groups based upon their political views toward social policy, such as government assistance, as opposed to hatred for the group itself. For example, Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza (1993) argue that race is often an afterthought when people decide their political views, as individuals choose to focus on the policy regardless of the racial implications.

Figure 4.7 suggests that significant differences in opinion remain toward blacks, the NAACP and CORE among conservative groups in 1964. While over 50 percent of traditional conservatives report very warm feelings toward blacks, only 33 percent of far-right sympathizers felt the same. Moreover, less than 4 percent of far-right sympathizers reported very warm feelings toward the NAACP or CORE. Comparatively, 28 percent of traditional conservatives felt very warm toward the NAACP and 15 percent felt very warm toward the CORE. In other words, gaps of 24 and 11 percentage points separate reactionary conservatives from traditional conservatives regarding their perceptions of the NAACP and CORE, respectively. Even though traditional conservative beliefs may account for antipathy toward Jews and Catholics, Figure 4.7 offers further support for my claim that far-right sympathizers are far from traditional conservatives, especially concerning racial out-groups and their organizations for social change. Yet, there are still a number of other factors that could explain the association between far-right sympathy and out-group antipathy.

Explaining Perceptions of Out-Groups in America

To account for other factors that might explain out-group antipathy, I rely upon the same controls used to examine attitudes toward integration and busing. Scholarship suggests that sociodemographic factors, such as age, gender, racial identity, education and income influence the evaluations of out-groups by dominant groups in society.²²

²² American society is arranged such that one group dominates over others, and race, gender and the Protestant Work Ethic are all used as justifications for group status. For more on group position and social dominance, see L. Bobo and M. Tuan (2006), *Prejudice and Politics: Group Position, Public Opinion, and the Wisconsin Treaty Rights Dispute*; J. Sidanius and F. Pratto (1999), *Social Dominance*.

Additionally, since political orientations might explain the association between far-right sympathy and attitudes toward groups perceived as political competition, I account for partisan identity, ideology, political knowledge, political mistrust and a belief in a limited government in my analysis.²³ Lastly, I account for church attendance, living in the South, anti-Communist attitudes and racism.²⁴

As I turn to my results, Table 4.2 presents the regression estimates for models predicting perceptions of Catholics, Jews, blacks, the NAACP and CORE.

Table 4.2. Predicting Warm Attitudes toward Out-Groups

	Catholics	Jews	Blacks	NAACP	CORE
Goldwater Vote in 1964	-2.47 (2.225)	-3.95* (1.894)	-3.00* (1.808)	-7.22* (2.279)	-7.13* (2.556)
Racism	-0.14* (0.040)	-0.14* (0.034)	-0.18* (0.032)	-0.27* (0.041)	-0.13* (0.047)
Pro-Communism	-0.08* (0.046)	0.01 (0.040)	-0.02 (0.038)	0.11* (0.048)	0.08 (0.055)
Political Trust	8.72* (3.092)	6.89* (2.633)	11.38* (2.514)	16.13* (3.228)	10.03* (3.624)
Political Knowledge	-4.18* (2.512)	1.76 (2.139)	2.22 (2.043)	-0.37 (2.635)	-2.31 (3.097)
Limited Govt.	-1.47 (1.867)	-2.46 (1.589)	-3.97* (1.517)	-6.93* (1.920)	-5.48* (2.145)
Republican	-3.42 (2.193)	2.71 (1.867)	5.42* (1.783)	6.78* (2.272)	2.46 (2.536)
Independent	-0.59 (2.134)	1.93 (1.817)	4.00* (1.732)	8.35* (2.192)	4.62* (2.418)
Constant	49.99* (3.976)	45.48* (3.384)	68.24* (3.231)	73.29* (4.139)	73.75* (4.706)
Observations	881	882	883	833	733
Chi ²	0.168	0.192	0.373	0.432	0.350

Standard errors in parentheses; all models are ordinary least-squares regression; models also control for ideology, church attendance, marital status, gender, race, education, age, income, home ownership and living in the South; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

²³ According to group interest theory, group identity and political context are inseparable, and perceived group competition can influence political attitudes and electoral behavior. For more, see Kaufmann (2004), *The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Behavior in American Cities*.

²⁴ Church attendance becomes especially important when examining attitudes toward two religious minorities, Jews and Catholics. Also, the NAACP and CORE were significantly active in the South during the Civil Rights movement because of the oppressive social conditions under Jim Crow that necessitated direct protest action.

According to Table 4.2, reactionary conservatism still predicts cold feelings toward Jews, Catholics, blacks, the NAACP and CORE even after controlling for other explanations. To further examine the predictive power of the associations presented in Table 4.2, Figures 4.8 and 4.9 display linear regression coefficients and standard errors for models predicting perceptions toward out-groups. In Figures 4.8 and 4.9, significant relationships are represented by a point estimate encompassed by a standard error that fails to cross zero.

Figure 4.8. Association Between Voting for Goldwater in 1964 and Attitudes toward Out-groups








Figure 4.8 demonstrates that far-right sympathy is significantly associated with cold feelings toward Jews and blacks. Figure 4.9 shows that far-right sympathy is also significantly associated with cold feelings toward the NAACP and CORE. Although far-right sympathy fails to predict perceptions of Catholics, intolerance significantly predicts negative perceptions. Furthermore, according to Figure 4.8, living in the South is the most powerful explanation for cold feelings toward Catholics. Nonetheless, Figure 8 also shows that, aside from white racial identification, far-right sympathy is one of the most powerful explanations for cold feelings toward Jews and blacks.

Similarly, Figure 4.9 shows that far-right sympathy is a powerful explanation for cold feelings toward the NAACP and CORE -- so powerful that, again, only white racial identity is a visibly superior predictor of cold feelings. Racism and politics also remain significantly associated with perceptions of both broad out-groups and social change organizations; however, even after accounting for alternative explanations far-right sympathy independently predicts cold feelings toward Jews, blacks, the NAACP and CORE in 1964. Altogether, the Far Right's anxiety toward social change extends beyond attitudes toward integration and busing, and also influences their evaluations of social change organizations as well as broader out-groups in America.

Figure 4.9. Association Between Voting for Goldwater in 1964 and Attitudes toward Civil Rights Groups



Discussion and Conclusion

My Chapter 4 results suggest that individuals who sympathized with the 1960s Far Right are more likely than unsympathetic individuals to express both opposition to integration and out-group antipathy. My results are most remarkable because the relationship between far-right sympathy and attitudes toward both integration and out-groups holds even after accounting for competing explanations. In other words, explanations such as intolerance, conservatism, party identification and sociodemographics fail to explain far-right sympathizers' opposition to integration and their negative perceptions of out-groups, suggesting that anxiety toward social change offers a viable account. I submit that far-right sympathy is a symptom of the anxiety held by individuals who perceive social change as threatening and believe the America they love is under attack by progressive groups seeking social justice.

Although my Chapter 4 findings are quite convincing in their assertion that reactionary conservatives held negative views toward integration and out-groups in 1964, a few inconsistencies require mention. Surprisingly, far-right sympathy fails to significantly predict attitudes toward neighborhood integration after competing explanations are also considered. A number of things could explain this non-finding, but additional analysis suggests that the relationship between far-right sympathy and attitudes toward neighborhood integration is moderated by whether or not a respondent lived in the South. The American South is unique because it experienced a Jim Crow system of segregation and disenfranchisement, legally separating blacks from whites in all aspects of life, including their neighborhoods. Southern systems of exclusion coupled with overt racism could overshadow any effect associated with sympathy for the Far Right for these

respondents. In other words, the influence of far-right sympathy on attitudes toward neighborhood integration may be regional.²⁵

In addition, I also find that far-right sympathy is significantly associated with negative perceptions of Jews and blacks, but not of Catholics. Again, a number of possible explanations exist for this non-finding; however, the election of the first Catholic president, John F. Kennedy, in 1960 and his assassination in 1963 provide a compelling possible answer. Scholarship suggests that the election of a “first” in American politics is often met with mixed emotions as individuals hide their true feelings in an attempt to remain politically correct.²⁶ However, Kennedy won the presidency in 1960 without any sign of overenthusiastic pre-election polls. Furthermore, the Far Right was concerned about the national appeal of the movement, and attempted to minimize the overt intolerance present in the mainstream movement. After Kennedy’s assassination, the Far Right may have felt that it would be not only insensitive, but also detrimental to the movement to express anti-Catholic attitudes in any capacity.

On the other hand, there is also a more optimistic explanation for the null relationship. Scholarship suggests that whites represented by a candidate who is a “first” to be elected from an underrepresented group become more accepting of racial diversity during that candidate’s incumbency (Hajnal, 2005). Thus, it is also possible that

²⁵ Further analysis suggests that while far-right sympathy fails to predict attitudes toward neighborhood integration among a national sample, far-right sympathizers in the North *are* more likely to oppose integration than other Americans. This comes as no surprise, as an integration in the North took on a very different character than in the South, and is less characterized by blatant and overt racism, which I find is a significant predictor of opposition to neighborhood integration across America, but especially in the South. For more on the struggle for equality in the North, see Thomas Sugrue (2009), *Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North*.

²⁶ The election of Mayor Tom Bradley saw overwhelming support for Bradley in pre-election polls, yet eventually lost his mayoral campaign in 1982. His loss was attributed to white voters telling pollsters that they would vote for Bradley, but then voted for his white competitor. For more on Tom Bradley and what has been deemed the “Bradley Effect,” see Citrin, Green and Sears (1990), “White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?”

Kennedy's presidency caused whites sympathetic to the Far Right to move closer to the rest of the country when it came to their perceptions of Catholics. In short, Kennedy may have softened what were originally negative views of Catholics amongst far-right sympathizers who realized that the country would not fall apart under Kennedy's presidency.

Despite a few inconsistencies, my Chapter 4 findings offer compelling evidence the anxiety of the Far Right was, at least in part, driving Far Right opposition to integration and negative attitudes toward out-groups in America; having accounted for a myriad of possible alternative explanations, independent effects of far-right sympathy remain. In sum, due to the number of possible alternative explanations that I have accounted for, it was unlikely that I would find any association exists between far-right sympathy and views toward integration and out-groups. Thus, my analysis clearly indicates that far-right sympathizers were more likely to oppose integration and feel cold toward out-groups because they were anxious of social change that was taking place in America.

Concluding Thoughts

Issues of race and group identity have played an important part in American politics for much of the country's history, and still hold a central place in politics today. Yet, the 1960s was arguably a time when issues of race and group identity were uniquely dominant on a national stage. Moreover, scholarship identifies issues of race in the 1960s as instrumental in the development of our current political environment, and the Far Right played an undeniable role in that development (Carmines & Stimson, 1992;

Lowndes, 2008). Having secured a seat at the Republican Party's table with the nomination of Goldwater for President, conservatives across America bared witness to what could happen if the Grand Old Party (GOP) ignored the views of the Far Right wing. Following Goldwater's defeat, the GOP needed to pick up the pieces in short order, and over the next two decades the party worked hard to incorporate enough of the Far Right's agenda that it could gain broad support among reactionary and traditional conservatives alike.

Richard Nixon's "Southern Strategy" in 1968 was designed to bring together a fractured Republican Party by regaining Southern support through policies of "law and order" alongside strict anti-Communism (Perlstein, 2008). Nixon appealed to a *Silent Majority* of American voters who, although dissatisfied with America, failed to boisterously voice their discontent. Nixon was able to rebuild enough of the conservative coalition to win the presidency in 1968, even with George Wallace's third party candidacy winning almost 14 percent of the popular vote. Nixon managed to re-capture defecting conservatives who sympathized with the Far Right in 1964, while Wallace captured the remaining Far Right activists with appeals of populism and racism (McEvoy, 1972). However, unlike in 1964, the split between Wallace and Nixon voters within the GOP was not enough to cost the party its shot at the White House.

Furthermore, the divide-and-conquer strategy employed by Nixon pitted working-class conservative whites against the progressive elites and social change activists, and created a political divide that continues to shape politics to this day (Perlstein, 2008). Far Right sympathizers' views toward racial progress and out-groups significantly influenced the political agenda of the GOP in the 1960s and beyond, solidifying the GOP as the

party of middle-class white Americans. In other words, the Far Right's opposition to integration and negative perceptions of out-groups pulled the GOP farther to the right on emerging issues in order to rebuild a conservative coalition. Nevertheless, the Far Right rears its head when America (especially conservative America) becomes too comfortable with change as a reminder that there are a significant number of Americans who deviate from an otherwise seemingly broad conservative consensus.²⁷

Today's Tea Party movement serves as our most recent reminder of the power the Far Right can yield, especially concerning issues of race in America. With the election of President Obama acting as the catalyst, disaffected Americans voiced their dissatisfaction with the direction of the country. During Obama's presidency, the Tea Party has organized protests and rallies declaring their opposition to immigration and gay and lesbian rights, and legislatively worked to institute voter ID laws and expand voting requirements thus creating obstacles for many Americans wishing to cast a ballot (Parker & Barreto, 2013). It is difficult to deny the similarities between the Tea Party's opposition to policies of inclusion and the Far Right's disapproval of integration and out-groups in the 1960s. And once again, the Tea Party has found a way to draw enough support away from the GOP that conservatives across America are left wondering if the party will ever be repaired.²⁸

In this chapter I examined the relationships between far-right sympathy and both opposition to integration and out-group antipathy. Prior to my analysis, only a small leap

²⁷ The work of Conover and Gray (1983) and Hixon, Jr. (1992) assert that the Goldwater movement was a necessary precursor to the political successes conservatives experienced throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Specifically, they identify the rise of the New Right in the late 1970s as an essential to understanding Reagan's political appeal in 1980.

²⁸ For example, an article by Ron Fournier (2014) in the *National Journal* exposes the pessimism within the rank of Republican leadership regarding the prospects of GOP unity by the 2016 presidential election cycle.

of faith was required to believe that the 1960s Far Right disagreed with racial integration. Anecdotal evidence squarely placed the Far Right in opposition to the Civil Rights movement, progressive leaders, and the goal of fully integrating America. My findings not only provide evidence to support what many have already presupposed – that the 1960s far-right opposed integration – but my work also shows that far-right sympathizers held negative perceptions of Jews and blacks, as well as dislike for the NAACP and CORE.

Moreover, my initial analysis of both periodicals and survey data, as presented in Chapters 1 and 2, indicates that sympathy for the Far Right is the product of anxiety about a changing America, and that far-right sympathizers are not typical traditional conservatives. In all, Far Right opposition to integration and dislike for out-groups in the 1960s must be attributed, at least in part, to the fear that the country was changing for the worst and on the brink of destruction. The fact that a similar Far Right movement is in full swing today beckons us to take a close look at far-right sympathy over time, possibly connecting movement sympathizers from one historical moment to another. The following, final chapter of my dissertation takes on this task.

Chapter 5

THE ENDURING POWER OF REACTIONARY CONSERVATISM

The central question driving this dissertation, as presented in Chapter 1, is what explains sympathy for the far-right movement of the 1960s. Specifically, I explore the part anxiety toward social change plays in driving far-right sympathy by tracing Far Right resistance to social change during different historical periods, and closely examining the elite messages of the Far Right in the 1960s. Chapter 2 then empirically tests the claims from the first chapter, and identifies movement sympathizers as reactionary conservatives. Chapter 3 examines the influence of far-right sympathy on political participation, and I find that far-right sympathizers were more likely than other Americans to engage in politics in 1964. Chapter 4 explores far-right sympathizers' attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups. In this final chapter, I examine the enduring strength of reactionary conservatism over time by assessing the influence of far-right sympathy on political engagement and attitudes toward integration and different groups in America in 1973, years after the 1960s Far Right occupied center stage in American politics.

To start my dissertation, I examined past and present far-right movements to illustrate why reactionary conservatism is the appropriate theoretical framework to explain far-right sympathy in several eras. Reactionary conservatism describes a resistance to any and all social change for fear of a deterioration of social prestige. Furthermore, in order to understand the Far Right of the 1960s as part of a long line of

far-right movements, I identify reactionary conservatism as a worldview acquired early in life, or a predisposition. Similar to other scholars, I argue that reactionary conservatism as a durable view of the world that promotes certain beliefs and judgments.¹ This chapter investigates the viability of identifying reactionary conservatism as a long-standing, stable political predisposition.

Using data from 1964, I made the claim that beyond and more precise than other explanations, reactionary conservatism influences political participation, attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups. My results support my claim, and at times I found reactionary conservatism a more powerful theoretical explanation than traditional explanations, such as partisan attachment and ideological strength.² My findings are similar to those in recent scholarship on the Tea Party that suggests sympathy for the Tea Party movement explains political participation and divergent attitudes toward patriotism, civil liberties, minority groups and President Obama (Parker & Barreto, 2013).

Additionally, I argue that conspiracy theories, often associated with reactionary conservatism, define far-right movements from the Know-Nothings to the Ku Klux Klan and the Tea Party. Moreover, there are even clear congenital links between past far-right movements and the Tea Party of today – the biological father of Tea Party founders the Koch brothers was a founding member of the John Birch Society (Epstein & Forster, 1967). Furthermore, JBS functions have appeared on the agendas and event schedules of different Tea Party factions, most notably the FreedomWorks faction of the Tea Party (Burghard & Zeskind, 2011). However, scholarship leaves the relationship between

¹ Notably, Parker and Barreto (2013) emphasize their belief that reactionary conservatism is a predisposition.

² Notable scholarship identifies partisan identity and ideology as instrumental to our understanding of political participation and political attitudes. See specifically, A. Campbell et al (1960), *The American Voter*, and M.S. Lewis-Beck et al (2008), *The American Voter Revisited*.

sympathizers of the Far Right at different historical moments relatively unexamined, and offers no empirical evidence suggesting that reactionary conservatism is a long-standing, durable worldview.³

This chapter empirically tests the power of reactionary conservatism over time, evaluating the concept's weight as a predisposition. Using panel data, I assess the enduring power of reactionary conservatism on individual behaviors and attitudes. I do this by examining individual attitudes years following the apex of the far-right movement of the 1960s – Goldwater's run for president.⁴ If reactionary conservatism truly is a political predisposition, then far-right sympathizers in the 1960s should remain more likely to participate in politics and hold similar attitudes toward social change and progress over time. In other words, if reactionary conservatism is a predisposition, then far-right sympathy, which explains certain behaviors and attitudes in 1964, should remain influential after the momentum of the initial far-right movement has slowed. If on the other hand reactionary conservatism is nothing more than a momentary attitude, then the predictive power of sympathy for the Far Right of the 1960s should fade along with the relatively short-lived political movement and historical moment.

In this chapter, I first provide a succinct explanation of reactionary conservatism as a political predisposition. I then describe my methods and data, and finally, I present my results. In sum, my findings include that reactionary conservatism, measured as far-right sympathy in the 1960s, remains a significant tripartite predictor in the 1970s: of

³ Although the scholarship of both Lipset and Raab (1970) and Sclesinger (1969) implies that far-right movements overtime are related, the scholarship fails to examine any empirical connections between the movements.

⁴ The work of Hixon, Jr. (1992) identifies the late 1950s and early 1960s as a time when the individuals and organizations of the far-right movement coalesced and constituted a “coherent right wing” during the presidential election of 1964 (pg. 53).

political participation, attitudes toward integration, and perceptions of symbols that represent resistance to social change. My results support the theory that reactionary conservatism is a predisposition rather than moment-related; reactionary conservatism remains influential several years after the far-right movement of the 1960s lost momentum. This chapter closes with concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.

Predispositions and Politics: Durable Systems of Belief

Many different outlets, such as political elites and the media, family members and even close friends constantly influence an individual's political behavior and attitudes. However, the degree to which individuals are willing to accept or reject the political information conveyed to them is dependent upon their preconceived interests, values and experiences (Zaller, 1992). These preconceived orientations are termed core values. Core values persist over an individual's lifetime and stem from early childhood socialization (Sears, 1983; Zaller, 1992; Clawson & Oxley, 2008).

Unlike attitudes, core values occupy a "more central" position within an individual's psyche because ordinary attitudes "depend on pre-existing social values."⁵ Core values crystalize early in life and serve as a filter for interpreting the changing world (Jennings, 1996; Sears & Funk, 1999). In other words, the early acquisition of core values ultimately influences how an individual interprets the world, and consequently

⁵ D.R. Kinder and D.O. Sears (1985) provide a summary of social psychological work on values and value systems in their book chapter, "Public Opinion and Political Action." The quoted text appears on page 674, yet Kinder and Sears rely upon the work of Allport (1961) and Rokeach (1973) to assert that core values inform other attitudes.

directs their political behaviors and attitudes (Sears, 1975).⁶ Most of the relevant research on politically based predispositions focuses on party identification and political ideology (because of their role in voting behavior), racial and ethnic prejudices, and other group-related attitudes (Sears & Funk, 1999). Yet, Parker and Barreto (2013) assert that reactionary conservatism is a political predisposition similar to political ideology, and reactionary conservatives acquire an anxiety toward social change that informs and guides their political action and preferences.

Scholarship fails to empirically test the durability of reactionary conservatism over time; however, work on another political predisposition, political ideology, is abundant. John Zaller's (1992) work on political information and elite discourse relies upon "stable, individual level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communication" a person receives (pg. 22). Zaller assigns values and ideologies the same theoretical meaning, and he suggests that ideology has a lasting influence on public opinion. M. Kent Jennings and Gregory Markus (1984) also find evidence of enduring systems of political values in their analysis of partisanship. Jennings and Markus find that partisan leanings fail to change much after they crystalize during adolescence.⁷

In addition to the aforementioned scholars, political predispositions are also central to Alvarez and Brehm's (2002) analysis in *Hard Choices, Easy Answers*. Even though they argue that understanding predispositions is more complicated than simply

⁶ Although scholars are in agreement that predispositions are formed during pre-adult socialization, there remains disagreement around whether long-standing predispositions are socialized episodically rather than incrementally. For more, see D.O. Sears and N.A. Valentino (1997), "Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Pre-adult Socialization."

⁷ Miler and Sears (1986) confirm the persistence of early childhood socialization using cross-sectional data from the General Social Survey (GSS) to examine socialization stages over time, yet they are unable to make conclusions about attitude change at the individual level.

identifying the minority of individuals who possess “well-defined, organized, and stable opinions,” they find that predispositions have an instrumental role in forming public opinion (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002, pg. 52).⁸ Alvarez and Brehm conclude that multiple political predispositions, working in conjunction with political information, inform political choices.

Recent scholarship on predispositions examines moral values that are central to the Far Right of the late twentieth century. Weisberg (2005) argues that predispositions informing an individual’s sense of right and wrong are instrumental in understanding the moral traditionalism of the New Right. In addition, Schwartz (2006, 2012) identifies ten values that help people cope with the world. Among the values he identifies, Schwartz (2012) designates “social status and prestige” as a core value, echoing characterizations of the Far Right (pg. 64). However, both Weisberg and Schwartz fall short of empirically testing the enduring strength of predispositions over time.

Lastly, David O. Sears and Carolyn Funk (1999) offer a final wrinkle to the discussion of predispositions. Sears and Funk explain that the political environment can also directly influence predispositions learned early in life. As salient issues change during different periods of time, timely stimulants prime, or activate, early-acquired beliefs. Just as Alvarez and Brehm (2002) advise, Sears and Funk suggest that individuals possess multiple predispositions at once, and the most salient issues prime a specific predisposition.⁹ As America encounters great moments of social change, reactionary

⁸ Alvarez and Brehm challenge Converse et al (1964) and Zaller (1992) by claiming that “virtually every” individual, as opposed to a few select, possess well-constructed core values that inform their political choices (Alvarez & Brehm, 2002, pg. 52). However, individual values are tempered by political knowledge, so even individuals with well-defined and stable opinions are unable to express consistent choices regarding uncommon aspects of politics.

⁹ In his early work, S.E. Asch (1948) suggests that changes in evaluation may result from a change in the salient object under judgment rather than a change in judgment itself. Put another way, judgment toward

conservatives' growing anxiety primes their beliefs about their place in America, and they resist change as a way to protect their position in society and maintain an America that meshes with their view of the world.

Throughout most of their lives, reactionary conservatives are comfortable with their perceived place in society, and view the world through a lens that has been developing since early-childhood; however, social change, perceived as threatening a reactionary conservative's world, leads to anxiety. Put another way, social change challenging the worldview of reactionary conservatives makes them anxious because change challenges the values and beliefs that ground their worldview, a worldview rooted in past socialization (Parker & Barreto, 2013). Thus, it is under circumstances of momentous social change that reactionary conservatives act. If reactionary conservatism truly is a predisposition, then its influence should persist over time. Conversely, if reactionary conservatism is a temporary and unstable attitude, then the concept should fail to explain behaviors and attitudes years after the far-right movement of the 1960s. Multivariate regression models can illustrate which of these scenarios is more accurate.

Data, Methods and Design

My interest in this study is to gain insight into individual behaviors and attitudes over time, to test the concept of reactionary conservatism as a political predisposition. Thus, I rely on panel data for its ability to demonstrate behavior and attitudes over time. Panel data offers a within-subject design where the same respondents interview at two or more points in time (Schuman & Presser, 1996), permitting an examination of change (or

certain objects may never change; it is the context that changes, prioritizing - or priming - certain judgments over others (pg. 256). For more on the priming hypothesis, see Iyengar and Kinder (1987); Kinder and Sanders (1996); Sears and Huddy (1992).

stability) over time. Another alternative for evaluating change over time is cross-sectional survey data, but this approach only permits the examination of *trends* over time, as the individuals examined are different at each occasion. Therefore, examinations of individuals' change over time rely on panel data rather than cross-sectional survey data.

M. Kent Jennings, in his analyses of political attitudes and life cycles, explains that panel data is essential to the examination of longitudinal patterns at the individual level (Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Jennings & Markus, 1984; Jennings, 1996). David O. Sears also turns to panel data in his extensive work on pre-adult socialization.¹⁰ Sears explains that conclusions drawn from cross-sectional data about longer segments of the human life cycle are speculative at best, and research requires longitudinal data to “achieve secure estimates” and reliable results (Sears & Funk, 1996, pg. 4).

Consequently, researchers agree that cross-sectional survey data falls short in evaluations of individual change over time, and panel data is preferred.

Finally, a number of studies have used panel data to bolster the initial claim in *The American Voter* that “an orientation toward political affairs typically begins before” individuals reach voting age (Campbell et al., 1960, pg. 146).¹¹ The creation of the National Election Panel Survey comes from the need to collect data from the same respondents at different points in time in response to limitations of cross-sectional data analysis. Undoubtedly, panel data is necessary to confidently claim that individual attitudes are driven by political predispositions that persist over time.

¹⁰ Specifically see, Sears and Valentino (1997); Sears and Funk (1999).

¹¹ See among others, Converse and Markus (1979); Jennings and Markus (1984); Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb (1991).

The Data

The data for this study come from a panel survey of parents and their children carried out by M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi at the Survey Research Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. My examination isolates the parents in the first two waves (1965 and 1973) of the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study (YPPS). I focus on the parents and the first two waves of the YPPS for two reasons. First, the parents are all of legal age to vote and participate in politics, and therefore already have crystallized core values and predisposed attitudes that have formed early in their lives. In other words, the parents are “firmly established and experienced veterans of electoral politics” due to their age (Jennings & Markus, 1984, pg. 78). Additionally, the first wave of the YPPS was collected in 1965 at the tail end of the far-right movement in the 1960s and the second wave was collected at a time without an organized national far-right movement. This makes these two years ideal for my examination over time. However, the two waves are close enough to one another in time that the salient political issues are essentially the same in both waves of the survey. Also, the survey examines the same attitudes in both years 1965 and in 1973.

Although the benefits associated with using YPPS are many, there are still limitations to the dataset that need mentioning. The first limitation is that the YPPS did not attempt to gather a nationally representative sample. The YPPS collected information from the parents of school-aged children chosen from a national probability sample of 97 secondary schools, selected within a probability proportionate to their size. Therefore, respondents in the panel data are older and richer than respondents in a nationally representative sample because the study design specifically targeted the parents of youth

who graduated high school in 1964 (see Table 4 in chapter appendix). However, these biases fail to carry over into other measures. When it comes to gender, education, marital status and partisan identity, the YPPS sample is representative of the nation. Furthermore, the YPPS also reflects the nation when it comes to my measure of far-right sympathy: voting for Goldwater for President in 1964.¹²

Also, as with any panel data, attrition is a concern. Of the 1,562 parents originally interviewed in 1965, 75.5 percent of the parents were re-interviewed in 1973 for a total of 1,179 cases. The parents who successfully re-interviewed in 1973 are indistinguishable from parents who dropped out of the study in 1965.¹³ Moreover, the retention rate for the first two waves of the YPPS is comparable to the retention rate for the 1972-1976 National Election Study Panel Survey (Jennings & Markus, 1984). The second wave of the YPPS is also representative of the first; aside from being slightly older and richer, the second wave in 1973 is similar to the first wave in 1965 (see Table A5.1 in Chapter 5 Results in the Appendix).

Lastly, although the YPPS is less comprehensive than other cross-sectional studies (such as the ANES), the available variables in the YPPS allow me to approximate my initial examination of reactionary conservatism completed in Chapters 3 and 4 while also considering change over time. Further, even though limitations exist with the YPPS, the theoretical leverage gained using panel data validates a shift from the ANES; the

¹² Separate multivariate regression analyses of only the 1965 YPPS wave also demonstrate that reactionary conservatism significantly predicts political behavior, attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups (see Table A5.2 in Chapter 5 Results in Appendix). The YPPS findings mirror those of the ANES suggesting that the YPPS sample, although slightly biased, is acceptable data for my analysis.

¹³ The available YPPS dataset only provides data for respondents who were interviewed in both waves of the panel study. This data limitation makes it impossible to conduct out-of-sample comparisons; however, Jennings and Niemi (1981) offer such an analysis in Appendix A of *Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents*.

endurance of reactionary conservatism over time cannot be accurately tested without panel data.

Methods, Design and Hypotheses

The following analysis examines the relationship between far-right sympathy in 1965 and political behavior and attitudes in 1973. To assess the enduring power of reactionary conservatism over time, I examine the relationship between my proxy for reactionary conservatism (or far-right sympathy) – a vote for Goldwater in 1964 – and political participation, attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups in 1973.¹⁴ Similar to my Chapter 4 analysis where I examine perceptions of the NAACP and CORE, I also examine perceptions of George Wallace, who I argue is a symbol of resistance to social change.¹⁵ I begin by analyzing the relationship between a vote for Goldwater in 1964 (measured in 1965) and political participation in 1973. I examine the relationship between my initial measure of reactionary conservative in 1965 and political action eight years later in 1973, and then move on to multivariate models. The combination of multivariate regression methods and the use of panel data allow me to first control for alternative explanations for political participation, as well as change in individual attitudes and sociodemographics over time. I then examine the explanatory

¹⁴ It is important to note that I measure far-right sympathy in 1965, directly following Goldwater's run for President. This allows for my analysis to capture Americans who sympathized with the movement during the 1960s, and also eliminates any bias that may occur from respondents in 1973 discussing their relationship to the Far Right or their support for Goldwater in hindsight.

¹⁵ My analysis of the 1964 ANES suggests that examining perceptions of specific political figures and symbols, such as the NAACP in 1964, may prove useful in addition to examining perceptions of broader out-groups. In 1964, I found that while reactionary conservatism explained, to some extent, perceptions of broad out-groups, the concept was an even more powerful predictor of perceptions of the NAACP and CORE, groups with a clear social change agenda.

power of far-right sympathy on attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups in 1973 using the same methodological approach.¹⁶

If anxiety toward social change is truly a predisposed worldview cultivated and adopted in adolescence, its influence should remain regardless of time and context. In the context of reactionary conservatism, the anxiety that drove sympathy for the Far Right on a national level during Goldwater's presidential bid should remain a significant explanation of behaviors and attitudes after the movement has dissipated. However, if reactionary conservatism is only a temporary product of political backlash and unique historical circumstances, far-right sympathizers in 1965 should be indistinguishable from other Americans eight years after the movement dissolved. It is from this argument that the following hypotheses derive:

H5.1: Far-right sympathy in 1965 will explain political participation in 1973 after accounting for other political and sociodemographic factors.

H5.2: Far-right sympathy in 1965 will explain opposition to government intervention in school integration and school busing in 1973 after accounting for other political and sociodemographic factors.

H5.3: Far-right sympathy in 1965 will explain perceptions of out-groups and George Wallace, a symbol of resistance to social change, in 1973 after accounting for other political and sociodemographic factors.

¹⁶ The results presented in Chapter 5 are from both logistical regressions and ordinary least squares regressions in which the standard errors are not clustered by wave. Advanced panel data modeling is unnecessary when examining only two waves of data and when outcome variables are only available in the latter wave of data. However, random effects models reinforce the results for each of the regression models that appear in this chapter. Again, although random effects modeling accounts for between and within subject differences across both panels, the random effect is essentially comparable to the error term in the non-clustered logistic or linear model because the outcome variables examined are only measured in 1973. For more on advanced panel data modeling, see Jeffrey M. Wooldridge (2010), *Econometrics Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*.

Results and Analysis

Results of my panel analysis suggest that reactionary conservatism explains, at least in part, political participation, attitudes toward integration and perceptions of out-groups. Reactionary conservatives, measured as individuals who voted for Goldwater in 1964, are more likely to participate in politics and less likely to approve of integration.¹⁷ On the other hand, individuals who voted for Goldwater fail to differ from other respondents in their perceptions of broad out-groups, a finding that differs from my analysis of perceptions of out-groups in Chapter 4. However, reactionary conservatives are more likely to express warm feelings toward George Wallace, a figure that represented resistance to social change and progress in 1973.

Political Engagement

The Far Right of the 1960s occupies an important place in American political history for two main reasons. First, the movement spoke to a segment of society that felt ignored. In the late 1950s, both the Democrats and the Republicans understood the inevitability of Civil Rights (Higham, 1959; Hodgson, 1978).¹⁸ The Far Right reached out to Americans who believed that the country was falling into the hands of traitors, race baiters and Communist subversives. Indictments of Eisenhower as a Communist tool

¹⁷ As alluded to in Chapter 2, voting for Goldwater in 1964 is a particularly good measure of reactionary conservatism for a number of reasons. First, the literature and rhetoric of the John Birch Society (JBS) reached far beyond their limited membership, garnering sympathy from a significant number of Americans looking to Goldwater for an alternative to the mainstream politics of the time. Additionally, Goldwater made explicit appeals to the anxiety and conspiracy espoused by the JBS without specifically endorsing the radical group and its leaders (Perlstein, 2001). This strategy allowed Goldwater to charm Americans who sympathized with the rhetoric of the Far Right. Finally, Americans who supported Goldwater in the early 1960s were cut from the same cloth as those who sympathized with the conspiratorial rhetoric of Joseph McCarthy a decade earlier (McEvoy, 1972).

¹⁸ Although scholars describe the 1950s as a time of liberal consensus, recent work argues that the consensus was rather limited and failed to reach beyond the liberal establishment. White resistance to integration in both the North and the South are unaccounted for in the liberal consensus. See, Gary Gerstle (1995), "Race and the Myth of the Liberal Consensus."

followed Nixon's failures in the 1960 presidential election, and the Far Right solidified its place in American politics.¹⁹


Although important, the Far Right's political and social views were only part of the movement's national attention. The Far Right of the 1960s had tremendous political influence because of the activism of movement sympathizers. Leading up to 1964 presidential election, the Far Right garnered local and state level support for Barry Goldwater. Specifically, the work of far-right sympathizers in Orange County, California secured Goldwater the Republican presidential nomination (McGirr, 2001; Perlstein, 2001). Anecdotal accounts also characterize the Far Right as a movement that constantly called and wrote representatives, held political rallies and actively campaigned (Broyles, 1964). In sum, scholarship highlights the political engagement of the Far Right.

In Chapter 3, I find that sympathy for the Far Right is associated with high levels of political engagement. My findings suggest that reactionary conservatives engage in politics because they are anxious about the way the country is changing and fear a loss in social prestige. Although disgusted and disapproving of government and politicians, far-right sympathizers chose to voice their dissatisfaction through the political process. However, I have yet to test whether far-right sympathizers remain more politically engaged than other Americans years after the national movement subsided. If sympathizers of the Far Right are predisposed to view social change as dangerous and destroying America, then they should continue to act in defense of the nation's status quo. On the other hand, if far-right sympathy is solely a reaction to the social and

¹⁹ Accusations against Eisenhower, made by the founder of the John Birch Society Robert Welch, positioned the far-right movement of the 1960s opposite mainstream conservatism as William F. Buckley used the *National Review* to criticize and renounce Welch. For a short description see, Sean Wilentz's (2010), "Confounding Fathers: The Tea Party's Cold War Roots."

political forces of the period, then they should be indistinguishable from the rest of America in the absence of a national far-right movement to mobilize them.


The 1973 wave of the YPPS measures a wide-range of typical political action. I examine measures of both electoral participation and non-electoral participation. Figure 5.1 presents the frequency of political participation for all respondents in 1973.



As Figure 5.1 shows, over 80 percent of overall respondents voted in the 1972 presidential election, but far fewer respondents participated in other, non-electoral ways. Less than 25 percent of respondents wore a campaign button or donated money to a political campaign in 1973, and fewer than 20 percent of respondents stated that they attended a political meeting. Less than 30 percent of respondents contacted a public official.²⁰

²⁰ After each respondent was asked whether or not they took part in each specific political act, they were asked when they last completed the act. The question of *when* such political action took place is important because I am attempting to measure participation years after the far right movement of the 1960s. I limit my examination to political acts that took place after 1967 because I want to ensure that time has elapsed

If, as I suggest, far-right sympathizers acted on their anxiety and dissatisfaction with a changing America in 1964, then the same predisposed attitudes should be driving their action in 1973. Figure 5.2 represents the results comparing far-right sympathizers, or respondents who voted for Goldwater, to other respondents.



As indicated in Figure 5.2, far-right sympathizers are statistically more likely to participate in politics. When it comes to voting 95 percent of far-right sympathizers report voting in the 1972 presidential election, compared to 76 percent of all other respondents. Far-right sympathizers report attending a political meeting, wearing a campaign button or donating money to a political campaign at least 10 percentage points higher than other respondents. Over 40 percent of far-right sympathizers report contacting or communicating with a political official, compared to only 25 percent of other respondents.

since the first wave of the survey in 1965 and their political act. Also, the great majority of political participation corresponds with the Presidential elections of 1968 and 1972.

The next step is to test whether or not sympathy for the Far Right has an independent effect on political participation beyond other factors associated with political action. I turn to multivariate regression analysis to examine the influence of far-right sympathy while also considering other factors. Scholarship suggests that numerous political and resource-based factors explain political participation. For example, individuals who are older, have higher incomes, and are more educated are more likely to participate in politics (Campbell et al., 1960; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). Gender and religion also play a role in political participation; women and individuals who attend church are more likely to participate (Campbell et al., 1960; Peterson, 1992; Harris, 1994; Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). I also account for race because minority groups have historically participated at lower rates than whites (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 2005).²¹

Additionally, marriage is also associated with political action as interpersonal influence can motivate individuals to participate (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Furthermore, individuals who are politically knowledgeable are more engaged, and those who mistrust the American government remove themselves from politics (Campbell et al., 1960; Easton, 1965; Templeton, 1966; Mueller et al., 1982; Schwartz, 1973). I also control for anti-Communist attitudes, political ideology, support for a limited federal government and partisan identity to account for explanations for right wing preferences that challenge reactionary conservatism.²² Finally, I also account for whether or not an

²¹ Recent scholarship suggests that racial minority groups, namely African Americans, are more likely to vote than whites once accounting for resource based explanations. Moreover, African American turnout surpassed white turnout for the first time in 2012. See, P. R. Abramson and W. Claggett (1986), "Race-Related Differences in Self-Reported and Validated Voter Turnout in 1984"; H. Yen (2013), "A Census First: Black Voter Turnout Surpasses Whites."

²² Due to data limitations I am unable to use the exact measure for limited government, whether or not government is too powerful, that appears in my analysis of ANES data. Instead, I use respondents' attitudes

individual lived in the South because Southern states overwhelmingly supported Goldwater in 1964 and any remaining association between support for Goldwater and political participation may be a product of their regional location in 1973.²³

My initial results suggest that far-right sympathy, measured in 1965 as a vote for Goldwater for President, remains a statistically significant predictor of political participation in 1973 (see Table A5.3 in Chapter 5 Results in the Appendix). Even after controlling for other factors known to influence political participation, such as age, education, income and political knowledge, sympathizers of the Far Right in 1965 are more likely to participate in politics eight years later. Although my initial analysis suggests that I correctly identify reactionary conservatism as an enduring predisposition, the utilization of panel data allows for additional methodological rigor.²⁴

Up to this point, I have considered the possibility that the sociodemographic characteristics and individual attitudes of a respondent may influence their political participation in 1973. However, changes in resources, political knowledge or attitudes over time can also influence political action. Thus, my final models control for changes in education, changes in income, changes in political knowledge, changes in political trust and changes in attitudes toward Communism from the first wave of the YPPS in 1965 to the second wave in 1973.²⁵

toward the government's role in providing jobs, as it was the only measure available that asked about government intervention.

²³ Additional analyses of the Deep South and the Border South fail to significantly change my results. See the Appendix at the end of the dissertation for the full explanation of coding the South.

²⁴ In addition, a comparison of the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) indicates that the models that account for change over time better fit the data.

²⁵ Change over time can only be examined when variables are measured exactly the same in both 1965 and 1972. I account for every possible change variable in my final model specifications. Please see Chapter 5 Results in the Appendix for a comparison of preliminary models to full models including variables measuring change over time. I created change variables by subtracting the values of 1965 measures from the values of 1973 measures.

Table 5.1 presents the results from my regression models predicting political participation. As indicated above, after controlling for changes in resources, knowledge, and attitudes over time, sympathy for the Far Right in 1965 remains a significant

Table 5.1. Predicting Political Engagement in 1973

	Voted in 1972	Attended a Meeting	Wore a Button	Donated to Campaign	Contacted Official
Goldwater Vote in '64	1.59* (0.467)	0.47* (0.275)	0.58* (0.281)	0.60* (0.292)	0.90* (0.258)
Anti-Communism	0.01 (0.365)	-0.12 (0.283)	-0.14 (0.272)	-0.20 (0.284)	-0.44* (0.259)
Political Mistrust	-0.23* (0.133)	0.06 (0.111)	0.16 (0.107)	-0.01 (0.116)	-0.04 (0.105)
Political Knowledge	0.86* (0.227)	0.34* (0.153)	0.56* (0.154)	0.68* (0.156)	0.16 (0.141)
Republican	0.40 (0.412)	0.07 (0.307)	-0.11 (0.294)	-0.26 (0.318)	-0.75* (0.298)
Independent	-0.27 (0.320)	-0.12 (0.289)	-1.26* (0.331)	-0.88* (0.315)	-0.10 (0.257)
Limited Government	0.17* (0.082)	-0.06 (0.071)	-0.10 (0.069)	-0.05 (0.075)	-0.07 (0.066)
Anti-Communism Change	0.07 (0.320)	-0.35 (0.236)	0.51* (0.229)	0.03 (0.235)	0.18 (0.214)
Pol Mistrust Change	0.07 (0.125)	-0.07 (0.102)	-0.11 (0.099)	-0.02 (0.107)	0.04 (0.094)
Pol Knowledge Change	-0.59* (0.220)	-0.22 (0.156)	-0.17 (0.153)	-0.49* (0.160)	-0.00 (0.145)
Education Change	0.30 (0.426)	0.31 (0.264)	-0.49 (0.297)	0.09 (0.280)	0.30 (0.257)
Income Change	-0.00 (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)	-0.00* (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)
Constant	0.97 (1.086)	-1.95* (0.807)	-2.78* (0.812)	-2.76* (0.854)	-2.31* (0.814)
Observations	656	651	653	653	637
% Pred. Correctly	88.4%	79.9%	79.8%	80.9%	73.9%


Standard errors in parentheses; all models are logistical regression; models also control for ideology, church attendance, marital status, gender, race, education, age, income and living in the South.

* $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

predictor of political participation in 1973. In other words, individuals who sympathized with the Far Right in 1965 are more likely to participate in politics eight years after the movement's momentum stalled with Goldwater's failed Presidential bid. For ease of interpretation, I turn to changes in predicted probabilities. The change in predicted

probability measures the change in the probability of participating in politics as my competing explanations move from their minimum to their maximum values.²⁶

Figure 5.3 shows the change in the predicted probability of engaging in politics when far-right sympathizers are compared to all other Americans.



²⁶ All other variables are held at their mean when calculating predicted probabilities.

As Figure 5.3 illustrates, an individual who sympathized with the Far Right in 1965, measured as voting for Goldwater for President, is 8 percent more likely to have voted in the presidential election in 1972. Sympathizing with the Far Right in 1965 is a powerful and significant predictor of voting in 1972, while anti-Communist attitudes, political trust and partisan identity fail to significantly predict voting behavior. Although individuals who support limited government are 7 percent more likely to have voted, reactionary conservatism predicts voting above and beyond the other political and socioeconomic explanations.

Sympathy for the Far Right also increases the likelihood of having attended a political meeting by 7 percent, again making it the most powerful predictor of political action among the alternative explanations displayed. Moreover, far-right sympathy, when compared to the alternative explanations displayed, is significantly associated with having worn a campaign button (9 percent increase) and having made a political donation (9 percent increase). When it comes to having contacted a political official, far-right sympathizers are 17 percent more likely to do so. In all, even after controlling for other factors and changes in resources and attitudes over time, sympathizing with the Far Right in 1965 remains one of the most powerful predictors of political participation in 1973.


Attitudes toward Integration

Thus far, my findings suggest that far-right sympathy remains a powerful predictor of political participation years after the far-right movement of the 1960s. However, does far-right sympathy also work to predict political attitudes over time? By the 1970s, America passed Civil Rights and Voting Rights legislation; nevertheless, the

country remained divided on whether or not the government should play an active role in ensuring racial integration (Lowndes, 2008). For many Americans, integration would happen in due time, and they still valued the separation of blacks and whites in society (Kruse, 2005). As the 1960s came to a close, integration of public schools and the concept of school busing reached its height (Lassiter, 2006). If some Americans saw the racial mixing of adults as an uncomfortable reality, then the thought of integrating elementary and high schools was unbearable (McMillen, 1971).

My Chapter 4 findings suggest that in 1964 far-right sympathizers were less likely than other Americans to support integration, both in their workplace and at their schools, as well as school busing. Furthermore, far-right sympathy was significantly associated with negative attitudes toward employment, school integration and busing even after controlling for other explanations. I now turn to the panel data to examine the power of far-right sympathy in 1965 on attitudes toward school integration and school busing in 1973. If sympathy for the Far Right – or reactionary conservatism – truly is representative of a predisposed worldview, then far-right sympathizers should remain less likely than other Americans to support school integration and busing eight years after the first wave of the survey. However, if reactionary conservatism proves not to be predisposition, then far-right sympathy in 1965 should fail to predict attitudes in 1973.

Figure 5.4 presents attitudes toward the government's role in school integration and attitudes toward busing in 1973. A majority of respondents (57 percent) opposed government intervention in school integration. Furthermore, 70 percent of respondents opposed school busing to achieve integration, suggesting that the idea of integration was easier for many Americans to accept than the proposed solution of busing.



Next, I examine the relationship between far-right sympathy in 1965 and attitudes toward school integration and busing in 1973. Figure 5.5 presents the attitudes of far-right sympathizers compared to all other Americans.




Figure 5.5. indicated that nine years after voting for Goldwater, far-right sympathizers are still different from other voters. Only 30 percent of far-right sympathizers supported government intervention to ensure integration compared with almost 48 percent of non-sympathizers. Additionally, close to 79 percent of far-right sympathizers opposed busing to ensure integration, over ten percentage points more than the rest of the country. Similar to my analysis on political participation, far-right sympathizers in 1965 are significantly more likely to oppose school integration and busing in 1973.

Even though my initial analysis suggests an association between sympathy for the Far Right in 1965 and attitudes toward school integration in 1973, I have yet to account for other explanations that may explain the observed relationships. In other words, could far-right sympathizers oppose government-led school integration and busing because of their views on limited government or their partisan attachment? Scholarship identifies support for a limited federal government and partisan identity as primary reasons why individuals may have disagreed with government-forced school integration and busing.²⁷

One key defense for separation and segregation is individual economic achievement. As the American suburbs grew in the 1960s and 70s, new white suburban families felt they had worked their way into economic prosperity. By virtue of living in the suburbs, families believed that they earned the right to send their children to neighborhood schools that were often better funded, better staffed and all around superior educational environments than schools in the inner city (McGirr, 2001; Lassiter, 2006; Kruse, 2007). White suburban families worked to give their children the best education possible, and they were unwilling to relinquish their hard-earned privilege. They refused

²⁷ See Lowndes (2008) and Lassiter (2006).

to allow poor, African American students into their schools, let alone bus their children to the inner city (Lassiter, 2006).

White Americans relied upon a conservative defense that dates back to the founding of the country: government is inherently tyrannical and should be limited.²⁸ Whites' justification for their resistance to school integration centered on the argument that government should interfere as little as possible in personal matters (Lassiter, 2006). During the 1960s the Republican Party platform argued that an expanding federal government was dangerous, and used this argument as a politically correct reason to oppose Civil Rights legislation (Kabaservice, 2012). By the 1970s, Americans had used traditional conservative views or partisan attachment to explain their opposition to school integration and busing for over a decade.

As I model attitudes toward school integration and busing in 1973, I account for a number of factors associated with policy preferences along with attitudes toward limited government and partisan identity. Scholarship associates sociodemographic factors, such as age, income, gender, marital status and education, with policy preferences in one form or another. Additionally, individuals who are knowledgeable about politics or mistrust the American political system hold views that differ from their counterparts, and individuals who attend church at a high rate also hold different policy preferences from those who do not.²⁹ I also take into account political factors that are instrumental in

²⁸ The role of government in the lives of American citizens was a fundamental point of disagreement between the Federalist and the Anti-Federalists, leading to a system of checks and balances. James Madison's argument can be found in Federalist No. 51, where he elaborates on the abuses of government.

²⁹ In *The American Voter*, Angus Campbell (1960) and his co-authors find that sociodemographic characteristics and political knowledge are associated with ideological stances and policy views. In addition, Mark Hetherington (2005) claims that political support, specifically trust in government, is associated with specific policy attitudes toward government spending and healthcare. Finally, church attendance, encompassed by a broader sense of religious attachment, has been shown to have great importance in American political life influencing attitudes toward abortion, gay rights and the environment.

understanding attitudes toward public policy, such as support for limited government, ideology and partisan identity politics (Campbell et al., 1960; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). Living in the South is an important control because of Southern animosity toward racial integration, and I argue that although the threat of Communism was used as justification for opposition to the Civil Rights movement and movements for racial integration, anti-Communism masked anxiety toward social change. I also account for changes over time in attitudes toward Communism, political support, political knowledge, education and income.³⁰

Even after accounting for alternative explanations and changes in resources and attitudes over time, far-right sympathy in 1965 significantly predicts attitudes toward school integration and busing in 1973. Table 5.2 presents the regression results for models predicting attitudes toward integration and busing. I again use changes in predicted probabilities to display my results. Figure 5.6 shows that far-right sympathizers are 10 percent less likely to think that the government should ensure school integration in 1973.

For more on religion in American political life, see Leege and Kellstedt (1993), *Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics*.


³⁰ Prior to specifying models that include variables for change over time, I find that far right sympathy significantly predicts opposition to school integration and busing in preliminary models. Please see Chapter 5 Results in the Appendix for the models.

Table 5.2. Predicting Attitudes toward Integration and Busing in 1973

	Govt. Should Ensure School Integration	Against Busing to Achieve Integration
Goldwater Vote in '64	-0.43* (0.238)	0.60* (0.270)
Anti-Communism	0.30 (0.240)	0.51* (0.257)
Political Mistrust	-0.12 (0.096)	0.15 (0.112)
Political Knowledge	0.08 (0.136)	-0.27* (0.145)
Republican	0.47* (0.263)	-0.53* (0.281)
Independent	0.06 (0.234)	0.29 (0.271)
Limited Government	-0.09 (0.059)	0.20* (0.065)
Anti-Communism Change	-0.49* (0.204)	-0.19 (0.215)
Pol Mistrust Change	0.09 (0.087)	-0.02 (0.103)
Pol Knowledge Change	-0.02 (0.134)	-0.02 (0.144)
Education Change	-0.08 (0.244)	-0.36 (0.249)
Income Change	-0.00 (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)
Constant	2.46* (0.736)	-1.37* (0.755)
Observations	613	641
% Pred. Correctly	65.9%	76.3%

Standard errors in parentheses; all models are logistical regression; models also control for ideology, church attendance, marital status, gender, race, education, age, income and living in the South. * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

Figure 5.6. Association between Voting for Goldwater and Attitudes toward Integration in 1973



Together, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.6 indicate that Individuals who support limited government and mistrust in the government are also less likely to support government enforced school integration (14 and 13 percent less likely, respectively). However, far-right sympathy predicts opposition to government-ensured school integration beyond alternative explanations. In other words, even after accounting for the effects of political

support and limited government, far-right sympathy remains a significant predictor in its own right.

When examining attitudes toward school busing, far-right sympathy again significantly predicts oppositional attitudes in 1973. Far-right sympathizers are 10 percent more likely to oppose school busing than Americans who failed to sympathize with the Far Right in 1965. Anti-Communist attitudes and support for limiting the federal government significantly predict opposition to school busing (9 and 24 percent, respectively). Still, far-right sympathy is a significant predictor independent of these other explanations. My results suggest reactionary conservatism is an enduring predisposition that significantly predicts attitudes toward school integration years after the far-right movement of the 1960s.

Perceptions of Out-groups

Thus far, my results suggest that far-right sympathy, or reactionary conservatism, is a powerful predictor of political participation and attitudes toward school integration and busing over time. Even after accounting for political and sociodemographic factors, as well as changes in both over time, the power of far-right sympathy endures. The final step of my analysis examines the enduring power of far-right sympathy on attitudes toward groups perceived as un-American: Jews, Catholics and African Americans. Just as in Chapter 4, I also examine attitudes toward a controversial figure that clearly represents social change, or in this case resistance to social change, George Wallace.

In their pursuit to protect social prestige, reactionary conservatives identify threatening groups as attempting to ruin American values and traditions in a quest to

destroy the country. Reactionary conservatives identify social change as an assault on America, which is historically identified as white, Protestant, working class and heterosexual (Smith, 1997; Devos & Banaji, 2005). Social change such as racial integration in the 1960s and 70s represents a lifestyle decline for individuals who are comfortable with their present social conditions and cultural privilege. As it turns out, individuals who identify most with America believe that true Americans are white, middle-class, Protestant and native-born (Theiss-Morse, 2009; Parker & Barreto, 2013). Therefore, Jewish Americans, Catholics and African Americans remain outside of the prototypical definition of real Americans.

In addition to perceptions of out-groups, I also examine attitudes toward George Wallace in 1973. In Chapter 4, I found that far-right sympathy significantly predicted attitudes toward Jews and blacks; however, far-right sympathy was even more powerful when examining perceptions of the NAACP and CORE, clear symbols of social change and progress in the 1960s because of the organizations' ties to the Civil Rights movement. I argue that George Wallace acts as a similar symbol in 1973 such that Wallace represents clear resistance to social change.

Since his first presidential run in 1964, Wallace believed that Communists and the federal government were to blame for the problems in America, and he appealed to working class Americans that felt their government had forgotten them (Hixon, Jr. 1992). Wallace believed that it was his job to return the Republican Party to its conservative, white roots (Kabasrvice, 2012). George Wallace feared an integrated America, and his anxiety toward social change materialized as a vehement defense of segregation. Wallace's supporters understood his objection to integration and his antipathy toward

blacks. Furthermore, his segregationist record and blatant appeal to racial resentments spoke for themselves.³¹ I argue that reactionary conservatives perceived Wallace as defending America’s past traditions against new, uncomfortable change.³²

To begin my analysis, I first explore how Americans generally felt about Jews, Catholics, blacks and George Wallace. Few individuals tend to report very warm feelings toward Jews, Catholics and blacks in 1973.³³ Figure 5.7 illustrates Americans’ attitudes toward these groups.




Figure 5.7 shows that only 41 percent of respondents report very warm feelings toward Catholics. Almost 33 percent of respondents report very warm feelings toward Jews, and

³¹ As Alabama Governor, Wallace famously stated, “Segregation forever” in his 1963 Inaugural Address (Kabaservice, 2012, pg 101).

³² The literature on Far Right support for George Wallace suggests that aside from segregationists in the South, only the most radical supporters of the Far Right in the early 1960s voted for George Wallace for President in 1968 (McEvoy, 1972; Hixon, Jr., 1992) However, I am interested in perceived warmth towards Wallace as a symbolic figure, not actually voting for him.

³³ Respondents were asked to rate each group or individuals on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents very warm feelings. For my bivariate analysis, warm feelings were coded as a score of 80 or higher on a 100-point scale. The feeling thermometer scales were coded from 0 to 100 points in the regression analysis that follows.

30 percent of respondents report very warm feelings toward blacks. Even fewer respondents felt very warm toward George Wallace, as a meager 14 percent of respondents report very warm feelings toward Wallace in 1973.

Figure 5.8 compares far-right sympathizers' perceptions of out-groups and George Wallace to all other respondents.




Figure 5.8 shows that far-right sympathizers are less likely to report very warm feelings toward Jews and Catholics as 5 percentage points separate them from other respondents. When compared to other respondents, significantly fewer far-right sympathizers report very warm feelings toward blacks. In addition, significantly more far-right sympathizers report very warm feelings toward George Wallace. Figure 5.8 suggests that, when compared to other Americans, far-right sympathizers are less likely to report very warm feelings toward Jews, Catholics and blacks, but they are more likely to report very warm feelings toward George Wallace. However, the relationships presented in Figure 5.8 are

nothing more than strong associations as I have yet to consider other, alternative factors that might explain the attitudes of far-right sympathizers.

To account for alternative explanations for perceptions of out-groups and George Wallace, I turn to a familiar set of controls. I account for sociodemographic factors, such as age, gender, racial identity, education and income. Scholarship has found that age, gender and race influence evaluations of other societal groups. Resources and economic status also influence how individuals assess other groups in society.³⁴

In addition, I account for partisan identity, ideology, support for limited government, political knowledge and political mistrust. Politics plays an instrumental role in identifying winners and losers in American society. Therefore, political orientations might explain the observed relationship between far-right sympathy and attitudes toward groups perceived as political competition.³⁵ Furthermore, I must account for political factors when examining how individuals evaluate George Wallace because of his political career. I also account for church attendance, living in the South and anti-Communist attitudes.³⁶ Lastly, I consider changes in resources and attitudes over time.

Table 5.3 presents the regression estimates for models predicting perceptions of Jews, Catholics, blacks and George Wallace. Figure 5.9 displays linear regression coefficients and standard errors for models predicting perceptions of out-groups and

³⁴ Dominance of one group over another is an arrangement persistent in America. Racism, sexism and the Protestant Work Ethic are used as justifications for group status. For more on group position and social dominance, see L. Bobo and M. Tuan (2006), *Prejudice and Politics: Group Position, Public Opinion, and the Wisconsin Treaty Rights Dispute*; J. Sidanius and F. Pratto (1999), *Social Dominance*.

³⁵ Group interest theory asserts that group identity and political context are inseparable, and perceived group conflict or competition is associated with political choices and electoral behavior. For more, see Kaufmann (2004), *The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Behavior in American Cities*.

³⁶ Church attendance becomes especially important when examining attitudes toward two religious minorities, Jews and Catholics. Also, Wallace found significant support in the South because of his anti-black attitudes and displayed his anti-Communist sentiments throughout his political career. For more on Wallace, see Dan T. Carter (1995), *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, The Origins of New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics*.

George Wallace. In Figure 5.9, significant relationships are represented by a point estimate encompassed by a standard error that fails to cross zero.

Table 5.3. Predicting Attitudes toward Out-Groups and George Wallace in 1973

	Jews	Catholics	Blacks	G. Wallace
Goldwater Vote in '64	-0.51 (1.891)	0.36 (1.953)	1.22 (1.822)	4.09* (2.263)
Anti-Communism	3.66* (1.909)	1.51 (1.986)	0.13 (1.840)	5.12* (2.282)
Political Mistrust	-1.81* (0.753)	-1.88* (0.774)	-2.34* (0.722)	-0.08 (0.895)
Political Knowledge	1.52 (1.070)	-0.07 (1.111)	-0.11 (1.030)	-3.89* (1.277)
Republican	-3.45 (2.092)	-1.49 (2.156)	-3.22 (2.010)	1.58 (2.522)
Independent	-2.31 (1.891)	-4.72* (1.966)	-3.64* (1.816)	0.90 (2.261)
Limited Government	-0.71 (0.470)	-0.63 (0.490)	-1.02* (0.453)	0.92 (0.563)
Anti-Communism Change	-0.50 (1.617)	-1.90 (1.687)	1.25 (1.561)	-1.64 (1.929)
Pol Mistrust Change	1.21* (0.684)	1.17* (0.707)	2.12* (0.657)	-1.05 (0.816)
Pol Knowledge Change	-0.43 (1.073)	-0.09 (1.126)	-0.86 (1.038)	0.12 (1.293)
Education Change	0.55 (1.924)	1.57 (2.017)	0.62 (1.879)	-0.50 (2.328)
Income Change	0.00 (0.000)	0.00 (0.000)	0.00 (0.000)	0.00 (0.000)
Constant	64.23* (5.589)	69.38* (5.797)	85.27* (5.389)	26.97* (6.702)
Observations	633	644	651	644
Chi ²	0.067	0.052	0.110	0.217

Standard errors in parentheses; all models are ordinary least-squares regression; models also control for ideology, church attendance, marital status, gender, race, education, age, income and living in the South. * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

Figure 5.9. Linear Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Out-groups in 1973




Table 5.3 shows that far-right sympathy fails to explain perceptions of Jews, Catholics and blacks, but is significantly associated with positive perceptions of George Wallace. Similarly, Figure 5.9 demonstrates that far-right sympathy fails to explain perceptions of Jews while also presenting the other factors controlled for in the model; being white, female and married all also significantly predict warm feelings toward Jews. On the other hand, being Republican and mistrustful of the government significantly predicts cold feelings toward Jews. An increase in political mistrust from 1965 to 1973

significantly predicts warm feelings toward Jews, but this finding may be a reflection of the existing government authorities in 1965 and 1973.³⁷

Likewise, I find that far-right sympathy fails to predict attitudes toward Catholics or blacks. The only significant explanation of warm feelings toward Catholics is white racial identity. On the other hand, identifying as an Independent and mistrusting the government explain cold feelings. Being white, Republican, supporting limited government and mistrusting government all predict cold feelings toward blacks, while church attendance significantly predicts warm feelings toward blacks. Just as with attitudes toward Jews, an increase in political mistrust from 1965 to 1973 predicts warm attitudes toward blacks.

Nevertheless, when examining perceptions of George Wallace, a clear symbol of resistance to social change, far-right sympathy significantly predicts warm feelings. Being from the South, white and reporting anti-Communist attitudes also significantly predicts warm feelings toward Wallace. However, even when accounting for alternative explanations, far-right sympathy in 1965 independently predicts warm feelings toward Wallace in 1973. In addition, political knowledge and a growing mistrust in government both predict cold feelings toward Wallace. In sum, unlike perceptions of Jews, Catholics and blacks, reactionary conservatism explains warm feelings toward George Wallace.

³⁷ Unlike political allegiance and other forms of diffuse political support, political trust is specific to the current political authorities in power. Since Democrats controlled the White House in 1965 and Republicans regained control by 1973, changes in political trust may be the result of partisan changes in national power. For more on diffuse and specific political trust, see D. Easton (1975), "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support."

Discussion and Conclusions

Throughout my dissertation, I have argued that far-right sympathizers in the 1960s were different from other Americans, and the evidence supports this assertion. Specifically, my analysis of 1964 political engagement found that far-right sympathizers participated in politics at higher rates than other Americans, and were more likely to oppose integration and harbor cold feelings toward symbols of social change. However, the framework I use to describe the Far Right theorizes that sympathizers are more than just a politically active group of Americans with unique political attitudes. Far-right sympathizers are reactionary conservatives and their anxiety toward social change drives their political behavior and attitudes. Moreover, reactionary conservatives' attitudes and behaviors are persuaded by a worldview dependent on traditional comforts and threatened by social change.

If the attitudes and political behavior of far-right sympathizers in the 1960s truly are dependent on an enduring, long-standing worldview, then the difference between them and other Americans should persist beyond the 1960s. My Chapter 5 results suggest this is the case. I find that the vigorous political action of the Far Right in 1964 was not unique to the historical time and circumstances. Far-right sympathizers participated in politics at higher rates than other Americans in 1973 without a national movement to mobilize them.

In addition to political action, sympathizers of the Far Right in the 1960s are also more likely than other Americans to oppose integration in 1973. Along with far-right sympathy, mistrust in government and support for limited government explain opposition to school integration. Individuals who mistrust their government may find themselves

unlikely to think the government can successfully integrate schools. Furthermore, anti-Communist attitudes predict opposition to school busing; Communist groups voiced their support for school busing, and linked busing to a historical fight against oppression.³⁸ Still, even after accounting for other explanations, far-right sympathizers remain distinctively opposed to school integration and busing several years after the height of the far-right movement of the 1960s.

Finally, far-right sympathizers are more likely than other Americans to feel warm toward George Wallace, a figure that symbolized resistance to social change. In the previous chapter, I found that in 1964 far-right sympathizers' perceptions of broadly described out-groups, such as Jews and blacks, were also distinguishable from other Americans. However, my analysis over time failed to produce a significant relationship between far-right sympathy in the 1960s and perceptions of Jews and blacks in 1973. It seems that the historical moment in the early 1960s is partially responsible for producing animosity amongst the Far Right toward such broad out-groups.³⁹ Nonetheless, the centrality of resistance to social change in my understanding of reactionary conservatism is further validated by the significant relationship between far-right sympathizers and perceptions of George Wallace.

As it turns out, identifying as Republican and mistrusting government also significantly predict cold feelings toward Jews. Scholarship suggests that Jewish Americans are likely to hold liberal views and identify with the Democratic Party, so it is

³⁸ The anti-busing movement eventually adopted an anti-Communist rhetoric to accompany the powerful anti-government rhetoric, leading to support for busing from Communist groups, such as the Progressive Labor Party. For more on busing and anti-Communism see, Formisano (2012), *Boston Against Busing: Race, Class and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s*.

³⁹ One explanation may be that in the years following the Civil Rights movement it became less politically correct to express direct antipathy toward broad descriptions of out-groups such as Jews, Catholics and especially blacks.

unsurprising that Republicans are more likely to have cold feelings.⁴⁰ Additionally, mistrust in government often accompanies a general social mistrust, so individuals that mistrust government might also mistrust other groups and individuals (Swartz, 1973). Such a theory would suggest that political mistrust should predict cold feelings toward Catholics and blacks as well, and I find that to be the case.

In addition, being white, Republican and supporting a limited government are all significantly associated with cold feelings toward blacks. Without a true proxy for racism, racist attitudes may be driving my measure for white racial identity when I am controlling for other factors.⁴¹ On the other hand, support for a limited government may explain cold feelings toward blacks because, as a group, blacks face stigmas that paint them as welfare recipients and over-reliant on government assistance. Symbolic racism relies upon negative stereotypes toward black Americans to justify anti-black attitudes (Sears et al., 2000), and support for a limited government might encompass attitudes of symbolic racism. Blacks may also represent *real* social policies that are perceived as government intrusion into a person's life, such as forced school integration and busing.

As was mentioned, when asked about George Wallace, a symbol of resistance to social change, far-right sympathizers were more likely than other Americans to hold warm feelings. Furthermore, both anti-Communist attitudes and white racial identity also explain warm feelings toward Wallace; Wallace was outspoken about his disdain for

⁴⁰ Jewish liberalism emerged in post-WWII America for a number of reasons: Jewish values that stressed charity and social justice, historical attachment to leftist parties in Europe that supported Jewish emancipation, and even the identification of the American right with anti-Semitism. For more, see Edward S. Shapiro's (1992) edited volume, *A Time for Healing: American Jewry since World War II*.

⁴¹ Unlike the 1964 American National Election Study data, the Youth Parent Socialization Study did not ask about the Ku Klux Klan or any other strong proxies for racism. However, I also find that white racial identity significantly predicts opposition to school integration and busing when controlling for other factors, which only strengthens the argument that white racial identity may be capturing racism after controlling for an abundance of other factors.

Communism and his opposition to integration. Still, even after accounting for these explanations, far-right sympathy in the 1960s independently explains warm attitudes toward Wallace in 1973 beyond other explanations.

As I extend my analysis of far-right sympathy beyond 1964, far-right sympathizers are indifferent from other Americans when it comes to their perceptions of broad descriptions of out-groups. However, sympathy for the Far Right in the 1960s remains an enduring predictor of warm feelings toward a symbol of resistance to social change in 1973, George Wallace. Far-right sympathizers continue to support figures that represent the original sentiments of the far-right movement in the 1960s – anxiety toward social change – almost a decade after they supported Barry Goldwater in 1964.

Final Thoughts

If nothing more, my results suggest that reactionary conservatives oppose social change at multiple times in their lives, regardless of social and political context. These findings validate my claim that predisposed attitudes about social change and prestige drive reactionary conservatism. Moreover, my results suggest that we should expect reactionary conservatives to remain attached to movement sentiments throughout much of their lifetime, providing initial evidence linking reactionary movements across time. Further analysis needs to explore the power of predisposed reactionary attitudes over a longer period, and possibly over multiple generations to understand the enduring power of reactionary conservatism. However, I have provided a starting point for scholars who link individuals that sympathize with the Tea Party to sympathizers of the New Right and the Far Right in the 1960s.

Additionally, my results suggest that the Far Right will actively participate in politics regardless of the presence of a national movement. The Far Right fought its way onto the national stage in the 1960s by supremely mobilizing and organizing sympathizers, and my results suggest that individuals who sympathize with the Far Right participate in politics at higher rates than other Americans. My Chapter 5 results suggest that far-right sympathizers continue to participate at heightened rates years after the movement that was thought to have mobilized them subsided. In other words, my results imply that reactionary conservatives continue to participate in politics at higher rates than other Americans throughout their life, consistently voicing their political preferences. When mainstream politics becomes too moderate for reactionary conservatives, they look to express themselves elsewhere. The emergence of the Tea Party reinforces my claim, as the Far Right remains one of the most politically active segments of America, and the current Tea Party is only one of many more far-right movements to come.

Conclusion

THE FAR RIGHT AS ENDEMIC IN AMERICAN POLITICS

“The Presidential campaign of 1964 introduced the word “extremism” into our political vocabulary as a synonym for ultraconservatism, but the phenomenon itself is anything but new. Throughout our history [extremism] has lurked under the surface of public life, finding an escape hatch at more or less definite intervals.”¹

- *Aurthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 1969*

As we evaluate the Far Right in contemporary politics, an age-old saying applies: *hindsight is twenty-twenty*. The Tea Party has already had a profound influence on electoral politics in contemporary America, and as we try to predict what type of lasting influence the Tea Party movement may have, my evaluation of the 1960s Far Right becomes invaluable.² Now that I have presented my analysis, I can confidently say that, at the very least, far-right sympathizers in the 1960s closely resembled the Tea Party and its supporters of today.

My research suggests that the similarities between the 1960s Far Right and the Tea Party extend beyond the demographic characteristics of the movements; both are primarily comprised of white, middle-aged, middle class men. I find that anxiety toward social changes in 1960s, such as the Civil Rights movement and the Cold War, motivated sympathy for the Far Right just as anxiety toward changes in contemporary America, namely the election of the first black President, Barack Obama, motivates support for the Tea Party. Moreover, my findings add validity to a theoretical framework that places both

¹ The quote is from an essay entitled, “Extremism in American Politics,” which is found on page 180 of Aurthur Schlesinger’s (1969) book, *Nothing Stands Still*.

² The work of Parker and Barreto (2013) details Tea Party victories across America.

the Tea Party and the 1960s Far Right in a long lineage of Far Right movements throughout American history.

As we look toward the future of American politics, my research positions the 1960s Far Right squarely in the theoretical frameworks proposed by Hofstadter (1964) and Lipset (1970), suggesting that the 1960s Far Right was a later iteration of the Know-Nothing Party and the second-era Ku Klux Klan, and also a precursor to the Tea Party. For the Know-Nothings, massive Irish-Catholic immigration in the nineteenth century threatened to displace them from the top of the social and economic ladder. The Klan, as I have discussed, perceived blacks, Jews, Catholics and independent women as destroying everything they love about their country. The 1960s Far Right, headed by the John Birch Society (JBS), perceived the Civil Rights movement and the Cold War as threatening and dangerous to America. And finally, the Tea Party is reacting to the election of the First African-American President alongside movements for immigration reform and gay and lesbian rights.

Furthermore, my content analysis highlighted the prominence of conspiracy theories in the literature of 1960s Far Right. The JBS, headed by Robert Welch, insisted that Communist subversives had infiltrated the country and America was near destruction. The Civil Rights movement was simply a Communist ploy to divide and conquer the country through race riots, and Communist traitors were identified in the Supreme Court and even the White House. Scholarship on the Tea Party also emphasizes the movement's tendency to buy into conspiracy theories, suggesting that the Tea Party thinks "Obama is out to destroy the country," is a "secret Muslim," and even an illegal immigrant (Parker & Barreto, 2013, pg. 253).

Moreover, the preoccupation with conspiracy among the 1960s Far Right and Tea Party again situates these movements alongside other historical iterations of the Far Right. More to the point, the Know-Nothings accused Irish Catholic immigrants of criminal activities in the name of the Crown, such as the assassination of President Lincoln, and the Klan clashed with blacks, Catholics and Jews because their so-called progress was deteriorating everything good about the country (Lipset & Raab, 1970). If nothing more, my analysis makes a strong case for the use of a theoretical framework that places the 1960s Far Right alongside other, similar Far Right movements throughout American history.

Lessons from the Past: Hindsight is Twenty-Twenty

The 1960s is considered a time of considerable political realignment in America. My research positions the 1960s Far Right as a direct predecessor to the Tea Party movement, and we can learn a great deal about what we might expect for the future of American politics from the mark the 1960s Far Right left on the political landscape. To start, the 1960s Far Right is credited with shifting conservative politics further to the right during a time when a moderate political consensus surrounding issues of race and civil rights was generally acknowledged (Lowndes, 2008; Kabaservice, 2012). Goldwater's victory in the 1964 Republican Party primary solidified the Far Right's role in national party politics, and forced the Republican Party to move to the right on social policy in order to recapture the conservative faction that had split from the party's base (Lowndes, 2008; Perlstein, 2001). In the ensuing decades, the Republican Party continued to

embrace ultra-conservative social policies and, with the help of the Far Right, Republicans controlled Congress and the White House for the better part of 50 years.

If we learn anything from the 1960s Far Right, it is that today's Tea Party movement may be garnering enough voting power, at least at the local level, to demand the attention of the Republican Party. If we accept general democratic theory, political representatives pay attention to what their constituents want in order to ensure re-election (Wlezien, 1995). So long as the Tea Party has the voting numbers to pull state (and local) representatives far to the right of traditional conservatives in the Republican Party, then the Tea Party may eventually force the party itself to move to the right in efforts to avoid a disastrous fraction. If the Tea Party's hold on the Republican Party fails to loosen, then we could expect a similar result as in the 1960s when Goldwater was able to commandeer the Republican Party in the name of the Far Right. Just as in the 1960s and the decades that followed, the Tea Party may shift mainstream conservative politics farther to the right than many moderate conservatives are comfortable with.³

Moreover, scholarship suggests that the Far Right is distinct from mainstream conservatives, and recent research on the Tea Party supports this claim through empirical analysis. However, my research is the first to provide rigorous empirical evidence suggesting that forces beyond mainstream conservative values explain both motivation for far-right sympathy and the consequences of sympathy on political behavior and attitudes in the 1960s. In other words, I find that anxiety toward social change significantly predicts sympathy for the 1960s Far Right above and beyond traditional conservatism, and that far-right sympathy is uniquely associated with high levels of

³ There are a few noteworthy conservatives who feel that a shift to the right among Republicans has already happened. For example, conservative blogger and FOX News contributor Leslie Marshall (2010) expressed her concern that the Tea Party was fragmenting the GOP.

political engagement, opposition to integration and out-group antipathy. Furthermore, my content analysis reveals that the 1960s Far Right insisted that Communist subversives controlled long-standing American political institutions, such as the Supreme Court, Congress and the White House. This sentiment directly contradicts traditional conservative values that rest upon stability and the maintenance of free society through the rule of law.⁴

In addition, the Tea Party's pull on the Republican Party might also be contributing to increasing party polarization in America. The years following Goldwater's defeat are some of the most politically polarized times in American history, with conservatives holding fast to ideas of "law and order" in response to civil disobedience and urban unrest (Perlstein, 2008). The party polarization of the 1960s created a country divided by party, with the South remaining solidly Republican for the following half-century (Carmines & Stimson, 1992; Kabaservice, 2012). If anything, the polarization that occurred in the 1960s, in a large part because the Far Right, that pulled the Republican Party farther to the margin should serve as a warning as we look toward the future. Scholarship suggests that America has already become more politically polarized over the last decade; nevertheless, the Tea Party's political success at the state and local level has put representatives in office that at worst hold extreme viewpoints extending far beyond traditional conservatism, and at best sympathize with the Tea Party movement's cause.⁵ Either way, newly elected Tea Party representatives have the potential to shape Congress and local governments in polarizing ways.

⁴ See Rossiter (1955), *Conservatism in America*; Viereck (1963), "The Philosophical 'New' Conservatism."

⁵ A 2014 Pew Research Center Report, entitled "Political Polarization in the American Public," suggests that Americans have not only become more consistently Republican and Democratic since 1994, but that

Lastly, my research advances scholarship on the Far Right by providing the first test of reactionary conservatism as a predisposition. I find that reactionary conservatives, identified in 1965 (by their vote for Goldwater in 1964) differ from other Americans eight years later, in 1973, regarding their political engagement, attitudes toward integration and perceptions of George Wallace - a figure I argue represents resistance to social change. In other words, even after accounting for a plethora of alternative explanations, including traditional conservative ideology, intolerance and sociodemographic characteristics, individuals who sympathized with the Far Right in 1964 still participate in politics at higher rates, and are more likely to oppose integration and hold negative perceptions toward out-groups years after the height of the 1960s movement. Furthermore, my analysis also accounts for changes over time in attitudes and sociodemographic status, further advancing the initial claim. The fact that far-right sympathizers remain different from other Americans nine years after the movement dissolved provides strong evidence that reactionary conservatism is a stable, long-standing predisposition.

My research is the first step (of many) in linking past Far Right movements to the Tea Party movement today, and even future movements that we have yet to witness. From my research, I can confidently say that the anxiety toward social change that motivates far-right sympathy fails to disappear over time. In other words, sympathizers fail to mobilize into a cohesive movement when the country is absent great social change. Moreover, although reactionary conservatism remains a powerful force in determining individuals' political behavior and attitudes, the anxiety that motivates far-right sympathy

animosity between the two parties has also increased. For more on political polarization, also see Alan Abramowitz (2010), *The Disappearing Center*.

often takes a backseat to other, more pressing political attitudes when threats to the traditional American way of life are subdued.

Beyond Reactionary Conservatism: A Philosophical Approach

Before I conclude, I offer one more conceptualization of the Far Right that stretches beyond American politics. The short discussion situates this project on the Far Right in a broader framework that might help us understand other attitude dispositions, such as anti-Semitism, white privilege or even anti-democratic sentiments. There may be a broader philosophical concept that encompasses reactionary conservatism that scholarship on the Far Right fails to address. A brief discussion is useful for at least two reasons. Allowing for a broader conception of reactionary conservatism strengthens the construct's durability throughout time and space. Thus far, I examine reactionary conservatism as an American phenomenon. Taking a broader philosophical approach allows for the application of reactionary conservatism to contexts and paradigms that are not inherently American, conservative or even political.

Also, going beyond social scientific scholarship to broader theoretical approaches only adds validity to the concept as an ideological construct. I argue that we should not limit the concept of reactionary conservatism to scholarship on political social movements, and although epistemologically different, the intellectuals I discuss in further detail are all converging on the same construct. Consequently, before I turn back to the 1960s, the following section moves beyond the scholarship readily available on the Far Right and explores a new, philosophical dimension of reactionary conservatism.

Conceptualizing Reactionary Conservatism:

Sartre, Fromm and Ellison

By tracing the reactionary nature of Far Right movements throughout time, I am able to draw upon anxiety towards social change and conspiracy as a constant bond. However, there is also a philosophical aspect to reactionary conservatism that, along with the historical narrative, yields a broader concept that transcends previous work on the Far Right. Just as Hofstadter (1964) and Lipset (1970) build on Adorno's (1950) work on pseudo-conservatism, Adorno relies upon the ideas of Jean-Paul Sartre, Erich Fromm and Ralph Ellison. The following section details how each intellectual points to the same ideological construct that is reactionary conservatism.

Adorno (1950) turns to anti-Semitism as a manifestation of pseudo-conservatism. He remarks that Jews "are described as having harmful effects in various areas of social life," even though the Jewish population in 1950s America "is actually small and relatively weak" (pg. 96). Adorno recognizes that there are additional economic, political, religious and institutional forces involved, but his work identifies a strong need for anti-Semites to protect their cultural prestige. Adorno is not alone in his attention to anti-Semitism; Adorno echoes both Jean-Paul Sartre and Erich Fromm in his observations.

Sartre's (1948) seminal work, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, also explains anti-Semitism as a preoccupation with prestige and anxiety towards social change. For Sartre, durability is paramount to the anti-Semite as it preserves his or her position at the top of the social and cultural ladder:

The existence of the Jew merely permits the anti-Semite to stifle his anxieties at their inception by persuading himself that his place in the

world has been marked out in advance, that it awaits him, and that tradition gives him the right to occupy it (pg. 54).

Here, Sartre explains that the anti-Semite's anxiety stems from social changes that threaten their worldview.

Also in conversation with a world still immersed in World War II, Erich Fromm (1941) argues that anti-Semitism, and particularly Nazism prior to WWII, was a reaction to a changing time-honored social order. Without a "fixed-place" in the world, an anti-Semite could no longer rest "on the security of his traditional status"⁶ (pg. 59). Fromm explains that anti-Semites are able to protect their world by defining their enemies through propaganda and "deliberate, conscious lies" (pg. 228). Sartre reiterates Fromm's claim stating that, to the anti-Semite, Jews' "only reason for existence is to serve as a scapegoat" (pg. 136). Together, Sartre and Fromm make a strong case for the centrality of anxiety towards social change, or more broadly, a new uncertain world, in anti-Semitic attitudes.

Jack Turner's (2012) recent book, *Awakening to Race*, also speaks to the importance of anxiety towards social change, specifically racial progress. Part of Turner's work examines racism towards African Americans. Turner's analysis focuses on the role of freedom in self-realization, and finding a self-identity capable of accepting an unstable world.⁷ In his discussion of freedom, much like Sartre's and Fromm's discussion of anti-

⁶ Although Fromm (1941) tends to focus more on economic status in his analysis of the Age of Reformation, cultural and social background played an instrumental role, and especially religious doctrine, in his explanation for the anxiety that accompanied economic reorganization. Fromm explains that "There is no place in medieval theory for economic activity which is not related to a moral end," and that trade is legitimate only for public benefit (pg. 54). As economic capitalism increased, a deterioration of economic position reflected a deterioration of social position as well because morality and salvation are no longer central to economic advancement.

⁷ Both Sartre and Fromm are attempting to understand restrictions on freedom, and specifically the totalitarian need to control the world and construct reality. Turner's book is working in this tradition;

Semitism, Turner explains that racism is a “way of evading life’s inevitable disorder, impurity and ambiguity” (pg. 78). Turner argues that Ralph Ellison is an intellectual working in the same tradition. Ellison understands white privilege as a way for white Americans to maintain their cultural status and “cast their sins onto a scapegoat” (Turner, 2012, pg. 78).

Anxiety towards social change is again a central theme throughout Ellison’s work on racism and the condition of blacks in America. Ellison believes that white racism is a reflection of an individual’s uneasiness towards American life:

...the Negro stereotype is really an image of the unorganized, irrational forces of American life, forces through which, by projecting them in forms of images of an easily dominated minority, the white individual seeks to be at home in a vast unknown world of America. Perhaps the object of the stereotype is not so much to crush the Negro as to console the white man⁸ (Ellison, 1964, pg. 41).

Ellison (1986) argues that blacks threaten the stability of white social prestige, and the emerging social standing and growing economic, political and social power of blacks “raise doubts about the white man’s value system”⁹ (pg. 111). Moreover, Ellison also contends that, to whites, blacks became co-conspirators through American media and propaganda. In order for whites to justify their intolerance and outright hatred of African Americans, white American media created a “national mythology in which Negroes were

however, like sections of Sartre and Fromm, Chapter 4 of Turner’s book specifically addresses racism and white-privilege and provides an opportunity to conceptually advance reactionary conservatism.

⁸ The quote originally appears in Ellison’s (1946) essay titled, “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity.”

⁹ The quote originally appears in Ellison’s (1970) essay titled, “What America Would be like Without Blacks.”

the chief scapegoats,” and the “function of that mythology was to allow whites a more secure place (if only symbolically) in American society”¹⁰ (Ellison, 1986, pg. 162).

Moving beyond the social scientific and historical work on reactionary attitudes provides a broader conceptual framework from which work on reactionary conservatism can expand. It also gives weight to the idea that reactionary conservatism is a predisposition that forms individuals’ worldviews. For Sartre, Fromm and Ellison, social change is always taking place, leading to anxiety.¹¹ The fact that these scholars (and intellectuals) discuss reactionary attitudes in terms parallel to scholarship on Far Right social movements adds validity to the concept. However, the ground gained by completing both a deep-historical and broad conceptual analysis of the Far Right is not without limitations.

Although tracing the Far Right through American history provides an analytical framework upon which theories of reactionary conservatism rest, rigorously testing those theories for each Far Right movement is an enormous task. Moreover, the dawn of survey data collection in the late 1940s, which is the basis for most empirical scholarship investigating political attitudes and behaviors, restricts examinations of early Far Right movements.¹² Similarly, any serious analysis of a broad, worldly conception of reactionary conservatism would entail creating new measures, collecting new data and conducting new analyses, all of which are beyond the scope of this dissertation. By focusing on the Far Right movement of the 1960s, I limit my examination to one of the

¹⁰ The quote originally appears in Ellison’s (1985) essay entitled, “An Extravagance of Laughter.”

¹¹ Unlike traditional examinations of reactionary conservatism, these thinkers do not identify singular events or specify times of great social change; however, they are still describing reactionary anxieties similar to what I am describing in my own analysis.

¹² Although the large-scale collection of individual survey data about political behavior dates back to the 1930s, it is not until 1944 when the first nationwide study using sample survey design was conducted by the National Opinion Research Center that survey data was used as a reliable source of research. See, Campbell et al. (1960), *The American Voter: Unabridged Edition*.

most influential right wing movements in American history; and, while the bulk of the dissertation is in conversation with Hofstadter (1964) and Lipset's (1963; 1970) research on the 1960s, as well as Parker and Barreto's (2013) research on the Tea Party, my broader exploration of the Far Right opens the door for future examinations to build conceptually.

Final Thoughts

Over the course of this dissertation I have argued that the 1960s Far Right is part of a long-line of right wing reactionary movements in American history motivated by anxiety toward social change. My research also suggests that sympathy for the Far Right, or reactionary conservatism, is a long-standing, stable predisposition that directs individuals' behavior and attitudes over time. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that we are witness to a new, contemporary Far Right movement that appears to be motivated by a similar worldview anxious about social change. Moreover, it should also come as no surprise that the Tea Party is far from traditionally conservative, and is fracturing the Republican Party.

If we have learned anything from the Far Right in the 1960s, it is that even a small faction can change the course of history if their political voice is loud enough. The 1960s Far Right organized a movement with a loud enough political voice to thrust Barry Goldwater to the Republican nomination for President, changing the make-up of the Republican Party forever. It seems as if the Tea Party could have a similarly transformative role in American politics today. On Tuesday, July 15th 2014, more than 100 Republicans endorsed the Democratic opponent against Kansas's Republican

Governor, Sam Brownback. Paul Davis, the challenger, portrayed Brownback as far to the right of the mainstream, criticizing his “hard-right agenda.” Brownback is considered so far to the right that he is perceived as incapable of working with people in his own party, and moderate Republicans, such as former GOP statehouse speakers, local mayors, city council members, GOP delegates and ex-congresswomen, are all throwing their support behind a Democratic candidate for Governor for the first time in Kansas in over fifty years. It appears that moderate Republican support for Davis, the Democrat, could actually tip the electoral scale.¹³

However, regardless of the outcome in the gubernatorial election in Kansas, we see the Far Right changing the current political landscape in many ways. Just as the 1960s Far Right inspired the Southern wing of the Democratic Party to vote Republican for the first time, today we see moderate Republicans, in solidly red states such as Kansas, actually shifting to the Democratic Party in response to ultra-conservative Tea Party candidates (even after the same moderate Republicans expressed such vehement disgust with President Obama). Whether or not the party realignment in Kansas is the precursor to a broader, more permanent political realignment is yet to be seen. However, if this is the beginning of a larger change in the course of American political history, we cannot honestly say that it comes as a surprise.

¹³ For more on the moderate Republican revolt in Kansas, see Manu Raju’s (2014) article in *Politico*, “GOP Moderates Revolt in Kansas.”

APPENDIX

The following appendix contains the detailed methodological procedures for the evidence presented in the dissertation. I presented two types of evidence. I drew on a content analysis for the qualitative component. More quantitative evidence was drawn from surveys conducted in the 1960s and 1970s: 1964 American National Election Study (ANES) and the first two waves of the Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study (YPPS) in 1965 and 1973. The bulk of my analysis draws on the 1964 ANES, but it was clear that I needed to utilize another survey so that I might better understand the relationship between reactionary conservatism as a predisposition and various social and political outcomes. My use of panel data also deepened my examination of reactionary conservatism by allowing for me to account for changes over time in various political and sociodemographic factors. Finally, my analysis of survey data permits me to move beyond the elite, and citizen-activist discourse examined in the John Birch Society's monthly magazine, *American Opinion*, and the *National Review* to the masses of individuals who sympathized with the 1960s Far Right across the nation.

1964 American National Election Study (ANES) Question Wording and Coding:

Dependent Variables

Vote for Barry Goldwater for President

This question measured whether or not a respondent voted for Barry Goldwater for President in 1964. The question was coded on a two-point scale (0-1), such that individuals who voted for Goldwater =1, and all others = 0.

Attention to Politics

This measured a respondents' political interest by asking if they pay any attention to political campaigns. The question was coded on a two-point scale (0-1), such that very much interested = 1.

Attend Political Meeting

This question asked respondents whether or not they had ever go to political meetings. The question was scaled (0-1), where 1=yes, attended a political meeting.

Work for a Political Campaign

This question asked respondents whether or not they had ever worked for a political campaign. The question was scaled (0-1), where 1=yes, worked for a political campaign.

Donate to a Political Campaign

This question asked respondents whether or not they had made a campaign contribution this year (in 1964). The question was scaled (0-1), where 1=yes, contributed to a campaign.

Display Campaign Literature

This question asked respondents whether or not they had ever displayed campaign literature. The question was scaled (0-1), where 1=yes, displayed campaign literature.

Write to a Political Official

This question asked respondents whether or not they ever write to political officials. The question was scaled (0-1), where 1=yes, attended a political meeting.

Employment Integration

This question asked whether or not a respondent thought the government should guarantee Fair and Equal practices (F.E.P.) in the workplace for Negroes. It was coded on the three-point scale (0-1), where a belief that the government should guarantee F.E.P. = 1.

School Integration

This question asked whether or not a respondent thought the federal government should integrate schools. It was coded on the three-point scale (0-1), where a belief that the government should integrate schools = 1.

Neighborhood Integration

This question asked whether or not a respondent agreed with housing integration. It was coded on the three-point scale (0-1), where support for housing integration = 1.

School Busing

This question asked whether or not a respondent would accept school busing. It was coded on the three-point scale (0-1), where acceptance of school busing = 1.

Attitudes toward Out-Groups

These questions asked respondents to rate their feelings toward Jews, Catholics and blacks on a one hundred-point scale (0-100). A score of 100 represented the warmest possible feelings.

Attitudes toward Social Change Organizations

These questions asked respondents to rate their feelings toward the *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People* (NAACP) and *Congress of Racial Equality* (CORE) on a one hundred-point scale (0-100). A score of 100 represented the warmest possible feelings.

1964 ANES Question Wording and Coding: Independent Variables

Racism

This question asked respondents to rate their feelings toward the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) on a one hundred-point scale (0-100). Warm feelings were considered racist, and a score of 100 represented the warmest possible feelings.

Pro-Communism

This question asked respondents to rate their feelings toward Communism on a one hundred-point scale (0-100). Warm feelings were considered Pro-Communist, and a score of 100 represented the warmest possible feelings.

Political Trust

Political Trust is indexed by the following items:

- (1) Do you trust the government to do what is right?
- (2) Do government people know what they are doing?
- (3) Is government run for the benefit of all?
- (4) What is the degree of dishonesty in the government?
- (5) Does Congress pay attention to constituents?

The items were scaled (0-1) so higher values correspond to higher levels of political trust. Reliability: $\alpha = 0.68$

Political Knowledge

Political Knowledge is indexed by the following items:

- (1) Which party, prior to the 1964 election, held a congressional majority?
- (2) Which party elected the most congress men in 1964?

The items were scaled (0-1) so higher values correspond to higher levels of political knowledge. Reliability: $\alpha = 0.67$

Limited Government

This question measured a respondent's support for limited government by asking respondents if they felt that the government was "too powerful" in 1964. It was coded either 0 or 1, where a belief that the government is too powerful = 1.

Party ID

This question measured a respondent's political party identification. The question was separated into three dummy variables for Democrat, Independent and Republican, each coded on a two-point scale (0-1), where 1=Democrat/Independent/Republican.

Ideology (Conservative)

Ideology is indexed by the following items. Each item represents a conservative symbol that individuals' may feel emotionally attached too. Thus, respondents who felt close to a number of the items were expressing an emotional attachment to symbols that fit within the conservative political tradition in America. The following items were measured as feeling thermometers on a one hundred-point scale (0-100):

- (1) Conservatives
- (2) Farmers
- (3) Military
- (4) American South
- (5) Big Business

The items indexed on a three-point scale (0-1) such that higher values correspond to higher levels of conservatism. Reliability: $\alpha = 0.60$

South

This question asked respondents which state they resided in. Respondent who lived in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina and South Carolina resided in the South. The variable was coded on a two-point scale (0-1) where the South = 1.

Married

Question asked respondents whether or not they were married, divorced or single. The variable was coded either 0 or 1, where married = 1.

Education

This question determined the respondent's highest level of education: "What is the highest level of education you completed?" Recoded on a four-point scale (0-1), with four categories where less than a high school diploma =0 and achieving a post baccalaureate degree = 1.

Age

Question asked for actual age in years, compressed into a four-point scale (0-1), where oldest cohort (65+) = 1.

Home Owner

This question asked respondents whether or not they owned their own home. It was coded either 0 or 1, where home owner = 1.

Female

This question determined the respondent's gender. It was coded either 0 or 1, where female=1.

White Racial Group Membership

This question measured a respondent's racial identity. The question was coded as a dummy variable on a two-point (0-1) scale, where white=1 and all other races=0.

Income

This question measured the estimated household income of the respondent in 1964. Recoded on a four-point scale (0-1) where the highest income level (>10K) = 1.

Church Attendance

This question measured a respondent's religious attendance by asking them how often they attended church: never, seldom, often or regularly. The question was scaled (0-1) such that higher values correspond to higher levels of religious attendance.

Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study (YPPS) Question Wording and Coding: Dependent Variables

Voted in 1972

This question asked respondents whether or not they voted in the 1972 general election for President. The question was scaled (0-1), where 1=voted.

Attended a Political Meeting

This question asked respondents (in 1973) whether or not they attended political meetings. The question was scaled (0-1), where 1=yes, attended a political meeting between 1968 and 1973.

Wore a Political Button

This question asked respondents whether or not they wore a political button in 1973. The question was scaled (0-1), where 1=yes, wore a political button.

Donated to a Political Campaign

This question asked respondents whether or not they gave money to a political campaign or politician in 1973. The question was scaled (0-1), where 1=yes, gave money.

Contacted a Political Official

This question asked respondents whether or not they contacted a public official in 1973. The question was scaled (0-1), where 1=yes, contacted an official.

School Integration

This question asked whether or not agreed that the country should bus to achieve integration in public schools. It was coded on the two-point scale (0-1), where a belief in busing to achieve integration = 0.

School Busing

This question asked whether or not a respondent thought the federal government should integrate schools. It was coded on the three-point scale (0-1), where a belief that the government should integrate schools = 1.

Attitudes toward Out-Groups and George Wallace

These questions asked respondents in 1973 to rate their feelings toward Jews, Catholics, blacks and George Wallace on a one hundred-point scale (0-100). A score of 100 represented the warmest possible feelings.

**Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study (YPPS) Question Wording and Coding:
Independent Variables**

Goldwater Vote in 1964

This question asked a respondent in 1965 whether or not they voted for Barry Goldwater for President in 1964. The question was coded on a two-point scale (0-1), such that individuals who voted for Goldwater =1, and all others = 0.

Anti-Communism

This question asked a respondent (in 1965 and 1973) whether or not they think that Communist can hold public office. The question was coded on a two-point scale (0-1), such that individuals who think Communist cannot hold office =1, and all others = 0.

Political Mistrust

Political Trust is indexed by the following items (in 1965 and 1973):

- (1) Is the government interested in public opinion?
- (2) Are government people crooked?
- (3) Do you trust the government to do what is right?
- (4) How much faith and confidence do you have in the government?
- (5) How much say do you have in government?

The items were scaled (0-1) so higher values correspond to lower levels of political trust. Reliability: $\alpha = 0.57$ (1965)

Political Knowledge

Political Knowledge is indexed by the following items (in 1965 and 1973):

- (1) What is the length of a U.S. Senator's term?
- (2) What is the number of members on the U.S. Supreme Court?
- (3) What is name of your state's governor?
- (4) Was Franklin D. Roosevelt a Democrat or Republican?

The items were scaled (0-1) so higher values correspond to higher levels of political knowledge. Reliability: $\alpha = 0.46$ (1965);

Party ID

This question measured a respondent's political party identification in 1973. The question was separated into three dummy variables for Democrat, Independent and Republican, each coded on a two-point scale (0-1), where 1=Democrat/Independent/Republican.

Limited Government

This question measured a respondent's support for limited government by asking respondents if they felt it was the government's responsibility to provide jobs to Americans in 1973. It was coded on a seven point-scale (0-1), where a belief that the government should let the market control jobs = 1.

Ideology (Conservative)

This question measured a respondent's ideology by asking how liberal, moderate, or conservative one felt they were in 1973. The question was re-coded on a three-point scale

(0-1), where higher values correspond with more conservative views, such that 0 = Liberal, 0.5 = Moderate, and 1 = Conservative.

Church Attendance

This question measured a respondent's religious attendance (in 1973) by asking them how often they attended church: never, seldom, often or regularly. The question was scaled (0-1) such that higher values correspond to higher levels of religious attendance.

Married

Question asked respondents whether or not they were married, divorced or single in 1973. The variable was coded either 0 or 1, where married = 1.

Female

This question determined the respondent's gender in 1973. It was coded either 0 or 1, where female=1.

White Racial Group Membership

This question measured a respondent's racial identity in 1973. The question was coded as a dummy variable on a two-point (0-1) scale, where white=1 and all other races=0.

Education

This question determined the respondent's highest level of education in 1965. Recoded on a five-point scale (0-1), where less than a high school diploma =0 and achieving a post baccalaureate degree = 1.

Age

Question asked for actual age in years in 1965, compressed into a four-point scale (0-1), where oldest cohort=1.

Income

This question measured the household income of the respondent: "What was your total combined household income (in 1965 and 1973) before taxes?" Recoded on a seven-point scale (0-1) where the highest income levels = 1.

South


This question asked respondents their state of residence 1973. Respondent who lived in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina and South Carolina resided in the South. The variable was coded on a two-point scale (0-1) where the South = 1.

Chapter 1 Results: Content Analysis


The following contains the detailed methodological procedures for the evidence presented in Chapter 1. I drew on a content analysis of the *American Opinion* and the *National Review* from a five-year period from 1960 to 1964. My analysis provides insight into how the political environment of the 1960s was interpreted by elites by examining content from the *American Opinion* compared to content from the *National Review*. If the Far Right of the 1960s is truly about mainstream conservatism, the content frames from their primary national newsletter, the *American Opinion*, should reflect the content in the *National Review*, which was and still is considered the standard for mainstream conservative thought. I selected content themes to encompass both themes that accounted for large amounts of content and themes that accounted for competing explanations for far-right sympathy.

The content for the *American Opinion* consists of 2,312 articles from the periodical from 1960 to 1964. The *American Opinion* content universe was sampled, and each substantive section was coded for a main content theme and three sub-themes. The *American Opinion* was published 11 months out of the year, and one issue often contained the summer months of July, August and September.

Content for the *National Review* was collected by coding every major article in every other month of the periodical from 1960 to 1964. The *National Review* was published every month of the year such that a main newsletter was followed by a smaller, less comprehensive bulletin the next month. My analysis coded every main newsletter for a main content theme and three sub-themes, and consists of 957 articles. Figure A1.1 presents the number of articles in each periodical for each year I collected material.



My content analysis finished with an intercoder reliability of 0.82. The analysis in Chapter 1 is limited to content frames with substantive meaning, thus eliminated administrative and informational content and domestic military content from my final examination. In my final analysis I examined 1,851 from the *American Opinion* and 669 articles from the *National Review*. Please see Figure A1.2 below for the full content analysis results.



Content Frame Descriptions

Far Right conspiracy: This content frame captures any material that is deliberately false or conspiratorial in nature. This frame describes material accusing certain groups of subversion or world domination, as well as content filled with rhetoric intended to create or distort reality. This frame also describes content that suggests that the government or the president is bad for America and destroying the country.

Racism: This frame describes content that is bigoted or blatantly racist. Content in this frame is generally directed towards black Americans and the civil rights movement. This content frame also includes any derogatory language toward racial groups as well as any racist imagery.

Anti-communism and socialism: This frame describes content that is anti-communist or anti-socialist. Generally, this content accuses certain groups or individuals of having communist or socialist associations and beliefs. Content also describes the United States as communist and socialist. This frame also captures content that attempts to inform readers of the danger of communism and socialism, often highlighting the communist and socialist elements of the United States or other countries around the world.

Domestic military issues: This frame describes content that discusses the military and the use of the military with the borders of the United States. Content generally argues for or against the usefulness of a standing army and military use inside of the United States.

Limited government and state's rights: This frame describes content that makes a case against or criticizes government expansion or a large national government in general. This frame also contains content arguing for the expansion of state's rights. Content generally focuses on limiting government expansion, especially in relation to the nationalization of controversial policies such as integration and equal rights.

Foreign affairs and national security: This describes content about international affairs and countries other than the United States. Content generally describes international conflict. This frame also describes content that focuses on protecting the country from outside and internal threats. Content generally describes new security measures to protect the United States. This content frame also captures material intended to inform readers on global affairs and events in countries other than the United States.

History and education: This content frame describes material that informs readers of historical events and figures. The content is educational, and often tells the biographical story or recognizes a historical event that relates to current events or issues.

Mistrust in government: This describes material specifically questioning the character of political authorities or national figures. The material also questions the amount of trust Americans can put into institutions such as Congress and the Supreme Court. This frame captures content that specifically questions how trustworthy individuals or institutions are.

Criticism of political leaders and authorities: This frame describes content that criticizes political leaders and authorities for statements, decisions and actions that they have made. This content generally attacks liberal politicians, civil rights activists and foreign political leaders.

Religion and morals: This describes content about religion, moral predispositions and general attitudes on what is right and wrong. Content generally focuses on the importance of religion within American culture as well as the immorality of certain behaviors.

Evangelical sentiments are also a focus of this content frame.

Patriotism: This describes content that focuses on the importance of loving America and remaining loyal to one's country. This content is often in reference to an American holiday such as the Fourth of July or Veterans Day. Content also references events, stories or biographies that emphasize the importance of national allegiance and expressing ones attachment to the United States.

Informational/Administrative and other content: This describes content that did not fit well into any of the identified content frames. Content generally focuses on local political issues or issues that are specific to a political agenda that does not fit into the national political scene. This frame also describes content that is informing readers of a political event. Content informing readers how to access information or of any changes coming to the periodical are also in this frame. Generally, content describes when political events are taking place or provides information about the authors of the literature.

Chapter 2 Results

Table A2.1. Predicting a Vote for Goldwater in 1964

	Goldwater Vote in 1964
Anxiety and Far Right Conspiracy (JBS)	0.02* (0.005)
Racism (KKK)	0.01* (0.006)
Pro-Communism	-0.02* (0.008)
Political Trust	-1.55* (0.499)
Political Knowledge	0.57 (0.466)
Limited Govt.	1.00* (0.249)
Republican	3.23* (0.329)
Independent/other	1.79* (0.340)
Ideology (Conservative)	1.17* (0.341)
South	1.07* (0.331)
Married	0.20 (0.338)
Education	1.14* (0.477)
Age	0.24 (0.425)
Home Owner	0.11 (0.292)
Female	-0.13 (0.241)
White	2.77* (1.062)
Income	0.12 (0.439)
Church Attendance	-0.36 (0.380)
Constant	-7.60 (1.276)
Observations	764
% Pred. Correctly	86%

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; logistic regression model; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

Chapter 3 Results

Table A3.1. Predicting Political Engagement in 1964

	Attention to Politics ^	Attend a Meeting	Campaign	Donate to Campaign	Display Campaign Literature	Write Official
Goldwater Vote in 1964	0.45* (0.199)	0.25 (0.313)	0.97* (0.407)	0.86* (0.294)	0.75* (0.256)	-0.24 (0.254)
Racism	-0.00 (0.004)	0.00 (0.006)	-0.01 (0.009)	0.01 (0.006)	0.00 (0.005)	0.00 (0.005)
Pro-Communism	-0.01* (0.004)	-0.00 (0.008)	-0.00 (0.010)	-0.01* (0.009)	0.00 (0.005)	-0.00 (0.006)
Political Trust	-0.01 (0.284)	-0.62 (0.460)	-0.80 (0.578)	0.39 (0.459)	-0.01 (0.359)	-0.25 (0.375)
Political Knowledge	0.77* (0.221)	0.89* (0.476)	-0.11 (0.555)	0.88* (0.476)	0.44 (0.304)	0.39 (0.343)
Limited Govt.	0.48* (0.168)	0.33 (0.273)	0.19 (0.353)	0.31 (0.261)	0.14 (0.215)	0.33 (0.216)
Republican	-0.26 (0.199)	0.15 (0.307)	0.28 (0.389)	0.41 (0.293)	-0.52* (0.258)	0.23 (0.253)
Independent	-0.35* (0.191)	-0.49 (0.361)	-0.89* (0.527)	-0.45 (0.343)	-0.64* (0.267)	0.36 (0.248)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.19 (0.185)	0.41 (0.318)	0.86* (0.411)	0.13 (0.302)	0.75* (0.238)	0.10 (0.252)
South	0.06 (0.178)	-0.07 (0.287)	-0.63 (0.401)	-0.50 (0.310)	0.44* (0.205)	0.07 (0.238)
Married	0.44* (0.178)	0.03 (0.318)	0.22 (0.418)	0.38 (0.328)	0.25 (0.236)	-0.10 (0.246)
Education	1.08* (0.281)	1.87* (0.442)	2.15* (0.590)	1.50* (0.426)	0.47 (0.349)	2.20* (0.359)
Age	0.41* (0.229)	0.23 (0.384)	-0.60 (0.496)	-0.08 (0.375)	-0.99* (0.297)	0.36 (0.306)
Home Owner	-0.07 (0.157)	0.84* (0.316)	0.48 (0.380)	0.31 (0.278)	0.12 (0.206)	0.24 (0.225)
Female	0.07 (0.137)	0.12 (0.230)	0.19 (0.292)	0.17 (0.221)	0.25 (0.175)	0.15 (0.185)
White	-1.07* (0.214)	-1.05* (0.341)	-1.02* (0.443)	-0.80* (0.359)	-1.43* (0.245)	0.34 (0.317)
Income	-0.01 (0.252)	0.55 (0.428)	0.13 (0.554)	1.07* (0.418)	0.51 (0.322)	0.57* (0.339)
Church Attendance	0.31 (0.211)	0.90* (0.374)	1.18* (0.495)	0.19 (0.346)	0.29 (0.275)	0.31 (0.286)
Constant		-4.39* (0.689)	-4.06* (0.833)	-4.55* (0.713)	-1.63* (0.457)	-3.75* (0.553)
Cut1	-1.02* (0.364)					
Cut2	0.90* (0.363)					
Observations	878	881	881	879	881	883
% Predic. Correctly	52%	88%	93%	87%	76%	80%

Standard errors in parentheses; all models logistical regression unless otherwise notes; ^ ordered logistical regression; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

Chapter 4 Results

Table A4.1. Predicting Support for Integration in 1964

	Employment Integration	School Integration	Neighborhood Integration	Busing
Goldwater Vote in 1964	-0.65* (0.226)	-0.46* (0.213)	-0.36 (0.227)	-0.55* (0.243)
Racism	-0.01* (0.004)	-0.02* (0.004)	-0.03* (0.004)	-0.00 (0.004)
Pro-Communism	0.01 (0.005)	-0.00 (0.005)	0.00 (0.005)	0.01* (0.004)
Political Trust	0.59* (0.332)	0.67* (0.295)	0.54* (0.321)	0.32 (0.314)
Political Knowledge	-0.18 (0.277)	-0.57* (0.244)	0.31 (0.262)	-0.09 (0.245)
Limited Govt.	-0.70* (0.189)	-0.75* (0.174)	-0.38* (0.185)	-0.33* (0.192)
Republican	-0.05 (0.223)	0.40* (0.218)	0.87* (0.237)	0.30 (0.225)
Independent	0.56* (0.223)	0.12 (0.206)	0.21 (0.216)	-0.21 (0.220)
Ideology	-0.20 (0.218)	-0.09 (0.196)	-0.32 (0.214)	-0.13 (0.202)
South	0.30 (0.212)	-0.45* (0.189)	-0.56* (0.199)	-0.16 (0.197)
Married	-0.06 (0.209)	0.12 (0.191)	-0.03 (0.206)	-0.17 (0.185)
Education	0.67* (0.314)	0.70* (0.294)	0.79* (0.321)	0.07 (0.310)
Age	0.16 (0.263)	-0.19 (0.246)	-1.10* (0.266)	-0.01 (0.250)
Home Owner	-0.42* (0.183)	-0.13 (0.170)	-0.23 (0.186)	-0.04 (0.170)
Female	0.20 (0.159)	-0.17 (0.147)	-0.06 (0.159)	0.27* (0.154)
White	-2.12* (0.299)	-1.67* (0.261)	-2.45* (0.418)	-1.13* (0.204)
Income	0.01 (0.290)	-0.01 (0.266)	-0.03 (0.282)	-0.54* (0.275)
Church Attendance	-0.19 (0.247)	0.23 (0.222)	0.38 (0.240)	-0.33 (0.237)
/Cut1	-2.43* (0.467)	-2.50* (0.416)	-3.91* (0.542)	-0.92* (0.391)
/Cut2	-1.97* (0.465)	-1.77* (0.413)	-3.04* (0.537)	-0.39 (0.390)
Observations	806	861	881	880
% Predic. Correctly	65.6%	61.2%	68.9%	67.4%

Standard errors in parentheses; all models are ordered logistical regression; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

Table A4.2. Predicting Warm Attitudes toward Out-Groups in 1964

	Catholics	Jews	Blacks	NAACP	CORE
Goldwater Vote in 1964	-2.47 (2.225)	-3.95* (1.894)	-3.00* (1.808)	-7.22* (2.279)	-7.13* (2.556)
Racism	-0.14* (0.040)	-0.14* (0.034)	-0.18* (0.032)	-0.27* (0.041)	-0.13* (0.047)
Pro-Communism	-0.08* (0.046)	0.01 (0.040)	-0.02 (0.038)	0.11* (0.048)	0.08 (0.055)
Political Trust	8.72* (3.092)	6.89* (2.633)	11.38* (2.514)	16.13* (3.228)	10.03* (3.624)
Political Knowledge	-4.18* (2.512)	1.76 (2.139)	2.22 (2.043)	-0.37 (2.635)	-2.31 (3.097)
Limited Govt.	-1.47 (1.867)	-2.46 (1.589)	-3.97* (1.517)	-6.93* (1.920)	-5.48* (2.145)
Republican	-3.42 (2.193)	2.71 (1.867)	5.42* (1.783)	6.78* (2.272)	2.46 (2.536)
Independent	-0.59 (2.134)	1.93 (1.817)	4.00* (1.732)	8.35* (2.192)	4.62* (2.418)
Ideology	17.44* (2.044)	16.97* (1.740)	15.84* (1.662)	-3.16 (2.104)	-2.14 (2.338)
South	-7.25* (1.939)	-4.62* (1.651)	0.40 (1.577)	-1.30 (1.987)	-2.14 (2.260)
Married	-2.97 (1.942)	-2.67 (1.653)	1.33 (1.578)	0.65 (2.029)	3.56 (2.272)
Education	3.24 (3.051)	9.78* (2.598)	8.26* (2.472)	8.94* (3.108)	1.58 (3.378)
Age	-3.52 (2.518)	4.13* (2.144)	2.30 (2.047)	3.14 (2.601)	4.21 (2.912)
Home Owner	-0.69 (1.749)	-1.77 (1.489)	-2.33 (1.422)	-4.56* (1.806)	-6.55* (2.040)
Female	0.09 (1.524)	2.05 (1.297)	2.08* (1.237)	2.28 (1.567)	5.17* (1.754)
White	7.22* (2.239)	-1.81 (1.907)	-25.69* (1.821)	-33.80* (2.285)	-29.24* (2.582)
Income	7.12* (2.749)	9.92* (2.341)	-3.85* (2.235)	1.25 (2.842)	-2.72 (3.173)
Church Attendance	7.97* (2.351)	1.18 (2.002)	4.30* (1.909)	4.17* (2.439)	-1.51 (2.680)
Constant	49.99 (3.976)	45.48* (3.384)	68.24 (3.231)	73.29 (4.139)	73.75 (4.706)
Observations	881	882	883	833	733
Chi ²	0.168	0.192	0.373	0.432	0.350

Standard errors in parentheses; all models are ordinary least-squares regression; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

Chapter 5 Results

Table A5.1. Comparison of Survey Sociodemographics

		<i>1964 ANES</i>	<i>1965 YPPS</i>	<i>1973 YPPS</i>
Gender	Female	56.1% (1,028)	58.4% (688)	58.4% (688)
	Male	43.9% (806)	41.6% (491)	41.6% (491)
	Total N	1,834	1,179	1,179
Party	Democrat	55.1% (1,011)	56.2% (663)	44.6% (495)
	Republican	22.6% (415)	32.4% (382)	28.5% (317)
	Indep/Other	21.5% (394)	10.5% (124)	26.8% (298)
	DK	0.8% (14)	0.9% (10)	0.1% (1)
	Total	1,834	1,179	1,111
Education*	Less HS	47.8% (876)	42.5% (501)	--
	HS Diploma	20.3% (373)	29.6% (349)	--
	Some college	21.1% (386)	14.2% (167)	--
	College degree	7.7% (142)	8.2% (97)	--
	Postgraduate degree	2.2% (40)	4.9% (58)	--
	DK	0.1% (2)	0.3% (4)	--
	Ref	0.8% (15)	0.3% (3)	--
	Total N	1,817	1,179	--
Age	21-34	28.7% (523)	0.6% (7)	--
	35-49	31.7% (579)	29.7% (350)	10.8% (127)
	50-64	24.7% (450)	68.7% (810)	75.4% (889)
	65+	14.9% (273)	0.7% (8)	13.5% (159)
	DK	--	0.1% (8)	0.1% (1)
	Ref	--	0.2% (3)	0.2% (3)
	Total N	1,825	1,179	1,179
Income	< 3,000	22.0% (404)	6.7% (78)	5.2% (57)
	3-6,000	29.1% (533)	24.1% (282)	10.6% (115)
	6-10,000	26.8% (492)	31.7% (370)	12.9% (140)
	> 10,000	18.1% (331)	35.8 (418)	68.5% (745)
	DK	2.8% (52)	0.4% (5)	0.8% (9)
	Ref	1.2% (22)	1.3% (15)	2.0% (21)
	Total N	1,834	1,168	1,087
Married	Married	73.1% (1,340)	88.5% (1,043)	83.2% (978)
	Single/other	26.9% (494)	11.5% (136)	16.8% (198)
	Total N	1,834	1,179	1,176
1964 Pres. Vote*	Vote Goldwater	21.7% (326)	27.4% (323)	--
	Vote Other/Nonvoter	76.4% (1,150)	72.5% (855)	--
	DK	0.9% (13)	0.1% (1)	--
	Ref	1.1% (16)	--	--
	Total N	1,505	1,179	--

*Variable NOT included in YPPS 1793 wave

Table A5.2. Comparison of Regression Results from 1964 ANES and 1965 YPPS

	Political Participation						Attitudes toward Integration				Attitudes toward Out-groups					
	Attend a Meeting		Display Campaign Ads		Donated		Integrate Schools		Housing Integration		Jews		Catholics		Blacks	
	1964 ANES [^]	1965 YPPS	1964 ANES	1965 YPPS	1964 ANES	1965 YPPS	1964 ANES [^]	1965 YPPS	1964 ANES	1965 YPPS	1964 ANES	1965 YPPS	1964 ANES	1965 YPPS	1964 ANES	1965 YPPS
Goldwater Vote	0.51 [*] (0.291)	0.34 (0.213)	0.93 [*] (0.243)	0.65 [*] (0.202)	0.91 [*] (0.276)	0.60 [*] (0.226)	-0.60 [*] (0.213)	-0.76 [*] (0.189)	-0.72 [*] (0.264)	-0.39 [*] (0.194)	-2.92 (1.917)	-0.25 (1.818)	-0.59 (2.138)	-0.01 (2.057)	-0.64 (1.826)	-2.11 (1.878)
Anti-Communism	-0.01 (0.006)	0.07 (0.175)	-0.00 (0.004)	-0.14 (0.157)	-0.02 [*] (0.006)	-0.06 (0.186)	-0.01 (0.004)	-0.37 [*] (0.152)	-0.00 (0.005)	-0.57 [*] (0.172)	-0.01 (0.032)	-3.58 [*] (1.464)	-0.08 [*] (0.036)	-0.64 (1.655)	-0.00 (0.031)	-3.67 [*] (1.511)
Political Mistrust	-0.72 [*] (0.421)	-0.05 (0.071)	0.01 (0.326)	-0.08 (0.064)	0.09 (0.428)	-0.04 (0.076)	0.83 [*] (0.289)	-0.39 [*] (0.062)	0.78 [*] (0.350)	-0.24 [*] (0.060)	6.83 [*] (2.519)	-2.78 [*] (0.568)	9.00 [*] (2.810)	-3.35 [*] (0.643)	11.76 [*] (2.400)	-3.62 [*] (0.587)
Pol Knowledge	0.64 (0.397)	0.20 [*] (0.103)	0.77 [*] (0.269)	0.03 (0.094)	1.16 [*] (0.446)	0.33 [*] (0.110)	-0.72 [*] (0.235)	-0.01 (0.088)	0.19 (0.281)	0.00 (0.095)	3.54 [*] (1.935)	1.65 [*] (0.855)	-3.58 [*] (2.159)	2.41 [*] (0.967)	0.90 (1.844)	1.03 (0.883)
Republican	0.36 (0.280)	0.13 (0.204)	-0.57 [*] (0.240)	-0.36 [*] (0.191)	0.54 [*] (0.275)	0.26 (0.218)	0.60 [*] (0.209)	0.24 (0.181)	1.26 [*] (0.264)	0.27 (0.190)	2.93 (1.804)	-1.68 (1.730)	-1.64 (2.013)	-3.70 [*] (1.957)	3.74 [*] (1.719)	0.90 (1.787)
Independent	-0.53 (0.339)	-0.50 (0.320)	-0.74 [*] (0.250)	-1.76 [*] (0.385)	-0.23 (0.318)	-0.52 (0.346)	0.15 (0.201)	-0.40 [*] (0.232)	0.64 [*] (0.253)	0.50 [*] (0.257)	0.79 (1.770)	-2.03 (2.254)	-0.70 (1.974)	-2.33 (2.550)	0.97 (1.686)	5.09 [*] (2.328)
Church Atten.	0.90 [*] (0.345)	0.33 (0.243)	0.21 (0.252)	-0.10 (0.216)	0.11 (0.324)	0.34 (0.263)	0.47 [*] (0.225)	0.13 (0.200)	0.28 (0.265)	0.14 (0.212)	5.09 [*] (1.947)	0.92 (1.958)	10.67 [*] (2.172)	3.08 (2.214)	6.98 [*] (1.855)	5.42 [*] (2.022)
Married	-0.13 (0.287)	-0.19 (0.281)	0.34 (0.217)	-0.16 (0.240)	0.31 (0.309)	-0.31 (0.326)	0.10 (0.190)	0.18 (0.225)	0.04 (0.240)	-0.08 (0.249)	-3.68 [*] (1.615)	-4.73 [*] (2.191)	-3.73 [*] (1.802)	-5.62 [*] (2.478)	0.60 (1.539)	0.33 (2.262)
Female	-0.07 (0.214)	-0.50 [*] (0.170)	0.13 (0.163)	-0.38 [*] (0.154)	0.23 (0.211)	-0.87 [*] (0.183)	-0.07 (0.147)	0.13 (0.145)	-0.08 (0.181)	-0.25 (0.157)	0.60 (1.279)	2.12 (1.413)	0.21 (1.427)	2.97 [*] (1.598)	1.23 (1.219)	-0.23 (1.459)
White	-0.89 [*] (0.317)	-0.26 (0.289)	-1.35 [*] (0.225)	-0.73 [*] (0.234)	-0.59 [*] (0.345)	-0.04 (0.349)	-1.78 [*] (0.255)	-1.01 [*] (0.251)	-3.00 [*] (0.486)	-1.69 [*] (0.356)	1.38 (1.793)	-1.39 (2.246)	8.24 [*] (2.001)	-2.06 (2.540)	-24.07 [*] (1.709)	-21.08 [*] (2.319)
Education	1.86 [*] (0.411)	1.54 [*] (0.311)	0.62 [*] (0.331)	0.53 [*] (0.295)	1.38 [*] (0.405)	1.23 [*] (0.328)	0.83 [*] (0.302)	0.04 (0.284)	0.93 [*] (0.373)	0.55 [*] (0.317)	8.20 [*] (2.641)	0.23 (2.762)	2.39 (2.946)	-4.01 (3.124)	6.45 [*] (2.516)	-3.47 (2.853)
Income	0.68 [*] (0.396)	0.00 (0.000)	0.16 (0.297)	0.00 (0.000)	0.99 [*] (0.391)	0.00 [*] (0.000)	0.10 (0.263)	0.00 (0.000)	-0.34 (0.326)	0.00 (0.000)	10.24 [*] (2.279)	0.00 [*] (0.000)	8.89 [*] (2.543)	0.00 [*] (0.000)	-4.59 [*] (2.171)	0.00 (0.000)
Age	0.18 (0.355)	-0.05 (0.165)	-0.80 [*] (0.275)	0.32 [*] (0.154)	-0.04 (0.354)	0.34 [*] (0.186)	-0.22 (0.241)	-0.21 (0.142)	-1.25 [*] (0.305)	-0.10 (0.152)	5.55 [*] (2.098)	-0.88 (1.368)	-0.79 (2.341)	1.35 (1.547)	3.17 (1.999)	-1.46 (1.412)
Own Home	0.58 [*] (0.274)	0.35 (0.226)	0.02 (0.186)	-0.08 (0.187)	0.16 (0.257)	-0.01 (0.239)	-0.07 (0.166)	-0.11 (0.177)	-0.14 (0.212)	-0.22 (0.196)	-0.81 (1.443)	-1.11 (1.712)	0.25 (1.610)	1.54 (1.936)	-0.43 (1.375)	-1.81 (1.768)
Racism	0.00 (0.006)		0.00 (0.004)		0.01 (0.005)		-0.01 [*] (0.004)		-0.03 [*] (0.004)		-0.11 [*] (0.031)		-0.08 [*] (0.035)		-0.12 [*] (0.030)	
Conservatism	0.04 (0.386)		0.27 (0.307)		0.24 (0.379)		-1.25 [*] (0.264)		-0.07 (0.329)		-2.13 (2.373)		-5.38 [*] (2.647)		-2.26 (2.261)	
Constant		-2.15 [*] (0.559)	-1.44 [*] (0.410)	-0.38 (0.481)	-4.60 [*] (0.664)	-3.36 [*] (0.642)		1.93 [*] (0.467)	3.79 [*] (0.623)	3.34 [*] (0.557)	47.30 [*] (3.171)	72.29 [*] (4.398)	53.48 [*] (3.538)	67.39 [*] (4.974)	74.38 [*] (3.021)	88.94 [*] (4.542)
/cut1	3.71 [*] (0.596)						-2.27 [*] (0.399)									
/cut2	4.57 [*] (0.607)						-1.88 [*] (0.397)									
Observations	1061	1004	1061	1027	1059	1027	957	1031	920	1025	1063	1031	1063	1031	1063	1031
% Pred. Correctly	89.0%	75.6%	87.9%	69.9%	78.3%	81.3%	67.4%	64.0%	78.5%	70.0%						
Chi ²											0.1005	0.0561	0.0933	0.043	0.0607	0.1425

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed; all models logistical regression unless otherwise noted; ^ ordered logistical regression.

Table A5.3. Predicting Political Engagement in 1973

	Voted in 1972		Attend a Meeting		Wore a Button		Donate to Campaign		Contact Official	
Goldwater Vote in '64	1.67 [*] (0.448)	1.59 [*] (0.467)	0.62 [*] (0.260)	0.47 [*] (0.275)	0.64 [*] (0.264)	0.58 [*] (0.281)	0.63 [*] (0.269)	0.60 [*] (0.292)	0.80 [*] (0.240)	0.90 [*] (0.258)
Anti-Communism	0.07 (0.271)	0.01 (0.365)	-0.45 [*] (0.221)	-0.12 (0.283)	0.16 (0.216)	-0.14 (0.272)	-0.29 (0.220)	-0.20 (0.284)	-0.34 [*] (0.202)	-0.44 [*] (0.259)
Political Mistrust	-0.15 (0.093)	-0.23 [*] (0.133)	0.00 (0.080)	0.06 (0.111)	0.06 (0.078)	0.16 (0.107)	-0.03 (0.082)	-0.01 (0.116)	-0.03 (0.074)	-0.04 (0.105)
Political Knowledge	0.64 [*] (0.175)	0.86 [*] (0.227)	0.20 (0.125)	0.34 [*] (0.153)	0.43 [*] (0.125)	0.56 [*] (0.154)	0.42 [*] (0.126)	0.68 [*] (0.156)	0.17 (0.116)	0.16 (0.141)
Republican	0.39 (0.400)	0.40 (0.412)	0.02 (0.299)	0.07 (0.307)	-0.09 (0.285)	-0.11 (0.294)	-0.25 (0.303)	-0.26 (0.318)	-0.71 [*] (0.288)	-0.75 [*] (0.298)
Independent	-0.30 (0.299)	-0.27 (0.320)	-0.18 (0.275)	-0.12 (0.289)	-1.19 [*] (0.312)	-1.26 [*] (0.331)	-0.87 [*] (0.291)	-0.88 [*] (0.315)	0.05 (0.242)	-0.10 (0.257)
Church Attendance	0.71 [*] (0.365)	0.86 [*] (0.386)	0.18 (0.286)	0.18 (0.297)	0.32 (0.282)	0.48 (0.295)	0.43 (0.290)	0.52 [*] (0.306)	0.24 (0.266)	0.26 (0.275)
Married	0.57 (0.349)	0.58 (0.367)	0.02 (0.332)	-0.04 (0.339)	-0.26 (0.307)	-0.41 (0.315)	-0.38 (0.338)	-0.37 (0.355)	-0.19 (0.294)	-0.22 (0.302)
Female	-0.17 (0.287)	-0.10 (0.300)	-0.13 (0.223)	-0.19 (0.232)	-0.28 (0.220)	-0.22 (0.228)	-0.88 [*] (0.227)	-0.88 [*] (0.239)	0.12 (0.209)	0.02 (0.217)
White	-1.89 [*] (0.530)	-1.97 [*] (0.575)	-0.86 [*] (0.380)	-0.87 [*] (0.400)	0.19 (0.395)	0.13 (0.418)	-0.08 (0.424)	-0.25 (0.452)	0.46 (0.437)	0.56 (0.470)
Education	1.66 [*] (0.614)	1.26 [*] (0.671)	0.53 (0.379)	0.23 (0.433)	0.04 (0.385)	-0.20 (0.438)	0.94 [*] (0.376)	0.56 (0.431)	1.02 [*] (0.357)	0.83 [*] (0.404)
Age	-0.07 [*] (0.022)	-0.06 [*] (0.023)	0.01 (0.017)	0.02 (0.018)	0.04 [*] (0.017)	0.04 [*] (0.018)	0.01 (0.018)	0.01 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.016)	-0.01 (0.016)
Income	0.00 (0.000)	0.00 [*] (0.000)	0.00 [*] (0.000)	0.00 [*] (0.000)	0.00 (0.000)	0.00 (0.000)	0.00 [*] (0.000)	0.00 [*] (0.000)	0.00 [*] (0.000)	0.00 [*] (0.000)
Limited Government	0.15 [*] (0.078)	0.17 [*] (0.082)	-0.06 (0.069)	-0.06 (0.071)	-0.11 (0.067)	-0.10 (0.069)	-0.04 (0.071)	-0.05 (0.075)	-0.07 (0.064)	-0.07 (0.066)
Ideology (Conservative)	-0.12 (0.109)	-0.11 (0.115)	-0.11 (0.090)	-0.12 (0.097)	-0.07 (0.089)	-0.11 (0.096)	-0.11 (0.093)	-0.12 (0.102)	0.08 (0.087)	0.08 (0.093)
South	-0.12 (0.390)	-0.18 (0.422)	-0.44 (0.364)	-0.34 (0.379)	-0.04 (0.328)	-0.11 (0.341)	-0.20 (0.358)	-0.22 (0.381)	-0.11 (0.317)	-0.10 (0.339)
Anti-Communism Change		0.07 (0.320)		-0.35 (0.236)		0.51 [*] (0.229)		0.03 (0.235)		0.18 (0.214)
Pol Mistrust Change		0.07 (0.125)		-0.07 (0.102)		-0.11 (0.099)		-0.02 (0.107)		0.04 (0.094)
Pol Knowledge Change		-0.59 [*] (0.220)		-0.22 (0.156)		-0.17 (0.153)		-0.49 [*] (0.160)		-0.00 (0.145)
Education Change		0.30 (0.426)		0.31 (0.264)		-0.49 (0.297)		0.09 (0.280)		0.30 (0.257)
Income Change		-0.00 (0.000)		-0.00 (0.000)		-0.00 (0.000)		-0.00 [*] (0.000)		-0.00 (0.000)
Constant	1.66 [*] (1.009)	0.97 (1.086)	-1.25 (0.771)	-1.95 [*] (0.807)	-2.71 [*] (0.772)	-2.78 [*] (0.812)	-2.08 [*] (0.804)	-2.76 [*] (0.854)	-2.34 [*] (0.778)	-2.31 [*] (0.814)
Observations	696	656	692	651	694	653	694	653	676	637
% Pred. Correctly	88.1%	85.9%	79.9%	79.9%	79.4%	79.8%	79.8%	80.9%	74.0%	73.9%
Prop. Reduction Error	0.067	0.073	-0.007	0.008	-0.007	0.036	0.114	0.150	0.017	0.012
McKelvey & Zavoina Chi ²	0.447	0.478	0.139	0.151	0.157	0.188	0.275	0.299	0.153	0.159
BIC	527.78	524.35	747.84	741.36	761.68	752.17	733.31	713.68	820.74	808.01

Standard errors in parentheses; all models are logistical regression; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

Table A5.4. Predicting Attitudes toward Integration and Busing in 1973

	Govt. Should Ensure School Integration		Against Busing to Achieve Integration	
Goldwater Vote in '64	-0.54 [*] (0.223)	-0.43 [*] (0.238)	0.75 [*] (0.249)	0.60 [*] (0.270)
Anti-Communism	-0.09 (0.182)	0.30 (0.240)	0.41 [*] (0.199)	0.51 [*] (0.257)
Political Mistrust	-0.06 (0.067)	-0.12 (0.096)	0.15 [*] (0.075)	0.15 (0.112)
Political Knowledge	0.05 (0.108)	0.08 (0.136)	-0.26 [*] (0.114)	-0.27 [*] (0.145)
Republican	0.46 [*] (0.254)	0.47 [*] (0.263)	-0.52 [*] (0.269)	-0.53 [*] (0.281)
Independent	0.14 (0.219)	0.06 (0.234)	0.00 (0.244)	0.29 (0.271)
Church Attendance	0.20 (0.242)	0.11 (0.253)	-0.28 (0.266)	-0.35 (0.283)
Married	-0.40 (0.261)	-0.54 [*] (0.273)	0.20 (0.281)	0.26 (0.295)
Female	-0.18 (0.188)	-0.31 (0.198)	0.16 (0.205)	0.19 (0.217)
White	-1.26 [*] (0.355)	-1.40 [*] (0.385)	1.50 [*] (0.331)	1.46 [*] (0.355)
Education	-0.10 (0.334)	0.05 (0.376)	-0.25 (0.352)	-0.28 (0.400)
Age	0.01 (0.014)	0.02 (0.015)	-0.01 (0.016)	-0.00 (0.017)
Income	0.00 (0.000)	0.00 (0.000)	-0.00 [*] (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)
Limited Government	-0.07 (0.056)	-0.09 (0.059)	0.20 [*] (0.061)	0.20 [*] (0.065)
Ideology (Conservative)	-0.32 [*] (0.076)	-0.30 [*] (0.082)	0.13 (0.081)	0.14 (0.088)
South	-0.56 [*] (0.290)	-0.48 (0.311)	-0.10 (0.304)	0.04 (0.336)
Anti-Communism Change		-0.49 [*] (0.204)		-0.19 (0.215)
Pol Mistrust Change		0.09 (0.087)		-0.02 (0.103)
Pol Knowledge Change		-0.02 (0.134)		-0.02 (0.144)
Education Change		-0.08 (0.244)		-0.36 (0.249)
Income Change		-0.00 (0.000)		-0.00 (0.000)
Constant	2.66 [*] (0.696)	2.46 [*] (0.736)	-1.20 [*] (0.705)	-1.37 [*] (0.755)
Observations	653	613	680	641
% Pred. Correctly	64.9%	65.9%	75.0%	76.3%
Prop. Reduction Error	0.176	0.187	0.141	0.141
McKelvey & Zavoina Chi ²	0.145	0.164	0.200	0.218
BIC	927.71	897.65	834.51	802.09

Standard errors in parentheses; all models are logistical regression; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

Table A5.5. Predicting Attitudes toward Out-Groups and George Wallace in 1973

	Jews		Catholics		Blacks		G. Wallace	
Goldwater Vote in '64	-1.62 (1.779)	-0.51 (1.891)	-0.81 (1.843)	0.36 (1.953)	0.11 (1.723)	1.22 (1.822)	4.68* (2.137)	4.09* (2.263)
Anti-Communism	2.88* (1.482)	3.66* (1.909)	0.03 (1.544)	1.51 (1.986)	0.56 (1.435)	0.13 (1.840)	3.66* (1.772)	5.12* (2.282)
Political Mistrust	-0.87 (0.535)	-1.81* (0.753)	-1.18* (0.555)	-1.88* (0.774)	-0.74 (0.518)	-2.34* (0.722)	-0.99 (0.637)	-0.08 (0.895)
Political Knowledge	1.20 (0.859)	1.52 (1.070)	-0.38 (0.897)	-0.07 (1.111)	-0.42 (0.835)	-0.11 (1.030)	-4.10* (1.034)	-3.89* (1.277)
Republican	-3.93* (2.027)	-3.45 (2.092)	-2.20 (2.092)	-1.49 (2.156)	-3.98* (1.957)	-3.22 (2.010)	1.29 (2.449)	1.58 (2.522)
Independent	-2.28 (1.798)	-2.31 (1.891)	-5.15* (1.861)	-4.72* (1.966)	-3.57* (1.729)	-3.64* (1.816)	1.63 (2.142)	0.90 (2.261)
Church Attendance	0.60 (1.958)	0.09 (2.036)	4.66* (2.040)	4.15* (2.115)	3.56* (1.900)	3.68* (1.966)	1.46 (2.352)	0.50 (2.437)
Married	3.80* (2.100)	3.53 (2.173)	-0.60 (2.186)	-0.73 (2.257)	1.43 (2.037)	0.86 (2.101)	1.73 (2.537)	1.42 (2.620)
Female	3.28* (1.523)	2.74* (1.580)	0.47 (1.585)	0.35 (1.643)	0.18 (1.473)	0.03 (1.520)	-0.45 (1.822)	-0.66 (1.888)
White	7.50* (2.661)	6.64* (2.828)	5.45* (2.805)	4.52 (2.992)	-10.78* (2.567)	-9.93* (2.731)	23.52* (3.188)	22.62* (3.399)
Education	2.62 (2.716)	1.24 (3.027)	0.63 (2.843)	-1.02 (3.164)	0.51 (2.643)	-1.80 (2.946)	-7.88* (3.253)	-5.88 (3.626)
Age	-0.20* (0.116)	-0.19 (0.120)	0.00 (0.119)	0.03 (0.124)	0.00 (0.112)	-0.01 (0.116)	-0.11 (0.138)	-0.10 (0.144)
Income	-0.00 (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)	-0.00* (0.000)	-0.00* (0.000)
Limited Government	-0.69 (0.453)	-0.71 (0.470)	-0.68 (0.472)	-0.63 (0.490)	-0.99* (0.438)	-1.02* (0.453)	1.18* (0.542)	0.92 (0.563)
Ideology (Conservative)	0.04 (0.612)	-0.15 (0.646)	0.72 (0.632)	0.40 (0.670)	-0.34 (0.587)	-0.43 (0.623)	3.00* (0.728)	2.60* (0.776)
South	-6.92* (2.225)	-5.45* (2.357)	-6.22* (2.352)	-4.72* (2.492)	-1.47 (2.122)	0.32 (2.252)	10.01* (2.623)	10.02* (2.788)
Anti-Communism Change		-0.50 (1.617)		-1.90 (1.687)		1.25 (1.561)		-1.64 (1.929)
Pol Mistrust Change		1.21* (0.684)		1.17* (0.707)		2.12* (0.657)		-1.05 (0.816)
Pol Knowledge Change		-0.43 (1.073)		-0.09 (1.126)		-0.86 (1.038)		0.12 (1.293)
Education Change		0.55 (1.924)		1.57 (2.017)		0.62 (1.879)		-0.50 (2.328)
Income Change		0.00 (0.000)		0.00 (0.000)		0.00 (0.000)		0.00 (0.000)
Constant	63.10* (5.338)	64.23* (5.589)	69.81* (5.528)	69.38* (5.797)	84.95* (5.158)	85.27* (5.389)	24.02* (6.405)	26.97* (6.702)
Observations	668	633	682	644	689	651	685	644
Chi ²	0.069	0.067	0.054	0.052	0.094	0.110	0.228	0.217
BIC	5815.54	5548.12	6006.22	5704.36	5974.09	5675.05	6228.59	5887.07

Standard errors in parentheses; all models are ordinary least-squared regression; * $p < 0.05$, one-tailed

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