Threat, Citizenship and Sexual Orientation: Developing and Measuring the Concept of Gay Threat

Elizabeth L. Cooper

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Reading Committee:

Matthew A. Barreto, chair

Christine Di Stefano

Patrick Egan

Darryl J. Hollman, GSR

Naomi D. Murakawa

Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

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University of Washington

Abstract

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Elizabeth L. Cooper

Chair of the Supervisory Committee

Professor Matthew A. Barreto

Political Science

This dissertation develops and measures the concept of gay threat. It argues that Americans make judgments about the possibility of normative gay citizenship; some view the concept of "gay citizen" as an oxymoron, while others do not. Those who view gay citizenship as a contradiction in terms respond to the recent expansion in the visibility and legal recognition of GLBT communities with feelings of threat. This expansion makes impossible citizens a reality, potentially undermining the normative nature of the polity itself. I use in-depth interviews to document that Americans who view gay citizenship as impossible make similar negative evaluations of gay economic, political, and social behavior. These interviews also demonstrate that gay threat is distinct from religious objections to or disgust towards lesbians and gay men. The similar evaluations of gay economic, political, and social behavior form the basis of a gay threat scale, which I develop and test over four pilot surveys. A final version, on a survey fielded by the ANES, demonstrates that the gay threat scale is cohesive and that gay threat has a distinct association with gay and lesbian-related policy preferences, even after adjusting for other psychological traits and the gay and lesbian feeling thermometer.

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Chapter 1: Gay Threat and American Politics

The early twenty-first century has so far proven to be an era in which gay men and lesbians have become more fully included in the political and social life of the United States.[1] In 2011, Congress repealed Don't Ask, Don't Tell, a law that prohibited openly gay men and lesbians from serving in the military ("Repeal Day: The End of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell'" 2014). President Barack Obama became the first sitting president to endorse same-sex marriage in 2012 (Wallsten and Wilson 2012), and in 2013 the United States Supreme Court overturned the Defense of Marriage Act, which barred federal recognition of same-sex marriages (Liptak 2013). In the decade between 2004 and 2014, 19 states and the District of Columbia provided marriage equality for same-sex couples (Davenport 2014). At the same time, there was increased visibility

[1] Note on terminology. The preferred terms in reference to sexual minorities have changed dramatically over the past 50 years. Current consensus is that "homosexual" is both overly medicalized and a relic of mid-century stigma. Thus, it is not the current preferred term, and I do not use it in this dissertation unless it is in direct reference to survey questions or quotes. (For discussion and more information on this terminology, see (Pinello 2005; Committee on Gay and Lesbian Concerns, American Psychological Association 1991; "GLAAD Media Reference Guide - AP, New York Times & Washington Post Style" 2014) Some people prefer the use of queer as a catch-all term for sexual and gender minorities; it can also connote an opposition to assimilationist politics and static identity categories. Many older lesbians and gay men are uncomfortable with using this term, as it used to be a strong insult. Given both the controversy of the term and the fact that there is a great diversity of viewpoints on assimilationist versus radical politics within these broader communities, I opt for the term "lesbian and gay." (For discussion of the term queer and its relationship to politics, see: ("A Definiton of 'Queer'" 2014; Berube and Escoffier 1991; Anonymous 1990; Bernstein Sycamore 2007). Lastly, many use them acronym GLBT, or gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered ("What Does It All Mean?" 2014). Because this project focuses exclusively on gay men and lesbians, I do not use the full acronym unless it is in reference to movement organizations.

of lesbians and gay men in television and cinema, including network television broadcast of a gay wedding (D'Addario 2014), a trend that began in the 1990's (Becker 2006).

These changes did not come without backlash, as two recent events illustrate. Comments made by *Duck Dynasty* patriarch Phil Robertson regarding his religiously-based opposition to gay relationships proved highly controversial. There was also strong negative reaction to Michael Sam, the first openly gay man drafted to the National Football League (NFL), when he kissed his boyfriend on the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) after he received news of his draft pick. In both cases, elite actors and online commentators denounced the current role of gay men and lesbians in the American polity, claiming that these events exemplified un-earned social visibility and political power that came at the expense of conservative Christians and traditional values.

In an interview in the January 2014 edition of *GQ* magazine, Robertson, a star of the Arts and Entertainment (A&E) Network show *Duck Dynasty*, discussed his belief that gay men and lesbians were immoral. He answered a reporter's question, "what, in your mind, is sinful," by paraphrasing the New Testament's 1 Corinthians chapter 6, verses 9 and 10[2] and comparing gay sexuality with bestiality and sexual promiscuity. He also opined that " [a] vagina… would be more desirable than a man's anus" (Magary 2014). Condemnation of Robertson was swift (Murray 2013; HRC staff 2013b), and A&E responded by indefinitely suspending Robertson from the series (Marechal 2013). Supporters of Robinson quickly counter-attacked, charging

[2] "Do you not know that wrong-doers will not inherit the Kingdom of God? Do not be deceived! Fornicators, idolaters, adulterers, male prostitutes, sodomites, thieves, the greedy, drunkards, revilers, robbers—none of these will inherit the kingdom of God." (Levine and Brettler 2011, 670)

A&E and Robertson's detractors with infringing on his freedom of speech, intolerance and religious discrimination. Major interest groups like the Heritage Foundation and the Family Research Council chimed in (FRC Staff 2013; Anderson 2013), but reaction was not limited to formal groups. Social media groups with names like "Support Phil Robertson" immediately appeared and grew exponentially as politically active social media users joined the fray ("Support Phil Robertson" 2013). Within 10 days, A&E had re-instated Robertson on the program (Yahr 2013).

Five months later, Michael Sam became the first openly gay player to be drafted into the NFL (Wagoner 2014). ESPN broadcast Sam receiving the Saint Louis Rams' call informing him that he had been drafted to the team. Afterwards, he kissed his boyfriend, and ESPN aired it (*Michael Sam Reacts to Being Drafted by the Rams* 2014). Again, controversy ensued, with advocacy groups and Twitter users criticizing both the decision to air the kiss and the media attention Sam received in general (Yan and Alsup 2014; Petchesky 2014). Others felt that Sam was getting preferential treatment in the draft compared to former quarterback Tim Tebow, who had been outspoken about his evangelical Christianity and pro-life political views (Thomas 2014; Whitley 2014).

The backlash in both of these cases presents strong rhetorical similarities. Supporters of Robertson and opponents of Sam did not merely frame their cases solely in terms of religion or disgust, though both explanations were present. In addition to these rationales, they articulated something else, threat. Part of the issue was that gay men and lesbians should never have been able to gain the political power needed for A&E to suspend Robertson or the social acceptance necessary for EPSN to air Sam's kiss. Because of this illegitimate access, the American political community, the polity, itself was under threat.

Both the Robertson and the Sam cases represent standard issues within American public life. Advocacy groups, pundits and social media users all call for public figures who make controversial remarks to face accountability (e.g. King 2013; ADL Staff 2014), and public figures who make such remarks are often fired or face economic backlash (e.g. Moskin 2013; Folkenflik 2010; Clark 2013; CNN Staff 2003). Kissing one's partner when receiving major recognition is common.[3] Thus, it is possible to argue that nothing about these two episodes is out of the ordinary or radical within the context of American politics.

However, many of Robertson's supporters and Sam's opponents present these two episodes as radical departures from the norms of American politics. The key difference, one that is articulated explicitly by both the supporters and the opponents, is that both events feature gay men and lesbians as more powerful participants, as more equal citizens, in American politics than has previously been the case. It is possible to interpret this increase in political and social power in multiple ways, such as excitement over a marginalized group overcoming historical exclusion or indifference as another legitimate group participates in a pluralist system. This is not how Robertson's supporters or Sam's opponents interpreted these events. Instead, they responded with feelings of threat when confronted with the presence of gay citizenship, a construction that had seemed -- and historically was -- impossible.

For example, Robertson's suspension becomes a threat to both freedom of religion and speech rather than a predictable result of making vulgar and stereotyped remarks about an identifiable minority group. The media's focus on Sam during the NFL draft is indicative of a

[3] For evidence of the expectation of kissing, see the criticism faced by Al Gore's stilted kiss with his then wife, Tipper, upon receiving the Democratic Party Presidential nomination (James 2000).

new and hostile culture that unfairly valorized him for violating social norms: being openly gay and kissing his boyfriend on national television. The media attention is therefore not the result of a newsworthy first, an openly gay man succeeding in the hyper-masculine NFL, and the airing of his kiss is not simply Sam and his relationship with parity to all other players, as someone with a more neutral or positive view of gay citizenship might think.

Figures 1 and 2, drawn from blog posts about the Robertson and Sam incidents, respectively, display this logic of gay threat in action. Figure 1 ("Support Phil Robertson" 2013)situates the controversy over Robertson within the context of same-sex marriage. Robertson's image is displayed over a pink and red equality sign, an image produced by the gay-rights advocacy group the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) that went viral within social media among supporters of marriage equality (HRC staff 2013a). The image asks "What is equality?" It places marriage equality at odds with Phil Robertson's employment by the *Duck Dynasty* franchise. The implication is that same-sex marriage is not real equality; an equal world would be one in which Robertson is able to condemn lesbians and gay men without protest or backlash. By interpreting the backlash from GLBT advocacy groups through the lens of threat, Robertson's supporters viewed what are fairly standard political tactics as conspiratorial and anti-democratic in this instance.

Figure 1: An Internet Image Implies that the Push for Marriage Equality is Not Real Equality.

Figure 2 also illustrates this zero-sum approach to the greater inclusion of lesbians and gay men in the polity, focusing this time on evaluations of the greater visibility of gay couples. The image presents Michael Sam in direct contrast with Tim Tebow, an NFL quarterback known for his commitment to evangelical Christianity (Bishop 2011). Sam kissing his boyfriend is a social behavior that makes sense in the context of his draft to the NFL. However, seen through the lens of threat, this kiss is a hyper-sexual violation of respectability; believing that gay couples have no right to kiss in public can render any display of affection between a gay couple more sexual, and, therefore, less appropriate than similar displays of affection between straight couples.[4] Tebow, in contrast, demonstrates his respectability by publicly praying during football games.[5] This image makes this contrast apparent and makes clear that the polity as a whole is threatened by this inversion of norms. Respectability, exhibited by Tebow, is punished, while

[4] For further discussion of the public's evaluation of "charmed" sexuality, see (Rubin 2012).

[5] For further discussion of the relationship between football and prayer as a normative part of many communities, see (Applebome 1989; States News Service 2010; Drape 2005).

disrespectability is celebrated. America is not blessed by God, according to this image, and, therefore the nation will suffer.

Figure 2: This Images Critiques an Inversion in the Norms of Respectability.

While these incidents garnered much media attention, taken by themselves, it is difficult to tell whether or not this reaction is indicative of a broader trend in American politics. There are two reasons why it is difficult to determine if this is a broader trend or not. First, these events played out over press releases, sound-bites and memes, which do not lend themselves to in-depth explanations of attitudes. The evaluations of the behavior itself are explicitly laid out, but left implicit are beliefs about the potential of lesbians and gay men to be citizens.

Second, the major actors in these events are advocacy groups and political bloggers and social media users. Current advocacy groups tend to have a professionalized, hierarchical

structure (Skocpol 2004), and they reflect the interests of only certain parts of their constituency (Strolovitch 2007). Most Americans have limited political engagement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Lewis-Beck 2008), and people who post political material on social media are not a representative sample of the United States as a whole. The fact that elite and other non-representative actors present gay men and lesbians as a threat to the nation does not, in and of itself, mean that this sentiment is widespread across the population.

Can current scholarship help us make sense of why gay men and lesbians are frequently cast as illegitimate citizens in American politics? First, it documents the rapid change in public opinion about gay men and lesbians as one of the most striking stories in American public opinion. Over the span of 40 years, gay men and lesbians have gone from a negative valence symbol, a group universally disliked by most Americans, to one that has broader social acceptance (Baunach 2012; Boer 1978; Yang 1997; Keleher and Smith 2012; Loftus 2001; Flores and Barclay 2013). It also provides an account of widespread backlash, as the process of acceptance has been uncontested or uniform. As with most instances of public opinion shift, there has been backlash as some segments of the population respond, resist and protest the change. Many aspects of this change are well documented. There is much written on the history of the GLBT movement (D'Emilio 1990; Carter 2010; Faderman 2012) and the pre-existing relationship between sexual minorities and the state (Canaday 2009; Johnson 2004; Berube 2010; Chauncey 1994). Significant focus has been on the ballot initiatives that attempted to block the movement's gains, from the Anita Bryant campaign in the late 1970's (Frank 2013) to campaigns over anti-discrimination ordinances in the 1990's (Dugan 2005) to banning same-sex marriage in the 2000's (Hillygus and Shields 2005; Smith, DeSantis, and Kassel 2006; Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz 2012; Campbell and Monson 2008), culminating in California's Proposition

8 (Abrajano 2010; Egan and Sherrill 2009; Wadsworth 2011). Scholars such as Fisher and Hall have documented rhetorical interplay between pro- and anti- GLBT factions (Fisher 2012; Hall 2013).

The previous literature can also shed additional light on individual reaction to the change in the position of lesbians and gay men in society. The fields of public opinion and psychology have produced research on the role that personality and socio-economic factors play in the formation of attitudes and backlash towards lesbians and gay men. These range from work examining a broad range of correlates (Patel et al. 1995; Herek 1988; Warriner, Nagoshi, and Nagoshi 2013; Goodman and Moradi 2008; Herek 1988; Kite and Deaux 1986) to focusing on the specific role that religiosity (Hunsberger 1996; Finlay and Walther 2003; Malcomnson et al. 2006), gender (Herek 2000; La Mar and Kite 1998), race (Whitley Jr, Childs, and Collins 2011) and interpersonal contact (Herek and Capitanio 1996; Herek and Glunt 1993; Barth, Overby, and Huffmon 2009; Barth and Perry 2007) have on these general attitudes. Other work has focused on how beliefs in gender roles (Whitley Jr 2001), social dominance and authoritarianism (Whitley, Jr. and Ægisdóttir 2000), right-wing authoritarianism (Hunsberger 1996; Rios 2013), anti-other affect (Ficarrotto 1990; Kinder and Kam 2009a, 151–171), ideology (Heaven and Oxman 1999), the gender performance of gay men (Cohen, Hall, and Tuttle 2009), media consumption (Garretson 2009; Mazur and Emmers-Sommer 2003) and beliefs about the etiology of sexual orientation (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008) affect attitudes and policy preferences. Some work has sought to create scales for attitudes towards lesbians and gay men generally (Herek 1984; Massey 2009).

It is also the case that threat and disgust play a role in attitudes about lesbians and gay men. Researchers have also documented that the threat of one's own mortality can trigger more

conservative policy attitudes against lesbians and gay men (Nail et al. 2009) and that triggering feelings of disgust can lead to more negative evaluations of gay men and lesbians (Cunningham, Forestell, and Dickter 2013;Smith et al. 2011). Moral disgust (Haidt and Hersh 2001; Inbar et al. 2009) and the desire to maintain a community's consensual values (Chong 2000, 153–185) can both lead to opposition towards policy that would expand the rights of lesbians and gay men. There exists preliminary research on the interplay between symbolic threat, right-wing authoritarianism and anti-gay prejudice (Rios 2013).

Taken together, this research demonstrates that attitudes about sexual orientation arise from a complex matrix of social context, belief and personality. They are not static; rather, they are malleable across time, as broader trends demonstrate, and across individuals, as the effects of question framing and experimental treatments show. What is missing from this literature, what is critical for making sense of the Robertson and Sam controversies, is an understanding of how beliefs about the polity, including criteria for citizenship and the normative scope of government action, contribute to threatened reactions towards lesbians and gay men. Does the rapid change of the social and political status of gay men and lesbians generate threat, and is this threat unique from other measures and explanations of attitudes towards lesbians and gay men?

In this dissertation, I argue that these changing social and political roles do generate a unique form of threat which I call gay threat. Gay threat provides additional explanatory power for understanding contemporary backlash. Central to the development of gay threat are beliefs about the ability of gay men and lesbians to be good citizens. There are multiple pathways to determine whether or not "gay citizen" is an oxymoron; normative beliefs about sexuality, about gay men and lesbians as a group, about the state and contact with individual lesbians and gay men can all play a part in this evaluation. Once an individual evaluates normative gay

citizenship as impossible, it colors all subsequent reactions to the gains of the GLBT movement and individual economic, political and social behavior by lesbian and gay people. Seen through the lens of gay threat, economic success becomes symptomatic of selfishness, political gains are zero-sum and occur through the subversion of American political institutions, and gender non-conformity and being open about one's sexual orientation become the categorically political and disrespectable flaunting of social norms.

Gay threat and the belief that "gay citizen" is a contradiction in terms stand in contrast to other ways of viewing the citizenship claims of lesbians and gay men. For example, it is possible to view gay men and lesbians neutrally, as some of the many players within a pluralist system, or to view them as a critical part of the polity. Rights gains would challenge neither view, and subsequent evaluations of gay and lesbian behavior would be less negative, demonstrating lower levels of threat. Ultimately, these evaluations, rooted in normative beliefs about gay citizenship, are one of the strongest drivers of opposition to gay and lesbian rights, standing alongside measures like religiosity, moral traditionalism and disgust.

Over the course of this dissertation, I make the case that gay threat is a unique and important concept for understanding opposition to and backlash against gay rights. I first turn my attention to laying out a theoretical explanation of gay threat in this and the following chapter. Figure 3 provides a breakdown of how the gay threat becomes triggered, and Figures 4 and 5 provide a more detailed examination of key parts of the process. Table 1 provides an overview of hypothetical scenarios designed for ease of understanding the theory. When discussing the possible ways a person can move through Figures 3 through 5, I shall refer to these hypothetical cases.

Before a person can experience gay threat, she must have two separate conceptualizations, a vision of what the polity should be like (Figure 5) and a broad normative evaluation of gay men and lesbians generally (Figure 4). Many things, like what sorts of political activities are legitimate, who should be given democratic consideration by other citizens and what the limits of legitimate government activities are, can influence this vision of the normative polity. Additionally, the role of money in politics, one's attitude towards protests and demonstrations and whether or not one believes that equality should be considered equality of opportunity or outcome can all become a part of an individual's vision. It is not necessary that such a vision include all of these things, however. Drawing from the examples in Table 1, Beth and Alicia both believe that the government should foster morality, but they have very different views of which morality, evangelical Christianity or American progressivism, that should be. Both Susan and Jonathan are libertarians and see all attempts at identity politics, both in terms of interest groups and in terms of government anti-discrimination policy, to violate their norms of limited government and individualism. Jessica believes in pluralism, free speech, and views America as a melting pot.

Table 1.1: Hypothetical Scenarios					
	Beth	**Susan**	**Jessica**	**Jonathan**	**Alicia**
Beliefs About Polity	Should foster morality - sees the morality of the public good as largely consistent with evangelical beliefs	Libertarian- thinks that people should approach the state as individuals and the state should treat people as individuals. Believes that policies and politics that reflect religious, racial, or minority identities violates this.	Believes in pluralistic inclusion; values the idea of free speech and America as melting pot	Libertarian- thinks that people should approach the state as individuals and the state should treat people as individuals. Believes that policies and politics that reflect religious, racial, or minority identities violates this.	Should foster morality; sees the morality of the public good as largely consistent with American progressivism
Beliefs About Lesbians and Gay Men	Negative - views gay and lesbian sexuality as immoral	Negative- thinks GLBT movement violates uses identity politics and that gay sexuality is disgusting	Negative- views gay and lesbian sexuality as immoral	Positive- believes that different sexual orientations are found in nature, enjoys Modern Family	Positive- thinks gay men and lesbians are part of an oppressed minority, enjoys drag shows and Pride parades
Contact	Limited to casual acquaintances	No	Gay Brother-in-Law	No	Lesbian Close Friend
Gay Threat	**Yes - Strongly**	**Yes- Strongly**	**No- Neutral**	**No-Neutral**	**No- Positive**

In addition to the normative view of the polity, individuals also have to make some sort of evaluation of gay men and lesbians generally to experience gay threat. Figure 4 demonstrates that there are many considerations that can drive this attitude, including religious belief, psychological traits such as authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, moral traditionalism, and feelings of disgust. Personal contact also has the potential to be highly significant in determining an overall attitude towards lesbians and gay men. Indeed, any of the factors listed earlier in this chapter could play a role in forming this evaluation.

We can see how this variation plays out in Table 1.1's examples. Both Beth and Jessica view same-sex sexuality as immoral. Both have some contact with lesbians and gay men, though Jessica's is mainly in the form of a long-standing relationship with her brother-in-law, and Beth's comes from acquaintances. Susan also has a negative evaluation of lesbians and gay men, but that comes from a belief that the GLBT movement violates her principles of individualism and that the policies it advocates for would violate the principle of limited government. Additionally, she feels disgust towards gay sexuality and does not have any contact with lesbians and gay men. Jonathan and Alicia both have positive views of lesbians and gay men, again for different reasons. Jonathan thinks that the prevalence of same-sex mating in the animal kingdom means that variation in sexual orientation is natural. Though he does not have any personal contact with lesbians and gay men, he enjoys watching *Modern Family*. Alicia, in contrast, bases her positive feelings towards lesbians and gay men on an affinity for gay culture, which includes a love of Pride parades and drag shows. Her best friend is a lesbian, and she believes that gay men and lesbians form an oppressed group.

These two beliefs combine to form an evaluation of gay citizenship (Figure 3). Some combinations of beliefs yield gay citizenship to be an oxymoron, while others lead individuals to feel neutral, ambivalent or positively about gay citizenship. Beth and Susan's beliefs would make it logically impossible for gay men and lesbians to be good citizens. In each case, they perceive gay men and lesbians as violating the norms of the American state. Note that there is flexibility within the norms that gay men and lesbians as a group can supposedly violate. Both Beth's beliefs in the state as a promoter of morality and Susan's libertarian beliefs lead to the same conclusion.

This is not the case for Jessica, Jonathan and Alicia. While Jessica believes that gay sexuality is immoral, she does not necessarily believe that it is the state's job to enforce that morality. What's more, her beliefs in pluralism and free speech make it logically possible for gay men and lesbians to participate legitimately in government, despite her beliefs. Jonathan and Alicia hold more congruent views. While Jonathan does not personally know any lesbians or gay men, there is nothing in his beliefs about them as a group that would preclude their participation as citizens. Alicia's long-lasting friendship with a lesbian, her participation in some forms of gay culture, and her belief that government has a moral obligation to correct injustices and prevent discrimination all lead her to see gay citizenship as a positive good instead of as an oxymoron.

Once someone like Susan or Beth believes that "gay citizen" is an oxymoron, it sets the stage for her to feel gay threat. Any attempts – or successes-- by lesbians and gay men to claim citizenship, from winning anti-discrimination ordinances, to enforcing those ordinances, to kissing in public, stands in direct contradiction to the belief that gay men and lesbians cannot be good citizens. This disconnect causes cognitive dissonance because the empirical reality of the polity is not matching normative ideals.

Regardless of whether or not someone thinks that American political life can include gay men and lesbians, they exist. They engage in political activities: voting, contacting elected officials, going to protests, participating in boycotts and posting political images on social media. They have economic lives, which include jobs, careers and consumption patterns. They have personal lives and relationships, which can range from marriages to short-term flings, and can involve public displays of affection: hand holding, having photos on display and kissing. They develop gender presentations that feel personably comfortable and authentic. Movement

organizations advocate for various policies from governmental agencies and companies, with varying degrees of input from different members and subsets of GLBT communities.

People like Susan and Beth who already feel gay threat will react differently to these examples of gay political power and visibility compared to people who do not feel gay threat, like Jessica, Jonathan and Alicia. Any evidence of the citizenship of lesbians and gay men, from boycotting a fast food restaurant to holding a date's hand or buying designer clothes, can become threatening because it provides further proof of the divide between a threatened person's normative polity and reality.

Thus, threatened individuals view the political, economic and social behavior of lesbians and gay men in a fundamentally different way than those who do not feel gay threat. Threatened people like Susan and Beth view political success as the result of using subversive, conspiratorial means, such as using the media as propaganda and closed-door political negotiations. Politics is a zero-sum game, where victories for lesbians and gay men necessarily translate into losses for other groups. In contrast, someone who strongly believes in pluralism and does not feel gay threat, like Jessica, would be more likely to access boycotts as one legitimate political tool out of many; and someone like Jonathan who is a non-threatened libertarian would see positive media portrayals as a legitimate outcome of the market for entertainment.

Likewise, threatened people view economic success as the result of gay rejection of the responsibilities of family, children and broader society. While such views may be logical for someone like Beth, Jonathan and Alicia might interpret stereotypes of gay wealth differently. As a libertarian who does not feel gay threat, Jonathan would likely believe that any economic success was earned. Alicia might feel that gay economic success signified overcoming discrimination and hardship.

Lastly, social behavior is another area that threatened and non-threatened people will evaluate differently. Two major forms of social behavior include public displays of affection, such as kissing a date, and gender non-conformity, such as having an androgynous style or having more masculine or feminine mannerisms than is typical for one's sex. Threatened Americans like Susan would interpret gender non-conforming appearance as inherently political and as demonstrating a lack of respect for proper social norms. Someone like Jessica would be more likely to see gender non-conforming behavior and public displays of affection as normal and legitimate ways for people to comport themselves. Alicia would see gender non-conforming behavior as a part of a subculture she feels affinity towards, and same-sex public displays of affection as a sign of a space being welcoming.

This is not to say non-threatened people like Jessica, Jonathan and Alicia would always agree with every action taken by a lesbian, gay man or advocacy group. Rather, they do not interpret these events through the lens of threat. Jonathan might oppose the politics of boycotts or firing people for their public remarks on principle but would not see anything particularly noteworthy or different about GLBT advocacy groups in particular doing this. Jessica would use similar criteria for evaluating public displays of affection between lesbian and gay couples and straight couples, while Alicia might take into account the different context and history of same-sex couples. Their criteria for judging consumption, career paths and economic success are not driven by the idea that gay men and lesbians cannot legitimately participate as good citizens.

It is likely that feelings of gay threat reinforces prior negative evaluations of gay men and lesbians. Seeing increased participation on the part of lesbians and gay men and seeing other parts of the polity grant legitimacy to political demands triggers feelings of threat. Once this threat is activated, it is likely that individuals update their prior beliefs about lesbians and gay

men to be more negative, which in turn reinforces the belief that there can be no such thing as a good gay citizen. Another outcome of gay threat is that threatened individuals will be more likely to oppose policies that would benefit gay and lesbian people, such as marriage equality, anti-discrimination ordinances and second-parent adoption, more strongly than those individuals who do not feel this threat.

Figure 3: The Development of Gay Threat



Figure 4: The Components of Normatively Evaluating Gay Men and Lesbians



Figure 5: Components of a Normative View of the Polity



Returning to the initial examples, we can see that this model of gay threat can provide additional analytical leverage in understanding the Robertson and Sam controversies. The support of Robertson is not simply based on Christian theology, and knee-jerk disgust is not the only thing drives opposition to ESPN's airing of Sam's kiss. Instead, the theory of gay threat would suggest that opposition is more complicated and that opponents see the stakes as higher than only theology or disgust. For example, Robertson and his supporters are working under a normative framework in which the government and society, working in tandem, are supposed to minimize sin, as defined by evangelical Christianity.[6] Identifying and living openly as gay is sinful according to this theology, so it is logically impossible for gay men and lesbians to claim equal citizenship under a government that is fulfilling its normative functions. The controversy with Sam raises similar issues.

Over the course of this dissertation, I develop this argument that gay threat is a critical concept for understanding opposition to lesbian and gay rights. In the next chapter, I further develop this theory, situating it in the existing literature on threat, intergroup attitudes and political psychology. From there, I spend the next three chapters empirically documenting that it is relatively widespread in the American population, with roughly a quarter of straight Americans experiencing it.

In the third chapter, I explore the process of how gay threat develops, which is represented by the vertical process in Figure 3. I employ discourse analysis to a dataset of

[6] For a discussion of evangelical theology on sexual orientation and its view of the relationship between the state and morality, see (Sears 2003; Reilly 2014; Kennedy and Newcombe 2007; Osten and Sears 2003; Sheldon 2005; Kupelian 2011).

interviews that asked respondents about their attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. These sets contain a broad-cross section of 30 Americans. They include people of diverse religious affiliations, varying contact with lesbians and gay men, parents and non-parents, and residents of five states.[7] In this chapter, I distinguish between respondents who feel gay threat and those who do not. I ultimately find that the rationales given by respondents who feel gay threat conform to the expectations derived from the theory of gay threat that I have begun to develop in this chapter.

After establishing support for the rationales of gay threat, in the next empirical chapter (Chapter 4), I develop a gay threat scale that documents its presence in the US population. I believe that respondents would have a hard time articulating feelings about abstract norms about the polity and gay and lesbian citizenship because such abstract concepts are far from respondents' daily lives and language and because social desirability bias might limit the number of people who explicitly say that lesbians and gay men should not be full citizens. Therefore, I measure gay threat by scaling together evaluations of gay and lesbian political, economic and social behavior. I do this because I think that it will be cognitively easier for people to evaluate a more specific, concrete scenario and because there will be less social desirability bias answering individual questions about smaller policy areas than citizenship writ large.

Over the course of Chapter 4, I provide an overview of the pilot data that I used to develop this scale. This pilot data came from 4 distinct surveys, the 2009 and 2010 Washington Poll, the 2011 May Washington Poll, and the 2011 Multi-State Survey of Race and Ethnicity. The first three sampled residents of Washington State and the last was a national sample

[7] Both interview sets combined contain respondents from Missouri, Illinois, Kentucky, Arizona, and Colorado.

clustered by state. I provide descriptive statistics, an analysis of the international consistency of the gay threat scale, factor loadings of the items and a comparison with other psychological measures such as racial resentment and social dominance orientation. I also test for differences by employing a split sample that references only gay men or lesbians. I do this to document that gay threat is consistent for both gay men and lesbians and that it is appropriate for the questions to reference both groups.

In the last empirical chapter (Chapter 5), I run the final version of the gay threat scale on the American National Election Study's 2013 Internet Recontact Survey. This version allows me to estimate exactly how common gay threat is in the American population and how it is associated with gay and lesbian-related policy. The gay threat scale has an internal consistency higher than most of the standard attitudinal batteries, and using it, I find that roughly a quarter of Americans feel threatened by lesbians and gay men. Additionally, there is a significant association between this threat and support for GL-friendly policy, such as marriage equality and adoption by same-sex parents. This threat is significant even after adjusting for factors that might initially lead a person to conclude that there was no place for lesbians and gay men in the polity, including moral traditionalism, religiosity, authoritarianism and social dominance orientation and a general feeling thermometer of attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. This chapter also replicates the findings from the statewide samples in the previous chapter; gay threat informs attitudes towards policy related to sexuality and sexual orientation. It does not impact the attitudes towards other policies related to different out-groups.

While this project provides a critical intervention for understanding both backlash against a group that is experiencing incredibly rapid public opinion change, it can generalize to other examples of inter-group relationships and political incorporation. I provide empirical evidence

to support the claim that citizenship and acceptance as a member of the polity are fundamental components of inter-group attitudes. Individual campaigns, such as the move for more inclusive anti-discrimination laws, marriage, or better representation in the media, are all expressions of this fight over membership. Understanding and documenting the importance of (contested) claims over membership can help make sense of the case of lesbians and gay men over time, test the efficacy of policy and messaging interventions, and shed light on related cases.

Chapter 2: Developing a Theory of Gay Threat

"Criticize anything that gay people do, and you risk ostracism, fines, suspension or loss of your livelihood."

- Pundit Cal Thomas

May 16,2104

Introduction

After ESPN aired Michael Sam's kiss, social media users, predictably, responded. One was Dolphins player Don Jones, who tweeted "OMG [oh my God]" and that the kiss was "horrible" (Alper 2014b). The Dolphins management fined Jones and "excused him from off season workouts" on May 11th, 2014 (Florio 2014). He was the second player to be disciplined for Twitter usage by the Dolphins during the 2014 draft (Alper 2014a), and he was re-instated on May 19th (Smith 2014).

This incident provided additional fodder for pundits concerned about Sam's draft to the NFL. On May 16th, long-time pundit Cal Thomas published an opinion piece for Fox News that focused on the double standard between the public's treatment of Tim Tebow and Michael Sam. Thomas's piece went beyond simple comparison and focused on how the incident with Jones was indicative of a broader moral decline in American public life. In doing so, Thomas provided an evaluation of events colored by gay threat.

Throughout his op-ed, Thomas explicitly characterizes the situation as an inversion of American ideals; the media and gay rights movement treat Sam "as the equivalent of an early American pioneer," as someone who is the embodiment of American values. In his telling, this positive valuation is inappropriate and inverts true American values. While Sam is an undeserved hero, Jones receives a punishment reminiscent of "old communist 're-education' camps." This shift has happened because "homosexuality" has become the "'third rail' of

politics;" those who broach the subject face political "death" in addition to the ills listed in the epigraph. Broader culture is now "secular and licentious," mocking Tebow and letting "anything go[], except for free speech critical of the LGBT crowd," despite the fact that there are, in Thomas's estimation, "probably more people attending church on Sunday morning than watching football on Sunday afternoon" (Thomas 2014).

Traditional accounts of opposition to gay and lesbian rights cannot explain why Thomas presents gay rights as the inverse of American political institutions. While Thomas clearly views gay relationships is immoral, the bulk of his criticism is that Jones's suspension is emblematic of broader threats to the American polity writ large. Free speech, the livelihood of good citizens and political death are the potential fate that can befall those who cross lesbians and gay men. In addition to concerns about morality, Thomas's piece demonstrates a fear this case is indicative of a threat to the moral order of the entire polity.[8]

This chapter provides a theoretical framework for understanding why a pundit like Thomas would link the Dolphin's fine and suspension of Jones to the destruction of the American state's democracy and morality. Evaluating whether or not lesbians and gay men are suitable citizens is the key consideration for developing the gay threat displayed by Thomas in his opinion piece, and this chapter provides the analytic background necessary to understand

[8] This stands in contrast to other criticism of the Dolphin's handling of Jones. Florio suggests that, given the NFL's long-standing tolerance for homophobia, it would be better and more pro-active to create clear, written guidelines for players on acceptable locker room talk and social media use rather than punish players on an ad hoc basis (Florio 2014). This evaluation of the situation does not evidence gay threat. Florio welcomes Sam's inclusion in the NFL and is calling for clear standards to help all players navigate changing league norms. He views these changes as positive.

why. It continues developing the framework of gay threat, operationalizing key terms like "citizen," situating gay threat within the psychology of in-groups and out-groups, and comparing it to other "out-group" related attitudes such as racial resentment. It then makes the case that those who feel gay threat make common evaluations of gay social, political, and economic behavior, so that they are suitable for use as cognitively easier-to-access proxies for gay threat in public opinion polling.

In the second part of the chapter, I provide greater historical context for understanding why gay threat has emerged to be a major component of attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. The social and legal statuses of lesbians and gay men have changed dramatically over the past fifty years. I argue that this rapid change, which has encompassed many major features of American life, means that there have been large changes in the relationship between gay men and lesbians collectively and the polity as a whole and that many parts of the GLBT movement have been directly engaged with the apparatus of the state, both by demanding policy changes and claiming citizenship. Much of the movement has involved "rights-claiming" (Scheingold 2004) and advocacy for specific policy interventions. The resultant debate about the appropriate relationship between gay men, lesbians and the state has dominated news coverage and popular debate. Contact via the media has an effect on attitudes towards lesbians and gay men in general (Garretson 2009), making these media frames especially important.

Media coverage of the movement, along with the movement activities themselves, cements the relationship between politics, protest and GLBT people in Americans' minds. Because of this specific context, evaluations about the propriety of gay men and lesbians' citizenship and relationship to the state should play a role in determining attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. The rapid nature of this change makes feelings of threat more likely;

though opinion change has been vast, not everyone has believed that "gay citizen" is a contradiction in terms will have changed her opinion.

Third, I make the case that this dissertation has an impact on the broader field of American public opinion. It is the first work to connect theoretically attitudes about the state and citizenship with attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. While researchers doing work on African-American politics have made this connection through their work on symbolic racism and racial resentment (Sears 1988; Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and Sanders 1996), this dissertation provides the first work, regardless of discipline, to conceptualize how evaluations of gay citizenship inform broader attitudes about lesbians and gay men and to create a reliable survey battery for measuring it.

Beyond this broad contribution, this dissertation enables researchers to answer additional questions. It provides a theoretical explanation for variations in Catholic and born-again support for gay and lesbian rights. It also can shed light on individuals whose policy preferences do not seem to align with current models, *i.e.* liberals who oppose same-sex marriage or Republicans who support same-sex adoption (Goodman and Moradi 2008). Lastly, it adds more complexity to the distinction between realistic and symbolic threats and reminds scholars of inter-group relations that sexuality, like race, ethnicity, and religion, shapes views of normative citizenship.

Gay Threat

In this section, I further develop the theoretical underpinnings of gay threat. I first operationalize two key concepts used to build this theory: the polity and citizenship. I document different kinds of beliefs about the polity and gay men and lesbians. After developing these concepts, I provide an overview of the psychology of in-groups and out-groups, which provides the theoretical source for this threat. Combining all of these pieces, I describe how the two

components can combine to form gay threat and compare it to other measures of attitudes towards out-groups. Lastly, I argue that it is better to measure gay threat via evaluations of concrete, day-to-day social, political and economic behaviors rather via conceptualizations of citizenship because ideals of citizenship are abstract and likely not available for "top of the head" evaluation (Zaller 1992) and because there should be enough uniformity in threatened evaluations of gay economic, social and political behavior to make it a more accessible proxy measurement for gay threat.

Key Concepts

The polity is the first concept that requires conceptualization. I have elected to use this term rather than "government" or "state" because "polity" implies the interaction of a wide range of actors and institutions. Both "government" and "state" connote that elite actors, formal institutions, and codified law are the most important avenues for academic inquiry. These are important, and they play a role in the development and expression of gay threat, including informing normative visions of the polity and providing examples of gay and lesbian political integration. For example Beth's[9] normative vision of the polity might include formal institutions like Congress and state legislatures codifying laws to help people realize their best moral lives. Alicia might respond more positively after hearing President Obama's endorsement of same-sex marriage (Wallsten and Wilson 2012), while Susan might feel heightened levels of gay threat after hearing the same news.

Formal institutions, codified laws, and powerful actors are not the only things that color individuals' normative visions of the polity, and they are not the only sources of news and events

[9] For clarity's sake, I will continue to refer to the hypothetical people referenced in Table 1.1 in this chapter.

that might trigger gay threat. Informal norms and average people can do both, and, as a term, polity is expansive enough to include them. For example, Figures 1 and 2 are both images created by average people on social media. A&E's and the Dolphin's suspensions of Robertson and Jones, respectively, were well within the organizations' legal purview. However, because people who opposed these decisions employed rights talk (McCann 1994), citing freedom of speech and religion, these cases also fall into the analytic category of "the polity."[10] Individual conversations with gay and lesbian people, like Jessica might have with her brother-in-law or Alicia might have with her best friend, are also included within my framework.

Citizenship is the second concept that I define for this project. Just as I utilize "polity" rather than "state" or "government" because it is more expansive, I conceptualize "citizen" broadly. Citizenship can extend beyond formal legal definitions to include access to specific formal institutions and informal mutual recognition, *i.e.* respecting and acknowledging another as a peer who possesses rights and with whom one should feel a sense of solidarity (Honneth 1996, 129). While there are currently few limits on legal citizenship based on sexual orientation,[11] much of the public debate and many goals of the GLBT movement focus on the

[10] For a sense of the breadth and depth of citizen participation implied by the term "polity," see, Honneth's description of Hegel's use of the term *polis*: it is an "ideal community" in which "the mores and customs … [are]... communicated" (Honneth 1996, 13). See also Aristotle's description: "when the multitude governs for the common benefit" (Aristotle 2001, 325; ch. 7, ls. 35-40). Constant describes the liberty found in this form of government as "exercising collectively, but directly, … complete sovereignty; in deliberating…, in forming alliances… in voting laws, in pronouncing judgments" (Constant 1988, 311).

[11] Historically, gender variant and openly gay and lesbian people have been unable to immigrate to the United States (Canaday 2009, 19–54; 214–254), and HIV positive people could not immigrate until January 4th, 2010 (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Staff 2014)

latter two forms of citizenship. Public opinion scholarship demonstrates that there is ample variation in how Americans assess these in the case of lesbians and gay men.[12] However, it seems unlikely that their "top of the head" response (Zaller 1992) to questions about citizenship would include these forms of citizenship, in part because much of the current debate about citizenship occurs around issues of immigration.[13]

Full access to the polity is not achieved by legal citizenship alone. Democratic citizenship hinges on having access to other political institutions, including the vote, the ability to run for office, to assemble and to participate in the duties of citizenship. Both de jure and de facto limitations can infringe on citizenship, and gay men and lesbians have experienced both forms of limitations. For example, de jure limitations have included ineligibility to work for the government (Johnson 2004), FBI surveillance (Charles 2010; Johnson 2004), the necessity of denouncing homosexuality as an illness to be eligible for tax exemption (Charles 2010), and exclusion from open military service (Canaday 2009, 174–214; Berube 2010). De facto limitations include structural limitations, such as anti-gay attitudes and poverty (Badgett, Durso, and Schneebaum 2013). These limitations can depress the number of openly gay office holders (Haider-Markel 2010) and limit the development of the educational and civic skills necessary to more effectively participate in government (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Lastly, mutual recognition forms the third level of citizenship. While the first two are directly related to the actions of formal law and elite political actors, mutual recognition stems

[12] Pages 16-17 of the dissertation and later sections within this chapter provide a discussion of this literature.

[13] Searches for the term "citizenship" on cnn.com, msnbc.com and foxnews.com on 8/9/2014 confirm this. Out of the first 20 search items on cnn.com, only 1 referred to the duties of citizenship (Liptak 2014). The rest referred to either a person's country of citizenship or immigration. The same pattern held for Fox and MSNBC.

from an individual's belief that another person is worthy of both rights and solidarity because she is a member of the community (Honneth 1996, 92–95; 107–130). Developing the sense of being worthy or rights or solidarity necessarily requires community; having rights means, at its base "rais[ing] claims whose *social* redemption is considered justified" (119), and social esteem emerges from "contributing…to the practical realization of *society's* abstractly defined goals" (126).[14]

Honneth asserts that both rights and solidarity will be sources of contestation within society. In the case of rights, conflict is evident in the history of rights claims. The expansion of rights over time that has emerged from protest movements, as previously excluded people demand access to legal recognition (116-117). Because solidarity is tied to over-arching values within society, conflict will emerge as "different groups attempt, by means of symbolic force and with reference to general goals, to raise the values of the abilities associated with their way of life" (127). Members of the polity do not always grant each other the moral standing (133) or social valuation (134) necessary to develop rights and social esteem, respectively.[15] Gaining rights and social esteem cannot be a unilateral process. Because these gains require mutual recognition, the possibility of contestation always exists.

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[14] Italics are mine.

[15] While Honneth also discusses the role of emotional love rooted in respect for another's physical integrity (126), I do not include it because the subsequent research design is not set up to include or measure an individual's propensity or history of physically assaulting and/or raping gay and lesbian people. Over the course of conducting interviews and reading transcripts, I did not find anyone who claimed that gay people should be killed, assaulted, or "correctively" raped. It is my hunch that the claims I heard of "they have to a right to be" or "they have a right to do what they want in their bedroom" reflects a recognition of this right to bodily integrity.

The anecdotes about Robertson, Sam, and Jones that opened these chapters illustrate that, for many, granting moral standing to individual lesbians and gay men seems inapropriate. Admitting the social value of gay men and lesbians collectively, to value them as "pioneers," would appear to go beyond the pale for someone like Thomas. Recognizing these aspects of citizenship, which require respect of another, not only as a rights bearing person, but as a moral being, form a central part of the claims of the GLBT movement. Feeling that one is being forced to cede these moral claims, via witnessing changes in law, public opinion and popular culture, is likely to be a central component that leads to gay threat.

Beliefs about the Polity

Now that I have conceptualized polity and citizenship, I turn my attention to particular beliefs about what the polity should be. These include notions of what the government should be doing, what its ultimate ends should be, and who should be included within its confines as a citizen. These beliefs, combined with normative beliefs about gay men and lesbians, contribute to the evaluation of whether or not gay men and lesbians can be legitimate citizens. There are myriad sets of combinations that can form the basis for these beliefs about the polity, and there are many paths one can take to end up with feelings of gay threat. However, there exist two broad views of the polity in the American context that particularly lend themselves to evaluations of gay threat.

The first view of the polity conducive to the development of gay threat is that promoting morality, broadly defined as helping citizens achieve some form of virtue in the service of a common good, is an important goal for the polity. This belief, which is a common component of republicanism, is relatively common throughout United States political history (Smith 1997). While the belief in a common good is relatively widespread, definitions of morality and virtue,

which provide different substantive visions of the common good, vary widely from person to person. The vision of the polity as normative beacon, as "a city on the hill," has consistently articulated since the start of Anglo colonization (Winthrop 1997, 1–12). Visions of what this "city" should look like vary widely. Both organizations, like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (McAdam 1999), and individual leaders, like Martin Luther King, Jr. (2009), in the Civil Rights Movement articulated the belief that a key goal of the polity was to provide justice. This stands in contrast to the theology and political goals of the Religious Right, which focused on cultivating private familial and sexual morality (Wilcox and Robinson 2010). However, like the Civil Rights Movement, both movement organizations and leaders also averred that a role of government was to promote morality.

The view that the polity should promote morality does not have to hinge exclusively on theological claims. For example, American elites argued throughout the 20th century that the government should assist in protecting youth and guiding them to normative adulthood for the greater health of American democracy (Rank 2014). In this case, elites had in mind a particular virtue, normative adulthood, which included economic independence and appropriate political participation, and they felt that it was the appropriate that formal governmental institutions should facilitate that.

While the belief that the polity should promote morality is certainly one belief that can lead to gay threat, it is not the only one. A second view, based largely on a version of classical liberalism (Smith 1997), can also lead to the development of gay threat. In this view, a key role of state institutions is protecting the interests and rights of individuals. Citizens should approach the state as individuals; group-based identities, whether they are based on gender, class, race or sexual orientation, are therefore an illegitimate way to engage in political action. This argument

is frequently operative in critiques of "hyphenated Americans" and identity politics. This argument contends that claims made on behalf of groups within the polity, rather than on behalf of oneself or the broader nation, are ultimately divisive to the nation as a whole and are thus illegitimate.[16]

In both the case of individualism and in the promotion of the common good, it is not necessary for these beliefs about the polity to automatically lead to the evaluation that gay men and lesbians are illegitimate citizens. Returning to Table 1.1, someone like Alicia could believe that an ultimate goal of the polity is to promote justice by incorporating marginalized groups. Jonathan could be libertarian and believe that formal governmental institutions should abolish discriminatory laws and that individual citizens should adopt a live-and-let-live attitude on issues related to sexuality. These examples illustrate that beliefs about the polity alone are not enough to trigger feelings of gay threat; they must intersect with evaluations of lesbians and gay men for an individual to reach the conclusion that gay citizenship is an oxymoron.

Evaluations of Gay Men and Lesbians

Evaluating gay men and lesbians generally is the second necessary part determining if they can be legitimate citizens. To come to this conclusion, there logically has to be some type of pre-existing negative evaluation of gay men and lesbians. Public opinion research has documented there are many things that correlate with having negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. There are standard socio-demographic factors associated with negative anti-gay

[16] For examples of this belief in contemporary political discourse, see Limbaugh 2014 and Will 2014. For historical examples stressing the importance on an assimilated national identity over distinct ethnic identities and economic individualism, see Zangwill (2006) and Sumner (1952), respectively.

feelings, which include age, ideology and partisanship (Lewis and Gossett 2008; Herek 1994; Heaven and Oxman 1999; Kite and Deaux 1986).

Religion is a strong driver of attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (Rowatt et al. 2009). Frequency of religious attendance is also associated with stronger anti-gay attitudes (Finlay and Walther 2003), but there is not a uniform effect across religions; people who identify as born-again Christians are more likely to have negative evaluations of gay men and lesbians compared to mainline Protestants and Catholics (Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Newport 2012; Campbell and Monson 2008). People who identify as fundamentalist tend to have more negative attitudes than those who do not (Hunsberger 1996; Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz 2012), though a general belief in the Protestant work ethic is associated with negative attitudes (Malcomnson et al. 2006).

Gender has a mixed impact on attitudes; earlier studies (Herek 1988; La Mar and Kite 1998) show that women are more supportive of lesbians and gay men, but later studies demonstrate mixed results. Many studies document no effects (Baunach 2012), but others demonstrate more nuanced effects, such as a gendered difference in affect for masculine-presenting versus feminine-presenting gay men and lesbians (Cohen, Hall, and Tuttle 2009).[17]

[17] Many of these variables are common in Political Science models. Thus, most articles in the discipline about attitudes towards lesbians and gay men in the discipline will include them. The effects are frequently similar. Psychology articles adjust for SES variables less often, likely due to small sample sizes (and, therefore, fewer degrees of freedom) and because researchers draw samples from the university population, which can lack variation across many socio-demographic items.

Personality can also play a role in determining attitudes (Goodman and Moradi 2008; Patel et al. 1995; Warriner, Nagoshi, and Nagoshi 2013). Feelings of disgust, particularly disgust towards the body, are associated with these negative attitudes (Cunningham, Forestell, and Dickter 2013; Inbar et al. 2009). Social dominance orientation, a tendency to support social order and existing hierarchies (Sidanius and Pratto 1999), is correlated with being anti-gay (Goodman and Moradi 2008; Whitley, Jr. and Ægisdóttir 2000). Right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1981), which uses the language of the right-wing to measure a belief in a hierarchical social structure with clearly defined values,[18] also has an effect (Hunsberger 1996; Rios 2013), as does ethno-centrism, a preference for one's own in-groups above out-groups (Kinder and Kam 2009a, 150–171). A belief in traditional gender roles (Whitley, Jr. and Ægisdóttir 2000; Whitley Jr 2001; Ficarrotto 1990) and responses to gender performance (Cohen, Hall, and Tuttle 2009) also matter.

Contact and social context also prove to be strong predictors of attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. Knowing lesbians and gay men is associated with having lower levels of prejudice and support for gay and lesbian-inclusive policy (Lewis 2006; Herek and Capitanio 1996; Heinze and Horn; Herek and Glunt 1993). Voluntary contact is especially powerful (Barth, Overby, and Huffmon 2009), and there is no added benefit to knowing gay couples as opposed to individual lesbians and gay men (Barth and Perry 2007). There are mixed effects for living near an area with a larger gay population; Barth and Overby demonstrate that it improves attitudes overall (2003), but Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz demonstrate that evangelical Christians who live next

[18] Authoritarianism on other parts of the political spectrum can exist but uses different rhetoric. Altemeyer is merely using the rhetoric employed by right-wing movements to make his scale. For a broader discussion of authoritarianism generally, see (Stenner 2005).

to larger populations of gay men and lesbians are more likely to support bans on marriage equality (2012). Contact via the media also results in more positive evaluations of gay men and lesbians (Garretson 2009; Mazur and Emmers-Sommer 2003).

This literature demonstrates that attitudes towards lesbians and gay men are complex. Research has demonstrated that anti-gay attitudes are best modeled as a multi-factor concept, not as a single, unified homophobia (Massey 2009). Practically speaking, this means that there are many ways individual people can arrive at a negative or positive evaluations of gay men or lesbians. In the case of Jonathan, contact via the media, of the type identified by Garretson (2009), via *Modern Family* might be enough for him to develop positive evaluations. For Alicia, having the sustained personal contact of the type described by Barth et al. (2003), might push her to view the increased participation of gay men and lesbians in the polity as a categorically positive step for the polity. In contrast, Beth's strong, evangelical religious beliefs can be a large factor in her over-all negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men.

Evaluations Meets the Psychology of In-Groups and Out-Groups

In order to feel gay threat, an individual has to draw a connection between her beliefs about the polity and her attitudes about lesbians and gay men. For example, it is possible to view gay men and lesbians as sinful but to also believe that the government should embrace pluralism, including value pluralism, rather than making regulations based on one's singular view of the common good. This was the case with Jessica in Table 1.1. While she would still have negative evaluations of gay men and lesbians, she would not view their increased cultural and political visibility as a threat to the polity itself. In contrast, in both Beth and Susan's cases, negative evaluations of gay men and lesbians dovetail with beliefs about the polity in such a way that gay men and lesbians become impossible, illegitimate citizens. In Beth's case, her belief in the

sinfulness and immorality of lesbians and gay men stands alongside the belief that the government should promote evangelical morality as the common good; in Susan's, evaluating lesbians and gay men as adopters of a group identity that interferes with individualism and national identity matches with her libertarian belief that everyone should approach the state as an individual.

Why would these evaluations of illegitimate citizenship cause feelings of gay threat? To further understand this threat, it is necessary to explore the psychology of in-groups and out-groups. Stated simply, in-groups are groups to which a person believes he belongs, and out-groups are groups to which a person does not believe he belongs (Kinder and Kam 2009a, 8). These groups can have profound political and social meaning – or not. Major groups that have deep legal and social meaning in the United States include but are not limited to gender, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, class.[19] However, groups can also be relatively transitory, such as carpool members or people on a jury (Hamilton, Sherman, and Rodgers 2004, 46).

Psychologists assert that people process the world in terms of groups and that this is a normal part of human functioning. The reason for this is similar to the reason that people stereotype. There exists a large amount of information that people have to process at any given moment. Processing and interacting with the world is cognitively taxing, and it would be impossible for individuals to evaluate everything as unique at every second. As a result, humans use heuristics, or shortcuts, to make sense of their world (Lippmann 1922; Bodenhausen and

[19] For a description of all of the meaning and salience of all of these groups in the US polity, see the justification for the empirical cases studies in Kinder and Kam (2009a).

Mackie 1993). Defining someone as a member of a group, as insider or outsider (Kinder and Kam 2009a), and stereotyping (Bodenhausen and Mackie 1993) all function as heuristics, making the world easier to process.

While it is possible for group creation to happen fairly quickly, and researchers can generate a sense of group-ness with minimal effort (Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel 1982); in the case of many groups of interest to Political Science, group creation has happened via longstanding processes of law and custom that limit full citizenship and participation within the polity (Kerber 1998; Higginbotham 1978). In the case of gay men and lesbians, there is a long history of the state both using normative sexuality to define membership, excluding lesbians and gay men specifically (Canaday 2009; Johnson 2004; Berube 2010; Hall 2013). Thus, like other groups, gay men and lesbians' existence as a group comes with a history of law and policy defining the group as other than citizen, as non-rights bearing and as unworthy of social esteem.

Given the broader historical policy, it is not surprising that individual Americans would view gay men and lesbians as a group, and as an illegitimate one unworthy of full citizenship. The rapidly changing position of gay men and lesbians in the polity threatens these long-held beliefs. Gay threat arises from the cognitive dissonance engendered by witnessing gay men and lesbians gain this access. This access not only challenges beliefs about gay citizenship; it threatens a person's normative beliefs about the polity. If illegitimate citizens can gain access and power in the polity, they can mold into something different than – and possibly contradictory to—one's pre-existing normative vision.

Much of the research on threat has focused on realistic group threat, the perception that another group challenges the economic status or political power of one's own group (Key 1949; Zarate et al. 2004; Morrison and Ybarra 2008; Corzine, Creech, and Corzine 1983; Blalock

1967). Beyond this loss of materialist power and in line with Honneth's work on mutual recognition (1996), a loss of cultural primacy or position can also generate feelings of threat for issues related to race (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981; D. Sears 1988), religion (Moen 1988; Gusfield 1963), immigration (Craig and Richeson 2014), sexual orientation (Chong 2000) and multiple issues in tandem (Parker and Barreto 2013; Barreto et al. 2011). Gay threat is thus in line with other work on threats about the loss of cultural and political position.

Gay threat is thus a fear that the increased status of lesbians and gay men will hurt the polity writ large. Because of a pre-existing belief that gay men and lesbians categorically cannot belong or participate legitimately in the polity, evidence of their presence suggests contagion and subversion. How else could an illegitimate group gain access to the polity and leave it unscathed? Thus, while people who experience gay threat are likely to fear that they will lose relative social status, gay threat goes beyond that. Another threat triggered gay threat is the loss of the polity altogether.

Eliciting Judgments and Measuring Gay Threat

Gay threat is theoretically based on a large number of abstract concepts that are not common in lay discourse: citizenship, mutual recognition, the polity. The process of socialization in American politics means, among other things, that people do have beliefs and opinions about what the state should do and who should participate in it (Garcia-Castanon 2013). However, people do not always articulate these beliefs in their day-to-day lives. As a result, accessing them would require in-depth questions and time for thoughtful responses because it is difficult for people to access such deep "self knowledge" (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Wilson and Dunn 2004). In short, it would require in-depth interviews to draw out the attitudes about the polity and its relationship to gay men and lesbians needed to document gay threat directly. Given cost

and time constraints, this would not be effective for measuring gay threat across populations or longitudinally.

Fortunately, people who feel gay threat should be able to provide consistent evaluations of gay and lesbian behavior. If the key driver of gay threat is the notion that gay men and lesbians are illegitimate citizens, then evaluations of everyday activities, such as gay couples holding hands in public, and movement organization victories, such as the enforcement of anti-discrimination law, should also be driven by the notion of gay illegitimacy. For example, criticism of Robertson and Jones's suspension that is driven by gay threat would label these controversies as violations of fundamental American values rather than the result of a muddled and confusion social media policy. Reaction to Sam's kiss motivated by gay threat should likewise claim that it violates the polity's norms of decency. These threatened evaluations, taken together, can form the basis of a scale of gay threat, which would prove useful for survey research, population analysis and longitudinal analysis.

In this section, I highlight three areas of behavior, economic, political and social, that could provide similar evaluations consistent with gay threat. I select these because they are broad, encompassing many forms of behavior that occur within the polity. The political and the social are tightly intertwined when we consider the polity and the dynamics of mutual recognition (Honneth 1996). While the economic is mentioned less in Honneth and is not part of a classical understanding of the polity (Constant 1988), it is consistent with American liberalism (Smith 1997) and with the longstanding American association between hard work and economic success as a sign of moral rectitude (Weber 2010; Tocqueville 1912). Thus, I include it as an area of behavior in which one might find evaluations consistent with gay threat. In this section, I

hypothesize what threatened evaluations of gay economic, political and social behavior might look like.

Threatened evaluations of gay economic behavior will center around the stereotype of gay wealth (Badgett 1998; Badgett 2001; Walls 2008, 61). Largely focused on gay men and re-enforced by popular cultural, this stereotype holds that gay men are wealthy, tasteful, artistic and professional (Becker 2006; Streitmatter 2008). Many popular shows that feature lesbians and gay men, such as *Will and Grace*, *Queer and Folk*, *Queer Eye for the Straight Guy*, and *The L Word* present them as upper-middle class and wealthy (Streitmatter 2008). Despite existence of gay and lesbian- headed families with children (Goldberg, Gartrell, and Gates 2014), this stereotype, and the media portrayals that come along with it, frequently do not mention them. Absent from this stereotype is economic discrimination faced by many gay men and lesbians (Badgett, Durso, and Schneebaum 2013).

Stereotypes of wealth can have mixed effects. Given the centrality of wealth in the American Dream (Adams 1931) and the Protestant work ethic (Weber 2010), there is the potential for these stereotypes to be positive. In fact, Kalkan et al. document that white Americans' feelings towards Jewish and Asian Americans are higher than their scores for many other minority groups (Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009, 848) However, as both anti-Semitism and the concept of Asian Americans the "model minority" illustrate, stereotypes of wealth are not always positive.[20]

[20] For a description of the way that the "model minority myth… exaggerates Asian American affluence" while rendering Asian Americans culturally other and politically docile, see (Kim 1999, 119–122). For an overview of the negative historical impact that stereotypes of Jewish wealth and power have had, see (Cohn 1996).

This ambivalence towards toward minority groups stereotyped as wealthy might carry over into attitudes about lesbians and gay men for non-threatened people.

A person who feels gay threat will not evaluate stereotypes of gay wealth in an ambivalent way. Instead, the evaluation will likely be wholly negative, as individuals evaluate the wealth as a result of gay abdication of personal and civic responsibility. Under a lens of threat, the supposed money, professional careers, and designer material goods enjoyed by gay men and lesbians all come from the abandonment of family life, which requires childrearing and self-sacrifice. Instead of using the American economic system to raise a family and continue the polity over future generations, gay men and lesbians have elected to enjoy the material bounty of American capitalism without making the concomitant civic sacrifices.

Political behavior provides the second avenue of behavior through which one can document gay threat. Mutual recognition of rights claims forms the basis of politics for Honneth (1996), and political actions, from formally engaging in the political process to daily rights claiming, has been a cornerstone of GLBT movement activity. These actions can include protesting police raids (Carter 2010), lobbying and mobilizing for and against legislation and propositions (Dugan 2005; Gallagher and Bull 1996), running for office as an openly gay or lesbian candidate (Haider-Markel 2010), governing while out (Herrick 2010), using the courts for formal legal mobilization (Kane 2010; Barclay, Bernstein, and Marshall 2009; Dupuis 2002; Mezey 2009), and developing individual-level rights consciousness (Harding 2006).

There are positive and neutral ways of viewing this political activity that would not be consistent with gay threat. For example, people like Alicia might view lesbians and gay men as a marginalized or oppressed group that is justified in using the American political system to advance rights claims. It is also possible to view these developments neutrally, in a less

enthusiastic but not overtly hostile manner. Even if someone like Jessica were to view lesbians and gay men as immoral, it is possible that she could view them as a group that successfully uses free speech and the marketplace of ideas to present a case for broader inclusion within a pluralistic system.

However, there are two negative ways of evaluating gay political behavior that would reflect gay threat: as zero-sum games between legitimate and illegitimate actors and as conspiracy. Zero-sum evaluations are evaluations that view gay and lesbian rights gains as occurring at the expense of other groups. The perception of the zero-sum nature of politics stems from the fact that rights often compete with each other, and, many times, there are trade-offs in values inherent in democracy (Davis and Silver 2004, 28). For someone who evaluates gay politics through the lens of gay threat, enforcement of anti-discrimination policies that include sexual orientation results in the concurrent loss of freedom of religion and contract for religious people.[21] Unlike Davis and Silver (2004), who present values trade-offs as a choice between two important values, the trade-off is not between two good choices in this case. This zero-sum characterization will come with a negative valence, as it appears that an illegitimate group is receiving legal rights and recognition while legitimate groups are losing theirs.

The second way that threatened people evaluate gay political behavior is through the lens of conspiracy and the subversion of the polity. This can take two rhetorical forms, and both stems from the dissonance caused by the belief that bad political actors are using a good system. The first is disbelief that majorities could vote in favor of or support "bad actors." A way to resolve this this dissonance is to claim that the illegitimate citizens used subversive or underhanded

[21] For an example of this rhetoric in action, see (Osten and Sears 2003).

means to gain power. A second belief come from fear of what could happen to the polity itself if illegitimate actors maintain positions of recognition. The logical outcome of this threat would be to fear that the polity itself would change so that it would no longer substantively or morally the be same polity.

Social behavior is the last area of behavior which people who feel gay threat evaluate. By this, I mean any behavior that lesbians and gay men do that takes place within the public sphere and is not directly related politic or formal rights claiming. This could include manners of style and dress, gender performance, and interacting with other people, including both straight and GLBT people. This interacting can range from talking about one's sexual orientation to how a couple interacts in public.

As was the case with economic and political behavior, people who do not feel gay threat will likely evaluate social behaviors neutrally or positively. Someone like Alicia might see a gay couple holding hands as an example of people living openly and honestly and view it positively. Jonathan might take note of a man in drag as something novel, then go about his day. However, those who feel gay threat will not interpret this gay social behavior in a positive or neutral manner. Rather, they will object to the recognizing the social value of gay and lesbian relationships and cultures (Honneth 1996) and interpret a couple holding hands as "flaunting" one's sexuality, or conspicuously displaying a lack of regard for the norms of the broader community.

One major difference between threatened and non-threatened people is the range of gay and lesbian actions that a person would categorize as "flaunting" or inappropriate. People who feel gay threat will have a very narrow view of what is respectable behavior versus what constitutes "flaunting." Whereas Alicia might think that only very public sex would cross the line of

respectability and that the word "flaunting" is offensive, Beth would think that a gay couple holding hands was both sexual and deliberately, politically challenging social norms. Using the same logic, any form of gender non-conforming behavior or style can also become a political challenge. Implicit within this judgment of flaunting is the idea that withholding respect, rights or consideration is deserved because a gay or lesbian person is choosing to act against norms.

Changes in Gay and Lesbian Citizenship

This section provides the broader historical context from gay threat emerges. It demonstrates that there has been rapid change across many levels of gay and lesbian political incorporation in the polity. I conceive of political incorporation as an event that occurs along multiple axes, along which one can participate in the polity. Table 2.1 provides concrete examples of how I think of these axes and how a marginalized group could move from "very unincorporated" to "dominant." Political incorporation is not merely a singular event or uni-dimensional phenomenon. Rather, it can happen across a number of axes, and groups back and forth between poles. Because gay men and lesbians have moved rapidly from "fully unincorporated" to somewhere along "mid-range" in the past forty-five years, those who believe that "gay citizen" is oxymoronic have lived through a period of major change. Previously, the belief that gay men and lesbians were illegitimate citizens was largely uncontested; today that belief is largely contested. This shift makes the cognitive dissonance, and therefore, gay threat, especially likely.

The case of gay men and lesbians provides one of the clearest examples of rapid incorporation across all of these axes over the relatively short span of forty-five years. Before the Stonewall riots of 1969 (Carter 2010), gay men and lesbians were at the "very unincorporated" side of the spectrum on very aspect. There were no elected gay or lesbian

officials (Haider-Markel 2010), and there was massive legislation that limited the open participation of gay men and lesbians in daily American life. For example, gay men and lesbians could not work for any branch of the federal government, including the military (Berube 2010; Canaday 2009, 174–213) and the State Department (Johnson 2004), and could not legally immigrate to the United States (Canaday 2009, 214–254). The federal state also excluded openly gay people from welfare benefits, in the form of New Deal aid and GI Bill benefits (Canaday 2009, 91–173).

At the state level, sodomy laws made openly espousing a gay or lesbian identity illegal (Eskridge, Jr. 2008). While there were very few cases of criminal charges resulting from the violation of sodomy laws, employers, courts, and school officials invoked them to justify firing decisions (Frost 1999), the denial of child custody (Kendell 2003), and to prevent the formation of gay and lesbian advocacy groups in a school setting (Brooke 1996). Additionally, while there were political organizations prior to the Stonewall riots, they kept a relatively low profile, and membership was largely anonymous (D'Emilio 1990; Gallo 2006). The first march for gay rights, which happened in 1965, had only 12 protestors ("Homosexuals Stage Protest in Capital" 1965).

Table 2.1: Levels of Incorporation within the Polity					
Form of Power	**Very Unincorporated**	**Unincorporated**	**Mid-Range**	**Incorporated**	**Dominant**
Elected Officials	None associated with group— Unthinkable	Starting to get elected --Token representation in small electoral districts	Increasing representation in larger and larger offices	Proportional representation relative to the population -- Group membership is an asset/not a problem	Over represented relative to population-- Membership in group is an asset
Public Opinion	Negative Valence symbol -- Uniformly negative feeling thermometers	Still negative beginning to get less negative	Neutral	Well liked -- Strong backlash against negative portrayals	Positive valence symbol -- Loved
Political Organization	Very limited -- Keeps low political profile	Limited, small organizations --- Can't credibly lobby	Small/Mid-range orgs. -- Building credibility -- Increasing visibility and membership	Extensive political organizations with strong lobbying capacity and large memberships	Continued lobbying capacity with important informal networks
Related Legislation	Legislation against-- Super-majorities in favor – No contestation	Legislation against -- Starting to get contested –Some contestation	Legislation highly contested – Potential to overturn previous legislation	Civic equality	Legislation favors group

Figure 6: Percentage of Americans Who Say that "Sexual Relations Between Two Adults of the Same Sex" Is "Always Wrong," by Year



Public opinion was also largely and uniformly negative in the years leading up to the Stonewall Riots and during the early phases of the Gay Liberation Movement. Figure 6 shows data from the General Social Survey (Smith et al. 2013). In the first years that the question was asked, roughly 71% of Americans reported that "sexual relations between two adults of the same sex was always wrong." The question itself had 4 response choices; an additional 6% of

respondents said that homosexual sex was "almost always wrong," and another 8% said that it was "sometimes wrong." Only 12% of Americans believed that it was "not wrong at all."[22]

All of these factors changed rapidly over the course of the next four and a half decades. The first openly lesbian political candidates won election in Minnesota and Massachusetts in 1974, the first openly gay man won re-election in Minnesota that same year, and the first out gay man won an election in 1977 in California (Victory Fund Staff 2014a). The number of openly gay or lesbian elected officials has increased exponentially since that time. In 1987, there were 20; that increased to 52 in 1991, 146 in 1998 and to over 200 in 2002 (Haider-Markel 2010, l. 495–504). The Victory Fund, an organization which funds and endorses the campaigns of gay and lesbian candidates, reports that there were openly gay elected officials in every state by 2012; it also claims that there are currently "over 500" openly gay and lesbian elected officials in the United States (Victory Fund Staff 2014b). While Haider-Markel reports that most of the elected offices held by openly gay and lesbian people in the 1980's were local (l. 499), there are seven out members of Congress, Senator Tammy Baldwin and 6 gay or bisexual House members (Peters 2013), who form a GLBT rights caucus ("Congressional LGBT Equality Caucus" 2014).

The number and scope of political organizations has likewise increased exponentially over the past 45 years. Pre-Stonewall, organizations largely fought to disseminate information about being gay and to provide a social network for gay men and lesbians who felt socially and geographically isolated (D'Emilio 1990; Gallo 2006). Major campaigns within this context were

[22] All analysis done by the author. Percentages do not add up to 100 because there was a fifth response category, "other."

largely over the organizations' right to exist. For example, the early Mattachine Society used the "secretive membership structure" of the Communist Party and employed "a series of 'orders'" akin to the Freemasons, which allowed for a high degree of anonymity in a hostile environment (Charles 2010, 265). Early homophile organizations,[23] such as the Mattachine Society, ONE and the Daughters of Bilitis, all came under heavy scrutiny by the FBI. The US Postal Department labelled *ONE Magazine* as obscene, preventing its shipment through the mail. It ultimately took a Supreme Court case in 1958 to reverse this decision (Charles 2010).

Like the number of gay candidates and elected officials, the number of organizations that were dedicated to gay and lesbian interests increased exponentially following the start of the Gay Liberation Movement. Contrasting with more narrow foci of earlier groups, these new groups witnessed an explosion of goals and occupied a wide range across the political spectrum. These stretched from education, to more traditionally lobbying organizations, grassroots activism and professional associations. Student organizations on college campuses spread throughout the mid-1960's (Reichard 2010). This was complemented later by the creation of GLSEN, an advocacy group that focused on the rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered students in K-12 (Kumashiro 2004). Throughout the 1990's-2010's, Gay Straight Alliances became more common throughout middle and high schools (Cahill 2004). Similar expansions happened in lobbying and professional organizations.

These more mainstream organizations and advocacy groups are not the only type of group that came into existence during this period; grassroots and radical networks also existed and frequently challenged the politics of groups like the Human Rights Campaign. These groups

[23] This is the initial movement name.

ranged from separatist lesbian feminist organizations to groups like ACT-UP that used direct confrontation and guerilla tactics to highlight the AIDS crisis (Gould 2009). The 1990s saw groups like Gay Shame and Queer Nation protest the mainstream movement's focus on military service, marriage, and corporate sponsorships (Berube and Escoffier 1991; Sycamore 2008). Currently, many diffuse activists use social networking sites like Tumblr to organize local events and raise consciousness about issues of queer rights and intersectionality.

There have also been major changes within laws related to sexual orientation. The early Gay Liberation Movement sought an end to police entrapment based on public sex[24] and to pass local anti-discrimination ordinances. These ordinances became the focal point of one of the first major campaigns against the Gay Rights Movement, Anita Bryant's 1977 Save Our Children campaign (Frank 2013). Much of the movement through the 2000s was focused on these local initiatives and fighting against local and state ballot initiatives to limit gay rights (Dugan 2005). Additionally, the HIV/AIDS crisis led to activism over the process of approving drugs and medical treatment (Gould 2009; Shilts 1988). The 1992 election of Bill Clinton, who courted the gay and lesbian vote, led to hopes to that there would be some change in federal policy, including a repeal of the ban on gay and lesbian service members in the military. Currently, marriage equality has gone from a fringe issue in the 1970s and 80s to one of the major stories in domestic politics (Rimmerman and Wilcox 2007).

Lastly, there have been major changes within American public opinion on the issue of gay rights. Returning to Figure 6, it is clear that the past forty-five years have not witnessed a

[24] Strolovitch notes that, ironically, media coverage of people arrested for gay public sex is currently similar to that of the 1950's (2012).

constant decline in evaluations of the morality of same-sex sexuality. Instead, there was a slight increase in the percent of Americans who say that gay sex is "always wrong" starting in the late 1970s, a trend that lasts through the 1980s. This decade produced many notable setbacks for gay men and lesbians, as the Centers for Disease Control documented what would be the first HIV/AIDS cases in 1981 (Shilts 1988) and the Supreme Court called the notion of gay rights "facetious at best" in *Bowers v. Hardwick* (1986). However, the early 1990s, a period that saw the first effective drugs to manage HIV infections, marked the beginning of a decline in anti-gay attitudes. This continued through the increasing visibility of gay men and lesbians in media, exemplified by Ellen DeGeneres's coming out in 1997 and the sitcom *Will and Grace*. It continued through the first legalization of same-sex marriage in 2004 and picked up steam after 2009, the first time that a majority of Americans did not feel that same-sex sexual relations were "always wrong."

There is one area that stands in contrast to this trend: questions about civil liberties (McClosky and Brill 1983; Stouffer 1955). Analysis of GSS data reveals that Americans have been relatively supportive of gay and lesbian civil liberties since the 1980's. Figure 7 graphs the results of the three civil liberties questions on the GSS: whether a gay man should be a college professor, whether a group that supports gay rights should be allowed to give a speech and whether books that support gay rights should be in a public library. Contrasted with Figure 6, Figure 2 reveals a consistent trend of greater support for gay civil liberties. Whereas a majority felt that gay sex was always immoral through 2009, the only instance in which there has been a majority that did not feel political tolerance for gay men has been for gay professors in 1972. This distinction reveals tension between willingness to grant legal rights and social esteem.

Figure 7: Opposition to Gay Civil Liberties by Year



Taken together, this history presents a picture of dramatic change. In a relatively short amount of time, gay men and lesbians have moved from being a group that would count as completely unincorporated according to the rubric provided in Table 2.1 to one whose status is mid-range. This movement has been diverse, as movement organizations have ranged from the radical, like ACT-UP and Gay Shame, to the conservative Log Cabin Republicans. Likewise, since the 1970's, there has been organized opposition to the expansion of gay rights, including countervailing interest groups and movements aiming to pass anti-gay legislation. While American attitudes towards gay men and lesbians have changed, they are complex, as the

consistent fifty-point public opinion gap between people who say gay sex is immoral and those who lack traditional political tolerance attests to.

This context provides fertile ground for examining the relationship between political incorporation, claiming the status of citizen recognition and threat. The change in the status of gay men and lesbians within society has been all-encompassing; a person born in 1964 has witnessed this group go from being universally reviled to one that is able to lay claim successfully to many aspects of citizenship. It is reasonable to assume that this opinion change is not uniform. Indeed, a variety of factors undergird variation in attitudes about lesbians and gay men, and the GSS evidence suggests that there is nuance within anti-gay attitudes.

Larger Contributions of This Project

There are several broader contributions of this project. The largest contribution is that it is the first piece of public opinion research to connect attitudes about lesbians and gay men to broader ideals about the polity and citizenship. As this chapter has demonstrated, much of the GLBT movement's activities have focused on the struggle to attain recognition of GLBT legal rights and social value. Despite the fact that this is a central claim of the movement, no public opinion research to date has attempted to explore how evaluations of this claim for recognition and, by extension, citizenship, affects overall policy preferences and attitudes toward lesbians and gay men. Indeed, no one has attempted to create an empirical measure that could be used in probability samples. While researchers have documented many correlates of attitudes towards lesbians and gay men, this fundamental relationship between the gay citizenship claims and threat has remained unexplored.

This dissertation will show that gay threat is a distinct attitude that has a profound impact on attitudes and policy preferences related to gay men and lesbians. In it, I make the case that

American conceptualizations of normative citizenship fundamentally include visions of proper sexuality. Much research along these lines has come from legal studies, political theory and American political development.[25] Taking this work as a theoretical guide, I am able to build on it, creating a measure that will enable me to create a population-level estimate of gay threat.

Other research in the social sciences has examined and documented the connection between perceptions of impossible citizens and the polity. Specifically, symbolic racism and the closely related racial resentment both theorize that current anti-Black attitudes stem from the belief that African Americans violate norms of good citizenship (Sears 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981). By extending this framework to a different group, one that is not based exclusively in race and is not indisputably hereditary, I hope to offer up options for other public opinion researchers to think creatively about the relationship between citizenship and group identity.

This dissertation provides a framework for understanding symbolic and status threats in relationship with realistic threats. The literature on realistic threat has focused on private economic losses and losses of political representation in terms of seats in legislatures (Key 1949; Corzine, Creech, and Corzine 1983; Blalock 1967). Symbolic and status threat research has been separate, focusing on a sense of losing power within a hierarchy or the social deference to which one is accustomed (Gusfield 1963; and Barreto 2013; Moen 1988; Craig and Richeson 2014; Bobo 1999; Bobo and Tuan 2006; Chong 2000). Implicit in both literatures is the claim that

[25] For example: see,Canaday (2009); Honneth (1996); Young (2002); Fraser (2004); Dupuis (2002); Kane (2010); Yoshino (2007); Kunzel (2008).

realistic threats are materialist and, therefore, real, while symbolic and status threats, which traffic in prestige and position, are not necessarily materialist and are not real.

I argue that, while status threats are not necessarily materialist threats in the same way that realistic group threats are,[26] it would be naïve to discount them as somehow unimportant or unreal. For people who feel gay threat, the soul of the polity is at stake. The cornerstone of gay threat is the evaluation that full citizenship for gay men and lesbians is fundamentally at odds with the one's normative vision of the polity. Extending this logic, the fear that gay threat engenders is that gay citizenship will alter the polity to the point of it becoming unrecognizable. The potential loss is the nation itself. This fear is profound, and researchers would do well to consider it as a tool for understanding the contemporary moment in politics.

This dissertation is also situated to provide a theoretical answer for some puzzles that have plagued research on attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. First is the question of why Catholics have more tolerant perceptions and policy preference toward lesbians and gay men compared to evangelicals. In addition to potential theological reasons, perhaps differences in attitudes towards the polity are a cause. Catholic Americans have historically had to distance themselves from the Church and assure Protestant voters that Catholic doctrine would not be the basis for public policy-making (Carty 2004). Evangelicals, on the other hand, have long experience with explicitly religious political organizations and movements (Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Perhaps this difference in attitudes towards the polity is leading to higher levels of gay threat in evangelicals but not Catholics. Additionally, this dissertation might be able to provide an explanation for individuals whose policy preferences do not match the expectations of

[26] Privileges accrued via social status certainly have material benefits.

current models of anti-gay attitudes. Perhaps gay threat can help to explain the people in the "liberal but oppose same-sex marriage" or "evangelical but support anti-discrimination ordinance" cells.

Lastly, this project, by creating an empirical measure of anti-gay attitudes, has the potential for applied use. It can gauge attitude change. It can do this longitudinally, but it can also be the dependent variable for policy and framing interventions to reduce anti-gay attitudes. This application has the greatest potential to improve the quality of life of gay and lesbian people.

Part of citizenship is about imaging others as belonging to the in-group and feeling a sense of belonging in return. It means being able to extend empathy, to imagine that one's claims are valid and to consider another's concerns when crafting public policy. Honneth argues that this recognition is critical for developing a sense of self-worth and self-esteem (129). Since gay threat is explicitly a lack of recognition, exposure to people who feel gay threat can have potentially damaging consequences for physical and mental health. The effects of having one's rights voted on (Russell et al. 2011; Russell 2000) and discrimination (Feinstein, Goldfried, and Davila 2012; Bostwick et al. 2014) all have documented negative impacts on gay men and lesbians' health. Living in an anti-gay environment increases the risks of suicidality and suicidal ideation (Haas et al. 2010), but living in a state that formally recognizes same-sex marriage can reduce the overall number of healthcare visits and healthcare costs of gay men (Hatzenbuehler et al. 2011). To the extent that gay threat as a measure is able to aid in developing successful policy and psychological interventions, it has the potential to indirectly improve the quality of life for lesbians and gay men.

Conclusion

This chapter has done three major things for the development of this dissertation. First, it has laid out the argument that gay threat is a unique form of anti-gay attitude, driven by the belief that "gay citizen" is an oxymoron. This belief arises from the combination of pre-existing negative evaluations of gay men and lesbians and normative beliefs about the polity. When faced with examples of gay incorporation within the polity, cognitive dissonance produces gay threat. While threat itself is hard to measure on survey items, threatened people should make similar evaluations of gay economic, political and social behavior as selfish, conspiratorial and zero-sum, and "flaunting," respectively. These common evaluations will provide the basis of the gay threat scale. Second, it has provided the context of changing attitudes towards lesbians and gay men, documenting just how wide-ranging and rapid change in attitudes, visibility and legal status that gay men and lesbians have experienced over the past forty years has been. This means that those who believe that "gay citizen" is an oxymoron have moved from a social and political context that largely supported their position to one that challenges it, making it an interesting case to study the connection between citizenship and threat. Third, I explained the broader contributions of the dissertation.

I now turn my attention to the empirical exploration of gay threat. In the next chapter, I use in-depth interviews to demonstrate that there are positive, neutral, and negative ways that Americans discuss gay economic, political, and social behavior and that negative evaluations have broad rhetorical similarities. I also show that individuals who make negative evaluations of all three forms of behavior believe that "gay citizen" is an oxymoron. Thus, it is possible to to create a scale for gay threat using these negative political, economic, and social evaluations as proxies. I then focus on developing a gay threat scale in the Chapter 4 and demonstrating the

prevalence of gay threat in the American public and its effect on public policy preferences in Chapter 5.

Chapter 3: Identifying Gay Threat and its Rationales

"It's only logical that Keynes would take this selfish worldview [his quip "In the long run, we're all dead" and his economic theories generally.] because he was an 'effete' member of society…[He] had no [children] because he was a homosexual and was married to a ballerina, with whom he likely talked of 'poetry' rather than procreated."

- Paraphrase of Prof. Niall Ferguson's remarks on John Maynard Keynes

10th Annual Altegris Conference[27]

May 3, 2013

Introduction

On May 3rd, 2013, *Financial Advisor* reporter Tom Kostigen reported on remarks made by Prof. Niall Ferguson, a chaired professor of economics at Harvard University. In the closed section, while discussing the 2008 financial crisis, someone asked Ferguson to compare "Keynes' famous philosophy of self-interest versus the economic philosophy of Edmund Burke, who believed that there was a social contract among the living, as well as the dead" (Kostigen 2013). Ferguson's response, paraphrased above, was that, as a gay man, Keynes was obviously childless and in a marriage of convenience. Because he had no children, he could not be concerned with the common good, which requires thinking about the long term and society as a whole. Thus, Keynes' inability to be a good citizen, rooted in his sexuality, was directly responsible for bad economic policy and "the financial crisis."

Predictably, Ferguson apologized publically within two days (Ferguson 2013). While he retracted this claim that "people who do not have children do not care about future generations," he still attributed Keynes' support of the Treaty of Versailles to his sexual orientation, specifically his attraction to a German man. He did not specifically apologize for saying that gay

[27] The conference was private. Kostigen, a reporter present, is the closest I could find to a direct quote (Kostigen 2013).

people cannot care about future generations; he retracted his statement about Keynes because "his wife Lydia miscarried." Presumably, his remark would have stood had Lydia never been pregnant. Other commentators noticed that Ferguson did not retract his evaluation of gay people as bad citizens (Trotter 2013; Bankoff 2013). A colleague from Cambridge suggested that these were long-standing beliefs of Ferguson's, not a momentary lapse in judgment (Kitson 2013).

This example contains all of the elements of gay threat. Ferguson asserts that Keynes's sexuality, his childlessness, and his attraction to a German man rendered him too selfish to participate constructively in crafting economic policy. The disconnection between citizenship and broadmindness, on the one hand, and gay identity and selfishness, on the other, is made explicit, as Ferguson discussed one of the most influential economists of the 20th century. Is it the case that most people can quickly make these connections off the top of their heads, the time frame available for answering survey questions? In the last chapter, I asserted that people did have normative ideals about citizenship, the polity and their connection to lesbians and gay men. However, I thought that it was likely that most people could not access this information, and, even if they did, differences in popular and academic use of the word "citizen" would lead to confusion.

I hypothesized, however, that people who felt gay threat would make similar evaluations of gay and lesbian behavior. For ease of analysis, I divided this into political, economic and social behavior. These evaluations manifest themselves in the following ways: gay economic behavior becomes indicative of selfishness; political behavior becomes part of a zero-sum game and/or conspiratorial subversion of the democratic process; and social behavior, *e.g.* gender performance and public displays of affection, becomes the flaunting of societal norms when seen through the lens of gay threat.

In this chapter, I confirm this hypothesis by conducting discourse analysis on a set of in-depth interviews. I first demonstrate that there is variation in valence within evaluations of gay and lesbian economic, political, and social behavior. People within these samples have positive, neutral, and negative evaluations of all three kinds of behavior. Additionally, many of the negative evaluations do center on ideas of selfishness, zero-sum politics, conspiracy, and flaunting.

Lastly, I discuss how these negative evaluations tie into beliefs about gay citizenship, comparing them with those given by people who made neutral or positive evaluations. I ultimately find that the assumptions about citizenship and the polity that are embedded with the negative evaluations of gay and lesbian economic, political, and social behavior render full gay citizenship oxymoronic. This stands in contrast to neutral and positive evaluations, which do not render gay citizenship impossible. Thus, survey questions based on the rhetoric of these negative evaluations should have content validity for measuring gay threat.

Discourse analysis from one set of interviews provides the material for this chapter. This set of interviews consists of a series of in-depth, semi-structured interviews that exclusively asked respondents about their attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. These interviews lasted on average 2 hours and were commissioned for the Face Value Project. Face Value researchers pre-screened interviewees based on their stated attitudes towards and previous contact with lesbians and gay men. Only those who were neutral, *i.e.*, did not support same-sex marriage or no legal recognition for same-sex couples, were eligible to be in the sample. This sample, while providing in-depth and nuanced responses, is limited by this pre-screening (Lake Research Partners 2012a; Lake Research Partners 2012b; Lake Research Partners 2012c; Lake Research

Partners 2012d; Lake Research Partners 2012e).[28] A full description of the interview's sampling scheme and protocol is found in Appendix A.

Methodology

I divided my coding scheme into three sections. The first was to find demographic information about the respondents. The second was to collect information about evaluations of gay and lesbian economic, political and social behavior. The third was to record the explanations give for these evaluations. I attempted to record as much individual-level information as possible.

Because many of the group interviews transcripts did not specify responses by individual, some information can only be recorded at the interview-group level. Throughout this analysis, I will refer to interviewees in two ways. The first is by their assigned first names (Table 3.1). The second is to refer to it interview group, A – P. When I cannot identify which respondent in a group interview said something, I will refer to the interview group's letter. To protect respondents' privacy, I have changed their first names[29] and identifying characteristics about their occupations. Table 1 provides a listing of the respondents, along with their identification number, group letter, and various demographic characteristics.

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[28] To simplify and shorten citations in this chapter, Vol.1 refers to (Lake Research Partners 2012a), Vol. 2 refers to (Lake Research Partners 2012b), Vol. 3 to (Lake Research Partners 2012c), Vol. 4 to (Lake Research Partners 2012d) and Vol. 5 to (Lake Research Partners 2012e).

[29] For names, I attempt to roughly match based on the decade of popularity and ethnicity. Thus, I might substitute Jessica for Ashley; Brenda for Linda; Kevin for Jason; Anthony for Juan, etc. For occupation, I list the general occupational category rather than more specific details. So, a full professor at the University of Washington would become a college professor or digital technician at ATT would become a utilities technician.

Table 3.1: Demographic Information of Respondents (2 pages)

Interview No.	Interview Grp.	Name	City	Sex	Ethnicity	Parent?	Marital Status	Occupation	Respondent's Religion
1	A	Lisa	Louisville	W	Anglo	Y	Married	Investigator	Unknown
2	B	Thomas	Louisville	M	Anglo	N	Single	Clerical	Unknown
3	C	Dawn	Louisville	W	Anglo	Y	Married	Accounts Manager	Unknown
4	D	Christopher	Louisville	M	Anglo	Y	Married	Operations Manager	Unknown
5	E	Lori	Kansas City	W	Anglo	Y	Married	Accountant	Catholic
6	F	Joseph	Kansas City	M	Anglo	Y	Divorced and Engaged	Social Scientist	Catholic
7	G	Pamela	Kansas City	W	Anglo	N	Single	Doctor	Presbyterian
8	H	Steve	Kansas City	M	Anglo	Y	Married	Academic Support	Unknown
9	I	Will	Indianapolis	M	Anglo	Y	Married	Financial Analyst	Catholic
10	J	Jacob	Indianapolis	M	Anglo	Y	Married	Teacher	Agnostic
11	K	Barbara	Denver	W	Anglo	N	Married	Insurance	Unknown
12	K	Donna	Denver	W	Anglo	N	Divorced	Cosmetologist	Unknown
13	K	Marsha	Denver	W	Anglo	Y	Married	Artist	References Church
14	K	Kathy	Denver	W	Anglo	N	Married	Finance	Unknown
15	L	Julia	Denver	W	Anglo (?)	N	Dating	Translator	Unknown
16	L	Mercedes	Denver	W	Latina (?)	N	Widowed	Translator	Unknown

17	L	Elena	Denver	W	Latina (?)	Y	Divorced	Translator	Unknown
18	L	Valerie	Denver	W	Latina (?)	Y	Divorced	Translator	Unknown
19	M	Cynthia	Phoenix	W	Latina	Y	Married	Teacher	Catholic
20	M	Adriana	Phoenix	W	Latina	Yes	Single	Unemployed/Maternity Leave	Catholic
21	N	Melanie	Phoenix	W	Latina	Yes	Married	Local Government	Catholic
22	N	Daniel	Phoenix	M	Latino	Yes	Married	Local Government	Catholic
23	O	Carrie	Chicago	W	Latina	Yes	Married	Blue Collar at Event Venue	Catholic
24	O	Alyssa	Chicago	W	Latina	Yes	Married (?)	Receptionist	Catholic
25	O	Maria	Chicago	W	Latina	Yes	Married	Homemaker	Catholic
26	O	Tracy	Chicago	W	Latina	Yes	Married	Receptionist	Catholic
27	P	Alma	Chicago	W	Latina	No	Married	Teacher	Catholic
28	P	Sofia	Chicago	W	Latina	No	Single	Police Officer	Catholic
29	P	Jasmine	Chicago	W	Latina	Yes	Separated	Cosmetologist	Catholic
30	P	Regina	Chicago	W	Latina	Yes	Married	Teacher	Catholic

There were several demographic characteristics I looked for while coding. Some were commonly mentioned at the beginning of the interview, and I have included them in Table 3.1. These include the city in which the interview took place, the respondent's sex, whether or not they were a parent, their marital status and their occupation.

Additionally, I coded religious affiliation, partisan affiliation and whether or not an individual had contact with lesbians or gay men. Respondents mentioned these less frequently compared to other traits, so I do not include them in Table 3.1. Partisan affiliation was not mentioned in most interviews. Respondent 9, Will, identified as a Democrat. Respondent 28, Sofia, is a Republican. 3 respondents, 8 (Steve) and some members of group K explicitly mention being more conservative. In contrast to Sofia, another member of group P is more liberal (either Alma, Jasmine or Regina.) All but 4 respondents mentioned knowing someone who was gay. The four without contact with lesbians and gay men were Respondents 1 (Lisa), 4 (Christopher), 5 (Lori), and 6 (Joseph).

The next, and most important, set of information that I looked for while coding were negative evaluations that would be indicative of gay threat. I divided these into the three broad evaluations of gay behavior that I developed in Chapter 2. The first evaluation I was economic behavior. The second was political behavior, which I sub-divided into articulations of zero-sum politics and conspiratorial politics, and the third was social behavior.

I divide categorize behavior as political, social, or economic for ease of analysis. In actuality, these are likely highly interconnected, and it might be the case that a statement can contain all three types of evaluation. As a result, I might triple code an item. For example, imagine the case of someone talking about a high school allowing openly gay students to use locker rooms. If a respondent were to say,

> "All of these gay activists came down from Denver, and they had never even heard of the school before. They probably don't even have kids or understand what it's like to be a parent and to try to raise your kid right in this culture. They had some closed door meetings; no one from the community could be there - just the principal and these gay activists. And – bam – they changed this policy, and now normal kids, innocent kids, are going to have to deal with this. And, it's not fair for the "gay" kids, either. They're being taught that it's fine to flaunt a private aspect of themselves they don't really understand

> and put it all out there, by talking about sex and wearing a dress or whatever. That's just not how the world works."

In this case, I would code the exchange as containing evaluations of political and social behavior. It contains political stereotypes because it presents the politics of school locker rooms as a zero-sum game; the "normal" and "innocent" kids lose out to the implicitly deviant gay and lesbian students. This zero-sum game is presented in a conspiratorial way; the political action is anonymous and anti-democratic. The "activists" are not a part of the community and use closed door meetings to address their concerns. Lastly, there is a concern that gay identity is overtly sexual and defined by gender non-conformity, which is deemed inappropriate. Thus, any move for greater political rights is tainted by this lack of respectability. This is the process that I use for coding these interviews.

Results

Economic Evaluations: Selfishness

11 out of the 30 interviewees, or 37 %, provided some form of evaluation about the economic behavior, specifically the supposed wealth and consumption patterns, of gay men and lesbians. 4 of these respondents view these stereotypes in a negative light and employ them in the way that is consistent with gay threat. 1 has a positive view of gay wealth. The other five make mention of gay wealth but appear to not attach a valence one way or the other.

I first turn my attention to those respondents who made negative evaluations of stereotyped gay economic behavior. Lisa from Louisville provided the most articulate and in-depth evaluation. She believes that most gay men and lesbians are wealthy (vol. 1, pg. 9), "educated" (vol. 1, pg.18) and "have good taste" (vol. 1, pg. 7). While these traits could all be positive, she attributes them to selfishness (vol. 1, pg. 9; vol. 1, pg. 18). She contrasts the selfishness of gay men with her own life. Whereas she puts "[her] husband or [her] child's needs

before [hers]," she thinks that gay men "put themselves before anybody else" and thinks that "whatever they want is the most important thing" (vol. 1, pg. 9). She continues to explain how this selfishness manifests itself in lesbians:

> "They want what they want. Um, to the extent of, if that's going to hurt somebody else's feelings or if it's going to put you in a bind, or their partner, they're going to put their own wants and wishes before, just about anybody or anything else" (vol. 1, pg. 19).

This selfishness, manifested by economic success, limits the legitimacy of gay and lesbian relationships. Gay couples see the "latest movies" and "get the latest clothes," but this represents "a material life … more than a spiritual kind of … closeness that other people have, … that [her] husband and [she] share" (vol. 1, pg. 10).[30]

No other respondents make the connection between gay wealth and selfishness as explicitly as Lisa. However, there are other respondents who do attribute the gay wealth to the abdication of personal and civic responsibility. For example, Joseph in Kansas City thinks that gay men "spend as much [a lot of] money on their clothing and accessories" (vol. 1, pg. 284). In part, this is because they "have a much higher level of disposable income" as they are "not spending a lot of [their] income of children and maybe a wife who works part time" (vol. 1, pg. 285). Like Lisa, he believes that these consumption patterns reflect less mature and responsible relationships: "their relationships are a little bit more based on physical looks not so much deep

[30] In vol. 3, pg. 292, Daniel and Carrie discuss gay men being "selfish" because "family" (Carrie) is not "a gay man's priority." "They think about themselves and think about what they're going to do." "Yeah, the partying and wanting to party so much and wanting to go out with guys and have sex all the time and not be resp…..[sic]." In this case, Carrie does not make the connection between selfishness and the abdication of familial responsibility on the one hand and stereotypes of wealth on the other.

interpersonal connections" (vol. 1, pg. 284). He believes that this is true, to a lesser extent, for lesbians (vol. 1 pg 290).

Jacob in Indianapolis ties together economic and political stereotypes. He thinks that these only apply for gay men and not lesbians. While he thinks that there is a stereotype of gay male wealth, he also believes that there are many more "poor, angry and uneducated" lesbians because they do not have the "opportunities to still go to college" and become "frustrated and just [be] (clap) done and over with" (vol. 3, pg. 70). As for gay men, they are:

> "Affluent, um the stigmatism [sic] of really kind of associating your gay male as being more of a political individual, you don't have the image of the rugged, poor gay man that is going to be as popularized on culture and things along that line. No one says you know I lived as a closet homosexual out in the boonies all these years, raising pigs and things like that. There's a little element of affluency, that there's a culture that goes along with some and some experiences, they've had to be able to pay for some of these kinds of things" (vol. 3, pg. 60).

He goes on to contrast this "affluency," by which he means a man who is "a little more modern, a little more cultured, and a little bit more experienced" (vol. 3, pg. 60) with the "rugged, poor man who dropped out of high school" (vol. 3, pg. 60).

These statements in and of themselves do not necessarily appear to be negatively valenced. However, throughout the interview, Jacob makes clear that masculine gay men, personified by "Les Stroud [from] the show Survivor" (vol. 3, pg. 62)[31] are the only socially legitimate gay men.[32] Jacob believes that any gay men who are less masculine than Les Stroud,

[31] Les Stroud is actually married to a woman and is in the wilderness survival show *Survivorman*. Jacob is probably referring to Richard Hatch, who was the openly gay winner of the first season of *Survivor*. Todd Herzog is another openly gay winner of *Survivor* (Fisher 2013; "Survivorman: Featuring Les Stroud" 2014).

[32] This is a confirmation of Cohen et al.'s findings for straight men (Cohen, Hall, and Tuttle 2009).

including the majority Jacob believes to be wealthy and effete, are conforming to cultural stereotypes of gay men. This behavior is indicative of caving to pressure from the media and identity groups rather than being a true individual. Thus, his evaluation of gay wealth fit into an overall negative view that Jacob has of gay men as a group.

The last negative connection with economic stereotypes came from interview group O. Like Lisa and Joseph, some women from this group draw a connection between lacking a family, not having children, and wealth. One woman asserted that gay men can:

> "afford to live up in their nice condo with their nice shoes and their high end clothes and, and cause she [a lesbian friend] knows a lot of gay people and they're, they're single. You know, if they're with somebody they're single and you know they don't have families. They don't have tuitions. They don't have to worry about food on the table. They're going to catch a date and get a meal…..and I'm going to go with the meal and even if they are starving they're going to go where the meal is and you can never tell and very fashionable, very stylish, and, and you know right now that's where it is. It's like the, probably like, it's true. You know? They probably have more to invest in than us cause we have kids and we have families and we have … and we have, you know little league or you have soccer or you have dance class and whatever your kids want to do you're funding your children's dreams. You're not just funding yourself" (vol. 4, pg. 45).

Like Lisa, Jacob and Joseph, this member of interview group O makes a connection between consumption, wealth accumulation, and forgoing having a family. The benefits that gay men accrue from not having to sacrifice for their children's dreams are enormous. Not only are they able to have a life style of conspicuous consumption; they are able to invest and gain wealth. They do not have the capacity for self-sacrifice in the same way that parents, defined by the respondent as an in-group, or "we," do.

Conflating stereotypes of gay wealth with selfishness is not the only way that respondents evaluate that stereotype. Lori in Kansas City imagines the "typical gay man" "caring about wines and gourmet food and that type of thing" (vol. 1, pg. 259) and envisions them "spend[ing]

a lot of money on clothes and personal hygiene" (vol. 1, pg 258). Pamela, a doctor in Kansas City, thinks that "financial stability" is the thing that "gay men care about most in their lives," but she backtracks to say that she thinks this is true of everyone (vol. 1, pg. 326). Steve of Kansas City, who expresses many other beliefs that are consistent with gay threat, mentions the stereotype of gay men as "middle aged, middle income nice job, probably a decent car" without touching on it more or connecting it to his other beliefs (vol. 2; pg 4). Marsha from Denver thinks that lesbians "have more money" because they "are pretty well educated and they probably have jobs that pay well." However, she cites that more lesbians "adopt[ing] kids" will "take[] away the disposable income" (vol. 3, pg. 117); thus, parenting, and the sacrifices it entails, are not at odds with her conception of lesbian identity.

At least one person from interview group L also associates gay men with "taste" and a "lifestyle" that includes parties to show off their garden (vol.3, pg. 157). Later in the interview, someone highlights markers of upper-middle class life, including opera, *Vogue* and *Architectural Digest* (vol. 3, pg. 159). Adriana in Phoenix told her mother and the interviewer that gay men were "very brand name," "high class" and want everything in their home to be "matching" (vol. 3., pg. 203). She doesn't view this negatively; instead, she says "more power to you, you can afford it you know" (vol. 3, pg. 204). Christopher from Louisville discusses the wealth of his wife's uncle in a positive way because he is "great to his kids" and gives "very good presents at Christmas, birthdays..." (vol. 1, pg. 228).

One respondent did have an explicitly positive view of economic stereotypes. Will from Indianapolis unwittingly invoked "best little boy in the world" syndrome (Reid 1973; Pachankis and Hatzenbuehler 2013) in explaining what he say as a disproportionate amount of success in the gay community:

> "…they all tend to be educated; you know, college graduate, post college. To me, it almost seems like, and I don't know quite how to explain this, but it almost seems like the fact that they're gay and the fact that they know that they're probably going to face a lifetime of you know so adversity makes them a little propelled to excel further with respect to their career and their income potential" (vol.3, pg 9).

Later in the interview, Will continues to discuss this stereotype without any negative connotations. He thinks that gay men dress well, in part because they "read the GQ's" but contrasts this with the fact that he "used to dress nice" but "can't afford it like [he] used to" (vol. 3, pg. 11).

Political Stereotypes: Zero-Sum

Fourteen out of 30 of the interviews, 47%, thought that the gay political behavior was a zero-sum game. The discussions of the zero-sum nature took place in a different way than I had expected. I had anticipated that people would explicitly talk about the zero-sum nature of rights in the context of legal rights and anti-discrimination ordinances and in term of elite and movement-level politics. This is less common, as only 2 people discussed this as an example.[33] Instead, most people who discussed their perception of GLBT politics as zero-sum gay politics in highly personal terms. Frequent imagery is that of illegitimate "militants" and activists "forcing" and "shoving" acceptance on innocent and average people. Abstract, formal law and elite politics were less of a concern; having other individual people demand legal and, particularly, social, recognition from the respondents themselves was the issue. Respondents still felt that they were losing something out of this process, so I categorize these responses as "zero-sum" evaluations.

One women of interview group L connects the militancy with a zero-sum game around formal legal rights and government actors. She explicit says that greater rights for gay men and

[33] Steve is double-coded in this section.

lesbians will result in fewer rights for religious groups. She cites a "case in England" where a "black minister" was "put into a re-education class to accept gays or something" (vol. 3, pg. 173). In this case, greater rights for gay men and lesbians resulted in fewer rights for religious people, as is part of the theory of gay threat.

Steve is also worried about the effect that gay marriage will have on religious conservatives. Specifically, he worries about "the government imposing a definition of marriage on them [religious people]" and sees this as a major source of threat (vol. 2, pg. 8). He also says that many conservatives have similar fears; while they feel positively towards the individual lesbians and gay men that they know, "political" and "social issues" are "the things they see as a threat to their religion and their politics" (vol. 2, pg. 16-17). This explicitly articulates the concern that gay men and lesbians cannot be members of the polity without hurting the rights and status of people who already have full membership in it.

Thirteen respondents framed the issue as one of informal, illegitimate, and forced recognition. For example, Dawn from Louisville is very uncomfortable with public displays of men kissing; images of a gay men kissing are more uncomfortable to her than seeing photos of the late Fred Phelps holding a "God Hates Fags" sign. However, she uses politics to make further distinctions between public displays of affection. A couple "at their house" with "their dog," while more offensive than Fred Phelps, is still less offensive than men kissing at a Pride Parade because while the parade isn't a "protest," it is a "gathering like that and maybe they're doing it more or showing it in something like that." They are "making more of a show" (vol. 1, pg. 196). Public displays of affection become inherently political. Additionally, the women of interview group K also tired of "the mentality of the protester," which is "annoying" (vol. 3, pg. 151).

Many respondents framed this issue in terms of "pushing a lifestyle," which many describe as people forcing acceptance, civil rights, or social esteem. Lori speaks positively of her hairdresser. She had a "good experience" with him because he "wasn't pushing his lifestyle off on [her]" (vol.1, pg. 266). When asked to explain what she meant by this, she claims that he "wasn't trying to promote gayness" but rather had the attitude of "this is who I am like it or not" (vol. 1, pg. 267). By this, it appears that "promoting gayness" is conditioned on a gay person expecting acceptance, or demanding Honneth's social esteem (1996, pg. 121-129).

Pamela has similar concerns. She takes issue with those whom she dubs "in your face gay" (vol. 1, pg. 352). These are people who act "like they have a chip on their shoulder, and they are always wanting to advocate for gay rights" (vol. 1, pg. 352). At one point, she describes these people as "fringe" (vol. 1, pg. 353). However, earlier in her interview, she conflates gay identity with this form of activism. When asked which heterosexual people would be most comfortable with lesbians and gay men, she imagines that only straight people who are "in your face activists" who "want[…] to be out there on the street corner holding signs" could possibly be completely comfortable around lesbians and gay men (vol. 1, pg. 336). Thus, there must be something inherently radical, political, and, in Pamela's estimation, inappropriate, about gay and lesbian identity.

She goes on to draw a connection between selfishness and gay politics. Unlike other respondents, she does not attribute this selfishness to a lack of family responsibility and childlessness. Rather, "activist" types are "so bent on their agenda that they don't kind of see a compromise" on issues like gay marriage (vol. 1, pg. 324). Both support and opposition to gay marriage are reasonable political positions for Pamela. People who are concerned that gay marriage will lead to "men and their sister wives" and "one woman who wanted to marry a

dolphin somewhere" are voicing reasonable opposition (vol. 1, pg. 328), and gay men should be able to "see that with reason" (vol. 1, pg. 328). This means that gay men are violating the norms of political discourse because "they expect their opinion to be heard, [but] they don't hear other opinions" (vol. 1, pg. 328).

Steve echoes Pamela's arguments. He thinks that gay men are "militant" (vol. 2, pg. 2) and "self-absorbed" (vol. 2, pg. 4). He connects militancy with being out, or open about one's sexual orientation. He clarifies, "It [coming out] is not just about being who they are. The want to be who they are and then project outward on everyone else so that everyone around them knows that they are gay" (vol. 2, pg. 2). He connects the militancy to explicit forms of political activism like "marching" where the goal

> "is always to put out for sexuality and to have it take on the same validity as heterosexual relationships where even heterosexual relationship would not be appropriate in that setting. It always has to be about their sexuality even though sexuality is not always an appropriate subject matter for every situation" (vol. 2, pg. 2).

Steve recognizes that gay men and lesbians have a right to exist in private spaces. This right does not stretch into the polity, however. Full citizenship for lesbians and gay men would include recognition of gay identity and social valuation of gay and lesbian relationships. To deny the legitimacy of these claims is to deny that legitimate gay citizenship can exist.

Jacob also believes many forms of gay and lesbian politics to be illegitimate. He has an idiosyncratic view of the polity, and he makes it very clear that most forms of gay and lesbian politics are incompatible with it. Jacob envisions the polity as an arena where everyone is already equal and should be able to maintain an equal voice. Within that realm, people can share opinions, but they cannot compel other people to do anything, and they should not make other people uncomfortable. He views both gender non-conformity and advocating for acceptance as

crossing that line by compelling other people's behavior and causing them discomfort. Practically speaking, this makes all GLBT movement activity illegitimate in his eyes.

He makes this logic clear when discussing his school's Gay Straight Alliance:

> "It started out as a really good fundamental group that was actually allowing for people to have dialogue who were of similar interest, essentially not gay, but yet saying you know what, there should be rights that all citizens should have, citizens should be free from bullying, they should be free from discrimination they should be free from these various situations, regardless of sexuality. That's perfectly fin[e], but then when all of a sudden you get a couple of students who really want to push the envelope and say 'well I'm gay and you have to accept me.' Alright, I don't have to accept anything, but I will work within the laws" (vol. 3 pg. 81)

He then goes on to explain that this "open flaunting" of sexuality (vol. 3, pg. 81), especially once it "purposely make[s] people uncomfortable as opposed to fundamentally saying what I believe" (vol. 3, pg. 82) is illegitimate. He has also explained this point of view to students, saying:

> "I had to have a conversation with a kid last year who was a very intelligent young man, very articulate, and was really pushing that envelope about really saying; people need to accept me as being gay. And I, and as we had this conversation. I said: you know what, you have the right to express yourself until it really starts to make people uncomfortable. And I said it's the same way that no one else has the right to express themselves until it makes you uncomfortable. So I'm not going to let the bigot in the back of the room admonish you and I'm not going to let you admonish the bigot either because this is now a fundamentally equal classroom" (vol. 3 pg. 102).

Using discomfort as a litmus test for political legitimacy renders any type of challenge to the status quo, including gay politics, illegitimate.

The women of interview group L were also concerned about the militancy they perceived in gay groups. Like Steve and Pamela, they discuss "militancy" of people who are "like I am gay on your sleeve," which the further explain as when someone says "you'd better accept me as I am or else" (vol. 3, pg. 173). This latter rationale mirrors what Jacob has said. Unlike the other respondents, this group of 3 Latinas and 1 Anglo woman connect this to a broader sensitivity that they see in other minorities (vol. 3, pg. 158). The draw a comparison between

saying "the 'n' word" and saying "queer" or "bitch" (vol. 3, pg. 158) and "Black Entertainment Television" and "gay groups and lesbian groups" (vol. 3, pg. 173). Unlike the other respondents who feel that militancy is categorically negative, it appears that these women have conflicting values about the polity that are driving their ambivalence. On the one hand, they, like the other respondents, feel that it is illegitimate to demand social esteem; on the other, they recognize that what they perceive as hyper-sensitivity about language is not unique to lesbians and gay men.

There are some references to gay politics that are fairly neutral. For example, someone in interview group P references "a flag" but doesn't expand on that (vol. 5, pg. 8). A woman in group O mentioned that "some people will sport the rainbows" (vol. 4, pg. 48) without following up on that point. Lori sees gay men as "liberal" without ascribing any positive or negative valence to it (vol. 1, pg. 261). When asked about what gay men want the most, Joseph says "acceptance (vol. 1, pg. 287) and mentions the repeal of Don't Tell as a measure of that acceptance without evaluating it positively or negatively (vol. 1, pg. 288). In most cases, these neutral evaluations do not make explicit reference to personal beliefs about the polity.

Others make a more positive connection about GLBT politics and the creation of group identity. Christopher points out the connection between current discriminatory policy and the creation of gay identity. When explaining how the lives of gay people differ from those of straight people, he says:

> "…The community, the rights and what they feel they have rights to do, and not the whole, the whole military "don't ask" and things of that nature. You know, I'm sure they all had to kind of bond together. You know, that was important for them to, to get that out there, to, you know support each other" (vol. 1, pg. 214).

Will thinks that gay men are "a little bit more aware" about issues like gay marriage, civil unions and Don't Ask; Don't Tell, and he thinks that they have slightly higher levels of political

knowledge (vol. 3, pg. 9, 16). Unlike others classified activism as "militant," Will and Christopher see these higher levels of political activism and awareness as good things.

Political Evaluations: Conspiracy

Conspiratorial thinking also stood out as another way of evaluating gay political behavior. Four out of the 30 interviewees, 13 %, held conspiratorial beliefs about lesbians and gay men. Elements of conspiratorial belief include thinking that lesbians and gay men subvert the democratic process in order to achieve their political goals, thus hurting the polity. In this section, I also record people who say that gays and lesbians are largely invisible or that the number of lesbians and gay men is growing. The first two examples will be negatively valenced by default. However, it is possible for the last two to be positively or negatively valenced, as I document.

Steve is explicit in his belief that he and many conservatives view GLBT politics through the lens of conspiracy. While Steve repeatedly claims that he doesn't have a problem with gay people in general, he believes that "certain groups within the gay community … are pushing for an agenda" (vol. 2, pg. 8). Steve repeats concerns about pushing an agenda throughout the interview, and he clearly thinks that this is the work of both the government (vol. 2, pg. 8) and a "militant" minority within the gay community (vol. 2, pg. 16). The ultimate goal of these militant groups is to promote same-sex marriage, and, as mentioned in the previous section, Steve feels that this will ultimately harm the status of religious conservatives within the polity. Consistent with my theory of gay threat, Steve does not appear to think that losing the debate over gay marriage is the result of pluralist politics. Rather, this loss ultimately originates from the illegitimate actions of militant groups that characterize gay political participation.

Lisa, Lori and Jacob articulate what they see as another anti-democratic political tactic: using media programing in order to change attitudes. Lisa says that the positive portrayal of gay men as "funny" with "great senses of humor" comes about "because they want, TV, media wants them to be more accepted by whoever's watching a show and make you feel good about it" (vol. 1, pg. 16). She speculates that it's for "ratings" (vol. 1, pg. 16), or market imperatives rather than politics. Lori has a darker view of the media's presentation of gay men. While discussing *Modern Family*, she whispers, making part of the transcript inaudible. However, the part that is understandable is "I understand where the market is. They market for shows [inaudible] acceptable lifestyle" (vol. 1, pg. 277).[34]

Jacob takes the media to task for only showing "the humor of the gay lifestyle" on shows like *Will and Grace*. He says that the media does not show the "awkwardness of the gay lifestyle" and think "they [high school students] should all be forced to [to watch *Boys Don't Cry*] (vol. 3, pg. 105-106).[35] Only focusing on the positive aspects of being gay is harmful for young people:

> "… when we look now, oh it's like, it's like this to be gay, well hell yeah if you're twenty years old and being gay in some way on television and stuff like that. Of course it's easy; no one talks about the being picked on in a locker room, feeling uncomfortable dressing, transgender to gay, lesbian issues and stuff like that, finding an actual spouse" (vol. 3, pg. 106).

In this case, Jacob feels that the move to push the acceptability of lesbians and gay men in coming at the cost of hurting youth. At earlier points in the interview, he revealed a concern that

[34] Despite this, she thinks that Cam is funny.

[35] He also compares rape and murder to having your period because they are "something you have to deal with in the beginning and then kind of get used to and then kind of fundamentally understand and adjust to." He then cites the lynching of James Bird in Texas.

butch women were merely "trying to portray that butch image…to get recognition" or effeminate men were "dressing very trendy, having a lisp at various times…[to fit] the image of Nathan Lane in *The Birdcage*" (vol. 3, pg. 71). He thinks that performing gender in a non-comformative way reflects an inauthentic self that reflects a blind acceptance of identity politics and that giving youth a falsely positive picture of being gay will increase the number of gay people.

The women of interview group K think that the interview itself is an example of the gay power and, potentially, conspiracy. Prescreened as a group of Christian women, they speak positively of their experiences with gay men and lesbians throughout the interview. However, once the interview got to module 4, in which respondents were asked to provided politically incorrect questions they have about lesbians and gay men, the women began to talk about their suspicion that the interview was a "politically driven focus group" (vol. 3, pg. 137). They wondered if a politician had commissioned the interview (vol. 3, pg. 137-138) or if it was about the repeal of Don't Ask; Don't Tell (vol. 3, pg. 138).

For some respondents, time spent around lesbians and gay men is uncomfortable because of what they both describe as the cliquish nature of lesbians and gay men. Joseph's employer allows employees to have social groups during work hours. He went to a GLBT one "for the hell of it" and to "find out which women in the office are lesbians" (vol. 1, pg. 300). He found the event to be

> "…tense. The people were chit-chatting a little bit to themselves. You could tell there was some – when you first walked in the door, everybody turned and looked. I felt like I was working a singles bar where all the people throw looks to see who is coming in now" (vol. 1, pg. 302).

Pamela reported a similar experience. She went with a "friend and her husband and me" to a New Year's Eve party where "there were 30 gay women." Like Joseph, she found the event

to be fun but awkward: "… it had an under-element of – I could read some of the [inaudible] heads thinking, 'why are they here because we all want to kiss each other at midnight. We don't want to do it in front of you guys'" (vol. 1, pg. 332). Both of these are relatively neutral, vis-à-vis understandings about the polity. While Pamela and Joseph report being uncomfortable, they do not make the claim that gay presence in these spaces was immoral or inappropriate.

The political concerns held by Pamela, Steve, Jacob and the women of interview groups K and L contain conspiratorial content, demonstrating the close connection between the two. Steve and interview group L's characterization of some stripes of gay politics are "militant" (vol. 2, pg. 2, 3, 8; vol. 3, pg. 173, 193) places gay politics as outside of the norms of American political participation. Thus, characterizing a group as militant places it beyond the pale of normal politics and legitimate citizenship.

There are other mentions of the gay community that are less negatively valenced, such as discussing the invisibility of gender-conforming lesbian and gay men. For example, Lisa discusses that her hairdresser began to lisp when he came out; she thinks it's because "he wanted to make himself accepted in that community" (vol. 1, pg. 8). Unlike Jacob, she does not see this as a bad thing. Three separate groups pointed out that there are probably more gay and lesbian people than straight people realize. Melanie and the women of interview group O think that this is true because gender conformity renders many mostly invisible (vol. 4, pg. 24; vol. 3, pg. 290, 298). Melanie pointed out that this meant that there were closeted men in political office (vol. 3, pg. 290). Dawn thinks that people are in the closet because of "fear of what people will say or think" (vol. 1, pg. 166). However, none of these people appeared threatened by this. Joseph was pleased to find out through his friend that "there are gay cop groups all over the country" (vol. 3, pg. 23).

Thomas presents a neutral valence when talking about the increase in the number of lesbians and gay men over the years. The community has come together because of "the guy in Shepardsville who got killed" (vol. 1, pg. 91).[36] He says that he has seen "more gay places open up" (vol. 1, pg. 102) and claims that there are more openly gay people now. This is because "back in my mom and dad's time period … they kept it in the closet" (vol. 1, pg. 109). While Thomas appears to feel disgust about gay men, calling them "butt pirates" and "sick" (vol. 1, pg. 78), he does not appear to be threatened by this particular aspect of the gay rights movement. He might be a person whose anti-gay attitudes are largely driven by disgust, not gay threat.

Social Behavior: Flaunting

Describing gay social behavior as flaunting was the most common negative evaluation of gay and lesbian behavior; between 19 and 22 of the respondents, 63-73% held this belief.[37] Respondents expressed this belief in two specific ways: by conflating public displays of affection with a lack of respectability and by associating non-normative gender expression with disrespecability. All of the respondents who either held negatively valenced political and economic stereotypes or who believed in the conspiratorial nature of gay men and lesbians discussed gay social behavior in terms of flaunting. However, some respondents only negatively about flaunting and not about any other component of behavior.

[36] I cannot find a reference to a hate crime in Shepardsville. I think he means Matthew Shepard's murder. This murder appears to have affected him greatly.

[37] This variation is due to the fact that one group of 4 interviewees cited a lack of respectability, but I was not able to track how many individuals within the group believed this. 19 is the minimum possible number, and 22 is the maximum.

The first major issue area in which respondents referenced gay men and lesbians as lacking in respectability was public displays of affection. There was variation in what respondents characterized as "too much" affection. Some thought that holding hands was too much, while others thought that "making out" or more explicitly sexual things were going too far. Another line of demarcation came from whether or not respondents perceived the displays of affection as a reflection of "love" or "lust." Love was appropriate and apolitical, whereas lust was inappropriate and political. Frequently, displays of lust, especially in the context of Pride Parades were deemed by respondents to be political (Dawn, vol. 1, pg. 196). While some respondents were quick to say that they held straight and gay public displays of affection to different standards, most respondents tried to say that they would hold straight couples to the same standards. Given that many respondents characterized holding hands or a quick kiss on the lips as "too much," this response seems to be borne of social desirability rather than consistently applying the same standards.

For example, Christopher from Louisville took issue with a photo two men kissing and holding hands. Though he recognized that "you can do what you want in public" and became less uncomfortable while talking through his feelings (vol. 1, pg. 253), he was still uncomfortable when shown photos. Both the photo of two men kissing on their porch and the one of two men kissing at a Pride Parade made him feel uncomfortable. Both were "out in public," though Christopher found the degree of being out in public and the "intensity" of the Pride Parade most troubling (vol. 1, pg. 253-254).

Lisa also evaluated gay public displays of affection as flaunting. She tried to rationalize this concern, following up the statement "I don't care to see two men kissing" with two claims. First, that she doesn't "care what they do ever if they're happy that's fine, and second, that she

"usually" doesn't "go around kissing my husband in public and letting someone take a picture of it" (vol.1, pg. 66). She goes on to clarify that kissing in public (in this case, in the context of a Pride Parade) is inappropriate because it is a "rebellious statement" made in a "public setting." She is less concerned with a photo of two men kissing after their wedding because it is "private" (vol. 1, pg. 68). In this case, she appears to be defining any public displays of affection that she shares with her husband as asexual or non-existent, while asserting that the only legitimate location for gay and lesbian couples is away from the public and away from the polity.

Steve voices a similar concern. He recounts an experience in Madison, Wisconsin, during which time he saw "a gay couple making out on the corner" at "9 o'clock on Wednesday" while he was walking around with his "wife and older son." He told the men "hey, it is not really appropriate in front of kids." One of the men "made some smart remark" then called him "a gay hater." This hurt his feelings (vol. 2, pg. 3).

The incident is, in his mind, a broader example of "a reactionary kind of thing but is also imposing their rights even though they may not have rights – on everybody around them just so they can express their identity" (vol. 2, pg. 2). He says that the other gay acquaintances he's had this conversation with are "narrow minded" because they do not think about their public displays of affection "from a heterosexual point of view" (vol. 2, pg. 2). This evaluation presents a normative view of gay status within the polity. Steve doubts the legitimacy of gay rights claiming, as is evidenced by the fact that he immediately negates a hypothetical rights claim. To the extent that gay men and lesbians are able to be in the polity, they are in a subordinate position. They have to recognize his rights claims, vis-à-vis thinking "from a heterosexual point of view," while he reserves the right to doubt gay and lesbian rights claiming. They must recognize his social valuation, while his recognition of theirs is discretionary.

Viewing gay public displays of affection as flaunting is not the only way that one can interpret this behavior. For example, a woman in group describes her reaction to seeing gay men kissing:

> "Like just weird, it was awkward you know like I didn't have, I didn't know what to say. I just looked and was like, like I had to like look twice to make sure they were doing what I thought they were doing. They weren't having sex or nothing but this was like you now holding hands or you know the touching, the, you know, kissing right away and pulling away and stuff you know, and I don't know. The way it felt weird but then it was like oh well whatever you know to each their own" (vol. 4, pg. 48-49).

While the experience was new to her, and she felt discomfort, but she clearly blames herself for her discomfort, not the gay couple. She clarifies:

> "…but, it's different because like I said when I was at the bus stop, I was like wow you know kind of like amazed for a second. I was like oh well you know I guess this is what happens when you go to high school…" (vol. 4, pg. 49)

She defines her discomfort solely in terms of seeing something novel. Implicit in this statement is the idea that, as she becomes more used to seeing gay couples, she will feel more comfortable around them and that the gay couple is not at fault for kissing.

The second major issue voiced by respondents was that non-conforming gender expressions were also inherently political and flaunting. All respondents noted a difference in gender presentation when thinking about gay men and lesbians. However, some respondents specifically labeled this difference as political, as a purposeful attempt to challenge society, or as shameful. In previous sections, it is clear that Jacob views any gender non-conformity as a deviation from one's true self. For example, he says:

> "I know some lesbians and regrettably, a good portion of them are butch, very butch, and I know some of them just purposefully portray that butch image because they are gay, as opposed to just being nonchalant, have no real issues of pushing the envelope, they portray it to 100% because I think that they have to feel butch to get that recognition. I think it's wrong. I think it's too why don't they just be themselves?" (vol. 3, pg. 71).

He has similar feelings about a men in drag:

> "This one [photo of a man in drag] is just the sheer fact of transgender, I would assume, I would assume this person is probably a transgender or as a cross dresser, one of the two, and if they're gay, so be it; and if they're not gay, they're really, really ugly" (vol. 3, pg. 100).

As with previous comments, Jacob feels that gender non-conforming clothes and behavior are a part of an inherently inauthentic lifestyle that violates American norms of individualism.

Discussion

Negative Evaluations of Behavior and Beliefs about the Polity

Overall, respondents negative evaluations of gay economic, political, and social behavior coincides with beliefs that gay men and lesbians are illegitimate citizens. From describing gay politics as "militant" to maintaining that gay and lesbian people abdicate civic responsibility, respondents who make negative claims about gay behavior implicitly or explicitly relate these claims to normative beliefs about the polity. There are a few more common trends in explaining the norms of the polity that gay men and lesbians violate. I list them below.

Specifically, Steve, Pamela, and Jacob all claim that gay and lesbian politics violates the norms of pluralism. They all see American politics as an arena where there is supposed to be compromise and where everyone has their say. They each think that "ardent activists" (vol. 1, pg. 324), "activists" (vol. 2, pg. 34) or students who are "queer as in odd and purposely trying to challenge society" (vol. 3, pg. 65) do not listen to the other side enough. Each respondent sees entertaining the opposing viewpoint to be a cornerstone of democratic participation. By saying "love us because we're gay" (vol. 3, pg. 65) or having "an accusatory attitude that anybody who is uncomfortable with gay people are narrow minded, closed minded religious bigots" (vol. 2, pg. 38), gay activists are precluding the other side of the debate and shutting down civil discourse

and "compromise" (vol. 1, pg. 324). Legitimate pluralism, in their minds, is one where gay men and lesbians cannot actively challenge anti-gay policies or attitudes and where recognition of gay claims for rights and social esteem are optional.

Jacob sees much of the behavior of gay people as a violation of the spirit of anti-discrimination laws. Anti-discrimination laws "are openly right there to protect, not promote" (vol. 3, pg. 79). By this, he means that the spirit of anti-discrimination laws is one of minimizing difference and assimilation. To wit, he cites Barney Frank is a good person because he does not say "I will only vote for gay legislation" but instead says "I am a gay man; I am no different than anyone else" (vol. 3, pg. 80).

Jacob defines assimilation narrowly. Assimilated gay and lesbian citizens ironically cannot demand recognition. He believes that certain men would say "I'm here, I'm queer and I'm proud" and then "hide behind laws that are there to protect you from discrimination and then flaunt the element at which that makes most people uncomfortable" (vol. 3, pg. 80). This is a case of using laws that Jacob sees as politically legitimate for politically illegitimate ends.

Neutral and Positive Evaluations of the Behavior and Beliefs about the Polity

Neutral or positive accounts of gay economic, political and social behavior present very different narratives of the relationship between gay men, lesbians, and the polity. If anything, positive evaluations of gay economic success and political behavior link gay men and lesbians with good citizenship. Respondents who give positive or neutral evaluations of gay men and lesbians do not deny the possibility that lesbians and gay men can be good citizens.

Will provides an important example of this. Though he is an observant Catholic and believes that marriage, by definition, can only be between a man and a woman, Will appears to be fairly excited about the possibility about the expansion of lesbian and gay rights. He has a lot

of contact with gay and lesbian people; he reports being very close to a lesbian niece (vol. 3, pg. 13) and has a good friend who is a gay police officer in another city (vol. 3, pg. 18). This contact has a profound effect on how he views gay political participation. He notes that his niece is "a bit more in tune with those issues [gay rights]" and going to Pride Parades while speaking affectionately about her girlfriend, "the same girl that basically is her first girlfriend" (vol. 3, pg. 14). He notes that gay men probably want the "the same thing as straight men do…having a partner, being accepted, living in a country where they can have the same marital rights." (vol. 3, pg. 16). He is indignant that his best friend was unable to take a police job in Tampa, Florida, because he had "gotten a blow job outside of a bar once" (vol. 3, pg. 18).

All of these responses indicate that Will views gay citizenship as compatible with the polity. He does not have an issue with gay political organizations, as his comments about his niece demonstrate. He recognizes rights claims as a legitimate and important part of people's lives, and he thinks that it is unfair that having sex at a bar once would disqualify you for a job. Contact and a belief that gay people can be citizens mean that he does not make negative evaluations of gay men and lesbians overall.

Despite this, Will's religious profile would indicate that he would be strongly opposed to gay rights given current models. When explicitly asked about his religious beliefs, he says that, as a Catholic "while they deserve love and compassion, what they're doing is a sin" (vol. 3, 28). That being said, he goes on to say:

> "… you need to be able to reconcile with yourself. It's like the Catholic Church doesn't believe in birth control. Well, I can tell you my wife has been on the pill. You know…" (vol. 3, pg. 31).

He does not want to be placed in a position where he has to choose between making a vote based on these beliefs and the people he loves; he prefers to not bring up the topic of politics (vol. 3,

29-30). Previous scholarship would tell us, based solely on religious identification, that Will would have strongly anti-gay attitudes. This is not the case, and gay threat provides a theoretical explanation as to why that is.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided qualitative documentation of gay threat. I also have documented that people who believe that gay men and lesbians are illegitimate members of the polity evaluate gay and lesbian political, economic and social behaviors in distinct ways. Compared to people who make neutral or positive evaluations of similar behavior, they are more likely to characterize gay consumption patterns as selfish and lacking public-mindedness; gay political behavior in a zero-sum, militant, and conspiratorial; and gay social behavior as flaunting.

Because survey questions that asked directly about citizenship would require more insight than a person would be likely to possess and have a high potential to be misunderstood, these commonalities are very helpful. A scale based on these survey questions would ask respondents to make easier "top of the head" evaluations and would be easier to understand. Therefore, I will use the rhetoric of the negative evaluations in the next chapter to develop a scale that can measure gay threat.

Chapter 4: Developing the Gay Threat Scale

"It goes beyond the pale of academic debate. It graphically shows lesbian acts."

- Rep. Garry Smith

South Carolina State Legislator

Feb. 20, 2014

At the start of the 2013-2014 school year, two colleges in South Carolina assigned GLBT-related books as community reads, books that the entire campus was encouraged to read. The College of Charleston assigned Alison Bechdel's *Fun Home* (Bechdel 2007); the University of South Carolina Upstate assigned *Outloud: The Best of Rainbow Radio*, which included oral histories of gay men and lesbians who ran radio stations in the Deep South (Madden and Chellew-Hodge 2010). The Palmetto Family Council received a complaint about *Fun Home* and promptly contacted their membership (Palmetto Family Staff 2013). They charged that the book was pornographic and that it was promoting a one-sided view of homosexuality (Knich 2013). State Representative Garry Smith led an investigation into books assigned at state colleges with GLBT themes (Borden 2014). Ultimately, the state legislature cut the budget of the two universities by the amount of the school-wide reading programs' costs. It could be restored only for teaching the "US Constitution and other founding documents, 'including the study of and devotion to American institutions and ideals'" (Thomason 2014).

The epigraph and its controversy demonstrate the juxtaposition that gay threat creates between "citizen" and "lesbian" clearly. Bechdel's memoir, a graphic novel, drew the bulk of the political ire; it chronicles her process of coming out as a lesbian, coping with her father's suicide, and trying to understand her relationship with her father, a deeply closeted gay man. It

makes few explicit references to politics and contains five panels depicting sex over the course of the book. It is first and foremost a story about Bechdel's life and her experiences processing grief and guilt. There do not appear to have been complaints about overt depictions of sex in Borden's history.

Smith and the South Carolina legislature place this story "beyond the pale" of "academic debate" and the polity itself. The ultimate monetary fine by the legislature literally contrasts having students read about gay lives with learning to venerate American founding documents. The South Carolina legislature is presenting "devotion" to founding documents as the ideal form of normative citizenship, thus placing Bechdel's memoir and Gordon's history as illegitimate citizenship. Lesbian identity, according to the logic of the state legislature is the antithesis of good citizenship. Having students read about, and potentially empathize with and grant social esteem towards, illegitimate citizens is threatening enough to trigger this controversy.

The above controversy highlights explicitly the claim that gay men and lesbians are impossible citizens. In the previous chapter, I documented language that I could use to develop accessible survey questions for measuring gay threat. In this chapter, I develop a measure of gay threat for use in survey research, which will allow me to get accurate estimates of the prevalence of gay threat in the population, to assess its relationship to policy preference, and, eventually, to test experimental interventions for minimizing gay threat. The next two empirical chapters are devoted to developing such a scale and testing these effects. In this chapter, I provide an overview, including results, of the pilot data that I used to develop this scale. In the next chapter, I use data from the American National Election Studies' 2013 Internet Recontact Study (2013) to demonstrate that the scale functions on a nationally representative sample and to show its connection to public policy preferences.

I use four iterations of pilot data in this chapter to show the development of the gay threat scale. I developed the content of the scale itself over two years, testing questions the 2009 and Spring 2010 Washington Poll (Parker and Barreto 2010; Barreto 2010). These data proved critical in providing the substantive question wording of the gay threat scale. I was not done after this testing, however. I used a split sample in the 2010 Washington Poll (Barreto 2010) to test the gendered assumptions of the survey questions. Half of the sample received the gay threat scale that only asked about attitudes towards gay men; the other half received the scale that only asked about lesbians. By testing for differences in the values between the responses to the two scales, I was able to see if gay threat was a phenomenon that primarily relates to attitudes about gay men or lesbians, or if it was a phenomenon that affected both. Lastly, I used the anchoring questions of the gay threat scale on the 2011 Multi-State Study of Race and Politics (Parker 2011)[38] to make comparisons between the gay threat scale and other, more established psychological scales such as authoritarianism and moral traditionalism.

The final result of this pilot data is a gay threat scale that has strong content validity, internal consistency, and predictive power for understanding policy preferences related to sexual orientation. This scale is theoretically and statistically distinct from scales that gauge more general psychological traits, such as right-wing authoritarianism, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and moral traditionalism. It is also distinct from other "anti-other" scales, such as racial resentment and modern sexism. It even has an independent effect compared to a basic feeling thermometer for lesbians and gay men. It provides a theoretically

[38] I used the abbreviated version of the scale due to space constraints on the survey instrument.

informed way to understand threat towards gay men and lesbians. For now, I turn my attention to the process of how this scale came to be.

Developing the Scale Questions

I first began developing the gay threat scale during the summer of 2009, and I would pilot the survey questions that would come to form the backbone of the gay threat scale over the course of two surveys over the course of one academic year. The first version, which is found in Table 4.1, was on the 2009 Washington Poll. The second version was on a follow-up poll in May 2010. In this version, I was able to employ a split sample to get two separate versions, A (Table 4.6) and B (Table 4.7), of the scale. In all versions of these scales, I drafted questions which I believed would assess the threatened valuation gay and lesbian political, social and economic behavior. I have marked them throughout this section accordingly.

I also tested questions that would gauge beliefs about the etiology of sexual orientation, in keeping with much of the literature on attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. It was my belief earlier in the project that these evaluations of etiology happened at the same stage as evaluations of threat regarding gay and lesbian political, social, and economic behavior. I ultimately elected to not use these questions on the final version of the gay threat scale for two reasons.

First, I realized that there is a large amount of variation and nuance in how Americans think about the etiology of sexual orientation, despite standard survey questions that ask whether or not sexual orientation is a choice or a lifestyle. I saw this both in the answers to the various questions listed below and in the in-depth interviews. Most respondents said that the one question they would ask both gay men and lesbians if etiquette were not a concern was how they knew that they were gay (Lake Research Partners 2012a; Lake Research Partners 2012b; Lake

Research Partners 2012c; Lake Research Partners 2012d; Lake Research Partners 2012e). They frequently used their own experiences with their sexuality and people that they personally knew when thinking about the causes of sexual orientation. Many did not believe that there was a uniform source of sexual orientation; they identified some people as having relatively fixed sexual orientations and others as having more fluid ones.

Second, these evaluations do not appear to necessarily be tied to whether or not people feel threat. As is the case with economic stereotypes, evaluations of the cause of sexual orientation do not necessarily come with a normative judgment. It is a two-stage process. An individual must first come to believe that an evaluation of the etiology of sexual orientation is true and then must give it a normative valence. For example, many early activists in the Gay Liberation Movement, lesbian feminists, and radical queers today emphasize the chosen nature of identifying as lesbian or gay. They would ascribe a positive meaning to this and would likely have positive evaluations of gay men and lesbians generally.[39] This stands in contrast to members of the Religious Right who make a similar claim about the chosen nature of sexual orientation but evaluate it negatively. Conversely, while there is ample evidence that evaluating sexual orientation as biologically fixed is associated with greater support for the GLBT movement (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008), there has been push back, including from political figures (Baker 2014), who equate sexual orientation with addiction. In this case, as with the case of stereotypes about wealth, it is the normative evaluation that is colored by feelings of gay threat.

[39] This sub-population is too small to have accurate survey data. Additionally, no mainstream surveys to my knowledge have questions that would allow one to identify the radical GLBTQ people.

Table 4.1 presents the first version of the gay threat scale. In it, I had two questions that tested evaluations of gay economic behavior, Money and Neighborhood.[40] One question, Kissing, tested evaluations of gay social behavior, and one, Lifestyle, tested evaluations of the etiology of sexual orientation. Power tests evaluations of gay and lesbian political behavior. Overall, there were 297 responses,[41] and residents of Washington State comprised the sample. Respondents had 6 response options to each question.[42] Respondents could strongly or somewhat agree or disagree. They also had the option to report that they did not know the answer or to refuse to answer the question. Some of the items were reverse coded. In this and in all subsequent analysis, I recode items so that a higher score equals what I hypothesize to be higher levels of gay threat.

[40] For ease of reading, I assign each question a one-word title listed after the question in the relevant tables. Questions that are substantively the same across pilot data will have the same name.

[41] This was the first year that the Washington Poll moved into the Center for Survey Research at the University of Washington, and it was also the first time any of the research team had coded surveys for use within a CATI system. A coding error resulted in the gay threat battery of questions being skipped altogether. Research assistants caught this error and corrected it before the survey ended. The end result of this was a relatively small number of responses.

[42] The response options are the same for all of the Washington Poll data: 2009, May 2010 and 2010.

Table 4.1: Gay Threat Scale Questions v. 1, 2009 Washington Poll
Because gay men have more money than straight men do, their life is easier than the average person [sic]. - Money
Gays and lesbians kissing in public is no different than straight people kissing in public. -Kissing
When lots of gays move into a neighborhood, it helps the area economically. - Neighborhood
Compared to the size of their community, lesbians and gay have too much political power. - Power
Being gay or lesbian is a lifestyle that someone chooses to follow. - Lifestyle

The most striking initial observation is how many respondents answered "don't know" for the economic questions. For example, 32.3% of respondents[43] reported that they could not answer Neighborhood; this percentage jumps to 50% for Money. This stands in marked contrast to the questions about political behavior, social behavior and etiology, whose percentage of "do not know" was 7.9 (Power), 4.6 (Kissing), and 6.4 (Lifestyle).

This variation in "do not know" rates is problematic both theoretically and statistically. There are theoretically many things that an answer of "do not know" could mean. For example, a person could not know if the stereotype is true, or perhaps she had not thought much about it. The difficulty with these evaluations of economic questions is that they require a two-pronged

[43] Percentages in this section are weighted by using statewide estimates of age, gender and region (Eastern Washington, Puget Sound and Other Western Washington.) This is true for all Washington Poll samples.

evaluation; a respondent must first believe economic stereotypes about gay and lesbian wealth and then must ascribe a negative valence to this stereotype. Respondents can also view wealth as a positive thing. This is a similar problem to the earlier issue I identified with questions about the etiology of sexual orientation.

Money attempted to ask respondents about a stereotype and to have them make a normative evaluation of it. Unfortunately, single questions that ask the respondent to make two distinct evaluations are not good in survey design. This question requires a person to agree with two assertions: first, that gay men are wealthier[44] and, second, that their lives are easier as a result. This question requires a respondent to agree to both parts of the question to be able to answer it; it is unclear how a person would answer it if she agreed or disagreed with one part. There is no way to disaggregate which part a person agrees or disagrees with, as is possible in longer interviews. The easier life question was flawed, and I subsequently excluded it from later versions of the gay threat scale.

In other cases, the "do not know" response might very well be a neutral response instead of non-response. For example, a person could theoretically feel fairly neutral about gay men and lesbians having too much political power. Because no neutral option is available, she could choose the "do not know." This means that it would be theoretically baseless to code the "do not know's" as a neutral middle category. For scale development, I therefore drop observations that are either "do not know" or "refused."

[44] Remember, this is a stereotype and is not factually accurate (Badgett, Durso, and Schneebaum 2013; Badgett 2001; Badgett 1998).

This leads to a large drop in the number of observations. The drop in individual observations is listed in Table 2. Combined, there are only 149 in the factor analysis. Because of these issues, I provide the following alpha scores, factor loading and correlation matrix with this caveat: these data should be read in the spirit of seeing what is working in the scale, what is not, and how I should adapt the gay threat scale moving forward. This following evidence shows how the scales work internally, but they should not be used or interpreted as representative of any population.

Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 provide the statistical analysis of the Washington Poll 2009 iteration of the scale. The theoretical concerns about the Money question are borne out statistically. It is negatively correlated with all other items (Table 4.3), affecting both the alpha score of the scale (Table 4.4) and the factor loadings (Table 4.5). It not only performs in an inverse direction. Removing it from the scale improves its overall performance (Table 4.4).

In contrast to the poor performance of Money, the questions that ask for an evaluation of social and political behavior, Kissing and Power, perform remarkably well. Removing each from the scale causes it move from performing moderately well with an alpha score of .71 to performing relatively poorly, with alphas of .59 and .61, respectively. The factor loadings are also quite high. This merits retaining these items, while making small changes to the "Kissing" question to make it a normative rather than an empirical evaluation.

Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics, WA Poll 2009			
	Mean	Standard Error	Observations
Money	3.64	0.65	236
Kissing	2.4	1.17	273
Neighborhood	2.72	0.96	187
Power	1.95	1.02	268
Lifestyle	2.27	1.23	268
NB: Don't Know and Refused Observations are removed; means and standard errors weighted by state region, gender and age			

Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix, WA Poll 2009					
	Power	Kiss	Lifestyle	Money	Neighborhood
Power	1				
Kiss	0.53	1			
Lifestyle	0.46	0.48	1		
Money	-.30	-.17	-.25	1	
Neighborhood	0.26	0.46	0.26	-.07	1

Table 4.4: Alpha Scores, WA Poll 2009			
Question	N	Sign	Alpha
Power	268	+	0.61
Kiss	273	+	0.59
Lifestyle	268	+	0.65
Money	236	-	0.73
Neighborhood	187	+	0.69
Total			0.71

Table 4.5: Factor Loadings, WA Poll 09	
	Factor Loading
Power	0.67
Kiss	0.73
Lifestyle	0.61
Money	-0.30
Neighborhood	0.47

I continued to develop the questions that would comprise the gay threat scale in the May 2010 Washington Poll. I retained the two questions which anchored the Washington Poll 2009 scale, one which asked for an evaluation of gay political behavior, Power, and one which asked for an evaluation of gay social behavior, Kissing. I changed the wording of Kissing so that it says "should be no different" instead of "is not different." This way, the question explicitly asks the respondent to provide a normative rather than empirical evaluation.

In the May 2010 poll, I had space for six questions. I took full advantage of having this much room on the survey by employing a split sample, which allowed me to test more questions. On both versions (Tables 4.6 and 4.7), I kept the anchoring variables, which gauged evaluations of social (Kissing) and political (Power) behaviors. One each version, I explored questions to gauge either evaluations of economic behavior (Table 4.6- Neighborhood2 and Money2) or political behavior (Table 4.7 – Aid and Speech). Although I ultimately rejected evaluations of the etiology of sexual orientation, I also explored various questions to test different evaluations of etiology (Lifestyle, Alcoholism and Teen).

I changed the wording of both Money2 and Neighborhood2 to attempt to overcome the faults of the original question wording. I had initially thought that the wording of

Neighborhood2 was to test attitudes about gentrification. I felt that this was unclear in the first version of the question, "When lots of gays move into a neighborhood, it helps the area economically" (Table 4.1). Thus, I changed the question to "economically depressed neighborhood" (Table 4.6) to make it clearer that I was talking about gentrification. I attempted to rectify the problem of asking two questions with Money2 by just asking if people believed the stereotype about gay and lesbian wealth (Table 4.6). In both cases, I added lesbians to the question so that all questions referred to the same groups.

Table 4.6: Gay Threat Scale Questions v.2, May 2010 Split Sample A
Compared to the size of their group, lesbians and gays have too much political power.- Power
Lesbian and gay couples kissing in public should be no different than straight couples kissing in public. - Kissing
When lots of gays and lesbians move into an economically depressed neighborhood, they make the neighborhood better. –Neighborhood2
Being gay or lesbian is a lifestyle someone chooses to follow. - Lifestyle
Gay men and lesbians, that is homosexuals, generally have more money than straight people. –Money2
Being gay is like alcoholism; people don't choose it, but they shouldn't give into it. - Alcoholism

This version of the scale actually performed worse than the 2009 version. Overall, there were 864 respondents. As with the last survey, the sample was drawn from residents of Washington State, and all respondents had the opportunity to either say that they did not know

the answer to a question or to refuse to answer it. There was no neutral category, as was the case with the previous sample. Many people responded that they did not know to the questions about economic behavior, causing me to lose many observations (Table 4.7). 38.3%[45] did not know an answer for Neighborhood2; 30% did not know for Money2. In contrast, the numbers were 7.1% for Kissing, 12% for Power, 10% for Lifestyle and 11.2% for Alcoholism. Between 1-2% of respondents refused to answer each question, in keeping with previous numbers from the previous iteration of scale. Forced choice questions can have value, especially when the questions are asking for sensitive information that might cause a respondent to demure due to social desirability. However, the downside is losing observations, and I am concerned about losing even 10% because people potentially feel neutrally about the issue.

Tables 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 provide more evidence of how this iteration of the scale underperformed. Money2, which had asked about belief in a stereotype that does not have a clear normative evaluation, performed especially poorly. It is inversely correlated with the question about economic behavior and correlated with Kissing and Lifestyle at less than 5% (Table 4.8). While it overall is correlated in the same direction with the other items (Table 4.9), the internal consistency of the scale improves by removing it. Its factor loading of .125 is very low (Table 4.10). Overall, it does not appear to be a strong component of gay threat. Neighborhood2 does not fare much better. Its correlations with other items are below .27 (Table 4.8), and the scale's internal consistency is not impacted by removing it (Table 4.9). Overall, the total alpha score of the scale is lower at .697 for this scale (Table 4.9) than it was for the first iteration of the scale, .714 (Table 4.4).

[45] Weighted average

Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics, WA Poll May 2010, Sample A			
	Mean	Standard Error	Observations
Power	2.02	1.10	754
Kissing	2.02	1.15	784
Neighborhood2	2.60	1.05	510
Lifestyle	2.36	1.27	767
Money2	1.77	0.92	580
Alcoholism	1.53	0.92	740
NB: Don't Know and Refused Observations are removed; means and standard errors weighted by state region, gender and age			

Table 4.8: Correlation Matrix, WA Poll May 2010, Sample A						
	Power	Kiss	Neighborhood	Lifestyle	Money	Alcoholism
Power	1					
Kissing	0.43	1				
Neighborhood2	0.19	0.27	1			
Lifestyle	0.38	0.35	0.23	1		
Money2	0.23	0.02	-.21	0.03	1	
Alcoholism	0.38	0.32	0.12	0.40	0.11	1

Table 4.9: Alpha Scores, WA Poll May 2010, Sample A			
Question	Observations	Sign	Alpha
Power	754	+	0.59
Kissing	784	+	0.62
Neighborhood2	510	+	0.70
Lifestyle	767	+	0.63
Money2	580	+	0.73
Alcoholism	740	+	0.64
Total			0.697

Table 4.10: Factor Loadings, WA Poll May 2010, Sample A	
Question	Factor Loading
Power	0.64
Kissing	0.59
Neighborhood2	0.33
Lifestyle	0.59
Money2	0.13
Alcoholism	0.55

The second half of the split sample, version B, performed much better than the original version did. I believe that this reflects that stereotyped evaluations of political behavior are necessarily negative, unlike the previous economic stereotypes. Because these questions contain both a stereotype and a negative evaluation, the questions perform better, and, therefore, so do

the scale metrics. Ultimately, 5 of these 6 questions (Power, Kissing, Aid, Speech and Coming Out) appear on the final version of the gay threat scale.

I experimented with three new sets of questions on Version B. The first were questions about gay and lesbian political behaviors, Aid and Speech. In designing both of these questions, I made use of common rhetoric that opponents of gay rights have used to voice their opposition. In particular, I wanted to use the zero-sum evaluations voiced by Chapter 3's interviewees and evangelical authors that rights protections for sexual minorities will force religiously conservative people to violate their beliefs, limiting their freedom of religion (Osten and Sears 2003). Speech specifically uses this scenario, a tradeoff between religious people and gay men and lesbians. Aid makes this more general, in reference claims that government organizations could not respond to discrimination cases against racial minorities if they also had to investigate instances of discrimination against gay men and lesbians.

Both are related to gay threat. Speech is related because it presents the increased political and legal incorporation of gay and lesbian people as a direct threat to the rights of religious people. Aid is related because, like Speech, it implies a zero-sum relationship, this time in relation to government protections and resources. These stand alongside Power, which captures the conspiratorial evaluation of gay and lesbian political behavior; agreement with the question means that respondents believe that gay men and lesbians are overrepresented in the political process.

The second area for which I wrote an additional question was social behavior. The repeat question, Kissing, asked respondents to evaluate the social behavior of individual gay and lesbians couples who kiss in public. This question evokes individual instances of public displays of affection. I wrote another question to evaluate social behavior that took a broader perspective.

Coming Out asks for a normative evaluation about how coming out as lesbian or gay affects society overall. It is also parallel to Power; Power asked respondents to evaluate the relationship between gay men and lesbians generally and politics. Coming Out does the same for society. Similarly, Kissing asks about more specific public displays of affection like Speech and Aid ask about more narrow policy areas.

The third area piloted a final question was about the etiology of sexual orientation, Teen. This was a way to get more detailed information about whether or not people believed sexual orientation to be basically fixed and identifiable by the time one was a teenager. In retrospect, there is no theoretical reason to attach this particular question to gay threat, and it does not perform well within the scale.

Table 4.11: Gay Threat Scale Questions v.2, May 2010 Split Sample B
Compared to the size of their group, lesbians and gay men have too much political power. - Power
Lesbian and gay couples kissing in public should be no different than straight couples kissing in public. -Kissing
Giving additional government protections to gay men and lesbians will take away resources from other groups who need help. -Aid
Expanding lesbian and gay rights will limit religious people's freedom of speech. -Speech
Gays and lesbians coming out, that is, telling people about their homosexuality, makes society better overall. –Coming Out
People generally know if they are gay or lesbian, that is, homosexual, when they are adolescents. -Teen

Overall, this scale performed better than the first iteration of the scale in 2009 and compared to the Version A of the split sample. It was able to capture gay threat by assessing people's evaluations of gay political and social behavior. Even the addition of Teen, which is not very theoretically connected to the scale, does not hurt its overall performance. The strong

performance of this scale resulted in this becoming the backbone of the final gay threat scale. In this particular sample, there are 822 total respondents, and descriptive statistics with "do not know" and refused responses removed are found in Table 4.12 Compared to the Version A, there are fewer questions that elicit high percentages of "do not know." Teen is the only question that produced a "do not know" rate of over 25% at 28.1%. Coming Out comes in next at 13.9%. The rest, Speech (5.8%), Aid (8.2), Power (9.5%) and Kissing (5.9%) are all under 10%. Less than 1% of respondents refused to provide an answer for every question but Power, which had a 1% refusal rate.

The scale performs well along all dimensions of the exploratory factor analysis. The correlations between all of the variables except Teen are strong, between .385 (Kissing and Speech) and .596 (Aid and Power) (Table 4.13). The alpha score for the entire scale is .799 but improves to .815 by removing Teen (Table 4.14). With the exception of Teen, all of the factors load at .582 or above on the first factor (Table 4.15). So far, this appears to be the strongest version of the gay threat scale.

Table 4.12: Descriptive Statistics, WA Poll Ma 2010, Sample B

	Mean	Standard Error	Observations
Power	2.04	1.09	734
Kissing	1.98	1.13	760
Aid	2.06	1.09	748
Speech	1.65	0.99	767
Coming Out	2.26	1.12	707
Teen	2.33	1.09	582

NB: Don't Know and Refused Observations are removed; means and standard errors weighted by state region, gender and age

Table 4.13: Correlation Matrix, WA Poll May 2010, Sample B						
	Power	Kissing	Aid	Speech	Coming Out	Teen
Power	1					
Kissing	0.53	1				
Aid	0.60	0.45	1			
Speech	0.47	0.39	0.42	1		
Coming Out	0.53	0.58	0.50	0.43	1	
Teen	0.15	0.22	0.20	0.15	0.22	1

Table 4.14 Alpha Scores, WA Poll May 2010, Sample B			
Question	Observations	Sign	Alpha
Power	734	+	0.75
Kissing	760	+	0.76
Aid	748	+	0.75
Speech	767	+	0.78
Coming Out	707	+	0.75
Teen	582	+	0.82
Total			0.799

Table 4.15: Factor Loadings, WA Poll May 2010, Sample B	
Question	Factor Loading
Power	0.75
Kissing	0.69
Aid	0.60
Speech	0.58
Coming Out	0.72
Teen	0.27

Testing the Gendered Dimensions of Gay Threat

By the time I had finished the May 2010 Washington Poll, I had a fair idea of which questions worked well and which did not. Questions that asked for a threatened response to gay and lesbian political and social behavior worked well, and questions that asked the same thing with regards to economic behavior did not appear to work well. In this next round of piloting, I wanted to give an economic question one last chance and to test another assumption of the gay threat scale: that behavior on the part of gay men and lesbians was equally likely to provoke feelings of gay threat.

I had been less careful initially about being sure that each question referenced both gay men and lesbians. For example, both Money and Neighborhood in the Washington Poll 2009 only referenced gay men. That early in the project, I initially was exploring stereotypes that might hold for only gay men or only lesbians. However, by later iterations I had developed the theory enough to say that backlash and threat against the increased visibility of sexual minorities likely includes both gay men and lesbians.

There is evidence to support this pairing. The GLBT movement has consciously included reference to lesbians since the late 1970s (Mecca 2009), and news and media representations of GLBT politics frequently feature both gay men and lesbians (Becker 2006). In the set of interviews, respondents who were exemplars of gay threat described both gay men and lesbians as economically selfish, politically conspiratorial, and socially disrespectable. While some respondents associated the image of gay wealth with urban gay men, there were mentions of wealthy lesbians, too.

However, there is also evidence that, while connected, Americans do not view lesbians and gay men as identical. For example, double standards exist about gay and lesbian sexuality and public displays of affection. The set of interviews displayed further differences. Respondents generally had an easier time describing stereotypes for gay men compared to lesbians (Lake Research Partners 2013). While it was very common to describe gay men and lesbians as gender non-conforming, the content of this non-conformity was obviously different; respondents universally reported gay men as stereotypically effeminate and some lesbians as butch. Some described gay men as friendly and caring, while others described lesbians as angry.

Given the competing evidence about the appropriateness of pairing gay men and lesbians, it seemed prudent to use a split sample to test for gender differences between the scale questions invoking only gay men and only lesbians in turn. This constituted the next version of the gay threat scale. If Americans evaluate the rhetoric of gay threat if they are primed to think about gay men versus lesbians, then there should be no difference in the means for each question. Ultimately, there should be no difference in the scale means, either. I present these results in Table 4.23, after reviewing the content of this scale (Table 4.16), the descriptive statistics for

each (Tables 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19), and compare the correlation matrices (Tables 4.20 and 4.21), alpha scores (Tables 4.22 and 4.23), and factor loadings (Table 4.24).

I kept the five questions that worked well from Version B of the May 2010 Washington Poll, Power, Kissing, Aid, Speech and Coming Out. I also tried Money2 one last time.[46] I did this because I had not seen if the questions that asked for evaluations of economic behavior would scale well with the political questions, Speech and Aid, that had worked so well in the May 2010 data. Overall, there were 461 respondents who received Version A, which was the battery that asked about gay men, and there were 393 who received Version B, which asked about lesbians.

There are very similar numbers of non-response between Versions A and B of the scale (Table 4.19). All but Coming Out are within 3 percentage points of each other; Coming Out is larger at 8, with more people not being able to answer the question about gay men. There are wide variations in "do not know" across the question items. These percentages range from 7.4 percent (rounded) for Kissing in both versions to 40 and 43% for Versions A and B, respectively, for Money2. Both versions of the Power question stand out with their high "do not know" rate of 22.6 and 23.7. In early versions of this question, "do not know" ranged between 7.9% (Washington Poll 2009) to 12% (May Washington Poll 2010, Version A). Perhaps this large jump is because of the longstanding political association between gay men and lesbians. Invoked singularly, respondents might not think about politics, the GLBT movement and the place of gay men and lesbians in the polity that trigger gay threat and make answering the question easier.

[46] Like Gretchen Wieners and fetch (Waters 2004), I kept trying to make Money2 happen.

Table 4.16: Gay Scale v. 3, Split by Gender, November 2010
Compared to the size of their group, lesbians/gay men have too much political power. - Power
Lesbian/gay couples kissing in public should be no different than straight couples kissing in public. -Kissing
Giving additional governmental protections to lesbians/gay men will take away resources from other groups who need help. - Aid
Expanding rights for lesbians/gay men will limit the freedom of speech of people who oppose their lifestyles. -Speech
Lesbians/gay men coming out, that is, telling people about their homosexuality, makes society better overall. – Come Out
Lesbians/ gay men, that is, female/male homosexuals, generally have more money than straight, that is, heterosexual women/men. –Money2

Table 4.17: Descriptive Statistics, WA Poll 2010, Gay Men

	Mean	Standard Error	Observations
Power	1.74	0.95	370
Kissing	2.08	1.15	418
Aid	1.94	1.05	404
Speech	1.80	1.09	399
Coming Out	2.24	1.08	347
Money2	1.98	1.08	265

NB: Don't Know and Refused Observations are removed; means and standard errors weighted by state region, gender and age

Table 4.18: Descriptive Statistics, WA Poll 2010, Lesbians			
	Mean	Standard Error	Observations
Power	1.80	1.06	292
Kissing	1.93	1.14	350
Aid	2.03	1.14	333
Speech	1.82	1.07	329
Coming Out	2.37	1.16	311
Money2	1.51	0.86	211
NB: Don't Know and Refused Observations are removed; means and standard errors weighted by state region, gender and age			

Table 4.19: Weighted Non-Response, WA Poll 2010, Gay Men and Lesbians		
Question	Gay Men	Lesbians
Power	21.56	23.66
Kissing	7.43	7.39
Aid	11.93	11.67
Speech	12.17	13.05
Coming Out	24.89	16.43
Money2	40.25	43.07

Overall, Versions A and B of the scale perform in very similar ways. The correlation matrices are similar for both Version A (Table 4.19) and Version B (Table 4.20). The range for Version A is between .04 (Speech and Money2) and .66 (Money2 and Kissing). For Version B, it is between .09 (Money2 and Coming Out) and .66 (Aid and Power). The scales both perform well; Version A has an alpha score of .80 (Table 4.22), and Version B has an alpha score of .83 (Table 4.23). In both cases, removing Money2 actually improves the scale. All of the items load

in the expected direction on the gay threat factor (Table 4.24), though Money2 has a very low factor loading in both versions. Taken together, this means that Money2 does not perform well within the gay threat scale and should not be included in the final version.

Table 4.20: Correlation Matrix, WA Poll 2010, Gay Men

	Power	Kissing	Aid	Speech	Coming Out	Money
Power	1					
Kissing	0.46	1				
Aid	0.41	0.39	1			
Speech	0.38	0.18	0.17	1		
Coming Out	0.57	0.42	0.47	0.2	1	
Money	0.54	0.66	0.47	0.04	0.58	1

Table 4.21: Correlation Matrix, WA Poll 2010, Lesbians

	Power	Kissing	Aid	Speech	Coming Out	Money
Power	1					
Kissing	0.50	1				
Aid	0.66	0.57	1			
Speech	0.49	0.51	0.68	1		
Coming Out	0.41	0.33	0.33	0.22	1	
Money	0.44	0.11	0.22	0.23	0.09	1

Table 4.22: Alpha Scores, WA Poll 2010, Gay Men			
Question	Observations	Sign	Alpha
Power	370	+	0.77
Kissing	418	+	0.77
Aid	404	+	0.77
Speech	399	+	0.75
Coming Out	347	+	0.75
Money2	265	+	0.82
Total			0.804

Table 4.23: Alpha Scores, WA Poll 2010, Lesbians			
Question	Observations	Sign	Alpha
Power	292	+	0.79
Kissing	350	+	0.79
Aid	333	+	0.80
Speech	329	+	0.81
Coming Out	311	+	0.80
Money2	211	+	0.84
Total			0.831

Table 4.24: Factor Loadings, WA Poll 2010, Gay Men and Lesbians		
Question	First Factor Loading, Gay Men	First Factor Loading, Lesbians
Power	0.73	0.76
Kissing	0.69	0.76
Aid	0.58	0.80
Speech	0.71	0.69
Coming Out	0.79	0.56
Money2	0.29	0.32

After testing the internal consistency of these scales and determining that Money2 should not be included, I conducted a series of t-tests on the means of each gay threat scale item (Table 4.25) and the combined additive scale. Of the 6 items, only two had a statistically significant t-test score: Kissing and Money2, which I have excluded, from the final version of the scale. In each case, the mean response for these items is lower, therefore, less threatened, for Version B (lesbians) than Version A (gay men), which is in line with responses in the in-depth interviews. For the rest of the items, I cannot reject the null hypothesis. This is also true for the scale itself. I created an additive scale out of the items that ranged from 6 to 24. There is a 79.4% probability that, if the null hypothesis were true, it would generate a t-value at least as big as the t-value generate from the t-test. The 95% confidence interval of the difference in means is -.85 to 1.11.

Table 4.25: Probability of getting a T Value >=T-Test Value if Null Hypothesis Were True –Using Sample Means of Gay Threat Scale Questions, Using Either Gay Men or Lesbians Only in Question Wording			
Question	Probability	Lower 95% CI of Difference	Upper 95% CI of Difference
Power	0.75	-0.12	0.17
Kissing	0.01	-0.37	-0.05
Aid	0.43	-0.09	0.22
Speech	0.68	-0.19	0.12
Coming Out	0.25	-0.07	0.27
Money	0.001	-0.47	-0.12

Taken together, this section provides strong evidence for keeping all scale items as "gay men and lesbians." There is no statistical difference between the means of 4 out of 5 of the individual scale items and none between versions of the scale itself. The earlier versions of the scale also outperform the divided version in another way: there are fewer "do not knows" when primed to think about Power in terms or "gay men and lesbians" compared to either one individually. Thus, I keep the scale combined.

Comparing Gay Threat to Other Scales

I had one final opportunity to collect pilot data before I applied to have my items on the ANES 2013 Internet Recontact Survey. This was on the 2011 Multi-State Study of Race and Politics. There were two main advantages to this particular survey. First, in contrast to all of the earlier pilot data, which sampled residents of Washington State, it was a national sample, stratified by state. Second, the broader survey instrument contained many other psychometric scales, which could prove useful for distinguishing the gay threat scale from other items.

Because of space constrictions, I was unable to field a full version of the scale. Instead, I included two of the questions that had been mainstays of previous versions of the scale: Power2 and Coming Out2.

There are major differences between these question wording in this survey compared to previous surveys (Table 4.26). Coming Out2 asked respondents to make a dichotomous evaluation of the benefit of coming out. However, two key phrases are missing "coming out" and "homosexuals." I left out "homosexuals" because it is a common term and because it comes with its own framing effects (Rios 2013). It also does not include the politically loaded (and therefore potentially subject to social desirability bias) phrase "coming out." The major difference between Power2 and Power is that it includes a middle category, potentially alleviating the previous problem and not having a neutral category. It is also a three point instead of a five or seven point Likert-type scale.

Overall, the sample was collected by taking probability sample stratified by 12 states, Pennsylvania, Michigan, South Carolina, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Colorado, Missouri, Georgia, Ohio, Arizona, Nevada and Florida. There were 1,512 respondents. As has been the case throughout this chapter, when recoding the variables, I have deleted respondents who either did not know or refused to answer a particular question. I did this both for the questions that anchored the gay threat scale (Table 4.26) and the questions that formed the batteries of other potentially related psychometric scales, authoritarianism, racial resentment, moral traditionalism, and social dominance orientation (Table 4.28). The descriptive statistics are found in Tables 4.27 and 4.29, respectively.

Table 4.26: Anchoring Questions on 2011 Multi-State Study of Race and Politics, January 2011
Is society better when it encourages gay men and lesbians to be open and talk about their sexual orientation publically or when it encourages them to keep their sexual orientation to themselves? – Coming Out2
As a group, do lesbians and gay men have too much political power, not enough political power or just about the right amount of political power? – Power2

Table 4.27: Descriptive Statistics, Anchoring Variables, MSSRP 2011

	Mean	Standard Error	Observations
Power2	0.48	0.35	1263
Come Out2	0.56	0.50	1293

NB: Don't Know and Refused Observations are removed; means and standard errors weighted by state region, gender and age

Table 4.28: Full Question Wording of Psycho-Social Scale Question Batteries
Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same. --Racial Resentment 1
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. -- Racial Resentment 2
Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. -- Racial Resentment 3
It's really just a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. -- Racial Resentment 4
This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties. -- Moral Traditionalism 1
The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society. -- Moral Traditionalism 2
If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. -- Social Dominance Orientation 1
Inferior groups should stay in their place. -- Social Dominance Orientation 2
Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. -- Social Dominance Orientation 3
We should do all that we can to equalize conditions for different groups. -- Social Dominance Orientation 4
Group equality should be our ideal. -- Social Dominance Orientation 5
We should increase social equality. -- Social Dominance Orientation 6
Which do you think is most important for a child to have: independence or respect for elders? -- Authoritarianism 1
Which do you think is most important for a child to have, curiosity or good manners? -- Authoritarianism 2
Which do you think is most important for a child to have, obedience or self-reliance? -- Authoritarianism 3
Which do you think is most important for a child to have, being considerate or being well behaved? -- Authoritarianism 4

Table 4.29: Descriptive Statistics, Other Psycho-Social Battery Items, 2011 MSSRP			
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Observations
Racial Resentment 1	0.67	0.38	1401
Racial Resentment 2	0.55	0.42	1450
Racial Resentment 3	0.62	0.38	1389
Racial Resentment 4	0.52	0.40	1405
Moral Traditionalism 1	0.63	0.39	1433
Moral Traditionalism 2	0.78	0.34	1469
Social Dominance Orientation 1	0.30	0.37	1413
Social Dominance Orientation 2	0.27	0.35	1389
Social Dominance Orientation 3	0.31	0.38	1419
Social Dominance Orientation 4	0.35	0.37	1463
Social Dominance Orientation 5	0.33	0.35	1403
Social Dominance Orientation 6	0.32	0.36	1444
Authoritarianism 1	0.70	0.40	1496
Authoritarianism 2	0.63	0.43	1504
Authoritarianism 3	0.47	0.45	1491
Authoritarianism 4	0.44	0.43	1489

As with the other pilot data, I ran a correlation matrix, an alpha test and exploratory factor analysis on all of the items. The correlations for Power2 and Coming Out2 are found in Table 4.30. It should be noted that the highest correlation in these two columns is the one between Power2 and Coming Out2. The rest are at or below .4. The alpha score was quite high for all of the items at .814. However, it is a mathematical property of alpha scores that longer

scales will have higher scores (Bartholomew 2008). This "scale," with 18 items, is three times as long as any of the previous gay threat scales. Typically in psychological experiments with scales this long, alpha scores have to be at or above .9 to be acceptable (Kim 1978). Likewise, the factor analysis does not reveal that these items form a cohesive scale. Whereas all iterations of the gay threat scale loaded onto one factor,[47] there are 3 if one factors all of these items together. What's more, there does not appear to be a sensible way to interpret the factor loadings of the second and third factor. The first factor is all positive, which is typical of multi-factor scales, but the rest do not have a theoretically driven interpretation. However, running factor analysis for each scale and the anchoring items of the gay threat scale reveals that there is a factor in each that can clearly be interpreted as a gay threat versus other scale factor (Tables 4.31, 4.32, 4.33, and 4.34). Taken together, this provides evidence that the gay threat scale is not synonymous with other already-identified "anti-other" scales, a hypothesis that I will test further in the next empirical chapter.

[47] I determined this by retaining factors that have an eigenvalue greater than or equal to 1 (Kim 1978).

Table 4.30: Partial Table of Correlation Matrix: Gay Threat Anchoring Items and Other Psycho-Social Battery Items		
	Power2	Coming Out2
Power2	1	
Coming Out 2	0.47	1
Racial Resentment 1	0.23	0.30
Racial Resentment 2	0.15	0.13
Racial Resentment 3	0.15	0.13
Racial Resentment 4	0.26	0.26
Moral Traditionalism 1	0.39	0.40
Moral Traditionalism 2	0.40	0.32
Social Dominance Orientation 1	0.18	0.16
Social Dominance Orientation 2	0.19	0.14
Social Dominance Orientation 3	0.18	0.18
Social Dominance Orientation 4	0.23	0.20
Social Dominance Orientation 5	0.20	0.15
Social Dominance Orientation 6	0.24	0.20
Authoritarianism 1	0.19	0.21
Authoritarianism 2	0.14	0.19
Authoritarianism 3	0.25	0.23
Authoritarianism 4	0.17	0.19

Table 4.31: Factor Loadings, Racial Resentment and Gay Threat, 2011 MSSRP		
Question	First Factor	Second Factor
Power2	0.45	0.40
Coming Out2	0.45	0.41
Racial Resentment 1	0.67	-0.10
Racial Resentment 2	0.53	-0.30
Racial Resentment 3	0.53	-0.39
Racial Resentment 4	0.60	0.04

Table 4.32: Authoritarianism and Gay Threat, 2011 MSSRP		
Question	First Factor	Second Factor
Power2	0.51	0.36
Coming Out2	0.52	0.35
Authoritarianism 1	0.51	-0.16
Authoritarianism 2	0.54	-0.23
Authoritarianism 3	0.58	-0.14
Authoritarianism 4	0.47	-0.16

Table 4.33: Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Gay Threat, 2011 MSSRP			
Question	First Factor	Second Factor	Third Factor
Power2	0.47	0.09	0.41
Coming Out2	0.42	0.08	0.43
SDO1	0.58	-0.55	-0.09
SDO2	0.58	-0.46	-0.11
SDO3	0.59	-0.48	-0.08
SDO4	0.501	0.54	-0.12
SDO5	0.50	0.42	-0.15
SDO6	0.55	0.53	-0.14

Table 4.34: Moral Traditionalism and Gay Threat, 2011 MSSRP		
Question	First Factor	Second Factor
Power2	0.64	0.09
Coming Out2	0.60	0.12
Moral Traditionalism 1	0.64	-0.09
Moral Traditionalism 2	0.62	-0.11

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of how I developed the gay threat scale, via testing 6 versions over the course of 4 pilot surveys. I have explained my rationale for exploring and reasons for selecting questions that would gauge Americans' evaluations of gay economic, political and social behavior through the lens of gay threat. I then used exploratory factor analysis and descriptive statistics to reveal the relative strengths and weaknesses of each question. This led me to modify and out-right reject many questions, particularly those related to evaluations of economic behavior. This is because evaluations of economic threat require a two-stage evaluation- belief in stereotypes of economic wealth and then a belief that these stereotypes represent a violation of norms – that is not compatible with a single survey question.

After developing the scale, I used piloted data to test two other things. First, I tested whether or not responses to individually priming gay men versus lesbians provoked different enough responses to make it inappropriate to scale the items together. The responses were quite similar, and there was even improvement on one of the items. Therefore, it was appropriate to word the items as "gay men and lesbians." Second, I tested two anchoring questions against

other psycho-social scales to see if I was actually measuring an already documented phenomenon. There is a distinct factor for these items, and their correlations are low. Therefore, the gay threat scale appears to be distinct.

Moving forward, I test the final scale using a national sample drawn from the American National Election Survey's 2013 Internet Recontact Survey. This version is the culmination of the piloting work presented in this chapter. I find that the final version works the best of all previous versions, and it has a unique impact on attitudes towards gay and lesbian-related policy even after controlling for standard psycho-social scales.

Chapter 5: Testing the Final Version of the Gay Threat Scale

"Sad day for our nation; founding fathers would be ashamed of our gen. to abandon wisdom of the ages re: cornerstone of strong societies."

- Dan Cathy, CEO of Chick-Fil-A upon hearing *US v. Windsor* and *Schwarzenegger v. Perry*

June 27, 2013

Introduction

When the United States Supreme Court handed down two decisions that overturned California's Proposition 8 and the Defense of Marriage Act, Chick-Fil-A CEO Dan Cathy tweeted his dismay (CBS Atlanta/AP 2014). As with the other examples featured in the epigraphs, Cathy contrasted good citizenship, in the form of the founders, with bad citizenship, in the form of Supreme Court justices who would rule to overturn two marriage bans. Over the course of the past four chapters, I have developed a theory of gay threat to make sense of this contrast. Gay threat, triggered by a combination of pre-existing negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men and the belief that they cannot legitimately be members of the polity, is evident in how threatened individuals characterize everyday behaviors of lesbian and gay life, including political, economic and social behavior. In the first empirical chapter, I utilized discourse analysis to document that, when given the chance to discuss their attitudes about lesbians and gay men in depth, some Americans make use of the logic of gay threat in making group evaluation. After providing support for the process of gay threat and the content validity of threatened evaluations of gay social, political and economic behavior, I turned my attention to developing a gay threat scale.

The second empirical chapter provided an overview of the development of this scale, as I analyzed pilot data from four separate surveys. This process resulted in finalizing the questions that would comprise the final gay threat scale and provided suggestive evidence for two things:

that the gay threat scale was distinct from related anti-other psycho-social scales and that it would work in a national sample. This pilot data could not answer all possible questions, however. The only national sample had only two items; the full scale had only gone on survey items of Washington State, a state that ultimately led the nation in voting on expanding GLB rights ("History of Referendum Measures" 2014; Martel 2012). Given that residents of Washington State are more liberal on GLBT issues, would the distribution of scale items differ with a national sample? Would the items still scale together with this different population? Lastly, Chapter 4 did not test the impact of gay threat on policy preferences, which would demonstrate that feelings of gay threat have concrete effects on broader public policy.

This final empirical chapter attempts to answer these questions, using data drawn from the American National Election Studies' 2013 Internet Recontact Study. This national sample, drawn using best practices in Political Science, allows me to both examine the performance of the final version of the gay threat scale and to test its association with policy preferences. These goals divide the chapter into two sections. In the first, I test the coherence of the gay threat scale (Table 5.1; H1), using the methods of exploratory factor analysis that I employed in the last chapter. In the second section, I test two hypotheses about the impact of the gay threat scale on support for policies related to gay men and lesbians (H2) and other groups (H3). Both parts allow me to test hypotheses 4 and 5, which assert that gay threat forms a distinct attitude from general psycho-social traits such as social dominance orientation (H4) and negative attitudes towards specific out-groups such as racial resentment (H5).

Table 5.1: Hypotheses Tested in Chapter 5
H1: The items of the gay threat scale should form a single scale.
H2: Gay threat should be associated with policy preferences towards gay men and lesbians. Higher gay threat scores should be inversely associated with support for including lesbians and gay men in the polity.
H3: Gay threat should not be associated with other policy preferences, particularly those that would include other minority groups in the polity.
H4: Gay threat forms an "anti-other" attitudes that is distinct from general psycho-social traits related to out-groups and social hierarchy.
H5: Gay threat forms an "anti-other" attitude that is distinct from attitudes towards other distinct out-groups.

This analysis has five parts in total: a description of the survey instrument, descriptive statistics for the scale items, scale development, modeling the scale and modeling policy preferences. Sections 2 through 4 provide evidence for H1, while Section 5 tests the rest of the hypotheses. In Section 2, I present the exact question wording of the final gay threat scale, noting the wording differences and discussing subsequent changes in interpretation, along with weighted population estimates for each. I then develop the scale itself in Section 3, using descriptive methods, specifically Cronbach's alpha scores, factor loadings and eigenvalues. In section 4, I model scale results, using regression analysis.

I use regression analysis to model support for 6 different policy areas to test the remaining hypotheses. Two, same-sex marriage and adoption by same-sex couples, relate to gay and lesbian issues, while four, affirmative action, immigration, military intervention in Iran and abortion, do not. A statistically significant coefficient for gay threat in the first two models would provide support to H2; it would add more evidence for H4 and H5 because these models control for general psycho-social traits related to out-groups and attitudes towards specific out-

groups. A lack of a statistically significant parameter for gay threat in the models for the last four policies would provide support for H3. In addition to providing the parameter estimates, I use predictive probabilities to give substantive interpretation to the coefficients and adjust p values of the gay threat parameters to account for multiple testing error.

Part I: Survey Instrument and Methodology

The 2013 Internet Recontact Survey exists due to the rise of cell-phone-only households and the secular decline in response rates in surveys. ANES researchers commissioned it as a follow-up survey to the 2012 Time Series survey as a means of furthering experimenting with online data collection methods. As a result, all respondents in the 2013 Internet Recontact Survey have answered the 2012 Time Series interviews online (ANES 2013, 1).

Because of the connection to the 2012 Time Series, it is important to understand the sample structure and protocol of the latter survey. As with all of the Time Series surveys, the sampling universe was US citizens who are 18 or older on the 2012 election day (ANES 2014, 21). GfK (formerly Knowledge Networks) managed the sample, employing Random Digit Dialing and Address Based Sampling. If a respondent did not have internet access, researchers provided a device and Internet access (ANES 2014, 22). All online respondents belonged to Knowledge Networks' panel and had already completed a demographic profile questionnaire, increasing the amount of demographic information available (ANES 2014, 24). The response rate for the 2012 ANES Time Series Study was 2%. This number takes into account attrition from initial contact by GfK to be in the survey respondent panel (ANES 2014, 31). While this number is low, it represents best practice for online sampling in the discipline of Political Science.

The 2013 Internet Recontact survey had 1,563 completes with 1,635 cases on file, and it was in the field from July 4 to July 15, 2013. The response rate is "about 2 percent or less," and the data set included weights. The median interview length was 21 minutes (ANES 2013, 2).

Part II: Gay Threat Items

The final scale items are listed in Table 5.2. After each question, I have inserted the shortened name I use for reference. Power, Speech and Others all gauge evaluations of gay and lesbian political behavior; Coming Out and Kissing gauge evaluations of lesbian and gay social behavior. Tables 5.3 through 5.7 present the weighted estimates of each response option, along with their standard errors and 95% confidence intervals. Figure 8 presents this information graphically. Table 5.8 provides another form of descriptive statistics, the sample mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for each variable as a whole.

Table 5.2: Full Wording of All Gay Threat Scale Items

1. Do gays and lesbians have too much political power, too little political power, or the right amount of political power? (Power)
    a. A great deal too much
    b. Somewhat too much
    c. A little too much
    d. The right amount
    e. A little too little
    f. Somewhat too little
    g. A great deal too little
2. When gays and lesbians "come out" – that is, when they tell people about their homosexuality, does this make society better, does it make society worse, or not make any difference for society? (Coming Out)
    a. Better
    b. Worse
    c. No difference
3. If gay and lesbian couples kiss in public, is this better, worse, or no different than straight (heterosexual) couples kissing in public? (Kissing)
    a. Better
    b. Worse
    c. No difference
4. How would expanding the rights of gays and lesbians affect religious people's freedom of speech? Would it increase, decrease, or have no effect on religious people's freedom of speech? (Speech)
    a. Increase a lot
    b. Increase a moderate amount
    c. Increase a little
    d. Have no effect
    e. Decrease a little
    f. Decrease a moderate amount
    g. Decrease a lot
5. How would government protections for lesbians and gays affect other groups who need help? Would it be good, bad, or neither good nor bad for other groups? (Others)
    a. Extremely good
    b. Moderately good
    c. A little good
    d. Neither good nor bad
    e. A little bad
    f. Moderately bad
    g. Extremely bad

Table 5.3: Power	Estimate	Standard Error	Lower CI	Upper CI
A Great Deal Too Little	5.25	0.89	3.50	6.99
Somewhat too Little	7.59	0.98	5.67	9.51
A Little Too Little	12.39	1.15	10.13	14.64
The Right Amount	36.24	1.73	32.85	39.63
A Little Too Much	12.18	1.11	10.01	14.36
Somewhat Too Much	10.77	1.08	8.65	12.89
A Great Deal Too Much	13.58	1.13	11.37	15.80
No Answer	2.00	0.51	1.00	3.00

Table 5.4: Coming Out	Estimate	Standard Error	Lower CI	Upper CI
Better	18.75	1.40	16.01	21.50
No Difference	56.48	1.76	53.03	59.93
Worse	23.32	1.47	20.44	26.20
No Answer	1.45	0.49	0.49	2.41

Table 5.5: Kissing	Estimate	Standard Error	Lower CI	Upper CI
Better	2.83	0.65	1.56	4.11
No Different	54.69	1.76	51.24	58.14
Worse	40.90	1.73	37.51	44.29
No Answer	1.58	0.44	0.71	2.44

Table 5.6: Speech	Estimate	Standard Error	Lower CI	Upper CI
Increase a Lot	3.56	0.70	2.19	4.93
Increase a Moderate Amount	4.01	0.75	2.54	5.48
Increase a Little	5.58	0.81	4.00	7.17
Have No Effect	62.35	1.72	58.98	65.72
Decrease a Little	5.81	0.75	4.34	7.28
Decrease a Moderate Amount	6.05	0.88	4.33	7.78
Decrease a Lot	10.42	0.88	8.70	12.15
No Answer	2.21	0.56	1.12	3.31

Table 5.7: Others	Estimate	Standard Error	Lower CI	Upper CI
Extremely Good	5.06	0.84	3.41	6.70
Moderately Good	8.11	1.04	6.07	10.15
A Little Good	6.70	0.87	4.99	8.40
Neither Good nor Bad	52.17	1.78	48.69	55.66
A Little Bad	10.62	1.06	8.54	12.69
Moderately Bad	7.79	0.94	5.95	9.63
Extremely Bad	7.86	0.94	6.02	9.71
No Answer	1.69	0.47	0.77	2.61

Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics, Gay Threat Scale Items					
Variables	N	Mean	Standard Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Power	1537	0.617	0.232	0.143	1
Come Out	1547	0.682	0.217	0.333	1
Kissing	1539	0.796	0.181	0.333	1
Speech	1536	0.608	0.189	0.143	1
Others	1538	0.588	0.202	0.143	1

Figure 8: Est. of the Population Response to Gay Threat Scale Items



Looking at Tables 5.3-5.8 and Figure 8, it is clear that there a large amount of variation within and between the variables. The variation within variables is useful because it demonstrates that each question is measuring a contestable evaluation of gay behavior. The variation between variables, evident in Table 5.8, is useful because it can help to tease out different levels of threat. Some questions, such as Speech, reveal that many people, 62.4%, feel neutral about a zero-sum rights competition between religious people and gay men and lesbians. Only 36% take a neutral position when asked about Power.

There are similar differences between positive and negative responses. Kissing provided the most negative response with 40.9%. Power followed with 36.6%.[48] Others, Coming Out and Speech all had similar rates of negative responses, at 26.3%, 23.3% and 22.3%, respectively. There's also variation on the positive end; Power was had the highest rate of positive responses with 25.3%, and Others and Coming Out were close at 19.9% and18.8%, respectively. 13.2 gave a positive answer for Speech, and only 2.8% said that gay and lesbian couples kissing in public was better than straight couples kissing in public. Taken together, this reveals that the American public is split with regards to its evaluations of gay and lesbian politics, with a slightly higher percentage feeling threatened about the incorporation of gay men and lesbians into the polity than feeling neutral or welcoming it. There is a split on the value of coming out, and the public as a whole feels most threatened by public displays of affection (Kissing).

There are three major differences between this final iteration of the gay threat scale and other versions: different questions have a different number of responses, all questions now have a neutral response category, and they no longer ask respondents to evaluate whether or not they agree or disagree with a statement. The questions vary between having 3 and 7 responses; Kissing and Coming out are in the former camp, and Power, Speech and Others are in the latter. Ideally, I would have liked all questions to have a standard 7 point response option for easier comparability, but I standardized response options, circumventing this issue. The lack of a neutral response option was a major concern in earlier iterations of the scale, as I could not disaggregate who felt neutrally about an item and who could not answer it (Chapter 4). Adding a

[48] This comes from adding together all 3 negative response categories.

neutral option did decrease the number of non-responses, from around 7.9-12%, to around 2% or less in this iteration of the scale (Tables 5.3-5.8).

Third, the scale no longer asks individuals to evaluate a particular statement and say whether or not they agree or disagree. For example, the previous Power item asked: "Compared to the size of their group, gay men and lesbians have too much political power." The responses ranged from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Strong agreement would be consistent with a high level of gay threat. There could be two reasons for strong disagreement, belief that gay men and lesbians had enough political power or belief that they had too little. While drafting the scale, I found this to be acceptable because I was thinking about threat as a dichotomous category. However, the interviews in Chapter 3 revealed that there are people who make positive, neutral and threatened evaluations of gay and lesbian political and social behavior. This new question wording captures this; with a low score reflecting someone who actively embraces GL people in the polity, a mid-range score being someone who is neutral or tolerant, and a high score being someone who feels gay threat.

Part III: Scale Development

The gay threat scale holds together well, confirming Hypothesis 1. I prepared the items for analysis by recoding the variables to be sure that the maximum value corresponded to the maximum gay threat score. (Both Coming Out and Kissing had originally assigned the highest value to the neutral question.) I then divided the response by the number of responses to standardize the responses. Thus, I divided Power by 7, Kissing by 3, etc.

I conducted 4 analyses to confirm that the gay threat scale holds together using this data set. First, I examined the Cronbach's alpha for the entire scale and the scales with one item removed to see that there was internal consistency within the scale. Second, I examined

eigenvalues for each factor to see that the scale was properly describing one factor rather than 2 or 3. Third, I calculated and examined the factor loadings for each item in the scale. Alongside the eigenvalue, factor loadings help to confirm that one factor describes the latent trait, gay threat. Lastly, I compared the alpha score of my scale to the alpha scores for other standard attitudinal scales. As the alpha score is a metric for how effective a scale is, this demonstrates that my scale performs just as well as other scales used in Political Science.

Table 5.9 presents Cronbach's alpha for all of the items together and for all of the items minus the one listed on the row. The scale as a whole performs quite well. Generally speaking, alpha scores over .6 are acceptable and over .7 are good (Kim 1978). The 5 items together have a Cronbach's alpha of .815, which is quite high.[49] By removing an item from the scale and recalculating Cronbach's alpha, one can examine how well an item fits into the scale (Kim 1978; Bartholomew 2008). Unlike earlier versions of the scale, there are no items whose removal improves the alpha score; all of the scale items contribute to its overall performance. The largest reduction of performance comes from removing Power, reducing the alpha to .753. This indicates that it is an anchoring variable and is consistent with earlier versions of the scale. The alpha drops moderately by removing Coming Out, Kissing and Others. There is only a minor reduction in performance by removing Speech.

Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show the results of conducting exploratory factor analysis, generating both eigenvalues and factor loadings, for the scale items. These provide evidence that the scale questions are measuring one latent variable, gay threat. Table 5.10 lists the eigenvalues

[49] It is also the second-highest alpha score of any version of the scale; the Washington Poll 2010 Split Sample for lesbians was slightly higher at .831.

of each factor. There are several ways to think about how eigenvalues relate to the number of factors to retain. The first is to retain all eigenvalues over 1 (1978; Bartholomew 2008). The second is to examine the eigenvalues visually via a scree plot; one looks for a large, distinct drop in the eigenvalues, or an elbow, and only keeps eigenvalues to the left of the elbow (Kim 1978; Bartholomew 2008). As Table 5.10 demonstrates, both metrics would suggest keeping one factor. Only the first eigenvalue is above 1, and there is a significant drop after the first one, such that graphing it would provide a clear visual elbow.

Table 5.11 continues the analysis by displaying the first and second factors' loadings for each of the scale items. The factor loadings further solidify my argument that retaining one factor is appropriate for measuring gay threat. First, all of the first factor loadings are in the hypothesized direction. Second, all of the factor loadings are relatively high, Power at .756 and Speech, the lowest, at .541. The items on the second factor do not have such a clear interpretation; they load in different directions that are not predicted or anticipated by my theory. There is no substantive reason why Kissing and Coming Out would load in one direction while the others load in the other, adding another piece of evidence in favor of the gay threat scale measuring one latent variable.

I have demonstrated that my scale has a high internal consistency and provided evidence that it is it measuring a single latent variable, gay threat. I wanted to demonstrate the performance of the gay threat scale relative to other psycho-social scales that are common in Political Science, so I calculated Cronbach's alpha several relevant and related scales: authoritarianism, right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, racial resentment, modern sexism and moral traditionalism (Table 5.12). The gay threat scale performs favorably, with the second highest alpha, after only racial resentment.

Table 5.9: Cronbach's Alpha for Scale				
Item	N	Item Rest Correlation	Average Inter-Item Correlation	Alpha
Power	1561	0.69	0.02	0.753
Coming Out	1570	0.62	0.02	0.761
Kissing	1561	0.59	0.02	0.786
Speech	1558	0.49	0.02	0.8112
Others	1560	0.61	0.02	0.778
Total			0.02	0.815

Table 5.10: Eigenvalues	
Factor 1	2.30
Factor 2	0.12
Factor 3	-0.11
Factor 4	-0.12
Factor 5	- 0.19

Table 5.11: Factor Loadings			
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Power	0.76	0.007	0.43
Coming Out	0.75	-0.14	0.42
Kissing	0.66	-0.18	0.53
Speech	0.54	0.21	0.66
Others	0.67	0.15	0.53

Table 5.12: Comparison of Gay threat Alpha Score to Other Alpha Scores	
Gay threat	0.815
Social Dominance Orientation	0.626
Authoritarianism	0.657
Right Wing Authoritarianism	0.723
Moral Traditionalism	0.734
Racial Resentment	0.850
Modern Sexism	0.734

Part IV: Modeling

Section III confirmed Hypothesis 1. The gay threat scale does hang together cohesively. In this next section, I turn my attention to the remaining hypotheses. Hypothesis 2 states that gay threat should associated with policy preferences towards gay men and lesbians. Hypothesis 3 specifies, however, that gay threat should not be associated with other policy preferences, even those that would include other minority groups in the polity. Hypotheses 4 and 5 state that gay threat is distinct from measures of general attitudes towards hierarchy and out-groups (H4) and specific out-groups (H5) I test these hypotheses in Part IVB. Before I model the impact of gay threat, I examine the final scale itself and model the variables that are associated with higher levels of gay threat in Part IVA

Part IVA: The Gay Threat Scale

I created the gay threat scale by adding together a subject's responses to each of the 5 questions, normalized to the extreme high value. Respondents who did not answer one of the questions were dropped from the analysis, and I have not imputed any data in this project. Because my concern for the remainder of this chapter is testing associations between gay threat and other variables, I am not showing weighted data or confidence intervals around the individual gay threat scores. I present the following summary of the gay threat variable and its distribution for subsequent use in modeling. I am not attempting to make a population estimate, and the numbers should not be interpreted as such.

Figure 9 shows that the most common response is in the middle of the gay threat score. It also show the distribution of the entire scale, which is obscured in Table 5.13. The people who score in the middle do not feel strong levels of gay threat; one could describe them as neutral or tolerant towards the inclusion of gay men and lesbians in the polity. For example, someone who scores near the middle, or around 3, would have said that lesbians and gay men have about the right amount of political power. They would also affirm that gay couples kissing in public was no different than straight couples kissing in public and that expanding gay rights would not have an impact of the government's ability to help other groups or affect religious people's freedom of speech.

There are also fewer people with low scores; theoretically, these would be the people who actively favor the expansion of gay men and lesbians' roles in the polity. These are the people who believe that same-sex couples kissing is better than straight couples kissing, who think that lesbians and gay men have too little political power and that society will be better overall with more people coming out and the government providing more protections for

lesbians and gay men. The long left tail in Figure 9 demonstrates that these people exist in the sample but that they are not as numerous as those who feel neutral or experience feelings of gay threat.

There is a relatively large cohort of respondents who feel gay threat, giving them high scores. In contrast to the narrow left tail of people who welcome the changes in the status of lesbians and gay men, there are a relatively large number of people who have higher levels of gay threat. These are the people who are behaving in a way that is consistent with gay threat. They evaluate gay political behavior in a zero-sum manner, saying that expanded protections hurt other groups and religious people. They argue that gay men and lesbians have too much power relative to the size of their group. The say that people coming out is bad for society and that gay and lesbian couples kissing are worse than straight couples.

Table 5.13: Gay Threat Summary

	Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max	N
Gay threat	3.23	0.77	1.10	5	1543

Figure 9: Fig 2: Distribution of Gay Threat Score



Next, I model the socio-economic, demographic and psychological traits that are associated with high levels of gay threat. Because there are 73 potential scores, I used ordinary least squares for the model. Before I present the results of these models, I describe how I selected and coded the dependent variables. Overall, I divide my variables into 2 categories: the socio-economic and demographic variables that are present in all models and the psychological traits that are available in the fully specified models. Table 5.14 provides descriptive statistics for each of these variables.

I included many standard socio-economic and demographic variables, including age, ideology, party identification, urbanity, region, educational attainment, sex, race and ethnicity. I coded age in years, ranging from 18 to 92. Knowledge Networks provided 14 response options for educational attainment; I kept them all so that I could preserve variation. I compiled a 7 point ideology scale, with 7 being the most conservative, using questions from the 2013 survey. I dropped respondents who refused to answer or could not place themselves on the ideological spectrum. I did the same with party identification, with 7 being a strong Republican identifier. I dropped those who identified with a third party because the ANES does not release specific party affiliation for third party members. Because third parties vary in their platforms and relative ideologies, I could not sensibly assign respondents a value for the party identification variable.

Many of the other variables were standard dummy variables. I coded sex with 1 as female. I coded non-metro as 1 for those who do not live in a Census-defined metropolitan area. I used the 4 region category with the Northeast as the reference category. There are dummy variables for the South, Midwest and West. I capture marital status as 1 for those who are married or widowed. I include widowed in this category because a marriage ending in death, which is typically not the fault of either party, is categorically different than a marriage that ends in divorce or separation. Information about race and ethnicity was included in the same question, rather than having one question about Hispanic identity and one about racial identity. As a work-around, I included dummy variables for non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics. This means that my reference category includes non-white, non-Hispanic people. The two response categories that I combined are non-Hispanic African Americans and non-Hispanic "People of Other Races."

There are 3 demographic variables that are frequently presented as key explanatory factors in explaining support for gay and lesbian rights, belonging to a conservative or traditional religion (Campbell and Monson 2008; Finlay and Walther 2003), sexuality orientation (Egan and Sherrill 2009; Egan 2012) and contact with lesbians and gay men (Barth and Perry 2007; Barth, Overby, and Huffmon 2009; Becker and Scheufele 2011). I used a dummy variable with 1 coded as an identification as a born-again Christian, to control for conservative religiosity.[50] The last two variables specifically relate to sexual orientation. It is likely that those who identify as lesbian or gay are probably have different views about same-sex marriage and adoption, relative to those who identify as heterosexual. I coded sexual orientation as 1 for people who identified as homosexual, gay, lesbian or bisexual and 0 if they identified as straight or heterosexual.

Coding contact with lesbians or gay men required a judgment call. There were 2 questions to draw from to control for contact with lesbians and gay men. The first was found on the 2013 survey and has been the contact measure that has appeared on the Washington Poll for years. It asks respondents, "How many people do you know personally who are gay or lesbian?" Respondents were then able to select a number from 0 to 99,999. The other, on the 2012 Time Series survey, asked respondents, "Among your immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, coworkers or close friends, are any of them gay, lesbian or bisexual, as far as you know?" I opted for using the latter because it gave the respondent specific examples of

[50] Many types of religious belief fall into the category of being traditional or conservative. However, because of privacy concerns, the most detailed information about religious preferences are Catholic, Protestant and Non-Christian. Both orthodox and more liberal adherents are found in each of these categories. Therefore, using these as dummy categories is not useful. Instead, I used a separate existing variable for those who identify as a born-again Christian.

relationships to consider, potentially prompting a closer and more meaningful relationships. I was additionally concerned with using the other question because I suspect that people are not good at gauging the size of their social network generally and because larger answers could be capturing extroversion, sociability or simply having larger social network. Additional analysis revealed that some individuals had put what appear to be nonsensical answers like 10,000. For these reasons, I opted for the 2012's version of contact.

The last set of variables I included were psychological scales of traits that are related to gay threat. These are racial resentment, modern sexism, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, right wing authoritarianism and moral traditionalism. In the previous chapter, I created a correlation matrix for all of the items that comprise these batteries[51] and the gay threat scale items; I also showed that the gay threat items all load on a distinct factor from the other psychological scale items. This demonstrated that the gay threat scale is capturing something distinct from a more general "anti-other" attitude. Adjusting models for these traits will further provide evidence that the gay threat scale is documenting a unique psychological trait. While not a psychological trait, I also adjust for a feeling thermometer score for lesbians and gay men, as I specified that negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men are a critical component of developing feelings of gay threat. Thus, I include psychological traits and socio-economic trait when modeling gay threat, Models 1 and 2.

[51] Excluding modern sexism, which was not on the 2011 MSSRP

Table 5.14: Summary Statistics Dependent Variables					
Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Observations
Gay threat	3.32	0.77	1.095	5	1543
Born Again Christian	0.31	0.46	0	1	1635
Age	54.15	15.96	18	92	1635
Educational Attainment	10.583	1.88	1	14	1635
Ideology	4.24	1.46	1	7	1625
Lives in a Non-Metro Area	0.14	0.35	0	1	1635
Southern	0.36	0.48	0	1	1635
Midwestern	0.25	0.43	0	1	1635
Western	0.22	0.42	0	1	1635
Female	0.48	0.50	0	1	1635
Gay Contact	0.43	0.50	0	1	1635
Party Identification	3.76	2.17	1	7	1507
Gay	0.04	0.19	0	1	1635
Married/Widowed	0.63	0.48	0	1	1635
White	0.72	0.45	0	1	1635
Hispanic	0.01	0.23	0	1	1635
Racial Resentment	2.77	0.81	0.8	4	1574
Social Dominance	2.07	0.64	0.8	4	1574
Right Wing Authoritarianism	2.79	0.82	1	5	1543
Modern Sexism	2.76	0.66	0.89	5	1567
Authoritarianism	2.19	1.33	0	4	1591
Moral Traditionalism	2.66	0.76	0.8	4	1574
Feeling Thermometer-Lesbians and Gay Men	.55	.27	0	1	1557

I modeled gay threat using ordinary least squares, adjusting for first the socio-economic and demographic and then psychological traits. In contrast with the next section, I do not have a specific variable of interest in for these models. The literature is well developed on which traits are associated with negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (Herek 1988; Herek 1984; Herek and Glunt 1993; Herek and Capitanio 1996; Brewer 2003; Heaven and Oxman 1999;

Finlay and Walther 2003; Barth, Overby, and Huffmon 2009). I have no reason to believe that there will be large deviations from this in my model.

Table 5.15 presents the results of modeling gay threat. There are not major deviations from the previous literature. Even after adjusting for psychological traits, born again status, ideology, age and region are all statistically significant. Additionally, as the contact literature has demonstrated, knowing a lesbian or gay person reduces negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men.

Table 5.15: Modeling Gay Threat		
	Model 1: Socio-Economic and Demographic Variables	**Model 2: Full Model**
Born Again Status	0.332*** *0.037*	.131*** *.029*
Age	0.004*** *0.001*	.002* *.001*
Educational Attainment	-0.019* *0.009*	.007 *.007*
Ideology	0.182*** *0.015*	.040*** *.012*
Lives in Non-Metro Area	0.166*** *0.047*	.071† *.036*
Southern	0.089† *0.046*	.083** *.035*
Midwestern	0.088† *0.049*	.100** *.038*
Western	0.133** *0.051*	.129*** *.039*
Female	-0.098** *0.032*	.001 *.026*
Gay Contact	-0.237*** *0.033*	-.046† *.026*
Party Identification	0.051*** *0.010*	-.003 *.008*
Gay	-0.330*** *0.089*	-.046 *.069*
Married/Widowed	0.026 *0.035*	.008 *.027*
White	-0.064 *0.047*	-.095** *.039*
Hispanic	0.048 *0.065*	-.106* *.052*
Feeling Thermometer- Lesbians and Gay Men		-1.061*** *.054*
Racial Resentment		.015 *.021*
Social Dominance		.025 *.021*
Right Wing Authoritarianism		.103*** *.022*
Modern Sexism		.120*** *.023*
Authoritarianism		.010 *.011*
Moral Traditionalism		.300*** *.024*
Constant	2.331*** 0.130	2.016*** .136
Adjusted R^2	0.4	.668

Part IVB: Modeling the Impact of Gay Threat

The final of part of my analysis focusing on modelling the impact of gay threat on support for public policy. I first test the association between gay threat and 2 policies related to gay rights: support for same sex marriage and adoption. These test Hypothesis 2. The full models for these dependent variables also test Hypotheses 4 and 5. I then model the association between gay threat and 4 difference policy areas that might trigger out-group threat and threat about norms: abortion, affirmative action, immigration and military intervention in Iran. These test Hypothesis 3. The full wording of all the dependent variables is found in Table 16.

Overall, I ran 12 additional models in this section. The first 4 use policy related to gay men and lesbians, attitudes towards same-sex marriage and adoption, as the dependent variable. Two of the models only adjust for relevant socio-economic and demographic variables. These include being a born-again Christian, age, educational attainment, ideology, living in a non-metro area, region, sex, party identification, marital status, knowing a lesbian or gay person, sexual orientation, race and ethnicity. The other two models were more fully specified and additionally adjusted for other psychological scales, specifically racial resentment, modern sexism, social dominance orientation, moral traditionalism, authoritarianism and right-wing authoritarianism and a feeling thermometer for lesbians and gay men.

The last 8 models used other policy areas as dependent variables. As was the case with the gay and lesbian related policy, I first present the models that only adjust for socio-economic and demographic variables. I then present the more fully specified models that include other relevant psychological scales and the feeling thermometer. All of the socio-economic models have the same dependent variables, and all of the fully specified models have the same

dependent variables. Because I am interested in the significance of the parameter estimate for gay threat to answer these four hypotheses and because I estimate many parameters over the course of this chapter, I provide Bonferroni adjustments to correct for multiple testing error in Table 5.21.

Because of differences in the construction of the dependent variables, I have to run several kinds models, ordinary least squares, logit and ordered logit. This allows me to maintain the original variation found in the questions.[52] Table 5.16 presents an overview of the number of responses, the question wording and, subsequently, the models used for each variable. The question for same-sex marriage had 3 response options, leading me to use an ordered logistic regression. The adoption question was dichotomous, resulting in a logistic regression. Affirmative action and abortion as a woman's choice had 7 and 9 part Likert responses, so I ran ordinary least squares regression. Immigration gave respondents 4 options, and bombing nuclear sites in Iran had 3 options, so I used ordered logistic regression. Descriptive statistics about the variables are found in Table 5.17.

I now turn my attention to the selection of the dependent variables. There were many options to choose from in selecting dependent variables related to lesbian and gay rights. Both the 2012 ANES Time Series and the 2013 Internet Recontact Study had a question about support for same-sex marriage that uses the same wording, and I ultimately opted to use the one from the 2012 survey. The 2012 question was battery of general policy questions and, logically, it would

[52] Two caveats of this variety of models are that 1) the reader should be careful comparing the parameter estimates across models and 2) the substantive interpretation of these models is not the same. My main concerns with models 5-12 are statistical significance and the direction of the effect of the gay threat parameter, not necessarily comparing the magnitude of the effect.

be impossible for the gay threat scale to have influenced respondents' answers. This is in contrast to the 2013 study, which asked the policy question immediately after the gay threat survey. It would be difficult to disentangle the priming effect of the survey instrument from more long standing policy preferences. The only downside is that there was a year between the 2012 and 2013 study. It is entirely possible that a respondent's attitudes about same sex marriage and, potentially, gay threat, changed during that time. However, I ultimately chose to use the 2012 question because of the lack of a framing effect and because it presents a harder case than the 2013 question. If there is a statistically significant association between the 2012 dependent variable and the 2013 gay threat scale, then it is more likely that there is an enduring association between the two.

The 2012 survey instrument allowed me to test the association between other policy related to lesbian and gay rights. This is in contrast to all of my pilot studies, which only asked about legal recognition of same-sex relationships. There were 3 additional questions on the survey instrument. Two questions, one that asked about the repeal of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" military ban on openly gay military service members and one that asked about job discrimination, had a split sample. Half asked the question about "lesbians and gay men," while half asked about "homosexuals." Because of this split sample, I did not include them in my analysis. The third question asked about adoption by gay couples. Because it lacked a split sample, I used it as a dependent variable to supplement the other model. This will help build the case that the gay threat scale works for more than questions about marriage equality.

I likewise had many policy questions to choose from when selecting dependent variables to test Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 states that, while high levels of gay threat will be associated with opposition to gay and lesbian-friendly policies, they will not be related to policies that effect

other out-groups. This is because, while the categorizing people in terms of in-groups and out-groups is a part of the human condition (Kinder and Kam 2009b), the precise nature of those groups will vary based on personal experience and social position. I have argued that gay threat arises because of a combination of pre-existing negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men and a belief that they are unable to be legitimate members of the polity and/or would threaten it if they were to be more included. While general "anti-other" dispositions such as modern sexism and right-wing authoritarianism can form the basis of these beliefs (Table 5.15), it is unlikely that gay threat itself would have an independent impact on policies related to other groups.

I wanted to select policies that had the potential to trigger feelings of threat or out-group hostility towards groups other than lesbians and gay men. It is conceivable that most policies could become connected with out-groups, given that politics concerns "who gets what, when and how" (Lasswell 1936) and given that policies such as welfare can become linked to out-groups by framing even if the policy does not only benefit out-groups (Hancock 2004). However, not every policy is immediately linked to a clear out group, and some question wordings explicitly mentioned out-groups. I did not select questions about the environment, healthcare or tax policy for these reasons. I selected policy items that explicitly relate to other racial, ethnic and religious groups or to challenging gender norms. The question about affirmative action explicitly invokes African Americans as the beneficiaries and because affirmative action, especially when it invokes race and African Americans, has challenged norms of color-blindness in the American political community, raising the potential for symbolic racism and racial resentment (Sears 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Steeh and Krysan 1996). There is another question about undocumented immigrants. Immigration in general can raise a sense of threat for both social status (Citrin et al. 1990) and economic position (Citrin et al. 1997). Undocumented

immigration has especially triggered a threatened response both in public opinion and policy (Alvarez and Butterfield 2000; Hood and Morris 1998; Tolbert and Hero 1996; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Hopkins 2010).

While I wanted questions about policies that are explicitly associated with various kinds of out-group threat, I wanted to select a wide variety of groups beyond major racial and ethnic minorities in the United States today. Thus, I also chose a question about support for bombing nuclear sites in Iran. The Iranian state is "other" for many reasons. It is an Islamic Republic, and many Americans view Muslims and Islam unfavorably in the United States (Dana, Barreto, and Oskooii 2011 pg. 506-507; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009) and have negative impressions of Iran and the Iranian government (Beeman 2005). I selected the question of bombing nuclear development sites because it was the most aggressive option that did not commit the United States to another ground war.

Lastly, I selected a question about whether or not the respondent believed that women should be able to have an abortion if they wanted one. While gender is distinct from race and ethnicity, women's citizenship historically had been circumscribed by tradition, law and religion (Smith 1997; Kerber 1998); this has included limitations to bodily autonomy (Hasday 2000; Reagan 1997). Feminist challenges to these limitations, including the push to legalize abortion, thus challenge traditional gender roles and hierarchies. Thus, public opinion on abortion is related to a variety of factors, many of which are related to attitudes towards lesbians and gay men (Conover and Gray 1983; Weisberg 2005; Conover 1988; Combs and Welch 1982).

Now that I have discussed my rationale for selecting the dependent variables, I explain how I coded them. For each question, I dropped any respondents who refused to answer. The number of respondents is listed in the descriptive statistics of Table 5.17, and the number of

respondents who refused can be calculated by subtracting that value from 1635. I also hypothesized which policy response would be most likely to be positively associated with high levels of gay threat. This way, interpretation of the parameter estimate's direction would be uniform across models. The policy preferences with the highest values were: no legal recognition for same-sex couples, no adoption by same-sex couples, strongly oppose affirmative action, make unauthorized immigrants felons, support bombing Iran, and strongly oppose abortion as a woman's choice.

Table 5.16: Dependent Variable Description

Question	Stem Wording	Number of Responses	Response Wording	Model Used	Survey	Question Label
Same Sex Marriage	Looking at page [preload: prepg Z] of the booklet. Which comes closest to your view? You can just tell me the number of your choice.	3	Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry, Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to form civil unions but not to get legally married, There should be no legal recognition of gay or lesbian couple's relationship	Ordered Logistic	2012 ANES Time Series	gayrt_marry
Adoption	Do you think gay or lesbian couples should be permitted to adopt children?	2	Yes, No	Logistic	2012 ANES Time Series	gayrt_adopt
Affirmative Action	Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose allowing universities to increase the number of black students studying at their schools by considering race along with other factors when choosing students? (Follow up questions about degree.)	7	Favor a great deal, Favor moderately, Favor a little, Neither favor nor oppose, Oppose a little, Oppose moderately, Oppose a great deal	OLS	2012 ANES Time Series	aa_uni_x
Immigration	Please look at page [preload: prepg v] of the booklet. Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be towards unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States? You can just tell me the number of your choice.	4	Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country, Have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain, Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States… certain requirements, Allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the United States...without penalties	Ordered Logistic	2012 ANES Time Series	immig_policy
Bombing Nuclear Sites	To try and prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, would you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose, the United States bombing Iran's nuclear development sites?	3	Favor, Oppose, Neither Favor Nor Oppose	Ordered Logistic	2012 ANES Time Series	iran_nuksite
Abortion	Next, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose abortion being legal if a woman chooses to have one? (Follow up question about degree.)	9	Favor a great deal, Favor moderately, Favor a little, Lean toward favoring, Do not lean either way, Lean toward opposing, Oppose a little, Oppose moderately, Oppose a great deal	OLS	2012 ANES Time Series	abort_choice_x

Table 5.17: Summary Statistics Dependent Variables					
Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Observations
Same Sex Marriage	1.87	0.79	1	3	1627
Same Sex Adoption	0.38	0.48	0	1	1610
Affirmative Action	4.99	1.75	1	7	1635
Immigration Policy	2.51	0.89	1	4	1627
Bomb Nuclear Facilities in Iran	1.96	0.82	1	3	1564
Abortion as a Woman's Choice	5.19	3.29	1	9	1562

Results

Table 5.18 presents the results from Models 3-6. This provides strong support for Hypothesis 2. There are positive and statistically significant associations between high levels of gay threat and opposing recognizing same-sex couples' relationships (Models 3 and 4) and adoption by same-sex couples (Models 5 and 6). This effect hold across policies even when controlling for relevant other types of "anti-other" personality traits (Models 4 and 6). Figure 10 illustrates this effect by demonstrating the predicted probabilities of opposing adoption by same-sex couples. The effect of higher levels of gay threat is visible across the ideological spectrum, those who do and do not identify as born-again Christians, and those who have different levels of moral traditionalism. Overall, the gay threat scale is capturing a unique and enduring part of attitudes towards lesbians and gay men, something that cannot be accounted for based on religiosity, personal contact or general out-group hostility alone. This confirms Hypotheses 4 and 5 that gay threat has a distinct effect apart from other psychological scales

Table 5.18: GL Policy				
	Model 3: Marriage SES Controls	**Model 4: Marriage Full**	**Model 5: Adoption SES Controls**	**Model 6: Adoption Full**
Gay threat	2.168*** *0.122*	1.448*** *.153*	1.903** 0.139	.915*** *.181*
Born Again Status	0.912*** *0.139*	.795*** *.150*	0.768*** *0.162*	.714*** *.181*
Age	0.008† *0.004*	.006 *.004*	0.005 *0.005*	.006 *.006*
Educational Attainment	-0.017 *0.033*	.032 *.037*	-0.066 *0.041*	-.039 *.047*
Ideology	0.296*** *0.06*	.185** *.066*	0.307*** *0.073*	.264** *.083*
Lives in Non-Metro Area	0.134 *0.176*	.057 *.189*	-0.01 0.21	-.051 *.236*
Southern	0.460** *0.174*	.495** *.183*	0.2 *0.214*	.356 *.234*
Midwestern	-0.025 *0.185*	.101 *.198*	-0.186 *0.23*	-.095 *.254*
Western	0.224 *0.194*	.305 *.205*	0.1 *0.24*	.158 *.265*
Female	0.071 *0.121*	.029 *.134*	-0.231 *0.149*	-.156 *.171*
Gay Contact	-0.600*** *0.123*	-.521*** *.131*	-0.438*** *0.152*	-.330† *.170*
Party Identification	0.123† *0.038*	.052 *.042*	0.028 *0.047*	-.093† *.054*
Gay	-1.005* *0.476*	-.567 *.540*	-1.917* *0.832*	-1.658† *.917*
Married/Widowed	-0.065 *0.132*	-.087 *.140*	-0.215 *0.162*	-.334† *.178*
White	-0.363* *0.175*	-.354† *.205*	-0.171 *0.218*	-.615* *.264*
Hispanic	-0.045 *0.252*	-.025 *.278*	0.05 *0.3*	-.458 *.349*
Feeling Thermometer-Lesbian and Gay		-2.093*** *.330*		-2.76*** .408
Racial Resentment		-.179 *.110*		-.031 *.140*
Social Dominance		.097 *.131*		.435** *.168*
Right Wing Authoritarianism		.343** *.113*		.436** *.146*
Modern Sexism		-.084 *.120*		.288† *.154*
Authoritarianism		.659 *.136*		-.061 *.069*
Moral Traditionalism		.659*** *.136*		.716*** *.176*
Cut Point 1	8.028 *0.607*	6.631 *.812*		
Cut Point 2	10.947 *0.65*	9.784 *.848*		
Constant			-7.875*** 0.733	-7.202*** *.1031*
Pseudo R^2	0.352	.391	0.364	.432

Figure 10: Predicted Prob. for Opposing Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples



Tables 5.19 and 5.20 show the results for the testing of Hypothesis 3, which held that gay threat would not be associated with "anti-other" policy preferences not related to lesbians and gay men. I find this to be the case. Before I fully specify the models (Table 5.19), gay threat is highly associated with each of the 4 policy outcomes. Remember, however, that this is the only psychological trait in the model, and that some of these psychological traits are a component of developing gay threat. It appears to be the case that, in these models, gay threat is serving as a proxy for this "anti-other" traits.

There is strong support for Hypothesis 3 once the reader focuses on Table 5.20. This presents the fully specified models, which control for more theoretically relevant psychological traits like racial resentment, authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. In all but one case, that of affirmative action, gay threat is no longer statistically associated with the policy outcome. Because I have run so many models and estimated so many model parameters, I have provided Bonferroni adjusted p values in Table 5.21 (2001). This provides stronger evidence for both Hypotheses 2 and 3; the p value remains significant for the Models 4 and 6, which are fully specified and about gay and lesbian-related policy, but become insignificant for Model 11, where affirmative action was the dependent variable.

Table 5.19: Non-GL Policy SES Control Models				
	Model 7: Affirmative Action	**Model 8: Immigration**	**Model 9: Military Intervention in Iran**	**Model 10: Abortion**
Gay threat	0.290*** *0.064*	0.498*** *0.089*	0.335*** 0.087	0.864*** *0.123*
Born Again Status	-0.214** *0.091*	-0.113 *0.126*	-0.157 *0.121*	1.168*** *0.176*
Age	-0.003 *0.003*	-0.008* *0.004*	0.000 *0.003*	-0.010* *0.005*
Educational Attainment	-0.057* *0.021*	-0.112*** *0.029*	-0.089** *0.028*	-0.135*** *0.040*
Ideology	0.248*** *0.037*	0.228*** *0.053*	0.125* *0.050*	0.510*** *0.071*
Lives in Non-Metro Area	-0.076 *0.114*	0.009 *0.155*	0.033* 0.159	0.573** 0.221
Southern	-0.188† *0.113*	-0.223 *0.157*	0.141 *0.151*	0.072 *0.215*
Midwestern	-0.055 *0.119*	-0.219 *0.166*	0.033 *0.159*	-0.050 *0.229*
Western	-0.125 *0.123*	-0.178 *0.171*	-0.112 *0.166*	-0.120 *0.237*
Female	0.027 *0.078*	-0.221* *0.107*	-0.336*** *0.104*	-0.079 *0.149*
Gay Contact	0.2290781** *0.080*	-0.042 *0.111*	-0.095 *0.107*	0.023 *0.154*
Party Identification	0.153*** *0.024*	0.092** *0.034*	0.158*** *0.033*	0.196*** *0.047*
Gay	0.206 *0.216*	0.397 *0.320*	0.356 *0.298*	0.625 *0.417*
Married/Widowed	0.132 *0.085*	-0.091 *0.119*	-0.022 *0.114*	0.326 *0.163*
White	1.314*** *0.114*	0.354* *0.163*	*-0.324 *0.151*	0.329 *0.219*
Hispanic	0.947*** *0.158*	-0.401† 0.229	-0.235 *0.209*	0.280 *0.305*
Cut Point 1		-1.764 *0.495*	0.081 *0.467*	
Cut Point 2		1.826 *0.492*	1.558 *0.469*	
Cut Point 3		*2.801* *0.495*		
Constant	2.106*** 0.349			0.296 *0.672*
Pseudo R^2	.3226 (adjusted R^2)	0.0735	0.0551	0.3197

Table 5.20: Non-GL Policy Full Models				
	Model 11: Affirmative Action	**Model 12: Immigration**	**Model 13: Military Intervention in Iran**	**Model 14: Abortion**
Gay threat	.162* *.081*	-.001 *.125*	.077 *.119*	.211 *.164*
Born Again Status	-.120 *.088*	-.167 *.134*	-.131 *.127*	.884*** *.178*
Age	.0004 *.002*	-.009* *.004*	.002 *.004*	-.012* *.005*
Educational Attainment	-.015 *.021*	-.061† *.032*	-.048 *.030*	-.086* *.042*
Ideology	.143*** *.037*	.129* *.057*	.032 *.053*	.396*** *.074*
Lives in Non-Metro Area	-.042 *.109*	-.025 *.163*	-.324* *.159*	.474* *.219*
Southern	-.204† *.106*	-.201 *.162*	.219 *.154*	.185 *.213*
Midwestern	-.061 *.113*	-.187 *.173*	.078 *.164*	.134 *.228*
Western	-.147 *.116*	-.159 *.178*	.005 *.170*	.034 *.234*
Female	.022 *.076*	-.235* *.116*	-.346** *.110*	-.031 *.154*
Gay Contact	.170* *.077*	.028 *.116*	-.068 *.111*	.113 *.155*
Party Identification	.070** *.024*	.021 *.037*	.088* *.035*	.15* *.049*
Gay	.218 *.206*	.303 *.336*	.341 *.308*	1.021* *.415*
Married/Widowed	.120 *.080*	-.106 *.124*	-.036 *.116*	.319* *.162*
White	.730*** *.116*	.060 *.182*	-.547*** *.168*	.579* *.234*
Hispanic	.361* *.116*	-.795*** *.248*	-.461* *.220*	.375 *.311*
Feeling Thermometer- Lesbians and Gays	.568** *.183*	-.670* *.279*	.097 *.263*	-.558 *.371*
Racial Resentment	.873*** *.061*	.417*** *.095*	.401*** *.091*	-.277* *.124*
Social Dominance	.098 *.074*	.276* *.113*	.169 *.109*	-.290† *.150*
Right Wing Authoritarianism	-.046 *.065*	.328*** *.098*	.136 *.095*	.369** *.130*
Modern Sexism	.078 *.032*	-.098 *.104*	.121 *.099*	.244† *.137*
Authoritarianism	-.066* .032	-.025 *.048*	-.002 *.046*	.199** *.064*
Moral Traditionalism	.115 .076	.231* *.115*	.184† .263	.856*** *.154*
Cut Point 1		-1.430 *.672*	1.705 *.630*	
Cut Point 2		2.297 *.673*	3.235 *.635*	
Cut Point 3		3.318 *.675*		
Constant	5.008*** .460			-.112 *.933*
Pseudo R^2	.436 (Adjusted)	.098	.070	.353 (Adjusted)

Table 5.21: Gay Threat Coefficient's P Value in Full Models -- Adjusted for Multiple Testing Error	
	Bonferroni
Marriage	3.442e-18
Adoption	1.498e-08
Affirmative Action	1
Immigration	1
Bombing Iran	1
Abortion	1

Discussion

Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that the gay threat scale works, and it captures a component of attitudes about lesbians and gay men that is distinct from previous psychological trait scales. There is variation across the all of the items that make up the scale, and the scale has a high level of internal consistency. It loads on one factor. All of this confirms Hypothesis 1. Additionally, it is highly associated with opposing policies that would expand the rights of lesbian and gay people, which confirms Hypothesis 2. Lastly, when one uses a fully specified model that includes other psychological traits, it is not associated with policies related to racial or ethnic others, such as immigration or affirmative action. This confirms Hypothesis 3. That the parameter estimate still has an effect when controlling for other psychological traits such as social dominance orientation and authoritarianism confirms Hypotheses 4 and 5.

The gay threat scale is helpful to political scientists because it is able to capture common feelings of threat about the increased integration of lesbians and gay men into the polity. As this chapter demonstrates, this threat is not limited to residents of Washington State or people talking in focus groups. Rather, roughly twenty percent of the US population is responding to the changing role of openly gay and lesbian people in American life with a sense of threat. While socialization plays a role in which people are threatened by this specific group, socio-

demographic controls like ideology and born-again Christianity are not proxies for it. Like the racial resentment and modern sexism scales before it, the gay threat scale provides public opinion researchers with a timely and nuanced way to examine attitudes towards lesbians and gay men.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have documented that gay threat is a key driver of opposition to expanding gay rights. This threat stems from a single decision point: the belief that lesbians and gay men are illegitimate citizens. There are multiple ways that people can arrive at this belief. Both religious evaluations of same-sex sexuality as sinful, coupled with the belief that government should minimize immoral behavior, and libertarian stances that characterize invocations of group interest as illiberal and illegitimate, combined with a belief that GLBT politics as categorically group-y, lead individuals to the same conclusion: there is no place for gay and lesbian people in the polity.

Once a respondent has determined that gay and lesbian people have no place in legitimate American politics, gay visibility and political success become threatening, and the basics of out-group psychology and threat apply. There are three main categories of gay and lesbian behavior, economic, political, and social. In each case, threat provides a distinct lens for viewing the behavior. People who feel gay threat will view gay economic behavior in a two-pronged way. First, they will believe in stereotypes about gay wealth, which can include beliefs that gay men and lesbians are more likely to have professional careers, additional discretionary income, or higher rates of consumption of status symbols like cars, homes, and designer clothing. These stereotyped views of gay wealth are not unique to people who hold threatened views of gay men and lesbians. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, many individuals hold these positive stereotypes. What distinguished the threatened respondents from the non-threatened respondents was a second step: the attribution of how gay men and lesbians acquired this wealth. Non-threatened respondents viewed this as a neutral phenomenon or as the result of hard work. Threatened

respondents, however, saw this economic success as a violation of the norms. They reasoned that gay men and lesbians acquired this wealth because they avoided the sacrifices of having children and caring for a family. Wealth became emblematic of selfishness.

Evaluations of gay political behavior are also different when viewed through the lens of gay threat. People who felt gay threat described gay and lesbian politics as a violation of the norms of American politics. They did this in two ways. The first was to describe pushes for equal treatment as a violation of freedom of speech and label gay men and lesbians who pushed for such treatment as bullies. Many respondents in Chapter 3 described this as "forced" acceptance. Additionally, they viewed labels such as "bigot" or "homophobe" as offensive. In this view, not supporting policies such as marriage equality was one policy position out of many that a person could legitimately hold; labelling such a person as a bigot was punishing someone who was within the mainstream of American politics.

Another threatened way that respondents viewed gay politics was to see it as conspiratorial. This was an evaluation of gay politics writ large. Labelling gay men and lesbians and their allies as bullies was a diffuse political phenomenon; respondents discussed day-to-day interactions and elite political discourse as places where bullying occurred. However, elite politics viewed through the lens of gay threat contained an additional component that would not make sense within day-to-day politics: conspiracy. This was the view that elite GLBT politics, from the representation of gay men and lesbians in popular media to the behavior of advocacy groups and elected officials, was the result of actions that occurred behind closed doors, apart from normative democratic procedures.

Lastly, there were evaluations of gay and lesbian social behavior. Like evaluations of material consumption and individual bullying behavior, these evaluations of social behavior

often happened at the level of decentralized individuals. Like evaluations of political behavior, evaluations of social behavior as threatening hinged on evaluating two kinds of behavior, public displays of affection and non-conforming gender presentations, as disrespectable. Threatened respondents politicized both types of behavior; holding hands or dressing in a gender non-conforming way were direct political challenges and designed to make people uncomfortable, according to people who felt gay threat. A key feature that distinguished threatened from non-threatened attitudes was that a person who felt gay threat could view almost any social behavior that distinguished a person as gay or lesbian as disrespectable and political.

These evaluations of gay men and lesbians as selfish, bullying, conspiratorial and disrespectable were consistent across people who felt gay threat, and they all stemmed from the belief that gay men and lesbians were outsiders in American politics. After documenting this process, I created a gay threat scale that measured these evaluations across the general population. I discovered that it was difficult to include questions that measured evaluations of economic behavior as selfish because that required a two-step process; respondents had to believe in stereotypes of gay wealth and evaluate these stereotypes negatively. This two-part evaluation does not lend itself to survey questions.

However, the final scale was able to capture all three additional components of gay threat: questions about coming out and public displays of affection tapped into beliefs about disrespectability. Questions asking about how greater rights for gay men and lesbians would affect religious people's freedom of speech and protections for other groups measured the belief that lesbians and gay men were bullying. Lastly, a question about the political power of gay men and lesbians as a group related to conspiratorial thinking. All of these questions loaded onto a single factor, gay threat. This statistical connection in Chapter 5 echoed the discursive

connection in Chapter 3 as the exemplars of gay threat wove together narratives about the threat posed by the increased political and social inclusion and visibility of gay men and lesbians. These threatened individuals often conflated political and social behavior, moving from discussing individual couples kissing to broader conversations about public policy.

This scale, tested via the American National Election Survey's 2013 Internet Recontact Survey, revealed that gay threat is a relatively common way of thinking about gay men and lesbians' relationship to the polity. In terms of individual items, roughly 40% of Americans rate same-sex public displays of affection as worse those involving different-sex couples. Approximately 35% say that gay men and lesbians, as a group, have too much political power. Just under a quarter of individuals belief that gay men and lesbians will curb religious people's freedom of speech, will hurt other groups within the polity and think that more people coming out is bad for society as a whole. Each of these items individually indicates some level of gay threat. Taken together as a scale, it is possible to distill the respondents who are true believers in gay threat across political and social behavior. 17.5% of respondents answered all of the questions giving a negative evaluation of lesbians and gay men. Roughly every one of six people experiences gay threat in the American polity.

This threat has an impact on attitudes towards public policy related to sexual orientation, including both marriage equality and adoption by same-sex parents. This association holds even when adjusting for other attitudes related to social hierarchies, morality and other out-groups, such as moral traditionalism, right-wing authoritarianism, modern sexism, racial resentment and social dominance orientation. The evaluation of gay men and lesbians as outsiders within the polity has a distinct effect on evaluating gay and lesbian political and social behavior. This in

turn has a unique impact policy, and this impact is distinct from simple bigotry or other "anti-other" attitude.

Taken as a whole, this dissertation demonstrates that gay threat is a distinct component of opposition to public policy that would bring gay men and lesbians closer to the fold of full citizenship and increase their visibility as full citizens within the policy. I have created a scale of gay threat that performs well within samples drawn from both Washington State and the United States as a whole. This scale performs well empirically, but the mechanism I have specified, the evaluation of lesbians and gay men as either fundamentally part of the polity, and therefore, belonging to an in-group, or distinct from it and therefore an out-group that is illegitimately attempting to gain the benefits of American government, its economy and its society, is theoretically important. It provides leverage for understanding many current puzzles within American public opinion scholarship, particularly the rapid change in attitudes towards gay and lesbian people and the role of contact in bringing about this change. This suggests directions for future research.

My theory of gay threat argues that a simple evaluation of gay and lesbian citizenship is at the crux of subsequent evaluations of gay and lesbian behavior. This argument implies that gay and lesbian people's behavior is largely irrelevant to threatened straight people's evaluations of them. The mechanism that triggers gay threat has occurred prior to an individual behavior on the part of a gay man or lesbian. However, the increase in the number of average people who are out and open about their sexual orientation might provide a mitigating variable that is driving much of the rapid shift in public opinion.

The contact literature specifies that contact with individuals from disliked groups is most effective when it either challenges stereotypes, inverts caste expectations or when there is a large

degree of similarities between both parties. Gay threat requires a strong initial evaluation of citizenship, and such a strong evaluation would require a strong form of contact specified by the literature. However, the unique distribution of sexual orientation across the population would seem to maximize the number of people potentially exposed to such contact. While out gay men and lesbians are slightly overly represented in urban and liberal households and sexual orientation is relatively concealable, there is more even distribution of sexual minorities across the US population compared to ethnicity, which is developed and passed through families.

The evaluation of whether or not gay men and lesbians can be part of the polity depends on individual experiences and, as such, could be potentially influenced by prolonged personal contact. Once that evaluation has changed, it is possible for policy preferences and positions to change. This is a credible pathway for explaining opinion change, and it merits further study.

In addition to specifying a process that can be of use in understanding public opinion change, I have developed a gay threat scale that can be of use in documenting changes in the levels of gay threat over time. I developed the core of the scale from 2009-2011, and the newest data, collected from the ANES, dates from July 2013. This has been a time of rapid change in both public policy and attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. The 2013 ANES Internet Recontact Study can provide a baseline measurement of gay threat, and, as the GLBT movement makes additional gains, it is possible to document a trend over time as people react with threat or as they their feelings of threat are alleviated.

This scale is also a useful dependent variable for use in testing the efficacy of interventions designed to increase favorability towards lesbians and gay men. Gay threat is a unique attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, distinct from feeling thermometers and general psychological traits. It is also an attitude that predicts strong hostility towards both public policy

and individual interactions with gay men and lesbians. Developing ways to ameliorate this threat is therefore potentially not only to change policy but to improve the day-to-day lived experiences of gay men and lesbians.

The creation of this dissertation took place during a period of rapid real-world changes in the status of lesbians and gay men in the American polity. To wit, when I started developing this scale during the summer of 2009, only 3 states allowed marriage equality. By the time my data collection was complete, this number had expanded to 13. Less than a year later, as I finish this dissertation, the number is at 19, with court rulings in favor of marriage equality in 8 additional states and pending legal challenges in every other state. This project had its genesis in the success of California's Proposition 8 and the slew of anti-equality constitutional amendments of the mid 2000's. At that time, the current state of affairs seemed impossible. It is my normative hope that this dissertation captures a threat that is waning and that use of the gay threat scale will become as outdated as it becomes a rare attitude in the population. It is my suspicion that it will continue to be useful, as ceding full membership in the polity requires a level of recognition that larger than any individual policy.

Appendix A: Interview Design

The set of interviews was conducted for Face Value, a research group that was committed to examining the sources of stigma against lesbians and gay men.[53] In this capacity, they hired Lake Research Partners and Goodwin Simon Strategic Research to help create and conducted guided interviews with heterosexual respondents about their feelings towards lesbians and gay men.

The research team, which included academics, graduate fellows (myself included) and researchers from the aforementioned firms, worked together to create the interview guide. There were several goals for this project. The first was that the team wanted to examine the attitudes of people who were moderate on issues of sexual orientation. Lake Research has a pool of respondents; they had pre-screening questions about sexual orientation. Those who answered at either end were excluded from the analysis. It should be noted that I have theorized that political group threat -- both the tendency to view lesbians and gay men in a conspiratorial way and as a realistically threatening group – should be most prevalent among those with generally negative views about lesbians and gay men. This means that there should be lower amounts of political group threat in this sample than there would be if we had screened only people with strongly anti-gay attitudes.

The interviews proceeded in two stages. The first stage were individual interviews in Louisville, Kentucky; Kansas City, Missouri; and Indianapolis, Indiana. There were 10 respondents in this stage. Four were in the first two cities, and 2 were in the third; 2 men and 2

[53] Unless otherwise indicated, all of the information about how the interviews were conducted comes from the memo, written January 20, 2011, to provide an initial report on Phase 1 and Phase 2 Focus Groups for Face Value. Amy Simon of Goodwin Simon Research and Bob Meadow of Lake Research Partners.

women were interviewed in Louisville and Kansas City, and 2 men were interviewed in Minneapolis. The respondents were between the ages of 30 and 55 (Meadow and Simon 2011.) The second stage had individuals discussing within groups. These interviews took place in Denver, Colorado; Phoenix, Arizona; and Chicago, Illinois. In Denver, there was an interview set with 4 Anglo women and another with 3 Latinas and 1 Anglo woman. In the first set, each woman knew one other but did not know everyone in the group.

In the second set, all of the women knew each other. In Phoenix, there was a Latino husband and wife pair and a Latina mother and daughter pair. In Chicago, there was a group of 4 Latina family members and 4 close Latina friends. Together, there were 30 total interviews, with 7 men and 23 women. There were 15 Anglos and 15 Latinos (Table A.1). Interviews were additionally matched by groups of Christian and non-Christian, people who had contact and didn't have contact with lesbians and gay men, and parents and non-parents. These were aligned with the original goals of Face Value. The end result was a broad cross-section of respondents based on gender, ethnicity, location, religiosity and contact.

There are some caveats about the divisions within the interview protocol. A majority of the interviewees were Catholic, and none appeared in their interviews to identify as a born-again Christian.[54] I am able to have more nuanced results about Catholics, but these interviews cannot be generalized to discuss the attitudes of evangelical, or born-again, Christians. There is likely a broader range of Christians within the Tea Party sample.

The interview protocol overall had 7 distinct of modules (Table A.1). In this section, I provide a detailed description of each module and explain, what, if any, parts of the questions

[54] This observation is the author's.

would seem to give the respondents space to answer in terms of political group threat. Overall, there was flexibility within the modules themselves. Interviewers would ask follow up questions in the interviewees made particularly interesting or salient points, so there are some differences in the length and specific content of modules. In addition to changes within individual interviews, there were changes over the course of the entire interview period, as the researchers examined preliminary interviews. They adjusted sections based on whether or not the specific wording of the modules was providing useful information. For example, in some sections, respondents appeared reluctant to answer. Those modules were modified so as to decrease the respondents' reluctance. I also discuss these changes in the following section.

Table A.1: Interview Modules
1. Stereotypes Gay Men and Lesbians
2. Personal Experience and Development of Attitudes
3. Changing Comfort Levels
4. Uncomfortable Questions
5. Talking to Children about Sexual Orientation
6. Photos and Comfort
7. Reflection and Self-Assessment

The interview began by gauging stereotypes about gay men. This was comprised of several questions. The first was to ask respondents to write down and list the first 5 words that came to their mind when they thought about gay men in general. This was followed up by asking about additional stereotypes that the individual might hold about gay men. These included what the most important thing was in gay men's lives, if they were religious, their relationship with their family and if they were more political, what their lives were like, if they could change their sexual orientation, what race they are, if they stick together more than other people and what, if any, race they tend to be. Then, the same was done for lesbians.

The second module on the protocol instructed interviewers to ask about the background that the respondent had about lesbian and gay issues. Specifically, interviewees were asked when they first knew about gay people and how the people in their lives had handled this issue. It went on to ask the respondents when (if) they met someone who had openly identified as gay and if they had talked with these people about what their lives were like as sexual minorities. It became clear over the course of the interview process that family was not the only place that individuals got information about being lesbian or gay.

Therefore, this module changed. Interviewees were still asked about their early experiences with lesbian or gay people. However, afterwards they were given a list of major types of relationships, including childhood friends, parents, coworkers, adult friends, extended families and religious communities. Respondents were able to cross out groups of people who had no influence on their ultimate attitudes about lesbians and gay men and put one, two or three stars by those types of people who had an influence. Respondents then explained why particular groups were influential or not and what the content of that influence was.

The third module tracked changes in attitudes towards lesbians and gay men over time. This was done via a feeling thermometer. Respondents were shown a line and told that one end represented people who felt extremely comfortable with lesbians and gay men. The other end represented the extreme of discomfort. They were asked to place themselves on the line now, and place where they were 10 years previously. The interviewer then probed to ask why they had or had not changed. They were also asked to imagine the exemplar of a person who would be at each extreme. This module stayed consistent over the course of the interviews. In this case, political group threat either appeared when respondents explained why they were not completely comfortable. It also gave them space to talk about their perceptions of political group threat in the popular culture by explaining the exemplar for someone who is completely uncomfortable with lesbians and gay men. In both this case and the previous case of explaining how people viewed sexual orientation, respondents could talk about how other people felt threat.

There fourth module attempted to get individuals to prompt individuals to ask questions that would otherwise be considered offensive or not politically correct about gay men and then lesbians. Respondents were prompted with an explanation of how we sometimes have questions that we cannot ask in polite company. This was done to put interviewees at ease with asking not politically correct questions by reminding them that everyone has such questions. At first, the respondents would say these questions out loud, and the interviewer would ask them how they thought a typical gay man or lesbian would answer. When respondents seemed reluctant to answer these questions, the principle investigators changed the interview protocol. Instead, the interviewer left the room, and respondents were able to write their question on a piece of paper.

The fifth module was designed to get the respondent talking about sexual orientation and children. The interviewer told the respondent to imagine that they had a 10 year old son and

gave them a stack of cards with emotions listed on them. These included, but were not limited to, frustrated, angry, relieved, concerned, unprepared, etc. They interviewee was then instructed to sort the cards to two piles, a pile for emotions that they would feel and a pile for emotions that they wouldn't feel, if their son were to ask them about a friend's gay dads. The exercise was repeated, with the son at age 7 and age 15. The respondents were then asked about how same-sex couples and greater acceptance of lesbians and gay men would affect children generally.

The sixth module was designed to get a sense of which depictions of gay and lesbian life are the most uncomfortable for respondents. The interviewers showed the interviewees multiple photos and asked them to arrange them on the table from the least to the most comfortable. The respondents were then asked to explain their choices. These photos varied in their inclusion of children, sexuality and gender performance. For example, there was a picture of a lesbian wedding, a gay wedding, two men kissing in leather gear at a Pride parade and "dykes on bikes." Some couples had a child with them; others had a dog. Additional photos were added during later interviews to include a teenaged lesbian couple kissing at prom. A photo of Fred Phelps, the late pastor of Westboro Baptist Church known for his "God Hates Fags" signs, was included. There was also a photo of a mother holding up a sign in support of her gay son at a rally for Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG). These photos, especially those that made interviewees uncomfortable, tended to provide a large amount of evidence about political group threat.

The last module asked respondents to think about how their views had changed and what they could do to be more tolerant and accepting of lesbians and gay men in the future. This was not included in later group and dyadic interviews due to time constraints. This module was included to help provided some value to the respondents. It let them reflect on the two hour

interview and what, if anything, they'd learned about themselves. However, this section did not tend to provide additional information for the purposes of this project.

Even though the interview protocol varied a little across interviews, much of the rest of the interview process was the same. All of the interviewees came into the interview without knowing that it was about lesbians and gay men. The pre-screening phone survey asked multiple political topics, including about Muslim Americans, African Americans, labor issues, etc. This design feature helped to get respondents' unprimed feelings about lesbians and gay men. They did not have the opportunity to think of anything in advance or research the issue more than they would have done.

Additionally, the interviews took place in facilities designed for focus groups in each of the host cities. The set-up of the room was "living room" style, which meant that they conversation took place in comfortable chairs around a coffee table (Meadow and Simon). To facilitate conversation, each location was equipped with snacks and drinks. There was a one-way mirror in each interview room. At the start of each interview, the interviewer explained its presence and said that other researchers were there for quality control purposes. The interviewer told interviewees that they were hired to conduct the interview and did not write the survey questions. Therefore, they explained to the interviewees that they had no stake in their answers. In all cases but two (cite – Phyllis interview with contact man in Kentucky and married couple in Phoenix), the interviewees and interviewers were matched on gender. The interviewees were also matched on ethnicity with their interviewers. One of two Latinas interviewers was paired with the Latino interviewees, and one of 3 [4?] interviewers was paired with the Anglo interviewees. The interviews only lasted two hours because of scheduling. This means that

some of the modules ended up being shorter, or not every respondent was able to answer them, due to time constraints.

For the first set of interviews, I was able to obtain complete transcripts. Before I continue with my explanation of the coding scheme, I would like to issue several caveats. The initial note on transcription cautions that "the voice level (vol. 1, pg. 3). Additionally, it is possible for there to be misspellings of names and other "idiosyncratic" terms (vol. 1, pg. 3). During the analysis of the interviews, I will endeavor to stick to the transcripts closely as possible. This means that grammatical and spelling errors might be present in subsequent quotes.

There are other notes of caution I have as regards these materials. Though audio, and, in some cases, video of the interviews exist, I did not use them for my analysis. I heard the part of the first four interviews when they were originally conducted in 2011, but I did not have them on hand for analysis in this chapter. This means that I am merely analyzing the words spoken, not the tone or body language of the respondent. Additionally, many of the interviews had multiple people in the interview. These were not always clearly marked in the transcripts. Where possible, I use the clues in the transcript, such as references to names and occupational information, to identify who said what. This was not always possible, and I can only identify some of the relevant comments by the interview as a whole.

A last caveat is that I did not have access to the pre-screening questionnaire. Thus, any identifying demographic characteristics either come from the descriptions listed in the transcripts or the content of the interview itself. I do not have religious affiliations for every respondent, for example.

Appendix B: Additional Analysis for Chapter 5

Table B.1 Correlation Matrix of Items in Gay Threat Scale, Feeling Thermometer and Contact

	Power	Come Out	Kissing	Speech	Others	Feeling Thermometer	Contact with GL
Power	1.000						
Come Out	0.595	1.000					
Kissing	0.524	0.583	1.000				
Speech	0.438	0.347	0.314	1.000			
Others	0.526	0.504	0.390	0.454	1.000		
Feeling Thermometer	-0.586	-0.580	-0.510	-0.358	-0.476	1.000	
Contact with GL	-0.217	-0.248	-0.209	-0.091	-0.185	0.297	1.000

B.2 Correlation Matrix: All Variables Used in the Analysis (pt. 1)								
	Gay Threat	Born Again	Age	Edu.	Ideology	Non-Metro	South	Midwest
Gay Threat	1.000							
Born Again	0.326	1.000						
Age	0.109	0.003	1.000					
Educational Attainment	-0.118	-0.078	-0.074	1.000				
Ideology	0.547	0.220	0.085	-0.076	1.000			
Non-Metro Area	0.167	0.140	0.013	-0.104	0.132	1.000		
South	0.058	0.172	0.033	0.010	0.028	0.035	1.000	
Midwest	0.023	-0.004	0.002	-0.059	0.014	0.104	-0.430	1.000
West	-0.001	-0.092	-0.044	0.047	-0.020	-0.108	-0.399	-0.296
Female	-0.094	0.076	0.015	-0.060	-0.053	0.021	-0.028	0.010
Gay/Lesbian Contact	-0.256	-0.094	0.008	0.109	-0.141	-0.046	-0.036	-0.048
Party Identification	0.432	0.127	-0.044	0.020	0.644	0.110	-0.006	0.010
Gay	-0.196	-0.028	-0.091	0.022	-0.201	0.008	0.015	-0.041
Married/ Widowed	0.155	0.046	0.289	0.034	0.190	0.033	0.002	-0.010
White	0.034	-0.146	0.090	0.102	0.144	0.110	-0.113	0.094
Hispanic	0.001	-0.030	-0.105	-0.091	-0.029	-0.078	-0.016	-0.097
Feeling Therm. Gay/Lesbian	-0.676	-0.199	-0.054	0.109	-0.389	-0.120	-0.029	-0.029
Racial Resentment	0.417	0.039	-0.003	-0.168	0.493	0.126	-0.018	0.030
Social Dominance Orientation	0.456	0.101	-0.005	-0.080	0.512	0.071	-0.026	0.019
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	0.590	0.295	0.067	-0.249	0.500	0.145	0.074	0.025
Modern Sexism	0.386	0.030	-0.109	0.011	0.401	0.024	-0.053	-0.002
Authoritarianism	0.309	0.244	0.028	-0.278	0.246	0.119	0.106	-0.025
Moral Traditionalism	0.696	0.320	0.167	-0.110	0.614	0.167	0.060	-0.026
Same-Sex Marriage	0.701	0.379	0.098	-0.095	0.486	0.142	0.114	-0.020
Same-Sex Adoption	0.605	0.318	0.068	-0.096	0.424	0.114	0.095	-0.026
Affirmative Action	0.299	-0.010	0.035	-0.058	0.431	0.087	-0.074	0.043
Immigration	0.297	0.074	-0.032	-0.113	0.307	0.084	-0.015	0.016
Abortion	0.450	0.303	0.013	-0.123	0.474	0.176	0.065	0.010

Bomb Iran	0.241	0.058	0.010	-0.086	0.253	0.005	0.057	-0.015

Table B.3 Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Analysis, Continued (pt. 2)

	West	Female	GL Contact	Party ID	Gay	Married/Widowed	White	Hispanic
West	1.000							
Female	-0.004	1.000						
Gay/Lesbian Contact	0.077	0.139	1.000					
Party Identification	0.021	-0.061	-0.101	1.000				
Gay	-0.011	-0.053	0.078	-0.126	1.000			
Married/ Widowed	0.008	0.022	-0.038	0.175	-0.181	1.000		
White	-0.041	0.019	0.060	0.312	-0.023	0.163	1.000	
Hispanic	0.162	-0.021	-0.025	-0.063	0.047	-0.051	-0.543	1
Feeling Thermometer Gay/Lesbian	0.017	0.158	0.301	-0.322	0.162	-0.111	-0.036	-0.0357
Racial Resentment	0.005	-0.037	-0.094	0.508	-0.075	0.120	0.297	0.027
Social Dominance Orientation	0.026	-0.082	-0.143	0.520	-0.156	0.092	0.182	0.0114
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	-0.068	0.001	-0.222	0.409	-0.153	0.100	-0.009	0.0406
Modern Sexism	0.054	-0.245	-0.079	0.443	-0.084	0.077	0.180	0.0212
Authoritarianism	-0.085	-0.019	-0.158	0.118	-0.077	-0.002	-0.179	0.0339
Moral Traditionalism	-0.017	-0.015	-0.181	0.505	-0.225	0.202	0.094	-0.0103
Same-Sex Marriage	-0.017	-0.074	-0.274	0.378	-0.155	0.130	-0.033	0.0256
Same-Sex Adoption	-0.009	-0.099	-0.215	0.306	-0.128	0.085	-0.013	0.0138
Affirmative Action	0.009	-0.015	0.004	0.462	-0.058	0.154	0.359	-0.0443
Immigration	-0.023	-0.070	-0.090	0.278	-0.053	0.029	0.128	-0.0836
Abortion	-0.044	-0.027	-0.120	0.406	-0.071	0.139	0.086	-0.0141
Bomb Iran	-0.014	-0.119	-0.097	0.251	-0.037	0.038	0.016	0.004

Table B.4 Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Analysis, Continued (pt. 3)								
	Feeling Therm.	Racial Resent.	Social Dom.	RWA	Mod. Sexism	Author.	Mortal Trad.	SSM
Feeling Thermometer Gay/Lesbian	1.000							
Racial Resentment	-0.321	1.000						
Social Dominance Orientation	-0.388	0.508	1.000					
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	-0.445	0.460	0.451	1.000				
Modern Sexism	-0.286	0.431	0.448	0.291	1.000			
Authoritarianism	-0.218	0.218	0.174	0.454	0.079	1.000		
Moral Traditionalism	-0.491	0.484	0.469	0.628	0.347	0.318	1.000	
Same-Sex Marriage	-0.575	0.297	0.372	0.526	0.271	0.293	0.611	1.000
Same-Sex Adoption	-0.538	0.275	0.354	0.457	0.284	0.225	0.519	0.662
Affirmative Action	-0.180	0.601	0.391	0.278	0.342	0.047	0.364	0.199
Immigration	-0.266	0.334	0.303	0.330	0.199	0.151	0.319	0.250
Abortion	-0.337	0.300	0.294	0.440	0.269	0.276	0.505	0.461
Bomb Iran	-0.177	0.280	0.241	0.248	0.217	0.136	0.258	0.213

Table B.5: Correlation Matrix of Variables Used in Analysis, Continued (pt. 4)

	Same-Sex Adoption	Affirmative Action	Immigration	Abortion	Bomb Iran
Same-Sex Adoption	1.000				
Affirmative Action	0.182	1.000			
Immigration	0.228	0.252	1.000		
Abortion	0.396	0.197	0.239	1.000	
Bomb Iran	0.227	0.183	0.132	0.156	1.000

Table B.6: OLS Regression. Gay and Lesbian Feeling Thermometer is Independent Variable		
Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Gay Threat	-0.207***	0.011
Born Again Status	0.004*	0.013
Age	0.000	0.000
Educational Attainment	0.003	0.003
Ideology	0.003	0.005
Non-Metro	-0.004	0.016
South	0.010	0.016
Midwest	0.004	0.017
West	0.013	0.017
Female	0.051***	0.011
Contact with Gay or Lesbian Person	0.063***	0.011
Party Id	0.000	0.004
Gay	0.043	0.030
Married/Widowed	-0.002	0.012
White	-0.028	0.017
Hispanic	-0.050*	0.023
Racial Resentment	0.001	0.009
Social Dominance Orientation	-0.035**	0.011
Right Wing Authoritarianism	-0.015	0.010
Modern Sexism	0.012	0.010
Authoritarianism	0.003	0.005
Moral Traditionalism	-0.004	0.011
Constant	1.226***	0.055

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