

143, 7:31a

--. The Prime Minister under Marquis Wen of Wei (魏文侯),

Li K'uei (李悝) said: When the grain for sale on the market (糶) is very dear, it harms the people. (Note: "People" here means the scholars, artisans, and merchants. (NOT THE PEASANTS)) If it is too cheap, it harms the farmers. If "the people" (non-farming occupations) are hurt, they will leave and scatter; if the farmers are hurt, then the country becomes poor. Thus whether prices are too dear or too cheap, the harm done is one and the same.

Those who are good are ruling their countries (states) see to it that "the people" are not harmed and that the farmers are benefited and encouraged. Therefore, those who are good at establishing fair prices for farm products / (善平糶者) must take care to see that the crop year is divided into categories of upper, middle, and lower "ripeness" (shu 熟).

In a bumper crop year, the rating is upper and (the government) buys up (糶) three parts of the crop and leaves 1; in a middle crop year, then it buys up two parts; in a lower year it buys up 1 part, thus causing that "the people" will have enough (to live on) and that the prices will be fair.

When there is a slight famine, the government then issues what has been collected for a small crop year. (Note: The officials release and sell off grain that they have stored up.) (END NOTE) In a middle famine year, then they issue what they have collected ~~xxx~~ during a middling crop year. In a serious famine, then they issue what they have collected in a bumper crop year, and sell it off (糶之).

(Note: Note that in the Han-shu section on Li K'uei ~~xx~~ he says: Those who are good at governing their states see to it that the people are not harmed while the farmers are benefited and encouraged. At the present time 1 fu (夫: a household with ~~one~~ a male as head of household?) consists of 5 persons, and they manage 100 mou of farmland. Every year they harvest 1 and 1/2 per mou 2 piculs (shih 碩) of grain, or a total of 150 shih (for 100 mou). If you take away the 15 shih they pay for their 1/10 taxes, this leaves a remainder

Trade-off!!
in Price of grain
(high prices hurt
urban dwellers +
low prices hurt farmers)

ever-normal
price stabilization

Han-shu
on peasant
family economy

魏文侯

李悝

糶

善平糶者

熟

糶

糶之

夫

碩

143, 7:31b

collected for 'a middle crop year; and in a serious famine year, the govt isuses what is has collected during a bumper crop year, and sells it off. Therefore even though there may be starvation and food or drought, by seälling off grain the price of grain is not dear and the people do not scatter. You take the surplus and use it to make up for insufficiencies. Thefefore it was applied in the state of Wei and the country was rich and powerful.

With regard to the fact that in an upper crop year the harvest was 4 times what it normally was, leaving a surplus of 400 shih for the family, in an average crop year the harvest from 100 mou was 150 shih. At the presetrn time in a bumper crop year the harvest is four times that, and the family collects 600 shih. If you calculate the expenes of the people for a whole year, it leaves a remainder of 400 shih. The officials buy up 300 shih. This is what is meant by buying up 3 parts and leaving 1. In a middle crop year when the harvest is three times normal, the harvest is 450 shih. After deducting for yearly expenses this leaves a remainder of 300 shih, and ~~the~~ the officials buy up 200 shih. This is what is meant by buying up two parts and leaving one.

In a lower crop year when the harvest is double normal harvests, the family harvests 300 shih; after deducting for yearly expenses it leaves a remainder of 100 shih, and the officials buy up 50 shih. This is what is meant by officials buying up 1 part in a lower crop year, meaning that they divide the 100 shih in half and ~~take~~ take 1 part of it.

In a small famine year, ~~when~~ the harvest is 100 shih, or 2/3 of normal. In a middle famine year, the crop is 70 shih or 1/2 of normal. In a serious famine year the harvest is 30 shih, or 1/5 of normal.) (END NOTE)

--During the reign of Hsüan-ti of the Han dynasty (BC 73-48), the Ta-ssu-neng and Chung-ch'eng(中丞), Keng Shou-ch'ang(耿壽昌) submitted a memorial that requested that the border chiin (commanderies) should all be required to build granaries. And when the price of grain was cheap

*Korean system?
for high when
income is
high
make relief
disbursements
when income is low
govt purchase
at high prices to
subsidize farmers
income*

*Han
73-48 BC.
Keng Shou-
chang*

143, 7;32a

they would buy up grain at a price higher (than the market price) in order to benefit the farmers. And at times when the price of grain was dear, they would sell off grain at a price lower than (the market price) in order to benefit the people (non-farming population). These granaries were called the ever-normal granaries. (ch'angp'ing ~~shka~~ ts'ang 常平倉).

(Note: At the time there had been several bumper crop years and the price of grain had fallen to 5 cash (my note: from a normal price of 30 cash) and the profit to the farmers was very small. Keng Shu-ch'ang memorialized for the establishment of this law and the people liked it. The emperor then issued the edict and reward Keng with the rank of Marquis of Kuan-wei (within the passes).

EVER-NORMAL

--. Ssu-ma Kung (司馬公) said: The Ever Normal Granaries is a law leftover from the sage kings of the three dynasties of antiquity. It was not only what Li K'uei and Keng Shu-ch'ang were able to do. When the price of grain is cheap, it does not harm to the farmers, and when the price of grain is dear, it does not harm to the people. The people have enough food to eat and the officials take the benefits (profit) from it. There is no better method than this.

--. In the reign of Wen-ti of the Sui dynasty, in the k'ai-huang period, 5th year (585 AD), the Minister of the Board of Taxation (度支尚書), Chang Sun-p'ing (長孫平) memorialized that among the ancients that 3 years worth of cultivation left a reserve of one year, and that 9 years' cultivation created a surplus reserve for three years. Even though there was flood and drought, nobody starved (無菜色). And all of this was due to the fact that there was method to encouraging and guiding (the people) and that reserves were prepared in advance. He requests that the people in the prefectures be encouraged to establish Righteous Granaries (i-ts'ang) in their villages (社). That on harvest day, in accordance with how much grain is obtained they should be encouraged to pay grain (to the granary) in ~~xxxxxxx~~ millet and wheat at the rate of 1 shih per family.

Sui Wen-ti

7:32b

585 Sai

3-9yr. reserve

社

143, 7:32b

would be
 (that was the highest rate). Lower rates ~~were~~ determined in grades according
 would be would
 to wealth. The granary ~~was~~ built in the village (she) and they/stored
 would be
 the grain in the cellar. (pit) The she-ssu (社司) ~~was~~ in put in charge of
 the ledgers and he investigated ~~xxxxxyxxxxxmkxmdxmxmxxxxxmkxmkxmxmxxxxx~~
 and kept a check on everything, and ~~to~~ make collect^{ions} every year so that there
 would be no loss to the reserves. If it happened that there wasn't a good
 would be
 crop and there was starvation in the village, then this grain ~~was~~ used for
 relief grants.

The emperor approved it and the granaries were called i-ts'ang (righteous
 granaries), or they were called she-ts'ang (社倉 :village granaries).

(Note: At the time (after the law was promulgated) wherever you went
 the grain reserves were piled up and the people avoided starvation. Later
 on because the people did not give thought to long-term planning and rashly
 wasted and spent the reserves of the she-ts'ang. Or they paid all the grain to
 the prefectural (chou) government. If there happened to be a drought, they
 would give out right away the grain that was supposed to be stored for future
 years. By the reign of Yang-ti (of Sui) the state ~~is~~ was faced with financial
 shortages and took the grain from the righteous granaries in order to meet
 official expenses. By the reign of T'ai-tsung of the T'ang dynasty it was
 again ordered that the chou and hsien of the empire establish Righteous
 Granaries in order to provide against disaster years and it was not permitted
 to spend the grain on miscellaneous (things). In the time of Empress Wu
 (Wu-hou 武后) and Chung-tsung (604-705, 705-710), both public and private
 finances were short and in difficulty and they borrowed from the Righteous
 Granaries to meet expenses. From the shen-lung period and after (705-707),
 expenditures from the Righteous Granaries tended to deplete their reserves.

(END NOTE)

社倉 or 社司

bad admin:
 1) spending revenues
 2) price too high
 3) relief payments too high
 Govt raids revenues to pay for expenses

again

144, 7:33a

Mr. Hu (Hu-shih **胡氏**) says: In relieving the starving, nothing is more important than in getting close to the people. (you are going to provide relief to?). The Righteous Granaries of the Sui dynasties did not collect that much from the people, but they were situated in the she (villages) and the starving people could obtain food. This was not far from the fact that in later generations they also had granaries called Righteous Granaries, but they were situated in the prefecture and commandery (chou-chün). If they had a famine, then the worthless officials would not report it to the throne (superior authorities). Only the good officials would report it. When the report arrived, then the clerks could be put in charge of issuing (grain from the granaries). The transfer of documents back and forth made difficult and obstructed the paying out of grain, and the officials and clerks in charge competed to get the grain (for themselves). The ones who benefited from it were in general those areas nearby cities (walls) and suburbs where the people had the sixangh ability to gexga go get (and carry) the grain themselves. How could people living in far off places take their aged (parents) and children several hundred li to get a few handfuls of grain?

--. In the Chou dynasty of the Five Dynasties period, in the 6th year of the hsien-te reign period (959 AD) there was a famine in the Huai-nan area. Shih-tsung (**世宗** :944-960) ordered that rice be loaned out. Some said that the people were poor and were afraid they would not be able to repay it. Shih-tsung said: the people are still my children; how could somebody's children be in precarious circumstances) suspended upside down) without a father knowing about it? And how could he hold them responsible and insist on repayment?

--Mr. Hu (**胡氏**) said: The granting of loans (to the starving) both benefits the people and is a source of trouble for them. It benefits them because it alleviates their immediate problem. It hurts them because of the fact that they must repay (the loan) at a later date. In demanding repayment, either one can be strict about the deadline for repayment, or one can collect a wastage surcharge (**耗徵其耗**), or collect interest (**取其息**), or

Should be in the villages, not the commandery!

delay + corruption

too far away

959 No repayment

7:33b

Loans no good; people can't repay. Wastage surcharge.

144, 7:33b

Some problems as in Korea

Bureaucratic corruption

loan out rice and have the people pay back the debt in cash, or continue to dun people for repayment even though they are poor and cannot repay, or have the clerks falsify the granting of loans and collect (repayment) from the people. Al, these things are ways in which the people are severely harmed. The officials (in charge of the granaries) believe that taking (a lot of grain from the people) during bumper crop years, and giving out only a little (during famines) is the method to use. The officials in charge of collecting grain make it their business to make collections on the basis of the number of heads and squeeze (funds) out of the ~~poor~~ people. When there is a great drought, there is no reduction of taxes; when there are floods, there are no reductions of taxes; when there is crop damage from insects, there is no reduction of taxes. The chief officials dun the people for tax payments but they do not register the amounts (do not abide by fixed quotas), so that they do not write down the fact that they extract ~~taxes~~ payments from the people's households in order to make up for deficiencies. If a family is not bankrupt, then they are not dropped from the registers. If it is as bad as this when payments are made ~~to~~ ^{by} the people, how much worse is it when the officials are loaning out grain. The responsibility for repayments means that the people are not left with any resources left over. Shih-tsung (of the Later Chou) regarded the people as his sons and succored their insufficiency (poverty) and did not require that they make repayment. This was the mind of a humane man and the administration of a true king.

State treasury of later Chou - free grants!

7:34a

Ch'in Chün's evils of grain loans

--. Ch'iu Chün (丘濬) said: In this statement of Mr. Hu's, not only did he talk about the evils of grain loans. At the present time we also have evils in the Righteous Granaries. The Righteous Granaries were basically designed to provide against famine (from bad crops) ~~to prevent our people from suffering harm.~~ ~~to prevent our people from suffering harm.~~ But the officials in charge when they make collect^{ions} regard with urgency making sufficient collections, they do not give any consideration to whether (how the grain is of good or bad quality they are doing it) is good or bad. When the grain is stored. Fearing that the grain might get soaked and (rot), they do not wait for a famine ~~to occur~~

Officials corrupt intention of the people

Relief system -8- (72) P'an'gye surok, chönje hurok, kosöl, sang
when grain is given out,

144, 7:34a

(before they give out grain), and/those who get the grain are not necessarily those who are supposed to eat it, and when grain is collected, in many cases it is ~~not~~ taken from those who ~~originally~~ originally received (the relief loan).

forms of corruption

What Mr. Hu said was that in demanding repayment, either (the officials) could be strict about the deadline for payment, or they might collect a wastage surcharge, or they might collect interest, or they might issue rice and demand cash for repayment, or they might dun for repayment those who were poor and not able to pay, or they clerks might falsify loans and collect from ordinary people. These several statements cover the various types of evils in the Righteous Granaries of today. What is said to be righteous, is in fact to do things that are not righteous. What was originally meant to benefit the people, on the contrary has come to harm them. It is only that I see that the business has become bothersome and the clerks only act corruptly and that is all, and there is truly no benefit as far as relief is concerned.

7:34b

P'AN'GYE:

社倉

--. I (P'an'gye) note that: The village granaries (she-ts'ang) were designed basically to encourage the people to be frugal so that they would have a surplus to prepare for famine crop conditions. They should be placed in the village (tang-she *當社*), and the she (village) should be allowed to manage it. They ought not be moved (the grain ought not be transferred) to be the reserves of the chuŭp (prefectural towns).

*the 社 (village) is supposed to manage it
Chinese system is superior
Korean hwanja is (1) stored in districts and (2) used for Gov't expenses.*

This is why the (Chinese village granaries) are basically different from the hwanja (還上) grain loan system in use in our country today. The so-called hwanja (hwansang *還上*), provides the reserves for ~~our~~ our (army and) country (kun'guk *軍國*). It has to be stored in the walled administrative towns and the magistrate's office manages it. It ought not be dispersed in the outer myön (districts). In later generations, the Righteous Granaries were attached to the chou-chün (pref. and commanderies, and the law

Relief system -9- (73) P'an'gye surok, ch'önje humok, kos'öl, sang
prescribed that the officials every year would collect (loans) and disburse
(loans). But because the hwanja system of our country also calls for loans
to the people and repayments every year, the system seems the same
(as the Chinese she-ts'ang system). Prior to the deadline the grain is given to
the people, and later on they are required to repay it. The official bureau
(agency) is in charge of the collections and chases after the people with
punishment and jail. Therefore, one has the various practices of the

144, 7:34b

officials ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ keeping strictly to deadlines and pressing the
people for repayment, the loaning out of a little grain, but the collection
of large amounts, the forced distribution of loan grants without waiting for
famine years, poor people absconding (to escape loans), and the collections
being made in their place from their neighbors and relatives, corrupt officials
and clerks using deceit and falsification in order to make all kinds of
arbitrary collections. There are thus all kinds of evils and harm so that
the prisoners fill up the jail yard, and the (poor people) who are whipped and
beaten are to be found everywhere within the jurisdiction. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

145, 7:35a

This
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ kind of system is nothing but a net to ensnare the people,
it is not the basic intention (behind the loan system) which is to save
the people from suffering.

All the people said that Wang An-shih (王安石) 's ch'ing-miao fa
(青苗法 :green shoots law) was no good, but how is this (our
system of grain loans) any different from the ch'ing-miao system?

Something like the Ever-Normal system is one which in years of bumper crops
does no damage to the farmer (because it maintains a high price for his
crops), and during famine periods does no harm to the (non-farming) population
(by keeping prices down). There are no evils to it either in the public or
private sense; both the ruler and the people obtain benefits. As far as
good laws are concerned, there are none that surpass this.

Our national law code also requires that Ever-Normal Granaries be established
in both the capital and the provinces, but this has never been carried out.

Why not?

*Korean hwanja system is the same as Wang's green shoots system
Ever-normal system is the Best law !!
never used in Yi dyn*

145, 7:35a

If you want to ~~establish them~~ take the best measures (at the present time, to deal with the situation), then (to handle) the hwanja grain loans of the present time in the various administrative towns, in all cases establish ever-normal (granaries) to ~~xxxx~~ pay out and ~~xxxx~~ buy up grain in accordance with the law (system). As for sach'ang (village granaries), then encourage and instruct the puro (fu-lao) elders of each village to establish them as they desire, and let them be managed ~~byxxxx~~ openly and publicly (fairly: konggong 公共) by the people and gentry (insa 人士) of each village (sa), and do not let the official yamen interfere in their administration.

Double systems
① Ever-normal Gran.
② 公共

(Note: In accordance with the early Sui and with Chu Hsi's she-ts'ang system, discuss and deliberate on regulations (for the system). Let the people and gentry of the village manage the granary publicly, and as for the official yamen, it will only give aid and encouragement, and that is all; it will not be able to supervise or exercise jurisdiction (over the granary).(END NOTE)

7:35b

Can this be ts'ang?

Objections:

Only after it is done like this, will (the right system) be obtained. Some might say that if the she-ts'ang (sach'ang) are placed in the ~~sach'ang~~ where the village shrine (she) is located, then it will be difficult to obtain people from the villages and therefore one cannot establish (the granaries) there. Or even if they are established, because of people pursuing their private desires, they will gradually be abandoned, so what about that? (I) say to this that if the court with sincere mind gives encouragement and ~~xxxxxx~~ does not interfere and cause trouble, ~~xxxxxx~~ and the people see the advantage of it and do not suffer harm from it, then it will become the established custom (among the villages) and there will be nothing that cannot be done. Or even if (the granaries) cannot be established, or if they are ~~xxx~~ repaired (created) and then fall into disuse so that ~~they are~~ they are not standard (institutions), still they will not cause harm to the people every year (as the current hwanja grain loan system does--Kim, 590). If the people can avoid the harm (from the hwanja grain loan system), then they will be able

Flu tax
less govt, more local control
anti-bureaucratic
? ?
Population vs. anti-
local elite
vs. Bureau.

145, 7:35b

to rest easy in their occupations and devote themselves to agriculture. if Families will have reserves stored up. In addition/the ever-normal granaries can function to make up for shortages (in times of famine), and then in famine years the lives of the people will be saved (succored). So how could the hwanja grain loan system compare to this?

--. During the reign of Hsiao-tsung of the Sung dynasty (1163-1190), the emperor promulgated an edict that the she-ts'ang method should be adopted in the various lu (routes, provinces). At the outset, Chu Hsi was living in Chien-ning-fu (建寧府), Ch'ung-an-hsieng (崇安縣), K'ai-yao hsiang (開耀鄉). In the 4th year of the Kan-tao year period (1168) there was a great famine among the people of Chien-ning.

Chu Hsi

1168

7:36a

Chu Hsi, together with the people of the hsiang, requested of the fu (pref.) requested 600 shih of ever-normal rice to be loaned out as relief, to be paid back in the winter with interest added. (Note: The interest on 1 shih would be 2x t'ou of rice) The repayment would be made in rice. From this time on every year grain was collected and distributed (歛散). In the case of a small (minor) bad crop, then the interest rate was reduced by half; and in case of a major famine, then the interest was completely eliminated. In the 14th year (1176), he obtained interest rice and built a granary, accumulated savings and then repaid the original principle of 600 shih to the fu. With the over 3,000 shih of rice that was saved, they (he) regarded it as (the capital fund) for the she-ts'ang and no longer collected any interest (on grain loans). On every shih of grain, they stopped at collecting a wastage surcharge (momi 耗米) of 3 sheng (升). Because of this even though the whole hsiang might meet with a famine year (bad crop year), the people were not lacking in food to eat.

1176

No interest

an r. with pao-chang org.

(Note: In each shē (shrine site)(granary site) a she-shou (社首) and pao-chang (保長) was appointed to keep the records and to divide up the population into pao units. After clarifying those who had not absconded, committed some crime or transgression or some impropriety of

145, 7:36a

behavior, they then in accordance with the register paid out grain. If any household did not want to borrow grain, no ~~payment~~ disbursement was made.

For the details of this system see the Chuja sach'ang samok (Chu Hsi she-ts'ang shih-mu)(END NOTE)

Chu Hsi

Later when (Chu Hsi) was summoned for a court audience he requested that this system be extended to a broad area and put into practice. Chu Hsi said: I would like the emperor to give clear instructions to the provinces that if there are any people or households that would like to establish (the she-ts'ang granaries), that the chou and hsien (pref. and districts) calculate and pay out rice from the ever-normal granaries (as a fund for the she-ts'ang). If there are any rich families who would like to issue rice to form the capital (fund for the she-ts'ang), they also should be allowed to do as they please. (do what is convenient for them). When the interest rice (that is accumulated) matches the amount (of the original capitalization), then it also will be repaid. And if there are local villages whose customs are not the same (different), they also should be allowed to act in accordance with the circumstances and set up a contract, report to the magistrates who will respect and protect (the granaries). And if they should desire not to establish a granary, the official yamen will not force them to do so, so that (the system) will not cause trouble.

up to choice of local people

7:36b

Hsiao-tsung gave his permission and decreed that/permanent residents (t'u-chü 土居) or temporary residents (寓居) of a hsiang, officials and people (shih-jen 士人), those whose behavior was righteous would report conditions to the chou and hsien, calculate (what rice was needed) from among the rice reserves of the Righteous Granaries, and use it to make disbursements (for the she-ts'ang, peasants?). With regard to the actual collections and disbursements (of loans from the she-ts'ang), measures for this would be taken publicly by the elders of the given hsiang, and the chou and hsien authorities would not interfere with it or force (loans to be made)(exercise any coercion).

*Local control
No bureau interference*

145, 7:36b

(Note: Chu Hsi once wrote about the Chin-hua she-ts'ang (金華),

saying: The reason why the customs of the generation are diseased (sick) with respect to this is no more than because the ch'ing-miao (green shoots) plan of Wang An-shih is a subject for discussion (is regarded as a good thing). But under the green shoots system the people are given money, and not grain; situated in in and (the granaries) are ~~managed by~~ the hsien (district) and not ~~by~~ the village (hsiang); and * (the granaries) are managed by the officials or princely men (insa, kunja 士, 君子) and not by the people/of the village (hsiang-jen). And in carrying out (the loaning of grain), they are quick to make collections and do not do it with any feelings of compassion or love (for the people). This is the reason why Wang was able to put* (his green shoots system) into practice in one town, but could not put it into practice throughout the whole empire.

Chu Hsi Opposes Wang An-shih's green shoots money loans gran. in dist. under mags. too impersonal

Chu Hsi Law: 1- 治法 2- 治人

-In addition (Chu Hsi) also wrote that the she-ts'ang system ought to be promoted. He said: If you have (good)government, it is ~~due~~ due to people (having men of talent); if you are lacking government, it is the responsibility of law. (yu chih cheng jen, wu chih cheng fa 有治人, 無治法), this is a great statement that will never be changed. In the time of the sage kings they ensured that if the people cultivated the land for three years, they would definitely accumulate one years' worth of savings (stored grain), and if they cultivated the land for 30 years, then they would accumulate 10 years' worth of grain (in reserve). And the people did not suffer from famine. This could be said to be a good law that will last for 10,000 generations.

3-9 yrs - because a good law Best EVER-NORMAL and best she-ts'ang

What is next (best) to this was the Han dynasty so-called Ever-Normal system. Even today this system is in use, and this system has always been a good one. However, at the present time it is only that this ~~xxx~~ just in terms of regulations, If barely exists ~~xxxxxxx~~ record books, and keys to the granaries. /it has no people to protect (maintain) it, then the law is no more than a law, and it cannot be put into practice by itself.

How much more important are these (so with the she-ts'ang which collect food products ~~xxxxxxx~~ in ~~xxxxxxx~~ isolated and remote villages.

supervision

146, 7:37a

And in their ~~management~~, they are not controlled by the regular officials, and in their management, it is not done by punishments of exile and transportation.

If you do not always obtain men who are loyal, trustworthy, intelligent and perspicacious people, like those who (operate the granaries) at the present time and who cooperate with one another in spirit and devote

all their efforts in being careful about the grain that is issued and received and block all forms of deceit and corruption, then one needs no time to wait and see that it would be difficult to maintain the law. This is the kind of a system which is worth reporting to future princely men of virtue.)(END NOTE)

but need good men

Chu Hsi said: Since ancient times there have been two views on the way to provide relief. The first is to induce a spirit of harmony to prevail (感召和氣) (by conducting good government, Kim 594) in order to produce abundant crops. The second is just to have plans for accumulating grain reserves. If the people wait for the next famine to occur to manage things (without making preparations in advance, Kim 594), then what other policy can there be?

He also said: in relieving starvation there is no strange policy (that is needed). The best thing is to make a study of irrigation (water conservancy).

Lü Tung-lai (呂東萊) said: In general if one is to discuss relief administration in a unified fashion, then one would have to say that the system of former kings by which they made preparations in advance (for (by storing grain) famine), is a superior system. (the best system). Li K'uei (李悝)'s system (buying and selling grain, Kim 594) is second best. To take stored grain and distribute it evenly (equally) and cause it to circulate, to have people migrate and grain be shifted around, this method is the third best. And if you have none of the above methods, the ~~XXXX~~ least best (worst) method is just to make gruel and distribute it to the people to eat.

Lü
① grain reserves
② Ever Normal mix stability in
③ direct relief grants

Chao Pien (趙抃) was the magistrate (gov) of Yüeh-chou (Chih Yüeh-chou 知越州). ~~There was a great~~ ~~in~~ Wu-Yüeh (吳越), ~~before the~~ ~~There was a drought~~

12 146, 7:38a


And the harm from the officials dunning them⁹ for debts extended to their neighbors and relatives (the officials dunned their neighbors and relatives for the debts of those who had absconded). Because the officials disturbed the people by whipping and beating them, many of the people shouted their grievances. And even though the officials forced neighbors and relatives to pay the debts of those who had absconded, they also were poor people who died, and that was all there was to it. In the end nothing could be obtained from them (this), and the official grain (finances) could also not avoid shortages and deficiencies.

How much worse was it when you consider that those registered as starving people were for the most part friends of the clerks in charge of relief, or relatives of the village headmen (li-cheng 里正) or household slaves and servants of influential families. As for the people who had no connections (wu-k'ao chih min 無告之民), on the contrary their names were missing (dropped) from the registers (of those eligible for relief).

At the present time, if in addition to issuing ever-normal grain from the granaries we calculate and divide up the amounts, and count the numbers of old, weak, sick, and women, and all those who have nothing to rely on, and give them free grants (pai-chi 白給), and as for the rest, if we recruit starving people in large numbers (from a broad area) and pay them wages for constructing dikes in order to build irrigation facilities, then if it is done like this, we will be able to both provide relief and build irrigation facilities ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ and kill two birds with one stone (accomplish two things in one fell swoop). The starving people will be fed from their labor and there will no longer be any evils from (corrupt) registration and no future concern because of the requirement to repay loans. In accordance with the fact that the people are recruited for work and go themselves, there will be no feelings of resentment. And if the wages we pay them/are sufficient, then they will have enough to provide for the elderly and young. Thus many people will come to

free grants
public works →

workfare



11

146, 7:38a

7:38b

~~ᄒᄒᄒᄒ~~ to work, and the benefits will be extended over a wide area, and irrigation facilities will be promoted everywhere, so that there never again will be any harm from a famine year and the people will not be lacking food to eat, and the state will not be short of tax revenues, and we will be able to rely on this for thousands and ten thousands of years. This system as far from the present system as heaven ~~is~~ is from earth is a far cry from the present system in terms of advantages and benefits.

As for ~~the~~ other construction projects, even though they may not be as urgent as irrigation facilities, if they are in accord with the needs of the times, we should also consider doing them (using labor on other kinds of construction projects as a means of providing relief)

(Note: The above section deals with the ever-normal granaries, the righteous granaries, and relief administration).