



**D. On the Present Political Situation in Burma and Our Tasks**  
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## I. A Decisive Period of Revolutionary Possibilities

The Year 1948 will be the most decisive year for the Burmese revolution. The conferment of bogus "independence" on Burma on January 4, 1948 is an imperialist manoeuvre to launch another assault on the Burmese people, fighting for real independence and people's democracy. Desperate efforts will be made by the British imperialists in collaboration with the A.F.P.F.L. Government to rally mass support by capitalising the "independence" celebrations and then launch a virulent anti-communist campaign, both political and military. Imperialism knows that its plans to tighten its grip over Burma's colonial exploitation behind the facade of "fake independence" will not succeed unless it is able to disrupt and then crush the rising mass resistance of the people by isolating the Communists and launching full scale civil war against them.

The dastardly murders of Aung San and his colleagues, planned and executed by the imperialists and their reactionary agents (1) were to be the beginning of such an assault against the rising mass resistance, and of a civil war against the Communists to smash once for all the possibilities of united resistance of Burmese people. Their aim was to get a provisional Government which would be a more pliant tool than Aung San, which would readily accept this treaty of slavery (2) and put it across to the people as one of real independence. They wanted a Government which, while it had still the prestige of Aung San Government among the people, would be a more reliable instrument of unleashing a full scale civil war against the rising mass resistance of the people led by the Communists. They have succeeded in disorganising the forces of the national movement and in getting such a Government which has already begun to make serious preparations for civil war.

Our prompt rallying of the people against the national murders, our bold and thorough exposure of the imperialists as the main movers behind this dastardly attack had prevented the imperialists from putting the blame for the murders upon the Communists.

Similarly our full blast campaign against the treaty of slavery and national humiliation has its supporters, the Thakin Nu-Bo Let Ya (3)

- 1) Immediately after the assassination of Aung San on 19 July 1947, Thakin Soe and his "Red Flag" were suspected to have been involved in the murder (see, e.g., The Burmese Review, 18 August 1947). The Communists (CPB), for their part, accused the imperialists of having staged the murder. When Ba Tin (a) Goshal repeated this accusation in his thesis, U Saw was already tried for having organized the murder out of egoistic motives.
- 2) Refers to Nu-Attlee Agreement (see also doc. B.5, pp.59-66).

gang and the Socialist leaders, already on the defensive. We have already pricked the bubble of "independence" that was inaugurated on January 4 and we have begun to expose its true nature to the people.

The resulting situation is one in which the Provisional Government is yet unstable and the forces of mass resistance in the fighting areas (\*2) of Arakan and Central Burma (4) remain undefeated despite military operations against them and are rising. The Provisional Government has not solved a single problem of the people; on the contrary, acting as tool of imperialism, it is pursuing a policy which deepens the economic crisis in the towns and the rural areas. Discontent and disillusionment regarding the Government is growing among the people. Faced with the situation, the Government is seeking a solution by intensifying repression in its desperate though hopeless effort to exterminate the forces of mass resistance. The Provisional Government is placing Burma on the brink of a disastrous civil war.

But the self-critical analysis of the results of our intervention and campaign after the national murders and the CC resolution of July 30 (5) should (\*lead\*) us to see how such a situation could develop. The tremendous response of the masses and the revolutionary situation which developed in consequence stands in sharp contrast to the vacillation the tailist policy we have been following as a result of the reformist deviation that has affected us in this period.

We must realise that the situation as has developed since is yet extremely favourable for the advance of the revolution, for the consolidation of the fighting areas, for a bold lead to all mass struggles against the effects of the crisis in the other areas, for a bolder and more vigorous exposure of the independence of the treaty of slavery and of the collaborating leaderships of the AFPFL. The situation is favourable for launching a bold drive for AFPFL-Communist unity (6) from below, isolating the leaders, for building real fighting people's front, bringing into existence a real people's Government. The situation is favourable for us to move forward to forestall their assault on the people which is being brought about

- 3) U (Thakin) Nu became Prime Minister after the assassination of Aung San; Bo Let Ya was Deputy Prime Minister (see p.62, note 7).
- 4) Fighting had begun in Arakan about two years earlier as a movement relatively independent from the events in Burma and of the Communists there. The fighting in Central Burma was partly instigated by the "Red Flag".
- 5) This resolution was not available to the editor.
- 6) AFPFL-Communist unity was called for by the CPB already in March 1947 and the efforts intensified after Aung San's death (see doc. A 6, pp.33-36, and B.5 to B.7, pp.59-71).

by unleashing civil war, so that one can mould the developments towards a national uprising against imperialism and for real independence and people's democracy.

That is why it becomes all the more urgent to root out the reformist deviation which began to paralyse our revolutionary outlook and practice soon after Aung San's death. It is undoubtedly true that this derailment originally came from our decision that we must rally behind the Thakin Nu Government which was represented as vigorously fighting the imperialist reactionary conspiracy. It was further confirmed later by our CC resolution which described the running manoeuvre of imperialism as a "serious national advance" and the "Provisional Government" which was itself a product of collaboration with imperialism and tied to imperialism bureaucratic machinery, as a "strategic (\*3) weapon" in the hands of the people. In consequence, we sought to adapt the programme and policy of the "final seizure of power" to the reformist and opportunist line expressed in our July CC resolution, taking it to be the correct revolutionary one in the situation. Our CC resolution of July 30, 1947 despite its apparent advocacy of "national war" in essence laid down the line of tailing behind Thakin Nu and Ba Swe and of toning down the struggles.

Out of this arose the reformist illusion that we could join the Provisional Government of Thakin Nu and Ba Swe, isolate them within the Government on the basis of our strength in the united front. We totally forgot the Leninist principle that the imperialist bureaucracy and State machine cannot be taken over and run in the interest of the people: on the contrary, it has to be smashed.

In October 1947, when we held our study class on the theory of colonial revolutions on the basis of the colonial thesis of the 6th Congress of Communist International we began to realise the reformist and opportunist implications of the CC resolution. But the understanding was yet formal; the turn was not made and the theory of proletarian hegemony in the colonial revolutions was not concretely applied to the situation which had arisen after the murder of Aung San. We did not see that the aim of the attack was not to replace the AFPFL leadership by the Saw-Sein-Maw (\*4) (7) gang but to force

- 7) a) U Saw (1900-1948): Burmese; Minister and then, 1940-1942, Prime Minister; detained by the British during the war; reformed the Myochit Party (see p.47, note 1), 1946; accompanied Aung San to London, January 1947, but repudiated the agreement; arrested in July 1947 for the murder of Aung San and the Cabinet Ministers; sentenced in December 1947 and hanged in May 1948.  
b) Thakin Ba Sein (1910-1964): Burmese; founder of Dobama Asia-yone; Minister under the Japanese; member of Governor's Execu-

the remaining AFPFL leadership itself in the position of subservient collaboration. We did not see that what was achieved was not real independence and that the AFPFL leadership had finally entered the path of subservient collaboration with imperialism.

But the rot has not been stopped. We write and act as if on January 4 "independence" has come. We continue to tail behind the bourgeois and are not coming boldly forward exposing the collaboration (\*of\*) bourgeois leadership, boldly leading the working class and the peasantry and the common people in the struggle for real independence, people's democracy and power. We must realise that only by making a clean break with these reformist deviations, with the illusions about the bourgeois leadership, can we unite the entire Party ranks for taking a bold initiative, leading the struggles in exposing the role of the collaborating leadership of AFPFL, in forestalling their civil war offensive and launching our own counteroffensive of people's resistance, culmination in the national uprising against imperialism, for independence and people's Government and people's democracy.

The situation is full of revolutionary possibilities. If we continue in our reformist deviations we may very easily be overawed by the strength of the collaborators and underestimate that rapidly growing disillusionment of the masses with the collaborating leadership, their increasingly rising against the betrayers, and their willingness to fight. The fate of the Burmese Revolution and also of the revolutionary movements in India and other South-East Asiatic countries are closely linked together. The present situation places great responsibility on our shoulders. We could be the initiators of a new revolutionary upsurge and an uprising which is bound to lead to similar developments in the neighbouring countries. Much therefore depends upon how quickly we uproot this disease of reformism which is eating away the vitals of our Party and swing our forces into action in the coming months.

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tive Council, 1946; accompanied Aung San to London in January 1947, but refused to sign the agreement; after the July assassinations imprisoned till May 1948; continued as politician in opposition; strong anti-communist.

c) Dr. Ba Maw (1893-?): Burmese; barrister; formed Sinyetha (Proletarian) Party; Minister, 1934-1937; Prime Minister 1937 to 1939; interned for anti-war propaganda, 1940; Head of Government during Japanese occupation, 1942-1945; interned in Japan, 1946; after release, reformed Mahabama Party, October 1946; interned during 1948; returned then to legal practice in Rangoon; wrote later Breakthrough in Burma - Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939-1946 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

The purpose of this document is to outline the features of a revolutionary understanding of the new situation and the new class alignment in Burma especially after Januar 4, to highlight politically the reformist deviations of the past CC resolution and indicate the new strategy and tasks. The purpose is to assist our discussions in the party ranks for preparing the resolution for our congress (8).

## II. Imperialist Strategy in the Colonies in the Context of the New International Situation

First and foremost, it is necessary to fight against the illusions that are being shown by imperialists and their social democratic servitors that imperialism is quitting the colonies, is abdicating its rule. It is hoax and the deception which is the main instrument of the national leadership of colonial movements to hide from the masses their going over to collaboration with imperialism; to disorganise and crush the forces of democratic revolution.

We are in a period of acute revolutionary crisis in the colonies where the national revolutionary movements headed by the working class Communist Parties which play a decisive role in them, today stands on the threshold of overthrowing (\*5) imperialist feudal order. Imperialism cannot continue its rule in the old form one single day. This became clear in 1945 and 1946, soon after the end of the second World War. It is impossible for it now to suppress the colonial revolts in the old way. By direct military operations, it can only maintain its rule by making it as "independence" by drawing away the national bourgeois leadership of liberation movements into collaboration with it in the task of disrupting and suppressing the rising forces of democratic revolution.

Party Congress on the new situation and tasks.

The concessions which Imperialism makes to the national bourgeois for this purpose, even though they appear to be far in advance of what imperialism ever gave the national leadership in the past, cannot and must not be viewed as an advance for the national movement. The granting of formal independence to the colonies, which while keeping intact the whole feudal basis of the economic and military domination of imperialism, splits away the national bourgeois leadership from the camp of anti-imperialist (\*6) struggle in order to use it as a weapon of disrupting and smashing the maturing forces of democratic revolution, is not an advance for the national liberation movement but the beginning of a treacherous assault upon it.

8) This congress of the CPB did not take place anymore.

The theory that the recent concessions made by the imperialism to the national bourgeois leadership in India, Burma, Ceylon, etc. are advance(\*s\*) for the national movement which have to be used for further advances, is the weapon of the collaborationist national bourgeois (\*7) leadership to work with the masses and disrupt the growing revolutionary upsurge. Its penetration in the ranks of the Communist Party is the penetration of bourgeois influence in our ranks and is anti-revolutionary.

Thus the statement which occurs in our last CC resolution of July 30, 1947, as well as (\*a\*) similar statement (\*8) regarding the Mountbatten Award which occurs in (\*the\*) Resolution of the CC of the CPI of June 1947 are examples of such influences. The statement referred to is:

"By the Nu-Attlee Agreement formal but serious concessions to the national demand has been wrung out from the British Imperialism." (Similar statement in the Mountbatten award resolution of the CPI is the following: "The Communist Party is of the opinion that new opportunities for national advances have been won." This refers to "imperialist assurance" that no independence relations with princes would be sought. Constituent Assembly is free to declare independence ...)

We must be quite clear that neither the Nu-Attlee Agreement nor the Anglo-Burmese treaty which "recognises the republic of the Union of Burma as a independent sovereign State," (9) is a "serious concession" to the national demand. It is unpardonable for a Communist to be taken in by imperialist manoeuvres about fake independence. We have only to apply one simple test to understand that it is no concession to national demand. The Burmese national demand is the AFPFL programme of January 1946. Has Burma got an "Independent State" which can be an instrument in the hands of the people to implement that programme? The opposite is the case.

The Thakin Nu-Bo Let Ya-Tin Tut-Kyaw Nyein Government (10) have by

- 9) The "Nu-Attlee Agreement" and the "Anglo-Burmese treaty," appearing here as different documents, are actually identical. Article 1 of this Agreement reads: "The Government of the United Kingdom recognize the Republic of the Union of Burma as a fully Independent Sovereign State." (Maung Maung Pye, Burma in the Crucible, op.cit., p.155)
- 10) a) Tin Tut (?-1948): Burmese; Adviser to the Burma Government in exile in Simla, 1942-1945; Member for Finance and Revenue in the second Governor's Executive Council, 1946; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1948; resigned from Cabinet in August 1948 to become Inspector General of Auxiliary Forces (Brigadier) and was assas-

the treaty signed away the inalienable right of the Burmese people to take into their possessions the resources of Burma away from the hands of British monopolists, nationalise them and thus advance towards smashing the imperialist feudal system. They have signed away the right of the Burmese people to build their own people's army of national defence and freedom and agreed to make the Burma Army the dependent and subservient adjunct of the British imperialist forces of aggression not only (\*against\*) Burma but also over the whole of South-East Asia. The strategic air fields of Burma would be paid for and controlled by the British imperialists and would be part of the general Anglo-American imperialist plan of dominating South Asia.

Does the Anglo-Burmese treaty accepted by the AFPFL leadership (\*be a present\* - \*9) of the imperialists and does it show the strength of the national liberation movement? The answer to this question has to be given in terms of the potential strength of the revolutionary upsurge which welled up soon after the war ended. If the leadership of the national movement which at that time was Communist had taken the bold step to a direct clash with imperialism as in the case of Indonesia and Vietnam, imperialism would have collapsed and the proletariat and its party, having strengthened itself in the progress(\*,\*) would have been in a position to consider the resulting position as an advance. But what has happened in Burma was that the revolutionary mass upsurge was not led but betrayed by the national leadership which was at that time also shared by the Communists. Afraid of the rising forces of the revolution and of the growing strength of the working class and the toiling peasantry under the leadership of the Communist Party, it turned to the path of collaboration with imperialism to damn the forces of revolution. Imperialism did not give any concessions to the national bourgeois leadership until it was convinced that it had finally given by the path of opposition and that it would now serve as a reliable base for the perpetuation of colonial rule in a new form and it would serve as a reliable weapon to strike and crush the revolutionary forces.

These concessions are a measure not of the strength but of the weakness of the national movement. They represent not a retreat of imperialism but its moving to position of advantage, from alone it could

minated on leaving the office of New Times of Burma (which he owned and edited) in December 1948.

b) Kyaw Nyein (1915-?): Burmese; succeeded Than Tun as General Secretary of AFPFL, September 1946; accompanied Aung San to London, January 1947; Minister for Home and Judicial Affairs, February 1947; Deputy Prime and Foreign Minister, November 1948 to April 1949; returned to Cabinet in 1951; sided U Ba Swe against U Nu when AFPFL split in 1958; interned after 1962 for several years.

now seek to perpetuate its rule in a new form.

The task of the Communist Party is not to create illusions among the people about the reform (referring the imperialist structure as against revolution) granted by imperialism as "independence" as a retreat of imperialism and an advance of the national movement, but to expose the same as "fake independence" as a new manoeuvre to tighten the grip of their domination over the country.

World imperialism is tremendously weakened as a result of the second World War. We have entered into a new and an accentuated phase of the general cases (\*10) of capitalism. It has to be smashed by the revolutionary might of the working class and the common people. Anglo-American (\*11) imperialism in crisis is seeking a way out by organising an expansionist and predatory drive to dominate the world.

"The basis aim of the imperialist camp is the strengthening of imperialism, the preparation of a new imperialist war, the struggle against socialism and democracy and all round for reactionary pro-fascist regimes and movements." (Zhdanov' report to Communist Parties' Information Conference, 1947).

The deepening of the general crisis of capitalism after the end of the second World War has led to the sharpening of the conflict between the colonial people and imperialism.

"The sharpening of the crisis of the colonial system as a result of the second World War is seen in the mighty surge of the national liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries which threatens the rear of the capitalist system.

"The colonial peoples refuse to live any longer in the old way and the ruling classes of the metropolitan countries cannot rule any longer in the old way. Attempts to suppress the national liberation movement by military force now encounter ever-increasing armed resistance from the colonial peoples and lead to prolonged colonial wars, such as that of Holland in Indonesia and of France in Viet Nam." (Zhdanov, *ibid.*)

In India and Burma too the condition in 1945 and 1946 (\*12) were maturing for united armed resistance by the national liberation movements. British imperialism succeeded in preventing such a development, thanks to the treacherous role played by the national bourgeois leadership, and it must be added, thanks to the reformist and tailist role of the Communist Parties of these two countries.

India and Burma have not won independence without "shedding blood"

without armed resistance against the British, as the hypocritical national bourgeois leaders proclaim; nor have British imperialists voluntarily abdicated their Empire as their social democratic servitors declared.

Imperialists have handed over "fake independence" and a sort of subservient State power to the national bourgeois leadership of Burma and India in return for their preventing the national uprising, in return to become their junior partners collaborators in perpetuating the colonial system. National bourgeois leadership have the State power, only to be used against the growing mass resistance of the people against the colonial system. Afraid of rising forces of the revolution, they are of course doing it more and more and that is why imperialism granted them that concession.

It is an illusion to think that they can and will use it against the imperialists in the interest of their country's independent economic or political development. On the contrary, they have earned State power by agreeing to regard as sacrosanct all imperialist property and interests, all contractual commitments to the imperialist. They have earned it by agreeing to make the armed forces of India and Burma dependent on and subservient to the British imperialist armed forces.

All this is crystal clear in the case of Burmese "independence" and in regard to the Anglo-Burmese treaty. We must denounce this treaty in our day to day agitation as one of Burmese slavery and national humiliation.

It is wrong to think that we would be isolated if we denounce the independence of January 4 as fake independence and expose the treaty on which Thakin Nu stakes his all as a treaty of slavery and national humiliation.

On the other hand, a well documented and concrete exposure of the Treaty, of the fake independence of these leaders who signed it, would isolate them and not us from the masses. The Burmese people already suspect "this gift of imperialism". They are already asking: If this is independence why have things not changed, why are we starving in the villages and why has the wage increase we won in the towns has come to nothing.

We must explain that the leadership which signed this Treaty have betrayed the programme of January 1946. They have signed away behind the back of the Burmese people their inalienable right to confiscate all foreign monopolies to break the shackles (\*of\*) imperialist monopoly domination which has reduced the Burmese to begging destitutes in their own rich homeland.

We must explain that the British imperialists murdered Aung San and the other AFPFL leaders in order to get a subservient leadership which sign such a treaty of national humiliation. Aung San himself had reformist illusions about British imperialism. He too pursued the path of collaboration with imperialism. But he appeared to learn from bitter experience of imperialist trickery of September 1946 and January 1947. He signed the San-Attlee agreement but was not sure if it was betrayal.

Between January and June 1947 he began to vacillate and hence he began to talk of reassertion of the programme of January 1946, towards AFPFL-Communist unity under the pressure of growing upsurge. Imperialists suspected that Aung San may refuse to agree to alliance with the Communists. That is why they murdered him.

Those who stepped in his shoes and have proved themselves pliant tools of imperialists in accepting the treaty must be denounced as betrayers of the ideals of Aung San and of the AFPFL. Their reporting to corpses must be exposed as hypocrisy.

### III. Aung San's Murders and After

In the six months that have elapsed since the murders of Aung San and his colleagues, significant changes have taken place in Burma. Thakin Nu Government which was formed immediately after the murders, has since decisively (\*swung in\*) to the path of subservient collaboration with imperialism. On August 29th it signed the Bo Let Ya-Free(\*man Agree\*)ment by which the British Government agreed to withdraw its troops as soon as possible while in return the Burmese Government (\*13) agree(\*d\*) to receive military mission from (\*the\*) British and from no other country. On Oct.16th, the Government signed the Nu-Attlee agreement which finalised the Anglo-Burmese treaty. According to this treaty Burma is nominally recognised as "an independent sovereign Republic" while the entire economic and military power still remains in the hands of British imperialists same as before. The signing of this treaty which comes into operation on January 4 does not bring either freedom or independence to the Burmese people. On the other hand the Thakin Nu Government is proving itself a mere subservient and pliant tool of British imperialist which the latter considers absolutely reliable. It is already carrying on a vigorous and brutal suppression of the fighting peasants in Arakan and in Middle Burma. It has demanded the surrender of all arms and issued an ordinance that possession of arms would be punished with death by open execution. It has banned "private armies" - a measure which is only meant to illegalise the volunteers of the C.P.B.

In other words the Thakin Nu Government has gone over to open col-

laboration with the British Imperialism. A new class alignment which came into force after Aung San's murder has been finalised in the conferment of bogus independence; this makes it necessary for (\*us\*) to formulate a new strategic (\*14) and tactical line. It requires a further sharpening of the policy and line laid down in the final seizure of power.

Instead however there has been a resetting (\*15) back from the fundamental analysis and slogans of that resolution, into a reformist and opportunist position. We slid back to a reformist approach. We must therefore examine in some detail the situation created by these murders and the policies and tactics we have followed in the subsequent period.

We must be quite clear that it was Aung San, representing the rising merchant bourgeois(\*ie\*) of Burma, which initiated the policy of compromise and collaboration with imperialism, allying himself with the representatives of the compradore bourgeoisie and the landlords in the AFPFL. Like a typical bourgeois leader he again and again threatened and headed struggle only in order to compromise. In September 1946 he headed the great upsurge, when all-Burma was paralysed by an all-in general strike combined with militant peasant demonstrations all over the country. But as soon as imperialism showed some willingness to grant concessions he betrayed the struggles, disrupted strikes and expelled the Communists from the AFPFL (11). What he got is an entry into the Governor's Executive Council and a promise of powers for the AFPFL.

We also did the same thing as Aung San, because of our reformist policy. But as soon as we understood our mistake, we came out of the Executive Council (12), urging upon the remaining AFPFL leaders to follow our step. It was no doubt, under imperialism's pressure, Aung San drove us out under the pretext of organisational indiscipline.

When by January he saw no sign of the Governor fulfilling the promise and discontent began to rise in his rank (\*16) and file and among the people, he again worked up the threat for a PVO-Socialist rising the general strikes of the workers in January at the time when he was in London, negotiating with the Attlee Government for full powers for his Government. As soon as he got the Aung San-Attlee Agreement which recognised by convention his Government as a Dominion Government (13), Aung San again betrayed the rising. When

11) See doc. B.2 to B.4 (pp.49-58).

12) See doc. A.5 (pp.31-32).

13) The British files make it absolutely clear that all negotiations run to the effect that Burma would not be a Dominion after independence - last not least because Aung San and other feared the

the New Times described Aung San at that time as acting as the tool of BRITISH Imperialism, they were objectively right.

Yet the final compromise with Imperialism was not yet settled. The San-Attlee agreement granted "financial autonomy" to the "Aung San Government" which was yet a Governor's Executive Council. It was supposed to function as "Dominion Government" only by convention, i.e. by the goodwill of the Governor Rance (14). In other words, Governor Rance was yet the supreme ruler. Aung San began to feel the pressure of the agitation of the Communist(\*s\*) who were denouncing the Aung San-Attlee agreement as a betrayal. In June, Aung San sent Thakin Nu to London to negotiate for the grant of Dominion Status to Burma, pending the final attainment of independence. When this was known to Burma, there was a wave of angry protests; all the people declaring that Burma does not want Dominion Status but immediate independence.

While Thakin Nu was busy carrying on the negotiations in London, Aung San was once again building up anti-British pressures in Burma, in order to get more concessions.

The Nu-Attlee talks resulted in the secret understanding that Burma would be recognised as an "independent sovereign republic" (\*17) if the Burmese leaders agreed to draft an agreement of British military and economic hold over Burma. When General Aung San saw the drafts after Nu's return in July, he disapproved of them (15). On July 13, in a public speech General Aung San reasserted Burma's demand for independence, in terms of the AFPFL January programme and spoke of struggle and united front to achieve the same.

Imperialism took this wavering of Aung San seriously because it was taking place against the background of the tremendous post-election upsurge. They knew that this upsurge was being led by the Communists and affecting the PVO rank and file as well. Our correct and sharp criticism of Aung San's compromising policy accompanied by our strong appeal for AFPFL-CP unity for national uprising (in our pamphlet "Whither Aung San") had tremendous effect upon the PVO rank and file.

By July 1947 the situation was developing towards a general uprising. Workers' General Strike in Rangoon, anti-Dominion status demon-

Communist propaganda against this status.

14) Sir Hubert Rance was Governor from 31 August 1946 to 4 January 1948, the day Burma became independent.

15) In these negotiations, it was agreed upon that Great Britain would recognize Burma's decision to leave or not to leave the Commonwealth.

strations by peasants' union, police and services strike, were scheduled to burst out about August 15th. There was a keen discontent and a spirit of rebellion in the Army and Navy too.

It was on the initiative and under the leadership of the Communist Party that these preparations for the strikes and the rising were taking place. General Aung San, instead of taking a firm stand against them and preparing the public for the acceptance of the "fake independence" and continued economic and military slavery to British as proposed by the Nu-Attlee understanding, began to talk of struggle for independence and of united front with Communist Party. This was a dangerous situation for imperialism.

Imperialism estimated that if things were allowed to take their own course, the rising would develop under Communist initiative and the (\*tempest\* - \*18) of the united upsurge would be so powerful that Aung San could not be in a position to check it or sabotage it from within. That is why they decided to take no risks and kill Aung San.

For Thakin Nu, representing the weak compradore bourgeoisie and the landlords, it was the fear of the impending revolution that led to acceptance of the Anglo-Burmese agreement.

By it the bourgeoisie is granted State power - but qualified and circumscribed in such a way as only enabled it to use that power against the revolution and not even for the development of its own class interests and in opposition to imperialism.

Despite the very minor nature of the "concession" Nu eagerly accepted it, for in contrast to Aung San he does not lead any militant organisation like the PVO (as Aung San did) nor has he any fighting traditions of struggle: this again is why he is more afraid of the impending revolution and therefore ready to be (\*a\*) pliant and subservient tool of imperialism(\*. For imperialism\* - \*19) murdered Aung San in the confidence that Thakin Nu would be a more pliant and subservient tool that it need(\*ed\*) to carry out its designs.

It appears we underestimated our own role in giving a favourable turn to the developing revolutionary situation between Jan. 1947 and Juli 1947. Imperialism did not. The blow struck at Aung San was really a blow at the preparations for a united uprising. The aim was to create disorganization and panic among the ranks of those who were preparing for the uprising. At the same time it was their aim to throw the guilt of the murders upon the Communists and create disruption.

They did not succeed in their objective. The masses and the rank and file of the AFPFL and the PVO before whose eyes the preparations for

the uprising was going on knew that the Communists were working on the basis of AFPFL-CP joint and were continually appealing to Aung San to join the uprising. They could never believe the lie about Communists striking Aung San. Thus when within half an hour of the murders, our squad came out on the street denouncing the imperialists and British military officers (\*as\* - \*20) the main culprits, the masses readily agreed with us.

We were perfectly right in approaching Thakin Nu immediately after the murder of Aung San. In fact the PVO ranks, stunned by the sudden murder of their leader, were looking forward to some such move for unity. They were heartened by our unity negotiations with the leaders of the AFPFL. But our approach and offer for united front to the AFPFL leadership ought to have been on the basis of a joint front for immediately rousing the entire nation against the murderers of the national leaders and for immediate seizure of power. Our offer ought to have been immediately made public directly to Thakin Nu so that the masses would have seen the lead we had given the country. This would have enabled us later to expose the compromising game of the AFPFL leadership. We were not wrong in making (\*21) immediately approach for united (\*front\*) of such a type to the AFPFL leadership soon after the murder. In fact, our first approach was on this basis and was correct; but we did not make it public and did not rouse the peoples in favour of our proposals. Instead we allowed ourselves to be dragged later by Thakin Nu into protracted negotiations, which were based on a peaceful perspective or our entering the Provisional Government on the basis of AFPFL-CP unity and carrying out the programme of the democratic revolution, with the help of the existing imperialism-feudal state machine. In other words, we were soon led to give up the correct revolutionary approach with which we began the negotiation and we were soon derailed completely into rank opportunists and reformist negotiations.

But the imperialists did succeed in their main objective, mainly paralysing the preparations for the uprising and disorganising its initiators. That means that they succeeded in paralysing the Communists. This happened because we ourselves were not conscious of our own role and importance in this revolutionary situation. We were panicked by the murders and we went immediately on the defensive. We rightly came out denouncing the murders as imperialist-planned and calling for immediate protest strikes and vengeance demonstrations in Rangoon. Our whole approach was as if working on peace time basis. We failed to see the revolutionary significance in the situation. Thereafter we began negotiations with Thakin Nu on the basis of unity and allowed the initiative to slip out of our hands. In the meantime, though with a delay of some 24 hours, Governor Rance in collaboration with Thakin Nu struck and clamped down curfew in Rangoon. If we had forestalled him and initiated a movement to avenge

the murders, on the basis of united front from below, we would have prevented the initiative from falling into the hands of Thakin Nu, (\*22) we could have used the streets, and the arena of mass protest strikes and struggles to proclaim our terms and programme of AFPFL-CP united front, for action to avenge the murders, to take over power, to expel the British murderers, (\*23) to carry through the programme of January 1946.

Instead of doing this we got ourselves bogged in long drawn negotiations for AFPFL-CP unity (\*24) negotiations with Thakin Nu. They were in their very nature top negotiations. Thakin Nu wanted that we should join the Government, repudiate and stop all struggles, and agree to follow "AFPFL Strategy" - i.e., the policy of collaboration with imperialism. We too were conducting the negotiations under the illusion that the Provisional National Government supported by the AFPFL-CP united front would be a strategic (\*25) weapon in the hands of the masses to carry forward the programme of the AFPFL and then lead the entire country into a national war against British imperialism.

In other words, at the time when the working class could have led the masses in Rangoon and elsewhere to rise in revolt against the imperialism and its agents who had struck the blow against Burmese nation, we were led to restrain the masses, tailed behind the collaborating AFPFL leadership (\*of\*) Thakin Nu, Bo Let Ya and others. If we had acted independently of Thakin Nu and led the masses to mass protest actions, and called for AFPFL-CP united front to take over the power to avenge the murders and repel the British, the situation would have changed immensely in our favour in all sections among the working class and peasantry, among PVO, among the police and the military. Even if we had not succeeded in raising the tempo of the development to the pitch of a successful rising then, the balance of forces in the united front would have shifted decisively in our favour, isolating Thakin Nu and the rest of the present AFPFL leadership.

Instead of tightening this imperialist reactionary offensive - which was in the nature of Kornilov affair, by independently unleashing the initiative of the masses - who were ready to fight - we checked the mass actions and (\*26) tailed behind Thakin Nu in quest of a top united front.

In our resolution of July 30, we defended this wrong stand by making an opportunist theory, which is direct continuation of the opportunist formulation criticised earlier, that the Nu-Attlee agreement (\*is\*) "a serious concession". What are the opportunist formulations made?

Firstly, the resolution states:

"The forms of power which imperialism was compelled to concede to the national movement, if correctly implemented, offers us greater opportunity today, for greater mobilisation of our country to prepare for a national (\*uprising\*) against British Imperialism." Under the circumstances, the existing provisional Government and the Constituent Assembly become strategic weapons (\*to\*) implement its programme. At the same time the provisional Government can be made to play a progressive role in alliance with other progressive force(\*s\*) of the world against the menace of American imperialism and its Union partner, British imperialism.

These formulations are directly copied from similar opportunist formulations made in the resolution on the "Mountbatten Award" of the CC of the CPI. They arise directly as a corollary from the bankrupt theses of both resolutions that the Nu-Attlee agreement in the case of Burma and the Mountbatten Award in the case of India are "a serious bourgeois national leadership on the basis of a compromise with he (\*...\*) - \*27) and "a national advance" then of course these become "strategic weapons" and so on.

It was the sudden dastard (\*28) assassination of Aung San and his ministerial colleagues, by imperialism and its reactionary agents like U Saw and others, which made us lose our bearings. As we saw above it was a blow aimed at those who were preparing for a national uprising. The aim was not to replace Aung San and the AFPFL leadership by the reactionary stooge gang of U Saw, who had no mass basis. The imperialists had tried to rule Burma with their help in 1945-46 and failed miserably. Their aim was to replace Aung San by a more pliant AFPFL leadership of Thakin Nu and Bo Let Ya enslavement...

Their aim was to disrupt the preparations for the uprising and to isolate the Communists.

This plan could be fought, as we said above, only by the independent initiative of the proletariat and not by surrendering the same to the national bourgeois leadership.

The imperialist counter-revolutionary attack was made possible by the disruptive and compromising policy of the national bourgeois leadership, in a somewhat similar way as the attack of counter-Punjab revolution against the people at the time of the Delhi-Punjab riots (16) was the nemesis of the compromising and disruptive policy

16) This passage is influenced by the CP of India which stated in "Review Of The Second Congress Of The Communist Party Of India" (28 February to 6 March 1948, printed in March 1948): "In the

of the Indian national leadership. These attacks could not be fought by the proletariat by tailing behind the collaborating bourgeois leadership.

To make a theory that the imperialists are seeking to replace the AFPFL Government by a "reactionary Government" of U Saw and others and then to surrender the initiative to the collaborating bourgeois leadership of Thakin Nu is rank reformism. This is exactly also what the leadership of CPI did, when after the Delhi-Punjab riots, it came out with the bankrupt reformist slogan of "all support to Nehru Government" (17).

It was correct to see and expose the imperialist hand behind this attack. But it was also necessary to see and expose that it was the disastrous nemesis of the compromising policy of the national leadership, of betraying the revolution, for sharing power in the imperialist bureaucratic state machine, in order to use it against the people.

The proletariat had to see that it was the rising tide of the revolution which was being attacked. It should have been called upon to defend the revolutionary upsurge which was the real national movement and not the collaborating AFPFL leaders and the Thakin Nu Government.

riots of 1946 and 1947 it was the Communist Party (\*of India\*) which came forward boldly denouncing imperialism as the arch-criminal of riots. ... In 1947, in the midst of the post-partition riots in the Punjab, it was the Communist Party members who displayed rare heroism in facing death in their efforts to save members of the minority community from the hands of the murderous riot mobs. / In Calcutta and Delhi it was the communists who were in the forefront of the heroic demonstrations which were organized to fight back the riots." (Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India, edited by M.B. Rao, vol.VII: 1948 to 1950, New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1976, p.182).

17) This also corresponds to criticism within the CPI: "Vacillations and reformism of the majority of the members of the central committee reached their culmination in the June (1947) meeting of the central committee on the discussions on the Mountbatten award. Every amendment which sought to put down that the Mountbatten award was a concession to the national bourgeoisie and that the national bourgeois leadership was striking a deal against the interests of the people was negated or watered down, and it was asserted that the Mountbatten award was concession to the national movement and the Indian people. After the defeat of these amendments the resolution was adopted without opposition." ("Review Of The Second Congress Of The CPI," ibid., p.209)

The Kornilov revolt against the revolutionary Petrograd was inspired and aided (\*29) by the British imperialists. Reactionary Cadet elements in Kerensky Government were implicated in it. Bolsheviks could not have fought and defeated the revolt by lining up behind the Kerensky Government which had, in fact, opened the front of counter-revolution by launching repression against the Bolsheviks and the revolutionary forces.

That is why:

"The party appealed to the masses to take action not, however, in defence of Kerensky, (\*30) but in defence of the reaction (\*31) against Kornilov and his hands." (History of the October Revolution, Vol.1, pp.22,pp.b.)

These correct tactics enabled the Bolsheviks to isolate the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary compromisers and shift the balance of forces in favour of a mass uprising, carried through three months later.

The opportunist tactics followed by us led us to exactly the opposite result. We turned away, though for a short time(\*,\*) from our programme of "final seizure of power" to the collaborationist programme and policy of using the existing provisional Government as "strategic weapon" etc.

They led us to direct repudiation of our correct revolutionary stand in our January CC resolution (final seizure of power) and to an opportunist course of actions, to tailing behind the bourgeois leadership. For instance, in the CC resolution of July 30, 1947. (\*32)

We up gave the slogan of seizing power in certain areas, on the ground that it would lead to civil war between bogus "Provisional Government" of Thakin Nu and the real Provisional Government. Our understanding was that we should strive for a national war on an all-Burma scale, by isolating Nu, Ba Swe & Co from the people. That was because of our illusions that we would be able to use the imperialist State machine for furthering the cause of the national war.

We said that the struggle of the peasants for rehabilitation, i.e., their struggle for land was not only to be through resistance movement against landlords and capitalists but it will also be through the Government machinery; the fact is that the real basis for economic and political collaboration already agreed to by Thakin Nu in the first Nu-Attlee agreement decisively retained old colonial social order and therefore far from putting the Nu Government in a position to make concessions to the people, it would lead to intensified exploitation and misery for the people.

We agreed to enter the Provisional Government, if Thakin Nu agreed to

- (1) (\*33) Implement the January 1946 AFPFL congress resolution;
- (2) CP-AFPFL unity on the basis of our organisational proposals;
- (3) independent existence of the Communist Party and right of public criticism, and
- (4) (\*34) popularisation of our independent policy of final seizure of power.

In October 1947 when we discussed this whole resolution in the light of our collective study of the old theses of the Communist International on the revolutions in the colonies, we began to realise how wrong and reformist all these formulations were. But because we failed to make a clean break with our previous CC resolution by finalising our corrected understanding in a new CC resolution, the baneful effects of the old reformist resolution still persisted and persist in the writings and policies of the leadership, showing that the conclusions reached by us in our October Discussion have been understood only superficially by us (\*35).

The continuation of the reformist interpretation is clearly visible in some articles which have appeared in the anniversary number of "Communist Daily" (18). For instance, our "report to our people" does not say that we exposed the Anglo-Burmese treaty as one of "enslavement". We "welcome" (\*36) the article of the treaty that Burma is recognised as "a sovereign independent republic" instead of exposing the utter falsity of that fake declaration by the British Government which only mask the retention of the economic and military domination of British imperialism over Burma.

There is no sharp exposure of the compromising role and policies of the Thakin Nu Government. For instance, on page 10 of the issue in the article on "Burma's independence upsurges during the year," "to sabotage the Nu Provisional Government, etc." (\*37). This means that we are not exposing the Thakin Nu Government of the compradore bourgeoisie and the landlords which is suppressing the fighting people. On the other hand, we are shielding it, giving it a clean bill by tailing of the bureaucracy sabotaging the Government. We must denounce the imperialist bureaucracy, (\*38) but expose the collaborators(\*, otherwise\*) we keep that bureaucracy intact and use it against the people.

In our fight for AFPFL-CP unity we are not sufficiently exposing the anti-unity manoeuvres of the AFPFL and Socialist leaders. Our mani-

- 18) A "Communist Daily" is not mentioned anywhere else. Probably, Ba Tin refers here to Pyithu Arnar ("People's Power"), the organ of the CPB at that time.

festos (issued on 17-12-47) on the formation of the Marxist League (19) is one which instead of exposing this as a disruptive and deceptive move, creates illusions about the Socialist leaders.

In our editorial (dated 24-12-47) regarding the "Services Union" (\*,\* - \*39) we call upon them to strengthen their unity and intensify their fight for improving their living conditions(\*,\*) call upon them also to improve their work for the independent Government which would come into existence after January 4.

It would mean a serious disaster for our Party if in the coming period of deepening economic crisis and of growing disillusionment of the masses with the collaborationist leadership, the party is not able to go into action boldly winning the masses away and becomes their tail. If we waver and underestimate the strength of the fighting masses, who follow us and are demanding a fighting lead, if we tail behind the collaborationist leaders instead of exposing them in the eyes of the masses, then it is the collaborationist leadership who would again seize the initiative to launch an offensive of civil war and repression.

We began to make the turn in our October study class mentioned above. But it has to be finalised in CC resolution laying down the policy for the new period which opened after January 4. It is the most urgent task before us. It took the CC of the CPI six months to correct a similar opportunist and reformist swing-back from the August Resolution, into which they have slipped since June last (Mountbatten Award Resolution). It is only now in December 1947 that the CC of the CPI has decisively broken with the reformist formulations and course of action laid down in their resolution on the Mountbatten Award. But the struggle has yet to be carried throughout their Party ranks.

We too have to make the turn through our CC and to carry the struggles through our entire ranks to purge out all traces of this dangerous reformism.

#### IV. Character of Provisional National Government of Thakin Nu

The provisional National Government of Thakin Nu claims that it is

- 19) The Marxist League was founded in the last week of November 1947 by members of the Socialist Party and the PVO, among them also Bo Let Ya. The Burmese Review (1 December 1947, p.8) wrote: "The political programme of the new League is not essentially different from that of the Socialist Party and is in essence the elimination of the private land owner and the gradual nationalisation of industry." Text of CPB manifesto not available.

the first independent Government of Burma which has come as a result to 120 years' struggle of the Burmese people for independence (Thakin Nu's speech on ... (\*40) Daily Communist). But the record of its acts during the last six months of its existence, (\*the\*) role it has played in signing the treaty, and the policy it has (\*41) outlined for the future, are enough to show that it was not leading Burma to freedom and democracy but was acting as an imperialist tool in their suppression.

We must early recognise and expose the fact that this Government is headed by those leaders of AFPFL like Thakin Nu and Bo Let Ya who paved the way for Burma's acceptance of the British-imposed treaty of surrender and slavery which General Aung San wanted to reject and fight. Imperialists killed Aung San by using the reactionary (\*42) Saw. But their aim was not to bring these discredited agents of theirs to power but the subservient and completely collaborationist leadership of Thakin Nu, Bo Let Ya, Tin Tut, socialist Kyaw Nyein and others.

July 19, therefore, marks a turning point in Burma's struggle for independence. From now on AFPFL leadership that remains becomes completely collaborationist and a tool of Anglo-American imperialism to disrupt and crush the revolutionary upsurge in Burma.

It has yet the same broad mass as the AFPFL leadership of Aung San. That is why it is particularly important to the British and the American imperialism in putting over to the Burmese people this fake independence and this treaty of slavery and national humiliation.

Thakin Nu and Bo Let Ya defend the military treaty as consistent with Burma's independence and sovereignty. We must expose the falsity of this, show how it reduces Burma to a vassal state, a stooge of Anglo-American reaction. (Note the Soviet comment on Iran's accepting the American military mission and loan.) The American imperialist press revaluated the treaty as one which Britain retains her economic and military domination in Burma "where it might well have lost everything" (New York Herald Tribune 29-9-47). Recent American press comment openly mentions that the American official circles are looking to Thakin Nu Government as a suitable object for a South East Asia Marshall plan and expect it (Thakin Nu Government) to have a showdown with communism (\*43) in order to qualify itself for it.

The Thakin Nu Government must be exposed as a government of compradore bourgeoisie and landlords which has betrayed the AFPFL programme of nationalisation of foreign industries, monopolies, etc. in the interest of its own class which get crumbs from the profits from the exploitation of the Burmese masses. Its policy of "raise exports, control imports" leads to further pauperisation of the peas-

antry (low prices of agricultural raw materials) and the starvation of workers and employees in cities (falling of real wage).

The hypocrisy of the whole "rehabilitation" cry of Thakin Nu, the falsity of this slogan of "economise, work more, and do not fight" must be thoroughly exposed as a call to Burmese people to submit themselves meekly to intensified imperialist exploitation.

We have to denounce his drive for military offensive against the people: (\*for\*) weeding out communist officers from the army, for combing out of arms (death punishment for possession of illegal arms), his suppression of civil liberties etc. The operations carried out against Arakan and Middle Burma peasantry are directly initiated by Thakin Nu and Kyaw Nyein (\*44), they must be denounced as the hangmen of the fighting Burmese peasantry. The oppression to sabotage Thakin Nu Government (\*45) is shielding the compromising leadership. This must be given up.

Above all the Thakin Nu Government must be exposed for keeping intact the old anti-people, corrupt, pro-imperialist bureaucracy, police and army command. He must be denounced for shielding the treacherous police chiefs and army men who were directly implicated in the murder of Aung San. His hypocritical unity approach to Communist must be exposed. He does not want unity with Communists but war against them. He wants to liquidate the AFPFL as a people's united front organization and convert it into an anti-Communist, anti-people political party of the compradore bourgeoisie and the landlords.

In short, we must clearly realise that the present leadership of the AFPFL and the Thakin Nu Government has officially (\*46) gone over to the policy of subservient collaboration with imperialism. Its policy leads to (\*47) tightening the bond of colonial slavery and of unleashing the civil war against the fighting people.

All talk about this Government being a strategic weapon etc. is rank opportunism. Our policy can never be support to this Government but work for undermining its mass basis.

We must give up the policy of kowtowing to Thakin Nu and the AFPFL leadership. The other day our Communist Daily printed in full the hypocritical speech of Thakin Nu without editorial comment or even critical headline. This is unpardonable in a communist paper.

Far from fostering any illusions about Nu, we have to expose him ruthlessly, showing:

- his collaborationist role, by selling the interests of the Burmese people through signing the Anglo-Burmese treaty(\*,\*) his betrayal of the revolution and people's confidence by signing a treaty

which Aung San had reflected; (\*-\*) alongside with Ba Swe his murder of the people's movement and his offensive against the people; his disruption of the AFPFL by destroying its UNF (20) character and transforming it under the cloak of "Marxism" into the political party of the collaborationist bourgeoisie.

"Imperialism and feudal reactionaries are main enemies." does not mean and should not be the excuse to give up the struggle against the bourgeois collaborators. Imperialism faced with the post-war revolutionary crisis is seeking to save itself by drawing the national bourgeois leadership which has yet a broad social base into collaboration. This is the new in the present situation. Imperialism cannot be fought unless we (\*give\*) in the present situation leadership (\*48) and isolate then completely from the national movement in order to physically destroy the imperialist state machine.

#### V. Programme and Main Slogan

In the context of the analysis and facts given above it should be clear that our position vis-a-vis the present Provisional Government is no support to it, exposure and fight against its anti-people policies. That Government cannot be "a strategic weapon" in the hands of the people. On the other hand, it is acting as a weapon in the hands of imperialism against the people.

In our CC resolution of July 1947 (\*we\*) gave the slogan "Turn the provisional Government into a real one." That slogan was given in the context of top unity negotiations which were going on at that time between the AFPFL leaders and the CPB for entry into the provisional Government. At that time we were following a completely tailist line vis-a-vis Thakin Nu and had the unpardonable illusion that by our entry into the Government we could get Thakin Nu to implement the January 1946 programme. There could be no question of our participating in a coalition Government and military domination of British imperialist and giving up the struggle against it. If we (\*had done so we would have committed the\*) crime (\*of\*) betraying the revolution (\*49).

There must be complete break with policies which are based on illusions about the "Provisional Government" or which lead to create illusions among the masses about it, which arouse out of the conception that it could be used as a strategic weapon by the UNF against imperialism.

The lie which Thakin Nu is propagating that the power which his Gov-

20) = United National Front.

ernment has got can be used for a peaceful transformation of Burma into a democratic one and even (\*a\*) Socialist Republic ensuring plenty to all must be ruthlessly exposed.

We must point out that Thakin Nu who advised the people "to economise, work more and do not fight" is doing so in the interest of Burma's merchant capitalists and landlords who in return for crumbs from the imperialists (share of rice trade, etc.) have joined the imperialists as junior and subservient partner in the exploitation of the Burmese toiling masses. This is not (\*the\*) path of "peaceful prosperity" but of bloody suppression of the people and creation of civil war among ourselves.

On the one hand, failure to sharply expose this day-in and day-out before the masses in terms of the Government and(\*,\*) on the other (\*hand\*), our actions in toning down the criticism of the Government and in only talking (\*50) of AFPFL-CP unity in general can only confirm and strengthen the illusions of the masses in the present Government. This is an expression of rank reformism (ref. to editorial on Thakin Nu's speech in Daily Communist, 25-12-47).

We must realize that we are living in the period of post-war revolutionary crisis. The Thakin Nu Government cannot solve a single problem. It will only enable the British imperialism to solve their crisis at the expense of the Burmese people. This means as the crisis deepens, unrest and discontent will grow among the masses. There are two sharp alternatives before the masses. The Communists have to go ahead boldly leading workers, peasants and the common people in struggles in defence of their living conditions, building AFPFL-CP united front, exposing and isolating the present leadership and the Government until we are in a position to unite and raise the whole opposition movement to the pitch of a rising into a national war against the British colonizers, for seizing power and for creating a people's Government based on AFPFL-CP unity and carrying through the democratic revolution.

If on the other hand, we do not quickly break with reformism, do not work and fight with this revolutionary perspective, and continue a peaceful development then it is the imperialists and the bourgeoisie who are as yet unstable and will succeed in disrupting the revolutionary upsurge, suppressing the masses and forcibly retaining the colonial (\*system\*) by creating civil war among ourselves.

There are the two alternatives - either rapid consolidation of our fighting areas, intensification of struggles everywhere, bold bid of forging CP-AFPFL unity from below for confiscating and taking over British monopolies, for seizing the land(\*,\*) for carrying the democratic revolution and people's power by national war against the

British colonizers, or the imperialists and the bourgeois-landlord Government succeed in unleashing the civil war, racial conflict, (\*51) disrupting the revolutionary upsurge and clamping intensified slavery, misery and joint exploitation, thereby getting established for a long time to come.

The point is that the situation is yet one of revolutionary crisis, the forces of revolution are strong and undefeated and we must build the mass movement, and struggles, in the course of which we expose and discredit the present Government as one which protects and perpetuates the British monopoly and landlordism. Our central slogan becomes AFPFL-CP united front for a national rising to take over British monopolies, repudiate British imposed seize land, ensure to the tiller (\*52).

In the course of the struggle we popularize the slogan for people's Government based on AFPFL-CP unity without the collaborators.

But we must totally break with the reformist perspective - based on the illusion that the present Government can be transformed into a weapon of implementing the January 1946 resolution. We must break with the perspective and practice as expressed in the CC resolution of July 30, 1947. Though this resolution talks of a national war and rising against imperialism in practice it repudiates the slogan and is really based on the bankrupt reformist thesis of peaceful development. It amounts to Thakin Nu's thesis: Imperialism has "quit," what is needed now is to support the present provisional Government, to change it if needed by including the Communists, to stop all struggles and then the Government will gradually implement the January 1946 resolution.

As pointed out earlier the influence of this resolution and its reformist perspective continues to dominate our practice. That must change.

#### To sum up

- \* Our central slogans become the following: -
- \* No support to the present Government - but its exposure as a Government of collaborationists, carrying out the dictates of Anglo-American imperialists - Burmese capitalists and landlords - betraying the fighting of AFPFL-CP unity (\*53) - betraying the January 1946 programme of AFPFL.
- \* National rising to tear up the treaty of slavery and assert real independence - take over British monopolies - land to (\*the\*) tiller (\*53a) - repudiate debts - smash imperialist-bureaucratic machinery (\*54).

- \* Set up a people's Government based on AFPFL-CP unity to carry through the democratic revolution.
- \* Alliance and co-operation with democratic China, fighting Viet Nam and Indonesia, and (\*all\* - \*53a) democratic countries and movements which are resisting Anglo-American imperialist domination.

#### Notes on the Programme

It is necessary for us to reformulate and bring up to date the programme of January 1946 as an immediate programme of democratic revolution, concentrating on revolutionary measures which a people's Government would take immediately.

- \* Annulment of Anglo-Burmese treaty of October, 1947. Assert Burma's people's sovereignty and independence. Take over all British and Foreign concerns, industries and banks and nationalise them, control of profits in industries (\*55) in private hands.
- \* Repudiate all imperialist debt of Burma.
- \* Establish State export import monopoly - Agreements with democratic countries for economic cooperation - including democratic China, fighting Viet Nam and Indonesia.
- \* Abolition of all forms of landlordism. Take over all land of landlords over 50 acres - distribute it to actual tillers. Land to the tillers. No sale of land - all transfer of land through peasant committees - Take over implements, cattle etc. of big landlords and make available to peasants. Abolition of every system of usury.
- \* 40 hours (\*week\* - \*56), living wage, social security, decent housing, right of organisation and strike to workers and agricultural labourers.
- \* Self-determination of national minorities, full autonomy to principal nationalities - Karens, Shans, Kachins, etc. Autonomy of Arakanese province. Regional autonomy within provinces and national units to tribes. Complete democracy in the States ruled by chieftains, abolition of feudal order.
- \* A constitution guaranteeing full freedom and democracy to the common man, ensuring full economic power to the people - people's officers.

#### VI. Fight for a Fighting United Front from Below

In order to develop the fighting unity of the toiling (\*57) masses and the people for the realization of the above programme we must give up the former conception of a national united front, AFPFL-Communist unity both from base and top, as outlined in our July resolution.

In Aung San's time when yet the bourgeoisie had not accepted the position of complete subservient collaboration with imperialism, there was yet the possibility of making top-to-bottom unity approaches (viz. "Whither Friend Aung San") but after Aung San's death and (\*as\*) a final basis for compromise is reached by which the bourgeoisie become finally subservient collaborationist, there is no possibility of top unity.

We must totally give up the reformist illusion that it is possible to achieve a top to bottom AFPFL-CP (\*unity\*) which will be an instrument of the fighting people, forcing the present or a reorganised Provisional Government to implement the programme of achieving real independence and people's democracy.

It was on this conception that our negotiations with Thakin Nu for united front with AFPFL were based. While publishing the whole course of the negotiations and correspondence that passed between Thakin Nu and ourselves (July-October 1947), we must frankly explain to the masses why these negotiations failed and who rejected the real fighting unity of the Burmese people for struggle against the British imperialists - for smashing the treaty, for establishing a real people's Government, for people's democracy.

We must explain to the people that we had the illusion that Thakin Nu and the present AFPFL leaders really wanted to close the ranks of the Burmese people to fight the treaty. We were wrong. They wanted to work within the four corners of the treaty, they wanted to restrain and repress the people fighting for land, bread and liberty against the deep(\*en\*)ing crisis, they wanted to perpetuate Anglo-American imperialist rule over (\*the\*) country. Explain the meaning (\*of\*) Thakin Nu's terms of unity and subsequent developments(\*,\*) have our criticism of them. Explain what (\*form\*) of united front the CP wants and how it is striving to build it in practice.

Our slogan still remains AFPFL-CP unity - not we build it from below and in course of struggles - on the bases of a sharp exposure of this reformist national bourgeois leadership that has now turned completely subserviently collaborationist.

When the national bourgeois leadership of the anti-imperialist movement in a colonial country goes over from opposition to collaboration with imperialism it begins to attack the most revolutionary wing of the anti-imperialist movement. It attacks the organised working class, the Communist Party and the leftist groups. Above all it seeks to exterminate the Communist Party (\*58) and tries to drive a wedge between the revolutionary working class and the democratic masses which follow the national (\*59) movement. Simultaneously it seeks to convert the national organization which was so far in the

nature of united front, into a regimental political party, by expelling the Communists and left groups. It seeks to insulate its mass basis, tighten it and use it to launch still vicious attacks through the State machinery against the revolutionary working class and peasantry led by the Communists and along with the real left elements within the PVO and socialists.

This happened in China, this is happening in India and Burma though of course the pattern in each case is different. But it must be realised that attack on the vanguard of revolution by the imperialists through the national leadership in the period of its going over to collaboration is not a sign of the bourgeois strength but of its weakness.

It is so afraid of losing its mass bases that it cannot allow the left and Communists the political liberty to put their point of view to the masses; it just tries to strangle their voice by force.

#### How and Why?

(60\*) The national leadership knows that the policy of collaboration and compromise with imperialism is extremely unpopular among the masses, so it seeks to mask it as "independence" and seeks most ruthlessly to gap and isolate its consistent exposers.

The immediate result of collaboration is not the achievement of prosperity and people's welfare but intensification of the crisis and rising discontent and disillusionment of the masses. That is another reason why the collaborationist national leadership seeks to smash and isolate those who seek to lead the masses to a revolutionary solution of the crisis.

As the crisis deepens conditions mature (\*61) for the discrediting of the collaborationist bourgeois leadership and for the emergence of the working class, led by its revolutionary class party, to rally the toiling masses and the common people for the final revolutionary assault on imperialist-feudal system.

It is unpardonable for Communist Parties in this period to be overawed of fright (\*62) by the anti-Communist offensive or repression launched by the bourgeois leadership or by the offensive communal riots launched by imperialism. It is disastrous if, thus overawed, they swing into the bourgeois; if they remain bogged in the former conceptions of the top to bottom united front and fail to come out sharply exposing the bourgeois leadership and building united front in partial struggles of the masses fighting back the crisis.

It would be as wrong for the CPI to persist in the slogan of a uni-

ted front from Gandhi and Nehru to Socialists and Communists as for us to persist in illusions of retaining Thakin Nu and the rest of the AFPFL leaders in the united front and down criticism of them.

In Burma, we got a tremendous response to our efforts to build AFPFL-CP unity in the fire of partial struggles, exposing at the same time the compromising policy of Aung San. We turned tables against the anti-Communist drive of Aung San (\*63) in this period because we correctly estimated the strength of our position and the weakness of the position of the collaborating leadership and went to the offensive.

Take the case of our estimation of the decisions of the recent meeting of the AFPFL council. This meeting taking place on the eve of January 4 sought to tighten up the AFPFL, bind its cadres and rank and file more firmly to the collaborationist policy and prevent them from drifting under the influence of the revolutionary policy of the Communist. The main achievement of this meeting was the formation of the Marxist League by the combination of the Socialist and PVO cadres. It was not an expression of a new growth of Socialist consciousness among the AFPFL cadres. On the other hand it was a top manoeuvre of the opportunist "Socialist" leader to trap the socialistically oriented PVO cadres into a reformist anti-Communist organisation and to check their tendency to cooperate with the Communists. It was (\*a\*) move to place a further wall between the AFPFL and Communists.

Our task was to expose this move, to show that the Marxist League had nothing to do with the revolutionary teachings of Marx on building the party of the proletariat - which were carried forward by Lenin and Stalin and which are the basis of the Communist Parties of the world. On the other hand the so-called principles of the Marxist League are principles of class collaboration, of reformist Social Democracy, which have played treacherous and ... (\*64) role in the working class movements of the world.

Instead of this, we crumple up before the reformist Socialist Leaders. We make the unpardonable statement that "a single Party of the proletariat cannot be created mechanically in the immediate present etc." (\*65). While the single proletarian party is already formed in Burma - The CPB. Why should we take the liquidationist position saying that "the Communists of Burma will strive for unity with the Marxist League" and then say we will guard against vulgarisation of Marxism.

We should have exposed the specific vulgarisation of Marxism which was the basis of the Marxist League (e.g. the class collaboration theory of the Socialist Leaders). We should have appealed to honest

socialistically oriented PVO cadres not to be deceived by those reformist leaders. We should have appealed to them to be (\*on\*) the watch and (\*not\*) allow themselves to be dragged into a plot to prevent AFPFL-CP unity.

It was wrong of us to regard the Marxist League as a Left Party - a Socialist Left-Wing Party in AFPFL, and on that basis call for "Left Joint actions with it to build the UNF." The Marxist League is not a Left Party within the AFPFL. It is organised by the ruling collaborationist leadership as its own political party and with the birth of "Marxism" in order to check the leftist pro-Communist tendencies of the PVO cadres and rank and file in order to cheat the people. It is also not (\*66) a Socialist Party and has no working class basis and it was wrong to talk of "ultimate fusion" with the Marxist League.

By taking this position we have given up the fight to expose the anti-unity and compromising "socialist" leadership of the Marxist League, which is identical with the collaborationist leadership. By taking this position we have relinquished the fight with the PVO cadres for the CP and for CP-AFPFL unity. In fact by taking this position we have really fallen into Thakin Nu's trap, who from behind organised this Marxist League just for achieving these two ends.

This error arises from reformist illusions about the collaborating national leadership and therefore about top unity. It leads to servile trailing behind the collaborators, ignoring the depth of the crisis, the growing disillusionment and fighting strength of the masses.

There must be complete break with this - our basic stand must be AFPFL unity from below by exposing and isolating the leadership, for realising the programme and slogans outlined in the previous section.

(\*67) We must treat the Marxist League as a party of collaboration, not as a leftist party. We must expose its leadership in the same way as we expose the collaborationist AFPFL leadership. We must particularly explain to the PVO and socialist rank and file the reformist and class collaborationist "Social Democracy" which their leaders are teaching them and explain to them the role of Social Democracy the world over (\*as pace makers\* - \*68) of Anglo-American(\*imperialism,\*) tell them how honest and genuine Socialists are joining with Communist(\*s\*) in united actions and for joining the single party of working class.

The meaning of the fight for AFPFL-CP unity in the present period is that it is a fight for building democratic people's front, under the

initiative of the working class and the CP, drawing in the vast masses of the peasantry by winning over the rank and the party. This united front is built in the practical battles of the working class, peasantry and employees, through political and ideological battles against the collaborating leadership, establishing proletarian hegemony and winning the broad masses for independence and people's democracy and for revolutionary attack upon the State which perpetuates the colonial social order.

### VII. Lead Mass Battles

The fruits of January 4 and of the policies (\*69) of betrayal which led to it would not be prosperity, not the rain of gold and silver which Thakin Nu promises after 5 years, but deepening crisis, further pauperisation of the peasantry and starvation for the workers and middle class employees in the towns, leading to rising discontent among the entire people. The policies which the Thakin Nu Government is proposing to adopt would not solve a single problem. They would worsen the crisis. Discontent and unrest would increase. The bankrupt leadership would seek to solve it by suppressing the people by force, by unleashing civil war. Such is the catastrophe that threatens the people in the coming six months.

But this is only one side of the picture and there is another. The Burmese masses, workers, peasants, employees have not ceased to fight against the British monopolists and the landlords and against repression. They will fight all the more doggedly against the effects of the deepening crisis. A new round of workers and employees strikes is in the offing. Large areas where peasants are resisting payment of taxes and rents are not yet subdued despite military operations. The Communist Party which has been leading these mass actions has increased in strength and prestige during the last year. People look upon it as an alternative national leadership. Thakin Nu and his Government have by no means the same anti-imperialist prestige as Aung San had. If we go ahead boldly with (\*70) developing practical battles and political exposure of the Government we would soon find that the Thakin Nu Government is losing popular support. If on the contrary we vacillate and tail behind the Government by making theories that "the struggles of the people have now to be fought not only as resistance movement but also through the Government machine" (21) - then of course the initiative will pass to the hands of the Government and the collaborationist leadership.

In short our job is to lead the masses in the fight against the efforts of the bourgeois and landlords to pass on the crisis on to the backs of the people. Everyone of these struggles will have a pro-

21) See, e.g., doc. A.4 (pp.21-30).

found significance in the context to the maturing of the democratic revolution.

Therefore much depends upon the correct policy being followed by the working class and the CPB - in conducting these struggles, making everyone of them battle against imperialist monopoly and domination, exposing the complicity and the treachery of the bourgeois leadership and the Government, and popularising the main slogans and programme of the revolution.

The bankrupt fear that Party will get isolated if it led this or that struggle must be given up. In this period of the world crisis, the task of leading the masses in the final struggle against imperialist domination lies upon us. It is the independent role of the working class and its party, as the anti-imperialist masses, against imperialist feudal combine, against the collaborationist bourgeoisie (\*71) that is the guarantee of the success of the democratic revolution. Through these struggles the working class party will build the broad front based on AFPFL-CP unity.

The new rise of prices which has come in the wake of import control order, has reduced whatever wage gains the working class and middle class employees had secured through last years' (\*72) struggles. The new round of strike struggles of the workers and middle class employees will have to be fought for the restoration of CLA for demanding a sliding scale so that wages keep pace with prices.

This is the time also to come out with the basic charter of demands for the workers, teachers, servicemen and so on. The struggles demonstrations for these basic charters will be focussed on the existing economic domination of British imperialists and on the guilt of collaborating leaders and Government. While building united front with AFPFL masses, the Socialists and PVO rank and file(\*,\*) a sharp exposure of the disruptive and strike-breaking moves of Socialist and Marxist League leaders in starting rival unions and in preaching theories of class collaboration will have to be made. Fraternisation between Red Guards and PVO and timely propaganda among the police and military to forestall and fight back repression on strikes is of the utmost importance. Repression and curtailment of civil liberties must be boldly fought back. Intense political activity must be planned among the working class and middle class employees, through leaders, meeting, study circles, discussion groups. The aim must be to win working class militants and fighting middle class employees for our policy for national rising against Anglo-American imperialism, for the theory of Marxism and Leninism, exposing to them the compromising policy of AFPFL and the bankrupt theory of class collaboration of socialist leaders. The aim is to make a bid to win the conscious and awakened militants in every trade and department for

our policy and for Communism to withhold the decisive leadership of the working class - to broaden and strengthen the basis of the Party in Rangoon where key battles would be fought again and again.

In rural areas which are under mixed influence (AFPFL and CP) we must begin the battle for moratorium for taxes and rents, for raising rice prices for peasants, for cheap commodities, against corrupt officials and against repression. The aim must be to raise the struggles to the level of united battles for no-tax movement, for rice seizures, for land to the tiller, for fighting repression by armed resistance on the basis of Red Guard-PVO and AFPFL-CP united front.

In the rural areas which are under our influence and in which the masses have supported us defeating military operation we must go ahead towards consolidating these areas.

In these areas from which the top officials and big landlords and kulaks have run away, our aim must be to achieve an orderly seizure of land under the leadership of peasant committees. While our main fighting base will be rural poor and poor peasants we must take care to win the middle peasant as an ally. Our policy of confiscation of land and farm implements levying fines by the peasant committees must be carried through in such a manner that the middle peasant as a section is won over and broken away from the kulaks and from the big landlords and their agents.

When we come to the stage of setting up a democratic administrative (\*73) authority in these areas - and this must be speeded up - we do it on the basis of CP-AFPFL unity. This of course presupposes that the AFPFL in the area is already rescued from the clutches of the collaborating leadership and already fighting shoulder to shoulder with us against the Government and the right-wing leaders.

The most important task (\*74) is the creation of the fighting force based on the Red Guards and in which militant PVO have joined. The form is again on the basis of Red Guard-PVO unity.

- (\*75) Military training of the fighting units in partisan warfare.
- Of the greatest importance is political training of the entire fighting force, the entire militant cadre (\*76) of the area. This must be on the basis of the "final seizure of power", new revolution, elements of Marxism-Leninism, sharp exposure of the policies of AFPFL leadership, critique of the socialist theory, etc. Revolutionary and unwavering fighting force can only be built on the firm foundation of loyalty to the political programme, to the teachings of Communism and hatred of bourgeois betrayal and social

democratic reformism.

- Of equal importance is the political propaganda among the supporting masses in the fighting area through our Daily newspaper, through posters, leaflets and communiqués of the local headquarters of democratic authority and of the Party and of the People's Army as well as through village meetings. The entire supporting population must know what they are fighting for. They must know that it is only the Communists and the fighting masses of the AFPFL that are carrying through the January 1946 programme of the AFPFL, while the present leaders of the League led by Thakin Nu, Bo Let Ya, Ba Swe are betraying it. This is so because Thakin Nu and the others have struck a treacherous deal with the Anglo-American imperialists in the interests of Burmese capitalists and landlords. They must know that what they have achieved in the fighting areas is only a glimpse of what entire Burmese can achieve when they rise all over the country to overthrow imperialist-feudal domination and set up a real people's Government.

Only when the people in the fighting areas are thus politically consolidated behind the lead of the Communist Party, to forge broad fighting unity with the AFPFL masses will it be possible for us to consolidate these areas. And this means hurling back repeated assaults of "military operations", weeding out internal enemies and traitors. This means the morale of the villagers would have to be so strong that they do not collapse when temporarily the village has passed into military hands and the fighting cadres have temporarily retreated. Our aim should be to convert the fighting areas into "liberated areas" with our own democratic organs of administration, authority and army.

In the fighting areas we must work and fight with the perspective of a long drawn struggle, in the course of which there would be many retreats and advances but in the course of which the fighting cadre and strength of the people continuously grows. The area and the People's Army would have to be carefully prepared for a long and arduous struggle. This means problems regarding food and clothing supply, mobility of the forces, vigilance and intelligence services, hideouts for retreat, training places, etc. would have to be solved on a permanent basis.

It is of the utmost importance to rally support for the fighting areas in the rest of the country. Our line of propaganda must be(\*:\*) the people and the peasants are fighting because they are being suppressed. They cannot pay rent and taxes. Low prices of rice, oil seeds, etc., and high prices of manufactured goods have raised them(\*,\*) on the top landlords, money lenders and corrupt officials fleece them. On the top come the military operations to

force them to pay. They have resisted - often put to flight the military and the blood-suckers. They began ordering their life on a democratic basis by taking over land through cooperation among themselves. They are really implementing the January programme of the AFPFL in a revolutionary way - in the only way it can be implemented. It is the Government of Thakin Nu, who is carrying on the civil war. We must raise the demand on the Government to stop war on them. We must expose all the slanders which the Government and Imperialist would spread about the fighting areas as being all attributed to Communist attack and all that, show how the entire people there (\*77) are in revolt.

### VIII. Organisation Tasks

All what has been said above means what is needed is a complete re-orientation of the general political line from the one given by our last CC resolution (of 30th July 1947). It must however be realised that this reorientation is in reality the restoration of the line of our "final seizure of power" resolution of January 1947. That line was fundamentally correct for the present period of revolutionary crisis in colonies, in the context of the changes that have come about in the world situation after the close of the second World War. That line has to be carried forward in the context of the finalisation of the compromise that has taken place in Burma after the signing of the Anglo-Burmese treaty and its coming into operation after January 4.

This new line is in complete accord with the correct revolutionary understanding of the present international situation which is now available to us as a result of the deliberation and decisions of the Nine Communist Parties (22).

Immediately after the war, and for several months thereafter, both India and Burma were bogged in a completely reformist understanding of the international and national situation. We were among those people who according to Kardelj "were ready to believe that after the war there would begin a period of peaceful parliamentary development of imperialism, and not a period of the further sharpening of the general crisis of capitalism and all its internal contradictions, a period in which at first opportunity the reactionary imperialist forces would again attempt to free themselves from the pressure of democratic forces and unite their hands for less imperialistic expansion, if not hampered by the democratic forces." (Organ of the I.B.C.P., I. (\*78), No.1, November 10, 1947).

22) Refers to the declaration establishing the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947.

We went completely reformist, thought in terms of peaceful development towards independence, ignoring imperialist offensive, trailed behind the compromising bourgeoisie in the (\*illusion\*) of false national unity, were blind to the rising revolutionary upsurge of the colonial peoples, underestimated it and betrayed it.

It was in July 1946 that the Indian comrades made a sharp (\*turn\*) from this bankrupt understanding and reformist practice (\*while\* - \*79) we made the turn in December-January of 1946-47. In both India and Burma the correctness of the new understanding and line was vindicated in practice, in the advance the Indian Party made in July to December 1946 and the advance we made in January to July 1947.

After that again the Indian Party resailed from that position in panic under the stress of riots, and repression and we also made a similar retreat after Aung San's murder. The Indian Party is now again making the correction under the stress of its own experience. The decisions and reports of the Communist Parties Conference assisted them in this.

We must also correct our past mistakes, in accordance with our new understanding of the international situation and boldly go forward in implementing the decisions contained in this report. The following is the outline for our draft resolution for our impending Party Congress.

1. Character of the Treaty and the "Independence" - (\*80) its meaning - imperialist policy in the context of the new international situation.
2. Aung San's murder was a dastardly imperialist blow against the rising forces of the revolution - its aim bringing into being a subservient AFPFL Government which would sign the treaty and split anti-imperialist forces.
3. Thakin Nu Government
  - Government of compromise and surrender.
  - Tool of Anglo-American imperialists.
  - Record of its deeds in 6 months.
  - Class character and collaborationist.
4. Policy of the Thakin Nu Government and the national bourgeois leadership - political and economic - leaders to deepening of crisis - tightening the grip of colonial exploitation - political situation - repression - war on the people.
5. Working class can and must avert this disaster - Results of deepening crisis, growing upsurge - struggle brewing, disillusionment

- urge for fighting unity from below.

Main slogans and programme. (\*81)

6. Tactics of the United Front in terms of the change in the situation - leadership of the AFPFL going over to the camp of counter-revolution - united front from below.
  - Attitude towards the Marxist League.
  - Building UF - (\*82) a struggle, political and ideological, exposure of the bourgeois and socialist leadership.
  - Fight for proletarian leadership.
7. Lead mass battles  
Win the masses for UF national rising against imperialism for people's Government, for democratic revolution.
8. Build the Party  
On the basis of the draft we prepare (\*there\*) should be a thorough discussion inside the Party in the process of getting delegates elected to the Party Congress.

The Party discussion and the Congress should unify the entire ranks firmly round the revolutionary line and equip them with a revolutionary understanding of the new situation and tasks.

In order to complete(\*ly\*) purge the reformist deviations from the ranks of the Party and to make it a fighting instrument of realising the aims set forth in three solutions, the entire Party ranks must be educated in Marxism-Leninism. A graded course of training for Party members and militants may be like the following:

1. Policy and Programme of the CPB. } Lecture pamphlet  
 What the CPB fights for } specially written
2. What is the Communist Party (\*83) } Lecture pamphlet  
 - Its aims and organisation - } specially written
3. Elements of Marxism-Leninism (\*83) - A study course.  
Elements of the Ideology and theory of Communist Party (\*83)  
 based on Communist Manifesto, Wage, Labour and Capital, Socialism; Utopian and Scientific; Imperialism, State & Revolution; problems of Leninism.
4. Lenin & Stalin on colonial revolution - a study course.  
 C.I. These, 2nd, 6th, 7th (\*84).
5. History of the CPSU(B) - a study course supplemented by reading from Lenin, 2 Vols., and Stalin's Leninism.

This is the minimum basic course which the leading comrades should themselves work out by self-study and work out into lectures supplemented by the self-study by the Party members of the texts themselves. This will have to be supplemented by numbers of special

courses such as

- (1) Imperialism in Burma
- (2) Working class struggles and Trade Unionism in Burma
- (3) Peasant struggles (\*and\*) Agrarian revolution in Burma
- (4) History of anti-imperialist struggles and national movement in Burma
- (5) Theory and practice of Party organisation
- (6) Insurrection and Partisan warfare.

We must not set some intellectual divorced from mass work to work out these courses. Party education is not done that way. Our top leaders themselves have to prepare these courses in form of lecture series by self-study and train the teachers themselves. This holds good for the entire course outlined above. By this method the Party leaders educate themselves and train the first batch of Party educators who are again (\*district\* - \*85) leaders for different areas themselves. Party education in Marxism-Leninism is and must be a continuous and organised activity of the Party. Failure to take it seriously leaves the entire Party from top to bottom open and vulnerable to the penetration of bourgeois influence, penetration of reformism. This (\*is\*) our very serious weakness and has already cost us dear. It can be liquidated only when the leadership of the Party takes it seriously and begins to educate itself with a view to becoming educators and turning out teachers. Immediate target must be to organise a central school for teachers.

This is the basis for the drive for broadening (\*86) the Party and extending its recruitment among the working class, poor peasants, middle class employees and the toiling classes belonging to the national minorities.

The Party in Burma is a cadre party, consisting of the best fighters drawn from the working class, poor peasantry, middle class intellectuals who are all whole-time workers and fighters. But it is therefore small in comparison to the vast influence it possesses. It has to be transferred into a mass party. And the first step towards it is intensive education drive among the existing cadre membership itself. A thorough education drive in the context of the developing struggles and political battles is the precondition of transforming the party into a mass Party.

### Editorial Remarks

Sources: Two manuscripts were at the disposal of the editor and therefore used for this text:

- MS 1: received from U Thein Pe Myint in December 1973 in Rangoon. It is typewritten, probably the third or fourth carbon-copy; 39,5 pages in folio size.
- MS 2: received from Dr. Robert Taylor in 1980 in London (original source unknown). It is a photocopy of an also typewritten original (or of a very good first carbon-copy); smaller types, therefore only 34,5 pages.

The manuscripts are typed on different typewriters. Both must have a common "ancestor" manuscript, because they sometimes contain the same mistakes as to spelling or text, though this is not always the case. In general, MS 1 seems to be more complete and altogether more reliable. The copyist of MS 2, on the other hand, sometimes marked a word or passage missing or distorted in the text from which he copied; several times sentences are also not correctly separated in MS 2. MS 2 uses capital letters where MS 1 (and this text) underlines.

The above text follows mostly MS 1. Typing errors are corrected without mentioning (see General Remarks of the Editor, p.XIV). Differences between the manuscripts are recorded in the Editorial Notes below. If the text seemed to be distorted in both manuscripts, it has been amended and the amendment marked as in other texts.

Date: Neither of the manuscripts is dated. However, several passages of the text (23) indicate that the thesis has been drafted end of 1947 or, even more probable, during the first weeks of 1948. It might be presumed that it has been finalized at the beginning of March 1948 (see below on Background).

Language: Not clear in this case; presumably English, as the thesis was probably drafted in India (see below).

Title: Same as original thesis (only the date has been added by the editor).

Author: Thakin Ba Tin (a) Goshal was of Indian origin, but (according to U Nu) born and educated in Burma. He was among the "founders" of the Communist Party in August 1939 and coopted into the Central Committee probably during its meeting in July 1946. When Thakin Ba Hein's malaria worsened in August 1946, he developed to be the CPB's chief ideologist. During all the later years in the underground,

23) See especially the beginning of Chapter III (p.93) and the mentioning of a meeting on the eve of 4 January (p.112).

Goshal remained very close to Thakin Than Tun. On 18 June 1967, he was killed in a most cruel way in the course of the inner-party purges staged in the style of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

Background: By 1947, the gulf between Communists and non-Communists in Europe and within the wartime alliance widened quickly. This brought about new theoretical and strategical discussions in the Soviet Union. Their outcome was a rejection of cooperation with non-Communist movements except on the basis of Communist supremacy. The speech of Andrei Zhdanov on the occasion of the founding of the Cominform on 22 September 1947 at Wiliza Gora (Poland) and the founding of the Cominform itself were the climax to these discussions and, altogether, promulgated the new doctrine, though the Soviet authorities were not quite aware of this as yet at that time. "Zhukov, in an article which appeared in Bol'shevik in December, made a more systematic effort to apply Zhdanov's theses to the East" (24). The first actual projection of both doctrines into the strategies of colonial parties occurred at the Southeast Asian Youth Conference held in Calcutta from 19 to 25 February 1948 (25).

The Communist Party of India adopted the new policy already at a Central Committee meeting in December where Thakin Than Tun and Thakin Ba Tin (a) Goshal participated. According to some authors, it was during this meeting that Goshal, as Ba Tin is called usually, wrote his thesis "The Revolutionary Possibilities for 1948" (26) and even discussed it with the leaders of the CPI. It is supposed to have been adopted at a Central Committee meeting of the CPB in January or in the beginning of March 1948.

At least Thakin Than Tun and Goshal participated then also in the Southeast Asian Youth Conference and the immediately following Second Congress of the CPI in February. It might be presumed that Goshal went over the text again after their return and that this perhaps has led to reformulating the title in to its present form of "On the Present Political Situation and Our Tasks." The "Goshal Thesis" applied the new line of international Communism to the then situation in Burma, criticizing the former (Browderist) line of collaboration with the British and especially the Government of Thakin Nu. The new line was finally adopted by a Communist rally at Pyin-

24) McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, op.cit., p.355; for more details see ibid. pp.351-360.

25) For more information on this Conference, which lasted till the 28, and its impact see Ruth T. McVey, The Calcutta Conference and The Southeast Asian Uprisings, Ithaca/N.Y.: Cornell University, 1958 (= Interim Reports Series, Southeast Asia Program).

26) See Government of the Union of Burma, Burma and the Insurrections, (Rangoon), September 1949, p.4.

mana on 18 March. It resulted in a more extreme policy of the CPB which just ten days later, i.e. on 28 March 1948, led to its going underground and taking up armed insurrection against the government.

The "Goshal Thesis" is therefore one of the most important texts in the history of the legal CPB. It has been mentioned first by the Burmese Government (see above note 26) and then also by several authors (27). As the CPB had no occasion anymore to publish it, the "Goshal Thesis" is printed here for the first time as a historic document. If my above mentioned hypothesis of an existence of two slightly different versions is right, the text surely represents the later version.

### Editorial Notes

- \*1) In both manuscripts, Contents have Arabic figures. This has been changed here in correspondence with the following text.
  - \*2) "is yet unstable ... fighting areas" omitted in MS 2.
  - \*3) MS 2: "straight" instead of "strategic."
  - \*4) MS 2 writes "San-Sein-Maw gang" which does not make sense, however.
  - \*5) MS 2: "overturning" instead of "overthrowing."
  - \*6) MS 2: "anti-imperialism" instead of "anti-imperialist."
  - \*7) "bourgeois" omitted in MS 2.
  - \*8) MS 2: "statements" instead of "statement."
  - \*9) Passage distorted identically in both manuscripts; Ba Tin probably meant "be a present of the imperialists," as inserted.
  - \*10) "cases" omitted in MS 2.
  - \*11) MS 2: only "American" instead of "Anglo-American."
  - \*12) MS 1 writes "1936" which does not make sense, however.
  - \*13) Here and at most places afterwards both manuscripts shorten "Government" to "Govt." which is, however, always written in full in this text. The same accounts for abbreviations such as "Jan." for "January," etc.
  - \*14) MS 1 writes "strategidence" which might be distorted from an original "strategic guidance."
  - \*15) In both manuscripts "resaiting" instead of the inserted "resetting"; MS 2 adds "(Sp?)", probably meaning "spoiled?"
  - \*16) "rank" underlined in MS 1.
  - \*17) Closing quotation mark missing in both manuscripts.
  - \*18) MS 1 has only "temp"; MS 2 puts "(missing word)" instead.
  - \*19) Both manuscripts have evidently omitted something in this passage, e.g. "For imperialism" (as added now) or at least
- 27) See e.g., Trager, *Burma: From Kingdom to Independence*, op.cit., pp.98-99, or Mc Lane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia*, op.cit., pp.371-374.

"which."

- \*20) Both manuscripts put "and" instead of "as."
- \*21) MS 2: "asking" instead of "making."
- \*22) "we would have ... Thakin Nu," omitted in MS 2.
- \*23) "to take over ... murderers" omitted in MS 2.
- \*24) MS 2: "united" instead of "unity."
- \*25) MS 2: "struggle" instead of "strategic."
- \*26) "of the masses ... and" omitted in MS 2.
- \*27) Passage distorted in both manuscripts; there is evidently a line missing which, however, cannot be reconstructed.
- \*28) Both manuscripts put a comma after "dastard."
- \*29) MS 2: "sided" instead of "aided."
- \*30) "however, in defence of Korensky" underlined in MS 1.
- \*31) Both manuscripts insert here an incomprehensible "it on." Perhaps the whole quotation is distorted.
- \*32) No new paragraph in MS 2.
- \*33) In both manuscripts "(2)" instead of "(1)."
- \*34) "(4)" missing in both manuscripts.
- \*35) "in our October discussion ... by us" omitted in MS 2.
- \*36) "welcome" in quotation marks and underlined in MS 1.
- \*37) In neither manuscript it is clear whether these are actually two headlines quoted (as put now) or only one.
- \*38) "We must denounce the imperialist bureaucracy" omitted in MS 2.
- \*39) Both manuscripts add here a distorting "which."
- \*40) In both manuscripts identical, but possibly a passage has been omitted.
- \*41) Both manuscripts write "has it".
- \*42) Both manuscripts write "reactionaries;" thus, the original text might have read also as "reactionaries around Saw."
- \*43) Both manuscripts "communist" instead of "communism."
- \*44) MS 2: "Kyaw Sein" instead of "Kyaw Nyein," but Kyaw Sein was not in a leading position at that time.
- \*45) Both manuscripts put a quotation mark before "is" without closing the quotation afterwards.
- \*46) MS 1: "finally" instead of "officially."
- \*47) "subservient collaboration ... leads to" missing in MS 2.
- \*48) In both manuscripts the passage is obviously distorted as it reads "unless we in the present situation. Leadership."
- \*49) In both manuscripts the sentence reads "If we crime betraying the revolution." which seems to be distorted, however.
- \*50) Both manuscripts write "taking" instead of "talking."
- \*51) MS 1 writes "racial conflict etc."
- \*52) Passage after "repudiate British" identical in both manuscripts, but evidently distorted.
- \*53) "betraying the fighting of AFPFL-CP unity" omitted in MS 2.
- \*53a) The passage is distorted in both manuscripts and has therefore been corrected according to a quotation of it given from another source by McLane (*Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia*,

- op.cit., p.372).
- \*54) May also be read, in both manuscripts, as "smash imperialist - bureaucratic machinery."
  - \*55) "and banks ... in industries" omitted in MS 2.
  - \*56) In both manuscripts "40 hours day" instead of "40 hours week."
  - \*57) MS 2: "boiling" instead of "toiling."
  - \*58) "and the leftist groups ... Communist Party" omitted in MS 2.
  - \*59) MS 2 adds here "organization."
  - \*60) MS 1 starts this and the next two paragraphs with a dash.
  - \*61) Both manuscripts write "nature."
  - \*62) MS 1 writes "overawed for frightened," MS 2 "overawed of frightened."
  - \*63) "We turned ... Aung San" omitted in MS 2.
  - \*64) MS 2 states explicitly "word missing."
  - \*65) No quotations marks in MS 2.
  - \*66) "not" is not in capitals (= underlined) in MS 2.
  - \*67) This and the next paragraph start with a dash in MS 1.
  - \*68) In both manuscripts "peace makes" instead of the now inserted "pace makers."
  - \*69) MS 2: "politics" instead of "policies."
  - \*70) "anti-imperialist ... boldly with" omitted in MS 2.
  - \*71) Passage identical in both manuscripts, but a few words have possibly been omitted in this sentence.
  - \*72) MS 2: "year's" instead of "years'"; however, such strikes took place in 1946 and 1947.
  - \*73) "administrative" omitted in MS 2.
  - \*74) Both manuscripts add here "of" which indicates that one or more words are missing.
  - \*75) MS 2: No dash at the beginning of this and the next two paragraphs.
  - \*76) MS 2: "core" instead of "cadre."
  - \*77) "there" omitted in MS 2.
  - \*78) Source not clear as MS 1 writes "I.B.C.P., I." and MS 2 puts "I.B.C.P.I." Presumably, the source is an organ of the Indian (-Bengali?) Communist Party.
  - \*79) In both manuscripts "which" instead of "while."
  - \*80) In MS 2 this and most of the following dashes (up to the end of the numbered paragraphs) are missing.
  - \*81) "Main slogans and programme" omitted in MS 2.
  - \*82) MS 2: "of" instead of "UF -" meaning "United Front."
  - \*83) No capitals (= underlined) in MS 2.
  - \*84) "These, ... 7th" underlined in MS 1.
  - \*85) In both manuscripts "disruct" instead of "district."
  - \*86) MS 2: "hardening" instead of "broadening."