Enclosing the Citizen: The Role of *Telos*, *Areté*, and Techniques of Power in Western Social Systems and K-12 Education

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Abstract

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This thesis discusses the ways that the evolving notions of the citizen in Western philosophical traditions has been deeply informed by the ancient Hellenic concepts of arete, telos, and logics of categorical thinking. I argue that teleological thinking is the catalyst for the use of differentiation in order to organize and, more specifically, hierarchize the natural world to serve the telos of those in power. This thesis is arranged in chronological order of historical time periods to illustrate the impact of Western philosophers and natural scientists on epistemologies of contemporary racialized thinking. Using Michel Foucault's theory of how power moves and regulates people and their own desires, I explore teleological thinking and how it uses a variety of enclosures as a technique of power. One important example can be seen in the teleological impulses of the United States K-12 education system, in particular through the implementation of the Common Core State Standards. In the last chapter, I narrow my analysis to a school improvement report for Stewart Middle School in Tacoma, Washington written by representatives from the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction. I focus on the impact of

the Common Core State Standards and how they primarily serve the State's economic interests to develop workers. I argue that the Common Core State Standards function to pre-problematize the "ideal" worker by enclosing students into racial, gender, and economic categories to organize and hierarchize them. I suggest that before we can take any action to change, we must internalize the problems posed and acknowledge how we play a role in the dialectical relationship of coercion and consent between the State, the school, and the student.

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Dedication

For all the outliers

who never stop asking *why*.

Chapter 1. Introduction: Mapping the Journey

My Culminating Experience

I have never felt *normal*. To me, being normal was living my life according to other's expectations. I was the kid who asked "why" after every directive or statement from my family, teachers, or friends. Looking back, most of my curiosity to know *why* came from my desire to always learn, but it was also my way of challenging authority because I wasn't about to do something simply for the sake of authority. I was an athlete in high school, but when I realized that everyone else's expectation for my life outweighed my own I made the decision to quit. Of course, I had a lot of push-back, but the more my coaches didn't understand why I quit the more validation I felt for doing it. I took their lack of understanding as sign that success was determined by someone other than me, and I wasn't okay with this assumption. Coaches couldn't understand how an athlete could just walk away from something they've invested in for a long time - especially when the system was set up to guarantee athletes more success post-high school - but I was determined to decide my own definition of success for my life.

When I asked myself *why* I was an athlete my answer was always *because I was good at it*; it was never because I was passionate about it. In many ways, I didn't want to pursue a career in athletics just because I was "born" to do it, or because I had "natural" abilities; that answer wasn't enough for me. What I didn't know then was that my experiences and how I moved through life was quite *normal*, but I was starting to question who the hell decided what normal was for me in the first place.

After high school, I accepted an internship with my church to work with immigrant families in the local community as well as participate in two international trips with teams. As a Christian, my life had a narrow purpose: live your life according to God's will. At the time, I

believed all of humanity had this purpose, and as I asked more questions and reconciled the answers I quickly realized that living a life according to one purpose was problematic. I thought, maybe I just needed to learn more about the history to give me evidence for why it started to feel so problematic, so I ended my internship early to start college. My intention was to get my undergraduate degree in church history, but since nothing in my early adult life actual went according to plan I eventually decided on a general history degree after changing schools multiple times. The antiquity classes that I took were my way of attempting to regain some lost ground in my search for the history of the Christian church. My first antiquity course was "Rome and the Early Church," and I remember one specific moment in that class that changed my ontology and challenged the existing epistemologies that I learned from an early age. I remember the exact moment when my professor explained how other societies in antiquity influenced a shift in Hebrew thinking from *henotheism*, or my god is better than your god, to *monotheism*, my god is the only god. I grew up in a monotheistic home and was told that all other gods were false, so this seemingly insignificant moment in class changed my entire outlook on life. If a society so central to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam could change their own ontology when forced to live among other societies, then what I know to be Truth must have been constructed and agreed upon centuries ago.

After experiencing my own ontological shift during my undergraduate years, it wasn't until I started graduate school that I began to name the theories and paradigms that help describe how I, and others, experience the world. For example, I learned that if you believe that this world exists only for God's will, then everything you know to be true originates, first and foremost, from God's will - it becomes a lens for how you see and judge the world. Essentially, what makes something true is measured against this single purpose. In contrast, if you believe that our

world is not predicated on any specific purpose, then truth is subjective; allowing for multiple truths (and purposes) to exist at once. The idea that meaning is agreed upon - not predetermined by God - impacted my approach to my own research. I realized how someone could have a positive paradigm - one that originates from God's will and includes natural Truths - but even though they see their own world through this lens it doesn't dismiss the fact that the lens they've chosen was constructed for them.

My Enclosed Self: Reconciling My Positionality

Graduate school taught me a lot about myself, but more importantly how I relate to the world around me. I learned that being an able-bodied, white, heterosexual, middle class, female means I experience and move through the world in a particular, determined way. At first, it felt awkward objectifying my identity into categories because it made me feel distant from my classmates and the world around me. Of all the categories I listed above, the only one that ever made me feel objectified was being born and identifying as female, so that odd feeling I had was me reconciling with the fact that others have felt objectified and oppressed for more than just their biological sex. I never had to identify with the other categories because society was built *for* those categories, which meant that my experience in life was more normal than I thought. It's not that I didn't understand or recognize the privileges that were afforded to me because I am white, heterosexual, able-bodied, and middle class, it's that I didn't fully understand why it was important for me to situate myself *in* them. It wasn't until I learned about social theory and read contemporary research that I understood the foundational role that these categories play in developing contemporary social systems and structures.

As I reconciled my own experiences, I started to realize that I was actually developing the foundation for my research. I knew that my research was not going to speak for anyone else

because I can't tell you how others experience the world, but I can certainly explore Western thinking to locate a possible reason for *why* each of us may experience it differently. I started with a question that eventually became this body of research: How is it that we've come to live in a world where the physical characteristics, orientations, and abilities of individuals play a role in how they experience and move through social life? Why is it that what is visible to the naked eye (e.g. race or gender) is evidence for an individual's' inherent quality or justification for their given role in society?

In many ways, my research is a journey that explores the limits of language through the use of categories, or enclosures. Ultimately, I narrow my focus in the last chapter to public education and the recent dependence on the Common Core State Standards to identify, divide, and diagnose students. In order for me to develop a holistic analysis, I knew that by studying language I would need to start my journey a few thousand years prior to our contemporary era. Language differentiates the world so we can make meaning of it, but throughout history there are examples of Western societies that attempt (and succeed) to convince others that these differences can be organized and hierarchized to establish a dominant group.

The focus of chapter 3 in this thesis is on race, but the same teleological thinking that concluded racial difference to be a byproduct of human evolution (i.e. dominance and deviance) was also the same thinking that hierarchized other categories like gender, ability, sexual orientation, and class. The categories and the sub-categories within them, not only help us make meaning and differentiate the world, but it is through teleological thinking that we have been convince to believe that white, heterosexual, able-bodied, men are superior in all physical, emotional, spiritual, and intellectual aspects; they are the standard for which all others are measured.

My thesis analyzes how categorical thinking was shaped by philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, but also how the Hellenes (those in the 4th and 5th centuries, B.C.E. who resided in the area of what is now modern day Greece) gave categorical thinking its purpose, or *telos*. I argue that teleological thinking is the catalyst for the *use* of differentiation to organize and, more specifically, hierarchize the natural world in order to serve the end-goal of those in power. This thesis' chapters are arranged in chronological order of historical time periods (i.e. Hellenic antiquity, the early Christian church, the Enlightenment, and our contemporary era) to illustrate how Western philosophers and scientists shaped the epistemologies of contemporary racial thinking. By exploring teleological thinking throughout Western history, I demonstrate that it is still at work within the United States through the implementation of the Common Core State Standards for education. It is through my examination of the use of enclosures that I locate how students are organized and hierarchized into categories that may easily be understood as racialized.

Why Foucault?

I first read Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish (1977)* during an independent study, and it impacted me in a way that I couldn't stop thinking about it, and it eventually became the jumping off point for this thesis. It was Foucault's discussion of power that interested me the most; not just a discussion of who has the most power but how systems are built on coercion, but we as a society consent where power moves and who we give it to based on our collective acceptance of any system. What I learned from Foucault (1980) is that power and knowledge are one and the same, and that "there can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth" (p. 93). I say Foucault was the jumping off point for my thesis because I started to think more deeply about what discourses of truth may have led us to

categorize and hierarchize people. What are the underlying themes and concepts within our contemporary discourses that we take for granted? For the purposes of this thesis, I realized how foundational teleological thinking was to our current discourses on politics, law, the economy, and education. There is always an ultimate purpose behind laws, policies, economic goals, and educational outcomes; and this purpose dictates the behaviors, habits, and actions of individuals. Therefore, Foucault's theory of power is imbedded throughout my thesis to illustrate how discourses of truth move in society and how we *believe in* and *consent to* the exercise of power over us.

Why Public Education?

Using K-12 public education in chapter four as the contemporary theatre for how categorical thinking plays out was an easy choice for me. I currently work for a public school district so its effects on society are front and center in my daily work; but aside from this, I have always understood public education as the one social institution for contemporary societies that determines the sustainability and stability for local communities. Just as my research reaches far back in Western history to locate the same concepts in discourses that continue to impact our present issues, I see public education as the central process for the development of citizens for the State. If the United States is predicated on thousands of years of Western ideology, then it's not enough to discover *who* U.S. society is built *for* but how current institutions like public education function to support and strengthen those same ideologies. Public education was and continues to be designed to directly serve the (white middle class) *telos* of the State, and a student's *areté* (virtue) is determined by their capacity to measure up to the (white) academic standards required by the State.

Summary of Chapters

In Chapter two, I start by introducing Michel Foucault's theory of enclosures as a technique of power for disciplining individuals and societies. I discuss the need for enclosures in language - to help find meaning in the world around us - and how enclosures function when applied through a positivist paradigm. The nature of enclosures is a central theme in this chapter, as well as my thesis, because I believe it reveals a sort of machine at work (technique of power) that creates and reinforces truths for individuals and societies. I analyze texts from both Plato and Aristotle to introduce and define *telos* and *areté* as core concepts in Hellenic society as well as situate them as two main concepts that follow Western thinkers throughout history.

The enclosing nature of both *telos* and *areté* laid the foundation for categorical thinking by establishing a moral and orderly standard for living. The second half of this chapter applies both *telos* and *areté* to Christian epistemology as examined through Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas. Christian apologists, like Augustine and Aquinas, often used Hellenic sources like Plato and Aristotle to argue the validity of Christian beliefs and practices, and often expressed Christianity as a more refined version of what both Hellenic philosophers taught. Both Augustine and Aquinas illustrate how the enclosing nature of *telos* and *areté*, when applied to Christian beliefs, introduce a more systemic approach for using the natural, physical world as a mode for not only revealing Truth but also a reason to differentiate humanity.

In Chapter three, I analyze how language is used to design and implement enclosures as a technique of power. I use Edward Said's *Orientalism* and Stuart Hall's *Representation* to illustrate how language is used to differentiate objects in the world, but also how discourse constructs a system for how those same objects are organized and hierarchized in society. I apply these theories to Western discourses on human varieties and early racialized thinking during the

sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. I analyze sources like Rene Descartes, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Arthur De Gobineau, and Immanuel Kant to locate how teleological thinking is foundational for their arguments on natural sciences and philosophy, and how contemporary racialized thinking emerged from their work.

This chapter concludes with the work of nineteenth-century Eugenicists and how conversations and studies about race changed from questions about *why* humanity is the way it is to *what kind* of humanity, or what *quality*, should exist. I demonstrate that language relies on enclosures to construct meaning and that discourses of truth are created, implemented, and strengthened by these enclosures, and this reveals how racialized thinking operates as a technique of power that disciplines individual behavior and action.

In Chapter four, I open with Bernard Bailyn's historiography of American public education to reveal how the narrative on the history of education in the United States has been produced by only those who advocated for its place as a modern profession. By acknowledging that public education has been almost untouched (i.e. critical analysis) by other academic disciplines, my goal is to illustrate that this sort of protection exists because of its direct attachment to the State ideology. I eventually narrow my analysis to a school improvement report for Stewart Middle School in Tacoma, Washington written to the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction. I focus on the impact of the Common Core State Standards and how they function to enclose, organize, and hierarchize students in order to determine their main function for the State.

The narrative found in the report for Stewart Middle School demonstrates how central academic standards are to student success, but more importantly how the CCSS allow schools, principals, teachers, and students to self-govern in ways that require very little on the part of the

State - even though they are designed to reinforce State ideology. I end the chapter with a discussion on Paulo Freire's theory on education as dynamic - a way to transform present realities through an on-going dialogical process. Discourses of truth should not be determined by those in power and exist as given realities but they should be shared discourses between teacher and student that reveal oppressions against the latter. Education through share dialogue should design and implement dynamic discourses of truth that are constantly active and changing to better serve the present and a desired future.

Chapter 2. Finding a Purpose: Teleology as the Foundation for Enclosures

Michel Foucault wrote on the disciplinary techniques of the French prison systems in *Discipline and Punish (1977),* and his focus was to use history as a source of learning to better understand contemporary systems. Simply put, Foucault was concerned with how and why the penal system in France went from *punishment-as-a-spectacle* to *punishment-as-suspended-rights*, which ultimately made punishment invisible. Foucault focused on the nature of *discipline* and how it functions as a "machine of power" to "produce subjected and practised bodies," and how this machine is dependent on the establishment of social systems like norms, laws, and institutions (p. 138). In other words, the eighteenth-century witnessed a rise in the expansion of government oversight through the establishment of laws and institutions (e.g. business, education, legal, etc.) whose primary function is to directly influence the beliefs, behaviors, and actions of its citizens.

In order for societal systems to discipline individuals, there needs to exist a mechanism for doing so, which I argue is through *enclosures*. If the primary function of laws and institutions is to control individuals, then somehow a knowledge *about* the individuals needs to exist. Enclosures are used in language to place individuals into categories that help to breakdown society as a whole into its most basic parts. Take, for example, the modern public school system and how, in order for it to properly diagnose its students, it must divide students into categories (e.g. race, income, disability, gender, grade-level, etc.) that are then used to inform *why* a student is successful or not. Without the examination of how enclosures function throughout history, it's easy to oversee that once categories were established to talk *about* individuals, those same categories were then used to design social institutions *for* specific categories.

This chapter examines, more broadly, the nature of enclosures and how they function at the ontological level through the control of belief systems (i.e. life's purpose) and how belief systems penetrate behavior and action. Similar to how Foucault uses history as a source of learning, I focus primarily on the concepts of *telos* and *areté* in Hellenic society and early Christianity, to illustrate that enclosures are not just a contemporary invention for control but an inevitable byproduct of language that, if left unexamined, is used to "produce subjected and practised bodies."

Foucault and the Nature of Enclosures

Central to most Western thinking is an ontological belief that our world operates from a natural, teleological order. The evolution of Western epistemology stems from this linear mode of thought. In order to demonstrate how Western epistemologies remain rooted in a positive ontology, I will use Michel Foucault's (1977) theory of enclosures to illustrate how the use of enclosures disciplines and coerces human behavior. Though Foucault used his theory as a critique of French prison systems from the eighteenth-century to modern day, his theory is about the "control and use of men" (p.141) through, what he coined, "technologies of power" (p. 131). More explicitly, enclosures are a way that power moves through social structures, such as norms, cultures, behaviors, and actions. Stuart Hall (2013) describes how technologies of power, or "strategies of application," operate from truths that societies think they know, or make known, and how this construction of knowledge is how power moves (p. 33). For example, a technology is how knowledge is applied to practice, or action; therefore, social systems operate from a technology of truth and power, since both, according to Foucault, are dependent on each other (p. 27).

Enclosures, then, are a mode by which power moves, and affords agents the ability to control the behavior and beliefs of others. According to Foucault (1977), the mid-seventeenth century to the nineteenth century brought forward "a whole set of techniques . . . methods and knowledge[s]" that controlled individuals through the act of disciplining their body (p. 141). Foucault used the design of Jeremy Bentham's prison system, known as the *Panopticon*, to illustrate how physical space was used to coerce the behavior and action of prisoners (p. 200). For example, the Panopticon was a prison with a surveillance tower in the center and encircled by individual cells, and it was designed with the sole purpose to monitor each prisoner's activity at all times. The Panopticon, according to Foucault, is described as a technology of power, and even more specifically as "perfect[ing] the exercise of power. Because it is possible to intervene [by those in power] at any moment and because the constant pressure [of those held in that space] acts even before the offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed" (emphasis added, p. 206). As a twenty-four-hour surveillance system, the Panopticon coerces individuals, though it lacks a direct form of intervention and functions ambiguously as a form of control. Once the structure of the Panopticon is in place and people occupy the space, it "gives power of mind over mind," which inevitably creates an automatic system where individuals monitor themselves based on what they believe to be right behavior and action within the Panopticon, which ultimately evolves into a form of consent rather than coercion (p. 206). Similar to how the Panopticon function, I argue that different technologies of power exist at different points in Western history, affecting places like schools and classrooms. These technologies operate from teleological assumptions about nature.

A central characteristic of disciplining, according to Foucault, is the use of *enclosures* to create, apply, and control meaning and action through language and physical spaces. Foucault

(1977) understood enclosures as a technique and described it as the "specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself" (p. 141). In Foucault's analysis, techniques are not simple and straightforward modes of power, but instead are complex systems that operate from their own sets of data, or knowledges. Understanding that these techniques use their own data and knowledges allows us to understand how discursive systems are confined by the very results they seek to produce. Language can also be a technique to confine, or act as an enclosure. For instance, language often classifies and partitions the natural world in order for us to distinguish one object or subject from others. The need to classify is also directly connected to the *purpose* of the object or subject, which is how enclosures are used to control societies. For example, both males and females can be simultaneously humans, citizens, athletes, students, and employees. Each of these categories represents a type of enclosure that situates and organizes subjects for a purpose, which is to control how males and females function in society within those categories. There is usually a distinguishing factor that places a subject into one category over another (e.g. the physical anatomy to determine sex), but it is how this division is used to assign purpose and roles that is problematic.

Stuart Hall (2013) describes language as a "system of representation" that is used socially and dependent on defining similarities and differences in order to set objects apart from one another (p. 3). One example of this is using race to classify humans into similar categories, and finding characteristics or attributes that keep categories together. Though the intention of categorizing by race is to assign likeness, the categories also function as a way to differentiate between each other. Enclosures design boundaries of definitions, and by doing so a technique of power is automatically implemented, ensuring that a defined object behaves within its given guidelines. Contemporary concepts of race operate in much the same way. Categories of race

were developed in the sixteenth-century to describe and provide a scientific explanation of societal differences around the world. Foucault's use of "heterogeneous" to describe enclosures applies an intended function where enclosures operate to include and exclude through defining objects and spaces. Enclosures can only function where differentiation is needed. More specifically, this function works to identify dissimilarity in order to define and differentiate an object, or person, based on what it is and is not. Over time, what started as a way to differentiate the physical nature of humans by categories of race quickly became a way for European scientists to also assign inherent qualities to the existing racial categories. By nature, enclosures, like the concept of race, rely on heterogeneity, or difference, to distinguish what is "in" and what is "out" when it comes to assigning meaning and purpose.

Enclosures as a technique of power. Similar to Foucault, Stuart Hall (2013) described symbols as "vehicles" that "carry meaning" and that meaning "set the rules, norms and conventions by which social life is organized and governed" (p. xx-xxi). Just as borders define physical spaces and establish new meaning and purpose for those spaces, you can also define objects through the use of language that encloses a set of new meanings. An example of an enclosure that uses physical space is the design of a school, where classrooms are used to designate space for instruction and learning, and this space is also assigned a teacher whose job is to regulate the behaviors and actions of students within that confined space. The layout of student desks, all pointed in one direction, signifies where the authority is located, and the space where the desks are pointed is occupied by the teacher. The physical design of the classroom controls the actions of students by telling them that learning happens when you face the teacher; thus, limiting any conversation among students.

Symbolic enclosures function through the use of classroom norms, or rules that students must adhere to when inside the classroom, and any deviation away from these rules requires that students be removed from the classroom. These classroom norms determine and control student behavior by establishing what is acceptable to *do* or *say* while inside that classroom. Enclosures function as a technique of power, whether physical or symbolic, and are used to gain consent of those in the system by controlling their behaviors and actions.

Techniques of power are complex systems at play and it is critical to understand that power in these systems is not fixed, but always in flux. Power is not "located at - or emanating from - a given point," but is an "organized, hierarchical, coordinated cluster of relations" (Foucault, 1980, p. 198). These *clusters of relations* originate and are strengthen by what Stuart Hall (2013) coined as discursive formations, which design and reinforce a set of knowledges or truths that dictate actions (p. 29). The relationship of power and knowledge is consubstantial, where there are no techniques of power that do not directly depend on existing ideas about what is true (p. 52). Foucault (1980) discusses how power moves in established symbolic enclosures through discourses of truth:

> in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize, and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. (p. 93)

Discourses of truth are, as Hall describes, "discursive formations" that societies use to determine what is true or false, and as these statements are legitimized, power is able to move through them (p. 34). Foucault illustrates how language and discourse are the critical elements in the movement of power and the production of truth. Power is dependent on discourse as the sole producer of knowledge, but also as the sole vehicle that carries meaning and directs action.

Foucault is describing how symbolic enclosures, used in discourse as a way to develop one's own understanding, are created and used to control or manipulate the actions of individuals, and demonstrate how power moves through social bodies. An example of enclosures, as shown through moral truths, is the use of language to identify what is *good* or *bad*. Once the application of these moral truths are accepted, they determine how we behave and act. In this case, morality produces a technique of power that operates through establishing *goodness* and therefore mapping behavior and action. Discourse is the map, and our beliefs or what we *know* as truth are landmarks along the path on which power moves.

The act of enclosing individuals, physically and symbolically, requires discourses of truth that power moves from and through as a way to coerce individuals into behaving and acting within existing sets of knowledges. Power is always moving through discursive systems, so the act of defining objects through language inserts existing knowledges whereby labeling locks-in, or encloses, meaning. Labeling is a way for humans to establish meaning that not only allows us to better understand the world we live in but inevitably constrains our belief of what is truth.

A great example of labeling can be found in the classroom with the use of labels to describe and differentiate high-achieving students from low-achieving students. The label chosen by the teacher to denote high or low (e.g. "gifted," "scholar," "struggling," or "special") is not of concern since the label itself, as the technique, is what assigns meaning to students. Essentially, we apply enclosed meaning for a purpose and this purpose, once identified, controls behavior and action through a process of consent by those applying and accepting the enclosures. Student behavior and action is often pre-determined by which label they are given in school. One problem with labels is how they are used as a fixed technique to categorize and confine individuals. Another problem is the way categories like these, ones that define people, get used

by people as preexisting, essential characteristics, or essences. We might look to the Hellenic era in order to understand how such categories became a part of Western epistemologies. The Hellenic era established rationales for fixed meaning and popularized the use of such techniques through the concepts of *telos* and *areté*.

The Enclosing Nature of *Telos* and *Areté* in Hellenic Society

Citizenship in Western history arguably begins in the Hellenic era, or the city-states that flourished during the fourth and fifth centuries B.C.E. in what is modern-day Greece. Hellenic citizenship focuses on the enclosing nature of the *polis*, or city-state, as a technique of power that moves through Hellenic discourses of truth regarding the nature of man[1] and his relationship to the *polis*. This union of man and the *polis* is best understood through the Hellenic concept of *areté*, or the ability to achieve an existence *par excellence* based on one's purpose in life. *Areté* is predicated on the question: what is the purpose of existence? Or, rather does a purpose for existence exist? Both Plato (2008b, 353c-353e) and Aristotle (2009, 1252a1) argued that a purpose for man existed, rooted in *goodness*, and all of nature functioned from and towards the notion of what is *good*. Teleological thinking was foundational for Hellenic thought where *telos* (purposeful end in life) was consubstantial with achieving a par excellence existence, or *areté*. This thinking amounted to Hellenes believing their purpose in life was to be the *best* in their given role (i.e. citizen, craftsman, warrior, etc.), because being the *best* in life granted them access to the essence of *goodness*.

As mentioned above, Plato (2008b) argued that the natural world was orderly (teleological), and the *telos* of this order was *goodness*. He even described it as "the all

[1] The use of "man" is intentional in my analysis as Hellenic society believed that man, not woman, was the highest form of existence. As I discuss techniques of power in Hellenic society, the use of "man" is its own symbolic enclosure that uses binary classification which automatically assumes a male-female binary set of inclusions and exclusions.

embracing sources of life" where individuals and their communities must spend their lives learning and operating from its rule (540a-b). According to Plato, the ability to know the nature of *goodness* was solely through the method of dialectics, which he described as the only way to gain truth (532a-b). People must use dialogue to learn and understand new truths since language is the bedrock of knowledge. Plato's argument is predicated on a rational and transcendental ontology that believed in absolute truths, and through dialectic humans could seek and find these universal truths. In contrast with Foucault who believed that language was used to construct truth, Plato believed that language was used to seek out an existing truth outside of language and dialectics was a technique used to illuminate Truth.

Dialectic was a method used by Socrates and Plato to expand an individual's capacity to gain pre-existing truths about the natural world. He applied the concept of *goodness* to this discussion by attributing goodness to the nature of an object. Using the example of the mind or body, they have a natural state of being good or bad; which, when applied to all other objects in the natural world, have a natural state of goodness or badness (353c-353e). This natural state of goodness or badness is not necessarily something that is given at birth. Rather, an object has the inherent potential to know and operate from *goodness*, but this *goodness* exists outside of the object. In other words, humans are born with the capacity to be good or bad and it is up to us to determine our capacity. From birth, we must all seek to obtain the true form of what is *good.* So, how does one know what is *good* and how can they obtain this *goodness*?

The importance of action in determining goodness. In Plato's *Gorgias,* Socrates engages in three separate conversations with three different individuals who represent various positions. The overarching topic of all three conversations was the relationship of morality and happiness and the role that rhetoric, politics, and justice play within that relationship. For

example, Plato understood legislation as being a type of guide that points man on the right, moral path (Herrick, 2013, p. 55-56). For Plato, the main function of laws was to monitor and control the morality of citizens. It is clear from *Gorgias* that Plato saw morality as existing through action; alternatively, man cannot seclude himself from the public realm because his *goodness* was dependent on his political action. Plato provides an example of morality as action in the discussion between Socrates and Polus about whether objects in life possess the quality of being good, bad, or neutral; and they determined that this quality is dependent on the intended outcome (467e-468c). In other words, the outcome from action is where *goodness* resides, not in the action itself; however, it is still depend on action to reach the outcome. In the dialogues, when Socrates asks Polus which was worse, "doing wrong or having wrong done to you," they both agree that *doing* wrong was worse (474c-476a).

Plato's Socrates argued that "what it takes for these states of goodness to occur in an ideal form is not chaos, but organization and perfection" (*Gorgias*, 506d). This argument for an orderly state of being is another way to articulate the belief in a *proper* methodology designed for a specific end, or *telos*. Thus, in order to achieve a perfect, *good* society everyone must discover the *right* methodology, or mode of action, to find existing Truths in nature. As Aristotle (2009) described it, all men act from and toward the achievement of a *good* (1252a1). If the natural world operates from an orderly, teleological purpose towards an ideal state of *goodness*, then it is assumed that all natural objects achieve this *goodness* through a methodology, through action. One might hear in Plato's insistence on action as a precursor to the quality of goodness in anything as a kind of technique of power like Foucault will discuss centuries later.

The coercive nature of *areté*. This ideal state of *goodness* is how Hellenes understood and defined *areté*, but a person's *areté* was different depending on their *telos*, or purposeful

function. The belief in *areté* added a layer of complexity that managed the behavior of individuals in order to control and manipulate society towards this ideal state. In many ways, the application of *areté* as a measurement of purpose and its primacy in social life - its centrality to everyday roles and responsibilities - establishes it as a form of coercion. However, over time, as the coercive nature becomes more hidden, individuals consent to its primacy in society as it continues hierarchize individuals; thus, establishing a system of benefits for those who obtain the highest form of *areté*.

The application of *areté* in Hellenic society coerced individuals into "cultivat[ed] habits or states of character that dispose[d] their bearers to act excellently in the circumstances at hand" (Goldberg, 1993, p. 15). Robin Waterfield (2008a) expands on this definition by describing *areté* as unique depending on an object's (animate or inanimate) purpose, but it was always predicated on the notion of *goodness*. He wrote, "We call a person morally good or good at weightlifting, we call a knife good if it is effective at cutting, we call a soup good if it is tasty, and so on" (p. xv). Waterfield's description also demonstrates the importance of action in determining an object's *goodness*. In his history of ancient Hellenic education, H.I. Marrou (1965) called *areté* a "quality of existence" (p. 11), wherein the notion of "quality" presupposed a *true* or ideal state of existence. In order to define something as "quality" there must be a system in place that measures objects against an ideal. Plato himself noted that "every individual has to do just one of the jobs relevant to the community, the one for which his nature has best equipped him" in order for society to be *good*, or ideal (2008b, p. 433a).

In his *Republic*, Plato detailed the ideal society whose number one requirement was morality, or *goodness*, and in order to achieve the highest state of *goodness* every member of each class (i.e. philosophers, warriors, workers) must fulfill the role they were born to do.

Therefore, for Plato, a citizen's *areté* was rooted in their ability to perform within the confines of their role for society as a whole. The performance of their role was judged against an existing ideal of the perfect philosopher, warrior, or worker that existed outside of our perceivable world. For Plato, all of nature was working towards a perfect end, but our natural world did not contain the perfect form of *goodness*, but could only be a reflection of it. For example, Plato argued that the true and perfect form of the *good* was not in our realm of reality waiting for man to perceive it. Humans do not have access to see this perfect form of *goodness*, but each person's soul, which has seen this perfect form of *goodness* before it joined with the body, acts as a guide for the person it inhabits (2009, 249c). If, according to Plato, perfection exists as a sort of destination, then the soul as a guide is coercive in nature, but because it is only a guide it waits for the individual to choose its path, though there is really only one correct choice. Life for the individual is not a life free from constraints; a map exists, which the soul knows, and the individual ceases to have a choice in determining the path.

In contrast, though Aristotle agreed that the perfect form of *goodness* existed, he argued that everyone could use their observable senses to perceive true *goodness* because it existed in nature -- not outside our realm of reality[2]. Although Plato and Aristotle (2009, 1253a18-1253a25) disagreed on whether or not *telos* was attainable, the belief in the existence of *telos* and *areté* was understood to Hellenes before either philosopher wrote and theorized about them. Plato and Aristotle continued a long thought tradition rooted in teleological assumptions about obtaining individual and collective forms of *areté*, and their writings continued to impact Western traditions and thought thousands of years after they died. As I noted before, what is

[2] Aristotle's epistemology predicates the Scientific Method and Descartes' *cogito*, which was established in the 16th and 17th century of Western history.

considered *good* can look and act different based on the object and its *telos*; therefore, both *telos* and *areté* are able to be reimagined in different periods of Western history.

Telos and *areté* are important to understanding the nature of the *polis* because those two concepts reveal an ontological foundation of Hellenic society that continues to be passed down through Western traditions to contemporary eras. Both concepts demonstrate a long-standing debate throughout Western history about the nature of existence and the belief of empirical evidence to prove the morality of individuals. At the center of Western philosophical thought, morality functions as a technology of power that affirms and justifies how humans design identities and control actions (Goldberg, 1993, p. 14). According to teleological thinking, humans exist to accomplish a goal, or *telos*, that comes with particular standards that are measured by *areté,* or morality, which allow individuals to judge themselves and society.

To an individual, *areté* functions as a sort of litmus test that examines the quality of their performance, but systematically it functions as a form of coercion; setting the standard that each person must achieve and allowing the individual to consent to the given standard. The consequence of not achieving *telos*, of not performing at the level needed to achieve an individual's *areté*, is what makes both concepts coercive in nature. The *polis* was designed to mirror both concepts, essentially absorbing the meaning and function of both by establishing a social apparatus that's sole purpose was to mold its citizens through *areté* to achieve *telos*. In other words, the *polis* took on the role of *telos* for its citizens and it was through the creation, shaping, and maintaining of the *polis* that its citizens achieved their own *areté.*

The *polis* existed to establish and enforce these moral guidelines in order to discipline citizens towards *telos* more efficiently. By enclosing the conditions for existence within a set of moral guidelines, the *polis* worked as a physical and symbolic enclosure to discipline those

within its sphere of power. The polis, then, controlled the identities and behaviors of its citizens through the physical spaces, such as the agora, and symbolic ones, such as titles, ranks, and the words used to identify people. In Western societies since antiquity, the movement of power is visible through the identification of *telos* and *areté* within each society. Medieval and modern Western societies have modeled their identities and governments from the same teleological concepts and methodologies of the Hellenic *polis*.

The Enclosing Nature of the Polis

Both *areté* and *telos* established enclosures, defining a system of power that used morality to control human behavior. At the same time, the institution of the city-state used a physical space to design and implement a movement of power that strengthened morality and how individuals behaved and acted. The boundaries of the *polis* are not similar to contemporary boundaries of nations. Hellenic "boundaries" of a *polis* are better understood in terms of membership, and the requirements for a membership in the *polis* controlled individual behavior and actions.The *polis* operated as a means to an end for its citizens who were given status as eligible participants in the daily legislative affairs, and were looked upon to play their part for the success of the *polis*. Every man was obligated to be an active participant to accomplish their own form of *areté* in order to collectively achieve *telos*. In the Republic, Plato insisted that every polis contained citizens who were each born to perform different tasks in order for the polis to function at its best (2008b, p. 433). The nature of *telos* and *areté* applied the notion of progress, where societal beliefs are predicated on the notion that they can collectively become better in order to achieve a purpose.

The *polis* as a mode of 'progress' toward *telos*. Aristotle theorized about the nature of the *polis* and its citizen and he wrote during a time when the *polis* was a well-established, self-

sufficient entity, with roughly 1,500 *poleis* existing within the Hellenic world (Nagle, 2006, p. ix). Not all *poleis* were considered examples of strong institutions. For example, J. Nicolas Coldstream (1984) suggested that Aristotle may have analyzed known weak settlements in northwestern Greece, still operating as small villages, in the same way that a social anthropologist might "study the ways of primitive societies" (p. 8). This implication of "primitive" societies is aligned with Aristotle's (2009) ontological assumptions about nature and society, where a hierarchy of natural, empirical evidence exists (1327b18). In addition, describing an object or society as "primitive" assumes a natural state of progression that exists directly from the ideal that a *polis* worked towards achieving. What are elements of a "primitive" society for Hellenes?

Thucydides (2009) described Hellenic ancient society (pre-*polis* inhabiting) as "weak" due to their conditions of isolation as nomadic tribes:

> It is clear that what is now called Greece was not originally a country of stable settlements. In earlier times there were constant migrations, any group readily moving on from its present land each time they were forced out by others who happened to be superior in numbers. There was no trade, no secure communication with each other by land or sea. Each group grazed its own land for subsistence, not building up financial reserves or farming the land, as it was never known when someone else might attack and take it from them - besides there were no walls. In the belief that they could acquire the daily necessities of food anywhere else, it was easy enough for them to uproot. For that reason they lacked the strength of large cities and all other kinds of resource. (1.2-1.3)

Thucydides' depiction of Hellenic life before the *polis* pointed to a life of chaos without the controlled, rigid nature of enclosures as defined modes of powers - in this case, the physical walls of the city. As noted earlier, Plato describes *goodness* as existing only through order, not chaos (*Gorgias*, 2008b, 506d). Thucydides used words such as "stable," "secure," and "superior" to describe successful societies who defeated Hellenic tribes, which implied that these tribes were the direct opposite of stable, secure, and superior before the formation of the *polis*. Aristotle

(2009) described this nomadic ancient society as “scattered groups” and individuals as “poor sorts of being;” weak and unstable with the “passion of war” (1252b17-1253a2). Plato, Aristotle, and Thucydides make the case that the *polis* was critical for the success, strength, and longevity of Hellenic society, and they all demonstrate the same ontological and epistemological assumption that society must “progress” along a linear trajectory to survive, or succeed. In the case of Hellenic society, progression meant collective association -- literally behind “walls” that enclosed their city-state -- in order to progress toward a higher form of *areté*. Aristotle and Thucydides’ articulations of non-*polis* inhabiting societies demonstrated the need to define and enclose the space of the *polis*. The *polis* became a physical enclosure through the collective association and agreement between households and villages. These collective associations defined the identities and functions of each *polis*.

D. Brendon Nagel (2006) described a *polis* existence as “synoecious”, or a mutually beneficial union, and was dependent on the joining of households. Thucydides provided an example of this synoecious nature when he described how Theseus united villages to form Athens (2.15.2). The synoecious nature of the *polis* is also found in Aristotle’s articulation. However, his depiction assumed a more philosophical and moral cause for the formation of a collective society rather than Thucydides more practical observation of its origins. Aristotle (2009) wrote: “Observation shows us, first, that every *polis* is a species of association, and, secondly, that all associations come into being for the sake of some good - for all men do all their acts with a view to achieving something which is, in their view, a good” (1252a1). From this articulation, societies are formed through mutual agreement towards a collective goal, thus implementing technologies of power that depend on the agreed upon norms. These norms of behavior, or *nomoi*, constitute how a person, or citizen, must act in order to function properly

toward the shared goal. This mutual association operated through techniques of power dependent on the enclosing nature of *telos* and *areté*, where man, household, and *polis* became interconnected.

The consubstantial relationship of the *polis* and citizen. The consubstantial nature of the *polis* and citizen serve as the method in Hellenic society for man to achieve *areté* based on his natural purpose. The *polis* took on function of *telos*, and it was designed as a system to support living a life *par excellence.* The enclosed nature of the *polis*, its rules and regulations, fashioned techniques of power that design, organize, divide, and hierarchize objects, or citizens. The nature of a citizen is the act of *belonging* to a physical and symbolic space that is bound, or enclosed. Hellenic citizenship not only marked geographical belonging to the region, but it also assigned a predetermined identity to the individual that required a particular demeanor and participatory role. Therefore, the citizen is defined by the binding nature of the *polis*, a set of enclosures which the citizen consents to through established discourses of truth that control behavior and action. The relationship of the *polis* and citizen is understood as consubstantial, because one does not exist without the function of the other. The purpose of the *polis* is directly dependent on the purpose of the citizen - to achieve *telos*.

Hellenic belief in a purposeful end to life (*telos*), rooted in *goodness*, allowed for a number of interpretations over what constituted the *good*. Through teleological assumptions about nature, man created and inhabits the *polis* to achieve an existence *par excellence*. Therefore, this relationship is consubstantial - man and *polis* are dependent on each other's existence, as described in the introduction to Aristotle's *Politics* (2009). R.F. Stalley writes, "So the man who creates a *polis* works with nature, not against it. Furthermore, man is naturally endowed with powers of practical reason, so that in creating a *polis* he is fulfilling his nature" (p.

xi). Stalley's description of the natural purpose of man and his consubstantial relationship to the *polis* illustrates what Foucault (1980) called a "cluster of relations" that constitute a movement of power (p. 198). The example of a cluster demonstrates how power is not centralized; power does not originate with either man or the *polis*, but the dependent relationship between the two allows power to move between both interchangeably. Power as a *cluster of relations* not only operates between man and the *polis*, but it is *through* discourse that power is able to move. Stuart Hall (2017) defines *discourse* as "that which gives human practice and institutions meaning," so in this context both Plato and Aristotle developed new meaning within existing belief systems and wrote on the nature of the *polis* in order to contribute to existing conversations that began earlier in Hellenic history (p. 31). In other words, Plato and Aristotle did not originate the technique of power that moves through *telos* and *areté*, they are, themselves, subjects of these techniques.

For Western society, Hellenic thought established a long-lasting tradition of ontological idealism, which designed and constituted teleological assumptions about the nature of the individual and society. Starting with an ontological belief in *telos*, Hellenic society defined themselves as members of the *polis*, and this type of enclosure established technologies of power that controlled behavior and disciplined the action of its citizens. Teleology functions as a map of behavior for Hellenes, and this map dictated the route that citizens must take in order to be *good*. This control of behavior is described by Hall (2013) when he wrote, "It is discourse, not subjects who speak it, which produces knowledge" (p. 39). The subject, in this case *citizens*, are not the producers of knowledge or truth but, in fact, products of existing discourses. When we are born into the world, we grow and develop through existing discourses that shape how we understand the world and how we relate to it. Discourse helps me navigate how I should think, behave, and act because it gives meaning to an unknown world and allows me to judge my own performance.

Existing Western discourses establish roles for individuals within societies, and these roles operate from teleological assumptions that produce standards of living.

The Reimagination of Hellenic Teleology in Christian Epistemology

Teleological thought did not end with Aristotle and Hellenic society, in fact it continued and thrived as the foundation of early Christian beliefs that humans exist for the purpose of God's good will. Judeo-Christian belief systems constituted a blend of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies for Western society where the belief in a perfect (divine) form, or ideal (God), strongly influenced epistemological arguments in the first five centuries after the birth of Christ. Many Christian apologists writing in the first through fifth-centuries C.E. often used Hellenic sources like Plato and Aristotle to argue the validity of Christian beliefs and practices, and often expressed Christianity as a more refined version of what both philosophers taught. Descending directly from the philosophical schools in Athens, both Platonism and Neoplatonism overlapped the centuries on either side of Christ's birth, which demonstrates why both schools of thought influenced early Christian apologists during the first two centuries after Christ's death (Deely, 2001, p 113). Deely notes that Platonism and Neoplatonism found more alignment with the doctrine of the Christian Church, versus Aristotle's writings which were more aligned with the doctrine of science (p. 112-113).

The first-century C.E. saw the Roman Empire begin its shift from paganism to Christianity and it was Platonism and later Neoplatonism that helped usher in new converts (p. 115-116). Wilkens (1984) described Neoplatonism as "the bridge that led the inquiring mind from paganism. . . . to Christianity" because it overlaid spirituality on top of Plato's philosophy (p. 159-160). Platonists viewed the natural world as a shadow of Plato's Forms, which meant that humans could not access the Forms; they could only experience a likeness of them.

Neoplatonists viewed the world as emanating from one supreme entity – the original creator of the Forms, but all of mankind had the potential to access this creator and their Forms through ascetic practices (Deely, 2001, p. 113). Essentially, Neoplatonists added two elements to Plato's original idea: (1) God as the creator, and (2) access to the Forms. Much of Neoplatonist theory combined both Platonic and Aristotelian reasoning through the belief in an ideal and teleological assumptions about how to acquire it.

Hellenic philosophy as a foundation for Christian thinking. Early Christian apologists, such as Clement of Alexandria, used Plato's *Forms* as a way to understand the natural world as God's creation, and the use of Aristotle to argue that elements of perfection can be found in nature since God's creation is perfect (Cross, 2009). In other words, Clement saw Plato's *Forms* as heaven and Aristotle's classification system as a way to find elements of heaven in nature. Clement's defense of Plato was rooted in his belief of an absolute truth, which he ultimately used to defend Hellenic philosophy as conducting early articulations of this truth prior to Christ's birth. Essentially, he argued that the Hellenes were philosophizing Christ's truth, but without knowing Christ or God. Clement argued that philosophy was a handmaiden to theology as well as a "'schoolmaster' to bring the [Hellenes] mind to Christ, as the Law brought the Hebrews. Thus, philosophy was a preparation, paving the way towards perfection in Christ" (as cited in Bettenson, 1999, p. 7). This "perfection in Christ" illustrates how *telos* in Hellenic society shifted away from *goodness* to Christ or God's will. Specifically, this change marks a fundamental shift in Western thinking that was rooted in a *telos* that was based on societal cohesion and into a *telos* that became more centered on the individual.

Christianity offered a way for *telos* to be available through the senses, and its teachings specified the standard one needed to live in order to achieve this perfect end. These teachings

demonstrated an existing ontological belief system - the existence of absolute truths and the ability to sense them in nature - and Christian apologist were no exception to this framework. Their work often mirrored Hellenic philosophic schools and they found ways to reconcile Christian teachings with the reasoning of Plato and Aristotle. Apologists like Clement of Alexandria argued a way to infuse Hellenic philosophies into Christian belief systems, and the purpose was to establish Christianity as a legitimate religion during a time when its teachings were not legal in the Roman empire. Non-Christian apologists like Galen, a prolific writer on anatomy, medicine, and philosophy during the second-century C.E. in Rome, went as far as to declare Christianity a philosophical school because it often mirrored other schools, like Stoicism and Platonism, by appealing to audiences with answers to questions of existence (Wilkens, 1984, p.73-74). The infusion of Hellenic philosophy into Christian doctrine was a direct cause of conversion for Augustine of Hippo, one of the most influential Christian apologists during the fourth and fifth century C.E. (p. 202).

In what he referred to as the "Platonic books," Augustine (2008a) recounts his own conversion to Christianity as originating from God who brought the Platonic books "under his eye" during a time of "monstrous pride" (p. 121). Augustine used his own conversion story as a way to introduce his own theological doctrine, but he never explicitly renounced the Platonic teachings. In the introduction to Augustine's *Confessions*, Henry Chadwick asserts that Plotinus, a famous Neoplatonist, actually gave Augustine the vocabulary he needed to understand the foundations of Christian theology on the union of the soul with God (p. xxi). Essentially, Augustine owed his belief in a divine entity to Neoplatonism, but the missing piece that Christianity offered to him was a direct path to what he called *bliss*, "not merely as an end to be perceived but as a realm to live in" (2008a, p. 130). By recognizing the "Platonic books" he

allowed them to remain as sources of validity for the existence of God, and as he paired them with the Christian gospels it demonstrated the interconnected relationship between Christianity and the philosophical school of Plato. An example of Augustine's unwillingness to renounce Neoplatonism is found in his *On Christian Teachings*, where he declared, "Any statements by those who are called philosophers, especially the Platonists, which happen to be true and consistent with our faith should not cause alarm, but be claimed for our own use" (p. 64).

The divine enclosure: God as the *telos*. The interconnectedness of Neoplatonist teachings and Christianity formed a mutual respect where philosophy recognized the value in religion as having the same purpose. A.D. Lloyd suggested that Neoplatonism prospered as a "spiritual movement" that saw religion as "morally valuable" for philosophical thinkers (as quoted in Wilkens, 1984, p. 128). This mutual appreciation allowed Augustine to shift morality and Hellenic concepts of *goodness* from philosophy and apply them to the divine. He wrote, "A just human society is one which submits to [God]. But happy are those who know that [God is] the source of moral precepts" (2008a, p. 48). Morality no longer existed in a transcendental realm, as Plato argued with his theory on *Forms*, but Christ became the tangible, perceivable *goodness* that man could access with his own senses. The promises of Christianity were as Augustine mentioned, "not merely as an end to be perceived but as a realm to live in" (p. 130).

In contrast to Plato's belief that *telos* was achieved through *collective* human action, Augustine's *Confessions* (2008a) eluded to "the nothingness of humanity and the totality of human dependence on God for the achievement of the good life" (p. x). This demonstrated Augustine's influence on why Christians from antiquity to modernity became increasingly more *individualistic* and focused on discovering the natural world rather than transcending it. God's will was the perfect end that required individual devotion and sacrifice in order to obtain it in this

life and after (p. 72). Focusing on the individual, rather than society, established new sources of enclosures (e.g. God) that not only operated externally (i.e. roles, behaviors, and appearances) but also internally (i.e. heart or soul) through ascetic practices and repentance rituals. This is made clear through *Confessions* as Augustine repeatedly references only his *personal* relationship with God rather than on *society's* responsibility or action towards God's will.

From antiquity to the middle ages, concepts like *telos* shifted away from the natural world and to the divine and this shift developed new technologies of power that emanated from the concept of God's will. When Augustine wrote *On Christian Teachings* (2008b) there were three types of critics that he identified and labeled: the unintelligent, the lazy, and the indifferent; of these three, he focused on the last because they did not believe that humans had agency in their salvation (p. xi). Augustine defends the separation of the body and soul, and that it is because of this separation that man must choose goodness over and over to establish good habits for the body. Take for example, the conflict that Augustine presents between the actions of the "flesh" (e.g. body) and the "spirit" (e.g. soul):

> For since it will be the case after the resurrection that the body will live forever in a state of utmost tranquility and total subservience to the spirit, it should be our concern in this life that the tendency of the flesh is reformed and not allowed to resist the spirit with its unruly impulses. But until this happens, the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh. The spirit fights back not out of hatred, but to establish its primacy, because it wants the body it loves to be subservient to something better; nor does the flesh fight back out of hatred, but because of the stranglehold of these habits which, after establishing themselves in the stock of our ancestors, have become naturally ingrained. (1.52-53)

Not only is Augustine declaring the superiority of the divine over the natural world, but he is also establishing that the body and flesh can inherit "habits" and pass them on to future generations.[3]

[3] Before converting to Christianity, Augustine was a convert to Manicheism that believed humans contained two conflicting elements: light and darkness. According to Manicheism, the light was spiritual in form (think of the soul

In other words, he is asserting that bad habits (i.e. behavior and action) is inferior and can be inherited, which is the basic concepts of eugenics discussed in the next chapter of this thesis as *telos* shifts back to the natural world. The struggle between the body and the soul, as Augustine describes, designs enclosures for the individual; where God's will designs the enclosure for the individual (i.e. coercion) and the individual must "choose" the right behavior or action within the guidelines set forth in the enclosure.

Furthermore, Hellenic concepts of *telos* were codependent and relied on men's interactions in society to develop and refine acts of *goodness*, but Christianity's insistence that God's will was a new form of *telos* implemented different forms of enclosures that ceased to be dependent on social interactions. Augustine (2008b) insists that all human goodness comes from God and any dependence on others for this goodness signified pride and arrogance (1.73-79). Augustine's reference above to the soul wanting the body to be "subservient to something better" is a call for individuals to enclose themselves for the ascension to goodness. As a part of this goodness, he discusses the soul and describes its dichotomous fate as it relates to God's goodness:

> If a person's soul does not die to the present world and begin to be conformed to the truth, it is drawn by the death of the body into a worse death and reborn not to experience a new heavenly state but to suffer the retribution of punishment. This is contained in our faith, and this, we must believe, is the reality: neither the soul nor the human body suffers total destruction, but the wicked rise to unimaginable agony, the good to eternal life. (1.37-38)

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in Christianity), and the darkness was considered matter, or physical (think of the body as described above). It is through the separation of the light and darkness that humans can achieve salvation. Neoplatonism was the bridge between Manicheism and Christianity for Augustine, because he was able to see light and darkness not as separate but as a spectrum where light emanates from one source; the further one was from the light (God; or the One) than more inferior they became. It is this shift to a superior/inferior binary, where humans could develop habits of superiority, as well as Thomas Aquinas' admiration for Augustine later in this chapter that is critical for the analysis on enclosure and the hierarchizing that occurs later in Western history (González, 1984, p. 208-211).

Augustine warns that any action away from what is required of the soul will result in death and "unimaginable agony." What becomes clear is that God's will, or truth, was the *divine* enclosure, and it created and implemented a movement of power based on acceptable behaviors and actions. Those who *knew* God's will became central figures for influencing how power moved in society (e.g. apostles, apologists, priests, etc.). Once God's will became the *telos*, then Christian leaders were able to define and characterize, with God's authority, how individuals achieved their own path to heaven, or a new form of *areté*.

Christian epistemology was not *ex nihilo*, or born from nothing; it was a new layer to an already existing Western epistemology. The belief in a teleological world existed as the Roman Empire expanded and enclosed more and more citizens and subjects within its boundaries. Life had purpose, and this purpose was determined by what was deemed *good*, thus, Christianity spent centuries arguing for the credibility of their methods for achieving this *good*. My analysis demonstrates that the concepts of Hellenic *telos* and *areté* were not altered by Christian articulations of the *good*, but were strengthened by it.

Enclosing Difference: Discovering Evidence of a Hierarchy

As Christianity expanded, the early thirteenth-century saw a rebirth of Aristotelian studies with the formation of the first universities in France and England. Sources of study for the early universities in Paris and Oxford were a blend of Christian and non-Christian material, where Hellenic philosophy and the natural sciences, such as medicine, were "avidly sought after and assimilated and brought into living contact with the divine teaching in the [Christian] Scriptures" (Aquinas, 2008, p. xii). Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican friar in the thirteenth-century C.E. and Christian apologist, wrote extensively on Aristotelian philosophy through the lens and authority of Christian theology. Timothy McDermott, in the introduction to Aquinas' (2008)

Selected Philosophical Writings, is quick to emphasize the amount of written text by Aquinas, to quantify how and why Aquinas was influential on later Enlightenment epistemology. Aquinas' extensive writings on Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology averaged roughly 1,190 words every day for twenty years during a time when writing and reading was limited to royalty and clergy (p. xv).

As higher education gained traction in Europe during the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras, Aquinas' writings were widely available for those looking to theorize about the nature of man's existence and purpose in the world through the lens of the divine. Centuries before René Descartes wrote on rationalism and developed his *cogito,* Aquinas wrote extensively on the nature of the *soul* and *bliss*, which he states as man's purposeful end (p. 328). As new forms of government and law were established with Christianity, Hellenic ontology became reinterpreted through a new lens - the divine - where natural law became an eternal law (Goldberg, 1993, p. 16). The rules of nature no longer belonged to nature, but to God the creator; so, life's purpose was knowing God, or *bliss* (Aquinas, 2008, p. 328). As Aristotle's theories were renewed and reevaluated in the thirteenth-century, Aquinas spent his time at school reconciling Aristotelian philosophy with Christian teachings (p. xiv). An example of this reconciliation at work was when Aquinas equated the concept of *goodness* with God; therefore, the *telos* in life remained *goodness* but it was no longer understood as its own form but as God (p. 376). In other words, *goodness* didn't exist as its own form of enclosure but existed only through God's will, as a divine enclosure.

As *telos* shifted from the Hellenic concept of *goodness* to God's will, *areté* also shifted from someone acting the best in their given role to acting to eliminate sin, or evil. Goldberg (1993) describes this shift where *telos* is provided by divine law and sin is the actions of men

against this divine law (p. 15). So, man must act in accordance with God's will and the conditions on which he achieves a *good* life are based on his ability to align his actions with this divine law. In this example, God's law prescribes strict norms of behavior by defining *right* behavior and action in order for individuals to live under its authority. Power moves through God's law, as *telos,* to coerce individuals to act. Judgement about whether individuals performed or acted in accordance with God's will and by God's law was conducted through the Church, and this process continued as a form of *areté.* Another way to view this shift from Hellenic *goodness* to God's law is to look back on Aristotle's' concept of the *good life,* where the *polis* was designed to create and institute laws that guide individuals to achieving the *good life,* or *telos*. Christian teachings continued this same ontology, but instead of the individual achieving *telos* and designing the law it was God who was both. Aquinas (2008) provided an explanation of God as the end goal and the law:

> If we suppose the world to be ruled by God's providence. . . . [then] the entire community of the universe is governed by God's reason. And so the very plan of government, existing in God as ruler of the universe, is a law in the true sense. . . . Law is an active ordering towards a goal, actively ordering other things to that goal. . . . When God governs he is his own goal, and he himself is his law, so that the eternal law serves no other purpose than itself. (p. 417)

Aquinas' use of a *goal* is intentional in this passage because he believed that "goal-directed behavior" existed in all-natural things regardless of their awareness (p. 201). In other words, everything in life operated towards a *telos*; thus, everything was created already having confined functions. A purposeful end, or goal, is by nature constraining due to predetermined guidelines for achieving them. The establishment of God as *telos,* instituted a new understanding of laws that controlled and disciplined man's behavior and action.

Aquinas continued a long tradition of articulating human existence through teleological assumptions, and he used *action* to demonstrate excellent human achievement (*areté*). The

essence of the *soul*, according to Aquinas (2008), exists as consubstantial with the human body where he described the *soul* as "its own perfection" (p. 190) when joined with the body, but its "essential characteristics" or how humans perceive the soul are ascertained through senses and the ability to reason (p. 127). This body and soul dichotomy is also found in the teachings of Plato (2009) when he described that the soul once walked with God and during its journey saw the true form of reality (249c).

Plato describes how the nature of the soul sought to unify itself with the body in order to provide guidance through the body's senses to perceive the "true reality" that it saw during its journey with God. As the soul sought perfection and the body constantly worked to obtain it, the power of the soul to coerce individuals through their own consent grew stronger as they lived to perfect themselves. For both Aquinas and Plato, action was how the body could become closer to perfection, and for Aquinas', it was *God's* perfection. Action is the realization of the soul where someone's perception of the world (senses) and natural truths (reason) are constantly working to narrow, or enclose, individuals through God's will. Essentially, the soul knows and understands the purpose in life, or the end goal, and the way it speaks to the body is through the senses by drawing a person towards what is considered rational. In this case, rationality is chosen for the individual and predetermines what is right and wrong based on the ideal that the soul is pushing the individual towards. Using a student as an example, the teacher performs the same role as the soul might - partnering with the student, or body, to guide their learning and teach them how to reach understanding, or an answer. What is critical in both examples (teacher/soul and student/body) is that Truth, or knowledge, is already predetermined, and only a rational student/body can find it. During the Enlightenment, but clearly established long before as articulated with Plato and Aquinas, rationality is the basis for Truth, and scientific inquiry is

centered around the individual's ability to sense or perceive Truth through specific methods - i.e. the Scientific Method. These early conversations that explore the relationship between the body and the soul inform the ontology of what becomes the study of natural sciences. Even though Christianity and science are often at odds, both come from the same ontological belief that individuals can find a first-cause, or absolute Truth, if they act in accordance with what is rational.

The varieties of *telos*: Difference as divinely sanctioned. The consubstantial nature of the *soul* and *body* is a form of Hellenic *areté* reimagined through the lens of Christian epistemologies, and the perfect end (*telos*) is God's will, or *bliss*. Another way of understanding this union assumes religious practice as natural, where union with God can be found and acquired in the natural world, or that man can find *bliss* in the natural world. Aquinas wrote, "At every level the means to a goal work together for an ultimate goal, and since in human beings as in other creatures that ultimate goal is perfect activity, every human good contributes to the perfecting of human activity" (2008, p. 330). Aquinas' "human activity" as the synoecious nature between the *body* and *soul* illustrates a disciplined action, or methodology towards an ideal. This argument mirrors Aristotle's (2009), who wrote, "Goodness by itself is not enough: there must also be a capacity for being active in doing good" (1325b7). Both articulations assumed that nothing in life can achieve independent perfection, but all things in life can obtain a piece of this perfection through purpose and action. In other words, *goodness* is understood as the whole - originating from God's will universally - and humanity, as its parts, can grasp only pieces of this *goodness*. If action is articulated as the mode by which humans come into union with God's will, then controlling this action becomes more essential to achieving this union.

Consequently, if humanity's union with God is dependent on *right* action, but no one action is considered perfect, then humanity must find perfection through a variety of actions. This notion of *variety* is also understood as the differences that exist in the natural world, and these differences were *sanctioned* by God. Aquinas attempted to account for differences that exist in species and how those differences are intentionally created by God. He wrote, "Now created things must all fall short of the full goodness of God, so, in order that things may reflect that goodness more perfectly, there had to be variety in things." Aquinas continues his argument:

> For human beings too, when they can't express the idea in their minds in one word, resort to many different ones that express that idea in different ways. And this also draws attention to how great God's perfection is: for the perfect goodness that exists one and unbroken in God can exist in creatures only in a multitude of fragmented ways. Now variety in things come from the different forms determining their species. So because of their goal things differ in form. And because they differ in form there is an order among things. (2008, p. 271)

This "variety" constituted a process that claimed why humans are different and how each difference served a purpose that is God-given and naturally hierarchized as an "order of things." Aquinas argued that difference in man exists for a divine purpose, and these differences served as a way to rank not only man but also species of all types based on their ability to achieve *bliss*. For the purposes of God's will, *difference* became a way for individuals to continue to be constrained by enclosed sets of meanings. Rather than *telos* confining individuals to specific identities or actions that existed for all, it multiplied and partitioned itself into a *variety* of identities or actions depending on the *type* of human.

Aquinas' discussion about "fragmented" differences in humans foreshadows sixteenth and seventeenth century discourses on race and human variety. In his quote, Aquinas references differing human forms and that it automatically equates to differing human goals, which then implies "an order." Take the opposite of what he is saying, if everyone looked the same, then

their goal, or *areté,* in life would also be the same; thus, everyone would be equal. According to this logic, if one perfect ideal exists, that the soul is constantly guiding individuals towards, then difference (e.g. race) must be a marker for superiority or inferiority. Aquinas is not the first, nor the last, to theorize on human differences, but his teleological thinking that is predicated on an ideal, or perfection, must find a rational explanation for difference. In this case, difference is articulated as a deviation from the perfect form that is God's will. More pointedly, God created a perfect form, but man has deviated from it.

The notion of *difference* is also central to Aristotle's (2009) theory of nature, where nature contains different parts that operate from states of either ruling or being ruled. As he described the different roles in a *polis*, his general understanding of difference is articulated when defending the natural subordination of slaves. He wrote, "In all cases where there is a compound, constituted of more than one part but forming one common entity, whether the parts be continuous or discrete, a ruling element and a ruled can always be traced" (1254a17). In other words, Aquinas used Aristotle to make the argument that there are multiple ways to achieve an end based on the categorical difference within humans and other species, but hidden within the multitude of ways lies a ranked order to achieving that end. In this context, variety is not different-but-equal. Rather, it assumed a natural spectrum of human progress and quality. Thus, categorizing and determining difference from teleological assumptions about nature inevitably forms a ranking of the objects necessary to achieving a perfect end, and for Aquinas (as well as medieval Western society) this perfect end was God's will.

The notion that all of humanity is working toward the same goal in life automatically implied that a map existed which denoted *right* action or behavior oriented toward achieving this goal. David Theo Goldberg (1993) builds on the concept of *right* action when he described the

function of morality as a human disposition to act reasonably. He wrote, “Acting virtuously in any instance - literally being virtuous - consisted in being moved by the right things, towards the right people, at the right time, in the right way, and with the right end in view” (p. 15). Power builds strength through the establishment of what is “right,” and this establishment automatically encloses meaning and forms a hierarchy of being and action.

Centralizing and narrowing purpose into the singular, where society is required to operate from the same teleological assumptions to achieve an ideal, creates a system of power rooted in the “right” that ranks humans based on their so called natural social role. Goldberg concluded that for medieval Christianity *right* action kept evil at bay and the *right* good was expressed through hierarchized social roles (p. 15). Over time, the rules for what constitute the “right” in any action or behavior brought with it a whole technique of power that inevitably created a ranked society and established “morally sanctioned exclusions” (p. 16).

In conclusion, this chapter focuses on the enclosing nature of the Hellenic concepts of both *telos* and *areté*, and illustrates how both concepts establish a movement of power that discipline both Hellenic and Christian subjects. Throughout Western history, the belief in a primary purpose for life (*telos*) relies on the use of enclosures in language to map the movement of discourse, and consequently knowledge. Foucault’s theory of power/knowledge reveals how language uses enclosures to design, organize, and implement a movement of power through the production of knowledge.

Christianity added a new layer to teleological thinking implemented by the Hellenes; *telos* became divinely sanction, moving away from the natural world. Christianity and a divinely sanctioned *telos* dominated Western ontology and epistemology for a century before Rene Descartes shifted Western thinking back to the natural world. Teleological thinking established

the foundation for categorical thinking, and by examining this belief system through Foucault's theory of power/knowledge a map can be drawn to illustrate how enclosures are used to discipline behavior and action. In the next chapter, I examine how the sixteenth through eighteenth century in Western history inspired a new (scientific) methodology for how enclosures are used to differentiate the natural world - dividing, organizing, and hierarchizing - and how this differentiation implemented racialized thinking that became the foundation to modern social institutions.

Chapter 3. Staying the Course: Using Enclosures to Navigate Difference

> Racialized discourse does not consist simply in descriptive representations of others. It includes a set of hypothetical premises about human kinds and about the differences between them (both mental and physical). It involves a class of ethical choices. And it incorporates a set of institutional regulations, directions, and pedagogic models. Norms or prescriptions for behavior are contextually circumscribed by specific hypotheses, ethical choices, regulations and models.
>
> – David Theo Goldberg, 1993, p. 47

The act of enclosing, according to Michel Foucault (1977), operates from a foundation built on *difference*, which "establish[es] presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications . . . to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate the qualities or merits" (p. 143). The nature of disciplining is rooted in the need to control and coerce individuals through enclosures, and the act of differentiation or partitioning is conducted in order to organize space and meaning. What makes *difference* such a critical aspect of disciplining and enclosing is that it objectifies subjects through classification and analysis. We say that a person is *black* or *white* in order to classify their difference, and then analyze why this difference exists in the first place, which sets up a complex system of representation. Using language to identify or label objects implements a movement of power that coerces the belief and behavior of individuals. To be labeled *black* or *white* automatically attaches meaning (often hierarchical in value) to an individual that includes historically evolving ideas about the essence of being *black* or *white*, even though many do not ascribe to such essentialized thinking.

And so, enclosures operate as a technique of power, but it is through language that enclosures are designed and implemented. Recall that Michel Foucault (1980) referred to an "economy of discourses" to describe how power and knowledge are created and transferred in societies (p. 93). On a foundational level, language is how we know what we know, and how we

communicate these truths to ourselves and others. Stuart Hall (2013) defines language as a "system of representation" where meaning and sense are established through words that are assigned to objects (p. 2). He describes the use of language to represent objects as a *system* because it's not just a matter of assigning a word to an individual object, but it is how the word is used within a more complex mode of classifying, arranging, and grouping of objects. A *chair* is not just a chair; the word is not only used to identify the object as a chair but to distinguish it apart from a table, or other objects, and the word signifies that it is an object used for sitting in a specific place for a specific purpose. Other objects like a couch or stool are terms used to signify a place to sit, but the understanding that chairs are used for sitting at a table or a desk - not a counter or in a living room - and that specific activities take place when sitting in a chair (e.g. family meals at a table or learning at a desk) reveals a complex *system* at work. Understanding how language is used in a complex system of representations is critical for understanding how enclosures operate as a mode of power.

Hall's (2013) use of a complex system at work is illustrated in Edward Said's (1979) theorizing of orientalism, that is the study of the *orient* and *oriental* by an *orientalist*, and how it was, in fact, constructed through language and representations. Said describes how "the Orient that appears in Orientalism is a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western empire" (p. 202-203). Said's work begins with the notion that *orientalism* is an idea that is man-made,[4] not an inherent "fact of nature;" and as an idea, orientalism has its own history and set of knowledges based on the arbitrary cultural division of the *West* and the *East* (which Said notes are really just reflections of themselves) (p. 4-5). These two terms - *East* and *West* - are a set of

[4] The gender reference is intentional considering the sources Said uses are men.

enclosures that function as a binary in order to call attention to difference, and this difference is arbitrary once analyzed more closely. For example, societies that are labeled as "Eastern" are located east of what demarcation? What it means to be from the *East* or the *West* or to be *Oriental* is constructed through language and monitored by those who created the enclosures in the first place - Westerners, or non-orientals. Even though one scholar might justify the meaning and use of "Eastern" or "Oriental" because it is applied to societies that share similar cultures and customs, the purpose of these sets of enclosures are to distinguish the difference between the observer and the observed.

Said did not focus on whether or not the Orient existed, but rather how contemporary notions of the Orient and the oriental, or rather beliefs and assumptions about them, were constructed and reconstructed through Western discourses that stemmed from the professional field of study that was *orientalism*. What Said makes clear is that the concept of the Orient was not constructed by orientals, but by orientalists (Westerners) whose objective observations were used as frameworks for what is true about the Orient (p. 40).

According to Said (1979), Orientalism as a complex system of representation, or as he refers to it as a "complex series of knowledges manipulat(ed) . . . by the West" (p. 40), is understood through the interconnection of Western Oriental scholars whose works have scaffolded on top of each other as each reinforce the knowledges of the previous:

> The result of Orientalism has been a sort of consensus: certain things, certain types of statement, certain types of work have seemed for the Orientalist correct. He has built his work and research upon them, and they in turn have pressed hard upon new writers and scholars. Orientalism can thus be regarded as a manner of regularized (or Orientalized) writing, vision, and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient. The Orient is taught, researched, administered, and pronounced upon in certain discrete ways. (Said, p. 202)

For example, if you asked anyone who lived east of Greece what they would describes themselves as (i.e. ethnicity) - none would use the term “oriental” since this term was only used by Westerners. The term itself, over the course of the last two to three centuries, is constructed by the West for Western consumption, which showcases that what it means to be “oriental” was developed by those who considered themselves the opposite. Recall Foucault’s (1977) description of how power moves through regimes of truth, or established discourses, that “permeate . . . the social body” (p. 93) as well as how Althusser (1970) explains the synoecious relationship of the RSA and ISA (p. 145). What is made clear by Said is that Oriental epistemologies were created and implemented by Western scholars through a system that he calls a “family of ideas” (p. 41), or discourses of truth, which developed an us/them dichotomy that stems from a belief in a weak/strong binary of cultural relations. In other words, Western societies view themselves as superior based on a belief system that is rooted in teleological assumptions about the natural world. If there is a way to achieve an existence par excellence, then Western societies believe they have come the closest in progressing towards this goal, and the *other*, or Oriental, societies are inferior in their efforts. Said makes the argument that the Western construct of the Orient did not originate from a “will to understand for purposes of coexistence,” but, instead, originated with the “purpose to control” and rule (p. xix).

In addition to how orientalism was constructed over time, Said acknowledges that “ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied without their force or more precisely their configuration of power” (p. 5). If enclosures are used as a way for power to move, then orientalism was constructed through the use of enclosures as its vehicle. In the case of Orientalism, the subject of study - the Oriental - is objectified as a means to control the knowledges, or “facts,” about the subject. Said demonstrates that the objectifier, as the

knowledge creator, is able to declare such knowledges as "fact," and this fact now "develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in [a] way that . . . is fundamentally, even ontologically stable" (p. 32). Essentially, the objectifier as the knowledge creator operates in dominion over "it", or the object. If power and knowledge do not exist without each other - that is, they are one in the same - then those who are knowledge creators are also developing a map of where power moves.

Consequently, the use of language to identify the "Orient" and the "Oriental" inevitably comes with a complex "system of representation" that illustrates the path in which power moves. In the context of Orientalism, the *Orient* is not just a term, but a starting point for knowledge creation and manipulation. Said warns, "When one uses categories like the Oriental and Western as both the starting and end points of analysis, research, public policy, the result is usually to polarize the distinction" (p. 45-46). The categories used to differentiate individuals and societies, like race or geography, are starting points for complex systems of representations. In language, what begins as a label to distinguish one thing from another inevitably develops a set of knowledges about that object that reaffirm and reinforce the label used. Said's theory of Orientalism offers a unique lens on how knowledge is created through the use of enclosures - that is, scholastic terms, theories, and objects of study (books, articles, etc.) - but he also demonstrates how *difference* is objectified and consequently hierarchized when conducted within a teleological system of belief.

The Power of Language to Recognize and Repurpose Difference

Goldberg (1993) claimed that the act of "naming or refusing to name things" established a movement of power that either "recognized or refused" the existence of an object (p. 150). Not only does power use language to acknowledge existence, it can also signify the object as

important, through recognition, or, in contrast, something to be ignored and/or unseen. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) refer to this use of language as a "presence," which is the process of selecting and showcasing certain "facts" to an audience; thus, assuming and elevating those facts as important and calling attention to one thing over another (p. 116-117). One example of this is in the U.S. public education curriculum, where a majority (at times all) sources used to describe and recount U.S. slavery history were written by white men. What is made "present" by these sources is a skewed interpretation of what really happened, and by failing to use black or brown sources implies that these authors and sources lack of authority on the subject, or that the absence of them means they don't exist at all. The act of naming or refusing to name, as Goldberg suggests, forms enclosures and power relations around things like race, which make present certain things about people and/or makes absent other things. Kenneth Burke (1968) suggests that the *terms* used by the observer, called "terministic screens," are what *shape* the reality of what is being observed by "directing the attention" to one interpretation over another (p. 45). The example he uses is one man retelling the same dream to different psychologists, and each interpretation by the psychologists is recorded and perceived differently. Goldberg, Said, Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Burke all demonstrate that language is used, intentionally or unintentionally, to develop our understanding of the world, but language also narrows this understanding. For example, racialized enclosures, on the surface, offer a way to differentiate people, but when these racialized enclosures are mistaken or used as a form of "natural law," then a "normal" is determined (e.g. white) and any differentiation quickly and seamlessly becomes hierarchized. Language is also limiting as it offers one perspective while excluding - intentionally or not - a multitude of others.

Language not only has the power to categorize and recognize, but it is the foundation for how truth is constructed and conveyed in society. Foucault (1980) described how:

> Each society has its regime of truth . . . the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (p. 131)

Foucault illustrates how contemporary knowledge production operates through language in order to construct the individual and their relationship to society. Language as a means of enclosing gives objects meaning, and meaning is always relational. Using race as an example, Ferdinand de Saussure argued that it is the *difference* of races that holds meaning, not the inherent nature or the essence of each (as noted in Hall, 2013, p. 224). Labeling a person *white* or *black* was established in order to distinguish one from the other rather than establish an essence of *whiteness* or *blackness*. In other words, a descriptor like *black* was chosen because of its relationship to *white*, which means the label was used as a relational term based on the knowledge creator. As Foucault argued, the foundation of truth in each society differs according to their own "regime of truth" that incorporates enclosed sets of meanings for objects and subjects. When used as a means of differentiation, enclosures design finite and narrow modes of thought that reduce individuals to simplified classifications. For example, Western society, since the sixteenth-century, has relied on the Scientific Method to reduce the individual to its natural and observable characteristics in order to classify and differentiate based on these physical traits.

New worlds require new methodologies. The late fifteenth-century saw the beginning of European expansion and colonialism in Africa and North America, as well as the beginning stages of the contemporary understanding of race (Goldberg, 2013, p. 62). Modern concepts of race cannot be articulated or understood without sensory perceptions of the physical human

body. Race is solely dependent on *the body*, or the physical attributes of individuals, and fails to denote any essence or inherent characteristics (i.e. the soul) beyond the physical world. Ivan Hannaford (1996) illustrated the significance of the *body* in antiquity as a member of the *polis* and later the church, or *ecclesia* (p. 147). The *body*, as an individual, was a member of a social structure, or apparatus, and this social apparatus contained norms, rules, practices, and moral obligations. The purpose of an individual's life was directly linked to the success of these social apparatuses and entities. Practical and moral judgements of humanity, how people presented themselves, behaved, and acted, were directly tied to their *membership* in the *polis* for Hellenes and the *ecclesia* for the Middle Ages. During ancient and medieval times, what united people together in a shared identity was not related to lineage or blood, but was law and faith because each insured the success of the social apparatus (Hannaford, p. 148). As a direct result, the discovery of natural sciences inspired philosophers to apply the same concepts of laws and faith, which up to this time were understood as social, to the individual man and human nature.

The discovery of never-before-seen (by Europeans) societies and environments inspired Western philosophers and scientists to seek answers for why each society is different and whether that difference is caused by the natural world. These types of questions drew the attention of Western monarchs and rulers to justify, through natural science, why their blood or familial line is entitled to rule or be considered superior. Not only did the natural sciences intrigue rulers, but they were also heavily influential in understanding nobility and civility among subjects. Hannaford (1996) explains that "the emphasis was now placed upon testing whether civilized man could be distinguished from the wild man according to the evidence of natural history rather than of the Bible and ancient [law]" (p. 189). During European colonialism, the resulting influence of natural sciences coupled with philosophy, was an infatuation with

measured outcomes that used enclosures as a mode to divide and differentiate humans into categories that pitted them against each other, which fundamentally assumed a system of hierarchies.

The emergence of race as a natural signifier of difference is rooted in Aristotle's scientific method for classifying plants and animals. According to Hannaford (1996), "The characteristics and divisions of mankind that became so important after the Renaissance are not to be found in the Greeks," but it was Aristotle's "method of analysis" that was used by scientists in the post-Renaissance eras to understand the natural differences of man (p. 58-59). Scientists believed, as Aristotle did, that our natural world contained traces of a higher power, or answers to unknown questions about life. It was Aristotle's belief that *telos* and *areté* could be achieved and perceived in nature that influenced natural scientists, and it was his explanation of *genus* and *species* as particles of a greater, universal whole that led scientists to seek political and social answers in the natural world (p. 44). The emergence of the Scientific Method created new epistemologies rooted in the practice of dividing and subdividing objects in nature. By enclosing humans, animals, and the natural world into categories of species and subspecies, the new epistemologies that emerged operated from assumed objective truths where power functioned through the discourses that labeled and hierarchized objects.

The natural order of things: Using enclosures to measure difference. In Hellenic society, enclosures were used as a way to apply meaning collectively, through discourse. Power centralized in the laws that were designed by politicians and philosophers to define and redefine the nature of existence. As Christianity was infused into the Roman empire and given power, enclosures became "God-given," which operated not from laws but from God through the Bible. Leading up to the seventeenth-century, the authority to enclose, or define, moved away from

man to God, but during the Renaissance the natural world became the key to unlocking the ultimate truths in life. Essentially, the authority to establish truth started in antiquity with man and laws, shifted to God and the *ecclesia,* and then blended the authority of both through nature. God created man, the *ecclesia*, and nature; thus, God established a divine law of nature that included man. René Descartes (2003), a central figure for the scientific revolution in the seventeenth-century, upon reflection of his imperfect existence, came to the conclusion that his ability to know truth came from "nature that was in fact more perfect" than man (p. 26). Though man and nature were both created by God, it is nature that has existed since the beginning of creation, thus, nature is more perfect (p. 33). In this same line of thought, Descartes expanded his understanding of creation to include "the laws of nature" that were put in place by God to evolve creation towards His perfection.

Aside from the divine aspects of Descartes theories, his biggest contribution to Western thought was his *cogito ergo sum* ("*je pense, donc je suis,*" or "I think, therefore I am") which ultimately allowed for the conceptual separation of mind and body (Descartes, 2003, p. 25). In essence, Descartes was the first to theorize that how humans experience nature through their senses is different from the material reality of nature. He used the example of light to illustrate his theory, "there may be a difference between our sensation of light . . . and whatever it is in the objects that produces that sensation" (p. 85). Another way of understanding Descartes' *cogito* with his "laws of nature" is that nature (i.e. the material world) operates from a rational, unwavering set of laws, or movements, and our senses do not; they (our senses) are irrational and unpredictable (one could be dreaming). Man must develop a *method*, according to Descartes, in order to "arrive at a true knowledge of all the things that [he] is capable of knowing" (p.125). In other words, since our senses are not reliable, a method must be created that anyone can use to

decipher was is true about nature. Descartes implemented an *order* to nature that functioned, according to him and eventually many others, as the only way for man to know what is universally true. As a result, this *order* instituted new epistemologies over the course of five centuries that relied solely on the Scientific Method to find truth.

Since Descartes, Western thought changed from discovering truth through dialectics, as Plato's Socrates believed, to divine revelation by God. The world no longer operated as man willed it or from chaos without God's will, but it now possessed an unshakable force - reason. Rationality and *order*, ordained by God, became the ultimate judgement for truth. Goldberg explained the nature of this *order*:

> [It is] expressed through the domination of Nature by Reason through the transparency of Nature to Reason in the Laws of Nature; through the classification of Nature in rational systems of thought; and through the mastery of Nature, physical and human, by way of 'design, manipulation, management, engineering.' (p. 3)

In other words, reason is dictated by the laws of nature and operates through a system of classification that designed how individuals think and process information. Goldberg's inclusion of "classification of Nature" speaks directly to the formation of modern concepts of race. By using the Scientific Method as a "rational system of thought", scientists sought to prove how and why humans were different by using empirical and rational methodologies to discover the *laws of nature*. Enclosures became a critical component to rational modes of thought. For scientists, the world needed to be classified and organized by perceivable similarities, first, and then the *natural* reasons for differences can be deduced (p. 28).

Examples of this technique of classification are found in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century works of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and Arthur de Gobineau. In an effort to categorize humanity, Blumenbach (1795/2000) called his technique the "five principal varieties of mankind" and it included the following categories: Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian,

American, and Malay (Bernasconi, p. 27). These categories were created based on the physical similarities of the people observed (e.g. geographic location, skin color, hair color, etc.), but Blumenbach went further in his analysis and applied subjective descriptors to each category. The Caucasian was described as having the "most beautiful form of the skull" and the most "handsome and becoming" in contrast with the Mongolian face described as "flat and depressing" or the Ethiopian forehead as "knotty, uneven" (p. 28). The categories themselves were not only created for physical similarities, but were also used to contain a hierarchical system.

The consequences of attaching value to the categories of races can be found in Gobineau's *The Inequality of Human Races* (1853):

> Indeed, the human species seems to have a very great difficulty in raising itself above a rudimentary type of organization; the transition to a more complex state is made only by those groups of tribes, that are eminently gifted. . . . These backward tribes, especially the Polynesian negroes, the Samoyedes and others in the far north, and the majority of the African races, have never been able to shake themselves free from their impotence. (Bernasconi, p. 47)

Value is ascribed to each race (e.g. "gifted" and "backwards") and is determined by its similarity to whichever race is deemed superior - i.e. Caucasians. The labelers, in this case, are white (Caucasian) males, so the terms used to describe *other* races were directly related to the race of the labeler; which established a dichotomy of superior/inferior. Categories serve to combine likeness, but when compared to each other categories automatically become markers of difference and thus ranked.

Gobineau expanded on the existing categories by using them to explain why societies who ruled over others eventually lose power. He concluded that societies failure to keep power was due to the mixing of blood with inferior races, which he described as *degeneration*. As societies are conquered over time, and the conqueror/conquered "fusion" begins, Gobineau

explains how “there appears a noticeable change of quality in the blood of the masters,” which warrants “new classifications [to be] invented” (p. 50). Both Blumenbach and Gobineau contributed to contemporary notions of race by assigning intrinsic values to the physical differences of skin color.

The inevitable hierarchy of race in teleological modes of thinking. The inherent nature of classification, of finding similarities that become enclosed within strict guidelines of the *laws of nature,* are problematic when understood as the foundation for race. Descartes described his *order*, or method, by stating that “the secret of the whole art consists in taking careful notice of what is most absolute among all things” (Descartes, 2003, p. 132). His concern was with what he called “absolute” truths and not “relative” truths. Not only did he focus on absolutes, but his method for determining a truth relied on inductive methodologies as primary over deductive (p. 136). He explicitly detailed a methodology that avoided “looking at many objects simultaneously in a single glance” because he believed that isolating one object and “attentively” studying it will allow someone to become more “insightful” (p. 144). For example, by examining and dissecting one *black* individual, Descartes believed that a scientist could find the essence of *blackness,* if such a thing existed. In other words, Descartes believed that a first-cause existed (from God) that provided a reason for difference, and the ability to determine this first-cause was dependent on the senses. Descartes’ methodology ignored societal influences *on* individuals when seeking new knowledges *about* individuals. He stressed that those who choose to use “far-fetched arguments” were “hardly sane” and they “think that shadows are clearer than the light” (p. 145). For him, the light (first-cause) was what could be observed through the senses.

Furthermore, the search for absolutes ignores and deems false any reality that accepts multiple truths existing at once. It ignores that individuals could exist as different races without the determination of superiority or inferiority. One example of this is the ability to acknowledge multiple races existing at once without the application of a hierarchy system that tries to determine which race is closer to an ideal. However, teleological thinking requires a hierarchy to account for difference since each race would play a different role in achieving *telos*. Recall Thomas Aquinas (2008) and his theory on the God-given natural variety and order of things (p. 271). Understanding how first-causes operate is found in Descartes' theory and application of what he called 'absolutes' and 'relatives' and how they relate to each other. He wrote, "'relatives' are further removed from 'absolutes' in so far as they contain more relations of this kind which are mutually subordinate to each other." He used the example of humans to illustrate his theory when he said, "If we consider individuals, the species (to which they belong) is something absolute; if we consider the genus, however, it is something relative" (p. 132).

From a basic scientific understanding, *species* and *genus* is the classification methodology created by Aristotle for the natural world, and in the late seventeenth-century human anthropology became a new discipline that relied on this classification system (Hannaford, 1996, p. 188). As a *species*, according to these natural scientists, there is an essence that makes humans human, and within this "humanness" there are a variety of subspecies, or races. Descartes' methodology was rooted in the belief that absolutes existed on the basis of ordered objects that operate under a natural power structure. Race is the "master category," as Michael Omi and Howard Winant (2015) suggest, which means that race is the first and foremost designation of difference; operating as a template for other categories like class, gender, and age (p. 100). Therefore, if humans are the unchanging, or absolute, according to Descartes, then race

became the marker of change, or difference, but anything that changed, or was relative, was seen as inferior. Essentially, though humans as a *genus* don't change, there must be a "master race" that all others veered from; thus, creating an inherent hierarchy. This power structure was based on a natural order of subordination in the tradition of Aquinas and his theory of God-given natural variety and order of things. Humans are the *absolute* and race is the *relative*. Humans are the constant, but race is the measure of subordination.

It is not until the eighteenth and nineteenth century that scientific studies emerged based on Descartes' theory of absolutes and relatives. An example of this is Immanuel Kant's (1775/2000) classification of races; not just because he was the first to establish scientific definitions of race but because he believed they *deviated* from one "single natural cause" (Bernasconi, p. 9). As mentioned above, Gobineau's belief in the *degeneration* of races was not an original idea, but was influenced significantly by Kant's theory of deviation. Kant wrote, "All deviations surely require a lineal root genus" and he believed that traces of this root genus could be found in an existing race (p. 19). From this perspective, Kant acknowledges that all races are human, but each race carries an inherent amount of deviation away from one perfect form; hence, the belief that human variety equates to human quality.

Categorizing the natural world into races and hypothesizing a natural hierarchy was not developed in a vacuum. The discovery of new worlds through exploration and colonization included the study of human variety, which became government sanctioned scientific studies. The birth of anthropology sparked new modes of human categorization and directly influenced the language used by philosophers, government officials, and politicians for the creation of laws, policies, and regulations. As noted above, discourse maps our cognitive world and is used as a vehicle for navigating what we believe as truth, but language is how we identify markers along

our path by labeling this truth. Racializing the natural state of man designed and constituted a set of discursive practices and complex *systems of representation* that eventually operated to normalize race as a formal category of human difference.

The consequence of race as a marker of difference is illustrated in the concept of the *Other*. The practice of Western natural scientists and philosophers naming and constructing categories of race "den[ied] all autonomy to those so named and imagined" (Goldberg, 1993, p. 150). Language was used first and foremost to label an unknown (e.g. new world discoveries), and in so doing the act of labeling enclosed a set of meanings that were attached to newly discovered people and customs. Those who created the label and attached meaning to it were the conquerors, and the consequences of these labels left conquered societies at a loss for their own subjectivity. Any truth attributed to race was design and implemented by Westerners, and the denial of autonomy to the racialized objects allowed power to move through the hands of the labeler; thus, instituting a technique that operates as a machine built on the language of racial difference.

This machine designs and encloses meaning that produce the *Other* through discourses that are authorized from scientifically verified information. The objectification of the *Other* is at the heart of racialized discourse, and no more evident than through language that constitutes the *Other* as *less than*. Descriptors that denote inferiority operate from a teleological assumption about the natural world as well as the understanding that difference is progressive, or a way to identify changes from an original state to a more developed, superior state. This new founded "scientific authority," according to Goldberg, founded the concept of the *Other* and relied on *natural law* to reveal its subordination as well as its potential liberation.

Once race was used in language to identify, or enclose, a set of truths about an individual, these truths shaped societal behaviors but, more importantly, actions. Goldberg (1993) describes how racialized language operates as "racist expressions" that "become normalized in and through the prevailing categories of modernity's epistemes and institutionalized in modernity's various modes of social articulation and power" (p. 90). Generation after generation incorporated racialized language into their vocabulary as new theories and studies emerged that helped individuals make sense of differing societies. Race and its subordinations became institutionalized through these discursive practices, and these designed and authorized new modes of power as racialized language was used in laws, policies, and regulations.

Omi and Winant (2015) offer a distinct definition of race as a "concept that signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies" (p. 103). What they call "racial formation" is a process that is rooted in existing assumptions about race - categories based on visual markers of differences (i.e. skin color, nose size, hair texture, etc.) - that are used to design and inform social practices in politics, law, education, and business (p. 103-104). Omi and Winant make it clear that race is woven into contemporary social structures not just an "irregularity within it," which is made true through the use of race in language as a form of representation (p. 105). Recall how systems of representation are complex; the use of labels (in this case racial labels) assume a whole network of meaning that defines what a person is by differentiating it from what it is not. Racial formations, as Omi and Winant make clear, infuse systems of representation with social systems of practice, which they refer to as "racial projects." These racial projects are actions based on preconceived notions of race that essentially "organize and distribute resources along particular racial lines" (p. 115). *Racism* is understood when resources are distributed inequitably based on racial identities and concepts that

get circulated. The journey from race being reliant on the *body* to race as an *identity* is mapped based on Western teleological thinking that used enclosures to create markers for people and citizens to denote progress towards achieving life's purpose.

Race as an Enclosure: The Historical Consequence of Teleological Thinking

The natural sciences not only brought new epistemologies rooted in absolute truths, but they also used the *laws of nature* to illustrate a linear progression of nature's parts. Accordingly, all things in the natural world are strategically moving and developing in relation to an unchanging and perfect essence. When the collective belief of a society is rooted in the idea of perfection, then societal language, norms, and behaviors are mapped in accordance with these absolute truths. One example of this is to imagine life as a marathon with a single finish line, but this finish line is not death, but life after death. Humanity spends years *training* and *disciplining* their bodies to reach the finish line, and the mode of training and disciplining exists not only in the physical body, but also the mind. Long-distance runners often train through workout routines that they believe are best for them to achieve this finish line, and in this marathon of life these routines are performed through actions and language. These routines become normalized in societies as *proven* methodologies for living a *good* life, but these routines are also the map of the marathon course. *Discourse* maps our cognitive understandings, and *behavior* maps how we act.

Descartes' classification methodology is an example of how humanity, in search of natural truths, developed a new discursive map that used race to mark humanity's progress towards the finish line. Race as a marker became the "expressive" object, or necessary adjective to further classify humans, which birthed an entire set of racialized discourses, and as this *expressive object* changes over time (e.g. negro, mulatto, black) so does the discourse and

meaning surrounding it (Goldberg, p. 42). However, change in this case is not change for the sake of change; it is understood as an act of progression, where humans are constantly evolving and race marks identifiable subordination in the evolution of humanity towards an historically evolving (or progressive) *telos*.

Racial differentiation: The search for inherent human subordination. Colonialism marked the beginning of a new racialized order (Omi, 2015, p. 3-4). The voyages funded by Spain, France, Great Britain, etc. in the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth-centuries ushered in new discourses that explored the meaning and reason for human variety. New methods of taxonomies for human variety, such as the Spanish *casta*, or a mixed-race individual, emerged, which changed discourses of race from cultures and norms to blood and nature (Katzew, 2004, p. 39-61). The remainder of this chapter focuses on the scientific classification of race as a natural marker of difference, which emerged in the late-seventeenth-century after three centuries of European, and more specifically Spanish, colonial conquest[5]. Though the first three centuries of colonialism bare an important and critical role in contemporary racialized thinking, I narrowed my research to focus on the philosophers and natural scientists that influenced the implementation of a systemic methodology of racialized thinking as demonstrated through scientific measurement.

Immanuel Kant (1777/2000), writing in the late eighteenth century, was the first philosopher to formalize racial difference as a scientifically verified fact, where "human beings

[5] Magali Carerra (2003) discusses the significance of *the body* in seventeenth and eighteenth-century discourses on New Spain, and argues that two Spanish/European debates at the time were critical in establishing the concept of race as a physical marker of "inner moral and ethical character:" physiognomics and *raza*, or lineage (p. 9). Physiognomics is an idea that uses scientific classifications and methodologies to prove that the inner characteristics of an individual can be perceived through their physical appearance, and this concept dates back to antiquity in Hellenistic and Roman text (p. 9). The concept of *raza* originated in fifteenth-century Spanish discourses to legitimize non-Christian persecution (e.g. Jews and Moors), but what started as a belief about religious purity shifted to the purity of blood and lineage (p. 10-11).

belong to one line of descent . . . regardless of their dissimilarity," but this dissimilarity is passed on through hereditary means and is understood as races (Bernasconi, p. 8). He called this dissimilarity, or race, a *deviation* and understood it to operate as a "half-breed offspring" where this half-breed no longer shares the same dominant traits as the original species. He wrote, "All deviations surely require a lineal root genus," and he believed this *root genus* to be "white of brownish color" (p. 19-20). He goes on to specify how all other races *deviated* from the original, *root* race. An example of Kant's *racial deviation* is how *whites* perpetuate their white race through reproduction and the same for the *black* race, thus when they come together and produce children, Kant refers to racially mixed humans as *half-breeds* (p. 8).

Kant formalized a system that operates from a set of categorical ideals (genus), and difference (race) maps an alternative path from the one originally designed by nature. Recall Descartes use of *absolute* (humans) and *relative* (race) and its influence on Kant's theory of *racial deviation*. His theory requires the use of enclosures to not only categorize but to establish a hierarchy. If an individual believes that the natural world functions towards an ideal (*telos),* then Kant's theory is an example of an individual trying to make sense of the *differences* that exist. More insidiously, racial categories end up justifying a number of global imperialist and racist projects, such as the rise of German *kultur* (civilization) and nationalism, which allegedly justified Western colonizers to export their "superior" culture to primitive, native societies.

The significance of Kant lies in his determination that race is natural, and it exists as a marker to show how humanity has deviated from its original, intended state. Kant insisted that the society that represented the earliest known traces of racial *deviation* was found to be from tribes in northern Germany, and even lists the characteristics that are attributed to this primeval man and woman as white with brown hair (p. 19). He went on to say the "interbreeding with

alien stock" was the reason further deviations were born. The importance of his analysis exists in the language used to describe racial difference not only as deviations, but as a natural system of subordination through hereditary means. Recall Omi and Winant's (2015) definition of *racial formation* and how "it is a sociohistorical process by which racial identities are created," which accurately describes how Kant's theory of racial deviation impacted scientific and social theories of race (p. 102). Both authors later argue that the scientific methods for classifying race served as the rationale for the subordination of race.

Writing at the same time as Kant, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1795/2000), regarded as the father of anthropology, was the first to coin the term "Caucasian" and determined that the *Caucasian race* is the "primeval" race that represents nature's original intent of human species (Bernasconi, p. 28). Blumenbach was a natural scientist that studied anatomy, so his influence on racial discourses is directly tied to his profession that objectified races through empirical analysis. As noted earlier by Goldberg, race developed as the *expressive object* in discourse because of philosophers like Kant and natural scientists like Blumenbach who played a role in the objectification of race. When science finds new ways to categorize the natural world, our vocabulary expands and our discourses change to accommodate these new sets of enclosures. A complex *system of representation* is initiated as each new category or difference emerges. Think on the example of a *chair* and how the term itself is one of a multitude of examples that means "a place to sit," but once you understand *why* something is called a *chair,* as opposed to another object used for sitting, then you understand that each term comes with a complex set of meanings.

As noted above, Blumenbach's not only established some of the categories of race still used today (i.e. Caucasian), but he also ascribed values to races:

> I have taken the name of this variety from Mount Caucasus, both because its neighbourhood, and especially its southern slope, produces the most beautiful race of men, I mean the Georgian; and because all physiological reasons converge to this, that in that region, if anywhere, it seems we ought with the greatest probability to place the autochthones of mankind. (p. 31)

In this example, beauty is used empirically to determine the quality of a race. What began as a way to understand the *varieties of mankind*, simultaneously became a classification system that not only labeled, but assigned meaning. Entire societies were not only objectified and classified, but based on the category they were assigned they also became subjects, or *expressive objects*, of European morality and standards of beauty. Hannaford (1996) uses an example of this shift from object to subject through the use of the term "negro" as originating in the sixteenth-century by the Spanish and Portuguese to describe West Africans. It was not until the eighteenth-century, the same time Blumenbach and Kant assigned attributes to races, that the term "negro" was used "to imply some kind of physical or mental inferiority, or as a standard measurement of beauty and ugliness" (Hannaford, p. 210).

Consequently, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are understood as the eras of reimagining Aristotle's *genus* and *species* methodology to study the natural world, but this reimagination also marked a critical shift away from Hellenic ideas of existence. In his explanation for why Kant was pivotal to the concept of race, Ivan Hannaford (1996) illustrates a withdrawal from Aristotle and the Hellenes who believed in "a civic disposition [that] appeared when men departed the realm of the private and barbarous and entered into a political relationship by virtue of their capacity to *do* politics" (p, 220). In contrast, Hannaford describes Kant's belief of an individual's "civic disposition" as dependent on their physiology and inner characteristics, which assumes that an individual is born with a limit for their *areté*, or quality of their existence. This withdrawal from Hellenic thought came when the individual was no longer

in control of their own *areté*, or existence *par excellence*, because natural science was attempting to prove that the physical world and an individual's *natural* state of existence (i.e. race) predetermined their *areté*. This predetermination established the belief in a natural-born hierarchy based on blood, and inspired a new form of racialized scientific studies, such as Eugenics. Though both the Hellenes' and natural scientists saw the world as teleological, the differences between them can be seen in how they believed individuals could obtain *telos*.

Reimagining *areté*: Eugenics and the power of exceptionalism. The modern concept of race was established through the scientific study of human difference as explained by nature and the physical world, but this curiosity of what makes humans different was born from Western thinkers who could not let go of *telos*, or the belief in an ideal end. Teleological thinking drives the curiosity of difference because, at its root, *telos* requires a perfect form, or existence; teleological thinking requires a form of *areté*. The Hellenic belief in *areté* assumed a natural role for an individual; a role that define their function in life as it related to the *polis*. Applied to twentieth century thinking on race, *areté* is reimagined as the individual's natural born state, where scientists searched for the essence of the *best* individual within blood, and they believed that race was the physical marker for what existed inside an individual. Race as a scientific method started in a manner that located the subordination of other races, but as the reality of a racialized world was constituted into the minds of individuals, the conversations changed to possibilities of losing one's superior standing. If *areté* existed in the blood of individuals, then the consequences of mixing this blood could be detrimental to future generations. In other words, the reimagination of *areté* was race itself; the purity of races became the cause for a perfect existence.

The nineteenth-century changed the conversations and studies about race from questions about why humanity is the way it is to what kind of humanity, or what quality, should continue to exist. Discourses on race and accepted knowledges from these discourses concluded that race marked superiority and inferiority. Considering what Foucault emphasized, that power does not exist without a set of knowledges, racial discourse designed a new set of knowledges that directly influenced societal beliefs about the individual and the ability of an individual to decide for themselves the purpose and quality of their existence. As curiosities about difference changed to fears of *being* different, societies tried to find answers in science for how they could ensure their own *areté,* so to speak. Hannah Arendt attributed this change to the development of new wave of social evolution that focused less on the past than on an ideal future (as noted in Hannaford, p. 325). A contemporary example of this is found in the preface of the book *The Bell Curve* (1996) where the author states, "This book is about difference in intellectual capacity among people and groups and what those differences mean for America's future" (p. xxi). According to this logic, society must find the best in its membership that can strengthen the biological genes of the future. Science developed and determined new knowledges of humans based on race, and these categories remained in place and were used as the foundation for social evolutionary theories.

Social evolution was solidified in the mind of Western thinkers with Charles Darwin (1871/2000), who wrote that "extinction follows chiefly from the competition of tribe with tribe, and race with race" (Bernasconi, p. 70). Darwin's *survival of the fittest* theory contributed to the social anxieties of individuals who feared for the future of not only themselves, but their own race. As a direct response, driven by this fear of extinction, Eugenics was designed to offer a solution to racial progression and allow individuals to speed-up nature's course, if you will.

Eugenics, as coined by Francis Galton (1904/2000), offered a way to correct the errors of past generations through "science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race" (p. 79). Rather than allow nature to *take its course* "blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly," the goal of eugenics was to give man the power to speed the progress of humanity in a manner that was "provident, quick, and kind" (p. 83). Eugenics offered a way for individuals, in whatever racial "species" they belonged in, to locate the best (*areté*) of their "kind," and to create a social system that disciplined their members to "raise the average quality" of their society (p. 80). Eugenics became the contemporary reimagination of Hellenic *areté*, the belief in an existence *par excellence*, but in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries *areté* could be controlled through social and scientific systems. Scientists believed they could find answers in nature, or human anatomy, that could identify this exceptionalism and use these findings, or knowledges, to transform human evolutionary patterns to benefit nations.

Biological determinism and the quantification of inherent intelligence. As anthropological studies continued to be used and supported by philosophical inquiries about human nature and the physical world, it comes as no surprise that the rise of Western nationalism also included a parallel movement of eugenics and the belief in biological determinism. Stephen J. Gould (1996) defines biological determinism as the moral, ethical, and physical differences of human classifications, "primarily races, classes, and sexes," which are predetermined by an individual's biology, but more specifically by the biology of each classification (p. 52). An example of this theory is the belief that an entire race is inherently less intelligent than others -- i.e. blacks are intellectually inferior because they are black or women are naturally inferior because they are women. Two critical components that led up to the belief in biological determinism, as explained by Gould, is what he called the process of *reification* and *ranking* in

Western thought (p. 56). Gould attributes the rise of the belief in biological determinism as directly rooted in the need to classify and hierarchize - the same components that make up Hellenic enclosures, and the enclosures of racial language.

The 19th century saw a quick rise and fall of craniometry, the scientific study of measuring skulls to determine intellectual capabilities, but as scientists failed to identify a correlation between skull size and intelligence levels a new psychological measurement system emerged called the Stanford-Binet IQ (intelligence quotient) test. What was originally designed as an age-based test by Alfred Binet to determine the capability of students to perform everyday tasks in order to identify poor performance in school (Gould, 1996, p. 178-185), quickly evolved with the help of H. H. Goddard into intellectual tests for immigrants coming into the United States (p. 194) and eventually into Lewis M. Terman a "national intelligence test" for students and the army (p. 209). The measurement of human intellect, by nature, became the *ranking* component that immediately follows the need to *categorize* in Western thinking. If humans are on a natural, linear progression, and the natural world can provide empirical evidence of this progression, then categories like race, gender, or IQ serve as a way to rank individuals.

The consequences of this linear mode of thought are societal systems that are built on inferences that assume the intellectual capacities of their members. The belief that humans are born as blank slates, or intellectually empty, and must learn as they grow older is linear thinking -- life always starts at 'A' and moves towards 'B'. The concept of this unified (Western) intelligence, born from the belief in human evolution and biological determinism, further categorized and ranked individuals. Another example of this linear thinking is to understand life as a race, where the race course is laid out for all to see in nature, and individuals are born more capable than others to reach the finish line faster. In the Supreme Court's opinion to uphold the

forced sterilization law in Virginia, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated, “It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind” (Buck v. Bell, 1927). The structures in place within societies are not created or implemented in a vacuum. For justices of the Supreme Court of the United States to determine that action must be taken to prevent “three generations of imbeciles” from procreating is a direct consequence of defining and constituting individuals based on the belief that human quality is quantifiable, measurable, predictable, and predetermined.

The evolution of modern racial thinking is predicated on two centuries of epistemologies that trace back to Hellenic concepts of *telos* and *areté*; where the belief in a natural and purposeful existence can be identified and known within our physical world. Plato formalized teleological thinking, but it was Aristotle that came up with the methodology to locate it in nature. Western societies have continued to reimage and redefine for themselves what it is they believe the purpose of humanity is and how individuals can live according to this purpose. Racial thinking emerged and developed directly from the belief in *telos*. Race was the ultimate consequence of Aristotelian thinking, and it quickly became the physical marker, born from a methodology dependent on categorization, that predetermine the quality of *areté* that individuals could achieve based on qualities determined at birth.

The arguments presented in this chapter demonstrate the consequences of unilinear thinking as shown through Western epistemologies that relied on empirical evidence to prove that our world was born as nothing and is progressing towards a more perfect future. It was through language that natural scientists and philosophers like Kant and Blumenbach divided humanity into categories and then use these categories in new discourses of truth (regimes of

truth) to speculate on which category was superior or inferior. By demonstrating that language relies on enclosures to construct meaning and that discourses of truth are created, implemented, and strengthened by these enclosures, reveals how racialized thinking operates as a technique of power that disciplines individual behavior and action. The use of language to categorize people by race allows for the implementation of *racial formations*, as Omi and Winant (2015) illustrate, where individuals are divided into enclosed sets of categories based on their physical attributes, and then new discourses emerge that directly influence the social body, the *polis*, through politics, laws, education, and business (p. 103-104).

A closer look at the K-12 public education system in the United States reveals a system built to reinforce the role of the central government as a means to discipline its citizenry. The belief that humanity is in a constant state of evolution allowed for the circulation of discourses predicated on the notion that the natural world reveals the secrets to this evolution (i.e. racial deviations). These same discourses reinforce racial formations by designing a social system based on the physical differences of individuals and simultaneously protecting the interests of the race believed to be at the peak of evolution - whites. Public education was and continues to be designed to directly serve the *telos* of the State, and a student's *areté* is determined by their capacity to measure up to the academic standards required by the State. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries designed, implemented, and strengthened a racialized discursive system that disciplined Western societies to agree and operate from these established racial identities. This discursive system ironically today hides race in plain sight - it references everything else but race, yet everything else are references to race. The final chapter of this thesis will reveal how the public education system in the United States reinforces particular racial arrangements by

designing a system that protects and strengthens not only the white *telos* of the State but derives that *telos* from a white racial *areté*.

Chapter 4. Education as Deterministic: Using Enclosures to Bank Knowledge

> The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A 'political anatomy', which was also a 'mechanics of power', was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines.
>
> – Michel Foucault, 1977, p. 138

At the turn of the twentieth-century in the United States, the history of education in America was taught as both an antidote and warning to teachers entering into the profession. In 1959, Bernard Bailyn (1972), an American historian specializing in United States (U.S.) Colonial and Revolutionary-Era history, presented a brief historiography on the current state of American education history. Bailyn's brief "interpretation" of the collection of research (which he noted "did not suffer from neglect") revealed an academic discipline whose history was "obscure" and "dettach[ed] from the main stream of historical research, writing, and teaching" (p. 3-5). The findings presented by Bailyn showcased a discipline that, since the mid-eighteenth century, was designed and controlled by those who sought to justify its professionality. He writes:

> The development of this historical field education . . . grew in almost isolation from the major influences and shaping minds of the twentieth-century historiography; and its isolation proved to be self-intensifying: the more parochial the subject became, the less capable it was of attracting the kinds of scholars who could give it broad relevance and bring it back into the public domain. (p. 8-9)

The method of historiography at the turn of the twentieth-century that Bailyn refers to is one that was able to, according to him, pinpoint the beginning of the main ideas for each discipline; when they took form and how they drastically changed the structure and culture of societies. What education historians, up until then, had failed to do was acknowledge that American education was a radical shift from its European and ancient predecessors; that the knowledges historians had developed about education (i.e. beliefs, purpose, mission, etc.) were not always existing in the minds of Americans, especially prior to the nineteenth-century (p. 10). In other words,

education historians wrote about American education as an advanced institution, superior and dismissive of its past, and declared that "present education [is] the last and highest form of evolution" (Thomas Davison as quoted by Bailyn, p. 7). Dismissing the reality of why American education became institutionalized and declaring it to be the "highest form of evolution" is self-serving and problematic for anyone seeking to challenging and critique the system as a whole.

Furthermore, America's most "renowned and influential American philosopher of education," John Dewey, promoted the same indoctrinating ideals as Thomas Davison's famous book on education in Western society (Soltis, 2002, p. 577). In his work *Democracy and Education,* originally published in 1916, Dewey (2012) describes the transmission of social "ideals, hopes, expectations, standards, opinions" as a "constant reweaving of the social fabric" (p. 6). It is the duty of the old [citizens] to train and educate the young [citizens] who are "born immature, helpless, without language, beliefs, ideas, or social standards" (p. 3). He goes on to proclaim that "unless pains are taken to see that genuine and thorough transmission takes place, the most civilized group will relapse into barbarism and then into savagery" (p. 6). Dewey's use of the terms "barbarism" and "savagery" are clearly emblematic of evolutionary thinking, much like Davidson; revealing a sense of burden on adults to adhere to the ordained principles of education already *formed* in American society.

My critique of Dewey is not holistic, but rather very specific to his articulation that humanity must progress, not regress. At times, he often shares the same critiques that I have articulated in this thesis, but my aim here is to point out the limits that his own philosophical arguments contain because of his belief in human progression and evolution theory. When any philosophic idea rests on the notion of progress or a superior/inferior dichotomy of the

past/future, then the argument itself acts as an enclosure that places limits on how "progress" can or should take place.

The problem with most Western evolutionary thinking, as I argue in chapter three, is that it relies on the concept of progress through an ideal (*telos*) that is only achieved if humanity can discover its secrets to natural selection, or even just natural progression. Teleological thinking encloses the world into neat, compartmentalized categories that serve a purpose: to organize the natural world based on an individual's *areté* in order to achieve *telos*. In chapter three, I argue that contemporary notions of *areté* are racialized based on hundreds of years of Western colonial expansion that was justified by natural scientists and philosophers. Bailyn's findings makes it clear that the history of American education is problematic when placed under the same critical analysis as other prevalent academic and professional disciplines. He comes close to describing a profession dominated by teleological thought as he describes the purpose of Thomas Davidson's famous *A History of Education* (1906) to "dignify a newly self-conscious profession [and] that modern education was a cosmic force leading mankind to a full realization of itself" (p. 7). Bailyn offers a unique analysis of early American education that inspired my own critiques on contemporary U.S. public education in this chapter.

This chapter will continue my analysis on the use of enclosures as a technique of power and a mode for meaning-making, and use the U.S. public education system and the Common Core State Standards (CCSS) as primary examples of the consequences of this teleological thinking. Both Hellenic concepts of *telos* and *areté* are imbedded in my critique as the two foundational concepts of Western ontology that continue to impact contemporary epistemologies. I analyze how the stories told by education historians about American education

were developed to create and establish the State[6] as a reimagined *telos*, and the student, or citizen, as reimagined notions of a racial *areté*. The contemporary public education system in the U.S. operates as an enclosure by partitioning students into hierarchized categories that predetermine their role in the American society and labor force. The design and implementation of the CCSS reveal a profession desperate to achieve *telos* through the coercion of what it means to be a student *par excellence*.

Enclosures of Contemporary U.S. Education

In the United States, reimagined notions of both *telos* and *areté* are shown in the relationship between the State and the capitalist economy. The latter operates as the *telos* that everything is working towards, the perfect end, if you will, and the role of the State *par excellence* acts as the vehicle for obtaining this end-goal. Essentially, the relationship between both the State and the capitalist economic system operate through teleological assumptions that subjugate the individuals within its borders. Each citizen plays a role in society that is specifically rooted in maintaining and strengthening the global capitalist system. The public education system in the United States became, and continues to operate as, the guiding institution that prepares and indoctrinates its citizenry through the subjugation of students. In other words, Capitalism and the State design a map that determines what students need to be taught and master, as well as the measurement system that ranks their achievements toward their own citizenship *par excellence*. The public education system acts as an enclosure that confines specific knowledges about the purpose of the school as a disciplinary entity and the role of the student as an interpellated subject.

[6] For the purposes of this chapter, any reference to "the State" with a capital S is intentional, and directly refers to the Marxian definition of the State as being controlled by an elite few with its own interests separate from the interests of its citizens. Throughout this chapter I discuss the *telos* of the State, which also implies the *telos* of the elite few.

Louis Althusser (1970), in his analysis of what he called Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA) and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA), demonstrates how power moves between both; the RSA having only to do with the public domain as one entity, and the ISA moving between both private and public, but can be multiple institutions at once. Another way to understand both is that an RSA is the governing entity (i.e. totalitarianism, democracy, economic systems, etc.), and its primary function is to coercively *control*; whereas the ISA, whose primary function is ideology, can be schools, churches, trades unions, language, or culture that align to the purpose of the governing entity (p. 142-143). Though each have a primary function - consent to ideology - the secondary function of each is the reverse, which means an RSA has a secondary function of ideology and an ISA has a secondary function of control through consent. As each apparatus operates, the dialectic nature of coercive control and consent to ideology create a movement of power where the RSA produces the conditions necessary for an ISA to thrive, and the ISA, in turn, strengthens the power of the RSA (p. 145).

One contemporary example of how these apparatuses function is shown through the public education system. Althusser (1970) believed:

> that the Ideological State Apparatus which has been installed in the *dominant* position in mature capitalist social formations as a result of a violent political and ideological class struggle against the old dominant Ideological State Apparatus, is the *educational ideological apparatus*. . . . Nevertheless, in this concert, on Ideological State Apparatus certainly has the dominant role, although hardly anyone lends an ear to its music: it is so silent! This is the School. (pp. 152-155)

The reason that the school is noted as the dominant apparatus is because, as Althusser explains, there is no other apparatus in society that hold children in one location as long as the school. The school is organized and standardized by grade levels and as students move to each grade their score is determined, which stays with them until they are deemed eligible to continue on with academics or exit into the workforce. Think of the school as a sifter, one that helps to divide

individuals into the proper social roles of the State, or government. The Capitalist system requires tiered roles for its citizens (e.g. the worker, the manager, the professional, the expert), and as students exit their required schooling they are predestined for a specific role depending on how they scored in the school (p. 155). In other words, the school molds and develops subjects that are bound to an ideology, and in this case since ISAs strengthen the RSA then the ideology that produces subjects is the dominant ideology of the State.

Furthermore, to continue with Althusser (1970), subjects (i.e. students) are born from and given an identity that belongs to an ideology; therefore, how subjects judge their own behavior and action is tied to the State and its ideology (p. 173). For example, being born in the United States means an individual is already subjugated to democratic and capitalist ideals because the entirety of the social and economic system is design to support and strengthen those two ideologies. Therefore, as Althusser (1970) analyzes, when an individual is born they are *hailed* by the State ideology (i.e. democracy) as a form of *ideological recognition* (i.e. citizen) (p. 172). According to Althusser, all ideologies are eternal and dependent on subjects to exist, which means they will always exist so long as there are individuals that recognize themselves within the ideology; therefore, the ideology calls out to individuals (hails or interpellates) and waits for the them to respond in acknowledgement (p. 175-176). Once the subject (an agent of their own choosing) freely accepts their subjugation to an ideology they become bound to a higher authority (i.e. system of beliefs) and is "stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting [their] submission" (p. 182).

Subsequently, enclosures are used to organize and hierarchize subjects within an ideology. Take for example the school as mentioned within Althusser's analysis, it functions as the main disciplinary institution for subjugating individuals as citizens for the State, but in order

to do this efficiently, the school uses enclosures (e.g. statistics) to organize students by age, gender (e.g. health and physical education curriculum), as well as intellectual capabilities (i.e. grade level standards). The more students are partitioned, the easier it is to identify which students are *good* or *bad* in accordance with the ideological standards of the State. Enclosures are used as a measuring system for the State through ideological institutions like the schools, which identifies subjects, divides them into categories, and then organizes those categories according to which one mirrors the ideology the best. Chapter three details how these categories become racialized and eventually embedded within Western discourses, and chapter four analyzes how these racialized enclosures are used in the modern public schools system to measure student success.

Ian Hunter (1996) determines there are two components that were critical to the formation of the modern State apparatus: (1) the goal of the Enlightenment era to detach politics from theology, and (2) the development of the social statistic as a new "expertise" of knowledge (pp. 152-153). The first component deals with the separation of the *citizen* from *man*. Hunter defines the *citizen* as one who is beholden to the law and *man* as a free subject as long as he does his duty and abides by the law (p. 152). This separation, originally theorized by Thomas Hobbes, was critical for the creation and implementation of the ethical autonomy of the State, and for the more contemporary notions of the *private* and *public* spheres of social behavior and action. The State schooling system was originally designed to train the private individual for the public State, and to control the parameters of the former so that it was able to enter into latter. Hunter writes that "popular education was not an attempt to realize the individual's inner self but a means of enclosing populations in a purpose-built pedagogical milieu capable of creating socially disciplined persons" (p. 155). Hunter's analysis also provides a reason for why, as Bailyn (1972)

points out, public education in America was kept isolated and "detached" from other academic disciplines to control the narrative of its history and purpose (p. 9). Bailyn even continues on in his analysis to suggest that education, as a discipline, was kept away from the public sphere of critique. Hunter suggests that it was the formation of the *population* as the object of discipline that became a new type of enclosure designed and defined by the State. The population became a new signifier of the collective citizenry. Once objectified, the population required classification and examination in order to understand it and determine a best practice for not only monitoring, but how to discipline and shape it through the function of the School.

The emergence of the *statistic* and its function as knowledge producing is central to understanding the exercise of State power. Through Foucault's (1979) knowledge/power dynamic (power does not exist without knowledge and vice versa), the emergence of the statistic designed and implemented new knowledges about individuals that, in turn, created new movements of power (p. 27). In her book, *The Seductions of Quantification*, Sally Engle Merry (2016) applies Foucault's theory to the population/State relationship, "What is measured and counted by states and civil society organizations depends on which problems seem politically important" (p. 29). In this example, power moves through what is measured by the State; thus, statistics about society are the markers on a map through which right behavior and action toward particular goals are determined. Take, for example, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969) analysis of epideictic (i.e. ceremonial or persuasive) speech when they argue that "knowledge of an audience cannot be conceived independently of the knowledge of how to influence it" (p. 23). From this statement, it is clear that the ability to *know* the population is also the means to control and monitor it; therefore, the creation of the *statistic* is critical to the production of knowledge on the population; thus, students.

In relation to the State, statistics are indicators that essentially monitor if the population is on the right path, or more specifically, if the population is adequate for the success and strength of the economy. Using a map as an example to illustrate the arrival or journey towards achieving *telos* provides a helpful visual to what is considered an invisible force - power. The answer to the question of *how to achieve telos*, specifically in the context of the State, is found in the objectification of the population as a new knowledge that encloses and coerces individuals through the use of the statistic. Engle Merry (2016) is quick to acknowledge that statistical indicators do not describe the natural world, but, in fact, function as knowledge creators that construct Truths about the world as well as act as a form of governance (p. 33). It is indicators as a function of governance that is at the core of State education theory and practice, which are rooted in a monitoring and measurement system like the Common Core State Standards.

The shift from the statistical indicators as a knowledge creator to a form of monitoring and control is demonstrated in how indicators are used in public education to map for students (and teachers) the correct behavior and action towards *telos* (i.e. dominant global economy). Make no mistake, in the United States statistical indicators for student achievement produce an identity for the student that is directly tied to the *telos* of the State; as shown in the Department of Education's mission to "promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness" (www.ed.gov/about). It is important to understand that any State controlled education system is solely designed, constituted, and implemented for the *telos* of the State, which is the dominance of the economic system worldwide. A closer look at U.S. population statistics that are used to define individuals and the use of CCSS as indicators for measuring student achievement reveals a deeper understanding for *how* the institution of public education, teachers, and students are disciplined by the State. The assumption that students must be

prepared to compete in the global economy sets up a system dependent on enclosures that not only coerces students, but denies them autonomy in their learning process. CCSS function as a technique of power that disciplines and coerces student behavior and action not for their own achievement, but for the State's.

The Enclosing Nature of the Common Core State Standards

In April 2014, the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI) issued a "level one guidance" on Required Action Districts (RAD), which required districts (determined by OSPI) with "low-achieving schools" to submit a school improvement plan (OSPI, p. 4). This section will use the RAD audit report (March 2014) conducted by OSPI for Stewart Middle School in Tacoma, Washington to analyze the interviews, recommendations, and requirements provided to "improve" the school. Using Foucault's framework for the use of enclosures and movement of power, I will illustrate how the Common Core State Standards (CCSS) and the reliance on a standards-based education system is symptomatic of teleological beliefs. The creation and implementation of the CCSS designated a movement of power that operates through enclosures to identify, organize, monitor, and control student outcomes for the white *telos* of the State.

The discursive panopticon: How standards monitor and control students. In 2008, five months before policy advisors convened to create the CCSS, the National Governors Association (NGA), in partnership with the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) and Achieve, Inc., released a report entitled "Benchmarking for Success: Ensuring U.S. Students Receive a World-Class Education," in which the purpose of the report was to "provide to states a roadmap for benchmarking their K-12 education systems to those of top-performing nations." There was no hiding that the purpose of developing standardized learning benchmarks for

English Language Arts (ELA) and Mathematics was to ensure that "America. . . . [has] workers whose knowledge, skills, and talents are competitive with the best in the world" (p. 1). The focus on "workers" reveals the hidden *telos* of the State: a hegemonic global economy, in which part of the nature of a citizen is to be inserted into the Capitalist economic system as a worker. In June 2010, the CCSS were released to states along with a "validation" report that found the standards to be "evidence-based" as well as "aligned with college and career expectations" ("Reaching Higher", p. 2). The use of "evidence-based" to describe the validity of the CCSS assumes, as Engle Merry (2016) argues, that the "evidence" collected are existing knowledges (i.e. naturally perceived truths) about students rather than created knowledges from the statistical indicator themselves. Not only does the report dismiss statistical indicators as knowledge-creators, but it also assumes the end-goal of education is fixed and the CCSS are proven to guide and discipline students to this goal.

Subsequently, the CCSS are direct descendants of teleological thinking that are based on the idea that education serves one purpose: the rise in *human capital* (NGA, 2008, p. 11). In order to achieve the *telos* of the State, the CCSS function as enclosures that are designed to partition students into a hierarchy of racialized categories that measure and monitor this human capital. Recall from chapter two, enclosures are technologies of power where knowledge is created - not discovered, or assumed - and are applied through practice, or action. In other words, standards (i.e. new knowledges) were designed - not discovered - to determine what a student must know and when they should know it, and these new knowledges dictate how (and perhaps if) students problematize their own learning experience as well as how they are defined and measured by teachers and administrators. The function of the CCSS to discipline students should be applied with caution considering that the State's notion of *good* human capital will always be

in the best interest of the State; thus, the CCSS operate in the best interest of Capital, not people or citizens. In this case, it is not the idea of *human capital* that poses a problem, but the institution that designs the qualities, merits, or standards that define what is *good* human capital.

One example of how standards are used to monitor human capital for the State is found in OSPI's audit report (2014) for Stewart Middle School when the authors expressed the end-goal of the required action districts process (i.e. failing schools) to be, not only, defined by the superintendent of public instruction, but one that "clos[es] the educational opportunity gap" and is no longer a "persistently lowest achieving" school (Appendix A, p. 3). The simple mention that progress is defined by the state superintendent's office is essential in understand the controlling nature of the CCSS and standards-based education, in general. For example, in the introduction of the report it states why Stewart was identified as "in need of improvement":

> This inconsistent and persistent lack of progress for the "all student" group and subgroups on state assessments in Reading and Mathematics the last three years led to the identification of the district as a Required Action District. . . Findings in this report are intended to assist district and school leaders in identifying an approved federal or state school improvement model appropriate for the school. (p. 3)

Not only are standards designed by and for the State, the measurement of students, schools, and districts is solely determined by state assessments. The leverage used by the State and local governments to control the actions of schools and districts is funding, which is revealed in the Appendix of Stewart's audit report when it emphasizes that if a school fails to submit a required action plan then the state will "redirect the district's Title I funds" (p. 4). Title funding is federally controlled money that is administered to the states, which is then dispersed to local districts. The State applies funding requirements and guidelines to control and monitor public education for its own benefit.

Consequently, as a technology of power, the CCSS act as an enclosing mechanism that defines students as workers for future Capitalist economies. As power moves through the school system, teachers and students tacitly consent to the State's set of definitions for people, as students, as human capital, as workers, as always subordinate to Capital; and this consent of State defined standards operates within a panoptic system. The CCSS function as Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon*, which is a circular prison with cells surrounding a surveillance tower in the center that monitors prisoners at all times. The architectural design functioned as a mechanism of power that operated from the subordination, consent, and self-discipline of the prisoners themselves. Michel Foucault (1977) describes this application of power as a movement, or "exercise," that requires the least amount of energy to operate a system that impacts a large number of prisoners:

> [The Panopticon] makes possible to perfect the exercise of power. It does this in several ways: because it can reduce the number of those who exercise it, while increasing the number of those on whom it is exercised. Because it is possible to intervene at any moment and because the constant pressure acts even before the offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed . . . because, without any physical instrument other than architecture and geometry, it acts directly on individuals; it gives 'power of mind over mind.' (p. 206)

In other words, the design of the Panopticon itself is meant to be ambiguous because, on one hand, it tells prisoners that their movements are monitored at all times (i.e. central tower), but, on the other hand, *who* is monitoring them is unknown. Take for example the perspective of a student; they sit in a classroom everyday monitoring their own behavior and action based on the known expectations given by the teacher and principal. But, the students outnumber the administrative staff significantly, so what keeps them monitoring and controlling their own behavior and action? The standards are the authority that design a system based on coercion, but it is the students that ultimately consent to their own monitoring.

The Panopticon is a system where the inmates monitor themselves based on the understanding that they are being watched at all times. For students in the classroom, the standards function as the twenty-four-hour surveillance system - the central tower. The standards define what learning is to eliminate any dissent or self-reflection. What the panoptic design perfects, according to Foucault, is the ability to enact the most power over an individual without any direct contact with the person, or people, who exercises it (p. 201). As an example of a panoptic system, the CCSS are established as the central monitoring system that disciplines students and teachers without any direct intervention by the State. The reason the State does not have to intervene is because students and teachers consent to the structure and rules because the system is designed so that both students and teachers don't see the need to problematize. However, the State does have the means to directly intervene at the last possible moment through adding or removing funding (e.g. federal and state grants). The State coerces the behaviors and actions of schools and districts by controlling the funding, but it is the consent of monitoring by the community (i.e. taxpayers and voters), parents, administrators, teachers, and students that allows for this movement of power.

The CCSS establishes a system that operates almost exclusively on its own and with its own set of rules where fewer individuals are required to *exercise* its power than it is *exercised* on for oversight purposes. Another way to understand the Panopticon and how power moves through its design, is to think of standards as a system of surveillance that monitors students (and teachers) with very little effort of those who designed and constituted it. Once implemented, the CCSS operate as an ambiguous, stand-alone system - one that falls silent on *how* the system should be followed - which leaves open a wide variety of interpretations and techniques. Once established, the CCSS list the "guidelines" for what students must know at the end of each grade,

which means it sets the stage and waits for individuals to assume their roles, or enclosures, if you will. Essentially, students are hailed as future workers - already born into their enclosure - and as long as they are trained not to question the system then they will always find an identity within the existing system that is predetermined for them.

When a student enters third-grade they are told what is expected of a "third-grader," which is really just an ambiguous term used to divide students by age level. Consequently, both teachers and students assume their roles (i.e. The Third-Grader and The Third-Grade Teacher) and judge themselves and each other based on the guidance handed down from the State. The CCSS establishes a panoptic enclosure by designing the structure that students and teachers must operate within, but it is the students and teachers themselves that ultimately consent to their own subordination by answering the hails (interpellations) that the system creates. Both students and teachers self-identify, self-police, and judge their own behavior and action - within the framework of the CCSS - without the direct intervention by the State.

Standards as a reimagination of the Hellenic soul. In chapter two, I briefly discuss Plato's (2009, 249c) interpretation of the body/soul dichotomy as it related to Thomas Aquinas' (2008, p. 190) belief that our senses, through reason, can perceive perfection with the soul. In summary, the soul is what *knows* the Truth and/or *telos* (having walked with God before joining in union with the body) and actively guides the body, or individual, into union with this Truth; thus, Truth exists externally, but we can find it and know it through our senses. When applied to the CCSS, the same belief in an ideal that is predetermined establishes standards as reimaged notions of the soul - a guide towards the *telos* of the State.

On a basic level, the role of the student is to know and master standards, while the role of the teacher is to implement a pedagogical method that builds a scaffold for the student to assist

them in meeting each standard. In the same vein as Plato and Aquinas' notion of the soul, the profession of the educator and the use of standards as *the* guide for student success demonstrates an epistemology built on "existing" knowledges. What is often believed or understood to be "existing" or "evidence-based" knowledge was design and implemented for a purpose: the dominance of the State through a strong economic system that functions on high-quality human capital. The foundation for standards-based instruction and curriculum functions as a guide toward achieving *telos*; much the same as the soul guides the body to a perfect union with God.

The CCSS, as the reimagined Hellenic soul, is evident when reading or analyzing solutions for "failing" schools. In the performance audit (2014) for Stewart Middle School, the number one recommendation given was for teachers to "design and implement protocols, structures, and professional development . . . to ensure all students receive rigorous, standards-aligned, and differentiated instruction and curriculum" (OSPI, p. 6). The authors went on to express "confidence" in the school, based on interviews conducted with staff, through their articulation to focus on a "number of research-based practices critical to boosting educator practice and increasing student outcomes." What is expressed and repeated throughout the report is the emphasis and reliance on standards as foundational to student success and achievement. In the last year of Stewart Middle School's three-year school improvement grant (SIG), one teacher expressed their support in focusing on standards:

> We had to redefine innovation and purpose. . . . Innovation wasn't about the standards. It was more about having the kids engaged and wanting to come to school, not that school is to get kids to a certain standard, and innovation is how you're going to get them there. It's been a big deal to get teachers to understand everything needs to be standards-driven, and you need to be super clear. (OSPI, 2014, March, Appendix C, p. 22)

The report goes onto describe the efforts of the district to "[commit] to work[ing] with Stewart Middle School teachers to ensure curriculum, instruction, and assessments align with standards,"

which will "lead to increased rigor across courses" and increase student academic achievement (p. 13). In this context, standards are the basis for rigor and the guide, or marker, for monitoring and measuring student success towards *telos*.

As a direct result of a standards-based education, the mark, or quality, of *good* instructional practice is dependent on the methodology used by the teacher, and their ability to communicate and ensure that students understand the *learning target*, or purpose, of each daily lesson. OSPI (2014) alludes to a *proper* methodology through the focus on learning targets as it described a "shift in practice" when "learning targets were present in every lesson observed" (p. 14). The "shift" assumes a change in instructional practice that is *better* aligned with standards-based education, but the choice in words also implies that the instruction prior to focusing on standards was inferior and responsible for why the school was in need of improvement. Take for example, the report's "concern" based on state assessment scores:

> Results on state assessment and the lack of a coherent system that ensures all students receive grade-level, standards-based instruction and curriculum and differentiated instruction as needed suggest staff teams are not consistently using common protocols and structures to analyze student work and determine and implement instructional changes needed to boost student achievement. (p. 17)

The measurement system used - state assessments - to make the judgements above (i.e. no consistency, lack of coherence) reveals how central standards are for not only guiding students, but also teachers. Based on the report, it is the poor *guidance* of the teachers and leadership to properly and "consistently us[e] common protocols and structures" to boost student achievement. In other words, the standards themselves are not the problem, but the teacher's failure to teach correctly in order for students to learn them.

As a part of the initial recommendation to implement standards-based curriculum and instruction, OSPI describes how the district structures teacher professional development on

"student data and align[s] curriculum vertically and with [the] Common Core and Washington State Standards" in order to inform collaborative, team-based lesson planning (p. 14). OPSI goes on to say that while teachers have access this this professional development, "evidence suggests teachers are not yet consistently implementing [this] research-based instructional practice with fidelity" (p. 15). The focus of concern on implementation, demonstrates that it is not the standards themselves, nor the dependency on them, that is problematic, but the failure of teachers to "consistently" use a *proper* methodology of instruction. The standards function as intended - enclosing teacher instruction for student learning that best satisfies the State economic needs. Just as the Hellenic soul knows and has seen perfection, the CCSS, as well as all content standards, assume to *know* who the ideal citizen is as well as the proper methodology to increase human capital for the success of the State.

Consequently, the emphasis on "research-based" and the use of the CCSS as foundational to student (and State) success, posits standards as a set of "expert" knowledges that are critical for the achievement of students. Success and achievement, in this context, is monitored with indicators measured through assessments that are designed to test whether or not a student "met" the standards assigned for each grade level. Engle Merry's (2016) summary of why statistical indicators and their corresponding assessments are problematic - because they "create the world they are measuring" - is important to keep in mind when quantitative data is viewed as objective (p. 21). In other words, indicators are manipulators designed by the CCSS and implemented by a hegemonic institution or social apparatus for a collective *telos*, and the data used to inform any progress towards meeting the standards creates new knowledges and are solely dependent on the belief in the *telos* that directly strengthens these new knowledges. The problem with teleology is the ease at which large institutions (i.e. government, churches, businesses, etc.) can manipulate

and/or decide for the masses what the *telos* is and how individuals should behave and act (areté) in order to achieve it. The way in which enclosures inform and affirm teleological epistemologies - categorizing and ordering the natural world for a purpose - exposes a methodology that is responsible for the achievement gaps in education.

The achievement gap: Reigning in the outliers. A direct consequence of teleological thinking is the dependence on enclosures to categorize and order the natural world. As argued in chapter three, race operates as an enclosure and served as a way to partition difference, and as each racial category is used to separate one category from the other, this division is automatically hierarchized. The same argument is applied to the CCSS and a standards-based system, in general. From the start, an education system designed for the *telos* of the State assumes a path already mapped that individuals are required to follow, and this path is designed for specific individuals in mind. Based on my argument in chapter three, teleological thinking justified the foundations for contemporary notions of race and used enclosures to justify a hierarchy of society based on race. Today, through the use and dependence on quantitative data in public education to inform the progress of student achievement, a *gap*, or unequal separation, of students by race (and other categorical identifiers) is evident.

The audit report (2014) for Stewart Middle School includes three recommendations to aid in the "turnaround model" chosen:

1. Design and implement protocols, structures, and professional development . . . to ensure all students receive rigorous, standards-aligned, and differentiated instruction and curriculum.
2. Provide the principal operational flexibility that (a) supports the school's turnaround plan; (b) builds staff capacity to deliver rigorous, standards-based instruction and curriculum and use data in making instructional decisions; and (c) aligns with district wide expectations for increases in student achievement.
3. Ensure the learning environment is safe, supportive, mutually respectful, and honors the cultures and families represented in the school. (p. 6)

The recommendations given by the audit team are silent on the standards themselves, or even how students performed on the state assessments. Based on what they recommend, the fault of students achieving at low levels rests solely on the teachers. They assume that protocols, structures, professional development, leadership flexibility, and a safe learning environment were absent or ineffective. Take for example a "concern" listed for the first recommendation:

> There is a lack of evidence indicating the current instructional improvement cycle serves Stewart Middle School students well. . . . [D]ata on the state assessments in Reading and Mathematics over the last several years indicate a lack of consistent progress. (p. 12)

This concern was written by the audit team despite having noted on the same page that staff and leadership were "focusing their efforts on selecting the highest leverage instructional practices." What is clear from the report, based on the contradictions between the results of interviews and what is recommended, is that the "problem" is not the students themselves nor the system that encloses their identity or quality, but the failure of teachers and leadership to raise the scores of student categories. It is important to note that I am not arguing for the fault to be placed with the students. In fact, my critique demonstrates that the foundational reason for why Stewart is a failing school is solely based on the student's state assessments scores, and yet the "concerns" and "recommendation" do not focus on students at all. When I say that the fault is not with students, what I am saying is that, according to the State, the students are functioning as intended within the categories prescribed.

Ian Hacking (1991), a philosopher of science, emphasized that the creation of the social statistic, as a way to monitor populations, established enclosures for individuals where:

> new kinds of people came to be counted, and the categories of the census . . . created the official form of the class structure of industrial societies. In addition to new kinds of people, there are also statistical meta-concepts of which the most notable is 'normalcy.' (p. 183)

In other words, the creation of the census in the nineteenth-century established a new set of knowledges about individuals for the purposes of monitoring the social body. On a basic level, *monitoring* is followed by *intervention*, which means that any system that monitors is looking for a *deviation* from the *norm* that it can then locate in order to intervene.

When Hacking describes how the social statistic created "normalcy," he is referring to the idea that monitoring for intervention requires a predetermined notion or idea of what is *normal*. In relation to the achievement gap, what is considered *normal* is understood as those who meet standard and those who do not are deviations in need of intervention. If the social statistic was created as a way to form class structures, then the categories required to illustrate these statistics became *discursive formations* that then are use to determine what is true or false about individuals in society (Hall, 2013, p. 34). Foucault (1980) describes how these discursive formations, or discourses of truth as he refers to them, are created and used to control or manipulate the actions of individuals, and how these discourses are used illustrates how power moves through social bodies.

As a direct result, in education, statistical indicators are not only determined as a number next to a student's name, but this number is then attached to the student *profile* that consists of a multitude of categories assigned to each student. At the district and state level, student scores on state tests can be divided and subdivided into a plethora of categories predetermined by student enrollment forms. The categories, or "subgroups" as OSPI refers to them as, consist of the following: age, grade level, biological sex, race or ethnicity, income level, English language learners, disability, immigration, and homelessness. When used as a way to monitor progress, these categories serve as a way to partition students to not only identify *how* students are performing, but *why* students are performing at specific levels. The *why* is rooted in what is

considered *normal*, which finds its answer hidden in the categories used, as Hacking (1991) described, to create the "class structures of industrial societies" (p. 183). *In other words, the first indicator for why a student did not meet a standard is found in the categories attached to them - i.e. race, gender, disability*. The CCSS established a set of indicators as a monitoring system that locates the norm, (determined by the categories provided) and any deviations from it; which then justifies a whole set of intervention models designed to normalize students who deviate.

Furthermore, normalcy seeks to homogenize, but in order to determine a "normal" one must locate an ideal. When teachers were interviewed and asked about their progress towards a "student-centered environment," one teacher responded with reluctance that it was difficult with "our kids and *their* cultures" (emphasis added, p. 25). For context, based on the report card data from OPSI, during the 2015-2106 school year, 84% of the teachers at Stewart Middle School identified as "white" (http://reportcard.ospi.k12.wa.us). The dichotomy presented - our/their - is telling of the way in which a school culture is considered to be *different* than the cultures outside its walls, or even the student's cultures. The teacher refers to a "difficulty" which translates to what is considered *different* in this particular case - the cultures. The culture that this teacher is referring to is one that is controlled and monitored by them based on their own whiteness[7] as the norm. In so few words, "culture" is easily transcribed as race.

Additionally, under the "requirements" for addressing the third recommendation by OSPI (2014) was for the school to "ensure all staff members reinforce agreed-upon classroom rules and procedures with fidelity and positively teach them to their students" (p. 29). This

[7] I use the term "whiteness" as a habitus, a set of physical, linguistic, and performative habits or dispositions. Whiteness does not necessarily refer to the identified racial formation that an individual may find affinity with, but it is historically linked to a white racial formation, as Omi and Winant define them. For more on whiteness see Inoue (2015), Ratcliffe (2005), Allen (1994), and Jacobson (1998).

requirement was provided to address the main recommendation to "honor [the] cultures and families" (p. 6). The intention for rules to be established in the classroom, for all students to follow, enforces an environment that is designed to be homogeneous; but, using homogeneity as a way to control *difference* is counterintuitive to what the report requires, which is "culturally responsive leadership and instructional practices" (p. 29).

As a way of monitoring, categories like race - or in this case *cultures* - are used to enclose students into easily identifiable categories that ultimately illustrate, though numbers, that non-white students have deviated from the white norm. Foucault (1979) describes how the goal of categories, or "partitions," is "to establish presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals….to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits" (p. 143). Based on the requirement for Stewart Middle School to homogenize their classroom norms, or rules, the purpose of student categories is solely to identify and monitor *difference*, and provide interventions that "help" students who fall within the "achievement gap" to, essentially, become normalized (or white).

Consequently, a monitoring system that uses categories as identifiers is problematic. In OSPI's audit report for Stewart (2014), the information about students are demographic statistics provided in visual graphs and charts that illustrate student performance on the reading and math state assessments by race, disability, household income, grade, and overall school totals (i.e. "subgroup"). Table 1 below is one of the examples provided in the report to give "additional background information about Stewart Middle School" (pp. 7-10). The categories and percentages are all that are used to make a direct determination about student achievement. If you use the chart below to make a statement, such as "In 2013, 28.1% of black students meet standard in reading and math on the state assessment," then the category plays a signifying role

in *why* those students did not meet standard. Perhaps one makes the erroneous conclusions that the teaching staff at Stewart are racists or the students themselves achieve at lower rates because they are black (i.e. eugenics); either way, the conclusions made center around their blackness, which is conceived as a deviation from the norm set by the report and the enclosures it reveals.

Whether or not the reason for categorizing by race is to make a statement about the student or the teacher, the fact remains that the category itself plays a role in answering *why* the student isn't achieving at the level desired. Regardless of the category used, the conclusions made about those who fall into the achievement gap center around the category itself; which shifts the "problem" back to the students as categorical outliers, or the teachers for failing to teach effectively, but not the standards themselves.

Table 1. *Subgroup Achievement Data on State Assessments from Baseline (2010) to 2013 in Reading/Math Combined*

Stewart	2010	2011	2012	2013	Change Baseline to 2013
All	32.1%	37.4%	35.3%	36.8%	4.7%
Asian	45.3%	41.0%	46.4%	50.0%	4.7%
Black	24.8%	28.6%	23.5%	28.1%	3.3%
Hispanic	19.8%	29.7%	31.3%	30.4%	10.6%
White	37.8%	43.5%	40.4%	42.2%	4.3%
Special Education	9.6%	12.5%	11.8%	7.5%	-2.1%
Low Income	29.2%	34.4%	31.2%	32.6%	3.3%

Telos as Consciousness: Dialogue as a Dynamic Process of Teaching and Learning

The [hidden] challenge of critical education theories. Public education as the catalyst for determining and strengthening citizens for the *telos* of the State is problematic, and what is

suggested by one scholar is that this problem is not the only foundational issue keeping schools from operating as liberating institutions for students. Ian Hunter (1996), challenges *critical* education theorists - e.g. *Liberal* and *Marxian* education theory - by arguing that they have the same foundational goal (i.e. liberation), but neither fully recognize the foundational goal of the State (p. 155). The foundational goal of both theories is the use of the school system as a means to realize, or make aware, the principles of equality and freedom through educational practice, and to help students form their rational self (p. 145). The ways in which both theories believe this realization should be obtained is where they differ, but Hunter insists that this difference is less important for understanding the school system and its functions as a whole as it relates to the State. Regardless of what theory is applied, the State ultimately controls the foundational goal of the public education system in the U.S, as demonstrated through the CCSS. Hunter summarizes the origins of the State school system:

> State-administered elementary education emerged as a new domain of government in which the school would take shape as an instrument for training whole populations in the capacities required for participation in more sophisticated forms of social, economic and political life. (p. 155)

Hunter's use of the term "population" posits it as a social object - something to be observed and studied - and this new social object was constructed by the State as a new knowledge and became the primary justification for a State-sponsored school system. In other words, once the State recognized its body of citizens as a "population," using language to label it as a signified object, then the State was able to construct its definition and functions through the collection and monitoring of empirical evidence (i.e. statistics reliant on prescribed categories). Hunter notes that State school "emerged as the instrument and object of a technically formed, institutionally-organized and circumstantially driven governmental expertise," which is also another way of saying that public education functions within an existing set of knowledges that was and is

designed and implemented by the State (p. 155). Understanding that it is the *telos* of the State that controls the purpose and guidance for public education is the essential first step in addressing a possible solution.

A map in the making: Education as transforming reality. Throughout this chapter, and my thesis as a whole, the foundational argument against most forms of Western thinking is one that ultimately relies on a *telos* and requires a superior/inferior dichotomy imbedded in its rhetoric. The ultimate consequence of this mode of thought is the use of enclosures to create and fix meaning for the natural world. My goal in critiquing this Western epistemology is to illustrate that the failure of many individuals to accept the existence of multiple truths at one time - to acknowledge differing perspectives on the world at once - is central to why we continue to face inequities even as the world evolves.

An alternative mode of thinking against Western teleology is Paulo Freire's dialogical approach to teaching and learning. Freire (2000) plots a simple formula to explain his framework on education: "authentic education is not carried on by "A" *for* "B" or by "A" *about* "B," but rather by "A" *with* "B," mediated by the world" (p. 93). By definition, Freire is describing a classroom where the teacher-student dichotomy is fluid - both take on the role of the other at any given moment during the learning and teaching process. Much of Freire's critique of what he calls "banking education," or the act of teachers depositing ideas into the minds of students, is problematic and symptomatic of a society consumed by teleology where the student must be *developed* in accordance with the *telos* of the State.

Another way of describing banking education is as an act of "*transferring* knowledge" rather than education being an "act *of* knowledge" (emphasis added, Freire, 1985, p. 102). The CCSS is exactly the oppressive regime that Freire warns against - a system of indoctrination built

to “create the ideal model of the “good man” (p. 93). More specifically, the CCSS, as a technique of power, operates as “paternalistic manipulation” that ceases to be dialogical in nature (Freire, 2000, p. 91). The CCSS is a system designed to only serve the best interest of students as workers for the benefit of the State economy, and coerces students and teachers into believing in the *telos* of the State.

Additionally, the conditions of contemporary education that Freire is critiquing are consequences of teleological thinking as well as the reliance on enclosures to manipulate and control meaning. As teleology functions with an end-goal in mind, enclosures are used to label, classify, and arrange the world in alignment with the *telos* of the State. A result of this mode of thinking is the *banking education* that Freire describes where students are seen as blank slates, needing to be filled up with ideas for living a purposeful life. One example of Freire’s (2000) critique is his warning against “depositing of ideas” because:

> dialogue is an encounter among women and men who name the world, it must not be a situation where some name on behalf of others, it is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one person by another. The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by the dialoguers; it is conquest of the world for the liberation of humankind. (p. 89)

In this statement, Freire is describing the central function of words in dialogue and meaning; similar to Stuart Hall’s (2013) “system of representations” where language is used to assign meaning to objects (p. 2). Though both are describing how language is used to create meaning, Freire (2000) insists that the process for “naming the world” must not be determined by those in power, but must be a process that is shared by the learners through love, humility, hope, and “faith in humankind” in order for it to be truly liberating (p 90). It is through compassion and in partnership that anyone can truly teach and learn. It is education as an *act* of knowledge rather than a *transmission* of knowledge that is revolutionary.

As a final point, Freire offers a solution grounded in full consciousness that *reveals* the system of oppression and how it operates to alienate individuals away from their own agency, but, moreover, his solution is an organic one that constantly seeks to locate those who are not aware of their oppression and bring them to liberation. Students should not be predetermined for this world, but should be allowed agency in order to decide for themselves what future they want to live. Education should not be a system built for a *known* future, but should, as Freire (1985) describes it, be an "engagement full of risk" (p. 58). He suggests that liberation is a "risk" because it assumes that a truly liberating education contains the possibility of losing something - ignorance. In the case of standards, I would argue that it is not so much losing ignorance as it is gaining self-realization - the process of stepping outside ourselves to problematize our behavior and actions. Freire later proclaims that "in mass societies, ways of thinking become as standardized as ways of dressing and tastes in food. . . . where everything is prefabricated and behavior is almost automatized, men are lost because they don't have to 'risk themselves'" (p. 88). In a teleological system, learning is static and prohibits critical thinking, but when *telos* is removed from society as a whole and placed back into the hands of individuals and local communities as a form of consciousness, that is when teaching and learning can truly be a dynamic process.

Looking Back in Order to Look Forward

When I started this journey I honestly didn't know how or where it was going to end. I knew the general direction - one that ended with public education - but I either didn't see the path in front of me or it didn't exist in the first place. I knew that the path I would walk was paved by Western thinkers, so I chose to research chronologically. I discovered two pervasive concepts in Hellenic culture - *telos* and *areté* - and found that traces of both are embedded in

Western thinking throughout history. The belief in teleological thinking, that humans are created for a purpose, is problematic once those in power, or those seeking to redirect power, have access to design and monitor what the *telos* is and is not, and who has access to it. We use enclosures in language to establish knowledges about individuals and the world around us (e.g. race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnic background, ability, etc.), but it is *how* those enclosures are used to serve a larger *telos* - i.e. the Hellenic *polis*, the Christian Church, Western colonization, the State - and how those same enclosures are hierarchized in order to measure progress.

This thesis journeys through Western history to demonstrate how teleological thinking uses enclosures to differentiate and hierarchize the world for a State or hegemonic *telos*. I end the discussion by focusing on education as serving the *telos* of the State through the use of standards and state assessments. Both Althusser's discussion on repressive and ideological state apparatuses, and Foucault's theory of how power moves, are critical because they reveal how the State and schools operate dialectically between *coercion* and *consent* to create and maintain a movement of power where the State produces the conditions necessary for the school, and the school, in turn, strengthens the power of the State. This movement of power is reinforced through the use of enclosures to make determinations about students. The statistical indicators used to measure student achievement are closely associated with racial categories, enclosures, that interpellate students in determined ways; ways that produce students as failures seemingly automatically. Enclosures serve a purpose, and this thesis calls attention to the problems created when that purpose is singular and controlled by those in power.

Ultimately, the focus of this thesis is to reveal how Western thinking seeks to control and monitor the whole world for a purpose, rather than seek a variety of solutions that differentiate

based on local community or individual needs. I recognize that this method of simply analyzing Western sources does not offer an immediate solution to the problems posed. Rather, I've pulled apart Western epistemologies to locate a possible origin for *why* we continue to design and implement inequitable systems. Without an understanding of the *why* we cannot offer alternative solutions for moving forward. I do know that any actions taken should first, and foremost, be in the best interest of students, families, and local communities. Before we can take action, we must internalize the problems posed and acknowledge how we play a role in the dialectical relationship of coercion and consent between the State and the school.

My final thoughts are organized around how we interrogate our own *teloi* in our lives. What is your *telos* as an individual, teacher, student, parent, community member, or leader? Is this *telos* fixed or dynamic? What outcomes do you seek based on this *telos*? Does this *telos* require you or others to make moral judgements about individuals? Does the language you use to determine those judgements require you to rank individuals? Is there someone that stands out when you think of an ideal person to achieve this *telos*? It is through this *ideal* that power moves because we consent to allow ourselves and others to be measured against it.

As a teacher, think of your ideal student. Where did the idea of your ideal student come from? When you were in school, who and what were the model students, athletes, teachers, textbooks, assignments, and grades? What were the requirements and rewards of you as a student? How did the awards or recognitions you received inform how you, as a teacher, award or discipline students in your own classroom? How do you talk to your students? Do you frequently use terms like "right" or "wrong" and "better" or "best" when you describe to them concepts or how to complete an assignment or task? Do you use a rubric? Do assessments and grades justify your use of those terms? Do the awards, punishments, rules, and grades dictate

how students behave and act in your classroom? Are students using the same terminology that you use to make moral judgements about themselves as students?

So, what's next? We must first recognize that we have failed students and families. The education system in the United States does not operate in the interest of individual students or their local communities. As illustrated in my analysis of how the CCSS are implemented, we can see how the education system primarily serves the State's economic interests to develop workers. The problem is how students are funneled into a system that predetermines what *kind* of worker they are. Measured against a single standard, the "ideal" worker is pre-problematized so that students and teachers are always consenting to the system. But, if we can see how the system is operating, we can take steps to bring agency back to our local communities and into the hands of students and teachers. Learning must always seek a *new* not a known future, and this discovery requires risk. We must risk the comforts of our current education system - a comfort that allows us to be complicit in our own predetermination. We must determine for ourselves, our community, and our classrooms what kind of future we want to seek and discover.

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