Foundations for Change?

Advocacy and Participatory Grantmaking Strategies in the U.S. Philanthropic Sector

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Abstract

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Philanthropic foundations are not merely patrons that provide grant funding to worthy causes. I seek to develop an understanding of philanthropic foundations as active political actors that attempt to influence social and policy change through two key strategies: advocacy and participatory grantmaking. The role of foundations in social and policy change merits scholarly attention for several reasons. For one, foundations wield significant power with the nearly $1 trillion in assets that they collectively hold, and they can wield this power to not only define the nature of societal challenges but also the manner in which they are addressed. Foundations—in particular private foundations—are also a unique organizational type as they are typically seeded with money from the wealthy, who receive generous tax breaks for doing so, and then are often run by the wealthy with minimal oversight. Critics argue that they thus represent a plutocratic

and undemocratic force in U.S. society. Furthermore, their role as funders aims the attention of the nonprofit sector as a whole to focus on particular challenges and solutions and not on others.

I develop a conceptual framework in the first chapter that aims to further understanding of what explains foundations engagement in social and policy change strategies. Drawing primarily on theories of organizational sociology, the framework posits that foundations' structure and context influence their engagement in advocacy and participatory grantmaking. With respect to structure, I expect that foundations' institutional logic, organizational form, levels of managerialism, and political orientation will affect their social and policy change strategies. In regard to foundations' context, I expect that relational factors—network embeddedness and organizational field—as well as external environment factors—community wealth and community political orientation—will influence foundation engagement in this work. I test the framework across three empirical studies. Chapter two examines the extent to which the structure and context of large foundations influences their engagement in advocacy. Chapter three narrows the focus to community foundations, specifically, and their engagement in advocacy and lobbying. Chapter four turns back to large foundations to examine their adoption of participatory grantmaking.

Across the findings from the three empirical chapters, the conceptual frame applies somewhat differently among these contexts, but there are key themes across the studies. A community logic is consequential for advocacy as we see for large foundations broadly and community foundations specifically. Foundations with a community logic, and its focus on partnership and collaboration, engage in more advocacy than other foundations. Embeddedness in inter-organizational networks is also an important driver of advocacy among both large foundations and community foundations, lending support to the idea that networks are important

conduits for knowledge sharing about advocacy. Furthermore, foundation form matters for both advocacy and participatory grantmaking but in divergent ways. Community foundations engage in less advocacy than private foundations but are more likely to embrace participatory grantmaking. In this regard, community foundations may feel pressure from donors and stakeholders to refrain overtly political activity, whereas participatory grantmaking, even if used as a tool for social change, may seem more in line with the roles and values of community foundations.

The political or social justice orientation of foundations also clearly matters for both advocacy and participatory grantmaking. Across the three chapters, foundations with a liberal or social justice orientation are more likely to display social and policy change discourse. However, with respect to concrete actions such as advocacy funding, lobbying, and participatory grantmaking, they do not engage in these strategies more than other foundations. Conversely, conservative foundations are not associated with advocacy discourse but they are strongly associated with advocacy funding. While discourse is certainly important as it can reflect the values and actions of foundations, these findings across multiple studies should promote reflection among liberal foundations about whether their actions for social and policy change match their public presentation.

The dissertation makes several contributions to the field. First, in terms of theoretical contributions, my dissertation applies theories from organizational sociology to this unique—yet understudied—type of organization. The dissertation also advances the nonprofit advocacy literature to address the drivers of foundation advocacy. Until now, this research has focused primarily on the determinants of advocacy among service-providing nonprofits. From a methodological standpoint, the dissertation uses machine-learning techniques to develop a

replicable measure of advocacy that can be used for any organization with a website, and it generates original survey data on this secretive and hard-to-reach population. From a practical perspective, the dissertation raises both practical considerations and normative concerns for foundations engaging in these strategies.

Table of Contents

List of Figures **12**

List of Tables **13**

Chapter 1. Introduction and Conceptual Framework: Foundations in Social and Policy Change **16**

Philanthropic Foundations as Part of the Nonprofit Sector and U.S. Society *20*

Foundations and Nonprofit Advocacy *23*

Defining Advocacy 23

History of Foundation Advocacy 24

Foundations and Participatory Grantmaking *26*

Defining Participatory Grantmaking 27

History of Participatory Grantmaking 28

Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Drivers of Foundations' Engagement in Social and Policy Change Strategies *30*

Organizational Drivers 31

Relational Drivers 38

External Environment Drivers 40

Overview of Dissertation Structure *41*

Chapter 2. The Big Players: Foundation Advocacy in the U.S. Policy Landscape **43**

Introduction **43**

Literature and Hypotheses **45**

Organizational Drivers *45*

Institutional Logic 45

Foundation Form 47

Managerialism 48

Political Orientation 51

Relational Drivers *52*

Organizational Field 52
Embeddedness in Inter-organizational Networks 53
External Environment Drivers *54*
Data and Methods **55**
Sample *55*
Data Sources *57*
Dependent Variables *58*
Advocacy Discourse on Websites 59
Grant Funding of Advocacy 67
Independent Variables *71*
Organizational Drivers 71
Relational Drivers 75
External Environment Drivers 76
Controls 77
Overview of Variable Construction *77*
Results **79**
Descriptive Statistics *79*
Advocacy Variables 79
Organizational Drivers 81
Relational Drivers 81
External Environment Drivers 82
Multivariate Results *82*
Organizational Drivers 88
Relational Drivers 90
External Environment Drivers 91
Discussion **91**
Summary **95**

Chapter 3. Change Starts at Home: Community Foundations as Leaders of Local Advocacy 97

Introduction 97

Literature Review and Hypotheses 101

Organizational Drivers of Advocacy 101

Institutional Logic 101

Managerialism 102

Social Justice Orientation 104

Relational Driver of Advocacy 105

External Environment Drivers of Advocacy 106

Data and Methods 107

Sample 107

Data 107

Dependent Variables 109

Advocacy Discourse on Websites 109

Lobbying 112

Independent variables 113

Organizational Drivers 113

Relational Drivers 114

External Environment Drivers 115

Controls 115

Results 117

Descriptive Statistics 117

Advocacy Variables 117

Organizational Drivers 119

Relational Driver 119

External Environment Drivers 119

Multivariate Results 120

Organizational Drivers.....126
Relational Driver.....128
External Environment Drivers.....129
Discussion.....129
Summary.....135
Chapter 4. Shifting Power: Participatory Grantmaking as a Social Change Strategy in the U.S. Philanthropic Sector 136
Introduction.....136
Literature and Hypotheses.....139
Participatory Practices and Grantmaking in Philanthropic Foundations.....140
Stakeholder Participation in Institutional Philanthropy Framework.....141
Organizational Drivers of Participatory Grantmaking.....146
Institutional Logic.....146
Foundation Form.....147
Managerialism.....148
Political Orientation.....149
Relational Drivers of Participatory Grantmaking.....150
Embeddedness in Inter-organizational Networks.....150
Organizational Field.....151
External Environment Drivers of Participatory Grantmaking.....152
Data and Methods.....154
Sample.....154
Data Sources.....155
Dependent Variable.....158
Independent Variables.....160
Organizational Drivers.....160
Relational Drivers.....163

External Environment Drivers....163
Controls....164
Modeling....166
Results....167
Descriptive Statistics....168
Participatory Grantmaking....168
Organizational Drivers....169
Relational Drivers....169
External Environment Drivers....170
Multivariate Results....170
Organizational Drivers....174
Relational Drivers....175
External Environment Drivers....175
Controls....176
Discussion....176
Summary....182
Chapter 5. Conclusion....183
References....190
Appendix A: Foundation Center Giving Strategy Taxonomy....201
Appendix B: Advocacy Discourse....204
Appendix C: IRS 990 Form....205
Appendix D: IRS 990-PF Form....206
Appendix E: Foundation Center Philanthropy Classification System....207
Appendix F: Survey Instrument....208
Appendix G: Supplemental Survey Results....220
Appendix H: Survey Methods Supplement....221

List of Figures

Figure 1.1. Conceptual Framework of the Drivers of Foundations' Engagement in Social and Policy Change Strategies…….31

Figure 2.1. Example of Advocacy Discourse on Large Foundation Website……....60

Figure 2.2. Comparing Precision and Recall Rates Across Multiple Algorithms and Preprocessing Configurations…….65

Figure 2.3. Comparing Performance of Preferred Model at 50% and 60% Probability Thresholds……..67

Figure 3.1. Map of the Geographic Distribution of Community Foundations in the U.S……99

Figure 3.2. Example of Advocacy Language on Community Foundation Website……...110

Figure 4.1. Ford Foundation Calls Attention to Participatory Grantmaking……..137

Figure 4.2. Stakeholder Participation in Institutional Philanthropy Framework……....145

Figure 4.3. Survey Question: Foundations' Direct Participatory Practices……159

Figure 4.4. Survey Question: Foundations' Indirect Participatory Practices…….160

List of Tables

Table 2.1. Website Scraping and Machine-learning Process for Developing Advocacy Discourse Measure…….61

Table 2.2. Pre-Processing Configurations for Text Analysis……64

Table 2.3. Illustrative Examples of Grants to Support Policy, Advocacy & Systems Reform……..68

Table 2.4. Overview of Variable Construction……77

Table 2.5. Descriptive Statistics……..80

Table 2.6. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables…….84

Table 2.7. Determinants of Foundation Funding for Advocacy……..86

Table 2.8. Determinants of Foundation Advocacy Discourse…….87

Table 3.1. Overview of Variable Construction……..116

Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics…….118

Table 3.3. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables……121

Table 3.4. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables……122

Table 3.5. Determinants of Community Foundation Advocacy Discourse……124

Table 3.6. Determinants of Community Foundation Lobbying……..125

Table 4.1. Foundation Respondent Characteristics Compared to Overall Sample…….156

Table 4.2. Overview of Variable Construction……...165

Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Foundation Respondents……...167

Table 4.4. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables……170

Table 4.5. Determinants of Participatory Grantmaking…….173

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Chapter 1. Introduction and Conceptual Framework: Foundations in Social and Policy Change

Philanthropic foundations wield significant influence in U.S. society due to their vast resources and often-esteemed reputations. Foundations exert their power to not only define societal challenges but also the potential solutions to address those challenges. This influence, however, has been coming under increasing scrutiny in recent years. Private foundations are seeded with money from the wealthy—for which those people receive generous tax subsidies—and are generally not held to account by outside stakeholders (e.g., citizens, customers, donors). Critics argue that the public subsidization—yet lack of accountability to the public—among foundations undermines democracy by reinforcing the political power of the wealthy (Giridharadas, 2018; Reich, 2016, 2018). This concern is particularly salient when considering the influence foundations may have on public policy.

Philanthropic foundations are not merely patrons that provide grant funding to worthy causes. I seek to develop an understanding of philanthropic foundations as active political actors that attempt to influence social and policy change through two key strategies: advocacy and participatory grantmaking. The Ford Foundation, for example, announced in 2015 that it would shift the entirety of its grantmaking to focus on one issue: inequality (Daniels, 2015). The foundation pledged to support nonprofits whose missions are to address the structural causes of inequality. In doing so, the foundation would provide greater support to nonprofits advocating for systemic change, and the foundation itself has advocated for policies addressing inequality, including a higher minimum wage (MacFarquhar, 2015; Wadia, 2016). Building on these efforts, Ford issued a call to action in 2017 for foundations such as is its own to adopt participatory grantmaking—an approach that incorporates outside voices in grant processes and funding

decision—into more of their work. The foundation argued that this approach to grantmaking has the potential to shift power to marginalized communities, increase transparency, and generate meaningful "bottom up" social change (Cardona, 2017).

While several philanthropic foundations, such as Ford, have a long history of engaging in social and policy change activities (O'Connor, 1999, 2010; Raynor, 1999), foundation engagement in these activities appears to have notably increased in recent years in the United States (Brulle, 2014; Brulle, Hall, Loy, & Schell-Smith, 2021; Gibson, 2017; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014; Reckhow, 2013; Reckhow & Tompkins-Stange, 2018; Tompkins-Stange, 2016). Foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation, for instance, advocated for national education standards called Common Core (Reckhow, 2016). Conservative foundations such as the Koch Alliance Foundations have provided considerable funding to think tanks to produce research to counter the need for climate change policies (Brulle, 2014; Brulle et al., 2021). The Zarrow Family Foundations, as another example, created a $6 million participatory grantmaking fund that aims to advance racial justice in Tulsa by allocating decision-making power entirely to people of color in determining funding decisions (Pitkin, 2020). While it is evident that some foundations are profoundly impacting society through both their funding and more direct action, they continue to be under-researched and poorly understood players in the U.S. political and policy landscape.

The role of foundations in social and policy change merits scholarly attention for several reasons. First, philanthropic foundations are nearing a trillion dollars in assets (Foundation Center, n.d.)—assets that can be deployed for a multitude of purposes, including advocacy and participatory grantmaking. Foundations' tremendous resources and reputations mean they are able to elevate certain societal challenges and bestow legitimacy on particular solutions

(Aksartova, 2003; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Quinn, Tompkins-stange, & Meyerson, 2014). As such, foundations have significantly affected policy areas like civil rights, the environment, and education (Brulle, 2014; Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; Reckhow, 2013; Reckhow & Tompkins-Stange, 2018; Tompkins-Stange, 2016). Their function as funders also means that their priorities aim grantseekers' attention toward certain problems and solutions—and consequently not on others—thus shaping the work of the nonprofit sector as whole. Furthermore, foundations' rapidly growing assets suggest that their influence is only likely to broaden and intensify moving forward.

Second, private foundations in particular are a unique organizational type due to a tax structure that allows their donors to stockpile cash—with substantial tax breaks and minimal oversight—and not distribute these funds until a later date (Hammack & Anheier, 2010; Reich, 2018). Foundations with this tax structure lack much in the way of accountability to outside stakeholders, unlike other organizational forms (Reich, 2016). Businesses, for example, need to be responsive to customers and shareholders; if customers are dissatisfied, they can take their business elsewhere and businesses will lose profits or eventually go out of business. With respect to government organizations, a public dissatisfied with government actions or programs can vote out elected leaders. Service-providing nonprofits, which rely on funders—government agencies, foundations, individual donors, or those who pay fees for service—can see their funding discontinued if these funders do not approve of the organization's activities or quality of work. Private foundations, however, lack these means for accountability. Many family foundations are run solely by members of the family. Larger, institutional foundations have boards of directors that can deploy foundation resources however they see fit within the limits of IRS rules. This tremendous freedom makes them unlike any other organizational form.

Third, and related to their organizational structure, is the argument that "…big philanthropy represents a type of plutocratic voice in democratic societies, private power directed at a public purpose" (Reich, 2016, p.466). Foundations are not merely a mechanism for the wealthy to express their charitable preferences. Their tax-exempt status means that the federal government effectively subsidizes foundations' preferences for addressing public challenges and in a manner that shelters foundations from external input or accountability (Reich, 2018). Subsequently, given their wealth and prestige, foundations often opt for "elite coordination" rather than attempting to understand the public's policy preferences or to build a base of public support for policy stances (Reckhow, 2016, p.454). This public subsidization is thus fundamentally undemocratic and serves to bolster the power—and fortunes—of the wealthy (Barkan, 2013; Karl & Katz, 1987; Reich, 2018).

Foundations are certainly core players in the U.S. political landscape that warrant further scholarly attention (Skocpol, 2016), but what explains foundations' engagement in social and policy change activities? I draw primarily on organizational sociology to argue that foundations are not only "strategic" actors but that these organizations' structure and context influence their engagement in social and policy change strategies as a means for mission achievement. For example, I expect to find that a foundations' political orientation, level of professionalization, and participation in interorganizational networks affect foundation engagement in advocacy and participatory grantmaking. I apply this conceptual frame through three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter seeks to understand the factors that influence the largest 500 foundations in the U.S. to engage in advocacy as a tool for achieving their mission. The second empirical chapter focuses more specifically on how these factors impact community foundations and their role in advocacy and lobbying. The final empirical chapter examines the extent to which these

drivers shape large foundations' adoption of participatory grantmaking strategies. Before turning to the empirical chapters, I first provide greater context with respect to the role of foundations in U.S. society and their engagement in advocacy and participatory grantmaking, and I develop the conceptual framework for understanding the drivers of their social and policy change strategies.

Philanthropic Foundations as Part of the Nonprofit Sector and U.S. Society

The nonprofit sector in the United States includes a broad array of organizations including charitable organizations, social welfare organizations, labor unions and social clubs (Salamon, 1999). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assigns the 501(c)(3) designation of tax exemption to nonprofits that are deemed to exist for charitable purposes, such as arts organizations, educational programs, churches, and food banks. The 501(c)(3) designation also includes private foundations, meaning that like public charities, they also have tax-exempt status through the IRS, but with their own particular sub-designation and specific year-end tax forms. Unlike other 501(c)(3) nonprofits, private foundations do not tend to provide direct services; instead, they provide grants to service-providing public charities to support their work.

Foundations are thus an organizational vehicle for philanthropy (Johnson & Johnson, 2004). In regard to private foundations, rather than an individual or business contributing money directly to a nonprofit, the donor funnels money into their own foundation, which is tax exempt. Private foundations, then, are required by federal tax law to distribute five percent of the value of their net investment assets per year to qualifying organizations (IRS, n.d.). To meet this giving threshold, foundations typically donate to nonprofits that perform work in the foundation's mission area or funding areas of interest.

Philanthropic foundations in the U.S. range greatly in both size and form. Some foundations have thousands of dollars in assets and no paid staff, while others have tens of

billions of dollars in assets with hundreds of paid staff (Foundation Center, n.d.). Philanthropic foundations comprise independent, community, corporate, and operating foundations (Prewitt, 2006), such as: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Silicon Valley Community Foundation, and the Bank of America Foundation. Independent foundations include family foundations, which are controlled by the original donors or their family, and institutional foundations, which have grown over time to be in the hands of those outside the family.[1] Community foundations are considered public charities—not private foundations—by the IRS. They are grantmaking public organizations that allow individuals and families to set up giving funds through the community foundation (rather than on their own) in order to benefit a certain geographic area (Council on Foundations, n.d.; Sacks, 2014). Corporate foundations are set up as the giving arm of a corporation, through which the foundation receives its assets (Minciullo & Pedrini, 2015). Finally, operating foundations may provide grants to other organizations but primarily operate their own service-providing programs.

Whatever their size and form, foundations take on a multitude of roles in U.S. society (Hammack & Anheier, 2010). Some argue that foundations play an important part in providing funding for causes that might otherwise go overlooked and are a critical means to address unmet public needs (Bishop, 2013; Frumkin, 1999). With respect to foundations' position vis-à-vis the government, institutional philanthropy can complement government by providing additional funds for public services, supplement government by working in areas neglected by the government, or advocate for change in government (Sandfort, 2008). Others argue that philanthropic foundations, specifically due to their unique lack of accountability structures, are

[1] Some scholars make a distinction between family and institutional (or independent) foundations, but the distinction between these types in practice is often blurred, and I consider them together here as independent foundations.

particularly well suited to play the role of innovator—funding experimental solutions to pressing societal problems (Reich, 2018).

In pursuing these roles, philanthropic foundations in the U.S. have come under intense criticism for their work. Not only do critics argue that foundations are fundamentally undemocratic in nature but also that they are a tool for elites' cultural imperialism both in the U.S. and abroad (Arnove, 1982; Barkan, 2013; Roelofs, 2003). Others argue that foundations professionalize social movements through which organizations they choose to fund (Jenkins & Halcli, 1999) or actively attempt to weaken social movements (Francis, 2015; Roelofs, 2003). These critiques are layered on top of the assertion that foundation assets are often generated through the exploitation of communities of color and rarely used to address deep, embedded structural inequalities (Kohl-Arenas, 2015; Villanueva, 2018).

Notwithstanding this criticism, there has been tremendous growth in the number of foundations over the decades—from approximately 1,000 in the early 1960s to more than 86,000 today (Clotfelter, 1992; Foundation Center, n.d.). In 2019, foundations provided more than $76 billion in funding to nonprofits, accounting for 17% of total private giving to nonprofits (Giving USA, 2020). Foundation grants are a significant and essential funding source for many service-providing nonprofits. As such, philanthropic foundations and their substantial funding play a critical role in the nonprofit sector and U.S. society more broadly.

Foundations and Nonprofit Advocacy

Defining Advocacy

Defining advocacy and determining its bounds has been a particularly challenging task for scholars. Many researchers have focused specifically on lobbying, the attempt to influence legislation, for its conceptual clarity. However, advocacy is much broader, and lobbying is just one tactic under the advocacy umbrella (Salamon & Geller, 2008). Reid (2000) provides an expansive definition of advocacy as a "wide range of individual and collective expression or action for a cause, idea, or policy (p.1)," which I draw on to inform this research in order to capture the full range of activities that can be considered advocacy. Advocacy is thus often conceptualized as a suite of tactics, such as direct lobbying, grassroots lobbying, public education, coalition building, judicial advocacy, expert testimony, research, and convening (Gormley & Cymrot, 2006; Guo & Saxton, 2013; Guo & Saxton, 2010; Mosley, 2011; Reid, 2000). Furthermore, these tactics are thought to belong to "insider" (e.g., expert testimony) or "outsider" (e.g., grassroots organizing) advocacy strategies (Gormley & Cymrot, 2006; Mosley, 2011), which can be deployed for both principled and instrumental reasons (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Foundations can both engage in these tactics themselves or fund other nonprofits to engage in these tactics.

Due to foundations' position in society, several advocacy tactics are particularly relevant for foundations. Given their roles as funders, for example, they are uniquely positioned to bring together grantees and other organizations through convening (Delfin & Tang, 2006; Sandfort, 2008). Their often well-respected reputation in society also makes them well suited to engage in public education through channels such as their website or social media accounts. One of the most prominent ways, however, that foundations engage in advocacy is through funding the

advocacy activities of other organizations. Foundations can fund a wide array of nonprofits from social movement organizations (Durán, 2005; Jenkins & Halcli, 1999; O'Connor, 2010) to public policy think tanks (Lubienski, Brewer, & La Londe, 2016; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014; Rich, 2004), and they can engage in the evaluation of the advocacy efforts of their grantees (Klugman, 2011; Masters & Osborn, 2010).

While foundations have a wide range of tactics available to them, it is important to note that private foundations are not allowed to lobby, which is considered a particular form of advocacy (Salamon & Geller, 2008) with a specific legal definition by the IRS as "attempting to influence legislation" (IRS, n.d.). While service-providing nonprofits and community foundations are allowed to lobby to a limited degree, private philanthropic foundations are, for the most part, forbidden by law from lobbying if they are to maintain their tax-exempt status. These limitations for private foundations have, in the past, likely led many foundations to shy away from advocacy altogether (Frumkin, 1998).

History of Foundation Advocacy

Several philanthropic foundations have an extensive history of being involved in social and policy change. In the early twentieth century, the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations funded research that addressed policy issues such as public health and agricultural modernization (Karl & Katz, 1981), while the Russell Sage foundation promoted national standards in areas such as workers' compensation, consumer credit, and housing (Hammack, 1999). The Rosenwald Foundation funded organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the Highland Center, which trained union organizers in the South (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; Rabinowitz, 1990). In the 1950s, the Ford Foundation supported desegregation in education by funding research on the effects of institutional racism on education, which was later used in

Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court case (Raynor, 1999). Later that decade and into the 1960s, Ford's Gray Areas program attempted to address poverty in inner cities, which directly informed the federal government's War on Poverty (O'Connor, 1999).

In 1961, Congress began to investigate foundations and their tax-preferred status. Some members of Congress were especially concerned about the Ford Foundation's involvement in voter registration drives and the financial abuses by some small foundations (Frumkin, 1999). Led by Republican Congressman Wright Pratman, this investigation eventually led to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (TRA), which laid out many new regulations that foundations would need to adhere to in order to protect their tax-exempt status (Frumkin, 1999; IRS, n.d.). The act explicitly prevented foundations from engaging in lobbying to influence legislation or elections. Shortly thereafter, the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (also known as the Filer Commission) was established in 1973 in order to both investigate the status of philanthropy in the country and to defend it from further criticism (Bothwell, 2002). The commission released a report in 1975 with recommendations to improve philanthropy; in response, a group called the Donee Group criticized the findings, stating that foundations were not doing enough to lead social change (Donee Group, 1977). The new regulations from the TRA and continued high profile attention undoubtedly cooled foundations' engagement in advocacy, especially for those foundations supporting more liberal social and policy change. Funding for social movements decreased by 20% in inflation-adjusted dollars between 1970 and 1980 (Jenkins & Halcli, 1999).

But for conservative-leaning foundations, engagement in advocacy started to markedly increase in the 1970s, after former Treasury Secretary William Simon began to encourage conservative philanthropists to align their giving with their political preferences (Covington,

2005). While more centrist and liberal-leaning foundations continued funding advocacy at a limited level, conservative foundations such as the Olin Foundation and Scaife Foundation began pouring money into policy research. Over the next three decades, these conservative foundations worked to establish and grow a network of conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute (Rich, 2004), spending more than one billion dollars in the 1990s on funding policy research through think tanks (Callahan, 1999).

As noted above, evidence indicates that there has been substantial growth in foundation engagement in advocacy in recent years, particularly by very large foundations (Foundation Center, 2011; Reckhow, 2013; Smith, 2010; Tompkins-Stange, 2016). For example, the K-12 education arena has seen a recent doubling in the amount of foundations dollars going to support national-level advocacy including pushing for policy options such as Common Core national K-12 standards and charter schools (Reckhow & Snyder, 2014; Tompkins-Stange, 2016). Large foundations, such as Gates and Broad, also have engaged in advocacy directly through tactics such as educating lawmakers on these issues. Furthermore, environmental issues like climate change have attracted significant advocacy funding, especially for those organizations advocating against the need for policy intervention, which have been largely successful (Brulle, 2014; Brulle et al., 2021). The recent impact of philanthropic foundations on major issues such as education and the environment are important milestones with respect to history of foundation advocacy.

Foundations and Participatory Grantmaking

With growing criticism of foundations' undemocratic nature, foundations face increasing pressure to change their practices and rethink their roles in generating social change (Daniels & Buhles, 2020). Increasing the participation of external stakeholders in foundations' governance

and grantmaking is one prominent strategy gaining traction in the sector as a means for moving away from top-down solutions to incorporating marginalized voices in determining how to produce meaningful and lasting change (Cardona, 2020; Daniels & Buhles, 2020). Participatory grantmaking itself is not new, but the consideration of such a strategy among large foundations has only recently been gaining steam. The MacArthur Foundation, as an example, created a participatory grantmaking portfolio in 2020 that aims to address inequity in the arts in Chicago by having an grant committee of community representatives to determine how the funds should be allocated (Banks, 2020). As another example, the Hartford Foundation for Public Giving, a large community foundation in Connecticut, launched a $2.9 million initiative in 2018 that set up 29 participatory grantmaking funds of $100,000 each—one for every town in the foundation's region. Each town created its own decision-making committees to determine how to spend the grant funds in their local community (Williams, 2018). Research has shown that other private and community foundations have also leveraged similar participatory grantmaking efforts (McGinnis Johnson, 2016).

Defining Participatory Grantmaking

Much like advocacy, participatory grantmaking has faced definitional challenges by both practitioners and scholars, as the lines between participatory practices more broadly and participatory grantmaking are often blurred. Gibson's (2017) seminal research on the topic states that participatory philanthropy "covers a wide range of institutional and individual activities such as incorporating grantee feedback into grant guidelines and strategy development, inviting non-grantmakers to sit on foundation boards, crowdfunding, and giving circles" (p.11). She goes on to set initial bounds for participatory grantmaking in particular but stops short of providing a specific definition:

> *"Participatory grantmaking narrows the focus to how grant decisions are made and by/for whom. Some see participatory grantmaking as one of many types of participatory philanthropy. Others think it is distinctive because it moves decision-making about money—which many see as the epitome of power—to the people most affected by the issues donors are trying to address" (Gibson, 2017, p.11).*

Building on the work of Gibson (2017) and other researchers, I develop a framework for conceptualizing participation in philanthropy (described in chapter four). This framework posits three key building blocks to understanding participation in this sector: who participates, in what processes do stakeholders participate, and to what degree do stakeholders influence foundation decisions. Stemming from this framework, I define participatory grantmaking as external stakeholders—with lower positions of power relative to foundations—having decision-making authority over a foundation's grantmaking processes and grant funding allocations. What this looks like "on the ground" can take a variety of forms, and foundations can either engage in this work directly or fund other nonprofits to pursue this strategy. Key to this definition, though, is that external stakeholders with lower positional power are not merely consulted or involved in decisions but that they have decision-making authority.

History of Participatory Grantmaking

Participatory approaches to philanthropy are not new and have long existed across cultures and communities (M. Berry, 1999; Smith, Shue, Vest, & Villareal, 1999). Within U.S. institutional philanthropy, however, the establishment of Boston's Haymarket People's Fund in 1974 was a landmark moment. The organization pooled funds from donors who were focused on systemic change and wanted to pursue that change by giving up their control over grant decisions to social activists in the community (Ostrander, 1995). A similar organization, the Liberty Hill Foundation, was created by one of these donors in Los Angles in 1976 (Lurie, 2016). The establishment of these funds led to several others throughout the country. To further learning

about participatory grantmaking, the Funding Exchange—a loose network of such funders—was established in 1979 to support these groups (Gibson, 2017; Lurie, 2016). What all these public foundations had in common was their desire to raise funds from donors in order to regrant that money to social justice causes in a manner that put activists at the center of decision making (Hart, 2014; Lurie, 2016).

The focus of participatory grantmaking continued to be on the community level into the next decade. The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation created the Community Foundations and Neighborhoods Small Grants Programs in 1984, which it funded for 10 years with the goal of having residents in several low-income communities decide how to allocate grant funding for their respective communities. This initiative eventually led to the development of Grassroots Grantmakers, a network of funders that focuses on involving non-grantmakers in their grant decisions (Burns & Downs, 2007). Other large private foundations started similar initiatives throughout the 1990s and 2000s by partnering with community foundations to include resident voices in local grantmaking (Gibson, 2017).

Much of the leading work in participatory grantmaking today occurs through public foundations doing work at the international level. The Disability Rights Fund (DRF), for example, was established in 2008 and organized around the idea of "Nothing about us without us." The organization works to support the rights of people with disabilities around the globe by raising funds and regranting those funds to organizations in the countries they serve (DRF, n.d.). In their participatory grantmaking model, people with disabilities across the world make up its grantmaking committees and decide which nonprofits to fund. As another example, the FRIDA/Young Feminist Fund works toward women's rights in multiple countries. Young feminist activists make grants to small organizations working for women's rights and provide

support to these groups for broader movement building (FRIDA, n.d.). Large foundations are taking notice and are not only funding groups like DRF and FRIDA, but also directly engaging in this type of work as well.

Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Drivers of Foundations' Engagement in Social and Policy Change Strategies

Given their long history of being involved in social and policy change efforts, surprisingly little empirical work has been conducted on what drives foundations to engage in this work. While the determinants of advocacy among service-providing nonprofits in the U.S. have been studied extensively (e.g., Child & Gronberg, 2007; Donaldson, 2007; Fyall & Allard, 2017; Lu, 2018; Mosley, 2010, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, 2007, 2009; Suárez & Hwang, 2008), little research has addressed philanthropic foundations' drivers of engagement in advocacy or other change efforts. As funders, rather than the providers of services, foundations may have different organizational determinants and motivations for engaging in this type of work than service-providing nonprofits. Drawing primarily on organizational sociology, I argue that foundations' structure and context influence their engagement in social and policy change strategies. These arguments are developed more fully below, and specific hypotheses about the effects of these drivers are detailed in each of the empirical chapters.



Figure 1.1. Conceptual Framework of the Drivers of Foundations' Engagement in Social and Policy Change Strategies

Organizational Drivers

Institutional Logic. Thornton and Ocasio define institutional logics as "the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals and organizations produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality" (2008, p. 101). Primary institutional logics in contemporary U.S. society are thought to be community, family, religion, state (government), the market, and the professions; each logic represents different organizing practices and symbols that shape how individuals and organizations act (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Logics shape individuals' and organizations' actions by influencing their decision making, vocabulary, and identity (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012). The logic that a foundation exhibits could impact its engagement in advocacy

and participatory grantmaking, and I would expect that a community logic, with an emphasis on activities such as community participation, collaboration, leadership development, and civic engagement (Grønbjerg, 2006; Graddy & Wang, 2008), to be aligned with social and policy change efforts. For foundations exhibiting a community logic, the approach to solving social problems would likely be directed at fostering an engaged citizenry and building community capacity, and this approach could lead to greater advocacy and participatory grantmaking.

Foundation Form. The organizational form of a foundation—in terms of its private or public structure—may also influence foundations' engagement in social and policy change strategies. Private foundations have a unique IRS designation that provides them certain freedoms and constraints, such as the requirement to pay out five percent of their total net investment assets through grants and eligible expenses (Council on Foundations, n.d.). These foundations are composed of independent foundations, corporate foundations, and operating foundations. Independent foundations, which consist of family and institutional foundations, receive their initial funding from an individual or family. Corporate foundations, while having a nonprofit status, are funded directly by their associated company (Minciullo & Pedrini, 2015). And, operating foundations are often established by an initial individual or family, but focus much of their work on their own programming.[2] Across these private foundations, there is little in the way of outside stakeholders to whom they are accountable (Reich, 2018), and there is no base of donors that needs to be considered when determining how to fulfill their missions. In addition, private foundations typically need to adhere to the intent their founders and stay within the operating bounds set by the IRS, such as the restrictions on lobbying.

[2] Operating foundations have an exemption from the five percent payout rule.

While several large, private foundations certainly engage in social and policy change efforts and to a great extent, it might be expected that community foundations—with their strong connections within their respective communities and their ability to lobby—would be more likely to participate in such work. Community foundations are structured as 501(c)(3) public charities, just as human services organizations or arts nonprofits are structured. These foundations rely on donors within their community in order to provide grants to nonprofits within the same community (Sacks, 2014). Reliance on a broad base of supporters who are focused on helping people and causes in their geographic area may make community foundations more likely to engage in social and policy change efforts that affect their communities. In addition, since community foundations are considered public charities and not private foundations, IRS rules do not prevent them from lobbying (although there are limits). This difference in rules may encourage community foundations to embrace social and policy change strategies more so than other foundations. Suárez & Lee (2011), however, find that community foundations are less likely to fund civic engagement than other types of foundations and equally as likely to support community organizing. Despite these findings, when using a broader definition of social and policy change that includes a wide range of strategies and tactics, community foundations might be expected to be actively engaged in more of these efforts.

Managerialism. Managerialism represents organizations' adoption of business-oriented practices and structures and can be conceptualized as having two distinct components: professionalization and rationalization (Maier, Meyer, & Steinbereithner, 2016; Suárez & Esparza, 2017). Foundations, and nonprofits more generally, have become increasingly professionalized (Frumkin, 1999; Hwang & Powell, 2009), and this professionalization takes different forms. For one, there has been an increase in the sheer number of paid professionals

working in foundations. Secondly, foundation staff members increasingly have bachelor's and higher-level degrees, as well as other certifications related to their specific field. These professionals tend to be members of professional associations where they continue their learning and share ideas across organizations.

The research to date on the role of professionalization in foundation advocacy, specifically, has focused primarily on foundations' preference for giving to professionalized organizations and how this preference for professionalization affects social movements and social movement organizations (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; Minkoff & Agnone, 2010; Staggenborg, 1988). While this research suggests that professionalized nonprofits are more likely to engage in moderate—rather than radical—advocacy tactics, it provides little guidance on whether an organization is more or less likely to engage in any type of advocacy or other social change activity. Additionally, this literature does not assess professionalization within the foundations themselves.

The effects of professionalization on advocacy by service-providing nonprofits have been evaluated with mixed results. Mosley (2010) finds that increased professionalization of leadership, in terms of education and credentials, is positively associated with advocacy efforts in human services nonprofits. Other researchers find that professionalization, based on the presence of paid staff, is either negatively associated or not associated at all with advocacy (Leroux & Goerdel, 2009; Nicholson-Crotty, 2007, 2009). More recent meta-analytic research, however, finds that professionalization overall has a positive effect on advocacy (Lu, 2018).

Furthermore, nonprofits with higher levels of paid professionals are more likely to reflect the trends in the sector due to shared professional networks (Hwang & Powell, 2009). These findings may also hold true for foundations. To the extent that advocacy and participatory

grantmaking are strategies that are discussed or promoted within these networks, then a foundation with paid staff may reflect these trends. Such professional networks have been instrumental in the ideas of venture philanthropy spreading across the field (Moody, 2007) and have greatly affected which nonprofits corporate foundation giving officers choose to support (Galaskiewicz, 1985). More professionalized nonprofits also tend to have the resources to invest in non-program related activities (Hwang & Powell, 2009). Foundations with the resources and inclination to invest in paid staff may then also have the capacity to dedicate staff time to activities such as advocacy and participatory grantmaking. In addition, trying to effect social or policy change can be highly challenging and may necessitate the support of professional staff. Professionalization, then, could provide the necessary capacity, knowledge, and interpersonal networks needed to support a foundation's engagement in social and policy change efforts.

As organizations become more professionalized, they also tend to become more rationalized. Rationalization refers to an organization's use of standardized tools—such as strategic plans, independent financial audits, quantitative program measures, and the use of consultants—to demonstrate effectiveness and accountability (Hwang & Powell, 2009). A strategic plan specifies goals and objectives and a timeline, usually three to five years, for achieving those goals. Quantitative measures are often used to help organization leaders understand whether they are meeting their goals and objectives, and consultants are often brought on to help organizations implement these plans and measures. Foundations have played a major role in the rise of such rationalized tools in the nonprofit sector as they seek to better understand the impact of their funding (Hwang & Powell, 2009).

Social and policy change efforts can take far longer than the scope of a strategic plan to achieve the desired effects, as institutional change in the United States is often slow (Coffman,

2007). The effects of these efforts are also highly difficult to quantify (Teles & Schmitt, 2011), and the inability of foundations to secure measurable outcomes during a strategic period may cause foundations to hesitate to engage in this work. On the other hand, the process of forming a strategic plan may direct a foundation toward the need for systemic change in order to achieve its mission and goals, and there is a growing literature addressing how foundations can measure and evaluate such efforts (Coffman, 2007; Guthrie, Louie, David, & Foster, 2005; Klugman, 2011; Masters & Osborn, 2010; Strong, 2012). Furthermore, there has been a significant rise in foundations employing "strategic philanthropy" concepts as a tool for effectiveness and mission fulfillment, and social and policy change are often viewed as key elements of strategic philanthropy (Nielsen, n.d.). Therefore, foundations that engage in rationalized practices may be more inclined to adopt social and policy change strategies as a means for achieving their goals and mission.

Political Orientation. The political orientation of a foundation may potentially be a significant driver of engagement in social and policy change efforts. With respect to advocacy, researchers have increasingly studied conservative foundations, their role in effecting policy change, and how their efforts compare to those of more liberal foundations (Rich, 2004; Covington, 2005; Hertel-Fernandez, 2016; Hertel-Fernandez & Skocpol, 2015; Krehely, House, & Kernan, 2004; Bothwell, 2005). As noted above, scholars point to the early 1970s as the beginning of serious funding for conservative ideas when former Treasury secretary William Simon called for donors to align their philanthropy with their political interests (Covington, 2005). Over the next several decades, conservative foundations funneled substantial sums of money to establish conservative think tanks and directly affect public policy (Allen, 1992; Rich, 2004; Callahan, 2001; Hertel-Fernandez, 2016: Krehely, House, & Kernan, 2004). Rich (2004)

shows that—supported by conservative foundations—the formation of conservative think tanks in the 1980s and 1990s grew at twice the rate of more liberal think tanks. While funding think tanks is the most prominent strategy that conservative foundations have used to engage in advocacy, they have employed other strategies as well. Conservative foundations have actively focused on state-level policy change and built cross-state networks of conservative 501(c)(3)s, 501(c)(4)s, and PACs (Hertel-Fernandez, 2016). These networks have worked to coordinate efforts across several policy issues, including the prevention of Medicaid expansion as part of the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, & Lynch, 2016). Comparatively, liberal foundations have provided far less funding to such networks, and liberal policy networks are more fragmented (Hertel-Fernandez & Skocpol, 2016).

This is not to say that liberal foundations do not fund think tanks, policy research, and network building, or that they are not engaging in high levels of advocacy through other tactics. But, research indicates that a broad swath of conservative foundations have a rich history of actively engaging in advocacy (Brulle, 2014; Covington, 2005; Hertel-Fernandez, 2016; Rich, 2004). The amount of money conservative foundations are willing to pour into policy research and their seeming desire to have a direct effect on policy change suggests that they may be more willing to fund and engage in many types of advocacy. Whether this is due to a certain historical path dependence based on previously built advocacy infrastructure or something particular to conservative ideology is unclear.

With respect to participatory grantmaking, however, the role of political orientation may differ. Participatory grantmaking is a strategy that is often associated with progressive causes that aims to generate "bottom up" solutions for social change (Cardona, 2017). While some conservatives argue that participatory grantmaking would be an ideal strategy for change that

connects with their anti-elitism values by devolving power to ordinary people (Hartmann, 2017), this approach may align more with liberal foundations who often state their intention to benefit marginalized communities. The limited evidence thus far in regard to which foundations adopt such a strategy indicates that liberal foundations are more inclined to embrace this approach to social change (Cardona, 2017; Gibson, 2017).

Relational Drivers

Organizational Field. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define an organizational field as "those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce similar services and products" (p.148). Fields can emerge from issue areas as well as products and services (Hoffman, 1997). The bounds of any given organizational field, however, are often difficult to establish and rely on a variety of indicators, including actor-level and activity-level indicators (Scott & Davis, 2007).

Within the nonprofit sector, organizational fields can be thought of in terms of organizations that work in the same policy or issue area. For example, nonprofits that work on environmental issues or those that work on issues of housing and homelessness could be considered part of the organizational fields that address those issues. Organizations within a field often face similar opportunities, constraints, and policy environments. Additionally, there may be field-wide logics that favor or disfavor engagement in social and policy change strategies, leading certain organizational fields to be more likely to engage in these efforts.

Evidence among service-providing nonprofits demonstrates that organizational fields, such as education, health, and the environment, can significantly influence engagement in advocacy among the nonprofits in these fields (Child & Grønberg, 2007; Suárez & Hwang,

2008). Research on philanthropic foundations further suggests that particular fields, such as education, may have a similar effect on foundations operating within the field (Barkan, 2013; Lipman, 2015; Lubienski et al., 2016; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014; Reckhow, 2013). We might then expect foundations within certain organizational fields to have an increased likelihood of engaging in social and policy change efforts more broadly.

Embeddedness. Embeddedness in inter-organizational networks refers to the ties that organizations develop with those external to their own organization (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, & Dowell, 2006; Powell, 1990). Networks and associations in the philanthropic sector work to connect foundations through conferences, meetings, and the sharing of online resources as they each work or collaborate to pursue their missions. Through these types of activities, networks can facilitate legitimacy and economic benefits for participating organizations (Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). For example, many foundations belong to the Council on Foundations, a national membership network of foundations, or regional ones like Northern California Grantmakers.

Among service-providing nonprofits, participation in inter-organization networks and collaborations has been shown to increase nonprofit involvement in advocacy in particular (Bass, Arons, Guinane, & Carter, 2007; Donaldson, 2007; Mosley, 2010; Salamon & Geller, 2008). While these networks are not necessarily focused on advocacy, they likely affect engagement in advocacy in at least two ways. These networks could serve as an important means for sharing ideas and knowledge about advocacy, even if that is not their primary goal. Networks could also indirectly affect engagement in advocacy, as organizations that belong to networks are embedded in broader communities, and this willingness to connect with external organizations may also make them more likely to be involved with their external environment through social and policy

change strategies. Interorganizational networks, then, may have a similar effect for foundations' advocacy and participatory grantmaking.

External Environment Drivers

Organizations' behaviors and strategies are shaped by their external environmental (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Davis, 2007). Even though private foundations, in particular, may not have the typical external accountability mechanisms as other organizations (e.g., customers, donors, citizens), they do not act in isolation. Like other types of organizations, foundations—both private and community—are likely to be influenced by their external environment. The limited evidence thus far with respect to these effects on foundations suggests that community characteristics influence community foundations' management strategies broadly (Graddy & Morgan, 2006). Further evidence from the nonprofit sector stems from service-providing nonprofits and demonstrates that aspects of nonprofits' external environment specifically shape their engagement in advocacy (Fyall & Allard, 2017; Mosley, 2010; Nicholson-Crotty, 2007). The external environment in which foundations are situated, then, may also impact their social and policy change strategies.

One key characteristic of a foundation's external environment that might be influential for these strategies is the political liberalism of the community. While there is political engagement across the conservative to liberal political spectrum, in the nonprofit sector—of which foundations are a part—there is a long history of social movement activism of advocacy for liberal causes (Goss, 2007; Jenkins & Halcli, 1999). Having a more liberal leaning external community may mean that foundations in those communities reflect that activism with greater engagement in social and policy change efforts.

Another key characteristic of the external environment to consider is the wealth of the community. There is substantial evidence that wealthier individuals are more likely to be politically engaged than low-income individuals (Gilens, 2005, 2012; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2012; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). With respect to advocacy, a foundation in an environment where individuals are politically engaged may be more likely to reflect this engagement and be involved in advocacy. Furthermore, foundations in wealthier communities may have greater resources and capacity to support these efforts. With respect to participatory grantmaking, on the other hand, the effect may differ. Foundations in wealthier communities may be more insulated from understanding community needs, thus limiting their consideration of participatory grantmaking strategies, even if these strategies might be a needed bridge between wealthy and marginalized voices.

Overview of Dissertation Structure

I test this conceptual framework across three empirical studies and detail the specific hypotheses in each of the following chapters. The first empirical chapter aims to understand the organizational and contextual drivers of large foundations' advocacy discourse and funding. The second empirical chapter concentrates specifically on how these factors affect community foundations' engagement in advocacy and lobbying. The final empirical chapter examines the influence these factors have on large foundations' adoption of participatory grantmaking. I expect that the conceptual framework will apply somewhat differently across these chapters depending on the particular context but that the effects will move largely in the same direction. It is important note here that in testing the conceptual framework in these chapters, I am assessing the extent to which relationships exist between these drivers and foundations' social and policy changes strategies, but I am not using causal inference methods and cannot claim causality.

Rather, I aim to the lay the foundation for building theory around what drives philanthropic organizations to engage in these strategies. I conclude the dissertation with a summary of the findings, key contributions, and implications for future research.

Chapter 2. The Big Players: Foundation Advocacy in the U.S. Policy Landscape

Introduction

Large philanthropic foundations actively engage in advocacy around issues that are important to their mission areas. Foundations such as the Annie E. Casey Foundation and the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, for example, played an integral role in the passage of California's 2010 law to extend foster care to those in the system from age 18 to age 21. These foundations funded researchers and advocates, disseminated evidence in support of foster care extension to lawmakers and the public, and built a coalition to support the idea of extending foster care to the age of 21 (Bushouse & Mosley, 2018). Casey and Hilton are two of the more than 86,000 foundations nationwide that collectively hold nearly a trillion dollars in assets and grant more than $70 billion per year. Of these foundations, the largest 500 by total giving—including foundations such as Casey and Hilton—account for nearly 50 percent of all foundation giving (Foundation Center, n.d.).

With few exceptions, little attention has been paid to understanding the organizational drivers of these foundations' engagement in advocacy (Suárez, 2012; Suárez & Lee, 2011). The research on foundations and advocacy has been mostly limited to case studies on the advocacy tactics used by a handful of the largest foundations (e.g., Tompkins-Stange, 2016; Bushouse & Mosley, 2018). This is a surprising omission considering the extensive body of literature that has been devoted to understanding the determinants of service-providing nonprofits' advocacy (Child & Gronberg, 2007; Fyall & Allard, 2017; Leroux & Goerdel, 2009; Lu, 2018; Mosley, 2010, 2011; Nicholson-Crotty, 2009, 2011; Suárez & Hwang, 2008). Given the prominent role of foundations in the nonprofit sector and society more broadly, understanding the patterns of their

social and policy change efforts is an important step in discerning changes in these strategies over time and evaluating the influence of foundations as active players in the policy process.

I argue that large foundations do not merely operate in a "strategic" manner but that their actions are shaped by structural and contextual forces. Organizational characteristics—institutional logic, foundation form, managerialism, and political orientation—likely influence the extent to which foundations consider and embrace advocacy as a strategy to accomplish their mission. Furthermore, while many foundations lack traditional means of accountability to external stakeholders, their relational context in terms of their organization field and network embeddedness, as well as their environmental context with respect to community wealth and politics, likely still impact their engagement in advocacy. This leads to the dissertation's first research question.

RQ1: *To what extent do large foundations' structure and context influence their engagement in advocacy as a strategy for achieving their missions?*

I address this research question by constructing a dataset from multiple sources and using a combination of machine learning and regression analysis. I develop two alternative measures of foundation advocacy in this work: advocacy discourse and advocacy funding. The advocacy discourse measure intentionally attempts to capture a broad range of advocacy actions. While discourse may not perfectly approximate a foundation's work "on the ground," it is important for understanding the extent to which foundations signal their embrace of advocacy to those outside their organization. Furthermore, the advocacy funding variable is a particularly meaningful measure of advocacy in this context considering the fundamental grantmaking nature of most foundations. How foundations decide to allocate their grant funds demonstrates their organizational priorities. In the next section, I develop specific hypotheses for this chapter as to

what drives large foundations to engage in advocacy as a means for mission fulfillment. I then describe the sample, data, and methods I employ to test these hypotheses. Finally, I present the results of this study and discuss the study's limitations, as well as the potential implications of the findings for future research.

Literature and Hypotheses

As outlined in the introductory chapter, I argue that organizational, relational, and external environment factors shape foundation engagement in advocacy. I draw on the conceptual framework developed in the first chapter to formulate hypotheses for this study and describe them in more detail below.

Organizational Drivers

Institutional Logic

As Thornton and Ocasio argue, institutional logics are "the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals and organizations produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality" (2008, p.101). Community, religion, state, market, and the professions are driving logics in the U.S., and these logics shape the decision making, vocabulary, and identity of both individuals and organizations (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). Institutional logics have been shown to influence actions of a wide range of organizations, from nonprofits to businesses to academia, and organizations often face competing pressures from multiple logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010b; Skelcher & Smith, 2015). The mechanisms by which

logics shape organizational behavior include the institutionalization of collective identities, the shaping of how people within an organization classify and categorize, and the influence on attention of decision makers within the organization (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). In order to understand individual and organizational behavior, institutional context and logics that shape that behavior are important to consider.

While foundations, particularly private foundations, may not have the traditional lines of accountability structures to those outside their organizations, they are still likely influenced by these broad logics and might align their foundation operations more closely with some logics over others. There is evidence among service-providing nonprofits that institutional logics influence the type of advocacy these organizations engage in (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2014), and this influence could hold true for foundations. Some foundations may exhibit a market logic that values business principles and competition, while others embody a logic of religion and its corresponding values. Other foundations may exhibit a community logic, where they place emphasis on activities such as community participation, collaboration, leadership development, and civic engagement (Graddy & Wang, 2009; Grønbjerg, 2006). For foundations with a community logic, the approach to solving social problems is typically directed at fostering an engaged citizenry and building community capacity, and such a logic may be more aligned with engagement in advocacy. I thus hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): *Foundations that exhibit a community logic will be positively associated with engagement in advocacy.*

Foundation Form

A foundation's organizational form—in terms of its status as a private or community foundation—may influence its engagement in advocacy. Private foundations include family, independent, corporate, and operating foundations that file a 990-PF with the IRS. What these private foundations have in common is that they are typically seeded with money from an individual or single entity—which receives significant tax benefits for the establishment of the foundation—and are privately controlled, with limited accountability to external stakeholders outside of IRS regulations (Reich, 2016). Family foundations, for instance, have boards that are controlled by members of the founding family, and corporate foundation boards are typically composed of executives from the associated firm (Minciullo & Pedrini, 2015).

Community foundations, on the other hand, are structured as 501(c)(3) public charities, just as human services organizations or other nonprofits are structured. These foundations typically fundraise from donors within their community in order to provide grants to local nonprofits (Sacks, 2014). This reliance on a base of local supporters, who presumably want to help people and causes in their community, may make community foundations more likely to advocate to address challenges facing their respective communities. Furthermore, community foundations are often viewed as local leaders that actively work to make their regions better for the people who live there (Hamilton, Parzen, & Brown, 2004; Sacks, 2014; Sloan, 2021), which may lead them to advocate to make that a reality.

Since community foundations are structured as public charities, and not as private foundations, IRS rules do not prevent them from lobbying, and this difference in regulations may encourage community foundations to engage in advocacy more so than private foundations. Suárez & Lee (2011), however, find that community foundations are less likely to fund civic

engagement than private foundations and equally as likely to support community organizing. Despite these findings, when using a broader definition of advocacy that includes a wide range of strategies and tactics, community foundations might be expected to be actively engaged in advocacy. While several large independent foundations certainly engage in advocacy and to a great extent (e.g., Bushouse & Mosley, 2018; Quinn et al., 2014; Reckhow, 2013), it might be expected that community foundations—with their connections to their respective communities and ability to lobby—would be more likely to advocate than private foundations. I therefore hypothesize:

> Hypothesis 1b (H1b): *Community foundations will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Managerialism

Managerialism broadly represents the adoption of business-oriented practices, routines, and structures by organizations and can be viewed as having two distinct components: professionalization and rationalization (Maier et al., 2016; Suárez & Esparza, 2017). The nonprofit sector, including foundations, has become increasingly professionalized, with a greater reliance on paid staff working in nonprofits, as well as the number of staff members who have bachelor's degrees or other high-level degrees and certifications related to their specific field (Frumkin, 1999; Hwang & Powell, 2009). The literature on professionalization in the nonprofit sector has focused primarily on service-providing nonprofits, and the effects of professionalization on advocacy has been evaluated with mixed results. Professionalized leadership, as measured by education levels or credentials, has been found to be positively associated with advocacy (Mosley, 2010), while professionalization as measured by the presence

of paid staff has been either negatively associated or not associated with nonprofits' engagement in advocacy (Leroux & Goerdel, 2009; Nicholson-Crotty, 2007, 2009).

More broadly, however, nonprofits with greater levels of paid staff are more likely to reflect sector trends as "best practices" propagate through professional networks (Hwang & Powell, 2009). Evidence of this influence of professional networks can be seen through the diffusion of venture philanthropy ideas and practices throughout the philanthropic sector (Moody, 2007). To the extent that advocacy has become a trend, professionalized foundations whose staff likely belong to professional networks, might reflect this trend. Professionalized nonprofits are also more likely to expend resources on activities that are not directly related to their programs (Hwang & Powell, 2009). If the same holds true for foundations, then those foundations that prioritize paid staff may also have the capacity to engage in activities not directly to their grantmaking, such as advocacy.

In addition to professional networks and capacity, knowledge of lobbying laws predicts existence of advocacy structure among service-providing nonprofits (Mellinger, 2014). When combined with the evidence that nonprofits with more highly credentialed nonprofit leaders are more likely to engage in advocacy, organizations with this requisite knowledge may be more confident in engaging in advocacy if they know they are not taking actions that could jeopardize their 501(c)(3) status. These findings could hold certainly true for foundations as well. Regardless of legality, engagement in advocacy can be difficult and time consuming, necessitating the existence of professional staff in order to do so. Thus, foundations with professionalized staff may be more likely to have the capacity, knowledge, and interpersonal networks to effectively advocate. This leads to my next hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1c (H1c): *Professionalized foundations will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Increased rationalization often co-occurs with an organization's professionalization. Rationalization refers to the formalization of organizations and comprises the standard routines, tools, and practices that organizations adopt to improve performance and signal effectiveness and accountability (Hwang & Powell, 2009; MacIndoe & Barman, 2013; Marshall & Suárez, 2014). These practices include strategic plans, audits, program evaluation, and the hiring of consultants. Not only have many foundations adopted these practices, but they have also played a significant role in the proliferation of these of these tools throughout the nonprofit sector as they demand more from nonprofits in an attempt to better understand the impact of their giving (Hwang & Powell, 2009).

The challenge in regard to advocacy is that advocacy efforts often require a long time horizon, something that is not easily accommodated by a three or five year strategic plan. Progress towards social and policy change can also be difficult to measure, thus perhaps making foundations hesitant to engage in advocacy. However, there has also been a rise in what is described as "strategic philanthropy," of which advocacy is often seen as a key component (Nielsen, n.d.). And, there is a growing literature as to how service-providing nonprofits and foundations can evaluate advocacy efforts (Coffman, 2007; Guthrie, Louie, David, & Foster, 2005; Klugman, 2011; Masters & Osborn, 2010; Strong, 2012). Thus, these trends may make rationalized foundations more likely to turn advocacy as means to fulfill their missions. This leads to the next hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1d (H1d): *Rationalized foundations will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Political Orientation

A foundation's political orientation is likely to be a key driver of advocacy. Many foundations with a conservative political orientation are actively attempting to effect change on a broad range of issues from climate change to immigration (Brulle, 2014). This advocacy is rooted in a decades-long history of conservative foundations attempting to affect policy, which continues today (Covington, 2005). As noted in the introductory chapter, former Treasury secretary and president of the conservative Olin Foundation, William Simon, called on conservative donors to align their political interest with their philanthropy in the 1970s. Through the course of the 1980s and 1990s, conservative foundations established the organizational infrastructure to propagate conservative ideas through the expansion of conservative think tanks and political networks (Allen, 1992; Callahan, 2001; Rich, 2004). These institutionalized structures allowed conservative foundations to fight against policies in the 2000s that aimed at combatting climate change and to work against the expansion of Medicaid in the 2010s (Brulle, 2014; Hertel-Fernandez et al., 2016; Jacques, Dunlap, & Freeman, 2008).

While foundations with a more liberal political orientation, like the Ford Foundation, also have a history of being of involved in social and policy change activities (O'Connor, 1999), liberal foundations have provided comparably far less funding to institution building to further their goals, and liberal policy networks are more fragmented (Hertel-Fernandez & Skocpol, 2016). Conservative foundations have invested substantially more than liberal foundations in supporting different types of advocacy through think tank funding, policy research, and network building (Covington, 2005; Hertel-Fernandez & Skocpol, 2016; Rich, 2004). Liberal foundations may engage in advocacy through other strategies and tactics, but evidence suggests that

conservative foundations are more willing to attempt to have a direct effect on policy change. This leads to my fourth hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1e (H1e): *Politically conservative foundations will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Relational Drivers

Organizational Field

An organizational field is defined as "those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). What an organizational field looks like in practice is often hard to put boundaries on, but one way to think about organizational fields in the nonprofit sector is to look at those organizations that do work in the same policy or mission area. Nonprofits that focus on the arts, for example, or those that work to provide affordable housing could be thought of as part of the larger organizational fields that do work in and address those issues. Nonprofits within a shared organizational field typically face similar policy environments and field-wide frames that shape their work.

Nonprofits within certain organizational fields may be more or less likely to advocate, as research on service-providing nonprofits has demonstrated. Child and Grønbjerg (2007) find that health, mutual benefit, and environment/animal-related organizations have significantly higher levels of advocacy than nonprofits in other fields. Suárez and Hwang (2008) similarly find that environmental organizations, rights groups, parent-teacher organizations, and hospitals are more likely to engage in lobbying than nonprofits in other fields. In relation to foundations specifically, there are growing literatures demonstrating the active roles that foundations are playing in affecting education policy (Barkan, 2013; Lipman, 2015; Lubienski et al., 2016; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014; Reckhow, 2013) and environmental policy (Brulle, 2014). Looking

across the common threads of this existing research, then, we might expect organizations in the fields of health, education and the environment to be more involved in advocacy, leading to the next hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 2a (H2a): *Foundations in the organizational fields of health, education, and the environment will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Embeddedness in Inter-organizational Networks

Inter-organizational networks are increasingly common in the philanthropic sector. These networks facilitate learning, legitimation, and even economic benefits (Podolny & Page, 1998) through tactics such as producing conferences, hosting meetings, sending newsletters, and holding online resources. The Council on Foundations, for example, is a national membership network of foundations that works to facilitate learning and the spread of best practices among foundations. Similarly, regional foundation networks, such as Philanthropy Northwest, help to facilitate connections and coordinate work among foundations to address regional issues.

Research on foundation networks is limited, but there is evidence that among service-providing nonprofits, networks play the significant role in nonprofit involvement in advocacy. Networks of service-providing nonprofits are typically mission or geography based, and they often work to facilitate learning and improve service provision. While the focus of many of these networks is not advocacy, participation in these kinds of networks increases nonprofits engagement in advocacy (Bass et al., 2007; Donaldson, 2007; Mosley, 2010). Networks might be associated with increased engagement in advocacy for two reasons. These networks can facilitate the sharing of ideas about advocacy even if advocacy is not their focus, and belonging to such networks might signal a foundation's openness to engage their broader community that might

also be reflected through increased advocacy. Inter-organizational networks may have a similar effect for foundations as they do for service-providing nonprofits, leading to the next hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2b (H2b): *Foundations embedded in inter-organizational networks will be positively associated with advocacy.*

External Environment Drivers

Foundations' external community contexts are also important to consider, as the communities that foundations are situated in likely influence the strategy and operations of foundations. Prior research demonstrates that the external environment influences organizations' behaviors broadly (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Davis, 2007), and this may hold true for foundations specifically. For example, community characteristics influence community foundations' management strategies (Graddy & Morgan, 2006), and the external environment has been shown to influence engagement in advocacy among service-providing nonprofits (Mosley, 2010; Fyall & Allard, 2017). While many private foundations do not have well-developed community connections, it might still be expected that community context will influence foundation strategies, including whether they adopt advocacy as a strategy for mission fulfillment.

One key characteristic of a foundation's external environment that might influence its engagement in advocacy is the political orientation of its community. While I earlier hypothesized that foundations with a conservative political ideology are more likely to advocate, when it comes to the community-level factors, we might actually expect communities with a more liberal orientation to encourage more advocacy. This is due to the long history of social movement activism and advocacy for liberal causes in the nonprofit sector and liberal

communities more broadly (Goss, 2007; Jenkins & Halcli, 1999). Thus, more liberal leaning communities may influence foundations in those communities to advocate at higher levels.

Hypothesis 3a (H3a): *Foundations in politically liberal communities will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Another important characteristic of the external environment that might influence foundations' advocacy is the economic wealth of their communities. We know from the political science literature that wealthier individuals tend to be more politically engaged than low-income individuals (Gilens, 2005, 2012; Schlozman et al., 2012; Verba et al., 1995), and we could expect this engagement to aggregate at the community level such that wealthier communities are more likely to be politically engaged through advocacy activities. Foundations in these communities would be expected to reflect this greater engagement in advocacy. Furthermore, foundations in wealthier communities may also have the needed capacity and resources to support engagement in advocacy. This leads to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3b (H3b): *Foundations in economically wealthier communities will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Data and Methods

Sample

I define large foundations as the 500 largest private and community foundations by total assets in the United States. While this sample is a small subset of the approximately 86,000 foundations nationwide—and by definition skews toward those foundations with the most resources—these 500 foundations account for nearly half of total foundation giving (Foundation Center, n.d.). Targeting this subset of foundations provides a greater understanding of what

influences those foundations that have the most giving power in the U.S. Furthermore, these large foundations are often viewed as leaders in their sector and influence the funding and actions of other foundations and nonprofits. Understanding their strategies and actions, such as engagement in advocacy, is thus highly important to understanding the sector as a whole.

All foundations in this sample are large, by definition, in terms of total assets, but they vary tremendously by age, geography, founders, staffing, and priorities. As an example, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation is a long-established foundation based in Michigan, which was founded by John Kellogg of Kellogg cereals. The foundation prioritizes children and families in multiple localities throughout the U.S., employs more than 100 staff members, and has a sophisticated website and social media presence. In contrast, the Sergey Brin Foundation is a recently founded organization funded with new tech money. Ironically, Sergey Brin—the co-founder of Google—has no website for his foundation. The foundation does not have any paid staff, largely remains out of the limelight, and the funding priorities are unclear. This sample also includes community foundations, which are structured as public charities, and whose work is largely focused on certain geographic areas, such as the Communities Foundation of Texas and the Seattle Foundation.

I used the Foundation Center online database—a national repository of foundation data—to create the sample frame of the largest 500 private and community foundations by total assets. I generated the sample frame in June of 2018, which drew on 2016 fiscal year data for most foundations.[3] After accounting for foundations that had since closed, merged, or been subsumed by the operations of another foundation, I had an effective sample size of 489, for which I was

[3] I compared this Foundation Center data of the largest 500 to IRS data. There was an overlap of 435 foundations, with the remaining differences due to which fiscal year data was available and whether organizations fell above or below the largest 500 threshold.

able to secure IRS data for 463 of these foundations. The sample is composed of 415 private foundations (84.8%) and 74 community foundations (15.2%). Foundations in the sample range in total assets from $239 million to $41 billion.

Data Sources

This study leverages data from four sources: (1) the Foundation Center,[4] (2) the IRS, (3) foundation websites, and (4) the Census Bureau's USA Counties data. I describe these sources in greater detail below.

1) The Foundation Center (FC) hosts profile data on most foundations in the United States, which includes information such as giving priorities and network memberships. I downloaded the profile for each foundation in the sample between December 2018 and January 2019, and I scraped this data using the program Visual BPD. In addition to profile data, the Foundation Center database also contains grants data on approximately 1,000 of the largest foundations in the U.S., including all grants of more than $10,000 given by these foundations, as well as many grants smaller in size. FC data is the most comprehensive foundation grants data currently available. Importantly for this study, the Foundation Center categorizes grants by their giving strategy, one of which is "policy, advocacy, and systems reform" (see Appendix A for full taxonomy of giving strategies).

2) All U.S. community foundations file tax form 990, and private foundations file form 990-PF, with the IRS annually in order to maintain their tax-exempt status. The IRS has a publicly available dataset with select variables from the 990 and 990-PF forms. This data provides several independent and control variables for the quantitative analysis, such as salary costs (professionalization) and total assets (size). I pulled this data in June of 2018, and at that

[4] The Foundation Center recently merged with Guidestar and is now also known as Candid.

time, the most recent and comprehensive data available across foundations was for the 2015 fiscal year. If no 2015 data was available for a foundation, I used 2014 data for that foundation.

3) Foundation websites are a key source of information about each organization's purpose, activities, and funding priorities. While only a small percentage of foundations overall have websites (Foundation Center, n.d.), most large foundations in the U.S. do have a web presence. I scraped these websites using Python in order to assess the advocacy language contained on these sites (described in more detail below). Of the 489 foundations in my effective sample, 396 had websites, and I was able to scrape the websites for 386 foundations.

4) USA Counties data are compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau. These datasets contain a wide array of county-level data, including characteristics such as presidential voting behavior, median income, and education levels. These data provide key indicators for assessing foundations' external environments.

Dependent Variables

Advocacy has been a difficult concept for scholars to both define and measure. In the nonprofit advocacy literature, advocacy is often measured by surveying organizations about their tactics used (e.g., Child & Gronberg, 2007; Mosley, 2010), which is advantageous in ascertaining advocacy data directly from organizations. However, surveying also encounters several challenges such as selection bias due to low response rates. I use two alternative measures of advocacy in this chapter: advocacy discourse and advocacy funding. I develop an advocacy discourse measure—informed by the advocacy literature—that assesses the level of advocacy discourse on foundation websites. In addition to discourse, and in line with previous research, I also measure advocacy through foundations' grant funding (Aksartova, 2003; Suárez, 2012).

Advocacy Discourse on Websites

Discourse is an integral aspect of what constitutes institutions, and changes in discourse can lead to broad institutional change since it is often the medium through which ideas and actions are conveyed (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Schmidt, 2008, 2010). At an organizational level, discourse shapes and reflects organizational identity and strategy (Bice, 2015; Martens, Jennings, & Jennings, 2007; Phillips & Oswick, 2012). In today's society, websites express organizational discourse as they are a primary point of contact between organizations and their external stakeholders, and they are a key aspect of organizations' presentation of self to those both inside and outside the organization (Powell, Horvath, & Brandtner, 2016). Websites have remained durable in their importance as a "homebase" for organizations even with the burgeoning use of social media across organizations and society.

The development of this advocacy measure is informed by the advocacy literature and aims to capture a broad range of advocacy actions (Berry & Aarons, 2005; Guo & Saxton, 2013; Guo & Saxton, 2010; Jenkins, 2006; Leroux & Goerdel, 2009; Mosley, 2013). While it is certainly possible for organizations to say one thing and do another, an analysis of discourse on organizations' websites provides insights into both the actions it takes and how an organization views and presents itself. For foundations in particular, website discourse signals to potential grantees, partners, and the public what ideas and values they openly embrace. Furthermore, there is significant research that demonstrates the power of discourse and issue framing on social and policy change efforts (Benford & Snow, 2000; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Lee, Ramus, & Vaccaro, 2018; Snow, 2004; Snow et al., 1986), and foundation discourse can reflect and impact these efforts. Figure 2.1 below provides an example of advocacy language on large foundation websites.

Figure 2.1. Example of Advocacy Discourse on Large Foundation Website
Source: William and Flora Hewlett Foundation website

I construct this dependent variable as the proportion of advocacy sentences on a foundation website. Using sentences as the basic unit for the text analysis allows for comparability across foundation websites. I identified foundation websites through their Foundation Center profiles, which typically have a website listed if the foundation has one. For foundations with no website listed on their FC profile, I conducted a Google search for the

foundation and reviewed the first three pages of results. This process resulted in the identification of 396 websites, which is 81% of the sample, and I was able to scrape the websites for 386 of these foundations. The development of this dependent variable then comprised six main steps.

Table 2.1. Website Scraping and Machine-learning Process for Developing Advocacy Discourse Measure [5]

Step	**Purpose**
Step 1	Develop web scraper and scrape HTML for each foundation website
Step 2	Remove HTML tags and create text files for each foundation website that are parsed into sentences
Step 3	Develop training set of hand-labeled advocacy sentences[6]
Step 4	Train and test machine learning algorithms to predict advocacy sentences based on the training set
Step 5	Cross-validate multiple combinations of the preprocessing configurations and machine-learning models to assess accuracy of predictions
Step 6	Label full corpus using preferred model and calculate percentage of advocacy sentences for each foundation website

The first step was to develop a web scraper to scrape the website text of each foundation. From December 2018 to February 2019, I used a Python script to scrape the first two levels of HTML for each website. Level one includes the organization's "home" page—the page that is reached through the root URL (e.g., fordfoundation.org). Level two contains all pages that link to the level one page and that have same root URL (i.e., from the within the foundation's website). I concentrate on the first two levels of foundations' websites since foundations likely include

[5] I conducted these steps in collaboration with a machine-learning researcher at the University of Washington.

[6] Steps 3-6 were first conducted for Ch. 3 and then tested on a subsample of the Ch. 2 data to ensure their accuracy and usability for this data set.

what they determine to be the most important content in the most conspicuous parts of their website. The initial scraper captured 336 (85%) of foundation websites, focusing on all accessible HTML content and ignoring PDFs and Word documents. I encountered various challenges with the remaining 15% of websites, leading to adaptations to the script in order to scrape them. These challenges included websites' "bot" detection, unsuccessful redirects, and non-standard coding within websites. In the end, I was able to scrape 97% of the foundation websites that I identified. A manual inspection of the remaining websites did not reveal any obvious systematic bias across these foundations in regard to characteristics such as foundation size, website size, age, and geographic location.

Once I scraped the HTML for each website, the second step was to then remove all HTML tags, which is the code that determines the visual presentation of a website. Removing such tags leaves a file solely of the text content of the webpage, which can then be parsed into sentences. This process allows for the sentences to be labeled as to whether or not they make reference to advocacy.

After the text had been parsed into sentences, the third step was to label sentences for their advocacy language. Due to the total volume of sentences across all the websites, however, hand labeling each sentence was not feasible. I therefore took advantage of machine-learning methods to categorize the sentences. When using a supervised machine-learning framework, researchers manually classify a random sample of documents (sentences in this case) and use these "gold" labeled documents to train machine-learning algorithms (Wilkerson & Casas, 2017). However, a challenge with this research is that selecting a random sample of sentences from the full corpus of text would likely result in few sentences about advocacy due to the relative infrequency of advocacy specific language on websites. If, for example, I hand labeled

1500 sentences and only 50 contained advocacy language, that would not be enough documents to adequately train the algorithms.

In order to have an adequate number of potential advocacy sentences in the training set, I, along with two other advocacy researchers, developed a dictionary of advocacy language based on past advocacy research (Berry & Aarons, 2005; Guo & Saxton, 2010, 2013; Jenkins, 2006; Leroux & Goerdel, 2009; Mosley, 2013) and used this dictionary to identify potential advocacy sentences (see Appendix B). Capturing the essence of advocacy through discourse is a difficult undertaking, however, and we built this list through a review of literature and shared discussion of what should and should not be included. Ultimately, we decided on a narrow list where we each agreed the words included would likely be indicative of advocacy—such as advocate, lobby, legislation, and reform—and we excluded words that were on the margins, such as civic engagement, that may be indicative of advocacy but could also include activities such as volunteering. We believed this approach to be the most conservative and defensible.

We used this dictionary to identify potential advocacy-related sentences. Two samples of 800 sentences each were then constructed; each sample contained 30% randomly selected sentences and 70% potential advocacy sentences. There were 100 sentences that were the same in both samples to allow for an intercoder reliability test. This yielded a set consisting of 1500 sentences that were hand labeled by two other researchers. The correlation coefficient between the two coders was .858. By using the dictionary approach to oversample potential advocacy-related sentences, we were able to build a balanced training set between potential advocacy sentences and completely random sentences. This training set then contained 676 true positives about advocacy and 824 true negatives (i.e., not about advocacy).

The fourth step was to use this training set of true positives and true negatives to train the machine-learning algorithms. The full set of sentences first needed to be pre-processed in order to train the algorithms (sentences were indicated either by a period or a new line). Common ways of preprocessing text in preparation of machine-learning text analysis are to transform words into lowercase and to remove punctuation, stopwords (e.g., I, it, is) and numbers (see Table 2.2). Furthermore, I added word features such as bigrams (word pairs) and trigrams in order to improve training performance. I then needed to determine which algorithms to train. I trained four machine learning models that are commonly used in text analysis: Naive Bayes (NB), Support Vector Machine (SVM), an Ensemble (that combines NB and SVM), as well as Doc2Vec.

Table 2.2. Pre-Processing Configurations for Text Analysis

	1	*2*	*3*
Remove punctuation: delete punctuation signs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Remove numbers: delete numbers present in the text	Yes	Yes	Yes
Remove stopwords: delete common words such as "I" and "we"	Yes	Yes	Yes
Convert text to lowercase	Upper	Lower	Lower
Stemming: keep only the stem-root of words (Porter stemmer)	No	No	Yes

The fifth step was to cross-validate multiple combinations of the preprocessing configurations and machine-learning models to assess accuracy of predictions. I used a 100-fold cross-validation process and a 70-30 train-test split to determine the predictive accuracy of each of the algorithms. This means that the gold-labeled sentences were split such that the algorithms trained on 70% of the sentences and then tested for accuracy on the other 30%. Repeating this

process 100 times at different folds within the data ensures there was not bias in the training and test sets. To assess the predictive accuracy, I calculated precision and recall percentages of these different algorithms. Precision is a measure of exactness, where higher precision means fewer false positives. In this case, precision is the percentage of sentences that were correctly predicted to be about advocacy. Recall is a measure of completeness; higher recall means fewer false negatives. I used this cross-validation process to test multiple combinations of the preprocessing options and algorithms.

The results in Figure 2.2 indicate that while NB, SVM and the ensemble approach (that combines NB and SVM) all had similarly high precision rates, the ensemble approach had a substantially better recall. The Doc2Vec algorithm, which is only compatible with the parameters laid out in preprocessing configuration 2, scored worse on both precision and recall than NB, SVM and the ensemble approach, and was discarded as an option. The precision and recall predictions for each algorithm/preprocessing configuration were developed using a 50% probability threshold, meaning that sentences that the algorithms predicted to have a 50% or greater likelihood of being about advocacy were labeled as a 1 for advocacy. Below, the highest precision (83%) and recall (70%) were achieved with the ensemble approach using preprocessing configuration 2.



Figure 2.2. Comparing Precision and Recall Rates Across Multiple Algorithms and Preprocessing Configurations

Taking the preferred model—the ensemble with preprocessing configuration 2—I tested to see whether I could achieve greater precision and recall by using a different probability threshold. I used a 60% probability threshold and increased precision from 83% to 87%, while recall dropped from 70% to 60% (see Figure 2.3 below). My primary concern was to maximize precision in order to ensure that those sentences labeled as advocacy were true positives. I thus chose to use the preferred model at the higher threshold.



Figure 2.3. Comparing Performance of Preferred Model at 50% and 60% Probability Thresholds

With the machine-learning algorithm trained and achieving satisfactory precision and recall, the sixth and final step was to label the rest of sentences in the corpus as to whether they contained advocacy language. After the sentences were labeled, I calculated the proportion of sentences on each website that contained advocacy language.

Grant Funding of Advocacy

Another way to conceptualize advocacy by foundations is through their grantmaking to other nonprofits for the purposes of advocacy (Aksartova, 2003; Suárez, 2012). Most

foundations are fundamentally grantmaking organizations (with the exception of operating foundations), and understanding what foundations fund is key to understanding these organizations' priorities. I develop this variable using grants information from the Foundation Center in order to calculate the proportion of overall giving that a foundation makes to advocacy. As mentioned above, the Foundation Center has the most comprehensive grants data available, and FC codes each grant in their database along a number of dimensions, including by giving strategy. Giving strategies include (but are not limited to): general support; program support; capacity-building and technical assistance; leadership and professional development; capital and infrastructure; outreach; research and evaluation; and policy, advocacy, and systems reform. Each grant in their database is assigned one or more strategies.

The policy, advocacy, and systems reform category is defined by the Foundation Center as grants aimed "to develop, promote, and transform public policies, especially involving the proposal of novel solutions to ongoing challenges encountered by political, economic and social systems and institutions, especially in the field of activity central to the mission or purpose of an organization or project" (Foundation Center Philanthropy Classification, n.d.). This category contains seven sub-strategies: advocacy, systems reform, litigation, grassroots organizing, coalition building, ethics and accountability, and equal access. To assign these strategies, the Foundation Center uses a combination of data from the 990, additional data that foundations provide directly to the Foundation Center, as well as data about the recipient organization, in order to inform a machine-learning process. This approach leads to grants with an explicit stated purpose of advocacy, as well as general support to policy and advocacy focused organizations (e.g., think tanks), to be identified as grants with a policy, advocacy, and systems reform strategy (see Table 2.3 for example grants).

Relying on the Foundation Center's taxonomy system for identifying grant strategies likely leads to a conservative measure of advocacy funding. For example, if a foundation wishes to support the YWCA in its advocacy efforts, the foundation could opt to simply provide a general support grant, and that support for advocacy would not be captured here. Furthermore, by only using grants explicitly labeled as using a policy, advocacy, and systems reforms strategy, I may miss grants that use other strategies, such as outreach, that is also intended for advocacy. However, I believe, this approach leads to the most conservative and defensible measure.

Table 2.3. Illustrative Examples of Grants to Support Policy, Advocacy, and Systems Reform

Foundation	Amount	Recipient	Stated Purpose
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation	$700,000	New York University	Research to evaluate how changes in tax and benefit policies and in retirement savings policies would impact wealth accumulation and labor supply of older workers
Allegheny Foundation	$50,000	American Legislative Exchange Council	Program support
Kresge Foundation	$100,000	Virginia Organizing	Program development support for a multi-year work plan to influence the community's climate-resilience planning, policy development, and implementation to better reflect the priorities and needs of low-income, urban residents
Meyer Memorial Trust	$40,000	Tualatin Riverkeepers	Support for advocacy and education to reduce stormwater pollution in the Tualatin River
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation	$95,000	Health Care for All	Support for the development of a coalition that can advocate improved food, housing, and health care policy to support a culture of health for children in Massachusetts
Triad Foundation	$10,000	Tax Foundation	Program development support for efforts to promote sensible tax policy
Tulsa Community Foundation	$5,000	Heritage Foundation	General operating support
W.K. Kellogg Foundation	$1,500,000	Parents for Public Schools	Program support for leadership, advocacy and mobilization skills training for low-income and marginalized parents in Mississippi to advance individual and collective efforts to advocate for quality public education

Source: Foundation Center

I developed the advocacy funding measure by first downloading all FC grants data for each foundation in the sample and then downloading grants specifically identified as using a policy, advocacy, and systems reform strategy. I downloaded this data for the three most recent years that were broadly available across foundations (2013-2015). The final measure was the

proportion of all grant dollars for each foundation that were directed at policy, advocacy, and systems reform for the three-year period.[7]

Independent Variables

Organizational Drivers

Community Logic. Determining the institutional logic that an organization inhabits or embraces is also challenging to measure. One approach is to evaluate the institutional logics that are reflected in the discourse the foundation uses to describe itself. Using such an approach, I determined whether a foundation exhibits a community logic by assessing the discourse on the foundation's Foundation Center profile. FC profiles include mission description, background information, and program area descriptions.

Based on prior literature (Graddy & Morgan, 2006; Grønbjerg, 2006), I coded each foundation as a 0 or 1 for whether their FC profile, home page, or about section contained language indicating a community logic. If the profile contained words or phrases such as collaboration, partnership, or leadership development, it was labeled a one for being community-oriented. As an example, the Grable Foundation states on its FC profile: "With a focus on southwestern Pennsylvania, we seek out nonprofit partners who share our commitment to making our region the best place to be a kid." To verify coding, another researcher coded a subsample of 30 foundations, and we achieved a correlation of .87.

Foundation Form. To determine organizational form, I used Foundation Center data that categorizes each foundation as being a private or community foundation. I created an indicator in which community foundations were labeled as a 1 and private foundations were labeled as a 0.

[7] For foundations that only had two years of available data, a two-year average was used.

Professionalization. I measure professionalization using foundations' IRS data. This measure uses overhead costs in the form of salaries and is calculated as the proportion of overall operating expenses that are spent on salaries, in line with previous research (Stewart & Faulk, 2014). This approach measures how much foundations prioritize spending on staff, but it does not take into account other potential measures of professionalization, such as the credentials of staff, which are not available in current data. A challenge I encountered in developing this variable is that private foundations and community foundations complete different versions of the 990 form, and I had to bridge these differences in the development of this variable. For community foundations, which use the standard IRS 990 form (see Appendix C), I used total salaries, other compensation, and employee benefits (Line 15, Part 1) and divided by total expenses (Line 18, Part 1). For private foundations, which use 990-PF forms (see Appendix D), I added officer compensation (Line 13, Part 1), other salaries (Line 14, Part 1), and employee benefits (Line 15, Part 1), and divided by total expenses (Line 26, Part 1). However, the IRS data set did not include other salaries (Line 14, Part 1) for private foundations, so these data were input manually for each foundation by reviewing its 990-PF form.

Rationalization. The use of consultants has been used as an indicator of rationalization in previous literature (Hwang & Powell, 2009). However, consultant use is not broken out for private foundations on the 990-PF the same way it is for community foundations, and this data is not in the IRS data set. As an alternative measure, I used the presence of a Glasspockets profile as a dichotomous indicator for rationalization. Glasspockets is a website hosted by the Foundation Center with the intent of improving transparency in institutional philanthropy. Foundations can choose whether they want to have a Glasspockets profile that provides insights

into the foundation's governance and grantmaking, and this choice is an indicator of whether a foundation embraces rationalized practices.[8]

Political Orientation. Measuring political orientation is a longstanding challenge within the political science field. Researchers have used proxies such as voting records (e.g., Clinton et al., 2004; Poole & Rosenthal, 1997) or analysis of text data from speeches (Lauderdale & Herzog, 2016) to measure legislators' political ideology, as well as voiced support or opposition for certain types of legislation to measure the ideology of interest groups (Klüver, 2009). For organizations that are 501(c)(3)s and not explicitly political organizations, however, measuring their political orientation is more challenging. Nonetheless, it is clear that some foundations do have a political orientation, and I attempted to build indicators for whether foundations have a liberal or conservative political orientation. These two indicators, liberal and conservative, are dichotomous and based on (a) membership to a liberal or conservative leaning network of foundations, or (b) grant funding to liberal or conservative think tanks.

To determine membership in a liberal foundation network, I used membership in the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP), a network of liberal funders explicitly committed social justice. I determined NCRP membership through one of two ways: (1) the foundation was listed on the NCRP website as a member, or (2) the foundation made a contribution to NCRP, as indicated in the Foundation Center grants data. I used both of these sources to ensure that I captured all foundations who were members and did not miss any foundations that may have requested not to be listed on the NCRP website.

[8] As another alternative to the use of consultants, I created a count variable of six rationalized practices, such as the presence of a website, publicly available audited financials, and use of social media. However, this variable was too highly correlated with other independent variables and could not be used in the final models.

To determine whether a foundation has provided funding to a liberal think tank, I first created a list of liberal think thanks. As there is not one agreed-upon classification of think tanks as to their political orientation, I drew on three well-cited and well-respected sources: Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise (Rich, 2004); Wake Forest University's Political Economy Research Guide (Wake Forest Univeristy, n.d.); and the New York Times (New York Times, 2008). I cross-referenced the three sources for agreement on which foundations were considered liberal. This process yielded the following list: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Center for American Progress, Economic Policy Institute, Demos, Public Citizen, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, the Roosevelt Institute.[9] I then downloaded the grants information from the Foundation Center of foundations that provided grants to these think tanks from 2013-2016, in line with the time frame of my other data. If a foundation in my sample had a membership in NCRP or had made grants to one of these think tanks, I labeled it a 1 for liberal.

I used membership in the Philanthropy Roundtable to determine membership in a conservative network. The Philanthropy Roundtable is a well-known association of conservative foundations with a mission "to foster excellence in philanthropy, protect philanthropic freedom, and help donors advance liberty, opportunity, and personal responsibility" (Philanthropy Roundtable, n.d.). Unlike NCRP, the Philanthropy Roundtable does not have a list of members on their website, so I relied solely on Foundation Center data to determine foundation membership as indicated by whether a foundation made a contribution to the Philanthropy Roundtable.

[9] Important to note here that the Brookings Institution is not included in this list because one of these sources considered it be centrist and not liberal.

With regard to conservative think tank funding, I first created a list of conservative think tanks in the same manner as I did for liberal think tanks using the same three sources. This process yielded the following list: Heritage Foundation,[10] Hoover Institution, American Enterprise Institute, Hudson Institute, Manhattan Institute, Pacific Research Institute, and the National Center for Policy Analysis.[11] I then downloaded the grants information from the Foundation Center of those foundations that provided grants to these think tanks. If a foundation in my sample had a membership in Philanthropy Roundtable or made grants to one of these think tanks, I labeled it as a 1 for conservative.

Relational Drivers

Organizational Field. Foundations tend to be a part of the organizational fields in which they prioritize their giving. To determine a foundation's primary organizational field, each foundation received a binary indicator as to whether education, health, or the environment was their top giving priority in terms of grantmaking dollars. The first step to creating this indicator was to download all grants data for each foundation from Foundation Center. FC categorizes each grant according to subject area, such as education, health, environment, human services, and arts and culture (see Appendix E for the taxonomy of subject areas), which I use as a proxy for organizational field. I then created a proportion by summing all grant dollars given over a three-year period in each subject area and dividing by total grant dollars given over that period. A foundation was labeled a 1 for education if the proportion of grant dollars it provided in this subject area was greater than the proportion granted in all other subject areas. The same process was followed for the subject areas of health and the environment.

[10] While the Heritage Foundation has "foundation" in its name, it is important to note that it is a 501(c)(3) public charity, not a foundation as defined in this study, and is not a part of my sample.
[11] NCPA ceased operations in late 2017 but was in operation for the years in which I was collecting data.

Embeddedness. I measure embeddedness in interorganizational networks as the total number of networks and associations to which a foundation belongs, as indicated on the Foundation Center's profiles for each foundation. For example, a foundation might belong to networks such as Northern California Grantmakers or the Council on Foundations. This variable is a count of all such networks listed on each foundation's FC profile.

External Environment Drivers

To assess foundations' external environments, I measure two important aspects of a foundation's surrounding community: community wealth and community politics. I use county-level data from the Census Bureau's USA Counties data to develop both measures, and while each foundation may define their community differently, using data for the county that the foundation is headquartered in allows for comparability across foundations. In relation to community wealth, there are several ways to conceptualize a community's economic resources, and I use factor analysis to capture multiple aspects: median household income, per capita income, and percentage of people with a bachelor's degree. This measure attempts to capture overall community (economic) wealth, while at the same time preserving degrees of freedom.[12] For community political orientation, I use the percentage of people voting for the Democratic presidential candidate in the data's most recent election to develop a community liberalism measure. This measure is, indeed, a coarse indicator for any one community's politics, which are likely nuanced and dynamic over time and do not necessarily map neatly onto political parties. However, this data allows me to roughly capture how liberal or conservative a foundation's county is and to allow for comparison across those counties.

[12] It is important to acknowledge that this measure only addresses standard economic measures and does not capture wealth in other senses such as cultural and social.

Controls

I use the common organizational controls of organizations' size and age. Organizational size is measured as total assets (logged) as indicated in the IRS data. Age is measured as the years since the ruling date for the foundation, also as indicated in the IRS data.

Overview of Variable Construction

Table 2.4 below provides an overview of how I measure the dependent and independent variables for this study. I use these variables to run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions to test my hypotheses. Next, I present the results of these analyses.

Table 2.4. Overview of Variable Construction

	Construct	*Variable*	*Measure/indicator*
		Dependent variables	
Advocacy	Advocacy	Advocacy discourse	Proportion of advocacy sentences on foundation website
		Advocacy funding	Proportion of funding for policy, advocacy, and systems reform
		Independent variables	
Organizational	Institutional logic	Community logic	0/1 indicator as to whether foundation uses community-oriented language on FC profile, website homepage, about
	Organizational form	Public	0/1 indicator if foundation is a community foundation (public charity)
	Managerialism	Professionalization	% of total expenses allocated to salaries/benefits
		Rationalization	0/1 indicator as to whether foundation has a Glasspockets profile
	Political orientation	Conservative	0/1 indicator if foundation belongs to conservative network or donates to conservative think tanks
		Liberal	0/1 indicator if foundation belongs to liberal network or donates to liberal think tanks
Relational	Organizational field	Education	0/1 indicator if education is organization's primary giving area
		Environment	0/1 indicator if environment is organization's primary giving area
		Health	0/1 indicator if health is organization's primary giving area
	Embeddedness	Networks	Number of networks to which foundation belongs
External	Community wealth	Community liberalism	Percent of voters in county voting for Democratic presidential candidate
	Community political orientation	Community wealth	Factor analysis of county-level data: per-capita income, median household income, % with a Bachelor's or higher
Controls	Organizational age	Age	Number of years since foundation was founded
	Organizational size	Size	Total assets (logged)

Results

I first report the descriptive statistics (see Table 2.5) and then turn to the results of the multivariate analysis. The total sample is 463 foundations when using advocacy funding as the dependent variable and 386 when using advocacy sentences as the dependent variable. I provide descriptive statistics for both sets of analyses.

Descriptive Statistics

Advocacy Variables

The mean spending on advocacy as a proportion of total giving is .064 with a standard deviation of .116. In regard to advocacy discourse, the mean proportion of sentences containing advocacy language on a foundation's website is .02, with a standard deviation of .027. Since the sample size changes depending on which dependent variable is used, I present descriptive statistics for the first sample (S1) using advocacy funding as the dependent variable, as well as the second sample (S2) using advocacy discourse as the dependent variable.

Table 2.5. Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Variables	Mean	SD
Dependent			*Dependent*		
Advocacy funding	.0642	0.116	Advocacy sentences	.0202	0.0272
Organizational drivers			*Organizational drivers*		
Community logic	0.564	--	Community logic	0.668	--
Public	0.153	--	Public	0.184	--
Professionalization	0.0708	0.0828	Professionalization	0.0778	0.0818
Rationalization	0.119	--	Rationalization	0.142	--
Liberal	0.207	--	Liberal	0.241	--
Conservative	0.322	--	Conservative	0.352	--
Relational Drivers			*Relational Drivers*		
Education field	0.438	--	Education field	0.446	--
Environment field	0.0432	--	Environment field	0.0466	--
Health field	0.106	--	Health field	0.109	--
Networks	3.244	4.857	Networks	3.754	5.065
External Drivers			*External Drivers*		
Community liberalism	65.12	15.4	Community liberalism	64.61	15.62
Community wealth	-0.0018	0.965	Community wealth	-0.055	0.963
Controls			*Controls*		
Age	34.85	22.74	Age	36.35	23.22
Total assets (logged)	19.87	1.276	Total assets (logged)	19.98	1.192
Observations	463			386	

Sources: Foundation Center, Internal Revenue Service, Foundation websites, U.S. Census Bureau USA Counties data

Organizational Drivers

As discussed above, the organizational drivers I examine in this study are institutional logic, foundation form, managerialism (professionalization and rationalization), and political orientation. The means for community logic are .564 (S1) and .668 (S2), meaning 56.4% of foundations in the first sample and 66.8% of foundations in the second sample display a community logic. The mean proportions that foundations spend on paid staff as a part of their overall expenditures are .071 (S1) and .078 (S2), with standard deviations of .083 (S1) and .082 (S2) respectively. The means for rationalization are .119 (S1) and .142 (S2), meaning 11.9% and 14.2% of foundations, respectively, have a Glasspockets profile

In regard to public organizational form, the means are .153 (S1) and .184 (S2), meaning 15.3% and 18.4% of foundations in the samples are community foundations with a public charity status. The means for liberal political orientation are .207 (S1) and .241 (S2), indicating that 20.7% and 24.1% of foundations in the samples have a liberal political orientation as indicated by liberal network membership or think tank funding. The means for conservative political orientation are .322 (S1) and .352 (S2), meaning 32.2% and 35.2% of foundations in the samples display a conservative political orientation based on their network membership or think tank funding.

Relational Drivers

The key relational drivers in this study are organizational field and embeddedness. The means for the organizational field of education are .438 (S1) and .446 (S2), meaning that 43.8% and 44.6% of foundations in the samples fund grantmaking in education as their top giving priority. The means for the organizational field of the environment are .043 (S1) and .047 (S2), indicating that 4.3% and 4.7% of foundations fund environmental causes as their top

grantmaking priority. The means for the health organizational field are .106 and .109, meaning 10.6% and 10.9% of foundations fund health as their top grantmaking priority. With respect to embeddedness, the mean number of networks or associations that foundations belong to are 3.244 (S1) and 3.754 (S2), with standard deviations of 4.857 (S1) and 5.065 (S2).

External Environment Drivers

I assess two key external environment drivers of advocacy: community liberalism and community wealth. The mean for community liberalism in the first sample is 65.12, with a standard deviation of 15.4, meaning that the average foundation in this sample is located in a county where 65.12% of voters voted for the Democratic presidential candidate. The mean for the second sample is 64.61, with a standard deviation of 15.62. Community wealth was measured as a factor analysis of three characteristics: per capita income, median household income, and percentage of people with a Bachelor's degree. The means for community wealth are -.002 (S1) and -.055 (S2), with standard deviations of .965 and .963 respectively.

Multivariate Results

I performed OLS regression analysis on cross-sectional data, using the common organizational controls of size and age. While my dependent variables are continuous, there are a significant number of zeros in both variables, which can present a modeling challenge for traditional OLS. In order to address potential challenges with heteroskedasticity, I bootstrapped my standard errors 1,000 times. Bootstrapping does not change the coefficients but does alter the standard errors and thus potentially the statistical significance of the results.[13] For each of the two dependent variables, then, I present two sets of analyses: one set that builds by conceptual

[13] I also performed regressions that clustered standard errors at the county and state levels to account for shared political environments across foundations, but this did not affect the results.

frame and uses OLS regression, and one set that builds by conceptual frame and uses OLS with bootstrapped standard errors.

First, however, I checked for multicollinearity among the independent variables. Table 2.6 displays the correlation matrix. Analysis of these correlations indicates no issues with multicollinearity.

Table 2.6. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. community	1													
2. public	0.353	1												
3. professionalization	0.148	-0.00976	1											
4. rationalization	0.266	-0.0296	0.126	1										
5. liberal	0.403	0.160	0.119	0.455	1									
6. conservative	0.238	0.249	-0.0147	0.134	0.231	1								
7. education field	-0.0448	0.0700	-0.0604	-0.0294	-0.120	0.0876	1							
8. environment field	0.0570	-0.00388	0.0524	0.0210	0.0754	-0.00896	-0.188	1						
9. health field	0.0599	-0.0708	-0.0527	0.0697	0.0676	0.00499	-0.304	-0.0726	1					
10. networks	0.425	0.196	0.220	0.459	0.565	0.314	-0.0656	0.0116	0.0440	1				
11. community liberalness	0.0577	-0.106	0.0316	0.133	0.201	-0.0646	-0.0710	-0.00475	0.0847	0.148	1			
12. community wealth	-0.127	-0.228	0.0224	0.172	0.0870	-0.147	-0.0480	0.00957	0.0863	-0.0193	0.480	1		
13. age	0.0634	0.115	0.123	0.111	0.136	0.106	0.0490	-0.0199	-0.00745	0.197	-0.00992	-0.0790	1	
14. total assets (logged)	0.290	0.0304	0.129	0.306	0.352	0.238	0.0213	-0.0120	0.0297	0.389	0.114	0.0458	0.106	1

Next, I present the regression results by conceptual frame. Each independent variable represents a hypothesis that relates to the conceptual frame, and I present results in order of the hypotheses. While the beta coefficients are relatively small due to the fact that foundations only dedicate an average of two percent of their overall website language to advocacy, the marginal effects can still be substantial. Overall results and implications will be further explored in the discussion section.

Table 2.7. Determinants of Foundation Funding for Advocacy

	OLS				OLS bootstrapped SE			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Organizational drivers								
Community logic	0.0515***			0.0426***	0.0515***			0.0426***
	(0.0113)			(0.0112)	(0.0117)			(0.0115)
Public	-0.087***			-0.082***	-0.087***			-0.082***
	(0.0145)			(0.0143)	(0.0135)			(0.0126)
Professionalization	0.0545			0.0267	0.0545			0.0267
	(0.0584)			(0.0575)	(0.0535)			(0.0561)
Rationalization	0.0437***			0.0275	0.0437**			0.0275
	(0.0168)			(0.0170)	(0.0190)			(0.0182)
Liberal	0.0490***			0.0206	0.0490***			0.0206
	(0.0142)			(0.0148)	(0.0176)			(0.0186)
Conservative	0.0392***			0.0376***	0.0392***			0.0376***
	(0.0109)			(0.0108)	(0.0123)			(0.0129)
Relational drivers								
Education		-0.0015		0.0004		-0.0015		0.0004
		(0.0106)		(0.0100)		(0.0095)		(0.0086)
Environment		0.0835***		0.0733***		0.0835*		0.0733*
		(0.0246)		(0.0231)		(0.0436)		(0.0443)
Health		0.0465***		0.0313**		0.0465***		0.0313*
		(0.0168)		(0.0159)		(0.0179)		(0.0177)
Networks		0.0076***		0.0044***		0.0076***		0.0044***
		(0.0011)		(0.0013)		(0.0011)		(0.0015)
External drivers								
Community liberalism			0.0015***	0.001***			0.0015***	0.001***
			(0.0004)	(0.0003)			(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Community wealth			0.00155	0.00205			0.00155	0.00205
			(0.0061)	(0.0057)			(0.0059)	(0.0054)
Controls								
Age	-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0000	-0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0000	-0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Total assets (log)	0.0078*	0.0144***	0.0233***	0.0057	0.0078**	0.0144***	0.0233***	0.0057*
	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0037)	(0.0038)	(0.0051)	(0.0032)
Constant	-0.133*	-0.245***	-0.493***	-0.159*	-0.133*	-0.245***	-0.493***	-0.159**
	(0.0801)	(0.0813)	(0.0815)	(0.081)	(0.0726)	(0.0717)	(0.101)	(0.0669)
Observations	463	463	463	463	463	463	463	463
R-squared	0.257	0.201	0.116	0.314	0.257	0.201	0.116	0.314

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: Foundation Center, Internal Revenue Service, Foundation websites, U.S. Census Bureau USA Counties data

Table 2.8. Determinants of Foundation Advocacy Discourse

	OLS				OLS bootstrapped SE			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Organizational drivers								
Community logic	0.0112***			0.0101***	0.0112***			0.0101***
	(0.0031)			(0.0031)	(0.0028)			(0.0029)
Public	-0.015***			-0.0137***	-0.015***			-0.0137***
	(0.0036)			(0.0036)	(0.0026)			(0.0027)
Professionalization	0.0251			0.0205	0.0251*			0.0205
	(0.0158)			(0.0156)	(0.0147)			(0.0145)
Rationalization	0.0041			0.0004	0.0041			0.0004
	(0.0042)			(0.0043)	(0.0052)			(0.0054)
Liberal	0.0155***			0.0107***	0.0155***			0.0107***
	(0.0036)			(0.0038)	(0.0041)			(0.0039)
Conservative	0.0022			0.0027	0.0022			0.0027
	(0.0029)			(0.0029)	(0.0032)			(0.0032)
Relational drivers								
Education		-0.0015		0.0005		-0.0015		0.0005
		(0.0029)		(0.0028)		(0.0031)		(0.0029)
Environment		-0.002		-0.0049		-0.002		-0.0049
		(0.0065)		(0.0061)		(0.0048)		(0.0046)
Health		0.0016		-0.0011		0.0016		-0.0011
		(0.0046)		(0.0043)		(0.0041)		(0.0039)
Networks		0.0015***		0.0007**		0.0015***		0.0007**
		(0.0003)		(0.0003)		(0.0003)		(0.0003)
External drivers								
Community liberalism			0.0004***	0.0003***			0.0004***	0.0003***
			(0.0001)	(0.0001)			(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Community wealth			0.002	0.0019			0.002	0.0019
			(0.0016)	(0.0016)			(0.0014)	(0.0015)
Controls								
Age	0.000	-0.0001	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.0001	0.000	0.000
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Total assets (log)	0.0001	0.0015	0.0032***	-0.0005	0.0001	0.0015	0.0032**	-0.0005
	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0011)	(0.0012)	(0.0013)	(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)
Constant	0.0073	-0.0128	-0.0712***	0.0011	0.0073	-0.0128	-0.0712***	0.0011
	(0.0234)	(0.0241)	(0.0224)	(0.0239)	(0.0241)	(0.0272)	(0.0260)	(0.0235)
Observations	386	386	386	386	386	386	386	386
R-squared	0.177	0.094	0.108	0.226	0.177	0.094	0.108	0.226

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: Foundation Center, Internal Revenue Service, Foundation websites, U.S. Census Bureau USA Counties data

Organizational Drivers

First, in H1a, I hypothesized that foundations with a community logic would engage in more advocacy. From the results in Table 2.7, Model 1 indicates a positive and highly significant relationship between community logic and advocacy funding. This relationship holds in the full model as indicated in Model 4. Significance at the $p<.01$ level continues to hold when bootstrapping standard errors in Model 5 and Model 8. When using advocacy discourse on foundation websites as the dependent variable, the data in Model 1 of Table 2.8 indicate a positive and highly significant relationship between community logic and advocacy discourse. This relationship remains highly significant at the $p<.01$ level in the full model (Model 4) and continues to remain highly significant when bootstrapping standard errors, as seen in Models 5 and 8. Thus, H1a is supported across both measures of advocacy.

In H1b, I predicted that community foundations, which have a public charity status, would engage in more advocacy than private foundations. The data indicate a significant and negative relationship between community foundations and advocacy funding. This negative relationship is present in both Model 1 of Table 2.7 and the full model (Model 4). This negative and significant relationship continues to hold at the $p<.01$ level when bootstrapping standard errors in Models 5 and 8. Furthermore, when using advocacy discourse as the dependent variable, the relationship further continues to be highly significant and negative as indicated by Models 1 and 4 of Table 2.8, as well as when standard errors are bootstrapped in Models 5 and 8. Given the strong negative relationship across model specifications and measures of advocacy, these findings do not support H1b and, in fact, indicate that community foundations engage in less advocacy than private foundations, not more so.

Hypotheses 1c and 1d predicted that foundations with higher levels of managerialism—both professionalization and rationalization—would be positively associated with advocacy. Model 1 in Table 2.7 indicates high significance for rationalization but no significance for professionalization. The full model (Model 4), however, indicates no significance for professionalization or rationalization in regard to their relationship with advocacy funding. These results remain true when bootstrapping standard errors in Models 5 and 8. Similar patterns hold true when using advocacy discourse as the dependent variable (see Table 2.8). Professionalization shows some significance here in Model 1, but significance is lost in the full model (Model 4), and similarly in Models 5 and 8. Rationalization is not significant in any of the models. Provided these consistent results, H1c and H1d, which predicted that professionalization and rationalization would be positively associated with foundation advocacy, are not supported.

In Hypothesis 1e, I predicted that foundations with a conservative political ideology would be positively associated with engagement in advocacy. The relationship between conservative foundations and advocacy is positive and strongly significant at the $p<.01$ level when using advocacy funding as the dependent variable (see Table 2.7, Model 1). This relationship remains highly significant in the full model (Model 4) and when bootstrapping standard errors (Models 5 and 8). There is a significant relationship between liberal foundations and advocacy funding in Model 1, but significance is lost in the full model (Model 4). The same pattern holds true in Models 5 and 8. However, when using advocacy discourse as the dependent variable, these relationships essentially flip in significance. In Table 2.8, liberal foundations are positively and significantly associated with advocacy discourse in both Model 1 and the full model (Model 4). This significance remains when bootstrapping standard errors in Models 5 and 8. For conservative foundations, there is not a significant relationship with advocacy when using

advocacy funding as the dependent variable across any of the models. Thus, H1e is partially supported given that conservative foundations are significantly associated with advocacy funding but not significantly associated with advocacy discourse.

Relational Drivers

Hypothesis 2a predicted that foundations within the organizational fields of education, health, and the environment would have a positive association advocacy. In Models 2 and 4 in Table 2.7, the education field does not have a significant relationship with advocacy funding, and this remains true in Models 6 and 8 when bootstrapping standard errors. The health and environment fields, however, are strongly and positively with advocacy funding in the standard OLS models at the $p<.01$ and $p<.05$ levels, respectively. When bootstrapping the standard errors, these positive relationships were still supported at the $p<.1$ level for both. However, when using advocacy discourse as the dependent variable, none of these organizational fields have a significant relationship with advocacy. There is thus partial support for H2a.

With Hypothesis 2b, I predicted that foundations' embeddedness within inter-organizational networks would have a positive association with advocacy. When using advocacy funding as the dependent variable, the effect size is small but the relationship is positive and significant, as seen in Model 2 of Table 2.7. In the full model (Model 4), the relationship is highly significant at the $p<.01$ level, and the same pattern holds in Models 6 and 8 when bootstrapping standard errors. When using advocacy discourse as the dependent variable, the relationship is positive and significant at the $p<.01$ level in Model 2 of Table 2.8 and remains significant at the $p<.05$ level in Model 4. These levels of significance remain when bootstrapping standard errors in Models 6 and 8. Thus, there is substantial support for H2b.

External Environment Drivers

Hypotheses 3a and 3b predicted that a foundation's external environment would influence its engagement in advocacy. Specifically, foundations in more politically liberal counties (H3a) and wealthier counties (H3b) would be positively associated with advocacy. Models 3 and 4 in Table 2.7 demonstrate a strongly significant and positive relationship between the political liberalism of the county and the foundation's engagement in advocacy, although the effect size is quite small. The results hold when bootstrapping standard errors as seen in Models 7 and 8. With respect to community wealth, there is not a significant relationship with advocacy funding across any of the models. The same patterns hold true in regard to advocacy discourse as seen in Table 2.8. Here, too, there is a highly significant relationship between community liberalism and advocacy discourse as seen in Models 3 and 4, as well as Models 7 and 8 when bootstrapping standard errors. There is no relationship between community wealth and advocacy discourse across any of the models. There is thus support for H3a but not for H3b.

Discussion

This chapter addresses a significant gap in the literature with regard to what drives philanthropic foundation in the United States to engage in advocacy as a strategy for fulfilling their missions. Philanthropic foundations have come under increased public scrutiny in recent years (Callahan, 2017; Giridharadas, 2018; Reich, 2018; Villanueva, 2018), but our understanding of what drives their actions is still quite limited. Their engagement in advocacy and desire to shape public policy is of particular interest given their plutocratic force—for private foundations in particular—and tax subsidized nature. This chapter represents an important first

step to understanding how the structure and organizational context of foundations matters for their behavior and strategies.

I find considerable support for the conceptual frame, which argues that organizational, relational, and external environment factors influence foundations' engagement in advocacy. With respect to the drivers of advocacy funding, several organizational factors matter: institutional logic, organizational form, and political orientation. Foundations with a community logic have a highly significant relationship with advocacy funding, suggesting that those foundations that display aspects of community leadership and partnership building engage in more advocacy through their funding. We also see that community foundations, which have a public charity tax status, are negatively associated with advocacy—contrary to my hypothesis. This lack of advocacy may be caused by stakeholder pressures to refrain from overtly political activity, or perhaps a lack of control over funds due to the presence of donor-advised funds. In addition, conservative foundations are highly associated with advocacy funding, but whether this is due to specific characteristics related to conservative ideology or simply stems from a path dependence of conservative funding for advocacy remains unclear.

In regard to relational and external environment drivers of advocacy, embeddedness in interorganizational networks, organizational fields, and community liberalism are consequential for advocacy funding. Foundations belonging to more interorganizational networks and associations fund more advocacy, suggesting that those foundations that are open to engaging in relationships with other organizations may be more likely to engage their external environment in other ways such as advocacy. This finding could also indicate that networks, even if not for the explicit purpose of advocacy, may be important conduits for conveying ideas and strategies around advocacy. The organizational fields of the environment and health are also associated

with higher levels of advocacy funding. There may be shared organizational relationships or field characteristics that help to promote advocacy among foundations working in these areas. We also see that foundations in more liberal counties are significantly more likely to fund advocacy.

These findings largely hold true when measuring advocacy through discourse, with two key differences. First, the effect of foundations' political orientation switches. Liberal foundations are significantly associated with advocacy discourse when there was no relationship with advocacy funding. Conservative foundations, on the other hand, were found to be associated with greater advocacy funding, but not associated with greater advocacy discourse. The second key difference between the advocacy funding models and advocacy discourse models is in regard to organizational field. While the organizational fields of the environment and health are significantly related to advocacy funding, no significant relationship exists for advocacy discourse.

The findings overall imply that advocacy funding and advocacy discourse have generally similar drivers for large foundations in the U.S. While these measures of advocacy are conceptually distinct, for many foundations, their advocacy more broadly and their funding of advocacy may be complementary strategies. The notable exception here is the difference between liberal foundations, which are more likely to be associated with advocacy discourse, and conservative foundations, which are more likely to be associated with advocacy funding. This result suggests that conservative foundations may be more prone to quietly fund advocacy, whereas liberal foundations may be more apt to directly engage in advocacy, or alternatively, simply more likely to signal their support for advocacy on their websites. This finding calls into question whether liberal foundations are "putting their money where their mouth is."

The results suggest substantial support for the conceptual frame, but there are several limitations that must be noted. This study is cross-sectional and does not support claims of causality, but rather, is a first step toward understanding the relationships between organizational, relational, and external environment factors with advocacy. Relatedly, this study only captures foundations in a snapshot of time, and these results may differ at different points in time. Furthermore, my focus on the largest foundations by total assets limits the generalizability of the findings to other very large foundations and not to the philanthropic sector as a whole.

Additional limitations exist in regard to the development of conceptual measures and indicators for this chapter. Advocacy, in particular, is a challenging concept to define and measure. The advocacy text measure is novel and attempts to assess a broad range of tactics, but it may not capture the full extent to which foundations use advocacy language or engage in advocacy. I opted for a text analysis approach that I believed to be most defensible and supported by previous advocacy literature, but this was also a conservative strategy as it might not capture advocacy language that is more subtle—thus leading to conservative measure of advocacy. Similarly, the advocacy grant funding measure may also be a conservative measure. I relied on the Foundation Center's classification of advocacy—those grants they determine to be "policy, advocacy, and systems reform." This category does not include strategies such as civic engagement, which may or may not be used for advocacy purposes. Furthermore, foundations can also support advocacy through making grants for general support, and this would not be captured as advocacy funding.

In regard to the independent variables, several measures are admittedly blunt indicators. The measure for community logic, for example, is binary and because of this, I am not capturing the extent to which a foundation has a community orientation. Those foundations that use

considerable language to indicate a community logic language are treated the same in the analysis as those that use only a little. Similarly, my indicators for political orientation consist of two binary variables. While this is a novel attempt at capturing the political orientation of foundations in a systematic way, I am not capturing the extent to which foundations are liberal or conservative, and there is certainly a spectrum on which foundations' political orientations fall. Finally, with regard to the external environment variables, I use county-level data for these measures. While I see that as the most consistent way to understand community influences across foundations, more refined measures may yield more nuanced results.

This study makes several contributions to the field despite these limitations. I address significant gaps in the literature by developing a framework for understanding what drives philanthropic foundations—powerful organizations that are highly under-researched—to engage in advocacy. I use machine-learning techniques to develop a new and replicable measure of advocacy across foundations. Finally, I lay the foundation for important future research questions. For example, foundations could vary greatly in their advocacy approaches (e.g., insider vs. outsider strategies), and accounting for these difference could lead to a fuller understanding of what drives their advocacy. These different tactical choices could also lead to varying effects on social and policy change. Perhaps the most import question stemming from this work is: To what extent are foundations achieving their social and policy change goals and what drives differences in the achievement of these goals?

Summary

In this empirical chapter, I tested my conceptual frame among the largest foundations in the United States and developed measures for the concepts of interest. I uncover significant

support for the conceptual frame, finding that organizational, relational and external environment factors influence foundations engagement in advocacy. In the next chapter, I turn to testing my conceptual frame among one type of foundation—community foundations in the U.S.

Chapter 3. Change Starts at Home: Community Foundations as Leaders of Local Advocacy

Introduction

Years of policy-making gridlock at the federal level in the U.S. has led to increasing policy change efforts at state and local levels (Katz & Nowak, 2017; McCartney, 2015). California recently passed laws regulating the internet and Washington state attempted to pass a carbon tax—policy areas that have typically been viewed as under the purview of the federal government. Many states have moved to legalize marijuana, and cities across the country have passed higher minimum wages. This intensified focus on state and local arenas as venues for policy change creates opportunities for actors at these levels to amass greater influence in the policy-making process. However, one such political actor has been largely overlooked—community foundations. While the findings from the previous chapter indicate that community foundations advocate less than private foundations, there is evidence that many community foundations are taking active roles in social and policy change (Kavate, 2021; Rojc, 2019).

Community foundations are grantmaking organizations aimed at improving people's lives in a defined geographic area by raising funds from a base of donors in that area (Council on Foundations, n.d.; Sacks, 2014). These foundations typically provide a vehicle for individuals, families, and corporations to set up giving funds to benefit their local community. In addition, community foundations often play a prominent role in their communities by identifying local needs and developing initiatives to address them, some with the active goal of transforming their communities (Hamilton et al., 2004; Sacks, 2014; Sloan, 2021). The East Bay Community Foundation in California, for example, serves the greater Oakland area with a mission to "partner with donors, social movements, and the community to eliminate structural barriers, advance

racial equity, and transform political, social, and economic outcomes for all who call the East Bay home." The foundation holds more than a half billion dollars in assets and manages donor-advised funds from individuals, families, and corporations. One of the major initiatives the foundation leads is called "A Just East Bay," which strives to support communities most harmed by systems of oppression and to change those systems. Another initiative, called "ASCEND:BLO," aims to enhance the growth of Black-led nonprofit organizations throughout the Bay Area.

Community foundations are widespread throughout the U.S., with even the least-populous states having at least one such foundation, and they constitute 11% of all foundation giving nationwide (Foundation Center, n.d.). Community foundations are often county based, but they may also define their community as a city, multi-city or multicounty area. They range greatly in size, with some community foundations holding less than $100,000 in assets while others—like the Silicon Valley Community Foundation and Tulsa Community Foundation hold several billions of dollars in assets. Figure 3.1 below shows the geographic distribution of community foundations throughout the country.

Figure 3.1. Map of the Geographic Distribution of Community Foundations in the United States
Source: Council on Foundations

Like service-providing organizations, community foundations are structured as 501(c)(3) public charities, and their distinction in being public charities—as opposed to private foundations—is consequential for several reasons. While private foundations are typically seeded with money from an individual, family, or corporation, a community foundation raises money on an ongoing basis from a multitude of donors. These foundations are not required to disburse five percent of their net investments on a yearly basis as private foundations are required. Most importantly for this study, community foundations are allowed to lobby, albeit with some restrictions.

With few exceptions (e.g., Graddy & Morgan, 2006), the role of community foundations as active actors in policy and social change processes has been largely overlooked. To the extent

that the literature has considered foundations as political actors, it has largely focused on a handful of the largest private foundations (e.g., Brulle, 2014; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014; Tompkins-Stange, 2016). Many community foundations, however, are seizing opportunities and pushing for policy change on issues ranging from racial justice to climate change (Kavate, 2021; Rojc, 2019). This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on community foundations as important political players and illuminating what drives their engagement in advocacy.

I argue that community foundations are not simply motivated by making "strategic" decisions but rather that their actions are shaped by structural and contextual factors. In particular, I expect that community foundations' institutional logic, level of managerialism and social justice orientation will affect their engagement in advocacy. Furthermore, since community foundations often have many ties with external stakeholders such as donors, community leaders, and grantees, I expect their advocacy to be influenced by aspects of their external environment, particularly the economic wealth and political orientation of their communities. This leads to the dissertation's second research question.

> RQ2: *To what extent do community foundations' structure and context drive their engagement in advocacy as a strategy for achieving their mission?*

To address this question, I combine multiple data sources and use machine-learning methods and regression analysis to assess the drivers of advocacy among community foundations nationwide. I employ two distinct advocacy measures in this study—advocacy discourse and lobbying. Advocacy discourse, as in the previous chapter, aims to capture the extent to which community foundations convey advocacy actions on their websites. Lobbying, on the other hand, is an advocacy tactic that is specifically defined as the attempt to influence legislation and is

reported to the IRS on community foundations' 990 forms. In the next section, I develop specific hypotheses for what predicts this advocacy before then turning to the methods and results for this chapter.

Literature Review and Hypotheses

Organizational Drivers of Advocacy

Institutional Logic

Institutional logics are "the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals and organizations produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality" (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p.101). The driving logics in U.S. society are considered to be community, religion, the state, market, and the professions, and these logics influence the decisions, vocabulary, and identity of individuals and organizations (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). Research demonstrates that institutional logics shape the actions and decisions of a wide array of organizations from private companies to nonprofits and academia and that organizations often confront pressures stemming from multiple institutional logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2010; Skelcher & Smith, 2015). With respect to service-providing nonprofits in particular, research indicates that institutional logics can influence the type of advocacy in which these organizations engage (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2014), and we might expect community foundations' advocacy to be similarly affected.

Community foundations, like other organizations, are likely to have their decisions and strategies influenced by these logics, and in particular, by the ones that they embrace or reflect. Community foundations that embody a market logic, for example, would be expected to focus on donor investments or competition. While it may seem intuitive that all community foundations would have a community logic, evidence has shown that not to be the case. Many community foundations are primarily focused on serving donor needs and managing investments rather than, say, community leadership (Graddy & Morgan, 2006). Those foundations that do reflect a community logic are likely to direct their efforts toward collaboration, partnership, and civic engagement (Graddy & Wang, 2009; Grønbjerg, 2006). Foundations, then, with a community logic—those that approach problem solving by engaging citizens and building community capacity—might be expected to be more open to advocacy strategies than those without a community logic. This leads to my first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): *Community foundations that exhibit a community logic will be positively associated with engagement in advocacy.*

Managerialism

Managerialism refers to the adoption of business practices and structures in nonprofits' operations and governance and can be thought of as having two components—professionalization and rationalization (Maier et al., 2016; Suárez & Esparza, 2017). Professionalization within the nonprofit sector relates to the reliance on paid staff as well as individuals with higher-level degrees and credentials (Frumkin, 1999; Hwang & Powell, 2009). With respect to the effects of professionalization on advocacy, previous studies of service-providing nonprofits indicate that nonprofit leaders with higher levels of education and credentials are positively associated with advocacy (Mosley, 2010), while nonprofits with higher

levels of paid staff are either negatively associated or not associated with advocacy (Leroux & Goerdel, 2009; Nicholson-Crotty, 2007, 2009). Nonprofits with greater levels of paid staff, however, are more likely to reflect trends in the sector as "best practices" diffuse through professional networks (Hwang & Powell, 2009), and this idea is bolstered by recent findings from a meta-analysis of the literature that professionalization is positively associated with nonprofit advocacy (Lu, 2018). Evidence of this diffusion can be seen in philanthropy, as well, as the concept of "venture philanthropy" has become prevalent in the sector (Moody, 2007). If advocacy is now viewed as a "best practice" in philanthropy, then those foundations that are more professionalized might reflect this trend. Furthermore, research on service-providing nonprofits indicates that more professionalized organizations are more likely to dedicate resources to activities not directly related to their programming (Hwang & Powell, 2009). The same might hold true for community foundations, and if so, professionalized foundations might be more likely to direct resources to activities not directly tied to their grantmaking, such as advocacy. This leads to my next hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1b (H1b): *Community foundation professionalization will be positively associated with advocacy.*

The adoption of rationalized practices often occurs alongside professionalization in organizations. Rationalization relates to organizations' increasing formalization as they apply standardized tools and practices to their operations with the aim of increasing performance and signaling effectiveness (Hwang & Powell, 2009; MacIndoe & Barman, 2013; Marshall & Suárez, 2014). Such practices include the use of strategic plans, audits, evaluations, and the hiring of consultants (Hwang & Powell, 2009). The implications of rationalization for advocacy, however, are not clear cut. On the one hand, advocacy impact is often difficult to measure and

non-linear, requiring a long time horizon—one that does not fit neatly in a three-year strategic plan. On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that advocacy is becoming a rationalized tool that is a key component of "strategic philanthropy" (Nielsen, n.d.). There is also a growing literature on evaluating the outcomes of advocacy (Coffman, 2007; Strong, 2012), and this trend may make foundations more likely to adopt such a strategy if they believe that they will be able to assess their impact through this work. I thus hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1c (H1c): *Community foundation rationalization will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Social Justice Orientation

Social justice philanthropy targets foundations' funding toward progressive causes, typically with a focus on systemic change (Faber & McCarthy, 2005; Foundation Center, 2009; Rabinowitz, 1992). While there are a few foundations with a long history of supporting social justice (Jenkins & Halcli, 1999; Ostrander, 2005; O'Connor; 1999), there has been a steady increase in the focus on social justice within the philanthropic field in recent decades (Suárez, 2012). We might expect that those community foundations that identify as working toward social justice goals to be more inclined to engage in advocacy, as social justice efforts often explicitly state a desire to change policy. Evidence indicates a relationship between foundations with a social change identity and funding for community organizing and civic engagement (Suárez & Lee, 2011). Community foundations, then, that identify with and engage in work pursuing social justice goals may be more likely to advocate as a way to pursue their mission. This leads to the next hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1d (H1d): *Community foundations with a social justice orientation will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Relational Driver of Advocacy[14]

Embeddedness in inter-organizational networks refers to the ties that organizations develop with entities outside their own (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, & Dowell, 2006; Powell, 1990). Research demonstrates that interorganizational networks and associations can facilitate learning, legitimacy, and even economic benefits for organizations that are a part of a network (Galaskiewicz et al., 2006; Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Within the philanthropic sector, associations such as the Southeastern Council of Foundations—a regional network of foundations that aims to promote peer-to-peer learning and leverage philanthropy to improve lives of people living in the region—host conferences, conduct meetings, and share informational resources with member organizations (Southeast Council of Foundations, n.d.). Embeddedness in these types of networks could be associated with advocacy for a couple of reasons. Evidence from the literature on service-providing nonprofits suggests that networks are a significant predictor of advocacy and can be important conduits for knowledge sharing about advocacy even when advocacy is not the focus of the network's activities (Donaldson, 2007; Lu, 2018; Mosley, 2010). Furthermore, organizations that are receptive to or actively engaged in inter-organizational networks may be more open to engaging their external environment through activities such as advocacy. This leads to my next hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *Community foundation embeddedness in inter-organizational networks will be positively associated with advocacy.*

[14] Organizational field is omitted from this study due to the limited data available for this set of foundations. The Foundation Center grantmaking data I used in the previous chapter are not broadly available for smaller community foundations. Furthermore, NTEE codes refer to community foundations simply as grantmaking organizations and do not provide data about their subject area focus.

External Environment Drivers of Advocacy

Previous scholarship demonstrates that the external environment influences organizations' behaviors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Davis, 2007), and this may be particularly true for community foundations. Due to the connections community foundations have within their communities—through both their reliance on donors and their desire to address community challenges (Sacks, 2014; Graddy & Morgan, 2006)—certain aspects of foundations' external communities may influence whether these foundations engage in advocacy. Research suggests that community characteristics can influence the strategic management approaches of community foundations (Graddy & Morgan, 2006), as well their grantmaking allocations (Guo & Brown, 2006), and this influence may apply to engagement in advocacy. One key characteristic of the community foundation's external environment that might be influential for advocacy is the political liberalism of its community. While there is political engagement across political spectrum, there is a long history of social movement activism and advocacy for liberal causes in the nonprofit sector and liberal communities (Jenkins & Halcli, 1999; Goss, 2007). Having a more liberal leaning base of residents then may lead to more advocacy by the community foundation engaged in serving that community. I thus hypothesize:

Hypothesis 3a (H3a): *Community foundations in more politically liberal communities will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Another key characteristic of the external environment to consider is the economic wealth of the community. There is strong evidence that wealthier individuals are more likely to be politically engaged than low-income individuals (Gilens, 2012; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995), and it is reasonable to expect that this political engagement aggregates to the community level. A community foundation in an environment where its residents are politically engaged

may be more likely to reflect this engagement and to advocate as an organization. Furthermore, foundations in wealthier communities may have greater resources and capacity to support this advocacy.

Hypothesis 3b (H3b): *Community foundations in wealthier communities will be positively associated with advocacy.*

Data and Methods

Sample

This study focuses on community foundations in the United States. With no IRS designation specific to community foundations, I first needed to identify the community foundation population. I combined two lists of community foundations from well-respected sources in the field—Council on Foundations (CF) and the Community Foundation Atlas (CFA)—with the intention of approximating close to the full population of community foundations in the U.S. All community foundations listed and which had their own employer identification number with the IRS were included. This process lead to an estimated 965 community foundations in the U.S., of which I was able to obtain IRS data for 876. I consider this to be the maximum operational sample.

Data

This study draws upon five data sources to address the research question: (1) Internal Revenue Service, (2) the Foundation Center, (3) community foundation websites, (4) the Community Foundation Atlas, and (5) the U.S. Census Bureau's USA Counties data. I describe each of these sources in more detail below.

1. Community foundations file tax form 990 with the IRS annually in order to maintain their tax-exempt status. Data from these forms are compiled by the National Center on Charitable Statistics (NCCS), as well as the IRS itself. The most recent and comprehensive data available at the time acquisition was for fiscal year 2013. These datasets provide lobbying data as well as several independent and control variables for the analysis, including salary costs (professionalization), total assets (size), and age.

2. The Foundation Center hosts profile data on most foundations in the United States, including community foundations. These profiles include information such as giving priorities and network memberships for each foundation. I downloaded each foundation's profile in February of 2017 and scraped these data using the program Visual BPD.

3. Community foundation websites are key sources of information about organizations' purpose and activities. While few foundations overall have websites, most community foundations in the U.S. do have a website presence. Each community foundation's website was scraped in order to assess any advocacy language contained on these sites. I identified websites for 815 of the total sample of 876 foundations. Of these 815, 84% (N=684) were scraped successfully. Those that were unable to be scraped were typically due to the crawler not being able to follow redirects or due to the website blocking the automated "bot." A manual review of the website URLs that were not able to be scraped did not suggest any identifiable patterns that would lead to selection bias.

4. The Community Foundation Atlas (CFA) is considered to be the most comprehensive directory of the world's community foundations (Foundation Center Grantcraft, 2014). CFA conducted a survey of community foundations to gather a wide array of data on community foundations' missions, operations, and funding priorities. These data both inform the sample

frame as well as provide profile information that contains background and mission information for community foundations in the United States.

5. The U.S. Census Bureau develops the USA Counties datasets. USA Counties data contain county-wide characteristics for each county in the U.S., including voting behavior and indicators of community wealth, which allow for the construction of key independent variables.

Dependent Variables

As noted in the previous chapter, defining and measuring advocacy has been challenging for researchers. Survey methods have often been used to directly solicit information from organizations about the advocacy tactics they employ (e.g., Mosely, 2010; Child & Gronbgjerg, 2007), but I seek to develop two alternative measures. The first draws on the advocacy literature to assess the level of advocacy discourse on community foundation websites, which enables me to capture a broad array of advocacy language and tactics. The second measure assesses whether a community foundation engages specifically in lobbying, which the IRS defines as "the attempt to influence legislation." Lobbying activities must be reported on community foundations' 990 forms, as it is the only form of advocacy that the IRS regulates. In line with previous research (Suárez & Hwang, 2008), I use this IRS data to determine if a community foundation lobbies. The development of these measures are described in more detail below.

Advocacy Discourse on Websites

I argued in the previous chapter that the discourse organizations use reflects and shapes their strategies, and that in today's society, websites are a key organizational feature that convey organizational discourse and identity (Bice, 2015; Martens et al., 2007; Philips & Oswick, 2012; Powell, Horvath & Brandtner, 2016). With respect to community foundations, their websites are particularly important platforms to analyze as they are a prominent outward representation to

community members, donors, and grantees about foundations' values and actions. Furthermore, while advocacy discourse does not necessarily translate into advocacy "on the ground," considerable evidence points to the importance of discourse and issue framing as impactful on social and policy change (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Lee, Ramus, & Vaccaro, 2018; Snow, 2004; Snow et al., 1986). Websites are an important means for documenting that discourse.

Figure 3.2. Example of Advocacy Language on Community Foundation Website



Source: Silicon Valley Community Foundation website

Using machine-learning methods, I constructed this dependent variable as the proportion of advocacy sentences on a foundation website.[15] Foundation websites were identified through the Council on Foundation data as well as Google searches, and I used sentences as the basic unit

[15] I developed this measure in collaboration with a machine-learning researcher at the University of Washington. The same process for constructing the advocacy discourse variable used for this chapter was also used for Ch.2. I provide a brief overview here--additional details on this process are provided in Ch.2.

for the text analysis to allow for comparability across foundation websites. The development of this dependent variable was then composed of six main steps. The first step was to develop a web crawler to scrape the website of each community foundation. These websites were scraped in September and October of 2017, concentrating on all HTML accessible content on the first two levels of the websites. The second step was to then remove all HTML tags (code that determines the visual presentation of the website) and parse the text into sentences in order for the sentences to be labeled as whether or not they make reference to advocacy.

After the text was parsed into sentences, the third step was to code sentences for whether or not they contained advocacy language. Due to the volume of text, however, hand coding each sentence was not feasible, and I instead took advantage of machine learning methods to categorize the sentences. When using supervised machine learning processes, as I do here, researchers manually classify a random sample of documents and use these "gold" labeled documents to train machine learning algorithms (Wilkerson & Casas, 2017). A challenge here, though, is that selecting a random sample of sentences from the full corpus of text would result in few sentences about advocacy, and this would not provide enough advocacy samples on which to train the machine learning algorithms. In order to have an adequate number of potential advocacy sentences in the training set, I, with two fellow advocacy researchers, developed a dictionary of advocacy language based on past advocacy research and used this dictionary to identify potential advocacy sentences. By using the dictionary approach to oversample potential advocacy-related sentences, a balanced training set between potential advocacy sentences and completely random sentences could be built. This training set consisted of 1500 sentences that were hand labeled by two researchers, and the correlation coefficient between the coders was .858.

The fourth step was to preprocess the raw sentences and determine which algorithms to train. Common ways of preprocessing text are to transform words into lowercase and to remove punctuation, stopwords (e.g., I, it, is) and numbers. Three machine-learning algorithms common in text analysis were then trained: Naive Bayes (NB), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and an ensemble approach (that combines NB and SVM). The fifth step was to cross-validate multiple combinations of the preprocessing configurations and machine-learning models to determine the accuracy of their predictions. The ensemble approach achieved the highest precision with an accuracy rate of 87%. Once the machine-learning algorithm was trained and achieving satisfactory accuracy, it could be used to label the rest of the sentences in the corpus as to whether they contained advocacy language. After the sentences were labeled, the sixth and final step was to calculate the proportion of sentences on each website that contained advocacy language.

Lobbying

Since community foundations—unlike private foundations—are allowed to lobby and still maintain their tax-exempt status, I can also assess whether they specifically engage in this advocacy tactic. Lobbying is defined by the IRS as "attempting to influence legislation" (IRS, n.d.) and is considered a particular form of advocacy (Salamon & Geller, 2008). Community foundations can lobby within certain limits, and they are required to report their lobbying on their 990 forms. In fact, lobbying is the only form of advocacy that the IRS regulates. There are two lines on the 990 that refer to lobbying. Part 4, line 4 asks, "Did the organization engage in lobbying activities, or have a section 501(h) election[16] in effect during the tax year?" Part 9, line

[16] 501(c)(3) public charities, like community foundations, can opt for a 501(h) election by filing Form 5768 with the IRS. The form is an expenditure test that authorizes a certain amount of lobbying expenditures, depending on the organizational size, that will not jeopardize the organization's tax-exempt status.

11d, asks organizations to state the dollar amount the organization spent on lobbying fees. I then constructed the lobbying variable as a dichotomous variable drawing from this IRS data. An organization received a 1 if they answered "yes" in Part 4, Line 4 or reported any lobbying fees in Part 9, line 11d on their 990 forms over a three-year period. While using this data only captures one tactic, it is particularly advantageous as it concretely represents community foundations direct engagement in advocacy.

Independent variables

Organizational Drivers

Community logic. For community foundations, institutional logics can be thought of in two distinct, yet related, ways. First, and like foundations more broadly, one can think of a community foundation's institutional logic(s) as being reflected in the discourse the foundation uses to describe itself. Using such an approach, I determined whether a foundation exhibits a community logic by assessing the discourse on the foundation's Foundation Center profiles. FC profiles include mission description, background information, and program area descriptions. Drawing on prior literature (Graddy & Morgan, 2006; Grønbjerg, 2006), I and two other coders labeled the profiles for whether they contained community logic language. To establish a common definition of the community logic construct, the three coders first evaluated the text for the same 100 foundations, with an initial correlation among coders between .68 and .75. We then discussed differences and applied our finalized definition to the remainder of the foundation profiles. If the profile contained words or phrases such as collaboration, partnership, civic leadership, or capacity building, it was labeled a 1 for being community-oriented. For example, the California Community Foundation states: "Our approach to civic engagement is focused on building and increasing the capacity of underrepresented communities."

Second, an alternative approach to understanding a community foundation's logic is to assess its funding model. Unlike foundations broadly, which are typically funded by a single person or entity, community foundations have multiple revenue streams: donations from community members, earned income through programs and services, and interest from investments. A funding model that is more heavily dependent on donations from the community would indicate a community logic, while a funding model more reliant on program revenue and investment income would be more indicative of a market logic. To measure each foundation's community logic through their funding model, I used the IRS data to calculate the percentage of total revenue that is composed of donations. A foundation is considered to have a community logic if more that 50% of its revenue stems from contributions.

Managerialism. I measured professionalization and rationalization using the IRS data. The professionalization measure uses overhead costs in the form of salaries and is calculated as the proportion of overall expenses that are allocated toward salaries, in line with previous research (Stewart & Faulk, 2014). Specifically, this variable draws on "salaries, other compensation, and employee benefits" (Line 15, Part 1) and is divided by total expenses (Line 18, Part 1). I measured rationalization as a count measure that relies on the number of consultant types with which a foundation engages, as indicated in Part 9, Section 11. This includes management, legal, accounting, fundraising, investment management and other consultants.[17]

Relational Drivers

Embeddedness. I measured embeddedness in interorganizational networks using the Foundation Center profiles. This variable is a count of all networks and associations listed on

[17] Excludes lobbying consultants to avoid endogeneity.

each foundation's profile. Examples of such networks include the Council on Foundations and the Southeast Council of Foundations.

External Environment Drivers

Community wealth and community political orientation are two factors external to the community foundation that are a part of its community context and may influence its engagement in advocacy. Using the USA Counties data, I measured community wealth as a factor of three county-level variables using the principal factor method: per capita income, median household income, and percentage of people with a Bachelor's degree or higher. Using a factor of these data that represent the economic wealth of the community helped preserve degrees of freedom for the analysis. I measured political liberalism of the community as the percentage of voters within the county that voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in the most recent year of the USA Counties data. While ideology and party do not always align, this measure should provide an approximation of a community's political orientation.

Controls

I used the common organizational controls of size and age as I did in the previous chapter. Organizational size is measured as the community foundations' total assets (logged) as available in the IRS data. Age is measured as the years since its IRS ruling date.

Table 3.1. Overview of Variable Construction

	Construct	*Variable*	*Measure/indicator*
Advocacy		*Dependent variables*	
	Advocacy	Advocacy discourse	Proportion of advocacy sentences on foundation website
		Lobbying	0/1 indictor based on IRS data over a three-year period
Organizational		*Independent variables*	
	Institutional logic	Community logic discourse	0/1 indicator as to whether foundation uses community-oriented language on FC profile
		Community logic donative model	0/1 indicator if more than 50% of foundation revenue is generated through community contributions
	Managerialism	Professionalization	% of total expenses allocated to salaries/benefits
		Rationalization	Count of number of consultant types used by the foundation
	Social justice orientation	Social justice identity	0/1 indicator based on whether foundation identifies with social justice or social movements on their FC profile
Relational	Embeddedness	Networks	Number of networks to which foundation belongs as indicated on FC profile
External	Community wealth	Community wealth	Factor analysis of county-level data: per-capita income, median household income, % with a Bachelor's or higher
	Community political orientation	Community liberalism	Percent of voters in county voting for Democratic presidential candidate
Controls	Organizational age	Age	Number of years since foundation was founded
	Organizational size	Size	Total assets (logged)

Results

I use regression analysis on cross-sectional data in this study. I first report the descriptive statistics (see Table 3.2) and then turn to the results of the multivariate analysis. The total sample is 590 when using advocacy discourse as the dependent variable and 774 when using lobbying as the dependent variable.

Descriptive Statistics

Advocacy Variables

The dependent variables I use in this study are advocacy discourse and lobbying. The mean percentage for advocacy discourse is 1.567% with a standard deviation of 1.254. The mean for lobbying is .103 (with a standard deviation of .305), meaning that 10.3% of community foundations engage in lobbying. The sample size for the analyses, however, changes with respect to which dependent variable is used. As such, I present two sets of descriptive statistics for the independent variables. The first set (S1) relates to the descriptive statistics when advocacy discourse is the dependent variable, and the second (S2) relates to when lobbying is used as the dependent variable.

Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Variables	Mean	SD
Dependent			*Dependent*		
% Advocacy sentences	1.567	1.254	Lobbying	0.103	--
Organizational			*Organizational drivers*		
Comm. logic discourse	0.361	--	Comm. logic discourse	0.323	--
Comm. logic donative model	0.727	--	Comm. logic donative model	0.698	--
Professionalization %	13.45	10.65	Professionalization %	12.82	11.23
Rationalization	2.834	1.164	Rationalization	2.65	1.217
Social justice orientation	0. 032	--	Social justice orientation	0.031	--
Relational			*Relational*		
Networks	2.542	3.191	Networks	2.193	2.964
External environment			*External Drivers*		
Community liberalism	51.13	13.02	Community liberalism	50.24	13.32
Community wealth (factor)	0.035	0. 953	Community wealth (factor)	0.035	0.959
Controls			*Controls*		
Age	26.74	16.05	Age	36.35	23.22
Total assets (logged)	16.88	1.78	Total assets (logged)	16.52	1.963
Observations	590			774	

Sources: Foundation Center, Community foundation websites, U.S. Census Bureau USA Counties data, Internal Revenue Service, National Center for Charitable Statistics

Organizational Drivers

The organizational drivers I examine in this chapter are institutional logic, managerialism (professionalization and rationalization), and social justice orientation. The means for community logic are .361 (S1) and .323 (S2), meaning that 36.1% of foundations in the first sample and 32.3% of foundations in the second sample display a community logic on their Foundation Center profiles. The means for donative dominance are .727 (S1) and .698 (S2), meaning that 72.7% and 69.8% of community foundations, respectively, generate a majority of their funding through community contributions. The mean percentages for professionalization—how much foundations allocate toward paid staff as a part of their total expenditures—are 13.45% (S1) and 12.82% (S2), with standard deviations of 10.65 and 11.23 respectively. The means for rationalization—the number of consultant types a foundation uses—are 2.834 (S1) and 2.65 (S2), with standard deviations of 1.164 and 1.217 respectively. The means for social justice orientation are .031 (S1) and .032 (S2), meaning that 3.1% and 3.2% of community foundations exhibit a social justice orientation on their FC profiles.

Relational Driver

The key relational driver in this chapter is embeddedness in interorganizational networks. The means for the total number of networks and associations to which a community foundation belongs are 2.542 (S1) and 2.193 (S2), with standard deviations of 3.191 and 2.964 respectively.

External Environment Drivers

The external environment drivers of advocacy that I assess in this chapter are community liberalism and community wealth. The mean for community liberalism in the first sample is 51.13 (standard deviation of 13.02), meaning that the average community foundation in this sample is located in a county where 51.13% of resident voters voted for the Democratic

presidential candidate. The mean for the second sample is 50.24, with a standard deviation of 13.32. Community wealth was measured as a factor analysis of three county-level characteristics—per capita income, median household income, and percentage of people with a Bachelor's degree. The means for community wealth are .0351 (S1) and .0352 (S2), with standard deviations of .953 and .959 respectively.

Multivariate Results

I performed OLS and logit regression analysis on cross sectional data, using the common organizational controls of age and size. To address potential challenges posed by heteroskedasticity and mild violations of assumptions, I bootstrapped the standard errors 1,000 times.[18] Bootstrapping the standard errors does not alter the coefficients but can affect the size of the standard errors and consequently the statistical significance of the results. For each dependent variable, I present two sets of analyses. The first set builds by conceptual frame and uses typical standard errors. The second set also builds by conceptual frame but uses bootstrapped standard errors.

I first checked for multicollinearity among the independent variables. The correlation matrices are shown in Tables 3.3 (S1) and 3.4 (S2). Analysis of these correlations does not indicate any issues with multicollinearity.

[18] I also conducted these analyses by clustering standard errors at the county and state levels to account for shared political environments across foundations, but this clustering did not substantially change the results from those presented here.

Table 3.3. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (N=590)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. community logic discourse	1									
2. community logic donative model	0.0723	1								
3. professionalization	-0.0417	-0.108**	1							
4. rationalization	0.229***	0.0663	-0.0818*	1						
5. social justice	0.183***	0.0471	0.0849*	0.133**	1					
6. networks	0.327***	0.111**	-0.0208	0.385***	0.487***	1				
7. community liberalism	0.269***	0.0670	0.0150	0.226***	0.220***	0.366***	1			
8. community wealth	0.203***	0.163***	0.0253	0.169***	0.136***	0.209***	0.311***	1		
9. age	0.170***	-0.150***	-0.0669	0.210***	0.0610	0.252***	0.0966*	0.0434	1	
10. total assets (logged)	0.319***	0.0173	-0.259***	0.532***	0.222***	0.569***	0.231***	0.0733	0.444***	1

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table 3.4. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (N=774)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. community logic discourse	1									
2. community logic donative model	0.0723	1								
3. professionalization	-0.0417	-0.108**	1							
4. rationalization	0.229***	0.0663	-0.0818*	1						
5. social justice	0.183***	0.0471	0.0849*	0.133**	1					
6. networks	0.327***	0.111**	-0.0208	0.385***	0.487***	1				
7. community liberalism	0.269***	0.0670	0.0150	0.226***	0.220***	0.366***	1			
8. community wealth	0.203***	0.163***	0.0253	0.169***	0.136***	0.209***	0.311***	1		
9. age	0.170***	-0.150***	-0.0669	0.210***	0.0610	0.252***	0.0966*	0.0434	1	
10. total assets (logged)	0.319***	0.0173	-0.259***	0.532***	0.222***	0.569***	0.231***	0.0733	0.444***	1

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Below, I present the regression results by conceptual frame. Each independent variable represents a hypothesis generated from the conceptual frame, and I present the results in order of the hypotheses. Table 3.5 displays the results with relation to the advocacy discourse dependent variable, which uses OLS regression with and without bootstrapped standard errors. Table 3.6 displays the results stemming from the lobbying dependent variable, which uses a logit regression, also with and without bootstrapped standard errors. The overall results and their implications will be discussed in the concluding section.

Table 3.5. Determinants of Community Foundation Advocacy Discourse

	OLS				OLS bootstrapped SE			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Organizational drivers								
Community logic disc.	0.366***			0.228**	0.366***			0.228**
	(0.1080)			(0.1080)	(0.1110)			(0.1030)
Community logic don.	0.367***			0.253**	0.367***			0.253**
	(0.1120)			(0.1110)	(0.1080)			(0.1050)
Professionalization	0.016***			0.014***	0.0162***			0.014***
	(0.0048)			(0.0047)	(0.0047)			(0.0045)
Rationalization	0.0789			0.0306	0.0789			0.0306
	(0.0497)			(0.0491)	(0.0531)			(0.0512)
Social justice	1.404***			0.822***	1.404***			0.822**
	(0.2880)			(0.3100)	(0.3670)			(0.3790)
Relational drivers								
Networks		0.136***		0.0648***		0.136***		0.0648***
		(0.0188)		(0.0213)		(0.0243)		(0.0214)
External drivers								
Community liberalism			0.0134***	0.00605			0.0134***	0.00605
			(0.0042)	(0.0042)			(0.0048)	(0.0044)
Community wealth			0.286***	0.205***			0.286***	0.205***
			(0.0584)	(0.0578)			(0.0645)	(0.0592)
Controls								
Age	0.0077**	0.0059*	0.0057*	0.0068**	0.0077**	0.0058*	0.0057	0.0068**
	(0.0035)	(0.0034)	(0.0034)	(0.0034)	(0.0035)	(0.0035)	(0.0035)	(0.0033)
Total assets (log)	-0.0367	-0.102***	-0.00061	-0.0826**	-0.0367	-0.102**	-0.00061	-0.0826
	(0.0380)	(0.0364)	(0.0317)	(0.0404)	(0.0481)	(0.0480)	(0.0393)	(0.0502)
Constant	1.094*	2.782***	0.743	1.740***	1.094	2.782***	0.743	1.740**
	(0.5790)	(0.5630)	(0.5060)	(0.6470)	(0.6810)	(0.7510)	(0.6400)	(0.7380)
Observations	590	590	590	590	590	590	590	590
R-squared	0.125	0.093	0.093	0.175	0.125	0.093	0.093	0.175

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: Foundation Center, Community foundation websites, U.S. Census Bureau USA Counties data, Internal Revenue Service, National Center for Charitable Statistics

Table 3.6. Determinants of Community Foundation Lobbying

	Logit				Logit bootstrapped SE			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Organizational drivers								
Community logic dis.	0.472			0.358	0.472			0.358
	(0.3070)			(0.3170)	(0.3060)			(0.3280)
Community logic don.	0.921**			0.836**	0.921**			0.836**
	(0.3850)			(0.3930)	(0.3910)			(0.3960)
Professionalization	0.0286			0.0242	0.0286			0.0242
	(0.0187)			(0.0189)	(0.0229)			(0.0246)
Rationalization	0.751***			0.752***	0.751***			0.752***
	(0.1690)			(0.1750)	(0.1800)			(0.1940)
Social justice	.9996*			0.608	.9996			0.608
	(0.5460)			(0.5940)	(0.6280)			(0.6520)
Relational drivers								
Networks		0.138***		0.0574		0.138**		0.0574
		(0.0477)		(0.0511)		(0.0598)		(0.0615)
External drivers								
Community liberalism			0.0239*	0.0153			0.0239	0.0153
			(0.0123)	(0.0134)			(0.0147)	(0.0152)
Community wealth			0.233	0.0804			0.233	0.0804
			(0.1590)	(0.1740)			(0.1570)	(0.1720)
Controls								
Age	0.00655	-0.00209	-0.00157	0.0059	0.00655	-0.00209	-0.00157	0.0059
	(0.0090)	(0.0088)	(0.0085)	(0.0092)	(0.0094)	(0.0095)	(0.0089)	(0.0100)
Total assets (log)	0.627***	0.769***	0.893***	0.506***	0.627***	0.769***	0.893***	0.506**
	(0.1350)	(0.1260)	(0.1110)	(0.1520)	(0.1840)	(0.1560)	(0.1320)	(0.2080)
Constant	-17.24***	-16.03***	-19.11***	-15.89***	-17.24***	-16.03***	-19.11***	-15.89***
	(2.3110)	(2.1260)	(1.9090)	(2.5890)	(3.2290)	(2.6610)	(2.4150)	(3.6120)
Observations	774	774	774	774	774	774	774	774
Pseudo R-squared	0.362	0.307	0.305	0.371	0.362	0.307	0.305	0.371

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Sources: Foundation Center, Community, U.S. Census Bureau USA Counties data, Internal Revenue Service, National Center for Charitable Statistics

Organizational Drivers

I hypothesized in H1a that community foundations with a community logic would engage in more advocacy than those without such a logic. From the results in Table 3.5, Model 1 indicates a positive and highly statistically significant relationship ($p<.01$) between community logic—as indicated on a foundation's FC profile—and advocacy discourse. This relationship holds in the full model at the $p<.05$ level as shown in Model 4. When bootstrapping standard errors, the relationship is still highly significant at the $p<.01$ level (Model 5) and in the full model (Model 8) at the $p<.05$ level. With respect to lobbying as the dependent variable, Model 1 in Table 3.6 shows a positive and significant relationship at the $p<.1$ level. However, the relationship does not hold in the full model (Model 4), and bootstrapping standard errors reflects the same results (Models 5 and 8).

As a complementary measure of community logic, I also assessed the effect of a community foundation's funding model on its advocacy. Results from Model 1 in Table 3.5 demonstrate a positive and highly statistically significant relationship ($p<.01$) between foundations that primarily rely on community contributions and advocacy discourse. This relationship continues to hold at the $p<.05$ level in the full model (Model 4). These results remain when bootstrapping the standard errors. When using lobbying as the dependent variable, the relationship is positive and statistically significant at the $p<.05$ level in Model 1 of Table 3.6, and this relationship continues to hold at the same level in the full model (Model 4). The results remain the same when bootstrapping the standard errors. Looking across the results of both conceptions of the independent variable and both advocacy measures, Hypothesis 1a is mostly supported.

I predicted in H1b that community foundation professionalization would be positively associated with advocacy. Model 1 in Table 3.5 demonstrates a positive and highly statistically significant relationship ($p<.01$) between foundation spending on paid staff and advocacy discourse. The relationship continues to be highly significant at the $p<.01$ level in the full model (Model 4). These results continue to hold when bootstrapping standard errors, as shown in Models 5 and 8. Model 1 in Table 3.6 indicates a positive and significant relationship ($p<.1$) between foundation professionalization and lobbying. However, this relationship loses significance in the full model (Model 4). The relationship is positive but insignificant in Model 5 when bootstrapping standard errors and continues to be insignificant in the full model (Model 8). Thus, H1b is partially supported.

In H1c, I hypothesized that community foundation rationalization would be positively associated with advocacy. Model 1 in Table 3.5 indicates a positive yet statistically insignificant relationship between the total number of consultant types that a community foundation employs and advocacy discourse. These results remain in the full model (Model 4), as well as when bootstrapping the standard errors in Models 5 and 8. However, the relationship is positive and highly significant when using lobbying as the dependent variable. Model 1 in Table 3.6 indicates a positive and significant relationship at the $p<.01$ level, and this relationship continues to hold at the $p<.01$ level in the full model (Model 4). The results continue to be highly significant at the $p<.01$ level when bootstrapping the standard errors in Models 5 and 8. H1c is thus partially supported.

Hypothesis 1d predicted that community foundations with a social justice orientation would be positively associated with advocacy. In Model 1 of Table 3.5, the results indicate a positive and highly significant ($p<.01$) relationship between those foundations with a social

justice orientation and advocacy. This relationship continues to hold at the p<.01 level in the full model (Model 4). When bootstrapping the standard errors, the relationship is positive and significant at the p<.05 level (as shown in Model 6) and continues to be significant at the same level in the full model (Model 8). When using lobbying as the dependent variable, the relationship is positive and significant at the p<.1 level, as seen in Model 1 of Table 3.6, but loses significance in the full models (Models 4 and 8). Hypothesis 1d is thus partially supported.

A key finding to note here is that organizational size is a significant driver of community foundation lobbying. While I did not propose a hypothesis in relation to this structural feature, community foundations' total asset size explains a substantial proportion of the likelihood to lobby. Asset size is significant at the p<.01 level in in the standard logit (Model 4, Table 3.6) and at the p<.05 level in the logit with bootstrapped standard errors (Model 8, Table 3.6).

Relational Driver

In H2, I hypothesized that foundations' embeddedness in inter-organizational networks would be positively associated with advocacy. Model 2 in Table 3.5 demonstrates a positive and highly significant relationship, at the p<.01 level, between the number of networks to which a community foundation belongs and advocacy discourse. This relationship continues to hold in the full model at the p<.01 level, as shown in Model 4. The relationship remains significant at the p<.01 level when bootstrapping for standard errors, as shown in Models 6 and 8. With respect to the lobbying dependent variable, the relationship is positive and significant at the p<.05 level in Model 2 of Table 3.6, but loses significance in the full model (Model 4). When bootstrapping the standard errors, the relationship is significant at the p<.05 level in Model 6 but, again, loses significance in the full model (Model 8). Hypothesis 4 is then partially supported.

External Environment Drivers

Hypothesis 3a predicted that foundations in more politically liberal communities would be positively associated with advocacy. Model 3 of Table 3.5 indicates a positive and significant relationship between community liberalism and advocacy discourse. This relationship, however, loses significance in the full model (Model 4). The same results are reflected when bootstrapping standard errors in Models 5 and 8. When using lobbying as the dependent variable, the relationship is positive and significant in Model 3 of Table 3.6, but loses significance in the full model (Model 4). The relationship is not significant in Models 7 and 8, when bootstrapping standard errors. Hypothesis 3a is thus not supported.

In H3b, I predicted that foundations in wealthier communities would be positively associated advocacy. Model 3 in Table 3.5 demonstrated a positive and highly significant ($p<.01$) relationship between community wealth and advocacy discourse. This relationship continues to be highly significant at the $p<.01$ level in the full model (Model 4). When bootstrapping standard errors, the relationship remains significant at the $p<.01$ level in Model 7, as well as in the full model (Model 8). When shifting to lobbying as the dependent variable, however, the relationship is positive yet insignificant in both Model 3 of Table 3.6 and in the full model (Model 4). Bootstrapping the standard errors leads to the same results. Hypothesis 3b is partially supported.

Discussion

Community foundations are important—yet often overlooked—players in advocacy for social and policy change. Frequently viewed as local leaders and conveners, they are uniquely positioned to coordinate action to address local and regional issues, but what drives their advocacy has received scant scholarly attention. What attention has been directed at foundations

as active political actors has largely focused on a few large private foundations (e.g., Reckhow, 2013; Tompkins-Stange, 2016). This chapter endeavors to address this gap in the literature and shed light on these important actors in the policy landscape.

I argue in this chapter that community foundations, like foundations more broadly, do not simply make strategic choices, but that their actions are shaped by structural and contextual factors. I find substantial support in this chapter for the conceptual frame that organizational, relational, and external environment factors are significant drivers of advocacy among community foundations. Regarding the organizational drivers of advocacy discourse, the results indicate that community foundations with a community logic, as expressed through their online presence or donative model, advocate significantly more than those without such a logic. Furthermore, higher levels of spending on paid staff are strongly associated with advocacy discourse, suggesting that advocacy may be diffusing through professional networks and that having the requisite human resources is critical to support community foundation involvement in advocacy. In line with previous research on foundations' support for community organizing and civic engagement (Suárez & Lee, 2011), community foundations with a social justice orientation engage in more advocacy discourse on their websites. This finding suggests that advocacy is considered an important strategy for foundations with social justice goals to adopt in order to achieve their missions.

With respect to contextual drivers, embeddedness and community wealth are significant drivers of advocacy discourse. The results for embeddedness imply that, much like service-providing nonprofits, networks are important conduits for advocacy knowledge, and openness to belonging to such networks may be aligned with openness to engaging the external environment through other avenues such as advocacy. Finally, community wealth is a key aspect of

community foundations' external environment that shapes their advocacy, lending support to the idea that higher levels of political engagement among wealthier individuals might aggregate at the community level, and foundations embedded in these communities reflect that political engagement.

A foundation's institutional logic and managerialism also matter for lobbying, but the results differ somewhat from the findings for advocacy discourse. Here, we see that a community logic—as evidenced by a donative model but not discourse—is significantly associated with lobbying, suggesting that foundations with broader community financial ties are more likely to lobby. In regard to managerialism, rationalization—rather than professionalization—is a highly significant driver of lobbying. This finding points to lobbying as an important rationalized practice for community foundations and is perhaps a strategy that is viewed as a "best practice" that successful organizations should want to adopt. Since this measures relies on consultant use, this result also potentially reveals consultants as key diffusers of lobbying knowledge. It is important to note here, while not related to a hypothesis, that organizational size is a significant driver of lobbying, implying that lobbying in particular takes substantial organizational resources to pursue.

Somewhat surprisingly, a foundation's social justice orientation is not associated with lobbying. Lobbying takes significant resources and specialized knowledge, and these organizations may focus on other "outsider" advocacy tactics rather than more "insider" or "elite" tactics such as lobbying. However, this finding could also imply that these foundations embrace advocacy in their discourse but that their organizational practices to do fully reflect what they portray to the public. Networks were also not found to be significant drivers of lobbying, perhaps suggesting that they are more influential in sharing knowledge about advocacy

broadly—as evidenced by the advocacy discourse findings—than lobbying specifically. Furthermore, neither community wealth nor community liberalism seem to influence community foundation lobbying.

Looking across the results, the implications of these findings highlight important normative concerns and practical considerations for the sector. Managerialism is driving much of the advocacy among community foundations. While this finding points to the potency of these forces, it also calls into question whether these professionalized and rationalized organizations are able to adequately represent their communities—particularly marginalized voices—in that advocacy. We also see that community foundations in wealthier communities are more likely engage in advocacy. In this regard, community foundations could be reflecting and reinforcing the power of the wealthy with their advocacy rather than addressing important community needs. These are undoubtedly important concerns community foundations should consider with respect to their roles as community advocates, but the findings also present potential concrete actions that these foundations can take for those that want to expand their advocacy presence. Investing in staffing and consulting structures, and participating in interorganizational networks, likely provide the necessary scaffolding to support this work.

The overall findings also imply that advocacy broadly, and lobbying more specifically, may have different levers for taking hold as an organizational strategy in community foundations. Advocacy is composed of a wide array of tactics that aim to move the needle on social and policy change, whereas lobbying is explicitly directed at influencing legislation and must be reported to the IRS. Lobbying is the only form of advocacy that is regulated, and it is often viewed as more contentious and overtly political than other tactics. This distinction could make some foundations more likely to embrace advocacy tactics, such as voter registration,

while shying away from tactics such as direct lobbying. Furthermore, lobbying requires both knowledge of the applicable lobbying regulations, as well as knowledge of the legislative process. Thus, the bar for engaging in lobbying is significantly higher than for other forms of advocacy, and large, rationalized community foundations are the ones most likely to have the requisite resources and knowledge to adopt this tactic.

The results in this chapter point to considerable support for the conceptual frame, but the limitations must be acknowledged. As with the previous chapter, the cross-sectional nature of this study does not support causal identification, but rather establishes important relationships between organizational and contextual factors and advocacy. Another potential limitation is the development of the advocacy discourse dependent variable. The construction of this variable draws on the advocacy literature, but it takes a narrow approach to identifying advocacy that excludes ambiguous potential advocacy language, such as civic engagement. In doing so, it may miss more subtle advocacy language, leading to conservative measure of advocacy. Additionally, while there are many advantages in using advocacy discourse as a measure, such as its applicability and replicability across foundations, it is also limited in that advocacy discourse may not fully reflect advocacy actions. Furthermore, the differences in drivers found in these results could be due to data limitations, with some foundations wanting to signal an embrace of advocacy and others not fully reporting their lobbying activities.

The independent variables, as in the previous chapter, also have limitations. The community logic measure is a stark binary indicator as reflected on its Foundation Center profile. Such a measure does not capture the extent to which a community foundation embodies a community logic, and gradations in this logic could matter. The external environment factors are also rough measures for a foundation's community context. While many community foundations

do indeed define their foundation's community at the county-level, the bounds of any foundation's community context likely do not perfectly align with its county borders.

In spite of these limitations, this chapter makes several important theoretical and methodological contributions. The study highlights community foundations as important actors in the policy process. These actors have mostly flown under the radar, a surprising omission in the nonprofit literature given their roles as local leaders and work with other nonprofits. The findings here also inform the organizational sociology literature by furthering understanding of what drives community foundations—an understudied organizational form—to engage in advocacy. Methodologically, advocacy has been challenging for researchers to define and measure, and the advocacy measure developed here draws on machine-learning techniques to put forth a replicable measure of advocacy discourse that captures an array activities that reflect the concept. The measure could be used in subsequent research for any organizations that have some type of online or text presence.

This work leads to a number of potential future research streams. While the advocacy discourse measure presents several strengths, it does not distinguish between types of advocacy tactics such as insider forms (e.g., direct lobbying) and outsider forms (e.g., community organizing). The IRS data captures lobbying to a degree, but this distinction warrants further attention for understanding the extent to which community foundations engage in "elite" versus "grassroots" strategies and what drives these differences in strategies. Relatedly, future research should investigate the ways in which community foundations combine tactics and to what effect. Another avenue for research is to further examine the lobbying conducted by community foundations. To what extent are community foundations lobbying in an instrumental manner to

help organizations like themselves (e.g., legislation around donor-advised funds) or lobbying to address important local issues affecting their community members?

Summary

In this chapter, I narrowed my focus by specifically targeting community foundations, a type of foundation that often plays a distinct and prominent role in communities across the country. I drew on multiple data sources to test my conceptual frame and found that structural characteristics, such as institutional logic and managerialism, are particularly meaningful for community foundations' engagement in advocacy and lobbying. Next, I turn back to large foundations and examine another potential strategy for these organizations to pursue social change—participatory grantmaking.

Chapter 4. Shifting Power: Participatory Grantmaking as a Social Change Strategy in the U.S. Philanthropic Sector

Introduction

Philanthropic foundations are coming under increasing scrutiny for their plutocratic power in the United States, leading to calls for foundations to shift power to those outside their organizations (Callahan, 2017; Cardona, 2017; Giridharadas, 2018; Reich, 2016, 2018; Villanueva, 2018). Foundations' tax-subsidized nature and lack of accountability to external stakeholders is viewed as particularly problematic (Reich, 2016, 2018). Compounding this lack of accountability is the argument that the money with which foundations are seeded often stems from the exploitation of communities of color and is rarely used to adequately address systemic inequities (Francis, 2015; Kohl-Arenas, 2015; Villanueva, 2018). In the wake of COVID-19 and the global protests following the murder of George Floyd, more pressure is being applied to foundations to rethink their roles in society and their strategies for generating change (Daniels & Buhles, 2020).

Increasing participation among external stakeholders is one strategy that is being promoted as a potential way forward for foundations to shift power (Cardona, 2020; Daniels & Buhles, 2020). The Ford Foundation has called attention to the need for its foundation and others to consider approaches such as participatory grantmaking, particularly for those foundations pursuing social change and racial justice (Cardona, 2017, 2020). Foundational research funded by Ford has provided a framework for conceptualizing participatory grantmaking in the philanthropic sector (Gibson, 2017). The Foundation Center—an influential organization that provides data and research to the nonprofit and philanthropic sectors—issued a report further

targeting foundations that provided additional insights for practitioners to build their participatory repertoires and engage stakeholders in governance and grantmaking (Gibson, 2018). This research has pointed to participatory grantmaking as an important means for countering top-down solutions to societal challenges, and rather supporting "bottom up" or "grassroots" social change.



Figure 4.1. Ford Foundation Calls Attention to Participatory Grantmaking
Source: Ford Foundation website

While public charities like the Haymarket Peoples' Fund and the Disability Rights Fund have long practiced participatory approaches to philanthropy, the uptake of such approaches by large foundations has remained limited (Gibson, 2017). However, there is evidence that some large private foundations are beginning to experiment with or use such approaches. The

MacArthur Foundation, for example, recently launched a new grantmaking portfolio called Culture, Equity, and the Arts that aims to address inequitable access to artistic and cultural experiences in Chicago—the initiative had 11 diverse Chicagoans serve as participatory grantmakers to determine how funds would be distributed (Banks, 2020). As another example, the Zarrow Families Foundation initiated a $6 million racial justice fund in which an advisory board composed entirely of people of color will determine funding guidelines and make funding decisions (Pitkin, 2020).

Participatory approaches to philanthropy, and participatory grantmaking in particular, certainly seem to be gaining attention and traction, leading some large foundations to adopt such a strategy. Recent research, however, indicates that many large foundations—those with the most dollars and power—are still reluctant to give up decision-making authority over their grant processes and funding allocations (Husted, Finchum-Mason, & Suárez, 2021). These differences in the adoption of participatory grantmaking begs the question: why do some foundations embrace this approach while others do not? This leads to the third dissertation research question:

RQ 3: *To what extent do large foundations' structure and context drive their engagement in participatory grantmaking as a strategy to achieve their missions?*

I argue that the adoption of participatory grantmaking is not only a rational, intentional strategy that foundations choose to implement, but rather that the structural characteristics and organizational context of foundations likely shape their decision making to engage in this approach to grantmaking. In particular, I expect community foundations—due to their existing community connections—and those exhibiting a community logic, with their focus on partnership and collaboration, to be associated with participatory grantmaking. While perhaps counterintuitive given the "grassroots" focus of participatory grantmaking, I also anticipate that

managerialism will lead to greater foundation engagement in participatory grantmaking as the concept becomes viewed as a rationalized practice that diffuses through professional networks. I further expect foundations with a liberal political orientation to be more likely to engage in participatory grantmaking due the practice's historical connection with more progressive causes and that network embeddedness could be an important means for knowledge sharing and diffusion of the approach.

I use data from a survey I conducted, along with two fellow researchers, of the 500 largest foundations in the United States (by total assets) to address the research question. In the following section, I develop a framework for conceptualizing participation within institutionalized philanthropy. I then draw on the conceptual frame presented in the first chapter to develop the specific hypotheses with respect to what drives foundations to adopt participatory grantmaking as a strategy to pursue their missions. Following that, I describe the sample, data and methods used to test my hypotheses. I then present the results and conclude by discussing the limitations and implications of this chapter, as well as future research questions generated by this work.

Literature and Hypotheses

I argue that organizational, relational, and external environment factors influence foundations' adoption of participatory grantmaking. In this section, I develop a framework of participation in institutional philanthropy and define participatory grantmaking. I then draw primarily on the organizational sociology literature to generate hypotheses about what drives the adoption of participatory grantmaking among large foundations in the U.S.

Participatory Practices and Grantmaking in Philanthropic Foundations

Stakeholder participation has been theorized across several fields, from public administration to political science and international development (e.g., Ebrahim, 2003; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Fung, 2006, 2015; Harris, 2020; IAP2 International, 2018). Across these fields is the recognition that those affected by a government or organization's decisions should have a voice in those decisions. Participation, particularly by those who are most affected by governments' or organizations decision, is often seen as an important—albeit insufficient—mechanism for transparency and accountability (Cavill & Sohail, 2007; Ebrahim, 2003; Fox, 2015). Participation is further viewed as a valuable strategy for governments and other organizations in their pursuit of legitimacy, effectiveness, and justice (Fung, 2015).

Several frameworks exist for conceptualizing participation with respect to the work and decision-making of government and nonprofit organizations. Seminal work by Arnstein (1969) posited a ladder of participation from manipulation to citizen control in government planning processes. Fung (2006, 2015) expanded this work by positing multiple dimensions that matter for participation in democratic societies: who participates, decision and communication mode, and authority and power. The practitioner-oriented International Association for Public Participation posits a spectrum of public participation from informing and consulting to involving, collaborating, and empowering (IAP2 International, 2018).

What participation looks like in practice can vary greatly depending on the context and has taken multiple forms within the philanthropic sector. A participatory approach to grantmaking, in particular, was pioneered decades ago by nonprofits like the Haymarket People's Fund, a relatively small public foundation focused on funding local social movement organizations in the Boston area (Ostrander, 1995). The Disability Rights Fund is another public

foundation that uses participatory grantmaking to distribute the funds it raises. The organization is built around the concept of "Nothing about us without us," where people with disabilities have decision-making power over organizational priorities and grant funding (Gibson, 2017). There has also been a growth in participatory modes of giving of such as collective giving and giving circles that aim to facilitate a more democratic approach to philanthropy (Bearman, Carboni, Eikenberry, & Franklin, 2017; Eikenberry, 2006; Gugerty & Husted, 2019). Some private and community foundations have even started to employ community advisory boards to influence grantmaking decisions (McGinnis Johnson, 2016). However, evidence suggests that large foundations, and private foundations in particular, but have been slow to adopt more participatory practices (Gibson, 2017; Husted et al., 2021).

Gibson (2017) posits a "starter" framework for thinking about participatory grantmaking as an emerging strategy in the context of institutional philanthropy. Her work identifies two key dimensions of participatory grantmaking: the processes in which stakeholders are involved and the degree of influence that participants have in those processes. Processes include the pre-grant, grantmaking, and post-grant stages of a foundation's work. The degree of influence refers to whether participants are informed, consulted, involved, or have decision-making power in those various processes (Gibson 2017). This framework has been influential in the philanthropic field and greatly informs the framework I present here.

Stakeholder Participation in Institutional Philanthropy Framework

Building on the work of Gibson (2017), Fung (2006, 2015), and others, I—along with my colleagues—developed a framework for understanding participation and participatory grantmaking within institutional philanthropy (Husted et al., 2021). Our framework synthesizes key participation literature and applies it to the context of institutional philanthropy. The

framework posits three primary dimensions of participation in philanthropy: (1) who participates?, (2) in what processes do participants participate?, and (3) to what degree do participants influence decision making? These are, of course, not the only dimensions that could matter, but we view these three dimensions as the key building blocks for understanding participation within institutional philanthropy.

Who Participates. The dimension of who participates relates to whether internal stakeholders (i.e., leaders, staff, board members) or external stakeholders, particularly those with less positional power (i.e., grantees, non-grantee nonprofit, affected community members, the public), are engaged in foundation processes. In Fung (2006), who participates is critical for understanding participatory efforts, and this dimension in the governmental domain spans from technical experts to a diffuse public sphere. With respect to philanthropic foundations, the traditional mode of operations is for internal stakeholders, such as the board and staff, to influence and make decisions about the foundation's governance and grantmaking. However, given their work to address societal challenges, it is important consider whether foundations engage key external stakeholders. Who they call upon to participate (or not) will undoubtedly shape their work.

The framework posits four key external stakeholder groups—in lower positions of power in relation to foundations—as integral to understanding participatory practices in institutional philanthropy. Grantees are the primary stakeholder group that most foundations interact with through their grantmaking processes. These are the organizations that foundations fund whose work presumably helps a foundation pursue its own goals or mission. The second stakeholder group is non-grantee nonprofits and community-based organizations (CBOs). This stakeholder group consists of the organizations that might be working in a foundation's areas of interest and

that a foundation could potentially fund or rely on in some way. The third stakeholder group is community members directly affected by foundation funding. This group is articulated in such a way that it can be flexibly applied across foundations and is aimed at capturing whether the communities that foundations aim to benefit are participating in their processes. For example, if a foundation's goal is to improve educational attainment among low-income people in Kansas City, are low-income people in that city being involved in its processes? This stakeholder group is particularly important for understanding whether foundations are pursuing a goal of equity with their participation by giving voice to those who will be most affected by their funding. The final stakeholder group considered is members of the public. This group is important for understanding whether foundations are using participation broadly as a democratizing function. There are certainly other important stakeholders groups that foundations might engage or collaborate with, such as government, corporations, or peer foundations, but these stakeholder groups are omitted in this framework as they are not typically considered to be in lower positions of power relative to foundations.

Processes. Given that most foundations are grantmaking organizations, the processes dimension of the framework focuses on grantmaking stages, as well as the setting of organizational priorities. This dimension is informed by Gibson's (2017) work that articulates pre-grant, grant process, and post-grant as key phases with respect to participatory grantmaking in particular. We focus on the pre-grant phase in terms of the setting of organizational priorities, which likely guide the overall direction of where grantmaking dollars flow. Grantmaking processes include the development of request-for-proposals, as well as the review of applications, which are core to many foundations' activities. We break out grant funding decisions from grantmaking processes, however, as we see the funding decision process as

distinct and uniquely important—the ultimate stage that controls how grant funding is allocated. Post-grant evaluation refers to the processes in which foundations determine the effectiveness of their grantmaking and which often informs their future strategies.

Influence. The third and final dimension of the framework is the degree to which participants influence processes. This is a crucial dimension across the literature (Arnstein, 1969; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Fung, 2006; Gibson, 2017; IAP2 International, 2018). Building on Gibson (2017), our framework proposes three principal types of influence: consulting, involving, and deciding. Consulting refers to the solicitation of participant feedback through activities such as surveys and focus groups. Involving refers to the full incorporation of participant feedback—through activities such as advisory committees—to significantly influence foundation processes. Deciding refers to the allocation of decision making authority to participants. It is important to note here that the framework does not include informing—the one-way communication from an organization to stakeholders—which is a part of some frameworks. While the act of informing is used by some organizations in an attempt to be participatory, its one-way nature is by definition not participatory and is excluded here.



Figure 4.2. Stakeholder Participation in Institutional Philanthropy Framework
Source: Husted, Finchum-Mason & Suárez (2021)

The above framework proposes a conceptual model of stakeholder participation within institutional philanthropy. Participatory grantmaking, however, is a subset of a foundation's broader participatory efforts. A challenge in the literature and in practice thus far, however, is determining how to bound or define participatory grantmaking (Gibson, 2017). I posit that meaningful participation is about external stakeholders—in lower positions of power—having decision-making authority over an organization's processes. Grantmaking in the philanthropic sector relates to grant processes and grant funding decisions. Thus, I define participatory grantmaking as external stakeholders—with lower positions of power relative to foundations—

having decision-making authority over a foundation's grantmaking processes and grant funding allocations. These aspects are highlighted in blue in the gray rectangles of Figure 4.2.

Organizational Drivers of Participatory Grantmaking

Institutional Logic

As discussed in previous chapters, institutional logics are the broad patterns, values, and scripts that shape how individuals and organizations make meaning of their reality (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). In the U.S., dominant logics include community, religion, state, market, and the professions, and these logics influence and shape individuals and organizations decision-making and identity (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). Research has shown that institutional logics affect the actions of an array of organizations including private companies, nonprofits, and academia, and that organizations often contend with pressures from multiple logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2010b; Skelcher & Smith, 2015).

Foundations, like other organizations, are likely susceptible to having their actions and strategies shaped by institutional logics, particularly those they embody or with which they identify. While private foundations, in particular, may be less accountable than other organization types to external entities, they are still likely influenced by these broad societal logics. Embracing a market logic, for example, might lead a foundation to focus on things like competition and the promotion of business practices. A community logic, on the other hand, draws on the ideas of community participation, collaboration and civic engagement (Graddy & Wang, 2009; Grønbjerg, 2006). Foundations that embody a community logic are likely to view their approach to solving social problems through a lens of engaging citizens and building community capacity. A community logic, then, would be directly aligned with the adoption of

participatory grantmaking, a strategy that specifically aims to include the voices of community stakeholders in determining where grant money should be allocated. I therefore hypothesize:

> Hypothesis 1a (H1a): *Foundations that exhibit a community logic will be positively associated with participatory grantmaking.*

Foundation Form

A foundation's organizational form refers to its structure as either a private or community foundation. Private foundations are those foundations that are established with the IRS as a 501(c)(3) private foundation and which file a 990-PF form. Private foundations include family, independent, operating, and corporate foundations. The shared commonality among them is that they are initially endowed with money from a single person or entity and are privately controlled by a limited number of individuals, typically with minimal accountability to external stakeholders (Reich, 2016).

Unlike private foundations, community foundations are structured as 501(c)(3) public charities, and as such file a regular 990 form. Community foundations are categorized by the IRS in the same manner as other nonprofits such as food banks and arts organizations. These foundations are typically focused on a specific county or region of the country and fundraise from a local base of supporters to make grants within that community (Sacks, 2014). While community foundations can be highly attuned to their donors' needs (Graddy & Morgan, 2006), they make grants to local nonprofits and are often active within their communities, acting as leaders in solving local challenges (Hammack, 1989; Ostrower, 2007; Sacks, 2014). Due to their existing relationships with a wide array of local stakeholders and their focus on community development, we might expect that the work of community foundations would be aligned with participatory grantmaking efforts. Previous research also indicates that foundation form can

affect a foundation's social justice discourse and grantmaking, with public foundations more likely adopt such a position (Suárez, 2012). A similar affect might hold true for participatory grantmaking. Therefore, I hypothesize:

> Hypothesis 1b (H1b): *Community foundations will be positively associated with participatory grantmaking.*

Managerialism

Managerialism refers to an organization's adoption of business practices, routines, and structures in their operations and governance (Maier et al., 2016). Professionalization and rationalization are two core, yet distinct, components of managerialism (Suárez & Esparza, 2017). Within the nonprofit sector, professionalization describes the increasing reliance on paid staff, as well as the increase in highly credentialed staff (Frumkin, 1999; Hwang & Powell, 2009). Nonprofits with higher levels of paid staff are more likely to reflect sector trends and to adopt what are considered to be best practices—as ideas diffuse through professional networks (Hwang & Powell, 2009). With respect to philanthropic foundations, in particular, the spread of venture philanthropy through professional networks—with its focus on business expertise and return on investment—demonstrates how professionalization can alter or influence organizational strategies (Moody, 2007). If participatory grantmaking has become something that is viewed as a best practice in philanthropic sector, as recent evidence suggests (Cardona, 2017, 2020; Gibson, 2018), then this grantmaking strategy may spread through professional networks as well. Foundations with more paid staff might also be more likely to have the time and resources to engage in a participatory approach to grantmaking. This leads to my next hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1c (H1c): *Professionalized foundations will be positively associated with participatory grantmaking.*

The increased adoption of rationalized practices often occurs alongside greater professionalization. Rationalization describes the formalization of organizations through the use standardized practices and tools to enhance performance and signal effectiveness and accountability (Hwang & Powell, 2009; MacIndoe & Barman, 2013; Marshall & Suárez, 2014). These practices often include the use of strategic plans, audits, and program evaluation, as well as the hiring of consultants to perform many of these functions (Hwang & Powell, 2009). We might assume, then, that those foundations that engage in rationalized practices are concerned with signaling effectiveness and accountability. Given that participation is often viewed as an important mechanism for accountability (Ebrahim, 2003), it would be expected that rationalized foundations would be more likely to adopt participatory grantmaking strategies to demonstrate their commitment to accountability. I thus hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1d (H1d): *Rationalized foundations will be positively associated with participatory grantmaking.*

Political Orientation

The implications of a foundation's political orientation on its engagement in participatory grantmaking is perhaps less clear than for advocacy, as I explored in chapter two. Advocacy is often political, and it would be expected for political orientation to matter for advocacy. Participatory approaches to grantmaking, on the other hand, do not seem inherently political on the surface. However, participatory grantmaking—which can often focus on the incorporation of voices from marginalized communities into foundation processes—is frequently posited as a means for achieving social justice and equity (Gibson, 2017), which typically aligns with the

work of more liberal organizations. Qualitative evidence indeed points to more liberal foundations embracing such practices thus far (Cardona, 2020; Gibson, 2017; Ostrander, 1995). The pioneering participatory grantmaking work of the public foundation, Haymarket People's Fund, for example, has focused on grassroots movements for social justice (Ostrander, 1995). With respect to large foundations, we see that more liberal leaning private foundations, such as the Ford Foundation and the Novo Foundation engaging in this practice (Cardona, 2020; Gibson, 2017). This work, however, is not necessarily limited to liberal foundations. In fact, there are conservatives in the philanthropic sector who argue that participatory grantmaking is a way to push back against elitism and devolve power to ordinary people (Hartmann, 2017). Despite this argument, the limited evidence thus far indicates that liberal foundations seem to be the ones most interested in the uptake of these strategies in their purported desire to aid marginalized communities. I therefore hypothesize:

> Hypothesis 1e (H1e): *Politically liberal foundations will be positively associated with participatory grantmaking.*

Relational Drivers of Participatory Grantmaking

Embeddedness in Inter-organizational Networks

Embeddedness refers to the ties or networks that organizations develop with those external to their own organization (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, & Dowell, 2006; Powell, 1990). In the philanthropic sector, networks and associations connect foundations through conferences, meetings, and the sharing of online resources as they each work or collaborate to pursue their missions. Through such activities, these types of networks can facilitate legitimacy and economic benefits for participating organizations (Podolny & Page, 1998; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Examples in the philanthropic sector include the Council on Foundations—a national

network that aims to promote knowledge sharing and collaboration among foundations—and the Northern California Grantmakers, which coordinates funders to tackle pressing regional challenges (Council on Foundations, n.d.; Northern California Grantmakers, n.d.). While there is substantial research to indicate that among service-providing nonprofits networks affect engagement in advocacy (e.g., Donaldson, 2007; Leroux & Goerdel, 2009; Mosley, 2010), assessing the implications of their role in the adoption of participatory grantmaking in the philanthropic sector is less clear. However, it seems possible that inter-organizational networks could be important conduits of knowledge sharing about participatory grantmaking, a process that takes considerable time and knowledge (Gibson, 2018). Additionally, foundations that are open to engaging with other organizations through networks and associations might also be more open to engaging their external environment and external stakeholders in other ways—potentially leading to an openness to considering participatory grantmaking strategies. I then hypothesize:

> Hypothesis 2a (H2a): *Foundations embedded in a greater number of inter-organizational networks will be positively associated with participatory grantmaking.*

Organizational Field

As discussed in previous chapters, an organizational field is defined as "those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce similar services and products (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Within the nonprofit sector, organizational fields can be thought of in terms of organizations that work in the same policy or issue area. Nonprofits that work on environmental issues or improving K-12 education can be thought of as being a part of their larger organizational fields that includes other

organizations working on similar issues. Nonprofits within a shared organizational field often face similar field-wide frames that influence how they do their work.

With respect to organizational fields, there is limited evidence thus far to indicate how a foundation's organizational field will influence its adoption of participatory grantmaking. However, unlike for advocacy, there is little reason to believe that the fields of education, the environment, and health would particularly matter for foundations' engagement in participatory grantmaking. There might be reason to believe, though, that the field of human services could play a role in influencing foundations' adoption of participatory grantmaking. Service-providing nonprofits in the human services field are critical actors in the social safety net, often acting with the aim of providing economic stability to vulnerable communities (Allard, 2009). Many such organizations approach their service provision with a frame of increasing access to services and structural change (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2014). These field-level frames could align well with the goals of participatory grantmaking such that foundations in this field—which provide funding to service providers—might be more likely to adopt participatory grantmaking strategies. Furthermore, much of the participating grantmaking taking place in the U.S. thus far has focused on local programs and giving citizens more say over the services and programs they access (Gibson, 2017), which aligns with the often local nature of human services provision. This leads to my next hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2b (H2b): *Foundations in the organizational field of human services will be positively associated with participatory grantmaking.*

External Environment Drivers of Participatory Grantmaking

Organizations are shaped and influenced by their environmental context (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Davis, 2007), and a foundation's external community is an important

aspect to consider when attempting to understand its actions and strategies. Foundations—like other organizations—do not exist in isolation, and they are likely susceptible to being influenced by their surrounding environment. While current evidence is limited, community characteristics have been shown to influence community foundation management strategies (Graddy & Morgan, 2006). The external environment has also been shown to influence advocacy specifically for service-providing nonprofits (Fyall & Allard, 2017; Mosley, 2010; Nicholson-Crotty, 2007), and it could be consequential for foundations with respect to other strategies as well.

The political orientation of a foundation's surrounding community is one external factor that may influence its actions, particularly its uptake of an approach like participatory grantmaking. There is a long history of social movement activism for liberal causes in the nonprofit sector and liberal communities more broadly (Jenkins & Halcli, 1999; Goss, 2007). Thus far, while not inherently a "liberal" practice, it seems that participatory grantmaking is more often being adopted as a strategy to pursue more liberal causes and change (Gibson, 2017). We might then expect that foundations in more liberal communities would be more open to a strategy of participatory grantmaking. I therefore hypothesize:

Hypothesis 3a (H3a): *Foundations in more politically liberal communities will be positively associated with participatory grantmaking.*

The economic wealth of a community might also affect the strategies of a foundation within that community. As noted earlier, political science research demonstrates that wealthier individuals tend to be more politically active than low-income individuals (Gilens, 2012, Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995), and we might expect that those findings might aggregate at the community level and be reflected by greater engagement in advocacy by foundations with those communities. The implications for community wealth are less clear, however, with respect to the

adoption of participatory grantmaking by a foundation. We might expect that foundations in wealthier communities are more insulated from understanding the needs of marginalized community members. On the one hand, that could lead to a greater desire to bridge differences through strategies such as participatory grantmaking. On the other hand, unless foundations realize the disconnect that likely exists, foundations in wealthier communities may not feel the need to engage external stakeholders. I thus hypothesize:

> Hypothesis 3b (H3b): *Foundations in wealthier communities will be negatively associated with participatory grantmaking.*

Data and Methods

Sample

This empirical chapter uses data from an original survey of the largest 500 private and community foundations in the United States by total assets. Even though the foundations in this sample are by definition all large in asset size, there is still significant variation in the variables of interest such as their organizational fields, institutional logics, and environmental context. I generated the sample frame using the Foundation Center online database in June of 2018, which drew on 2016 fiscal year data for most foundations. After accounting for foundations that had since closed, merged, or been subsumed by the operations of another foundation, I had an effective sample size of 489 foundations that I could survey. Of these 489 foundations, 148 completed the survey, for a response rate of 30.3%.

Data Sources

This study leverages data from four sources: (1) original survey data, (2) the Foundation Center, (3) the IRS, and (4) the Census Bureau's USA Counties data. I describe each of these sources in greater detail below.

1. I, along with two other researchers, conducted a nationwide survey of the 500 largest private and community foundations in the United States to assess their engagement in participatory approaches to governance and grantmaking. A survey of this nature and magnitude is a particularly challenging undertaking given the often-secretive nature of foundations. To combat this challenge, we used multiple sources to identify foundations' contact information: Foundation Center profile data, website searches, LinkedIn, and the Inside Philanthropy database.[19] We targeted the foundation CEO or other high-level executives when possible.

We conducted interviews with ten philanthropy practitioners from January to March of 2020 to inform the development of the survey instrument. We piloted the survey with philanthropy and nonprofit practitioners in late March and adjusted the survey instrument as suggested by their feedback. We launched the survey in late May of 2020 by sending links to foundation leaders via email. Foundation targets received multiple email reminders and follow-up phone calls to encourage completion of the survey. The survey closed in January 2021 with 148 foundations having completed the survey, for a response rate of 30.3%. Table 4.1 below provides an overview of respondent characteristic (n=148) compared to the overall sample of 500 foundations.

[19] Inside Philanthropy is an online news source dedicated to covering philanthropy. Their site contains a paid service that provides access to foundation contact information.

Table 4.1. Foundation Respondent Characteristics Compared to Overall Sample

	Number of Respondents	Percent of Respondents	Percent of Overall Sample
Foundation type			
Private foundation	114	77.0%	85%
Community foundation	34	23.0%	15%
Geographic region			
West	40	27.0%	25.4%
Southwest	15	10.1%	7.8%
Midwest	42	28.4%	21.0%
Southeast	14	9.5%	13.4%
Northeast	37	25.0%	32.4%
Primary giving area			
Education	66	44.6%	43.1%
Human Services	26	17.6%	12.7%
Health	14	9.5%	10.6%
Environment	4	2.7%	4.5%
Other area	38	25.7%	29.0%
Total assets	Respondents		Overall sample
Mean	$1,033,895,422		$1,038, 667,439
Standard deviation	$1,875,941,031		$2,418,979,487
Median	452,382,124		$472,942,717
Minimum	243,819,481		$233,679,117
Maximum	13,584,110,000		$41,326,959,325

Source: Foundation Center and IRS

Building on the conceptual framework of participation in philanthropy, the survey contained a series of questions in regard to foundations' engagement with external stakeholders (see Appendix F for the relevant portion of the survey instrument). The survey asked foundations about their involvement of external stakeholders along two dimensions: (1) stage of organizational or grantmaking process and (2) degree of influence or power-sharing. Four key

external stakeholders groups were considered in these questions: (1) grantees, (2) non-grantee nonprofits and community-based organizations, (3) community members directly affected by the foundation's funding, and (4) members of the public. The survey also contained questions about foundations' funding of participation. The survey asked if foundations funded grantees (that regrant the foundation's dollars) to engage external stakeholders along the same two dimensions—process and power-sharing. The external stakeholders considered in these questions were peer nonprofits, affected community members, and members of the public.

2. The Foundation Center (FC) hosts profile and grantmaking data on many foundations in the United States. These profiles include information such as giving priorities, network memberships, and contact information. I downloaded the profile for each foundation in the sample between December 2018 and January 2019, as well as their grants data for a three-year period.

3. The IRS hosts publicly available datasets with select variables from the 990 and 990-PF annual tax forms. Community foundations file tax form 990, and private foundations file form 990-PF, each year in order to maintain their tax-exempt status. These data provide independent and control variables for the analysis, such as salary costs (professionalization) and total assets (size). When I obtained the IRS data in June of 2018, the most recent and comprehensive data available across foundations was for the 2015 fiscal year. I used 2014 data for foundations when 2015 data was not available.

4. The U.S. Census Bureau develops the USA Counties datasets. These datasets contain a variety of county-level data, such as presidential voting behavior, median income, and education levels. Using these data provides key indicators for assessing foundations' external environments.

Dependent Variable

I draw on foundations' survey responses with respect to their participatory practices in order to develop the dependent variable. The survey aimed to capture the full realm of participatory practices and grantmaking in which foundations engage. The survey asked each foundation about whether it engaged external stakeholders in its organizational or grantmaking processes (i.e., organizational priorities, grantmaking processes, funding decisions, post-grant evaluation) and the extent to which foundations shared power in these processes (i.e., consulting, involving, deciding). In regard to these questions, the survey asked about four key stakeholder groups: grantees, non-grantee nonprofits/CBOs, affected community members, and members of the public. The survey further asked about whether foundations funded grantees to engage stakeholders along these same dimensions.

The focus of this study is participatory grantmaking specifically, and as such, I draw on the survey questions that directly relate to participatory grantmaking. As discussed earlier, I define participatory grantmaking as external stakeholders—with lower positions of power relative to foundations—having decision-making authority over a foundation's grantmaking processes and grant funding allocations. I therefore draw on the survey questions that ask foundations about external stakeholders having decision-making authority, and I focus specifically on decision-making as it relates to grantmaking processes and grant funding decisions. Figure 4.3 shows the relevant survey question, as it was presented to foundations, about their direct engagement in participatory practices. Figure 4.4 shows the relevant survey question as it relates to foundations' funding of grantees to engage in participatory practices. The processes of interest for this study—grantmaking processes and grant funding decisions— are highlighted with a blue box in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.



Figure 4.3. Survey Question: Foundations' Direct Participatory Practices

Source: Survey instrument



Figure 4.4. Survey Question: Foundations' Indirect Participatory Practices
Source: Survey instrument

The dependent variable is a count of all of the processes in which external stakeholders made decisions in relation to the foundation's grantmaking, both directly and indirectly. The highest possible total for direct participatory grantmaking is eight, and the highest possible total for indirect is six. Thus, the maximum possible count for any foundation is fourteen.

Independent Variables

Organizational Drivers

Community Logic. As in chapter two, I evaluated whether private and community foundations inhabit a community logic by analyzing the discourse they use to describe themselves. I draw on foundations' Foundation Center profiles, as well as the home and about pages of foundations websites. Foundation Center profiles include information such as mission,

background, and program area descriptions. The home page and about sections of foundation websites typically reflect similar information. Drawing on previous literature (Grønbjerg, 2006; Graddy & Morgan 2006), I assessed foundation discourse for words that indicate a community logic, such as collaboration, partnership, or leadership development. I coded foundations a 1 if their Foundation Center profile or home/about pages contained this type of community language, and I labeled it a 0 if it did not contain any such language. To verify coding, another researcher coded a random sample of 30 foundations, and we achieved a correlation of .87.

Foundation Form. I used the Foundation Center profile data to assess whether a foundation is a private or community (public) foundation. Foundation Center profiles contain this information for all foundations in its database. Community foundations were labeled a 1 for public and private foundations were labeled 0.

Professionalization. I measure professionalization as the proportion of overall foundation expenses allocated toward salaries, as indicated by the IRS data and in line with previous research (Steward & Faulk, 2014). While this approach does not take into account to professional credentials, it does represent the extent to which foundations prioritize spending on paid staff. The challenge with developing this measure, however, is that private and community foundations complete different 990 forms, and these differences needed to be bridged in the development of this variable. With respect to community foundations, which complete the standard 990 from, I used total salaries, other compensation, and employee benefits (Line 15, Part 1) and divided by total expenses (Line 18, Part 1). For private foundations, which complete form 990-PF, I combined officer compensation (Line 13, Part 1), other salaries (Line 14, Part 1), and employee benefits (Line 15, Part 1), and divided by total expenses (Line 26, Part 1). Since

the IRS dataset did not include other salaries as a variable for private foundations, I manually added this data by reviewing each foundation's 990-PF form for the relevant year.

Rationalization. I used the presence of a publicly available annual report as an indicator of rationalization. Foundations can choose to post an annual report on their website or on their Foundation Center profile.[20] Choosing to provide this type of public facing document indicates a willingness to embrace rationalized practices, such as increased transparency. For practical reasons, I use this indicator as an alternative to the use of consultants as a measure, which I used in chapter three, and which has been used in previous literature (Hwang & Powell, 2009). IRS 990-PF forms do not list out consultant use in a comparable manner to IRS 990 forms, and this data is not included in the IRS dataset. The annual report indicator was also chosen among other potential options for its explanatory power.[21]

Political Orientation. I use two dichotomous indicators—liberal and conservative—for political orientation. These indicators are based on whether a foundation belongs to liberal or conservative leaning foundation network.[22] A foundation is considered liberal if it is a member of the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP), a national network of liberal-leaning foundations committed to social justice work. I determined NCRP membership in one of two ways: the foundation was listed as a member on the NCRP website or the foundation had contributed to NCRP (as indicated by Foundation Center data). To determine if a foundation is conservative, I used membership in the Philanthropy Roundtable, a well-known network of conservative foundations. The Philanthropy Roundtable, however, does not list member

[20] There are no legal requirements for foundations to produce annual reports.

[21] A count of rationalized practices, such as social media use and audited financials, was too highly correlated with other independent variables to use in the analysis. I use the presence of an annual report, rather than a Glasspockets profile as I did in chapter two, due to its stronger explanatory power.

[22] These indicators differ slightly from those used in chapter two and were chosen for their greater explanatory power.

foundations on its website. I therefore relied on Foundation Center contributions data to determine if the foundation had contributed to the network.

Relational Drivers

Organizational Field. My hypothesis focuses on the organizational field of human services. Since foundations tend to belong to the organizational fields in which they prioritize their giving, I use grantmaking data to determine each foundation's organizational field. Every foundation received a binary indicator as to whether human services was its top grantmaking priority. To develop this indicator, I downloaded all grants data from each foundation from the Foundation Center. FC categorizes grants by subject area, such as education, human services, and the arts, which I used to determine the organizational field. I created a variable for each subject area, which was the proportion of all grantmaking dollars provided over a three-year period in that subject. I labeled a foundation as 1 for human services if the proportion of its total grantmaking dollars given in the subject area of human services was greater than the proportion it gave in any other subject area.

Embeddedness. I measure embeddedness as a foundation's total number of memberships in interorganizational networks and associations. I draw on Foundation Center profiles, which list these memberships, to develop a count variable of such memberships. These types of networks and associations include groups such as Philanthropy Northwest or Council on Foundations.

External Environment Drivers

I measured two important aspects of the foundation's external environment—community wealth and community political orientation—to understand how foundations might be influenced by these external community contexts. I used county-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau's

USA Counties data to construct both variables. These data were based on the county in which the foundation's headquarters is located. For community wealth, I used the county's median household income (logged).[23] With respect to community political orientation, I use the percentage of people voting for the Democratic presidential candidate in the dataset's most recent election as a way to assess the liberalism of the community. While a coarse indicator a community's political orientation, this variable construction does allow me to roughly capture how liberal or conservative a foundation's county is and to compare across counties.

Controls

As in previous chapters, I use the common organizational controls of size and age. Organizational size is measured as total assets (logged) as indicated by IRS data. Age is measured as the years since founding, also as indicated by the IRS data.

Table 4.2 below provides an overview of the dependent and independent variables I use for this chapter. I draw on these variables to run Poisson regressions to test my hypotheses in the next section.

[23] I use median household income in this chapter as opposed to a factor of variables because of its explanatory power.

Table 4.2. Overview of Variable Construction

	Construct	*Variable*	*Measure/indicator*
Participatory Grantmaking		*Dependent variables*	
	Participatory Grantmaking	Participatory grantmaking activities	Count of the number of participatory grantmaking activities foundation engaged in based on survey
		Independent variables	
Organizational	Institutional logic	Community logic	0/1 indicator as to whether foundation uses community-oriented language on FC profile, or website homepage/about page
	Organizational form	Public	0/1 indicator if foundation is a community foundation (public charity)
	Managerialism	Professionalization	% of total expenses allocated to salaries/benefits
		Rationalization	0/1 indicator as to whether foundation has a publicly available annual report
	Organizational political orientation	Liberal	0/1 indicator if foundation belongs to liberal foundation network
		Conservative	0/1 indicator if foundation belongs to conservative foundation network
Relational	Organizational field	Human Services	0/1 indicator if human services is organization's primary giving area
	Embeddedness	Networks	Number of networks to which foundation belongs
External	Community wealth	Community wealth	Median household income for county (logged)
	Community political orientation	Community liberalism	Percent of voters in county voting for Democratic presidential candidate
Controls	Organizational age	Age	Number of years since foundation was founded
	Organizational size	Size	Total assets (logged)

Modeling

I performed Poisson regression analysis on cross-sectional data using common organizational controls and robust standard errors. I chose Poisson regression due to the count nature of the dependent variable. A Poisson regression, however, assumes that the mean of the distribution equals the variance, which is not the case here. I therefore use robust standard errors to address this challenge, which is a common way to handle mild violations of this assumption. Using robust standard errors does not alter the coefficients but can affect statistical significance. A negative binomial model was also considered since it is a more generalizable form of the Poisson and in some cases can better handle over dispersion when the mean of the distribution does not equal the variance. However, a negative binomial assumes the number of trials (in this case, the number of potential participatory grantmaking activities) is unknown, and this assumption does not fit my data given the known maximum of activities (14). A zero-inflated model was also considered since there is a high number of zeros in the dependent variable. Zero-inflated models though are not well suited for smaller sample sizes, and they make assumptions about the nature of the zeros that do not hold true with this data. Therefore, I chose to employ a Poisson regression with the robust standard errors to account for mild violations of assumptions.

While survey weighting can be useful in accounting for nonresponse with respect to survey data, I use unweighted data in this analysis. Survey weights are particularly suitable for descriptive analysis and generating mean estimates, for example. However, there is substantial debate regarding the conditions under which using survey weights is appropriate in multivariate analysis, and a model-based approach is a common alternative to using survey weights (Gelman, 2007). With this technique, variables that predict both nonresponse and the outcome of interest are included as terms in the model. The three most impactful variables on survey response were

foundation form, the human services organizational field, and an index of rationalized practices. I include the first two variables and a variation of the third in my models—since they relate to key hypotheses and are theoretically predictive of the outcome—as an alternative to a survey-weight design.[24]

With respect to the independent variables in this study, an important point to note is that some of the variables in these models use different measures than in chapter two. While the independent variable concepts remain the same, the variable measures differ somewhat due to the need to prioritize those variables with the most explanatory power, particularly with the smaller sample size in this chapter. I used a combination of R^2, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to determine variables that maximized model fit.

Results

I first report the descriptive statistics (see Table 4.3) before turning to present the results of the multivariate analysis. The total sample is 145 foundations for this analysis.[25] The multivariate results use a Poisson regression due to the count nature of the dependent variable, and results are presented in unweighted form.

[24] While I believe the unweighted analysis to be a stronger approach, I include weighted results in Appendix G, as well as the survey weight methodology in Appendix H, which identified the three key predictors of survey response. The results are not opposed to the ones presented here, but due to the overlap in predictors of survey response and the independent variables of interest here, some effects were diminished. The rationalization index is too highly correlated with other independent variables in the model, and as such, I use a component of this index—a publicly available annual report—as an indicator of rationalization.

[25] 148 foundations completed the survey. However, two of these foundations are operating foundations and do not make grants. One foundation was omitted due to missing independent variables.

Descriptive Statistics

Participatory Grantmaking

Participatory grantmaking is measured by the number of participatory grantmaking activities the foundation engaged in, as indicated in its survey responses. The mean number of participatory grantmaking activities a foundation engaged in is .807 with a standard deviation of 1.519. While the theoretical maximum is 14 if foundations engaged in every activity proposed on the survey, the observed maximum is 8.

Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Foundation Respondents

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Dependent				
Participatory grantmaking activities	0.807	1.519	0	8
Organizational drivers				
Community logic	0.752	--	0	1
Public	0.234	--	0	1
Professionalization %	9.404	8.556	0	43.99
Rationalization	0.655	--	0	1
Liberal	0.228	--	0	1
Conservative	0.228	--	0	1
Relational Drivers				
Human services field	0.166	--	0	1
Networks	4.697	5.404	0	27
External Env. Drivers				
Comm. liberalism	62.332	15.986	0	92.5
Comm. wealth (log)	10.933	0.227	10.5	11.48
Controls				
Age	36.469	22.765	1	88
Total assets (log)	19.992	0.986	14.636	23.059
Observations	145			

Organizational Drivers

The organization drivers I examine in this chapter are institutional logic, foundation form, managerialism (professionalization and rationalization), and political orientation. The mean for community logic is .752, indicating that 75.2% of foundation respondents display a community logic on their website or Foundation Center profile. The mean for community foundations with a public charity status is .234, which indicates that 23.4% of foundations respondents are community foundations.

With respect to the components of managerialism, the mean for professionalization is 9.404 (with a standard deviation of 8.556), meaning that the average foundation respondent spends 9.4% of their total expenditures on paid staff. The mean for rationalization is .655, indicating that 65.5% of foundation respondents have a publicly available annual report. In regard to political orientation, the mean for liberal is .228, which means that 22.8% of foundation respondents belong to the liberal foundation network, National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy. The mean for conservative is .228, meaning that 22.8% of foundation respondents belong to the conservative foundation network, Philanthropy Roundtable.[26]

Relational Drivers

The key relational drivers in this chapter are organizational field and interorganizational networks. The mean for the organizational field of human services is .166, meaning that 16.6% of foundation respondents fund human services as their top grantmaking priority. The mean for networks is 4.967 (with a standard deviation of 5.404), meaning that the average foundation respondent belongs to nearly five networks or associations.

[26] It is a coincidence that the percentages for liberal and conservative are the same.

External Environment Drivers

I assess two key external drivers of participatory grantmaking: community liberalism and community wealth. The mean for community liberalism is 62.33 (standard deviation of 15.986), meaning that the average foundation respondent was located in a county where 62.33% of resident voters voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in the data's most recent election results. The mean for community wealth is 10.933 (standard deviation of .227), which is the log of the median household income in the county where the foundation is located.

Multivariate Results

I present Poisson regression results with robust standard errors. First, however, I checked for multicollinearity among the independent variables. Table 4.4 displays the correlation matrix. Analysis of these correlations indicates no issues with multicollinearity.

Table 4.4. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. community logic	1											
2. public	0.28	1										
3. professionalization	-0.0216	-0.204	1									
4. rationalization	0.423	0.367	0.0808	1								
5. liberal	0.198	-0.0675	-0.065	0.0823	1							
6. conservative	0.0454	-0.145	-0.0316	0.0131	0.137	1						
7. human services field	0.0412	0.192	-0.153	-0.106	0.0238	-0.153	1					
8. networks	0.326	0.0705	-0.00453	0.282	0.571	0.192	-0.113	1				
9. community liberalness	0.102	-0.0926	0.144	-0.0568	0.197	-0.195	-0.0224	0.164	1			
10. community wealth	-0.0886	-0.216	-0.0241	-0.071	0.132	0.0229	-0.132	0.0206	0.215	1		
11. age	-0.0627	-0.0337	0.162	0.106	0.176	0.0852	-0.0828	0.18	0.0183	-0.0225	1	
12. total assets (logged)	0.344	0.000766	-0.0435	0.191	0.372	0.326	-0.016	0.434	0.0347	0.0423	0.0891	1

Next, I present the Poisson regression results by conceptual frame. Each independent variable represents a hypothesis that relates to the dissertation's conceptual frame, and I present results in order of the hypotheses I have laid out above. Overall results and their implications will be further addressed in the discussion section.

Table 4.5. Determinants of Participatory Grantmaking

	Poisson with Robust SE			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Organizational drivers				
Community logic	0.34			0.479
	(0.512)			(0.41)
Public	0.947***			0.552*
	(0.327)			(0.298)
Professionalization	0.0347*			0.0348**
	(0.0193)			(0.0155)
Rationalization	0.678*			0.696*
	(0.401)			(0.414)
Liberal	0.286			0.272
	(0.316)			(0.32)
Conservative	-0.899**			-1.009**
	(0.458)			(0.407)
Relational drivers				
Human services field		0.650*		0.296
		(0.393)		(0.339)
Networks		0.0235		0.0177
		(0.0249)		(0.0242)
External environment drivers				
Community liberalism			0.0075	-0.0034
			(0.0115)	(0.0108)
Community wealth			-2.883***	-2.201***
			(0.906)	(0.76)
Controls				
Age	-0.0026	-0.001	-0.0013	-0.0025
	(0.0054)	(0.0055)	(0.0055)	(0.0054)
Total assets (log)	0.561***	0.272	0.400**	0.635***
	(0.2)	(0.168)	(0.164)	(0.237)
Constant	-12.71***	-5.917*	22.67**	9.797
	(3.979)	(3.291)	(9.602)	(8.626
Observations	145	145	145	145
Pseudo R2	0.1791	0.0456	0.1075	0.2315

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Organizational Drivers

I hypothesized in H1a that foundations with a community logic would be more likely to engage in participatory grantmaking. The results in Model 1 of Table 4.5 indicate a positive yet statistically insignificant relationship between a community logic and participatory grantmaking, as well in the full model in Model 4. H1a is thus not supported. With Hypothesis 1b, I predicted that community foundations, which have a public charity status, would be more likely to engage in participatory grantmaking than private foundations. The data demonstrate a statistically significant and positive relationship between community foundations and participatory grantmaking. In Model 1, the relationship is significant at the $p<.01$ level and continues to be significant in the full model (Model 4) at the $p<.1$ level. H1b is supported given the positive and significant relationship between community foundations and participatory grantmaking across these models.

With respect to managerialism, Hypotheses 1c and 1d predicted that professionalized and rationalized foundations would be more likely to engage in participatory grantmaking. Model 1 in Table 4.5 indicates a positive and statistically significant relationship between professionalization and participatory grantmaking at the $p<.1$ level. This relationship continues to hold in the full model (Model 4) at the $p<.05$ level. In regard to rationalization, Model 1 indicates a positive and significant relationship with participatory grantmaking at the $p<.1$ level, and this relationship also continues to hold in the full model (Model 4). Thus, Hypotheses 1c and 1d are supported.

In Hypothesis 1e, I predicted that foundations with a liberal political orientation would be positively associated with participatory grantmaking. The relationship between liberal foundations and participatory grantmaking is not statistically significant in either Model 1 of

Table 4.5 or the full model (Model 4). However, the relationship between conservative foundations and participatory grantmaking is negative and highly significant at the $p<.05$ level in Model 1, as well as in the full model (Model 4). While H1e is not supported, these results yield important findings that suggest that political orientation does indeed matter as conservative foundations are much less likely to engage in participatory grantmaking.

Relational Drivers

Hypothesis 2a predicted that foundations within the organizational field of human services would be positively associated with engagement in participatory grantmaking. In Model 2 of Table 4.5, the human services field has a positive and significant relationship participatory grantmaking at the $p<.1$ level. However, this relationship loses significance in the full model (Model 4). Thus, Hypothesis 5 is not supported. In Hypothesis 2b, I predicted that foundations embedded in inter-organizational networks would be positively associate with participatory grantmaking. Model 2 shows a positive but insignificant relationship between networks and participatory grantmaking, and this result holds in the full model (Model 4). Hypothesis 2b is therefore not supported.

External Environment Drivers

In Hypotheses 3a and 3b, I predicted that a foundation's external environment would influence its engagement in participatory grantmaking. Foundations in more politically liberal counties were predicted to be positively associated with participatory grantmaking. Model 3 in Table 4.5 shows a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between community liberalism and participatory grantmaking, and this result continues in the full model (Model 4). Hypothesis 3a is thus not supported. With respect to H3b, community wealth is negatively and significantly associated at the $p<.01$ level with participatory grantmaking, as shown in Model 3.

The relationship continues to be highly significant at the p<.01 level in the full model (Model 4). Hypothesis 3b is therefore supported.

Controls

Organizational age and size are used as controls in this study. Age is not significant across any of the models. However, it is important to note that total assets is highly significant. In the full model (Model 4), total assets is significant at the p<.01 level.

Discussion

This study highlights an important and emerging strategy for social change in the philanthropic sector—participatory grantmaking. With increasing criticism of foundations' undemocratic nature and inattention (and contribution) to racial injustice, there are growing calls for foundations to shift how they operate and to include more outside voices in their decision making (Cardona, 2017, 2020; Daniels & Buhles, 2020). Some large foundations are pursuing participatory grantmaking strategies in light of this escalating chorus of criticism, but others remain hesitant to do so (Gibson, 2017; Husted et al., 2021). What is driving some foundations to embrace such an approach to grantmaking while others do not? This chapter works to advance understanding of what shapes foundations' strategies for social change.

I find support for the conceptual frame, which argues that organizational and contextual factors influence foundations' adoption of participatory grantmaking. Community foundations are significantly more likely than private foundations to embrace participatory grantmaking, which aligns with my hypothesis. This finding is likely due to many community foundations having well developed relationships within their communities and perhaps an ability to build on

the community leadership and collaboration work that many of these foundations already engage in. Professionalization and rationalization also play a key role in the uptake of participatory grantmaking strategies. These results suggest that paid staff have an important role to play in the adoption of participatory grantmaking and that this approach to grantmaking is becoming increasingly viewed as a rationalized "best practice" in the philanthropic sector.

Political orientation clearly matters for participatory grantmaking. Conservative foundations—those belonging to the Philanthropy Roundtable—engage in significantly less participatory grantmaking than foundations without a clear political orientation. Despite arguments by some conservatives that participatory grantmaking aligns well with conservative values (Hartmann, 2017), these foundations seem to be reluctant to embrace such a strategy. As important as the significant finding for conservative foundations is, the insignificant finding for liberal foundations—those that belong to National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy—is equally as important. Given the alignment between what is often viewed as the social justice orientation of participatory grantmaking and the stated goals of liberal foundations and the NCRP, it is surprising that these foundations do not engage in more participatory grantmaking than those foundations without a clear political orientation.

It is important to note here that a significant organizational factor is size. While I used organizational size as a control and did not develop a hypothesis around it, size certainly seems to matter. Foundations with higher levels of total assets are more likely to engage in participatory grantmaking. This is a somewhat surprising result since all foundations in the sample are large by definition. At this point in time at least, organizational resources are consequential—even among the largest foundations—for the adoption of participatory grantmaking. This suggests, in line with previous research, that participatory grantmaking is seen as resource intensive, and that

may be keeping foundations that are relatively smaller from adopting such as a strategy (Gibson, 2017; Husted, Finchum-Mason & Suárez, 2021). Large foundations may be more likely to believe that they have enough resources to dedicate to or experiment with participatory grantmaking.

With respect to contextual factors, the wealth of the community in which a foundation is situated matters. Foundations in wealthier communities are significantly less likely to adopt participatory grantmaking strategies. This aligns with my hypothesis and possibly suggests that foundations in wealthier communities may be more insulated from community needs. However, the results do not support organizational field, networks, or community liberalism as important determinants of participatory grantmaking. The finding for community liberalism is particularly surprising given the seeming alignment between participatory grantmaking's frequently stated social justice goals and presumed liberal-community values.

There are several practical implications for the overall findings of this work. While participatory grantmaking is a nascent strategy and its adoption is not yet widespread, community foundations seem to be leading the way with respect to conferring decision making authority to external stakeholders in their grantmaking. Private foundations could not only fund more of their work but could also learn from these foundations as to how to meaningfully engage in participatory grantmaking directly. What community foundations learn from their relatively early engagement in participatory approaches to grantmaking could inform the sector as whole. Furthermore, managerialism seems to be driving much of the engagement in this work. In some senses this is surprising, as one might expect professionalized and rationalized foundations to direct their efforts away from a "grassroots" approach and toward more top-down methods. But, these findings suggest that participatory grantmaking is becoming an accepted practice and that

foundations interested in engaging in this work should invest in the human resource capacity to support participatory structures. At the same time, it is important for foundations to reflect on *why* they want to engage in participatory grantmaking. Practitioners indicate that the "why" behind participatory grantmaking is key to achieving meaningful change for those who have been marginalized (Gibson, 2017). If this work is not motivated by a deep commitment to social change and desire to shift power, then it runs the risk of simply maintaining the status quo.

The finding that conservative foundations are seemingly lukewarm to the idea of participatory grantmaking is, perhaps, not unexpected. However, the result that liberal foundations that are members of NCRP are not significantly more inclined to engage in participatory grantmaking than other foundations is quite surprising. The mission of NCRP is to "promote philanthropy that serves the public good, is responsive to people and communities with the least wealth and opportunity, and is held accountable" (NCRP, n.d.). I would expect to see a fuller embrace of a participatory approach to grantmaking by these foundations as a means for supporting community-driven solutions and incorporating into the grant process the voices of those most affected by foundation funding. This finding calls into question whether these foundations are actually willing to shift power away from their halls of privilege.

There are several limitations to this study that should be noted. Like previous chapters, this study uses a cross-sectional research design that does not support claims of causality but rather identifies important relationships between organizational and contextual factors and engagement in participatory grantmaking. Another significant limitation to note is that there is always risk of selection bias with survey methods. The survey was intentionally promoted in such a manner that it omitted direct reference to participatory grantmaking, and this choice was made to reduce selection bias among those who already engage in participatory grantmaking.

However, risk of selection bias still exists, particularly as those foundations that are willing to engage in participatory grantmaking might also be more willing to complete a survey.

There are additional limitations given the survey design. The questions on the survey asked if the foundation engaged stakeholders at any point in the previous two years. This language was intentionally chosen to clearly bound the survey questions. However, we do not know if those practices are continuing, nor do we know the extent to which the foundation engaged in any one of those activities. For example, if a foundation indicated that they had engaged affected community members by giving them decision-making authority over grant funding, we do not know if this happened once or multiple times or the amount of grant dollars over which they had control. Furthermore, a foundations' engagement with participatory grantmaking was captured only at the point in time that the survey was administered. With an emerging strategy like participatory grantmaking, foundations' adoption of such an approach to grantmaking could shift dramatically over time.

With respect to the independent variables, several measures are coarse indicators. As in chapter two, the measure for community logic is a binary indicator for if a foundations expresses any community orientation on its relevant website pages or Foundation Center profile page. This does not capture that gradations that exist in how community oriented a foundation is. The political orientation measures also use two blunt binary indicators—one for whether the foundation belongs to the liberal foundation network and one for whether the foundation belongs to the conservative foundation network. These indicators are a novel attempt to try to assess the political orientation of foundations, but these indicators are not capturing the extent to which a foundation is liberal and conservative, and that could matter. In regard to the external environment variables, I use county-level data for the county in which a foundation is

headquartered. Using a measure like this allows for comparability across foundations, but it is likely that the community that influences a foundation is different for each foundation.

Despite these limitations, this chapter makes several important contributions. First, the study draws attention to large foundations as important actors in public governance whose participatory practices should be examined given their power and influence in society. Second, it sets forth a framework that bridges multiple participation literatures and applies them to the philanthropic sector, providing the building blocks for understanding participation in institutional philanthropy. Third, the original survey data generated through this study is a novel contribution to the field, particularly due to the secretive and hard-to-reach nature of many foundations that has previously limited research on this population. These data provide important insights into foundations' decision making and participatory practices. Finally, this work makes theoretical contributions to nonprofit studies and organizational sociology by furthering understanding of what shapes the actions and strategies of foundations—understudied organizations with a unique form and role in society.

There is still a great deal unknown with an emerging strategy like participatory grantmaking, and this study lays the foundation for important future research questions. For one, future work should address the extent to which foundations are funding participatory grantmaking or directly engaging in these practices and whether differences in these approaches affects social change outcomes. Additionally, it would be important to understand whether foundations are adopting participatory grantmaking as a democratizing strategy by incorporating outside voices broadly, or as strategy to pursue equity and justice by intentionally incorporating marginalized voices. Future research should also attempt to understand the different ways in which participatory grantmaking is implemented and address how the adoption of participatory

grantmaking relates to foundations' other strategic initiatives—such as advocacy—and to what effect.

Summary

I tested my conceptual frame in this chapter among large foundations in the United States in the context of participatory grantmaking. I find support for the conceptual frame, particularly that organizational factors—foundation form, managerialism, and political orientation—influence foundations' engagement of participatory grantmaking. These findings build upon the results in the previous two chapters, pointing to importance of organizational and contextual drivers in shaping foundations' social and policy change strategies. Next, I turn to the concluding chapter and discuss the findings and implications across the chapters.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

Philanthropic foundations' vast resources and roles as funders mean they have significant influence in the U.S. nonprofit sector and society more broadly. Their plutocratic force and undemocratic nature have drawn increasing scrutiny in recent years and is particularly notable when considering their attempts to influence social and policy change. This dissertation aims to further understanding of foundations as not merely patrons of worthy causes but as active political actors in the U.S. policy landscape, and it represents a critical first step to deepening understanding about what shapes these actors' strategies. I developed a conceptual framework in the first chapter for understanding what influences foundations' social and policy change strategies and tested this framework in multiple contexts across the three empirical chapters.

The second chapter sought to understand the drivers of advocacy, as measured by advocacy funding and advocacy discourse, among the largest foundations in the U.S. The key findings in chapter two indicate that the structural aspects of large foundations—institutional logic, foundation form, and political orientation—are important factors that affect their engagement in advocacy. Foundations with a community logic are significantly more likely than other foundations to engage in advocacy, as indicated by their discourse and funding. Foundations that embody a community logic, with a focus on partnership, collaboration, and leadership in their work, seem to find alignment with advocacy as a strategy to pursue their missions. Surprisingly, however, community foundations engage in less advocacy discourse or advocacy funding than private foundations. While this finding is contrary to my hypothesis, it is in line with previous research (Suárez & Lee, 2011) and suggests that community foundations face pressures that private foundations do not and which influence their engagement in advocacy.

Community foundations may encounter stakeholder pressures to refrain from political action, or perhaps a focus on donor services rather than community leadership (Graddy & Morgan, 2006) might make some community foundations less likely to advocate. The most interesting finding in this chapter is that conservative foundations are associated with higher levels of advocacy funding, while liberal foundations are associated with higher levels of advocacy discourse. Conservative foundations may be flying under the radar and taking the tact of quietly funding the advocacy work of other organizations. Liberal foundations, on the other hand, may be more directly engaged in this work and describe these activities on their websites. This finding could also imply that liberal foundations feel compelled to publicly express support for advocacy as a means to addressing structural problems but do not necessarily have a preference for funding these activities as compared to other priorities.

Contextual factors—embeddedness, organizational field, and community liberalism—also matter for large foundations' engagement in advocacy. Embeddedness in networks seems to be a powerful driver of advocacy both in terms of discourse and funding. Inter-organizational networks, then, might be essential conduits in the dissemination of information about such practices, as well as norms for engaging in this work. The organizational fields of health and the environment are also important predictors of foundations engagement in advocacy, suggesting that foundations in these fields share common frames that incline them toward advocacy. Community liberalism is also a small but significant factor. Foundations in more liberal communities may be influenced by their greater liberal activism in their surrounding context and more open to engaging in advocacy themselves.

The third chapter turned its focus specifically to community foundations to assess what shapes their advocacy, both in terms of discourse and lobbying. While we see some similarities

with large foundations, community foundations have somewhat different drivers of advocacy, which could be due to their different structural form, regulations, and relationships with their communities. Key findings in this chapter point to several organizational drivers as being impactful for advocacy: institutional logic, managerialism, and social justice orientation. As in chapter two, we see that a community logic is a driving force for advocacy. While it might be expected that all community foundations would necessarily have a community logic, many community foundations focus more on investment management and services for donor-advised funds than on community leadership (Graddy & Morgan, 2006). However, those community foundations that do embrace a community logic in their work are more likely to also engage in advocacy, as seen in the results for both advocacy discourse and lobbying. Managerialism plays an important role among community foundations as well, with professionalization and rationalization driving advocacy discourse and lobbying, respectively. For community foundations, professionalization and rationalization seem to play a particularly important role, indicating that advocacy may be seen as a "best practice" that is diffused through professional networks and reliance on consultants. Surprisingly, a social justice orientation matters for advocacy discourse but not for lobbying among community foundations. This finding could indicate that foundations with a social justice orientation may focus more on "grassroots" strategies rather than "insider" or "elite" strategies. Or, these foundations might perceive an obligation to express support for advocacy but do not have the capacity to engage in a strategy as resource intensive as lobbying.

We also see in this chapter that context matters for community foundations' advocacy. Embeddedness in inter-organizational networks is significantly associated with advocacy discourse, and like for foundations more broadly, might be a key means for the diffusion of

knowledge and norms around advocacy. Community foundations in wealthier communities also engage in more advocacy. This finding suggests that the foundations in these communities may reflect higher levels of political engagement among the individuals in their communities. However, this finding could also indicate that community foundations in less wealthy communities are more focused on meeting immediate needs rather than advocating for longer term change.

The findings in chapter three further suggest that advocacy, broadly, and lobbying, specifically, have different drivers. Lobbying is the explicit intent of influencing legislation and is only regulated form of advocacy among 501(c)(3) public charities. Engaging in lobbying takes substantial knowledge of lobbying laws, as well as legislative processes. The results here indicate that asset size and rationalization are significant drivers of lobbying for community foundations. This finding points to the considerable resources it takes to effectively engage in lobbying, as it is the largest community foundations that rely most heavily on consultants that are adopting lobbying as a strategy.

Chapter four concentrated on an emerging strategy for social change among large foundations—participatory grantmaking. The key findings in this chapter indicate that the structural aspects of organizations—foundation form, managerialism, and political orientation—influence foundations' engagement in participatory grantmaking. Unlike with advocacy, community foundations seem to be leading the way on participatory grantmaking as they are significantly more likely than private foundations to use this strategy. Participatory grantmaking may seem more obviously in line with the values of many community foundations than advocacy, and they may have existing community connections that they can draw on for participatory approaches to grantmaking. Managerialism is also driving much of the participatory

grantmaking, with professionalized and rationalized foundations seemingly more likely to embrace such a strategy. The finding suggests that this nascent strategy is coming to be viewed as a "best practice" within the sector that is diffusing through professional networks. With respect to political orientation, it is not surprising that conservative foundations are significantly less likely to embrace participatory grantmaking, given its history and common association with progressive causes. It is quite surprising, however, that liberal foundations that are members of NCRP are not more likely than other foundations to engage in participatory grantmaking. NCRP espouses the values of transparency and responsiveness to marginalized communities—values that are seemingly well aligned with the goals of participatory grantmaking. This finding calls into questions whether these foundations are willing to shift power to those outside their organizations.

Across the findings from the three empirical chapters, the conceptual frame applies somewhat differently among these contexts, and there are key similarities and differences to note. A community logic is consequential for advocacy as we see for large foundations broadly and community foundations specifically. Foundations with a community logic, and its focus on partnership and collaboration, engage in more advocacy than other foundations. Embeddedness is also an important driver of advocacy among both large foundations and community foundations, lending support to the idea that networks are important means for knowledge sharing with respect to advocacy. Furthermore, foundation form matters for both advocacy and participatory grantmaking but in divergent ways. Community foundations are less likely than private foundations to advocate but more likely to embrace participatory grantmaking. In this regard, community foundations may feel pressure from stakeholders to refrain political activity,

whereas participatory grantmaking, even if used as a tool for social change, may seem more in line with the roles and values of community foundations.

The political or social justice orientation of foundations clearly matters for both advocacy and participatory grantmaking. Across the three chapters, foundations with a liberal or social justice orientation are more likely to display social and policy change discourse, but, when it comes to concrete actions such as advocacy funding, lobbying, and participatory grantmaking, they are not more likely to engage in these strategies than other foundations. Conversely, conservative foundations are not associated with advocacy discourse but they are strongly associated with advocacy funding. Discourse is certainly important as it can reflect the values and actions of foundations and is a meaningful signal of what foundations embrace. However, these findings across multiple studies should promote reflection among liberal foundations about whether their actions for social and policy change match their public image.

This dissertation makes several important contributions to the field. First, it attempts to highlight philanthropic foundations—influential yet understudied organizations—as key players in the U.S. policy landscape. Theoretically, it develops a conceptual framework for understanding social and policy change strategies in the philanthropic sector and tests the framework through three empirical studies. This work informs the nonprofit management and organizational sociology literatures by concentrating on these unique organizations that substantially influence the nonprofit sector and society more broadly. Methodologically, the dissertation draws on machine-learning processes to put forward a replicable method of measuring advocacy across any type of organization that has a website or other text representation. The dissertation further generates novel data through an original survey administered to both community foundations and private foundations—a secretive and hard-to-

reach population. Finally, it offers practical implications supporting social and policy change strategies within foundations, as well as potential areas for reflection and normative discussions among these organizations.

My dissertation is just a small step in laying the foundation for future research on philanthropic foundations and their roles in advocacy and participatory grantmaking. This is a rich area to study, and more research should be conducted to build on this and the work of other scholars (e.g., Bushouse & Mosley, 2018; Reckhow, 2013; Suárez & Lee, 2011; Tompkins-Stange, 2016) to further our understanding of these important players in the U.S. philanthropic sector. Their funding and actions aim the attention of nonprofits and influence the sector as a whole, and their roles in social and policy change demonstrate that they are affecting U.S. society more broadly. Future research should address the different types of advocacy strategies foundations can employ (e.g., insider vs. outsider tactics), what leads to these varying strategies, and the effects these strategies have on bringing about desired change. Furthermore, foundations seem to differ in the extent to which they are directly engaged in advocacy and participatory grantmaking or fund the work of others to engage in these strategies. What drives the differences in these approaches to social and policy change efforts and with what consequences? Exploring the relationship between foundations' advocacy and participatory grantmaking strategies could be particularly worthwhile in furthering understanding about the extent to which these strategies reinforce one another. Perhaps, most importantly, is the need to understand how advocacy and participatory grantmaking strategies are affecting the outcomes that foundations aim to achieve.

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Appendix A: Foundation Center Grant Strategy Taxonomy

PCS Code	Former GCS Code	Support Strategy Level 1	Support Strategy Level 2	Support Strategy Level 3	All terms	Definitions and Scope Notes
UA0000	10	**General support**			General support	Support for the day-to-day operating costs of an organization or to further the general purpose of an organization. Also includes support which may be applied to any use or to fund any purpose (unrestricted support); does not include unspecified support. Use For: Membership dues.
UB0000	*12	**Regranting**			Regranting	Support, often to an intermediary or umbrella organization, intended to be passed on to other organizations or individuals based on agreed-upon criteria and limitations.
UC0000	CT=Y	**Continuing support**			Continuing support	Support provided for the same purpose as in the previous year or years, or support renewed for another year or years.
UD0000	13	**Capacity-building and technical assistance**			Capacity-building and	To increase an organization's sustainability and effectiveness through strategic and long-range planning, organizational assessment and development, business planning, and the use of outside consultants. Use primarily for process-oriented capacity-building that seeks to improve organizational practices. See Also: Management and leadership development.
UD0100	70		Technical assistance		Technical assistance	Provision of any specialized service or skill that a nonprofit does not possess within the organization, but which it may need in order to operate more effectively. Use For: Consultants, Consultancies.
UD0200	46		Seed money		Seed money	To start, establish or initiate a new project or organization; may cover salaries and other operating expenses of a new project. Use For: Start-up funds.
UD0300	NEW		System and operational improvements		System and operation	Efforts to enhance an organization's effectiveness through development of best practices, policies and procedures, performance management systems and tools.
UD0400	NEW		Fiscal sponsorships		Fiscal sponsorships	A formal arrangement in which a tax-exempt public charity (or similar registered nonprofit) sponsors a project or organization that lacks an exempt status or official registration. The sponsoring organization may assume expenditure responsibility for the organization and may provide other supporting administrative services.
UD0500	NEW		Mergers		Mergers	To build an organization's capacity through merger with another organization, especially one with a similar or related mission or field of activity. Includes mergers between organizations that are related corporately, through charter or other affiliation; for example: mergers between two separate affiliates of the American Lung Association.
UD0600	*04		Regulation and administration		Regulation and admin	Efforts to set standards, monitor performance, confer accreditation, or otherwise regulate and administer groups or projects.
UE0000	NEW	**Leadership and professional development**			Leadership and profe	Professional development of management, executives, boards, staff, and volunteers. Includes leadership development, recruiting, training, and salaries.
UE0100	42		Faculty and staff development		Faculty and staff dev	Salary or development of staff members of specific programs.
UE0200	43		Professorships		Professorships	To support or endow a professorship or chair, especially at an educational or research institution.
UE0300	NEW		Board development		Board development	To evaluate or improve a board's structure, role and performance. Includes board recruitment, ethical board governance and implementation of governance models.
UE0400	13		Management and leadership development		Management and lea	To strengthen organizational leadership. This includes salaries of management and executives, administrative staff support, training and leadership development programs.
UE0500	NEW		Volunteer development		Volunteer developme	Recruitment, training, and deployment of volunteer staff in administrative or program capacities.
UF0000	NEW	**Capital and infrastructure**			Capital and infrastruc	To acquire, upgrade or develop capital infrastructure. Includes: building acquisition, maintenance and renovations; land acquisitions and rent payments; information technology and other equipment; and collections.
UF0100	20		Capital campaigns		Capital campaigns	A campaign to raise funds for a variety of long-term purposes, such as building construction or acquisition, endowments, land acquisition, etc.
UF0200	22		Equipment		Equipment	To acquire or upgrade equipment for an organization's day-to-day operations such as furnishings and HVAC systems or equipment related to an organization's specific programs such medical equipment for medical facilities. See Also: Information technology, Collections acquisitions.
UF0300	23		Information technology		Information technolog	To acquire, upgrade or develop computer technology. Includes hardware, software, peripherals, systems, networking components and mobile devices.
UF0400	21		Building and renovations		Building and renovati	Constructing, renovating, remodeling, or rehabilitating property.
UF0500	NEW		Rent		Rent	Support to pay rent on a building or space.
UF0600	24		Land acquisitions		Land acquisitions	Support to purchase real estate property (not buildings).
UF0700	NEW		Building acquisitions		Building acquisitions	Support to purchase buildings or other structures.
UF0800	NEW		Facilities maintenance		Facilities maintenanc	Support for day-to-day operation or general maintenance of buildings and grounds.
UF0900	27		Collections acquisitions		Collections acquisitior	Acquisitions by libraries, schools, museums, etc. of permanent materials as part of a collection, often books, artifacts, or art.
UF1000	4A		Collections management and preservation		Collections managem	Maintenance, preservation, organization, description and conservation of tangible or digital items in a collection.
UG0000	12	**Financial sustainability**			Financial sustainabilit	To ensure continued financial viability for organizations, especially those with low resources or serving low-resource/high need communities. Includes efforts to develop sustainable fundraising, marketing and development within organizations.
UG0100	NEW		Earned income		Earned income	Support to increase the revenue generated from the sale of goods, services rendered, or work performed as part of the activities of an organization or program.
UG0200	25		Endowments		Endowments	Bequests or gifts intended to be kept permanently and invested to provide income for continued support of an organization.
UG0300	NEW		Financial services		Financial services	Support for development of or access to financial services including budget, accounting, auditing, tax assistance and planning, and other services such as loans, lines of credit, and banking or credit union services. Note: Loans, lines of credit, etc. are not considered PRIs or MRIs unless specifically stated as such by the grantmaking organization.
UG0400	15		Annual campaigns		Annual campaigns	Any organized effort by a nonprofit to secure gifts on an annual basis; also called annual appeals.
UG0500	NEW		Fundraising		Fundraising	To raise donated funds and maintain productive relationships with donors. Use for fundraising galas and to purchase tables or tickets to events.
UG0600	26		Debt reduction		Debt reduction	To reduce an organization's indebtedness; also referred to as deficit financing. Frequently refers to mortgage relief.
UG0700	30		Emergency funds		Emergency funds	One-time support to cover the immediate short-term funding needs of an organization on an emergency basis.
UG0800	77		Sponsorships		Sponsorships	Support for fundraising, celebratory, or programmatic events for an organization where the funder's name or trademark is branded or marketed along with the event. Includes support for walks/races to raise money for a disease or cause, dinners or tables (in lieu of a donation) at events honoring a person or cause, and the underwriting of programs and events such as performances, seasons, exhibitions, etc.
UH0000	75	**Outreach**			Outreach	Efforts to reach out to the general public or specific groups/communities to make them aware of the organization or a specific program, event or cause funded or supported by the organization.
UH0100	NEW		Public engagement and education		Public engagement a	To use communications strategies to educate, enlighten, raise awareness, and involve the public in certain activities and issue areas.
UH0200	NEW		Audience development		Audience developme	Support to reach a larger audience, to reach particular kinds of audiences, or to develop on-going relationships with an audience, especially but not exclusively for arts and cultural groups and programs.
UH0300	NEW		Marketing		Marketing	Support for activities that promote, sell, distribute, and communicate the value of a product or service. Includes advertising and branding.
UH0400	71		Cause-related marketing		Cause-related marketi	Support linking gifts to charity with marketing promotions.

UJ0000	NEW	**Network-building and collaboration**			Network-building and	Building structures and creating opportunities to work more closely and effectively with partners and peers, including through networking activities, physical or virtual. These may be collaborations, partnerships, alliances, meetings, travel, and other interactions with people or organizations as a way to exchange information or services, plan and prioritize, resolve conflicts, share resources, etc.
UJ0100	41		Convening		Convening	To bring together diverse stakeholders in a collective process of sharing insights and making decisions about a specific topic and leading to a well-defined outcome. This process may be contained in a single gathering, but is more often accomplished in a series of meetings and other events or programs that allow a more thorough and in-depth process.
UJ0200	NEW		Conferences and exhibits		Conferences and exh	Encouragement and facilitation of the gathering of people, groups or organizations to meet and discuss issues or events on a particular topic. This includes conferences, seminars, workshops, meetings, annual conventions.
UJ0201	NEW			Conference hosting	Conference hosting	Support for a group or venue to sponsor a conference or seminar.
UJ0202	NEW			Conference presenting	Conference presentin	Support for a person, group or organization to make a presentation at a conference or seminar.
UJ0203	NEW			Conference attendance	Conference attendan	Support for a person or group of people to attend a conference or seminar.
UJ0300	96		Exchange programs		Exchange programs	Support for people to travel to other places and assume a local role there, as student, teacher, artist, volunteer, etc. These exchanges can be one-way or two-way and may be intended to facilitate a sharing of culture, history, tradition, or knowledge and foster a sense of mutual understanding.
UJ0400	NEW		Grantee relations		Grantee relations	Development of a better relationship between funders and the organizations they support, including development of shared goals and objectives, and improving communications and feedback.
UJ0500	NEW		Donor collaborations		Donor collaborations	Formation of joint endeavors between grantmakers to optimize impact and avoid duplication of effort. This may include sharing of information, coordination of grantmaking, pooling of resources, and a shared decision-making process.
UJ0600	NEW		Nonprofit collaborations		Nonprofit collaboratio	Support for 2 or more nonprofits to collaborate on an issue, project, publication, etc. Includes joint programming collaborations, merging of resources, sharing of resources, collaborative leadership, co-sponsorship.
UJ0700	NEW		Online engagement		Online engagement	Building virtual structures and creating online opportunities for peers, partners, and supporters to interact and share information on topics and initiatives of mutual interest or shared projects.
UJ0800	*14		Information and Referral		Information and Refe	Efforts to gather, organize, and disseminate information on subjects or activities to groups or individuals working in that area or to those requiring support or services in that area.
UK0000	*06	**Policy, advocacy and systems reform**			Policy, advocacy and	To develop, promote, and transform public policies, especially involving the proposal of novel solutions to ongoing challenges encountered by political, economic and social systems and institutions, especially in the field of activity central to the mission or purpose of an organization or project.
UK0100	14		Advocacy		Advocacy	Advocacy in the public arena to influence policy and allocation of resources; this includes advocating for better policies and services in various program areas (for example school reform, full access to health care, legal reform, environmental clean-up work, etc.) and providing assistance in planning advocacy campaigns.
UK0200	*07		Systems reform		Systems reform	Efforts meant to change fundamental structures of institutions, systems, and policies.
UK0300	NEW		Litigation		Litigation	Legal action in the public interest toward mission-related policy and reform goals, and activism in the court system. Also includes litigation, including arbitration, mediation and negotiation, in support of nonprofits and charitable organizations; especially legal guidance supporting operations; liability, contractual and governance issues; regulatory compliance; exempt organization and other tax concerns; fiduciary conduct; intellectual property; and other areas requiring legal expertise. Use For: Legal advocacy, Strategic litigation.
UK0400	NEW		Grassroots organizing		Grassroots organizing	Building popular support for, encouraging activism around, and helping to organize a forum to address an issue or policy, often a specific social justice issue, at the community level.
UK0500	NEW		Coalition building		Coalition building	The joining of human and material resources of individuals and organizations with common or diverse interests to work toward compatible goals of varying breadth and produce change through the actions of these partnerships. These may take the form of temporary, informal arrangements that can become permanent, independently constituted organizations, with local, regional or national membership.
UK0600	*08		Ethics and accountability		Ethics and accountab	Efforts to set and enforce ethical norms in certain fields, professions, etc.
UK0700	*13		Equal access		Equal access	Efforts to ensure equal opportunity and access to services, resources, and advancement in particular fields of activity.
UM0000	NEW	**Research and evaluation**			Research and evalua	Efforts to discover, collect, analyze, interpret, test, document, and disseminate data, information, knowledge, and the applications of that knowledge. This includes basic and applied scientific research; studies, surveys, investigations and clinical trials in social sciences and medicine; historical research in the arts and humanities; evaluation of specific programs and initiatives; feasibility studies; institutional evaluations; and data measurement systems to assess and improve performance.
UM0100	60		Research		Research	Basic and applied research, other studies, surveys, investigations, and clinical trials.
UM0200	78		Program evaluations		Program evaluations	Evaluation of a specific project or program; includes awards both to agencies to pay for evaluation costs and to research institutes and other program evaluators.
UM0300	NEW		Institutional evaluations		Institutional evaluatio	Evaluation of an organization's specific mission, purpose, profile, and performance with an aim to improving stated objectives and outcomes.
UM0400	NEW		Data and measurement systems		Data and measureme	The design and development of systems for gathering and analyzing data with an aim to help organizations improve how they measure, assess and, ultimately, improve their performance and results.
UN0000	40	**Program support**			Program support	To support specific projects or programs as opposed to general purpose support.
UN0100	NEW		Pilot programs		Pilot programs	Untried projects or programs that are being tested for feasibility or proof-of-concept.
UN0200	NEW		Program creation		Program creation	To design and implement a new program or project.
UN0300	NEW		Program expansion		Program expansion	To take an existing program and expand it to serve more participants, serve more locations, or address other appropriate areas of need.
UN0400	NEW		Program replication		Program replication	To take a successful program and recreate it to serve another area or group.
UN0500	47		Curriculum development		Curriculum developme	Support for schools, colleges, universities, and educational support organizations to develop general or discipline-specific curricular. May be used outside of education-related coding, for example for a museum or filmmaker to create a curriculum for an exhibit or a film.
UP0000	NEW	**Presentations and productions**			Presentations and pr	The creation, development, and display of public, print and multimedia presentations and productions, often by institutions and individuals in educational, nonprofit, arts, humanities and media.
UP0100	48		Performances		Performances	Mounting a production in the areas of performing arts, concerts, theatre, dance, etc.
UP0200	49		Exhibitions		Exhibitions	To mount an exhibit or to support the installation of a touring exhibit, often by museums, libraries, or historical societies.
UP0300	44		Recordings		Recordings	Film, television, video, audio, radio and recordings in other media. Not used for general support of TV or radio stations.
UP0400	45		Publications		Publications	To publish reports or other publications issued by a nonprofit resulting from research or projects of interest to the funder.
UP0500	4C		Online media		Online media	To create, design, maintain and provide content for Web sites, electronic media, intranets, internet services and other online media.
UP0600	4B		Commissioning new works		Commissioning new w	Support for the creation and generation of new artistic works in a variety of fields and media.

UQ0000	NEW	**Product and service development**			Product and service d	Efforts assisting nonprofits and charitable organizations through the phased life cycle of a product or service, from idea generation through feasibility study to product launch to enhancing the product or service after recipient feedback and process evaluation.
UQ0100	NEW		Product discovery		Product discovery	Efforts assisting nonprofits and charitable organizations for exploratory process involving identification of issue, opportunity and target group or audience, proposal of solution and corresponding product, architecture of step-by-step strategy and outline of distribution plan, promoting institutional advancement through scalable model.
UQ0200	NEW		Product development		Product development	Efforts assisting nonprofits and charitable organizations to design, create and conduct marketing research for existing or newly developed product through systematic procedural methodology, turning market opportunity into available, salable product.
UQ0300	NEW		Commodity provision		Commodity provision	Efforts assisting nonprofits and charitable organizations to acquire and distribute needed materials and products. Includes packaged goods, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, and other disposable and perishable health, medical, sanitary, agricultural and electronic supplies needed in bulk for disaster or international relief efforts, for example; as well as more customized, smaller batches of items intended for more localized, targeted programs. Do not use for equipment.
UQ0400	NEW		Product and service delivery		Product and service d	Efforts to deliver or distribute products and services, and to streamline these processes, making necessary adjustments and improvements and optimizing recipient experience and overall efficiency and quality of the products or services.
UQ0500	NEW		Translation		Translation	Conversion of material from one language into another, to convey its message and intent, in nonprofit and charitable literature, publications, articles, and other printed materials. Also includes the work of interpreters at conferences, convenings, workshops, lectures and other public events, facilitating dissemination of knowledge and information; and in institutional settings where individual interpretive services are needed to ensure equal access to services for speakers of other languages.
UR0000	NEW	**Individual development**			Individual developme	Support to provide assistance to individuals in the form of grants-in-aid, stipends, loans, work-study, or other awards for pursuing educational, research, or professional goals.
UR0100	54		Awards, prizes and competitions		Awards, prizes and co	Artists' awards, prizes, competitions, housing, living space, work space and other prizes.
UR0200	55		Camperships		Camperships	Partial or full tuition subsidies to enable participants who would not otherwise be financially able to participate in fee-based camping programs.
UR0300	56		Travel awards		Travel awards	Awards to individuals to cover transportation and/or out-of-town living expenses while attending a conference or completing a period of study or special project. Enrollment in a college or university is not a requirement.
UR0400	51		Fellowships		Fellowships	Support for fellowships at institutions, usually universities but there are exceptions, such as think tanks and other policy organizations.
UR0500	52		Internships		Internships	Awards for paid or unpaid positions providing work-experience, on-the-job training, and/or school credit. These positions can provide research or job services to organizations and serve as recruitment tools for employers, and can provide opportunities for interns to explore career possibilities, gain experience, and find permanent employment.
UR0600	53		Scholarships		Scholarships	Support to an individual or educational institution or organization to support a scholarship program, mainly for students at the undergraduate level.
UR0700	9W		Sabbaticals		Sabbaticals	Support to take long-term but temporary leave, sometimes awarded as an employee benefit. Sabbaticals commonly last from 2 months to a year and can be used for rest, writing, research, or reflection.
UR0800	9L		Residencies		Residencies	Nonmonetary award usually of short duration, usually only for artists of all disciplines to further their creative work. Meals, living quarters, equipment, and studio space may be provided.
UR0900	50		Student aid		Student aid	Support to students enabling them to attend educational institutions.
UR0901	9A			Aid to graduates or students of specific schools	Aid to graduates or st	Support to people who attend or have attended a specific school. Some programs may also specify institutions to be attended after graduation. In many cases, application must be made through the high school or college instead of the foundation.
UR0902	9E			Postdoctoral support	Postdoctoral support	Support for research or further study after receiving doctoral degree.
UR0903	9G			Graduate support	Graduate support	Support to pursue graduate work and a master's level graduate degree after receiving an undergraduate degree.
UR0904	9H			Technical education support	Technical education s	Support to attend postsecondary institutions that offer certificates in education directly related to preparation for specific careers, and which require no more than two years of study.
UR0905	9I			Precollege support	Precollege support	Scholarships and loans given for expenses related to elementary or secondary education, such as private school tuition.
UR0906	9J			Undergraduate support	Undergraduate suppo	Support to pursue undergraduate work and a bachelor's or associate degree.
UR0907	9K			Postgraduate support	Postgraduate support	Support to pursue a doctoral degree after receiving a master's level graduate degree
UR0908	9N			Work-study grants	Work-study grants	Support for educational expenses awarded to students who engage in a part-time work arrangement. A work commitment of 10-15 hours per week is customarily required.
UR0909	9O			Doctoral support	Doctoral support	Support for dissertation or thesis research in pursuit of a doctoral degree.
UR0910	9Q			Stipends	Stipends	Short-term awards offered to independent scholars, writers, artists and researchers to defray expenses incurred in advancing their professional goals.
US0000	NEW	**Participatory grantmaking**			Participatory grantmal	Work done through a grantmaking process where the beneficiary community determines funding decisions.

Appendix B

Below is the list of the terms used to identify advocacy discourse. Note that in order to perform this task, these terms and all words in the complete corpus of sentences were stemmed using a Porter stemmer. As an example, the first stem “advoc” allowed us to find sentences that had the word advocacy but also the word advocate in them.

- advoc
- advocaci
- lobbi
- public educ
- public polici
- justic
- civil rights
- reform
- mobil
- protest
- ralli
- public opinion
- legisl
- congress
- judici
- grassroot

Form **990**

Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax

Under section 501(c), 527, or 4947(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (except private foundations)

► **Do not enter social security numbers on this form as it may be made public.**

► **Information about Form 990 and its instructions is at *www.irs.gov/form990*.**

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

OMB No. 1545-0047

2015

Open to Public Inspection

A For the 2015 calendar year, or tax year beginning , 2015, and ending , 20

B Check if applicable:
☐ Address change
☐ Name change
☐ Initial return
☐ Final return/terminated
☐ Amended return
☐ Application pending

C Name of organization

Doing business as

Number and street (or P.O. box if mail is not delivered to street address) | Room/suite

City or town, state or province, country, and ZIP or foreign postal code

D Employer identification number

E Telephone number

G Gross receipts $

F Name and address of principal officer:

H(a) Is this a group return for subordinates? ☐ **Yes** ☐ **No**

H(b) Are all subordinates included? ☐ **Yes** ☐ **No**
If "No," attach a list. (see instructions)

H(c) Group exemption number ►

I Tax-exempt status: ☐ 501(c)(3) ☐ 501(c) ( ) ◄ (insert no.) ☐ 4947(a)(1) or ☐ 527

J **Website:** ►

K Form of organization: ☐ Corporation ☐ Trust ☐ Association ☐ Other ►

L Year of formation:

M State of legal domicile:

Part I Summary

Activities & Governance

1 Briefly describe the organization's mission or most significant activities:

2 Check this box ► ☐ if the organization discontinued its operations or disposed of more than 25% of its net assets.

3	Number of voting members of the governing body (Part VI, line 1a)	3	
4	Number of independent voting members of the governing body (Part VI, line 1b)	4	
5	Total number of individuals employed in calendar year 2015 (Part V, line 2a)	5	
6	Total number of volunteers (estimate if necessary)	6	
7a	Total unrelated business revenue from Part VIII, column (C), line 12	7a	
b	Net unrelated business taxable income from Form 990-T, line 34	7b	

		Prior Year	Current Year
Revenue	8 Contributions and grants (Part VIII, line 1h)		
	9 Program service revenue (Part VIII, line 2g)		
	10 Investment income (Part VIII, column (A), lines 3, 4, and 7d)		
	11 Other revenue (Part VIII, column (A), lines 5, 6d, 8c, 9c, 10c, and 11e)		
	12 Total revenue—add lines 8 through 11 (must equal Part VIII, column (A), line 12)		
Expenses	13 Grants and similar amounts paid (Part IX, column (A), lines 1–3)		
	14 Benefits paid to or for members (Part IX, column (A), line 4)		
	15 Salaries, other compensation, employee benefits (Part IX, column (A), lines 5–10)		
	16a Professional fundraising fees (Part IX, column (A), line 11e)		
	b Total fundraising expenses (Part IX, column (D), line 25) ►		
	17 Other expenses (Part IX, column (A), lines 11a–11d, 11f–24e)		
	18 Total expenses. Add lines 13–17 (must equal Part IX, column (A), line 25)		
	19 Revenue less expenses. Subtract line 18 from line 12		

		Beginning of Current Year	End of Year
Net Assets or Fund Balances	20 Total assets (Part X, line 16)		
	21 Total liabilities (Part X, line 26)		
	22 Net assets or fund balances. Subtract line 21 from line 20		

Part II Signature Block

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than officer) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge.

Sign Here

Signature of officer | Date

Type or print name and title

Paid Preparer Use Only

Print/Type preparer's name | Preparer's signature | Date | Check ☐ if self-employed | PTIN

Firm's name ► | Firm's EIN ►

Firm's address ► | Phone no.

May the IRS discuss this return with the preparer shown above? (see instructions) ☐ **Yes** ☐ **No**

For Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, see the separate instructions. Cat. No. 11282Y Form **990** (2015)

Form **990-PF**

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Return of Private Foundation

or Section 4947(a)(1) Trust Treated as Private Foundation

▶ **Do not enter social security numbers on this form as it may be made public.**
▶ **Information about Form 990-PF and its separate instructions is at *www.irs.gov/form990pf*.**

OMB No. 1545-0052

2015

Open to Public Inspection

For calendar year 2015 or tax year beginning , 2015, and ending , 20

Name of foundation

A Employer identification number

Number and street (or P.O. box number if mail is not delivered to street address) | Room/suite

B Telephone number (see instructions)

City or town, state or province, country, and ZIP or foreign postal code

C If exemption application is pending, check here ▶ ☐

G Check all that apply: ☐ Initial return ☐ Initial return of a former public charity ☐ Final return ☐ Amended return ☐ Address change ☐ Name change

D 1. Foreign organizations, check here . . . ▶ ☐

2. Foreign organizations meeting the 85% test, check here and attach computation . . ▶ ☐

H Check type of organization: ☐ Section 501(c)(3) exempt private foundation ☐ Section 4947(a)(1) nonexempt charitable trust ☐ Other taxable private foundation

E If private foundation status was terminated under section 507(b)(1)(A), check here . . . . ▶ ☐

I Fair market value of all assets at end of year *(from Part II, col. (c), line 16)* ▶ **$**

J Accounting method: ☐ Cash ☐ Accrual ☐ Other (specify) _____
(Part I, column (d) must be on cash basis.)

F If the foundation is in a 60-month termination under section 507(b)(1)(B), check here . . ▶ ☐

Part I **Analysis of Revenue and Expenses** *(The total of amounts in columns (b), (c), and (d) may not necessarily equal the amounts in column (a) (see instructions).)*

			(a) Revenue and expenses per books	(b) Net investment income	(c) Adjusted net income	(d) Disbursements for charitable purposes (cash basis only)
Revenue	1	Contributions, gifts, grants, etc., received (attach schedule)				
	2	Check ▶ ☐ if the foundation is **not** required to attach Sch. B				
	3	Interest on savings and temporary cash investments				
	4	Dividends and interest from securities				
	5a	Gross rents				
	b	Net rental income or (loss) _____				
	6a	Net gain or (loss) from sale of assets not on line 10				
	b	Gross sales price for all assets on line 6a _____				
	7	Capital gain net income (from Part IV, line 2) . .				
	8	Net short-term capital gain				
	9	Income modifications				
	10a	Gross sales less returns and allowances				
	b	Less: Cost of goods sold . . .				
	c	Gross profit or (loss) (attach schedule)				
	11	Other income (attach schedule)				
	12	**Total.** Add lines 1 through 11				
Operating and Administrative Expenses	13	Compensation of officers, directors, trustees, etc.				
	14	Other employee salaries and wages				
	15	Pension plans, employee benefits				
	16a	Legal fees (attach schedule)				
	b	Accounting fees (attach schedule)				
	c	Other professional fees (attach schedule) . . .				
	17	Interest				
	18	Taxes (attach schedule) (see instructions)				
	19	Depreciation (attach schedule) and depletion . .				
	20	Occupancy				
	21	Travel, conferences, and meetings				
	22	Printing and publications				
	23	Other expenses (attach schedule)				
	24	**Total operating and administrative expenses.** Add lines 13 through 23				
	25	Contributions, gifts, grants paid				
	26	**Total expenses and disbursements.** Add lines 24 and 25				
	27	Subtract line 26 from line 12:				
	a	**Excess of revenue over expenses and disbursements**				
	b	**Net investment income** (if negative, enter -0-) .				
	c	**Adjusted net income** (if negative, enter -0-) . .				

Appendix E

Foundation Center (Candid) philanthropy classification system as it relates to grant **subject** areas. Describes what is being supported – grantmaker areas of focus, primary work of nonprofits and activities being funded.

- Agriculture, fishing and forestry
- Arts and culture
- Community and economic development
- Education
- Environment
- Health
- Human rights
- Human services
- Information and communications
- International relations
- Philanthropy
- Public affairs
- Public safety
- Religion
- Science
- Social sciences
- Sports and recreation
- Unknown or not classified

Appendix F: Survey Instrument

Part IV

This section is for **all** foundations, **except** operating foundation that do not make grants.

The following series of questions relates to the involvement of various stakeholders in your foundation's governance and operations at any point in the past two years. In each of these questions, you will see the following terms:

- Solicited feedback
- Incorporated feedback
- Made decisions

The table below provides some examples of the types of activities that constitute each of these terms.

Action	What this might look like
Solicited stakeholder feedback	surveys, focus groups, meetings, opportunities for comment
Incorporated feedback from stakeholder to influence	stakeholders serving on foundation working groups or advisory committees
Stakeholder made decisions	the foundation confers decision-making authority upon the stakeholder

If your foundation does not utilize a specific activity to engage the highlighted stakeholder, please select **Not applicable** at the end of each row in order to be able to proceed to the next section of the survey.

Question 25

Indicate all of the ways in which your foundation ***solicited feedback from*** stakeholders about various aspects of the foundation's governance or grant-making.

Please select all that apply.

	our organizational priorities	our grant-making processes	which grantees we fund	our post-grant evaluation	Not applicable
Our foundation solicited feedback from **staff** about	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation solicited feedback from **peer foundations** about	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation solicited feedback from **donors/members** about	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation solicited feedback from **current/former grantees** about	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation solicited feedback from **non-grantee nonprofits/community-based organizations** about	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation solicited feedback from **community members directly affected by the foundation's funding** about	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation solicited feedback from **members of the public** about	—	—	—	—	—

Question 26

Indicate all of the ways in which your foundation ***incorporated feedback from stakeholders to influence*** various aspects of the foundation's governance or grant-making.

Please select all that apply.

	our organizational priorities	our grant-making processes	which grantees we fund	our post-grant evaluation	Not applicable
Our foundation incorporated feedback from **staff** to influence	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation incorporated feedback from **peer foundations** to influence	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation incorporated feedback from **donors/members** to influence	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation incorporated feedback from **current/former grantees** to influence	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation incorporated feedback from **non-grantee nonprofits/community-based organizations** to influence	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation incorporated feedback from **community members directly affected by the foundation's funding** to influence	—	—	—	—	—
Our foundation incorporated feedback from **members of the public** to influence	—	—	—	—	—

Question 27

Indicate all of the ways in which ***stakeholders made decisions*** about various aspects of the foundation's governance or grant-making.

Please select all that apply.

	our organizational priorities	our grant-making processes	which grantees we fund	our post-grant evaluation	Not applicable
Staff made decisions about	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭
Peer foundations made decisions about	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭
Donors/members made decisions about	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭
Current/former grantees made decisions about	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭
N**on-grantee nonprofits/community-based organizations** made decisions about	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭
Community members directly affected by the foundation's funding made decisions about	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭
Members of the public made decisions about	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭

Question 28

Have you collaborated with consultants to conduct any of the activities (e.g., soliciting feedback from stakeholders, incorporating stakeholder feedback to influence decision-making) that you have indicated in the previous section?

We use the term consultants to indicate any management organization, philanthropic advisory group, or an independent consultant with which your foundation collaborates.

- ▭ Yes
- ▭ No

Question 29

Which of the following best describes the relationship between your foundation and the consultant(s) with which it worked to engage stakeholders in the past two years?

- ▭ Our foundation staff/board collaborated with the consultant(s) in both decision-making and implementation.
- ▭ Our foundation staff/board made decisions and relied on the consultant(s) to implement them.
- ▭ Our foundation staff/board collaborated with the consultant(s) to make decisions, but the consultant(s) implemented them.
- ▭ Our foundation delegated decision-making and implementation to the consultant(s).

If you indicated that your foundation engages the following stakeholders in Question 27 or Question 28, please continue on to Question 30 in the next section:

- **Current or former grantees**
- **Non-grantee nonprofits/community based organizations**
- **Community members directly affected by the foundation's funding**
- **Members of the public**

If you indicated **Not applicable** for the above entities, please move on to Part VI.

Part V

You have indicated that your foundation engaged external stakeholders at some point in the past two years. We are interested in understanding ***how*** your foundation identified and engaged external stakeholders.

Question 30

Who identified external stakeholders to participate? *Please select all that apply.*

- ▭ Foundation board members
- ▭ Foundation staff
- ▭ Consultants
- ▭ Grantees
- ▭ Contacts in our foundation network
- ▭ Other

If **Other**, please indicate who identified external stakeholders to participate.

Question 31

What processes were used to identify external stakeholders to participate? *Please select all that apply.*

- ▭ Our foundation sent invitations to external stakeholders.
- ▭ Our foundation requested nominations from another entity.
- ▭ External stakeholders self-selected.
- ▭ Our foundation used other methods to engage external stakeholders.

If your foundation has used **other** processes to identify external stakeholders to participate, please describe those methods here.

Question 32

Indicate the attributes that were important in selecting external stakeholders to participate.

Please select all that apply.

- ▭ The external stakeholder's knowledge of the challenge our foundation seeks to address.
- ▭ The external stakeholder's willingness to share information or best practices.
- ▭ The experience that the external stakeholder had with our foundation's target beneficiaries.
- ▭ The diversity of perspectives that the external stakeholder brought to the process.
- ▭ Our foundation had existing relationships with the external stakeholder(s).
- ▭ Other

If other attributes were important in selecting external stakeholders, please describe those attributes here.

Question 33

Indicate how your foundation facilitated external stakeholder participation.

Please select all that apply.

- ▭ Provided multiple forums for participation (e.g. in-person, online)
- ▭ Scheduled meetings outside of business hours
- ▭ Provided childcare
- ▭ Compensated external stakeholders for time
- ▭ Held meetings in accessible locations
- ▭ Other

If your foundation facilitated stakeholder participation in other ways, please describe them here.

Part VI

The following section is intended for foundations that **make grants**.

If your foundation does not make grants, please continue to Part VIII.

Question 34

In the last two years, has your foundation funded grantees to make grants to other organizations?

- ▭ Yes
- ▭ No

The following series of questions reflect whether and how your foundation funded grantees to engage various stakeholders at any point in the past two years. In each of these questions, you will see the following terms:

- Solicited feedback
- Incorporated feedback
- Made decisions

The table below provides some examples of the types of activities that constitute each of these terms.

Action	What this might look like
Solicited stakeholder feedback	surveys, focus groups, meetings, opportunities for comment
Incorporated feedback from stakeholder to influence	stakeholders serving on foundation working groups or advisory committees
Stakeholder made decisions	the foundation confers decision-making authority upon the stakeholder

If your foundation does not utilize a specific activity to engage the highlighted stakeholder, please select **Not applicable** at the end of each row in order to be able to proceed to the next section of the survey.

Question 35

Indicate all of the activities for which your foundation funded grantees to ***solicit feedback*** from stakeholders.

Please select all that apply.

	the grantee's organizational priorities	the grantee's grant-making processes	what the grantee funds	the grantee's evaluation of programs	Not applicable
Our foundation funded grantees to solicit feedback from **peer nonprofits/CBOs** about	–	–	–	–	–
Our foundation funded grantees to solicit feedback from **community members directly affected by the foundation's funding** about	–	–	–	–	–
Our foundation funded grantees to solicit feedback from **members of the public** about	–	–	–	–	–

Question 36

Indicate all of the activities for which your foundation funded grantees to ***incorporate feedback*** from stakeholders to influence organizational governance/operations.

Please select all that apply.

	the grantee's organizational priorities	the grantee's grant-making processes	what the grantee funds	the grantee's evaluation of programs	Not applicable
Our foundation funded grantees to incorporate feedback from **peer nonprofits/CBOs** to influence	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭
Our foundation funded grantees to incorporate feedback from **community members directly affected by the foundation's funding** to influence	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭
Our foundation funded grantees to incorporate feedback from **members of the public** to influence	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭

Question 37

Indicate all of the activities for which your foundation funded grantees to ***confer decision-making authority upon*** stakeholders.

Please select all that apply.

	the grantee's organizational priorities	the grantee's grant-making processes	what the grantee funds	the grantee's evaluation of programs	Not applicable
Our foundation funded grantees to confer decision-making authority upon **peer nonprofits/CBOs** about	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭
Our foundation funded grantees to confer decision-making authority upon **community members directly affected by the foundation's funding** about	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭
Our foundation funded grantees to confer decision-making authority upon **members of the public** about	▭	▭	▭	▭	▭

Question 38

Has your foundation collaborated with consultants to assist your grantees with any of the activities (e.g., soliciting feedback from stakeholders) that you have indicated in the previous section?

Just a reminder: we use the term consultants to indicate any management organization, philanthropic advisory group, or an independent consultant with which your foundation collaborates.

- ▭ Yes
- ▭ No

If you responded **Yes**, please continue to Question 39.
If you responded **No**, please continue to Part VII.

Question 39

Which of the following best characterizes the roles of your foundation's staff/board, your grantee's staff/board, and the consultant(s) in these activities?

	Decision-making processes	Implementation processes	Not applicable
Foundation **staff/board** was involved in	–	–	–
Our **grantee nonprofit** was involved in	–	–	–
Our **consultant** was involved in	–	–	–

Appendix G: Chapter 4 Results with Survey Weights

	Poisson with Survey Weights			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Organizational drivers				
Community logic	0.831			0.832
	(0.5180)			(0.5050)
Public	0.815**			0.563*
	(0.3210)			(0.3220)
Professionalization	0.0245			0.025
	(0.0193)			(0.0196)
Rationalization	0.384			0.415
	(0.3920)			(0.4000)
Liberal	-0.334			-0.346
	(0.3030)			(0.3250)
Conservative	-1.106**			-1.160***
	(0.4440)			(0.4370)
Relational drivers				
Human Services		0.65		0.23
		(0.4050)		(0.3630)
Networks		0.0301		0.0114
		(0.0256)		(0.0276)
External drivers				
Community liberalness			0.00874	-0.00171
			(0.0121)	(0.0116)
Community wealth			-2.032**	-1.281
			(0.9570)	(0.8500)
Controls				
Age	-0.00241	-0.00335	-0.00291	-0.00277
	(0.0055)	(0.0061)	(0.0063)	(0.0057)
Total assets (log)	0.520***	0.346*	0.449***	0.556**
	(0.1980)	(0.1850)	(0.1720)	(0.2340)
Constant	-11.90***	-7.511**	12.22	1.417
	(4.0270)	(3.6520)	(9.9580)	(9.5340)
Observations	145	145	145	145
Pseudo R2	*	*	*	*

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix H: Chapter 4 Survey Weight Development

Survey weights were developed using the inverse probability of response based on an analysis multiple covariates. A series of logit models were first conducted to identify predictors of response. The final weighting model was determined using a combination of AIC and BIC and used to generate ŷ, the predicted probability of response, for each organization. The inverse of that predicted probability was then employed as the survey weight. The final model used three predictors: whether the foundation was a private foundation, a professionalization/ rationalization index of transparency and accountability indicators, and whether the foundation's primary giving area is human services.

Table. Logit model regressions to identify survey response predictors

	LOGIT MODELS			
Construct	**Estimate (Coef)**	**SE**	**Test statistic**	**p value**
Whether or not the foundation is private (1 = private, 0 = community)	-0.810480272	0.260799343	-3.107677582	0.001885637
Total assets (unmanipulated)	0.000000000	0.000000000	-0.051418807	0.958991799
Logged total assets	0.030890962	0.116814309	0.264445015	0.791437029
Total giving for 2015 (most recent year available)	-0.000000001	0.000000001	-0.550917504	0.581690228
Log of total giving 2015	0.041497391	0.042476646	0.976946039	0.328595867
Whether the foundation has a website	1.652326128	0.385491652	4.286282517	0.000018169
Administrative expense ratio	0.342304091	0.408911164	0.837111141	0.402530098
Number of professional associations	0.087433251	0.021304896	4.103904187	0.000040624
Percent rural population in the county in which the foundation is located	1.168939927	0.809628807	1.443797351	0.148795987
Binary indicator of staff	1.360370676	0.325637660	4.177559424	0.000029465
Education is the top grantmaking priority	0.110321067	0.201118931	0.548536463	0.583323600
Human services is the top grantmaking priority	0.699139708	0.283311245	2.467744289	0.013596741
Health is the top grantmaking priority	-0.189309478	0.329941150	-0.573767408	0.566125206
Environment is a top grantmaking priority	-0.702716632	0.562052942	-1.250267687	0.211201778
Foundation is located in the midwest (ref. = West Mountain & Pacific)	0.236388778	0.278998969	0.847274736	0.396842005
Foundation is located in the southwest (ref. = West Mountain & Pacific)	0.171850257	0.382741709	0.448997987	0.653433109
Foundation is located in the northeast (ref. = West Mountain & Pacific)	-0.610909082	0.271794273	-2.247689311	0.024596008
Foundation is located in the southeast (ref. = West Mountain & Pacific)	-0.689380698	0.358405231	-1.923467177	0.054421405
Count of transparency & accountability indicators, including annual reports and audited financials (min 0, max 7)	**0.410694417**	**0.055351712**	**7.419723785**	**0.000000000**
Audited financials available online	1.388226551	0.207869832	6.678345458	0.000000000
Annual report available online	1.149890243	0.205432485	5.597411943	0.000000022
Guidestar 990	0.772961604	1.099916663	0.702745608	0.482214299
Has guidestar profile	1.073603105	0.206186239	5.206958075	0.000000192
Filled out guidestar survey	1.088459917	0.234880851	4.634093899	0.000003585
Glass pockets rated	1.136637155	0.293448276	3.873381600	0.000107336
Has social media account	1.254595266	0.215074848	5.833296077	0.000000005

Table. Propensity Weighting Models (GLM)

Model					AIC	BIC	VIF Issues
PW Model 1							
privatefdn	website	networks	humanservices	northeast	563.213	588.3672	none over 5
PW Model 2							
privatefdn	staffing	networks	humanservices	northeast	566.1517	591.3059	none over 5
PW Model 3							
profes_index	humanservices	northeast			538.2601	555.0296	none over 5
PW Model 4 (FULL)							
privatefdn	website	networks	profes_index	staffing	538.8364	572.3753	none over 5
humanservices	northeast						
FINAL WEIGHTING MODEL							
privatefdn	profes_index	humanservices			537.0766	582.6666	none over 5