

Director of
Central
Intelligence

~~Top Secret~~



(b)(3)

SECRET

MTD 81-2811X

National Intelligence Daily

Friday
4 December 1981

~~Top Secret~~

CONFIDENTIAL

4 December 1981

Copy

253

(b)(3)


5 1 2

Warning Notice

**This Document Not To Be Reproduced
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WN)**

**National Security
Information**

**Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions**




(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~




(b)(3)

Contents



NR Record

El Salvador: *Prospects for Negotiations* 4



NR Record



~~Top Secret~~



4 December 1981

(b)(3)

(b)(3)



~~Top Secret~~

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

EL SALVADOR: Prospects for Negotiations

The guerrillas' assertions that they are willing to negotiate without preconditions are aimed at undermining the junta's election strategy and at strengthening leftist unity. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Moderates in the leftist alliance oppose the protracted war strategy of guerrilla hardliners and believe that attempts to boycott the elections or to disrupt them through violence could backfire. They want to break the military impasse by negotiating a power-sharing arrangement with the government but are hamstrung by the more radical elements. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Leaders of the largest guerrilla group will not accept any compromise with the government. To maintain insurgent unity, however, they are publicly giving lip-service to the call for negotiations. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Both moderates and hardliners expect the junta to reject negotiations. By pushing talks they hope to sow discord within the junta and plan to increase accusations of government intransigence in their continuing efforts to damage the credibility of the election process. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Senior military officers believe that the armed forces are at least holding their own against the insurgents and refuse to allow the left to achieve through talks what it cannot win on the battlefield. Some civilian leaders, on the other hand, believe that negotiations would split the insurgents but are unwilling to challenge the military by pressing their views. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~[REDACTED]
4 December 1981

(b)(3)