

Maintaining Memory:

The Inclusion of Korean *Hibakusha* in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Museum

Allison A. Foltyn

1826658

Prof. Kenneth Pyle

JSIS 584B–Hiroshima and Nagasaki

10 December 2019

Introduction

On the morning of August 6, 1945 Lieutenant Colonel Yi U was on his way to work when the Enola Gay dropped the Little Boy bomb on Hiroshima. He was found later that day and taken to a hospital where he died the following day.¹ Yi was one of the many Koreans residing in Hiroshima in 1945 as the war drew to a close, but unlike the majority of Korean residents Yi was a prince of the Joseon Kingdom's Yi dynasty and nephew of Sunjong, the last Korean emperor before the peninsula was annexed by Japan in 1910. In 1967 a cenotaph was erected at the location where his body was found following the blast in memory of Korean victims of the bombing.² This location was outside of the Hiroshima Peace Park, however, and came to be seen to embody the discrimination faced by Korean *hibakusha* and by Koreans in Japan more broadly, with Korean residents' groups later moving to have a cenotaph within the park. The cenotaph and its relocation along with the inclusion of the stories of Korean victims of the bombing within the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum are the two main controversies surrounding the role of the maintenance of the existence and memory of Korean victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, which along with medical support has been the primary struggle of Korean *hibakusha* and will be the main focus of this paper. As there has been both more written about the museum in Hiroshima and the controversies surrounding it as well as more Koreans present in Hiroshima at the end of the war, this paper will focus on Hiroshima, though Nagasaki does also have a museum and a park dedicated to the remembrance of the bombing and there is a memorial to Korean victims located there.³ Though a full explanation would likely fill volumes, this paper will begin by looking at a

¹ Yuko Takahashi, "Identities Surrounding a Cenotaph for Korean Atomic Bomb Victims," *Korean Studies* 42 (2018): 76.

² Ibid.

³ "Nagasaki Korean Atomic Bomb Victims' Memorial," Nagasaki City – Peace and Atomic Bomb, accessed December 8, 2019, https://nagasakipeace.jp/english/map/zone_inori/tsuito_chosenjin_giseisha.html.

brief synopsis of the relations between Korea and Japan in the modern era and the status of Koreans in Japan in the twentieth century. This will be followed by a section on the normalization of Japan-South Korea relations and a section on the background of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Museum. Next will be a discussion on the controversies surrounding the aforementioned Cenotaph for Korean Victims of the Atomic Bombing and its eventual relocation. The third main section will focus on the inclusion of Korean, and more broadly non-Japanese, narratives in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum itself, followed by a section on Korean *hibakusha* in Korea and a comparison with comfort women. The final section will look at some ongoing questions surrounding the issue of Korean *hibakusha* before concluding.

Background on Japan-Korea Relations and Koreans in Japan

Though a full discussion of the relationship between Japan and Korea over the centuries would take much more time and space than this paper allows, it has been, in a complete understatement and oversimplification, complicated. The statue of Yi Sun-sin, the admiral who rebuffed Japanese naval attacks ordered by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in a planned invasion of Korea in the late sixteenth century, is one of two statues standing in Gwanghwamun square in central Seoul today. The other is of King Sejong the Great, who created the Korean alphabet, *hangul*, in the fifteenth century. During the following Edo Period in which Japan maintained the relatively isolationist foreign policy of *sakoku*, however, the Japanese and Korean governments maintained relations and continued to conduct trade with one and other. Following the forced opening of Japan by Perry in the mid-nineteenth century and a series of unequal treaties between Japan and Western powers, Korea became the target of Japan's own expansionist policy. Using the same form of gunboat diplomacy that had been used against it not long before, Japan concluded the Treaty of

Kanghwa with Korea in 1876.⁴ Japan continued to increase its influence in Korean affairs in the following years, including orchestrating the assassination of Queen Min, consort to Gojong, and fighting two wars over influence on the peninsula, the Sino-Japanese War from 1894 to 1895 and the Russo-Japanese War from 1904 to 1905.⁵

Following the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Korea was made a protectorate of the Japanese Empire after the Treaty of Portsmouth recognized Japanese interests in Korea and in 1910 was officially annexed as a colony, beginning thirty-five years of official colonial occupation by Imperial Japan.⁶ In the 1930s, the Japanese Empire began to expand beyond the Korean Peninsula into the mainland, first Manchuria and later into the rest of China. This produced fifteen long years of war for the subjects of Imperial Japan, which included Koreans, as well as the numerous peoples affected by the government's expansionist policies and the war fought to achieve them. During the colonial period many Koreans emigrated to Japan in search of better opportunities for themselves and their children. Additionally, as the war effort progressed the Japanese government began conscripting for labor, many Koreans were brought to the Japanese mainland by force. As such there were many Koreans in Japan when the atomic bombs were dropped by the United States on August 6 and August 9, 1945 on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, and consequently many Koreans were victims of the bombings.⁷ Following Japanese surrender and the end of the war on August 15, 1945 many returned to Korea, now in a split occupation by the United States and the Soviet Union, but many also chose to stay in Japan and now comprise one of the largest minority groups in Japan, where they are known as *zainichi*.

⁴ Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 43,49.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 66, 103.

⁶ "Text of The Treaty.: Signed by The Emperor of Japan And Czar of Russia," *New York Times (1857-1922)*, Oct 17, 1905. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/96567202?accountid=14784>.

⁷ John W. Dower, "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory," in *Hiroshima in History and Memory*, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 140.

Relations between the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan were not normalized until 1965 under Korean president Park Chung Hee and the manner in which relations were normalized has informed many of the controversies between Japan and Korea in the years since. In the 1965 treaty establishing basic relations between Japan and South Korea, the governments came to an agreement regarding Japanese compensation in which the Japanese government would provide \$300,000,000 in grants and \$200,000,000 in credits over the course of the next ten years.⁸ As a part of this agreement, the governments of Japan and South Korea confirmed that “claims between them and between their nationals have been settled completely and finally,” and agreement which abrogated the right of Korean nationals to sue the Japanese government for damages occurring during the colonial period, notably including those of former comfort women and of conscripted laborers.⁹ As none of the compensation went directly to Korean victims of Japanese acts, the Park regime used the money to further modernization, and as the agreement was concluded by the authoritarian Park regime, it has remained controversial in Korea in the decades since it was ratified.

As mentioned previously, during the colonial period many Koreans emigrated to Japan either willingly in search of better opportunities or as they were conscripted for the war effort. Throughout both the colonial period and the years since its end, Korean residents in Japan have been discriminated against and even killed as a consequence of being viewed as second-class citizens of the empire. The massacre of Koreans in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 is one of the most extreme examples of this. In the aftermath of the massive earthquake and ensuing fires that swept through Tokyo, thousands of Koreans were killed after rumors spread

⁸ Shigeru Oda, "The Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea," *The American Journal of International Law* 61, no. 1 (1967): 46-47.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

that Koreans had poisoned wells and other scaremongering tactics targeting Koreans and other migrant laborers.¹⁰ Aside from such overt acts of violence against ethnic Koreans in Japan, who were citizens of the Japanese Empire, there was frequent discrimination both in Japan and also by Japanese residents in Korea.¹¹ After Japanese surrender in 1945, ethnic Koreans in Japan ceased to be imperial citizens and became classified as foreigners residing in Japan, which is the origin of the term *zainichi*, and faced legal discrimination in addition to statelessness in the context of the division of Korea.¹² Both the discrimination as second class citizens during the colonial period and the loss of citizenship and uncertain status following Japanese defeat in 1945 have made it incredibly difficult for ethnic Korean victims of the atomic bombings, as well those who suffered due to other events such as forced conscription by the Japanese government, to receive either acknowledgement or compensation, regardless of whether they returned to Korea or remained in Japan following the end of the war.

History of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum

Integral to the story of the recognition of Korean victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is the history of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum itself. As early as September 1945 the desire for a piece of land near the epicenter of the blast to be laid aside for a commemorative site was expressed by the prefecture of Hiroshima and in 1949 the National Diet passed the Peace Memorial Construction Law, which expressed the plan to rebuild Hiroshima as a city of peace.¹³ Also in 1949 on the anniversary of the bombing, Hiroshima promulgated the

¹⁰ Byung Wook Jung, "Migrant Labor and Massacres: A Comparison of the 1923 Massacre of Koreans and Chinese during the Great Kanto Earthquake and the 1931 Anti-Chinese Riots and Massacre of Chinese in Colonial Korea," *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 6, no. 1 (2017): 180.

¹¹ Rennie Moon, "Koreans in Japan," SPICE—Stanford University (2010), accessed December 5, 2019, https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/koreans_in_japan.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Stefanie Schäfer, "The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and its Exhibition," in *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, eds. Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008), 155-156.

Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law and the Kenzo Tange Group's proposed design for the new commemorative peace park was declared the winner.¹⁴ Ironically, Tange's design for the peace museum reused an earlier design meant to commemorate the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the imperialist and militarist goal in whose name Japan had fought the war.¹⁵ Nevertheless, construction began on the museum in 1951 and it opened to the public in 1955, ten years after the bombing.¹⁶ The museum's initial collection was based on the collection of material artifacts from the bombing that had been collected by Shogo Nagaoka, a geologist and the first director of the museum, and added to by citizens of Hiroshima as they brought additional pieces to be preserved in the museum.¹⁷

The museum underwent its first major redesign and renovation in the mid 1970s in which many of the exhibits were redesigned to produce a more "realistic" depiction of the aftermath of the bombing. This was exemplified by a controversial change in how clothing worn by those who had experienced the bombing was displayed from simple dummies to wax figures painted and designed to reproduce the image of those in the immediate aftermath of the bombing.¹⁸ A second major renovation was completed in the early 1990s in which a new wing was added to the museum. Central to this second renovation was a discussion on the inclusion of Japan's role as the perpetrator of war in the museum, known as the "perpetrator's corner discussion."¹⁹ During this discussion it was argued that in not portraying the context in which the atomic bomb was dropped, Japan's role as aggressor was downplayed which prevented an acknowledgement of responsibility for the war. Also a part of this discussion was the inclusion of Korean narratives in the museum,

¹⁴ "Museum History," Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum (HPMM), accessed 17 November 2019, http://hpmmuseum.jp/modules/info/index.php?action=PageView&page_id=67&lang=eng.

¹⁵ Schäfer, "Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum," 157.

¹⁶ HPMM, "Museum History."

¹⁷ Schäfer, "Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum," 158.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 158-160.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 163.

including that many of the Korean victims were present in the city due to wartime labor conscription.²⁰ The most recent renovations of the museum began in 2014 with the East Building reopened in 2017 and the Main Building reopened in April 2019.²¹



Figure 1: The Cenotaph for Korean Atomic Bomb Victims pictured at its current location within the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park.²²

Controversies Surrounding the Cenotaph for Korean Victims in the 1990s

In 1970, a cenotaph dedicated to Korean victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was erected just outside the Hiroshima Peace Park by local Korean residents of Hiroshima, most of whom were associated with South Korea.²³ The Mindan group, those *zainichi* Korean residents

²⁰ Ibid., 165.

²¹ HPMM, "Museum History."

²² "Monument dedicated to Korean Victims and Survivors," *Explore Hiroshima*, accessed November 16, 2019, <https://www.hiroshima-navi.or.jp/en/post/007263.html>.

²³ Takahashi, "Identities Surrounding Cenotaph," 65.

who were pro-South Korea, had initially made the request to build a memorial dedicated to the Korean victims of the bombing inside the park in 1967 but had been denied. The reasoning given by city officials at the time was that the construction of privately sponsored memorials within the park had been stopped in order to prevent the park becoming a “graveyard” and as such the memorial to Korean victims was built outside of the park.²⁴ Though not ideal, the location was not considered particularly controversial by the members of the committee for the memorial as it was the location where a member of the Korean royal family, Prince Yi U, was found after the blast. Prince Yi was a grandson of Emperor Gojong and nephew of Emperor Sunjong, the last emperor of Korea before Japanese annexation, and a lieutenant colonel in the Imperial Japanese Army during the war and died of his injuries the day after the bombing.²⁵ The cenotaph itself stands on a turtle-shaped base and is engraved with the epigraphs “Souls of the dead ride to heaven on the backs of turtles” and “For souls of Prince Yi U and over 20,000 others,” written in Japanese in addition to the title of the cenotaph in Japanese and English as well as a short history of Koreans in Japan written in Korean (see Figure 1 for a picture of the cenotaph).²⁶ As the years progressed, however, the cenotaph’s location outside the park, where monuments had continued to be constructed in the remembrance of different groups of victims, began to be seen as discriminatory and citizens’ groups moved to have a monument to Korean victims within the park.

The initial push to erect a monument to Korean victims of the bombing within the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park began in the late 1980s. Growing out of the context of the continued discrimination against Koreans in Japan from the colonial period onward discussed previously, the cenotaph’s location outside the park became symbolic of how Koreans were

²⁴ “Korean A-Bomb Victims Ignored in Japan,” *The Korea Times*, August 12, 1986.

²⁵ Takahashi, “Identities Surrounding Cenotaph,” 76.

²⁶ “Monument dedicated to Korean Victims and Survivors”; Takahashi, “Identities Surrounding Cenotaph,” 77.

discriminated against “even in death” and Korean residents’ associations demanded that the monument be moved.²⁷ That monuments had continued to be built within the park after the original request to build a monument to Korean victims within the park had been denied was the source of the majority of the accusations of discrimination against Koreans by city officials in their refusal to build a memorial within the park and attempts at justifying the exclusion of a Korean memorial were unsatisfactory.²⁸ There was also controversy within the ethnic Korean population over the cenotaph, as it had originally been erected by the Mindan, who supported South Korea, and therefore there was a desire to erect a “unified” monument that would encompass all Korean victims, not solely those who later aligned with South Korea. Due to the likelihood of disagreement between the Mindan and the Sōren, who support North Korea and are also known by the Korean name Chongryon, the Hiroshima city government was unwilling to take an active role in initial negotiations to create a “unified” monument due to a desire to avoid being perceived to have taken sides in the inter-Korean conflict.²⁹

The Hiroshima city government’s fear of an inter-Korean split in negotiations for a unified cenotaph was accurate and there was a deadlock for nearly ten years primarily concerning linguistic terminology. The original cenotaph had used the term *Kankoku-jin* (Kr.: *Hanguk-in*) to refer to the Korean victims of the bombings. This term is now usually used to refer to South Koreans referencing the full name of the Republic of Korea (*Daehan Minguk* in Korean and pronounced *Daikan Minkoku* in Japanese) while pro-North Korean residents in Japan continue to use the term *Chōsen-jin*, which refers to the Joseon Kingdom, the last Korean kingdom prior to Japanese annexation and is also the term that continues to be used in North Korea to the present

²⁷ “Korean A-Bomb Victims Ignored in Japan.” *The Korea Times*, August 12, 1986, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1907242312?accountid=14784>.

²⁸ Takahashi, “Identities Surrounding Cenotaph,” 69.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 70.

day.³⁰ The pro-South Mindan argued that *Kankoku-jin* also referred to the subjects of the Korean Empire (Kr.: *Daehan Jeguk*, Jp.: *Daikan Teikoku*), which had been proclaimed by Emperor Gojong at the end of the nineteenth century to raise Korea's status to equal that of the Japanese Empire and Chinese Empire and also happened to be the root of South Korea's official name. The Sōren, however, argued that as *Chōsen-jin* had been the term used to refer to Koreans throughout the colonial period, it was more appropriate as a term to refer to all Koreans who had suffered in the bombing.³¹ While the Mindan and Sōren eventually reached the agreement that both terms would be used on the monument, they failed to come to a consensus on the details and negotiations stalled for several years.³²

While for the majority of the controversy surrounding the cenotaph the Hiroshima city government had maintained a hands-off approach as to decisions regarding the final monument and, preferring to let the two Korean groups come to a decision without the government's interference or mediation, in 1998 the mayor of Hiroshima, Takashi Hiraoka, made a personal effort to resolve the issue before his retirement. Hiraoka had spent much of his youth in Korea while it was under Japanese colonial rule and had become interested in the struggles of Korean *hibakusha* as an adult and had remained invested in the issue of the relocation of the cenotaph after his election to mayor in 1991.³³ Hiraoka was thus able to use his own personal contacts with those on both sides of the inter-Korean debate and to, in effect, function as a back-channel between the Mindan and Sōren groups. Arguably thanks to his efforts, the Mindan and Sōren agreed to Hiraoka's proposal to move the cenotaph erected in 1967 as-is into the park and to leave the

³⁰ Ibid., 70-71; Eugene Moosa, "Hiroshima Divided Over Monuments: 45 Years after World's First Atomic Attack," *The Korea Times*, August 7, 1990, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1922440127?accountid=14784>.

³¹ Takahashi, "Identities Surrounding Cenotaph," 70-71.

³² Ibid., 75.

³³ Ibid., 83.

construction of a “unified” monument for a later date when the time was right.³⁴ The existing cenotaph was moved without alteration into the park in July 1999 and remains in place today as there has yet to be an agreement on a “unified” monument.³⁵

Inclusion of Korean Victims in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum

As with the relocation of the Cenotaph, the 1990s also featured a debate on providing a more comprehensive context of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, as discussed in the earlier section on the museum’s history. Prior to the renovations in the 1990s, the “official” depictions of the bombing had generally portrayed the victims as unitary group and in relatively vague terms to elicit a universal response that the bombings had been an attack on humanity as a whole. At the same time, official representations had also focused on that dubious honor of the “Japanese” as the sole victims of nuclear weapons.³⁶ The existence and experience of Korean *hibakusha* challenged both of these narratives, as they were in many ways “double victims” of both the Japanese Empire and the American attack. The events and the global context of the 1990s resulted in challenges to the “official” Japanese narrative of the end of the Second World War, including that of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These events included the collapse of the Soviet Union and the resultant optimism and the revisiting of the situation that began the Cold War, including the end of the World War. More relevant to the context of the Hiroshima Museum, however, was the fiftieth anniversary of the bombings and the end of the war and the additional reflection of the events that it spurred. In the United States, this resulted in controversy over the planned exhibition of the Enola Gay, the

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ “Monument dedicated to Korean Victims and Survivors.”

³⁶ Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 121.

bomber that dropped the Little Boy bomb on Hiroshima, at the Smithsonian Museum.³⁷ While in the case of the Smithsonian, there was pushback over the proposed inclusion of discussion of the disastrous effects of the bomb in Hiroshima, controversy regarding the Hiroshima Museum pushed for greater inclusion of the context of the war and the Japanese Empire's role in beginning the conflict. This produced the "perpetrator's corner" discussion mentioned above and also the inclusion of the existence of Korean victims after the renovations completed in 1994 in anticipation of the fiftieth anniversary the following year.³⁸ Despite this shift, and as at the time the Cenotaph for Korean Victims had not yet been moved to its current location within the park, there remained the view that the renovations had not gone far enough and that a more comprehensive portrayal of the bombing, its context, and its victims was necessary.³⁹

To the end of providing a more comprehensive and nuanced view of the bombings and their context, renovations began in 2014 and were completed in April 2019.⁴⁰ As such, the museum decided to "put individual victims into focus, to tell people that not only Japanese people but whoever was there was bombed, regardless of their nationality," and the newly renovated museum now has a section profiling several foreign victims of the bombing.⁴¹ The section includes four foreign victims' stories: that of an American prisoner of war who died in the bombing and whose identification tags were found in the rubble, that of a Malaysian student, that of a German priest,

³⁷ Neil A. Lewis, "Smithsonian Substantially Alters Enola Gay Exhibit After Criticism," *New York Times*, Oct 01, 1994, Late Edition (East Coast). <https://search.proquest.com/docview/429934338?accountid=14784>.

³⁸ HPMM, "Museum History."

³⁹ P.H. Ferguson, "Hiroshima No Longer Just a Victim New museum wing explores city's actions during war," *THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE*, August 6, 1994: A14, *NewsBank: Access World News – Historical and Current*, <https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-view?p=WORLDNEWS&docref=news/0EB4F609276933C4>.

⁴⁰ HPMM, "Museum History."

⁴¹ Hironobu Ochiba quoted in Keita Nakamura, "Foreign hibakusha speaking out as museum dedicates section to them," *Kyodo News*, June 17, 2019, accessed November 15, 2019, <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/06/79e44ff2701d-feature-foreign-hibakusha-speaking-out-as-museum-dedicates-section-to-them.html>.

and that of a Korean man conscripted for the war effort.⁴² The caption for the section, entitled “Away from Home” within the wider section “Realities of the Bombing,” is presented along with a painting of an injured Korean woman in the aftermath and reads:

The atomic bomb destroyed lives without regard to national or ethnic origins. Tens of thousands of Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese, as well as Japanese-Americans were living in Hiroshima at the time, including those who had been conscripted or recruited from these areas.

Other non-Japanese people, such as students from Southeast Asia and China, German priests, Russian families, and American POWs also became victims.⁴³

The section is then further broken down into the sub-sections on each individual profiled. The Korean man profiled in the section, Kwak Kwi-Hoon, was 21 at the time of the bombing and had been conscripted to a unit of the army assigned to Hiroshima, where he was at the time of the bombing.⁴⁴ His profile is accompanied by a photograph of Kwak as an elderly man with the Genbaku Dome visible in the background and reads in full:

As conscription was implemented in Korea, Kwak Kwi-Hoon (then, 21), a Korean student at Jeonju Normal School was assigned to a unit in Hiroshima in September 1944. Kwi-Hoon was bombed at roughly 2,000 m from the hypocenter while on duty. He sustained severe burns and injuries to his head and back; he fell into a coma for three days from August 9 after getting to a relief station in the suburbs. After the war, he concentrated on getting home. He headed for Korea immediately after his unit was disbanded in September. Returning home, he taught at schools while devoting himself to support A-bomb victims. His slogan was, “A-bomb survivors know no borders.”⁴⁵

The desire to bring the focus of the museum onto the victims and their various experiences extends beyond the section specifically dedicated to foreign victims and there are references to a more diverse range of experiences elsewhere in the museum as well.

⁴² Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, “Away from Home,” accessed November 15, 2019, http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=ItemView&item_id=120&lang=eng.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, “Kwak Kwi-Hoon,” accessed November 15, 2019, http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=DocumentView&document_id=468&lang=eng.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

The redesigned section on the history of Hiroshima before, during, and after the Asia-Pacific War contains a decently well-rounded depiction of many of the aspects that the museum had earlier been criticized for leaving out. Firstly, the section on wartime mobilization acknowledges that as a result of colonial rule, many Koreans were assigned to factories in Hiroshima and were present during the bombing.⁴⁶ Moving into the post-war period, a section on the movement of people in the immediate aftermath of the war states that “Koreans who had been living in Hiroshima for various reasons returned to their home country,” along with the many Japanese who had been in Manchuria or elsewhere in Japan’s empire returned to Japan.⁴⁷ The museum also covers the issue of medical support for overseas and Korean *hibakusha* in two principle sections entitled “A-bomb Survivors Living Overseas” and “Medical Support for A-bomb Survivors in Korea,” respectively. The former discusses how *hibakusha* living overseas, including Japanese who emigrated after the war, were initially excluded from eligibility to receive support covered by the Japanese government and the latter focuses specifically on Korean victims in Korea’s initial difficulty in receiving medical support.⁴⁸ Additionally, testimonies from two Korean *hibakusha* living in Hiroshima that were filmed in the late 1980s are available through the Peace Database maintained by the museum. In the testimonies, Kan Munhi, 26 years old at the time of the bombing, discusses the discrimination faced by Koreans living in Hiroshima during the war years while Kwak Bok-soon, to my knowledge of no relation to direct Kwak Kwi-Hoon, who was 16 years old at the time of the bombing visits the Cenotaph to Korean Victims at its

⁴⁶ Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, “Mobilized Civilians,” accessed November 15, 2019, http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=DocumentView&document_id=91&lang=eng.

⁴⁷ Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, “The War Ends, People Move,” accessed November 15, 2019, http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=DocumentView&document_id=105&lang=eng.

⁴⁸ Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, “A-bomb Survivors Living Overseas,” accessed November 15, 2019, http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=DocumentView&document_id=135&lang=eng. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, “Medical Support for A-bomb Survivors in Korea,” accessed November 15, 2019, http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=DocumentView&document_id=147&lang=eng.

former location outside the park.⁴⁹ The most recent renovation also removed the aforementioned controversial display of clothing on mannequins made to resemble victims with their skin melting off and overall has moved to focus primarily on the victims and the artifacts left behind.⁵⁰

While the museum now provides a much more comprehensive depiction of the bombing, its context, and the aftermath and how different groups of people were affected, there is much about the experience of Korean victims that is either omitted from the discussion or is severely abbreviated. The significance of Kwak Kwi-Hoon is one notable example of this. In the caption of the section on medical support for overseas *hibakusha*, it is stated that in 1980 overseas *hibakusha* were allowed to come to Japan to receive medical treatment covered by the Japanese government and that in 2001 changes were made to allow survivors residing overseas to apply for an Atomic Bomb Survivor's Certificate overseas and to receive medical treatment overseas as well.⁵¹ The change in 1980 is the result of a court case brought by Korean *hibakusha* Son Jin-Doo in which he won the right to medical treatment, but the medical treatment had to be in Japan. The 2001 changes allowing survivors to receive treatment overseas is the result of a case brought by Kwak Kwi-Hoon, however, which neither his profile nor the section on medical treatment for overseas *hibakusha* mentions.⁵² As a result of the changes made after the ruling on Kwak's case, which went to the Japanese high court, there are now over three thousand health card holders outside of Japan, most of them in South Korea.⁵³ Kwak is also one of the founding members of the South Korean Atomic

⁴⁹ "Survivor Testimonies," Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum: Peace Database, accessed December 7, 2019, http://a-bombdb.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/pdbe/search/col_testify.

⁵⁰ Sonoko Miyazaki, "Revamped peace museum offers personal look at A-bomb victims," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 24, 2019, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201904240061.html>.

⁵¹ HPMM, "A-bomb Survivors Overseas."

⁵² "Japan compensates Korean A-bomb victim," *BBC News*, June 1, 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1364728.stm>; Andreas Hippin, "The end of silence: Korea's Hiroshima," *The Japan Times*, August 2, 2005, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2005/08/02/issues/the-end-of-silence-koreas-hiroshima/#.XeateZNKg_V.

⁵³ Keita Nakamura, "Foreign hibakusha speaking out as museum dedicates section to them," *Kyodo News*, June 17, 2019, accessed November 15, 2019, <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/06/79e44ff2701d-feature-foreign-hibakusha-speaking-out-as-museum-dedicates-section-to-them.html>.

Bomb Sufferers Association and has been outspoken on the issues facing Korean *hibakusha* both within South Korea and in Japan.⁵⁴

Korean *Hibakusha* in South Korea

Not unlike other groups that were, in one way or another, victims of Japanese imperialism, Korean *hibakusha* were relatively silent for many years. Korean victims of the atomic bombings were not discussed in the many years of negotiations between the Japanese and South Korean governments leading to normalization in 1965, nor have they received much attention in the decades since.⁵⁵ Kwak Kwi-Hoon's own hypothesis for the silence of the Korean government is that there was pressure from the United States' government to not bring up the issue as doing so would likely conflict with the American orthodox view that the bombs were necessary to end the war. At the same time the general view of the Korean public that the bombs ended the war and restored Korean independence and when Kwak attempted to bring up the plight of the Korean *hibakusha*, he was told it was "a necessary sacrifice for the country to win its liberty."⁵⁶ My own view on the Korean government's neglect to bring up Korean bomb victims in normalization negotiations is that Park Chung Hee was much more concerned with industrialization and other related policies and, thus, willing to let the grievances of individual victims or groups of victims go by the wayside, an attitude that has also led to the continued issue of comfort women. Additionally, just as many Korean survivors within Japan did not disclose their Korean heritage due to fears of racial discrimination, many of the those who returned to Korea in the aftermath faced discrimination for having lived in Japan. Many of those who returned to Korea were labeled collaborators and many young people who had grown up primarily in Japan also faced difficulties

⁵⁴ Junji Akechi, "Kwak Kwi Hoon, honorary president of the South Korean Atomic Bomb Sufferers Association, speaks in Hiroshima," *The Chugoku Shimbun*, June 13, 2009, <http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=19815>.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

for their poor Korean language skills.⁵⁷ Many *hibakusha* with visible scarring from the bombing were also discriminated against and those that did not were loath to disclose their *hibakusha* background due to fears of it affecting marriage prospects.⁵⁸ Korean *hibakusha* in Korea thus share many similarities with comfort women, those women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese Imperial Army, but have had very different experiences in how they have been used politically by the South Korean government.

While the comfort women have often been used as a political instrument by the South Korean government, especially since the 1990s, Korean *hibakusha* have not. As discussed above, many comfort women did not disclose their past experiences for fear of the social repercussions until the 1990s, when many began to come forward and demand compensation and apology from the Japanese government. In the years since, there have been several apologies by the Japanese government as well as several attempts at reaching an agreement between the South Korean and Japanese governments, with the most recent in 2015 under the Park Geun-hye administration, which was later rejected by the Moon administration after Park's impeachment.⁵⁹ The issue of comfort women has also received significant attention globally, with the United States House of Representatives passing a resolution in 2007 calling on the Japanese government to "formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery" during the Asia-Pacific War.⁶⁰ Korean *hibakusha* have, in comparison, received very little attention both in Japan and

⁵⁷ Hippin, "Korea's Hiroshima"; "Residents at South Korean facility for A-bomb survivors recall childhood in Japan," *The Mainichi*, Feb. 7, 2016, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160207/p2a/00m/0na/018000c>.

⁵⁸ Hippin, "Korea's Hiroshima."

⁵⁹ For a full list of apologies made by the Japanese government regarding wartime events, there is a Wikipedia article that has collated all apologies. See "List of war apology statements issued by Japan," Wikipedia, accessed Dec. 8, 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_war_apology_statements_issued_by_Japan

⁶⁰ U.S. Congress, House, *A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as*

Korea and abroad and as a result the impetus for many of the changes have been the result of either individual *hibakusha* or of groups both in Korea and Japan, such as the Korean atomic Bomb Sufferers Association founded by Kwak or the Mindan and Sören groups in Japan, and much of the focus on the changes in the Hiroshima Museum has been on maintaining the memory of the Korean *hibakusha*.

Ongoing Questions

There are several questions that continue to be discussed with regard to the events of World War II and its end. Many of these are relating to memory, such as where the responsibility lies for maintaining memory of atrocities and events of the past. These conversations happen not just in regard to events in the Pacific theater but also surrounding the Holocaust and events in Europe. Just this week German Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed the importance of remembering the crimes committed by Germany in the Holocaust during a visit to Auschwitz so that such events never happen again.⁶¹ Similar rhetoric of “never again” is often used in relation to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and formed much of the initial impetus for the creation of the museum initially. This has resulted in the “Japan as victim”—“Japan as aggressor” debate that has formed much of the controversy surrounding the museum in the past and resulted in the changes to provide additional context in the renovations conducted in both the 1990s and the most recent renovations. In this discussion of memory and the maintenance of memory for future generations who did not personally experience the events, the stance of Korean *hibakusha* has overall been a desire to be included in the historical narrative and for it to be acknowledged that

"comfort women", during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II, H Res. 121, 110th Cong., passed July 30, 2007, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-resolution/12>.

⁶¹ Colin Dwyer, “Merkel Tours Auschwitz With ‘Sense Of Shame’ And Warns Of Resurgent Anti-Semitism,” NPR, December 6, 2019, <https://www.npr.org/2019/12/06/785572011/merkel-tours-auschwitz-with-sense-of-shame-and-warns-of-resurgent-anti-semitism>.

they were also in Hiroshima during the bombing and that the reason they were there was because of the Japanese Empire, whether due to a search for better opportunities in the context of colonialism or more directly due to conscription. The addition of the section on foreign victims in the museum is thus crucial to bringing awareness of their existence to a wider audience.⁶² While the comfort women issue has in general been focused on the issue of an apology and, possibly, compensation, the Korean *hibakusha* have focused more on obtaining medical support and an acknowledgement of their existence. This is likely the reason there has been less of a discussion on whether there is a time limit on the issue.

Regardless of what form it would take, that there is a time limit on a Japanese apology with regard to the government's role in comfort women is often discussed. As most of the surviving comfort women are now in their eighties or nineties, their being alive and accepting an apology is considered by activists and others to be necessary for the apology to be successful.⁶³ Additionally, for the surviving comfort women, an acceptable apology must contain an admission of the culpability of the Japanese government for the coercion of women as official policy and it is mainly for this reason that earlier apologies have been deemed unacceptable.⁶⁴ This disconnect on what constitutes an acceptable apology has produced an ongoing issue where the Japanese government takes the stance that it has already apologized multiple times and is unwilling to continue while the Korean side continues to demand an apology. This has often been used as a political instrument of the South Korean government in relations with Japan, which are currently at a low point after disagreements on trade relations earlier this year. Due to the different circumstances of Korean

⁶² Nakamura, "Foreign *Hibakusha* Speaking Out."

⁶³ John Smith and Haejin Choi, "South Korea's surviving 'comfort women' spend final years seeking atonement from Japan," Reuters, November 22, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-japan-comfortwomen/south-koreas-surviving-comfort-women-spend-final-years-seeking-atonement-from-japan-idUSKCN1NS024>.

⁶⁴ Flora Drury, "Obituary: Kim Bok-dong, the South Korean 'comfort woman'," BBC News, February 3, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47042684>.

hibakusha and also the relative lack of awareness of their existence within South Korea, there have not been such discussions surrounding the memory of Korean *hibakusha* in the wider discourse between South Korea and Japan.

Another ongoing question relating to the maintenance of memory is the case of the Korean *hibakusha* is what the museum's role should be. While it is logical that a museum dedicated to maintaining the memory of the atomic bombings and their victims should include all victims and not just those that are convenient for the desired narrative, as the museum now does following renovations, there is an outstanding question of how objective the museum should be in its portrayal of events. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum arguably has an overt goal in its mission: to maintain the memory of the horror and tragedy of the atomic bombings so that such an event never happens again. After nearly seventy-five years the museum now has a much broader discussion of the context of the bombings and of the victims of the bombings, who are now acknowledged to have different experiences. As mentioned earlier, however, the museum does not provide much information of the specific struggles foreign victims endured in order to receive that acknowledgement. The question thus remains, is it their duty to do so and, if so, what would that look like? Former comfort women have demanded an admission of guilt from the Japanese government for their role, but in the case of Korean *hibakusha*, is it the responsibility of the Hiroshima Museum to make a statement on who is culpable or does that responsibility rest with the Japanese government? Additionally, does some responsibility lie with the Korean government in maintaining the memory of Korean *hibakusha*? These are likely questions that will continue to be asked in the future.

Conclusion

How Japan has chosen to remember the Second World War has produced various controversies in the decades since 1945 ranging from the words used in high school textbooks to continued calls for apologies for wartime crimes. The way in which the war ended, with two atomic bombs dropped by the United States and its allies on Japanese cities and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war has produced some of this controversy as it resulted in a conflict between the narratives of Japan as an aggressor in the war and Japan as the only country to have had an atomic bomb dropped on it. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Museum has become a place where these debates have coalesced through subsequent renovations to the museum and additions to the park over the years. The ethnic Korean victims of the bombing present in Hiroshima at the time as a result of the Japanese colonization of the Korean peninsula, whether directly or indirectly, has been one such debate surrounding the maintenance of memory. This paper has discussed the controversies surrounding the memorial cenotaph to Korean victims of the bombing and the inclusion of the narratives of Korean and other foreign victims in the museum and also how they compare with other lingering issues stemming from policies of the Japanese government before and during the war, namely comfort women. With the most recent renovations to the museum, there is now the recognition that the atomic bombings were not something experienced solely by “Japanese” people and that others suffered as well. Is this enough? That is to be judged by those who experienced the bombing and the subsequent struggle for recognition. But it is certainly a step in the right direction to making sure that the events of the end of the Second World War are preserved for posterity in the hope that such an event never happens again.

Bibliographic Essay

I came to this topic as a result of a discussion with Professor Pyle near the beginning of the course when I expressed a desire to write on Koreans' experience of the bombing and was told that no one had yet written on the inclusion, or lack thereof, of Koreans in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. My subsequent research confirmed that there has been relatively little scholarly work done on the issue, though as the most recent renovations were only completed earlier this year there may be more in the future.

I therefore began my research with the website of the museum, as I was unable to physically visit the museum. A sitewide search for the word "Korea" yielded the various mentions of Koreans in Hiroshima before, on, and after August 6, 1945 and formed the bulk of the primary source materials used in this paper. Newspaper articles also proved a valuable resource in examining both the recent renovations as well as the various discussions that happened in the past and were used to trace the developments in how the museum has been perceived by the public over the years.

In examining the history of the museum itself, "The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and its Exhibition" by Stefanie Schäfer, a chapter in *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan* proved very valuable. The chapter contains discussion of the museum's inception as well as the various renovations conducted over the years and controversies surrounding them. This was very useful in seeing how the most recent renovation changed the exhibit.

In examining the controversy surrounding the Cenotaph for Korean Atomic Bomb Victims, the article "Identities Surrounding a Cenotaph for Korean Atomic Bomb Victims" by Yuko Takahashi was very useful. *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory* by Lisa Yoneyama contained a useful chapter on the cenotaph as well. These two sources were some of the few secondary sources I was able to find that related specifically to Korean atomic bomb

victims and for much of the paper I relied primarily on newspaper articles and on the museum's own sources made available online.

Notable for its absence, I was unable to find Korean language sources on Korean *hibakusha*, though I did use some articles from Korean newspapers or their English versions around the time of the controversy surrounding the Cenotaph. This lack of scholarly work on the issue would seem to corroborate the finding that the issues of Korean *hibakusha* are not very well known within Korea and that the issues that they face do not receive much attention, especially when compared with those of the comfort women which frequently appear in the news, and also speaks to the need to maintain the memory of Korean *hibakusha* for future generations.

Bibliography

- Akechi, Junji. "Kwak Kwi Hoon, honorary president of the South Korean Atomic Bomb Sufferers Association, speaks in Hiroshima." *The Chugoku Shimbun*, June 13, 2009. <http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=19815>.
- "Asian News; Hiroshima Shelves Plan to Move Cenotaph for Koreans." *Japan Economic Newswire*. August 4, 1990. <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SP7-D930-000F-P228-00000-00&context=1516831>.
- "Asian News; S. Korean Envoy Demands Cenotaph Be Placed Inside Park." *Japan Economic Newswire*. April 27, 1990. <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SP7-DFK0-000F-P23J-00000-00&context=1516831>.
- "Ceremony commemorates Korean victims of Hiroshima nuclear bombing." *EFE World News Service*, August 5, 2017. *Gale General OneFile* (accessed November 15, 2019). https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A499907801/ITOF?u=wash_main&sid=ITOF&xid=07dd5a0c.
- Dower, John W. "The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory." In *Hiroshima in History and Memory*, edited by Michael J. Hogan, 116-142. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Drury, Flora. "Obituary: Kim Bok-dong, the South Korean 'comfort woman'." BBC News. February 3, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47042684>.
- Duró, Ágata. "A Pioneer among the South Korean Atomic Bomb Victims: Significance of the Son Jin-doo Trial." *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding* 4, no. 2 (2016): 271-292.
- Duus, Peter. *The Abacus and the Sword*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- Dwyer, Colin. "Merkel Tours Auschwitz With 'Sense Of Shame' And Warns Of Resurgent Anti-Semitism." NPR. December 6, 2019. <https://www.npr.org/2019/12/06/785572011/merkel-tours-auschwitz-with-sense-of-shame-and-warns-of-resurgent-anti-semitism>.
- Ferguson, P.H. "Hiroshima No Longer Just a Victim New museum wing explores city's actions during war." *THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE*, August 6, 1994: A14. *NewsBank: Access World News – Historical and Current*. <https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-view?p=WORLDNEWS&docref=news/0EB4F609276933C4>.

- Gil, Yun-hyung. "The sad history of the memorial stone to Korean victims in Hiroshima Peace Park." *Hankyoreh*, May 13, 2016. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/743733.html.
- Haberman, Clyde. "Hapchon Journal; A Different Hiroshima Story: The Bitter Koreans." *The New York Times*, April 29, 1988. <https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/29/world/hapchon-journal-a-different-hiroshima-story-the-bitter-koreans.html>.
- Hippin, Andreas. "The end of silence: Korea's Hiroshima." *The Japan Times*, August 2, 2005. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2005/08/02/issues/the-end-of-silence-koreas-hiroshima/#.XeateZNKg_V.
- "Hiroshima museum unveils new items of A-bomb victims." *Kyodo News International, Inc.*, April 24, 2019. *NewsBank: Access World News – Historical and Current*. <https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/document-view?p=WORLDNEWS&docref=news/1730643924EA7C38>.
- Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. "A-bomb Survivors Living Overseas." Accessed November 15, 2019. http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=DocumentView&document_id=135&lang=eng.
- Ibid. "Away from Home." Accessed November 15, 2019. http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=ItemView&item_id=120&lang=eng.
- Ibid. "Kwak Kwi-Hoon." Accessed November 15, 2019. http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=DocumentView&document_id=468&lang=eng.
- Ibid. "Medical Support for A-bomb Survivors in Korea." Accessed November 15, 2019. http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=DocumentView&document_id=147&lang=eng.
- Ibid. "Mobilized Civilians." Accessed November 15, 2019. http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=DocumentView&document_id=91&lang=eng.
- Ibid. "Museum History." Accessed 17 November 2019. http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/info/index.php?action=PageView&page_id=67&lang=eng.
- Ibid. "The War Ends, People Move." Accessed November 15, 2019. http://hpmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=DocumentView&document_id=105&lang=eng.

“Japan compensates Korean A-bomb victim.” *BBC News*, June 1, 2001.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1364728.stm>.

Jung, Byung Wook. "Migrant Labor and Massacres: A Comparison of the 1923 Massacre of Koreans and Chinese during the Great Kanto Earthquake and the 1931 Anti-Chinese Riots and Massacre of Chinese in Colonial Korea." *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 6, no. 1 (2017): 177-204.

“Korean A-Bomb Victims Ignored in Japan.” *The Korea Times*, August 12, 1986.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1907242312?accountid=14784>.

Lewis, Neil A. "Smithsonian Substantially Alters Enola Gay Exhibit After Criticism." *New York Times*, Oct 01, 1994, Late Edition (East Coast).
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/429934338?accountid=14784>.

Miyazaki, Sonoko. “Revamped peace museum offers personal look at A-bomb victims.” *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 24, 2019.
<http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201904240061.html>.

Moon, Rennie. “Koreans in Japan.” SPICE–Stanford University (2010). Accessed December 5, 2019. https://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/koreans_in_japan.

Moosa, Eugene. “Hiroshima Divided Over Monuments: 45 Years after World’s First Atomic Attack.” *The Korea Times*, August 7, 1990.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1922440127?accountid=14784>.

“Monument dedicated to Korean Victims and Survivors.” *Explore Hiroshima*. Accessed November 16, 2019. <https://www.hiroshima-navi.or.jp/en/post/007263.html>.

“Nagasaki Korean Atomic Bomb Victims' Memorial.” Nagasaki City – Peace and Atomic Bomb. Accessed December 8, 2019.
https://nagasakipeace.jp/english/map/zone_inori/tsuito_chosenjin_giseisha.html.

Nakamura, Keita. “Foreign hibakusha speaking out as museum dedicates section to them.” *Kyodo News*, June 17, 2019. Accessed November 15, 2019.
<https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/06/79e44ff2701d-feature-foreign-hibakusha-speaking-out-as-museum-dedicates-section-to-them.html>.

Oda, Shigeru. "The Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea." *The American Journal of International Law* 61, no. 1 (1967): 35-56. doi:10.2307/2196830.

Reid, T.R. “War anniversary reopens debate on Japan’s culpability in conflict.” *The Washington Post*, August 15, 1994.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/08/15/war-anniversary-reopens-debate-on-japans-culpability-in-conflict/eab7e005-b7f2-47de-9101-f4731f9553e2/>.

- “Residents at South Korean facility for A-bomb survivors recall childhood in Japan.” *The Mainichi*, February 7, 2016.
<https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160207/p2a/00m/0na/018000c>.
- Schäfer, Stefanie. “The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and its Exhibition.” In *The Power of Memory in Modern Japan*, edited by Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker, 155-170. Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2008.
- Smith, John and Haejin Choi. “South Korea's surviving 'comfort women' spend final years seeking atonement from Japan.” Reuters. November 22, 2018.
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-japan-comfortwomen/south-koreas-surviving-comfort-women-spend-final-years-seeking-atonement-from-japan-idUSKCN1NS024>.
- “Survivor Testimonies,” Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum: Peace Database, accessed December 7, 2019. http://a-bombdb.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/pdbe/search/col_testify.
- Takahashi, Yuko. "Identities Surrounding a Cenotaph for Korean Atomic Bomb Victims." *Korean Studies* 42 (2018): 64-90. *Gale OneFile: Diversity Studies* (accessed November 15, 2019).
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A544710432/PPDS?u=wash_main&sid=PPDS&xid=675bcc2c.
- "Text of The Treaty.: Signed by The Emperor of Japan And Czar of Russia." *New York Times* (1857-1922), October 17, 1905.
<https://search.proquest.com/docview/96567202?accountid=14784>.
- Tong, Kurt W. "Koreas Forgotten Atomic-Bomb Victims." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 23, no. 1 (1991): 31-37.
- U.S. Congress, House. *A resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as "comfort women", during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II.* H Res. 121. 110th Cong. Passed July 30, 2007.
<https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-resolution/12>.
- Yoneyama, Lisa. *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- Yoneyama, Lisa. “Memory Matters: Hiroshima’s Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity.” *Public Culture* 7 (1995): 499-527.