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RELEASE IN FULL

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E. O. 12356: DECL: 8/4/88
TAGS: PINS, PINT, MILI, ES
SUBJECT: (S) EL SALVADOR MILITARY ASSESSMENT

REF: SAN SALVADOR 2327

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AT PRESENT, 29,218 MILITARY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SALVADOR FACE AN ENEMY OF ABOUT 4,000 FULL-TIME ARMED INSURGENTS. THIS REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF ARMED FORCES STRENGTH AND, IN OUR ESTIMATION, A SLIGHT DECREASE IN SUBVERSIVE NUMBERS DUE TO DESERTIONS AND CASUALTIES. BOTH SIDES

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COUNT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF FOLLOWERS IN VARIOUS STATES OF READINESS AND ARMAMENT. THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO THE ARMED FORCES IS EXPANDING SLIGHTLY AND TO INSURGENTS THROUGH CUBA AND NICARAGUA IS REMAINING STABLE.

3. THE SALVADORAN ECONOMY CONTINUES IN DECLINE ABETTED BY CUMULATIVE SUBVERSIVE DESTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC ASSETS EXCEEDING \$100 MILLION. SUBVERSIVES WERE ABLE TO PREVENT VOTING IN LESS THAN FIVE PERCENT OF THE VOTING

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Marvin
Russell, Senior Reviewer

PLACES OF SALVADOR AND ONLY TWO OF 261 MUNICIPALITIES ARE IN THEIR HANDS AT PRESENT. ALL INDICES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS ARE DOWN IN 1982. HOWEVER, CIVILIANS CONTINUE TO LEAVE EL SALVADOR IN RECORD NUMBERS.

4. THE MORALE OF THE ARMED FORCES REMAINS HIGH WITH OCCASIONAL RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT ABOUT SPECIFIC POLICIES AND LEADERS. HALF OF THE CADET LIEUTENANTS TRAINED IN THE U.S. ARE BEING UTILIZED WHILE THE REMAINDER UNDERGO FURTHER TRAINING. THE OPERATION IN MORAZAN IN JUNE ILLUSTRATED BOTH LONG STANDING WEAKNESSES IN THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE U.S. -TRAINED BATTALIONS. THE ARMED FORCES REMAIN UNITED BEHIND PRESIDENT MAGAN WITH IMPORTANT ELEMENTS WARY OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CONSTITUTENT ASSEMBLY. DESPITE THIS WARINESS GENERATED BY PERCEIVED THREATS TO U.S. AND CIVILIAN SUPPORT AND SOME DIS-SATISFACTION WITH THE HIGH COMMAND, POSSIBILITIES OF A GOLPE APPEAR SLIM. PROGRESS IS BEING MADE, ALBEIT SLOWLY ON CONTROL OF ABUSES. ARMED FORCES INABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INCREASING PROFESSIONALISM THROUGH EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS REMAINS A PROBLEM.

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5. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM CONTRIBUTED TO THIS QUARTERLY MILITARY ASSESSMENT--THE FIRST SINCE THE MARCH 28 ELECTIONS (REFTEL). END SUMMARY.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSIS: WHILE THE MARCH 28 ELECTIONS AND THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY REPRESENT BOTH A POLITICAL AND A MILITARY VICTORY FOR THE GOES, THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS REMAINS FRAGILE. NONETHELESS, AS OF NOW THE TRENDES ARE TOWARD EVENTUAL SUCCESS FOR THE GOES AND FOR LONG-RANGE U.S. POLICIES.

--SUBVERSIVES DEMONSTRATED DURING THE ELECTIONS, IN AN EARLY MAY OFFENSIVE, AND AGAIN DURING THE MORAZAN OPERATION IN JUNE THE PRESENT LIMITS OF THEIR STRENGTH.

--THE ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO GROW IN NUMBERS, PROFESSIONALISM AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR CIVILIAN AND U.S. SUPPORT.

--REGIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY IS GROWING.

--A PLURALISTIC CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT HAS WEATHERED IT FIRST TUMULTUOUS 60 DAYS AND IS SETTLING IN TO AN HISTORICALLY UNPRECEDENTED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY.

--THE ECONOMY, TARGET OF THE GUERRILLA PROLONGED WAR, HAS SURVIVED THE WORST BLOWS AGAINST IT DEMONSTRATING A RESILIENCY WHICH LEAVES IT POISED FOR RECOVERY IF SUFFICIENT EXTERNAL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESOURCES BECOME AVAILABLE.

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7. PROGRESS ON THE MILITARY FRONT IN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS IN
ESTABLISHING LONGER TERM TRENDS WILL BE MEASURED BY:
--THE ABILITY OF THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND TO UNDER-
TAKE STRATEGIC PLANNING TO USE ITS EXPANDED RESOURCES
TO TAKE AND HOLD OBJECTIVES SELECTED FOR THEIR
IMPORTANCE RATHER THAN AS REACTIONS TO SUBVERSIVE
INTIATIVES. WE EXPECT ONLY LIMITED PROGRESS.

--THE SUCCESS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN IDENTIFYING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES TO WHICH THE DIVERGENT POLITICAL INTERESTS CAN SUBSCRIBE. WE SEE SOME SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING SUCH A POLITICAL AGENDA.

--DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL PLAN FOR PEACE INCLUDING A MEANINGFUL AMNESTY PROGRAM, SOME MECHANISM FOR RECONCILIATION AND EXPANDED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, AND AN INSTITUTIONAL

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BASE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVANCES. WE EXPECT SUCH A PLAN TO EMERGE THOUGH FLAWED BY REALITIES OF PRESENT DAY EL SALVADOR, ELEMENTS BOTH OF THE LESS COMMITTED ARMED INSURGENTS AND THE MORE MODERATE POLITICAL LEFT COULD BE ATTRACTED BY IT.

--DELIVERY OF CONTINUED U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ABOVE. WE SEE CONTINUING VULNERABILITY TO A CURTAILMENT OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE WHICH WOULD DEVASTATE THE ECONOMY AND UNLEASH LATENT DESTRUCTIVE FORCES WITHIN THE MILITARY AS A CONTINUING DANGER. RISING ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING AS A RESULT OF INEQUITIES IN U.S. CONGRESSIONAL CONDITIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR COMPOUND THIS PROBLEM. EN CONCLUSIONS.

8. PART I - CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION

A. LOCATION, SIZE, LOGISTIC SITUATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES

AS OF JUNE 1982 THE COMBINED STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES WAS 29,218. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE PERHAPS AS MANY AS 80,000 PARA-MILITARY FORCES CONSISTING OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE UNITS, TERRITORIAL FORCES AND OTHER GROUPS IN VARYING STAGES OF READINESS. THE ARMY CONSISTS OF 17,691 PEOPLE ORGANIZED IN 19 DIFFERENT BATTALION-SIZED MANEUVER UNITS, ONE ARTILLERY BRIGADE AND A CAVALRY REGIMENT. THERE ARE 423 NAVY, 754 AIR FORCE, 3,447 NATIONAL GUARD, 4,887 NATIONAL POLICE, AND 2,016 TREASURY POLICE. THE COUNTRY IS DIVIDED INTO SIX MILITARY ZONES. WHILE CRITICAL SHORTAGES OF FIREARMS, SUPPLIES AND MUNITIONS CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES, THE ONLY KNOWN CRITICAL SHORTAGE WHICH COULD AFFECT

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SHORT-TERM MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY IS FUEL. THIS PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY THE RECENT INSURGENT INTERDICTION OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND COULD BE REMEDIED BY CONVOYING

GASOLINE TRUCKS UNDER MILITARY ESCORT.

B. INSURGENTS

THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF POSTULATES APPROXIMATELY 10,000 GUERRILLAS NOT ALL OF WHOM ARE ARMED AND PUTS TOTAL POTENTIAL SUBVERSIVES, INCLUDING PART-TIME MILITIA AND MASSES OR FOLLOWERS, AT 50,000 PLUS. WE BELIEVE A CASE CAN BE MADE THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 4,000 COMBATANTS AND 5,000 TO 10,000 MILITIA WITH AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS. THIS MAY BE SLIGHTLY LOWER THAN THE FIGURE WE UNDERSTAND THE WASHINGTON ANALYTICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE HAS ADOPTED OF FOUR TO FIVE THOUSAND ARMED COMBATANTS AND 8,000-13,000 MILITIA. OUR PRIMARY REASON FOR A LOWER FIGURE IS THAT GUERRILLA OPERATIONS DO NOT INDICATE HIGHER FIGURES. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE MORAZAN FIGHTING IN THE FIRST PART OF JULY, BATTLEFIELD COMMANDERS REPORT DECREASING MILITARY EXPERIENCE AMONG THE SUBVERSIVES. PARTICULARLY MENTIONED ARE POOR MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER TECHNIQUES, LACK OF FIRE DISCIPLINE AND INCREASING NUMBERS OF FEMALES AND YOUNG PEOPLE. IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT WHILE FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND OF THE BEST TRAINED SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES WERE TIED DOWN IN MORAZAN, SUBVERSIVES WERE UNABLE TO MOUNT A SUSTAINED MILITARY CAMPAIGN ELSEWHERE. THEY CONCENTRATED ON THE SOFTEST OF TARGETS--INTERDICTING HIGHWAYS, BOMBING BUSES, AND ATTACKS ON THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM.

SUBVERSIVES ARE LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BUT ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN SECTORS PRIMARILY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENTS OF USulután, SAN VICENTE, CUSCATLÁN, CHALATENANGO, AND MORAZÁN.

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OUR REDUCED ESTIMATE OF FORCE LEVELS IS BASED ON A VIEW THAT OVERALL STRENGTH HAS DECLINED SOMEWHAT IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS DUE TO CASUALTIES AND DESERTIONS. HOWEVER, THE EVIDENCE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE.

C. THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO ARMED FORCES OF SALVADOR
THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE OTHER THAN EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING HAS BEEN PROVIDED ALMOST ENTIRELY BY HONDURAS IN THE FORM OF INTERDICTION OF INFILTRATION FROM NICARAGUA ACROSS THE GULF OF FONSECA AND THE HONDURAS/EL SALVADOR BORDER. RECENTLY, THIS COOPERATION INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY WHEN MULTI-BATTALION HONDURAN FORCES WERE DEPLOYED IN BLOCKING POSITIONS ALONG THE BORDER WITH MORAZAN PROVINCE TO SUPPORT A SALVADORAN OPERATION. DURING THIS OPERATION, HONDURAN AIRCRAFT FLEW RECONNAISSANCE AND STRIKE MISSIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER.

OTHER THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE IS AS FOLLOWS:

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1 NATIONALIST CHINA HAS OFFERED AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF SCHOOL

QUOTAS AT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COURSE.

2) VENEZUELA HAS OFFERED 50 QUOTAS FOR CADETS/JUNIOR OFFICERS TO ATTEND THE "CAZADORES" SCHOOL. AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF MEDICS ARE ALSO TO BE TRAINED IN VENEZUELA. THERE ARE CURRENTLY FIVE SALVADORAN CADETS IN VENEZUELAN MILITARY ACADEMIES.

VENEZUELA IS EXPECTED TO SEND A MOBILE TRAINING TEAM FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TO EL SALVADOR IN JULY.

VENEZUELA HAS DEPLOYED TWO MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS IN SALVADOR WITH APPROXIMATELY 30 INSTRUCTORS TO TRAIN TWO "CAZADORES" LIGHT BATTALIONS AND AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF SALVADORANS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS. THIS IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE AN INCREASE IN END STRENGTH, BUT RATHER TRAINING FOR PERSONNEL/UNITS ALREADY IN SERVICE. WHETHER THESE UNITS WILL RECEIVE ANY EQUIPMENT IS UNKNOWN,

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ALTHOUGH A SMALL NUMBER OF FAL RIFLES HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED IN TO EL SALVADOR FROM VENEZUELA.

3) COLOMBIA IS PROVIDING FOUR OR FIVE QUOTAS FOR LANCERO SCHOOL THIS YEAR.

4) ARGENTINA WILL SELL EL SALVADOR AN UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF 9MM BROWNING PISTOLS, MACHINE PISTOLS, 9MM AMMUNITION, AND .38 CALIBER AMMUNITION. ARGENTINA HAS OFFERED EL SALVADOR ONE HUNDRED MILLION U.S. DOLLARS IN DEFENSE LOANS. EL SALVADOR IS EXPECTED TO DECLINE THIS LOAN DUE TO ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. FIVE SALVADORANS ARE ATTENDING AN INTELLIGENCE COURSE IN ARGENTINA.

5) CHILE IS CURRENTLY TRAINING THIRTY-TWO SALVADORANS IN A VARIETY OF SCHOOLS.

6) THERE IS ONE SALVADORAN CADET AT THE PERUVIAN AIR FORCE ACADEMY.

7) THERE ARE SIX SALVADORANS ATTENDING VARIOUS MILITARY SCHOOLS IN PARAGUAY.

8) THERE IS ONE SALVADORAN OFFICER AT THE MILITARY ENGINEERING SCHOOL IN MEXICO.

9) THERE ARE NO KNOWN SIGNIFICANT TRANSFERS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THIRD COUNTRIES TO EL SALVADOR.

D. THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO SUBVERSIVES
THIRD COUNTRY RESUPPLY ASSISTANCE TO THE SUBVERSIVE ELEMENT IN EL SALVADOR DESPITE THE TWO-MONTH LULL FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS HAS SHOWN THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS:

--THERE HAS NOT BEEN A DECREASE IN THE LEVEL OF RESUPPLY ACTIVITY.

--THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MAINLINE GUERRILLAS WITH M-16, FAL AND G-3 RIFLES.

--THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF MONEY NEEDED TO RUN GUERRILLA CAMP SYSTEMS.

--THERE HAS BEEN A SEASONAL CHANGE FROM MAINLY SEA TO MAINLY AIR DELIVERIES ALONG WITH A SLIGHT INCREASE IN LAND RESUPPLY.

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--THERE IS A POSSIBLE CONNECTION WITH CUBAN AIR DELIVERY TO NICARAGUA, ILLUSTRATED BY THE INCREASED CUBAN DELIVERIES IN THE WEEKS PRECEDING THE SALVADORAN ELECTIONS, AND THE LEVEL OF ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE SALVADORAN INSURGENCY. THIS OBSERVATION WAS AGAIN MADE DURING THE INCREASED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AT THE END OF JUNE/BEGINNING OF JULY.

THIRD COUNTRY RESUPPLY ASSISTANCE TO THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR IS STILL BEING CHanneled THROUGH CUBA AND NICARAGUA. SOVIET, CUBAN, VIETNAMESE AND NORTH KOREAN RESUPPLY ASSISTANCE IS NEVER DIRECTLY DELIVERED. RATHER, MATERIEL, ARMAMENTS, FOOD, MEDICINE, AND MONEY IS LAUNDERED EITHER THROUGH CUBA OR NICARAGUA OR, UPON OCCASION, MEXICO. (NOTE: MOST DELIVERIES THROUGH MEXICO ARE DESTINED FOR GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS.)

THIRD COUNTRY RESUPPLY METHODS STILL INVOLVE ALL THREE ROUTES, CONSISTING OF AIR, SEA AND LAND. A PATTERN OF EBB AND FLOW OF RESUPPLY DELIVERIES APPEARS PRIMARILY TO BE TIED TO WEATHER CONDITIONS AND, SECONDLY, TO AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORT VEHICLES. BUT, AN UPSURGE OF DELIVERIES HAS BEEN NOTED ON OCCASION DUE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL REVERSES ON THE SIDE OF THE GUERRILLAS. HUMINT REPORTING FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR DID DISCUSS NICARAGUAN, CUBAN AND SOVIET REEVALUATION OF RESUPPLY AND SUPPORT EFFORTS FOR THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS AND ITS ATTENDANT GAIN. HOWEVER, HEAVY PRESS COVERAGE REGARDING ARMS DELIVERIES TO NICARAGUA MAY HAVE HAD THIS EFFECT. SINCE THE END OF MAY/BEGINNING OF JUNE, RESUPPLY EFFORTS APPEAR TO HAVE RESUMED AT PREVIOUS LEVELS. DELIVERY PERIODS APPEAR TO BE APRIL THROUGH OCTOBER LARGELY BY AIR, AUGUST THROUGH JANUARY LARGELY BY LAND, JANUARY THROUGH MARCH LARGELY BY SEA. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT AT ANY GIVEN TIME ALL THREE ALL THREE METHODS OF LAND, SEA AND AIR APPEAR TO BE USED IN CONTINUOUS CONSORT. A "WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE/ ATTITUDE SEEMS TO PREVAIL; BUT THE PLANNING FOR WHAT IS AVAILABLE IS DONE TWO TO THREE MONTHS BEFORE

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THE SYSTEM IS CHANGED.

NO NEW LEVEL OF WEAPONRY SOPHISTICATION HAS BEEN INTRODUCED THIS QUARTER. HOWEVER, A RAID ON A SUBVERSIVE SAFE HOUSE IN SAN SALVADOR IN EARLY JULY NETTED WEAPONS OF RUSSIAN ORIGIN AMONG OTHERS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW RUSSIAN GRENADES, FUSES AND RPG-2'S FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA, ALL WEAPONRY PREVIOUSLY HAND BEEN OF WESTERN MANUFACTURE.

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THIRD COUNTRY TRAINING OF SALVADORAN INSURGENTS OUTSIDE EL SALVADOR HAS REMAINED AT THE SAME HIGH LEVEL. TRAINING IS PROVIDED IN NICARAGUA, CUBA, MEXICO AND POSSIBLY VIETNAM. TRAINING WITHIN EL SALVADOR, WITHIN THE LAST QUARTER, HAS INCREASED AS INDICATED BY THE EXPANSION OF THE TRAINING CAMPS AND TRAINING FACILITIES; E.G., MORAZAN. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASED SPECIALIZATION WITHIN THE FPL TO INCLUDE VANGUARD UNITS AND SPECIAL FORCES UNITS.

THIRD COUNTRY DELIVERIES ARE NOT LARGE. THE DELIVERIES USUALLY AVERAGE BETWEEN FIVE TO EIGHT THOUSAND POUNDS. IF THE MATERIAL IS PARA-DROPPED, IT USUALLY IS IN 100-POUND LOADS. IF THE MATERIAL IS LANDED BY PLANE, IT IS UNKNOWN HOW THE MATERIAL IS

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PACKAGED. AIR DELIVERIES ARE PROBABLY LANDED VERSUS AIR DROPPED. IF THE MATERIAL IS DELIVERED BY BOAT, DELIVERIES CAN BE AS LARGE AS 16,000 POUNDS, BUT IT IS UNKNOWN AS TO THE NUMBER OF BOATS, PANGAS AND FISHING BOATS NEEDED FOR SUCH A DELIVERY. LAND DELIVERIES SINCE THE CRACKDOWN LAST NOVEMBER HAVE BEEN IN EXTREMELY SMALL AMOUNTS; I.E., 7-10 RIFLES.

CURRENTLY, GUERRILLA NEEDS APPEAR TO BE AMMUNITION FOR RIFLES, MORTARS AND THE RPG-2 ROCKET LAUNCHERS; MATERIAL TO BUILD EXPLOSIVES, CHLORATE AND COPPER TUBING; SHOES AND MEDICINE. MEDICINE, HOWEVER, IS USUALLY PURCHASED IN SAN SALVADOR. MOST OF THE MAINLINE GUERRILLAS APPEAR TO HAVE M-16, FAL, OR G-3 RIFLES IN FAIR CONDITION. ONLY 45-50 PERCENT OF THE MILITIA APPEAR TO HAVE ANY KIND OF WEAPON AND IT IS USUALLY IN WORN CONDITION. EACH 150-MAN UNIT TRIES TO HAVE A LEAST ONE 81MM MORTAR AND TWO RPG-2 ROCKET LAUNCHERS PER 25 MEN AND ONE SNIPER PER 25 MEN, DEPENDING ON EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY. THIS INDICATES A SOMEWHAT INADEQUATE TO&#amp;E FOR MAINLINE UNITS.

DUE TO FAILED INSURGENT OPERATIONS DURING THE ELECTIONS AND DEPLETED SUPPLIES, THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN APRIL AND THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF MAY IN DESERTIONS AND A RISE IN MORALE PROBLEMS AND INCREASED FRICTION BETWEEN FACTIONS. NEW PLANS AND RESUPPLY DELIVERIES WERE MADE TO OVERCOME THESE PROBLEMS. EVIDENTLY, BY THE BEGINNING OF JUNE, ADEQUATE RESUPPLY FOR ALL AREAS WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND MORALE AND UNREST WITHIN THE VARIOUS FACTIONS SUBSIDED. THREE-QUARTERS OF THE CURRENT RESUPPLY APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY AIR AND ONE-QUARTER BY LAND. THERE WAS A DISTINCT DROP IN SEA

DELIVERIES AFTER APRIL. HOWEVER, A FEW HAVE BEEN NOTED.

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GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN JUNE INDICATE ADEQUATE SUPPLY LEVELS TO SUPPORT THE ERP TARGETS OF PARALYZING LOCAL TRANSPORTATION AND THE FPL TARGETS OF GOVERNMENT ELECTRICAL, TELEPHONE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. ADEQUATE SUPPLIES ALSO APPEAR TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT NEW GUERRILLA TACTICS OF ATTACKING AND MANEUVERING RATHER THAN ATTACKING AND WITHDRAWING. IF THE GUERRILLAS CANNOT MAINTAIN THESE SUPPLY LEVELS, THEN THEY PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO REVERT BACK TO THEIR PREVIOUS TACTICS.

9. PART II - IMPACT OF MILITARY SITUATION ON CIVILIAN ACTIVITY

A. THE ECONOMY

ATTACKS ON THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE HAVE BEEN MOST SEVERE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SAN VICENTE AND THE AREA EAST OF THE LEMPA RIVER. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE AREAS ACCOUNT FOR ALMOST HALF OF THE SALVADORAN TERRITORY BUT LESS THAN A QUARTER OF THE NATION'S ECONOMY. IN RECENT WEEKS, SAN SALVADOR HAS ALSO SEEN A RENEWAL OF URBAN TERRORISM, DIRECTED CHIEFLY AGAINST THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM. ATTACKS DURING THIS PERIOD HAVE BEEN, ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY, HARASSING ACTIONS IN WHICH ONLY THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MANY PINPRICKS IS IMPORTANT.

NATIONWIDE, FROM APRIL 1 TO JUNE 30, SOME 77 ELECTRICAL FACILITIES WERE DAMAGED OR DESTROYED, INCLUDING 58 ELECTRICAL TOWERS WHICH COST SLIGHTLY MORE THAN \$800,000 TO REPAIR ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS. SINCE AUGUST 1980, SOME 346 ELECTRICAL TOWERS HAVE BEEN DAMAGED OR DESTROYED, WITH AN ESTIMATED COST OF \$4.7 MILLION TO RETURN THEM TO SERVICE. MORE IMPORTANTLY, AS ATTACKS ON THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM ISOLATE AREAS FROM THE PRIMARY GENERATING SOURCE, SECONDARY GENERATING FACILITIES MUST BE UTILIZED. WHILE THE PRIMARY GENERATING SOURCES ARE HYDROELECTRIC OR GEOTHERMAL, THE SECONDARY SOURCES ARE PETROLEUM BASED. FROM APRIL 1 TO JUNE 30, RELIANCE ON PETROLEUM-BASED ELECTRICITY

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INCREASED THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE ENERGY COST TO EL SALVADOR BY \$1.7 MILLION. SINCE AUGUST 1980, RELIANCE ON OTHERWISE UNNECESSARY PETROLEUM-BASED ENERGY HAS INCREASED EL SALVADOR'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS BY \$8.5 MILLION. INCLUDING THE INDIRECT COST OF UTILIZING PETROLEUM-BASED ENERGY, THE PRICE TAG FOR LEFTIST

DESTRUCTION OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM FROM APRIL 1ST TO JUNE 30TH WAS \$2.6 MILLION; CUMULATIVELY FROM AUGUST 1980, THE PRICE TAG WAS \$13.6 MILLION, NOT INCLUDING THE COST OF PERMANENT REPAIR OF TOWERS WHICH HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO SERVICE ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS ONLY.

THE CHIEF IMPACT OF ATTACKS ON THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM IS NOT THE HIGH COST OF REPAIR. IT IS THE INDIRECT INTERRUPTION OF PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES IN MAJOR PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THE DEPARTMENT OF SAN MIGUEL, HOME OF THE NATION'S THIRD LARGEST CITY AND

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A CENTER FOR COTTON, LIVESTOCK, DAIRY PRODUCTS, AND LIGHT INDUSTRY, WAS WITHOUT POWER FOR 126 DAYS IN 1981. AS OF JULY 7, SAN MIGUEL HAD BEEN WITHOUT POWER FOR 63 DAYS IN 1982. THE DEPARTMENTS OF USULUTAN AND LA UNION, CENTERS FOR COTTON GROWING, FISHING, AND LIGHT INDUSTRY, SUFFERED SIMILAR PROBLEMS.

LEFTIST ATTACKS ON THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM TAKE ON AN ADDED SIGNIFICANCE WHEN VIEWED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THEIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, ESPECIALLY URBAN TRANSPORTATION IN SAN SALVADOR AND INTERDEPARTMENTAL TRANSPORTATION IN THE EASTERN SECTION OF THE COUNTRY. THE GUERRILLAS' CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE FLOW OF TRAFFIC AND INTERRUPT IT ALMOST AT WILL HAS ALLOWED THEM TO CUT OFF ALMOST COMPLETELY THE FLOW OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, ESPECIALLY

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FUEL OIL, TO THE EAST. THUS, TEMPORARY GENERATORS, ALWAYS A SECOND BEST SOLUTION, HAVE BEEN EVEN LESS ABLE TO MAKE UP FOR THE INTERRUPTIONS IN ELECTRICAL FLOW THROUGH THE MAIN POWER GRID. THIS HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY CRITICAL FOR HOSPITALS AND WATER PUMPING STATIONS, AS WELL AS FOR FACTORIES, DAIRIES, COTTON AND COFFEE PROCESSING PLANTS, COLD STORAGE FACILITIES FOR SEAFOOD PRODUCTS, AND LIGHT INDUSTRY.

DURING THE APRIL TO JUNE QUARTER, SOME 33 BUSES AND EIGHT OTHER VEHICLES WERE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS OF SAN SALVADOR. NATIONWIDE, DURING THAT SAME PERIOD, AN ADDITIONAL 74 BUSES WERE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED. THE HAZARDS OF TRAVEL TO THE EAST HAVE CAUSED MAJOR TRANSPORT COMPANIES VIRTUALLY TO SUSPEND OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA, WITH ADVERSE RESULTS FOR ALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY THERE, ESPECIALLY IN THE SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM AND THE SHIPMENT OF SEAFOOD PRODUCTS BY LAND TO GUATEMALAN PORTS ON THE CARIBBEAN.

ARMED LEFTIST ACTIVITY CONTINUES TO TAKE A HEAVY TOLL ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. ESPECIALLY IN THE COTTON GROWING AREA OF USULUTAN AND THE COFFEE GROWING AREAS OF SAN VICENTE AND SAN MIGUEL, TERRORIST ACTIVITY HAS FORCED A MAJOR REDUCTION, AND IN SOME CASES A COMPLETE HALT, TO PRODUCTION. FORTY PHASE I COOPS, AMONG THE LARGEST AND POTENTIALLY MOST PRODUCTIVE

FARMS IN THE COUNTRY, STILL ARE UNABLE TO RESUME OPERATIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR INABILITY TO BRING IN INPUTS AND TECHNICAL ADVISORS, BECAUSE THEY CANNOT FREELY TRANSPORT THEIR OUTPUT, AND BECAUSE LOCAL GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES DIRECTLY THREATEN WORK IN THE FIELDS.

ESTIMATES OF TOTAL LEFTIST DAMAGE TO THE ECONOMY, INCLUDING DIRECT DAMAGE TO ECONOMIC ASSETS AND THE

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INDIRECT DAMAGE OF IMPEDING PRODUCTION, ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. CUMULATIVE LEFTIST DESTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC ASSETS EXCEEDS \$100 MILLION. COMBINING LEFTIST DESTRUCTION OF ASSETS, NORMAL DEPRECIATION, AND THE LOW LEVEL OF INVESTMENT CAUSED BY UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE COURSE AND THE SECURITY OF PRODUCTIVE OPERATIONS, EL SALVADOR HAS HAD A NEGATIVE REAL NET INVESTMENT. THAT IS, THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF THE NATION HAS DECLINED SHARPLY IN ABSOLUTE TERMS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS.

B. MUNICIPALITIES IN CONFLICT

THE ESAF'S CURRENT CONCEPT FOR DEFENDING ITS POPULATION CALLS FOR A STATIC DEFENSE WITH LOCAL PATROLLING IN SELECTED CITIES, TOWN AND VILLAGES. ALTHOUGH APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IS TIED UP IN THIS TASK, THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH TROOPS TO SPREAD AROUND IN EVERY SMALL RURAL TOWN. THEREFORE, IN THE COUNTRYSIDE THE DETACHMENTS TEND TO BE SMALL, AND THE GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OVERRUN AND SEIZE A PARTICULAR TOWN FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. COMMITMENT OF SUFFICIENT ESAF TROOPS HAS ALWAYS RESULTED IN THE TOWN BEING RECAPTURED. RECENT EXAMPLES INCLUDE PERQUIN AND SAN FERNANDO IN MORAZAN. EL CARRIZAL AND OJOS DE AGUA, TWO OTHER TOWNS CAPTURED IN JUNE, ARE STILL UNDER GUERRILLA CONTROL SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ESAF HAS NOT YET COMMITTED ASSETS TO RESEIZE THEM.

URBAN TERRORISM. INCIDENTS IN THE LARGER CITIES (E.G., SAN SALVADOR, SAN MIGUEL, ETC.) HAVE BEEN PRIMARILY DIRECTED AT THE INFRASTRUCTURE: PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, HIGH TENSION CABLES, AND THE TELEPHONE BOXES, THROUGH POLICE HAVE RECENTLY BECOME TARGETS. ASSASSINATIONS OF UNPROMINENT INDIVIDUALS ARE ALSO A COMMON OCCURENCE. RECENTLY THERE HAVE BEEN UNCONFIRMED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT THE INSURGENTS INTEND TO RENEW URBAN INSURGENCY ON A LARGE SCALE.

THE ONLY SYSTEMATIC TEST OF GOVERNMENT VS. INSURGENT CONTROL THROUGHOUT SALVADOR TOOK PLACE

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AT THE TIME OF THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS WHICH THE
GUERRILLAS MADE A MAJOR EFFORT TO PREVENT. AT THAT
TIME, THE GOVERNMENT WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT
AUTHORITY SO THAT VOTING TOOK PLACE IN ALL BUT
APPROXIMATELY 20 OF THE MORE THAN 500 VOTING PLACES IN EL
SALVADOR.

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AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PAN/INTAFF

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C. VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS

ALL INDICES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS HAVE SHOWED A DOWNWARD TREND SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1982 THOUGH THE PATTERN HAS BEEN ERRATIC. THERE HAS TENDED TO BE AN UPSURGE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIAN AT TIMES OF HEAVY INSURGENT ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY PRIOR TO THE ELECTION. PRESS REPORTS OF VIOLENT CIVILIAN DEATHS NOW AVERAGE APPROXIMATELY 50 PER WEEK AS COMPARED TO 100 AT THE END OF 1981 AND AS MANY AS 200 EARLIER IN 1981.

URBAN TERRORISM HAS NOT BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD INFLECTING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. FOR EXAMPLE, SINCE JULY 1981 THERE HAVE BEEN 234 BOMB EXPLOSIONS WITHIN THE CITY OF SAN SALVADOR. THESE ARE BROKEN DOWN AS

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FOLLOWS: 83 BUSES, SEVEN ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, 44 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND 100 BUSINESSES OR PRIVATE PROPERTIES. OUT OF THESE 234 INCIDENTS ONLY TEN DEATHS WERE REPORTED, INCLUDING THREE POLICEMEN.

FOREIGNERS HAVE NOT BEEN THE OBJECTS OF SPECIFIC ATTACKS DURING THE CURRENT WAVE OF URBAN TERRORISM THOUGH THE PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR'S VEHICLE WAS BOMBED ON JUNE 30, 1982. INFORMATION REGARDING THIS BOMBING INDICATE IT WAS ONE OF OPPORTUNITY RATHER THAN A PLANNED ATTACK. THE ONLY OTHER INCIDENT WAS THE THROWING OF A GRENADE INTO THE GARDEN OF THE VENEZUELAN EMBASSY IN FEBRUARY.

D. POPULATION TRENDS

VISA FIGURES INDICATE SALVADORANS HAVE BEEN LEAVING THE COUNTRY IN RECORD NUMBERS. WE PROCESSED 8,688 IMMIGRANT VISAS CASES IN FY 81 AND EXPECT AT LEAST 11,000 IN FY 82. IN FY 81, 43,786 NON-IMMIGRANT VISA APPLICATIONS WERE PROCESSED, AND WE EXPECT 50,000

IN FY 82. WE ARE SEEING AN INCREASING NUMBER OF ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS AS NIV HOLDERS OPT TO STAY IN THE U.S. RATHER THAN RETURN TO EL SALVADOR. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION CONTINUES AT HIGH LEVELS WITH PERHAPS ONE-HALF MILLION SALVADORANS LIVING IN THE U.S. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE THE OVERALL REFUGEE POPULATION OUTSIDE OF EL SALVADOR, IT MAY TOTAL AS MANY AS 800,000. THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY INCREASE IN PERSONS APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE U.S. DURING FY 82. ON THE OTHER HAND, RECENT FIGURES PROVIDED BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR INDICATE THAT THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT IS NOW ISSUING FEWER PASSPORTS THAN DURING 1981.

THE GOES POPULATION PROJECTION FOR 1982 IS 4.8

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MILLION. LIMITED VITAL STATISTICS WOULD INDICATE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SLIGHT DECLINE IN POPULATION GROWTH RATE OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS. THE DISPLACED PERSONS ESTIMATE FOR JUNE 1982 IS 182,000, DOWN FROM A HIGH OF 225,000 IN APRIL AND FROM 212,000 AT THE END OF 1981. THIS IS A RESULT OF REFINED CENSUS TECHNIQUES AND A REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL CONFLICTIVE AREAS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE ALLOWING THE RETURN OF SOME DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR PLACE OF ORIGIN. THE U.S. CITIZEN POPULATION SHOWED AN INCREASE TO 1200 DURING FY 81 AFTER SHOWING A DECREASE FOR TWO YEARS RUNNING.

10. PART III- PROFESSION OF ARMED FORCES
A. LEADERSHIP, COHESIVENESS OF OFFICER CORPS,
ABSORPTION OF U.S.-TRAINED OFFICERS

THE MORAG OF (#)
VGRADE AND JUNIOR OFFICERS HIGHLY MOTIVATED AND
PREPARED FOR THE LONG HAUL.

DURING THE LATTER WEEKS OF THE QUARTER SOME RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT HAVE BEEN SURFACING. AS THE EUPHORIA OF THE SUCCESSFUL MARCH 1982 ELECTIONS WEARS OFF, MANY OFFICERS AT ALL LEVEL ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE JULY CERTIFICATION AND BEYOND. THE QUESTION IS: WILL EL SALVADOR BECOME ANOTHER NICARAGUA, ABANDONED BY THE U.S. AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE?

A BRIEF SURGE OF DISCONTENT SURFACED IN JUNE WHEN IN THE FACE OF THE LOSS OF A BRIGADE COMMANDER AND THE SUB-SECRETARY OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MANY OFFICERS, IN THEIR FRUSTRATION, BLAMED THESE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE LACK OF LEADERSHIP BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE WHO WAS VIEWED AS TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH POLITICAL MANEUVERING TO PROSECUTE THE WAR. WITH THE WIND-DOWN OF OPERATIONS RESCATE THIS CRITICISM HAS SUBSIDED, HOWEVER.

INSOFAR AS THE ABSORPTION OF U.S. TRAINED OFFICERS IS CONCERNED, THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS AT ALL

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WITH THOSE ASSIGNED TO THE THREE QUICK-REACTION BATTALIONS. THEY CONTINUE TO DO WELL IN THE FIELD AND ARE HIGHLY PRIZED BY THEIR COMMANDERS. HOWEVER, HALF OF THE CADET LIEUTENANTS ARE SERVING IN ALL DEPARTMENTS IN ALL THREE SERVICES, WHILE THE REMAINDER RECEIVE ADDITIONAL TRAINING AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL. EVENTUALLY BOTH GROUPS WILL ROTATE. THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE FIELD. IN AN ARMY SORELY LACKING IN JUNIOR OFFICER LEADERSHIP, DEPARTMENTAL AND DETACHMENT COMMANDERS HAVE NOT ALWAYS USED THESE HIGHLY-TRAINED ASSETS WELL. IN SOME INSTANCES THEY ARE USED TO TRAIN RECRUITS, WHILE IN OTHERS THEY RUN GUARD DETAILS. SOME RESENTMENT OF THESE

NOTE BY OC/T: (#) GARBLE/OMISSION PARA 10. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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"GRINGO-TRAINED HOTSHOTS" HAS BEEN RECEIVED AS WELL.

B. FUNCTIONING OF COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL HEADQUARTERS COMMAND
CAPABILITY CONTINUES TO IMPROVE (ALBEIT AT TIMES SLOWLY)
AND, PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY, THEY REMAIN OPEN TO
SUGGESTIONS AND CHANGE. THEIR GREATEST SHORTCOMING
STILL LIES IN THEIR TENDENCY TO REACT TO INSURGENT
INITIATIVES RATHER THAN TAKE THE OFFENSIVE. THE LATEST
EPISODES IN CHALATENANGO AND MORAZAN WHERE AMPLE
EVIDENCE OF THE FOREGOING. A MAJOR SHORTCOMING LIES
BETWEEN HEADQUARTERS AND THE SIX BRIGADE COMMANDERS.
THE BRIGADE COMMANDERS PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS
OFTEN WITHOUT PRECOGNIZANCE BY THE HIGH COMMAND. THIS
FAILURE HAS CREATED SITUATIONS WHERE THE HIGH COMMAND
MUST ATTEMPT TO "CATCH UP" TO THE OPERATIONS IN TERMS
OF TACTICAL SUPPORT, LOGISTICS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

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THE PROPENSITY FOR THE BRIGADE COMMANDERS TO TAKE
UNILATERAL ACTION THAT ULTIMATELY IMPACTS ELSEWHERE HAS
RESULTED IN POORLY PLANNED, EXECUTED AND SUPPORTED
OPERATIONS, HAS DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED
COMBAT CASUALTIES AND EQUIPMENT LOSS, AND PROVIDED
THE INSURGENT WITH A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA
ADVANTAGE. WE HAVE PROVIDED BY SEPTTEL A DETAILED
CRITIQUE OF WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE AREAS FOR POTENTIAL
IMPROVEMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES AS WELL AS A BRIEF
ANALYSIS OF OPERATION RESCATE IN MORAZAN FROM
JUNE 5 UNTIL JULY 2, 1982. U.S. TRAINERS WORKING
SPECIFICALLY WITH THE ARMED FORCES DIRECTORATES OF
INTELLIGENCE AND OF OPERATIONS BELIEVE MANY OF THESE

PROBLEMS HAVE WORKABLE SOLUTIONS AND HAVE FOUND A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF STAFF OFFICERS TO ADDRESS THEM. ALTHOUGH MUCH REMAINS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AT THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, THE SIGNIFICANT COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS APPEAR TO BE AT THE BRIGADE LEVEL AND WILL REQUIRE FURTHER ATTENTION.

C. UTILIZATION OF U.S. EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING, INCLUDING PERFORMANCE OF U.S.-TRAINED RAPID REACTION FORCES

LACK OF AN ADEQUATE TRAINING BASE, THE RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ARMED FORCES, A SHORTAGE OF TRAINED OFFICERS AT BRIGADE AND BATTALION STAFF LEVEL, AND DAILY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS CONTINUE TO HAMPER THE EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION AND UTILIZATION OF U.S.-PROVIDED EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. THESE WEAKNESSES ARE RECOGNIZED BY THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF, AND THE D-3 IS ATTEMPTING TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION. CONSIDERABLE EFFORT IS BEING EXPENDED TO REPRODUCE THE TRAINING MATERIAL, MANUALS, ETC. THAT HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO THE

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U.S. TRAINED UNITS AND PERSONNEL. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING DISSEMINATED TO THE REMAINDER OF THE ARMED FORCES. MEANWHILE, THE NON-U.S. TRAINED UNITS WILL REMAIN WEAK IN THE AREAS OF SMALL UNIT TACTICS, PATROLLING, AIRMOBILE AND NIGHT OPERATIONS, WEAPONS TRAINING AND THE EFFECTIVE USE OF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS. THE D-3 VIEWS CONTINUED U.S. TRAINING, BOTH IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY, AS THE LONG TERM SOLUTION.

THE U.S.-TRAINED UNITS ARE PERFORMING WELL. THE THREE RAPID REACTION BATTALIONS, ATACATL, BELLOSO AND ATONAL, CARRY THE MAJRO LOAD IN THE OPERATIONS THEY PARTICIPATE IN. DURING SIX OF THE LAST SEVEN WEEKS, THESE UNITS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN ALMOST CONSTANT COMBAT OPERATIONS WITH HEAVY FIGHTING INVOLVED. THEIR MORALE AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS REMAINS HIGH. DURING THE RECENT OPERATION IN NORTHERN MORAZAN PROVINCE, THE GOVERNMENT WAS ABLE TO TURN THE TIDE AND GAIN THE INITIATIVE ONLY AS A RESULT OF THE COORDINATED ACTIONS OF THE THREE BATTALIONS. LEADERSHIP, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND TACTICAL TECHNIQUES IN THSE THREE UNITS GREATLY SURPASSES THAT FOUND IN OTHER UNITS. DURING THE MORAZAN OPERATION, AIR GROUND OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED WITH SOME EFFECTIVENESS, AND THE A-37 PACKAGE WAS EMPLOYED IN A ROLE SIMILAR TO THAT USED BY U.S. FORCES.

A MAJOR WEAKNESS THAT RMEAINS IS THE FAILURE TO UTILIZE THE LIMITED AIRMOBILE CAPABILITY TO AIRLIFT TROOPS DIRECTLY INTO COMBAT OPERATIONS. BRIGADE COMMANDERS AND THEIR STAFFS PLAN AND CONDUCT ALL COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THEIR ESPECTIVE AREAS. THEY USE THE AIRMOBILE ASSETS PIECEMEAL, AND MAINLY FOR RESUPPLY AND

MEDICAL EVACUATION PURPOSES. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBLEM IS THE FACT THAT THE EXISTING HELICOPTERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS ON A DAILY BASIS TO AIRLIFT MORE THAN A PLOTOON AT A TIME. IN JULY 1982 THERE WERE AN AVERAGE OF 32 MILITARY TRAINERS IN COUNTRY. THE AVERAGE OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS HAS BEEN 40. WE FIND THESE

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NUMBERS ADEQUATE THOUGH OCCASIONAL TEMPORARY SURGES PRESS AGAINST THE CEILING OF 55. THERE WOULD BE FEWER OPERATING PROBLEMS IF THE CEILING WERE OBSERVED ON A BASIS OF AVERAGES RATHER THAN ON AN ABSOLUTE BASIS.

D. CIVILIAN/MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

THE ARMED FORCES IS THE TRADITIONAL PIVOTAL ELEMENT IN SALVADORAN POLITICS. THROUGH THREAT OR ACTUAL USE OF FORCE, THE MILITARY HAS HISTORICALLY DETERMINED DEGREE OF CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE OUTCOME OF TRANSITIONS IN NATIONAL POLITICS. THIS WAS PROVEN ONCE AGAIN BOTH IN THEIR DECISION NOT TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE MARCH ELECTIONS AND LATER TO INTERVENE DECISIVELY IN DETERMINING THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW PROVISIONAL

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INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PAN/INTAFF

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GOVERNMENT. THE HIGH COMMAND HAS CONTINUED TO ACT UNEQUIVOCALLY WHEN IT SAW ITS OWN INTERESTS THREATENED. THEY BOTH PUBLICLY COUNTERED THE ACTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ON AGRARIAN REFORM THROUGH A MAJOR SHOW OF SUPPORT FOR IT AND PRIVATELY AND QUIETLY SCUTTLED D'AUBUISSON'S AMNESTY PROPOSAL. RECENT TRIPS BY THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT TO PANAMA AND ALLEGATIONS THAT D'AUBUISSON HAS ENTERED INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FMLN AND CUBA HAVE MADE THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND EVEN MORE WARY OF HIM AND DETERMINED TO EXERCISE CONTROL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE MAINTAINED AN EXCELLENT RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT MAGANA AND CONTINUE TO GIVE HIM THEIR SUPPORT. ANXIETY ABOUT THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IS MOST FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED BY THE REFORMIST OFFICERS CENTERED AROUND

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THE MILITARY SCHOOL CLASSES OF 1963 AND 1964. THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REVOLUTION OF OCTOBER 1979 WILL BE THWARTED BY A RIGHTIST ASSEMBLY AN AN INEFFECTUAL EXECUTIVE. HOWEVER, THE ABILITY TO TURN DISATISFACTION INTO A GOLPE DE ESTADO IS LIMITED. THEY HAVE BEEN THE STRONGEST ADVOCATES FOR KEEPING THE MILITARY OUT OF POLITICS

AND SUPPORTERS OF THE RECENT ELECTIONS. THEREFORE, KNOWING FULL WELL THE IMPACT A MOVE AGAINST THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY LEADERSHIP WOULD HAVE ON WORLD OPINION, THEIR ABILITY TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION IS SUBSCRIBED. LIKEWISE, THEIR RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT MAGANA, IN LIEU OF A CIVILIAN ALTERNATIVE TO HIM, COMPELS THEM TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE CIVILIAN LEADER PUT FORWARD BY THE VOTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDERS THEMSELVES. THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE HIGH COMMAND COULD POTENTIALLY LEAD TO A MOVE AGAINST GENERAL GARCIA BUT THERE IS NOT INDICATION THAT THEIR DISSATISFACTION IS SUCH THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO RALLY AROUND AN ALTERNATIVE TO HIM UNLESS, PERHAPS, COL. FLORES LIMA SHOULD SHIFT HIS POSTURE CONSIDERABLY.

THE ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION FOR JULY 1982 DEMONSTRATES THAT THE MILITARY HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ON HALTING ABUSES AGAINST CIVILIANS, BOTH REDUCING THE NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS AND SUBMITTING EVER MORE OF THEIR OWN, INCLUDING OFFICERS, TO CIVILIAN JUSTICE. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS CHANGED ATTITUDE HAS EXTENDED TO A REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION WHICH ACTUALLY APPEARS TO BE ON THE RISE AMONG THE MILITARY. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE U.S., THE CHURCH, THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS, AND THE ICRC ARE SUBJECT TO A CRUCIAL

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LIMITATION--THE PRESSURES THEY BRING TO BEAR ARE EXTERNAL TO THE ARMED FORCES ITSELF. THERE IS NO WAY OF BEING CERTAIN TO WHAT DEGREE PERSUASION OR COERCION HAVE IN REALITY CHANGED THE ORIENTATION OF THE MILITARY TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES VIS-A-VIS ELIMINATION OF THE ENEMY. HOWEVER, TO AN INCREASING DEGREE THE MILITARY ZONE COMMANDERS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROSECUTING THE WAR TALK AND, TO A LIMITED EXTENT, ACT AS IF THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THEY MUST WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IF THEY ARE TO WIN THE WAR.

E. ARMED FORCES PUBLIC RELATIONS

THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES PUBLIC RELATIONS APPARATUS, PARTICULARLY THE PRESS COMMITTEE OF THE ARMED FORCES, IS TERRIBLE. THE GOOD NEWS GETS OUT SLOWLY AND IN PIECEMEAL FASHION, AND THE BAD NEWS IS ALMOST NEVER REVEALED THROUGH OFFICIAL SOURCES-- THUS GIVING AN INVESTIGATIVE (I.E., SENSATIONALIST) CAST TO COVERAGE OF UNFAVORABLE EVENTS. THE MILITARY HAS GIVEN LITTLE PRIORITY TO SETTING UP AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR DEALING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. COPREFA (THE ARMED FORCES PRESS COMMITTEE) IS CURRENTLY WELL SUITED TO RECEIVE INFORMATION TO DISTRIBUTE, TO

DENY REQUESTS OF VARIOUS SORTS, AND TO KEEP THE PRESS AWAY FROM THE "REAL ARMY." THERE IS NOT INDICATION THAT COPREFA KNOWS MORE THAN IT SAYS, IS ASKED ITS OPINION ON HOW TO HANDLE A SITUATION, VIEWS THE PRESS AS ANYTHING BUT AN ADVERSARY TO BE CONTAINED, OR HAS ANYTHING MORE THAN A CURSORY KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE OR TECHNICAL NEEDS OF A FOREIGN JOURNALIST. THE COMBINATION OF THEIR HANDLING OF THE PRESS ALONG WITH THE GENUINE FAILINGS OF THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO PLAGUE EFFORTS TO WIN WORLD SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN POSITION. ONLY PROGRESS IN BRINGING ABOUT THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES IS

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LIKELY TO HAVE ANY REAL IMPACT ON RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM BUT INCREASING ATTENTION MUST BE PLACED ON PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE INFORMATION EFFORT ALONG WITH THE OTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES PERFORMANCE.
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