

notions of human motivation. Indeed, the communal riots were a major factor, Ranadive later explained, in persuading the radical wing to join Joshi and rally behind the two governments.²¹ But whether the CPI's reaction was the result of confused panic or of tactical calculation, its logical course was to seek a stronger role among the anti-communal political forces. Accordingly, Joshi cast off all restraint; proclaiming to both the Indian and Pakistani governments that the CPI would support them, he declared, "It is the duty of us all to rally wholeheartedly and enthusiastically behind them and pledge them all our support."²²

As a sign of its loyalty the Party went so far as to repress the mass agitation that it had itself set in motion earlier. The Tebhaga movement provides a noteworthy example. This movement, which the CPI had promoted in Bengal a year earlier, expressed a peasant demand for a larger share of the crops. It had gained great momentum, but in the fall of 1947 the Party's foremost Bengali leader, Bhowani Sen, declared, "We appeal to the peasants not to launch direct action this year as they did last year." Explaining, he said that the new government "must be given an opportunity of fulfilling its promises through legal channels."²³

In general, however, it became increasingly apparent that the CPI's deference was not to the new Indian government but rather to one man: Nehru. In October, the Party called Nehru the "voice of the people," and it proposed a "joint front from Pandit Nehru to the Socialists and Communists."²⁴ In November the Party urged Congress's rank and file to strengthen the prime minister's hand for "progressive reorganization of the Government."²⁵ And on Nehru's birthday, the CPI sent greetings which asserted that he "alone kept the democratic traditions of the national movement alive" during the past months. This birthday message resounded with uncritical praise, and it concluded with the eager hope that Nehru would become "India's Premier No. 1 who set her on the road to Socialism and prosperity."²⁶

Thus it became clear that the CPI distinguished between the progressive Nehru and the rest of the government, and focused all its aspirations on liberalizing the government through strengthening the prime minister. This tactic was plainly set forth in a statement attributed to R. Palme Dutt by the Socialist leader, Madhu Limaye. Ac-

²¹ *Ibid.*; Supplement (March 21, 1948), p. 4.

²² P. C. Joshi, "The Punjab Riots," *Labour Monthly*, XXIX (Oct., 1947), p. 315.

²³ *People's Age*, VI (Nov. 30, 1947), p. 10.

²⁴ *Ibid.* (Oct. 12, 1947), p. 5; and (Oct. 19, 1947), p. 1.

²⁵ *Ibid.* (Nov. 30, 1947), p. 16.

²⁶ *Ibid.* (Nov. 9, 1947), p. 3.

ording to Limaye, Dutt told him in a personal interview in November, 1947:

Your talk about leaving the Congress is untimely and mistaken and you should not only remain in the Congress but agitate for the re-admittance of the Communists into the national organization. The Congress is now divided into two camps, the progressive camp led by Pandit Nehru, Sheikh Abdulla and others, and the reactionary bloc led by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. It is the supreme duty of all of us to support Nehru. If Nehru offers you seats on his cabinet, you should readily accept the offer.²⁷

Thus the CPI and its tutor, R. Palme Dutt, continued almost to the end of 1947 to judge Nehru worthy of left-wing support and amenable to left-wing influence. They apparently were confident that, with Communist backing, the prime minister would rout the more conservative forces in his government and bring progressive elements into the seats of power. All this, a full five months after the Soviet authorities in Moscow had pronounced precisely the opposite verdict on Nehru, shrugging him aside as a "rich man" and condemning his regime as "reactionary."

The CPI Declares War on Nehru

The surrender of the radical faction of the CPI to Joshi's moderate line proved to be only temporary. Although it was apparently inhibited by the communal civil war, the leftist element again began to grow restive soon after the achievement of independence. Joshi's line continued to prevail officially, but from about mid-August articles by Ranadive began to appear more frequently in the Party press, sounding a harsher note alongside Joshi's lyrical passages. For example, in the midst of the Party's celebrations on Independence Day itself, Ranadive warned in *People's Age* that the Nehru government was "compromising" and that it was "developing authoritarian attributes."²⁸

One can only speculate about the precise reasons for the reemergence of radical sentiment within the CPI. However, it is probably not a coincidence that in mid-August another influence, hitherto unrepresented, began to appear in Indian Communist publications—an influence bound to stir militancy. In its third issue, which appeared on about August 15, the CPI theoretical journal, *Communist*, began to print articles written by leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party.²⁹

²⁷ Madhu Limaye, *Communist Party: Facts and Fiction* (Hyderabad: Chetana Prakashan Ltd., 1951), p. 57.

²⁸ *People's Age*, VI (Aug. 15, 1947), p. 20.

²⁹ "Character of the New Democratic State in Yugoslavia," *Communist*, I (Sept., 1947). This is described as an editorial reprinted from the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, *Communist* (Jan., 1947).

From later testimony of CPI leaders, it is clear that the Party was already aware of Kardelj's radical article on Communist policy in the colonies. Indeed, by the end of 1947 the Indian Communists published this document in pamphlet form.³⁰ In Kardelj's view that the bourgeoisie as a whole had turned reactionary and must be met with violent revolution, the hotbloods of the CPI probably found the encouragement they needed for shaking off the uncongenial policy of loyal opposition to Nehru.

However, domestic factors were also at work in rousing radical sentiment in the CPI, and that sentiment now found much broader support among the rank and file. In the first place, it is likely that the Party's veterans were so thoroughly conditioned to militancy that they could not gracefully adjust to the role of loyal opposition in free India. In the second place, the membership as a whole evidently tended to blame the Joshi line for difficulties which confronted them in many of the Party's mass activities. In the trade-union, peasant, student, and women's movements, the CPI had seen its strength steadily ebbing since the war, as Congress and Socialist organizers returned to action after long imprisonment. The Party now faced a serious problem in these fields; in the trade-union sphere, for example, it was witnessing the formation of a rival federation, the Indian National Trade Union Congress, sponsored by the Congress with the express intent of giving battle to the Communist-dominated All-India Trade Union Congress. In these circumstances, Communist labor leaders could not be expected to enjoy turning the other cheek through a policy of loyalty to the Congress government. The natural reflex of Party stalwarts in this and other fields was to demand a more aggressive policy. Moreover it is likely that the rank and file began to perceive more sharply the revolutionary potentialities in the anxious and disordered Indian political scene.

The main factor, however, in inner-Party dissatisfaction with Joshi's moderation was no doubt the example of the success of a more militant line in Telengana. Telengana, as has been mentioned, is in the eastern half of the princely state of Hyderabad, comprising eight districts and an area of 44,000 square miles, and populated mainly by the Telugu-speaking people. Under the despotism of the Nizam of Hyderabad, a notoriously oppressive semifeudal agrarian system had been perpetuated, and as a result the peasantry was ripe for radical leadership. Beginning during the war with the capture of the Andhra Mahasabha, formerly a reformist cultural-political organization tolerated by the Nizam because of its moderation, the Telengana Communists

³⁰ See footnote 11.

gradually set in motion a genuinely indigenous mass campaign against the landlords and the state autocracy, concentrated in the two districts of Nalgonda and Warangal. By mid-1946 this movement assumed the proportions of active revolt in scattered localities, as armed volunteer village brigades began to form for resistance against the authority of the Nizam. It was obvious that a chain reaction of village insurrections might be ignited at any moment. Up to this point the Communists had professed moderate goals; under directions from the central CPI leadership they did not encourage outright revolt. Their demands were limited to the abolition of "illegal exactions" and other excesses perpetrated by the landlords. Moreover, they pledged to support Hyderabad's accession to India, and they maintained at least the façade of collaboration with the Congress organization in the state. Communist policy was thus aimed against the state autocracy rather than the central government. Yet the intense particularism of the Telugu-speaking people, added to the peasant discontent, made them a tempting base for an attack on the government.³¹

Whatever the reasons, a radical propensity began to reassert itself in the CPI, and Joshi found himself under increasing criticism. He was attacked as a "petty-bourgeois reformist" and accused of installing too many of his own supporters—many of them youths just back from British universities—in positions of power in the Party bureaucracy.³² As further news of the leftist trend in the international Communist movement reached India, it found a growing faction in the CPI eager to seize upon it as sanction for ousting Joshi and reversing the Party's course.

Apparently, the first clear statement of the radical international line came to the Indian Communists in the reports of the first Cominform meeting, held in Poland in September, 1947. The major speech of the meeting, delivered by Zhdanov, gave additional support to the Indian radicals. Zhdanov asserted that the weakening of the imperialist states had aggravated the "crisis of the colonial system." In desperation the imperialist powers resorted to several devices to maintain the subjection of the colonies, he said. They had tried to crush the national movements by force, producing colonial wars such as those in Indonesia and Viet Nam. Or they had erected a Red bogey to justify their continued power; in this way, he said, "they are seeking to keep India and China under the sway of imperialism and in continued political

³¹ This description of the situation in Telengana is drawn primarily from the following sources: "On Telengana," Information Document No. 7 (2) (Politburo, Communist Party of India, Oct. 7, 1950), pp. 1-5; and *The Hyderabad Problem: The Next Step* (Bombay: Hyderabad Struggle Committee, Socialist Party, 1948), pp. 70-77.

³² Interview in India with a former member of CPI.

and economic bondage." In the current international situation, he declared, "the chief danger to the working class . . . lies in underrating its own strength and overrating the strength of the enemy." Communist parties must therefore lead national resistance to "the plans of imperialist expansion and aggression along every line."³³ Zhdanov said nothing more about India, but the radicals in the CPI, assuming that the Nehru government had aligned itself with imperialism, read his speech as a call to arms against that government.³⁴

Zhdanov did indeed sanction an intensified anti-imperialist campaign in the colonies which, in the Russian view, meant an attack on the Nehru government, but he did not openly sanction an all-out anti-capitalist strategy. In fact, he concluded his speech with emphasis on "democratic" Communist aims, and he did not specify that the bourgeoisie had turned reactionary.

But in another speech at this meeting, given by Kardelj, the Indian radicals found clear sanction for an anticapitalist strategy: in this address Kardelj made a powerful statement of the view that the democratic and socialist revolutions must "intertwine," and that the Communists must therefore attack the bourgeoisie as a whole. It was to this speech that the CPI radicals paid the most eager attention; extracts from it, together with parts of Marshall Tito's main report to the Yugoslav Party's Second Congress, were reprinted in the official CPI journal.³⁵ According to a later inner-Party account of this period by Ajoy Ghosh, the Indian radicals regarded Kardelj as the greatest Marxist thinker outside Russia; Ghosh claims that Kardelj's writings "most powerfully influenced me and others who were fighting against Joshism," and that Ranadive hailed them as "showing us the correct Marxist revolutionary path."³⁶

The impact of Yugoslav influence on the CPI was apparently reinforced by one other event: a trip made by the Party's principal labor leader, S. A. Dange, who went to Prague for a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions. Little is known about Dange's activities except that he toured Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., but he apparently served on his return as a carrier of the Yugoslav line; R. Palme Dutt later referred to him as "one of the main vehicles for Titoite political influence" in the CPI.³⁷ Since Dange must have made

³³ A. Zhdanov, *The International Situation* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), pp. 11, 16, 46-47.

³⁴ Interview in India with a former member of the CPI.

³⁵ *Communist*, I (Jan., 1948), pp. 313-319; 334-340.

³⁶ Prabodh Chandra, [Ajoy Ghosh?], "On 'A Note on the Present Situation in Our Party,'" *PHQ Open Forum*, No. 12 (Oct., 1949), pp. 3-4.

³⁷ Deven and Bal Krishna, "Talks with Comrade R. Palme Dutt and Other Impressions Gained Abroad by Deven and Bal Krishna," *PHQ Unit*, Jan. 6, 1951, p. 4.

contact with other leaders of international communism, it seems likely that he received their approval for, or at least their acquiescence in, applying the "Titoite" line in India.

In any event, the CPI acted as though it had conclusive international sanction for a new line. In the second week of December, 1947, the Indian Central Committee met in Bombay, and the radical faction challenged Joshi. If the radicals had required another argument to bolster their opposition, they could have found it in the fact that the Congress government of Bombay, to which Joshi urged loyal opposition, had only a week earlier announced severe restrictions on the content of the Communist press.³⁸ But the radical faction was already well-armed; Ranadive secured majority support for his line and displaced Joshi as the real leader of the Party.

In a new resolution, the Central Committee announced a complete reversal of the Party's course.³⁹ The resolution denounced as "opportunism" the assumption made by Joshi and Dutt that the Nehru government could be influenced by popular pressure or that it might even be reorganized to include leftist forces. Instead, the resolution called for an uncompromising struggle against the government. Following Zhdanov's thesis that the world was now divided into two hostile camps, it declared that Nehru's policy "is only leading to subservience to the Anglo-American Imperialist Camp." Indian big business, it said, had come to an agreement with imperialism, and the bourgeois government was backing up this "reactionary" policy. Thus, the resolution concluded, "the national bourgeois leadership will be increasingly forced to submit to the imperialist domination and the common toiling people will be forced to submit to the leadership of the upper classes, namely the national leadership." To meet this situation, the resolution called for unity among the "workers and peasants and progressive intellectuals" in a campaign to unseat the bourgeois leadership.

So far as the CPI was concerned, then, the long debate of 1946-47—for or against the Nehru government, for or against the Indian bourgeoisie—was concluded. The Indian Communists, though they did not seem yet to understand its full import, had made the crucial decision for an all-out political attack on Nehru under a thorough-going anti-capitalist orientation. The cold war had reached India.

The Russian academicians had long before reached agreement on the debate concerning Nehru, but the evidence suggests that at the end of 1947, and even after, they were still in disagreement on the

³⁸ *People's Age*, VI (Dec. 7, 1947), p. 1.

³⁹ *Communist Statement of Policy: For the Struggle for Full Independence and People's Democracy* (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1947), 14 pp.

second part of the debate—for or against the Indian bourgeoisie. In December and January, 1947–48, Zhukov, Dyakov, and Balabushevich expressed their views at length in the Russian journals, and in these views there was still no agreed strategy for Indian communism.

In the December issue of *Bolshevik* Zhukov said that in the colonies as a whole it was the big bourgeoisie which had betrayed national interests by coming to terms with imperialism; therefore, he declared, “in many countries” of Asia the middle bourgeoisie could be an ally of the working class. He applied this thesis to countries such as Viet Nam and Indonesia where colonial wars were being waged, but he did not expressly apply it to India. Indeed, in discussing India his view of the bourgeois classes was ambiguous; he condemned the “Indian bourgeoisie” for aspiring to neutralism in international affairs, but in a later passage Zhukov declared that the “bourgeois nationalists,” or “national-reformists,” were Britain’s “second line of defence” in India. But in defining the tasks of the CPI he did not even hint at an anti-capitalist strategy, and in fact he seemed to stress the relative weakness of the Party, as though to caution it against revolutionary adventurism.⁴⁰

Dyakov and Balabushevich both held firm to their position that the bourgeoisie had turned reactionary.⁴¹ However, Balabushevich betrayed the fact that he was trailing behind events rather than anticipating them by declaring that the Mountbatten Plan represented a real concession and was therefore a “step ahead” for India—an echo of the Joshi line which was patently incongruous in his analysis. This fact, along with Zhukov’s apparent unwillingness to commit himself, seems to indicate that the Russians did not have an agreed strategy for the Indian situation. The result, whether intentional or not, was that guidance of the CPI fell to the Cominform, and thus to the Yugoslavs.

The CPI Second Congress

With or without express sanction from the Russian authorities, the Ranadive radicals now controlled the Central Committee of the Party. On the charge of factionalism, they began to purge the Party bureaucracy of all who stood by the Joshi line. In addition, in order to formalize their control and to mobilize the Party behind the new line, they decided to hold an All-India Party Congress—the second in

⁴⁰ E. Zhukov, “Obostrenie krizisa kolonial’noi sistemy” [The Sharpening of the Crisis of the Colonial System], *Bolshevik* (Dec. 15, 1947), pp. 51–65.

⁴¹ A. Dyakov, “Partitioned India,” *New Times* (Jan. 14, 1948), pp. 3–10; V. Balabushevich, “Indiia posle razdela” [India After Partition], *Mirovooe khoziaistvo . . .*, (Dec. 1947), pp. 41–63.

the CPI’s history. At the Committee’s December meeting a subcommittee was appointed to draft a comprehensive political resolution for distribution within the CPI, and a list of nominations for a new Central Committee was drawn up for submission to the Party Congress. Members of the Central Committee went back to their bailiwicks and hastily convened provincial Party conferences to discuss the draft resolution and elect delegates for the Congress. Thus with strong direction from the top, the Party machinery operated rapidly and effectively to rally the organization. On February 28, 1948, only two and one-half months after the December decision, the Party Congress convened in Calcutta.⁴²

Attending the meeting was the core of the Party. Of the 632 delegates on hand, according to the Party press, 565 were “whole-timers” or “professional revolutionaries”—that is, Party functionaries and organizers. A total of 919 delegates had been elected, *People’s Age* said, but many were not able to attend. From Telengana, 75 delegates were supposed to come to Calcutta, but only four or five managed to make the trip. Also in attendance, according to the Party press, were fraternal delegations from Australia, Burma, Ceylon, and, finally, Yugoslavia. There was no official representative of the British Party and none from the Soviet Union.

Later inner-Party accounts of the Congress make it clear that the comrades from Australia, Burma, and Ceylon were merely passive spectators. However, the Yugoslav delegates—Vladimir Dedijer and Radoven Zokovic—played an exceedingly active part, as though with the authority of the international Communist movement. According to Ajoy Ghosh, they tutored the Indian delegates in the thesis of the “intertwined” revolutions under an anticapitalist strategy. They also argued, at the Congress, for the tactic of a monolithic party front in India, on the order of that created by the party in Yugoslavia. Some Indian leaders recognized that such a tactic was unrealistic in India, given CPI weakness, but as Ghosh said, “otherwise, we swallowed all that the Yugoslavs told us.” Comrade Sharkey from Australia, reported Ghosh, did not object to the adoption of the Yugoslav advice; the theories of Chinese communism were mentioned by no one.⁴³

Basing his line squarely on the Yugoslav views, Ranadive was in command of the Congress from the outset. The first major event of the session was his report on the draft resolution, and it established

⁴² The following account of the proceedings of the CPI Second Congress, which were held in camera, is drawn primarily from the official report in the Party press: *People’s Age: Supplement*, VI (March 21, 1948); and *ibid.* (March 14, 1948).

⁴³ Prabodh Chandra, “On ‘A Note . . .,’” p. 5.

the tone of the Congress. Ranadive declared that the Indian bourgeoisie was lining up with the Anglo-American imperialist camp, which was locked in "irreconcilable conflict" with the democratic camp led by the Soviet Union. Accordingly, he said, the Party must lead the struggle for "people's democracy," in which the fight for democracy "gets intertwined with the fight for Socialism." In other words, the Party must lead the "fight for rallying the majority of the people against capitalism." Toward this end, he said, the Party must build a "people's democratic front" representing an alliance from below among the working class, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie, along with the progressive intelligentsia.

Beyond reciting the anti-capitalist strategy, Ranadive strongly implied that his violent terminology would be accompanied in certain areas by violent tactics. Whereas the Joshi leadership had ignored the agrarian insurrections in Telengana, Ranadive seized on them as symbols of the new stage upon which the Party was entering. In Telengana, he said, "we took the struggle to new qualitative heights with exemplary organization." In conclusion he declared, "Telengana today means Communists and Communists mean Telengana."

In the second major speech at the Congress, Bhowani Sen, who was to become Ranadive's principal lieutenant, delivered a fuller statement of the new tactics. This speech represented a crucial revision of the nationality policy which the Party had pursued from 1942 to 1948; now the CPI declared that self-determination must be accomplished, not by the whole population of a given nationality, but by revolutionary action of the working class and its allies. Condemning the earlier policy as exemplified in Kashmir, where the Party had supported Sheikh Abdullah's pro-Indian movement and had even supported formal accession to India rather than to Pakistan, Sen asserted that Telengana provided the new model for CPI policy. Revolution must come first—not only in the princely states which had not yet been formally integrated into either India or Pakistan, but throughout the subcontinent.

The real solution to this question is on the field of battle. The heroic people of Telengana, the great example of their fight against autocracy, not only show what will happen inside the States, but also what will be the real future of India and Pakistan. That is the way the victorious people must march to freedom and real democracy. . . . We must be proud to say that here at least there is the force that will achieve Indian liberation.⁴⁴

In fact, sentiment in favor of the Telengana movement was so strong that the delegates from that area were able to secure adoption of a

⁴⁴ *People's Age: Supplement*, VI (March 21, 1948), p. 3.

spontaneous resolution expressing full support of their movement.

The main reports to the Congress were followed by a one-hour address in which P. C. Joshi, the deposed leader, performed the ritual of self-criticism. Joshi confessed that he had "confused and corrupted" the Party, acting as a "betrayer," a "coward," a "petty-bourgeois vacillator," an "arch bureaucrat," and "the embodiment of right reformism." He denounced his entire career as a leader, even declaring that at the beginning he had been "a student intellectual thrown into Party leadership by the accident of history."⁴⁵

However, when the retiring Central Committee presented its official nominations for a new Committee, Joshi's name was on the list along with a majority of the old members and nearly an equal number of new members. But the delegates to the Congress were evidently convinced by Joshi's self-condemnation, for he alone among the official nominees was not elected. The new Central Committee immediately elected B. T. Ranadive as general secretary, thereby formalizing the change which had taken place two and one-half months earlier.

Other business transacted by the CPI Second Congress included a long debate on the main political resolution, the "Political Thesis," submitted by the leadership. Already amendments had been incorporated into this resolution by the drafting commission, after inner-Party discussion of the earlier draft. However, the Congress delegates further criticized details of the document with "vigour and firmness," according to the Party press. At the end of the discussion, Ranadive called upon the Congress to adopt the resolution without change and to entrust the Central Committee with amending it afterward in accordance with the views expressed by the delegates. This proposal was accepted, and the resolution was adopted unanimously. The Political Thesis ran to ninety-five pages in the pamphlet edition published later, and it constituted a comprehensive statement of the new line.⁴⁶ In its essentials it declared that a "revolutionary upsurge" was in motion in India, and that the final phase of the revolution, the phase of "armed clashes," had arrived. This "people's democratic revolution," it said, involved "the completion of the tasks of democratic revolution and the simultaneous building up of Socialism." The Party must mobilize the working class, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie against imperialism and capitalism. The Nehru government, according to the thesis, represented the interests of the Indian national bourgeoisie; this

⁴⁵ "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India on P. C. Joshi's Appeal Against Expulsion," June 5, 1950 [typed copy], p. 4.

⁴⁶ *Political Thesis; Adopted at the Second Congress, Calcutta, February 28-March 6, 1948* (Bombay: Communist Party of India, 1948), 95 pp.

government must be attacked by a new democratic front, a "genuine fighting alliance of the masses."

If there was any doubt of the concrete meaning of this document, it was dispelled for the Congress delegates by a specific statement, made on behalf of the Central Committee in the course of the debate, to the effect that the "people's democratic state" meant nothing more nor less than "the dictatorship of the proletariat." The CPI had served notice that it was bent on orthodox revolution against the Nehru government.

As events later demonstrated, the Indian Communists were not to be alone in this intention. In 1948 Communist parties elsewhere in Southeast Asia took the revolutionary path, and violent civil war broke out in Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia. Students of international communism have speculated, without clear evidence, that these revolts were instigated on specific orders from Moscow communicated to the parties at a meeting of the Southeast Asia Youth Conference, held in Calcutta almost simultaneously with the CPI's Second Congress.⁴⁷ Russian guests attended this meeting as did delegates from India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Viet Nam, the Philippines, and North and South Korea. But more important, perhaps, was the presence of the Yugoslav delegation, on hand for the CPI Congress. Since the Yugoslav Communists spoke with authority to the Indian Communists, whether that authority was a product of their international prestige or of concrete sanction from the Cominform, it is possible that they also spoke with authority to other Southeast Asian parties. As P. C. Joshi expressed it in a statement published later, the Telengana peasant revolution in India was conducted by the CPI leadership "on the basis of the tactical line personally given by the Titoite Yugoslav delegates to our Party Congress."⁴⁸ It is at least possible that Yugoslav directives triggered Communist guerrilla-style revolution throughout Southeast Asia.

The general secretary of the Burmese Communist Party, Than Tun, was present at the CPI Second Congress in Calcutta, and on the occasion of a speech to the Congress he hinted broadly at revolution in Burma. The Burmese Communists were making every effort to avoid civil war, he said, "but if the national bourgeoisie, backed by the Anglo-Americans, insist on having it, well they will have it." Concluding, he declared, "Comrades, 1948 is a decisive year for the libera-

⁴⁷ For a summary of and comment upon this speculation, see John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, pp. 33-34.

⁴⁸ P. C. Joshi, *Problems of the Mass Movement* (Allahabad: Adhunik Pustak Bhandar, n.d. [1951?]), pp. 76-77.

tion movements. It will decide the fate of the liberation movements in Southeast Asia."⁴⁹

But whatever the significance of the year 1948 for other Communist parties in Asia, that year witnessed the beginning of a crisis for the CPI unequalled in its history.

⁴⁹ *People's Age*, VI (March 14, 1948), p. 10.