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TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

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1. THE STEPPED-UP MANEUVERING WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE RIGHTIST POLITICAL SECTOR, WHICH THREATENS THE STABILITY OF THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, DERIVES PRIMARILY FROM WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION IN THE MILITARY TOWARD MINISTER OF DEFENSE GARCIA AND THE EXPLOITATION OF THIS OPPOSITION BY THE RIGHTWING ARENA PARTY.

2. MANY MILITARY OFFICERS, INCLUDING KEY UNIT COMMANDERS AND MUCH OF THE JUNIOR OFFICER CORPS, WANT GARCIA TO RESIGN AS HE AGREED TO DO DURING THE RECENT REBELLION AGAINST HIM BY LTC. OCHOA PEREZ. GARCIA, AS OF 3 FEB, HOWEVER, HAS GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT HE INTENDS TO REMAIN IN OFFICE. AS RESULT, OFFICERS, WHO BLAME GARCIA WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR MANY OF THE MILITARY'S PROBLEMS, ARE INCREASINGLY INCLINED TO TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE HIS RESIGNATION. ARENA, WHICH HAS A VESTED INTEREST IN REMOVING GARCIA WHO HAS PERSONALLY ENFORCED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORM PROGRAMS AND HAS FOUGHT OFF ARENA EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE MILITARY. HENCE, ARENA IS ADDING MOMENTUM, CONVENIENTLY AGREEING WITH THE MILITARY'S CRITICISM OF GARCIA AS A BAD MANAGER OF THE WAR. ADDITIONALLY, THERE ARE SOME MILITARY OFFICERS WHO ARE IN LEAGUE WITH ARENA AND SUPPORT ITS OBJECTIVES IN REMOVING GARCIA.

3. [redacted] AND AMB/DCM CONCUR AS SUGGESTED IN REF THAT GARCIA'S REMOVAL WOULD DEFUSE THE CRISIS. IF HE OR THE PRESIDENT WERE TO OFFICIALLY DECLARE GARCIA'S INTENTIONS TO RESIGN, THE MILITARY ACTIVISTS WOULD BE PLACATED, AS WELL AS HIS ARENA ENEMIES. WE PRESUME THE AMB WILL MAKE THIS RECOMMENDATION KNOWN TO GARCIA AND/OR PRESIDENT MAGANA.

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4. [redacted] AS OF 3 FEB, VIDES CASANOVA

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CONTINUES TO BE APPROACHED BY MILITARY OFFICERS REQUESTING HIS SUPPORT FOR A COUP AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION, AND TO ACT AS THE HEAD OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT. VIDES CONTINUES TO RESOLUTELY REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN AND STRONGLY WARNS THE PLOTTERS AGAINST SUCH A MOVE.

5. IF AND WHEN GARCIA RESIGNS, HIS MOST LIKELY REPLACEMENT, GEN. VIDES CASANOVA, IS A GOOD CHOICE IN THAT HE ENJOYS WIDESPREAD POPULARITY IN THE MILITARY AND MUCH OF THE POLITICAL SECTOR. HE COULD BE EXPECTED TO PROMOTE THE REFORMS AND A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. WHILE HE PROBABLY WILL NOT FIGHT OFF THE ARENA EFFORTS TO PREVAIL IN EL SALVADOR WITH THE DEXTERITY OR TENACITY OF GARCIA, HE IS A MODERATE, AND A MAN OF GOODWILL, WHO CAN BE EXPECTED TO APPLY HIS FULL ENERGIES TO FIGHTING THE WAR AS WELL AS PROMOTING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

6. FOREGOING REPRESENTS OUR MOST TIMELY ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM WHICH WE ARE CONVINCED CAN BE ELIMINATED, AT LEAST FOR THE SHORT TERM, BY THE RESIGNATION OF GEN. GARCIA.

7. NO FILE.

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