THE PROOF FOR THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE PROPHET

	(A paper read at the 1967 annual meeting of the Western Branch of the
American Oriental Society in Portland, Oregon, and updated in December 2006)


	In order to avoid having to accept revelation as true through blind
faith alone, later Ash`arite theologians attempted to prove the truth of
revelation by completely rational means. To this end they developed a series
of rational proofs which culminated in a proof for the truthfulness of the
Prophet; for if the Prophet could be demonstrated to be truthful, then all
statements contained in revelation, both in the Qur'an and in hadith, would be
true statements and one could believe in their truth on the basis of reason
rather than on the basis of faith alone.

	This series of rational proofs developed by the Ash`arite theologians
included proofs for the following doctrines or propositions:

	1. The universe is originated.

	2. The universe has an originator or creator.

	3. The creator of the universe is knowing, powerful and willing.

	4. Prophecy is possible.

	5. Miracles are possible.

	6. Miracles indicate the truthfulness of one who claims to be a
prophet.

	7. Muhammad claimed to be a prophet and performed miracles.(1)

	According to the theologians each of these propositions had to be
demonstrated by what they called a rational proof or dalil `aqli.  They
defined a rational proof as a proof based on premisses known intuitively or
necessarily to be true through reason or sense perception, and which as such
was consequently said to yield certain knowledge.  Six varieties of necessary
premisses upon which rational proofs could be based were commonly accepted by
the theologians.  These were:

	1. Awwaliyat, first principles or axioms, such as the statement that
the whole is greater than any of its parts.

	2. Qadaya qiyasatuha ma`aha, which are propositions containing their
own syllogisms, such as the statement that four is an even number.

	3. Mahsusat, or sense perceptions, such as the statement that this
fire is hot.

	4. Mutawatirat, or historical or geographical facts reported by a
sufficient number of witnesses such that it would be impossible to suppose
that they were all lying.

	5. Mujarrabat, or facts known through experimentation, such as the
statement that scammony is a laxative.

	6. Hadsiyat, or acute guesses, as, for example, the statement that the
light of the moon is derived from that of the sun.(2)

	Distinguished from the rational proof was the traditional proof or
dalil naqli, which was defined as a proof containing one or more premisses
taken from revelation.  Traditional proofs could not, of course, be used in
the series of arguments to establish the truthfulness of the prophet.  Once,
however, the truthfulness of the prophet had been rationally demonstrated,
traditional proofs could be used in proving additional theological doctrines.

	How successful were the Ash`arite theologians, then, in establishing
the truth of revelation by means of rational proofs?  To their own
satisfaction, at least, they were able to formulate proofs for all of the
doctrines mentioned above except for the proposition stating that a miracle
indicates the truthfulness of anyone claiming to be a prophet.  Here they had
to admit their inability to come up with any rational proof at all.
Nevertheless, in spite of their inability to prove this proposition
rationally, they still felt that it was a true proposition.  How could people
be convinced, however, that it was a true proposition in the absence of any
rational proof?

	One solution to this problem was to resort to the following argument
by analogy:

	Suppose that a powerful king is sitting on his throne before an
audience.  A man rises and announces that he is the messenger or spokesman of
this king to his people.  He then turns to the king and says: Your majesty, if
I am speaking the truth with regard to my claim to be your spokesman, then
perform some act which is contrary to your usual custom.  If the king then
performs such an act, all those present will know that the king performed that
act only in order to confirm the truthfulness of the man claiming to be his
spokesman or messenger.  In like manner God performs a miracle by the hand of
the prophet and in so doing confirms the claim of the prophet to be telling
the truth.

	Realizing, however, that this argument by analogy fell short of being
a really convincing argument, the theologians attempted another solution to
the problem.  This was to claim that the proposition that a miracle indicates
the truthfulness of a prophet is known necessarily to be true in spite of the
fact that it cannot be classed under any of the six varieties of necessary
premisses commonly accepted as being necessarily true.

	The explanation of how such a proposition could be known necessarily
to be true and why such a solution was acceptable to Ash`arite theologians,
can be found in the Ash`arite doctrine of what can be called immediate
causality as opposed to the Mu`tazilite doctrine of mediate causality or
tawlid.

	As is well known, God's power according to Ash`arite doctrine, is
limited only by logical impossibility.  God is free to do anything except that
which involves a logical contradiction.  He cannot, for example, cause
something to exist and not exist at the same time.

	God is furthermore the immediate and only cause of everything that
exists or occurs in the universe.  All effects are caused directly by God
rather than by the causes to which we commonly ascribe these effects.  Thus,
if someone moves his hand on which he is wearing a ring God is the direct and
immediate cause not only of the movement of the hand but also of the movement
of the ring.  The movement of the ring is not caused by the movement of the
hand, nor the movement of the hand by the person who wills to move his hand.

	Because God customarily acts in accordance with certain patterns and
always, or almost always, causes the ring to move at the same time He causes
the hand to move, it appears that the movement of the hand is the cause of the
movement of the ring.  It is, however, entirely within God's power to cause
the hand to move without simultaneously causing the ring to move.

	Acts of God which are in accord with His customary pattern of acting
are known as `adiyat.  Acts which occur counter to this customary pattern are
miracles or khawariq al-`adah, which literally means things which pierce or
penetrate or go beyond the customary.

	This doctrine of immediate causality is not only used to explain the
occurrence of miracles but also to explain how knowledge is acquired.  Like
everything else knowledge is something created directly by God.  If we know
that a first principle or axiom is true, it is because God has created this
knowledge in our minds following the conception of both the subject and
predicate of the axiom.  Similarly the knowledge that the conclusion of a
syllogism is true is created by God after he has created in our minds the
knowledge of the premisses.

	This doctrine of God-caused knowledge thus explains how the
proposition that a miracle indicates the truthfulness of the prophet can be
known necessarily to be true; for when we witness a miracle and hear the words
of the prophet, God creates in our minds the knowledge that the prophet is
telling the truth.

	However, since God is not under any compulsion to act according to His
customary patterns and does, in fact, act counter to these patterns in the
case of miracles, God can refrain from creating in our minds the knowledge of
the truth of a proposition, even though that proposition might be true. Can
God, however, create in our minds the knowledge of the truth of a proposition
which in itself is false?  Can He, for example, create in our minds the
knowledge that a prophet is telling the truth when in reality the prophet is
lying?  The theologians answered this question in the negative on the grounds
that such an act on the part of God would involve a logical contradiction in
that the prophet would be both telling the truth and lying at the same time. 
God's power extends only to acts which are logically possible and He
consequently cannot create in our minds knowledge of the truth of a
proposition which in itself is false.(3)


                                END NOTES

1. See al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid I, 39-40; al-Jurjani, Sharh al-Mawaqif
II, 50-51; al-Qushji, Sharh al-Tajrid, p. 462.
 
2. See al-Razi, Qutb al-Din, Sharh al-Risalah al-Shamsiyah, II, 240;
al-Isfahani, Mata1i` al-Anzar pp. 26-7; al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid, I, 19;
al-Jurjani, Sharh al- Mawaqif, I, 123, II, 36; al-Amidi, Abkar al-Afkar, fols.
17b-18a.  It should be noted that these six premisses are derived from Ibn
Sina.  See his al-Isharat wa-al-Tanbihat, I, 213-219; al-Shifa', al-Mantiq,
al-Burhan, pp. 63-64; and al-Najah, pp. 61-66.

3. For the arguments concerning the proposition that miracles indicate the
truthfulness of prophets see al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din, al-Arba`in fi Usul al-Din,
pp. 316-324; al-Jurjani, Sharh al-Mawaqif, VIII, 228-30, 236-240;
al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid, II, pp. 131-132; al-Amidi, Abkar al-Afkar,
fols. 214b-215a, 217a-217b, 218a, 22la-221b.


                            LIST OF WORKS CITED

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volumes.  Tehran 1377-1379.

Ibn Sina, Abu `Ali al-Husayn ibn `Abd Allah, al-Najah fi al-Hikmah al-
Mantiqiyah wa-al-Tabi`iyah wa-al-Ilahiyah.  Cairo 1357/1938.

Ibn Sina, Abu `Ali al-Husayn ibn `Abd Allah, al-Shifa', al-Mantiq, al-Burhan.
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al-Jurjani, al-Sayyid al-Sharif `Ali ibn Muhammad, Sharh al-Mawaqif.  Eight
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al-Qushji, `Ala' al-Din `Ali ibn Muhammad, Sharh al-Tajrid. Tabriz(?) 1307. (A
commentary on Tajrid al-`Aqa'id of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi)

al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din Muhammad ibn `Umar, Kitab al-Arba`in fi Usul al-Din.
Hyderabad 1353.

al-Razi, Qutb al-Din Mahmud ibn Muhammad, Sharh al-Risalah al-Shamsiyah.  Two
volumes. Cairo 1323-1327.  (A commentary on Najm al-Din al-Katibi's al-Risalah
al-Shamsiyah)

al-Taftazani, Sa`d al-Din Mas`ud ibn `Umar, Sharh al-Maqasid.  Two volumes.
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al-Kalam)


					Nicholas Heer
					heer@u.washington.edu