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INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION: THE
JAPANESE PARTIES IN THE CONSTITUENCIES

University of Washington

PH.D.

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Interest Groups and Political Party Organization

The Japanese Parties in the Constituencies

by

James John Foster

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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(Chairperson of Supervisory Committee)

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Doctoral Dissertation

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
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study will investigate the constituency organizations of the five major Japanese political parties in Hyogo prefecture and elaborate how the distinctive support bases of these parties influenced their organizational development in the 25 year period between 1955 and 1980. The various institutional and operational features of the parties are examined; the formal structure, party membership and leadership, and methods of finance. The primary conclusion centers on the unique importance of linkages to distinctive interest groupings in the electorate, in shaping party organizational structure.

The existence of a close relationship between political parties and certain large interest groupings such as commercial associations, unions, agricultural cooperatives, and religious sects has long been recognized. Although parties have been thought to be broad aggregators of interests in their quest for governmental power, it is generally accepted that they have tended to rely more heavily upon one group than another for support i.e., that each party has a more or less distinctive support base. The influence that these special ties have had upon the organizational form assumed by the parties, however, has not been well appreciated. Analyses of political party organization have not

Map 1
Map of Hyogo Prefecture



distinguished between political parties with a largely union support base from those that might depend upon a particular religious sect or farm organization. Instead, very broad typologies of party organizational patterns, normally with only a few cells, have been introduced. Furthermore, these have often been coupled to a developmental assumption that one pattern of party organization was both superior to and destined to replace the others.

The analytic utility of these typologies has been limited. Many of the cells in these typologies have been so vaguely defined that every party in a political system might be located within them. There is also little evidence that the organizations of all political parties are changing in the direction predicted by these typologies. Most important, the assumption that all political parties will be organized similarly whatever the nature of their interest backing has been an obstacle to an understanding of the different organizational tasks faced by parties with different support bases.

These problems with current thinking about political party organization have particularly hindered research into party organization in Japan. Japanese parties have been looked upon by Japanese and foreign scholars alike as organizationally primitive and criticized as overly dependent upon a few large interests to the exclusion of the average citizen. This has nurtured the implicit assumption that the organization of the Japanese parties, particularly in the local constituencies, did

not warrant close examination. This study will take strong exception to this position. It will be argued that the organizational structure exhibited by the Hyogo parties must be understood as a consequence of the organizational tasks posed by the interest groupings found in their distinctive support bases. From a broader comparative perspective, the conclusions reached here suggest that the influence of interest groups upon party structure must be taken into account in the development of a typology of party organizational patterns.

Political Parties and Interest Groups Outside of Japan

A political party may be defined generally as "any group . . . seeking to elect government officeholders under a given label."¹ This definition permits a useful distinction to be drawn between interest groups² and parties. Although they both engage in a wide range of political activities in an election campaign, parties are basically concerned with winning votes while interest groups will direct their principal efforts to influencing policy.³

Still, once this distinction has been made considerable room for collaboration between parties and interest groups seems to remain.⁴ In Europe most of the political parties rely heavily in elections upon the support of the membership of particular union, farm, commercial, and religious groups.⁵ In some cases, there has also been a substantial degree of organizational interpenetration between them both at the membership and leadership levels.⁶

The development of these special relationships has been the result of religious, class, communal, and regional cleavages in the political system, while their strength has been mediated in part by the degree of centralization of governmental functions and the nature of the rules governing electoral competition.⁷

The American political system differs from those of the European countries in the nature of its cleavages, the arrangement of its political institutions, and the organization of electoral competition. Some scholars, noting these differences, have argued that the character of the American political process is quite different.⁸ Proponents of this approach, known as the pluralist school, have understood interest groups to be essentially non-partisan organizations that work both sides of the political street in pursuit of private interests.⁹ The willingness of these interest groups to desert and re-form adhoc coalitions to press for the resolution of particular issues has been considered to be crucial in producing democratic outcomes. Parties in this perspective were assigned the special function of aggregating the many separate interests of particular groups in order to create a democratic majority that was capable of governance. This clear differentiation of the political articulation from the aggregation function, which the pluralists saw in American politics, was felt to represent a higher level of party development,¹⁰ and it was anticipated that the European parties despite the obstacles presented by their electoral and institutional differences would

progressively disassociate themselves from their interest groupings to become more like their American counterparts.

Ironically, it is the American parties that appear to have become more like the European. Pluralism is no longer accepted as a complete description of American political life. Although muted by the federal system and the separation of executive and legislative electoral constituencies, class, ethnic, and racial cleavages have always acted to forge more or less stable ties between major interest groups and one of the two political parties.¹¹ More important, the American parties have been shown to be not so broadly aggregative as had been thought. The competitive patterns characteristic of single member electoral districts have often worked to disadvantage less well organized minorities such as Blacks and Hispanics, and even majorities such as consumers and conservationists, in favor of groups with the money to orchestrate a slick media campaign or the organizational muscle necessary to mount an intensive vote mobilization effort.¹² The two parties, well aware of the power of corporate and union interests, have tended to recruit candidates and pursue policies tailored to these groups, and neglected at times the legitimate interests of the less powerful.¹³

A different pattern of historical development and arrangement of electoral competition has made interest group and party linkages far more complex in America than in Europe. Nevertheless, it can be argued that more or less stable ties between particular groups and parties have been the rule rather than the exception in both

settings. Moreover, it appears that the strength of these relationships are not necessarily connected to any particular stage of party development. Although the linkages between the British Labor party and the Trade Union Congress are far closer than those between the Democratic party and the AFL-CIO, it cannot rightly be inferred from this that either party is more modern than the other.

Interest Groups and Political Party Organizational Patterns

The analysis of party organizational structure has always been an essential part of research into political parties because "it often explains the strength and efficiency of certain parties and the weakness and inefficiency of others."¹⁴ A number of typologies of party organizational patterns have been developed, many of them based on studies of parties in both industrialized and developing societies.¹⁵ The most influential typology today remains Duverger's 1951 formulation that posited two basic organizational patterns: an elite (partis de cadre) and a mass (partis de masses) party.¹⁸ Duverger elaborated the differences between these types in terms of their basic elements (caucus versus branch), general articulation (limited versus extensive), intra-party linkages (vertical versus horizontal), and degree of centralization. He then used them to discuss the meaning of party membership and the nature of party leadership. Duverger argued that the mass party, which he saw to have developed to structure the votes of an

expanded electorate produced by universal manhood suffrage, was the party organizational pattern best suited to the requirements of modern political competition.¹⁷

Duverger's basic typology of party organizational patterns was largely accepted¹⁸ by his sharpest critic, Leon Epstein who nevertheless had strong reservations about the developmental implications that Duverger had attached to it. Epstein claimed that "organization in one degree or another always exists for . . . electoral purpose"¹⁹ and that the loosely organized elite parties, which Duverger had felt to be less modern, were actually better suited for competition in an increasingly complex, media-oriented society than the more rigidly structured mass party.²⁰

Neither Duverger, Epstein, nor any of the other proponents of a particular party organizational typology, have been much concerned to specify the relationship between interest groups and party structure. In general, it has been treated as a residual category: the particular coalition of interest groups present at a party's formation are thought to have some influence upon the structural pattern that it first adopts, but afterwards the party organization is seen to develop greater or lesser structural complexity based on a universal logic of party organizational development.²¹

This neglect of the influence that a party's support base might have upon its organizational structure has reduced the utility of these typologies. First, the categories in each typology have often been so broadly defined they have provided

little gain in explanatory power. Duverger in a 1966 study argued that "the characteristic feature of the French parties is their extraordinary weakness"²² and labelled all but the Communists, elite parties. In contrast to this he found the Scandinavian parties to be "strongly organized and disciplined"²³ mass parties. This raises the question of whether the specification of a "French" and "Scandinavian" party organizational pattern might not have served equally well to distinguish among these parties.²⁴ Second, despite the arguments on both sides, there does not seem to be a clear party organizational development sequence in either direction. American political parties outside of a few city and state organizations have never developed an extensive organizational apparatus and show few signs of doing so in the future.²⁵ On the other hand, the large European and non-European socialist parties of the past are still supported in their electoral activities by a large dues-paying membership and an extensive network of party branches.²⁶

A specification of interest group and party linkages should permit a more sophisticated comparison of the various aspects of party organization. The structure and activities of the branch networks established by union and religious-based parties can be quite different, as may their decisionmaking and Secretariat structures. For example, a party dependent upon the unions for support might locate its branches in the workplace, while a religious party may place them in each parish. This will have

important consequences for the parties' capacity to contact and mobilize voters from outside these two groups. The meaning of membership in a party, the importance of party dues, and the role of party endorsed assemblymen also might diverge significantly in parties that have different interest groupings affiliated with them.

An assessment of the relationship between parties and interest groups can also offer much insight into the direction and speed of party organizational change. A party tied to a large well disciplined union federation may initially create an organizational structure sufficient only to control the executive committees of the constituent unions of the federation. Later, perhaps pressed by the failing capacity of the federation leadership to mobilize the rank and file, the party may move to develop an organization capable of more direct control over the votes of the federation membership or of mobilizing votes from other interest groupings. Another party that is affiliated with less well disciplined, socially marginal elements such as non-union workers, welfare recipients, and students might be led to create an extensive organizational apparatus from the first in order to weld its supporters into an effective political force. A third party that could count on the allegiance of a heterogeneous group of farm, commercial, and professional interests may find it most efficient to leave the mobilization of votes to ad hoc electoral organizations put together by its candidates. As these candidate organizations

come to face a stronger challenge from other political parties in the system, it might begin to develop a specialized propaganda capability but remain in other respects organizationally weak.

The creation of a typology of party organizational patterns that classifies parties in terms of their interest group backing does not completely escape the ambiguity that has limited the usefulness of the typologies advanced by Duverger and others. Union based parties are not of one sort: the French Socialist party and the British Labor party are obviously different in a number of ways.²⁷ Religious parties have also taken on different patterns that vary from the tightly disciplined Social Christian party in Belgium to the more loosely organized Christian Democratic party in Italy. Nevertheless, it can be argued that parties with similar support bases will probably face common organizational problems in trying to mobilize groups affiliated with them and to reach out for new support. Studies such as this one, which proposes to analyze party organizational patterns from this perspective, will contribute ultimately, it is hoped, to a more comprehensive understanding of party organizations.

Interest Groups and the Japanese Political Parties

The close ties between Japanese parties and particular interest groups have long been recognized.²⁸ All of the five major political parties (see Table 1) have affiliated with them a well defined subset of interest groupings to which they look for help in mobilizing votes in the local constituencies at times of

Table 1
The Five Major Japanese Political Parties

Party	Date of Formation	Major Interest Group Base	Number of Seats in Lower House ^a	Share of Votes ^a
LDP	1956	Farm, Commercial and Professional Associations	253	44.6
JSP	1945	Left-wing Trade Unions (Sōhyō)	107	19.7
DSP	1960	Right-wing Trade Unions (Domei)	36	6.8
KOM	1964	Buddhist Lay Organization (Sōkagakkai)	58	9.8
JCP	1922	Non-union workers and other socially marginal elements enrolled in party <u>front groups</u>	41	10.4

^aResults of October 1979 Lower House Election; see Kōbe Shimbun October 9, 1979.

elections. The Liberal Democratic party (LDP), which has held power since its formation in 1956, is closely connected with business interests represented by the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and the Japan Chambers of Commerce (Nishō), farmers who are members of the National Federation of Agriculture Cooperatives Association, and a large number of professional and other interest groups such as the Japan Medical Association and the Veterans Pension Association.²⁹ The Japan Socialist party (JSP), which is the largest of the opposition parties, is affiliated with the General Council of Trade Unions (Sōhyō).³⁰ The Democratic Socialist party (DSP), which was formed in 1960 from elements of the JSP's right wing, is backed in elections by the Japan Confederation of Labor (Dōmei).³¹ The Komeito (KOM--Clean Government party) was established in 1964 by a Buddhist lay organization, the Sōkagakkai (The Value Creation Society) which still remains its most prominent supporter.³² The Japan Communist party (JCP) is the oldest of the Japanese parties, but it has only become a major force in national politics since the late 1960's. Because the party still has very limited support in the union movement, much of its recent success can be attributed to the strength of the network of front groups that it has created to organize non-union workers, welfare recipients, and other socially marginal groups.³³

The Demand for Reform of the Japanese Parties

The strong and exclusive bonds that have developed between certain large interest groups and the political parties in Japan has elicited much criticism from Japanese and foreign scholars alike.³⁴ They have argued that a truly "modern" political party had to be more than merely a vehicle for the articulation of the interests of particular commercial, farm, union, or religious groups. It had to stand for a set of principles, recruit membership broadly from all those in the electorate that shared them, and build a nationwide network of party branches capable of directing the electoral fight to transform these principles into public policy. Control of this party apparatus was to be vested in the membership. They were to formulate the party program and to choose party leaders from their ranks. Only in this way could the parties be made to serve the needs of ordinary citizens rather than those of big business, big labor, or any other group. "Modernization" was expected to help the perennially second-place JSP the most by encouraging it to search beyond the labor movement for support, and it was hoped that this would permit the party at long last to win a majority of the seats in the Lower House and thus break the long hegemony of the conservatives.³⁵

Interest Groups and the Constituency Organization of the Japanese Parties

Despite the wide acceptance of the linkage between the parties and certain interest groups and the reformist demands for a

transformation of party organization, there have been paradoxically few studies that have probed the ties between interest groups and the parties at the local level and the effect that they have had upon the constituency organizations of the parties. Students of the national parties have often been content simply to note the remark of a former Minister of Education, "Japanese political parties are like ghosts, they have heads but no feet".³⁶

Aiba Junichi, who contributed the section on political parties to a 1973 volume of bibliographic essays on the state of research in political sociology in Japan,³⁷ could list only two works dealing with the organization of the constituency parties: Soma Masao's "Chihō Seitō no Kōzō to Kinō" (1967) and a study by American political scientist Gerald Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style (1971).

Soma outlined in a brief 20 pages the organization of the conservative and socialist parties in rural Niigata prefecture during the early 1960's and touched on aspects of party activities in Chiba, Saitama, and Yamagata prefectures.³⁸ He was concerned to see how the conservatives have managed to retain their base of support in the rural areas in the face of the socioeconomic changes initiated by the Occupation's land reform policies and the national government's commitment to rapid growth, and what kind of opposition the Socialists have been able to mount against them. Soma found that the owners of construction and logging firms have joined the heads of the local farm cooperatives in the party

hierarchy and that public works programs and subsidies to agriculture have blunted local discontent with the LDP growth program. The socialist leadership was drawn largely from activists in the prewar tenant movement and union officials. Party activity outside of elections was limited to protests against LDP policies staged by the local labor councils (chikurō). Curtis's work was not primarily concerned with party organization,³⁹ but he did discuss how the LDP prefectural federation was tied into the major conservative interests in Oita prefecture and how the conservative base of support and vote mobilization strategies differed in urban and rural areas of the prefecture.

No Japanese scholars have investigated systematically the constituency organizations of the smaller opposition parties. The most reliable information can be found in materials published by the parties themselves⁴⁰ and the memoirs of prominent local politicians.⁴¹ The English language materials are even more sketchy. Cecil Brett, in his analysis of Okayama prefecture, has described the strength of the organizational structure that the Komeito has developed there, and the success that the party has had in drawing support from beyond the Sōkagakkai through the activities of party administered citizen livelihood centers.⁴² But he offers little persuasive evidence that the party organization and these centers actually function as Komeito officials claim. John Copper's⁴³ and Hong Kim's⁴⁴ recent articles on the JCP have provided some insight into the party's present organizational and

electoral difficulties. However, their analyses have offered few details of the structuring of the party's local organization and the relationship of party organs to the Communist support base in the constituencies. There are no published monographs on the local organization of the DSP. The most up-to-date scholarly discussion of the organizational dilemmas facing this party can be found in Tsurutani's chapter on the opposition parties⁴⁵ where he argues that this party like the JSP is largely dependent in local elections upon the organizational strength of the Dōmei federation.

Political Parties in Hyogo Prefecture

This study proposes to investigate the linkages between interest groups and the Japanese political parties in the constituencies and the influence that these linkages have had upon the development of local party organization through an intensive examination of the constituency organizations in Hyogo prefecture of the five established parties during the 25 year period between 1955 and 1980. In the following chapters, data will be presented on the organized groups in the prefecture that have officially endorsed each party to their membership and contributed money to its candidates. Next, the organizational history of each party will be described in terms of changes in seven structural elements:

- 1) party branch structure; 2) party decisionmaking organs;
- 3) party Secretariat structure; 4) party membership; 5) party leadership; 6) sources of party income and patterns of party

expenditures; 7) backgrounds of party candidates for public office. The differences observed among the parties, and within the parties over time, will be analyzed in terms of the interest groupings affiliated with each of them. These seven elements were chosen to highlight the different effects of interest groupings upon party organizational structure. It will be seen, for example, that the branch structure of the union based JSP is quite different from that of the LDP, which is tied to farm and commercial interests. These elements also serve to single out several issues of importance in the literature on party organization. As will be developed in the conclusion to this study, generalizations about party organizational patterns, such as those of Michels about party decisionmaking structures⁴⁶ and those of Wilson about party membership⁴⁷ must be modified to take into account the varying effects of a party's interest backing upon its structure.

The decision to study intensively the organization of the political parties in one prefecture was prompted by the difficulties in obtaining reliable information about the constituency organizations of the Japanese parties, and the desire to investigate in detail the interaction between interest groups and the parties over an extended period of time. The discussion of party organization in Hyogo prefecture found here is based on:

- 1) reports on party organizational structure and membership contained in materials distributed to delegates to the conventions of the prefectural parties and other materials made available by the Hyogo parties.

- 2) articles on party activities in the Kōbe Shimbun, a daily newspaper published in the prefecture, and the weekly or monthly news sheets put out by the prefectural parties.
- 3) election results, campaign biographies, and party financial status reports issued by the Hyogo Election Commission (Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai) and published in the official Register of Hyogo Prefecture (Hyōgoken Kōhō).
- 4) extensive interviews with the officers, staff, candidates, and membership of the five Hyogo parties.

An Introduction to Hyogo Prefecture

Hyogo prefecture, the site chosen for this study, is located about 700 kilometers southwest of Tokyo in the Kansai region of Japan. It is a large prefecture encompassing 8,400 square kilometers, and is the only one to front on both the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan (see Map 1). The prefecture has a population of 5.1 million (1978) making it the sixth largest in the country.

Hyogo can be divided into six major districts: Kobe city, Hanshin, Awajii Island, East Harima, West Harima (all of which are on the Pacific Coast), and Tamba that lies on the Sea of Japan side. Each of the districts has a distinct character and can be said to be fairly representative of the different conditions that the political parties encounter in other areas of the nation.

Kobe city (population 1.3 million) is the capital of the prefecture and the second largest port in the nation. It is a center for the manufacture of industrial goods ranging from chemicals to steel to electrical machinery.

The Hanshin area is situated between the cities of Kobe and Osaka (population 2.6 million). It includes one major industrial center, Amagasaki (540,000) and a number of suburban residential communities: Nishinomiya (400,000), Takarazuka (170,000), and Ashiya (70,000).

Awajii island is located several kilometers off the coast near Kobe city. It is connected to the mainland only by ferries and its population of some 120,000 is engaged principally in rice and mandarin orange cultivation, and some light manufacture.

The East Harima district is centered around the old castle town of Akashi (240,000) and extends deep into the mountainous center of the prefecture. The cities of Miki (60,000) and Ono (40,000) early developed as centers for the textile industry. In more recent years, the cities of Kakogawa (180,000) and Takasago (80,000) have been created as new industrial cities specializing in steel and chemical production.

Himeiji city (440,000) can boast of the largest and best preserved castle in Japan and its status as the biggest city in the West Harima district. It serves as a commercial center for this primarily agricultural area, and is the site of Japan's most modern steel works. The city of Aioi (40,000) at the far western tip of the district is a center for shipbuilding.

The Tamba region is separated from the rest of Hyogo by a low but rugged range of mountains. Its isolation from the Pacific coast districts has only recently been breached by the completion

of an expressway linking its only city Toyooka (40,000) with Kobe. The population in Tamba engages mainly in fishing, logging, and cattle raising.

Hyogo prefecture has been a part of or anticipated the great social tremors that have swept through Japan in its effort to develop a modern economy. The rural areas and the cities in Hyogo were centers for the prewar socialist movement. The influential Christian socialist Kagawa Toyohiko taught at Kansei Gakuen university in Kobe and the city was one of the few areas to send candidates of the Social Mass party to the prewar Diet.⁴⁸

In the immediate postwar period, Hyogo provided a number of leaders for the new labor movement and several union federations established their headquarters in Kobe.⁴⁹ By 1955, union membership in the prefecture stood at nearly a half million.⁵⁰ The postwar ferment in the factories of the prefecture proved fertile ground for the Communist party. Before the Occupation forces intervened to break for good its power in the unions, two of the party's candidates had been elected to the Lower House from Hyogo in 1949. Because of the importance of Kobe port to the United States war effort in Korea, the city became a center for party agitation against the United States military presence in Japan during the 1950's.

Hyogo grew rapidly after the Korean war. The population of its two largest cities, Kobe and Amagasaki, nearly doubled between 1955 and 1970 as population from the rural counties of the prefecture and neighboring areas streamed to work in their factories

and offices. Within a 10 year period the Sōkagakkai, a Buddhist lay organization with millennial goals, grew from 5,000 to over 150,000 families to become a major political force in Hyogo.⁵¹ Shortages of housing, severe pollution, and poor or inadequate social services fueled a citizen "revolt" that elected "reform" mayors in Kobe and Amagasaki cities.⁵² But for all this growth, large parts of Hyogo particularly the Awajii island, West Harima, and Tamba districts remained essentially rural. The prefecture today has 167,000 farm households, the sixth largest in the country. The area under cultivation at 100,000 hectares is exceeded substantially only by the large northern prefectures.⁵³

The slowdown in Japanese and world economic growth that began in the mid-seventies was felt with particular severity in Hyogo. The steel mills of Kobe, the textile factories in Miki, and the shipyards in Aioi have been forced to cutback sharply on personnel. The wave of reform that committed the cities to the provision of a variety of new social services has now passed and left in its wake frustrated city officials and angry citizens who wonder how they can pay for them in a time of shrinking revenues. The new era of limits has broken up the "reform" coalition of the early 1970's. The conservatives narrowly lost a bid to win back control of Amagasaki city and the mayor of Kobe has found it prudent to disassociate himself from the "reform" label. It has also brought about a scramble for control over the limited resources available to the cities. The Buraku, members of a formerly outcaste group in

Japan, have been very active in Hyogo in demanding their share of public services for their communities.⁵⁴ The strains between the Buraku and other groups in the Tamba region exploded in violence in 1975 in a case that drew national attention.⁵⁵

The Hyogo Political System

A political map of Hyogo would divide it into five not six districts. For the House of Representatives (HR) races, Awajii island is included within the Hanshin district. At present, five representatives are elected at-large from Kobe city which forms the first Hyogo legislative district. The second district (Hanshin and Awajii island) also elects five; the third district (East Harima) three; the fourth district (West Harima) four; and the fifth district (Tamba) three. The fifth district is unusual in that with its 225,000 registered voters it has the lowest voter to assemblyman ratio in the nation.⁵⁶ The prefecture also elects six representatives at-large to the House of Councillors (HC).⁵⁷ The terms of office are staggered so that only three positions are contested at each election. Hyogo has a 91 seat Prefectural Assembly (PA) made up of representatives elected at large from the wards of Kobe⁵⁸ and the other cities and counties of the prefecture.

The LDP presently holds 6 of the 20 HR seats in Hyogo and a 10 seat majority in the prefectural assembly. In prefecture-wide elections it can muster a minimum of 600,000 votes. The JSP holds 5 seats in the Lower House and 12 in the prefectural assembly.

Table 2

Performance of Five Major Parties in 1977 HC,^a 1979 PA,^b
and 1979 HR,^c Elections in Hyogo

	LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP	KOM	Total
Kobe HR	1	1	1	1	1	5
Kobe PA	8	5	3	3	4	22
Hanshin HR	1	2	0	1	1	5
Hanshin PA	14	4	2	3	5	28
East Harima HR	1	0	1	0	1	3
East Harima PA	10	2	1	0	1	14
West Harima HR	2	1	0	0	1	4
West Harima PA	13	1	0	0	1	15
Tamba HR	1	1	1	0	0	3
Tamba PA	7	0	1	0	0	8
Total HR	6	5	3	2	4	20
Total PA	54	12	7	6	11	91
Hyogo HC	2	1	0	1	2	6

^aHyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.⁵⁹

^bKōbe Shimbun, April 3, 1979.

^cKōbe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.⁶⁰

it can count on some 400,000 supporters at election time. The other socialist party, the DSP, has 3 HR seats at present, 2 of them newly won in the 1979 General Election. It has 7 PA seats, up 1 from the 6 held by the party when it was founded in 1960, and can pull in 300,000 votes in the HC election.

The Komeito has enjoyed good success in Hyogo. Although it entered prefectural politics only 15 years before, it now has 4 Diet representatives and 11 seats in the prefectural assembly. It is able to muster 400,000 votes at election time. The JCP can count 2 HR representatives and 6 prefectural assemblymen. In elections, Communist candidates can expect a minimum of 250,000 votes out of the 2.2 million cast.

Plan of the Study

The succeeding chapters of this study will analyze in-depth the linkages between the organizational structure of the five established parties and the interest groups in Hyogo to which they look for support. Chapter II will deal with the Liberal Democratic party Hyogo federation, Chapter III the Hyogo Socialist party, Chapter IV the Democratic Socialist party Hyogo federation, Chapter V the Japan Communist Party Hyogo Committee, and Chapter VI the Hyogo Komeito. Chapter VII will examine why interest groups and parties are so closely linked together in Japan and the implications for the Hyogo parties of the weakening capacity of these groups to mobilize their membership in elections. Chapter VIII will

summarize the findings of this study with regard to the influence of the interest group backing of the Hyogo political parties upon their organizational structure and raise some problems with the present literature on political party organization.

Throughout this study Japanese names have been listed in accordance with Japanese custom, with the family name preceeding the personal name. The romanization of Japanese words follows the method used in the 1974 edition of Kenkyūsha's New Japanese-English Dictionary. Exceptions to this are made only in the case of names of persons and places such as Hyogo and Kobe and of the Komeito, for which long marks have been omitted.

NOTES

¹ Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Fredrick Praeger, 1967), p. 9.

² Interest groups are understood in this study to be interactional groups which have a formal organizational structure, i.e., a well defined membership, formally selected leadership, and a professional staff. In this sense, blue-collar workers as a whole do not constitute an interest group, only those organized into a particular union do. Similarly, doctors are considered an interest group only as they act collectively through a medical association. See the distinction that Samuel Eldersveld draws between "categorical" and "interactional" groups as well as his discussion of the "latency" or "potentiality" of interest groups in "American Interest Groups: A Survey of Research and Some Implications for Theory and Method" in Betty Zisk, ed., American Political Interest Groups: Readings in Theory and Research (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), pp. 61-66.

³ Leon Epstein, op. cit., p. 12.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 73-75. Epstein does not see any confusion of function for a political party to be closely associated with an interest group. See also pp. 279-285.

⁵ See the country by country reports on the European parties in Stanley Henig, ed., Political Parties in the European Community (London: George Allen and Urwin, 1979). In a study of the supporters of 76 parties in 17 different countries, Rose and Urwin found that only 19 parties could be characterized as drawing support from most segments of the electorate. Eighteen of the parties drew support largely from co-religionists and 20 from the working class. For details see Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties, and Strains in Regimes" Comparative Political Studies 2 (April 1969), pp. 7-67.

⁶ For the British Labor party see Samuel Beer, British Politics in a Collectivist Age (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1965), pp. 105-242; for the Norwegian parties see the chapter on the "Relations of Parties to Social Organizations" in Henry Valen and David Katz, Political Parties in Norway (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1967), pp. 304-330; for the Italian parties see Joseph LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 84-99 and pp. 199-251.

⁷See discussion in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64; see also Appendix A in Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971).

⁸See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955), pp. 23-32.

⁹See "Pluralist Democracy: An Explanation" in Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 223-325; see also discussion in Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1969), pp. 29-54.

¹⁰Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 112-114.

¹¹See J. David Greenstone's discussion of the relationship between the United Autoworkers Union and the Democratic party in Detroit in Labor in American Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1969), pp. 110-140; see also with Paul Peterson his Race and Authority in Urban Politics (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973) *passim*; the recognition of close ties between interest groups and parties in American politics is not new: see V. O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 5th ed., 1964), pp. 154-161.

¹²See for example David Nichols, Financing Elections: The Politics of an American Ruling Class (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974, *passim*; this criticism of the parties is not new, see E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Wilson, 1960, *passim*).

¹³This does not mean that major shifts in the alignment of the interest groupings behind the Democratic and Republican parties have not occurred. See Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); see also James L. Sundquist, The Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1973).

¹⁴Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954), p. 4.

¹⁵David Apter drew a distinction between a "party of solidarity" and a "party of representation" in the Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 179-222; Sigmund Neumann has contrasted the "party of

individual representation" to the "party of integration" in "Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties" in Sigmund Neumann, ed. Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 403-405. Otto Kirchheimer has introduced the "catch-all" party, which stands organizationally somewhere between Duverger's two party types in the "Transformation of Western European Party Systems" in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds. Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 177-200. A recent formulation is that of Kay Lawson who uses three variables: "1) the extent to which power is concentrated at the top or dispersed to constituent units; 2) the extent to which active members have a role in forming party policy; and 3) the extent to which active members help carry out party decisions" (p. 227) to generate six party organizational patterns: the committee party, the convocation party, the club party, the cadre party, the vanguard party, and the mass party. For more details see Kay Lawson, The Comparative Study of Political Parties (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), pp. 77-81.

¹⁶Maurice Duverger, op. cit., pp. 4-60. Later, Duverger was to refine his argument and introduce a middle grouping between the elite and mass parties, which was labelled appropriately an "intermediate" category. Within each category, Duverger has delineated a number of party types: in the elite group there is an European type, which corresponds to the English Conservative and Liberal parties, and an American type, which seems most closely related to the now nearly extinct "machine" parties; in the mass party group there is a Socialist type, of which the pre-World War I German Social Democratic party seems to have been the model, a Communist type, and a Fascist type; in the new "intermediate" category there is an indirect party type that takes after the British Labor party and an "Underdeveloped Countries" party type. For details, see Maurice Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1972), pp. 6-18. Duverger's continued influence over thinking about party organization can be seen most clearly in Frank Sorauf's discussion of American party organization in Party Politics in America (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 2nd ed., 1972), especially pp. 62-64.

¹⁷Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, op. cit., pp. 422-427. Duverger seems to have retreated substantially from this position. The question of party organizational development was not taken up at all in his later work, Party Politics and Pressure Groups. However, the belief that the mass party offers a superior form of party organization is not dead. See William Wright's discussion of the Party Democracy model in "Comparative Party Models: Rational-Efficient and Party Democracy" in William Wright, ed. A Comparative Study of Party Organization (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 17-54.

¹⁸In truth, it is hard to judge where Epstein really stands on this point. In his criticism of Duverger, he seems to accept the elite versus mass distinction, but the underlying thrust of his analysis is to assert that organization is not essential for a party to carry out its most important function of providing a label under which candidates contest for political office; see Leon Epstein, op. cit., pp. 98-129.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 98.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 233-260.

²¹See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, op. cit., xiii-xxxviii; and Leon Epstein, op. cit., pp. 27-31.

²²Maurice Duverger, Party Politics and Pressure Groups, op. cit., pp. 91-94.

²³Ibid., pp. 86-87.

²⁴A typology of this sort was actually advanced by Gabriel Almond in "Comparative Political Systems," The Journal of Political Studies (18) 1956, pp. 405-408. In contrasting the Anglo-American and Continental European types, he noted that the Scandinavian parties fell somewhere in-between.

²⁵Frank Sorauf, op. cit., pp. 65-85. He notes, "The semantics of American politics often reflects its most tenacious myths. . . . And yet, even the most cursory experience with American party organization suggests that all the semantic puffery hides a vastly less imposing reality" (p. 65).

²⁶In October 1977 the membership of the Austrian Socialist party was 716,000; the German Social Democratic party 970,000; the Israeli Labor party 300,000; the Italian Socialist party 538,000; the New Zealand Labor party 195,000; the Norwegian Labor party 200,000; the Swedish Social Democratic party 890,000; and the Swiss Social Democratic party 890,000. Data collected by the Minshatō Kokusai Kyoku and found in Minshatō Sōshiki Kyoku, Nyutō Kara Tōkatsudō (Tōkyō: Minshatō Kyōden Kyoku, 1977), p. 60.

²⁷One difference can be found in the nature of their membership. The French Socialist party accepts only individual members; the British Labor party permits indirect affiliation through the trade unions as well as individual membership.

²⁸One of the first English language studies to call attention to this was Masumi Junnosuke and Robert Scalapino, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); for a recent overview of these relationships see Taketsugu Tsurutani, Political Change in Japan (New York: David MacKay Co., 1976), passim.

²⁹For details see Haruhiro Fukui, Party in Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 144-170.

³⁰See Allan B. Cole et al., Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), especially pp. 313-369.

³¹Ibid., pp. 69-82.

³²Hori Yukio, Komeitō Ron (Tōkyō: Aoki Shoten, 1973), especially pp. 191-194.

³³Asahi Shimbunsha, Nihon Kyōsantō (Tōkyō: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1973), especially pp. 95-137.

³⁴For the flavor of this voluminous literature, see Matsushita Keiichi, Gendai Nihon no Seijiteki Kōsei (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1962); Yoshimura Tadashi, Nihon no Seiji Shindan (Tōkyō: Seishin Shobo, 1964); and Shiratori Rei, Nihon ni okeru Hōshu to Kakushin (Tōkyō: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1973). In English see Gary Allinson, "Japan's Independent Vote: Dilemma or Opportunity?" Japan Interpreter, Spring 1976, pp. 36-55; this stress upon party "modernization" often finds its way into discussions by the parties themselves of organizational reform: see the "Tō no Kaikaku" series in Jiyū Minshū, nos. 255-260 (1977) and "Tokushū - Shinsei Shakaitō Hyakuman no Tō Kensetsu" in Gekkan Shakaitō, no. 260, June 1978, pp. 10-97.

³⁵The JSP has always been the largest by far of the opposition parties, but its base in the Sōhyō unions has been too small for it to contest with the LDP for control of the Lower House. Since 1960 the party has never won more than 140 seats in the 511 seat chamber.

³⁶Quoted in Cole et al., op. cit., p. 263; Nathaniel Thayer cites the same quote with regard to the LDP organization but attributes it to a party worker in Hiroshima. See How the Conservatives Rule Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 85.

³⁷Aiba Junichi, "Seiji Soshiki to Seiji Undō" in Fukutake Tadashi and Watanuki Joji, eds., Shakaikagaku Kōza: Seiji Shakaigaku Vol. 7 (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1973).

³⁸Soma Masao, "Chihō Seitō no Kōzō to Kinō", Nenpō Seijigaku, 1967, pp. 132-158.

³⁹Curtis described the campaign of an LDP candidate for the House of Representatives. See Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), particularly the chapter on "The Organizational Strategy."

⁴⁰See for example on the JCP, Nihon Kyōsantō Hyōgoken linkai, Hyōgoken Tō no Ayumi (Ōsaka: Kansai Insatsusho, 1972).

⁴¹On the Democratic Socialist party: Nagae Kazuo, Waga Shōwashi (Kōbe: Ato Insatsu, 1976).

⁴²Cecil Brett, "The Komeito and Local Japanese Politics," Asian Survey 19(4) April 1979, pp. 353-365.

⁴³Copper reports that party cohesion is weakening and that only about one-half of the claimed membership are presently active (pp. 364-365). See John Copper, "The Japan Communist Party's Recent Electoral Defeats: A Signal of Decline?" Asian Survey 19(4) April 1979, pp. 353-365.

⁴⁴Hong speculates that despite electoral setbacks the party will stick to its parliamentary path because of the conservatism of the local party leadership, who will not wish to risk the economic security provided them by the party's publishing activities, administration of hospitals and tax consulting services, and positions in some unions for the vague revolutionary ideals that animated the party in the 1950's. See Hong Kim, "The JCP's Parliamentary Road," Problems of Communism 26(2), March-April 1977, pp. 19-35.

⁴⁵Taketsugu Tsurutani, op. cit., pp. 163-168.

⁴⁶See Roberto Michels, Political Parties (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1959), p. 34.

⁴⁷See James Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 97-115.

⁴⁸For details of the prewar socialist movement see George Totten, The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

⁴⁹For example, Sasaki Ryosaku presently an HR assembly man from the Hyogo 5th District served as the secretary-general of the national Electric Utilities Workers union; the Seamen Union (1979 membership 153,000) was the largest national union to take Kobe as its headquarters.

⁵⁰Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, Rōdō Kumiai Meibo 1977, p. 150.

⁵¹For source of Sōkagakkai membership see Chapter VI, Note 14.

⁵²The term "reform" (kakushin) refers to adhoc coalitions of the opposition parties behind mayoral or gubernatorial candidates against conservative or LDP supported incumbents. The "reform" camp is thought to emphasize social welfare programs as opposed to the growth-oriented policies of the conservatives. For more details see Terry MacDougall, "Japanese Urban Local Politics: Towards a Viable Progressive Local Opposition" in Lewis Austin, ed. Japan: The Paradox of Progress (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 31-56.

⁵³Sōrifu Tōkei Kyoku, Nihon Tōkei Nenkan Shōwa 54-nen 1979.

⁵⁴See Chong-do Hah and Christopher Lapp, "Japanese Politics of Equality in Transition: The Case of the Burakumin," Asian Survey 18(5), May 1978, pp. 487-504.

⁵⁵Thomas Rohlen, "Violence at Yoka High School," Asian Survey 16(7), July 1976, pp. 682-699.

⁵⁶The geographic boundaries of the Lower House election districts have not been changed since the adoption of the postwar Constitution in 1947. As indicated in Table 74, however, there have been great changes in the number of voters within each HR district. Since many of the LDP assemblymen are elected from the rural areas, the party has been reluctant to support legislation to change the allotment of Lower House seats to each district in line with population changes. Where changes have been made, as in the Kobe HR district (3 to 5 seats), the result has been to increase the number of seats in urban districts rather than to reduce them in the rural areas. In 1947, the Lower House had 466 seats. Today it has 513. The changes made have not been sufficient to reduce the imbalance between the rural and urban districts. The Hyogo 5th district is the most outstanding example of this. In Kobe, for example, one HR assemblyman represents 190,000 voters. In the 5th district he represents only 81,000.

⁵⁷The House of Councillors has 252 members elected for six year terms. Half of the Chamber stands for election every three years. One-hundred members are elected at-large from the entire nation. The other 152 are elected at-large from the 47 prefectures with the number of seats from each varying from 2 to 8.

⁵⁸Kobe along with nine other large cities in Japan have been extended special status as designated cities (shitei toshi). Candidates for the city and prefectural assemblies in Kobe are not elected at-large with the entire city or county as their constituency, as is the case with the other assemblymen in Hyogo, but from one of the nine Kobe city wards.

⁵⁹Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai, Senkyo Kiroku (Shōwa 52-7-10 Shikkō Sangiin Senkyo) 1977. The Hyogo Election Commission issues a report on the number of registered voters, backgrounds of candidates for public office, number of election law violations, and results of elections for each national and local election held in the prefecture. These are available for reference at the Commission office and at the Hyogo prefectural library. These data were used to determine the results of the national HC and HR elections and the prefectural elections held in Hyogo between 1947 and 1977. These data will be indicated in the text under the reference Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.

⁶⁰Data on 1979 Prefectural Assembly election and House of Representatives election drawn respectively from April 3, 1979 and October 9, 1979 issues of the Kōbe Shimbun.

CHAPTER 11

THE HYOGO LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY FEDERATION

The Liberal Democratic Party has as its basic policy goals: the protection of human rights and opposition to both totalitarianism and threats against the social order, the encouragement of pride in the nation, the promotion of cultural and moral values, respect for private property, the building of economic prosperity, and the proper operation of parliamentary institutions.¹ The party is considered the most conservative of the major parties in Japan and its membership is strongly anti-communist. It had pursued until checked by pollution and the energy crisis an aggressive policy of economic growth. Presently, the party is attempting to insulate the economy from these problems through the encouragement of pollution-free, low-energy, capital-intensive industries.² The LDP's emphasis upon economic growth led it in the past to value revenue producing capital expenditures over the provision of other government services. But in recent years under strong pressure from the left, the party has begun to advocate the extension of welfare benefits, particularly to the elderly.³ In foreign affairs, the LDP has strongly supported the Mutual Security treaty with the United States and developed close ties with South Korea. It has opened up diplomatic and commercial relations with the Peoples

Republic of China and has maintained correct, if not cordial, relations with the Soviet Union.

The Hyogo federation of the LDP was established on October 5, 1956 by national assembly members of the conservative Liberal and Democratic parties. Kiyose Ichiro, the chairman of the Democratic party, assumed the chairmanship of the newly formed party because the number of incumbent HR assemblymen from the Democratic party (nine) substantially exceeded those from the Liberal party (one). After its first election as a unified party in 1958, the Hyogo LDP held three of six seats in the House of Councillors, 11 of 18 in the Lower House, and 62 of 78 in the prefectural assembly. At present (1980), the party has two of six seats in the House of Councillors, six of 20 in the House of Representatives, and 54 of 91 in the prefectural assembly.

The Party Interest Group Base

The Six Major Components of LDP Support

In Japan, as in the other industrialized democracies, the growing provision of services and the increasing regulation of business and professional activities by the State has produced a huge constituency that looks towards government for favor and protection. The price at which the farmer sells his rice is set in Tokyo as is the fee which doctors receive for services provided under the national health insurance program, and the tax that is assessed against alcoholic beverages. Construction firms need a

steady outflow of government public works projects to maintain their profitability while trucking firms need highways to compete with the railroads, and small businesses require access to government guaranteed loans in time of economic downturn.

The LDP has been continuously in power at the national level since 1949, and it has used the provision of government services and the application of government regulations as a means to maintain and strengthen its hold on power. In Hyogo, the LDP has enjoyed unbroken control of the prefectural assembly and the assemblies of all the cities and towns in the prefecture except Kobe, Amagasaki, and Nishinomiya. The party has also put its candidate in the governor's seat for all but one term (1955-1959). As a result, the local federation has been able like the national party to look for support from a kaleidoscopic array of interests in the prefecture. These groups have provided both money and votes to LDP candidates and, in some cases, have encouraged their membership to work for a party candidate who faced a difficult election or made available employment to a defeated candidate.

The LDP support base in Hyogo prefecture can be divided into six major components: farm-marine organizations, small business and trade associations, professional associations, community-service groups, large corporations, and ideologically conservative groups. The organizations included in each of these components will be introduced below with attention paid to the size of their membership

and the amount of financial support that they can make available to the party and its candidates in elections.⁵

It is important to note at the outset that many of the organizations in the LDP base are semi-governmental bodies:⁶ they were established by law as a means of structuring relationships between a department of the national or prefectural government and certain special constituencies, and have been used to channel government loans, subsidies, and technical assistance to them. Although the LDP has not established a formal network of front groups in the prefecture to mobilize special constituencies like the socialists and the JCP have, these organizations have come to serve this function for the party because of its long control over the legislature and executive in Hyogo. Since these are semi-governmental organizations, they are not allowed to endorse political candidates or contribute money to their campaigns. Nonetheless, these organizations are highly political. In some cases, they have avoided the restrictions placed on their political activities through the creation of political leagues (seiji renmei) that are nominally independent of the parent organization and publicly endorse the party and raise money for its candidates. In other instances, where these political leagues have not been created, the leadership who are often party members will informally lobby the group membership on behalf of conservative candidates.

All farmers in Hyogo are members of the Hyogo Farm Cooperative Association and all fishermen members of the Hyogo Fishing

Cooperative Association. These organizations were established by law in the immediate postwar period to aid farmers and fishermen in obtaining insurance, marketing their products, and buying equipment.⁷ At present, the Farm Cooperative Association has a membership of 190,000 organized into 127 cooperatives; the fishermen number 11,000 members in 64 cooperatives.⁸

The size of the farmers' Association makes it a particularly important constituency for the LDP, and the ties between its officers and the party are very close: Ueda Hachiro, the chairman of the Hyogo Farm Council,⁹ is the head of the LDP Secretariat Farm-Marine department, Yaotaki Yohei, a former vice-chairman of the Council, is an LDP prefectural assemblyman, and Inoue Yasutomo, the head of the Secretariat's Organization committee, is a director of the Cooperative Association. The Association has two political leagues registered with the Election Commission: the Agricultural Policy Promotion Association (1977 Budget: 2.5 million yen--\$12,500) and the Dairy Farmer's Association (1977 Budget: 5.6 million yen--\$28,000). The money spent on political activities by these two groups in 1977 was quite modest, but it is the votes that they command rather than their financial resources that make the farmers important to the LDP.

Small businesses in the prefecture are tied together through two organizations: the Hyogo Chambers of Commerce and the Hyogo Small and Medium-size Enterprise Associations Liaison Council. Both organizations are used by the prefectural and local

governments' Commerce departments to extend loans and management assistance to small businesses. The Chambers of Commerce draw their members only from individual firms and have been organized in every city and town in the prefecture. At present, they have a membership of some 67,000 firms.¹⁰ The Liaison Council accepts only industry, trade, or commercial associations as members and coordinates their activities at the prefectural level. In 1977, 822 associations were members of the Council.¹¹ Both of these organizations have political leagues affiliated with them: the Hyogo Chambers of Commerce Political League (1977 Budget: 792,000 yen--\$3,960) and the Kobe Small and Medium-size Enterprises Political League (1977 Budget: 202,000 yen--\$1,010). As the size of their budgets suggest, the political activities of these two leagues are limited mainly to the endorsement of LDP candidates in newsletters mailed to their membership and the sponsorship of meetings with the candidates. But the LDP and its candidates can expect substantial support from the industry, trade, and commercial associations, and firms that belong to them: the 1,014 member Hyogo Petroleum Association spent 6.4 million yen (\$32,000) in 1977, the 4,556 member Hyogo Realtors 9.2 million yen (\$46,000), the 90 member Hyogo Road Transport Association 8.6 million yen (\$43,000), the 1,175 member Liquid Propane Gas Dealers Association 4.6 million yen (\$23,000), and the 507 member Hyogo Lumber Industry Association 5 million yen (\$25,000). Furthermore, officers in these organizations will sometimes help run the campaigns of LDP

candidates: for example, in 1976 the manager of the LDP first district HR incumbent Ishii Hajime's campaign was the chairman of the Chambers of Commerce Political League.

The community-service organizations were established by local citizens with the aid of the prefectural and local governments in order to provide certain public services such as fire protection, street-cleaning, and crime prevention that could not effectively be undertaken by the governments. The most important of these groups are the Community clubs (chōnaikai), the Women's Clubs Federation, the Volunteer Fire Companies (shōbōdan), and the Hyogo Youth League (seinendan). Although these groups are formally independent from the government and do not have a legal status akin to that of the agricultural cooperatives or the small business associations, their activities have been largely subsidized and directed by the governmental agency responsible for the functional area in which they operate. The Community clubs, which embrace all residents in a particular neighborhood, and the Women's Clubs Federation that has 500,000 women formally enrolled are by far the largest of these organizations.¹² The Volunteer Fire Companies number 66,000 members¹³ and the Hyogo Youth League 15,000.¹⁴ None of these organizations have a political league attached to them nor do they endorse political candidates. Yet the ties between the leadership of these groups and the LDP are tight. Many of the Community clubs have served as the political base for conservative town and city assemblymen,¹⁵ and the chairwoman of the Women's Clubs Federation

is reported to have worked hard on behalf of the LDP candidates in the 1974 and 1977 Hyogo district HC elections.¹⁶ The chairman of the Volunteer Fire Company Association in 1979, Mizoguchi Shinji, was an LDP prefectural assemblyman, as was the representative from Hyogo on the board of directors of the national Japan Youth League, Nakamura Toshio.

The Hyogo Medical Association and the Hyogo Dental Association are the most prominent among the professional associations engaged in political activities in the prefecture. In 1977, the 2,407 member Medical Association gave 12.6 million yen (\$63,000) and the 1,644 member Dental Association 16.9 million yen (\$84,500) to political candidates. These two groups differ from those discussed above because of their purely private nature: they receive no subsidies or administrative guidance from the prefectural government. Still, their concern with the management of the national health insurance program and desire to protect certain tax advantages won by them in the past has bound them closely to the ruling party.¹⁷ Among the opposition parties in Hyogo the Dental Association has contributed money only to Democratic Socialist party candidates, and the Medical Association has supported a JSP candidate only once: the physician Hori Masao in the second district. Other professional associations that have been supportive of conservative candidates include the 2,066 member Hyogo Pharmacists Association (1977 Budget: 11.1 million yen--\$55,500),

the 219 member Tax Accountants Association (1977 Budget: 1.1 million yen--\$5,500), and the Hyogo Solicitors Association (1977 Budget: 1.1 million yen--\$5,500).

The LDP is firmly anti-communist and has pledged itself to preserve and promote historical Japanese cultural and moral values. This has enabled the party to draw support from many ideologically conservative groups in the prefecture. The most politically active and powerful of these is the Seichō no ie (Society to Promote Life and Growth) sect, a new religion that combines older Buddhist and Shinto beliefs with a strong faith in the moral superiority of the Japanese race and a militant anti-communism. Seichō no ie claims a membership of 20,000 households in Hyogo and in 1977 disposed of a budget of 23.1 million yen (\$115,000) for political activities.¹⁸ It has endorsed LDP candidates to its members in all levels of elections, contributed money to their campaigns, and sometimes provided the party with volunteers to put up posters and distribute literature. Less militant religious groups have also been attracted by the LDP's emphasis upon traditional values. Conservative candidates in their search for support are careful to make substantial contributions to the expenses of festivals sponsored by the parishioners of Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines in their districts.¹⁹

Big business has always been firmly in the LDP camp and the principal source of financial support for the party. In 1977, Hyogo based firms that contributed to the national party's

financial support group the Citizens' Political Council (Kokumin Seiji Kyōkai) included Kawasaki Heavy Industries (30 million yen--\$150,000), Kawasaki Steel (75 million yen--\$375,000), Kobe Steel (75 million yen--\$375,000), Taiyo-Kobe Bank (43.5 million yen--\$217,500), Hankyu Private Railway (21.1 million yen--\$105,500), and Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries (49.7 million yen--\$248,500).²⁰ In addition, these companies and others have extended substantial behind-the-scenes organizational support to LDP candidates. In 1976, for example, the chairman of Kawasaki Heavy Industries served as the LDP first district HR candidate Sunada Shigetami's chief fund-raiser and is reported to have taken strong measures to mobilize the employees of this company and those of its suppliers and customers behind Sunada.²¹

As might be expected, a number of influential groups cannot be included in the categories described above. The most important of these are three veterans' organizations: the Disabled Veterans Association (Senshōbyōsha Kai), the Veterans Pension Association (Gunonkai), and the Families of the War Dead Association (Izokukai); and two education groups: the Retired Female Teachers Association and the Education Advancement Association (Kyōiku Suishin Kyōkai), an association of retired male teachers and school administrators. The 15,000 member Veterans Pension Association²² is the most active of the veterans groups in support of the LDP. At the time of the LDP membership drive in 1978

nearly 1,000 members of the group joined enmasse and came to constitute one of the few LDP branches within an organization in Hyogo.²³ As for the education groups, 2,000 members of these organizations joined in 1974 to form a new group, the Association to Preserve a Sound Education (Tadashii Kyōiku o Mamoru Kai), with the party's incumbent HC assemblyman Kanai Motohiko as its chairman.²⁴ The organization's ostensive purpose was to try to counterbalance the influence of the Teachers union and the JCP-backed Mothers' Liaison Council (Haha-oya Renraku Kai) over education, but it also was an effective electoral vehicle for Kanai who in the 1977 HC election had to contest for votes with the former chairman of the Kobe Teachers union, Kotani Mamoru. School teachers and administrators are formidable campaigners in Hyogo because of their ties with former students and influence over Parent-Teachers Associations.²⁵

The support which the groups described above can bring to the LDP permit the party to win a minimum of 600,000 votes in an HC election, some 800,000 votes in an HR contest, and over one million votes in prefectural assembly races. The organizations found in the LDP base include almost every group in the prefecture except the labor unions, the Sōkagakkai, and the Communist front groups. The problem for the LDP in elections is to protect this mammoth constituency from the inroads of the other parties. The conservative control of government gives the party a powerful apparatus through which to structure and hold in line these groups, but not

all demands can be successfully met from public resources. The dilemma that this presents to the LDP has been mitigated to some extent through the kōenkai (election support groups) of their candidates and a more than occasional resort to bribery, both of which help to knit together its fragmented constituency base.

Kōenkai

The kōenkai have been one of the most distinctive features of LDP organization at the local level.²⁶ The Hyogo party is no exception to this pattern: all of the conservative candidates for prefectural and national office in Hyogo have organized them. The kōenkai have often been understood as a consequence of Japan's multi-member districting system where two or more candidates from the same party are forced to run in the same district and compete with each other for votes.²⁷ It has been assumed that since a party in this situation cannot favor one candidate over the other, party direction of the election campaign is difficult, and that in the end each candidate must create his own campaign organization. This explanation, however, is unsatisfactory in some respects because it does not explain well the performance of the opposition parties in elections. The Komeito and the Communists have succeeded in Hyogo prefectural assembly elections in dividing up their support base among several candidates running in the same districts without sparking the electoral free-for-all characteristic of the LDP campaigns. In the Hanshin district where the Socialists

have always endorsed two or more candidates, the public sector unions have worked for one candidate and the private sector unions for the other with a minimum of intra-party rivalry.

The reason that LDP candidates fight so bitterly among themselves in elections should be more correctly attributed to the diversity of the conservative base. Where a party's base is limited and the interests of the groups that make up that base broadly similar, the decision as to how divide up that base among several candidates can be made rather easily. But when as in the LDP there is a high degree of diversity and often little communality of interest beyond perhaps a general antagonism towards the unions, the Gakkai, and the Communists an acceptable division of the vote is often very difficult--even when a lack of cooperation may spell certain defeat for the party.²⁸ The competition that rages in elections between the kōenkai of different LDP candidates to enroll the leadership and ordinary membership of important constituencies in the conservative base is thus at least in some part a consequence of the very broadness of the party's support.

This competition for support among the LDP kōenkai for all its excesses is not to be deplored, because its major effect is not to weaken but to strengthen the party. The LDP cannot meet all the demands made upon it. The competition between different candidates and their support groups in elections provides a legitimate way to resolve these conflicting demands without permanently alienating any one group. Furthermore, this kind of

competition because of the close personal ties that develop between a candidate and a subset of the party's base reinforces interest-based incentives to turnout on behalf of the party in elections. The importance of these personal ties is underscored by looking again at LDP performance in different levels of elections. In the Hyogo district HC election the party since 1974 has run only one candidate and has been able to win only 600,000 votes. In the HR elections where it has endorsed 10 or more candidates it receives 200,000 more votes, and in the prefectural assembly contests where some 70 conservative candidates run the party may poll some 400,000 votes above its HC performance.

Corruption

Because of the wide diversity in the groups that back up the LDP the interests, at any one point in time, of a portion of this base may be quite ill-defined and, especially when a long-term incumbent has just retired, their ties to a candidate not well developed. In these situations, the money that the party and its candidates can raise from the large corporations plays an important role in firming up the conservative base and, in the case of competition between LDP candidates, in denying votes to one's opponent. The groups that receive money fall as a rule into no special category and the candidates that bribe them range from local assemblymen to members of the House of Councillors. In one famous case that occurred in 1965, Yamauchi Ichiro, a national

HC LDP candidate was arrested for having distributed 9.4 million yen (\$47,000) to 20 conservative members of the Hyogo prefectural assembly in return for the support of their koenkai.²⁹ In nearly every election, the leadership of local farm cooperatives are arrested on bribery charges. Many of the smaller new religions that may have 3,000 to 5,000 believers in the prefecture are particularly attractive targets, because they represent a disciplined bloc of votes that in a close election can bring victory to the candidate able to gain their support.³⁰ Another group that deserves special mention is the underworld. Kobe is the home base for Japan's largest underworld organization, the Yamaguchi gang. Several conservative assemblymen are said to have close ties with the gang, which controls cabarets, bath houses, and restaurants in the city, and LDP national assemblymen have been seen attending weddings, funerals, and other social functions involving the top leaders of the gang.³¹ Party candidates will offer protection from the police and money to the gangsters not so much for their votes as for their capacity to intimidate the campaign workers of their opponents, destroy their posters, and disrupt their meetings.

Factions

The LDP does not offer much in the way of direct financial help to its candidates. In 1976, for example, its HR candidates in Hyogo received only a 5 million yen (\$25,000) contribution to their campaign from the party along with its endorsement.³²

A contribution of this size cannot begin to meet the expenses of a campaign that may cost upwards of 200 million yen (one million dollars). The party's candidates in Hyogo have thus had to rely on contributions from interest groups and businesses in the prefecture, and monies from corporations outside the prefecture and groups with national interests channeled through one of the factional groupings in the national party.

The importance and persistence of factions in the LDP has been often remarked in the literature on political parties in Japan. Competition between them has been used to explain the party's action or lack of action in the area of foreign or domestic policy,³³ the selection process of the prime minister and the constant reshuffling of ministerial positions in the Cabinet,³⁴ and the sometime fratricidal campaigns in the multi-member election districts.³⁵ All of the major factions maintain offices in Tokyo and hold regular meetings of their members who may number as many as 50 or 60 Lower House assemblymen. The membership of the factions are so well-defined that the leading newspapers will publish lists of all factions after each national election and speculate on the implications of the losses or gains experienced by them.³⁶

One unusual aspect of the Japanese factions that has not been stressed sufficiently in the literature³⁷ is that they have neither an ideological or socioeconomic base, nor do they have any formal organizational structure in the constituencies. The factions exist

for the most part only within the LDP delegation in the national Diet and serve as the personal apparatus of aspirants for the post of prime minister in their struggle for control over the delegation. The leaders of the factions are able to attract followers into their camp on the basis of their personal charisma and the practical help that they can extend in the form of campaign monies and ministerial positions in government.

The situation in Hyogo offers good evidence for these assertions. All of the major factions except for that of Ohira can be found in Hyogo, along with two of the smaller factions (see Table 3). No one faction can be said to be dominant, and it

Table 3
Factional Alignments of Hyogo LDP HR
Candidates in 1976

HR District	LDP Candidates	Name of Faction
Kobe	Ishii Hajime Sunada Shigetami	Tanaka Nakasone
Hanshin	Hara Kensaburo Nagata Torao	Funada Mizuta
East Harima	Tokai Motosaburo	Fukuda
West Harima	Komoto Toshio Toida Saburo Matsumoto Juro	Miki Tanaka Fukuda
Tamba	Tani Yoichi Arita Kiichi	Nakasone Fukuda

Source: Asahi Shimbun December 7, 1976.

has been the rule that each faction will not have more than one member in the same HR district. This suggests that electoral considerations are paramount in the determining of an assemblyman's factional connections.³⁸ The prefectural federation as a whole does not serve as the base for a particular faction.

A review of the contributions to their campaigns reported by LDP HR candidates to the Hyogo Election Commission in 1976 found as expected that all of the candidates relied heavily upon contributions from the financial support groups of their factions. But it was also uncovered that one candidate received contributions from both the Fukuda and Nakasone factions⁴⁰ and that despite their different factional connections each of the candidates tended to receive contributions from the same conservative interest groups in the prefecture. These contributors included the key elements in the conservative electoral base in the prefecture: the Hyogo Medical Association, the Hyogo Dental Association, the Hyogo Realtors Association, the Hyogo Petroleum Association, the Hyogo Pharmacists Association, the Agricultural Policy Promotion Association, and the Hyogo Road Transport Association. Admittedly the reports on contributions submitted by the candidates may not acknowledge all sources of support, but if the factions had a more determinate socioeconomic base some difference might be expected to appear among that portion of the contributions that were made public.

Several months before the election of the national party president by the LDP membership in November of 1978, an Asahi Shimbun

poll of Hyogo prefectural assemblymen found that 42 of 51 LDP assemblymen were affiliated with a particular national faction (see Table 4).⁴¹ Interviews, however, with members of the

Table 4
Factional Alignments in Hyogo Prefectural
Assembly in 1978

Name of Faction	Number of Prefectural Assemblymen
Fukuda	11
Nakasone	9
Tanaka	7
Miki	7
Small	8
Non-aligned	9

Source: Asahi Shimbun, September 23, 1978, p. 2.

prefectural assembly indicated that this line-up reflected the ties that had been established between these prefectural assemblymen and Diet members' koenkai, and did not greatly influence the power balance within the Hyogo LDP assembly delegation.⁴² One reason for this is that the stakes are different in the prefectural as compared with the national assembly. The governor, who is elected directly by the people of the prefecture for a four-year term at a

time different from that of the assembly, carries the major responsibility for the administration of prefectural affairs. His office prepares the budget and initiates all major legislation. There are factions within the prefectural legislature, as there are within any Japanese group, but they bear no necessary relationship to the national level factions and have remained weak because of the need to present a united front versus the governor.

LDP politics at the national level cannot be understood without an appreciation for the factional dynamics at work within the party. Nonetheless, these factional differences are not directly carried over into the local conservative organizations. While the national factions have always provided money to certain candidates and have sometimes lobbied hard to win the endorsement of a candidate pledged to them for an HR seat in one of the five Hyogo districts, the struggle among the national factions for power in the Diet has not divided the Hyogo federation into a number of warring, mutually suspicious camps structured along the same factional lines. Politics within the federation is largely determined by the often conflicting interests of the many groups that make up the broad LDP support base in the prefecture.

The Party Branch Structure

The Kōseikai and the Hyogo LDP

The LDP in Hyogo was officially launched as a party on October 5, 1956 as the result of an agreement among conservative

national assemblymen in the prefecture to cooperate together in elections. Yet it did not fully emerge as a party in the prefectural assembly until the dissolution of the non-partisan Kōseikai (Fair Politics Club) in 1966. This delay was the result of shrewd, practical politics and a conservative prejudice against parties as organizations that threatened to subvert the close, personal relationship between an assemblyman and his constituency.

The Kōseikai was a product of the 1951 prefectural assembly and 1954 gubernatorial election.⁴³ In the 1951 PA elections, the Liberal party headed by Masaki Sadamaru from rural Izushi county and Hosomi Tatsuzo from Kobe had won 48 of the 78 assembly seats. A non-partisan conservative group the Shinseikai (New Politics Club) led by Nakano Bunmom also from Kobe gained 15 seats. The remaining 11 seats were held by the socialists. In 1954, the JSP endorsed candidate for governor Sakamoto Katsu won a surprise victory over the two-term conservative incumbent Kishida Yukio. Kishida's defeat quite naturally threw the Liberal party majority in the assembly into confusion: with their hold over the prefectural administrative apparatus weakened, the conservative assemblymen were worried lest the same fate befall them in the election scheduled for April of 1955. Hosomi was the leader of a faction within the Liberal party that had opposed Kishida's bid for a third term. Upon Kishida's defeat, he moved to make his accommodation with the new governor. Along with 28 members of the Liberal party, Hosomi joined hands with Nakano's Shinseikai to

form a new non-partisan assembly group the Kōseikai that pledged to cooperate with the new governor. Sakamoto, a member of the Socialist right-wing, welcomed the support of this 43 member group which gave him the secure control of the assembly that the JSP's 11 seats could not provide, and agreed to work closely with them. In the 1955 prefectural assembly elections the Kōseikai won 34 seats, the Socialists 20, and the Liberals only five. Twenty-three non-partisan candidates were elected, 12 of whom immediately joined the Kōseikai to give it a comfortable majority in the 78 seat assembly.

The formation of the LDP at the national level came in the midst of this reshuffling of the conservative power structure within the prefecture. The Kōseikai did not disband upon the institution of the LDP Hyogo federation, because Sakamoto was still the governor. With his socialist background it would have been difficult for him to work in the assembly with a conservative group that clearly identified itself with the LDP. By 1958, Sakamoto's relationship with the conservative leadership in Hyogo had warmed to such an extent that his bid for a second term was contested only by the Communists. In 1962 with the cooperation of the conservative leadership, Sakamoto engineered the candidacy of his vice-governor Kanai Motohiko who ran as an independent against the gubernatorial candidate put up by the JSP. Throughout this period the Kōseikai operated in the prefecture as the party of the governor, and appropriated for itself the image of a supra-partisan

group that was dedicated to serving the interests of the entire prefecture not just one segment of it. The Kōseikai was nevertheless closely tied with the LDP federation in the prefecture:

Manabe Manjiro, a Kōseikai leader from Taka county, served as chairman of the LDP's Policy committee from 1956 to 1960 and vice-president of the party in 1964; Terai Yagichi, the secretary-general of the federation in 1965, was a Kōseikai member of the assembly. This schizophrenic relationship between the Kōseikai and the LDP was sustained by the conservative insistence that national politics had no connection with the resolution of local problems. In reality, of course, local affairs for all the rhetoric were closely intertwined with national politics, and it was ultimately national politics that destroyed the Kōseikai.

The dissolution of the Kōseikai in 1966 was occasioned by a bribery scandal uncovered during the 1965 HC election. As described before, Yamauchi Ichiro, an LDP candidate for a national seat, was accused of distributing money that he had gathered from construction industry sources to Kōseikai assemblymen in return for their promise to campaign for him within their districts. In all 17 of the 54 members of the Kōseikai delegation in the prefectural assembly were convicted of Election Law violations and the leader of the delegation, Muneyuki Genji, although not implicated in the scandal, accepted responsibility for this disgrace and resigned his seat. The remaining members of the club formally joined the LDP federation and reconstituted themselves as the LDP assembly

delegation. Non-partisanship was at least for the moment to be avoided because it had attached to it the taint of "backroom" politics.

With the establishment of the LDP prefectural delegation, the Hyogo party at long last began to take more definite shape. The leadership encouraged members of the party PA delegation to set up branches within their districts, and by 1970 the party could report the incorporation of 34 branches in the prefecture. Although the federation had always had an office and a two or three man staff attached to it, the party branches when they had existed at all in a particular area had been organized before 1967 in a haphazard adhoc fashion by conservative assemblymen, who usually stood as independents or Kōseikai endorsed candidates in local elections. The nurturing of the party's constituency and the mobilization of votes in elections was left to the national assemblymen who would either bargain, as did the unfortunate Yamauchi Ichiro, with local assemblymen for the support of their kōenkai or when possible try to incorporate the leadership of important conservative groups directly into kōenkai of their own. For all practical purposes, the LDP did not have a formal organizational presence in Hyogo until more than 10 years after the party's establishment.

The Present Branch Structure of the Hyogo LDP

The LDP since 1967 has had a two tier organization in Hyogo: the prefectural federation (shibu rengokai) and local branches (shibu).

The purpose of the federation has been to promote communication between the national party headquarters and local branches, work to develop support and understanding for the party in the prefecture, recommend national assembly candidates to the national party, and decide on the endorsement of candidates for local office. The federation has no formal grant of power to supervise the activities of assemblymen in the prefectural and municipal assemblies, although as a last resort it can expel members who ignore party directives.⁴⁴

As a rule, one party branch is to be established in each Kobe ward, city, and town in Hyogo. When appropriate, branches may also be established in prefecture-wide organizations such as trade associations or interest groups. A minimum of 50 party members is required to constitute an official party branch.

Among the 34 LDP party branches in Hyogo established by 1970 only two were to be found in organizations.⁴⁵ Between 1970 and 1976, the number of geographic party branches increased gradually to 47 while the number of organization branches rose to only 9 (see Table 5).⁴⁶ The preponderance of geographic over organizational branches in the Hyogo LDP is in sharp contrast to the branch structure of the Communist and socialist parties in the prefecture. In these parties, most of the branches can be found within organizations like unions, which are supportive of them. Part of the explanation for this can be found in differences among their party charters. The JCP and the socialist parties have a middle level

of organization variously called district councils or branch associations that serve to coordinate the activities of their branches within a particular geographic area.

Table 5
Hyogo LDP Branches, 1970-1978

Year	Geographic Branches	Organizational Branches
1970	32	2
1971	39	3
1972	41	3
1973	45	3
1974	48	6
1975	48	6
1976	47	9
1977	unavailable	
1978	81	11

Source: Hyogo LDP.

Another more important reason for the difference may be related to the fragmented character of the LDP's constituency. The party's geographic branches serve to coordinate the activities of party assemblymen kōenkai in mayoral races within cities and towns and gubernatorial and national assembly elections in the prefecture. The kōenkai in this sense may be the organizational

equivalents of the JCP and socialist branches in the unions. Although the kōenkai of national assemblymen contain a cross-section of groups in the LDP constituency, the kōenkai of city and town assemblymen are not so diverse. Many times they may consist only of the members of a particular religious sect, community club, or farm cooperative.⁴⁷ It is possible for such small groups to support an assemblyman because of the large size of town and city assemblies.⁴⁸ Often only 200 to 300 votes are required to win a seat. Some of the national and prefectural assemblymen that make up the leadership of the Hyogo party would undoubtedly like to weaken the hold of local assemblymen over these groups by getting more of them to affiliate directly with the party.⁴⁹ Yet this is not likely to occur in part because of the natural resistance by local assemblymen to any attempt to undermine their base of power, and in part because of a widely-shared belief in the party that the personal relationship between the assemblyman and his support base which characterizes the kōenkai is probably the most effective way to mobilize the vast LDP constituency in elections.⁵⁰

Between 1977 and 1978, the LDP nearly doubled the number of its branches in Hyogo. This large increase came about as part of a national party inspired attempt to reform and modernize its constituency organizations in the wake of the damage done the party's reputation by the Lockheed scandal. It did not signify, however, a doubling of the party's organizational strength in the

prefecture. Almost all of the new branches were geographic branches and the party leaders at present do not expect them to do much more than collect party dues and hold a general meeting of the membership once a year.⁵¹ The kōenkai remain the principal method for mobilizing support in elections. Nevertheless, the leadership is trying to put the branches on a firmer footing by encouraging the membership to bear the cost of maintaining a branch office. It is claimed that about one-third of the branches now have an office, but it was also admitted that none of these offices as yet have a paid organizer attached to them.⁵² The offices thus have greater importance as a symbol of conservative unity in a particular city or town than any practical effect upon the level of party activity. One trend that seems to bode ill for this attempt to strengthen the party organization is the formation in some of the larger cities of sub-branches (bunkai) by assemblymen that have been reluctant to affiliate their kōenkai with a branch headed by one of their opponents.⁵³

To supplement the formal branch structure the party charter provides for the creation of a liaison council (rengokai) to coordinate the activities of the party's ward branches within a designated city (shitei toshi) and the party's town branches in a prefectural assembly district. In Hyogo, a liaison council of this kind has been established in Kobe to coordinate party campaign activities in the mayoral election. These councils have not been incorporated in the prefectural assembly districts. Communication

among town LDP branches in these districts has been routed through the prefectural assembly candidate's kōenkai.

Party Decisionmaking Organs

The party convention is the highest decisionmaking organ of the Hyogo party and is required by the party charter to meet once a year.⁵⁴ Extraordinary sessions of the convention may be called by the party's headquarters committee or by a vote of one-third of the federation membership. Delegates to the convention are chosen by the party branches with one delegate allotted for every 50 members. In addition, federation officials, members of the General Affairs committee, and a branch presidents and secretary-generals are automatically extended voting rights.

The Hyogo party convention met 25 times between 1956 and 1978. The convention has normally been convened in July, although in years when there was a HC election, it has been moved up or back several months. The party has never called an Extraordinary convention. When problems have arisen requiring the urgent consideration of the membership, the leadership has preferred to call into session the General Affairs committee.

In contrast to the practice of the other parties in the prefecture, the Hyogo LDP does not provide its delegates in advance a copy of the report on activities to be made by the party secretary-general and the various committees and departments of the Secretariat. Instead they only receive a four to five page

handout that indicates the schedule of convention activities, summarizes in a few words the leadership's plans for the coming year, and briefly lists the resolutions to be acted on by the convention. The Hyogo party charter is quite vague about the powers granted to the convention.⁵⁵ In practice, the major business of the convention has been the election of party officers by acclamation (there has never been a competing slate of candidates) and the introduction to the membership of the party's candidates for major political office. Review and approval of the party budget and the activities of the Secretariat as well as the recommendation and selection of party candidates for national and local office is left to the General Affairs committee.⁵⁶

The General Affairs committee (sōmu-iinkai) is supposed to meet as necessary to deal with matters of importance (juyō jikō) to the party. The committee is made up of federation officers and some 200 full and alternate committeemen elected by the party convention. One full and one alternate member is usually picked from each branch, and these positions are normally filled by local branch presidents and secretary-generals. The General Affairs committee in Hyogo exercises most of the powers formally vested in the convention by the other Hyogo parties. It meets several times each year to deliberate on the party budget and debate the endorsement of candidates. It has on occasion showed itself to be more than just a rubber stamp for recommendation made by top party officials. For example, in 1976 there was considerable opposition

among younger party assemblymen to the endorsement of the 73 year-old former governor Kanai Motohiko for a second term in the Upper House. They used the General Affairs committee as a forum to air their opposition and persuaded a majority of the committee to send the nomination back to the Election committee of the Secretariat for reconsideration.⁵⁷

When the LDP was first established it did not have a headquarters committee (kanji-kai). Executive authority in the federation rested solely with the party president and the secretary-general.⁵⁸ The committee was first organized in 1969 to better coordinate the activities of the party Secretariat, but its powers like those of the convention are rather ambiguous. The party charter specifies that the committee is to meet to deliberate on important matters related to the administration of party affairs.⁵⁹ In this respect, it is similar to the Executive committees of the JCP and socialist parties. Yet unlike them the party chairman is not a member of the committee. It is headed by the secretary-general and has as members the chairmen of most of the committees and some of the departments in the party Secretariat as well as representatives from the five HR districts.⁶⁰ Party officials when questioned about its role stressed the advisory function which it served and indicated that the committee met only irregularly.⁶¹ They also stated that decisions on most matters concerning party affairs were still made by an informally constituted "officers committee" (san-yaku kai) made up of the president,

vice-president, secretary-general, and vice-secretary-generals that meets weekly to discuss party business. Those members of the party Secretariat whose advice is required are also invited to attend. Any decisions made by this body that break any new ground are referred to the General Affairs committee for its consideration.

The Party Secretariat

The federation Secretariat is divided into six committees: organization, propaganda, election, policy, local administration, and finance.⁶² The Finance committee is small (nine members) and has been chaired since 1968 by a national assemblyman who has the connections necessary to raise large sums of money from corporate contributors quickly.⁶³ The other committees are much larger (the 1976 Propaganda committee had 34 members) and have always been chaired by prefectural or Kobe city assemblymen. Each of the committees except for Finance and Local Administration is divided up into a number of departments. The Organization committee which deals with both the party membership and certain special constituencies oversees six departments: organization, urban strategy, interest group strategy, youth, women, and students. The Propaganda committee has two departments: public meetings (yūsetsu-bu) and intelligence-propaganda (jōhō-senden-bu), and the Policy committee four: commerce, farm-marine, welfare-labor (kōsei-rōdō-bu), and culture-education (bunkyo-bu). All of the departments except for youth, women, and students are headed by

prefectural or Kobe city assemblymen. None of the federation's 10-person staff chair a committee or supervise a department in the Secretariat.

The Secretariat of a political party might be thought to perform four basic functions: the maintenance and strengthening of the party organization, the nurturing of ties with special constituencies in the party's support base, the management of elections and the party's propaganda activities, and the supervision of party assemblymen and the coordination of party policy. Because of the fragmented nature of its electoral base and the crucial role played by assemblymen kōenkai in mobilizing this base in elections, the Hyogo LDP Secretariat is able to handle only the propaganda function well.

The Organization committee of the Hyogo LDP may well have looked upon its efforts in 1978 with a considerable degree of satisfaction. In conjunction with national party efforts to strengthen local organization, the committee oversaw an increase in party membership from 13,000 to 44,000. In November of that year some 85 percent of this membership participated in balloting for the selection of the national party president.⁶⁴ The registration of these new members, the collection of dues, and the mailing out and counting of presidential ballots made it necessary for the committee to hire temporarily several new staff members. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in greater detail in the section on membership, the large increases in membership

experienced by the party were a result of the wholesale enrollment of the kōenkai of conservative national and local assemblymen. The new members did not join the party out of a commitment to its program or because of Organization committee efforts to establish LDP branches within groups such as agricultural cooperatives or trade associations that make up the LDP base. The formal organization of the LDP in Hyogo is still in an embryonic stage. The maintenance and sustaining of party strength rests not with the Organization committee but the kōenkai of individual assemblymen.

The LDP unlike the Communist and socialist parties has not attempted to establish a network of front groups in the prefecture in order to mobilize support from special constituencies like small businessmen or farmers. It has relied instead on the prefectural bureaucracy and candidate kōenkai to structure its relations with various groups. As a result, the departments within the Secretariat responsible for different constituencies have engaged in only token efforts. The Urban Strategy department has recently sponsored a "Building a Livable Prefecture" (Sumiyoi Kendo Zukuri) campaign aimed at trying to link some of the new citizen groups with LDP prefectural and national policymakers. In late November of 1977, the Interest Group Strategy department launched the Hyogo Organizations Liaison Council (Hyogo Kakushu Dantai Renraku Kyōgikai) with the chairman of the Hyogo Chambers of Commerce as its head. The Council's purpose was to bring all the conservative trade and commercial associations together under one organizational

umbrella, but 18 months later the party leadership when questioned about its subsequent activities indicated that the Council was essentially defunct. When a group in the LDP constituency requires something of the government, it will usually work directly through the assemblymen most closely connected with it. The departments within the party Secretariat will only play a role if the assemblyman feels that the formal party endorsement of the request will help the group in dealing with prefectural or national officials.⁶⁵

In response to increased competition from the opposition parties in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Hyogo LDP has invested much money and effort in propaganda activities especially in the HC, gubernatorial, and Kobe Mayoral elections. While the party has been able to depend upon its assemblymen's koenkai to deliver the party's support base in PA and HR elections, there has been as noted before a considerable drop in support for conservative candidates in elections as the size of the electoral district increases. This was laid to the fragmented character of the LDP base which contains so many groups that it is difficult for any one candidate to adequately represent them all. The advent of the disciplined Communist and Gakkai voting blocs, however, has made it crucial for the LDP in these elections to mobilize its base to the greatest extent possible.

In Hyogo, the party has relied upon colorful posters and badges, inflammatory attacks upon the character of the opposition parties and their leaders, and massive leafletting to generate

interest in its candidates among conservative voters. The most extensive use of these propaganda techniques occurred in the 1973 Kobe Mayoral race when the LDP put up former Kobe HR assemblyman Sunada Shigetami against Miyazaki Tatsuo who was sponsored by the four opposition parties.⁶⁶ This contest came in the aftermath of opposition party victories in gubernatorial races in the large prefectures of Tokyo and Osaka, and it was looked upon as the first major test of the popularity of the new Tanaka Cabinet. The LDP through the Hyogo federation committed 226.2 million yen (1.1 million dollars) to what resulted in a losing effort.⁶⁷ But before it was over 250,000 campaign buttons⁶⁸ and more than eight million pieces of literature had been distributed by both sides.⁶⁹

The new restrictions placed on election activities by the 1975 revision of the Election Law make the repetition of such a campaign impossible,⁷⁰ but propaganda⁷¹ still remains the most important activity engaged in by the federation Secretariat. In 1977 the year of the Hyogo district HC election, the party spent 81 million yen (\$405,500) on propaganda for the campaign.⁷² An examination of the receipts used by the party to document the financial status report filed with the Election Commission for that year shows that the money was used for: the temporary expansion of the federation Secretariat staff from 10 to 21, the hiring of housewives and students to distribute campaign literature and put up posters, the rental of offices in all the major cities in the prefecture for the purpose of entertaining the heads of important

local organizations, the rental and purchase of vans to be used as "sound cars," and the distribution of money to prefectural, city, and town assemblymen to compensate their kōenkai for expenses incurred on behalf of the campaign.

The Local Government Affairs and Policy committees despite their titles do not function to supervise party assemblymen or coordinate party policy. These matters are left largely to the LDP or conservative delegation in each of the assemblies. In cases where there are flagrant violations of party discipline, it is the delegations that would make the motion for expulsion from the party. The activities of these two committees though limited are, however, useful to the party. The Local Government Affairs committee sponsors the Local Assemblies Liaison Council (Chihō Gikai Renraku Kyōgikai). This organization includes some 1,300 of the 1,500 local assemblymen who run as independents in elections, only about one-half of whom are party members. Although the formal activities of the Council consist largely of an annual meeting and occasional seminars, it does represent a formal organizational link between the party and assemblymen that are outside its branch structure in the prefecture. The Policy committee serves mainly as a forum for national party officials who visit the prefecture to explain party decisions on the national budget and gauge the reaction of conservative groups to them. Since the opportunity to attend these sessions with national party leaders is highly prized

among local conservatives, the selection of the some 50 members for this committee offers a way for the party to reward its friends.

Party Membership

The LDP considers itself to be a national party (kokumin seitō) of all the people. It welcomes into the party anyone, whatever their class background, who is willing to work for the happiness and prosperity of the Japanese race (minzoku).⁷³ A new member must be recommended by two or more members in good standing and pay in advance the party's annual dues of 2,000 yen (\$10.00).⁷⁴ Before 1977 the party's charter did not enumerate any specific rights and duties of membership other than to admonish that members who ignored decisions made by party organs risked expulsion.⁷⁵ Today, as the result of the reforms undertaken in the wake of the Lockheed scandal and mounting public criticism of the vast sums of money spent in the past to influence the 400 odd electors of the party president, all party members in good standing have been extended the right to participate in the selection of the party's national president.⁷⁶

As discussed before, the 1966 dissolution of the Kōseikai set the stage for a reorganization of the Hyogo federation. The party began to enforce for the first time the maintenance of a register of party members, the payment of dues, and the formal establishment of party branches in each of the towns and cities of the prefecture. At the close of 1967, the Hyogo LDP reported its membership to be

7,700 (see Table 6).⁷⁷ The following year saw a slight drop, but through 1976 the party maintained an average dues paying membership

Table 6
LDP Membership in Hyogo 1967-1978

Year	Number of Members	Year	Number of Members
1967	7,729	1973	12,518
1968	6,987	1974	10,624
1969	9,829	1975	9,139
1970	11,701	1976	10,795
1971	10,944	1977	13,163
1972	10,948	1978	44,693

Source: Hyogo LDP.

of 10,000 in the prefecture. At the same time, the number of party branches grew from near zero in 1967 to 34 in 1970, and to 58 in 1976. The dues-paying membership was maintained and the number of party branches increased by encouraging incumbent prefectural assembly candidates to enroll some of the membership of their koenkai in the party in return for its endorsement, and requiring candidates who sought the federation endorsement to be recommended by the LDP branch in their district.⁷⁸ Such tactics made the LDP the largest party in terms of membership in the prefecture by 1976. Yet it had little discernible impact upon the party's

performance in the HC or HR elections: in the 1968 HC election the party polled 655,000 votes and in the 1974 election 614,000; in the 1967 HR election it received 869,000 votes and in the 1972 election 877,000.

There is no firm information available on the composition of the party's membership during the 1967-1976 period. But according to party officers active at the time, the membership was largely made up of prefectural assemblymen and influential members of their support groups usually town and city assemblymen that ran in their own elections as independents.⁷⁹ Often with the retirement or defeat of a candidate, these members would retire from the party as well. For the individual party member, membership in the party had little meaning. The LDP charter before 1977 attached no specific duties or privileges to membership other than the payment of dues, and even these had little more than symbolic value. Party dues at a nominal 1,000 yen (\$5.00) a year⁸⁰ provided little financial support for the party. Moreover the division of dues (200 yen to the national headquarters, 300 yen to the prefectural federation, and 500 yen to the local branch) was such that it enabled the local assemblymen, who invariably served as the local branch chairman, to discount the dues of their supporters by as much as one-half.

In 1977 a second wave of reform struck the Hyogo LDP, this time initiated by the national party. Reform again meant an attempt to increase and regularize party membership. The national party as an incentive to new members extended to the membership the right to

participate in the selection of the party president. It set as a goal for the Hyogo party the enrollment of 90,000 members by March 1978. The Hyogo party did not come near to attaining this target. By the end of 1977 less than 2,500 new members had joined the federation, raising total membership to slightly more than 13,000. But two months later, membership had exploded to over 44,000. This moved the Hyogo federation from 14th to the 11th position among prefectures in terms of total membership (see Table 7).

Table 7
Membership of the 15 Largest LDP Prefectural Federations
in 1976 and 1978

1976		1978	
Hokkaido	29,847	Tokyo	89,024
Shizuoka	27,366	Gumma	76,041
Aichi	23,449	Shizuoka	71,661
Niigata	23,446	Hokkaido	59,647
Toyama	22,955	Gifu	59,383
Tokyo	20,952	Kagawa	49,603
Saitama	17,803	Hiroshima	48,648
Ishikawa	15,985	Yamaguchi	44,905
Tochigi	14,941	HYOGO	44,693
Osaka	12,794	Aichi	43,091
Kumamoto	11,161	Toyama	41,451
HYOGO	10,314	Niigata	41,347
Kagawa	9,172	Osaka	38,377

Source: Asahi Shimbun February 27, 1978.

The largest increases came in the first (1,000 members to 10,000 members) and fourth districts (3,000 members to 16,000 members). The first district increase was due to the sharp competition for its 180,000 vote conservative base waged by the two LDP incumbents in this urban area. With the possibility of a dissolution of the Diet to follow the election, both men used the membership drive as an opportunity to strengthen their campaign organizations. The competition for members was intensified by their factional connections: Sunada was a member of the Nakasone faction and the Minister of Education in the Fukuda Cabinet; Ishii Hajime was a member of the Tanaka faction that supported Ohira in the presidential election and the chairman of the Hyogo federation.⁸¹ The gains made by the party in the fourth district can be attributed to the presidential candidacy of the Miki faction's Komoto Toshio who had been a HR assembly incumbent since 1949 from the district.

Paradoxically, Komoto's decision to contest the party presidency as the representative of the Miki faction may have hampered the Hyogo federation's drive to enroll 90,000 members in the party. Komoto's favorite son status in the prefecture made it certain that he would occupy first place in the balloting with the Ohira and Fukuda groups having to content themselves with second place. The rules for the election allotted points to each federation based on the size of its membership. These points were to be divided among the top two vote-getters only. A third-place finish resulted in no points. Under these conditions, the Fukuda

and Ohira camps seem to have directed their fullest campaign efforts to other prefectures where a first-place finish was possible and the danger of a third-place defeat was not present.⁸²

There is no information available yet on the composition of the Hyogo federation's new membership. The federation at the time of the 25th Party Convention in July of 1978 admitted that the biggest challenge facing the party was the absorption of the new membership into the federation's branch structure. Interviews with them in May of 1979 indicated that only some 35,000 members had paid their 2,000 yen (\$10.00) dues for 1979.⁸³

There was much newspaper comment about the means used to increase membership.⁸⁴ Critics charged that LDP candidates enrolled their kōenkai en masse, often without informing the members, and paid only the 200 yen (\$1.00) headquarters fee for each of the new members. There were also reports that companies with close ties to the LDP had ordered their employees to enroll in the party and had paid the party fee from company funds. Given the some 85 percent turnout of the membership for the presidential election in the prefecture, however, these charges do not seem applicable to Hyogo. Still, it is questionable whether the party in adding new members to its ranks was able to reach towards new sources of support or whether it simply brought into the party representatives of the constituencies from which it had drawn support in the past. The latter is probably closer to the truth

and suggest that an improvement in the party's electoral performance will not be concomitant with its increased membership.

The LDP represents a stable coalition of trade, professional, and commercial associations, agricultural cooperatives, and conservative religious and community service groups in Hyogo prefecture that are bound to it not only because of the benefits that it can provide them as the ruling party, but also because of their opposition to the ideologies embraced by the labor unions and their distrust of the Sōkagakkai and the Communists. The party mobilizes the support of these groups at times of elections through the efforts of conservative city and town assemblymen in the prefecture.

There are 100 cities and towns in Hyogo prefecture and nearly 2,000 city and town assemblymen. Even the smallest towns will have a 12 member assembly and the largest, the Kobe assembly, numbers 71 seats. Among these 2,000 assemblymen in 1978, there were only 48 LDP endorsed incumbents, and more than one-half of them could be found in the 26-member LDP-Kobe city delegation. Yet some 1,300 of the 1,500 assemblymen, who identify themselves as non-partisan candidates in local contests, will support LDP endorsed candidates at other levels of elections.⁸⁵ These 1,300 assemblymen are often leaders of groups in their community supportive of the LDP, and despite their non-partisan label nearly one-half of them are party members. They will arrange the endorsement of LDP candidates by their groups and meet some of the expenses that the party may incur in their district out of the salary that they receive as assemblymen.

The LDP, in a sense, derives some of its remarkable strength from the unusual size of the local assemblies. The party's support base unlike that of the socialists or Komeito is fragmented into a number of small groups that are difficult to organize into a coherent political force. But the large size of the assemblies, coupled with an at-large electoral system that permits groups of even modest membership to send their own representatives to the legislature, gives the LDP a way to contact and coordinate the leadership of these groups. Town and city assemblymen are not drawn into the party because its endorsement might help their election. Rather they see the party as a means by which they can participate in prefectural and national affairs. In return, they serve as the link between their constituency and the party.

The rapid increase in the LDP's membership from 13,000 to some 40,000 will help the party insofar as it has been able to incorporate more assemblymen into its ranks or has managed to win over labor union and Gakkai activists. Neither seems to have been the case. Instead the membership drive was engineered by the party's assembly membership and amounted to little more than the formal admission into the party of a portion of their own kōenkai, whose membership had supported the LDP in the past and would probably continue to do so in the future with or without the stimulus provided by membership in the party.

The national LDP's efforts to reform the party organization are at one level probably a ploy to deflect public criticism of

the party in the wake of the Lockheed scandal. At another level, however, the direction that these reforms have taken with their strong emphasis upon increasing party membership reflect a belief held by some party leaders that party supporters should be directly affiliated with the party rather than through the assemblymen kōenkai. Yet given the fragmented character of the LDP support base it is questionable whether this is desirable. The assemblymen kōenkai serve as a useful buffer between the party and its constituency. The close personal ties that develop between the members of the kōenkai and their assembly candidate appear to be crucial in enabling the LDP to count on a stable level of support over time, especially in cases where the party has been forced to favor the demands of one group over another.

Party Leadership

The major party officers⁸⁶ in the Hyogo federation are the president, vice-presidents, secretary-general, and the chairman of the General Affairs committee. The term of office is one year. All officers are elected by the party convention.

Between 1956 and 1978, the LDP had 13 presidents (see Table 8). All of them have been incumbent members of the House of Representatives. The first president of the party was Kiyose Ichiro, a fourth district HR assemblyman and the president of the Democratic party in Hyogo. He was followed in 1959 by Hara Kensaburo, a second district HR assemblyman and a former

Table 8
 Presidents of the Hyogo LDP Federation, 1956-1978

Year	Name	Background
1956-1958	Kiyose Ichiro	Two term HR assemblyman
1959-1960	Hara Kensaburo	Six term HR assemblyman
1961-1963	Kojima Tetsuzo	Six term HR assemblyman
1964	Horikawa Kyohei	Five term HR assemblyman
1965-1966	Komoto Toshio	Seven term HR assemblyman
1967	Arita Kiichi	Seven term HR assemblyman
1968	Nagata Torao	Seven term HR assemblyman
1969	Tokai Motosaburo	Five term HR assemblyman
1970	Sunada Shigetami	Three term HR assemblyman
1971-1974	Kojima Tetsuzo	Eight term HR assemblyman
1975-1976	Hara Kensaburo	Eleven term HR assemblyman
1977-1978	Ishii Hajime	Three term HR assemblyman

Source: Hyogo LDP.

member of the Liberal party. Afterwards, the position was rotated among the party's HR delegation members on the basis of seniority and availability. The president's position is largely honorary, but it is a demanding one in that it requires the incumbent to represent the federation at numerous political gatherings in the prefecture.

The secretary-general position was given first to Sudo Shimpachi a first district HR assemblyman and like the party chairman a member of the Democratic party. It may seem unusual that the Liberal party in Hyogo upon its merger with the Democratic party did not receive either the post of president or secretary-general in the federation, but this is a measure of the defeat suffered by the party in the 1956 HR election in Hyogo. Eight of the nine candidates that it had endorsed, including six incumbents, were rejected by the voters. Under these conditions the Liberal party had to settle for one of the four vice-president positions: it went to Horikawa Kyohei the most senior among the defeated Liberal party incumbents. Quite naturally, the competition between the Liberal and Democratic parties was not put aside immediately upon the merger of the two parties. Sudo hampered by charges of corruption lost his seat in 1958 to Nakai Kazuo, a former Liberal party incumbent who had been defeated by Sudo in 1956. Nakai after the election was quick to demand the secretary-general position for himself, and a year later he helped to engineer the replacement of

Kiyose as party president with Hara Kensaburo another former member of the Liberal party.

Nakai left the secretary-general post after his own defeat in the 1960 General Election. Upon his departure, there was a consensus within the party that the post should not go again to an incumbent HR assemblyman. The consensus was based on the need to separate the federation from the campaign of a particular HR candidate. It also arose from the desire of the prefectural assemblymen for a role with greater prominence in the federation hierarchy. The Hyogo LDP attempted to resolve in advance the inevitable competition among the assemblymen for the secretary-general position by routinely assigning it to the previous year's prefectural assembly chairman. This resulted, however, in the accession of secretary-generals who were quite advanced in age because the chairmanship of the assembly had traditionally been given to the most senior conservative member in the chamber. It also proved to be disruptive of the continuity of organizational effort within the prefectural Secretariat since the term of office was so short. In conjunction with the reorganization of the LDP federation following the dissolution of the Kōseikai, the automatic assignment of the prefectural assembly chairman to the position was abandoned and the minimum term of office was extended to two years. Still, the prestige of the position has required that the party select a prefectural assemblyman who has served a minimum of four

Table 9
Secretary-Generals of the Hyogo LDP Federation,
1956-1978

Year	Name	Background
1956-1957	Sudo Shimpachi	Four term HR assemblyman
1958-1960	Nakai Kazuo	Three term HR assemblyman
1961	Yano Kigen	Four term prefectural assemblyman
1962	Tsutada Ryoichi	Four term prefectural assemblyman
1963-1964	Manabe Mantaro	Five term prefectural assemblyman
1965	Terai Yasaichi	Four term prefectural assemblyman
1966	Nose Zensaburo	Four term prefectural assemblyman
1967	Mori Shinosuke	Five term prefectural assemblyman
1968-1969	Niwa Eiichi	Four term prefectural assemblyman
1970-1971	Ikuta Katsumi	Four term prefectural assemblyman
1972-1973	Nitsuta Hideo	Five term prefectural assemblyman
1974	Utsumi Toshio	Six term prefectural assemblyman
1975	Yonezawa Hiroshi	Four term prefectural assemblyman
1976	Iwatani Kenji	Six term prefectural assemblyman
1977-1978	Nakazawa Eiji	Five term prefectural assemblyman

Source: Hyogo LDP.

terms in office, and the two-year incumbency rule has not always been adhered to (see Table 9).

The distribution of other offices in the Hyogo federation upon the merger of the Liberal and Democratic parties reflected the delicate balance among the conservative forces in the prefecture. Masaki Sadamaru the Liberal party leader in the prefectural assembly and Nakano Bunmon the leader of the Shinseikai group were named vice-presidents. Hosomi Tatsuzo the head of the break-away Liberal party faction that had made its separate peace with the Socialist governor became chairman of the General Affairs committee, while Manabe Manjiro the Hosomi lieutenant who had arranged the Liberal-Shinseikai merger that spawned the Kōseikai took on the chairmanship of the Policy committee.

The rivalry among local conservative assemblymen seemed to intensify with the merger of the two parties. In the prefectural assembly Nakano and Hosomi engaged in a bitter struggle for control of the Kōseikai. When Nakano decided to stand for the House of Councillors as an LDP candidate, Hosomi persuaded Narita Ichiro, a well-known governor of Hyogo in the prewar period, to try for an HC seat. He secured for Narita the other of the two LDP endorsements and campaigned on his behalf throughout the prefecture. As the result of Hosomi's efforts Narita came in a surprise first in the four candidate field, while Nakano ran 130,000 votes behind and barely nosed out the JSP candidate Sano Yoshio for the third seat. Hosomi then managed to have

Narita by reason of this victory replace Nakano as one of the party's four vice-presidents.

Between 1956 and 1964, the remaining principals in the competition for ascendancy within the assembly shuffled in and out of the major party offices. Hosomi served as chairman of the General Affairs committee in 1956, 1957, 1960, and 1961, and federation vice-chairman in 1958, 1959, 1962, and 1963. Masaki was a federation vice-president in 1956, 1957, 1960, and 1961, and chairman of the General Affairs committee in 1958 and 1959. Manabe held the chairmanship of the Policy committee from 1956 to 1960 and served as vice-president in 1963 and 1964.

The assignment of federation office was somewhat removed from assembly politics after the retirement of Masaki in 1963 and the death of Hosomi in 1964 (see Table 10). In 1967 the number of vice-president positions was reduced from four to three. One seat each was assigned to the national, prefectural, and Kobe assembly delegations. The national assembly position has usually been given to first and second term HR or HC incumbents. The position is largely honorary, but it does provide its recipient with a title that can compensate in some part for the lack of ministerial status at election time. The prefectural assembly seat has been rotated among the senior members (four terms or more) of the LDP delegation, while the Kobe seat has been closely held by the most senior assemblymen (six terms or more) in that chamber. After 1965 the chairmanship of the General Affairs committee was never again

Table 10
Vice-Presidents of the Hyogo LDP Federation, 1956-1978

Year	Name and Background
1956-1957	Horikawa Kyohei (HR), Nakano Bunmon (PA), Masaki Sadamaru (PA), Ito Yoshikatsu (Kobe) ^a
1958-1960	Narita Ichiro (HC), Tokai Motosaburo (HR), Hosomi Tatsuzo (PA), Atsukata Masahisashi (Kobe)
1961	Aota Gentaro (HC), Komoto Toshio (HR), Masaki Sadamaru (PA), Shimizu Shigeo (Kobe)
1962-1963	Aota Gentaro (HC), Komoto Toshio (HR), Shimizu Shieo (Kobe)
1964	Sunada Shigetami (HR), Manabe Manjiro (PA), Ito Yoshikatsu (Kobe)
1965-1966	Aota Gentaro (HC), Sunada Shigetami (HR), Manabe Manjiro (PA), Ito Yoshikatsu (Kobe)
1967	Sunada Shigetami (HR), Nose Zensaburo (PA), Narase Sataro (Kobe)
1968-1969	Sunada Shigetami (HR), Nishimura Matsuzo (PA), Narase Sataro (Kobe)
1970-1971	Matsumoto Juro (HR), Katsuya Takeo (PA), Narase Sataro (Kobe)
1972-1973	Ishii Ichiji (PA), Utsumi Toshio (PA), Narase Sataro (Kobe)
1974	Toida Saburo (HR), Okazawa Kunro (PA), Morikawa Kanichi (Kobe)
1975	Toida Saburo (HR), Iwatani Kenji (PA), Morikawa Kanichi (Kobe)

Table 10 (Continued)

Year	Name and Background
1976	Toida Saburo (HR), Fujii Kenzo (PA), Kawaii Genjiro (Kobe)
1977	Nakanishi Ichiro (HC), Fujii Kenzo (PA), Morikawa Kanichi (Kobe)
1978	Nakanishi Ichiro (HC), Iwatani Kenji (PA), Morikawa Kanichi (Kobe)

Source: Hyogo LDP.

^aKobe indicates Kobe city assembly.

held by a prefectural assemblyman (see Table 11). It went instead to a very senior member of the Kobe delegation. Nonetheless, the prefectural assemblymen have not been deprived of the opportunity to hold federation office: they occupy the chairmanship of almost all the committees and departments in the party Secretariat.

Table 11
Chairmen of the General Affairs Committee
in the Hyogo LDP, 1956-1978

Year	Name and Background
1956-1957	Hosomi Tatsuzo, three-term prefectural assemblyman
1958-1960	Masaki Sadamaru, three-term prefectural assemblyman
1961	Hosomi Tatsuzo, four-term prefectural assemblyman
1962-1964	Yano Kigen, four-term prefectural assemblyman
1965-1973	Shimizu Shigeo, five-term Kobe assemblyman
1974-1975	Okajima Osamu, six-term Kobe assemblyman
1976-1978	Matsumoto Shoichi, eight-term Kobe assemblyman

Source: Hyogo LDP.

The LDP because of its fragmented base is a party in which assemblymen have special importance. The federation has always been willing to extend party office to assemblymen who felt that the recognition attendant to these positions might help them in their campaign. But with some 800 conservative assemblymen who are also

party members to satisfy, the federation is often hard-pressed to find enough positions to go around. The Hyogo party's official listing of officers in 1976 contained over 400 names. It included, in addition to the usual officers that can be found in the listings put out by the other prefectural parties, the complete membership of all committees in the party Secretariat, the 200-odd members of the General Affairs committee, and nearly 40 party advisors (komon and sōdan-yaku). Other parties, of course, are willing to provide titles for party assemblymen or members who might request them, but none have gone to the lengths of the LDP.

The incumbents of positions within the party hierarchy are not necessarily those with influence within the party. Federation office in the LDP is usually honorary (although only long-term assemblymen are eligible), and is normally rotated among the assembly group designated for the seat on a non-competitive basis. The purpose of this is to permit the assemblymen to enjoy the prestige of the position without threatening the unity of the party. Decisions made in the Hyogo LDP on candidate endorsement or policy selection are made, if at all possible, by consensus. Where this proves impossible, the authority of party office counts little. What is important at these times is control over access to campaign funds and influential constituencies, and this rests not with the federation but with the kōenkai of the individual assemblymen.

Party FinancesSources of Party Income⁸⁷

Membership dues in the Hyogo LDP federation until 1978 were 1,000 yen (\$5.00) and collected by the party in January of every year. Dues were not collected on a regular basis by the Hyogo party until 1967. The revenue which they produced for the entire prefectural party in that year came to about 7 million yen (\$35,000). By 1977, the gradual increase in the membership of the party had raised income from this source to 10.5 million yen (\$52,500), but this equalled only eight percent of total party revenues.⁸⁸ The rapid growth of party membership in the first months of 1978 to 44,000 and the raising of annual party dues to 2,000 yen (\$10.00) should produce future revenues of nearly 60 million yen (\$300,000) for the party, making income from dues equal to exactly half of party income in 1977.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, it is important to note that dues in the LDP are lower than those of any party. The average socialist or Communist party member may pay in a year 9 to 10 times as much as his LDP counterpart. The LDP has never regarded its members as a primary source of support for the activities of the party.⁹⁰ In line with this philosophy, Hyogo federation members have never had to pay special assessments to fund the party Secretariat or to build up its campaign war chest.

The salaries of national, prefectural, and Kobe city assemblymen are assessed by the Hyogo federation to meet some of its expenses. National assemblymen pay 420,000 yen (\$2100) annually,

and prefectural, city, and town assemblymen 72,000 yen (\$360). These figures are far less than the some 1 million yen (\$5,000) that national assemblymen and the 450,000 to 500,000 yen (\$2,250-2,500) that local assemblymen are assessed by the other parties in the prefecture. One reason for the lower assessments is the higher expenses that the LDP assemblymen incur in maintaining the local branches of the party and binding together the diverse groups that make up the conservative constituency. A second reason is that the LDP federation does not regard itself as having a prior claim on the compensation received by its representatives for their assembly work.⁹¹ Unlike the JCP or the socialist parties, the LDP assemblymen's salaries are regarded as their personal property. The federation does expect, however, that the assemblymen cover some of the election expenses incurred by the party Secretariat. In 1977 the Hyogo LDP received 9.5 million yen (\$47,500) from the support group of Kanai Motohiko, the party's 1977 Hyogo district HC candidate.

The money raised from corporations and other interest groups by the Citizens' Political Council (Kokumin Seiji Kyōkai),⁹² the national party's financial support association, and transferred to the federation by the national party have been an important source of revenue for the Hyogo party. Since 1962 the Hyogo federation has received by agreement one-third of the monies collected in the prefecture by this group. The Council has also provided the party with financial assistance to meet extraordinary election expenses

(see Table 12). At the time of the hard fought Kobe Mayoral election in 1973, the Council made funds available to the Hyogo federation totalling 214 million yen (1.1 million dollars).

Table 12

Income Received by Hyogo LDP from Citizens'
Political Council, 1964-1977

Year	Amount	Year	Amount
1964	8 ^a	1971	37
1965	unavailable	1972	27
1966	unavailable	1973	214
1967	18	1974	38
1968	30	1975	14
1969	19	1976	17
1970	7	1977	11

Source: Hyogo Senkyo Kanri linkai.

^aIn millions of yen.

Since the 1975 revision of the Political Funds Control Law, the capacity of the Citizens' Political Council to raise funds for the party has declined dramatically. Although the Council did have individual members, it raised most of its money from corporate sources. The 1975 revision of the law set a limit proportional to capitalization on the absolute amount of contributions that a corporation could make to political organizations in any year.⁹³

This put an uncomfortable lid on the size of the contributions that the LDP could expect to receive from corporate circles. The intention of the revision was to reduce the parties' dependence upon corporate and union sources of political contributions and to encourage them to develop a cadre of individual supporters. The Hyogo LDP at the initiative of the national headquarters established in February of 1977 the Hyogo branch of the Liberal Citizens' Association (Jiyū Kokumin Kaigi) a fund-raising organization that encourages individuals supportive of the LDP to commit 10,000 yen (\$50.00) a year to the party. The party leadership claim to have enrolled 8,000 members in Hyogo in the first year of its operation.⁹⁴ Since the prefectural federation is permitted to retain one-half of the money raised by this group in Hyogo, it might expect revenues of some 40 million yen (\$120,000) from this source in the future.

In addition to the national money from these financial support groups, the Hyogo LDP has been successful in raising money on its own account from within the prefecture. This has been especially true since the late 1960's when the importance of federation directed propaganda activities came to be recognized. At the time of the 1970 gubernatorial election the party received nearly 100 million (\$500,000) in contributions. In 1975, the party raised some 50 million yen (\$250,000) to be used in the prefectural and city assembly contests. Construction firms, banks, and large manufacturing concerns in the prefecture figured large in the

contributions that were acknowledged in the party's report to the Election commission.⁹⁵ These kind of contributions have accounted for over one-half of federation income in most years.

The limitation on corporate contributions and closer public scrutiny of the sources of party income after the Lockheed scandal led the Hyogo party to hold its first public fund-raising party in July of 1976. The tickets for this event were priced at 30,000 yen (\$150.00) each. Conservative assemblymen were encouraged to buy 10 to 20 tickets at a discount from the federation and sell them at face value to their supporters with the understanding that the assemblymen retain the difference for their own campaigns. The national party's secretary-general Ohira Masayoshi and the chairman of its General Affairs committee Nakasone Yasuhiro were the featured guests at the party. The federation reported sales of 4,100 tickets and revenues from the evening of 73.8 million yen (\$369,000).⁹⁶ This represented an impressive 64 percent of the party's total income. In 1977 a second federation party raised 55 million yen (\$275,000), 49 percent of total party revenues for the year.

The income of the Hyogo federation in the 1957-1961 period never exceeded 10.7 million yen (\$53,500), and it fell as low as 5 million yen (\$25,000) in 1961 (see Table 13). The party collected dues only irregularly and received little in the way of contributions from businesses or individuals. Its principal source of income was money assessed against party endorsed national

Table 13
Hyogo LDP Federation Income, 1957-1977

Year	Amount	Year	Amount
1957	6 ^a	1968	33
1958	6	1969	76
1959	10	1970	114
1960	9	1971	70
1961	5	1972	79
1962	unavailable	1973	282
1963	15	1974	132
1964	unavailable	1975	80
1965	unavailable	1976	116 ^b
1966	unavailable	1977	120
1967	34		

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.

^aIn millions of yen.

^bAfter 1976 income adjusted for expense of federation party.

assemblymen and that contributed by conservative local assemblymen. In the 1964-1968 period the federation's income, supplemented by monies raised by the Citizens' Political Council and the start of the regular collection of party dues, grew steadily from 16.4 million yen (\$82,000) to 34.8 million yen (\$174,000). The years between 1969 and 1974 saw the Hyogo LDP budget, sparked by money raised within the prefecture by the federation and transferred from the national party for four hotly contested national elections (1969 HR, 1971 HC, 1972 HR, 1974 HC), the election of new governor (1970), and the Kobe mayoral contest (1973), balloon to 282 million yen (1.4 million dollars) in 1973 and average 92.2 million yen (\$461,000) for the other five years.

The growth in the income of the Hyogo party ended in 1975 when revenues for the year dropped back to 80 million yen (\$400,000). In 1976 and 1977 these improved only slightly to around 120 million yen (\$600,000). The decline in 1975 can be attributed to the absence of a prefecture-wide election that would generate substantial contributions to the federation. The slow recovery in 1976 and 1977 can be laid to the new restrictions on corporate contributions and the reorganization of the LDP's national financial support group. Revenues in the future can be expected to quickly approach 200 million yen (1 million dollars) with the guarantee of 60 million yen (\$300,000) from member dues and some 40 million yen (\$200,000) from the Liberal Citizens' Association.

Pattern of Party Expenditures

LDP federation expenditures for staff have grown from one million yen (\$5,000) in 1957, when the party maintained a small office in the Motomachi shopping area of Kobe, to 23 million yen (\$115,000) in 1977 when the party employed a 10-member staff. No one period can be pointed to as the years when personnel expenditures grew most rapidly (see Table 14). Additions to the staff have been gradual and have had little relationship to the overall level of party expenditures. The present staff includes four college graduates, and salaries average between 140,000 and 150,000 yen (\$700-750) a month with a four month yearly bonus.

Expenditures for the permanent federation staff have never come to much more than 15 percent of total federation expenses. This has been especially true since 1969 when the party began to invest large sums of money in propaganda activities during prefecture-wide elections. In 1970 propaganda expenses amounted to 84 percent of federation expenditures, and in 1977 67 percent (see Table 15). As noted before, this money was used in part to hire additional help for the duration of the campaign and to subsidize local assemblymen kōenkai activities on behalf of party candidates.

In looking at the other expenditures made by the LDP federation, one surprise is that it pays no rent. The reason is that the building in which the party offices are located is owned by the federation. Since 1964 the Hyogo LDP has occupied offices

Table 14
Hyogo LDP Expenditures for Personnel, 1957-1977

Year	Amount	Year	Amount
1957	1.0 ^a	1968	4.6
1958	.6	1969	7.9
1959	unavailable	1970	10.4
1960	1.2	1971	unavailable
1961	1.5	1972	10.6
1962	unavailable	1973	12.9
1963	unavailable	1974	16.1
1964	unavailable	1975	15.6
1965	unavailable	1976	17.2
1966	unavailable	1977	23.1
1967	5.2		

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Linkai.
a) In millions of yen.

Table 15
Hyogo LDP Expenditures for Propaganda, 1957-1977

Year	Amount	Year	Amount
1957	5.3 ^a	1968	23.8
1958	4.8	1969	48.7
1959	unavailable	1970	103.5
1960	9.4	1971	83.2
1961	4.4	1972	77.4
1962	unavailable	1973	226.2
1963	unavailable	1974	158.2
1964	14.6	1975	71.5
1965	unavailable	1976	93.8
1966	unavailable	1977	81.1
1967	21.3		

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.

^aIn millions of yen.

on the second floor of a five-story building situated across the street from the prefectural legislature. The building was built by the Kajima construction company at a cost of 100 million yen (\$500,000) and given to the Hyogo federation to be used as its headquarters.⁹⁷ The first floor of the building contains a garage. The third and fourth floors are used for meetings and contain the Hyogo offices of the Citizens' Political Council and the newly formed Liberal Citizens' Association.

The proportionate share of personnel expenditures in the LDP federation budget is small when compared to that of the JSP or Communist parties. It reflects a difference between the LDP and these parties in their organizational strategies. The JCP and to some extent the JSP have invested much money in the maintenance and development of a network of front groups in the prefecture staffed by party organizers. The LDP in Hyogo has no front group structure of its own. Instead it has relied upon the kōenkai of its assemblymen to mediate its relationship with its constituency. The role of the federation staff has been to coordinate the propaganda activities of the party, particularly in prefecture-wide contests, so as to sustain continued public support for the party's control of government.

Party Candidates

House of Representatives

The merger of the Liberal and Democratic parties in Hyogo gave the conservatives at once a party that could boast of 10 incumbent House of Representative assemblymen (see Table 16). Company presidents (Sudo, Maeda, Obata, Komoto, Arita), former local assemblymen and mayors (Nagata, Tokai), and lawyers (Kiyose, Kojima) were the only occupations represented with one exception:

Hara Kensaburo from the second district was a well-known novelist and landowner.⁹⁸ Among the 10 unsuccessful candidates from the Liberal and Democratic parties in the 1955 HR election, businessmen (Shiota, Yoshida, Kobayashi, Okami) and local assemblymen and mayors (Nakai, Tomita, Horikawa) were again the most numerous. Of the remaining three candidates, Okada Goro was a former bureaucrat in the Transportation Ministry, Kuroda Iwao an administrative assistant to Yoshida Shigeru the president of the Liberal Party, and Sasaki Morio a journalist formerly with the Mainichi Shimbun.

The marriage of the two conservative parties was occasioned at the national level, but the increasing strength of the Socialists within Hyogo underscored the need for conservative unity in the prefecture. In the 1953 House of Councillors election, disarray in the conservative ranks had permitted the Socialists to elect both of their candidates. The inability of the Liberal party to dissuade Kishida Yukio from seeking a third term as governor had resulted in a crushing defeat for the party at the hands of the JSP

Table 16

Hyogo LDP HR Candidates, 1955-1979

Year/District	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
1955	Sudo (D) ^a Nakai (L-x) ^c	Nagata (C) Hara (L) ^b Maeda (D) Shiota (D-x) Tomita (L-x) Yoshida (D-x)	Tokai (D) Kobayashi (L-x) Okada (L-x) Kuroda (L-x)	Kiyose (D) Komoto (D) Obata (D) Horikawa (L-x) Okami (L-x)	Arita (D) Kojima (D) Sasaki (L-x)
1958	Nakai Sudo (x) Sunada (x)	Hara Nagata Tomita Maeda (x) Yoshida (x) Shiota (x)	Tokai Kobayashi Fujiwara (x)	Kiyose Komoto Horikawa	Arita Kojima
1960	Sudo Nakai (x) Sunada (x)	Hara Nagata Tomita Ikeda (x)	Tokai Okada Kobayashi (x)	Kiyose Komoto Okami Horikawa (x)	Arita Kojima Sasaki (x)
1963	Sunada Nakai (x)	Hara Nagata Tomita (x)	Tokai Okada (x)	Kiyose Komoto Horikawa	Arita Kojima Sasaki (x)

Table 16.(Continued)

Year/District	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
1967	Sunada Ishii (x)	Hara Nagata Nakazawa (x)	Tokai	Kiyose Komoto Horikawa	Arita Kojima (x)
1969	Sunada Ishii	Hara Nagata Koike (x)	Tokai	Komoto Matsumoto Toida (x)	Arita Kojima
1972	Ishii Sunada (x)	Hara Nagata (x)	Tokai Kobayashi	Komoto Matsumoto Toida	Arita Kojima
1976	Ishii Sunada	Hara Nagata	Tokai	Komoto Toida Matsumoto (x)	Tani Arita (x)
1979	Ishii Sunada (x)	Hara Nagata (x)	Tokai	Komoto Matsumoto Toida (x)	Tani Nishiyama (x) Fujiwara (x)

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Linkai; Kōbe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.

Note: Between 1955 and 1963 three seats were contested in the first district. The number of seats was increased to four in 1967 and five in 1976. The number of seats in the other districts have remained the same: second (5), third (3), fourth (4), and fifth (3).

^a(D) Democratic Party.

^b(L) Liberal Party.

^c(x) Defeated in election.

candidate Sakamoto Katsu in 1954. In the 1955 General Election the Socialists, although still divided among themselves,⁹⁹ cooperated on an adhoc basis and managed to increase their seats in the Lower House from 5 to 8 and their vote in the prefecture as a whole from 405,000 to 510,000.

At the time of the 1958 HR election, the new LDP was faced with the necessity of reducing the number of candidates that it nominated if it was to stem the Socialist advance. In 1955 the Liberal and Democratic parties had nominated in every district, but Kobe, more candidates than the size of the conservative base in these districts could justify. The reduction of even one candidate in the second through fifth HR districts could have won for the conservatives as many as four additional seats in the Lower House. The task of reduction, however, could not be approached in a rigorous mathematical fashion, if the newly formed party was not to split in two again. Fortunately, the conservatives in Hyogo had a relatively easy time of it, because the Liberal party had been left with only one incumbent after the 1955 HR election.¹⁰⁰ The federation cut one candidate each in the third and fifth districts and two in the fourth. The first district proved less tractable.

In Kobe the number of candidates was increased from two to three, despite the fact that the party had only elected one representative in this three seat district in 1955. The prefectural federation in 1958 had recommended only the Democratic incumbent Sudo Shimpachi and the defeated Liberal incumbent Nakai Kazuo to

the national party headquarters. But at the meeting of the national party's nomination committee Kono Ichiro, a powerful faction leader in the national party, demanded that Sunada Shigetami, his administrative assistant and the son of a former Diet member from Kobe, be put on the ticket instead of the incumbent Sudo, who was under investigation at the time in an election bribery scandal. The prefectural federation led by the former chairman Kiyose Ichiro objected to the non-endorsement of the Hyogo party's secretary-general, Sudo. The negotiations between the federation and the party headquarters produced the surprising decision to endorse all three candidates. The result was an easy victory for the two Socialist incumbents in the district, Kawakami Jotaro and Goto Torao.

Nevertheless the limited reduction of candidates accomplished by the Hyogo federation in the other HR districts enabled the LDP to protect the 10 seats won by the conservatives in 1955 and gave the party one additional seat in the third district. In an election where the newly united Socialist party expected to advance at the expense of the LDP, this was an important victory.

The occupational background of the candidates endorsed in 1958 remained largely unchanged from 1955. Company presidents (Sudo, Yoshida, Maeda, Kobayashi, Komoto, Arita) and local assemblymen and mayors (Nakai, Nagata, Tokai, Horikawa) were still dominant. The one new candidate, Sunada Shigetami, was a significant exception to this: he had served his political apprenticeship as an administrative assistant to national faction leader Kono Ichiro and had

returned to the prefecture to take over his father's political base in Kobe. The number of administrative assistants and sons of former incumbents that relied upon their mentor's or father's kōenkai to deliver votes for them in their first elections would increase as the pre-1955 conservative assemblymen began to retire in the late 1960's.

In the 1960 HR election, the candidates endorsed by the LDP remained largely familiar. Two former Liberal party incumbents (Okami Osamu and Sasaki Morio) were added to the list, but only two new candidates were endorsed. Okada Shuichi, another Transportation ministry bureaucrat, succeeded to the 1955 Liberal party candidate Okada Goro's base in the Ono city area of the third district. Ikeda Tokumasu, an Amagasaki prefectural assemblyman, hoped to rally the supporters of Nishinomiya-based Maeda Fusanosuke and Amagasaki-based Yoshida Yoshitaro, both of whom had retired after the 1958 HR election. Okada managed only to unseat the incumbent Kobayashi in the second district and Ikeda fell short of gaining a fourth seat in the Hanshin area. But overall the LDP did well, winning 11 of 18 HR seats in the prefecture.

In 1963, the number of HR candidates endorsed by the party dropped from 17 to 13. The reduced number of endorsements was due in three cases to the voluntary retirement of the candidates: Sudo in the first district, Ikeda in the second, and Kobayashi Masaharu in the third. Okami Osamu, the fourth non-endorsed candidate, was an incumbent in the fourth district. The party had four candidates

in this district vying for four available seats. With the JSP candidate Miki Yoshio a strong contender for one of these seats, it was felt that the party could only safely endorse three candidates. Okami, despite his incumbency, was the loser in a four-way struggle in the district for the LDP nomination. No new candidates were put up by the LDP in 1963. As the result of the defeat of the incumbent Tomita Kenji in the second district and Okada Shuichi in the third, the party managed to elect only nine candidates from Hyogo in this election.

The 1967 and 1969 elections witnessed the retirement or death of many of the Lower House assemblymen that had joined together to form the LDP and their replacement by younger candidates who were to carry the party through the 1970's. Nakai Kazuo in the first district retired after his second straight defeat in 1963. In his place the party nominated Ishii Hajime the son of a Kobe prefectural assemblyman and a former administrative assistant to the LDP leader, Tanaka Kakuei. Ishii was defeated in the 1967 race, but won a seat in 1969. In the second district, the LDP endorsed Nakazawa Eiji, a Nishinomiya prefectural assemblyman, to replace the defeated Tomita Kenji. He in turn was replaced in 1969 by Koike Yuzo, an Amagasaki city assemblyman. Neither of them proved able to win back Tomita's seat for the party. Okada's retirement after his defeat provided the opportunity for a new conservative to stand for the Lower House from the third district. Kawanishi Kiyoshi, a former LDP HC candidate, sought the party's nomination but his bid

was blocked by the incumbent Tokai Motosaburo's insistence that there were only enough votes in the district for one conservative candidate. Kawanishi persisted and stood in the election as an independent, but was defeated.

With the retirement of Horikawa Kyohei and the death of Kiyose Ichiro preceeding the 1969 HR election, four candidates appeared to vigorously contest for the LDP endorsement for these two vacated seats in the fourth district; Matsumoto Juro, a retired Finance ministry official; Toida Saburo, Kiyose's administrative assistant; Muneyuki Genji, the former head of the Kōseikai and Kiyose's 1967 campaign manager; and Machida Takashi, a Construction ministry official with close ties to business interests in Himeiji city. Matsumoto and Toida had the advantage of having received Horikawa's and Kiyose's own endorsement as their successors, and used this to successfully press their case before the federation. Both Muneyuki and Machida refused to accept the party's decision and ran as independents. The presence of five conservative candidates (Komoto Toshio, the remaining incumbent in this district, had been automatically endorsed) contesting for four seats so divided the conservative vote that the party could elect only two candidates, Komoto and Matsumoto, instead of its normal three. The fourth seat in this district went to a new Komeito candidate, Arai Yoshiyuki.

In the fifth district Sasaki Morio retired in 1963, the loser of the bitter three-way electoral contests for the two "conservative" seats in this three seat district. The powerful support bases of

the two remaining conservative candidates Arita Kiichi and Kojima Tetsuzo and the strength of the DSP incumbent Sasaki Ryosaku made it unthinkable for the party to nominate a candidate to replace him. The supporters of Sasaki Morio in this rural district, however, could not be brought quickly around to support his victorious rivals. With no conservative candidate to support a number of them voted for the Socialist candidate, Iga Masamori, lifting him over Kojima in 1967.

Times of candidate succession have been dangerous for the LDP in Hyogo. Before 1963 the LDP could usually elect 11 candidates in the prefecture, but it could elect only eight in 1967 and succeeded in 1969 to increase this only to nine. The losses suffered by the party can be generally organized into three categories. In the first, the opposition of party incumbents within the same district has prevented the LDP from selecting a candidate to contest for the votes freed by the retirement of an older or defeated candidate. These votes have in some cases not been effectively absorbed by the party's other incumbents and, consequently, have been available for mobilization by the candidates of the opposition parties. The defeat of Kojima in the fifth district by the JSP's Iga Masamori is one example of this. A second grouping involves the situation where two or more candidates contest for the party nomination upon the retirement of an incumbent or defeated candidate. Unless the party can persuade all potential aspirants for its endorsement to abide by its decision, it may find that its support base in a

district has become the target of independent conservative candidates who may siphon off enough votes to defeat the party nominee. The LDP loss of a seat in the fourth district in 1969 exhibits this pattern. In the last category can be located cases where the party has succeeded in obtaining the consent of the district incumbents to a new candidate and has also been able to prevent the appearance of disaffected independent candidates. Victory should belong to the party in these instances, but sometimes eludes it, because the candidate selected by the party is unable to either fully take over the support of the previous candidate's electoral base or bring in enough votes of his own to make up the difference. The defeat of Nakazawa in the second district in 1967 can be attributed to these factors. He ran extremely well in Nishinomiya city but was unable to fully mobilize Tomita's support base in Amagasaki. Some of the conservative voters in this city may have drifted over to the other two LDP incumbents or supported the JSP endorsed Amagasaki city physician Horii Masao.¹⁰¹

Candidate succession in the 1967-1969 period occasioned some changes in the occupational distribution of LDP candidates. The number of candidates who had been company officials dropped from six in 1958 to two (Komoto and Arita), and the number of local assemblymen and mayors from five to three (Nagata, Tokai, and Koike). An increase from one to three came in candidates who had been administrative assistants to members of the Diet (Sunada, Ishii, and Toida).

After the bitter infighting that marked the late 1960's, the decade of the 1970's despite a strong challenge from the opposition parties produced few changes in the line-up of the LDP HR candidates in Hyogo. The federation endorsed one new candidate in 1972, Kobayashi Masaoto a journalist and the son of the former LDP incumbent from the third district Kobayashi Masaharu. In 1976 with the retirement of Kojima Tetsuzo in the fifth district, the party endorsed Tani Yoshio a prefectural assemblyman from the area. It also suffered the loss of the young Kobayashi who defected to the New Liberal Club (NLC).

The results of the 1979 election suggest that the 1980's may be more turbulent for the party. In this election, two long-term incumbents, Sunada Shigetami and Nagata Torao, were unseated by narrow margins. Sunada seems sure to come back, but Nagata at 69 will probably retire. The challenge for the party will be to come up with a candidate capable of taking over his support base without undermining that of the party's remaining incumbent Hara Kensaburo. The Hyogo federation did not handle this succession process well in the fifth district after Arita Kiichi's retirement, following his narrow defeat in the 1976 election. It endorsed in the 1979 HR contest three candidates in this district for the first time since 1963. The results show (see Table 17) that the party could have easily defeated Iga Masamori the JDP candidate, if it had been able to limit the number of its candidates to two. Nevertheless, in the third and fourth

districts the party should continue to remain strong. Tokai freed from having to share his votes with Kobayashi won a strong victory in 1979, and Toida and Matsumoto who have alternated in the second LDP seat in this district are well positioned to succeed Komoto when he retires.

Table 17

LDP Performance in the Hyogo Fifth District
in 1976 and 1979 HR Election

Name of Candidate	1976	1979
Arita (LDP)	44 ^a	--
Nishiyama (LDP)	--	28
Fujiwara (LDP)	--	20
Tani (LDP)	46	37
Sasaki (DSP)	48	69
Iga (JSP)	45	36
Maeda (JCP)	20	10

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai;
Kobe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.

^aVote in thousands.

House of Councillors

The first HC election after the formation of the LDP occurred in 1956. The LDP nominated two candidates Nakano Bunmon and Narita Ichiro (see Table 18). Nakano was a prefectural assemblyman

Table 18
LDP Hyogo District HC Candidates 1956-1977

Year	Name of Candidate	Background
1956	Nakano Bunmon Narita Ichiro	Prefectural assemblyman Former governor of Hyogo prefecture
1959	Okazaki Shinichi Aota Gentaro	President of insurance company Director of Hyogo Farm Cooperative Association
1963	Kishida Yukio Nakano Bunmon	Former governor of Hyogo prefecture Former prefectural assemblymen
1965	Aota Gentaro Kawanishi Kiyoshi (x) ^a	Former director of Hyogo Farm Cooperative Association President of textile company
1968	Kishida Yukio (x) Nakanishi Ichiro (x)	Former governor of Hyogo prefecture Former official in Economic Planning Agency
1971	Kanai Motohiko Nakanishi Ichiro (x)	Former governor of Hyogo prefecture Former official in Economic Planning Agency
1974	Nakanishi Ichiro	Former official in Economic Planning Agency
1977	Kanai Motohiko	Former governor of Hyogo prefecture

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Inkai.

^a(x) Candidate defeated in election.

from Kobe who had the strong backing of urban, financial interests in the prefecture. Narita was a former governor of the prefecture, and through that position had developed a broad network of personal connections with town assemblymen and mayors in the rural districts. Their nomination established a pattern for subsequent House of Councillors contests, where the party would stand two candidates.

First, Nakano and Narita were a balanced ticket. One had a strong support in the urban areas, the other in the rural districts of the prefecture. The LDP ran two candidates in every HC election through 1971. Each of the tickets with the exception of the 1965 Kawanishi-Aota combination¹⁰² had a clearly identified "urban" and "rural" candidate. This one exception led the LDP to record its worse performance (541,000 votes) ever in the prefecture at the polls.

Second, the battle between the two candidates for support of local assemblymen kōenkai was often more fierce than that between the LDP and the other parties for the votes of the prefectural electorate. Hosomi's strong backing of Narita in 1956 nearly occasioned Nakano's defeat by the JSP candidate Sano Yoshio. The bitter infighting between the former prefectural governor Kishida Yukio and Nakanishi Ichiro a former official in the Economic Planning Agency produced the defeat of both candidates in 1968. The refusal of another former governor Kanai Motohiko to release some of his assembly support to Nakanishi in the 1971

election assured his defeat in a second bid for office, when a more equal distribution of the 807,000 votes polled by the party could have elected both candidates by healthy margins.¹⁰³

Finally, the 130,000 vote gap that separated Narita from Nakano in the 1956 election demonstrated the unmatched strength of former governors in prefecture-wide elections. The LDP has subsequently endorsed for the House of Councillors both Kishida Yukio, governor of Hyogo from 1947-1954, and Kanai Motohiko, governor from 1962 to 1970.

The LDP has not been able to elect two candidates to the House of Councillors from Hyogo since 1963. Since 1974 the party has endorsed only one candidate for the three seats contested in each election, and elected him by margins of some 200,000 votes over his nearest competitor. Increased competition from the opposition parties, particularly the Komeito which could marshal 400,000 votes, has discouraged the LDP from considering the endorsement of two candidates again. But the over 800,000 votes won by LDP HR candidates in the 1979 election suggest that the LDP base in the prefecture, if properly divided, is still more than sufficient to support two candidates. The problem for the party has been that its constituency in Hyogo is too broad and fragmented to permit an effective division of this huge pool of votes.

Prefectural Assembly

The LDP did not fully emerge as a party at the prefectural level until the dissolution of the Kōseikai in 1966. In discussing

the backgrounds of LDP prefectural assemblymen during this period, it is necessary to look not only at party endorsed candidates but also assemblymen who ran on the Kōseikai ticket or as independents. The Kōseikai, as noted before, was an integral part of the federation despite its formal independence. After the 1966 dissolution of the Kōseikai, the majority of conservative prefectural assemblymen ran as LDP candidates. Nevertheless, the party has had to enlist the aid of those who stood as independents in every assembly session in order to control the chamber (see Table 19).

The reasons why a conservative candidate might run as an independent rather than as a LDP endorsed candidate vary. Some candidates have ideological reasons: they believe that partisan politics has no place in the local assemblies.¹⁰⁴ Manabe Manjiro, one of the leaders of the party during the late 1950's and early 1960's, always ran as an independent from his constituency in Taka county. Other candidates in districts that already have an established LDP incumbent may have their access to the party endorsement blocked. In such cases, they may run as independents with the intention of joining the party should they be elected. For example, Ueda Hachiro from Taki county running as an independent defeated the LDP endorsed incumbent in 1967, and then in the next election stood as the LDP candidate for the seat. A third group of candidates have stood as independents in one election and party endorsed candidates in the next for tactical reasons. Okada Gengo, a five-term assemblyman, was a good example of this. In his first

Table 19
Conservative Performance in Hyogo Prefectural Assembly Elections, 1955-1979

Year	Number of Seats	Liberal Party	LDP	Koseikai	Independents
1955	78	5	--	34	23
1959	83	--	38	9	12
1963	87	--	26	21	9
1967	90	--	40	--	16
1971	90	--	42	--	10
1975	90	--	37	--	15
1979	91	--	38	--	16

Source: Hyogoken Senkyo Kanri Inkai; Kōbe Shimbun April 3, 1979.

election (1959) Okada ran as an independent against an incumbent who was affiliated with the Kōseikai, and then in 1963 stood unopposed in the district as a Kōseikai candidate. With the dissolution of the Kōseikai, Okada ran as an independent in the 1967 election. Faced with a JCP endorsed opponent in 1971 he accepted the LDP nomination, but in 1975 he once more became an independent. It should be noted that despite his status as an independent Okada served as vice-chairman in 1976 of the Hyogo federation Finance committee.

The conservatives in Hyogo have maintained a comfortable majority in the prefectural assembly since the LDP's inception. In 1958 they commanded 59 of 83 seats, and in 1979 54 of 91 seats. During this period the conservative hold on the third district (11 of 12 seats in 1959 versus 10 of 13 in 1979), the fourth district (13 of 15 versus 12 of 16), and the fifth district (7 of 9 versus 7 of 9) has remained virtually unchanged. The largest drop in seats have occurred in Kobe (10 of 22 in 1959 versus 8 of 24 in 1979) and the Hanshin district (17 of 23 versus 15 of 28). But even in these areas the conservatives have shown great tenacity.

In Kobe the party was able to retain the 10 seats which it held in 1959 until the 1975 election, when it lost one seat each in the Fukiai and Tarumi wards of the city. Furthermore, it is difficult to interpret the loss of these seats as true setbacks for the party. In Fukiai the conservative candidate Majima Yoshinobu with a support base of 9,000 votes had been the top vote-getter in

the district until 1975. In that year Majima at age 65 had to deal not only with the opposition parties, but also a challenge from a conservative independent Nakamura Kosuke who had served as chairman of the Youth department in the federation Secretariat. The young (43) challenger took 3,000 votes from Majima, and caused him to lose his seat by a margin of 300 votes to a new candidate from the Komeito. In 1979, despite Majima's retirement after the defeat, Nakamura was again denied the nomination and his candidacy as an independent once more prevented the LDP endorsed candidate from winning a seat in this district. In the Tarumi ward one of the party's incumbents, Kanai Michio, retired before the 1975 election after three terms in the assembly. Suematsu Mitsuyoshi, the other LDP incumbent, prevented Kanai's administrative assistant Shimazu Isozo from receiving the nomination, and managed in the election to increase his own vote from 13,000 to 27,000. This was 1,000 more votes than the combined vote of Suematsu and Kanai in 1971. In the 1979 election Suematsu once more ran alone and again won 27,000 votes.

Conservative losses in the Hanshin district have been concentrated in Amagasaki city. The LDP held six assembly seats in this city in 1959 and five in 1963 and 1967, but only two after the 1971 and 1975 PA elections. Yet a comparison of the number of votes received by conservative candidates in 1967 (66,000 of 171,000 votes) and 1971 (72,000 of 196,000 votes), when the party endorsed six candidates, with the votes won by the only two candidates that

sought election in 1975 (50,000 of 193,000 votes) indicates that careful candidate selection could have enabled the party to elect one or perhaps two additional candidates in that election. In 1979 this was demonstrated to be true when the party won 50,000 of the 176,000 votes cast and easily elected three candidates.

Successful conservative prefectural assembly candidates have been drawn mainly from business. In 1959, 33 of the 59 conservative candidates elected were company presidents or executives. In 1979, 27 of 54 were. These candidates were drawn exclusively from small and medium-sized firms operating within Hyogo. Businesses that dealt with the prefectural government or were regulated by it such as construction companies, credit unions, engineering firms, sake brewers, and logging companies were most common. The candidates with a business background were also often community leaders. Many of them had served as officers in the local chambers of commerce, volunteer fire department, PTA, or community clubs. The conservative candidates that reported farming as an occupation in their campaign biographies were much fewer in number: 14 of 59 in 1959 and only four of 54 in 1979. This imbalance was in part rectified by the many candidates from the rural areas of the prefecture who operated companies that sold farm supplies or marketed agricultural products. Recently, the local government bureaucracies have become an important source of party prefectural candidates. While none of the candidates elected in 1959 were former government officials, nine were elected to office in 1979.

In this group, two had served in the prefectural police, two had worked in the Agriculture department of the prefectural government, and one had headed the Construction department of a city government. All of these positions were obviously useful for developing the linkages to important constituencies which are necessary to wage a successful prefectural assembly campaign.

Whatever their background a substantial number of conservative prefectural assemblymen had served previously as city and town assemblymen or mayors: 11 of 59 in 1959, 29 of 56 in 1967, and 22 of 54 in 1979. Experience in local electoral politics prior to the prefectural assembly race is an important first step for a candidate towards the building of a koenkai structure sufficient to win the party nomination and the election. Still, the number of candidates with experience in local politics has exceeded one-half of the successful conservative candidates only once, in 1967, and then by just one candidate. One reason is that city and town assemblymen stand for their positions at-large. The competitive patterns that develop in this kind of election make later cooperation in a prefectural race difficult to achieve. Local assemblymen, who do run for prefectural office, have often served as chairmen of the local assembly and used the influence provided by this position to forge a winning coalition. Mayors, of course, do not face the same limitations that the assemblymen do, in that they run in the equivalent of a single member PA district. Very few mayors, however, have been willing to give up their executive

powers for the limited influence of a first-term prefectural assemblyman. Those mayors who have stood in prefectural assembly elections have always been executives in smaller towns in the rural areas. Another reason for the comparatively small number of prefectural assemblymen with previous electoral experience is that in recent years the status and salary available to local assemblymen in the largest cities has approached that of the prefectural assembly.¹⁰⁵ In some cases, there may be little incentive for a local politician to give up the security of a senior position in a large city assembly for the uncertain world of prefectural politics.

Prefectural assemblymen have been an important source of strength for the LDP in Hyogo. Unlike the other prefectural parties, the LDP federation has been able to locate branches in nearly every city and town in the prefecture. The prefectural assemblymen have served as officers in these branches and helped to underwrite their expenses. The constituency work carried out by prefectural assemblymen has also been critical to the maintenance and development of the LDP's support base in Hyogo. The LDP as a party cannot rely upon the organizational framework provided by a union federation or a religious group. Nor can it command the services of a force of ideologically committed volunteers. The party's support base is a loose confederation of different and sometimes competing organizations. Prefectural assembly candidates

working through the party branches and their own kōenkai serve as the focal point around which this support is organized and regularized.

Geography and Hyogo LDP Candidates

The loose informal nature of the LDP support base and its dependence upon the organizational network supplied by prefectural assemblymen makes the place of origin a matter of critical importance in the selection of national assembly candidates. Family ties, school friends, business and professional acquaintances are the raw material out of which a campaign organization is fashioned. Since 1955, only three conservative candidates have not been born and raised in the district from which they stood for election. Two of the exceptions were candidates from Kobe: Sudo Shimpachi and Nakai Kazuo. Sudo was born in Oita prefecture, several hundred miles to the southwest of Hyogo. He had come to Kobe after graduation from the university, and started a company there which manufactured rubber products. He became active in the rubber manufacture trade association and used that as a base from which to launch his political career. Nakai was from nearby Osaka. He had worked as a young lawyer in Kobe and was first elected from this district to the Diet in 1928. During the Pacific war, he served as mayor of Kobe. Nakai was purged by the Occupation authorities, but resumed his political career in 1952 when a general amnesty was proclaimed. The third exception was a fourth district candidate,

Toida Saburo, who had been born in Tokyo. Toida's introduction to the district came when he began to work as the administrative assistant for the long-term fourth district incumbent Kiyose Ichiro. During his some 20 years on Kiyose's staff, Toida was able to develop strong enough ties among the city and town assemblymen in the fourth district that upon Kiyose's death he was able to hold off a challenge to his endorsement mounted by Muneyuki Genji, the former head of the Kōseikai.

Geography plays an important role even within the HR districts. All of the successful LDP candidates in the large second through fifth districts had a distinctive base of support (jiban) in one part of the district from which they drew a disproportionate share of their vote.¹⁰⁶

In the second district, the LDP since 1955 has always managed to elect one candidate from the northern part of Awajii island (Hara Kensaburo) and one from the southern half (Nagata Torao). Competition for a third conservative seat has always come from a candidate based in one of the two large population centers on the mainland: Nishinomiya (Maeda, Nakazawa) or Amagasaki (Yoshida, Ikeda, Koike) cities.

In the third district, the LDP in 1958 had two strong incumbents: Tokai Motosaburo based in Takasago city and Kobayashi Masaharu who drew support from the Ono city area. Kobayashi lost the 1960 election when his control over votes in Ono was challenged by another candidate from that city,

Okada Shuichi. When Okada retired after the 1963 election, Tokai managed to block the federation's endorsement of a second candidate in this district until yet another Ono candidate Kobayashi Masaoto, the son of Masaharu, emerged in 1972 to claim the nomination. In 1976, when Kobayashi left the LDP to run as a member of the New Liberal Club, he managed to take with him a large part of his Ono support.

The fourth district has always had a minimum of three LDP endorsed candidates and as many as five conservative running for four HR seats. The highly competitive nature of these elections has made it imperative that a candidate bring into the race with him a reliable geographic base of support. Each of the successful candidates in this district had one: Kiyose Ichiro could count on the votes of Shikima and Kanzaki counties, Komoto Toshio had those of Ibo county and Aioi city, and Horikawa Kyohei with a base in Himeiji would win or lose an election based on how many of his Himeiji votes he could protect from his conservative competitors. Kiyose and Horikawa were successful in passing these geographic bases to their successors, Toida Saburo and Matsumoto Juro.

The fifth district is divided into two geographically distinct and historically mutually suspicious regions: the Tajima area made up of Mikata, Kinosaki, Izushi, Yabu, and Asako counties and Toyooka city, and the Tanba area comprised of the large Hikami and Taki counties. The LDP until 1963 had three strong candidates who fought among themselves for the three seats in this district:

Kojima Tetszo had been born in Yabu county and could count on the Tajima vote, while Sasaki Morio and Arita Kiichi were both from Hikami county. Before the Socialist and later DSP candidate Sasaki Ryosaku had succeeded in putting together a solid anti-conservative coalition that spanned both regions, Arita and Sasaki Morio would divide among themselves the Tanba vote and contest for enough of the anti-Kojima vote in Tajima to elect both of them. After Sasaki Ryosaku's election to the Diet in 1955, this became increasingly difficult. Sasaki Morio's defeat in the 1963 election convinced him that his campaign organization was not strong enough to do battle again with Arita in Tanba: he had only received 21,000 votes from the area versus Arita's 33,000. With his retirement competition within the conservative camp was reduced greatly. Kojima and Arita invested the major part of their campaign effort in mobilizing their separate geographic bases (see Table 20). In 1976, upon the retirement of Kojima, the LDP nominated a Tajima based prefectural assemblyman Tani Yoshio to replace him. In 1979 two Tanba based candidates Nishiyama Keijiro and Fujiwara Saburo managed to obtain the federation endorsement and fought a bitter battle to succeed Arita. As Table 20 indicates, both ran well in the Tanba area but did very poorly in the Tajima region.

The LDP support base in Hyogo includes nearly every group outside of the unions, the Sokagakkai, and the Communist front groups. It is very large: in prefectural assembly elections the

Table 20
Performance of LDP HR Candidates in the Hyogo
Fifth District, 1967-1979

Tajima	Kojima	Tani	Arita	Nishiyama/Fujiwara
1967	36.6 ^a		13.6	
1969	52.8		12.2	
1972	43.0		10.9	
1976		43.6	12.2	
1979		36.6		7.0
Tanba				
1967	3.0		40.0	
1969	3.7		39.0	
1972	2.3		34.6	
1976		2.8	31.9	
1979		1.0		41.2

Source: Hyogoken Senkyo Kanri Inkai; Kobe Shimbun
October 9, 1979.

^aVote in thousands.

party can hope to win over one million votes. But it is also fragmented and difficult to mobilize in national elections. This is why geography plays such an important role in conservative election strategies. LDP national assembly candidates take pains to identify themselves with a particular area as yet another means of pulling together the diverse interest groups in a community. This is also why periods of succession between candidates have been difficult for the party: the process of deciding upon a new candidate involves a reconstitution of the pattern of conservative interests that sustained the former incumbent.

NOTES

¹See "Jiyūminshutō Kihon Kenshō" in Jiyūminshutō, Waga Tō no Kihon Hōshin (Tōkyō: Jiyū Minshutō Kōhō linkai, 1977), pp. 11-26.

²See Jiyūminshutō Seimu Chōsakai, Waga Tō no Kōyaku (Tōkyō: Jiyūminshutō Kōhō linkai Shuppan Kyoku, 1977), pp. 56-68 and pp. 79-90.

³Ibid., pp. 24-30.

⁴Ibid., pp. 6-9.

⁵Data on contributions of these organizations to political candidates and parties derived from reports filed by these groups with the Hyogo Election Commission (Hyōgoken Senkyō Kanri linkai) as required by law. Any organization that raises money for use in a political campaign must register with the Commission as a political organization (seiji dantai) and file a yearly report on the sources of its income and the nature of its expenditures. A summary of these reports is published by the Commission in the Hyōgoken Kōhō (Official Register of Hyogo Prefecture) under the title "Seiji Dantai Shushi Hōkokusho no Yōshi." The most recent summary was published in the Hyōgoken Kōhō Go-gai Bessatsu May 20, 1978. The dues-paying membership of these organizations, unless otherwise noted, are also drawn from these reports. Yen-dollar equivalents are based on the exchange rate of 200 yen to one United States dollar that prevailed at the time of the study.

⁶The Agricultural Cooperatives Law was enacted in December of 1947; for a brief discussion of its provisions see Nihon Nōgyō Nenkan Hakkō Kai, "Nōgyō Dantai-Nōmin Soshiki no Dōkō" in Nōgyō Nenkan 1980, pp. 75-78.

⁷See Nōgyō Kaihatsu Senta, Chiiki Nōgyō Shinkō ni Hatasu Nōkyō no Yakuwari (Tōkyō: Nōgyō Kyōdō Kumiai Chuōkai Nōchisanbu, 1979).

⁸Nōrin Gyogyō Shingikai, Nōgyō Kyodo Kumiai-Shinrin Kumiai-Gyogyō Kyōdō Kumiai no Genjō, 1979.

⁹The Farm Council was established by law in 1951 (some revisions in its status were made in 1957) as an organization separate from the Cooperative Association with the purpose of representing agricultural interests before governmental agencies. Membership in the Council is on an individual, not Cooperative basis. In Hyogo its

role in the shaping of agricultural policy has been largely taken over by the Cooperative Association. See "Nōgyō Dantai - Nōmin Sohiki no Dōkō," op. cit., p. 76.

¹⁰Hyōgoken Shōkō-bu, Kyōdō Kumiai Shōkō Dantai Meibo 1978.

¹¹Hyōgoken Chūshō Kigyō Dantai Chūokai, Chūshō Kigyō Shisaku no Aramashi 1978.

¹²Data from materials made available by Women's section of the Social Welfare department of the Hyogo prefectural government.

¹³Interview with member of Hyogo Prefectural Fire department on April 20, 1979.

¹⁴Hyōgoken Sei-shōnen Kyoku, Sei-shōnen Dantai no Genjō 1975.

¹⁵See Kōbe Shimbun analyses of the 1979 Local Elections on March 26-28, 1979.

¹⁶Interview with knowledgeable observer of Hyogo LDP on October 5, 1978.

¹⁷For more details on the National Health Insurance Program and the tax advantages available to medical practitioners in Japan, see William Steslicke, Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), especially pp. 34-51 and pp. 69-121.

¹⁸Interview with member of Seichō no ie staff on June 13, 1979.

¹⁹A review of the receipts submitted by LDP candidates to the Hyogo Election Commission to document the expenditures of their financial support groups, which are also required to register as political organizations, uncovered that Kanai Motohiko the LDP Hyogo district HC candidate in 1977 had contributed money to 11 shrines and temples in the prefecture including the large Ikuta Jinja, Kōbe Gōkoku Jinja, and the Nishinomiya Jinja. These receipts are kept on file by the Hyogo Election Commission for three years from their date of submission, and are available for public inspection upon request.

²⁰See "Zenkoku Kakutō Zaisei Hōkokusho" in Kanpō July 20, 1978.

²¹Interview with knowledgeable observer of Hyogo LDP on October 5, 1978. Another example: Tokai Motosaburo, an LDP third district HR candidate, is said to have close connections with the Bridgestone Tire Company and Kobe Steel, both large corporations with plants located in his district.

²² Interview with member of Veteran's Pension Association staff on May 23, 1979.

²³ Data on LDP membership and branch structure furnished by staff of Hyogo LDP federation. In the aftermath of the Lockheed scandal in 1976, the LDP as part of an effort to "modernize" the party set the goal of enrolling three percent of all registered voters in the party (two million members) by March of 1978. In order to spur interest among conservative supporters in party membership, the rules governing the election of the party president were amended to permit their participation in the election process. For details see "Sōsai Kōsen Kitei" in Jiyū Minshutō, Tōsoku 1977.

²⁴ Interview with staff of Hyogo LDP on December 27, 1978.

²⁵ Interview with Socialist party official on September 14, 1978.

²⁶ For a detailed study of one conservative politician's kōenkai, see Gerald Curtis, op. cit., especially pp. 126-151.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 138-139, see also Haruhiro Fukui, op. cit., p. 159.

²⁸ This was demonstrated most recently in the Hyogo fifth district at the time of the 1979 HR election. Because of the lack of consensus in the district over the successor to long-term LDP assemblyman Arita Kiichi, the party ended up endorsing three candidates in a district in which it had never won more than two seats in any election since 1952. As a result, the party was able to elect only one candidate even though the votes won by the three contenders were more than sufficient to elect two. See Table 19.

²⁹ For a more complete description see Kōbe Shimbun, "Hyōgo Kengikai Hyakunen" nos. 51 and 52, March 11-12, 1978.

³⁰ Interview with non-partisan candidate for Ashiya city council on May 30, 1979.

³¹ Interview with close observer of LDP on May 18, 1978.

³² Candidates for public office are required to report contributions to their campaigns to the Election Commission which publishes them as "Senkyo Undō Hiyō no Shūshi ni Kansuru Shirabe" in Hyōgoken Kōhō. For the 1976 report see August 1977.

³³For foreign policy see D. C. Heilmann, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); for domestic policy see Haruhiro Fukui, op. cit., pp. 173-197.

³⁴See Nathaniel Thayer, op. cit., pp. 149-179.

³⁵See Gerald Curtis, op. cit., pp. 1-32.

³⁶Membership of the LDP factions as determined by the Asahi Shimbun after 1976 HR election: Fukuda (51), Tanaka (42), Ohira (37), Nakasone (37), Miki (32), Shina (11), Mizuta (11), Ishii (4), Non-Aligned Diet members (24). In one of the periodic moves to reform the party, the factions were officially dissolved in the early part of 1977 but they began to reemerge again in mid-1978 behind each of the candidates for the party presidency. After the 1979 election the Asahi Shimbun published the following breakdown of the LDP factional membership: Fukuda (48), Tanaka (48), Ohira (47), Nakasone (40), Miki (30), and Non-Aligned Diet members (40). For the early development of these factional groupings see Fukui, op. cit., pp. 107-143 and Thayer, op. cit., pp. 15-57.

³⁷Fukui and Thayer, who have written most extensively about the LDP factions in English, have been more concerned about their effect upon decisionmaking in the Diet than with their linkages to local politics.

³⁸Curtis drew the same conclusion from his study of Sato Bunsei's quest for the party nomination, see op. cit., pp. 23-24.

³⁹In addition to their official campaign organizations, the reports filed with the Hyogo Election Commission by the several financial support groups maintained by the candidates were also examined. Since the revision of the Political Funds Control Law in 1975 political contributions over 1.5 million yen (\$7,500) to any one candidate's financial support group are forbidden. To get around this provision, candidates have established and registered with the Commission sometimes as many as five nominally independent financial support groups, each of which can accept a 1.5 million yen contribution from the same donor.

⁴⁰Sunada Shigetami, a first district HR candidate and member of the Nakasone faction, received contributions from both the Nakasone faction's Sanno Economic Research Association and the Fukuda faction's Chiyoda Political-Economic Research Association. Although only one instance of this could be found in Hyogo, it seems that it is rather common for one faction to ingratiate itself with members of another faction through contributions to their campaign. In Sunada's case, these contributions were

particularly welcome because he faced an uphill battle in his attempt in 1976 to win back the HR seat that he had lost in the 1972 General Election.

⁴¹The Asahi Shimbun poll was undertaken in September of 1978 in order to predict the voting preferences of the assemblymen and their kōenkai in the presidential election. See Asahi Shimbun, September 23, 1978, p. 2.

⁴²Interview with LDP prefectural assemblyman on May 14, 1979.

⁴³The discussion below is based on the Kobe Shimbun "Hyogo Kengikai Hyakunen" nos. 40-55, February 26-March 17, 1978, and interviews with party leaders active at the time on December 9, 1978 and January 21, 1979.

⁴⁴The party's authority over assemblymen is weak because most conservative assemblymen outside of the prefectural and Kobe city assemblies stand in elections as independents, even though they may be party members.

⁴⁵Data on party branches taken from reports made by the federation secretary-general to the 15th (1968), 18th (1971), 19th (1972), 20th (1973), 21st (1974), 23rd (1976), and 24th (1977) Party Conventions, as well as other internal party documents, made available by the staff of the federation.

⁴⁶These organizations included the Hyogo Rice Dealers Association, the Postage and Revenue Stamp Vendors Association, the Veteran's Pension Association, and the Families of the War Dead Association.

⁴⁷Interview with non-partisan candidate for Ashiya city council on May 30, 1979.

⁴⁸Even the smallest town assembly has 12 seats. Ashiya a city of 70,000 has a 30 seat assembly and Kobe city has a 71 seat assembly.

⁴⁹When LDP officials talk of "modernizing" the party, this seems to be the result that they anticipate.

⁵⁰Interview with former LDP official on December 9, 1978.

⁵¹Interview with staff of Hyogo LDP on May 7, 1979.

⁵²Interview with staff of Hyogo LDP on May 7, 1979.

⁵³The situation in Nishinomiya city poses even graver problems: there are three party branches and one sub-branch! The chairmen of the three competing branches are all LDP prefectural assemblymen.

⁵⁴Data on party convention drawn from reports of the secretary-general to the conventions cited in note 45 as well as materials made available to delegates to the 25th (1978) convention, interviews with the federation staff on December 27, 1978 and May 7, 1979, and the charter of the Hyogo federation.

⁵⁵The only powers explicitly given the convention in the charter are the election of party officials (Article 12).

⁵⁶Article 14 of the charter provides a justification for this by specifying that the General Affairs committee can act for the convention when the speedy meeting of the convention might prove difficult. Once a decision is taken the committee only has the obligation to report (hōkoku suru) this to next scheduled convention.

⁵⁷This was discussed in the secretary-general's report to the 24th Party Convention.

⁵⁸Interview with the Hyogo federation staff on December 27, 1978.

⁵⁹Article 20 of prefectural federation charter. The word used to describe its powers is not the kettei suru found in the charters of the other parties but kyōgi suru, a verb which suggests a more limited advisory function.

⁶⁰In 1977 the Hyogo headquarters committee had 25 members: two were prefectural assemblymen from Kobe, three came from the Hanshin district, three from East Harima, four from West Harima, and two from the Tamba region. There were also 11 members from the Kobe city assembly on the committee as well as the chairmen of the Organization, Propaganda, Local Government Affairs, and Election committees in the party Secretariat. The only non-assembly member of the committee was the female head of the Secretariat's Women's department.

⁶¹Interview with the Hyogo federation staff on December 27, 1978.

⁶²Data on party Secretariat unless otherwise indicated derived from reports of secretary-general to the party conventions cited in note 45, interviews with the federation staff on December 27, 1978 and May 7, 1979, and with an LDP prefectural assemblyman on May 14, 1979.

⁶³The committee was chaired from 1968 to 1977 by Komoto Toshio, a fourth district HR assemblyman, who is the owner of the large Sanko Steamship Corporation. He was succeeded by Kanai Motohiko, the former two-term governor of the prefecture, who is presently serving his second term in the Upper House as a Hyogo district representative. Both men are well known for their close ties with large conservative contributors.

⁶⁴Turnout figure found in Asahi Shimbun, November 28, 1978. Thirty-five thousand out of 42,000 Hyogo party members voted in the election. The national turnout was 87 percent: 1.3 million out of 1.5 million eligible members participated.

⁶⁵Interview with LDP prefectural assemblyman on May 14, 1979.

⁶⁶Miyazaki had been supported by the LDP in his first campaign in 1969, but after the 1971 city assembly elections which produced an opposition majority he veered sharply to the left. In 1977 with another change in the political climate he adopted a more conciliatory stance to the still potent conservative minority (26 of 68 seats) in the assembly and ran unopposed for a third term.

⁶⁷Report on its financial status filed by the Hyogo federation with the Hyogo Election Commission and published under the title "Seiji Dantai no Shūshi Hōkokusho no Yōshi" in Hyōgoken Kōhō on March 12, 1974.

⁶⁸One tactic adopted by both the conservative and opposition camps was to have their supporters wear a small blue (conservative) or green (opposition) button on their lapel as a public declaration of their preference.

⁶⁹Estimate made by the Kōbe Shimbun in its analyses of the election.

⁷⁰The law placed strict limits on the number and kinds of campaign literature that could be distributed. For further information see Chapter VII.

⁷¹Propaganda activities here is used in a broad sense. It refers to expenditures by the party not related to the maintenance and development of its formal organization or front group structure.

⁷²See "Seiji Dantai no Shūshi Hōkokusho no Yōshi" in Hyōgoken Kōhō, May 20, 1978. This figure has been adjusted for the 42 million yen (\$210,000) spent by the party on the fund-raising dinner in 1977. The original figure was 123.1 million yen (\$615,000). The expense of the dinner was so great because the

party sold tickets at a discount to local assemblymen, thus, creating a large difference between nominal and actual revenues for the party.

⁷³"Tō no Seikaku" in Jiyū Minshutō, Waga Tō no Kihon Hōshin, op. cit., p. 4.

⁷⁴Article 93 of the national Party Charter. In Jiyū Minshutō, Tōsoku 1977, p. 25.

⁷⁵"Jiyū Minshutō Shōbatsu Kitei," ibid., pp. 43-48.

⁷⁶Under the old rule, only party national assemblymen and one delegate from each of the prefectural federations were permitted to participate in the selection of the party president. See Thayer, op. cit., pp. 159-161.

⁷⁷Information on party membership made available by staff of Hyogo LDP.

⁷⁸The endorsement was important because it made a challenge by another conservative candidate more difficult.

⁷⁹Interview with Hyogo prefectural assemblyman on May 14, 1979.

⁸⁰Party dues were raised to 2,000 yen (\$10.00) only in 1978.

⁸¹Four factional leaders contested for the presidency. Ohira Masayoshi won both the preliminary election and the later balloting at the party convention. The results of the preliminary election in Hyogo: Komoto Toshio (12,158 votes), Fukuda Takeo (9,393), Ohira Masayoshi (8,112), and Nakasone Yasuhiro (6,148). See Asahi Shimbun, November 28, 1978, p. 1.

⁸²Hyogo had 43 points, Komoto won 24 and Fukuda 19. Nationally Ohira won 748, Fukuda 638, Nakasone 93, and Komoto 46. See Asahi Shimbun, November 28, 1978, p. 1.

⁸³Interview with Hyogo federation staff on May 7, 1979. The dues for each year are supposed to be paid in full in January.

⁸⁴See for example "Fuyase, Fuyase no Daigōrei" in Asahi Shimbun, February 13, 1978, p. 2.

⁸⁵Interview with Hyogo prefectural assemblyman on May 14, 1979. This corresponds to the estimate of the membership of the Hyogo Local Assembly Liaison Council provided by the staff of the Hyogo federation on December 27, 1978.

⁸⁶ Identity of party officers provided by Hyogo LDP staff. Information on officers' backgrounds drawn from campaign biographies published in the Kōbe Shimbun and interviews with former party officers on December 9, 1978 and January 21, 1979. Number of terms in office for assemblymen calculated from the adoption of the postwar Constitution in 1947. Many of the party officers in the 1950's had served in the prewar assemblies and were purged by the Occupation authorities in the first years of the Occupation. They were not permitted to stand for political office until a general amnesty was declared in 1952.

⁸⁷ Discussion in this section based on reports filed with the Hyogo Election Commission by the party between 1957 and 1977 and published in the Hyōgoken Kōhō under the title "Seiji Dantai no Shūshi Hōkokusho."¹¹ Before 1976 the reports were published biannually, afterwards once a year. Reports are missing for 1962, 1964, 1965, and the second half of 1966.

⁸⁸ Some 5.2 million yen (\$26,000) of this was remitted back to the party branches.

⁸⁹ The federation is allowed to retain 1,300 yen (\$6.50) for each member. The other 700 yen (\$3.50) goes to the national headquarters.

⁹⁰ Interview with former LDP party official on December 9, 1978.

⁹¹ Interview with staff of Hyogo LDP on May 7, 1979.

⁹² The Citizens' Political Council was established in July 1961 to raise money for the national party from individuals and corporations; for more details see Fukui, op. cit., pp. 148-151.

⁹³ See Jichishō Senkyo-bu, Kaisei Seiji Shikin Kisei Hō Kaisetsu (Tōkyō: Chihō Zaimu Kyōkai, 1976), p. 125. For example companies whose total capitalization amounted to less than five million dollars could contribute no more than \$3,500. The maximum contribution permitted was \$500,000. Contributions from unions were similarly restricted: see p. 128.

⁹⁴ Interview with staff of Hyogo LDP on December 27, 1978.

⁹⁵ Those acknowledged included Obayashi Construction, Sumitomo Construction, Hanshin Sogo Bank, Kawasaki Steel, and Kansai Power.

⁹⁶ Data from receipts used to document 1976 financial status report of the Hyogo federation on file at the Hyogo Election Commission.

⁹⁷ Interview with former party official on December 9, 1978.

⁹⁸ Information on candidates' backgrounds drawn from official campaign biographies filed by the candidates with the Hyogo Election Commission and published in the Kōbe Shimbun. A number of points were checked in interviews with party assemblymen, members of the Hyogo federation staff, former party officials, and several knowledgeable observers of the Hyogo federation. The Kōbe Shimbun's coverage of national and local elections in Hyogo between 1952 and 1979 was also extensively consulted.

⁹⁹ The Socialist party in Hyogo was split into rival left and right wings between 1952 and 1956. For more information see Chapter III.

¹⁰⁰ Before the 1955 election the combined conservative parties had an HR assembly delegation of 14, six from the Liberal party and eight from the Democratic party. The Liberals lost five seats in this election, while the Democrats managed to win an additional one.

¹⁰¹ See discussion in Chapter III and IV.

¹⁰² Kawanishi was a third district businessman who was not well known in the Kobe and Hanshin areas. Aota's strength in the farm cooperatives prevented him from balancing this weakness in the urban areas with rural votes.

¹⁰³ The JSP candidate Kotani Mamaoru who came in third won only 335,000 votes. Kanai won 519,000 votes to Nakanishi's 288,000.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with former LDP official on December 9, 1978.

¹⁰⁵ Only one of the eight LDP prefectural assemblymen in Kobe in 1979 had previously served in the Kobe city assembly.

¹⁰⁶ This does not seem to be unique to Hyogo. All of the conservative candidates in Curtis' study of the 1967 HR election in Oita prefecture had a strong jiban.

CHAPTER III

THE HYOGO SOCIALIST PARTY

The Japan Socialist Party was organized on September 2, 1945 by the leadership of the prewar proletariat parties, principally the Social Mass Party.¹ It is pledged to the achievement of a socialist revolution and the realization of the complete international independence of Japan through democratic means.² The party has as its economic objectives³ the government management of the most important sectors of the economy and cooperative management of small and medium sized enterprises, agriculture, and fishing. In the area of social reform, the party promises to end class distinctions through the equalization of wages and the extension of welfare programs.⁴ It advocates in the area of foreign affairs⁵ the withdrawal of United States armed forces from bases in Japan, the abandonment of the Security Treaty with the United States, the reorganization of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and the guaranteeing of Japanese independence through a policy of unarmed neutralism and friendly relations with all countries. The JSP rejects completely the armed overthrow of the present constitutional order.⁶ Its acceptance of parliamentary democracy, however, is qualified.⁷ The party's strategy of action is to pursue its political objectives both in and outside the legislature: it seeks to couple the activities of its representatives in the legislature with the direct struggles of

workers and peoples' organizations against monopoly capitalism and United States imperialism in the workplace and the neighborhoods.

The Hyogo headquarters of the party was founded in Kobe on November 15, 1945 by three former Social Mass Party national assemblymen, Kawakami Jotaro, Nagae Kazuo, and Kawai Giichi.⁸ In the first election under the new constitution in April of 1947, the party managed to capture five of the 18 HR seats in the prefecture and in 1956 succeeded in electing a high of eight HR assemblymen. At present, the party controls one of six Hyogo district HC seats, five of the 20 HR seats, and 12 of the 91 seats in the Hyogo prefectural assembly.

The Party Interest Group Base

Union Support for the Hyogo JSP

The Hyogo JSP headquarters can depend upon a minimum of 350,000 votes in a prefecture-wide election. A substantial part of this support comes from unions affiliated with the Sōhyō labor federation, which has regularly endorsed the party's candidates to its membership in all levels of elections in Hyogo. The Hyogo chapter of the Sōhyō unions was founded on April 24, 1953. Accurate figures on Sōhyō membership are not available until 1960, when it stood at 189,000 (47 percent of the organized workforce),⁹ but interviews with union officials active at the time have indicated that membership in the federation was around 125,000 at its inception.¹⁰ After 1960, the Sōhyō federation did not grow in

step with the economy. Membership was 229,000 in 1965 and accounted for 43 percent of the organized workforce. It was 230,000 (39 percent) in 1970 and only 235,000 (39 percent) in 1975.¹¹

The distribution of the Sōhyō membership among the five Hyogo HR districts is difficult to determine precisely because some unions have taken Kobe as their prefectural headquarters and registered with the federation there rather than in the district where their members are actually employed. Another more important problem is that many workers do not live in the election districts in which they work. An estimate,¹² however, can be offered. Membership in the Hanshin district is probably the largest with 80,000 resident union members. It is followed closely by Kobe with 60,000. The rear is brought up by the more rural third (40,000) and fourth districts (40,000), and the isolated, undeveloped fifth district (15,000). This distribution of the party's principal source of union support has made it possible for the JSP to always elect at least one candidate in every HR district in Hyogo, but the fifth.

The principal unions affiliated with Sōhyō in Hyogo prefecture are the Steelworkers (56,000), Local Government Employees (57,400), Teachers (24,800), High School Teachers (7,500), Metalworkers (10,100), Postal workers (6,400), Communication Workers (8,200), National Railway Workers (5,900), Private Railway Employees (7,700), Chemical Workers (4,600), Kobe-Himeiji Bus Company Employees (2,100), and the Kōbe Shimbun Employees (1,200) unions.¹³

Over 110,000 of the Sōhyō membership in Hyogo are public employees, and 89,000 in this group are members of either the Local Government Employees or Teachers unions. This has meant that a large number of potential party activists have been distributed more or less evenly throughout the cities and towns in each HR electoral district, rather than being geographically concentrated around the location of a particular factory site as many of the private unions supportive of the DSP are. In the rural areas of Hyogo these two unions have usually served as a nucleus for Socialist political activities. The private company unions affiliated with Sōhyō are located principally in the urban areas of the prefecture. Among these, the Metalworkers and Private Railway Employees unions have been most active on behalf of the party.

Outside of the Sōhyō federation, the Hyogo JSP can expect the endorsements of most of the constituent unions in the 67,000 member Chūritsu labor federation and the district councils that make up the nearly 200,000 member Hyogo Federation of Labor Councils (chikurō). The principal members of the Chūritsu federation in Hyogo are the Electrical Manufacture Workers (30,800), the Construction Workers (13,900), the Food Processing Employees (5,200), and the Insurance Companies Employees (7,300) unions.¹⁴ Since these unions will usually also endorse the candidates of the Democratic Socialist party to their members, the level of support in any election that the JSP can expect to receive from them will depend on how strong its faction and how

well-known its candidate is within each union. The Hyogo party has in recent years forged the closest ties with the 11,000 member Mitsubishi Electrical Workers union.¹⁵

The Hyogo Federation of Labor Councils was made up of 33 district councils in 1977,¹⁶ nearly one from each city and county in the prefecture. Although the district councils were first established to promote cooperation and facilitate communication among all unions in a particular geographic area, they now are dominated by Sōhyō affiliated unions and have no member unions of the Domei federation.¹⁷ Since perhaps as much as one-quarter of their membership in Hyogo is made up of small unions (less than 100 members) not affiliated with any of the three national federations, the endorsement of these councils provides the JSP with an opportunity to mobilize some of the 150,000 members of independent unions in the prefecture.

The formal endorsement of any union does not guarantee the support of the rank and file for the JSP, but it is useful to the party in a number of ways.¹⁸ Before the campaign, the party's candidates will be featured in union publications and invited to address union conventions and attend union sponsored social functions. During the campaign, the unions will permit the placement of Socialist candidate posters on union announcement boards and make arrangements for the candidate to speak before their members. Very often union executive committee members will join the candidate as he greets workers outside the plant or office in the morning.

They will also encourage workers to take a day off to visit friends and relatives in order to solicit their support for the candidate or to help out in the campaign by distributing literature or making telephone calls. These advantages are not available to candidates that have not been formally endorsed and have served to limit the capacity of JCP and Komeito activists to mobilize support for their candidates within the unions.

Union endorsements sometimes, but not always, include financial support for the party and its candidates.¹⁹ Unions generate contributions through requests to their membership endorsed by the executive committee to pledge 1,000 yen (\$5.00) or more to the campaign of a particular candidate. Unless the candidate is well known to the workers, these requests often fall on deaf ears. To ensure full member participation in the campaign, the union leadership may pass a resolution making these contributions mandatory: failure to give in this situation can result in a loss of union voting privileges for a member.

The JCP in recent years has naturally protested against this policy and their opposition has made it difficult for the union leadership to make these contributions obligatory. This issue was raised most forcefully within the Teachers union in the 1974 Hyogo district HC election when the former head of the Hyogo chapter of Sōhyō was the JSP nominee.²⁰ The union leadership had set a target of a 70 percent subscription to the Socialist campaign for every branch of the union, and threatened that a branch would lose its

voting rights at the union convention if the target was not met. Two of the union's branch chiefs were JCP members, and they protested the leadership's decision as an infringement of their right to participate in union affairs. Their action forced the executive committee to retract the threatened punishment.

The unreliability of the union membership as a source of campaign funds has led the Hyogo JSP to seek contributions from the management of private corporations whose union executive committees are controlled by party members.²¹ Management in return for these contributions expects the party to smooth relations with the unions, and the candidates to look after their interests in Tokyo. The numerous private railway companies in the prefecture have proven to be an important source of funds for the Hyogo party.

The Socialist hold on the Sōhyō unions and those within the District Labor Councils and Chūritsu federations is sustained by the majorities that it holds on the executive committees of the unions which make them up. To maintain this control the party must contend with determined efforts by JCP, Komeito, and DSP activists to elect candidates of their own persuasion to these posts. The Socialists have managed to block the Communists from these positions by cooperating in some cases with management to undermine their candidacies.²² The Komeito has made some progress at achieving lower offices within the unions, but Gakkai membership among organized workers has not been sufficient to bring them any greater voice in the management of the unions.²³

The DSP has presented far bigger problems for the JSP. The more cooperative stance that DSP activists have taken towards management has made them an attractive alternative to the more strident Socialists in private industry. There has also been increasing discontent among the leadership in private industry unions affiliated with Sōhyō, because of their belief that the public union dominated federation leadership has not been sufficiently sensitive to the different problems facing the worker in non-government enterprises. The result of this in Hyogo has been increasing electoral cooperation between the 56,000 member strong Steelworkers union and the DSP.²⁴ At present, the Steelworkers despite their affiliation with Sōhyō endorse both JSP and DSP candidates to their members. If the Steelworkers leave Sōhyō and affiliate with Dōmei, a federation that exclusively endorses the DSP, the effect upon the JSP in Hyogo could be devastating: without these votes its HR candidates in the hotly contested first, third, and fourth districts, where this union is strongest, would face an uphill battle in their quest for election.

Support from Outside the Unions

Apart from the Sōhyō federation and some elements in the District Labor Councils and Chūritsu federations, the JSP cannot expect the regular support of any other important interest groups in the prefecture. A review of the campaign contributions reported by Socialist candidates in the 1955 through 1976 HR

elections and the 1959 through 1977 HC elections to the Hyogo Election Commission²⁵ found that these had come largely from such big Sōhyō affiliated unions as the Teachers, Local Government Employees, and Private Railway Employees. Exceptions to this pattern came only in the case of long-term incumbents who had been able to use their office to the advantage of powerful conservative groups in their constituency. Unfortunately for the party, these special relationships did not extend to their successors in office.

The case of Sano Yoshio, the JSP HC candidate in elections between 1958 and 1968, is a good example of this. In the two election campaigns (1958 and 1962) that he waged as a non-incumbent, Sano reported contributions only from the party and the Teachers union. In the 1968 election, in which he stood as an incumbent, he listed contributions from a number of normally conservative construction firms and corporations. Sano died in office in 1973. Neither of the new Socialist candidates for the Hyogo HC seats in the 1971 and 1974 elections acknowledged any contributions from these sources. Their financial support was limited, as Sano's had been before his election, to the party and a few large unions.

The contributions listed by party candidates in their reports to the Election Commission are, of course, only a part of the resources from outside the unions available to the JSP in elections. Some Socialist candidates have developed close ties with certain banks and credit unions in Hyogo that have not been completely reflected in their statements to the Commission.²⁶

Others like second district HR incumbent Hori Masao have received the endorsement in elections of conservative organizations such as the Medical Association.²⁷ But even if this less formal kind of support is taken into account, the support for the Socialist party from outside the unions in Hyogo has still been irregular and always candidate-specific. The JSP is perceived to be the representative in the political arena of an important segment of the labor movement in Hyogo. Non-union organizations will support its candidates only insofar as they judge them to be "winners" capable of immediately rewarding any support extended them.

Party Branch Structure

The JSP in Hyogo prefecture has a three-tiered organizational structure: prefectural headquarters (ken-honbu), branch association (sō-shibu), and branch (shibu).

The prefectural headquarters was established to implement national party directives and coordinate the activities of party organs in Hyogo.²⁸ It is also responsible for the formulation of party policy within the prefecture, the supervision of local party assemblymen, the recommendation to the national party of candidates for national, prefectural, or Kobe city assembly seats, and the approval of nominations for the city and town assemblies in Hyogo.²⁹ The headquarters has an office in downtown Kobe across the street from the prefectural Legislature and employs a staff of nine.

When the two wings of the JSP came together in Hyogo in 1956, the party only had two levels of organization: the headquarters (then called a federation--shibu rengokai) and the party branches.³⁰ The branches at this time were charged with coordinating party activities within a particular ward, city or town, and their membership was drawn from all party members in the area. This made for some very large branches: the Amagasaki city branch, for example, had 155 members in 1959.³¹ Below the branch level, party members were permitted to organize themselves into squads (han) in their place of work. These squads, however, had no formal status and individual members were affiliated with the party through the branch, not the squad.

This organizational structure proved efficient in coordinating through the squads the activities of the unions during elections, but it did not work so well in helping the party reach out beyond its labor base to gain new support in the neighborhoods. The branches were far too large for that. To deal with this problem the national party at its 22nd Convention in 1962 restructured its local organization by creating a new party unit, the branch association.³² This new unit took over the branches' task of coordinating party activities in a particular geographic area. With this reform, the branches became the base unit of the party organization and could be located in either the workplace or the neighborhoods. But in order to avoid the problems of size, membership in the branches was limited to 20 members.

The reorganization did not proceed at all smoothly. Party leaders in Hyogo credit the large drop in membership between 1967 (1,635), when they finally began to enforce the change, and 1970 (934) to an attempt to break up the union based squads into a number of party branches based on the worker's place of residence.³³ Because of the resistance that it encountered, the party had only been able to establish a "branch association-branch" structure in 17 of Hyogo's 50 administrative districts by 1970. Today the situation has improved somewhat.³⁴ The party now has 38 branch associations in Hyogo, 14 of them have their own offices and about 10 employed a full-time organizer in 1979 whose salary was paid out of dues and revenues from the party paper. The party also has 100 branches, almost all of which are located in Sōhyō affiliated unions such as Kobe City Employees, Postal Workers, National Railway Employees, and the Communication Workers.³⁵ Ironically, because the membership of any one branch seldom exceeds 10 members, the organizational limits for most purposes of the JSP in Hyogo are the branch associations.

The formal, hierarchically organized structure of the Hyogo JSP leading from the prefectural headquarters to the branch is supplemented by two informal, horizontally organized units. The district council (chiku kyōgikai) is made up of representatives from all the branch associations in a HR district, and its purpose is to coordinate party activities in this electoral contest. There are presently five district councils in Hyogo, corresponding

to the five HR districts. The party members council (tōin kyōgikai) is made up of all party members within a particular industry or professional group. The organization of these councils was particularly encouraged after 1962 as a means of blunting union member dissatisfaction with the restructuring of party branches. There are at present 10 party member councils in Hyogo. They have been organized only within the Sōhyō affiliated union bloc.³⁶ The Chūritsu union leadership, which endorses both Socialist and DSP candidates, has refused to permit their organization within this federation on the grounds that they represent a threat to the independence of the unions from the parties. The JSP has been unsuccessful in establishing party member councils among professional groups such as physicians, lawyers, or intellectuals.

Party Decisionmaking Organs

The prefectural convention is the highest decisionmaking organ of the Hyogo JSP. Between 1945 and 1978, the Hyogo party held 49 prefectural party conventions. The party had held nine conventions up to the time of the split between the right and left wings of the party in January of 1952.³⁷ During the period of the split, the two wings held separate conventions. When the rival factions came back together on February 5, 1956, they numbered the convention of reunification the party's twelfth. Since then the conventions have been held on the average of slightly less than twice a year. Delegates to the prefectural convention are allotted on the basis

of one to each branch association with additional delegates permitted for every 10 members. Prefectural assemblymen are automatically extended delegate status, as are members of the headquarters Executive committee. In 1977, 180 delegates participated in the Hyogo party convention.³⁸

There are two kinds of party conventions: regular and Extraordinary.³⁹ Regular party conventions are to be convened according to the party charter once a year, immediately after the national party convention. Their purpose is to review party activities and expenditures in the previous year, deliberate on how decisions reached at the national party convention can be implemented within the prefecture, and choose all party officers and Executive and Central committee members. Depending on the timing of elections and other contingencies, the period separating regular party conventions can be as short as eight months or as long as 18. Extraordinary party conventions are held as necessary at the call of the party's Executive committee. They also can be, but never have been, convened by a vote of one-half of the branch associations. Their purpose is to deliberate on matters concerning which the Executive committee feels it is necessary to gain the approval and understanding of the entire membership. The Extraordinary conventions have often been simply used as opportunities to introduce the party's candidates to the membership. At other times, more serious matters have been taken up. In October of 1965, an Extraordinary convention was called to elect new party officers,

after the resignation of the Executive committee following the defeat of the party's candidate in the Kobe mayoral race. In June of 1969, another was called to review a plan for strengthening the party's organization drawn up by the Executive committee. Between 1956 and 1965, the Hyogo JSP convened only one Extraordinary convention (15th Party Convention--March 15, 1959). Beginning with the 23rd Party Convention (September 23, 1965), which met to discuss the upcoming Kobe city mayoral election, the party by 1978 had convened 13 Extraordinary conventions.

Delegates to regular party conventions are presented with a thick (in 1977 it numbered 31 pages) offset printed pamphlet that contains a report on party activities in the past year and proposals for the coming year drawn up by the Executive committee. The 1977 pamphlet contained reports on the 1976 General Election, JSP efforts in Hyogo prefecture to bring about the withdrawal of United States military forces from Japan and to oppose the raising of the price of electricity, party activities in the local assemblies, the progress made on the party's four year rebuilding program, and the state of party finances. Next, after a brief explanation of the party's interpretation of the current international and domestic political situation, the proposals made by the Executive committee for party activities in the succeeding year were set out. This section was followed by the reports and proposals of the different departments in the party Secretariat.

Delegates to the Extraordinary conventions also receive a pamphlet (this may or may not be offset) that explains the business of the convention. In 1973, the delegates were presented with a 16 page pamphlet that discussed preparations for the upcoming House of Councillors election, including the proposal that party members pledge 5,000 yen (\$25.00) each to the campaign. The pamphlet also contained an interim report on party preparations for the 1975 local elections. The centerpiece of this report was an eight page chart that listed district by district for prefectural, city, and town assembly races the current partisan distribution of seats, the number of voters, votes gained by the party in the area in past local and national elections, the candidates proposed by the party, and the union support that the candidates brought with them.

During the period when the party convention is not in session, the Central committee (chuō-iinkai) is charged with the responsibility of overseeing the activities of the Executive committee. Its approval must be obtained for any amendments to the party budget or for major changes in the party program. The Central committee in 1978 had 75 members, one from each of the 38 branch associations with additional delegates allotted for every 50 members. Although the committee is required formally to be convened only three times annually, it has met in Hyogo as many as four and five times each year.⁴⁰ Recently it has been extensively consulted regarding JSP participation in electoral coalitions with other parties behind candidates for governor or mayor.

The Executive committee (shikkō-iinkai) is responsible for the carrying out of the decisions of the prefectural convention, the supervision of the activities of the branch associations, and the administration of party finances. It is empowered to choose the heads of departments and standing committees within the Secretariat and, when necessary, may also establish special committees. The Executive committee was made up of the party chairman, the vice-chairmen, and the secretary and vice-secretary generals and 15 executive committeemen in 1978. Four of the committeemen came from the prefectural and Kobe city assemblies, four from party front groups, three from the Secretariat staff, three from the Hanshin area city assemblies, and one from the Metalworkers union. The committee has been convened about twice a month in Hyogo, usually on Saturday.⁴¹

The Party Secretariat

The Secretariat of the Hyogo JSP in 1978 contained 11 departments and four standing committees.⁴² The departments could be broadly divided into those dealing with special constituencies and those concerned with party maintenance and growth. All of the departments, except for General Affairs, were headed by a chairman and vice-chairman. They were assisted by a committee made up of representatives from each of the HR districts. The General Affairs department did not have a committee of district representatives attached to it. It consisted only of a chairman and a full-time

Secretariat employee who assisted him in his routine office management responsibilities.

Special Constituencies

This grouping contains six departments: youth, women, labor, small business, farm marine, and citizens organizations. These departments focus on strengthening ties between the party and special economic and social constituencies in Hyogo. The discussion of their activities below will center on the means that the party has employed, and its successes and failures, in working with them.

The Youth department of the Hyogo JSP works through the Socialist Youth League (Shakai Shugi Seinen Dōmei) a front group established by the party to nurture support among young factory workers and students. The League is well organized in Hyogo. In 1979, it had some 2,000 members (about 70 percent of whom were students), five full-time organizers (two from the unions and three from the universities), and an office in downtown Kobe. The League has had great importance for the party: in 1976 60 percent of new party members came out of it and all of the new organizers hired to staff the branch association offices have been former League activists. As a result, the chairman of the Youth department in the party has usually also been the chairman of the League. Nevertheless, there have been some problems in this relationship. The League in recent years has been strongly

influenced by the militant Marxist position of the Socialism Association (Shakai Shugi Kyōkai) faction within the party.⁴³ Since the unions in the Hyogo party are overwhelmingly committed to a more moderate position, there has been considerable friction between the party leadership and the League. This came to the surface in the 1978 gubernatorial election when the League did not fully mobilize its membership on behalf of the party's candidate Horii Masao, because of his opposition to the influence of the Socialism Association in national party affairs. The radical direction of the League has not won the support of all of the party's youth. In the Hanshin area, a rival group composed mainly of young workers has been formed that rejects the student-dominated League position. As yet it has not been able to break the League's control over the party's Youth department, but the struggle may permanently weaken this, the strongest of all of the Hyogo JSP's front groups.⁴⁴

The party's Women's department works to develop support among working women and the wives of union members through two party front groups, the Japan Women's Association (Nihon Fujin no Kai) and the Association to Protect Health and Home (Inochi to Kurashi o Mamoru Kai). Neither of these associations are very strong in Hyogo. The Women's Association may have at most 100 members in the prefecture, many of them the wives of party candidates and members. The head of the Women's department usually serves as the chairwoman of this group. The Home Association has no organizational

structure at all: the name is simply used when the department needs a sponsor for a public meeting on an issue of concern to housewives. Attendance at these meetings usually come from the membership of the Housewives Association (Shufu no Kai), a group sponsored by the Women's department of the Sōhyō federation.

The Labor department is charged with the maintenance and strengthening of support for the JSP in Sōhyō, the District Labor Councils, and the Chūritsu federations. Yet it has succeeded in doing little more than to make arrangements for the participation of the party leadership in demonstrations undertaken by these unions at the time of the annual spring labor offensive (shūntō). Other formal efforts by the department to firm up Socialist support have ended in failure. Since 1968, for example, it has sponsored the Association to Support the JSP (Shakaitō o Yoku Suru Kai) within the unions in order to attract workers to the party who might be reluctant to commit themselves to the full burden of membership. The workers who joined were asked only to pay the cost of a subscription to the party newspaper, Shakai Shimpō. This organization, however, has never had more than a few hundred members. Again, a big problem for the Hyogo party since the early 1970's has been that, while it has always succeeded in gaining the endorsement of the Sōhyō unions, the strength of the other parties on the shop floor has made it difficult for the party to fully mobilize the union vote at election time. To combat this trend the Labor department at the time of the 1974 Hyogo district HC election tried

to establish Socialist Party Support Committees (Shakaïtō Shiji linkai) in the principal Sōhyō unions. But the party leadership in a report to the 45th Prefectural Party Convention in 1975 had to acknowledge that despite the great expectations harbored for these committees at their inception, most of them carried out no formal activities during or after that election.

With this record of failure has the Labor department been able to contribute at all to the party's interest in sustaining support for itself in the labor movement? The regular endorsements that the JSP has managed to obtain from Sōhyō and the other federations have been due largely to its co-option of the union leadership in the prefecture into the party organization. The Labor department is the most striking example of this. All of the five chairmen since 1965 have held high positions in the labor movement and two went on to become chairmen of the Hyogo chapter of Sōhyō after their tenure of office in the department. The efforts of the JSP in Hyogo to go beyond symbolic solidarity, as expressed in its participation in the spring labor demonstrations, to establish a formal organizational presence in the unions have achieved little success. But these difficulties have so far been more than balanced out by its continued control over leadership positions in the labor movement.

The Small Business department has worked to expand the party's base among shopowners and the managers of small enterprises threatened by the conservative party's close connections with the largest corporations through two front groups, the Small and

Medium-size Enterprise Labor-Management Association (Chū-shō Kigyō Rōmukyōkai) and the Small and Medium-sized Trade Associations Liaison Council (Chū-shō Shōkōgyo Dantai Kyōkai). The Labor-Management Association was established in the early 1960's in imitation of the JCP's highly successful Democratic Chambers of Commerce. It provides to small businessmen for a small fee, 2,000 yen (\$10.00) to 3,000 yen (\$15.00) a month, tax advice and management assistance. At present, the Association is said to have 30 branches and employ a full-time staff of seven who supervise the efforts of party volunteers. Although the total membership of the Association is not known, it was discovered that the Association had only 151 members in the large Hanshin district,⁴⁵ suggesting that it could not begin to rival the 26,000 strong JCP organization in the prefecture. The director of the Labor-Management Association in 1979 was also the chairman of the department. The Small and Medium-size Trade Associations Liaison Council was organized in 1977 to try to bring together behind the party some of the 1,000-odd trade and commercial associations in the prefecture.⁴⁶ To date the Council has attracted little interest: chapters have been established in only two cities, Takarazuka and Ashiya.

The Farm-Marine department of the Hyogo JSP has worked to increase the party's presence in the rural areas of Hyogo prefecture. Its efforts have been hampered by the collapse in 1974 of the Hyogo chapter of the radical All Japan Farmers Union and the domination by DSP activists of the agricultural cooperative

employees unions in the prefecture. The department at present is trying to deal with these obstacles by encouraging party members in the conservative farm cooperatives to form party member councils (nōson tōin kyōgikai) and support candidates sympathetic to the party for positions of leadership, but it has enjoyed little visible support.

The Citizen Organizations department was formed in 1965 to capitalize on the anti-conservative sentiment of the many adhoc groups which had emerged to protest environmental pollution and the inadequacy of city social services. The department has sponsored a number of liaison council, such as the Hyogo Council to Protest Pollution, with its largely union-based assemblymen as chairmen in an effort to enlarge their base of support. The party has had mixed success with these. While citizens are happy to borrow the prestige of the assemblymen in their particular struggle, they are often reluctant to entrust their broader political interests to candidates so closely tied with the unions. Moreover, the Liaison Councils set up by the department have had no real continuing organizational presence. They may sponsor a meeting at which party assemblymen speak or encourage union members to join citizens in a demonstration, and then lapse into months of inactivity. The department has never really taken the lead in organizing citizens on its own account around a particular issue.

Party Maintenance and Growth

This grouping contains five departments: organization, general affairs, education and propaganda, publications, and local government affairs. The Organization department deals largely with the supervision of the activities of party branch associations and branches and the recruitment of party members. The General Affairs department, as mentioned earlier, handles administrative matters for the party. The remaining three departments will be discussed below with the purpose of showing how the steady support which the party could expect from the labor movement has hindered the development of the organizational means by which it could reach to individual citizens outside this constituency.

The JSP is the only party in Hyogo that does not have a separate Propaganda department in its Secretariat. The propaganda function is carried out by a combined Education-Propaganda department (kyōiku-senden-bu). During the 1960's the department cooperated with the Kobe branch of the national party front group, the Labor University (Rōdō Daigaku), which focused its efforts on developing radical Socialist activists within the unions.⁴⁷ The party made little effort to directly reach out to the non-union voter through the distribution of literature or the dispatch of speakers to neighborhood assemblies. Despite the large propaganda efforts launched by the Komeito, the JCP, and even the LDP in Hyogo in the early 1970's, the JSP remained committed to this course. Until 1976, reports by the department to the convention

spoke only of seminars on party theory or lectures on current affairs that it had put together. No mention was made of propaganda activities. This was in sharp contrast to the Komeito, where the Propaganda department sponsored training sessions for sound car announcers, and the JCP where it was at work establishing neighborhood newspapers. Finally at the 47th Prefectural Convention in 1977 when the party adopted a four year rebuilding plan, the importance of propaganda activities for the party's future in the prefecture gained some belated recognition. But the measures proposed to strengthen the party's propaganda capabilities since then have fallen far short of those pursued by the other parties: the leadership has urged branch associations to install party signboards throughout their districts⁴⁸ and to conduct a "Good Morning Socialist Party" (Ohayō Shakaitō) campaign.⁴⁹ Moreover, Imamura Tsutsumi who has run the department since 1975 is a full-time activist who draws his salary not from the party but from the Hyogo chapter of the Labor University.

The Publications department is responsible for the management of the party newspaper, Shakai Shimpō in the prefecture. The paper is presently distributed twice weekly by both paid and volunteer party members. The subscription fee (400 yen (\$2.00) per month in 1979) is collected by party volunteers. The Hyogo JSP headquarters has placed great emphasis on increasing the circulation of the paper within the prefecture, because it looks upon it as an important means of increasing party membership and public

understanding of Socialist goals. Despite this emphasis, the results in Hyogo have been disappointing (see Table 21). The

Table 21
Shakai Shimpō Circulation 1965-1977^a

Year	Copies	Year	Copies
1965	3,533	1973	5,978
1966	3,744	1975	6,456
1967	4,048	1976	6,740
1968	2,391	1977	8,800

Source: Hyogo JSP.

^a1969-1972, 1974 circulation unavailable.

circulation of the paper has grown by only slightly more than 5,000 copies since 1965. In 1977 the circulation of the paper was only 8,800 copies, just one-third of that of the JCP daily Akahata. Participation by the membership in the management of the paper has also been low. In 1973, only 60 percent of the papers were hand-delivered by the membership: the remainder had to be mailed. In 1978 it was claimed by the party that over 80 percent of the papers were delivered by members to subscriber's doors, but it was also admitted that the remission of subscription fees often ran several months behind schedule.

The Publications department also handles two other national publications. Gekkan Shakaitō (The Socialist Party Monthly), a theoretical journal, had a readership of 371 in 1965, and today it is still less than 500 in the prefecture. The Shashin Nyūsu (The News in Pictures) is a one page monthly that relates the activities of the national party in pictures coupled to a few brief captions. The headquarters receives 1,000 copies of the News each month from the national party and is supposed to hand them over to the branch associations for posting on neighborhood party signboards. Most of the copies, however, end up on labor union bulletin boards. Very few find their way into the neighborhoods where they might be read by non-union voters. The headquarters has also published on its own account since 1967 a single sheet prefectural party paper, Hyogo Shimpō (Hyogo News). From 1967 to 1973, the paper was published on a quarterly basis. Since 1973, the paper has been published three times a month and mailed to the party membership. It contains communications from party officials and news about the activities of party candidates and front groups.

The Local Government Affairs department may seem a curious choice for inclusion in this section, but its operations serve to reveal the party's dependence upon the union movement for organizational support. The department is formally charged with providing local Socialist assemblymen with the information necessary to challenge the decisions reached by the conservative majority and the bureaucratic apparatus that backs it up in the legislature.

To this end it has sponsored an annual meeting of party assemblymen to exchange views on common problems. Yet the department itself does not have the capability to provide the quality of research needed by the assemblymen. It depends for the development of its position papers upon the Hyogo Local Government Research Center (Hyōgo Chihō Jichi Kenkyū Senta), an organization funded and staffed by the Local Government Employees union.

The Standing Committees

The Hyogo JSP has four standing committees: finance, peoples organizations, elections, and policymaking. The composition of these committees are all somewhat different, but they are distinguished from the committees attached to the departments in that they include as members the heads of departments in the Secretariat and party officers. The Finance committee is responsible for preparing the party budget and approving any large expenditures. These matters will be taken up in a later section. The other three committees will be introduced below. They have served to coordinate party activities in three important areas: the promotion of a united front of opposition forces, legislative strategy, and electoral tactics.

The Peoples Organization (kokumin undō) committee has attempted to put together a broad coalition of all forces opposed to the conservative regime around a limited number of foreign policy and domestic issues. However, the front groups that it has created for

this purpose such as the Peoples Council to Ban Nuclear Weapons (Gensui Bakudan Kinshi Kokumin Kaigi), the Prefectural Committee in Support of a Peaceful and Independent Unification of Korea (Chōsen no Jishūteki Wahei Toitsu o Shiji Suru Hyōgokenmin linkai), and the Association to Protect the Constitution (Kenpō o Mamoru Kai) have not succeeded as the party intended in shaping public opinion on these issues. Although they have a list of officers and a member of the party Secretariat assigned to handle their affairs, the membership of these groups is quite ill-defined and, in most cases, overlaps from one group to another. The public meetings, seminars, and demonstrations of these groups are well attended only when some of the unions in the JSP support base mobilize their membership on behalf of them.

The Policy Deliberation committee of the Hyogo party is supposed to supervise the activities of party representatives in the local assemblies. By the party's own admission it has not performed well. The committee has not met regularly and has had great problems getting city and town assemblymen to go along with policies formally adopted by the prefectural headquarters. The problem is that the interests of the unions that back up the party in national contest do not always coincide on local issues. A classic example is the prolonged public dispute which erupted between the prefectural party and the Kobe city assembly delegation in 1968 over the raising of bus fares in the city.⁵⁰ The prefectural headquarters position was that any raise would place a

hardship on the workers. The Kobe delegation, which was largely based in the City Employees union, were willing to go along with the LDP proposed increase because it was linked to new equipment purchases that they believed the city transportation system needed. The situation was ultimately resolved through the intervention of the national party with compromises made on both sides. These kinds of disputes have erupted many times since.

The Election committee has always been chaired by a high union official. In 1978 the chairman's position was held by Fukumi Fukuichi, who had moved over to assume the post from the Election Strategy committee of the Hyogo Sōhyō federation Secretariat. This committee makes recommendations to the party on the nomination of candidates and oversees party campaigns in the prefecture. Although the committee has played a quite visible role in negotiations with the other opposition parties over possible coalitions in gubernatorial or mayoral contests, it usually acts only to affirm decisions reached elsewhere. In local or national assembly races, the recommendation of a candidate to the party by such powerful unions as the Teachers, National Railways, or Local Government Employees along with the promise of organizational support often makes the acceptance by the party merely perfunctory.

Party Membership

The working class is looked upon as the primary source of JSP membership, but people from any class are welcome into the party.⁵¹

The JSP requires that new members be recommended to the party by two members in good standing. Party members have the right to discuss party policy in party assemblies and publications, vote and stand as candidates in party elections, and present proposals to any party assembly. They have the duty to pay party dues, obey party directives; participate in party activities, and study party policies and programs. Most important, as members of the party they must be willing to devote themselves to the service of the people. Groups such as unions may also affiliate with the party as organizations.⁵² They are required to support the party program and pay an annual membership fee. In return they are permitted to send delegates to the party convention. Unions with a national membership are to affiliate directly with the central headquarters; those operating only within a single prefecture are to register with the local headquarters. The Hyogo party has only one union affiliated directly with it, the 850 member Kikkōman Shōyu union.

The Hyogo JSP was founded in Kobe on November 15, 1945 and by late 1947 could report a membership of 3,006 (see Table 22).⁵³ Even such modest success, however, was short-lived: by 1951 party membership had dropped back to 1,917 and JSP membership in Hyogo was never again to exceed 2,000. At the time of the break-up of the Hyogo JSP into rival left and right wings in 1953, the left wing had a membership of 679 while the right wing party had at 1,019 a membership nearly twice as large. The greater size of the right wing was the result of party elder Kawakami Jotaro's decision

Table 22
Socialist Party Membership in Hyogo 1947-1959

Year	Membership
1947	3,006
1948	2,916
1949	unavailable
1950	unavailable
1951	1,971
1952 (right-wing)	1,019
1952 (left-wing)	679
1957	1,483
1958	1,518
1959	1,408

Source: See Note 53.

to accept the chairmanship of the national right wing party. The two wings of the JSP were rejoined in February of 1956, but as a result of continued factional infighting the reported membership of the newly unified party in 1957 (1,483) was less than the sum of its parts. By 1959 the year before the right wing finally departed to form the DSP, Socialist membership in Hyogo had fallen to 1,408.

When the DSP was formed in 1960, 425 members left the Hyogo party.⁵⁴ Considering the size of the right-wing element in the

party at the time of the 1952-1956 break, the loss might have been much greater (see Table 23). The left wing of the Hyogo JSP managed to maintain control over the largest part of the party membership because the right-wing leader Kawakami Jotaro declined the invitation of DSP chairman, Nishio Suehiro, to join the new party and accepted instead the vice-chairmanship of the national JSP. Membership in the Hyogo JSP grew in the 1961-1967 period as the result of the intensive efforts by the party to enroll more of its labor union constituency. The greatest increase came in the Kobe City Employees (55 members in 1959 versus 121 in 1965) and Postal Workers (12 members in 1959 versus 62 in 1965) unions.

JSP membership in Hyogo dropped precipitously after 1967. The drop was a consequence of the party's attempt to reorganize its union-based squads into 20 member neighborhood branches. The new policy was meant to strengthen party influence among non-union constituencies. The problem with it lay in its assignment of workers at the same work site to different party branches based on their place of residence. Most workers had joined the party as an outgrowth of their workplace oriented union activities. A significant number perceived this connection to be broken and drifted away from the party.

Since 1971, JSP membership has increased only fitfully: in 1977 it stood at 1,325, a figure not even equal to that of the party membership in 1957 (1,483) just after the unification of the right and left wings. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that,

Table 23
Socialist Party Membership in Hyogo, 1960-1977

Year	Membership	Year	Membership
1960	1,035	1969	1,196
1961	1,301	1970	934
1962	1,598	1971	1,078
1963	1,916	1972	1,086
1964	1,640	1973	unavailable
1965	1,535	1974	1,188
1966	1,580	1975	unavailable
1967	1,635	1976	unavailable
1968	1,188	1977	1,325

Source: See Note 53.

despite the departure of its right wing and the advent of the Komeito and the JCP, the membership of the JSP in Hyogo has remained remarkably stable in this 20 year period. The only marked change in membership was brought about as the result of the party's own ill-advised attempts at organizational reform.

The small size of the JSP membership in Hyogo might seem unusual for a party that has been able to elect as many as eight members to the Lower House from the prefecture, but it is not out of line with the organization of the Socialist party in other prefectures. Hyogo is the sixth largest prefecture in Japan in terms of population, and the membership of the Hyogo JSP makes it the eighth largest in the country. This is only slightly smaller than what might be expected (see Table 24).⁵⁵

The geographic distribution of the JSP membership in Hyogo is highly skewed in favor of the first and second HR districts. The party has been particularly weak in the rural fourth and fifth districts (see Table 25). In 1974, the party had no organizational presence in four of the nine cities and towns in the fourth district and four of the eight in the fifth district. Even in those areas where the party had branch associations, these existed many times in name only. Outside of Himeiji city, JSP branch associations in the fourth district had only between 6 and 11 members. Still, the numeric weakness of the party in terms of membership has not barred the JSP from political power.

Table 24
Membership of the 10 Largest Socialist
Prefectural Parties in 1977

Prefecture	Members	Prefecture	Members
Hokkaido	4,660	Fukuoka	1,617
Tokyo	4,185	Nagano	1,518
Niigata	2,096	HYOGO	1,325
Osaka	1,780	Chiba	1,318
Kanagawa	1,702	Kyoto	1,314

Source: Asahi Shimbun, March 2, 1978.

Table 25
Distribution of JSP Membership in Hyogo in 1974

District	Members	Branch Associations
Kobe	425	8
Hanshin	385	8
East Harima	170	7
West Harima	77	6
Tamba	84	4

Source: Hyogo JSP.

The Socialists can boast of incumbent HR assemblymen in the fourth and fifth districts as well as in the Kobe and Hanshin areas.

JSP membership in Hyogo comes largely from the unions. In 1966, all but 182 of the party's 1,580 members were from the unions. The unions represented were on the whole affiliated with Sōhyō and included the Local Government Employees (261), Kobe City Transport Employees (90), Private Railway Employees (142), National Railway Employees (98), Postal Workers (98), Steelworkers (99), Teachers (51), and Communication Workers (52) unions. The non-union party members were reported to be 12 housewives, 40 members of agricultural cooperatives, 20 staff employees of local and national assemblymen, 63 who were self-employed, four university professors, one physician, one lawyer, and six shopkeepers. The age distribution of party members in Hyogo at this time was 20 years (14.8 percent), 30 years (44.7 percent), 40 years (20.0 percent), 50 years (10.2 percent), and 60 or over (2.3 percent). As can be seen, more than one-half were under 40.

There is no detailed information on the present occupational distribution of the party membership. But party officials admit to a figure of 90 percent union membership and add that half of this number are on the executive boards of their respective unions.⁵⁶ The unions best represented in the party today are said to be Local Government Employees, Teachers, Postal Workers, National Railway Employees, and Communication Workers unions. The party is very weak among the private industry unions, except for the

Mitsubishi Electric Employees union, and it no longer controls the executive committees of any of the three major steel company unions in the prefecture.⁵⁷ The age distribution of the membership in 1975 was available and revealed that the party had grown older during the 10 years separating it from the previous survey: 20 years (15.2 percent), 30 years (29.2 percent), 40 years (36.3 percent) 50 or more years (19.3 percent). The median age for the membership was over 40 at this time. There is little reason to believe that it has changed significantly since then.

New party members come mainly from the Socialist Youth League or the Sōhyō Youth groups. In 1976, 60 percent of new members came from the League and 32 percent from Sōnyō. The remaining eight percent were drawn from the Japan Women's Association and the Small and Medium-size Enterprises Labor-Management Association. As the gradual aging of the membership indicates, the JSP in Hyogo has had a difficult time holding on to this new membership. In 1976, the number of new members was matched by those leaving or expelled from the party. The major reason for expulsion was non-payment of dues or special assessments.

The membership of the Hyogo JSP at 1,325, as noted before, seems extremely low for a party that succeeded for all its problems in polling 381,000 votes in the 1979 Hyogo district HC election and could boast after the 1979 HR election of five incumbent members in the House of Representatives. But to look only at the size of the party is to neglect the question of what power resources these

members bring to it. In Hyogo more than one-half of the membership sit on the governing boards of labor unions. These positions provide the party with ready access to the organizational and financial resources of these unions and a strong claim to the votes of their members. The JSP leadership in its reports to the prefectural conventions has often stressed the need for the party to attract new members. Recently the national chairman of the party has committed it to a target of one million members by 1981.⁵⁸ In the short run, increasing the membership of the party in Hyogo would not be an impossible task. The JSP could enroll a substantial proportion of the membership of the Sōhyō federation and other unions. But it is questionable whether this would have the effect of revitalizing and strengthening the party. The Hyogo JSP needs not merely new members, but members that give the party access to new constituencies. If only 100 representatives from the leadership of such traditionally conservative support groups such as the Liquor Retailers Association or the Hyogo Public Bath Operators Association were to embrace the party, the JSP's standing in the prefecture would be transformed. Unfortunately for the future prospects of the party this event is highly unlikely.

Party Leadership

The major party officers⁵⁹ in the Hyogo JSP are the chairman, vice-chairmen, and the secretary-general. They are chosen for a one-year term by the prefectural convention. An Executive

committee, composed of prefectural and city assemblymen, members of the headquarters' Secretariat and the staff of party front groups and labor union officials, is also approved by the convention at the same time. The selection of party officers has always been by acclamation. There have never been contending candidates for any of the positions.

Yamashita Eiji, a Hanshin district HR incumbent who had maintained good relations with both the left and right wings of the Hyogo party, assumed the chairmanship upon the reunification of the party in February of 1956 (see Table 26). Yamashita served as

Table 26
Chairmen of the Hyogo JSP, 1956-1979

Year	Name	Background
1956-1957	Yamashita Eiji	House of Representatives
1958-1962	Matsuzawa Kenji	House of Councillors
1963-1965	Kotani Mamoru	Prefectural Assembly
1966	Miki Yoshio	House of Representatives
1967-1968	Goto Torao	House of Representatives
1969-1971	Kotani Mamoru	Prefectural Assembly
1972-1974	Hori Masao	House of Representatives
1975-1979	Kawakami Tamio	House of Representatives

Source: Hyogo JSP.

chairman between 1956 and 1958. Two years later he left the party to join the DSP. Yamashita was succeeded by Matsuzawa Kenji, who had served as the chairman of the right-wing Socialist party in the prefecture during the period of the split (1952-1956).

Matsuzawa, a professor at Kansai Gakuen university, had been elected as a member of the Japan Labor party to the prewar Kobe and Hyogo assemblies. He won a seat in the Lower House in the first postwar election (April 1946) and had moved over to the Upper House in 1953. Matsuzawa's entrance into politics had been greatly influenced by another Kansai Gakuen professor, Kawakami Jotaro. Kawakami's decision to remain with the left wing upon the departure of the Nishio faction to form the DSP contributed to Matsuzawa's own determination to stay on as chairman of the Hyogo party. This produced the rather paradoxical situation of the former chairman of the right-wing party in the prefecture guiding the left-wing through the difficult period following the split with the DSP. This unusual turn of events did much to preserve the JSP organization in the prefecture.⁶⁰

In 1963, Matsuzawa was succeeded by Kotani Mamoru, a Kobe prefectural assemblyman and former chairman of the city Teachers union. The selection of a prefectural assemblyman over a number of eligible national assembly representatives was an unusual step for the party to take. This decision in some part reflected dissatisfaction in the Hyogo party with Matsuzawa's long incumbency. Matsuzawa, then a second-term member of the

Upper House, had as he grew older become less willing to undergo the rounds of "politiking" at the social functions of Socialist support groups that was expected of a party chairman.

Three years later, the party returned to a national assemblyman: Miki Yoshio a fourth district HR representative. But he was quickly succeeded the next year by Goto Tarao, a four-term first district HR representative who had been defeated in the 1967 General Election. The party chairmanship in Hyogo has always been a largely honorary position. Miki's seat in the fourth district underwritten by the powerful Teachers union was safe, while Goto faced in Kobe a tough uphill battle against the Komeito and the revitalized JCP. The chairmanship was given him with the hope that the public exposure attendant to the position would give a boost to his campaign.

Goto was once again defeated in 1969 and Kotani returned to the chairmanship. This time it was extended to Kotani to help him in his campaign for a seat in the House of Councillors. The party chairman makes policy statements to the newspapers in the name of the party, represents the Hyogo headquarters at meetings and gatherings sponsored by unions and other groups friendly to the party, and presides over official party activities. The post provides an excellent position from which to conduct a political campaign without running afoul of the provisions of the Election Law.

Kotani won his seat in the 1971 HC election and Hori Masao, a HR incumbent from the second district, succeeded as chairman in 1972. Hori was not the most senior assemblyman among the Socialist national delegation nor was he facing an unusually difficult election. He was selected for the post like Miki Yoshio before him, because he had not served as chairman before and indicated a willingness to bear the ceremonial rigors of the office. Hori served as chairman until June of 1975, when he was replaced by Kawakami Tamio, the son of former party leader Kawakami Jotaro. Kawakami was again not the most senior assemblyman, but he carried the magic of the Kawakami name. The JSP in Hyogo after its poor showing in the 1975 local assembly elections undoubtedly felt it useful to associate itself with the triumphs of the past.⁶¹

The vice-chairmanship of the Hyogo party has been held largely by Hyogo and Kobe assemblymen (see Table 27). Assemblymen from other cities in the prefecture have never been selected for the post. This is not only due to differences in prestige or geographic proximity. The JSP prefectural headquarters concerns itself primarily with Kobe city and prefectural affairs. The center of party activity for the other cities and towns in the prefecture are the branch associations. The chairman and vice-chairmen of these units are invariably city and town assemblymen.

The number of vice-chairmen positions in the Hyogo JSP has varied between one and three. The number depends upon how many

Table 27
Vice-Chairmen of the Hyogo JSP, 1956-1979

Year	Name	Background
1956-1958	Kotani Mamoru Moriguchi Shinichi	Prefectural Assembly Kobe Assembly
1958-1959	Yamaguchi Jotaro Nakanose Kokichi	HR candidate Kobe Assembly
1960-1962	Kotani Mamoru Moriguchi Shinichi	Prefectural Assembly Kobe Assembly
1963-1965	Torie Yutaka	Kobe Assembly
1966	Morishita Sadao Senba Saichi	Prefectural Assembly Kobe Assembly
1967	Tamura Saichi Aogi Masao	Prefectural Assembly Kobe Assembly
1968	Gyotani Takotaro Kikuchi Kunio	Prefectural Assembly Akashi City Labor Council
1969	Fukui Yoshio Fukumi Fukuichi	Prefectural Assembly Communication Workers

Table 27 (Continued)

Year	Name	Background
1970	Nakajima Tsuneo Aogi Masao	Prefectural Assembly Kobe Assembly
1971-1972	Aogi Masao Kanda Yasunosuke	Kobe Assembly Prefectural Assembly
1973-1974	Aogi Masao Sumitomo Shoji Matsuo Tadao	Kobe Assembly Prefectural Assembly HC candidate
1975-1977	Aogi Masao Murakami Asao	Kobe Assembly Prefectural Assembly
1978-1979	Aogi Masao Ota Takeshi Masue Tomio	Kobe Assembly Prefectural Assembly PA candidate

Source: Hyogo JSP.

candidates are eligible for the position. Long-term incumbents in the Hyogo and Kobe assemblies head up the list, but incumbency is not the only criteria for eligibility. As with the chairmanship of the party, the vice-chairman position is sometimes used to give a candidate for national office greater visibility before the public. This strategy was most obvious in the case of Matsuo Tadao, the chairman of Hyogo Sōhyō who was quickly named a vice-chairman upon the death in office of Hyogo district HC representative, Sano Yoshio, and nominated by the party to stand as its candidate in a special election held in 1972 to fill the vacancy. The same strategy explains in part the selection of Masue Tomio as vice-chairman in 1978. Masue was endorsed by the party in the 1979 PA elections, just after his retirement as head of the Hyogo Sōhyō federation. Although prefectural assembly candidates are usually given some party office to boost their campaigns, they have never before been favored with a vice-chairmanship. In Masue's case, however, his prestige in the union movement demanded a party office of similar stature.

The union leadership within the prefecture can also stake a claim to office, even when they are not party candidates. In 1968 and 1969, a vice-chairmanship was awarded to union leaders who were neither public officials nor party candidates. These years not coincidentally were those in which the Hyogo party attempted to reorganize the large union squads into 20 member party branches. Aogi Masao, who has held a vice-chairmanship since 1970, has done

so not only because of his long tenure in the Kobe assembly (five terms) but also because of his service as vice-chairman of Hyogo Sōhyō.

The Socialist headquarters in Hyogo, in contrast to the practice of the DSP, LDP, and the Komeito, has never given a vice-chairmanship to an incumbent national assemblyman. Since the vice-chairmanship is essentially an honorary position, this practice has had little practical consequences for decisionmaking in the headquarters except to hold down the number of positions awarded at the party convention. In the other parties, there have always been a minimum of three vice-chairmen with prefectural and Kobe assemblymen occupying two of these position and one usually going to a national assemblyman.

The secretary-general position has been shared exclusively among the senior members of the prefectural and Kobe city delegations (see Table 28). The secretary-general has the formal responsibility to supervise the day to day activities of the prefectural Secretariat. To assist him in this task and to give greater continuity in the administration of party affairs the office of vice-secretary-general was created in 1974, and since then, the post has been held by Anada Kiyohaku a full-time employee of the Secretariat.

The Executive committee of the Hyogo party is made up of party officers and the chiefs of the Secretariat's 11 departments and four standing committees. The number of staff members of the party

Table 28
Secretary-Generals of the Hyogo JSP, 1956-1979

Year	Name	Background
1956-1957	Takiwa Susumu	Prefectural Assembly
1958-1962	Torie Yutaka	Kobe Assembly
1963-1965	Ozaki Osamu	Prefectural Assembly
1966	Sato Torao	Prefectural Assembly
1967-1968	Ota Takeshi	Prefectural Assembly
1969	Torie Yutaka	Kobe Assembly
1970-1972	Morishita Sadao	Prefectural Assembly
1973-1974	Kanda Yasunosuke	Prefectural Assembly
1975-1979	Sugita Tetsuo	Prefectural Assembly

Source: Hyogo JSP.

Secretariat and party front groups with seats on the Executive committee (8 of 20) is extremely high when compared with that of the other parties in the prefecture. Yet this does not give the staff a disproportionate share of influence over party affairs for a number of reasons. First, the Executive committee does not make decisions by a majority vote. All issues are decided unanimously with the chairman and high ranking assemblymen taking the lead in the shaping of a consensus.⁶² Second, the staff should not be considered as a force within the party that has an institutional identity of its own. Most party staff members have come out of

Table 29
Membership of Hyogo JSP Executive Committee, 1977

Name	Position	Background
Kawakami Tamio	Chairman	House of Representatives
Aogi Masao	Vice-Chairman	Kobe Assembly
Murakami Asao	Vice-Chairman	Prefectural Assembly
Sugita Tetsuo	Secretary-General	Prefectural Assembly
Anada Kiyohaku	Vice-Secretary-General	Secretariat Staff
Kawauchi Kiyoshi	Finance Committee	Amagasaki Assembly
Takeuchi Kazuo	Policy Committee	Prefectural Assembly
Fukumi Fukuichi	Election Committee	Communication Workers
Nagaoka Teruo	Organization Department	Secretariat Staff
Yoshida Kunio	General Affairs Department	Takarazuka Assembly
Kawakami Kiyoshi	Labor Department	Metalworkers union
Nishimura Shogo	Farm Department	Kasei Assembly
Nakamura Yoshinobu	Small Business Department	Labor-Management Association

Table 29 (Continued)

Name	Position	Background
Inamura Tsutsumi	Education-Propaganda	Labor University
Nakanishi Yuzo	Publications Department	Secretariat Staff
Yamanaka Kozo	Local Government Department	Kobe Assembly
Tsuno Hiro	Youth Department	Socialist Youth League
Tsutsumi Hiroko	Women's Department	Japan Women's Association
Takanaga Tomio	Citizens Organizations	Secretariat Staff
Yoshida Takeo	Peoples Organizations	Kobe Assembly

Source: Hyogo JSP.

the union movement. Some plan to return after working for the party, while others will stand as JSP assembly candidates. None contemplate a career within the local or national party administration.⁶³ Finally, the leadership of the JSP in Hyogo has always been closely tied in with that of the unions in the prefecture. Since 1955 all but three of the party chairmen (Matsuzawa, Hori, and Kawakami) have served as chairmen of powerful unions within the prefecture, and of 16 party vice-chairmen only one (Fukui Yoshio) has not been part of the union movement. Real power in the Hyogo JSP does not come from party office or membership on the Executive committee, but from privileged access to the votes and financial support of the largest unions.

Party Finances

Sources of Party Income⁶⁴

Membership dues in the JSP have as a rule always been one percent of income. The formula seems simple, but it has been difficult to apply in practice. Questions have arisen as to the minimum amount of dues required to maintain membership status in the party, the increments by which dues should be increased with corresponding increases in income, and the means by which the income of the membership should be determined. During the past 25 years, the headquarters in Hyogo and the national party have struggled to find solutions appropriate to these problems. In 1968, for example, the party decided on a minimum payment of

350 yen (\$1.75) per month as a condition of membership. Members with a basic income over 40,000 yen (\$200.00) per month were required to pay one percent of that or 400 yen (\$2.00) a month in dues. Increases over this amount were set at 50 yen (\$.25) increments e.g., members with incomes between 45,000 yen (\$225) and 50,000 yen (\$250) were to pay dues of 450 yen (\$2.50). After 1973, the minimum dues payment was raised to 500 yen (\$2.50) and a new payment structure was adopted. Party members with incomes less than 100,000 yen (\$500) were to pay one percent of their income, those between 100,000 and 150,000 yen (\$750) 1.5 percent, between 150,000 and 300,000 yen (\$1500) two percent, and over 300,000 yen 2.5 percent. The problem of income determination has always remained unresolved. Members are expected to register their income with the party every six months, but changes in dues payment usually lag far behind any pay increases. Moreover, since the party only assesses dues against a member's basic salary the income received from twice yearly bonuses, which may amount to nearly one-half of a worker's basic salary, cannot be tapped by the party.

In addition to membership dues, each party member is liable for a number of special party assessments. In 1973, for example, the prefectural convention made Hyogo JSP members responsible for a 2,500 yen (\$12.50) levy earmarked for the retirement of national headquarters' election debts, another 2,500 yen assessment for propaganda activities, a 1,000 yen (\$5.00) levy for the general

party election fund, and yet another 1,000 yen assessment to underwrite anti-Security Treaty activities. On top of this, Hyogo members were required to "contribute" 4,500 yen (\$22.50) to the party's gubernatorial and 5,000 yen (\$25.00) to its HC candidates' campaigns. The response of the membership to this confusing array of levies and required contributions in that year, however, was not enthusiastic. Although the special levy for the national party headquarters' debt was 70 percent subscribed, that for propaganda was largely ignored and hardly any money at all was collected for the election fund, the anti-Security Treaty movement, or the two election campaigns.

The collection of dues in the Hyogo JSP is carried out by the branch associations. Before the mid-1970's they were required to forward from the money they had collected a specific yen amount for each member to the prefectural and national party headquarters. They were permitted to retain what remained to finance their own activities. For example, during the 1960's the branch associations were required to send 1,200 yen (\$6.00) annually for each member to the national headquarters and 800 yen (\$4.00) to the prefectural party. Since 1974, however, this system of collection has been abandoned. The central headquarters now collects all the dues money received by the branch associations and then returns it to them based on the needs of local party organizations in different parts of the country.⁶⁵

The amount of dues money that the Hyogo party receives at present is uncertain. In its 1976 and 1977 reports to the Hyogo Election Commission, the party claimed to have received no monies from dues or assessments of party members. This was misleading but technically correct, because the money went to the national party before it was returned to the prefectural headquarters. The monies received from the national party were listed under the category of transfer funds (kofukin) and totalled in 1977, 60 million yen (\$300,000). About one-third of this amount would appear to come from member dues.⁶⁶

Another source of income for the Hyogo JSP is the assessment of the salaries received by public officials endorsed by the party in elections. At present, the prefectural headquarters collects one million yen (\$5,000) from national assemblymen and 450,000 yen (\$2,250) from prefectural and Kobe city assemblymen. Assemblymen in the other cities and towns, whose salaries vary depending upon the size of their constituencies, pay about five percent of their salary directly to the branch associations of which they are members. In 1977, income from assessments of party assemblymen amounted to 16.1 million yen (\$80,500) for the Hyogo headquarters; it is uncertain how much the branch associations received.

The Hyogo JSP does not receive contributions from unions, businesses, or other interest groups to cover its normal administrative expenses: those are considered the responsibility of the membership and party assemblymen. During elections, of course,

large amounts of money are raised on behalf of the party both within and outside the prefecture. This money, however, is not distributed through the party Secretariat, but funneled through influential assemblymen and union leaders to party candidates. Consequently, it does not appear in the reports filed by the party with the Election Commission.

The JSP newspaper Shakai Shimpō is delivered by the party to its readership for 400 yen (\$2.00) a month. The Hyogo party is permitted to retain 100 yen (\$.50) for each copy. With a circulation of 8,800 in the prefecture, this provides the party with 10.5 million yen (\$52,500) a year in revenues. This money remains with the branch associations and is used by them to underwrite the cost of their offices and staff.

Before 1976, the Hyogo parties were only required to register their prefectural offices with the Election Commission.⁶⁷ As a result, the income reported by the JSP through 1975 only represented that of the prefectural headquarters. Between 1972 and 1975 this came to between 15 million (\$75,000) and 17 million (\$85,000) yen annually. Since the reports did not distinguish between money collected from the membership and party assemblymen, it is difficult to say which was more important. After the revision of the Political Funds Control Law to include party branches, the reported income of the Hyogo JSP rose sharply to 69 million yen (\$345,000) in 1976 and 87 million yen (\$435,000) in 1977. The reports in these years do distinguish the income from

assessments of party prefectural and Kobe city assemblymen from other sources. Unfortunately, revenues from member dues and assessments, city and town assemblymen's salaries, and the subscription fees of the party newspaper are all lumped together in the category of national party transfer funds. As a result, no firm conclusions can be reached on the balance between the importance of the membership and party assemblymen as a source of income for the party in Hyogo. However, it can be said with assurance that these two together are the principal sources of income of the party followed by the party newspaper. Contributions from the unions or other interest groups do not provide significant financial support for the party.

Pattern of Party Expenditures

The Hyogo JSP's largest expenditure has been for personnel. The party's 1958 projected budget allotted 55,000 yen (\$275) a month for staff. This came when health and other benefits were included to an annual expenditure of 720,000 yen (\$3,600), nearly 40 percent of the 2.1 million yen (\$10,500) headquarters budget. By 1972 party expenditures on staff had risen to six million yen (\$30,000) (just over 40 percent of total expenditures) and gradually increased through 1975 when staff salaries topped 12 million yen (\$60,000) and accounted for 60 percent of the 19 million yen (\$95,000) in headquarters expenditures for that year.

An examination of the receipts submitted by the party to document personnel expenditures to the Election Commission for the period January to June 1975 revealed that the party paid salaries totalling 4.3 million yen (\$21,500)⁶⁸ to nine members of the Secretariat staff for this six month period (see Table 30). The

Table 30
Salaries Paid to Staff of Hyogo JSP Headquarters,
January-June 1975

Position	Salary
Vice-Secretary General	579,000
Finance Committee Employee	527,000
Citizen Organization Department Chief	515,000
Organization Department Chief	570,000
General Affairs Department Chief	350,000
General Affairs Department Employee	486,000
Small Business Department Chief	586,000
Women's Department Chief	320,000
Receptionist	401,000

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.

receipts showed that none of the headquarters employees received a basic salary in 1975 that was larger than 100,000 yen (\$500) a month. However, it is known that the chief of the Small Business

department was able to supplement his salary with the money he received from his position as the director of the Labor-Management Association. It was intimated by the party leadership that similar opportunities were available through the unions for other members of the Secretariat staff.⁶⁹ For all this, the salaries were undeniably low. The JSP has been able to attract into its Secretariat only those most dedicated to the socialist cause or those whose union activities have made them unemployable elsewhere.⁷⁰

Since the revision of the Political Funds Control Law, the salaries paid to employees of the branch associations have also been included with those of the party headquarters. In 1976 ' personnel expenses for the entire Socialist organization in Hyogo came to 26 million yen (\$130,000), in 1977 30 million yen (\$150,000). At this time, the party employed altogether 19 staff people with an average salary including twice yearly bonuses of about 1.5 million yen (\$7,500).

Despite the cooperation that the Sōhyō unions extend to the party, neither the members of the Sōhyō staff nor Sōhyō facilities are used publicly by the JSP. This is in sharp contrast to the practice of the DSP, which relies heavily upon the Dōmei organization in the second, third, and fourth HR districts. The reason is that JCP activists have been quick to block any direct participation of the unions in the management of JSP affairs.⁷¹ As a result, rent has been the next largest expense for the prefectural party. In 1958, the prefectural party was paying 18,000 yen (\$90)

a month for a small office fronting on one of Kobe's shopping areas. In 1975, the party paid 230,000 yen (\$1,150) a month for an office located on the second floor of a small office building facing the prefectural government offices and flanked by the headquarters of the LDP. The Socialists occupy the entire floor, which is divided into three rooms. One room is reserved for the chairman of the headquarters and the reception of visitors to the office. The other two are crowded with desks belonging to members of the Secretariat as well as the staff of party front groups. In 1977 the party paid 10.9 million yen (\$54,500) for the renting of this office and the 14 offices of the branch associations. The branch associations usually had small one-room offices with an average rent of around 50,000 yen (\$250) a month.

The Hyogo JSP has never allotted much money for propaganda activities. In 1958 propaganda expenses for the prefectural headquarters were only 50,000 yen (\$250), out of a total budget of 2.1 million yen (\$10,500). In 1974 they came to only 1.4 million yen (\$7,000) of a 13.4 million yen (\$67,000) budget. In contrast, the Komeito headquarters spent 71 million yen (\$355,000) in 1974, and the JSP 39 million yen (\$195,000). As discussed above, the Hyogo party made a formal commitment to increase its propaganda capabilities at its 47th Convention in 1977. The 14.8 million yen (\$74,000) spent for propaganda in that year when the income and expenditures of the headquarters and branch associations were reported together, however, fell far

short of the 62.5 million yen (\$312,500) used by the Communists in the prefecture.

The total expenditures of the JSP in Hyogo in 1977 amounted to only 78.7 million yen (\$393,500). This is small by any standard for a party that is capable in a prefecture wide contest of winning between 350,000 and 400,000 votes. Most of the money goes to salaries for a party staff of 19 and the rental of office space. Although the size of its staff and the number of offices that it maintains gives the Hyogo JSP the most well developed constituency organization in the prefecture after the Communists, this organization is far from adequate, as the discussion above about the party's Secretariat indicated, to develop and effectively sustain support for the party among interest groupings outside the labor movement where it cannot depend upon the endorsements of the top leadership.

Party Candidates

The warring left and right wings of the JSP came back together to reconstitute the Hyogo headquarters in February of 1956. The reunified party occupied a position that the JSP has not enjoyed since in the prefecture: it could boast of incumbents in eight of the 18 Hyogo HR seats and three of the six Hyogo district HC seats. Six of the party's Lower House representatives⁷² were former chairmen of some of the largest unions or union federations in Hyogo: Goto Torao (Sanyo Private Railway union),

Yamaguchi Jotaro (Hanshin Private Railway union), Yamashita Eiji (Kubota Metals Company union), Tanaka Takeo (East Harima Labor Council), Onishi Masamichi (Teachers union), and Sasaki Ryosaku (Kansai Power Company union). The two who were not union officials, Kawakami Jotaro and Yoshida Kenichi were respectively a university professor and a lawyer who had a history of involvement in the prewar socialist movement. Among the HC assemblymen, Matsuura Seiichi had headed up the Seamen union, while Kawaii Giichi had been active in the prewar tenant farmers movement. The third Matsuzawa Kenji was a university professor and a former member of the Kobe city council, who had been active in the prewar labor movement.

In the 1955 prefectural assembly elections, the then divided left and right wing parties had fielded together 41 candidates. They managed to elect 19, a number that the JSP was later to exceed only twice again: 1958 (22) and 1963 (23). Among these 19, five were former union officials, four held positions in organizations like labor credit unions that were an outgrowth of the labor movement, and five were officials in local chapters of the All Japan Farmers union. In the remaining five, four were lawyers or physicians and one the owner of a small manufacturing firm.

With the departure of the DSP in 1960, JSP representation in the Diet from Hyogo dropped somewhat: the party now held six out of 18 seats in the Lower House and two of six in the Upper House. In the House of Representatives, the party's delegation was made

up of four former union officials: Goto (Sanyo Railroad), Yamaguchi (Hanshin Railroad), Tanaka (East Harima Labor Council), and Miki Yoshio (Teachers union). It also included one university professor (Kawakami Jotaro) and a physician (Hori Masao). In the House of Councillors, university professor Matsuzawa Kenji was joined by Sano Yoshio the former chairman of the Metalworkers union. At the prefectural level, the party fielded only 29 candidates but managed, despite the loss of six incumbent assemblymen to the DSP, to increase its representation in the assembly from 22 in 1959 (the year before the split) to 23 in 1963. The party succeeded in this by nominating union officials who were capable of delivering intact the party's support base in the unions. Of the 12 new candidates elected 10 were former union officials, and the total number of incumbents in the party's prefectural delegation with union backgrounds rose to 18. The remaining five included two from the All-Japan Farmers union, two professionals, and one businessman.

By 1972, as the result of stiff competition from the Komeito and the JCP, the Socialist party in Hyogo could point to only five incumbents in the House of Representatives and one in the House of Councillors. Two of the HR members came from the unions (Tanaka and Miki) and three from the professions: Doi Takako (university instructor), Hori Masao (physician), and Kawakami Tamio (university professor). In the Upper House, the party had only the former chairman of the Kobe city Teachers union Kotani Mamoru. The JSP's

standing in the prefectural assembly was equally disturbing. The party had a delegation of only 18, down five seats from its high of 23 in 1963. In this group of incumbents, assemblymen with union backgrounds numbered 16.

Presently, the JSP's representation in the Diet from Hyogo remains unchanged from that which prevailed in 1972: the party has five members in the Lower House and one in the Upper House. One of the party's HR members Iga Sadamori is a former Teachers union official. The other four come from the professions: Kawakami Tamio, Doi Takako, Hori Masao, and Goto Shigeru (journalist). In the Upper House Kotani Mamoru from the Teachers union remains the party's sole incumbent. The Hyogo JSP now has 12 representatives in the prefectural assembly. All but one of them has come out of the union movement (see Table 31). The single exception is a leader of the Buraku Liberation League in Amagasaki city.⁷³

The backgrounds of candidates selected by the Hyogo JSP in the HR and prefectural assembly elections may seem to be moving in different directions: the number of candidates with union backgrounds has dropped greatly in Hyogo HR races, while it has risen sharply in the PA elections. But in the case of new HR candidates endorsed by the JSP since the mid-1960's closer examination shows that the pool from which the party selects its nominees has not really been broadened. Kawakami Tamio was picked for the Kobe seat after his father's death in 1966. Doi Takako was a radical intellectual long active in Hyogo party front groups who was chosen

Table 31
JSP Prefectural Assemblymen after 1979 Hyogo PA Election

Name	Background
Ota Takeshi	Kobe Steel Company union
Kanda Yasunosuke	Sogo Department Store union
Madono Tomio	Teachers union
Sugita Tetsu	Kobe City Employees union
Kamiezu Hisashi	<u>Buraku</u> Liberation League
Kaneo Katsumi	Prefectural Employees union
Kito Yoshio	Communications Workers union
Nagamoto Nobuyori	Nishinomiya City Labor Council
Yasuda Eisho	Itami City Labor Council
Katsurai Masumi	East Harima Labor Council
Sumitomo Shoji	Sanyo Railway Employees union
Murakami Asao	Teachers union

Source: Kobe Shimbun. See Note 72.

to succeed Yamaguchi Jotaro with the approval of his union, the Private Railways Employees. Goto Shigeru had served on the editorial staff of the national party newspaper Shakai Shimpō and received the endorsement of long-term fourth district incumbent Miki Yoshio's principal support base, the Teachers union. None of them could be said to be tied to the leadership of any major interest grouping outside of the Socialist's own labor constituency. In the prefectural assembly elections, the now complete dominance of the unions can be ascribed to two factors: first, the collapse of the All-Japan Farmers union that in the past had supported some Socialist candidates in the rural areas of the prefecture and second, the increasing cost of campaigning for the assembly.⁷⁴ The only candidates now able to stand as Socialists are union officials who can look to the organizational and financial support of their membership, and most important, have a job to return to in the event of their defeat.

Close affiliation with one of the important unions in Hyogo is essential for a JSP candidate, but geography plays an important role as well in all elections. Among the 19 JSP prefectural assembly candidates in 1975, 12 had been born in the district from which they stood for election. All of the seven non-native candidates stood in the large cities of Kobe, Amagasaki, and Himeiji. Even in this group, four of the seven had been born in other parts of the prefecture. In the House of Representatives elections, all six of candidates endorsed by the party in the 1976

election had been born and raised in the district which they sought to represent. Geographic origin assumes this kind of importance in candidate selection, because personal ties between the candidate and the union leadership within a district are often more effective than shared ideological goals in mobilizing the financial and organizational resources of the unions behind the party.

The union origins of many JSP candidates also does not mean that they can expect no support from groups outside of labor. As pointed out before in the case of Sano Yoshio, the party's HC representative from the Metalworkers union, successful JSP candidates have received financial and other support from normally conservative trade and professional associations. This kind of support has helped the JSP somewhat in Hyogo, but it carries with it special problems. Foremost of these is that of candidate succession. This refers to the difficulties that a party has maintaining a former incumbent's level of support when death or defeat in an election forces it to replace him with a new candidate.

The best example of the effects of the candidate succession problem upon the Hyogo JSP are the difficulties that befell the party upon the sudden death in office of its long-term HR incumbent Kawakami Jotaro. The Socialists won two of the three seats in the Kobe district in every election from 1955 through 1963. This was surprising in view of the fact that the some 80,000 members of unions supportive of the party in the city at

this time were not sufficient to guarantee such success.⁷⁵ The reason for the level of support enjoyed by the JSP was the personal popularity of Kawakami, a former professor of law at Kobe's prestigious Kansai Gakuen university, among all groups in the city.⁷⁶ This special support did not extend to the other Socialist HR candidates: Goto Torao, an official in the Private Railways Employees union, drew support exclusively from the Sōhyō federation affiliated unions; Nagae Kazuo, who left the party in 1960 to join the DSP, depended upon the votes of the right-wing Zenrō federation.⁷⁷ Kawakami's popularity also did not promote involvement in the party by groups outside the JSP's normal labor constituency: membership in the party did not increase in the 1955-1963 period nor did the union domination of leadership positions in the party change.

The party leadership in Hyogo was well aware of the personal nature of Kawakami's support in the city, and upon his death hastened to confer the nomination upon his son Tamio. In the first election after his father's death, the younger Kawakami proved equal to the task of holding for the party his father's support base: the JSP ran only 21,000 votes behind its performance in the 1963 election (see Table 32). But in 1969 the Kawakami magic had lost its power over the Kobe voter. The JSP lost 51,000 votes and failed to win even one seat in the first district. In 1972 the party regained one of the now four seats in Kobe,⁷⁸ but was forced in its straitened circumstances to endorse only

Table 32
Socialist Performance in Kobe HR Elections, 1955-1979

Year	LDP	JSP	KOM	JCP	DSP	VOTE	VOTERS
1955	136 ^a	175				311	579
1958	183	179		10		374	644
1960	174	148		13	45	381	689
1963	154	179		21	46	401	740
1967	154	158	96	33	60	504	813
1969	152	106	103	68	54	485	862
1972	188	105	96	106	39	534	923
1976	183	100	106	90	71	560	947
1979	159	78	97	93	85	521	951

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Linkai; Kōbe Shimbun October 9, 1979.

^aVote in thousands.

Kawakami as its candidate. Kawakami has since held the seat for the JSP and his name remains an important link for party officials with a past when they could nominate three candidates in this city and expect to win two of three seats. Not surprisingly, considering the character of Kawakami Jotaro's support, the beneficiaries of the Socialist collapse have been the DSP and the LDP. The DSP elected a candidate to the Diet for the first time ever in 1967, and the conservatives elected two candidates to the Diet from Kobe in 1969 for the first since the party had been formed.

It is important to note here that the great losses sustained by the JSP in Kobe did not come at the expense of its organized support base in the unions. The party continues to receive the endorsement of unions affiliated with the Sōhyō and other federations in the prefecture, and it can still count among its members and officers the elite of the labor movement. The losses came because with Kawakami Jotaro's death the party's capacity to reach out to groups beyond this constituency was weakened.

A similar situation threatens to develop in Hyogo's second district, where the party against all odds has sent two candidates to the Diet in all but two HR elections since 1952.⁷⁹ A good deal of the credit for this should go to Horo Masao, because the 80,000 members of unions supportive of the party in this district are not sufficient to generate the some 180,000 votes needed to elect two candidates in this district. Horo is a physician who claims to have been attracted to Marxism in his youth.⁸⁰ In 1955

he ran an unsuccessful campaign for the Diet as an independent with the backing of only the Amagasaki Medical Association. He was endorsed by the Socialists in 1958 and with the support of the unions based in Amagasaki has won a Diet seat in every election, except 1976 when he lost his seat by a few thousand votes. Hori is presently 63 years old, and as the decade of the 1980's unfolds the JSP will have to prepare for his retirement. In the 1979 General Election Hori won 53,000 votes in Amagasaki city, while his JSP running mate, Doi Takako, received only 12,000 (see Table 33).

Table 33
Socialist Performance in Amagasaki City in HR Elections,
1969-1979

	Hori	Doi	HC Election	PA Election
1969	38 ^a	13		41
1971			42	
1972	45	17		
1974			44	
1975				44
1976	45	18		
1977			35	
1979	53	12		38

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai; Kōbe Shimbun,
April 3 and October 9, 1974.

^aVote in thousands.

In the 1977 HC race the Socialist candidate won only 35,000 votes in Amagasaki, and in the 1979 PA elections JSP candidates did just slightly better with 38,000 votes in the city. This poor showing is a result of the party's failure to win the support of the Medical Association and other conservative groups that have supported Hori in Amagasaki for its other candidates. With his eventual retirement, Socialist support in this city may collapse as quickly as it did in Kobe leaving the party with the capacity founded on its union strength to elect only one HR candidate in the Hanshin district.

NOTES

¹For details of the party founding see Gekkan Shakaitō Henshubu, Nihon Shakaitō no Sanju-nen (1) (Tōkyō: Shakai Shimpō, 1974), pp. 29-41.

²See the platform of the JSP in Soshiki Kyoku, Nihon Shakaitō Kōryō, Kiyaku (Tōkyō: Nihon Shakaitō Chūo Honbu, 1977), pp. 18-24.

³See "Shakaishugi no Mokuteki" in ibid., pp. 31-35; for further details see "Kakushin ni Totte no Chūki Keizai Seisaku" in Gekkan Shakaitō, no. 261, July 1978.

⁴See Gekkan Shakaitō, no. 277, October 1979, pp. 100-126.

⁵Ibid., pp. 196-210.

⁶Soshiki Kyoku, op. cit., pp. 19-20. The party in this section of its platform clearly distinguishes itself from the Communists.

⁷Ibid., pp. 24-31.

⁸Matsuzawa Kenji, Watashi no Gendai Jūsō (Kobe: Tanaka Insatsū, 1964), pp. 96-97.

⁹Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, Rōdō Kumiai Meibo 1960.

¹⁰Interview with former chairman of Hyogo Sōhyō on October 5, 1978. Before 1960, member unions of the Sōhyō federation would intentionally underestimate their real membership in order to reduce the dues which they were required to pay the federation. Even today, membership figures for the large national federation may be underestimated by 10 percent to 20 percent.

¹¹Data drawn from Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, Rōdō Kumiai Meibo for 1965, 1970, and 1975.

¹²Estimates based on interview with former Hyogo Sōhyō chairman on October 5, 1978, figures used by the Kōbe Shimbun in its analyses of the JSP electoral base before HR elections in the prefecture, and information supplied by the Hyogo prefectural government labor department.

¹³Membership figures drawn from Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, Rōdō Kumiai Meibo 1977.

¹⁴Ibid., The Chūritsu Rōdō Kumiai Renraku Kaigi (Non-Aligned Unions Liaison Council) is made up of private industry unions. The federation leaves the endorsement of party candidates to its constituent unions.

¹⁵Interview with Socialist party official June 6, 1979.

¹⁶Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, Rōdō Kumiai Meibo 1977.

¹⁷Interview with Socialist party official October 5, 1978.

¹⁸Interview with Socialist party official October 1, 1978.

¹⁹Interview with Socialist party official September 19, 1978.

²⁰Hyōgo Minpō May 1974.

²¹Interview with close observer of Hyogo JSP on November 29, 1978.

²²See incidents reported in Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho, Nikyō-Minsei (Osaka: Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho, 1979), pp. 449-462.

²³Interview with chairman of major Hyogo union on May 25, 1979.

²⁴Interview with Socialist party official on June 6, 1979. The Socialists have suffered the same discrimination within the Steelworkers union as have the Communists. The success of managements' efforts to weed out JSP activists has laid the basis for closer cooperation between the Steelworkers and the DSP.

²⁵See Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai, "Senkyo Undō Hiyō no Shūshi ni Kansuru Shirabe" in Hyōgoken Kōhō, April 1955, July 1958, August 1959, January 1961, September 1962, January 1964, September 1965, March 1967, September 1968, February 1970, August 1971, February 1973, September 1974, February 1977, September 1977.

²⁶In lieu of contributions banks and credit unions often would make interest free loans to Socialist candidates or to the party. If the candidate won the loan was cancelled. Interview with knowledgeable observer of JSP on September 19, 1978.

²⁷Hori is unusual among Socialist candidates in that he is a physician. This gives him entrance to a number of groups normally closed to the JSP.

²⁸See the section in the party charter on the prefectural headquarters in Soshiki Kyoku, op. cit., pp. 46-50.

²⁹Interview with the staff of the Hyogo JSP headquarters on August 30, 1978.

³⁰For further details see Articles 14-28 of the old party charter in Kokumin Seiji Nenkanshū linkai, Kokumin Seiji Nenkanshū 1962, pp. 578-582.

³¹Information on party membership in 1959 found among papers of Imazu Kikumatsu, a prewar and postwar labor leader in Hyogo. The papers were contributed by him to and are now available at the Hyogo Prefecture Labor Movement Research Center.

³²See the third section of the new Charter in Kokumin Seiji Nenkanshū linkai, Kokumin Seiji Nenkanshū 1963, pp. 724-728.

³³Interview with Socialist party official on September 19, 1978. See note 53 for source of membership figures.

³⁴Interview with staff of Hyogo JSP on August 30, 1978.

³⁵Interview with Socialist party official on September 19, 1978.

³⁶Interview with staff of Hyogo JSP on August 30, 1978. The ten unions where party members councils have been organized: Communication Workers, Postal Workers, Local Government Employees, Private Railway Employees, National Railway Employees (Kokurō and Dōrō), Metalworkers, Service Industry, and the Food Processing unions.

³⁷The two wings of the party split over whether to support the Peace and Security treaties negotiated between Japan and the United States in 1951. See Allan Cole et al., Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 32-56.

³⁸Interview with staff of Hyogo JSP on August 30, 1978.

³⁹Discussion below based on Secretariat reports, draft resolutions, and other materials provided delegates to the 13th (1957), 22nd (1965), 25th (1966), 26th (1966), 27th (1967), 30th (1968), 31st (1969), 32nd (1969), 33rd (1970), 35th (1970), 36th (1971), 37th (1972), 39th (1973), 40th (1973), 41st (1973), 42nd (1974), 45th (1975), 46th (1976), and 47th (1977) Prefectural Conventions.

⁴⁰Interview with Hyogo JSP staff on August 30, 1978 and Socialist party official on January 29, 1979.

⁴¹Interview with Hyogo JSP on August 30, 1978.

⁴²Discussion below, except where indicated, is based on materials provided to delegates to prefectural party conventions, reports in the newspaper of the prefectural party Hyōgo Shimpō (Hyogo News), interviews with the staff of the Hyogo JSP on August 30, 1978 and September 8, 1978, and interviews with Socialist party officials on September 14, 1978, September 19, 1978, September 27, 1978, October 5, 1978, October 13, 1978, November 14, 1978, January 29, 1979, and June 6, 1979.

⁴³An excellent discussion of the history and present activities of this Association nationally can be found in Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., pp. 651-746; in English see references in Cole et al., op. cit., pp. 88 and 347.

⁴⁴Efforts to reconcile these two groups at the 47th Party Convention in April 1978 failed, see Hyōgo Shimpō April 15, 1978.

⁴⁵Hyōgoken Shōkō-bu, Kyōdō Kumiai, Shōkō Dantai Meibo 1978.

⁴⁶There are 1,135 commercial, industrial, and trade associations registered with the Hyogo Commerce department (1978).

⁴⁷An excellent discussion of the organization and goals of the Labor University can be found in Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., pp. 747-754.

⁴⁸The signboards were to be put up in every neighborhood and used to announce meetings with party assemblymen, report on party activities in the assemblies, and display party posters. The staff admitted on September 8, 1978 that not much progress had been achieved.

⁴⁹This campaign had party members rise early several mornings each month to participate in party rallies staged in front of the principal train stations in the prefecture.

⁵⁰See Kōbe Shimbun October 21, December 25, December 27 (1967), January 17, February 16, February 22, March 4, March 6, March 9, March 25, April 1 (1968).

⁵¹See party Charter on membership duties and privileges in Soshiki Kyoku, op. cit., pp. 38-41.

⁵²Ibid., p. 66. Many of the unions in Hyogo are affiliated with the national party, e.g., Private Railway Employees, Postal Workers, Communication Workers, and Coal Miners unions. The Kikkoman union was affiliated with the party when its chairman was as a Socialist candidate in the Takasago city assembly election. Interview with Socialist party official on January 29, 1979.

⁵³Data on membership drawn from materials made available by Hyogo JSP except as noted: data for 1947, 1948, 1951, 1952, 1958, and 1959 discovered among Imazu Kikumatsu papers (see note 31); data for 1960-1964 drawn from Kokumin Seiji Nenkan 1962-1965.

⁵⁴Materials provided to delegates of first convention of the Hyogo DSP in June 1960. These were made available by the staff of Hyogo DSP.

⁵⁵Source: Asahi Shimbun, March 2, 1978. National membership of the party at the time was 43,918.

⁵⁶Interview with Socialist party official on September 19, 1978 and January 29, 1979.

⁵⁷Interview with Socialist party official on June 6, 1979.

⁵⁸Atsukata Ichio, "Shakaitō Saisei e no Teigen: Hyakumannin no Tō," Asahi Janaru 19 (51) December 16, 1977, pp. 6-22.

⁵⁹Information, except as cited, on party officers' identities and backgrounds gathered from materials provided to delegates to prefectural party conventions cited above and campaign biographies found in analyses of local and national elections by the Kōbe Shimbun in the period 1955-1978. Clarification was requested on a number of points during interviews with the party staff and officials.

⁶⁰Discussion drawn from Matsuzawa Kenji, op. cit., pp. 143-146.

⁶¹The party held 18 seats going into the election and emerged with only 11, as the result of a strong showing by the Komeito.

⁶² Interview with Socialist party official September 19, 1978.

⁶³ Interview with Socialist party official on January 29, 1979.

⁶⁴ Information about JSP finances in Hyogo for the period 1955 comes from three sources. One is the reports submitted by the party to the Hyogo Election Commission and published periodically in Hyōgoken Kōhō under the title, "Seiji Dantai no Shūshi Hōkokusho no Yoshi." Unfortunately, there is a gap in this data between 1958 and 1972. The materials available are for the years 1956-1958 and 1972-1977. This permits a comparison of the pattern of party income and expenditures at the start and finish of the 20 year period dealt with in this study, but makes determination of what intervened difficult. A second source are two reports made by the Hyogo party's Audit committee to the 1958 prefectural convention that were found among the papers of Imazu Kikumatsu (see Note 31). The first report lists party income and expenditures for the preceeding year (1957), and the second projects revenues and expenses for the coming year. These reports proved useful, because they were more detailed than those presented to the Elections Commission. A third and final source are the more general reports on the state of party financial affairs contained in materials distributed to delegates to the Party Conventions between 1965 and 1977. Party officials and members of the Hyogo JSP staff were quite reluctant in interviews to talk specifically about party finances, but they proved helpful in clarifying some points.

⁶⁵ Interview with Socialist party official on June 6, 1979.

⁶⁶ The assumption made was that average JSP member paid 18,000 yen (\$90.00) in dues each year. With a membership of 1,325 this results in revenues for the party of 23.8 million yen (\$119,000). In the past, the national party received about 10 percent of member dues. If this still holds true, the Hyogo party should have derived 21.4 million yen (\$107,000) from dues paid by party members in the prefecture.

⁶⁷ For details of the law see Jichishō Senkyobu, Seiji Shikin Kiseihō Kaisetsu (Tokyo: Chihō Zaimu Kyōkai, 1976), p. 3.

⁶⁸ Because the twice yearly bonuses for the staff are paid in July and December, they were not included in the accounting cycle. As a result, the 4.3 million yen paid is substantially less than one-half of the 12 million yen in personnel expenses claimed by the headquarters in 1975.

⁶⁹Interview with Socialist party official September 27, 1978. In addition to these nine employees, the chairmen of the party's Youth and Education-Propaganda departments were also engaged in full-time party work. Their salaries were paid by the Socialist Youth League and the Labor University.

⁷⁰One of the employees in the prefectural headquarters had been fired from Kawasaki Heavy Industries because of his union activities.

⁷¹Interview with Socialist party official on September 19, 1978.

⁷²The discussion below is based on the campaign biographies filed by party candidates with the Hyogo Elections Commission and background information on candidates published by the Kōbe Shimbun as part of its coverage of local and national elections between 1955 and 1977. A number of points were clarified in interviews with the party staff and officials.

⁷³The Socialists have always been closely connected with this group, and especially since the Asada faction within the Buraku movement threw Communist activists out of the Buraku Liberation League this organization has in turn cooperated with Socialist candidates. As suggested by the union backgrounds of the other PA candidates, the Buraku have been one of the few groups outside the union movement to which the party has been able to look for regular support. For more information see Chong-do Han and Christopher Lapp, "Japanese Politics of Equality in Transition: The Case of the Burakumin," op. cit.

⁷⁴A DSP staff member estimated that it might cost a new candidate between 8 and 10 million yen (\$40-50,000) to run for a prefectural assembly seat. Interview on May 10, 1979.

⁷⁵Source for data on union membership: Kōbe Shimbun election analyses for 1955, 1958, 1960, and 1963 HR elections.

⁷⁶Interview with Socialist party official on September 14, 1978.

⁷⁷Zen Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Kaigi (All-Japan Trade Union Congress) was organized by right wing unions dissatisfied with the Sōhyō position on the Peace Treaty with the United States and membership in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. It was the organizational predecessor of the Dōmei federation organized in 1964.

⁷⁸Because of population growth, the number of HR assemblymen elected from Kobe was increased from three to four in 1967 and four to five in 1976.

⁷⁹The party failed to elect two candidates in only the 1967 and 1976 elections.

⁸⁰Interview with Hori published in Kōbe Shimbun January 10, 1967.

CHAPTER IV

THE HYOGO DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST FEDERATION

The Democratic Socialist Party was organized on January 25, 1960 to work for the realization of a democratic socialist society in Japan. The party is opposed to the totalitarian solutions pursued by the Communists and pledges itself to the task of building a socialist society without sacrificing basic human rights.¹ The DSP's economic program calls for the development and implementation of a comprehensive economic plan that would balance economic growth with the enhancement of Japan's social welfare resources. The plan is based on the nationalization of certain key industries and the government regulation of financial institutions.² In the area of foreign policy, the DSP identifies Japan as a member of the Western alliance. It believes that Japan's defense capabilities should and can be strengthened while retaining Article 9 of the postwar Constitution, and favors the retention of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty with some reservations.³ The DSP is a minority party. In the foreseeable future it could come to power only as the member of a coalition government. The party has stated that it is willing to cooperate with any political party that supports the postwar Constitution, pledges itself to the building of a welfare society, and is committed to the preservation of parliamentary

government.⁴ In practical terms this has meant that the party will work with all but the far right-wing of the LDP and the Communist parties.

The Hyogo federation of the DSP was founded on June 5th of 1960 by some 20 Socialist party local and national assemblymen and the leadership of the Seamen, Kansai Power Company, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and other Zenrō federation unions.⁵ The party reached the peak of its influence in 1968 when it controlled two seats in the House of Councillors and four in the House of Representatives from Hyogo. At present, the party has three seats in the Lower House but none in the Upper.

The Party Interest Group Base

Union Support for the Hyogo DSP

The DSP can always count on receiving the endorsement of the unions affiliated with the Hyogo Dōmei Federation in elections. The Dōmei federation is the organizational successor of Zenrō, the union federation that supported the right-wing of the Japan Socialist Party during the 1950's. At the time of the formation of the DSP in Hyogo, Zenrō membership was officially reported as 62,000.⁶ As was the case with the Sōhyō unions in the 1950's, this figure may substantially underestimate the actual membership of the federation. Accurate membership figures for the right-wing unions are available only after the founding of the Dōmei federation in 1964. In that year, membership was 98,000.

Conservations with labor leaders active at this time indicate that it is not unreasonable to use a figure of 88,000 as a measure of Zenrō strength within Hyogo in 1960.⁷

The Dōmei federation in the prefecture has grown only slightly in its 16 years of existence. Between 1964 and 1970 it added 34,000 members, but since then membership has increased hardly at all: in 1977 Dōmei membership in Hyogo was 135,000, representing 23 percent of all organized workers.⁸ Geographically, Dōmei membership is concentrated in Hyogo within the seaside industrial belt that extends from Amagasaki in Eastern Hyogo to Aioi in the west. In 1977, the Kobe district council of the Dōmei federation reported a membership of 48,000. The four Dōmei area councils in the second electoral district had a combined membership of 17,000, the third district 30,000, the fourth district 17,000, and the fifth district 7,000. The total membership of the district councils came to less than 135,000 since unions like the Postal and Railroad Workers whose membership is scattered throughout the prefecture affiliate directly with the Hyogo chapter. Interviews with members of the Hyogo DSP staff indicated that these figures provided a good estimate of the number of Dōmei members who were registered voters for every HR district but the fifth where the number of union voters is actually about 15,000.⁹ This means that Dōmei votes alone are not sufficient in any of the Hyogo HR districts to elect a DSP candidate outright.

The principal Dōmei unions in Hyogo include: the Shipbuilding and Heavy Industries Workers union (Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Hitachi Shipbuilding, and Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries unions) with a membership of 43,000, the Seamen union (16,000), Textile Workers (16,000), Metalworkers (11,000), Kansai Power Company union (6,000), Postal Workers (3,900), Railroad Workers (3,800), Chemical Workers (3,800), Food Processing Employees (3,600), Transport Workers (2,700), and Agricultural Cooperatives Employees (2,400). The votes of the Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Metalworkers, and the Seamen unions usually provide the electoral base for DSP candidates in the first, second, and third districts. The Textile Workers union is the most important in the third district. Kansai Power, the Railroad Workers, and Ishikawajima Harima comprise the party's limited base in the fourth district. The Agricultural Cooperative Employees and Kansai Power are an important source of support in the fifth district.

Another source of support for the DSP in Hyogo are the unions affiliated with the Chūritsu federation, the Sōhyō affiliated but rightward leaning Steelworkers, and the 1,000-odd small company unions that are not members of any of the three national federations.¹⁰ As discussed in Chapter III, which of the unions within this group will support the party depends upon the success that right-wing trade unionists have in winning elections to their executive committees, the bodies that have the power to determine

candidate endorsements. Over time, the Hyogo DSP has been most successful in gaining the support of the 33,000 member Kawasaki Steel union.¹¹ In the usual case, however, unions that fall within this group will endorse the candidates of the JSP as well as the DSP to their membership.

Union endorsements are important to the party, because they give it access to the union membership. As noted before, parties endorsed by a union can put up posters within the work area, use union meeting halls for candidate speeches to the membership, and have published articles about their candidate in the union paper. The stringent requirements of the electoral law and the limited coverage of elections given by the mass media combine to make these some of the few opportunities that the DSP has to influence the working man's vote directly. The endorsement of a union like the Agricultural Cooperative Employees in Hyogo is also useful to the party because it gives the DSP access to the farm constituency which the cooperatives serve. Sasaki Ryosaku, the long-term DSP incumbent in the rural fifth district, has skillfully used the help of this union to counterbalance the endorsement of the LDP by the cooperative leadership.¹²

The unions are not usually an important source of campaign monies for the Hyogo DSP.¹³ The Dōmei unions will at election time request from their members a 1,000 yen (\$5.00) to 2,000 yen (\$10.00) contribution to the campaign, but the party can expect a high rate of subscription only from the particular union or industry group

that the candidate belongs to. Unions, of course, can offer other types of non-financial support beyond a simple endorsement. In the 1950's the Zenrō unions often encouraged their members to serve as volunteers in the campaigns of right-wing socialist candidates. Today, however Dōmei members are more reluctant to sacrifice their leisure hours for campaign work and, when they do, they may expect that the party will cover the cost of their meals, transportation, and some after-hours socializing. Under these conditions, many DSP candidates report that it is less expensive to hire part-time student help.

The unions are probably most useful to the DSP as a means to encourage corporate cooperation with and financial support for the party's candidates.¹⁴ The party holds out to management the promise of smoother relations with the company unions and argues the danger of a growth of JCP or JSP strength in the union movement and the local and national assemblies. Corporate cooperation takes the form of permitting party candidates to address the work-force on company time, allowing employees to take time off with pay to help in the campaign, and sanctioning the active participation of company officers in the support groups of some DSP candidates. The Kansai Power Company, for example, invited Sasaki Ryosaku, the party's chairman, to speak to its workers during the 1974 Upper House campaign and encouraged these employees to take off a half-day with full pay any time during a two-week period in order that they might visit relatives and friends to request their

support for the DSP. In the 1976 HR election, a number of section and department chiefs from Ishikawajima Harima served as officers in the DSP's fourth district candidate's organization.

Corporate contributions are either funneled through the local unions or the national party's Tokyo-based financial support group, the Political Harmony Council (Seiwa Kyōkai). Important contributors to this fund from Hyogo have been Kobe Steel, Kawasaki Steel, Taiyo-Kobe Bank, Takeda Pharmaceutical, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and the Kansai Power Company.¹⁵ All of them have unions that are members of Dōmei or have a strong right-wing faction.

These contributions, in a strange reversal of roles, are sometimes used by the Hyogo DSP to firm up its support among the union leadership. During the 1977 Upper House election, a DSP prefectural assemblyman from Kobe was arrested on charges of passing a 500,000 yen (\$2,500) bribe to the branch chief of the Kawasaki steel union in return for his support in the campaign. The fact of corporate contributions and other forms of cooperation with the DSP, however, does not signify that big business is willing to support the party as an alternative to the LDP. Corporate contributions to the LDP's Citizens Political Council have often been 10 times the size of those made to the DSP group.¹⁶ In elections, corporate interests in Hyogo have only backed DSP candidates when this has clearly served to weaken the JSP or the Communists.¹⁷

Support for the DSP from Outside the Union Movement

The DSP cannot depend upon the regular endorsement of any organized groups in Hyogo such as trade, farm, or professional associations outside the union movement. Individual DSP candidates, however, may sometimes expect considerable support. Indeed given the inadequacy of the party's DSP base, this has been an essential element in party electoral victories. A review of the contributions to their campaigns reported by DSP HR candidates between 1960 and 1976 indicates in some part the balance between the support received by them from the unions and these other constituencies in Hyogo.¹⁸

In the first district, Nagae Katzuo had been a JSP endorsed candidate in the 1958 election. In that campaign he had received contributions from the Seamen union and the Textile Workers. After leaving the Socialist party, he and later his son Nagae Kazuhito received contributions in every election from the Dōmei affiliated Mitsubishi Heavy Industries union, Nada Seikyō (a consumer cooperative that operates a large chain of supermarkets in the Kansai area), the Hyogo Labor Credit union, and the Hyogo Chapter of Dōmei.

In the third district, Yoshida Kenichi had also been nominated by the JSP in 1958. He stood for office until his defeat in the 1972 election. He was succeeded by Shiota Susumu, an official in the Labor Ministry. Yoshida, like Nagae, had received support from the Seamen union and the Textile Workers before leaving the JSP.

In 1960, he added to this support the Kansai Power union, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries union, the Daiwa Rubber union, and the Hyogo Medical Association. In the late 1960's, Yoshida also reported contributions from the Hyogo chapters of the Liquor Retailers Association and the Japan Overland Shippers Association. His successor Shiota was limited to union support: the Metalworkers union, the Seamen union, and the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries union.

The DSP has not yet been able to elect a candidate from the fourth district of Hyogo. In the six elections between 1963 and 1976, it fielded five different candidates. These candidates received the backing of the Seamen union, Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries union, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries union, Hyogo Dōmei, the Takeda Pharmaceutical union, and the occasional support of the Hyogo Pharmacists Association and the Himeiji City Medical Association.

The fifth district of Hyogo has sent Sasaki Ryosaku to the Diet in every election since 1955. In his first election, Sasaki relied heavily upon the financial backing of the Kansai Power and Osaka Gas Employees unions. After his break with the JSP, he ran with the backing of these unions as well as that of the Textile Workers union, the Hyogo Dōmei federation, and the conservative Agricultural Policy Promotion Association. By the time of the 1976 election, Sasaki had fashioned a peculiar coalition behind him that included union groups such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

union, the United Shipbuilders union, the Seamen union, the Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries union, and such traditionally conservative groups as the Petroleum Products Association, the National Trucking Council, and the National Sake Brewers Association.

These reports by the candidates to the Hyogo Election Commission show the solid support extended by the Dōmei federated unions to DSP candidates in the prefecture. They also reveal that financial support was available from conservative groups for the DSP, but that it was candidate-specific and generally available only to incumbents. The reports filed with the Commission, of course, do not tell the whole story.¹⁹ Nagae Kazuhito in the first district is known to receive contributions from a 70 member group of small businesses, the owners of which were classmates of his at Kansai Gakuen university in Kobe. The second district's Yamashita working through the Kubota Steel company developed support among conservative groups in Amagasaki and Nishinomiya cities. Sasaki Ryosaku, because of his position as chairman of the national DSP, has received help from the Sōkagakkai in the Tamba district. Nevertheless, the pattern of support for the DSP has remained essentially the same. Groups outside the union movement have been selective in their endorsement of DSP candidates. Although they may work with a particular candidate, they see their long-term interests as being served by one of the other political parties, usually the LDP.

The Party Branch Structure

When the Democratic Socialist party was first established in Hyogo its organization consisted of a prefectural federation (shibu rengokai) and party branches (shibu).²⁰ One branch was to be organized in each city and town in the prefecture. Additional branches could also be established within the unions when there were 30 or more party members. Since the party in its first years concentrated its efforts on electing assemblymen to the national Diet, the 6th National Party Congress encouraged the establishment of district councils (senkyo-ku rengokai) in each of the HR districts to coordinate the activities of the party branches in elections.²¹ But after the party's crushing defeat in the 1972 General Election,²² the national party initiated a thorough reform of its constituency organization with the purpose of increasing party strength in the local assemblies as well as the national Diet. The 17th Party Congress (1973) reforms gave the party a four tier organizational structure in Hyogo: prefectural federation, district council, branch associations (sō-shibu), and branch.²³

The prefectural federation serves to carry out the decisions of the national party congress and to coordinate the activities of the five district councils in Hyogo. It maintains close contacts with the DSP constituency in the Dōmei federation, supervises the party's delegations in the Hyogo and Kobe assemblies, and manages local and national elections in the prefecture.²⁴ The Hyogo federation is located in a one-room office in downtown Kobe.

It has only one full-time organizer and lacks a formal Secretariat structure. Responsibility for party activities are divided up among the party's assemblymen on an adhoc basis by the federation's governing body, the Executive committee.

There are five district councils in Hyogo, one in each of the five HR districts. They are all headed by the party's national assembly candidate or incumbent in the district and act principally to coordinate the activities of the Dōmei unions within the district in elections. Although the Kobe district council in Hyogo shares an office with the prefectural federation and has one full-time staff member of its own, the councils in the second through fifth districts find space in the local Dōmei federation chapters. The party has hired a woman part-time to answer the telephone and take care of the councils' correspondence in the second and third districts. This is handled for the DSP on a part-time basis by one of the Dōmei organizers in the fourth and fifth districts.

The branch associations can be established whenever there are two or more party branches within a prefectural assembly district. Before the 1973 reform, nearly all of the DSP city and town branches were found in the Dōmei unions. The branch associations were organized with an explicitly geographic focus in order to develop support for the party among other constituencies and supervise the party's efforts in mayoral and prefectural assembly elections. The Hyogo party, however, has not been able to

establish an extensive network of branch associations in the prefecture: in 1979 there were only six DSP branch associations. Three of them were to be found in the wards of Kobe and one each in Takarazuka, Akashi, and Nishinomiya cities. They had been organized only in those areas where the party had an incumbent member of the Hyogo or Kobe assemblies, and they served mainly as the personal campaign apparatus of these candidates.

DSP branches can now be formed in any residential area or workplace where there are five or more party members. They are considered to be the basic unit of the party organization. Their members are expected to work together to increase the membership of the party and the circulation of the party newspaper, the Shukan Minsha (The Weekly Social-Democrat), and to cooperate with DSP candidates for political office. The reality is quite different. In 1979 there were 42 DSP branches in Hyogo prefecture. Nearly all of them were located within the Dōmei unions. The chairmen of these branches were invariably DSP city or town assemblymen. Their members were drawn from the closest supporters of these assemblymen and were principally concerned with the reelection of their own candidate: it was reported that they would help out in the campaigns of other DSP candidates only reluctantly.²⁵

It is important to note that not all members of the DSP belonged to a party branch. DSP members in the prefecture are enrolled through the district councils. These are the bodies that

maintain the rosters of party members and collect dues. Their members are in part drawn directly from the executive committees of the Dōmei unions located in the HR districts. These officials are not necessarily members of the branches organized around a particular DSP local assembly candidate. The formal organizational structure of the party in Hyogo thus extends to the branch level but, in practice, it is the district councils that serve as the centers for party activity. The branch associations and the branches amount to little more than the personal organizations or kōenkai of individual party candidates, and often do not last beyond their incumbency. When a candidate retires or is defeated, the branch association or branch in his neighborhood or place of work will sometimes be dissolved.

Party Decisionmaking Organs

The federation congress is the highest decisionmaking body for the DSP in Hyogo. The party has convened 19 prefectural congresses since the party's inception.²⁶ The congresses have assembled on the average of once a year, but the length of time between them has varied from nine months between the 4th and 5th congresses and 16 months between the 14th and 15th congresses. The timing of the Hyogo congress will depend on the scheduling of local elections and the date of the national party meeting. Officially, delegates to the congress are to be selected on a proportional basis. In Hyogo, however, this has not been

rigidly adhered to. The congresses on the whole have been relatively quiet affairs, and the real problem has been to get a respectable turnout: in recent years, 150-200 members have participated in the prefectural congresses. The business of the congress is to review the report of the Executive committee on the party's activities since the last congress, receive the report of the Audit committee on party finances, pass resolutions on matters of concern to the party membership, and elect a new group of party officers.

When the prefectural congress is not in session, its powers are to be exercised by a Central committee (chūo-iinkai). The committee is supposed to be called into session at least quarterly and operate as a check on the power of the Executive committee. In Hyogo, membership on the committee has been roughly apportioned among the five district councils and numbered about 75. Election to the committee is prized for the public recognition that goes along with it, rather than the opportunity which it provides for participation in party decisionmaking. The committee has met in Hyogo only about once a year, usually a month or two before the party congress, in order to preview the report of the Executive committee to the congress, which it has always accepted unanimously.

The decisionmaking functions of the Central committee have been largely taken over in the prefecture by an adhoc body called the Extraordinary Executive committee (kakudai shikkō-iinkai). This committee was established because the Central committee like

the party congress is a formal decisionmaking organ of the party and, as such, announcements of the resolutions and reports to be considered at the meeting have to be sent out for the consideration of the committeemen at least two weeks in advance. This rather cumbersome procedure has made it difficult to convene the Central committee on short notice. The Extraordinary Executive committee is composed of the party's Executive committee and several additional representatives from each of the party's district councils. It meets several times a year, usually to settle upon party election strategy. Since it is not a formal organ of the party, approval of any decisions that it might take must wait the convening of the Central committee or the prefectural congress. Its purpose is to mobilize support behind actions taken by the Executive committee in order to speed up their implementation at the district level.

The Hyogo Executive committee (shikkō-iinkai) is made up of the chairman of the federation, the vice-chairmen, the secretary-general, and the executive committeemen. Neither number nor proportionality is important in determining the size or the make up of the committee. There have been as few as 25 and as many as 34 members of this committee. In 1979 there were 31 members: nine from Kobe, six from the Hanshin area, three from East Harima, six from West Harima, and nine from Tamba. The most important factor in the selection of committee members has often been who among the membership had the time to serve the party. The Executive committee

meets once a month. It takes responsibility for the day to day affairs of the party and the supervision of the party staff. It is not a body that makes decisions by a strict majority vote, but functions instead as a place where the leadership of the party from the five HR districts and the unions can meet to deal with its organizational and electoral problems. Decisions reached by this committee become party policy. The congress and the Central committee have never seriously questioned its authority.

Despite the predominant role played in party decisionmaking by the Executive committee, the DSP in Hyogo is nevertheless scrupulous in its respect for the formal prerogatives of the party congress and the Central committee. The election of party officers, the presentation of the next year's budget, and the nomination of party candidates all must take place at the congress. Any amendments to these decisions before the next party congress must be approved by the Central committee. The large grant of formal power to the party congress and the Central committee contrasts sharply with role assigned these bodies by the other parties, but mirrors the organizational structure of the DSP's constituency in the Dōmei federation. The unions give great formal deference to the ideal of rank and file control. The farm and business organizations behind the LDP, the Gakkai, and the Communist front groups are just the opposite: the mechanisms available for rank and file control of the leadership are quite limited.

The Party Secretariat

The Hyogo DSF does not have a formally constituted party Secretariat. This departure from the normal pattern of party organization in Hyogo is consistent with the nature of the party's Dōmei support base. The Hyogo federation operates out of the offices of the Dōmei district liaison councils in the HR districts and has relied heavily upon them to mobilize the party's vote on election day. Unlike the JSP, which faces a challenge to its control of the Sōhyō organization from the JCP, or the Komeito, which has been criticized for its close ties with the Gakkai, the DSP is under few constraints in its use of the unions for political purposes. It has, consequently, had little incentive to create a formal Secretariat structure.

This should not suggest that DSP assemblymen lack organizational titles to wear at election time. The Hyogo federation is generous in giving to its assemblymen party offices tailored to the political image that they wish to strike in their campaigns.²⁸ The positions, however, carry with them no formal authority in the party. The Executive committee does set up special committees to research a problem and report back to it with recommendations, but there is no formal division of organizational responsibilities in the Hyogo party.

Party Front Groups

The national DSP has attempted to work through a number of front groups to increase its membership and influence among special targeted constituencies in Japan. The officers of these groups have usually been DSP party members and their finances have been heavily dependent upon party contributions. Because of the weakness of its Secretariat, the Hyogo party has had very limited success in establishing chapters of these groups in the prefecture.²⁹

The Hyogo chapter of the Japan Democratic Socialist Student Alliance (Nihon Minshushakaishugi Gakusei Dōmei) was founded in 1967 at the height of the disorders that had closed many Japanese university campuses. The organization was pledged to preserve freedom of expression in the universities and to cooperate with the DSP in the creation of a democratic socialist society. The group at present has a national membership of only 250 with the largest number to be found in Tokyo, Nagoya, and Fukuoka. The Hyogo chapter is now defunct, although there is some interest in trying to revive it among the party leadership.

The Japan Democratic Womens Association (Nihon Minshu Fujinkai) was organized by the DSP nationally in 1961. The group concerns itself with the raising of women's awareness of political and economic issues and agitating for greater welfare expenditures. It never took firm root in Hyogo prefecture until 1978. Before then, women's participation in the party had been mediated through

the electoral support groups of the party's two women candidates for the Hyogo district House of Councillors. It was only after their defeats in the 1974 and 1977 elections that the Hyogo chapter was formally constituted. Hamamoto Ritsuko, a city assembly member from Kobe, was named the first chair-woman and the wives of prefectural and national candidates for office in the party have played a large part in organizing the group and have dominated its executive committee. Current membership is around 200 in the prefecture.

The Democratic Small Businesses Political Alliance (Minshu Chūshōkigyō Seiji Renmei) was organized in Hyogo in February of 1967. The purpose of the group is to provide an organizational framework for the rallying of small businesses behind the union-based DSP. The group has a membership of 7,000 nationwide and its chairman, Kasuga Ikko, is a former chairman of the national DSP. The Hyogo chapter has a membership of only 70 firms, all of which are located in Kobe. It functions only to raise money for the party's HR candidate in the first district, Nagae Kazuhito.

The DSP's failure to establish an effective network of front groups once more underlines its nearly complete dependence upon the Hyogo chapter of the Dōmei federation for the mobilization of its constituency at election time. Although the party's assemblymen are able on an individual basis to garner support from groups outside the labor movement, the Hyogo federation has no formal organizational ties with them.

Party Membership

The DSP welcome into the party as members people from all classes of Japanese society. In its charter, the party specifically rejects the idea that it represents the interests of a particular class or that its membership comprise the vanguard of a new social order.³⁰ Membership in the DSP is formally extended to anyone who supports the party's platform and returns an application for membership. Recommendations from current party members are not required. The district councils have the right to reject or approve these applications, but their decisions can be reviewed by higher party organs.³¹ The DSP platform states explicitly that a member is not required to put party interests over individual values.³² The party does require, however, that for a member to remain in good standing he or she must observe the party charter, pay party dues, read the party newspaper, participate regularly in party activities, and support party candidates for local and national office. Party members who fall more than six months behind in their dues may be expelled. Party members have the right to use party forums (publications and congresses) for the discussion of party policy, put forward proposals for discussion before any party organ, and participate in party elections.³³

Organizations such as labor unions may affiliate themselves with the party, if they subscribe to the party platform and agree to pay a party fee based on the size of their membership. National organizations are to be affiliated directly with the

party headquarters; others are to affiliate with the prefectural federations. There are only two unions affiliated directly with the Hyogo federation, the 568 member Osaka Gas Employees and 446 member Takeda Pharmaceutical unions. A number of the unions active in the prefecture, however, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the Textile Workers, and the Chemical Workers unions are affiliated with the national party.³⁴

Hyogo prefecture in 1960 seemed to be a place where the new DSP might prosper, because it presented the party with the opportunity to take over the Japan Socialist Party organization nearly intact. The Hyogo JSP in the year before the DSP break-away had a membership of 1,409. Within this group, nearly 900 members could be identified as supportive of the party's right-wing leadership based on the positions that they took during the previous division of the socialist movement in Hyogo between 1952 and 1956. As discussed before,³⁵ the DSP failed to take full advantage of this opportunity because its leadership could not persuade Kawakami Jotaro, the former national chairman of the right-wing party and a Lower House representative from Kobe, to join with them in leaving the JSP. The majority of the 900 JSP members, to whom the Hyogo DSP looked for support, had affiliated themselves with the right wing at the time of the schism less out of an ideological commitment than because of their loyalty to the charismatic Kawakami. His refusal to join the DSP doomed its chances of taking with it a sizeable part of the JSP membership in Hyogo. At the time

of the party's formal organization in June of 1960, it was joined by only 425 former JSP members.³⁶

The new Hyogo federation at its first congress set for itself the goal of increasing membership in the prefecture to 3,000 in the next year. The target was hopelessly unrealistic, given the 425 member JSP base of the party and the fact that Socialist party membership in the prefecture had exceeded 3,000 only once before (3,006 in 1947). Although membership figures are not available for the party after its first year, dues paying membership in Hyogo came to only 795 in April of 1962 (see Table 34).

Table 34

DSP Membership in Hyogo Prefecture, 1960-1978

Year	Members	Year	Members
1960	425	1974	827
1961	unavailable	1975	987
1962	795	1976	unavailable
1963-1972	unavailable	1977	841
1973	850	1978	888

Source: Hyogo DSP, see Note 36.

During the decade, between 1963 and 1973, the reports of the prefectural Audit committee to the party congress indicate that the Hyogo DSP received no income from member dues: its expenses

during this period were covered by contributions from party candidates and assessments by the federation of the district councils.³⁷ Since the regular payment of dues is listed in the party charter as a requirement of membership, DSP membership in Hyogo prefecture at this time was technically zero. Practically, although no records are available since dues were not collected, the active members probably fluctuated between 600 and 800 members.³⁸

After the DSP's defeat in the 1972 General Election, when it was reduced to one seat in the Lower House from Hyogo, the prefectural federation set about the rebuilding of the party organization. The first order of business was to bring up to date the list of party members in the prefecture by requiring all current members to register again with the district councils in their area. In May of 1973, 673 members had registered with the party and by the end of the year this figure had climbed to 850. The federation next enforced the payment of dues as a condition of continued membership. By December of 1974, 827 members were listed as having paid their dues in full, and in January of 1978 dues-paying membership was reported by the federation to be 888. Yet this still made the Hyogo party only the ninth largest federation in the nation,³⁹ a position that was a source of some embarrassment to the local party because it was the home base of the national party chairman Sasaki Ryosaku (see Table 35).

Table 35
Membership of the 10 Largest DSP Federations in 1978

Prefecture	Members	Prefecture	Members
Aichi	2,927	Kanagawa	1,204
Osaka	2,595	Hiroshima	1,130
Tokyo	2,425	Kyoto	1,044
Shizuoka	1,524	HYOGO	888
Hokkaido	1,500	Niigata	872

Source: Hyogo DSP, see Note 39.

About two-thirds of the present Hyogo DSP membership are members of the unions affiliated with the Dōmei federation. The majority of this group are on the executive committees of these unions. Their commitment to the party is in many cases organizational, rather than individual. When these members leave their union positions, many of them will also leave the party.⁴⁰ The next largest group are members that belong to Sōhyō or Chūritsu affiliated unions. These members are usually officers within their unions and often leaders of minority factions on the executive boards of unions dominated by JSP members. The nominally Sōhyō affiliated Kawasaki Steel union membership make up the largest portion of this group. The remainder of the DSP membership is composed of management-level personnel in a few local businesses, shopowners, and women. The size of this last group as

a percentage of total membership tends to rise and fall in accordance with the schedule of local assembly elections in Hyogo. At election time, local assemblymen are encouraged to enroll a number of their non-union supporters in the party in return for the DSP endorsement.⁴¹ The record number of members (987) that the party had enrolled at the time of the 1975 prefectural assembly elections was due to this.

The figures available on the geographic distribution of the party membership (see Table 36) show that the largest number of

Table 36
Distribution of DSP Membership in Hyogo, 1978

District	Members	District	Members
Kobe	274	West Harima	139
Hanshin	150	Tamba	179
East Harima	131		

Source: Hyogo DSP.

party members can be found in Kobe (274) followed by the Tamba area (179). These figures generally follow the distribution of the Dōmei membership and the strength of the party's local assembly delegation in each district. The Tamba figures are slightly out of line, because of the incorporation of a part of party chairman Sasaki Ryosaku's kōenkai into the membership.⁴²

The membership of the DSP is the smallest of all the parties in Hyogo. Yet the strategic positions in the labor movement controlled by this membership have allowed the party to receive at the polls as many votes as the more organizationally powerful JCP. The stagnation in the growth of the Dōmei federation in the early 1970's, however, forced the Hyogo DSP to try to recruit new members more aggressively. This effort began in 1973 with the re-registration of the membership, the enforcement of dues collection, and the incorporation into the branch structure of the party the campaign organizations of party assemblymen. But seven years later, it has yet to bear any real fruit. This lack of success is not surprising. The leadership of conservative groups in Hyogo are reluctant to participate in a union-dominated party like the DSP for fear that their interests will not be well-served. Furthermore individuals, whatever their ideological inclinations, have little incentive to join the party because the Hyogo federation does not have the organizational structure necessary to sustain this kind of membership. The district councils serve mainly to coordinate the activities of the union leadership in HR elections and the party branch associations and branches exist only as a part of the kōenkai of local DSP assemblymen.

Party Leadership

The major party officers in the DSP Hyogo federation are the chairman, vice-chairmen, and secretary-general. These officers

are elected at the prefectural congress for a two year term along with the members of the Executive committee.⁴³

In the 19 years between 1960 and 1979, the DSP in Hyogo has had six chairmen. Sasaki Ryosaku, a fifth district Diet member and currently national chairman of the party, held the position the longest, a total of nine years. After the war, Sasaki had participated in the creation of the Electrical Power Workers union and had served as its first national secretary-general. In 1947, he had been elected through the efforts of this union to a national district House of Councillors seat. He first stood for office in the fifth HR district of Hyogo in 1955, and has been reelected in every contest since.

The first chairman of the party was Matsuura Seiichi, an incumbent member of the House of Councillors from Hyogo (see Table 37). Matsuura was elected to a second term as chairman in 1962, but he resigned the position in the same year following his defeat in the July HC election. The selection of Matsuura as the party's first chairman was not surprising. In addition to being the incumbent national assemblyman with the most seniority, Matsuura had participated in the founding of the Seamen union after the war. This union was the first to announce its support for Nishio Suehiro, the organizer of the DSP and its first national chairman, in his struggles with the JSP leadership. In the first days of the new party, the Seamen union headquarters in Kobe provided office space to the prefectural leadership.

Table 37
Hyogo DSP Federation Chairmen, 1960-1979

Year	Name	Background
1960-1962	Matsuura Seiichi	House of Councilors
1963-1966	Sasaki Ryosaku	House of Representatives
1967-1968	Nagae Kazuo	House of Representatives
1969	Yamashita Eiji	House of Representatives
1970-1971	Yoshida Kenichi	House of Representatives
1972-1976	Sasaki Ryosaku	House of Representatives
1977-1979	Kitaguchi Susumu	Prefectural Assembly

Source: Hyogo DSP.

Sasaki Ryosaku filled out the remainder of Matsuura's term after his 1962 defeat. At the time, he was the only DSP Diet member from Hyogo. Sasaki was reelected twice in 1964 and 1966. He resigned midway through his second full term in 1967 to make way for the newly elected Nagae Kazuo, who had just won back his seat in the first district after an 18 year hiatus. Nagae had been an activist in the prewar labor and socialist movements. In 1929 he had been elected to the first of four terms in the Kobe city council.⁴⁴ Nagae served one term in the prewar Diet as a member of the Social Mass Party, and after the war in 1948 was named Agriculture minister in the Socialist-led Katayama Cabinet. He resigned from the Cabinet amid allegations of corruption and, although he was later vindicated by the courts, the public outcry cost him his seat in the Diet. Later as a non-assembly member of the Kawakami faction, he was instrumental in the formation of the Minshuka Dōmei (Democratic Alliance) group within it that broke with the JSP and joined the Nishio-Nishimura group to form the DSP.⁴⁵

Nagae was elected to a term as chairman of the federation in his own right in 1968. He stepped down in February of 1969 to assume the vice-chairmanship of the national party and was succeeded by the national assemblyman next in line of seniority, Yamashita Eiji. Yamashita had first run for the Diet from the Hanshin district in 1946. His electoral base was in the Kubota Steel union, of which he was chairman, and the Amagasaki chapter of

the Sōdōmei union federation⁴⁶ that he had helped to reorganize after the war. Yamashita lost only three elections in his career: 1948, 1960, and 1969. The 1960 loss prevented him from taking over the chairmanship from Matsuura; his defeat in 1969 forced him to relinquish the chairmanship less than a year after his accession to the post.

With Yamashita's departure, the informally held seniority rule in the Hyogo DSP dictated that the position should go to the third district's Yoshida Kenichi. Yoshida was a lawyer who had been active in the prewar tenant movement in the East Harima district. He was elected to the Diet for the first time in 1953 on the votes of the textile workers in the mills in the northern part of the district, some former tenant farmers, and the people of his home city, Akashi. Throughout his Diet career, Yoshida had to contend not only with several LDP candidates but also with a left-wing socialist candidate, Tanaka Takeo who based himself in the Sōhyō affiliated unions in the district. The numbers went against Yoshida in 1958 and 1960, but he was able to bounce back and add a seat to the DSP prefectural total in 1963. In 1972, he lost for a third and last time.

With Yoshida's defeat, the DSP faced a situation akin to that of 1960. Sasaki was once again the sole DSP representative from Hyogo in the Lower House. The party, in contrast to 1960, did have two women, Nakazawa Itoko and Hagiwara Yukako who were incumbent members of the Upper House. But with the reduction of the party's

Lower House delegation from four in 1967 to one, the Hyogo federation was not ready to experiment with female leadership. Despite the fact that Sasaki had served already nearly five years in the post and notwithstanding the constraints placed on him by his assumption in 1969 of the secretary-general position in the national party, the Hyogo party again drafted Sasaki to succeed Yoshida in 1972.

Sasaki served as chairman until his election to the chairmanship of the national party in November of 1977. His acceptance of the post left the Hyogo DSP without an incumbent national assemblyman to serve as its chairman: Sasaki could not be asked to hold both positions. The federation was consequently forced to turn to the prefectural assemblyman with the most seniority, Kitaguchi Susumu. Kitaguchi was a three-term prefectural assemblyman from Akashi city at the time of his election to the chairmanship. He started in politics as an administrative assistant to the third district Diet representative, Yoshida Kenichi. He was elected at 25 to the first of three terms in the Akashi city council and then moved on in 1967 to the prefectural assembly. After the completion of Sasaki's unfinished term as chairman, Kitaguchi was elected to a two year term in 1978.

The chairmanship of the Hyogo DSP has thus been largely an honorary position. There have never been officially declared rival candidates for the post and the election of the chairman at the prefectural congress has always been by acclamation. Since the

chairman was more often in Tokyo than in Hyogo, the responsibility for the management of the party lay mainly with the secretary-general. This was especially true during Sasaki's second incumbency. Under Kitaguchi, the chairman has been more visible than in the past and played a more active role in federation affairs. But with the DSP victory in the 1979 Lower House elections, his tenure will probably be short. In 1980 the party can be expected to offer the chairmanship to one of its new incumbent HR assemblymen.

Like the chairmanship, the vice-chairmanship has been a largely honorary position. The number of vice-chairmen has varied with the number of candidates qualified for the post. In 1960, at the inception of the party, the Hyogo chapter had four vice-chairmen. Two as might be expected were senior members of the Hyogo and Kobe assemblies: Kominami Shinji and Tsutomu Tsutsumi.⁴⁷ The others were rather surprising: Goji Hashi was a dentist active in the Dental Association's political league and Nakayama Keizo, the president of a Kobe firm who was friendly with Nagae (see Table 38). The new party included these men among their list of officers to signal groups outside the labor movement its eagerness for their support. Goji and Nakayama served as vice-chairmen until 1964, but after their retirement they were not replaced with representatives from the other professions or business largely because of objections from the DSP's union constituency. The unions argued that the favoring of a few groups

Table 38

Hyogo DSP Federation Vice-Chairmen, 1960-1979

Year	Name and Background
1960	Kominami Shinji, prefectural assembly; Tsutomu Tsutsumi, Kobe city assembly; Goji Hashi, Hyogo Dental Association; Nakayama Keizo, businessman.
1961-1964	Oku Goichi, prefectural assembly; Goji Hashi, Hyogo Dental Association; Nakayama Keizo, businessman.
1965-1966	Nakazawa Itoko, House of Councillors; Oku Goichi, prefectural assembly; Matsushita Komatani, prefectural assembly.
1967	Nakazawa Itoko, House of Councillors; Oku Goichi, prefectural assembly.
1968-1973	Nakazawa Itoko, House of Councillors; Hagiwara Yukako, House of Councillors; Oku Goichi, prefectural assembly.
1974	Nakazawa Itoko, House of Councillors; Hagiwara Yukako, House of Councillors; Nagae Kazuhito, HR candidate.
1975-1976	Nakazawa Itoko, House of Councillors; Nagae Kazuhito, HR candidate.
1977	Nakazawa Itoko, House of Councillors; Nagae Kazuhito, HR candidate; Shiota Susumu, HR candidate; Kitaguchi Susumu, prefectural assembly.
1978-1979	Nakazawa Itoko, former HC incumbent; Nagae Kazuhito, HR candidate; Shiota Susumu, HR candidate

Source: Hyogo DSP.

out of many with the coveted vice-chairmanships would work against the party's efforts to develop the broad support that it needed to elect its candidates. Behind this objection, there was dissatisfaction with the failure of Goji and Nakayama to serve as a bridge between the party's labor base and conservative groups.⁴⁸

Since 1965 the vice-chairmen positions have been held by public officials or DSP candidates for office. They proved to be a convenient place to locate the party's two female Upper House incumbents in the federation hierarchy. Nakazawa Itoko was named vice-chairwoman following her victory in the 1965 election; Hagiwara Yukako became one after election in 1968. The incumbents in 1979 mirrored the low state of the DSP's fortunes in the prefecture just before the October HR election. Two of them were HR candidates, Nagae Kazuhito from the first district and Shiota Susumu from the third district. They were given the posts in order to give their candidacies more public visibility. Nakazawa was permitted to retain her vice-chairwoman position after her 1977 defeat, because there were plans to endorse her as the party's candidate again in the 1980 HC election.

The secretary-general position has normally been held by senior Kobe city or prefectural assemblymen. They have been chosen for this post because party activity in the DSP has been centered on the whole around its delegations in the local assemblies and the executive committees of the Dōmei federation. A secretary-general must be able to work well with both groups, and

assemblymen are usually the only members able to do this (see Table 39).

Table 39
Hyogo DSP Secretary-Generals, 1960-1979

Year	Name	Background
1960-1964	Sakai Toyoki	Kobe city assembly
1965	Nagae Kazuo	HR candidate
1966-1968	Oku Goichi	Prefectural assembly
1969	Kitaguchi Susumu	Prefectural assembly
1970-1973	Nagae Kazuhito	Prefectural assembly
1974-1976	Fujie Hisano	Labor union organizer
1977-1979	Oda Goro	Kobe city assembly

Source: Hyogo DSP.

There have been just two exceptions to this pattern. In 1965 Nagae Kazuo, an HR candidate in the first district, was given the post in order to give him standing as a party official during the period that he was managing Nakazawa Itoko's campaign for the Upper House. After the election, he stepped aside in favor of Oku Goichi, a prefectural assemblyman. In 1974, as part of a plan adopted at the prefectural congress to rebuild the party after its defeats in the 1972 General Election, the Hyogo federation experimented with a non-assemblyman secretary-general.

It selected Fujie Hisano, a capable labor union activist from one of the smaller Domei federated unions, and gave him a salary that permitted him to assume the position full-time. The experiment did not work out happily. Fujie did not get along well with the assemblymen and did not have the status necessary to deal with the top Dōmei leadership.⁴⁹ The federation resolved the problem by replacing him with Oda Goro, a five-term Kobe city assemblyman, and hiring a young union organizer to fill a newly created vice-secretary-general position.

Seats on the Executive committee have been mainly given over to prefectural, city, and town assemblymen with preference given to prefectural and Kobe assemblymen over those from the other cities and towns in Hyogo (see Table 40). Seniority is the rule normally followed in making decisions within each grouping. In 1979, all of the party's prefectural and Kobe assembly members were included among the membership of the Executive committee or served as party officers. Along with them, five city assemblymen from the Hanshin area, two each from East and West Harima, and three town assemblymen from Tamba were included in the committee membership.

The unions that make up the DSP support base in Hyogo are represented on the Executive committee indirectly by assemblymen who have used their positions on the executive committees of the unions as a stepping stone for a political career. Sakai Toyoki, for example, is the former chairman of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries union. They are also directly represented. In 1979,

Table 40
Membership of Hyogo DSP Executive Committee, 1979

Name	Background	Name	Background
Mametani Isao	Hyogo <u>Dōmei</u>	Takeuchi Tsuneo	Itami assembly
Nishimura Tokimasu	Kobe <u>Dōmei</u>	Takase Shigeru	Hyogo assembly candidate
Yoshioka Yasushi	Hyogo assembly candidate	Sasame Yusuru	Akashi assembly
Kaneo Katsunari	Kansai Power union	Nakatani Kunio	Kakogawa assembly
Takata Iwao	Kobe assembly	Takabayashi Katsumi	Himeiji assembly
Hanamoto Ritsuko	Kobe assembly	Kanai Hidetoshi	Akatsuki assembly
Sakai Toyoki	Kobe assembly	Murakami Kenichi	Ishikawajima Harima union
Yasuhiro Kaoru	Kobe assembly	Okamoto Taiji	Hyogo assembly candidate
Morita Goro	Kobe assembly	Okino Hiroyuki	Hyogo <u>Dōmei</u>
Sasaki Tamotsu	Kobe assembly	Furudono Tadayoshi	Yao town assembly
Wada Kazunari	Hyogo assembly	Yura Akira	Hikami town assembly
Asakawa Kazunari	Nishinomiya assembly	Sakai Masaki	Ennan town assembly
Ueshima Nobuo	Nishinomiya assembly	Masaaki Shoji	National Railway union
Sakamoto Jinja	Amagasaki assembly	Sasaki Koji	Hyogo assembly
Yoshitani Kiyochi	Kawanishi assembly		

Source: Hyogo DSP.

the secretary-generals of the Hyogo and Kobe chapters of the Dōmei federation, the Kansai Power Company union, and the Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries union held seats on the committee.

As noted earlier, the Executive committee does not make decisions by a majority vote. It serves instead to coordinate party activities and to sustain a consensus on party policy, especially with regard to candidate selection. Since the competition for positions in the party hierarchy could be a threat to party unity, the Hyogo DSP has developed an informal set of criteria based largely on seniority and the status attached to different assembly posts that serve to limit eligibility. As a result, party offices have become largely honorary: the positions occupied by an individual tell nothing about his influence in the federation. Real power in the Hyogo DSP rests with those assemblymen and union officers who can best deliver their constituency to the party in elections.

Party Finances

Sources of Party Income⁵⁰

Membership dues in the DSP are officially set at 1,000 yen (\$5.00) per month. They are collected by the district councils, which are required to send 200 yen (\$1.00) per member to the national headquarters and 100 yen (\$.50) per member to the prefectural federation. The remaining 700 yen (\$3.50) is to be used for district council, branch associations, and branch

activities. In Hyogo prefecture, however, dues are actually collected from the membership only in the first, third, and fifth districts.⁵¹ In the third and fifth districts 1,000 yen is collected, but in Kobe the membership fee has been reduced by that council to 850 yen (\$4.25) a month. Federation and headquarters fees are paid for the membership in the second and fourth districts only irregularly out of monies left over from the campaigns managed by these councils.

Member dues have not been an important source of income for the prefectural federation. The 100 yen (\$.50) that it collected from each of its 888 members in each month of 1978 amounted to slightly over one million yen (\$5,000). This sum was barely sufficient to cover the rental of the federation's office in downtown Kobe. During the years 1963 to 1973, the federation did not even collect this small sum from the membership. Instead it received 50,000 yen (\$250) a month from each of the five district councils as their contribution to its expenses. But dues have made a significant contribution to the district councils budgets where they are collected. The Kobe council retained after paying headquarters and federation fees 550 yen (\$2.75) from 274 members for each month of 1978. This provided the council with annual revenues of 1.8 million yen (\$9,000), twice the amount that the federation realized from dues. Similar amounts were collected by the third and fifth district bodies.

The Hyogo DSP assesses a portion of the salaries of incumbent national and local public officials in return for its endorsement and support in elections. The money received is usually five percent of the officials' salaries, although the amount varies from year to year depending upon the party's and the assemblymen's obligations. In 1977, the DSP received 600,000 yen (\$3,000) out of the eight million yen (\$40,000) salaries paid DSP prefectural and Kobe assemblymen. It also accepted much larger contributions from its two incumbent Diet members, Sasaki Ryosaku - three million yen (\$15,000) and Nakazawa Itoko - 2.5 million yen (\$12,500). The prefectural federation office has claim to the monies assessed against national and prefectural assemblymen. In the case of the prefectural assemblymen, the money is deducted on a monthly basis from their salaries by the office staff of the Hyogo assembly and handed over directly to the party.⁵² In 1977, the party's five PA assemblymen paid a total of three million yen (\$15,000) to the federation. Each of the district councils is empowered to collect these assessments from assemblymen endorsed by the DSP in their area. The Kobe district council in 1977 collected 5.4 million yen (\$27,000) from nine city assemblymen. This money paid the salary of a full-time organizer and the expenses of the office that the council shares with the federation in the city.

Contributions to DSP prefectural party organs by the unions are virtually unknown. Unions will make contributions to the campaigns of party candidates, who are associated with them, and

set aside union funds to cover their own electioneering activities on behalf of the party. Yet they leave the financing of the party office and staff in the prefecture to the membership and its candidates. This attitude towards contributions to the party extended even to the DSP federation and Kobe district council's 1977 fundraising party for the campaigns of Nagae Kazuhito and Nakazawa Itoko. The party planned to sell 2,000 tickets at 20,000 yen (\$100) each with the hopes of raising a 40 million yen (\$200,000) war chest. Union reluctance to contribute directly to the DSP forced it to assign 1,000 tickets to the Hyogo Dōmei federation with the request that the leadership sell the tickets to the membership and use the money raised to pay for union activities on behalf of the party in the upcoming elections.⁵³

The Hyogo party has received no direct or regular financial support from businesses within the prefecture. During the early 1960's, it did receive some money from a group of local firms called the Shinseikei Kenkyūkai (The Political Economy Study Group). But this group had been organized primarily to support the candidacy of the first district's Nagae Kazuo, and gave money to the party only intermittently.⁵⁴ In 1977, the party did succeed in selling 1,000 tickets to local firms for its fundraising party. Yet here again, the purpose of the party was to raise money for specific candidates not to underwrite the operating expenses of the federation. The tickets were distributed through local DSP assemblymen who were permitted to retain 3,000 to 5,000 yen

(\$15 to \$25) for every ticket sold. As a result, the Hyogo DSP could report an income from the party of only 4.2 million yen (\$21,000), the rest of the money remained with the Dōmei unions, the local assemblymen, or went to the campaign organizations of the two candidates.

Party publications have provided little, if any, revenue for the Hyogo party. The national headquarters publishes a weekly newspaper, the Shūkan Minsha (The Weekly Social-Democrat), that all party members are required to read. The paper is delivered to the federation by the national party and mailed by it directly to the readership in the prefecture, which numbered 4,750 in 1978.⁵⁵ The federation collects a subscription fee of 70 yen (\$.35) a month from each member and 225 yen (\$1.12) from non-members, but this money barely covers the expenses incurred by the party in the distribution of the paper. The federation also distributes the party's theoretical journal, Kakushin (The Progressive) at 350 yen (\$1.75) a copy. Circulation of this monthly in 1977 was only 84 copies in Hyogo.

The reports made by the DSP federation to the Hyogo Election Commission show a gradual increase in party revenues from two million (\$10,000) in 1961 to 13 million (\$65,000) yen in 1975.⁵⁶ This money came nearly exclusively from member dues and the assessment of party assemblymen and represented only the income received by the prefectural federation office.⁵⁷ The gradual increase in the party federation income in this period can

be attributed to increases in the salaries of national and prefectural assemblymen; the sharp increase between 1973 and 1975 was the result of the combination of this with the party's decision to enforce the payment of member dues (see Table 41).

Table 41
DSP Hyogo Federation Income, 1961-1977

Year	Income	Year	Income
1961	2.1 ^a	1970	6.7
1962	unavailable	1971	4.1
1963	unavailable	1972	4.7
1964	1.8	1973	6.1
1965	3.1	1974	9.1
1966	unavailable	1975	13.3
1967	3.3	1976	105.3
1968	6.5	1977	81.9
1969	unavailable		

Source: Hyogoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.

^aMillions of yen.

The DSP reports show an abrupt increase in party income from 13 million (\$65,000) in 1975 to 105 million (\$525,000) in 1976 and 81.9 million (\$409,500) yen in 1977. This large jump in income did not signal, however, a transformation of the activities of the

party in the prefecture. The actual income of the prefectural federation, which had been the source of the income figures used in the previous reports, remained essentially the same. To this was added membership dues and assemblymen assessments collected by the district councils, and money transferred from the national party to help the federation in the 1976 HR and 1977 HC elections. The transfer money amounted to 55 million (\$275,000) in 1976 and 43 million (\$215,000) yen in 1977 and reflected the success of the national party financial group, the Political Harmony Council,⁵⁸ in raising money from corporate sources in these years. The federation had received money from the national party at election time before, but it had been limited and principally channeled through the candidates' campaign organizations or the Dōmei unions.⁵⁹ Given corporate ambivalence towards the DSP and its union backing, it is uncertain the extent to which the prefectural party will be able to count on this source of funds in the future, particularly in non-election years.

Patterns of Party Expenditures

The money collected by the prefectural federation and the district councils has been used principally to maintain an office and hire staff. The office shared by the Hyogo federation and the Kobe district council has been located, since the party's founding, on the first floor of a small building situated directly across the street from Kobe's busiest train station, Sannomiya. The rent

is presently a little more than one million yen (\$5,000) a year. The DSP makes use of its nearly ideal location by displaying a bright orange sign that labels the office as the headquarters of the party in the prefecture. Inside, space is at a premium. There are three desks and two telephones. A part of the one-room office has been informally set off from the rest by the placing of a sofa and two chairs around a small table, and is used by the staff as a reception area for visitors to the office.

Before 1974, a woman was hired on a part-time basis by the federation to answer the telephone and perform light clerical duties at the office. In 1974 with the enforcement of the payment of membership dues, the federation and the Kobe district council were at last each able to hire a full-time organizer.⁶⁰ The two employees of the party in 1979 working out of the federation office were both in their early thirties and received a salary of less than 100,000 yen (\$500) a month. This was not intended to be a living wage. The party could not hire an organizer unless his living expenses could be guaranteed by some other agency, usually a union or his family. Both of the men had hopes of making a career for themselves in local politics. If they chose to try for the assembly, the party was committed to help with the financing of their campaigns.⁶¹

Without a full-time staff before 1974, the activities of the formal DSP organization in Hyogo were quite limited. The financial reports for the years 1961 to 1974 show that the largest expenses

were for rent, telephones, and postage, and that these came in total to less than one million yen (\$5,000) a year. The expenses for the printing of party literature at election time and other campaign activities were all covered informally by the party's candidates, the unions, or the national headquarters. Between 1974 and 1975, additional money from member dues and the assessment of party assemblymen allowed the purchase and maintenance of a car by the prefectural federation, but little else.

It is only in 1976 with the official accounting for money received by the federation from the national party that an estimate of expenditures for campaign related propaganda activities can be made: the party spent around 90 million yen (\$475,000) in 1976 and 65 million yen (\$325,000) in 1977.⁶² The money went for the printing and mailing of campaign literature and the hiring of temporary election workers. This level of expenditures compared favorably with that of the LDP and exceeded that of the JSP substantially in the prefecture. Nonetheless, the results in the elections held in these years were disappointing for the DSP,⁶³ and considering the federation's dependence upon national party subsidies it is uncertain how long it will be able to continue activities of this kind. More important, the limited amount of money spent by the federation for permanent office and staff underlines the weakness of the DSP's formal organization in the prefecture. As will be developed more fully in the next section, the Hyogo party cannot hope to make any real gains unless

it is able to move beyond its Dōmei constituency to develop strong and regular support from other groups in the electorate. The federation without a Secretariat structure and a network of party branches and front groups is poorly equipped to accomplish this task.

Party Candidates⁶⁴

The DSP at the time of its formation in 1960 could boast in Hyogo prefecture of one incumbent House of Councillor representative, Matsuura Seiichi, and two incumbent members of the House of Representatives, Yamashita Eiji from the second district and Sasaki Ryosaku from the fifth. It also had the support of two former JSP assemblymen, Nagae Kazuo from Kobe and Yoshida Kenichi from East Harima. Among prefectural assemblymen, the party had the support of seven incumbents. Four of them were from Kobe, and one each from Amagasaki, Nishinomiya, and Himeiji cities. The three incumbent national assemblymen, as introduced before, had all used their positions in the unions as a means to enter political life. Matsuura had been chairman of the Seamen union and Sasaki secretary-general of the Electrical Power Workers union. Yamashita had served as chairman of the Kubota Steel company union and later vice-chairman of the Hyogo chapter of the Zenrō federation. The two former JSP incumbents had both been active in the early labor and tenant-rights movements, and Nagae had served in the prewar Diet. Four of the party's prefectural assemblymen were union officials, two physicians, and one the owner of a lumber company.

House of Representatives

The HR incumbents and candidates who broke with the JSP to form the Hyogo federation of the DSP received the party endorsement for national office in every election until 1972 (see Table 42). The fourth district, where the party did not have a proven candidate, was the only area that saw any change in the HR candidates selected during this period and, even here, the party's first chairman Matsuura Seiichi, who was defeated in the 1962 HC election, was the DSP nominee in two of the four elections between 1963 and 1972.

As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the DSP's base in the Dōmei union is not sufficient in any of Hyogo's five HR districts to send an assembly candidate to the Lower House. To survive in the prefecture the DSP has had to gain the support of groups outside its Dōmei base. The former JSP incumbents that it endorsed for HR seats from the Kobe, Hanshin, East Harima, and Tamba districts throughout the 1960's were quite adept at this. The strategies that they adopted to deal with the support base problem differed from district to district depending upon the background of the candidate and the political opportunities available.⁶⁵

Nagae Kazuo in Kobe worked to develop support among the Sōhyō affiliated Steelworkers, which he and the Socialist candidate Kawakami Jotaro had long shared between them. In the election following the death of Kawakami in 1966, Nagae added perhaps as

Table 42
DSP Candidates in Hyogo HR Elections, 1960-1979

Year	Kobe	Hanshin	East Harima	West Harima	Tamba
1960	Nagae -x (45) ^a	Yamashita (48)	Yoshida -x (53)	Fukui -x (23)	Sakai (41)
1963	Nagae -x (46)	Yamashita (75)	Yoshida (67)	Matsuura -x (30)	Sakai (48)
1967	Nagae (60)	Yamashita (78)	Yoshida (63)	Matsuura -x (38)	Sasaki (52)
1969	Nagae -x (54)	Yamashita -x (67)	Yoshida (54)	Kishida -x (29)	Sasaki (51)
1972	Nagae -x (37)	none	Yoshida -x (41)	Machida -x (49)	Sasaki (61)
1976	Nagae -x (69)	none	Shiota -x (49)	Hagiwara -x (45)	Sasaki (48)
1979	Nagae (58)	Soma -x (50)	Shiota (72)	none	Sasaki (61)

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Linkai; Kōbe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.

^aVote in thousands received by candidate.

^xDefeated in election.

many as 14,000 votes from Kawakami supporters to his base in the Dōmei unions. This gave him votes enough to secure for the DSP the new fourth seat from Kobe in the 1967 HR election.

Yamashita Eiji in the Hanshin district used his influence with the Kubota Steel company to build up a strong base of personal support among conservative groups in Amagasaki and Nishinomiya cities. When the LDP reduced the number of its candidates with an electoral base in these two cities from two to one in the 1963 election, Yamashita used these connections to bring some 25,000 conservative voters into his camp.

The DSP third district candidate, Yoshida Kenichi, also won a seat in the Diet by virtue of the votes that he took from the conservatives. Yoshida had been born and made his career in Akashi city. He used the suspicion felt by Akashi city voters for candidates from the Ono city and Takasago areas of the district to pull normally conservative voters from the LDP candidates who were based in these areas. In the 1963 election, when he was first elected to the Lower House as a DSP representative, 29,000 of his 67,000 votes came from Akashi.

In the fifth district Sasaki Ryosaku could expect less than 15,000 votes from the Dōmei federation in any election. Nevertheless, he has been returned to the Diet in every election since the party's inception because of the support that he has developed among traditionally conservative farm groups and the help that he has received from the Sōkagakkai.⁶⁶

The success of these varied strategies in bridging the gap between the party's Dōmei base and the minimum number of votes needed for election permitted the DSP's great victory in the 1967 election, when it elected four candidates from Hyogo to the Diet. The individual nature of this success, however, made the party's future dependent upon the candidates that it nominated and the strategies decided upon by the other parties. In the 1967-1972 period, three DSP candidates went down to defeat. In the first district, Nagae Kazuo at 71 proved unequal to the challenge posed by his incumbency by the aggressive campaign waged by the young (35) conservative candidate Ishii Hajime. In the second district, Yamashita lost his seat in 1969 when after a six year hiatus conservative candidates stood from both Amagasaki and Nishinomiya cities. Yoshida in the third district was forced into retirement in 1972 because of the candidacy of an independent conservative from Akashi, Ishii Saburo who cut into his support base in this city enough for Yoshida to finish fourth in a six man race for three seats.

With the loss of Nagae, Yamashita, and Yoshida, the DSP faced a situation similar to that it had met in 1960 in the fourth district. In this district, the right-wing socialist incumbent Onishi Masamichi had died in office just before the formation of the DSP and his successor, Miki Yoshio, elected to stay with the JSP. The new DSP without a recognized incumbent and only one prefectural assemblyman in the district found it difficult to bring

even its then 10,000 member constituency in the Zenrō federation to the polls: in 1960 it registered only 23,000 votes, and its performance did not go over 40,000 votes until 1972.

In 1976, the Hyogo DSP had only two prefectural assemblymen and the potential support of some 50,000 members of the Dōmei federation in Kobe. In the second district the party also had two assemblymen, one from Nishinomiya and one from Takarazuka city, but its Dōmei base was much smaller, numbering only some 20,000 members. The party in the third district had but one incumbent assembly member in the third district and a Dōmei constituency of 30,000. In none of these districts was the party's Dōmei base alone large enough, even if fully mobilized, to send a DSP candidate to the Diet. Furthermore, the weakness of the party's prefectural assembly delegation from each of these districts meant that any mustering of support from outside of the Dōmei base would have to be the responsibility of the campaign organizations of the Diet candidates.

The DSP bowed to these unfavorable odds in the second district and did not stand a candidate. But in the first district, where an additional seat would be contested, the prospects looked better and the federation decided to endorse again its 1972 candidate, Nagae Kazuhito the son of its former incumbent. In the third district it replaced the defeated Yoshida with a new candidate Shiota Susumu, a former official in the Labor Ministry and a native of Kakogawa city. Both candidates ran about as well as could be

expected under the circumstances. Nagae won 69,000 votes. This was much better than his 1972 performance when he polled only 37,000 votes, but there was no indication that he had drawn significant support from outside the Dōmei union membership. Shiota who was able to draw some support from conservative voters in Kakogawa city received 49,000 votes, 8,000 more than Yoshida had won in his last campaign but still 25,000 short of the number needed to win a seat.

In the 1979 election, there was no reason to anticipate a better showing by either Nagae or Shiota. The Dōmei base in both the first and third districts remained essentially the same while the number of party prefectural assemblymen had increased by only one in Kobe and not at all in the third district. Nonetheless both won surprising victories: Nagae increased his vote by 16,000 to 85,000, and Shiota raised his by an impressive 23,000 to 72,000 votes. An analysis of their performance suggest that Nagae won votes from the LDP's Sunada Shigetami and the JSP's Kawakami Tamio, and that Shiota took over some of the support that had gone to the New Liberal Club's Kobayashi Masaoto in 1976. These two victories coupled with the reelection of Sasaki Ryosaku in the fifth district gave the party its best showing in any HR election since 1967.

Unfortunately for the future prospects of the DSP in Hyogo, Nagae and Shiota's upset victories appear to be little different from the personal triumphs of Nagae Kazuo, Yamashita Eiichi, and Yoshida Kenichi in the past. It is most uncertain whether they

will retain their seats in the next election and even less likely, as will be discussed below, whether their victories will improve the party's performance in the 1980 House of Councillors or 1983 prefectural assembly elections. The Hyogo DSP is organizationally so structured as to mobilize the Dōmei unions. Party offices are located in the Dōmei federation and the network of district councils are arranged to maintain control over the federation by the party. Party members are drawn principally from the Dōmei federation membership and most party officers have a background in the union movement. But to win elections the party has had to gain support from other constituencies that have often been organizationally tied to the other parties. It has accomplished this, at times with great success, by choosing candidates who have been able to strike adhoc bargains with these groups for support in an election. The problem has been that these promises of cooperation have not usually lasted beyond the campaigns of these individuals. As a result, the great victories won by the party in one election have often been undone in the next.

House of Councillors

The inadequacy of the party's Dōmei base has also dictated DSP strategy in the House of Councillor's elections. The party's first candidate, the former JSP incumbent Matsuura Seiichi, could muster with Zenrō support alone 231,000 votes in the 1962 Hyogo district HC election. The federation in 1965 nominated in his place a city

assemblywoman from the second district city of Takarazuka, Nakazawa Itoko. She won back Matsuura's seat by staying close to the DSP HR vote in the third, fourth, and fifth districts and running far ahead of the party's HR candidates in the first and second districts (see Table 43). Buoyed by this victory, the DSP endorsed a woman elementary school principal from the fourth district, Hagiwara Yukako, in the 1968 election. She not only managed to match Nakazawa's performance, but added some 50,000 votes to it by running exceptionally well in her native West Harima district. These two women were the first female candidates to be put up by a major party for national office in Hyogo history. Nagae Kazuo played a major role in pushing for their nomination.⁶⁷ He believed that the DSP had to reach beyond its base in the Dōmei federation, if it was to become a force in prefectural politics. Matsuura's defeat in previous elections and the lack of a male candidate of similar stature gave him the opportunity in 1963 to lobby the acceptance of the union leadership.

The novelty of women running for high political office was not the only reason that Nakazawa and Hagiwara were able to poll votes that exceeded those collected by the DSP in the HR elections. The Hyogo district HC elections present a different array of choices to the voters. Nakazawa was helped in the 1965 election by the LDP nomination of two candidates, Aota Gentaro and Kawanishi Yakio, who were not well-known in the Kobe and Hanshin areas. Hagiwara benefitted from the then incumbent Nakazawa's

Table 43
DSP Performance in Hyogo District HC Elections, 1962-1977

Year	Candidate	Kobe	Hanshin	East Harima	West Harima	Tamba
1962	Matsuura -x	62 ^a	61	33	35	35
1965	Nakazawa	70	98	41	49	41
1968	Hagiwara	77	100	55	74	40
1971	Nakazawa	66	100	48	52	46
1974	Hagiwara -x	78	102	60	83	45
1977	Nakazawa -x	75	92	58	58	43

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Linkai.

^aVote in thousands.

^xCandidate defeated.

support in the second district and the failure of the other parties to put up a candidate with ties to the fourth district. The absence of the powerful HR candidates in these elections was also an especial boost for the DSP. In Kobe, the party could expect to pick up the right-wing socialist vote that went to Kawakami in the General Election. In the second district, with native sons Hara Kensaburo and Nagata Torao on the sidelines, the party could compete on more equal terms with the LDP for the Awajii Island vote. And in the fourth district, the DSP might attract conservative voters who were usually divided among Komoto, Horikawa, and Kiyose. These advantages would probably have been available to the DSP whomever the party might have endorsed. Nevertheless, as Matsuura's candidacy in 1963 demonstrated, a candidate too closely connected with the Dōmei unions could not make the best use of them. Nakazawa and Hagiwara succeeded in some part because their gender helped to make more acceptable their union backing with normally conservative voters.

In the 1974 and 1977 HC elections, although Hagiwara and Nakazawa were able to retain the votes that they had received in their successful campaigns of 1965, 1968, and 1971, they fell victim to the large number of votes mobilized by the women candidates endorsed by the JCP (Yasutake Hiroko in 1974) and the Komeito (Watanabe Michiko in 1977).⁶⁸ Candidate image is an important asset for a party, but it is only one part of a successful campaign. The DSP in 1974 and 1977 had strong

candidates in Hagiwara and Nakazawa, but its base in the Dōmei unions and the prefectural assembly could not match the strength of the Communist front groups or the Sōkaōakkai.

Prefectural Assembly

The DSP did not face its first prefectural assembly election in Hyogo until April of 1963. In this election it nominated 12 candidates for the assembly, including the seven incumbents who had broken with the JSP in 1960. Only five of the candidates stood in districts outside Kobe and only two in this group were non-incumbents.⁶⁹ The Hyogo DSP federation managed to elect only six of these 12, four of whom were incumbents and one a previous incumbent. The one successful new candidate was a physician and former city assemblyman from Ikuta ward. All of the unsuccessful new candidates had been officers in the Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Steel unions. Thus, in this its first prefectural election, the DSP had failed even to hold on to the seven seats that it had started with. It did not field any candidates in the fifth HR district, nor any new candidates in addition to its one incumbent in the fourth district and two in the second district. In the third district, where it had at the start no incumbent assemblymen, the DSP endorsed two candidates but could elect only one.

This first election set a pattern to be followed in the next four (see Table 44). The party never nominated more than 15 candidates for the 90 seat assembly and could never elect more than

Table 44
DSP Prefectural Assembly Candidates, 1963-1979

District	1963	1967	1971	1975	1979
Kobe	7 (24) ^a	5 (24)	7 (24)	5 (24)	3 (24)
Hanshin	2 (26)	5 (28)	5 (28)	4 (28)	3 (29)
East Harima	2 (13)	2 (13)	2 (13)	3 (13)	1 (13)
West Harima	1 (15)	1 (16)	1 (16)	1 (16)	1 (16)
Tamba	0 (9)	0 (9)	0 (9)	1 (9)	1 (9)
Total	12 (87)	13 (90)	15 (90)	14 (90)	8 (91)

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Inkai; Kōbe Shimbun April 3, 1979.

^aNumber of seats in district.

eight. The geographic imbalance in favor of the urban districts also remained. The DSP never put up more than three candidates in the third district and one in the fourth; it stood a candidate in the fifth district for the first time ever in 1975. The backgrounds of the candidates for the prefectural assembly, however, have changed to some degree over time. Candidates with ties to the union movement are no longer as visible. In 1963, seven of 12 candidates were union officers; in 1979, only three of eight. The other 1979 candidates included two businessmen, one prefectural bureaucrat, one university professor, and one former administrative assistant to a Diet member.

This change in the complexion of the DSP candidates for the assembly has been a consequence of the small size of the party's Dōmei base. In the early 1960's union votes alone in some PA districts were sufficient to elect its candidates, but with the beginning of strong competition from the Komeito and Communist organizations the DSP has had to find candidates that could add the votes of normally conservative groups to its union constituency. The party was successful in the 1979 Nishinomiya district PA race only because it could add the votes of the kōenkai of four local conservative city assemblymen to those available from the city Dōmei unions.⁷⁰

The DSP has not been able to duplicate its Nishinomiya success in very many other contests. Elections cost money and the Hyogo federation has not been able to extend much in the way of aid

to new candidates at the local level. In trying to recruit new candidates the most important criteria for the party in recent years has been the personal or organizational resources that a candidate can bring with him. The number of candidates willing to risk their personal fortunes on the uncertain chance of electoral victory have become fewer and fewer in Hyogo, and instances like those of the Fukiai ward DSP assembly aspirant whose company went bankrupt after his two unsuccessful campaigns for office⁷¹ have made it difficult for the party to work against this trend. This has hurt the party in districts like Kobe's Nagata ward where the performance of its candidates in other levels of elections have suggested that a strong campaign effort might win a PA seat for the party.⁷²

The Hyogo DSP is thus caught in a vicious circle. The party can expect little further electoral success in the prefecture unless it can move beyond its union base to recruit prefectural assembly candidates capable of bringing in the support of groups that are part of the LDP constituency. Yet, it cannot attract these candidates when the bloc of votes that it commands in the Dōmei unions is not large enough to offer a realistic chance of victory. The party's chances for an improvement in its electoral performance will ultimately depend less on the kind of candidates that it is able to recruit than on the success of Dōmei activists' efforts to detach the Steelworkers and other unions from the Sōhyō

federation. Without a strong, dependable base of its own in the prefecture, the Hyogo DSP is in a poor position to pull away conservative support from the LDP.

NOTES

¹Minshatō, Minshatō Kōryō (Tōkyō: Minshatō Kyōden Kyoku, 1976), p. 9.

²Minshatō Soshiki Kyoku, Minshatō Seisaku Handobukku (Tōkyō: Minshatō Kyōden Kyoku, 1976), pp. 11-127.

³Ibid., pp. 72-110.

⁴Ibid., pp. 31-35.

⁵Report on events leading up to the formation of the Hyogo federation contained in documents given to delegates to the first federation Congress. These were made available by the Hyogo federation staff.

⁶Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, Hyōgoken Rōdō Kumiai Meibo 1960.

⁷See note 10 in Chapter III.

⁸Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, Hyōgoken Rōdō Kumiai Meibo 1964, 1970, 1977.

⁹Membership of district councils derived from Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, Hyogoken Rodo Kumiai Meibo 1977; interview with staff of Hyogo DSP, August 2, 1978.

¹⁰Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, Hyōgoken Rōdō Kumiai Meibo 1977.

¹¹Interview with Steelworkers union official on May 25, 1979.

¹²Interview with staff of Hyogo DSP on November 28, 1978.

¹³Discussion below based on interview with staff of Hyogo DSP on November 28, 1978.

¹⁴Interview with close observer of Hyogo DSP on February 20, 1979.

¹⁵See "Zenkoku Kakutō no Zaisei Hōkokusho" in Kanpō, op. cit.

¹⁶In 1977, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries contributed 76.8 million yen to the LDP but only 8.1 million to the DSP, Kawasaki Steel 75.3 million yen and 5.0 million, Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries 49.7 million yen and 4.9 million, and Taiyo-Kobe Bank 43.5 million yen and 3.5 million. See Ibid.

¹⁷Ishikawajima Harima officials may have participated in the campaign of DSP candidate Hagiwara Yukako in 1976 with the hope of preventing the new JSP candidate, Goto Shigeru, from succeeding to the seat of retired Socialist incumbent Miki Yoshio. In previous elections, their support for the candidacy of the LDP's Komoto Toshio had severely hampered party efforts to mobilize the Dōmei affiliated company union.

¹⁸See "Senkyo Undō Hiyō no Shūshi ni Kansuru Shirabe" in Hyōgoken Kōhō, op. cit.

¹⁹Interview with close observer of the Hyogo DSP on February 20, 1979.

²⁰See Section 3 of 1961 national party Charter in Umemoto Sutemi, Minshatō 15-shū Nenshi (Tōkyō: Minshatō 15-shū Nenshi Hanpukai, 1975), p. 148.

²¹See "Soshiki Katsudō" in Kokumin Seiji Nenkan Henshū linkai, Kokumin Seiji Nenkan 1965, p. 792.

²²The party dropped from 31 to 19 seats in the Lower House after the 1972 HR election.

²³See "1973-nendo Undō Hōshin" in Kokumin Seiji Nenkan 1974, p. 818.

²⁴Discussion below on party branch structure based on interview with former party official on July 25, 1978 and meetings with the Hyogo federation staff on August 2, 1978, November 16, 1978, November 28, 1978, and May 25, 1979.

²⁵Interview with campaign manager of DSP prefectural assembly candidate on May 10, 1979.

²⁶Discussion based on proceedings of the 1st (1960), 5th (1964), 8th (1967), 9th (1968), 10th (1969), 11th (1970), 12th (1971), 13th (1972), 14th (1973), 15th (1974), 16th (1975), 17th (1976), and 18th (1977) Party Congresses made available by the federation staff as well as interviews with the federation staff on August 2, 1978 and May 25, 1979 and a former party official on July 25, 1978.

²⁷See "Dōmei Keisei Sengen" in 10-nen Shi Henshū linkai, Hyōgo Dōmei 10-nen Shi 1975, pp. 11-13.

²⁸Many of the DSP candidates in their campaign literature will list themselves as the chairman of the party's pollution strategy committee or small business department, but these committees and departments have no other members (volunteers or paid) and do not report on their activities to the federation congress. Interview with knowledgeable observer of Hyogo party on February 20, 1979.

²⁹Information on party front groups drawn from interviews with federation staff on August 2, 1978 and November 28, 1978 and officer of Japan Democratic Women's Association on August 9, 1978.

³⁰Minshatō, Minshatō Kōryō op. cit., pp. 10-11.

³¹See Article 10 of party charter in Minshatō Soshiki Kyoku, Nyūtō Kara Tōkatsudo (Tōkyō: Minshatō Kyōden Kyoku 1977), p. 37.

³²Minshatō, Minshatō Kōryō, op. cit., p. 11.

³³See party charter Articles 6-8.

³⁴Interview with Hyogo federation staff on August 2, 1978.

³⁵See section on JSP membership in Chapter III.

³⁶Information on DSP membership supplied by the Hyogo federation staff.

³⁷The reports on federation finances made by the party's Audit committee to prefectural congress were made available by the DSP federation staff for the years 1960, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1973, and 1974.

³⁸Interview with former party official on July 25, 1978. The national party did publish figures for the membership of the Hyogo federation during some of these years: September 1963 (2,504) October 1965 (2,627), April 1967 (3,186), and October 1970 (3,054). These are clearly not in line with figures for dues-paying membership provided by the Hyogo federation for the years before and after this period. The disparity in the figures is probably the result of the payment of the portion of the dues owed the national party by DSP HR assemblymen on behalf of some of the members of their campaign organizations in order to maintain the voting strength of the federation at the national party congress. See "Minshatō" in Kokumin Seiji Nenkan Henshū linkai, Kokumin Seiji Nenkan 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1972.

³⁹Total membership of the national party in 1978 was 32,000. Four-thousand of these members belonged to the Chemical Workers union and were enrolled directly through the national party rather than through the federations, as the remaining 28,000 individual party members were.

⁴⁰Interview with federation staff on November 28, 1978.

⁴¹Interview with former Hyogo DSP party official on July 25, 1978.

⁴²Interview with close observer of Hyogo DSP federation on February 20, 1978.

⁴³Identities of party officers provided by Hyogo federation staff. Background information drawn from campaign biographies submitted to the Hyogo Election Commission and published in the Kōbe Shimbun. Nagae Kazuo's Waga Shōwa-shi, op. cit. was also helpful. A number of points were clarified in interviews with the party staff and party officials.

⁴⁴The term of office in the prewar Kobe council was only two years.

⁴⁵For a discussion of the events leading up to the formation of the party, see Umemoto Sutemi, op. cit., pp. 81-118. For the JSP interpretation, see Gekkan Shakaitō Henshūbu, Nihon Shakaitō no 30-nen (2) op. cit., pp. 273-306.

⁴⁶The All-Japan General Federation of Trade Unions (Zen Nihon Rōdō Kumiai Sōdomei) was first organized by socialist activists in the early 1920's. It split into competing left and right wing factions at its 1925 convention and did not reappear until after the war. See Cole et al., op. cit., p. 13. It was reconstituted by right wing trade unionists. The left wing formed their own union after the war, the Congress of Industrial Unions (Zenkoku Sangyō-betsu Kumiai).

⁴⁷Tsutsumi was chairman of the Shipbuilders union and in 1956 became a vice-chairman of Hyogo Dōmei.

⁴⁸Interview with former party official on July 25, 1978.

⁴⁹Interview with a close observer of the Hyogo DSP on February 20, 1979.

⁵⁰Information on the Hyogo DSP federation finances comes from two sources, the reports made to the federation congresses by the party's Audit committee (see note 37) and those filed with the Hyogo Election Commission for all years between 1961 and 1977 except for 1962, 1963, and 1966, which were missing for all of the Hyogo parties.

⁵¹Interview with Hyogo federation staff on November 28, 1978.

⁵²Interview with Hyogo federation staff on August 2, 1978.

⁵³Interview with Hyogo federation staff on November 28, 1978.

⁵⁴Interview with former party official on July 25, 1978.

⁵⁵Data on circulation of party publications provided by Hyogo federation staff.

⁵⁶The financial information contained in the Audit committee and Election Commission reports were in substantial agreement. The Election Commission data was used in creating the table because it was more complete and the fiscal year was the same as the calendar year. The fiscal year in the Audit committee reports ran from April to March.

⁵⁷This is not all the income available to the party during this period. Neither the Audit committee reports nor those to the Election commission included monies collected by the district councils from local assemblymen, which was not transferred to the federation, or that contributed by the national party to the federation in elections.

⁵⁸The Political Harmony Council is the financial support group of the national party which solicits contributions from corporations and individuals on behalf of the party. In 1977, it collected 706 million yen (3.5 million dollars). This was more than twice the 304 million yen (1.5 million dollars) collected by its organizational predecessor, the Democratic Socialist Council (Minshu Shakai Kyōkai) in 1975. See Kanpō, August 11, 1976.

⁵⁹Interview with former party official on July 25, 1978 and staff of Hyogo DSP on May 25, 1979. This money was reported as income to the Hyogo Election Commission.

⁶⁰The first full-time employee of the federation was the secretary-general Fujie Hisano in 1974. After he left the federation in 1977, the position went to the current incumbent, a young man formerly on the staff of one of the Dōmei unions.

⁶¹ Interview with Hyogo federation staff on November 16, 1978.

⁶² Figures for propaganda expenditures arrived at by assuming that the normal expenditures for the federation office and staff remained at near 1975 levels.

⁶³ The party managed to return only long-term incumbent Sasaki Ryosaku in the 1976 HR election and saw their incumbent two term HC assembly woman, Nakazawa Itoko, defeated in 1977.

⁶⁴ Information on party candidates derived from campaign biographies filed with the Hyogo Election Commission and published by the Kōbe Shimbun. A number of points were clarified in interviews with party officials and members of the Hyogo federation staff.

⁶⁵ Discussion below based on analyses of Hyogo local and national elections published in the Kōbe Shimbun between 1955 and 1979, and the results of these elections published in Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai, Senkyo Kiroku 1955-1977. Information on 1979 elections drawn from Kōbe Shimbun April 3 and October 9, 1979.

⁶⁶ The Komeito has yet to run a candidate in this district, and the party in order to strengthen its ties with the DSP at the national level has had the Gakkai leadership in the district support Sasaki.

⁶⁷ Interview with close observer of Hyogo DSP federation on February 20, 1977.

⁶⁸ See Chapters V and VI.

⁶⁹ One of these non-incumbents was a former three-term JSP assemblyman who had been defeated in the previous PA election.

⁷⁰ Interview with the campaign manager for a DSP prefectural assembly candidate on May 10, 1979.

⁷¹ Interview with close observer of DSP federation on February 20, 1979.

⁷² In the 1975 PA elections in Nagata, 14,000 votes were the minimum needed to win a seat. In 1979, for lack of a challenge, the four incumbents (one from each of the other parties) were automatically reelected. Nagae Kazuhito won 9,500 votes in this district in October of 1979, and the party successfully elected two Kobe city assemblymen from the ward in April of 1979 with a combined vote of 8,500. The gap between this performance and the 14,000 votes needed is large, but might be made up in a determined campaign.

CHAPTER V

THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY HYOGO COMMITTEE

The Japan Communist party (JCP) is the oldest of the Japanese parties, having been first organized in July of 1922. Its activities in the prewar period effectively came to a stop in October of 1932 when most the party leadership were arrested and imprisoned under the provisions of the Public Safety Preservation Law (Jian Iji Ho).¹ The party was reorganized upon the release of the leadership from prison by the Occupation authorities in the fall of 1945. The JCP has proclaimed itself as the vanguard of the working class.² The goal of the party is to free the Japanese workers from the bonds of American and Japanese monopoly capital and build a socialist society that will maintain peaceful relations with all countries. The party believes that the achievement of a democratic revolution must precede a socialist revolution in Japan.³ It, therefore, is willing to cooperate with all democratic forces in a limited program that has as its purpose the replacement of the conservative regime with a coalition of the opposition forces and the enactment of a minimal program that includes the breaking of the Japan-American Security Treaty, the reorganization of the Self-Defense Forces, the expansion of welfare programs, the nationalization of certain key industries, and strict government supervision of financial institutions.⁴ After the 1979 HR

elections, the party held only 41 of the 513 seats in the Lower House, and is unlikely because of the antagonism of the other opposition parties to participate in power any time in the foreseeable future.

The Hyogo committee of the JCP was first organized in January of 1930, but was forced to disband in October of 1932 when some 400 of its members were arrested.⁵ The committee was reorganized immediately after the war and in 1949 the party managed to elect two members to the Lower House, one each from the Kobe and Hanshin HR districts. The Korean War, a change in Occupation policy, and factional disputes within the party broke Communist power in the unions and at the polls in the early 1950's. It was 20 years before the party could again elect a candidate for national office from Kobe. At present, the Hyogo party holds one of six seats in the Hyogo House of Councillors delegation and two House of Representative seats. The party won six of 91 seats contested in the 1979 Prefectural Assembly election.

The Party Interest Group Base

The Hyogo JCP, the Unions, and Party Front Groups

The Communists in Hyogo prefecture as they peered into the decade of the 1980's could confidently expect to win 250,000 votes in any House of Councillors (HC) election. In the House of Representatives (HR) elections, the party could expect to poll 90,000 to 100,000 votes in the first and second HR district,

30,000 in the third and fourth districts, and 10,000 to 15,000 votes in the fifth district. This contrasted sharply with the party's position just 15 years before when it polled only 84,000 votes in the entire prefecture and had yet to win more than 22,000 votes in either the first or second district HR races.

The party's rapid growth in Hyogo since 1965 is all the more surprising because the JCP alone among the parties in Japan cannot depend upon the support of any of the major interest groupings in the country. Unlike its European counterparts, the party was not able to gain control of a substantial segment of the labor movement after the war.⁶ The "Red Purge" orchestrated in part by the Occupation forces in the early 1950's in which JCP members and sympathizers were removed from positions of influence in the unions,⁷ and the continued efforts of management and the socialists⁸ to prevent the election of Communists to union executive boards have effectively served to block party influence within the mainstream of the union movement.

Union support for the JCP in Hyogo has consequently been limited. The party receives the exclusive endorsement⁹ of only the All Japan Accident Insurance (1,200 members) and the Hanshin Plumbers (300 members) unions. It is jointly endorsed with the JSP by the National Revenue Service Workers (100 members), the Kōbe Newspaper Employees (1,200 members), the National Railway Workers (5,000 members), the Kobe Transport Workers (2,200 members), the High School Teachers (7,500 members), the Longshoremen

(4,900 members) and the Hyogo Day-Laborers (6,000 members) unions.¹⁰ The party can also look for support from party member led minority factions in unions which formally endorse the candidates of the other parties. For example, Urai Yoichi, the JCP's first district HR candidate, has claimed the support of a member of the executive committee of the DSP affiliated Kawasaki Steelworkers union¹¹ and Yasutake Hiroko, who was the JCP HC candidate in 1974, had served for a time in the women's department of the Hyogo Sōhyō's Secretariat.

The level of union support which the JCP has managed to obtain has not been sufficient to provide it with the electoral strength that it has enjoyed in the prefecture. The party has created the conditions for its success by building a network of front groups¹² staffed by party members that have allowed the JCP to mobilize votes beyond its natural labor constituency. The most important of these groups have been the Democratic Youth League (Minsei), the New Japan Women's Association (Shinipu), the Democratic Chambers of Commerce (Minshō), and the Democratic Medical Care Association (Miniren). All of these organizations have provided the party with important organizational and financial assistance in its election campaigns. The Democratic Youth League and the New Japan Women's Association have also been the principal sources of new party members, while the Democratic Chambers of Commerce has provided the party with a number of prefectural and Kobe city

assembly candidates and the Democratic Medical Care Association gave the Hyogo party its first successful HR candidate, physician Urai Yoichi.

The Democratic Youth League is the JCP's youth group. Its efforts are directed at organizing high school and university students and young workers. It offers to these young people the opportunity to join with their peers in bowling, hiking, and other kinds of recreational activities. The organization also provides the vehicle by which the demands of students or the young workers can be brought to the attention of the school administration and the union leadership. The Hyogo chapter of the Democratic Youth League had 6,800 members in 1978 and 13 district committees located throughout the prefecture.¹³ Kobe University and the Kobe Foreign Language University, the most prestigious public schools in the prefecture, had the largest branches. There were also active branches within New Japan Steel, Kobe Steel, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Mitsubishi Electric corporations and several banking and credit institutions.¹⁴

The New Japan Women's Association is the party's women's group. Although the JCP is affiliated with a wide range of other local and national women's groups that focus on particular issues such as pollution, day-care centers, or education, this group is the party's effort to fashion their leadership into a coherent political force. The Hyogo chapter had a membership of 4,700 in

1978 and 38 branches in the prefecture. Approximately 15 percent of this membership were also members of the Hyogo party.¹⁵

The Democratic Chambers of Commerce is the organizational means by which the JCP has attempted to penetrate the conservative world of the "petit bourgeois." This group began by offering prospective members help in the preparation of their taxes. It grew rapidly on the strength of the belief that its expertise could save the small shopowner money. Recently, it has expanded its activities to include agitation for the extension of government guaranteed low-interest loans to small businessmen faced with a financial emergency. The Hyogo chapter has a nominal membership of 26,000 in the prefecture (about 60 percent of them are located in the Kobe-Hanshin area) and 25 branches,¹⁶ but only about 4,000 are actively involved in the organization. The remainder simply take advantage of its tax service. Dues in the group are linked to income and average about 3,500 yen (\$17.50) a month. This money and the 5,000 (\$25.00) to 10,000 (\$50.00) yen contributions that members are encouraged to make to JCP candidates at election time are said to be an important source of financial support for the party.¹⁷

The Democratic Medical Care Association is the most prominent of the many service-oriented groups that the JCP has created as a means of organizing voters on the fringes of Japanese society that have not been absorbed into the organizations that make up the support groups of the other parties. It operates 450 hospitals

and clinics throughout the nation staffed by party affiliated physicians who provide the public with inexpensive medical care. The Hyogo chapter has 21 examination centers and two hospitals with a medical staff of over 500.¹⁸ It is said to have some 17,000 patients registered in its health program.¹⁹ Along with the medical care provided them, patients and their families are encouraged by the staff to subscribe to Akahata (Red Flag) the party newspaper, join the support groups of party candidates, and make contributions to party campaigns.

The JCP in Hyogo has not been able to win endorsements from organizations outside the narrow circle of union and front group support described above. A review of the surveys returned to the Kobe Shimbun²⁰ in 1972 and 1976 by Urai Yoichi and Kinoshita Motoni, the party's candidates in the first and second district HR elections, uncovered that they claimed no endorsement from any of the large farm, commercial, religious and professional groups, or union federations in Hyogo. Again, in the reports²¹ filed on individual contributors to their campaigns by Communist candidates in the HR and HC elections between 1965 and 1977 with the Hyogo Elections Commission, none of the contributors could be identified as coming from the leadership of conservative groups or major unions. Most could be accounted for as coming from party assemblymen and members of the prefectural Central Committee.

One target of the JCP front groups are, of course, the membership of conservative organizations and unions in Hyogo.

The Democratic Chambers of Commerce was set up to weaken the conservative Chambers of Commerce; the New Japan Women's Association was meant to counter the Hyogo Women's Clubs Federation whose activities are coordinated through the Women's section of the Social Welfare department of the prefectural government; and the Democratic Youth League has worked to undermine the authority of established union leadership among young union members. As a result, it is not surprising that the leadership of these groups would be most reluctant to endorse the party. Nevertheless, the fact the JCP does not receive the endorsement of these organizations is evidence that it has yet to succeed in threatening the position of leaders supportive of the conservative and socialist parties within them. It also shows that for all its success the Communist organization in Hyogo remains isolated. The JCP front groups are not in any sense independent of the party: they were created at the instigation of the party and have been led in all cases by the membership of the party.²² The Hyogo JCP has not drawn endorsements broadly from all segments of the prefectural political system. Its influence in prefectural affairs depends heavily upon the support that its front groups have been able to muster from those voters outside of the established interests in Hyogo.

The Party Branch Structure

The Organization of the Hyogo JCP Before 1961

The Hyogo JCP was reestablished after the war in October of 1945 by Kishimoto Shigeo, Inoguchi Masao, Tada Ryuji, and Hirayoshi Nobuyuki immediately upon their release from prison.²³ The Hyogo party participated in the reestablishment of the prefectural chapter of the radical All-Japan Farmer's Union in May of 1946 and the formation of Hyogo's first labor federation, the Hyogo Congress of Industrial Unions (Sangyōbetsu Hyōgoken Chihō Kaigi).²⁴ In the first postwar General Election in April of 1946, the party polled 34,000 votes. In the first Local Election under the new Constitution in 1947, the Hyogo JCP elected its first candidate, Horikawa Hitokazu, to the Kobe city assembly. Two years later in 1949, the Hyogo party sent its first representatives to the national assembly, Tachibana Toshio from Kobe and Inoguchi Masao from Hanshin.

In the latter part of the Occupation, the Hyogo JCP suffered a series of setbacks that brought it to the brink of extinction. In April of 1948, Horikawa was arrested by the Occupation authorities for his alleged role in the takeover of the Hyogo governor's office in the protests that accompanied the closing of the Korean language schools in Kobe. In 1950, the Cominform criticism of the JCP program of limited cooperation with the Occupation and the MacArthur ordered purge of 24 members of the national party's Central Committee split the entire party into two warring factions,

the Mainstream group led by the party's chairman at the time Tokuda Kyuichi and International group headed by the party's present leader Miyamoto Kenji.²⁵ The differences between these two factions broadly hinged on their evaluation of the Occupation reforms and the possibility of a peaceful path to political power. The Hyogo JCP broke up along with the national party. Its effectiveness in the prefecture was further impaired by a purge of JCP members carried out by the Kobe Newspaper and companies like Kawasaki Heavy Industries. The purge was accompanied by the enactment in the prefecture by city and town assemblies of public order laws (kōan jōrei) designed to limit JCP organizational activities, and the arrest by the Occupation forces in February 1951 of 14 party members²⁶ for the distribution among Kobe port workers of literature critical of the United States war effort in Korea.

The Hyogo party was not to be formally reconstituted until after the July 1958 meeting of the 7th National Party Congress. The party's two HR incumbent were soundly defeated in the 1952 Lower House election and, although elements of the Hyogo party did run candidates under the party label in the 1953 and 1955 HR elections and the 1956 HC election, the JCP between 1950 and 1958 was engaged mainly in covert agitation against the United States military presence in Japan. The party believed that it could never gain power as long as the United States retained the capacity to intervene directly in Japanese domestic affairs. In elections,

most of the membership worked on behalf of left-wing socialist candidates in Hyogo.

After 1958, the JCP renounced its belief in the futility of contesting elections under the present constitutional order and began in Hyogo the long process of building itself into a political force capable of contesting for seats in the Diet with the ruling conservative and labor union backed socialist parties. The process was not smooth, yet by the time of the 8th National Party Congress in July of 1961, which formally committed the party to rebuild its organization in the constituencies, the Hyogo party had begun to take the first steps towards the making of an organizational apparatus that today cannot be rivaled by any of the other parties in the prefecture.

The Present Branch Structure of the Hyogo JCP

The JCP now has a three tiered organizational structure within Hyogo prefectural committee (ken-iinkai), district committees (chiku-iinkai), and party branches (shibu).

The prefectural committee is responsible for the implementation in the prefecture of decisions made at the national party congress and the directives of the national Central Committee. The committee is also charged with the maintenance of liaison with groups friendly or affiliated with the party in the prefecture, the coordination of the party newspaper's distribution and subscription drives, the supervision of party assemblymen within

the local governments, the management of party election campaigns, and the maintenance of the party organization in the prefecture.²⁷ The committee is headquartered in three buildings in downtown Kobe, the capitol of the prefecture. Its paid staff, including 14 members of the prefectural Executive committee, is between 50 and 75 employees.²⁸

The district committees of the party were established to direct and coordinate the work of party branches within a particular area. Their zone of responsibility does not necessarily correspond to the geographic divisions of the electoral districts of the local governmental units. Instead the party attaches a functional definition to them. The district committees must be constituted so as to generate from their membership the financial support necessary to maintain an office and a full-time staff. In Hyogo prefecture in 1979, there were 11 district committees. Three of them were located in Kobe, three on the mainland part of the Hanshin district, one on Awajii Island, one each in the third and fourth districts, and two in the fifth district (see Table 45). The present arrangement of the district committees in Hyogo was set by the 27th Hyogo Party Congress in line with a decision made at the 12th National Party Congress in 1973 that directed the subdivision of the existing party district committee system in order to strengthen the supervision of the activities of the party branches. Prior to this time, party district committees in Hyogo had numbered five and corresponded in their territorial responsibilities to the

Table 45
JSP District Committees in Hyogo Prefecture, 1979

Committee	Estimate of Paid Staff
Kobe-Central	23
Kobe-East	12
Kobe-West	18
Amagasaki	20
Nishinomiya-Ashiya	14
North Hanshin	16
East Harima	22
West Harima	17
Tajima	2
Tamba	4
Awajii Island	2

Source: See Note 29.

five HR election districts within the prefecture. The subdivision was undertaken in 1973 because the national party decided that increases in the party membership were sufficient to support additional district committees. All of the district committees in Hyogo have their own office and staff. The largest is the Kobe-Central committee which is estimated to have as many as 23 employees. It is followed closely by the East Harima (22) and Amagasaki (20) committees. The smallest is the two member Awajii Island committee.²⁹

The fundamental unit of the party is the branch. It can be formed within a geographic area or place of work such as a factory, mine, school, or government office wherever there are three or more party members. When the membership of a branch exceeds 10, it may be subdivided into squads (han). The formal duties of a JCP party branch³⁰ are to collect member dues, hold regular meetings of the membership, make efforts to expand the circulation of the party newspaper, bring in new members to the party, work to increase public understanding and support for the party, ensure that the membership observe party rules and implement party directives, and educate the membership in scientific socialist principles. In 1978, the Hyogo party was estimated to have some 950 branches in the prefecture. Almost all of them were located in the union or party front groups.³¹ The party's goal has been to try to establish a branch within every union in the prefecture. It has very few branches in the neighborhoods. Coordination of the

party's political activities in a geographic area takes place at the district level. The JCP's emphasis in Hyogo has been on organizing people based on their place of work rather than where they live.

The prefectural, district, and branch committees are the basic units of organization in the Hyogo JCP, but there are also two additional bodies: district committee liaison councils (shi-gun-iinkai) and party member groups (tō-iinkai). The liaison councils are a product of the creation of separate district committees in the Kobe, Hanshin, and Tamba HR districts. Their purpose is to coordinate party preparations for and campaign activities during the Lower House elections. These liaison councils have neither an office nor a staff, and they function only in an auxiliary status to the different district committees. Similarly, when party members belong to the same organization or industrial group (for example, members of party branches in the Post Office or Teachers unions) they are expected by the party to form a party members group to help coordinate party activities within these bodies.

The organization of the socialist parties in Hyogo bears a formal similarity to that of the JCP, but they cannot match the size of its staff or the number of district offices that the Communist operate. The conservative LDP and the Komeito fare even worse in a comparison. Their branch structure exists only on paper below the prefectural level in Hyogo. One reason for these differences is that the JCP did not have an organized constituency

upon which to overlay its branch structure. The socialist parties have worked to mobilize support through the organizational infrastructure provided them by the large union federations; the LDP has relied upon conservative groups such as agricultural cooperatives and commercial associations, and the Komeito has looked to the Sōkagakkai. The Communists in Hyogo without this kind of backing have had to depend upon the support of party members and the front groups sustained by them. The functional definition given to the intermediary units of the party organization is a necessary outcome of this: the party could not establish any more district committees than its membership could support. The party has sought most persistently the support of labor unions and the fringe elements in Japanese society. It has, consequently, not organized its branches on a geographic basis but has placed them in the workplace and party front groups.

Party Decisionmaking Organs

The congress of the prefectural committee is the highest decisionmaking organ for the JCP in Hyogo. The party charter prescribes that the prefectural congresses be convened at least once a year (Article 38).³² Extraordinary sessions may be convened at the discretion of the party's Central committee or by a vote of one-third of the membership in the prefecture. The prefectural congress meets to hear the report of the chairman on new decisions made by the national party and the activities of the party in the

prefecture, since the last congress. The chairman's report is often quite lengthy: in 1973, it required three hours for its presentation from the podium.³³ Delegates from the branches to the congress are permitted to present in writing their own assessment of the party's activities during the period prior to the congress and their proposals for the future. A limited number of them are permitted to address the congress. Based on the chairman's report and those offered by the other delegates, each party congress approves a series of resolutions that lay out in broad terms the prefectural party's program of action for the next inter-congress period. These resolutions, as they are with the other parties, are usually prepared in advance and approved with a voice vote. The congress's final duty is to elect a Central Committee that will later meet to choose the party chairman. The congress selects the Central committeemen from a list of candidates prepared by the outgoing committee. The congress does not vote to approve or reject the entire slate, as is the case with the socialist parties in Hyogo. Instead, it has the power to turn back the nomination of any individual candidate by casting a negative vote against him. In practice, however, this has never occurred in Hyogo.

The prefectural congress does not have the power to endorse party candidates for office. JCP candidates for office in Hyogo are recommended by the prefectural Central committee to the national party. The Central committee of the national party makes the final decision in party nominations. Candidates for local

office in Hyogo are usually introduced to the congress delegates and may make a few general remarks on the theme of their campaign.

Between 1945 and 1978, the Hyogo JCP held 32 Party Congresses. The rule that they be convened annually has not been adhered to rigidly: the congresses have been convened at intervals varying from six to 24 months. Delegates have been chosen on the basis of one for every 10 to 13 party members. Members of the party's Executive and Central committees also participate in the congress, but party assemblymen must be elected delegates if they are not members of these committees. The congresses have often been convened after a national party congress or opened several months prior to an election. In the latter case, the proceedings of the congress have included the introduction of party candidates for office and the adoption of a party electoral platform.

The prefectural Central committee represents the party congress when it is not in session. It elects from its membership the party's chairman and Executive committee, and has the responsibility for the supervision of party finances. In Hyogo, the Central committee meets on the average of once a month to deliberate on party affairs. The number of members on the Hyogo committee has changed from congress to congress. In 1973, the Central committee had 50 full-members and 23 candidates.³⁴ In 1978, the committee included 72 full-members and 17 candidates.³⁵ The Central committee is made up of district committee chairmen and vice-chairmen, the chairmen of the departments and committees

within the prefectural Secretariat, and senior members of the party's assembly delegations.

The Executive committee (kanbu-kai) of the prefectural party takes responsibility for the day to day administration of party affairs. The committee represent the party before the public and chooses both from within and outside its membership the heads of the departments and committees within the party Secretariat. It can be convened as often as is necessary for the conduct of party business. All members of the Executive committee are full-time employees of the party. They receive a salary of between 100,000 (\$500) and 130,000 (\$650) yen a month with a one month bonus twice yearly.³⁶ In Hyogo, the Executive committee presently has 14 members including the chairman. It is convened on the average of once a week. All members of the committee in Hyogo are long term party activists with backgrounds in the labor movement or the prewar tenant farmers struggle.

In addition to these formal deliberative organs of the party, the Hyogo JCP also has a liaison council made up of the chairman or vice-chairmen of all party branches in the prefecture called the Prefectural Activists Council (Katsudōsha Kaigi). This nearly 1,000 member council is usually convened after a meeting of the national party Central Committee that occurs once every three to five months. The purpose of the council is to ensure the rapid and correct implementation of the national Central committee's decisions within the prefecture.

The JCP's decisionmaking structure is similar to that of Communist organizations in other countries, and shares their emphasis upon the principle of the democratic centralization of authority. In terms of its formal characteristics, the JCP congress has far less power than the Hyogo socialist parties' conventions, but it compares favorably with the role in party affairs assigned the conventions of the prefectural LDP and Komeito. The relative centralization of decisionmaking power in the Hyogo JCP has been functional for the party because it lacks an organized support base, and as a result has been forced to create one from elements in the population outside of those incorporated into the power bases of the other parties. This has required great organizational discipline with the attendant subordination of the congress to the Central and Executive committees. The party's success in Hyogo has not given it a more pluralistic and open decisionmaking structure. Indeed, just the opposite has been true.

The Party Secretariat

The Secretariat of the Hyogo JCP in 1979 had 24 departments and committees. These could be grouped generally into four functional categories: those concerned with liaison with special constituencies, assemblies and elections, ideology, and the maintenance and growth of the party. The departments are usually run by a chairman who draws a full-time salary from the party. He is assisted by a number of vice-chairmen who are often come from the

party front groups, whose activities the department supervises. The Secretariat committees have a structure similar to that of the departments, but they differ in that their membership come from the departments and their responsibilities are usually broader.³⁷

Special Constituencies

There are 11 departments and one Secretariat committee in this first grouping: youth, women, labor, farm-marine, small business, shopkeepers, the intelligentsia, citizens movements, Burakumin,³⁸ coalition strategy, legal strategy, and pollution. A review of their activities highlights the JCP's successes and failures in trying to undermine the coherence of the conservative groups and unions that support the other parties and to create for itself its own constituency in the prefecture.

The Youth department of the Hyogo party works principally with the JCP's youth organization, the Democratic Youth League. It also has helped to organize a number of recreation and sporting clubs such as the Hyōgoken Kinrōsha Sangake Renmei (mountaineering), the Hyōgoken Suki Kyōgikai (skiing), the Hyōgoken Yakyū Kyōgikai (baseball), the Hyōgoken Tenisu Kyōgikai (tennis) and the Hyōgoken Suiei Kyōgikai (swimming). The purpose of these clubs is to provide young workers with recreational opportunities and to encourage them to take an interest in the political issues that concern the party. The programs of these clubs in Hyogo have been very active, yet they have not provided the party with the

anticipated number of young party activists. The problem has been that the younger workers who enjoy outdoor activities will not normally spend the time studying Communist political literature necessary to become an effective party member.³⁹

The party's Women's department works in tandem with the New Japan Women's Association. In recent years it has been closely involved with the party controlled Haha-oya Renraku-kai, an association of education activists. The department has an inward focus as well: it offers support to women party members and has encouraged them to strive for positions of leadership in the party. At present, there are six women on the Hyogo party's Central committee, but as yet none on the important Executive committee.

The Labor department of the party uses party member groups to increase Communist influence within elements of organized labor that occupy key positions in prefectural economic structure such as the steel and shipbuilding unions, the public service unions (post office, telecommunications, schools, railroads), and the government employees unions. Management and the socialist union leadership in Hyogo have been alert to try to limit JCP influence within the work force through the firing, when possible, of party members and various types of job and salary discrimination. The companies that have taken the strongest measures in Hyogo have been Kawasaki Heavy Industries, the Kansai Power Company, and Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries.⁴⁰ The unions of all of these companies are controlled by DSP activists. The Hyogo party

has fought back through the creation of the Kobe Council to End Political Discrimination at Kawasaki Heavy Industries and the Council to Protest Violations of Human Rights at Kansai Power. In January of 1976, it had two of its national assembly representatives, Urai Yoichi from Kobe and Yasutake Hiroko, a Hyogo district HC incumbent, visit the Aioi city plant of Ishikawajima Harima to investigate charges of discrimination.⁴²

As noted before, the JCP is unusual among the world's non-governing Communist parties in that it has achieved substantial electoral success without the backing of a Communist controlled union federation. Nevertheless, the party is well aware that without strong union support it has little chance of actually participating in power. Consequently, the party leadership has sought to win the support of the existing union federations by working from within to capture control of the executive committees of their constituent unions. It has also tried since 1965 to build support by organizing its own unions and bringing into them on an individual basis workers employed in non-union enterprises.⁴² In Hyogo, as elsewhere, these unions were first organized on an industry or craft basis by the party. The most important of them were the Hyogo Service Industry Workers (Hyogo Shōgyō Ippan Rōdō Kumiai), Hyogo Machinery and Metal Workers, Kobe Rubber Industry Workers, and Hyogo Construction Laborers unions. None of them ever became very large.⁴³ In line with the decision of the 14th National Party Congress to join these unions together into one national federation,

the Hyogo party Labor department in 1977 helped to create the Center to Promote the Organization of Non-Union Workers (Hyōgo Misoshiki Rōdōsha no Soshiki o Susmeru Kyōdō Senta).

The Farm-Marine department of the JCP has been most active on Awajii island where the party has been concerned with the problem of the over-production of Japanese mandarin oranges, and in the fifth district where it has been working to strengthen its influence with the agricultural and fishing cooperatives. The department has been hampered in its activities by the party's lack of success in sustaining a party controlled farm organization in the prefecture. The Hyogo chapter of the All-Japan Farmers Union, established after the war by socialist and communist activists in the tenants movement, collapsed in the early 1970's and has yet to be reconstituted.⁴⁴ At present, the party works through party member groups and Akahata readers discussion groups in the rural areas to reach individual farmers or fishermen. The head of the department in 1978 was a Nishinomiya prefectural assemblyman and former vice-chairman of the Kobe Steel union. His surprising selection to head the department reflects the party's recent efforts to organize truck farmers on the outskirts of the large urban centers, whose livelihood is threatened by high property taxes. It also suggest the distance that lies between the party and the leadership of the farm cooperative movement in Hyogo.

The Small Business department of the Hyogo party has a dual focus. It is concerned with the working condition of the labor

force within these enterprises, and the strengthening of the position of the owners of these businesses versus the banks and the large national corporations. The party has sought support from this constituency by working in the assembly for the extension of emergency loans to these enterprises in order to protect owners from bankruptcy and the workers from the loss of employment. The party in Hyogo has tried to approach this constituency through the Friends of Small Business Association (Chū-shō Kigyō Dōyūkai) but the leadership has admitted that this organization has not had much success. Most small businesses are already enrolled in a conservative commercial association and might face the cancellation of contracts or loans were they to cooperate with the party. They are also as a group very resistive to any attempt to organize their employees.

With the "petit bourgeois"--the owners of coffee shops, dry-cleaners, and neighborhood groceries--the party has enjoyed much greater success. The Shopowners department (shimin-bu) works through the party's well entrenched and powerful Democratic Chambers of Commerce that attracts membership by offering tax and management advice. In the past several years, the department has devoted its energies to organizing local association of neighborhood shopowners against the intrusion of supermarkets and large shopping malls.

The Hyogo party's Intelligentsia department reaches out to the intellectual community through the Japan Scientists Council (Nihon Kagakusha Kaigi) a federation of academic research groups,

and the Cultural Organizations Liaison Council, a federation of cultural and artistic groups. These two federations coordinate a kaleidoscopic array of small specialized groups that include the Marxist Research Seminar, the Japan-Korean Studies Group, the Education Research Group, the Japan Democratic Literature Alliance, the Poets Council, and the Folk Crafts Protection Society. The department's objective in working with these groups is not only to gather the support of the intelligentsia, but through them to create an intellectual climate within which Communist goals can obtain greater legitimacy and acceptance.

The Citizens Movement department was not established in the Hyogo party until after the 11th National Party Congress that committed it to cooperate with the spontaneous neighborhood groups formed to cope with traffic congestion, high-rise apartments, and the other ills that have threatened the safety and comfort of urban living. The department is charged with discovering these groups and bringing their demands to the attention of party assemblymen, or introducing them to lawyers affiliated with the party when legal action is required. Presently, it is working with groups concerned with the noise and safety problems presented by Route 43, the major truck route through the prefecture, and those working to preserve "green-spaces" in the city.

Until 1972, the Hyogo party attacked the problem of Buraku discrimination in conjunction with the Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaihō Dōmei), a group formed independently of the party that

had come under its control through the accession of party members to positions of organizational leadership. This control was broken by an anti-leadership group called the Asada faction, which pushed out the party membership, claiming that the interests of the Buraku should not be tied to that of any one party. The Burakumin department has since attempted to rebuild its influence by creating a new organization to rival the Liberation League, the Hyogo Buraku Liberation Movement (Kaihō Undō). The Buraku problem is an issue of keen concern in Hyogo. The problem of discrimination has been considerably muddled by the bitter infighting within the Burakumin between groups supportive and opposed to the JCP's influence, and the violent tactics used by the anti-JCP group to force its program upon the Hyogo High School Teachers union. So far, the JCP has only benefited from the troubles. Its stand against the sometimes extreme demands made by the Asada faction on the staff of the prefecture's high schools have won it strong support from the Teachers union.

The Coalition Strategy department of the party cooperates with Communist sponsored groups such as the Japan Peace Committee, the Japan Council Against Nuclear Weapons (Gensuikyō), and the Liaison Council to Block Revision of the Constitution (Kenpō Kaiaku Bōshi Kakukai Renraku Kyōgikai), and similar groups affiliated with the other parties. The purpose of the department is to create a broad national coalition on a limited number of key foreign policy and domestic issues. In Hyogo, the department managed in May 1976

to effect the organizational merger of the party's nuclear weapons issue group with that of the JSP.⁴⁵ It has also cooperated with the JSP in opposing the location of Self Defense Force Hawk missiles in the rural fifth district.

The Legal Strategy department handles legal affairs for the party. It works with the Democratic Law Association (Minshu Hōritsu Kyōkai), which has 36 lawyers affiliated with it, to offer legal services to citizen groups and to protect party members who have been discharged for political activities by their companies. It is currently pressing damage suits against members of the Buraku Liberation League for their part in an attack upon teachers at the Yoka Township High School in 1975.⁴⁶ The department has also proven to be an attractive source of candidates for the party. Maeda Sadao, the party's fifth district HR candidate, and Kinoshita Motoni, a second district HR incumbent, are both former chairmen of this department.

Although the Citizens Movement and Legal Strategy departments both deal with environmental issues, the Pollution committee was especially established in the Secretariat to oversee a comprehensive approach to this problem, which in the early 1970's approached crises dimensions in the prefecture. At present, this committee is cooperating with those in 11 other surrounding prefectures to set up a regional anti-pollution liaison council, the Association to Protect the Environment of the Inland Sea. The party leadership claims that over 100 citizen organizations

have agreed to participate in this council, but also has acknowledged that very few of these groups will be able to link their members' commitment to the immediate problems which they face with the broader policy demands articulated by the party.

Assemblies and Elections

The three departments in this category supervise the activities of the party in government and elections: local governments, national assembly, and elections. Their importance is suggested by the fact that all three chairmen of these departments were members of the prefectural Executive committee. The operations of the departments reveal the firm control the party leadership has maintained over JCP assemblymen, a control that reflects the narrowness of the party's base of support in the prefecture.

The Local Government department is responsible for coordinating through their respective assembly delegations the activities of party representatives in the Hyogo and Kobe assemblies. The activities of party representatives in the other city and town assemblies in the prefecture are supervised by the district committees which report to the prefectural department. Assemblymen's status in the JCP is different from that in the other parties. They are looked upon as instruments of the party, and the income realized from their position is considered to belong to the party. They are expected to meet their living expenses out of a salary that is equal to that paid a member of the party's Executive

committee. The chairmanship of the department reflects this attitude. In sharp contrast to the other parties, this position was held in 1979 by a non-assemblyman. The department also serves to provide party assemblymen with the information that they need to contend with the representatives of the prefectural bureaucracy in the legislature. This function is crucial to the party's influence in the assembly. Because of its small numbers (six in the prefectural assembly and 11 in the Kobe assembly), the JCP can only influence legislation through its capacity to raise issues that the conservative majority would prefer to ignore.

All the departments introduced to this point find parallels in the Secretariats of the other parties in the prefecture. This is not true in the case of the National Assembly department. The purpose of the department is to ensure that issues of concern to the party's constituency in Hyogo are brought to the attention of their representatives in Tokyo, and that the power and prestige of the national assemblymen can be made useful to the party within the prefecture. This department brings into view again the JCP's attitude towards assemblymen: they are an asset to be used to strengthen the party in its competition for political power with other groups in the prefecture. The visit by Urai and Yasutake to investigate charges of discrimination at the Ishikawajima Harima factory in Aioi is a good example of the way in which national assemblymen have been employed by the party in Hyogo. This

department like the Local Government department is headed by a non-assemblyman.

The Election Strategy department of the Hyogo party is the center for Communist electoral activity in the prefecture. The JCP in Hyogo underwrites the entire cost of a candidate's campaign and it treats the candidate's own electoral ambitions as subordinate to the party's overall strategy for obtaining power in the prefecture. The Hyogo party's control over its candidates' electoral future has been graphically revealed in a number of cases. In November of 1969, the party replaced its designated candidate for the Kobe district HR seat, Tachibana Toshio, one day before the opening of the three week official campaign period in favor of Urai Yoichi, the party's candidate for Kobe mayor in an election held a week before. In 1977, the JCP replaced Furumori Shigeru, the party's designated Hyogo district HC candidate for more than a year, with Fujiki Yoko, an activist in the New Japan Women's Association, less than five months before the election. Abrupt changes in candidates such as these would have been unthinkable in the other parties because their candidates have usually been officers in the major interest groupings in their base of support. The JCP has been able to do this because the constituency to which the candidate might hope to appeal was created and is controlled by the party. The Election department like the other two in this group was headed up in 1979 by a non-assemblyman.

Ideology

One department and two Secretariat committees can be located in this category: propaganda, culture-education, and policy. All of them have been assigned the task of trying to reduce the isolation of the party from the mainstream of prefectural political life through the nurturing in the public of a favorable image of Communist goals and the development of a practical political agenda for the prefectural party within the limits set by national party decisions.

The JCP in Hyogo cannot count on the stable support of a large well-identified grouping in the population such as the union membership or the believers of a particular religion. Moreover, the party's efforts to develop support have been hampered by the negative image of the party held by many segments of the public. Consequently, it has put great emphasis upon propaganda activities that can reach out to the individual voter and serve to reduce public distrust of the party. The Propaganda department of the Hyogo party has access to the high speed presses of a company managed by party activists, the International Cooperative Press. The equipment in this company is said to be of such efficiency that the party can have posters and billets printed for less than half the cost that the other Hyogo parties are forced to pay.⁴⁷ It also has a well organized cadre of party member-volunteers who can reportedly place party literature in the mailboxes of most Hyogo prefecture residents within 24 hours.⁴⁸ It may take the other

parties three days to a week to accomplish the same task. The 1975 revision of the Election Law placed rather strict limits on the number of posters and billets that each party can use in an election campaign.⁴⁹ As a result, since 1975, the Propaganda department has laid increasing emphasis on the development of local party newspapers. These newspapers have the advantage that they are more likely to be read and remembered by the voters than hastily prepared and delivered billets and, as newspapers, they are not subject to the restrictions placed upon billet distribution: the party is free to issue as many editions of the paper as it can deliver at election time. In addition to the paper of the prefectural party Hyōgo Minpō (Hyogo Peoples News), there are 14 local newspapers issued irregularly by the district committees and individual branches with the assistance of the prefectural Propaganda department. The papers of the Santo and Hidaka township branches are said to have played an important role in the party's success in the 1975 Local Elections in the Hyogo fifth district.

The Culture-Education committee works to improve the party's image in a less direct fashion. It cooperates with a number of musical, theatrical, and cinema groups that present programs that portray the Communist world favorably and point up contradictions and inequities in the present Japanese social structure. Some of these groups include the Hyōgo Utagoe Kyōgikai (sponsors concerts of protest and proletariat music), the Kōbe Rōen Renraku-kai (proletariat theatre), and the Kōbe Eiga Sakuru Kyōgikai

(sponsorship of Soviet and East European films). The committee is made up of the chairmen of departments in the Secretariat dealing with particular party constituencies and party members active in the organizations that work with the committee. Its purpose is to permit the coordination of their activities: for example, the Democratic Youth League may organize ticket sales on the university campuses for a movie offered by the Kobe Eiga Sakuru Kyogikai.

The Policy committee of the Hyogo JCP does not make policy for the party, but rather tries to gather the information necessary for the Executive committee to properly evaluate a particular issue area. The committee has 10 regular members drawn from full-time party officials, party assemblymen, and policy experts. It has no fixed sub-committee structure. Instead, the committee sets up special project teams that may draw some of their membership from outside the committee. Presently, the committee has been asked by the Executive committee to study the development plans proposed by the prefectural government with special emphasis on the proposed construction of a new airport and a coastal highway to link it with downtown Kobe, both issues of great concern to the residents in the path of the proposed construction.

Organizational Maintenance and Growth

The final functional category into which the Secretariat of the Hyogo JCP can be arranged includes the organization, finance, newspaper, publications, education, and citizen contact

departments. The Organization and Finance departments will be treated more generally in the succeeding sections on membership and party income and expenditures. The other departments will be described below in way that emphasizes the problems that the party has faced in Hyogo from the mid-1970's in trying to build upon its great successes of the 1960's.

The Newspaper department manages the delivery and the collection of subscription fees for the national party paper, Akahata. In 1978 the paper circulated daily to 29,500 readers and the Sunday edition reached 129,500.⁵⁰ Akahata, in sharp contrast to the two to five page offerings of the other parties, usually has 16 pages in its daily format and 20 pages on Sunday. It includes a sports section, cartoons, and radio and television listings. The paper is put together by an editorial staff in Tokyo and transmitted by a telephone-facsimile hook-up to the paper's Kansai regional printing plant in Osaka (Akahata has three other such plants in Tokyo, Sapporo, and Fukuoka). The Osaka plant sends the paper by truck to distribution points in Hyogo. The paper is delivered to subscribers each morning by party members, who commit themselves to the delivery of 25 to 50 copies of the paper several times a week before going off to work. Collection of the subscription fee is also carried out each month by the party membership.⁵¹ The prefectural and district committees of the Hyogo JCP together employed 60 party members part-time and maintained nine offices to coordinate the distribution of the paper and the forwarding of

subscription fees in 1977. Salaries averaged between 70,000 (\$350) and 90,000 (\$450) yen a month for these workers.⁵² Party members were also paid for the delivery of the paper, but the money, which amounted to only a few thousand yen a month (\$10-\$15.00), was usually contributed by them to support the activities of their local branch.

Since the 8th National Party Congress, the JCP under the leadership of Miyamoto Kenji has looked upon the expansion of the Akahata readership as the primary means of increasing the influence of the party. Circulation goals have been set for the party at each congress and periodically subscription drives (40 in all since 1961) have been inaugurated during which the ordinary work of the party has stopped and the entire membership has turned its energies to boosting Akahata readership. In recent years, quotas have been assigned to the party membership: prefectural assemblymen (100 copies), city assemblymen (50 copies), town assemblymen (30 copies), and ordinary members (5 to 25 copies). The names of party members who have exceeded their assigned quotas have been listed in the party papers: in July of 1978, for example, 75 members of the Hyogo party were given special recognition by the national party for having brought in more than 30 new subscriptions to Akahata during the three month period prior to the 56th anniversary of the founding of the party; 123 party members were mentioned for bringing five new daily and more than 10 Sunday edition subscriptions.⁵³ This seems to indicate some progress on the part of the Hyogo party to develop

new readership. Yet, in Hyogo circulation of the daily edition has remained unchanged since 1973;⁵⁴ circulation of the Sunday edition has increased by only 12,000 copies.⁵⁵ The explanation for this is that the gains announced by the party have often been only temporary. New readers who took the paper at the insistence of a persuasive party member may lose interest and drop their subscription the next month. Members under pressure to meet their quotas are said to have occasionally registered friends and neighbors without their consent as new subscribers. In the Higashi Nada ward of Kobe, one party branch in order to meet the quota given it is known to have bought the newspaper on its own account and distributed it free.⁵⁶ These sudden spurts and equally quick drops in readership have made deliveries difficult and collection of the subscription fees, at times, impossible.

In recent months, there have appeared signs of the beginnings of a sharp debate in the party over whether Akahata subscription drives are the best ways to increase party influence. Hakamada Satoshi, the former vice-chairman of the party, who was stripped of his title and expelled from the party at the 14th National Congress, has openly criticized Miyamoto's emphasis upon Akahata. He argues that the party would do better to put its efforts into the organization of the labor force and the contesting more vigorously of union executive committee elections.⁵⁷

The Publications department of the party promotes the sale in the prefecture of the remarkable number of journals and books

published by the party. It also manages a bookstore owned by the party in one of Kobe's shopping malls.

The Education department deals with the indoctrination of party members. In accordance with a resolution of the 14th National Party Congress, the 31st Hyogo Party Congress pledged the party to make a more careful attempt to introduce new members to the party and make greater efforts to increase the political awareness of the existing membership.⁵⁸ This has been a major problem for the JCP. The Hyogo party has had little trouble in attracting new members: in April of 1977 after a speech given by the national party's secretary-general, Fuha Tetsuzo, to an audience of 3,000 university students, 231 students filled out applications for party membership.⁵⁹ Yet the party has had great difficulty retaining these new members. The leadership reports that most lose interest after only two or three months. A result of this, that will be detailed later, is that the membership of the JCP in Hyogo has remained virtually unchanged since the early 1970's. The Education department also tries to maintain close contact with the Akahata readership through the sponsorship of Akahata readers' discussion groups. In conjunction with the Organization department, it has made the Akahata Festival a regular event in Hyogo. The festival, which in 1979 was held for the 16th time since 1960, has usually been convened in a large city park and has attracted as many as 40,000 participants (1978 estimate by Hyōgo Minpō) through its presentation in concert of such top-name performers as Saryo Naomi.

The Citizen Contact department is the newest in the prefectural Secretariat. It was established in accordance with a resolution passed at the 13th National Party Congress in July of 1976. The department was set up to coordinate the activities of JCP organized citizen contact centers (shimin renraku-sho) in the prefecture.⁶⁰ The purpose of these centers is to provide a means by which the party's organization can be mobilized to handle the requests of individual voters as opposed to those of organized groups. The matters handled by these centers are identical to those informal services that have always been provided to constituents by conservative and Communist assemblymen alike. In Hyogo, the party branches, Akahata distribution centers, and even the homes of individual party members now sport signs identifying them as JCP citizen contact centers. But they seem to serve mainly a propaganda function for the party: citizens who visit them are simply referred to party assemblymen or to one of the many service organizations affiliated with the party.

Party Membership

The JCP is open to any Japanese national over 18 who has a commitment to the party program, a willingness to join in party activities, and the capacity to pay party dues.⁶¹ Prospective members must be recommended by two members in good standing to the party and undergo a five month candidacy period. During the candidacy, the prospective members receive a minimum of six hours

of instruction on party goals and programs. A booklet prepared by the Central committee is used as the text for this instruction.⁶²

In addition to the normal requirements for continued membership in good standing specified by all the political parties, i.e., payment of dues and participation in party activities, the JCP party charter goes into considerable detail to specify member obligations. They include commitments on the part of the member to: 1) guard the unity of the party and preserve its organizational strength; 2) carry out party directives; 3) increase the readership of party publications and party membership; 4) educate himself in party programs and scientific socialism; 5) remain faithful to party principles; 6) help through self-criticism and constructive criticism of party organizations or officials to improve the activities of the party; 7) remain loyal to the party organization under all circumstances; 8) be watchful against attempts to injure the party or the people's interests; and 9) participate in the solution to any disputes in the party organization. These obligations have been presented in the order that they appear in the second article⁶³ of the party charter. It is interesting to note that the first obligation of a party member is to preserve the unity of the party and that four of the remaining eight obligations are pointedly directed at the problem of factionalism which wrecked the party in the 1950's. This list of obligations also underlines the party's distrust of the conservative government and fear of the Japanese right wing. At the time of the 14th National

Party Congress in 1977, the membership was explicitly cautioned to be vigilant against violent attacks upon party leaders and local officers, and to be concerned to unmask spies who posing as loyal members had worked their way into the organization with the purpose of weakening the party from within.⁶⁴ In this regard, the Hyogo party has had special reason to be vigilant. On May 26, 1977 a knife wielding right wing youth was stopped just 15 meters short of the national party chairman, Miyamoto Kenji, who was giving a speech at Kobe's Kokusai Kaikan (International Hall). Outside the hall, right wing groups such as the Kansai Protect the Nation Organization (Kansai Gōkokudan) and the Defend the Fatherland Forces (Sōkoku Bōeitai) had amassed 17 trucks and 80 helmeted supporters to protest his visit to the city.⁶⁵ It is also well known that the Hyogo prefectural police maintain close surveillance of the party and its activities.

The JCP makes heavy financial demands upon its membership. Party dues are one percent of income. Those who fall more than six months behind in the payment of dues lose the right to participate in party congresses and may be expelled from the party. Members are also liable for a number of special assessments. These have included in recent years collections to support party publications, to cover the expenses of party conferences, to provide party employees with a year-end bonus, to purchase a sound car, to aid party activities in rural areas of the prefecture, to sponsor the convening of the party school, and to help party

members who have lost their jobs as the result of their political activities.⁶⁶ In addition to these required assessments, party members are expected to make contributions to the campaign funds of party endorsed candidates. With all these different demands placed upon them, it is estimated that the average party member receiving a base salary of 100,000 (\$500) a month may pay in dues, special assessments, and fees for party publications nearly 5,000 (\$25.00) yen a month. Any contributions to party candidates will be on top of this figure.⁶⁷

Membership in the Hyogo JCP at the time of the 7th National Party Congress in 1958 was around 1,300.⁶⁸ Just two years later in 1960, the party succeeded in doubling this figure⁶⁹ and by 1966 membership stood at 8,100.⁷⁰ After this, the growth rate of party membership began to level off. In 1973 the party in Hyogo was reported to have 13,000 members, 15 to 20 percent of whom were not in good standing because of their failure to pay party dues.⁷⁰ Five years later membership had not increased appreciably: in 1978 the official membership of the Hyogo JCP was 13,600⁷² and the dues-paying membership only 11,340.⁷³ The Hyogo party was the eighth largest prefectural committee in the party in both 1973 and 1978 (see Table 46).

The JCP has had trouble increasing its membership in part because it has grown more selective.⁷⁴ In the first few years of the membership drive, members were instructed to target the dissatisfied and lonely in their workplaces or neighborhoods, gain

their confidence, and introduce them to the party. The JCP, however, quickly found that this group did not make for a reliable

Table 46
Membership of the 10 Largest JCP Prefectural
Committees in 1973 and 1978

Prefecture	1973	1978
Tokyo	57,000	58,500
Osaka	32,000	33,500
Kyoto	20,000	22,500
Hokkaido	18,000	19,500
Fukuoka	18,000	18,000
Kanagawa	17,000	17,500
Aichi	15,000	15,000
HYOGO	13,000	13,600
Nagano	9,000	10,600
Saitama	8,700	9,200

Source: See Note 72 and 73.

party cadre, nor did it give the party access to the organizational resources of outside groups. In 1967, the party introduced a five month candidacy period prior to the party's acceptance of an applicant's formal petition for membership. The party also began to put greater emphasis upon the cultivation of the occupants of

positions of leadership in the workplace or the neighborhoods. As a result, membership which had grown from 40,000 to 280,000 nationwide in less than a decade slowed to an increase of less than one-half this number in the next 10 years. In 1978, the national membership of the party was estimated to be 341,000.⁷⁵

The JCP has targeted industrial areas and areas around proposed highways and dams in rural districts as places where the party has best hopes of cultivating new support. The distribution of dues-paying party members among the district committees in Hyogo shows that the bulk of the membership is located in the urban districts of Kobe and Hanshin, but that the party can draw on a substantial organization in nearly every area of the prefecture (see Table 47):

There is little reliable information on the composition of the JCP membership in Hyogo. It is known that the majority of the party's membership come from a working class background, but there are also elements from the intelligentsia, white-collar workers (mostly in the public service and government employees unions) and the "petit bourgeois." Women make up about one-third of the membership.⁷⁶ The JCP differs from the other parties in that its membership do not hold positions of influence within conservative groups, unions, or religious sects in the prefecture. The party has drawn its membership largely from the activist stratum of the groups affiliated with the party such as the Democratic Youth League, the New Japan Women's Association, and the Democratic

Table 47
Membership of Hyogo JCP District Committees^a in 1978

District	Members
Amagasaki	1,418
Awajii Island	162
Kobe-Central	1,696
Kobe-West	1,272
Kobe-East	1,049
West Harima	1,025
Tajima	383
Tamba	284
East Harima	1,171
Nishinomiya	845
North Hanshin	734

Source: Hyogo Senkyo Kanri Linkai--See note 73.

^aOne-thousand three-hundred forty members are attached directly to the prefectural committee.

Chambers of Commerce.⁷⁷ The JCP's goal has been to enroll as members 10 percent of the membership of the key unions in the prefecture such as the Steelworkers, Local Government Employees, and the Shipbuilders. It has been stopped far short of this goal by the vigilance of management and the socialist parties. The Communists have also tried to make similar progress among the shopkeepers and farming groups, but they have made little headway against the strong conservative and Sōkagakkai organizations. Membership in the party, which had increased rapidly during the 1960's, stagnated after the mid-1970's in part because the party had filled out the political vacuum on the unorganized fringes of Japanese society.

The JCP is an anomaly among the Hyogo parties because it has not been linked firmly with one of the major interest groupings in the prefecture. Membership in the JCP made it the largest party in the prefecture before the LDP's rapid and probably temporary enrollment of the personal support groups of its assemblymen in 1978.⁷⁸ But the size of its membership was not related to the extent of its influence in Hyogo. Rather it indicated the enormous organizational effort required to weld into an effective political force fringe elements like disgruntled union members, welfare recipients, and shopkeepers in the less prosperous shopping areas who did not have their own natural organizational life or communication network.

Party Leadership

The major party offices in the prefectural JCP are the chairman, the vice-chairmen, and the members of the Executive committee. They are all elected to serve for the term between the meetings of the prefectural party congress and its election of a new Central committee. All party officers are full-time employees of the party and draw a basic salary of around 120,000 (\$600) yen each month.

Tada Ryuji assumed the chairmanship of the Hyogo party after its emergence from the confusion of the 1950-1959 period. Tada had joined the party in the 1920's, as an outgrowth of his activities in the union of the Takasago city Mitsubishi Pulp plant. During the 1930's he had been national chairman of the party's youth group, the Communist Youth League (Kyōsanshugi Seinen Dōmei). After the war, he had joined with Kishimoto Shigeo the party's postwar chairman in the reorganization of the JCP in the prefecture and had served as a member of the first Executive committee. During the 1950's, although he served for a time on the Tokuda faction dominated national Central committee as a representative of Kasuga Shojiro's Kansai group, Tada generally took a position similar to that of the International faction.⁷⁹ By the time of the 8th Party Congress when the Kasuga group left the party, he appears to have fully committed himself to the Miyamoto line. Tada oversaw the growth of the Hyogo party through the 1960's and well into the 1970's. He finally stepped down in 1977, but has remained active

in the party as its honorary chairman, a special post created for by the Hyogo Central committee.

Tada was succeeded by the current chairman, Kitsu Chikamatsu. Kitsu joined the party after the war while working at the Sumitomo Tube company, and had served as the chairman of the large JCP Amagasaki city committee within the old Hanshin district committee structure. He ran unsuccessfully as a party candidate for the prefectural assembly from Amagasaki in 1963. Kitsu was named a vice chairman of the party in 1973. Two years before his selection as chairman in 1977, Kitsu assumed the temporary position of "chairman's representative" in order to smooth the transition between his administration and that of Tada's. Kitsu's term in office already shows signs of being a long one: he was reelected to the chairmanship by the Central committee in December of 1978.

The number of vice-chairmanships in the Hyogo party is not fixed, and has varied from one to a present total of three. All of the vice-chairmen have also been members of the Executive committee and have, at times, served as chairmen of one of the departments within the Secretariat.

Tachibana Toshio held the vice-chairman position in the Hyogo party from 1958 to 1969. Tachibana had served briefly after the war as the secretary-general of the Kobe City Employees union and had been elected as a JCP candidate to the Lower House in 1949. He was defeated in 1952, but ran again in 1958, 1960, 1963, and 1967. Tachibana was the party's designated candidate in 1969, but was

replaced on the day before the announcement of the election by Urai Yoichi. Tachibana served as Urai's campaign manager in this election and then left the prefecture to work in the national party Secretariat.

Hirayoshi Nobuyuki was vice-chairman of the party between 1967 and 1977. He had joined the party in the prewar period and had been a member of the Kansai Area committee of the JCP (Kansai Chihō linkai). Along with Tada, he was a member of the Hyogo party's first postwar Central committee and was active in the Kansai group within the national party during the 1950's. He was rewarded for his support of Miyamoto at the 7th National Party congress when he was named as a candidate member of the national Central committee.⁸¹

Sakamoto Kenzo was named vice-chairman in 1975. Sakamoto became a member of the party after the war and had headed up the Secretariat of the 1,200 member All Japan Accident Insurance union in Hyogo. He became a member of the Central committee of the Hyogo party in the early 1960's. He was reelected to the vice-chairmanship in 1977 and 1978.

In 1977, the Hyogo party's Central committee elected two new vice-chairmen to replace the outgoing Hirayoshi. Numada Yoichi was a former teacher from the fourth HR district and a five-time party candidate for the Lower House; Konishi Takeo had been active in the Communication Workers union.

The Executive committee of the Hyogo party has 14 members. Most of the members have come out of a labor background and have served as chairmen of party branches and district committees (see Table 48). Their terms in office have usually been quite long: Sakamoto Kenjo, the current vice-chairman, has been a member of the committee at least since 1963. None of the committee members have been assemblymen, but a number of them have run unsuccessfully for local office. All of the present members (1979) of the Executive committee joined the party either in the prewar or immediate postwar period. Although many of them have come out of the union movement, none of them presently hold a position on the prefectural executive committees of any of the major Hyogo unions. This is in sharp contrast to the Executive committees of the socialist parties which are dominated by union officers.

Officer positions and membership on the Executive committee are not honorary in the JCP, as they are in many of the other political parties in Hyogo. As indicated above, all members are paid a full-time salary and their incumbency in office has been quite lengthy. The Executive committee has control over party funds for both ordinary party operations and election campaigns. It also has the power to organize the party Secretariat so as to meet party needs, and the right to recommend candidates to the national committee. Since the JCP in order to protect its organization from external subversion still remains quite secretive about its operations, the Executive committee members are the only

Table 48
Membership of Hyogo JCP Executive Committee, 1979

Name	Position	Background
Kitsu Chikamatsu	Chairman	Steel Workers union
Sakamoto Kenzo	Vice-Chairman	Insurance Workers union
Numada Yoichi	Vice-Chairman and Finance department	Teachers union
Konishi Takeo	Vice-chairman	Communications Workers union
Adachi Sadao	Organization department	Farmer's Union activist
Atsumi Harumi	Labor department	Shipbuilding union
Ishii Susumu	Organization department	Metal Workers union
Kajimoto Shushi	Education department	Intelligentsia
Tsukamoto Kazuo	Local Government department	Steel Workers union
Hata Toshiaki	Coalition Strategy department	Labor Ministry
Fukuhara Tomio	Election Strategy department	Railroad Workers union
Fuchi Mamoru	Youth department	Newspaper Workers union
Matsuo Shigemi	Policy committee	Service Industry worker
Mizobuchi Shigeo	National Assembly department	unavailable

Source: See Note 79.

members in the party that are aware of the full scope of party activities in the prefecture. As a result, party assembly candidates, employees in the Secretariat, or activists in party front groups have not been in the position to challenge or share in their power.

The Hyogo party leadership is now undergoing a period of transition from those who were active in the party in the prewar era and served time in the prisons of the old regime, and those like Kitsuo, Sakamoto, and Numada who joined the party only after the war. The transition, however, does not seem to herald a shift in the fundamental cast of the party. The Hyogo JCP in the 1950's gave up the electoral struggle and for a decade pursued a policy of direct confrontation with the authorities. The new leadership of the party all participated in this struggle. It will be another 10 to 15 years before the generation of the 1960's comes of age and a career in the assembly might come to be looked upon as a path to power and influence in the party. Even then, the degree of pluralism that this might introduce into the party is suspect. The JCP for all its success remains isolated from the mainstream of political life in Hyogo. Party assemblymen do not have a base of support independent of the party apparatus. Meaningful changes in the distribution of power within the party cannot be expected unless the Communists are able to broaden their base of support to include interest groups, such as unions and farm cooperatives, that are organizationally distinct from the party.

Party FinancesSources of Party Income⁸²

Membership dues in the JCP are one percent of income. The dues are divided up among the different units of the party according to the following formula: national committee (15 percent), prefectural committee (25 percent), district committee (40 percent), and branch (20 percent).⁸³ In 1976, the Hyogo committee received 51 million yen (\$255,000) in dues from its 13,000 members; in 1977 55 million yen (\$275,000). This amounted to, respectively, 35 and 27 percent of the total revenues reported by the prefectural committee in these years. The dependence upon dues as a source of income was much less for the party's district committees (see Table 49). It varied from a low of 11 percent in the case of the Tamba committee to a high of 25 percent for the large Kobe-Central committee. Despite the higher percentage of dues that the district committees receive, their smaller membership reduces the importance of income from this source. The major part of the budget of the district committees in Hyogo is supported by contributions, a significant portion of which come from party assemblymen.

The Hyogo JCP assesses the entire salary of party endorsed prefectural and Kobe city assemblymen. It then pays them a salary of 200,000 yen (\$1,000) a month, from which they are expected to meet their living and office-related expenses, deducts 500,000 (\$2,500) to 700,000 (\$3,500) yen as the "contribution" of the

Table 49
Party Dues and Contributions as a Percentage of Hyogo JCP District Committee Income in 1977

Committee	Dues	Contributions
Prefecture	27	22
Amagasaki	21	50
Awajii Island	14	28
Kobe-Central	25	57
Kobe-West	20	50
Kobe-East	26	42
West Harima	14	64
Tajima	12	51
Tamba	11	61
East Harima	16	66
Nishinomiya	14	60
North Hanshin	14	42

Source: See Note 82.

assemblymen to the prefectural committee budget, and sets aside the remainder as a fund to be used by the party in the prefectural and Kobe city election campaigns.⁸⁴ Only the 500,000 to 700,000 yen "contribution" of the assemblymen is reported as prefectural party income to the Elections Commission. In the four years between the 1975 and 1979 prefectural and Kobe city elections, the Hyogo party's "special" election fund can be expected to have grown to over 300 million yen (\$1.5 million).

The JCP will only accept contributions from individuals. In 1976 the Hyogo prefectural committee received 44 million yen (\$220,000) from 130 contributors; in 1977 45 million yen (\$245,000) from 150 contributors. Approximately 10 million yen (\$50,000) in each year was money collected from party assemblymen. The remainder came from the officers and members of party front groups such as Fukui Shoichi the long-time president of the Hyogo Democratic Chambers of Commerce, 500,000 yen (\$2,500), and party officers and members such as Nishimura Tadayuki the chairman of the third HR district JCP candidate support association, 200,000 yen (\$1,000), and Komatsu Masuki an illustrator whose sketches often appear in the Hyogo party's newspaper, 500,000 yen (\$2,500). An examination of the receipts submitted by the party to the Hyogo Elections Commission show that in most cases these contributions were not made at once, but instead spaced out over the year. Fukui, for example, contributed an average of 40,000 yen (\$200) each month to the party.

The national party derived just over 80 percent of its income in 1977 from the revenues generated by the party paper, Akahata.⁸⁵ This was not true in the case of the local committees. The Hyogo party receives 500 yen (\$2.50) a month out of the 1,430 yen (\$7.15) subscription fee (1978) collected for the daily (1,100 yen) and Sunday editions (330 yen). The money is distributed among the district committees and branches in the prefecture which use it to compensate party members who coordinate the delivery of the paper and the collection of the subscription fee.⁸⁶ No information is available on the amount of money received by the branches, but the financial reports of the prefectural and district committees indicate that the income derived from the paper is either minimal or, in some cases, that the committees incur a deficit from their management of the paper (see Table 50).

An important supplementary source of party income beyond dues and contributions for the prefectural committee is transfer payments. The Hyogo committee receives monies from both the national party and the district committees in the prefecture. In 1976 the national party contributed 14 million yen (\$70,000); in 1977 18 million yen (\$90,000). The district committees gave 26.1 million (\$130,500) in 1976 and 53.9 million (\$269,500) yen in 1977. The increase in transfer payments in 1977 was necessitated by the expenses incurred by the prefectural committee as part of its management of the 1977 HC election on behalf of the party.

Table 50
The Cost of Distributing Akahata for the JCP District Committees, 1977

Committee	Income From Subscriptions	Expenditures for Distribution
Prefecture	13.9 ^a	8.6 ^a
Anagasaki	14.0	12.6
Awajii Island ^b	4.3	4.4
Kobe-Central	8.4	10.3
Kobe-West	13.1	9.1
Kobe-East ^b	10.5	10.9
West Harima	8.7	8.3
Tajima	5.7	5.2
Tamba	1.7	1.5
East Harima ^b	6.5	7.7
Nishinomiya	8.7	7.0
North Hanshin	11.1	9.0

Source: See Note 82.

^aMillions of yen.

^bCommittee handles Akahata at a loss.

Revenues for the prefectural committee alone of the JCP in 1976 were 143 million yen (\$715,000) in 1976; in 1977 they were 203 million yen (\$1,015,000). These revenues easily made the JCP the richest party in the prefecture. When the income of the district committees of the party (366 million yen--\$1.8 million) is added to this figure, the differences in the publicly acknowledged resources available to each of the parties in Hyogo is even more striking (see Table 51).

Table 51
Income of the Hyogo Prefectural Parties in 1977

Party	Income
JCP Prefectural and District Committees	570 ^a
JCP Prefectural Committee	203
Liberal Democratic Party	160
Japan Socialist Party	87
Democratic Socialist Party	84
Komeito	26

Source: See Note 82.

^aMillions of yen.

Pattern of Party Expenditures

The Hyogo JCP's largest expenditure is for personnel: 87 million yen (\$435,000) in 1976 and 92 million yen (\$460,000) in

1977. The prefectural committee has staff of between 50 and 75. Salaries range from 90,000 yen (\$450) for lower level Secretariat employees to 130,000 yen (\$650) for department chairmen. Bonuses are officially set at one month's salary and distributed twice a year, but the actual size of the bonus depends upon the amount of money contributed for this purpose. Party employees are recruited from the membership, usually from within the prefecture. Hours are long and pressures are great for workers in the Secretariat. Many of them must take on second jobs in order to support their families. There is little outlet available for the frustrations and disappointments that are a part of their jobs. Because of the party's concern for its public image and its fear of subversion, drinking or other night-time social activities are frowned upon and may even cost a party employee his job.

The next largest expenditure for the Hyogo party is for propaganda. Because the JCP lacks a large organized base of support, it has tried to reach out to the individual voter in order to expand its influence. Propaganda has been an important means to change the public's perception of the party as an illegal organization that is prone to violence against its opponents. Incomplete reports from the early 1970's show that the expenditures of the prefectural committee for propaganda were 39 million (\$195,000) in 1974 and 30 million yen (\$150,000) in 1975. As was the case with the other parties, JCP expenditures for propaganda dropped after

the revision of the election law. In 1977 the prefectural committee spent only 25 million yen (\$125,000).⁸⁷

The Hyogo committee spent 17.9 million yen (\$89,000) to rent three offices in downtown Kobe in 1977. The main office was a narrow four-story building that fronted on one of the city's busiest shopping malls. The office had a conference room where the Executive committee met and housed the staff of the Organization, Coalition Strategy, and Election departments. A second office was located several blocks to the west of it in a business district. This one had three floors and contained the remainder of the Secretariat staff including the prefectural party paper, Minpō. A third office situated about one mile in the opposite direction was across the street from Kobe's largest department store. The prefectural committee shared this space with the staff of the party's Kobe HR representative and its Hyogo district HC incumbent. The office had a large meeting room, and was used most frequently for the convening of the 72 member Central committee.

The expenditures reported by the prefectural committee for personnel, propaganda, and office space represent only a part of the publicly acknowledged expenditures by the JCP in Hyogo. Each of the 11 district committees has its own office and employees, a full-time staff, and all of them carry on a wide range of political and propaganda activities (see Table 52). Nonetheless, the financial power of the JCP should not be overestimated. The reported income and expenditures of the other parties in Hyogo are

Table 52
JCP District Committee Expenditures in Hyogo, 1977

Committee	Personnel	Office	Propaganda
Amagasaki	20.0 ^a	2.4 ^a	3.8 ^a
Awajii Island	1.6	.5	.1
Kobe-Central	22.9	3.0	6.8
Kobe-West	17.4	3.3	4.1
Kobe-East	11.0	1.8	5.3
West Harima	15.5	3.2	6.9
Tajima	3.9	1.0	1.9
Tamba	3.3	.6	.4
East Harima	20.9	1.7	1.8
Nishinomiya	13.5	3.7	4.2
North Hanshin	9.5	1.9	2.2

Source: See Note 82.

^aMillions of yen.

much lower than the JCP, but this does not mean that they are politically weaker. Indeed the LDP, JSP, and Komeito have gained more votes in all levels of election than the JCP while the DSP has polled roughly the same number of votes as have the Communists.

Organization building and maintenance requires money. These costs are not reflected directly in the expenditures of the other parties, because their prefectural apparatus has not taken up this challenge. Instead this is left to the officers and staff of the agricultural and commercial associations, unions, and religious sects that support them. In the case of the JCP, the opposite is true. The Communist support base outside of its core membership and a few unions is very loosely defined. It has been brought together and molded into an effective political force by the activities of the party committees and its front groups. The staff, office space, and propaganda expenditures required for this kind of activity have posed a heavy burden upon the party. The JCP raises and spends more money than the other parties in the prefecture, because it has to in order to sustain its organization in its bid for power.

Party Candidates⁸⁸

The JCP reentered prefectural politics in earnest in 1958 when it nominated for the first time since 1949 a full slate of HR candidates. Still, the party had a long wait before it returned its first candidate to the national assembly: it was not until

1969 that the party captured an HR seat from Kobe and 1974 that it won one of the three Hyogo district HC seats. During the 1960's Communist candidates were all long term party activists that had joined in the prewar and immediate postwar period: Tachibana Toshio in the first district stood in every HR election between 1958 and 1969, and Susami Hachiro in the second in every election between 1958 and 1972. The party did not expect them to win, rather it used their candidacies as an opportunity to create greater public awareness of the party and the issues with which it was concerned.

The party's policy towards its candidates and elections shifted after 1969. In November of this year the party had nominated Urai Yoichi a physician associated with the Democratic Medical Care Association in Kobe as its candidate for Mayor. To the surprise of many observers he polled an impressive 97,000 votes in a losing campaign against the former deputy mayor, Miyazaki Tatsuo who had the support of all of the other parties. Upon the sudden dissolution of the Diet at the end of the same month, the party replaced its perennial nominee Tachibana with Urai, who went on to poll 68,000 votes and gain a seat in the first district for the party which he has held ever since. Encouraged by this success, the JCP nominated Kinoshita Motoni, a lawyer active in the Democratic Law Association, for a second district HR seat in 1972 and Maeda Sadao, another lawyer, for the rural fifth district HR post in 1976. Kinoshita won the second district seat in 1972, lost it by a few thousand

votes in 1976, and gained it back in 1979. Maeda did not come near victory in 1976, but his 20,000 votes were more than three times the number that the party had won in past races. The JCP's greatest triumph, however, came in the 1974 Hyogo district HC race in which it had nominated a virtually politically unknown woman of 45, Yasutake Hiroko. Running against strong opposition, she managed to turn popular resentment against inflation and conservative corruption into a victory of unprecedented proportions for the party, winning 417,000 votes in Hyogo--150,000 more than the party had won before or since.

JCP participation in the prefectural assembly elections before 1967 was limited: it ran only five candidates in 1958 and nine in 1963. The party in these elections endorsed candidates in only the largest cities in the prefecture, principally Kobe (see Table 53). This pattern of selective participation changed in 1967. The party endorsed 23 candidates, a number just short of the 29 nominated by the JSP. In 1971 the Communists ran 25 candidates equalling the number put up by the Socialists, and succeeded in sending four of them to assembly. Four years later in 1975, the JCP endorsed 35 candidates surpassing the JSP's 16. In this election, the party stood candidates in every Kobe ward, every city in the Hanshin district, in seven of the 11 cities and counties in the East Harima district, and six of the eight cities and counties in the Tamba district. Despite this aggressive contesting of elections in prefectural assembly districts across the prefecture, however, the

Table 53
Hyogo JCP Prefectural Assembly Candidates by District, 1959-1979

Year	Total	Kobe	Hanshin	East Harima	West Harima	Tamba
1959	5	1	1	1	1	1
1963	9	5	1	2	1	0
1967	23	8	6	4	3	2
1971	25 (4) ^a	8 (2)	6 (2)	6	3	2
1975	35 (6)	9 (2)	10 (3)	7	3 (1)	6
1979	20 (6)	9 (2)	7 (3)	1	1 (1)	2

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai; Kōbe Shimbun, April 3, 1979.

^aNumber in brackets indicates number of candidates elected.

party could only manage to increase its assembly representation by two members. Sobered by this defeat, the party in 1979 reduced the number of its candidates from 35 to 20 in order to bring party resources to bear on those races where it had the greatest opportunity for success. Nonetheless, it succeeded again in electing only six candidates, five of them from the same districts as in 1975.

JCP candidates for the prefectural assembly have been drawn largely from the labor unions and the ranks of party front groups. The labor unions represented include public sector unions such as the National Railway Workers, Teachers, and Local Government Employees and private industry unions such as Kobe Securities, Showa Oil, Kawasaki Steel, and Fuji Chemical. Unlike the socialist parties' candidates, very few of the Communist candidates have held the chairman or secretary-general posts in their unions. In 1979 of the 12 party candidates with union backgrounds only one Furumori Kenji, who was the chairman of the JCP dominated High School Teachers union, had held either of these posts. Of the remaining candidates only two indicated in their campaign biographies that they had served as officers in their unions: Inoguchi Kaoru was a former vice-chairman of Kobe Steel and Yasuda Akinari a former member of the executive committee of the Fukiai branch of the Kawasaki Steel Workers union.

Because of the weakness of the JCP base in the unions more than 50 percent of its candidates in 1971 (19 of 25) and 1975

(19 of 35) had non-union backgrounds. In 1979 with the wholesale reduction of candidates, this fell to 40 percent (eight of 20). None of these candidates could be identified as coming from any of the prominent agricultural, professional, or commercial associations in Hyogo. The majority indicated in their campaign biographies ties with party front groups. In 1975, for example, among the 19 non-union candidates endorsed by the party four were from the Democratic Medical Care Association, four from the Democratic Chambers of Commerce, and one from the New Japan Women's association.

The Hyogo JCP as a Vehicle for Protest

The Communist party's rapid rise to prominence in national politics⁸⁹ between 1967 and 1972 has often been explained as the result of the attraction that the JCP held for voters dissatisfied with the established parties⁹⁰ and its willingness to put forward practical policies that dealt with issues of concern to ordinary citizens.⁹¹ These same explanations have also been used to account for the difficulties that party has encountered in moving beyond the level of support that it enjoyed in 1972.⁹² John Copper has argued that "the party attained success rapidly; it may be on the verge of declining just as rapidly."⁹³ He bases this prediction on "the fact that a large middle-class has developed in Japan" with fundamentally "moderate or centrist voting tendencies" which despite an earlier flirtation with the Communists now predispose

them to support the "middle of the road" parties such as the DSP and the Komeito.⁹⁴ Hong Kim⁹⁵ has not concurred in Copper's assessment that support for the JCP is so "soft" that it might collapse overnight, but he has attributed the current stagnation of the party principally to the persistence of an "anti-Communist allergy" in the public and the failure of the JCP to form a "united front" with the other opposition parties whereby it could burnish its public image through more vigorous participation at the center of political affairs. What can this study of the Communist party in Hyogo add to this discussion?

Support for the Communist party in Hyogo has been largely drawn from the membership of its front groups and unions controlled by the party. Survey data from the first and second HR districts of Hyogo,⁹⁵ where the party is the strongest, show that support for it is greatest among the self-employed, professionals, and white-collar workers in Kobe; and blue-collar workers and the self-employed in Hanshin (see Table 54). The blue-collar vote has always been an important source of support for the party, but it is smaller than what might be expected because of socialist control of the labor movement in Hyogo. The self-employed and professionals have been drawn into the Communist camp through the activities of the party's front groups, such as the Democratic Chambers of Commerce and various culture circles. They have served to offset the party's weakness among the blue-collar. White-collar support for the party comes from the inroads that it has made in Kobe into

the Teachers and other public sector unions. The party has had greater success here because the Occupation-sponsored purges of Communists in government service were less far reaching than those undertaken in private industry.⁹⁷

Table 54
Support for JCP by Occupation in Kobe and
Hanshin HR Districts, 1976

	Kobe	Hanshin
Self-Employed	21	7
Professional	20	5
White-Collar	11	4
Management	2	0
Blue-Collar	5	8

Source: See Note 95.

The Communist organization in Hyogo grew rapidly in the 1960's but entered a period of stagnation in the early 1970's. Although data is not available on changes in the membership of party front groups, it is known that party membership peaked in 1973 and that the Communists have not managed to gain control of the executive committee of any major union Hyogo besides that of the High School Teachers'. Together with this, the growth of the Akahata readership which rose rapidly throughout the 1960's began to slow down as the

party entered the 1970's. Since 1973, the readership of the Sunday paper in Hyogo has remained at about 130,000 despite intensive efforts by the party to increase circulation.

This organizational stagnation was matched by the party's performance in the national district HC election (see Table 55).

Table 55
JCP National District HC Performance
in Hyogo, 1962-1977

Year	Votes
1962	44 ^a
1965	74
1968	90
1971	145
1974	241
1977	189

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.

^aVote in thousands.

In 1977, the party's record of consistent electoral growth was snapped when it polled 52,000 fewer votes than it had in 1974. As will be discussed below, the 1974 vote received by the party may not be a good measure of its true strength in the prefecture and, consequently, the 189,000 votes won in 1977 in that they exceeded the party's 1971 performance by 44,000 votes could be thought a

victory of sorts. Nevertheless, these votes were not much beyond the size of the Akahata readership in the prefecture at the time.⁹⁸ Even if some households were to take more than one copy of the paper as a gesture of support for the party, the number of votes that it received would probably still average somewhat less than two per paper. At this level of election, it would appear that the JCP could do little better than mobilize the votes of only those most firmly committed to it in Hyogo.

The JCP won a HR seat in Kobe in 1969 and one in Hanshin in 1972. In Kobe, the party bettered its 1967 performance by 35,000 votes; in Hanshin it won 47,000 votes than it had in 1969 (see Table 56). There are no panel studies that examine changes in

Table 56

JCP Performance in Kobe and Hanshin HR
Districts, 1963-1979

District	1963	1967	1969	1972	1976	1979
Kobe	21 ^a	33	68	106	90	93
Hanshin	21	31	53	100	86	93

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai; Kōbe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.

^aVote in thousands.

voting behavior for the 1969 and 1972 elections in this district. and without them it is difficult to determine with precision the

sources of the JCP vote. Moreover, these two elections in Kobe and Hanshin were periods of candidate succession for the LDP, JSP, and DSP⁹⁹ and, consequently, there were great fluctuations in the number of votes that these parties received for reasons not necessarily related to competition from the JCP. It can be argued, however, that the Communist 1969 and 1972 electoral victories were an organizational triumph for the party. Although the new JCP voters in these elections may have been initially motivated more by their dislike for the established parties than by a commitment to the Communist program, the party has succeeded in these two districts in maintaining the level of support won in these elections in subsequent HR and prefectural assembly elections (see Table 57). The credit for this should go to the party's network of front groups and the activities of its membership in the unions. A massive "protest" vote made up of defectors from the established parties, who might support the party in one election only to desert it in the next, does not seem to have been an important element in the JCP success in the HR and PA elections in these two districts. If it were, there should be much more variability in the number of votes won by the JCP in different levels of elections and over time.

Communist performance in the Hyogo district HC elections, except for 1974, has been quite similar to its support pattern in the HR races (Table 58). In these elections; the JCP candidates have all run considerably ahead of the party's national district HC candidate. Differences in the backgrounds of the candidates

Table 57
Distribution of JCP Vote in Kobe and Hanshin HR and PA Elections,
1972-1979

Kobe District	1972 HR	1975 PA	1976 HR	1979 PA	1979 HR
Higashi Nada ward	13 ^a	11	11	9	12
Nada ward	13	8	9	7	9
Fukiai ward	7	4	5	3	5
Ikuta ward	5	6	4	4	4
Hyogo/Kita wards	23 ^b	11/11	11/9	9/10	11/10
Nagata ward	17	14	14	-- ^c	13
Suma ward	10	8	8	7	11
Tarumi ward	16	13	18	13	18

Table 57 (Continued)

<u>Hanshin District</u>	1972 HR	1975 PA	1976 HR	1979 PA	1979 HR
Anagasaki city	40	28 (2) ^c	35	24 (2)	35
Nishinomiya city	24	22 (2)	20	15 (1)	23
Sumoto city	1	1	1	-- ^e	1
Ashiya city	4	6	3	3	3
Itami city	10	12	10	6	10
Takarazuka city	9	7	7	8	9
Kawanishi city	6	4	5	4	5
Sanda city	1	1	1	--	1
Tsuna county	1	--	1	--	1
Mihara county	1	--	1	--	1

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai; Kōbe Shimbun April 3 and October 9, 1979.

^aVote in thousands.

^bKita ward created from northern party of old Hyogo ward in 1975.

^cNo election in Nagota ward in 1979. ^dNumber of JCP candidates in same PA district.

^e--JCP did not stand a candidate.

Table 58
JCP Performance in HC and HR Elections
in Hyogo, 1962-1979

	National HC	Hyogo HC	Hyogo HR
1962	44 ^a	58	
1963			61
1965	74	84	
1967			89
1968	90	132	
1969			164
1971	145	216	
1972			264
1974	241	417	
1976			263
1977	189	262	
1979			242

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Linkai; Kobe Shimbun October 9, 1979.

^aVote in thousands.

appear important here. Candidates in the national district HC election are invariably high national party officials; those running in the other elections have been selected since 1971 from the ranks of the party's front organizations in Hyogo. Voters in the HC election may select the party's candidate for the Hyogo seat, but vote for one of the popular "talent" candidates in the national district.¹⁰⁰ This reveals a softness in support for the JCP in Hyogo, but it does not mean that the party might lose these votes as quickly as it has won them in the prefecture. The JCP, as seen in the regularity of the support received by its HR and PA candidates, has a solid core of local support. The challenge for it in the 1980's is to link this up with its broader national concerns.

The 1974 HC election represents a striking exception to much of what has been said above. The JCP candidate Yasutake Hiroko's trademark white suits and vigorous campaign style, coupled with widespread dissatisfaction in the electorate with the inflation and economic uncertainty created by the Arab oil embargo of the previous October,¹⁰¹ produced an enormous public response to her candidacy. The turnout in the election (67 percent) was the highest ever for an HC contest. The JCP drew 417,000 votes, 201,000 more than it had won in the 1971 HC contest, and Yasutake edged out Ozaki Osamu, the Socialist candidate and former head of the prefectural Sōhyō union federation, by 16,000 votes to win the third seat in the district. The 400,000 votes polled by Yasutake were 150,000 more votes than the JCP had polled in any election in Hyogo before or since

(see Table 59). In the voting for the national district HC candidate, that took place at the same time, the Communist candidate

Table 59
Party Performance in Hyogo District HC
Elections, 1968-1977

Year	LDP	JSP	DSP	JCP	KOM	NLC	VOTE	VOTERS
1968	655 ^a	363	351	132	415	---	1,919	2,992
1971	807	335	315	216	---	---	1,674	3,209
1974	614	401	369	417	440	---	2,275	3,371
1977	611	381	330	262	432	189	2,230	3,471

Source: Hyogoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.

^aVotes in thousands.

won only 241,000 votes. In the next HC election the party nominated another woman, Fujiki Yoko, but she could poll only 262,000 votes. This bettered the party's 1971 performance by nearly 50,000 votes but fell far short of Yasutake's record performance.

The tremendous success of Yasutake in the 1974 election serves notice that the JCP has at times profited from voter dissatisfaction with the established parties. However, it is important to note that this success has not carried over into the performance of the party in other levels of election nor did it extend to the party's Hyogo district HC candidate in the 1977 election. This suggests strongly

that the 1974 HC election with its enormous turnout of the "protest" vote is the exception rather than the rule in contests involving Communist candidates. The JCP in Hyogo can look in prefecture-wide races to a normal level of support approaching 250,000 votes.

Without the endorsement of the major interest groupings in Hyogo, it has had to depend upon its network of front groups to mobilize this vote behind its candidates on election day. Because of the strength of these front groups, the party will remain a significant political force in the prefecture for the foreseeable future. But unless it is able to undermine the support for the unions and other major interest groups in the prefecture for the other Hyogo parties, the JCP cannot expect further growth in the 1980's.

NOTES

¹For details see George Beckmann and Genji Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party 1922-1945 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969).

²Nihon Kyōsanto Chuō linkai, Nihon Kyōsanto Kōryō, Kivaku (Tōkyō: Nihon Kyōsanto Chuō linkai Shuppanyoku, 1977), p. 2.

³Ibid., p. 2.

⁴See "Minshu Rengo Seifu Kōryō ni Tsuite no Nihon Kyōsantō no Teian" in Nihon Keizai Kenkyūsho, Nikyō-Minsei (1979), op. cit., pp. 192-194.

⁵Nihon Kyōsanto Hyōgoken linkai, Hyōgoken To nō Ayumi 1972, p. 148.

⁶The French Communist Party is endorsed in elections by the General Confederation of Labor (1.5 to 2.5 million members); the Italian Communist Party receives strong support from the General Confederation of Italian Labor (3.5 million members). They are the only two Western European Communist parties to match or exceed the electoral strength of the Japan Communist Party. See the sections on "France" (p. 147) and "Italy" (p. 191) in Richard F. Starr, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977).

⁷See Koyama Hirotatsu, Sengo Nihon Kyōsantō Shi (Tōkyō: Haga Shoten, 1966), pp. 99-100.

⁸Interview with Socialist party official on October 9, 1978.

⁹Interview with Socialist party official on October 9, 1978.

¹⁰Membership figures from Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, Hyōgoken Rōdō Kumiai Meibo 1977.

¹¹The Kōbe Shimbun, as part of its coverage of the 1972 and 1976 campaigns, mailed a survey to the candidates of all parties. One question asked the candidates to list those organizations and prominent individuals in their districts from which they had received endorsements. These surveys have not been published, but were made available through the courtesy of the Research section of the Editorial department of the Kōbe Shimbun.

¹²For a detailed, but somewhat dated, description of these front groups at the national level, see Asahi Shimbunsha, Nihon Kyōsantō Asahi Shimbunsha 1973, pp. 95-120; in English see George Totten, "The Peoples Parliamentary Path of the Japanese Communist Party, Part II: Local Level Tactics," Pacific Affairs 46 (3) Fall 1973, pp. 392-398. The most comprehensive treatment of both the national and local organizations of these groups can be found in Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho, Nikyō-Minsei (1979), pp. 347-650.

¹³Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., p. 296.

¹⁴Interview with well-informed observer of Hyogo JCP on September 15, 1978.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., p. 535. A similar figure also appeared in Hyōgo Minpō the newspaper of the prefectural JCP in 1977.

¹⁷Interview on September 15, 1978.

¹⁸Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., pp. 547-548.

¹⁹Interview on September 15, 1978.

²⁰See Note 11.

²¹Candidates for public office in Japan are required to file reports on the source and amount of contributions to their campaign with the prefectural Election Commission. See Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai, "Senkyō Undō Hiyō no Shūshi ni Kansuru Shirabe" in Hyōgoken Kōhō, September 1956, April 1967, September 1968, February 1970, September 1971, February 1973, September 1974, February 1977, and September 1977.

²²See evidence presented in Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979) op. cit., pp. 347-650.

²³Early history of the party in Hyogo drawn from Nihon Kyōsantō Hyōgoken linkai, Hyōgoken Tō no Ayumi, op. cit.

²⁴For a description of the national organizations of these two groups, see George Totten, op. cit., p. 387 and pp. 393-394.

²⁵The situation was actually more confused than this. In addition to the Tokuda and Miyamoto groups, there was a Kansai group formed around Kasuga Shojiro as well as factions led by Kamiyama Shigeo and Nakanishi Koichi. See Shisō Undō Kenkyūsho, Nihon Kyōsantō Honbu (Tokyo: Zenbōsha, 1967), pp. 33-34; the factional infighting among these groups is detailed in Koyama Hirotatsu, op. cit., pp. 69-129.

²⁶Two of those arrested, Kurushima Yoshitada and Yasuda Akinari, are presently JCP representatives in the Hyogo prefectural assembly.

²⁷Discussion in this section based on interview with Hyogo JCP official on November 29, 1978.

²⁸Estimate of size of staff based on statement of income and expenditures submitted by party to Hyogo Election Commission, as required by the Political Funds Control Law of all organizations registered with the Commission as political organizations (seiji dantai). Assumption was made that average salary of staff was between 1.5 million (\$7,500) and two million (\$10,000) yen a year. Personnel expenses reported by the Hyogo committee for 1976 and 1977 were respectively 87.2 million (\$436,000) and 92.5 million (\$462,000) yen. The reports were published in the August 1977 and May 1978 issues of Hyōgoken Kōhō under the title, "Seiji Dantai no Shūshi Hōkokusho no Yōshi."

²⁹Estimate based on personnel expenses reported by the district committees to the Election Commission. Assumption made that average salary was two million (\$10,000) yen in order to derive a "low" figure for each district committee. It is likely that some committees have half again more employees than estimated. The Election Commission has no power to investigate the accuracy of the financial reports submitted by the party, but the figure of 200-225 paid party activists working in the prefecture is close to the 200-250 estimate used by a knowledgeable observer of the party in an interview on September 15, 1978. Hyogo JCP officials refused to discuss the size of the staff on February 15, 1979.

³⁰See Nihon Kyōsantō, Shibu Katsudō no Tebiki (Tōkyō: Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō linkai Shuppan Kyōko, 1972).

³¹Interview with Hyogo JCP official on February 15, 1979.

³²See Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō linkai, op. cit., p. 58.

³³Hyōgo Minpō, December 1973.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Hyōgo Minpō, December 1978.

³⁶Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., p. 317.
Ordinary employees in the Secretariat will receive 80,000 (\$400) to 100,000 (\$500) yen a month. Fringe benefits such as health care and transportation and the twice yearly bonuses were added to these figures to arrive at the 1.5 million to two million yen figures used in estimating the size of the JCP paid staff.

³⁷Discussion below based largely on interviews with Hyogo JCP officials on November 29, 1978 and May 11, 1979.

³⁸The Burakumin are members of a former outcaste group in feudal Japan. For more information, see Chong-do Hah and Christopher Lapp, "Japanese Politics of Equality in Transition: The Case of the Burakumin," op. cit.

³⁹Interview on September 15, 1978.

⁴⁰See discussion in Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., pp. 437-462.

⁴¹Hyōgo Minpō January 1976.

⁴²Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., pp. 465-474.

⁴³In 1977, the Hyogo Service Industry Employees union was listed as having only 1,200 members; see Hyōgoken Rōdō-bu, op. cit.

⁴⁴Interview with Socialist party official on October 5, 1978.

⁴⁵Hyōgo Minpō May 1976.

⁴⁶For details see Thomas Rohlen, "Violence at Yoka High School," op. cit.

⁴⁷Interview with Socialist party official on September 19, 1978.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹For a discussion of these revisions see Ronald J. Hrebenar, "The Politics of Electoral Reform," Asian Survey 17 (10) October 1977, pp. 967-977. See also Chapter VII of this study.

⁵⁰See Gekkan Zenbō December 1978, p. 15.

⁵¹See Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., pp. 337-340.

⁵²Source of this data are receipts submitted by the party to Election Commission to document expenditures claimed in its 1977 financial status report. The commission is required to maintain these receipts and other documentation on file for three years and make them available to the public upon request.

⁵³Interview on September 15, 1978.

⁵⁴Gekkan Zenbō, op. cit.

⁵⁵See Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho, Nikyō-Minsei (Osaka: Nihon Keizai Kenkyūsho, 1973).

⁵⁶Interview with Socialist party official October 5, 1978.

⁵⁷See "Hakamada Satoshi o Mita Miyamoto Kenji no Ittō Ryu," Shūkan Asahi January 20, 1978, pp. 16-21; see also interview with Hakamada in Sande Mainichi January 22, 1978, pp. 128-130.

⁵⁸See Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., p. 197.

⁵⁹Hyōgo Minpō April 1977.

⁶⁰These were established in imitation of the Komeito's citizen livelihood centers, see Tsurutani, op. cit., p. 157 for further details.

⁶¹Discussion of formal requirements and obligations of party membership derived from Kyōsantō Chūō linkai, op. cit., pp. 40-46.

⁶²Nihon Kyōsantō Chūō linkai, Nihon Kyōsantō Shōkai (Tōkyō: Nihon Kyōsanto Shuppan Kyoku, 1978).

⁶³It reads in Japanese: "Zenryoku o agete tō no toitsu o mamori, tō no danketsu o katameru."

⁶⁴See "Tō to Taishu Undō no Bōei under section dealing with "To no Kensetsu no Shōninmu" in Zenei no. 419, December 1977, p. 62.

⁶⁵Hyōgo Minpō May 1977.

⁶⁶Interview on September 15, 1978.

⁶⁷See Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., p. 315, the breakdown was: party dues 1,000 yen (\$5.00), party newspapers and study guides 1,730 yen (\$8.65), other party publications 800 yen (\$4.00), and special assessments 1,200 yen (\$6.00).

⁶⁸Letter from Hyogo JCP official dated May 20, 1979.

⁶⁹Nihon Kyōsantō Hyōgoken Chūō linkai, op. cit., p. 164.

⁷⁰Taken from a report of the Kōan Chōsacho on August 1, 1966 by Robert Scalapino, The Japan Communist Movement: 1920-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 311.

⁷¹See Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1973), op. cit.

⁷²See Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., p. 296.

⁷³See Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai, "Seiji Dantai Shūshi Hōkusho no Yōshi" (1978), op. cit.

⁷⁴Discussion drawn from Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., pp. 292-295.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 296.

⁷⁶Interview with Hyogo JCP party official on February 15, 1979.

⁷⁷Interview on September 15, 1978.

⁷⁸For details of this membership drive, which was tied into the LDP's reform of the rules governing the selection of the party president, see Chapter II.

⁷⁹Identities and background of party officers drawn from interviews with Hyogo JCP officials on November 29, 1978, February 15, 1979, and May 11, 1979, campaign biographies published in the Kōbe Shimbun between 1955 and 1979 as part of its coverage of local and national elections in the prefecture, and articles on the party leadership found in Hyōgo Minpō 1963-1979.

⁸⁰See Koyama Hirotsu, op. cit., p. 87 and p. 95.

⁸¹Shisō Undō Kenkyūsho, op. cit., p. 46.

⁸²The only source of information available on JCP finance in Hyogo are the reports published by the Election Commission. This material is unfortunately incomplete. In the period 1959 to 1970, the Hyogo JCP reported on its financial status for only one six month period, July to December 1963. Between 1971 and 1975, the party made regular reports to the Commission, but these covered only a part of its income and expenditures for the period. A full public accounting of the Hyogo JCP's financial status is only available for the years 1976 and 1977. This discussion in this section will be based largely on these data.

⁸³Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyūsho (1979), op. cit., p. 314.

⁸⁴Interview on September 15, 1978.

⁸⁵See "Zenoku Kakutō Zaisei Hōkusho" in Kanpō July 20, 1978, p. 6. The income received from the party paper was 13.9 billion yen (\$69.8 million). But it is important to note that the party expended 12.6 billion yen (\$63.3 million) for publication costs.

⁸⁶Expenses borne by the district committees for the distribution of the paper included salaries, building rental, truck rental, gasoline charges, and postal expenses.

⁸⁷The money went to purchase and maintenance of a sound car, printing of posters and papers, and purchase of a loudspeaker system in 1977.

⁸⁸Information on candidates' backgrounds drawn from official campaign biographies filed by the candidates with the Hyogo Election Commission and published by the Kōbe Shimbun. A number of points were checked in interviews with party officials. Kōbe Shimbun election analyses between 1952 and 1979 were also consulted.

⁸⁹The JCP increased the number of its seats in the Lower House from five to 38 in 1972.

⁹⁰Taketsugu Tsurutani has written, "the popular support for the party has increased not because it is Communist but because it serves certain political functions that the other parties do not, and serves people in ways where other parties have been derelict." op. cit., p. 151.

⁹¹Hong Kim has argued, "in short the JCP's recent electoral success can be attributed to the deradicalization of the party which has enabled it to adapt effectively to the challenges of electoral politics, and to some degree to the worsening urban and environmental problems that are the result of Japan's rapid economic growth in the 60's" (pp. 289-290); see "Deradicalization of the Japan Communist Party under Kenji Miyamoto," World Politics 38 (2) 1976.

⁹²In the 1976 HR election the party dropped back to 19 seats. It won 41 seats. In both elections, its share of the vote remained at the 1972 level of 10 percent.

⁹³John Copper, op. cit., p. 355.

⁹⁴ibid., p. 362.

⁹⁵Hong Kim, "The JCP's Parliamentary Road," op. cit., pp. 25-27.

⁹⁶Survey conducted by Kōbe Shimbun in December of 1976 just before the General Election. In the first district, 588 voters were interviewed and 10.4 percent identified themselves as Communist supporters; in the second district, 647 were interviewed of which 5.1 percent were Communists. The actual share of the vote received by Communist candidates in these districts was nearly twice these figures: 18.9 percent in Kobe and 10.9 percent in Hanshin. This limits greatly the extent to which generalization from these surveys about the nature of JCP support in these two areas is possible. Survey made available through courtesy of Research section of the Editorial department of the Kōbe Shimbun.

⁹⁷Interview with Socialist party official on October 9, 1978.

⁹⁸The designated candidate for the Kansai region Kondo Tadayoshi won 143,000 votes in Hyogo. The rest were split among the candidates endorsed to party supporters in other areas. The 143,000 figure is remarkably close to the hardcore Communist support represented by the Akahata readership.

⁹⁹In the first district, the JSP's Kawakami Jotaro died just before the 1967 election and five-term Diet member Goto Torao retired after the 1969 election, as did the DSP's Nagae Kazuo who first had been elected to the Diet from Kobe in 1937. In the second district, the JSP's five-term incumbent Yamaguchi Jotaro retired after the 1967 election and the DSP's Yamashita Eiji after the 1969 election. The LDP, which had endorsed three candidates in 1969, nominated only two in 1972.

¹⁰⁰"Talent" candidates are popular novelists, TV personalities, journalists, and sometimes even comedians who run in the national district HC contest. They usually have no fixed policy views and attract votes based on their personal popularity. The LDP has frequently endorsed these candidates (seven in 1974) as a means of preserving its now slender majority in the Upper House. For an examination of this phenomenon see Yomiuri Shimbunsha Seron Chōsashitsu, Senkyo o Tettei Bunseki Suru (Tōkyō: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1975), pp. 174-314.

¹⁰¹Interview with defeated 1974 Socialist HC candidate on September 19, 1978.

CHAPTER VI

THE HYOGO KOMEITO

The Komeito (KOM) or Clean Government party was formally incorporated on November 17, 1964. The Komeito portrays itself as a party of "middle of the road reformism"¹ and defines this as a political program characterized by humanism (man rather than the State as the point of departure for political reforms), wholism (political reform to advantage the entire society, not just one segment of it), gradualism (political reform conceived as a long, incremental process), and pacifism (any political reform to take place within the boundaries of Japan's Peace Constitution).² In practical terms, the Komeito program in the economic sector calls for a gradual nationalization of key manufacturing and energy related industries. It promises a shift in emphasis from the growth-oriented policies of the LDP, which have favored the largest corporations, to people oriented measures aimed at increasing the nation's social welfare.³ The party's foreign policy program is now in a period of transition. In the past, the Komeito called for strict Japanese neutrality in international affairs and adherence to the spirit of Article 9 of the Postwar Constitution.⁴ In line with this stance, the party worked for the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the transformation of the Self-Defense Forces into a National Guard with strictly defensive capabilities.

Although the principle of neutrality still remains the keystone of party policy, the Komeito at its 15th Party Convention in 1978 indicated that it would retain the Security Treaty at least on a temporary basis should it come to share in power.⁵ Its position on the Self-Defense Forces remains unchanged.

The Hyogo headquarters of the Komeito was not formally inaugurated until July of 1970, but the party, operating out of its Kansai area headquarters in Osaka, had entered a candidate in the Hyogo district HC election as early as 1965 and in 1967 had succeeded in electing a member of the Lower House from both the Kobe and the Hanshin HR districts. Presently, the party has two seats in the Hyogo delegation to the House of Councillors, four in the House of Representatives, and 11 in the prefectural assembly.

The Party Interest Group Base

The Hyogo Komeito and the Sōkagakkai

The Sōkagakkai is a religious laymen's group affiliated with the Buddhist sect, Nichiren Shōshū.⁶ The Gakkai is unusual among the groups closely connected with the political parties in Japan, because of its direct involvement in the formation of the Komeito. Until June of 1970, the party like its predecessor, the Kōmei Seiji Renmei, was no more than the organizational means by which the Sōkagakkai worked to realize its political goal of the creation of a Buddhist society in Japan (obutsu-myōqō).⁷ The direct participation of a religious group with millennial goals in

electoral politics naturally was looked on with some suspicion by the other political parties and many religious sects.⁸ After the Gakkai had tried in the late 1960's to prevent the distribution of Sōkagakkai o Kiru (The Inside Story of the Sōkagakkai)⁹ by Fujiwara Hirotatsu, a professor at Meiji University who took dead aim at the dangers presented by this relationship, open criticism of the Gakkai and the Komeito appeared in the press¹⁰ and nearly resulted in an embarrassing formal parliamentary inquiry into charges that the Gakkai and the party had violated the constitutional rights of those who questioned their goals and methods.

In the Spring of 1970, the Gakkai and the Komeito leadership bowed to public opinion and announced a formal break between the religious organization and the party. The Gakkai in the future would restrict itself to religious education activities and no longer participate in the direction of party affairs.¹¹ The leadership of the Komeito resigned from any positions that they held in the Gakkai organization and the party platform was revised to exclude any references to explicitly religious goals.¹² The "new" Komeito promised to work towards the realization of a reformist alliance that would unite the forces of the center against the LDP and the radical left.¹³ Yet, despite the Gakkai's pledge of non-interference and the promise contained in the party's new charter, a decade later the Sōkagakkai is still active in the affairs of the Komeito in Hyogo prefecture and remains virtually

the only major group in the prefecture to extend its help to the party's candidates in elections.

The Gakkai, as it did in other urbanized prefectures, was quick to win converts in Hyogo (see Table 60). The 5,000 Hyogo

Table 60

Sōkagakkai Households in Hyogo in Years of
HC Elections, 1956-1977

Year	Number of Households
1956	5,000
1959	not available
1962	70,000
1965	150,000
1968	172,000
1971	not available
1974	not available
1977	160,000

Source: See Note 14.

households in 1956 grew to 172,000 by 1968, when the Gakkai attain the peak of its influence in the prefecture.¹⁴ At present, there are an estimated 160,000 households in Hyogo. These believers are fairly evenly distributed among the four HR districts that front the Pacific coast with the largest concentrations to be found in

Kobe, Nishinomiya, and Amagasaki cities (see Table 61).¹⁵ The Gakkai is weakest in the largely rural 5th HR district.

Table 61
Distribution of Sōkagakkai Households in Hyogo, 1980

HR District	Number of Households
Kobe	45,000
Hanshin	45,000
East Harima	30,000
West Harima	30,000
Tamba	10,000

Source: See Note 15.

It is not certain how many voters there might be in each Gakkai household, but the normally accepted figure is an average of just under two.¹⁶ The Gakkai, consequently, is capable of providing the Komeito with as many as 300,000 votes in a prefecture-wide contest, a number that is approximately three-quarters of the votes needed to secure a House of Councillors seat for the party.¹⁷ The strength of the Gakkai in Kobe, Hanshin, East Harima, and West Harima is of a size sufficient to guarantee the party an HR seat from each of these districts.¹⁸

Support for the Komeito Outside the Sōkagakkai

Support for the Komeito outside the Gakkai in Hyogo is very limited. A review of the reports to the Hyogo Election Commission made by Komeito HR candidates of contributors to their campaigns in the four HR elections between 1967 and 1976¹⁹ discovered that none of the contributors listed by them could be identified as leaders of any of the prominent farm, business, or labor groups in the prefecture.²⁰ The surveys returned by these candidates to the Kobe Shimbun in 1972 and 1976²¹ serve to reinforce this impression of the party's isolation from the mainstream of Hyogo political life. Once again, none of them could list the endorsement of any conservative group. Among the unions, only the 75 member Minolta Camera and 300 member Hyogo chapter of the National Railway Equipment Manufacturers Employees union were reported to have extended their support. The strong Gakkai presence²² behind these candidates' campaigns, moreover, was acknowledged by their frequent mention of endorsements from such Gakkai affiliated organizations as the Democratic Music Association (Minshu Ongaku Kyōkai) and the Working Womens' Association (Hataraku Fujin no Kai).²³

Contributions to campaigns and endorsements by the leadership of prominent organizations in the prefecture are, of course, only one measure of support. The Komeito in Hyogo undoubtedly has some strength among the union rank and file that are tied organizationally to the socialist parties and the membership of the farm, trade, and manufacture associations that line up behind the LDP.²⁴ Yet the lack

of contributions and endorsements is an indication of the failure of its activists to penetrate these organizations and to gain control of their governing bodies. When the prefectural headquarters staff of the party was asked to name those major organized groups in Hyogo that have regularly endorsed the party they were unable to name even one, preferring instead to characterize Komeito support as coming from individuals who sought a middle path between the LDP and the leftist opposition.²⁵

The Party Branch Structure

The Komeito presently has a three tiered organization in Hyogo prefecture: prefectural headquarters, branch associations, and branches. This structure is a product of the 1970 reform of the party charter.²⁶ Although the Komeito was established in 1964, it did not open a prefectural headquarters in Hyogo until July of 1970 one month after its formal break with the Gakkai. Between 1964 and 1970, the party operated in the prefecture through two branches, one in Kobe city and the other in Nishinomiya. These branches were formally affiliated with the national headquarters through the Komeito's Kansai regional office located in Osaka, but their work in the prefecture was coordinated principally through the Hyogo chapter of the Sōkagakkai. Party activity in this period was just one element in the Gakkai's efforts to expand its influence in the prefecture.

The prefectural headquarters (honbu) of the Hyogo Komeito is today located in Kobe. The purpose of the headquarters, as defined by the party charter, is to implement within Hyogo the decisions of the national party convention and other national organs, coordinate the activities of the branch associations and branches within the prefecture, develop party policy with regard to prefectural issues, and direct the activities of local party assemblymen.²⁷ As will be discussed in detail below, the headquarters has neither the staff nor budget to effectively undertake these tasks.

The Komeito party charter assigns no particular geographic definition or administrative function to the branch associations (sō-shibu). Until 1979, the party had nine branch associations in the prefecture (see Table 62). Their geographic distribution was

Table 62
Komeito Branch Associations in Hyogo, 1978

District	Branch Associations
Kobe	Kobe
Hanshin	Nishinomiya, Amagasaki, Awajii Island
East Harima	East Harima
West Harima	West Harima, Himeiji, Aioi
Tamba	Toyooka

Source: Hyogo Komeito.

skewed in favor of the second and fourth HR districts. The large number of branch associations in these two areas can be attributed to the presence within them of several discrete urban areas and the longer history of Komeito involvement in HR elections in these districts. The Komeito did not run a candidate in the East Harima district until 1976, and has yet to stand a candidate in the Tamba district. In February of 1979 at the 9th Hyogo Party Convention, the branch associations in the second and fourth districts were consolidated so that the party now has only one in each HR district. The activities engaged in by the branch associations are limited. None of the branch associations have an office or employ a staff. They are invariably headed by prefectural or city assemblymen and maintain contact with the prefectural headquarters through the party delegation office in one of the assemblies or the assemblymen's own offices.

Komeito party branches (shibu) are expected to hold a meeting of the general membership at least once a month. Branch officers are urged to meet together one additional time each month, and the branch president must meet frequently with other presidents in his area to plan joint activities. These activities ideally include the sponsorship of public meetings with Komeito officials and local assemblymen, the establishment of citizen livelihood centers, participation in party paper subscription drives, and the distribution of party handbills.²⁸ The reality, of course, is quite

different. In 1978 there were officially 63 Komeito branches in Hyogo prefecture. But they existed, for the most part, in name only. None of them had an office or staff, and the prefectural headquarters proved unable upon request to provide a list with their addresses and phone numbers.

How then does the Komeito carry out political activities in the neighborhoods? The headquarters staff, when questioned, admitted that the distribution of party literature and posters at election time was largely carried out through the offices of the party's prefectural and city assemblymen.²⁹ It is these assemblymen who have also served as a crucial link between the party and the Gakkai organization.³⁰ The Komeito has no branch structure in Hyogo beyond the prefectural headquarters. It has relied instead upon Gakkai believers, who are the members of the personal support groups of Komeito assemblymen, to bring its supporters to the polls in elections.

Party Decisionmaking Organs

The decisionmaking organs of the Komeito are different at the national and prefectural levels. The present organization of the national party is based on the sweeping revisions of the party charter in 1970. Before these revisions, decisionmaking power in the party was centralized in the office of the president.³¹ He appointed all party officers and the members of an advisory committee (kanbu-kai) that assisted him in the administration of

party affairs (Article 15). There was no intermediary deliberative body, such as a Central committee, that could be convened when the annual convention was not in session. The Disciplinary committee, which was empowered to investigate charges of party member failure to adhere to decisions reached at the convention, made its recommendation to the president not the convention. He alone had the power to decide those acts which required expulsion (Article 41).

The revisions undertaken at the 8th national convention sought to reduce the power of the president. Under the new charter, all party officers and the members of the Disciplinary and Audit committees were to be chosen by the party convention (Article 20). When the convention was not in session, its deliberative powers were exercised by a Central committee made up of members nominated from each of the prefectural headquarters and approved by the convention (Articles 21-27). This committee was to meet at least once every three months to review party activities. Responsibility for the administration of party affairs was vested in a formally constituted Executive committee (shikkō-iinkai) elected directly by the convention (Article 24). The party's Program of Action for 1970 acknowledged the sweeping nature of these changes in a section appropriately titled the "Establishment of Party Democracy."³²

The decisionmaking structure of the national party today is formally indistinguishable from that of the two socialist parties. At the prefectural level, however, the formal authority of the party president has not been reduced to the extent that it has been in

the national party.³³ In Hyogo prefecture, the Komeito party convention is held annually just after that of the national party. It has met nine times since the prefectural headquarters was formally inaugurated in 1970, and is normally attended by about 100 delegates selected so as to be geographically representative rather than proportional to the size of the membership.³⁴ The purpose of the convention is to hear the report of the Hyogo delegates to the national convention, pass resolutions calling for their implementation in the prefecture, and elect party officers when necessary. The congress does not review the headquarters budget nor does it approve the nomination of party candidates.³⁵ Furthermore, the Hyogo Komeito does not have a Central committee or an Executive committee. All formal authority rests with the president when the convention is not in session. He bears responsibility for the implementation of the national party program, the approval of the party budget, and the recommendation of party candidates to the national party headquarters. To assist him, there is an informal headquarters officers committee (kanbu-kai), but it meets at his request and does not constitute a legislative counterpoint to the executive power of the president.

This unusual centralization of authority in the president appears to reflect the hierarchical and tightly structured organization of the Komeito's parent organization, the Gakkai. The Gakkai, as do many religious groups, chooses its president for life and places few restrictions on his authority to make decisions for

the group. Not coincidentally, the first president of the Hyogo Komeito was Watanabe Ichiro, a man who had also served as the head of the Hyogo chapter of the Gakkai. The still powerful role of the president in the Hyogo party undoubtedly owes much to his tenure. It is unlikely to change under his successors unless the support base of the party comes to include groups outside the Gakkai.

The Party Secretariat

The Secretariat of the Hyogo Komeito had 12 departments in 1979. These can be grouped generally into three functional categories: those concerned with the maintenance and growth of the party (organization and general affairs); liaison with special constituencies (labor, women, youth, farm-marine, small businesses, prefectural movements, and pollution); and the dissemination of the party program (education, policy, and propaganda). All of the departments, except General Affairs, have been usually headed up by national or prefectural assemblymen. In general, the level of activity in the Hyogo Secretariat is quite low. As will be discussed later, the party has neither the staff nor the budget to carry out extensive political activities. Instead it has relied heavily upon the personal support groups of its assemblymen working within the Gakkai organization to mobilize votes on its behalf in elections. In this section, the limited character of the activities engaged in by the Secretariat departments and the difficulties

experienced by the Hyogo Komeito in trying to move beyond its Gakkai support base will be examined.

Party Maintenance and Growth

The citizen livelihood centers (shimin sōdan) are probably the best known of the organizational activities engaged in by the Hyogo Komeito.³⁷ The centers were first established by the party's predecessor, the Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, in 1963. They operate to bring citizen complaints about municipal services to the attention of party assemblymen, who route them to the appropriate government agency. The Hyogo Komeito claimed to have handled over 44,000 requests for assistance in 1978. Yet none of these centers in Hyogo had their own offices or staff. They have usually been operated out of the homes of party assemblymen and are identified as centers to the public by a plastic sticker similar to those used by the assemblymen of the other parties to identify their district offices to constituents. As is the cases with the other parties, the sticker serves more to publicize the Komeito's name than it does to provide citizens with ready access to their representatives. Despite the party leadership's touting of these centers as an organizational innovation, the services extended through seem in substance little different from the routine casework handled by all assemblymen in Hyogo.

The legal counselling service (hōritsu sodan) of the Hyogo party is more innovative and substantive, but its scale is

correspondingly smaller. Counselling is provided once a month by lawyers affiliated with the party in three cities: Kobe, Amagasaki, and Himeiji. In 1978, the party provided assistance in 521 cases before the courts, a number far smaller than the grandiose claims made for the citizen livelihood centers, and probably a better measure of the true extent of the activities engaged in by the Secretariat of the Hyogo party.

The goal of the citizen livelihood centers and the legal counselling services provided by the Komeito is to increase public understanding and support for the party programs. Paradoxically they are not meant to attract new members to the party. The Organization department of Hyogo Komeito has spent little time working to increase the membership of the party in Hyogo. As will be discussed later, the prefectural leadership do not see an increase in the party membership as an necessary component of efforts aimed at broadening support for the party in Hyogo.

Special Constituencies

Among the groups outside the Gakkai from which the party hopes to win support, the most important is labor. Relations between the Komeito and the unions in Hyogo have been strained, because the union leadership often perceive the party as trying to undermine their influence among the rank and file. The Labor department of the party has tried to counter this in two ways. First, it has formally participated in the union sponsored May Day and Spring

Labor Offensive (shuntō) demonstrations. Second, it has sent party observers to the conventions of the Hyogo chapters of the major unions. In 1977, the party delivered greetings at the Hyogo Sōhyo federation and Teachers union conventions, and in 1978 at the Dōmei federation meeting. Still, the party has made little progress in winning support from the labor movement in the prefecture. The head of the Hyogo party Labor department, Komatani Akira, did not come out of the labor movement and, consequently, lacks the personal and organizational ties that party officers in the socialist and Communist parties use so effectively to firm up their labor constituency. The party would like to organize non-union workers in the prefecture, but it has hesitated to do so because of strong resistance from both management and the established union leadership.³⁸

The experience of the Small Business department illustrates some of the problems that the Komeito has had in trying to develop support among conservative constituencies. In working with small businesses, the party has not been able to use the existing network of government subsidized Chambers of Commerce (shōkōkaigisho) because the latter's leadership, committed to the LDP, has proved uncooperative. As a result, in trying both to develop information about the needs of these companies and to make them aware of the help that it is ready to provide them in dealing with the prefectural bureaucracy, the Komeito has had to either approach them

directly or rely upon the introduction of the Gakkai.³⁹ Neither method offers much hope of developing a strong base in this constituency.

Dissemination of the Party Program

The Education department of the party is not much concerned with the planning of seminars directed towards increasing the political awareness and sophistication of the membership. Instead, its major task has been to improve the propaganda capabilities of both party members and "friends of the party," Gakkai believers who help out in campaigns. To this end it has sponsored workshops, usually at election time, dealing with such topics as the provisions of the Election Law and the efficient operation of "sound cars."

The Policy department, despite its name, is largely uninvolved in either the development of the party program or the supervision of party assemblymen. Its activities have been directed instead towards the publicizing of party policy in the prefecture through the mailing of propaganda material to major interest groups in Hyogo and the sending of speakers to political forums sponsored by various community groups. The essentially non-political character of the department can be seen in the fact that its chairman between 1975 and 1977, Okazaki Hiro, was an employee of the prefectural headquarters. During these years, all of the other departments in the Secretariat except General Affairs had been headed by prefectural assemblymen.

The Propaganda department of the Hyogo Komeito is the most active in the Secretariat. In most year, more than one-half of the headquarters budget has been allotted for propaganda activities. The emphasis upon propaganda seen in the activities of the Hyogo Secretariat reflects the party's difficulties in recruiting organized support outside the Gakkai. The Hyogo Komeito's strategy has been to bypass the leadership of organizations antagonistic to it, and directly seek out the support of the individual voter. The capacity of the party to deliver handbills and put up posters in short order throughout the prefecture is well regarded by outside observers. Yet, as was often pointed out, it has been the organizational strength of the Gakkai, not the party, that has made this possible.⁴⁰ The party Secretariat operates in Hyogo mainly as a front to cushion and deflect public suspicion of the direct involvement of a religious organization like the Gakkai in electoral politics.

Party Membership

Membership in the Komeito is open to any Japanese citizen over 18 who is committed to the party program of world peace, parliamentary democracy, and social welfare, and has been recommended by two party members in good standing. The privileges of membership are similar to those available in the other parties: the right to discuss party policy in party forums and publications and to stand for party office. In contrast to all but the LDP, the burdens are

quite minimal: dues are a nominal 1,000 yen (\$5.00) a year and members are asked only to support party candidates and read the party newspaper.

Although the Komeito immediately established offices in the prefecture upon its organization in 1964, there is no reliable information available on party membership in Hyogo before the establishment of the prefectural headquarters in 1970. Between 1964 and 1970, the party had acted as the official political arm of the Gakkai organization and its activities in the prefecture were coordinated through the Gakkai's Hyogo chapter. The Gakkai's president, Ikeda Daisaku, had made it a part of a believer's religious duties to support and assist the party in its activities. Consequently, membership in the party of itself did not serve to separate Komeito activists from the party's larger constituency in the electorate.

The figures that are available for the period place national party membership at 280,000 and claim a Hyogo membership of 14,000.⁴¹ But these seem exaggerated. The membership of the Komeito both at the national level and in Hyogo prefecture since 1970 has never amounted to more than 60 percent of these numbers and the staff of the Hyogo Komeito, although unable to supply a figure, has indicated that membership in the prefecture is not appreciably different today than it was in the late 1960's.⁴²

At its 1970 national convention, the Komeito pledged itself to recruit "men of ability both in and out of the Sōkagakkai, in every

stratum of society, in every supporting organization"⁴³ and adopted a resolution requiring the present membership to re-register with the newly established prefectural headquarters as an affirmation of their support for the reforms undertaken by the convention.⁴⁴ The new Hyogo prefectural headquarters was established at the same address as the former Kobe branch association of the party, just one month after the conclusion of the national convention. By the end of 1970, about 4,000 of the 14,000 supposed members of the party in Hyogo before the reorganization had registered with the prefectural headquarters. In November of 1971, membership in the Hyogo party stood at nearly 6,000 and in July of 1974, it peaked at 8,270. Afterwards, membership declined slightly and has remained ever since near 7,000 members (see Table 64).⁴⁵

There are no figures available on the present distribution of the Komeito membership within the prefecture. The staff of the Hyogo Komeito have indicated, however, that the size of the party's membership in each of the HR districts is roughly proportional to their population. This would give the Hanshin district a membership of around 2,500 and rural Tamba one of about 500.⁴⁶ Nationally, the Hyogo party is said to rank fifth in size following Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, and Aichi prefectures.⁴⁷

Party officials in Tokyo and Hyogo were quite reticent about the number of Gakkai believers within the Komeito membership.⁴⁸ When questioned they avoided a direct response, but did assert that the Hyogo party could count among its membership some members

who were not affiliated with the Gakkai. Careful questioning did uncover that the officers and staff of the prefectural headquarters were all members of the Gakkai, as well as, all but one of the party's candidates for office in Hyogo. Based on this evidence,

Table 63

Komeito Membership in Hyogo Prefecture, 1969-1977

Year	Members	Year	Members
1969	14,143	1974	unavailable
1970	3,996	1975	unavailable
1971	5,890	1976	6,981
1972	5,957	1977	7,450
1973	8,270		

Source: See Note 45.

it can be stated with confidence that the number of non-Gakkai members in the Hyogo party is probably very small and their influence insignificant.

The number of young party members and women in the Hyogo Komeito proved to be quite large. In 1978, the number of party members under 35 came to nearly 37 percent of the membership.⁴⁹ These young people have provided the organizational heart of the party's efforts to increase its support outside the Gakkai through the distribution of literature and telephone solicitation.

Women comprised just over 40 percent of the membership, a proportion far higher than that of any other party in the prefecture.⁵⁰ Yet, only one woman held a position of prominence in the party Secretariat: not, surprisingly, the Womens' department was headed up by a prefectural assembly woman from Himeiji city. This high proportion of young and female membership in the Hyogo party is not necessarily a manifestation of the diversity of its base of support. Rather it might be thought to reflect its narrowness. Youth and women in Japanese society are the two groups least likely to occupy positions of importance in the traditionally conservative organizations that the Komeito would like to attract to its banners from the camp of the LDP. The proportion of youth and women may be so high, because of the party's inability to recruit members from the leadership strata of these groups.

The Komeito has two kinds of members: ordinary and block captains (chiku-iin). In 1978, the Hyogo party counted 1,100 block captains among its 7,000 members.⁵¹ These block captains are the linch pin of the Komeito's election effort. Like precinct captains in a well-run American political machine, they are responsible for mobilizing the Komeito vote in their neighborhoods. These block captains can also be said to represent the organizational linkage between the Komeito and the Gakkai. Since 1970 when its officers resigned their positions within the Gakkai organization, the Komeito leadership has been formally separated from that of the Gakkai. But this separation was not carried out at the level of

the block captains. One close observer of the party in Hyogo has stated that these block captains are often influential members of the neighborhood zadankai and sometimes even employees of the Gakkai organization.⁵²

The analogy with the American political machine, however, should not be carried too far. The party has not aggressively sought to recruit members nor is it capable of coordinating their activities in elections.⁵³ Instead, the Komeito's electoral efforts have been undertaken on a largely ad hoc basis by its assemblymen who have fashioned their supporters in the party's Gakkai constituency into personal campaign organizations. It is important not to mistake the solidarity of the party's electoral base with the efficiency of the party apparatus. Membership in the Hyogo Komeito cannot match the discipline and devotion to the party of the Communist cadre. It is much more akin to that of the LDP where the activist stratum is committed not to the party but to particular candidates.

Party Leadership

Major officers in the Hyogo Komeito include the president, vice-president, secretary-general, and vice-secretary generals. They are elected for a term of two years. The heads of the departments in the party Secretariat are chosen by the president with the approval of the prefectural convention.

The Komeito entered the prefectural political system with the establishment of branch associations in the Kobe and Hanshin districts. Terai Eiji, a prefectural assemblyman, became the president of the Kobe branch; Koda Ryuichi, a Nishinomiya city assemblyman, the president of the Hanshin branch. Since the Hyogo party had no national assembly members in 1964, Koda's assumption of the Nishinomiya post is not surprising. The branch association there was probably little more than an informal aggregation of the Gakkai activists that had worked on his campaign. Terai's position as the head of the Kobe branch, however, is at first glance rather unusual. Terai, a 37 year-old Gakkai official, had been elected in 1963 to the prefectural assembly from Amagasaki city. In the same election, the party had succeeded in sending to the assembly from Kobe city's Hyogo ward, Hatano Ryoichi a 47 year-old professor. Why was Terai, an assemblyman from Amagasaki city, named to the Kobe presidency instead of Hatano? The answer is suggestive of the relationship between the Gakkai and the party that prevailed in these first days: Terai was chosen to head the Kobe office because his position in the Gakkai was senior to that of Hatano.⁵⁴

The head of the Hyogo chapter of the Sōkagakkai during the first years of the party was Watanabe Ichiro, a former editor of the Seikyō Shimbun,⁵⁵ who had been born and raised in Shizuoka prefecture. Watanabe was assisted in his work by Okamoto Tomio a vice-president of the Hyogo Sōkagakkai, and Arai Yoshiyuki a member of the External Affairs section of the Kansai regional

office of the Gakkai until his election to the Kobe city council in 1963. Watanabe ran unsuccessfully as the party's candidate in the 1965 Hyogo district HC election. In 1967, however, he stood for an HR seat from Kobe and was elected; Okamoto ran in the same election from the Hanshin HR district and was also victorious. In 1969 Arai, after leaving the Kobe city council, ran successfully for an HR seat in Hyogo's fourth HR district.

Along with the revision of the party's charter at the 8th national convention, all Komeito officials were required to resign their positions in the Gakkai. Watanabe and Okamoto who were listed in 1970 as national directors of the Gakkai and Arai, who was an assistant director, left these positions and assumed posts in the newly formed prefectural headquarters' hierarchy. Watanabe became president, Okamoto vice-president, and Arai chairman of the Disciplinary committee. The new secretary-general of the party Ozaki Keinosuke and the chief of the Policy department Yahara Hideo could also be identified as former Gakkai directors⁵⁶ (see Table 64).

At the inception of the prefectural headquarters, the Komeito had only six officers: president, vice-president, secretary-general, vice-secretary general, and the chairmen of the Audit and Disciplinary committees, and three department chiefs: Organization, Policy, and Propaganda. The president and vice-president of the prefectural headquarters were members of the Diet, as was the

chairman of the Disciplinary committee. The other positions were all occupied by prefectural and Kobe city assemblymen.

Table 64
Major Party Officers in the Komeito, 1970-1979

Year	President
1970-1976	Watanabe Ichiro, HR assemblyman from Kobe
1976-1979	Yahara Hideo, Hyogo HC assemblyman
Vice-Presidents	
1970-1979	Okamoto Tomio, HR assemblyman from Hanshin
1974-1979	Arai Yoshiyuki, HR assemblyman from West Harima
1974-1976	Yahara Hideo, Hyogo HC assemblyman
1976-1979	Ozaki Keinosuke, prefectural assemblyman
Secretary-General	
1970-1976	Ozaki Keinosuke, prefectural assemblyman
1976-1979	Komatani Akira, prefectural assemblyman

Source: Hyogo Komeito.

By 1974, the number of posts and officers had increased greatly. Watanabe had retained the presidency, but the number of vice-presidents had increased to three to include Arai and the party's newly elected member of the House of Councillors,

Yahara Hideo. The number of vice secretary-general position also had increased from one to four. These positions were filled by city assemblymen, one from each of the first four HR districts in Hyogo. The remaining party officers and heads of departments in the Secretariat were all party assemblymen with the exception of the chief of the Policy department, Okazaki Hiro who was a member of the Secretariat staff.

In 1977, Yahara Hideo succeeded to the presidency of the party. Watanabe was named an advisor, Ozaki moved to one of the vacated vice-president positions, and Komatani Akira, a two-term prefectural assemblyman from Kobe, took over as secretary-general. There were two other changes of interest. First, the number of vice-secretary general positions were increased from four to five with the new one going to Ishida Ryoichi, an Amagasaki prefectural assemblyman. Second, Fukui Haruo, a city assemblyman from Kawanishi, became the chief of the Policy department. The party explained this as a routine rotation of the office among the party membership,⁵⁷ but the accession to the position by an assemblyman hints at the difficulties the staff member Okazaki may have encountered with other party officers. There seems to be little room at the top for party activists who are not also assemblymen.

All party officers in the Hyogo headquarters have been members of the Sōkagakkai and many of them have been officials within the Gakkai organization.⁵⁸ Yet Hyogo prefecture is unusual in that it is one of the few that can point to a non-Gakkai member among the

Diet representatives endorsed by the party. Iida Tadao, a professor in the law school of Kansai Gakuin university and a non-Gakkai member (although some members of his family do belong to the Gakkai), was nominated by the Hyogo Komeito as its candidate in the third district of Hyogo and elected to the Diet in 1976. Despite his election, however, Iida has not been permitted to hold office within the party prefectural organization. He is listed simply as an advisor to the party. This is highly irregular especially in a party as small as the Komeito.⁵⁹ It suggests that Gakkai membership is still a prerequisite for influence within the party. This point is reinforced by the continuing influence of Watanabe, Okamoto, and Arai. These three men were all high ranking officials within the Gakkai and undertook the task of building the Komeito in Hyogo in their capacity as Gakkai officials. When the party was separated from the Gakkai, they resigned their positions and took formal control of the party. They presently hold three of the four HR seats that the party has in the prefecture. It can be assumed that this kind of leadership facilitates cooperation between the party and the Gakkai. As indicated earlier, this is a necessity for the Komeito in Hyogo because it has not been successful in expanding its support among groups outside the Gakkai.

Party FinancesSources of Party Income⁶⁰

Party member dues have not been an important source of party income. At 1,000 yen (\$5.00) a year they put at best a nominal obligation upon the membership. All the dues collected by the Hyogo Komeito are sent to the national headquarters which then remits a portion of them back to the prefecture. The headquarters, in turn, is expected to turn over about one-half of this amount to the branch associations. In 1977, the Hyogo headquarters received 7.4 million yen (\$37,000) from the national party. It retained four million (\$20,000) for its own account and divided the rest among the then nine branch associations in the prefecture.

The Komeito takes approximately 10 percent of the basic salary of its assemblymen as a mandatory assessment to the party treasury.⁶¹ For a prefectural assemblymen in Hyogo this comes to 50,000 yen (\$250.00) a month. The assessments are collected directly by the national party. Neither the prefectural headquarters nor the party's branch associations share in this income.

Contributions to the Hyogo party have come nearly exclusively from party national, prefectural, and city assemblymen. The Hyogo party has never reported receiving any financial help from an individual who could be identified as a leader in the union movement or conservative groups in the prefecture. The contributions made by assemblymen have usually been offered to cover expenses incurred by the headquarters on behalf of their campaigns.⁶²

In 1977, the Hyogo party reported contributions totalling 12.9 million yen (\$64,500). 10.7 million yen (\$53,500) of this amount was listed as the donation of Watanabe Michiko, the Hyogo party's 1977 HC candidate. Such large contributions from candidates have been important sources of income for the party in election years.

The Hyogo party receives no income from the party newspaper, the Kōmei Shimbun, and does not participate much in its management. The paper is printed in Osaka and delivered throughout the prefecture by the Gakkai's Seikyō Shimbun network.⁶³ The subscription fee is also collected by Seikyō representatives and forwarded directly to the national party. The Hyogo party is involved only in drives to increase the circulation of the paper. In 1975 the daily edition had a circulation of 18,000 and the Sunday 33,000.⁶⁴ The party conventions have continually emphasized the importance of the newspaper as an organizational tool and set for the party the goal of increasing circulation in the prefecture by 3,000 copies each year, but the Hyogo party has yet to approach this target.

The total income reported by the Hyogo Komeito for the years 1971 to 1977 was quite low in comparison with that of the other parties. Precise revenue figures for the party between 1971 and 1975 are difficult to determine, because it counted any surplus in its accounts as an addition to the succeeding year's income. A look at the pattern of party expenditures in these years, however, permits the estimate that the Hyogo headquarters spent only

11 million yen (\$55,000) in its first year and 63 million (\$315,000) in 1975. Accurate figures are available for the next two years,⁶⁵ and they show that the party had revenues of 58 million (\$290,000) in 1976 and only 26 million yen (\$130,000) in 1977.

Pattern of Party Expenditures

The Hyogo Komeito could function at all on such meager revenues because its personnel expenditures were borne by the national party. The Hyogo headquarters had a staff of three in 1971. This had expanded to eight by 1977, three of whom were college graduates.⁶⁶ The payment by the national headquarters of staff salaries for the prefectural party does not mean that the Komeito is possessed of a national corps of party organizers. All the employees of the Hyogo party were recruited from within the prefecture, and they look forward not to a career in the national party bureaucracy but in the local assembly.

The largest expenditure that the Hyogo party made on its own account was for propaganda. The Komeito in Hyogo, as discussed before, has had great difficulties in moving beyond its Sōkagakkai base to garner the endorsement of the leadership of other important interest groups for its candidates. Because of this, the party has tried to sidestep the organized framework of these groups and reach out to their membership on an individual basis. Party expenditures for propaganda peaked in 1974 at the time of the HC election, and declined rapidly after the 1975 revision of the Election Law,

which limited the number of handbills and special editions of the party paper that the headquarters might distribute⁶⁷ (see Table 65).

Table 65

Expenditures of Hyogo Komeito for Propaganda, 1971-1979

Year	Income	Year	Income
1971	10 ^a	1975	51
1972	unavailable	1976	34
1973	16	1977	30
1974	71		

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.

^aMillions of yen.

The Hyogo Komeito spent 3.3 million yen (\$16,500) for office space in 1975.⁶⁸ This figure was comparable with that of the other parties. Its eight member staff is presently located on the second floor of a building in a working class district of Kobe's Nada ward. This is in sharp contrast to the LDP and the JSP that have chosen to place themselves opposite the prefectural capitol building, the DSP which is positioned across the street from Kobe's busiest railway station Sannomiya, and the JCP whose office fronts on Kobe's most prosperous shopping mall. The party's office has two rooms:

one filled with desks for the staff and the other containing a large table and some 10 chairs to accommodate meetings of the headquarters committee (kanbu-kai). By the standards of the other parties, the prefectural headquarters of the Komeito is relatively spacious. Yet, considering that it is the only official Komeito office in all of Hyogo prefecture, it is grossly inadequate to serve the needs of a party that was able to win more than 400,000 votes in the 1977 HC election.

The Komeito in Hyogo prefecture has a significantly different financial profile from that of the other parties. For them, members dues, assemblymen's salaries, or money gathered within the prefecture at party sponsored fundraising dinners are crucial sources of revenue. This is not the case for the Hyogo Komeito. Its most important source of ordinary income is the some 16 million yen (\$80,000)⁶⁹ provided by the national party's underwriting of its personnel expenses. Since the party's branch associations have neither an office nor staff, this means that the official expenditures of the entire Komeito organization in the prefecture amounted to only 66 million yen (\$330,000) in 1977,⁷⁰ the lowest of any party in Hyogo (see Table 66).

The ostensive purpose of the Komeito headquarters in Hyogo is to develop new sources of support for the party through the opening of channels of communication between it and established groups in the prefecture such as unions and trade associations, and the waging of an aggressive propaganda campaign. In reality,

however, the party organization functions as little more than a front for the Gakkai. The task of mobilizing its votes in elections is carried out mainly by the personal support groups of its assemblyman working within the Gakkai apparatus.

Table 66
Total Expenditures of Hyogo Parties in 1977

Party	Expenditures
Japan Communist Party	550 ^a
Liberal Democratic Party	160
Democratic Socialist Party	81
Japan Socialist Party	78
Komeito	66

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.

^aMillions of yen.

Party Candidates

The Komeito is a young party. It first fielded candidates for the prefectural assembly in 1963, the House of Councillors in 1965, and the House of Representatives in 1967. It has been very successful in Hyogo prefecture. The prefectural party has two incumbent Upper House representatives, four Lower House, and 11 prefectural assemblymen. This gives the party a claim equal to that of the JSP as the second largest party in Hyogo.

The youth of the party has meant that it has yet to face the problem of replacing an aging incumbent with a younger new candidate, one that plagued the LDP, JSP, and DSP organizations in the prefecture throughout the 1970's. All of the party's incumbents are surprisingly young. Only one candidate, Iida Tadao, is in his sixties. Another, Okamoto Tomio, is in his fifties, but the remaining four are all in their mid-to-late forties. Given the reluctance of the Hyogo voter to turn out incumbents,⁷¹ the Komeito's hold on its six national level seats seems certain to continue through the decade of the 1980's.

The Komeito achieved almost overnight success in Hyogo prefecture in the years between 1967 and 1969. It elected in this brief period three HR candidates, one HC candidate, and all six of its candidates for the prefectural assembly. The problems surrounding the separation of the Komeito organization from the Sokagakkai interrupted, but did not reverse, the party's accumulation of assembly seats. The Komeito did not run a candidate in the 1971 Hyogo district HC election and stood only seven candidates in the prefectural assembly race of the same year, electing six. But in 1972, it bucked the national trend which saw a drop in Komeito strength in the national assembly⁷² and returned all three of its incumbents.

In the series of elections between 1974 and 1977, the party began where it had left off in 1971. During this period, the Komeito won a seat in both the 1974 and 1977 Hyogo district HC

elections, captured an additional HR position in the 1976 General Election for a total of four, and elected 14 of its 18 candidates for the prefectural assembly in the 1975 Local Elections.

Despite these dramatic gains, the Sōkagakkai remained practically the only source of Komeito candidates. No Komeito candidate at any level of election was either a union official or an officer in any of the trade associations within the prefecture. Before the 1971 split from the Sōkagakkai, all of the party's national candidates and three of its six prefectural assembly candidates were in their campaign biographies identified as officers in the Gakkai organization. After 1971, the influence of the Gakkai continued unchanged. All but one of the party's national incumbents were former Gakkai officials. At the prefectural level, although only two of the 18 could still be identified as former Gakkai officials, all candidates were Gakkai believers.⁷³

The one national assemblyman who was not a former Gakkai official was also, at the same time, not a Gakkai believer. This makes his case of special interest. Iida Tadao's endorsement by the party for the third district HR seat in the 1976 election was not his first association with the party. He had been nominated by the Hyogo Komeito as its gubernatorial candidate in an effort by the party to ease voter suspicion in the wake of the scandal over the Fujiwara book. He lost this election, but polled 79,000 votes in the 1976 HR race to bring to the party its fourth Diet seat from the prefecture. Yet the Komeito's hopes that the

nomination of a non-Gakkai candidate would help the party expand its support among voters outside the Gakkai was not vindicated by Iida's victory. An analysis of the vote shows that he ran appreciably better than other Komeito candidates only in his hometown of Akashi⁷⁴ (see Table 67).

In the 1979 prefectural assembly elections, the impressive gains of the 1974-1977 period came to an abrupt halt. The party nominated only 15 candidates, all Gakkai members,⁷⁵ and managed to elect only 11. A comparison of the vote received by the Komeito candidates in the 1975 and 1979 PA races shows two things: first, in 1979 the party nominated candidates only in those districts where it had stood them before and did not put up candidates in three of the four districts which it had lost in 1975; second, the number of votes received by Komeito candidates in 1979 with allowance made for the dramatic decrease in voter turnout from 58 percent to 50 percent due to bad weather⁷⁶ were essentially the same as in 1975 (see Table 68). These two factors suggest that the party may have reached the limits of the votes available to it from its Gakkai support base in Hyogo.

The staff of the Hyogo Komeito have indirectly admitted as much.⁷⁷ In interviews, they have stated that because the support available to the party in a particular PA district can be estimated with considerable accuracy, the party has found it difficult to recruit candidates in areas where it is weak. The strain upon self and family involved in a losing campaign is not the only reason for

Table 67
Komeito Performance in Hyogo Third HR District, 1974-1977

City/County	1974 HC	1975 PA	1976 HR	1977 HC
Akashi	20 ^a	18	25	20
Kakogawa	14	17	16	16
Nishiwaki	3	--	3	3
Miki	4	--	5	4
Takasago	7	--	8	7
Ono	4	--	3	4
Kasai	5	--	4	4
Mino	0	--	0	0
Kato	3	--	2	2
Taka	3	--	2	3
Kako	3	--	4	4
Inan	1	--	1	1
Total	71	--	79	72

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai.

^aVote in thousands.

Table 68
Komeito Performance in the 1975 and 1979 Hyogo PA Elections

Ward/City	1975 PA	Number of Votes ^b	1979 PA	Number of Votes ^b
Higashi Nada	12.4 ^a		11.3	
Nada	13.1	13.1	11.7	
Fukiai	6.9		5.9	
Hyogo	16.6		13.3	
Kita	11.6	11.9	----- ^d	
Nagata	17.6		(no election)	
Suma	10.7	10.8	-----	
Tarumi	14.3		17.1	
Amagasaki (1) ^c	16.7		15.4	
(2)	16.7		15.3	
(3)	12.4		13.7	

Table 68 (Continued)

Ward/City	1975 PA	Number of Votes ^b	1979 PA	Number of Votes ^b
Nishinomiya	19.9		18.4	
Itami	13.3		14.5	17.6
Kawanishi	12.7	15.2	-----	
Akashi	18.2		15.9	
Kakogawa	17.7		17.5	19.2
Himeji (1)	18.7		17.3	
(2)	16.8		14.8	14.8

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Linkai; Kōbe Shimbun April 3, 1979.^aVote in thousands.^bMinimum number of votes required to win a seat in those districts where Komeito candidate was defeated.^cPerformance of each party candidate in those districts where party stood more than one candidate.^dIndicates failure of party to stand candidate in 1979 election. There was no election in Kobe's Nagata ward, because no party put up a candidate to challenge the four incumbents for their seats. The Komeito incumbent was automatically returned for another four year term.

this. Prefectural assembly candidates in the Komeito, as a rule, receive no financial assistance from the party.⁷⁸ They are expected to raise funds for their campaign from among their supporters, usually Gakkai believers. In an area where the Gakkai is weak, this is often an impossible task.

The party has actively cast about for ways to escape the dilemmas presented by its limited support base. In the 1979 PA election, it negotiated to give its support to a DSP candidate in the Suma ward of Kobe in return for that party's support in Fukiai ward and Kakogawa city. Despite some friction between union activists from Kawasaki Heavy industries and the Gakkai organization in Suma,⁷⁹ the coalition there was a great success. The DSP candidate had finished last in 1975 with only 6,500 votes. In 1979 with the help of the 10,000 votes won by the Komeito candidate in 1975, he nearly doubled his past performance to win 12,500 votes and a seat in the assembly. Things did not go so smoothly, however, on the Komeito side of the ledger. DSP activists in Fukiai and Kakogawa refused to recognize the agreement reached between the Komeito Hyogo headquarters and the DSP prefectural federation.⁸⁰ As a result, both Komeito candidates actually polled fewer votes than they had in 1975.

In the 1979 General Election, the Komeito again nominated its four incumbents and succeeded in sending all of them back to the Diet. But a comparison of the votes that they received with their performance in the past gives little hope that the party will be

able to elect additional candidates from these districts in the near future (see Table 69). In the fifth HR district, where the party

Table 69
Performance of Hyogo Komeito HR Candidates,
1967-1979

Name	1967	1969	1972	1976	1979
Watanabe Ichiro	96 ^a	103	96	106	97
Okamoto Tomio	95	112	108	123	117
Arai Yoshiyuki		56	59	65	66
Iida Tadao				79	79

Source: Hyogo Senkyo Kanri linkai; Kōbe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.

^aVote in thousands.

has yet to stand a candidate, the prospects are equally bleak. The Komeito has not contested for any of the eight prefectural assembly seats from this area and in the 1977 Hyogo district HC race won only 23,000 votes there, some 20,000 short of the number normally needed to elect an HR candidate.⁸¹

The Komeito has prospered in Hyogo prefecture because its ties with the Gakkai have permitted it to marshal strong and regular support behind its candidates in elections. This will continue, but the party's potential for further growth is in doubt because it has yet to move successfully beyond this base. The possibility of

the party developing significant support among conservative or socialist constituencies in the near future is limited. The Komeito organization in the prefecture is weakest of any of the parties, its membership is virtually indistinguishable from Gakkai believers, and its leadership and candidates are too closely tied to the Gakkai. It will most likely remain an influential, but distinctly minority, party whose ultimate fate will be decided by the future vitality of the Gakkai organization in Hyogo.

NOTES

¹From the revised statement of principles adopted by the party at its 8th National Convention in June 1970; see Komeito, The 8th National Party Convention 1970, p. 17.

²Komeito International Affairs Bureau, Komeito 1975, pp. 11-15; see also "Proposals for a Middle of the Road Coalition Government" in Komeito, 11th National Party Convention 1973, pp. 26-33.

³Komeito International Affairs Bureau, op. cit., p. 39; see also "Our Economic Policy Directed Towards the Building of a Welfare Society" in Komeito, 10th National Party Convention 1972, pp. 48-60.

⁴"Foreign and Security Policies" in Komeito, 11th National Party Convention 1973, pp. 34-53.

⁵See summary of proceedings of 15th National Party Convention in Yomiuri Shimbunsha, Yomiuri Nenkan 1979, p. 264.

⁶Nichiren Shōshū or Nichiren True Faith was founded by Saint Nichiren (1222-1282) in the thirteenth century. Sōkagakkai, as reorganized after the war by Toda Josei, is an association of members of this sect pledged to mutual aid in the pursuit of personal enlightenment (jōbutsu) and to the propagation of this faith in Japan and throughout the world (kōsen-rufu). Sōkagakkai presently has a membership in Japan of 7.8 million households (October 1978, Source: Sōkagakkai). The actual number of believers may be two or three times this figure depending upon the assumptions made about how many believers there are in each household. All members of the Sōkagakkai are members of the Nichiren Shōshū sect, but the reverse is not true. There are estimated to be some 50,000 households that are members only of Nichiren Shōshū (Source: Abbot of Nichiren Shōshū temple, interview on June 19, 1979). In contrast to the Gakkai households, these believers have belonged to the faith in many cases for several generations.

⁷For a succinct discussion of Gakkai beliefs and their relationship to the teachings of Nichiren see James White, The Sōkagakkai and Mass Society (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 30-38. See also Ikeda Daisaku, Seiji to Shūkyō (Tōkyō: Hōshoin, 1964).

⁸See for example, Nihon Shakaitō Chuō Gakkō, Sōkagakkai, Sono Mondaiten (Tokyo: Nihon Shakaitō, 1962) Nihon Kyōsantō, Kōmeitō o Do Miru Ka (Tokyo: Nihon Kyōsantō, 1965); Risshokōseikai Seinen Honbu Chōsa, Sōkagakkai Hihan no Tame ni (Tokyo: Risshokōseikai, 1965).

⁹Fujiwara Hirotatsu, Sōkagakkai o Kiru (Tokyo: Nisshin Shimpō, 1969).

¹⁰A listing of some of these articles in the leading journals, weeklies, and newspapers can be found in Horii Yukio, Kōmeitō Ron (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1973), pp. 247-255.

¹¹Ikedo speech to 33rd National Convention of the Sōkagakkai quoted in Ibid., pp. 58-59.

¹²The new charter dropped all references to obutsu myōgō and buppō minshushugi. In their place was put chūdō shugi and gikaisei minshushugi. See Komeitō, The 8th National Convention, op. cit., p. 17.

¹³See "The Middle of the Road Party Line," Ibid., pp. 53-57.

¹⁴Figures given for Gakkai membership are all unofficial estimates. The Sōkagakkai does not publish membership figures on a prefectural basis. 1956 estimate taken from Horii Yukio, op. cit., p. 206. 1962, 1965, and 1968 estimates taken from Kōbe Shimbun analyses of the support base of the party in Hyogo published in these years just prior to the House of Councillors election. Since the official separation of the Komeito and the Gakkai, the paper has provided no estimates with its analyses. The 1977 figure comes from the Hyogo JCP newspaper Minpō (May 1977) analysis of the challenges facing that party's candidate in the upcoming HC election. Officials of the Sōkagakkai and the Komeito when questioned refused to confirm or deny these estimates.

¹⁵Estimates of Gakkai strength derived from Kōbe Shimbun analyses of the Komeito support base in the 1967 and 1969 HR election. The same figures were used by Asahi Shimbun in their 1967 and 1969 election coverage and Horii Yukio in his discussion of the 1967 election in op. cit., p. 201. There are no more recent figures available, but since the membership of the Gakkai has remained relatively stable in Hyogo these estimates are still a reliable indicator of the distribution of Gakkai strength.

¹⁶Both the Kōbe Shimbun and the Asahi Shimbun make this assumption in their election analyses; also see Horii Yukio, op. cit., pp. 196-207.

¹⁷In 1977, the third HC seat in Hyogo was won by a JSP candidate with 381,000 votes. The Komeito won 432,000 votes in this election.

¹⁸The minimum number of votes required to win a HR seat in 1979: Kobe (78,000), Hanshin (93,000), East Harima (72,000), West Harima (66,000), and Tamba (36,000).

¹⁹See Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai, "Senkyo Undō Hiyō no Shūshi ni Kansuru Shirabe" in Hyōgoken Kōhō April 1967, February 1970, February 1973, and February 1977.

²⁰The Komeito has a policy of accepting contributions only from individuals. The list of contributors submitted by them to the Commission was examined to determine whether the leadership of groups outside the Gakkai were included in it.

²¹See Chapter V, Note 11.

²²National Gakkai officials (interview on December 14, 1978) and staff members of the Hyogo Komeito (interview November 10, 1978), when asked directly by this researcher, repeatedly denied the existence of any cooperation in elections between the two organizations.

²³The Gakkai as part of its proselytizing activities has created a whole panoply of front groups that function to attract potential converts by sponsoring non-religious activities such as music concerts, sports tournaments, or cultural circles that serve to bring ordinary citizens into contact with Gakkai members and beliefs. These groups are useful to the Komeito because they can help its candidates reach voters outside the immediate circle of believers.

²⁴Analyses of elections by the Kōbe and Asahi Shimbun have never mentioned the support of Komeito candidates by any formally organized group other than the Gakkai or its front organizations. It would occasionally be mentioned in an article that a particular candidate was popular among small businesses or citizen groups, but no specific organizations were ever named.

²⁵When the list of contributors was shown to staff members of the Hyogo party for their comments, the contributors were described only as people supportive of the principles of the party. The staff gave no indication the list included any prominent elements of party support beyond the Gakkai.

²⁶See Komeito, The 8th National Convention op. cit., pp. 51-52.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 28.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 52.

²⁹ Interview with staff of Hyogo Komeito April 18, 1978.

³⁰ Interview with Socialist party official September 14, 1978 and Abbot of Nichiren Shōshū temple on June 19, 1979.

³¹ Text of 1964 party charter can be found in Tsuji Kiyoaki, Shiryō: Sengo 20-nenshi Vol. 1 (Tōkyō: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1966), pp. 440-441; see especially Articles 5, 10, 15, and 19 for a specification of the chairman's authority; for a detailed discussion of the differences between the 1964 and 1970 charters see Hori, op. cit., pp. 160-165.

³² Komeito, The 8th National Convention op. cit., pp. 52-53.

³³ The Hyogo Komeito could not make available a copy of the prefectural headquarters' charter. The discussion here is based on interviews with the headquarters staff.

³⁴ One-hundred delegates is very small when compared with the other parties. The DSP has less than 1,000 members in Hyogo, but reports that its conventions are attended by 150 to 200 delegates. The General Affairs committee of the LDP, which functions like a Central committee for the party, has 250 members in Hyogo.

³⁵ The staff of the Hyogo Komeito made available to this researcher the proceedings of the 3rd (1972), 4th (1973), 5th (1974), 7th (1976), and 8th (1978) prefectural party conventions.

³⁶ Interview with Komeito prefectural assemblyman on December 27, 1978.

³⁷ See Taketsugu Tsurutani, op. cit., p. 157.

³⁸ In November of 1967, Ikeda came under strong criticism from union leaders when he proposed the creation of a Gakkai sponsored national union, Nihon Minshu Rōdō Kyōgikai (Minrō), for details see Hori, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

³⁹ Interview with Komeito prefectural assemblyman on December 27, 1978.

⁴⁰ Interview with DSP federation staff May 10, 1979.

⁴¹ Found in Hori, op. cit., p. 164.

- ⁴² Interview with staff of Hyogo Komeito November 10, 1978.
- ⁴³ Komeito, The 8th National Convention, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 50-51.
- ⁴⁵ Membership figures taken from proceedings of 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th prefectural conventions.
- ⁴⁶ Interview with staff of Hyogo Komeito November 10, 1978.
- ⁴⁷ Interview with staff of Hyogo Komeito May 23, 1979.
- ⁴⁸ Interview with member of International department in national party Secretariat on January 23, 1978 and staff of Hyogo party on April 18, 1978.
- ⁴⁹ Data from proceedings of the 8th prefectural party convention.
- ⁵⁰ Estimate provided by staff of Hyogo Komeito in interview on November 10, 1978.
- ⁵¹ Data from proceedings of the 8th prefectural party convention.
- ⁵² Interview with Abbot of Nichiren Shōshū temple on June 19, 1979.
- ⁵³ At the 8th national party convention, the leadership admitted that "up to now our party has often seemed to be merely an organization formed around individual Dietmen," see Komeito, 8th National Convention op. cit., p. 50; in an interview on November 10, 1978 one member of the staff remarked that the Komeito has yet to build a strong, effective organization in the prefecture and that it remains largely an assemblyman centered party.
- ⁵⁴ Interview with Komeito prefectural assemblymen on December 27, 1978.
- ⁵⁵ Seikyō Shimbun is the national newspaper of the Sōkagakkai. National circulation as of October 1978 was 4.5 million copies. Circulation of the paper in Hyogo was not available.
- ⁵⁶ Ozaki and Yahara were prefectural assemblymen at the time.
- ⁵⁷ Interview with staff of Hyogo Komeito May 23, 1979.
- ⁵⁸ Interview with staff of Hyogo Komeito April 18, 1978.

⁵⁹In the other Hyogo parties incumbent Diet members and even candidates hold high party office; the advisor positions are usually held by retired long-term assemblymen.

⁶⁰The Komeito did not register as a prefectural political organization with the Hyogo Election Commission until July 1970. The first report available on its financial status is for the period January-June 1971. Between 1964 and 1970, money spent by the party in Hyogo was lumped together with that spent by the Kansai regional headquarters of the party, which was registered in Osaka. The discussion here is based on reports made to the Hyogo Election Commission by the party between 1971 and 1977.

⁶¹The Hyogo staff refused to reveal the exact percentage assessed and would not indicate whether different amounts were assessed local and national assemblymen. Source: interviews with staff on November 10, 1978 and prefectural assemblyman on December 27, 1978.

⁶²Interview with Komeito prefectural assemblyman on December 27, 1978.

⁶³This was admitted to inadvertently by the Hyogo Komeito staff in an interview on November 10, 1978 in response to a question of how someone wanting delivery of the paper might arrange for it. It was confirmed by the Abbot of the Nichiren Shōshū temple who also suggested that the party has had trouble increasing the circulation of the paper because of the fear among Gakkai officials that efforts to push it too hard might reduce the readership of the Seikyō Shimbun. Most of the readership of the Kōmei Shimbun, he reported, look upon their subscription as a contribution to the party.

⁶⁴Data from proceedings of the 5th prefectural party convention. The national party claims a circulation of 800,000 for the daily edition and 1,400,000 for the Sunday. Given that the Hyogo party is the fifth largest in the country these figures seem exaggerated. See Miyakawa Takayoshi, ed., Seiji Handobukku (Tōkyō: Seiji Kōhō Senta, 1977), p. 205 for national circulation figures.

⁶⁵The more detailed financial statements required by the revised Political Funds Control Law made it possible to separate current income from the surplus carried over from the previous years.

⁶⁶Interview with staff of Hyogo Komeito on April 18, 1978.

⁶⁷An examination of the receipts presented by the Komeito to document its propaganda expenses produced the following breakdown: Movies (6.5 million--\$32,500), Slides (1.2 million--\$6,000), Meeting Place Rental (2.5 million--\$12,500), Sound Car (3.6 million--\$18,000), Posters (15.1 million--\$75,500), and Contributions to Branch Associations (2.1 million--\$10,500).

⁶⁸The change in reporting procedures after 1975 makes it impossible to separate out rent expenses for 1976 and 1977.

⁶⁹The salaries of the staff of the Hyogo Komeito, including bi-annual bonuses, average slightly under two million yen (\$10,000) a year.

⁷⁰The prefectural party reported expenditures of 50 million yen for 1977 to the Election Commission. Adding the estimate for personnel expenses brings this to 66 million yen.

⁷¹In 1979, only four of the 20 incumbent assemblymen in Hyogo were defeated in their bid for reelection. Two of the successful challengers were themselves former incumbents. The average assemblyman had served four to five terms in the Lower House. The oldest had won a seat in every election since 1946.

⁷²The party dropped from 47 to 29 seats in the House of Representatives.

⁷³After the 1970 split the campaign biographies submitted by Komeito candidates to the Kōbe Shimbun and the Elections Commission no longer contained any reference to positions that they might have held in the past as officials in the Gakkai. The two, whom can still be identified as such, were candidates in the 1967 prefectural assembly elections. The religious beliefs of PA candidates were confirmed by the Hyogo Komeito staff in an interview on April 18, 1978.

⁷⁴Iida is the only Komeito candidate for national office in Hyogo that seems to have been able to rely upon a particular geographic base in his campaign. Among the party's HC incumbents, Yahara Hideo is from Hiroshima and Watanabe Michiko, although born in Kobe, started her political life as a Komeito HR assemblywoman from Tokyo's 1st HR district. Other party HR incumbents are all from outside the prefecture: Watanabe Ichiro (Shizuoka), Okamoto Tomio (Nara), and Arai Yoshiyuki (Shizuoka). This contrasts sharply with the LDP where all but three of their HR candidates between 1955 and 1976 in Hyogo were born and raised in the HR district from which they sought election.

⁷⁵Interview with staff of Hyogo Komeito May 23, 1979.

⁷⁶Election day, April 8, 1979 saw Hyogo visited by torrential rains; the conditions were so desperate that it was a wonder that over 50 percent of the voters did get to the polls.

⁷⁷Interview with staff November 10, 1978 and May 23, 1979.

⁷⁸Interview with Komeito prefectural assemblyman December 27, 1978.

⁷⁹Interview with union official on May 25, 1979.

⁸⁰Interview with DSP federation staff on May 10, 1979.

⁸¹In 1979, Iga Sadamori, the JSP candidate, won the third seat in this district with 36,000 votes, but this was because the LDP had broken with its usual policy of nominating only two candidates in this three seat district and supported three. The new conservative party, the New Liberal Club, also entered the fray in 1979 with its own candidate. The larger number of candidates resulted in a smaller number of votes for each. Normally, 45,000 votes are necessary to win a seat in this district.

CHAPTER VII

CULTURE, MULTI-MEMBER DISTRICTS, THE ELECTION LAW, AND THE INDEPENDENT VOTER IN HYOGO: THEIR EFFECT UPON PARTY-INTEREST GROUP LINKAGES

In the opening chapter of this study it was asserted that parties never represent the entire electorate. They are always tied more or less closely to a particular alignment of interests, be they farm, commercial, union, or religious. It was emphasized that the strength of this relationship was variable. Next, the existence of especially close linkages between the Japanese political parties and particular interest groups was noted, and in succeeding chapters the nature of the relationship between the parties and these interest groups in one prefecture was examined and their organizational consequences for the political parties was assessed. This was done without explicitly trying to determine why the ties between parties and interest groups are so strong in Japan. It is now time to deal with this question.

In this chapter, it will be asserted that three conditions encourage these close ties: a Japanese cultural preference for all-inclusive group affiliations, the competitive patterns encouraged by the multi-member electoral districts, and the constraints placed on party campaign activities by the provisions of the Election Law. The argument for the importance of cultural

factors will be based on studies of Japanese groups and voting behavior by foreign and Japanese scholars. The arguments made for the importance of the electoral districting and the Election Law will be based upon data drawn from the performance of the political parties in Hyogo.

In a rather long concluding section, the implications for the political parties of the weakening capacity of the groups affiliated with them to mobilize their membership, as the result of the great socioeconomic changes that have occurred in Hyogo over the past 25 years, and the concurrent growth in the number of voters who identify themselves as independents will be examined. It will be argued that the importance of the independent voter is still questionable and that major changes in the party system will only result from a shift in the composition of the groups that make up the support bases of the parties.

Culture and the Linkages Between Parties and Interest Groups in Japan

The party systems of Europe were in large part a product of the different religious, class, communal, and regional cleavages within each nation.¹ It was these fundamental disagreements that bound particular interests to parties and which have remained by far the most important explanation for voting behavior in Europe.²

These cleavages, however, have not occasioned the same divisions in Japanese politics. Japan, as a racially homogenous and culturally cohesive island nation, has not been plagued by the

communal and regional struggles that have been characteristic of Western European politics. Despite the strength of the Sōkagakkai supported Komeito, Church-State relations have also never been a significant issue. Class rhetoric has been used to legitimate the political programs of the Communist and Socialist parties, but surveys of their supporters do not distinguish them clearly from those of the LDP in terms of income or occupation.³

The weakness of these important societal cleavages in Japan would seem to suggest the existence of a fluid party system characterized by a significant amount of cross-party voting behavior. But, paradoxically, just the reverse has been the case. Overall, there has been remarkable consistency in voter support for the political parties from election to election.⁴

How are these contradictory indications to be reconciled? Watanuki Joji has explained voting consistency as a product of a cultural cleavage in Japanese society that separates those who support the reforms undertaken after the war from those who wish to adopt a Constitution more in keeping with traditional Japanese values.⁵ As evidence for this, he has cited survey data which showed some difference in the educational backgrounds and age distribution of conservative and opposition party supporters.⁶ Watanuki's theory is useful for delineating one level of conflict between the parties in Japan, but it begs the question of the deep divisions which separate the opposition parties. The dynamics

underlying voting behavior and the structure of the party system in Japan seem to lie elsewhere.

Shinohara Hajime has noted that the voluntary purposive character of groups in Western societies cannot be found in Japan.⁷ Group formation there has not been the result of individuals joining together in order to accomplish specific goals, but instead the natural, spontaneous result of people living and working in the same environment. Parties in this view are not independent of these groups, but extensions of them into politics. As a result, political parties in Japan have not been able to be broadly aggregative out of a sense that this would endanger the natural harmony and balance of the base group. Instead, they have largely served to articulate particular interests.

Richardson and Flanigan have drawn on this argument to explain the consistency of Japanese voting behavior in the absence of well-defined cleavages.⁸ They have suggested that this paradox can be understood only if the importance of interest groups in mobilizing and channeling the vote is recognized: "Japanese groups have well-developed, institutionalized procedures for transmitting partisan communication and several culturally reinforced mechanisms for promoting a high degree of conformity."⁹ Voting regularly for a particular party is not necessarily a product of sharp cleavages in a society, which divide individual voters into antagonistic camps. It can also be the result of voters being so tightly integrated

into a particular group network that they are unaware of or indifferent to the interests of voters in other groups.

The conclusion, therefore, is that a culturally sanctioned preference in Japan for all-inclusive and affective, as opposed to narrowly interest-based, group affiliations has helped to set the basic parameters of the political and party system by tending to bind particular interest groups and through them sets of voters to the political parties.

Multi-Member Districting and the Linkages Between Parties and Interest Groups

The effect of the culture forces discussed above has been reinforced by certain structural peculiarities of the Japanese electoral system. Japan alone among democratic nations chooses its national legislators in medium-sized election districts, where candidates compete at-large for from three to five seats.¹⁰ The result has been to bind parties even more closely to large, well-organized interest groups such as unions, commercial association, or religious sects. There has been little incentive for parties to work for a more broadly based coalition than is required for victory. Indeed, adding new interests to an existing alliance may not result in a larger margin of victory, because the compromises required to accommodate the new groups may alienate present supporters. The electoral system, consequently, acts to encourage often highly irresponsible and unresponsive behavior on the part of the parties. For the smaller opposition parties, it

discourages attempts to expand their support beyond that required to elect a single candidate. With the larger LDP and JSP, it forces a conservative electoral strategy that will often lead them to forego an opportunity to maintain or increase the size of their representation in the face of a challenge from the smaller parties lest they cause the defeat of all of their present incumbents.

The performance of the Komeito and the JCP in the Kobe HR elections illustrates the case for the smaller opposition parties. The Komeito first elected a candidate to the Diet from Kobe in 1967. In that election, it polled 96,000 votes; 12 years later in 1979 the party won only 1,000 more, 97,000 votes. The Communists succeeded first in 1969: Urai Yoichi won the fifth seat in the Kobe district by a comfortable margin over the DSP candidate (68,000 to 54,000). Yet with the yearly increases in the voting population in Kobe this level of support was not sufficient to guarantee the party control over the seat. In the next election, the party delivered 106,000 for Urai and has sustained this level of support in the last several elections (see Table 70).

Why have the votes received by these two parties levelled off in the Kobe HR district in the 1970's, after such dramatic gains in the late 1960's? One reason is that assuming a mathematically exact division of the vote both the Komeito and the JCP would have each needed an additional 60,000 votes to send a second candidate to the Diet in 1979.¹¹ In this election, the differences between the votes that they received and the sixth place DSP candidate

were, respectively, only 19,000 and 15,000 votes. If the Komeito or the JCP were to run a second candidate in this district, they would incur a risk that this candidate might win enough votes away from their present incumbent to cause both of their defeats. Yet without

Table 70
Performance of KOM and JCP in Hyogo First District HR
Elections, 1963-1979

Year	KOM	JCP
1963	--	21 ^a
1967	96	33
1969	103	68
1972	96	106
1976	106	90
1979	97	103

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai;
Kōbe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.

^aVote in thousands.

a second candidate it has been very difficult for these parties to win the support of groups outside their normal political base. There is little incentive for any group to throw its support behind an incumbent whose seat is secure. The path to political influence is for a group to put its votes where they might make a difference between victory and defeat. As a result, the Komeito has not been

able to better its 1967 performance in Kobe when it first won a seat; the JCP has yet to surpass the vote it received in the 1972 election, when it secured the Kobe HR seat that it had first won in 1969. In the 1979 election, the DSP, Komeito, and JCP together captured nine of the 20 HR seats in Hyogo, but none of these parties has attempted to run more than one candidate in any HR district, in part because of the obstacles placed in their way by multi-member districting.

The LDP experience in the second district demonstrates the pernicious effect of multi-member districting upon Hyogo's largest party. The Hanshin district includes two politically distinct areas: the highly urban mainland district located around Nishinomiya and Amagasaki cities and the large rural Awajii island situated several miles off the coast. In the 1958 election, the LDP nominated six candidates; three of them based on Awajii and three in Hanshin. The party polled 279,000 votes in this election and two Awajii and one Hanshin candidate were sent to the Diet from this five-seat constituency (see Table 71). Although the number of voters on Awajii island were less than one-half those on the mainland, the island candidates, Hara Kensaburo and Nagata Torao, were successful because the Hanshin candidates had little appeal on Awajii, while they were able to make significant, if limited, inroads into conservative voters on the mainland.

Before the 1979 election, the LDP had lost votes in only three contests: 1960 (30,000 votes), 1963 (9,000 votes), and 1972

Table 71
Party Performance in Hyogo Second District HR Elections, 1958-1979

Year	LDP	JSP	DSP	KOM	JCP	NLC	VOTE	VOTERS
1958	279 ^a	149	---	---	11	---	441	639
1960	249	126	48	---	11	---	436	681
1963	240	145	75	---	20	---	484	812
1967	263	164	78	95	30	---	636	962
1969	276	142	67	112	52	---	653	1,057
1972	222	190	45	108	99	---	668	1,117
1976	232	194	---	123	86	131	783	1,157
1979	215	198	50	117	93	38	719	1,174

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Linkai; Kōbe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.

^aVote in thousands.

(54,000 votes). All had been occasioned by the retirement of Hanshin-based LDP candidates. In the first two instances, new candidates based in Nishinomiya or Amagasaki cities quickly won back these votes for the party, but they were lost permanently after the 1969 election when increased competition from the Komeito and the JCP led Hara and Nagata to argue that their incumbencies were endangered by the nomination of a third candidate, despite the fact that the party's 1969 candidate from Amagasaki and a conservative independent challenger from Nishinomiya had together polled 68,000 votes.¹² This was just short of the 69,000 votes won by the JSP candidate who took the district's fifth seat in the Diet.

In the 1972 election with no candidate of their own Hanshin conservatives deserted the party in droves. The LDP vote in Nishinomiya city dropped from 56,000 to 40,000, and in Amagasaki from 60,000 to 47,000. These voters may have turned to one of the JSP candidates¹³ or stayed away from the polls. In 1976, as will be touched on later, these voters appear to have formed the core of the support won by the NLC's candidate Tonedachi Masanari, a prominent Nishinomiya conservative.

In 1979, the LDP again nominated only Hara and Nagata. Hara was elected for his thirteenth consecutive term and Nagata, who had served nine terms in the Diet, lost his bid for reelection by a scant 1,200 votes. The party had its poorest showing ever in the district winning only 215,000 votes. Nagata, who is 69, will probably retire after this defeat, and Hara at 73 will not last out

the decade. The LDP, meanwhile, is faced in the 1980's with the problem of rebuilding its support in the populous mainland area of the Hanshin HR district. Multi-member districting discourages a political party when faced with strong competition from working to forcefully expand its base of support. Instead, it is led, as was the LDP in its retreat from the urban centers of Nishinomiya and Amagasaki to the security of Awajii island, to reduce the numbers of its candidates and more intensively cultivate its own constituency.

The Public Office Election Law and Party--Interest
Group Linkages

The restrictions of the Public Office Election Law (Kōshoku Senkyo Hō) tend to reinforce the incentive provided by multi-member districting for the parties to represent one segment of the community rather than the broad range of public opinion.¹⁴ The most damaging constraint is that on canvassing. Section 138 of the Law prohibits the visitation of voters at home or their place of work to request their vote for a particular candidate or political party.¹⁵ This makes difficult a neighborhood based campaign strategy where party members directly contact individual voters, ascertain their preferences, and make up a constituency register that indicates areas of the district where campaign resources should be allocated and election day "get-out-the-vote" efforts centered. And it leads parties to set up their campaigns along

functional, as opposed to geographic, lines so as to best utilize the organizational network provided by established groups in each district. Since these groups are often in conflict with each other, reliance upon one to contact their membership often makes impossible an appeal for support to the others. Moreover, in depending upon these organizations to mediate voter contact for them, the parties lose the public, open character needed to generate enthusiasm and support among the ordinary citizen for their programs and candidates. Activity on behalf of the political parties comes to be seen as the affair of the top leadership of the commercial associations, unions, and other groups in the prefecture rather than something open to every voter.

The ill effects of the prohibition of canvassing are compounded by the way in which pre-election activities (jizen undō) are regulated. Section 129 of the Law makes illegal the formal announcement of candidacy and overt campaigning for office before the opening of the official campaign period.¹⁶ In the case of the HC election the official period is only 23 days, for the HR race an even shorter 20 days from start to finish. By "overt campaign activity" the law essentially prohibits any attempt to solicit individual voter support through telephone calls, the distribution of literature, or the convening of public meetings. Activities related to the "preparation" for candidacy are not restricted.¹⁷ These may include such obvious activities as the solicitation of contributions, the leasing of office space, and the hiring of

staff. But the law also permits the solicitation of endorsements from organizations such as agricultural cooperatives and religious sects, and activities by the leadership of these groups to line up support for a candidate within these organizations through the scheduling of meetings between the membership and the as-yet undeclared candidate and the endorsement of the candidate in publications directed at their membership. The provisions of the Election Law, consequently, give the leadership of these groups a powerful hold over the kind of information that reaches their membership about a candidate for all but the brief period of the official campaign. Since the top leaders of powerful groups in Hyogo are usually members of one of the political parties, they play an important gatekeeper role in preventing the parties from making significant inroads into groups outside their normal constituency.

Japan is one of the most media saturated societies in the world.¹⁸ Yet the Election Law assures that newspapers, television, and radio do not play a role in elections comparable to the one that they do in the United States. Candidates for public office are permitted to place only five newspaper advertisements of a fixed size and have broadcast a maximum of six times on radio and television a four-and-one-half minute taped policy statement.¹⁹ Parties are permitted unlimited access to the media, but only to argue their political platforms not recommend their candidates.²⁰ The role of tying particular candidates to programs, which is

often thought to be the most characteristic function of political parties,²¹ falls to interest groupings that are allowed under the law to promote particular candidates in publications, such as trade journals and union newsletters, that are not directed primarily at the general public. Although broad public discussion of the issues at stake in an election campaign does serve an educational purpose, a candidate's personal charisma is often an important element in bringing new support into a party. The constraints placed on the use of the media by the parties makes it difficult for them to employ this charisma in an effort to bypass the leadership of existing interest groupings in the prefecture and bring their case directly to the individual voter.

The regulations discussed above only sketch the broad outlines of the Election Law. Campaigns in Japan are conducted in a veritable straitjacket. There are rules that cover such minutia as the number and size of campaign posters, the number and salaries of campaign workers, and the jobs that minors can fill in an election effort.²² The Hyogo police enforce the law with considerable vigor. In the 1975 prefectural assembly elections in Hyogo, 871 campaign workers were issued warnings, 249 were taken into custody for questioning by the police, and 9 were eventually convicted and sentenced to jail terms or fined.²³ The largest number of warnings were given out for the placing of posters on other than the official poster boards set up in the neighborhoods by the Election Commission or the distribution of literature not approved by the

Commission. Vote buying or bribery accounted for the largest number of actual arrests. In the usual case, money did not change hands directly. Instead the candidate or his staff would be charged with entertaining the leadership of important local groups at an expensive nightclub or restaurant in order to ensure their support in the election (see Table 72).

Table 72
Election Violation Summary, 1975 Hyogo PA

	Warning	Arrests	Convictions
Bribery	5	237	7
Illegal Literature or Posters	837	18	0
Interference in Campaign	1	2	2
Canvassing	2	1	0
Other	27	1	0
Total	871	249	9

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai.

Despite the large number of warnings issued, only a small percentage of actual violations come to the attention of the police. The limits placed by the law on campaign spending are so unrealistic that wholesale falsification of records is the order of the day. In the 1976 HR campaign, the spending limits were set

at 10.7 million yen (\$53,500) in Kobe, 11.5 million yen (\$57,500) in Hanshin, 10.5 million (\$52,500) in East Harima, 9.7 million (\$47,500) in West Harima, and 8.5 million (\$42,500) in Tamba.²⁴

In reality, it is estimated that each of the candidates spent between \$500,000 and \$1,000,000. All the parties direct considerable effort to educate their candidates and campaign workers in how to avoid the provisions of the law.²⁵ The attitude taken is that which is not expressly forbidden must be legal,²⁶ and the parties are constantly testing the limits of the law in such a way as to violate its spirit, if not the letter.

The effect of this is to place both practical and psychological barriers against participation in party politics by ordinary citizens. The requirement that all groups engaged in campaign-related activities must register with the Election Commission and file a complex statement of income and expenditures²⁷ discourages the spontaneous formation of citizen support groups for a particular candidate and makes politics appear something better left to the professional. The restrictions on pre-election activities and the shortness of the official campaign period also work to limit the participation of citizen-volunteers who must hold down a full-time job. Most important, the extra-legal character of many activities necessary to the campaign and the cynicism that is characteristic of most party workers' attitudes to the Election Law has attached to almost any effort to influence votes the taint of corruption.²⁸ Together with the stiff criminal penalties attached to violations of

the Election Law,²⁹ this has made the general public very reluctant to involve themselves with the parties and the campaigns.

The Emergence of the Independent Voter

Hyogo prefecture's rapid economic development between 1955 and 1980 produced some striking changes in the composition of the work force. The number of workers in manufacturing industries increased by nearly 100 percent (343,000 to 671,000), those in the service sector by 80 percent (202,000 to 364,000), and those in the construction trades by an incredible 650 percent (30,000 to 190,000). The farming population, meanwhile, dropped from 571,000 to 179,000.³⁰ Although the area around Kobe port had been an industrial center before the war, chemical, steel, and ship-building activities expanded to include the entire Pacific coast of the prefecture in the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's. Government spending for public works such as highways, port improvements, and schools and private demand for housing and industrial plants transformed the construction industry into one of the prefecture's major employers. The service sector grew apace with the increasingly urban character of the prefecture (see Table 73).

The number of registered voters in Hyogo increased from two million in 1955 to nearly 3.4 million in 1979.³¹ The largest increases came in the Kobe (574,000 to 951,000) and Hanshin (564,000 to 1,174,000) HR districts. This mass migration had the

Table 73
Changes in Hyogo Work-Force Composition, 1955-1978

Year	Government	Mining	Construction	Manufacture	Wholesale/Retail	Finance
1955	43 ^a	5	30	343	429	56
1978	78	2	190	671	504	73
Year	Real Estate	Transportation/Public Utilities	Service	Agriculture	Total	
1955	8	135	202	571	1,364	
1978	18	181	364	179	2,258	

Source: Sorifu Tokei Kyoku 1979.

^aIn thousands.

potential to overwhelm local political structures. It can be assumed that many of these new voters were young people who came to Hyogo from the rural areas to work in its factories or were members of the geographically mobile "new" middle class employed in the banks, trading firms, and insurance concerns found in Kobe and nearby Osaka city. They were much less likely to heed the recommendations in elections of local notables or the union leadership³² (see Table 74).

Table 74
Changes in Size of Hyogo Electorate, 1955-1979

District	1955	1979
Kobe	574 ^a	951
Hanshin	564	1,174
East Harima	319	583
West Harima	366	569
Tamba	231	243

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Linkai.

^aIn thousands.

The social dislocations that were part of such a massive population movement and the environmental problems caused by the rapid growth in Hyogo, which encouraged it, made the prefecture fertile ground for the environmental, consumers, education, womens,

and other single-issue groups that have been collectively labelled the "citizens movement."³³ These groups have received a great deal of attention from some political scientists, such as Okuda Michio, Matsubara Haruo, and Matsushita Keiichi, who saw in them the birth of a new participatory ethic in Japan.³⁴ Citizens in their view join these groups because they are no longer satisfied to leave decisions that vitally affect their lives to the leadership of established groups. These scholars believe that this new style of participation carries over into the relationship of these citizens with the political parties. Their votes can no longer be guaranteed or manipulated by the leaders of residential or workplace groups. They will evaluate the candidates based on his or her record and vote for the one who promises to best serve their individual interests without regard to party affiliation.

Survey data confirms that there is an important segment of the electorate in Kobe city and throughout Hyogo prefecture that classify themselves as independents.³⁵ Although the figures show great variability because of differences in the timing of the surveys³⁶ and the phrasing of the questions,³⁷ they do indicate that the size of this group has averaged near 20 percent of the electorate since 1970. The number of independents is largest among voters in their twenties: in the Kōbe Shimbun surveys of Hyogo this group has been about 10 percent above the average for the population; Tanaka Kunio in his 1979 survey found that a staggering

49 percent of those in this age cohort in Kobe city classified themselves as independents (see Table 75).

There is also some evidence of defections by formerly regular voters from one party to another: only 53 percent of Tanaka's 1979 sample indicated that they presently supported the party that they had preferred in the past. The rate of defection was highest from the LDP and the JSP. Within the group that had changed their party preference, 16 percent were former LDP supporters and 20 percent JSP supporters. The primary beneficiaries among the established parties of these defections were the DSP and the JCP (see Table 76). Additional, if indirect, evidence of some movement of voters between parties comes from Richardson's study of net partisan change in Japan between 1958 and 1972.³⁸ He found that, while the average for all HR assembly districts was about five percent, the first, second, and fifth districts of Hyogo showed a rate of change for the period of between 25 and 30 percent.

The Independent Voter and the Established Political Parties

The cultural norms manifested in the closed exclusive organizational style characteristic of political and social institutions in Japan are not immutable, but they can be expected to change only slowly. The appearance of voters who classify themselves in surveys as independents and the rapid growth of the citizens movement with its new style of political participation may portend a fundamental change in the relationship between the

Table 75
Independent Voters in Kobe and Hyogo, 1963-1979

Survey	Area	1963	1967	1969	1970	1971	1972	1974	1976	1977	1979
Tanaka Kunio	Kobe				31			33		25	28
<u>Kōbe Shimbun</u>	Kobe		4	16			18		18		
<u>Kōbe Shimbun</u>	Hyogo					29		21		13	
<u>Asahi Shimbun</u>	Hyogo	7	10	15		20	18	21	22	19	23
<u>Asahi Shimbun</u>	National	8	9	11		16	15	19	20	20	21

Source: See Notes 35, 36, and 37.

Table 76
Defections from Political Parties in Kobe, 1979

Party Affiliation	LDP	JSP	KOM	DSP	JCP	NLC	SCL ^a	Independent	Total
Always Supported	86	79	87	70	51	9	17	--	53
Past LDP	--	7	3	15	11	48	0	11	8
Past JSP	8	--	3	10	13	22	17	15	10
Past KOM	0	0	--	0	8	4	0	1	1
Past DSP	1	0	2	--	2	4	17	1	1
Past JCP	0	3	0	1	--	4	0	1	0
Past NLC	0	0	1	0	0	--	0	1	0
Past Independent	3	5	3	1	14	9	0	61	21
Unknown	2	6	0	1	5	0	50	5	4
Total	(320)	(136)	(61)	(69)	(62)	(23)	(6)	(282)	(959)

Source: Kōbe-Shi Senkyo Kanri Linkai 1979, see Note 35.

^aSocialist Citizen League.

citizen and the State in Japan. Yet, at present, their political significance is open to question. A survey in the Kobe Shimbun, taken before the 1977 HC election, shows that these voters do not act as a group but instead scatter their votes among the candidates of all the parties thus cancelling out their effect (see Table 77).

Table 77

Kōbe Shimbun 1977 HC Candidate Preference Survey

	LDP	JSP	KOM	JCP	DSP	NLC	Independent
Kanai (LDP)	68	10	1	7	9	16	15
Watanabe (KOM)	4	5	80	8	4	10	3
Nakazawa (DSP)	3	8	3	3	61	8	14
Okumura (NLC)	1	2	0	2	0	29	7
Fujiki (JCP)	1	4	0	66	2	6	6
Kotani (JSP)	2	41	1	0	4	3	6
Other	1	1	0	2	0	2	1
No Answer	21	29	14	13	20	26	49

Source: Kōbe Shimbun, see Note 35.

It also indicates that even when forced to choose among the contending candidates,³⁹ just days before the election, nearly 50 percent cannot do so. This suggests that they may not vote at all. This inference is supported by a 1979 Tanaka Kunio survey of

voters in Kobe which found that the rate of self-reported non-voting among independents was twice as high as among party supporters⁴⁰ (see Table 78).

Table 78
Self-Reported incidence of Non-Voting
in Kobe, 1979

	Voted	Did Not Vote
LDP	72	27
JSP	73	24
KOM	93	7
DSP	81	17
JCP	79	21
NLC	61	34
Independents	48	50
Total	67	49
Actual Turnout	49	51

Source: Kōbe-shi Senkyo Kanri linkai 1979,
see Note 35.

These results should not be surprising. Independent voters constitute themselves as a distinct group only insofar as they are lumped together in one category of a sample survey. They have no necessary communality of interests or organizational infrastructure

that can serve to focus their political efforts or bring them to the polls on election day.

Why hasn't the citizen movement functioned to structure the independent vote? Like the term independent, the "citizen" movement is also a catch-all label under which is subsumed a wide variety of political activities. The movement is far too politically fragmented and the groups which constitute it often too short-lived for it to provide a support base for any party or candidate. None of the prefectural assemblymen in Hyogo or the city councillors in Kobe claim to be representatives of the citizen movement in the assembly. They all take their seats as members of a political party. The broad "citizen" coalitions with imaginative titles, such as the current governor's "Asu no Kensei o Tsukuru Kai" (Association to Build Tomorrow's Prefectural Government) and his 1978 opponent Horii Masao's "Hyogo Kusa no Ne Kai" (The Hyogo Grass-roots Association), have served only to smooth the relationships between political parties that have been forced to work together in executive election contests.⁴¹ The "Asu no Kensei o Tsukuru Kai" was backed up by the LDP, KOM, and the DSP. It served no real function in the gubernatorial campaign other than to coordinate the candidate's schedule with the separate campaign efforts of the three parties. The "Hyogo Kusa no Ne Kai" drew support only from the Socialist party. The Communists refused to cooperate with it, after long negotiations, and ran their own candidate under yet a third label, the "Kakushin Hyogo Kensei o

Tsukuru Kai'' (Association to Build a Progressive Hyogo Government), because the JSP would not promise them that Hori who had been defeated in the 1976 second district HR election would not be a candidate in next General Election in Hanshin, if he were to lose.⁴²

This is not to dismiss the effectiveness or importance of the citizen movement as a vehicle for the protection of the environment and the expansion of social services in Hyogo. Still, it is necessary to stress that these groups did not emerge de nova in the late 1960's and they do not all represent a new mode of political participation. Group life in Japanese cities has always been strong and extensive. Jack Lewis found in his study of the archetypical citizen protest in Mishima city against the proposed location of a petrochemical complex there that the leadership in this effort came from established groups in the city.⁴³ The citizens council, which represented the community against the municipal authorities and the company, was not a new organizational form in which citizens participated directly, but rather a loose confederation, whose members were all leaders of groups in their own right and at the core of which was a conservative political faction opposed to the present mayor. Akimoto Ritsuo, in a survey of citizen groups active between 1970 and 1972 in Hyogo prefecture, found that 59 percent of these groups had their origins in existing community-wide organizations.⁴⁴ The largest number were based in PTA groups (27 percent) and the next largest in neighborhood associations (chōnaikai) (13 percent). He also learned that very

few of these groups had engaged in the demonstrations or other kinds of disruptive activities associated popularly with the citizens movement. Most had participated only in such traditional forms of protest as chinjō, the making of a formal request for action to the city council or proper bureaucratic authority in the name of the group.

The Independent Voter and the New Liberal Club

The experience of the New Liberal Club in Hyogo highlights the marginal character of the independent vote. The NLC was formed in 1976 to take advantage of the growing independent vote and the increasing number of defections from the LDP to the other parties.⁴⁵ Kono Yohei, the party's first chairman, pledged it to revitalize conservatism in Japan by building a policy-oriented party of individual membership that could tap the energies of the new kind of voters beginning to emerge in Japan. In the 1976 HR election, the party nominated candidates in the second and third districts of Hyogo. Tonedachi Masaharu won handily in the Hanshin district with 131,000 votes, an unprecedented number for a first time candidate. Kobayashi Masaoto, a former LDP incumbent, surpassed his performance in the 1972 election by over 45,000 votes and placed first in the third district. Yet, the spectacular success of the NLC in Hyogo does not mean that a party which depends heavily upon the personal charisma of its top leadership and seeks to bypass the leadership of established groups by appealing directly for the support of

individual citizens is possible at this time in Japan. Both of the NLC candidates in Hyogo relied heavily on conservative groups that normally supported the LDP to mobilize votes on their behalf.

Tonedachi was a former LDP endorsed candidate for mayor in Nishinomiya city had had been boosted as a possible LDP HR candidate in the district before the 1976 election. He received solid support in his campaign from those Hanshin conservative groups dissatisfied with the LDP decision to back only the two Awajii incumbents, Hara and Nagata. He also managed to garner unofficial help from the Dōmei unions, when the DSP could not recruit a candidate to stand in this district. Tonedachi unfortunately died in office and his successor, Takeda Nobunari, had none of these advantages in the 1979 election and could poll only 38,000 votes.

Kobayashi Masaoto in the third district hardly fit the urban conservative image of the NLC. He first won election in 1972 as an LDP endorsed candidate with the help of the rural based campaign organization (jiban) of his father Kobayashi Masahara, an LDP Diet member during the 1950's and 1960's. As Table 79 indicates, he ran very poorly in the coastal cities of Akashi and Kakogawa in 1972 and that it was there that the NLC endorsement in 1976 proved to be most effective in bringing him new votes. Four years later in 1979, with the bloom off the NLC,⁴⁶ he dropped overall 34,000 votes, losing most heavily in the urban coastal areas while his

Table 79
Kobayashi Masaoto Performance in Hyogo Third HR District, 1972-1979

City/County	1972	1976	1979
Akashi	5 ^a	19	9
Kakogawa	3	12	7
Nishiwaki	5	7	5
Miki	6	8	6
Takasago	2	4	2
Ono	11	12	11
Kasei	6	8	6
Mino	1	1	1
Kato	6	8	6
Taka	5	8	5
Kako	1	3	2
Total	51	95	62

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri Jinkai: Kōbe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.

^a/ote in thousands.

popularity in the area of his father's old jiban around Ono city remained undiminished. Kobayashi's decision to run as an NLC candidate did not represent a new kind of conservative politics so much as it did a ploy to benefit from the publicity and interest that went with the formation of a new party.⁴⁷ The support, which he gained from voters desirous of an alternative to the present parties, was substantial but was not alone sufficient to support his candidacy.

Continuity in the Hyogo Party System

Looking at the Hyogo party system over the past 25 years, there have been elements of both great change and impressive continuity. It is the changes, quite naturally, that have attracted the most attention. In 1955, the LDP held three HC seats, 11 of the 18 HR seats, and 62 of the 78 seats in the prefectural assembly. The JSP held the remainder. As the 1980's begin, the conservatives have been reduced to only two HC seats, six of the 20 HR seats, and 55 out of 91 prefectural assembly slots; the JSP now has only one HC seat, five HR seats, and 12 prefectural assembly seats. The other positions have all been captured by the three new parties that entered Hyogo politics in the 1960's: the DSP, the Komeito, and the JCP.

The share of the vote commanded by the two older parties in the important HR elections has also declined precipitously (see Table 80). In 1955, they divided among themselves 99 percent of

the vote. In the 1979 election, they accounted for only 52 percent. The remainder was shared among the new parties of the 1960's and the one new party of the 1970's the NLC, with the largest portion going to the Komeito.

Table 80

Share of Vote Received by Parties in Hyogo
HR Elections, 1955-1979

Year	LDP	JSP	KOM	DSP	JCP	NLC
1955	64	35			1	
1958	61	37			2	
1960	57	28		13	2	
1963	51	29		16	4	
1967	44	26	10	15	4	
1969	43	21	14	13	8	
1972	41	22	12	11	12	
1976	33	21	16	9	11	9
1979	36	19	16	12	11	5

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai; Kōbe Shimbun,
October 9, 1979.

Why have the two established parties of the 1950's, the LDP and the JSP lost seats in the Diet to the newer parties and slipped so dramatically in their share of the Hyogo vote?

One explanation might be that these parties were organizationally weakened by the desertion to the other parties of influential elements in their constituencies and the votes that they controlled. This seems to be what happened in 1960 when right wing JSP assemblymen and the unions that backed them left that party to form the DSP. Yet this study of the parties in Hyogo prefecture does not show that a defection of substantial segments of either the conservative or socialist support base in Hyogo was responsible for the dramatic gains made by the Komeito and the JCP between 1967 and 1972. The LDP can still depend upon the loyalty of conservative organizations like the agricultural cooperatives, public service groups, and commercial associations, and Socialist party activists have managed to maintain control of the Sōhyō labor federation. There is some question as the extent to which the leadership of these bodies can still line up the rank and file behind party candidates, but there is no evidence that either Komeito or Communist activists have been able to penetrate these groups to a degree sufficient to bring their organizational support behind either party in an election.

Party performance can also be measured in terms of the number of votes won. This approach permits an analysis of changes in the absolute level of support that a party is able to mobilize over time. It shows that there has been a surprising degree of continuity in the performance of the LDP and JSP in Hyogo.

As with the share of the vote won by these parties, there can be observed a decline in the number of votes: the LDP received 921,000 votes in 1955 and 829,000 in 1979; the JSP after the shock of the DSP desertion had passed garnered 489,000 in 1963 versus 449,000 in 1979 (see Table 81). But the decline has been much less sharp and, more important, there is no indication of an accelerated rate of decline for either party in the critical 1967-1972 period where JCP and KOM gains in Hyogo were centered. The JSP registered 497,000 votes in the 1967 election, when the JCP just beginning to recover from the setbacks it had incurred in the 1950's polled only an insignificant 89,000 votes. In 1976, the Socialists fell short of this mark by only 1,000 votes in an election where the Communists fell short by the same margin of their 1972 high water-mark of 264,000 votes. The LDP gained 869,000 votes in the 1963 HR election, the one just prior to the entrance of the Komeito into prefectural politics. In the 1976 contest, if its vote (789,000) is combined with that of the NLC (227,000), the two conservative parties will be seen to have polled over a million votes in the same election that the Komeito received a record 373,000 votes.

The success of the LDP and the JSP in bringing to the polls in the 1976 election a number of votes the equal of those that they had won in 1967 does not, of course, rule out the possibility that the composition of these votes has changed. It is likely that the JCP and the KOM did win some votes from these two parties and that these losses were balanced out by gains made from other sources.

Table 81
Number of Votes Received by Parties in Hyogo HR Elections, 1955-1979

Year	LDP	JSP	DSP	KOM	JCP	NLC	VOTE	VOTERS	TURNOUT
1955	921 ^a	510			13		1,439	2,054	70.0
1958	983	578			35		1,598	2,230	71.6
1960	912	427	212		35		1,602	2,328	68.8
1963	869	489	268		61		1,692	2,572	65.7
1967	860	497	293	191(2) ^b	89		1,950	2,843	68.5
1969	858	420	258	271(3)	164		1,975	3,106	63.5
1972	871	459	234	263(4)	264		2,105	3,311	63.5
1976	789	496	212(4)	373(4)	263	227(2)	2,390	3,454	69.1
1979	829	449	276	361(4)	246	107(3)	2,292	3,520	65.1

Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai; Kōbe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.

^aVotes in thousands.

^bNumber of candidates endorsed when less than one in each HR district.

Nevertheless, it can be safely inferred that the gains made by the JCP and the Komeito in the period between 1967 and 1972 were not occasioned by a massive movement of votes from the established to the newer parties in Hyogo.

The inconsistency between the great changes observed in the share of the vote received by the LDP and the JSP (between the 1963 and 1972 elections the LDP dropped 16 percentage points, the JSP seven) and the relative continuity in their number of votes can be explained by the combination in Hyogo of a steady increase in the number of registered voters between 1955 (2,572,000) and 1979 (3,454,000) with a fairly stable rate of voter turnout (average 67.4 percent). In this political environment, for a party to win only as many votes as it had in the past meant that its share of the vote, and its share in political power, would decline absolutely. The very continuity in the number of votes won by the LDP and the JSP is in this sense a measure of their failure to broaden their base of support in the prefecture. The Komeito and the JCP have not succeeded in Hyogo by directly subverting the constituencies of the established parties in the unions, public service groups, commercial associations, and agricultural cooperatives. Instead, they have relied upon their own rival network of support groups to mobilize behind them on election day those not fully a part of these organizations: younger union members resentful of the older leadership and workers in non-union shops, new residents to the cities, small manufacturers not well

connected with the banks, and retailers and restaurant owners in the less prestigious and prosperous shopping centers.

The Future of the Hyogo Party System

The rapid population growth and the opportunity it provided the JCP and the Komeito to challenge the hegemony of the LDP and the JSP in Hyogo is now largely a thing of the past. The number of registered voters increased by only 66,000 between the 1976 and 1979 elections, the smallest increase of any three years in the period under study. An increase in the turnout of voters over the present level is also unlikely given past trends. If the JCP and the Komeito are to grow further, they will have to confront the strength of the LDP and the socialists in the conservative groups and unions in Hyogo. The 1979 election was essentially a replay of the 1976 contest, because of their failure to undertake this successfully.

In the 1950's politics in Hyogo centered on a competition between a conservative coalition made up of agricultural and commercial interests that had controlled the prefecture in the prewar era and the newly emergent labor movement. The balance arrived at between them carried forward into the mid-1960's when it was upset by the appearance upon the prefectural political scene of the Gakkai organization and the Communist front groups. The 1970's saw a sharing of power among these four broad groupings in Hyogo with none of them able to gain a decisive advantage: the

conservative groups and the unions have managed to stave off the attempts to undermine their coherence, while the Gakkai and the Communists have found the recruitment of new members increasingly difficult.

Will the balance mirrored in the distribution of votes in the 1979 HR election continue through the 1980's? Changes in the fundamental relationship among the political parties in Hyogo will depend upon forces that might tend to shift the present balance of the major organized interest groupings in the prefecture.

A number of scenarios are possible. One that is often mentioned is the collapse of the Sōhyō federation. The Hyogo Sōhyō is at present an increasingly uneasy alliance of private industry and public employee unions. The private industry unions feel that the federation has emphasized political issues at the expense of the real economic needs of their workers. The public employees are concerned that the private unions are not solidly behind their demands for government recognition of their right to strike. Behind these frictions are Dōmei and Communist activists. Dōmei is trying to wean the Steelworkers away from Sōhyō and, already, the Hyogo DSP has received money and electoral support from this union in elections. The Communist minority is using the strike issue as a means of weakening the hold of the Sōhyō leadership upon the large Railroad Workers and Teachers unions. Should the Steelworkers leave the Sōhyō federation to join Dōmei and Communist activists lead the Railroad and Teachers unions out of the federation, it could mean

the end for the JSP and its unusual brand of radical socialism, and a change of enormous consequence for Hyogo politics.

The breakup of the alliance of farm and commercial interests that have supported the LDP is a second possibility. At the national level, this alliance has been strained by business's reluctance to continue to pay for crop subsidy programs and its willingness to sacrifice agricultural interests in order to protect its markets in Europe and America. In Hyogo, the Farm Cooperatives Association has been pressing LDP assemblymen from the rural areas of the prefecture to resist these measures.⁴⁸ Any differences between farm and commercial interests in the prefecture have so far been worked out within the party. But, given the LDP dependence in Hyogo upon the support of voters in the rural counties, any weakening in the support of the agricultural cooperatives for the party could have a large impact upon the party's delegation in the prefectural assembly and the political fortunes of five of its six incumbent HR representatives.

The development of a split in the Sōkagakkai is a third factor that might shift the balance of the party system in Hyogo. The Gakkai has entered an uncertain period with the resignation in the spring of 1979 of Ikeda Daisaku as its president. Hyogo prefecture has been a center for opposition to his leadership from the priests of the Nichiren Shōshu sect.⁴⁹ If the Gakkai were to divide up into pro and anti-Ikeda factions, the effect upon the Komeito in Hyogo would be devastating. Without the solid backing of the Gakkai, the

party could not expect to elect even one of its candidates. The impact upon the other parties would be less direct. It is unlikely that significant numbers of Gakkai voters would immediately go over in force to them. But a weakening of the coherence of the large Gakkai voting bloc would make it easier for smaller parties like the DSP and the JCP to elect their candidates, because it would reduce the number of votes required for victory in the multi-member HR districts.

Any of these events could force the conservatives to share power with one or more of the opposition parties in the Hyogo prefectural assembly and, if carried through to the national level, could result in opposition participation in the Cabinet. This would remove a major source of tension and instability from the Japanese political system, and perhaps lay the groundwork for cooperation between the conservative and opposition parties on the long postponed issues of defense, education, and labor policy.⁵⁰ It is interesting to note that this would not be contingent upon the modernization of the Japanese party organization in the constituencies nor would it presage it. Indeed, to some extent, the delicate negotiations required to effect and maintain a coalition in power and guide needed legislation through the Diet might well require the stable and structured voting patterns that have been characteristic of the parties in Hyogo.⁵¹

NOTES

¹ Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, op. cit., pp. 1-64.

² See Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties, and Strains on Regimes," op. cit.

³ This has been borne out by a number of surveys. See Miyake Ichiro et al., Kotonaru Reberu ni Okeru Tōhyō Kōdō no Kenkyū (Tōkyō: Sobunsha, 1967); Akuto Hiroshi, "Changing Political Culture in Japan," Text of Seminar on Changing Values in Modern Japan Nihonjin Kenkyukai 1977.

⁴ See Bradeley Richardson, "Stability and Change in Japanese Voting Behavior 1958-1972," Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 36 (4) August 1977, pp. 675-694; see also Nobutaka Ike, A Theory of Japanese Democracy (Boulder: Western Press, 1978), p. 89.

⁵ Watanuki Joji, "Patterns of Politics in Present Day Japan" in Lipset and Rokkan, op. cit.

⁶ Ibid., p. 449.

⁷ Shinohara Hajime, Nihon no Seiji Fudō (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1971), see particularly the chapter on "Naru no Ronri"; Nakane Chie also makes this point in Japanese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 23-86.

⁸ Scott Flanigan and Bradeley Richardson, Japanese Electoral Behavior: Social Cleavages, Social Networks, and Partisanship Sage Professional Papers in Contemporary Sociology, Sage Publications, 1977.

⁹ Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁰ A brief historical overview of the evolution of the multi-member election districts can be found in Soma Masao, "Senkyo Seido no Kaikaku," Tōkyō Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūsho, Sengo Kaikaku Vol. 3 (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1974), pp. 91-141.

¹¹ Votes received by candidates in Kobe HR election in 1979:

Watanabe Ichiro (KOM)	97,944
Urai Yoichi (JCP)	93,011
Nagae Kazuhito (DSP)	85,892
Ishii Hajime (LDP)	84,714
Kawakami Tamio (JSP)	78,938
Sunada Shigetami (LDP)	76,656 (lost)

Source: Kōbe Shimbun, October 9, 1979.

¹² Interview with Socialist party official on October 5, 1978. LDP officials refused to comment on Hara and Nagata's role in the decision to endorse only two candidates. The conservative challenger who ran as an independent, Nakazawa Eiji, was an LDP prefectural assemblyman and is presently the vice-chairman of the Hyogo Federation.

¹³ Hori Masao (73,000 to 91,000 votes) and Doi Takako (69,000 to 99,000 votes) each improved their performance over 1969 in the 1972 election. Hori is a physician and Doi a former university instructor, backgrounds unusual for the union-based Socialists. Hori is known to have close ties with the Amagasaki Medical association and Doi with Hanshin area women's groups. It is likely that some of their support came from the LDP, although other factors such as the softness of Dōmei support for a new DSP candidate and the expected recovery from the JSP's poor showing in 1969 were also involved.

¹⁴ Discussion is based on several publications edited by the Ministry of Autonomy that provide the official interpretation of the laws provisions. See Jichishō Senkyo-bu, Shūgiin Senkyo no Tebiki Shōwa 51-nen (Tōkyō: Gyōsei, 1976); Jichishō Senkyo-bu, Sangiin Tsūjō Senkyo ni okeru Seitō-Seiji Dantai no Seiji Katsudō no Tebiki (Tōkyō: Daiichi Hōki Shuppansha, 1977); Jichishō Senkyo-bu, Kaisei Seiji Shikin Kiseihō no Kaisetsu (Tōkyō: Zaidan Hōjin Chihōzaimu Kyōkai, 1976).

¹⁵ See Jichishō Senkyo-bu, Shūgiin Senkyo no Tebiki Shōwa 51-nen, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 4-9.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 29-35.

¹⁸Ninety-nine percent of Japanese households have a color television; the average Japanese spends three and one-fourth hours a day watching television. The country's major newspapers are distributed nationally and possess an enormous readership: Asahi Shimbun (7.3 million), Yomiuri Shimbun (7.5 million), Mainichi Shimbun (4.4 million). Source: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, Yomiuri Nenkan 1979.

¹⁹Jichishō Senkyo-bu, Shūgiin Senkyo no Tebiki Shōwa 51-nen, op. cit., pp. 150-152, 186-192.

²⁰Jichishō Senkyo-bu, Sangiin Tsūjō Senkyo ni Okeru Seitō-Seiji Dantai no Seiji Katsudō no Tebiki, op. cit., pp. 61-63.

²¹Leon Epstein, despite his general pessimism about the capacity of the parties to perform the policymaking and other functions sometimes assigned to them, understands the provision of labels to candidates by parties to be their most distinctive activity. Although party names do appear on the ballot next to those of the candidates and the candidates in their own literature are able to identify themselves as members of a particular party, the restrictions on party use of the media to promote specific candidates does severely hamper their capacity in Japan to perform this labeling function: see Leon Epstein, "Political Parties" in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., The Handbook of Political Science Vol. 4 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 229-230.

²²For an entertaining account of the headaches these can cause a campaign manager see Yamada Hisahiro, Waga Senkyo Sanbō Nikki (Tōkyō: Kodansha, 1977).

²³Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai, Senkyo Kiroku 1975, p. 164.

²⁴Source: Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai, Senkyo Kiroku 1976. The limits were set in 1976 by the following formula:

20 yen X (number of voters/number of seats) + 6.9 million yen

For further details see Jichishō Senkyo-bu, Shūgiin Senkyo no Tebiki Shōwa 51-nen, op. cit., pp. 245-248.

²⁵See for example Jiyū Minshutō Senkyo Taisaku linkai, Sōsenkyo Jissen no Tebiki: Senkyo Undō ni Hikei (Tokyo: Jiyū Minshutō Kōhō linkai Shuppan Kyoku 1976). This publication instructs party candidates and campaign workers on the provisions of the law and provides helpful information on how to tread the fine line between legal and illegal campaign activity. For example, to avoid the restrictions on the number of campaign billets that can be distributed, the party advises its local

branches to hand out small pamphlets that outline the party program, see p. 113.

²⁶ Party officials in all the Hyogo parties spoke often to this researcher of the strategies that they had devised to get around the provisions of the law.

²⁷ See Jichishō Senkyo-bu, Kaisei Seiji Shikin Kiseihō Kaisetsu, op. cit., pp. 13-24. For a copy of the financial report that political organizations are required to file with the Commission see pp. 93-107.

²⁸ See Miki Takeo and Ichikawa Fusae, "Taidan: Kinken Seiji Kara no Dashutsu," Asahi Janaru Vol. 16 (31) August 9, 1974, pp. 4-8.

²⁹ Canvassing carries a penalty of one year in prison and/or a fine of 100,000 yen (\$500.00); the distribution of campaign literature not approved by the Election Supervisory Commission, two years in prison and/or a fine of 200,000 yen (\$1,000). A list of the major penalties can be found in Jiyū Minshutō Senkyo Taisaku linkai, op. cit., pp. 128-135.

³⁰ Sōrifu Tōkei Kyoku, Nihon Tōkei Nenkan Showa 54-nen, 1979.

³¹ Hyōgoken Senkyo Kanri linkai, Senkyo Kiroku 1955-1977: The Hyogo Election Commission issues a report on the number of registered voters, backgrounds of candidates, number of election law violations, and results of elections for each national and local election held in the prefecture. These are available for reference at the Election Commission office and at the Hyogo prefectural library. A summary of these reports is published in the Hyogoken Kōhō. Data on 1979 elections from Kobe Shimbun April 3 and October 9, 1979.

³² For a fuller treatment of urbanization and its political effects in Japan see Fukutake Tadashi, Japanese Society Today, University of Tokyo Press 1974, pp. 74-78 and James White and Frank Munger, eds., Social Change and Community Politics in Japan (Chapel Hill: Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Comparative Urban Studies Monograph no. 4), 1976; dissatisfaction among younger union members with the leadership has been discussed by Taishiro Shiriai, "Decisionmaking in Japanese Labor Unions," in Ezra Vogel, ed., Modern Japanese Organizations and Decisionmaking (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 167-184.

³³ For a good brief introduction in English to the citizen movement see Tsurutani, op. cit., p. 194.

³⁴Each of these scholars have written extensively on the subject. Their most representative works: Okuda Michio, "Chiiki Shakai to Shimin Undō," Iwanami Koza, Gendai Toshi Seisaku II (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973); Matsubara Haruo, ed., Jūmin Sanka to Jichi no Kakushin (Tōkyō: Okubo Shobo, 1975); Matsushita Keiichi, Shibiru Minimamu no Shisō, (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971).

³⁵Five surveys of voters in Kobe city and Hyogo prefecture were consulted:

a) Tanaka Kunio, Kōbe Shimin no Seiji-Senkyo ni taisuru Taido Chōsa Hōkokusho, (Kōbe: Kōbe-shi Senkyo Kanri linkai 1970, 1974, 1977, 1979).

b) Kōbe Shimbun survey of Kobe voters' party and candidate preferences before House of Representatives election 1967, 1969, 1972, 1976. The Research Section of the Editorial Department of the Kōbe Shimbun provided direct access to the computer print-out of these surveys. A summary and analysis of each survey appeared in the Kōbe Shimbun just before each of the elections.

c) Kōbe Shimbun survey of Hyogo voters' party and candidate preference before House of Councillors elections 1971, 1974, 1977. Again summary of these surveys available in issues of Kōbe Shimbun just prior to the election.

d) Asahi Shimbun: Shūgiin Senkyo Jōsei Chōsa 1963, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1979. Before every HR election, the Asahi Shimbun as part of its coverage questions 800 voters in each of the 123 HR districts in Japan on their party preferences. The results are published just before the election with figures given for the nation as a whole and for each of the 47 prefectures.

e) Asahi Shimbun: Sangiin Senkyo Jōsei Chōsa 1968, 1971, 1974, 1977. Results are based on an interview of 800 voters in each of the 47 prefectures.

³⁶The Tanaka Kunio polls are not election surveys. Their purpose is not to predict electoral outcomes but to probe Kobe citizen's attitudes towards elections and politics and relate these to variables such as length of residence in the city and sense of material well-being. The much higher number of respondents who identify themselves as independents in this poll as compared with the newspaper polls is probably due to the fact that it was not undertaken in the heat of the political campaign. Both newspaper polls are carried out the two weeks prior to the election. The Tanaka Kunio polls date from considerably before and after the elections: November 1970, January 1974, January 1976, and August 1979.

³⁷The Kōbe Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun surveys were conducted at the same time. The substantial differences in the number of independent voters identified by the two surveys (29 versus 20 in 1971, and 13 versus 19 in 1977) may be due to differences in the phrasing

of their party preference questions. The Kōbe Shimbun asked voters which party they support (shiji suru) while the Asahi asked voters which they like (suki). The "support" question might measure voting intention while the other may measure voter disposition toward the parties. Turnout in the 1971 HC election in Hyogo was low because the Komeito decided not to run a candidate for the prefectural district seat. As a result, the number of voters who had formed a clear intention to support a party may have been lower than usual while dispositions towards the parties remained the same. In 1977, voters may have decided to support a party without feeling good about their choice. In general, the interpretation of these surveys must be handled with great care.

³⁸Bradeley Richardson, "Stability and Change in Japanese Voting Behavior 1958-1972," op. cit., p. 679.

³⁹In contrast to previous surveys by the paper, respondents were strongly urged to indicate which of the candidates they most preferred. Before 1977, they had been asked only to indicate the candidate for whom they intended to vote. In the usual case, more than one-half of the sample had yet to form any firm intention. The change in the format of the question was designed to reduce this by asking those who had yet to make a firm choice to indicate which candidate they were most inclined to.

⁴⁰Tanaka Kunio, Kōbe Shimin no Seiji ni Taisuru Taido Chōsa Hōkokusho, op. cit., p. 84.

⁴¹Despite its parliamentary system at the national level, Japan's mayors and governors of prefectures are elected directly by the voters. Since none of the opposition parties and, more recently, even the LDP has not been strong enough to run candidates of their own, they have been forced to pool their resources with other parties and interest groups in the community in order to wage a successful campaign. Some scholars have interpreted the broad coalitions that have resulted as a triumph of citizen over party politics: see for example Tsurutani, op. cit., pp. 198-201, 210-211, 222-231.

⁴²Hori did lose the governor's race but he won his seat back in the Diet in the 1979 General Election. The Communist assessment that his bid for the governorship in November 1978 was simply a prelude to his campaign for reelection proved to be accurate.

⁴³Jack Lewis, "Hokaku Rengo: The Politics of Conservative-Progressive Cooperation in a Japanese City." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1974.

⁴⁴Akimoto Ritsuo, "Jūmin Undō no Shokeitai" in Matsubara Haruo, op. cit.

⁴⁵For a description in English of the events surrounding the formation of the party in 1976 and some of its recent problems, see Richard Hrebenar, "Kono Yohei and the Future of the Shin Jiyu Club," The Japan Interpreter Vol. 12, Spring 1978; a good introduction to the party can be found in "Shin Jiyu Kurabu Tetteiteki Kenkyū," Bungei Shunjū 55 (6) June 1977, pp. 92-130.

⁴⁶The party had managed to elect only three of its 13 candidates in the 1977 HC election, and had been weakened by the conflict between the party chairman, Kono Yohei, and its secretary-general, Nishioka Takeo, over the party's relationship with the LDP in the Diet. Kono was opposed to any cooperation with the LDP in the Diet, while Nishioka was open to it on a issue by issue basis. Nishioka broke with the party over this matter in 1979 and ran as an independent in the General Election.

⁴⁷Interview with Socialist party official on October 13, 1979.

⁴⁸Interview with member of Hyogo Agricultural Cooperative Association staff on April 11, 1979.

⁴⁹Interview with Abbot of Nichiren Shōshū temple on June 19, 1979.

⁵⁰These issues have not been successfully dealt with because of the opposition parties adamant refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the LDP's legislative majority. See Michael Leiserson's discussion of "permanent opposition" in "Political Opposition and Political Development in Japan," pp. 341-398 in Robert Dahl, Regimes and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

⁵¹Arend Lijphart has drawn a conclusion similar to this from his study of the parties in the Netherlands: see The Politics of Accommodation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); see also Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), especially "A Theory of a Stable Democracy," pp. 225-287.

CHAPTER VIII

INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

The organization of a political party cannot be fully understood unless the linkages between the party and particular interest groupings in the electorate are taken into account. This is especially true in the case of the Japanese parties where cultural and institutional forces have combined to bind parties and interest groups very closely together. In this closing chapter, the influence of commercial, farm, union, religious, and other groups active in Hyogo upon the organization of the prefectural parties will be summarized, and the contrasting organizational responses of the parties to their special support bases analyzed. The differences observed in their responses will be discussed with reference to the literature available on political party organization. A concluding section will argue that the linkages between political parties and interest groups should be taken into account in constructing a typology of party organizational patterns.

Major Findings

This study has been concerned with the linkages between interest groups and political parties and the influence of these linkages upon party organization. Seven major findings of this

study of the Hyogo parties are listed in Table 82. It goes without saying that their explanatory power requires further investigation both in Japan and other countries, but it is hoped that they might contribute to a more complete understanding of party organizational patterns.

Interest Groups and Party Branch Structure in Hyogo

All the parties in Hyogo have a headquarters. These headquarters each occupy an office in Kobe, the prefectural capital and maintain a full-time staff whose size varies from two in the case of the DSP to over forty for the JCP. Moreover, each of the parties except the LDP have some intermediary organizations between the prefectural headquarters and the party branches. These are variously called district councils (DSP), branch associations (JSP and Komeito), and district committees (JCP).

Both the socialists and the Communists have, as a rule, required their intermediate units to maintain an office and a full-time staff. Because of the functional definition given their district committees, the Communists have been most successful at this. Each of their 11 district committees have an office and a full-time staff ranging from an estimated two to 26 employees. The DSP has an office and a one-man staff attached to each of its district councils in Hyogo, but it has accomplished this in the second through fifth districts only by borrowing space and personnel from the Dōmei union federation. The JSP officially has 38 branch

Table 82

The Influence of Interest Groups Upon Party Organization in Hyogo

Major Findings

- 1) The subdivisions of the Hyogo parties' organizations, e.g., in the case of the DSP the district councils, branch associations, and branches, have been shaped by the requirements for mobilizing their respective support bases in the prefecture.
- 2) The relative authority and importance of the Hyogo parties' decisionmaking organs is related to the nature of the decisionmaking norms and structures of the interest groups in their support bases.
- 3) The kinds of departments and committees established by the Hyogo parties and the nature of the activities engaged in by them have been determined by the mobilization requirements of their support bases.
- 4) The composition and conditions of membership in the Hyogo parties have been dependent upon the nature of the interest groups to which the parties look principally for support in the prefecture.
- 5) Party office in the Hyogo parties has been largely honorary in order to guard party unity. It has usually been awarded to incumbent assemblymen, because only they have the experience and status necessary to deal with the leadership of the interest groups found in the parties' support bases. Real power in these parties, however, belongs to those who control the organizational and financial resources of each party's support base.

Table 82 (Continued)

Major Findings

- 6) The financing of political parties in Hyogo has taken on three general patterns:
 - a) party dependent nearly exclusively upon member dues, assemblymen assessments, and contributions from individual supporters to fund its activities. The JCP exhibited this pattern which seems to be characteristic of a party that lacks the support of well organized interest groups in the electorate.
 - b) party dependent upon its own resources to pay for a permanent office and staff, but looks to its support base to provide for the cost of electioneering. This pattern was found in both the LDP and the socialist parties. It seems to be the usual division of financial responsibility between political parties and interest groups.
 - c) party has very limited resources of its own and consequently depends upon its support base to subsidize its ordinary as well as election related expenses. This pattern was exhibited only by the Komeito and it may be characteristic of parties backed by hierarchically organized and tightly structured groups like the Sokagakkai.
- 7) The candidates selected by the Hyogo parties have usually had close ties to the interest groups that made up their primary source of support in the prefecture.

associations in the prefecture. However, only 14 of them have an office and half of these are without a paid organizer. The JSP has fallen so far short, because its geographic definition of branch associations has resulted sometimes in district units with memberships of less than 10. It has also been hampered by the opposition of the JCP faction within Sōhyō to its publicly sharing the facilities of the union federation.

The Komeito until 1979 had nine formally designated branch associations in Hyogo, but they had neither a clear geographic or functional definition. The associations were established in those areas where the party had large assembly delegations. None had an office or staff attached to them. Contact with the prefectural headquarters was maintained through the association chairman, who was usually a senior member of the Komeito delegation in the prefectural or city assembly. In February of 1979, the number of Komeito branch associations was reduced by the party to five, and their areas of responsibility set to correspond to the HR election districts in Hyogo. As yet, these associations have no office or staff.

The LDP has no formal intermediate organization between its prefectural headquarters and the branches of the party. But the 51 conservative branches have been organized in nearly every city and town in Hyogo and are equivalent in size and responsibility to the JSP branch associations.

The branches of the other parties have been organized largely in the workplace or within groups supportive of the parties. There are very few neighborhood branches. The 100 JSP branches draw their membership principally from the executive committees of the Sōhyō federation; the 42 DSP branches from those of the Dōmei federation. The 950 JCP branches can be found largely in the unions and party affiliated organizations like the Democratic Chambers of Commerce. The 63 Komeito branches are all connected with the Gakkai organization.

Because the JSP and the DSP have had the backing of the Sōhyō and Dōmei union federations, the interest of these parties has been in maintaining their control over these organizations through a network of party branches located within the unions that make them up. Only in the late 1960's, did the socialist parties in Hyogo begin to interest themselves seriously in the control of all voters within a particular geographic area through the organization of intermediate units such as district councils and district associations, and neighborhood-based party branches. The DSP succeeded in building a skeletal network of intermediate units at the HR district level by relying upon the local area councils of the Dōmei federation. The JSP has yet to succeed for two reasons: it has set for itself the bigger challenge of building a city-town based intermediary structure to rival that of the LDP, and it has not been able to draw upon the resources of its Sōhyō support base.

The Komeito, when it first entered the prefecture in the 1965 HC race, simply worked through the existing Gakkai organizational structure. After the separation of the party and the religion at the national level in 1970, a Hyogo prefectural headquarters was formally inaugurated. However, even today the party's branch associations and branches are closely tied in with this lay group: the Komeito organization really exists in name only below the prefectural level in Hyogo. Party activity at election time is carried out by Gakkai believers, who belong to the personal support groups organized by Komeito candidates, rather than members operating out of the party branches.

The branch structure of the LDP can be said to have emerged from its unchallenged control over the local assemblies. Until 1967, the party lacked a formal network of branches in Hyogo. With the dissolution of the Kōseikai, the leadership encouraged LDP prefectural assemblymen and conservative assemblymen in the cities and towns to incorporate official LDP branches in their districts. These branches, once formed, engaged in little, if any, official activity. One reason for their weakness was that their membership was made up of, and all positions of leadership were filled by, local assemblymen and their immediate personal supporters. The party had simply formalized the loose relationship that had held among conservative elements in the prefecture before the dissolution of the Kōseikai. The leadership did not try to bypass the assemblymen and organize branches within the groups that made up their support

base, in part because of the very multiplicity of groups to which the party looked for support, and in part due to the resistance of local assemblymen to any attempt by the party to interpose itself between them and their constituency.

The JCP differs from the other parties in that it does not have a well organized support base upon which to build its branch structure. It depends for its support upon members of the party and the front groups sustained by them. The functional definition given to the intermediary units of the party is a necessary outcome of this. Without the organized backing of the unions or the Gakkai, the party could not establish any more district committees than its membership could support. The party has sought most persistently the support of the labor unions and the fringe elements in Japanese society. It has, consequently, not organized its branches on a geographic basis but has established them within the workplace and party front groups, like the Democratic Medical Care Association, which are trying to organize socially marginal elements such as the aged and welfare recipients.

The Basic Units of Party Organization

The French political scientist Maurice Duverger proposed in his classic 1951 study of political parties that their basic units took on one of three organizational patterns: the caucus, the branch, or the cell.¹ The caucus was made up of a group of notables chosen because of their influence within important groups affiliated

with the party. In contrast, the branch and the cell were made up of members who were affiliated with the party on an individual basis out of a commitment to its program or ideology. Duverger argued that the branch and the cell differed principally in that the branch was organized on a geographic basis, which usually corresponded to one of the electoral subdivisions in a country, while the cell had an occupational focus and could normally be found in the workplace or within work-related organizations.

Duverger thought the branch organization to be characteristic of socialist parties and the cell, of Communist parties.² Yet in the case of the Hyogo parties it was found that only the conservative LDP had a branch network structured along geographic lines. The branches of the socialist parties, as well as those of the JCP, were located largely in the workplace, and those of the Komeito, where they existed at all, were to be found in the Gakkai organization. This suggests that the cell may not in all respects be unique to Communist parties.³ Instead it might be considered an organizational response dependent upon a party's support base. The Hyogo socialist parties, in particular, have worked to establish party cells within the unions in order to better mobilize their support in elections.

The LDP's adoption of a geographically based branch structure may also be considered an organizational response to the problems presented by the nature of its support base. It might be thought that the LDP has a caucus type organizational network in Hyogo.

Yet it is important to remember that the members of the LDP branches were not drawn, on the whole, from the leadership of interest groups affiliated with the party as were members of Duverger's caucus, but largely from the ranks of conservative assemblymen and their most immediate supporters. The Hyogo LDP has not had to work for the establishment of party cells within the interest groups supportive of it, because the kōenkai of these assemblymen have provided an effective means of mobilizing them in elections. At the same time, the influence of the heterogenous character of the conservative base on the party organization has also played an important role in this development. A strong extensive party organization like that possessed by the JCP has not necessarily been anathema to the conservatives,⁴ but the fragmented nature of its interest group base has made its realization almost impossible.

Interest Groups and Party Decisionmaking Organs in Hyogo

The conventions of the prefectural parties in Hyogo have never included the entire membership. They are usually made up of delegates who are formally chosen by the membership of the branches and intermediate units of the parties. The stated purpose of the conventions is to provide a measure of rank and file control over the leadership. Their actual powers, however, differ sharply from party to party.

The socialist parties are the most scrupulous in respecting the prerogatives of the conventions. The approval of a detailed

party program for the coming year, the review and approval of the party budget, the formal endorsement of party candidates, and the election of party officers all take place at the conventions. The JSP has frequently convened extraordinary sessions of its convention to discuss amendments to the year's program of action and to introduce reforms of the party's organizational structure.

The LDP party convention meets only to elect party officers and to adopt resolutions that guide the party in only the vaguest terms in its policy pronouncements throughout the year. Review and approval of the party budget and the endorsement of party candidates is left to a 200 member General Affairs committee.

With the Komeito, the prefectural convention elects party officers and formally adopts a detailed program of action for the party. But review of the party's budget and the recommendation of party candidates to the national party is left up to the party president.

In the JCP, the prefectural convention functions only to elect a Central Committee that is empowered to make decisions for the party in the area of finance, candidates, and policy, and elects from its own ranks party officers. The JCP convention does hear a report on party activities given by the chairman, but any commitment of the party to a formal program of action is made by the Central committee.

Day to day decisions for the two socialist and Communist parties are made by an Executive committee headed up by the party

chairman. These decisions are reviewed at intervals of several months by the party Central committees. The LDP and the Komeito are headed up by party presidents who are advised by informally constituted "officers" committees. These parties have no Executive committee structure. The president's decisions are subject to review by the General Affairs committee in the LDP. The Komeito president is responsible only to the party convention.

The decisionmaking structure of the two socialist parties with its strong formal deference to the authority of the convention bears much similarity to that of the union federations that make up the socialist support base. The power wielded by the party president and the General Affairs committee of the LDP at the expense of the convention is a likely consequence of the assemblymen-centered branch organization of the party and the low value placed upon individual membership by the party.

The centralization of formal power in the office of the president in the Komeito is due in part to the ill-defined nature of the organizational structure of the party in Hyogo. The Komeito was conceived in the Culture department of the Gakkai. As a result, the party naturally depended upon the Gakkai network of activists to mobilize its votes at election time, and its leadership owed responsibility more to the directors of the Gakkai than to the membership. Despite the formal separation of the party and the religion at the prefectural level, the local

apparatus is still tied in with the Gakkai organization. It, consequently, mirrors the vertically organized Gakkai command structure.

The Communist party structure in Hyogo is modelled after Communist organizations in other countries, and it shares their emphasis upon the principle of democratic centralization of decisionmaking. The reliance upon a party structure organized according to this principle has been functional in the case of the Hyogo LDP. The party lacks an organized support base in the electorate and, as a result, has been forced to weld socially marginal elements into a viable political force. This has required great organizational discipline with the attendant subordination of the convention to the Central and Executive committees.

The Party Conventions and Executive Authority

Roberto Michels in an influential study of the prewar German Social Democratic party advanced an "Iron Law of Oligarchy"⁵ for parties and other collective organizations. One aspect of the "Iron Law" predicted that, whatever their initial democratic pretensions, power in political parties would eventually come to center more and more in the executive authority.⁶ The operations of this law in the case of the Hyogo parties can be seen quite clearly, if attention is limited to the formal decisionmaking structures.⁷ Neither the party conventions nor the Central

committees operate to provide for any meaningful rank and file control over the party leadership.

Nonetheless, there still remain significant differences in the formal arrangement of the decisionmaking organs among the parties to be explained. This suggests, as a corollary to Michels' Law, that insofar as their formal structure is concerned political parties will probably never be any more democratic than the groups, which are most closely affiliated with them. In a religious party like the Komeito, where the spiritual authority of the leadership is the equal of any temporal majority among the rank and file, no meaningful decentralization of formal power should be expected. Similarly in a party like the LDP that is supported by conservative organizations, in which seniority and the mobilization of an informal, "behind-the scenes" (kuro-maku) consensus weigh large in the decisionmaking process, the existence of a strong Executive committee structure is unlikely.

Interest Groups and Party Secretariat Structure in Hyogo

All of the parties in Hyogo, except the DSP, have a formally organized Secretariat. These are generally organized so as to accomplish four principal tasks:

- 1) maintain and strengthen the party organization in the prefecture (organization, finance, party member education, and publication departments).
- 2) strengthen ties with population groups and influential constituencies in the electorate (youth, women, labor, small business, and farm-marine departments).

- 3) manage party campaigns and propaganda activities (election committee and propaganda department).
- 4) supervise party assemblymen and coordinate party policy (local assemblies department and policy committee).

There are some interesting exceptions to the outline sketched above which are related to the nature of each party's interest backing. The LDP in Hyogo does not have a Labor department, and the JSP is the only party that does not have a separate Propaganda department in its Secretariat. The Komeito did not have a Farm-Marine department until 1977. With the exception of the JCP, none of the parties had special departments dealing with the intelligentsia or culture-education issues. Only the JCP and the JSP had a special department dealing with the creation of a united front.

The LDP does not receive the formal endorsement of any of the labor union federations. By public and private union members alike, the LDP is viewed as the party of management. Although individual candidates may be able to secure limited support from particular unions, the LDP as a party has not actively sought labor union support. If it were to establish within its Secretariat a labor relations department, it would have a most difficult time finding someone with sufficient stature to deal with the Hyogo labor leadership. Unlike the JSP, which has often installed high officials from the Sōhyō federation in this position, the conservatives have no such access to the union elite.

Hyogo Sōhyō in the late 1950's and early 1960's was an organization second in size only to the agricultural cooperatives association in the prefecture. In the late 1960's with a membership of 230,000 it even passed this mammoth organization. It is natural, therefore, that the Socialist party was concerned to maintain control over this organization. The party faced challenges from DSP and JCP activists within the unions and from management without. It worked to meet these through the educational and propaganda activities of the Labor University, which sought to nurture Socialist activists in the unions. Unfortunately, this inward focus and the control over party propaganda activities by Labor University activists, which it permitted, limited the JSP's capacity to respond to the decreasing importance of the Sōhyō membership as a percentage of organized labor and the electorate. The party has only recently and very tentatively begun in Hyogo to put together a propaganda effort directed at the non-union voter.

The Komeito has been backed by the Sōkagakkai, an essentially urban-based religious movement, whose believers have been drawn primarily from workers in the service industry and the petit bourgeois. Consequently, it was natural that the party in its attempt to move beyond its Gakkai base should early on try to strengthen its ties with the labor movement. The Hyogo party's Labor department was instituted only one year after the party formally broke with the Gakkai (1971). From the same perspective, it is also understandable that the party should be late in turning

its attention to the cultivation of agricultural and fishing interests in the rural parts of the prefecture. The party's hope is that its neo-conservative policies, substantial presence in the Diet, and Buddhist affiliations can make it an attractive alternative to the LDP for conservative, rural voters.

The Communists in Hyogo have labored under a double burden. They have not had reliable organized support and have had an image of violence among the public that hampered their search for the unattached vote. The Intelligentsia department and the Culture-Education committee were not established by the party to win the support of a narrow, cultured elite but as a means to create a climate in which Communist goals could become more acceptable. The other parties, of course, have Propaganda departments charged with improving their image before the public. Yet none has been able to duplicate the myriad of small research groups, theatre and movie organizations, and music associations that are managed by the Culture-Education committee of the Hyogo JCP.

The JCP and the JSP each have a department within them that deals with the formation of a united front (toitsu sensen), the "Holy Grail" of Japan's splintered left. To this end, the two parties sponsor a number of groups dealing with specific issues, usually of a foreign policy nature, that can mobilize support from all segments of the society against the government. In the usual case, Sōhyō elements line up behind the JSP and the Communists marshal the membership of their various support groups. Although

the purpose of these departments is to encourage the broad cooperation of all elements in the society, the distinctively different interest group bases that each rallies shows that the gap between the two parties is as much sociological as it is ideological.

The DSP alone among the parties in Hyogo does not have a fully articulated Secretariat. Special assignments are given out through the Executive committee, and at election time candidates will run for office listing themselves as chairmen of departments or committees in the Secretariat that deal with issues of concern to their constituency. In fact, however, these departments and committees do not hold regular meetings outside of the monthly convening of the party's Executive committee. The DSP can be considered in some sense a party still-born. It was a product of the formation of the Dōmei federation and the breakaway of several incumbent and formerly incumbent JSP assemblymen. The party's vote mobilization effort has been essentially directed at Dōmei and the private support groups of party assemblymen. Success by the party at the local level has been extremely limited. The small membership and the personality-centered politics of the DSP have kept the party from developing a fully elaborated Secretariat structure.

The Functions Served by Political Parties

Students of political parties have always recognized that they perform a variety of functions in the political system.⁸ A listing

of the most common functions might include: the selection of candidates, the management of elections, the development of policy, the organization of the legislature, the education of party members and the citizenry, the aggregation and communication of citizen preferences to government leaders, the provision of opportunities for participation in politics, the mobilization of the citizenry behind government programs, and the provision of symbols to legitimate governmental authority and promote national solidarity. The multiplicity of the functions that parties might perform raises the question of whether a party must necessarily perform any of them, and if so, when and under what conditions they might be performed. Leon Epstein has argued that the management of election is the primary function, the others only incidental.⁹ Many of the Japanese scholars¹⁰ cited in the introduction to this study, who have criticized what they take to be the irresponsibility of the present parties in Japan, would probably disagree sharply with this. Most would probably expect that the parties at least attempt to perform all but the last two listed above, which are reminiscent of the role played by the Japanese parties in the late 1930's and during the war.¹¹

This study of the parties in Hyogo prefecture, however, suggests that such expectations are quite unrealistic. Although certain activities may be thought of as characteristic of the Secretariats established by the political parties, they will not necessarily engage in any of them. What functions parties will

perform and the success that they will have in them will be determined at least in some part by the party's support base. The conservative farm, commercial, and professional groups that make up the LDP base require a different package of party activities aimed at sustaining and nurturing their support than do the non-union workers and other socially marginal elements that comprise the JCP base.

Interest Groups and Party Membership in Hyogo

The membership of all the Hyogo parties, except the JCP, is small in relation to the number of votes that they receive and is drawn nearly exclusively from influential members of the large interest groupings behind each of them. The DSP finds its membership in the Dōmei elite, the JSP in the Sōhyō leadership. The LDP looks to activists within conservative organizations in the prefecture, and the Komeito enrolls members of the Gakkai. None of these parties have managed to attract the leadership of groups outside their normal constituency into their organization.

The membership of these four parties are not completely identical. The DSP and JSP membership is much smaller than that of the LDP or Komeito. Membership in the socialist parties is limited on the whole to the upper echelon of union officials who will join the party upon attaining office and, in some cases, leave the party when their term has been completed. The membership of top union officials in these parties gives them access to the organizational

and financial resources of the unions. This means that they can use the union newspaper, place their candidates' posters in the workplace, introduce their candidates to the membership at union sponsored functions, and raise contributions from the union membership to cover campaign expenses. Even if these parties had substantial support among the union rank and file, none of this would be possible without the support of the leadership. The JCP and the Komeito find themselves in this position within the socialist dominated Hyogo union federations.

In the LDP and the Komeito, membership in the party is more candidate-centered. Individuals will join the party because of personal or interest-based ties to a particular candidate. These people are not necessarily the top leadership of the groups supportive of the two parties. Nonetheless, they can be expected to play a major role in bringing out the vote of these groups at election time. It should be noted, however, that neither party puts a very high value on party membership. Dues assessed members are nominal and the major lines of communication between the parties and their support bases extend through their assemblymen.

The Communist membership is an exception to much of what has been said above. JCP membership is large and committed to the party. Its members, however, if they have organizational ties outside the party, only rarely occupy positions of influence in these groups. The Communist party has swelled its ranks by recruiting from among the outs in the prefecture: disgruntled

members among the rank and file of the large unions, workers in non-unionized marginal industries, small shopowners in the less prosperous shopping areas, and the unemployed. This is difficult to translate into political capital. As a result, although the DSP in Hyogo has a membership that is not even seven percent of the size of the Hyogo JCP, it is able to draw a vote in the House of Councillors election that is nearly equal to that of the Communist, because its 900 members make up the leadership strata of the powerful Hyogo Dōmei federation. Still, the importance of the size of the JCP membership should not be underrated. The JCP needs these people to sustain its network of front groups in the prefecture. Party members work full or part-time administering the programs of these groups with little or no compensation and occupy most of the positions of leadership within them.

The Meaning of Party Membership

James Wilson, in an attempt to link the reasons why people join parties to party organizational patterns, developed three basic party types: 1) the machine party where patronage is the primary incentive; 2) the purposive party where ideological motivations are preeminent; and 3) the solidarity party where "social contacts, political fun, and the pleasure of being on the inside" are the principal benefits sought.¹² The Hyogo parties do not fit clearly, however, into these categories. In the socialist parties, members join as the result of their positions in the labor movement.

Since they see party membership as a way to promote labor's interests in the political arena, this may qualify as purposive behavior--but it does not seem to be ideologically motivated. In the LDP and the Komeito, solidarity incentives are important for some members. For the rest, material incentives appear to be the principal motivators in the LDP and "ideological" interests related to the promotion of the Gakkai faith serve this function in the Komeito. Yet it is important to realize that this cataloguing of individual expectations from membership alone does not fully explain the nature of membership in these two parties, anymore than it does in the socialist parties. The LDP and Komeito draw support from quite distinct groups in the electorate. This study of the Hyogo party membership has suggested that the most important variable for explaining why people joined these two parties, as well as the socialist parties, was their organizational affiliation. The LDP has drawn members nearly exclusively from farm, commercial, and professional groups; the Komeito is similarly dependent upon the Gakkai.

Wilson placed the United States Communist party under the purposive category.¹³ The Hyogo JCP would probably qualify under the solidarity category as well. This is not crippling to Wilson's argument, but the ambiguity of his categories serve to raise the more general question of why a party might attract any particular mixture of members. The evidence developed in this

study suggest that the answer lies with the nature of a party's support base. In the case of the JCP, because of the socially marginal character of its base, it has had to use strong ideological and solidarity incentives in order to weld these elements into an effective political force. In the other parties, because an organizational infrastructure was already in place, such incentives were not so necessary.

Interest Groups and Party Leadership in Hyogo

Positions of formal leadership in the Hyogo parties are normally held by their incumbents in political office. It is unusual for the ordinary membership or the party staff to assume major visible positions in the hierarchy.

The highest offices in the parties (chairman or president, vice-chairmen, and secretary-general) do not necessarily confer real power upon their incumbents. They are largely honorary. Party officers serve as the representatives of the party before the public and its support base. They spend much of their time at fund-raising events and other party sponsored gatherings. The public attention given these positions encourages a party to place in them the candidates that it has endorsed for office, in order to provide them with a legitimate excuse for electioneering activities prior to the start of the official campaign period. The exhausting round of social functions that the offices entail

encourage the incumbents to rotate the positions among themselves on a regular basis.

Party officers cannot make party policy on their own account. Any decisions made by a party are arrived at in close consultation with their base of support in the electorate. Real decisionmaking power in a party rests with those who have the most direct access to the money and endorsements of powerful interest groups. In this sense, the chairmen of the major unions in Sōhyō have a far greater voice in party decisionmaking than the officers of the Hyogo JSP might. This does not mean that a party's support base dictates party policy. It is often difficult to tell whether the tail wags the dog or the dog, the tail. In the normal sequence of events, the top leadership of a party's support group will resign their positions to accept the party's nomination for public office. After they are elected, they will assume a prominent place in the party hierarchy. Their task will be then to bring around to the party's point of view their successor to office in the support group.

The chairmanships of the departments and committees within the parties' Secretariats are held on the whole by party assemblymen. There are two, rather practical, reasons for this. First, there are more than enough assemblymen in every party ready to fill offices in the Secretariat. Even the smallest town in Hyogo has a 12 member assembly. Assemblymen's salaries are also high. When yearly bonuses are included the 71 Kobe and 91 prefectural assemblymen each receive eight million yen (\$40,000) annually. The large

number of assemblymen and their large salaries provide the parties with a pool of skilled labor that is available at no expense for political work. This corp of assemblymen have been the mainstay of the organizational apparatus of every party in Hyogo, but the JCP. Second and equally important, party assemblymen have in most cases served an apprenticeship in the organizations supportive of the parties. As a result, these assemblymen can bring to a department or committee the personal connections and prestige needed to mobilize the elite of targeted interest groups behind the party. Full-time employees of the Hyogo parties can only in the rarest cases effectively represent them before these groups. Party staffers are usually in their late twenties or thirties and are themselves involved in serving the apprenticeship required of prospective party assemblymen. They are in no position to deal as equals with the leadership of party support groups who may be twenty or thirty years their senior.

The Hyogo Komeito because of the tightly organized nature of the party's Gakkai base is an exception to the characterization of party office as largely honorary. The top Komeito leaders, Watanabe Ichiro, Okamoto Tomio, and Arai Yoshiyuki, all moved directly from the Gakkai to assume positions in the party upon its formal separation in 1971. Watanabe held the president's position through 1977 and Arai and Okamoto still remain party vice-presidents. There can be little doubt that, at least through the 1970's, there

was little separation between the formal power structure in the party and that which pertained in its support base.

The Hyogo JCP represent a more far reaching exception to the characterization of party leadership made above. None of the members of the party's Executive committee are assemblymen, nor have they served as officers of prefecture-wide organizations such as unions and trade associations. Positions in the Communist hierarchy are not honorary. Tada Ryuji held the party chairmanship from the time of its reemergence into Hyogo politics in the early 1960's through 1976. JCP officers are all full-time employees of the party. Through their day to day work in the party Secretariat and because of the secrecy that still surround much of party activity, they have retained firm control over access to party sources of electoral support. No party candidate or ordinary member of the party in Hyogo has yet dared to challenge their authority.

The Hyogo JCP differs so much from the other parties, in part, because the pattern of its development in the prefecture has been the reverse of that of the other parties. In the normal case, the interest groups behind each of the parties produced a set of candidates that in turn organized parties to coordinate their affairs in the assembly and to sustain support for them among these interest groups. The leadership of these parties was consequently identical with that of their assembly candidates. The JCP, after the purge of its membership from the unions by the

Occupation forces, became a party without a well-defined source of support. In the early 1960's, the party established a large number of front groups in an attempt to build a new support base for itself. Later it picked the leadership of these organizations to stand as party candidates in elections. The result of this has been to make both the leadership of party front groups and party assembly candidates distinctly subordinate to the party leadership, most of whom had joined the party in the prewar era or the immediate postwar years.

The Distribution of Power in Political Parties

Samuel Eldersveld in his study of the Wayne County Democratic and Republican organizations labeled the distribution of power in these parties, a stratarchy.¹⁴ By this he meant that power was not closely held by a few top leaders, but that instead there existed within the party organization a plethora of competing power centers whose relations were characterized by patterns of "reciprocal deference."¹⁵ The Hyogo LDP and the socialist parties, despite the differences in the rules governing the operations of their formal decisionmaking units, seem to fit this formulation well. The assemblymen in these three parties who occupy positions of leadership at the prefectural level and in lower party units are usually leaders of groups within the party support base in their own right. The formal positions of leadership in these parties are chosen on a non-competitive basis as symbols of party unity.

Any decisions that are made by this leadership will usually be the product of elaborate consultations among all levels of the party organization.

The Eldersveld model does not hold as well for the Communist party or the Komeito in Hyogo. Leadership positions in these parties are not honorary and decisions for the party are made by a relatively much more narrow group. The reason behind these differences does not have much to do with Michels' law of Oligarchy that Eldersveld sought to refute.¹⁶ Rather the explanation lies in the different interest bases of these two parties from those of the LDP and the socialists. In the case of the Komeito, the party leadership were also officials in the Gakkai. Unlike the union federations that are made up of independent company unions with the power to ignore or obstruct any candidate endorsements made by the federation hierarchy with which they do not agree, control of the Gakkai's organizational and financial resources remains firmly in the hands of the prefectural leadership. A similar situation prevails in the JCP. This suggests the conclusion that the conditions for stratarchy will exist only where a party's support base contains a multitude of power centers with which to sustain competing elites. Although the focus of his research was different, Samuel Barnes has drawn a similar conclusion with regard to internal party democracy within an Italian Socialist party federation.¹⁷

Interest Groups and Party Finances in Hyogo

The parties in Hyogo draw income from four principal sources: member dues, the assessment of party assemblymen, contributions from party support groups, and funds transferred to them from the national parties. The sale of party publications in the prefecture does result in significant revenues for the Hyogo Komeito and JCP, but all money collected by them is forwarded to the national headquarters. The nature of each party's support base does much to determine which of these sources assumes the most importance.

All of the Hyogo parties require the payment of dues by their membership. The dues, however, amount to a significant source of income only in the case of the JCP. The LDP (44,000 members) and the Komeito (7,000 members) have a comparatively large membership, but the dues for each have been set at a nominal 1,000 (\$5.00) or 2,000 yen (\$10.00) a year. The socialist parties, in contrast, demand considerably more. The DSP (900 members) collects 1,000 yen (\$5.00) a month, and the JSP (1,325 members) expects one percent of a member's income. Yet their small membership means that their total revenues from dues falls short of that of the LDP.

The Communists, like the JSP, collect one percent of member income as dues. This results in average dues payments of between 18,000 (\$90.00) and 24,000 yen (\$120.00) a year from each member. With a base of 13,000 members in the prefecture, this provides the party with an estimated income of some 260 million yen (\$1.3 million)

annually, a figure that is more than five times that of the LDP. Party dues contribute slightly less than half of the party's reported income in the prefecture.

The heavy dependence of the JCP upon members dues is not surprising. Because the party has lacked an organized support base in the electorate, it has developed as a party of individual rather than organizationally based membership. The requirement of regular and significant financial support from the membership has been essential to the continued success of the party. This has not been the case with the other parties. The agriculture cooperatives, the commercial associations, the unions, and the Gakkai have an organizational existence apart from the parties which they support, and would be a political force in Hyogo with or without them. Members are important to the non-Communist parties because of the access that they provide them to the financial resources of these organizations, not for any personal financial support that they might offer.

For their day to day expenses the two socialist parties depend heavily upon the assessment of party endorsed assemblymen. They collect between 3 and 10 percent of the salaries of legislators from the town assemblies to the Diet. Contributions from the support groups of these parties in the unions have not been a regular source of income for them. The operating budget of the unions is derived from member dues, and the leadership is bound to use this money for union activities only. They expect socialist

parties to pay on their own account the expense of maintaining an office and a skeleton staff in Hyogo. The parties have been able to operate with this level of support, because their union backing guarantees them a much larger number of assemblymen than the JCP can draw on. At times of election, however, the situation is different. The unions will come out strongly for particular socialist candidates. The leadership will raise funds for the campaign by assessing an obligatory contribution from each union member and pressuring, when possible, management into extending financial support.

The LDP presents another picture. The party does assess the salaries of assemblymen endorsed by the party. Yet, the size of the assessment made against them and the amount collected as a percentage of total party income is small by socialist standards. The LDP can afford to make less stringent demands upon its assemblymen, because it can depend upon the financial support of all the major corporate interests in the prefecture. The corporations, unlike the unions, face no restrictions in the allocation of their funds. Their contributions, first, through the Citizens Political Council (Kokumin Seiji Kyōkai) and now through the Liberal Citizens Council (Jiyū Kokumin Kaigi), and the prefectural party's own fundraising events have been the most important source of income for the LDP Hyogo federation. In 1977, corporate contributions came to 84 million yen (\$420,000). This figure represented 70 percent of the party's ordinary budget.

The Komeito organization in Hyogo lacks an independent financial base. The dues that it collects scarcely return an income sufficient to cover the expense of maintaining a roster of membership. The money assessed against assemblymen is gathered directly by the national headquarters. The prefectural party does receive contributions, but these are not made on a regular basis and usually come from party assemblymen who reimburse the party office for expenses incurred on their behalf in elections. The Hyogo Komeito's reported income for 1977 was only 26 million yen (\$130,000). The Komeito is able to carry out political activities as a party in the prefecture, only because the eight man staff of the prefectural headquarters is paid directly by the national party. Beyond their efforts, the party must depend upon the Gakkai organization.

The Sōkagakkai, like many religious bodies, has a hierarchical and highly centralized organizational structure. Unlike the national union federations, which are made up of independent company and craft unions that at times make political endorsements at odds with those sanctioned by the federation elite, decisionmaking in the Gakkai is firmly centered in the office of a president who is elected for life. The Komeito exhibits a degree of centralization in its administrative structure that is similar to that of the Gakkai. The party did not establish a headquarters in Hyogo until 1970, and has yet to set up offices and staff in the towns and cities of the prefecture. The party has been content to leave the

mobilization of its Gakkai base to the informal support groups surrounding its assembly candidates, and has concentrated its energies on propaganda tactics designed to improve the party's image before the public. Although it formally split with the Gakkai in 1970, the party in Hyogo, which is still headed by the members of the old Gakkai Culture department, has not been able to achieve full organizational elaboration. The monolithic nature of its support group has hindered the development of the Hyogo party's organizational structure and the financial base necessary to support it.

Patterns of Party Financing

There is not yet available a generally accepted formulation of the patterns which party income and expenditures might take. One major obstacle to its development has been the problems surrounding research into this area of party activities. Parties are notoriously reluctant to divulge the sources of their income to outsiders and the data that are available from reports filed by the parties with governmental agencies and attempts by journalists and others to estimate party revenues often contain conflicting figures. As a result a number of readers in the field of party organization do not even take up the subject.¹⁸ Epstein in his long book on Western political parties devoted only eight-pages to the question of party finances.¹⁹ He drew the conclusion that no party can depend solely upon member dues. To support their activities parties had to turn to some large outside organizations such as business, the unions, or even the government.

This study of the Hyogo political parties offers three general patterns of party financing that might be useful to investigate in other settings. The first pattern is one where a party depends upon member dues, assemblymen assessments, and contributions from individual supporters to fund nearly all of its activities. The Hyogo JCP was the only party in the prefecture to exhibit this pattern, which seems to be characteristic of a party without a well-defined support base. A second pattern is one in which a party relies on its own resources to cover the cost of maintaining a permanent office and staff, but looks to interest groups affiliated with the party to bear the expense of electioneering activities. The LDP and the socialist parties can both be located in this category, which probably represents the usual relationship that pertains between a party and its support base. It might also be ventured that member dues and assemblymen assessments will bulk larger, as a proportion of total party revenues, in a union based party than in one tied to business interests because of the disparity in the financial resources available to each group. The third pattern describes the case of a party which is dependent upon its base of support in the electorate to subsidize its ordinary as well as its election related expenses. In Hyogo, only the Komeito falls into this group. Yet this pattern is probably not typical of all religious based parties. Rather it seems to be the result, as noted above, of the hierarchical and tightly structured nature of the

Gakkai organization. If the Japanese unions were organized on an industry-wide as opposed to an enterprise basis, a similar relationship between the unions and the socialist parties might have developed.

One of the most important objectives of the election reform law passed in Japan in 1975 was to reduce party dependence upon contributions from major interest groups and increase the incentives through tax deductions for individual contributors. The results of this study of party financing in Hyogo do not provide much hope that the objectives of this legislation can be achieved. Contributions from individuals and member dues were not truly significant sources of income for any of the parties except the Communist. As discussed in the previous chapter, a number of cultural and structural factors have encouraged the Japanese political parties to develop unusually close ties with particular interest groups in the electorate. These groups serve to provide the money needed by the parties to carry out an electoral campaign. Even in the event that all contributions from organizations to the political parties were banned, it is likely that commercial associations, the unions, and other groups would still act informally to structure contributions from their members to the parties.

Interest Groups and Party Candidates in Hyogo

Candidates for public office endorsed by the parties in Hyogo have come nearly exclusively from the leadership of their principal support groups. The strategy adopted by the parties in elections has been to try to mobilize their own base as fully as possible, rather than appeal to voters who are members of organizations committed to the other parties.

The LDP has drawn its candidates for national and prefectural office from business, the bureaucracy, and the professions. A number of them have served apprenticeships in the city and town assemblies. All but three of its HR candidates had been born and raised in the district from which they stood for office. Some had fathers who had held prefectural or national office, or had served as the administrative assistants to Diet members and had taken over their base of support in the district.

The two socialist parties have looked principally to the top leadership of the Sōhyō and Dōmei federations for their candidates. The JSP has recruited, in particular, Teachers union officials because of their standing in the local communities. Both parties have drawn some candidates from among intellectuals, the professions, and women. The DSP has probably gone farthest in this respect. It has nominated women for the House of Councillors in every Hyogo district election since 1965, and in the 1972 election took the unusual step of nominating in the fourth HR district a candidate, who had twice before sought but failed to receive the LDP endorsement.

The Komeito has stepped outside its Gakkai base to recruit a candidate only once. Its other candidates for national and prefectural office have usually been high Gakkai officials and always Gakkai members. The one exception to this, Iida Tadao was a university professor. Although he was a non-believer, members of his family did belong to the Gakkai and, so far, despite his election to the Diet from the third district he has not been given a place in the official hierarchy of the prefectural party.

There has been a great deal of continuity in the candidates nominated by all of these parties. In the 1976 HR election, four of the eight successful LDP candidates had served more than 20 years each in the Diet. In the Kobe HR district, the sons of two founders of the socialist movement in Hyogo, Kawakami Tamio and Nagae Kazuhito, have competed with each other for votes in every election since 1972, one as a representative of the JSP and the other of the DSP. The Komeito incumbents in the first through fourth districts have been the only candidates nominated by that party for these seats.

All the candidates nominated by the JCP have been members of the JCP, but the 1969 HR election marks a significant change in the type of candidate put up by the party. Before this election, the JCP had enlisted candidates who had joined the party in the prewar or immediate postwar period and, who, in many cases, were members of the party's Central committee. The Communists did not expect after 1949 to elect them to office and the campaigns were designed with the purpose of keeping the party's name and program before the

public. However, in the 1969 HR race in Kobe the party at the last minute substituted Urai Yoichi, the medical director of the city's Miniren clinic, for Tachibana Toshio the vice-chairman of the prefectural party and the party's candidate for this seat in every election since 1946. Urai polled 68,000 votes and won for the party its first HR seat from the prefecture since 1949.

Thereafter, the JCP nominated candidates, many of them lawyers, who had achieved some personal prominence in the prefecture through their activities in the party's network of front organizations. This policy of nominating candidates, who, although they were members of the party, were at one step removed from it because of their public role in the front groups has helped to assuage public fears about the militant, extra-legal activities engaged in by the party in the past. Still, this new type of Communist candidates has not served to bring in the endorsements of unions and other major interest groups in Hyogo that the party so desperately needs, if it is to move away from the fringes and into the mainstream of prefectural political life.

Organizational Affiliation and Political Recruitment

The political recruitment literature has long recognized the importance of organizational affiliation as a variable influencing the selection of party candidates.²⁰ Unfortunately, the data presented on the backgrounds of party candidates in many studies has been limited largely to socioeconomic status variables such as

age, income, or education and rather vague occupational categories such as bureaucrat, trade unionist, journalist, or lawyer.²¹ In some cases, where the number of candidates is very large, the gathering and presenting of more specific information could be difficult. Nevertheless, as this study has indicated, an understanding of the organizational affiliations of party candidates can offer much insight into the groups that a party looks to as its principal source of support and the possibility for changes in the composition of this backing. For example, with regard to Watanabe Ichiro, the former chairman of the Hyogo Komeito, it is far more important to know that he was the head of the Gakkai chapter in Hyogo than that he is a former journalist in his late forties. Similarly, the increasing number of lawyers and physicians who have stood as Communist candidates in Hyogo might be interpreted as a sign that the JCP has been transformed into a middle-class party, until their ties with the tightly organized party front groups are revealed and the reasons for the weakness of the party in the unions explained.

In Conclusion

It is difficult to foresee what form a new typology of party organizational patterns might take. This study of the Hyogo parties, however, has made clear the problems inherent to any typology that contains within it a developmental logic by showing the extent to which the organizational structure of the parties in

Hyogo was determined by the tasks posed by their distinctive interest group bases. Duverger's distinction between an elite and a mass party did not have to explain all the organizational forms that a party might take on as long as the underlying development sequence from a traditional to a modern party organization was accepted as a useful heuristic device. But once the logic of that sequence has been brought into question, the utility of the typology is greatly reduced.

It is significant that the foremost student of parties since Duverger, Leon Epstein, has not produced his own typology of party organizational patterns. As touched on before, Epstein has not done so, because he sees party organization as essentially indeterminant, i.e., a party will develop the organizational form best suited to compete successfully in elections.²² But such a view of party organization is unsatisfactory. Political parties are a vital and continuing part of the political process. This is particularly true in countries like Japan where, in addition to electing candidates, they play an important role in organizing the government. It is crucial to understand both the strengths and limitations of the way in which they are organized to perform these functions.

Nevertheless, Epstein's insight that party organization must be understood as a response to the competitive situation facing a party in the political system is useful. This study of the Hyogo parties would qualify this assertion only by adding that the most

important element influencing a party's organizational response will be the nature of the interest groups with which it is most closely affiliated.

In the introduction to this study, it was asserted that there always exists a special relationship between particular interest groups and a political party, and that this relationship can be more or less strong. In Japan, it has been unusually strong because the electoral system and the law governing election activities tend to reinforce the Japanese cultural preference for all-inclusive group affiliations. It is, therefore, analytically very rewarding to explain the organization and activities of the Japanese parties in terms of their respective interest group bases and to understand the problem of party organizational reform within this framework.

But it is also clear that not all union-based parties, for example, will exhibit the same organizational pattern. One reason for this perhaps is that the term "union" is not analytically precise enough. In the discussion in this study of the two union based parties active in Hyogo, some organizational differences were found to exist between them. These were due in part to the challenge presented to Socialist control over the Sōhyō federation by JCP activists, that made it impossible for the JSP to use the offices and staff of the federation to carry out party business. Variables that might be important determinants of the effect which

union backing has upon party organization in other settings might include the composition of the unions in a party's support base (public employee versus private industry employees) and the organizational character of basic units of national union federations (industry, craft, or enterprise). Like problems can be anticipated in comparing religious parties. The doctrine and character of the Sōkagakkai is quite different from that of the Catholic Church, which has stood behind many of the Christian Democratic parties in Europe.

A simple typology linking unions with one party organizational pattern and religious groups with another is consequently not possible. But this should not be a cause for discouragement. Political reality is complex and any theoretical apprehension of it must in part reflect this. A flexible formulation of party organizational patterns that groups parties according to the nature of their interest backings seems both desirable and useful. Such an approach would avoid the disadvantages of too rigid an application of the same developmental standards to all parties, as well as the problems of an overly eclectic view that sees all too many patterns without any sense of the dynamic behind party organizational change. It would also serve to point research into productive areas of inquiry by raising questions about the conditions required for successful party reform and the extent of inter-party competition in elections.

This study of the political parties in Hyogo has tried to make clear the linkages between interest groups active in the prefecture and the organizations there of the five major Japanese parties.

It was argued that the nature of the interest groups in the support bases of each of the parties has been an important factor in shaping the organizational patterns exhibited by them. This was understood to be a consequence of the different organizational tasks faced by parties with different interest group bases. Further research both in Japan and in other countries is necessary to more fully develop and explain the influence of interest groups upon party structure. But it is hoped that the findings of this study with regard to the Hyogo parties and their implications for current theory dealing with party organization can help to stimulate a constructive debate on the subject.

NOTES

¹ Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, op. cit., pp. 17-36.

² Ibid., p. 31.

³ Neil McInnes has gone so far as to argue that "without the cell, there would be no CP's (Communist parties) and if and when they lose their specific nature and become more like other Western political parties, the process will begin with the decline of the cell" (p. 100); see The Communist Parties of Western Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).

⁴ Duverger has argued that the caucus is an expression of middle-class political culture: "the middle-class represented by these parties of the Right does not like the organizational and collective action which accompanies branches and cells. The existence of this class is based on the recognition of a traditional 'elite' which is the result either of birth or of free competition. It is therefore natural that it should find its political expression within the framework of the caucus" (p. 21); see Duverger, Political Parties, op. cit.

⁵ Roberto Michels, Political Parties, op. cit., pp. 389-390.

⁶ Michels notes, "in theory the Leader is merely an employee bound by the instructions he receives. He has to carry out the instructions of the mass, of which he is no more than an Executive organ. But in actual fact, as the organization increases in size, this control becomes purely fictitious. In all the socialist parties, there is a continual increase in the number of functions withdrawn from electoral assemblies and transferred to the executive committees" (p. 34); ibid.

⁷ In this section the major concern is whether party decision-making structures actually function as specified in the party charters. Michels law is confirmed only in this sense. See the section on party leadership in this chapter for a discussion of the limitations of Michels law with regard to the informal balance of power in a party.

⁸ See for example, the list of party functions in Peter H. Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics Holt, Reinhart, and Wilson 1970, pp. 272-289 and that supplied by Frank Sorauff, op. cit., pp. 12-15; for the functions of parties in nation-building, see Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "Conclusion" in LaPalombara and Weiner, eds., op. cit., pp. 399-435.

⁹ Leon Epstein, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

¹⁰ See Chapter 1, Note 34.

¹¹ See Robert Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), pp. 346-392 and G. M. Berger, Parties Out of Power in Japan 1931-1941 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 263-292.

¹² James Wilson, Political Organizations, op. cit., pp. 97-115.

¹³ Ibid., p. 105.

¹⁴ Samuel Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 98-117.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁷ Samuel Barnes, Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 214-233.

¹⁸ See for example William Wright, ed., A Comparative Study of Party Organization, op. cit.; Kay Lawson in an otherwise fine review of the literature on parties does not take up the question of party finances, see The Comparative Study of Political Parties, op. cit.

¹⁹ Leon Epstein, op. cit., pp. 272-280.

²⁰ See for example the discussion in Lester Seligman, "Political Parties and the Recruitment of Political Leadership" in Lewis Edinger, ed., Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 310-311.

²¹ Ivor Crewe has called these the "Tired Old Variables" (p. 24) in "Introduction: Studying Elites in Britain" in Ivor Crewe, ed., Elites in Western Democracy (British Sociology Yearbook Vol. 1) (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974).

²² Leon Epstein, op. cit., pp. 257-260.

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