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TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR [Redacted]

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CONCUR IN DISSEMINATION OF REF REPORT. SUGGEST FOLLOWING
REGARDING LEFTIST MILITARY OFFICERS, WE DOUBT
THAT THIS RELATIVELY MINOR ELEMENT COULD EXERT SIGNIFICANT
INFLUENCE OVER THE NEAR TERM. IT IS ALSO DOUBTFUL THAT
COLONEL SIGIFREDO OCHOA PEREZ WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN AS HEAD
OF THE ARMED FORCES, DESPITE HIS CONNECTIONS IN RIGHTIST
POLITICAL CIRCLES. MOST SALVADORAN FIELD-GRADE OFFICERS DID
NOT ENDORSE OCHOA'S EARLY JANUARY REBELLION AND REGARD OCHOA
AS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AND OVERLY POLITICAL. WE DISAGREE ON THE
EXTENT OF SUPPORT FOR GENERAL GARCIA WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE
LESS THAN 40 PERCENT OF THE OFFICER CORPS. FOR FURTHER DETAILS
ON INCREASING ARMED FORCES SENTIMENT THAT GARCIA SHOULD RESIGN
AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE, [Redacted]

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