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UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, PH.D., 1979

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DESEGREGATING THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

1954-1968

By

Doris Hinson Pieroth

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

1979

Approved by Otis A. Pease
Chairman of Supervisory Committee

Program Authorized
to Offer Degree Department of History

Date May 25, 1979

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PREFACE

The nation's public schools, along with society's other institutions, were under heavy assault in the social revolution of the 1960's. One of the major battering rams in that seige in the city of Seattle, Washington, was the issue of racial desegregation, which had its origins in the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education. The Seattle School District did not maintain a de jure segregated school system. Those Southern districts which were operating "separate but equal" systems were the focus of attention in the early aftermath of the Brown ruling, and it was quite some time before Northern or border states became other than somewhat detached observers of the agonizing drama surrounding school integration.

As the integration movement came to encompass de facto as well as de jure segregation, each city outside the South encountered the problem in its own individual setting and time frame and against its own unique background. Each district administration or school board reacted to desegregation demands in its own peculiar fashion. Seattle's location in the Pacific Northwest tends to shelter it somewhat from early encounter with new and

innovative ideas and issues. It is not surprising that it had a comparatively late meeting with the issue of desegregation.

While no major decision of the Supreme Court could go completely unnoticed, Brown v. Board of Education caused a very small ripple in Seattle. It was not until the fall of 1970 that the entire city was forced to face the reality of possible inclusion in a program to desegregate its schools. This study concerns the events which led to that abrupt awakening for the majority. Its major emphasis is on the period between 1954 and 1968, at which time the School Board made a major policy decision to establish desegregated middle schools, and it was the announcement of that policy's implementation which burst on the city in 1970.

Although Seattle's population has great racial diversity, in the early stages of school desegregation the focus was almost exclusively on the integration of black students into the majority white system. Only gradually in the 1970's did concern for racial balance become truly multi-ethnic. School enrollment figures showing racial distribution in the early years are sketchy or nonexistent. The earliest record is for 1957, showing a total enrollment of 91,782 students, 5.7 percent black. Record keeping became more dependable between 1962 and 1968.

By 1968 the 94,002 pupil system was reported to be 11 percent black.

The Seattle School District is governed by an autonomous, non-partisan School Board which has independent taxing authority. Board members are elected on a city-wide ballot, and the Board was essentially apolitical through most of the period under consideration. They felt hampered in efforts to deal with de facto segregation by Washington's restrictive and cumbersome method of funding the public schools. While theoretically the State Legislature provides funding for schools from the State General Fund, by 1958 that funding was so inadequate as to force many local districts to submit annually to the voters a special levy request to further tax local property in order to meet their operating needs. Securing simple majority approval of such additional taxation would seem difficult enough, but the State Constitution required a 60 percent affirmative vote in an election in which ballots cast must equal 40 percent of the total vote in the last previous general election. Consequently, although the Seattle School Board, unlike boards in some cities, was not a political tool of machine or party, it felt itself restrained politically by an annual quest for that super majority from the electorate.

Even before civil rights activists began to pressure

the School District to integrate, the Administration, under the leadership of Superintendent Ernest Campbell, had begun programs in the early 1960's which broke new ground in the realm of equal educational opportunity. These early efforts, primarily compensatory programs, were honest attempts to deal with a growing and bewildering problem. When the pressure to integrate did come, the Board responded by altering policy to allow students to voluntarily transfer to other schools if such moves would contribute to school desegregation.

Upon Superintendent Campbell's retirement in 1965, the School Board chose to break a precedent which had existed beyond anyone's memory. In appointing his successor, they by-passed the District's own ranks and brought in an outsider. Forbes Bottomly came from Colorado with new approaches to learning and to school administration. It would be his lot to try to withstand the storm over desegregation which broke in the later sixties.

Seattle's involvement in school desegregation coincided with the escalation of civil rights activity and the proliferation of groups of varying degrees of militancy. The schools were subjected to persuasion, litigation, boycott, disruption and student activism. The advent of Black Power added another dimension to the story and when the national trend toward decentralization and local

control of schools reached Seattle it, too, influenced the course of events.

Sources for this study fall into three major categories: accounts in the press; papers from the files of the Seattle School District and from collections in the Manuscripts Division of the University of Washington Library; and interviews with principal participants and others whose perceptions gave added dimensions to the story. Many individuals generously granted the use of their private collections of papers, and the Seattle Urban League permitted use of some material from its office files. The Municipal League of Seattle and King County granted the use of minutes of the meetings of the Board of Trustees and the League committees.

During the course of this study, I accumulated many debts of gratitude. I especially appreciate the generous amounts of time given by those who granted me interviews. Both the Seattle Times and the Post-Intelligencer permitted the use of facilities and material in their libraries, and I appreciate the help given by the library staff of the Times. For the use of Seattle School District records I am especially grateful to former Superintendent Forbes Bottomly who granted use of those records prior to the establishment of the School District Archives.

I am indebted to Professor Otis Pease for his

direction and assistance in the writing of this dissertation. It was a long time in the process, and its completion owes much to friends and colleagues who were persistent in their encouragement.

I am grateful to my husband, John, for constant encouragement and his incredible patience and good humor throughout the course of the project, and to our two daughters, Suzanne and Jeanne, for their cooperation and the contribution of their experience in Seattle's integrated schools.

CHAPTER I

"IT IS NOT OUR FAULT."

The Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, a decision of sweeping and fateful importance for the entire American school system, reached only very slowly into most non-Southern communities. Seattle's citizens did not at first grasp its importance, and they had little awareness of any prospects for change which it might hold for the city.

The decision shared space in the two daily papers with the Army-McCarthy hearings and the war in Indo-China. On May 17, 1954, the evening Seattle Times' major headline proclaimed "Eisenhower Bans Testimony to Senate Probers; Recess Taken." Below it appeared "High Court Rules Against Segregation In Schools," a story concluded on page 18, accompanied by a photograph of the victorious NAACP attorneys.[1] The desegration decision made the front page for only one more day. In the succeeding days the editorial page featured comments by syndicated columnists James Reston and Roscoe Drummond, and an Associated Press report of editorial comment from leading newspapers across the country. But the Seattle Times made no editorial comment of its own.[2]

The Post-Intelligencer gave over about half of its front page on the morning of May 18 to "High Court's Ruling Rocks South." Higher headline priority was given to "Soviets Ship Arms to Guatemala," however, and both stories shared space with an article covering the jailing of Mrs. Barbara Hartle, "Washington state communist."[3] The Court decision subsequently dropped from page one, but for the rest of the week syndicated writers for the P-I discussed desegration, and the Friday editorial, two columns wide and running the full length of the page, described it as "A Great Blow for Freedom." In the cartoon accompanying it, an arm of Uncle Sam labeled "Unanimous Supreme Court vote against segregation" delivered a blow to the chin of a "Commie propagandist," while a Little-Black-Sambo character carrying school books looked on from the background. The P-I editorial dealt with change, alluded to enormous changes to come, and spoke of the need for citizens, nation-wide,

> to act with the same reasoning and restraint as the Supreme Court and remember with the same unanimity the Court displayed that we are first of all Americans . . . . It is one of the responsibilities of the highest court to advance with the times . . . . And it seems to us that . . . [in the decision] there is quiet, compelling reasoning applied to conditions that are real and vital in 1954 where they were abstruse and academic in 1896.

The editorial ended on a note which preoccupied the nation generally at that time and the Hearst press in particular:

> Finally, the Court decision is a smashing blow to Communist propagandists, who . . . have been trying to make profit of charges of racial discrimination against us. This is a decision which will be felt around the world.[4]

During the week that followed, both Seattle dailies carried occasional news releases related to Brown. The P-I made one early attempt to relate the decision to Seattle schools. Lewis Watts, Executive Secretary of the Seattle Urban League, was quoted May 18 as believing it to be "'the most significant act in the race relations field by the Supreme Court since the Dred Scott Decision,'" doing more to eliminate segregation than anything else so far with the possible exception of integration of the armed forces. "While the greatest impact would be in the South, [he said] repercussions would be felt here. . . .many Southern Negroes have come to the Pacific Northwest because of inadequate educational opportunities for their children in the South.[5]

The P-I article that reported Watts' comments added a significant editorial remark of its own:

> There is no segregation in the schools of this state. In fact, in some of the school districts, Seattle included, there are Negro teachers who have mixed classes.[6]

While the writer did not use the terms de jure and de facto, which were far from being the household words in 1954 that they would later become, the concepts and the distinction between them as applied to segregation were pervasive.

Few citizens in Seattle believed that "segregation" applied to their community, for segregation appeared to them to mean legally mandated separation of pupils by race, nothing more. At a School Board meeting in November, 1954, Superintendent Samuel Fleming reported that at a Conference of Superintendents of Major Cities which he had attended in Louisville, Kentucky, "Desegration came in for considerable discussion. Of course, I was simply a kibitzer in that discussion."[7] Seattle, in short, was not involved.

The first meeting of the Seattle School Board following the Court decision, held on May 21, made no mention of the decision or of desegregation.[8] Seattle's heavy concentration of black students in six elementary and three secondary schools[9] was not officially considered segregation.

The general reaction among others prominent in running Seattle's schools appears to have been "very favorable" to the Court's decision. Mrs. Henry B. Owen, President of the Seattle School Board in 1954, later recalled no particular Board reaction to the decision:

> Of course we were still thinking of it at that time in terms of those schools that were intentionally segregated. And about the first discussions that I remember--we had some discussions among ourselves about the fact that we <u>couldn't</u> do anything about the housing . . . our feeling at that time was "it was not our fault that the schools were segregated," and I think we interpreted the 1954 decision in those terms.[10]

Dr. Edward Palmason, who joined Mrs. Owen on the Board

four years later, agreed. The Board and the District administrators held, he said, that

> the Brown decision was a race decision--not necessarily an education decision and that it dealt with segregation by law and it didn't affect us. This was the kind of peculiar, comfortable feeling that we had all over the country--that, yes, Brown was right--it's wrong to segregate children by law, but our segregation was caused by housing patterns and we're not guilty. And that's the way it sat.[11]

It had been sitting that way for some time, and as Lewis Watts predicted, there would be repercussions in Seattle from the Brown case. Organizations active in the field of race relations, such as the Urban League and Seattle's Civic Unity Committee, had been concerned for years with conditions and programs in the schools. Their concern and efforts toward change and equalization of opportunity would escalate.

In Seattle, as elsewhere, the landmark ruling helped build the base for what was to become Seattle's civil rights movement. In the words of Walter Hundley, Seattle's black community "didn't run out into the street and set off fire crackers, but we were extremely jubilant." With the feeling that Supreme Court rulings on race questions "really followed the winds of the political times," the decision "meant to us that America might be ready for some serious change. So we tried to build on that."[12]

Prior to 1954, the Seattle School District had

confined its effort to promote racial integration primarily to the hiring of minority teachers. Ernest Campbell, Fleming's successor as Superintendent, recalled:

> [It] began way back in the forties--with Mr. Fleming and Virgil Smith, who was active in the Urban League. They were very careful, or tried to be. They wanted to bring in non-white teachers who could establish themselves and be well-respected . . . . And they did so --they were elected on their merits--they were assigned all over the city . . . they achieved the respect of the other teachers and of the parents . . . and this number grew [by the mid-sixties] to something like 150.[13]

It was Mr. Campbell's feeling that the minority teachers,

> . . . the finest quality of people and excellent teachers, did more to help develop in the attitudes and minds of people all over Seattle a willingness to accept, not only them, but further steps [toward integration]--than any other thing the School District could possibly have done.[14]

In the 1940's the School District had moved very cautiously into minority hiring, with an occasional push from citizens and very strong incentive from a severe post-World War II teacher shortage. Soon after the war, Stimson Bullitt, Seattle attorney, contacted the District to recommend a well-qualified candidate for a teaching position. The candidate was a black Easterner with a degree from Yale. The District responded to Bullitt that Seattle was not ready for a black teacher.[15]

In September, 1946, the School Board received a letter

from the father of three students, with a copy of his letter to the Times, which the paper had published. The letter to the press had pointed out that if the Board sincerely wanted to relieve the teacher shortage, let them

> . . . employ qualified persons regardless of race, color or creed. There are many fine men and women, adequately trained, who, because they are Negroes, Japanese, Chinese, or Filipino are barred from teaching in Seattle schools.[16]

He had offered publicly to show the Board, which might hesitate because parents would object to non-white teachers, that there were those who would welcome them and that racial and religious extractions did not matter. He guaranteed 5,000 signatures to a statement to that effect.* [17]

In September, 1945, the Board had been contacted about minority hiring by the executive committee of the organization called the Christian Friends of Racial Equality. At their September 11 meeting they had considered the fact, as they understood it, that during the past several years a large number of Seattle teachers had been recruited from other states, "but that among them had been no Negro teachers." They then voted to send the following resolution to the Board and the Superintendent, with a copy to the Civic Unity Committee:

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*The Board's reply to his letter is not in the District files.

> Resolved: That the Christian Friends of Racial Equality ask the adoption of a policy of non-discrimination in the hiring of professional personnel, and that the enlistment of teachers representing the Minority Groups be accomplished through the same procedure by which the present teaching staff is enlisted.[18]

The School District's response to the Christian Friends is not known, but their resolution generated contact between the School District and the Civic Unity Committee. Two days after receiving it, Superintendent Fleming wrote to George Greenwood, CUC president:

> When I was talking with you relative to negro teachers I overlooked the fact that we had had three or four of these teachers in our nursery schools and day care centers in certain sections of the city. We have had no unfavorable reaction.[19]

A debate over the hiring of black teachers, meanwhile, arose in the inner circles of the Administration. Virgil Smith, an assistant superintendent for curriculum, later to receive Civic Unity's award for outstanding achievement in human relations, was strong in support of minority hiring. Smith was given the job of finding qualified classroom teachers. The Superintendent discussed the hiring of a black teacher with the Board, and the Board, recalled Mrs. Owen later, offered no objections, "so long as he got a topnotch person."[20]

The shortage of teachers for the 1947-48 school year posed a problem. In July, the Superintendent had reported to the Board that there were still thirty teachers needed

at the elementary level, particularly in the first and second grades. The pressure of the shortage shows in the Board's voting election of teachers in two categories: "Regular Election" and "Emergency Service," the latter primarily for the hiring of married women. That summer the Board chose 19 teachers under regular election and 22 for emergency service. They appear to have included two black teachers, Mrs. Thelma Fisher Dewitty and Miss Marita Johnson, reported in the Seattle Times on September 3, 1947, as the first two Negro teachers "in the history of the city's public schools."* Mrs. Dewitty, from Corpus Christi, Texas, was to teach second grade at Cooper School in West Seattle. Miss Johnson, who had come to Seattle from Dayton, Ohio, would teach household service at the Broadway-Edison Technical School.[21]

Further careful publicity followed. A Times photograph the next day showed Mrs. Dewitty in the midst of a second grade reading group at Cooper, and the text advised that "The first two Negroes ever to teach in Seattle Public Schools were at their jobs today and happy in their new surroundings." The city was reassured that "Both come to the Seattle School system with more than adequate

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*The name of neither Mrs. Dewitty nor Miss Johnson appears on the list of newly elected teachers in the District's official records for July, August or September, 1947.

educational backgrounds." Miss Johnson was a graduate of Hampton Institute and had done graduate work in dietetics at the University of Chicago and the University of Washington. Mrs. Dewitty graduated from Wiley College, Marshal, Texas; had taught in Texas schools for fourteen years; and had attended the 1947 summer session at the University of Washington.[22]

Whether it was caution or oversight, Mrs. Dewitty's election to the teacher corps was not noted officially until April, 1948. In January, the Board had voted to eliminate the emergency service classification, and, at its April 16 meeting, teachers on that list were voted to regular status with all seniority rights. Mrs. Dewitty was among those so transferred, and she continued to teach for the School District until her retirement in 1971.[23]

Miss Johnson's career with the District appears to have been less secure and to have lacked Admininstration support. The course which she was to teach had been requested by the Urban League. It attracted a group of from fifteen to twenty interested students. They were referred through a counseling network, resulting in a small enrollment. The Urban League, fearing that the course was in jeopardy, met with the District's Virgil Smith in January, 1948, to discuss the problem. The final disposition of the matter is not apparent, but Miss Johnson is reported to have later "expressed the belief that Mr. Fleming [felt]

that the Urban League did not 'have its feet on the ground' in requesting this course."[24] Her name was not encountered in any further connection with the School District.

Perhaps the Superintendent need not have been conservative in the minority hiring area. There was positive response almost immediately. The National Conference of Christians and Jews and the Seattle Association of Classroom Teachers wrote to express approval and gratification at the District's non-discriminatory policy in employment. The Seattle Teachers Union, local 200, wrote to commend the "enlightened decision . . . [which] upholds the democratic tradition of economic opportunity for all."[25]

The policy of being "color blind" in personnel matters prevailed at that time, and it is not possible to follow the early course of minority hiring in detail. One other instance further illustrates the District's caution, however. The agenda for the School Board meeting on April 22, 1949, included the election of teachers, which, in this case, called for special consideration. Superintendent Fleming alerted the Board to expect the recommendation

> . . . of Mrs. May Higa, a Japanese girl,*

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*She was a graduate of Central Washington College of Education and the University of Washington, with an additional year of graduate work at Columbia.

> . . . for election as a kindergarten or first grade teacher . . . . [The Superintendent said that] she is a superior person in every respect . . . [and the] plan would be to use her at the Bailey Gatzert School.

He went on to explain that he had not had a chance to consult with the Board about this and would not be at the meeting, so he had

> . . . prepared two recommendations on personnel, one containing Mrs. Higa's name and one omitting it, with the idea that the Board will . . . discuss the matter in Committee of the Whole and according to the Board's judgment the list, either with or without Mrs. Higa's name, will be offered at the meeting.[26]

He felt that she would be accepted by the community and that she was entitled to their favorable consideration. "The matter" was obviously settled in Committee, since her name was on the list presented at the Board meeting. The election of those recommended was unanimous.[27]

There are early indications of School District involvement with minority student problems. While, for the most part, it appears as positive concern for equal educational opportunity and an early inclination toward compensatory programs, there is evidence that Seattle schools had clearly had problems of segregation.

Seattle Civic Unity Committee (CUC) stayed in close contact with the School District. As early as December, 1944, there had been meetings with the District on the question of "Democratic education." One such discussion

had given Civic Unity's president

> . . . the impression that the Seattle Public Schools are very conscious of the problem and extremely progressive in attempting to work out programs and procedures in the school system to cope with the problem.[28]

This impression remained and tempered the relationship between CUC and the School District. The closeness of that relationship was apparent when the term of Emlyn Jones, a School District representative on the CUC Board, expired and Civic Unity sought to have him on their Advisory Council so that they

> . . . could continue to have him represent the Seattle Public Schools and be invited to every meeting. . . . He is an asset and carries over the old understanding of Mr. Fleming that CUC is the Seattle Public Schools resource on School-Community relationships. Someone new may not have this conception.[29]

Civic Unity was given to optimistic generalizations about the District's intergroup activities, such as in saying that teachers and administrators made "every effort to assure absolutely equal educational opportunities for all races and creeds."[30]

In 1951, at Civic Unity's behest, Dr. Chester Babcock prepared a report which elaborated on some of the School District's earlier intergroup experiences. During the 1937-38 school year a committee of teachers had worked with the Urban League to develop a bibliography of materials on race relations, which was issued by the Superintendent's

office on January 31, 1938, and marked ". . . the first specific step toward a program of inter-cultural education in the Seattle Public Schools." In light of problems and changes which occurred during World War II, such as the evacuation of Japanese citizens and the influx of other minorities, Superintendent Worth McClure had requested a comprehensive survey in the fall of 1943 in an attempt to determine whether the District's intergroup relations were being handled "democratically." The survey found many instances in which individual building adminstrators were firm in equal treatment of students and were supported by the central administration. One such case involved a principal's refusal to remove a black elementary student from the safety patrol in response to the demand from a father who protested against "having a Negro school boy patrolman tell his son when he could and could not cross the street."[31]

Civic Unity sponsored many conferences, seminars and workshops. Beginning in 1953, the organization held an annual high school conference on race relations in cooperation with the School District. The event was hosted by a different high school each year, received good media coverage, and was always reported as successful in the CUC minutes. For the rest of its existence, Civic Unity remained involved in the problems of school segregation, and this involvement was "second only in importance to [its

work in] housing discrimination."[32]

The Urban League had a different perspective in the early years. Its concern was more practical and led to some action by School District personnel. The request for a course to be taught by a black teacher at Broadway-Edison is a case in point. The Urban League was indirectly responsible for some of the District's initial attempts to deal with the problems of disadvantaged students.

In 1949, H. D. Woodland, an Urban League staff member, filed a report on "Garfield drop-out and failure problems," telling of a project started in collaboration with the Garfield attendance officer, a Miss Warren. When Woodland had detailed for her the experience of a recent Garfield graduate, the story caught her attention and produced wider and more serious concern for the problems of school climate and home and learning environments.[33]

During the previous summer the League had convinced the phone company to accept the graduate as an applicant for a position as a switchboard operator.. He and the company's personnel manager conferred and decided that, in Woodland's words:

> . . . because of a number of acceptable features [she] would be just the right person to begin with as our first [black] telephone operator. Everything went very well until [her] grades were secured from Garfield. [Then] Mr. Ross rejected the application, stating that [her] scholastic standards were not as high as the Telephone Company would

wish to take a chance with.[34]

Neither Miss Warren nor Mr. Slocum, the Vice-principal, could believe this. They were both familiar with her outstanding activity career at Garfield, where she had also been a B student. In checking, they found that she had transferred from Bremerton where her work had been poor. Those who knew her and what she was capable of doing were convinced that something in the Bremerton experience had kept her from doing her best there, and they came to the conclusion that "it is this factor that we should discover in relation to all non-white students . . . find out why . . . [a capable] student is not doing the work that he or she is supposed to do."[35]

The concern which that story generated among the Garfield staff led gradually to a group based at the School District's headquarters, which, by the following spring was called the "committee for the study of school leavers." Urban League involvement continued, with its executive secretary in attendance at many of the early meetings. The group produced a study of 106 students, 41 percent non-white, who had dropped out of Garfield during the 1948-49 school year. A written report from the committee was seen as vital, both because it would be helpful in getting teachers more involved and because it ". . . would do much toward focusing the interest of Mr. Fleming upon the study." The importance of reaching Superintendent

Fleming was stressed at a number of points by the committee. The School District's research department issued a mimeographed document titled "Garfield Leaver Study," dated April 25, 1950.[36]

The committee was variously known as the "Leaver Study Group," "The Garfield Drop Out Committee," and the "Garfield Retaining Committee." The impression is that each year the group began anew to redefine its objectives and that it did not utilize fully all of its resources. Minutes of meetings show sporadic activity through the committee's last meeting on March 30, 1955.[37]

Allegations of discrimination and an increase in interracial problems in the schools continued to reach the Civic Unity Committee and the Urban League. The two groups responded differently. In 1951, the Urban League sent a field worker to Garfield to investigate patterns of exclusion and segregation in extra-curricular activities. A black student had been told by the music director not to try out for the majorette group, which was all-white; not

> . . . to join the group but form a group of her own. She asked him what he meant and he told her specifically that she should form a group consisting of colored girls.[38]

Selection for parts in plays and operettas was regarded as discriminatory.

> During the Funfest the participation of non-whites was certainly on a segregated pattern within the Funfest and

> he observed that there were approximately three non-whites in the cast taking bit parts, which played them most definitely in the background or too much characteristic stereotyping.[39]

The Urban League also discovered that Garfield was the only school that did not sponsor dances. The Vice-principal said that in the past the dances had not been too successful, but "it was pointed out by the Negro lads that the school feared the race question, and that was the basic reason why the dances were closed down."[40] It appears that the Urban League did not confront the District directly with these instances of discrimination.

In April, 1955, the Civic Unity board received a report of a case of "alleged discrimination relating to a Negro boy in the Seattle Public Schools." His mother had registered a complaint with Civic Unity regarding his transfer by the School District from Leschi to Horace Mann, a school with a higher percentage of non-white enrollment. She felt that the transfer was based on race rather than the need for special programs. While no formal complaint was lodged by CUC, the executive secretary did investigate and, on the basis of facts obtained from the School District's perspective, it was concluded that the transfer had been made in the interest of the child's progress. Civic Unity's executive secretary wrote to the boy's mother and said:

> The transfer was, I am sure, for his

> benefit and I do hope you will not encourage him to believe it had anything to do with his race. He needs to learn as we all do, that although we are sometimes discriminated against unjustly we are usually judged by our own ability and the way we get along with other people.[41]

Civic Unity records reflected an optimistic picture of Seattle's school situation and a confidence that the District was doing the right thing. On her return from a National Association of Intergroup Relations Organizations conference in Kansas City in November, 1957, Louise Blackham, CUC's executive secretary, reported to its board that in her view Seattle was ahead of most cities in regard to the trend toward "one race schools." This was so because of a ". . . School Board truly concerned; aware; seeking solutions and working with civic agencies on the problem;" and because there was "a re-examining of school boundaries actually in process, with civic agencies permitted to participate." She also cited the facts that the District had a policy of "impartial placement" of teachers, and that school people were participating in local minority housing programs.[42]

The Urban League was less optimistic and more practical in its approach. Its files contain the report of a Human Relations Workshop which was held at Eckstein Junior High School in May, 1955. Its theme was "Building Positive Community Programs to Relieve Tensions." Schools were one

area of concern, and reports indicate that fairly frank discussion must have taken place.[43] At the same time, the Urban League was attempting to organize a grass roots group in the Central Area to deal with growing problems there.

Randolph Carter, Urban League staff member, met with six others on May 17, 1955, to try to form the Garfield Neighborhood Committee. He raised serious questions about community responsibility for providing programs in health, welfare, education and recreation, and "suggested that they try to get a clear idea of the basic problems affecting the lives of the people in the area." The Urban League was concerned about growing black juvenile delinquency in and around Washington Junior High, and about Garfield's becoming segregated. The first step needed was for the neighborhood committee to "decide whether it wanted to be in business, seriously and long enough to get the job done."[44] These organizing efforts appear to have been fruitless, and the committee did not materialize.

The following year, however, the Urban League organized its own committee on schools, which did "stay in business" and played an important role in attempts to desegregate Seattle's schools. The committee was to be made up of "city-wide representatives with an interest and concern in the welfare of children and the proper function of schools." The letter sent to prospective members in October, 1956,

began by saying that

> Because daily newspapers devote columns to the school problems of the South, we are inclined to disregard the thought of similar circumstances locally. However, Seattle, like other Northern cities, has problems of its own.[45]

It supported that assertion with figures showing growing minority racial concentration in a few of the city's schools.

By 1957, 81 percent of all elementary age black pupils in Seattle were enrolled in nine schools: Mann, Leschi, Harrison, Madrona, Minor, Colman, Stevens, Gatzert and High Point. Only High Point, which served the area in West Seattle containing the High Point public housing project, was not located in the city's Central Area. Two of those eight Central Area schools, Madrona and Harrison, were involved with McGilvra School in a triangle of parental concern (which had begun as early as 1953) over growing racial imbalance, attendance boundary changes and pupil transfer policies.[46]

During the previous school year (1955-56) tension was high in the Madrona area. Civic Unity consulted with the Madrona Community Club in March, 1956, concerning rumors of ". . . problems caused by 'infiltration' of negroes (sic) in the community, such as juvenile delinquency; school problems; 'group' and 'individual infiltration.'" CUC summarized the problem:

> Tension exists in club due to rigid determination on part of old residents to keep minorities out of area and rigid determination on part of new younger residents to welcome minorities to area and to prevent flight of white residents from area. (sic)[47]

Conflict had surfaced the preceding October, when the Old Guard had been challenged by an "'aggressive group' largely made up of new comers." Some suggestions were made by Alex Gottfried and Douglas Shaw Palmer for changes in the Club's 1936 constitution and by-laws. A document dated October 25, 1955, favored a tightening of policy on special meetings and by-law changes, as well as replacing the constitutional wording on membership elegibility for "All persons of the Caucasian race and good moral character" with "Any person residing or owning real property in this district."[48]

The Bulletin of the Community Club announcing its October 3, 1955, meeting at Epiphany Parish Hall detailed in no uncertain terms where the Club's president stood. After the ritual request for dues and a disclaimer that he was only giving his personal opinions and not speaking as president, Leslie H. Dills came down to cases:

> This District has problems.
>
> Problem #1. Attempted infiltration of our area by certain groups and organizations, which, if effected, will cause depreciation of our property values.
> Problem #2. The taking over of our schools by these same groups.
> Problem #3. Intimidation of property

> owners by some unscrupulous real estate dealers (by telling . . . owners . . . they cannot refuse to sell to other than members of the Caucasian race). THIS IS NOT TRUE.
> Problem #4. Vandalism and Assault, by negro (sic) teenagers upon white women in or near one of our local shopping districts.
> Problem #5. A DEFEATIST ATTITUDE held by some of our residents that negro (sic) infiltration is inevitable. THIS IS NOT TRUE, a united front can save the situation.
>
> . . . a UNITED FRONT by your CLUB is the most effective way of meeting our problems.[49]

Some residents in the community appear to have held the Seattle School District rather than gradual and "inevitable" population shifts responsible for increasing black enrollment at Madrona. In 1953, Civic Unity requested the School District Administration to explain its boundary and enrollment policies. The letter requesting this information explained that

> Al Westberg* says he gets recurring comments that in this district there would seem to be placement of Negro children in the Madrona School even though it would seem logical, geographically, to be enrolled at McGilvra. His own observation . . . was that there could be some truth to this allegation. Some of his wife's PTA friends indicate that this kind of division is taken for granted.[50]

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*Mr. Westberg at one time served the 37th District in the Washington State House of Representatives and he was the first chairman of the Seattle Human Rights Commission.

Miss Blackham softened CUC's impact somewhat by adding for the administrator that Mrs. Owen thought the complaint was probably unjustified ("since it's against the sincere policy and practice of the Seattle Public Schools,") and that any specific case would receive immediate attention.[51]

Mrs. Owen recalled the early boundary and transfer disputes, and that her earliest awareness of segregation involved her trying to convince a black parent to send children to McGilvra. "McGilvra . . . had the reputation of being an all-white school and, I learned, was supposed to be an all-white school because the School Board was keeping it that way."[52]

The information on boundaries and enrollments was given to the Civic Unity board by Emlyn Jones in September, 1955, by which time the atmosphere in the Madrona Community was growing rather ugly. He reported that pupil placement was done on the basis of distance of residence from school and with consideration for natural boundaries such as arterial streets. "Adjustments are sometimes made in individual cases on the basis of relevant, reasonable factors." So far as McGilvra was concerned, there was only one black family in the area and its children attended parochial schools. He asked that "any case of alleged discrimination" received by Civic Unity be referred to him, while questions of attendance area boundaries went to Assistant

Superintendent Kenneth Selby,[53] thus keeping the two issues entirely separate.

He did not address the question of white pupil transfers being allowed into McGilvra, but this was to come up soon, when Al Westberg reported on the October 3 meeting of the Madrona-Denny Blaine Community Club. There had been heated discussion about housing, and

> Mr. Westberg said that during the discussion regarding the Madrona-Denny Blaine area there was reference to school boundaries and implications that it seems to be possible to transfer white children across borders to the McGilvra School but that this privilege is not granted to Negro families. Since questions on this come up year after year . . . it was decided to look into it once again . . . so that we may have accurate information on the matter.[54]

In the course of Civic Unity's discussion of school boundaries and changing population patterns

> Mr. Jones reaffirmed the attitude of the Seattle Public Schools Administration. He said that schools serve their local districts. The Administration does not believe it is wise to change boundaries on the basis of race. Children are transferred from one school to another if the principals of these schools agree on the desirability of the transfer but that such transfers are not on the basis of race or religion.[55]

On the occasions when reference was made to exceptions to the neighborhood attendance assignment, whether it was "adjustment" in individual cases or "desirability" of transfer agreed on by school principals, there would seem to be

loopholes through which a school bus could be driven. The Civic Unity board apparently was not totally satisfied with the School District's explanations. At any rate, they authorized appointment of a committee "to look into complaints regarding the school boundary between McGilvra and Denny-Blaine [Madrona] schools."[56]

In the meantime, the Harrison community had been heard from. At the School Board meeting on May 14, 1954, the secretary read a communique from the Harrison PTA ". . .requesting a change in the boundary lines of the Harrison School to meet the need of the growing enrollment." By unanimous vote of the Board, "the matter was referred to the Superintendent for study and report."[57]

Harrison School, at 32nd Avenue and East Republican, is virtually an equal distance from both McGilvra, at 38th Avenue East and East Blaine, and Madrona, at 33rd Avenue and East Union. There was, however, no equality in the facilities at the three sites. At that time students at McGilvra were housed in a brick building, nine rooms of which were completed in 1913 and the other four of which were added in 1940. The Madrona facility provided eight classrooms in a fifty-year-old frame building and a 1917 brick addition which included eight classrooms, a domestic science room, shop, kitchen and lunchroom.[58]

Harrison students, on the other hand, were in a four-room brick structure built in 1913, with portable classrooms

needed to accommodate its total enrollment. Harrison's original 1913 blueprints indicated plans to increase the size of the building to twenty-five rooms; however, by 1954 no additions had been made.[59]

In the early years of the depression the Harrison enrollment declined and the cost of maintaining it became prohibitive. The School Board voted on July 22, 1932, to close Harrison, and its pupils were disbursed to Madrona and to Longfellow. (Longfellow was on the site of what became Meany Junior High in 1942.)[60]

Community groups pressed the School Board to re-open the school, and it did so in 1936. In the years following the re-opening, the enrollment was erratic. A 1951 School District publication was somewhat prophetic in the following statement:

> The future of Harrison School would be hard to predict because of constant population shifts in that area. The P.T.A. at Harrison is an active group, however, and they will do all they can to maintain their school.[61]

The letter from the Harrison PTA in the spring of 1954 was considerably more detailed than the brief reference to it in the May 14 School Board minutes. The group of "tax payers" signing the letter (including Mrs. Irving Clark, Mrs. George R. Thieme, and the PTA president, Mrs. Garrett) confronted the problems at the school directly in their attempt to change the boundary lines. The lines had been

established when the school re-opened to accommodate the overflow of primary grade students from neighboring schools. They pointed out that Harrison now had pupils through fifth grade and would have the sixth grade added in September. Since population growth had produced unbalanced pupil loads in the adjacent schools as well as Harrison, they assumed that the boundaries would again be adjusted as they had been periodically in the past.[62]

Having made these points, they had set the stage for presenting their basic concerns:

> The enrollment at Harrison School has recently shown a decreasing white minority. This gives the appearance to both white and non-white families of a segregated school. Knowing your antipathy to any such result, we ask you to consider this danger and adjust the boundary lines in such a way as to include more white children in the Harrison School district.
>
> Naturally this would increase the enrollment and perhaps give cause for complaint on the ground of inadequate facilities. But a visit to Harrison School will show that even for the present foreseeable enrollment the plant facilities are inadequate.

They then presented other situations causing concern at the school: poor lunchroom facilities, inadequate facilities for all-student assemblies and for rainy days (no small consideration in Seattle), and inadequate plumbing for the total enrollment.[63]

Mr. Fleming dealt with all the grievances. He had to admit that Harrison was at a disadvantage so far as

lunchroom, assembly space and rainy day areas were concerned, but he defended the plumbing as exceeding the minimum set by the state. His explanation of boundary changes among the three school areas probably did little to change the minds of those who believed that McGilvra was being intentionally kept an all-white school:

> We do not change boundaries excepting for the purpose of transferring part of the load of one school to another. This was done in the case of Harrison for the purpose of relieving both Madrona and McGilvra, although the transfer from the Madrona district was greater than the transfer from McGilvra. Further transfer of territory, if made, would cut into the Madrona District more than the McGilvra district because the latter is situated with space on the grounds so that it can take care of its load with portables. We would not feel it was proper procedure in any event to gerrymander territory from one district to another in order to balance up the race situation in any community school.[64]

More of that statement appeared in the District's response to a committee of Harrison patrons who attended the May 28 Board meeting to pursue the matters raised on the 14th. In the discussion which followed, both Donald A. Schmechel, a prominent attorney and a Harrison area resident, and Lewis Watts, Executive Secretary of the Urban League, spoke of the "great desirability of maintaining a race balance at Harrison School."[65]

At its early stages, the de facto segregation controversy in Seattle was handled at the level of administrative

procedure rather than as Board policy. However, after fairly lengthy discussion on May 28, "members of the Board expressed a great desire to solve the problem, and . . . [on a unanimous vote] the Harrison district was asked to appoint a committee to meet with Mr. Selby to examine the boundaries and explore any possibility for improving the situation."[66] After some discussion at their meeting on June 18, Board members decided to visit both Harrison and Madrona schools at the next regular meeting, July 2, 1954.[67] Minutes of that meeting show that the Board left for the schools immediately after adjournment, but there is no indication of what the visits may have accomplished.[68]

While both the Civic Unity Committee and the Urban League continued to be involved in school related matters, and certainly individual and group feelings within and between neighborhood school areas remained unsettled, the record of the School District shows nothing more on boundaries and transfers until the fall of 1956. In the interim, the Board elected a new superintendent, and the membership of the Board itself was changing.

The retirement of Superintendent Samuel E. Fleming, effective the following June, was announced December 30, 1955. Mr. Fleming had been with the Seattle Public Schools for 48 years. He had become Superintendent in 1945, only the fourth man to serve in that office since the turn of the century.[69] There was no search for a successor, and

no one outside the District was considered. The Board members were "quite universally agreed" that Ernest Campbell was the man they wanted, and his selection was announced in March, 1956.[70]

Mr. Campbell was a product of the Seattle Public Schools. He graduated from West Seattle High School and the University of Washington. He began his professional service with the District in 1936 as an administrative assistant to Superintendent Worth McClure. He became an assistant superintendent in 1940. People concerned about problems in segregated schools might have taken heart at his selection as Superintendent had they seen Urban League reports of early meetings of the group studying Garfield dropouts. While other adminstrators were seen as articulate in expressing humanitarian concerns, few could be counted on for effective action. There was confidence in Mr. Campbell, however. He was seen as having a good grasp of some new concepts in education, which he ". . . would certainly implement into action." As he pointed out himself, the idea of compensatory education was not peculiar to the 1960's, and the Seattle School District had attempted to provide such programs early on.[71]

There were two changes in School Board membership during the mid-50's. In January, 1954, businessman Kenneth Schoenfeld resigned because of ill health. That

vacancy was filled in March by the Board's appointment of Bernard Reiter, a highly respected attorney. In November, 1955, the resignation of John H. Reid, University District publisher, created both another vacancy and some dissension on a Board that seldom if ever acted with less than unanimity. James Duncan wanted to defer Board action and allow a city election in March to fill the vacancy. He was concerned that another Board appointment would raise criticism and charges of self-perpetuation. The other members felt that a five-member board could not afford to operate one member short for that length of time, and at their meeting on December 15, E. Lyle Goss, Manager of the University Book Store, was appointed to the Board position.[72]

The issue of student transfer policies was back before the Board in October, 1956. An administrative memo, dated October 11, was prepared for the Board's information. It was headed "Problems of Racial Population in Elementary Schools," and it detailed a complete investigation of the entire matter. The schools specifically involved were Harrison, Colman, Gatzert, Leschi, Madrona, Mann, and T. T. Minor, all having large percentages of black students enrolled.[73]

The memorandum listed the causes of this racial imbalance as imposed housing restrictions, gregariousness and "transfer policies?".(sic) Such imbalance was found

to result in lower academic achievement, behavior problems, lower staff morale and parental dissatisfaction based on the three factors as well as on racial imbalance itself. Community groups and others had suggested means of coping with the problem, including changing the transfer policy, instituting some aspects of compensatory education, using pupil ability grouping, making building improvements and additions, gerrymandering attendance boundaries, and transporting pupils "to more distant schools." [74] The idea of bussing arose early in Seattle.

The memorandum then restated the District's transfer policy as follows:

> Upon application of the parents, a principal may transfer a pupil to another school, provided it is found upon telephoning to the principal of the other school that there is room for such a pupil and that there is no special reason that such transfer should not be made. Parents should understand that the transfer of pupils to schools not in their own districts is merely tentative and that they will be required to return to their home schools in case the rooms to which they have been assigned become crowded.[75]

The section of the memo dealing with the application of that policy almost certainly would have given support to those contending that the transfer policy was not equitable and was, indeed, adding to the problem of racial imbalance. It revealed that principals did not consider the policy a mandate to grant transfers without a

valid reason until after 1952, and that since 1952 principals were advised to approve transfers without any valid reason. It further said that there was no clear understanding as to what constituted "room" in a school or what constituted "crowded."* However, that lack would seem to have been made a moot point by the final statement that transfers had accumulated even with the addition of portables, which usually signified overcrowding and a need for additional space.[76]

In analyzing the possibility of the District's having a "non-transfer policy," four consequences were projected by the Administration. First, such a non-policy would dissatisfy white patrons who wished their children to attend elsewhere. Secondly, white patrons "whose children must remain" would be better satisfied. Third, non-white patrons would also be better satisfied. And finally, in a forecast of what would later be termed white flight, it considered that a non-transfer policy might cause as much imbalance as their present one by creating movement out of the neighborhood or into private schools.[77]

The memo posed questions pertaining specifically to the Harrison situation. How could the District justify a

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*The District never did clarify what was meant by a "valid reason."

permanent addition at the site in view of its having been closed twenty years ago? What would happen if Harrison were partially or entirely closed and neighboring schools enlarged? The answer to the latter question was that the racial balance would not change, that additions to those neighboring buildings and grounds would be necessary, and that Madrona would have to accept the bulk of the Harrison load.[78] Surely many would ask "Why not McGilvra?"

That memorandum formed the basis of Mr. Selby's report to the Board at its October 12 meeting, and much of it found its way into the official record. He pointed out the change in application of the policy since 1952, and stated the conclusion that a non-transfer policy would not solve the problem of racial imbalance. In the discussion which followed, after the Board was shown a map of school boundaries, it was agreed that the boundaries of Harrison should be changed to extend eastward to Lake Washington. This enlargement of the Harrison attendance area was an administrative procedure, not a Board policy change. "The Board expressed interest in the report, which was placed on file."[79]

The Urban League's School Committee met three days later and also adressed the situation at Harrison. They were especially concerned about the 50 percent annual teacher turnover at the school. They considered it a fact that District policy allowed white students who

should have attended Harrison to transfer to McGilvra instead. An additional concern to be further investigated by the committee was the Harrison principal's ". . . attitude and a few unflattering remarks that were made toward minority groups."[80]

The Harrison boundaries continued to plague the School District during that school year (1956-57), and the Harrison community now was expressing its concern strongly in terms of de facto segregation and race discrimination. The School Board minutes for May 10, 1957, refer to the receipt of a communication from the Harrison PTA which expressed "concern that the student body of the Harrison School has become largely composed of minority racial groups . . . proposed some possible solutions and requested an appointment to discuss them with the Board."[81]

The letter itself conveyed a note of considerably more urgency than the entry in the official record implies. It referred to a number of meetings held to explore the problem of growing racial imbalance, a trend which, if it were to continue, might well result in a total non-Caucasian student body; and it recalled their concern about inadequate facilities, which had been called to the District's attention earlier. The community fully appreciated and understood the absence of any segregation policy in Seattle's schools, ". . . yet we are faced with an increasing problem of de facto segregation, the

consequences of which are just as real as if segregation were a policy."[82] In view of the importance of trying to remove actual racial segregation, they asked that the District consider a number of suggested courses of action.

They first asked the adoption of a formal policy acknowledging the importance of trying to preserve and promote racial balance, for the enchancement of the education and social development of all students regardless of race. They asked that the District study possible methods of implementing such a policy for all Seattle Public Schools. They then requested consideration of methods adopted or studied elsewhere to combat de facto segregation. These methods included locating new schools so that imbalance would be unlikely; adjusting boundaries to relieve imbalance or stabilize student population; continuing a policy of equal teaching and facility standards; and considering whether schools becoming completely minority should be closed, or at least not enlarged, and the affected students sent to neighboring schools.[83]

While they focused attention on Harrison, the problem involved all Central Area schools to some degree. They welcomed an opportunity to discuss the problem with the School Board:

> We recognize that your primary concern is rightly with education, but we are convinced that the problem set forth above vitally affects the quality and success of education. Any contribution,

> however small, which you can make would be a significant part of the overall community attack on the problem of racial discrimination.[84]

Even after being prodded and urged to deal with the problem of segregation as such, the School District adhered to its policy of handling student population problems officially as matters of school load and overcrowding. At the Board meeting on June 14, 1957, "McGilvra-Harrison Area Transfer" was again on the agenda, this time with patrons from the McGilvra area present to confront the Board. They were objecting to the transferring of approximately twenty pupils from McGilvra to Harrison for the coming school year.

The principal at McGilvra had ". . . notified parents of children attending McGilvra but living in the Harrison district that they would be expected to enroll their children at Harrison next fall" in accordance with standard procedure "which has been followed for years" in such situations. Only three or four of the prospective transfers were the result of the recent Harrison boundary change. The others were all being assigned to Harrison in accordance with boundaries set in 1950 and 1954. Failure to pass a 3.5 mill levy had resulted in the loss of one teaching position at McGilvra. The transfers were being made because grades one, two and six in that building would be large, and the corresponding grades at

Harrison would not be particularly crowded.[85]

The delegation of McGilvra parents present to protest the transfers gave arguments ranging from concern about children crossing a major arterial, to their desire to have sixth graders finish elementary school where they were well known. And "each of the parents stated they had no information that they were not in the McGilvra district and had made specific inquiries before purchasing their property to be sure of their school location."[86] The area involved in the dispute was between Madison Street on the south and the Broadmoor Country Club on the north, along 31st, 32nd, and 33rd Avenues North.* [87]

The Board referred the matter to the Superintendent for study. At the next Board meeting, June 28, postponement of a real settlement was effectively managed. Note was taken of apparent ". . . confusion and erroneous information regarding the boundaries . . . following [Harrison's] reactivation a few years ago." Residents of the disputed area had been allowed to enroll at McGilvra and had not been told it was not the proper school. Since a new building would be under construction at the Harrison site during the coming year, limiting play space, a "transfer of pupils at this time . . . [would] tend to crowd

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*In 1961, the designation of those streets was changed from Avenue North to Avenue East.

Harrison classes at a time when the construction program will present management problems." The recommended "solution" which was accepted, was that sixth graders be allowed to remain at McGilvra and that the 12 first and second graders be given the option of transferring or staying at McGilvra until the new Harrison building was completed. "If enrollment figures then require it, they, with others from other grades not presently affected, would be transferred to Harrison."[88]

The reprieve was not too gratefully received by the McGilvra parents at the meeting, who once again protested any transfers. Judging from other sources, discussion at the meeting must have touched on racial balance. The Seattle Times carried a small item headed "Protest Not on Racial Issues, Say Parents." A spokesman for the group, Mrs. Max Kaminoff of 1111 33rd Avenue North, asserted that none of them favored segregated schools, but that transferring a "handful" of white children to Harrison would not integrate it in the true sense of the word. The real target of their protest was ". . . an unfair realignment of school district boundaries."[89] Mrs. Kaminoff was a bit more pointed and specific in a letter to the Superintendent dated June 29, 1957:

> I did not mean to imply that my 8-year old child should not attend a school of mixed children, but I did want to bring out the point that four or five children from this neighborhood

> would not balance the fact that they would be in the minority in a predominantly colored school.
>
> As for the borderline that skirts around Broadmoor in a zigzag line, that gives the impression that there is prejudice on the School Board's part to keep Broadmoor in the McGilvra district and the rest out. Why is there such a point of removing one block from the McGilvra school district when the block involved (33rd Ave. N) is surrounded by Broadmoor on three sides?[90]

Parents from that same area were back one year later after receiving a letter from the School District requiring that all students living within the Harrison attendance area but enrolled elsewhere be registered at Harrison by the opening of school in September, 1958. This time they felt they knew why their area was involved and they directly charged the School District with maneuvering to keep McGilvra an all-white school.

In a letter to Mr. Campbell, May 15, 1958, the group asked to appear before the Board to protest the Harrison boundaries:

> The basis of the protest of the undersigned is that the boundaries for the Harrison Elementary School were not set in accordance with the long-established standards of the School District . . . but were arbitrarily set with an end to excluding colored children from McGilvra School, which is adjacent to the Harrison school district . . . [and they felt] that the establishment of the Harrison School boundaries was violative of the spirit

> of the law of the land that schools not be segregated.[91]

This letter was sent on to the Board with a notation that the group would be present in a Board meeting.

The Times covered the May 23 Board meeting: "Transfer of Pupils Again Protested." The delegation of parents was identified as including some of those who had begun the fight the year before, adding that two of the parents were Negroes. The School District representative recounted the policy on transfers and boundaries, and explained that the recent extensive addition to Harrison allowed the building to accommodate all pupils in its area, even those previously allowed to transfer to McGilvra because of overcrowding. The protesting delegation's statement was reported as charging that boundaries "'were set with the end to exclude colored children from McGilvra School,'" and that chances of integrating Harrison were "nil" since white parents on the border would move rather than send children to Harrison. It was also reported that after reading their formal statement the group "charged that 'the Broadmoor fence' was the real issue in setting up the school boundaries, and contended that they live closer to McGilvra than many families within the McGilvra area."[92]

On June 4, Mrs. Owen, Mr. Selby and Mr. Campbell went over the territory carefully again in order to come to some conclusion in the boundary dispute. On June 6, the

Board unanimously accepted the Superintendent's recommendation that they confirm the "recently announced intention to require pupils residing in this area now attending school elsewhere . . . to attend the Harrison School in September, 1958."[93]

That settled the matter for 1958-59, but an "I told you so" postlude was played that spring. Mrs. S. Akrish, of 1139 33rd Avenue North, wrote to the Board once more, stating the consensus of parents concerned. She reminded the Board that, although their children were transferred to Harrison, ostensibly because of overcrowding at McGilvra, "It was the opinion of the protesting parents that the five colored children was the true reason for the transfer." They had been denied a request for a portable at McGilvra to relieve crowding, but her children had recently brought home a notice from Harrison with the information that continued growth there would necessitate "two more portables . . . [and she could not] see where they will find the available space, since the play area is inadequate as it stands today." She also reminded them that this overflow was predicted by their group a year ago. Since figures showed a decline in enrollment at McGilvra, she contended that it would be more plausible and economical to transfer the overflow to McGilvra even if it meant adding portables there, where there was twice the space,

> . . . or would it create too much panic

> in Madison Park to have colored children attending their all-white McGilvra School. It appears that this situation does not differ from that at Little Rock, Arkansas, with the exception that here it is a political "hush-hush." This is in the form of a protest, and I don't intend to go through the red tape of petitions again.[94]

The brief official reference to the Akrish letter indicated Board intention to study the matter further for 1959-60. Mr. Selby more or less corroborated some of the protestors' claims when he confirmed that there had been enrollment growth at Harrison and a decline at McGilvra, resulting in Harrison's operating at capacity and McGilvra's having an empty room, which was "utilized by providing them with a library/reading-improvement teacher."[95] (Knowledge of the provision of a special teacher at McGilvra would surely have rubbed salt in the wounds of the transferees' parents.) The options considered for dealing with the pupil loads included leaving things as they were; making two possible boundary changes, one of which would not alter the McGilvra enrollment significantly and one which would, while moving mostly black students; and restoring the free transfer, hoping enough parents would take advantage of it to help. The third option was considered ". . . the weakest plan, and it is very doubtful whether many children would now transfer,"[96] an analysis that is difficult to understand in view of the strong protests which the District had received.

These options were presented to the Board in committee. No action was taken but the Board did ask for the location of children in the area ". . . with a view toward changing the boundaries sufficient to fill the vacant rooms at McGilvra and prevent portables at Harrison."[97]

The truth of charges of intentional segregation at McGilvra is difficult to determine. There is no accurate and precise indication of boundaries at that time, other than the District's stated policy of assigning students to the school nearest their homes and the 1956 extension of the Harrison boundaries to the lake front. In this era of a "color blind" approach by the School District, and of society in general, at the behest of the State Board Against Discrimination, the only reliable statistics on racial distribution in the schools for this period were compiled for 1957. These figures show a black student population of 75.6 percent at Harrison, while at McGilvra black students comprised .06 percent of the enrollment.[98]

The School District's transfer policies had come under fire at the Junior High School level, also, with some critical allegations of "favoritism." In 1957, the School District was beset by the mounting problem of attempts to transfer students out of Central Area junior highs, and home/school workers were assigned to ". . . certain areas where the problem [was] acute, such as was true between Washington and Mercer Schools this year." Parental

deception in transfer applications was implied, but ". . . comparatively few attempts at such deception are successful."[99] They had been ". . . literally deluged with requests for transfers from Washington to Mercer . . . [but] held that no transfer [would] be granted except under extremely unusual circumstances." The charge was raised that children of School District personnel were being allowed to transfer from Washington. The Director of the Attendance Office maintained that no such transfer would be granted under circumstances which would deny it to any other student, although they had ". . . attempted to make transfers for school personnel when a valid reason is involved and when such a transfer does not inconvenience or embarrass the system."[100]

The enrollment figures at Washington Junior High for 1957 show a 48.2 percent black student body. Adjacent Mercer and Sharples Junior Highs, to which the majority of transfers were sought, had black percentages of 3.1 and 2.4 respectively.[101]

In June, 1957, the Superintendent had reported to the Board that the "publicity attendant upon the McGilvra-Harrison problem had caused the Urban League to be interested."[102] The Urban League had become increasingly interested in the total school situation. In February, 1958, its School Committee presented to the Urban League Board a resume of its "fact-finding function" which had been

carried on since its inception in October, 1956.

The Committee's report had both symbolic and tangible goals:

> We urge that the Seattle Public School Board make an early public statement of policy affirming its concern over racial imbalance in the Seattle Public Schools and its support of as many of the following recommendations of the Urban League as possible.[103]

This was the first de facto segregation "demand" by a civil rights group that the School Board received. The Board met with representatives of the Urban League Committee in executive session February 28, 1958, and requested time to give the recommendations further study.[104]

Those recommendations included physical plant improvements at Central Area schools, elimination of the free transfer policy, boundary changes to reduce tendencies toward racial imbalance, location of new elementary schools so as to decrease imbalance, consideration of transferring students out of over-crowded Central Area schools, and attention to the problem's underlying cause--housing, with School Board cooperation in dealing with the housing problem. All of these recommendations would be back before the Board countless times in the future, along with a seventh recommendation which had been omitted from the Urban League Committee's final report. An earlier draft had added that if the other recommended methods did not help solve the problem, ". . . the Seattle School

Board give attention to the complete abandonment of highly segregated schools and the transportation of children to other areas."[105] The report commended the School Board for its decision to require Harrison area residents to return to that building in the fall of 1958, noting acceptance and support for this position from many of those affected even though there had been opposition at its presentation. They suggested that the School District give further study to the transfer problem, not only between Harrison and McGilvra, but also between Leschi and Muir and between Gatzert and Beacon Hill.[106]

By the end of the 1950's, Seattle had taken on what might be termed classic characteristics of a de facto segregated school system. White parents attempted to transfer children out of schools as they gradually "tipped" toward higher percentages of black enrollment. White families moved from neighborhoods previously all-white or "comfortably" integrated. Civil rights and intergroup organizations gradually began to pressure the School District to take measures to openly combat problems attendant upon segregation in the schools. The School District steadfastly adhered to its policies on student transfer and attendance boundaries and to its position that any segregation in the schools was caused by housing patterns and thus did not come within the purvue of the School Board to take corrective measures.

Two things stand out in the Seattle picture that seem to set it apart from that in other cities. First, School Board members did evidence that they were becoming concerned about conditions in the racially impacted schools, and the School District did maintain fairly close liaison with groups such as the Urban League. Given the demographics of that section of the city most involved in the early boundary and transfer disputes, some of Seattle's more influential citizens had a direct, personal stake in the resolution of the problems, a fact which had some bearing on the next phase of the school desegregation story.

CHAPTER II

AID FOR "DISADVANTAGED SCHOOLS"

The period from 1959 through 1962 was a turning point in the Seattle desegregation story. Gradual changes in attitude and action took place within the community, the School Board and the District Administration. Changing population patterns in Central Area schools continued to cause parents to request transfers and boundary changes. The School Board was aware in the early sixties of the "elaborate ruses" white parents were using to avoid having their children in schools with any sizable number of black pupils.[1] Negative publicity about the schools caused concern for the School District, especially among staff members in the Central Area schools. Organizations such as the Civic Unity Committee continued to work to influence attitudes toward integration in schools and neighborhoods. De facto segregated schools and open housing became increasingly important topics for civic groups, civil rights organizations and the School Board.

The composition of the School Board changed during this period. In 1958, James Duncan, a long-time leader in Seattle's labor movement, retired from the Board after serving for twenty-four years. The election held that

spring to fill the seat vacated by Mr. Duncan was won by Dr. Edward Palmason, a physician from the Ballard area. That campaign was waged in the aftermath of the Russian Sputnik launching, and in the midst of the controversy created by Rudolph Fleisch's book, Why Johnny Can't Read. The issues were traditional education and closing the technology gap rather than racial desegregation. The second change in Board membership occurred in 1961, with the retirement of Dietrich Schmitz, Washington Mutual Savings Bank Chairman, who had been appointed to the Board in 1928. That vacancy was filled by the appointment of Philip B. Swain, personnel officer with the Boeing Company.[2]

The issue of segregation in the schools had not been brought to the Board during Mr. Fleming's tenure as Superintendent, and the District was well into Mr. Campbell's regime before desegregation as such came to them for any decisions. Up until the early sixties, in the words of Mrs. Owen, the Board ". . . steadfastly felt that we had nothing to do with desegregation because it was not our fault that the schools were segregated--it depended entirely on housing."[3] Swain recalls the Board at the time of his appointment, himself included, being less sensitive than they ". . . should have been to the educational defects of the preponderantly black elementary schools in the Central Area." They were somewhat hesitant to "step out and really face up to problems, which had they been

pursued a little more aggressively . . . would have been found to be there."

> There was a type of euphoria that sort of centered around Garfield High School . . . what a great multi-racial educational institution it was. We weren't in too bad shape as long as we had more people in any given year who were Garfield graduates getting their Ph.D.'s than graduates of any other school.[4]

This euphoria was no doubt also sustained by statistics such as those showing 55 percent of the Garfield class of 1959 going on to college.* [5]

The Harrison-McGilvra disputes had been seen as strictly localized problems, exacerbated somewhat by the unusual situation of having student bodies composed of high and low extremes of academic achievement and cultural background, with no levels in between. The pressure that the Superintendent's office began to feel in the early sixties was seen as coming not from parents in the community, but ". . . from the organizational leadership and some 'maybe self-appointed leadership' who began to attend Board meetings . . . and were increasingly insistent that the Board adopt an outright and compulsory type of desegregation policy."[6] There continued to be concern for

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*Further breakdown of those statistics show the college enrollees to have been 66% of the 160 white graduates, 57% of the 71 Asians, and 27% of the 124 black graduates.

equality in facilities and teaching staffs, and there was increasing attention called to other conditions accompanying segregation: low academic achievement, drop-outs and discipline problems.

One of the primary objectives of the School District in submitting some large bond issues "was to improve the physical facilities in the oldest part of town."[7] Colman Elementary had received a new addition in 1956, and the long-awaited Harrison addition was dedicated in 1958 at a ceremony that drew one of the largest community turnouts the Central Area had seen at that time. T. T. Minor Elementary was enlarged in 1960, and both Madrona and Leschi Elementary Schools, as well as Garfield High School, received building additions in 1961. Washington Junior High, a wooden structure built in 1906, was completely replaced in 1963.[8]

The notoriety caused by any "incident," real or rumored, in a Central Area school was a source of distress for teachers. They wanted the public, especially families with school age children, to have a more balanced picture. Frank Hanawalt, Garfield principal in 1959, along with other staff members, discussed this at a Civic Unity Board meeting. They were unhappy that the good, positive things that occurred at Garfield went unreported.

> What does get publicized about Garfield is the one incident that is derogatory. "People are not rational about Negroes"

> and we get caught in the trap of emotionalism about one incident involving race.[9]

The Public Schools Committee of the Seattle-King County Municipal League heard Mr. Hanawalt discuss problems of de facto segregation in Seattle at its meeting December 17, 1959, a meeting also attended by Sidney Gerber, Chairman of the Washington State Board Against Discrimination (WSBAD). Another meeting of the Committee was held March 3, 1960, to continue "discussion of the effect of racial discrimination on our public schools." The School District was represented this time by Olaf Kvamme, Principal of Madrona Elementary School. Among others present at the meeting were Mrs. Andrew Gunby, Kenneth MacDonald of the WSBAD, Irving Clark, Jr., Solie Ringold, Walter B. Williams and Donald Schmechel. Schmechel had spoken in behalf of the Harrison area in dealings with the School District over attendance boundaries.[10]

Mr. Kvamme stated the District policy of not setting boundaries "on sociological groupings" and added that the new Washington Junior High School boundaries would include a portion of the Mt. Baker Residential area, producing racial mixing in the school. Clark asked about the possibility of moving ". . . children from colored districts to other schools to even up the classes." The discussion also centered on what citizens outside the segregated areas could do to prepare for change. MacDonald raised the

question of why business leaders were not doing something about a problem that hurt the city's economy. A motion was made by Mrs. Gunby to appoint a subcommittee ". . . to study the facts brought forth in these two meetings and report to the main committee with suggestions."[11]

Mrs. Gunby, Schmechel, and Chandler Redman comprised the subcommittee, and they came to the full committee at its April 20, 1960, meeting with a report titled Report and Resolution Concerning Racial Segregation in the Seattle Public Schools. They prefaced the resolution with a statement to the effect that an essential ingredient of any successful school was ". . . reasonably balanced representation of the various groups that make up the community . . . racial, religious and economic" and that housing patterns did not permit this in the schools of Seattle and its suburbs. The resolution itself was:

> That the Seattle School Board should adopt a formal policy of promoting more balanced racial representation in all of the elementary and secondary schools and should undertake to implement such a policy from time to time in various ways, including, but not limited to, the following: . . .[12]

Those suggestions included construction, expansion or remodeling of buildings , done with an eye to desegregation objectives; boundary adjustment to correct present and prevent future imbalance; and that "'free transfer' of students living in one school district to another school

district should be permitted only when such free transfer will assist in accomplishing above objectives." The School Board was commended for recent efforts to improve buildings and programs, especially in the Central Area schools. Since segregated housing patterns affected economic growth, planning and general development as well as schools, the subcommittee recommended that the Municipal League Board form a special committee or a joint committee to study all the ramifications of the segregated housing patterns in Seattle's Central Area.[13]

In the discussion which followed, it was asked whether the subcommittee felt that the Seattle School District was ". . . not doing a satisfactory job now of meeting the racial segregation problem." Mr. Schmechel replied that that was not the case, but they felt the District might do even better in correcting racial imbalance in certain schools. Paul Green, former president of Civic Unity, said that many groups in the city were working on the problem, and "they have been complimentary of the Seattle School Board in its efforts. We are told that Seattle has one of the best integrated school systems in the United States." He suggested that they "not go off the deep end in this problem," and that they discuss the ". . . proposed recommendations with leaders of interracial groups and find out what they are doing."[14] The discussion covered the entire spectrum of feelings and opinions, pro and

con, of segregated schools and housing, after which a motion made by T. Evans Wyckoff that the resolution be tabled carried twelve to seven. The final consensus was that interracial group leaders be contacted and that the Public Schools Committee meet with them in May.[15]

The interest of the Municipal League in de facto segregation took the matter into a broader and potentially significant arena in the community. It was a highly respected and prestigious organization, whose members were influential leaders in the city. Prior to 1960, its Public Schools Committee had been concerned primarily with taxation and special levies, although various subcommittees had studied and reported on such topics as high school curriculum, teacher training, and merit pay for teachers. Its involvement with the segregated schools problem was welcomed by inter-group and civil rights organizations, and at the same time it tended to bring out differences in the goals and methods of these groups. The Municipal League itself was somewhat divided as to whether it <u>should</u> be involved, and records show this to be the case throughout the sixties.

Civic Unity Committee's caution and protective stance toward the School District were early apparent. Two days after the Municipal League resolution was tabled, its executive secretary sent a memo to its president asking for a current statement on de facto segregation to send to the

Municipal League committee. She explained that Paul Green had suggested they contact Civic Unity and that he ". . . apparently helped to save them from blasting the School Board and asking other agencies to do 'something' without sufficient information about the situation."[16] The President, Arthur Barnett, contacted the Municipal League committee and sent a great deal of background information. The tone of his letter, copies of which went to Superintendent Campbell, was generally supportive of the School District's handling of problems and its "sincere" attitude, and there were no recommendations for any further action or solutions.[17]

The Municipal League's Public Schools Committee met again May 6, with representatives from Civic Unity, the Urban League and the School District. The Urban League recommended the following for schools with large non-white populations: adequate physical facilities, strong principals, mature teachers, social workers, more counseling services, and more cultural enrichment programs. Civic Unity's position was, in the main, that more legal support to remedy problems was not needed, but "what we need is to break down the barriers of public prejudice." The School District representative, Assistant Superintendent Earl Towner, asked whether "quality education" meant what is given by the schools or what the pupils get out of it, and stated that schools in the Central Area had the same text

books and quality of education as those in the rest of the city. He also said that "teachers prefer to teach in schools which are in the vicinity of their homes. Therefore, we have no trouble in keeping Negro and Oriental teachers in this area. We have experienced teachers in this area."[18]

The meeting's minutes show that Lewis Watts, representing the Urban League, anticipated beneficial results relating to schools from planned urban renewal projects in the area, and that he did not ". . . believe in 'bussing' children from one school to another merely to mix the classes racially." Barnett agreed on the matter of bussing, said that it was not a solution, and that he understood it to have been discarded in other cities. "The consensus appeared to be that the Seattle School District is doing a good job in meeting this problem by providing good physical facilities and capable teachers in the Central Area."[19]

That Committee met again May 31, and among those present were Lewis Watts, Donald Schmechel, David Wagoner* and Solie Ringold. The effect of racial segregation in the schools was up for discussion, and the Committee had

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*Wagoner would become chairman of the Public Schools Committee in 1963, and in 1965 would be appointed to the Seattle School Board.

been provided with a summary of its four previous meetings on the subject. Ringold asked for a reading of the resolution tabled April 20, and suggested that the points of view of groups closer to the problem than those attending the last meeting be ascertained--groups such as the NAACP, Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Committee, WSBAD, and the Greater Seattle Housing Council. It was moved and unanimously carried to send copies of the April 20 resolution to interested organizations and ask that they return written comments and suggestions as to how the Municipal League could help remedy the problem.[20]

There is no indication in the record of further Municipal League committee action concerning segregation for the rest of that year. But its involvement resumed in March, 1961, when the organizations' responses to the tabled resolution were reported. The consensus of the replies had been to commend the Municipal League resolution and its accompanying suggestions.[21]

The letters themselves showed differing stances among the civil rights groups, as well as providing an occasional new dimension of the problem for the Committee to consider. Civic Unity saw that the Municipal League's proposals ". . . should have great value as an expression of the concern of leaders in the life of this city," warned that to avoid abuse of a "free transfer" privilege a specific policy was needed to prohibit transfers that would cause

further racial imbalance, placed heavy stress on housing as the problem's underlying cause, and suggested that it would be better to start the resolution by commending the School Board's efforts to date.[22] The Christian Friends for Racial Equality supported the resolution, suggested that Central Area families be encouraged to seek housing elsewhere, and added that the Municipal League interest should be made known in the Central Area, ". . . thus giving encouragement and lifting the morale of the area."[23]

The NAACP commended the Municipal League report and resolution, and added concern about the high rate of faculty turnover in Central Area schools. In regard to "free transfer" this was the first group to go one step further, saying that the ". . . other alternative is for the School Board to sanction 'mass transfer' of students to schools outside of the segregated Central Area."[24] The American Jewish Committee commended the resolution and ideas and proposed an additional recommendation to the School Board for ". . . development of a systematic program of intergroup education, both for pupils and teachers," properly funded and staffed.[25]

Seymour Kaplan, Regional Director of the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, responded July 18, 1960, with the observation that it looked as though the Municipal League committee had studied the situation thoroughly and that there was not much to add. He did suggest "a

need for interchange of students," not just to give the appearance of integration but on the basis of mutual interests such as debating.[26] The next day, Kaplan wrote to the committee again and stressed the importance of its involvement with the desegregation problem. He had just learned of the resolution's tabling and hoped that tabling of the matter did not mean

> . . . that it will therefore go unattended, for the prestige and reputation of the Municipal League could go far in helping obliterate what will become one of our sorest problems in the decade ahead. If the Municipal League will not give us the needed leadership, the result could be an invitation to a creeping paralysis affecting the health of our body politic. Your organization is in a key position, indeed.[27]

He urged that their committee's statement be accepted and publicized as a first step and that the proposed Municipal League special committee be formed to study all the ramifications of segregated housing patterns, offering to help if they planned to include representatives from other organizations on that committee. He pointed out that many studies had already been done, but:

> The one ingredient lacking has been implementation of the findings. It is hoped that the Municipal League would lend its weight in seeing that this implementation will result from any forthcoming study.[28]

When the Municipal League's Public Schools Committee

met on March 24, 1961,* there was considerable discussion of the resolution after the committee had been given the gist of the organizations' responses to it. Wagoner contended that the motion made it appear as though they would like to have the School Board announce its policy regarding segregation, and Schmechel said that it would be helpful if the Board did publicly announce its recognition of racial imbalance in the schools. At the end of the discussion Chairman Cox offered a resolution that differed subtly, but significantly, from the original which had been tabled in April, 1960.[29] It became known as the Majority Resolution and was sent to the Municipal League Board of Trustees for their consideration and action. A Minority Resolution also went to the Trustees. With the exception of the two paragraphs quoted below, the two resolutions were virtually identical to the original, including rationale, suggested solutions to the problem, and the recommendation that a Municipal League special committee be formed to study the entire problem of segregated housing. The Majority Resolution wording was:

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*At this meeting Committee Chairman Kenneth Cox announced that he was leaving Seattle in April to become Chief of the Broadcast Division of the Federal Communications Commission, and that Douglas Shaw Palmer had been appointed to replace him as chairman. Palmer had been active in the Madrona Community disputes of the mid-fifties.

> It is hereby resolved that the Municipal League should recommend to the Seattle School Board that the latter adopt a formal policy statement recognizing and defining the problem, outlining the steps it believes it can take to improve the situation, and calling on the public officials and civic organizations having responsibility and interest in this area to take further action to supplement the efforts of the School Board.[30]

The corresponding paragraph in the Minority Resolution stated:

> It is hereby resolved that the Municipal League should recommend to the Seattle School Board that the latter adopt a formal policy of promoting a more balanced racial representation in all of the elementary and secondary schools and that the Board undertake to implement such a policy from time to time in various ways including but not limited to the following: . . ."[31]

Each of the resolutions then listed the points given in the April 20, 1960, resolution.

The Board of Trustees were cautious and appeared reluctant to become involved in the matter at their meeting on April 17, 1961. The Schools Committee report was presented by Douglas Shaw Palmer, and he gave a complete summary of Committee activities since its first meeting in December, 1959, to consider the effects of racial segregation in the schools. Past president Paul Ashley said at the outset that ". . . he wished to express his view that this matter is outside the purview of the League," and at a later point in the meeting another member ". . . suggested that this is not a problem that can be discussed in

the open."

In speaking to the resolution, David Wagoner said

> . . . he believed the Majority Resolution was more moderate. The Minority Resolution implies criticism of the School Board in this respect which is not justified and he questioned the so-called "free transfer of colored pupils to other schools and vice versa." [32]

Palmer stressed that the segregation problem was more important than any other in the city, a sentiment echoed by Schmechel: "The situation requires, he said, a more definite policy than the School Board had given."[33]

Trustee Harold Shefelman said that they were shutting their eyes to reality. "Both reports constitute a slap in the face to the School Board . . . in this case we are moving into the social field. We are opening up a Pandora's box of troubles. We should talk to the School Board." A motion by Ashley carried, tabling the Schools Committee report ". . . pending an inquiry by a special committee as to whether or not this matter is within the League's jurisdiction."[34] It appears to have been considered outside its jurisdiction, since subsequent minutes of the Public Schools Committee show a return to the general topics of budget and taxes. Through 1962 and 1963 its subcommittees were concerned with testing, juvenile delinquency and the problem of school dropouts. It was in August, 1963, by which time the School Board had been openly confronted about equal opportunity and had taken

steps toward dealing with de facto segregation, that the Municipal League would again concern itself with that topic.

Other organizations did not withdraw from the school picture, and one proposal offered and promoted by the Citic Unity Committee resulted in a new program aimed at producing greater racial understanding. Civic Unity would appear to have been the least aggressive of the various groups concerned with school segregation problems. At times the organization was made to seem an apologist for School District policies. In a meeting of its School-Community Committee in May, 1961, the need to determine current facts about the problems in segregated schools was acknowledged, and they agreed to confer with the District's administration. They further agreed to

> . . . again assure the Seattle School Board and administration of our confidence that the problems implied here are being given a great deal of thoughtful attention; that Civic Unity Committee, however, needs to be informed so as to be able to support progressive efforts, to intelligently defend the district against unjust charges constantly made concerning the schools in the oldest areas of the city where rapid changes are taking place in racial composition, and to establish its own position on this difficult school situation caused by factors outside the area of education.[35]

At that same meeting the committee was much less timid in agreeing to initiate a move toward a voluntary student

exchange program between high schools. They agreed to ask the District to explore the feasibility of such an exchange involving grades eleven and twelve, and to put such a program into effect in the fall of 1961.[36]

The Civic Unity Board unanimously endorsed the idea and voted to suggest its implementation to the School Board, thus setting in motion plans for the first inter-school exchange of students in the District's history, albeit on a very modest scale. A letter to School Board President Reiter urged the District to start such a program and offered Civic Unity help to make it work. The letter spoke of the urgency in undertaking such a program, with census figures showing trends toward more "one race" schools, which would even "include the one 'integrated' high school of the city, wiping out the values to which we have all pointed with pride."[37]

The School Board learned of the idea at its meeting June 7, 1961. The Civic Unity proposal was described as being ". . . for the specific purpose of giving more students an opportunity to know and associate with young people of other backgrounds." The Superintendent said that this same suggestion "had come from several different directions so recently he had not had time to analyze them."[38]

On June 21, the Board received a copy of a memo from Jack Greaves, Director of Secondary Schools, which

showed that preliminary planning was taking place. Greaves said the District had been thinking along similar lines and that Garfield's Hanawalt and Miss Louella Hart had discussed possible exchanges among high schools for several months. Planning was toward an exchange between junior and senior social studies classes in the north-south divisions of the athletic league, and details would be handled by social studies department heads. They saw five weeks being sufficient duration for the exchange, with students being in their home school at the beginning and end of the semester. The memo also said "Exchange should not be undertaken solely to fulfill the purpose of integration, and should not be limited to an exchange between Garfield and one of the mono-racial schools."[39]

The student exchange program was referred to again in the Superintendent's report to the Board at its July 5 meeting, ". . . but there was not time to hold a discussion of the matter." On July 19, the Board was brought up to date on the ". . . thinking that has been going on in the Administration concerning a possible exchange of students among our high schools. Superintendent Campbell emphasized that the project is strictly in the exploratory stages at this time."[40]

On August 29, after three months had passed, Civic Unity checked back with the School Board. They would appreciate the School District's letting them know about

progress on the project so that they might inform their Board of Trustees at its September 11 meeting. The Superintendent replied that the Board had been kept informed of developments "including your interest," and he stressed the importance of careful planning. "You will note that some preliminary discussions have been taking place since last spring," but further consultation would be needed ". . . before the School Board is asked to consider a plan."[41]

The tempo of planning accelerated after school started that fall. Another Greaves memo, September 22, reported that they were making some progress. "Mr. Vandivanter [Principal at Ballard High School] and Mr. Hanawalt are enthusiastic about giving it a try."[42] This information was relayed to the Board in October, with the notation that the "exchange will probably be ready to begin at the ten-week break." [43]

Once the planning was complete and implementation was assured, the press gave it coverage. The front page of the Times, November 2, headed a story "Ballard and Garfield to Exchange Pupils." It reported that the plan had been discussed for more than a year. Neither school had yet chosen its participants, but both had many applicants. The article noted that the Civic Unity Committee had suggested a similar plan as an experiment in interracial relations, and that "the School District program

does not mention race relations, although lessons in race relations will be inherent in some exchanges." The District described it as an effort to further sportsmanship.[44] A week later the Post-Intelligencer covered the exchange program with a picture of the participants and a story headed: "Swap Schools. Ready for Big Experiment." The exchange was reportedly planned to extend from November 15 to December 15, with its purpose ". . . to promote sportsmanship and mutual respect." The students were all high school juniors, and the picture shows that the Garfield group included three girls, one white and two Asian, and two boys, one white and one black.[45]

The District took great care to avoid the appearance of dealing with the problem of segregation. Civic Unity's executive secretary referred to the recently launched exchange program in a letter to a Federal Housing official.

> This is only token integration but it is progress since it shows recognition on the part of the schools that there is need to stimulate intergroup understanding (although they wisely do not refer to the exchange in terms of race since it is better for the youngsters to work together as representing different schools rather than races).[46]

The second high school exchange took place in the spring semester, 1962, and it involved students from Roosevelt and Franklin High Schools.* [47]

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*1962 enrollment figures for the four high schools

The same issue of the Post-Intelligencer that reported the exchange program, November 9, 1961, carried a front page story headed "School Board Refuses to Ban Rev. King Talk." The School Board had faced what the newspaper termed "spirited protest" at its meeting the previous day over the invitation to Dr. King to address an assembly at Garfield High School that Friday. King's Seattle appearance was sponsored by Mt. Zion Baptist Church, and while he was in the city he addressed groups at Temple de Hirsch and the University of Washington, as well as giving Mount Zion's public lecture at the Eagles' Auditorium.[48] Mrs. Payne Karr was spokesman for the protestors at the Board meeting, presenting the usual arguments against controversial speakers in the schools, especially one ". . . who has been associated with and has aided and abetted causes inimical to the United States of America." When she pressed for reasons for his being invited to Garfield, it was explained that it seemed only logical for a school with a high percentage of minority students to hear a man of his stature and achievement. Civic Unity Committee was represented at the meeting and supported the Board in its

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taking part in the first student exchanges show that Garfield's student body was 51.4% black; Franklin's 9.2% black, second highest in the city; Roosevelt's .04% black; and Ballard's .01% black. (SSD, Racial Distribution, 1957-68, p. 19.)

stand.[49] In subsequent Board meetings, supporting communiques were reported, and a final tally given the Board November 22, showed that the District had received 57 letters commending the Board's stand and seven that had opposed Reverend King's appearance.[50]

In the spring of 1961, the principals of schools in the Central Area sent to the Superintendent a program of action which they felt would ". . . provide a realistic and comprehensive approach to the emergency situation that is rapidly developing in the schools of this area." They had felt for some time that they had ". . . a set of circumstances unique in the Seattle School System," but they now felt the time had come to ". . . recommend specific action in selected areas." They thought some of their recommendations should be implemented immediately, while others were designed to fit into a long-range plan which the District needed for dealing with its segregated schools.[51]

The areas selected for attention were school personnel, curriculum, guidance, administration and community relations. Many of the recommendations were the same as or similar to suggestions made by civil rights and community groups, and they would appear to have formed the foundation of the compensatory education program which the District was to pursue. The principals did not include changes in attendance boundaries or student transfers, as

many of the citizens' groups were beginning to do.

Their recommendations relating to personnel included encouraging experienced and competent teachers to apply for vacancies in the area; searching for teachers with a special interest in students from varied backgrounds; allowing greater participation by Central Area principals in selecting their staffs; securing good cadet teachers for the area as a means of recruiting future teachers; and planning a special orientation program for teachers new to Central Area schools. In the area of curriculum, they recognized the obvious cultural and educational background deficiencies of many of the students and recommended smaller class size; asked for more specialized help from the Administration's Curriculum Division; and stressed the need for stronger vocational education programs in Central Area schools. They requested more guidance and counseling services, and pointed out the need for a more specialized testing program for Central Area students.[52]

In the area of administration they sought more building-level administrative staff to deal with daily behavior problems, student conferences and parent contacts. They spoke to the problem of retaining good principals in the Central Area schools, rather than having them transfer to schools "of higher classification," saying:

> This can be avoided if schools with strong minority group representation were given higher classification as the

> principal reaches maximum pay so the incentive to change schools is removed.[53]

They saw the area of community relations as one of the most important approaches to the unique problems of the area, and they referred to community relations in a much broader sense than "simply selling the community on the school program." They referred to the development of effective (two-way) communication between school and community, and to greater participation of parents in school affairs. To do an effective job they needed ". . . the services of a person with special skills and training in this type of work." With a distant echo from the 1949 "committee for the study of school leavers," they recommended

> . . . that the School District participate in a joint school-community research project to discover what factors in the home, school, and community life are contributing to the low aspiration level of many of the young people living in the Central Area . . . . The Urban League in Seattle has also expressed interest in working on such a joint school-community project. We feel that this recommendation is the most basic and important one we are making.[54]

Superintendent Campbell sent copies of the letter to Board members, and it appeared at the March 29, 1961, Board meeting as a report prepared "for the interest of the Board." Mr. Campbell said that a number of the principals' proposals ". . . would cost money, but it is the desire of the administration to undertake them as far as

funds and planning will permit."[55]

The principals do not seem to have conveyed fully to the Central Administration their sense of urgency about the city's segregated schools. There is no indication of immediate or early implementation of any of the proposals. There was a growing awareness within the School District of the problems of segregated schools and disadvantaged students, but it would be quite some time before they became a top priority concern.

Board members and administrators attended numerous national meetings throughout 1962, many of which were focused on those problems. April 4, 1962, marked a change in the national orientation of the School Board. The Board voted unanimously to send a member as an official representative to the National School Board Association meeting each year, with expenses provided by the District. Mrs. Owen explained that they had not done this in the past, but members had gone as often as possible, paying their own expenses. It had not been

> . . . of great importance a few years ago because the quality of the meetings were not up to that of the State Directors meetings, but this is no longer the case. The national meetings have improved greatly and there is now wide participation from all over the United States.[56]

Thus Seattle moved into the main stream nationally on a

regular basis, and it is highly likely that desegregation was a major concern at those meetings.

It definitely was the focus of conferences attended by administrators. Mr. Selby attended a Conference on Elementary School Problems in Large Cities, in St. Paul, and reported to the Board that much attention had been focused on "Deprived Areas." It was reported that all cities were having trouble assigning teachers in those areas, and "The general attitude toward this problem (integration) seemed to be one of pessimism and unhappiness."[57] In November, Mr. Greaves reported to the Board on the Conference on Secondary School Problems of Large Cities, which he had attended in Los Angeles.

> Mr. Greaves stated that regardless of whether they were included in the agenda, three problems kept cropping up: Divergent Youth, Professional Negotiations, and "De Facto Segregation." His report included some highlights of the first two of these.[58]

Presumably desegregation was not covered in his report, and minutes of neither meeting which heard the administrators indicates any application of their information to the Seattle scene or any discussion of the situation.

In May, Mr. Campbell attended a Conference on Problems of Segregation and Desegregation of Public Schools, which was sponsored by the United States Commission on Civil Rights. He reported to the Board that to combat de facto segregation elsewhere ". . . there is being tried

the open, or free, transfer policy and the transporting of pupils from one area to another section of the city where there is not a race predominance," but he felt that neither of these methods solved the basic problems. He cited the problem of classroom space in a free transfer program, and was concerned that ". . . in the second [method] the child is dislodged from the children of his neighborhood and from [the school's] capacity to bring the whole community into closer relationship and to aid the family." He said that he thought the approach that Seattle had begun on the problem was sound. That approach retained the neighborhood schools for offering compensatory program opportunities for the disadvantaged. He also saw the need for the School District to collaborate with other groups in the community interested in solving the problem.[59]

Early in the 1962 fall semester the School District established a city-wide committee for dealing with the disadvantaged student. Its programs were to be coordinated by Tom Cooney, a reading improvement teacher who had also had experience as a social worker for both the School District and Seattle's Ryther Child Center.[60] This move by the School District won editorial praise in The Facts, a neighborhood newspaper in the Central Area.* In

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*The Facts identified itself in 1962 as "The Northwest's Largest American Negro Publication," and its masthead motto

addition to saying that such a committee ". . . should have a deterrent effect on the incident of dropouts and subsequent employment problems," the paper praised the efforts of Frank Hanawalt and the Urban League in spearheading the drive for just such a program.[61]

The established civil rights organizations began to have more frequent contact with the School District. Communiques and meeting minutes in the files of the Urban League School Committee show growing concern throughout 1962 for segregation, low achievement, and the quality of Central Area schools. That committee met with Central Administration people and with Washington Junior High Principal, Frank Fidler, to discuss problems there, especially their concerns about Washington attendance area boundaries. A memo dated May 28, 1962, focused on the need for practical, preventive measures to deal with segregation problems at the elementary school level. The committee felt there was ". . . extreme urgency . . . because of the rapidly growing concern, anxiety and need for direction among citizens and parents in the Central Area Community.[62]

In June the Urban League committee met at the District's Administration and Service Center to voice its

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was "The Truth is Great, the Facts are Reality."

concerns with a group that included Superintendent Campbell, Frank Hanawalt and Olaf Kvamme. Both Hanawalt and Kvamme were in the group of Central Area principals who had made recommendation to the Superintendent a year earlier to begin dealing with Central Area problems. At this meeting it was pointed out that there were constraints imposed by finances and the special levy means of funding programs. "Levies must be passed each year and Central Administration is only able to plan year-by-year because of this limitation."[63]

The NAACP's concern for conditions in the Seattle schools became apparent in 1962, and both local and national officials made contact with the School District. In March, a panel of school administrators discussed guidance programs in Central Area schools before a meeting of the Seattle branch, and an overflow crowd from the community. In a letter of March 29, E. June Smith, Vice-president of the Seattle branch, told Superintendent Campbell that since many of the ideas expressed at that meeting had

> . . . crystalized the need for greater community activity with the schools, we are now planning to launch into a definite program of study in order that we might be able to assist you and members of your staff in bringing about a true picture of democracy throughout the Seattle public schools. . . . We feel that neither school officials or the NAACP can afford to relax in these areas so important to the development of the youth in our communities.[64]

That same day the School District received an invitation to meet two national officers of the NAACP--Robert Carter, General Counsel, and June Shagaloff, Special Assistant for Education. They were to be in Seattle April 2 and 3, to visit schools and assist the Seattle branch "in its work in the field of education." They were scheduled to discuss "De Facto Segregation in Public Schools" at an open meeting at Mt. Zion Baptist Church.[65]

The Seattle Times covered their appearance in the city: "Segregation in Seattle Area Schools Reported." A statement by Carter said that at least eight Central Area schools were segregated "not by law but by actuality," and that while there was no question that housing was basic to de facto segregation problems, ". . . school administrators may alleviate the problem by redistricting or by allowing children to attend schools of their choice." The article said that the Seattle branch of NAACP was studying de facto segregation with a view toward making recommendations to the School District.[66]

At the April 18, 1962 School Board meeting, the Superintendent presented two communiques which ". . . pointed up the rapidly accelerating interest in problems of de facto segregation."[67] A letter from Archie Katz, President of Civic Unity Committee invited the Superintendent to its next meeting to bring them up to date on progress being made in areas related to its special interest."

Since Mr.Campbell would be out of town on the meeting date, the Board approved sending a representative. The Civic Unity letter is another indication of that group's seeming ambivalence in the whole school segregation matter. While apparently wanting to facilitate some sort of solution to the problem, they wanted the School District to know that

> We also understand the inevitable pressures to "do something" about the kinds of inter-racial situations found in and around the central area, and sincerely hope that these pressures developing about de facto segregation will not result in unwise action by organizations or residents. It is to this end we would like to explore with you possible channels for greater awareness in the community of the school administration's deep concern and active efforts to meet these new problems faced by . . . schools in every northern city.[68]

That kind of reinforcement from a major intergroup organization in the city must have blunted the urgency of other appeals for the District to act.

The second of the two communications the Board received on April 18 was an Urban League memo with a cover letter from administrator Jack Greaves. He had attended the April 5 meeting of the Urban League schools committee at which recommendations for its Board contained in the memo were discussed. Those recommendations were that the Urban League contact public bodies, such as the City Council, the School Board and the Park Board and urge them to ". . . take a public stand in favor of open housing," and that the Urban

League urge the School Board both to study detrimental effects of de facto segregation and to take racial factors into account in future school programs, such as the location of new schools.[69] In his letter, Greaves recounted his contribution to the discussion at the Committee meeting. He had suggested that Urban League efforts at garnering support be widely directed to include others, such as the Mayor's office, churches and the Chamber of Commerce. He also had spoken from the School District's perspective:

> I took the opportunity to say that while undoubtedly each of the individual School Board members would be in favor of open housing in principle, the fact that such a public statement as the League is requesting would cause controversy at a time when we have two vital elections within less than 12 months might make it difficult for the School Board to take the lead.[70]

This would not be the last time that the need for winning a special levy election would be seen as a reason for taking no action.

In October, 1962, the Board was alerted to possible future difficulties connected with the opening of the new Washington Junior High building. For the Board's conference preceding its October 17 meeting, the Superintendent relayed to the members a memorandum drawing possible parallels between situations in Seattle and San Francisco. "The matter discussed in the October 10 memo from Mr. Jack

Greaves to me is not listed on the agenda. Only enough copies have been prepared for members of the Board . . . it can be the basis for later discussion of this subject."[71]

During the past summer Greaves had heard San Francisco Superintendent Harold Spears discuss in detail the problems faced there in the opening of Central Junior High School, which had been planned for September, 1962, with a 60 percent non-white student body. A protest, led by the NAACP and backed editorially by one of the city's dailies, had been so strong that their Board decided against opening the school. The San Francisco Board was now faced with two lawsuits ". . . demanding that the Board end 'De Facto Segregation" throughout the city, and that Central Junior High School be opened next semester on an integrated basis."[72]

Construction of Seattle's Washington Junior High was approximately 15 percent complete at that point. Its opening was scheduled for the following fall, with a

> relatively high proportion of non-white students, and because the present Washington building will probably be converted to an elementary school with a student body largely non-white, a review of some of the conditions may be appropriate.

Greaves then reviewed the District's boundary and attendance policies, with a slightly different angle. He said that, generally speaking, elementary students could

transfer freely if there were room, but when a new school opened to serve students previously enrolled elsewhere, it was necessary "for a time to define boundaries and insist upon attendance" at the new school by those living within the boundaries. At the secondary level, no students attended a school outside their own districts ". . . except for special transfers sometimes granted by the Attendance Department for special reasons."[74]

The need for a policy covering newly opened schools was crucial in the case of Washington Junior High. When Seattle went to the junior high system, and phased out most of its eight-year elementary schools, Washington became a seventh and eight grade center. Muir, a predominantly white elementary school, remained an eight-year school for some time longer, "and thus was outside of the original boundaries" of Washington Junior High. Mercer Junior High was built in 1957, and Muir students began to go there after sixth grade. The feeder schools to Washington had become predominantly black, and Muir had remained predominantly white. The Greaves memo said that although Washington is nearer, Muir graduates went to Mercer on a city bus.* The new Washington building was several

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*Location of the three schools on a map of the city would appear to place Muir closer to Mercer, "as the crow flies." Difficulty of transportation across the Rainier Valley corridor and of access

blocks closer to Muir than the old building had been, and there would be no overcrowding at Washington, while Mercer would have a number of portables.

> It would be logical, under any other circumstances, to move the southern boundary of Washington south and to include students from the Muir Elementary School area to relieve Mercer and to balance enrollment at the two schools. There have been a number of inquiries about this possibility.[75]

"Any other circumstances" would probably not have involved racial balance. Racial distribution statistics for 1962 show Washington with a student body 66.4 percent black, while that at Mercer was 7.2 percent black.[76]

The Greaves memo stressed the School District's position on segregation in schools as a problem of housing patterns. However, in presenting options and alternatives to moving the new Washington boundaries south, the idea of dispersing minority students was offered.

> In this plan, the schools become the active agent of integration. The student population in each school is set . . . [with racial ratios] approximately the same as . . . [in] the city's whole population. This program would call for complex transportation facilities . . . requiring some students to travel much further to school than now.[77]

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to the west side of Beacon Hill could constitute the basis for the statement that Muir was closer to Washington.

It was added that someone would have the unpleasant task of assigning students, and that people might begin to feel "that some schools were more desirable than others." The dispersal idea had been suggested to the District a year earlier as an alternative to construction of the Washington building.[78]

The Mercer-Washington boundary problem served to return de facto segregation to the School Board's attention, and the example of litigation in a similar situation in San Francisco might have put the entire matter in a different perspective. Perhaps the District found itself stymied by its own policies and inconsistencies; at any rate, Muir students continued to attend Mercer Junior High. The use of the former Washington Junior High building became the center of controversy the following year.

In October, 1962, the Seattle Times ran a four-part series by its education writer, Byron Johnsrud, dealing with ". . . efforts of Seattle schools in the field of 'disadvantaged' children and 'de facto segregation.'" This might well have been the first general, city-wide publicity given to the situation in Seattle. The problems were referred to as "deep and often touchy," and the issues involved as potentially

> explosive [if handled unwisely] with old and new prejudices, since most of the "disadvantaged" children in "de facto segregated" schools come from Negro families. Hence it becomes more than normally

> necessary to handle the situation with dispassionate intelligence.[79]

which, it was felt, the School District seemed to be doing. The first article mentioned a disadvantaged committee headed by Garfield's Hanawalt, and noted that while twelve of the city's schools considered disadvantaged were in the Central Area, two Central Area schools were not so designated. It reported that the District was

> approaching the issue solely from the standpoint of providing such schools with educational tools that produce better results, without reference to any possible major reforms in the social, cultural or economic forces which always weigh heavily in such instances.[80]

The series spelled out the various problems of disadvantaged and culturally deprived students, and some of the steps already taken by the School District to combat them. It pointed out that the problems transcended racial lines and were not confined to Central Area schools. The second article in the series disseminated some racial stereotypes. It stated that "Orientals generally fare well in a school environment." It also offered the curious observation that "Negro migrants from the South present their own special problems. Parental inability to cope with a newfound independence frequently is reflected in the children."[81]

Third in the series was headed "Seattle School Aides Reject NAACP Recommendations." Other sources available show no reference to such recommendations, but the Times

indicated that the NAACP had recommended both redistricting and "open registration" to the School District as two means of dealing with de facto segregation. Both of the ideas were rejected as being unsuited to Seattle's situation. School administrators reportedly saw "little sense in transporting pupils to so-called advantaged schools only to return them daily to the same deprived environment." It also reported that the District's decisions had received "sturdy support" from neighborhoods with disadvantaged schools, and from organizations such as the Urban League, United Good Neighbors, the Atlantic Street Center and the University of Washington.[82]

The need to know more about the racial composition of student bodies became more apparent, and December 5, 1962, was "census day" in the Seattle schools. While still under the general admonition to remain "color blind," the District had found a racial distribution study done by a University of Washington research office in 1957 extremely helpful. In conducting its own census, the School District prepared a form to be filled out by each classroom teacher, based on the teacher's observation, ". . . <u>without questioning any pupils, parent or anyone outside the school system.</u>" And instructions were that "<u>The identity of every individual will be concealed completely.</u>"[83]

In October that year the District had compiled racial statistics for the teacher corps in response to a request

from the Washington State Board Against Discrimination. That survey showed a total of 229 non-white teachers, with minority teachers in every high school and all but one junior high. There were thirty-one elementary schools with no minority teacher.[84]

As 1962 drew to a close, the fact of segregated schools and their problems became more apparent. In November, a man arrived on the scene who was to become a driving force in the growing effort to move the School District to act. Reverend John Hurst Adams came to Seattle as senior minister of the First A.M.E. Church, which has been described as ". . . the place of worship for Seattle's Negro establishment."[85] He was a graduate of Boston University School of Theology, and had done graduate work at Harvard and at Union Theological Seminary. He had served churches in and around Boston and been on the faculty of Payne Theological Seminary, Wilberforce, Ohio. Since 1955 he had served as President of Paul Quinn College, Waco, Texas.[86]

Reverend Adams was considered the most persistent and forceful of the civil rights leaders who came before the School Board in the early sixties. Others worked for change, "But Mr. Adams was way out ahead of everybody else in his determination that something should be done--in fact he was way out ahead of a good many people in his own community."[87]

The time was coming when the School District could no longer take comfort from Civic Unity reassurance that its sincere efforts were resulting in the best situation in the country. The national civil rights movement was coming closer to affecting the Pacific Northwest and pressure was mounting on the District to deal effectively with the problems of segregation. New individuals and organizations were ready to increase that pressure and to heighten the awareness of the entire city, and familiar names and groups were ready to join them.

CHAPTER III

VOLUNTARY TRANSFER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

In his 1968 study, The Politics of School Desegregation, Robert L. Crain presented desegregation case studies of eight northern cities. In sorting out the common threads in those stories he advanced a number of hypotheses relating to the school integration issue. The first of these is that the demand for school integration comes either from civil rights groups (e.g. NAACP) or from integrated neighborhood groups. "In four cities, interracial neighborhood groups and white liberals were in the forefront of the protest."[1] The civil rights group demands tended to be general in tone, while the neighborhood groups were concerned with maintaining integrated schools to prevent white flight.

Another hypothesis, in which a distinction is made between community leaders and civil rights leaders within the black community, relates to the goals of those making demands of the school boards:

> The goals of the civil rights leadership can be seen as either "welfare" goals or "symbolic" goals. White liberals and Negro community leaders tend to hold welfare goals, while Negro civil rights leaders tend to hold symbolic goals. Persons who hold welfare goals are concerned with the education of individual Negro children;

> thus they support compensatory education. They favor integration because they believe it beneficial to the student; thus they hold to the long-range goal of completely eliminating segregated schools. Leaders with symbolic goals are concerned with the elimination of racial discrimination and with establishing racial equality as a major community value. Thus these leaders are not so concerned with compensatory education and tend to evaluate an integration program not merely on the basis of the number of students involved but according to whether the school system has demonstrated its acceptance of the principle of racial equality.[2]

In the early stages of the Seattle experience some of these threads have been apparent. Integrated neighborhood groups sought to maintain integrated schools in the Madrona, Harrison, McGilvra boundary and transfer disputes. At that point both Civic Unity Committee and the Urban League were concerned with "welfare" goals, and the NAACP had not yet entered the picture. Some of the same white liberals from the Harrison and Madrona areas took the lead in the unsuccessful attempt to move the Municipal League to press the School Board for a policy of promoting racial balance in the schools.

Crain saw the early events in San Francisco as an excellent example of the de facto segregation issue. The School Board there was ". . . asked to express regret over schools that were segregated as a result of housing patterns," and the demands did not go much beyond that point. He saw this concern over the importance of policy

statements about de facto segregation as fitting the hypothesis "that the goal of the civil rights movement is to obtain commitment to the principle of racial equality."[3]

The admission by the School Board of the presence of segregation in its district became important to the Seattle Urban League. A memo from Education Committee Chairman Leonard Schroeter clarified some committee statements made at a conference between Urban League board members and staff people on March 7, 1963, regarding their board's making a public statement on school desegregation. It acknowledged that the Seattle School District had done a few things in the area of the culturally deprived student, and that Urban League activities had been helpful there.

> However, neither the School Board nor the Administration, as such, have yet given recognition to the fact of growing de facto segregation, per se, in the public schools of our city. Until this is done, any program designed to meet the problem of de facto segregation will be inadequate, simply because the problem must be posed or isolated before the problem-solving can be applied and become effective. This is a major objective of our Education Committee and we shall soon be making this recommendation to the Seattle School Board.[4]

This would indicate that Schroeter, at least, saw the admission of the problem as more than symbolic. Public confrontation on the issue came at a May School Board meeting, and was centered in a statement about the proposed use of the "old" Washington Junior High building.

The scheduled fall opening of Washington Junior High School not only produced concern for possible repercussions about its boundaries, but it raised speculation as to the future use of the old frame building being vacated at 18th Avenue and Washington Street. The School District proposed establishing an elementary school in the building in order to relieve crowded conditions at neighborhood schools. Groups within the Central Area community wanted to see the building used as a vocational high school or a pre-vocational school rather than another segregated elementary school. As an Urban League memo pointed out, a pre-vocational center would draw students city-wide, hence would be desegregated.[5]

That memo referred to a meeting on March 15, 1963, at which Fred Breit and Kenneth Selby presented the Administration plan for the building to some Central Area residents. "The question of whether any consideration had been given to the racial composition was raised. Mr. Ken Selby said no."[6]

The Administration memo from Breit to Superintendent Campbell, relating events of that same meeting, did not specifically mention the question of racial composition. It indicates School District paternalism and underscores the need for the new and better community relations requested by the Central Area principals two years earlier. The memo said that the two administrators had met

> . . . with about twenty citizens (Negro, Oriental and a few Caucasians) at Washington Junior High School last Friday afternoon for a little over an hour. Our expressed purpose was to discuss the proposed elementary school for the old Washington Junior High building, but after initial presentation a large share of the time was spent discussing the needs of the dropout and what we could do for him. These people, largely the Negro representatives, felt the urgent need of immediate action and seemed to think that a vocational high school was the answer.[7]

The two administrators told the group that a city-wide committee review was planned and that there was a need for a broad look at the problem rather than relying on any one solution, such as a vocational high school. They told them of the

> ". . . need for funds and the need for cooperative effort and responsibility on the part of everyone. Well, we covered many other aspects of their problem, and I think they left with the feeling that we were trying to do something about their concerns but that we could make no commitment regarding a vocational high school. With that in mind, I believe the elementary school at Washington would be accepted."[8]

The community was less convinced than Breit thought they were. At the School Board meeting on April 17, Reverend Robert Baxter, Chairman of the Central Area Community Council, represented that group's "interest in vocational and pre-vocational training," in the words of the brief reference in the official record. The Times reported that "Central Area of City Asks School-Program Changes."

The article stated that the Central Area Community Council had urged the use of the old Washington Junior High as a vocational or pre-vocational center in the Central Area.[9] A few days later the Times gave editorial support to the Community Council's request for the School Board "to give 'serious attention' to vocational training at the high school level in the central district." They recognized the dropout problem and the need for some program in addition to the offerings in the comprehensive high schools. There was no mention of race or of de facto segregation.[10]

The School District was not addressing the disposition of the Washington building as a segregation problem. In a communique to the School Board prior to its May 1 meeting, Superintendent Campbell briefed the members in anticipation of an Urban League appearance at that meeting. He reported the March meeting initiated by Breit and Selby, and that no conclusions about the building had been reached and no plans announced. Their intent had been to ". . . hold further conferences with interested citizens at appropriate times. The Urban League, however, without awaiting further discussions has seemed anxious to go on record." The Superintendent hoped to bring the problem of the Washington building to the Board more fully soon, but it had "many difficulties." Committees, under Breit's direction, were studying such facets of the situation as were related to the District's obligations in the area of

vocational, pre-vocational and occupational education. Even though the Urban League's objection to the creation of another de facto segregated school was clear, there is no indication that the School District was dealing with the situation from that standpoint at all.[11]

At the May 1 School Board meeting, Leonard Schroeter presented the statement of the Urban League Board. He began by citing the School District's proposal to move students from Gatzert, Mann, Leschi and Colman to the vacated Washington building to relieve overcrowding and to remove the need for 21 portables at those four schools. The Urban League statement endorsed the intent of the proposal and supported removing the portables to provide more playground area, and then went to the heart of the matter:

> HOWEVER, we feel strongly that the Seattle School Administration has not given cognizance to two vital aspects of this proposed transfer:
>
> 1. The present site of old Washington is located in a business area providing hazardous conditions . . .
>
> 2. Insufficient concern has been given to the final racial composition of this proposed elementary school. It is well known that the four schools involved were among the seven that had the highest non-white pupil attendance out of 86 elementary schools in the city in 1958. (Gatzert, 81.7 [%]; Mann, 92.3; Leschi, 80.4; Colman, 79.6). Should the School Administration's proposal be implemented, Seattle will create an eighth highly segregated elementary school. A racially segregated school will have continued detrimental effects on the pupils attending.

> THEREFORE, the Seattle Urban League opposes use of the old Washington Building as an elementary school . . . .
>
> Instead, the Seattle Urban League recommends:
>
> 1. An immediate study on the use of this facility as a pre-vocational training and guidance center for youth below 18 years of age.
>
> 2. An immediate study, with an increased sense of urgency, be made of the problems of de facto segregation, and prompt action toward solving those problems remaining, and the causes thereof, be taken.[12]

In the ensuing discussion, recorded at greater length in this instance than was usually the case, Schroeter cited growing segregation in the schools. He reminded the Board that the problem had been called to their attention ". . . about ten years ago but that nothing has been done to correct the situation." He then warned that

> . . . failure of the Board to take a strong stand against segregation could result in steps being taken: that both the School Board and the Urban League would regret. Organizations other than the Urban League are seriously considering filing law suits which would require the Board to desegregate Seattle schools.'[13]

Mrs. Frances Owen, who had been elected Board President in April, said that they would take the League's request under consideration, and stressed that they had been concerned with segregation problems for many years. She gave the following ". . . examples of School District effort in this regard: employment of Negro teachers, open

enrollment, zoning (changing of boundaries), judicious choice of sites, compensatory education." Superintendent Campbell came to the District's defense, saying that "rather than having taken a passive attitude [it] has been instrumental in making people in the community aware of these concerns." He noted the March 15 meeting at Washington Junior High as an example of District initiative, as well as the District's bringing a national authority on the dropout problem to Seattle as a consultant. He said that it was "important to emphasize that the School District has been moving affirmatively in many areas, which, it feels, can lead to acceptance of solutions to the ultimate problems."[14]

The record of actual accomplishments, contrary to the assertions of both the Board President and Superintendent, was thin. The District's strongest position was in regard to hiring minority teachers and assigning them to schools on a non-discriminatory basis, although in January of that year complaints about District hiring policy had been filed with the Washington State Board Against Discrimination.[15] The somewhat ambiguous statement about leading "to acceptance of solutions to the ultimate problems" reinforces the impression that the Administration had not itself given recognition to the fact of growing de facto segregation, per se, and isolated it as a problem, which the Urban League had seen as necessary before any

effective solutions could be found.

Both daily papers covered the May 1 Board meeting and reported the discussions and exchanges more fully than had the meeting minutes. The Post-Intelligencer described Schroeter's presentation as charging ". . . the Seattle School Board with the responsibility of taking a strong, affirmative, positive stand against segregation in Seattle Schools."[16] The Times coverage was headed "League Asks Job Training in Schools." It reported that the Urban League had joined those requesting a vocational center in a presentation to the School Board, ". . . adding to it a condemnation of growing racial segregation in Central District schools." That article reported Campbell's saying that the vocational use of Washington would be more expensive than returning it to elementary use, and Board and Administration statements denying foot dragging on problems of segregation. The Times also revealed the Superintendent's observation that the matter was ". . . one to be dealt with by all elements of the city, not just the public schools," and Board member Palmason's description of the problem as "sociological" and his suggestion that an Urban League assault on the policies of the National Association of Real Estate Boards "might have more telling effect."[17]

Contained in Breit's report of the community meeting at Washington Junior High in March is the notation that

"One Negro indicated he would send in a written suggestion that we do not use the building at all as it is too old."[18] The position of that one lone patron proved to be the solution to the dilemma. The old Washington building was closed in 1963.[19]

In 1963, the School Board changed, following an election which was heatedly contested along liberal-conservative lines. Dr. Robert A. Tidwell, a pediatrician who was well known city-wide, ran against David Sprague, an insurance broker.*

Tidwell, the more conservative of the two, filed early. He had learned in advance that Lyle Goss, whose children were among his patients, did not plan to seek another term on the Board. His interest in running stemmed from his obvious concern for the welfare of children, and some professional concern within his office about the direction in which they perceived the schools to be moving. An associate urged him to run for the post. He later said that he "ran scared" against Sprague's strong challenge, and that while he did not know it at the time, he "was picked up by some very right wing groups and given their support."[20] Sprague's membership in the American Civil

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*Sprague was a trustee of Western Washington State College, and he later represented the 37th Legislative District in the Washington State House of Representatives.

Liberties Union was a major issue and the chief allegation against him in the "hate sheets spread through the mails and at assorted candidates' forums and PTA meetings" in the closing days of the campaign.[21]

In the primary election in February, Tidwell outpolled the combined votes of all of his opponents with 19,857 votes. As a result of the primary totals he was unopposed on the general election ballot in March, and received a total vote of 65,218. School Board incumbent Philip Swain, also unopposed, polled a total of 52,087 votes.[22]

As the civil rights movement grew and gathered strength nation-wide, open housing ferment bubbled to the surface in Seattle. The School District's reliance on housing patterns as the rationale for its approach to segregation in the schools made it highly visible in the struggle to reduce segregation in housing.

In June, 1963, the Urban League pressed the School Board to take affirmative action against discrimination in housing. In a letter from its Education Committee Chairman and the President of its Board of Directors,* the Urban League reminded the School Board of its previous requests for action in solving problems of segregation in Central

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*The Urban League President at that time was George Neff Stevens, Dean of the University of Washington Law School.

Area schools, and noted that precedent for such action had been set by school boards in other cities. They reminded, also, that

> Members of the Seattle School Board expressed concern about problems resulting from segregated schools, but noted that they had no control over discrimination in housing which is the cause of de facto segregation in these schools. We again submit that this situation can be alleviated by enactment of a fair housing ordinance by the City Council and Mayor of Seattle.
>
> Therefore, the Board of Directors of the Seattle Urban League, by unanimous action, and with an increasing sense of urgency, respectfully requests that the Seattle School Board, by resolution, petition the Mayor and City Council to enact immediately an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in all housing. . . . And, to take such other affirmative steps as will make this legislation meaningful and effective.[23]

That letter was presented to the Board at its meeting June 12. In response, Mrs. Owen referred to the School Board's awareness of the increasing concentration of non-white students in some schools, and said that this awareness had led to "significant improvements in the educational opportunities for pupils in those schools." However, it was Board policy

> . . . not to initiate or promote ordinances and legislation on matters not primarily the responsibility of the public schools. The Board believes that it should not inject itself at this point into a matter which is the proper concern of other governmental bodies. Should an ordinance or other proposal be

> submitted by such a body, the School Board would then be in a position to decide whether or not to give its endorsement.[24]

If the School Board were aware of the increase in racial imbalance and its attendant problems, School District personnel working with those problems and students on a daily basis were doubly aware. Fred Breit reported to the Superintendent that from the District's Committee on Disadvantaged Students had come the conclusion that ". . . major problems confronting the citizens of the Central Area of the city were of enough consequence to warrant a meeting of citizens to exchange viewpoints and express opinions." A sub-committee recommended specific steps which included inviting citizens to a meeting to be held in June, trying to assure an attendance of at least fifty people. Those invited should be "representative individuals who would bring thoughtful counsel to the meeting" with wide membership in community organizations, and they should be informed that one of the major topics would be de facto segregation. The possibility of inviting city officials was to be explored; if that were deemed inadvisable they were to be considered as members of a follow-up group. The purpose of the public meeting would be

> . . . to establish the fact that School Board members are interested in the various city problems that relate to the public schools, and are anxious to work with citizens in determining courses of action to follow.[25]

The letter of invitation to such a meeting, planned for June 18, 1963, at the School District's Administrative and Service Center, referred to it as an opportunity for ". . . citizens to exchange viewpoints and opinions and suggest cooperative plans for future action on matters which are particularly pressing." The letter was over the name of Board President Owen. It stressed that they anticipated ". . . a valuable exchange of thinking on matters that merit collaborative effort and carry joint responsibility."[26]

Throughout May and June the drive toward equal housing and employment opportunities accelerated and became more visible and vocal in Seattle. The Times spoke editorially of the need to establish a better pace for the equalization of civil rights, a pace holding assurance that better conditions would be provided in housing and employment. The newspaper pointed out that Seattle was fortunate in its relative freedom from strife, which was due in part

> . . . to the thoughtful leadership of organizations and individuals who have endeavored to deal with the situation at a moderate pace. These moderates, though, may well be faced very shortly with demands from radicals for precipitate action which could develop ugly aspects.
>
> Thus moderates must be given community support to assure that the equalization of opportunities is of moving concern to the citizenry as a whole and

> will proceed at a pace which is observable and satisfactory to minorities. "Talk" will not suffice.[27]

The same editorial supported the move by Mayor Gordon Clinton to establish a Human Rights Commission for the city, rather than proposing the strong open-housing ordinance sought from him by the moderate civil rights leaders.

By June the city was experiencing public demonstrations. The Seattle chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality, which was estimated to have a membership of between forty and fifty,[28] had organized picketing of the Bon Marche department store to win some gains in minority employment. CORE, in conjunction with NAACP and a number of clergymen, organized a demonstration march in the Westlake Mall on Saturday, June 15, to promote an open housing ordinance.[29]

The following Monday the same groups mustered an interracial rally of 400 people at the Municipal Building, prior to the Mayor's annual message to the City Council which was to contain his request for the Human Rights Commission. Mayor Clinton went before the demonstrators, heard them ask him for a strong housing ordinance, and then requested their support for <u>his</u> plan. The Chairman of the demonstration, Reverend Mance Jackson of the Bethel Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, told Clinton that they heard him, ". . . 'and we think there is no intention of our city government to do anything.'" He vowed that

they would continue demonstrations until they achieved their goal.[30]

The Urban League, which was not an official participant in the demonstrations, criticized the Clinton approach as a step backward which fell short of meeting the need. The League President asserted that the Mayor seemed to be following the minority report from the 1962 Citizens' Advisory Committee on Minority Housing, which had been headed by Al Westberg. The majority had "advised passage of an ordinance against discrimination in sale or rent of housing," while the minority favored a commission not backed by an ordinance.[31]

While the Urban League continued to pressure the School District, it kept a generally lower profile compared to some of the other civil rights groups. It also found itself "caught in the cross fire"--criticized by blacks because it was not action-oriented and by whites because it was moving too fast. Its Executive Secretary, Edwin T. Pratt, said that ". . . the League is a 'silent partner,'" even though it was not linked with the activist groups conducting the June demonstrations.[32]

Much of the leadership in Seattle's increasingly activist civil rights movement came from the ranks of the black clergy. Mance Jackson, a Whittier College graduate from Los Angeles, was Vice President of the NAACP and active in CORE.[33] Reverend Samuel E. McKinney of Mt. Zion

Baptist Church, a Morehouse College classmate of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., scored Seattle's problem at that time as being ". . . 'one of lethargy, communication and community,'" which had been there all the time but could no longer be ignored. He was quoted as saying, somewhat prophetically,

> People might think we [the civil rights leaders] are radical or extremist, which we are not. But if they don't listen to us, Lord help them with what they will have to deal with later.[34]

Reverend John Adams asserted that "the Negro minister has always been in civil rights full time." The Times referred to him as a newcomer to Seattle, ". . . [who] has appeared as a spokesman wherever Negro protests against racial discrimination have been aired."[35] At the June 17 open-housing rally he had told Mayor Clinton, in reference to a Human Rights Commission, "We honestly believe you are putting a Band-Aid on a civic cancer.'"[36]

Two laymen who were active in the Seattle chapter of NAACP were its President, Charles V. Johnson, an attorney, and Dr. Earl V. Miller, a physician. Dr. Miller was Chairman of the NAACP's Education Committee.

These five were among the estimated 190 people who attended the June 18 meeting called by the School Board "to discuss equal educational opportunities." The School District was represented by Superintendent Campbell and three Board members--Owen, Swain and Tidwell. City

Councilmen present were Mrs. Harlan Edwards, Wing Luke and A. Ludlow Kramer. Many civil rights groups were represented, including the Urban League, NAACP, CORE, ACLU, and the Anti-Defamation League.[37]

Both the Urban League and NAACP presented formal position statements. The NAACP began by saying that

> Segregated public schools deliberate, de facto, or a combination of both are psychologically and educationally harmful to Negro and white children . . . . While school officials are not responsible for segregated housing, they are responsible for segregated public schools whatever the cause may be.[38]

Six elementary and two junior high schools were listed as being segregated. Among suggestions for achieving desegregation in Seattle were "redrawing of the gerrymandered school zones," and open enrollment, although the latter was considered least desirable. In a blurring of lines between Crain's welfare and symbolic goals, the NAACP statement fell back to the responsibility of the School District to provide compensatory education elements "to meet the actual needs of the Negro student," in the event that it "may be impossible to desegregate some schools."[39]

The Urban League stated its belief that segregation in Seattle's schools had reached the point

> . . . where forthright and affirmative action must be taken to not only alleviate, but to remedy, this situation which has detrimental effects on both white and non-white students.[40]

It requested the School Board to reconsider its decision to not ask the Mayor and City Council to enact an open-housing ordinance. Among its other recommendations was the addition to the District staff of a full-time coordinator for the disadvantaged student program.[41] Both of the civil rights organizations stressed the importance of desegregation for white students as well as non-white.

The meeting's format called for each of the Board members and Superintendent to make ten-minute opening comments, after which President Owen opened the meeting for discussion from the floor. Early questions and comments centered around what factors resulted in the "disadvantaged school" designation, and there was a fairly pointed exchange over the School District's keeping of records designating race.[42]

Reverend Mance Jackson finally put the main question squarely when he said "It is time we quit beating around the bush and get to the problem--the question is whether de facto segregation is a fact?" Mrs. Owen's reply, "It is a fact," was a public recognition of the problem, but she added that "we must be careful to differentiate between legislative segregation and de facto segregation. De facto segregation has been a matter over which we have had no control."[43]

The direction of the meeting shifted away from discussion and exchange of ideas toward a pressing for some

action. Reverend Jackson asked what steps were being taken to combat de facto segregation. Dr. Miller, who presented the NAACP statement, asked "Has the School Board taken an official position on de facto segregation?" Reverend Adams pressed with "What has the School Board done to give leadership to end de facto segregation?" Mrs. Owen replied that there was no specific plan at that time. Ed Singler, a CORE activist reminded them that there had been demonstrations elsewhere, and "If something doesn't happen as a result of Board action, demonstrations will take place in Seattle. . . . The School Board should go on record admitting segregation." Later in the meeting, John Darrah, a Madrona resident identified with the ACLU, made a similar thrust:

> It is important that the School Board as publicly elected officials resolve that it will support action on the matter of segregation . . . here we have a situation where the School Board and the City Council have the opportunity to alleviate a social evil.[44]

By that time the meeting's focus had shifted to include open housing, beginning with Leonard Schroeter's comments:

> Six weeks ago I presented several questions to the Board; specifically asked the Board to pass a resolution in support of the open housing ordinance. This was a request only for a simple symbolic act and I feel that in failing to pass such a resolution, the Board is drawing a fine line.

Board member Swain said there was no question in his mind about the gravity of the situation; however, he did not feel it was his role

> . . . as a School Board member to tell the City Council what to do. We recognize that de facto segregation does exist in some of our schools and we are concerned about developing a course of action.

Mrs. Neil Thorlakson, a resident of the city's north end, supported the efforts of the Board

> . . . to provide compensatory education and to resolve the problems of de facto segregation. [She also thought,] however, the School Board's business is that of providing the best education possible for our children and segregation is not a problem which we can expect the School Board to resolve, but a problem which must be assumed by the City Council and the Mayor. If the City Council would enact an open housing ordinance, would the School Board present a supporting resolution?

Mrs. Owen replied that they probably would do so.[45]

It was suggested from the floor that as many people as possible from the present gathering attend the July 1 City Council meeting on open housing. Councilman Kramer pointed out that the Mayor was coming to the Council about listing services, not about an open-housing ordinance. Councilman Wing Luke, speaking for himself and Kramer, said that the City Council "would be interested in an expression of interest from the School Board regarding open housing." He saw an increasing need for the Council ". . .

to share its concerns with other government agencies and the Council will welcome the School Board's support." Councilwoman Edwards agreed with Mrs. Thorlakson that the School Board's job was education, and the problem could only be solved by open housing. She said that the question was how to achieve that, and "Unless caution is exercised in the matter, we may find a referendum on the next ballot which would be strongly supported by the opposition."[46]

The question was asked, "Should we not have another meeting to hear what the Board is planning?" Swain suggested a citizens' advisory group to work with the Board, and added that this committee should have city-wide representation. This brought a mixed reaction. Reverend Adams said, "The Negro community is tired of being studied and of having elected officials pass the buck." Reverend McKinney suggested that "what we need is a non-Caucasian on the School Board. The School Board itself needs help." He also made the observation that the School Board was a good one, ". . . and we should have a report from it before school begins."[47]

Comments from the floor stressed the need for a Board policy position on de facto segregation, without which school staff resources could not be fully employed toward solving the problem. One person maintained that open housing would <u>not</u> solve the problem, and suggested "that

people with specific ideas send them to the School Board in advance of the next meeting."

Some specific plans were voiced that night. After saying that "no panacea will be found by undertaking another broad citizens committee study," Donald Schmechel went on to present a plan that would divide the Central Area into quadrants and transfer pupils from those sections into each of the city's junior high schools. More specific plans and suggestions began to come forth as the hour grew later, and Mrs. Owen ended the meeting by asking those present who wished to

> [to] submit their ideas to the School Board and [said] that a citizens committee would be selected to view the ideas and recommend consideration of the most significant ones at a subsequent meeting to which all invited to this meeting would again receive an invitation.[48]

The June 18 meeting was a turning point for the School District. While the matter continued to be referred to as the need for equal educational opportunities, the Board had publicly acknowledged that de facto segregation existed in the city's schools, and the direction had been set for action, in addition to discussion and "sincere concern." It was evident at the meeting that those who had lived with the situation and had been through the process of fact-finding, discussion, exchange of ideas and attempts to move groups and individuals to act were growing impatient with those who were only then coming to

realize that a problem existed. Support and pressure for Board action could not be ignored.

The Times report of the meeting was headed "School Board Hit, Praised at Meeting"--praised for being the first city governmental body to initiate such a public airing of problems, hit for not being imaginative in seeking solutions to racial imbalance. The two reported results of the meeting were a promise to recommend to the full School Board formation of a citizens' advisory committee, "with solid Negro representation," and the promise to call another public meeting in a month.[49]

It was in reaction to that meeting that the Board received its first communication opposing action to alleviate segregation. The official record of the Board's June 26 meeting indicated that Mrs. Owen would reply to the letter from a Magnolia area woman who had written to express her "view on school districting with particular reference to transfer requests of different racial groups."[50] The record, as usual, understated things. The letter, typed completely in upper case, said in part:

> IS IT POSSIBLE THE SCHOOL BOARD WILL YIELD TO PRESSURE FROM A GROUP OF NEGROES----WHEN THROUGH THE YEARS, IT REMAINED ADAMANT TO THE PLEAS OF SOME WHITE CHILDREN, TO BE PERMITTED TO TRANSFER TO OTHER SCHOOLS OUTSIDE THEIR DISTRICT.
>
> BUT NOW THE NEGRO SAYS TO HELL WITH LAW AND ORDER---AND BOUNDARIES-----WHILE OUR CHILDREN QUIETLY ACCEPTED DECISIONS

AND LET IT GO AT THAT.[51]

Mrs. Owen's predictably gracious reply was a personal one, which she typed herself, in keeping with her practice while she was on the School Board:

> You are interpreting the racial situation as it concerns the Seattle School District quite differently from what the School Board has found it to be. It is by no means true that the Negroes in Seattle have said "to Hell with law and order--and boundaries" and that they are bringing pressure to bear to enable their children to enjoy privileges which have not been accorded to white children. . . . Please rest assured that the Seattle Schools are concerned with the educational opportunity afforded all of Seattle's children and we shall exert our best judgement to accomplish this end.[52]

The public meeting on June 18 produced a slight change in the School Board's stance regarding the City Council and open housing. This is expressed in a letter of June 20 from Mrs. Owen to City Council President Floyd Miller. She said that one of the many suggestions to the Board had been that the Board address a resolution to the Council requesting enactment of an open housing ordinance:

> It heretofore has been and remains our conviction that it would be inappropriate for the Board to take such a step with regard to a matter of legislation properly within the jurisdiction of the Council. During the course of our discussions, however, the three members of the City Council who were present expressed themselves generally to the effect that your body would be receptive to a communication indicating the School Board's concern and also providing some

> information available to us which might be relevant to your deliberations on this matter.

Maps and racial distribution figures for school enrollments were enclosed, and Mrs. Owen related Board awareness of "gross racial imbalance" in certain Central Area schools, and said:

> We furthermore recognize that discrimination in housing is a major cause of these situations of racial imbalance, and therefore we would support in all ways appropriate to our function the enactment and implementation of corrective measures.[53]

This fell far short of asking for an open housing ordinance, but, with press coverage to the effect that "School Board Will Back Housing Plan," the Board was publicly involved and on record. Miller invited the Board to the July 1 meeting, at which its letter would be formally presented to the Council.[54]

The School Board's second public meeting was planned for July 23. In the interim, the Board proceeded to establish an advisory group "to work with it on the problems of equal educational opportunities, with particular reference to the Central Area, and to review the many diverse recommendations calling for specific actions."[55] In the Board letter to those accepting membership on the committee, it was stressed that the group would "make all reports and recommendations directly to the Board."[56] Mrs. Owen also stressed that

> The committee has intentionally been kept small and no one connected with the schools, with the exception of Mr. Kvamme who is serving as coordinator, has been appointed to the committee. It is the Board's wish that the committee will feel no restraint in making its recommendations.[57]

Don G. Abel, an attorney who had been State Chairman of the Democratic Party in 1954 and was active in civic affairs, agreed to chair the committee. He was generally considered to have been a good choice for the District's first efforts in desegregation, a fair man who was conciliatory yet willing to take some risks.[58] He had attended the June 18 meeting, and his orientation to de facto segregation is apparent in a letter to Mrs. Owen following that meeting. He felt that her conduct of the meeting had placed the problem in exactly the right perspective--that the problem was one of educating thousands of youngsters throughout the city ". . . and not simply a crash program to alleviate the sore spot of de facto segregation." His direct contact with the schools had been in volunteer work at Meany Junior High, which he considered an inferior school (where the racial balance had changed from 27.5 percent black in 1957 to 49.3 percent black in 1962).[59] He and other Central Area parents hoped the Board would press ahead to bring all Central Area schools up to par, and he said:

> Frankly, I believe that transporting or shipping students to different parts of

> the city might do quite a bit to alleviate Meany Junior High's problems. I cannot pass a judgment on this because of my limited experience.[60]

The committee was called The Citizens' Advisory Committee for Equal Educational Opportunity. In addition to the chairman, the committee included the following members:

Reverend Robert L. Baxter	Wylie M. Hemphill
Fitzgerald Beaver	Dr. John R. Henry
Louis Bernstein	Mrs. Whittier Johnson
Mrs. T. W. Carroll	Mrs. Milton Karr
Randolph W. Carter	G. Beale McCulloch
Carl B. Erickson	Dr. Earl V. Miller
Jerome Farris	Douglas Shaw Palmer
Archie M. Greenlee	Mrs. John D. Spaeth
Philip Hayasaka	Mrs. Edward F. Stern

Thirteen of that group were present at the Committee's first meeting at Madrona Elementary School, July 9, 1963.[61]

The Times account of the Committee's formation reported that six of the members were black. The Committee represented a variety of backgrounds and attitudes, but all of them brought to the group a knowledge and interest in school affairs, with advocacy for no fixed position.[62]

At that initial meeting the purposes of the Committee and the scope of its operations and responsibilities were defined. In addition to the general purpose of preparing recommendations for the School Board, that of determining how the School District was attempting to provide equal educational opportunity was listed, as well as identifying current District practices to be continued or strengthened; identifying practices for experimentation or introduction as part of the District's program; and identifying

practices which were barriers to providing equal educational opportunities. It was understood that, while the Committee would make recommendations ". . . the Board will retain the responsibility for final decision on these matters." It was agreed that when its study was completed the Committee would be dissolved, and March 1, 1964, was set as a target date for submitting its final report to the Board. "Interim recommendations pertaining to matters which the Committee feels need the early attention of the School Board can be submitted during the course of the study."[63] It was the interim recommendations that created the greatest impact, and by 1964 much of their report was anti-climactic.

The Committee met at least one more time before the promised follow-up public meeting. The group decided to do its work in subcommittees. The establishment of three of these at its July 18 meeting was reported in the Times, and Seattle was introduced to the ideas and vocabulary of desegregation. Those three subgroups were planned to study the following: The Princeton Plan ("splitting enrollments of neighboring schools to achieve new integration"); the feasibility of transporting children out of their neighborhood schools; and the drawing of school boundaries to prevent segregation.* The Times also referred to the

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*The other subcommittees dealt with open enrollment,

total Committee as having been established to study ways to "eliminate de facto segregation,"[64] a choice of words which the School District had never made.

Also prior to the second public meeting, the Board received a letter that put their dilemma into a political perspective and urged them to assume strong leadership for equality. It came from John Darrah, Executive Secretary of the American Civil Liberties Union, who had spoken at the June 18 meeting as a Madrona School parent. He told them that beyond setting their own house in order regarding any discriminatory practices, it seemed they

> . . . may also have to decide whether to pursue a special program of integrating schools despite public controversy, because of the long-run educational values to be derived by both white and Negro pupils; or whether to avoid such a program because its controversial nature might possibly jeopardize public support of the school system and harm the overall educational program.

He urged them to consider these political problems, although he realized that

> Political leadership may not appeal to School Board members who naturally prefer to concentrate on education; like it or not, however, education takes on a controversial, political aspect in a predominantly mono-racial school.

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guidance and counselling, junior high centers, compensatory education, interracial instructional materials, public relations, and standards of behavior and discipline.

He noted the differing viewpoints expressed to the Board, and observed that, at present, civil rights advocates seemed to agree on only one thing:

> That the School Board as a social institution has a vital role in breaking the vicious circle of practices holding Negroes to a second-class citizenship. We trust that with the good will of all this can ultimately be accomplished.[65]

The civil rights movement was forcing the School District to face political realities and to alter its style of dealing with the community. It appears that its Equal Educational Opportunity Committee was a departure from the practice of deciding a policy and presenting it publicly for review and acceptance, as the Administration had attempted to do in the case of its proposal for the old Washington Junior High building.

Following the appointment of the Citizens' Advisory Committee, Civic Unity contacted the Board to commend its committee selection. In its letter, this group, which had been associated with the School District for almost twenty years, made the assumption that the Administration already had in mind a framework or outline of a program and action deemed appropriate and feasible for Seattle. In her reply, Mrs. Owen indicated that the new committee had free reign and was expected to take the initiative. The Board hoped that its ". . . study of Seattle's situation will produce better solutions than have been tried elsewhere. We shall

await their recommendations with interest."[66]

The second public meeting was held July 25, and it was the forum for the first report from the Citizens' Advisory Committee. The Times reported that the Committee "found last night it will not lack public interest as it seeks to find solutions to end 'de facto' segregation in Seattle schools." During the two-hour meeting attended by approximately 300 people, "the majority of them Caucasian," Chairman Able "was deluged with questions and suggestions" as he made the Committee report. The Times said that Abel indicated the Committee's attitude "when he presented a resolution asking the School Board to 'adopt a policy of ending segregation immediately by whatever workable solutions are available.'"[67]

The Committee had found ten schools that it considered to be segregated, with enrollments at least 40 percent black.* Representatives at the meeting from the Madison Park and Montlake Community Clubs, whose Central Area schools were not on that list, asked to be allowed to appear before the Committee. Abel reported thirteen recommendations which the Committee was studying, including student transfer out of established boundaries, the

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*In addition to Garfield High School, those schools were Washington and Meany Junior High Schools and the following elementary schools: Mann, Minor, Colman, Gatzert, Harrison, Leschi, Madrona and Stevens.

Princeton Plan and boundary changes. They were considering a suggestion to convert the new Washington Junior High School to a city-wide pre-vocational school and the recommendation that the District hire a full-time interracial coordinator.[68]

The direction and tone of that meeting, lacking minutes or a transcript, can be seen in another letter to the School Board from the Executive Secretary of Civic Unity. She found the meeting a good example of public participation, with a "refreshing lack of defensiveness" on the Board's part. She congratulated Mrs. Owen on the "free, direct, matter-of-fact discussion," adding that she did not "agree at all with the comment that discussion at this time was an 'utter waste of time.'" She thought it had been valuable to broadcast facts about work and efforts of the past

> . . . from one who has been with it all these years. Many of those most vocal in protest are newcomers to Seattle--from less than one year to two to five years--and are unfamiliar with past efforts . . . . The fire, pressure, and even insolence, of the first meeting subsided by the end of this second meeting to respectful and dignified appreciation . . . .

accompanied, nevertheless, with a warning to be alert. It was, in her view, good that all had been reminded that the School Board had responsibility to act, so they must be sure that recommendations were practicable.[69] Mrs. Owen replied that she, too, thought the meeting had gone well,

> . . . but, of course, the real test will come when we have to evaluate the Committee recommendations. I only hope that by that time the Negro leaders will have come to recognize that we are working with them, not for them, and that we shall have established sufficient confidence and communication with them--particularly through the Advisory Committee--that together we can accept recommendations that are really workable.[70]

Through August, the Citizens' Advisory Committee pursued its work, which was to lead later that month to establishment of Seattle's Voluntary Racial Transfer program. The Board continued to receive pressure from civil rights leaders, and Reverend John Adams emerged as the most insistent and constant of those pressing for Board action. Mrs. Owen recalled that he

> . . . used to come to every School Board meeting. I was President then and I well remember--he would get up and say, "'what are you doing?'" We would say, "'we cannot let you know yet--you will just have to wait.'" . . . I think he began to wear us down more than anything else. I don't think he changed our thinking so much--except that he must have--because something, and I don't remember what it was, brought us to this feeling that we must open things up, and allow students to go to other schools if they wanted to. . . . We never had had a transfer program of that sort at all, so this really was a departure from regular school policy.[71]

At the School Board meeting on August 7, 1963, Reverend Adams appeared "Re: Request for Some Immediate Action on De Facto Segregated Schools." He expressed gratitude for the appointment of the Citizens' Advisory Committee,

"but strongly urged the Board, inasmuch as it was hardly likely that the Committee would have a recommendation by September, to take some specific steps before the opening of the schools in September." Mrs. Owen's response was that

> . . . the Board would feel that it was out of order to move forward without waiting for the Committee to make recommendations . . . the Board is not attempting to drag its feet on this matter and neither is the Committee, but rather is taking its assignment very seriously.[72]

The Seattle Junior Chamber of Commerce submitted a resolution to the School Board at its August 14 meeting. The Junior Chamber recognized that de facto segregation existed in Seattle, but was unclear about educational and related deficiencies resulting from it. The official record mentions only one paragraph from the resolution:

> The Seattle Junior Chamber of Commerce believes that one prime function [of the Citizens' Advisory Committee] . . . must be to define and describe these deficiencies and report their findings not only to the School Board but to the public at large."[73]

The resolution itself also called for action

> . . . we further urge that SAID COMMITTEE recommend immediate reasonable solutions to such of its findings as indicate a correlation between de facto school segregation and the absence of optimum . . . opportunities in the affected schools.[74]

At that August 14 meeting, Mrs. Owen gave a progress report from the Citizens' Advisory Committee. Its first

interim report had been submitted to the Board, covering the areas of a policy statement, zoning, open enrollment, transportation of pupils, and a human relations program for teachers. This report had been referred to the Administration to ". . . consider to what extent implementation of the recommendations can be made." The subcommittee studying the Princeton Plan had already concluded that it was ". . . inadvisable for Seattle at the present time and that other measures should be taken." The Board planned no action until the Committee's complete report had been received. Its full recommendations were to be presented at the next regular Board meeting, scheduled for August 28.[75]

Reverend Adams was present and told the School Board "that 'direct action' will be taken by the Seattle Negro community if the Seattle School Board has not acted upon recommended integration programs by the opening of classes on September 4." The Citizens' Advisory Committee and the School Board were obviously giving serious consideration to pupil transfers. Mrs. Owen's response to Adams was that they would need to know "which schools have vacant classrooms before transfers of many pupils could be approved," and this could best be determined after the first day of school.

> Reverend Adams noted that August 28 was the date of the planned 100,000 member march on Washington, D.C., and, he said,

> "'I am happy the Board is going to meet on August 28 and I hope its action will make August 28 a red-letter day in the civil rights struggle.'"[76]

The Times account of that meeting was headed: "Voluntary Transfers in School Racial Imbalance Favored," and said that this had come to light in the discussion between Mrs. Owen and Reverend Adams.* It reported that the Committee would "recommend 'open transfer' as one means of easing racial imbalance," that the transfers would be voluntary, and that they would be only into schools in which there was available classroom space. Mrs. Owen also reportedly said that informal polls had shown "no overwhelming enthusiasm for transferring from either white or Negro parents because of the transportation problems involved."[77]

The press expanded considerably beyond the official record's reference to "direct action" threatened by Adams. He had warned that school "study-ins," and School Board "sit-ins" were probable without some action by the School District. The "study-ins would involve "sit-ins" at

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*Reverend Adams was referred to as Chairman of the Central Area Civil Rights Committee, which has been described as a civil rights coalition of sorts. In addition to Adams, it included such leaders as Charles Johnson, Edwin Pratt, Mineo Katagiri, Andrew Young, Randolph Carter, Walter Hubbard, Reverend McKinney and Walter Hundley. They represented all the major civil rights organizations, and they met regularly in strategy sessions.

predominantly white schools.[78]

In mid-August, Donald Schmechel wrote an article, "End De Facto Segregation," which was printed by both the daily Times and the weekly Argus. He asserted that changing housing patterns would be too difficult and slow to solve the segregation problem in school populations, and he urged a voluntary transfer program. Much of his presentation is in the classic mold of the white liberal concern for maintaining an integrated neighborhood. His plan

> . . . would offer substantial numbers of non-white families the opportunity for their children to attend a senior high school where the percentage of non-white students would be relatively low. It would improve the situation of white pupils presently attending Garfield. It might help improve the housing pattern in the Central Area by encouraging more white families to buy or remain in that area.[79]

The Central Area Civil Rights Committee (CACRC) staged a march and demonstration in Seattle to coincide with the "Jobs and Freedom" march in Washington, D.C., on August 28. The plans called for demonstrators to meet at the First A.M.E. Church, 14th and East Pine, at 10:30 a.m. for the march to a noon rally at the Federal Court House. Reverend John Adams was the spokesman for CACRC, and he was joined in the leadership by Reverend John Lynch, Assistant Pastor at St. James Cathedral, and Reverend Lemuel Peterson, Executive Minister of the Greater Seattle Council of Churches.[80]

In a prepared statement issued prior to the march, Adams said that its purpose was to demonstrate support for Congressional passage of civil rights legislation; to demonstrate disgust with organized labor for its stand on the Washington, D.C. march; to remind owners and employers in the Seattle area that there had been but minimal progress in equality of job opportunities; and

> to inform the School Board that while it did nothing to create segregation in Seattle schools, it is guilty of many years of sugar coating and doing nothing about the problem, giving its passive consent to the situation which exists today. We expect positive, tangible decisions and steps to eliminate segregated schools in Seattle this school year. "The Negro community will not be pacified by a committee appointed too late, or a Board which does too little."[81]

The size of the Seattle march and demonstration is uncertain, but it was described as orderly. United States Attorney Brock Adams welcomed the demonstrators at the Court House and congratulated them on the "peaceful exercise of their Constitutional rights." Reverend Petersen "called on the demonstrators to attend a Seattle School Board meeting this afternoon to oppose segregated school facilities."[82]

The School District Administration anticipated possible demonstrations at the August 28 Board meeting. District Security Chief Charles O'Toole had been in contact with the Seattle Police Department and he relayed its

recommendations for precautions to the School Board Secretary. The Police suggestions were to close off all the Administration building except for the public areas, and to have some "plain clothes" people and two police women in the audience. The Assistant Police Chief also suggested that Superintendent Campbell be instructed

> . . . that it would be best if the Board and the staff retire to the Board conference room and exit by way of the Superintendent's office to the parking lot at the conclusion of their meeting. It was suggested that the controversial subject be closed in such a manner that interested parties were in effect invited back for continued conference at subsequent meetings, even though the Board's decision, which will be publicly announced at the meeting, appears to be final and conclusive.

Mr. Campbell was also to understand that if he were to allow a sit-in, he would complicate subsequent arrest and conviction processes.[83]

The School District need not have been too concerned, although apparently many did heed Reverend Petersen's call to go from the Court House demonstration to the School Board meeting. A crowd of approximately 250 attended the meeting, but there were no "incidents" or protests when Mrs. Owen announced the new policy on student transfer which was adopted by the Board.[84] Prior to the meeting the District had received five letters on the subject of equal educational opportunity, and three of them opposed transporting pupils to achieve racial balance.[85]

The new policy was presented in a special order of business, and Mrs. Owen expressed the Board's appreciation to the Citizens' Advisory Committee, on whose recommendations the policy was based. Her reading of the policy statement began with the Board's recognition of its responsibility to promote racial understanding within its broad obligation to provide quality educational programs. The statement recounted Seattle's housing patterns, the School District's adherance to the neighborhood school concept, and the resulting racial imbalance. It reaffirmed Board faith in the concept of neighborhood schools, but saw racial imbalance as lessening "the opportunity for students to have the benefit of knowing members of other races," which the Board saw as a valuable educational experience.

> Therefore, and based on the recommendation of the Citizens' Advisory Committee for Equal Educational Opportunity, the School Board will modify its neighborhood school attendance policy for the 1963-64 school year to permit voluntary transfers to certain schools under circumstances outlined below. The School Board wishes to emphasize that no parents--Negro or white--will be required by this policy change to send their children to any schools outside their regular attendance area, with the exception of children enrolled in special education classes, offered only in certain locations.[86]

The elementary school transfer policy was to remain as it had been, based on "space available" arrangements between building principals, "but approval will be facilitated if it reduces the racial imbalance in the 'leaving

and receiving' school." The racial balancing potential of the policy was emphasized when it was added that "Transfer of white students to 'leaving' schools can be requested through this existing channel."[87] It would, however, be quite some time before any stress would be placed on this "reverse transfer" aspect of the policy.

Designated as "leaving schools" were Colman, Gatzert, Harrison, Leschi, Madrona, Mann, Minor and Stevens. The "receiving schools" were buildings with space available. There were nine in the north end of the city, three in West Seattle, and two on Queen Anne Hill, plus Lowell and Seward Schools on Capitol Hill, and Beacon Hill Elementary School.[88]

At the secondary level, the new policy allowed for transfers for three reasons. Any student could transfer if there were room in the school to which the transfer was made, and if it would improve the racial imbalance in both sending and receiving schools. Any students could transfer in order to enroll in some recently announced prevocational courses. "Any student may transfer to take advantage of specialized programs not available in his home school."[89] The third provision was sufficiently vague that it would be used for years as a vehicle for white flight, serving to increase racial imbalance in Central Area schools. All of the junior and senior high schools in the city were "receiving" schools for Garfield, Meany

and Washington.

It was explained that no transfers would be arranged until after school started the following week, and that all transfers were to be for a full school year, barring emergencies. Athletic eligibility rules did not change, and a student was still required to attend one semester in a receiving school before his eligibility was allowed. Transportation for transferees was not provided by the School District. It was explained that the District could not, "according to legal opinion and because of financial stringencies, provide free transportation for the purpose of reducing racial imbalance."[90]

The Harrison-McGilvra boundary received separate attention in the new policy statement. The area north of Madison Street, which had been the focus of dispute in the late fifties and was considered to be within Harrison boundaries, was designated as an optional attendance area for the two schools, effective with the opening of school on September 4, 1963.[91] It would appear that the District had abandoned the effort of trying to compel students living north of Madison to attend Harrison.

Board adoption of the policy statement was unanimous. In the discussion which followed, the Board was congratulated and given support. Reverend Petersen of the Church Council accurately predicted one of the biggest problems, which was also one of the greatest weaknesses of

the voluntary transfer program, when he told the Board, "You will need the help of the public, especially with transportation." It was brought out during the discussion that space available for transfers could accommodate 1400 of the city's 7,000 black students.[92]

The Post-Intelligencer's coverage of that landmark meeting was headed "Board Approves Transfer to Non-neighborhood Schools in Answer to Charges of Segregation," while the Times calmed the city with "Mass Transfers of Negro Pupils is Not Expected." It reported that Administration sources did not expect to be inundated by requests for transfers, and it gave no indication that the District wanted it to be otherwise. The article stressed the lack of impact on athletic eligibility and quoted Mrs. Owen as saying that "no one need fear that 'the entire Garfield backfield will switch to Ballard.'"[93]

The Times addressed the Voluntary Racial Transfer Program editorially on August 30: "Schools Face the Race Issue." It expressed the hope that the community would cooperate with the Board in its efforts. Its record "on racial and related matters inspires confidence in the Board's judgment." The Times itself was far from pushing for reform, but thought that the VRT looked to be

> . . . a practical and workable procedure for achieving a more equitable racial mixture in the schools while retaining the concept of the neighborhood school. . . . The public should keep in mind

> that it is not the primary function of the School Board to act as a pace-setter for reform of conditions that are due to social and economic conditions quite outside the province of education. . . . In our view, any program for large-scale compulsory transfers of pupils to schools distant from their homes would create resistance and negate the progress that is being made in breaking down de facto segregation.

It was the Times' feeling that, in the interest of "'good human relations,'" the community should give the Board's new plan a fair chance to prove its worth.[94]

It was the School Board, under increasing pressure from civil rights advocates and with the recommendations and support of its Citizens' Advisory Committee, which took the lead in initiating this sharp departure from the School District's previous policies. Mrs. Owen later recalled the Superintendent's surprise, when he learned what the Board had decided to do. Her Board colleague, Philip Swain, felt that the transfer policy decision was one which should refute the later

> . . . frequent accusations that the School Board is a rubber stamp for the Administration, because there was a large degree of Board involvement in the development of the specific terms of that policy. But in the final analysis it had the commitment of Ernie Campbell as well as of the Board. And it was taken in the face of legal advice that it might be ruled unconstitutional.[95]

The Voluntary Racial Transfer Program (VRT) was promoted with varying degrees of enthusiasm and commitment,

and, although additional strategies and plans were later employed by the schools, it remained the District's primary vehicle in the desegregation effort.*

Its announcement and initial operation brought support and commendation from groups such as the newly established Seattle Human Rights Commission; renewed pressure for effective promotion and implementation from civil rights groups; and outright opposition from some citizens. There was, however, no organized opposition to the transfer plan.

The Municipal League, which had shelved its interest in school desegregation two years earlier, exercised great caution in deciding whether to commend the School Board on its new policy. Its Public Schools Committee had returned to studying such things as reading and the problems of juvenile delinquency during 1963. However, in July the League's Board of Trustees adopted the following resolution:

> The President shall appoint a special committee of League members to consider and make recommendations on the problems of race relations and minority rights in Seattle and King County as the same may affect or be affected by the activities or the legislative acts of local governments in this area.[96]

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*The VRT continued in operation through the 1977-78 school year, after which it was supplanted by a district-wide mandatory program.

The primary areas for the Committee's investigation were housing and School District policy.

The Committee was chaired by John Rupp, and among its members were Norman Ackley, former Mayor William F. Devin, Paul Green, League President James R. Ellis, and its legal counsel, Donald Schmechel. The League asked investigation of whether it was "legal or justifiable for the Seattle School District to spend tax money . . . to transport negro pupils from . . . the Central District;" whether it was "legal or justifiable" to change boundaries to allow black students to attend schools outside the Central Area; and whether it was "legal or justifiable" to plan future buildings to improve racial balance. The observation was offered to its Committee that "Taxpaying citizens must decide whether or not they believe that the expense for this sociological change in policy is justified."[97]

This new League committee plowed much the same ground worked by the Public Schools Committee in 1960. They began by hearing from civil rights group representatives on August 21. The groups this time were NAACP and CORE, rather than the Urban League and Civic Unity Committee.*

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*Civic Unity Committee funding by United Good Neighbors was terminated July 1, 1964, primarily because of the establishment of the city's Human Rights Commission. CUC did not survive this loss of financial support.

School District representatives came to them on August 31, bringing reports and copies of the Board's transfer policy statement.[98] At its meeting on September 27, the question was raised as to whether the Committee should take any cognizance of the new transfer policy.

> It was decided that the action of the School Board should be commended. It was particularly gratified at the stand of the School Board declining to furnish free transportation to colored pupils who wish to transfer . . . on the grounds that this would require also transportation for white pupils living a mile and a half away from schools and would cost a substantial sum.[99]

This was sent on to the Board of Trustees. A Municipal League statement, dated October 22, 1963, similarly commended the School Board for its voluntary transfer plan to

> . . . alleviate the present imbalance of racial groups. We support its declining to furnish free transportation for these transferring pupils on the grounds that it cannot legally make such a discrimination against the many thousands of other pupils who live more than one and a half miles from their schools.[100]

Furnishing transportation for transferring students was the focus of what controversy there was over the VRT, and it remained a problem for proponents of integration for a number of years. While one or two correspondents expressed opposition to the transfer of black students to any school under any circumstances, the majority in the fall of 1963 objected, as the Times put it, to "proposals

that the schools provide free transportation for Negro pupils who attend schools outside their home area."[101]

The Citizens' Advisory Committee very soon saw the cost of transportation as a problem for the VRT. At its September 19 meeting it unanimously passed a resolution asking the School Board to furnish a detailed statement of the legal and economic reasons behind its policy of not furnishing transportation. The thinking behind this was, in part, that legislation might be secured to help the Board on transportation funding.[102]

The School Board's President and its Citizens' Advisory Committee, represented by Chairman Abel and Dr. Earl Miller, appeared before a hearing of the State Legislature's Interim Committee on Education on October 5, to seek state funding assistance for transportation. Mrs. Owen cited an Attorney General's Office opinion that the School District would be liable for transportation costs for all students living two miles or more from school if it provided free transportation for the voluntary transfers. Abel and Miller, in urging the legislators to act to make funding possible, reported that 238 students had transferred that semester, and Dr. Miller added his estimate that as many as 500 might have, had it been free to ride.[103]

Dr. Miller also responded to the legislative query which gave the Times its heading for coverage of the

meeting: "Marriage Question Arises in Hearing."

> Dr. Earl Miller of Seattle yesterday told a legislative committee he saw no connection between the Negro-transfer program of the Seattle Public Schools and the possible encouragement of interracial marriages. "'Marriage needs more than sitting in the same classroom,'" Dr. Miller said. . . . [he] spoke in response to a question from State Representative Don Eldridge of Mount Vernon.[104]

The response to the transfer opportunity was followed fairly closely that first semester. The School District was apprehensive about possible "trouble" and civil rights groups were concerned that ample time be given for recruiting transferees. September 23 was set as the deadline for transfer applications.

The opening day of school found the Times reporting, "Few Negroes Ask Transfers From Schools." School officials expected the number to increase after letters explaining the program had been sent home to parents. The transfers which were made went on "without incident." The creation of the Harrison-McGilvra optional area north of Madison produced no change in the racial make-up of either school on opening day. The eighty or so pupils involved had attended Harrison the year before and no changes were noted on opening day.[105]

The Voluntary Racial Transfer program was actively promoted by groups within the Central Area. From the time of the original announcement of the policy, the Urban

League held neighborhood meetings to interpret and publicize the program.[106] At a Madrona community meeting on September 10, members of the Citizens' Advisory Committee presented a plea to parents to take advantage of the Board's plan. Those parents pointed to transportation costs as a barrier to their participation. The total number of transfers at that time was 117--forty-one high school students, thirty-three junior high, and forty-three elementary.[107]

By the September 23 cut-off date the number had grown to 238--sixty-nine elementary, ninety-six junior high, and seventy-three senior high. The Board rejected the idea of extending the deadline at its meeting two days later. "From an educational standpoint alone," Mrs. Owen explained, "we cannot continue to introduce new students into classes beyond the period which was announced." Mr. Campbell reported to the Board that day that "all transfers were made without incident and the program appears to be a very successful one."[108]

The School Board met at Meany Junior High School on December 4, and in response to questions from the audience Mrs. Owen announced that the transfer program would be continued the following year. They hoped to have most of the transfers for the second year arranged before school was out that spring. Mrs. Owen assessed the number of students currently involved in the VRT (238) as "probably

not as heavy as many people had hoped," but she felt it was much too early to judge the success of the program.[109]

Mrs. Owen had, a few weeks earlier, defended the Central Area schools and said that the Board need make no apology for the quality of education there. Reflecting that "kind of euphoria," as Philip Swain later described the Board's view of Garfield in the early sixties, she cited the fact that Garfield, one of the smallest high schools, had seven graduates "among the top scholars in the 1963 graduating class at the University of Washington." Only Roosevelt High School, the city's largest, had more, with fourteen.[110]

Indeed, Garfield attracted seven "reverse" transfers that first year, when very few white students moved to predominantly black schools. Three came from Roosevelt, two from Ingraham, and one each from Franklin and Blanchett, a parochial school in the north end of the city.[111] They found Garfield to be a friendlier place than their former schools, agreeing that the social atmosphere was "warmer, less constrained, and more tolerant." They said, "social barriers are flimsy or non-existent at Garfield."[112]

The Citizens' Advisory Committee was eager for greater "reverse transfer" participation. It recommended accepting transfer applications for the second semester (1963-64) and publicizing this to parents throughout the District.

Some of the Committee members were in definite disagreement with the Administration decision that the transfer policy announcement would be sent only to schools with "substantial Negro enrollment and would not be sent to Caucasian schools. The Committee feels that every opportunity should be extended to Caucasians to transfer into the predominantly Negro schools."[113]

Although the District seems to have had less than total enthusiasm for promoting its Voluntary Racial transfer policy, there was within the Administration the feeling that Seattle was "indeed fortunate to have the makings of a solution [to desegregation problems] at hand." This was especially so in light of negative reports from other systems that had integrated their schools.[114] The new policy had at least bought some time. While attitudes about the VRT then fell short of self-congratulatory, Dr. Palmason later thought that

> This kind of let us off the hook a little bit. This was a positive thing that people could accept . . . [people] felt good inside--we were doing something.[115]

They were not let off the hook for long, however. Most of the city was content to think that the Voluntary Racial Transfer program would take care of integration, which is not to say that they necessarily welcomed it. But there would soon be pressure on the District to implement its new program to the fullest, in order to increase the

number of students and schools affected.

The School Board had been forced to face political reality and had acknowledged that de facto segregation did exist in Seattle schools. The policy statement that established the VRT contained what was to be a constant and distinguishing position of the School Board--that integration could be a valuable educational experience.

Civil rights activity would grow in volume and intensity during the coming year as Seattle faced its first test on open housing. Both new and older, established civil rights groups would turn increased attention to the schools, and the Urban League, which heretofore had maintained a relatively low profile, would challenge the District with a proposed plan for city-wide desegregation.

CHAPTER IV

THE TRIAD PLAN--A NOT SO MODEST PROPOSAL

While the Voluntary Transfer Program was the most dramatic response which the School Board made to its Citizens' Advisory Committee's interim recommendations, it was not the only one. In response to the call for in-service human relations programs for teachers and other staff, the District held a special orientation meeting for all teachers new to schools in the Central Area. It was designed to give general background information about the area, and "an understanding of the people who live there." Experienced teachers from those schools shared with the newcomers the techniques and procedures that had proved effective in their situations.[1] The meeting, which was held at Madrona School on October 30, 1963, was considered very valuable, and the Superintendent received requests for early planning of a repeat session the following year.[2]

The Citizens' Advisory Committee had also pushed for the creation of a full time administrative position for a coordinator of inter-group relations. A similar part-time position had been created in 1962. The scope of that job had greatly expanded, and when Superintendent Campbell proposed a full-time post to the Board in the fall of 1963,

his proposal was unanimously approved.[3] The job description, published in the District's personnel bulletin in January, 1964, included a wide range of responsibilities. In addition to coordinating all of the District's intergroup committee activities, the post also was responsible for curriculum adaptation, research aimed at helping the culturally deprived, recruiting and training staffs for schools with a high percentage of disadvantaged students, and working with community agencies that were similarly involved.[4]

Robert A. Bass was selected for the job in March, from among twenty-four applicants. He held both bachelor and masters degrees from Kansas State Teachers College, and he had taught for five years in Port Arthur, Texas, before coming to Seattle in 1957 as a teacher at the Luther Burbank School. He was later a counselor at Franklin High School.[5] The Times underscored his upcoming role in "leading" the transfer program. "Ball, a Negro, favors the transfer program and will make recommendations on how it should be carried out . . . [and] he said 'The only real opportunity for a Negro to make advancement is through education.'"[6] Bass reaffirmed his commitment to the transfer program with a new dimension the following year when he told the Municipal League's Civil Rights Committee, "I believe in the transfer program because even a deprived Negro in a lily-white school can make a

cultural contribution to the white pupils."[7]

Civil Rights and School integration could never have been far from the School Board's attention in the winter and spring of 1964. A succession of reports from the Superintendent kept them informed of desegregation experiences in other cities. Among the District's own activities was an intergroup workshop at Garfield High School in March, led by Dr. Sam Shepherd of the St. Louis school system. That same month Seattle held its first vote on open housing and elected a new mayor.

Having seen the establishment of a Human Rights Commission rather than the open-housing ordinance which they had sought the previous summer, civil rights leaders continued the fight for an ordinance. The Central Area Civil Rights Committee held a rally and demonstration on October 20, 1963, "in the vicinity of Garfield,"* and in the pre-rally publicity a turnout of 5,000 was forecast. A potential clash between ordinance proponents and the Washington contingent of Citizens' Councils of America was averted when the Councils' planned counter-demonstration was cancelled in the face of the Seattle Police Department's vow

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*Throughout the sixties, the press persisted in using the name of Garfield High School as a Central Area reference point in reporting civil rights events and civil disorders. This did nothing to enhance the school's image in the minds of residents in other areas of the city.

to keep the groups apart "by force of the entire police department if necessary."[8] The crowd, about one-fourth Caucasian, was estimated at 1,200, but "rain and a raw wind [had] helped hold down the turnout."[9]

On October 26, 1963, the City Council voted seven to two to place on the March 10 Municipal Election ballot a watered-down version of an open housing ordinance drafted by the Human Rights Commission. Only Councilmen Wing Luke and Charles M. Carroll voted against referring it to public vote in lieu of Council enactment.[10]

The King County Board of Commissioners, with much less timidity, enacted an open housing law for the County in the week prior to Seattle's election in March, 1964, and in so doing sent the Seattle Times into an editorial frenzy. The Times was certain that Seattle would defeat the ordinance, "whether one likes it or not," and held that the public interest would be better served with a housing pattern established on a standard basis rather than one which would make the county a "checker board" on housing laws.[11] In an earlier editorial ("Public Will Set the Pace") the Times had seen defeat for the ordinance because "its advocates have not taken into account the premise that legal compulsion cannot achieve reform unless the citizens are ready to accept it."[12]

Open housing was an issue in the campaign for the Mayor's office, in which Dorm Braman actively opposed the

ordinance. It was supported by Seattle Council PTA and by both the Seattle Federation of Teachers and the Seattle Teachers Association. The teachers groups regarded it as a "means of combating school segregation." The School Board was silent.* The Municipal League took no stand on the ordinance, although its Civil Rights Committee had been investigating the area of fair housing for the past seven months.[13]

In the race for mayor, Dorm Braman defeated John Cherberg 93,027 to 81,681. The vote on the open housing ordinance was 53,453 yes and 112,448 no.[14]

Seattle settled back into complacency. One year prior to the Watts riot, a Seattle journal of some influence could say, "The Negro, too, must have patience and understanding," and find it "disturbing to hear Negro leaders on television the night of the election threatening 'civil disobedience'; that Seattle may become a 'major battleground'; and we are in 'for a hot summer.'"[15] The electorate's concern for integration, and its awareness and involvement in the problem, are mirrored in the election returns. The closer a district was to the segregated housing section of the city, the greater the "yes" vote on

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*The School District had an 8.3 mill levy on the February 11 primary ballot and no doubt felt it could risk no stand on housing.

open housing. The one legislative district in the city to vote in favor of the ordinance was the 37th, with the heaviest percentage of minority population (and containing all the predominantly black schools but one). The 44th District, in the city's northwest section, returned a vote against the ordinance of three to one, and in West Seattle and Magnolia the vote was more than two to one against. In the 35th (downtown) and 43rd (Capitol Hill and Laurelhurst) Districts, adjacent to the Central Area on the southwest and north respectively, the vote was three to two against.[16]

Two weeks after the defeat of the open-housing ordinance, the School Board received the official report of its Citizens' Advisory Committee for Equal Educational Opportunity. In the absence of Chairman Abel, the report was presented by Douglas Shaw Palmer, who noted the Board's full cooperation in such instances as the adoption of the VRT and the orientation session for Central Area teachers. Mrs. Owen, in turn, expressed the Board's appreciation for all the hours of careful consideration and told him that it "had been proud that it could put their recommendations into effect." Mr. Swain said he felt the "whole community, not just the Board owes this committee a vote of thanks."[17]

In its investigation of the Seattle situation, the Committee established that approximately seven percent of the District's 100,000 students were black

> . . . and almost all of these attend school in the "central" area of Seattle because this is where they live . . . . Most of the schools outside the central area have no Negro children in attendance. The Committee determined that there was no law, rule, policy or practice of the Board, its staff, or its teachers that produced this result.[18]

The sub-committee on attendance area boundaries concluded that there was no evidence of gerrymandering to the detriment of black students.

> The Committee noted that some school districts in other parts of the United States have been criticized for failing to keep physical plants and teaching staffs of central or downtown schools on a par with schools in other areas of the city. This condition does not exist in Seattle. Construction money has been fairly allocated and all schools are at least reasonably adequate.[19]

They found that Central Area schools had received at least equal treatment in regard to teaching staffs, and indeed had recently been provided with extra staff. While this was substantial progress by the District, it was not enough to meet the special burden produced by the higher percentage of disadvantaged pupils.

> Granted, then, that the schools attended by Negroes are substantially the same as schools attended by Caucasians, does a condition of unfairness or inequality exist by reason of the fact that many Negro children go to school with many other Negroes and with few Caucasians? The Committee concluded the answer must be in the affirmative and made a series of recommendations to the Board.[20]

The committee had come close to its target date of

March first for completion of its work. The only change in the committee's original membership occurred when Philip Hayasaka, who was selected to head the city's new Human Rights Commission, was replaced by Tsuguo Ikeda. Not all of the committee's resolutions were adopted unanimously, but individual member votes were not recorded. Provision had been made for each member to note dissent "to any part of this report to which he strongly excepts."[21]

There were twenty-two recommendations in all. They were the outgrowth of recommendations from the working sub-committees, whose reports were included in the Committee's final report to the Board. While it was felt that all the sub-committee material merited consideration by the School District, "the reports of the sub-committees were not adopted by the full Committee."[22]

The first eight recommendations were directed, in the main, toward racial imbalance and enrollment and boundary matters, and had been dealt with, for the most part, in the Board's August 28 policy statement. They had also included a call for establishment of a special human relations orientation program for all teachers. The response to this was formation of an Intergroup Relations Committee, city-wide in representation and cutting across all District staff lines and levels. Its scope was to include review of District policies, administrative organization, curriculum content and materials, guidance and counselling,

information services, and the "attitudes and skills of individual teachers."[23] It was the coordination of efforts in these areas that Robert Bass was hired to oversee in March of 1964.

The next eight recommendations were directed at improving and expanding elements in the District's compensatory education program. One was the recommendation that interracial teaching materials be introduced into the curriculum, and two others were directed toward college and university teacher preparation programs.[24] All of these points would reappear, some in the form of demands, in the upheavals of the later sixties.

The last two recommendations involved transportation for the transfer program, and both had drawn dissent from within the committee. Members McCulloch and Hemphill voted "no" on the recommendation that the School Board seek legislation to authorize the District's providing transportation for VRT's. And on the final recommendation for the Board, "when and if lawful," to provide free transportation for the VRT, Hemphill again voted "no," and Mrs. Carroll dissented with the opinion that it would be unfair to all the others who live long distances and with the question:

> Why would any Negro child in the "sending" schools prefer to remain in his home school and either walk or pay his own transportation when by transferring his transportation would be paid.[25]

Why indeed? How strong was support for the transfer idea within the School District's own advisory committee?

A few days after the report was made public, the Times commented editorially: "Equal Opportunity in Schooling."

> There is cause for satisfaction in the high marks given the Seattle Public Schools last week by the Citizens' Advisory Committee for Equal Educational Opportunity.
>
> In general, the committee found that the Seattle schools cannot be blamed for the high degree of racial imbalance that prevails in the system, and that the School Board is attempting to deal with the situation in a prudent manner. We concur.[26]

The rest of the editorial was directed toward the Committee's call for expansion of vocational training. So long as the School District could not be blamed, the city was satisfied, and the fact that racial imbalance prevailed in the system was not a mandate to integrate the schools.

The District administration responded fairly swiftly to the Advisory Committee's report. A document was sent to Mr. Campbell in April "to acquaint the School Board members with district activity relating to the recommendations of the Citizens' Committee."[27] This paper covered such things as the orientation program for Central Area teachers; the establishment of the Intergroup Relations Committee; the successful workshop conducted by Dr. Sam Shepherd in March, which drew 417 District people; and Robert Bass's appointment that spring as Coordinator for

Intergroup Relations. Details of the many and varied elements of the compensatory program and the commitment to its expansion were included.[28]

In regard to "interracial teaching materials," the new Intergroup Relations Committee was reported to be promoting a "special brochure dealing with [such] materials." The curriculum division of the District was said also to be "giving special consideration to interracial materials that can be used advantageously."[29] This promotion and consideration must have been at a glacial pace. The lack of such material in the curriculum was an underlying factor contributing to a serious student-Principal confrontation at Franklin High School in the spring of 1968, which resulted in suspensions, arrests and a Superior Court trial.

The Administration report dealt at some length with the VRT, especially with the legal restraints which prohibited District funding of student transportation. District VRT promotional efforts, in addition to Bass's meeting with prospective transferees at Meany, Washington and Garfield, consisted of the following, much of which was "in-house":

> Notice sent to parents of all students in Seattle School District.*

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*This is apparently a policy change in line with earlier Citizens' Advisory Committee requests and objections.

News releases in two major newspapers and community papers.
Announcement in Seattle School District GUIDE--three concurrent weeks. (sic)
Discussion during secondary principals' meeting.
Discussion during general principals' meeting including elementary and secondary.
Television stations carried announcements of the program.
Radio interviews (Mr. Breit).[30]

Breit's excursions into the electronic media may have been the catalyst which produced organized citizen involvement in the promotion of the Transfer Program. Heretofore reaction from the community had largely been to laud the School District for its policy of not providing transportation for transfer students and to take satisfaction from the District's "prudent" approach to the problems of equal educational opportunity. In May, 1964, the School Board heard otherwise.

A letter from Carla Chotzen, chairman of a committee called "Operation Transfer," was received in response to a statement made on television by Deputy Superintendent Breit to the effect that only a small number of students had availed themselves of the transfer plan and that this fact indicated that all others were satisfied with Central Area schools. Mrs. Chotzen's committee felt that his conclusion was unwarranted.[31] In support of their position she related an experience of the prior week at Leschi Elementary School. Mrs. Beatrice Hudson had been substituting in the fifth grade there and had devoted the last ten

minutes of one day to discussing the Voluntary Transfer Program. She asked how many would make use of the transfer program if money for transportation were found. Seven of the 28 students said they would, and remained after class to give their names and phone numbers. It was confirmed for Mrs. Hudson by all but one family (who had no phone) that cost was the main reason they could not be interested in the VRT, and she was also given the names of two other families whose situations were the same. Their committee felt

> . . . that this personal approach is the key to the question "Why are not more Negroes availing themselves of the Plan?" Teachers and principals have not been given a firm directive from above more than merely to mention the plan. Furthermore, they tend to feel that requests to transfer out of their school may reflect badly on their school. They have a vested interest in maintaining their jobs.[32]

"Operation Transfer" wanted permission to provide this personal approach in promoting the VRT, and they sought an extension of the May first deadline for transfer applications. They had met twice with Mr. Bass on this and other items, and in each instance he had referred them "to the School Board for authorization." They were now requesting to meet with the Board to present their concerns which, by that time, included seeking some authority for the Intergroup Relations Coordinator "besides keeping harmony."[33]

The group did not receive a hearing with the School Board at that point, but they were granted a meeting on May 25 with Mr. Breit. He told Superintendent Campbell the substance of their requests and that his impression of the group was that they felt

> . . . not enough is being done by the school district to help Negroes take advantage of the transfer program. They are concerned because so few are transferring and the de facto segregation of our schools has changed very little. They are convinced that large numbers of Negroes cannot afford to go but would if they had bus fare.[34]

Increasing civil rights activity had apparently made the School District wary. There was immediate interest on Breit's part as to who the group actually were:

> As far as I can tell, the Committee does not represent any established organization but is purely a voluntary group . . . [and] Although they were critical, there seemed to be no strong desire for mass action or demonstration. However, they couldn't resist saying that we had been perilously close to a boycott and this always is a potential. Frankly, I believe a boycott of one kind or another will take place eventually.[35]

The conference with Mr. Breit obviously did not satisfy them. Both Mrs. Chotzen and Mrs. Hudson fired off letters that same day in further pursuit of their objectives. Mrs. Hudson, as secretary of "Operation Transfer," wrote to Alfred J. Westberg, Chairman of the Seattle Human Rights Commission. She told him what they saw the problems and their solutions to be and that

> The problem of racial imbalance is not one that should be placed solely upon the Central Area citizens but on the community at large . . . . We therefore ask that the Human Rights Commission commence investigation and negotiation with the appropriate bodies to implement the transfer plan to its maximum.[36]

A copy of that letter was included in the one to Board President Swain in which Mrs. Hudson insisted that the transfer program must be available to every eligible child, not just those who could afford it, "in order to fulfill its limited goal."[37]

Mrs. Chotzen's letter following the meeting with Mr. Breit went to Breit himself. He had told her group that things envisioned in education thirty years ago were just then coming about, and that they should consider the progress made in the transfer program since last year. She wrote to tell him that she felt they "did not communicate with one another for lack of defining the word 'progress.'" She used his stressing of gradualism to challenge the School District's intentions and to assail its approach to its segregation problems.

> The gradual approach to the solution of this vast social problem simply will not do . . . . You indicate that you expect the Negroes to provide leadership, presumably for gradualism. This they cannot and will not do unless you provide positive leadership <u>first</u> . . . . I got the feeling from our discussion that the Administration is afraid that Negro pupils will actually avail themselves of the offer of 1400 possible transfers . . . making good on your offer would be

> a positive step . . . .
>
> There are solutions if we want to find them. If you do not bring about solutions, you leave no choice but for the Negro community to do so in whatever way the community will listen.
>
> We are only asking you to help us implement your plan. It is not too late . . . . Were you serious when you offered the transfer plan to relieve the Central Area? We need your answer now.[38]

It seems doubtful that there could have been a bridging of the gap between the Breit and Chotzen perceptions of the situation. The confrontation did, however, cause the School District to contact Louis Bruno, State Superintendent of Public Instruction. "Operation Transfer" had asked Breit whether any state funds were available for the transfer students. He told them he knew of none, but that he would communicate with the state superintendent, "and make their wishes known." His letter to Bruno was certainly not intercession in their behalf, but was rather a recounting for the state superintendent of the Seattle School District's rationale for not paying transportation costs. The Office of the Superintendent of Public In-Struction confirmed the District's position.

> We find no semblance of statutory provision for the transportation of children on the basis of their race, and we also would conclude that were the Seattle School District to provide transportation for certain students, whether Negroes or Caucasians, the obligation then would be upon the district to transport all of the children of the district.[39]

The School Board decided on May 27 to retain May

first as the deadline for transfer applications. "This decision was given to Mrs. Hudson and Mrs. Chotzen by telephone on Thursday, and neither of them was pleased." They requested and were given an appointment with the Board. In preparation for that meeting, the administration drafted a statement for Board President Swain, which noted that the deadline had already been extended from April 15 to May 1, and which recounted District efforts in equal educational opportunity to date. An indication of the concern about possible "direct action" is seen in a footnote to the draft statement, labeled "To be used only if necessary." It deplored "the prospect of a school boycott, which has been suggested by some."[40]

Calm prevailed when "Operation Transfer" met with the School Board on June 3, 1964. The District's rationale for its enrollment deadline and other policies were spelled out, and President Swain told the group of an evaluation of the VRT, being prepared by a University of Washington research team, which would help in future planning. They were told that the Board appreciated their coming, and that their thinking would be passed on to the Citizens' Advisory Committee, which the Board was planning to call upon again soon.[41]

When discussing "Operation Transfer" some years later, Mrs. Hudson said that they did not have much support from anyone, especially not from anyone within the School

District. She felt that, although they did succeed later in raising some money for transfers, those initial efforts were "really kind of silly when you look back on it."[42] She and Carla Chotzen both went on to further activities in behalf of school integration, and "Operation Transfer" had served to put the Seattle School District on notice that footdragging and lack of commitment would not go unchallenged.

Their contention that no District transportation for the transfer program was a prohibiting factor for many was more or less substantiated by the University evaluation promised by Swain. That study reported that the majority of the students in the program used public transportation, which meant long bus rides on one or more transit routes in many cases. Approximately 40 percent of the transferees had experienced problems because of missed busses, and for some, occasionally "not going to school because of the lack of finances for payment of bus fares." It was found that transportation difficulties could influence some of the transferees to leave the program and return to schools in the Central Area.[43] The information about transportation difficulties also indicated some District personnel attitudes toward the transfer program:

> Despite the problems imposed by transportation, however, in only 8 instances did the [92] teachers and counsellors [surveyed] feel the School District should provide transportation for these students.[44]

The six-week registration period which the School District allowed for the transfer program's second year did produce an increase in participation. The registration had been announced on March 18, and there were a number of follow-up items in the press through April. Three hundred and seventy-six transfer requests were reported on May 7, a substantial increase over the 238 who participated the first year.[45] By and large, the School District and the city's "establishment" were content.

Editorially the Seattle Times stood fast that spring (1964) in support of the neighborhood school, as it had in February when it held the neighborhood school concept to be fundamental to American education, and questioned "how far this basic concept should be bent in order to meet integration aims." In May it hailed the United States Supreme Court's refusing to review a lower court ruling on racial imbalance caused by "factors outside the province of education" as a "victory for the usual concept of the neighborhood school" and as upholding the wisdom of school districts, including Seattle, to not be "pressured into programs for compulsory transfer of pupils . . . merely to achieve racial balance." The Times commended the School District's compensatory education steps and its voluntary transfer program, and then cited the relatively small number of students who did transfer as showing "the disinterest in bus-hauling pupils to far-away schools where

educational opportunities are no better." The entire editorial was aimed in opposition to school boycott talk which was making the rounds locally. The School District was pleased with the editorial and appreciated the newspaper's support.[46]

A few days earlier, Jack Tanner, an attorney from Tacoma who was Northwest Area President of the NAACP, had publicly criticized Seattle's voluntary transfer program and called for a school boycott until there was "positive action" to correct racial imbalance. In addressing a convention of area NAACP leaders, Tanner had called the transfer policy "terrible" and said that "'It has shifted the burden from the School Board to the parents of Negro children, who are not equipped to cope with the problem.'" He accused the Board of evading the issue of racial imbalance.[47]

Tanner's remarks drew an instant response from the School District. Deputy Superintendent Breit said that it would be tragic to interrupt some of the many ways the District was trying to improve the quality of education, and that it was uninterrupted education, not a boycott, that was the desperate need of children in Central Area Schools. In defending the VRT, Breit said it was not a failure, and asserted, as he did on television, that the small number participating meant "that the majority of [Central Area] parents . . . are convinced their children

are being as well educated as those elsewhere in the city."[48]

The idea of a boycott received opposition in the Central Area. Isaiah Edwards, who had long been active in Central Area youth group activities, criticized Tanner's proposal as having

> . . . an odor of the self-interest of Mr. Tanner instead of the interest of our children.
>
> We have been trying everything to keep our kids in school and along comes a man who wants to keep them out. I predict his call for a boycott will fall on deaf ears.[49]

Seattle Branch of NAACP had no boycott plans, even though E. June Smith, the chapter president, was critical of the VRT. She was "not happy with the Transfer Program . . . [and felt] the School Board had not done its part to push the program until Mr. Bass's appointment."[50]

In March the Seattle branch's education chairman had asked School District help in its planning for financial assistance for transfer students. His committee had been providing aid on a crisis basis that year and needed more information for more effective planning on a larger scale. Dr. Miller assured the Board that NAACP's only interest was

> . . . to facilitate and make the transfer program a success.
>
> We think a successful pupil transfer program will protect the Seattle . . . School System from some of the actions, demonstrations and embarrassment occurring

in other parts of the country.[51]

In May, at the same time "Operation Transfer" was seeking District cooperation in better implementing the VRT, the NAACP, too, pushed for better promotion of the plan and also questioned District motives and intentions.

> It appears the plan was offered only to placate the demands from our combined Civil Rights organizations. The plan was offered without the full participation of the school administrators with respect to implementation.

They requested action that would give the transfer program "greater meaning to eliminate de facto segregation."[52]

Among various NAACP proposals brought to the Board at its meeting on June 3 was one in opposition to rebuilding of Horace Mann School in the Central Area. They suggested that the school be closed at the end of that school year instead. The closure of Mann, with dispersal of its mostly black student body to all-white schools had also been suggested by "Operation Transfer."

Horace Mann School was a two-story frame structure built at the corner of 24th Avenue and East Cherry in 1902, and there had been no additions since. The racial composition of the student body had changed from 79.3 percent black in 1957 to 96.5 percent black in 1964.[54] In 1964, the question of what to do with the crowded school and its students was at the center of conflict within the Central Area and between groups there and the School District for the next four years. There was a wide range of

opinion about Mann in the Central Area, and the question of its future produced the first instance of community opposition to proposals from civil rights organizations and leaders.

A "grass-roots" parent group presented petitions bearing 447 signatures to the School Board in May, requesting a new building for their area. Replacement of Mann was a high priority for the District, but a new building depended on passage of an upcoming bond issue.[55] Location of a new building was somewhat complicated by the recommendation of the City Planning Commission that it be located at a new site further south and west. A planning report produced by City and School District staffs in 1962 had emphasized "relating new schools to community and neighborhood boundaries." It proposed abandoning Mann and Summit Elementary Schools, eliminating Stevens Elementary and building a new school to the south.[56] It can fairly safely be assumed that racial balance was not a factor in the planning.

During the summer of 1964 there was a growing number of meetings to deal with de facto segregation. In mid-June the principals of Washington and Garfield called a group together from the community to discuss plans for taking advantage of Federal War on Poverty funds. Much of the discussion at that meeting was critical of School District efforts and pointed to the need for more initiative on the District's part if citizen support was to be expected.[57]

The School Board scheduled a meeting with NAACP representatives for June 29, and in preparation for it the administration took stock of where the District stood with civil rights groups. It was thought those organizations and their leaders would not be satisfied until there was "complete integration of all Seattle Public Schools," and the District could expect continued pressure and perhaps "overt action." The administration had no "accurate measure of opinions held by rank and file Negro parents and citizens."[58] They had not hesitated, however, to assume that those parents were satisfied with Central Area schools.

The NAACP members who met with the Board urged the School District to ascertain its legal responsibility and the constitutionality of de facto segregated schools. They pointed to Horace Mann as an example of a school whose closure would allow students to attend other schools with an acceptable racial balance. They urged the Board to seek state funds for transportation, and that students in the optional attendance area between Harrison and McGilvra be required to go to McGilvra. The entire School Board was present for the meeting, and administrators in attendance included the Superintendent, Mr. Breit and Mr. Bass.[59] The conflict between strategies of integrating the schools or of providing compensatory programs in predominantly black neighborhood schools came into focus that day. The

NAACP people received no satisfaction.

Dr. Earl Miller, who was also a member of the District's Citizens' Advisory Committee, conveyed their displeasure to the Board:

> It is obvious from our discussion . . . that the School Administration's imagination and effort are being expended in the area of compensatory education at the expense of the area of desegregation. We hope we conveyed to you our strong dissatisfaction and disagreement with the approach to the problem of the segregated Central Area Schools.
>
> One cannot have quality education when it is incomplete. Where whole vistas of human experience are absent, education is incomplete . . . we urge you to adopt a comprehensive plan and timetable of integration. Nothing less than this will be acceptable.[60]

He offered several suggestions for city-wide desegregation plans, and he specifically called for the closure of Horace Mann School. The Washington State Constitution was invoked, regarding the state's paramount duty to provide education for all children "without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste or sex." He told the Board that as an agency of the state, it could not act in a manner contrary to the constitution nor "evade its responsibility by disclaimer statements, such as lack of funds to accomplish the goal."[61]

The School Board regretted the NAACP's overall dissatisfaction, because they believed that substantial progress was being made, "and so apparently [did] many community spokesmen and concerned cigizens." The Voluntary

Transfer Program was the Board's answer to charges of neglecting desegregation. Since Dr. Miller had contended that school-provided transportation was essential to making the VRT work, he was reminded that

> The neighborhood school is still the soundest concept around which to organize an urban system . . . . Using District-provided transportation would be inconsistent with that concept, and for that reason could not be justified to the taxpayers . . . [and it was pointed out] that an opportunity exists for those who are not satisfied with the level of participation [in the VRT] . . . . A voluntary effort to raise transportation money . . . would be a sharing of the problem with the School Board, as differentiated from expecting us to solve unilaterally all aspects of the complex problem.[62]

The School District had just unveiled plans for the implementation of extensive new compensatory programs. These additional moves were in further response to recommendations of the Citizens' Advisory Committee, whose chairman praised the expanded programming. The Seattle Times editorially judged the plans as a "Worthy School Program"[63] So there was support for the District's approach, but the issue of physically integrating the school system now became the focus for efforts of civil rights groups.

The Seattle Chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality joined the school desegregation battle in earnest in the summer of 1964. In March they had requested a chance

to meet with administrators to discuss the selection of a full-time Intergroup Coordinator, and in June the chapter established an education committee.[64] The Seattle chapter had experienced the same sort of "schism" that had beset CORE chapters elsewhere. In Seattle the cleavage was primarily along generational lines and over the choice of tactics as the local situation became more heated. As demonstrations increased, tension mounted, and things came to a head in March, in the aftermath of the open housing defeat, with a hostile and physical confrontation during a CORE demonstration at the real estate offices of the Picture Floor Plans agency.[65] The heightened CORE militance nation wide disrupted relationships with NAACP chapters, and Seattle NAACP officials were reported as being "appalled at CORE's obstructive tactics [and] angrily discontinued cooperation."[66]

In the effort to secure integrated schools, however, this break in relations is not apparent. The Seattle CORE group laid careful ground work for its various projects. Every issue was researched thoroughly so that when an agency was approached to make changes, the requests were based on what CORE knew that agency to be able to do. There were some bright and capable people in the organization who were able and willing to do this kind of work. Walter Hundley, CORE vice-chairman in 1964, later recalled that in the school situation, they had studied all aspects

of Seattle's de facto segregation so well that they thought they "knew as much about what [the District] could do as they did. If not more."[67]

Among those bright and able people in CORE was the chairman of its education committee, Dr. Delores Alleyne, a black pediatrician. Her committee pushed the School District in pursuit of objectives which were much the same as those of the NAACP. In August, CORE prepared a 20-page study of the segregation in Seattle's schools, which included detailed proposals for city-wide integration at the secondary level. In July the Education Committee brought four proposals to the CORE chapter which the membership voted thirty to three to take to the School Board. The discussion which preceeded that vote indicated a desire to work cooperatively on such matters with the NAACP.[68]

The School Board received the recommendations at its meeting on July 29. The requests for implementation in the 1964-65 school year were for more attractive, warmer and vigorous promotion of the present Voluntary Transfer Program, with transportation provided and a new registration period during the first two weeks of school; compulsory intergroup relations training for teachers; the integration of High Point Elementary School with two adjacent schools, using the Princeton Plan; and the closure of Horace Mann, providing transportation for its students to other schools, creating student bodies no more than

30 percent black. The committee spelled out for the Board the three-step CORE procedure for dealing with organizations they wished to influence. First, there was investigation; then negotiation on the goals set forth; and finally, if there were a lack of good faith in attempting to reach those goals, there was "peaceful, non-violent direct action of whatever type seems most likely to achieve the desired results." In this instance they wanted to "negotiate" by August 15.[69] The Board agreed to meet with them on August 12 to consider their proposals.[70]

Both Seattle dailies covered that Board meeting. The P-I concentrated on the Mann closure: "CORE Asks: Close Mann School," and they gave some details on the use of the Princeton Plan at High Point. The Times highlighted transportation costs, "CORE Seeks Free School-Bus Rides," and reported that

> The Seattle Public Schools faced the possibility of "peaceful, nonviolent direct action" by CORE today, as the stinger in recommendations on "defacto segregation" set forth by the civil rights group.

For the Times, the "real stickler in the listed recommendations" was the request for free transportation, since the District had resisted all such requests and no money for such transportation was included in the preliminary budget.[71]

The calls for closure of Mann presented, in microcosm, the whole desegregation dilemma. The School District

began to sort through its options as the second meeting with CORE approached.

What were the wishes of the parents of Mann students? There was no reliable answer, but had not the Mann PTA come in May, wanting a replacement, not closure? The problem was more complex because of pressure "directed to parents from some quarters" to transfer their children, and there was justification in assuming that large numbers of Mann parents supported the neighborhood school concept. Would a Mann closure be educationally sound? There was no definitive answer. Although there were those who believed almost any integrated school to be preferable to a segregated one, what may be good for one child may not be good for another.[72]

There was speculation as to how a closure at Mann would be interpreted by the community in general. "The whole problem of integration in the schools [was] becoming increasingly touchy," and the fall political campaigns would likely fan resentments and prejudices. A transfer program with transportation paid, resulting from even a partial closure of Mann to relieve crowding at the upper grade levels, "could be a volitile matter." It would probably be seen as "board submission to pressure demands," and could also "lead almost immediately to further demands based on 'crowded conditions.'" The feeling was strong that any Mann closure

> . . . would be the forerunner of further demands, because these demands are based primarily . . . on a deep conviction that any "segregated" school is a sub-standard one . . . [obviously] the ultimate result of accepting such a conclusion would be the transferring out of additional hundreds and transferring in of comparable numbers in order to achieve integration in the schools of the Central Area.[73]

Horace Mann was not to be the camel's nose in the School District's tent, and the Board refused to close the school when it met with CORE on August 12. The Board did, however, agree to a two-week registration period for the VRT at the elementary level. There was no agreement on the recommendations made earlier for the upcoming school year, so CORE presented a new set of proposals aimed at secondary schools for implementation by September, 1965.* The additional proposals were embodied in CORE's twenty-page analysis and plan for Seattle, and rested on the assumption that "among the basic reorientations needed is a policy of required change to replace the present notion of 'voluntary change . . . [because Seattle's] situation cannot be significantly improved without a program of required transfers."[74]

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*The boldest plan was one calling for boundary changes involving Garfield and the high schools surrounding it. The results envisioned were the following student body ratios: Garfield, 30% black; Franklin, 20% black; and Roosevelt, Lincoln and Queen Anne, between 5 and 10% black.

The operative word there was "required," a concept which the Times emphasized: "CORE Urges Mandatory Pupil Transfers to Correct School Racial Imbalances." The P-I, on the other hand, stressed "More Talks Promised CORE on Transfers."[75]

There was opposition in the Central Area to the closure of Mann. Isaiah Edwards, who had earlier taken exception to statements by Jack Tanner, had begun writing a column for the Facts. In one edition he cited the failure of "responsible Negro citizens" to speak out against "reckless, irresponsible extremism on the part of individuals, and relatively small groups who appoint themselves as leaders and spokesmen for the Negroes of the Central Area." He feared that violence could result. He called proposals by civil rights groups to close Mann "wild and jungle talk . . . [which] Bobo himself doesn't appreciate."[76]

Although plans were made for the School Board to meet in conference with CORE again in September, Dr. Alleyne had requested written answers from the District to the questions they had raised. This response was similar to the one received by the NAACP on the matter of transportation for the VRT, including the suggestions that they raise transportation funds privately. There was the added news that for the 1964-65 school year, the elementary level voluntary transfer program would be expanded so that any school with space available could receive transfer

students, and that the elementary registration period would open again in January for the second semester. There were plans for the distribution in March of "an attractive announcement" to pupils in all schools "calling attention to" the transfer program for the next year. The Board felt it was already doing exactly what CORE suggested in the area of intergroup relations.[77]

As for revising secondary school attendance boundaries to aid Garfield's racial imbalance, the District was not sure that the ratio would be improved, but they were sure that the socio-economic balance there would be adversely affected. So far as Mann was concerned, the Board intended to confer with "representative groups" and parents from the area before making a decision, but they would continue to study means of reducing the school's enrollment and relieving crowded conditions there.[78]

The District rejected again the idea of using the Princeton Plan, which had earlier been found unsuitable for Seattle by the Citizens' Advisory Committee. The High Point matter once more injected a controversial "optional area" into the picture. Part of the High Point attendance area was being designated as optional with Fairmount Park to relieve heavy enrollment at High Point. They did not consider the racial make-up at High Point to be undesirable, and it had not been designated a "leaving" school for the VRT. The black population at High point had gone

from 19.9 percent in 1957 to 31.9 percent in 1964, while at Fairmount Park the change had been from zero percent black in 1957 to 4.4 percent in 1964.[79]

The optional area plan produced an immediate reaction in civil rights circles which suggests that cooperation between CORE and the NAACP had not been discontinued entirely.* The Board heard from the latter's Dr. Miller:

> It is rumored that an optional zone is to be established between High Point and Fairmount Park Elementary Schools. If this is indeed a fact, we strongly urge you to assign this area to the Fairmount School District rather than make it optional. The miserable failure of the optional zone between Harrison and McGilvra Elementary Schools is proof positive of the inability of optional zoning to effectuate significant desegregation of the schools.[80]

And he repeated the call for that area's students to be assigned to McGilvra. He said that District compliance on these points would be considered real evidence that it intended to "eradicate" racial imbalance in the Seattle system, and if they failed "to do this voluntarily, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [would] have no other recourse but to attempt to force [them] to do so legally."[81]

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*Not only did the NAACP receive word of the High Point-Fairmount Park optional zone, which was contained in a district communique to CORE, but a copy of the School District reply to the NAACP's objections is in the CORE papers in the University of Washington manuscripts collection.

Dr. Miller also saw overcrowding at Mercer Junior High while the Washington building was under-utilized as being parallel to the situation between High Point and Fairmount Park. The administration's response to that particular point indicated the incompatibility, as it were, between desegregation and compensatory programs. The enrollment at Mercer could not be reduced by sending some students to Washington because

> The educational program at Washington . . . has been designed to meet the special needs of the students enrolled. To do this it is necessary to maintain a much smaller class size . . . [and] To add a large number of additional students would . . . reduce or nullify the effectiveness of the established program.

As for the Harrison-McGilvra optional area, the District felt that since parents had been given the opportunity to change schools, but had not done so, "it would not be prudent to require them to transfer at this time."[82]

Meanwhile, "Operation Transfer" accepted the School District's offer to let the community raise transportation funds privately for students in the VRT. In its customary article about the opening of school, urging students to return to and remain in school, The Facts reported that "Operation Transfer" was accepting donations for transfers "from persons anxious to aid peaceable school integration in Seattle." In an accompanying article about the transfer program, both Carla Chotzen and Bea Hudson were listed

as the people to contact for information, and it reported that, although the fund drive was not connected with the Citizens' Advisory Committee, its chairman, Don Abel, was "giving his support to this effort to match funds to the present need."[83] According to the Times, the committee was seeking "to find pupils who would transfer if they could afford the bus fare." An "Operation Transfer" account was established at North West Bank to receive public donations.[84]

As the second year of the transfer program began (1964-65), publicity was given to "reverse" transfer--white students transferring into predominantly black Central Area schools. This aspect of the program had not been stressed by the District, a fact which bothered Garfield's Principal Hanawalt, who said:

> Promotion of the reverse transfer program needs stronger support from other high schools in the city. I am rather alarmed at some of the reports that have filtered back to us at Garfield on the attitude of some school people toward the possibility of some Caucasian students transferring to Garfield. Apparently, some school people are just as misinformed on the kind of academic program and student respect for teachers found at Garfield as large numbers of community people are.

The seven students who had transferred to Garfield that first year had contributed measurably to the morale of the school, and had helped to preserve a positive perspective toward the school among its students and teachers.[85]

Two of those seven were joined for their second year of transferring by their mothers, who were elementary school teachers. Sue Hagen's mother moved from Olympic View to Leschi to teach first grade, and Karen McCartney's mother transferred from High Point's third grade to Horace Mann. Among other reverse transfers that year were the Leroy Annis family's two younger daughters, who moved from Laurelhurst to T. T. Minor while three older siblings were attending Meany Junior High rather than Eckstein.[86]

While pressure mounted that summer for transportation funds and increased desegregation efforts, the School Board received the first evaluation of its voluntary transfer program. That program had been launched on short notice, a fact which contributed to the research team's problems with tight time restrictions. Their work was begun in December, 1963, a bare three months into the program. The team, from the University of Washington School of Social Work, collected data from school records and from questionnaires given to teachers, counsellors and principals in the receiving schools. The report gave some indication of overall effects of the program, and it revealed a bit about the School District people who were charged with implementing it. So far as the 224 transfer students were concerned, the report sought to indicate their social adjustment, academic performance, behavior and like or

dislike of school.[87] Although the grade record for the previous year was the one single item of information about students that had been most uniformly forwarded from the sending schools, there were thirty students whose grade information "was missing for reasons that were not clear to the research team." From the data that was available it was found that transferring had lowered the students' rank in class at the receiving school. However, based on teacher evaluation of the students in the total school situation, "their performance is seen to be somewhat better than the recorded grades would indicate," and most of those who had performed above average the year before continued to do so in the receiving school. In the matter of social adjustment, teachers and counsellors rated 84 percent of the students as getting along well with their peer groups, while 14 percent had difficulty (2% unknown). Fourteen percent were thought to prefer to be left alone rather than mixing with other students, and, overall, 50 percent were judged to have friends exclusively among the black transfer students. It was noted that in the early grades "in many instances after the children became acquainted and became used to each other, race made little difference."[88]

At the elementary level, 79 percent of the students presented no behavior problems, and those who did were described in general "as using aggressive and anti-social

behavior, disruptive talking, and annoying attention-getting devices." Seventh-six percent of the Junior High students had no behavior problems, but here the report cited poor conduct on busses as well as general disruption on the part of those who did, and girls in that category were described as insulting and noisy. High school transfer students showed 71 percent with no problem in behavior, and the catalog of anti-social behavior on the part of the others was enlarged to include cheating and fighting.[89]

Nevertheless, the assessment of the transferees' effect on other students was that only 11 percent had caused disruptive change in the classroom, 80 percent had created no change in the classroom, and seven percent "had caused changes in contributing favorably to the classes by sharing cultural customs and/or alerting the teacher to an alteration in the presentation of studies in the Civil War." The consensus of school personnel surveyed was that their transferring had "begun to reveal some favorable benefits for many of the students."[90]

The students' like or dislike of school was difficult to judge, but it was thought that 89 percent of the elementary pupils did like school, 75 percent in junior high "seemed to like school, and in high school almost 86 percent showed a positive attitude toward school." As for the teachers' evaluation of student response toward them, the 72 percent considered to have positive attitudes toward

teachers were seen as cooperative, pleasant, well-mannered and friendly, while nine percent were thought to be passive and apathetic and 18 percent were described as having "defiant, hostile and unpleasant attitudes" toward teachers.[91]

The study showed that the majority of the transferees were Seattle natives, and they came from two-parent families. In light of the increased problem of transportation, it is interesting to see that better attendance records were reported for the transfer students than they had experienced the year before in their sending schools.[92]

All but six of the thirty-two principals surveyed felt that there were some advantages to the program at that point, and twelve of them felt that both black and white students were benefitting. The disadvantages which they saw were in three main areas: the great distance between home and school; the lack of facilities in the receiving schools to meet the needs of many of the transferees; and "transfer students, in general, being not representative of the Negro race in its intelligence, social adjustment, and citizenship." The major change in the program which some principals wanted to see was provision for more and better planning, "so integration could be encouraged rather than retarded." Two principals thought the program should be "eliminated, feeling, as many others did, that integration could better be resolved through open housing,"

and they wanted to retain the neighborhood school concept. "One principal looked upon this program as the beginning of the breakdown of the district system."[93]

A resume of the study was prepared for the Board by the administration. One assertion in that document was that the "attitude of school personnel in the 'receiving' schools toward the transferees was cooperative, accepting and friendly."[94] How accepting and friendly could the atmosphere have been in the receiving schools whose principals thought the program should be eliminated or where it was seen as the beginning of the end for the school system?

The fall semester began with the School District relying on its Voluntary Racial Transfer program and compensatory measures to meet its responsibility in providing equal educational opportunity. There was no evidence of any recognition of obligation to desegregate the schools, and civil rights groups were not happy with what they considered District intransigence. In September, Dr. Alleyne told the CORE chapter that her committee had "gotten nowhere with the School Board, and direct action [was] probably needed." Since they depended heavily on community support and understanding, CORE turned to promoting its desegregation proposals within the community, addressing Central Area gatherings such as PTA meetings.[95] The School District was also keeping in touch with the community that fall, and in October its Citizens' Advisory

Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity was called back into service.

The city and its school system were stunned in December by the unexpected resignation of Superintendent Campbell. The School Board had been aware of his intention to leave at the end of that school year, but no hint of his plans had reached other quarters in the District.[96]

The suddenness of the move, combined with the usual pattern in Seattle of superintendents serving in office much longer than Mr. Campbell's eight years, served to fuel the rumor that his "early retirement" had been caused by the anticipation of desegregation conflict. There were those in the administration who thought the stage was set for battle at that point, and that Mr. Campbell did not want to tackle it. Some Board members felt that, while he did not retire to avoid having the mounting desegregation problem land on his shoulders, perhaps he did find it difficult to adjust from their original conception of the District's responsibility for desegregation,[97] an adjustment that was becoming inevitable.

Mr. Campbell himself noted two major considerations in his decision to retire. In the first place, he was really not taking an "early retirement," since he was sixty-six years old at the time and the Board had already begun to discuss returning the retirement age to sixty-five after raising it to seventy during World War II. In

the second instance, and perhaps above all, he wanted to retire while he was still in good health. From the broad perspective of thirty years with the School District, it was obvious to him that there were many kinds of changes that would be taking place in the near future. He knew that he

> . . . couldn't be at the helm very much longer, and it might be an opportune time for a new and younger person to come in and live with those problems over a longer period of time than [he] could possibly have done.

He recalled later that while desegregation was among those emerging problems, it was not then the kind of consuming thing that it became, and he was not sure that it entered into his thinking about retirement at all.[98]

Another unexpected turn of events came in December with the death of School Board President Bernard Reiter. The Board was now faced with a search for a new superintendent and the task of replacing an able and valued colleague.

The Board vacancy was filled on January 13, 1965, when David E. Wagoner was appointed to the position by unanimous vote of the Board members. Mrs. Owen said at that meeting that they had received "more suggestions of strong names as candidates for this position than she [had] ever known in her long service on the Board."[99] Wagoner was an attorney with one of the city's most prestigious

law firms. He had been chairman of the Municipal League's Public Schools Committee, had joined the School District's Citizens' Advisory Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity the preceding fall, and was on the Community-College Advisory Committee to the Legislature's Interim Committee on Education.

The School District began the new year (1965) with Intergroup Relations Emphasis Week, January 13 to 20. This was seen as an opportunity for the schools to "take part in the effort to focus on ways in which all of us can assist the movement toward better human relations in our community." Those opportunities "consist[ed] of two television programs in the [various school] buildings, and one lecture in the Opera House."[100] The District had earlier focused the attention of the Washington State Board Against Discrimination on its "school programs being provided to assure equal educational opportunity." That board, which had been "deeply impressed," offered in January to work with the School Board "wherever the need arises."[101]

Civil rights and Central Area groups were well aware that "the need" had already arisen, and their efforts were already focused on ways for everyone to "assist the movement toward better human relations," and to integrate the schools. That winter both Reverend John Adams and a delegation from the Meany PTA had requested and received

permission for community groups to use school facilities in the Central Area to provide student study centers for use after school hours.[102] This was clearly consistent with District policy of providing compensation. The education committee of CORE, on the other hand, spent January and February developing a project proposal to compensate, upgrade, change and integrate the Central Area schools.

Leadership of the education committee had passed to Carla Chotzen and Bea Hudson, and when the "Education Project" was presented to the CORE chapter, immediate attention was given to "the kinds of direct action that could be used" to reach their goals. In addition to revising school boundaries to effect a black student body of no more than 30 percent at Garfield, Washington and Meany, those goals included securing legislation to allow transportation funding for transfer students, and securing the location of a major, non-vocational part of the District's proposed community college in the Central Area. The Community College proposal was the most revolutionary to date. It called for the utilization of the Mann and Garfield sites as a community college complex, presupposing building closures and student dispersal. Mann could be used immediately while Garfield would be phased out over a three-year period.[103]

CORE saw many positive results if the community college plan were implemented. To begin with, the status of the Central Area would be enhanced. A community college

would increase the perception of educational opportunities for black students in the area, and it would help integrate the area--"change its characterization as a 'Negro' community, and [it would] beautify the area." For promotion of their plan they targeted the State Legislature, the School Board, and parents of black children in the Central Area, whose support was essential.[104]

While their projected tactics included negotiating, picketing and boycotting, if needed, in this instance infiltration appears to have been employed. Walter Hundley, a CORE official, became a member of the School District's Citizens' Advisory Committee when it was reconvened in the fall of 1964. It is hardly mere coincidence that the sub-committee which he chaired, on the rezoning of Garfield's attendance boundaries, produced recommendations for a community college complex on the Garfield site, supported by the same rationale used by CORE. The sub-committee also recommended financing of transportation for transfers and boundary revisions to secure a maximum of 30 percent black student populations in Central Area secondary schools.[105]

That spring the Seattle Times once again expressed editorial satisfaction with the United States Supreme Court's refusal to review an Appeals Court decision "upholding the long-standing neighborhood-based system of pupil assignment in this country's public schools." The editorial pointed out that some school districts, most notably

New York City, had yielded to pressure for compulsory transfers of pupils, "merely to achieve racial balance," drawing counter pressure from opponents, and had thus become caught up in boycotts, demonstrations and disruptions. Seattle, in contrast, had "made clear its concern with extreme racial imbalance" and, by instituting its voluntary racial transfer, shown its desire to "reduce the imbalance and mitigate its effects by any available means short of compulsion." Again, the heavy concentration of black students in Central Area schools was attributed to social and economic factors, and the newspaper, which one year earlier had not supported open housing, said that other elements in the community, not the schools, "bear the responsibility for breaking down racial ghettos."[106]

While other civil rights groups had become more vocal and aggressive toward the School District, the Urban League had remained relatively quiet in the background. They had not forgotten about schools, but while CORE and NAACP were proposing and negotiating plans with the District, and alluding to and threatening direct action, the Urban League was still planning meetings, seminars and workshops. One such event was envisioned for three or four days in October, 1964, to concentrate on black history. A request had gone to historian John Hope Franklin of the University of Chicago for his leadership and participation. The Urban League was

> . . . considering the possibility of launching a "remedial history" program during the coming year, designed to compensate for the inadequate treatment of the role of the Negro in most social studies courses. This program would be part of a longer range effort to eventually have a truly integrated history taught in our public schools.[107]

In the spring of 1965, however, the Urban League shifted gears. While remaining somewhat apart from the more "militant" civil rights groups, the League vigorously promoted "A Proposal for Re-Organization of the Elementary Division of the Seattle Public Schools." Publicly labeled the "Triad Plan," this proposal succeeded in jarring the city from complacency and in evoking greater public opposition and outcry than any other issue with which the District had yet been involved. The administration put far more into its opposition to this proposal, even before it became public knowledge, than to anything suggested by NAACP or CORE, in part, perhaps, because it was a challenge from a group they had always considered to be a cooperative and trusted ally. The Triad Plan brought the issue of compensatory education vs. school integration into public view. It challenged head-on the concept of the neighborhood school, advocated as essential the role of the public school as an agent of social change, and posed for the School Board the question of their willingness to assume responsibility and leadership with less than mass citizen support.

The proposal had been prepared during the fall of 1964. It was more or less the creation of Ivan King, a member of the Urban League staff, but there is little doubt that he had authorization from the League's executive secretary, Edwin T. Pratt, to proceed with the planning.[108] The Urban League's spokesman in the Triad matter was its board president, James I. Kimbrough.

The proposal was a sweeping one which was designed to ultimately involve all of the city's elementary schools. It addressed urban social problems in relation to education--problems such as transient population, low socio-economic level, patterns of unusual family structure, sub-standard housing, and a high proportion of minority groups. The study concluded that

> . . . a simultaneous attack on cultural deprivation and social segregation offers the best hope of overcoming the problems discussed and of affording Seattle with the possibility of remaining the educational leader in the future that it has been in the past.[109]

Its aim was a socio-economic balance as well as racial balance within the city's elementary schools.

As a long-range solution, the plan called for the School District to "eventually construct a series of educational parks or plazas--complexes of buildings on reasonably large tracts of land," serving students at all levels from pre-school to junior college. It was pointed out that districts nation-wide were considering or

planning educational parks to replace widely scattered buildings, and that "promotion of integration can be a significant benefit of the plan," if it is begun early enough in the course of a city's evolution.[110]

> As an immediate plan, we urge the reorganization of Seattle's elementary schools into "community" or much broadened neighborhood complexes of schools. These "community" grade schools would require no new construction at this time, but would permit many of the advantages of the educational plaza. They would offer opportunity for the most creative use of existing facilities, administrative machinery, and personnel.
>
> A community elementary unit would ideally consist of a set of three present schools and their respective attendance areas. All three schools in this set (or "triad") would continue to provide kindergarten classes for 5-year-olds in their immediate vicinity. But otherwise they would be specialized to accommodate approximately two grade levels only. One building would be a primary unit, serving first and second graders from the enlarged attendance area; another building would handle third and fourth graders and the final building would house fifth and sixth graders.[111]

The long-range aspects of the Triad Plan were virtually forgotten in the furor which erupted over the contemplation of creating triads from neighborhood schools.

The study on which the proposal was based utilized data obtained from the School District as well as some of the Urban League's own material. It employed some very

complex formulas* in determining such factors as "environmental adequacy," "educational adequacy of home and neighborhood," and "adequacy of pupil behavior and academic achievement" for use in drawing up three alternative first phase programs.

The first of the alternative plans focused on disadvantage. The triads in this plan involved schools in the lower and middle rank of "cultural adequacy," effecting a concentration of compensatory education programs, which in this instance took

> . . . slight precedence over comprehensive social integration of the school population. (While racial integration is promoted by this alternative, white and non-white students involved are primarily from the lower half of the socio-economic scale).[112]

The second alternative plan was aimed at "maximizing diversity" to promote socio-economic heterogeneity. In this instance triads were designed to include one disadvantaged school, one in the middle range of adequacy and one in the very advantaged range. The city's eleven most deprived schools were used as core schools, but, in order to extend the triad concept city-wide, two somewhat disasvantaged schools in the North End (Green Lake and Greenwood) were also used. Three examples of the selected triads

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*The proposal was accompanied by a 20-page statistical appendix.

presented in this proposal were Harrison-University Heights-Laurelhurst; Madrona-Seward-View Ridge; and High Point-Roxhill-Fauntleroy.[113]

The third alternative was set forth with an eye toward the educational park. The Urban League considered this the most speculative of the three, in that it required a commitment to eventual establishment of educational parks. It was essentially a double triad, with the plan being to use that larger attendance area's best physically situated school building as the nucleus for future development as an educational park for the six-school area.[114]

Some of the arguments set forth in the proposal to support the triad concept could only have produced a defensive, if not negative, reaction among Board members and administrators. The document scored compensatory education for not "piercing the social vacuum" and suggested that "perhaps the most useful form of compensatory education a school system can offer is escape from segregated circumstances."[115] There was a highly critical commentary on the District's voluntary transfer plan, which began by saying that when the VRT was introduced it "should have been recognized that it was probably a stop-gap measure at best." It touched on a number of the program's weaknesses, including lack of transportation, and charged that "the voluntary transfer program puts the burden of expense and

inconvenience on a few individuals, rather than the whole city--which stands to benefit from improved education and improved human relations." A final barb was a reminder for them that the Board's own Citizens' Advisory Committee had recommended considering "'the possibility of instituting additional or alternative programs'" to improve racial balance if boundary changes and the VRT did not materially improve the balance in the schools.[116]

The Urban League presented their proposal to the School Board in February, 1965.* However, the administration knew of the plan before the first of the year. Jack Greaves, Assistant Superintendent for Secondary Schools, was a member of the Urban League Board, and in some quarters he was thought to have "leaked" the plan to the Board so that they had a position set to oppose it long before it received official consideration.[117]

Greaves did contact his fellow Urban League Board members in December, 1964, to voice his personal dilemma over the plan. He did "not find it easy to find fault with any well-intentioned proposal that aims to equalize educational opportunities or to advance the cause of civil rights," but from a practical standpoint he was "deeply concerned about proposals of unproven educational value

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*It became public knowledge in April.

that could weaken" a good public school program. He reminded them that the proposal's compulsory transfer provisions ran counter to the School Board's stated policy (of August 28, 1963), mentioned the unlikelihood of much parental support for long distance bussing, and pointed out the political fact that the District's last levy passage was so close (60.03% affirmative) that a 200 vote difference would have meant large and significant cuts in school programs. He also wanted the League Board to consider its own stake in the proposal's future.

> Under circumstances like these, it is unrealistic to expect any school board to take chances that might alienate a sizable group of voters. . . . Since, under present conditions, the Board could not agree to this plan, does the Urban League wish to urge or promote it? What might be the effect on the Urban League itself if the League promoted a plan that would be so disturbing to parents of either race.[118]

That Board was willing to take its chances, and in February the School Board set in motion plans for meeting with the full Urban League Board to discuss their proposal.[119] That meeting with the School Board "in Committee" took place on March 17. In the meantime, the School Board had received a briefing on the proposal accompanied by a ten-page administration document which presented comments on the Triad Plan.[120] Part of that document was dated January 17, 1965, which would seem to lend credence to the theory of "leakage."[121]

One of the areas of the plan which was challenged most vigorously in this paper was the Urban League's view of parental acceptance of its proposal. The School District held that it was "pure conjecture" that "opposition from white parents to the bussing of children across the city would be short-lived," and it doubted the assumption that black parents would approve the plans. "No one can speak for these Negro parents," but the administration cited as an indication of their attitudes the fact that there was virtually no response to the transfer opportunities offered to black parents in the optional attendance areas, and a Louis Harris survey, which indicated 3[illegible] percent favorable, 53 percent unfavorable (with 13% undecided) reaction to bussing on the part of black parents.[122]

By the time the two boards met in March for the Urban League's explanation of its proposal, the School Board had received counter arguments, and the Superintendent had prepared a lengthy statement of "general considerations" related to the plan. In his statement, Mr. Campbell noted the long and fruitful relationship between the School District and Urban League and recalled a number of cooperative actions dating back to the District's original minority hiring venture and the Garfield dropout study. He spoke of the School Board's "concern over the concentration of Negro children in the schools of the Central Area," and said that the establishment of the voluntary transfer

program made it clear "that the Seattle School Board not only has accepted the goal of racial balance in our schools, but has taken active steps to more nearly achieve the goal."[123]

However, it did not mean "that the Board accepts the conclusion that segregated schools need be, per se, inferior ones." In this regard he stressed District commitment to compensatory programs and lamented the fact that many people "measure the School System's efforts to alleviate the problems of the disadvantaged only in terms of the number of pupils who have transferred under the voluntary transfer program." He defended the Board's adherance to voluntary policy primarily on the ground that

> . . . the overwhelming preponderance of parents, both white and Negro, appear to support the neighborhood school plan. At no time has a substantial desire for the type of program proposed by the Urban League been voiced by the parents themselves.[124]

In closing, Mr. Campbell dealt with the role of the public school in effecting social change, and in so doing presented the view that undergirded the School District's entire approach to desegregation at that time.

> The public schools do not exist for the purpose of imposing broad social reforms upon the people. They operate within the framework of the will of the people expressed through laws enacted by the state legislature. All school policies and regulations must be consistent with the wishes of the people thus expressed. . . . The public schools are educational

> institutions. As such they do have an important responsibility for bringing about social change. . . . But that responsibility is not expressed for example in terms of outright teacher advocacy of . . . issues or through the school board's imposition on the people of its point of view except where necessary to safeguard the integrity of the classroom. It is expressed in the obligation to develop through the educational process the rational powers and understandings of pupils. . . . This means, then, that the study of controversial social and political issues is encouraged through fact finding, discussion, conclusions based on evidence. [sic] In this light the schools do have a great responsibility for bringing about social change--through the disciplined minds and hearts and conclusions of adults who earlier have been given the best of educational opportunities in the classroom. For the schools to seek to impose social change would result only in a succession of conflicts and ultimate chaos which would set back genuine progress incalculably.[125]

In what seems an attempt toward reconciling integration with compensatory education, he asserted that

> The school system has expressed its earnest desire to provide equal opportunity for all pupils . . . [but] The elimination of segregated schools is a goal, as a part of the community's genuine acceptance of integration in its major aspects, not as a unilateral compulsory regulation of the School Board.[126]

A brief discussion among members of the boards and their staffs followed the reading of Mr. Campbell's statement. They agreed that a subsequent meeting with administrators "and possibly the Board," might be beneficial "after ample time had elapsed for a study" of the Triad Plan.[127] The Urban League's representatives were not

pleased with that first meeting, and the Superintendent later told the Board that he had "learned that the Urban League committee . . . [felt] that it was given the 'brush-off' . . . [and he felt that perhaps his] statement read to them in isolation [was] responsible for that feeling."[128]

The Urban League's president, James Kimbrough, publicly presented the Triad Plan at the School Board meeting on April 14. In the course of a lengthy prepared statement he addressed some of the challenges to the Triad Plan which had come in the Superintendent's remarks at that previous meeting with the School Board. This public rebuttal of "several statements by Mr. Campbell which had not been otherwise publicized" did not sit well with some Board members and seems to have figured in the ultimate decision to reject the Urban League proposal.[129]

In response to the Superintendent's position on the school as an agent of social change, Kimbrough maintained that "obviously, social change is the over-riding purpose of education." The Urban League could understand the School District's reluctance to assume a leadership role, since "social change always involves some discomfort, some pain, some controversy," but they did not ask that they take total responsibility, only "to assume their rightful share, even as they had asked . . . other institutions of society."[130] His comments on responsibility and leadership

must surely have stung the Board members.

> The question of public acceptance and compulsion is an interesting one. School Board members are elected and school administrators are chosen because of their presumed competence in educational matters and their presumed willingness to assume responsibility and leadership . . . [They] do not ask for a plebiscite each time they make a decision and, indeed, probably institute many programs which would not immediately gain majority support but are seen by them as educationally sound . . . recently, we have seen public support develop for the voluntary racial transfer program following implementation; the support was not pre-existent on any wide scale.[131]

In commenting on the School District's reliance on compensatory education, he found such programs commendable, but went on to label the plight of culturally deprived, segregated students as a civic disease and compensatory education as "the aspirin which has been prescribed primarily to alleviate the symptoms of this disease." What was called for instead was

> . . . structural and organizational guarantees of sound education, not just unusually great concern borne out of possibly short-lived civil rights ferment in our city and nation. Popularity of social change is too transient to achieve the fundamental changes needed.[132]

Following Kimbrough's presentation, Board President Swain stated the Board's hope for continued good relations with the Urban League and that the Board was looking forward to reviewing in detail its recommendations. He also said that since Kimbrough had addressed some of the

questions that had arisen regarding the Triad Plan, he felt "attention should be called to a document authored by Superintendent Campbell that gives consideration" to some of those points. Copies of Mr. Campbell's March 15 statement, along with that of the Urban League, "were distributed to members of the press who were present."[133]

Both Seattle dailies covered that Board meeting and presented thorough accounts of the plan to the public. The Times emphasized that the Urban League saw the triads "as a first step toward its ultimate goal of a series of 'educational parks' where mixing would be extended to all grade levels." Its article was under the head: "Board Studies Racial Mixing School Plan," while the P-I went with "School Board Urged to Accept 'Triad Plan'!" The Times quoted Mr. Campbell's statement that "'the public schools do not exist for the purpose of imposing broad social reforms upon the people.'"[134]

That same quotation was repeated three days later in a Times editorial advising against the Triad Plan. It said that the city was long indebted to the Urban League for its contributions to bettering race relations. The League had given a

> . . . thought-provoking proposal for accelerating racial mixing in the public schools . . . [which provided] an excellent basis for further official and unofficial study and discussion of a problem that concerns every thinking citizen. . . . [They believed] however, that the

> board should reject the proposal, as such, on the grounds of what [they] might call the "three C's": It is Compulsory, Clumsy and Costly.

Aside from the details of this or any other plans regarding racial imbalance in the schools, the Times saw "the basic question [as] how much responsibility the schools should assume in the area of social reform."[135]

The weekly Argus also commented editorially. In his column "As I See It," publisher Philip Bailey did not see the Triad Plan favorably. He said that opposition to the plan would have been minor, had the Urban League proposed a "mixing up of students based on intellectual ability and drive," but saw little merit in simply "throw[ing] together children from different races and backgrounds" to try to help the underprivileged. A primary thought of his was that "every community and every nation still needs an aristocracy of brains, breeding [sic]."[136]

Following the initial public announcement and editorial comment, the press gave virtually no attention to the Triad Plan until the School Board's decision on the matter at its meeting on May 12. The P-I did print a map showing student movement envisioned in the Plan's first alternative proposal, and a short re-cap of the plan on May 7. Two days later a brief item reported heavy telephone traffic into the Urban League office, with most of the calls being described as "queries and comments on the school-grouping system" described in the P-I's map.[137]

If the press was quiet, the people were not. By the time of its meeting on April 28, the School Board had received 27 letters protesting the Triad Plan and one supporting it. The final count of communications received by the School District regarding the Triad Plan was 3,497. Sixteen of these were non-commital and thirty-nine supported the plan. Included in the final tally were 27 telegrams and 962 telepone calls. Among the letters were approximately sixty petitions of assorted length and wording, but enough uniformity and duplication to indicate scattered attempts at organized opposition.[138]

The letters and calls came from all over the city and were couched in terms ranging from rational, philosophical and legalistic to hateful, vitriolic and racist. One letter from parents in West Seattle began by saying that "we would like to make our disapproval of the 'Triad' plan known to you. It is difficult to express politely how strongly we are against it." They succeeded in being civil, however, and their letter contained most of the arguments raised by opponents of the plan. They defended the neighborhood school and expressed concern for the preservation of property values. They agreed that "the purpose of the schools is education, not social experimentation," and they championed individualism, industriousness, competition and success, with perhaps a touch of racism showing.

The city, in fact, encourages, a division

> between economic classes through low income housing laws, under which people in areas such as High Point are forced by law to move if they happen to become industrious enough to earn a little too much money.
>
> Economic segregation exists. It is a fact of life in a competitive economy. It is the incentive necessary for the human psyche to achieve and excel. Without it, what measure of "success" remains? What will substitute for incentive?
>
> We submit the "Triad" plan is a devious method of attempting to make the coming generation accept a philosophy of "Big Brotherism," wherein collectivisation and communal leveling will be a norm of existence, and individual excellence will be villified.[139]

There were letters written by group spokesmen. An example in this category came from a trustee of the View Ridge Community Club, speaking for that "Organization of over 1500 resident families" in the northeast section of the city. Their primary objection to the Triad Plan was that it was in "direct violation of the traditional right of a parent to choose the school his child will attend." He expressed a contention evident in much of the correspondence--that they did not oppose any reasonable plan to improve the level of education in Seattle. Realizing that there might have been problems in the school system, they were

> willing to offer the utmost assistance to any and all students who want a better education and are willing to work for it . . . [and they felt] that the voluntary program of transfer, if necessary, for those who are earnestly attempting to

> gain a potentially better education is a commendable thing and should be encouraged. However, we do not feel that the level of education available in any Seattle school is so poor as to require mandatory distribution of children to obtain an adequate education.[140]

Board members who dealt with the Triad proposal later remembered the response to it as heavier than that generated by any other proposal or issue. Mrs. Owen ranked it above the public outcry in the early fifties over the School Board's intention to purchase Fort Flagler on Whidby Island for use in outdoor education programs. She also said that "in the debate on the Triad Plan there became evident bitterness and a real animosity that up until that time the School Board hadn't felt." David Wagoner theorized that the plan had been a shock to the community and the heavy outpouring of individual objection stemmed from the fact that there was no city-wide organized opposition to it. He received more phone calls during the time of the Triad Plan than at any other point in his seven years on the Board. It caused some dislocation in his law firm's office, since, he said, "there were two days when we had to put a secretary full time answering my telephone. Never [again was] there anything approaching that."[141]

Nor were the civil rights groups silent or inactive during the weeks before the School Board's decision. Early in May a notice was mailed with CORE's non-profit postage

permit, announcing a special meeting on Thursday, May 6, at the East Side YMCA. The meeting was called ". . . to lay plans for some effective demonstration to let the [School] Board . . . know that we want meaningful action on their part to end de facto school segregation now." In anticipation of the Board's reply to the Triad Plan, they had

> . . . requested that they also reply on that date [May 12] to proposals put forward by CORE, NAACP, and the schools' own Citizens' Advisory Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity. If, on the 12th, nothing affirmative is forthcoming on any of these proposals we must be ready for action.

This was an invitation to "come and help plan what that action will be."[142]

The request that the Board reply to the other proposals was made in a letter to Board President Swain from E. June Smith, president of NAACP and Walter Hundley, chairman of CORE. They said that the Board's decision on the Urban League proposal was being awaited "anxiously" and reminded him of the other proposals. They pointed out that all of the proposals made "note of the fact that compensatory education is not a substitute for integrated education," and said that they expected the Board, on May 12, to "indicate what its plans will be to accomplish the integration of Seattle's schools."[143]

That special CORE meeting on May 6 produced contingency plans for a demonstration on May 12, intended to

increase community awareness of the issue, especially in the Central Area, as well as to "make the School Board aware of our seriousness." It was concluded that "embarrassment and some state of crisis is necessary to impress the urgency of the situation upon the School Board and the city." They sought to have as heavy attendance as possible at the Board meeting, with their supporters prepared to walk out when "bad decisions" were given and to gather outside to begin picketing.[144]

More than 500 people attended the School Board meeting on May 12 to hear the "unanimous decision of the Board that the Triad Plan is unacceptable." It was found unacceptable because it would not improve educational opportunity for Seattle elementary school children, and "on the other hand, there [was] substantial reason to believe that it would create uncertainty and frustration for pupils and parents." Basic to their findings were the Board's belief in a strong program of compensatory education as "fundamental to the achievement of . . . equal educational opportunity," and its belief that the "neighborhood school concept is sound and has values which are essential to a strong program of compensatory education." The Board also questioned some of the educational claims and conclusions of the Triad Plan, and they considered that it would be a costly undertaking. On that occasion the Board reaffirmed its position that no parent would be required to send a

child to a school outside their regular attendance area.[145]

Swain's reading of the Board's decision was greeted by prolonged applause from the overflow crowd. As planned, proponents of the proposal walked out of the meeting and took their places on an integrated picket line. They marched around the school headquarters building with signs that read "Integrate the Schools.[146]

Back inside, the meeting was open for thirty minutes of questions and comments, and those comments were about equally divided, pro and con. Among those speaking were A. J. Westberg, Chairman of the Seattle Human Rights Commission, who "expressed the hope that the Board would not close all doors to a change in the neighborhood school policy." Leon Bridges, Urban League Education Committee Chairman, voiced "extreme disappointment that the School Board did not see fit to give any encouragement to the plan." Reverend John Adams also expressed

> . . . great disappointment both with the response of the School Board and what he termed the naive concept of the social scene in which America lives. He said that in spite of all the good will and intention, the Seattle Public Schools [were] more segregated than they were ten or eleven years ago. He then asked what alternative plan the Board [had that would] make a fundamental breakthrough in the educational picture in Seattle.

In response to this, Swain stated what had finally become evident--"that desegregation as an end in itself is not an objective of the schools."[147]

Opponents of the proposal also voiced their feelings at the meeting, which the P-I described as being "punctuated by overtones of emotion." Mrs. Owen later said of the "many, many parents there [that] they really were pretty caustic, and some of them were inclined to be vicious . . . and you realized what a very strong public opposition there was to this." The Times featured Mrs. Leroy Malmberg from West Seattle, a relatively calm parent, as a representative of this majority group at the meeting, and quoted her as saying:

> "We are shocked that something like this (the 'triad plan') could be put up. . . . We wonder . . . now that the school board has made its decision, whether we have to fight this all over again or be allowed to choose our schools."[148]

Civil rights leaders were angry with the negative verdict on May 12, and also with the process that led to the rejection of the plan. Mineo Katagiri later said that they had viewed Mr. Campbell as a "lame duck," and had assumed that a final decision on the Triad Plan would come from his successor's administration. He said they had

> . . . expected the Board to say this proposal is so new to us that we would like to ask you to wait until Dr. Bottomly gets here and . . . have him study it and then the Board reply. Instead, Campbell simply responded by saying this is not acceptable. . . .

and stating why in the three-page document which was read, and "they simply cut off all negotiations."[149] It was

this feeling that the Board "slammed the door on the Triad Plan instead of leaving it open for further discussion" that fueled their bitterness.[150]

On May 13, a news release was issued by CORE and NAACP. Both organizations had earlier told the board that they awaited a response to proposals which they had made as well as to the Triad Plan and that they expected the Board to indicate its plans to accomplish school integration. A preliminary draft of their statement for the press reflected ther anger and frustration when no such plans were indicated. The term "resisters of progress" was penciled in to replace "bigots" before the following message was released:

> On Wednesday, the Seattle School Board in coalition with community resisters of progress, continued to perpetuate the illusion that all is well in Seattle . . . adherance to the neighborhood school concept is a facade to maintain segregated schools in opposition to the 1954 Supreme Court decision. The conscience of many in attendance was shocked at the School Board's obvious pleasure at their support from the extremists . . . [they, CORE and NAACP] had worked for over two years in good faith on the assumption that the School Board sincerely believed in integrated education.

They would, they concluded, never again allow themselves to be duped into thinking the Board would voluntarily do anything to end school segregation. They vowed to continue direct action and other efforts to persuade the Board to integrate the schools.[151]

The P-I reported NAACP's Dr. Earl Miller as saying that their executive boards' meeting and the picketing at the School Board meeting had not been precipitated by the rejection of the Triad Plan, but rather by the failure of the Board to approve any long-range school integration program at all. Both Seattle dailies quoted extensively from their statement, and the Times included a response by Board President Swain, who said that they had failed to mention "the many things done and planned to bring about equality in education for all children . . . regardless of color." He called the two groups "irresponsible in saying that the School Board 'took obvious pleasure at support from the extremists.'"[152]

Neither newspaper supported the Triad Plan editorially. In news coverage, however, the P-I devoted almost one-fifth of its front page to the May 12 Board meeting, complete with photos of Swain, Hundley and Adams, and its 6:00 A.M. Final Edition had as its top headline: "School Board Rejects 'Triad' Plan for Dispersing Pupils." Times coverage of that meeting, along with the complete text of Swain's statement, appeared on page 53 under the heading "N.A.A.C.P., CORE Will Meet Tonight."[153]

The P-I called the rejection of the Triad Plan a "Wise Decision," and, in its editorial opinion, the School Board had no other choice. It noted the uncertainties in the plan for all pupils and parents, its prohibitive

expense, and the fact that the voluntary transfer program "appears to be progressing at a reasonable rate." It saw value in the Urban League's proposal, however,

> . . . in that it brought home . . . the need for continued progress toward the solution of this vital matter. . ... But we think it is fortunate both for the schools, and the cause of integration which this newspaper endorses, that the Seattle School Board did not attempt to impose the Triad Plan.[154]

The Times editorial regarding the Triad Plan bore an interesting title: "Obligation to Minorities." The Times, too, thought the Board had "made the wisest decision it could under the circumstances," since to do otherwise would have "plunged the school system into bitter turmoil." It said that "the problems of Negroes, of course, are foremost," and likened the situation to an unexploded bomb which must be defused so that there would be no explosions as there had been elsewhere. Such defusing could be brought about "only by rational steps to provide equality in job opportunities, housing, education--the abolition of barriers that discriminate against all minorities." While Seattle may have more time than most cities, time was running out--the younger generation may not be patient, and "idle sentiments of inter-racial equalities must be motivated into action." Though they opposed the plan, they could understand that it had been presented after "disillusionment in a community, which seems to wish well for Negroes, but seems unwilling or unable to recognize that

there is a time bomb ticking away. What this community must have is leadership without further delay to begin defusing the bomb while there is still time."[155]

Some of this might have provided at least mild surprise for the NAACP, which had earlier branded the Times as being committed to the status quo in desegregation and unwilling to accept a plan which involved additional expense, compulsion or pupil transfer, all of which they had deemed essential.[156] But there was no surprise in the Times' showing little more inclination to provide the leadership it called for than it had shown in regard to open housing a year earlier.

Perhaps the crux of the school integration matter for the Times is contained in its description of the Seattle situation as

> . . . a holding action in which, instead of dispersing white children into Negro neighborhood schools, [emphasis added] we should be dispersing Negro families and their children from neighborhoods which threaten to become "ghettos."

The thought of white children being sent into black neighborhoods would seem to have been the new element needed to cause reconsideration of the newspaper's stand against VRT transportation payment by the School District. At any rate, the editorial then concluded with the assertion that

> The Seattle School Board has endeavored to do its part [for interracial equality], although perhaps it should provide transportation charges for Negro pupils who

accept its voluntary racial transfer program.[157]

Both NAACP and CORE were represented at the School Board's next regular meeting on May 26. Walter Hundley, CORE chairman, stressed to the Board that "something has to be done," even if the specific plans presented to them were found to be unacceptable. E. June Smith asked the Board what they intended to do, now that they had turned down the Triad Plan. Swain, having had contact with civil rights leaders in the interim, asked to speak to this matter on behalf of the Board. "He said rejection of the . . . controversial Triad Plan . . . did not in any way 'close the door' to continued study of other proposals aimed at improving racial balance." He then said that the Board had referred all plans and proposals from community groups to its Citizens' Advisory Committee, which, in turn, had recommended "certain courses of action." The Board felt that it would be in a better position to make a general communication to all the interested parties after it had reviewed the recommendations with the committee.[158]

The Board members who made the decision to reject the Triad Plan did so, in the main, because they thought that it was too far in advance of the time and conditions in Seattle. They thought there was no possibility of its being accepted by the community. Swain considered it a utopian plan that was unrealistically conceived, and he "saw absolutely no hope of ever making . . . intelligible

to the parents" its complicated socio-economic weightings for creating the triads. Mrs. Owen later recalled that they held "no brief with the Triad Plan . . . [and] really did not seriously consider" it. Dr. Palmason, in discussing the plan later, thought that it had merit, and

> Maybe we should have tried a modification of it. But it just seemed too far-reaching for us at that time . . . we always had this incubus of annual levy hanging around our necks all the time and we were just fearful that we might lose the levy if we went too far too fast.[159]

Mr. Campbell, too, in retrospect, thought that subsequent developments in Seattle might have justified a later modification of the position he took in rejecting the Triad proposal. His successor in the Superintendent's office thought the Triad Plan to have been essentially the same as the Princeton Plan which had worked effectively elsewhere and which could have been a good plan to follow here, "but the political climate as such in Seattle was almost impossible at that time." He had been "rather surprised at the hostile reaction."[160]

By the time of the Triad rejection, Forbes Bottomly had been selected to succeed Mr. Campbell as Superintendent. He had been in Seattle in April, and had attended the School Board meeting on April 28. His introduction, with the customary exchange of platitudes, was the first item on the agenda, followed immediately by the report of communications to the Board which ran 27 to one against

the Triad Plan. In an interview at that time, he gave no indication of any change to come in the School District's posture on desegregation. He said that the de facto segregation in Seattle existed "not because of the schools," and that "'the schools must operate on a policy of being color blind . . . [and segregation was] an entire social situation . . . the schools can't solve it all.'"[161]

. . . . . .

The rejection of the Triad Plan marked a turning point in the relationship between the School District and the major civil rights groups. It became apparent that desegregation per se was not an objective of the School Board just as those groups were coming to focus on integration rather than compensatory programs in pursuit of equal educational opportunity. CORE began to stress the necessity of "required" transfers to integrate the schools, and the number of threats of direct action against the District increased.

In the summer of 1965, after two years of the Voluntary Racial Transfer Program, for which transportation was still not funded, the city appeared complacent about the schools. There was great comfort in the report from the Citizens' Advisory Committee that segregated schools in Seattle were not the fault of the School District.

Within the Central Area there was beginning to appear some difference of opinion as to the best course to take

for schools there, with the disposition of the Horace Mann building being a case in point. The months ahead would bring new controversy over transfers. The new Superintendent's perception of the situation would change, and he would seek new solutions to growing problems while pressure from civil rights leaders mounted.

CHAPTER V

MANDATORY TRANSFER FROM "OVERCROWDED SCHOOLS"

The search for a new Superintendent began early in 1965. Mr. Campbell's personal recommendation to the Board was that they seek his replacement from outside Seattle. Although there were good people in the Seattle District, some of whom were themselves nearing retirement however, he "felt there might be wisdom in the Board breaking the pattern that had existed for decades--since Frank B. Cooper was brought in in 1900 from Iowa." The Board members, too, sensed the need for new direction. Some of the Board were lobbied heavily by downtown business interests in behalf of candidates from within the system. Dr. Tidwell received strong pressure to influence the choice, and very negative reactions when they did go outside Seattle for their selection. Philip Swain, Board President at the time, considered their selection of an outsider to have been one of the real milestones in the relationship between the School Board and establishment figures in the city, who had made very clear their assumptions as to who was going to replace Mr. Campbell.[1]

The Board spent a great deal of time establishing criteria for their selection of a superintendent. Beyond

the obvious requirements of experience, credentials and academic degrees, they were concerned with three basic points. In the first instance, they wanted someone who had demonstrated, in a district of some size, the ability to give leadership for educational change. This was Tidwell's number one priority--"innovation! new approaches to how kids can learn--willingness to move ahead!" Since the State Legislature had recently enacted the Professional Negotiations Act, a second crucial area of concern to the Board was collective bargaining, which they could see would soon loom large among Board responsibilities. The new superintendent must be someone who could deal with problems of negotiating. The third thing was the matter of equal educational opportunity. They knew that something would have to be done and that their upcoming rejection of the Triad Plan would solve nothing.[2] As Swain later phrased it, they were looking for

> Someone who by background and personal philosophy could be predicted to have a real chance of success in the area of multi-racial urban education, providing leadership and working effectively with a great variety of groups that we were then aware . . . were now going to demand their voice in the formulation of educational policy.[3]

While these three points were of concern to all the Board members, they did not all place the same emphasis on that which touched on school integration. In fact, Tidwell was later sure that integration matters did not enter his

thinking at all. Bottomly himself recalled that the problem of desegregation was not put to him directly, and it "wasn't a matter of inquiry as far as he was aware at that particular time." Swain, on the other hand, recalled relating the Triad Plan to Bottomly prior to his actually being hired and he was aware ("very much so") of the point things had reached in the city before he took the job. Within the administration there were those who saw that Bottomly was hired specifically to handle desegregation--that the Board knew something would have to happen, so they were "looking for someone to make it happen."[4]

Swain spent two days in Atlantic City that spring, interviewing candidates at the National Convention of the American Association of School Administrators. This screening narrowed the field for the whole Board, who then traveled together to interview the final candidates. Their last stop before returning home was in Colorado, where Forbes Bottomly was Superintendent of the sprawling Jefferson County School District in the Denver suburbs. Dr. Palmason later described their trek and its outcome.

> Tidwell and I kind of sized these guys up from a health standpoint. We decided we didn't want [one candidate] because he had rheumatoid arthritis and smoked like a chimney. But when we met this Bottomly it was like a breath of fresh air. . . . He had done some very interesting things there [in Colorado]. . . . We thought we wanted to hire him. . . . As we all sat on the plane from Denver to Seattle we sort of decided that we'd float or sink

> together on this. We knew he would come like a bombshell. Because Seattle had almost an incestuous line of superintendents. . . The reason we hired him was his progressive stance . . . he was willing to shake the tree . . . and principally because we wanted a breath of fresh air in the community. It turned into a kind of tornado.[5]

Bottomly was officially chosen as Superintendent by unanimous vote of the Board at its meeting on March 24, 1965. Mrs. Owen presented that item of business with a brief description of their selection process. She said that they had received many applications, and, following the preliminary sifting of candidates and interviews with those in final consideration, ". . . the man was interviewed who without any question was the Board's unanimous choice." She said that replies to inquiries about him were "almost lyrical in their recommendation and she really wished to congratulate her fellow Board members that by the first of April the Board had found a man whom . . . [they] feel all are going to enjoy so much in the position of Superintendent."[6]

Regardless of the emphasis placed on desegregation by either the Board or Dr. Bottomly in the course of his selection, the reality and importance of the issue could hardly have been overlooked by the new Superintendent early in his tenure. In the aftermath of the Triad Plan's rejection, civil rights groups were unhappy and frustrated by the failure of the School District to develop or adopt

any long-range plan for effectively integrating the schools. Throughout the spring and summer of 1965 they continued their efforts to produce some change.

CORE and NAACP joined forces for a meeting on June eighth. The announcement of the meeting, over the names of NAACP's E. June Smith and CORE's Walter Hundley, stressed that people and ideas were needed "to help inform the Negro Community" about the school integration crisis. They highlighted the School District's conviction "that Negro parents do not want to integrate their children; they believe that Negro parents do not want to bus their children to school--even if the schools pay the cost." CORE and NAACP, on the other hand, were convinced that 90 percent do support integration, but they must

> . . . go out and get their personal commitment and their signature to show the School Board. CORE and NAACP members and supporters--especially Negro members and friends--have to go into house meetings, coffee hours, club meetings, etc. to inform the parents, answer their questions, and explain our program. By fall we must have 3,000 parents' support.[7]

At that meeting thirty-three teams were formed to go into churches, homes and clubs to talk to people and secure their personal commitments. There was an echo of the emphasis in the announcement quoted above, and portent of changes to come in the civil rights movement, when "it was moved and seconded that the requirement be integrated teams or all negro--that no caucasians go out alone. The

motion carried unanimously."[8]

In July the NAACP moved to put economic pressure on the School District. In a letter to Francis Keppell, United States Commissioner of Education, E. June Smith cited enrollment statistics which showed that "the majority of Seattle's Negro children attend schools . . . that are in fact segregated," and she charged that "the Seattle School Board has officially adopted the policy of refusing to take any affirmative action to alleviate this condition." She then requested that the Seattle School District be required to file desegregation plans for approval by his office, "on penalty of being deprived of federal funds."[9]

The letter was released to the press, and it brought a swift response from Board President Swain, who called the charges "wide of the mark." While granting that Mrs. Smith's enrollment statistics were "by and large" true, Swain countered the charge of refusing to take affirmative action to alleviate conditions of racial imbalance by pointing to the Board's acceptance of a number of proposals from its Citizens' Advisory Committee for Equal Educational Opportunity. He also said that further steps were under study and some would "be accepted for the fall of 1965."[10]

At about that same time, the NAACP announced its plans to seek legislation enabling expansion of the Seattle School Board from five to fifteen members. The proposal

was being made because of the size of the Seattle system, "problems arising from racially imbalanced school enrollments and the lack of a professional educator on the board." The group's spokesman said that

> . . . "it is inexcusable that we should tolerate an inadequate School Board. . . . These five persons act with unanimity on all questions and especially on school segregation and the problems of neighborhood schools . . . that lead to racially imbalanced schools as a result of blind, willful adherence to outmoded education concepts."[11]

CORE and NAACP collaborated again in August with a joint "Education Newsletter," which announced another Central Area parent meeting scheduled for August 14. It also carried the news that NAACP was preparing to bring suit against the School District to correct de facto segregation, and it asked for volunteers to be plaintiffs in the case.

> It is, of course, necessary to obtain plaintiffs for such a suit. If you have children between 6 and 18 years of age, and are interested in becoming a plaintiff in this action, you may do so by contacting [either CORE or NAACP].[12]

A great deal of effort appears to have gone toward finding potential plaintiffs. They sought representatives from as many schools as possible within the District, and from each of the following racial categories: Chinese, Japanese, Negro, other non-whites, and Caucasian. "Within the limits of imagination, reason and practicality, the

more plaintiffs the better."[13]

The drive to recruit plaintiffs for a lawsuit that would not soon materialize, and the door-to-door canvass of the Central Area to secure parental commitment to integrated schools, symbolized Seattle's awareness of civil rights issues and the frustrations of civil rights leaders when Forbes Bottomly became Superintendent of Schools that summer. There was no unanimity of opinion in the Central Area, and a gulf between the leadership and the grassroots was beginning to develop.

If the Central Area seemed not to know it had problems, the rest of the city was seen to be in far worse straits. In October, 1965, an article in Seattle Magazine proclaimed that

> If there is any point on which Negroes here are in general agreement, it is that white Seattleites have a peculiar ability to isolate themselves from any knowledge or concern about the black population and its predicament.[14]

Its author found that residents outside Seattle's Central Area were vaguely aware of the city's race situation, but, lacking any "first-hand evidence in their own peaceful enclaves . . . [they felt] justified in banning the issue from their minds." Despite growing media coverage of the on-going social revolution

> . . . the bulk of Seattle's white community indicates in countless subtle ways that it has no interest in the Negroes, either individually or collectively, and

> couldn't care less about their plight. This is the real "Negro problem" in Seattle.[15]

Civil rights groups and their leaders can have received no encouragement from reports of the new Superintendent's first day on the job--July 1, 1965. In addition to saying that school people needed to know more about what parents thought of proposed solutions to de facto school segregation and the educational effect of those plans, Dr. Bottomly was quoted as saying, "We do not want to play around with little children's lives because adults are not able to solve their civil-rights problems."[16] He saw the greatest challenge in Seattle to be in the area of instruction, but visualized no major changes in the immediate future. Any changes would be "in line with the philosophy and goals already established by the School Board." He intended to work hard for equal educational opportunity, allowing that "positive and beneficial steps [had] already been taken by the School Board and [that] more will be taken,"[17] while giving no hint as to what those might be. However, in August he again asserted his opposition to "any plan of compulsory school transfer at this time."[18]

Among the papers that he might very well have found on his desk that first day were two reports which had been overshadowed by the attention given to the Triad Plan. Both would have focused his attention on equal opportunity and desegregation and perhaps served to brief him on the

state of things in the Seattle School District.

The Supplemental Report of the Citizens' Advisory Committee for Equal Educational Opportunity had been scheduled for presentation to the Board at its meeting on April 14, the same meeting at which the Urban League's Kimbrough officially presented the Triad Plan. However, Committee Chairman Don Abel decided against the public presentation of that report, preferring instead that the Board simply say that the report had been received and was being studied.[19]

The Citizens' Advisory Committee had been reactivated and enlarged in October, 1964. New members were Sherman Bushell, Jr., Jesse Epstein, Walter Hundley, Calvin McCune, Methodist Bishop Everett Palmer, George Schofield and David Wagoner. This time the committee was concerned with the economic and legal problems involved in student transportation as well as boundaries, optional attendance areas and a plan for re-drawing the Garfield attendance area.[20]

The majority of the committee recommended that the optional area between Harrison and McGilvra be retained while that between High Point and Fairmount Park be discontinued and that there be no change in the boundary between Washington and Mercer Junior Highs. They also recommended that the School Board proceed with planning of pre-kindergarten programs for "underprivileged children." Their remaining three recommendations carried notations of

dissent by some members. One member did not concur on closing Horace Mann and dispersing those students to other schools at District expense. In what was the most revolutionary departure from past and current policy, the committee recommended transferring and transporting students "so as to bring about an improved racial balance . . . with an immediate goal of a maximum of 30 percent Negro students in any school." However, on that point "several members of the committee noted a dissent to the compulsory shifting of people" to achieve racial balance. And there were several dissenting voices on the recommendation to locate a community college in the Central Area.[21]

The second document which the new Superintendent might have found instructive was the report of another study related to the Voluntary Racial Transfer Program, conducted by a research team from the University of Washington School of Social Work during the 1964-65 school year. The report was based on a study of eighty-four black seventh graders, one group of whom were attending Washington or Meany Junior High Schools while the others were VRT students in the city's other junior highs. The data came from interviews with the students' parents.

Among the findings reported was the fact that transfer families were somewhat smaller and tended to be in better financial circumstances than the non-transfer families. While there was little difference in the education

level of the fathers in the two groups, mothers of transfer students tended to be somewhat better educated than their non-transfer counterparts. A larger percentage of transfer parents had, themselves, attended integrated schools, and in transferring their children they seemed to have been seeking higher education standards, an improved general environment and peer association, more effective discipline and an integrated school situation. As had been contended by civil rights groups, the cost of transportation and the inconvenience involved were clearly the most significant factors affecting the decision of whether or not to transfer. While it might have been assumed that families active in civil rights groups were more likely to transfer, this was not borne out by the data. "Very few families were involved in any civil rights groups."[22]

In his first month in office, Dr. Bottomly encountered the problems of overcrowding, transportation funding, school closures, boundary changes and potential mandatory student transfers all wrapped up in one package. The District's elementary division had drawn up proposals to deal with enrollment changes and overcrowding in a number of schools in the city. Although three of the five situations involved had figured in debates over racial balance, the matter was dealt with as one of facilities utilization and overcrowding.

Closure of the Navy's Shearwater Housing Project had

caused a drop in enrollment at Decatur Elementary School in the Northeast section of the city, so it was proposed that attendance boundaries be changed to allow children in the Decatur and two neighboring areas to once again attend their closest schools. Since High Point Elementary had been overcrowded while adjacent Fairmount Park was not filled, it was proposed that students in the optional area that had been established between the two schools be assigned to Fairmount Park[23]--a change which the NAACP had been urging the District to make for more than a year.

Summit School, a frame structure built in 1905 at the corner of Summit Avenue and East Union Street on First Hill, was the elementary school closest to the city center, in the path of expanding commercial use and changing residential patterns. Its enrollment had been steadily declining to "the point where it is difficult to provide good education at a reasonable cost." It was proposed that Summit be closed and pupils from its attendance area "be transported to schools where regular classroom space is available." At both Horace Mann and Leschi the enrollments were growing, and proposed new programs provided by the Federal Education Act of 1965 would add to existing problems of over-crowding. To relieve the crowded conditions, actual and potential, attendance area boundary changes were proposed. In the case of Mann, all students living south of Jefferson Street (approximately 160 to 170

students) would be temporarily transported to other schools, as would all students in the Leschi attendance area who lived west of Empire Way.* [24]

Because the Central Area boundary changes and building closure would necessitate transporting students, the problem of transportation funding arose again. In a request to the State Superintendent's Office for 90 percent state reimbursement of transportation funds, Dr. Bottomly described the proposed moves as a temporary adjustment for a three-year emergency period, and he asked for "a waiver in this case of the regulation which requires that if any children are transported all must be."[25]

When the proposals reached the School Board at its meeting on August 25, 1965, Loren Troxel, Assistant Superintendent for Elementary Schools, listed their transportation costs as $68,080.00, "of which 90 percent will be reimbursed by the State." With a $38,000 saving from the closing of Summit and the changes at Mann and Leschi, the District stood to come out ahead financially. The Board voted unanimously to accept the recommendation for changes in schools and boundaries.[26]

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*The School District's report of racial distributions from 1957 to 1968 showed the black percentage in Summit's student body as 16.5% in 1957 and 24% in 1964. At Horace Mann the black percentage went from 79.3 to 96.5 between 1957 and 1964, and at Leschi from 66.8 in 1957 to 92.1 in 1964.

The transfer of Mann and Leschi students went smoothly on the first day of school that fall,[27] but there was less than total enthusiasm for the transfers and boundary changes. While this kind of action had been sought by civil rights groups, not all Central Area school patrons were happy about it. There seemed to be a feeling that more schools would be closed, and the question was raised as to "what happens to the real estate values when people want to move here, knowing there are no schools for their children?" The point was also made that Central Area parents were "hard-working tax payers . . . [and] entitled to nearby schools for our children."[28]

Mrs. Gertrude DuPree, a black neighborhood activist who had no children affected by the changes and who would be involved with later anti-integration groups, questioned the right of civil rights leaders to speak for the entire community. "People who don't know the feelings of the Negro community are the ones who have been pushing for 'integration' of our children," she said. She was critical of Reverend Samuel McKinney, who had called the Summit, Leschi and Mann decisions "a step in the right direction," and she asked why his two children were not transferred from Madrona "under the voluntary transfer program last year if it were so important?"[29]

The Voluntary Racial Transfer Program had been, in a sense, public recognition of segregation in the Seattle

schools--albeit de facto segregation which the School District did not consider to be its fault. That limited transfer program had been relatively well received in the city. Civil rights groups had pushed for closures, boundary changes and transfers, and when such mandatory reassignments came about some among those groups saw that the blocks of black pupils moved into heretofore white neighborhood schools posed a threat to whites.[30] Prior to the Board adoption of the proposals on Summit, Mann and Leschi, the education committee of CORE met with Dr. Bottomly primarily to discuss the transferring of students out of Horace Mann. After the District plans for such transfers had been announced, one of that committee's concerns was for "making it more agreeable to the white community."[31]

Although the District couched the transfers and Summit closure in terms of facilities utilization, and although the Superintendent was on record as opposed to compulsory transfers at that time, there were, predictably, those who saw the move as "only a means of slipping in a mild version of the unpopular triad plan."[32] In response to criticism of the plan and its cost, Dr. Bottomly said that it was "unfortunate that this decision has been identified by the public with the civil rights movement . . . this is a temporary measure for relieving overcrowding at several schools." At the same time, however, he had to

admit "there is no denying that this decision has civil rights overtones . . . but it has been made on the basis of school population."[33]

The Summit, Mann and Leschi changes marked a turning point in the story of transportation funding. Just as there had been virtually universal satisfaction in the city when VRT transfers were not publicly funded, much of the outcry in August, 1965, was over the proposed use of tax money to transfer the students from Mann and Leschi.

Late that month "Operation Transrer" was again asking for contributions for VRT transportation. They had financed transportation for sixteen students in the previous school year and "until the Seattle Public Schools can provide a solution to this problem . . . [they felt that they] must come back to the Seattle Community for help."[34] They had pressured the School District to contact the State Superintendent in 1964, and the District turned to the State again in 1965 to seek help and clarification of the funding situation.

In February, 1965, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction held that, lacking a formal legal opinion, it would be "very questionable" to provide transportation for VRT students unless they provided it for all. The School Board decided that the District should stay in contact with the State Superintendent and urge that an official opinion be secured from the State Attorney General.[35] In

May, on behalf of the School District, the King County Prosecutor's office* requested the Attorney General to issue an opinion on the matter.[36]

Prosecuting Attorney Charles O. Carrol requested an opinion

> . . . on the constitutionality of a certain voluntary student transfer program which has been initiated by Seattle School District No. 1 in order to alleviate existing racial imbalance in certain of its school facilities . . . [and whether, granting its constitutionality] the school district may obtain state reimbursement in regard to costs incurred in providing transportation to students transferring under the program even though it does not provide similar transportation to its general student population.[37]

In December, 1965, the Attorney General found the voluntary student transfer program to be "constitutionally defensible," and that it was clear that, subject to qualifications by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, a district operating such a program "may obtain reimbursement for costs incurred in providing transportation for transfer students" even though not provided for all others.[38]

State reimbursement for transportation costs was governed by laws on apportionment of state school funds and by rules adopted by State Superintendent Louis Bruno. The

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*At that time the King County Prosecutor's Office provided legal counsel for the Seattle School District.

State Superintendent's ruling in effect before August 26, 1965, had required that transportation be provided for all students living more than two miles from school if it were provided for any students in the district. However, on that date, Superintendent Bruno established an exception to the "transport-one-transport-all" rule to enable a school district to apply for reimbursement of funds which his office could exempt from the general rule if he deemed "'such transportation to provide for improvement and equalization of educational opportunities.'" The only circumstances under which an application for exemption would be considered were for transportation necessitated by building condemnation or closure by lawful authority or by reason of partial or total destruction of a building; for transportation of pupils unable to attend regular public school classes because of their physical or mental condition; or in a situation where "'. . . the transportation appears necessary to reduce the educational handicap caused by racial imbalance.'"

The State Superintendent's ruling came ten days after Dr. Bottomly had requested a waiver of the regulation requiring transportation for all. It was, no doubt, in anticipation of the rule change that the School Board was told on August 25 that 90 percent of the transportation costs for the Summit, Mann and Leschi area students would be paid by the state.

The School Board, with CORE urging it on, lost little time in trying to determine what the rulings made possible for them. At the Board meeting on December 22, Carla Chotzen and Walter Hundley sought immediate action to implement the Attorney General's opinion. The Board was certain that the opinion did not make extra money available, but rather made it legal to use funds if they were available, and the District's biennial budget had been established before the opinion was issued.[40] The entire School Board was scheduled to meet with Superintendent Bruno in January, since early approval of any transportation plan was essential. The Board tried to convince the CORE representatives that it was "'not dragging its feet' on the transportation issue," and that it was serious about pursuing it. Mrs. Owen assured them that "'When five members of the School Board march on Olympia it must be an important matter.'"[41]

By January, 1966, therefore, the Seattle School District would appear to have been on a slightly different tack. District influence in Olympia would appear to have been a factor in a major change in state policy which allowed funding for the transfer programs then in effect and which would make possible the additional Central Area student transfers that were in the offing for 1966. The state reimbursement possibility freed the School District to some extent from the political and financial straight

jacket which was imposed on it by the need to rely heavily on the special levy as a means of funding its operations.

Leadership from the Superintendent's Office for new directions or expanded efforts for achieving racial balance had not seemed likely in light of some of Dr. Bottomly's statements during his first weeks with the School District. He had expressed satisfaction with the status quo, which at that point in Seattle reflected two themes that recurred regularly in the Crain study of desegregation in northern cities. Crain concluded that "one barrier to the civil rights movement is the school superintendent," and in his case studies two positions were apparent among superintendents who had moved autonomously in rejecting civil rights demands. The most common was

> . . . the insistence on a "color-blind" policy of ignoring racial distinctions . . . [and] coupled with this attention to color blindness [was] the stress placed on a narrow definition of the function of the school as "educational" rather than "social."[42]

Yet, by 1969, the Seattle experience with de facto segregation was seen as a success story. In his book The Politics of Schools, Robert Bendiner detailed the most "famous" of the desegregation stories--Berkeley, California, and Evanston, Illinois. He then noted that a few other cities, including Rochester, White Plains, Hartford, Sacramento and Seattle, should be similarly cited

> . . . as instances of communities that

> have made progress toward achieving racial balance, and their boards have properly been credited either with taking a strong lead or with encouraging superintendents who did. But these [boards] were exceptional in one way or another . . . or endowed, by luck or by choice, with determined and innovative superintendents, like . . . Forbes Bottomly in Seattle. . . .[43]

The themes in Crain shed some light on the desegregation story in Seattle under the new superintendent. While it did not recur with the frequency of the first two, there was the third theme of "extreme defensiveness about the schools, coupled with an intolerance of 'lay' criticism."[44] Based on interviews and documents, Crain proposed "that these three themes taken together represent one sort of ideal type of superintendent behavior,"[45] and in the course of his support of his proposal a kind of superintendent profile emerges. Forbes Bottomly did not match that profile.

Crain's picture is of a man who felt insecure in his position and reacted accordingly. He tended to be of low socio-economic status and highly mobile socially. Since the only avenue to the superintendency was through the ranks of teaching, he had majored in education in college, taught several years in the classroom and then risen through the administrative ranks. As late as 1961, "only a tiny fraction of college freshmen (0.2 percent) chose educational administration as a career." The 1960's crop

of superintendents had begun teaching in the 1920's, and Crain found it "hard to imagine that the big city school superintendent anticipated becoming a highly paid executive when he entered teachers college."[46]

Forbes Bottomly was only forty-four years old when he was chosen to bring a "breath of fresh air" to the Seattle school system. The route which he had taken to the Seattle Superintendent's office resembled only remotely, if at all, the track documented in the Crain study.

During World War II he served in Naval Aviation as the pilot of a patrol bomber. After the war he returned to the University of Montana to complete his Bachelor of Arts degree with multiple majors in history, political science and Spanish. He then earned a masters degree in Educational Administration from the same school and later his doctorate in education from Washington State University. He did additional graduate work at UCLA, Columbia University and the National University of Mexico.[47]

He taught for a short time on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation at Browning, Montana, and at the time of the Brown v. Board of Education decision he was superintendent in a small logging town in Montana. He had an opportunity to discuss the Supreme Court ruling at some length with his father, a Justice of the Montana Supreme Court, who at that time saw it as a major decision. He later recalled his own first impression being that the ruling was

"a step forward in human affairs."[48] The decision would not affect him professionally, however, until he arrived in Seattle. The Jefferson County District in Colorado was essentially an all-white, middle class suburban district. In the years between Browning and Jefferson County, he worked for one year as Director of Research for the American School Publishing Corporation in New York City, served the following year as an Assistant Professor in Educational Administration at San Francisco State College, and for the next three years was Director of Research for the Spokane, Washington, Public Schools. At various times during that period he was a lecturer in Educational Administration at schools which included Washington State University, the University of Colorado and the University of Texas.[49]

This background produced the "determined and innovative" superintendent with whom the Seattle School Board had by choice endowed itself. In working with the Board toward solutions of some of public education's problems, he soon came to see, to borrow Bendiner's phrase, that the schools had ". . . the urgent necessity to educate the children of the poor and enraged as well as they educate the children of the comfortable and the satisfied."[50] This realization came during his early introduction to Seattle's Central Area.

He came to Seattle with a certain tradition. Having

grown up near the Indian reservation where he subsequently taught, he was aware of the problems Indians faced, and he had some sensitivity to the problems of minorities in the nation as a whole. But he was "completely unaware of the intensity and the deep depths of the Negro urban problem and the feelings of black people."[51] He later recalled his first months in Seattle.

> When I first came to town, Robert Bass was the "house Negro" here, if you want to be crass about it. But he accepted this fact and his role with a great deal of feeling of responsibility. I think it was the first week, he said to me, "You're going to have to be educated about the city--and about us--about black people."[52] . . . [And for the next six or eight months] he took me into the Central Area, introduced me to families, made sure that I attended meetings, and made it possible for me to become educated in a short time concerning some of our toughest urban problems. I came, through his guidance, to understand the hostilities, the hopes, the aspirations, the beauty, the possibilities, and some of the incredible problems of poverty and degradation that the city holds.[53]

In the course of this urban apprenticeship he met parents, civil rights activists, black professional and religious leaders, angry youth and "revolutionaries who were starting to build up organizations of separatism." All of these encounters had an impact on him. But, again in his words,

> I think more than any other . . . the frustration and despair and the anger--and yet the tremendous deep hope of the black mother about the education of her

> kids was something that affected me very deeply. The black mothers were coming to a point where they really started the revolution--really they did. . . . [They] were coming to a point where they were just not going to allow the system to get away with not educating their kids.[54]

He went through "night after night and case after case of the problems of prejudice as seen by the black people--the lack of sensitivity that they observed in the system" regarding their children, until he became aware that things were not just as they "saw it as a white establishment sitting down here." He came to think that most people who had been deeply involved could "not see any other solution except to bring about an integration of the schools and, as a result, general improvement of the educational process," which he viewed not only in terms of the basic skills, "but in getting kids to rub off the rough edges of hostility, suspicion and fear."[55] This meshing of integration and improvement in education became a distinguishing characteristic of the Seattle attempts to improve racial balance and added a further complication by incurring the wrath of the city's educational traditionalists.

Not only were his evenings filled with Central Area meetings, formal and informal, many of his days were similarly committed. He had luncheon meetings with civil rights groups and individual civil rights leaders, initiating some of them himself. He was invited to address the Seattle-King County Bar Association in October, "to stress

civil rights."[56] He visited in Central Area schools and attended lunch meetings in the schools with community groups. As a result of one such meeting at Garfield in December he set in motion plans for human relations sessions for faculty, having come to ". . . believe that there should be an opportunity to discuss openly problems of prejudice, and throw them right out on the table."[57]

In early August he had told the Municipal League's Public Schools Committee ". . . that the parents of the colored children do not appear to be so interested in this matter of going to other schools as the leaders of the civil rights movement."[58] By the end of October he saw the need for state and federal help in solving the problem of disadvantaged and segregated schools. Prior to a meeting of the Legislature's Interim Committee on Education, he told a colleague who would be addressing the committee that he ". . . would like to see some legislation, too, regarding the matter of segregation." And he raised the question of whether there were ". . . an obligation on the part of school districts to break down de facto segregation in the schools, and if so, what state aid will be forthcoming to help carry it out."[59] In a "Dear Frank" letter to Francis Keppell, who was by then Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, he said:

> While those of us trying to run the big city school systems can find all sorts of excuses for not being able to do this

> or that, I think the time has come when we must do certain things. Our involvement in the area of civil rights is the paramount responsibility and we should welcome the help of the Federal government in the solutions to some of these problems.[60]

If Robert Bass had conducted an intensified educational short course for the new Superintendent, the community provided, if not the final exam, at least a stiff mid-term. The following spring Bottomly and the School District faced the biggest gun in the civil rights arsenal, the school boycott.

CHAPTER VI

BOYCOTT

Among the currents flowing in the city, the idea of a school boycott to dramatize segregated schools gradually gained momentum. While boycotts had been threatened from time to time in the past, the climate would be right in the spring of 1966 for a boycott actually to take place. Throughout January and February that year, while funding for transportation remained in the news, the realization was growing that new programs were needed to reach the goal of racial balance. The Coleman Report added weight to the arguments favoring integration over compensatory measures.[1]

At a meeting in February, the Seattle Teachers Association stressed the desire of teachers to have their ideas considered in setting racial policy. They concluded that the voluntary transfer program was a minimal gesture, and changes were suggested which included closing Central Area schools and bussing those children to other buildings throughout the city.[2] The Municipal League's Civil Rights Committee was again interested in the public schools, and on February 9 Garfield's Principal, Frank Hanawalt, gave them an update on statistics and population shifts in all Central Area schools. He also detailed what he was doing in his own school to cope with growing problems. The

School District was then receiving some indication that parents elsewhere in the city would welcome Central Area transferees to their neighborhood schools.[3]

Funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity began to funnel into the Central Area, and there was jockeying for position among leaders and groups to establish control of funds and programs. The men of the Central Area Civil Rights Committee were a very influential group. In the early months of the anti-poverty program they were instrumental in the development of plans and projects such as the Central Area Motivation Program (CAMP), which would work closely with the School District in the coming years.[4]

These same men were not of a mind to let integration matters drop with the rejection of the Triad Plan, and in the course of their early meetings with Forbes Bottomly in September, 1965, they spelled this out clearly. Bottomly asked them to give him until February to become acclimated to Seattle. They felt this to be reasonable and they agreed to wait. "And then, the first of February," as Mineo Katagiri later reconstructed it, "we asked for an appointment to remind him that we had been reasonable and nothing had happened."[5]

Boycott was "in the air," and larger community groups were thinking and talking about it. In early February, Walter Hundley brought together some of the CACRC members, including Adams, Pratt and Charles Johnson, for lunch in a

meeting room at a restaurant on Elliot Avenue. He was somewhat apprehensive about how they would react as he laid out the school situation from the CORE perspective and suggested boycott. He later recalled that meeting:

> I told them, you know the schools . . . the CORE committee wasn't able to get anywhere with the School District--there were just a lot of games being played. I said, "We've got to do something . . . we've really got to move this thing--and it's got to be dramatic." And I suggested that we have a school boycott, but that we do it in the most responsible manner possible . . ."it's going to be a lot of work for everybody. The organizational, logistical kind of thing would . . . be tremendous--but I think we could pull it off." And we kicked it around--and Adams said, "You're right! Right on!" And then the others fell in line.[6]

This agreement assured the solid backing of the major civil rights groups, with the exception of the Urban League. However, its "underground" support was pledged by Pratt, while publicly it could not participate because of "established agency and National Urban League policy."[7]

The boycott was officially sponsored by CORE, NAACP and the Central Area Civil Rights Committee. Much of the planning and organizing was done by people who had long been associated with the CORE Education Committee. The total Central Area community was fairly well united in this and it enjoyed wide support. It was remembered as being "very exciting--a really good experience . . . [with everyone] being terribly positive."[8]

CORE had established fairly regular contact with the

School District and at a special meeting of CORE on February 17, Carla Chotzen, Education Committee Chairman, reviewed current developments "in negotiations with the school board." It was her feeling that the board and Superintendent Forbes Bottomly reacted negatively to all questions and suggestions by civil rights organizations. Mrs. Chotzen suggested 'more drastic steps' be taken." It was moved and seconded "that C.O.R.E. join the NAACP and the Central Area Committee on Civil Rights in organizing a school boycott on March 31 and April 1, 1966." The motion passed, but in the discussion that took place before the vote there was concern about the extent of support for a boycott, and "possible consequences for participating students." In later discussion that evening, the idea surfaced to establish "Freedom Schools" for boycott participants. "Father Lynch discussed Catholic schools and expressed his support of the idea of a boycott."[9]

On February 23, the three sponsoring groups released to the press the text of their letter to the School District in which they spelled out their complaints and intentions. They told the Board and Superintendent that they were requesting <u>all</u> parents in Seattle to keep their children out of schools on March 31 and April 1, and that they had "quite frankly . . . given up hope that any serious plan to integrate the schools" was or would be considered. Hence their protest, which they were prepared to continue

periodically until two conditions were met:

> 1. The Seattle Public Schools develop and publish a comprehensive plan to integrate the schools within a reasonable period of time . . .
> 2. The Seattle Public Schools begin immediately a program of compulsory in-service training for all school personnel in human relations with emphasis on the understanding and acceptance of racial minorities in previously all-white schools.

The decision to boycott had not been easily or lightly made.

> However, after years of discussion with school officials, after watching schools in the Negro community become increasingly segregated, after realizing that the increase in population is constantly exacerbating the problem,

they felt they must act while there was still "a potential for solving the problem." They stressed that the Supreme Court had held that "separate education is unequal education--for both black and white," and it was a condition which they were determined to combat. They did not want to perpetuate the protest indefinitely, so they stood "ready to discuss . . . at any time means to accomplish the goals of desegregation of the schools."[10]

The press expanded on the letter and quoted John Cornethan, Chairman of CORE, as saying that "'This boycott is not necessary; it is the last thing we want to do. . . . But the school board has not been at all receptive to our suggestions.'" NAACP's E. June Smith said that she supposed the boycott would be called off if something were

done, but any plan would have to be spelled out. They would not accept "' a promise that something will eventually be done.'" They both said that they would be willing to meet with school officials at any time but had heard nothing from them.[11]

For his part, the Superintendent agreed that the boycott was not necessary since they were already aware of the situation. Bottomly said that it would have little effect one way or the other on plans to end segregation. He was quoted as saying, "'There are certainly more constructive ways for these people to accomplish their ends, . . . [the boycott] would have no adverse effect on any desegregation plans . . . [nor] affect the board's desire and ability to move ahead . . . [but] the board will not and cannot operate under pressure.'"[12] The School District had been aware that a boycott was coming. Bottomly had watched it build up and found it frustrating to be unable with "one wipe of the hand to put everything where it should be."[13]

Planning went forward for all aspects of the boycott. Much stress was placed on publicity city-wide and leafleting throughout the Central Area, but the biggest planning problem centered on the freedom schools. The boycott leaders had, early on, been concerned about telling students not to go to school. Perhaps they recalled the reaction to Jack Tanner's boycott call two years earlier--"We have

been trying everything to keep our kids in school and along comes a man who wants to keep them out." At any rate, they saw the need for some kind of substitute for the regular school program to stress the importance of school during the two days of the boycott, and a freedom school planning committee was formed within the general leadership group.[14]

By the time of CORE's regular meeting on February 24, the freedom school planning was under way. Committees on sites, staffing and curriculum had met and were scheduled to meet again soon. A request was made for donations of school materials as well as for more volunteers to join the working committees. Carla Chotzen stressed to the group that night that the ". . . impression that the school boycott concerned only the Central Area was one which needed correction."[15]

As the boycott dates drew nearer, the need was seen for more volunteers to staff the elementary level freedom schools, and planners were concerned about the amount of publicity to be given to details of the schools. On March 6, Reverend John Adams announced to the press the plan for freedom schools, for which a "committee of educators is arranging for a staff to teach Negro history, life and culture." He underscored that the boycott was not "meant to be a holiday; it will be an educational experience as well as a protest of the . . . failure to end racial segregation

in the schools here." And he stressed the committee hope that a "substantial number of white people . . . [would join the] protest and participate in operating the freedom schools."[16]

Later, the plans were spelled out in greater detail. Again stressing that the boycott days did not represent "time off," the boycott spokesmen elaborated on the "'carefully planned' schedule of classes from 1 to 3 o'clock." Eight freedom schools would be staffed by more than 100 teachers. Elementary schools were planned for First A.M.E. Church, Madrona Presbyterian Church, East Madison YMCA, Goodwill Baptist Church, St. Peter Claver Center and Cherry Hill Baptist Church. Junior high centers would be at Mt. Zion and Tabernacle Baptist Churches, and senior high schools were planned for Prince Hall Masonic Temple, East Side YMCA and Woodland Park Presbyterian Church.[17]

In addition to the 100 teachers, other volunteers had offered to serve as doctors on call, resource people and general assistants. They were planning a varied elementary school curriculum, with movies, music and arts and crafts, as well as small group discussion. Negro history and civil rights were to be the major focus. Nancy Norton, one of the principal planners, said that they wanted to use "'good solid material that all children can do well together,'" and that their aim was "'to promote a good integrated experience for the children who came to the schools.'"

Junior and senior high assemblies were planned to include a jazz concert and civil rights discussion and commentary by Reverend Peter Raible of the University Unitarian Church and Professor Alex Gottfried of the University of Washington. Students in those schools could choose from among classes in "Negro literature and history, arts and crafts, play reading, creative writing and college counseling."[18]

Boycott leaders had no idea how many students would participate in the boycott and attend the freedom schools. John Adams was sure the freedom schools "could handle as many as 5,000 students." Others among the leadership felt "that an enrollment of 500-700 would make the schools a success."[19] The numbers game was played by both sides, and there was considerable disagreement both before and after April first as to what number of participants would or did constitute a success for the boycott.

At one point before the event, the leadership group said that they thought they could get 2000 students to boycott, and the School Board reportedly saw that number as being very impressive. Mineo Katagiri recalled Board member David Wagoner telling them that " If the Central Area can get 2000 children out, they convince me they know what they're talking about " in regard to school programs and needed changes. They took that to be something of a challenge. It is doubtful that many people expected that

large a response to the boycott call. Herb Robinson, associate editor of the Times, said in February that, if the boycott did occur, it was possible that ". . . only a minimal number of Negro pupils will stay away from class." He though this because there was "no hot issue such as last year's controversial 'triad' plan under public debate" and because ". . . the response of Negro parents to even the voluntary-transfer program continues to be only lukewarm."[20]

The School District's immediate reaction to the notification of the boycott was to plan to document what they had already done to mitigate the effects of racial imbalance, and to restate in "stronger language its stand against racial discrimination." Dr. Palmason, Board President, said that he could see "'no areas of negotiation'" to avert the boycott; however, they were discussing ways to give "more promotion to the volunteer pupil-transfer program but 'without twisting arms.'" Palmason also said, "'I sympathize with the protest but it seems that they want everything yesterday.'" The board members seemed to be taking a "'turn the other cheek attitude' toward the boycott, apparently reluctant to make long-range plans under pressure."[21]

The Board and Superintendent remained firm in resisting action under pressure. In March, the informational brochure "Seattle Schools," which was sent home with students each month, contained a four-page supplement entitled

"Education for Understanding." It outlined Board policy and described District programs and efforts in the area of overcoming "racial, cultural and economic barriers." Portions of the Superintendent's message were given wider readership in the community when they were quoted in the Times.

> "There is no more urgent cause in our time than that of reaching out to bring our Negro citizens in the [sic] mainstream of opportunity. . . . The sting of history is behind this urgency. For a hundred years they have been methodically denied the opportunity to thrive under those magnificent principles of initiative and self-determination which have brought us to our present level of abundance and for which their fathers and ours agonized and toiled."[22]

That brochure supplement produced a rash of letters to the School District objecting, not only to efforts to integrate the schools, but to the expenditure of money for things such as the Superintendent's message.[23]

On March 18, the promised restatement of the Board's opposition to racial discrimination was made public. It was scheduled for publication later that month, but it surfaced at an inter-faith meeting of the clergy, one of many such meetings held prior to the boycott. While in years to come that statement was repeatedly referred to and considered to constitute a bulwark of the District's racial policy stance, it was criticized by civil rights leaders in 1966 for falling short of their expectations. The Board stated its belief that "forced racial segregation" was contrary to the

basic principles of our society; that equal educational opportunity must be provided for all children with special programs "to assure that cultural deficiencies are overcome"; that each child "must be accepted and treated by every member of the school staff without prejudice or bias"; and, in what was to become a frequently quoted passage:

> "We believe that an integrated education provides better racial understanding among all people. We will work to bring this about by whatever just, reasonable and educationally sound means are available to us."[24]

The Madrona community, a racially integrated neighborhood with a predominantly black elementary school that was badly overcrowded, added to the pressures building up prior to the boycott. The Madrona PTA was a fairly potent force, and Co-chairmen Sheila Bodemer and Roger Sale represented them before the School Board at its meeting on March 9. In order to decide whether or not their PTA would boycott, they wanted to know what the District was doing to reduce de facto segregation and what plans there were for integrating the schools in the future. There were approximately 200 people at the meeting, which was picketed by civil rights groups, and the response to the questions from Madrona "apparently did not fully convince many in the audience that the schools are doing enough to reduce de facto segregation." The Superintendent said that there were four points on which they were concentrating, while "'realizing this issue is not a school district problem'" He cited

plans for teacher seminars on overcoming prejudice; curriculum stress on cultural contributions of minorities; the Voluntary Racial Transfer Program as a way of providing integrated education; and compensatory programs for Central Area schools, which he acknowledged to have lower achievement levels, something the District had heretofore been reluctant to do.[25]

Boycott opponents were also at the meeting. One Madrona parent, insisting that the Madrona PTA did not speak for him, defended Central Area schools as "among the best in the nation" and voiced what was a major point in most opposition to the boycott.

> "I have no intention of placidly standing by while my children are used as unwitting pawns in a political power struggle or in supporting by silence the abuse of a school board to forward such schemes."[26]

That meeting not only did not satisfy the majority in the Madrona delegation, but many of them went ". . . away feeling the Board intended to do very little about these problems of segregated schools and as a result many now support the boycott who opposed it earlier." The discussion at the meeting also resulted in a later demand for an apology from Dr. Palmason for his remarking "that 'the pill' might be the answer for overcrowding at Madrona School because Negroes have larger families." Palmason refused to apologize, saying that he had made the remarks in levity, but that they were based on "'a simple sociological

fact.'"[27]

There were other delegations and communications relating to transportation, desegregation and the boycott before the Board at that March 9 meeting, including a recommendation from the Citizens' Advisory Committee, which urged the District to ". . . immediately provide bus service for the pupils who are taking part in the voluntary racial transfer program." A letter from E. June Smith put the NAACP on record supporting the idea of locating Seattle's community college in the Central Area.[28]

In addition to its sponsoring civil rights organizations and community groups that gradually joined in along the way, the boycott received much of its support from the clergy. That support was not without controversy, however. What occurred was something of an inter-faith free-for-all, with the Roman Catholic position beginning and remaining firmly in support, the Protestants fighting bitterly among themselves, and a rabbi trying to pick up the pieces. The crux of the matter, which formed the basis for most of the openly expressed opposition, was the illegality of a boycott that broke the truancy laws and concern over the "use" of children in registering a protest.

The involvement of Father John Lynch in CORE planning meetings was an early indication of Catholic support. In March the Catholic Interracial Council issued a statement supporting the boycott, which said, in part, that they

> ". . . would much rather that the School Board would act without such pressure being applied . . . [but] there can be no doubt there is de facto segregation in the schools and also that the School Board has resisted any proposal which would substantially reduce racially segregated education. [And they held that] . . . the gross inequalities of a segregated education fully justify a boycott as an attempt to bring about more equal educational opportunities."

The statement was firmly backed by the Most Reverend Thomas A. Connolly, Archbishop of Seattle. This was consistent with his earlier statement from the pulpit of St. James Cathedral, that he approved and endorsed

> " . . . any type of peaceful demonstration or march or exhibition that will serve to alert our fellow citizens to the unfortunate plight [of minorities]. . . . It will be public opinion that will eventually secure the aims and ends for which this battle is being fought."

The words were backed with money. The Interracial Council and St. Peter Claver Center gave $125.00 for support of the boycott, and the Center was donated for use as a freedom school.[29] In spite of the strong official support and the stand taken by the Archbishop, however, some archdiocesan officials privately conceded that many laymen were not pleased at the prospect of the boycott.[30]

Unitarians for Social Justice passed a resolution supporting the boycott.[31] The congregation of the University Unitarian Church, on the other hand, adopted a resolution ". . . condemning racial imbalances in the Seattle public schools," by a vote of 141 to 19, and they called on

parents "'to make a considered decision regarding their participation in the school boycott,'" letting their decision be known to the School Board.[32] The congregation's minister, Reverend Peter Raible, had earlier announced his support of the boycott and was scheduled for involvement in the freedom schools.

The Presbytery of Seattle, with sixty-three member churches, favored the establishment of freedom schools, but did not endorse the boycott.[33] The Seattle Association of Evangelicals, representing 150 churches in the greater Seattle area, opposed the boycott. Their executive board's statement welcomed " . . . any attempt to extend liberty and justice to all . . . [and urged] solutions to the inequalities of opportunity." However, they felt ". . . that such pursuit of equality can be engaged in without resorting to a school boycott," and they invoked the words of J. Edgar Hoover, that the rights of dissent and petition for redress of grievances must "be asserted in a lawful manner."[34]

Press coverage of the communique from the Church Council of Greater Seattle to its member churches misconstrued the Council's message and triggered extensive public and clerical controversy. On March 16, Reverend Samuel McKinney, Council President, and Reverend Lemuel Peterson, Executive Minister of the Council, wrote to Dr. Palmason and enclosed a copy of the message to member churches. They

told Palmason that the Church Council had "taken note of" the boycott and freedom school plans, and they commended the School Board for the progress made in the last two or three years and for "giving heed to proposals" of the Citizens' Advisory Committee. They then urged the Board to give priority to the development of a specific plan to deal with de facto segregation. They did not state support for the boycott.[35]

The letter to the member churches began with the content of the letter to Palmason. The message, much of which was directed to white and suburban congregations, then focused on the need to support local school boards in working out feasible plans for integration in order to avoid state or federal legislative action. Stressing the need for Caucasian involvement, it then said, ". . . we prefer local action, if possible, and therefore urge all our friends, members and parents to support the Seattle School Board in adopting such a plan." It teetered on the brink of endorsement by describing the boycott as "the only form of protest which will bring this issue sharply to" public attention. The word to the suburbs was that now they had a chance to do something constructive,

> . . . to take some creative part of overcoming this social cancer. They should not remain passive during this forthcoming boycott, but use this as an occasion to begin to face the larger issues of the metropolitan area.

The freedom schools were seen as a constructive way to participate.[36]

On March 17, the Times quoted liberally from the Council message in an article headed "Churchmen Back School Boycott."[37] That same day, a hand-written letter from Reverend Petersen came to the School Board to set the record straight. One of the Council Board members had released the messages ". . . inadvertantly to the Times." Petersen apologized, because he

> . . . had wanted the School Board members and the churches to have [their] communications before the news stories appeared. But "managing" the news doesn't seem to work.
>
> [He thought they would find that the] messages do not openly endorse the School Boycott--although that interpretation will be made by some as it had been in the Times.[38]

The next morning the P-I said "Church Council Backs Boycott," and that evening the Times followed up its original story with "Clerics Hail, Assail Boycott Backers." This second article, which now referred to the Council statement as "giving blessings to the School boycott" rather than support, quoted various clergymen on both sides of the boycott issue. One long-time opponent of the Church Council, Reverend Thomas W. Miller of the Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church, urged them "to reconsider and rescind the endorsement of law breaking before any further harm is done to the children and homes of our city."[39]

The rift among the clergy widened when fifteen ministers from downtown churches publicly disavowed support for the boycott, and the controversy was well covered by both dailies. That group of ministers represented some of the city's most influential churches, including First Presbyterian, First Methodist, First Baptist, Gethsemane Lutheran and Plymouth Congregational.

Following a two and one-half hour meeting which was attended by Superintendent Forbes Bottomly, the ministers issued two statements. In one they pledged "' support and cooperation with the school authorities' in attempting to achieve 'the monumental task of a completely integrated and educationally sound school system,'" urged "that the mayor and City Council form a citizens' committee 'to lead the community in creative and responsible actions'" in regard to housing and employment, and called on "'all citizens to become concerned and involved.'" In the second statement, however, they publicly disassociated themselves from the Church Council Board's "pronouncements . . . as released to and interpreted by the public press." Among their reasons for the disavowal were their beliefs that the boycott called for illegal action; that it was a "'deliberate attempt and treacherous use of undiscerning young people as the tools and victims of the motives and objections of adults,'" that it fostered disrespect for law and condoned "'insurordination thinly veiled by the problem of

civil rights;'" and that the "'resultant ferment [was] destructive of the educational process and . . . a perversion of the strength most needed in an evolving, integrated society.'" Along with those strong words, they urged the Council to work with the School Board and ". . . give less heed to standing back and hurling controversial statements to the press. " They seemed wounded in believing that the Council Board had "'been insensitive to the intolerable pastoral burden that it [had] imposed on them, many of whom . . . [had actively supported the Council's work] in the face of opposition on the part of the laity.'"[40]

Three days later twenty black ministers from Central Area churches, along with Father Lynch from the Catholic Interracial Council, called a press conference at which Reverend John Adams was spokesman for the group. He scorched their downtown colleagues with withering oratory. He spoke of their closed minds and "bought consciences . . . 'their enslavement to the big givers and leading men of the city which causes them to abdicate their Christian responsibility.'" He called hypocritical "'their belief in equal rights and integration without the courage to act.'"[41]

They, too, felt the need to ask for understanding of their difficult position, however, with a statement that saw trouble ahead for Central Area leadership.

> "There is a growing commitment to resist integration in the Negro community. . . . This portends great dangers for our city.

> It is based upon suspicion and constant rejection. We do not win support and plaudits for bucking this tide, but we are convinced the wholeness of our society and the validity of the church's message is at stake. We appeal for help to keep the division of our community among [sic] color lines from hardening into hatred and contempt."[42]

On March 25, Rabbi Raphael Levine of Temple De Hirsch gained front page coverage when he assumed the role of attempted peacemaker. He called for a conference of concerned citizens and leaders from all the groups--civil rights, school and church--to "discuss the problem of racially imbalanced school enrollments." It was a last-ditch attempt to negotiate differences, to get people to "sit down and reason together." Rabbi Levine felt that "'Any other course is an admission of the failure of the democratic process.'"[43]

Such a meeting did take place on March 29, in the mayor's office. They established a planning committee which intended to call further meetings, and they hoped that "'by conferences and dedicated work they could relieve the tensions and avoid further disorder.'" The boycott itself was not discussed officially. "The theme of the meeting was that the Negro should be assured that the white community does have his interests at heart." Black leaders were not impressed. Charles Johnson, Northwest Area President of the NAACP, who left the meeting before it adjourned, said, "'I don't think anything was accomplished . . . I

really don't see why we were invited here.'"[44]

Not since the open housing vote in 1964 had feelings in Seattle run so high over a civil rights issue. Even the Washington State Board Against Discrimination could not agree on the boycott, with its Chairman Kenneth A. MacDonald arguing on the minority side that rather than being illegal, truancy in this case could be construed as a means of petitioning the government, hence legal under the First Amendment.[45]

As the boycott dates approached, Seattle was described as a "city of tortured consciences and divided churches," and the P-I labeled the boycott a "crisis of conscience." Neither daily newspaper supported the boycott. As early as February 24, the Times had editorially called the boycott threat "ill-advised," repeating that the schools "primary function is education, not social reform" and stating that "no major public agency in the state has shown more concern about racial problems than the Seattle Public Schools." The Times, at that time, had been concerned about "encouraging parents to direct their children to defy public authority," and by March 29 they were saying that "if youngsters are importuned to break truancy laws they will apply that yardstick to other laws." They supported the School Board in "refusing to be stampeded into making concessions," and hoped "that the boycott will find mighty few participants." On the eve of the boycott, a P-I editorial called it wrong

principally because it was illegal, and because it would not help ease the problem of de facto segregation. In the period since the boycott call, much attention and responsible discussion had centered on de facto segregation, hence the P-I felt that in one respect a major purpose of the boycott had been accomplished, and that by cancelling the protest at that point (March 30) the civil rights leaders "would gain a measure of community respect and support that would be invaluable toward ultimate solution of the problem."[46]

Civil rights leaders were far from calling off the boycott. NAACP's Dr. Earl Miller countered the "children as unwitting pawns" argument by saying that they would be the recipients of any progress made in the struggle, and he said that freedom schools and the boycott itself were part of "'efforts to give leadership training to a new generation of civil rights leaders.'" He dismissed School District desegregation efforts to date as tokenism, and said the boycott was "just the beginning . . . [that they were] engaged in a long-range struggle with the School Board." Reverend Adams agreed that it was only the beginning, that they had already tried everything else to get the Board to integrate the schools.[47]

For its part, the School District maintained its "turn the other cheek" posture and continued to, officially, virtually ignore the boycott. While there was no change

in the District position that they would not take any action under duress of an illegal boycott, they were caught in a web of conflicting pressures. Both the School Board and the Administration ". . . admit[ted] that 'subtle pressures' opposed to the Negro community aims have been much more persistent and pervasive than those of the civil rights groups."[48]

Superintendent Bottomly seems to have been torn by his desire for some accommodation with the civil rights demands and the need to stand firm. He was determined to "keep a firm hand on this thing, yet . . . continue to seek ways in which we might provide for equal opportunities in a reasonable and just way." In the weeks just prior to the boycott he moved to create another position in the Intergroup Relations Office for a human relations consultant, who would also head in-service training and assist in recruitment for Central Area faculty and staff. The District's projected "Prejudice Seminars" for all faculty were a high priority for the Superintendent and he directed his deputy, Fred Breit, to "please give this your fullest attention and report back . . . on the progress being made." He considered it extremely important to have the sessions under way that spring and thought a preview session would do the Superintendent and his cabinet "some good, too."[49]

In an attempt to create a concilliatory position and perhaps turn the boycott into an educational experience,

there was developed a "statesmanlike policy toward minorities" a statement of which was to be given to the building principals and ultimately to be released to the press. The plan was for the walkout to be explained to students in all schools in group discussions--to be dignified and not ridiculed or belittled. Constantine Angelos, who later became Education Editor of the Times, was at that time with the press office of the School District, and he was frustrated at being unable to give the press that page-long blueprint for faculty reaction to the boycott. The statement was circulated through layers of administration, and by the time it came to Angelos for release, it "had been red-lined to only one sentence on contractual obligations."[50] Indeed, the Superintendent's final word in the Times was that the boycott was " an illegal thing, " students participating would receive no disciplinary action but would be given unexcused absences, and "teachers also will be expected to fulfill their teaching contracts on the boycott days."[51]

After such a prolonged, and in some instances dramatic, build-up, the boycott event itself might easily have been anti-climactic. Such was not the case.

The boycott dates had been chosen because they were the last two days before spring vacation and would produce the least disruption in the schools. There is no way the planners could have foreseen that Thursday, March 31, would be ". . . a perfect day for skipping school. [When] balmy

breezes whispered their age-old summons to loll about under the bright sun and pale blue skies." While some students may have responded to that call in the P-I's description, many more descended on the freedom schools.[52]

Crowding in the freedom schools was a problem, and when a site filled up, the children were sent to another nearby. Reverend Samuel McKinney, whose Mt. Zion Baptist Church accommodated 500 children, commented that "All the facilities we utilized were taxed to capacity. We had to find some auxiliary sites. Temple de Hirsh [sic] [took] some to help us." That overflow was estimated to be an additional 100 students. Carol Richman's experience was not an isolated case. She took her children to the freedom school at the Madrona Presbyterian Church. There the estimated 320 children were far more than anticipated, and she stayed on to help out as a teacher. With such enrollments as 450 at the East Madison "Y" and 400 at the St. Peter Claver Center, the total was over 3,000 students each day.[53]

Attendance at the freedom schools exceeded the planners' expectations. They were better organized and more productive than the leaders had even hoped, and the "kids really joined in . . . and helped make it work." As Walter Hundley said, they had wanted the entire operation to be carried out "in a manner that really seemed responsible so that the public . . . would understand that we are serious, and that we are responsible; . . . and that we were willing

to pay <u>our</u> dues for a better system."[54]

As planned, the integrated classes "were taught about Negro history, the meaning of the boycott, Indian culture," and music and crafts. For some in attendance the freedom school "experience was novel--they were attending schools with Negro children for the first time in their lives."[55]

The boycott's sponsors considered it a solid success. John Adams cited the fact that it had generated the community's first full-scale discussion of segregation, and that "'the participation, a great deal of it from outside the central area, clearly demonstrated the strong support for integration.'" He hoped that the School Board would then begin to develop an integration master plan, to be implemented "'perhaps over a course of several years . . . [which had been their] objective from the start.'"[56]

Absenteeism in the city's schools was greater on Friday than it had been on the boycott's first day. School officials attributed the increase to "truancy in advance of next week's spring vacation." The School District maintained that the boycott was not a success and that, based on its total effect on the school system, "the response was moderate." Civil rights leaders considered these pronouncements to be the Administration's attempt to "neutralize the effects of the boycott," and they were content that the protest had been "a 'clear-cut success.'"[57]

District attendance figures show that Central Area

schools registered the greatest percentage of increase in student absences. The day before the boycott had seen 824 students absent from those schools. On March 31, the number was 3,185 and on the second day of protest it was 3,918. On Friday, the absentee rate city-wide was 11.2 percent or nearly twice the 6.37 percent registered the day before the boycott. Whatever the effect of its PTA's activities, Madrona Elementary School had 488 of its 897 students missing on Thursday and 560 on Friday.[58]

The District's word on contractual obligations was received loud and clear by the teacher corps. Only three certificated employees of the District chose to participate in the boycott, and Roberta Byrd Barr, who was principal of the freedom school at the East Madison YMCA, felt that they had really put their jobs on the line when they made that decision. Dick Warner, a history teacher at Ballard High School who believed strongly in integrated schools and considered it his duty to participate, gave up two days pay to teach in the Mt. Zion freedom school.[59]

The general attitude of the city's teachers, however, can be seen in communications which came to the Board in the weeks just after the boycott. There were letters and petitions from school faculties in support of the Board's position on desegregation, and it appears that most of these were motivated by disapproval of a pro-integration policy statement passed at the April meeting of the Seattle

Teachers Association. The communiques came from thirty-seven schools located in all areas of the city and from the Administration and Service Center, with the number of signatures reaching a high of fifty-seven on the petition from West Seattle High School.[60]

The correspondence to the Board that was generated by the boycott itself came from a wide geographical area. There were letters from the suburbs and from as far away as Everett. The tone of many of the letters was virulently racist, and the issues of communism, morality and inter-racial marriage appeared frequently. Since many were diatribes against the Council of Churches, it is obvious that the Council's involvement helped to produce the outpouring. There were also several letters from parents who had favored the boycott. Some of them wanted to be on record in support of integration but they had not kept their children out of school because they opposed the use of children as "pawns." At its meeting on April 13, the Board received a report of sixty-nine communications which ran the entire gamut.[61]

State Superintendent Louis Bruno, who considered the boycott a "moderate success" hoped that it would "lead to the proper dialogue between Seattle School officials and civil rights leaders," and in its aftermath said "he would not be opposed to any feasible bussing plan to end de facto segregation."[62] Dialogue, if nothing else, was set in

motion in April, by the core of the group which had met in the mayor's office on March 29. Rabbi Levine, Methodist Bishop Everett Palmer and William P. Woods, past-president of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce announced "formation of a citizens' committee to end de facto segregation in Seattle schools . . . in direct response to the two-day school boycott." They projected a fifty-member group with a steering committee that included John Adams and Samuel McKinney. As of April 3, the steps they would take had not been determined.[63]

The effects of the boycott were not easily assessed. One observation was that most whites were left unaffected by it. "Still, token support from white families who enrolled their children in freedom schools was evident." Mineo Katagiri, whose daughter Grace was among the students involved, said, "It was shocking to Roosevelt High School when a lot of Roosevelt kids walked out in sympathy and attended the freedom schools," and he felt that the boycott was a turning point after which the School Board would have to take the civil rights leaders seriously. Walter Hundley, on the other hand, while he had been pleased with the success of the boycott, later thought that "the long run result of it wasn't productive. Because despite that huge effort, the District really still let us down."[64]

Follow-up boycotts had been threatened, but in the Central Area there were indications that the original

boycott effort had drained energies to some extent. CORE received reports of

> ". . . various post-boycott meetings which reflected the general disinterest in another boycott before the next school year, but a wide consensus that continued efforts to place pressure on the school board to integrate the schools must be maintained."

At the CORE chapter meeting on April 28, heated discussion followed a motion to commit CORE "to continue immediate action to place pressure on the school board." A final motion "resulted in amending the proposal making certain suggestions for action sound less mandatory." This stance caused a guest who had been invited to discuss her civil rights activities in Mississippi to refuse "to address the group, declaring her disgust with the lack of real interest in improving the Seattle school situation."[65]

The three organizations that had sponsored the boycott did call a Town Hall Meeting for May 31 at the First A.M.E. Church. The announcements of the meeting, which were sent to supporters of the boycott, including parents, students, and freedom school teachers, proclaimed that it had been two months

> . . . since the very successful school boycott. Your strong support of this community's efforts to integrate the schools did make an impact on our entire city. We have waited patiently for the Seattle Public Schools to take some positive step toward integration, but so far there has been only silence. We have tried to be "responsible" and "reasonable," but after months--NOTHING.

They must help decide what the next step would be. Options suggested were another boycott in September and massive marches and picketing directed at the School Board.[66]

The School District did little that was new and substantive to satisfy the integration demands of the civil rights leaders, and the same problems continued to receive much the same responses as before. There was renewed effort to increase the voluntary transfer participation, which was down that year, and the Board indicated that it might put a one mill special levy for transportation on the fall ballot. This trial balloon was shot down at a School Board meeting at Nathan Hale High School on April 12, in "a verbal shooting match over the board's proposal to 'bus' school students." Many in the audience said such a levy would hurt other issues on the ballot, including a junior college bond issue, and some added that "such a program including the volunteer transfer program may 'undermine the confidence in the school board.'"[67]

The District did initiate two things in the boycott's immediate aftermath. In conjunction with the Central Area Motivation Program, a "counselling bank" was established in the Central Area to offer "'neutral ground' where parents and the schools [could] take problems involving Central Area children." The bank idea had the Superintendent's support as a means of bridging the communications

gap which had sometimes led to hostility and misunderstanding.[68] The second program, also in conjunction with CAMP as well as the Seattle Human Rights Commission, was a series of Race Relations Seminars for Central Area parents and School District administrators. Large meetings at Garfield were followed by smaller meetings in 100 homes throughout the Central Area. The Superintendent, who no doubt drew on his own earlier experiences, supported this, too, as "one of a number of programs the schools have established to improve communications and understanding within our city."[69]

Through the rest of spring and on into early summer, Dr. Bottomly moved quietly to institute some administrative changes which would ease some of the pressure. The Central Area Civil Rights Committee had stressed the need for more black principals and administrators. On March 23, Robert Bass was named Acting Vice-principal of T. T. Minor Elementary School, which made him the first and only black in the principals' ranks since the death of Harrison Caldwell in 1964. Later in the summer he was joined by Warren Burton, who was appointed Vice-principal at Sharples Junior High. Among other administrative appointments were Dorothy Hollingsworth as Director of the Head Start Program, Mildred German as Assistant Supervisor of the District's Guidance Office, and Roberta Byrd, who was appointed to the newly created position of Community Liaison Coordinator for

Title I programs throughout the city. While he would accommodate some demands and institute many new federally funded programs, such as those under Title I, the Superintendent frequently reminded the staff members involved that, for example,

> We want to cooperate, but not to such an extent that the educational program we would like to offer would be, in any way, interfered with by any agency other than the School District.[70]

Virtually ignored in the uproar which ensued from the disagreements among the clergy on March 18, was another event of far greater potential significance than the boycott. That day the NAACP filed in Federal District Court the suit which had been in preparation since the previous summer. The suit, which named as defendants the School Board and Superintendent Bottomly, sought a court order requiring the District to submit a plan for elimination of racial segregation in the schools and specifically asked for the closure of Washington Junior High and Mann, Leschi, Harrison, Colman and Minor Elementary Schools. It also sought an order to stop the District's alleged practices of drawing school boundaries that caused racial segregation, assigning black teachers on the basis of race, and failing to promote qualified black and other non-white teachers to principalships.[71]

The suit was brought on behalf of thirty black minors "'. . . and on behalf of thousands of minors of all racial

derivations.'" Attorneys for the plaintiffs were Philip Burton and Charles V. Johnson of Seattle and Robert L. Carter and Lewis Steele of New York City. Carter, General Counsel for the NAACP, called the suit "'quite a strong case,'" and he said that although the School Board had "given 'some recognition' to the existence of segregation in schools here . . . the key issue in the case is not whether segregation exists but whether the board has done enough to eliminate it." Attorney Burton declared that the voluntary transfer program was not working in Seattle "or anywhere else," and in expanding on the motion for closure of the Central Area schools, he said

> "You cannot desegregate those (the five) schools without closing them. The school directors have said they have no obligation to do anything with the (existing) social situation. But you have to disperse the ghetto."[72]

The School District, departing from its usual practice, went outside the County Prosecutor's Office for legal representation and appointed Charles S. Burdell as special counsel for the case. The NAACP immediately castigated the Board for incurring "an unwarranted expense." E. June Smith said that by utilizing the Prosecutor's staff, the District could, in their estimation, save up to 100,000 dollars in legal fees, which "could be put to other use, such as defraying expenses of students who participate in the voluntary transfer program."[73]

In June there were additional developments on the

student transfer front. The Board backed away from its earlier idea of a levy to finance transportation, and at its meeting on June 8, Dr. Palmason announced the plan for a citizens' committee to raise money to pay the bus fare for students in the VRT. That committee was chaired by Rabbi Levine and composed of many of the same people who had been with him at the time of the boycott, including William P. Woods and Bishop Palmer.[74]

At the same meeting, the Board announced plans to expand its transfer program to relieve overcrowding in the Central Area schools by moving an additional 500 students in the coming fall. This would involve sending pupils from eleven elementary schools,* eight in the Central Area and three in West Seattle. Parents in those schools would first "be asked voluntarily to agree to allow their children to be transported" to schools with more and better facilities. If there were not enough volunteers, others would be assigned to fill the quota.[75] With this departure in policy, the District adopted the concept of a voluntary transfer program with a mandatory back-up built into it.

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*Students would be sent from Colman, Cooper, Gatzert, Harrison, High Point, Highland Park, Leschi, Madrona, Mann, Minor and Stevens. Receiving schools were to be Arbor Heights, Broadview, Bryant, Decatur, Maple Leaf, North Beach, Northgate, Pinehurst, Sand Point, Schmitz Park, View Ridge and Wedgewood.

Rabbi Levine's group set a goal of 100,000 dollars to be raised for the VRT. It was reported that these funds "would be administered through the Seattle Schools budget to seek to qualify for 90 percent state reimbursement." Transportation for the 500 students who were to be moved because of overcrowding would be financed under Title I of the Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Considerable confusion over the two transportation projects was evident at the Board meeting, and a small group of parents protested any transportation plans at all--voluntary or otherwise. However, "the situation smoothed out considerably" after Board member Swain made clear that it was the voluntary transfer program that the Levine committee was helping and "the separate move to transport the 500 'does not regard race, but only overcrowding.'"[76]

Both daily newspapers supported the Levine committee's operation. The Times called it "an opportunity for every citizen who deplores racial imbalance in the schools to make contributions toward alleviating it through voluntary transfers." The P-I thought the School Board had been wise in dropping the one mill for transportation from its levy request, and favored state reimbursement for the Levine committee funds. The P-I also cut through the public insistence that the federally funded transfer of an additional 500 students did not regard race by pointing out that "by relieving overcrowded conditions, racial imbalance will

also be significantly relieved."[77]

Overcrowding in Central Area schools was a problem about which that community had been concerned for years. Once again, the Madrona PTA had attempted to come to grips with the problem and while there was "no clear consensus on any particular plan which they would recommend," they did agree on two matters which Roger Sale was instructed to take to the School Board. They saw the "present situation as being almost intolerable . . . [and that] the genuine solution . . . is going to involve some serious and drastic re-examination of present school plans and policies . . . no matter what make-shift is devised to get us through the next year or so." The second point of agreement was on six conditions that must be met if the District were to adopt a transfer plan involving Madrona students. Among these were insurance of a receptive atmosphere and fair treatment of transferred students; provision of compensatory measures where needed, equal to those at Madrona; the presence of supervisors on buses; and the incurrence of no cost to parents. The Board was receptive to the six points and felt that most of the conditions could be met.[78]

A "splinter group" in the PTA submitted a suggestion for transferring out of Madrona all students of one grade level for one year. The advantages seen for this idea, which came to be called the "Junior Year Abroad Plan," were that children would move with friends and classmates

and there would be a better cross-section of students involved. The group was "afraid an all-volunteer transfer would skim off the better motivated students," and geographically based transfers might draw from only one economic class.[79]

The program which was adopted was, for all practical purposes, a voluntary program, since the community response to it eliminated the need for mandatory reassignment to fill the 500-student quota. By mid-July there were 660 responses indicating an intention to transfer. Others received were placed on a waiting list in anticipation of more space being available than had been thought earlier. The transfer opportunity had been heavily promoted in the Central Area by the School District and by civil rights groups. Parents received letters from Superintendent Bottomly stressing the advantages of transferring. Central Area Motivation Program block workers contacted every Central Area home to explain the program's opportunities.[80]

The civil rights groups and leaders who had been pressing the School District for integrated schools since 1963 (and even before then) supported this movement to disperse black children, under whatever guise the District chose to label it. A letter promoting it was sent to Central Area parents over the signatures of John Adams, Walter Hundley, Samuel McKinney, Edwin T. Pratt, E. June Smith, John Cornethan and Charles V. Johnson. Individually

and collectively, that group wielded a great deal of influence. They urged parents to allow their children to take part, relayed School District reassurance which spoke to most parental fears and reservations, and put the burden on the community by saying that

> Some of us have worked extremely hard to bring about a paid transportation program for our youth and now it is up to our community to support the program by volunteering to transfer our children.[81]

That letter, free from rhetoric and posturing, stated the crux of what motivated those leaders to work relentlessly for an integrated school system. They backed the "overcrowding" transfer program, limited as it was, because they felt that

> it is indispensable to the future health and wellbeing of every citizen of Seattle, and particularly minority group persons, to have the maximum personal relationships with other groups if those minority group children are to grow up to take their place confidently in the larger society.

They cited studies from "Seattle and elsewhere," showing that minority children learned better and were better motivated "when they attend schools with children from all other backgrounds." They wanted Seattle to be "one of the first school systems nation-wide that solves this problem before it gets out of hand . . . [as in] Watts, Chicago's South Side, and Harlem."[82]

. . . . . .

By the time school was out for the summer (1966) the city had settled back to "normal" following the flurry caused by the boycott. However, in assessing his first year as Superintendent, Dr. Bottomly, while foreseeing no second boycott, still saw

> . . . solution of the growth problem in the low-income and de facto segregated central area schools [as] the major issue in the years ahead.
>
> "The dilemma," Bottomly said, "is whether to add portables or new buildings, transfer children to space in other schools or to think up new solutions."[83]

The proposal of new solutions was to come soon.

CHAPTER VII

"SAVE OUR SCHOOLS"

One reason for Bottomly's appointment as Superintendent was the School Board's anticipation that he would provide some innovative changes in the school system. In June of 1966 he proposed the first such possible innovation which spoke to problems of de facto segregation as well as to problems of teaching and learning. In presenting his Continuous Progress Center Concept, he intended it for discussion by the District staff, by a citizens' committee created specifically for the task, and by the public at large as one administrative proposal for improving individual instruction in Seattle's schools. It set in motion a debate which raged for well over a year and continued with varying degrees of intensity throughout his eight years as Superintendent. The chief opponents of the proposal were a group called Save Our Neighborhood Schools Committee, which had been formed in reaction to the Board's decision to expand its transfer program to relieve overcrowding.[1] From the very beginning there was no attempt to camouflage the potential for school integration which such centers contained. It did not take long for the SONS group to turn its objections toward the continuous

progress centers.

The Sunday edition of the Times, June 19, 1966, introduced the city to the two concepts which many found quite revolutionary--continuous progress and educational centers. The idea of continuous progress (or non-graded progress) focused on achievement and mastery as the criteria for progress in school rather than the length of time served. It was oriented to the individual student and allowed for

> rapid learners to expand into a wide variety or depth of experiences while the slow learners may master the basic material step by step . . . [it was] geared to handle efficiently the great human diversity which the city produces. It promises to tackle the dropout problem at its roots, while providing stimulating programs for the able.[2]

Almost immediately this educational concept became linked in the public mind with a mental picture of large, impersonal centers to which masses of children would be "bussed" and in which chaos would reign. Efficiency was the watchword in much of the Superintendent's thinking, and his proposal aimed at an efficient and educationally sound way to deal with several of the most pressing urban and metropolitan problems. He stressed the need to follow industry's lead in utilizing the results of research to concentrate efforts more efficiently in the use of talent, materials and resources.[3]

The proposal actually called for retaining

neighborhood schools for Head Start programs through grade three or four. The next grouping of students would be in intermediate continuous-progress centers from grade four "through Grade 7, with 4,000 to 6,000 youngsters each, 'insuring small-group integrity' by using the 'school-within-a-school concept.'" The next stage would be two groupings on one campus--grades 8 - 11 and 12 - 14. Bottomly saw that grade twelve "naturally should become part of the community college."[4]

The Superintendent was looking toward urban citizens of the future and saw a growing need for their outlook to be cosmopolitan.

> It is the aim of the Continuous Progress Center Concept to have youngsters progress from the home to the immediate neighborhood, to a large neighborhood community, on to a metropolitan or collegiate environment. With a curriculum based upon individual achievement . . . [and stress on] home-school contacts, with the organization for small groupings throughout, this plan hopes to help develop the urban man who has retained and refined his dignity of individual spirit.[5]

The proposal was a long-range plan requiring at least twenty years for implementation. Planning was to coincide with "the orderly phasing out of older superannuated buildings and be geared to the growth, decline, or shift of population within the city." Limiting racial percentages was envisioned "in order to assure the vitality of the contributions of all cultures." A tentative time-table included developing one or more intermediate centers by 1970 (four

years hence) and two secondary centers adjacent to the North and South Community College campuses by 1975 or 1980.[6]

Bottomly's plan was ". . . based upon the traditional American belief that the best setting for public education is a cross section of American life with all its diversities."[7] The greatest diversity to be found for public education in Seattle in 1966 would have been in racially integrated schools, and there is not much evidence to suggest that traditional belief was then ready to encompass that much diversity. But the Superintendent stressed the need to consider the factor of social dynamics in the Central Area. He saw Seattle reaching the point in its history where it would either

> spend a lot of time in perpetuating an all-Negro city, such as Washington, D.C., . . . or in creating a restrictive section such as the Watts area in Los Angeles. This does not have to happen in Seattle if we provide a good educational program to keep people from fleeing the city.[8]

Many of the overcrowded schools in the Central Area already had their small sites filled with portables. The Superintendent saw two possibilities--compounding the problem by expanding those over-burdened facilities or bussing children to available space in other schools--and he was concerned about what to do when pressures continued to build. He said that we

> . . . do not want to go into cross-bussing and forced mixing, which may be bad educationally.

> It seems to me that we must formulate a new plan to meet de facto segregation, a plan that will not provide for cross-bussing into the present educational program.[9]

Bottomly's proposal envisaged a feeder system that would provide naturally integrated schools. He had asked the School Board for permission to form a citizens' committee to study implications of his proposal. As Shelby Scates, political columnist for the P-I, observed, "sentiment dies hard, if at all. . . . . [The Superintendent is] actively soliciting public discussion about the school system's structure. He seems sure to get it."[10]

The Times sought the reactions of four secondary school principals soon after the continuous progress center proposal was made public. Richard West, of Roosevelt in the North End (with a 1.9% black student body in 1966) thought the plan was "'a pretty good idea--as long as it's based on an educational standard,'" but he warned against implementing a program simply for racial or economic reasons. Donald Means, Principal at Rainier Beach in the South End (2.9% black in 1966) foresaw that it would require considerable time to develop, but appeared to support the idea when he observed that it seemed "'as though a lot of big cities have simply surrendered their school systems'" and added that it need not be that way. He was glad to hear someone (Bottomly) say that good education was possible in urban areas. Two Central Area principals,

Hanawalt at Garfield (55.9% black in 1966) and Frank Fidler at Washington Junior High (72.9%) were even more supportive. Fidler said the plan certainly "provides a base from which we can discuss," and that the schools had to change. He cautioned that it should be viewed only as long-range and not an overnight occurrence. Hanawalt was "'quite frankly pleased and enthusiastic . . . [and thought] the experimental stages can and should begin soon.'" He expected that there would be a lot of reaction to it, and that was important. West had said, "'Naturally, there's going to be resistance any time there is a change,'" and he did not think "'Seattle would ever buy a dissolution of the neighborhood schools completely.'"[11] Total dissolution of neighborhood schools was not in the proposal, but many others besides West made that erroneous interpretation.

Herb Robinson, Associate Editor of the Times, helped this misconception along with a column headed "Policy Shift Hinted by School Action." He implied that the School Board had already made plans for a change in the Head Start Program which it "unexpectedly dropped," hinting that "a major over-all school-policy shift may be in the making." What the Board had actually done was to clarify its position in regard to a proposal released by the Office of Economic Opportunity to locate all Head Start pre-schoolers in the Horace Mann building. Dr. Palmason

issued a statement that said the Board had ". . . decided not to approve this proposal because it does not follow the Board's policy to maintain the neighborhood school for younger children," and that the program would continue to be held in the various neighborhood locations. Robinson saw a portent of change in "the use of the qualifying words, 'for younger children,'" and he said that Palmason had "given a clue this week [that] the board already is prepared to go along with the idea of abandoning neighborhood schools, at least after the third or fourth grades."[12] One wonders how many people read beyond his last comma.

Both newspapers dealt with the Continuous Progress proposal on their editorial pages. The P-I noted that the neighborhood schools concept was long-cherished in Seattle and that the "proposals for large, educational centers is sure to disturb many parents at first encounter. Nevertheless . . . [they] deserve the community's thoughtful, objective study." It noted the conflicting pressures to eliminate de facto segregation and to retain neighborhood schools, thought Dr. Bottomly had "demonstrated both courage and initiative in submitting the proposals for public debate," and found it "refreshing to have these educational proposals removed from the confines of closed meeting rooms." There was a whole-hearted endorsement of the idea of a citizens' committee to study the implications of the proposals. Ross Cunningham's editorial column in the

Times countered "an impression being attached to . . . [Bottomly's] proposal to reorganize the Seattle School system." He found the central idea "neither new nor revolutionary." On the contrary, it was "in large measure an extension of the school-consolidation program that has been under way in rural areas of the state since 1941." The arguments opposed to both the continuous progress proposals and the 1941 legislation were much the same, with champions of the neighborhood school replacing those of the one-room country school house. Significantly, he found that the 1966 arguments "probably are more compelling than those of 1941," with current educational requirements more severe, and "Moreover, transporting of pupils should go far toward integrating the schools racially."[13]

Times editorial staffers must not have read one another's material. In August, by which time the citizens' committee had been formed to study the proposal, and the District was submitting a 43 million dollar bond issue, a Sunday lead editorial referred to Dr. Bottomly's "proposal for a drastic overhaul" of the schools and "Bottomly's plan for an eventual radical redesign of the entire systim." It detailed some changes announced for implementation that fall, calling them "departures from time-honored procedures that pupils in some city high schools will be exposed to this year." They seemed genuinely to lament that "the old study-hall system will be revised so as to

make broader use of libraries," and to be giving warning that the "expanded use of libraries and laboratories lends itself, of course, to the centralized school concept." While they could see that "many of the secondary-level changes appear to make good sense," they had definite "reservations about Dr. Bottomly's proposal that pupils at about the fourth-grade level be transported out of their neighborhood schools to centralized schools." They were concerned about the "growth of delinquency" when pupils were concentrated in large numbers. One last, unsubstantiated paragraph, together with heavy stress throughout on Dr. Bottomly's responsibility for the whole idea, suggests that dissident voices in the School District may have reached an editorial ear:

> Yet some Seattle residents are asking whether the school administration is not already embarked, in advance of formal decision, on a path to large-scale physical dislocation of pupils below the high-school level.[14]

Fifty-seven people accepted School Board invitations to a "special meeting of key citizens" on July 21, 1966, at which they were to "review and react to some very important ideas being presented . . . on the subject of Educational Centers." They represented a cross-section of Seattleites, and the P-I reported general agreement among them that the concept of Continuous Progress Centers was acceptable for Seattle, "that planning should start now and . . . implementation of the program should not be

delayed too long." Most of them were willing to serve on a citizens' committee--again, in the words of the P-I--"to assist in pushing the proposal." Board President Palmason indicated that they would form the nucleus of a committee of about one hundred.[15]

Beginning with the coverage of the initial meeting of this nucleus group, there was an air of fete accompli about the Citizens' Advisory Committee's ultimate decision. Although there is nothing to suggest that the Board had overtly sought a promotional, rubber stamp support group, they found themselves on the defensive when the committee's operation became an issue in the September bond election.

In August the Board announced plans to place on the September ballot a 43 million dollar bond issue to finance building repair and remodeling as well as community college campus construction. Twenty million was earmarked for the community colleges, and allocation of the funds for the kindergarten through twelfth grade program would be made "after further study of organizational patterns, including Continuous Progress Centers." Former Mayor Gordon Clinton was named chairman of the citizens' bond committee, which had a very short lead time to mount a city-wide political effort.[16]

At the same meeting the Board announced formation of the 100-member Seattle Citizens' School Building Committee, which would study the District's "long-range building

needs, including the 'continuous-progress-center concept.'" The chairman of the committee was Carl Dakan, a vice-president of Pacific National Bank, a Seattle native who had attended Bryant Elementary School, Roosevelt High School and the University of Washington, and still resided in the city's Northeast section. The committee held its organizational meeting on August 25, 1966, at which time it was projected that its final report would be given to the Board the following summer.[17]

Within a week of its announcement of the bond issue, the Board clarified how the K-12 funds would be spent. "Pressure from groups concerned with the racial distribution in Seattle schools and the board's plans to deal with it" forced the Board to list the planned projects. The list included enlarging or remodeling seven high schools and five junior highs. New buildings were planned to replace eight elementary schools, and funds were to be used to repair damage which thirty-seven buildings had sustained in an earthquake on April 29, 1965.[18]

To that list would be added whatever construction the Board deemed necessary from the Dakan committee report. If those recommendations were that Continuous Progress Centers were feasible, only one center would be built with funds from that bond issue. That center, "if it is decided that one should be built," would be located on District-owned land on Beacon Hill, in the midst of a number of

elementary schools either in need of remodeling or already slated for replacement.[19] Dr. Palmason said that if the 100-citizen committee recommended against a center, the money would "be channeled into the more normal educational routine uses." The Board President also stressed that they wanted a broad range of community interest on the committee and "no 'pre-judging.'"[20]

By the time its 100-member committee met in its organizational meeting, the School Board's primary opposition had already met, organized and done battle with the District and civil rights groups. On June 16, fifteen parents, both black and white, representing neighborhoods scattered throughout the city, met at the North End home of Mrs. Elliot Carlson. They gathered to form a group opposed to the School Board's recently announced plans to extend its transfer program by 500 students in order to relieve overcrowding in Central Area schools. "They reaffirmed their belief in the neighborhood school concept, first established in Seattle Public Schools 90 years ago," and announced opposition to plans that would destroy that concept. One parent from West Seattle maintained that the School Board was "'obviously . . . overtly bussing children, involuntarily if necessary, to desegregate the schools.'" The group held that, although some Central Area schools were overcrowded, the capacity of Central Area schools actually exceeded enrollments. They intended

to press the District for clarification of figures on teacher-pupil ratio and available space.[21] It would appear that they preferred to see children from the overcrowded schools switched to the allegedly under-utilized Central Area buildings rather than into their neighborhood schools in the North End, Magnolia and West Seattle. Since transfer was being considered only for Central Area students, it seems likely that much of the resistance was to the extension of "receiving school" status to additional predominantly white neighborhood schools.

Mrs. Gertrude Dupree, a black Central Area resident, attended the meeting and used it and the publicity it generated to remind people of a public meeting at the Garfield Recreation Center on June 30, to which she had invited the School Board. She was opposed to any efforts to move children from Central Area schools.[22] A year earlier, Mrs. Dupree had lambasted civil rights leaders and the School District when Summit School had been closed and students had been shifted from Mann and Leschi to relieve crowding in those schools.

By the time of the meeting at the Garfield Recreation Center, the group was known as the Save Our Neighborhood Schools Committee and was headed by Mrs. Carlson and Mrs. Dupree. (The "N" was soon dropped in favor of SOS.) That meeting was attended by more than 150 people, including the Superintendent and the entire Board, excepting Swain,

who was out of town. Mrs. Dupree opened the meeting by saying that many parents in the Central Area did not want "such bussing" as was planned. The Washington Junior High PTA President called for "'more and better schools' in the Central Area," and another parent expressed that she had become perturbed by the compulsory back-up idea. Mrs. Dupree also told the crowd "'We're going to bring a law-suit and we're going to keep our schools and you're going to help us,'" with no further elaboration except to say later that perhaps she "'. . . should have said intervene in a law suit.'"[23]

Not all the blacks at the meeting agreed with Mrs. Dupree and SOS. Dr. Eugene Hall told the committee, "'I wonder if you are not leading people down the primrose path when you say "Save Our Schools." I see nothing wrong with what the School Board has done.'"[24] Walter Hundley, then Director of CAMP, "tried repeatedly to gain recognition but was refused." He later told reporters that

> "the bleeding hearts concern on bussing [of black children] by a large number of whites is evidence that they are using a shibboleth (the bussing issue) to keep us here in the central area."[25]

Dr. Palmason was the one board member to speak up when comments were invited from the floor. He tried to respond to eighteen questions on a mimeographed sheet which SOS had distributed. By that time, however, the meeting was almost out of hand. There had been so many

impromptu speeches "on the whole wide civil rights field and unanswered questions from the floor that little genuine information was produced."[26]

The SOS group made good on its intention to intervene in the suit against the School District filed in March by NAACP attorneys. A motion to intervene was filed July 29, by a group of seven Central Area property owners and "parents of 27 school children, all but two Negro," a fact emphasized in the press. SOS's co-chairman, Mrs. Dupree, was one of the seven property owners seeking the intervention. The announcement of the suit was made in a rather unusual setting for a Central Area group--at a meeting of the 44th District Republican Club held in the clubhouse of the Blue Ridge Community Club in the city's virtually all-white Northwest section.[27]

The intervenors, whose attorney was Russell J. Austin, Jr., held that the closure of Central Area schools sought in the NAACP suit was not in the best interest of themselves or other Central Area residents and property owners. They maintained that closing those schools "would deprive them of 'their right of freedom of association under the Constitution' and the right of voluntary transfer, create undue hardships, including 'ridicule and scorn [sic] . . . because of their clothing' to the children involved, and reduce the value of the real property in the area." While they recognized that racial imbalance was a fact in those

Central Area schools, they did not agree "that this imbalance constitutes segregation."[28]

Austin contended, when the motion was filed, that the NAACP's plaintiffs were "'using school children like pawns,'" and that the relief sought in the original suit would "'take away as many or more Constitutional rights of people who are not plaintiffs as those who are.'" He later told the court that his clients denied the existence of segregation in the Central Area schools, and that the NAACP suit was "not a civil-rights suit," but "merely a smoke screen behind which the N.A.A.C.P. seeks to extend its influence and domination over all members of the Negro race, including particularly little children."[29]

At a hearing in United States District Court in August, Judge William J. Lindberg ruled that the parents had no right to intervene and, to that extent, denied the motion. Final ruling was deferred to a later date, pending interpretation of new federal rules. Judge Lindberg told Attorney Austin, "'It would appear you are actually in the role of a defendant,'" and Austin agreed. He elaborated on this by saying that

> one reason for seeking to intervene is that the applicants fear that the Seattle School Board may not make a vigorous defense in view of the educational-centers, or "continuous-progress centers" concept announced recently. . . .
>
> Closure of the neighborhood schools "might very well permit the premature establishment of such a system to the

immediate detriment of the applicants."[30]

By August, SOS was opposing the Continuous Progress Centers, as well as the movement of black students out of the Central Area. They had launched a petition drive by circulating 8,000 petitions "in support of the neighborhood school concept." They had opened a fund account at the Madison-Pike Branch of Seattle First National Bank to receive contributions to meet their legal costs, and they had established ten chapters city-wide.[31]

As an organization, SOS was both informal and well-organized. It had begun as a word-of-mouth gathering of neighbors, former neighbors and kindred souls. No doubt Mrs. Dupree's earlier objections to transferring Central Area children accounted for her being included. Although there was a treasurer, there was little money and that was raised primarily by "passing the hat." No membership lists were kept, and, in pre-public disclosure days, they "never filed anything anyplace." They operated a speakers' bureau and maintained the neighborhood chapters in Ballard, Northgate, Lake City, West Seattle, Queen Anne and Magnolia, as well as the Central Area. Early on, they saw their basic function to be informational--to make the public aware of what was being considered and why. They made a concerted effort to have someone in attendance at all School Board meetings.[32]

In addition to Mrs. Carlson and Mrs. Dupree, others

who were publicly identified with SOS in its early stages were George Marshall, Desmond Birch and Veda Jellen. Birch had been at the Garfield Recreation Center meeting and he spoke to the gathering at the Blue Ridge Community Club. He was a student at Seattle University, where he was president of the New Conservatives, and he was active in the Seventh District Young Republicans organization. George Marshall, SOS Treasurer, was a frequent contributor of letters to the editor. One such letter in August objected to the School District's announced intention to seek to qualify Rabbi Levine's voluntary transfer funds for 90 percent state reimbursement. Veda Jellen, a former neighbor of Carlson and Marshall, was the chapter coordinator and chairman of the Magnolia chapter and was probably well known to the School Board for her views on transfers and transportation. Only the previous May she had declared that the transportation of pupils should be a ballot proposition separate from the levy, and that "transportation should be provided on the basis of need rather than race."[33]

The black members of SOS were most active in the group's very early stages, and their greatest contribution would appear to have been their role in the move to intervene in the NAACP suit against the School District. Mrs. Dupree was involved for much of the time. Veda Jellen later remembered her as having coordinated their Central Area chapter, but she then "began to drift away."[34] Others

active in the Central Area discounted her influence and doubted whether SOS had much support in the Central Area. Walter Hundley thought that Mrs. Dupree, who "ended up being one of [his] best buddies," was being used by "the whites who were really in charge of the organization," that she really had no support in the black community. He said that

> Mrs. Dupree rounded up her relatives, in the black community, as part of the SOS thing, but that's about all they had. It was the whites from the other neighborhoods who were using her.[35]

Urban League President James Kimbrough, backed by Executive Director Edwin Pratt, went so far as to say that SOS did "'not represent any responsible group of Negroes in this community.'" The August NAACP Newsletter charged "that whites are using 'gullible' Central Area Negroes through the SOS Committee in the 'defense of segregated schools.'"[36]

In July SOS took its campaign against Continuous Progress Centers to Mayor J. D. Braman. Veda Jellen had received a phone call "from a man on the Seattle Planning Commission," who urged her to read the report of the Commission's study on long-range planning, which had concentrated on neighborhood schools for the city's future.[37] They invoked the Planning Commission Report when they met with Braman, and they asked him "to press for a memorial to the City Council urging that the traditional

neighborhood concept of schools be retained." They were specific in their opposition to Superintendent Bottomly's concept "for shuffling the attendance of schools according to grade . . . [resulting in] a 'tremendous amount of children being transferred at a fantastic cost.'" In a response reminiscent of the School Board on open housing three years earlier, Braman demurred. He saw such a memorial only antagonizing the School Board, since School District operations were out of his province, and, besides, ". . . he would be angry if school board members told him how to run city hall."[38]

One disappointed citizen, writing to the editor about Braman's refusal to take a stand, chided the Mayor for not having enough faith in the Planning Commission to back its work on schools. In her own support for the Commission she sounded a protective and provincial note which was heard often in debates over the city's schools. She said that the Commission's plan had been "developed by planners and educators familiar with the over-all picture of Seattle development . . . while Dr. Forbes Bottomly is a 'Johnny-come-lately' to the Seattle scene."[39]

In August SOS took its case to Olympia and met with an administrative assistant to the Governor, a consultant in the State Office of Public Instruction, and the Western Washington field director for the Office of Economic Opportunity. Their agenda centered on "transportation of

pupils and the retention of the neighborhood schools." "They questioned the legality of state reimbursement of privately contributed funds for the . . . voluntary transfer program," (emphasis added) as well as the planned use of federal funds for transportation in the program to relieve overcrowding. They objected to the use of OEO funds to publicize that latter program "through block workers of the Central Area Motivation Program," who were actively seeking volunteers to fill the quota. On that score they were told that CAMP, essentially a non-profit corporation, could " extend their operations to anything they see fit. " SOS also asked state officials "to consider the effect of the educational-centers plan proposed" for Seattle. Touching all bases, they went to the State Auditors office "to discuss auditing procedures of the Seattle School District."[40]

SOS confronted the School Board directly at the Board meeting on August 24, 1966. They warned of the threat which the Continuous Progress Centers posed to passage of the 43 million dollar bond issue, made clear that they supported the bond issue but not the centers, and expressed fear that the bonds would be defeated unless voters were "assured by the board that none of the money [would] be used to further the new educational concept." In response, Dr. Palmason read a Board statement to clarify things, stressing that the bond issue "was arrived at after months

of study and is designed to meet present building needs, regardless of whether a center is built." In the long discussion which followed, both the Board and Superintendent stressed that the concept would be studied and discussed in depth by the citizens' committee and the District staff, and that "no plan would be adopted without the fullest consideration of what will provide the best education for the children of Seattle."[41]

The meeting was long and sometimes heated, with Dr. Palmason's penchant for freely speaking his mind for publication once again bringing a demand for a public apology. He had been quoted in the Post-Intelligencer "to the effect that SOS members are not really concerned with saving the neighborhood school but with keeping Negro pupils out of THEIR schools." Saying that "'it would be easy to say I was misquoted . . . but that would not be fair'" to the reporter, Palmason added that it was unfortunate that the quote implied that "he had said ALL members of SOS are racists." He went on, however, to say that he was "convinced that SOME members of SOS are trying to block the school board's efforts to ease segregation."[42]

Almost obscured by the SOS fireworks at the meeting was Board approval of a project that was to play a large role in later District efforts to increase the number of "reverse transfer" students in the VRT. Planning and development was approved for an Instructional Resource

Center at T. T. Minor Elementary School in the Central Area. The project, funded under Title I, created at Minor "a model school for pilot projects in individualized instruction and continuous progress," to begin in September, 1966.[43]

From the time of the original announcement of the centers concept, on through September, no School Board meeting was without a list of correspondence, for the record, covering centers and neighborhood schools. The communications were both in support and in opposition to the centers, and they came from every part of the city. Many supporting letters were from Central Area residents, both black and white, and from civil rights groups. Opposition was strong in the North End, and there were indications of some concerted effort at a letter-writing campaign in the Northwest section. In September, the Board received petitions bearing a total of 485 signatures in support of the Continuous Progress Centers and the District's bond issue.[44]

Superintendent Bottomly had harbored no illusions that his proposals would be readily accepted. In August he wrote a friend that

> Things are going great guns here. We've gone way out on a limb to propose a long range educational centers plan. . . . There will be of course great battles over this, and, in fact, the lines are already drawn. We do have strong support and a citizens' committee which will study the problem intensively, but it will be a fight and we are anticipating the

challenge to be great.

He told Philip Hayasaka of the Seattle Human Rights Commission that he appreciated being able to count on his support and that they would "have tough sledding ahead as we attempt to get our entire community to examine the concept that we have proposed."[45]

Bottomly actively promoted the centers concept, addressing countless PTA meetings and civic groups. He solicited the involvement of groups such as the League of Women Voters, which he was "very anxious to have . . . examine the general design of the . . . plan . . . proposed for consideration." He explained the entire program to groups such as the Municipal League's Civil Rights and Public Schools Committees. He did not hesitate to defend the plan's potential for integrating the schools, as he did that fall before a luncheon meeting sponsored by the Jewish Community Centers and the Anti-Defamation League, when he said, "'There must be a community effort to keep the racial balance adjusted so that our children come in touch with the complexity of metropolitan life.'" He thought that the "'clash of ideas and dialogue' over the neighborhood school concept in the community" was good.[46]

Ideas continued to clash, and the bond election provided an occasion for dialogue. The press kept the centers concept before the public. In September the Times ran a series of articles on similar education centers projects

in Florida, New York and New Jersey. Both dailies dealt editorially with the Continuous Progress Centers in the course of urging passage of the bond issue. The P-I believed that

> . . . the worry over dismemberment of the neighborhood school concept is a falsely based one. Even if the entire, long-range plan for continuous progress centers were to be implemented someday, primary school youngsters would continue to attend classes within walking distance of homes.[47]

The Times was less sanguine about the plan, being willing merely to postpone the neighborhood school issue as one "that must be resolved over a long period of time . . . with the citizens participating through subsequent elections of members of the School Board." They hoped the voters would separate that controversy from the District's basic building requirements.[48]

In spite of the controversy, the bond issue passed with just over the constitutionally required 60 percent affirmative vote; and, perhaps indeed because of the controversy, there was sufficient voter turnout to validate it. The Superintendent and Board President Palmason saw the vote as reaffirmation of citizens' confidence in the School Board, and Palmason said it was "'a tribute to the common sense of the voters who . . . voted the bonds despite what [he] would call a peripheral dispute.'"[49]

Although SOS cancelled plans to present the Board with petitions "against forced bussing and the centers

concept" on the day after what they had foreseen as the defeat of the bond issue, the group did not retreat for long. They monitored the 100-member citizen's committee closely as it began hearing from education experts in order to arrive at conclusions and recommendations on the Continuous Progress Centers. SOS did not oppose the 14.9 mill operations levy which the District submitted to voters that fall, but by late October they were annoyed by, if not alarmed at, the fact that the 100-member committee was hearing presentations only from proponents of education centers. In an attempt to secure balance, Mrs. Carlson called Max Rafferty, California's controversial and conservative State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and invited him to speak to the committee, whose Chairman Dakan had said that they did want to hear a professional critic of the centers.[50]

In October, Rafferty's syndicated column, which was carried by the Times, blasted the idea of educational parks under a heading that would have delighted any xenophobic Seattleite: "So Many Ideas from Back East Are Bad."[51] His schedule would not allow a Seattle appearance before the first of the year, and there was some uncertainty as to whether the 100-member committee would hear him even if he were to come. In the meantime, it was arranged for the committee to hear from two opponents of the Centers--Veda Jellen, SOS Chapter coordinator, and W. M. Schubert,

Professor of Chemistry at the University of Washington. Schubert had written his opposing views to the Superintendent in the early stages of the controversy and Mrs. Jellen had been involved in SOS from its beginning.[52]

They spoke to the Committee of 100 on November 28, 1966, at a meeting attended by more than 150 people. Schubert agreed with centers proponents that the plan had many attractive features, but argued that its positive elements, including all the new teaching aids, could be utilized equally as well if not better in the existing neighborhood schools. The size of the centers bothered him. "If relatively mature students in a large university feel a loss of identity, what would be the effect on children of 9 or 10?"[53] Schubert said that the Centers might accelerate de facto segregation rather than curing it, by creating white flight, and speaking of segregation per se said, "'Not until you integrate the hearts and minds of people will you solve the problem . . . [sic] you must first integrate the neighborhoods. Mrs. Jellen continued with that thought, which was one of SOS's basic positions, saying, "'You might desegregate schools but you won't have desegregated the neighborhoods.'" She expressed her concern that minority children in the centers "would feel even more keenly the cultural differences acquired in the home than [they would] at the neighborhood school."[54]

The Times picked up on Schubert's point about

university students' loss of identity in an editorial titled "Questioning School 'Centers.'" Noting that "huge university campuses . . . have been the scenes of demonstrations caused in part by students who complain of their lack of identification with their instructors . . . [and] with the institutions themselves," it thought the School Board owed a satisfactory answer to the question of pupil maturity and large centers if they planned to install the Continuous Progress Centers in Seattle.[55]

Just prior to the Jellen-Schubert appearance before the Committee, SOS had approached the School Board to propose its "open enrollment plan." They reasoned that the primary aim of educational parks ". . . in a city of this size is to accomplish socio-economic racial balance," and they conceded that Seattle did have "some degree of de facto school segregation, resulting from the economic level of the parents of children" in the Central Area. They wanted it understood that SOS had "always supported the voluntary transfer program." (Their Olympia trek suggests that their support might not have extended to funding the program.) The VRT appeared to them to have "become decreasingly attractive to the participants in the past several years." (The program was then in only its third year of operation.) For that reason, SOS wanted to

> . . . request and recommend that the board change its position on traditional school boundaries and abolish the present boundaries altogether. . . . By allowing the

> children living within walking distance first priority to his neighborhood school and offering equal opportunity to all remaining vacancies to any student from any school, regardless of economic, racial or neighborhood background, we can completely abolish any kind of forced or defacto segregation and still allow the white and Negro parents who so choose to keep their youngsters in their neighborhood school.[56]

She said that SOS "would be willing to help raise transportation funds to implement such a plan."[57]

By December, when it was determined that Rafferty would not be able to appear in Seattle at all, the Committee of 100 had reorganized into smaller study groups and working subcommittees. SOS intended to keep track of things and wanted any general meetings of the Committee to be "open for silent observers and to the press."[58]

The press gave quite thorough coverage to the centers debate that fall, and did not fail to highlight its school integration aspects. Both dailies carried analysis and commentary on the matter. A column in the P-I in November noted that there was concerted opposition to the proposal, but it was "based mainly on the narrow view that the neighborhood school concept is too precious to relinquish to a 'new-fangled idea,'" and while there were many reasons to support the proposal, "arguments hinge mainly on desegregation. Perhaps only a few will put it so plainly but it remains the primary cause of opposition."[59]

In his column in the Times, Herb Robinson focused on

"the absorbing question of whether the public schools should expand their role as an instrument of social reform." He noted a small increase in the number of reverse transfers to Garfield and some reasons for their switching --to learn to live with all people, to not be prejudiced and to "accept [people] for what they are." The State Board Against Discrimination had recently sounded a similar note in its first joint meeting with the State Board of Education, and Robinson quoted Fred Haley of the Discrimination Board as saying:

> Educators too often "fail to see the problem of race as one of educational dimensions . . . children must be educated for life in a world where no race can choose to live alone. . . . The truly 'underprivileged' child in our country is the sheltered youngster growing up in the hideously unreal environment of suburbia."

Commenting for himself, Robinson said that while, in the recent past, "most school officials were reluctant to grapple with racial issues . . . there appears to be a slowly growing consensus that the schools will have to play a larger part in the race relations effort."[60]

In their first joint meeting, the Board Against Discrimination (SBAD) had asked the Board of Education to take an "active role in developing solutions to the problem of de facto segregation," with Haley saying that local districts should not have to bear the whole burden of programs for disadvantaged children. He hoped that the

Education Board would agree with his board's "long-range policy statement holding that equal education is not possible in a de facto segregated school and that such schools should be eliminated." Among the things specifically requested of the Education Board were: taking racial factors into account in apportionment of state funds for new buildings; increasing state aid for programs for disadvantaged pupils; requiring local boards to file plans for discouraging segregation in determining site selection and zoning for new schools; encouraging multi-racial teaching staffs; helping districts select multi-ethnic curriculum materials; and undertaking studies of school district reorganization, including educational parks for metropolitan areas.[61]

The State Board of Education did act on intergroup relations at a later meeting, and in December, 1966, State Superintendent Louis Bruno sent copies of the Board's statement and recommendations to all County and School District Superintendents, noting that it was the Board's "hope that . . . superintendents and boards of directors will give careful consideration to the statement and take those steps which are appropriate to its implementation." The five points recommended fell considerably short of what the SBAD had requested. The first was a vague recommendation for all districts to make specific efforts to move toward solutions of segregation problems. They next called

for an annual ethnic count of pupils, to realistically aid planning. The third recommendation was for re-examination of personnel practices to remove all barriers, real or implied, to equal opportunity. They asked for explicit recognition of multi-cultural contributions in instruction. The fifth recommendation was for pre-service and in-service teacher education to help "develop understanding and a sensitivity to the problems of interpersonal and intergroup relations." The Board also recommended that the State Superintendent create an ad hoc committee from its group and the SBAD to give further attention to human relations problems in the schools.[62]

In December, Bottomly appealed to the legislature to help solve "the problems of 'urban overburden' and racial tensions." He told King County legislators that old ways would not work in dealing with new and growing problems and that the School District needed their help "'because we're in trouble. We're facing a crisis situation.'" He was concerned about a reform of school financing which could eliminate the problem of the annual school excess levy except for truly "special purposes." He also sought action on transportation (" Mobility is a condition of city life, " Bottomly said.), and for a state school-equalization distribution formula that would take into account urban factors for which the Seattle School District had to provide.[63]

The Seattle School District had been expanding and upgrading its own intergroup activities. In November, 1966, Robert L. Williams was appointed to the position from which Robert Bass had been moved into a principalship, and the name of the post was changed to Assistant to the Superintendent for Intergroup Relations. He was not able to report until January 2, 1967, and while the Superintendent would have liked to have had him available sooner, it was understood that the time was needed for Williams to phase out of his current job as Executive Director of the Minneapolis Urban League. He held degrees from South Carolina State College and the Atlanta University School of Social Work. Prior to going to Minnesota in 1958 he had been with the Seattle Urban League and the State Board Against Discrimination.[64]

In the coming year the Superintendent would become even more concerned with increasing racial tensions in the city, and with a shifting pattern of leadership in the Central Area. In summarizing the past year as he left office in December, 1966, Urban League President James Kimbrough said that all the elements "to spark racial violence" were present and he added, "'The situation now is worse in Seattle than it ever has been before.'" The Urban League cited as causes of increased tension

> . . . recent shootings of two youths by police officers, lack of on-the-job training to provide working skills and jobs, inadequate progress in the area of

> housing and curtailment of federally financed local poverty programs.[65]

Superintendent Bottomly was in touch with officials at all levels--local, state and federal--as the District grappled with the problems. Among the concerns he expressed to the Mayor was the increase in the percentage of black students in Central Area schools. The influx of students, in itself, was not a major problem.

> But many of the youngsters coming in have not had benefit of the control and discipline which have been traditional in the Seattle Schools, and, as a result, we have had some incidents which have not been good.

He also noted the effect on Central Area families of recent Boeing layoffs and their attendant anxiety, but he did "not sense a crisis situation approaching," and he thought the Municipal League's recent creation of an Urban Problems Committee was a timely and important effort at bringing together "various facets of community leadership to analyze the whole problem."[66]

With the state's congressmen he was very blunt in expressing concern caused by cuts in appropriations for Community Action Programs in Seattle. What worried him was not just fear for the survival of the District's programs which had developed in close cooperation with those Community Programs (e.g., Head Start). Having watched "the involvement of many people in developing plans . . . [he thought] that more than any program . . . in the cities,

these Community Action Programs [had] attacked the problem at its very heart." And, perhaps of even more vital concern, "As a result of the cutbacks there has been great frustration, anxiety and bitterness on the part of the Negro leadership and the Negro community here in Seattle."[67]

In February, 1967, the State Board of Education met in Seattle, where its members were given a firsthand introduction to segregated schools and a crash course in the special needs and problems of urban districts, conducted by the Superintendents and administrators from Seattle, Spokane and Tacoma. The State Board, together with people from the State Office of Public Instruction, visited Muir and Minor Elementary Schools, and their tours through Garfield and Washington Junior High were conducted by Principals Hanawalt and Fidler, who provided additional insight, enabling the groups to go "away with a great deal of knowledge and feeling about" Seattle's problems. Robert Williams, newly arrived Assistant to the Superintendent, had assembled population statistics to indicate minority patterns. His office had just completed a survey of high school sophomores which showed that one-fourth of the black students had been born in the South, and one-sixth had been born in non-southern states other than Washington. Dr. Bottomly put the urban situation into a state perspective for the State Board by pointing out that

"The whole state will pay the price

> of failure in the cities to handle school problems and it will share the rewards of the cities' successes. . . .
>
> Seattle is a beautiful, exciting and dynamic city . . . but unless we move with vigor and imagination it will follow the same declining, frustrating route to ugliness and chaos that other beautiful cities have taken."[68]

Nation-wide changes and developments in race relations such as the advent of Black Power and growth of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, which were reported Daily by newspapers and television networks, had not directly affected Seattle. But in April, 1967, one of the distant TV figures became reality when Stokely Charmichael spoke at Garfield High School. One point upon which almost all participants in Seattle's desegregation drama agree is that the Stokely Charmichael speech was a turning point for the city and its schools. His appearance was not without controversy even before he arrived in town.

To borrow from a front page headline in the Post-Intelligencer, "Black Power" Handed the School District a "Hot Potato." Mrs. John Bundy, Chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in Seattle, made a request to rent Garfield High School auditorium for a speech by Carmichael on Wednesday, April 19. She did not deny that he was a controversial figure and did not expect all who heard him to agree with him, but she was sure that the question and answer period would be "stimulating." She said that by allowing him to speak at Garfield, the School

District would "be making a great contribution to an intrinsic part of any educational process--the free exchange of ideas and opinions."[69]

The request caused some consternation at the School District's headquarters, where efforts to track down information and opinions produced little of substance. Mr. Hanawalt had no knowledge of SNCC in Seattle at that time; he did know Mrs. Bundy and said, "the Bundy's are fine and dependable people." He and the Urban League's Ed Pratt had discussed SNCC, and Pratt was not familiar with the group then, either. Robert Williams' response was the same about the local group, and although he knew Carmichael had spoken frequently at colleges and universities, "he [did] not know about a secondary school. [But], he would be inclined to be influenced by the type of people who are sponsoring the meeting."[70]

Search of its records as far back as 1942, to find a precedent, produced nothing conclusive for the District either. On August 10, 1966, the Board had granted use of the Garfield auditorium to the American Civil Liberties Union for a lecture by James Meredith (title: "Racial Peace in America"). On the other hand, on February 10, 1947, the Board had denied use of the Broadway High School auditorium to the Communist Party.[71] The District turned to the Prosecuting Attorney for advice "as to whether the School Board has the right under the Constitution and under state

statute to deny the use of school facilities for the appearance of Mr. Stokely Carmichael." The Prosecutor's opinion was that inasmuch as the Board had allowed the use of school premises for public meetings, it should do so "on a non-discriminatory basis."

> However, if the board has reasonable grounds to believe that the high school and auditorium will be used to advocate violence or other criminal activity, or that its use will in any way be prejudicial to the best interest of the district or in conflict with the school program, it is justified in denying the use of the facilities.

Prosecutor Carroll volunteered to obtain information on Carmichael "from the Seattle Police Department," if the Board so desired.[72]

Even before he had received the Prosecutor's written opinion, the Superintendent had formulated a response for the media:

> "While we recognize the right and need of controversial persons to be heard in Seattle, we feel that Mr. Carmichael's appearance in Garfield High School might tend to undermine the fine progress which has been made so far and might jeopardize future progress in school race relations."[73]

By April 1, only Mrs. Bundy among the principal participants was saying anything, "and she very little," except that the District had sent her a formal letter rejecting her request. The letter read in part that, while the District sympathized with Carmichael's basic purpose, they found "'extreme conflict with his procedure and recent

actions regarding national problems.'" They were apprehensive about his speaking at a school, which could be

> . . . misconstrued by the opposition as an endorsement of Mr. Carmichael and that statements which he should make may develop and aggravate tensions detrimental to the best interest of the community and the schools.

"The board did not spell out who the 'opposition' might be," but Mrs. Bundy went to the School Board with an attorney and accompanied by Reverend John Adams, who was described by the P-I as a "civil rights leader of many a skirmish" who was there as a conciliator.[74]

The School Board, before denying the SNCC request, had

> . . . asked that a panel of reactors be permitted to follow Mr. Carmichael in his presentation, clarifying, inquiring, describing and exploring all points of view about the meaning of Black Power. This was turned down by Mr. Carmichael's sponsors because it would dilute the emotional impact of his presentation.[75]

When the denial was made, within the broad sweep of the Prosecutor's phrase, "prejudicial to the best interest of the district," it was not done to prevent Carmichael from speaking in Seattle, as his supporters later charged. The Board simply had

> . . . rather he not speak at Garfield High School where . . . [it was] aggressively attempting to bring about good racial balance through transfer programs. It [felt] that incitive and inflammatory actions could destroy the progressive measures [then] being put forth.[76]

It was later reported that the Board's decision to bar the

speech from Garfield was not unanimous. "At least two of the five members felt it was wiser to allow Carmichael to speak."[77]

When the American Civil Liberties Union announced on April 4 that it would probably seek a writ of mandamus to set aside the Board's decision, one of its attorneys zeroed in on the SNCC refusal " to accept certain conditions " as one of the reasons for the Board's action. Raymond E. Brown was reported as saying that the "Board had insisted on selecting the panel, and had ruled out such organizations as CORE and NAACP as not representing 'grass roots' elements taking part in the rally."[78]

The Superintendent lost no time in reassuring those two civil rights groups that no such thing had happened. He wrote to both Andrew Young of NAACP and CORE's John Cornethan, saying:

> . . . at no time has any member of the Board or myself stated that C.O.R.E and N.A.A.C.P. would be ruled out nor did we state that these organizations were not representative of the community in the Central Area.[79]

It was essential that all bases be covered and that all the District's fences be kept in good repair. The addition of a Black Power faction in the Central Area exacerbated a problem which had plagued the District since the earliest controversies surrounding Washington Junior High and the overcrowding at Horace Mann--the problem of determining who really did represent the Central Area community.

Carmichael's sponsors contended that the Board's denial of the use of Garfield was an abridgment of the right of free speech and assembly. The District was ordered to permit him to speak "or show cause in Court . . . why he was banned." At that Court hearing, Judge Frank D. James ruled that the School Board's regulations were not definite enough, that their rejection of Carmichael was not based on "legally supportable grounds," and that the Board was asking him to uphold a position which gave "sanction to what would amount to 'prior restraint' of Carmichael's right to speak."[80]

Mrs. Bundy, on behalf of SNCC, had been joined in the request for a writ of mandamus by Clifford Hooper, on behalf of the Negro Voters League, and by Gerritt W. Kouwenhoven and Waymon Ware, "individually and representative of a class" of citizens wanting to hear Carmichael. The defendents, Superintendent Bottomly, all five Board members and the School District, were ordered on April 12 to "issue a permit to the plaintiffs for the use of Garfield High School Auditorium on April 19, 1967 from 7:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m."[81] While the attorneys from the Prosecutor's Office were reported to have immediately begun work on an appeal, the School District decided against pursuing the matter at that time. Later, however, after Carmichael's appearance, the Board did request the Prosecutor to appeal Judge James' decision to the State Supreme

Court. The Court would not entertain their appeal, and a motion to dismiss it was granted on June 9.[82]

The Carmichael affair was in the news at the same time as a speech by American Nazi Party leader George Lincoln Rockwell at Seattle University, and when Seattle was also reading front page accounts of such things as Dr. Martin Luther King's call for a boycott of the war in Vietnam, a civic ban on a light show planned by the Free University, and the circulation of a "Pro-hippie Petition" in the University District.[83] The School Board received communications from the public which were reasonably well balanced pro and con concerning their decision. The comments ranged from "We are behind you 100% in keeping this Carmichael out of the schools" to the feeling "that in a democracy, whether or not one agrees with what may be said, that the man, Stokely Carmichael has a right to be heard." The latter thought was the consensus of the Garfield Community Council.[84]

Other organizations which had been critical of the Board, or had asked that they rescind the denial, were the Seattle Human Rights Commission, the Council of Churches, eighteen members of the University of Washington Law School faculty and the Central Area Civil Rights Committee, whose spokesman, John Adams, called the Board's decision an "'expression of paternalism in deciding which ideas should or should not be heard.'"[85] The P-I took the District to task

editorially for using the wrong reason to arrive at the right dicision, saying:

> The attitude that every controversial speaker must be followed by someone of opposite views in a forensic balancing act is nonsensical. . . . The Board could have made a reasonable argument that a Stokely Carmichael talk isn't likely to contribute to the Educational goals of the Seattle School District.

The Times' Ross Cunningham thought that Carmichael's sponsors should be grateful to the Board, "which was wrong in judgment as well as principle," since the controversy had given Carmichael so much publicity "on which radical speakers thrive."[86]

That publicity did not include any appearances before the local press. The only interview that Carmichael granted during his visit to Seattle was with a pair of student journalists from the Madrona Elementary School newspaper. Carmichael stayed in the Montlake district home of Mr. and Mrs. John Bundy while he was in the city. When Margaret Richman wondered "if a representative of the Madrona Barker could go to a press conference with Stokely Carmichael," she called to ask Mrs. Bundy and was told that "Mr. Carmichael wasn't going to have a press conference, but Mrs. Bundy readily admitted Rodney Carter [and Margaret] to a private interview with Mr. Carmichael." The columns which they wrote afterward included information about his civil rights background and some quotes from his speech at Garfield, as well as their personal impressions from the

meeting with him. They had found him smiling and friendly.[87]

The publicity, even without a press conference, produced large audiences for him on April 19. He spoke to a crowd estimated at between 3500 and 4000 at the University of Washington that afternoon, and people began to gather for the Garfield speech just after six o'clock. By the time the doors opened at 4:45 there was already a capacity crowd. Frank Hanawalt thought that the gathering numbered around 4000, 2500 of whom heard the speech over the public address system in the gym, and several hundred were turned away. The Garfield audience was at least 20 percent white.[88]

Both speeches were familiar to those who had heard Carmichael before. He hit the press, which he said had distorted Black Power, as well as traditional civil rights integrationists and the white power structure. In the afternoon he had said "'No one is talking about the blacks taking over the country, but about taking over our own communities.'" He said that the civil rights movement saw its role as liaison between

> . . . the powerful white community and the powerless black. Its posture was that of a dependent, a supplicant.
>
> It tended to maintain the traditional dependence of the blacks, to make the white community accessible to "selected black people."

As more blacks became acceptable (if integration were accomplished) there would be no black community. "'What must be abolished is not the black community, but the

dependent, colonial status forced upon it.'"[89] He told the crowd at Garfield that

> "White people assume they can give freedom, but nobody gives freedom. They can only deny it. We are all born free. We are enslaved by institutionalized racism. Our fight is to civilize white America."[90]

Although his main emphasis that evening was on racial pride, he jabbed at civil rights moderates again, saying, "'Integration is meaningful only to a small chosen class--the fight is against white supremacy and that's where the fight always has been.'" It was observed that no generation gap existed in the crowd's response. Middle-aged blacks as well as youth cheered his chastising of "white hunkies."[91]

The crowd at Garfield was described as being, in the main, "thoughtfully attentive." They were not curiosity seekers or a crowd "eager to have their emotions set on fire." Carmichael's greatest audience response was to the humor with which he interlaced "his acid castigation of the white power structure." Superintendent Bottomly, who was there that evening, later called the speech "a powerful thing," and, while he could "not blame him for what happened later . . . [thought Carmichael] symbolized a change in a lot of the young black people." Their response was to challenge and push, causing turmoil. Ed Banks, a highly respected leader in the black community, said that Carmichael "didn't raise any converts here,"

that the effect of his speech was to "solidify a group already here--those 'Amen brothers' who were already disenchanted with the schools."[92]

Even though their spokesman, John Adams, had criticized the School Board's denial of the use of the Garfield auditorium, the civil rights leaders who made up the Central Area Civil Rights Committee took a neutral stance on Carmichael's appearance in Seattle. They did so, in the words of Walter Hundley,

> Because we expected precisely what happened . . . kids get turned on with rhetoric. Stokely Carmichael was like one of those rock groups . . . that's what they wanted to hear. And there was no way we "old heads" could tell them, "Man, that's rhetoric!" Some of it was good . . . for a black person the kids respected to tell them that they are somebody, to stand up for themselves--this was good. Because you don't know, unless you've been there--how little black people felt about themselves. Even what we might consider successful black people really, in their heart of hearts, felt they were inferior--because they had been taught that for generations. And to get a ringing message that "Hey! That ain't so!"--is good. And I must admit that the Carmichaels got that portion of the message over much more strongly than our organizations had been able to do. Even though as early as Du Bois we had been trying to say that . . . [but he] put it across to the kids. That's good. But the rest of it was [nonsense]. So the kids wandered around defiantly . . . instead of taking the whole message and working as hard on achievement.

They had known that his appearance would "be kind of a set-back for integrationists."[93] It did mark the beginning of the split in Seattle between integrationists and

separatists, a split which had considerable impact on the course of school desegregation.

A week before Carmichael's speech, civil rights leaders had again proposed Central Area school closures and the dispersal of students city-wide. At the first meeting which the Committee of 100 had held since December, John Adams suggested closing Garfield and Washington Junior High "as among possible interim de facto school segregation solutions until education centers are built in Seattle." This time he suggested the possibility of creating a special school at Garfield, along the lines of the Bronx High School of Science in New York City, and he reminded them of the possible use of that building for a community college. He also told the committee that the Beacon Hill site proposed for a first Continuous Progress Center was in the path of black migration in the city, and that he suspected that in four or five years "'you will have a segregated continuous progress center.'"[94]

The future of Garfield as a community high school became a major concern in the Central Area, and a major puzzle for the School District. It was a focal point in the split between integrationists and separatists and in the movement for "local control" which gathered momentum the following year.

In the wake of the Carmichael speech, Superintendent Bottomly continued his efforts to find educationally sound

solutions to the problems of segregated schools, while waiting for the Committee report on the Continuous Progress Centers. Cooperation between the District and the Central Area Motivation Program continued. Although the District was not able to fund CAMP's After-school Study Center Program, the Superintendent considered it important, and he wanted the District to "cooperate and help in kind." He instructed the evaluation department to monitor closely the progress of the children in the transfer programs, especially "the mandatory program begun a year and a half ago." He was concerned about Garfield, and when Miss Luella Hart retired that spring he asked her (she and Frank Hanawalt had spearheaded the earliest five-week student exchanges in 1961) to share her thoughts, ideas and recommendations "for improvement of communication, . . . faculty morale, [and] . . . instructional programming" at that school. He maintained the Friday afternoon standing appointment with Robert Williams, and Williams was part of frequent meetings with civil rights leaders in Bottomly's office during the month of May.[95]

One such meeting, on May 17, preceeded comments in the press by the CACRC's spokesman John Adams. That group "reaffirmed its committment to integrated education but warned of another possible school boycott." They planned to deal with the boycott question at a public meeting later that week, which they had called partially because

" the progress toward integrated education has been slower than the growth of the problem of segregated schools. " The committee "was concerned about 'racial isolation' because of the 'talk over making central-area schools black from principals to pupils.'" Adams indicated that the civil rights committee favored the educational park idea.*[96]

That community meeting, on the 19th, drew about 100 people to the First A.M.E. Church. The main speaker was California Assemblyman Willie Brown, who told the gathering that the United States, excepting the South,

> did not comprehend fully the United States Supreme Court school-desegregation decision . . . [and that] Southern techniques to avoid the decision were 'crude,' compared with the sophisticated tactics of northern cities and which also 'apparently the city of Seattle uses.'[97]

Local civil rights leaders then leveled some specifics, with Walter Hundley telling them, "'A year after the boycott we are worse off than we were before. . . . That's not emotion--that's statistics.'" He and John Adams indicated civil rights support for Continuous Progress Centers, and criticized "formation of the [100-member] citizens' group as a way for the School Board to avoid its

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*The group was also critical of the University of Washington "because of 'the lack of leadership of its School of Education' on the problem of segregation and the failure of the administration to integrate the faculty."

responsibility." Adams said that, in June,

> . . . when the committee of 100 makes its report . . . [sic] and it is either negative or wish-washy, we will brace up and gear our community, or organizations, so we can proceed as school opens to demonstrate the massiveness of our discontent as to what is happening in education and its effect on our children.

They did allow that two positive elements had followed from the previous boycott--the appointment of "a Negro assistant to the superintendent . . . who reports directly to Dr. Forbes Bottomly," and the establishment of the Levine Fund for VRT student transportation.[98]

The Levine Fund, while falling far short of the visualized goal of 100,000 dollars, did provide help for 183 pupils in the Voluntary Racial Transfer Program, which still utilized regular transit bus routes for students. As of June 21, 1967, the District had received 8,000 dolars from the fund. There was no state reimbursement for the funds disbursed during the 1966-67 school year, but action taken in the 1967 legislative session provided for monthly transportation reimbursement to the District beginning in July, 1967.[99]

The Continuous Progress Center proposal offered the School District an innovative option for correcting racial imbalance and improving learning climate. It gave the city an issue for debate which would figure heavily in the coming School Board election. But, even as the Board

waited for the Committee of 100's recommendations on the centers, the District could not stand still. The Administration continued to put major effort into improving and enlarging the Voluntary Racial Transfer Program. The promise of public funding of transportation, long sought by the District, renewed optimism about that program's effectiveness.

Reaction to the District's expansion of the program of mandatory reassignment of students from over-crowded schools in the Central Area resulted in the formation of Save Our Neighborhood Schools. That group, the first to openly oppose such transfers, also offered the primary opposition to Continuous Progress Centers. As opposition grew more open in the rest of the city, the Central Area, too, was experiencing changing attitudes. A budding Black Power element there was to add to the District's difficulties in schools where conditions were beginning to decline.

CHAPTER VIII

CONTINUOUS PROGRESS--CONTINUOUS CONTROVERSY

In the early summer of 1967, Seattle took stock of its race relations. The Human Rights Commission's annual report to the mayor warned that housing and educational problems appeared to be growing faster than solutions to them. The P-I spoke editorially of the "Tragedy of Black Power," saying that the idea of racial separatism in Seattle could "be traced to [Stokely] Carmichael's recent visit," and that it had so far manitself primarily in reference to the public schools. The Seattle Chapter of SNCC called for more black teachers and counsellors as well as a black principal for Garfield and for ". . . an end to the bussing of 'black children' to white districts." Superintendent Bottomly and Board member Swain were invited to a lunch hosted by Kenneth Fisher on June 13 "to talk about some problems of major importance to our community, with particular reference to our central district and our minority citizens." The list of others invited is a virtual "who's who" from business, industry, clergy, press and civil rights organizations.[1]

In May, Dr. Tidwell, who was then Board President,

had given an important speech regarding policy toward desegregation. His theme was "The Need to Move Ahead," and the speech was made to a gathering of 650 parents, volunteers and staff of the Head Start Program. It was, in effect, a call for community support for some old, some revised and some new directions. He reaffirmed the Board's "determination to move steadfastly toward ending de facto segregation," with the Voluntary Racial Transfer Program as a leading tool. The VRT was to be increased to reduce the enrollment and stabilize Garfield in the coming school year, with a major effort being made to encourage white "reverse" transfers into the school. He said the District would continue and increase its other operations (both mandatory and voluntary) transferring children out of overcrowded Central Area schools. What set the speech apart from other District statements was Dr. Tidwell's indication, in the midst of the continuous progress centers debate, that the Board was not unwilling to take some fairly drastic steps. He said,

> In succeeding years the Board will take further steps to attain and maintain an educationally sound racial balance [in the schools]. . . . I would call to your attention that, for various reasons the School Board has in the past closed schools and changed boundaries. (Emphasis added.) All steps will be carefully planned and executed to assure that there will be no less of educational opportunity for any child.[2]

The Times turned to that paragraph for its front page heading: "Some Schools May Be Closed to Attain 'Racial Balance.'"[3]

The response to Tidwell's remarks was not long in coming. However, the volume of mail was not as heavy as it had been on other occasions. The communications came from a wide geographical area and were overwhelmingly negative. Alfred Schweppe, prominent attorney, expressed his concern that "the intellectual excellence in education not be diminished through efforts to achieve social reforms." A resident of the Shoreline School District wrote that the news had "alarmed [him] as it should every taxpayer in Seattle." Mothers threatened to move from the city or to place children in private schools. A North End businessman asked Dr. Tidwell, "Why don't you do good bleeding hearts crawl back into the woodwork you came out of," and he took it upon himself to speak for everyone when he added, "The American public has always been distrustful of the intellectual egg heads who don't live in a competitive atmosphere, and who do no work but lots of theorizing." Another writer declared in a letter to the Board President:

> Your intentions may please 15,000 to 20,000 niggers, do gooders and educated dunces, but it certainly will not be acceptable to the majority of the honest, working taxpayers. . . .
> The taxpayers of this state have

> reached their limit, as they are tired of being taxed to death to support the ever increasing numbers of trash, prostitutes, their offsprings and niggers.[sic]

The School Board announced no school closures at that point, but the administration did direct more attention to the VRT.[4]

Superintendent Bottomly asked the Council of Churches for its help in encouraging white transfers into the Central Area. Early in that effort he hoped for 100 to 150 reverse transfers, with "perhaps 300 out," and he knew that they would need a "strong campaign." The District had the assurance of help from the leaders of CAMP and NAACP, but at that point the response of the Central Area community was uncertain. Black students were less inclined to accept Reverend Adams' idea for closing Garfield and moving them out. One senior said, " If he really wants to do something for us . . . why doesn't he go out and bring the white students into Garfield?"[5]

The stepped up campaign for transfer students produced a total of 1,775 for the 1967-68 school year, an increase of 581. The largest increase was at the elementary level. There were eighty-four transfers into Garfield. Nine of the white transfers were from suburban school districts--Highline, Issaquah, Lake Washington, Northshore and Shoreline.[6]

The reverse transfer at Garfield led the Times to see a ". . . tentative but encouraging sign that Seattle's voluntary racial transfer program [was] beginning to make itself felt." It shared the School Board's hope that the VRT could soon produce a 50-50 ratio at Garfield and elsewhere "where racial imbalance [continued] to create an unsatisfactory academic and social climate." The Times acknowledged the free bus transportation that fall as an important factor, but felt that much credit for the increased numbers must go to civil rights groups' promotion in the Central Area and to church organizations in the recruiting of reverse transfers.[7]

The larger exodus of VRT students from the Central Area necessitated adding portables at receiving schools. Sand Point School had never had portables, and some of the parents there objected "to having some of their children in a portable to make room for additional transfers." The school had received twenty-nine children from Harrison the year before, and they were to be joined by twenty-two more from Harrison as well as thirteen new transfers from Madrona. One Sand Point mother was quoted as saying, "'I have never objected before when they were using the capacity of the school, but I do when they bring in a portable.'" Dr. Tidwell held firm on

the Board's position when he said, "'The Board is going to go ahead to do everything it can to eliminate de facto segregation. . . . If a parent wants his child out of the central district, we certainly are going to accommodate him.'"[8]

Planning for fuller utilization of the voluntary transfer program had begun soon after the arrival in January, 1967, of Robert Williams to head and upgrade the District's Intergroup Relations Department. The movement of black VRT students back to their Central Area "sending" schools became a District concern in March. During the previous school year (1966-67) twenty-one students had returned to their leaving schools. It was realized that if this occurred "in a significant number of cases, the objectives of the transfer program will be diluted." The District was still operating under the somewhat vague transfer policies which had always prevailed (as amended August 28, 1963), and in an attempt to stem any tide of returning VRT pupils, it was recommended that all receiving schools become the "home schools" of transfer students. Any contemplated transfer back must then be submitted to an assistant superintendent and the Intergroup Relations Department could begin to keep case records on all such transfers. There was emphasis on closer liaison between central

administration and all schools involved.[9]

There appears to have been a need for stronger direction and tighter central coordination and control for the VRT. Northeast Area principals had complained about inequities in resources available to receiving schools,* and they were told in terms which, for Bottomly, were rather sharp,

> The matter of equity is always debatable and your ideas are welcome. . . . However, the transfer program will not be discontinued, and should it be impossible for additional resources to be allocated to your school we shall expect you to accept all children and to provide the best type of education possible with the resources available.

A month later he did, however, allot thirty thousand dollars for compensatory measures in receiving schools.[10] On another occasion, as the District actively sought more volunteers, he centralized evaluation and decision making in regard to availability of space in receiving schools and told his deputy, Fred Breit, "I don't think we can any longer ask principals how much space they have, or how many Negro children they might want to take."[11]

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*The need for compensatory programs for transferring students was a major concern of parent groups in sending schools (e.g. Madrona PTA). The problem of Federal Title I funds not "following" the disadvantaged students remained a major complaint of parents and staffs in receiving schools.

The reception of black students in predominantly white schools had been a special concern to Central Area parents and civil rights leaders since the beginning of the VRT. In July, 1967, the Intergroup Relations office, following a recommendation from CAMP, proposed employing Central Area residents as Home-School Aides to provide support for transfer students and ease their transition to new schools. Not only would the aide program provide the children with an adult in the receiving school who was familiar to them, their parents and their home neighborhood, it would be a closer liaison betwen parents and schools which could help forestall problems. Better communication would give Central Area families closer identification with receiving schools, and the School District saw also that the presence of an aide would perform the important service of "acquaint[ing] receiving school personnel with the dynamics of the Central Area."[12]

There had always been problems in connection with the VRT, the most notable being the very tangible matter of transportation. The more intangible problems contributed to the increasing Central Area resistance to transferring which began in 1967 while the total number of transfer students was growing.

In her position as Community Liaison, Roberta Byrd Barr was involved in recruiting Central Area VRT students,

but she felt ambivalent about it even in the program's early years. She later said of the program, "it was a one-sided deal . . . [and blacks] paid an extremely high price." She was then also essentially a district-wide "trouble shooter" for the VRT. She was called to receiving schools where black students were having trouble, where sorting out the details of each incident "had to run the gamut of everyone's perception." Her own perception was that "a lot of the trouble originated on the bus--the kids arrived at school angry."[13]

Even though state reimbursement for transportation began in the fall of 1967, VRT students still used regular transit busses on routes which, for many, meant rides of longer than an hour and transferring at least once.

In order to be at school on time, transfer students had to catch a transit bus at a very early hour, and some parents were especially anxious about their daughters leaving home before daylight. At the end of the day, the four o'clock expiration time for their school bus passes eliminated any opportunity for after school activity, and the length of travel time put them home too late to be involved there.[14]

In December, Robert Williams told Bottomly that the kinds of situations which produced angry students at school had caused parents of some junior high students to

meet "with C.O.R.E. in an effort to start a movement to get all junior and senior high transfer students to return to central area schools." CORE initially rejected supporting that effort provided the District took action to "eliminate the core cause of the problem at the junior high level." The District did not want to jeopardize the VRT by losing 346 junior high students, a significant increase over the previous year's total of 178. Williams moved quickly to request that charter bus service be arranged for junior high transfer students.[15] There was more at stake in the matter than the possible loss of some transfer students, however. There were the safety, morale and conduct of the students, and the public perception of the School District and its transfer program--not to mention the general state of Seatle's race relations.

The increased number of students created more problems on the buses and the District received fifty-four complaints of student conduct reported to Seattle Transit that fall by drivers or patrons. The manager of the Kress store at Third and Pine had complained a number of times about the "negative behavior" of some of the students who waited there to transfer and congregated in the store's entrance.[16]

For their part, the students reported that some bus

drivers and adult passengers were rude and prejudiced in their relationships with the black teenagers. They were aware of being treated differently from white students on the busses, and they resented being rebuked and criticized as a group for the acts of a few.

> Students reported that Caucasian students who board the bus at school and depart at points in the North End leave as much trash on the bus as they do, but since they are the only students still on the bus when it arrives downtown at the transfer point the drivers demand that they clean up the bus. In some cases where students refuse, their passes are taken away by the drivers and poor conduct reports are sent to the school. If they refuse to give up their passes an inspector is called. The bus is delayed. . . . Everyone involved becomes tense and angry and in a few instances the police have been called. This usually occurs at a busy downtown intersection with the public as the observer. . . .[17]

One such incident in December resulted in the arrest of three students. There were, as usual, conflicting reports, but apparently the bus driver "locked the doors and refused to let them off the bus until they cleaned it," and a struggle erupted when one of the students broke the glass to the emergency exit box. A Juvenile Court hearing was set for December 7, with the students represented by NAACP attorneys.[18] The outcome of the hearing was not apparent, but beginning on January 22, 1968, the School District provided charter bus service for junior high transfers.[19]

Voluntary transfer was still the only thing which the School District acknowledged as being employed specifically to desegregate the schools. Even as the battle over continuous progress centers entered its later stages in the fall of 1967, the Superintendent was insisting, community perception to the contrary, that

> The purpose of the center is not to bring about integration. It will do this only as an added benefit. The purpose is to bring about modern education in the most efficient way possible or at least in as efficient a manner as we can determine through our feasibility studies.[20]

Whatever its purpose, the continuous progress center concept was contested every step of the way by the Save Our Schools group. In February, 1967, they tried to raise funds to defray legal costs incurred when they intervened in the suit brought by the NAACP to close some Central Area schools. Mrs. Elliott Carlson, SOS co-chairman, explained that their attorney, Russell Austin, had "worked largely without compensation 'as a labor of love' for the Negro parents involved," and in order to pay him they placed classified ads in both daily newspapers appealing for funds.[21] Judge Lindberg had still not ruled on the SOS intervention and that suit was still pending in May, when SOS called for the return of petitions which they had circulated to secure support for retaining neighborhood schools. Mrs. Carlson reported

then that the response to its fund drive had been "overwhelming." The petitions, with more than 5,000 signatures, were presented to the School Board on May 29. At that time Mrs. Carlson told the Board again that her group was disappointed that opponents of the centers were "'repeatedly denied seats' on the citizens' committee," and she announced that SOS was eager to provide speakers for any groups interested in the centers controversy.[22] The School Board Secretary acknowledged receipt of the petitions and pointed out to Mrs. Carlson that they contained some signatures of residents outside the Seattle School District.[23]

In June, another group joined the battle. Citizens for Quality Education (CQE) formed "'to generate public enthusiasm about advancing contemporary concepts of education' in Seattle." Chairman of the organization was Dr. August Swanson, Associate Dean of the University of Washington Medical School, and its vice-chairman was Herman Siqueland, a Seattle attorney. One of the group's first announced undertakings was to evaluate and respond to the Committee of 100's report on the continuous progress center concept. They were convinced that there was support in the city for this kind of educational approach, and Swanson said, "'these people need to make their voices heard. . . . Too often questions concerning change

in approach to education result only in reaction and criticism.'"[24]

CQE also intended to evaluate and support School Board candidates who favored the group's goals. This political element was somewhat in contrast to the political stance which SOS had professed up to that time. When Mrs. Carlson had presented the SOS petitions to the Board she stated that it had never been their intention "'to threaten the school administration with withdrawal of our support, but only to make them aware of the broad community disapproval [of the centers] . . . and of any attempt . . . to implement such a radical educational change without first submitting it to public referendum.'"[25]

Superintendent Bottomly was happy to have the support of the new group, and he arranged for them to have consultative help. He was politically pragmatic in wanting Dr. Swanson to know that there was "no need for them [CQE] to support the centers--only the continuous progress concept."[26]

CQE's first public meeting was held June 21, 1967, at the University Congregational Church. Bottomly spoke to the gathering of about 150, telling them, among other things, that the School District "'should move as rapidly as possible into the new basic curriculums, . . .

[and urging] broadly meaningful racial integration.'" In what must have been a surprise to the meeting's sponsors, Professor W. M. Schubert challenged the Superintendent to a public debate. Schubert had joined SOS's Veda Jellen in speaking against the centers, although he was not himself a member of that group. Bottomly was happy to accept the challenge, but said he wanted "'to wait until the (citizens) committee makes its report.'"[27]

The Times thought such a debate would be a good thing. Editorially they felt that the Continuous Progress Center Proposal needed "more airing," and that it was not as well understood as it should be.[28] After learning of the Committee's recommendations, the Times warned that Seattle citizens would

> . . . be well-advised to be close listeners, if not active participants, in the public discussions of the controversial continuous-progress-learning-center concept of education which has received a favorable recommendation from a majority of the committee established to judge the plan. . . . [It calls] for a drastic revision of the Seattle public school system . . . [one which] would substantially eliminate the neighborhood school concept which, until Dr. Bottomly proposed the substitute plan, had been widely acclaimed by most parents and teachers alike [although it was] by no means sacrosanct. . . . A secondary effect of the proposal would fit hand-in-glove with the furtherance of racial integration . . . because there would be intermingling of pupils from different sections of the city.

Having said all that, they hoped everyone would keep an

open mind and that public discussions would "be on an intelligent plan devoid of over simplification and emotional cliches"; and, for their part, they would offer no opinion until hearing further detailed debate.[29]

The Committee of 100 held its final meeting on July 24, and voted on recommendations to be taken to the School Board. That five-hour meeting was a fairly stormy session, and the final vote which approved recommending that a continuous progress center be built created dissension within the Committee. A minority of the Committee objected strenuously to parliamentary procedures which had prevented separating the issues so that it would have been possible to vote in favor of continuous progress teaching methods while opposing the centers. The dissenting group also publicly cast suspicion on the final vote, which had recommended building a center by a vote of 39 to 19, with one abstention.[30]

The dissenters issued a "Minority Statement" which underlined the results of the Committee vote and pointed out that "only 58 of the original 114 members voted [and] those in favor did not constitute a majority of the original committee."[31] This became such a point of contention with the centers' opponents that the School District felt impelled to clarify the matter publicly. It was reported that of the 114 people who had agreed in the

summer of 1966 to be on the committee thirteen had never attended any meetings. The remaining 101 attended through mid-December, at which time thirty-two more stopped participating. Of the sixty-nine remaining active members, eight were not at the voting session and two who were, left before the vote was taken. Of the fifty-eight ballots cast, 67 percent (39) were in favor and 33 percent (19) were opposed.[32] One of the eight absentees was R. Mort Frayn, who later wrote to Board President Tidwell,

> I was unable to be at the final meeting for a vote on the report, and for that reason there was one vote less that could have been added to the majority . . . [while parts of the plan may need re-evaluating] in the main I feel that here is an opportunity to move our educational system forward.[33]

When the report was presented to the Board on August 9, Committee Chairman Dakan presented the minority statement as well, and requested that it be given the same public consideration as the majority report. The Times printed the text of the minority statement on August 10, noting that it had published details of the majority report earlier. Dr. Tidwell accepted the report and said that before the Board made any decision, "an intensive effort would be made to inform the public about the recommendations in the report."[34]

Initial public reaction to the Committee's work followed predictable lines. Citizens for Quality Education was happy with the outcome and planned to begin soon to interview School Board candidates from a perspective favoring centers. Civil rights leaders were pleased, even though the recommendations would not solve all the problems, and John Adams said, "'I think the committee has tried to deal with education in the new reality of urbanization.'" SOS's Mrs. Carlson called for "a public vote 'for or against educational plazas.'" She said,

> It is our opinion that [with centers] racial balance would be defeated because many people do not like the Bottomly plan and would move out of the city if the plan were adopted.

She also called the report "'premature because only 39 committee members voted in favor.'"[35]

The final report of the Seattle Citizens' School Progress Planning Committee did not include a minority report. It contained excerpts from Superintendent Bottomly's original concept proposal as well as reports from the six subcommittees which had studied the proposal from the standpoints of continuous progress itself, professional staff, students, parents and the public, curriculum and facilities.

As a result of its year-long study, the Committee concluded

> . . . that the concept of continuous progress offers an opportunity to significantly improve the quality of education available to every Seattle Public School student . . . [and] that a learning center . . . would increase the effectiveness of the concept.

Although they realized that improved quality of education for Seattle students would require increased operating costs, learning centers appeared to be an efficient means of achieving improvement. So the Committee recommended

> . . . that a continuous progress learning center . . . be developed as soon as feasible. If the . . . Board concludes that the first . . . center is successful, additional continuous progress learning centers should be developed as soon as possible.[36]

As a guide line for locating the first center, the Committee recommended that the proposed Beacon Hill site "be re-examined in light of its topographical limitations, . . . improvement of racial balance, and possible location of other centers." The report spoke specifically to the matter of racial isolation, which it said then existed "in most Seattle schools." It held that reduction of racial isolation was

> . . . of vital importance at all grade levels for the general improvement of scholastic achievement of disadvantaged and minority students and for the development of mature social attitudes in all students.
>
> A long-term solution to the quest for quality education in an integrated

> environment . . . can best be accomplished through the continuous progress learning center approach.
>
> Therefore, the . . . Committee recommends . . . that continuous progress learning centers be developed as soon as feasible and that vigorous efforts be continued to extend integrated learning situations throughout the Seattle school system.[37]

The statement by the Committee's minority was fairly widely distributed. A prefatory statement in it said that "those who dissented from the [Committee's] report are in no way an organized group." Much of their objection was to the process by which the Committee had arrived at its conclusions and recommendations, especially the fact that "no meetings of the entire committee were devoted to questions and answers and discussion concerning the [completed] subcommittee reports." They also found the source of testimony to the Committee to be suspect. Their statement said that

> Eastern educators who had little prior knowledge of Seattle traveled here to discuss educational proposals and speak in support of centers. We find almost no parallel in Seattle for the problems faced in many other cities.

The heart of their dissent was in the following statement:

> We agree that continuous progress, properly implemented . . . offers an opportunity to improve significantly the quality of education available to Seattle Public School students. We do not agree that learning centers provide the only way or necessarily the best way to implement [it].[38]

Underlying that was the fact that they did not agree, either, that a learning center "on Beacon Hill, or anywhere else, constitutes the best long-term solution to the problem" of promoting better race relations. A subcommittee report had recommended a maximum of 50 percent non-white enrollment for a center, with 33 percent maximum for any racial minority group. The dissenters

> question[ed] the idea of assigning pupils to schools in accordance with some predetermined percentage of pupils of each race . . . [saying that] Although it may be possible to create a racially balanced school in this way, we think it unlikely that this would produce meaningful integration, improved race relations, or improved education. . . . We will have meaningful school integration when we have integrated neighborhoods.[39]

That last statement was strongly reminiscent of some earlier SOS pronouncements, as was the dissenters' alternative suggestion for review of the City Planning Commission's comprehensive plan. In summarizing their alternatives, they wanted to

> Make sure that the desires of minority races are known. We suggest a survey of minority race parents . . . to determine their attitudes toward bussing and other educational problems. If a large majority of parents desire bussing, there are adequate good facilities with which to bus the children. We are against the center and unnecessary bussing, <u>but we are not against integration</u>. [emphasis added]

They emphatically did "not feel that the school district

should be assigned the responsibility of social reform when it is a community problem requiring all of [its] resources."[40]

So the battle lines were drawn. The dissenting members of the Committee of 100 organized a speakers bureau to "present the opinions of 'those who feel that modern educational techniques can best be developed within the structure of Seattle's present neighborhoods.'" The School District countered a week later with an announcement that they would furnish speakers for any group interested in continuous progress centers. The dissenters received an early editorial boost from the Times, which called their report a "thought-provoking critical evaluation that raises valid questions about the asserted effectiveness of the centers . . . [they said it was] not a resort to negativism but a high level, thoughtful appraisal" which put the burden of proof on proponents of centers to show them superior to neighborhood schools.[41]

In August, 1967, the League of Women Voters sponsored three community hearings on the continuous progress center plan, as the School District made good on its promise to inform the public about the recommendations of the Committee. The format for the League meetings called for a fifteen minute explanation of the concept by the District's Dale Goss, a fifteen minute presentation of

the majority report and a ten minute statement of the minority position. Copies of both the report and the minority statement were distributed, and a thirty minute question and answer period was followed by a time for comments for the record which were limited to three minutes each.[42]

The first of the meetings, attended by more than one-hundred people, was held at Rainier Beach High School on August 22. Edith Lobe, League President, explained that the hearings were being held as "early as possible before the School Board election next month because 'the future of public schools is too important to be made a vehicle for campaign oratory.'" Even so, one candidate, Howard Schmidt, who was described in the press as the "most outspoken critic" there, indulged in some oratory, calling the centers a threat "to the integrity of teachers and the sanctity of the classroom," adding that the real issue was "state control of our lives." Statements supporting the centers were made by representatives of CQE, NAACP, the Anti-Defamation League and the Central Seattle Community Council. The record shows thirteen statements in favor of the centers and four opposed.[43]

The Times Gus Angelos had said that members of the Save Our Schools Committee were conspicuous by their absence at Rainier Beach. They were present at the second

hearing on August 25, and of the six statements opposing the centers, four were made by SOS members. That meeting drew more than 150 people to Ingraham High School in the city's Northwest section. Board members present were Tidwell, Owen, Swain and Wagoner. Wagoner was up for re-election that fall. Other candidates were present that evening also. Both Mrs. Elliott Carlson and W. M. Schubert had filed for Board positions and both spoke against the centers at that meeting. SOS's Veda Jellen was there and she urged submission of a separate bond issue for any center, which, she said, would place "'responsibility for the decision [on centers] exactly where it was constitutionally intended--in the hands of the taxpayers and parents.'" The record shows that thirteen statements were made in favor of centers. Citizens for Quality Education made a strong showing at that meeting and they drew criticism from opponents for distributing their position papers on school property.[44]

The final public hearing was at Garfield on August 30, and it, too, drew a crowd of over 150. Ten statements were recorded in favor of centers and four in opposition. The four opposing statements came from SOS's Carlson and George Marshall, Board candidate Schmidt and the wife of candidate Schubert. Before he was cut off by the three minute time limit, Schmidt spoke at length

about pride and self-improvement, saying that he was happy to be speaking at Garfield, "a school of unsurpassed school spirit and pride." He urged that emphasis not be put on "'arbitrary programs which reduce proud individuals into bus-weary, uprooted numbers in centralized schools.'" [45]

The Reverend John Adams, who spoke last, carried the evening at Garfield. Declaring that he had "been really touched by this tremendous affection for the neighborhood school," he presented petitions with 3,000 signatures of Central Area residents who wanted continuous progress centers.[46] He was interrupted by applause when he urged the School Board to start moving, and added, "'Moving on continuous-progress centers not as soon as possible and not with all deliberate speed, but, if I may borrow the next line, "with majestic instancy."'" He said he knew they were taking risks in the new centers, "'but we also know that what they've done to our children now--they've got to quit.'" He noted that 2,000 Central Area children had signed for transfer programs and said that he thought that number, plus the 3,000 signatures, showed the Central Area's interest in quality education.[47]

One of the more significant things reported out of that series of meetings was the Superintendent's flexibility on size and location of the first center. At the

Rainier Beach meeting he said he saw no reason why it couldn't be tried on a smaller scale as a pilot study, since there was "no magic" in the proposed enrollment figure of 3,000. This appears to have made little difference to those who professed opposition to centers primarily because of their size. Bottomly told the Rainier Beach gathering that in drawing up the proposal the planning department "'threw in everything they would like to have [and] You know we don't operate that way.'" Both he and Dale Goss, Director of Planning and Research, stressed that the model of a hypothetical center had been drawn for study purposes only and should now be discarded.[48] Perhaps it was too much to expect the public to deal with hypothetical proposals and abstractions.

The weekly Argus wondered somewhat the same thing in an article headed, "Bottomly Stakes Career on New Concept," asking, "Can a revolutionary idea survive the slow, grinding bureaucratic process of a democracy?"[49] When the revolutionary concept included racial integration and was taken up as the major issue in an election, the chances of survival would have appeared to be slim.

Political expediency no doubt played a part in a step sideways which the School Board took just before the election that fall. On September 6, Dr. Tidwell called a morning press conference to announce that the Board would

adopt the continuous progress concept as "an educational goal" for all schools but would not decide on building a center until further study, since they wanted to consider a pilot center on a somewhat smaller scale. Speaking for himself, Tidwell also said, "'I think I have adopted the idea of a center as well as the teaching concept.'" It was not until September 13 that "for the purpose of the record, the Board confirmed its position as given in the following statement . . . [by Tidwell] at a news conference [that the Board would] . . . make no decision on a new center until after Administration studies are completed and have been evaluated by the Board."[50]

The Times thrust Tidwell's announcement onto page one. Editorially it referred to "Schools' Well-Chosen Goal," and said the Board was wise to clarify its attitude on continuous progress and the "related but distinct proposal to develop large centers." They thought the Board's new position was sound and that it "should dispel any fears about the District's harboring "intentions of taking the system out into the wild blue yonder." The P-I editorial, on the other hand, thought the Board statement should be included in the English curriculum "as an outstanding example of ambiguous prose." While granting that more specifics were needed, they thought it reasonable to assume that Board members had already

formed an opinion on centers and that the public had a right to know their attitude before the fall election. It was the P-I's "hunch that a majority of the Board" favored centers, and, if so, they should say so and "attempt to sell the public on their soundness."[51]

The State Senate's subcommittee on Metropolitan Education had scheduled a public hearing on continuous progress centers for September 14, and had scheduled Superintendent Bottomly to testify. On September 6, again mirroring the School Board's political concern, Dr. Palmason wrote to the committee chairman, Senator Wes Uhlman, to urge him to cancel the hearing. Since the Board had issued its statement that morning clarifying its attitude toward centers, Palmason thought that the hearing would "now become irrelevant and unnecessary" and he said that Administration and Board feeling was "that your hearing can serve no useful purpose." Palmason's letter indicated just how scared the Board was running that fall. He told Uhlman,

> The timing of the hearing is extremely unfortunate since it comes just before an important primary election. . . . [It] could have deleterious effects on our November levy election as well. There have been so many distortions and half-truths it has become almost impossible to carry on a rational and meaningful dialogue. I doubt that your hearing would help to clear the air. Again I plead with you to cancel or postpone . . . [it].[52]

Uhlman was not deterred and told Palmason that, should the Board prevent Dr. Bottomly's appearing at the hearing, "the resulting political flap would bode not but ill for the Board and the administration." He assured him that the committee would be taking no position on the centers concept at that time and that he would be calling several more hearings in the near future to deal with pressing problems.[53]

. . . . . .

The School Board election that fall produced campaigns of unprecedented magnitude and intensity for Seattle. Seldom had an incumbent been challenged, even in token fashion, and since 1958, when Dr. Palmason was elected to replace James Duncan, only one election had included a contest with no incumbent. The debate over continuous progress centers was a primary ingredient in the 1967 campaign.

In July, Mrs. Owen announced that she would not run for re-election to the Board. She had served for twenty-two years, having been appointed in 1945, and had been one of only two women ever to be elected to the Board. She did not want to serve another six-year term, but she averred that she was "not retiring from education." Indeed not, since she was at that time a member of the Board of Overseers of Whitman College and President of

the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges. Mrs. Owen was a native of Walla Walla and she graduated from Whitman College with a degree in Classics. She had always been an active volunteer in civic and charitable organizations, having, for example, been a trustee of Children's Orthopedic Hospital for over thirty years and one of the first board members of Seattle Civic Unity Committee. She was no name-on-the-letterhead board member, and in 1966 she was named Outstanding Citizen of the Year by the Municipal League.[54] In an editorial at the time of her announced intention to leave the School Board, the Times called her "a pillar of intelligent strength to the . . . school system . . . [whose] wise counsel and leadership will be missed."[55]

The Times had earlier made the observation that "the developing public argument over the progress-centers issue figured in her decision to retire from the Board." Mrs. Owen took strong exception to that and said that she was "not running away from a fight."[56]

Four candidates filed for that open position on the Board (Position No. 1)--Mrs. Elliot Carlson, James A. Manning, William F. Schubert and Beverly Smith. SOS's Veda Jellen was later at a loss to explain how it was that both Carlson and Schubert filed for the same position, thus splitting the anti-centers vote. Manning, a

former junior high school science teacher, who was then an educational marketing representative for IBM, did not oppose the centers and he said, "gradual growth toward a center is a logical step in education."[57]

Beverly Smith, a Seattle native who had been active in the upper echelons of the Seattle PTA Council and had chaired the Citizens' Levy Committee, was then Assistant Director of the Washington State Nurses Association. As late as the August 25 hearing at Ingraham High School, she remained non-commital on the matter of continuous progress centers. Two days before the primary in September she was reported as generally supporting the idea of studying a scaled-down pilot center, saying "'more research is needed.'" On the eve of the primary, in what was surely an unprecedented move by a School Board member, Mrs. Owen endorsed Smith. She did so because of her concern that emotionalism generated by the centers controversy would cause the public to "overlook that a school-board member must exercise jundment in many other areas." She had known Beverly Smith through her PTA and levy activities and had considered her both capable and admirable.[58]

The race for Position No. 2 on the Board drew two candidates in addition to David Wagoner, the incumbent. Both men were opposed to continuous progress centers.

Howard Schmidt, a social studies teacher at Bellevue's Sammamish High School, had spoken against the centers at the League of Women Voters hearings in August. Roscoe Hildebrandt, a civil and structural engineer, filed in order to oppose the centers. He knew some of the dissenting members of the Committee of 100, and Robert O. Phillips, who wrote their Minority Statement, had offered to be his campaign manager. By the time of the primary, Wagoner's position was that of the Board as set forth in Dr. Tidwell's statement to the press on September 6,[59] namely that continuous progress was an "educational goal" for schools but that further study was needed before deciding whether to build a center.

For that campaign the candidate organizations were better organized than the usual loose coalition of friends and neighbors which had sufficed in the past. Every effort was made to give the candidates public exposure at candidate nights and coffee hours. Municipal League candidate evaluations were always influential in city elections and that election was no exception. The The ratings for School Board Position No. 1 were "average candidate" for Carlson, Manning and Schubert and "above-average candidate" for Smith. The Position No. 2 candidate ratings were "below-average candidate" for Schmidt, "average candidate" for Hildebrandt and

"superior incumbent" for Wagoner.[60]

The results of the elections were seen as a decisive vote of confidence for the School Board, but not necessarily for continuous progress centers, since neither winner had campaigned as an outspoken centers advocate. Beverly Smith polled 29,276 votes to a combined total of 20,393 for her opponents. Her nearest challenger was Schubert with 8,533 votes. Wagoner's 29,845 vote total bested his combined opposition by 12,971. Their showing in the primary was tantamount to election since any candidate garnering fifty-one percent of the vote appeared unopposed on the November general election ballot.

As the year wore on toward their promised date of decision in January, the Board received a few more endorsements of continuous progress centers. Groups on record in support were the Seattle YWCA, the Seattle Human Rights Commission, the Seattle Principals' Association and the executive board of the Seattle Teachers Association. The principals' resolution hedged only slightly in its conclusion that they would "vigorously support the Seattle School Board in any decision it may make regarding continuous progress centers which represents a bold and vigorous step into the future."[62]

. . . . . .

During the summer, while most attention was on the

Committee of 100 and the debate over continuous progress centers, two things had occurred in the Central Area to further embroil the School District in desegregation politics. The first of these concerned the principal of Meany Junior High, Carl Barbo, and the other involved Frank Hanawalt, principal of Garfield High School.

The Meany episode might best be introduced by mixing metaphors. It was something of a tempset in a teapot, but where there's smoke there's fire. In the final analysis, it was of no lasting significance in the course of desegregating Seattle's schools. However, it does illustrate the deep and lasting concern of Central Area citizens and the frustration which they experienced in trying to move the administrative bureaucracy to productive action.

In February, 1966, almost eighteen months earlier, the Education Committee of the Central Seattle Community Council (CSCC)* had written to the Superintendent that there were serious community relations problems at Meany. They sent details of the situation to Assistant Superintendent Jack Greaves, and in April, 1966, asked to meet

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*The Central Seattle Community Council was an integrated organization of representatives from nineteen individual community councils in the area, which had a combined total of over one thousand members.

with him in the near future. They received no reply. Since his earliest months in Seattle, Bottomly had been aware of concern about the situation at Meany. From time to time during 1966 he heard from patrons and community leaders, including one who requested to see him on October 17 because she was "terribly concerned about what is going on at Meany."[63]

The Community Council had received complaints from Meany parents, both black and white, who focused on the principal's office where a more sensitive person was wanted. Carl Barbo was said to have a "very short fuse," saying things to parents and children which, at best, were not tactful. The education committee of CSCC kept an anecdotal record of the principal's actions, and this was included in the material sent to the District. They resurrected the issue with the Superintendent in March, 1967, and secured a meeting with Greaves on April 10. They came away from that meeting with the impression that nothing could or would be done about the administration at Meany.[64]

The education committee met on June 10 and made their file of Meany correspondence available to a reporter from the P-I. Although only four of the specific instances cited by the committee had concerned race relations, the newspaper ran an article on July 2 under the

heading: "Discrimination Charged at Meany." Coming during the summer, in the lull before the full storm of the continuous progress centers issue, the Meany story was given prolonged attention in the press, and on July 5 the Seattle Human Relations Commission began an investigation into the matter.[65]

At that hearing, Reverend Samuel McKinney said that civil rights leaders had been telling the School District that Central Area principals were building empires, and he added, "'Some of these schools may have fancy programs on the surface, but these principals are trying to build their private fiefs and keep the peasants locked in.'" Ed Banks, a CSCC leader, stressed that in making a change at Meany, the race of any new principal was not the issue, and he said they were trying to build the system up, not tear it down--"'What we're afraid of is a riot up there.'" Others of the committee said they did not believe that the School District discriminated as a matter of policy, but simply allowed it to happen. The School District presented its case to the Commission on July 10. The Superintendent's five-page report on Meany detailed all of the District's programs and efforts at the school, and ended with an invitation for the Commission to visit Meany when school opened in the fall.[66]

In the meantime, the Meany faculty reacted angrily.

In a letter to the Board, signed by forty-eight faculty members, they called the matter a "flagrant attack on the entire faculty and . . . a degree of racism on the part of" the Community Council. They asked for a full investigation of the matter, and they were immediately supported in this by the Times, whose editorial also insisted that such an investigation should be carried out by the School Board, not the Human Rights Commission.[67]

That editorial also referred to "assertions that willful segregation has been practiced in Meany's lunchroom and classrooms." This caused the Community Council to remind the Superintendent that they had at no time charged "willful segregation," and that their complaints had been "distorted beyond belief." Bottomly, in turn, told them that the District Administration had"certainly found itself in an impossible situation as a result of the publicity given to the charges," adding that they were "attempting very carefully to work out some sensitive problems at that particular time."[68]

Among those sensitive problems was the transfer of Barbo. It was announced on July 10 that he was being transferred to Thompson Junior High, but the Superintendent insisted that this "had been decided long before the present complaints were made public." The press also reported, along with the transfer, that a black principal

was being sought as a replacement at Meany.[69]

Had the School District told CSCC at their meeting on April 10 that a change in leadership was contemplated for Meany, there is little likelihood that the matter would ever have reached the press. As committee representatives said in their appearance before the Human Rights Commission, they had made their complaints public as "'an act of desperation' after two years of attempting to get the administration to make changes."[70]

The Human Rights Commission met on July 18 and concluded that because some of the charges were "long outdated, there appears little point in further investigation of them. [However,] There will be continued interest in current charges." The Commission also stated its intention to accept the District's invitation for first-hand observation in the fall.[71]

A well-publicized attempt to oust Frank Hanawalt from the Garfield principalship in August was an opening salvo in a Central Area political struggle. The lines were quickly drawn, and at that stage major community sentiment was with Hanawalt.

The group which called for his replacement was the Central Area Committee for Peace and Improvement (CAPI), whose chairman was Les McIntosh. CAPI claimed about ninety members on August 10, and was described by the

Times as "almost all new faces to the civil-rights scene and mostly between the ages of 20 and 30." A week later they claimed 160 members. It had evolved very quickly from a group of about twelve young adults who had called themselves the Grass Roots Committee and had met with Governor Dan Evans when he had visited a restless Central Area earlier in August seeking recommendations for community improvements. The smaller group was short-lived, and CAPI moved in to support its general position. McIntosh insisted that his group was nor formed to undermine present civil rights leadership. He called it a "'young Turk' organization--one of progressive and positive militancy . . . which 'recogniz[ed] some of the realities of the civil-rights movement.'" They embraced black power but did not consider violence as a means of achieving it.[72]

Reverend Samuel McKinney was not convinced by CAPI's disclaimer of intention to challenge the established leadership. He was a leading defender of Hanawalt, saying that students felt they could take legitimate problems to Hanawalt and get some response while they felt "'stymied by underlings.'" McKinney put the Garfield controversy in a broader context, pointing out that there were other issues involved which the community needed to face. "Namely, who does represent us in the area of

civil rights." He granted that the newer, younger activists had a legitimate right to speak, but he said, "'I fear they have fallen for the oldest trick in the white man's arsenal: Divide and conquer.'"[73]

One of the first things CAPI did was to draw up a list of proposals for the School Board. The first proposal was to replace Frank Hanawalt "with an administrator approved by the committee," followed by that to add minority history to the curriculum of every school in the city. There were eight proposals in all, among which were those to add more black teachers, counselors and administrators; to start a program to help teachers deal better with Central Area problems; and to change student suspension regulations.[74]

Reaction to the Hanawalt replacement proposal was immediate. Times articles had headings such as "Anti Hanawalt Attitude Shocks Many at Garfield," and "Hanawalt Backers Say His Critics are 'Unrepresentative.'" There was organized support for him among recent Garfield graduates in the community, and the Garfield faculty came to his defense at a summer meeting called specifically for the purpose. Mrs. Freddie Braxton, a black teacher who was instrumental in organizing the special faculty meeting, said, "[I] would work for Frank anywhere," and she added that it would be a step backward to attempt to make

Garfield all black. The School District received an immediate flow of communications backing the principal. They came not only from individuals but from groups such as CAMP, the Seattle Human Rights Commission, the National Council of Negro Women, the Capitol Hill Lions Club, the Garfield Community Council, CSCC,[75] and even from the Seattle chapter of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee. SNCC Chairman Carl Miller said they were convinced that Hanawalt "'does have the best interest of the Negro student at heart,' and added that the Garfield principal had not only added Afro-American history, but 'shook up the whole history course.'"[76]

Ultimately, even CAPI urged community-wide support for Hanawalt, "but only for as long as there are results." A meeting between CAPI and the School Board apparently produced the change in the group's stand. Both McIntosh and Board President Tidwell said the meeting was "fruitful," and Tidwell said that it was the first time they had "'heard specific problems in this way.'"[77] It would not be the last.

The School District became much more involved in the community, working with groups such as CAMP in programs for Central Area youngsters "developed during the summer of 1967 to help alleviate tense and unforeseen conditions." This sort of cooperation continued after school started

and in December Superintendent Bottomly sought to authorize free use of the Garfield gym by the Central Area Youth Association (CAYA), even if it required Board action. He felt that "the situation in the Central Area requires that these schools be, as fully as possible, community use schools." In August the District had opened its own Central Area Reception Center for families new to Seattle. It provided counselling services and school orientation information which included an explanation of the Voluntary Racial Transfer Program.[78]

Black Power seeds planted in April began to sprout at Garfield that fall. The leaders of a group promoting a Black Power assembly for the school said that "too many of us are walking around the halls of Garfield . . . NOT knowing what's going on in the Black Rebellion," and they circulated a petition "in order to show Mr. Hanawalt and the school board that this assembly is wanted and demanded by the Black student." The student-planned assembly was held on Friday, December 15, with speakers representing three militant groups from the University of Washington. The students also heard Roberta Byrd Barr who offered alternative ideas and suggestions for discussion sessions which followed the all-school gathering. Carl Miller spoke for SNCC, Robbie Stern for the University District Movement, and Bernie Yang for Students for

a Democratic Society. All three of them covered a wide range of social issues from a black power perspective, but, from the school's standpoint, the most destructive note probably was struck by Miller who said of Garfield, "'It's a slum school' . . . 'Quit kidding yourselves. They've been telling you Garfield's great, Garfield's great. It isn't.'"[79]

Bottomly was aware of mounting tensions at Garfield that fall and he told a friend, "We are going to have continuous problems as the battle for the young Negro minds continues because of the lure of black power." In November he asked Ed Banks to take the lead in working out the composition of a Community Advisory Committee for Garfield to work with Hanawalt. He wanted the committee to include representatives from all Central Area factions and elements, including the Caucasian since forty percent of the Garfield student body was white.[80]

. . . . . .

Garfield had come on troubled times by the end of 1967. Even so, by fall the number of white transfers into the school had risen. The Voluntary Racial Transfer program had shown an increase in the number of students at all levels. At the same time, resistance grew among Central Area parents to the idea of volunteering their children, and some had even spearheaded a move to return

children to their home schools. While Dr. Tidwell had alluded to possible further school closures and dispersal of black pupils, forces in the Central Area were beginning to call for an end to that sort of one-way bussing. There would soon be growing talk of the desirability of all-black schools.

The city had become embroiled in the debate over Continuous Progress Centers, which had mixed the matters of educational innovation and racial integration. The debate had succeeded in politicizing a School Board election to a far greater degree than had been the case previously in Seattle. The entire city had been exposed to desegregation dialogue, and vocal and organized opposition had developed. Not only did the School District have this new element to contend with, the Superintendent would soon be trying to find some sort of consensus on Central Area schools, and in the year to come the national trend toward decentralization and community control of schools would reach Seattle.

CHAPTER IX

DESEGREGATED MIDDLE SCHOOLS

The formation of the Garfield Citizens Advisory Committee came too late to enable its members to work with Frank Hanawalt. At one of its earliest meetings (January 29, 1968) he announced his resignation as Garfield's principal. Superintendent Bottomly had seen CAPI's attempt to oust him the previous summer as a symbolic statement to the effect that "Garfield is more or less a black school--give it a black principal." He was sure that most Central Area people respected Hanawalt who, in Bottomly's words, "had a good, non-paternalistic understanding and feeling about his role as principal" there. But he sensed also that because of the strain he had been under, Hanawalt could use a period of rest, and, significantly, that the District could use a period to reassess the racial make-up of the Garfield staff.[1]

Hanawalt took a month's leave of absence and returned to the District in February as a resource person in the Intergroup Relations Office. He was replaced by Frank Fidler, who had been principal at Washington Junior High. Fidler's appointment was something of a surprise, since many people had assumed that Garfield's next

principal would be black.[2]

In December, 1967, the State Board of Education, at the behest of State Superintendent Louis Bruno, adopted a ruling on state matching funds for local building construction denying such funds for any construction which would "'create or aggravate racial imbalance.'" While the ruling would ultimately help combat segregation in the schools, it presented an immediate dilemma for the Seattle School District in regard to a major remodeling proposal for Garfield which would involve nearly 105,000 dollars in state matching funds.[3]

The School District had pondered the future of Garfield for some time. Even as plans went ahead in the fall of 1967 for concerted efforts to increase reverse transfers into the school, the Administration for the first time seriously entertained thoughts to "terminate Garfield High School and disperse its population."[4] In December, Bottomly suggested organizing a ". . . small task force to build upon the proposal of Jack Greaves to phase out Garfield . . . and to look at Washington . . . and Mann . . . perhaps as the next step." He knew it would involve ". . . a power fight with the Central Area citizens who are against having their youngsters transported for long distances, but . . . [he thought they] must move ahead with this."[5]

The press reported in late January, 1968, that an Administration team was working on the problem and that it would recommend to the School Board that Washington and Mann be closed. Administrators had already been meeting with community groups and civil rights spokesmen as well as Central Area school staffs, but Bottomly insisted that no report had been written and that he would take nothing to the Board without more facts and information. At that point the remodeling of Garfield was still the District's top priority for that school, and Robert Williams, at a meeting of the Garfield Advisory Committee, "denied the substance of current rumors that Garfield might be closed."[6]

Despite Williams' disclaimer, the rumor persisted and evoked editorial comment from the P-I--"Garfield Closure Would Be Absurd." They noted the fact that Garfield's black population of more than 54 percent made it racially imbalanced by the State Board of Education's "narrow definition of defacto segregation," hence ineligible for state matching funds under the recent ruling, but the P-I did not consider that sufficient reason to abandon the building and recommended that the School District "proceed with the renovation of Garfield, without the state's aid if necessary." A month earlier the Times had editorialized in the same vein, questioning the State

Board's role in local autonomy and saying that the Seattle District warranted no such "clubbing" on integration.[7]

Both newspapers had referred to Garfield's "proud tradition" and contributions to race relations. The P-I called Garfield

> Seattle's shining example of a school in which young people of divergent racial backgrounds--Negro, Caucasian and Oriental--have studied and played in harmony. [Adding that] While the school's enrollment may meet the state's theoretical definition of segregation, as a practical matter the school is a model of integration.[8]

This sort of accolade helped make the District's decisions regarding Garfield more difficult. It was the kind of positive support needed to shore up morale at the school and to recruit additional white reverse transfers, especially in view of the perception by the rest of the city of growing unrest in the Central Area. Although the situation would become worse the following year, even then, in "post-Carmichael" 1968, Garfield was on the verge of becoming a less comfortable place for white students and staff.

In February, the Superintendent was pushing an administration committee to "go over our desegration plans for next year, considering the alternatives and supporting data needed for the Board to make a decision." Among

the alternatives he suggested were closing Garfield "as originally proposed," phasing out Garfield "over a two-to-four-year period," or closing Garfield for a three-year experimental period. He said their ". . . present plan was hurriedly put together with not very much thought going into it yet, nor refinements made." He wanted that done "before the desegregation plans go to the Board or even come to the Superintendent."[9]

He also wanted to develop long-range planning for desegregation rather than presenting something more or less piecemeal each year. His own thinking had gone on ahead, and he told his deputy,

> I am inclined to believe that the next step should call for some "equality of inconvenience," and that we should seek out ways of changing boundaries or developing some kind of an exchange or cooperative program with schools to get youngsters involved with central area schools, as well as having central area youngsters involved with other schools. You might go back and take another look at the Triad Plan. Even though it raised a lot of eyebrows in the past, I think it has some elements which might be of some use to us.[10]

While Meany Junior High was not one of the schools about whose future there was speculation, it was back in the news in January when its new principal arrived. Dr. Roland Patterson was introduced to the city as the "first Negro principal of a Seattle secondary school,"[11] and his selection and hiring marked the beginning of a

concerted effort by the District to recruit minority administrators.

When Bottomly arrived in 1965 he had found in Seattle as in many major cities, a system which he later described as essentially paternalistic and "ingrown, with a great deal of beholdenship among the administrators . . . which was pretty powerful and tied the administration into a pretty tight knot of understanding about who was going to be promoted and when." He said that he had been "concerned that there weren't very many minority people who were, quote, qualified." When things began to "break loose in the sixties it became apparent that we just had to change that and get some minorities into positions and do it quickly." They began the search for a principal for Meany and the administrative staff brought in names, and, in Bottomly's words,

> . . . they were white names--white people, and I finally said that we've just <u>got</u> to get a minority person for Meany--but they couldn't find any qualified people. Rev. McKinney told me about Roland Patterson.[12]

Negotiations between the District and Patterson had actually begun during the preceding summer, in the midst of the controversy over CSCC charges concerning Meany. The new principal could have had no illusions about his Seattle assignment, because the Superintendent sent him the press "clippings regarding the rhubarb" as well as

his own statement to the Human Rights Commission. When Patterson came in January, the CSCC president welcomed him, told him they considered the whole thing "a closed issue," offered to send him copies of the correspondence if he were interested, and did so in response to Patterson's request six days later.[13] Dr. Patterson was no stranger to Seattle, having taught here in the early fifties at High Point and Cooper Elementary Schools. He was a graduate of New York University and he received both his master's degree and doctorate from Teachers College, Columbia. He was principal of an elementary school in Montclair, New Jersey, when he was hired by the Seattle School District.[14]

While Meany was welcoming a new principal, and rumors were flying about school closures, the School Board finally moved on the matter of continuous progress centers. On February 14, 1968, the Board unanimously approved the Superintendent's recommendation for "plans, specifications and cost alternatives for a Southeast Pilot Educational Center in the vicinity of Rainier Beach Junior-Senior High School." The center (SEEC) was projected to open in September, 1970, with three components--kindergarten through grade four at Dunlap School, grades five through eight at an intermediate center to be built near the high school, and grades nine through

twelve at the high school. The total enrollment was visualized as 3500 students, with 500 in the primary school and 1500 at each of the other two levels. The instructional format would be based on the continuous progress concept. The Board's official statement said,

> A racial proportion not to exceed 25 percent Negro will be maintained in the Center. Some busing may be involved but to what extent, if any, is subject to further study.

Feeder schools for the intermediate center were to be selected from among Dunlap, Emerson, Rainier View and South Van Asselt in the Southeast Area, and Colman, Madrona, Mann and Washington Junior High in the Central Area.[15] Selection of the Central Area feeder schools proved to be a thorny problem, and any Central Area participation would require bussing.

Reactions to the Board decision were predictable, with one exception. Mrs. Elliott Carlson, SOS founder, was quoted as saying she had "'no complaints on the Rainier Beach center at all because it does not involve massive bussing and it can be controlled.'" It might also be pointed out that the center did not involve her part of town. In the Rainier Beach community there was some negative reaction. One real estate broker who questioned the influx of Central Area students to the proposed center said, "'We have an integrated area down

there . . . we want a balanced system throughout the city. Do not push it down just to our area.'"[16] Citizens for Quality Education praised the decision in a formal statement to the Board in which they called SEEC "the beginning of what can be a superior urban school district."[17]

Civil rights groups also commended the Board. On the day that the Board officially approved the Southeast Center, the NAACP agreed to the dismissal of its suit against the School District which had been filed in August of 1966. In explaining his agreement to dismissal of the suit, NAACP attorney Philip Burton cited their approval of the Rainier Beach Center plan as one which, while not filed in court, "would contribute to a better education for children and reduce racial imbalance." They had originally charged that the School Board "had not and was not preparing a desegregation plan."[18]

Their decision very likely was influenced also by the many meetings throughout January between District administrators and civil rights groups. The Superintendent himself had a number of meetings with civil rights leaders, including a breakfast meeting on January 23,[19] following which, that afternoon, administrators presented the District's proposed "Integration Plan" to the Central Area Civil Rights Committee. The CACRC later incorporated most of that plan into an Eleven Point Proposal

of its own.

At Mt. Zion Baptist Church that day the Civil Rights Committee fully supported that part of the District's plan which would close Horace Mann and convert Madrona to a Headstart through fourth grade facility. They also supported closing Washington Junior High in September 1968, provided that the problems of bussing the students were solved. They adamantly opposed the District plan to retain Garfield as a high school which would be reduced to a more manageable enrollment of between 1000 and 1200 students.[20]

The CACRC said that Garfield must be closed. Their preference was for closing it that fall, 1968, or at least phasing it out for closure in the fall of 1969, with the community, staff and students prepared for that closure when the Integration Plan was first announced. They felt that no principal would

> . . . be able to significantly reverse the situation at Garfield. . . . [that it could not] be saved; it [could] only follow the path of de facto segregated high schools in other cities . . . [that it] would become 90 percent Negro in a few years unless Caucasian students are mandatorily transferred into Garfield.[21]

It was more or less agreed at that meeting that when the Board announced its plan each CACRC member would take it to his organization and recommend endorsement of all proposals except that to retain Garfield.

The civil rights leaders also planned to start then to work in the community to gain support for the District's plan and to "counteract efforts of 'Black School Concept' advocates." They suggested that the Integration Plan be announced to coincide with the SEEC announcement, because they felt that unless it could be shown that it was part of a "total plan for school integration . . . their efforts to gain wide community support would be weakened."[22] This was not done.

True to their word, the civil rights leaders promoted the District's ideas in the community, while they continued to call for the closure of Garfield. Reverend John Adams fired the first salvo on February 2, when he called Mann "'an educational fraud and a fire trap'" and said it, along with Washington Junior High, should be closed. Regarding Garfield, he said the change in the principal's office had not dealt with the problem but had merely "'changed the management.'" The problems there could not be controlled by one man, he said, "'it will take a change in the system.'" The leaders of CORE publicly backed the closing of Mann, but not Garfield or Washington. They began to stress sharing the burden of integration and said, "'In short, white children can be bussed into the central area as easily as black children can be bussed out.'"[23]

Urban League President Benjamin Weeks followed that same line of argument when he told the Superintendent,

> Manipulation of Central Area School populations alone will not suffice. By bussing only Negro students, we run the risk that the entire burden for the solution of segregation is seen as falling on . . . [them]. It will lead to resistance and resentment.

He reminded Bottomly of the League's Triad Plan and told him the present inescapable conclusion was that the concerns which prompted that plan in 1965 were as pressing as ever. Those views were publicized by the Urban League, along with its disappointment that the announcement of the SEEC plan, which it found commendable, had not included plans for integrating the rest of the city.[24]

The NAACP publicly agreed with much of the Urban League sentiment and most of the School District plan. It called for closing Garfield, however, and specifically requested " that the reverse transfer program (bussing white students into the Central Area) become an integral part of your plan for Central Area schools. "[25]

Throughout February the School District sent representatives to a series of "'grass roots' forums" sponsored by civil rights and community groups in the Central Area. They explained the District's proposals and received community reaction. That reaction was snowballing in the direction of equal bussing of white and

black students, as was the sentiment of Central Area teachers. A committee of those teachers, who had met earlier with the Superintendent, recommended "'only two-way' racial bussing" and no Central Area school closures. They also wanted to see "much more training" for teachers working with minority children in the North End receiving schools. Even the Executive Board of the Seattle Teachers Association proposed that "'students at all levels be bussed in both directions, to and from the Central District.'"[26]

Stiff resistance to school closures was encountered directly by the School District in a meeting of about thirty-five parents at Horace Mann School. After a forty-five minute explanation of the District's proposals, Assistant Superintendent Loren Troxel was supported by only one person--Mann principal Tom Patillo, who thought the school should be closed for the good of the children. The parents wanted to replace the decrepit Mann structure with a new building and bus white students in to create racial balance. Mrs. Wanda Redmond, Mann PTA president, talked about new schools and improved programs in the North End, and she ". . . drew applause when she pounded the table for emphasis, saying: 'Bring some of those things here! Bring them here!'" Another parent told Troxel, "'Put some white kids with

our Negro kids. . . . We can accept them. We all breathe the same air.'" Resentment was also directed at that meeting toward the civil rights leaders who had advocated the school closures originally and now supported the District plan.[27] That resentment continued to grow and contributed to the explosive events of March 6, when those leaders themselves took their proposals to the community.

Negotiations appear to have taken place between the District and the Civil Rights Committee prior to that date. The Eleven-Point Proposal presented to the community by CACRC that evening included the continuation of Garfield as a high school with a reduced enrollment of 1200 students. The trade-off was obviously the School District's apparent willingness to include in its plan the mandatory bussing of 300 white students into Garfield.[28]

The meeting on March 6, 1968, at the East Madison YMCA, was sponsored by the Central Area Civil Rights Committee. Described by Roberta Byrd Barr as a "water shed evening," it marked a shift in leadership and direction in the Central Area and a turning point in the relationship between that community and the School District. When John Adams had first announced the meeting, he recounted the committee's past efforts in pressing the

School Board "for action in developing quality multi-racial education," which had succeeded to the point where the District was beginning to move. He said,

> "Now some people are saying that this is not what they want . . . [so] We want to enjoin the issue of black separatism as far as education is concerned. Nobody has ever been able to develop a ghetto school that educates children."[29]

On the day of the meeting, Adams said that it was to "rally support for integrated education and to oppose separatism in the schools." On the day after the meeting, the P-I's John deYonge said that it had become ". . . obvious quickly and sometimes loudly, that Central Area residents may want to integrate their schools --but their way." He described the meeting, which drew a crowd of about 400 people, as an old-fashioned town-meeting "jam packed with citizens and with voices of dissent."[30]

Adams read CACRC's Eleven-Point Proposal and presented a "panel of Negro professional men to support the [proposal's] position that Negroes must be integrated fully into Seattle schools." Soon after he presented the first speaker, the opposition, ". . . some young militants, some middle-aged or older but not professional men, began voicing objections."[31] Emotions generated by the debate over the closure of Garfield and Mann and the growing feeling that black students were being forced to

bear the entire burden of desegregation helped to fuel the fire of opposition.

After the meeting Walter Hundley said that parents present that night "had been intimidated by . . . 'the strategy of impoliteness' of the militant opposition." Reverend Adams did not want that meeting to cause the School District to back away from integration. He said, "'They need to do what needs to be done and take their lumps for it,'" and he accused the School Board of playing "'community politics in determining educational policy.'" He also said, "The Seattle School Board is mistaken if it thinks it can get a unanimous central-area position on the future of schools there."[32]

His last remark was a masterpiece of understatement which pointed to the heart of the School District's dilemma. The Superintendent's thinking was to try to arrive at some kind of consensus in order to avoid destructive fragmentation in the Central Area. He was loath to do anything which would "divide and conquer," playing off one group against another. Yet he appears to have tried to find a spokesman, or group of spokesmen, with whom to deal, and in this instance he had settled on the group of men who comprised the CACRC. At the time of the YMCA meeting he did not see their Eleven-Point Proposal as the central administration's plan, but instead he said it was

one which ". . . came out of a rather broad community involvement of several years . . . [and was then] being debated and subjected to scrutiny and dialogue by a number of central area groups." He believed it was "necessary and proper that this kind of dialogue be carried on." He knew there was growing resistance to school closures in the Central Area, and he told NAACP's Andrew Young that he was "watching with great interest the results of the Civil Rights Committee meeting on March 6."[33]

At that meeting, when John Adams, "the most effective speaker among the civil rights leaders," presented the proposal to the crowd, in Roberta Byrd Barr's word, "they swept him right off the platform." Both she and Ed Banks saw that this public rebuke to him as a spokesman fairly well destroyed Adams' effectiveness as a leader and diluted his influence with the city and with the School District. Banks, chairman of the Garfield Advisory Committee at that time, was almost universally considered "Mr. Grass Roots" in the Central Area, and his reading of the community mood had caused him to plead with Adams to not call that meeting. Banks said that the majority of the black community would have made any change necessary to help their children succeed, but in 1968 he had found them no longer willing to let their children be the lone cutting edge in desegregation. Adams apparently ignored or

discounted this and attempted to forge a black consensus to compromise with the School District for "decent education," assuming, perhaps, that CACRC influence or, again as Banks put it, "the muscle of CAMP . . . would be enough to bring about unity in the black community."[34]

Banks' fears were realized when "three militant groups came to the meeting and really tore it up and disrupted things." He identified one group of dissidents as followers of Keve Bray*--"supposedly pro-black who opposed all white cooperation." The second group he termed the "religious muslims," and the third he saw as more politically oriented--the followers of Carmichael,[35] who probably were the nucleus for the Black Students Union and the Black Panthers.

The latter group's more positive expressions of a hope for a better future and more control in their own lives influenced some of the older men who had coached and worked with them on youth teams. Most of these older men, who saw Garfield as an essential community institution, had never supported the idea of closing the school and bussing the students out. They considered that scheme an

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*Bray has been described as "a dangerous, bright and well-educated professional hustler" who operated peripherally in the black community. He went from one marginal occupation to another and when militancy began to pay off he moved into it. In the mid-1970's he was murdered on a downtown street in Denver.

upper-middle class idea which had never been held by a majority of the community.[36]

Alfred Cowles, Executive Director of the Washington State Board Against Discrimination, succeeded Adams as CACRC chairman when Adams was transferred to California later that year. Cowles did not support the closure of Garfield in 1968, and in discussing that whole matter later, he said,

> The point of view of closing Garfield was the view of the black professional in the sixties. But the point of view of John Q. Black Citizen was "keep Garfield open." Though I was a black professional I was supporting the position of all the little people. . . . Garfield represented a symbol to the community. They wanted a high school that would serve the black community. To strip the area of a high school they saw as tantamount to saying this area doesn't count. . . . The black professional leaders were integrationists all the way, and they said integration is going to be painful . . . so accept the pain that goes with it. The other point of view was we've been suffering pain already too long--let the other group suffer some some pain.[37]

Others saw the same dynamic in the repudiation of the established leadership. Mineo Katagiri, himself a member of CACRC, saw the March 6 meeting as a very important one in which the school issue became a total black community issue rather than one confined largely to the civil rights groups. He considered it the juncture at which the "black man-on-the-street" supplanted the black

professional. He also saw the loss of leadership by the establishment civil rights leaders as the beginning of real pain for Forbes Bottomly,[38] who spent another year seeking evidence of some Central Area consensus.

The CACRC members felt that the Superintendent had let them down,[39] that he had pushed them out front on it and when the School District saw the display by the Black Power people, "they backed off." Walter Hundley said that Bottomly had come to the civil rights leaders and told them he was ready with a plan to move children--"that he was ready to go, to integrate." He told them he knew it would be difficult and all he asked was that they be with him, to which they replied of course they would be. Bottomly asked them to call a meeting and tell the community what was going to be done, according to Hundley, who later recounted that

> We said, "OK." But we said, "Now, you know, you may get a lot of mixed things out of this meeting. But what we're understanding you to say to us is that you want us to give the information. This is not a plebescite or referendum or anything." He agreed.

Hundley then described the meeting by saying that the Black Power people

> . . . flood[ed] the place . . . and the school people sat there and listened to [them] . . . jump up and do their thing --because the television cameras were there--despite the fact that you had people like Judge Charles Z. Smith, Roland

> Patterson, John Adams . . . on the panel --people like that who were explaining this approach . . . and saying this is what ought to happen, this is what's going to happen. . . .

Hundley felt that Bottomly "more or less capitulated to hysteria," and that the only thing to follow from it all "was the token bussing of some black kids" when Horace Mann was closed the following fall.[40]

Roberta Byrd Barr viewed the power shift from a slightly different perspective. She had connections with both the CACRC* and School District camps, and she felt that each group made one big, fundamental mistake. The School District made the one which was traditional in dealing with the black community--going through "one black honcho with power or the smallest set of people with whom they [could deal] . . . but there is no such thing as 'the leader.'" For its part, she saw CACRC, "a very effective group," making only one mistake--that of not broadening its base. She said, "They felt that as long as that group of very able men remained in control and in touch," they did not need to broaden the base.[41] Consequently their potentially broader base did not support them when their plan was on the line.

In the aftermath of the meeting, both opponents and

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*She described herself as their token woman member.

advocates of the Eleven-Point Proposal publicized their stands. The School District received a number of supporting letters from individual patrons in the Central Area, some of whom identified themselves as active members of the NAACP. A letter from Mrs. Robert Joyner, President of the Seattle Benefit League, said, "It is unfortunate but it seems the best solution for Garfield is to close it, too." The Board of the East Madison YMCA urged that Garfield be closed, but said they would accept its continuation with a lowered enrollment "as a move in the right direction."[42]

The Greater Seattle Council of Churches supported the Eleven-Point Proposal and said that "the school transfer program should be shared by the white community." The local chapter of Alpha Phi Alpha, a black fraternity, supported the proposal, and its president, Dr. Robert L. Flennaugh, echoed the the call for improved education for black children which could "be received only in a setting that encompasses multiracial programs conducive to a well-rounded education for all our children."[43]

The proposal's primary organizational opposition came from the Central Seattle Community Council, whose education committee was unanimously against it. In the spectrum of Central Area groups, CSCC was perhaps closest to the "grass roots." Its education committee endorsed

integrated education, curriculum revision, and "required two-way bussing so that the responsibility for racial balance is equally shared." They called the Eleven-Point Proposal "'disastrous' and predicted racial polarization here if it is put into operation."[44]

The CACRC made at least one attempt to organize a city-wide committee to "develop plans for multi-racial education," which was one of the eleven points. A meeting at Meany Junior High, chaired by Reverend Adams, was attended by approximately two hundred and fifty people on March 26. It was reported that "most of the two hour meeting was a shouting match," but Adams prevailed. He succeeded in preventing a vote on the Eleven-Point Proposal, which he maintained was "not at issue at the meeting." The crowd was predominantly black and represented a wide range of Central Area opinion. While the prevailing mood was favorable to integrated education, there was no agreement as to how to provide it.[45]

The CACRC members were soon joined in the feeling of having been let down by the School District. Ed Banks, too, felt the lack of support for his group, and it led to his resignation as Chairman of the Garfield Advisory Committee.

Since the opening of school that year, the academic and social situations at Garfield had been deteriorating.

Black parents had been asked by Hanawalt to join a "hall group" to provide an adult "presence" in the building. Once in the building, with the opportunity to visit classes, one parent said they "couldn't believe what they saw." They found the results of the VRT, which had, in the later words of Dr. Tidwell, "Skimmed the cream right off the top" of the student body, taking the more able and motivated students. The black parents considered what was left at Garfield as "the Seattle School District's failures--kids who couldn't read," who were in the lower two-fifths of their classes and "were not being taught." They came to feel that the School District simply was not equipped to deal with the diverse population which their community presented and that only a tiny fraction of the Garfield faculty were really dedicated to educating their children. They knew changes had to be made.[46]

The community advisory committee for Garfield had its first meeting on January 15, 1968. It was an interracial group, broadly representative of the community. Its purpose was to advise the principal of the community's views, especially in regard to the plans for the school's future, and to provide a communication link between the Garfield faculty and area residents.[47]

The community knew that one of its biggest problems was what Banks called "kind of a blanket condemnation of

the school and the area as 'no good.'" He described the atmosphere at the first Advisory Committee meeting, at which he was elected chairman, as filled with a "feeling of hopelessness." But the group went to work and tried to sort things out. They soon realized the impossibility of dealing with any of the problems in isolation and "requested [of the School District] that no steps be taken in regard to Garfield until we have been heard from." On March 5 they told the School Board that the "Garfield Advisory Committee opposes the closing of Garfield and reduction of enrollment." With an eye toward the storm that was about to break, they also asked that the extent and intensity of the Committee's involvement "weight [in their direction] the value of expressions coming from the community."[48]

The Committee sent a second statement to the Board amplifying its position on retaining Garfield as presently constituted. They told the Board they had no quarrel with the goal of integrated education, but they did take exception to what they called the District's "narrow view" of integrated education which had committed it

> . . . to a reduction of "racial imbalance" and bussing out Negro students. . . . [adding that] While the School Board recognizes the basic inequality of the Negro community bearing the complete burden of bussing and integration, it proposes to do nothing about this.

They asked the Board to realize that there were other factors of greater importance than reducing Garfield's racial imbalance, and they said that the "real" feeling of the Garfield community, "the grass roots, the people who live here and embrace its ethnic composition," was that the Board did not have its finger on the Central Area's pulse. The committee members who signed that statement did represent a cross-section of the Central Area population:

Ed Banks	Fay Padelford
Leonard Dawson	Barbara Patton
Marie-Louise Dietrichson	Carol Richman
Isaiah Edwards	Frances Schmechel
George Fujimoto	Paul Spickard
Clifford Hooper	Bruce Waldo
Lloyd Jackson	Jeri Ware
Minora Masuda	Diane Wong [49]

At that same time, a group of about one-hundred Central Area white parents, some of whom were on the Advisory Committee, issued a public statement supporting integrated education and Central Area schools. A spokesman for the group, Mrs. J. J. Albi, said, "'We're not advocating anything as a group . . . but we did want to dispel some grave myths about central-area schools, and we felt white parents should be heard from.'" They said that they had found not only good education available in those schools, but "also some benefits unattainable in most schools outside the central-area." They believed that their children had "'a distinct advantage over children in all white schools, for whom our multiracial society may

have little reality.'"[50]

Just as the Advisory Committee was beginning to come to grips with the situation at Garfield, an incident occurred, the handling of which brought about the resignation of Banks as its chairman and weakened its effectiveness in the community. Garfield played in the state regional play-off basketball tournament in the small South Puget Sound town of Lacey, which was not the most hospitable place for the school's all-black team. The situation was later described as impossible for "a black team in a white community in which many felt there was hostility."[51]

In an altercation after the game two Garfield student spectators pushed and struck a game official. The two were disciplined by Principal Frank Fidler, but the school was dealt a devastating blow by the Washington Interscholastic Activities Association when it reacted almost immediately by placing the entire school on probation for one year. This was considered racist overreaction by many of the Advisory Committee, and Banks saw it as "just about the last straw for white parents." Banks resigned the Committee chairmanship as much in protest of the School District's lack of support in the matter as of the state association's ruling. He told the School Board that

> . . . due to hostility throughout the community and the news stories resulting from recent events that are connected to the school, I find the help we were trying to bring to the school subverted each passing day. I am working in this community to try to promote harmony and understanding. I can no longer keep the respect and understanding with the people I have to work with if I continue to serve as chairman of this committee.[52]

Particularly galling to the Central Area was the memory of a worse situation at Ballard High School a year earlier. An account given by an Advisory Committee subgroup said, "Black people from Garfield--students, parents, teachers--were assaulted and beaten." They remembered that in that instance, although rocks thrown by a crowd of whites inflicted considerable damage on their automobiles and it was necessary that ". . . several police cars [be] present at the scene of the attack," no action against Ballard was taken by the School District.[53]

Officers of the Negro Voters League (NVL) were quick to deplore Banks' resignation as Advisory Committee Chairman, terming it "a loss to the community of a leader who had worked with both moderates and militants." They also questioned the WIAA authority over non-athlete spectators, and NVL Chairman Lloyd Jackson said it was "'a very hard pill to swallow' for a student body whose athletes were praised by the Lacey game officials." Another NVL member saw the possibility of political collusion, saying,

> "Personally, I think they (the state organization) are trying to reinforce the closure of Horace Mann School and Washington Junior High School and to close Garfield if they can."[54]

Bottomly, too, was distressed by the resignation of Banks, whom he considered "'a very strong leader in the central area during these times of dissent.'" He told Banks of his desire "to see that communications are improved to bring about as much understanding as possible of the social revolution taking place in our city," and that Banks' leadership would continue to be significant.[55] But the community's trust in the School District had further eroded, and the effectiveness of the Garfield Advisory Committee had been seriously compromised.

Earlier in the 1968 basketball season,, the Ballard-Garfield rivalry had produced another post-game disturbance, which the District had anticipated in light of the bitter feelings from the year before. Bottomly told a parent after the 1968 confrontation that he thought the faculty of each school had done

> . . . a good job of attempting to maintain order after the game, and it was an especially good job under the circumstances.
>
> Meanwhile, we have begun a number of sessions in which the youngsters at Garfield and Ballard are sitting down in sensitivity programs attempting to work out their differences so that this type of behavior will not happen again.[56]

Bottomly had called student leaders from the two

schools into his office for those sessions, and they led to some larger, inter-school dialogues. In planning those larger discussions, the student leaders did not care where they took place, but they did specify that in order for them to be free to talk, they wanted no parents and no school authorities present. The Superintendent was reluctant to release students from school unsupervised, so the Ecumenical Metropolitan Ministry (EMM), under the direction of Reverend Mineo Katagiri, enlisted for the project. The series of dialogues was held at the University Congregational Church, and, while the EMM provided adult leadership, Katagiri said, "The students made all the speeches--made charges and counter charges and cleared the atmosphere." They had set a limit of 100 students from each school for each of five sessions, expecting the group to get smaller as the week went on. But the numbers grew, and the last day saw the largest group, some of whom attended in spite of parental objections. Katagiri felt that the students "came to a good understanding," and that the sessions had been well worth the criticism that came later.[57]

The Metropolitan Ministry staff wrote to the Superintendent that, in light of the experience of the dialogues, they were "more than ever convinced that multiracial education is important." They had received many

favorable communications from students and faculty and invitations had come from other schools to address their students. They were ready to assist the District in any way to build quality multiracial schools, and said that if it took the "closing of Mann, Washington, Garfield, bussing and so on, to accomplish this goal, then we urge you to undertake them post haste."[58] This kind of reinforcement helped to influence Bottomly to include provisions for such student dialogues in his later recommendations to the School Board.

The School District received a spate of letters objecting to the use of church property and to the role of the Ecumenical Metropolitan Ministry in the interracial dialogues.[59] In the late sixties there were a number of other crosscurrents pushing and pulling the School District, including distress over student militance and opposition to the Viet Nam War. Such issues further complicated their efforts to deal with social change. At the same time, however, the Board found growing support in 1968 for desegregation.

Kathryn Bullit was present at the School Board meeting on March 14 to report a recently organized petition drive in support of any Board decision that would "help insure quality multiracial education." The backers of the petitions were circulating over 1500 of them city-

wide and in the Shoreline, Bellevue, Mercer Island and Highline School Districts. Ultimately seventy-two petitions were returned to the School District, with all but ten bearing a full complement of eighteen or twenty signatures.[60] The League of Women Voters was also represented at that meeting in March, to re-emphasize that organization's support of District efforts to end segregation. Edith Lobe, League President, said,

> "No community can adequately meet a challenge of which it is inadequately aware . . . we offer our services, our time, our background in providing the citizen adequate nonpartisan information in our mutual effort to face this mounting crisis in our city."[61]

The League of Women Voters had been on record since 1966 in support of avenues pursued by the District to "permit each child to reach his fullest potential," including compensatory programs, teacher training and the VRT, with public payment of transportation.[62]

Another statement by Citizens for Quality Education joined the growing support for action to desegregate. CQE went beyond its backing of integrated continuous progress centers, which they recognized as a long-range goal, and they called for "effective, decisive action on interim plans" which could be part of an over-all plan. They said the time was right "to move forward with a program of community wide, two-way bussing," and told the Board

> Wherever we live, whatever our age, race, or financial status, our lives and our city will be influenced by your action. A dormant plan on a shelf is useless; we must have the commitment and will to act now. . . . We urge that you move vigorously, seeking community understanding and support, but insisting on quality education and equality of opportunity in our schools.[63]

The P-I had recently given the Board and the community an editorial nudge while commenting on the exodus of white families to the suburbs and the influx of blacks to the central city. (In 1957, the Seattle Public School enrollment of 91,782 had been 90.6 percent white, 5.7 percent black. In September, 1968, statistics would show a total enrollment of 94,002, of which 82.3 percent would be white and 11 percent black.)[64] The P-I said this population shift was "creating growing problems for the school district and the city at large," but, fortunately, the Superintendent was not only keenly aware of the problems but had also "been willing to stick out his neck by proposing such innovative projects as large, racially balanced continuous progress centers." While such proposals as that and involuntary bussing of students were understandably not popular with those "who cherish the traditional neighborhood school system . . . [the editorial averred that] there must be public acceptance of some basic changes in that system, if the city is to have any hope of dealing effectively with the problems created [by

the population changes]."[65]

The Superintendent was willing to stick his neck out once more in the spring of 1968. Recommendations which he made to the Board in March included a proposal to establish racially balanced middle schools throughout the school system. The acceptance of these recommendations resulted in the most sifnificant desegregation policy decision which the School Board would make for several years to come.

Bottomly based his recommendations on earlier Board policy statements such as that made in 1966:

> "We believe that an integrated education provides better racial understanding among all children. We will work to bring it about by whatever just, reasonable and educationally sound means are available to us."

He strengthened them with references to recommendations by the President's Commission on Civil Disorders. He alluded to the State Board of Education Policy aimed at reducing de facto desegregation, and he cited the Seattle Principals Association resolution urging District efforts in that direction. He told the Board, "A number of thoughtful and responsible groups [he listed 31 in all] have supported the direction you have taken, and have encouraged you to take further steps." He noted that in spite of the VRT six elementary and one junior high remained racially segregated and that the present trend

would push several other schools, including Garfield, into that category. (Garfield already qualified for that designation by State Board standards.) And Bottomly said that it had "long been apparent that the voluntary transfer program alone would not overcome racial imbalance in all the schools."[66]

The Superintendent then listed four factors which had strongly influenced him to submit his recommendations. First, there appeared to him to be "a growing acceptance of the need for multi-racial education by both Caucasian and Negro parents." Then he listed the growing resistance among black parents to one-way bussing of their children and their contention that "if multi-racial education is good then the effort should be made by the entire community, white and black alike." The third factor he cited was the

> . . . growing sense of self-determination in the Negro community . . . which was manifested in a resistance to being manipulated by the "establishment" [and seen in] many Negro youth . . . who search for identity and a value system which give dignity to that identity.

He saw those young people as neither separatists nor integrationists, and he described them as being "militant in their quest for significance and involvement in the issues which affect their lives." Finally, he told the Board,

> . . . there is a black extremist movement which is small in numbers, but

> matches the white extremists in militancy and hate. They threaten to bomb, burn and destroy and to split society apart. We cannot, any of us, allow these extremists, either black or white, to intimidate, blackmail, or deter us from making good judgments about the future of our city and the education of all our children.[67]

Having taken all of those things into account, he submitted eight recommendations. Briefly, they were:

1. Institute in all grades for all students a revised and upgraded program of the history, culture, and contributions of minority groups of America. . . .
2. Develop a required in-service educational program for all school district employees which aims at greater under standing of minority youth with the purpose of exposing the myths and superstitions which make up prejudice. . . .
3. Encourage expansion of the voluntary student exchange program and opportunities for students of different racial and ethnic backgrounds to carry on dialogue . . . [and continue] the student dialogue programs sponsored by the Ecumenical Metropolitan Ministry. . . .
4. Strengthen the voluntary transfer program. . . .
5. Plan first steps in the transition of junior high schools to middle schools. . . . [The middle school] provides an organizational pattern which is more nearly in tune with the needs of children who are between childhood and young adulthood . . . and it lends itself to curricular reform and modern teaching techniques, including individualization of pacing and instruction. The development of the middle school does not entail a major reorganization problem, nor any major new facilities. . . .

> It is recommended that you authorize the administration to begin immediate planning to convert three junior high schools to racially balanced middle schools. . . .
>
> 6. Close Horace Mann as an elementary school at the end of the 1967-68 school year. . . .
>
> 7. Retain Garfield High School as a high school . . . [and] the Garfield staff proposal for making the school a magnet school for the whole city be implemented as rapidly as feasible.
>
> 8. Begin a feasibility study with the City Planning Commission to determine the long-range effect on the city master plan of . . . middle schools, educational centers . . . [and other] proposals growing out of Forward Thrust and Model Cities.[68]

The proposal for racially balanced middle schools also called for appointing a citizens advisory committee to help plan the conversion. Among the specific areas to be addressed by that committee were determining attendance area, size and grade configuration for the schools; weighing the alternatives of voluntary and mandatory pupil "attendance"; working out a desirable multiracial composition for each school; and recommending the type and extent of transportation necessary. Washington Junior High was to be converted by September, 1969, and Meany and Hamilton Junior High were proposed for conversion "by no later than September, 1971."[69] (Hamilton is located outside the Central Area, just north of the ship canal.)

The proposals were given extensive public exposure well in advance of any Board action. The Superintendent presented them first to the District's teacher corps in and early telecast on the morning of March 28. He met with the press at a news conference later that morning, and both daily papers featured the proposals on page one. There had been considerable and varied speculation as to what the Superintendent would propose for desegregation, and much of the early press coverage centered on public reaction as well as giving details of the proposed plan.[70]

The parents of Mann students were disappointed, and even though the proposal might offer an improvement over the present situation, they still felt that one-way transfer was not fair. SOS's Mrs. Carlson called the plan "'an interim step toward an educational park system throughout the entire city,'" saying that Bottomly "'approached mandatory busing . . . [sic] with a great deal of caution because the city has reacted so negatively to busing plans.'" A CORE spokesman found the plan " very positive " but called for two-way bussing for the middle schools. NAACP's Charles Johnson felt that Bottomly had "'yielded to the clamor and hollering of a few people by watering down the original proposals,'" and he added that he thought the Superintendent had made a mistake. Reverend John Adams was out of town and unavailable for comment (he

would be heard from later, however), and Walter Hundley declined to comment without studying the proposal further. Central Seattle Community Council also wanted to study it further and seek wider community reaction before making any statement.[71]

Bottomly had effectively side-stepped the issue of bussing in his proposal by delegating to a citizens advisory committee the chore of recommending the "type and extent of transportation necessary." He appears to have hedged a bit more in the press conference, with the Times reporting his saying "'It may not be necessary to have mandatory bussing,'" just after he had said multiracial middle schools would "'. . . not be possible without moving white children into the central area.'" The P-I bored in a bit further, saying that the Superintendent did "not think the school board by itself could decide on mandatory bussing of white students without the aid of the community --and hence [sic] the committee." (Emphasis added.) The article continued,

> "The direct involvement of the citizens of Seattle is the only way social reform is going to take place," Dr. Bottomly said.
> "We've gone about as far as we can in . . . our . . . (sic) recommendations."[72]

Editorially the P-I called the proposals both pragmatic and reasonable, and said that reasonable people

would heed the call for citizen involvement and support the "thoughtful program." The Times labeled the proposals "a moderate course," adding that it was "obvious that Bottomly and the staff favor compulsory bussing of students out of the central area, but are avoiding . . . compulsory bussing into the central area--at least for the time being." The editorial alluded to the city's total problem in the area of race relations saying, "Clearly, the school system's pace is limited to that permitted by public acceptance," and then, returning, as always, to the theme of open housing, it indulged in some wishful thinking, saying "circumstances requiring . . . [a] turn to new and controversial . . . [student] groupings would be far less severe if by a wave of the miracle-maker's wand the community offered 'housing desegregation.'"[73]

On April 10, on a motion by Swain, with a second by Tidwell, the Board unanimously adopted all of the eight recommendations, with but minor modifications. The only significant change was in regard to the timetable for middle school conversions. Rather than the Superintendent's call for Washington Junior High to be ready as a desegregated middle school by September, 1969, with Meany and Hamilton following no later than September, 1971, the Board adopted the wording that, in the transition to middle schools, "one or more junior high schools will become

racially balanced by September, 1969, and a total of at least three by September, 1971." (Emphasis added.) The Board conveyed a sense of urgency about the move to middle schools, and Swain said that, without minimizing any of the other plans just approved, the transition to middle schools was "one of great significance as [they] look[ed] to the future," from the standpoint of both desegregation and the quality of education.[74]

The P-I's John deYonge reported that "Board Accepts DeFacto Plan--and Sparks Fly." The first sparks were struck by Reverend John Adams, who, speaking for the Central Area Civil Rights Committee, lashed the Board for lack of leadership and courage to do what was right. He underscored the "futile impossibility of gaining white [or black] citizen consensus on the steps necessary to end de facto segregation." Reminding them that the Civil Rights Committee, "believing the . . . Board was seriously committed to ending . . . segregation . . . accepted much abuse and anger from the . . . community in urging . . . bold, incisive steps," he said,

> In a craven failure of nerve, the School Board has deferred integrative action for at least one year. Even worse, the Board has abdicated its responsibility to yet another "citizens' committee." Why? The School Board has all the facts . . . and studies which all point inescapably in one direction--break up ghetto education.
>
> We need no more study, we need action. We do not have one more year.[75]

There was then some verbal sparring between Adams and Mrs. John Mattox, of the Washington State Conservative Party and a supporter of George Wallace's bid for the presidency, who held that any attempts to end segregation were unconstitutional. Many others of all races spoke, with the majority reported favoring integration "now."[76]

Many of those who spoke stressed a new climate in the city, as did Jean Walkinshaw, a Montlake resident, who said,

> "I think the climate of the community is such that you could be able to do much more . . . [sic] that there are white people who would be willing to have their children bussed into the central area."

Mrs. Thelma Dewitty, who was then teaching at John Hay School on Queen Anne Hill, urged more and equal integrative action, saying "'If our boys and girls can stand in the rain to catch busses, the other children can, too.'" Mineo Katagiri called for ". . . quality integrated education as soon as possible, 'not out of fear of riots, but because justice . . . demands it.'"[77]

One thing which had by then come to characterize Seattle's desegregation efforts, and which perhaps distinguished them from efforts in other cities, was the District's approaching desegregation as both a racial and an educational problem. For some time Bottomly had been reluctant to further the strategy of "'Merely cross-bussing

or one-way bussing . . . [sic] into our traditional classroom set up.'"[78] He saw the move to middle schools as a solution to both aspects of the problem and as compatible with the continuous progress stance of the Board. The Superintendent did not consider the new programs to be experimental, as would his opponents when those programs were later implemented. Rather, he saw them as developmental, building on things already tested and giving the District a more systematic approach to its long-range operations.

It is evident that the Board members who adopted the middle school plan saw it as a strategy for both desegregation and the improvement of education. However, the balance between the two elements, in the words of Beverly Smith, ". . . probably varied in each person's mind." She, of the five, appears to have seen the middle school adoption more as an educational move, a position which would be consistent with the firm conviction she expressed during her campaign for the Board that the junior high school needed revision.[79]

During her long tenure on the Board Mrs. Owen had seen growing dissatisfaction with the junior high school which would seem to dictate some sort of change for those grade levels. She had also seen a change in attitude toward desegregation take place among her fellow Board

members, four of whom participated in the middle school decision, and none of whom had come to the Board as a committed liberal dedicated to integrating the schools. Of that change she later said,

> We came along together. I think this was the remarkable part of it--that from a fairly united base of feeling that it was not our responsibility we all sort of at the same time moved forward.

She called it a "slow evolution" and said that no one factor led to the change, adding,

> . . . changes in society were bearing in on us. And then I do think that Dr. Bottomly had a very definite effect on our thinking. . . . I think we soon realized how he felt--that we should move forward--that it was going to take courage but he believed in doing it.[80]

Since 1965, when David Wagoner joined the Board, they had held countless meetings and discussions on educational change and desegregation, and, by 1968, they had arrived at the point of accepting the two-fold concept in the middle school proposal. In Wagoner's mind, "the idea was a <u>desegregated</u> middle school." So it was, too, with Tidwell, who saw the middle school move giving them a chance for "a true desegregation program," while another persuasive argument for him had been the promise which the plan held for a program better suited to student maturity levels.[81]

Swain also saw desegregation as a large part of their

thinking, and, although the case for middle schools, which he vigorously espoused, was made independent of desegregation, they did merge the two when they took action in 1968. Swain traced the philosophical commitment to desegregate the schools, from which they "never waivered," to their 1966 policy statement, and he said that from then on they "really were aggressively seeking the means of making that come alive." He also cited as influences on their gradual realization of the need for action both evidence from the Coleman Report and the "demonstrable fact that the voluntary transfer program was exascerbating the situation rather than contributing to the solution."[82]

Dr. Palmason, who was generally considered to be the Board liberal, took a fairly pragmatic approach to the middle school decision. Mrs. Owen's recent departure from the Board had made him the member with the longest record of service, and he had been the entire route with the District in desegregation. In his view, there were three means of dealing with segregated schools--improve them with compensatory programs, close them, or reconstitute them. They had tried the first two and the problem had not been solved, so "it just seemed logical to try the third."[83]

Although the Board's decision caused a flurry of excitement among desegregation's supporters and opponents

alike, that interest was short lived, and the matter of integrated middle schools was virtually ignored by the city. Not until the Board considered a specific proposal in the fall of 1970, with a target date for implementation, was there any extensive response, and then there was a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding as to what was involved. The District became embroiled in litigation, and ultimately the School Board faced, and survived, a recall election.

Dr. Bottomly later discussed their middle school decision in the light of political realities in Seattle in 1968. They realized that because of the concern of parents, regardless of race, about where their little children were assigned, the primary schools (kindergarten through grade four) should "be essentially neighborhood schools with a voluntary [desegregation] program built in." Holding that the School Board "had some responsibility to see to it that the students had some extended education in an integrated environment," they planned that in the middle school, for students who were a little older, "there would be integrated education for all students for a period of at least four years. So far as the senior high school level was concerned, he said, "the obvious political scene at that particular time was that you couldn't tell high school students anything . . . [and] that it

would be very difficult to order high school students here and there around the city for the purpose of desegregation." The thought was that the students themselves could choose the high school they would attend. Regarding attendance choices and assignments, in Bottomly's words, "we were saying that the primary would be the parents' choice, the intermediate would be the School Board's choice, and on the higher levels it would be the students' choice."[84] The middle school plan was developed around that general conceptual framework.

By the end of May, a committee chaired by William H. Gates had drawn up a list of prospective members for the middle school citizens advisory committee. Later that summer, Reverend John C. Leffler, Dean of St. Mark's Cathedral, accepted the chairmanship of that city-wide committee. By that time, however, events in the Central Area were overwhelming the District, and the Superintendent asked Dean Leffler to hold off on his committee's work.[85] The advisory committee aspect of the middle school plan never did materialize.

The first of the recommendations which the Board adopted on April 10, the teaching of minority history in all the schools, had long been high on the Superintendent's list of priorities. It had also been one of the earliest requests by civil rights leaders, and by the

spring of 1968 it was one of the loudest demands from young people in organizations such as the Black Students Union (BSU). Bottomly received reinforcement in wanting such an addition to the curriculum from Governor Dan Evans. Following his foray into the Central Area in the summer of 1967, Evans told Bottomly,

> . . . I do want to express as strongly as I can the proposals made by the "Grass Roots Committee" at their meeting with me last Thursday. Four of their suggestions dealt directly with school affairs. . . .
>
> The first is one which I believe deserves prompt action and represented, I think, their most immediate concern. This suggestion was to include Afro-American History in the school curriculum. Their claim, which I cannot directly verify, is that there has been much talk of adding this . . . but no action . . . [and they felt] that a mimeographed supplement [at least] plus the necessary instructions, should be available at the beginning of the school year this fall, especially in schools such as Garfield and perhaps Franklin.[86]

The Superintendent could have verified for him the claim of no action. As early as March, 1966, he had asked the curriculum division to report on efforts being made to include material on the "contributions of the Negro people and the developing of favorable attitudes toward other races." By May, 1968, after the recommendation to include minority studies had been adopted by the Board he was still prodding the curriculum division, with growing impatience and an increased sense of urgency, to

> . . . allot such resources and talent for this to make sure that this comes to fruition by next fall. . . . This will take priority over other social studies changes and investments.[87]

On May 19, the Times placed on page one the announcement that "minority history and culture will be offered in every school in Seattle beginning next fall." The Superintendent was quoted as saying, " This is going to be a bona fide, intellectually honest program. " Two weeks later Bottomly was reminding curriculum division personnel,

> I've made major commitments to the community on this for next fall. We've had plenty of time to develop and implement such programs, and I want to be sure . . . that this matter is adequately taken care of.[88]

By the time of the Board's official action on minority history, the District had experienced a major disturbance traceable to student dissatisfaction which stemmed in part from lack of action on curriculum changes. In his letter the previous August, the Governor had also relayed some of the other grievances of black students concerning the kind of school climate which led to an upheaval at Franklin High School in March, 1968. He told Bottomly,

> The "Grass Roots' " . . . second concern is a rather nebulous one and yet, I expect, troublesome. This . . . was that central area teachers need specialized training and understanding for the Negro's problems. They had particular reference to counseling and their general feeling that Negro youngsters are aimed toward technical or vocational futures while white boys and

> girls are encouraged to go on to college and university. The third suggestion was to emphasize the use of indigenous teachers and teachers' aides where possible to create better communication between teacher and pupil.[89]

Another point of contention for the "Grass Roots" had surfaced in the Anti-Hanawalt move made by CAPI--the need to revise the School District's suspension regulations.

In 1968 the racial make-up of the student body at Franklin High School was 58.7 percent white, 18.2 percent black, 11.4 percent Japanese and 6.8 percent Chinese. Among the 129 black students were harbored some, if not all, of the grievances noted. The Franklin administration and conditions at the school had been a source of concern to some community groups for some time. Frank Ahearn, the track coach reportedly had resigned earlier that spring "over the suspension of a black track star there [and] had warned the School Board four weeks before [the disturbance] about conditions at Franklin." According to Larry Gossett, a 1963 Franklin graduate who was then BSU coordinator on campuses in Washington, the principal and vice-principal had for some time responded negatively to any suggestions and efforts by black students at Franklin. He said they had denied black history, had refused to consider a Black Student Union, and had refused to allow black girls to come to school wearing their hair in the "natural" style. The vice-principal in particular was remembered as having

discouraged black students from a college career unless they were class officers or outstanding athletes, and Gossett saw this as having a "deadening impact on spirit."[90]

The Franklin disturbance, which eventually mushroomed into one of the major episodes in Seattle's racial unrest, began on Thursday, March 28, the day of the District's initial publicizing of its new integration plan. Following a student "black-power meeting" at the Beanery, a gathering place across from the school, there was a fight in a Franklin hallway caused when a black student intervened in a scuffle between two other students, one black, one white. The fight itself was between the two black students, who were suspended by Vice-principal Charles Shearer. The next day, Principal Loren Ralph ruled on whether to continue or to drop the suspensions. A larger, more consequential disturbance took place when it was learned that one of the two students was not reinstated.[91]

Having been alerted to possible trouble, older youth leaders, members of SNCC and the BSU at the University of Washington, went to the Beanery around noon on Friday. They found a large crowd of black students from Franklin ready to descend on the school for a "sit-in." They tried to organize an orderly demonstration and they went along with the students to the principal's office to try to prevent trouble. Trouble did ensue, including

vandalism to school property; and Principal Ralph later claimed to have been "manhandled." As a result, nine students, eight boys and one girl, were suspended from Franklin, and the School District pressed unlawful assembly charges in Justice Court against five of the non-students involved. Two others were similarly charged in Juvenile Court.[92]

Eventually all of the suspended students were reinstated in school, although not all were returned to Franklin. Those accused of unlawful assembly were Trolice Flavors, a Franklin student who had been involved in the original fight; Richard Gossett, a Highline Community College student; and Carl Miller, Aaron Dixon and Larry Gossett, all of whom were students at the University of Washington. Events before, during and after their trial before an all-white jury in the Justice Court of Judge James Dore created considerable concern in the city over such matters as excessive bail and excessive sentencing as well as the constitutionality of the unlawful assembly statute. Three of the defendants, Larry Gossett, Miller and Dixon, were convicted and given the maximum sentence of six months in County Jail. They were acquitted in January, 1969, on the appeal of their convictions to Superior Court.[93]

The Superintendent was obviously sensitive to the

climate at Franklin, even while standing firm against violence and what was seen as intrusion from the outside. Vice-principal Shearer was reassigned almost immediately after the initial incident. The District was pressured by the Mt. Baker Improvement Club to replace the principal also, and that group's Franklin High School Committee sought to file a complaint against Ralph with the State Board Against Discrimination.[94] Bottomly retained Ralph at Franklin for the rest of that year, but told him,

> 'It's going to require a great deal of flexibility on your part, in combining good control and reasonable discipline, along with an opening up and development of more flexibility in the way youngsters are handled and the way teachers are expected to behave in a changing environment.[95]

In July a new administrative "team" was moved into Franklin, with Frank Hanawalt once again assigned to a principalship. The redoubtable Roberta Byrd Barr, who had been on leave as an advisor to the Model Cities Program, was named a vice-principal.[96]

Among the long-term results of the entire Franklin episode was the solidifying of the youth leadership as a consequence of the trial. From then on, the BSU leaders and Black Panthers enjoyed greater influence among Central Area youth than they might otherwise have expected.[97] The replacement team assigned to administer Franklin instituted a number of reforms. Feeling that they "had

nothing to lose," they tried a number of new things which have since become commonplace in Seattle and elsewhere in the state--such things as the first high school program for pregnant students and the first alternative high school for dropout male students.[98]

In the midst of community turmoil over the future of Central Area schools that spring, a faculty task force was working on the idea of creating a "magnet school" for Garfield. The task force was spearheaded by Dorothy Pounds, a counsellor, and Parker Cook, the school's long-time director of music. The blueprint which emerged was for a two-pronged magnet to attract students in the fine arts and the "life sciences." The plan received approval from the District, and on July 8 it was unveiled publicly by Cook at a luncheon meeting of the Chamber of Commerce Education Committee. Since the District budget would not cover the cost of the new program, the Administration was seeking financial help from the public.[99]

Much of the Garfield magnet story revolves around attempts to raise funds. The Seattle-King County Board of Realtors announced almost immediately that they would head the drive to raise 120,000 dollars. The School Board was delighted with this offer, but their joy was no doubt short-lived. Little resulted from the realtors' involvement. A number of fund-raising rallies were

planned and postponed, and a month later the drive was reorganized under a multiracial steering committee headed by Gary Levine, a businessman who was a Garfield alumnus.[100]

As late as November, Levine said they still needed 80,000 dollars to keep the program running through the school year. They had raised 40,000 already, including a 10,000 dollar contribution from Patrons of Northwest Civic, Cultural and Charitable Organizations (PONCHO), and a pledge from the realtors to raise 20,000. (As of April, 1969, that sum had not been produced.) Ultimately the School District had to allocate additional money "to provide funds required for maintaining the Magnet School Program at Garfield for the balance of the school year," even though the program had never reached the magnitude envisioned a year earlier.[101]

In the recriminations which followed, the Board of Realtors was seen by Levine as wanting "to improve their image in the Central Area," but blundering badly. Gary Gayton, who had helped in the fund-raising attempts was quoted as saying of the realtors,

> "I'm shocked at the fact that they've used this project as a means to get national recognition. They've gone around the country lauding their efforts when, except for a few sincere people, none of them have done a damn thing."[102]

The Superintendent was philosophical about the curtailment of the program. He congratulated Garfield's

Principal Fidler and the magnet committee on their "magnificent effort," and expressed some disappointment over the entire matter of funding. While expressing disappointment also that the magnet idea "failed to attract significantly large numbers of students from other high schools as had been hoped," he said that the experience had demonstrated that new strategies would work for some students better than traditional approaches would.[103]

Funding aside, perhaps the biggest handicap carried by the Magnet Program was lack of community support. While groups such as the Washington State Arts Commission gave early endorsement to the plan, it failed to attract the backing of Central Area organizations. Neither the Garfield Advisory Committee nor the CSCC Education Committee endorsed it. Barbara Patton, who was a member of both, said that their initial feeling was that the program "'was aimed purely at bringing white students into Garfield,'" and this approach raised two objections.

> "First," she [said] "we didn't think it would work--pure and simple--and second, we were afraid the program would do little to improve the scholastic level of Garfield itself."

Indeed, Principal Fidler was later reported to have said it had little effect on the school.[104]

Minora Masuda, a member of the Garfield Advisory Committee, explained that group's lack of support for the

magnet, saying, "'It was a showcase kind of a program which glittered, but could not provide solid results because it did not change the relationship of students and teachers.'"[105] From another point on the Central Area spectrum, Walter Hundley, who was then head of the Seattle Model Cities Program, was able to give the Garfield Magnet qualified support. He told Dorothy Pounds,

> . . . I still have grave reservations about the "magnet" aspect of the program. I believe it has no value in meeting the need for an integrated Seattle school system . . . [but] As long as these proposals are not seen as the final solution, I could heartily endorse the program proposal for Garfield for this coming year.[106]

Part of the discontent stemmed from the feeling that the black community was once more having a program imposed on it without its having been included in the planning. Bea Hudson, identified with the Negro Voters League at that time, said, "'We are critical of the school people for bringing a plan out and then asking the community to get involved.'" A CAMP spokesman put the Magnet issue back into the political whirlpool of school closures when he said, "'Many people think this magnet idea is just another way of manipulating the closure of Garfield.'"[107]

In a sense, this objection to having a predetermined plan foisted off on the community brought the School District and the Central Area full circle to where they had

begun--the attempted conversion of Old Washington Junior High to a segregated elementary school. In 1968, however, the atmosphere was such that growing support in the Central Area for a greater community voice in school decisions forced a detour in some of the District's plans and delay in implementing some programs.

. . . . . .

The debate and conflict over the future of Garfield had taken the issue of Central Area schools, which had been primarily the concern of civil rights groups, into the community as a wider issue of importance to the man-on-the-street. Both the Central Area Civil Rights Committee and the Garfield Advisory Committee thought they lacked support from the School District in their efforts to improve or to integrate the schools, and it became difficult to counteract growing sentiment for an all-black school at Garfield.

At the same time, it is possible to see that in the spring of 1968, even before the wave of remorse and conciliation which swept over the city following the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King (in which Seattle finally produced an open-housing ordinance), there was growing support for meaningful integration in many areas of the city. Had the School District been able to implement its middle school plans in that atmosphere of cooperation the

following fall, the course of integration in the city would obviously have been different.

As it was, the summer of 1968 was another one of racial unrest. Central Area school activists turned greater attention to convincing the community of the true crisis in their schools, while becoming aware themselves that the community must unite in order to bring about constructive solutions. As school opened in September, events set in motion during the summer were to produce a new era in relations between the School District and the Central Area.

CHAPTER X

CONFLICT, CONSENSUS, "COMMUNITY CONTROL"

The Central Area had weathered the attempt to close Garfield in the spring of 1968, but school issues had been taken into a wider community arena. Parent patrols at Garfield, as well as the work of the Garfield Advisory Committee, had given parents a first-hand observation of conditions in the school. That spring there had been disturbances at both Meany and Washington Junior High Schools, resulting in District requests for greater parent involvement, especially at Washington. If parents needed any further evidence to convince them of the existence of a real crisis in their schools, a special report by the Urban League, issued in July, provided documentation. The report gave statistics on the dropout and suspension rates in Central Area schools, showing Garfield with a suspension rate of 12.96 percent compared to 4.93 percent citywide, and with a dropout rate twice that of the city mean. The report also detailed a ten-year increase in racial imbalance in Central Area schools. Perhaps the most telling figures were Metropolitan Achievement Test scores showing

Central Area schools far below the city mean scores.* Here was proof from a source trusted by Central Area parents that the schools were not educating their children.[1]

One of the earliest concerns of civil rights leaders, and PTA and community groups in the Central Area had been the attitude and effectiveness of teachers, and this concern grew in 1968. Although the School District had moved to establish human relations programs, it was still felt that teachers who could not understand and cope with the special problems in the Central Area schools should be assigned elsewhere. The view of many parents, both black and white, was expressed to the School District during the airing of complaints about Meany the previous summer. While understanding that the District had been both disappointed and frustrated with the results of some of the programs for disadvantaged pupils, one parent had said that there was one basic thing which made such failures almost predictable. This was the fact that the programs were aimed at

> . . . changing the attitude of the disadvantaged children, at making up for

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*The reading statistics were especially low. The city mean score for reading in the tenth grade was 54, at Garfield it was 38; for reading in the eighth grade the city mean score was 62, at Washington it was 23; for reading in the sixth grade the city mean was 50, at Mann it was 12.

> some deficiency in them. Now, if Negro children feel hostile and negative because they feel that they are living on the perimeter of the white society and that they are excluded and kept apart even in the very schools they attend, this is not a psychological aberration that can be corrected by a hundred new programs; it is an accurate assessment of the real situation. The deficiency has not all been in the Negro children. . . . If you continue both at Meany and in the school system in general to regard the Negro population as an unwelcome problem that you will do your best to solve, the Negro children will respond by being an unwelcome problem.[2]

Another voice from the summer of 1967 was heard when Les MacIntosh, spokesman for CAPI, expressed somewhat the same thought in slightly different terms. In a letter to the editor at the P-I he said that the problem of poor schools must be solved and he predicted an upheaval in the schools, "If we continue to allow white middle-class teachers to teach in Central Area schools, trying to teach black boys and girls, who have problems far exceeding the education, experience and understanding of their teachers." He saw District attempts to recruit "qualified" black teachers and administrators as a failure, adding that such efforts indicated ". . . they have been half-stepping at best." He then made the District an offer:

> "Since we claim to understand the problems and the School Board claims they cannot solve the problem, then it would seem only natural that the board should delegate its responsibilities to CAPI."[3]

While lacking MacIntosh's self-assurance, other groups had attempted to bring organizations in the Central Area together to try for some agreement on plans for school improvements. The Garfield Advisory Committee had invited a number of organizations to a meeting to reach some common ground, and only three sent representatives. Central Seattle Community Council asked organizations in the area for written proposals, and they received one reply.[4]

On August 3, an all-day workshop succeeded in attracting sufficient community representation to encourage further steps toward citizen involvement in decisions affecting Central Area schools. It had been planned by a small group of people who had long been active in Central Area education projects, especially those of the Central Seattle Community Council and the Urban League.[5]

They had decided that invitations to that large, all-day meeting should go to any group that had ever done anything in connection with education in the Central Area. The workshop attracted twenty-two representatives from sixteen organizations which spanned the entire spectrum of opinion, age, experience and militancy. The following organizations were represented:

Black Students Union	Meany PTA
Central Seattle Community Council	Minor PTA
Garfield Advisory Committee	Model Cities
Harrison Community Council	Multi-service Center
Harrison PTA	NAACP
Leschi Improvement Council	Negro Voters League
Madrona Community Council	Urban League
Madrona PTA	Yesler-Atlantic Neighborhood Improvement Project

Each group presented a report of its educational goals and ideas for solving the Central Area crisis. In an effort to achieve consensus, the common items were extracted from the various positions. These common goals pointed in the direction of greater control by the community over its schools. Among the "general accepted common goals" were in-service training for all school personnel, changes in teacher preparation at the college level, and the removal from Central Area schools of all teachers who could not relate effectively to the students.[6]

The group circulated a report of the meeting to all the organizations which had been invited to the workshop, and they reconvened during the following week in order to set some action in motion before school opened. At the second meeting, it was found that most of the organizations could endorse the common goals, and that ". . . creation of the community (or sub-district) school board was first priority."[7] At the original workshop, the decision had been made to

> Make contact with School Board for a future meeting with representatives of

> those groups that are in basic agreement. Before this meeting we will take it to the total Central Area community: other organizations, individuals in the community, no press releases. Copies to memberships. [sic][8]

The workshop's sponsors made every effort to involve all segments of the community. They saw the need for an end to fighting among Central Area groups; and felt that any program for improving the schools which was presented and supported by a unified voice would have the greatest chance of District acceptance. A series of large, public meetings followed in August. Positions expressed at those meetings regarding a sub-district board ranged all the way from total control and separation from the Seattle School District to no community control at all.

From those August meetings emerged what came to be known as the Ad Hoc Committee for Central Area Education. This was a fluid group, with little formal structure although it was built around a solid core comprised mainly of the original workshop participants and planners. Its ad hoc status was deemed essential to avoid identification with any existing group or program. In order to avoid creating a single target for opponents, co-chairmen were elected, and the choice of Ed Banks and Matthew Hudson gave the group stability and respect in the community.[9]

The Ad Hoc Committee held regular weekly public meetings (usually at Meany Junior High School) in which policy decisions were made and the community was, in turn, kept informed of the committee's progress in dealings with the School District. The committee had approached the School Board, as envisioned on August 3, and "after several meetings, an agreement was reached [for the District] to negotiate with representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee."[10]

The Ad Hoc Committee selected a negotiating team and named Bea Hudson as its spokesman. What was to be negotiated was some kind of elected body to speak for the Central Area on education matters. Negotiations began September 12 and ran through January 15, 1969. There were frequent sessions, and the Ad Hoc team reported back to the community each week in the Committee's public meetings. The team received direction and suggestions in those meetings, and a point of considerable conflict was the extent of community control to be sought by the negotiators.[11] For its part, the School District was concerned with the legitimacy of the group as a voice for the Central Area, and as negotiations proceeded much of its attention was directed toward the representation on any elected body, qualifications for candidates in any election, and details of an election itself.[12]

A final agreement was reached between the

negotiation teams on January 15, 1969, with only minor changes made later by mutual agreement. An election, supervised by the League of Women Voters, was held on March 29, 1969, to choose a Central Area School Council. The Council was given formal recognition by the School Board at its meeting on April 2, 1969.

The School Board could not legally delegate any of its power or authority to a sub-board or area council,[13] and in the final analysis the Central Area School Council was an advisory body. The Ad Hoc negotiators had secured a major concession, however, in that the Council was to be an elected one, and it was perceived as having power by virtue of the agreement giving the Council equal voice with the School District in the selection of an administrator for the Central Area. The Ad Hoc Committee issued a final report in April, which included the following summary of its agreement with the School District:

SUMMARY OF AGREEMENT

> Decentralization and formation of the Central Area School Council would provide for an Administrator to be at cabinet level and be responsible directly to the Superintendent. The Central Area Administrator would be responsible for . . . [all] aspects of the school program, under the final authority of the Seattle School Board. The paramount issue then became the relationship of a community School Council to the Administrator of a decentralized district. The two major issues were agreed to as follows: (1) The Administrator will be selected jointly by

> the School Council and the Seattle School District; (2) The Council will be elected so that its responsibility is to the people and its power is derived from the people. . . .[14]

It was agreed that five of the Council members would be elected from the Central Area at large and eleven would be elected by voters residing in the elementary school attendance areas which they would represent. The election was well promoted and publicized by both daily newspapers and the community weekly. There were 4,950 ballots cast to elect the sixteen member Council.[15]

Even as the Ad Hoc team and the School District representatives met to negotiate that fall, the crisis in the schools grew with additional incidents of violence. There were disturbances of varying degree at Washington, Cleveland, Rainier Beach, Garfield and Franklin, not all of which were in the Central Area. The most serious trouble occurred at Rainier Beach, and, again, at Washington Junior High.

Rumor and over-reaction fueled an incident which occurred at Rainier Beach on the first day of school in 1968, and tension in the school and the community lasted well into the next week. On Wednesday, September 4, a "routine" hallway confrontation between two boys resulted in an afterschool fight off the school grounds in which a white

student attacked a younger black student.* The fight attracted a crowd of ". . . about 200 student spectators. News accounts written from police reports gave the impression that white students were ganging up on black students," according to Principal Donald Means. Rumors flew, and on Thursday some parents began taking children out of school. A group of ". . . black youths not enrolled at Rainier Beach appeared about noon, but left when Means talked to them." The rumor volume increased, but Friday began quietly with parent and community volunteers, school staff and security people in the building. Around two o'clock a group of about fifteen Black Panthers, led by Aaron Dixon, went into the school "carrying rifles with open bolts and the barrels pointed at the ceiling." They told Principal Means that "they had come to get assurances their 'black brethren' would not be molested." Means told them that no student would be molested, and the Panthers left when he asked them to. They gathered in a nearby parking lot, and had dispersed by the time police arrived soon after.[16]

The rumor mill reported the situation as having stopped just short of a riot, with the Principal having been

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*The racial composition of the student body at Rainier Beach in the fall of 1968 was 86.6 percent white, 3.6 percent black, 4.8 percent Japanese and 1.8 percent Chinese.

beaten, threats of fire-bombings received, and thirty-five carloads of black youths ready "to descend on the school at 2:30 p.m. 'to tear the place apart.'"[17] The truth, pale by comparison, was alarming enough, and the School District, which had been caught completely off guard, moved to assure parents of measures to prevent any such occurance in the future. An estimated one thousand parents attended a meeting at the school on Monday, September 9, to hear the Superintendent set the record straight. They also heard Seattle Police Chief Frank Ramon say, "'I will tell you flatly that armed invasion of any school in Seattle will not happen again.'"[18] By the end of that week the normal order had been restored.

The District had recommended permanent closure of Washington Junior High, which had been the scene of disorders resulting in the school's early closure one day the previous spring. In September, 1968, the school was closed once again, for two days, when teachers refused to return to the building following three days of sporadic incidents of violence. On Monday a non-student appeared in the building and attacked the principal. He was arrested, "but the students became agitated and disruption of school began." A pistol loaded with blanks was fired into a classroom, and "on Wednesday, a group of non-students who were either Black Panthers or masquerading as Black Panthers began harassing youngsters off the school grounds."

Students milled around the halls, refusing to go to class, and when school was dismissed earlier than usual that afternoon there was disorder in the neighborhood and two nearby stores were looted.[19] The school remained closed on Thursday and Friday.

A meeting of parents was called. The Superintendent clarified what happened and outlined steps to prevent any recurrence. In calling the meeting, Bottomly said, "'We've gone the route on this thing, and I think our patience is at an end.'" He wanted no "'outside agitators, Black Panthers or any others'" at the meeting, just parents, "'to discuss how we can continue the education of their children.'"[20]

The meeting produced expressions of willingness on the part of parents to help in maintaining order and improving conditions. But there was also a very strong note of concern about racism among the school staff and the inability of some teachers to cope with the realities of the situation. The school reopened the following Monday with parents and increased security forces monitoring the hallways.[21]

Many of the concerns which surfaced in both the Rainier Beach and Washington parent meetings had been expressed in the Central Area for some time and they underscored the goals of the Ad Hoc negotiating team. The move toward a community voice in selection of an administrator

for their decentralized area was seen as one way of dealing with the problem of insensitive and inadequate teachers and administrators.

Reorganization of the School District administrative structure had been a consideration since as early as 1961, when a study by the management consultant firm of Booz, Allen and Hamilton had recommended dividing the District geographically into two administrative units with the ship canal being a dividing line. The establishment of a separate administrative planning unit for the Southeast Education Center in the spring of 1968 had begun a move toward greater decentralization. The creation of the Central Area School Council (CASC) and a separate administrative entity fit into long-range plans for a city-wide change.[22] The coincidence of publicity about Central Area "local control" and city-wide decentralization succeeded in clouding both issues and the present writer observed that the confusion surfaced later among the issues raised by opponents of integrated middle schools and the Central Area School Council.

While there were high hopes that CASC would provide a greater minority voice in School District affairs, there was a move toward black representation on the School Board, which had been sought by civil rights groups since the first meeting on de facto segregation in June, 1963. The Board had come to realize the necessity of this kind of

change and they had an "understanding that if a Board vacancy occurred a minority person would be appointed."[23]

Early in the 1969 session of the State Legislature, a bill was introduced in the Senate to enlarge the Seattle School Board from five to seven members, which would assure two immediate Board vacancies. A major amendment was added to the bill in the House by 37th District Representative George Fleming, the Legislature's lone black member. The Fleming amendment provided for Board members to be elected from director districts rather than on a city-wide basis. Fearing that a fragmented and increasingly politicized School District would result from election of the Board by "wards," the District fought the Fleming amendment. Fleming himself saw it as a guarantee that the rest of the city could not defeat a black candidate from the Central Area. A House-Senate conference committee produced a compromise measure which provided for candidates to be nominated from individual director districts while still being elected in the general election on a city-wide ballot. The bill was signed by Governor Dan Evans on March 25, 1969.[24]

The School Board's first black member was Alfred E. Cowles, Executive Secretary of the Washington State Board Against Discrimination. He and Joseph O. Epler, a savings and loan executive, were appointed to the newly created positions on May 7, and they both stood for election the

following fall. Cowles had strong city-wide backing and defeated his general election opponent by more than 25,000 votes. Epler, on the other hand, was defeated in the November election by Richard J. Alexander, whom he trailed by just over 13,000 votes. Alexander, an employee of the Boeing Comapny, was elected to represent the Ballard and Green Lake areas of the city, and he later said that at the time of that election, ". . . desegregation wasn't a problem," and that no one thought much about it outside the Central Area.[25]

Cowles was a relative newcomer to the Central Area when he was appointed to the Board. He had an early opportunity to heighten his credibility with the community and to solidify its support for him. He publicly challenged his Board colleagues on a matter of importance to CASC and broke the unanimity of the Board, which had long been a source of irritation to the Central Area and civil rights leaders. The newly organized School Council found itself at odds with the School Board over the choice of a Central Area Administrator. At a heated meeting of the two groups in May, the issue had come down to CASC's demand for its administrator to have direct access to Bottomly rather than reporting through a deputy superintendent and for its administrator to have a salary commensurate with the District's other two assistant superintendents, regardless of seniority. By supporting the CASC

position, Cowles gained its trust and confidence, because, in his words, ". . . they felt that I had the guts to stand up to six colleagues . . . whether I won or not was not nearly as important as representing a point of view that was very important to them."[26]

The Council's choice for the administrator's job was Dr. Roland Patterson, Principal of Meany Junior High, and he was officially appointed to the post in July. Patterson, an advocate of community control, was highly respected by most of the Central Area community, and Bottomly once described him as ". . . a brilliant, hard-driving administrator; yet . . . one who is concerned about children and parents."[27]

Patterson was to become one of the most controversial people ever to appear on the Seattle school scene. He did bring a measure of order and improvement to some Central Area schools, winning for himself a dedicated and devoted following. But as the District moved on toward implementation of the multiracial middle school policy and the city became aware of plans for decentralization, he generated fear and opposition elsewhere among those who saw in him the danger of a Central Area "take over" of their schools.

The School Council and Patterson worked incredibly long hours, and in the course of the next school year (1969-70) they developed an educational plan for the

Central Area which they submitted to the School Board for approval. This came to be known as the "4-4-4 Plan," and it was implemented in Central Area schools in the fall of 1970. Briefly, the plan called for grade configurations in elementary schools to be changed to kindergarten through grade four. Exceptions were Harrison, which became an early childhood center for children through second grade, Colman and Minor, which remained kindergarten through grades six and five respectively, and Madrona, which became the fifth and sixth grade center for a newly established middle school. Meany Junior High was designated the seventh and eighth grade facility for the middle school (which became known as Meany-Madrona) and Washington Junior High was closed.

The 4-4-4 Plan required transportation of children from their neighborhood schools in some instances (e.g., Harrison), and it did result in increased black enrollment in some of the peripheral schools which had previously been predominantly white, as well as at Meany. Some parents in those schools had fought the 4-4-4 Plan throughout its planning stages, and in August, 1970, six families filed suit against the School District, charging it with practicing racial discrimination. The suit alleged that the 4-4-4 reorganization had increased non-white enrollment in Central Area schools while allowing other schools in the city to remain "predominantly or exclusively

attended by white students." It sought to have the court order the District to present "an acceptable plan to achieve meaningful racial balance in the public schools throughout Seattle School District No. 1," while ordering an interim open-enrollment plan "where any student . . . is allowed to attend any public school . . . without regard to race, color, national origin" or distance from home to school.[28]

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Not long after these charges were made public, the School Board's plans for more schools throughout the city also became public knowledge. Beginning with page one stories on Sunday, September 27, both daily papers carried extensive coverage of a plan calling for mandatory reassignment of students between Meany-Madrona and Hamilton, Wilson and Eckstein Junior Highs which were, in the process, being converted to middle schools.

If, as Board member Alexander said, desegregation had not been thought of much by anyone outside the Central Area a year earlier, that would no longer be the case in Seattle. Reaction to "middle school bussing" was immediate and stormy. Candidate oratory and posturing during campaigns for the legislature that fall fanned the fire and a series of public meetings called by the School Board to explain and defend its plans produced large and hostile crowds. The formation of an organization called Citizens

Against Mandatory Bussing (CAMB) provided well organized and funded opposition to the middle schools, including legal action which succeeded in delaying full implementation of the plan for one year beyond the target date of September, 1971.

While the usual objections were voiced and charges were made that the District was going beyond its jurisdiction in mandating "social change," and acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner doing so, the record shows that the Board had arrived only very carefully and gradually at its middle school policy in 1968. In the two years which had elapsed since then, the evidence is equally as strong that decisions were carefully weighed and that the Board had moved essentially to improve educational opportunity and school climate rather than to simply bring about social change.

The middle school decision took a heavy political toll. Dr. Palmason was defeated for re-election to the Board in the fall of 1971, the first incumbent within memory to be unseated. Dr. Tidwell resigned from the Board on March 29, 1972. The ultimate political drama was played out in January, 1973, when charges filed two years earlier resulted in a recall election for the four remaining Board members who had made the mandatory middle school desegregation decision--Cowles, Smith, Swain and Wagoner. The voters sustained them in office, but within a year

Cowles resigned, Smith and Wagoner did not seek re-election, and Forbes Bottomly, who had led the District through eight tumultuous years, resigned as Superintendent.

The mandatory middle school plan which had created dissension in the city had always been considered Bottomly's doing, and he had become the focus of debate in the recall election. Many people never saw him as other than a "Johnny-come-lately" to Seattle, who had turned the comfortable status quo upside-down and made life difficult. Saying, "'This is the time for me to go,'" rather than risk being a divisive issue in the School Board election of 1973, he chose to resign that summer. As he was leaving office in August he said that

> ". . . people who have fears and anxieties and hate have to have a person to focus on. I think I consciously became a lightning rod for that so people could be angry with me and not at the school system so we could pass our school levies.
>
> As a result, I think the system stayed healthy while controversy raged, but that was healthy, too, for education and for the city.[29]

The social revolution of the sixties had taken a heavy toll on the people who had tried to steer society's institutions through that decade. After six years on the School Board, taking the brunt of attack against the school system, Smith and Wagoner could not be faulted for not seeking re-election. It is possible, too, that they did not want to tempt political fate too far and risk

defeat by reactionary opponents who would threaten the progress of the past few years.

The desegregated middle school program was implemented in the fall of 1972. It involved only Meany-Madrona, Hamilton, Wilson and Eckstein. Succeeding Administrations and Boards appear to have lacked the commitment and dedication to the middle school plan which would have been necessary to sustain it and to realize the city-wide program envisioned in 1968.

The school which was created at Meany-Madrona was perhaps the finest accomplishment of the Central Area community's effort to improve its schools. It enjoyed tremendous community support and involvement in its first years, and it reflected the best of what was possible from "community control."

The violence with interracial overtones which some schools experienced in the 1968-69 school year rightly alarmed parents of all students. It increased the difficulty of inaugurating any programs at any grade levels which could effectively desegregate the schools. Within the Central Area itself suit was filed against the District to prevent the inclusion of some previously predominantly white schools in the newly proposed 4-4-4 Plan.

In the course of pressuring the School District for more and better things for their schools, the Central Area community had succeeded in establishing an elected council

whose power was more apparent than real. The coincidence of the Central Area School Council with the administrative reorganization of the District served to alarm many in other parts of the city. It became an issue which fueled the fight against change in the schools and was a factor in producing major and effective opposition to desegregated middle schools when the District finally implemented its policy decision of 1968.

CONCLUSION

In 1965, as they were editorially opposing the Urban League's Triad Plan, the Seattle Times said that the plan had been presented after "disillusionment in a community which seems to wish well for Negroes, but seems unwilling or unable to recognize that there is a time bomb ticking away." The time bomb, of course, referred to escalating civil rights activity. The description of the city as wishing its black citizens well while being unwilling or unable to deal realistically with the situation would appear to characterize the stance of the city toward integrating its schools during the period between 1954 and 1968.

During the first decade following the Brown decision the School District came very slowly to the admission that segregation existed in its schools, and once that point had been reached there was a long period during which the School Board came slowly to accept an obligation to actively integrate schools as well as to desegregate those which were racially impacted. It was an enormous change which the Board made from its position in 1954, that whatever racial imbalance there may be was caused by housing patterns, hence not their "fault," to its adoption of a proposal to create racially balanced middle schools, which,

despite reluctance to publicly speak in terms of transportation or "bussing," obviously would require mandatory pupil reassignment from customary neighborhood school patterns.

The press, for its part, did little to assist the School Board in its attempt to break out of the earlier pattern. The Times, especially, seemed willing to express platitudes in support of equal opportunity, but stopped short of supporting any proposals which would actually accomplish an integration of the schools. By 1968 the Post-Intelligencer was showing a willingness to entertain thoughts of some basic changes in the system if there were to be any hope for dealing with the city's shifting racial balance.

The schools enjoyed the support of the clergy along most of the route it took during that period. The black clergy had provided the driving force behind demands for change in the early sixties, and the white clergy, especially as represented by the Catholic Archdiocese and the Greater Seattle Council of Churches, joined them to give strong support to measures which the Board took to improve equal opportunity and to desegregate the schools. The Church Council took an active role in promoting "reverse transfer" recruitment for the Voluntary Racial Transfer Program in 1968, even as it had supported the VRT from its beginnings in 1963. The creation of the Ecumenical

Metropolitan Ministry in the mid-sixties provided another voice from the clergy as well as another link with civil rights activists.

Seattle was fortunate in that it did not experience the rancorous and divisive polarization of the sort inflicted on Boston by the politics of Louise Day Hicks. That Seattle had a relatively small black population and was confronted with demands for desegregation later than other major communities may have been factors; but the early and continued presence in the city of an organization such as Civic Unity Committee and the status of the Urban League in the city's establishment can not be overlooked. Even though Civic Unity appears to have been timid and paternalistic in its approach to race relations, service on its board and committees had, since 1943, provided exposure to interracial problems and programs for people who both then and later were influential in the life of the city.

The Urban League, too, had given to civic leaders and representatives from the School District opportunities to learn and grow in the area of race relations. Even though it, too, seemed less aggressive in pursuit of school desegregation than some of the later civil rights groups, it remained constant and in the long run provided great support, both moral and financial, for new and more militant efforts in the later sixties. Its Triad Plan served to

rouse the city and put it on notice that changes were due in the neighborhood school concept which had always governed School District policy.

Other civil rights organizations came to apply greater pressure on the School District. The fact that Seattle's desegregation moves coincided with growing militancy in the civil rights movement made the schools a prime stage on which that drama could be played out. Even though the newer, more militant voices appeared to gain power and to have greater influence with the School District, the impression remains that Seattle's Central Area never lost its basic moderate-to-conservative caste. There was no wholesale turn to militant leadership, and even though the community sought and obtained a greater role in running its schools, great influence still rested with people such as Ed Banks and Walter Hundley. Hundley's role as Director of the Model Cities Program guaranteed him influence in the Central Area and the city at large.

As the School District changed from offering compensatory programs to assure equal educational opportunity to physically integrating the schools in order to provide multiracial experiences, one thing remained constant. The Seattle District approached segregated schools as an educational problem rather than purely a race problem, even as it went from asserting that the schools had no role in social reform to accepting an obligation to provide an

integrated school experience for all students. Educational soundness and effectiveness had been the primary concern in all strategies from the earliest compensatory programs under Superintendent Ernest Campbell through the continuous progress and middle school proposals put forth by Forbes Bottomly. That Seattle's desegregation attempts coincided with other social upheavals and challenges to prevailing values would appear to have made it more difficult for people to accept changes in the educational system.

The changes which took place in the Seattle school system between 1954 and 1968 obviously reflect the changes which took place in the thinking and the attitudes of the School Board members. Mrs. Owen was referring to the persistence of Reverend John Adams in 1963 when she said he began to wear the Board down rather than changing their thinking, adding ". . . except that he must have--because something . . . brought us to this feeling that we must open things up, and allow students to go to other schools." All of the elements noted above entered into the Board's changed stance. There was constant pressure from civil rights groups, continued recommendations from groups such as the Central Area principals, support for integration strategies from organizations ranging from the Anti-Defamation League to the League of Women Voters, and growing concern about school climate from the "grass roots."

Gradually the Board lost some of its euphoria about Central Area schools and they listened to parent groups who had become aware of a true crisis. The Board had known that change and innovation was essential for the District when they selected Forbes Bottomly as Superintendent, and they were to a great extent responding to his perceptions and innovations when they made the policy decision in 1968 which set them on the course toward integrated middle schools and mandatory pupil reassignment.

Seattle enjoyed leadership of exceptionally high quality from that School Board which arrived at and later attempted to implement the middle school policy. Although they moved slowly and cautiously, their leadership was firm, bending little to accommodate shifting public sentiment and pressure. If they could be faulted at all by integrationists, perhaps it would be for their reluctance to act earlier and as boldly as they might have in the face of the need to go to the voters for annual approval of a levy for operating funds. (They never "lost" a levy, even in the spring of 1971 following the outcry over middle schools.)

The civil rights groups which confronted the School District early in the sixties also provided leadership of exceptional quality in the city. It may be true that these leaders were way ahead of the black community grass roots, but by the time the community was fully awakened to

its educational crisis, by which time the national mood was shifting toward local control or even separatism, that early leadership had established dialogue with a School Board which was willing to listen and to make changes. New community spokesmen emerged, and their determination reinforced a School District willing to listen and compromise. The election of the Central Area School Council established a new relationship between school and community.

Seattle was fortunate in having a determined, though small, group of white citizens who believed in a racially integrated society and school system. Many of them lived in mixed neighborhoods whose schools had become integrated naturally, and many had been involved in the boundary controversies surrounding Harrison, Madrona and McGilvra schools in the late fifties. They stood firm, remained in the public schools and worked hard to integrate those schools and improve their educational climate. Their position won support from parents throughout the city, and by 1968 there was growing sentiment for school integration.

. . . . . .

Seattle had always considered itself different, and many in the city had seen no relevance for Seattle in the pressing problems and rapidly deteriorating conditions in other school systems. It was thought to have more good will and more time for solving its problems than other cities, and, indeed, it was frequently referred to in the

sixties as the "city with a chance." When events and statistics proved that Seattle was not immune to crisis, the School Board responded with a policy which contained the potential for a long-term solution to the problem of desegregating the District's schools.

Perhaps the recall election of 1973 had a telling effect on later Board members, who appear to have been hesitant to initiate any lasting integration programs. It seems as though Seattle had the will to deal with desegregation only when the problem reached crisis proportions. The momentum generated by civil rights and community activists and by the promise of middle schools in 1970 was allowed to slacken. Not until there was the threat of litigation and possible Federal Court intervention in 1977 would the Board and Administration again direct serious attention to solving the problem of racial imbalance (de facto segregation). Given the response which the city made to the crisis in the sixties under the leadership of public-minded people of good will, however, there is hope that Seattle's response to the challenge of the late seventies and the eighties will result in further progress toward realizing the long-established goal of providing an integrated education, "by whatever just, reasonable and educationally sound means are available to us."

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Doris Hinson Pieroth was born in Seattle, Washington, on January 24, 1930, the daughter of Lucille Lorton Hinson and Hurshel Dean Hinson. Her family moved to Prague, Oklahoma, in 1942, where she graduated from Prague High School in 1947. She holds the following degrees: Bachelor of Science from Oklahoma College for Women, Chickasha, Oklahoma; Master of Science in Physical Education from Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts; and Master of Arts from the University of Washington. She is married to John Philip Pieroth, Jr., and they have two daughters, Suzanne and Jeanne.