The Poetics of Worlding: Nonhuman Cartographers and the Becoming of Histories

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Abstract

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This dissertation utilizes a comparative angle to examine how and why 19th- and 20th- century U.S. and Sinophone poets invoked the human/animal divide through composition of imaginative space and deconstruction of a linguicentric conception of the world. I argue that Walt Whitman and Emily Dickinson, in particular, demonstrate a manner of engaging nonhuman subjects that corresponds to what Jacques Derrida terms *zoopoetics* and initiates alternative, multispecies world-building during their poetic composition. Further, I contend that when Whitman and Dickinson write to, as, and with animals, they write as world poet in this anti-anthropocentric alter-world. And when, in the mid-to late 20th-century, Sinophone poets write their own animal-focused poetries in response, their writing manifests this ongoing posthuman challenge to the categories structuring and dictating both global literary exchange and conventional literary study.

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Introduction

A Human Fantasy: The World as We Know it

How can acts of poetry writing and reading constitute a world in defiance of human geographical formations as recorded on the map of the globe and open up possibilities to resituate the human race in an alternative, non-global-oriented world with completely revamped conceptions of space and time? Emily Dickinson, resisting the world as her contemporary 19th-century Americans knew it, gazes at *the beyond* in search of an alternative place inhabited by a puzzling "species":

This World is not conclusion.
A Species stands beyond—
Invisible, as Music—
But positive, as Sound—
It beckons, and it baffles—
Philosophy, dont know—
And through a Riddle, at the last—
Sagacity, must go— (*The Poems*, 171).

Deeming her 19th-century U.S. "World" to be inconclusive, Dickinson ponders the artificial modes of construing sound, and life and death. Failing to reach the "species" beyond the periphery of the human map through the modes of music and philosophy, Dickinson arrives at a "riddle" which even human sagacity cannot resolve. The "species," in the conventional reading of the poem, represents existence in the afterlife, especially from the Christian point of view. To resolve the riddle of death, Dickinson consults heavenly hymns, songs sung from the beyond. The intangibility of religious faith, while plausible as noises heard, is tempting as well as

perplexing in the poet's learning about afterlife. Faith can be "invisible" because it is abstract human creation. Therefore, attempting to use the human property of "sagacity" to comprehend the riddle-like, larger-than-human experience of death is of little avail. If we read the poem on a national, 19th-century scale, we might readily *conclude* that the poem is about Dickinson's struggle with religious and scientific perspectives of life and death by referring to the events that took place during Dickinson's lifetime in 19th-century U.S. However, what if we consider 19th-century U.S. an arbitrary set of temporal and spatial measures and hence our understanding of the phrase remains *inconclusive*? What if Dickinson never perceived *her* world to fit in with the anthropocentric demarcation of space and time? If Dickinson's world is not conclusion, the species that presides beyond her perception serves as a key to the riddle unresolved.

Similar to Dickinson's quest for an *out-of-this-world* species, Walt Whitman looks under the sea water into the "world below":

> The world below the brine,
>
> Forests at the bottom of the sea, the branches and leaves,
>
> ……………………………………………………
>
> Sluggish existences grazing there suspended, or slowly crawling close to the bottom,
>
> The sperm-whale at the surface blowing air and spray, or disporting with his flukes,
>
> The leaden-eyed shark, the walrus, the turtle, the hairy sea-leopard, and the sting-ray,
>
> Passions there, wars, pursuits, tribes, sight in those ocean-depths, breathing that thick-breathing air, as so many do,
>
> The change thence to the sight here, and to the subtle air breathed by beings like us who walk this sphere,
>
> The change onward from ours to that of beings who walk other spheres (Whitman 399).

Composing an alternative world below the horizon, Whitman presents his poetic explorations of the various sea levels and the nonhuman existences dwelling in each of them. From the whale slapping its fluke on the surface to the stingray resting at the bottom of the sea, Whitman utilizes his cataloguing style as a method for constructing a world under the sea water, *hidden* from human perception. It is hidden because the world below the sea is inaccessible to humans without tools. Without diving equipmentor underwater cameras, humans cannot perceive the "forests at the bottom of the sea," and "sluggish existences grazing…or slowly crawling close to the bottom." The vast vertical dimension of space below the horizon, within which human existence is peripheral, contains an environment paralleling that above the horizon. In such an underwater world, passions, wars, pursuits, and tribes are perceived differently due to that the air is "thick" and needs to be breathed in via a physiological mechanism that extracts oxygen from water or tools that help to produce oxygen. Lacking such a physiological mechanism, human animals breathe "subtle" air above the horizon where the "change" of sights happens once nonhuman animals surface the water. Similarly, the sight in ocean-depths is an alternative to human perception of space. The thick air, as what substantiates the underwater environment and its living organisms, becomes a boundary between human and nonhuman oceanic existences. By paralleling and connecting the worlds above and below the brine through the shared historical events such as the launching of wars and the forming of societies as well as the differed methods of perceiving the events, Whitman's poem serves as an imaginative geographical locale in which the boundary between thick and subtle air; the sea and the land is constantly changing with the relay of human and nonhuman *sights* between vertical "spheres."

Perhaps Whitman's depiction of an alternative, underwater sea world is an appropriate approach to resolving Dickinson's riddle. The "species" beyond her perception, in this case, is

not death or the deceased but refers to the ubiquitous nonhuman entities that seem "invisible" because of her limited access to them. While Dickinson deems these existences "positive," she struggles, despite her persistent pursuit of knowledge of afterlife, to reconcile with the religious conception of life and death in a world that contains more than human forms, as science has aptly shown. Reading Whitman's semi-scientific ways of observing and recording nonhuman existences in the sea and Dickinson's poetic quest for a world beyond the living human species, one comes to the realization that both poets dwelt, via their vigorous poetic creation, beyond the anthropocentric spatial and temporal measures of 19th-century U.S. Their notion of the world does not correspond to the 19th-century U.S. social, national, and cultural conditions. Furthermore, their respective poetic construction of worlds beyond human geography manifests acts of deterritorialization of the man-made U.S. territory.

The question of Americanness or "American" has been raised previously to resituate so-called "American Literature." In "Deep Time: American Literature and World History," Wai Chee Dimock emphasizes the importance of connecting "American" history to world history, which requires a much longer stretch of time, and proposes a more extended duration for American literary studies via what she calls "deep time":

> [Deep time] produces a map that, thanks to its receding horizons, its backward extension into far-flung temporal and spatial coordinates, must depart significantly from a map predicated on the short life of the US. For the force of historical depth is such as to suggest a world that predates that adjective *American* (759).

Looking back to the time when U.S. did not exist on the map and yet when "the world was already in full existence" (Dimock 760), Dimock suggests that such "cumulative history" of that existence serves as a temporal frame that "takes American literature easily outside the nation's

borders." By viewing world history as a "diachronic axis" (Dimock 760) on which U.S. history appears as part of the ongoing global timeline, Dimock's proposal of deep time denationalizes what we call "U.S. territory" and, further, "U.S. poets" such as Whitman and Dickinson. Indeed, Dimock argues that the "[t]ranscendentalists were internationalists to a fault." With particular focus on Emerson's reading and translation of literatures across religions, nations, languages, Dimock presents Emerson's manners of reading and circulating literary thoughts in a long duration of time across multiple spatial coordinates as an exemplar to show how "American" literature is planetary on intertextual terms. Such attempt to re-scale the relation between American literature and the world is further advanced in *Shades of the Planet: American Literature as World Literature*, co-edited by Dimock and Lawrence Buell. In this compact volume, the contributors, including Dimock, appeal to the study of American literature as a way to revamp the "relatively arbitrary and demonstrably ephemeral borders of the nation" to be more "robustly empirical" (Dimock and Buell, 5). While the volume provides multiple methodologies that follow the travel routes of individual writers, a majority of the essays aim to deepen the idea of the planet in the reading of American literature. While the volume certainly enriches the scope of studying American literature beyond the national borders in global, transnational, and international contexts, a clear definition of "world," as differentiated from "globe," is lacking. A coherent methodology for reading American literature as world literature remains a task yet to be accomplished.

A more recent work by Pheng Cheah, *What is a World?* examines the world as a temporal object, adding to the common approaches to studying the world from a spatio-geographical vantage point. Following Goethe to distinguish the globe from the world, Cheah argues that "the world is…a form of relating, belonging, and being with" while "the globe—the

thing produced by processes of globalization—is a bounded object or entity in Mercatorian space.” Stressing the continual and morphing qualities of the world that is constantly “made and remade” and manifests “an ongoing dynamic process of becoming,” Cheah suggests it is these qualities that we should refer to when rethinking world literature as “something that can play a fundamental role and be a force in the ongoing cartography and creation of the world” (42). Cheah’s method of worlding is essential not only to empowering literature as its own force to make the world rather than serve as byproducts of global trade, political intercourse, or cultural transmission, but also to rethinking the concept of deterritorialization in a fluid sense. Since world literature, according to Cheah, can be a force of cartography of the world, conceiving a project to study world literature demands one to deterritorialize literary criticism from “the map of the globe” (42). Certainly, Dimock’s conception of deep time has made such an attempt to read American literature beyond U.S. territory. Nonetheless, her reading of American literature as part of world history and a manifestation of international, cross-cultural, and cross-lingual circulation and creation adheres to the convenient assumption that the map of the world resembles the map of the globe. Hence, at its best, her denationalization of the U.S. and American literature beyond the national borders resists U.S. parochialism. If the nation “America” is fictional as Dimock claims, how can other continents and religions such as Africa or Islam whose literary and cultural creation influences American literature “non-fictional”? Who is to affirm or invalidate the man-made map?

While Dimock’s method of denationalizing American literature is limiting because it inevitably leans on the map of the globe as a reference for literary circulation, Cheah argues for the pressing distinction between the “world” and the “globe” and considers world-making, instead of global circulation, to be the paramount phenomenon of literary mobility. Cheah’s

method of worlding with the cartographic force of literary creation elicits a worldly[1], rather than global, position of literary deterritorialization. If we study literary locales in a manner that does not correspond to the charted places on the global map, then we may find that the mobilization of literature resulting from the collaborative efforts by the writer and the reader manifests various cartographic acts which constantly make and remake the world maps. Literary creation, then, constructs worlds that undergo perpetual becomings of places and generates multiple worldviews every time the acts of writing and reading occur. If we, adhering to such a method of worlding via literary cartography, read Whitman and Dickinson's poetry as a cartographic force that resituates 19th-century U.S. on the global map, we can readily deterritorialize their work from conventional spatial and temporal frames and consider Whitman and Dickinson as "world poets."

Within the scope of this dissertation, I propose a poetics of worlding, via which Whitman and Dickinson *make* their worlds during the process of poetic composition and therefore should be recognized as world poets. Adding to Cheah's argument that world literature can be viewed as a force in the continuous cartography of the world, I bring in Donna Haraway's conception of "alter-worlding" that relates "becoming with" to becoming "worldly" (3) and sees "species interdependence" (19) as the core of such alternative worlding. This alter-world can be understood as a world that neither reflects the map of the globe nor centralizes human existence. The voiding of the human and nonhuman divide as well as the flattening of human-exclusive ownership of subjectivity are keys to comprehending and navigating the map of poetic worlds. Employing Bruno Latour's notion of "the collective" that signifies "everything but not two separated" and where humans and nonhumans "exchange properties," a mechanism which eradicates "subject-object opposition" (Latour 61), I coin the term "the poetic collective" to

demonstrate how interspecies co-creation in Dickinson's and Whitman's nonhuman- and animal-focused poems embodies a boundary-crossing cartographic method for delineating the alter-world.

The poetic collective, which is conceived in 19th-century U.S. literary creation of which U.S. imperialism remains a major characteristic in critics' eyes, serves as a foundation of alter-worlding literary cartography, whose anti-anthropocentric manners of mapping spaces deterritorialize Whitman's and Dickinson's work so that it is no longer contained within U.S. territory on the map of the globe. The map of a poetic alter-world is drawn via the ongoing construction of the poetic collective formed within and between the poets' nonhuman- and animal- focused poems. To further dismantle the human and nonhuman divide in the poetic collective, I apply Vinciane Despret's concept of the becomings of subjectivity to help show how, in the selected Whitman's and Dickinson's poems focused on the nonhuman, the human and nonhuman actors[2] in the poetic collective perform a relay of subjective force during the exchange of their respectively unique properties. By emphasizing the destabilized, morphing ownership of subjectivity between the human and nonhuman actors in the poems, I present the cartographic function of the poetic collective via paying close attention to the poets' following, inscribing, and re-creating nonhuman spaces on their pages. Through such attentive observation and through exercising an alter-worldly imagination, Whitman and Dickinson map spaces that do not conform to the spatial and temporal coordinates of their physical existence as located on the global map and in human history. Their compositional process embodies a sort of poetic cartography that operates against the human-nonhuman, subject-object divides and suggests poetry's normative force in charting an alter-world.

To further illustrate how such a multispecies poetic collective *maps time*, I evoke Henri Lefebvre's theory of rhythmanalysis to investigate the fragmentation and non-chronology of time in the collective. Resisting the conventional map of the globe and the chronological ordering of time, the collective houses an alter-world (or alter-worlds) constituted by rhythm—"interaction between a place, a time, and an expenditure of energy" (Lefebvre 25). Using Lefebvre's definition of rhythm to demontrate the inseparability of time, space, and acts of composition as a form of energy expenditure, I propose that poetic cartography, if employing a rhythmic approach to mapping, includes human and nonhuman mapmakers to delineate both space and time. Unlike the common global map and historical narratives which respectively describe the globe from fixed spatial and chronological viewpoints, the map of an alter-world is fluid in both spatial and temporal senses. Furthermore, the acts of mapping alter-worlds *are* spatio-temporal—especially when the multispecies actors in the collective continue to build poetic worlds through their mutual exchange of bodily rhythms, a cartographic technique which generates multiple temporal scales free from the anthropocentric chronological events of history.

To succeed in alter-worlding is to inherit history differently. World history (or perhaps more pertinently in this case, global history), while an ongoing process as suggested by Dimock, does not include nonhuman animals whose existence has been ubiquitous with or without their human counterparts since the dawn of time. Haraway argues that when species meet, the contact zones become the venues for all the species to become worldly together. And it is in such multispecies contact zones that the poetic collective occurs and alter-worlds continue to be made and remade. To eventually narrate world history inclusive of both human and nonhuman animals, it is necessary to challenge the international borders demarcated on the global map by showing how an alter-world conceived in the poetic collective can plausibly extend itself beyond

the scope of 19th-century U.S. poetry and disrupt spatial and temporal coordinates of the globe via interspecies spatial transgression. Shu-mei Shih's conception of world history, though monospecies and similarly globe-oriented, enables a crucial move of worlding that dismisses international and intercontinental borders by addressing the interconnectedness of the world via a network of relations. Shih contends, "[t]he relational method of world history…allows for the scaling back and forth between the world and the text as well as along the intermediate scales" (Shih 80). Her proposed network of relations functions similarly to Latour's actor network of associations in that they both seek to dismantle hierarchical stratifications in political and social senses. Certainly, Latour's notion of democracy expands to the nonhuman sphere. The poetic collective that operates via the exchange of properties between human and nonhuman actors manifests a textual network—an alter-world—which is constituted by multifarious worlds, in accordance with Shih's description of the reciprocal scaling between the world and the text as a normative composition of world history.

The plurality of worlds under the umbrella term "alter-world" can be further explicated via Jakob von Uexküll's theory of the *environment*:

> [E]verything a subject perceives belongs to its *perception world* [*Merkwelt*], and everything it produces, to its *effect world* [*Wirkwelt*]]. These two worlds, of perception and production of effects, form one closed unit, the *environment* (42).

Uexküll's statement suggests that what we know to be an immense, global-scaled, and all-encompassing world be constituted by a plurality of perception and effect worlds. Applying this formula to the operation of the poetic collective, I argue that an alter-world formed in the poetic collective composed of nonhuman-focused poems is inclusive of diverse perception and effect worlds that are perceived and produced by the human and nonhuman subjects. The human and

nonhuman actors with subjective force, through the exchange of their respectively unique properties, perceive and produce worlds in a collaborative manner that undermines the human and nonhuman divide. In this regard, a perception world perceived by a human actor can, via the interspecies relay and becoming of subjectivity, belong to a nonhuman actor's sight. Similarly, an effect world produced by a nonhuman actor can be perceived by a human actor who undergoes an exchange of properties with his/her nonhuman counterparts. Such fluid and morphing relations between the multispecies "environments" embody acts of transgression between perception and effect worlds. An alter-world, in comparison with the conventional map of the globe, exhibits locales that are constantly mobilized, deterritorialized, and reterritorialized. In Bertrand Westphal's words, "[t]he in-between is a deterritorialization in action, but one that loiters awaiting the moments of its reterritorialization. It is the equivalent of suspending all determination, all identity"(Westphal 69). The space between the human and nonhuman environments, then, manifests a becoming of geography constituted by constant acts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization as multispecies actors mobilize themselves to and fro between their respective environments via exchanges of properties. The poetic collective, accordingly, functions in a spatially transgressive manner through its particular inclusion of nonhuman- and animal-focused poems. By tracing such an idiosyncratic mode of poetic composition that involves animals and the unknown, nonhuman worlds in 19th-century U.S. poetry, especially Whitman's and Dickinson's work, to uncover an alter-world in which the poets dwelt beyond their contemporary imperialistic worldview, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate how multispecies poetic creation is crucial to the undertaking of Haraway's notion of alter-worlds as well as Cheah's theory of worlding predicated on literature as a normative force of ongoing cartography. While the globe might be a spherical object that can be overlaid by

longitudes and latitudes, the world is still in the making. Critics engaged in unthinking the U.S. and resisting U.S. imperialism in literary studies need to recognize that it is impossible to unthink the nation without deconstructing the global map. Otherwise, such acts of unthinking the nation inevitably result in producing a set of capitalist reconfigurations of the globe, entrenched in a U.S.-centric *worldview*.

Furthering the problematics of unthinking the nation with recourse to globalization, Chapter One examines David Damrosch's conception of world literature founded on the circulation of literature beyond its culture of origin through translation and argues that, with reference to Walter Benjamin's theory of translation, cultural originality is frequently lost in translation. To say that literary circulation mobilizes cultures is to surrender literary creation to transculturation, a phenomenon of capitalist globalization. I proposed that, in order to unthink the U.S. territory without reinventing the capitalist wheel, it is essential that we appeal to the unconfined literary landscape, which, according to Robert Abrams, manifests an "open-ended space" (14) where human poets such as Dickinson and Whitman conduct translation in, what Franco Moretti calls, "evolutionary terms" (90). Following a form from one space to another and attending to its transformation, Dickinson's "I dwell in Possibility" and "Wild nights—Wild nights!" as well as Whitman's "Germs" and "Kosmos" demonstrate an inter-spatial approach to poetic translation. Referring to Robert Tally's theory of the spatial turn and imaginative mapping in literary creation, my first chapter exemplifies how Dickinson and Whitman perform cartographic acts via exploring nonhuman(-centered) space during their poetic composition. Their poetic maps reveal that they wrote beyond their temporal and spatial confinements of 19th-century U.S. and composed their own *worlds* that are constantly (re)made and manifest literary deterritorialization of both physical and human geographical spaces.

Continuing to investigate the world constructed during the process of poetic creation, Chapter Two discusses the cartographic foundation of such an anti-anthropocentric space and proposes a multispecies approach to forming an alter-world. Turning to Charles Darwin's *The Descent of Man* and Giorgio Agamben's *The Open: Man and Animal* to foreground the continuum of human and nonhuman animals, I suggest that Dickinson's poetic composition as a manifestation of interspecies co-creation is an exemplar of a poetic alter-world which embodies Bruno Latour's notion of the collective as her cartographic foundation. In Dickinson's poetic collective, the human and nonhuman "spokesperson[s]"—a term drawn from Latour—take turns to speak/gesticulate in each other's place. Resisting the divides of humans and nonhumans; society and nature, the poetic collective embodies an alter-world in which multispecies spokespersons co-exist, co-create, and co-inherit histories. As the human and nonhuman spokespersons undertake the exchange of properties to make poems and map spaces, they, reciprocally, experience, what Vinciane Despret suggests, "the becomings of subjectivity." The multispecies spokesperson's exchange of their respectively unique and subjective properties presents a cartographic method operating in the poetic collective. Using Dickinson's "The Bee is not afraid of me," "I heard a Fly buzz—when I died—," and "I started Early—Took my Dog," my second chapter discusses interspecies mechanisms in the poetic collective. Reading the poems as locales in the alter-world in which human and nonhuman actors/spokespersons exchange properties, undertake the relay of subjectivity, and experience the becomings of subjectivity constituted by multiple gazes, this chapter proposes a model of an alter-world constructed in the poetic collective that defies binarism and delineates uncharted spaces, with respect to the map of the globe, across species lines and anthropocentric geographical boundaries.

Chapter Three presents another cartographic method in the poetic collective by examining Whitman's "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking" through Henri Lefebvre's theory of rhythmanalysis. Focusing on the sea locale at which nonhuman actors compose a map with manifold rhythms in the poem, this chapter demonstrates how interspecies border-crossing and collaborative alter-worlding, as embodied by the human poet and the male mockingbird's acts of co-creating the oceanic verse, disrupt the rhythm of time. While Lefebvre considers rhythm to be a contact zone of place, time, and an expenditure of energy, I suggest that "Out of the Cradle" stages an elegiac collective where human and bird actors exchange their properties via pulsating rhythms from the ocean waves. The constantly morphing, unpredictable rhythm of the sea serves as a cartographic mechanism that forms Whitman's poetic collective via multispecies composition of space against chronological time. In this oceanic alter-world, time is fragmented, juxtaposing the adult male actor's disorganized memories about the sea, as well as non-chronological, regarding the complex structure of the multitemporal rhythms of the adult male's memory, the boy's translation, and the male mockingbird's opera-like song. Closely investigating the function of rhythm in the oceanic alter-world, my third chapter demonstrates detailed and extensive discussion of Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis and its application to devising a cartographic approach to constructing an anti-anthropocentric alter-world of non-linear, multiple temporalities.

The last chapter returns to the significance of worlding via literary creation and showcases how the multispecies poetic collective germinated via Dickinson's compositional techniques of worlding can be extended to the Sinophone region. Revamping the relation between 19th-century U.S. and 20th-century Taiwan as two distinct temporal and spatial indicators on the map of the globe, I employ Bertrand Westphal's conception of transgression

and transgressivity as a cartographic method to show the interconnectedness of 19th-century U.S. and 20th-century Taiwan in an alter-world established by transgressive poetic writing and reading. Referring to Jakob von Uexküll's notion of the environment as a composite of perception and effect worlds with varied visual spaces between different species, I use bird poems respectively created in 19th-century U.S. and 20th-cenutry Taiwan on the global map in human history—Dickinson's "The Robin is a Gabriel" and Kwang-chung Yu's "There was a Dead Bird"— to show, via Shih's relational method of worlding, when the poets observe and undergo the becoming of subjectivity of the birds, their bird poems constitute a network of transgressive gazes that perceive *beyond* their physical existences recorded across the globe and in chronological time. My final chapter, as the theoretical culmination of the quests for an ongoing cartographic process inclusive of nonhuman species in the worlding game in the previous chapters, provides a model of how writers and readers of nonhuman-focused poetries mobilize themselves around the globe without being defined or boxed by their literary itinerary.

In an age when globalization is at its peak, it should be crucial, or perhaps freeing, for literary studies *not* to serve as merely byproducts of international trade, political discourse, and transcultural exchange and negotiation. Literature can, and should, be so much more. The original intent of this dissertation derives from my critical frustration with the convenient and yet arbitrary adherence to the U.S. historical narrative when conducting criticism of 19th-century U.S. literature, a phenomenon which leads to Dimock's efforts to (re)define "America" or "American." When reading literature in a manner that strictly and straightforwardly corresponds to its specific sociocultural and economic power relations in 19th-century U.S. including patriarchy, white supremacy, and imperialism, the normative power of literary creation and the unique perspectives of each literary author remain inevitably neglected. I wish to propose that

while we should not disregard such historical agency and power that influence literary production, we should also attend to how poets model for us an escape from understanding literature as inextricably embedded in—and making meaning only in relation to—its immediate material, social, and economic context.

With an aim to prioritize the autonomous and meaning-making characteristics of literary work and pronounce its normative force of world-building, the questions this dissertation seeks to address are: What constitutes the U.S. and what is American literature? What happens when we read national literature without resorting to the nation's historical, political, and social accounts? Since we normally understand the world as composed of multiple nations, what is the relation between a nation and the world? Do we really know what the world entails? How is it different from the globe? Pursing questions along these lines, I have come to realize that "this world is not conclusion," as Dickinson announced two centuries ago, and that to truly unthink the U.S. requires one to, first, investigate the notion of the world. Appealing to Dickinson's and Whitman's work that shows ample uncertainty about *their worlds* in an era where U.S. territorial expansion could not have been more globe-defining, the dissertation aims at deterritorializing the *unfitting* poets from U.S. territory and human history and argues for an alter-world charted by multispecies transgressive cartographers. In this alter-world where continuous acts of writing and reading with and about the nonhuman animals occur, the interspecies co-existence and co-creation remain a crucial *key* for us to re-mapping the world and re-inheriting histories toward a more modest, mind-opening trajectory. In this alter-world, both the 19th-century U.S. poets—Dickinson and Whitman—and the 20th-century Taiwanese poet—Yu—are "world poets," who map their particular and yet connected poetic worlds against conventional spatial and temporal coordinates of the globe.

Notes

[1] Here I define "worldly" as "of the world," as opposed to "of the globe," corresponding to Cheah's distinction between "world" and "globe."

[2] "Actor," a term derived from Latour's Actor-network theory, refers to the participants that exchange properties to compose together the raw materials in the collective.

CHAPTER ONE

Translating as World Mapping: When Dickinson and Whitman Composed Space

Periodization in the studies of American[1] literature, while offering a systematic roadmap for readers to (re)imagine modes of living and writing adhered to different periods of time, is predicated on the belief in the linearity of time and the discontinuity of space outside the U.S. The study of 19th-century literature sees its own entrenchment from historical, cultural, and political aspects, especially with regard to contemporary deconstructionist thought, which aims to "unthink" the nation and to unravel the U.S. imperialistic structures fundamental to the 19th-century worldviews. To rethink, or even unthink, what was a common thought in the past, Americanists embark on the act of conceptualizing space in the 19th-century. Since periodization is still prevalent and remains a standardized approach to categorizing literary studies in the U.S., re-spatialization, relatively, seems more readily applicable concerning the ongoing activities of globalization in all aspects. This chapter seeks to redefine the spatial conception of the work of Emily Dickinson and Walt Whitman against the U.S. hegemonic imposition on literary imagination and to prove that both poets formed alternative worldviews uncircumscribed by 19th-century U.S. territory and produced *worldly literature* in their readily mobilized poetic space beyond human and physical geographies.

World literature, as a field of study, is commonly viewed as a product of globalization. While the study of world literature challenges the European and North American focuses on canons to allow emerging global perspectives, David Damrosch takes on the challenge to think globally by arguing that "world literature…encompass[es] all literary works that circulate beyond their culture of origin" (Damrosch 4) via translation. His argument, while demonstrating a significant step for U.S. readers to think outside their national territory, remains idealistic and

overly simplified for two reasons. First, by stating that literary works circulate "beyond their culture," Damrosch asserts that literary works are composed in some sort of amorphously unified cultures in different places in the world. The sense of certainty in Damrosch's use of "culture" is therefore an abstract term that attempts to define something undefinable. What if an author's sense of culture conflicts with his/her contemporary identification of cultural realities? What if an author's sense of place resides in his/her imaginative literary space, unrecognized in his/her national territory? What kind of world literature can this author possibly produce, if he or she does not conceive of the world based on the man-made global map or national borders, which are the instruments utilized by Damrosch to systemize literary works in the world? Second, if literary works are circulated through translation beyond their culture of origin, the issue of "origin" or originality rises because of the inherent untranslatability between languages. Even if the language of an original literary work does represent the culture where it is produced, is another language into which the original work is translated able to sustain the cultural representation in translation? In other words, cultural specificity is frequently lost in translation, an innocent betrayal of the learned translators who seek to express, in the words of Walter Benjamin, "the most intimate relationships among languages" (Benjamin 77). The betrayal of untranslatability is innocent because of Damrosch's uncritical presumption that culture is locally dependent, original, and translatable. Considering Benjamin's view on translation as an expression of the intimate trans-lingual relationships, cultural originality and translatability depend on the effectivity of the expression, which is "the mode of meaning" (Benjamin 78) as a manner to indicate what is meant. Since expressions of each language differ socially and culturally, the expression of translation which attempts to mitigate and represent the inter-lingual relationships between the original and translated works inevitably remains unstable. Therefore, it

is crucial to address the uncertainty in Damrosch's belief that, by circulating literary works, translators are mobilizing the original works of culture. What *is* certain is that cultural activities and identities are mobilized via the constant acts of localization and globalization. In fact, without the initial act of a locale receiving a literary work or a language foreign to that locale, which is a process of localizing the non-native, globalization could not have occurred *to* non-Western places. In other words, the acts of localization and globalization are symbiotic, and no specific order of their occurrences can be determined. Because English has been the dominant language in the world since the last century, Damrosch's proposal to invite global perspectives to literary studies in the U.S. through the study of world literature can be understood as the U.S. academia's belated *localization* of the non-European and non-U.S. languages and literatures. Therefore, his pursuit of global viewpoints is inherently a request for European and U.S. readers to examine the issues of receiving and localizing languages and literatures foreign to them. What Damrosch means by "world," accordingly, is a non-European/U.S. space, a geographical fragment resulting from his inadvertent re-spatialization of the "world" as he knows it.

Upon addressing the problematic of inter-lingual translatability and the fragments in cultural translation reflected in Damrosch's conception of world literature, I wish to recontextualize the ongoing discussion of untranslatability between the global and local languages by exploring the acts of re-configuring the world in selected poems by Dickinson and Whitman. I intend to argue that both poets construct an alternative method of mapping *their* world beyond physical geography. In addition, by de-spatializing and re-spatializing 19th-century U.S. through poetry writing, their works already deconstructed the rigid notion of the nation in the 19th century and defied the assumed distinction of the global and local. I also wish to emphasize that previous scholarship on the question of untranslatability in the study of world

literature unanimously focused on the inter-lingual translations between different human language users in a world construed in Damrosch's *fashion*. By exploring the alternative worlds projected in Dickinson's and Whitman's poems which contain spaces beyond the U.S. and the inter-human territories, I will argue for a new approach to studying world literature through rethinking human geography in 19th-century U.S.

Rethinking the U.S. territory has been one of the major critical concerns in American studies since the first decade of this century. Studies on deterritorializing 19th-century U.S. literature have shown that 19th-century authors exhibit the tendency to be *free* from national borders in their works. In *Geography and The Production of Space in Nineteenth-Century American Literature*, Hsuan Hsu emphasizes how activities such as globalism, technological advancement, and commercialism, which took place during the period, helped to generate an international point of view or a compositional style that allowed writers to jump from "the national to the planetary scale" (Hsu 135), a statement which sustains, based on a historical approach to reading literature. However, Hsu's reading of 19th-century U.S. literature, which traces the cultural activities of that time, is problematic, not only because it is constrained temporally, but also because it diminishes the organic interdependency and reciprocity between literature and culture and sees literature solely as a product of cultural activities, but not the other way around. It seems that, by paralleling 19th-century globalism and transnational forces with the scale of literary creation, Hsu, perhaps inadvertently, suggests a new approach to *territorializing* 19th-century American literature, while destabilizing the conventional views of mono-nationalism, parochialism, exceptionalism, and place. His new method of territorialization through literature is strictly based on historical facts and theories of cultural geography, which paves the way for him to reread literature, for example, Whitman's prose and poetry, in a new

geography added to the already "well-appointed body"[2] of 19th-century U.S. Instead of mobilizing the literature of that period, or Whitman per se, Hsu's book, ironically, adds to the 19th-century U.S. territorial and commercial expansion a new transnational and global territory.

Instead of examining how 19th-century writers respond to the global geography in their literary works, as points of reference for their globalizing intent, which, especially in Whitman's case, is manifested as a "rhetoric of global unity"(Hsu 144), Robert Abrams resorts to the critical negligence of local and individual landscapes, which amounts to "negative geography or space"(Abrams 2). Uncovering such negative space in 19th-century U.S. writing, Abrams aims to dehistoricize literature created during the time from the European tradition and context by investigating the unmapped landscape in the literary narratives of selected authors. His approach suggests a significant step toward rendering a sense of autonomy to literature and literary criticism. According to Abrams, 19th-century U.S. authors' literary imagination serves as their rebellion against the politically and culturally imposed sense of space. Abrams' approach to studying literary landscapes of this period generates an opportunity to redefine the relationship between literature and culture, national territories and literary space, and writers and readers. While Abrams stresses that the existence of such "open-ended space" destabilizes "the concept of human community" (Abrams 14), I suggest that, through reading Dickinson's and Whitman's poems, one can discover that such human-exclusive insecurity can be mediated by exploring the conventionally non-human space and that a human community *is* inherently unstable, both locally and globally, throughout histories.

A more immediate question is: why do humans think we are exclusive? Either with the notion of a uniquely American manifest destiny or that of humans' sole possession of intelligence, humans create and use languages to make sense of and even dominate the existing

ridges and valleys on the surface of the earth, in our own exclusive manner. This exclusivity is, in fact, a common approach for all species of animals, plants, and substances in nature, which, respectively, have their *exclusive* methods of survival. For instance, every spring, robins relocate to the lawn around the student housing area on the campus of the University of Washington to forage from the man-made patches of grass. While their chirping during the forage in the breeding season might not sound intelligible to human ears, their behavior manifests an exclusive sort of ornithic intelligence to make sense/use of, and further, dominate human landscapes for survival. The student housing area, as an "open" human-centered space, is susceptible to non-human invasion and exploitation. However, it is almost unheard of that a student complains about his/her living space being destabilized or negated due to the robins' annual *territorialization* of the lawn in spring. The negligence of animal occupation in a human-centered space is a common and yet curious condition. Is it because we are too human-focused to recognize that we are constantly sharing all sorts of space with non-human beings, other than those we consider parasites? Can it be that the non-human spaces are *excluded* from the study of human geography, which deals with the interactions between human beings and their environments in particular places, because they do not share our *lingua franca*? What I wish to gain from this example is that the human condition is never exclusively human, when we examine the condition through the concepts of space and place. Since space and place are constantly changing factors, according to human and nonhuman formations in each given locale, a human community, which, I argue, is never solely human, fluctuates with the human and nonhuman participants' modes of living in various types of space in the community, whether it be national, cultural, historical, or literary. Along these lines of thought, I will further pursue that the human insecurity resulting from the negative sense of placeness, with regard to Abram's

inquiry into the literary imagination of "human beings deprived of firm, reassuring placement within historical contexts" (Abrams 15), can be dismissed, or at least alleviated, by opening up definitions of community to the nonhumans with whom humans share a world.

This alternative concept of a more *inclusive* human-nonhuman community, as a result of Dickinson's and Whitman's acts of *translation* to deterritorialize the anthropocentric world, can serve as a model of studying world literature via a literary system predicated on shared human-nonhuman spaces and places. Before I proceed to discuss the poems, I wish to stress that, in this literary system, the challenge of (un)translatability is no longer inter-lingual. I will demonstrate a poetics of mapping which renders flexibility and fluidity in scale between the local and the global. The notion of (un)translatability encountered in the poetics of mapping is addressed in what Franco Moretti calls, "evolutionary terms," through "the multiplicity of spaces" manifest in the poets' acts of "follow[ing] [a form] from space to space, and study[ing] the reason for its transformations" (90). While Emily Apter devotes the majority of her critique on world literature to translatability in what Moretti defines as "market terms," which concern the mapping of "a genre's circulation, influence, imitation, marketability, election to the canon, congeniality to cultural comparatism and appropriation" (Apter 50), I argue that investigating translatability in evolutionary terms is more productive, due to the recourse to the volatile and transformative applications of space in literary analysis. Especially in the cases of poets who constantly utilize spatial observation and imagination in the intermediate space between human and nonhuman spheres, such as Dickinson and Whitman, the notion of translatability in their poetry is closely related to "the multiplicity of spaces" manifested in various scales of foci "from space to space." Their acts of poetry writing are motivated by a manner of following a spatial form, either tangible or imaginary. This sort of following, embodied by their poetic lines, constitutes the

poets' translation of the world around them against individualistic centrism. Their translation of the world form does not exclude or neglect nonhuman spatial formations and does not correspond to the global map and national borders. Therefore, in the context of reading 19th-century U.S. poetry using Dickinson and Whitman as case studies, I will prove that translatability, if viewed in light of Moretti's "evolutionary" approach, is sustainable if we examine translatability of literature from an inter-spatial, instead of inter-lingual, angle.

To demonstrate the employment of an inter-spatial approach to poetic translation, I will discuss Dickinson's "I dwell in Possibility" and "Wild nights – Wild nights!" and Whitman's "Germs" and "Kosmos," which help to investigate the concept of spatial translation *within* a language. I will refer to Robert T. Tally's *Spatiality*, which is a significant work introducing the interaction between spatial and literary studies, as a theoretical framework for my poetic analysis. Viewing the act of writing as "a form of spatialization" (Tally 5), Tally defines literary cartography as "a form of mapping," which manifests itself in narrative (but not limited to narrative works) by an "imaginative writer" who "functions as a kind of mapmaker" (Tally 8). In other words, writing about space is mapping in/with literature. To further illustrate the nature of a literary mapmaker's endeavor, Tally describes the act of writing about space:

> Like the mapmaker, the writer must survey territory, determining which features of a given landscape to include, to emphasize, or to diminish; for example, some shadings may need to be darker than others, some lines bolder, and so on. The writer must establish the scale and the shape, no less of the narrative than of the places in it. The literary cartographer, even one who operates in such non-realistic modes as myth or fantasy, must determine the degree to which a given representation of a place refers to any 'real' place in the geographical world (45).

For literary cartographers, the essential and yet most challenging task lies in their literary representation of or reference to "real" places in global geographies. While Tally does not state in detail what a "real" place entails, it may be interpreted as an indication of the tangible and material locales, of course, in an ambiguous manner. The notion of "real" is ambiguous in literary studies because literary criticism is based on a human-centered ontology, with which critics measure the validity of literary works based on the normative conception of the world. Therefore, the geographical world divided by coordinates and national boundaries remains the most convenient method for critics to address the acts of mapping and spatialization in literature. Yet, this sort of normative approach disregards unconventional writers, especially poets whose poetic compositions defy their contemporary norm, in this case, Dickinson and Whitman, both of whom demonstrate innovative and idiosyncratic manners of conceiving of the world via poetic spatialization, rather than physical geographical formations.

It is important to widen the scope of thinking about mapping in literature, because previous criticism has conveniently negated alternative possibilities of mapping the world beyond the man-made coordinates. In "I dwell in Possibility," Dickinson as a cartographer, according to Tally, "survey[s] territory, determin[es] which features of a given landscape to include, to emphasize, or to diminish," through the act of "following," with regard to Moretti's theory of translatability, "from space to space" in constantly changing scales. Since Dickinson's attention to and *translation* of the spatial scales do not correspond to the man-made global map, her effort to map the world via poetic composition is neglected by scholars researching maps in literature, such as Adele J. Haft, who argues that "[n]either Emily Dickinson nor Walt Whitman, the two prodigious and canonical American poets prior to the twentieth century, had much to say about maps" (Haft 2). It is apparent that research conducted on the subject of mapping in

literature conforms to the existing map of the globe and that cartography is frequently associated with the tangible and materialistic aspects of the world. That is why, when Haft researched literary works addressing the concept or the act of mapping, she did not acknowledge the imaginative *property* of literature, which constitutes an alternative spatial arrangement in delineating 19th-century U.S. and is not merely a representation of a "real" place as recorded in the field of human geography. Geographer Mark Monmonier's *How to Lie with Maps* remains an essential work to address how what we think of as *real* maps often distort and manipulate reality and what we consider to be scientifically and realistically mapped can easily be models of cartographic illusions. Monmonier's skeptical critique implicitly welcomes an *openly* imaginary approach to mapmaking in literature. While Dickinson and Whitman may not use the term "map" in their poetry, they have indeed made multiple attempts to re-map 19th-century U.S. through their imaginative poetic spatialization.

Dickinson's poetic "Possibility" manifests her cartographic intent to map the spaces between the physical structures and the human body:

I dwell in Possibility –
A fairer House than Prose –
More numerous of Windows –
Superior – for Doors –

Of Chambers as the Cedars –
Impregnable of eye –
And for an everlasting Roof
The Gambrels of the Sky –

Of Visitors – the fairest –

For Occupation – This –

The spreading wide my narrow Hands

To gather Paradise –

Starting from the first line of the poem, it is clear that Dickinson's idea of her Amherst homestead, a historical and tangible site which physically circumscribes the poet's dwelling in 19th-century America, is rather different from the critically acclaimed notion of her reclusive home. While the terms "reclusive" and "hermitic" are used to describe Dickinson, due to her limited and passive social interaction with other humans in the later part of her life, they, in effect, localize the poet within 19th-century U.S. social and cultural conventions. To recognize Dickinson as a hermit is to succumb to a temporal, tangible, and local sense of socialization. Conveniently and yet uncritically, we *know* Dickinson from a narrow set of criteria: the 19th-century period, the Amherst house, and the U.S. nation. Based on these criteria, a 19th-century individual who interacted with humans on a regular basis and traveled at least across the country, if not abroad, would be considered a non-hermitic, mobile, and social person, and that is indeed why Whitman is constantly considered an extreme opposite of Dickinson as a 19th-century U.S. poet, due to what *was locally seen, heard,* and *recorded* about him in his personal life. However, what if we as readers no longer confine our understanding of socialization to such a limiting definition? What if we attempt to *truly* live up to the expectation of thinking globally in this globalized era? A further analysis of the poem reveals that Dickinson, contrary to her reputation of reclusiveness, was more of a *world* thinker than most of her contemporaries and even us as her 21st-century readers.

The speaker of the poem dwells in “Possibility,” which is a more pleasant “House” than “Prose.” Here, Dickinson enters the constant debate over the superiority of poetry to prose and defends her desirable position as a poet who is surrounded with spatial possibilities. It should be noted that Dickinson’s use of “House” “is altered, transformed from an objectively certain structure to a poetic and futural ‘possibility,’ something neither certain or present at all” (Boscaljon 49). According to Daniel Boscaljon, the “House” represents a poetic space independent from Dickinson’s objective and physical surroundings and built upon the future. The countless “Windows,” which serve as Dickinson’s poetic “eye” and “vision,”and the “Doors” of each room in this house manifest her cedar-like “stout hearts” and “steadfast spirits” (*Emily Dickinson Lexicon*). At this point, the poet has drafted an intangible and imaginative blueprint for a poetico-corporeal landscape with the house, windows, and doors mirroring the human body, visionary eyes, and the sturdy heart of the poet. Dickinson as a cartographer maps her Amherst home via her conception of the body and the metaphysical realm the body encompasses and extends to. For Dickinson, the metaphysical functions of the physical units of the house are as real as the poetic possibilities, in which she “dwells.” I hope to stress that, by juxtaposing the human body, the body of the poem, and the idea of a physical house, Dickinson demonstrates what Boscaljon calls “homecomings,” when “humans are gathered into spaces that they have worked to appropriate to themselves” (Boscaljon 50). Instead of being a hermit, Dickinson’s dwelling is outside and beyond physical constraints and is circumscribed by “possibility.” The poetic space in this poem displays the expansion of the poetico-corporeal map as the poet continues to “appropriate” the space above the house.

Since the poetic eye and spirit of the poet are invincible, “an everlasting Roof” is necessary to contain such mighty and productive bodies of possibility on this poetico-corporeal

landscape. Therefore, Dickinson suggests that this eternal roof be "the Gambrels of the Sky," which can be understood as the "bodily appendage[s]" of the "divine dwelling place" or "home on high" (*Emily Dickinson Lexicon*). In the last two lines of the second stanza, the corporeality of the human body is extended to become part of the heavenly body, an additional element of the juxtaposed bodies in the poem. By expanding the vertical aspect of space in this poetic landscape, Dickinson's notion of the transcendental human body corresponds to her trans-spatial conception of poetic dwelling and writing as fluid and boundary-crossing beyond the tangible. With reference to *Emily Dickinson Lexicon*, the sky resembles a heavenly home, which manifests Dickinson's poetic dwelling beyond physical geography. According to Sally Bayley, rather than the Amherst house or 19th-century U.S., Dickinson expresses her intention to live in "possibility," "which signifies the imaginative freedom to dwell both in and out of time and space; both indoors and out" (Bayley 4). Dickinson's imaginative freedom, which contributes to the rich suggestiveness of American space, lends itself to an open space of "free association" (Bayley 4), an exhibition of Dickinson's creative actions. While conceptually innovative, Bayley's critique on American space frees Dickinson from her physical house in Amherst but settles with the limitation of Dickinson's mobility temporally and spatially within the U.S. territory.

I will emphasize that Dickinson's imaginative mind is beyond the scope of the U.S. nation. Instead of localizing Dickinson's mobility manifested in her imaginative freedom in the poetic space, I wish to argue that the free and suggestive space in Dickinson's poetic imagination is predicated upon the analogy between the human body, the physical landscape, and the body of the poem—a cartographical device employed by Dickinson to *draw* herself and her readers *into* the poetic map. As this poem is circulated, the act of mapmaking continues to take place. Since

Dickinson situates herself in this "Possibility" of poetry, which invites readers as "the fairest" "Visitors," her poetic cartography constantly expands through the "wide" "spreading" of her "narrow Hands," a bodily movement which starts with Dickinson's physical hands facilitating her poetry writing, and extends to encompass readers of her poetry in an imaginative, anticipatory, and futuristic manner. Here, Dickinson's conception of space, generated by her act of writing, de-temporalizes herself beyond the 19th century due to her vague and therefore inclusive anticipation of the patrons of her poetry. What is envisioned in her poetic map is a particular pattern of spatial-transitions: from the tangible to the metaphysical, the corporeal to the imaginative, and the writer to the reader. The cartographic process of the poem begins with indicating the dwelling of the cartographer/the poet, in the innumerable possibilities of poetry writing, followed by visualizing the manner of dwelling in the physical context of the surroundings within/outside the house and embodying the manner of dwelling through the corporeal body of the writing poet/mapmaking cartographer. Regarding Tally's statement that "the writer must survey territory, determining which features of a given landscape to include, to emphasize," Dickinson demonstrates an inter-dimensional examination of the corporeal human body, the physical surroundings of the house, and the imaginative space conceived in the body of the poem, with a concluding emphasis on her particular manner of dwelling in possibility through her hands, which gather "Paradise," a metaphor for "poetry" and "lyrical verses." The poetic map generated by the poem encompasses three dimensions of landscapes: the corporeal human body, the house and its surroundings, and the literal body of the poem. The cartographical activities perceived in this poem do not conform to the conception of physical geography in 19th-century U.S., especially regarding the critical notion of geographical confinements Dickinson has encountered. Instead of succumbing to her contemporary social and territorial measures,

Dickinson, through writing this poem, composes an alternative map which manifests her peculiar dwelling in the world as *her translation* of, according to Moretti, “the multiplicity of spaces.” Her act of “following” the landscape “transformations” from the spatial dimension of the human body, to that of the house and of the poetic lines, demonstrates an activity of inter-spatial translation. Because the poem is composed in an inter-spatial manner, Dickinson’s process of writing amounts to Moretti’s notion of translatability in “evolutionary terms.” By translating/following various forms of spatial construction in three dimensions in this poem, Dickinson, as the writer and mapmaker, creates an interactive and ever-changing map which guides her readers through the three spatial dimensions via the poetic progression and invites them to join in the wide space generated between her writing hands in an “evolutionary” fashion. Yet, Dickinson’s inter-spatial translation does not just end with the last line of the poem. As the reader engages themselves in Dickinson’s following of spatial forms of the writing human body, the house, and the poetic lines, a fourth spatial dimension of the poetic map is established, between the literal body of the poem and the corporeal body of the reader. Subsequently, an alternative set of spatial dimensions takes place in the reader’s imaginative space, resulting from their experience of the spatial dimensions conceived in Dickinson’s imaginative poetic map.

The inter-spatial method of translation is also employed in Whitman’s “Germs,” which explores the inter-spatial relationship between the human body, the universe, and the act of poetry writing, through the constant shifts in spatial scales in his poetic landscape. Providing a map which guides us to the genesis of everything—“the germs,” the speaker begins the poem by directing the reader’s attention to the smaller scales of spatial elements constituting and residing in the human body: “FORMS, qualities, lives, humanity, language, thoughts” (Whitman 409). Starting from the shape and arrangement constituting the appearance of the corporeal human

body, the speaker pursues further inward and surveys the attributes and vigor generated by the body. Switching from considering the human body individually, the speaker enlarges the spatial scale of what the body encompasses by regarding the body in a collective sense: "humanity"—the condition of being human, "language"—the method of human communication, and "thoughts"—ideas occurring in the human mind. The three elements manifest the non-tangible products resulting from the collective efforts made by multiple corporeal bodies. With regard to the order of the elements which appear in the first line of the poem, the speaker seems to suggest that the corporeal human body is the beginning of all, and without this tangible existence, the collective and more abstract aspects about humans would not be developed. Examining the factors about the human body in a corporeal and metaphysical manner, the spatial scale employed in the first line shifts from a small and individual locale of the corporeal body to a larger and impalpable locale constituted by the metaphysical joining of all the individual bodies.

The capacity of the human body to manifest and encompass space, as demonstrated in the poem, corresponds to "Descartes' notion of Euclidean space in which space cannot be separated from the bodies *in* space" and his belief that "all bodies have a fundamental characteristic" of "spatial extension," with reference to Tally's comment on Descartes' theory applicable to spatial studies. Tally reasserts that, according to Descartes, "what we think of *as* space is really just this extension of bodies" (Tally 27). Descartes' concept of bodies and space aligns itself with Whitman's idea of germs as what constitute the body, which further contains and extends to various spatial scales between humans, nature, and the universe. Upon investigating the smaller scale of the "known" and "unknown" phenomena of and about the human body, the speaker extends the discussion of the human phenomena to a larger scale of "the stars." Analogous to the observation of the forms of the human body, the speaker's spatial imagination of the stars begins

with their shape/shapelessness. The shift in the speaker's attention from the contour of the human bodies to that of the nonhuman heavenly bodies manifests Descartes' notion that space is continuous. Therefore, the human and heavenly bodies, as "the bodies *in* space," are connected because they are fundamentally extensions of space to each other. Yet, the interspatial relationship explored by the speaker does not stop here. The speaker continues to parallel the stars with the natural and artificial components of a country, which are of a smaller spatial scale than the celestial realm: "Wonders as of those countries—the soil, trees, cities, inhabitants, whatever they may be." While "soil" serves as a communal locale on which "trees" are rooted in nature, "cities" are sites inhabited by people in a collective manner. The analogies between the stars situated in the universe, trees grown on the soil, and people residing in cities demonstrate the speaker's intention to address the similarities between the notion of dwelling of the corporeal human body, the vegetation, and the planets in various locales. In each of the locales, the body of the dweller is an extension of the dwelled space. The dwelled space, which is continuous, connects the locales altogether to the poetic landscape constructed within the lines in the poem.

It should be noted that until this point, the poetic lines are composed via a catalogue of nouns—"the soil, trees, cities, inhabitants," which individually signify the dwelling bodies at each given locale. Immediately after focusing on the life forms in nature and cities, the speaker enlarges the scale again to the planetary sphere where the "suns," "moons," and the "rings," as celestial bodies, dwell outside the earthly landscape and yet are connected, as an extension, to the planet earth. In addition to the constant shifts between spatial scales in his poetic cartographical process, Whitman's particular manner of "following" forms from one space to another, with regard to Moretti's evolutionary terms of translation, lies in his cataloguing style. Through the juxtapositions of nouns in the catalogue of the poem, the poet demonstrates an evolution of

spatial perception starting from the corporeal body and the translations of the space of corporeality into that of the heavenly bodies in the planetary spheres and of the bodies of vegetation on earth. All the bodies, joined via the mutual extension of space each of them generates, become each other's spatial manifestation and transformation in this poetic catalogue of spatial translation. Furthermore, during the culmination of the poem, the largest spatial scale—the celestial realm—is translated, in a manner of spatial juxtaposition, into "a handful space" between the speaker's extended arm and half-closed hand. The abundant fluidity of spatial formation and transformation between locales in the poem is a manifestation of Whitman's cartographical act of *following* and *translating* the various scales of spaces. Echoing his distinguished yawp "I am large, I contain multitudes" in "Song of Myself," the small-scaled handful of space germinated between a hand and an arm of the human body, "contains the start of each and all" and constitutes "germs of all." Viewing the human body from a microbiological level, Whitman's conception of an individual defies the common notion of a single human body as an individual. Instead, his interpretation of individualism pertains to a smaller scale of microorganisms which constitute human bodies. Resisting the limiting concept of what the space of a body *contains*, Whitman is more interested in exploring how space "informs objects" (Tally 38), materializing our perception of the world through what is *not* contained finitely. In the case of this poem, the germs, as the smallest scale of the spatial formation examined, instead of being contained within the space of the corporeal body, provide essential principles to the spatial formation occurring to the locales of the body, the earthly landscape, and the universe. The self-regenerating and organic germs initiate the process of spatial formation within the human body, which later extends itself to the landscape of vegetation and civilization and the heavenly bodies of the stars, the suns, the moons and the planets. The quality of space to "inform" and generate is

manifested in Whitman's attentive following of the forms from one space to another, all of which are connected and mutually extensive. It is with this particular sort of following in poetry writing that Whitman the cartographer maps his poetic landscape beyond 19th-century U.S., starting with his conception of the handful space, which can be *translated*, from a reader's point of view, as an alternative *form* of Dickinson's wide-spreading "narrow Hands."

Through examining Dickinson's dwelling manifest in the inter-spatial construction of her poetic world beyond her Amherst homestead and Whitman's conception of the body's infinite extension to various spatial formations, I have demonstrated how these two poets' particular writing process exhibits an act of deterritorializing 19th-century U.S., both spatially and temporally. The U.S. territorialization, while conveniently considered a spatial phenomenon, is also temporal because the combination of time and space—19th-century and the U.S.—establishes women's role in society, by which Dickinson was and is evaluated then and now, and further entrenches Dickinson criticism in the singular mission of getting Dickinson *out of doors*, as an anachronistic endeavor to celebrate her belated female emancipation. I wish to emphasize that the poet had long anticipated the "Possibility" of her poetic dwelling *outside* her house and beyond her contemporary social and cultural confinements, with the "Gambrels of the Sky" as the "everlasting roof." Upon close examination of the poem, I cannot help but ponder over the hastily assumed legitimacy and credibility of the contemporary critics who argue for the constant repression Dickinson suffered as a female. How do we *know* that she had not already drawn her path out of the societal oppression through her cartographical activities? How do we *know* that Dickinson had not, in fact, found peace with her alternative and unconventional dwelling in her poetic landscape, which resists a human-centered, religion-guiding, and male-dominant world view? In a similar fashion, the critical conversation centered on whether Whitman was a sexist or

a racist does not seem to concern itself with the poet's conception of humanity and individualism from a germinal and atomic level. How can we assume Whitman's perception of his society to be identical with the common values of his Caucasian male contemporaries? How do we *know* that he had not conceived of all of humanity in a de-spatialized and de-temporalized manner beyond our 21st-century comprehension through his poetic translations of the world? By thinking of humanity and the universe from a germinal level, hasn't Whitman already, inevitably, reformed the world and rebelled against his contemporary concept of it via his act of poetic cartography, which is *informed* by his translations of various spatial dimensions?

By reading Dickinson's "I dwell in Possibility" and Whitman's "Germs" with the approaches of Tally's theory of literary cartography and Moretti's concept on translatability in evolutionary terms, I have shown that both poets have indeed dwelt outside and beyond their geographical confinements in the 19th century through their alternative spatial and temporal conceptions of the world mapped with their poetic pens. To further trace Dickinson's alternative dwelling as a phenomenon of her poetic cartography, I will investigate the poem "Wild nights—Wild nights!", which addresses the notion of a displaced speaker navigating herself/himself away from the human geographies toward the uncharted, nonhuman sea:

Wild nights—Wild nights!
Were I with thee
Wild nights should be
Our luxury!

Futile—the winds—
To a Heart in port—

Done with the Compass—

Done with the Chart!

Rowing in Eden—

Ah—the Sea!

Might I but moor—tonight—

In thee!

Before diving into a close reading of the poetic landscape, I will explore the notion of displacement, which is essential to the cartographic technique employed in this poem. In the chapter titled "The Spatial Turn," Tally states that "the displaced person is understandably more attuned to matters of place" (Tally 13), a thought which is inspired by what J.R.R. Tolkien wrote in a letter to his son, who was then serving in the Royal Air Force overseas during the Second World War, "I imagine that a fish out of water is the only fish that has an inkling of water" (Tolkien 64). Distance and separation, elements which contribute to one's displacement from a locale, enable the displaced to become more attentive to not only the original place from which they are excluded but also a new locale where they perceive the original place via a newfound space. In the case of "Wild nights—wild nights!", the speaker expresses his/her longing to relocate to an alternative temporal and spatial sphere: the nighttime and the sea. In this imagined sphere, the speaker becomes attuned to not only the void elements of the daytime and the land but to the new "dangerous, dark, and wild" (Dean 92) locale of the sea. Dickinson scholars have yet to reach a systematic understanding of what the sea symbolizes in her poetry. While Dickinson constantly uses "he" (or "He") to refer to the sea in her poems, it remains unclear who "he" is. Naturally, the most convenient and least controversial way is to interpret "he" as a

human male figure. Figures such as Poseidon or God are common references for Dickinson's use of the sea as "he/He" in "I started Early—Took my Dog," another poem which depicts the poet's bodily encounter with the sea. Since Dickinson had never been to the sea physically but dwelt in the "Possibility" of her poetic landscape, it shall be logical to assume that the prescribed components in her imaginative poetic landscape do not necessarily mirror the natural formations in the physical landscape of the world. Escaping from her Amherst home as a displaced person confronting the metaphysical nighttime rowing in the sea, Dickinson had meanwhile freed herself from her contemporary social protocol that was predicated on definite gender roles. How can we, then, read the sea from a displaced speaker's point of view in Dickinson's poetic space, rather than from our modern reader's knowledge of the 19th-century cultural and social conventions?

I wish to point out that a common approach to criticism of poetry, at least of the work of Dickinson and Whitman, is to identify the speaker in a poem with the poet who creates the poem. Therefore, the speakers of Dickinson's poems are oftentimes thought to be female humans. While this approach adds a sense of personal engagement that allows a biographical aspect of poetic composition and critique, it also restrains the critical possibility to read Dickinson's poetry against anthropocentrism and established gender identities. The speaker in "Wild nights—Wild nights!" has constantly been regarded as female and the "wild nights" the speaker seeks to engage herself with symbolize her erotic longing. With this convenient assumption that the speaker is female, the poem is subsequently associated with a manifestation of female sexual emancipation, which may endanger the speaker who tastes the forbidden fruit, and may result in her banishment from the sanctuary in Eden. Along the lines of this critical pursuit of female erotic inclinations in Dickinson's poetry, Marisa Anne Pagnattaro pushes the envelope and

argues for the possibility of the erotic persona not only as female but androgynous. Using Thomas Higginson's editorial remark on the "malignant" (Bingham 127) implication present in the poem, Pagnattaro stresses that the erotic longing is "without gender" (Pagnattaro 33) and is open to abundant critical possibility. While Pagnattaro's argument is valid and absolutely "unfetters" Dickinson from the conventional views on women's roles and desires, I seek to further press the notion of critical possibility by releasing Dickinson from anthropocentric world views, which in part problematize the issues of gender.

Gender or gendering has proven to be useful and problematic for us to navigate in an anthropocentric and linguicentric world. Phrases such as "mother nature" are useful to recognize the generative and accommodating qualities of those who conceive or give birth to children. However, the analogy between nature and motherhood potentially neglects the paternal capacity to cultivate and harbor human offspring. Certainly, this is not to say all women are naturally inclined to acts of nurturing, or only women can "give birth." Trans men, for instance, are not women but are able to produce offspring. Yet, from an etymological viewpoint, the definition of "mother" does not make sense independently of "father." The fluidity in not only parental genders but genders in general is productive and helps to throw off the conformist shackles, but it is, at the same time, problematic when the morphing concepts of gendering are employed to situate Dickinson anachronistically. Furthermore, the undying attempt to apply the framework of gender studies to literary criticism, while productive in developing pedagogical strategies and interpersonal/inter-gender respect, restricts what a male or female author's work *should* represent or symbolize, and it limits, in this case, Dickinson criticism to anthropocentric approaches. When Higginson shows his surprise (or perhaps repulse) at the erotic and improper connotations in "Wild nights—Wild nights!", we can safely assume that he reads the poem through solely

human-centered and gender-fixed eyes. Pagnattaro's view of the androgynous speaker, while allowing the notion of gender fluidity, still leaves Dickinson entrenched in an anthropocentric critical space, where the concept of gender is utilized to navigate her poetic landscape of possibility. It should be stressed that it is never specifically explained in the poem that the sea symbolizes either a male or female human or that "wild nights" suggest erotic experiences. Certainly, if one reads the poem with the presumption that it is an erotic poem, both of the symbols can only seem logical. However, I wish to pursue this further by, first, referring to a letter Dickinson wrote to Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Bowles in 1862, which gives the reader an inkling of the poet's conception of "a wild night":

> It grieves me that you speak of Death with so much expectation. I know there is no pang like that for those we love, nor any leisure like the one they leave so closed behind them, but Dying is a wild Night and a new Road.
>
> I suppose we are all thinking of Immortality, at times so stimulated that we cannot sleep. Secrets are interesting, but they are also solemn—and speculate with all our might, we cannot ascertain. (*Letters*, 169)

Upon reading the passage, one can easily identify a wild night with the process of dying, and this process manifests "a new Road" that cannot be navigated with the artificial tools of a "Compass" and a nautical "Chart." In other words, this new road exists in an alternative nonhuman space beyond the man-made maps recording the physical terrestrial and nautical areas on earth. Wild nights, as an alternatively temporal and spatial sphere, serve as an undomesticated and nocturnal locale through which one passes when dying and begins a new path after death. Switching from his/her civil *living* condition to the imagined afterlife "Rowing" into the wild nights, the speaker is displaced from the presumably safe locale of human development and re-placed to the

unknown, possibly dangerous, nonhuman natural world. Since the speaker is removed from the presumed human world founded on and operating within anthropocentric principles, he/she is more “attuned to matters of place,” to quote Tally, and therefore perceives his/her locale more critically than scholarship on this poem has ever been able to achieve. The speaker’s extraordinary perception of the locale resulting from his/her displacement from the shared land-based society attests to Dickinson’s ingenious cartographical method that mobilizes the poet, her speaker, and both of their places of dwelling in a metaphysical manner. By appointing the speaker in this poem as a displaced persona, Dickinson creates a sort of interactive map that engages both the locale and the dweller of the locale—in this case, the sea and the speaker who seeks to be with the sea. Her particular kind of map defies the common rigid and objective features of a map. Rather, her literary space is composed by a special kind of map that is mobile, constantly morphing, and inter-dimensional. It is inter-dimensional because the map requires the landscape and the dweller of the landscape to interact with each other, in order to function as a tool for navigation. This particular manner of interaction, which has its root in the poetic “Possibility” resulting from the changing and mobilized imaginary literary space, helps foster a destabilized and yet generative relationship between the speaker and the place he/she resides. In such “wild nights,” the speaker is *not* obliged to be female, male, or even human. The speaker, in this poetic seascape, is able to represent all forms of life that venture out to the sea with a defiant intent to be “Done” with the normality on the shore. Understanding the poem from such a transcendental perspective inclusive of all life forms, the reader is therefore compelled to re-read the poem from the point of view of the anti-anthropocentric and displaced persona.

The displaced “I,” who is wishfully attentive to what the “wild nights” can offer, speaks to the second-person “thee,” who serves as the essential agent accomplishing the inter-

dimensional interaction between the wild nights and the speaker. As discussed previously, the new road exists for the speaker to explore in this alternative nonhuman space that occurs upon the completion of the dying process. In addition, this new road can only be traveled through the means of "rowing," which suggests that the act of traveling shall take place on water. In the first stanza, the displaced speaker summons his/her travel agent, the sea, by addressing it in the second-person "thee" at the alternative locale of a wild night. Through such a device of the sea agent, the speaker is able to journey toward the unattainable wild night, which symbolizes the process of dying, with reference to Dickinson's letter to Mr. and Mrs. Bowles. It is unattainable because Dickinson had, in fact, never been to the sea in her life; therefore, it is through this imagined sea agent that the poet has the speaker embark on the journey to dying, which was also unattainable to the then living poet, who was preoccupied with the subject of death during most of her lifetime.

Having experienced the demises of her acquaintances and lived at a time when religious teaching was centered on preparing believers for their eventual death, Dickinson demonstrates her curiosity about the subject of death and seeks to *figure it out* through the means of both letter and poetry writing. Her attempt to imagine dying is manifested in the second stanza. Upon introducing the agent required to initiate the dying process of a wild night, the speaker proceeds to describe the process with regard to his/her traveling on the sea. First, "the winds" no longer have power to determine the physical course of the speaker's journey on the water, because his/her "Heart" is set toward the "port" of death, which the winds cannot navigate toward and which is considered a final resting place (*Emily Dickinson Lexicon*). To achieve this final resting place, the speaker shall have no use of a compass or the chart, items which are usually used for navigation on the sea, because this alternative locale does not exist on the man-made global map.

This final resting place, constructed during the process of dying, is unattainable unless one follows the speaker's particular steps of demanding the sea agent and choosing a new road, which is only possible on wild nights.

Introducing the specific method used to navigate the undomesticated nocturnal seascape, the speaker continues rowing, with no need for the mundane compass and chart, in "Eden," which suggests the "spiritual world" or "afterlife" (*Emily Dickinson Lexicon*). In the third stanza, the seemingly unguided rowing is provided with a final direction when the speaker again declares to the sea, "Might I but moor—tonight—/In thee!". Instead of navigating *on* the sea, the speaker chooses to secure him/herself firmly *in* the sea by "mooring," an action which suggests fixity in space and in time. Here, to moor in the sea signifies the final stage of building the resting place, where the speaker eventually *reaches death*. To moor in the sea also suggests the act of crossing over from the physical human place to imaginary poetic space. It is through this transcendental approach to mapping the inter-dimensional locales in her physical world of 19th-century Amherst and her poetic sphere of displacement that Dickinson draws a metaphysical map that transcends the banal notions conveniently built upon anthropocentrism and physical longevity. Through the writing process of "Wild nights—Wild nights!", Dickinson not only *found her way out* of her contemporary society and the conventions adhering to it but created a philosophical mapping of the mind, which all her readers can use as a guide to contemplate and arrive at death.

Using a displaced speaker, Dickinson mobilizes herself with the interactive map she creates and presents the spatial relations between herself and the worlds she dwells in, both physical and imaginary. Owing to the displaced speaker's attentiveness to both ordinary and alternative spatial configurations, Dickinson has managed to reside, through the speaker, in her

own world, which manifests a map navigating the boundaries of life and death beyond temporal and spatial restrictions. In Tally's words, "Displacement, perhaps more than a homely rootedness in place, underscores the critical importance of spatial relations in our attempts to interpret, and change, the world" (Tally 13). It is as if Dickinson had foreseen the possibilities that a poetic subject of displacement could generate, considering her own physical domesticity. It is these possibilities that manifest Dickinson's world, the map for which, as imprinted between the lines of her poetry, is composed of the interaction between a displaced subject and his/her place of dwelling, and constant spatial formations and transformations.

To further investigate changes in the world as a result of our interpretation of spatial relations, I will use Whitman's "Kosmos" to discuss how the spatial turn in literary studies is manifested in "the experience of space and place, the desire or need for mapping, and the self-conscious reflection on ways and means of achieving a more liveable sense of place, or a better map" (Tally 16). While it is in "Possibilities' that Dickinson chooses to dwell, Whitman, in a similar vein of thought, conceives of the poetic persona of a "kosmos," "who" follows an imaginary map, on which "the past [and] the future, dwell…, like space, inseparable together" (Whitman 516). The interchangeability of time and space on Whitman's poetic map suggests a non-Americentric manner of dwelling, unconfined by the historical and cultural systems operating in 19th-century U.S. With regard to the notion of the infinite extensions of the body, which generate multiple dimensions of space, as explored previously in "Germs," the kosmos speaker embodies "Nature" and "includes diversity," a concept which can be connected to the multiplicity of spatial relations the kosmos manifests in Whitman's poetic spacescape. Since Whitman's "democratic space," which is conceived in his poetry of "geography," "provided the American people with their first articulate mental map" (Roche 16), his poetic space embodies

the change of the worldview of the 19th-century U.S. mindset. Mirroring Dickinson's imaginary dwelling on the poetic landscape where the journey through life and death/post-life is mapped out, Whitman's democratic space suggests a conceptual change regarding the U.S. territory and the spatiality of the universe beyond the human world via the perspective of the personified kosmos. It is also this change in the human-spatial relations that encourage the readers of Whitman across time to reflect, according to Tally, in a "self-conscious" manner, what it means to peruse "a better map" (Tally 16). While Whitman's cataloguing method of mapping is oftentimes interpreted as an imperialistic gesture, this particular interpretation sustains only if the readers *subconsciously* assume that to dwell on the U.S. territory is to "achieve a more liveable sense of place" (Tally 16). In the first line of the poem, Whitman announces that only nature can truly encompass diversity and that nature is the microcosm of the cosmic system on earth, a thought which immediately deterritorializes the poet from the political, historical, and social spheres constituting 19th-century U.S. from the *human* point of view. In addition to his deterritorializaing gesture to re-delineate his world, Whitman's poetic achievement "departs…radically from nineteenth-century poetic convention in its virtual abandonment of metaphorical and symbolic figures" (Cutler 149). According to Edward S. Cutler, Whitman's cataloguing style is best understood as a "metonymic connectivity" (Cutler 149), a notion predicated upon Roman Jakobson's theory of combination and contexture, which suggests that "any [linguistic] sign is made up of constituent signs and/or occurs only in combination with other signs" and that "any linguistic unit at one and the same time serves as a context for simpler units and/or finds its own context in a more complex linguistic unit" (Jakobson 54). Applying Jakobson's notion of association and combination, I argue that Whitman's catalogue is not just a list of *free* juxtapositions. Instead, using "Kosmos" as an example, I will demonstrate the

linguistic and conceptual connectivity between each poetic line and how this connectivity embodies "our lives as situated in a mobile array of social and spatial relations" that are "mapped" in the poem when read at "the spatial turn" (Tally 16-17).

While Cutler focuses more on the use of metonymic character in "Song of Myself," I wish to extend his critique to the composition of "Kosmos," a poem which illustrates the kosmos persona established in "Song of Myself." Similarly structured in a cataloguing style, "Kosmos" makes its spatial progress via the poetic subject's action, which is dictated by verbs signifying the gestures of discovery and preservation in the poetic lines, such as "includes," "look'd forth," "contains," "holds," "finds," and "believes." Rendering a collective sense of inclusiveness in the physical world to the poetic subject "who" is identified as "Nature," the poem is set up with a sprawling manner of spatial construct from the very beginning. Situated in the natural context, the subject is then introduced as the manifestation of the landscapes of the planetary earth, which *contain the multitudes* of sexual, philanthropic, and balancing capacities. So far, the first three lines demonstrate a twofold connectivity: Jakobson's notion of contexture via linguistic signs and Tally's statement on the spatial turn. Since Jakobson deems poetics as a way to study verbal structure, it is fitting to examine how Whitman constructs his kosmos with words through Jakobson's linguistic approach. While the use of the verb "include" invites the reader to explore parts of the entire gamut of the diverse elements that constitute "Nature," the use of the be verb "is" indicates a perpetual state of being that is manifested in a wide range of natural landscapes of the earth described in a Whitmanesque manner of peculiar word choices such as "sexuality," "charity," and "equilibrium." The persona of kosmos contains what it manifests: Diversity *is* nature, which *is* the earth, where all lives happen. Here, the verbal elements of kosmos, diversity, nature, and the earth make sense *only* when they are read as constituent signs with each other. In

other words, the transcendental aspect of the earth that manifests all natural phenomena cannot be derived if the reader is not introduced to the identical notions of diversity and nature first. Correspondingly, without the prior use of the terms of diversity and nature, the Whitmanesque diction used to suggest the "amplitude" of earthly actions cannot find its more complex linguistic context.

To further understand the interesting word choices in lines two and three, I find Tally's socio-spatial viewpoint productive in contributing a cause to the intricate linguistic contexts, as previously investigated. Why does Whitman choose to use words such as "amplitude," "sexuality," "charity," and "equilibrium"? How do these words help us to understand the earth in a way that we have not already known? According to Tally, when we take the spatial turn to examine the world we live in, we are actually exploring a range of relations formed at the intersections of our social and spatial domains. These intersected points can be examined in Whitman's particular word choices. For instance, "amplitude," while suggesting a range of various landscapes on earth, can also refer to the maximum extent of vibration or oscillation that is measured from the position of equilibrium in the field of physics. Since Whitman utilizes the analogies between the human body and the bodies of water; the human body and the U.S. territory in his *Sea-Drift* collection and "Poetry To-day in America—Shakespeare—The Future," it is not overreaching to suggest that "the amplitude of the earth" can be thought of as an analogy to the biological diversity of the human body. Therefore, when the poet identifies the poetic subject of kosmos as the manifestation of "coarseness and sexuality of the earth," he stresses the raw and reproductive attributes of the corporeal human body. Furthermore, the kosmos also embodies "the great charity of the earth," which indicates the earth's accommodation of diverse landscapes and can be associated with the benevolent quality as a desirable trait of humanity.

The human body's physical and mental capacities, as indicated by these poetic words, are able to maintain a balance, based on which the bodily actions occur. Juxtaposing the body of the earth and the human body, Whitman creates an inter-spatial correspondence of social implications. It should be noted that, in this case, the notion of the social does not involve interpersonal interactions. Rather, the concept of the social, derived from Bruno Latour's definition of it as a "trail of associations between heterogeneous elements" (5), is established due to the capability of the human body to produce a set of associations with the physical landscapes of the earth. That is to say, the map of the social and spatial relations is conceived in the human body, which encompasses infinite spatial capacity and inter-spatial connectivity.

Exploring the spatial capacity of the human body further, Whitman translates the bodily space from an anatomic approach addressing both the corporeal and the cerebral:

> Who has not look'd forth from the windows the eyes for nothing, or whose brain held
>   audience with messengers for nothing,
> Who contains believers and disbelievers, who is the most majestic lover,
> Who holds duly his or her triune proportion of realism, spiritualism, and of the aesthetic
>   or intellectual,
> Who having consider'd the body finds all its organs and parts good[…] (Lines 4-9)

These four lines can be understood in a collective manner when read as linguistic signs of combination and contexture, referring to Jakobson's theory. Using the kosmos speaker as an overarching linguistic unit that connects the poetic signs in each line together, Whitman, in this particular section of cosmic inclusion, studies the human brain and projects its metaphysical associations. Starting from the windows of the human soul, as a symbol for the eyes, the kosmos speaker looks outward and forward. The linguistic units of the "windows" and "eyes" serve as

the “constituent signs” that help to delineate the larger physical unit of the brain. The brain, correspondingly, provides a “more complex linguistic” and physical “context” (Jakobson 54) for the windows and the eyes. Here, the brain of the kosmos speaker is able to keep the interest of the spectators with its “messengers,” which can be understood as the chemicals that sustain the functions of the brain. In a cerebral sense, Whitman explores what the kosmos entails on the smallest molecular scale of the brain chemicals, which also serve as a smaller unit of constituent signs than that of the eyes. The continuous process of spatial contraction exposes the associative and “social” qualities within the corporeal human body.

Next, Whitman switches his focus to the metaphorical connotations invoked by the anatomical aspect of the brain. The kosmos speaker, whose spatial capacity is enlarged due to the “audience” the brain accommodates, does not discriminate between religious disparities and is manifested as the most dignified and beautiful lover. The love the speaker holds has its foundation in the notion of the Trinity that is re-imagined in a secular and boundary-crossing manner: “his or her triune proportion of realism, spiritualism, and of the aesthetic or intellectual.” Whitman suggests that the balance of the realistic and spiritual views and the aesthetic and intellectual cultivation manifests the key to the loving unity each individual should possess. The linguistic sign of “the majestic lover” is, therefore, reflected on and clarified by the triune elements of the method of loving, which performs a larger and intangible context the kosmos speaker “holds.” Starting from the anatomical aspect of the brain to the metaphysical realizations of the brain chemicals, Whitman has demonstrated the tangible realities of the human body, as well as the nonmaterial and philosophical capacity of the mind. In the last section, Whitman returns to a smaller scale of the corporeal body, which recognizes all its organs and parts as “good” in a non-discriminatory fashion. In addition to the all-encompassing love for

every human being, the kosmos speaker also appreciates each component of his/her body equally. This egalitarian thought infuses the poetic lines and can be applied to the various aspects of nature, the earth, the cerebral and metaphysical brain, the triune elements of living and loving, and the corporeal parts of the human body. Considering the cosmic implications via the realistic and spiritual points of view, Whitman as a poet performs the third element by composing poetry, which is an aesthetic and intellectual activity, reincarnating himself in the body of the kosmos.

Upon examining the body from the physical and metaphysical perspectives, Whitman investigates the theories of the body at a spatial and temporal level:

> Who, out of the theory of the earth and of his or her body understands by subtle analogies all other theories,
>
> The theory of a city, a poem, and of the large politics of these States;
>
> Who believes not only in our globe with its sun and moon, but in other globes with their suns and moons,
>
> Who, constructing the house of himself or herself, not for a day but for all time, sees races, eras, dates, generations,
>
> The past, the future, dwelling there, like space, inseparable together. (Lines 10-17)

Stressing the interchangeability between the theory of the earth and that of the human body, Whitman states that the kosmos speaker is able to comprehend theories of all kinds, due to his/her physical manifestation of the theory and embodiment of the diversity and inclusiveness of the earth. The juxtaposition of the large scale of the theory of the earth and the small scale of the theory of the body reinforces the constant spatial expansion and contraction, as well as the fluidity of the spatial scales. Subsequently, the spatial fluidity is demonstrated through three artificial spaces: “a city,” “a poem,” and “these States.” A city, just like a poem, is a product of

human construction. The interaction between the dwellers in a city is, therefore, analogous to the interaction between the speaker and participants who *reside* in a poem. Similarly, the landscapes of a city and a poem overlap, a perspective which can be applied to the enlarged scale of human construction manifest in the United States. The politics of the States, which are the activities in the form of debate and conversations in the government, can be associated with the conversations that constitute interpersonal interaction in a city and inter-spatial negotiation in a poetic thought. Up to this point, the theory of the body has proven applicable to not only the corporeal and physical level but also the infrastructural, poetic, and intellectual realms.

Certainly, identifying Whitman's concept of the body as spatially accommodating and translatable is not a new critical thought. In *The Fiction of America*, Susanne Hamscha states that "Whitman's body" is "the common, democratic, and all-encompassing body" and that Whitman's perception of his body as spread out allows him to stretch into every corner and incorporate the entire nation" (164). Encouraging the reader to read Whitman's poem beyond the literal, Hamscha advocates for the notion of the body politic by arguing that we should understand Whitman's body "in spatial terms" and "imagin[e] it as a live map" (165). While her examination of the spatial quality of Whitman's body is provocative in that she juxtaposes the Manhattan urban space with "Whitman's city" as "a place of conversion and alteration" (166) in a specific manner, her focus on the spatial possibility of Whitman's body remains constrained within the U.S. territory on the continent of North America. Yet, Whitman has told us that the theory of the body is analogous not only to that of a city, in the case of Hamscha's argument, Manhattan, but also to that of a poem and the States. The theory of a poem can be understood as more "all-encompassing" than that of an urban live map, because poetry itself is mobile and fluid and travels on *leaves* between the fingertips of readers, against time and space, and via

translation. In this regard, the theory of the body is the theory of poetic reading and translating. Instead of emphasizing the "democratic" containment of Whitman's body, I wish to appeal to the notion that Whitman's body has generated endless possibilities transported via poetry reading and translating in a detemporalized and despatialized manner, and therefore, *cannot* be contained.

Whitman has made it clear that his spatial limit is the cosmos. Through the personified kosmos speaker, he explores the possibilities of other globes having "their suns and moons," a hypothetical figure of speech which suggests the possibility of the parallel selves of "I." Thus, "I contain multitudes" is a statement *not* about the poet's self-absorbedness or even narcissistic attitude but rather reflects how, in "Kosmos," Whitman constructs "the house of himself or herself," an imaginary poetic space where the process of building is still continuing. In this poetic space, the dwellers, whether human or nonhuman, comprehend the man-made concepts of "races, eras, dates," and "generations" in a *non-linear* sense of time. Just like space, "the past, the future," and his present, at which Whitman wrote this poem, dwell in our world *not* in the form of temporal segments but of cosmic connectivity. The notion that time and space dwell in the same cohesive fashion can be related to Jakobson's theory of the contexture of signs. If each historical and geographical point in *our* globe is used as a context for one another, the modern human condition, perhaps, will achieve "the equilibrium" of dwelling, and Whitman's body will no longer be American but cosmic, unbound by periodizing and politicizing critical eyes.

In conclusion, I wish to point out that, by visiting and dwelling in Dickinson's and Whitman's poetic landscapes, we as readers have participated in the poets' cartographic acts, exploring non-anthropocentric space. In each locale we visited, the poets have given us directions to help us navigate their respective poetic spaces. In "I dwell in Possibility," we are

introduced to Dickinson's poetico-coporeal map, which guides us to explore the multiple dimensions of her dwelling beyond 19th-century U.S. via her translation of various spatial forms. In "Germs," we are invited to recognize the spatial extension of the human bodies to different spheres with regard to Whitman's manner of following multiple spatial scales and his conception that space *informs* more than it contains. In "Wild Nights- Wild Nights!," a displaced speaker presents a map that shows how we can arrive at death, a new road that is built upon non-anthropocentric worldviews against gender and religious divides and is especially insightful in our post-human condition. Finally, in "Kosmos," Whitman shows us how to navigate time and space together in a world *larger* than human and physical geographies. Each of these poetic maps demonstrates how the poets wrote beyond their temporal and spatial confinements in 19th-century U.S. and composed their own worlds with an ingenious set of perspectives that were far *ahead* of us as 21st-century global citizens. With regard to Tally's statement, "the spatial turn" in Dickinson's and Whitman's poetic maps "is thus a turn towards the world itself." Reflecting on their respective poetic worlds, both poets share with us their understanding of their lives "as situated in a mobile array of social and spatial relations that in one way or another, need to be mapped" (Tally 16-17). Their maps are mobile and the social and spatial relations investigated on the maps are beyond simply the human realm. Their shared notion of "social" is most applicable when referring to Latour's concept of associations and exchange between disparate participating elements[3], which are manifested in both human and nonhuman forms in their poetic landscapes beyond 19th-century U.S. Addressing the particular methods of Dickinson's and Whitman's poetic composition, which resist temporal, spatial, and human boundaries, my exploration of both poets' compositional methods regarding inter-spatial translation and extension, the displaced speaker, and combination and contexture, has proved that Dickinson and

Whitman are poets of the *world*, which confronts the demand for a reconfiguration of our post-human condition.

In the next chapter, I will delve into Latour's theory of the collective in *Politics of Nature* and Donna Haraway's conception of "alter-worlding" in *When Species Meet* in order to devise a "poetic collective," a term I coined, as the foundation of an anti-anthropocentric, literary cartographical model this dissertation aims to establish. Using Dickinson's nonhuman-focused poems that resist human-nonhuman, subject-object, and nature-society divides, Chapter Two will demonstrate a cartographic method of geographical becoming that operates in the collective, with reference to Vinciane Despret's notion of the becoming of subjectivities and Haraway's twofold definitions of "species."

Notes

[1] The use of the terms "American" and "America" in this book adheres to the United States.

[2] Whitman, Walt. "Poetry To-day in America—Shakespeare—The Future." *Poetry and Prose*. NY: Library of America, 1996. 1038. In this prose work, Whitman uses the term "well-appointed body" with "little or no soul" to indicate the rapidly expanding U.S. territory which was in its urgent need for "democratic sociology" and "imaginative literature" to substantially construct "a new world."

[3] Bruno Latour's conception of "the collective" in *Politics of Nature* will be further explored in Chapter Two.

CHAPTER TWO

Alternative World-Builders in Dickinson's Poetic Collective

I will continue to advance an alternative conception of the "world" via investigating the multiple unmapped spaces in 19th-century U.S. poetry. It builds on the previous chapter by further examining the poetic spaces constructed against the notion of human exceptionalism and demonstrating that 19th-century U.S. poet, Emily Dickinson, has, during her poetic compositional process, relayed her presumed human subjectivity to animals living and writing in/with her poems. Starting with Charles Darwin's *The Descent of Man*, where similarities of the mental powers between men and animals are registered and the hierarchy of men and animals is determined based on the degrees of their exertion of the mental powers, I wish to represent the concept of human-animal continuum as established from a biological and behavioral aspect in the Darwinist theory in the 19th century, an empirical approach which negates the notion of human-animal divide commonly assumed and accepted in our contemporary cultures across the globe.

While the similar possession of mental powers places humans and certain nonhuman animals on the same evolutionary spectrum from a biological vantage point, the disconnect between humans and animals is evidently pronounced with regards to their drastically different historical narratives and linguistic identifiers in our anthropocentric world. As explored in Giorgio Agamben's *The Open: Man and Animal*, humans presume a particular mode of absence of nature to be "proper" (29) to them and this *unnatural* void of nature undermines the definition of Homo sapiens as a species, and instead, produces the "anthropological machine" (29) which reassures the humanity of the term with anthropomorphic efforts. Agamben's investigation of the

historical and linguistic constructs, through which the human-animal divide sustains in an abstract and arbitrary manner, elicits an ontological opening in the binary system constituting the relation between humans and animals as an interspecies one. Opposing the binarism, Agamben's quest for the caesura between humans and animals provokes the question of the ontological and epistemological methods of identifying "species," as explored in Donna Haraway's *When Species Meet*, where the definition of "species" is examined and the concepts of interspecies meeting and becoming are established.

Focusing on the interspecies interdependence as a desired aspect to facilitate alternative world making, Haraway proposes an unconventional way to consider the term "companion species" (18), which live "intersectionally," a more ideal approach to living by "inherit[ing] histories" (35) through interspecies meeting points. Her unconventional approach includes humans as one of the companion species and suggests that each species is inseparable from one another and therefore is inherently intersectional. It should be noted that Haraway's conception of (inter)species ranges from inanimate to animate existences and resists "[t]he Great Divides of animal/human, nature/culture, organic/technical, and wild/domestic" (15). She argues that for an "alter-globalization" (5) to occur, these "mundane differences" underlying the divides need to be addressed via acts of respect and response, rather than pursuits of "sublime and final ends" (15). Employing respect and prompting response during the "touch" (36) of another species, Haraway contends, are essential actions of "becoming with" (36), which holds humans, as one of the multiple species, responsible for alternative world-building.

Haraway's idea of alter-worlding corresponds to one of the main goals of this dissertation: to revamp the world via poetic cartography. Since I have demonstrated that Dickinson and Whitman compose alternative poetic landscapes beyond physical geography in

19th-century U.S. in the previous chapter, I will explore here the alternative mapmaking in 19th-century U.S. poetry with regard to Haraway's theory of interspecies alter-worlding in this chapter. Furthermore, I wish to show that nonhuman species, in the selected poems of Dickinson, construct a poetic alter-world which embodies Bruno Latour's conception of the "collective" (*Politics* 59) that "signifies everything but not two separated" (59). In this, what I call, "poetic collective," the nonhuman animals play the role of poetic "spokesperson[s]" (64), who *speak* in the poets' place, "between doubt and uncertainty" (64). Latour's theory of the collective resists the great divides identified by Haraway and his employment of the spokesperson mechanism in politics pronounces the fluidity and constant exchange between human and nonhuman species. Humans and nonhumans, according to Latour, speak, never on their own, but through something or someone else, the spokesperson. I wish to elaborate on the spokesperson mechanism and argue that when multiple species participate in the act of "becoming with" (Haraway 36), their gestures of showing respect and attentiveness as well as responding are rendered effective in contributing to the alter-worldmaking through the nonhuman spokespersons' *living intersectionally* in the poetic collective.

The connection made between Haraway's interspecies alter-worlding, Latour's system of the collective and spokesperson, and 19th-century U.S. animal poems, can be further strengthened by considering Aaron Moe's *Zoopoetics*, which argues that poetry is a multispecies event created by poets through their attentiveness toward animals. Moe's work establishes the role of animals as makers in the poetic tradition. Due to animals' use of gestures, on which, according to Moe, poetry thrives "more than any other written genre" (22). His discussion on animal gestures is centered on how gestures constitute the delivery and the "body" of a poem, aspects which are oftentimes neglected when "ways of knowing" are constantly prioritized over

"ways of being" (23) during the writing and reading of poetry. He further contends that it is the gestures that carry language. When animals participate in the *poiesis* (Moe 18) of poetry via gestures, which can be understood as movements of their bodies recorded attentively in poems by poets, they no longer remain agents projected by the poets' human minds but are rendered "new ways of being" (Moe 22) in language and in the poet-animal relationship due to their "new way of gesturing" (22). I intend to investigate animal gestures in selected 19th-century U.S. poems by discussing how animal gestures function in Latour's spokesperson mechanism, which enables interspecies exchange and collaboration in alter-worlding, a groundbreaking method of mapmaking which focuses on gesticulative composition of the human and nonhuman animal participants via the writing and reading of poetry. Adding to the previously discussed interspatial method of translation as a cartographic technique employed to compose alternative worlds uncircumscribed by the U.S. territory, this chapter will demonstrate how the poetic collective serves as a foundation for alter-worlding and proposes a cartographic approach to constructing an alter-world via acts of interspecies becomings of subjectivities during Dickinson's poetic composition.

I. Theorizing Interspecies Relations

To eventually demonstrate the interspecies collaboration in making a map to build an alternative world via the approach of zoopoetics in this chapter, I find it appropriate to, first, explore Darwin's theory on the behaviorist observation of the similarities between humans and both the lower and higher animals with regard to our shared "mental powers" (Darwin 176). Darwin's theory is provocative to discuss the notion of animals as subjects alongside Vinciane Despret's "The Becomings of Subjectivity in Animal Worlds," which identifies the exchange of subjective properties between breeders and their animals and which I shall return to shortly.

Darwin presents the similarity in emotional expression between humans and young/lower nonhuman animals:

> The lower animals, like man, manifestly feel pleasure and pain, happiness and misery. Happiness is never better exhibited than by young animals, such as puppies, kittens, lambs, &c., when playing together, like our own children. Even insects play together, as has been described by that excellent observer P. Huber, who saw ants chasing and pretending to bite each other, like so many puppies (177).

Darwin seems to *translate* the variation of animals' bodily movements and gestures into referential expressions he as a human can comprehend by describing young animals as "our own children" and borrowing Huber's description of the "pretending" ants. Ants as insects are also compared to "many puppies," which are ranked higher than insects, among the descent of man. Using the human viewpoint as the sole perspective to translate animal behaviors, Darwin's understanding of nonhuman animals remains anthropomorphic and deeply entrenched in the linearity of time due to his fundamental belief that the lower animals existing on earth before the higher animals, "the lowest barbarians" (177), and humans. While there is no difference regarding the fact that all of them have mental faculties, Darwin specifies that what remains crucial is the degree to which they are able to exercise their mental faculties through the categories of emotions, curiosity, imitation, attention, memory, imagination, and reason[1]. Clearly, these categories used to evaluate mental powers are based on *the human standard*, which, according to Darwin, classifies the highest animal—man, in the theory of evolution, and rooted in the chronological development of the human species. Once the sequential development from the lowest animal to man is delineated, Darwin, as the human theorist and a manifestation of the final stage of the evolution, *looks back* from the anthropocentric vantage point and offers

an epistemological account of the animals *lower* than man. His narrative of humans and nonhuman animals, while testifying to the continuum between them from a behaviorist and empirical viewpoint, imposes the notions of thinking and responding on the recorded behaviors of the animals, whose only possible perspective of the world is deemed to correspond to that of humans' and whose place in the world is determined and ranked via a linguicentric construct of the world. Certainly, it is rendered much more convenient to think that the nonhuman animals are like "our own children," and the ants are like "puppies," which are ranked higher in the theory of evolution and therefore *closer* to us. However, understanding other species by employing the agency of human languages, while comforting to those who are content with viewing animals as the lesser, is problematic because this understanding is predicated upon the epistemological notion of the world and even within the realm of epistemology, it does not recognize the varied understandings of animals resulting from the diverse manners of thinking and expression in different human languages. For instance, a Mandarin Chinese native speaker possibly comprehends the category of "imagination" very differently from an English native speaker. What the word "imagination" entails in English is constantly lost in translation when a translator presents its *counterpart* in Chinese, a factor which leads to the variations of the worldviews within each linguicentric and anthropocentric construct. When Darwin describes the similarities between humans and nonhuman animals, he dismisses the invalidity of an epistemological perspective on the world of nonhuman animals whose exertion of "mental powers" remains inexplicable in human languages—humans have never been able to *think* about animals in a *non-linguistic* manner. In addition, Darwin's theory on the descent of man inadvertently generates a complex and yet provocative issue regarding the diverse *human* ways of conceiving the world within a linguicentric construct constituted by multiple languages. As

both the denotative and connotative meanings of "imagination" vary in the use of different human languages, the social and cultural development of the mental powers of the users of a language may differ largely from those of other languages. In brief, Darwin's theory, while signifying the biological continuum between humans and animals, remains insufficient in addressing the linguistic and epistemological void in the animal existence and communication as well as the interlingual untranslatability which leads to the heterogeneous development of mental powers within the human species.

Rather than assuming the linguistic authority as a human to narrate an evolutionary history predicated upon the sequential development from the low animals to the high animals and man, Agamben identifies a disruptive moment unaddressed in Darwin's evolutionary narrative by defying the presumption of language being exclusively and innately human:

> What distinguishes man from animal is language, but this is not a natural given already inherent in the psychophysical structure of man; it is, rather, a historical production which, as such, can be properly assigned neither to man nor to animal. If this element is taken away, the difference between man and animal vanishes, unless we imagine a nonspeaking *man--Homo alalus*, precisely--who would function as a bridge that passes from the animal to the human (36).

Arguing that the human ownership of language is separate from the human "psychophysical structure," which suggests the mental and physical properties of man as used by Darwin to illustrate the varied degrees within the similarities of mental powers as well as the divergent bodily features between the low/high animals and man, Agamben proposes that the use of language is a historical, instead of psychophysical construct. Since the cause of history is to record and study the past human events, language used to narrate history has become a singly

human instrument to produce the narrative. Consequently, the past events inclusive of both humans and animals are often registered as exclusively human experiences: history is inevitably anthropocentric and animal history is categorized as a separate account from that of humans. In this regard, by pointing out that language is "a historical production," Agamben dismantles the notion that the use of language defines *Homo sapiens*, that is, modern man, as it is distinguished from *Homo alalus* by wisdom determined based on linguistic capacity. Since language is not inherently a human property but is produced historically, the continuum between animals and humans is manifested and pronounced when we consider the animal and human relationship against historical, epistemological, and linguicentric vantage points. What Agamben terms "the anthropological machine of humanism" (29) addresses a sort of conceptual in-betweenness that overrides the human and animal divide. He defines the term as such:

> The anthropological machine of humanism is an ironic apparatus that verifies the absence of a nature proper to Homo, holding him suspended between a celestial and a terrestrial nature, between animal and human.

According to Agamben, the machine functions as a system negligent in recognizing the sub-categories filling the great divide of animals and humans. *Homo*, which encompasses species more than just *Homo sapiens*, such as *Homo alalus and Homo ferus*, constitutes the non-speaking hominoids, who are considered the "non-man" (37), between animal and human; nature and culture. Viewing the animal and human relationship against binarism, Agamben addresses the significant void of "articulation between human and animal, man and non-man, speaking being and living being"—a "caesura" or "a bare life"[2] which corresponds to neither the natural (as opposed to artificiality of civilization as a result of human linguistic constructs) nor the linguistic zones. Regarding the caesura as an empty zone between the natural and linguistic

zones and the lack of philosophical attention devoted to exploring these indeterminate sub-categories existing between animal and human, Agamben's perception of this void reveals the historical and epistemological animal-man discontinuum, undermining Darwin's empirical account of the physical and mental continuum between humans and their descents. By isolating language, the commonly recognized factor defining human, from human existence and history, Agamben, inadvertently, disrupts the chronological structure of Darwin's theory of evolutionary development of animals and man, as well as flattens the hierarchical order of the species. Darwin's evolutionary outlook, despite its contribution to cross-species development, yields to an anthropocentric and linguicentric narrative of the world.

Agamben's perspective on the relationship between man and animal is an ontological one and is in conformity with Martin Heidegger's rejection of the traditional metaphysical definition of man as *animal rationale*, the being of man whose mode of living is complicated merely due to its added property of language and reason, criteria used by Darwin to determine the superiority of humans over nonhuman animals. Illustrating Heidegger's concepts of "open" (*offen*) and "openable" (*offenbar*), Agamben distinguishes the animal environment from the human inhabitation:

> The ontological status of animal environment can at this point be defined: it is *offen* (open) but not offenbar (disconcealed; lit., openable). For the animal, beings are open but not accessible; that is to say, that are open in an inaccessibility and opacity--that is, in some way, in a nonrelation. This openness without disconcealment distinguishes the animal's poverty in world from the world-forming which characterizes man. (55)

Since neither the animal environment nor the animal itself "are revealed as beings" (54) and the void of revelation of relation results in the animal's poverty in world, what distinguishes the

animal from man are its inaccessibility and non-relation. If one's being is recognized through linguistic usage and accessibility, the relation between the being and itself is therefore constructed based on the epistemological, rather than ontological, state of the being. The discrepancy between man's epistemologically dominant approach to conceiving the world and the animal's ontological manner of dwelling in the world results in man's relatively more active mechanism of *shaping* the world around them. Consequently, a sense of obscurity remains present in the animal environment which manifests "a bare life" (38). It is bare because it is not *articulated* in a linguistic fashion; it is bare because it is unclothed with epistemological constructs. The bareness remains *open* in an inarticulate way which is inaccessible to the articulate humans—the open in the ontological status of animal environment is *unopenable* to the man operating through relation and relatability, methods which are obstructed when humans and animals share their existence in the world. This void of relation and relatability constitutes a caesura between man and animal; linguistic and natural zones; world forming and world dwelling. The caesura exhibits a disconnect between man and animal regarding their coexistence in the world. Agamben's theory, while reflecting the commonality that the human access to the animal world is predicated upon the linguistic and metaphysical notions of the anthropological machine underlying Darwin's evolutionary theory, rearticulates the animal-man relation in a non-hierarchical and *open* mode.

What happens after we identify the ontological tear between humans and animals? How can we proceed to address *the open* between animal and human worlds? Furthermore, according to Haraway, how can all the species "inherit histories" (35) *together* in our contemporary moment where alter-worlding, as an alternative method of building an interspecies world, should be called upon? With an eventual goal to demonstrate the alternative world building embodied in

selected Dickinson's animal and nonhuman focused poems in this chapter, I wish to initiate the world-building process by mending the *inarticualted nakedness* imposed on nonhuman species and pronouncing the role of the nonhuman animals as *active* participants in the making of history. Once the nonhuman animals are situated in a shared historical and literary context via the reading of the selected poems, an alternative method of interspecies world building shall emerge as a phenomenon of what Haraway terms "cosmopolitics."[3] While Agamben's recognition of caesura disrupts the sequential relation between man and animal as delineated in Darwin's theory, further exploration of what the caesura between animal and human existence entails remains the crucial link to my argument for a multispecies worldview projected in Dickinson's poems. To investigate the inarticulate caesura between human and nonhuman species, I will, first, examine the conception of "species" as presented in Haraway's words:

> *Species*, like all the old and important words, is equally promiscuous, but in the visual register rather than the gustatory. The Latin *specere* is at the root of things here, with its tones of 'to look' and 'to behold.' In logic, *species* refers to a mental impression or idea, strengthening the notion that thinking and seeing are clones. Referring both to the relentlessly 'specific' or particular and to a class of individuals with the same characteristics, *species* contains its own opposite in the most promising---or special—way (17).

Species, defined as a class of individuals having common characteristics, is endowed with a more complex and less rigid understanding. The root of *specere* in Latin, which can be seen in words as "spec-," means "to look," an action related to a subject exercising his/her visual capacity and attentiveness. The aspect of "spec-" provokes one to focus on the common characteristic of looking between the individuals in a class. The direction of looking, in this

regard, remains debatable. Can an individual of a class look at or within himself/herself? Or can this act of looking be understood as a mutual and collective sort of spectating among the individuals of a class? Also, how does the act of looking reform what a species encompasses? From the viewpoint of logic, the act of looking is identical with that of thinking because species is a manifestation of "a mental impression or idea," which is malleable and contextualized. Through reconstructing the understanding of "species" from the Latin root and the aspect of logic, the definition of species of a group of individuals sharing common characteristics is shaken due to the fundamental dynamics between the beholder and the beheld; the spectator and the spectacle. To look at something is at the same time to be looked back at by that "something." Therefore, to look is to reflect the exteriority of oneself, both physically and mentally. It is physical because, for instance, when we observe a bird, we describe and comprehend its movements, sounds, and appearance based on the ways we as humans perceive and portray ourselves. We may describe a bird as "taking flight," "singing songs," and "having sharp vision" because these are phrases we use to pronounce our human (lack of) mobility, musicality, and eyesight. For this reason, when a human being observes and thinks about a bird, he/she, simultaneously, reflects what can be observed about himself/herself. In this case, the spectator becomes the spectacle alongside the bird. The human and nonhuman species are considered from a single viewpoint originated from the human spectator, and the physical *impression* of the bird embodies its mental impression as registered by the human spectator looking at the bird in an anthropocentric manner. This particular moment of interspecies looking can be extracted as a mental impression of both the human and bird species, with regard to the definition of species in logic, via which the human "thinking" is a "clone" of their "seeing." The seemingly rigid and well-defined categorizations of species are rendered ineffective when we constitute the notion of

species with acts of looking at/within and thinking about/from—a species, in this sense, is composed of multiple gazes. The boundary between the human and nonhuman is a fluid matter of constant gazing and impersonating at both physical and mental levels.

Starting from a visual cue of a being other than our human selves, Haraway illustrates how an act of looking can be manifested and practiced:

> To hold in regard, to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to pay attention, to have courteous regard for, to esteem: all of that is tied to polite greeting, to constituting the polis, where and when species meet. To knot companion and species together in encounter, in regard and in respect, is to enter the world of becoming with, where *who and what are* is precisely what is at stake (19).

It can be discerned that mutual respect, responses, and attention are essential to interspecies meeting. The meeting point manifests a "polis," a body of multispecies citizens in this alternative, anti-anthropocentric world. At this meeting point, humans are no longer the central participants of world making and interspecies encounters predicated upon respect and attention constitute multiple acts of "becoming with," an idea which suggests continuity and affinity. As each species takes on the act of becoming with (another species), an intermediate state of the species emerges—the act of becoming loses its connotation of direction and destination because during interspecies encounters, a species' act of becoming manifests the collective acts of multispecies transformation. The transformative acts of species are mutually dependent at every interspecies meeting point. The question of "who" or "what" is rendered amiss during the interspecies encounters due to the flattening of subjectivity, which is essentially a linguistic construct and distinguishes humans from nonhumans, at every meeting point where attention, regard, and respect are manifested through interspecies gazes, *without* languages.

The language-less interspecies acts of looking are useful to rethink the role of language in the literary representation of animals—how do we as human critics resist viewing animals in literature as symbols to convey human experience? How can we argue for a vantage point from which any experience occurring in a space where human and nonhuman beings coexist is inherently an interspecies experience? And more importantly, how can we devise such a venue to study literary imagination against anthropocentric worldviews? In "Literary Animal Agents," Susan McHugh suggests there be a new lens of understanding animals in literature against the epistemological constructs constituting academic disciplines:

> [T]he more important lesson for future research lies in a growing responsibility to relate critical practice to the (inter)disciplinary consequences of taking literary animals seriously. As literature becomes one of many locations for negotiating the representational problems of animals, forcing new questions about how literary histories bind animals that have linguistic forms (like metaphoric chains of substitution) to the terms of human individuals, literary studies has a greater opportunity to intervene in the problems of species' mutating through xenotransplantation, genetic modification, and cloning, which appear to be changing the terms of life itself (491-492).

To take literary animals seriously demands that we as humans take ourselves less seriously. "The representational problems of animals" in literature stem from a human-centered frame of perceiving the animals from *our* human sense of world built upon linguistic constructs, which are manifested in the social, political, cultural, historical, and philosophical domains. To relieve literary animals from the *duties* of representing human experience is to realize that animals do not and should not take on the world in a way similar to the human "terms," which are

approaches employed by humans to survive, live, and thrive in a world established via linguicentric constructs. It is only logical, at a fleeting moment of considering the idea of unthinking the human terms, we panic. We realize our incapability when having to comprehend the world against linguistic gravitation. This human lack of competency is at the core of McHugh's petition for scholars to "forgo the politics and privileges of knowledges conceived in exclusively disciplinary terms" (492). Academic disciplines are products of an anthropocentric frame to understand and function in the world. While disciplines might serve an effective purpose to human activities, they do not oftentimes accommodate participants in the zones *between* the disciplines. Certainly, methods have been created and further developed to address human participants in the world who find themselves struggling between the circumferential narratives in each discipline—the collaborative work of interdisciplinarity in academia has therefore been stressed and advocated for as a way to move humanities *forward* in an inclusive and boundary-crossing manner.

This sort of inclusivity and boundary-crossing works in an anthropocentric approach to achieving interdisciplinarity does not recognize that language-based communication, in a larger scale, *is* a manifestation of a discipline that is inaccessible to non-language users, who dwell outside the discipline and are therefore excluded by the linguicentric discipline (within which sub-disciplines of different languages exist) constructed collectively by human language users. Consequently, studying literary animals as representations of human experience, is to force human subjectivity onto animal behaviors via a linguicentric creation and analysis of the acts of non-language-based animate beings and to dismiss animal subjectivity solely because we, as language users, are denied access to their non-linguicentric discipline of living and taking actions. Owing to our incapability of *knowing* what animals *mean* when performing certain acts,

we have decided that they lack subjectivity—a dismissal of activities exercised in the animal minds that remain indecipherable to us who live according to the epistemological constructs established and reinforced by the use of languages. Perhaps (the authorization of) the possession of subjectivity in the study of literary animals should be the immediate challenge and concern in scholarly conversation. In light of the disconnect between the human linguicentric and the animal non-linguicentric disciplines, how do scholars in literary studies situate themselves in between and address the epistemological discrepancy between the two disciplines that occur constantly and ubiquitously in literary creation?

I propose that we, first, learn a lesson from a breeder-animal relationship as described in Vinciane Despret's "The Becomings of Subjectivity in Animal Worlds," which can help to shed some light on the epistemological discrepancy between humans and animals. Prompted by the question of "how does one become a lion" (127) as explored in scientifically observational approaches, Despret's research seeks to address how human scientists have attempted to properly learn from animals whose communicative apparatuses remain somewhat absent and yet overlap the human apparatuses to an extent where reciprocal exchange of intentions and the becomings of subjectivity on both the animal and human sides occur. Through this sort of mutual behavior learning, the animals and scientists enter a process of becoming, as manifested in mindful activities, during the significant amount of time they spent existing and living closely with each other. In this regard, Despret argues that scientists do not study these animals as representative of their human counterparts but as nonhuman representers of their animal world constituted by a different set of apparatuses in communication. In addition, by interviewing the cow and pig breeders who live and work closely with animals, Despret states that the apparatuses testify "to the power of the transformations themselves" (128) because when animals also demonstrate

their intention to *guide* human breeders in a particular event, the notion of subjectivity of a solely human property is rendered ineffective. She suggests that the breeding situations where humans and animals work and accomplish things together are "situations of the extension of subjectivity" (129), where a breeder is regarded as part of the cow world (as the cows *invite* the breeders to help with the birth of a calf) and where the cows remain essential to the breeder's ontological worldviews. During the calving, by recognizing and subsequently assisting in the reproduction of the animals, the breeder reacts to the cows' intention of seeking help—the animal intention manifested as a subjective and conscious act is therefore transformed into the human apparatus of providing assistance as a response to the intention expressed. The subjectivity of the cows, although void of linguistic manifestation, is extended to the subjective mind of the breeder who then makes a decision to participate in the calving with a language-based act, announcing to the cows surrounding the soon-to-be-mother cow, "shoo, it's me" and "don't you want to help me look for Semba?" (134). Correspondingly, by using an essential method of human communication—language, the breeder's words manifesting his subjective intention are transformed, or perhaps translated, into the cow apparatus which receives and occupies an overlapping zone between the cow and human apparatuses where the human language is comprehended by the non-language-user cows. The human subjectivity is, therefore, extended to the cows' behaviors, due to the animal recognition of the human intention. Regarding the cow breeder's example, we can assert that in situations where humans and animals work closely together, pay attention to each other, and produce responses to interspecies encounters, the authorization of the ownership of subjectivity is no longer a human privilege. Both humans and animals in the situations exert their respective subjective forces, whether in a linguicentric or

gesture-oriented fashion, and during the process of their exertion of subjectivity, exhibit their mutual becomings of alter-species subjects.

If we employ Despret's notion of the situation-based extension of subjectivity between humans and animals in the study of literary animals which is deemed problematic by McHugh due to the epistemological difficulty of the *unauthorized* subjectivity in non-linguicentric animals, we may come to agree that animals in literature can be more than just representations of human experience. We may *learn* that we as humans can learn from them via attentive observation of and intimate co-existence with them. Further, perhaps it is with my utopian wish that we as humans can learn to realize that not all other nonhuman beings exist for our sake. Not all literary animals are written to amplify our metaphorical existences even though writers inevitably create with human languages. Yet, just as the cow breeder approaches the cows using his language, writers observe attentively and respond with respect to animals as recorded on their pages. I wish to argue that writers' attentive looking at and thinking with animals demonstrate what Despret calls a becoming process of (animal) subjectivity. And right after the animals are recorded on the pages where writers' subjectivity is exerted and transforms animal behaviors into the human linguicentric apparatus, the literary animals manifest an extension of human subjectivity through the written words. Throughout the process of producing a literary work about animals, neither the human writers nor the animals in observation obtain sole possession of subjectivity. Instead, they constantly extend and relay subjective forces in both linguistic and behavioral manners during the creation of animal-focused literatures. In this regard, the significance of literary animals is beyond the discrepancy between the human and animal epistemological apparatuses. Literary animals are no longer bound with linguistic forms but challenge and transform literary studies, which are presumed to be predicated upon a purely

linguistic construct. Their existence in literature undermines the linguicentric vantage points of *knowing* the world and destabilizes the anthropocentric construction of literary criticism. To revolutionize the study of literary animals demands that the human scholars, who inevitably/subconsciously feel at home in linguistic constructs, be open and vulnerable to discussing the linguistically *silent* animals. It demands the scholars to respond to what is unknown from a language-based viewpoint with respect and care. I consider this simple step of admitting our human lack of access to the animal world void of languages a starting point to take literary animals seriously. Through careful and attentive observation during interspecies encounters recorded in literature, an alternative world where literary animals and writers reside closely to each other is therefore established. And this alter-world corresponds to Haraway's vision of an interspecies method of worlding:

> Species interdependence is the name of the worlding game on earth, and that game must be one of response and respect. That is the play of companion species learning to pay attention (19).

Haraway's emphasis on the mutual dependence of species is crucial to addressing the reciprocity between writers and literary animals. The reciprocal acts are demonstrated through the shared exertion of subjectivity between the human and animal participants in the making of literature. The interspecies relay of subjective forces is made possible only in such occasions of literary creation where writers and the animals they interact and coexist accomplish tasks together, an interspecies collaboration founded on mutual respect manifested as acts of paying attention and responding to other species by humbling oneself to learn about the unfamiliar and the inaccessible. During this process of attentive observation, the unfamiliar and the inaccessible

become what/who one can coexist and learn with and eventually call companions in this alternative interspecies worlding of literary imagination.

II. The Becoming of a Poetic Collective

Having established the relationship between Haraway's theory of alter-worlding, Despret's conception of the becomings of subjectivity, and McHugh's petition for a new method to studying literary animals, I now wish to propose an interspecies network constituted by multiple gazes signifying the inter-subject process of becoming (the other species). And this network, I argue, is manifested in Dickinson's animal-focused poems. I will investigate the interspecies network in light of Latour's Actor-network theory, which informs his conceptions of "the collective" (59) and "spokesperson" (64), two significant notions essential to unthinking the great divides such as subject and object, science and politics, nature and society, and as what I will show in my analyses of the selected poems, humans and animals. Alongside Agamben's critique on the arbitrary opposition of human and nonhuman beings, Latour's definition of the collective depicts a continuum of natural and social forms that is a manifestation of an anti-anthropocentric practice of politics:

> I use the word [collective] only to mark a political philosophy in which *there are no longer two* major poles of attraction, one that would produce unity in the form of nature and another that would produce unity in the form of societies. *The* collective signifies 'everything but not two separated' (59).

According to Latour, the commonly presumed notions of nature as separate from anthropogenic impact and of society as demonstrative of anthropogenic activities are to be negated and integrated as one collective and fluid whole. I suggest that the operation of the collective corresponds to the process of the inter-subject becomings between animals and humans, who are,

respectively, token figures in the natural and social settings. By redefining politics as "the entire set of tasks that allow the progressive composition of a common world" (53), Latour opens up the political realm to collaboratively interspecies endeavors, which constitute a new sort of political mechanism inclusive of human and animal subjects. And I propose that this alternative political system exists in the poetic space composed by Dickinson, whose poetic imagination manifests phenomena of alter-worlding as a result of interspecies relays of subjectivity.

To further demonstrate the relays of subjectivity between the poets and the poetic animals with Latour's notion of the human and nonhuman "exchange of properties" (61) in the collective, I suggest the implementation of his idea of the "spokesperson" (64) essential to delineating the breakdown of the subject-object and human-nonhuman oppositions. The spokesperson mechanism, which constantly operates in an in-between space, contributes to the interspecies exchange of subjective forces. Addressing the "spokesperson" apparatus in politics, Latour stresses the void of transparency and certainty in the network:

> In politics, there is a very useful term for designating the whole gamut of intermediaries between someone who speaks and someone else who speaks in that person's place, between doubt and uncertainty…[W]ith the notion of spokesperson, we are designating not the transparency of the speech in question, but the entire gamut running from complete doubt (I may be a spokesperson, but I am speaking in my own name and not in the name of those I represent) to total confidence (when I speak, it is really those I represent who speak through my mouth) (64).

The intermediate properties of spokespersons are useful to portray the fluidity and mobility of the interspecies subjective forces during the process of becomings. Since the becomings of subjectivity constantly occur in an in-between state during human and animal encounters, doubt

and uncertainty constitute the mutual acts of perceiving and responding to intentions between humans and animals. With uncertainty, human and animal spokespersons *speak* for themselves and in the name of those they represent through languages and gestures used to demonstrate the mutual recognition of intentions, as seen in the example of the breeder and his cows. During the events of human-animal collaboration to accomplish “a set of tasks” (Latour 53) to compose, progressively, “a common world” (53), the cow spokespersons, who are the calving cow and the surrounding cows, as well as the human breeding spokesperson, accomplish a set of tasks including acknowledging the presence of each other, receiving and responding to intentions using language and bodily movements, and sharing a common goal of contributing to the progress of calving. With confidence, the human and nonhuman spokespersons speak for their counterparts that they represent. Through this sort of mutual representation of voices, the exertion of subjectivity in the collective is evenly distributed between human and nonhuman participants, who exchange “properties” (59) and “compentencies” (62). I wish to suggest that Dickinson’s poetic composition manifests what I call a poetic collective where interspecies exchange happens through the spokesperson apparatus and the process of subjective becomings is demonstrated between the writing human poet and the gesticulating animals.

To illustrate the operation of the poetic collective using Dickinson’s poems exhibiting a gamut of intermediaries, I will divide my discussion into three interspecies mechanisms: exchange of properties between human and nonhuman *actors* in “The Bee is not afraid of me,” the relay of subjectivity between human and nonhuman spokespersons in “I heard a Fly buzz—when I died—,” and the becomings of subjectivity constituted by multiple gazes in “I started Early—Took my Dog.” To address the first mechanism of the poetic collective, I suggest that we enter Dickinson’s imaginative spatial construction of a rainy forest. The mobility of the

interspecies exchange is demonstrated in her playful use of personification of the nonhuman elements:

> The Bee is not afraid of me.
> I know the Butterfly—
> The pretty people in the Woods
> Receive me cordially—
>
> The Brooks laugh louder
> When I come—
> The Breezes madder play;
> Wherefore mine eye thy silver mists,
> Wherefore, Oh Summer's Day? (*The Poems*, 59)

In the beginning of the poem, readers are struck by a sense of mystery when attempting to identify the speaker. Who is "me" or "I"? Should the speaker be conveniently understood as human or Dickinson the poet? The relationship between the bee, the butterfly, the brooks, the breezes, and the speaker seems friendly and interactive in an outdoor setting where *human* vocabularies such as "afraid," "know", "laugh," "play," and "madder" are employed. If the speaker is human, the human and nonhuman split does not seem to find its potent manifestation amidst the interactions. I suggest my readers, at this particular moment, attempt to dwell with Dickinson and her nonhuman spokespersons in the poetic space constructed amidst summer showers. Summer rain remains a familiar setting in Dickinson's poems. In "A Drop fell on the Apple Tree" (*The Poems*, 371), Dickinson describes how raindrops fall on an apple tree and different parts of the roof, producing "laugh"-like sounds on the "Gables." The raindrops then

"help the Brook," in a manner of replenishing the water as an act of nourishment and revitalization. In collaboration with the breezes that "brought dejected lutes" in the poem, the raindrops "bathed" the bushes, which became covered with sparkly drops of rain "in the Glee." By writing extensively about the miniscule raindrops, Dickinson demonstrates "a sense of humility that stems from…[her] identification with the small" (Gerhardt 22). In paying close attention to the motion of rainfall in summer, Dickinson seems to identify herself with the tiny raindrops that, in turn, speak in the poet's place as a nonhuman spokesperson. In this poem, the nonhuman raindrops' action-making, subjective gestures help to form Dickinson's peculiar perspective of summer showers and manifests the interspecies subjective becomings between the poet and the rain. Such technique of animating and pronouncing the subjective capacity of the nonhuman rain is elevated in "The Bee is not afraid of me," in which the rain takes on the speaking/gesticulating role of first-person "I." In the poem, the rain is appreciated by the bee and the butterfly as they "receive" it "cordially" and because it animates the flow of the stream water and the movement of the wind. From a scientific viewpoint, it is plausible that the rain, in the poem, appears near the end of spring, during the time when rain water is abundant, which, consequently, produces "louder" and "madder" sounds when the rain falls on the brooks and interacts with the "breezes." As the season changes from spring to summer, the warm rain falls on the cooler water surface in the brooks, forming "silver mists" that travel via the playful breezes on a summer day, anticipated by the variation of temperature and rainfall during the transition between the seasons. The rain spokesperson's eye, in a prospective manner, envisions and embodies the encounter of the high and low temperatures during the change of seasons.

I will further my interpretation of the poem by delving into Latour's conception of the collective. The concept of the collective has its root in Latour's seminal thought of the Actor-

Network Theory (ANT), which argues for constantly shifting relational networks that manifest human and nonhuman actors who are equal and mobilized across time and space and that "ha[ve] no a priori order relation" ("On Actor-Network Theory" 5). Individuality of each actor is the least of the ANT's concern. It is the actors' collective transition and transformation that facilitate movements between nodes of networks where human and nonhuman actors are active and that enable the networks to exist. Along the lines of Latour's conception of the ANT, Dickinson, who records the phenomena in human words, is the human actor that collaborates with the nonhuman actors such as the insects, the rain speaker, the brooks, and the breezes to complete a poetic set of tasks enacted by nature during the change of seasons. This poem can, therefore, be understood as a manifestation of the poetic collective where the conventionally presumed human speaker is the nonhuman rain, a natural phenomenon which is translated through Dickinson's process of writing into human words. In the poem, the human actor and nonhuman actors do not assume hierarchy, an essential criterion which contributes to the human-nonhuman split, as exemplified in the previous discussion on Darwin's evolutionary theory. Instead, Dickinson the poet as the human actor, the nonhuman insects, and the nonhuman rain speaker "exchange their properties" (59) and "competencies" (62) through multiple actions. First, the poet utilizes her human properties to observe, follow, and relate to the natural events that take place between the insects, water, and the wind. Upon close attention to the course of nature, Dickinson exerts her human competency to inscribe the sight creatively on paper via the English language prevalent in the human apparatus. Second, the nonhuman insect actors participate in the exchange by demonstrating their ways of living: the annual encounters between the bee, the butterfly, the brooks, the wind, and the rain between spring and summer. The constant interaction in the poetic collective manifests a fluid landscape where the ownership of properties or competencies is

mobilized between human and nonhuman actors through the constant acts of exchange: the nonhuman modes of existence in the forest corresponds to Dickinson's cartographic technique of composing the musical raindrops.

While Dickinson constructs and dwells in this poetic realm that reflects Latour's collective, she, along with the nonhuman actors in the poem, anticipates the visit of "Summer's Day," a result of the exchange of properties between the human poet actor and the nonhuman insect and water actors who jointly complete a set of tasks in preparation for summer. Eventually, the action of the nonhuman actor "Summer's Day" is manifest in its being humanized as the second-person "thy," whose timely arrival is embodied in glittering, misty raindrops, each of which, in a quaint fashion, represents the rain spokesperson's tear-shedding gesture. The final exchange of properties can be regarded as a meta-textual *wordplay* Dickinson employs to demonstrate the inseparability between human and nonhuman beings and to echo, metapoetically, the brooks' loud laughter and the breezes' mad *play*. The human poet composes the poem where the first-person speaker impersonates the rain that *sees* summer's day as the second-person counterpart. The nonhuman actors such as the rain and summer's day are humanized by Dickinson's poetic language that seeks to dehumanize the role of the speaker in the poem. The twofold (de)humanizing actions demonstrate the constant exchange of properties between the human and nonhuman actors in the poetic collective in which Dickinson's particular use of words and process of writing defy the dichotomies between humans and nonhumans; nature and socialization, constituting what Latour terms a "progressive composition of the common world" (*Politics of Nature* 53). I intend to further argue that in Dickinson's "common world" (53), politics is not a solely human activity. Through her poetic imagination and composition, politics becomes something that is truly *common* because it is inclusive of

"everything but not two separated" (*Politics of Nature* 59). In her poetic collective which has been manifested in the exemplary poem above, human and nonhuman actors take turns to assume the authority of the poetic voice by completing an "entire set of tasks" (53) essential to the seasonal transition from spring to summer. Through the demonstration of the poetic collective, an alternative and broader space in which Dickinson's interspecies network is formed and for which Dickinson criticism shall advance beyond the comfortingly anthropocentric approaches.

While an anti-anthropocentric approach to literary studies is inevitably deemed futile by critics due to the fact that literature, or any other disciplines created and operated by humans, really, cannot escape the linguistic constructs of the world. Therefore, what I intend to pursue when demonstrating an anti-anthropocentric approach to reading Dickinson's animal- and nonhuman- focused poems is to resist viewing animals as symbols for human experience, and further, to widen, if not reconstruct, the epistemological conception of the world constituted by multispecies experiences. Aaron Shackelford's "Dickinson's Animals and Anthropomorphism" sheds a positive light on Dickinson's use of anthropomorphism by arguing that the inescapability of human perception in writing about animals serves as an effective reminder of human limits to comprehend animals:

> Rather than attempts to erase the human, [Dickinson] pushes the limits of how far we can project the human onto the animals. In Dickinson's poems, anthropomorphism uncovers just how limited our own consciousness and epistemology really is, while also demonstrating how this shapes our knowledge of animals" (51).

The key idea that we can take away from Shackelford's argument is that criticism of literary animals should not be about fighting anthropomorphic tendencies in writing but challenging the

human knowledge about animals, with regard to the poetic portrayal and narrative of animals that seek to redefine what is thought to be knowable and to explore the *unknown.* And Shackelford contends that it is in this liminal space that Dickinson's perception of animals is demonstrated. I will add that to justify the anthropomorphic inclination of Dickinson's poetic composition is to, implicitly, agree with the notion that humans are perpetually and inevitably anthropocentric. While it is true that humans are absolutely more anthropocentric than non-human animals, just as Despret argues for the loss of "lioness" if a lion speaks in human languages, what I wish to emphasize is the extent to which humans resist their ethnocentrism (sustained by a generalized global human community) and egocentrism when exerting their human perceptions in the presumed anthropocentric comfort zone. Dwelling between the realms of the knowable and the unknown within the human vantage points, Dickinson's poetic manipulation of human perception, while anthropomorphic in a thought-provoking manner, exhibits an anti-anthropocentric direction toward depicting human and animal coexistence. And this alternative representation of human and animal relationships corresponds to Latour's defiance of the great divides between human and nonhuman, society and nature.

III. The Fly Spokesperson

Applying Latour's theory to Dickinson's particular process of poetry writing, I wish to emphasize that it is her poetic collective that despatializes her physical place as designated by human geography, enables her to travel beyond the human sphere across species, and generates ample possibilities in studying poetics and animals together and humans and nonhumans as equals, or even, one and the same, in literary representation. To further illustrate this newfound political domain occupied by humans and nonhumans, all of whom *have a say* in this democratic collective, I suggest that we take a closer look into how the human and nonhuman actors

undertake and exert subjectivity via Dickinson's ingenious use of words in her poetry. In *Politics of Nature*, Latour introduces the notion of "spokesperson," a term frequently used in politics to "designate the whole gamut of intermediaries" (64). Since Dickinson's poetic collective signifies the inclusivity of everything but not two separated, it is evident that the concept of intermediacy reflects the fluidity and constant exchange of properties between the human and nonhuman actors in the collective. While Latour defines a "spokesperson" as an intermediator "between someone who speaks and someone else who speaks in that person's place, between doubt and uncertainty" (*Politics of Nature* 64), I intend to apply his notion of "spokesperson" to investigating the ever-changing loci of subjectivity of the human and nonhuman spokespersons, instead of speakers, in Dickinson's poetry. Her poem "I heard a Fly buzz" serves as an effective example that derives productive thoughts from the critical approach of employing Latour's concept of "spokesperson." Before examining the poem, it should be noted that the difference between a speaker and a spokesperson lies in the absolute ownership of subjectivity. A speaker of a poem is frequently considered to be an equivalent of the poet himself/herself by literary critics, an approach which centers the subjectivity of the poetic voice on the human speaker(s) of a poem or the poet who creates the poem. To replace the critical use of a speaker with a spokesperson is to challenge the concept of poetics as a purely human creation. Since a spokesperson constantly functions in an intermediary state, the subjectivity of a poem, therefore, travels between the human and nonhuman spokespersons who speak for and with the poet, in each other's place. Consequently, subjectivity is no longer a solely human property.

"I heard a Fly buzz," another of Dickinson's insect poems, showcases the mobilized subjectivity between the human and fly spokespersons:

I heard a Fly buzz—when I died—

The Stillness in the Room
Was like the Stillness in the Air—
Between the Heaves of Storm—

The Eyes around - had wrung them dry -
And Breaths were gathering firm
For that last Onset - when the King
Be witnessed - in the Room -

I willed my keepsakes—Signed away
What portion of me be
Assignable—and then it was
There interposed a Fly

With Blue—uncertain—stumbling Buzz—
Between the light—and me—
And then the Windows failed—and then
I could not see to see— (*The Poems*, 265).

The poem starts with a deceased person who reimagines and revisits the last moment of his/her life. In the very beginning of the poem, the first-person human spokesperson introduces his/her nonhuman counterpart—a fly, whose speech consists of buzzing sounds, as if it was speaking in the human spokesperson's place during his/her process of dying. The act of dying is silent, which is contrasted by the equivocal buzz of the nonhuman fly speaker that takes over the poetic voice

of "I." While the buzzing sound might not be regarded as an equivalent of human language, it is speech because it manifests the movement of the fly—its gesture. With reference to Moe's notion of the continuity between the body, animal gestures, and poetic language in *Zoopoetics*, I intend to argue that the fly *speaks* in the deceased human spokesperson's place via its beating of the wings: A gesture articulates the subjectivity of the fly spokesperson that participates in the composition of the poem with Dickinson, who gesticulates her voice through the act of writing with a pen and the English language. While Moe stresses the necessity to include "animal makers" (21) in the process of poetry writing because of "the energy of [their] gesture" (18), I hope to further his argument and suggest that these animal makers, or what I call animal spokespersons, serve as alternative loci for Dickinson to live out her imaginative world in which the poet as a human subject travels to and then dwells within the bodies of the other human or nonhuman spokespersons in the poem. As she relocates between them, her poetic voice and vision are transformed into theirs during her process of poetry writing and the shift of subjectivity takes place each time the act of relocation occurs.

While the deceased human speaker, or to be more exact, the *nonhuman* speaker with a human voice, switches his/her attention to the buzzing fly, the subjectivity of the poet is rendered, through the use of first-person "I", to the deceased human spokesperson, whose subjectivity is embodied in the fly spokesperson upon his/her encounter with the fly's humming wings. In contrast to the silence and the stagnant air in the room, the fly spokesperson's buzzing speech is the only source of animation in the first stanza. At this moment, it is apparent that the corpse lying on the deathbed is presented more as an object than a subject because it is the fly's buzzing sound that dominates the movement in the space of the room as well as within the poetic lines. The fly spokesperson, in addition to manifesting the poetic subjectivity, serves as an

intermediator between periods of strong pulling from the storm, which, according to *Emily Dickinson Lexicon*, is defined as rainfall or violent wind. I wish to interpret Dickinson's use of "the Heaves of Storm" as metaphors that reflect the dead spokesperson's physical and mental journey before reaching the final moment of life. Struggling to obtain a moment of peace between episodes of physical and mental torments as death approaches, the dead spokesperson experiences a buzzing fly that appears to invigorate his/her calming moments before the eventual strike of the storm.

Shifting the focus from the fly spokesperson to the dead spokesperson in the second stanza, Dickinson allows the poetic subjectivity to return to the dead spokesperson by narrating from his/her sight in the deathbed. The dead spokesperson perceives that during his/her temporary break from the physical/mental struggle, the people who are around his/her deathbed seems to join him/her in the peaceful and quiet moments as their eyes are no longer brimmed with tears. While the dead spokesperson narrates the behavior of the onlookers in the room, his/her subjectivity departs from his/her immobilized body for the onlookers' sight. The onlookers' dry eyes and firm breaths signify their changing subjective perception during the spokesperson's dying process: from sorrow to salutation. Rather than the end of life, the onlookers view the spokesperson's imminent death as a beginning of the final task of living, a state of existence which is worshipped by the onlookers because they regard the deceased as "the King" in the room among the living.

Crossing the border of life and death, the dead spokesperson assumes the subjectivity of the King as esteemed by the onlookers and proceeds to assign his/her possessions in the transitional state. During this process, the fly spokesperson abruptly inserts itself. This time, the dead spokesperson records that he/she sees the fly before hearing it. The room has remained

silent until the dead spokesperson hears the fly's buzz again. However, the appearance of the fly spokesperson is obscured by "Blue," which is understood as a "heavenly color" (*Emily Dickinson Lexicon*). Here, it is no longer clear where the poetic subjectivity is located because as the dead spokesperson's health is failing, the fly spokesperson cannot flap its wings constantly but stumble. With regard to Latour's notion of "spokesperson," both the dead and fly spokespersons are situated in an intermediary state where the sense of subjectivity dissipates between the gesticulatory relays of the spokespersons and "between doubt and uncertainty" (*Politics of Nature* 64). The blue, "uncertain," and "stumbling" buzzing gesture of the fly spokesperson seems to express the approaching declination of the senses in the dead spokesperson's place. In addition to experiencing the in-between state with the dead spokesperson, the fly spokesperson also serves as an intermediator between the heavenly light and the dying. Dickinson seems to suggest that a fly, as a nonhuman insect, speaks in the place of the living and yet dying human as well as in the place of the afterlife realm, perhaps heaven.

The fly as a nonhuman spokesperson is endowed, via Dickinson's writing process, with the ability to locate and undertake subjectivity of the human and the nonhuman; the living and the dead; the corporeal and the mystical. While the dead spokesperson loses his/her eyesight, conventionally thought of as the window to the soul, it is unclear to the reader if the fly spokesperson still manages to move its wings after the death of the human spokesperson. I wish to emphasize that the poem does not end where the last line is written. In fact, it is precisely the moment when the dead spokesperson loses his/her eyesight that the fly spokesperson is set free from the *weakening* subjectivity the dead spokesperson embodies. The unseen fly spokesperson is left *seen* on the leaves of poetry, gesturing, in an alphabetical manner, in the poet's place, as a nonhuman writing subject, or in Moe's words, an "animal maker" of poetry. In this poem, the

subjectivity of the poetic voice shifts from the poet to the first-person spokesperson, from the dying spokesperson to the fly spokesperson and back to the dead spokesperson and the stumbling fly, and finally, from the mystical fly spokesperson to the human writing subject, the poet. The interspecies transmission of subjective *speeches* with a constantly doubtful and uncertain deliveries corresponds to the process of becomings of subjectivity presented by Despret. The process of becomings of interspecies subjectivity occurs between the poet and the dying human and fly spokespersons, whose act of *exchanging properties* at the scene of the deathbed as portrayed in the poem remains ongoing—the exchange continues to happen every time the poem is read.

IV. Invoking the Multispecies Gazes

Applying Haraway's conception of species as constituted by multiple gazes which are clones of thoughts, the interspecies becomings of subjectivity, can be demonstrated through the reciprocal looking and being looked at, in respect and with attention. Dickinson's "I started Early—Took my Dog" delineates a poetic collective where interspecies becomings of subjectivity happen in a form of exchanging properties through mutual gazes between the human and nonhuman:

> I started Early—Took my Dog—
> And visited the Sea—
> The Mermaids in the Basement
> Came out to look at me—
>
> And Frigates—in the Upper Floor
> Extended Hempen Hands—

Presuming Me to be a Mouse—

Aground—opon the Sands—

But no Man moved Me—till the Tide

Went past my simple Shoe—

And past my Apron—and my Belt

And past my Boddice—too—

And made as He would eat me up—

As wholly as a Dew

Opon a Dandelion's Sleeve—

And then—I started—too—

And He—He followed—close behind—

I felt His Silver Heel

Opon my Ancle—Then My shoes

Would overflow with Pearl—

Until We met the Solid Town—

No One He seemed to know—

And bowing—with a Mighty look—

At me—The Sea withdrew—

The dog-owner spokesperson, along with his/her dog, goes to the sea in the early morning, and his/her first encounter are mermaids looking at him/her upon their emerging from the bottom of the sea. Two elements in the first stanza remain curious: the dog's existence is unacknowledged amidst the spokesperson's and mermaids' reciprocal gazes, and the commonly assumed spectacle of mythical mermaids becomes the spectators looking at the dog owner. Where is the dog? Or, what is the dog looking at? Why is the dog unseen by the mermaids? Evidently, the mermaids' gazes are rendered upon only the human spokesperson who assumes that the mermaids are looking only at him/her. With regard to Jacques Lacan's theory of mirror stage, the subject's ego is formed when one sees himself/herself in the mirror. Subsequently, the subject's identity is structured by his/her gaze of the other. In other words, the subject's identity is fragmented by his/her own acts of gazing and his/her subjectivity is constituted not only by himself/herself but by external factors organizing the gazes. In the case of the first stanza of the poem, the subjectivity of the dog-owner goes through a process of becoming and experiencing the mythological construct of mermaids who are spokespersons of a different *species* that look back and are manifested in the human dog-owner spokesperson's thought. Since Haraway states that seeing and thinking are clones during interspecies encounters, the dog void in the human spokesperson's sight is dismissed from his/her mind. Therefore, the interspecies becomings of subjectivity occur only between the dog owner and mermaids, who mirror each other inter-subjectively through acts of looking and look back.

The second stanza sees another interspecies encounter between the dog owner, the ships sailing the sea, canvas sails, and an imagined mouse. The gaze of the dog owner spokesperson extends to the distant ocean on which sail ships travel with their sails billowing like waving arms/hands in the wind. This time, the interspecies encounter is manifested in attentive looking

and in the forming of "mental impression or idea" (Haraway 17). Upon gazing at the sailing ships and the billowing sails, the human spokesperson manifests his/her becoming of subjectivity of the ships and sails—nonhuman species constituted by the acts of gazing, referring to Haraway, by portraying his/her own mental impression of a mouse as the figure the alter-species of sails and ships would presume him/her to be from afar. When the human spokesperson speculates the alter-species presumption of him/her, his/her subjectivity is split and mirrored onto the ships and sails, through the acts of looking and looking back. The mouse species, as a subject generated by the second stage of becoming as shown in the method of mirroring the self, demonstrates the forming of a species during a multispecies encounter where thinking and seeing are clones and sights reify thoughts.

From stanza three to stanza five, the interspecies encounters operate through the human spokesperson's multiple gazes at him/herself and the tides of the sea. Each look rendered on him/herself is a look on the waves engaging his/her corporeality and eventually enveloping his/her body almost fully. Starting from his/her "shoe" that is gazed upon and wetted by the tide first, the spokesperson depicts his/her subsequent gazes at different parts of body upward: "my Apron," "my Belt," and "my Boddice." At this moment, the sea tide has not looked back at the human spokesperson—the interspecies encounter has yet to take place. In the following stanza, the sea tide is personified as "He" who would "eat [the spokesperson] up." This is when the alter-species of the tide acts on his subjectivity and when the interspecies becomings of subjectivity occur. Responding to the tide's intention in an attentive manner which corresponds to the spokesperson's mental impression of the tide, the spokesperson enters what Despret calls "situations of the extension of subjectivity" (129). Through the encounter between the body of the human spokesperson and the movement of the tide, the spokesperson's gazes on his/her own

body are closely "followed" by the tide's actions of chasing the spokespersons. The tide's actions of swallowing, following, and overflowing the spokesperson manifest the idea of the spectacle staring back at the spectator—the tide's actions mirror the extension and the fragmentation of subjectivity in such interspecies situations where constant relays of subjectivity constitute the reciprocal becomings of the subjective forces of the other species. Overwhelmed by the tide species' acts of *looking back* as a manner of regarding and responding in Haraway's notion on interspecies encounters, the spokesperson attempts to withdraw him/herself when he/she "started" heading toward the shore where "the Solid Town" is located. The civilized sphere is "solid" in comparison with the sea because the fluid, volatile sea speaks a different sort of language and therefore manifests an erasure of the human understanding of the *intention* of the tides approaching the shore. This is a crucial moment in the poem where the divide between society and nature is further enforced and where Dickinson's poetic composition breaks away from Latour's theory of the collective. With regard to Agamben's concept that the realm of nonhuman animals while remaining open is not openable to humans, due to the human lack of access to a non-linguicentric world, I wish to argue that this sort of inaccessibility can also be applied when the sea "withdrew" from the town on the shore. Certainly, it is the human spokesperson who looks at the ebbing tide and deems it withdrawing. The mental impression of the withdrawing tide is formed in the spokesperson's act of gazing at the sea during such interspecies encounter. And this time, the fragmented subjectivity, as a result of the spokesperson's mirroring his/her identify in another species, stays shattered. The process of the mutual becomings of subjectivity between the spokesperson and the sea is discontinued. The poetic collective is dismantled, and the human spokesperson is left alone to speak only for him/herself. However, Dickinson's move toward an anti-anthropocentric way of depicting the

the sea is evident through the spokesperson's eventual departure from the notion of "We," which serves as a culmination of the process of the interspecies becomings of subjectivity. Her challenging the limit of consciousness, referring to Shackelford's argument, recognizes the fallacy of an anthropomorphic approach to narrating the nonhuman intention. And by exhibiting the human incompentencies which halt the exchange of properties between human and nonhuman actors in the collective and pronouncing the *un-becomings* of subjectivity between the dog owner and the sea in the poem, Dickinson shows us a respectful and anti-anthropocentric approach to an alter-world building where ceaseless efforts and actions of interspecies and intersubjective becomings and un-becomings occur with attentiveness and regard.

Closing the chapter, I wish to suggest that Dickinson's animal- and nonhuman- focused poems manifest alter-worlds where humans are no longer the sole world makers with subjectivity in our multispecies communities. The interspecies encounters demonstrated by the intersubjective becomings and un-becomings in Dickinson's poetic collective exemplify how the open between humans and animals, while unopenable due to the lack of epistemological construct in human perception of the nonhuman sphere with recourse to Agamben's critique on the anthropological machine, informs a world of its own. And this alternative world can be depicted fittingly with regard to Dickinson's ingenious poetic cartography where human and nonhuman makers construct alter-spaces through reciprocal interspecies correspondence demonstrated via respect, attentiveness, and acts of looking and looking back. Amidst the multiple manners of looking which subsequently induce acts of thinking, the interspecies encounters in selected Dickinson's poems defy Darwin's evolutionary theory predicated upon the *thinking* higher animals and humans and the *non-thinking* lower animals. While a gaze is bestowed upon the other, a thought is germinated at the moment—species, regardless of ranking,

embodies a plethora of gazes and ideas uncircumscribed by the evolutionary *order*. Consequently, every species serves as a spokesperson for one another through the constant acts of looking and looking back, and during the interspecies encounters, they speak or gesticulate a gamut of intermediary thoughts signifying their mutual becomings of subjectivity in the alter-world. I wish to emphasize that Dickinson's poetic alter-world with multispecies world builders is to be viewed as the beginning of literary criticism taking actions against the human-exceptionalist conception of the world by taking animals and nonhuman species in literature seriously, with regard to McHugh's proposal. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate a cartographic method based on Henri Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis in my reading of Whitman's "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking." By reading the poem as an interspecies, multitemporal poetic collective, I will argue that rhythm, referring to Lefebvre, serves as a cartographic mechanism that maps the sea/seashore against chronological time.

Notes

[1] The categories are referred to in the epigraph in the beginning of Chapter III. Darwin, "The Descent of Man." 176.

[2] Agamben, *The Open*, 38.

[3] In *When Species Meet,* Haraway states that the question of companion species is "a question of cosmopolitics, of learning to be 'polite' in responsible relation to always asymmetrical living and dying, and nurturing and killing" (42).

CHAPTER THREE

Cartographic Rhythms: Trembling Throat and Hissing Sea

The previous chapter explores Emily Dickinson's multispecies cartography via poetic composition as an imaginative and more generous approach to constructing our world against the anthropocentric vantage point that is so often taken for granted. Through Donna Haraway's proposal of alter-worlding inclusive of multiple species and Bruno Latour's conception of the collective flattening the conventional delegation of human subjects versus nonhuman objects, Dickinson's non-anthropocentric poems manifest a critical venue where what Giorgio Agamben terms the "anthropological machine" fails to sustain the human and animal dichotomy. This chapter will continue to investigate another method of poetic cartography as manifested in Walt Whitman's "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking." Employing Henri Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis to read "Out of the Cradle," I aim to explore the imagined geography of the sea and the nonhuman actors that compose the map of the seashore as cartographers with manifold rhythms, as portrayed in the poem. Maintaining this dissertation's overall pursuit of how 19th-century U.S. poets imagine alternative, non-anthropocentric space and reconstruct their worldviews via dwelling in such imaginative space during their poetic composition, this chapter focuses on the sea/seashore as a locale for interspecies border-crossing and collaborative alter-worlding in the dynamic acts of poetry writing and reading. Viewing nonhuman actors in poetry as the primary cartographers and readers as imaginative geographers, with reference to Robert Tally's *Spatiality*, this chapter examines the imagined sea as a geminating locale for poetic cartography in Whitman's bird poem and argues that nonhuman cartographers, deemed as pioneers in what Haraway calls alter-worlding, draw an alternative map via their bodily movements and gestures which constitute a wide array of rhythmic temporalization and spatialization.

As discussed in Tally's book, geocriticism has been applied to examine narrative that "operates as a form of mapping" (8). His conception of literary cartography and geography is centered on the imaginative reciprocation of spatialization in literature between the writers and the readers. While Tally does suggest that iconographic and non-narrative poetry "could appear to be all the more map-like, insofar as they already appear to be straightforward representations of space, whether in the forms of various spatial arrangements of lines on a page or of depictions of the geographical space exterior to literature" (49), he emphasizes the poetic form as displayed on a page as the arena for a poet's imaginative act of mapmaking. It is indeed evident that the literal presentation of poetic lines visualized as an image, as opposed to the ideological construction between the lines, manifests a sort of spatial arrangements that are absent in the conventional forms of narrative. In addition to Tally's statement that poetic forms represent space in a straightforward manner, poets as cartographers also charts spaces with a more thoughtful, subtle approach. If we view poets as cartographers of an imagined space, poetic forms on a page, then, can be thought of as the periphery or outline of an imaginary map while the denotative and connotative reading of the poetic lines serve as signposts and details of the map. Readers who play the role of geographers, examine not only the periphery of the poetic map but the cartographic details between the lines in such an imaginative space. It is particularly through the investigation of such details that an anti-anthropocentric approach to mapping emerges in literary spatialization.

Since this chapter focuses on cartographical acts at the locale of the sea in Whitman's "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking," I find Rebecca Mills' "The Elegiac Tradition and the Imagined Geography of the Sea and the Shore" illuminating in starting a conversation on geocriticism and poetry. Using elegies as the primary texts to explore the seascape as imagined

geographies, Mills proposes an interdisciplinary method to study the genre of elegy and the field of geographies:

> My discussion of the seascape…aims to contribute both to extending the field of geocriticism toward emotional and transformative geographies sketched in nonnarrative poetry, as well as diverting elegiac criticism from its preoccupation with chronology and history (498).

Speaking directly to Tally's theorization of literary cartography as a critical movement primarily focused on the genre of narrative, Mills' interdisciplinary angle furthers the critical productivity and opportunities in the study of space and place as well as the volatility of geographical conceptions on a literary map. Her argument concerning the "emotional and transformative" geographies delineated in elegies suggests the capacity of space to inform time. Instead of viewing the genre of elegy as a lament in retrospect, her perspective of elegies is concerned with spatial mobility and affectivity of the seascape that interrupts the rigid, chronological documentation of human life in elegiac criticism. Foregrounding the natural elements, especially the sea and the shore, in elegiac composition, Mills seems to appeal for, in addition to her stated interest in connecting poetry and geocriticism, an alternative way of telling the stories of human existence. Her resistance to the conventional approaches of elegiac criticism, which stress chronology and history, echoes Haraway's argument that "[w]hen species meet, the question of how to inherit histories is pressing, and how to get on together is at stake" (35). It is at the particular moment of interspecies encounter when alter-worlding occurs and the conventional understanding of world history is shattered. Haraway states that the encountering of species entails reciprocal acts of looking and holding in regard. I consider the act of gazing a mode of spatial production as the gazer acknowledges the space between him/her and the gazed who

affirms the existence of such space by looking back. Therefore, the organic, reciprocal looking between the gazer and the gazed manifests a morphing space which is constantly expanded, diminished, and shifted in accordance with the (void of) exchange between human and nonhuman species.

Mills' notion of "transformative geographies," in this regard, demonstrates the mutual acts of holding in regard between the human poet and the nonhuman sea and shore, the participants of the interspecies encounters in the elegiac moments. It is at those moments that geographies cease to be sites to record historical events but mobilize multispecies existence against the anthropocentric and chronological ways of knowing. By recognizing the capacity of the sea and the shore to invigorate and even re-write history of human existence, Mills' article brings forth an exemplar of Haraway's alter-worlding in the study of poetry and geography beyond the spatial arrangements on the conventional world map. I wish to further the exploration of spatial imagination in poetry at the sea to present an alternative method of cartography in animal-focused poetry that unsettles the current conception of geographical boundaries.

Continuing to investigate Latour's theory of the collective in which humans and nonhumans exchange properties and the subject-object opposition is defied as discussed in the last chapter, here I will use the concept of the poetic collective to inaugurate a system of poetic mapping via Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis, as embodied in the exchange between human and nonhuman actors, in my reading of Whitman's "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking." An elegiac poem about memory and the merging of multiple temporal events, Whitman's "Out of the Cradle" demonstrates what I call "a multi-temporal collective." In Latour's words, "[t]he collective signifies 'everything but not two separated'," and "humans and nonhumans […] can exchange properties, in order to compose in common the raw materials of the collective" (59).

Latour's anti-binary approach to describing the roles of actors in multispecies networks and the responsibilities encompassed in the roles every actor plays is founded on the notion of the fluid and morphing quality of human and nonhuman acting *properties*. I suggest that what Latour means by the exchange of properties can be understood as the interaction between actors, each of whom performs their own unique gestures and rhythms. As stated by Lefebvre, "Everywhere there is interaction between a place, a time, and an expenditure of energy, there is rhythm" (25). The interaction between the actors is manifested in their mutual giving and receiving of the social cues, and my use of "social" here is derived from Latour's Actor Network Theory that the social is an assemblage of human and nonhuman actors. Through the exchange of such social properties engendered by the different combinations of place, time, and manners in which energy is exerted, multispecies actors compose poetry with rhythms generated by their bodies—the "raw material" (Latour 59), the untamed repetition of "movements, gestures, action, situations, differences" (Lefebvre 25), as described in Lefebvre's definition of rhythms in repetition.

So, how does Whitman's "Out of the Cradle" demonstrate a multi-temporal collective in which human and nonhuman actors compose poetic lines with rhythms? As previously mentioned, the poem is about memory and recollection of various moments in the past, present, and future. In "The Act of Remembering in 'Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking'," Janet Zehr discusses the three main interpretive approaches to reading the poem and prioritizes the critical lens that looks at the poem as a manifestation of the remembering processes of the poet's mind. Different from the other approaches of reading the poem from biographical and cosmic scales, the focus on the poem as a vehicle to delineate the processes of the minds of the poet as well as of all men and women helps to pronounce the capacity of poetic composition to, in Zehr's words, "re-shape the events in the past and alters time" (21). Zehr notes that the events in the past are re-

shaped when “the man/poet in the present constructs one moment, a composite moment that may have very little relation to what actually occurred, that can relay the emotions of many more or less similar moments in the past”(23). She further argues that the poem “represents the process of remembering” (23) and such a process is very different from creating a poem from a memory very accurately. In other words, Zehr believes that this poem should not be read merely with reference to biographical evidence of Whitman’s life. As soon as Whitman recounts a moment from the past and resituates the moment in his present when composing the poem, the heavily used phrase such as “every day” becomes a generalization of only one specific moment in the past the poet manages to recollect and represent as, what Zehr terms, “a composite moment,” altering the perspective on time as narrated by sequential events.

Other critics have pointed out it is likely that the narrator’s mental state contributes to the morphing quality of the process of remembering as demonstrated in the poem. Stanley Gutman’s article “Conflations in Walt Whitman’s ‘Out of the Cradle’” appeals to the destabilizing psyche underlying the poem:

> I claim that the conflations in “Out of the Cradle” present the manner in which the psyche transforms not only present conflicts in the light of past conflicts (a transformation with which we are all familiar), but also past conflicts in the lights of present conflicts. Thus memory (“Reminiscence”), which shapes the individual’s behavior in the present, is itself continually reshaped so as to be serviceable to the individual present needs (150).

Stressing the transformative quality of the psyche of the poet, Gutman argues that it is the boy’s memory of the past that shapes his present action—the longing for maternal affection and unity with the mother. Furthermore, his argument also supports that it is the present conflicts of the narrator’s mind that is reflected in the boy’s attentive acts of translating the mockingbird’s song,

which can be seen in the "curious" boy's "[c]autiously peering, absorbing, translating" (Whitman 389). By saying that memory is itself continually reshaped, Gutman debunks the sole ownership and exertion of subjectivity of the boy translator as a human actor. The present behavior of the boy translator is altered by memory, which is no longer merely something that is owned and recalled but an autonomous nonhuman actor that shapes and reshapes the poet's decision-making during the composition of the poem. The exchange of properties in Whitman's multispecies collective takes place between the human and nonhuman actors assuming the roles of the boy, the singing mockingbird, and the amorphous memory. In this collective, binaries do not exist because the acts of the bird's singing of memory, the boy's translating the songs, and memory's shaping and reshaping the poet's compositional process are inseparable from one another. Therefore, the conventional reading of poetry that views human speaking roles as subjects who take action to observe nonhuman existence as objects of analysis is not applicable in a collective in which subjects and objects are mutually replaceable. Here, the flattening of the power relationships between subjects and objects manifests Latour's networks of relationships in which actors interact with each other via association rather than subject-object bifurcation.

Colleen Boggs' perspective on the mutual dependence of the presumed human subject and nonhuman object in *Animalia Americana: Animal Representations and Biopolitical Subjectivity* is useful to further the discussion:

> The subject is not self-sufficient but relies on affective relationships that cross the species lines…Human and nonhuman are themselves mutable categories whose definitions are worked out in these affective relationships (6).

Seeking to refute the "binarization between the human and the animal" (Boggs 7), Boggs' idea on the affective relationships in place of linguicentric communication between humans and

animals is crucial to addressing the nonhuman ownership of subjectivity demonstrated in "intertwined symbolizations and embodiments" (7). When Whitman writes about the boy's intense attraction to and observation of the mockingbird's singing from his childhood experience, the poet's memory is, in a sense, re-constructed or reshaped, not only via his own present conflict, as Gutman suggests, but via the mockingbird's trembling throat. The male mockingbird's trembling throat, an embodiment of his untiring gesture of communication, is imprinted in the boy's soul, which, then, translates the bird's song into poetic lines. While the attentive boy might not understand the true message of the bird's song as he eventually questions the bird if it is really to his mate he sings, his translation of the bird's vocal gesture manifests his attempt to represent the affect which is induced by the bird's singing ceaselessly and causes him to shed tears repetitively. Through such affective relationship where the boy as the human subject relies on the nonhuman bird's vocalization to re-live his past moments, the fragmented memories in "Out of the Cradle" become an everchanging site for interspecies relays of subjectivity via affective, non-linguicentric modes of communication.

Whether it is Zehr's reading of "Out of the Cradle" as Whitman's remembering processes unfaithful to the description of time in the poetic lines or Gutman's note on the self-ruling memory revealing Whitman's transformative projection of his longings, the compositional precariousness concerning human subjectivity results from the frustrating attempts to connect the poem to the poet's biographical events through the poetic narrative of memory. Memory, once rendered autonomous or transmitted to nonhuman actors, deconstructs the subject-object relationship in the poem. So, how can we advance the discussion on the working of memory in Whitman's poetic composition? I find Lefebvre's idea on the relationship between memory and rhythms instrumental in comprehending the function of memory in "Out of the Cradle" in an

alternative manner uncircumscribed by the human psyche. Stressing the ubiquity and yet obscurity of rhythms, Lefebvre describes the "movement" of memory and how it manifests rhythms:

> No camera, no image or series of images can show these rhythms. It requires equally attentive eyes and ears, a head and a memory and a heart. A memory? Yes, in order to grasp this present otherwise than in an instantaneous moment, to restore it in its moments, in the movement of diverse rhythms. The recollection of other moments and of all hours is indispensable, not as a simple point of reference, but in order not to isolate this present and in order to *live* it in all its diversity, made up of subjects and objects, subjective states and objective figures (45).

According to Lefebvre, memory is something necessary for us to live at the present moment in a diverse manner. And such diversity is demonstrated in the movement of rhythms. I want to further suggest that the diverse rhythms are the ways in which memory is presented and altered in "Out of the Cradle." Starting in the first stanza of the poem, memory from the past is introduced in the sense of hearing:

> From the memories of the bird that chanted to me,
> From your memories sad brother, from the fitful risings and fallings I heard,
> …………………………………………………..…
> From those beginning notes of yearning and love there in the mist,
> From the thousand responses of my heart never to cease (Whitman 388).

First, it is the bird's chanting that constitutes the speaker's memories. The memories are then expanded to notes of love and yearning and the undying thousand responses of the heart of the speaker who identifies as a chanting boy. The rhythms detected via hearing are the "chanting" of

the mockingbird which contrasts with the more internal and affective notes generated by the boy's profound "yearning and love" from his heart. It is as if the beating of the heart composed "the thousand responses" to the mockingbird's chanting. The rhythm of a heart pulsates responsively to the melodic memory of the bird. Here, rhythms are mobilized through the human actor's ability to hear the nonhuman bird's memory as well as his own present bodily rhythms echoing the auditory movement of the memory.

The movement continues as the bird's memory is sighted and enacted via the boy's visual translation in the third and fourth stanzas:

Shine! Shine! Shine!
Pour down our warmth, great sun!
While we bask, we two together.

Two together!
Winds blow south, or winds blow north,
Day come white, or night come black,
Home, or rivers and mountains from home,
Singing all time, minding no time,
While we two keep together.

Through the movement of rhythms enacted by the action of the sun shining, the wind blowing, and the birds basking and singing, a set of visualized nonhuman actors' properties coexist and are in exchange with each other and the human actor's behavior of "peering, absorbing, and translating." The nonhuman properties such as warmth of the sun and directionality of the wind are exchangeable due to the fluidity of time—as seen in "singing all time, minding no time." And

such timeless and spatially morphing property of memory results from the inseparability of the two birds against time, which further addresses the networks of relationships constructed by association in the multispecies poetic collective. The visual congruence is displayed through the nonhuman rhythms between the acts of sun-shining, bird-basking, wind-blowing, and deconstructing restraints of time and space. The movement of diverse rhythms, as the poem continues, is embodied repetitively through aural and visual faculties utilized by the bird who sings and the boy who translates the song. A poetic rendition of the process of remembering, the compositional technique of “Out of the Cradle” embodies what Lefebvre considers a memory formed by diverse rhythms produced by human and nonhuman actors, each of whom has their points of reference to sound, space, and time.

The reference to time as in the line “[s]inging all time, minding no time” is particularly intriguing because the temporal reference in the poem is manifested in the fragmented moments of the remembering process. The disruption of chronological record of events as a result of Whitman’s employment of diverse rhythms corresponds to Mills’ proposal of studying elegies against chronological and historical vantage points. Since the genre of elegy entails the act of reflection on the dead, “Out of the Cradle,” which ends with the sea whispering “Death, death, death, death, death,” should be read more than a mournful song composed of the narrator’s past and present memories. With regard to Mills’ observation of the elegy tradition at the sea and the shore, “Out of the Cradle,” while written as a narrative of non-sequential events with human and nonhuman characters, manifests an elegiac collective where the man and boy actors interact with the bird actor via pulsating rhythms from the ocean waves.

In “The Rhythm That Rocks Walt’s Cradle,” W. D. Snodgrass suggests that the rhythmic structure in the poetic lines is in a constant flow with the ocean:

> This cradle…, the sea, which had once rocked all like and is introduced and developed here in a thematic rhythm, an auditory symbol evoking the ocean's movement (404-405).

Focusing on the variation of beats and the rhythmic motifs, Snodgrass elaborates on the previous criticism on Whitman's inspiration by opera during the composition of the poem and suggests that the musicality of the poem is especially prominent in the nonhuman mockingbird's song:

> Only when he recalls and 'translates' the actual mockingbird's song—first an aria of joy at being with his mate, then of desolation at her loss—does Whitman return to an even more pronounced music (406).

Snodgrass' reading of "Out of the Cradle" examines Whitman's composition in a twofold manner: poetic form and thematic movement. Referring to the structure of opera to conduct a musical analysis of the poem and using the variations of beats to identify the thematic movements between the lines, Snodgrass suggests that Whitman's "rhythmic theme-and-variations prosody" (410) is unique to this poem and has not been employed in his other "grief-ridden" (410) poems such as "When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloomed" and "As I Ebb'd with the Ocean of Life." Such observation begs one to further the inquiry: why mockingbirds? While it is known that Whitman might have seen mockingbirds in the South after he accepted a position in the New Orleans *Crescent* in 1848, the influences on his composing and untiringly revising "Out of the Cradle" have been widely discussed by critics. I find Maire Mullins' piece on the compositional process of the poem essential to exploring what Snodgrass deems to be a unique thematic movement of rhythms in the context of a multispecies discourse. In "Birdsong in Whitman: Listening to the Mockingbird in 'Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking'," Mullins contends that Septimus Winner's "Listen to the Mockingbird," a popular song in the 19th-century, serves as a major influence on Whitman's composition of "Out of the Cradle." She

quotes part of the song that corresponds to the boy's attentive translation of the mockingbird and the movement of the ocean in the poem:

> Listen to the mocking bird,
>
> Listen to the mocking bird,
>
> The mocking bird still sings o'er her grave.
>
> Listen to the mocking bird,
>
> Listen to the mocking bird,
>
> Still singing where the weeping willows wave (21).

Mullins, then, conducts a reading of this part of the song in association with "Out of the Cradle":

> In Whitman's poem, the "grave" is the ocean, and the male mockingbird searches in vain for his mate as the young boy watches. In Winner's song, the mockingbird perches on the "weeping willows," which "wave"—much like the "white arms out in the breakers tirelessly tossing" in "Out of the Cradle" (*LG* 1892, 198). The young boy in Whitman's poem watch[es] the lone mockingbird call for his mate…listening as the lone mocking bird searches for his mate and sings a series of fruitless appeals for her return (*LG* 1892, 197) (Mullins 21-22).

The act of listening attentively is essential to Winner's song about the mockingbird, just like the boy translator observes the mockingbird via "cautiously peering, absorbing, translating." Mullin's comparison of the images of weeping willows and the white arms as the metaphors of the sea makes it evident that Whitman's description of mockingbirds might have its source in the popular song, which is said to be a song appreciated by his Captain Abraham Lincoln (Mullins 19).

Another influence that might have contributed to Whitman's composition of "Out of the Cradle," in Mullins' perspective, was his friendship with John Burroughs, a 19th-century American naturalist. While Burroughs describes Whitman's birdsong as "ideal and eminently characteristic" and "poetical and not at all ornithological" in "Birds and Poets," he considers the birdsong unmatched in literature and is "a rendering of free translation" (9). Mullins argues that it was their friendship that "deepened [Whitman's] understanding of birdsong" and enabled him to listen "differently and more accurately to the mockingbird" (23). The two influences on Whitman's composition as investigated in Mullins' work are certainly valid, on condition that humans be capable of understanding mockingbirds' songs to imitate them *accurately* and that Whitman's main contributions to the description of the mockingbird in "Out of the Cradle," other than his poetic art, be his cultivated curiosity about birds at a young age and his trip to New Orleans. Returning to the quest of this chapter to examine how multispecies actors in poetry map space and construct an alternative world against anthropocentric measures, I find these questions essential to reading "Out of the Cradle" *uncertainly* and freely: is it possible to situate Whitman and his animal-focused poems beyond the man-made map and his biographical context in an attempt to defy the absolute human ownership of subjectivity in literary creation? Just like Whitman's revision process of "Out of the Cradle," the study of ornithology has progressed since the 19th-century. How can we re-visit the male mockingbird's songs and his characteristics from a more contemporarily ornithological viewpoint to re-evaluate the human-and-bird relationship in our posthuman condition? Furthermore, how can we investigate the working of rhythms in the poem in conjunction with the scientific study of mockingbirds?

In addition, the two sources of inspiration proposed by Mullins seem contradictory. If Whitman indeed found inspiration in Winner's song, which is an anthropomorphic representation

of mockingbirds' behavior, his resorting to Burroughs for a scientific (and oftentimes considered more objective) perspective to *translate* the mockingbird's song suggests the artistic uncertainty embedded in the poetic composition. If Whitman's goal is to sing *with* the mockingbird via the boy's translation in order to perform his poetic art, he might not feel obliged to revise the mockingbird's song to be more "accurate" in the later versions. Burroughs' comment on Whitman's poem as "not at all ornithological" also sheds light on the inaccuracy of Whitman's portrayal of the mockingbird. It is worth noting that such authorial inconsistency is inevitable if we as critics endeavor to equate Whitman's artistic capacity for poetic composition with his knowledge and certainty about the animals that dwell in his poems. What if Whitman, in addition to creating the narrator of "a curious boy," is, during the compositional process, a curious author as well as a human actor who intends to conduct a sort of exchange of properties with the nonhuman bird by exercising his human ability to write, with regard to Latour's proposed mechanism of the collective? What if we investigate such mechanism of human and nonhuman exchange of properties in the multispecies, multitemporal collective manifested in "Out of the Cradle" by tracing the embodiment of rhythms by both the human and nonhuman actors?

Before I delve into the function of bodily rhythms in the poem, I will look at Mary Russell-Roberson's 2016 article on mockingbird's learning of songs in the *Living Bird* Magazine, published by *The Cornell Lab of Ornithology*, an organization whose mission is to "interpret and conserve the earth's biological diversity through research, education and citizen science focused on birds" (*The Cornell Lab*) Since the Cornell lab focuses on citizen science that aims to educate the general public and conducts research through the collaboration between professional and amateur scientists, I find it pertinent to discuss Roberson's report on and Whitman's memory of mockingbirds together, especially when Whitman is considered an

amateur ornithologist whose poetic description of the mockingbird is "not at all ornithological," in Burroughs' words, but whose articulation of the characteristics of mockingbirds' song to his readers is certainly informative and impactful, if not *accurate*. Therefore, here I will provide an updated understanding about mockingbirds' songs from Roberson's article, in an attempt to re-read "Out of the Cradle" against its historical context as employed in Mullins' work.

In "Mockingbirds Can Learn Hundreds of Songs, But There's A Limit," Roberson describes how mockingbirds compose their songs:

> Their singing is not only voluminous but also diverse. Mockingbirds string together series of repeated phrases, some of which are imitations of other bird species. A male may have several hundred phrases in his repertoire, although some will be in much heavier rotation than others. A typical song is about equally divided between mimicked phrases and mockingbird-specific vocalizations (*The Cornell Lab*).

The diverse and voluminous songs of mockingbirds parallel Whitman's prolificity in composing poems, which are characteristic of their oratorical and musical qualities. His cataloguing style also corresponds to mockingbirds' compositional technique of "string[ing] together series of repeated phrases," as stated by Roberson. The repetitive "Out of…" and "From…" in the first stanza of "Out of Cradle," while not included in the two parts of the mockingbird's song in the poem, serves as a foil to enhance the repetitional feature of mockingbirds' song that is translated by the curious boy. The exchange of subjectivity in composition between the human poet and the nonhuman mockingbird in "Out of the Cradle" further solidifies my approach to reading the poem as a multispecies collective. Whitman as a human actor in the collective, through such exchange of compositional techniques with the male mockingbird, appears to create and revise the poem in a similar fashion to what Roberson describes as mockingbirds' typical song—a song

"equally divided between mimicked phrases and mockingbird-specific vocalizations." The boy's two-part translation of the male mockingbird's song can be viewed as Whitman's endeavor to mimic mockingbirds' melodic rhythms, and the rest of the poem, which is centered on the rhythmic movement of the sea and seashore, remains Whitman's own sea-specific poetic utterance, given that "Out of the Cradle" is part of his *Sea-Drift* collection. In this vein of thought, Whitman assumes the position of a mockingbird when composing, singing, and revising "Out of the Cradle" via mimicking his mockingbird's song by using techniques of repetition and cataloguing and, at the same time, maintaining his incessant oratorical outpour about the ocean. Thinking of Whitman as a human *actor* who acts out mockingbirds' musical properties, I will further suggest that the male mockingbird in the poem, in turn, takes on the human poet's properties of poetic creation and syntactic capacity as a thinking and writing subject.

I wish to stress, again, the flattening of human subjectivity remains an essential characteristic of the poetic collective. Through the mutual exchange of properties between the human and nonhuman actors, the ownership and exertion of subjective force are constantly relayed between the humans and nonhumans in the collective. The properties that are being exchanged are germinated via the operation of subjectivity in poetic composition, which is driven by both the human and nonhuman bodily movements that interact with space and time constructed in the poem. I find Lefebvre's definition of rhythm useful and productive in explicating how Whitman's poetic collective is formed through multispecies composition of space against chronological time as an alternative, anti-anthropocentric world:

> Everywhere there is interaction between a place, a time, and an expenditure of energy, there is rhythm. Therefore:
>
> (a) repetition (of movements, gestures, action, situations, differences);

(b) interferences of linear processes and cyclical processes;

(c) birth, growth, peak, then decline and end.

In this alter-world, time is fragmented and non-chronological. Different from Zehr's interpretation of the poem as *Whitman's* composite moment, I will emphasize that this poem is a co-creation of both the human poet and the nonhuman mockingbird, who co-own and co-contribute to the composite moment from their respective moments of existence in the past and the present. Referring to Snodgrass' viewpoint on the sea as the thematic rhythms of "Out of the Cradle," I will further his idea by arguing that the sea, in addition to being the driving force of rhythms between the stanzas, also serves as the place and the time, in which the human and nonhuman expenditures of energy are manifested in their bodily movements in the poetic collective. The sea as the cradle where Whitman the posing mockingbird and the male mockingbird from Alabama sing their symbiotic song is a living and constantly fluctuating locale, which can be viewed as the thoughtful foundation of the multispecies collective. The thought, here, lies in the debunking of Whitman's portrayal of the mockingbird's songs as merely an anthropomorphic attempt to understand animal behaviors. His semi-accurate mimesis is certainly linguicentric and anthropocentric, as seen in "Shine! shine! shine!" and "Blow! blow! blow!", which represent human perception of the motions of the sun and the wind. However, it should be noted that when composing the poem as a "human mockingbird," a term I coin to refer to Whitman as a human actor acting out the properties of his nonhuman counterpart—the male mockingbird—in the collective, Whitman also includes his own "specific vocalization," referring to Roberson's point on mockingbirds' compositional technique. The specific vocalization in his composition of the poem is driven by the rocking cradle, "the white arms out in the breakers tirelessly tossing," and "the savage old mother incessantly crying." The male mockingbird in the

poem, viewed as Whitman's subject of study and inspiration in previous criticism, is, then, transformed into a subject who writes and whose properties of melodic composition and performance constitute diverse rhythms of repetition that move with the boy's chronological narration along the *vocalized* seashore.

I. Diverse Rhythms in Repetition

The male mockingbird's diverse rhythms in repetition are first demonstrated in his singing and basking with his mate in the sun and the wind, again, in the third and fourth stanzas:

Shine! shine! shine!
Pour down your warmth, great sun!
While we bask, we two together.

Two together!
Winds blow south, or winds blow north,
Day come white, or night come black,
Home, or rivers and mountains from home,
Singing all time, minding no time,
While we two keep together (389).

The varied beats used to repetitively emphasize the mockingbirds' juxtaposed basking bodies as in "we two together," "Two together!", and "we two keep together," show the altering rhythms in their song which centers on the recurrent theme of the two birds' jointly basking in both the stanzas. The repetition of the verbs "shine," "blow," and "come" manifests the nonhuman mockingbird's gesture to perceive its environment via the anthropomorphic translation of the boy as the human actor in this scene. The boy and the two mockingbirds together, through their

respective embodiment of linguistic and kinesthetic rhythms, establish an imagined landscape where nonhuman birds assume the foreground while the boy "cautiously" translates from the periphery. Such a harmonious multispecies scene is transformed due to the change of the situation as signaled by the repetition of "*Blow! blow! blow!*". In the final stanza of the first part of the boy's translation, the mockingbirds' bodies are mobilized as the she- and he-birds are no longer physically *together*. The male mockingbird's repetitive gesticulation of the winds blowing serves to foreshadow a different scenario in his impending future as he "wait[s] and wait[s]" for his mate to be blown back to him. Starting from the previous stanzas, time remains non-existent and yet all-encompassing in the birds' singing. The movement of rhythms lies in the changing of place and the human and nonhuman exertion of energy, with regard to Lefebvre's conception of rhythm. When the wind blows the she-bird away, the wind becomes a nonhuman actor whose expenditure of energy is manifested in the act of repetitive blowing. The ever-changing wind, which indicates place in the production of rhythms—"Winds blow south, or winds blow north"—in the previous stanza, repeats its rhythmic blowing and enacts change in the mockingbirds' situation.

The repetitive movement of rhythms to enable interspatial and interspecies exchange continues in the second part of the boy's translation of the mockingbird's song:

Soothe! soothe! soothe!

Close on its wave soothes the wave behind,

And again another behind embracing and lapping, every one close,

But my love soothes not me, not me.

Low hangs the moon, it rose late,

It is lagging—O I think it is heavy with love, with love.

O madly the sea pushes upon the land,

With love, with love (390).

In this section, the sea wave as the nonhuman actor performs its energizing force through the repetitive acts of soothing. With the seashore as the locale and the wave pounding the shore as a form of energy expenditure, the moon that hangs low and rises late serves to indicate time—dusk—in this multispecies rhythmic scene. The male mockingbird, who has entered the stage of mourning for the loss his mate, sings his sorrowful song by repeating "my love soothes not me, not me," "[the moon] is heavy with love, with love," and "the sea pushes…with love, with love." If we understand "my love" as a reference to the missing she-bird, who can no longer comfort the he-bird due to her absence, we can, therefore, further suggest that when the he-bird describes the moon as heavy with love and the lapping wave as a manifestation of love, an exchange of bodily rhythms between the moon, the sea, and the she-bird occurs. It is the she-bird, the he-bird's beloved, that weighs down the moon to prevent herself from drooping into the sea. The moon becomes *heavy* with the male mockingbird's imagined acts of survival of his mate. The physical appearance of the moon is animated, in a drag-beat sort of movement of low-hanging and late-rising—"with love, with love," via the imagined she-bird's resistance to gravitational energy, to her impending death in the sea. Meanwhile, the sea wave that pounds the shore in a rhythmic fashion—"with love, with love"—can be seen as the drowning she-bird's desperate attempts to hang on to the land of life where her nest is located. Through embodying the rhythms of the moon's perpetual gesture of hanging in the sky, the sea wave's untiring lapping the shore, the she-bird manifests and relays subjectivity to the hanging moon and the lapping wave. The

male mockingbird's repetitive calling for his mate "with love" assembles diverse rhythms between the nonhuman actors—the moon, the sea wave, and his imagined, drowning mate. Here, the male mockingbird's action of singing about his mate with repetitive phrases helps to visualize the she-bird's bodily rhythms that pulsate with the movements of the moon and the wave and construct an alternative map between life and death at the seashore.

The working of rhythms in repetition in the mockingbird's song continues throughout the second part of the boy's translation as darkness gradually overwhelms the piercing sound of the he-bird's "trembling throat" in the night sky and renders his rhythmic song useless. In a final attempt to conclude his song, the mockingbird's melodic rhythms circulate back to the first sequence of repetition where he sings "we two together…we two keep together." The difference in such thematic repetition of rhythms in the last stanza of his song is shown with the additional two words at the end of the line: we two together *no more*. The emphasis on the notion of "no more" via repetition in the final stanza, therefore, marks the end of the mockingbird's musical and bodily rhythms as well as the boy's translation of the mockingbird's song in a mimetic, linguicentric sense. Examining the boy's two-part translation through Lefebvre's theory of rhythm in repetition, one can find that his rhyth manalysis is proven generative in reading Whitman's representation of mockingbirds' song in the poetic collective of "Out of the Cradle" where human and nonhuman prosodic and bodily rhythms as forms of expenditure of energy delineate alternative methods of spatialization, destabilizing (non-) linguistic, interspecies, and temporal boundaries.

II. Rhythms as Interferences of Linear and Cyclic Processes

Whitman as a human mockingbird, while mimicking the nonhuman male mockingbird's bodily rhythms that are manifested in his vocal gestures, diurnal and nocturnal

situations/movements, and differences in his rhythmic repetition, exerts his compositional energy by making his own specific utterance of the sea and a unique poetic structure that disrupts the conventional conception of time and space through the act of remembering. Zehr's reading of "Out of the Cradle" as Whitman's process of remembering is useful to examine how rhythm is employed as a form of interference in the poem. In Lefebvre's words, rhythm is also embodied in the "interferences of linear processes and cyclical processes" (25). Here, I will investigate how the non-mimetic part of the poem interferes the linear and cyclical processes of time and composition that frame the mockingbird's song. The poem as a *bird song* sung by Whitman the human mockingbird, shares a similar compositional technique to mockingbirds' instinctual composition—a song constituted by the imitation of other birds' songs and by the mockingbird's own specific vocalization, with regard to Roberson's article. Whitman, in composing "Out of the Cradle," designs the structure of the song in a similar fashion—his liguicentric mimesis of mockingbirds' song recorded in the boy's translation and his own specific vocalization narrating fragmented moments from the past, present and the future with the rhythm of the rocking sea.

While I have shown previously that rhythms in repetition through varied movements, gestures, actions, situations, and differences are embodied in the diverse bodily rhythms of the nonhuman sun, wind, moon, sea, and mockingbirds in the boy's translation, here I will focus on how rhythm can serve to interfere both linear and cyclical processes via Whitman's specific vocalization in the poem in a particular place driven by an expenditure of energy. The specific vocalization, unlike the poet's mimetic translation of mockingbirds' songs, stems from the oceanic rhythm sustaining the entire poem. The sea's vocalization has its onset as "the cradle endlessly rocking," a movement which suggests a sense of perpetuity, setting up a cyclical frame of the poetic collective. The act of rocking ceaselessly demonstrates a metronomic quality of the

wave. The untiring sea waves as the place setting suggests the sense of time which, while seeming monotonous and constant at the onset of the poem, fluctuates as the narrator resumes his act of reminiscing about his childhood:

> A man, yet by these tears a little boy again,
>
> Throwing myself on the sand, confronting the waves,
>
> I, chanter of pains and joys, uniter of here and hereafter,
>
> Taking all hints to use them, but swiftly leaping beyond them,
>
> A reminiscence sing (388).

The confrontation of the waves initiates the narrator's traveling in time, in a linear sense, to the past, the starting point of the reminiscence. Whitman the human mockingbird, assumes the position of a "uniter" that connects the present and future by singing his song. It is the lapping waves that entail "hints" as inspirations to Whitman's song, and by moving much faster than the nonhuman waves whose rhythm remains cyclical, the poet as the human actor seems determined that his song will surpass the recurrent oceanic rhythm and his bodily movement will generate an alternative rhythm via the act of "leaping." The human actor's leap, here, demonstrates an exertion of energy *forward*, confronting the metronomic manner of energy production of the sea.

The leap beyond the cyclical waves mobilizes the narrator onto the seashore in "some briers," where "the lilac-scent" (388) fills the air and the grass prospers. The boy's translation of the mockingbird's love song thereon begins, as a result of the narrator's deviating from the recurrent process of the waves and leaping toward the shore, where a linear process of the mockingbird's musical recollection of the past takes place. While the cyclical process of the oceanic rhythm is disrupted by Whitman's endeavor to concoct a linear narration of the mockingbird's story, the place setting is transitioned from the sea cradle to the briers on the

shore. The interference of linear and cyclical processes continues to be manifested in the boy's descriptive notes inserted between sections of his translation of the mockingbird's song. The first part of his notes addressing the disappearance of the she-bird in one afternoon serves as an interference of the mockingbird's melodic rhythm in repetition as well as a linear development of the birds' story.

Next, the linear scale of the narrative is expanded to be the duration of summer months:

> And thenceforward all summer in the sound of the sea,
>
> And at night under the full of the moon in calmer weather,
>
> Over the hoarse surging of the sea,
>
> Or flitting from brier to brier by day,
>
> I saw, I heard at intervals the remaining one, the he-bird,
>
> The solitary guest from Alabama (389).

The locale of the sea is written into the scene where the male mockingbird's search for his mate continues. The sound of the lapping wave repeats itself in a cyclical manner while the progression of summer "day by day" entails a linear perspective of time. The boy, whose bodily movements are manifested in the acts of seeing and hearing, interrupts the mockingbird's song with his translation of the mutual interference of rhythms between the cyclical waves and the linear narrative of the birds' story. The boy's body and its gesture can be understood as, in Lefebvre's words, "the first point of analysis, the tool for subsequent investigations" (6). The boy's corporeal rhythms which dominate how he observes and translates the mockingbird's song manifests a mode of analysis that, while anthropocentric, allows the nonhuman actors to exchange their properties with each other and with the boy through a wide range of bodily generated rhythms from all the multispecies actors in the poetic collective. In such a

"polyrhythmically" constructed collective, "in place of fixed things, [the boy] follow[s] each *being*, each *body*, as having its place, its rhythm, with its recent past, a foreseeable and a distant future" (40-41). The boy's in-between notes, in this regard, serves as the human actor's method of following and interfering the nonhuman rhythms as embodied by the sea, the moon, and the mockingbirds. Subsequently, each of the nonhuman actors claims its place with its unique rhythms that do not correspond to the boy translator's linguicentric approach to energizing the collective with written and spoken words. By approaching the stanza from Lefebvre's polyrhythmic perspective, we can see that the linear process of the mockingbird's story is interfered by the bodily rhythms of the sea, the moon, and the boy translator, whose respective rhythms construct a myriad of temporal perspectives on the seashore.

The cyclical rhythms of the lapping waves continue to serve as the locale where the boy listens to the mockingbird's notes attentively as he experiences the surroundings with his own bodily rhythm:

> Yes my brother I know,
>
> The rest might not, but I have treasur'd every note.
>
> For more than once dimly down to the beach gliding,
>
> Silent, avoiding the moonbeams, blending myself with the shadows,
>
> Recalling now the obscure shapes, the echoes, the sounds and sights after their sorts,
>
> The white arms out in the breakers tirelessly tossing,
>
> I, with bare feet, a child, the wind wafting my hair,
>
> Listen'd long and long (390).

Lefebvre states that "the body consists of a bundle of rhythms…[which] suggest an aesthetic arrangement" (30). Here, the boy's bodily action is centered on the act of listening, the

expenditure of energy of his ears. The bodily silence manifested in the stanza extends not only to the boy's void of utterance as a quiet and persistent listener but also his imperceptible physical body "gliding" in the shadows under the faint light. Due to such intensified *silent rhythms* demonstrated via the boy's vocal and corporeal invisibility, the sound of the waves, with the mockingbird's singing in the foreground of the translation, reverberates from the previous scene. The pounding waves, at the same time, assume the human property of "arms" that "tirelessly" toss themselves at the shore. The juxtaposition of the passive, silent boy with the active, more audible sea waves immobilizes the human actor's body and mind. The boy is preoccupied with the images and sounds in his surroundings as he recalls "the obscure shapes, the echoes, the sounds, and sights." Cyrus Patell suggests the act of recalling here should signify the boy's growth into a poet as he is "now translating the notes" and "following [his] brother" (Whitman 390). He calls this transition "the very act of figural conversion to which this poem is devoted and is at this moment enacting" (396). I find Patell's argument for the act of figural conversion thought-provoking and will expand on the conversion from a multispecies vantage point.

While Patell focuses on the figural conversion of the boy to a poet as a result of his capability to translate the mockingbird's notes, I propose that the acts of converting figures or shapes be driven by the bodily movements/gestures of the nonhuman actors in the stanza. In the beginning, the boy claims that he is only capable of treasuring but not translating the mockingbird's notes. He, then, visits the shore frequently, which can be viewed as an exemplar of his bodily rhythm, in a completely silent manner. To become unperceivable *by* the moonbeams, he blends himself with the shadows—an action exhibiting his conversion into a figure of darkness, which causes him to be dependent on the movement of the moonbeams. Therefore, as he is converted into a shadow caused by the moonbeams' shining over objects on

the shore, his previous anthropocentric endeavor to "avoid" moonbeams is rendered irrelevant due to his assumption of the nonhuman property of shadows. However, his conversion to the nonhuman counterparts in the collective does not last long. In the next line, the boy recalls, as if he suddenly realizes just *now*, at the moment when he remembers his previous converted nonhuman self, the obscurity of the shapes, echoes, sounds, and sights he has experienced in his last figural conversion into a shadow. The mysterious nonhuman figures or patterns manifest in bodies of image and sound can be understood as the boy's reflection on his previous visual and aural experiences on the seashore from an unusual, non-anthropocentric point of view that is no longer accessible—hence obscure—to him as the human observer. The nonhuman shapes and sounds are then converted to the vivid, "tirelessly tossing breakers" which are compared to white "arms," the upper limbs of the human body. However, here, the arms are symbols of the pounding sea waves, the main source of energy expenditure in the scene. The arms, as part of the human figure, are converted into the sea waves, which manifest cyclical rhythm as they toss tirelessly, producing echoes in sound. The immobilized boy, who lacks bodily movement and gesture in comparison to the waves, remains unfaltering in his act of listening. His persistent listening entails a linear sense of time that moves *forward* in the *long* duration of the mockingbird's song, which continues to tell the development of the missing she-bird in the next few stanzas after the boy's translation note.

In the end of this two-stanza section of the boy's record about his act of listening to the mockingbird's song, he finally is capable of not only treasuring but "translating the notes." As the boy is converted into a translator, he is, at the same time, transformed from a listener to a singer of the mockingbird's story. Because of his attentive acts of "following" and listening to the linear progression of the mockingbird's story, his translation, which is demonstrated in the

italic stanzas that follow, intersects constantly with the cyclical movement of the sea waves via the interweaving of the boy's observational and the mockingbird's musical *notes* throughout the poem. It is with such intersection of the linear and cyclical processes resulting in multiple rhythms of interference in the poetic composition that the alternative spatial arrangements and perceptions are enacted. While the mockingbird's song serves to create an anthropomorphic imagination of the bird's journey of searching for his mate near the sea shore, the physical sea shore is re-constructed by the boy's attentive translation which is in exchange with the bird's musical notes. Through such exchange of human and nonhuman properties of communication, the subjective force of the sea and the mockingbird as a result of their active energy expenditure governs the temporal (non-) progression as well as the spatial re-formation at the sea shore as an alter-world.

The boy's translating notes that serve to frame the mockingbird's song in a linearly chronological manner against the sea wave's cyclical rhythm are discontinued as the mockingbird's song ends in the he-bird's announcement of "[w]e two together no more." Following the mockingbird's song is the third-person narrative concluding the exchange of bodily rhythms between, particularly, the mockingbird, the sea, and the boy:

> The aria sinking,
>
> All else continuing, the stars shining,
>
> The winds blowing, the notes of the bird continuous echoing,
>
> With angry moans the fierce old mother incessantly moaning,
>
> ……………………………….
>
> The boy ecstatic, with his bare feet the waves, with his hair the atmosphere dallying,
>
> The love in the heart long pent, now loose, now at last tumultuously bursting,

The aria's meaning, the ears, the soul, swiftly depositing,

The strange tears down the cheeks coursing,

The colloquy there, the trio, each uttering,

The undertone, the savage old mother incessantly crying,

To the boy's soul's questions sullenly timing, some drown'd secret hissing,

To the outsetting bard (392).

While the linear process of the mockingbird's solo song comes to an end, the notes of the song resound in a repetitive rhythm along with the bodily movements of the blowing winds and the moaning sea. The linearity of the progression of the bird's song is, therefore, transformed into continuously echoing notes that resemble the cyclical rhythms of the incessantly lapping waves. The boy, who is now in an ecstatic state, seems to be *enveloped* by the waves and the winds, whose movements slow down as the boy's heart bursts with rhapsodies of love. In an instant, the meaning of the linearly structured song is imprinted via the boy's ears on his soul, a human property which is unconfined by the physical place and surpasses time through the relay of poetic inspirations. It is within this poem that the boy's soul travels in time, in a linearly *non-chronological* manner. As "the strange tears" course down the boy's cheeks as a sign of his poetic revelation, the readers are transported back to the present moment where the adult narrator recalls, with tears, his memory of the mockingbirds from his boyhood in the first stanza. Tears of the boy and the adult narrator serve as signposts that initiate the chronological narrative of the bird's aria as well as the reverse chronological process of the narrator's reminiscence. Such forward and backward movement of time on the linear spectrum is made possible through the three-way communication—"the trio"—between the boy, the mockingbird, and the sea.

The "incessant crying" of the waves produces a surrounding rhythm at the locale of the sea where the boy translates the mockingbird's chronological story within a non-chronological frame constructed by Whitman in the poem. The communication is effective only when the meaning of the aria is deposited in the boy's soul and when the sea wave's cyclical composition of rhythm accompanies such man-and-bird translation of thoughts in Whitman's poem, which is constituted by multispecies composition of the mimetic songs by the mockingbird and the "outsetting bard." While the human and nonhuman mimetic songs in the "Out of the Cradle" are composed with rhythms generated by the mutual interference of the forward and backward movements of time, Whitman the human mockingbird's non-mimetic, specific vocalization is demonstrated through the sea wave's untiring and recurrent lapping on the shore, which functions as the cyclical rhythm in the earthly collective. The constant interference of the waves' cyclical rhythm with the linear trajectory of the bird's song and the boy's translation of the song, while showing how Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis renders an alternative way to interpret the working of fragmented time, expands the readers' perception of space. It is through both the human and nonhuman actors' expenditures of energy which create various temporal rhythms in both the linear and cyclical modes that Whitman's seashore is (re)formed as a place where "here and hereafter" are united in an alternative *reminiscent* world beyond the anthropocentric conception of time.

III. Rhythm in the Process of Birth, Growth, Peak, Decline, and End

The last characteristic in Lefebvre's conception of rhythm is manifested in the process of "birth, growth, peak, then decline and end" (25). In addition to being a poem about memory and unique methods of poetic composition, the multispecies rhythms in "Out of the Cradle" construct the locale of the sea as a space that accommodates the process of life and death in various

temporal perceptions. The endless rocking movement of the sea makes the narrator's memory about his childhood come alive. The boy's memory about the mockingbird's song, then, manifests the growth and peak of the relationship between the two birds, the decline which is shown via the disappearance of the she-bird, and the he-bird's eventual announcement of giving up on the search for his mate. Remembering his translation as a boy in flashbacks, the adult narrator narrates, as a form of energy expenditure, the rhythm of birth, growth, peak, decline, and end, by presenting the mockingbird's chronological story and his own reverse chronological flashback to re-tell the experience listening to the mockingbird sing. His narration of the mockingbird's events reveals a linear perspective on the process from birth to end, which corresponds to a conventional and anthropocentric comprehension of time.

If we read the poem with a special focus on the sea device, we can see that the overall structure of the poem reflects Lefebvre's rhythmic process from birth to end in a cyclical sense. The birth of the entire poem is "out of the cradle" of the rocking sea, where "the myriad thence-arous'd words" and "the word stronger and more delicious than any" are "[b]orne hither" (388) in the memories chanted to the narrator from the bird. In the second stanza, the seashore becomes a place which fosters the growth of the grass as well as nurtures the surroundings of the mockingbirds' nest, in which the birth of chicks can be expected in the near future. The build-up of what turns out to be a tragedy for the birds occurs in the following stanza where the joyful singing of the birds dominates the expression of sound in the scene. Next comes the peak—the turning point—of the poem, when the she-bird suddenly disappears. The only sound that is left in the scene is the "hoarse surging" of the sea, a harsh and loud aural movement which responds to the thematic peak of the poem. The sea waves continue to move loudly as the male mockingbird laments the loss of his mate, which can be seen in "O madly the sea pushes upon the land" (390).

The decline of the sound of the sea occurs as the he-bird begins to sing loudly, calling to his love, with his voice shot "[h]igh and clear…over the waves" (390). The he-bird's loud calling reflected in the subdued sound of the waves as "husky-nois'd" (391). Finally, the end of the oceanic rhythmic process takes place in the old mother's incessant "moaning" (392), a long and low sound that expresses a sense of suffering. Certainly, the moaning sound of the waves serves to accompany the sinking of the she-bird's image into the sea as imagined in the he-bird's mournful song. As the poem approaches its end, the "words" the narrator celebrate during the birth of the verse as well as the rebirth his memories, are condensed to one final word—death. The sea "lisp'd to [the narrator] the low and delicious word death" repetitively, in a "hissing" and yet "melodious" way: "Death, death, death, death, death" (393). It is the sea that "whisper'd" (394) the end of the she-bird's life, the he-bird's song, and the narrator's memory, with a "creeping" (394) gesture, manifesting the motion of sea waves ebbing from the shore. It should be noted that the ebbs and flows of the sea are recurrent, cyclical phenomena and that the various sorts of sounds of the waves uttered in the process of birth, growth, peak, decline, and end shall repeat themselves again and again, surpassing Whitman's final revision of his oceanic song. In this regard, it is evident that the geographical formation of the seashore in the composition of "Out of the Cradle" reflects the bardic cartographer's intention to write in a way that is out of human control. His construction of such morphing, mobilizing, and living space in the poem, read from Lefebvre's theory of rhythmanalysis, is the fruit of the collaborative orchestration of bodily rhythms between the human and nonhuman actors who dwell in this poetic collective of alternative landscapes that do not correspond to landforms categorized on the conventional map and can only be perceived with rhythmic eyes and ears.

In conclusion, this chapter explores how Whitman as a cartographer maps nonhuman space at the seashore with multispecies rhythms in the forms of repetition in movement, interference with linear and cyclical processes, and the life-and-death process in "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking." Using Latour's notion of the collective to frame the poem as a multispecies, multitemporal poetic collective, my reading of "Out of the Cradle" has shown what Patell terms "figural conversion" between human and nonhuman actors through the mutual exchange of bodily rhythms, which manifest expenditures of energy at the multitemporal seashore. In the poem, the sea and seashore become locales that are constructed and reshaped through various types of temporalizing rhythms. The working of rhythm, as investigated in Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis, serves as the main method of alter-worlding which occurs as a result of a myriad of spatial perceptions from the human and nonhuman actors' discrepant perspectives of time. In the next chapter, I will continue the quest for methods of alter-worlding, with particular attention to the dynamic correlation between time and space. Referring to Henri Bertrand Westphal's *Geocriticism* and Shu-mei Shih's relational method of studying comparative literature, I will demonstrate how rethinking the world via poetic cartography inspires alternative approaches to constructing a worldly place where non-linguicentric translation in poetry forms passageways crossing national and continental boundaries.

CHAPTER FOUR

Revamping the World through Bird's-Eye Views: Spatial Transgression in Transpacific Poetries

How does one construct, place by place, a map of worlds yet unknown? One must take flight like a fly, or better, like the Angels, whose passages and messages constantly weave divine ubiquity, and move toward the universal through virtual sites? (274)

—Michel Serres, *Atlas*

The previous chapter examines how rhythms in poetic composition demonstrate an alternative method of alter-worlding in a multispecies collective and chart nonhuman space in Walt Whitman's "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking." Employing Henri Lefebvre's theory of rhythmanalysis that uncovers the anti-anthropocentric geographies at the seashore where the mocking bird, the boy translator, and the poet compose manifold rhythms of the seascape collectively, I have proposed a model of poetic cartography that delineates space and place across species and against historical and chronological constructs. Space, then, from the perspectives of literary studies, is (re)generative, contingent, and transgressive, especially in Bertrand Westphal's conception of transgression, which I will return to later. If space and the notion of space remain a morphing constant, how does one *know* the world? Could it be more accurate to say that each of us understands *a* world, whose composition varies between human and nonhuman individuals dwelling in spatial networks overlapping one another? In this regard, the world as we know it is actually a composite of multifarious perspectives of space of different species, each of which constructs a map of its own world.

When Michel Serres considers methods applicable to construct a map of worlds yet unknown to us, as shown in the epigraph, he resorts to flies and the angels, nonhuman beings that excel at moving in vertical space in defiance of gravity. Interestingly, the juxtaposition of flies and the angels, while bizarre, corresponds to Emily Dickinson's portrayal of a fly that

gesticulates, with its *undying* buzz, the passage between life and death, in "I heard a Fly buzz—when I died." The correlation between vertical mobility and divinity remains a cartographic attribute for poets and philosophers alike, in this case, Dickinson and Serres. Such genuine concern about constructing a map that seeks to delineate the unknown, instead of revising the map drawn from anthropocentric perspectives, is also reflected in Kwang-chung Yu[1]'s three-poem series *The Universe in Perspective*[2]. In "The Universe from a Fly's Perspective," Yu satirizes the outdated view of the universe by creating a parallel between a fly's perception of space and the Catholic worldview:

On a turning spindle
a fly sings,
"Look! Look! The whole universe
is spinning around me!"

In the Roman church, a philosopher
instructs a swarm of flies,
"Yes, I concur that the sun outside the window
does spin around us in flight!"

The "turning spindle" is a poetic symbol indicating Copernicus' established theory of the earth's rotation in the 16th century, which was later supported by physicists such as Galileo and Newton. The fly's vocalization, then, suggests a conventional view of the universe that regards the planet earth inhabited by humans and other life forms as the center of the universe. Certainly, Yu further pursues that such a view of the universe is anthropocentric by presenting the theological and religious practice of the Roman church whose teaching enphasizes the human-

centered quest for life after death and has influenced Western philosophy greatly. By using flies' limited perception of space and time, in comparison to human capacity to perceive the world, Yu analogizes the close-mindedness of Catholic believers to the short-sightedness of flies. Lacking the capability to see as far and clear as humans do, flies sense their surroundings based on the contrast of brightness and darkness with a limited sight range. Such binary ways of perceiving the environment cause flies to have relatively small, what Jakob von Uexküll calls, "visual space" that is constituted by the coarse "mosaic of places" (62) of their environment. Flies animate their surroundings to "the farthest plane that closes off their visual place" (Uexküll, 69), and in Yu's poem, the turning spindle seems to be the farthest plane within the fly's sight. According to Uexküll, visual space is closed off on all sides and therefore forms a bubble around the subjects who perceive their environments. Each bubble, consequently, encompasses a unique world animated by the subjects' varied capacities to perceive space and time around them. The world as we know it, in this regard, does not exist, at least not unanimously among multiple species that inhabit the earth[3]. There is only a plurality of worlds, or what Uexküll terms, "bubbles," within which multispecies subjects perceive and construct their worlds. The Roman church in the poem, then, manifests a human-centered bubble whose visual space is fenced by the religious doctrine and whose farthest plane in sight, against scientific discoveries, coincides with that of a fly's bubble when scaled in the spatial relations between the earth and the universe.

Yu's poem, by addressing the multispecies perceptions of the universe, serves as what Serres calls a "virtual site," in which the worldviews of flies and Catholics resemble each other and consequently construct similarly coarse mosaic of places on their respective maps between themselves, the earth, and the universe. The goal of this chapter is to launch this sort of investigation into human-animal relations as mapped in the poetic construction of *worlds* through

analyzing multispecies temporal and spatial perceptions on a transpacific scale. By reconceiving the world as we know it through the implementation of an alternative version of spatial networks connected via the virtual sites set up in Dickinson's and Yu's animal-focused poems, this chapter seeks to propose a model of studying world literature through the lens of multispecies poetic cartography and interspatial transgression and translation.

Methods to study world literature have undergone constant intervention and revision. Undoubtedly, world literature scholars endeavor to understand the world via the intersections between literature and other fields of study such as history, philosophy, trade, politics, translation, public health, and more. Among the works on enacting methods to study world literature, I find Shu-mei Shih's relational approach most thought-provoking and applicable to my objective to dismantle the geography of the globe and put bottom-up modes of alter-worlding into creative and critical practice in literary studies. Examining the text and the world as various sets of relationalities in "Comparison as Relation," Shih perceives comparative literature and world literature as means to manifest temporal and spatial connectedness in world history:

> The relational method informed by world history, I contend, allows for the scaling back and forth between the world and the text as well as along the intermediate scales, moving toward a more integrated conception of comparative literature and world literature, where the issue is not inclusiveness or qualification (which text deserves to be studied or designated as 'world literature' and which does not) but excavating and activating the historically specific set of relationalities across time and space. These relationalities can be as much about form as content; hence the importance of poetics (80).

Shih's notion of world literature is liberating in that, instead of proposing ways of categorization, which can be seen in the worlding methods of dividing nations, continents, cultures, and

languages in accordance with the human-made global map, it examines the similarities and connectedness between historical events that inspire literary creation around the world. By viewing the past events and the ongoing investigation and re-creation of such events in literature beyond each nation's linear chorological narrative of its past events, Shih's application of studying individual histories of different nations and cultures as history of the world suggests the plausibility and positivity of reading national literatures against their respective political, cultural, social, and historical constraints that *domesticate* literary criticism in each nation and mold literary works into products of globalization.

Inspired by Shih's approach to stressing the "interconnectedness of the world" by considering world literature as "a network of horizontal and vertical relations" (95) across time and space, I will further Shih's relational theory by including animals in the transnational formation of history, as derived from Donna Haraway's notion of multispecies inheritance of past events, and by relating to Bruno Latour's Actor-network theory to establish a network of relations against the binarism of human and nonhuman; West and East; and life and death. Studying world literature via Haraway's proposal of multispecies alter-worlding, I will demonstrate how temporal and spatial relationalities between 19th-century U.S. and 20th-century Sinophone poetries can be explicated through animal perceptions and gestures that revamp the anthropocentric framing of the study of literary form and content in the aforementioned times and places adhering to human history and geography. Invoking birds whose bodily movement and mobility expand across vertical and horizontal spaces on earth as cartographic subjects in Dickinson's "The Robin is a Gabriel" and Yu's "There was a Dead Bird," this chapter aims to show how the exchange of spatial perspectives between human poets, readers, and nonhuman birds in 19th-century U.S. and 20th-century Sinophone poetries manifests a poetics of

multispecies worlding. Furthermore, I argue that such world-building is predicated upon a network of horizontal and vertical relations constituted by interspecies transgression and mobilization in the poetic collective, which corresponds to Shih's conception of "integrated" world literature and shall serve as a model of studying world literature or, within the scope of my dissertation, world poetries, via an anti-anthropocentric approach.

Haraway's notion of multispecies alter-worlding, as examined in Chapter Two, is rooted in an alternative but more generous way of understanding the existence of species as formed by the acts of gazing and being gazed between multispecies spectators. The function of sight, then, remains crucial to establishing this new world—it is new, in a sense that it is the first time humans are willing to *see* that the world as we know it merely stands for an anthropocentric perception of temporal and spatial activities on earth and that the environments we dwell in are not necessary about and for us. To uncover an alternative world and inherit history in an anti-anthropocentric manner via, specifically, the visual perceptions in our multispecies environments on earth, I find it illuminating to begin such nonhuman-centered narrative of history from the sight and vision of birds in poetry. Continuing to address the correlation between citizen science and animal-focused poetry as established between the Cornell Lab's study of mockingbirds' learning of songs and Whitman's poetic reinvention of the "trembling throat" in Chapter Three, I propose to look at both Dickinson's and Yu's selected bird-focused poems as alternative, literary exemplars of world birding. In "Birding as Giving: Citizen Science," Nate Swick explains the inclusive quality of ornithology:

> One of the wonderful things about being a birder is that ornithology remains one of the very few sciences in which amateurs can have a significant impact on real science. There are no hobby particle-physicists, no armchair organic-chemists, but birders are able to

> provide great data to those who actively study bird distribution and abundance, simply by going out into the field and recording what they see (98).

While naturalist John Burroughs claimed that Whitman's "Out of the Cradle" was "not at all ornithological" (12), Burroughs's notion of ornithology strictly adhered to so-called "real science." Yet, as suggested in the last chapter, what if we read Whitman's bird poem as his endeavor to show what he *sees* when he perceives the male mockingbird, and further, his attempts to understand the world differently from the mockingbird's perspective? Although to imagine or assume the perspectives of nonhuman animals is thought to be anthropomorphic, to be entrenched with the *fault* of anthropomorphism is to firmly hold onto the divide between humans and animals. If we view humans as human animals, human characteristics, which are what underlie the notion of anthropomorphism, become part of animal characteristics. An anti-anthropocentric method of constructing the world, then, entails decentering the activities of human animals as the main events and re-thinking activities of all animals in history on earth. In this regard, Whitman's deemed anthropomorphic birding ought to be seen as his attempt to perceive his environment in an anti-anthropocentric manner. Poets as a birders record what they see through their own acts of birding which, in turn, inspires their poetic imagination of birds' visual space, referring to Uexküll's description of perceived environments. By composing numerous poems about, to, and with birds, poets are devoted, although amateur, birders, whose poetic composition *can* have a significant impact on science, as suggested by Swick, and whose acts of writing manifest their vigorous attempts to provide larger-than-science framing of multispecies co-inhabitation on earth.

Combining Shih's view on world literature as a network of relations, Latour's notion of the collective manifesting human and nonhuman exchange of properties, Haraway's proposal of

an alter-world in which we inherit history differently, and Uexküll's theory of multiple worlds as a result of individually perceived environments or constructed bubbles, I seek to present a model of a poetic collective formed jointly by 19th-century U.S. and 20th-century Sinophone bird-focused poetries, which are to be read as texts essential to implementing multispecies alter-worlding on a transpacific scale. By viewing poets as birders and birds in poetry as cartographers, I will demonstrate an alternative, anti-anthropocentric world, in which human and nonhuman animals perceive and construct their environments as micro-worlds within the poetic collective, against national boundaries and historical accounts between the U.S. and the Sinophone region. To accomplish such a multispecies model of poetic alter-worlding as a precursor of reconceiving the study of world literature in an anti-anthropocentric fashion, I find it imperative to address the notions of transgression and transgressivity, with regard to Bertrand Westphal's *Geocriticism*, when revamping the spatial conceptions of the world, which, by the end of this chapter, shall be convincingly understood as "worlds" in the plural form. Since poetic alter-worlding entails imaginative, non-physical comprehension of geography, Westphal's geophilosophy serves as an effective mapping tool for such an unconventional approach to making worlds across species.

In light of Vinciane Despret's idea of "the becomings of subjectivity" between breeders and their animals as discussed in Chapter Two, I wish to suggest that mutual becomings of subjectivity also take place between the writing poets and the map-making birds. Using Deleuze's statement that "becoming is geographical," Westphal reminds us that such becoming can only be illustrated in U.S. literature because Americans, unlike French that are "too human" "too historical," and "too concerned with the future and the past," know "how to become" (24). If Deleuze and Westphal are right about the morphing quality of U.S. literature, it is not a stretch

to argue that 19th-century U.S. poetry can be read against its temporal and spatial constraints and, therefore, undergoes a sort of imaginatively geographical becoming via nonhuman birds' cartographic gestures during the multispecies compositional process. In Westphal's words, "the plurality of inscription in space-time and the proliferation of rhythms that spring from them could form the basis of a sociopoetic approach" (44) in literary theory. Dickinson's copious animal-focused poems provide sociopoetic[4] venues for critical discussion beyond the 19th-century U.S. discourse. In "The Robin is a Gabriel," Dickinson presents a silent robin whose sociality manifests the imaginative geographies between heaven and earth, within and outside the household, and between the writer and the reader:

> The Robin is a Gabriel
> In humble circumstances—
> His Dress denotes him socially,
> Of Transport's Working Classes—
> He has the punctuality
> Of the New England Farmer—
> The same oblique integrity,
> A Vista vastly warmer—
> A small but sturdy Residence,
> A Self denying Household,
>
> The Guests of Perspicacity
> Are all that cross his Threshold—
> As covert as a Fugitive,

> Cajoling Consternation
>
> By Ditties to the Enemy
>
> And Silvan Punctuation— (*The Poems*, 566)

Previous scholarship has explored Dickinson's abundant poems about birds of various species. In "Birds in Dickinson's Words," Jonathan Skinner provides his count of Dickinson's bird poems:

> According to my last count, nearly 15 percent of Dickinson's poems contain birds (264 of 1789 poems), with twenty-four species named; about one third of these are specifically bird poems. Schuman and Hodgman come up with the figure of 222 poems mentioning birds, with twenty-six species named—roughly half of which appear in their selection of thirty-seven poems. (They follow Johnson's text, but also supply Franklin's numbers for each poem). Whatever the exact count, Dickinson clearly was a close observer of bird life, especially of common "backyard" birds like robins, sparrows and jays, and birds of the open field like orioles and bobolinks (families in the "middle landscape," just about midway on a size and perceptual scale running from tiny, fast warblers to big, slow herons and hawks). Apart from her 150 uses of the word "bird," she names the robin 38 times, the bobolink 12, the sparrow 9, the jay 7, the hummingbird 5, and so forth, down through crow and oriole 4, bluebird, phoebe, and wren 3, and blackbird 2, to just one mention of the nightingale (107).

According to Skinner, Dickinson appeared to be a fervent bird watcher and documenter. Her particular attention to backyard birds such as robins remains my main focus on Dickinson's becoming of subjectivity that is germane to her sociopoetic approach to mapping the imagined space against chronological time. To further understand Dickinson's persistent calling for robins, I will examine the elements of the locale, time frame, and writing subject in "The Robin is a

Gabriel" to sketch out a preliminary map embedded Dickinson's animal-focused poetry that manifests a prototype of multispecies alter-worlding.

Why backyards? A backyard is a locale that connects the house, a sheltered place, and the outdoors, a place typically considered to be away from human occupation. The backyard of Dickinson's Massachusetts homestead, therefore, can be seen as an in-between space, via which the poet constrains and expands her mobility within and beyond artificial infrastructure. It is also a constantly morphing space of geographical becomings, as manifested in Dickinson's poetic composition, against the categories of human and physical geographies. Robins' annual spring migration to Dickinson's backyard in North America is a favored phenomenon by the poet as she views the robin as a Gabriel, the angel that guards the gate Eden in John Milton's *Paradise Lost*, the reference of which I will discuss more later. Certainly, her earthly backyard, in comparison to the world above or the space upward, seems "humble" and subdued. The juxtaposition of the vertical/spiritual and the horizontal/earthly spaces is clearly presented in the beginning of the poem. The robin, which descends from the heavenly sky to earthly trees, serves as the bird spokesperson that gesticulates across spaces via its bodily movements, referring to Latour's conception of spokesperson and the collective discussed previously in Chapter Two.

The robin's spring migration and breeding in humanly populated places such as Dickinson's backyard signifies its transgression of human and nonhuman boundaries designated in the conception of human geography. Recalling my example of robins' annual migration to the yards in the student housing area at the University of Washington as recurrent animal-directed deterritorialization of human space, I suggest the robin that enters Dickinson's backyard be viewed as a spokesperson for other robins migrating to civilization annually in a manner of spatial transgression. The robins who dwell within the students' visual space also take

transgressive flights to Dickinson's poetic page and Massachusetts backyard via the students' recurrent acts of reading Dickinson's bird poems. To further investigate how such transgression functions to construct imaginative maps in Dickinson's poetic "virtual sites," in Serres's words, I will appeal to Westphal's conception of transgression and transgressivity as a mobilized constant during the acts (re)spatialization:

> Transgression corresponds to the crossing of a boundary beyond which stretches a marginal space of freedom. When it becomes a permanent principle, it turns into transgressivity. The transgressive gaze is constantly directed toward an emancipatory horizon in order to see beyond a code and territory that serves as its 'domain.' But transgression equally lies in the swerve, in the new trajectory, the unexpected, and the unpredictable. It is centrifugal, since it flees from the heart of the system, from the space of reference (47).

Upon moving from the sky downward to the humble, man-made backyard as an act of crossing nonhuman and human boundaries, the robin carries with its flight from heaven to earth a marginal space of interspecies freedom that is, in turn, manifested in the exchange of the observant poet's transgressive gaze and the innocent robin's territorial transgression. The robin is innocent because, in spite of the humanly established course of social norms, it remains "oblique," deviating from the mainstream trajectory of living and survival. His "integrity," which can be defined as "honesty" and "sincerity" in *Emily Dickinson Lexicon*, an attribute paralleled by the New England farmer, serves as the associative actant in Dickinson's poetic network, building human and nonhuman relationships in the poem. The poet, whose integrity is shown through her writing, feels connected to the robin *socially*, referring to Latour's theory of the social, via their shared deviation from the mainstream expectation of sociality. Similar to how

farmers cultivating their lands punctually at particular times on an annual basis, Dickinson makes sure to fertilize her creative soil regularly, along with her poetic robin that shows up singing and breeding at her backyard every spring. The exchange of properties in the poetic collective, then, is exhibited through the shared human and nonhuman consistency in cultivating life in both creative and reproductive senses.

Robins' consistent, recurrent transgression of human territory manifests "a permanent principle," in Westphal's words, of annual boundary-crossing. On the other hand, Dickinson's "transgressive gaze," an attentive and intense manner of looking, stretches her own visual space, referring to Uexküll, to overlap that of the robin as the recipient of her gaze, forming an interspecies marginal space of transgression. The poet as a gazer who is not content with her human perception of the environment intensely looks forward, outward, and upward until the farthest plane in her visual space is expanded, regardless of her human limitation. At the moment when the poet's visual space is broadened, she becomes free from the confinement of human "domain" and global map. The geographical becomings, as a result of interspecies spatial transgression, occur to the gazer and the gazed in the poetic collective. One might find such a fluid cartographic method unconvincing or anxiety-inducing due to its lack of materiality, compared to "real," physical geography. However, if we are willing to take on the long-debated question of reality when thinking about world mapping, we can readily see how ideologies and politics, as something impalpable, play a significant role in the historical, cultural, and social demarcations of land, aquatic, and aerial spaces. If we accept that what we deem real entails constant unexpectedness and unpredictability, instead of stability and rigidity, then it would seem instinctual to view transgression as an operational norm in our spatial perception and construction on earth.

Once transgression becomes a constant, Westphal proposes a new perspective on cartographic methods:

> As permanent transgression eventually becomes transgressivity, a territory rendered incessantly mobile will eventually be governed (so to speak) by an almost impalpable deterritorializing and evolutionary dialectic. Therefore, territory is occluded in favor of evolving territoriality, as any attempt to demarcate territory would be ephemeral (52).

Dickinson's poetic collective, then, manifests a territory that is perpetually mobile and is "governed" by intangible acts of interspecies deterritorialization of artificial domains as well as by the constantly developing exchange of discourses led by human and nonhuman subjects. Dickinson's poetic discourse is spatial, due to her lifelong untiring endeavor to compose unconventional poems and letters that demonstrate (inter)textual spatialization of her wider-than-the-sky brain. Dickinson has never intended her work to be confined as 19th-century U.S. women's literature. On the contrary, she seems to think of herself as larger than the categories of female/woman and human species, as reflected in her transgressive gaze in the poem. Using "he" and "his" to address the robin, Dickinson's use of a male robin as a symbol of her own discipline and mobility of poetic creation suggests her intent to make public her *particular* ways of living and writing uncircumscribed by cultural norms.

In the poem, the bird spokesperson—the robin—experiences the geographical becoming and boundary crossing between heaven and earth because it is thought to be "a Gabriel." Dickinson's symbolic use of Gabriel can be further illustrated by her familiarity with Milton's *Paradise Lost*. In "'Paradise Fictitious': Dickinson's Milton," Eleanor Heginbotham discusses the compositional methods and motives shared by Dickinson and Milton, referring to the markings supposedly made by Dickinson on a copy of *Paradise Lost* that is now located in

Harvard's Houghton Library. Heginbotham states that Dickinson was especially influenced by "Milton's Satan tumbling through space, testing bridges to Paradise, observing the human love he would never share, railing at his stupid cohorts, and attempting with bravado and silver words to outwit the God who denied him Heaven, Eden, and Earth" (57). Milton's *out-of-place* Satan seems to echo Dickinson's poetic expression of spatial transgression. His inability to belong to a place, is contrasted by Dickinson's purposeful construction of poetic geographies manifesting what Westphal terms "evolving territoriality." If constant spatial transgression leads to the void of fixed territories, could it be plausible to say that in Dickinson's poetic collective, Gabriel could have relocated from heaven to earth since the boundary between the two can no longer be demarcated? Heaven, Eden, and Earth are, therefore, a non-locale, serving as nodes of transgressive deterritorialization. The Gabriel in the form of a robin in the poem plays the role of a nonhuman cartographer mapping the transgressive route of transporting heavenly voices to earthly space. The poem itself, then, is a vessel loaded with interspecies evolving territoriality that redefines the anthropocentric conception of space and place every time the poem is read by a human, whose environments and visual space are expanded and whose bubble overlaps that of the poetic robin during the process of reading.

In addition to dismantling the conventional spatial relations between Heaven, Eden, and Earth and reconstructing the gate of Eden via the robin in her backyard, Dickinson's transgressive gaze also liberates her own bodily existence from the confinement of her house. By associating the robin's sight and vision with her human ones to perceive her artificial surroundings, Dickinson gains a new, "warmer" perspective of the world. The perspective acquired via the exchange of human and nonhuman capacities to see is warmer because such an exchange only takes place in spring. The arrival of the robin at her residence, in a symbolic

sense, parallels the lyrical creation in Dickinson's poetry. Her acts of creation are punctual and the written text of poetry that houses the creation—the "Residence"—is "relentless" and "impenetrable" (*Emily Dickinson Lexicon*). While her poetry produces warm, comforting perspectives, it remains "self-denying," a term suggesting the withholding of creative freedom in her poetic composition. The residence/household, then, embodies Dickinson's imaginative house of poetry that is incessantly mobilized by her regular acts of writing—the robin's annual migration to her backyard. Her house can also be seen as an impalpable locale that is repetitively territorized by the human guests of "perspicacity" and deterritorialized via the robin's punctual "ditties."

In "Wings," Stanley Plumly describes the various roles of the robin in the poem and suggests that Dickinson is a symbolist:

> This is the robin of robins, with qualities, first, of a holy messenger, then of a sterling farmer, then of a thoughtful and discerning home-owner, then of a smart and secret "fugitive." It's a poem of affection and buoyancy, without any death-watch or quarrel with the status quo. Yet it recycles roles Dickinson the house-body sees herself playing. Like so much of her work, it marks Dickinson as a symbolist, a poet completely committed to the evocation and conversion of the meta-object and byplay of form and content. For Dickinson, the *ur* and ultimate subject is almost always poetry itself—self-referential, a thing made, but a thing made of multiples (170).

Plumly's listing of the robin's roles is useful in clarifying the multiple responsibilities the bird spokesperson undertakes in the poet's place. However, viewing Dickinson as a symbolist and the robin as one of her poetic symbols, while contributing to a more straightforward explication of the poem, revokes the mobile and transgressive qualities of her poetic composition. More than

just "playing roles," Dickinson, as discussed in the second and current chapters, makes poetry *with* animals and charts their shared, multispecies environment via coinciding her *bubble* with theirs. In this regard, poetry, as her "ultimate subject"—her residence/household, is Dickinson's enduring space of transgressivity, made of multiple geographical becomings. Her residence, the poem, is not "a thing" but a creative and intangible node in the multispecies network of association. Her poetry exhibits a cartographic collective, in which being social entails interspecies associative building via the exchange and overlapping of spatial perspectives. Therefore, when her residence is *territorialized* by the insightful guests—plausibly the judging readers of her poetry—who would quickly attend to her manners of writing and keep her creative freedom in check, Dickinson appeals to the robin's capacity as a nonhuman animal to transgress man-made boundaries in both physical and social regards with his flight and songs. The social relationship between Dickinson and the robin is demonstrated by their discursive assemblages of the poet's acts of looking and writing and the bird's recurrent migratory gestures. Such assemblages are constantly transforming and being transformed via the nonhuman actor's bodily movement in the vertical dimension of space whose map remains loosely established and where opportunities of deterritorializing anthropocentric domains are ample. The poet, as the human actor, participates in such social assemblages with her transgressive acts of gazing at and *through* the nonhuman robin beyond her humanly limited farthest plane, in order to perceive and then construct her environment beyond the physical house. Such social discursive assemblages, while silent, are recorded in Dickinson's poem where interspatial transgression—from heaven to earth; from the sky to the exterior of the residence; and from within the household to the threshold of the house—enacts geographical becomings undertaken by human and nonhuman animals collaboratively.

The residence of the robin, or poetry, in which Dickinson truthfully dwells, continues to serve as the "virtual site," in Serres' words, where *social* visits from the guests mark the human transgression of the robin's household, or in this case, Dickinson's poetic, if not *real*, place of dwelling. The threshold, an in-between space where transgressive acts take place, becomes a locale of transgressivity that manifests evolving territoriality amidst human and nonhuman assemblages of their perceived environments and points of contact between their respective bubbles. Upon such human and nonhuman confrontation as a result of the guests' crossing the threshold to the robin's residence, the original resident of the house—the robin, or the creator of this poem—Dickinson, turns to hiding *centrifugally* and "flee[s] the space of reference," with regard to Westphal's description of transgression, and *reassembles* the human and nonhuman actants whose bubbles expand and contract due to the shrewdness of the guests as human actors. Dwelling in the nonhuman, "covert" bubble, whose visionary horizon is considered "oblique" by the intelligent and yet self-righteous human guests, the robin who is now a fugitive and who gesticulates in Dickinson's place anxiously persuades the guests, who oppose his as well as Dickinson's lyrical place of dwelling and are now the "Enemy," with pure songs and punctuation made from trees.

Expressing her aspiration to write against conventions and gendered appropriateness, Dickinson aligns herself with the nonhuman robin whose ways of living and singing are closer to her own perspectives of the world than other human companions and critics with whom she interacted in her life. It is clear that Dickinson might have found it easier and more instinctual to *socialize* with birds that took flights to her backyard than with the people who entered her house by crossing the threshold. By observing robins' particular habits of migration to human territory every spring—their transgression of human bubbles is regular but temporary—Dickinson seems

to suggest that their non-confrontational, non-threshold-crossing manner of interacting and socializing with humans be most appropriate, or tolerable, when she thinks of her own desired manner of interpersonal communication. Just as robins visit human spheres on an annual basis and each of their visits does not last longer than the duration of the spring season, Dickinson argues that her poetic creation as a means for her to communicate with other humans should function in a similar fashion to the robin's mobilized body in both horizontal and vertical spaces as well as its punctual production of *social* songs. By translating her observation as a birder of the robin into her creation as a poet, Dickinson, via the imaginative geographies of the poetic collective, composes animal-focused poetry to announce her resistance to the 19th-century U.S. cultural and social protocols adhered by her contemporary literary circles, whether they be gendered norms of writing or religious teaching. Led by her transgressive gazes as a devoted birder, Dickinson writes "ditties" that might have made her some enemies in her lifetime while her excessive use of dashes continues to obstruct our critical attempts to enter her bubble of the alter-world as well as pay tribute to robins that passionately and loudly chirp amidst our earthly, flattened, human domains.

It is worth noting that "The Robin is a Gabriel" is a poem created in an epistolary context. The poem was enclosed in a letter Dickinson wrote to her neighbor Sarah Tuckerman, the wife of Edward Tuckerman, a botanist and professor at Amherst College. During their correspondence, Dickinson constantly alludes to flowers and birds as messengers that mobilize her evolving perspectives on life and death, in addition to the smaller scale of daily matters. In an early letter to Mrs. Sarah Tuckerman in 1875, Dickinson uses the flight of birds as an analogy to the departure of her father from his earthly existence:

> DEAR FRIEND,—It was so long my custom to seek you with the birds, they would scarcely feel at home should I do otherwise, though as home itself is far from home since my father died, why should custom tire? (*Letters*, 326).

Though Mrs. Tuckerman's responses to Dickinson's letters cannot be retrieved, it is plausible to assume that the subject of botany, especially, remains their shared interest, as Mrs. Tuckerman was known to support and sympathize with her husband's work.[5] Expressing her feeling of loss of home upon her father's death, Dickinson, besides acknowledging the love and security her father provided for her, seems to suggest that her father had gone to live with birds, whose home manifests the sky, the vertical space humans have least access to, compared to the locales on the horizon. Edward Dickinson, who now shares the heavenly bubble with birds, is mobilized from his Massachusetts homestead to an alter-world, in which human and nonhuman animals, especially those with wings, co-exist and co-participate in building such an imaginative geography of what Westphal terms "evolutionary dialectic." The exchange between the human pursuit of afterlife and the nonhuman bird's-eye view crossing the boundaries of heaven and earth is reflected in Dickinson's recognition of birds' expansive, moving territory, as shown in the letter, and in her longing for a perpetual locale of constant mobility beyond human geographies that she can truly call home, away from her Massachusetts house.

Certainly, no birds physically delivered Dickinson's letters to Sarah Tuckerman. By imagining that it was the birds that "seek" Tuckerman, Dickinson compares her diligence to mobilize her thoughts with the birds' instinctual behavior to take flights. Here, her letter serves as a nonhuman actant of the poetic collective and participates in the *social* assemblage of interspecies co-creation embodied by the poet's germination and the imagined birds' delivery of the thought on the destination of an afterlife. It is evident that letter-writing helps to sustain

Dickinson's creativity. In "'A Letter is a Joy of Earth': Emily Dickinson's Letters and Victorian Epistolary Conventions," Stephanie A. Tingley establishes the importance of letter-writing to Dickinson's idiosyncratic creation:

> Letter-writing afforded Emily Dickinson a socially and culturally sanctioned opportunity for regular practice in composition and invention that became both central and crucial to her creative project. Dickinson's letters are crucial sites of reading and writing that contain many of her most innovative experiments in calling traditional genre distinctions into question by deliberately blurring boundaries and mixing modes (202).

While Tingley points out how Dickinson's epistolary practices provide a venue for her to test out unconventional and experimental techniques of composition, his emphasis on Dickinson's writing that blur boundaries and mix modes of traditional genres is essential to my investigation of her acts of transgression between textual and physical places. As Dickinson writes to distinguish herself from and to challenge her status quo, her letters demonstrate "a real reluctance to parrot model letters and often conducts radical stylistic experiments within the traditional frame provided by conventional salutations and complementary closes" (Tingley 204). Striving to fit in as well as to resist her contemporary social and cultural conditions, Dickinson's sociality, again, is more pertinent to what Latour defines acts of (re-)collecting elements of our environment in order to gain a new sense of being in the collective. She *takes advantage* of such a "socially and culturally sanctioned opportunity" for women to write letters by rebelling against letter-writing guidebooks, especially with her excessive use of dashes:

> In contrast to convention, Dickinson's correspondence, like her poetry, is peppered with dashes that both link disparate elements and provide rich gaps between ideas that often invite multiple interpretations (Tingley 206).

Through writing, Dickinson is able to re-make sense of her being in an alter-world which is more generous, inclusive, and fluid in that her poetic and epistolary work seeks to embrace difference, provoke uncertainty, and challenge the anthropocentric authority that circumscribes our conception of the world. Her use of dashes to evoke obscurity in "The Robin is a Gabriel" and other poems included in her letters, while edited out in Mabel Loomis Todd's *Letters of Emily Dickinson*, is preserved in Franklin's edition of her poetry collection, which matches the punctuation marks in the original manuscript.[6] Perhaps Todd, as an editor of Dickinson's letter upon Lavinia's request, felt uncomfortable about such *misuse* or *carelessness* of punctuation and performed her editing duties to remove Dickinson's dashes to maintain clarity of the text. To show Dickinson's original intent to challenge her status quo, I quote the poem from Franklin's edition and provide a more complex, transgressive interpretation. The poem, which has been adapted/adopted in Todd's and Franklin's respective collections of Dickinson's writing, is a significant example of intertextual correlations and confrontations between Dickinson and her diverse readers. Through Todd's vigilant eyes, the poem is confined, in a gendered and anthropocentric manner, in the 19th-century U.S. In constrast, the original manuscript and Franklin's edition see the poem undergoing transgressive interspecies migration as well as formal deterritorialization of the epistolary domain. The *proper* "Robin" in the original manuscript, while corrected to be lowercase "robin" in Todd's edition, manifests its power as a maker of poetry, rather than just a symbol with wings, regarding Plumly's viewpoint presented previously.

When Dickinson sent this poem to Sarah Tuckerman in 1880, the robin, among the birds Dickinson has sent to "seek" Tuckerman, speaks for Dickinson in light of her persistence and idiosyncrasy in her poetic creation and reclusive manner of socialization. The robin as a Gabriel

manifests Dickinson's access to Eden on earth, as a result of her transgressive gaze as a birder whose visual space as well as vision resemble that of song birds. In particular, she consistently resorts to birds when she thinks about death and dying, an impalpable locale that is permanently mobile and (de)territorized by acts of living. In a letter to Sarah Tuckerman in October 1885, less than a year before Dickinson's death, the poet writes:

> DEAR FRIEND,—I thought of you on your lonely journey, certain the hallowed heroine was gratified, though mute. I trust your return in safety and with closer clutch for that which remains, for dying whets the grasp.
>
> October is a mighty month, for in it little Gilbert died. 'Open the door,' was his last cry, 'the boys are waiting for me.' Quite used to his commandment, his little aunt obeyed, and still two years and many days, and he does not return.
>
> Where makes my lark his nest?
>
> But Corinthians' bugle obliterates the birds,' so covering your loved heart to keep it from another shot (*Letters* 332).

Experiencing the serial deaths of her father, mother, and her nephew, Dickinson, in this period of her life, was shaken by personal tragedy as well as undergoing her own physical decline. The members of the purely human world, in which Dickinson was compelled to participate as a 19th-century U.S. woman, left the Dickinsonian bubble of the Massachusetts homestead one by one. The anthropocentric bubble Dickinson dwells in with other human actors is continuously territorialized by the transgression of the bubble of death. Dickinson's transgressive gaze, then, extends to the visual space of the afterlife and seeks to peek at the environment, in Uexküll's words, of the alter-world via her poetic pursuit of animal perspectives that might shed some light on the vast, intangible spaces between life and death and of death that remains unknowable to

human perception. In this alter-world, Dickinson questions the whereabouts of her deceased nephew by having a lark as a spokesperson for Gilbert, whose speech can no longer be heard. Instead of addressing Gilbert in Heaven from a religious vantage point, Dickinson looks for Gilbert on an open ground, possibly prairies, where larks make their nests as her nephew begins a new cycle of life. At this moment, the alter-world of afterlife is located on earth, which seems to be within reach for the poet. However, the blasting sound of "resurrection" or "restoration of the mortal body into an immoral state" (*Emily Dickinson Lexicon*) completely overwhelms the singing larks as nonhuman spokespersons for Gilbert, obstructing Dickinson's transcendental attempt to locate her nephew's newfound home in the multispecies collective of interspatial transgressivity between life and death.

The juxtaposition of Christian and transcendental approaches to understanding life and death in the letter shows Dickinson's continued struggle with religious faith in her later years. By stating that religious resurrection intervenes the lark spokesperson's act of nesting on an open ground, Dickinson presents Gilbert's eternal confinement in an anthropocentric visual space, which birds cannot *call* home. It is as if Gilbert retreated into his normative, anthropocentric world when he crossed the threshold of Dickinson's house after she "open[ed] the door." His temporary dwelling with Dickinson and her animals in the poetic collective of an alter-world during his visit to her house manifests a time-sensitive becoming of geography for him as he participates in Dickinson's particular, multispecies *social* scene. Her transgressive gaze across interspecies spatial boundaries that guides her incessant construction of the poetic alter-world is ineffective in crossing the boundaries between the religious and multispecies bubbles. Perhaps this should be no surprise since religions are purely anthropocentric constructs with worldviews founded on human exceptionalism. I believe that, though brought up in a Calvinist household,

Dickinson intended her poetic creation to form a world that is generous, transgressive, and larger-than-human. With a goal to demonstrate how her poetic alter-world is built on a multispecies collective that is perpetually mobile and expansive beyond human geographies, I will continue the exploration of her poetic alter-world as it extends to the other side of the Pacific Ocean—the Sinophone sphere.

Much like poetry written in English, birds remain almost an obsession, or *destination*, for poetic creation for Sinophone poets. Birds are a destination because poets write incessantly to achieve their mobility of flight and resistance to gravitational pull. In addition to embodying flies' perspective in his poetry, as shown in "The Universe from a Fly's Perspective" discussed previously, Yu, in the same series, also resorts to mosquitoes to address how the bodily movement of certain animals/insects capable of flying defies human limitation of mobility in vertical space:

> …..…………………………………..
>
> A mosquito listening to the lecture [of Newton] from underneath a desk
>
> is not at all persuaded;
>
> he flies across Newton's face, challenging him:
>
> "Where is the [gravitational] pull?"

The unconvinced mosquito in the poem disagrees with Newton's theory of gravity because the theory does not apply to its perspective of the world, or the universe, and fails to construct its environment—its perception and visual space, due to the lack of upward direction of the farthest plane. Possessing the capacity to take flights like flies and mosquitoes, birds, besides effortlessly moving against the gravitational pull, produce songs that bring about perspectives which can only be gained via freedom of bodily movement in vertical space. While Dickinson the birder

watches birds attentively and composes a poetic alter-world as an anti-anthropocentric bubble that overlaps the robin's expansive bubble, Yu practices birding on the other side of the Pacific Ocean via lamenting the contracted space of his poetic creation via the immobility of a "dead" song bird:

> When winter solstice's here
> And vernal equinox still far,
> What dialect is most safe to adopt?
> If you're a warbler of a bird,
> Beautiful, white all over feathered,
> You'll be a taxidermist's delight
> To adorn that museum, vivid as if undead.
> Under the Latin name will be noted:
> A song bird, swift in song and in flight,
> Of rare species now, all but extinct.
> Or you can sing a timely song
> To earn your place in a draped room,
> Perched demurely upon a wall,
> And pleasing chamber music to make,
> Away from the wild woodnote call.
> When the clock strikes eleven,
> Eleven times, then, must you chime
> Under the batons of short hand and long.
> Or you will insist on an outdoor song

In the chill-spell of winter when

Sneeze and cough are in tune and safe (42).

Written in Taiwan in 1966, "There was a Dead Bird" satirizes the government's impediment of freedom of speech, restricted use of Mandarin Chinese and other dialects, and censorship on political topics in literary creation during the period of Martial Law in Taiwan from 1949 to 1987. Similar to Dickinson, Yu as a poet takes on the role of a "seer," whose transgressive gaze manifests visions generated in literary and artistic creation.[7] By viewing the warbling bird as his nonhuman spokesperson whose properties of white, pure appearance and "timely songs" lead to its entrenchment in an anthropocentric space of "a draped room," Yu establishes a poetic space in which temporal fluidity is replaced by artificial regulation of hours and seasons and a song bird's spatial perspective is obstructed by a human-made "chamber." Though possessing the ability to fly, the song bird perches on a wall in a reserved manner, singing "music"—artificial composition of sounds—to please the sheltered listeners and resisting its instinctual call to the woods. Just like a cuckoo clock on a wall, the confined song bird "chime[s]," instead of chirps, following the artificial measurement of time. Unable to take flight into the woods and sing its songs freely, the song bird, or more specifically, the cuckoo on the wall, dwells in a wooden clock, a human-crafted locale with limited visual space available only sporadically between hours.

In contrast to Dickinson's robin that descends to earth vertically and establishes its environment amidst human territories, Yu's song bird is trapped indoors, moving horizontally back and forth, in and out of the wooden box with hourly short springs. Compared the challenging time under the Martial Law to the "chill-spell of winter," Yu advises the song bird, his nonhuman spokesperson in the poetic space, not to make any louder sounds than "sneeze" or

"cough" if it wishes to, eventually, sing outside the censored bubble safely, upon the lifting of the Martial Law. Through the exchange of the poet's gazing at the song bird's hindered bodily movement and the bird's monotonous cuckoo signifying anthropocentric time, an interspatial relationship takes place between the governmental censorship of Yu's creative mobility and the wooden clock containing the wild song bird. Yu's poetic thoughts and visions, just like the songs of the birds, were becoming "extinct" and "rare," as the bird spokesperson is removed from "the wild woodnote call." The contraction of the visual space of the bird's spokesperson who speaks or sings in the poet's place manifests the blockage of Yu's transgressive gaze through the bird in order to gain alternative perspective. In this regard, the shrinking of the bird's perceived environment, its bubble, suggests the obstruction of Yu's poetic construction of the multispecies collective, his work-in-progress interspecies bubble. The bird's-eye view, then, reaches as far as the edge of the sheltered, draped room while Yu's cartographic acts of spatial construction of an alter-world are suspended, due to the bird's entrapment in darkness walled off by the wooden panel of the clock, between hours. The bird's hourly songs reflect Yu's censored publications of poems under the Martial Law in Taiwan. Derived from the freedom to sing and take flights, the bird was considered "dead" as Yu's poetic creation became extinct. The dead bird's bubble coincides the bubble of Yu who was compelled to be silent. The draped room, in this context, serves as a transgressive locale. At such a locale, the in-between space of life and death is enacted and constantly territorized and deterritorized by Yu's acts of world-building via evolving dialectic on artistic creation and ornithological observation.

Apparently, the inability to create poetry freely is deemed a sort of death for Yu. Further, poetry writing is what keeps Yu *alive* against his fearfulness of death, similar to how Dickinson makes numerous attempts to encounter and prepare for death in her poetry. For Yu, poetic

composition should serve as something more than descriptive words in a given language. Instead, regarding Jin-dan Li's article, it is what inspires thoughts as reflected truthfully in the heart (70). According to Yu, not all sounds made via vibration of the tongue and considered language constitute thoughts, products of systematic and consistent practice of the writing/composing subjects. For this reason, a cuckoo in a wooden clock cannot sing a song. What can be considered a lyrical or bird song, then, entails human and nonhuman singers' spatial and creative freedom unbounded by the categories of man-made physical and ideological structures such as a "museum," a "draped room," a "wall," or the Martial Law. The interspecies collaboration in the acts of writing is essential for Yu's song bird to come alive and regain its ever-expanding bubble. With such prerequisites for poetic creation through animal articulation and perception, the geography of water as a substance that shapeshifts and is shapeless seems to be an appropriate actant of the poetic collective that connects various locales of transgressive spatialization on the alter-worlding map.

My aim to link Yu's immobilized song bird indoors and the extinction of its acts of singing and flying to Dickinson's *transgressive* robin in the poetic alter-world calls for Shih's relational method that stresses the interconnectedness of the world from the nonhuman oceanic perception of space on earth:

> Viewing from the perspective of the sea…allows us to see the world as an archipelago, where different land masses (whether the so-called continents or the so-called islands) are all islands; though of varying sizes, they are also all interconnected by the sea (85).

The sea, as the node at which geographical becomings happen, serves as the constantly mobile locale of poetic quests. It is a site of transgressivity because acts of territorialization and deterritorialization occur regularly as the ocean tides ebb and flow away from and toward the

island shores. Viewing Taiwan and North America as islands of varied sizes, the sea, as a nonhuman spokesperson for poets like Yu and Dickinson, *articulates* a network of spatial relations that create a new perspective on the connection of the two "islands." If every land mass is an island, then poetry created on each island is connected via the perspective of the sea. While Shih does not intend to propose an anthropocentric model of studying the world due to that she still resorts, primarily, to exclusively human history to further the connectedness of the islands, her oceanic method of worlding flattens the human ownership of subjectivity and maps earthly spaces from the nonhuman perspective. The sea, along with the sky, embodies the vertical space in which humans encounter our limitation without the aid of machines. While the sky is inaccessible to the song bird or the silenced poet in the poem, Yu uses poetry writing as a means to enable the immobilized bird to take flights in front of his readers' eyes and join the robin in the sky mapped via Dickinson's poetic composition. As Yu the birder describes his disappointment in not seeing the song bird flying and singing freely, the song bird should not merely be thought of as confined to the wall in the draped room. Through Dickinson's and Yu's shared readers' diligent acts of *poetic birding* that results in the interspatial and intertextual transgression or migration of birds in the poetic network constructed by the two *island birders*, the warbler is able to sing freely, again, perhaps in Dickinson's backyard. The immobility of a bird is transient in the poem, which manifests a poetic node of evolving territoriality and constant acts of (de)territorialization in the network. The active and continuous reader-writer relationships are formed between the birders or creators of the multispecies poetic collective and the readers who participate as *translators* in the collective. Therefore, as readers study the birding activities in the alter-world constructed by Dickinson and Yu in their respective islands, they, at the same time, *watch* the poetic birds attentively and prompt the birds' intertextual migration.

While Shih's proposal of worlding via the perspective of the sea revolutionizes the cartographical method of the world by viewing all land masses as islands related to each other via the sea instead of demarcations of national territories, her relational approach can also be further illustrated when reading sea-focused poems by poets such as Dickinson, Whitman, and Yu as an alternative set of poetic nodes in the multispecies collective. Dickinson's poems such as "Wild nights - Wild night!" discussed in Chapter One, Whitman's poems such as "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking" examined in Chapter Three, and Yu's numerous poems on the sea such as "The Sea as My Neighbor," "Up here Facing the Sea," and "The Romance of the Sea" are all exemplars of nonhuman sea actors that, through intertextual association and geographical connection, construct the oceanic section of the poetic network. Yet, within the scope of this chapter and dissertation, I shall reserve this idea of the oceanic poetic collective for future projects. What I intend to address further here is Shih's emphasis on the interconnectedness of the world, a term which has been redefined when Shih dismantles the ideological structure of nations and replaces the world map with archipelagoes wide-ranging in sizes. By focusing on the interconnectedness between Dickinson's and Yu's birding activities that are manifested in their poetic creation, I have shown an alter-world—or a revised version of "the world"—constructed by the poets' transgressive gazes that contribute to the expansion of human visual space, through the bird's-eye view. Furthermore, I contend that readers of Yu's and Dickinson's bird-focused poems, via their acts of reading and poetic birding, embody a manner of intertextual connectedness, through which the birds in the poems migrate freely in the readers' *environment* on a transpacific scale.

In conclusion, this chapter demonstrates how multispecies poetic collective, as constructed via Dickinson's and Yu's bird poems, is a productive virtual site to construct a map

of worlds that is yet unknown to us, in response to Serres' quest for an alternative version of a world map. Birds, flies, mosquitoes, and Angels such as Gabriel remain crucial nonhuman actors in mapping the vertical space of the poetic network. In such a relational network, poems that are created via the poets' transgressive gaze at birds and compositional building of an alter-world through the bird's eye view serve as constantly mobile locales, at which human and nonhuman bubbles pass, coincide, and overlap each other. The alter-world, then, is constructed by mobilized maps that are drawn in accordance with the establishment, territorialization and deterritorialization of the multispecies bubbles, each of which undergoes spatial transgression in the collective. The bubbles, the environment of human and nonhuman actors, constitute an alter-world via interspatial and intertextual relations between the poets, the birds, in the context of this chapter, and the readers. This alter-world, built on multiple poetic virtual sites, offers human readers an opportunity to conceive our world *obliquely*, challenge our status quo, and participate in uncovering an alternative set of realities via the acts of co-existing and co-creating with nonhuman animals. While this chapter provides a model of how a multispecies poetic collective functions to re-map space and construct a world *not* as we know it or worlds composed of interspecies *environments*, more work needs to be done in order to form a more systematic and permanent mobilized sense of reality, which we currently are compelled to call *literary imagination*.

Notes

[1] Yu, Kwang-chung (1956-2017) was a renowned Sinophone poet, prose writer, and translator. He obtained a Master of Fine Arts degree from Iowa Writers' Workshop at the University of Iowa in 1958 and was invited by the U.S. Department of State to go on a two-year lecture tour in Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania from 1964 to 1965. He also taught poetry as a visiting professor in Temple Buell College in Denver from 1969-1970. For more detail on Yu's background, please read my article "Songs yet to Be Sung: Walt Whitman and Taiwan's Yu Kwang-chung" published by *Walt Whitman Quarterly Review*.
ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2153&context=wwqr

[2] Lin, Hsinmei. Trans. "*The Universe in Perspective*, *Commentator, and The Birth of a Masterpiece by Yu Kwang-chung.*" *Transference* 3, no. 1 (2016): 26.

[3] I use "earth" in this chapter to indicate the spatial substance on which multiple species reside and should be differentiated from the definition-in-progress "world," which can be referred to Haraway's theory of formulating an alternative world on earth inclusive of nonhumans and to Uexküll's proposal of a world as a bubble, an environment that is formed by each living being's visual space within their perception.

[4] I interpret "social" in "sociopoetic" based on Bruno Latour's theorization of social in *Reassembling the Social*: *An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory*. In the book, Latour suggests that the social entails acts of assemblages that renew our sense of being in the collective, which is constituted by constantly shifting networks of relationships between human and nonhuman actors in social and natural worlds.

[5] Farlow, W. G. "Memoir of Edward Tuckerman: 1817-1886." *Biodiversity Heritage Library*. Washington: Judd & Detweiler, 1887.

www.biodiversitylibrary.org/item/129651#page/5/mode/1up. The memoir was read before the National Academy of Sciences in April, 1887.

[6] See the link to *Emily Dickinson Archive* for the original manuscript of "The Robin is a Gabriel." https://www.edickinson.org/editions/1/image_sets/240472.

[7] Su, Qi-kang. "Chinese Poems in English Translation: Kwang-chung Yu's Art of Composition." *The Songs of the 'Woeful Shepherds'.* Eds. Qi-kang Su, Yi-jun Wang, and Jin-zhong Zhang. Taipei: Chiuko, 2018. 183-210. In the article, Su states that Yu plays the role of a seer, especially with regard to the Western poetic tradition of viewing poets as visionaries, as exemplified in the poem "There was a Dead Bird," the English version of which has been re-created, Su argues, rather than translated, by Yu.

CODA

A Real World in Prospect

Why are we compelled to address the concept of reality in quotation—"real" or "reality"? Is it because what is deemed real or reality remains subjective constructs which vary between individuals? If so, when we, as humans, casually mention that animals live in a different sort of reality, aren't we indirectly confirming that animals *do* possess subjectivity as they perceive and interact with their environments inaccessible to humans, who are confined within the map of globe, though enormous, because we uncritically decide that as members of Homo sapiens, we belong *together*—we have a shared reality inaccessible to nonhuman animals.

This dissertation questions such arbitrary reality of the global map that, subsequently dominates literary studies on the national, international, and intercontinental scales. To challenge spatial and temporal contexts of the globe and human history that reflect *partial* reality for some humans—in the case of this dissertation, Dickinson, Whitman, and Yu, the dissertation has re-scaled and/or clarified the relation between the globe and the world, the world and the text. Viewing literature, particularly poetry, as a privileged vehicle to talk about how interiority is expressed in the outside world—the world which is commonly considered "real," I have shown that when poets compose nonhuman- and animal-focused poems, they demonstrate an ingenious approach to *accessing* nonhuman and animal realities. Through their anti-anthropocentric manner of poetic cartography, the so-called "intangible" or "imagined" space can be, and *is* real. Such space constructed via acts of poetry writing and reading has been considered unreal merely because it is not charted on the global map and recorded in human historical narrative. By studying these uncharted spaces that are delineated in 19th-century U.S. nonhuman focused

poems, I have proposed a model of mapping an alter-world where humans and nonhumans co-exist and co-create—a cartographical mechanism which I call a poetic collective.

Such a multispecies poetic collective manifests spatial and temporal realities our current conception of the globe has yet to accommodate. As I trudged through certain parts of the dissertation in which I needed to argue for the legitimacy of a landscape or a locale described in selected poems that does not correspond to the global map, I was daunted by the *necessity* of using "imaginary" to refer to literary space. I have even grown dubious about our seemingly assuring distinction between the real and the imaginary. Certainly, it is not within the scope of my dissertation to join the philosophical quest for the real. Or, does it really have to be intricately philosophical so that only those who *belong to* the intellectual or academic circles can have a say? To make poetry reading and literary criticism accessible to the public demands us who are in the academia to loosen our grip on the anthropocentric construct of knowledge, especially our knowledge about "the world" we dwell in. And this dissertation should serve as a message to address the unknown that is neglected in our learned conception of the world and to urge us to rethink our human positions in our multispecies world. For this reason, this dissertation can be viewed as a prototype of worlding in multispecies literature.

As I further develop my dissertation into a book, I will focus on implementing a *real*, accessible approach to studying world literature as multispecies literature generated via poetic cartography and alter-worlding. Inviting students as poetry readers to participate in constructing an alter-world via collaboratively reading nonhuman- and animal-focused poems in a classroom as well as using a digital platform, I will provide both physical and electronic venues, sites at which multispecies poetic collectives and alter-worlds take place. In this classroom- and website-based poetic collective where students and I collaborate to delineate uncharted spaces manifested

in nonhuman-focused poetries and our daily lives, we will map an alter-world constituted by our attentive observation of nonhumans and animals on both physical and literary levels. In this alter-world, literary landscapes exhibit real places for multispecies dwelling. Through our mutual exchanges of properties of reading, writing, drawing, and photographing about and with nonhuman entities, a multispecies poetic collective becomes *tangible* and interactive. By recording and interpreting nonhuman activities and events in both physical and literary environments, we together will take the first step of transplanting my theoretical model of an alter-world from my dissertation to public and educational locales such as a classroom or a website.

With the goal to include nonhuman entities across the globe in our poetic collective to continue to build the alter-world, I have begun a translation project, in which I select and translate Kwang-chung Yu's poems from Mandarin Chinese into English. Using a language-based method of translation to mobilize nonhuman actors in Sinophone poetry to the English-speaking sphere, I will encourage multilingual students to translate nonhuman-focused poems written in a language other than English and immerse all students in English translations of poems written in a variety of languages. By involving themselves in the process of composing translations or reading translated works, students undergo a sort of interspatial transgression as they collaboratively map spaces in the alter-world with nonhuman actors across the globe. It is inevitable that, to expand the poetic collective of an alter-world, we should refer to the global map and utilize our capacity to use languages. However, different from Damrosch's proposal that translated works in global circulation constitute world, or more accurately, global literature, I produce and employ works of hermeneutic translation as a means to complement human limitation in perceiving *a* world whose linguistic construct differs from their own. By using

translation to open up human perception worlds to reach the nonhuman sphere, human readers who participate in the acts of exchange of properties via reading, writing, and attentive observation are able to enter the nonhuman perception worlds as well as chart spaces with the nonhuman makers in the shared effect worlds.

As language-oriented translators participate in the poetic collective by contributing their translation of nonhuman- and animal-focused poems in a language other than English, their translation is also interspatial and non-linguicentric because they enter the nonhuman perception worlds during their attentive following and translating, in a manner similar to the boy translator who translates the mockingbird's songs, and co-exist with their translated nonhuman actors in the multispecies alter-world. To make sure that such engaging project of worlding becomes *accepted* as reality, I will keep an active and detailed archive of the in-classroom and multimodal activities of poetic alter-worlding on the project website, which is open-access, interactive, and constantly *under construction*, drawn from Cheah's idea that the world is perpetually being made and remade. The attribute of the poetic collective as a cartographic foundation—"everything but not two separated" (*Politics of Nature*, 59) will serve as the core feature of the project website, which aims to present the abstract and the theoretical in a tangible and accessible manner. By devising such a project of a poetic collective to *realize* and perform the methods of worlding proposed in the dissertation, I consider this project an initial step to narrate histories of multispecies co-existence and therefore will manifest the becoming of histories of a poetic alter-world that are not aligned with the anthropocentric account of global history.

Ultimately, I do expect my research in this dissertation to be a small step outside the anthropocentric comfort zone in literary study and worldly human existence. Such a small step can contribute substantially to the pursuit of true diversity. In line with my persistent goal to

create a diverse classroom without subjecting students to institutional, human-made categories, my research also addresses the necessity to include nonhuman species in the acts of meaning-making and world-building in literary studies against anthropocentric worldviews. As I move forward, I will delve more into the poetics of worlding in Sinophone studies as well as further my current prototype of world poetries, in order to enact a literary cartographic system of worlding predicated on multispecies poetries. Combining my prospective pedagogical and scholarly goals to conceive a world of multispecies diversity, I, along with the robins I dwelt with every spring on the campus of the University of Washington, have begun charting an alter-world known only to those who keep it *real*.

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