

State and Mutiny in the Northern Song, 1000-1050

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A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2017

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Program Authorized to Offer Degree:

History

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Abstract

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This dissertation uses the Northern Song state's response to mutinies as a prism through which to view different aspects of the government's response to crisis. To this end, I focus on the suppression of five mutinies in the first half of the eleventh century, a time when the Song government was stable and the army posed little threat to the central government. I look closely at how officials and the emperor understood mutinies and the proposals officials made to suppress them in order to learn more about the nature of Song governance. Through an investigation of the individuals sent to direct and oversee campaigns against the mutineers, I show the qualities the court sought in men sent to put down unrest. In addition, I seek to understand how the physical and human geographies of the regions where mutinies broke out shaped the government's actions. When sizing up the resources of the Song state and the

mutineers, both in terms of people and wealth, it is clear that the Song held an overwhelming advantage. However, the mutineers often took steps which challenged the Song's legitimacy, forcing the dynasty to react in kind by denouncing them. With a study of the punishments and rewards distributed to mutineers and the Song's officials and soldiers, we can learn more about the concerns of the state. While the mutineers' leaders were usually executed, their followers could and did receive pardons. The rewards and especially the punishments handed out to officials were intended to clarify what the state expected of its officials. Finally, once the mutiny was over, the government sought to restore order, both in clean-up campaigns to root out supporters of the mutiny and by trying to rebuild the state's relationship with society.

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Acknowledgements

As I have been working to complete my dissertation, I have reflected on all those who have helped me on my path through graduate school. Without their support and encouragement, this would not have been possible. I believe everyone needs a community to help them through difficulties and to share in their successes. For this reason, I want to express my appreciation to so many people in my own community.

I first and foremost want to thank my advisor and dissertation committee chair, Professor Patricia Ebrey, for the innumerable ways she has kindly helped me over the years. I have benefitted greatly from her broad knowledge of Chinese history, as she has always been able to direct me towards new scholarship as my study unfolded in different directions. Professor Ebrey's questions and comments have consistently helped me see my work in a new light and to guide me through the process of researching and writing throughout graduate school. Her enthusiasm for the study of Chinese history has helped keep me going in my own studies. Professor Ebrey's advice and support has proven essential for the successful completion of this dissertation.

I also want to thank the other members of my reading committee, Professors Kent Guy and Mary O'Neil. Professor Guy's strong interest in political history in imperial China is similar to my own, and my field with him in Late Imperial China has provided considerable inspiration for my dissertation. He was always ready to meet when I sought his advice. The experience of helping him compile materials on Qing officials introduced me to the importance of studying the lives of a cohort as a means to understand political administration, and one of my chapters in particular is the result of that experience. Professor Guy's humor and kindness have also been of great value while I have made my way through graduate school. Professor O'Neil gave me the

wonderful opportunity for a comparative perspective. By studying Renaissance Italy with a focus on state rituals, I gained a deeper appreciation for the state's use of ceremony, symbolism, and language as a form of power. While I could say beforehand that ritual was undoubtedly important in imperial China, above all in Confucianism, it was not until I witnessed the ways in which Florence and Venice sought to use ritual that I more fully understood the value it had. I greatly enjoyed learning about and discussing Italian history with Professor O'Neil, and my field with her has greatly influenced the direction of my dissertation and research interests. In a similar vein, I would like to thank Professor Hwasook Nam, who was on my doctoral exam committee. She was willing to guide me through the scholarship on the development of Neo-Confucianism in the Chosŏn period, which again helped me reflect upon changes within China in new ways. Her encouragement has also played an important role during my time in graduate school.

I must also extend my thanks to the University of Washington's History Department and the Jackson School of International Studies, particularly the China Studies Program where I began my graduate studies. The faculty and staff in both places provided ready support for the wide array of questions and concerns that emerged at different points in my time here. I have received generous funding during my time at the UW. The K.C. Hsiao Fellowship, History Departmental Fellowships, China Dissertation Fellowships, and the Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowships all played an essential role in giving me the means to research and write this dissertation. To these I wish to add Professor Ebrey's generous support by taking me on as an assistant on book projects. Those opportunities also allowed me to view emerging scholarship and gave me an appreciation of the revising and publishing process, both of which have helped me with the dissertation and will continue to do so in the future.

I also want to extend my gratitude towards my fellow graduate students, past and present, who have helped me intellectually and emotionally during my time at the UW. Among them are Xiaolin Duan, Lily Schatz, Matt Van Duyn, Gladys Ge Jian, and Xiaoshun Zeng, who read and provided feedback on my writing in seminars, going back to my nascent research on the Beizhou mutiny at the start of my time in the History Department. Countless other graduate students have provided a ready source of support in a variety of ways while I have attended UW, including: Hsiao-wen Cheng, Chad Garcia, Chong Eun Ahn, Jeongwon Hyun, Michael Aguirre, Jessica Bachman, Patty Gauthier, Emily Anderson Hall, Emma Hinchliffe, Jesse Meredith, Eleanor Mahoney, Britta Anson, Roneva Keel, Patrcik Lozar, Jorge Bayona, Arna Elezovic, Huong Nguyen, and Hongxuan Lin. I like to think that we have helped each other as a large network of support, ranging from guiding one another through the intricacies of graduate programs to providing a listening ear for others' concerns. Thank you all, and many more, for your tremendous help over the years.

I would also like to express my eternal appreciation for my family. My parents, Peyton and Diane Canary, instilled in me a love of learning that has carried me from childhood through the successful completion of a doctorate, and I am sure that this love will continue on. They both also shared an enthusiasm for history in particular. A major part of my childhood was riding in the car to just about every point of historical note in Virginia, and this left a deep impression on me, as one might expect given where I am today. They also influenced my own particular brand of humor, which has carried me through the dissertation research and writing process. My wife, Rong Ren, has been a tremendous source of support as I pursued my doctorate. It is easy to allow graduate school life to consume all of one's time and energy, at times seeming like the only thing in the world, but Rong has been a constant reminder that there is more to enjoy in life than


studies. I have greatly relished our times together exploring the natural beauty of the Pacific Northwest, and I look forward to exploring the region, and the world, more with her as I move beyond graduate studies. Finally, I want to thank our daughter Amber, who was born just as I completed my degree in the China Studies Program and has grown up, quite literally, during my time in the History Department. Her boundless enthusiasm and energy has provided great joy and again kept me aware that there is so much to experience in this life.

Map 1. Northern Song Circuits with Locations of Mutinies




Source: Adapted from Chaffee, John W. and Denis Twitchett, eds., *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 5, Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907-1279*, iv, and Tan Qixiang, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, Vol. 6, 3-4.

Map 2. Sichuan Mutiny of 1000




Source: Adapted from Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 29-30.

Map 3. Guangnan Mutiny of 1007




Map 4. Jingdong and Huainan Mutiny of 1043- Jingdong Map



Source: Adapted from Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 14-15.

Map 5. Jingdong and Huainan Mutiny of 1043- Huainan Map



Map 6. Baozhou, Hebei Mutiny of 1044



Source: Adapted from Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 16-17.

Map 7. Beizhou, Hebei Mutiny of 1047-1048



Source: Adapted from Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 16-17.

Introduction

Late in the eleventh month of 1047, authorities in the northern city of Damingfu 大名府 (modern Daming, Hebei) arrested Pan Fangjing 潘方淨 (fl. 1040s) for plotting to assassinate the Damingfu prefect and Hebei military intendant Jia Changchao 賈昌朝 (998-1065). Jia and his officials discovered this was part of a larger plan to launch a major uprising in Hebei on the first day of the new year. The leader of this conspiracy was Wang Ze 王則 (d. 1048), a low-ranking officer in the garrison at Beizhou 貝州 (modern Qinghe, Hebei), which bordered Damingfu to the north. Upon learning of the arrest, Wang and his supporters in the garrison and prefectural office launched their mutiny early. They captured Beizhou's prefect Zhang Deyi 張得一 (d. 1048), killed or put to flight other officials, plundered storehouses, and closed the city gates. Wang drafted Beizhou's adult male population, from twelve to seventy *sui*, and tattooed their faces with an oath that “The Righteous Army will destroy the Zhao [i.e., the Song imperial family] and achieve victory!”¹

Within a day, Jia Changchao received word of the mutiny and dispatched troops to Beizhou under the command of Damingfu's Military Administrator 鈐轄 Hao Zhi 郝質 (d. 1078). North of Beizhou, the Gaoyang Pass Circuit Chief Area Administrator 高陽關都部署 Wang Xin 王信 (d. 1048) led his soldiers to join Hao in a siege against Wang's forces.² When the court learned of the mutiny, Emperor Renzong (r. 1022-1063) first sent two officials and later the prefect of Kaifeng 開封 Ming Hao 明鎬 (d. 1048) to oversee the military operations at

¹ CB 161.3890. For the location of Beizhou relative to Damingfu, see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, Vol. 6, 16-17.

² CB 161.3891.

Beizhou.³ After a month of inconclusive fighting, the court ordered the vice grand councilor Wen Yanbo 文彥博 (1006-1097) to take charge.⁴ Song troops dug a tunnel below the walls of Beizhou, allowing them to attack the city from within. Beizhou fell quickly, with Wang captured shortly thereafter and executed in the capital market. In total, the mutiny lasted sixty-five days.⁵

What should we make of this mutiny? Does analysis of it provide any insight into the workings of the Song state? Scholars' studies of uprisings in Chinese history have usually focused on the instigators and what led them to take up arms: What were their grievances? What were their goals? Did religion play a part? What strategies did they employ? Why did they in the end fail? This study, by contrast, directs our attention to the Song government and asks how it managed to suppress uprisings such as mutinies: How did the government assess each situation? How quickly could it act? Did court officials unite to act quickly, or was response delayed by disputes at court? Can we see in the government's response anything that would explain why among the major Chinese dynasties the Song alone was able to suppress all significant uprisings relatively quickly?

I see this dissertation on the government's response to mutinies in the early eleventh century above all as a contribution to a better understanding of how the Song government operated at a nuts-and-bolts level, how decisions were made, resources mobilized, and actions taken. At the same time, it provides a new perspective on one of the most studied issues in Song history: the civilian control of the military. Scholars examining this topic tend to focus on long-term trends in order to understand the process, nature, and consequences of civilian control during the Song. They find that the early Song emperors established policies designed to

³ CB 161.3892. The two first officials Renzong dispatched were a eunuch named Mai Yunyan 麥允言 (d. 1050) and a military official, Wang Kai 王凱 (d. 1061); see CB 161.3891.

⁴ CB 162.3903.

⁵ CB 162.3905-06.

fragment military authority, bring it under the control of the central government, and subordinate army officers to civilian officials. These measures helped to curb the military autonomy which had troubled the Tang (618-907) and Five Dynasties (907-960), giving the Song greater stability. However, this internal tranquility came at the cost of military effectiveness in struggles against the Song's neighbors and reduced the status of officers and especially rank-and-file soldiers. Furthermore, although rebellious generals and soldiers no longer posed an existential threat to the dynasty, mutinies still erupted. My research examines how the government defeated such uprisings relatively quickly and without compromising the centralized, civilian control of the military that is seen as a hallmark of Song rule.

In recent decades study of the Song dynasty, its government, its armies, its economy, and its intellectual and social history has been very lively, with scholars taking on such topics as the changing character of the sociopolitical elite, commercialization and the development of foreign trade, ideological shifts like the revitalization of Confucianism and the rise of *Daoxue* 道學, and the role of the military in the formation of the Song state and its subsequent relationship with the civilian-led government.⁶ Many of these studies touch on the broader transformation of imperial China's state and society from the medieval to late imperial periods, known as the "Tang-Song

⁶ The foundation for English language studies on the evolution of the Song elite is Robert Hartwell's article on the transformation of China from the Tang through the early Ming ("Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China, 750-1550"). Hartwell's student Robert Hymes concludes that a local elite arose in the Southern Song (1127-1279) with the retreat of the state following the demise of the Northern Song (960-1127); see Hymes' *Statesmen and Gentlemen*, where he examines the elite of Fuzhou 撫州, Jiangnan West. Sukhee Lee's recent book on the state-society relationship in Southern Song Mingzhou (modern Ningbo, Zhejiang) suggests that at least in some areas of the Southern Song the state remained more active in society than was the case in Jiangxi (*Negotiated Power*). One example of work on commercialization and trade is Billy K.L. So's monograph on the economic development of southern Fujian (*Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China*). Peter K. Bol studies intellectual changes from the latter half of the Tang dynasty through the Northern Song (*This Culture of Ours*), while Hoyt Tillman describes how the debates the renowned *Daoxue* scholar Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) had with his twelfth-century contemporaries influenced his philosophical positions (*Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's Ascendancy*). For a discussion of the military and its position vis-à-vis civil officialdom, see the literature review below.

transition.” Several characteristics of the late imperial period have their origins in the Song dynasty, such as the gentry and the economic and cultural primacy of southern China.

To narrow my focus and get down to the details, in this dissertation I look only at five mutinies that occurred in a fifty-year period, from 1000 to 1050. For reference, the mutinies are listed below:

List of Mutinies			
Year	Location (Modern Location)	Mutiny Leader(s)	Duration
1000	Chengdu 成都 (Yizhou 益州), Xichuan Circuit 西川路 (Chengdu, Sichuan) ⁷	Wang Jun 王均	9 months
1007	Yizhou 宜州, Guangnan West Circuit 廣南西路 (Yishan 宜山, Guangxi)	Chen Jin 陳進 Lu Chengjun 盧成均	2 months
1043	Yizhou 沂州, Jingdong East Circuit 京東東路 (Linyi 臨沂, Shandong)	Wang Lun 王倫	2 months
1044	Baozhou 保州, Hebei West Circuit 河北西路 (Baoding 保定, Hebei)	Wei Gui 韋貴	20 days
1047-1048	Beizhou 貝州, Hebei East Circuit 河北東路 (Qinghe 清河, Hebei)	Wang Ze 王則 Zhang Luan 張巒 Bu Ji 卜吉	65 days

I have chosen to concentrate on the first half of the eleventh century due to its stability compared with earlier and later periods. By 1000, four decades after its founding, the Song had consolidated its control over most of what was considered Chinese territory (though not all, as discussed below), the civil service examination was in full swing, and the third emperor Zhenzong (r. 997-1022) had taken the throne.⁸ Especially after the conclusion of a treaty with Liao (916-1125) in 1005, there was a respite from war and the society and economy prospered to a remarkable degree. In short, by the start of the period I study, the Song had achieved stability

⁷ I use Chengdu throughout this dissertation, although the name used for the prefecture at the time of the mutiny was Yizhou. This is because the three mutinies launched in Sichuan, Guangnan, and Jingdong began in places written as Yizhou in *pinyin*. To reduce the potential for confusion, and since the Yizhou in Sichuan is known today as Chengdu, a name also used during the Song much of the time, I have chosen to use it instead of Yizhou.

⁸ For an overview of the reigns of Emperors Taizu (r. 960-976) and Taizong (r. 976-997), see Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty,” 206-260.

and many of the state's institutions and practices were in place. After the reign of Zhenzong's successor Renzong, budget problems in the 1060s led to the reforms of Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021-1086) and Emperor Shenzong (r. 1067-1085). They pushed for a more activist state and reshaped the ways in which the government interacted with society and the economy through reforms collectively called the New Policies. The reformers also introduced changes to the military in an effort to cut expenses and improve effectiveness. These measures included reductions in the army's size, the elimination of the garrison rotation policy 更戍法, and the implementation of the *baojia* 保甲 militia which was intended to replace the professional army. Mutinies and their suppression during this period would require a separate study.⁹

Scholarship on Civilian Control of the Military

Those who study the Song military recognize that there was a transition from the military prominence of the late Tang and Five Dynasties to the civilian dominance of the army in the eleventh century. Following the An Lushan 安祿山 Rebellion of 755-763, regional military leaders called military governors 節度使 increasingly asserted their autonomy from the Tang court. Succeeding emperors' efforts to bring the governors back under their control had mixed results. Following the rebellion of Huang Chao 黃巢 (d. 884), Tang authority over most of the empire effectively ended, and military governors vied to control the emperor. One of the governors, Zhu Wen 朱溫 (r. 907-912), finally extinguished the dynasty and established the Later Liang (907-923), the first of the Five Dynasties. Nevertheless, other regional military leaders continued to possess a power base of loyal troops under their command. This gave them

⁹ The most authoritative English-language scholar of the New Policies era is Paul J. Smith. For a solid treatment of the New Policies during the reign of Shenzong, see Smith, "Shen-tsung's Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-shih," 347-483. I actually stop well short of Shenzong's reign, primarily because the last major mutiny during Renzong's rule ended in 1048, hence I give the time frame of 1000 to 1050.

the means to resist imperial policies and agents and to carry out their own coups. As a result, there was a rapid turnover of dynasties in North China during the early to mid-tenth century. However, by the time of the Treaty of Chanyuan 澶淵之盟 in 1005, there were no autonomous military governors, and the threat of an ambitious general deposing the Song emperor seemed remote. Historians have investigated Song military history in the tenth and early eleventh century to understand this shift from a powerful, autonomous military establishment to an army heavily subordinated to the civilian wing of the government. What was the process that transferred military authority to civil officials? Was this a grand plan of the first Song emperors? Finally, what were the consequences of this transformation?

Modern historians have focused on the means by which the Song emperors established centralized control of the military, ultimately under the command of civilians. Wang Gungwu looks earlier, to the late Tang and Five Dynasties, for the origins of this centralization process. Wang argues that the process of asserting authority from the capital began during the final decades of the Tang, when Zhu Wen sought to expand and consolidate his control over Henan. After the Tang's collapse, successive contenders continued to implement policies aimed at undermining the autonomy of military governors and thereby expanding their own control over the military in North China. This approach involved integrating the provincial system into the imperial government, and the Song inherited this hybrid state.¹⁰ Edmund H. Worthy, Jr. points to the relocation of military governors away from their power bases and the governors' handover of their subordinate prefectures to the Song as the final blows to the threat those officials posed.¹¹ Wang Zengyu examines the structure of the military, including the changes intended to give

¹⁰ Wang, *The Structure of Power in North China*.

¹¹ See Worthy, "The Founding of Sung China," 274-79 for an overview of the steps taken to strip military governors of their power.

Emperor Taizu greater control over the military. He replaced retiring generals with lower-ranking officers in the Three Guards 三衛 commands in charge of the imperial army. This in turn eroded the commanders' power vis-à-vis the Bureau of Military Affairs 樞密院, which was the top policy-making organ for the military. Taizu and his successors also kept military units small and fragmented to avoid assembling forces sufficiently large and coordinated to challenge the dynasty.¹²

Chen Feng identifies Taizong as a pivotal figure in the transition to a centralized, and particularly civilian, control over the military. He argues that the first Song emperors all gave increasing importance to civil officials while seeking to control the military, but this process became particularly apparent starting with Taizong.¹³ Chen also finds that the composition of the Bureau of Military Affairs shifted away from a prevalence of veteran generals under Taizu to an increase in civil officials and personal favorites during Taizong's rule.¹⁴ Chen Changzheng and Michael C. McGrath both discuss measures which increased military authority of centrally-appointed military officials in territorial administration beyond the capital. Such measures included the transfer of command from military garrison commanders to largely civilian prefects and the establishment of civil officials as military intendants.¹⁵

Scholars can thus easily point to a number of policies and practices which resulted in the central government asserting its authority over the military through civil officials by the early eleventh century. However, according to Peter Lorge, many historians writing on the topic have

¹² Wang, "A History of the Sung Military," 214-16.

¹³ Chen, "Shilun Songchao 'chongwen yiwu' zhiguo sixiang yu fanglüe de xingcheng," 1-18. For the changes under Taizong, see pages 6-11.

¹⁴ Chen, "Cong Shumiyuan chang'er chushen bianhua kan Bei Song 'yiwen yuwu' fangzhen de yingxiang," 56-71 (62-63 for the changes under Taizong). Many of Taizong's favored courtiers had military ranks, but Chen points out that they had little experience in battle.

¹⁵ Chen, *Tang Song difang zhengzhi tizhi zhuanxing yanjiu*, 241-43 and McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration," 189-247.

assumed that this was an intentional development carried out by the first Song emperors, especially Taizu. He traces the narrative of a plan by the Song founder to control the military using civil officials to the eleventh century. At that time, scholars like Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007-1072) argued that the dynastic founders wanted the civilian dominance of government so the Song could move away from the chaos of the Five Dynasties. Because of this narrative, later historians looking at the early Song accepted a teleological view of civil rule as intentional and inevitable.¹⁶ Lorge briefly surveys present-day scholarship on the political history of the early Song. He notes that the narrative continues to appear, but also indicates that many historians are aware of and dissatisfied with its limitations.¹⁷

Lorge provides a different reading of the first half-century of Song rule by looking carefully at the chronology of events and fitting military and political developments into a broader historical context. He reveals that concerns over war influenced the development of both the Later Zhou (951-960) and early Song states. Zhou Shizong (r. 954-959) and Song Taizu used their victories as political capital to centralize military authority. Taizong initially attempted to rely on conquest to bolster his political position as well, but he demonstrated his weak military prowess when he dragged the Song into twenty-five years of conflict with the Liao. Therefore, he turned away from the military and sought support from civil officials, improving their political position. However, Lorge sees the separation of war from politics as complete only in the reign of Zhenzong, after the empire was peaceful internally and externally. The Treaty of Chanyuan ensured peace with Liao, making reliance on the military less necessary. Lorge

¹⁶ Lorge, *The Reunification of China*, 29-37.

¹⁷ Lorge, *The Reunification of China*, 36-39. Lorge points out in particular Deng Xiaonan's work on the "ancestors' family instructions 祖宗家法 (or 祖宗之法)" as a novel way to understand Song political history. See for example Deng, "'Zhengjia zhi fa' yu Zhao Song de 'zuzong jiafa,'" 73-85. For an article on the subject in English (translated for the *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies* from the original French), see Deng and Lamouroux, "The 'Ancestors' Family Instructions,'" 79-97.

concludes that there was no intention from the outset to shift to civil rule in the early Song. This only occurred due to consequences stemming from the dynasty's success or failure on the battlefield. In other words, while civil officials grew from powerless functionaries at the capital to one of the dominant political groups of the Song during these years, this was less an objective and more a side effect of the emperors' use of war for political ends.¹⁸

Historians have also examined the consequences of this shift to civilian control of the military, focusing on the declining social status of the military and soldiers in Song society. In their article on Northern Song mutinies, Wang Junying and Chen Feng identify several causes, such as the continued poor discipline of soldiers, steps taken to weaken the military's political influence, and the corruption of superior officers and civil officials.¹⁹ The most thorough analysis of soldiers' declining status is Elad Alyagon's dissertation on the lives of soldiers in the Song. Alyagon identifies structural forces which eroded the status of soldiers, creating an underclass that was held suspect by the state and society alike. The Song government inherited from previous dynasties the practice of tattooing soldiers to distinguish them from the rest of society, and the rotation system instituted by Taizu forced them to move constantly. As a consequence, the social status of soldiers suffered, aligning them more with criminals than commoners. The lower status and difficult circumstances of the soldiers—intended by design—no doubt contributed to the outbreak of mutinies.²⁰ At the same time, historians have pushed back somewhat on the idea that the concept of *wu* 武, or martial virtue, was completely negated in favor of *wen* 文, or civil virtue. Peter Lorge finds that at least the military elite could enjoy

¹⁸ Lorge, *The Reunification of China*, 278-86.

¹⁹ Wang and Chen, "Bei Song jiceng shizu bianluan chulun," 118-23.

²⁰ See Alyagon, "Inked," 44-70 for the roles that tattooing and rotation played in the declining status of the army. He also goes into detail about the social origins of soldiers (71-116) and their lives in the military, with an eye towards their social decline with age (117-51). Alyagon also discusses the resulting resistance to recruitment and service in the army, which included threats of violence and mutinies by angry or desperate soldiers (152-99).

considerable privilege, not least through marriage ties to the imperial clan.²¹ Don J. Wyatt also provides examples of officials who exhibited both civil and military virtues, suggesting that *wu* was not quite as universally demeaned as generally thought.²² Nevertheless, for the rank-and-file, there is a clear indication that their material conditions and social status deteriorated during the Song.

The policies that Taizu and Taizong instituted brought the military firmly under the control of the central government. This lessened the potential danger military leaders could pose to the dynasty. It also led to the preeminence of the civil officials in the eleventh century, although this was not the original intention of the founding emperors. One consequence of these changes was the general deterioration of the military's position in Song society. This proved to be a double-edged sword. The changes kept the threat of the army to the state's stability to a minimum, but they also allowed the exploitation of soldiers which sparked various forms of resistance, including mutinies. The emperor and his ministers still needed to address such uprisings. We must see their response to mutinies, then, as yet another facet of the central government's control of the military. We should examine mutiny suppression efforts to strengthen further our understanding of how the state interacted with the military. High-ranking titles, generous stipends, and marriage with the Zhao imperial clan represent one extreme of the government's treatment of the military; the use of brute force represents the other extreme.

An Overview of the Reigns of Zhenzong and Renzong

To fit the mutinies better into the historical context, it is worth providing a brief summary of the reigns of the two sitting emperors, Zhenzong (r. 997-1022) and Renzong (r. 1022-1063),

²¹ Lorge, "The Northern Song Aristocracy and the Royal Family," 37-48.

²² Wyatt, "Unsung Men of War," 192-218.

during the first half of the eleventh century. The events and developments which affected the military during this time will receive the most attention.

Zhenzong was the third emperor of the Song. The son of Taizong and nephew of Taizu, he initially tried to follow in their footsteps, according to Karl F. Olsson. Taizu was an excellent military commander and played an active role in government. Taizong was less capable militarily but far more suspicious, which again required a great deal of attention to governance.²³ Both of the founding emperors, however, sought to canvass widely for the opinions of officials. Zhenzong, too, called for proposals from officialdom more frequently than his predecessors during the first years after he became emperor.²⁴ He also held routine audiences until late in his reign, though he did prefer to delegate decision-making as time went on.²⁵

Zhenzong inherited the ongoing military conflict with the Liao dynasty (916-1125) north of the Song. After defeating the Northern Han in 979, Taizong attempted to invade Liao to recover former Tang territory. This sparked over two decades of invasions and counter-invasions between the two sides. Zhenzong thus faced a dangerous adversary when he took the throne.²⁶ In 1004, the Liao launched what would be their final invasion of the Song. Officials and generals persuaded Zhenzong to lead the army in person, and the Song force from Kaifeng encountered the main Liao army at Chanzhou 澶州 (sometimes rendered Shanzhou) in southern Hebei. There representatives of the Song and Liao worked out the Treaty of Chanyuan (Shanyuan) in 1005. The agreement established rough diplomatic parity between the two states, although the Song

²³ Olsson, "The Structure of Power Under the Third Emperor," 15-18 for a brief comparison of Taizu and Taizong.

²⁴ Olsson, "The Structure of Power Under the Third Emperor," 40-41.

²⁵ Olsson, "The Structure of Power Under the Third Emperor," 45.

²⁶ Lau and Huang, "Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty," 248-51 briefly describes Taizong's misadventures fighting the Liao, and 262-264 details the situation between the two dynasties at the start of Zhenzong's reign.

had to pay an annual “gift” to Liao.²⁷ While peace between both countries would hold for well over a century, the Song continued to invest heavily in defenses along the northern border.

Following the treaty, Zhenzong’s style of rule shifted away from the more energetic, personally involved form of Taizu and Taizong. Olsson finds that the emperor began to limit access to the throne and to delegate more responsibilities to subordinates from then on. He argues that this restriction of access and delegation of authority was probably necessary because of the enlarged bureaucracy and increasingly complex demands of governing.²⁸ Concerned about the loss of prestige due to the Treaty of Chanyuan, Zhenzong devoted his attention instead to symbolic measures intended to augment his legitimacy. This began with the “discovery” of letters allegedly from Heaven that began appearing in 1008, and reached its zenith with the costly *fengshan* 封禪 and Earth deity sacrifices.²⁹ Another development which would affect later reigns was the rise of factional struggle at court. The most acute conflict was between Zhenzong’s long-serving Grand Councilor Wang Dan 王旦 (957-1017) and the Commissioner of Military Affairs Wang Qinruo 王欽若 (962-1025).³⁰

When Zhenzong died in 1022, he left a young son, Renzong, to assume the throne. Due to Renzong’s age, Zhenzong ordered on his deathbed that his wife, Empress Dowager Liu (968-1033, regent from 1022-1033), would serve as regent. Liu ruled capably during Renzong’s minority. She was able to maintain control while refusing to give in to calls by her more Confucian-minded opponents to step down. While some of her behavior, most notably the wearing of imperial robes while conducting sacrifices at the imperial ancestral temple and her

²⁷ Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty,” 262-70.

²⁸ Olsson, “The Structure of Power Under the Third Emperor,” 239-40.

²⁹ Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty,” 270-73 and Olsson, “The Structure of Power Under the Third Emperor,” 161-75.

³⁰ Olsson, “The Structure of Power Under the Third Emperor,” 187-237.

rejection of calls to step down towards the end of her life, raised concerns that she was trying to hold onto power for her own sake, she seems to have been concerned about the young emperor's ability to rule, and this might explain her long regency.³¹

As Renzong assumed power in the years after Empress Dowager Liu's death, he began to rely on a high-ranking civil official named Lü Yijian 呂夷簡 (979-1044) to run court affairs. Renzong himself showed little interest in actively ruling. Although there were breaks in Lü's power, he dominated the court from 1034 until 1043 when he retired from office. Factionalism broke out again during Lü's tenure, particularly between Grand Councilor Lü and an outspoken official named Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989-1052). The conflict between these two and their supporters initially resulted in the expulsion of Fan and his allies from Kaifeng, but opponents continued to complain about Lü.³²

While factional strife simmered within the Song government in the late 1030s, a new external crisis emerged. While the Tangut rulers to the northwest of the Song had presented tribute for decades, there was conflict between the two states, and in 1038 the current ruler Li Yuanhao 李元昊 (1003-1048, r. 1038-1048) gathered enough political power and territory to make a push for his own dynasty. Declaring himself emperor of the Xixia 西夏, Li sought recognition of his new title from the Song. Renzong unsurprisingly rejected this request, prompting Li to launch attacks on the Song's frontier. A costly war resulted that lasted until Li agreed in 1044 to refer to himself as a "vassal 臣" of Song in his correspondence. The conflict harshly affected the Song state's finances and involved significant manpower to hold the forts defending against the Tanguts. The Song army generally performed poorly, but according to

³¹ Chaffee, "Empress Liu," 1-25 and McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung," 279-89.

³² McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung," 289-300.

Michael McGrath the dynasty wore out the Xixia by making use of its far vaster economy and population.³³ A serious consequence of the war, however, was a greatly inflated military and increasingly dire budgetary problems.³⁴

As the Song struggled to gain an advantage over the Xixia, Fan Zhongyan and his allies reemerged in the spotlight. Fan and his fellow reformer Han Qi 韓琦 (1008-1075) had both proven to be able military leaders in the conflict, which won them favorable attention from Renzong, whose long-time minister Lü Yijian was increasingly ill. Lü retired in 1043, and Fan Zhongyan and his allies received court appointments. Fan put forward a number of reforms which the emperor approved, but they rankled many high officials. This opposition, which accused Fan and his supporters of many misdeeds including forming a “faction,” eventually pushed Renzong away from the reformers. Fan and other reformers were reassigned to posts outside the capital, and the reforms themselves were fully repealed by 1045.³⁵

After the conclusion of the war with Xixia and the failure of the reforms, the status quo held on for the remainder of Renzong’s reign. By the late 1050s, some reformers like Ouyang Xiu and Han Qi returned to court, but they did not significantly alter the state’s direction. The court attempted to decrease the size of the military, but it achieved only modest improvements. At the same time, the budget continued to swell owing to the enlarged military and bureaucracy, with deficits recorded in 1056 and 1057.³⁶ While the problems facing the Song seemed to mount during his rule, especially from the middle part of the reign, it was viewed as a golden age from

³³ McGrath, “Frustrated Empires,” 151-90 for an overview of the Song-Xixia conflict.

³⁴ Smith, “Shen-tsung’s Reign and the New Policies of Wang Anshi,” 347-49.

³⁵ Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu*, 40-51 for an overview of the reforms and opposition. It should be noted that James T.C. Liu sees the Wang Lun mutiny of 1043 in Shandong as responsible for bringing in the reformers. See also McGrath, “The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung,” 316-23.

³⁶ McGrath, “The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung,” 323-28.

the perspective of officials who faced the bitter factional divides that marred the final decades of the Northern Song.

The Military of the Northern Song and Territorial Administration

Before examining the mutinies themselves, it is a good idea to present the basic structure of the Song military and territorial administration. While today the armed forces generally are divided according to where they carry out combat (land for the army, sea for the navy, and air for the air force), the Song divided the military differently. According to Wang Zengyu, there were six different types of military units: They were the imperial army 禁軍, the prefectural army 廂軍, local militias 鄉兵, frontier tribal troops 蕃兵, local troops 土兵, and bowmen 弓手.³⁷ Among these, the most important by far were the imperial army and prefectural army, and they are worth examining more closely.

From the beginning of the Song dynasty, the imperial army was located at the capital of Kaifeng. Emperor Taizu boosted the size of the imperial army by ordering that garrisons spread across the empire select their best soldiers and send them to the capital.³⁸ He placed these soldiers in the existing imperial army and gave them training. As Taizu conquered the south, a similar process took place with the troops who surrendered.³⁹ Prefectural army units, or at least the most capable soldiers within them, were sometimes promoted to form or fill in imperial army units.⁴⁰ The government encouraged the sons of soldiers to join the army as well, and there were

³⁷ Wang, “A History of the Sung Military,” 217. The editors of the *Songshi*, by contrast, stated that there were mainly three types of armies: The imperial army, the prefectural army, and the local militias, though they also acknowledged the frontier tribal troops (SS 187.4569).

³⁸ SS 189.4639.

³⁹ For example, according to the *Songshi*: “In Qiande 乾德 3 (965), [the Song] pacified Shu, took their troops, and established them as the Fengyi 奉議 [Army]. Later this was changed to the present name [of Fengjie 奉節]... There were five commanderies [in the] capital region 京師 (SS 187.4595).” The Song reorganized several Later Shu units in this fashion (SS 187.4595 and 4596).

⁴⁰ In one case, the Zhongjie Army 忠節軍 was formed by “choosing those who were robust in the prefectural armies [from among] all the prefectures” (SS 187.4596).

recruitment efforts from society at large, both through coercion and during natural disasters.⁴¹ As the imperial army was a standing professional army, soldiers were expected to remain in the military. To prevent desertion, the Song followed the Five Dynasties practice of tattooing the face or arms of recruits and punished deserters with death.⁴²

The imperial army served as the combat troops of the Song. They were divided into two, and later three, commands. Soldiers under the Palace Command 殿前司 primarily served at the capital with only a few garrisons outside that region. Troops from the Metropolitan Commands 侍衛司, on the other hand, filled most of the imperial army garrisons across the empire.⁴³ The government sought to curb the potential for a military coup or secession through two key measures. First, there was an effort to balance the number of imperial army soldiers so that half of the soldiers were stationed in Kaifeng at any given time.⁴⁴ Second, the soldiers shifted between prefectural garrisons and the capital as part of the garrison rotation policy, which was designed to block the formation of any local power bases. This was only abolished with Shenzong's creation of the area generalship policy 置將法, which kept soldiers within a certain region, and the *baojia* militias.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Wang, "A History of the Sung Military," 218-19. Wang comments that recruitment in the event of a natural disaster served as a way to provide aid while also lessening the chance of unrest. Elad Alyagon also discusses the various means by which the Song recruited men into its armies in chapter two of his dissertation (see Alyagon, "Inked," 71-116).

⁴² On tattooing in the Song military, see Alyagon, "Inked," 51-60; for the punishments of deserters, see Wang, "A History of the Sung Military," 219. Alyagon also finds that deserters could avoid execution through amnesties or signing up with other units; he also notes that deserters often became bandits (Alyagon, "Inked," 163-70). The tendency for mutineers and other deserters to blend with other types of unrest is discussed in chapter one of my dissertation.

⁴³ Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 67. The Metropolitan Command was eventually divided into separate cavalry and infantry commands, resulting in the Three Commands. Wang also includes a listing of the locations where palace and metropolitan troops were garrisoned (Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 43-66).

⁴⁴ Wang, "A History of the Sung Military," 217. He also states that this policy "was gradually abandoned."

⁴⁵ McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration," 167-68.

The soldiers themselves were organized into a hierarchy of units within the imperial army. In descending order of size, the units were wings 廂, armies 軍, commanderies 指揮 (sometimes referred to as regiments 營), and troops 都.⁴⁶ The following table lists these units along with their scale and the commanding officers:

Military Units and Commanders in the Song				
Hierarchical Unit	Number of subordinate units	Number of soldiers	Commanding Officer Title	Second-in-Command Title
Wing 廂	10 Armies	25,000	Wing Commander-in-Chief 廂都指揮使	Wing Inspector-in-Chief 廂都虞侯
Army 軍	5 Commanderies	2500	Army Commander-in-Chief 軍都指揮使	Inspector-in-Chief 都虞侯
Commandery 指揮 / Regiment 營	5 Troops	500	Commander 指揮使	Vice Commandant 副指揮使
Troop 都	---	100	<i>Cavalry:</i> Military Commander 軍使 <i>Infantry:</i> Troop Commandant 都頭	<i>Cavalry:</i> Vice Military Commander 副兵馬使 <i>Infantry:</i> 副都頭

Sources: The unit types and their subordinate units come from Wang, “A History of the Sung Military,” 216. The commanding officer titles come from Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 33 (for wings), 37 (for armies), 39 (for commanderies), and 41-42 (for troops).

This is an idealized form of military organization for two reasons. First, in practice, the most important unit was the commandery.⁴⁷ The Song garrisoned soldiers in different prefectures according to commanderies. Each commandery did exist as a subordinate component of an “army.” For example, Wang Ze, who started the Hebei mutiny in 1047, was described as an officer 小校 from Beizhou’s single Xuanyi Army 宣毅軍 commandery.⁴⁸ However, the Xuanyi

⁴⁶ *Wujing zongyao* 1.12b, also cited in Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 14, where Wang notes that the regiment, or *ying*, was also called a commandery, or *zhihui*.

⁴⁷ Wang, “A History of the Sung Military,” 216-17: “For the most part, after the beginning of T’ai-tsung’s reign, the commandery was usually the basic organizational unit of the imperial armies during troop movements, fortifications, and battles.”

⁴⁸ CB 161.3890.

Army spanned nine circuits from Hebei in the north to Fujian in the southeast with the vast majority of prefectures having only one or two commanderies garrisoned at each.⁴⁹ Coordinating across such a wide range was impractical; the constituent commanderies were united only in name. Indeed, when the Song *did* put together wings and armies, they were often disorganized since they were only temporary assemblies; the commanderies functioned effectively as independent units.⁵⁰ Second, according to Wang Zengyu's research, the numbers of soldiers given in the table do not reflect reality, either, since units tended to be much smaller. Drawing on examples from the reigns of Zhenzong, Renzong, and Shenzong, Wang Zengyu lists one commandery with 250 soldiers as an extreme case, while the others he cited mostly hovered between 430 and 470.⁵¹ Thus it is difficult to use the number of commanderies as a means of calculating the number of soldiers in a location. One could consider using commanderies in a prefecture as a means of assessing the relative size of military forces in a prefecture or broader region, however, which is how Michael C. McGrath used them when determining the distribution of the army across the empire.⁵²

Garrisoned alongside the imperial armies were the prefectural armies. When Taizu ordered the top soldiers across the empire to travel to the capital, the rest remained as prefectural troops, and he and his successors intentionally allowed their military capability to lapse. They

⁴⁹ SS 187.4600.

⁵⁰ Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 39-40. Wang notes here that when wings and armies were assembled, there was a problem recognized in the early Song as “the soldiers do not know the generals, and the generals do not know the soldiers 兵不知將，將不知兵.” He argues this was not the case for the leadership of the commanderies themselves, but rather the leaders of the units above that level. In his chapter in the *Cambridge History of China*, Wang comments that the Song intentionally sought to prevent familiarity between commanders and their subordinate troops for the sake of dynastic stability, even at the cost of military effectiveness (Wang, “A History of the Sung Military,” 216-17). This sacrifice of effectiveness for security is a common theme in Song governance.

⁵¹ Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 39. Similarly, Wang finds that the numbers of soldiers in wings and armies fell far short of the idealized picture: For example, the crack “Four Elite Armies 上四軍” on paper should have had altogether 200,000 men based on their organizational structure, but in reality probably had something closer to 33,000 soldiers (Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 34). In other words, the eight wings established under the Four Elite Armies likely did not have enough troops to form even two idealized wings.

⁵² McGrath, “Military and Regional Administration,” 168-78.

rarely received military training—it was often explicitly stated if they did—and instead they became something akin to labor battalions.⁵³ The types of work they performed varied widely, including repairing walls, constructing bridges, building boats, and managing the waterworks of the Yellow River. Sometimes the names of the prefectural armies indicated their job, such as the “Bridges and Roads Army 橋道軍” tasked, predictably enough, with building bridges and repairing roads.⁵⁴ There were several sources of manpower for the prefectural armies. First, when the state recruited people for the military, including after natural disasters, those who met the standards for the imperial armies went there, while those who did not joined the prefectural armies. Second, cowardly and lazy imperial army soldiers could be demoted to the prefectural army. Third, the government sent convicts sentenced to penal labor to work in the prefectural army. While there was a prefectural army explicitly dedicated for penal laborers, known as the Laocheng Army 牢城軍, evidence suggests that other penal labor armies existed, such as the Chenghai Army 澄海軍, and convicts entered other prefectural army units as well.⁵⁵ Prefectural armies were organized in the same fashion as imperial armies, with commanderies again serving as the most important unit. They were also the same size at five hundred soldiers (at least in theory), with the exception of Laocheng commanderies, which only had three hundred men according to the statutory quota.⁵⁶

⁵³ SS 189.4639. As the *Songshi* records here: “The rest [who were not summoned to Kaifeng] remained in their original garrisons 本城. Although there was no garrison rotation [policy], they thus rarely trained. The majority provided labor and that was it.” It was not until the Qingli period (1041-1048) of Renzong’s reign that some prefectural army units received military training according to Wang Zengyu’s analysis (Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 85). Elad Alyagon presents evidence that the *Songshi* claim that prefectural soldiers did not rotate between prefectures was wrong (Alyagon, “Inked,” 62-63).

⁵⁴ Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 82.

⁵⁵ Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 81-82.

⁵⁶ Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 84.

Commanderies were stationed in prefectures, which were the middle of the three levels of territorial units administered by centrally-appointed officials during the Song. In ascending order, these units were counties 縣 (led by magistrates 知縣), prefectures 州 (headed by prefects 知州), and circuits 路 (overseen by intendants 監司).⁵⁷ Prefectures consisted of multiple counties, while circuits supervised multiple prefectures. Among these units, prefectures and circuits are the most important for this study because of their roles relating to the army. The system of counties and prefectures, known as the *junxian* 郡縣 system in Chinese, dated back to before the Qin unification of 221 BC. Prefects, who were usually civil officials, gained control of the army garrisons in their jurisdictions by the end of the tenth century.⁵⁸ There developed a division of labor between counties and prefectures: County officials focused on collecting revenue for the state, while prefects possessed authority over the military garrisoned in their jurisdiction.⁵⁹

Circuits were a new development in the Song. Administrative units consisting of multiple prefectures had existed in earlier dynasties, such as the provinces led by military governors in the Tang and Five Dynasties. However, as seen above, such large units could pose a threat to centralized control. In a piecemeal fashion, the Song implemented the circuits to improve surveillance while working to prevent a monopolization of power which could weaken the court's authority in a region. The government achieved this balance primarily by dividing the task of overseeing different facets of territorial administration among several officials known as

⁵⁷ There were four types of prefectures: superior prefectures 府, ordinary prefectures 州, military prefectures 軍, and industrial prefectures 監. In this dissertation, I use these terms as a suffix to indicate the type of prefecture (e.g., Damingfu was a superior prefecture, while Beizhou was an ordinary prefecture).

⁵⁸ Chen, *Tang Song difang zhengzhi tizhi zhuanxing yanjiu*, 241-43.

⁵⁹ Mostern, "Dividing the Realm," 46. According to Ruth Mostern, this resulted in an increase in the number of prefectures along the northern borders with Liao and Xixia, where there was a large military presence, and a similar growth in the number of counties in the prosperous southeast as the court sought to improve tax collection efforts there (Mostern, "Dividing the Realm," 106-07).

intendants. The first type of intendant was the fiscal intendant 轉運使. This post began as a transport commissioner who accompanied the Song armies as they conquered the south in order to supply the military and gain control of the new territories' wealth. The utility of the office for the court soon became apparent. The Song made it a permanent position and extended it across the empire by the turn of the eleventh century.⁶⁰ As the title "fiscal intendant" implies, the main duty of this position was keeping an eye on the financial situation of the circuit and its constituent prefectures.⁶¹

Over the course of the eleventh century, the Song established additional intendants. Among these, the military intendant 安撫使 is the most important for this study. By the 1040s, military intendants appeared as permanent posts in the northern frontier circuits and near Kaifeng.⁶² They possessed wide-ranging responsibilities, including the army, law, and banditry suppression.⁶³ The different types of intendants operated within the same territory and were roughly equal in rank. As such, there was a check on the authority of any one intendant.⁶⁴ Furthermore, while the intendants supervised the prefectures, they were not in direct control of

⁶⁰ Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 55. The transport commissioner first appeared in the Tang dynasty and grew in importance following the An Lushan Rebellion as the court worked to maintain sufficient revenue by relying on state monopolies (Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 54-55).

⁶¹ Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 56-57.

⁶² For this study, the military circuits of Hebei and Jingdong are the most important. Jingdong's military intendency was established in the fifth month of 1042 (CB 136.3265). It is unclear when Hebei first had a permanent military intendant. According to Li Tao's comments in the *Changbian*, the court may have established it in 5/1042 as well, when Damingfu was designated the Northern Capital, but he also found evidence it was established in 1045 or 1046 (CB 136.3265).

⁶³ McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration," 41.

⁶⁴ Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 63-64. While the different types of intendants occupied the same position in territorial administrative hierarchy, sometimes one intendant was clearly higher-ranking. Michael C. McGrath argues that in border circuits the military intendant was both in rank and in practice superior to fiscal and other intendants (McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration," 56-57 and 197-205). He does accept that fiscal intendants were more important in other places than the north (McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration," 22). Brian E. McKnight also states that military intendants were the top circuit-level officials on the borders, but fiscal intendants were more prominent in interior circuits (McKnight, *Law and Order*, 232-33).

them. Prefects, for example, could petition the court without going through the intendant, adding another potential constraint on the authority of circuit officials.⁶⁵

Overviews of the Mutinies

The location of the five mutinies is shown in Map 1. It is also useful to sketch their histories briefly.

The 1000 Sichuan Mutiny of Wang Jun

The first mutiny in this study was the 1000 Wang Jun (d. 1000) mutiny in Chengdu, Sichuan, located in the southwestern corner of the empire (see Map 2). According to the historical record, Wang Jun, who served as inspector-in-chief 都虞侯 of one of the two Shenwei 神衛 Army commandaries in Chengdu, was not the instigator of this mutiny.⁶⁶ Instead, it was the soldier Zhao Yanshun 趙延順 (d. 1000) who killed Chengdu Military Administrator 鈐轄 Fu Zhaoshou 符昭壽 (d. 1000) after Fu had excessively flogged a soldier.⁶⁷ Wang was sent to apprehend Zhao, but instead was persuaded to assume leadership.⁶⁸ He and his troops already had tensions with the prefectural leadership, allegedly due to embarrassment over their military uniforms during an inspection, so he probably needed little convincing.⁶⁹ Wang then seized Chengdu as Prefect Niu Mian 牛冕 (*jinshi* 978) and Fiscal Intendant Zhang Shi 張適 (*jinshi* 980) fled north to Hanzhou 漢州.⁷⁰ The court then sent Lei Youzhong 雷有終 (947-1005) and several other officials in charge of eight thousand soldiers to regain control of Sichuan. Wang's uprising spread through much of western Sichuan and the mutineers impressed many the inhabitants,

⁶⁵ Kracke, *Civil Service*, 50-51.

⁶⁶ CB 45.980 for Wang's appointment.

⁶⁷ SHY Bing 10.10.

⁶⁸ CB 46.983.

⁶⁹ CB 45.980. The author implies that Wang himself was to blame for the tension: He was supposedly fond of drinking and gambling, and used military equipment to cover the expense.

⁷⁰ CB 46.980. According to his entry in the *Songshi*, Zhang was Xichuan fiscal intendant (SS 277.9440).

including Daoists and Buddhist monks, to fight on their side (though it is likely that at least some joined willingly). The mutineers failed to take the strategic Jianmen Pass 劍門 which was located in Jianzhou 劍州 to the northeast of the prefectural seat and guarded the approach towards Chengdu from Shaanxi, while Song loyalist forces were organized close to Chengdu, most notably by the Shuzhou 蜀州 Prefect Yang Huaizhong 楊懷忠 (d. 1024). After nine months of fighting, Song forces retook Chengdu by tunneling under the walls. Wang fled eastward to Fushunjian 富順監.⁷¹ At this point the records diverge. The *Song huiyao* account states he was decapitated in Fushunjian, while the *Changbian* claims he hanged himself in the tenth month.⁷²

The 1007 Guangxi Mutiny of Chen Jin

The second mutiny was led by Chen Jin (d. 1007), an officer in the Chenghai prefectural army commandery 澄海軍校 of Yizhou, Guangnan West Circuit in the far south of the Song (see Map 3).⁷³ As noted above, the Chenghai Army was a penal labor prefectural army, which means Chen and his comrades were likely convicts.⁷⁴ The revolt was in response to the cruel acts of Yizhou's Prefect Liu Yonggui 劉永規 (d. 1007). Liu forced the soldiers to gather timber in wind and rain so he could repair the prefectural government offices, beating those who failed to meet their quota and making their wives collect wood as well. Chen killed Liu and seized the seat of Yizhou in the sixth month of 1007, forcing the Vice Prefect 通判 Lu Chengjun (fl. 1000s) to lead the mutiny.⁷⁵ They tried to move upstream, but their attacks on nearby Huaiyuanjun 懷遠軍 in

⁷¹ SHY Bing 10.10-12. For the location of Jianmen, see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 29-30.

⁷² SHY Bing 10.11-12 and CB 47.1027. Since Wang is posthumously decapitated in the *Changbian* account, it may be that his suicide was omitted from the *Song huiyao*.

⁷³ SHY Bing 10.12.

⁷⁴ Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 81.

⁷⁵ CB 66.1472.

Yizhou and Tianhezhai 天河寨 in Rongzhou 融州 failed.⁷⁶ He then headed downstream to Liuzhou 柳州, capturing the seat after the prefect fled.⁷⁷ His forces moved on to Xiangzhou 象州 where they besieged the city for forty days but were unable to take it.⁷⁸ In the meantime, there was a buildup of government forces in Guizhou 桂州 to the north of Xiangzhou, under the command of the pacification commissioner 安撫使 Cao Liyong 曹利用 (971-1029).⁷⁹ As Song troops moved to relieve Xiangzhou, the mutineers found themselves trapped. Chen Jin was beheaded and the leader Lu Chengjun captured.⁸⁰

The 1043 Shandong Mutiny of Wang Lun

The third mutiny in this study was the Wang Lun (d. 1043) mutiny in 1043 that erupted in Jingdong East Circuit (modern Shandong, see Map 4) in the northeast corner of the Song and moved south into the two Huainan circuits (modern Jiangsu and Anhui, see Map 5).⁸¹ The circumstances surrounding the beginning of the Wang Lun mutiny are opaque. Wang was a soldier in the Huyi 虎翼 Army when he killed the patrolling inspector 巡檢 of Yizhou, Zhu Jin 朱進 (d. 1043), in the fifth month of 1043.⁸² Why he did this is not explained in the extant

⁷⁶ CB 66.1483-1484. There is uncertainty about when this occurred and who was responsible for the defense of Huaiyuanjun. For the locations of these places, see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35. In Tan Qixiang's map, following information dated to 1111, Huaiyuanjun does not exist, but there is a Huaiyuanzhai (Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35). The *Changbian* records that Huaiyuanjun was a haltered-and-bridled prefecture that was abolished and replaced with Huaiyuanzhai 懷遠寨 in 1075 (CB 260.6351). Since it was a haltered-and-bridled prefecture, the "prefect" in charge must have been a local indigenous leader whose authority was acknowledged by the court.

⁷⁷ CB 66.1484.

⁷⁸ SHY Bing 10.13.

⁷⁹ CB 66.1472. The troops were told to wait at Guizhou for Cao's arrival and then attack with combined forces.

⁸⁰ SHY Bing 10.13-14. Here Lu Chengjun is described as the leader (*zeishou* 賊首) and Chen Jin called a "false general (*weijiang* 偽將)." There is no evidence of Lu's fate, though he likely was killed.

⁸¹ SHY Bing 10.14.

⁸² CB 141.3981 and SHY Bing 10.14. The *Songshi* does not list Yizhou as one of the locations of a Huyi Army commandery (SS 187.4594). It is likely that Wang Lun was a deserter from a Huyi garrison in Jingdong West who fled to Yizhou and killed Zhu Jin, perhaps to avoid being arrested. However, evidence points to the existence of other Huyi units that are not mentioned in the *Songshi*. For example, Zhenzong ordered Huyi Army troops from Qizhou 蘄州 and Huangzhou 黃州 in Huainan to fight the 1007 mutiny of Chen Jin in Guangxi; these prefectures

record, but it is possible that Wang had deserted from a Huyi garrison in Jingdong West Circuit. Wang first attempted to travel northward to Qingzhou 青州 but soon turned southward, crossing into Huainan.⁸³ Ouyang Xiu reported that the mutineers gradually increased to two to three hundred men and robbed openly as they “ran amuck in Huaihai as if no one was there.”⁸⁴ In the seventh month Fu Yongji 傅永吉 (fl. 1040s), who had been dispatched by the Qingzhou prefect and Jingdong military intendant Chen Zhizhong 陳執中 (991-1059), led forces in an attack at Hezhou 和州, near the border with Jiangnan East circuit, killing Wang.⁸⁵ It is noteworthy that Fu pursued the mutineers down to the Yangzi across two circuits.⁸⁶

The 1044 Hebei Mutiny at Baozhou

The fourth mutiny broke out in Baozhou, Hebei West Circuit (see Map 6) on the northern border of the Song in the eighth month of 1044 in response to Baozhou Vice Prefect Shi Daiju’s 石待舉 (d. 1044) proposal to reduce payments to garrisoned soldiers there and to replace the customary eunuch commander with a military official. Following an altercation between Shi and Director-in-Chief 都監 Wei Gui 韋貴 (fl. 1040s-1050s), a number of soldiers rose up in arms. The prefect Liu Jizong 劉繼宗 (d. 1044) and Shi Daiju initially tried to resist with the help of loyal soldiers in the Wudi and Zhaoshou commanderies, but then they tried to escape, dying in the process. The initial mutineers closed the gates of the city and turned to Patrolling Inspector and Director-in-Chief Wang Shouyi 王守一 (d. 1044), asking him to become their leader. Wang

are not listed in the dynastic history (CB 66.1472). While this suggests that Yizhou’s Huyi garrison might be missing from the *Songshi* list as well, this seems less probable. Ouyang Xiu does call Wang an “Yizhou soldier,” but this might be because he killed Zhu there (CB 141.3388).

⁸³ CB 142.3398.

⁸⁴ QSW 32:679.108.

⁸⁵ SHY Bing 10.14. The *Changbian* states Fu did receive help from the Jianghuai Supply Commissioner 江淮制置發運使 Xu Di 徐的 (fl. 1040s), see CB 142.3398.

⁸⁶ See Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 14-15 (Jingdong) and 22-23 (Huainan).

refused, and was promptly killed. They then turned to Wei Gui, who agreed to lead them, likely due to what had happened to Wang Shouyi.⁸⁷ Wei for his part was reluctant to carry on the mutiny. He sought to limit the looting and attacks on civilians in Baozhou, and he encouraged his fellow soldiers to surrender.⁸⁸

Meanwhile, the Song dispatched troops to surround the city, and sent Tian Kuang 田況 (1005-1063) and later Fu Bi 富弼 (1004-1083) to oversee the siege.⁸⁹ Renzong ordered Xiongzhou 雄州 Prefect Wang Deji 王德基 (fl. 1040s) to patrol the Song-Liao border to prevent any unrest among the people living there.⁹⁰ The emperor sent an amnesty to the mutineers in return for their surrender. The soldiers remained skeptical of the imperial decree and asked to meet with Li Zhaoliang 李昭亮 (992-1063), a well-known military officer who was related by marriage to the Song imperial clan.⁹¹ Li arrived, and yet they still were unwilling to submit until another officer, Guo Kui 郭逵 (1022-1088), scaled the city wall and persuaded them to open the gates. Upon entering the city, most soldiers seem to have surrendered without incident, but 429 members of a Yunyi Army commandery were summarily executed by being thrown down a well and buried alive. The survivors, who numbered over two thousand, were pardoned and dispersed across other military garrisons.⁹² Wei Gui was among those who survived; he was demoted rather than executed due to his efforts to limit violence and robbery and to convince his fellow soldiers to give up.⁹³

⁸⁷ CB 151.3676.

⁸⁸ CB 152.3700.

⁸⁹ CB 151.3683 (for Tian) and 3688 (for Fu). Fu Bi was explicitly ordered by the Secretariat-Chancellery and Bureau of Military Affairs (jointly referred to as the Two Administrations 兩府) to travel to Baozhou (SHY Bing 10.15). Troops within the Hebei circuit had already begun to move upon learning about the mutiny (CB 151.3676).

⁹⁰ CB 151.3683.

⁹¹ For Li's relationship, being the son of the elder brother of Taizong's Empress Li (960-1004), see SS 464.13563.

⁹² CB 151.3688. The identity of this group is most clearly stated in Sima Guang's 司馬光 (1019-1086) account, where he states that one of the last commanderies to surrender was buried alive. See *Sushui jiwèn* 4.70.

⁹³ CB 152.3699-700.

The 1047-1048 Hebei Mutiny of Wang Ze

The fifth and final mutiny examined here is the mutiny led by Wang Ze, which broke out in Beizhou in Hebei East Circuit in the northeastern edge of the Song during the winter of 1047-1048 (see Map 7). Before Wang became the leader of a mutiny, he had fled to the Song from Liao during a famine and helped tend sheep in Beizhou before joining the garrison, where he was eventually promoted to an officer in the Xuanyi Army. Along the way he became acquainted with two clerks at the prefectural offices, Zhang Luan 張巒 (d. 1048) and Bu Ji 卜吉 (d. 1048). They belonged to a religious sect that believed the Maitreya Buddha was coming.⁹⁴ Wang, Zhang, and Bu plotted to assassinate the Damingfu prefect Jia Changchao and sever the pontoon bridge (*fuliang* 浮梁, literally a “floating bridge”) spanning the Yellow River at Chanzhou.⁹⁵ Since Jia was also concurrently Hebei’s military intendant and was thus responsible for the region’s military, killing him would weaken the coordination of loyal troops.⁹⁶ The mutineers presumably believed that destroying the bridge would also impede the movement of Song forces from Kaifeng, which was south of the river. While the objective of these actions is not explicitly stated, the plot suggests that Wang and his supporters hoped to buy time to expand and consolidate their position in Hebei before the court could reassert control.

However, Pan Fangjing, the assassin sent to kill Jia, was captured, and the conspirators had to carry out their plans immediately. They seized the prefectural seat of Beizhou, and in the tumult those officials who did not side with Wang Ze were killed, captured, or put to flight. After

⁹⁴ Wang claimed to be a buddha, owing to a mark on his back resembling the character *fu* 福, though the *Changbian* account suggests it was a tattoo given to him by his mother. Wang used the title of “Buddha 佛” after he rebelled (see CB 161.3890).

⁹⁵ CB 161.3890. The *Changbian* does not explicitly say it was a bridge across the Yellow River, but it flowed through the prefecture and would represent a serious barrier for reinforcements from the capital if traffic over the river was blocked. See Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 16-17.

⁹⁶ CB 161.3890. Jia is named as “Regent of the Northern Capital 北京留守” in this passage, but in his biography it is clear he was concurrently Damingfu prefect and Hebei military intendant, see SS 285.9619.

sealing the gates, Wang began to establish a government and took symbolic steps such as changing the reign period and calendar. Males in Beizhou aged twelve to seventy were pressed into service and swore an oath to overthrow the Song.⁹⁷ In response to the mutiny, the court first sent Ming Hao to recapture Beizhou, but when he was unable to take the city, Vice Grand Councilor Wen Yanbo was dispatched to head the operations as pacification commissioner 宣撫使.⁹⁸ A breakthrough occurred when Song forces tunneled under the city walls, defeating the mutineers and capturing Wang Ze, thus ending the conflict after sixty-five days.⁹⁹

Causes of the Mutinies

What sparked the mutinies? The accounts suggest cruelty by superior officers or officials was a major cause. In Sichuan, the mutiny was triggered by Military Administrator Fu Zhaoshou's excessive flogging of a soldier. In Guangxi, it was the way Prefect Liu Yonggui forced soldiers and their families to perform hard labor in difficult conditions. Disagreements over reduced payments sparked the first mutiny in Hebei. For the other two mutinies, the circumstances surrounding Wang Lun are unclear, but he may have been a deserter trying to avoid recapture. Given that his punishment was likely death for leaving his garrison, Wang may have felt he had no choice but to kill Zhu Jin and attempt to flee; cruelty not by a single official but rather by the entire state apparatus may have driven his decision. The only case that has no suggestion of cruelty as a precipitating factor was the second Hebei mutiny, where Wang Ze made plans for an uprising that was part-mutiny, part-millenarian rebellion.

⁹⁷ CB 161.3890.

⁹⁸ SS 292.9770 and CB 162.3902-03. In addition to Ming's mistakes, this passage in the *Changbian* also recorded that the Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs 樞密使, Xia Song 夏竦 (985-1051), despised Ming and blocked his reports. This suggests that the court sent Wen Yanbo in light of an interpersonal conflict. The characterization of Xia here seems apt. In 1043, he accused the Qingli reform movement of plotting a coup, using a forged letter allegedly from the reformer Shi Jie 石介 (1005-1045); see Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu*, 49 and CB 150.3637.

⁹⁹ SS 292.9771.

However, it is possible to identify additional underlying causes by examining the broader historical context. The Sichuan mutiny in 1000 was only five years after the violent end to a massive rebellion there headed by Wang Xiaobo 王小波 (d. 994) and Li Shun 李順 (d. 994).¹⁰⁰ The mutiny was in fact the final of five major uprisings in the region, which had been restive ever since the Song conquered the kingdom of Later Shu 後蜀 (934-965).¹⁰¹ The mutineers who rose up in Yizhou, Guangnan West Circuit in 1007 were living amid non-Han ethnic groups whose attitude towards the Song could be hostile at times; in 999, the prefect there, Feng Li 馮勵 (d. 999), was killed battling a group known as the Xi Man 溪蠻.¹⁰² These difficulties likely kept tensions high and made it easier to reach a breaking point like when Liu Yonggui began to abuse the soldiers there. The three mutinies in the 1040s occurred at a time when there were tensions with the Liao to the north and Xixia to the northwest. The 1043 Shandong mutiny and the 1044 Hebei mutiny erupted while the Song waged its costly war with the Xixia. The 1047-1048 Hebei mutiny broke out under relatively peaceful conditions, but the whole northern border area from Hebei in the east to Shaanxi in the west was the site of a heavy military build-up throughout the Northern Song.¹⁰³

Chapter Outlines

This dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter looks at how officials understood mutinies. Officials frequently tied mutinies to other forms of unrest, namely banditry,

¹⁰⁰ Lorge, *Reunification of China*, 225-35 for a description of the Wang Xiaobo-Li Shun Rebellion of 993-995.

¹⁰¹ Chen, "Managing the Territories," 5.

¹⁰² CB 45.964. Feng was replaced by Zhang Conggu 張從古 (sometimes named as Congji 從吉, d. 1007), who had himself previously fought the Xi Man when he served as prefect of Yizhou.

¹⁰³ For more information on the conditions which helped fuel unrest among the soldiers, Elad Alyagon's dissertation provides a solid and thorough description and analysis. His third chapter overall looks at ways that soldiers and commoners being pushed towards conscription resisted the state (Alyagon, "Inked," 152-99). A most helpful complement to my brief discussion of the causes of mutinies here is Alyagon's sections relating to mutinies specifically, where he uses the Baozhou mutiny in particular as a case study (Alyagon, "Inked," 184-95).

and even to meteorological or celestial phenomena. The rhetoric and terminology used to describe the mutineers and their actions also share similarities with that used for bandits. They also brought up uprisings in previous dynasties, like the An Lushan Rebellion of the Tang. That rebellion was particularly instructive, as An Lushan was a powerful general who eventually broke with the Tang court and captured both Luoyang and Chang'an. The event underscored the danger the military could pose to a dynasty; even though the Tang did not fall to An, the central government's position vis-à-vis the military governors weakened considerably following his defeat. Officials tied mutinies to other forms of unrest, both contemporary and historical, in order to stress the level of threat the dynasty faced.

By making such connections, officials hoped to spur the court to adopt proposals they believed would defeat the mutineers and prevent future unrest. These proposals included offering pardons or rewards to anyone who surrendered—especially if they killed a leader of the mutiny on their way out, improving physical defenses and recruiting more soldiers or law enforcement personnel, and drawing in marginal groups, such as convicts, bandits, and even failed examination candidates, to assist the state. Through a study of such proposals, we can gain a better understanding of what kinds of actions officials thought were possible or desirable for the state to carry out. This helps reveal the degree the state was thought to be able to reach into society to influence those outside the government, at least in the minds of its agents.

In the second chapter, I focus on the criteria the Song court used to decide which officials would lead the suppression campaigns. Military expertise was, of course, a primary concern when making selections, and the vast majority of officials chosen had previously served in or overseen military operations. However, the court also wanted to ensure that officials would act in the state's interests while in the field with relatively little supervision. To improve its confidence

in the commanders it dispatched, the court relied on a mix of military officials, civil officials, and eunuchs. Military officials did play an important role, but only made up a slim majority of those explicitly ordered to head the campaigns. Their knowledge and experience in military matters were of course essential for any successful effort against the mutinies. Civil officials were appointed, often in the top position of a campaign. Many also had previous knowledge overseeing the military in wartime, and in many ways their leadership on these campaigns paralleled the civilian control of the army in times of peace. Finally, eunuchs were also selected to fill a variety of roles, from assisting the leaders of campaigns to delivering imperial amnesties. Some could boast extensive military experience, while others served as messengers or even acted as observers of the army and the officials leading it.

The role of geography in shaping the state's actions during a mutiny is the subject of my third chapter. I look at each region where a mutiny broke out individually. I first examine the preexisting conditions of a given region. The Song state's long-term presence and interests in that location were shaped by the historical circumstances, physical geography, the government's relationship with neighboring states, and the broader concerns of the maintenance of the empire. These conditions affected how the Song could respond to a mutiny, forcing distinct approaches to mutiny suppression. Following the end of a mutiny, the government sought to prevent a recurrence of uprisings by adjusting the state's resources there, often altering the administrative landscape in the process.

Finally, I turn to the suppression of the mutinies and their aftermaths. For the former issue, I focus on two aspects. First, I look at how the disparity of power between the mutineers and the Song state affected their approaches to one another. In short, the government brought its vastly greater resources, both human and material, to bear against the mutineers. A mutiny's

leaders could not hope to defeat the Song through force alone. While mutineers were willing to employ force to acquire supplies and boost the number of its supporters, they needed other means to support their cause. They made efforts to assert their legitimacy and question the Song's. Through the creation of fledgling governments and symbolic measures like changing reign era titles and public pronouncements against the sitting dynasty, mutineers presented themselves as an alternative to the Song, something the government did its best to refute.

This chapter also deals with the related question of the Song's relationship with local society. Both the government and mutineers sought local support, and the state had to reassert control and attempt to rebuild relations with people in its bid to prevent future outbreaks. With the aftermath of the mutiny, the state also gave rewards and carried out punishments.

Unsurprisingly, mutineers and those who joined them were generally punished while those loyal to the Song reaped rewards. Nevertheless, the court did often live up to its promise to pardon those who surrendered, but it still used means to surveil or control them to lessen the potential for further unrest. The government was also quick to punish those officials who were seen as responsible for allowing a mutiny to break out or failing to block its spread. In some cases, an official performed admirably in certain ways and miserably in others. In those situations, high officials sometimes discussed what the appropriate measures that should be taken were. This was important since others in the bureaucracy would learn what fate awaited an official who performed with mixed results in the face of a difficult situation.

Sources

For this study, I employ a variety of sources to get a more comprehensive picture of the Song court's response to the mutinies. These range from histories to government documents to

biographies. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, and so it is worthy establishing them now. In addition, I will cover other complications that the sources present at relevant points.

To develop an overview of the mutiny, the first step is to consult histories written on the Northern Song. The most famous and thorough of these is the *Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian* (*A Draft of the Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government* 續資治通鑑長編), hereafter the *Changbian*. As the title suggests, this was a rough draft of a text intended to serve as a sequel to the original *Comprehensive Mirror* written by the famous historian and statesman Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086). The compiler Li Tao 李濤 (1115-1184) aimed to provide a morally-grounded account of the Northern Song in the vein of Sima's earlier work. He left behind a very detailed account of events at the Song court. Li drew from a wide array of non-extant texts, providing information that would otherwise be lost.¹⁰⁴ The original draft spanned the entirety of the Northern Song, but some sections are now missing, most notably in the latter half of the Northern Song.¹⁰⁵ The text remains massive, and due to its unwieldy size scholars sometimes offered alternative compilations derived from the main text. Yang Zhongliang 楊仲良 rearranged the text to provide all the portions of a particular event in a single section for his *Tongjian changbian jishi benmo* 通鑑長編紀事本末.¹⁰⁶ While Yang's version does make it easier to read about an event, the *Changbian* itself remains valuable for providing the other happenings that affected the court at the same time and giving details of officials' careers not found in their extant biographies. A key pitfall, however, is that the *Changbian* is very focused on the court. There is information on events outside of court such as battles and the actions of

¹⁰⁴ Hervouet, ed., *A Sung Bibliography*, 72-75.

¹⁰⁵ Charles Hartman notes the suspicious nature of the gaps, as they span many of the years the reforms were in place. He argues that *Daoxue* opponents of the New Policies purposefully removed them. See Hartman, "Sung Government and Politics," 25.

¹⁰⁶ Hervouet, ed., *A Sung Bibliography*, 74.

territorial officials, but they often appear in the context of a debate at or reaction from the court. This is less of a problem when the goal is to examine how the court responded to mutinies, but worth keeping in mind.

While the *Changbian* is the most valuable historical account of the mutinies, there is also the *Songshi* (*History of the Song* 宋史). This is the official dynastic history of the Song, compiled in the 1340s under the supervision of the Yuan (1271-1368) court. This was done simultaneously with the histories of the Liao (916-1125) and Jin (1115-1234) dynasties, and it is regarded as rather poorly edited.¹⁰⁷ The annals of each emperor's reign have information on some of the mutinies but are very terse, while the treatises do offer some helpful information, such as tracking the alterations made to prefectures over the course of the dynasty. The biography section is by far the most useful as it provides information on the careers of many officials involved in the suppression campaigns. One can also find accounts of individuals' actions during the mutinies within their biographies as well, which helps to flesh out developments.

The third major source for this study is the *Song huiyao jigao* (*Draft of the Essential Song Documents* 宋會要輯稿), hereafter *Song huiyao*. As with other dynasties' *huiyao*, this was a compendium of government documents about state institutions arranged into broad rubrics, including the "Offices 職官," "Territories 方域," and "Military 兵" sections which are the most useful for our purposes here. These in turn are further divided into subsections; for example, the Offices section includes chapters on offices and on promotions and demotions. There are also brief summaries of the mutinies provided under the "Suppressing Rebellions 討叛" chapters of

¹⁰⁷ The editors of the *Siku zongmu tiyao*, the catalog of the eighteenth century compilation *Siku quanshu*, criticized the *Songshi* as having too much emphasis on establishing the orthodoxy of the Daoxue movement and neglecting other matters: "Therefore, mistakes and errors are beyond count" (*Siku quanshu zongmu tiyao* 46.1008-09).

the Military rubric.¹⁰⁸ During the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), Xu Song 徐松 (1781-1848) reconstituted the *Song huiyao* by gleaning passages from the original that survived in the major Ming encyclopedia, the 15th century *Yongle dadian* 永樂大典. Even with the aid of the encyclopedia, the *Song huiyao* is missing a great deal of information.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the details that have survived are still invaluable.

In addition to these three sources which served as the base of my research, there are other accounts and sources scattered across numerous other works. While the biographies of the *Songshi* are helpful, there are other records of peoples' lives. These include funerary inscriptions 墓誌銘, spirit path inscriptions 神道碑銘, and records of conduct 行狀. Funerary and spirit path inscriptions tend to have more information on the family of the deceased. Records of conduct were compiled by an official's family and submitted to the government. They focus primarily on an individual's career, going into greater detail than the *Songshi* biographies, which were actually derived from the records of conduct. Memorials and edicts are also an important source of information to gain insight into how officials and the emperor thought about mutinies and how they proposed to end them. Collected writings 文集 put together the memorials, funerary inscriptions, records of conduct, and other documents penned by one individual. Imperial edicts and orders are found in the *Changbian* and *Song huiyao*, but also were assembled in collections of their own, like the *Song da zhaoling ji* (*Collection of Major Decrees of the [Northern] Song* 宋大詔令集). Today the editors of the *Quan Song wen* (*The Complete Song Prose* 全宋文) have compiled these writings and many others gleaned from Song sources, arranging them by author. Other texts offer useful details as well. The 1080 Song geography *Yuanfeng Jiuyu zhi* (*Treatise*

¹⁰⁸ I use "rebellion" as opposed to mutiny here because the mutinies are covered alongside uprisings by non-Han ethnic groups and popular uprisings like that of Fang La 方臘 (d. 1121).

¹⁰⁹ Hervouet, ed., *A Sung Bibliography*, 177-78.

of the Nine Regions during the Yuanfeng Reign 元豐九域志) provides information on each county and prefecture with details on changes made to them. For specifics on the Song military, a valuable resource is the *Wujing zongyao* (*Complete Essentials of the Military Classics* 武經總要), a court project finished in 1044.

While the sources are replete with excellent information, it is important to keep a few issues in mind. First, the authors of all the texts were the political and social elite of the Song.¹¹⁰ Because of this, they had a loyalty to the dynasty that influenced their attitudes, especially towards anyone taking up arms against the state. Such a bias no doubt shaped their views, and those of their peers in government, towards the mutineers and informed their proposals for suppression. Second, the mutineers themselves are silent. Any writings they had composed are no longer extant, and even confessions—problematic as they would be due to the likelihood they were extracted under torture—no longer exist. We must consequently rely upon hostile authors from the scholar-official class to learn about the rationale and actions of the mutinous soldiers. Taken together, these two problems mean there is a strong bias in favor of the Song and against the mutineers in the extant writings covering the mutinies. However, since the purpose of this dissertation is to examine how the state responded to mutinies, this is less of a problem than it would be if the objective was to determine what actually caused the mutinies and to present the mutineers' perceptions.

Third, the types of information available for each mutiny vary. Much of the source material for the 1043 Shandong mutiny led by Wang Lun, for example, comes from the memorials submitted to the throne by the remonstrance officials 諫官 Ouyang Xiu and Cai

¹¹⁰ The *Songshi* is somewhat of an exception, as it was compiled at the Yuan court. However, the materials used for the history primarily came from the Song government.

Xiang 蔡襄 (1012-1067). Details about the mutiny itself and its suppression are sketchy. By contrast, there is considerable information in the *Changbian* about the ups and downs of the siege against the 1047-1048 Hebei mutiny of Wang Ze, but there are few preserved memorials or edicts at court. As a consequence, the collected writings provide great detail about the former mutiny but the historical accounts do not have much to offer, while the opposite was true for the latter mutiny. The difference in these cases seems to be tied in part to the renown of the authors. Ouyang was one of the “Eight Prose Masters of the Tang and Song 唐宋八大家” while Cai’s writings remain prized for his calligraphic mastery. This enhanced the chances that their memorials would survive to the present. While we have far more sources from the Song than from earlier periods, much was lost to attrition over the centuries, and even aesthetics could secure the survival of some texts over others. We would of course prefer consistency in the types of sources available for each mutiny, but must make do with what is still around in the present.

Chapter 1

Understandings of Mutinies and How to Suppress Them

When confronted with a crisis like a mutiny, officials frequently submitted memorials advising the emperor on the best course of action. These memorials allow us to investigate two different but related issues pertaining to mutiny suppression. The first is how the political elite of the Song understood mutinies. Why did they occur, what was their significance, and why did people join them? The explanations offered by the emperor and his officials provide insight into their views on the relationship between the state, society, and the mutineers and the tensions they identified which resulted in an uprising. The second issue is what kind of proposals officials made to end the mutinies and prevent their recurrence. As will be seen, it is clear that officials' views on mutinies and state-society relations informed their proposals.

Conceptions about Mutinies

In an effort to underscore the gravity of the crisis confronting the dynasty, both the emperor and his officials drew on their understanding of mutinies and employed language intended to disparage or delegitimize the mutineers while also presenting them as an urgent threat. Examining their rhetoric helps to clarify what they thought of mutinies and the people who joined them. While there was some lexical distinction between mutineers and bandits of unspecified origin, there was a blurred boundary between mutinies on the one hand and banditry or popular rebellion on the other. This was perhaps in part a rhetorical device to emphasize the danger such unrest posed. However, mutinies sometimes drew in other elements of society. This suggests that the lack of a clear distinction represents not a failing of the officials to differentiate between various types of unrest, but rather a recognition that some mutinies spread into society beyond a cohort of disaffected soldiers. Through an examination of the language used in

memorials and edicts and the comparisons made between contemporary uprisings and those in earlier periods, we can learn what those at court thought of the mutinies.

While this section looks at rhetoric in order to understand how members of the court urged the prompt suppression of a mutiny, it is worth noting that other concerns, such as personal aggrandizement or factional interests, could play a role in shaping a proposal. While it is important to keep such motives in mind, the focus in this chapter is to look at the edicts and proposals to the throne with an eye towards how the authors grappled with what mutinies were, why they occurred, and what would stop them.

Terminology

Officials used a common set of words to refer to the mutineers and their actions in a way that presented the mutinies as menacing and illegitimate. The terms used for the mutineers themselves connected them to other armed threats to the dynasty's stability, while the verbs employed in official documents underline that the mutiny was disruptive and violent. By using such language, members of the court made it clear they thought the rebellious soldiers were a threat, but also that their power was illegitimate. Since dynastic legitimacy rested on the presumption that the dynasty was virtuous and therefore deserving to rule, this language could simultaneously reassure a leader while still imploring that he act.¹¹¹

The most common term used for the mutineers was *junzei* 軍賊, which appears in both memorials and historical accounts, although the meaning of *junzei* was used for more people

¹¹¹ It would be surprising, of course, if any different language was employed at court, since even a suggestion that the mutineers had any legitimacy would no doubt have been seen as treasonous. However, as will be seen below, the concern was that continued inaction would not only allow the mutiny to persist, but also allow for greater threats to manifest. In public proclamations, such as acts of grace (*deyin* 德音), it was also important to use language which argued that the mutineers were fomenting disorder in order to counter efforts to present their cause as legitimate.

than just those soldiers who rebelled against the authority of local officials or the dynasty.¹¹² The term comes from the characters *jun*, meaning “soldier” or “military,” and *zei*, meaning “thief” or “rebel.” “Mutineer” is an apt translation in the cases studied here, as they involved the killing of superior officers and officials and usually a rejection of the Song’s authority. This was the case with the 1007 Guangnan West mutiny, for example, because Chen Jin killed the Yizhou Prefect Liu Yonggui and later proclaimed himself the “King Who Pacifies the South 南平王.”¹¹³

However, *junzei* could also refer to deserters. During the Sichuan mutiny led by Wang Jun in 1000, Tian Xi 田錫 (940-1003) commented:

In places near the capital, there are many reports of *junzei* betraying us and fleeing... afterwards we drove them out. Although it is somewhat peaceful, recently the Khitan violated our borders, and I heard that two or three thousand soldiers in the Longmeng Army feigned an engagement with the Khitan, and pillaged Hebei. Now I hear they have scattered into the mountains and forests of Yanzhou. 近京諸處，多報軍賊逃背，沿黃河掠軍縣；後來驅除，雖稍寧息，昨契丹犯境，聞龍猛兵士三二千人詐作契丹，擄劫河北，今聞散在兗州山林間。¹¹⁴

Tian next mentioned Wang Jun, but he did not clearly distinguish between soldiers who fled battle and pillaged Hebei, on the one hand, and Wang who captured Chengdu, the most important city in Sichuan, on the other.¹¹⁵ From the perspective of Tian, they were both groups

¹¹² For some examples of *junzei*’s usage in the context of mutinies, see CB 142.3398 (for Wang Lun in Sichuan), CB 151.3683-84 (for Baozhou, Hebei’s mutineers), and CB 161.3891 (for Beizhou, Hebei’s mutineers).

¹¹³ CB 66.1472. The 1044 mutiny in Baozhou, Hebei was an exception since the leader of the mutineers, Wei Gui, wanted to surrender (CB 152.3699-700). However, there were 429 soldiers who were killed (CB 151.3688).

¹¹⁴ QSW 5:87.127.

¹¹⁵ QSW 5:87.127.

of soldiers acting beyond the control of Song authorities, and this warranted the epithet of *junzei* in each case.

The distinction between mutineers and other groups who carried out armed violence becomes fuzzier still with the term *zei*. As a noun, it could be used by itself or, more commonly, as a compound word. A frequent compound word using *zei* was *daozei* 盜賊, used for people who banded together and robbed using violence. *Daozei* are usually translated into English as “bandits.”¹¹⁶ Mutineers could also fall under the broader category of *daozei* sometimes, as when Ouyang Xiu discussed a general rise in banditry, but then specifically talked about Wang Lun.¹¹⁷ *Zei* also could refer to enemies beyond the Song’s borders, as seen with the frequent reference to “western rebels/bandits 西賊” when talking about the Xixia.¹¹⁸ When anti-state violence by Song subjects is part of what makes these groups *zei*, translating the word as “rebel” seems apt.

Officials also used the term *zei* by itself or in combination with another character to refer to mutineers, as seen with “[Wang] Jun’s rebels 均賊,” “wicked (or heterodox) rebels 妖賊,” and “the rebels of Bei[zhou] 貝賊.”¹¹⁹ Unlike *junzei*, the term *zei* could be used for civilians who sided with or were coerced into supporting the mutineers, as when Ma Zhijie 馬知節 (955-1019) stated, “[During] the disorders of Li Shun (993-995) and Wang Jun, among the commoners 民 of

¹¹⁶ See McKnight, *Law and Order*, 85-94 for a discussion of banditry (page 89 for an explanation of the term *daozei*).

¹¹⁷ CB 161.3388. He also refers to Wang as a *junzei*, which suggests that Ouyang saw mutineers as a type of bandit.

¹¹⁸ For example, Fu Bi’s memorial in 1043 (CB 143.3450).

¹¹⁹ For the use of *zei* in regards to a mutiny, see QSW 5:89.167, 6:108.72, 8:163.219, 10:216.425, and two memorials on QSW 30:643.161-62. The line containing *zei* in Tian Xi’s congratulatory memorial (QSW 5:89.167) is repeated in Zhang Yong’s 張詠 (946-1015) own congratulatory memorial (QSW 6:108.72). The almost verbatim repetition (Zhang left out some information, mostly names, and changed *zei* to *zeiren* 賊人) suggests they were copying down a portion of a report of the victory over Wang Jun sent to officials throughout the empire; Tian’s mention of reading the court bulletin 邸報 reinforces this suspicion. For 均賊, see QSW 10:216.425; for 妖賊, see QSW 30:643.161; and for 貝賊, see QSW 30:643.161. Winston W. Lo briefly mentions the court bulletins (calling them the “official gazette”), noting they were sent through the postal system across the empire every ten days, providing officials with information of news at court and in the bureaucracy (Lo, *Civil Service*, 49-50).

Shu there were those who became rebels 為賊, tattooing their faces and falsely administering [affairs].”¹²⁰ Since commoners are mentioned here, using *junzei* would have been problematic. This may help explain why some memorials included mutinies alongside other forms of popular resistance, a topic discussed below. To put it briefly, the use of *zei* in reference to mutineers ties them to other forms of violent collective actions, and helps point to a conception of mutinies as just a single manifestation of those actions, one that specifically involves soldiers rather than other groups in society.

To make matters more complicated, however, in Emperor Zhenzong’s edict calling on Wang Jun and his supporters in Chengdu to surrender, he wrote, “Previously Fu Zhaoshou (whose death by Zhao Yanshun sparked the Sichuan mutiny in 1000) neglected to change his ways. He was ignorant in [how to] soothe and pacify, and thus he caused you to fall into 陷 being criminals 匪人.”¹²¹ Fu had beaten soldiers repeatedly and excessively, and the resentment towards him among the troops culminated in his death. It is clear here that the emperor is writing only to Wang and his fellow mutineers who had grievances against Fu Zhaoshou, not the civilians who joined the uprising. Yet he referred to them as “criminals” who had fallen afoul of the law. This was not simply using a less harsh invective to persuade the soldiers to surrender, however, since Zhenzong was willing to refer to them as “traitorous soldiers 叛兵” in a later pardon after the death of Wang Jun while still extending the amnesty to “soldiers, commoners, and people of all sorts 軍民諸色人.”¹²²

¹²⁰ QSW 8:163.219.

¹²¹ QSW 10:216.424.

¹²² QSW 11:217.10-11. Zhenzong does, however, exclude “officials 官吏 and officers 使臣 not to be released,” so the offer might have been extended only to regular combat troops who did not hold significant rank.

There were also terms used to describe mutineers that gave more explicit moral judgments or emphasized the collective nature of these rebellious groups. For example, the emperor and officials called the followers of Wang Jun and Wang Ze “vicious followers 凶徒” and “evildoers 妖孽.”¹²³ The term *yao* is associated with evil and can mean demons or other ill-willed spirits (as in the word *yaoguai* 妖怪 meaning “monster”). Similarly, Wang Jun’s supporters were called *jianxie* 姦邪, meaning “treacherous and evil [people].”¹²⁴ Wang Jun himself was singled out as being a “savage opportunist 鷓張” and the “principal evil 元惡.”¹²⁵

Some terms emphasized that the mutineers were a “gang (*dang* 黨),” that is, a group that banded together illegitimately, as seen with terms like “vicious gang (*xiongdang* 兇黨),” “rebellious gang (*nidang* 逆黨),” and “vicious army (*xionglü* 凶旅).”¹²⁶ While the term army, or *lü*, could be used neutrally, *dang* generally had a negative connotation. As Ari Daniel Levine has shown in his study of factional politics during this period, *dang* was initially benign prior to the Qin unification, but by late Han times referred to “a malign faction at court.”¹²⁷ This held true in the Northern Song, where “*dang* and *pengdang* were often practically synonymous, and unambiguously meant a factional affiliation, a horizontal association of ministers that undermined the dynastic polity and overrode the vertical ties of loyalty between a monarch and his ministers.”¹²⁸ The mere insinuation of being in an exclusive group with fellow like-minded individuals who held political power was dangerous.¹²⁹ There were arguments, most notably by

¹²³ For *xiongtu*, see QSW 5:89.168, and for *yaonie*, see QSW 10:197.47 and QSW 30:643.161.

¹²⁴ QSW 14:283.180.

¹²⁵ QSW 14:283.180.

¹²⁶ For *xiongdang*, see QSW 6:108.72 and QSW 10:197.47; for *nidang*, see QSW 26:546.49; and for *xionglü*, see QSW 11:217.10.

¹²⁷ Levine, *Common Language*, 25-26.

¹²⁸ Levine, *Common Language*, 26-27.

¹²⁹ Fan Zhongyan did attempt to alter the conception by admitting to Emperor Renzong that he and his reformers constituted a faction (CB 148.3580-82). This did not persuade the emperor, and combined with other events to

Ouyang Xiu, which suggested that virtuous officials could form factions.¹³⁰ However, as Levine makes clear above, the general consensus during the Northern Song was that any *dang* was immoral. Therefore, the word was useful to delegitimize opponents, whether they were other officials at court or soldiers on the fringes of the empire.

When describing the actions mutineers took, authors stressed the chaotic nature of the mutinies. However, they also distinguished between leaders and followers. Brian E. McKnight has written that Song officials commonly differentiated between leaders and followers among bandits, with the former deserving severe punishment but the latter deserving mercy, and the same attitude held for mutineers when we look at the verbs employed.¹³¹

The act of mutiny was described in terms which illustrated that what the soldiers were doing was morally wrong. One common phrase used was *zuo luan* 作亂, meaning “to create chaos.”¹³² Similar phrases also appeared, such as “to create evil (*gounie* 搆孽)” and “to give birth to chaos (*zi luanjie* 滋亂階).”¹³³ Chaos (*luan*) was the undesirable opposite of the order (*zhi* 治) which a ruler was supposed to create and sustain. Since order was moral and the objective of a good ruler, the mutineers’ causing disorder made them both illegitimate and immoral.

Another word used was “to betray (*pan* 叛),” which authors employed as a verb, a noun, and as a modifier for a noun like with “traitorous troops (*panbing*)” discussed above.¹³⁴ *Pan* was

weaken the reformers’ position at court, ultimately leading to their dismissal and the end of the reforms (McGrath, “The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung,” 321-23).

¹³⁰ See Ouyang Xiu’s renowned essay, “On Factions (*Pengdang lun* 朋黨論),” where he asserted that gentlemen and petty men could both form factions, but only the factions of gentlemen were real, since the factions of petty men only lasted as long as they derived benefits from their association (see QSW 34:730.374-75 and CB 148.3580-82). According to James T.C. Liu, Ouyang did not believe this line of reasoning himself, but Fan Zhongyan had put the reformists in an awkward position by arguing they were a faction (Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu*, 54-56).

¹³¹ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 12-13.

¹³² QSW 5:87.127, 11:217.10, and 14:283.180.

¹³³ QSW 11:217.10 (for *gounie* and *zi luanjie*).

¹³⁴ For examples, see CB 48.1058 (for Sichuan’s mutiny), CB 66.1475 (for Guangnan), CB 141.3381 (for Jingdong), CB 151.3676 (for Baozhou, Hebei), and CB 161.3890 (for Beizhou, Hebei).

used to describe rebellious actions by those thought to be in some sort of service to the state, and therefore were supposed to display loyalty (*zhong* 忠) to the Song. Soldiers, of course, fell into this category. Officials did as well, as seen in Yang Yi's 楊億 (974-1020) call to execute "traitorous officials (*panchen* 叛臣)."¹³⁵ This could also extend to those who existed beyond the Song's borders, as when Fu Bi talked about the time "before the western rebels [i.e., the Tanguts of Xixia] had betrayed us 西賊未叛以前," the "betrayal" being Li Yuanhao's declaration of himself as emperor.¹³⁶ Officials held the leaders above all responsible for unrest. Wang Jun was accused of "harboring rebellious intentions (*huai nijie* 懷逆節)," "daring to sprout rebellious intentions (*gan meng nijie* 敢萌逆節)," and "hiding his rebellious attitude (*baocang nitai* 包藏逆態)."¹³⁷ In the last example, found in an edict written for the emperor by Hong Zhan 洪湛 (963-1003), after expressing the emperor's compassion and efforts to achieve peace, the emperor/Hong claimed that Wang "alone renounced the state's grace 孤負國恩."¹³⁸ This distancing of the leader of an uprising from his followers helped allow a potential reconciliation with the majority of rebel forces.

There remained a question about why people would join a mutiny against the state. McKnight finds that Song officials tried to offer reasons why people would commit crimes. While conceding that some individuals were beyond hope of reform, they embraced Mencius' notion that people could reform themselves, and that bad behavior was the result of the environment or a lack of moral cultivation.¹³⁹ From this, there was a sense that most people were

¹³⁵ QSW 14:283.180.

¹³⁶ QSW 28:601.302.

¹³⁷ QSW 5:89.168 (for *huai nijie*), 7:146.321 (for *gan meng nijie*), and 10:197.47 (for *baocang nitai*).

¹³⁸ QSW 10:197.47.

¹³⁹ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 6-9 for an overview of these beliefs and the role of environment (page 13 mentions the view that some people could not improve).

malleable. While this provided individuals the opportunity to improve themselves, it also allowed for them to be constrained or manipulated, whether by their environment or other people, into carrying out misdeeds.

Government documents reveal there was a clear view that the mutineers expanded unrest by manipulating the population through agitation and coercion. Emperor Zhenzong, for example, issued an edict which mentioned Wang Jun's "betrayal [of the Song] and disruption [of the people] (*panrao* 叛擾)."¹⁴⁰ Similarly, Zhang Yong argued that Wang agitated (*saodong* 搔動) people in cities adjacent to Chengdu.¹⁴¹ While these examples suggest that upheaval in Sichuan was the product of fear sparked by the mutiny, officials also used language which suggested that the mutineers actively tried to bolster support in the region, as when Wang "fanned and aroused (*shanyao* 扇搖) a vicious gang" to support him.¹⁴² He also was said to have "shouted to assemble (*xiaojū* 嘯聚)" followers.¹⁴³ In these examples, "the people" seem to lack any agency, simply being disturbed, agitated, or whipped up into supporting the mutiny. However, mutineers could also compel people to support the uprising against their will. The famously upright official Bao Zheng 包拯 (999-1062), for example, suggested in 1044 that the "rebellious gang" of soldiers in Baozhou, Hebei included those who had been "tricked into wrongdoing and compelled to follow (*guawu xiecong* 誑誤脅從)."¹⁴⁴ In Bao's view, supporters in Baozhou had made a conscious choice to join in the mutiny, but at least some did so because they were tricked or coerced, and this needed to be considered.

¹⁴⁰ QSW 11:218.37.

¹⁴¹ QSW 6:108.72. Zhang also claimed the mutiny "alarmed and disrupted distant places (*jingsao yuantu* 驚騷遠土)," suggesting that the disorder caused by the mutiny was not just limited to the areas directly affected (see QSW 10:197.47).

¹⁴² QSW 6:108.72.

¹⁴³ QSW 10:197.47.

¹⁴⁴ QSW 26:546.49.

Underlying these concerns about people being unsettled by mutinies or compelled to support them is an assumption that most of the population was readily open to manipulation. There was a recognition that this could be used both by and against the government. Bao Zheng's memorial demonstrates a view that some number of mutineers were deceived into supporting the 1044 uprising in Baozhou, Hebei. Concerns about people being misled could persist even after the suppression of unrest. In the twelfth month of 1001, over a year after Wang Jun's mutiny had been put down, Zhenzong ordered continued surveillance of western Sichuan due to unsettling rumors, commenting: "I have heard that since Wang Jun's betrayal and disruption in western Shu, people's hearts have not yet become tranquil, and also there are petty people who conceal each other and confuse [the people] (*qian xiang kuanghuo* 潛相誑惑)." ¹⁴⁵

At the same time, officials thought leniency would sow confusion among the mutineers. Asking the emperor to promote scholarly generals to fight, Wang Yucheng 王禹偁 (954-1001) said, "Although they would rely upon the nine methods of attack, especially the [method of] leaving the net open on three sides [that is, providing opportunity for the enemy to escape danger], [if the enemy] still dared to hold the cities, this would make them muddled (*mifu* 迷惑)." ¹⁴⁶ Bao Zheng requested that a eunuch be sent into Baozhou with an edict promising a pardon. He did not believe this would necessarily put an end to the mutiny, but could set in motion the mutineers' undoing:

Even if the rebellious gang is deluded (*mihuo* 迷惑), they will not yet trust and follow [the edict], [but] among them are people who were tricked into wrongdoing and compelled to follow. If we send the edict to them, there will inevitably be others who will

¹⁴⁵ QSW 11:218.37. He does not go into detail on what the rumors are, only expressing concern for how it would affect people's moods and asking for increased monitoring.

¹⁴⁶ QSW 7:146.321.

change, and perhaps this would completely alter the situation. 從逆黨迷惑，未即信從，其間誑誤脅從之人，以使命在彼，必有他變，或翻然改圖矣。¹⁴⁷

As seen here and in the discussion of proposals below, Song officials felt that it was possible to sow discord within the ranks of the mutineers as part of the suppression effort. Their belief in the ease with which many, if not most, people could be manipulated was central both to the fear of people being swayed or compelled to rebel and to the confidence that they could be persuaded to break away from rebel leaders and return to the fold as subjects.

Rhetoric

In addition to using a vocabulary intended to vilify and delegitimize the mutineers, government documents feature several methods to underscore the threat posed by unrest, to criticize the weakness of the Song's preparations and response, and to back up their proposals. Four methods used are historical analogies, references to classical texts, emphasizing the scope of disorder beyond mutinies and the threat of a mutiny to spread, and criticisms of the government's poor policies and conditions which created or exacerbated the crisis. Together, these approaches needed to be familiar and convincing to the court, and especially to the emperor, in order to move them to action.

Song officials drew upon history both to illustrate the seriousness of crises like mutinies and to offer solutions. The historical references employed by memorialists included examples from the past which served as a warning for the Song. Ouyang Xiu focused on this in the midst of the 1043 Wang Lun mutiny in Jingdong and Huainan, arguing that the raising of troops in response to threats actually worsened the situation for the Later Han (25-220), Sui (581-618), and Tang dynasties:

¹⁴⁷ QSW 26:546.49.

Your servant humbly observes that since antiquity the disaster and chaos of states in all cases were on account of soldiers first being raised, then bandits next arose, and subsequently they spread unchecked. The incidents of the Later Han, Sui, and Tang can be used as a mirror. 臣竊見自古國家禍亂，皆因兵革先興，而盜賊繼起，遂至橫流，後漢、隋、唐之事，可以為鑑。¹⁴⁸

In a later memorial, Ouyang repeated this statement in stronger terms:

I observe that the subcelestial realm is empty, completely lacking military preparations. I will point to and give an account of the perished states of the Late Han, Sui, and Tang. In all cases, on account of troops being raised, banditry arose. They [i.e., the soldiers] were not capable of attacking and eliminating [the bandits]; therefore, they spread unchecked. 為見天下空虛，全無武備，指陳後漢、隋、唐亡國之鑑，皆因兵革先興而盜賊繼起，不能撲滅，遂至橫流。¹⁴⁹

The connection to a Song mutiny was an issue of military leaders gaining power at the expense of the central government. We can see an example of this from the Tang. As noted in the introduction of the dissertation, the Tang court had to contend with powerful military governors following the An Lushan Rebellion in the eighth century. Song officials voiced concern about the potential for a similar recurrence in their dynasty. In 1062, Sima Guang warned about the broad powers of the military intendants. He noted that the court installed them during the war with Xixia but never dismantled the posts once the conflict ended. Sima worried that the power of the military intendants would undermine the court's authority, drawing a parallel with the

¹⁴⁸ QSW 32:679.108.

¹⁴⁹ QSW 32:681.135.

military governors of the Tang.¹⁵⁰ While Sima Guang presented his memorial after the period of our study, he was addressing the development of permanent military intendants in the 1040s. From Ouyang Xiu's memorials, it is clear he also believed there was a correlation between the raising of troops and a spread of unrest, and he feared the Song could head down the same path which doomed the earlier dynasties.

Although history could be used to warn the court, it could also be employed to argue for certain actions. The Han and Tang were again commonly cited. Looking at the natural disasters which struck the Song alongside unrest like the Wang Jun mutiny, Tian Xi noted that the Former Han (206 BC-9 AD) emperors issued amnesties when earthquakes or eclipses occurred, and he criticized Zhenzong for not doing the same.¹⁵¹ Cai Xiang, writing on the 1043 Wang Lun mutiny in Jingdong and Huainan, explained that Emperor Guangwu (r. 25-57), who restored the Han dynasty, effectively curbed banditry by rewarding bandits who turned on their leaders.¹⁵² The following year, Bao Zheng proposed that Renzong send a trusted eunuch to carry a pardon to the Baozhou mutineers in Hebei, citing as precedent the Tang emperor Dezong's (r. 779-805) decision to send Kong Chaofu 孔巢父 (d. 784) to convince a rebellious military governor named Li Huaiguang 李懷光 (729-785) to submit to Tang authority.¹⁵³ Officials also used history to dissuade the court from carrying out a particular action. Ma Liang 馬亮 (d. 1031) and Lei

¹⁵⁰ CB 196.4746-61 (esp. 4749 for the parallel between the military intendants and the Tang military governors). For a translation of a portion of Sima's memorial, see McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration," 206-07.

¹⁵¹ QSW 5:87.130.

¹⁵² QSW 46:1002.364.

¹⁵³ QSW 26:546.49. Further exploration of Kong's mission reveals that it is a confusing example to use in justifying sending a messenger. According to the *Jiu Tangshu*, Kong was killed by Li in the seventh month of 784, and the latter continued to rebel until his own death in the fall of 785, over a year later (*Jiu Tangshu* 121.3493-94 for the account in Li's biography, and 154.4096 for Kong's biography). This differs significantly from Bao Zheng's account, where he states, "Before long 未久, the commander Niu Jun 牛俊 beheaded Huaiguang, and through this surrendered the city." Perhaps Niu had a change of heart, but waiting more than a year after Kong's death to be swayed by his words is a bit unbelievable.

Youzhong sent a joint memorial to the emperor concerning plans to tear down a portion of Chengdu's fortifications known as a *yangmacheng* 羊馬城.¹⁵⁴ While acknowledging the problems the defensive structure posed in the event an enemy controlled Chengdu, they noted that it was built by Meng Zhixiang 孟知祥 (874-934) in order to defend the city from invasion by non-Han peoples generically called the “Man 蠻.” For Ma and Lei, this was a more constant concern compared to unusual and unpredictable events like the revolts of Wang Jun or Li Shun.¹⁵⁵

Another strategy used by officials was to stress the scope or spread of unrest by tying the mutiny to other disasters and painting a possible, dangerous trajectory for an unchecked uprising. Authors of memorials pointed out the rise of other forms of unrest alongside the mutiny, the occurrence of natural disasters, and the potential threat of external forces acting on the Song's internal weakness. Frequently these crises seem unrelated to one another, but the evidence in some cases, combined with the worldview of officials, helps explain why they made such connections.

In some memorials, officials listed in succession different forms of lawlessness, often involving locations far apart from one another. Tian Xi, for example, discussed the Wang Jun mutiny in Sichuan along with deserters in the capital region and looting following a retreat after a battle against Liao forces on the northern border. Aside from the Song's woes in controlling its

¹⁵⁴ This was a shorter, outer wall surrounding the main city wall. See *Wujing zongyao* 12.2.

¹⁵⁵ QSW 7:130.13. The *Quan Song wen* gives Lei Youzhong as the author, but the *Changbian* attributes the memorial to Ma and Lei (see CB 48.1058). The date they give for the beginning of construction by Meng is 928, the third year of the Tiancheng era of the Later Tang dynasty (923-937). At the time, he had served as military governor of Xichuan (the western portion of Sichuan) for three years on behalf of the Later Tang. In 934, Meng founded the Later Shu (934-965), six years after building the wall. For a biography of his life, see *Jiu Wudaishu* 136.1822-23.

own military, he also mentions the rise of bandits in Hedong.¹⁵⁶ Ouyang Xiu also painted a picture of widespread unrest when addressing the conclusion of the Wang Lun mutiny:

Presently in Jianchangjun 建昌軍, there is one incident with four hundred men, and in Guiyangjian 桂陽監 there is another with seventy men. In the wilds, a single episode [involves] a hundred men, and other [bandits] are in Chizhou 池州, Xiezhou 解州, Dengzhou 鄧州, and the Southern Capital [also known as Yingtianfu 應天府, modern Shangqiu, Henan]. In each case, there are many strong bandits. They all raise banners, beat drums, and enter the cities in the daytime. 今建昌軍一火四百人, 桂陽監一火七十人, 草賊一火百人, 其餘池州、解州、鄧州、南京等處, 各有強賊不少, 皆建旗鳴鼓, 白日入城。¹⁵⁷

The locations Ouyang names were spread across the empire: Jianchangjun was located in modern Jiangxi province of southern China, Guiyangjian was situated in neighboring Hunan, Xiezhou was in modern Shanxi province in the northwestern part of the Song, and Dengzhou and Yingtianfu were both in what is today Henan province near the center of the Song. Commenting in 1043 on the troubles with numerous groups of bandits in Jingdong circuit, where the Wang Lun mutiny began, Yu Jing 余靖 (1000-1064) stated, “Everywhere they arise in swarms 處處蜂起.”¹⁵⁸ In a later memorial, Yu described banditry breaking out across Shaanxi, Jingxi, Jingdong, Huainan, and Jinghu circuits, adding, “Those that are large number several hundred men, while those that are small number thirty to fifty men.”¹⁵⁹ Given the scope of the unrest and the small scale of most cases, the point in these memorials was not to suggest a large concerted action by

¹⁵⁶ QSW 5:87.127.

¹⁵⁷ QSW 32:681.135.

¹⁵⁸ QSW 26:560.290.

¹⁵⁹ QSW 26:561.296.

groups arrayed against the Song state, but rather that threats to stability were posed not just by the mutiny.

Natural disasters were occasionally evoked out alongside unrest. This was clearest in Tian Xi's memorial about curbing "banditry" which included Wang Jun's mutiny. After laying out the above cases of desertion, mutiny, and banditry, Tian discussed an ongoing famine in Jiangnan and Liangzhe circuits in the southeast and earthquakes in Jiangnan and Huainan.¹⁶⁰ In his request that Zhenzong issue amnesties in response to disasters, he mentioned the Former Han issuing such edicts when eclipses occurred, eclipses being considered ominous.¹⁶¹ Zhenzong himself also saw a connection between natural phenomena and unrest. In 1007, when he discussed the appointment of officials to fight Chen Jin in Guangnan West circuit, the emperor began by explaining that "the Directorate of Astronomy 司天 repeatedly submitted [memorials on] natural phenomena, and said there ought to be troops [sent]."¹⁶² While the threat of a mutiny could be cause enough to send the military to suppress it, Zhenzong made it clear that signs from Heaven had also factored into his decision.

Internal threats from banditry, mutinies, and natural disasters were sometimes accompanied by discussions of the Song's woes with neighboring states. After discussing unrest within the Song in 1000, Tian Xi mentioned the leader of the Tanguts Li Jiqian 李繼遷 (d. 1004), grandfather of Li Yuanhao who declared himself emperor of Xixia. Tian complained that Li Jiqian had "named himself the King Who Pacifies the West 自稱西平王."¹⁶³ Writing in 1044,

¹⁶⁰ QSW 5:87.128. Tian Xi had his own motivations for this, as he was prefect of Taizhou 泰州 in Huainan at the time (CB 46.1002-06, which names Tian as Taizhou's prefect and includes the memorial referenced here).

¹⁶¹ QSW 5:87.130.

¹⁶² CB 66.1472. In a similar case in 1043, Yu Jing connected banditry and other threats to Venus violating (or transiting? 犯) Jupiter in one of the constellations. This memorial was submitted in the ninth month of 1043, after the end of the Wang Lun mutiny, but does not mention it (QSW 26:560.293-94).

¹⁶³ QSW 5:87.127.

Bao Zheng noted that Liao was also a potential threat. Since Baozhou was adjacent to Liao, they had sent troops to the border to investigate under the pretense of defense. This prompted Bao to request that the court use veteran generals and large numbers of troops to protect two neighboring prefectures on the Song-Liao border.¹⁶⁴

While acknowledging the presence of foreign threats, there was a tendency to downplay their danger compared to internal unrest. Ouyang Xiu, Yu Jing, and Cai Xiang all noted the ongoing conflict with Xixia as one source of trouble for the Song as it struggled to catch Wang Lun.¹⁶⁵ However, Ouyang Xiu likened enemy states to diseases of the skin, while those who opposed the Song within the empire were diseases of the viscera and thus had a greater likelihood of becoming fatal.¹⁶⁶ Yu Jing likewise argued that the threat to the Song was greater internally than externally, commenting “If we do not vastly establish defenses and use them to rectify prior defeats, then your servant worries that the disaster of the country would not be located in the Yi and Di [i.e., foreign states], but would arise from the interior of the domain. 若非大設隄防，以矯前弊，則臣憂國家之患，不在夷狄，而起於封域之內矣。”¹⁶⁷ While willing to add conflicts with foreign countries to the list of problems afflicting the dynasty, there was an attempt to downplay them, either as a rhetorical gesture to keep the court’s attention focused on internal unrest or because memorialists truly believed they were a lesser danger.

In addition to concerns about a variety of threats from across the empire and beyond, Song officials also worried about the potential for a mutiny to spread. The Wang Jun, Chen Jin, and Wang Lun mutinies all spread to disrupt the regions where they originated, so this was no

¹⁶⁴ QSW 26:546.49.

¹⁶⁵ QSW 32:679.111-12 for Ouyang; QSW 26:560.289 for Yu; and QSW 46:1002.364 for Cai.

¹⁶⁶ QSW 32:679.111-12.

¹⁶⁷ QSW 26:560.289. The terms Yi and Di are generic names for non-Chinese peoples, and here refer to the Tanguts of the Xixia and probably the Khitan of the Liao.

idle threat. Wang Yucheng warned that the disaster of the Wang Jun mutiny “flowed to scattered areas, and extended to the pillaging and occupation of cities 蓋災流於分野，致盜據於城池。”¹⁶⁸ The act of grace Hong Zhan composed on behalf of Emperor Zhenzong also noted, “He [Wang Jun] cried out and assembled [supporters], put cities in peril, and alarmed and disturbed distant places 嘯聚危城，驚騷遠土。”¹⁶⁹ Hong’s description suggested that the instability caused by a mutiny could have an effect far from the location of fighting. Ouyang Xiu and Cai Xiang painted similar pictures of the Wang Lun mutiny. Ouyang presented a bleak vision of what was to come if Wang was not dealt with quickly:

If Wang Lun and others roam about the Jianghuai region, encouraging and assembling criminals, and his followers gradually increase, then they will go south to Yue, Min, and Guang and stop [only] at the Daling. They will run westward to Baxia and spy upon Liangshu as though they were unoccupied. Who could resist them? 假令王倫等周遊江淮之上，驅集罪人，徒眾漸多，南越閩、廣而斷大嶺，西走巴峽以窺兩蜀，所在空然，誰能禦之？¹⁷⁰

Ouyang’s prediction is a bit fantastic with Wang’s followers rushing through southern China down to Guangnan and pouring westward into Sichuan, but the possibility of unrest spreading was quite real. The example of E Lin 鄂鄰 (d. 1042) presents an eerily similar case to Wang’s mutiny. According to the account in the *Changbian*, E Lin, like Wang, killed a patrolling inspector and then fled with a band of soldiers in 1040. Running from Liangzhe, E “gathered soldiers, pillaged prefectures and counties in Hunan, Fujian, and Guangnan, and then fled to the

¹⁶⁸ QSW 7:146.321.

¹⁶⁹ QSW 10:197.47.

¹⁷⁰ QSW 32:679.108.

sea.”¹⁷¹ When discussing the Wang Lun mutiny, Cai Xiang recalled his travel home to Fujian via Liangzhe, commenting that E Lin caused alarm even in coastal prefectures where his followers had not arrived.¹⁷² Not mentioned by Cai, but certainly known to Renzong, was that E subsequently fled to Champa 占城 in what is now southern Vietnam.¹⁷³ While both E Lin and Wang Lun did not succeed in holding any of the territory they passed through, they proved quite disruptive, and there was a chance that they might have been able to hold land and use that to expand outward, threatening Song control there or even throwing the dynasty’s stability into question.

As seen in their discussions of the scope and spread of unrest detailed above, authors lumped together a wide array of unsettling events including mutinies, banditry, foreign incursions, and natural disasters or otherwise ominous phenomena beyond the human realm. This was most clearly demonstrated in Tian Xi’s memorial, which addressed widespread disorder across the north alongside his narrower concern about a famine in Jiangnan and Liangzhe circuits, close to where he was posted.¹⁷⁴ There are different ways to interpret officials’ listing

¹⁷¹ CB 129.3058. The patrolling inspector was a eunuch named Zhang Huaixin 張懷信 (d. 1040), whose cruelty was thought to have provoked E Lin and other soldiers into killing him and revolting. He was unpopular with the general population as well, apparently being nicknamed “Zhang the Shambler 張列擊” by the masses. Sima Guang, in his miscellany *Sushui jiwén*, clarifies that E Lin was a soldier under Zhang’s command in the coastal prefectures of Wenzhou 溫州 and Taizhou 台州 (see *Sushui jiwén* 12.241).

¹⁷² QSW 46:1002.364.

¹⁷³ SHY Fanyi 4.70. In 1041, according to a passage in *Song huiyao*, “The Guangnan East circuit fiscal intendant reported: ‘A merchant named Shao Bao 邵保 arrived in Champa and saw the mutineer E Lin with more than a hundred men, and that he was tied up 羈縻 in that country.’” According to the “Capturing Bandits 捕賊” section of the *Song huiyao*, “People in Champa said their king had an audience with him and bound him, afraid [our] great dynasty would seek him” (SHY Bing 11.16-17). Why Champa did not immediately inform the Song it had captured E Lin is unclear. It is possible that Champa’s ruler in fact happily accepted the services of a Chinese soldier with troops attached to him, and was just as happy to turn him over to the Song for a reward upon the latter’s request. At any rate, Champa sent E Lin and his supporters under armed escort to Guangzhou, where he was killed and his head exposed (CB 137.3283). This was not the first time the Song worried about mutineers fleeing to Vietnam. During the Chen Jin mutiny in Guangnan West, Feng Zheng 馮拯 (958-1023) worried that Chen and his supporters might flee to Vietnam (Jiaozhi 交趾) or Hainan Island (瓊管). See CB 66.1486.

¹⁷⁴ QSW 5:87.127-30.

such disparate crises together. On the one hand, the litany of examples of challenges confronting the court can paint a dire picture by sheer bulk and compel the emperor and his ministers to act.

On the other hand, the neat categories of mutiny, popular uprising, and banditry may be useful conceptually but these forms of unrest could blend together in practice. Wang Jun's mutiny began with soldiers, but Song sources accuse him of impressing civilians, including Daoist and Buddhist clergy. Given the tumultuous history of Sichuan in the closing decades of the tenth century, it is quite likely that civilians were not all forced to join Wang, and many may have supported a rebellion of their own volition. In 1047 Wang Ze similarly began his uprising within the Beizhou, Hebei garrison, but he impressed all adult males between twelve and seventy in the city into his service, and even before the mutiny broke out he counted clerks as his co-conspirators.¹⁷⁵ Wang Lun also reached beyond his core of mutineers to ally with bandits in Huainan. To make matters more complex, Wang Ze's mutiny had millenarian overtones, which tied him into a broader set of religious groups deemed heterodox by the court.¹⁷⁶ Wang Jun allegedly held heterodox beliefs as well.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ CB 46.994 for Wang Jun, and CB 161.3890 for Wang Ze. Information on the Guangnan and Baozhou, Hebei mutinies is less clear on who fought with the mutineers. When the mutineers following Chen abandoned Yizhou in Guangna, they allegedly killed elderly family members likely out of fear for what would happen to them if they were captured (CB 66.1484). Only soldiers are mentioned as participants in Baozhou, but it is possible they recruited or impressed civilians to defend the city during the siege. This was the case with the mutinies of Wang Jun and Wang Ze, both of which also involved sieges. Furthermore, requiring civilians to help defend a surrounded city was standard practice for government forces in the Song, and it stands to reason that mutinous Song officers would employ such tactics (Franke, "Siege and Defense of Towns," 155-56).

¹⁷⁶ Wang took the name of the Buddha to present himself as the Maitreya Buddha. According to the account in the *Changbian*, there was a belief in Beizhou and neighboring Jizhou 冀州 that Maitreya was coming, and some people studied illicit rituals and divination texts (CB 161.3890). Some members of the official class were attracted to these unorthodox views as well. A rumor broke out that a heterodox master named Li Jiao 李教 (d. before 1047) was in Beizhou during the siege. Li was the son of an official, Li Tan 李曇, who lived in Jizhou (CB 163.3918). His older brother Li Yang 李暉 (fl. 1040s) obtained a *jinshi* degree and married into the family of Zhang Cun 張存 (984-1071), another official from Jizhou, which neighbored Beizhou (SS 320.10414). Sima Guang was another son-in-law of Zhang Cun. See Sima's funerary inscription for Zhang, which lists both Li and Sima as his sons-in-law, QSW 56:1227.293-96. Sima also wrote about Li Tan's imprisonment and exile (*Sushui jiwén* 4.71-72).

¹⁷⁷ According to Yang Yi, Wang "dared to collude with (or fabricate?) heterodox beliefs 乃敢結構異端." See QSW 14:283.180.

In addition, there was a widely-held belief that human actions could influence the natural realm, and this in turn could sometimes affect the human realm.¹⁷⁸ In the case of the Directorate of Astronomy's warning to Zhenzong, Heaven was thought to reflect the instability in the human realm by the appearance of ominous celestial phenomena. However, there could be more substantive interactions between the human and natural world, as seen in Tian Xi's discussion of a famine and its relation to banditry. One of the tragic consequences of the famine was that refugees who died on the road remained unburied. He criticized the unenthusiastic attitude of local leaders who made little move to inter the bodies, save for sometimes turning the disposal of corpses over to Buddhist clergy. He wanted the court to task people with offering sacrifices to the dead and burying exposed corpses "to avoid injuring harmonious *qi* 免傷和氣." Tian believed that this, combined with cutting taxes in afflicted areas, would help prevent banditry.¹⁷⁹ The implication, then, is that a potential consequence of injuring harmonious *qi* is unrest, whether by directly affecting people or worsening the famine. In the specific case Tian laid out, natural disaster was met by government inaction, and that inaction in turn threatened to affect natural processes in a way which would further exacerbate the situation. Therefore, there was a view in the Song that not only could there be a blurring of the lines between different types of unrest, but the human and natural realms could also interact in ways which weakened stability.

Another way of encouraging the court to adopt an official's proposal was to attack the existing policies and practices as incapable of defending against mutinies. He might accuse the court or territorial officials of inactivity, attack the policies implemented to respond to the mutiny as flawed, or lament the poor state of defenses and military training. Ouyang Xiu and Cai

¹⁷⁸ For an example of the way in which such beliefs played out on the political stage, specifically in relation to the fate of the Qingli reforms of Fan Zhongyan, see Skonicki, "Employing the Right Kind of Men," 39-98.

¹⁷⁹ QSW 5:87.128.

Xiang voiced concerns that the court was not taking the Wang Lun mutiny seriously enough, treating it as an “ordinary matter” in Ouyang’s words.¹⁸⁰ They raised complaints about local officials in Huainan, too. Rather than put up a fight, prefects preferred to allow the mutineers free passage through their jurisdiction, even offering them supplies or feasts to persuade them against pillaging.¹⁸¹ While Fan Zhongyan stood up for local officials in a debate at court and argued that they had little choice because they lacked sufficient weapons and armor to resist, his reformist allies tried to use the free roaming of Wang Lun to indict their political opponents and propose improvements.¹⁸² Concerns could also emerge about the activity of those dispatched to fight a mutiny. In his request to be sent to Beizhou to oversee operations against Wang Ze, Wen Yanbo argued that it was necessary to dispatch him since the civil official in charge at the time, Ming Hao, had proven unable to recapture the city.¹⁸³

Officials might also take aim at policies responding to a mutiny that were counterproductive or otherwise flawed. One such policy was Emperor Zhenzong’s attempt to recruit civil officials who were “courageous and talented with weapons 武勇才器” in response to ongoing challenges like the Wang Lun mutiny. Tian Xi questioned the wisdom of the recruitment effort based on earlier experience. He specifically mentioned two unsuccessful civil officials-turned-military leaders named Liu Chi 劉墀 and Zheng Xuan 鄭宣, explaining that Liu died at the hands of the Khitan at Yizhou 易州 and Zheng passed away without any

¹⁸⁰ QSW 32:679.108.

¹⁸¹ QSW 32:682.164 for Ouyang and QSW 46:1002.366 for Cai.

¹⁸² Fan’s debate was with his erstwhile reformist ally Fu Bi over the sentencing of Gaoyoujun Prefect Chao Zhongyue. This issue was serious enough to both that they did not speak to each other for some time afterwards (CB 145.3499).

¹⁸³ QSW 30:643.161. Wen also noted that the court had decided not to order Jia Changchao, the military intendant of Hebei, from his seat in Damingfu on account of that prefecture’s importance. Whether or not his language was intended to imply that the court was mistaken in keeping Jia away from Beizhou, Wen pointed this out as another reason why he should be deployed.

achievements. Tian expressed doubts about the policy both because he felt there were few court officials matching the desired attributes the emperor wanted, and furthermore believed if there even were such people, “most would not wish to be in a military assignment.”¹⁸⁴ He also criticized an alternative policy of promoting low-ranking military officials to serve in border posts. They would require sponsors 舉主, but due to the possibility of sponsors being jointly punished for the misdeeds of those they put forward, Tian thought that there would be few men offered. The use of sponsors was a regular practice in the Song, most notably in the highly valued promotion of civil officials from executory to administrative officials.¹⁸⁵ Compared to the significance of that shift, Tian probably felt that the potential costs of recommending a military official outweighed the benefits for a sponsor, and that led to his pessimism about the effectiveness of the policy.

Criticisms of the court’s response might focus not only on individual edicts, but also on the culture of the court itself. This was clear from Ouyang Xiu’s 1043 condemnation of court officials who protected errant lower-ranking members of the government. He railed against the pardon of Han Gang 韓綱, the prefect of Guanghuajun 光化軍. Guanghuajun, in Jingxi South Circuit, was threatened by bandits, and the garrison manned the walls in case the bandits tried to attack the prefectural seat. However, Han treated the soldiers so poorly that they revolted and began looting the city they had previously defended, while the prefect himself climbed over the

¹⁸⁴ The term “court official” here refers to civil officials who held a personal rank of 8a or above. Many such officials were serving outside of court. QSW 5:87.127. Liu and Zheng, along with several other officials, had their personal ranks changed from civil to military in 987 (SHY Zhiguan 61.3). According to the chart created by Umehara Kaoru, the transfer was completely lateral, with both men keeping the same 7a *jiupin* rank (Umehara, “Civil and Military Officials,” 4, Chart I). According to the *Liaoshi*, Liu Chi was prefect of Yizhou when it was retaken by the Liao in 989; the account only states that they made him surrender (降刺史劉擘), but Liu probably died at that time (*Liaoshi* 12.133) given what Tian Xi said.

¹⁸⁵ Winston W. Lo finds that sponsorship was the key element in this promotion, which was known as *gaiguan* 改官 and which Lo called “the most important sluice gate [in the personal rank system]” (Lo, *Civil Service*, 163-70).

walls and escaped on a small boat.¹⁸⁶ In Ouyang's view, Han deserved serious punishment, but he got a very lenient treatment on account of his ties to court. Ouyang brought up the inappropriate mercy given Han Gang to make a point about the lack of punishments for officials in Huainan who did nothing to stand up to Wang Lun and in some cases even provided material aid to him. He alleged that, like Han, a number of the officials who encountered Wang avoided repercussions because of their relationships to court officials, and this led to a very poor response to the mutineers as they roamed through the region.¹⁸⁷

The concerns about a poor political culture were mirrored by worries about a weak military culture. Tian Xi's comments on Zhenzong's recruitment of civil officials to serve as military leaders indicates a concern from the throne itself about the fitness of the army at the time of the Sichuan mutiny of Wang Jun in 1000. Tian further elaborates on the problems facing the Song in this area, especially in terms of discipline: "The Great Peace has lasted a long time. [Due to this] the troops are not accustomed to execute battle formations, commanders do not know about attacking and defending, and moreover the troops are regarded as arrogant and the generals lowly."¹⁸⁸ While praising the emperor for the peace the dynasty enjoyed, Tian identified this peace as breeding complacency which made both soldiers and generals incompetent.¹⁸⁹ In terms of discipline, the roles of the troops and their commanding officers had reversed with the

¹⁸⁶ Sima Guang left the most thorough account of the Han's actions and the ensuing mutiny in *Sushui jiwen* 11.202-03; see also CB 144.3478-79 for a description of Han's behavior and its consequences. Han did ultimately suffer punishment, being stricken from the roll of officials 除名 and placed under registered control in Yingzhou 英州 in Guangnan East Circuit (SS 315.10300).

¹⁸⁷ QSW 32:682.164-65.

¹⁸⁸ QSW 5:87.130.

¹⁸⁹ It is worth noting that this "great peace" is more excessive praise than an accurate picture of conditions in the Song. In the years leading to the outbreak of the Wang Jun mutiny, Sichuan had suffered from a massive rebellion and brutal pacification campaign, and the Song itself remained stuck in a series of invasions and counter-invasions with the Liao which periodically erupted since the 970s. It may be true that many garrisons were filled with soldiers who had little to no experience with combat, but the areas of Hebei and Sichuan which Tian specified as restive were areas where recurrent fighting had taken place for years.

former's arrogance and the latter's lowliness. Wang Yucheng echoed Tian's concerns, commenting that in Sichuan prior to the rise of Wang Jun, "The officials in charge of defense were not martial, and the garrison soldiers toyed with their weapons."¹⁹⁰ Yang Yi made clearer the ways in which Wang Jun was able to sway soldiers to support him:

As for Wang Jun [and his supporters], he personally led the army, he defended the land in person, and he was very generous with salaries, bestowing them repeatedly. [The troops] filled themselves on sumptuous meals, their bedding and clothing were comfortable, and when he sent out troops for whom he was responsible, there was never a push for achievement (i.e., he did not push the soldiers hard). 如王均等，身率戎行，地親藩衛，祿廩優厚，賜予便蕃。饜飫膏粱，被服輕煖，出荷干城之寄，曾無汗馬之勞¹⁹¹

This description makes Wang Jun out to be a kind, if perhaps overindulgent, officer, especially as his position was inspector-in-chief, whose responsibilities included disciplining soldiers. In Yang's view, however, there was something insidious, as it made the men pliable to side with him. This line of reasoning spoke to the emperor and his officials at the time. Emperor Taizong had worked to transfer authority over garrisons away from officers and into the hands of prefects, a project his son Zhenzong continued.¹⁹² The Song emperors implemented measures like that to break the personal bonds between the military governors and their troops—bonds which had weakened the Tang and its successors—and Wang Jun's currying favor with his subordinates likely reminded the court of that uncomfortable history.¹⁹³ The discipline of soldiers remained a complaint under Renzong. Bao Zheng decried their lack of training, raising questions both about

¹⁹⁰ QSW 7:146.321.

¹⁹¹ QSW 14:283.180.

¹⁹² Chen, *Tang Song difang zhengzhi tizhi zhuanxing yanjiu*, 241-43.

¹⁹³ One method the Song used to counter such a relationship was the garrison rotation policy that shifted soldiers between the capital and different posts in the provinces, as mentioned in the introduction (see McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration," 167-68).

the ability of government troops to take Baozhou and about the likely bloodshed if force was used to retake the city.¹⁹⁴

Alongside concerns with the training of soldiers and capability of their commanders, Song officials decried the failure of local governments to maintain defenses, including structures like walls and moats as well as armor and weapons. In the case of Lei Youzhong and Ma Liang's plea regarding Chengdu's outer wall, the two sought to persuade the court against tearing down one of the city's defenses, much less repairing or expanding on what was there. Tian Xi complained about the poor upkeep of defenses in his memorial on unrest that included Wang Jun's mutiny, remarking that bandits could move unimpeded due to the decay of defenses across the empire.¹⁹⁵ He similarly pointed out that few weapons and sets of armor were in good condition.¹⁹⁶ Commenting on Wang Lun's move through Huainan in 1043, Cai Xiang pointed out local officials' inability to resist the mutineers was tied closely to the lack of defensive structures and armaments: "Walls and moats are not maintained, and weapons and armor are not mended. There are no tools for warning and defense and no preparations for battle. This causes the common people to cry out, and one after another cities are thrown into turmoil."¹⁹⁷ In his defense of Gaoyoujun 高郵軍 Prefect Chao Zhongyue 晁仲約 (*jinshi* 1041-1048), who treated Wang and his men to a feast, Fan Zhongyan claimed Chao had little choice because his prefecture lacked weapons and shackles, making it difficult to apprehend Wang.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ QSW 26:546.49.

¹⁹⁵ QSW 5:87.129. Tian comments, "Now in many places the walls and moats are often unrepaired, crumbling the walls and filling the trenches. [People, or bandits] come and go as if it is flat land. If there was a sudden rise in banditry, how would local officials anywhere put up a solid defense 今諸處城池多不修築，壞垣填塹，往來如平地，萬一卒有盜起，逐處官吏何以固守?"

¹⁹⁶ QSW 5:87.130.

¹⁹⁷ QSW 46:1002.364.

¹⁹⁸ CB 145.3499.

The decline in military preparedness in terms of troop discipline and physical defenses points to a sort of “hollowing out” in the early eleventh century. Once the Song conquered the southern kingdoms, it proved quite successful at holding the territory with little resistance, with the notable exception of Sichuan. However, the relative security of the interior compared to the northern borders allowed a decline in military strength in the south. Officials pointed out this situation in memorials to the throne. Fu Bi expressed alarm in 1040 when troops garrisoned across the empire were sent to defend the northern frontier. Although the government found replacements for places like Jingxi and Jingdong circuits—which neighbored Kaifeng—no such measure was implemented in the southeast. He warned that bandits might arise to take advantage of the power vacuum.¹⁹⁹ The court’s failure to act on Fu’s concerns probably exacerbated the Wang Lun mutiny. While Fu Bi wrote about actions taken in response to the war with the Xixia, the decline in military strength in places far from the frontiers long pre-dated that conflict. When faced with the Chen Jin mutiny in Guangnan West Circuit in 1007, the court had to send troops from a very wide range roughly spanning the area of today’s Hunan and Hubei provinces.²⁰⁰ Drawing soldiers from such a huge area illustrates that Song forces were already stretched thin in the south by the first decade of the eleventh century. Unrest like these mutinies highlighted the weakness of military preparedness in the interior, prompting calls to improve the army or implement a more robust surveillance and law enforcement system.

When advocating for a proposal, officials drew on a number of rhetorical strategies to stress the urgency of a mutiny. Historical references could draw uncomfortable parallels between a crisis in the present and a disaster for previous dynasties, but they might also serve as a guide

¹⁹⁹ QSW 28:601.291-93.

²⁰⁰ CB 66.1472. In his order, Zhenzong dispatched troops from Jinghu North and South and from two prefectures in the southwest corner of Huainan West Circuit.

for action. Another approach was to list several crises, natural or man-made, that had broken out in a short period of time in order to raise concerns about the stability of both state and society. In some cases, memorialists pointed to the threat of unrest spreading. Finally, the Song government was criticized for failures such as reacting slowly to an uprising, carrying out bad policies, and allowing defenses and discipline to deteriorate, all of which could exacerbate an already serious situation.

Proposals

Once officials made clear the urgency of the situation, they offered solutions to the court. Some proposals dealt with the immediate threat of an ongoing mutiny, while others called for more substantial changes to the military or government. Officials recommended drawing on the Song's people, both in and out of government, to combat the mutineers, while they also sought to shore up the military and defenses of the dynasty to keep mutinies from recurring.

Brian E. McKnight, in his study of the Song's system of law enforcement, identifies four key methods used to tackle unrest: "persuasion, prevention, cooptation, and suppression."²⁰¹ While he ties persuasion to education, which the Song did not really pursue in the context of dealing with mutinies, the other three certainly appeared. Officials proposed strengthening defenses, improving local administration by employing better officials, and promising rewards or reduced penalties for those who surrendered. However, they also accepted violent suppression as a likely course of action.

The suppression campaigns carried out against the mutinies of course required the dispatching of loyal forces. Both the central and local governments could deploy troops, and this probably did not require prompting from officials most of the time. However, there are a few

²⁰¹ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 14-15.

requests that the emperor send out forces. Speaking with Wang Dan in 1007 about the court's response to the Chen Jin mutiny in Guangnan West, Zhenzong mentioned that the Directorate of Astronomy submitted several celestial phenomena and officials there had "said there ought to be troops [sent] 言當有兵." Based in part on the directorate's recommendation, the court decided to send forces into Guangnan.²⁰² In 1043, during the Wang Lun mutiny, Ouyang Xiu requested that imperial commissioners be sent from the capital alongside the continued deployment of troops to Huainan.²⁰³ Due to concerns about the Liao taking advantage of instability along the northern border caused by the 1044 Baozhou mutiny in Hebei, Bao Zheng suggested the deployment of senior generals and a heavy military presence in the border prefectures of Anshun 安肅軍 and Guangxinjun 廣信軍.²⁰⁴ As will also be seen in the discussion of long-term solutions, there was an expectation that force would be needed to prevent or deter mutinies and other uprisings, so the requests for soldiers is unsurprising.

While the military was thought to be essential in dealing with a mutiny, the Song government did attempt other methods to resolve the crisis, such as amnesties and pardons. Amnesties were issued in most of the mutinies, although only in Baozhou did it prove successful.²⁰⁵ That amnesty may have been the result of Bao Zheng's request that Renzong send a trusted eunuch to carry the edict announcing the amnesty into the city.²⁰⁶ Not all officials welcomed amnesties, however. When Renzong sent a eunuch messenger named He Chengyong

²⁰² CB 66.1472. The actual memorials from the directorate are no longer extant.

²⁰³ QSW 32:679.109.

²⁰⁴ QSW 26:546.49.

²⁰⁵ As noted earlier, this was likely due to Wei Gui's leadership, as he encouraged his fellow soldiers to surrender (CB 152.3699-700).

²⁰⁶ QSW 26:546.49. An amnesty was offered, but a military official met with the mutineers instead; see CB 151.3688. One eunuch, Hebei Mounted Courier Li Jihe, did climb up the wall to meet with the mutineers as well, though (SS 468.13651). For other amnesties, we have a copy of an offer from Zhenzong to Wang Jun's men (QSW 10:216.424), and Zhenzong also had forty copies posted in Guangnan to induce Chen Jin's forces to surrender (CB 66.1488).

何誠用 with an amnesty for Wang Ze and his supporters in 1047, Gao Ruone 高若訥 (997-1055), serving as censor, argued that the move would embolden other soldiers to rebel and cause the Song's enemies to laugh.²⁰⁷ Still, amnesties were frequent enough during mutinies that they probably required little prompting from officials; they were simply a matter of course for emperors to issue. Also, even if a mutiny had to be forcibly suppressed, pardons and acts of grace were given to mutineers who surrendered and especially to commoners whom the government assumed were pressed into service.²⁰⁸ McKnight notes that Song people believed that a person who surrendered "had in fact been changed, a view that reveals the deep Chinese belief that wrongful behavior was under the voluntary control of the person in question."²⁰⁹ There was therefore a moral component behind the amnesties as well.

Given that only the Baozhou mutiny ended with a relatively peaceful surrender, amnesties likely served other purposes aside from convincing mutineers to lay down their arms. Officials also saw them as a means to weaken the resolve of their opponents. Brian E. McKnight identifies that Song officials often sought to "split leaders from followers by offering amnesty to those who surrendered."²¹⁰ The Song followed this approach when dealing with mutinies. Bao Zheng's memorial spells out this role amnesties played. First, he specified that the amnesty should target those tricked or forced into supporting the Baozhou mutineers. Bao wanted to drive a wedge between the instigators of the uprising and those brought in unwillingly. The desire to cause divisions among the mutineers and their allies is clear from his telling of the story of Kong Chaofu's attempt to get the military governor Li Huaiguang to surrender, mentioned earlier. One

²⁰⁷ CB 161.3892-93. The emperor ignored Gao's complaint.

²⁰⁸ See for example the act of grace drafted by Hong Zhan for Zhenzong in 1000 after the end of the Wang Jun mutiny, QSW 10:197.47.

²⁰⁹ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 14-15.

²¹⁰ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 88-89.

of the rebellious military governor's generals, Niu Jun, assassinated Li, and Bao implied this was because he had been swayed by the Tang court's offer of mercy.²¹¹ The point Bao Zheng was making from this story was clear. Even if the amnesty failed to get the mutineers to surrender, it could cause splits among their leaders and bring about an end to the uprising without the need to put it down by force.

Bao Zheng's advice on how to turn mutineers against each other echoes that given by Cai Xiang and Ouyang Xiu during the Jingdong-Huainan mutiny of Wang Lun. Here they were more explicit in trying to sow discord among their enemies. Cai drew on the historical example of Emperor Guangwu who restored the Han dynasty amid the turmoil caused by the collapse of Wang Mang's 王莽 (45 BC-23 AD) short-lived Xin dynasty (9-23). Guangwu ordered that if a group of five rebels killed one rebel, they would be pardoned. Cai requested a similar policy of pardoning five men who killed one mutineer. Furthermore, he suggested that people forced to serve the mutineers could redeem themselves just by surrendering, but they could also be rewarded if they killed a mutineer and then surrendered.²¹² Ouyang Xiu also sought to foster a divide between Wang Lun's core supporters and commoners made to fight for him. Ouyang asked that officials be ordered to console the families of coerced commoners and have them write letters to induce them to escape, promising a pardon and rewards if they also killed any mutineers. He believed that this would cause suspicions to break out among Wang's forces, weakening them in the process.²¹³ Through the policies they recommended, Bao Zheng, Cai Xiang, and Ouyang Xiu hoped to wreak havoc by both prompting the mutineers' rank and file to

²¹¹ QSW 26:546.49. As noted earlier, Bao's telling does not square with the accounts of the *Jiu Tangshu* (*Jiu Tangshu* 121.3493-94 and 154.4096).

²¹² QSW 46:1002.364-65. Cai wanted surrendering rebels to target the original mutineers who followed Wang Lun after he killed Zhu Jin. He estimated that there were more than forty such individuals, and stipulated that people could be pardoned after killing them (臣今乞軍賊元殺忠佐者四十餘人，若能五人共殺一名，告官，并與免罪).

²¹³ QSW 32:679.109.

run away, possibly after killing some of their former comrades, and causing dissension among those who remained.

In their recommendations on how to counter Wang Lun, Ouyang Xiu and Cai Xiang did not limit themselves to turning mutineers against each other. They also looked at how they could draw on Song society more broadly, especially those who stood to gain appreciably from working with the government. Ouyang made the unusual request to find if Zhu Jin, the official Wang Lun killed, had a son. If there was a son, he should be given a rank in the government and ordered to capture Wang as revenge for his father's death.²¹⁴ While Zhu's son, if he existed, had a stake in the mutiny because his father was Wang's victim, Ouyang and Cai both looked to more marginalized figures for support as well. In the same memorial, Ouyang asked that the court send a commander to recruit bandits in Huainan, promising rewards to those who killed mutineers.²¹⁵ The use of bandits may seem peculiar, but the Song frequently offered pardons and even ranks and posts to bandits who had grown to an unmanageable size in return for their surrender.²¹⁶ The usefulness of recruiting bandits to fight was twofold, as the Song gained additional manpower against Wang Lun and his allies while simultaneously denying them access to those bandits.

Ouyang and Cai's calls to recruit different parts of society not only included bandits, but other groups who were criminals or otherwise occupied marginal spaces in the Song. As seen above, Cai was concerned about the possibility that Wang Lun would try to flee the Song just

²¹⁴ QSW 32:679.108. There is no mention of an actual son in any source.

²¹⁵ QSW 32:679.109.

²¹⁶ Brian E. McKnight identifies this as a cooptation strategy (McKnight, *Law and Order*, 14-15 and 106-07). Probably the most famous bandit to surrender to the Song and then serve the dynasty was Song Jiang 宋江. The historical Song Jiang scarcely appears in documents, but is noted for robbing several prefectures with impunity and later helping the Song fight the rebel Fang La 方臘 (d. 1121) following his pardon (for a brief overview of Song's life, see his entry in Chang, *Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin*, 735-36). However, he would grow to legendary status over subsequent centuries and came to be enshrined as one of the main characters in the Ming novel *Outlaws of the Marsh*.

like E Lin had a few years earlier. He asked the emperor to order officials in Liangzhe, Fujian, and Guangnan circuits to recruit men from a variety of backgrounds to join a few hundred regular soldiers and defend strategic locations along the coast, complete with boats. The recruits were to come not only from subordinates of local officials who were considered “brave and skilled in martial arts 武藝膽勇,” which is not very surprising, but also from among officials who had been demoted and people who had been sent into registered control 編管.²¹⁷ Given that registered control was primarily used as a sentence for officials, Cai was calling for officials to be recruited, whether demoted or registered. However, these were individuals whose behavior had pushed them to the margins of officialdom. Cai wanted to recruit these men because it offered them a chance at redemption, to pull them away from the fringes and back into the fold, and he likely viewed this as a strong incentive for them to fight hard for the Song. If they were able to kill any mutineers, Cai suggested, they could receive substantial rewards and a reduction in their punishments.²¹⁸

Ouyang Xiu went a step further, asking to recruit people not just to fight the mutineers, but to infiltrate their ranks. The types of people he recommended were a motley crew consisting of failed examination candidates 下第舉人, mountain and forest recluses 山林隱士, and exiles.²¹⁹ If they were able to ingratiate themselves with Wang and his allies and then tried to kill the leaders of the mutiny or lead the mutineers into a trap, they would be generously rewarded. Even if their actions did not end the mutiny, they could cause lasting harm: “The vicious gang would harbor suspicions about those they regarded as valuable, and they will not recruit

²¹⁷ QSW 46:1002.365. Registered control was a somewhat less severe form of exile primarily used for officials (McKnight, *Law and Order*, 398-99).

²¹⁸ QSW 46:1002.365.

²¹⁹ The term for failed candidates Ouyang used is “*juven* who failed the [*jinshi*] exams.”

unsavory individuals to serve as strategists 所貴兇黨懷疑，不肯招延無賴之人以為謀主。”²²⁰

Here Ouyang lumps together three quite different groups (failed candidates, recluses, and exiles) and calls them collectively “unsavory individuals” whom the mutineers might find attractive. It is not surprising that he would express a low opinion of exiles, but it seems odd to rank failed candidates and recluses alongside convicted criminals sentenced to a punishment second only to death.²²¹ Exam candidates aspired to government service, and secluding oneself from the world was hardly illicit.

The common factor between the three groups seems to be their marginal status or leadership potential. Exiles were forced to reside away from home for years, often separating them from family and community connections.²²² Their status as criminals made them undesirable as well. It seems reasonable that many exiles resented their position in society and would be willing to find some way out of their predicament. Failed candidates likewise held an ambiguous position in the Song. The term Ouyang used literally translates as “*juren* who failed the [*jinshi*] exams.” In the Song, the term *juren* referred to people who had passed the prefectural examination. John Chaffee notes that the attitudes of contemporary authors towards *juren* were decidedly mixed, which reinforces the marginal status they occupied.²²³ Some would go on to pass the *jinshi* exams and in time receive posts in the government, but Ouyang specifically

²²⁰ QSW 32:679.109.

²²¹ There were five levels of punishment in the Song. In descending order of severity they were death, exile, penal servitude, beating with a heavy rod, and beating with a light rod. Sometimes these punishments were converted, with the exception of death, to various numbers of blows with a heavy rod. See McKnight, “Chinese Law and Legal System,” 270.

²²² McKnight finds significant variation in the duration of exile and how far from home someone was sent. The most serious would be permanent exile, while others might be restricted to a location within their home prefectures. Often exiles had a penal servitude requirement as part of the sentence (McKnight, *Law and Order*, 390-94).

²²³ Chaffee draws a comparison between the Song’s *juren* and the *shengyuan* of the Ming and Qing, commenting that both were “esteemed by some but ridiculed by others,” (Chaffee, *Thorny Gates of Learning*, 32). As Frederick Wakeman, Jr. explains, the *shengyuan* enjoyed somewhat heightened status due to passing the first level of the exams, but could not serve in government. During the late Ming, they were often seen as troublemakers, and some participated in rebellions (Wakeman, “Introduction,” 2-3).

targeted those *juren* who did not pass. With their hopes dashed in the exams, many failed candidates were likely frustrated that their abilities fell short—or went unrecognized by the state. Their intelligence and education would make them ideal recruits for mutineers. Recluses lived on the physical margins of society. People left the everyday world for different reasons, such as spiritual pursuits, and were considered to be exceptional individuals with talents developed in seclusion. Some also withdrew because of a dissatisfaction with the world or the state, and these latter may have been awaiting opportunities to put their talents to use for the sake of someone who offered a change to the status quo. The marginal status of these three groups meant they presented both risk and opportunity to the state. They could be swayed to serve the mutineers who could give them opportunities usually unavailable to men in their positions, but the promise of rewards or pardons could also persuade them instead to support the Song. It is clear that Ouyang wanted the court to play on the ambiguity of their loyalties. Such men were attractive to mutineers, and he hoped to exploit that attraction to infiltrate the rebels and weaken them from within.

Officials also offered advice on long-term solutions for preventing further unrest. In general, they recommended strengthening defense, especially by increasing the number of troops, and improving the quality of local administration by employing better officials. It is worth noting that the memorials generally did not offer solutions for the ongoing demeaned status of soldiers which sparked mutinies. It may be that they viewed the excesses of prefects or other officials who treated troops so poorly they rebelled as individual failings.²²⁴ As a result, they believed that better officials could resolve the grievances that led to uprisings without needing to make significant changes to the treatment of soldiers.

²²⁴ For example, in his edict offering amnesty, Zhenzong blamed the military administrator Fu Zhaoshou alone for the mistreatment of soldiers which resulted in his death (QSW 10:216.424).

Increasing the number of soldiers may seem a peculiar solution to a mutiny, but officials requested just that following the Wang Lun mutiny.²²⁵ The reason such requests appeared then is quite clear: Song government troops were so weak in Huainan that Wang was able to elude capture for two months, hence Ouyang Xiu's complaint that the mutineers "ran amok in Huainan as if no one was there."²²⁶ As will be seen in chapter three, this weakness was likely because the Song prized Huainan and areas to its south for their tax revenue and thought the region as more stable and less in need of protection. This was certainly the case when compared to Hebei and other northern circuits on the Song's borders with Liao and Xixia. However, the utter lack of preparedness needed to be addressed. That meant improving garrisons, and increasing their size was deemed necessary in memorials by Ouyang Xiu and Fu Bi. Ouyang laid out four points to improve defenses against mutineers and bandits, and the first item was to establish troops.²²⁷ In another memorial, he wanted the court to recruit soldiers to garrison the southeast, not just by drawing from the existing armies but also by ordering prefectures to supply names of people who could "draw [a sword] and shoot [a bow]."²²⁸

The most comprehensive plan to boost troop numbers was first proposed by Fu Bi in 1040.²²⁹ Three years later, Fu and Ouyang both asked the court to carry out Fu's request because of the power vacuum exposed by Wang Lun's mutiny.²³⁰ Fu was already concerned about the drop in troop numbers in the southeast in 1040, as regular troops were siphoned off to fight the

²²⁵ The risks posed by increasing the density of troops in a region were clear from the Wang Ze mutiny. Wang's supporters allegedly joined with others in the nearby prefectures of Dezhou 德州 and Qizhou 齊州 (CB 161.3890). After Wang rebelled in Beizhou, there were two abortive mutinies in Qizhou and Shenzhou 深州 (CB 163.3935 for Qizhou and CB 162.3906 for Shenzhou). The attempted uprising in Qizhou does suggest some coordination, but the revolt in Shenzhou may have been sparked by some soldiers who simply tried to take advantage of the disorder.

²²⁶ QSW 32:679.108.

²²⁷ QSW 32:681.146. The other three points were to select bandit-catching officials, make rewards and punishments clear, and expel excess officials and employ good administrators.

²²⁸ QSW 32:679.113.

²²⁹ QSW 28:601.291-93.

²³⁰ See QSW 28:601.303 for Fu's 1043 request, and QSW 32:681.147 for Ouyang's memorial.

Xixia. He requested that the emperor order strategically important prefectures to recruit three thousand or five thousand men, depending on the population, for a total of no more than fifty thousand. These recruits would be trained as “crack troops 精兵” and divided roughly equally among the garrisons. New posts would be created to supervise these troops, with two officials in charge at the prefectural level and another two at the circuit level.²³¹

Beyond boosting the number of regular soldiers, Ouyang Xiu also proposed grouping households into units known as *wubao* 伍保. He attributed the development of the *wubao* system to one Ou Fa 區法 during his tenure as sheriff of Jishui 吉水 County in Jizhou 吉州, Jiangnan West Circuit.²³² In Jishui, he grouped five families into one unit, and this helped reduce the incidence of banditry. Ouyang encouraged the court to investigate the *wubao* system to see if it lived up to the claims he made. If the system did work well, then he wanted it implemented across the empire.²³³ In this way, improved defenses would not just include more soldiers, but also draw the subjects of the Song into the efforts to counter unrest.

Brian E. McKnight writes that there was a militia system known as the *baowu* 保伍, which officials in the Northern Song sometimes supported. These were often lightly armed, had some amount of training, and men usually served after the growing season.²³⁴ However, it seems more likely that the *wubao* created by Ou Fa functioned as mutual surveillance groups rather

²³¹ QSW 28:601.292. One circuit-level official would be in charge of strategy 經略, and the other was responsible for administration 節制.

²³² Little is known about Ou Fa, aside from what Ouyang Xiu reported. Ou received his degree and then served two terms as sheriff, distinguishing himself both times for tackling banditry. The first time was in Xin’gan 新淦 County, near Jishui. For his efforts in Xin’gan, Ou was promoted from being an executory official 選人 to a “capital official 京官” in the administrative class (QSW 32:683.166). Ou Fa is also mentioned in an edict giving his son Ou Lingyu 區令輿 a personal rank (*Xixi ji* 5). There he is named as the “Retired Vice Director of the Bureau of Operations 職方員外郎致仕.”

²³³ QSW 32:683.166-67.

²³⁴ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 136-37. Despite the similarity of the names, I think the *wubao* and *baowu* organizations were functionally different, as explained here.

than armed militias for a couple of reasons. First, Ouyang makes no mention of any training. For militias, men would need to meet for drills, but he does not discuss this when talking about the *wubao*. Second, he praises the system because “commoners found it very convenient.”²³⁵ Whatever the utility of militias, families were often unhappy about the service because they took men away from the farms, where they were needed, in order to serve and to train. As Elad Alyagon finds, many commoners were also wary of militias because they sometimes served as conduits to bring people into the regular army.²³⁶ The *wubao* system, by contrast, was probably thought to be convenient because it did not impose such burdens on families. Whatever the exact nature of Ou Fa’s *wubao* system, the key point here is that even before the *baojia* militia of the New Policies some Song officials believed that organizing the population at large was necessary to boost defenses. This also provides some parallels with the measures Ouyang and Cai Xiang advocated which involved recruiting criminals and other marginalized groups to fight or even infiltrate the mutineers. It too was a means by which the government utilized non-state actors to achieve its ends.

Other forms of defenses beyond more soldiers were considered essential as well. Officials often repeated that walls, moats, weapons, and armor were all in disrepair. Though rarely spelled out, it is clear they hoped something would be done to shore up physical defenses. Cai Xiang, for example, worried about the defenses in the southeast, but did not explicitly request that the court order repairs.²³⁷ In their joint memorial to Zhenzong, Lei Youzhong and Ma Liang protested the court’s decision to tear down part of Chengdu’s wall, but they also moved proactively to improve the city’s defenses, asking for aid to repair the walls instead.²³⁸

²³⁵ QSW 32:683.166.

²³⁶ Alyagon, “Soldier Mutinies and Resistance,” 281.

²³⁷ QSW 32:1002.364.

²³⁸ QSW 7:130.13.

Why officials complained about defenses but did not call for an edict demanding repairs is unclear. Since a prefect's duties included maintaining defenses and government buildings, it may be that they felt local initiative would be better than a blanket order from the capital. At the same time, an overzealous official could potentially cause more harm than good when making repairs. Massive public works projects used *corvée* laborers or soldiers, and they could become potentially dangerous if ill-treated. Chen Jin mutinied when the Yizhou Prefect Liu Yonggui forced sailors in the Song navy to repair government buildings, beating those who did not meet their goals and making the sailors' families collect wood.²³⁹ Following the Wang Lun mutiny, Prefect Chen Zhizhong made repairs to the walls of Qingzhou, but people found the work intolerable. Renzong suspended the work until Chen convinced him that it was necessary due to the unstable diplomatic situation with Liao at the time.²⁴⁰ Both represent potential issues involved with large-scale projects. In the former case, abuse of requisitioned labor resulted in an uprising, while in the latter case the court had to decide between the happiness of Qingzhou's inhabitants and the security of the capital.

Finally, officials recognized that better local officials would yield an improved response to mutinies. In one memorial, Ouyang Xiu provided a four point solution: establish more troops, select bandit-catching officials, make rewards and punishments clear, and expel excess officials and employ good administrators who would soothe the people.²⁴¹ Three of the four points were related to officials. Getting rid of poor officials was a logical first step. Cai Xiang and Ouyang Xiu both targeted officials who had failed to resist Wang Lun. Cai called out five such men by

²³⁹ CB 66.1472.

²⁴⁰ CB 151.3683. Chen countered that repairs were necessary because the Liao were trying to renegotiate the terms of the Treaty of Chanyuan.

²⁴¹ QSW 32:681.146.

name and asked that they be punished.²⁴² Ouyang offered a more concrete recommendation for punishing Huainan officials. In his memorial, he called for dismissing officials or even striking them from the rolls of people eligible for office (known as disenrollment 除名). Furthermore, he wanted the former officials to be put into the army to fight and redeem themselves.²⁴³ He targeted sheriffs and patrolling inspectors in particular, since they served as the local law enforcement, and asked that they be punished if the court was forced to dispatch troops to handle unrest.²⁴⁴ Ouyang also cautioned against pardoning officials. After calling for the punishment of officials like the prefect Chao Zhongyue, who had feasted Wang Lun, he asked that there be no amnesties. There was a bandit in Jingxi circuit named Zhang Hai 張海 (d. 1043) who proved challenging to suppress, and Ouyang feared that clemency for officials who failed to resist Wang's mutiny would cause officials in Jingxi to avoid fighting Zhang as well.²⁴⁵

Ouyang and Cai also called for a broader cleanup of local administration. Cai Xiang asked that the court dismiss muddled, old, or untalented officials.²⁴⁶ Ouyang asked that the court select officials more carefully, since there was a tendency to appoint old, sick, or corrupt officials in peaceful areas. This could obviously threaten stability in those places. He recounted an example from when he was appointed controller-general of Huazhou 滑州, Jingxi North Circuit in 1042. An official in his seventies named Liu Yi 劉依 (fl. 1040s) visited Ouyang a few times, each time asking about a Vice Grand Councilor Wang. However, at the time all of the former vice grand councilors surnamed Wang had already died. Ouyang concluded that if men like Liu

²⁴² QSW 46:1002.366. Cai also criticized the unnamed magistrate of Yancheng 鹽城 county.

²⁴³ QSW 32:679.111-13. By asking that punished officials fight in return for redemption, Ouyang echoed Cai Xiang's call to recruit demoted officials and those under registered control to defend against rebels and bandits in return for rewards and reduced punishments (QSW 46:1002.365).

²⁴⁴ QSW 32:679.112.

²⁴⁵ QSW 32:682.165.

²⁴⁶ QSW 46:1002.364.

were employed, they would prove unable to resist rebels or bandits.²⁴⁷ He even took aim at court officials for failing to deal effectively with the mutiny, citing the Han dynasty precedent where the emperor held his top ministers (the “Three Dukes 三公”) responsible for rebellions and other major disasters, in some cases executing them.²⁴⁸ Taken together, these proposals sought to oust poor quality officials from the Song administration, whether or not there was actual misconduct.

What kind of official should replace those ineffective administrators? Ouyang Xiu gives a rather vague recommendation to “use good officials to soothe the weary people so that they do not rise as bandits 用良吏，以撫疲民，使不起為賊。”²⁴⁹ He does not describe what criteria made an official “good.” Later in the memorial, he refers back to his solution, but simply asks the emperor to listen to the many proposals laid before him and “choose what is good and implement it 擇其善者而行。”²⁵⁰ Ouyang is more explicit when discussing the selection of sheriffs and patrolling inspectors. In the case of sheriffs, he laments the frequent use of young, new examination graduates for the position, pointing out that “they are bookish and timid 儒生怯懦.” Instead of these weak, inexperienced officials, the Ministry of Personnel should revise its standards for the position and select “martial and brave talents 武勇人才” to serve as sheriffs.²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ QSW 32:681.134. For the date of Ouyang Xiu’s appointment, see *Ouyang Xiu nianpu* 1064. There were several possibilities for Vice Grand Councilor Wang: Wang Dan (957-1017), Wang Zeng 王曾 (978-1038), Wang Qinruo (962-1025), or Wang Sui 王隨 (d. 1039); see SS 210-211 *passim* for their appointments. While the others have dates listed in Chang Bide’s *Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin*, Wang Sui does not. However, the *Changbian* states that he died in the first month of Baoyuan 2, or 1039 (see CB 123.2893). Huazhou is a prefecture not connected directly to the rest of Jingxi North, but rather sandwiched between Hebei and Jingdong (see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 12-13).

²⁴⁸ QSW 32:681.146. Ouyang’s indictment of court officials probably related to the politics of the day, as many top officials were allies of the recently retired minister Lü Yijian and opponents of the reformist faction that included Ouyang Xiu and Cai Xiang. Together the two attempted to use their roles as remonstrance officials to oust anti-reformists and bring allies into the court.

²⁴⁹ QSW 32:681.146.

²⁵⁰ QSW 32:681.147.

²⁵¹ QSW 32:679.113. The term Ouyang uses for the Ministry of Personnel is *Quansi* 銓司, an alternate name for the ministry according to Hucker.

Similarly, many patrolling inspectors proved problematic, as Ouyang argues, “Often they are unable to catch bandits; on the contrary, they bring about disaster for the prefectures and counties 多不能捕賊，反與州縣為患。” He proposed that the court select servitors 使臣 who would in turn recruit soldiers or even commoners who could use sword and bow.²⁵² He is not clear on this point, but it seems that he meant the court should recruit reliable, low-ranking military officials to serve as patrolling inspectors, and they in turn would be allowed to choose the men they would command. In both cases, the officials Ouyang wanted for local law enforcement were to be chosen primarily based on their military capabilities.

While Ouyang advocated using officials with military abilities, some Song officials did not think that was sufficient. A little over forty years earlier, with the Song government facing banditry, mutiny, and desertion, Zhenzong ordered officials to recommend low-ranking civil officials who had “bravery and talent 武勇才器” to serve in military assignments and positions on the frontier.²⁵³ A month after the edict, Tian Xi criticized the recruitment effort on two grounds. First, recent efforts to recruit civil officials in this way had proven unsuccessful, with those recommended accomplishing little. He also had doubts that there were many “brave and talented” civil officials left, and even if there were such men, they would be unwilling to serve. Second, in Tian’s view it was more important to have officials who could effectively direct troops rather than boast military prowess:

If you seek the skills of riding and shooting and people who are courageous and fierce, in the *Art of War* there are methods to select them, and it is easy to seek out and acquire [such] men. However, it is essential above all else that those who have wise stratagems

²⁵² QSW 32:679.113. “Servitors” were military officials at the bottom of the Nine Ranks (8a-9b).

²⁵³ QSW 5:87.127. The edict is also found with a few differences in the *Changbian* (CB 46.992).

direct them. The latter contribute more than the former. Moreover, if people lack courage and are timid, and those who are good at using troops employ wise strategies to command them, then [even] those who are timid will have courage. 若求騎射之藝，勇猛之人，兵法中自有選求之法，便求得人，但要有智謀者指使之而已。所謂獲兔者犬，指蹤者人也。況善用兵者，人無勇怯，以智略使之，則怯者有勇。²⁵⁴

Rather than choosing military talents, Tian suggested employing higher ranking military officials who were wise and seen to have meritorious deeds 有智見勳勞者。²⁵⁵ Toward the end of his memorial, he revisited the issue, hoping the emperor would focus on choosing commanders and inquire broadly for strategies. He stressed the potential danger the dynasty could otherwise face: “If you merely seek appointments from among the Three Ranks and bravery from civil officials, I fear that we will fail in the great plan of the dynasty and the great affairs of state 若止三班中求任使，文班中求武勇，臣竊懼失朝廷大計，失國家大事也。”²⁵⁶ In Tian’s view, the ability to command effectively was more important than possessing military talent, and he wanted the emperor to recruit from more experienced military officials rather than low-ranking civil officials. Ouyang Xiu, on the other hand, did see a problem with using inexperienced examination graduates, but felt military talent was more valuable for a sheriff to possess as he did not mention leadership capabilities. He also entrusted the position of patrolling inspector to

²⁵⁴ QSW 5:87.127.

²⁵⁵ QSW 5:87.128. The military ranks he recommends for recruits were from 7b and above.

²⁵⁶ QSW 5:87.130. The “Three Ranks 三班” here likely refer to court officials, as the term is a reference to the positions officials took at court (the ranks being those grouped according to the emperor’s left, right, and front). See Hucker, *Dictionary of Official Titles*, 400.

low-ranking military officials. In other words, Ouyang's ideal candidates for local law enforcement were exactly those Tian Xi warned against appointing.²⁵⁷

While Tian Xi and Ouyang Xiu had differing views over the best characteristics in officials that dealt with unrest, they both recognized the importance of using rewards and punishments 賞罰 to control those officials. Tian encouraged the emperor to use the “two handles 二柄” of rewards and punishments to control the officials he appointed. He explained to the emperor, “Because the rewards and punishments motivate them (i.e, the upper ranks of the military officials), how could there not be men of the caliber of Yang Ye 楊業 (d. 986) and Hou Yanguang 侯延廣 (947-996) who will carry out meritorious deeds on behalf of the state 因賞罰激勵，豈無楊業、侯延廣輩為國家立功勳也?”²⁵⁸ Ouyang Xiu also supported using rewards and punishments as a tool to ensure the behavior of subordinates, and he asked that the emperor set policies of rewards and punishments for both sheriffs and patrolling inspectors.²⁵⁹ The use of rewards and punishments were originally associated with the Legalist school of thought; indeed, the “Two Handles” is the name of a chapter in the *Hanfeizi* 韓非子. In the Song, however, men who described themselves as Confucians, like Ouyang Xiu, were quite comfortable with resorting to this method. In the proposals detailed here, we have already seen the use of rewards to persuade rebels, criminals, wayward officials, and other marginalized groups to take actions which would aid the dynasty. It is clear here that rewards and punishments were expected to be used to encourage good behavior on the part of officials, too. I will cover the actual rewards and punishments given to officials in chapter four.

²⁵⁷ Admittedly, Ouyang does not explicitly state that he wanted *civil* officials to serve as sheriff, but the post generally was filled by a civil official, complementing the patrolling inspector who was usually a military official, as pointed out by McKnight (McKnight, *Law and Order*, 147).

²⁵⁸ QSW 5:87.128.

²⁵⁹ QSW 32:679.113.

Conclusion

Through an examination of government documents, it is possible to observe how Song officials and emperors thought of mutinies, and in turn how their views shaped the proposals they offered. Through the language employed, it is clear that mutineers were seen as agents of chaos, and that they were similar in nature to bandits and other criminal elements in society. Tying mutineers to bandits and even natural disasters allowed officials to intensify a sense of urgency which also bolstered their arguments for proposals to put down mutinies. Still, there was a distinction between the leadership seen as beyond redemption and the rank-and-file supporters of the mutineers who could be saved. This hope of salvation was often offered under the pretense that they had been tricked or coerced into fighting against the Song. Officials relied on such perceptions to back their proposed methods of suppressing the mutinies. They recommended harsh punishment of the leaders, but pardons for followers. Officials believed that the correlation between mutineers and other illicit or marginalized segments of society provided an opportunity to sway people in those segments to support the Song, thus improving the dynasty's position while denying the mutineers access to people who might otherwise side with them. When the mutinies ended, officials generally recommended retrenchment, boosting defenses like garrisons, choosing capable leaders, and rewards and punishments to shape behavior.

Chapter 2

Who to Send? Personnel Selection in Mutiny Suppression Campaigns

Once word of a mutiny reached the court, how did the emperor and his ministers decide whom to dispatch? On rare occasion, we still have a direct explanation. After dispatching several officials and troops to fight Chen Jin in Guangnan West Circuit in 1007, Emperor Zhenzong told Grand Councilor Wang Dan and other court officials:

The Directorate of Astronomy repeatedly submitted [memorials on] natural phenomena, and said that there ought to be troops [sent]. I worry that in that distant place [i.e., Guangnan West] the prefects did not get them. Now bandits have indeed arisen there. The court discussed and chose officials. They said that [Cao] Liyong 曹利用 (971-1029) excels in strategy, and he will do his utmost in royal affairs. [Zhang] Xu 張煦 (948-1020) has much experience serving on the frontier, and is very familiar with employing soldiers. [Zhang] Conggu 張從古 (959-1007) is extremely knowledgeable of strategic points in the hills and valleys of the Lingwai region [i.e., Guangnan]. [Zhang] Jineng 張繼能 (957-1021) advances courageously and [so] it is acceptable to employ him.²⁶⁰ 司天屢上占候，言當有兵，方憂遠地牧守不得其人，今此賊果作。廷議擇官，且言利用精於方略，悉心王事，煦多歷邊任、尤熟用兵，從古頗知嶺外山川險阨，繼能勇往可任。

Unfortunately, other cases lack such explicit reasons for choosing specific individuals.

Additionally, the officials had other advantages omitted in the emperor's summary. Zhang Conggu, for example, had twice served as prefect in Yizhou, where the mutiny erupted, and

²⁶⁰ CB 66.1472.

knew the terrain not least because of his involvement in conflicts with local non-Han peoples in that area.²⁶¹ Therefore, we need to look more deeply at the backgrounds of the individuals sent to suppress mutinies to gain a better understanding of why the court chose them.²⁶²

This examination enhances our knowledge of selecting officials in the government and the distribution of power at court. There is existing scholarship on personnel selection for routine appointments. Winston W. Lo and Brian E. McKnight find that the Ministry of Personnel and Bureau of Military Affairs filled all but the highest posts, which were the responsibility of the emperor.²⁶³ Officials in charge of personnel matched potential candidates with offices that matched their civil service experience, which was determined by the previous post an official held. This rather impersonal appointment process could take anywhere from days to months, in part depending on the attractiveness of a given post.²⁶⁴ However, mutinies were by their very nature unpredictable, and the court needed to address them quickly. The positions created to fight such unrest were thus ad hoc appointments. Furthermore, there was a greater imperative for the court to select experienced, capable officials to deal with the crisis at hand. The primary goal of this chapter is to clarify what criteria the court employed when appointing officials to put down mutineers.

In addition, I find that the emperor played a central role in the selection of officials to fight a mutiny. Usually, a given emperor's enthusiasm and capacity for government affairs

²⁶¹ CB 45.964.

²⁶² While I will discuss five mutinies in other chapters, the court did not order anyone to fight Wang Lun in the Jingdong-Huainan mutiny of 1043, and so that mutiny is not dealt with here.

²⁶³ Lo, *Civil Service*, 132-33 and McKnight, *Law and Order*, 265-66.

²⁶⁴ Hartman, "Sung Government and Politics," 68-71. Appointees had the right to refuse a few offers before they had to accept the position provided to them, which could result in less desirable offices being left vacant for a long time. In fact, the service requirements for a post lowered over time as it remained unfilled, presumably to entice more ambitious, but less experienced, candidates to take the opportunity. Obviously this would not be acceptable in the event of a mutiny, where prompt response was more critical than with a routine appointment.

played a significant role in shaping the relationship between the throne and officialdom.²⁶⁵ For example, Renzong showed relatively little interest in guiding the state. He was content with Lü Yijian's long-standing domination of the court.²⁶⁶ Shenzong, on the other hand, was very assertive. He appointed Wang Anshi and promulgated the New Policies, continuing them despite the protests of many top officials.²⁶⁷ Far from being under the spell of a powerful minister, however, Shenzong also struck out on his own, as when he instituted the Yuanfeng administrative reforms over the objections of high officials and the since-retired Wang Anshi.²⁶⁸ Although a ruler's temperament played a role, even relatively passive monarchs could be stirred to action if compelled by circumstances. For example, Renzong brought in Fan Zhongyan and his reformist supporters due to several concerns including the ongoing war with Xixia and concurrent unrest within the empire.²⁶⁹ He also showed considerable interest in the celebrated general Di Qing 狄青 (1008-1057) and appointed him to the Bureau of Military Affairs despite the unease of top civil officials.²⁷⁰

Upon examining the backgrounds of officials appointed to put down mutinies, there is compelling evidence that emperors played an active role in the selection process. This is likely due to the potential threat mutinies posed to the dynasty. Often occurring along the frontier, these uprisings threatened the empire's grasp over the periphery since those who were garrisoned to maintain or extend the center's control now rose up against it. Ensuring his own survival, and

²⁶⁵ See Olsson's dissertation, "The Structure of Power Under the Third Emperor," which delves into how Shenzong's changing attitudes and his declining health shaped court politics.

²⁶⁶ McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung," 292-98 for Lü's prominence at court under Renzong in the 1030s.

²⁶⁷ Smith, "Shen-tsung's Reign and the New Policies of Wang An-shih."

²⁶⁸ Hartman, "Sung Government and Politics," 129.

²⁶⁹ McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung," 316-17.

²⁷⁰ McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung," 332.

that of his posterity, likely drove an emperor to take a more assertive role than he would under more peaceful circumstances.

After compiling a list of people who were sent to suppress the mutinies covered in this study, I drew on sources, from the official biographies in the *Songshi* to the funerary inscriptions found in collected works, in order to look at what made these officials attractive choices. Following a brief overview of the cohort dispatched by the court, I examine two different factors which influenced selection. First, in each mutiny where the court dispatched officials, there was a mix of military officials, civil officials, and eunuchs. Each group brought specific benefits and played particular roles in the suppression efforts. Second, the interpersonal relationships between officials, as well as those tying officials to the emperor, suggest that the court was interested in utilizing those relationships and that the emperor in particular relied them as another check against behavior which favored personal interests over those of the dynasty.

Compiling Dispatched Officials

Before investigating the factors which contributed to the selection of specific officials, it is crucial to cast an appropriately-sized net to determine whom to study. After establishing the criteria needed to count an official as one chosen by the court, we will look briefly at the composition of these groups, with an eye towards the wing of the government in which an official served—that is, whether he was a military official, civil official, or a eunuch.

When deciding on whom to study, I restricted the pool of subjects to those expressly described as being ordered, given a post, or otherwise dispatched to deal with a mutiny. This is distinct from those who already were in the area and acted on their own volition or within the scope of their incumbent offices. For example, in 1047 Wang Xin traveled on his own accord to Beizhou, Hebei once he heard of Wang Ze's uprising, and was only given a new post after he

had reached the prefecture, effectively confirming him in place.²⁷¹ Therefore, Wang Xin should not be counted as being “dispatched” by the court. In 1048, the court dispatched two civil officials, Ju Zhenqing 鞠真卿 and Wang Qi 王起, to Beizhou. However, they received appointments because of requests by Wen Yanbo and Ming Hao.²⁷² Renzong most likely would not have sent them otherwise, so I chose not to count them, either. Another example of someone who played a role in the suppression efforts but was not expressly sent to fight as Guangnan West Fiscal Intendant Shu Ben 舒賁 who, among other things, sent Yu Derun 于德潤 to attack Chen Jin’s forces.²⁷³ Shu was not appointed in response to the mutiny, but rather carried out actions within the scope of the office he already held and thus should also not be counted. Fu Bi, by contrast, had just been appointed Hebei pacification commissioner just before the 1044 mutiny in Baozhou, but received a command from the emperor to lead the forces gathered there.²⁷⁴ Having been expressly chosen, I do count Fu as having been dispatched. There are other individuals named in accounts, such as the officers Yang Sui 楊遂 and Meng Yuan 孟元, both of whom distinguished themselves at Beizhou in 1047-1048. These men were likely not selected individually but rather belonged to military units under the command of more senior officers chosen by the court; they, too, are not counted.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ CB 161.3891.

²⁷² See CB 162.3903 for the requests. Wen and Ming actually requested the assistance of seven officials in total, but Ju and Wang were the only ones explicitly named. Little is known about either Ju or Wang, although it is noteworthy that Wang was the author of an account on the Beizhou mutiny, *A Record of Suppressing the Rebels at Ganling* 甘陵誅叛錄 (SS 203.5120), with Ganling being used as an alternative name for Beizhou. Unfortunately, Wang’s work is not extant.

²⁷³ CB 66.1485. For Shu’s post during the Chen Jin mutiny, see SHY Bing 10.12.

²⁷⁴ Fu received his commission to Hebei on the fourth day of 8/1044 (CB 151.3674). The mutiny broke out on the following day (SHY Bing 10.15). According to the *Changbian*, the emperor ordered Fu to Baozhou on or before the twenty-fourth of 8/1044 (CB 151.3688) due to an alleged lack of leadership.

²⁷⁵ SS 342.11062 (for Yang) and 323.10460 (for Meng). Yang’s claim to fame was his role in stopping the “fire oxen 火牛” which the Beizhou mutineers provoked into a stampede to trample Song troops; Yang allegedly struck one of the oxen on the nose with his spear, causing the oxen to turn back, scattering the mutineers (CB 162.3905-06). Fire oxen had spears tied to their sides, and grasses were tied to the animals’ tails and then set on fire to cause them to charge toward the enemy. This was a tactic which the Song government included in the *Wujing zongyao*

Another issue is the attrition of the sources. It is very likely that many officials involved in the mutiny suppression campaigns had biographies that are no longer extant. An official, or the author of the biography, might not have enjoyed enough of a reputation to be deemed worthy of inclusion in histories like the *Songshi* or the *Changbian*, or to have a collected writing compiled and circulate enough to survive the passage of time. This means that it is very likely other officials were chosen, but their names were lost for any number of reasons. We do know of Yang Huaizhong, the prefect of Shuzhou who resisted Wang Jun in 1000 and tried to retake Chengdu, from received texts, but he lacked his own biography in any such source. The recent discovery of his funerary inscription, unearthed in Henan, demonstrates the fragility of such sources.²⁷⁶ While it is impossible, of course, to determine how many names were lost, we can examine which types of officials are more likely to have their biographies written and preserved. Literati were the most common authors of funerary inscriptions, records of conduct, and the biographies included in the official histories, and this group was closely tied to civil officialdom. As has been noted by Denis Twitchett, there was a tendency for biographers to favor civil officials over their military and eunuch counterparts.²⁷⁷ Eunuch biographies are rare: Eunuchs are lumped together in just four *juan* within the *Songshi* biography section, which is 242 *juan* long.²⁷⁸ Jennifer Jay writes that Song authors treated eunuchs with hostility. This was due in part to long-standing negative attitudes Confucian writers had towards eunuchs, and more

(see *Wujing zongyao* 11.21 for a description and illustration). As a reward, Yang was promoted to head a metropolitan army commandery 神衛指揮使 (SS 342.11062). Meng was wounded dozens of times during the siege, including by a stone from a catapult. Despite the injuries, he helped recruit soldiers to attack Beizhou from tunnels dug beneath the city.

²⁷⁶ SHY Bing 10.11 for Yang's efforts against Wang Jun. The modern historian Wang Lianlong has written an article on Yang's funerary inscription, including a transcription, in Wang, "Xin jian Bei Song 'Yang Huaizhong mu zhi' kao."

²⁷⁷ Twitchett, "Problems of Chinese Biography," 31.

²⁷⁸ These are *juan* 466 through 469. I excluded the final sections of the *Songshi* biographies from the total count, as they dealt with other states and ethnic groups rather than individuals.

immediately to the considerable power eunuchs held in the Tang, which contributed to the demise of that dynasty.²⁷⁹ While all types of officials are susceptible to attrition, military officials and especially eunuchs were more prone to this than civil officials.

Distinguishing between the three types of officials is an important step in this analysis. For identifying military and civil officials, the process is quite straightforward. Upon becoming eligible to hold a government or military post, an individual was granted a personal rank that provided a stipend while in office and gave certain privileges such as reduced taxes.²⁸⁰ There were numerous personal ranks that belonged to two tracks, a military track and civil track. As the names imply, military officials held military ranks, and civil officials held civil ranks.²⁸¹ Therefore, military and civil officials are quite easy to recognize since their personal ranks are commonly mentioned when they were appointed or received a promotion or demotion. Eunuchs, on the other hand, are trickier to identify. There were some unique personal rank titles, such as *gaopin* 高品, but at some ranks eunuchs used the same titles as military officials.²⁸² In those cases, if we find that an individual is identified using a common generic term for a eunuch, like *neishi* 內侍, or held a post in the Palace Eunuch Service 入內內侍省, then it is safe to say he was a eunuch. For the sake of caution, I only counted someone as a eunuch if he had identifying markers like those given above; otherwise, if an individual held a military rank, he is classified

²⁷⁹ Jay, “Song Confucian Views on Eunuchs,” 45-46.

²⁸⁰ Hartman, “Sung Government and Politics,” 49-50. Winston Lo discusses salaries in Lo, *Civil Service*, 158-62. He mentions that the salary specifically tied to personal rank became obsolete, certainly after the Yuanfeng reforms of 1082.

²⁸¹ Hartman, “Sung Government and Politics,” 49-50.

²⁸² See the table in Gong, *Songdai guanzhi cidian*, 698. In particular, the eunuch personal ranks for 7a and 7b are identical to the military personal ranks (compare with the table in Umehara, “Civil and Military Officials,” 4). According to the table compiled by Gong Yanming, there were several unique personal rank titles for eunuchs, some of which were slightly altered variants of military personal ranks. For example, *runei dong/xi gongfengguan* 入內東、西供奉官 is clearly a eunuch parallel to the military personal rank *dong/xi gongfengguan* 東、西供奉官. The prefix of *runei* was the distinguishing marker to indicate if the bearer of the rank was a eunuch. Both also had the same numerical rank (8b).

as a military official. This does mean that some individuals I categorize as military officials might in fact have been eunuchs, but this is unlikely to be a serious issue.

With the criteria above, we can create the following table (this is drawn from a larger table compiled with the names, posts, and other information about the individuals, which can be found in Appendix Table 1):

Officials Dispatched to Suppress Mutinies					
	Chengdu, Sichuan (Wang Jun, 1000)	Yizhou, Guangnan West (Chen Jin, 1007)	Baozhou, Hebei (Wei Gui, 1044)	Beizhou, Hebei (Wang Ze, 1047-1048)	Total
Military	11	4	3	2	19
Civil	6	1	3	3	13
Eunuch	2	5	2	3	11
Total	19	10	8	8	43

In total, forty-three different officials were dispatched according to extant sources. One military official, Zhang Xu 張煦 (948-1020), and one eunuch, Zhang Jineng 張繼能, received appointments to fight two different mutinies.²⁸³ The number of officials sent to put down each mutiny is within a rather narrow range. The Wang Jun and Chen Jin mutinies did have more officials dispatched. This may have been due in part to the geographic spread of the unrest, as Wang controlled Chengdu, the principal city of Sichuan, as well as much of the western portion of the region, and Chen's actions spilled out of Yizhou into other prefectures. The geographic scope of fighting is clear from the appointment of three or four officials as Chuanxia suppression

²⁸³ For their roles in the mutinies, see SS 308.10149-50 (for Zhang Xu) and SS 466.13620-21 (for Zhang Jineng). I only counted Zhang Xu and Zhang Jineng once in the totals in the right-hand column, which explains the discrepancies for the military officials and eunuchs rows. The numbers in the table here also include six individuals (five civil officials and one military official) sent after a mutiny ended. Of those, the court dispatched four civil officials and one military official to Sichuan to help sweep up the remaining partisans of Wang Jun and restore order (CB 47.1030), while another civil official was sent to Baozhou to serve as prefect there (CB 151.3689). If we only look at officials sent during the mutiny, we have a total of 37 officials with 18 military, 8 civil, and 11 eunuchs. In addition, there was another eunuch, Li Jihe 李繼和 (d. 1072), who played a role in the Baozhou mutiny but as an incumbent official in Hebei who was not expressly sent to the city. He was subsequently dispatched to serve as mounted courier at the Beizhou mutiny (see SS 468.13651), and I only counted him for Beizhou.

patrolling inspectors 川峽路招安巡檢使, since the name “Chuanxia” referred to what were then the two circuits of Sichuan.²⁸⁴ In Hebei, both the Baozhou and Beizhou mutineers remained within a single, besieged city. Given the nature of the crisis, it is unsurprising that the most common type of official dispatched was the military official. The title of military official, however, is a bit of a misnomer. As Winston W. Lo points out, many military officials—that is, those holding military personal rank titles—did not have anything to do with military affairs.²⁸⁵ However, we shall see that this does not seem to be an issue here. Most clearly performed military functions—either leading troops or overseeing the army, and had prior experience fighting or serving as prefects in frontier regions where conflict was a real possibility. Civil

²⁸⁴ There are three military officials who definitely acted as patrolling inspectors, and perhaps one of two eunuch commanders. The military officials were Li Hui 李惠, Shi Pu 石普, and Li Shoulun 李守倫, appointed in 1/1000. There is some confusion about the titles of Li, Shi, and Li. Some sources list them as suppression patrolling inspectors 招安巡檢使, while Lei Youzhong is listed as Chuanxia bandit-catching suppression commissioner 川峽兩路捉賊招安使 (see SHY Bing 10.10 and Lei Youzhong’s *Songshi* biography SS 278.9457; Shi Pu’s biography states he became a suppression patrolling inspector, too SS 255.10472). However, in the *Changbian*, Shi and the two Lis are called bandit-catching suppression commissioners (the same title held by Lei according to his *Songshi* biography), while Lei is somewhat clumsily called the “Chuanxia army bandit-catching suppression patrolling inspector and fiscal intendant” 川峽兩路軍馬招安巡檢捉賊轉運公事 (CB 46.989). There is more evidence in favor of calling them suppression patrolling inspectors, and this would also distinguish them more clearly from Lei Youzhong, who led the effort against the mutineers (SS 255.10471). The situation with the eunuch in question is also confusing: He might have been Qin Han or Zhang Jineng, if there even was a eunuch appointed at the same time as Li Hui, Shi Pu, and Li Shoulun. Lei’s *Songshi* biography (SS 278.9457) and the *Changbian* (CB 46.989) make no mention of a eunuch in the list of initial appointments of 1/1000, while the *Song huiyao* lists Qin Han as suppression patrolling inspector alongside Shi and the two Lis (SHY Bing 10.10; Qin is also called a patrolling inspector in his *Songshi* biography, SS 466.13612). Li Tao made the decision to cut out Qin from the list in the *Changbian*. His reason was that while the *Veritable Records* 實錄 (no longer extant) had Qin Han in the list of officials initially dispatched, there was an order in the eighth month sending Qin to Sichuan (CB 46.989). However, in the eighth month the *Changbian* records that Qin was “again dispatched 復遣” to the region, when he was given the title of bandit-catching suppression commissioner 兩路捉賊招安使 (CB 47.1024, this is the same title given Lei Youzhong in the *Song huiyao* and Lei’s *Songshi* biography, but also the same title given Li Hui, Shi Pu, and Li Shoulun in the *Changbian*). The phrase “again dispatched” suggests that Qin had previously gone to Sichuan and returned to the capital, only to be sent back again. The *Song huiyao* also has Qin arriving in the fourth month of 1000 (SHY Bing 10.11). However, that passage came after an account of an unsuccessful attack on Chengdu that is largely identical to the *Changbian* account dated to the eighth month which directly preceded Qin’s appointment (compare SHY Bing 10.11 to CB 47.1024)—the attacks (and appointments) describe the same events. In short, the chronology for Qin Han’s arrival is unclear: He may have arrived in the first, fourth, or eighth month of 1000, and there may have been an interlude when he returned to Kaifeng and then was sent back. A second eunuch, Zhang Jineng, is also named as a suppression patrolling inspector (SS 466.13620), though there are no details as to when he was assigned.

²⁸⁵ Lo, *Civil Service*, 27.

officials were less common, but they tended to hold the highest positions of any official dispatched.²⁸⁶ Eunuchs made up the smallest group, but were still quite often found. Also, as noted above, some of the military officials might have been eunuchs who lacked any of the identifying markers of a eunuch, so eleven should be seen as a minimum number. In the following sections, we will examine what made each type of official—military, civil, or eunuch—attractive for dispatching to put down mutinies.

Military Officials

The officials who directed troops in the field were primarily from a group known as military officials. This term is a literal translation of the Chinese *wuguan* 武官, which is a blanket term for officials who held military personal ranks. However, as noted above, Winston W. Lo finds that many military officials had little or no background in the military at all. Charles Hartman remarks that these officials could serve in functional posts related to security, but also “finance, and low-level secretarial and accounting work.”²⁸⁷ Furthermore, the vast majority of military officials did not have experience serving as rank-and-file soldiers or as officers in command of specific units like the troop commandant or commander. Examining how military officials in 1213 had entered government service, John Chaffee finds that 14.9 percent were transfers from the army, and another 2.5 percent entered by way of the military examinations.²⁸⁸ The most common way they entered government service was through the *yin*, or protection, privilege 蔭補 which they received from members of their family (most often fathers and

²⁸⁶ The military official Cao Liyong, who oversaw the response to the 1007 Chen Jin mutiny in Guangnan, was an exception, as will be seen in the section on military officials below. His role as the envoy in peace negotiations with Liao, leading to the Treaty of Chanyuan of 1005, might explain in part his prominent position in Guangnan (SS 290.9705-06). He clearly gained the emperor’s favor with the treaty, being promoted from 殿直, rank 9a, to 東上閣門使, rank 6a, as a consequence (CB 58.1292).

²⁸⁷ Lo, *Civil Service*, 27 and Hartman, “Sung Government and Politics,” 52.

²⁸⁸ Chaffee, *Thorny Gates of Learning*, 22 Table 2. According to Lo, this 1213 list by method of entry is the only complete one extant for the Song dynasty (Lo, *Civil Service*, 85).

grandfathers) who already held office.²⁸⁹ In light of these facts, one cannot presume that an individual holding a military personal rank had anything to do with the military. It is therefore critical to look into the backgrounds of the military officials dispatched to fight mutinies to see if they in fact had experience in military affairs. Evidence reveals that these officials were, on the whole, familiar with the army, even if they did not rise from the ranks. The following table lists all the military officials dispatched to fight the mutinies.

List of Dispatched Military Officials				
Mutiny (Year)	Name	Entry	Post Held	Personal Rank
Sichuan (1000)	Li Hui 李惠	Unknown	Chuanxia Suppression Patrolling Inspector 川峽路招安巡檢使 (SHY Bing 10.10)	御廚使 7a (SS 278.9457)
	Shi Pu 石普	Yin Privilege (SS 324.10471)	Chuanxia Suppression Patrolling Inspector 川峽路招安巡檢使 (SHY Bing 10.10)	洛苑使 7a (CB 46.989)
	Li Shoulun 李守倫	Unknown	Chuanxia Suppression Patrolling Inspector 川峽路招安巡檢使 (SHY Bing 10.10)	供備庫副使 7b (SS 278.9457)
	Shangguan Zheng 上官正	Zhuke Degree 諸科 (San Zhuan 三傳, SS 308.10137)	Dongchuan Circuit Military Administrator-in-Chief 東川都鈐轄 (CB 46.989) or Xia Circuit Military Administrator-in-Chief 峽路都鈐轄 (SS 308.10138)	東上閣門使 6a (as of 998, SS 308.10138)
	Wang Ruan 王阮	Unknown	Temporary Chengdu Director-in-Chief 益州駐泊都監 (SS 278.9457)	內殿崇班 8a (SHY Bing 10.10)
	Gao Jixun 高繼勳	Yin Privilege (SS 289.9694)	Temporary Chengdu Director-in-Chief 益州駐泊都監 (SS 278.9457) and Supervisor of Xichuan Prefectural Patrolling Inspectors 提舉西川諸州軍巡檢使 (SS 289.9694)	崇儀副使 7b (SS 289.9694)
	Sun Zhengci 孫正辭	Unknown	Patrolling Inspector-in-Chief 諸州都巡檢使 (CB 46.989)	供奉官 8b (CB 46.989)
	Li Jichang 李繼昌	Yin Privilege (SS 257.8954)	Xia Circuit Military Administrator-in-Chief 峽路都鈐轄 (CB 46.989)	西京作坊使 7a (CB 46.989)
	Yang Chongxun 楊崇勳	Yin Privilege (SS 290.9713)	Mounted Courier 承受公事 (QSW 25:524.65)	西頭供奉官 8b (QSW 25:524.65)

²⁸⁹ 51.1% of military officials in 1213 entered the government through *yin* privilege (Chaffee, *Thorny Gates of Learning*, 22 Table 2). Edward A. Kracke, Jr. states that the *yin* privilege was mostly granted to sons and other male relatives or dependents (Kracke, *Civil Service*, 73). For a description of the *yin* privilege, its rationale, and criticisms about it, see Lo, *Civil Service*, 102-09. John Chaffee notes that *yin* privilege recipients had to still take a placement exam to hold office, and many still attempted the civil service exams (Chaffee, “Sung Education,” 287-88).

	Zhang Xu 張煦	Yin Privilege (SS 308.10149)	Mianzhou-Hanzhou-Jianmen Patrolling Inspector-in-Chief 綿、漢、劍門路都巡檢使 (SS 308.10149)	供備庫副使 7b (CB 47.1014)
	Li Chengxiang 李承象	Unknown	Joint Manager of Pacification 同句當安撫事 (Post-Mutiny, 句當 probably should be 勾當, meaning "manager," CB 47.1030)	閣門祗候 (at least 9a CB 47.1030)
Guangnan West (1007)	Cao Liyong 曹利用	Yin Privilege (SS 290.9705)	Guangnan East and West Pacification Commissioner 廣南東西路安撫使 (CB 66.1472)	東上閣門使 6a (CB 66.1472)
	Zhang Xu 張煦	Yin Privilege (SS 308.10149)	Guangnan East and West Pacification Commissioner 廣南東西路安撫使 (CB 66.1472)	供備庫使 7a (CB 66.1472)
	Zhang Conggu 張從古	Yin Privilege (SS 276.9406)	Assisted Cao Liyong and Zhang Xu 副之 (CB 66.1472)	如京副使 7b (CB 66.1472)
	He Rong 何榮	Unknown	Guangzhou Military Administrator 廣州鈐轄 (CB 66.1480)	內殿崇班 8a (CB 66.1480)
Baozhou, Hebei (1044)	Li Zhaoliang 李昭亮	Yin Privilege (SS 464.13563)	Zhengdingfu-Dingzhou Chief Administrator 真定府、定州路都部署 and Infantry Assistant Commander-in-Chief 步軍副都指揮使 (Incumbent, CB 144.3476, could have been Assistant Chief Administrator instead, see <i>Sushui jiwén</i> 11.204)	感德軍留後 3a (CB 144.3476)
	Wang Deji 王德基	Unknown	Border Military Intendant 緣邊安撫使 and Xiongzhou Prefect 知雄州 (Incumbent, CB 152.3696)	四方館使 5b (CB 152.3696)
	Wang Guo 王果	Zhuke Degree (Mingfa 明法, initially held civil official ranks, SS 326.10529)	Dingzhou Prefect 知定州 (Incumbent, CB 151.3688)	皇城使 7a (CB 152.3697)
Beizhou, Hebei (1047-1048)	Gao Jilong 高繼隆	Unknown (probably <i>yin</i> privilege by way of father Gao Qiong 高瓊, like his brother Gao Jixun listed above)	Beizhou Prefect 知貝州 (CB 161.3892)	東上閣門使 6a (CB 161.3892)
	Wang Kai 王凱	Recommended by Kou Zhun 寇準 based on unusual appearance and merits of ancestors (SS 255.8925)	Unknown (Recalled to capital and awaiting audience with emperor when mutiny broke out, SS 255.8925-26)	西京作坊使 7a (CB 161.3891)

First, it would be useful to examine the method of entry of military officials. Nineteen individual military officials in all served in the suppression campaigns. The information on their means of becoming officials is listed as follows:

Method of Entry for Military Officials	
Method of Entry	Number of Military Officials
<i>Yin</i> Privilege	8
Civil Service Examination	2
Recommendation	1
Unknown	8

Of the eleven whose method of entry is clearly indicated, eight became officials through the *yin* privilege. This is a conservative figure, as a case could be made that Gao Jilong, one of the officials whose method of entry is unknown, also entered via the *yin* privilege. Gao was a son of the high-ranking general Gao Qiong 高瓊 (935-1006), and we know that his brother Gao Jixun became an official through protection.²⁹⁰ This suggests that Gao Jilong also benefited from the *yin* privilege, but the matter cannot be decisively resolved because he lacks an extant biographical source. In addition, the one recommendation was for Wang Kai. The recommending official, Kou Zhun 寇準 (961-1023), reported Wang to the court for office in part because of his unusual appearance, but probably more importantly because of his ancestors: His great-grandfather was Wang Quanbin 王全斌, who helped conquer Later Shu for the Song, and his grandfather Wang Shenjun 王審鈞 died fighting for the dynasty. While neither of the elder Wangs personally bestowed a rank on Wang Kai, it is clear that their service to the state played a role in his entry into the government, similar to the rationale behind the *yin* privilege.²⁹¹

²⁹⁰ SS 289.9694.

²⁹¹ SS 255.8925. Winston W. Lo describes the *yin* privilege in transactional terms: “It [the *yin* privilege] was an integral part of the remuneration for which ambitious men were prepared to make the utmost sacrifice to enter the emperor’s service and gain his good graces” (Lo, *Civil Service*, 103).

Finally, there are the two military officials who entered the government by way of the civil service exams, Wang Guo and Shangguan Zheng. Normally, passing the *jinshi* or one of the *zhuke* exams would put the official in the civil official track of personal ranks. This was the case for Wang. He passed the *mingfa* (law) 明法 exam and initially rose in the ranks as a civil official but later was switched to the military official track on account of a memorial he submitted on policies for selecting generals and preparing the borders.²⁹² Shangguan's initial position is less clear, but the evidence provided suggests that after passing the *San Zhuan* 三傳 exam he was always in the military official track or moved there early on.²⁹³ It is true that civil officials could and did request to switch to the military track, and vice versa, though this seem to have been rare.²⁹⁴

One key finding from examining the entry methods is that, to the best of our knowledge, none of the military officials examined here entered through the army or military examinations. Are there other ways to determine if a military official had anything to do with the military? Examining the background of the officials can provide insight. Thirteen of the nineteen military officials have information about their careers prior to the mutiny they were sent to handle. Of those, eleven had served in positions related to the military. There were a number of official posts at the prefecture and circuit levels which were in charge of army units within their jurisdiction. Three such offices appear often in the previous government experience of the military officials: the military administrator 鈐轄, patrolling inspector 巡檢使, and director-in-

²⁹² SS 326.10529-30 for Wang's career leading up to the Baozhou, Hebei mutiny, including his passing the civil service exam. The explanation for his transfer from the civil to military track is laid out more clearly in the *Changbian* (CB 119.2799).

²⁹³ The *San Zhuan* was an examination based on the three commentaries of the *Spring and Autumn Annals* 春秋.

²⁹⁴ Lo, *Civil Service*, 150-51. Lo suggests that "transfer from the civil rank system to the military rank system was probably more common."

chief 都監. Eight of the eleven officials served at least once as a military administrator.²⁹⁵ This position, according to the modern historian Gong Yanming, was an office for commanding officers leading troops on expeditions, but in garrisons was in charge of quarters, defenses, and the training of imperial army soldiers.²⁹⁶ Five officials had experience as a patrolling inspector.²⁹⁷ This, too, was originally a purely military post to led attacks defend the borders against invasion, but morphed into a law enforcement official in charge of curbing banditry and protecting state monopolies against private trade.²⁹⁸ Four officials worked previously as a director-in-chief, who had controls over the military similar to the military administrator.²⁹⁹ Their jurisdictions could range from a single prefecture to multiple prefectures to a circuit.

It is clear, then, that most of the military officials examined here had held posts related to the military, and the experience of managing troops in a prefecture or circuit was valuable. However, did any of them see combat or otherwise direct troops in conflicts? Eight have clear evidence of some involvement in fighting. Shi Pu, Shangguan Zheng, and Li Jichang, all of whom were sent to fight against the Sichuan mutiny in 1000, had previously battled Li Shun or his remaining supporters.³⁰⁰ Gao Jixun, who was also sent to Sichuan, previously worked as a patrolling inspector-in-chief along the border of Jingxi North and Yongxingjun Circuits, where he suppressed a large number of bandits.³⁰¹ Zhang Xu, who participated in both the Sichuan and

²⁹⁵ These were Shangguan Zheng (SS 308.10138), Li Jichang (SS 257.8954-55), Zhang Xu (in between his service against the Sichuan mutiny and Guangnan mutiny, SS 308.10150), Li Zhaoliang (SS 464.13563), Wang Deji (CB 126.2995), Wang Guo (SS 326.10529-30), Gao Jilong (CB 125.2945), and Wang Kai (SS 255.8925).

²⁹⁶ Gong, *Songdai guanzhi cidian*, 447.

²⁹⁷ These were Shi Pu (SS 324.10472), Gao Jixun (QSW 53:1156.222-23), Li Jichang (SS 257.8954-55), Zhang Xu (before, during, and after the Sichuan mutiny, SS 308.10149), and Wang Kai (SS 255.8925).

²⁹⁸ Gong, *Songdai guanzhi cidian*, 452.

²⁹⁹ Gong, *Songdai guanzhi cidian*, 450. The officials appointed previously as directors-in-chief were Zhang Xu (after Sichuan but before Guangnan mutinies, SS 308.10149), Wang Deji (CB 126.2995), Wang Guo (SS 326.10529), and Wang Kai (SS 255.8925).

³⁰⁰ SS 324.10471 (for Shi), 308.10137 (for Shangguan), and SS 257.8954-55 (for Li).

³⁰¹ QSW 53:1156.222-23.

Guangnan suppression campaigns, fought Liao cavalry who had crossed into Song territory prior to being sent to Sichuan.³⁰² Zhang Conggu, as prefect of Yizhou in Guangnan West, had repeatedly attacked the non-Han peoples in the area, which gave him both military experience and better knowledge of the region.³⁰³ While Wang Guo did not have records putting him in charge of soldiers, he helped the Song in security matters while prefect of Baozhou. The Liao wanted to make demands for Song territory, but Wang was able to acquire a draft of the demands which he forwarded to the court. He was thus promoted to be Gaoyang Pass Circuit's military administrator.³⁰⁴ Gao Jilong and Wang Kai, both of whom were sent to Beizhou, Hebei, had experience in the early 1040s leading or directing troops in the war with Xixia.³⁰⁵ The remaining three officials for whom there is evidence of their careers prior to the mutinies likely witnessed clashes with Xixia owing to their posts during that war.³⁰⁶

There are two exceptions to this tendency to appoint military officials with substantive experience with the army with Yang Chongxun and Cao Liyong. In 1000, Yang was appointed mounted courier during the Sichuan mutiny. In that position, he was responsible for surveilling the Song army, rather than leading troops. According to his biography in the *Songshi*, Yang

³⁰² SS 308.10149-50. Zhang participated in the assaults on Chengdu. After the mutiny was suppressed, he was put in charge of military affairs in the circuit alongside Chengdu's prefect Song Taichu 宋太初 (946-1007), and gained further experience in clashes between the Song and Tanguts during the period between the two mutinies.

³⁰³ CB 45.964. As seen in the quote at the start of this chapter, Zhang's knowledge of the region was the reason Zhenzong gave for his appointment (CB 66.1472).

³⁰⁴ SS 326.10529.

³⁰⁵ Gao Jilong's experience included sieges, including sending troops to relieve the siege of Yanzhou (CB 126.2971) and to destroy Xixia fortresses (CB 129.3051). According to his *Songshi* biography, Wang Kai fought with the Xixia several times, including enduring a thirty-one day siege of Linzhou 麟州 in Hedong. In all, he remained in the northwest for nine years when Ming Hao, the first civil official in charge of suppressing the Beizhou mutiny, recommended him to the emperor. Wang was in Kaifeng awaiting his audience with Renzong when the mutiny broke out (SS 255.8925-26).

³⁰⁶ Li Zhaoliang served as Qinfeng Assistant Chief Area Commander 秦鳳副部署 when he was additionally appointed Qinfeng's Assistant Border Suppression Military Intendant 本路招討經略安撫副使 in 1041, in the midst of the Song-Xixia wars (CB 134.3196). Wang Deji was prefect of Fuzhou 知鄜州 and Fu-Yan military administrator 鄜延鈐轄 in Yongxingjun Circuit briefly in 1040, though it should be noted we know this only in the context of his demotion for aiding Yanzhou 延州 too slowly (CB 127.3005). Finally, Wang Guo was made Yongxingjun military administrator 永興軍鈐轄 in 1042 (CB 138.3327).

entered government service through the *yin* privilege. He served Emperor Zhenzong when he was still crown prince. During that time he learned about military arts and the rise and fall of previous dynasties.³⁰⁷ There is no evidence that he spent time in any capacity related to the military prior to the mutiny, however. Taken together, these points indicate that Yang was chosen primarily because of his personal service to Zhenzong, where he presumably earned the emperor’s trust. Cao Liyong became one of two pacification commissioners in response to the Guangnan mutiny in 1007. While Cao’s biography credits him with shooting and killing a Liao general during the fight prior to the Treaty of Chanyuan, there is no other evidence that he held posts responsible for the military before the mutiny. He, too, was named mounted courier early on, but this again was a post that observed the military rather than taking charge of it. Judging by his biography in the *Songshi*, Cao’s most notable accomplishment was as a key negotiator between the Liao and the Song in the drafting of the treaty, but Zhenzong did say that he chose Cao because of he was “good at strategy 精於方略.” It is possible that he did have military experience, but records on that no longer exist.³⁰⁸

The military officials’ posts were concentrated on the frontier, especially the north and northwest. For example, seven military officials served as prefects for a total of nineteen times by the time they were dispatched to fight a mutiny. I have listed them in the table below:

Military Officials with Experience as Prefect		
Official	Prefectures (Circuit)	Source
Shangguan Zheng	Cangzhou 滄州(Hebei), Qingzhou (Jingdong)	SS 308.10138
Zhang Xu	Huanzhou 環州 (Yongxingjun), Baoanjin 保安軍 (Yongxingjun)	SS 308.10149
Zhang Conggu	Yizhou (Guangnan, twice), Huanzhou (Yongxingjun), Lizhou 禮州 (Jinghu North)	SS 276.9406 CB 45.964

³⁰⁷ SS 290.9713.

³⁰⁸ SS 290.9705-06 and CB 66.1472 (for Zhenzong’s explanation for selecting Cao).

Li Zhaoliang	Daizhou 代州 (Hedong), Yingzhou 瀛州 (Hebei), Dingzhou (Hebei)	SS 464.13563
Wang Deji	Fuzhou (Yongxingjun), Xiongzhou (Hebei)*	CB 127.3005 CB 151.3683
Wang Guo	Yongxingjun (Yongxingjun), Baozhou (Hebei), Longzhou (Qinfeng), Dingzhou (Hebei)*	SS 326.10529-30
Gao Jilong	Huanzhou (Yongxingjun), Cangzhou (Hebei)*	CB 133.3170 CB 161.3892

*Post held when mutiny erupted.

Each had served two to four times as prefect. Of these nineteen terms as prefect, all but two were on the frontier, and fifteen were located in the north and northwest. These were vital areas for the Song military, where a large portion of the Song's army was garrisoned to defend against possible attacks by Liao and Xixia. Prior experience in military affairs was valuable for the post, but it was also an opportunity for officials to gain such experience, especially in the northern reaches of the empire.

Turning to the mutinies, it is clear that most military officials had a role in overseeing and directing soldiers. They received the same posts of patrolling inspector, military administrator, and director-in-chief. This is most clearly revealed in the efforts to suppress the Sichuan mutiny, when eleven of the nineteen military officials were sent. Zhenzong appointed Li Hui, Shi Pu, and Li Shoulun as Chuanxia Circuits suppression patrolling inspectors 川峡路招安巡檢使.³⁰⁹ The term “suppression (*zhaoan*)” could serve as a title on its own 招安使, but was also used as a prefix to indicate that they were sent in response to an uprising and could act without seeking a response from the court.³¹⁰ Sun Zhengci and Zhang Xu also served as patrolling inspectors.³¹¹

³⁰⁹ SHY Bing 10.10.

³¹⁰ Gong, *Songdai guanzhi cidian*, 463. Charles Hucker translates *zhaoanshi* as “pacification commissioner,” noting that an official in this post was literally “sent out to summon to peace” (Hucker, *Dictionary of Official Titles*, 116). However, I chose to translate it as “suppression” since there are already two other posts translated as pacification commissioner (*anfushi* and *xuanfushi*).

³¹¹ CB 46.989 (for Sun) and SS 308.10149 (for Zhang). Their posts did not have the term *zhaoan* attached.

Sun was appointed at the same time as Shi Pu and the two Lis. Zhang Xu's appointment in the fourth month of 1000 was the result of a vacancy following the punishment of another patrolling inspector named Zhang Sijun 張思鈞.³¹² Gao Jixun and Wang Ruan were both appointed temporary directors-in-chief for Chengdu 益州駐泊都監.³¹³ Finally, Shangguan Zheng became Dongchuan or Xia Circuit's military administrator-in-chief 東川 or 峽路都鈐轄, and after the mutiny was put down Li Chengxiang was appointed to help manage the pacification efforts under the civilian pacification commissioners Wang Qinruo and Liang Hao 梁顥 (963-1004).³¹⁴ As explained above, Yang Chongxun also received an appointment as mounted courier, but his responsibility was to keep a careful eye on the army for the sake of the court.

For the remaining mutinies, the number of military officials ordered to fight by the court is much smaller. In response to the Guangnan mutiny in 1007, Cao Liyong and Zhang Xu were both named pacification commissioners for the region, and Zhang Conggu was to assist them.³¹⁵ Cao was the most prominent official in the accounts.³¹⁶ He waited in Guizhou to gather the soldiers sent into Guangnan, and then moved to rescue Xiangzhou from Chen Jin's siege.³¹⁷ In

³¹² CB 47.1014. Zhang Sijun served as patrolling inspector for Mianzhou 綿州, Hanzhou 漢州, Longzhou 龍州, and Jianzhou 劍州. In 2/1000, he led an attack on Hanzhou, which had been taken over by Wang Jun's forces, and killed the "false prefect 偽刺史" Miao Jin 苗進. He next joined with Lei Youzhong, the head of the troops and officers sent from the capital, in an assault on Shengxian Bridge 升僊橋 (CB 46.992-93). However, Zhang allegedly grew arrogant after his victories, and he sought a good horse from a sheriff named Fu Ao 傅翱. Fu refused, so Zhang Sijun killed him. Fu's family complained, the Censorate intervened, and Zhang was ultimately disenrolled 削籍 and exiled to Fengzhou 封州 in Guangnan East (CB 47.1014).

³¹³ SS 278.9457. According to his *Songshi* biography, Gao was also appointed as a supervisor for patrolling inspectors of prefectures in Xichuan circuit 提舉西川諸州軍巡檢使 (SS 289.9694).

³¹⁴ Shangguan's titles likely refers to the same circuit but using a different name—he was clearly not in charge of Xichuan Circuit, where Chengdu was located (see CB 46.989 for Dongchuan and SS 308.10138 for Xia Circuit). Li Chengxiang's appointment in Chinese was 同句當安撫事 ("joint manager of pacification affairs") according to CB 47.1030, although 句當 was more commonly written as 勾當, a common prefix in official titles.

³¹⁵ CB 66.1472.

³¹⁶ Zhang Xu is conspicuously absent in the *Changbian* and *Song huiyao* accounts of the mutiny (the *Changbian* only mentions that he was appointed and subsequently rewarded, see CB 66.1472 for his appointment and 67.1498 for his promotion), while his *Songshi* biography says he worked with Cao to kill Chen Jin (SS 308.10150).

³¹⁷ This strategy of building up forces in Guizhou and then attacking is clear from Zhenzong's comments to the grand councilor: "The Yizhou thieves heard the government army arrived in Guizhou. [Their] situation is extremely

addition, Cao acted as a link between the court and the field since the court contacted him and he in return was the one who sent word of victory over the mutineers.³¹⁸ As a part of the broader defenses against the mutineers, Zhenzong also appointed He Rong 何榮 as an additional military administrator in Guangzhou.³¹⁹

During the Baozhou, Hebei mutiny in 1044, three military officials were ordered to deal with the uprising. Li Zhaoliang, Wang Deji, and Wang Guo were all incumbent officials in the area, which probably explains their selection. Renzong ordered Wang Deji to keep an eye on the border out of a concern over unrest there.³²⁰ The emperor also commanded Li Zhaoliang and Wang Guo to attack Baozhou.³²¹ We also know Wang Guo carried out attacks on Baozhou because of his demotion due to too many soldiers dying under his command.³²² According to a letter and memorial by Ouyang Xiu, Li Zhaoliang worked with Tian Kuang to handle the Baozhou mutiny.³²³ However, he evidently also had some renown with the soldiers who rebelled, since they asked to meet with him during the negotiations for their surrender. This prompted the emperor to send Li to meet with the mutineers.³²⁴

Finally, the military officials Wang Kai and Gao Jilong were sent to Beizhou, Hebei in 1047 in response to Wang Ze's mutiny. Wang received orders from Renzong to attack, so it is

desperate. It is permissible to order Cao Liyong and the others to divide the troops to pursue and capture, according to the circumstances" 宜州賊聞官軍至桂州，勢頗窮蹙，可令曹利用等分兵追捕，以便宜從事 (CB 66.1488). Cao then moved to relieve Xiangzhou, engaging the mutineers first in Wuxian County 武仙縣 in Xiangzhou before fighting the besiegers (CB 66.1489).

³¹⁸ For example, Zhenzong sent a feast to Guizhou specifically naming Cao Liyong as a recipient (CB 66.1478), and he dispatched a eunuch messenger named Shi Chonggui 史崇貴 to "console 撫問" Cao (CB 66.1486). Once the mutineers were defeated and Xiangzhou secured, Cao sent Yu Derun to report the victory (CB 66.1489).

³¹⁹ CB 66.1480.

³²⁰ CB 151.3683. There was also likely a concern that Liao would take advantage of the situation, although this was not explicitly stated.

³²¹ *Sushui jiwen* 11.204.

³²² CB 152.3697.

³²³ QSW 32:693.350 and 33:699.102-03.

³²⁴ SS 464.13563. There is here, of course, some discrepancy with Li Zhaoliang. Did he first go to Baozhou on the emperor's orders to attack, or did he only travel there when the mutineers requested a meeting with him? Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine which was the case. Either way, Li was ordered to Baozhou.

clear he had a military role.³²⁵ Gao Jilong served as Cangzhou's 滄州 prefect at the time of his appointment as prefect of Beizhou.³²⁶ This was done to replace the incumbent Zhang Deyi, who was captured by the mutineers and, as it turned out, cooperated with them.³²⁷ No information is provided about what he did aside from receiving the appointment, although he did receive a promotion after the mutiny ended.³²⁸

Looking at the military officials dispatched to fight the mutinies in this study, it is clear that they played a significant role in directing the troops. While it is true many military officials staffing the Song bureaucracy did not have anything to do with the military, the majority of those who have extant accounts of their early careers had a record of posts in charge of the army, with many carrying out or directing attacks. Such previous experience explains why they assumed military roles in the suppression campaigns. The military officials directed attacks, while their civil official counterparts generally assumed a leadership position, as will be seen in the next section.

Civil Officials

While military officials were clearly necessary for fighting mutinies, the use of civil officials is a bit less clear at first glance. What did they bring to the table? The shift of military control into civil hands in the late tenth century, as described in the introduction, helped; a number of the civil officials involved with mutiny suppression campaigns had military experience. In a parallel to routine territorial administration, civil officials also held most of the

³²⁵ Once Wang, accompanied by Mai Yunyan, arrived at Beizhou, Renzong ordered them to attack Beizhou alongside two other military officials, Gaoyang Pass Chief Area Commander Wang Xin and Damingfu Military Administrator Hao Zhi (CB 161.3892).

³²⁶ CB 161.3892.

³²⁷ See CB 162.3912-13 for a list of Zhang's actions which resulted in his execution. It is unclear when the court learned of Zhang's complicity with Wang Ze.

³²⁸ CB 162.3907.

highest posts established in response to the mutinies. However, the court employed the tactic of overlapping authority to check the potential for a civil official to give free rein to his own interests. In other words, civil officials were used to counterbalance other civil officials. While this chapter focuses on those officials dispatched by the court to suppress mutinies, the existing administration in a given region also helped ensure that civil officials worked for the interests of the central government. The list of civil officials sent to handle the mutinies are in the following table.

List of Dispatched Civil Officials				
Mutiny	Name	Entry	Post Held	Personal Rank
Sichuan (1000)	Lei Youzhong 雷有終	Yin Privilege 蔭補 (SS 278.9455)	Chengdu Prefect 知益州 and Suppression and Bandit-Catching Commissioner 川峽兩路招安捉賊事 (SS 278.9457)	工部侍郎 3b (CB 46.989)
	Ma Liang 馬亮	Jinshi Degree 進士 (SS 298.9915)	Xichuan Fiscal Intendant 西川轉運使 (CB 47.1025) or Assistant Intendant 轉運副使 (SS 298.9916)	兵部員外郎 7a (CB 48.1045)
	Wang Qinruo 王欽若	Jinshi Degree (SS 283.9559)	Xichuan Circuit Pacification Commissioner 西川路安撫使 (Post-Mutiny, CB 47.1030 and SS 283.9560)	右正言 7b (as of 999, CB 45.959)
	Liang Hao 梁顥	Jinshi Degree (SS 296.9863-64)	Xia Circuit Pacification Commissioner 峽路安撫使 (Post-Mutiny, CB 47.1030 and SS 296.3865)	左司諫 7a (in 12i/1001, SHY Shihuo 57.3)
	Yuan Jifu 袁及甫	Unknown	Assisted Wang Qinruo and Liang Hao 副之 (Post-Mutiny, CB 47.1030)	國子博士 7b (CB 47.1030)
	Li Yizhi 李易直	Unknown	Assisted Wang Qinruo and Liang Hao 副之 (Post-Mutiny, CB 47.1030)	秘書丞 8a (CB 47.1030)
Guangnan West (1007)	Xue Yan 薛顏	Zhuke Degree (San Li 三禮, SS 299.9943)	Manager of the Guangnan East and West Fiscal Intendancies 勾當廣南東西路轉運司事 (SS 299.9943)	虞部員外郎 7a (CB 66.1472)
Baozhou, Hebei (1044)	Fu Bi 富弼	Decree Exam 制科 (Ranked as Maocaiyi 茂材異等, SS 313.10249)	Hebei Pacification Commissioner (Incumbent) 河北宣撫使 (CB 151.3674)	右諫議大夫 4b (Before and after mutiny, CB 142.3417 and CB 154.3740)
	Tian Kuang 田況	Jinshi Degree (SS 292.9778)	Chengdejun Prefect 知成德軍 and Zhengdingfu-Dingzhou Circuit Military Intendant 真定府、定州路安撫使 (CB 151.3683)	右正言 7b (CB 152.3697)
	Liu Huan 劉渙	Yin Privilege (SS 324.10493)	Baозhou Prefect 知保州 (Post-Mutiny, CB 151.3689)	工部郎中 6b (CB 151.3689)

Beizhou, Hebei (1047-1048)	Wen Yanbo 文彥博	Jinshi Degree (SS 313.10258)	Hebei Pacification Commissioner 河北宣撫使 and Vice Grand Councilor 參知政事 (CB 162.3903)	右諫議大夫 4b (CB 162.3903)
	Ming Hao 明鎬	Jinshi Degree (SS 292.9769)	Hebei Emergency Commissioner 河北體量安撫使 and Auxiliary Academician of the Bureau of Military Affairs 樞密直學士 (CB 161.3892)	左諫議大夫 4b (CB 161.3892)
	Zheng Xiang 鄭驥	Jinshi Degree (SS 301.10005)	Provisional Hebei Fiscal Intendant 權河北轉運使 (CB 162.3902)	工部郎中 6b (CB 162.3902)

As with the military officials, we can gain an understanding of the status of the civil officials by the ways they entered the government. Thirteen civil officials were sent by the court, and we know how eleven of them became officials. Nine passed the civil service exams, with seven passing the *jinshi* exams. Fu Bi passed the even more prestigious decree examination. Given the acclaim for passing the civil service exams, and the benefits degrees could confer, these individuals were seen as being among the top talents in the government.³²⁹

The military officials who accompanied the civil officials on the campaigns often had experience in posts related to the military, as seen in the previous section. The civil officials also had ties to the army, but further removed. Lei Youzhong, who headed suppression efforts in Sichuan, served twice as a military transport commissioner 隨軍轉運使, once in a campaign against Liao and a second time against the rebel Li Shun in Xia Circuit. In this second post, Lei helped thwart two surprise attacks by Li's followers. As a reward, he became Chengdu's prefect and suppression commissioner.³³⁰ Xue Yan, who was the one civil official dispatched to Guangnan in 1007, previously served as fiscal intendant in Kuizhou Circuit 夔州路 in Sichuan.

³²⁹ Kaoru Umehara notes that *jinshi* degree holders in particular enjoyed higher placement in the personal ranks when they began their official careers, and they moved more quickly up the ranks as well (see Umehara, "Civil and Military Officials," 8 and 11-12).

³³⁰ SS 278.9456. The Chinese for "transport commissioner" is the same as fiscal intendant. However, given the prefix *suijun* ("to follow the army"), it is clear this was an ad hoc post responsible for transporting resources on behalf of the army. This is more in the mold of the *zhuanyunshi* who accompanied the Song army on its conquests of the south in order to gain control of state finances there. Eventually these became permanent offices, the fiscal intendancies. Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 54-55.

He asked the court for weapons to train troops garrisoned there and also dealt with the non-Han groups in the area.³³¹ The experience with the indigenous population there would have proven helpful in Guangnan. In addition, Xue submitted new maps of Kuizhou to the court.³³²

Among the civil officials sent to deal with the two Hebei mutinies in the 1040s, most had experience in Shaanxi during the war with Xixia in the late 1030s and early 1040s. In 1043, Renzong appointed Tian Kuang as Shaanxi assistant pacification commissioner 陝西宣撫副使.³³³ He also submitted a fourteen-point memorial on controlling the borders.³³⁴ Liu Huan volunteered to meet with the Gusiluo 唃廝羅 (a Tibetan state), where he obtained an agreement with them to attack Xixia as well as acquired maps of the “western prefectures 西州.”³³⁵ Liu was subsequently appointed to Shaanxi’s fiscal intendency and Qin-Long Circuit foreign suppression commissioner 秦龍路招安蕃落使.³³⁶ Wen Yanbo also served in the northwest, including as Hedong fiscal intendant in 1040 until 1042, when he was appointed Weizhou 渭州 prefect, Jing-Yuan Circuit chief area commander 涇原路都部署, and border military intendant and suppression commissioner 經略安撫緣邊招討使.³³⁷ Ming Hao, too, was active in the region, holding posts as Shaanxi fiscal intendant and Hedong fiscal intendant-in-chief, where he repeatedly helped repair fortifications.³³⁸ Zheng Xiang worked with Yu Zhouxun 魚周詢 to raise 100,000 people to fight in Shaanxi and later served concurrently as provisional Shaanxi fiscal

³³¹ CB 57.1261, 60.1340, and 64.1438.

³³² CB 63.1405.

³³³ CB 142.3415. Prior to this, in 1040, Tian was notary administrative assistant of the Shaanxi border military intendency 簽書陝西經略安撫判官事 (see CB 128.3031 for appointment and 129.3055 for full title)

³³⁴ SS 292.9780.

³³⁵ SS 324.10493 and CB 128.3035 and 131.3114.

³³⁶ CB 131.3114. He was either appointed as fiscal intendant (SS 324.10493) or assistant fiscal intendant (CB 131.3114).

³³⁷ CB 127.3019 for the earliest mention of his post as fiscal intendant in the *Changbian*. He remained in that post until his promotion in 10/1042 (CB 138.3315).

³³⁸ SS 9769-70.

and surveillance intendant 權陝西轉運按察使 and Sanmen supply commissioner 三門發運使.³³⁹ Finally, while Fu Bi did not serve in the northwest, he did discuss military matters and was appointed as assistant commissioner of military affairs in 1043.³⁴⁰

In addition to suppression by force, the Song was sometimes willing to negotiate and accept surrender, as seen with the surrender of the comparatively less bloody Baozhou mutiny.³⁴¹ Civil officials who had experience with negotiations or had helped stave off more serious unrest were valuable as well, then. During the Sichuan mutiny, Xue Yan had convinced Wang Jun's forces to retreat while he was prefect of Langzhou 閬州, which may have played a role in his appointment to Guangnan in 1007.³⁴² When Fu Bi was made pacification commissioner, he had earlier concluded a delicate negotiation with Liao, which had demanded land because of the Song's military buildup in the north.³⁴³ Such experience would undoubtedly have come in handy when Renzong ordered him to Baozhou. They might also be expected to carry out measures to reduce tensions. The mutiny in Sichuan involved not just soldiers but eventually many commoners; although Song historians were at pains to suggest they were coerced, it is likely a number joined willingly. It was important to curb conditions which could turn a mutiny into a full-fledged rebellion supported by a wide section of society. Ma Liang and Ming Hao might have been chosen for their previous efforts in such areas. Ma previously rooted out a family of abusive clerks and aided people whose families were seized for failure to pay, and Ming used

³³⁹ SS 301.10006 and CB 142.3423.

³⁴⁰ SS 313.10252 and CB 142.3417 for Fu's appointment to the Bureau of Military Affairs. For one example of Fu's contributions to military strategy discussions, see his 1039 memorial on responses to the Xixia (QSW 28:600.274-87).

³⁴¹ CB 151.3688.

³⁴² According to Xue's spirit path inscription, the prefecture was effectively defenseless, requiring him to convince the mutineers to leave (QSW 69:1506.222-23).

³⁴³ SS 313.10250-52. The Song argued the buildup was to counter Xixia.

price stabilization and army recruitment as means to aid people in an effort to prevent a rise in banditry in Sichuan's Yizhou Circuit 益州路.³⁴⁴

Civil officials assumed a position in charge of the overall suppression efforts in three of the four mutinies where the court sent officials. For the Sichuan mutiny in 1000, Lei Youzhong was the leader. In the second month of the year, Lei led his forces in conjunction with Zhang Sijun to attack Chengdu.³⁴⁵ He then led soldiers into Chengdu alongside Shangguan Zheng and Shi Pu when the mutineers feigned fleeing the city, resulting in a disaster for the Song's forces who were trapped inside. After making it back outside the city, Lei then sent out notices encouraging people forced to support the mutineers to surrender.³⁴⁶ He also sent his nephew Li Xiaoxian to report a victory to the court where he presented an umbrella and spear they allegedly captured from Wang Jun himself.³⁴⁷ Once the mutineers were defeated, Lei sent Yang Chongxun to report that victory as well.³⁴⁸ Lei served as a leader on the ground, directing the army to attack, while also acting as a link with the court.

For the 1044 mutiny in Baozhou, Hebei, the court first sent Tian Kuang “to assess and handle the mutineers, and to take heed according to the situation 相度處置叛軍，仍聽便宜從事.”³⁴⁹ Tian then expressed concerns about disturbances along the border with Liao which could attract the northern neighbor's attention, leading to his appointment as prefect of Chengdejun 成

³⁴⁴ SS 298.9915 for Ma and SS 292.9769 for Ming. Wang Zengyu finds that both emperors and officials believed that recruitment into the army 募兵 during a disaster helped prevent unrest (Wang, *Songdai junzhi chutan*, 263-64).

³⁴⁵ CB 46.993.

³⁴⁶ CB 46.994. Interestingly, another military official, Li Jichang, was suspicious and ultimately chose not to enter Chengdu, evidently refusing orders. Song soldiers began to scatter into the city to loot when the mutineers closed the gates and used furniture to block the roads so they could carry out an ambush.

³⁴⁷ CB 47.1014.

³⁴⁸ CB 47.1028.

³⁴⁹ SS 292.9782 and CB 151.3683.

德軍 and Zhendingfu-Dingzhou circuit military intendant.³⁵⁰ Tian's *Songshi* biography makes it clear that he was in charge of the siege at Baozhou since he "supervised the assembled generals' attacks."³⁵¹ When the mutineers surrendered, he also sent a memorial to the court announcing that he had pacified Baozhou.³⁵² However, it appears the court was not satisfied with Tian's oversight alone, and so the emperor ordered Fu Bi, already serving as Hebei pacification commissioner, to travel to the prefecture to take charge.³⁵³ His position above Tian is demonstrated by his order for Tian to pull back the army in a bid to negotiate a surrender.³⁵⁴

Finally, in the first month of the Beizhou, Hebei mutiny in 1047, Ming Hao was put in charge as Hebei emergency commissioner.³⁵⁵ His role is mainly revealed through his memorials to the court. First, he reported the destruction of an observation post.³⁵⁶ Second, Ming submitted other requests to the court.³⁵⁷ Together these indicate that Ming served as the link between the

³⁵⁰ CB 151.3683-84. The maps I included in this dissertation, and Tan Qixiang's maps from which I adapted them, do not have Chengdejun. Neither the *Songshi*'s geography treatise nor the *Yuanfeng Jiuyu zhi* have Chengdejun listed as a prefecture. There is evidence that Chengdejun existed as an administrative unit during the Northern Song. For example, the *Changbian* names a prefect of Chengdejun in 1024 (CB 102.2355), and people held the position of prefect there at least until 1100 (CB 909.12128). That would cover the period of the *Yuanfeng Jiuyu zhi*'s compilation around 1080, making the omission all the more glaring. We know of at least one county of Chengdejun: Lingshou County 靈壽縣, recorded as part of Chengdejun in 1072 (CB 238.5804). That county is found in Tan Qixiang's atlas as a part of Zhendingfu, a short distance to the northwest of Zhendingfu's prefectural seat (see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 16-17). We can say for certain that Chengdejun did exist as a discrete prefecture during at least part of the Northern Song and that it encompassed at least some portion of what came to be part of Zhendingfu.

³⁵¹ SS 292.9782.

³⁵² CB 152.3696.

³⁵³ CB 151.3688. Fu was appointed shortly before the mutiny at his own request. The surface reason for the appointment was because of movements by Liao's military, but it is suggested the real reason was that Fu wanted to avoid slander at court (see CB 151.3674-76).

³⁵⁴ CB 151.3688.

³⁵⁵ CB 161.3892. Ming's position, the *tiliang anfushi* 體量安撫使, lacks a widely-accepted English translation. The position was used for a variety of crises. Gong Yanming explains that the post was generally used in response to natural disasters like floods or droughts (Gong, *Songdai guanzhi cidian*, 502), although the appointment of Ming Hao here demonstrates that other concerning situations could warrant the appointment of a *tiliang anfushi*. The title might be literally translated as "the commissioner who inspects and pacifies (or soothes)." Given its role as an ad hoc post created in response to disasters, I offer "Emergency Commissioner" as a possible translation.

³⁵⁶ CB 162.3902-03.

³⁵⁷ CB 162.3903. These requests were blocked by Commissioner of Military Affairs Xia Song, which will be discussed in further detail below.

court and the officials and soldiers surrounding Beizhou. After a month with little success, Wen Yanbo assumed leadership as Hebei pacification commissioner with Ming Hao assisting him.³⁵⁸ According to Sima Guang, the two officials supervised the construction of a second observation post. When this also proved futile after ten days, Wen approved the suggestion of two penal laborers to build a tunnel under the city wall.³⁵⁹ Following the recapture of Beizhou and the apprehension of Wang Ze, he sent the eunuch Mounted Courier Li Jihe 李繼和 (d. 1072) to report the victory.³⁶⁰

There was one exception to the appointment of a civil official to head suppression efforts. During the Guangnan mutiny in 1007, the leader of the Song efforts against Chen Jin was the military official Cao Liyong. As seen in the discussion of military officials above, Cao played a very similar role to the civil officials who led the government's response to the other mutinies. Namely, he directed troops, served as the connection between the court and the forces in Guangnan, and informed the court of Chen's defeat.³⁶¹ Adding Cao's responsibilities and actions to those of his civil counterparts, we can thus identify the preceding officials as the leaders of the suppression campaigns, all of whom performed a similar set of functions.

In three of the mutinies, the emperor appointed a fiscal intendant. Zhenzong sent Ma Liang to Sichuan as Xichuan Circuit fiscal intendant. He acted as both a sort of quartermaster and was in charge of his circuit's finances more generally. As Song troops succeeded in entering

³⁵⁸ SS 292.9770 and CB 161.3903.

³⁵⁹ *Sushui jiwen* 9.168.

³⁶⁰ CB 162.3906.

³⁶¹ CB 66.1478, 1486, 1488, and 1489 for Cao's roles in the suppression campaign. . Cao was made pacification commissioner along with another military official, Zhang Xu. The title given was "Pacification Commissioner of Guangnan East and West Circuits." The post might have been divided between the two men. Zhang is conspicuously absent in the suppression campaign while Cao was clearly present in Guizhou (CB 66.1478), which would suggest Cao was pacification commissioner for Guangnan West, where most of the fighting occurred, while Zhang was pacification commissioner for Guangnan East. An alternative account in Zhang Xu's *Songshi* biography states instead that he was assisting Cao, rather than on par with him (SS 308.10150), albeit bearing the same title as Cao.

Chengdu, the mutineers under Wang Jun continued to resist. In Wenweng Ward 文翁坊, there was siege equipment gathered at a Daoist temple by Wang's men. Chengdu's Temporary Director-in-Chief Gao Jixun informed Ma of the situation and requested items to make torches, which soldiers then used to burn the siege weapons.³⁶² After the city was recaptured, the food situation was dire, prompting Ma to intervene: "Within the city a *dou* of rice cost 1000 cash, so he opened the storehouses to reduce the price, and people relied on this for support."³⁶³ When Chen Jin mutinied in Guangnan, Xue Yan was chosen to head the fiscal intendancies in Guangnan East and West. However, there is no indication he did anything of note in Guangnan.³⁶⁴ Early in 1048, Zheng Xiang became provisional Hebei fiscal intendant. Information on what Zheng did is also missing, but he was expected to help prepare for the needs of the army at Beizhou.³⁶⁵

Finally, civil officials received appointments after the end of the mutiny, playing a role in trying to reassert Song authority in the region. Following the recapture of Chengdu and the death of Wang Jun in 1000, Zhenzong sent Wang Qinruo and Liang Hao as pacification commissioners to Xichuan Circuit and Xia Circuit, respectively. He also dispatched two civil officials, Yuan Jifu and Li Yizhi, to assist Wang and Liang. The emperor tasked them with examining the records of those arrested in Sichuan so that their sentences could be reduced.³⁶⁶ Wang sent a memorial

³⁶² CB 47.1025. Ma's biography in the *Songshi* records his post as assistant fiscal intendant (SS 298.9916), but he is listed as fiscal intendant in the *Changbian* for 1000/9 (CB 47.1025) and 1001/2 (CB 48.1045). Two solutions come to mind for this discrepancy; either Ma was appointed fiscal intendant and the biography is incorrect, or he was initially appointed to assistant fiscal intendant, but had been promoted by the end of the mutiny.

³⁶³ SS 298.9916.

³⁶⁴ SS 299.9943. Shu Ben was the fiscal intendant for Guangnan West circuit (CB 66.1472). The name of the Guangnan East fiscal intendant is unknown, but there had to have been one, particularly since Guangzhou, an important port, was located there.

³⁶⁵ CB 162.3902. Ouyang Xiu was posted as Hebei's fiscal and surveillance intendant-in-chief 河北都轉運按察使 in the midst of the 1044 mutiny at Baozhou. However, the *Changbian* account indicates that his appointment was not in response to the mutiny but a punishment for Ouyang overstepping his bounds (CB 151.3684).

³⁶⁶ CB 47.1030.

praising a local official for thwarting an attempt by people in Pengzhou 彭州 from rising up in response to Wang Jun.³⁶⁷ He also recommended that the court appoint two separate officials as registrar and sheriff of Sichuanese counties with more than five thousand households; previously all counties in the region had a single official serving in both posts.³⁶⁸ In 1044, Liu Huan was appointed prefect of Baozhou at the conclusion of the mutiny. This no doubt was primarily due to the vacancy left from the start of the mutiny when the previous prefect died. However, he only arrived the following month, after the mutiny had ended. Liu also had to deal with lingering tensions there. Shortly after his arrival, he uncovered a plot to mutiny again. He executed the leaders behind the plan, which seems to have prevented further unrest.³⁶⁹

Given that they served in the highest posts in most suppression campaigns, the court needed to ensure that the civil officials selected did not act in a way which would exacerbate the situation. There were a number of ways officials could misbehave, such as treason, cowardice, corruption, or cruelty. In the mutinies, only one clear example of treason by a civil official occurred when the incumbent Beizhou prefect Zhang Deyi worked for Wang Ze, and even in this case he probably did so under duress since he was being held captive.³⁷⁰ Cowardice was another possible charge, and there are numerous examples of civil officials fleeing their posts when mutineers approached.³⁷¹ This was less of a concern for the officials chosen, however, as they

³⁶⁷ CB 48.1057. The official was Chen Congyi 陳從易 (d. 1031), whose *Songshi* biography also mentions his actions and promotion (SS 300.9978).

³⁶⁸ CB 48.1058. The emperor agreed to this recommendation.

³⁶⁹ CB 151.3689.

³⁷⁰ CB 162.3912-13 for Zhang's misdeeds, such as handing over his official seal, creating illegitimate ceremonies, and referring to Wang Ze as king. Zhang also allegedly did not aid Ma Sui 馬遂 (d. 1047) when he tried to kill Wang (CB 162.3907-08). The only other possible case is Lu Chengjun siding with Chen Jin in the Guangnan mutiny, but it is quite likely Lu was a military official and Chen's supporters supposedly compelled him too (CB 66.1472).

³⁷¹ Among the more notorious examples found in relation to the mutinies: The prefect of Chengdu Niu Mian fled to Hanzhou with Fiscal Intendant Zhang Shi at the start of the Wang Jun mutiny (SS 277.9440); Liuzhou 柳州 Prefect Wang Yu's 王昱 (962-1035) flight led to the capture of the prefecture by Chen Jin's troops (CB 66.1484); Baozhou Prefect Liu Jizong drowned in the moat and Vice Prefect Shi Daiju was killed in the outer defenses (鹿角, literally

were in the company of a large armed force. Corruption was another potential problem, but some of the officials had distinguished themselves by uncovering corrupt officials or otherwise demonstrating a strong sense of right and wrong.³⁷²

One shortfall of some dispatched civil officials, however, was cruelty. Three significant cases exist, and how they were handled are suggestive of a common tactic of the Song government—using officials to check other officials.³⁷³ Lei Youzhong, for all his laudable qualities, carried out a disturbing act after recapturing Chengdu. According to his biography in the *Songshi*, Lei was suspicious of those who had surrendered, and sent men to set fires to the walls to root out anyone who was hiding. He then started a large fire next to a gate tower and rounded up clerks and runners who had allegedly received posts in Wang Jun’s government. After ascending the tower, he asked prominent local men if they recognized the accused, and if the men said the accused had received a post, Lei commanded attendants to throw them into the fire. The biographer comments: “[This went on] from morning through the afternoon, [and] those

“deer antlers,” was a type of fortification called an abatis, see *Wujing zongyao* 12.16-17 for an image and description) while they tried to escape (CB 151.3676); and Hebei Judicial Intendants Tian Jing 田京 (992-1058) and Ren Huangchang 任黃裳 abandoned their families in Beizhou when they escaped by climbing over the walls (CB 161.3890).

³⁷² Early in his career, Lei Youzhong revealed the corruption of his immediate superior, the magistrate of Laiwu Directorate 萊蕪監 Liu Qi 劉祺 (SS 278.9455; this was a county-level directorate subordinate to Yanzhou 兗州 in Jingdong West, see SS 85.2110). Ma Liang was known for his investigation against a powerful family of clerks (SS 298.9915). Finally, Liu Huan rose to prominence with Renzong by asking Empress Dowager Liu to relinquish power to the emperor (CB 113.2644), but he also joined with Fan Zhongyan and others in speaking out against the emperor’s decision to dismiss his first empress (CB 113.2648). Although he disagreed with the emperor and had to pay a fine as a consequence (SS 324.10493), he likely gained a reputation as someone willing to speak his conscience.

³⁷³ Brian E. McKnight remarks on this hallmark of Song governance in the context of the overlapping duties of different kinds of intendants: “This pragmatic use of intendants in differing roles fitted well with the general Song distaste for allowing any single type of official to monopolize an important function” (McKnight, *Law and Order*, 232-33).

who burned to death numbered several hundred. At the time, it was referred to as unjust and cruel.”³⁷⁴

A similar purge occurred in 1044, following the Baozhou, Hebei mutiny, and a second massacre almost took place. According to the *Changbian*, “[Tian] Kuang obtained the names [of the 429 ‘instigators’] and ordered Yang Huaimin to lead troops into the city; all [of the instigators] were thrown into a pit and killed 悉阬殺之.”³⁷⁵ After receiving the emperor’s pardon, the soldiers who surrendered were dispersed to different prefectures to serve in the army there. This did not satisfy Fu Bi, however. Fu concocted a plan to order officials in those prefectures to kill the soldiers at an appointed time.³⁷⁶ The actions of both Lei and Tian, as well as Fu’s plans, were potentially threatening in already tense situations, and indeed were arguably just as dangerous for stability as cowardice or corruption. However, as the top officials in the suppression campaigns, it would be difficult to establish credible oversight. For example, in the middle of the Baozhou, Hebei mutiny in 1044, Ouyang Xiu became Hebei fiscal and surveillance intendant-in-chief. He sent a memorial to Renzong asking that he be included in

³⁷⁴ SS 278.9460. This same passage appears almost identically in the *Changbian* (CB 47.1026). The *Songshi* version added the phrase “at the time,” probably to stress this was a view of Lei’s contemporaries, not just a judgment of the dynastic history’s editors.

³⁷⁵ CB 151.3688. The *Changbian* uses the term *keng* 阬, meaning pit (here used as a verb), while the *Song huiyao* account has them forced into a large well 大井 (SHY Bing 10.15). The number of men held responsible for the uprising is oddly specific. The *Song huiyao* states it was specifically a Yunyi commandery 雲翼軍 that mutinied. Sima Guang states explicitly that one of the commanderies that surrendered was cast into a pit (*Sushui jiwen* 4.70). Commanderies had 500 men on paper, but in reality tended to be lower (Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 39); 429 would be quite a realistic number for the actual size of a commandery. Indeed, according to the *Song huiyao* Yang “ordered [the group] to return to their original regiment 令歸本營” where their names were called out 點名 and they were executed. Finally, a Baozhou Wudi 無敵 prefectural army commandery was promoted to become a Yunyi commandery (CB 152.3698), which could make sense as a reward for loyal service, or perhaps because one of the Yunyi commanderies had been annihilated. Taken together, these suggest the 429 men executed all belonged to a single Yunyi commandery (one of the five Yunyi commanderies at Baozhou according to SS 187.4592) that sparked the crisis.

³⁷⁶ CB 151.3689. Fu Bi seems to have desired a heavy application of the law in general. He also had a fierce debate with his fellow reformer Fan Zhongyan over the punishment of Gaoyoujun Prefect Chao Zhongyue, who had feasted Wang Lun to spare his prefecture. Fu advocated the death penalty, while Fan pleaded for clemency (CB 145.3499).

discussions with Tian Kuang and Li Zhaoliang about the mutiny.³⁷⁷ While Ouyang occupied a high-ranking position in Hebei, he was evidently unable to supervise operations in Baozhou.

The Song in this case relied on a common practice of diffusing authority to multiple officials. The responsibilities of many positions overlapped with each other, and this was likely by design.³⁷⁸ This is, for example, played out in routine relations between circuit intendants and prefects. Since a circuit consisted of multiple prefectures which it needed to supervise, it would suggest that the intendant had authority over prefects. However, prefects could send memorials directly to the throne, bypassing their putative superiors.³⁷⁹ This made the relationship of who was in charge of whom ambiguous, and it was this ambiguity which served the central government by preventing a monopolization of power which could give an official the capacity to act against the Song's interests.³⁸⁰ It is telling that in the case of Chengdu Prefect Lei Youzhong, the Xichuan Fiscal Intendant Ma Liang intervened. The exact details are unclear, but suggest Ma rescued a large number of people: "When the mutineers were put down, the chief generals [continued to] seek merit, and [thus] the killing did not cease. [Ma] Liang saved the lives of several thousand people."³⁸¹ The language is obscure, but the "chief generals" may have

³⁷⁷ QSW 32:693.350. In a separate letter to the Commissioner of Military Affairs Du Yan 杜衍 (978-1057), Ouyang also complains, "I personally requested to discuss military affairs together with Tian and Li, but until now they have kept quiet and not replied 自請願與田、李共議兵事，至今寢而不報" (QSW 33:699.102-03). For Ouyang's appointment, see Liu, *Ouyang Xiu nianpu*, 1079a.

³⁷⁸ Charles Hartman identifies this as a "balance of function," whereby different aspects of the decision-making process and implementation was divided among multiple organs within the government to prevent any one official or institution from gaining too much undue authority (Hartman, "Sung Government and Politics," 36-37).

³⁷⁹ Lo, *Civil Service*, 41. Lo contrasts this with Ming and Qing provinces, as prefects had to send memorials intended for the capital via the provincial administration. Lo also notes that in some cases prefects had higher personal ranks than the intendants (Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 63), further demonstrating the incomplete nature of the circuit's superiority relative to the prefecture.

³⁸⁰ Although he is talking about Sichuan's administration in particular, Lo remarks that the structure of territorial administration "was almost foolproof against usurpation of power" (Lo, *Civil Service*, 215).

³⁸¹ SS 298.9916. Ma's urging to spare people persisted when he returned to the capital. His biography continues: "[When the emperor] summoned him and asked about affairs in Sichuan, eighty-nine people arrived at the palace who had been assembled and brought in shackles [from Sichuan] for having been deceived by the mutineers. The vice grand councilor 執政 wanted to kill them all. Liang said: 'The ignorant masses were forced to obey, and these are [merely] one or two percent [of the total]. The rest who fled and hid in the mountains and forests are numerous.

included Lei Youzhong, with the continued killings a reference to the fires he had set and the hasty executions of accused functionaries. While he was not a general *per se*, he was their superior, as illustrated earlier. It is also noteworthy that it was Ma Liang who worked to reduce grain prices in Chengdu, as seen above, and not Lei, who served as prefect, suggesting the latter was less concerned with aiding the civilians for whom he was responsible than rooting out dissent.³⁸²

Tian Kuang seems to have faced no criticism regarding his actions, perhaps because he helped negotiate the surrender of most of the Baozhou garrison and specifically executed those thought to be most responsible for the mutiny. This suggests the court believed that the action, while cruel by modern standards, was an appropriate response.³⁸³ In the case of Fu Bi, it was not a fellow ad hoc appointee to put down the Baozhou mutiny who dissuaded him, but Ouyang Xiu.³⁸⁴ Ouyang objected to Fu's plan, telling him that it would be an act of disobedience since the emperor had already pardoned the soldiers. He also questioned the practicality of killing numerous soldiers simultaneously across several prefectures. He remarked that if some of the prefects delayed carrying out the plan, the soldiers might catch wind of the other killings and decide to rise up again rather than wait to die. Fortunately, Fu Bi heeded Ouyang's warning. It is important that in both cases a fellow civil official intervened to prevent or mitigate the cruel acts of the premier official involved in the suppression campaign, and that the official could have been appointed in response to the mutiny or already serve in the area as a part of the regular administration.

If you do not now forgive them, the people who waver will be suspicious and afraid when they hear the news. Once someone calls out, they will rise again. This is a case of exterminating them all, or letting them all live.' The emperor understood, and pardoned them all."

³⁸² SS 298.9916.

³⁸³ In fact, Tian's *Songshi* biography comments that "on account of his achievement, he was promoted to Imperial Diarist (7a) 以功遷起居舍人" (SS 292.9782).

³⁸⁴ CB 151.3689.

Civil officials regularly filled the highest positions on the campaign. Their primary duties were no doubt to supervise military officials and communicate with the capital, but prior experience in conflicts or negotiations could also make a potential appointee stand out. The court still relied on other officials, either dispatched in the campaign or already serving in the affected area, to help check any excessive behavior that could undermine the efforts to pacify the region.

Eunuchs

While military officials were a necessity and civil officials supervised them on campaigns, the significant presence of eunuchs on these campaigns is intriguing. Eleven out of forty-three officials sent to put down the mutinies, or just over one fourth, were eunuchs. In addition, the court sent one of the eunuchs to two separate mutinies.³⁸⁵ Eunuchs played three roles in the mutinies. First, many served in a capacity similar to military officials, namely they were in charge of the army and carried out attacks or prepared defenses. Second, they conveyed orders and amnesties from the court to officials in the field and brought back news of victories. Third, they worked as observers and inspectors on the campaigns. A single eunuch could fulfill one, two, or all three roles in a campaign. Furthermore, the relationship between eunuchs and civil officials is known to have been very contentious, and therefore this points to the emperor playing an important role in making the appointments.

List of Dispatched Eunuchs			
Mutiny (Year)	Name	Post Held	Personal Rank
Sichuan (1000)	Qin Han 秦翰	[Chuanxia] Two Circuits Bandit-Catching Suppression Commissioner 兩路捉賊招安使 (CB 47.1024) or Chuanxia Suppression Patrolling Inspector 川峽招安巡檢使 (SS 466.13612)	洛苑使 7a (CB 47.1024)
	Zhang Jineng 張繼能	Chuanxia Suppression Patrolling Inspector 川峽兩路招安巡檢使 (SS 466.13620)	崇儀使 7a (as of 997, SS 466.13620)

³⁸⁵ This was Zhang Jineng for the Sichuan and Guangnan West mutinies.

Guangnan West (1007)	Zhang Jineng 張繼能	Assisted Cao Liyong and Zhang Xu 副之 (CB 66.1472)	內殿崇班 8a (SHY Bing 10.12)
	Yu Derun 于德潤	Unknown (Sent to deliver amnesty, CB 66.1473)	入內高班內品 9b (CB 66.1473)
	Zhou Wenzhi 周文質	Temporary Guangzhou Director-in-Chief 廣州駐泊都監 (CB 66.1473)	高品 9a (CB 66.1473)
	Shi Chonggui 史崇貴	Unknown (Sent to Guizhou to console Cao Liyong, CB 66.1486)	Unknown
	Yan Wenqing 閻文慶	Unknown (Sent to provide a feast for Cao Liyong et al., CB 66.1478)	Unknown
Baozhou, Hebei (1044)	Liu Baoxin 劉保信	Unknown (Sent to “observe” Baozhou mutiny, CB 151.3683)	入內供奉官 8b (CB 151.3683)
	Yang Huaimin 楊懷敏	Border Patrolling Inspector-in-Chief 緣邊都巡檢 and Administrative Aide to Palace Domestic Service 入內內侍押班 (Incumbent, CB 152.3696 and 3697; also <i>Sushui jiwu</i> 11.204)	洛苑使 7a (CB 152.3697)
Beizhou, Hebei (1047-1048)	Mai Yunyan 麥允言	Administrative Aid to Palace Eunuch Service 入內押班 (CB 161.3891)	宮苑使 7a (CB 161.3891)
	He Chengyong 何誠用	Unknown (Delivered amnesty to Beizhou, CB 161.3892)	入內供奉官 8b (as of 1045, SHY Li 9.3)
	Li Jihe 李繼和	Mounted Courier at the Foot of [Beizhou's] Wall 城下走馬承受 (SS 468.13651)	入內殿頭 8b (CB 162.3903)

As with the military and civil officials, it is worth examining the eunuchs as a group. While most military officials dispatched to fight the mutinies came into the government service by way of *yin* privilege, and most civil officials sent had passed the civil service exams, all the eunuchs initially entered the palace after having been castrated. In Song times, according to Jennifer Jay, eunuchs primarily came from commoner families around Kaifeng.³⁸⁶ Military and civil officials retained their original family ties, but this was not the case for eunuchs. Instead, when a eunuch turned thirty, he could ask to adopt a son, allowing him to establish a family.³⁸⁷ It is clear that eunuchs valued this adopted family. For example, in Zhang Jineng’s biography, it

³⁸⁶ Jay, “Song Confucian Views on Eunuchs,” 46-47 n. 5. Jay notes that about half of the eunuchs with biographies in the *Songshi* came from Kaifeng. Two eunuchs in this study had ancestral homes outside of Kaifeng. Qin Han’s family came from Zhending 真定 in Hebei (SS 466.13612). Zhang Jineng was from Taiyuan 太原, though his family had almost certainly moved away from there since, at the time he was brought into the palace in the Jianlong 建隆 period (960-963), that city was still the capital of the Northern Han (951-979), an adversary of the Song (SS 466.13620).

³⁸⁷ SS 466.13599; see Jay, “Song Confucian Views on Eunuchs,” 46.

records that his (adoptive) father Zhang Zan 張贊 became a eunuch at the end of the Later Jin dynasty (936-947); nothing is said of his natal family aside from the fact that they were originally from Taiyuan.³⁸⁸ Also, Li Jihe's adopted son, Li Congshan 李從善, asked if Shenzong would give Li a posthumous title in 1072.³⁸⁹ Eunuchs could win considerable prestige, wealth, and even political power, but it depended on their service to the state; eunuchs had few alternatives, because they were forbidden to work outside the government.³⁹⁰ While some spent their lives as personal servants of the imperial family, others served as messengers, and yet others made a career in the provinces.

We have information on the previous service of five eunuchs. They often had prior experience in charge of troops outside the capital, sometimes for years. Indeed, Chen Feng and Yu Huaqing both note that many eunuchs had experience with the military in the early Northern Song. Chen argues that they mostly served as the “eyes and ears” of the emperor and supervised the army, and held posts such as mounted courier and military administrator.³⁹¹ Yu, on the other hand, sees a more active military role for eunuchs from the start of the Song, as they frequently appeared on the battlefield against the Khitan, Tanguts, and against internal threats.³⁹² Two such eunuch commanders sent to fight Wang Jun in Sichuan in 1000 were Qin Han 秦翰 (952-1015)

³⁸⁸ SS 466.13620.

³⁸⁹ CB 233.5664. His request was refused, as seen below.

³⁹⁰ SS 466.13599. Jennifer Jay lists these and other restrictions on eunuchs (Jay, “Song Confucian Views on Eunuchs,” 46-47). For comparison, a member of the scholar-official class could prove successful outside of government in a variety of ways, such as teaching, practicing medicine, or even becoming a merchant; these were recommended alternatives proposed by the Song official Yuan Cai 袁采 (*jinshi* 1063) for his descendants who could not pass the *jinshi* exam (see Ebrey, *Family and Property in Sung China*, 267). A cast-out eunuch would find it virtually impossible to thrive outside the court. David Robinson's description of rejected eunuchs accosting visitors for a pittance outside the gates of Beijing may come from the Ming dynasty (Robinson, *Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven*, 35), but it seems reasonable to expect that a similar fate existed for their Song counterparts.

³⁹¹ Chen, “Bei Song houqi wenchen yu huanguan gongtong tongjun tizhi de liubi,” 167.

³⁹² Yu, *Zhongguo huanguan zhidu shi*, 312-15.

and Zhang Jineng.³⁹³ In 979, Qin Han became a director-in-chief during the invasion of Liao. He subsequently held posts such as director-in-chief and military administrator in Hebei and the northwestern frontier of the Song, even helping the Song general Li Jilong 李繼隆 (950-1005) capture the Tangut leader Zhao Baozhong 趙保忠.³⁹⁴ Zhang Jineng was director-in-chief in Hebei during one of Liao's invasions, and he supervised the army under Li Jilong in the Song's conflict with the Tanguts. Zhang remained in Shaanxi carrying out attacks while holding offices like director-in-chief and patrolling inspector before being sent to fight against the Sichuan mutiny.³⁹⁵ Zhou Wenzhi, who was sent to Guangzhou to help defend the city during the Guangnan mutiny in 1007, had previously commanded the west side of the northern stockade at Chanzhou in 1004 when the Song and Liao faced each other in the lead-up to the treaty negotiations. He received word of an incoming Liao attack and warned Li Jilong and Qin Han to prepare while also sending troops to defend.³⁹⁶ Yang Huaimin, who helped in the siege at Baozhou in 1044, held several posts related to the military. He had already served a term as border patrolling inspector for Baozhou and Guangxinjun in 1042, prior to his resumption of that role sometime before the mutiny.³⁹⁷ Yang also held a post as Gaoyang Pass Circuit military administrator 高陽關路鈐轄 later that year.³⁹⁸ Finally, prior to being dispatched to Beizhou,

³⁹³ Yu Huaqing in fact uses the careers of Qin and Zhang as examples of these eunuch commanders (Yu, *Zhongguo huanguan zhidu shi*, 313).

³⁹⁴ SS 466.13612. Zhao is also known by his original name Li Jipeng 李繼捧 (Chang, *Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin*, 3544).

³⁹⁵ SS 466.13620.

³⁹⁶ CB 59.1313-14.

³⁹⁷ CB 136.3269. He was also concurrently Zhendingfu-Dingzhou Circuit military administrator 真定府、定州路鈐轄. It is unclear when he resumed the post as border patrolling inspector (Yang clearly held it by the start of the Baozhou mutiny as seen in *Sushui jiwen* 11.204), but he did hold a post elsewhere in Hebei in the interim (CB 137.3295).

³⁹⁸ CB 137.3295. Yang seems to have had a more complex career than purely serving in a military capacity. He apparently had some knowledge of waterworks. For example, he was sent to deal with the Yellow River's dikes. One time Yang went to observe a breach at Chanzhou, where he built a dike (CB 108.2513). Another time he was put in charge of the Yellow River's dikes on the south bank at Chanzhou (CB 118.2785). Additionally, during Yang's first term as border patrolling inspector in northern Hebei, he got into an argument with Wang Guo over

Hebei in 1048, Li Jihe served as a mounted courier for Hebei earlier in the 1040s, during which time he played a role in the negotiations with the mutineers at Baozhou.³⁹⁹

Six of the eleven eunuchs involved in the suppression campaigns played a military role according to the extant record. In 1000, Qin Han and Zhang Jineng both received posts related to the military in the fight against Wang Jun in Sichuan.⁴⁰⁰ While no information is available on Zhang's actions, Qin played a rather prominent role. He helped calm tensions between two military officials, Shangguan Zheng and Shi Pu, and personally supervised attacks, winning all five of the battles in which he took part. As a result of his success, Zhenzong gave Qin a handwritten letter commending him.⁴⁰¹

During the Guangnan mutiny of 1007, Zhang Jineng assisted the pacification commissioner while Zhou Wenzhi served as Guangzhou's temporary military director-in-chief.⁴⁰² As with his role in Sichuan, the sources are silent about what Zhang did in Guangnan. Zhou's actions are clearer. The emperor told him to oversee Guangzhou's defenses: "You urgently [will] go forth, and together with the prefecture's officials secretly set up and prepare to resist. It is urgent that [if] the robbers arrive, [you should] at once gather the patrolling inspectors, cavalry and infantry, and control important roads in order to block them."⁴⁰³ This position was vital given Guangzhou's role as a major port and the principal city of the Guangnan region. He readied defenses in Guangzhou itself, and sent boats to Duanzhou 端州 in order to

Yang's efforts to build water defenses on the Song-Liao border while Wang served as Gaoyang Pass Circuit military administrator, with Wang resisting the flooding of fields and stating that the work was flooding people's fields and would not be beneficial to border preparations 無益邊備 (SS 326.10529 and CB 136.3269).

³⁹⁹ SS 468.13651.

⁴⁰⁰ CB 47.1024 and SS 466.13612 for Qin; there is a discrepancy regarding his title in the sources, see the table above. Zhang was certainly named as a suppression patrolling inspector (SS 466.13620).

⁴⁰¹ SS 466.13612-13 for his actions in Sichuan.

⁴⁰² CB 66.1472 for Zhang and CB 66.1473 for Zhou.

⁴⁰³ CB 66.1473.

block mutineers from traveling downstream to threaten the port.⁴⁰⁴ In addition, while there is no evidence that he had a post which put him in charge of troops, Yu Derun led one thousand soldiers in an attack against the mutineers.⁴⁰⁵

We can also find examples of military roles for eunuchs in the two Hebei mutinies. During the Baozhou mutiny of 1044, the emperor ordered Yang Huaimin to attack.⁴⁰⁶ Finally, in the twelfth month of 1047 Renzong sent Mai Yunyan from Kaifeng to Beizhou, and he was ordered to attack the prefectural seat alongside Wang Kai and two other military officials, Wang Xin and Hao Zhi.⁴⁰⁷ The order implies that Mai was considered to be roughly on par with these men, who were the top military commanders in the siege. From these examples, it is clear that not only were eunuchs appointed to military positions, but also they contributed to the success of putting down the mutinies.

Eunuchs also frequently served as a connection between the court and the field. The court sometimes sent eunuchs with the pardons or calls for surrender proclaimed by the emperor. In 1007, Yu Derun went to Guangnan West with a pardon for any mutineer who surrendered, while Renzong dispatched He Chengyong to Beizhou to deliver an amnesty in the twelfth month of 1047.⁴⁰⁸ A eunuch messenger might also travel to meet with the leader of the suppression campaign on behalf of the throne. Two eunuchs came to Guangnan in this way. Zhenzong ordered Shi Chonggui to “console” Cao Liyong after a report that Chen Jin’s men still controlled Liuzhou, while Yan Wenqing came to Guizhou to provide a feast for Cao and others.⁴⁰⁹ Eunuchs could also deliver messages back to the capital, as when Cao sent Yu Derun to Kaifeng to report

⁴⁰⁴ CB 66.1485.

⁴⁰⁵ CB 66.1485. The Guangnan West Fiscal Intendant Shu Ben ordered this attack.

⁴⁰⁶ *Sushui jiwen* 11.204.

⁴⁰⁷ CB 161.3891 for the order to send Mai, and 161.3892 for the order for Mai and the others to attack.

⁴⁰⁸ CB 66.1473 for Yu and CB 161.3892 for He.

⁴⁰⁹ CB 66.1486 for Shi and CB 66.1478 for Yan.

the victory in Guangnan.⁴¹⁰ Wen Yanbo likewise had Li Jihe bring news of Wang Ze's defeat at Beizhou to the court.⁴¹¹

Finally, eunuchs could be employed to gather information for the court's benefit, even investigating their fellow Song officials on the campaign. This was a common function for eunuchs in the early Northern Song according to Chen Feng.⁴¹² Eunuchs had a considerable history acting as agents of the throne, such as the army supervisors 監軍 of the Tang, and the Song continued to employ them in this way.⁴¹³ There are a few examples of this surveillance function. In 1044, Liu Baoxin traveled to Baozhou in order to observe the mutiny.⁴¹⁴ Eunuchs sent to accompany the campaigns could also be expected to inform on the progress, or lack of progress, achieved. Yu Derun was the one who informed the court directly that Liuzhou remained in Chen Jin's hands, bypassing Cao Liyong.⁴¹⁵ This role as an inspector of the campaign is clearest with Li Jihe, who was serving as Hebei's mounted courier when he went to Baozhou in 1044, and became the "mounted courier at the foot of the city wall 城下走馬承受" in 1048, during the Beizhou mutiny.⁴¹⁶ This post may sound like a simple messenger position, but its actual purpose was to inspect the military circuits for any questionable matters.⁴¹⁷ Thus, Li Jihe's specific duty was to check on the Song's military forces and the officials overseeing them as they surrounded Baozhou and Beizhou.

⁴¹⁰ CB 66.1489.

⁴¹¹ CB 162.3906.

⁴¹² Chen, "Bei Song houqi wenchen yu huanguan gongtong tongjun tizhi de liubi," 167.

⁴¹³ Wang, *Structure of Power in North China*, 10 fn. 4. In fact, the same term was used for Zhang Jineng when he worked with Li Jilong in Shaanxi, though it was likely just a phrase meaning "to inspect the army" (see SS 466.13620).

⁴¹⁴ CB 151.3683.

⁴¹⁵ CB 66.1486. As a consequence of this, Zhenzong sent Shi Chonggui to "console" Cao. It is unclear whether Shi was sent to console Cao for his failure to retake Liuzhou, or because Cao was upset about Yu going behind his back.

⁴¹⁶ SS 468.13651. It should be stressed here that Li was not ordered to Baozhou by Renzong, rather he was likely just performing the duties of his post.

⁴¹⁷ Gong, *Songdai guanzhi cidian*, 444-45 for a description of this and related positions.

As can be seen from the mentions of Yu Derun above, one eunuch could play multiple roles in the field. Zhenzong sent Yu to Guangnan to carry an amnesty, and one might expect that his duty was thus fulfilled when he delivered the document.⁴¹⁸ However, he remained present throughout the suppression efforts and beyond. He led troops in battle, sent the report on Liuzhou to the emperor, and carried news of Chen Jin's defeat to Kaifeng.⁴¹⁹ Yu was then sent back to Guizhou to help oversee the efforts to root out the remnants of the mutiny. Shi Chonggui similarly went to Guangnan to meet with Cao, but he worked with Yu Derun after the mutiny ended, too.⁴²⁰ While Li Jihe was not expressly ordered to Baozhou in 1044, he probably first arrived to surveil the Song forces around the prefectural seat as per his regular duties, but subsequently decided to try negotiating with the mutineers, and even climbed the wall by himself to meet with them.⁴²¹ These cases show that eunuchs could contribute to a single campaign in multiple ways. The examples of Yu and Shi also reveals that, sometimes at least, a eunuch arrived to complete one stated task, and did not simply return to the capital right away. Given Yu's report, it seems plausible that the emperor sent them not only to deliver a message, but also wanted them to stay there in order to help with the suppression effort and find anything problematic they might need to report to the throne.

The presence of eunuchs on these campaigns is intriguing because of the poor relationship between civil officials and eunuchs. Given civil officials' contentious history with eunuchs in previous dynasties and their sense of moral superiority, it is little surprise that those officials and other literati usually cast eunuchs in an unfavorable light.⁴²² When Mai Yunyan

⁴¹⁸ CB 66.1473.

⁴¹⁹ CB 66.1485, 1486, and 1489.

⁴²⁰ CB 67.1499.

⁴²¹ SS 468.13651.

⁴²² Jay, "Song Confucian Views on Eunuchs," 45-51.

died, Renzong tried to send a *lubu* 鹵簿, a ceremonial procession for high-ranking officials, as a posthumous honor. Sima Guang protested that during the Tang this was only used on the occasions of marriages and funerals of meritorious officials who had helped found the dynasty. Mai, on the other hand, was merely a “favored servant 近習之臣.”⁴²³ The term suggests that Mai’s personal ties to Renzong had swayed the emperor to reward him in such a manner, rather than any notable achievement.

Since there was such animosity towards eunuchs, it seems doubtful that civil officials willingly chose them to assist in mutiny suppression campaigns. This points to imperial intervention in the selection process. Eunuchs could act as a third bloc to check the actions of military and civil officials. Precedents for reliance on eunuchs in this way existed, such as when Emperor Huan (r. 146-168) of the late Han dynasty allied with eunuchs to drive his in-laws, the Liang family, from power.⁴²⁴ Although it appears after the Song, it is worth noting one of the most notorious examples of using eunuchs in this manner: the Eastern Depot of the Ming dynasty, an organization established by the Yongle Emperor (r. 1402-1424) and which functioned as a secret police and was run by eunuchs.⁴²⁵ The idea of using eunuchs to help rulers exert control over officialdom remained an attractive possibility to emperors throughout the imperial period. While this sometimes resulted in excessive power in the hands of eunuchs, using them more judiciously could prove quite useful, and this seems more in line with how eunuchs were used during the mutinies.

As a word of caution, however, it is worth pointing out that an emperor’s decision to send eunuchs did not mean the ruler and eunuchs were constant allies. Instead, they were utilized

⁴²³ SS 336.10758.

⁴²⁴ Bielenstein, “Wang Mang, the Restoration of the Han Dynasty, and the Later Han,” 286.

⁴²⁵ Hucker, “Ming Government,” 24.

when it was thought convenient or necessary. While Renzong was moved by the death of Mai Yunyan to lavish him with rewards, Shenzong reacted quite differently following the passing of Li Jihe. Li served in both the Baozhou and Beizhou mutinies in Hebei, and was not above putting himself into danger: He ascended the wall of Baozhou by himself to meet the soldiers, and in another instance quelled unrest among archers in Huanzhou 環州 by walking into the middle of them and challenging them. Yet, when his adopted son Li Congshan asked for a posthumous title, Shenzong retorted, “This is fraud! [Li] Jihe lacked military accomplishments, so why must he receive a posthumous title 此弊事也! 繼和無軍功, 何必贈?”⁴²⁶ While eunuchs’ interests often coincided with the throne’s, the ruler’s interests superseded their own when there was a conflict between the two.

Interpersonal Relationships

While the types of officials dispatched were an important aspect of selecting who should go, the court also had to take into account the relationship between individuals in the government, as well as their relationships to the throne. It was essential to take into account the interpersonal relationships of people who needed to work together. Qualified officials might not necessarily be the best if they routinely sparred with one another. Familial ties also mattered. They had long been recognized as a double-edged sword, but sometimes those ties were critical for the court’s confidence in an official.

Debates at court could be heated. When arguing before Renzong over the correct punishment of an official who feasted Wang Lun, Fan Zhongyan and Fu Bi fought with each other bitterly, despite being allies.⁴²⁷ Allowing at least some level of contentious discussion was

⁴²⁶ SS 468.13651.

⁴²⁷ CB 145.3499.

considered necessary, but sometimes the ruler thought it went too far. If arguments could grow sharp enough to stymie the functioning of the court, the emperor might intervene to curb such antagonism. Jia Changchao had been made prefect of Damingfu and Hebei military intendant because he had argued repeatedly with Wu Yu 吳育 (1004-1058) while both were state councilors.⁴²⁸ In other words, Renzong had exiled Jia and Wu from the capital as a consequence of their inability to work together. However, it is important to note here that mere disagreement was not the only cause of their reassignments. Dating at least as far back as the melding of correlative cosmology with Confucianism under Dong Zhongshu in the Western Han, a longstanding belief held that the behavior and attitude of the emperor or his ministers could have consequences not just for government or society, but for nature as well.⁴²⁹ It was the censor Gao Ruone's argument that tied a recent drought to Jia and Wu's squabbling which convinced Renzong to send both out of the court.⁴³⁰ From the perspective of the emperor, their disagreements not only marred the court's ability to function, but also had a serious effect on natural phenomena.

One clear case of interpersonal relations having an effect on personnel selection was the appointment of Wen Yanbo as the pacification commissioner of Hebei in the first month of 1048, demoting the previous top official in the field, Ming Hao, to second-in-command.⁴³¹ Ming had overseen operations against Wang Ze at Beizhou for about a month, and near the end of his

⁴²⁸ SS 285.9619 and CB 160.3867

⁴²⁹ Douglas Skonicki has written on the role of correlative cosmology in Song politics, including an article on its use during the Qingli Reforms to bring in supporters of Fan Zhongyan and oust opponents. See Skonicki, "Employing the Right Kind of Men."

⁴³⁰ SS 285.9619 and CB 160.3867. Gao made reference to the "Hongfan (Great Plan 洪範)" chapter of the *Shujing* 書經 to argue the fighting was tied to the lack of rain. As Douglas Skonicki points out, however, many Song officials such as Ouyang Xiu expressed doubts about the validity of correlative cosmology. While officials may have been skeptical, Renzong was a firm believer, and so officials sometimes appealed to the emperor using natural disasters to promote changes at court. See Skonicki, "Employing the Right Kind of Men."

⁴³¹ CB 162.3903.

leadership the government forces had suffered two setbacks. The mutineers burned a tower built by the Song to look into the city, and an attempt by locals to help troops climb the walls of Beizhou failed.⁴³² The lack of progress and attendant blunders likely fostered low confidence in Ming's leadership. Wen Yanbo was not dispatched until over a month after the mutiny began, but he was already requesting assignment to Beizhou a little over ten days into the crisis.⁴³³ We should be cautious not to place too much blame on Ming Hao for the Song's ongoing woes, because efforts were also hampered by a major figure at court, Xia Song.

Xia Song headed the Bureau of Military Affairs. His interest in resolving the mutiny should have been paramount given his post. However, Xia was also a shrewd political figure, and according to the *Changbian*, he “despised Ming Hao.” Concerned that Ming would receive credit for defeating Wang Ze, he did not relay Ming's memorials to the court.⁴³⁴ Xia's behavior in another infamous incident suggests he was willing to cause serious problems in the government to advance his own interests. He opposed the Qingli Reforms of Fan Zhongyan, and allegedly came up with a creative means to weaken Renzong's confidence in the upstart faction. One ally of Fan named Shi Jie 石介 (1005-1045) was known for his incredibly outspoken personality. In 1044, Xia Song had one of his maids master Shi's calligraphic style, and then forge a letter in which Shi Jie advocated that the reformers launch a coup. The emperor doubted the authenticity, but it nevertheless weakened Fan's faction, prompting Fan and Fu Bi to request posts in Hebei.⁴³⁵ Xia's meddling likely pushed Renzong to accept Wen Yanbo's offer to replace Ming Hao as the leader, in the hopes that Xia would be more amenable to work with Wen. Xia only

⁴³² CB 162.3902-03. The tower was called *juyin* 距闕 in Chinese. For this structure, see *Wujing zongyao* 10.4.

⁴³³ QSW 30:643.161-62.

⁴³⁴ CB 162.3903.

⁴³⁵ CB 150.3637.

faced demotion later in the fifth month of 1048.⁴³⁶ His poor relationship with Ming Hao was one of several issues surrounding Xia Song; more serious was the accusation that he had protected men suspected of infiltrating the palace at night. The catalyst for this demotion, however, was an unusual phenomenon in the sounding of five peals of thunder on a cloudless day. An unnerved Renzong called the Hanlin academician Zhang Fangping 張方平 (1007-1091), and had him draft the order for Xia's demotion.⁴³⁷

The parallels of Xia's dismissal with the demotions of Jia Changchao and Wu Yu are significant. Discord at court may persist for a considerable period of time, but sometimes it took a signal from Heaven to trigger action. This is suggestive of three points regarding the dynamics of the court of Renzong in particular, and perhaps more broadly for Song emperors. First, arousing the emperor's ire alone was not necessarily grounds for dismissal or demotion, but an accompanying disaster or portent could convince the emperor such an action was needed. This likely underscored the gravity of the situation. Second, by using a natural phenomenon as the trigger for punishment, the emperor enjoyed protection from blame by claiming that the problem had spilled out of mere political disagreements into disturbing Heaven. As Renzong told Zhang Fangping, "Xia Song is treacherous (*jianxie* 姦邪), on account [of his behavior] he has caused the heavens to change like this. It is appropriate to send him away."⁴³⁸ It is not any personal enmity or frustration on the part of Renzong towards Xia, but the will of Heaven! It plays on an important ambiguity: How did the emperor know that it was Xia's actions which caused the thunder? At the time the explanation likely would have been that the emperor, as Son of Heaven, and serving consequently as the lynchpin between Heaven, Man, and Earth, was unique among

⁴³⁶ CB 164.3951

⁴³⁷ SS 283.9576 and CB 164.3951.

⁴³⁸ SS 283.9576 and CB 164.3951.

humans to discern what had caused disturbances in the world. Today, we would be more inclined to argue that Renzong had a desire, conscious or unconscious, to remove Xia from the Bureau of Military Affairs, and the portent provided a convenient excuse to carry out his demotion. It also harkens back to the opening quotation in this chapter, when Zhenzong explicitly states that he decided to dispatch troops to put down the mutiny due in part to the Directorate of Astronomy's reading of portents.⁴³⁹

Third, and most important for our broader discussion of personnel selection, it shows the active role that emperors could play in administration in the face of a real or perceived crisis. Renzong is generally characterized as a relatively apathetic ruler. However, if something or someone particularly caught his attention, then he could swing quickly into a more forceful stance in the court. One of Renzong's first assertive moves following the regency of his mother, Empress Dowager Liu, was to depose his wife, Empress Guo (1012-1035), who was chosen by Liu. Officials protested the decision, but they were dismissed while Renzong went ahead with the divorce.⁴⁴⁰ The emperor's sincere belief in correlative cosmology could disturb him enough to act against toxic elements at court.⁴⁴¹ Mutinies, particularly those at Baozhou and Beizhou near the border with Liao, presented challenges to the Song's regional security, if not the stability of the dynasty itself. Renzong's concern to retain his paramount position for himself and his descendants suggests a certain sensitivity to a number of potential threats to his rule which could drive him to intervene in administration.

⁴³⁹ CB 66.1472.

⁴⁴⁰ Chaffee, "The Rise and Regency of Empress Liu," 8, and McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung," 292-93.

⁴⁴¹ Zhenzong, certainly by 1008 with the arrival of "documents from Heaven" to the palace, also displayed a strong belief in supernatural forces. The Heavenly letters affair was also tied to the growing perception of the Chanyuan Treaty as humiliating to the Song. For an overview of this affair, see Lau and Huang, "The Founding and Consolidation of the Sung Dynasty," 270-73.

Another form of interpersonal relationships found in the context of mutinies is marriage. It is likely in three different mutinies, there was at least one case of marriage ties between two dispatched officials or between a dispatched official and an important official already in the field, in each case involving at least one of the top officials. Lei Youzhong, appointed prefect of Chengdu and the senior civil official dispatched to put down the Wang Jun mutiny in 1000, was likely brother-in-law to Li Shiheng 李士衡 (959-1032), the military official prefect of Jianzhou, who was holed up in the strategic pass of Jianmen which separated Sichuan from Shaanxi.⁴⁴² Tian Kuang and Fu Bi, both civil officials, were definitely brothers-in-law by the start of the Baozhou mutiny in 1044, and Fu asked the emperor for Tian's assistance when he was appointed to Hebei pacification commissioner. Tian was shortly afterwards sent to Baozhou, which put him in Fu's jurisdiction.⁴⁴³ Finally, Wen Yanbo asked that Ju Zhenqing, who was also likely his brother-in-law or otherwise related by marriage, accompany him to Beizhou, which Renzong approved.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴² For Lei's appointment, see CB 46.989; for Li's position as prefect of Jianzhou, see SS 295.9936 (Li's name is also sometimes written as 李仕衡). Li Shiheng's spirit path inscription records his second wife as Yan'an Commandery Mistress Lei 延安郡君雷, a member of the Fengyi Lei clan 馮翊雷. Lei Youzhong was a member of this clan. According to a comment on the China Biographical Database, Li's wife was likely a daughter of Lei Dexiang, Lei Youzhong's father. Even if this is not the case, she almost certainly was related to Lei Youzhong. The time of the marriage is unclear, but there is some evidence which points to a marriage before 1000. Li Shiheng married twice, but his first wife is recorded as having died young. He had six sons and three daughters, many of whom almost certainly were born by his second wife. His youngest son, Li Pidan 李丕旦 (1004-1052), was born in 1004, four years after the mutiny (QSW 19:388.29).

⁴⁴³ CB 151.3683 for the order sending Tian to Baozhou, and CB 151.3674-76 for Fu's appointment as pacification commissioner and his memorial. Fu technically was not appointed due to the mutiny, as the concerns he laid out in his memorial had to do with the Liao, and he asked for the assignment because of problems at court, but Tian was ultimately sent out because of the Baozhou mutiny. The *Song huiyao* and *Changbian* record that Fu was subsequently ordered to go to Baozhou as well (SHY Bing 10.15; also CB 151.3688). According to the funerary inscription of Tian Kuang's wife, Lady Fu married when she was 19, which puts her marriage at around 1034, ten years before the Baozhou mutiny (QSW 98:2150.325-26).

⁴⁴⁴ CB 162.3903. This is the most tenuous connection. Wen Yanbo's sister married one Ju Qiqing 鞠齊卿, a son of Ju Yong 鞠詠 (d. 1031) who shared the same *qing* 卿 as Ju Zhenqing (QSW 31:659.76). According to a commentator on the CBDB, they likely share the character as a generational marker. Though having both men as sons of Ju Yong may be too much of a stretch, it does lend credence to the idea that they were related. Interestingly, Ju Qiqing held the personal rank of Recorder of the Directorate of Palace Buildings (*Jiangzuo jian zhubu* 將作監主簿), which is the same rank Ju Zhenqing held when Wen requested his assistance. Ju Qiqing is only mentioned Wen

These marriage ties seem to fly in the face of the norms of personnel management in the Song. As in other dynasties, the government practiced avoidance. According to Edward A. Kracke, Jr.'s study of the civil service, this meant primarily that kin were not allowed to serve together in a part of the government.⁴⁴⁵ The reasons for a policy of avoidance are clear. Kinship ties could trump loyalty to the state, leading to a potential for all sorts of malfeasance and corruption. At heart here is a consequence of the Confucian emphasis on filial piety with an expectation that such piety would extend naturally to loyalty towards the ruler, with society effectively as a family writ large. This introduced a quite plausible conflict over which had precedence. In order to mitigate this dangerous ambiguity, rules were put into place preventing kin from serving with one another (later extended to a ban on serving in one's native place).

Why would it be permissible, then, for the court to dispatch these brothers-in-law, most of whom were civil officials, to work together to put down a crisis as serious as a mutiny? If they privileged their marriage ties over loyalty to the state, this would be a grave threat. Even if they did not rebel, they might try to profit from the endeavor in other ways which would undermine the state's authority and even its credibility in a restive area. Given the particular conditions of these ad hoc posts, however, the familial ties might have actually been more of an asset than a threat. A major factor here is the location of the men's families. While close kin generally followed officials to their posts under normal circumstances, a crisis situation requiring

Yanbo's collected works. While Wen gave Qiqing's rank in 1033, years before the mutiny in 1047, there is a possibility that Qiqing and Zhenqing are in fact the same person, with either 齊 or 真 being a transcription error.⁴⁴⁵ Kracke, *Civil Service*, 100. Avoidance in later periods included a ban on serving a post in one's native place or the surrounding area, out of a concern that an official might use his position to benefit his family to the detriment of good governance. This seems to have been less common in Song times, although Kracke does note an example (SHY Zhiguan 61.38, cited in Kracke, *Civil Service*, 100 n. 102). Brian E. McKnight points out that many prefects for Hangzhou were natives to the area (the same held true for Mingzhou 明州 and Fuzhou 福州, which McKnight uses for comparison). See McKnight, "Administrators of Hangchow," 190. Also, the Song barred Sichuanese from serving in their home region in the first half of the eleventh century, which was not a normal practice (Lo, *Civil Service*, 203-04).

military action would have been too dangerous. The risk of family members dying or being captured was too great, and that could influence an official's behavior. An example of this occurred during the Wang Ze mutiny. The Hebei Judicial Intendant Tian Jing 田京 (992-1058) was staying in Beizhou with his family when the mutiny began, and only Tian was able to escape.⁴⁴⁶ The rebels attempted to convince Tian not to attack by presenting his family members on the city wall. Tian responded not only with indifference to his family's plight, but even took a bow and shot at them, killing four.⁴⁴⁷ In this case, loyalty to the Song proved more powerful than duty to family. One suspects this episode was recorded because of the unusual actions of Tian, which the state no doubt appreciated. It also served as grounds to mitigate a demotion he received since he abandoned his post at the start of the mutiny.⁴⁴⁸ It thus underscores the need for officials' families to remain at home when they were on campaigns, since such behavior was not necessarily expected.

This apprehension towards familial ties additionally manifested itself in a ban on officials bringing their families to Sichuan which lasted about four decades. The ban was put into effect following the Li Shun rebellion of 993-995.⁴⁴⁹ This example suggests that keeping families away from their officials had two purposes. First, as seen above, it kept officials from being put into a position like that of Tian Jing, allowing them to act without concern that their family members could be captured or killed by rebels or mutineers. Second, Winston Lo points out the policy functioned as a hostage system.⁴⁵⁰ With his family outside of Sichuan, and quite likely in Kaifeng, an official knew that his family would suffer the consequences if he proved traitorous.

⁴⁴⁶ CB 161.3890.

⁴⁴⁷ CB 163.3917

⁴⁴⁸ CB 163.3917.

⁴⁴⁹ Lo, *Civil Service*, 203-04.

⁴⁵⁰ Lo, *Civil Service*, 203.

This second purpose helps explain why brothers-in-law could serve together in fighting against a mutiny. Both would be concerned about their own natal families, of course, but now they also had to be concerned about their in-laws as well. This provided a secondary check on an officials' behavior. Not only did an official need to worry about his own conduct, but also the conduct of his brother-in-law, since treachery by the latter could threaten his own family.

There is no example in the mutinies of a brother-in-law acting in a way which threatened the wellbeing of both his family and his in-laws, but there are two cases following the end of the Beizhou mutiny in 1048 which demonstrate that the Song did punish family members for the misdeeds of their kin. One involved a case of treason, when the Beizhou Prefect Zhang Deyi cooperated with the mutineers following his capture. Zhang's brothers were demoted and his wife and children punished as well, and Zhang Deyi himself was executed.⁴⁵¹ The second case stemmed from a rumor that a member of a heterodox sect, Li Jiao 李教 (d. before 1047), was in Beizhou with Wang Ze. Li had learned sorcery from a master who came from Zhendingfu 真定府.⁴⁵² While drunk, Li "made seditious (or heterodox) speech 為妖言."⁴⁵³ When that came to light, he hanged himself. After Wang Ze's mutiny began, a rumor circulated that Li had not in fact died. The court reacted quickly by punishing, among others, both Li's father *and* his brother's father-in-law Zhang Cun. Later, an investigation revealed Li Jiao was not among the rebels and had indeed committed suicide.⁴⁵⁴ Nevertheless, it reveals that the Song government was willing to hold both natal family and in-laws liable for the crimes of relatives. This

⁴⁵¹ CB 162.3912-13.

⁴⁵² CB 163.3918.

⁴⁵³ SS 320.10414.

⁴⁵⁴ CB 163.3918.

collective punishment might not have been at the forefront of officials' minds, but it was a legitimate concern which could constrain their behavior.

Another marriage tie, however, was quite comfortable for the court, and that was a tie to the imperial clan. Peter Lorge has identified a pattern of marriages between prominent military officers and the Zhao family, which he terms the "Northern Song military aristocracy."⁴⁵⁵ We can find several examples of marriage ties between military officials and the imperial clan when looking at officials dispatched to put down mutinies. However, most lack clear dates for marriages or even births, making it difficult to determine who was married at the time of the mutiny. For example, Li Jichang, whose son Li Zunxu 李遵勗 (988-1038) married a daughter of Emperor Taizong, was almost certainly not related to the imperial clan when he fought against Wang Jun, since his son and Taizong's daughter were both 13 *sui* at the time; marriage was possible but unlikely at that young of an age.⁴⁵⁶ They may have been betrothed, but there is no evidence pointing to that, either. A few examples do exist for the mutinies during Renzong's rule, however.

During the Baozhou mutiny, the emperor ordered Wang Deji, prefect of Xiongzhou and Hebei's border military intendant, to curb unrest along the border, since Tian Kuang feared this would be an excuse for Liao to send troops towards the Song-Liao border. Wang's post was no doubt responsible in part for the order, but his ties to the throne might have seemed attractive as well. Wang's wife was a cousin to Empress Cao (1016-1079), the wife of Renzong, and both

⁴⁵⁵ Lorge, "Northern Song Military Aristocracy."

⁴⁵⁶ According to Chang Bide, both Li Zunxu and his wife were born in 988 (Chang, *Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin*, 1056-57. Li Jichang himself almost married into the imperial clan, to a daughter of Emperor Taizu, but he did not want to marry her, and his father quickly arranged another marriage to avoid it; this upset Taizu (SS 257.8954). For Li's role in the Wang Jun mutiny, see SS 257.8955.

women were in turn granddaughters of Cao Bin 曹彬 (931-999), one of the founding generals of the Song.⁴⁵⁷

Another example of this was Gao Jilong, who was prefect of Cangzhou when he was appointed prefect of Beizhou to replace Zhang Deyi.⁴⁵⁸ Gao had two ties to the imperial clan. First, his daughter married Zhao Shiyong 趙世顛, a descendant on Emperor Taizu's line. She died at age seventeen on the fifth day of the tenth month of 1047, shortly before the Wang Ze mutiny.⁴⁵⁹ The second tie the Gao family had to the Zhaos was through the marriage of Gao Jilong's great niece to Zhao Zongshi 趙宗實 (later Zhao Shu 趙曙), who would become Emperor Yingzong.⁴⁶⁰ Furthermore, the future Empress Gao's mother was an older sister of Renzong's Empress Cao.⁴⁶¹ She married Zhao Zongshi in 1047.⁴⁶² Gao Jilong's father, Gao

⁴⁵⁷ Empress Cao's father was Cao Qi 曹玘 (SS 258.8983). For this relation, and the relationship between Cao Qi and Ms. Cao, see QSW 21:432.31 (see also Chang, *Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin*, 2185). There is no clear date for the marriage between Wang Deji and Ms. Cao, but evidence demonstrates they were married by the late 1030s. According to the record of conduct of Ms. Cao's father, Cao Wei 曹瑋 (973-1030), written by Song Xiang 宋庠 (996-1066), Wang Deji had already married her and held a personal rank of Assistant Commissioner of the West Palace Audience Gate (rank 6b) at the time (QSW 21:432.31). Wang held the higher rank of Commissioner of the West Palace Audience Gate (6a) by 1040 (CB 127.3005); as a lower bound, he was rank 8a in 1032 (CB 111.2585-86). Cao Cong 曹琮, a brother of Cao Wei, was listed as being Tongzhou Surveillance Commissioner (3b) (QSW 21:432.31). Cao Cong was below this rank in 1034 (CB 115.2707), but had the rank by 1039 (CB 123.2902). The following year, he was again promoted to Dingguo Army Deputy Military Governor (3a) (CB 127.3006). The record of conduct was probably written between 1034 and 1040, and Wang Deji married Ms. Cao during or before this period.

⁴⁵⁸ CB 161.3892.

⁴⁵⁹ For the marriage to Zhao Shiyong, Ms. Gao's parentage, and the day of her death, see QSW 38:824.250. Zhao was the son of Zhao Congxin (one of 37 sons), who was a great-grandson of Emperor Taizu (QSW 53:1158.259 for relationship to Taizu, and 53:1158.260 for Zhao Shiyong in the list of sons).

⁴⁶⁰ SS 242.8625 lists Gao Jixun as the empress dowager's grandfather. For the relationship between Jixun and Gao Jilong, see their father Gao Qiong's entry, SS 289.9694.

⁴⁶¹ SS 242.8625.

⁴⁶² It is important to note that Zhao Zongshi was not crown prince when he married. He was only named heir apparent in 1062 (McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung," 336-37). However, evidence points to a long-standing preference for Zhao Zongshi as an alternative if Renzong could not name his son a successor. Starting in 1035, he was brought into the palace to prepare him for becoming emperor. In 1039 one of Renzong's consorts gave birth to a son, and so Zhao Zongshi was sent away (McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung," 336). None of Renzong's natural-born sons survived beyond three years old (McGrath, "The Reigns of Jen-tsung and Ying-tsung," 335). While Zhao Zongshi was not heir apparent in 1047, he was probably regarded as the most likely successor at that time. The marriage between him and a niece of the empress further illustrates the importance he still held. Interestingly, Empress Dowager Gao's *Songshi* biography says that as a child she lived in the imperial palace, a period that coincided with her future husband's initial time there. They were the same age, and considered

Qiong, also played an important role in the early Song, most notably for encouraging Emperor Zhenzong to oversee personally the Song's engagement with a Liao invasion force, a conflict which culminated in the Treaty of Chanyuan in 1004.⁴⁶³ His brother, Gao Jixun (Empress Dowager Gao's grandfather), achieved military merit in his own right, as seen in his participation in the fight against Wang Jun.⁴⁶⁴ The marriages were likely a consequence of the loyal service of the Gao family to the Song, and it was a recognition of this loyal service which may have made Gao Jilong an attractive choice to become Beizhou's prefect.

A final military official likely selected for his ties to the imperial clan was Li Zhaoliang. His aunt was the final empress of Taizong, Empress Dowager Li (960-1004).⁴⁶⁵ He enjoyed privileges with the court from an early age due to this connection. At four *sui* he was given a personal rank through the *yin* protection, and also permitted to enter the inner palace.⁴⁶⁶ Additionally, one of his sisters married Cao Xuan 曹玘, an uncle of Empress Cao.⁴⁶⁷ Li was therefore related to two empresses, including the incumbent. Finally, Li's daughter also married an imperial clansman, Zhao Yunbi 趙允弼 (1008-1070).⁴⁶⁸ What is unique in his case, however,

by Renzong to be a match (SS 242.8625). She was thus considered a potential match for Zhao Shu even when he was first being groomed to become emperor.

⁴⁶³ SS 289.9693. The account describes Gao Qiong's encouragement: "At the time, the forward armies were already engaged in battle with the enemy. The emperor wanted to go personally to the camp, [but] some urged him to return south. Qiong said, 'The enemy army is already exhausted. It is appropriate for Your Majesty to go on in person, in order to supervise their [i.e., the Song army's] success.' The emperor was pleased, and that day moved on to Chanyuan." 時前軍已與敵接戰，上欲親臨營壘，或勸南還，瓊曰：“敵師已老，陛下宜親往，以督其成。”上悅，即日進幸澶淵。

⁴⁶⁴ SS 289.9694-95 for Gao Jixun's role during the suppression campaign in Sichuan.

⁴⁶⁵ The *Songshi* records him as being "the son of Empress Dowager Mingde's elder brother [Li] Jilong 李繼隆 (950-1005)" (SS 464.13563). Li Jilong's *Songshi* biography also names him as a son (SS 257.8969). Empress Dowager Li was not, however, the biological mother of Zhenzong (and by extension the biological grandmother of Renzong). Zhenzong was born to a consort also surnamed Li who died in 977 (SS 242.8610). Li Zhaoliang is named in Li Jilong's funerary inscription, but under a former name, Zhaoqing 昭慶 (QSW 15:301.77); Jilong's *Songshi* biography states that Zhaoqing's name was changed to Zhaoliang (SS 257.8969).

⁴⁶⁶ SS 464.13563.

⁴⁶⁷ QSW 15:301.77 for Li Jilong's funerary inscription, which records that one of his daughters married Cao Xuan. See QSW 21:432.31 for Cao Xuan's relationship to Cao Qi, the empress' father.

⁴⁶⁸ QSW 53:1160.296.

is that he was requested by the Baozhou mutineers. The rebellious soldiers refused the edict ordering their surrender, and instead shouted, “If you get Infantry Commander Li [Zhaoliang] to come, we will surrender.” The emperor then ordered Li to go to Baozhou.⁴⁶⁹ Why did the mutineers ask for Li in particular? He was at the time the Zhendingfu-Dingzhou Chief Area Administrator 真定府、定州都部署, located adjacent to Baozhou.⁴⁷⁰ However, the soldiers seemed suspicious of the edict, and so they were likely seeking assurances for the validity of the call to surrender. A high-ranking military official who was also closely tied to the imperial clan may have struck them as more reliable. Accounts differ on whether Li Zhaoliang convinced them. According to his *Songshi* biography, he succeeded after riding to the wall with an escort all unarmored and lacking bows and arrows, and climbing up the wall.⁴⁷¹ The *Changbian* version, however, states the mutineers remained suspicious of Li and Tian Kuang, and it took the military official Guo Kui to climb the wall unarmed and convince them to surrender.⁴⁷²

Other personal relationships with the emperor could also play a role. Yang Chongxun was a military official who became mounted courier in the campaign to defeat Wang Jun in Sichuan.⁴⁷³ As seen earlier, his selection was no doubt tied to his relationship with Zhenzong, which dated back to when the emperor was still crown prince.⁴⁷⁴ His role in the crown prince’s residence was predicated on a need for “devoted and intelligent 忠實聰悟” attendants.⁴⁷⁵

Zhenzong and Yang had known each other for years by the time of Wang Jun’s mutiny, with

⁴⁶⁹ CB 151.3688.

⁴⁷⁰ CB 144.3476 for Li’s appointment to Zhendingfu and Dingzhou. According to the *Changbian*, Li was summoned to Baozhou by imperial orders after the demand from the mutineers to meet him (CB 151.3688). There is evidence, however, that Li Zhaoliang was already at Baozhou working with Tian Kuang, such as the account in the *Song huiyao* (SHY Bing 10.15) and a memorial by Ouyang Xiu (QSW 32:693.350), making the request to meet with Li a bit less significant than if he was called to Baozhou from Zhendingfu or Dingzhou.

⁴⁷¹ SS 464.13563.

⁴⁷² CB 151.3688.

⁴⁷³ QSW 25:524.65.

⁴⁷⁴ SS 290.9713.

⁴⁷⁵ QSW 25:524.65.

Yang essentially growing up in the future emperor's residence. Zhenzong likely felt comfortable sending Yang as mounted courier as a result.

The relationship between officials confronting a mutiny, as well as with the throne, served as one guide for selecting personnel. Antagonism between officials, in the field or at court, could stymie effective government action, so the state had to mitigate such complications. On the other hand, marriage ties could prove useful. Those ties could foster cooperation between in-laws working together on a suppression campaign. They also provided a complex set of checks on those officials. With family far closer physically to the political center, perhaps even in the capital itself, than to their kin in the field, officials had to be aware that misdeeds on their parts could have serious repercussions for their loved ones. Given that in-laws could be implicated as well, this made it so both officials had good reason to ensure that they work in the interests of the Song state rather than for their personal gain. Ties to the imperial clan, on the other hand, married the interests of the official to that of the throne. In other words, they benefitted from a close relationship with the Zhaos, and it would be best to work for the perpetuation of the Zhao family's rule since it would aid their own posterity. Personal relationships were not the only, or even the chief, criterion for choosing officials, but the benefits—and liabilities—of such ties had to be clear to the court, and likely influenced decisions. Finally, the logic behind choosing officials based on interpersonal relations points to the emperor as an important figure in making these decisions.

Conclusion

When confronted with a crisis like a mutiny, the court usually dispatched officials in response. In order to decide who to send, officials and the emperor sought individuals who could effectively fight the mutineers and oversee the suppression efforts. The court valued military

expertise, of course, and most officials sent out had some form of experience in battle or planning strategy. They sent a mix of military officials, civil officials, and eunuchs. The military officials sent had the most obvious value to a suppression campaign, given their prior experience directing the army. The state also ordered civil officials on the campaigns, usually in the paramount position. Many of the dispatched civil officials, too, had experience related to the military. There was a concern about the lack of supervision these officials had, and so the court relied on other civil officials, and some surveillance officials like the mounted courier, to keep an eye on them. In addition, the emperor turned to eunuchs for support. They performed three distinct roles, as military commanders, messengers, and observers of the suppression campaign forces, although one eunuch could act in multiple capacities.

When making personnel decisions, the court needed to take into account the relationship between individual officials as well. Failure to do so could mar the functioning of the suppression efforts, as what happened between Ming Hao and Xia Song, which negatively affected the siege against Wang Ze at Beizhou. One type of interpersonal relationship that seemed to be helpful was marriage ties. While such a relationship could lead to corrupt dealings, the threat of collective punishment, even if left unstated, meant that in-laws would not only be more likely to work together towards a common goal, but also to keep an eye on each other's behavior to prevent the punishment of both families. This concern over conflicting loyalties mattered less, however, when one of the married families was the imperial clan. Such a tie to the throne made the stakes higher for an official, as his fate would be tied to that of the dynasty, and that would be a strong motivating factor.

Chapter 3

Concerning Place: Geographic Considerations

This chapter investigates how the Song dynasty responded to the distinct geographies of the places where the mutinies erupted. There are four regions where the five mutinies broke out: Sichuan (for the Wang Jun mutiny in 1000), Guangnan (for the Chen Jin mutiny of 1007), Jingdong and Huainan Circuits (for the Wang Lun mutiny of 1043), and Hebei (for the Baozhou mutiny of 1044 and Wang Ze mutiny of 1047-1048). I will first describe the structure of Song territorial administration and provide an overview of scholarship that assesses the spatial organization of the Song state. This is followed by an examination of each region where a mutiny broke out, with particular attention to how the region's physical and human geographies influenced the Song's efforts to suppress unrest. Four of the five mutinies appeared along the periphery of the empire, and all of the regions had diverse physical and historical landscapes which posed challenges to the government.

Territorial Administration of the Northern Song

During the Song dynasty, there were three levels of territorial administration staffed by centrally-appointed officials: In ascending order, they were the county, the prefecture, and the circuit. Multiple counties made up a prefecture, and multiple prefectures made up a circuit. All levels were responsible for maintaining order, but prefectures and circuits are the most important for this study due to their relationship to the military.

The prefecture was vital for the Song's military affairs. The *Songshi* states that the prefect was in charge of the overall affairs of the prefecture, and that he managed the administration of both soldiers and commoners.⁴⁷⁶ By the start of the eleventh century, military

⁴⁷⁶ SS 120.3973. Ruth Mostern points out that Song prefects were in charge of the military, unlike county magistrates (Mostern, "*Dividing the Realm*," 39).

authority generally rested with civil officials.⁴⁷⁷ The prefects' authority over soldiers was a double-edged sword for the court. While prefects controlled the garrisons for the central government's benefit, a cruel administrator's actions could spark a mutiny.⁴⁷⁸

Above the prefecture, the Song established circuits led by intendants who supervised groups of prefectures, as described in the introduction. For our purpose, the most important were the fiscal intendants and the military intendants. The first to appear were "the fiscal intendants [who] raised revenue and authorized expenditure for governmental activities beyond the capabilities of the constituent prefectures."⁴⁷⁹ According to Brian E. McKnight, military intendants "had both military administrative and military command functions."⁴⁸⁰ Fiscal intendants were the most important in the interior, while military intendants held prominence on the borders, especially in the north.⁴⁸¹ Still, there was no chain of command and duties could overlap, resulting in a system of checks and balances between the different intendants.⁴⁸² Both Winston W. Lo and McKnight suggest that this was an attempt by the Song court to maintain control.⁴⁸³ In this distribution of authority, McKnight writes, "we can see one of the distinctive traits of the Song pattern of governance: a willingness to sacrifice a degree of administrative efficiency and control in order to prevent the growth of excessive power in local hands."⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁷⁷ Chen, *Tang Song difang zhengzhitizhi zhuanxing yanjiu*, 241-43. This was a process which continued into Zhenzong's reign. For a detailed overview of the role of the Five Dynasties rulers in reasserting central authority, see Gungwu Wang's *The Structure of Power in North China during the Five Dynasties*.

⁴⁷⁸ The Chen Jin mutiny in Guangnan broke out because of a prefect's abuses (CB 66.1472). We also saw this in the case of Han Gang in 1043, who caused his soldiers to revolt and loot the city they were supposed to defend (CB 144.3478-79).

⁴⁷⁹ Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 57.

⁴⁸⁰ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 232.

⁴⁸¹ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 232-33 and McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration," 22.

⁴⁸² Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 63-64.

⁴⁸³ Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 64 and McKnight, *Law and Order*, 232-33. Lo also suggests this may have been "due to the force of circumstances as well as to a deliberate attempt by the central government to tighten control."

⁴⁸⁴ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 232.

Finally, a word of caution must be given for the post of military intendant, or *anfushi*. McKnight finds that *anfushi* were first sent out sporadically before being permanently established first in the north and gradually into the interior by the end of Renzong's reign.⁴⁸⁵ According to the *Song huiyao*, in 1006 the Hebei military intendant, who served concurrently as prefect of Xiongzhou 雄州, became the first permanent military intendant. Prior to this, “[if there was] a disaster in the circuits, or a military clash on the frontier, [the court] specially dispatched a commissioner to pacify (*anfu*). When the matter was over, he was dismissed.”⁴⁸⁶ Since these *anfushi* were not permanent, they differed qualitatively from the aforementioned Hebei military intendant as well as all other types of intendants. Furthermore, according to the *Song huiyao*, when a military circuit was established, it was filled by a prefect in that circuit, as seen in the case of Hebei above.⁴⁸⁷ In this study, both types of *anfushi* occur. To distinguish between the two, I will follow Charles O. Hucker's rendering of *anfushi* as “pacification commissioner” for the mutinies of 1000 and 1007.⁴⁸⁸ Hucker notes it was a Tang post “delegated from the central government to bring order to a troubled area.”⁴⁸⁹ This clearly resembles the earlier Song *anfushi* and not the permanent military intendant. I will use “military intendant” during the 1040s since the military intendants of Hebei and Jingdong circuits were permanent and concurrently served as prefects like the Hebei military intendant cited above.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁵ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 232-33.

⁴⁸⁶ SHY Zhiguan 41.79.

⁴⁸⁷ SHY Zhiguan 41.79.

⁴⁸⁸ Hucker, *Official Titles*, 104. In 1000, Wang Qinruo and Liang Hao were made Xichuan and Xia circuit *anfushi* (西川及峡路安撫使). See CB 47.1030. For the 1007 Chen Jin mutiny, Cao Liyong and Zhang Xu were made *anfushi* for Guangnan East and West circuits (SHY Bing 10.12). These were temporary appointments without concurrent prefect posts.

⁴⁸⁹ Hucker, *Official Titles*, 104.

⁴⁹⁰ Chen Zhizhong was both Jingdong military intendant and prefect of Qingzhou during the Wang Lun mutiny in 1043. He was already Qingzhou prefect when given the joint appointment of military intendant in 1042 (see CB 135.3231). Jia Changchao was Hebei military intendant and prefect of Damingfu during the Wang Ze mutiny in 1047-1048 (for Jia, see SS 285.9619).

The basic framework of imperial Chinese administration is relatively straightforward, but it is essential to assess how well the territorial divisions aided in governing a vast empire. The geographic limitations to the Song state's authority were clear in the frontiers. According to Nicolas Tackett, the northern border became a fixed line in the eleventh century due to the tensions there, as "China was forced to construct linear military defenses."⁴⁹¹ This was not the norm prior to the Song: "A more accurate representation of the Tang frontier might make use of a series of dots or small circles (representing cities and forts held by the military) connected together by lines (representing roads)."⁴⁹² Evidence suggests the other frontiers of the Song fit the Tang model better. For example, Richard von Glahn finds that Yujing 涪井 in southern Sichuan, important to the state for its salt, was "an isolated enclave, populated by a few officials and the convict laborers sentenced to a life of [salt production]."⁴⁹³ Even well within the interior, the actual extent of state control could be quite limited. Peter Golas writes that the Song wine monopoly was not universally enforceable, and therefore the government chose to rely on a zone of monopoly control within a certain distance from prefectural or county seats and market towns.⁴⁹⁴ These studies illustrate the limits of state power in the Song dynasty and will be worth keeping in mind when examining how the state suppressed mutinies. This gives an impression of Song control as focused on administrative centers with the government's power decreasing as one moved away from the center.

In order to overcome these shortcomings, the Song court had two important tools at its disposal. The first was to merge or divide administrative jurisdictions. Ruth Mostern finds this

⁴⁹¹ Tackett, "Great Wall," 137.

⁴⁹² Tackett, "Great Wall," 121.

⁴⁹³ Von Glahn, *The Country of Streams and Grottoes*, 74.

⁴⁹⁴ Golas, "The Sung Wine Monopoly," 5-7. The largest prohibition area was around the capital Kaifeng while the seats of lower units and market towns had smaller areas to monitor.

was a common method to organize the empire's territory in order to meet the needs or draw on the resources of different regions:

By the turn of the [eleventh] century, there had been 278 changes to the spatial organization of the empire. Collectively, the spatial changes created a defensible frontier on China's northern perimeter, staffed by personnel who were free to serve as a result of the abolition of counties and prefectures in the far south, and supported by resources generated by enhanced revenue-collection in counties that had been created in the commercial core of the southeast.⁴⁹⁵

The state certainly had a sound rationale for the ways it utilized counties and prefectures. The pressures from Liao and Xixia in the north and northwest meant a build-up of personnel by way of establishing more prefectures in those regions, while reduced state presence in the far south and more counties in the wealthy southeast helped provide both human and material resources for the north's defense.⁴⁹⁶ A key point here is that the Song court accounted for the circumstances of each region, molding spatial organization accordingly to meet its overall aims.

Winston W. Lo finds that the Song employed the same method for circuits. However, unlike prefectures, each circuit intendant only controlled certain aspects of administration. For example, the judicial intendant 提點刑獄使 was created in addition to the fiscal intendant to enhance the surveillance function of circuits.⁴⁹⁷ Eventually several different circuit intendants could work within the same region. Lo writes, "Throughout most of the Song period there were three regular types of intendants: fiscal, judicial, and ever-normal granaries."⁴⁹⁸ Since intendants

⁴⁹⁵ Mostern, "Dividing the Realm," 107. The defensible frontier she describes was the result of establishing forty-seven prefectures in the north and northwest (Mostern, "Dividing the Realm," 106).

⁴⁹⁶ Mostern, "Dividing the Realm," 106-107.

⁴⁹⁷ Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 59.

⁴⁹⁸ Lo, *Civil Service*, 41.

were specialized, the Song court could set up whatever types of intendants were thought to be necessary for a given region. This explains why fiscal intendants appeared throughout the empire by the turn of the eleventh century, while military intendants first appeared on the borders around the same time and were only gradually installed in the interior over the following half-century.⁴⁹⁹ To intensify control and surveillance, existing circuits could be divided. As an example, Lo cites Sichuan's two circuits being divided into four in 1001 due to uprisings, an episode covered in more detail below.⁵⁰⁰

The other method we shall see in this study was the promotion and demotion of prefectures. Two sets of ranks are significant here. The first is the specific classification appended to a prefecture's name. There were four types of prefectures in the Song: In descending order, they were superior prefectures (*fu* 府), ordinary prefectures (*zhou* 州), military prefectures (*jun* 軍), and industrial prefectures (*jian* 監). These characters were appended to a prefecture's name, as in Hangzhou 杭州 or Damingfu 大名府. Ruth Mostern sums up the differences, writing, "Normatively speaking, *fu* were populous and strategic, *jun* were military, and *jian* were industrial, and there was a hierarchy of status among them."⁵⁰¹ In this system, a given prefecture could be promoted (*sheng* 升) or demoted (*jiang* 降) by changing the suffix. For example, in 1006 Emperor Zhenzong (r. 997-1022) promoted (*sheng*) Songzhou 宋州 to a *fu* prefecture, changing its name to Yingtianfu 應天府, because it was where his uncle Zhao Kuangyin served as military governor when he overthrew the Later Zhou (*yingtian* can be translated as "responding to Heaven," indicating that Taizu took power rightfully).⁵⁰² Conversely, Chengdufu

⁴⁹⁹ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 231-233.

⁵⁰⁰ Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 58-59.

⁵⁰¹ Mostern, "Dividing the Realm," 41.

⁵⁰² SS 85.2110. In the sixth year of Zhou Shizong's reign, Zhao was made the Guide Army military governor 歸德軍節度使 (SS 1.3). This governorship was based in what was then known as Songzhou (SS 85.2110).

成都府 was demoted (*jiang*) to Yizhou 益州 following the 993-995 Li Shun Rebellion in Sichuan.⁵⁰³

The second prefectural ranking system important for this study is what the modern historian Yu Wei calls the *jiedu* system (*jiedu tixi* 節度體系).⁵⁰⁴ This was the result of the Song court finally wresting regional control from the military governors of the Tang and Five Dynasties. Rather than dispensing with titles like *jiedu* which were related to the military governors' administration, however, the Song court used them in two different systems. In the first, they remained tied to people and were used as high-ranking titles for officials, now devoid of actual power.⁵⁰⁵ In the second system, they served as a designation for prefectures. There were four ranks: In descending order they were *jiedu*, *fangyu* 防禦, *tuanlian* 團練, and *cishi* 刺史 (also referred to as *junshi* 軍事) prefectures.⁵⁰⁶ This was the system most pertinent to mutiny suppression. A prefecture's *jiedu* rank determined certain aspects of the government, such as the number and seniority of prefectural officials, the allotment of official fields, some funds from the central government like "public use money (*gongyong qian* 公用錢)," and the salaries of military officials.⁵⁰⁷ Importantly, Yu Wei finds that the Song court adjusted these ranks over the course of

⁵⁰³ SS 89.2210.

⁵⁰⁴ Yu, "Songdai de *jiedu*, *fangyu*, *tuanlian*, *cishizhou*," 65.

⁵⁰⁵ We see this with several officials dispatched to fight mutinies. For example, Shangguan Zheng held the title of Mingzhou Military Training Commissioner 洺州團練使 (CB 46.989) when he fought Wang Jun in 1000, and Mai Yunyan was promoted to Meizhou Defense Commissioner 眉州防禦使 during the Beizhou mutiny of 1047-1048 (CB 162.3907). These titles could be held by individuals with military or civil personal ranks: After the end of the Beizhou mutiny in 1048, Jia Changchao, a civil official, was given the title of Shannan East Route Military Governor 山南東道節度使 (CB 162.3908).

⁵⁰⁶ Yu, "Songdai de *jiedu*, *fangyu*, *tuanlian*, *cishizhou*," 66-67. Like *jiedu*, the other ranks originally referred to posts. For example, *tuanlian* (or more precisely *tuanlianshi* 團練使) is translated by Charles O. Hucker as "Military Training Commissioner" (Hucker, *Official Titles*, 548-49). However, since the titles are now devoid of responsibilities and are used here to refer to prefectures and not officials, I have decided to keep them in *pinyin*.

⁵⁰⁷ Yu, "Songdai de *jiedu*, *fangyu*, *tuanlian*, *cishizhou*," 67-68. Yu divides the prefectural staff of different *jiedu* ranks according to where they fell under the four ranks of executory officials (*xuanren* 選人); the higher the *jiedu* rank, the higher the rank required for that post (see Yu, "Songdai de *jiedu*, *fangyu*, *tuanlian*, *cishizhou*," 67 Table 1). The top three ranks were grouped together as *liangshi zhiguan* 兩使職官, while the fourth rank was classified as

the dynasty, which serves as evidence that they retained some importance to the state.⁵⁰⁸ Military affairs was one of the reasons for changing a prefecture's *jiedu* rank, and Yu's examples include mutinies covered in this study.⁵⁰⁹

As seen above, the Song divided its territory into counties, prefectures, and circuits in order to assert its control. Among their many duties, prefectural and circuit officials had responsibilities related to the military. However, the ability of the state to project its power on the frontier and even in the interior remained limited. Despite these drawbacks, the Song state proved capable of manipulating the spatial organization and rankings of jurisdictions in order to suit its needs in a region. Although these changes were undoubtedly imperfect, they allowed the state to establish a uniform structure (counties, prefectures, and circuits) across the empire that allowed for considerable variation within those layers of government.

Problems of History: The Wang Jun Mutiny of Sichuan

Sichuan was the most difficult region for the Song to integrate, and the Wang Jun mutiny of 1000 erupted a mere five years after a serious popular rebellion was brutally put down. The trouble for the Song was related to Sichuan's isolated location and a population which had grown accustomed to ruling itself during the Five Dynasties. Already concerned about the stability of its rule there before the mutiny, the court intensified its supervision and relied on forces along the border between Sichuan and the rest of the empire to ensure stability. The Song court drew a clear conclusion from the mutiny: Even their own military garrisons, not to mention the local people, were unreliable, and they had to guard against their own subjects.

chudeng zhiguan 初等職官, as explained in Gong, *Songdai guanzhi cidian*, 575. See also the chart in Umehara, "Civil and Military Officials," 4.

⁵⁰⁸ A table compiled by Yu includes promotions dating from 967 to 1246 (see Yu, "Songdai de jiedu, fangyu, tuanlian, cishizhou," 70-71 Table 2).

⁵⁰⁹ Yu, "Songdai de jiedu, fangyu, tuanlian, cishizhou," 68-72.

Song Chen spells out clearly the challenges the Song faced when it conquered the Sichuanese kingdom of Later Shu in 965. The fundamental issue was geography. Sichuan was ringed by high mountains with only two perilous means of entering the region from the north or east. To the north was a small plank road, while to the east travelers had to contend with the Three Gorges. Chen notes, “The independent states that ruled Sichuan stationed troops there and in the Three Gorges area during the tenth century to protect Sichuan from the northern expeditions, including that of the Song.”⁵¹⁰

To control Sichuan, Chen finds, the Song had to contend with the challenging geography, powerful local elites who possessed their own military organization, and a sophisticated cultural elite which had enjoyed political participation under the independent regimes in Sichuan and would need to be incorporated into Song politics.⁵¹¹ Unsurprisingly, with such a location and background, Sichuan was very restive, as Chen writes, “Between 965 and 1000 the Song went through five major rebellions and mutinies, all of which broke out in Sichuan.”⁵¹² The Wang Jun mutiny was the last of these.

To understand the relationship between the Song government and Sichuan at the time, it is important to examine the 993-995 rebellion of Wang Xiaobo and Li Shun. The suppression of Li Shun, under the command of the eunuch Wang Ji'en, was brutal, crushing 100,000 rebels and beheading 30,000 in Chengdu.⁵¹³ One could easily expect that many civilians were also massacred. Anger over the level of bloodshed committed by Song troops must have lingered. As a consequence of the rebellion, the court instituted serious measures against Sichuan. Chengdu

⁵¹⁰ Chen, “Managing the Territories,” 4-5. The pass to the north was called Jianmen, see Zhang and Zhou, “Qianxi Bei Song shiqi junshi zhi Shu,” 72. Jianmen played a vital role in preventing Wang from controlling entry into Sichuan (SS 299.9936).

⁵¹¹ Chen, “Managing the Territories,” 98-101.

⁵¹² Chen, “Managing the Territories,” 5.

⁵¹³ SS 466.13603. Wang Xiaobo was killed by a stray arrow in 993, and Li Shun then took command of the rebels (SS 5.92-93).

was stripped of its *fu* and *jiedu* status and renamed Yizhou 益州.⁵¹⁴ At the same time, Lingzhou 陵州 on the southern border of Chengdu was promoted from a *junshi* prefecture to a *tuanlian* prefecture because it successfully resisted attacks from Li Shun.⁵¹⁵ This was a move up one rank from the lowest in the *jiedu* system. As seen above with Yu Wei's study, this gave Lingzhou more experienced staff and additional funding.⁵¹⁶ It was probably intended to make Lingzhou a counter to Chengdu. Another harsh method was the ban on native Sichuanese serving anywhere within the region, while any nonnative officials dispatched to the region could not bring their families. Winston Lo writes that this was a common practice carried out by the Song in newly-conquered regions where loyalties were suspect, but the duration of the ban in Sichuan was exceptional. Nonnative officials were only allowed to bring their families starting in the 1030s, and Sichuanese could not serve there until the regulation "was repealed by the end of the reign of Emperor Renzong."⁵¹⁷

For the Sichuan mutiny, the Song had to rely on outside support, an indication of a weak military presence in Sichuan. It seems the only imperial army forces stationed at Chengdu, and likely all of Sichuan, were the two Shenwei commanderies which rebelled, Wang Jun himself being one of the commanders.⁵¹⁸ Zhenzong provided eight thousand infantry and cavalry to the

⁵¹⁴ SS 89.2210.

⁵¹⁵ QSW 51:1100.40. The memorial cited here came to my attention through reading Yu Wei, who quoted part of it (Yu, "Songdai de jiedu, fangyu, tuanlian, cishizhou," 68). Upon examination of the memorial itself, I found the author, Wen Tong 文同 (1018-1079), referred to Lingzhou as explicitly having been a *junshi* prefecture. The reason for the memorial is peculiar, as Wen requested the casting of a seal for Lingzhou recognizing its status as a *tuanlian* prefecture years after the promotion (Wen was born long after the promotion). For the location of Lingzhou, see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 29-30. It is referred to as Lingjingjian 陵井監 since it was demoted in 1072 (SS 89.2215).

⁵¹⁶ Yu, "Songdai de jiedu, fangyu, tuanlian, cishizhou," 67-68.

⁵¹⁷ Lo, *Civil Service*, 203-04.

⁵¹⁸ CB 45.980 states that Wang led one of the two Shenwei Army commanderies, with the other led by Dong Fu 董福. Dong managed his soldiers better than Wang did, according to the *Songshi* biography of Lei Youzhong, but his fate is unknown (SS 278.9461). Both Shenwei commanderies probably revolted, since they are not found in the *Songshi*'s list of imperial army commanderies (SS 187.4594), with only the single Zhongyong Army commandery found for Chengdu (SS 187.4596). The Zhongyong Army was formed in the aftermath of the mutiny from the

officials dispatched to put down the mutiny.⁵¹⁹ Song Chen finds the weak military presence was by design from the beginning of the Song's control over the region as "soldiers in the local armies were reduced to menial labor, and defense of the region was entrusted to imperial garrisons dispatched from outside Sichuan," and even the latter were kept poorly trained.⁵²⁰ Still, troops within Sichuan played a role in the fight against Wang. Mianzhou and the northern pass at Jianmen were successfully defended, and the Shuzhou Prefect Yang Huaizhong raised troops in an attempt to retake Chengdu.⁵²¹

Following the suppression of the mutiny, the Song divided the region into smaller circuits. It had previously been divided into two, but the court saw the mutiny as a sign of the inadequacy of this arrangement. Sichuan was thus divided into four circuits, each taking on the name of a principal prefecture under its jurisdiction: Yizhou Circuit 益州路, Zizhou Circuit 梓州路, Lizhou Circuit 利州路, and Kuizhou Circuit 夔州路.⁵²² Song Chen notes, however, that Chengdu remained important as "the Prefect of Chengdu was made concurrent fiscal commissioner of the whole of Sichuan."⁵²³ Despite the role Chengdu had played as the center of two large uprisings in the span of five years, one of which resulted in the prefecture's demotion, it is telling that the Song recognized its continued importance.

remnants of loyal forces there (CB 51.1125). In 1013, Zhenzong ordered the creation of another five imperial army commanderies, known as the Ningyuan Army 寧遠軍, using prefectural army soldiers (SS 187.4596). The *Changbian* dates the creation of the Ningyuan Army to 1014, and states that the emperor drew soldiers from Chengdu and Pengzhou 彭州, promoted them to imperial army soldiers, and stationed them in Rongzhou 戎州 to the south of Chengdu (CB 83.1894). Rongzhou was to the south of Chengdu, making it likely that the purpose was to defend the area from non-Han peoples.

⁵¹⁹ CB 46.989.

⁵²⁰ Chen, "Managing the Territories," 101.

⁵²¹ SHY Bing 10.11.

⁵²² For the order to divide Sichuan's circuits and the names of the four circuits, see CB 48.1052-53. Winston W. Lo used this case to show that circuits were sometimes divided to improve surveillance (Lo, "Circuits and Circuits Intendants," 58-59).

⁵²³ Chen, "Managing the Territories," 116. See CB 48.1058 for the concurrent appointment.

According to Zhang Jian and Zhou Jin, throughout the Northern Song, there was a policy in place, possibly even before the Wang Jun mutiny, to maintain only a skeletal presence of soldiers in strategically important places within Sichuan while relying on soldiers in Shaanxi and the Jinghu circuits who could quickly move in response to unrest in Sichuan.⁵²⁴ Zhang and Zhou identify the presence of ill-trained troops as one of the reasons for this policy, alongside the pressing need for troops in the north and northwest and continued instability in Sichuan, namely the occasional breakout of mutinies.⁵²⁵ None of the latter evidently threatened the Song's hold on the region like with Wang Jun's uprising. According to Song Chen, following the mutiny in 1000, Sichuan suffered no major rebellion until 1207.⁵²⁶

The Southern Frontier and the Guangnan Mutiny of Chen Jin

The Song court encountered a frontier society in the far south when dealing with the Guangnan mutiny led by Chen Jin in 1007. The Guangnan region, filled with non-Han peoples and a dangerous “miasma (*zhang*),” was regarded as a dangerous place by officials, who consequently were reluctant to serve there. The court had to cope with both challenges in the face of the Chen Jin mutiny.

The mutiny broke out in Guangnan West circuit, a peripheral region of the Song (modern Guangxi and parts of Guizhou and Yunnan provinces). Political control was limited at best, not least due to the number of non-Han peoples living there. Their presence was recognized by the state via numerous “haltered-and-bridled prefectures (*jimizhou* 羈縻州)” spread across the circuit. According to the *Songshi*, Yizhou alone had ten haltered-and-bridled prefectures.⁵²⁷

⁵²⁴ Zhang and Zhou, “Qianxi Bei Song shiqi junshi zhi Shu,” 72-73. Song Chen's comments above suggest this was not an entirely new policy (Chen, “Managing the Territories,” 101).

⁵²⁵ Zhang and Zhou, “Qianxi Bei Song shiqi junshi zhi Shu,” 71-72. They are more explicit about the frequent mutinies contributing to this policy in the abstract (Zhang and Zhou, “Qianxi Bei Song shiqi junshi zhi Shu,” 70).

⁵²⁶ Chen, “Managing the Territories,” 5.

⁵²⁷ SS 90.2242-43.

James Anderson finds this system, which established 300 such prefectures across an area stretching from Guangdong to Sichuan, was applied to the southern frontier first in the Tang but the early Song eagerly resumed it. It relied on granting hereditary titles and authority to local leaders in return for loyalty to the court. He points out cogently, however, that these indigenous leaders often accepted the terms since the relationship aided their own goals of expansion on the frontier.⁵²⁸ To summarize the attitudes of the Song and Vietnam states towards this region, Anderson comments: “For both the Chinese and Vietnamese courts, the frontier was a liminal area, removed from the locus of power within the court and the capital city... If anything, the frontier was a source of trouble, not of promise, an area that required surveillance and diligent control and offered very little in return.”⁵²⁹ Faced with large numbers of indigenous non-Han peoples who nominally owed loyalty to the Song, the court had to decide what role, if any, they should play in suppressing the mutiny. Despite the ambiguous nature of control over the region, the Song lightly guarded this region. Guangnan West had at most three imperial army commanderies at the time, two in Guizhou 桂州 and one in Rongzhou 容州.⁵³⁰ The very few

⁵²⁸ Anderson, *Rebel Den*, 26-29.

⁵²⁹ Anderson, *Rebel Den*, 85.

⁵³⁰ SS 187.4597. They belonged to the Xionglüe Army, which was created in 1003, just four years before the Chen Jin mutiny. However, the *Songshi* list includes commanderies established later, during the reign of Renzong, so there may have been even less than three in 1007. The number of commanderies for Guangnan East and West, and indeed for every circuit, comes from lists in the *Songshi* (SS 187 for imperial armies before 1068; and 189 for prefectural armies). Those lists are organized according to the type of military unit (for example, Imperial Bodyguard cavalry and infantry armies), then by army (e.g., the Shenwei Infantry Army). Finally, the prefectures where a specific army has commanderies are listed in order. In short, the *Songshi* list is helpful for finding the locations of all the commanderies of a particular army, but cumbersome if you want to find all the imperial or prefectural army units associated with a specific prefecture or circuit.

Modern historians studying the Song have helpfully rearranged the lists by circuit and prefecture. Michael McGrath has put together tables that show the number of commanderies (referred to by McGrath as battalions) in each circuit (see McGrath, “Military and Regional Administration,” 169 Table 4-1 for imperial army commanderies before 1068 and 173 Table 4-3 for prefectural army commanderies). Wang Zengyu has similarly arranged the commanderies of the imperial army into a table by circuit and then by prefecture (Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 43-66), and the commanderies of the prefectural army by circuit (Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 86-87).

However, like the *Songshi* lists, their tables appear to be snapshots that do not account for changes over time. The *Songshi* editors do comment on when armies were established and when new commanderies were added, but the list of prefectures likely represent the final tally before 1068. This was a problem for the Shenwei commanderies at Chengdu. They existed prior to the Wang Jun mutiny (CB 45.980), but appear to have disappeared

commanderies in Guangnan West, combined with the large presence of non-Han “haltered-and-bridled” prefectures, indicate that the Song had only limited effective control over the region. It is likely that the Song’s power projection in the region was akin to the Tang model of limited control fixed on cities and forts described by Nicolas Tackett above.⁵³¹

If the Song’s control over the people in Guangnan was tenuous, the government also had to contend with a challenging physical environment. Access to Guangnan West from the north relied on the Ling Canal 靈渠 connecting Hunan’s Xiang River 湘水 to the Li River 漓水 just north of the prefectural seat of Guizhou.⁵³² This canal was built by the Qin (221-206 BCE) in order to attack the kingdom of Nanyue 南越, and was repaired at the start of the Song.⁵³³ River transport seems to have been the main mode of transportation in the region, as all prefectural seats in the circuit were located on rivers. These rivers fed into the West River which flowed towards Guangzhou in Guangnan East.⁵³⁴ While the terrain was partially responsible for the difficulties nature posed, Song officials were also vexed over the threat of *zhang* 瘴. Cong Ellen Zhang has demonstrated that while *zhang*, often translated as “miasma,” can refer more narrowly to a host of tropical diseases like malaria, it was just as much a cultural concept used to encapsulate all that was dreaded of a hostile, alien environment. Tellingly, the regions thought to be affected by *zhang* moved steadily southward with the advance of Han colonization. During

(likely eliminated on purpose) after Wang was defeated. As a consequence, Chengdu is not listed when one examines the Shenwei Army in the *Songshi*, which only states that the army exists in the capital region (SS 187.4594). In the case here, Wang Zengyu identifies five commanderies in Guangnan West, including three Xionglüe Cavalry commanderies (Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 66). However, he does not note that the cavalry commanderies were only established in 1055, long after the Chen Jin mutiny (SS 187.4574). The tables McGrath and Wang compiled are invaluable, but they must be cross-examined with other sources in an effort to ensure that the data is representative for the time of a given mutiny.

⁵³¹ Tackett, “Great Wall,” 121.

⁵³² For the location of the Ling Canal, see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35.

⁵³³ SS 97.2417.

⁵³⁴ Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35.

the Song, *zhang* was a grave concern for any official posted or exiled to Guangnan.⁵³⁵ Winston W. Lo writes that while most circuits had intendants posted to different prefectures, in Guangnan West almost all were located in Guizhou since it was the only prefectural seat deemed to be healthy.⁵³⁶

The Song state had to adapt to the political and environmental challenges in Guangnan in order to suppress Chen Jin's mutiny. It is clear that the court had concerns over the non-Han peoples of Yizhou and Rongzhou 融州. According to the *Changbian*, in the eighth month of 1007, Emperor Zhenzong issued an edict to the leaders of the Xi Man in those two prefectures, promising handsome rewards if they restrained their people from "disturbing the border peoples." The text alleges that "The leaders all received the order and did not dare to act."⁵³⁷

It is possible that the promise of rewards convinced them to stay out of the conflict, but another reason might have been the appointment of Zhang Conggu to assist in suppression efforts. The emperor explained that he appointed Zhang because of his familiarity with the "strategic passes of the mountains and rivers in Lingwai [i.e., Guangnan]."⁵³⁸ What was left unsaid, however, was that he had also served as prefect of Yizhou twice before. The *Changbian* records the reason for Zhang's second appointment in 999, when the incumbent prefect died in battle against "Man bandits 蠻賊." He had carried out attacks on the Xi Man during his first tenure in Yizhou, earning him a recommendation from the fiscal intendant. With Zhang's reappointment, the Man ceased hostilities.⁵³⁹ However great the rewards, Zhang Conggu's presence in the suppression campaign likely reminded the Xi Man and others that the Song was

⁵³⁵ Zhang, "Between Life and Death," 191-96 *passim*.

⁵³⁶ Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 59-61 *passim*.

⁵³⁷ CB 66.1478. "Xi Man" was a generic term for indigenous populations, also known as the "Five Xi Man," who lived in several river valleys ranging from modern Guizhou to Hubei (Luo ed., *Hanyu dacidian*, vol. 2, 3391).

⁵³⁸ CB 66.1472.

⁵³⁹ CB 45.964.

willing to use force if they assisted Chen. The order Zhenzong sent to the non-Han leaders, however, only targeted Yizhou and neighboring Rongzhou, and it is clear that other non-Han people participated since Yongzhou 邕州 Prefect Cao Keming 曹克明 recruited three thousand “Xidong troops 溪峒兵” to help fight.⁵⁴⁰

Likely because of a combination of threats and rewards, there does not appear to have been any support for the mutineers from the indigenous population. Chen’s forces did try to move westward towards Huaiyuanjun and other haltered-and-bridled prefectures, but his attacks failed.⁵⁴¹ The motives behind his forays into non-Han areas are unclear. Perhaps Chen had hoped to ally with indigenous populations, trade with or raid them for supplies, or coerce them into joining a broader rebellion. He ultimately chose to move toward Liuzhou and Xiangzhou, neither of which had haltered-and-bridled prefectures.⁵⁴²

By moving downstream, Chen Jin drew closer to Guizhou and Guangzhou. Capturing Guizhou would give access to Jinghu South circuit and the Yangzi, while Guangzhou’s importance as the principal city in Guangnan would greatly enhance his position in the far south and weaken the Song’s hold there.⁵⁴³ The wealth of the prefecture also made it an attractive place to target. When dispatching Zhou Wenzhi to oversee the defense of Guangzhou, Zhenzong noted, “Panyu [i.e., Guangzhou] has amassed treasure, and the commoners have long known

⁵⁴⁰ SS 272.9317.

⁵⁴¹ CB 66.1483. For the presence of haltered-and-bridled prefectures west of Yizhou’s seat, see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35.

⁵⁴² In the *Changbian*, Shu Ben reported that Chen and his supporters fled Yizhou towards Liuzhou and Xiangzhou with the objective of plundering Guangzhou (CB 66.1484). This suggests the mutineers had attacked Huaiyuanjun and Tianhezhai earlier. For the absence of haltered-and-bridled prefectures in the two prefectures, see SS 90.2242 (Liuzhou) and 90.2241 (Xiangzhou). It is likely that non-Han people lived there, but the lack of haltered-and-bridled prefectures suggests that they were too few in numbers or insufficiently organized to compel the Song court to recognize them officially as with Yizhou and Rongzhou’s indigenous leaders.

⁵⁴³ For these locations, see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35. Guangzhou was at the time the only Area Command (*dudufu* 都督府) in Guangnan and had a registered population of over 140,000 households during the Yuanfeng period (1078-1085), far beyond any other prefecture in the region (SS 90.2235 for Area Command status, 2235-46 for registered population sizes of prefectures).

peace 番禺寶貨所聚，民庶久安。”⁵⁴⁴ Also, when the court received a report that Chen’s forces still controlled Liuzhou’s Luorong County 洛容縣, Feng Zheng expressed concern that Chen might try to flee to Vietnam or Hainan Island.⁵⁴⁵ To combat his moves, the Song government used local troops to resist Chen’s forces. The Guangnan West Fiscal Intendant Shu Ben dispatched soldiers from Guizhou and Xunzhou 潯州 westward to Liucheng 柳城, a county in Liuzhou.⁵⁴⁶ However, as noted above, the number of soldiers in Guangnan was small.⁵⁴⁷ Therefore, the court had to dispatch forces from other regions to carry out attacks against the mutineers. According to the *Changbian*, the court sent imperial army soldiers from Jinghu North and South circuits and even two prefectures in Huainan West circuit (altogether an area encompassing modern Hunan and Hubei). They traveled to Guizhou, which served as a staging area under the command of Cao Liyong as pacification commissioner.⁵⁴⁸ Given that troops were drawn from such a large area, it seems likely forces in the interior were thin by the early eleventh century. As will be seen with the Jingdong-Huainan mutiny of Wang Lun in 1043, the military preparedness of the empire’s interior grew seriously inadequate. Out of concern for the miasma (*yanzhang* 炎瘴), the emperor ordered that prefectures build shelters along the roads for Cao and others.⁵⁴⁹

With imperial army forces pouring into Guangnan to fight Chen Jin, the combination of local garrisons and outside troops allowed the Song to stymie the rebel soldiers’ movements. The Song court recognized its limited ability to project power in the region, making it necessary to

⁵⁴⁴ CB 66.1473.

⁵⁴⁵ CB 66.1486.

⁵⁴⁶ CB 66.1472. The forces sent by Shu were defeated, with only one of the commanders barely escaping (SS 466.13621). The mutineers gained control of several places in Liuzhou, which prompted the report to which Feng Zheng responded.

⁵⁴⁷ SS 187.4597.

⁵⁴⁸ CB 66.1472.

⁵⁴⁹ CB 66.1479.

try to hold strategic points like Shu Ben attempted at Liucheng.⁵⁵⁰ The explicit reason Zhenzong provided for sending Zhang Conggu was his familiarity with the terrain.⁵⁵¹ While Chen moved toward both Guizhou and Guangzhou, the military build-up at Guizhou frustrated any possible move northward. The mutineers were repelled by forces under the Guizhou-Zhaozhou 昭州 patrolling inspector Zhang Shourong 張守榮 (fl. 1000s); the location of the battle is not given, but it seems likely the fighting occurred in Guizhou.⁵⁵² Following the defeat, Chen's attentions turned downstream, as the mutineers had abandoned Yizhou and were crossing Liuzhou and Xiangzhou for a more defensible position in Rongzhou 容州 and to send some soldiers to raid Guangzhou.⁵⁵³ In response to the ongoing crisis, the court had increased the number of military administrators in Guangzhou, appointing the military official He Rong in the eighth month.⁵⁵⁴ The Guangzhou Temporary Director-in-Chief Zhou Wenzhi, a eunuch commander appointed the previous month, set up a blockade at a gorge on the West River in Duanzhou on the western border of Guangzhou, in addition to making repairs to the city walls, armor, and weapons.⁵⁵⁵ Through such measures, the Song court was able to improve the defenses of the two most important prefectures in Guangnan and hem in Chen Jin.

Following the death of Chen, the prefecture of Xiangzhou was promoted to a *fangyu* prefecture, the second highest of the four *jiedu* ranks; it is unknown what its rank was before the

⁵⁵⁰ CB 66.1472.

⁵⁵¹ CB 66.1472.

⁵⁵² SHY Bing 10.13. Guizhou was adjacent to Liuzhou, which the mutineers had occupied, while Zhaozhou was on the opposite side of Guizhou from Liuzhou, see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35.

⁵⁵³ SHY Bing 10.13. This was based on a report by Shu Ben, recorded in CB 66.1484. This attempt to reach Rongzhou likely failed, since the mutiny ended at Xiangzhou. Rongzhou was separated from Xiangzhou by Xunzhou (see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35).

⁵⁵⁴ CB 66.1480.

⁵⁵⁵ CB 66.1485. For Zhou's appointment, see CB 66.1473. The West River is not named, but it is the only river that makes sense to block given the position of the mutineers (Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35). At the same time, Shu Ben dispatched the eunuch Yu Derun to lead one thousand soldiers in an attack (CB 66.1485).

mutiny.⁵⁵⁶ This gave Xiangzhou a larger and more experienced staff as well as additional funds, as noted by Yu Wei, and these benefits would augment the prefecture's utility in the event of a future mutiny.⁵⁵⁷ Given that Yizhou was a *junshi* prefecture in the *Yuanfeng Jiuyu zhi* and there is no record of it being demoted as a consequence of the mutiny, it was probably already at the lowest *jiedu* rank and therefore could not be further reduced.⁵⁵⁸ The reason for Xiangzhou's promotion was likely twofold. First, it was in a strategic location, where rivers from Yizhou, Liuzhou, and Rongzhou fed into a leg of the West River.⁵⁵⁹ The promotion would allow it to defend the western approach to Guangzhou better. Second, it had successfully resisted Chen's siege, proving capable of being defended.⁵⁶⁰ This had been the reason for Lingzhou's promotion in Sichuan after the Wang Xiaobo-Li Shun Rebellion, according to the memorialist Wen Tong.⁵⁶¹

In the eleventh month of 1007, Zhenzong issued an edict requiring that the Bureau of Personnel Evaluation 審官院 select capital and court officials who had served as county magistrate to fill the positions of prefect and vice prefect in Guangnan.⁵⁶² Two things are worth noting here. First, the emperor ordered that appointees must have experience running local government, suggesting that some officials could become prefects despite having never served as a county magistrate. Zhenzong does not give an explanation why he wanted local government leadership experience, but the circumstances of the edict, which followed a significant armed uprising in Guangnan sparked by an abusive prefect, suggest that he wanted more experienced

⁵⁵⁶ CB 67.1498.

⁵⁵⁷ Yu, "Songdai de jiedu, fangyu, tuanlian, cishizhou," 67-68.

⁵⁵⁸ *Yuanfeng Jiuyu zhi* 429.

⁵⁵⁹ Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35.

⁵⁶⁰ According to the *Song huiyao*, Xiangzhou survived a forty-day siege. The location of the town was not perfect, however. It was situated on a hill, which meant they lacked a well to supply water. Luckily for the inhabitants, there was sufficient rainfall at the time to replenish their store of water (SHY Bing 10.13-14).

⁵⁶¹ QSW 51:1100.40.

⁵⁶² CB 67.1505.

personnel who would presumably treat the soldiers better and know how to handle dissension better. Second, it is noteworthy that Zhenzong wanted capital and court officials, that is, civil officials. According to the *Song huiyao*, the position of prefect could be filled by a civilian capital or court official (ranks 9b to 7a) or a military official with the title of audience usher 閣門祇候 (9a) or better.⁵⁶³ The edict, however, cut out military officials as candidates for prefect or vice prefect posts. Unfortunately, Zhenzong did not provide his reasoning for this restriction, either.

The Song faced a number of challenges when it fought Chen Jin in Guangnan. It had to contend with its own weak presence as seen in the imperial army forces thinly stationed there as well as the sizeable non-Han population, particularly dense in the northwest corner of Guangnan West where the mutiny first began. To make matters worse, government forces had to fight when *zhang* was looming over the far south. Holding off the rebel soldiers at strategic points was necessary. Troops recruited across a massive area set up camp at Guizhou, defending its access to the interior, and a blockade was established in Duanzhou owing to its position between Chen's forces and Guangzhou. Accommodations were provided on imperial orders due to the fear of miasma. The indigenous population posed a potential problem to Song efforts in the region, so the court responded with explicit promises of rewards and an implicit threat made by appointing an official who had earlier suppressed unrest in the region. Once the mutiny ended, Xiangzhou was promoted in *jiedu* rank due to its location and success in fending off the mutineers, in a bid to stymie future uprisings.

⁵⁶³ SHY Zhiguan 47.1. This is for standard prefectures; superior prefectures required higher personal ranks. Kaoru Umehara explains that the Audience Usher title was given to military officials once they had attained the rank of *youban dianzhi* 右班殿直 (9a). Umehara notes that Audience Usher was a functional post but also used as a title similar to academic titles for civil officials. Many military officials involved with the mutiny suppression campaigns either held the title when they were dispatched or were rewarded it afterwards; given their posts in the field, these were titles devoid of function (see Umehara, "Civil and Military Officials, 26-27).

Ineffectual Defense in the Interior: The Jingdong-Huainan Mutiny of Wang Lun

As noted earlier, when dispatching soldiers to fight Chen Jin in Guangnan, the court had to draw on soldiers from three different circuits, some hundreds of miles away. While the northern and northwestern borders and frontiers were densely packed with soldiers, the interior maintained much smaller forces. When hostilities were raging with the Tangut Xixia on the border of Shaanxi, the attentions and resources of the court, both human and material, poured into the northwest.⁵⁶⁴ When in 1043 the soldier Wang Lun rebelled in Jingdong Circuit, there were few effective efforts to stop him. For two months he and his supporters roamed about Huainan virtually unopposed until he was finally chased down by soldiers from Jingdong.⁵⁶⁵ Ouyang Xiu reported in one memorial that Wang Lun was able to pillage with ease through Yizhou and Mizhou 密州 in Jingdong, and Haizhou 海州, Yangzhou 揚州, Sizhou 泗州, Chuzhou 楚州, and Gaoyoujun in Huainan.⁵⁶⁶ Surprisingly, little seems to have been done to address this issue, although it may well have fed into broader concerns about the state of the military which reformers led by Fan Zhongyan tried to resolve.⁵⁶⁷ The political geography may have remained unaltered in part because Wang never captured any prefectural seats and he did not pose a threat in the heavily garrisoned Jingdong region which guarded the capital.

There are two key reasons for this glaring ineptitude on the part of officials. The first is related to the interest of the Song in wealth acquisition in Huainan. As Cecilia Lee-fang Chien

⁵⁶⁴ For an overview of the conflict between the Song and Xixia during which the Wang Lun mutiny erupted, see McGrath, "Frustrated Empires," 151-90.

⁵⁶⁵ SHY Bing 10.14.

⁵⁶⁶ QSW 32:679.108. Judging by the list of officials punished for failing to resist Wang Lun, Chuzhou 滁州 was another prefecture that Wang passed through (SHY Zhiguan 64.44).

⁵⁶⁷ In a ten point memorial submitted to the emperor, Fan Zhongyan and Fu Bi suggested establishing militias to help maintain security (CB 143.3431-44 for the memorial; 3441 for the point on militias). See Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu*, 43-44. James T.C. Liu argues that there was a causal relationship between the Wang Lun mutiny and the rise of the reformers (Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu*, 40-41).

writes, “Huainan was the biggest sea salt producer; its revenues comprised two-thirds of the total earned from sea salt.”⁵⁶⁸ While it may seem rational to garrison large numbers of troops to protect these interests, the expenses of doing so was probably prohibitive, especially as so many resources were being spent in the war against Xixia.⁵⁶⁹ That said, the region did possess a decent enough garrison, on paper anyway. Huainan East circuit had 41 imperial army commanderies to Jingdong East’s 40. However, adding Huainan West and Jingdong West, respectively, gave Huainan 58 commanderies while Jingdong had 161.⁵⁷⁰ Although the numbers in Huainan might seem adequate, the actual preparedness of the region was evidently not. A fierce debate at court broke out between Fan Zhongyan and his fellow reformer Fu Bi. Chao Zhongyue, the prefect of Gaoyoujun, persuaded wealthy families in his jurisdiction to present gifts to Wang Lun in return for sparing the inhabitants. Fu Bi agreed with the locals who wanted the prefect’s head. Fan countered that while fighting the mutineers was ideal, the prefecture lacked weapons, and he suggested that had Chao resisted, Wang’s forces would have killed and pillaged.⁵⁷¹ While this was only one prefecture, it suggests that other officials’ reluctance to engage the mutineers might not have been due to cowardice alone.

The second reason was that the region’s geography posed issues. Huainan was a coastal region, making it possible for Wang to flee to sea if seriously threatened. The remonstrance official Cai Xiang expressed this concern in a memorial about Wang’s mutiny, noting that another mutineer named E Lin had caused considerable trouble along the southeast coast in his flight to sea.⁵⁷² E Lin was a soldier in Zhedong when he killed a patrolling inspector in 1040 and

⁵⁶⁸ Chien, *Salt and State*, 41.

⁵⁶⁹ McGrath, “Frustrated Empires,” 151-190.

⁵⁷⁰ SS 187.4584-601. See also McGrath, “Military and Regional Administration,” 169 Table 4-1.

⁵⁷¹ CB 145.3499. As a result of this argument, Fan and Fu were not on speaking terms for some time.

⁵⁷² QSW 46:1002.364-66.

then pillaged the coast down to Guangnan.⁵⁷³ He fled to Champa in what is now southern Vietnam, and was only handed back to the Song in 1042.⁵⁷⁴ The Song's inadequate coastal defense allowed E Lin to flee the country, so it seemed plausible that Wang Lun could do the same. His turn towards the interior was perhaps his own undoing, then.

Wang Lun's mutiny does not reveal insights into the adaptability of the Song when it came to confronting mutinies, but instead provides an example of the limits the dynasty faced. The interior was generally more stable. It was not expected that a region like Huainan would face a mutiny, so when one erupted the court could do little, particularly at a time when its attentions were on the frontier. In a sense, however, the spatial organization established by the Song did serve its interests here. Wang Lun's abortive attack on Qingzhou made it clear that Jingdong circuit had the troops necessary to defend itself and the capital.⁵⁷⁵ He turned southward to the far less well-defended Huainan region, but Jingdong's troops were able to pursue him. There seemed little reason to alter the spatial organization because the mutiny was, in the end, a singular occurrence in an otherwise stable area. Wang's mutiny was neither proceeded nor followed by further unrest like that seen in Sichuan or Hebei.

Mutiny on a Fixed Border: The Baozhou and Beizhou Mutinies of Hebei

The Baozhou and Beizhou mutinies (in 1044 and 1047-1048, respectively) in Hebei illustrate how cross-border relations can affect the Song state's response to unrest. The presence of the powerful Liao Empire to the north shaped Hebei's landscape. In this case, the

⁵⁷³ CB 129.3058.

⁵⁷⁴ He was spotted by a merchant in 1041, see SHY Fanyi 4.70. E Lin was escorted to Guangzhou by Champa the following year, CB 137.3283.

⁵⁷⁵ Michael C. McGrath writes that Jingdong West, adjacent to Qingzhou's Jingdong East circuit, was garrisoned to protect the capital from northern invasion (McGrath, "Military and Regional Administration," 179).

development of Hebei in response to Song-Liao relations allowed for a rapid reaction to the uprising, although those relations with its northern neighbor also complicated that reaction.

To understand how the Song court viewed Hebei, it is necessary to examine the influence of the Khitan Liao dynasty on the region. As noted in the introduction, after decades of fighting, the Song and Liao agreed to the Treaty of Chanyuan. As a consequence of the treaty, the Song was unable to gain control of the Sixteen Prefectures.⁵⁷⁶ Instead, the Song border in Hebei was established at a very weak location. Nicolas Tackett writes of the problem this border posed: “Now that the border traversed the North China Plain, which was as flat as a ‘straw mat’ in the words of Song Qi 宋祁 (998-1061), there were no natural barriers that could hamper a cavalry invasion.”⁵⁷⁷ The superior cavalry of Liao held a clear advantage in this terrain compared to Song forces which heavily relied on infantry.⁵⁷⁸ Compounding the issue was a lack of local warhorses. As Paul Smith points out, the Song was in a serious predicament here. He writes that other major dynasties relied on pastures within their borders or could purchase horses from various competing groups in the steppe. The Song could rely on neither option. The pastures enjoyed by the Tang fell under Liao and Xixia control, both of whom strove to deny the Song access to the warhorses of the steppes to the best of their abilities. There were attempts to raise horses in Song territory, but none succeeded. Instead, Smith concludes, most of the Song’s warhorses came from Tibetans to the west.⁵⁷⁹ These horses had to be transported hundreds of miles across the empire to the northern border. While Smith does not estimate the mortality rate

⁵⁷⁶ Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation,” 267.

⁵⁷⁷ Tackett, “Great Wall,” 128.

⁵⁷⁸ Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation,” 222.

⁵⁷⁹ Smith, *Taxing Heaven’s Storehouse*, 17-30.

of these horses in transit during the Northern Song, in the Southern Song (1127-1279) twenty percent was seen as the norm, and in some cases more than half died en route.⁵⁸⁰

Because of these issues, the Song had to rely on other means than a sizeable cavalry. Four methods were employed. First, as per the terms of the Treaty of Chanyuan, the Song made annual payments which were seen as preventing future outbreaks of violence. This actually worked to the advantage of the Song since the payments were far less than wartime expenditures and “these payments were easily offset by the surpluses acquired from the seven new border markets that were established.”⁵⁸¹ Second, as Nicolas Tackett argues, due to the threat of Liao cavalry to Song infantry, “it was essential under the Song to establish continuous linear fortifications that could not be circumvented by fast-moving horses.”⁵⁸² The Song created a complex “border zone” of fortifications across Hebei which consisted of troops (apparently garrisoned in underground tunnels), traps, a palisade of trees, and even a long series of interconnected waterworks.⁵⁸³ Third, alongside the border fortifications, the Song stationed huge numbers of soldiers in Hebei and along the rest of the northern and northwestern frontiers. This is clear from the number of commanderies stationed in Hebei. Michael C. McGrath finds that one-third of the imperial army’s commanderies were located in the north and northwest.⁵⁸⁴ Finally, Ruth Mostern notes that the north and northwest saw a significant growth in the number of prefectures in the tenth century, as the Song took steps to ensure a strong military presence in those regions due to concerns with Liao and Xixia.⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁸⁰ Smith, *Taxing Heaven’s Storehouse*, 285.

⁵⁸¹ Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation,” 267-68 (quote on 268).

⁵⁸² Tackett, “Great Wall,” 125.

⁵⁸³ Tackett, “Great Wall,” 129-31. For the role this “great ditch” played in the peace treaty, see Lorge, “Great Ditch,” 59-74.

⁵⁸⁴ McGrath, “Military and Regional Administration,” 178.

⁵⁸⁵ Mostern, *Dividing the Realm*, 106.

This background shaped how the government reacted to the 1044 mutiny in Baozhou. The prefecture bordered Liao, and tensions were higher than normal at the time. On the fourth day of the eighth month of 1044, Emperor Renzong dispatched Fu Bi as Hebei pacification commissioner, having told Fu Bi, “The Northern Enemy arrived at Yunzhou. I fear, therefore, that they will attack our Hedong. The Two Administrations [i.e., the Secretariat-Chancellery and the Bureau of Military Affairs] said it is appropriate to make preparations 北敵受禮雲州，恐遂襲我河東，兩府宜設備。”⁵⁸⁶ The Song was already taking steps to defend the northern border when, the day after Renzong ordered Fu Bi to Hebei, one of the Yunyi Army commanderies garrisoned at Baozhou revolted.⁵⁸⁷

What stands out from the response to the Baozhou mutiny was how the siege appears to have relied entirely on forces from nearby prefectures. This was likely the result of the density of prefectures in Hebei. The first response to the mutiny, according to the *Changbian* account, was from Guangxinjun Prefect Liu Yisun 劉貽孫 who traveled with Mounted Courier Song Youyan 宋有言. Guangxinjun was a small military prefecture located on the Song-Liao border to the northeast of Baozhou. Liu and Song talked with the rebelling soldiers, some of whom wanted to surrender. However, other Song forces responding to the mutiny carried out attacks which resulted in the Baozhou mutineers “returning to a defensive posture and resisting orders [presumably to surrender] 遂復固守拒命.”⁵⁸⁸ At some unspecified point, Dingzhou Prefect

⁵⁸⁶ CB 151.3674. Yunzhou was the Western Capital of the Liao, also known as Datongfu 大同府 (modern Datong, Hebei). See *Liaoshi* 11.505-06. For its location relative to Hedong, see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 10-11.

⁵⁸⁷ SHY Bing 10.15.

⁵⁸⁸ CB 151.3676. Given Liu and Song were trying to negotiate with the mutineers, it seems likely that others arriving at Baozhou launched the attacks (諸路各進來討). Prefect Liu Yisun was a military official (CB 151.3676), while Song Youyan, the mounted courier, was a eunuch (CB 152.3696). According to the *Changbian*, there was no leadership overseeing Song forces besieging Baozhou until Renzong ordered Fu Bi to travel there, which likely explained the conflicting response when Liu and Song attempted negotiations (CB 151.3688).

Wang Guo traveled to Baozhou as well. Dingzhou was on Baozhou's western border.⁵⁸⁹ On the twelfth day of the eighth month, Renzong also ordered Xiongzhou Prefect Wang Deji to investigate the northern border out of a concern that people on the border had been disturbed by the unrest in Baozhou.⁵⁹⁰ There is also some evidence that Zhendingfu-Dingzhou Circuit Chief Administrator Li Zhaoliang was also at Baozhou before the emperor ordered him to talk with the mutineers to convince them to surrender.⁵⁹¹

As the mutiny unfolded, concerns about the Liao remained in the forefront of people's minds and affected proposals to deal with the mutiny and potential cross-border implications. On the thirteenth day of the eighth month, Cai Xiang called for a violent suppression of the mutiny, reiterating a call by himself, Ouyang Xiu, and Sun Fu 孫甫 (998-1057).⁵⁹² Concluding his memorial, Cai stressed the potential internal and external implications of the mutiny:

In general, the Middle Kingdom has become something little regarded by the Northern Enemy. This comes from the court's authority and orders not being carried out. Now, if you use crack troops to enter the city and execute the three thousand rebellious soldiers, and by way of that cut out the sprouts of disaster and chaos in the Subcelestial Realm, then the enemy, who is close [to Baozhou], will inevitably be frightened. How could they even consider prying [into our affairs]? 夫中國為北敵所輕者，本由朝廷威令不行，今

⁵⁸⁹ CB 151.3688. When the mutiny broke out, one of the commanders stationed there, Zang Zhen 臧稹, fled on horseback to Dingzhou to report the uprising (CB 152.3701). Also, on 8/13 Cai Xiang, asked that Renzong order Wang Guo to enter Baozhou with troops under the pretext of delivering a pardon, and then kill the mutineers (CB 151.3684-85, discussed more below); it would make sense to send the order to someone who was already at the siege. According to the account in Sima Guang's *Sushui jiwen*, the emperor ordered Wang to attack Baozhou (*Sushui jiwen* 11.204). If that is the case, then the court may have inadvertently pushed the mutineers from negotiations and prolonged the siege.

⁵⁹⁰ CB 151.3683.

⁵⁹¹ See Ouyang Xiu's memorial asking that he be allowed to speak with Tian Kuang and Li Zhaoliang with respect to the Baozhou mutiny, QSW 32:693.350. Other evidence suggests he only went to the prefecture when requested by the mutineers. See CB 151.3688 and SS 464.13563.

⁵⁹² CB 151.3684-85.

以勁兵入城誅三千叛卒，以絕天下禍亂之萌，而敵人咫尺，必將悚動，安慮其窺乎！⁵⁹³

The point Cai made was clear. Massacring the Baozhou mutineers would not only send a strong message to other soldiers thinking about reacting violently against their superiors, but would also dissuade Liao from interfering. Owing to the ongoing heightened tensions with Liao that resulted in Fu Bi's initial posting to Hebei as pacification commissioner, there was a concern in Cai's mind that Liao might try to take advantage of the unrest. While seeking a more lenient solution to the mutiny, Bao Zheng expressed similar concerns about the Liao, owing to the strategic location of Baozhou. As noted earlier in chapter one, he requested that the emperor send heavy numbers of troops under the command of veteran generals to Ansujun and Guangxinjun, military prefectures located on the Song-Liao border to the northeast of Baozhou, to defend against a possible invasion.⁵⁹⁴

The Song-Liao relationship also affected the state's response to the Beizhou mutiny of 1047-1048. Due to the significant presence of military forces already in Hebei, these forces moved quickly against Wang Ze. Upon learning of the uprising, the Damingfu prefect and Hebei military intendant Jia Changchao sent troops from Damingfu to Beizhou under the Military Administrator Hao Zhi.⁵⁹⁵ After receiving word from Jia, the court ordered Chanzhou, Dingzhou, and Zhendingfu in Hebei, and Mengzhou 孟州 in Jingxi North circuit, to prepare defenses. The following day, two officials, the eunuch Mai Yunyan and military official Wang Kai, were sent from Kaifeng to Beizhou, but they apparently were not accompanied by troops. Rather, the

⁵⁹³ CB 151.3685.

⁵⁹⁴ QSW 26:546.49.

⁵⁹⁵ CB 161.3891.

emperor “ordered Jia Changchao to send crack troops to protect them 詔賈昌朝發精兵衛之。”⁵⁹⁶

It is clear, then, that the court relied on Hebei’s existing troops to carry out the suppression. The actions of Gaoyang Pass Circuit Chief Administrator 高陽關都部署 Wang Xin further demonstrate this.⁵⁹⁷ It is recorded in the *Changbian* that Wang led troops from his jurisdiction in northern Hebei down to Beizhou. He evidently did this without express authorization from the court, because Wang was confirmed in place by the court *after* he arrived at the foot of the city walls.⁵⁹⁸ The court’s reliance on the garrisons within Hebei was possible only because the longstanding tensions with Liao led to such a heavy military presence.

At the same time, other concerns regarding Liao weighed on the minds of Song officials and the emperor. Since the mutiny began roughly a month before the New Year, the Liao envoy would move through Hebei to exchange the annual congratulations while the Song was engaged in a pacification campaign there.⁵⁹⁹ This was a serious concern, since it was likely the envoy would learn of the mutiny. The Liao would be watching closely, then, to see how the Song handled it. It would be even worse if the envoy was caught up in the conflict, and so Renzong

⁵⁹⁶ CB 161.3891.

⁵⁹⁷ In frontier areas of Shaanxi and Hebei, prefectures were sometimes joined together in small military circuits. They seem to be subordinate or in some way inferior to the military circuits described elsewhere in this dissertation. For example, the Gaoyang Pass Circuit 高陽關路 dates back to at least 999, but appears to have been headed not by a military intendant, but rather a chief administrator (CB 45.955 and 962). The name first appeared in 982, when the northern area of Song-controlled Hebei, known as Guannan 關南, was changed to Gaoyang Pass (CB 23.514). The Hebei military intendant clearly had jurisdiction over Gaoyang Pass Circuit at the end of 1047 when the Beizhou mutiny began. In the fourth month of 1048, Xia Song presented a memorial asking that Hebei’s military circuit remain united in peacetime, but split into four smaller circuits, including a Gaoyang Pass Military Circuit, in times of conflict (QSW 17:347.87). As will be discussed below, Xia’s proposal was partially adopted in the fourth month of 1048 with the establishment of four permanent military circuits in Hebei, and Gaoyang Pass was one of the circuits. This demonstrates that prior to the division, Hebei was considered to be a single military circuit, with smaller circuits of lower status located within it. Gaoyang Pass Circuit covered the upper portion of Hebei West Circuit. It is unclear prior to the division of Hebei in 1048 which prefectures were part of the circuit; after division, the prefectures included Yingzhou 瀛州, Mozhou 莫州, Xiongzhou 雄州, Bazhou 霸州, Enzhou 恩州 (that is, Beizhou, which had been renamed), Jizhou 冀州, Cangzhou 滄州, Yongjingjun 永靜軍, Qianningjun 乾寧軍, Baodingjun 保定軍, and Xin’anjun 信安軍 (CB 164.3948), with the military intendant serving concurrently as the prefect of Yingzhou (SHY Zhiguan 41.90).

⁵⁹⁸ CB 161.3891.

⁵⁹⁹ CB 161.3891.

had the envoy's route adjusted.⁶⁰⁰ This was no idle threat because the mutineers attempted to break through the siege in an effort to kidnap the envoy, presumably to use as leverage.⁶⁰¹ Had they succeeded, this embarrassment for the Song could well have turned into a serious disaster for relations with the Liao. Even with the envoy safely out of the way, there remained concerns over the northern state's reaction to the Song's response to the mutiny. Emperor Renzong ordered an amnesty for the mutineers if they surrendered, but this came under attack by the censor Gao Ruone, who warned that such an action would both lead to more unrest and cause the Song's enemies to laugh. The emperor ignored Gao's protest.⁶⁰² The mutineers apparently rejected this amnesty, but it seems at least some Song officials were concerned that this act might signal military weakness on the part of the dynasty, allowing Liao to take advantage of the situation.⁶⁰³

Following the capture of Wang Ze, the Song carried out a couple of measures which affected the political geography of Hebei. First, Renzong demoted Beizhou from a *jiedu* to *junshi* prefecture and renamed it Enzhou 恩州. The edict which ordered the demotion and renaming is the only one extant for the mutinies in this study, and is therefore worth examining in its entirety:

Ganling is a former kingdom and a vital defensive point in the territory of Ji.⁶⁰⁴ Once [the Eastern Han?] established a high post, and this separated [the region] into its own domain

⁶⁰⁰ CB 161.3891.

⁶⁰¹ CB 162.3903-04.

⁶⁰² CB 161.3892-93.

⁶⁰³ The mutineers may have been wary of an amnesty due to an event which might have occurred before it was sent. After learning of the mutiny, an official serving under Jia Changchao named Ma Sui 馬遂 (d. 1047?) volunteered to meet with Wang Ze to negotiate a surrender. When it became clear during his meeting with Wang that the mutiny leader was unwilling to submit, Ma tried to strangle him but was killed by Wang's supporters. See SS 446.13152. Unfortunately there is no information which indicates when this occurred, but given how quickly Ma volunteered, there is a good possibility it happened before the amnesty was dispatched.

⁶⁰⁴ Ganling was a commandery (*jun* 郡) established at the end of the Eastern Han (25-220). It also referred to a county which was renamed Qinghe 清河 County during the Three Kingdoms period (see Liu et al., *Chūgoku rekishi chimei daijiten*, vol. 3, *wu* 35). According to the *Yuanfeng Jiuyu zhi*, Qinghe was the seat of Beizhou during the Northern Song, and Ganling was a town (*zhen* 鎮) in Qinghe County (*Yuanfeng Jiuyu zhi* 72). Ganling was also used

(*zhijun* 支郡). As it happened, wicked, heterodox thieves arose, and they incited the clerks and soldiers to rely on each other. They treated the soldiers in charge of the storehouses leniently, and together they blocked the ramparts of the prefecture [seat]. [Only] when we had to capture and attack [the mutineers] did we begin to exterminate them. I long to see this region transformed after a long time of cultivation. People harbor loyalty and indignation and at the same time suppress savagery [in their hearts], [but] they were stirred up by the criminals, and they nearly succeeded [in establishing] vile customs. Although the origin [of the mutiny] lies in deceit, the good err on the side of mildness. [Therefore] it is appropriate to bestow an auspicious name, and additionally to demonstrate kindness and forgiveness. Beizhou will be reduced to a *junshi* prefecture with the title of Yongqing Army abolished. I will grant it the title of Enzhou. The prefecture of Enzhou in Guangnan East circuit will [now] be called Nan'enzhou. 甘陵舊國，冀土要藩，嘗建高牙，俾殊支郡。偶凶妖之竊發，扇吏卒以相依，輕弄庫兵，共嬰州壘。逮須捕擊，始伏誅夷。言念此邦，久陶至化，合懷忠憤，同弭猖狂，輒動匪人，幾成汚俗。雖本緣于詿誤，良有玷于和平。宜錫嘉名，且昭善貸。其貝州可降為軍事州，廢永清軍號，仍賜恩州為額。其廣南東路恩州以南恩州為額。⁶⁰⁵

While the chronology leaves significant gaps, the edict presents a narrative of Beizhou's fall into iniquity followed by the emperor's prescription for redemption. The origin of disaster is traced back to the late Han dynasty with the posting of a "high official" who established his own domain. This was most likely the establishment of a "King of Ganling 甘陵王" in 148 by

in the title of the lost text *A Record of Suppressing the Rebels at Ganling (Ganling zhupan lu)* by Wang Qi (SS 202.5120). The character for *ji* here is the same as Jizhou, but it probably refers more expansively to the region of Ji recorded in the *Tribute of Yu* 禹貢 (Liu et al., *Chūgoku rekishi chimei daijiten*, vol. 1, 183).

⁶⁰⁵ SHY Fangyu 5.29. I am indebted to Duan Xiaolin for her help in proofreading my translation of this edict.

Emperor Huan (r. 146-168) of the Eastern Han dynasty.⁶⁰⁶ The term translated as “domain” here is *zhijun*, which was used, interestingly enough, in both the Han and late Tang-Five Dynasties contexts. In the Han, it referred to the constituent commanderies of “marquisates” or “kingdoms” (*hou* 侯 or *guo* 國, respectively). For the Tang and Five Dynasties, it was the area where a military governor had effectively seized power—the term was probably intended to harken back to the Han.⁶⁰⁷

This usurpation of authority allowed heterodox followers to infiltrate the clerks and the garrison, both of whom worked jointly to take control of the prefectural seat. Here the edict is clearly referring to Wang Ze, a member of the garrison, and his clerk supporters Zhang Luan and Bu Ji.⁶⁰⁸ The rot had set in enough to require a violent suppression, but the emperor hoped to see rejuvenation, noting the “righteous indignation” of Beizhou’s inhabitants. Sparing the remaining civilians (an unknown number of whom died in the siege and final melee to capture the seat) was one step in favor of mercy. To underline this mercy, Renzong ordered the prefecture renamed Enzhou—*en* 恩 meaning “grace” or “mercy.” The meaning must have been intentional because the renaming of Beizhou to Enzhou was inconvenient, as there already was an Enzhou in Guangnan East circuit. This meant in fact that *two* prefectures were renamed as a consequence, with the southern Enzhou renamed Nan’enzhou (“South Enzhou”).

⁶⁰⁶ *Hou Hanshu* 7.293. Emperor Huan enfeoffed the King of Anping 安平王 Liu De’s 劉得 son, the Marquis of Jing 經侯 Liu Li 劉理, as King of Ganling. The kingdom was abolished in 206 (*Hou Hanshu* 9.384). Renzong is exaggerating the idea that such a figure as the king of Ganling could pose a threat to centralized control. While kings during the early Han dynasty did present a challenge, their power was severely curtailed during the second century BC (see Loewe, “The Former Han,” 139-144 for examples of how emperors succeeded in curtailing the authority of the kings).

⁶⁰⁷ Luo ed., *Hanyu dacidian*, vol. 2, 2731.

⁶⁰⁸ CB 161.3890.

At the same time, Jizhou, the prefecture due north of Beizhou, was promoted to the *jiedu* rank.⁶⁰⁹ What implications did the demotion of Beizhou and promotion of Jizhou have? As noted above, Yu Wei writes that a prefecture's rank in the *jiedu* system determined the size and experience of the prefectural government's staff and the amount of certain types of funds, including lands owned by the office.⁶¹⁰ While reducing the size of Beizhou's staff seems counterintuitive, the demotion also reduced available funds for mutineers. Also, this was balanced by the promotion of Jizhou. Shifting resources to a nearby, presumably more reliable prefecture would decrease the amount of wealth available to would-be mutineers in Beizhou while giving its neighbor more funding and staff to put down any future outbreak of violence. Jizhou may also have been chosen since it bordered both Beizhou and Shenzhou 深州, another prefecture where an abortive mutiny took place during Wang Ze's mutiny.⁶¹¹

Finally, Hebei was divided into four military circuits rather than one.⁶¹² As seen previously from Winston Lo's work, dividing circuits was intended to improve surveillance functions, and it would make sense to try strengthening oversight after a mutiny had broken out.⁶¹³ Enzhou and Jizhou both became part of the Gaoyang Pass Circuit 高陽關路.⁶¹⁴ The prefect of Yingzhou was put in charge of the circuit.⁶¹⁵ This may have been because Gaoyang

⁶⁰⁹ SHY Fangyu 5.2.

⁶¹⁰ Yu, "Songdai de jiedu, fangyu, tuanlian, cishizhou," 67-68.

⁶¹¹ CB 162.3906. For the location of these prefectures, see Tan, *Zhongguo lidai ditu ji*, vol. 6, 16-17. It is unclear whether this revolt was part of a broader plot or an opportunistic soldier capitalizing on the chaos.

⁶¹² CB 164.3947-48.

⁶¹³ Lo, "Circuits and Circuit Intendants," 58-59.

⁶¹⁴ CB 164.3948.

⁶¹⁵ CB 164.3947. For the location of Yingzhou in relation to Jizhou and Enzhou, see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 16-17. Yingzhou is labeled as Hejianfu 河間府 because it was promoted to a metropolitan prefecture in 1108 (SS 86.2123).

Pass was located in Yingzhou.⁶¹⁶ Since Wang Xin was based in Gaoyang Pass when he went to Beizhou, it likely made sense to put the prefect overseeing the pass in charge of the circuit.⁶¹⁷

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the physical and human geographies of different regions influenced the Song state's response to mutinies. When soldiers rebelled in a given location, the government had to act according to preexisting conditions for that area. The state was in fact one contributor to those conditions. The Song shifted human and material resources to fit its needs in these different places as it tried to address the broader concerns of maintaining the empire as a whole. This could result in drastically different situations, as seen with the heavy militarization of the northern border with Liao compared to the sparsely garrisoned southern frontier. Given the concerns with Liao, the uneven distribution of soldiers made sense, at least in normal circumstances. When confronted with a crisis like a mutiny, the Song state tried to rely on the existing institutions it established in the affected region, but frequently had to rely on additional measures to resolve the threat.

Despite the wide-ranging differences between the locations where mutinies broke out, the Song was able to adapt its responses with surprising success. In the suppression itself, we of course witness the use of force, but the Song had to deal with the ways in which geography affected the distribution of forces. While Hebei's large number of combat troops were sufficient against Wang Ze, the other regions covered in this study needed outside support because they did not normally have so many soldiers. When facing the challenges of geography, Song officials and officers were able to overcome them, if not turn them to their advantage.

⁶¹⁶ *Yuanfeng Jiuyu zhi* 66-67. Gaoyang Pass was listed here as located in Hejian County 河間縣, which was also the seat of Yingzhou.

⁶¹⁷ CB 161.3891.

Suppression was just one aspect of the Song's response to mutinies, as the government also tried to prevent future uprisings. In addition to military force, the Song relied on the manipulation of its territorial administration. The frequency with which the Song altered prefectures and circuits in the aftermath of mutinies (or rebellions) is noteworthy. While the various ranks of prefectures and types of circuits make understanding the Song's spatial organization a daunting task, it provided the state with useful tools to respond flexibly to the conditions of different regions. By dividing circuits and promoting and demoting prefectures, the Song could adjust the political geography of a region to improve supervision and shift resources. Brute force was still the primary means to end unrest, but the changes to territorial administration helped ensure such unbridled violence was not needed again.

Chapter 4

Suppression and the Aftermath

This chapter examines three issues, one concerning the nature of the suppression effort, and the other two on the aftermath of the mutiny. First, when sizing up the Song and the mutineers, it is clear that there was an asymmetry of power between the two sides; the Song government vastly outnumbered the mutineers in terms of people and wealth. In addition to demonstrating the degree of asymmetry, I focus on the ways in which the mutineers tried to counter the lopsided power relationship and the efforts of the Song's supporters to undermine the mutineers' efforts. Second, I investigate the use of rewards and punishments dealt out by the state at the end of the mutiny. Of course, mutineers were generally punished and loyal officials and soldiers were generally rewarded, but how they were punished or rewarded was intended to send a message to others. Furthermore, there were some officials who committed great deeds and grave mistakes, and the court needed to sort out how to treat those cases since they could shape the behavior of other officials in the future. Finally, the Song sought to restore order to the region, but to do so required both an attempt to mollify the population and an effort to monitor society and root out anyone who could cause a relapse of unrest.

Asymmetry of Power and its Consequences

It is clear that the Song dynasty had far more resources than the mutineers who confronted it. The disparity between the two sides shaped their approaches to one another. Possessing a large military and bringing in significant tax revenues, the Song state sought to bring those strengths to bear on the mutineers who controlled a much smaller territory, sometimes confined to a single prefectural seat. Since direct clashes with Song troops were unlikely to end well for the mutineers, the leaders tried to bolster their position by increasing

their numbers, securing material resources, and challenging the legitimacy of the Song by granting themselves titles and taking the steps necessary to establish themselves as an alternative state. The difference in the strengths of the two sides also affected their relationship with society. The Song could act with less support or acquiescence from the local population, while mutineers needed to interact with the population, whether bringing them in as supporters or extracting supplies from them.

To illustrate the disparity in the strength between the two sides, it is useful to compare the two sides' manpower. The Song army grew over the course of the tenth and eleventh centuries. The Song had 358,000 imperial army soldiers by the end of Taizong's reign in 997, 432,000 by the end of Zhenzong's reign in 1022, and 826,000 during the Qingli period (1041-1048).⁶¹⁸ The number of soldiers involved in mutiny suppression campaigns is known only for the Wang Jun and Wang Ze mutinies. In 1000, Zhenzong dispatched 8,000 cavalry to Sichuan against Wang Jun, and in 1048 Renzong rewarded 8,400 soldiers and officers after the conclusion of the Wang Ze mutiny in Hebei.⁶¹⁹ The number of troops sent to Sichuan should be seen as a lower limit, however, since Shuzhou's prefect Yang Huaizhong called on soldiers already in the region to assist, and some commoners also formed units for self-defense.⁶²⁰ Li Shiheng, prefect of Jianzhou, also sought recruits, gathering over a thousand men to bolster the defense of Jianmen Pass.⁶²¹ There were also people tasked with supporting the army, such as the prefectural armies which by the eleventh century had mostly transformed into labor battalions; their duties could

⁶¹⁸ SS 187.4576.

⁶¹⁹ SHY Bing 10.10 for Wang Jun, and CB 162.3907 for Wang Ze. The latter figure is described as encompassing officers and soldiers ranging from inspectors-in-chief to regular soldiers (都虞侯至士卒).

⁶²⁰ They are treated as siding with the Song, and Yang supposedly chose more than seventy leaders for them, but they might have been more interested in defending their communities from threats than attacking the mutineers. The commoners called themselves "The Masses of the Pure Altars 清壇眾," which suggests some kind of religious underpinning to the organizations (see CB 46.989).

⁶²¹ CB 46.988.

include transporting supplies in times of conflict.⁶²² There are no figures explicitly given for such support. However, it allegedly took 20,000 workers to build a large observation post during the siege of Beizhou.⁶²³ It is unclear who these individuals were. Prefectural army soldiers were likely involved, but the number could also include conscripted local commoners.

For other mutinies, the number of pro-government forces is less clear. There are no numbers given for the number of troops involved with suppressing the mutinies in Jingdong and Baozhou, Hebei. During the Chen Jin mutiny in Guangnan West circuit, Zhenzong ordered troops to assemble in Guizhou from garrisons across Jinghu North and South circuits (modern Hunan and Hubei provinces).⁶²⁴ It is reasonable to think that only a portion of the soldiers from each garrison were sent, but the vast area they were drawn from hints at a sizeable government army entering Guangnan. On two occasions during that suppression campaign a Song force of about one thousand men engaged the mutineers.⁶²⁵ In addition, as with Yang Huaizhong's organizing (or commandeering) of commoner defense groups, the Yongzhou Prefect Cao Keming 曹克明 recruited 3,000 non-Han troops, and together with another 1,500 soldiers "rescued" by local non-Han leader and Tianzhou 田州 Prefect Huang Zhongying 黃眾盈 they hurried to Xiangzhou. They also killed roughly four hundred mutineers in neighboring Guizhou 貴州.⁶²⁶ In the above examples, it is clear thousands of Song soldiers were ordered to suppress

⁶²² Wang, *Songchao junzhi chutan*, 81-82.

⁶²³ This figure appears in the *Changbian* when Ming Hao reported the burning of the observation post (see CB 162.3902-03 for the incident and the number of workers).

⁶²⁴ CB 66.1472.

⁶²⁵ The Guangnan Fiscal Intendant Shu Ben reported the first incident in which a Song force tried to defend Liucheng county; given that two of the commanders died in the battle and another fled for his life, the troops were probably scattered, killed, or captured by the mutineers (CB 66.1476). In the second incident, Shu ordered the eunuch Yu Derun to lead a thousand soldiers to pursue and attack Chen Jin's supporters (CB 66.1485).

⁶²⁶ SS 272.9317. Cao Keming was not related to Cao Liyong, the leader of the Song suppression campaign. Huang Zhongying was already prefect of Tianzhou in 1006, the year before Chen Jin's mutiny (SHY Zhiguan 47.4). Tianzhou was a "haltered-and-bridled" prefecture within Yongzhou, which means Huang was an indigenous leader who was cooperating with the Song government (see SS 90.2240-41 for the status of Tianzhou). Huang also held the title of *Liangjiang fangeshi* 兩江防遏使 ("the defender of the Two Rivers") when ordered by Cao to attack other

the mutinies. Occasionally they were assisted by commoners or indigenous people, as seen in Sichuan and Guangnan, respectively. While the number of soldiers might not be overwhelmingly large compared to the mutineers, as we shall see shortly, the Song could send additional troops drawn from the hundreds of thousands stationed in the capital and across the empire.

When the numbers of mutineers, as well as any commoners who supported them, are presented, they are clearly smaller than the government troops arrayed against them. In two cases, we have estimates of the total involved. The Baozhou mutiny ended with over two thousand soldiers surrendering to the Song and another 429 executed, giving a total of a little under 2,500.⁶²⁷ This is close to the number Cai Xiang gave, when he told Renzong it was better to kill 3,000 soldiers at Baozhou now than to forgive them and face many more rebellious soldiers later.⁶²⁸ It is unclear if any commoners joined the mutineers, but there was no mention of non-military individuals. In addition, the allegedly reluctant leader of the mutiny Wei Gui was saved from a death sentence in part because he tried to limit violence against civilians during the siege, indicating that there was a divide between commoners and soldiers in Baozhou.⁶²⁹ During the Chen Jin mutiny, a group of about three thousand fled from Yizhou, but this includes family members of the soldiers who may or may not have joined them in combat.⁶³⁰ According to Cai

non-Han groups prior to the Chen Jin mutiny (SS 272.9317). The term Liangjiang here refers to two regions, the “Right River 右河” and “Left River 左河,” in Yongzhou (see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 34-35).

⁶²⁷ CB 151.3688. The case of Baozhou demonstrates that one cannot use a prefecture’s garrison size on paper as an estimate of the number of mutineers. In theory, Baozhou had 10,300 soldiers based on the number of imperial and prefectural army commanderies stationed there (SS 187 and 189 for the imperial and prefectural commanderies, respectively), far more than the actual number of soldiers who surrendered or were executed.

⁶²⁸ CB 151.3684-85.

⁶²⁹ CB 152.3699-700.

⁶³⁰ SHY Bing 10.13. When abandoning Yizhou, Chen and his supporters drowned around five hundred elderly and young family members. Shu Ben reported the number of soldiers and the killing of dependents to the court (see CB 66.1484). The reason for the deaths of those family members was probably out of concern that they would slow the mutineers down and if captured could be used as leverage by the Song to try to get some of the soldiers to surrender. Presumably other adult members of the soldiers’ families did accompany the mutineers.

Xiang, Wang Lun's initial mutineers dwindled to a few dozen, but Ouyang Xiu reported that their numbers grew to a few hundred in Huainan.⁶³¹

The other mutinies only give a vague impression of the number of supporters. Wang Jun must have had a sizeable force since he was able to capture Chengdu, holding it for nine months and holding nearby Hanzhou for about a month.⁶³² There were two Shenwei Army commanderies in Chengdu, providing a maximum of 1,000 imperial army soldiers. Given that Zhao Yanshun, who killed Fu Zhaoshou and thus began the mutiny, was a soldier in the Shenwei Army, and that Wang Jun led one of the commanderies, it is likely many, if not all, sided with him to capture the city.⁶³³ Furthermore, the account in the *Changbian* holds that the mutineers impressed “those who were young and strong among the commoners and Buddhist and Daoist clergy.”⁶³⁴ Regardless of whether or not these civilians joined Wang Jun willingly, this would add to the total number of anti-Song forces in western Sichuan. There are other indications of the strength of Wang's forces. While Wang was advancing on Jianmen after Hanzhou's capture, he had enough supporters left in Chengdu to repel an attack led by Yang Huaizhong.⁶³⁵ In one battle during the third month, government troops killed over one thousand mutineers, suggesting a sizeable military force under Wang Jun.⁶³⁶ In the final pitched battle at Chengdu, with Song troops storming the city through two tunnels dug under the walls, more than three thousand of

⁶³¹ Cai stated “those mutineers who killed the *zhongzuo* 忠佐 [Zhu Jin] number more than forty” (QSW 46:1002.364). Ouyang claimed there were “two to three hundred men” following Wang Lun when the mutineers arrived in Gaoyoujun (QSW 32:679.108).

⁶³² Wang's mutiny began on the first day of 1000, and he fled Chengdu for Fushunjian in the thirtieth day of the ninth month (according to the SHY Bing 10.11) or start of the tenth month (CB 47.1027). Wang captured Hanzhou on the third day of the first month of 1000 (CB 46.984), and Song forces under Zhang Sijun recovered the prefectural seat on the twelfth day of the second month (CB 46.992).

⁶³³ CB 45.980.

⁶³⁴ CB 46.994.

⁶³⁵ SHY Bing 10.11.

⁶³⁶ SHY Bing 10.11.

Wang's followers perished.⁶³⁷ Perhaps the supporters of Wang Jun outnumbered the eight thousand dispatched by Zhenzong, but they also had to contend with the resistance of incumbent officials like Yang Huaizhong and Li Shiheng, who had soldiers and commoners who sided with them. Also, the commoners who joined Wang were of course not professional soldiers, meaning even if Wang's forces outnumbered the Song's, most were weaker on the battlefield.

We know even less about the total number of soldiers who sided with Wang Ze in Beizhou, Hebei in 1047. There appears to have been a battle between Wang's followers and soldiers who opposed the mutiny, and some of the latter fled the city and regrouped with the Hebei Judicial Intendant Tian Jing.⁶³⁸ In anticipation of a siege, Wang impressed the entire male population of Beizhou from twelve to seventy *sui*, having them swear oaths.⁶³⁹ This no doubt increased the number of fighters significantly, but it is unclear by how much. In terms of actual numbers, the Song army captured a few hundred mutineers who allegedly were trying to kidnap the Liao's New Year greetings envoy, and six hundred soldiers and commoners from Beizhou surrendered to the Song.⁶⁴⁰ Despite the loss of several hundred people, Wang Ze's forces continued to hold Beizhou until the government completed a tunnel into the city. Having the entire adult male population of a city, Wang's forces may have rivalled or even surpassed those of the Song besiegers, but chances are that age, lack of military ability, and perhaps morale made most imperfect substitutes for combat soldiers.

There was also a sharp disparity in wealth between the state and the mutineers. The Song government drew on taxes collected across the empire for its budget and the imperial treasury.

⁶³⁷ CB 47.1025.

⁶³⁸ According to Tian's record of conduct, he accepted over one hundred soldiers and recruited several hundred "dare to die soldiers 死士" who defended the "South Pass" (QSW 68:1479.169).

⁶³⁹ CB 161.3890.

⁶⁴⁰ SS 292.9771 and CB 161.3891.

Exact tax rates are uncertain, but scholars agree that the Song accumulated a higher percentage of the total wealth of the country than any other dynasty.⁶⁴¹ The state used this wealth in the course of suppressing mutinies. The Wang Ze mutiny provides the clearest information about the ways in which the Song state distributed money. Renzong ordered “special funds” sent to troops besieging Beizhou on two occasions, in the twelfth month of 1047 and first month of 1048.⁶⁴² Soldiers received rewards for killing mutineers, as seen in the emperor’s call to punish anyone who committed massacres, presumably under the pretext that they were “rebels,” so they could receive compensation.⁶⁴³ Following an unsuccessful attempt by some of Beizhou’s inhabitants to bring Song soldiers over the walls, the emperor ordered that those inhabitants and the generals on site receive a total of two thousand strings of cash.⁶⁴⁴ At the conclusion of the mutiny, the court paid money as part of the rewards given to soldiers.⁶⁴⁵ Beyond these expenses, the Song must have spent additional resources transporting grain and equipment to Beizhou, but information on logistics is not extant.⁶⁴⁶

The court sometimes expected local governments to contribute as well. Out of a concern about disease in Guangnan, Zhenzong ordered prefectural governments there to build shelters for

⁶⁴¹ Peter Golas discusses estimates of the Song government’s revenue as a percent of the total economy. He fixes a percentage of 24% for the 1070s, admittedly a high point in the Song state’s pursuit of revenue, but other estimates also indicate that the Song government acquired a higher proportion of the empire’s total wealth (though quite a bit less than the percentage Golas gives) than the Ming, the Qing, and early modern European states (Golas, “The Sung Economy: How Big?,” 90-94).

⁶⁴² CB 161.3893 and 162.3903.

⁶⁴³ CB 161.3892.

⁶⁴⁴ CB 161.3891. The event meriting the reward is not detailed here, but it is likely the attempt to retake the city spelled out in the explanation for the appointment of Wen Yanbo as pacification commissioner in the first month of 1048. Four Beizhou inhabitants named Wang Wenqing, Guo Bin, Zhao Zongben, and Wang Shun signaled to the Song commanders that they would drop ropes over the side of the wall at night. This did occur, and some soldiers made it up the wall but were ultimately repelled, with the four civilians escaping with the retreating government troops (CB 162.3903).

⁶⁴⁵ CB 162.3907.

⁶⁴⁶ We know it was an issue the Song wanted handled, since Zheng Xiang was appointed fiscal intendant in order to supply the army surrounding Beizhou (CB 162.3902).

Cao Liyong and other officials fighting Chen Jin in the late summer of 1007.⁶⁴⁷ There was no explanation of how they should pay for it, so it is likely the prefects had to come up with the funds themselves. The emperor also told Zhou Wenzhi to prepare Guangzhou's defenses, but makes no mention of how to pay for it.⁶⁴⁸ The local government again was probably expected to pay for it, or otherwise use the power of the state to compel people to help. A case of the latter is Zhou's commandeering of fishing boats to blockade the West River at Duanzhou.⁶⁴⁹

The mutineers, by contrast, had comparably little wealth at hand. Their initial resources likely came from government storehouses when they seized a prefectural seat. This is clear with the capture of Beizhou, when supporters of Wang Ze demanded that Dong Yuanheng 董元亨 (d. 1047) hand over the keys to the storehouses.⁶⁵⁰ When capturing additional prefectures or county seats, the mutineers probably plundered storehouses there, too. This no doubt motivated Li Shiheng's decision to burn Jianzhou's fodder and grain when he evacuated to defend Jianmen Pass.⁶⁵¹ Even if they were unable to take control of a prefectural seat, mutineers could threaten local officials and residents to meet their demands, including food and other resources. Wang Lun's forces were never strong enough to seize a city or town, but they were able to get local officials to hand over supplies or at the very least to avoid confronting the mutineers. For example, Cai Xiang complained:

Gaoyoujun's [prefect] Chao Zhongyue humbled himself and went out to meet [the rebels], [the magistrate of Tianchang County 天長縣, Yangzhou] Shao Xian welcomed the rebels, and both got together and drank. Yancheng County's [in Chuzhou 楚州]

⁶⁴⁷ CB 66.1479.

⁶⁴⁸ CB 66.1473.

⁶⁴⁹ CB 66.1485.

⁶⁵⁰ CB 161.3890-91. See also Dong's biography (SS 446.13153).

⁶⁵¹ SS 299.9936.

magistrate and others avoided the mutineers and did not go out. The Yangzhou Temporary [Director-in-Chief] Wang Yi (978-1050) went out to Guangshan and waited until it was convenient to return; he knew of the rebels and did not help. 高郵軍晁仲約屈身迎候，邵先迎賊，彼此聚飲。鹽城知縣等避賊不出。揚州駐泊王乞出光山等便回，知賊不救。⁶⁵²

Although Wang and his supporters were not able to gain enough traction from the resources they received to develop into a more serious threat, the actions of local officials helped to sustain the mutineers and prolong the pursuit across Huainan.

Finally, the Song enjoyed a greater sense of legitimacy than any group of mutineers. By the time Wang Jun's mutiny had begun, the Song dynasty had survived for forty years and was on its third emperor. It had also succeeded in conquering most of the Tang dynasty's territory, overseeing it with a large administration and military. Wang's mutiny in Sichuan illustrated that the Song's rule was not absolute and that resentment towards the dynasty in the region could still threaten its control there, but there was no existential threat to the Song itself. The Song was assumed to hold the Mandate of Heaven until proven otherwise, while the mutineers would be considered illegitimate until they won recognition from the Song or overthrew the dynasty.

While unable to overwhelm the Song due to its greater wealth and manpower, the mutineers did take steps to call the Song's legitimacy into question. The key approach was to present an alternative leadership to the Song court. The most detailed description of such an

⁶⁵² QSW 46:1002.366. Guangshan 光山 probably refers to Guangshan County in Guangzhou 光州, a prefecture in the far western part of Huainan West Circuit (see Tan, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji*, vol. 6, 22-23). In Cai's memorial, Wang's name is given as Wang Qi 王乞, but according to the record of his demotion in the *Song huiyao*, his name is Wang Yi (SHY Zhiguan 64.43); this is further corroborated in Wang's record of conduct (QSW 80:1748.157). The offices of Shao Xian and Wang Yi are also given in SHY Zhiguan 64.43.

attempt comes from the Beizhou, Hebei mutiny, shortly after Wang Ze took control of the city at the end of 11/1047:

[Wang] Ze falsely assumed the title King of Dongping Commandery. He made Zhang Luan grand councilor and Bu Ji commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs, and established a state called Anyang. A placard affixed over his residence's door called it the Central Capital, and he established titles for all the rooms, stables, and storehouses of his home. The reign era was changed to Desheng (Attaining Sagacity), taking the twelfth month [of the Song calendar] to be the first month [of Anyang's calendar]. The commoners ranging in age from twelve to seventy all had their faces tattooed declaring: "The Righteous Army will destroy the Zhaos and attain victory." For flags and commands, he led using "the Buddha" as his title. On the walls [of Beizhou], every tower was made a "prefecture," with a title written for each prefecture. He assigned his followers as "prefects," and on every side [of the wall] there was one area commander-in-chief. 則僭號東平郡王，以張巒為宰相，卜吉為樞密使，建國曰安陽，榜所居門曰中京，居室廡庫皆立名號，改元曰得聖，以十二月為正月。百姓年十二以上，七十以下，皆涅其面曰“義軍破趙得勝。”旗幟號令，率以佛為稱。城以一樓為一州，書州名，補其徒為知州，每面置一總管。⁶⁵³

Through these actions, Wang Ze attempted to declare his movement as a legitimate government and to call for the end of the Song. He assumed a title on his own. Similar titles were used by other figures, such as the King of Western Peace 西平王 used by the Tangut leader Li Jiqian. From the *Changbian*, we can trace how the Song changed its view of the title depending on who

⁶⁵³ CB 161.3890.

granted it. In 1000, Li was recorded as having “called himself 自稱” King of Western Peace.⁶⁵⁴

This was the prerogative of the Song alone, however, as Grand Councilor Lü Mengzheng 呂蒙正 reported that Liao “falsely enfeoffed 偽封” the Tangut ruler with the same title three years later in 1003.⁶⁵⁵ Three years later, the Song made peace with Li, and it was recorded that “[Emperor Zhenzong] enfeoffed the king of the state of Xia, Li Jiqian, as the King of Western Peace.”⁶⁵⁶ While in reality confirming a title Li had already granted himself, the Song’s perspective was that it had conferred and thus legitimized his title. From this, it is clear that the title was only seen as legitimate to the Song when granted by the Song. No individual could give himself the title, nor could any other ruler bestow it. Although their circumstances differed significantly, both Li Jiqian and Wang Ze flouted Song authority by giving themselves high titles; Li was able to force the Song to accept his title as a ruler of a kingdom (though the dynasty still portrayed itself as granting it), but Wang ultimately was unable to make a similar case.

While barricaded within a single city, Wang went about taking the steps to establish his own government. He made the two clerks who had supported him high ranking officials bearing the same titles of officials in the highest levels of the Song government. Wang declared his own state and even established a capital and prefectures all within the confines of Beizhou.⁶⁵⁷ The symbolic, almost comical, gesture of turning towers into prefectures did serve a practical purpose, however, since it doubled as a means to organize the city’s defense. Further organization of the population occurred, too. Because people were fleeing over the walls, Wang grouped five families together in units that would be collectively executed if one of their number

⁶⁵⁴ CB 46.1002.

⁶⁵⁵ CB 54.1181.

⁶⁵⁶ SS 7.131 and CB 64.1428. Granting the title of King of Western Peace was one of five concessions offered by the Song in a draft agreement proposed in 1005 (CB 60.1346-47).

⁶⁵⁷ CB 161.3890 and SS 292.9770-71.

escaped.⁶⁵⁸ As noted earlier, Ouyang Xiu recommended similar mutual responsibility groups when offering policies in response to the Shandong mutiny of Wang Lun.⁶⁵⁹ Herbert Franke finds that Chinese imperial governments like the Song employed such military preparations as the mass mobilization of a town's population, their organization into mutual responsibility units, and establishing a system for manning the walls.⁶⁶⁰ It is reasonable to expect that the mutineers used such methods themselves when holed up in a town or city, as is borne out from the example of Beizhou.

Wang Ze took additional symbolic steps to challenge the Song. He changed the reign era name and calendar, thus rejecting the calendar set by the Song.⁶⁶¹ Another way he strove to demonstrate his superiority to the Song ruler was by proclaiming himself to be the Buddha, using that title when leading.⁶⁶² His decision to declare himself to be the Buddha offered an alternative form of legitimacy to the Confucian Mandate of Heaven, although he challenged the Song on those grounds, too, as seen in the calendar changes.

Wang Ze also tried to galvanize support among the local population in Beizhou. After recruiting or forcing youths and adults to serve in the city's defense, Wang tattooed their faces with a slogan denouncing the Song. This was probably intended to boost morale and unite the residents in a cause against the reigning dynasty. Furthermore, by claiming to be the Buddha, Wang tapped into local religious beliefs, as there was a sect in Hebei which believed that Maitreya would come soon. Wang Ze and his chief supporters, Zhang Luan and Bu Ji, conspired

⁶⁵⁸ CB 161.3890 and SS 292.9771.

⁶⁵⁹ QSW 32:683.166.

⁶⁶⁰ Franke, "Siege and Defense of Towns," 155-56 (for impressing a town's inhabitants), 158 (on mutual responsibility units), and 173-75 (for measures taken to defend city walls).

⁶⁶¹ CB 161.3890.

⁶⁶² CB 161.3890.

to rebel, and they or their adherents traveled to nearby prefectures, with an implication that they were looking to spread their beliefs to other garrisons.⁶⁶³

Wang Jun had taken similar steps after capturing Chengdu. He declared a new state, the Great Shu 大蜀, and changed the reign era title to Huashun 化順 (Changing Obedience), a title with obvious implications for the Song's legitimacy.⁶⁶⁴ He named Zhang Kai 張鋹, a low-ranking military officer, as his grand councilor, appointed Lu Mahu 魯麻胡 to be pacification patrolling inspector 招安巡檢, and posted Miao Jin 苗進 to Hanzhou as prefect.⁶⁶⁵ In addition, many people in Chengdu were killed by Lei Youzhong and Qin Han for having allegedly served as officials in the fledgling State Finance Commission 三司.⁶⁶⁶ Similar to Wang Ze's flags emblazoned with the title "Buddha," Wang Jun possessed ritual items 法物, presumably to enhance the legitimacy of his rule in western Sichuan.⁶⁶⁷ Among such items were a golden spear and a yellow umbrella.⁶⁶⁸ Wang's mutiny also had a religious element, as his grand councilor Zhang Kai was alleged to "crudely practice yinyang 粗習陰陽," presumably to persuade people into supporting the mutineers.⁶⁶⁹

Also like Wang Ze's recruitment of the general male population of Beizhou, Wang Jun carried out a similar policy following the attempt to crush the Song's forces by luring them into Chengdu. Taking advantage of the chaos that ensued as the remaining Song soldiers fled the city,

⁶⁶³ CB 161.3890. The communal act of tattooing faces which declared an intention to overthrow the Song has similarities with the blood covenants of the Spring and Autumn period, where participants smeared or drank the blood of a sacrificial victim to consecrate a decision or alliance. On blood covenants, see Lewis, *Sanctioned Violence in Early China*, 43-50.

⁶⁶⁴ CB 46.983.

⁶⁶⁵ See CB 46.983 for the appointment of Zhang Kai, CB 46.989-90 for the description of Lu Mahu as a "false patrolling inspector," and CB 46.992 for the death of Miao Jin in his capacity as prefect 刺史 of Hanzhou.

⁶⁶⁶ CB 47.1026 and SS 278.9460.

⁶⁶⁷ CB 47.1027. When Wang's mutiny was defeated, the Song army was said to have seized these "ritual items."

⁶⁶⁸ SS 278.9463.

⁶⁶⁹ SS 278.9461.

many other people also escaped to the surrounding villages. The mutineers had cavalry pursue and kill them, while also dismembering the family members of those who left Chengdu in order to intimidate the remaining population. It was at this point that Wang impressed the inhabitants of the city by tattooing their hands and faces, shaving their heads, giving them uniforms, and ordering them to defend the walls, alternating with the soldiers.⁶⁷⁰ Looking at the cases of Wang Ze and Wang Jun's mutinies, it is clear that they were taking steps to replicate the political structure of the Song, and they used symbols to legitimize their rule.

The remaining mutinies are scarcer in details on the government structure—if any—and symbolic measures. Ouyang Xiu claimed that Wang Lun wore yellow robes, which were meant for the emperor alone, although this may have been a colorful way to say that Wang still harbored intentions to challenge the Song's rule.⁶⁷¹ More interesting were the tattoos mentioned in a few memorials. Apparently the core group of Wang Lun's supporters, those several dozen soldiers who had followed him from Yizhou, tattooed their faces with the sentence: "Heaven sends down a sagacious and victorious commander."⁶⁷² This commander presumably referred to their leader who was expected to punish the Song on Heaven's behalf. In proposals, Ouyang and Cai Xiang treated these tattooed men as distinct from the bandits and commoners who joined them in Huainan, implying that while others could be pardoned or rewarded for surrendering to the Song, those who had facial tattoos should receive no such mercy.⁶⁷³ There are two likely reasons this distinction was made. First, they were Song soldiers who followed Wang Lun after he had killed the patrolling inspector Zhu Jin. Their persistence in following him into another

⁶⁷⁰ CB 46.994. This event is also described by Elad Alyagon (Alyagon, "Inked," 220).

⁶⁷¹ QSW 32:679.108.

⁶⁷² QSW 32:679.108.

⁶⁷³ QSW 32:679.108 and QSW 46:1002.364-65. In the second memorial, Cai advises, "If those people who were compelled to rob by those who tattooed their faces turn themselves in, they will avoid punishment 若被驅掠刺面之人，但能首身者免罪。"

circuit and their willingness to tattoo their faces with a slogan praising Wang suggested that they were quite loyal to him, and they had deserted the Song as a consequence.

Second, the tattoos implied rather serious support for Wang. For much of China's history, including the Song, tattoos were used to mark criminals, giving the practice a rather unsavory connotation.⁶⁷⁴ Song soldiers were tattooed when they joined, following practices begun in the Five Dynasties, primarily to prevent the men from deserting and disappearing into society. However, in some cases, according to Carrie Reed, soldiers might voluntarily tattoo themselves with oaths to boost morale. The famous Southern Song general Yue Fei 岳飛 (1103-1041) had the words “repay the country with the utmost loyalty 盡忠報國” tattooed on his back, which served as an indication of his unwavering support of the dynasty.⁶⁷⁵ Still, as Elad Alyagon points out, military tattoos helped to push soldiers into a lower social status because the practice helped to blur the line between soldier and criminal.⁶⁷⁶ The soldiers' decision to tattoo their faces with a seditious line would make it impossible to hide from Song authorities, and since they did this willingly in support of Wang, officials like Ouyang Xiu and Cai Xiang believed that they were beyond redemption. Alyagon also points out that the mutineers not only tattooed themselves, but they and other rebellious forces could follow the Song's lead and tattoo other people as they were drawn into their army. He mentions the examples of Wang Jun and Wang Ze both tattooing the residents of their respective cities as noted above.⁶⁷⁷ However, the inhabitants of Chengdu and Beizhou probably had little say in whether they wanted the facial tattoos, and so their tattoos

⁶⁷⁴ Reed, “Tattoo in Early China,” 364-66.

⁶⁷⁵ Reed, “Tattoo in Early China,” 368-70. For the case of Yue Fei, see also SS 365.11393.

⁶⁷⁶ Alyagon, “Inked,” 44-60 for his discussion of the origins of military tattoos and the use of them to control the military in the Song. Also of interest is Alyagon's dissertation chapter on loyalist tattoos, which includes an analysis of tattoos used by mutineers and other rebellious groups (Alyagon, “Inked,” 200-42, and especially 219-21 for mutineer and rebel tattoos in the Northern Song).

⁶⁷⁷ Alyagon, “Inked,” 219-21.

were likely not regarded as indicating the seditious character of the tattooed individual in the eyes of the Song state, unlike those Wang Lun's followers sported.

The Chen Jin and Baozhou mutinies offer little in the way of evidence regarding any state-building or attempts at legitimation. Lu Chengjun was made a commander of Chen's forces, but beyond that there is little information on their organization.⁶⁷⁸ Zhang Xu's *Songshi* biography claims that Chen "usurped the title of the King of Southern Peace 僭號南平王."⁶⁷⁹ The Baozhou mutineers, or at least their leader Wei Gui, on the other hand, did not intend to rebel against the Song and were more willing to consider surrender.⁶⁸⁰ Accordingly, there is no mention of Wei or other soldiers adopting titles or taking other steps to challenge the dynasty's authority.

While it could rely primarily on brute force and the promise of rewards to put an end to the mutiny, the Song state also tried to deny any credibility to the mutineers' claims to legitimacy. In the immediate context of the suppression campaign, this could involve capturing any regalia related to the nascent state the leaders of a mutiny were trying to create, as well as rooting out sympathizers. When Song forces led by Yang Huaizhong attacked Wang Jun and his supporters in a final battle at Fushunjian, they seized flags and ritual implements of Wang's Great Shu.⁶⁸¹ Capturing these symbols of the rival state, and presumably presenting them to the court or destroying them, would deprive any aspiring rebels of a physical manifestation connecting themselves to the uprisings which repeatedly flared up in Sichuan.⁶⁸²

⁶⁷⁸ SHY Bing 10.12.

⁶⁷⁹ SS 308.10150.

⁶⁸⁰ CB 152.3700.

⁶⁸¹ CB 47.1027. As noted above, they also seized a yellow umbrella and a golden spear from Wang Jun in an earlier altercation (CB 47.1014).

⁶⁸² Other cultures shared similar concerns over the threat of physical symbols of a failed movement. When the firebrand religious leader Girolamo Savonarola (1452-1498) fell from power in Florence, he was executed. To ensure that no relics could be taken by supporters, his body was cremated and the ashes dumped into the Arno River. See Martines, *Fire in the City*, 206-07 for the execution and disposal of the remains.

Although it was important to prevent artifacts of one rebellion from becoming potent symbols for another one, Song officials recognized that people could still harbor support for the mutineers or anger towards the dynasty. This worry informed Fu Bi's plan to massacre pardoned soldiers from Baozhou, as he had doubts about their loyalty.⁶⁸³ After recapturing Chengdu from Wang Jun, Lei Youzhong tried to root out any rebels hiding in the city walls, and held a hasty trial to identify and execute anyone who served in Wang's government, as noted earlier.⁶⁸⁴ This hunt for supporters continued for months after the mutiny had ended in the ninth month of 1000. Ma Liang reported to the throne in the second month of 1001 that many people had fled to the wilderness out of a fear that they would be arrested, and he requested that the emperor issue a pardon to convince them to return to their homes.⁶⁸⁵ If the aftermath of earlier rebellions in Sichuan is any indication, they might have fled to avoid looting by Song government troops.⁶⁸⁶ As long as Lei continued to search for Wang's adherents, robbing, arresting, or killing commoners could be justified under the pretext that they were supporters of the mutiny. Issuing the pardon would remove such a justification, perhaps lessening the prevalence of looting and encouraging commoners to return to their homes.

There are other cases of continued clean-up campaigns in the aftermath of a mutiny. Once Chen Jin was defeated in Xiangzhou, Guangnan West, Song forces remained in the region for the remainder of 1007. Emperor Zhenzong ordered Cao Liyong to patrol the circuit to deal with any remnants. Shi Chonggui and Yu Derun were likewise told to remain in Guizhou to oversee efforts.⁶⁸⁷ By the end of 1007, Cao reported to the court that the surviving mutineers had

⁶⁸³ CB 151.3689.

⁶⁸⁴ CB 47.1026.

⁶⁸⁵ CB 48.1045.

⁶⁸⁶ After the initial conquest of Shu in 965, looting by Song soldiers sparked a massive rebellion. See Lorge, *Reunification of China*, 146-48 for an overview. For one example of looting in Chengdu, see CB 6.148, where soldiers robbed merchants in the market.

⁶⁸⁷ CB 67.1499.

all been arrested or killed.⁶⁸⁸ In 1048, following the end of the Wang Ze mutiny, there was also an effort to rid Hebei of “heterodox” beliefs, though the emperor cautioned against pursuing investigations too far.⁶⁸⁹

Looking towards the potential of future uprisings, government records and the histories which drew from official sources were at pains to label the mutineers as illegitimate for posterity. As noted in chapter one, Song officials referred to the mutineers as literally “soldier-rebels” and claimed that they had “rebelled” or “betrayed” the government.⁶⁹⁰ The leaders of the mutinies were said to have “falsely assumed” titles, as with Wang Ze, and the mutineers’ commanders were called “false generals 偽將.”⁶⁹¹ The point of these labels was to make clear that there was no righteousness in the actions of these individuals in an effort to prevent sympathies or to give the impression that their grievances excused them for launching a mutiny.

While the Song was keen to counter any claims to legitimacy by the mutineers, officials were also concerned about losing a potent symbol of authority, the official seals, to their adversaries. There are a few references to seals in the context of the mutinies. First, one of the serious crimes committed by Beizhou’s prefect Zhang Deyi was allowing Wang Ze to take his seal.⁶⁹² Second, in 1007 Lu Chengjun offered Yizhou’s seal to the Guangnan West Fiscal Intendant Shu Ben when seeking a pardon.⁶⁹³ Finally, when Tian Jing and Ren Huangchang 任黃裳 fled Beizhou, the account noted that they “gripped [their] seals 持印” as they climbed down the city wall.⁶⁹⁴ This concern about seals existed on both practical and symbolic grounds. On

⁶⁸⁸ CB 67.1510.

⁶⁸⁹ CB 163.3920.

⁶⁹⁰ For use of *junzei*, see CB 142.3398, CB 151.3683-84, and CB 161.3891. For an example of “to rebel,” see CB 48.1058.

⁶⁹¹ CB 161.3890 for Wang Ze’s title, and SHY Bing 10.13 for the declaration of Chen Jin as a “false general.”

⁶⁹² CB 162.3912.

⁶⁹³ SS 466.13621.

⁶⁹⁴ CB 161.3890.

practical grounds, the seal could be used to forge documents to confuse other officials in the area. However, as news of the mutiny spread, this probably became a less critical concern since people would be aware that a document marked by the seal of a captured prefecture was likely sent by the mutineers. At the same time, the seals were also important symbols of authority stretching back to the Warring States period, when rulers began to give officials seals to invest them with temporary authority.⁶⁹⁵ As with their Zhou predecessors, emperors also recognized that the seals represented imperial authority delegated to an individual by the throne. As a result, it was important in Zhang's indictment that he handed over the prefect's seal to Wang Ze, and Lu Chengjun offered to hand over the seal for Yizhou when negotiating surrender, probably seeing it as a valuable bargaining chip. Similarly, the fact that Tian and Ren still had their seals when they left Beizhou helped make a case to lessen their punishments. Carrying the seals with them, even while they abandoned their families, was taken as a sign of the serious commitment they had to serving the dynasty, and this was seen as a reason to ease up on them.

Rewards and Punishments

As seen in chapter one, officials encouraged the use of rewards and punishments as a tool of government. With this tool, the state could encourage or discourage certain actions. This section will look at the rewards and punishments handed down by the Song state. Many are unsurprising: The leaders of the mutinies were executed, their followers pardoned, successful officials and soldiers rewarded, and wayward officials demoted or dismissed. However, there were areas of contention, such as the degree of punishment mutineers should receive and how to treat officials who made both grave errors and great achievements in the course of an uprising.

⁶⁹⁵ Lewis, "Warring States Political History," 608-09: "In the Warring States such military and religious paraphernalia were replaced by the seal of office for civil officials and the tally for military command. Seals, which were used to validate official commands, were worn at the waist as a sign of power, but it was a power that was visibly removed."

Examining contested sentences and rewards reveals the complexity of thoughts on how rewards and punishments were best distributed in the Northern Song.

Recognition of the use of rewards and punishments as a tool of government goes back to the Warring States period. Han Fei 韓非 (d. 233 BC) argued that a ruler should manage his ministers through the use of the “two handles” of punishments and rewards.⁶⁹⁶ He explained, “Ministers are afraid of execution and punishment but look upon congratulations and rewards as advantages.”⁶⁹⁷ While Han Fei’s ideas came to be associated with the Legalist school of thought, often seen in opposition to Confucianism, they persisted throughout the imperial period. By Song times, both the emperor and officials accepted the use of rewards and punishments as means of guiding the state by promoting or sanctioning certain behaviors.⁶⁹⁸ Related to the two handles was the need for a ruler to size up the “actuality and names,” which Han Fei defined as “the minister’s words and deeds.” In short, if an official is given a task and does not accomplish it as he promised, then he is to be punished.⁶⁹⁹ When rewarding and punishing officials, the duties incumbent in a post needed to be met, and this was a guide for deciding what actions the court should take following a mutiny.

⁶⁹⁶ Technically, in his chapter on the “Two Handles,” Han Fei called for “punishments 刑” and “kindness 德.” Wing-tsit Chan comments that 德 is devoid of morality in the *Han Feizi*, and simply means giving praise and gifts. 德 here is clearly akin to rewards 賞, and Song scholar-officials used the latter character when discussing “rewards and punishments 刑賞.”

⁶⁹⁷ *Han Feizi*, translated in Chan, *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy*, 256.

⁶⁹⁸ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 24-27. McKnight finds that even Ouyang Xiu, who saw himself as a strict Confucian, nevertheless supported rewards and punishments.

⁶⁹⁹ Han Fei argues that not only should ministers be punished if their deeds fall short of their words, but also if the deeds exceeded their words. A minister was supposed to complete a task to the letter, neither failing to accomplish it nor going beyond what the ruler sought (and the minister promised or proposed) when assigning the task. The latter case sounds peculiar, but there are situations where it makes sense. If a ruler asked a general to conquer a certain territory, but the general went beyond the bounds of that territory and grabbed more, it would at first glance seem quite praiseworthy. However, the general would be acting on his own at that point, which threatened the authority of the ruler. If the ruler praised the general for his conquest, it would signal to others that they should similarly overstep their bounds, and this could further erode the ruler’s position. Since Han Fei’s focus in this passage is the preservation of the ruler’s authority over his ministers, the implication is that any action perceived as acting on one’s own authority, and not the ruler’s, threatens the ruler.

Punishing and Pardoning Mutineers

Once a mutiny concluded, the first step was the punishment of the mutineers. The leaders were the prime targets, while their followers were more likely to be pardoned. The leaders' fates varied somewhat, however. Wang Jun committed suicide at Fushunjian and was posthumously decapitated. His head was given to Yang Huaizhong and displayed in the northern market of Chengdu.⁷⁰⁰ Chen Jin was beheaded as well, but it is unclear if he was killed in battle or after capture. Chen's ally Lu Chengjun, who had been named commander by Chen, either was captured or surrendered to the Song along with his family.⁷⁰¹ Wang Lun was beheaded during or shortly after battle in the Huainan prefecture of Hezhou.⁷⁰² Wang Ze was captured alive and sent to the capital, where he was dismembered in the market.⁷⁰³ According to the *Song huiyao*, however, he was beheaded along with his co-conspirators Zhang Luan and Bu Ji and their family members.⁷⁰⁴

The one leader who clearly escaped death was Wei Gui, the leader of the Baozhou mutiny. While Wei's clash with Vice Prefect Shi Daiju sparked the mutiny which resulted in the deaths of Shi and the prefect, his subsequent actions indicate that he was not seeking to rebel, but was angry over the loss of pay. According to the account in the *Changbian*, Wei assumed leadership only after the mutineers had offered the opportunity to another officer, Wang Shouyi. Wang refused and was killed, so Wei likely felt he had little choice in becoming the leader.⁷⁰⁵ From his position, he allegedly tried to mitigate the damage caused by the mutiny. He

⁷⁰⁰ CB 47.1027-28.

⁷⁰¹ The *Song huiyao* records that he was captured (SHY Bing 10.13), while the *Changbian* account states he surrendered (CB 66.1489). We have no information on what happened to Lu after this point.

⁷⁰² SHY Bing 10.14. Similar to the case of Lu Chengjun, in the *Song huiyao* it is only stated that a stalwart man named Zhang Ju got his head, while the *Changbian* specifically states that Wang was captured and executed 捕殺 (CB 142.3398).

⁷⁰³ CB 162.3912.

⁷⁰⁴ SHY Bing 10.16.

⁷⁰⁵ CB 151.3676.

encouraged the rebellious soldiers to surrender, even opening the city gates (presumably to let Song forces in or to get soldiers to come out and give up), and he tried to limit the killing of residents in the city. Because of these acts, the emperor had him demoted by merely half a personal rank (from 8b to 9a) and sent to supervise state monopoly revenues and commercial taxes in Yuezhou 岳州 in Jinghu North Circuit. The famous official Bao Zheng objected to this, saying the “crime was major but the sentence light 罪大責輕.” He asked that Wei instead be sent to a “distant, malignant place 遠惡處” under registered control.⁷⁰⁶ Renzong ignored Bao’s request.⁷⁰⁷ It seems the emperor’s trust in the loyalty of Wei Gui was warranted, because he was promoted in 1052 for killing a bandit leader.⁷⁰⁸ While his argument with Shi Daiju helped spark the mutiny, the account makes it clear that Wei led the mutiny while under duress, and he also had spared the civilians of Baozhou while trying to convince the mutineers to surrender. Taken together, these made a death sentence undesirable. Even though he called for a harsher punishment, Bao Zheng did not seek the death penalty either.

Other, nameless individuals who were identified as “leaders” of some sort among the mutineers suffered summary executions. Following the recapture of Chengdu, Lei Youzhong presided over the hasty “trial” where several hundred men were cast into a fire for allegedly acting as officials for Wang Jun.⁷⁰⁹ A similar fate befell the “commanders 帥” of Chen Jin. Some sixty such leaders were captured alive, only to be beheaded.⁷¹⁰ As seen above, Lu Chengjun alone seems to have surrendered without being killed afterwards, but there is no evidence to

⁷⁰⁶ The term “distant, malignant place” meant places far from the capital and thought to be hazardous to people’s health. It most commonly referred to the areas of Guangan where malaria and other tropical diseases were endemic. Exile (of which registered control was a type) to these places was considered very harsh. See McKnight, *Law and Order*, 430-31.

⁷⁰⁷ CB 152.3699-700.

⁷⁰⁸ CB 172.4147.

⁷⁰⁹ CB 47.1026.

⁷¹⁰ CB 66.1489.

argue that convincingly. While Wei Gui managed to survive relatively unscathed, 429 “instigators 造逆者,” most likely an entire Yunyi Army commandery, were thrown into a well and buried alive.⁷¹¹

Although the leadership was largely wiped out, the rank and file soldiers, as well as coerced commoners, frequently received pardons.⁷¹² The number of soldiers pardoned is not always clear, but it could reach into the thousands. After Li Shiheng defeated a sizeable force sent by Wang Jun to take the pass at Jianmen in the first month of 1000, there was a large number of commoners who were forced into fighting the Song and had since scattered following the battle. Li sent out an announcement recruiting those commoners who surrendered to him, obtaining 1,000 men in this way.⁷¹³ Zhenzong issued a pardon for soldiers and commoners who fought for Wang Jun, with the exception of officials who served Wang and those who murdered or committed the “Ten Abominations 十惡,” a set of especially serious crimes ranging from rebellion to patricide.⁷¹⁴ In 1044, two thousand Baozhou soldiers who had mutinied opened the gates of the city and gave themselves up, receiving a pardon in exchange.⁷¹⁵

While it is unclear where the pardoned soldiers in Sichuan went following the mutiny, we know the fates of the surviving soldiers of the Baozhou mutiny. Those who surrendered were

⁷¹¹ CB 151.3688 and *Sushui jiwen* 4.70.

⁷¹² See SS 6.113 for Wang Jun and CB 151.3688 for Baozhou. There is no information on what happened to the regular soldiers in the Chen Jin and Wang Lun mutinies. In the former case, it seems likely that a pardon was issued for those who surrendered like Lu Chengjun. In the latter, only a small number of the original mutineers, perhaps several dozen, remained with Wang as he fled into Huainan, and the number probably shrank even more by the very end. Those who entered Huainan had tattooed their faces in solidarity with Wang, which suggests considerable commitment. With such a small, dedicated group of supporters, it is possible all the original mutineers were wiped out at Hezhou.

⁷¹³ CB 46.988.

⁷¹⁴ QSW 10:197.47. They did, of course, participate in a rebellion against the Song, but the government presumably did not charge them with that crime. As for those who served in Wang’s nascent government, Lei Youzhong massacred many such individuals in the hasty “trials” held in Chengdu described in chapter two. For a list of the Ten Abominations, see *Jiu Tangshu* 50.2137, and for English translations, see McKnight, *Law and Order*, 492.

⁷¹⁵ CB 151.3688.

distributed to other garrisons.⁷¹⁶ Not all officials welcomed the mercy granted the soldiers, however. Two previously mentioned cases stand out. First, prior to the surrender, Cai Xiang, Ouyang Xiu, and Sun Fu asked the emperor to kill all of the mutineers.⁷¹⁷ Second, Fu Bi remained suspicious of the surrendered soldiers' sincerity and told Ouyang Xiu of his plan to kill them all in their new garrisons on the same appointed day. Fortunately for those soldiers, Ouyang disagreed, reminding Fu that his plan would go against an imperial pardon and could trigger a new mutiny.⁷¹⁸ It was probably not that Ouyang had regretted his earlier request to wipe out the mutineers, but rather that he recognized the changed circumstances made the plan illicit and probably unworkable.

Relocating the soldiers was useful in several respects. First, by sending them to multiple garrisons, they were relatively isolated from their fellow mutineers but surrounded by presumably loyal soldiers. The number of former mutineers sent to each garrison is unknown, but it stands to reason they comprised only a minority of the soldiers stationed at any given location. In a new environment surrounded by unfamiliar soldiers, they would have a hard time sparking a new mutiny. Second, they were removed from their social networks developed in the place where the uprising broke out. Wang Ze had managed to gain supporters in the government offices of Beizhou with his accomplices Zhang Luan and Bu Ji, and together they reached out to the nearby prefectures of Dezhou and Qizhou to participate in the uprising.⁷¹⁹ Other soldiers might have enjoyed similar ties to members of the local government. Severing these bonds would help curb the possibility of a recurrence.

⁷¹⁶ CB 151.3689.

⁷¹⁷ CB 151.3684-85.

⁷¹⁸ CB 151.3689.

⁷¹⁹ CB 161.3890.

Finally, there was an attitude that some places made people more susceptible to negative influences. Song officials sometimes observed that the geography and history of certain places influenced people's behavior.⁷²⁰ Sichuan was isolated from the rest of the empire and had been home to an independent state for several decades in the tenth century. These characteristics were thought to contribute to a general rebelliousness of the local population. As a consequence, the Song barred native Sichuanese from serving there. The court also banned non-native officials from bringing their families to Sichuan out of a concern that the region could foment rebellious attitudes even among outsiders.⁷²¹ In a similar case, Renzong justified his demotion and renaming of Beizhou because it had grown independent of the central government in the past, and this was thought to have allowed "heterodox" forces to arise and undermine Song control there.⁷²² If some places were believed to be "corrupting," relocating the soldiers would give them an opportunity to "renew" themselves, freed from that pernicious influence.⁷²³

There were other, more practical reasons for the pardons. First, it would be very difficult to determine guilt in the cases of individual soldiers. Some probably joined the mutinies willingly, while others may have felt they had little choice in the matter. Investigating each case would have been incredibly costly in terms of time and resources. Instead, the court seems to have preferred giving the soldiers the benefit of a doubt. Erring on the side of leniency was considered more acceptable than the alternative. This was especially true during the Song, as Brian McKnight notes that the Song issued the most amnesties of any dynasty.⁷²⁴ Second, executing all those who surrendered could prompt resistance. If mutineers believed they would

⁷²⁰ See comments about geography in McKnight, *Law and Order*, 8-9, and 109-11 for additional discussion of challenges geography could pose for effective state control.

⁷²¹ Lo, *Civil Service*, 203-04.

⁷²² SHY Fangyu 5.29.

⁷²³ On the idea of surrendered people "renewing themselves," see McKnight, *Law and Order*, 15.

⁷²⁴ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 485. For an overview of amnesties in Chinese history, see McKnight, *The Quality of Mercy*.

be killed after surrendering, they would likely prefer to fight ferociously for a possible chance of escape or try to take down as many of their adversaries as possible rather than give up and face certain death.⁷²⁵ If it was decided after their surrender to kill all the prisoners, they could resist and start a new mutiny. This was the scenario about which Ouyang Xiu warned Fu Bi.

Conversely, pardoning soldiers in one mutiny could lead those in later mutinies to be more willing to surrender in the hopes of similar treatment. Finally, the show of benevolence could set soldiers down the path of renewal, making it clear the emperor was willing to give them a chance to redeem themselves. At the same time, it illustrated the power of the imperial state and revealed that the government could wipe out all of them if the ruler so desired, but he had chosen not to do so, thus reminding the former mutineers of their subordinate position vis-à-vis the state.

Families Collectively Punished and Rewarded

As with other societies, family was the most important part of people's lives in the Song, a fact recognized in Confucian teachings which emphasized that cultivating morality began with practicing filial piety at home. Since the family was so central to society in imperial China, the state at times used the collective punishment of families, which was a long-standing practice by the Song.⁷²⁶ Several examples of such punishments appear following the conclusion of a mutiny. However, an official's family ties could also block or lessen the degree of punishment inflicted. At the same time, an official's family members could also be rewarded for his service. This occurred when an official died while fighting the mutineers. The most typical reward was the bestowal of personal rank titles on the sons of the deceased.

⁷²⁵ One can liken this to one of the Thirty-Six Stratagems, *yuqin guzong* 欲擒故縱, which encouraged a commander to give the enemy the prospect of escape to weaken their resolve to fight to the death, thus making it easier to capture them.

⁷²⁶ Brian E. McKnight writes that punishing relatives continued into the imperial period, noting "such joint adjudication and punishment were retained for certain classes of crimes...Such joint adjudication affected certain related groups, most commonly people living in the same household and close relatives" (McKnight, *Law and Order*, 53).

The most notable example of collective punishment was the execution of Wang Ze, Zhang Luan, and Bu Ji's families in the capital market.⁷²⁷ Two other examples from the Wang Ze mutiny stand out as well. First, the prefect of Beizhou Zhang Deyi was executed, his brothers were demoted, and his wife and children were “dealt with according to the law 論如律.” Zhang allegedly surrendered his official seal to the mutineers, referred to Wang Ze as the “king 大王,” helped create rituals, and accepted a post in Wang's fledgling government.⁷²⁸ He also was accused of doing nothing when Ma Sui 馬遂 (d. 1047) attempted to kill Wang Ze, resulting in Ma's death.⁷²⁹ Second, upon learning of the rumor that an expert in heterodox teachings named Li Jiao was in Beizhou with the mutineers, the emperor ordered Li's parents, elder brother, the officials responsible for Li's case, and Li's brother's father-in-law Zhang Cun all demoted or placed under registered control.⁷³⁰ Association with a mutiny was grounds for punishment not only for the individual involved, but potentially for other family members.

Although an official's family could receive sentences for his misdeeds, his familial ties could also spare him from heavier punishments. During the Wang Lun mutiny, several officials in Huainan failed to resist the mutineers and even provided aid in some cases, such as Chao Zhongyue as seen above.⁷³¹ Ouyang Xiu railed against this behavior, and expressed concerns that officials might get away with lesser sentences because of ties to court officials. For evidence to

⁷²⁷ SHY Bing 10.16. There is no clear indication of who these family members were, since the generic term “family members 家屬” was used.

⁷²⁸ CB 162.3912-13. According to the *Songshi*, Zhang Deyi's father Zhang Qi 張耆 had twenty-four sons, although only one, Zhang Xiyi 張希一, is clearly indicated as having been punished for his brother's actions (SS 290.9711 and 9712).

⁷²⁹ CB 162.3907-08 and SS 446.13152.

⁷³⁰ CB 163.3918. We know the ultimate fate of Li Jiao's father Li Tan because of a piece by Sima Guang praising Li Tan's servant Wang Kui 王逵. Li Tan was sent to Nan'enzhou, Guangnan, where he committed suicide shortly after arrival. While the court also exiled Li's sons (Li Jiao's brothers) to Guangnan, they were separated (*Sushui jiwen* 4.71).

⁷³¹ CB 145.3499.

support his contention, Ouyang pointed out the recent lenient treatment of Guanghuajun Prefect Han Gang, who managed to turn the soldiers defending the prefectural seat from bandits against him.⁷³² Despite the terrible behavior of Han, he received only a light punishment, Ouyang charged, because his familial connection to the court. Concerned that this would send a bad message to other officials facing similar circumstances, Ouyang requested that no such clemency be shown to those serving in Huainan who did not fight the mutineers.⁷³³

While family members could be held responsible for the misdeeds of another member, it was also possible for them to receive rewards for a relative's achievements. This was an extension of the *yin* privilege, which as noted in chapter two permitted officials at certain ranks to give another family member, usually a son, a personal rank which made him eligible to serve in the government. In the case of the mutinies examined here, family members sometimes received these rewards when an official was killed. The official himself received considerable posthumous rewards as well, usually elevating him to a high personal rank. Two examples stand out from the Beizhou, Hebei mutiny of 1047-1048. Beizhou Vice Prefect Dong Yuanheng, for example, was promoted to vice minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices 太常少卿, and Ma Sui, a commander in the Northern Capital 北京指揮 of Damingfu was made Commissioner of Palace Halls and Parks 宮苑使. Ma's wife was made Jingzhong County Mistress 旌忠縣君.⁷³⁴ Dong's son and grandsons and Ma's sons received such ranks after their fathers died during the

⁷³² QSW 32:682.164-65. Ouyang's memorial is also provided in CB 145.3498-99, and another account of the mutiny in Guanghuajun is found in *Sushui jiwén* 11.202-03.

⁷³³ QSW 32:682.164-65.

⁷³⁴ SS 446.13153 for Dong and SS 446.13152 for Ma. The jump in ranks were notable. Generally speaking, the living officials I examined who gained a promotion were raised half a rank (e.g., from 7b to 7a). Dong Yuanheng jumped from 7b to 6a (CB 163.3921), while Ma went from 9b to 7a (CB 162.3907). While the reason for such significant promotions is not given, it was no doubt because they had died in service to the Song.

Wang Ze mutiny.⁷³⁵ The families of Dong and Ma also had another reward. Dong Yuanheng's alleged killer Hao Yong 郝用 "was executed to use as an offering to Yuanheng 斬以祭元亨."⁷³⁶ In a particularly grisly case, one of Ma Sui's sons was allowed to be the executioner, carrying out the unusual punishment of cutting out the heart 剖心 of his killer, the Xiaojie Army soldier 驍捷卒 Shi Qing 石慶 and "sacrificing him 祭之."⁷³⁷ The rewards and executions suggest that the state sought to reward both the living and the dead for the service of an official killed during a mutiny.

Rewarding Loyal Service

The Song government presented rewards to officials and soldiers who fought the mutineers, and also extended rewards to civilians who assisted the state. The types of rewards were not particularly astonishing, consisting of promotions and money or other material goods. There was an effort to ensure that the servants of the Song were rewarded appropriately, and as such the promotions and gifts were distributed according to the merits of the individuals (a table containing all list of all officials who received rewards is included in the appendix). In some cases, however, officials had committed acts deserving of both reward and censure, and these require some additional attention.

⁷³⁵ See CB 163.3921 for the ranks granted Dong's descendants and CB 162.3907-08 for Ma's five sons' receiving personal ranks.

⁷³⁶ SS 446.13153.

⁷³⁷ SS 446.13152 and CB 162.3908. While the death penalty during the Song tended to be carried out by decapitation or strangulation, emperors could permit more gruesome punishments (McKnight, *Law and Order*, 450-52). Wang Ze, as noted above, was possibly executed by dismemberment. Emperor Renzong also holds the dubious distinction of being the first Chinese emperor to allow slow slicing 凌遲, often referred to in a more graphic manner as "death by a thousand cuts," which appears to have originated with the Khitan Liao (McKnight, *Law and Order*, 451-52). The term used for the execution of Ma Sui's killer, *pou xin*, has a rather notorious origin with the wicked last king of the Shang (?-1045 BC), who allegedly had his virtuous minister Bi Gan's 比干 chest cut open to observe his heart. Given that this infamous incident was well-known, it is interesting that the term was used here to describe a presumably legitimate execution.

The rewards granted following the Beizhou mutiny are the most detailed, and therefore worthy of the closest attention. There, rewards were given to government forces in two distinct groups. The first group consisted primarily of the top leaders, usually those who had been expressly sent on the suppression campaign by the emperor or were already posted to the region but had aided the Song troops. They were identified by name, and their rewards were promotions, with the new titles clearly provided. For example, the *Changbian* records that “The Right Grand Master of Remonstrance and Vice Grand Councilor Wen Yanbo became Vice Minister of the Bureau of Rites and Grand Councilor.”⁷³⁸ Another seven officials were listed as receiving promotions: Ming Hao, Wang Xin, Mai Yunyan, Wang Kai, Gao Jilong, Zhang Zhong 張忠, and Jia Changchao.⁷³⁹ These individuals were either in the top positions, as in the cases of Wen Yanbo, Ming Hao, and Jia Changchao, or recognized for their particular contributions to the state, such as Zhang Zhong.

The remaining rewards were given to lower-ranking civil officials, military officers, and soldiers. The *Changbian* states that sixty civil officials who served in military assignments 預軍期者 and officers and soldiers from the rank of inspector-in-chief 都虞侯 to basic soldiers 士卒, numbering 8,400, received rewards according to their merit.⁷⁴⁰ Meritorious officials and soldiers

⁷³⁸ CB 162.3907 and 3908 (the latter for Jia alone).

⁷³⁹ CB 162.3907. Of these officials, Wang Xin moved with his troops to Beizhou on his own initiative, and Jia Changchao was already in his post as Hebei military intendant, which made it unnecessary to order them to deal with Beizhou (although Wang did receive a post after her arrived there). Zhang Zhong was the only other individual lacking evidence of direct orders dispatching him. Zhang caught the court’s attention when he was the first to reach the top of Beizhou’s walls in one of the failed attempts to take the city. He was severely injured in the process, and that combined with his achievement of leading the climb up the wall warranted his being singled out (CB 162.3905).

⁷⁴⁰ CB 162.3907. The civil officials are identified as executory officials 選人 and capital and court officials 京朝官. Capital and court officials did not necessarily serve in those locations; rather, it was a reference to civil officials in ranks 9b to 7b, at the bottom of the Nine Ranks system. Executory officials were even lower, and did not receive a Nine Rank designation.

were organized into five ranks, and they gained promotions according to those ranks while those left unranked received money and commendations:

Rewards for Beizhou Officials and Soldiers ⁷⁴¹		
Merit-Based Rank	Number of Personal Rank Titles Promoted 轉資	Number of People Rewarded
First	5	160
Second	4	300
Third	3	300
Fourth	2	600
Fifth	1	1,800
Unranked	No promotion; received money 緡錢 and commendations 差	Not specified (presumably the remaining 5,240 individuals)

Less than half of the soldiers received promotions. Allegedly the ranks were given for merit, but there is no indication of how merit was determined. The numbers are round, which suggests there were quotas for each rank; it is also noteworthy that the first rank consisted of one-hundred *sixty* people, leaving one to wonder if those sixty were the unnamed civil officials. If that is the case, then the ranking may have been less to represent merit than to represent preexisting ranks in the bureaucracy and military.⁷⁴² We see a similar ranking of merit in the ninth month of 1044, following the Baozhou mutiny in Hebei. Tian Kuang sent to court a list of meritorious officials. They too were divided into five ranks, but it is clear the list did not include regular soldiers (or at least most were excluded) since there was only a total of sixty-two individuals. The top two

⁷⁴¹ Table compiled from CB 162.3907.

⁷⁴² That is, the additional 100 individuals rewarded in the first rank were probably top military officers, with the second, third, fourth, and fifth ranks filled out by increasingly lower-ranking officers and regular soldiers. A possible defense of such an arrangement is that the responsibilities of higher-ranking officers played a bigger role in the Song's victory than the individual exploits of soldiers on the ground. This is akin to the bonuses given to managers and executives in companies which generally outweigh the bonuses or commissions earned by employees who made the actual sales to customers. Even though they might never have sold an item in their lives, they are tasked with overseeing numerous employees and locations and shaping company policies; the success of those employees and stores are consequently attributed to managers and executives. Returning to the Beizhou mutiny, distributing rewards based on one's position in the military hierarchy, but presented under the guise of "merit," would also help reaffirm the legitimacy of the hierarchy itself.

ranks were promoted, while the top three had the waiting time for eligibility for a personal rank promotion reduced by two years. The fourth and fifth ranks received silver, silk, and a commendation.⁷⁴³

The records of rewards following other mutinies are similar in nature to those at Beizhou. After the Sichuan mutiny of Wang Jun in 1000, Lei Youzhong was given the prestige title of Baoxin Deputy Military Governor and Surveillance Commissioner 保信軍節度觀察留後, while nineteen others also received promotions or similar rewards.⁷⁴⁴ Similarly, following the end of the 1007 Chen Jin mutiny in Guangnan, Cao Liyong, Zhang Xu, Zhang Conggu, and Zhang Jineng all received promotions, with Zhang Jineng receiving especially lavish rewards for leading the vanguard against the mutineers. The remaining officials were promoted and given commendations. Three soldiers from the Guiyuan (Returning from Afar) Army 歸遠軍—Li Hao 李昊, Liu Zong 劉宗, and Zhao Min 趙敏—who allegedly killed Chen Jin were raised to the rank of troop commandant 都頭. Officials at Xiangzhou and the leaders of the haltered-and-bridled prefectures of Huaiyuanjun and Tianhezhai were promoted three ranks by the emperor. Finally, the fiscal intendants of Guangnan East and Jinghu South circuits, the senior officials of six prefectures, and Zhou Wenzhi received promotions as well on account of their supplying the army and preparing defenses 以供軍設備故也.⁷⁴⁵ The rewards for the 1043 Jingdong and 1044 Baozhou, Hebei mutinies were more perfunctory. In each case, the commanding officials

⁷⁴³ CB 152.3701.

⁷⁴⁴ There are several sources for the rewards: SS 257.8955, 278.9462-63, 279.9485, 289.9694, 298.9916, 300.9978, 308.10138, 308.10149, 324.10472, 426.12694, 466.13613, 466.13620; CB 47.1010-11, 47.1029; and QSW 25:524.65.

⁷⁴⁵ CB 67.1498-99. Councilors recommended that Xiangzhou's officials be promoted three ranks, with Huaiyuanjun and Tianhezhai only given two ranks, but Zhenzong argued that the latter two places were the first to face the brunt of the mutiny and had successfully fended off the attackers. Therefore, they deserved the same treatment as Xiangzhou's officials. The six prefectures were Guangzhou, Guizhou, Yongzhou, Rongzhou 容州, Tanzhou 潭州, and Rongzhou 融州. Tanzhou was far from the fighting, located in Jinghu South Circuit (Tanzhou is now known as Changsha, capital of Hunan province), again suggesting the geographic scope of the efforts against Chen.

received promotions in the vein of their peers who fought against Wang Jun, Chen Jin, and Wang Ze.⁷⁴⁶ Also, in the case of Wang Lun in Shandong, Zhang Ju 張矩, a stalwart man from Liyang County 歷陽縣 in Hezhou, Huainan was recognized for taking Wang's head.⁷⁴⁷ For his role, Zhang was given a personal rank, which made him eligible for government office among other benefits.⁷⁴⁸

Punishing Wayward Officials

While the Song government provided rewards for those officials who dutifully served the state, it also punished those who failed in their responsibilities. After each mutiny, a number of officials, as well as some family members, were punished. I will examine three aspects of the punishments here. First, how were these officials punished? Second, what were the reasons for their punishments? Finally, is there evidence that the sentences pronounced were in fact carried out? This is important in light of legal privileges given officials as discussed by Brian E. McKnight.

When an official did not perform his duties successfully, the emperor could sentence him to a number of potential punishments, including a number of penalties which applied specifically to officials. In the aftermath of mutinies, the sentences ranged from demotion to execution, as we

⁷⁴⁶ For the rewards given to officials who fought Wang Lun, see CB 142.3418-19; for rewards bestowed upon those who put down the Baozhou mutiny, see CB 152.3697-98.

⁷⁴⁷ CB 142.3398. A "stalwart man" was a position in the subbureaucracy, serving under an elder. They played a variety of roles to help maintain order in local society, including law enforcement (see McKnight, *Law and Order*, 134-35). Liyang County was part of Hezhou, where Wang met his end (SS 88.2183-84). The subbureaucracy refers to agents of the state, especially below the county level, where government responsibilities were fulfilled by requisitioned laborers rather than centrally-appointed officials. Brian E. McKnight gives a good overview of the subbureaucracy in the early Northern Song in his book *Village and Bureaucracy in Southern Sung China* (see McKnight, *Village and Bureaucracy*, 20-31 for the subbureaucracy from the start of the Northern Song until the advent of the New Policies).

⁷⁴⁸ CB 142.3419. Zhang was given the personal rank of Attendant of the Three Ranks 三班奉職, which is 9b on the Nine Ranks (see Umehara, "Civil and Military Officials," 4).

can see in the following table (I have provided details on each official or relative to an official who was punished in a table in the appendix):

Types of Punishments	
Punishment	Number of Officials Punished
Demotion	46
Transfer	29 (14 Supervisors; 15 Other)
Penal Registration and Exile	25 (21 Registered Control; 2 Exile; 2 Beaten, Tattooed, and sent to Sramana Island)
Dismissal	11
Disenrollment	1
Execution	1
Fine	1

It is important to note here that a single official could receive more than one type of punishment.

For example, Chuzhou 滁州 Vice Prefect Wu Jifu 吳幾復 was demoted and placed under registered control in Hengzhou 衡州, Jinghu South Circuit.⁷⁴⁹

It is worth going over what each of these types of punishments entailed. Demotion involved a drop in an official's personal rank and sometimes prestige title. Pei Deyu 裴德輿, who formerly served as Beizhou's prefect, was demoted three personal rank titles and had his prestige title lowered as well.⁷⁵⁰ Transfer is fairly clear: The official changed from one post to another as a part of his punishment, as when Zhang Wenzhi 張晁之 was demoted and shifted from serving as Hebei's fiscal intendant to prefect of Guozhou 虢州 in Yongxingjun Circuit.⁷⁵¹ While Zhang's transfer was from one regular post to another, there were also positions where the emperor sent officials as a punishment. The most common one encountered here was as a state monopoly agent 監當官. In this and other closely related offices, people served as supervisors of the state monopolies or commercial taxes for a prefecture. Gong Yanming finds that these were

⁷⁴⁹ SHY Zhiguan 64.44.

⁷⁵⁰ CB 162.3908.

⁷⁵¹ SHY Zhiguan 64.47.

posts usually staffed by executory-level civil officials and low-ranking military officials, but the state also used them to send capital and court civil officials (rank 9b to 7b) who committed some fault.⁷⁵² Fourteen officials had to serve as monopoly agents; Zhang Deyi's brother Xiyi 張希一 had to serve as supervisor of the salt monopoly in Hongzhou 洪州, Jiangnan West.⁷⁵³

Another frequent sentence was penal registration, where someone was forced to reside in a prefecture some distance from his or her home, often requiring that the person perform hard labor in the prefectural army.⁷⁵⁴ Twenty-five officials were sent into some form of registration. All but four were put under registered control 編管. As Brian E. McKnight explains, this was a type of penal registration often applied to officials. It was more lenient than other forms of penal registration, as those sentenced did not have to enter the prefectural army and were allowed freer movement within the prefecture, although they received no food or other assistance from the state.⁷⁵⁵ Sixteen of the twenty-four Huainan officials punished for failing to resist Wang Lun were sentenced to registered control.⁷⁵⁶ Two other officials were exiled rather than put in registered control.⁷⁵⁷ Another two officials suffered a beating, tattooing, and exile to Sramana

⁷⁵² Gong, *Songdai guanzhi cidian*, 558-59 for the general office of state monopoly agent and related offices that dealt with one specific monopoly or commercial taxes. When determining the number of officials punished in a particular way, I included Li Tan in this group even though he was given a different post (administrative assistant 別駕, see Gong, *Songdai guanzhi cidian*, 538 for a description of this post). While he did not have any duties, unlike state monopoly agents, he shared a similar fate, as he was sentenced to a low-ranking post that existed at least in part to punish officials.

⁷⁵³ SS 290.9712.

⁷⁵⁴ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 385-445 for a thorough treatment of penal registration.

⁷⁵⁵ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 398-401. While we cannot determine for sure the background of the family of the man named Zhao Zhong 趙仲 who taught Li Jiao sorcery, the fact that they were placed under registered control rather than registered control suggests they came from an official household (SHY Zhiguan 65.5). While McKnight does not mention it, it is clear from the punishments handed out in the wake of the mutinies that officials' families could also be given registered control.

⁷⁵⁶ SHY Zhiguan 64.43.

⁷⁵⁷ These were Chengdu Prefect Niu Mian, who fled when Wang Jun's mutiny began (SHY Zhiguan 64.14-15), and Feng Wenji 馮文吉, who had fled Beizhou (CB 162.3908).

Island off the northern coast of the Shandong Peninsula.⁷⁵⁸ According to McKnight, this was considered the most brutal location to be sent for penal registration.⁷⁵⁹

A fourth type of punishment was dismissal, which eleven officials faced. Two officials were dismissed in addition to other punishments, but the rest were either only dismissed or demoted and dismissed.⁷⁶⁰ One official each was given a fine, the death penalty, or disenrollment. Fines and execution are self-explanatory. Zhang Deyi was the one official executed.⁷⁶¹ One of the officials who had given a recommendation for Zhang, Liu Yuanyu 劉元瑜, had to pay a fine.⁷⁶² For disenrollment, an official lost all ranks and titles and was barred from serving in government for several years; the one official who suffered this was Feng Wenji, who was also exiled.⁷⁶³

Why were these officials punished? The accounts of punishments in the *Changbian* and *Song huiyao* provide reasons, usually after listing out the officials and their penalties.⁷⁶⁴ There were a variety of causes for punishments, as seen here:

Reasons for Punishments	
Reason	Number of Officials or Relatives Punished
Cowardice	31
Failure to carry out duties	26
Joined mutineers	6
Joint adjudication	15

⁷⁵⁸ One such person was the Baozhou commander 保州指揮 Zhang Du 張瀆, who joined the mutineers at Baozhou and had claimed to Wei Gui that he had read magical texts 法書, presumably in an offer to use magic to help the mutiny (SHY Zhiguan 64.48 and CB 152.3700). The other official was Zhao Weiyi 趙惟一, who fled Beizhou like Feng Wenji had (SHY Zhiguan 65.2 and CB 162.3908); Feng avoided Zhao's fate by having worked hard in the suppression effort after fleeing (SHY Zhiguan 65.2).

⁷⁵⁹ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 420-30.

⁷⁶⁰ The two officials were Niu Mian and Zhang Shi, who fled Chengdu. Niu was exiled, while Zhang was sent to serve in a low-ranking post (SHY Zhiguan 64.14-15). No doubt the officials who were transferred or exiled also lost the functional post they held, but the term “dismissal (most often 勒停)” here seems to have been used in most cases as a punishment in itself, as opposed to a consequence of another penalty.

⁷⁶¹ CB 162.3912-13.

⁷⁶² CB 164.3949.

⁷⁶³ SHY Zhiguan 65.2 and CB 162.3908.

⁷⁶⁴ For example, the Huainan officials who did not fight Wang Lun were punished as a group. After telling the reader who was punished and how, the author gave the reason for the penalties (SHY Zhiguan 64.43-44).

The most common reason was cowardice. This could include an official abandoning his post, as was the case with Niu Mian and Zhang Shi mentioned above.⁷⁶⁵ Members of the local government who bribed or otherwise tried to avoid conflict with the mutineers could also be punished. This was the issue for all twenty-four individuals punished for failing to confront Wang Lun in Huainan. They were accused of acting “cowardly 怯懦.”⁷⁶⁶

Another common punishment was the failure to carry out one’s duties. One such duty was to investigate what was happening in one’s jurisdiction. Guangnan West Fiscal Intendant Shu Ben, for example, was punished because he did not investigate the behavior of Yizhou Prefect Liu Yonggui, allowing the latter’s excessively harsh behavior to spark Chen Jin’s uprising.⁷⁶⁷ Officials who no longer served in a post could still be punished for a mutiny that arose later. After the end of the Wang Ze mutiny in Hebei, the former Beizhou Prefect Pei Deyu and Beizhou Military Administrator Li Zhaodu 李昭度 were both demoted as a result of failing to investigate the “heterodox gang 妖黨” during their tenure.⁷⁶⁸ An official could also be punished because the mutiny simply happened in his jurisdiction, as was the explanation for the punishments meted out to Huangfu Bi and Tian Jing.⁷⁶⁹ Failure to catch the mutineers and other signs of poor performance in one’s office could also lead to a punishment.⁷⁷⁰

⁷⁶⁵ SHY Zhiguan 65.2.

⁷⁶⁶ The court also punished sixteen for having offered bribes to Wang Lun and avoiding the mutineers (SHY Zhiguan 64.43-44).

⁷⁶⁷ CB 67.1497-98.

⁷⁶⁸ SHY Zhiguan 65.2.

⁷⁶⁹ SHY Zhiguan 65.2.

⁷⁷⁰ In Guangnan, Liuzhou Prefect Wang Yu 王昱 was made supervisor of the wine monopoly. The stated reason for the punishment was that he failed to catch the mutineers in a timely manner (QSW 19:396.189), although he also fled Liuzhou, which would be grounds for punishment (CB 66.1484). Wang Guo at Baozhou similarly performed poorly; at first he could not pacify while commanding the troops (SHY Zhiguan 64.44), and he lost too many soldiers during the siege; as a consequence, he was demoted and made prefect of Mizhou in Jingdong East Circuit (CB 152.3697).

Additionally, six officials were punished for working with the mutineers in some capacity. Wei Gui, as seen above, led the mutineers at Baozhou, although his actions there suggested he was not altogether enthusiastic for rebelling against the Song. There were four others who supported the mutineers during the mutiny there, but three of them also had a complex relationship with the mutiny. Shiqi Zhen's 侍其臻 father was prefect of neighboring Ansjun, and Zhen suffered because other soldiers thought he wanted to coordinate with his father to help the Song retake Baozhou; they repeatedly wanted to behead him. Jia Shiyong 賈世永, met with Tian Kuang and tried to convince a eunuch named Song Youyan to come into the city with him to persuade the soldiers inside to open the gates. Song refused, and Jia returned to the city. Shi Keshun 史克順 actually led troops to battle against the mutineers, but he was hit in the eye with an arrow. The one Baozhou official who sided with the mutineers and seemed committed to support them was Zhang Du. When Wei Gui was encouraging the soldiers to surrender, Zhang mentioned his knowledge of sorcery, which suggests he was not interested in giving up. It is not surprising, then, that Zhang received the harshest punishment of the group, as he was sent to Sramana Island.⁷⁷¹ Finally, there was Zhang Deyi, who aided Wang Ze at Beizhou. Of these six, only Zhang was executed.⁷⁷²

The last reason given for punishments was joint adjudication through family ties or other connections. As seen above, the families of Zhang Deyi and Li Jiao suffered penalties ranging from state monopoly agent to registered control.⁷⁷³ The parents and wife of Zhao Zhong 趙仲,

⁷⁷¹ CB 152.3699-700 and SHY Zhiguan 64.47-48. Given the explanation of what Shi Keshun did, it is unclear why he was punished at all; he seemed to have fought the mutineers, and there is no evidence he assisted them.

⁷⁷² CB 162.3912-13.

⁷⁷³ We know Zhang Deyi's brothers were punished, although it is unclear how many (CB 162.3912-13). As noted above, Zhang's father Zhang Qi had twenty-four sons in all, and his son (Deyi's brother) Zhang Xiyi became a state monopoly agent (SS 290.9711-12). Li Jiao's father became an administrative aide in Zhaozhou, Guangnan West, while his brother and mother were given registered control (SHY Zhiguan 65.4).

the man who taught Li Jiao sorcery, were also given registered control.⁷⁷⁴ In addition, seven officials faced penalties for having given sponsorships for Zhang Deyi.⁷⁷⁵ According to Winston W. Lo, when giving a sponsorship 舉官, a Song official became liable for his beneficiary's conduct, as seen here.⁷⁷⁶

Brian E. McKnight has written on the subject of legal privileges for officials, and finds that there were a number of methods to lower the punishment of an official. The amount of leniency an official could receive depended on his personal rank, with higher-ranking officials able to reduce more serious punishments and commute them to fines. Officials could also ask for disenrollment which, like the punishment mentioned above, meant they lost all ranks and titles and were barred from any government service for a number of years.⁷⁷⁷ Did officials here seek reductions in punishments?

The answer is likely yes. If the privilege was available, one would assume most would take advantage of it. However, there is no direct evidence of these officials asking for the privileges. An alternative approach would be to see if the officials actually endured the penalties meted out to them, suggesting that the penalty took effect. Here there is a little evidence. For example, Liu Zhi was demoted to Hanlin academician and reader-in-waiting 翰林侍讀學士 and made prefect of Caizhou 蔡州 in the fourth month of 1048.⁷⁷⁸ In the first month of the following year, he was indeed mentioned as Caizhou's prefect.⁷⁷⁹ In the ninth month of 1044, Zhang Mian 張沔 was demoted from Director of the Ministry of Punishments 刑部郎中 to Director of the

⁷⁷⁴ SHY Zhiguan 65.4.

⁷⁷⁵ These individuals were Wang Gongchen 王拱辰, Liu Zhi 柳植, Cheng Kan 程戡, Yu Zhouxun 魚周詢 (all in CB 164.3943), Wang Deji, Wang Zhongyong 王中庸, and Liu Yuanyu 劉元瑜 (in CB 164.3949).

⁷⁷⁶ Lo, *Civil Service*, 191-92.

⁷⁷⁷ McKnight, "Song Legal Privileges," 95-106, and esp. 96-99 for the types of privileges and disenrollment.

⁷⁷⁸ CB 164.3943.

⁷⁷⁹ CB 166.3981-82.

Ministry of Works 工部郎中 (both 6b) because of the Baozhou, Hebei mutiny.⁷⁸⁰ Less than four years later, in early 1048, Zhang still held that personal rank when he was again demoted, this time to Vice Director of the Ministry of Punishments 都官員外郎 (7a), for failing to investigate the Li Jiao affair thoroughly.⁷⁸¹ Finally, we know that Li Tan was indeed sent down to Guangnan to serve as administrative aide.⁷⁸² We can see, then, that at least some of the punishments did hold. Assuming people tried to use their legal privileges when possible, then the punishments listed probably occurred after those privileges were taken into account.

Sorting Out Mixed Behaviors

While there were some officials who clearly deserved rewards, and others who clearly deserved punishments, a handful of officials acted in both positive and negative ways from the perspective of the court. This could spark comment from officials and even ignited debates as the emperor and others wrestled with what would be an appropriate action. As seen above, Jia Changchao got a promotion for his role in the Beizhou mutiny suppression campaign. However, this reward received criticism from the Hanlin academician reader-in-waiting Yang Xie 楊偕 (980-1049), who pointed out, “The rebels appeared within [Jia] Changchao’s jurisdiction, and it got to the point that [the court had to] send out top officials, and only then were they able to pacify [the mutineers]. [Jia] Changchao [should be] punished and ought not to be rewarded.” This did not sway Renzong.⁷⁸³ Four additional examples merit close attention.

The first is Li Shiheng, the defender of the Jianmen Pass between Sichuan and Shaanxi. Li was prefect of Jianzhou, where the pass was located. According to Li’s *Songshi* biography,

⁷⁸⁰ CB 152.3696.

⁷⁸¹ CB 163.3918 and SHY Zhiguan 65.3.

⁷⁸² *Sushui jiwen* 4.71.

⁷⁸³ CB 162.3908.

“Wang Jun rebelled, and [Li] Shiheng determined that the prefecture’s soldiers were not enough to defend [the seat], so he promptly abandoned the city and burned the fodder and grain. He [then] carted the gold and silk eastward to defend Jianmen.”⁷⁸⁴ The mutineers attacked Jianzhou’s seat but found the city empty of supplies, causing them hasten towards Jianmen where they were defeated, losing several thousand allegedly.⁷⁸⁵ Li reported the victory by the end of the first month of 1000, and the emperor promoted him a full rank and bestowed upon him purple robes and a fish satchel, signs of high office.⁷⁸⁶ However, sometime after this, one or more suppression commissioners protested that Li had abandoned his city. Who did this is unclear. Li’s *Songshi* biography only says it was a commissioner 使者, while the *Changbian* records the charge against him was leveled by a Chuanxia suppression commissioner 川峡招安使.⁷⁸⁷ This could refer to Lei Youzhong, Li Hui, Shi Pu, or Li Shoulun.⁷⁸⁸ However, since Lei Youzhong was likely related to Li Shiheng by that time, it was probably one of the other commissioners who spoke out against Li. Zhenzong was persuaded to punish Li instead, demoting him to supervise Qianzhou 虔州, Jiangnan West’s taxes.⁷⁸⁹ This did not seem to mar Li Shiheng’s career too much, however, as two years later he held the personal rank Zhenzong had given him initially for his defense of Jianmen.⁷⁹⁰ It is unclear if he kept that rank during his punishment, or if he was elevated again afterward. Either way, it indicates that ultimately Li’s

⁷⁸⁴ SS 299.9936. The *Changbian* has a very similar account: “The prefect of Jianzhou and Assistant Director of the Palace Library Li Shiheng heard about the plundering. On account of the prefectural seat being difficult to defend, he promptly burned the granaries and storehouses and transported the gold and silk, heading east to protect Jianmen” (CB 46.988).

⁷⁸⁵ SS 299.9936. Both the *Songshi* and *Changbian* accounts also suggest Li sent out placards inducing the mutineers and their supporters to surrender, with about one thousand responding. In the *Changbian* he allegedly had them join his army, while his *Songshi* biography simply states those who surrendered were treated without suspicion (see SS 299.9936 and CB 46.988).

⁷⁸⁶ CB 46.990. His promotion took him from 8a to 7a on the Nine Ranks system.

⁷⁸⁷ SS 299.9936 and CB 46.990-91.

⁷⁸⁸ CB 46.989.

⁷⁸⁹ SS 299.9936.

⁷⁹⁰ CB 53.1161.

success in defeating the mutineers outweighed his mistake in abandoning Jianzhou. The message intended from this may have been that prefects *should* defend their seats and expect punishment if they flee, but that can be offset if they bring about a more significant victory on account of that dereliction of duty.

Another example of deciding how to handle commendable and dishonorable behavior was Zhending Circuit Area Chief Administrator 真定路都部署 Li Zhaoliang. The Baozhou mutineers requested to speak with him, and therefore he was dispatched to convince them to surrender. Allegedly he arrived with a small group of cavalry and approached the mutineers unarmed and without armor. For his actions contributing to a successful end to the mutiny, Li was given rewards including a reappointment as prefect of Dingzhou and three hundred ounces of gold.⁷⁹¹ However, he had also distributed the women from the families of the mutineers among the armies and took some into his own home, and this was emulated by Baozhou Vice Prefect Feng Bowen 馮博文 and others. Ouyang Xiu, then Hebei chief fiscal intendant, arrested and imprisoned Feng, and a terrified Li Zhaoliang immediately released the women in his home.⁷⁹² Ouyang submitted an impeachment of Li because he had seized women, but the emperor ignored the charges.⁷⁹³ There was no stated reason for the extremely lenient treatment of Li Zhaoliang, despite it being clear that he had abused the trust he projected when negotiating with the mutineers. Li's crime may have even played a role in another attempt at a mutiny the following month, suggesting that the action was not only immoral but also threatened the peace

⁷⁹¹ SS 464.13563.

⁷⁹² CB 152.3697-98. The *Changbian* simply states that Li “immediately released them 立出之.” It is unclear there if that meant all the women abducted by Li and Feng, including those given to the armies. The account of this event in Ouyang Xiu’s biography clarifies that Li “immediately released those women he received 立出所納婦,” leaving the fate of the other women unknown (SS 319.10377). Since Shi Daiju had held the title of Baozhou vice prefect when he was killed (CB 151.3676), it is safe to assume Feng was his replacement.

⁷⁹³ CB 152.3697-98 and SS 464.13563.

negotiated with the mutineers.⁷⁹⁴ The most plausible explanation for Renzong ignoring Li's behavior would be his family ties to the imperial clan, as noted in chapter two.⁷⁹⁵ His decision to release the women he had taken might also have played a role. Perhaps the emperor felt that was enough to make things right and that it showed contrition on Li's part; there is no evidence, by contrast, that Feng Bowen was released.

In a vein similar to Li Shiheng's exploits against Wang Jun, Hebei Judicial Intendant Tian Jing's actions against Wang Ze and his supporters clashed with his decision to flee Beizhou at the beginning of the mutiny. Tian and another judicial intendant, Ren Huangchang, abandoned their families and climbed over the walls carrying their official seals.⁷⁹⁶ Initially, because the mutiny had occurred in his jurisdiction, Tian was demoted to supervise Yunzhou's 鄆州 taxes.⁷⁹⁷ Following this ignoble flight, however, Tian consistently took successful steps to counter the mutiny. According to the censor He Tan 何鄰 (1004-1072), Tian was the first to send a report about the mutiny.⁷⁹⁸ Wen Yanbo also notes that he had only been in Beizhou for about a month when the uprising began. Tian fled from Beizhou to the South Pass 南關, where he entered a garrison to calm the troops there and executed a group of soldiers from Baozhou who had set fires to commoners' homes in response to the mutiny. One of Wang's supporters named Cui Xiang 崔象 came to Tian under the pretext of surrendering, but then attempted to stir up the local population, at which point Tian killed him. These actions persuaded the officers in the garrison at South Pass not to rebel. He then helped oversee attacks against Beizhou.⁷⁹⁹

⁷⁹⁴ CB 151.3689. The newly arrived prefect for Baozhou, Liu Huan, uncovered the plot. By killing the leader of the plot, he convinced the rest of the army to submit again.

⁷⁹⁵ SS 464.13563.

⁷⁹⁶ CB 161.3890-91.

⁷⁹⁷ CB 162.3908.

⁷⁹⁸ CB 162.3911.

⁷⁹⁹ CB 163.3917. This account is also repeated almost verbatim in Tian Jing's biography; see SS 303.10052. Presumably the Baozhou soldiers were there to fight the mutiny.

What stood out the most, however, was his behavior towards his family, who had remained behind in the city when he fled. The mutineers attempted to use them as a bargaining chip to negotiate with Tian:

The rebels tied up his wife and children, and they mounted the wall and were forced to say: “Do not attack the city, [if you do] they will slaughter us all on the wall.” Jing cried out to the assembled troops to continue to advance and attack. He fit arrows on his bow and shot up, killing four members of his family. The rebels realized that Tian Jing did not take them into consideration, and then pulled his wife and children away. 賊繫京妻子乘城，迫使呼曰：“毋亟攻城，城中將屠我輩矣。”京叱諸軍益進攻，注矢仰射，殺其家四人。賊知京無所顧，乃牽妻子去。⁸⁰⁰

Putting loyalty to the state ahead of loyalty to one’s family was unusual for a society that put such a primacy on the family—filial piety was the core tenet of Confucianism. Tian’s willingness to sacrifice the safety of his family, and even kill some members, did not go unnoticed by the court. An unnamed member of the Censorate remarked, “His failure to inspect the mutineers was a minor infraction, but his righteousness in forgetting his family for the sake of the country was major. It is not appropriate to demote him, and I seek also to change his post to prefect of Jiangyinjun 江陰軍 [in Liangzhe].”⁸⁰¹ Here the reasoning for reversing a demotion is spelled out, as the censor felt that Tian’s actions demonstrated a strong sense of loyalty to the state even at the expense of his close relations. Since this was a rather unique case that pitted loyalty to one’s family against that to the state, it was an opportunity for the court to send a message to other officials regarding how they should behave if found in a similar position. In

⁸⁰⁰ CB 163.3917.

⁸⁰¹ CB 163.3917.

other words, by forgiving Tian for his initial dereliction of duty on account of subsequent actions, the court made it clear that anyone serving the government should prioritize the state over family. It also illustrated that if an official did make a mistake, he could redeem himself by acting on a fierce loyalty to the dynasty.

While the first three cases given above involved a mixture of praiseworthy and blameworthy acts which the state needed to sort out when determining how to reward or punish, the case of Gaoyoujun's prefect Chao Zhongyue instead revolved around the question of what was an appropriate punishment. As seen with Cai Xiang's criticism above, Chao failed to resist Wang Lun and in fact welcomed him.⁸⁰² Even worse, he also made wealthy commoners provide gifts to the rebels and allowed them passage without violence.⁸⁰³ Little seemed to weigh in Chao's favor.

However, the case sparked a debate at court between Fan Zhongyan and Fu Bi, erstwhile allies in the reform movement gaining steam in 1043. Fu and Fan differed on how Chao should be punished. Fu Bi recommended execution, decrying Chao's unwillingness to oppose the rebels and his pilfering of the people, adding, "I have heard of the people of Gaoyou's urgently desiring to feast on his flesh; it is not permissible to release him 聞高郵之民疾之欲食其肉，不可釋也。"⁸⁰⁴ Fan Zhongyan disagreed:

If a jurisdiction's weapons and shackles were sufficient to use to fight and defend, but on encountering rebels one did not resist and moreover bribed them [i.e., the rebels], in this case what the law ought to be is execution. Now, Gaoyou lacked weapons and shackles. As for Zhongyue's propriety, although he ought to have striven to fight and defend, in

⁸⁰² QSW 46:1002.366.

⁸⁰³ CB 145.3499.

⁸⁰⁴ CB 145.3499.

such a situation there can be a pardon, and as for executing him, I fear this is not the intent of the law. With regards to the sentiments of the common people, although he prepared a feast with their property, he was able to spare them from killing and pillaging. The reason [for this behavior] is in part out of fondness for them [i.e., the people]. To say then that they want to feast on his flesh, those who spread [such views] are excessive. 郡縣兵械，足以戰守，遇賊不禦，而又賂之，此法所當誅也。今高郵無兵與械，雖仲約之義，當勉力戰守，然事有可恕，戮之，恐非法意也。小民之情，雖釀出財物，而得免於殺掠，理或喜之，而云欲食其肉，傳者過也。⁸⁰⁵

To Fan, it was important to take into account the situation. If Gaoyoujun did indeed lack a means to resist the mutineers, how could Chao be expected to resist Wang's forces? On the contrary, by compelling people to give a feast, he sated the appetites of Wang and his followers and thus prevented violence against the people under his charge. Renzong decided in favor of Fan's position.⁸⁰⁶ Chao was sent under registered control to Shaozhou 韶州 in Guangnan East circuit.⁸⁰⁷ Apparently the incident led to a falling out between Fu Bi and Fan Zhongyan. Fu accused Fan of failing to uphold the law, while Fan countered, "Since the times of the founders, we have never recklessly killed an official."⁸⁰⁸ After the incident, "the two men were uneasy at court," although Fu eventually came to agree with Fan.⁸⁰⁹ Both Fan and Fu agreed that Chao deserved to be punished, but differed on the appropriate severity of the punishment. Ultimately the emperor decided to lean towards mercy. It is clear that the mitigating factor was a recognition that while Chao had committed a serious crime not only by failing to resist but also even aiding

⁸⁰⁵ CB 145.3499.

⁸⁰⁶ CB 145.3499.

⁸⁰⁷ SHY Zhiguan 64.43.

⁸⁰⁸ CB 145.3499.

⁸⁰⁹ CB 145.3499.

Wang through gifts, he had saved the lives of people in his prefecture by doing so. The message Renzong and Fan Zhongyan likely wanted to send was that it was a crime not to resist, but the state acknowledged there were circumstances where leniency could be offered if an official broke the law in an effort to spare those he was tasked to defend.

Pacifying the People

Aside from rewards and punishments given to those directly involved with the mutinies and their suppression, the Song government sought to take steps to improve its relationship with the population of the places affected by the unrest. Often this involved reducing or eliminating taxes and commuting sentences. The state remained wary of the local population, however, as seen with efforts at continued surveillance and rooting out perceived threats. We have a decent amount of information about such efforts following the Sichuan, Guangnan, and Beizhou, Hebei mutinies, so they will serve as examples.

After Wang Jun's death around the end of the ninth month of 1000, the Song moved ahead to reduce tensions in Sichuan. Zhenzong issued an act of grace pardoning prisoners facing the death penalty in Sichuan.⁸¹⁰ The emperor also sent an amnesty for soldiers and commoners "forced" to fight for Wang.⁸¹¹ He furthermore dispatched Wang Qinruo and Liang Hao to the region as pacification commissioners, with Yuan Jifu 袁及甫 and Li Yizhi 李易直 assisting them. They were tasked with looking into who had been imprisoned and to reduce punishments by one degree from the death penalty down.⁸¹² This echoed Tian Xi's recommendations to issue pardons as the Han dynasty did during times of disaster, discussed in chapter one.⁸¹³

⁸¹⁰ CB 47.1029.

⁸¹¹ QSW 11:218.37.

⁸¹² CB 47.1030.

⁸¹³ QSW 5:87.130.

However, even if the pardons were in fact enforced, people in Sichuan remained wary of Song authorities. Ma Liang stated in an audience with the emperor in the second month of the following year that many families continued to hide in the wilderness. Ma asked that the prisoners who had accompanied him from Sichuan be pardoned to convince families to return to their homes, which the emperor granted.⁸¹⁴ Song officials also had to deal with unrest that spun out of the mutiny itself. In the eastern Sichuan haltered-and-bridled prefecture of Gaozhou 高州, the Xi Man people there made plans to defend themselves, but furthermore began robbing others on the road. Fiscal Intendant Ding Wei 丁謂 (966-1037) met with a leader of the Xi Man named Tian Yanyi 田彥伊, who agreed to stop the attacks and place engraved stones marking the boundaries of the Xi Man territory. Tian sent his son with local products as a gift, surrendered weapons to the Song, and stated they would not violate the borders.⁸¹⁵ Through these steps, the Song hoped to deescalate tensions with the local population and return to a more stable relationship.

At the same time, however, the state continued to take steps to identify and curb any potential unrest. This is clear from two examples. First, in the twelfth month of 1001, Zhenzong issued an order to officials in Sichuan:

I have heard that in western Shu, following the Wang Jun uprising, the people's hearts are not yet at ease. There are also petty people who secretly deceive and confuse [the people]. It is appropriate to order senior officials to increase surveillance strictly. Make an announcement that, if there are rumors [intended] to sway the masses, they will be

⁸¹⁴ CB 48.1045.

⁸¹⁵ CB 47.1032. The *Changbian* records that the local products were “tribute” 貢. For Gaozhou's status as a haltered-and-bridled prefecture, see SS 89.2218-19. At the time Ding was serving as Xia Circuit fiscal intendant, later made Kuizhou Circuit fiscal intendant after the division of Sichuan into four circuits (SS 283.9566).

treated very severely and stopped. 聞西蜀自王均叛擾之後，人心未寧，亦有小民，潛相誑惑。宜令長吏嚴加警察，有訛言動眾，情理切害，斬訖以聞。⁸¹⁶

Evidently sympathies with Wang Jun remained in Sichuan over a year after his death, prompting the emperor to order his officials to stay vigilant. Two years later, in 1003, Chengdu Prefect Ma Zhijie requested that the court reissue pardon certificates given to those who had supported the Li Shun rebellion and Wang Jun mutiny but surrendered to the Song. The purpose was again to keep tabs on civilians, specifically those who had sided with the rebels and mutineers. This is clear from Ma's explanation that issuing new certificates would allow them to determine the number of certificate holders and "use [that] to defend against treachery and deceit 以防姦偽."⁸¹⁷ Three years following the Wang Jun mutiny, and eight years after the Li Shun rebellion, the Song remained concerned about the potential for unrest in Sichuan, prompting officials to advocate for measures to continue watching the population there closely.

In addition, in 1002, Ma Zhijie made a request regarding prefectural soldiers 州兵 who had rejected Wang Jun and killed mutineers. After the mutiny, the emperor consequently gave this group the title of "Zhongyong (loyal and brave 忠勇)" and promoted the soldiers to the imperial army, i.e., they became combat troops as part of the Zhongyong Army. Ma noted that their pay remained the same after the promotion—they were receiving salaries for prefectural troops, not imperial army soldiers 升為禁軍，而月給仍舊. He asked that those with "skill and bravery" be retained as members of the imperial army, but that the rest return to prefectural soldier status. Zhenzong had reservations about this, replying, "Since this cohort has renown for being loyal and obedient, how could it be permitted to demote them 此輩既名忠順，安可斥

⁸¹⁶ QSW 11:218.37.

⁸¹⁷ QSW 8:163.219.

退?” Instead, the emperor ordered to increase all the soldiers’ pay to match that of the imperial army.⁸¹⁸

The issue underlying this was probably grievances of the soldiers that they enjoyed a higher title as imperial army soldiers, but without the corresponding pay increase. Ma, perhaps with an eye towards the existing financial arrangements for Chengdu, wanted to demote less effective members of the group. This could have allowed him to pay an appropriate monthly salary to the remaining promoted soldiers, though he left such a goal unstated. The emperor seems to have recognized Ma’s intent, which is why he ordered the pay increase. Zhenzong may also have been wary about demoting soldiers who had loyally served the Song during the outbreak of the mutiny. If there were disgruntled soldiers noticing their pay did not match their new status, taking a portion and demoting them would probably do little to help the situation. Furthermore, even if the soldiers had not proven themselves after the mutiny, was it proper for the government to strip them of the recognition of their loyal service? Zhenzong’s decision to increase the soldiers’ pay likely satisfied all parties: All of the soldiers would keep their improved status as imperial army troops and now also received appropriate pay; Ma was able to get support from the emperor to increase salaries, curbing potential complaints from those soldiers; and the emperor was able to demonstrate his concern for the wellbeing of the military and his commitment to reward all those who stood with the Song when faced with an uprising by their peers.

As with the Wang Jun mutiny, the emperor issued an act of grace following the Chen Jin mutiny. All convicts, including those facing the death penalty, in Yizhou, Liuzhou, Xiangzhou, and Huaiyuanjun were pardoned, while those elsewhere in Guangnan East and West circuits had

⁸¹⁸ CB 51.1125.

their sentences reduced by one degree, with supporters of the mutineers who turned themselves in not to be punished 勿理. The emperor also ordered the reduction of the head tax 丁錢 and summer and fall taxes for Yizhou, Liuzhou, Xiangzhou, and Huaiyuanjun, while lowering the fall tax for Guizhou and Zhaozhou.⁸¹⁹ The four prefectures were likely singled out for especially generous treatment because the key moments of the mutiny and suppression campaign had occurred there.⁸²⁰ Other parts of the Guangnan region, chiefly Guangzhou, had prepared defenses in the event the mutiny spread further, which probably explains the extension of the amnesty over the whole territory.⁸²¹

As noted in chapter three, Xiangzhou was also promoted to a *fangyu* prefecture status—the second-highest in the *jiedu* ranking system—as a consequence of its success in resisting a siege laid by Chen.⁸²² This granted Xiangzhou's government additional resources, strengthening its position in the region, presumably seen as more reliable because of the victory scored there. Finally, there was a clean-up effort similar to the dispatch of Wang Qinruo and Liang Hao to Sichuan. As mentioned before, Shi Chonggui and Yu Derun remained at Guizhou to oversee efforts to convince the remaining mutineers to surrender. Cao Liyong was to survey the prefectures and then return to court, probably to inform the emperor about what the situation was on the ground. Cao was also told to leave behind servitors 使臣, lower-ranking military officials, to head Huaiyuanjun and Tianhezhai and serve as Xiangzhou's patrolling inspector due to the potential instability caused by the mutiny.⁸²³ Cao said he had finished handling the remnants of

⁸¹⁹ CB 67.1499.

⁸²⁰ Yizhou was where the mutiny began, Huaiyuanjun successfully repelled an attack from Chen's forces, Liuzhou was captured by the mutineers, and Xiangzhou endured a forty day siege without falling (see SHY Bing 10.12-13).

⁸²¹ CB 66.1485 for Zhou Wenzhi's preparation of defenses at Guangzhou, including a blockade using commandeered boats at Duanzhou to the west.

⁸²² CB 67.1498.

⁸²³ CB 67.1499.

the mutineers by the twelfth month of 1007.⁸²⁴ Similar to Sichuan following Wang Jun, the court wanted to finish rooting out supporters of Chen Jin and to ensure the stability of the areas of Guangnan directly affected by the mutiny.

The aftermath of the Wang Ze mutiny featured similar methods to those employed following the demise of Wang Jun and Chen Jin. Emperor Renzong duly issued an amnesty for Hebei. He also eliminated the summer and fall taxes, but only for “the people’s fields which soldiers had trampled 兵所踐民田,” presumably a much smaller area than the multiple prefectures that witnessed reduced taxes in Guangnan.⁸²⁵ This “trampling” may have been a euphemism for looting, as Tian Jing had to put a stop to Baozhou soldiers’ burning of commoners’ homes.⁸²⁶ The intensity of the damage around Beizhou, and the smaller geographic scope of the damage, may explain why taxes were eliminated 除 on Beizhou’s fields while taxes in Guangnan were only reduced 蠲.⁸²⁷ The several prefectures struck by Chen’s mutiny on the whole probably did not suffer as intense damage in any given area as the fields around Beizhou, and eliminating taxes for the immediate area surrounding the prefectural seat was easier for the state to endure than eliminating taxes across several prefectures. Xiangzhou did face a forty-day siege, but the siege at Beizhou lasted sixty-five days, and the number of people surrounding the latter was greater, too.⁸²⁸ Even so, the region beyond Beizhou evidently was not doing well, as

⁸²⁴ CB 67.1510.

⁸²⁵ CB 162.3906.

⁸²⁶ CB 163.3917.

⁸²⁷ CB 162.3906 and 67.1499.

⁸²⁸ For the duration of the sieges, see SHY Bing 10.13 for Xiangzhou and CB 162.3906 for Beizhou. The numbers of troops besieging the respective prefectural seats are unclear, but evidence points to a larger contingent surrounding Beizhou. There were about three thousand supporters for Chen, including family members, when they fled Yizhou, but the number likely fell by the time the siege began (SHY Bing 10.13). By contrast, the Song forces at Beizhou included at least 8,400 soldiers (CB 162.3907), and perhaps another 20,000 people who helped build the observation tower to look over the city wall (CB 162.3902). The latter number seems high and might include locals or some of the soldiers, but it can still serve as an upper limit. Thus, at a minimum, there were more than twice as many Song soldiers and laborers surrounding Beizhou than mutineers besieging Xiangzhou, and perhaps more than nine times as many.

several nearby prefectures suffered from a famine. In the month following the recapture of Beizhou, the emperor sent twenty thousand strings of cash to Yingzhou 瀛州, Mozhou 莫州, Beizhou, and Jizhou to help families redeem the children they had sold as a result of the natural disaster.⁸²⁹ How much of the economic dislocation was also due to the mutiny is unclear, though it likely did little to help the situation. If people were forced to sell their children because of the mutiny, then obviously there would be grievances towards the state. Even if the reason was purely the famine, having to sell one's children likely added to any simmering tensions in the area. The move to help parents probably helped to improve the state's relationship with local society in and around Beizhou, regardless of the circumstances that prompted the selling.

The Song government also adopted administrative and symbolic measures aimed to improve its control over central Hebei and bolster its legitimacy at the local level. Like with the promotion of Xiangzhou, the court manipulated the prefectural rankings of Jizhou and Beizhou, while Beizhou was also renamed Enzhou.⁸³⁰ The emperor also ordered the construction of the Jingzhong Temple 旌忠寺. The stated purpose was to pray for the wellbeing of the soldiers who had died during the siege.⁸³¹ However, the name literally translates as “Manifesting Loyalty Temple.” This suggests the religious site was not only intended to tend to the dead, but also to stress the importance of loyalty to the living.⁸³² In the same edict, Renzong called for the performance of the Water-Land Retreat 水陸齋, a costly ritual intended to aid those who had died, but also demonstrating imperial concern for the soldiers. Although intended for the

⁸²⁹ CB 163.3919.

⁸³⁰ SHY Fangyu 5.2 (for Jizhou) and 29 (for Beizhou).

⁸³¹ CB 162.3907.

⁸³² Incidentally, this is the same title Ma Sui's wife received (旌忠縣君) in recognition of his actions against Wang Ze, further demonstrating the message Renzong intended to send (SS 446.13152).

Beizhou mutiny, the ritual was to be performed at Pu'an Temple 普安院 in the capital region.⁸³³

The reason to carry out the retreat at the capital is unclear.⁸³⁴ Taken together, the changes in administrative rankings and symbolic steps were intended to bolster the Song's position in central Hebei by shifting state power away from Beizhou and improving the dynasty's legitimacy in the region.

As seen with the continued surveillance in Sichuan, however, the Song government worked to uproot the remaining supporters of Wang Ze and his sect. With Tian Jing's summary execution of Cui Xiang, one of Wang's adherents, outside of Beizhou, it was clear that there was some number of sectarians outside of the besieged city.⁸³⁵ The rumor of Li Jiao's presence with the mutineers also indicated a broader connection. Li's family resided at nearby Jizhou, and a man from Zhendingfu, Hebei West Circuit allegedly trained Li Jiao in sorcery, giving the impression of a regional network that included soldiers, clerks, and even members of the scholar-official class.⁸³⁶ This was further reinforced with two failed attempts at mutinies in nearby Shenzhou 深州 and Qizhou 齊州.⁸³⁷ According to the *Changbian* and *Songshi* accounts, Wang's supporters traveled to Qizhou and Dezhou 德州 to the southeast of Beizhou in order to form a compact between adherents in these places to help overthrow Song control of North China.⁸³⁸ Although it is unclear if the uprisings actually had a connection with Wang Ze, the Song

⁸³³ CB 162.3907.

⁸³⁴ Pu'an Temple had ties to the Song imperial family, which might have served as justification. Taizu and Taizong's mother established a buddha hall 佛殿 there, and the coffin of Consort Li, Zhenzong's birth mother who was posthumously promoted to Empress Yuande, was stored at the temple before burial. See SHY Dao Shi 2.12.

⁸³⁵ CB 163.3917.

⁸³⁶ CB 163.3918.

⁸³⁷ CB 162.3906 for Shenzhou and CB 163.3935 for Qizhou.

⁸³⁸ CB 161.3890 and SS 292.9970. It does not say that Wang's followers approached anyone in Shenzhou, but it is entirely possible.

government clearly assumed they did.⁸³⁹ In the case at Shenzhou, the would-be mutineer Pang Dan 龐旦 planned to kill officers posted there on the first day of the new year, which was the same time that Wang Ze had planned to launch the mutiny, and the *Changbian* recorded that Pang intended to “plunder the storehouses and weapons to respond to it [i.e., the Wang Ze mutiny].”⁸⁴⁰ The Qizhou mutineers Ma Da 馬達 and Zhang Qing 張青 also allegedly wanted to revolt “to respond to [Wang] Ze.”⁸⁴¹ Taken together, these incidents revealed to the Song government that it faced the possibility of continued unrest unless it addressed a potential network spanning multiple prefectures north of the capital.

Details are scarce, but it appears that the local government initiated a large-scale crackdown on sectarians in Hebei. Similar to Lei Youzhong’s violent efforts to eliminate Wang Jun’s supporters, officials cast a wide net as they tried to apprehend people who belonged to the “heterodox gang 妖黨.”⁸⁴² This is evident in Renzong’s concerns that the arrests could scoop up “the good people 良民.” He therefore issued an edict to caution against the excessive pursuit of heterodox believers.⁸⁴³ The Hanlin academician Zhang Fangping also expressed reservations about this obsession to root out such people:

Recently, on account of the Bei[zhou] rebels harboring wickedness and causing disorder, the court again prosecuted the imprisonment of Li Tan, and Zhang Cun for example suffered heavy punishment. The prefectures received instruction and became aware of the occurrence of seditious (or heterodox) affairs. It has come to the point that chanting

⁸³⁹ At the very least, the plotters at Shenzhou and Qizhou took advantage of the disorder caused by the mutiny at Beizhou.

⁸⁴⁰ CB 162.3906. See CB 161.3890 for Wang’s plans.

⁸⁴¹ CB 163.3935.

⁸⁴² CB 47.1026 for the case with Wang Jun’s followers.

⁸⁴³ CB 163.3920.

sutras, making offerings to the Buddha, and amulets are forbidden arts. When encountered [people] are seized and bound, and this has spread to the commoners... I have seen that there are more than seventy cases submitted to the Judicial Control Office, and within those [i.e., the seventy cases] over twenty are connected to these heterodox matters. Although [Your Majesty] recently sent down a decree to end [the investigations], I am afraid that officials refer to Li Tan as a warning, and they have not returned to a heart of peace and forgiveness. 近因貝賊挾妖為亂，朝廷又追劾李曇之獄，張存等例蒙重罰。州郡承風，覺發妖事，至於誦經供佛，符咒禁術，盡遭捕繫，蔓延平民。。。臣見判審刑院奏案七十餘道，內二十餘道係是妖事。雖近降朝旨嚴加止絕，但恐官吏指李曇為鑒戒，無復更平恕之心。⁸⁴⁴

According to Zhang, the emperor's order for officials to pull back on their investigations had limited success. They regarded even innocuous Buddhist activities such as sutra recitation as grounds for arrest, and this undoubtedly put a strain on relations between local society and the state. However, no massive uprising emerged in Hebei.⁸⁴⁵ It is also unclear how long the

⁸⁴⁴ CB 163.3928-29. Li Tan was the father of Li Jiao, who was rumored to have joined with Wang Ze, though in fact Li Jiao had committed suicide before the mutiny began, and Zhang Cun was father-in-law to Li Jiao's brother, implicating him (see CB 163.3918). One can read in Zhang's memorial an implicit criticism of the punishments meted out to Li Tan and Zhang Cun. In his view, the sentences of those two individuals overly alarmed officials who faced a similar concern about heterodox practices in their jurisdictions, sparking heavy-handed persecution that even targeted benign practices. What is left unsaid, but may have been Zhang Fangping's implicit point, was that this overzealous pursuit of heterodoxy would not have occurred if Li Tan and Zhang Cun had received less serious punishments.

⁸⁴⁵ At the same time, however, there was a large group of alleged "heterodox believers 妖人" that assembled in Caizhou 蔡州, a prefecture to the south of Kaifeng. It is unclear if they had any relationship to Wang's sect. The emperor dispatched a commissioner to arrest the ten people who convened the meeting. Caizhou's prefect Wu Yu persuaded the commissioner to send a constable rather than soldiers, and the affair ended without serious incident. Ten people were arrested and taken to the capital, but no crimes were discovered, prompting the court to punish the people who had reported the assembly, presumably for making false accusations (CB 163.3920).

investigations lasted, though they probably stopped by the seventh month of 1048 at the latest, when there were massive floods in Hebei.⁸⁴⁶

Conclusion

As seen above, the Song government enjoyed superior wealth and manpower over the mutineers, and this made the chance of survival, let alone victory, slim for the latter. Whenever possible, the mutineers did try to gain resources, often through plundering storehouses, and to build up their forces using civilians, at least some perhaps coerced. However, while materially they stood little chance against the Song, they could call into question the legitimacy of the dynasty. The leaders adopted high-sounding titles, and Wang Jun and Wang Ze even established fledgling governments with high officials, banners, and ritual implements. Song officials needed to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the mutineers, and so they killed the leaders, seized tangible symbols of the rival, nascent states, and made explicit their views that any titles assumed or granted by a mutiny leader were false.

Once the mutiny had ended, the Song went forward with rewards and punishments. On the mutineers' side, the leaders were killed in battle or executed with the exception of Wei Gui who showed little interest in standing against the dynasty. The surviving followers in a mutiny were generally pardoned, although large-scale summary executions of some portion did take place sometimes. On the Song's side, officials and soldiers received rewards, as did civilians who aided the dynasty. Those who died fighting the mutineers received posthumous titles, and their families were also rewarded, namely as the sons of the deceased received ranks. Family ties could also be a liability if an official performed poorly, however, as seen with the case of Zhang

⁸⁴⁶ See SHY Ruiyi 3.2 and SS 61.1326. The *Songshi* says that a dike in Chanzhou burst in the sixth month, while in the seventh month heavy rains in Weizhou led to flooding in Hebei. The soldiers stationed in the area fled, exacerbating the problem.

Deyi. Officials deemed responsible for the mutiny's unfolding could also be punished. There were a few cases where an official performed well in some aspects but poorly in others. In those situations, there was an effort to balance the merits and demerits, with an awareness that others in officialdom were watching and would take the fate of those individuals into account if facing similar circumstances.

Finally, the Song attempted to restore its control over a region affected by mutiny. A major cornerstone to this was to mollify the civilian population there by granting amnesties, reductions of punishment, and tax relief. Following the Wang Ze mutiny, there were also symbolic steps taken, such as the construction of a temple and offerings to those who died fighting the mutineers. However, a lingering concern about the potential for renewed unrest remained in at least some cases. This could prompt heightened surveillance, tracking those who had been pardoned, and even purges and persecutions. Such measures may have been seen as necessary, at least among officials on the ground, but there were attempts to restrain local governments from rooting out dissent too aggressively.

Conclusion

In his 1977 survey of the merits and demerits of each dynasty's government, Qian Mu is particularly critical of the Song. When comparing the Song to the Han and Tang in particular, he saw the Song as the least impressive of the three.⁸⁴⁷ Qian cites the Song's military as one example of the dynasty's weakness, although he acknowledges that many of the army's woes came from developments during the Tang and Five Dynasties. The problems he identifies are many of those mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation. The state used soldiers, particularly in the prefectural army, as laborers, while facial tattoos to prevent desertion brought down the reputation of soldiers so that they were on par with convicts. The ineffectiveness of the military was exacerbated due to geographic issues, namely the North China Plain which afforded the capital and the Song-Liao border little protection from the cavalry of Liao. The army became bloated, in part because the state continued to build up its defenses and because the army retained older soldiers who were no longer effective fighters. The use of hired soldiers, while potentially useful in some circumstances, was ill-suited for the defensive policy that the Song pursued with Liao. The Song government's concerns over powerful military leaders and haughty soldiers led to a division in the army between rank-and-file soldiers routinely rotated between the capital and the provinces and their temporary commanding officers. There was also an effort to support civilian side of the government and lower the status of the military.⁸⁴⁸

Qian did note that one positive consequence of the weakness of the military was a cultural rejuvenation, above all the rise of Neo-Confucianism, which the growing emphasis on civil officials in government enabled.⁸⁴⁹ However, the weakened military could still cause

⁸⁴⁷ Qian, *Zhongguo lidai zhengzhi deshi*, 71.

⁸⁴⁸ Qian, *Zhongguo lidai zhengzhi deshi*, 87-94 for Qian's discussion of the Song military.

⁸⁴⁹ Qian, *Zhongguo lidai zhengzhi deshi*, 91-92.

internal unrest.⁸⁵⁰ Although there are now critiques of some assumptions, such as the view that Emperor Taizu intentionally curtailed the military in favor of civil officials, Qian's overall description and conclusions remain valid, including the ongoing issue of low-grade unrest within the army.⁸⁵¹ While no threat from the army akin to the military governors of times past emerged during the Song, there continued to be a degree of unrest among soldiers. This could at times erupt in violence targeting local officials and sometimes the Song dynasty itself. This dissertation's goal was to identify how the government dealt with such uprisings in order to understand better how the state administered the empire. In each chapter I examine a different aspect of the Song's suppression efforts.

In chapter one, we study officials' proposals to end the mutinies. We find that they made suggestions which point to a belief that the Song state was quite capable of bringing the government's power to bear on the mutineers while the government also sought to draw support from parts of local society. They supported pardoning lower-ranking mutineers while their superiors faced the full extent of the law, boosting defenses and troop numbers to prevent future outbreaks of violence, and drawing on other elements of local society to counter the mutiny. Pardons could reveal a tacit acceptance that a state could not effectively control certain elements, and this was the case at times when, for example, bandit leaders were given government posts or other rewards. However, the leaders of the mutinies were almost all killed in battle or executed, and when it is clear from the sources that the rank and file of the mutineers were pardoned, they were subsequently split up and relocated to other garrisons. The pardons issued at the end of the mutinies did not grant any sort of posts to the mutineers, and while officials suggested using

⁸⁵⁰ Qian, *Zhongguo lidai zhengzhi deshi*, 90.

⁸⁵¹ For example, Qian recounted the story of Taizu asking that his successors never kill a scholar-official (Qian, *Zhongguo lidai zhengzhi deshi*, 91). Charles Hartman has found that the account is likely a fabrication started in the Southern Song (Hartman, "Cao Xun and the Legend of Emperor Taizu's Oath").

rewards, there is no evidence that any mutineer received a reward aside from avoiding punishment. The state did not relocate civilians who fought alongside the mutineers, but proposals indicated that it did attempt to keep tabs on them, at least in the case of the Wang Jun mutiny.

Officials also recommended that the Song use its wealth to increase the state's presence at the local level and to recruit support in the area where a mutiny broke out. This included calls for improved physical defenses and elevated troop numbers, but more attention was paid to trying to gain support from the populace. Officials suggested distributing wealth and other rewards like official ranks in order to convince locals to stand with the dynasty against the mutineers. Since official ranks granted not only heightened social status but also pecuniary benefits like tax breaks, the Song was in a sense again relying on the vast revenue it received to sway elements of local society in order to absorb the loss of taxes.⁸⁵² Interestingly, officials did not argue that such rewards be provided to local elites, but rather to more “fringe” elements like bandits, convicts, and officials under administrative sanction. Given Ouyang Xiu's belief that these individuals could infiltrate the mutineers, the purpose of the overtures to marginalized social groups was twofold. First, they could aid the state, but second, in that very support, they would deny the mutineers access to elements of society that had grievances with the state and consequently appeared to be natural allies of a mutiny. There was confidence in these proposals that the state could not only increase its influence at the local level by boosting garrisons but also that the government could reach into society, even to those who had reason to oppose the state, and bring them to the Song's side. Evidence is scant that many of the proposals were put into

⁸⁵² Hartman, “Sung Government and Politics,” 50 for a brief description of privileges given to official households 官戶 in the Song.

practice, but the act of submitting these memorials to the throne suggests that their authors believed it was plausible for the state to carry out their suggestions.

When observing in chapter two how the Song selected officials to fight the mutineers, we find that the court looked for effective leadership while also ensuring that those in the field did not work against the central government's interests. Most officials for whom we have background information had served in military operations, either leading troops or overseeing operations, often as part of civilian oversight of the Song army. What is most noteworthy of the pool of officials dispatched was that they came from different quarters of the Song government, namely the military, the civil bureaucracy, and the inner palace. Each group brought different qualities to the suppression campaigns. Military officers provided military expertise, an obvious asset when confronting a mutiny. Civil officials served as the leaders and supervisors of campaigns. They also linked the court and the field, receiving directions from Kaifeng while sending word of developments in the campaign back to the capital. In a sense, their role paralleled that of the (mostly civilian) prefects and military intendants, who maintained civilian control of the army in peacetime as well as during times of war. The sense of superiority that civil officials typically displayed towards their military counterparts in the Song likely weakened the potential for collusion between the two. Finally, eunuchs, many with extensive military experience, carried out sensitive deliveries of amnesties, led troops, could report separately to the emperor, and in other ways acted as stand-ins for the emperor; the eunuchs' very presence despite the antipathy civil officials had for them suggests the emperor was an active participant in making personnel selections in the face of a crisis like a mutiny.

This mixture of officials allowed each group's strengths to shine. However, they did serve to counter each other to some degree, and yet this appears not to have seriously harmed any

of the campaigns. In fact, it sometimes worked in the dynasty's favor. When unnamed generals were allegedly killing civilians following the capture of Chengdu near the end of the Wang Jun mutiny, Ma Liang intervened to save many people. Ma later distributed rice to the population while the prefect of Chengdu, Lei Youzhong, seems to have ignored that responsibility of his office in his zeal to root out sympathizers of the mutineers. Such overlap could reduce efficiency, but it could also help to curb excesses. At the same time, vertical channels of communication were susceptible to problems of their own, as seen when Ming Hao's reports from Beizhou were blocked by Xia Song on account of personal enmity. How the court came to learn of Xia's obstructionism is unclear, but it may be telling that the specially appointed mounted courier at Beizhou, Li Jihe, was a eunuch, and he likely had a more direct avenue to the throne.

Finally, marriage relationships between some officials as well as between officials and the imperial clan might also have helped the court maintain control over the suppression campaigns. The marital ties some officials enjoyed with the Zhao family obviously gave them a vested interest in the Song's continued survival. In the case of Li Zhaoliang even the mutineers seemed to have valued his relationship to the emperor by way of Li's great aunt. On the other hand, the appearance of brothers-in-law on the field together seems to fly in the face of the avoidance policy of the time which prevented relatives from serving within the same office or branch of the government. However, the practice of collective punishment, wherein even in-laws could suffer for one's crimes, likely increased the pressure on officials to perform well. Their family, and their affines, were generally located elsewhere in the empire, and that made them in a sense hostages of the state, susceptible to collective punishment based on the poor actions of their own kin or an in-law on the campaign.

In the third chapter, we see that the administrative landscape of the Northern Song took shape according to the needs of the state, as shown in Ruth Mostern's earlier study. Some areas had a high concentration of soldiers due to cross-border tensions. The Song was able to besiege the mutineers holed up in Baozhou and Beizhou in Hebei because of the density of troops along the Song-Liao border. However, other regions were only thinly garrisoned since they did not merit a significant defense, often serving as pools of wealth from which the state could draw revenue to fund defenses and other government projects elsewhere. This allowed Wang Lun and his accompanying mutineers and bandits to roam relatively freely across Huainan for two months, but in the end the forces sent from Jingdong East Circuit and Huainan's own troops and local law enforcement proved sufficient to confront them. However, if it was deemed necessary the state could intercede with troops dispatched from outside the affected region, as was the case for the Wang Jun mutiny in Sichuan and the Chen Jin mutiny in Guangnan West. Although outside troops accompanied officials dispatched by the court in those cases, local officials remained active in resisting attacks by mutineers and gathering forces to go on the offensive when possible.

After the mutinies were put down, the local administration was readjusted to suit the dynasty's interests. This did not always entail a reduction of the military in the region. The court did have the number of commanderies in Chengdu reduced from two to one, but that was due to a longer pattern of unrest which had resulted in strained Song control and considerable bloodshed. Instead, the state more often focused on rearranging the administration through the promotion and demotion of prefectures and the division of fiscal or military circuits. Through this approach, the state intended to keep state capacity in the region roughly the same as before. It did this by rebalancing that capacity through a shift of human and material resources away

from a prefecture where a mutiny broke out towards another, presumably more reliable prefecture, such as one that successfully defended against the mutineers. The Song used this method to enhance its control of the area in a bid to prevent future uprisings.

Finally, in the fourth chapter, we look at the engagement between the Song and mutineers over local society and the aftermath of the mutiny suppression campaigns. As the Song and mutineers grappled with one another, it is clear that a serious asymmetry existed between the two sides. The Song enjoyed access to far more wealth and manpower than the mutineers, and as the sitting dynasty it had clear political legitimacy. Unable to match the weight of the Song government's resources brought to bear against them, the mutineers sought to assert their own legitimacy while challenging that of the Song. To be sure, mutineers used their military strength as best they could to acquire resources and impress local civilians to join the mutiny, but the chance of success in a major battle remained low unless the uprising gained momentum. The leaders of the mutinies often did this by taking symbolic measures to present themselves as plausible contenders for the Mandate of Heaven. Such measures included adopting titles for a mutiny's leader and establishing a new reign era, encroaching on the prerogatives of the Song emperor. These may seem frivolous to modern eyes, but it is clear the Song court took the challenge seriously because officials emphasized the titles were assumed falsely and historical records note that at least some of the physical symbols of the mutineers' fledgling state were seized, perhaps in an effort to prevent a later uprising rallying around such relics.

Following the defeat of the mutiny, the state then sought to restore order in the region. Continued suppression was part of the effort, but that was combined with attempts to assuage locals. The authors of pardons described people who fought alongside the mutineers as duped or coerced into joining—whether this was true probably varied from person to person—and they

therefore deserved a second chance, even if the government decided that pardon certificates and surveillance were necessary. The Song might offer tax breaks to people living in areas affected by a mutiny, and the dynasty rewarded those who actively assisted the government. The court also carried out symbolic and spiritual measures in a bid to improve relations with Beizhou following Wang Ze's demise. These measures included renaming the prefecture to Enzhou and building Jingzhong ("Manifesting Loyalty") Temple. As the construction of a religious site implies, the state was not solely concerned with mundane affairs, since its intended use was to pray for soldiers who died in battle, and this was reinforced with the concurrent order that a Buddhist ritual called the Water-Land Retreat be conducted at a temple in the capital. Interestingly, the state rarely seems to have tried to improve the treatment of soldiers.

This can probably be lined to the belief in the necessity for the state to reward those who served it and punished those who opposed it. In this way, the government could encourage or discourage certain behaviors. The leaders of most mutinies either died in battle or were later executed, with the notable exceptions of Baozhou's Wei Gui and perhaps Lu Chengjun who supported Chen Jin's mutiny. However, the state was willing to welcome back those who surrendered. This included the mutiny leaders Wei Gui and perhaps Lu Chengjun, but more often the Song granted pardons to the rank-and-file of the mutineers and civilians who sided with them. This was probably necessary to bring an end to the conflict since not all immediately submitted to the Song—Ma Liang, for example, noted that many supporters of Wang Jun had fled into the mountains, hiding from authorities. While many mutineers were likely spared execution, they did not avoid punishment altogether because they were subsequently dispersed to other garrisons, a sign of the government's caution against taking their surrender at face value.

On the government's side, rewards were given to most of those who put down a mutiny. The top tier officials dispatched to carry out operations received the best rewards, while the soldiers themselves were arranged into groups and rewarded according to their merit. There were exceptions, however. Local officials who fled from a mutiny were especially censured, but even those who participated in the suppression efforts could face punishment on the grounds that an uprising had broken out on their watch. The Guangnan fiscal intendant Shu Ben, for example, seemed to have fulfilled the duties of his office appropriately during the Chen Jin mutiny, and yet he incurred a demotion due to a failure of appropriate oversight. In a few cases, officials were rewarded and then subsequently punished, or vice versa, because of behavior which was admirable in some aspects and deserving of admonition in others. The reversals, which sometimes were accompanied by angry memorials and debates at court, indicate that officials in Kaifeng believed the government had to get rewards and punishments right. Weighing praiseworthy and blameworthy actions was not easy, as officials discussed thorny issues like the need for local officials to resist mutineers while also safeguarding civilians or an official failing to prevent an uprising while performing admirably in suppression efforts. Other officials would pay attention to the ways in which the government handled these issues, and the final decisions could affect their behavior in the future.

As I look beyond this dissertation towards the prospects of further research, a number of avenues appear that extend from certain parts of my work. One noteworthy aspect of the Song's response to mutinies was the government's ability to use wealth and status to reward support and punish wrongdoing or failure. The Song state could draw on a variety of resources, both material and symbolic, to reward or punish. Brian E. McKnight finds that the Song's "use of wealth includes both financing the means for suppressing enemies and purchasing the allegiance or at

least the toleration of the majority of society.” However, as a premodern government, it was also limited by the ability to draw revenue from the economy.⁸⁵³ Symbolic changes, such as the granting of ranks or the privilege to wear certain clothing, did not necessarily cost much, if anything, but should also be counted as a resource of the state. Additionally, there was a cost to punishing people, such as the time and resources spent on investigation, trial, transport, and the feeding and housing of penal laborers. With the officials’ proposals to reward and punish, and my analysis of how the government treated people who sided with or against the Song, I am curious to explore the development of the system of rewards and punishments during the dynasty. For example, what were the regulations and routine practices which guided people on how to reward effective officials and punish ineffective ones? Aside from monetary concerns, what other limitations were there on the kinds of rewards given? In addition, what can the difference in rewards and punishments between praiseworthy or culpable individuals tell us about Song government and social values?

A second area of future research is the role of administrative changes during the Song dynasty. What new developments occurred in administrative practices which helped or hindered the state’s response to mutinies? For example, the status of the Bureau of Military Affairs fell in importance vis-à-vis the Secretariat-Chancellery over the course of the Northern Song. What kind of an effect did the changes in relationships between different levels or parts of the government have on mutiny suppression? Above all, I am interested in the ways in which information flowed within the government and between the state and society. I would like to examine not only how information flowed under normal circumstances, but also focus on the cases where something goes wrong, such as when Xia Song blocked Ming Hao’s reports from

⁸⁵³ McKnight, *Law and Order*, 27-28 (quote on 27).

reaching the court. This is in part because the failure of an otherwise routine process is more likely to warrant attention, and because I believe that when something does not work as intended, it presents us with an excellent opportunity to learn more about the process, its limitations, and efforts to improve the process.

Finally, there is one thread which seems to weave through the dissertation, and that is the power of the state to attach labels in order to achieve its goals. We can see that the Song government employed this in several ways. In chapter one, we found that the emperor, his officials, and later historians in the Song used terms to delegitimize the efforts of mutineers. From the perspective of the state's agents and supporters, which they presented to themselves, to society, and to posterity, the mutineers were not just soldiers angry at mistreatment, they were *junzei*, or "soldier-thieves." When mutiny leaders gave titles to themselves and their supporters, the authors of memorials and histories made sure to point out that these were *false* titles. When officials requested pardons for the rank-and-file soldiers and commoners who joined the mutiny, they delegitimized and trivialized the concerns of those who took a stance against the government by arguing that those individuals who took up arms against the Song at the behest of mutiny leaders were "deceived" or "coerced."

In chapter two, we looked at the appointment of officials. Giving those ad hoc posts to officials granted them powers to act against the mutineers. The titles often spelled out the responsibility of an official, as seen with the Chuanxia Circuits pacification patrolling inspector. It also established a hierarchy of command to allow for the effective oversight and coordination of operations. In chapter three, we saw the use of *jiedu* ranks to raise or lower prefectures, which had both symbolic and real consequences for the local government, as the state used the ranks to highlight the success or failure of a given prefecture to stave off threats and to redistribute

personnel and resources in a bid to secure the region. With the renaming of Beizhou to Enzhou, Emperor Renzong hoped to demonstrate to the residents there the “mercy” which *en* meant. Finally, in chapter four, the Song government rewarded and punished officials with the raising or lowering of personal rank titles. There were sometimes questions raised about the reward or punishment of a specific official, indicating a desire to affix the title which best suited the individual in light of his achievement or failure. This was no small matter, as officials believed it was important to get it right to signal the kinds of behavior others in the government should emulate or avoid.

In short, people in the Song government thought that labels had power, and the state could and should employ those labels to succeed in its goals. Assigning names to people and things was long considered an essential part of Confucian governance. This goes back to Confucius himself, who argued the “rectification of names 正名” was the first step he would take in administrating a government:

When the names are not correct, what is said will not sound reasonable; when what is said does not sound reasonable, affairs will not culminate in success; when affairs do not culminate in success, rites and music will not flourish; when rites and music do not flourish, punishments will not fit the crimes; when punishments do not fit the crimes, the common people will not know where to put hand and foot.⁸⁵⁴

It is important for the name, or label, to accord with reality, in order to make clear how people should behave. This could mean that a title was in a sense invalid if it was claimed by someone who did not act in a way deserving of that title. We can see an example of this in Mencius’

⁸⁵⁴ *Analects* 13.3, trans. in Lau, *Analects*, 118.

discussion of the death of Zhou 紂, the last king of the Shang who was defeated by the founder of the Zhou 周, King Wu 武王:

King Xuan of Qi asked, “Is it true that Tang banished Jie and King Wu marched against Zhou?”

“It is so recorded,” answered Mencius.

“Is regicide permissible?”

“He who mutilates benevolence is a mutilator; he who cripples rightness is a crippler; and a man who is both a mutilator and a crippler is an ‘outcast.’ I have indeed heard of the punishment of the ‘outcast Zhou 紂,’ but I have not heard of any regicide.”⁸⁵⁵

In other words, the last king of Shang may have held the title of king, but he acted in a way which made him undeserving of the title. Therefore, in Mencius’ view, when King Wu killed King Zhou, the act was really not the killing of the king but the punishment of a criminal. In a way, the Song officials who called the mutineers *junzei* and rejected the titles assumed by the mutineers as false echoed Mencius’ argument.

From the Confucian perspective, the names they employed represented reality, and any misuse of the names was a crime because it confused people’s understanding. This is emphasized by Xunzi. He says that the sage kings fixed the names, making things easy to understand so that the world could be governed easily. Xunzi commented: “Thus, they called it great vileness to mince words and recklessly create names such as to disorder the correct names and thereby confuse the people... This wrongdoing was considered to be just like the crime of forging tallies and measures.”⁸⁵⁶ To Song emperors and officials, the labels they used to describe mutineers, to

⁸⁵⁵ *Mencius* 1B.8, trans. in Lau, *Mencius*, 23.

⁸⁵⁶ *Xunzi* Ch. 22, trans. in Hutton, *Xunzi*, 236-37.

reward or punish officials, and to rename or adjust the ranking of prefectures reflected their understanding of the world. Such labels were used to combat alternative perceptions of the world. To give an example, the Song government described Wang Ze and his supporters as *junzei*, but in the oath the residents of Beizhou swore when pushed to join Wang, they described his force as the “righteous army.” While officials believed their labels represented reality, a better way is to view them as one of a number of narratives intended to persuade an audience of the righteousness of their cause. The Song state’s use of labeling to govern and to buttress its position in society is an avenue worth further exploration, particularly when the government faced challenges to its rule.

As I look towards embarking on future research projects, I intend to examine each of the three potential topics discussed here. To carry this out, I plan to extend my study of the Song to include other types of crises, such as floods and famines, to help reveal the methods employed by the state in those circumstances. I hope to find other approaches to handling a crisis that will further illustrate how the Song government functioned in relation to the society it ruled.

Appendix

The following pages provide three tables for the reader for reference, particularly for Chapter Two and Chapter Four. The first table lists the officials who were sent by the court to fight the mutinies. The table is arranged by mutiny first, and then by the type of official. The second table is for those rewarded for their contributions in the suppression effort, and is arranged like the first table. The third table is a list of all the officials and relatives punished because of some misconduct in the course of the mutiny. It is arranged by mutiny. Since punishments were often given out in groups, with many individuals penalized for the same faults, I recorded the officials and others in the order they appeared within each group.⁸⁵⁷

⁸⁵⁷ The list of punishments comes primarily from the *Changbian* or *Song huiyao*, likely drawing on government documents. When a document dealt with multiple people being punished at one time, the author of that document would first list out each individual and the punishment that person received. After stating the punishment for each person, the author then would explain why people were being punished. This could be done as a group, or individuals could be singled out and their particular misdeeds detailed. I have kept the groups intact primarily for my own convenience, but it should also make it easier if someone wanted to look up the primary sources on the punishments.

Appendix Table 1: Officials Dispatched to Suppress Mutinies					
Mutiny	Name	Type of Official	Entry	Post Held	Personal Rank
Sichuan Mutiny of 1000 (Wang Jun)	Lei Youzhong 雷有終	Civil	Yin Privilege 蔭補 (SS 278.9455)	Chengdu Prefect 知益州 and Suppression and Bandit-Catching Commissioner 川峽兩路招安捉賊事 (SS 278.9457)	工部侍郎 3b (CB 46.989)
	Ma Liang 馬亮	Civil	Jinshi Degree 進士 (SS 298.9915)	Xichuan Fiscal Intendant 西川轉運使 (CB 47.1025) or Assistant Intendant 轉運副使 (SS 298.9916)	兵部員外郎 7a (CB 48.1045)
	Wang Qinruo 王欽若	Civil	Jinshi Degree (SS 283.9559)	Xichuan Circuit Pacification Commissioner 西川路安撫使 (Post-Mutiny, CB 47.1030 and SS 283.9560)	右正言 7b (as of 999, CB 45.959)
	Liang Hao 梁顥	Civil	Jinshi Degree (SS 296.9863-64)	Xia Circuit Pacification Commissioner 峽路安撫使 (Post-Mutiny, CB 47.1030 and SS 296.3865)	左司諫 7a (in 12i/1001, SHY Shihuo 57.3)
	Yuan Jifu 袁及甫	Civil	Unknown	Assisted Wang Qinruo and Liang Hao 副之 (Post-Mutiny, CB 47.1030)	國子博士 7b (CB 47.1030)
	Li Yizhi 李易直	Civil	Unknown	Assisted Wang Qinruo and Liang Hao 副之 (Post-Mutiny, CB 47.1030)	秘書丞 8a (CB 47.1030)
	Li Hui 李惠	Military	Unknown	Chuanxia Suppression Patrolling Inspector 川峽路招安巡檢使 (SHY Bing 10.10)	御廚使 7a (SS 278.9457)
	Shi Pu 石普	Military	Yin Privilege (SS 324.10471)	Chuanxia Suppression Patrolling Inspector 川峽路招安巡檢使 (SHY Bing 10.10)	洛苑使 7a (CB 46.989)
	Li Shoulun 李守倫	Military	Unknown	Chuanxia Suppression Patrolling Inspector 川峽路招安巡檢使 (SHY Bing 10.10)	供備庫副使 7b (SS 278.9457)
	Shangguan Zheng 上官正	Military	Zhuke Degree 諸科 (San Zhuan 三傳, SS 308.10137)	Dongchuan Circuit Military Administrator-in-Chief 東川都鈐轄 (CB 46.989) or Xia Circuit Military Administrator-in-Chief 峽路都鈐轄 (SS 308.10138)	東上閣門使 6a (as of 998, SS 308.10138)
	Wang Ruan 王阮	Military	Unknown	Temporary Chengdu Director-in-Chief 益州駐泊都監 (SS 278.9457)	內殿崇班 8a (SHY Bing 10.10)
	Gao Jixun 高繼勳	Military	Yin Privilege (SS 289.9694)	Temporary Chengdu Director-in-Chief 益州駐泊都監 (SS 278.9457) and Supervisor of Xichuan Prefectural Patrolling Inspectors 提舉西川諸州軍巡檢使 (SS 289.9694)	崇儀副使 7b (SS 289.9694)
	Sun Zhengci 孫正辭	Military	Unknown	Patrolling Inspector-in-Chief 諸州都巡檢使 (CB 46.989)	供奉官 8b (CB 46.989)
	Li Jichang 李繼昌	Military	Yin Privilege (SS 257.8954)	Xia Circuit Military Administrator-in-Chief 峽路都鈐轄 (CB 46.989)	西京作坊使 7a (CB 46.989)

	Yang Chongxun 楊崇勳	Military	Yin Privilege (SS 290.9713)	Mounted Courier 承受公事 (QSW 25:524.65)	西頭供奉官 8b (QSW 25:524.65)
	Zhang Xu 張煦	Military	Yin Privilege (SS 308.10149)	Mianzhou-Hanzhou-Jianmen Patrolling Inspector-in-Chief 綿、漢劍門路都巡檢使 (SS 308.10149)	供備庫副使 7b (CB 47.1014)
	Li Chengxiang 李承象	Military	Unknown	Joint Manager of Pacification 同句當安撫事 (Post-Mutiny, 句當 probably should be 勾當, meaning "manager," CB 47.1030)	閣門祗候 (at least 9a CB 47.1030)
	Qin Han 秦翰	Eunuch	Became eunuch	[Chuanxia] Two Circuits Bandit-Catching Suppression Commissioner 兩路捉賊招安使 (CB 47.1024) or Chuanxia Suppression Patrolling Inspector 川峽招安巡檢使 (SS 466.13612)	洛苑使 7a (CB 47.1024)
	Zhang Jineng 張繼能	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Chuanxia Suppression Patrolling Inspector 川峽兩路招安巡檢使 (SS 466.13620)	崇儀使 7a (as of 997, SS 466.13620)
Guangnan West Mutiny of 1007 (Chen Jin)	Xue Yan 薛顏	Civil	Zhuke Degree (San Li 三禮, SS 299.9943)	Manager of the Guangnan East and West Fiscal Intendancies 勾當廣南東西路轉運司事 (SS 299.9943)	虞部員外郎 7a (CB 66.1472)
	Cao Liyong 曹利用	Military	Yin Privilege (SS 290.9705)	Guangnan East and West Pacification Commissioner 廣南東西路安撫使 (CB 66.1472)	東上閣門使 6a (CB 66.1472)
	Zhang Xu 張煦	Military	Yin Privilege (SS 308.10149)	Guangnan East and West Pacification Commissioner 廣南東西路安撫使 (CB 66.1472)	供備庫使 7a (CB 66.1472)
	Zhang Conggu 張從古 (also known as Zhang Congji 張從吉)	Military	Yin Privilege (SS 276.9406)	Assisted Cao Liyong and Zhang Xu 副之 (CB 66.1472)	如京副使 7b CB 66.1472
	He Rong 何榮	Military	Unknown	Guangzhou Military Administrator 廣州鈐轄 (CB 66.1480)	內殿崇班 8a (CB 66.1480)
	Zhang Jineng 張繼能	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Assisted Cao Liyong and Zhang Xu 副之 (CB 66.1472)	內殿崇班 8a (SHY Bing 10.12)
	Yu Derun 于德潤	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Unknown (Sent to deliver amnesty, CB 66.1473)	入內高班內品 9b (CB 66.1473)
	Zhou Wenzhi 周文質	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Temporary Guangzhou Director-in-Chief 廣州駐泊都監 (CB 66.1473)	高品 9a (CB 66.1473)
	Shi Chonggui 史崇貴	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Unknown (Sent to Guizhou to console Cao Liyong, CB 66.1486)	Unknown

	Yan Wenqing 閻文慶	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Unknown (Sent to provide a feast for Cao Liyong et al., CB 66.1478)	Unknown
Baozhou, Hebei Mutiny of 1044 (Wei Gui)	Fu Bi 富弼	Civil	Decree Exam 制科 (Ranked as Maocaiyi 茂材異等, SS 313.10249)	Hebei Pacification Commissioner (Incumbent) 河北宣撫使 (CB 151.3674)	右諫議大夫 4b (Before and after mutiny, CB 142.3417 and CB 154.3740)
	Tian Kuang 田況	Civil	Jinshi Degree (SS 292.9778)	Chengdejun Prefect 知成德軍 and Zhengdingfu-Dingzhou Circuit Pacification Commissioner 真定府、定州路安撫使 (CB 151.3683)	右正言 7b (CB 152.3697)
	Liu Huan 劉渙	Civil	Yin Privilege (SS 324.10493)	Baозhou Prefect 知保州 (Post-Mutiny, CB 151.3689)	工部郎中 6b (CB 151.3689)
	Li Zhaoliang 李昭亮	Military	Yin Privilege (SS 464.13563)	Zhengdingfu-Dingzhou Chief Administrator 真定府、定州路都部署 and Infantry Assistant Commander-in-Chief 步軍副都指揮使 (Incumbent, CB 144.3476; could have been Assistant Chief Administrator instead, see <i>Sushui jiwēn</i> 11.204)	感德軍留後 3a (CB 144.3476)
	Wang Deji 王德基	Military	Unknown	Border Military Intendant 緣邊安撫使 and Xiongzhou Prefect 知雄州 (Incumbent, CB 152.3696)	四方館使 5b (CB 152.3696)
	Wang Guo 王果	Military	Zhuke Degree (Mingfa 明法, initially held civil official ranks, SS 326.10529)	Dingzhou Prefect 知定州 (Incumbent, CB 151.3688 and <i>Sushui jiwēn</i> 11.204)	皇城使 7a (CB 152.3697)
	Liu Baoxin 劉保信	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Unknown	入內供奉官 8b (CB 151.3683)
	Yang Huaimin 楊懷敏	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Border Patrolling Inspector-in-Chief 緣邊都巡檢 and Administrative Aide to Palace Domestic Service 入內內侍押班 (Incumbent, CB 152.3696 and 3697; also <i>Sushui jiwēn</i> 11.204)	洛苑使 7a (CB 152.3697)
Beizhou, Hebei Mutiny of 1047-1048 (Wang Ze)	Wen Yanbo 文彥博	Civil	Jinshi Degree (SS 313.10258)	Hebei Pacification Commissioner 河北宣撫使 and Vice Grand Councilor 參知政事 (CB 162.3903)	右諫議大夫 4b (CB 162.3903)
	Ming Hao 明鎬	Civil	Jinshi Degree (SS 292.9769)	Hebei Emergency Commissioner 河北體量安撫使 and Auxiliary Academician of the Bureau of Military Affairs 樞密直學士 (CB 161.3892)	左諫議大夫 4b (CB 161.3892)

Zheng Xiang 鄭驤	Civil	Jinshi Degree (SS 301.10005)	Provisional Hebei Fiscal Intendant 權河北轉運使 (CB 162.3902)	工部郎中 6b (CB 162.3902)
Gao Jilong 高繼隆	Military	Unknown (probably Yin Privilege by way of father Gao Qiong 高瓊, like his brother Gao Jixun listed above)	Beizhou Prefect 知貝州 (CB 161.3892)	東上閣門使 6a (CB 161.3892)
Wang Kai 王凱	Military	Recommended by Kou Zhun 寇準 on unusual appearance and merits of great-grandfather and grandfather (SS 255.8925)	Unknown (Recalled to capital and awaiting audience with emperor when mutiny broke out, SS 255.8925-26)	西京作坊使 7a (CB 161.3891)
Mai Yunyan 麥允言	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Administrative Aid to Palace Eunuch Service 入內押班 (CB 161.3891)	宮苑使 7a (CB 161.3891)
He Chengyong 何誠用	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Unknown (Delivered amnesty to Beizhou, CB 161.3892)	入內供奉官 8b (as of 1045, SHY Li 9.3)
Li Jihe 李繼和	Eunuch	Became eunuch	Mounted Courier at the Foot of [Beizhou's] Wall 城下走馬承受 (SS 468.13651)	入內殿頭 8b (CB 162.3903)

Appendix Table 2: List of Rewarded Officials, Soldiers, Relatives, and Commoners

Mutiny	Name	Type of Official	Post Held	Personal Rank When Appointed	Rewards
Sichuan Mutiny of 1000 (Wang Jun)	Lei Youzhong 雷有終	Civil	Chengdu Prefect 知益州 and Chuanxia Circuits Pacification and Bandit-Catching Commissioner 川峽兩路招安捉賊事 (SS 278.9457)	工部侍郎 3b, Prestige Title 廬州觀察使 3b (CB 46.989)	Prestige Title 保信軍節度觀察留後 3a (SS 278.9462)
	Ma Liang 馬亮	Civil	Xichuan Fiscal Intendant 西川轉運使 (CB 47.1025 and 48.1045) (or Assistant Fiscal Intendant 轉運副使, SS 298.9916)	兵部員外郎 7a (CB 48.1045)	Made Auxiliary in the Historiography Office 直史館 (SS 298.9916)
	Lei Xiaoxian 雷孝先	Civil	Unknown (Followed uncle, Lei Youzhong)	太常寺奉禮郎 9b (SS 278.9463)	將作監丞 8b (SS 278.9463)
	Chen Congyi 陳從易	Civil	Pengzhou Military Judge 彭州軍事推官 Unranked (SS 300.9978)	Pengzhou Military Judge 彭州軍事推官 Unranked (SS 300.9978)	秘書省著作佐郎 8b, Sentence Evaluator of the Court of Judicial Review 大理寺詳斷官 (SS 300.9978)
	Zhang Lun 張綸	Civil	Unknown (Followed Lei Youzhong, no office known SS 426.12694)	右班殿直 9a (SS 426.12694)	右侍禁 9a, Qingzhou Supervisor of Militia 慶州兵馬監押 (SS 426.12694)
	Shi Pu 石普	Military	Chuanxia Pacification Patrolling Inspector 川峽路招安巡檢使 (SS 324.10472)	洛苑使 7a, Prestige Title 富州團練使 3b (CB 46.984-85)	Prestige Title 冀州團練使 3b, 300 taels gold, 3000 taels silver (SS 324.10472)
	Li Shoulun* 李守倫	Military	Chuanxia Pacification Patrolling Inspector 川峽路招安巡檢使 (SS 278.9457)	供備庫副使 7b (CB 46.989)	Posthumous Rank 崇儀使 7a, Prestige Title 武州刺史 4a (CB 47.1010-11)
	Shangguan Zheng 上官正	Military	Dongchuan Circuit Military Administrator-in-Chief 東川都鈐轄 (CB 46.989) (or Xia Circuit Military Administrator-in-Chief 峽路 SS 308.10138)	東上閤門使 6a (as of 998, SS 308.10138), Prestige Title 洺州團練使 3b (CB 46.989)	Zizhou Prefect 知梓州 (transferred 移 according to SS 308.10138, timing unclear)
	Wang Ruan 王阮	Military	Temporary Chengdu Director-in-Chief 益州駐泊都監 (SS 278.9457)	內殿崇班 8a (SHY Bing 10.10)	崇儀使 7a (SS 278.9462), in 3/1001 made Lizhou Prefect 知利州 (SHY Fangyu 7.3)
	Gao Jixun 高繼勳	Military	Temporary Chengdu Director-in-Chief 益州駐泊都監 (SS 278.9457) and Supervisor of Xichuan Prefectural	崇儀副使 7b (SS 289.9694)	崇儀使 7a (SS 289.9694)

		Patrolling Inspectors 提舉西川諸州軍巡檢公事 (SS 289.9694)		
Sun Zhengci 孫正辭	Military	Prefectural Patrolling Inspector-in-Chief 諸州都巡檢使 (CB 46.989)	供奉官 8b (CB 46.989)	內殿崇班 8a (SS 278.9462)
Yang Chongxun 楊崇勳	Military	Mounted Courier 承受公事 (QSW 25:524.65)	西頭供奉官 8b (QSW 25:524.65)	內殿崇班 8a, Prestige Title 銀青光祿大夫 3b, Acting Chancellor of the Directorate of Education 檢校國子祭酒, Grand Master of the Censorate 御史大夫, Commandant of the Capital Patrol 騎都尉 (QSW 25:524.65)
Ma Gui 馬貴	Military	Patrolling Inspector 巡檢 (SS 278.9459)	殿直 9a (SS 278.9459)	供奉官 8b (SS 278.9462)
Zhang Xu 張煦	Military	Mianzhou-Hanzhou-Jianmen Patrolling Inspector-in-Chief 綿、漢、劍門路都巡檢使 (SS 308.10149)	供備庫副使 7b (CB 47.1014)	正使 (供備庫使, certainly by 1004 CB 58.1274) 7a, transferred to Chengdu Director-in-Chief 益州都監 (SS 308.10149)
Li Jichang 李繼昌	Military	Xia Circuit Military Administrator-in-Chief 峽路都鈐轄 (CB 46.989)	西京作坊使 7a (CB 46.989)	Prestige Title 夔州刺史 4a (SS 257.8955)
Liu Shaorong* 劉紹榮	Military	Chengdu Patrolling Inspector-in-Chief (益州) 都巡檢使 (SS 46.983)	西京左藏庫使 7a (CB 47.1010)	Left Shenwu General 左神武大將軍, Prestige Title 3b 誠州團練使 (CB 47.1010)
Xu Jun 許均	Military	御前忠佐馬軍都軍頭 (prior to being dispatched SS 279.9485)	Same (Army Officer Rank, SS 279.9485)	東西班都虞侯, Prestige Title 順州刺史 (SS 279.9485)
Yang Huaizhong 楊懷忠	Military	Shuzhou Prefect 知蜀州 (CB 46.989)	供奉官 8b and Audience Usher 閣門祗候 (CB 46.989)	供奉庫副使 7b (SS 278.9462)
Qin Han 秦翰	Eunuch	Bandit-Catching Pacification Commissioner of the Two Circuits (of Chuanxia) 兩路捉賊招安使 (CB 47.1024)	洛苑使 7a (CB 47.1024)	內園使 7a, Prestige Title 恩州刺史 (SS 466.13613)
Zhang Jineng 張繼能	Eunuch	Chuanxia Pacification Patrolling Inspector 川峽兩路招安巡檢使 (SS 466.13620)	崇儀使 7a (as of 997, SS 466.13620)	Remained in Sichuan as Lizhou Pacification Patrolling Inspector 利州招安巡檢 (SS 466.13620)

Guangnan West Mutiny of 1007 (Chen Jin)	Xue Yan 薛顏	Civil	Manager of the Guangnan East and West Fiscal Intendancies 勾當廣南東、西路轉運司事 (SS 299.9943)	虞部員外郎 7a (CB 66.1472)	金部員外郎 7a, Hedong Fiscal Intendant 河東轉運使 (SS 299.9943)
	He Bing 何邴	Civil	Xiangzhou Prefect 知象州 (CB 67.1498)	大理評事 9a (CB 67.1498)	祠部員外郎 7a, awarded scarlet (robe?) 緋, sons Zhidao 知道, Zhigu 知古, Zhichang 知常 given ranks (SS 466.13622)
	Cao Liyong 曹利用	Military	Guangnan (West) Pacification Commissioner 廣南西路安撫使 (CB 66.1472)	東上閣門使 6a, Prestige Title 忠州刺史 (CB 66.1472)	引進使 5b (CB 67.1498)
	Zhang Xu 張煦	Military	Guangnan (East) Pacification Commissioner 廣南東路安撫使 (CB 66.1472)	供備庫使 7a, Prestige Title 賀州刺史 (CB 66.1472)	如京使, Huaizhou Prefect 知懷州 (SS 308.10150)
	Zhang Conggu 張從古	Military	Assistant Pacification Commissioner 安撫副使 (CB 66.1472)	如京副使 7b (CB 66.1472)	莊宅副使 7b (SS 276.9406)
	Hao Weihe* 郝惟和	Military	Guizhou Supervisor of Militia 桂州監押 (CB 67.1502)	殿直 9a (CB 67.1502)	如京副使 7b (CB 67.1502)
	Han Ming* 韓明	Military	Liucheng County, Liuzhou Supervisor of Militia 柳州柳城縣監押 (CB 67.1502)	殿直 9a (CB 67.1502)	崇儀副使 7b (CB 67.1502)
	Xu Gui* 許貴	Military	Guizhou-Xiangzhou Patrolling Inspector 桂象等州巡檢 (CB 67.1502)	三班奉職 9b (CB 67.1502)	內殿崇班 8a (CB 67.1502)
	Chen Ding 陳定	Military	Yizhou Commander 宜州指揮使 (CB 67.1502)	Same (Army Officer Rank, CB 67.1502)	Army Commander-in-Chief 馬步軍都指揮使 (CB 67.1502)
	Huang Wan 黃晚	Military	Yizhou Troop Commandant 宜州都頭 (CB 67.1502)	Same (Army Officer Rank, CB 67.1502)	Infantry Commander 步軍指揮使 (CB 67.1502-03)
	Guo Zhiyan 郭志言	Military	Unknown	寄班侍禁 9a (CB 66.1489)	供奉庫使 7a (CB 466.13622)
	Zhang Shourong* 張守榮	Military	Guizhou-Zhaozhou Patrolling Inspector 桂昭等州巡檢 (CB 66.1483) or Yongzhou Patrolling Inspector 邕州巡檢使 (CB 66.1491)	侍禁 9a (SS 466.13621)	Initially promoted 西頭供奉官 8b (CB 66.1491), made Audience Usher 閣門祗候 (SS 466.13622), imperial physician sent by emperor after falling ill 遣國醫, after death posthumously made 如京使 7a, son given rank (CB 66.1491)
	Zhang Chongbao	Military	Yongzhou-Guizhou Patrolling Inspector 邕桂巡檢 (SS 466.13621)	殿直 9a (SS 466.13621)	右侍禁 9a (SS 466.13622)

	張崇寶				
	Zhang Chonggui 張崇貴	Military	Rongzhou-Liuzhou Patrolling Inspector 融柳等州巡檢 (CB 66.1483)	Unknown (Possibly 殿直 9a and Audience Usher 閣門祇候, but might just be Ren Ji, CB 66.1483)	西頭供奉官 8b (CB 66.1483)
	Ren Ji# 任吉	Military	Huaiyuanjun Prefect 知懷遠軍 (CB 66.1483)	殿直 9a, Audience Usher 閣門祇候 (CB 66.1483)	西頭供奉官 8b (CB 66.1483)
	Qian Ji# 錢吉	Military	Tianhezhai Supervisor of Militia 天河寨監押 (CB 66.1483)	三班奉職 9b (CB 66.1483)	右侍禁 9a (CB 66.1483)
	Li Hao 李昊	Military	Guiyuan Army soldier 歸遠軍士	None	Guiyuan Army Troop Commandant 本軍都頭 (CB 67.1498)
	Liu Zong 劉宗	Military	Guiyuan Army soldier 歸遠軍士	None	Guiyuan Army Troop Commandant 本軍都頭 (CB 67.1498)
	Zhao Min 趙敏	Military	Guiyuan Army soldier 歸遠軍士	None	Guiyuan Army Troop Commandant 本軍都頭 (CB 67.1498)
	Guo Quanfeng 郭全豐	Military	御前忠佐馬步軍副都軍頭 (SS 466.13622)	Same (Army Officer Rank, SS 466.13622)	都軍頭, Prestige Title 勤州刺史 (SS 466.13622)
	Cao Keming 曹克明	Military	Yongzhou Prefect 知邕州 (SS 272.9317)	供備庫副使 7b (SS 272.9317)	One son given personal rank, Keming promoted to 供備庫使 7a, and made 江、淮、兩浙都大提舉捉賊 (SS 272.9317)
	Zhang Jineng 張繼能	Eunuch	Assistant Pacification Commissioner 安撫副使 (SHY Bing 10.12)	內殿崇班 8a (SHY Bing 10.12)	供備庫使 7a (SS 466.13622)
	Zhou Wenzhi 周文質	Eunuch	Guangzhou Temporary Director-in-Chief 廣州駐泊都監 (CB 66.1473)	高品 9a (CB 66.1473)	Rewarded 獎 (CB 67.1499)
Jingdong-Huainan Mutiny of 1043 (Wang Lun)	Li Xigu 李熙古	Civil	Hezhou Vice Prefect 和州通判 (CB 142.3418)	都官員外郎 7a (CB 142.3418)	職方員外郎 7a and Fengzhou Prefect 知鳳州 (CB 142.3418)
	Xu Di 徐的	Civil	Huainan, Jiangzhe, Jinghu Supervisory Supply Commissioner 淮南江浙荆湖制置發運使 (CB 142.3419)	兵部員外郎 7a (CB 142.3419)	工部郎中 6b and Auxiliary to the Institute for the Glorification of Literature 直昭文館 (CB 142.3419)
	Fu Yongji 傅永吉	Military	Jingdong Supervisory Patrolling Inspector 京東同提舉巡檢 (CB 142.3418-19)	左班殿直 9a and Audience Usher 閣門祇候 (CB 142.3419)	禮賓副使 7b and 閣門通事舍人 (CB 142.3419)

	Song Lin 宋璘	Military	Yizhou Patrolling Inspector 沂州巡檢 (SHY Bing 10.14)	三班借職 9b (SHY Bing 10.15)	右侍禁 9a and Audience Usher 閣門祇候 (SHY Bing 10.15)
	Zheng An 鄭安	Military	Commander (指使=指揮使) and 散直長行 (CB 142.3419)	None	三班奉職 9b (CB 142.3419)
	Li Jiugao 李九皋	Military	差使 and 殿侍 (CB 142.3419)	Same	三班借職 9b (CB 142.3419)
	Zhao Ding 趙鼎	Military	Hebei Registered Control 和州編管人 (CB 142.3419)	None (Previously 西頭供奉官 8b and Audience Usher 閣門祇候, CB 142.3419)	供奉官 8b (CB 142.3419)
	Xu Qian 許千	Military	Officer 軍校 (CB 142.3419)	None	Promoted 遷擢 (along with six others, CB 142.3419)
	Zhang Ju 張矩	Commoner	Hezhou Liyang County Stalwart Man 和州歷陽縣壯丁 (CB 142.3419)	None	三班奉職 9b (CB 142.3419)
	Chen Ming 陳明	Commoner	Unclear (probably stalwart man, CB 142.3419)	None	三班借職 9b (CB 142.3419)
	Shang Heng 尚享	Commoner	Unclear (probably stalwart man, CB 142.3419)	None	三班借職 9b (CB 142.3419)
Hebei West Mutiny of 1044 (Baozhou)	Tian Kuang 田況	Civil	Auxiliary Academician of the Longtu Pavillion 龍圖閣直學士, Chengdujun Prefect 知成德軍, Zhendingfu-Dingzhou Pacification Commissioner 真定府、定州路安撫使 (CB 151.3683)	右正言 7b (CB 152.3697)	起居舍人 7a (CB 152.3697)
	Li Zhaoliang 李昭亮	Military	Zhendingfu-Dingzhou Chief Administrator 真定府、定州路都部署 (CB 144.3476) and Infantry Assistant Commander-in-Chief 步軍副都指揮使 (CB 152.3697)	感德軍留後 3a (CB 152.3697)	淮康軍留後 3a and Dingzhou Prefect 知定州 (CB 152.3697)
	Guo Kui 郭逵	Military	Zhending Army Supervisor of Militia 真定兵馬監押 (SS 290.9723)	右侍禁 9a (CB 151.3688)	Audience Usher 閣門祇候 (CB 152.3698) and Huanqing Army Director-in-Chief 環慶兵馬都監 (CB 290.9723)
	Zang Zhen 臧稹	Military	Baозhou Commander 保州指揮 (CB 152.3701)	三班借職 9b (CB 152.3701)	奉職 9b (CB 152.3701)

	Wang Shouyi* 王守一	Military	Baozhou-Guangxinjun-Ansujun Border Patrolling Inspector and Director-in-Chief 保州廣信安肅軍緣邊巡檢、都監 (CB 152.3698)	西京左藏庫副使 (CB 152.3698)	Posthumous Prestige Title 成州團練使 3b, son Wang Huaiyi 王懷懿 promoted from 三班借職 9b to 西頭供奉官 8b (CB 152.3698)
	Liu Zongyan* 劉宗言	Military	保州緣邊走馬承受 (CB 152.3698)	Unknown	Posthumously made 左千牛衛將軍 (CB 152.3698)
	Yang Huaimin 楊懷敏	Eunuch	緣邊都巡檢 (CB 152.3696) and Administrative Aide to the Palace Eunuch Service 入內內侍押班 (CB 152.3697)	洛苑使 7a and Prestige Title 普州刺史 4a (CB 152.3697)	Prestige Title 通州團練使 3b (CB 152.3697)
	Li Jihe 李繼和	Eunuch	Hebei Mounted Courier 河北承受 (SS 468.13651)	Unknown	Promoted two steps on personal rank ladder 遷兩秩 (SS 468.13651)
Hebei East Mutiny of 1047-1048 (Wang Ze)	Jia Changchao 賈昌朝	Civil	Grand Councilor 同平章事, Damingfu Prefect 判大名府, Concurrently Northern Capital Regent 兼北京留守司 (CB 162.3908), and Hebei Military Intendant 河北安撫使 (CB 161.3886)	檢校太傅 1a and Prestige Title 武勝節度使 2b (CB 162.3908)	檢校太師 1a, Prestige Title 山南東道節度使 2b, and enfeoffed as Duke of Anguo 進封安國公 (CB 162.3908)
	Wen Yanbo 文彥博	Civil	Vice Grand Councilor 參知政事 and Hebei Pacification Commissioner 河北宣撫使 (CB 162.3903)	右諫議大夫 4b (CB 162.3903)	禮部侍郎 3b and Grand Councilor 平章事 (CB 162.3907)
	Ming Hao 明鎬	Civil	Hebei Emergency Commissioner 河北體量安撫使 (CB 161.3892) and Auxiliary Academician of the Bureau of Military Affairs 樞密直學士 (CB 162.3907)	左諫議大夫 4b (CB 162.3907)	給事中 4a and Duanming Hall Academician 端明殿學士 (CB 162.3907)
	Wang Jiang* 王獎	Civil	Administrator for Public Order 司理參軍 (CB 163.3921)	Same (Civil executory rank, CB 163.3921)	Sons Wang Gui 王規 and Wang Jin 王覲 made Managers of Requisitioned Labor 諸州司士參軍 (CB 163.3921)
	Qi Kai* 齊開	Civil	Qinghe County Magistrate 清河令 (CB 163.3921)	Same (Civil executory rank, CB 163.3921)	Sons Qi Kangmin 齊康民 and 齊康功 made Managers of Requisitioned Labor 諸州司士參軍 (CB 163.3921)
	Li Hao* 李浩	Civil	Administrative Assistant to the Military Governor 節度判官 (CB 161.3890)	Same (Civil executory rank, CB 163.3921)	Sons Li Yan 李偃 made Wei County Sheriff 魏縣尉, Li Qiu 李俅 made Nanhe County Sheriff 南和尉, and Li Kan 李侃 made Hengshui County Sheriff 衡水尉 (CB 163.3921)

Dong Yuanheng* 董元亨	Civil	Beizhou Vice Prefect 貝州通判 (CB 163.3921)	國子博士 7b (CB 163.3921)	太常少卿 6a (SS 446.13153), son Dong Yi 董沂 made 太常寺太祝 9b, grandsons Dong Yaozi 董堯咨 and Dong Yaoxun 董堯詢 both made 將作監主簿 9b (CB 163.3921)
Wang Yi* 王湊	Civil	Registrar 主簿 (probably Qinghe Registrar) (CB 163.3921)	Same (Civil executory rank, CB 163.3921)	Sons Wang Anning 王安寧 and Wang Anshi 王安世 made Managers of Requisitioned Labor 諸州司士參軍 (CB 163.3921)
Zheng Xiang 鄭驥	Civil	Provisional Hebei Fiscal Intendant 權河北轉運使 (CB 162.3902)	工部郎中 6b (CB 162.3902)	Edict Attendant of the Hall of Heavenly Manifestations 天章閣待制 and Fengxiangfu Prefect 知鳳翔府; refused promotion on grounds of Hebei Fiscal Intendants Huangfu Bi's punishment and Xia Anqi's 夏安期 lack of a reward; subsequently promoted to 中書工部郎中 and made Hebei Fiscal Intendant-in-Chief 河北都轉運使 and then Huazhou Prefect 知華州 on account of illness (SS 301.10006)
Wang Xin 王信	Military	Gaoyang Pass Circuit Chief Area Commander 高陽關路都部署, Cavalry Inspector-in-Chief 馬軍都虞侯 (CB 161.3891), and Pacification Area Chief Commander at Beizhou 貝州城下招捉都總管 (SHY Bing 10.15)	象州防禦使 3b (CB 161.3891)	威德軍節度觀察留後 3a (SS 326.10519)
Wang Kai 王凱	Military	Unknown	西京作坊使 7a and Prestige Title 資州刺史 4a (CB 162.3907)	Prestige Title 澤州刺史 4a and Binzhou Prefect 知邠州 (SS 255.8926)
Gao Jilong 高繼隆	Military	Beizhou Prefect 知貝州 (CB 161.3892)	東上閣門使 6a and Prestige Title 榮州刺史 (CB 161.3892)	引進使 5b and Prestige Title 陵州團練使 3b (CB 162.3907)
Zhang Zhong 張忠	Military	Zhendingfu Circuit Director-in-Chief 真定府路都監 (CB 162.3907)	東頭供奉官 8b and Audience Usher 閣門祗候 (CB 162.3905)	First made 崇儀副使 7b (CB 162.3905), then made 如京使 7a (SS 326.10521, or 西染院使 7a according

				to CB 162.3907), Prestige Title 資州刺史 4a (SS 326.10521)
Yang Sui 楊遂	Military	Officer 軍校 (CB 162.3905)	Unknown	Shenwei Commander 神衛指揮使 (SS 349.11062)
Ma Sui* 馬遂	Military	Commander at the Northern Capital 北京指揮 (SS 446.13152)	三班奉職 9b (SS 446.13152)	宮苑使 7a, wife enfeoffed as 旌忠縣君, given cap and robe 賜冠帔, five sons given personal ranks (SS 446.13152)
Cao Jie 曹竭	Military	Unknown	右班殿直 9a (CB 162.3905)	內殿崇班 8a (CB 163.3919)
Liu Zun 劉遵	Military	Zhendingfu Laocheng Commandery Inspector-in-Chief 真定府牢城指揮都虞侯 (CB 163.3919)	Unknown	內殿崇班 8a (CB 163.3919)
Zhang Yin* 張綱	Military	Unknown	東頭供奉官 8b and Audience Usher 閣門祗候 (CB 163.3921)	右領軍衛將軍 (CB 163.3921)
Tian Bin 田斌	Military	[Beizhou] Military Director-in-Chief 兵馬都監 (SS 292.9771)	內殿承制 8a (SS 292.9771)	宮苑副使 7b (SS 303.10053)
Dong Xiu 董秀	Military (Convict)	Laocheng Prefectural Army Soldier 牢城卒 (<i>Sushui jiwén</i> 9.168)	Same (Army rank)	內殿崇班 8a (<i>Sushui jiwén</i> 9.169)
Liu Bing 劉炳	Military (Convict)	Laocheng Prefectural Army Soldier 牢城卒 (<i>Sushui jiwén</i> 9.168)	Same (Army rank)	內殿崇班 8a (<i>Sushui jiwén</i> 9.169)
Mai Yunyan 麥允言	Eunuch	Administrative Assistant to the Palace Eunuch Service 入內押班 (CB 161.3891)	宮苑使 7a and Prestige Title 象州團練使 3b (CB 161.3891)	Promoted to Assistant Office Manager in the Palace Eunuch Service 入內副都知 and given Prestige Title 眉州防禦使 3b during mutiny, further promoted to 昭宣使 6a and Suizhou Surveillance Commissioner 遂州觀察使 3b (CB 162.3907)
Li Jihe 李繼和	Eunuch	Mounted Courier at the Foot of [Beizhou's] Wall 城下走馬承受 (SS 468.13651)	入內殿頭 8b (CB 162.3903)	Rewarded with embroidered robe, gold belt 賜繼和錦袍、金帶 (CB 162.3906)
Wang Wenqing	Commoner	None (Beizhou resident, CB 162.3903)	N/A	西頭供奉官 8b (CB 162.3903)

	汪文慶				
	Guo Bin 郭斌	Commoner	None (Beizhou resident, CB 162.3903)	N/A	西頭供奉官 8b (CB 162.3903)
	Zhao Zongben 趙宗本	Commoner	None (Beizhou resident, CB 162.3903)	N/A	西頭供奉官 8b (CB 162.3903)
	Wang Shun 汪順	Commoner	None (Beizhou resident, CB 162.3903)	N/A	西頭供奉官 8b (CB 162.3903)

*Posthumously rewarded

#Non-Han leader (given Chinese official titles)

Appendix Table 3: List of Punished Officials and Relatives							
Mutiny	Name	Type of Official	Post	Personal Rank	Punishment	Reason	Source
Sichuan Mutiny of 1000 (Wang Jun)	Niu Mian 牛冕	Civil	Chengdu Prefect 知益州	右諫議大夫 4b	Dismissed 削籍 and exiled to Danzhou 流儋州, Guangnan West	Abandoned Chengdu and Hanzhou 漢州 (SHY Zhiguan 64.14-15)	CB 47.1014
	Zhang Shi 張適	Civil	Xichuan Circuit Fiscal Intendant 西川路轉運使	祠部郎中 6b	Dismissed 削籍 and made Lianzhou Adjutant 連州參軍 in Guangnan East	Abandoned Chengdu and Hanzhou (SHY Zhiguan 64.14-15)	CB 47.1014
	Li Shiheng 李士衡 (sometimes written 李仕衡)	Civil	Jianzhou Prefect 知劍州	秘書丞 8a	At first rewarded, then made Supervisor of Qianzhou's Commercial Taxes 監虔州稅 in Jiangnan West	Abandoned Jianzhou	SS 299.9936
	Unnamed Chengdu officials (vice prefect and below 通判以下)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Demoted 貶黜	Unknown (probably for abandoning Chengdu)
Guangnan West Mutiny of 1007 (Chen Jin)	Shu Ben 舒賁	Civil (according to SHY Shihuo 57.5)	Guangnan West Circuit Fiscal Intendant 廣南西路轉運使	Unknown	Impeached 劾 and dismissed 罷其任 (replaced by Ma Liang 馬亮)	Failed to investigate Yizhou 宜州 Prefect Liu Yonggui's cruel administration	CB 67.1497-98
	Wang Yu 王昱	Civil	Liuzhou Prefect 知柳州	度支員外郎 7a, 典職崇文院, and 秘閣	Made Supervisor of Wine Monopoly in Xintu, Linjiangjun 臨江軍監新徒縣酒稅, Jiangnan West (Xintu does not exist, could be Xin'gan 新淦 or Xinyu 新喻 Counties)	Failed to catch mutineers in a timely manner (though not given as a reason in <i>muzhiming</i> , Wang also fled Liuzhou, which would be grounds for punishment, see CB 66.1484)	QSW 19:396.189
Jingdong-Huainan Mutiny of 1043	Wang Yi 王乙	Military	Yangzhou Temporary Director-in-	供奉官 8b and Audience Usher 閣門祗候	Removed Audience Usher title 追閣門祗候 and registered control in	Gathered gold and silver to give to Wang Lun, were cowardly, and avoided the mutineers (SHY Zhiguan 64.44)	SHY Zhiguan 64.43

(Wang Lun)			Chief 揚州駐泊都監		Changzhou 常州編管, Liangzhe	
	Han Xiangzhong 韓象中	Military	Patrolling Inspector-in-Chief 都巡檢	內殿崇班 8a	Demoted one step 追見任官 and given registered control in Hezhou 和州編管, Huainan West	SHY Zhiguan 64.43
	Shi Ye 史燁	Military	Join Patrolling Inspector 同巡檢	左班殿直 9a	Specially demoted two steps 特追兩任官 and dismissed 勒停	SHY Zhiguan 64.43
	Li Fengxian 李奉先	Military	Supervisor of Militia 監押	左班殿直 9a	Specially demoted two steps 特追兩任官 and given registered control in Haizhou 海州編管, Huainan East	SHY Zhiguan 64.43
	Shao Xian 邵先	Civil	Tianchang County (Yangzhou) Magistrate 知天長縣	大理寺丞 8b	Specially demoted two steps 特追兩任官 and given registered control in Daozhou 道州編管, Jinghu South	SHY Zhiguan 64.43
	Shu Anyi 舒安易	Civil	Tianchang County Sheriff 天長縣尉	Same	Demoted one step 追見任官 and given registered control in Taizhou 泰州編管, Huainan East	SHY Zhiguan 64.43
	Zhang Yong 張永	Military	Tianchang County Patrolling Inspector 天長縣巡檢	奉職 9b	Demoted one step 追見任官 and registered control in Tongzhou 通州編管, Huainan East	SHY Zhiguan 64.43
	Liu Liang 劉亮	Civil	Jiangdu County (Yangzhou) Sheriff 江都縣尉	Same	Demoted one step 追見任官 and registered control in Tongzhou 通州編管, Huainan East	SHY Zhiguan 64.43
	Chao Zhongyue 晁仲約	Civil	Gaoyoujun Prefect 高郵軍知軍	太常丞 8a	Demoted three steps and dismissed 追三任官勒停, further reduced two steps 更	SHY Zhiguan 64.43

				特追兩任官, and registered control in Shaozhou 韶州編管, Guangnan East	
Li Wenbing 李文炳	Military	Supervisor of Militia 監押	供奉官 8b	Specially demoted two steps 特追兩任官 and sentenced to registered control in Yuezhou 配岳州編管, Jinghu North	SHY Zhiguan 64.43-44
Lüqiu Xiaozhi 閻丘孝直	Civil	Administrative Assistant 判官	Same	Specially dismissed 特勒停	SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Zheng Zhaoqing 鄭昭慶	Civil	Administrative Supervisor 錄事參軍	Same	Specially dismissed 特勒停	SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Chen Yonghe 陳用和	Civil	Gaoyou County (Gaoyoujun) Sheriff 高郵縣尉	Same	Demoted two steps 追兩任官 and registered control in Runzhou 潤州編管, Liangzhe	SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Xin Liang 辛亮	Military	Sanshuzhen (Gaoyoujun) Patrolling Inspector 三塾鎮巡檢	侍禁 9a	Demoted two steps 追兩任官 and dismissed 勒停	SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Li Shian 李士安	Military	Chuzhou-Gaoyoujun Arresting Agent for Tea and Salt Smugglers 楚州高郵軍巡私茶鹽	左班殿直 9a	Demoted one step 追見任官 and dismissed 勒停	SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Fu Da 傅達	Military	Supervisor of New Dikes 監新河堰	奉職 9b	Demoted two steps 追兩任官 and specially dismissed 特勒停	SHY Zhiguan 64.44

Wu Jifu 吳幾復	Civil	Chuzhou Vice Prefect 滁州通判	屯田員外郎 7a	Demoted two steps 追兩任官 and registered control in Hengzhou 衡州編管, Jinghu South	Were cowardly when Wang Lun entered their jurisdictions (SHY Zhiguan 64.44)	SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Liu Xuan 劉宣	Military	Chuzhou-Hezhou Joint Patrolling Inspector 滁和州同巡檢	侍禁 9a	Demoted two steps 追兩任官 and registered control in Changzhou 常州編管, Liangzhe		SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Zhao Zongwang 趙宗望	Military	Supervisor of Militia 監押	供奉官 8b	Demoted one step 追一任官 and registered control in Tongzhou 通州編管, Huainan East		SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Fu Heng 符衡	Civil	Qingliu County (Chuzhou 滁州) Sheriff 清流縣尉	Same	Demoted one step 追見任官 and registered control in Tongzhou 通州編管, Huainan East		SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Wu Yuanqing 吳元卿	Civil	Quanjiao County (Chuzhou 滁州) Sheriff 全椒縣尉	Same	Demoted one step 追見任官 and registered control in Haizhou 海州編管, Huainan East		SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Luo Maosun 羅茂孫	Civil	Laian County (Chuzhou 滁州) Sheriff 來安縣尉	Same	Demoted one step 追見任官 and registered control in Guangzhou 光州編管, Huainan West		SHY Zhiguan 64.44

	Li Yang 李陽	Civil	Laian County Magistrate 來安 縣令	Same	Demoted one step 追見任官 and dismissed 勒停		SHY Zhiguan 64.44
	An Jie 安節	Civil	Quanjiao County Magistrate 全椒 縣令	Same	Demoted one step 追見任官 and dismissed 勒停		SHY Zhiguan 64.44
Baozhou, Hebei West Mutiny of 1044	Zhang Wenzhi 張晷之	Civil	Hebei Circuit Fiscal Intendant 河北路轉運使	工部郎中 6b and Edict Attendant of the Hall of Heavenly Manifestation s 天章閣待制	Demoted 落職, made Guozhou Prefect 知虢州 in Yongxingjun Circuit (Part of Shaanxi)	Punished for mutiny occurring in their jurisdiction (SHY Shiguan 64.47)	SHY Zhiguan 64.47
	Zhang Mian 張沔	Civil	Hebei Fiscal Surveillance Intendant 河北 轉運按察使 (full title according to CB 142.3407)	刑部郎中 6b	Demoted to 工部郎中 6b, made Ruzhou Prefect 知汝州 in Jingxi North		CB 152. 3696
	Wang Yi 王儀	Civil	(Hebei) Judicial Intendant 提點 刑獄	司勳員外郎 7a	Demoted one step 降一官 (SHY Zhiguan 64.47), made Zezhou Prefect 知澤州, Hedong		CB 152.3696
	Wang Bing 王秉	Military	(Hebei) Joint Judicial Intendant 同提 點刑獄	東頭供奉官 8b and Audience	Demoted one step to 西頭供 奉官 8b (CB 152.3696) and made Heyang Director-in- Chief 河陽都監 in		CB 152.3696

			Usher 閣門祇候	Mengzhou 孟州, Jingxi North (SHY Zhiguan 64.47)	
Wang Deji 王德基	Military	Border Military Intendant and concurrent Xiongzhou Prefect 緣邊安撫使兼知雄州	四方館使 5b and Prestige Title 榮州刺史 4a	Demoted to 西上閣門使 6a	CB 152.3696
Zhao Mu 趙牧	Military	Director-in-Chief within Hebei Military Border Intendancy 河北沿邊安撫都監	東頭供奉官 8b and Audience Usher 閣門祇候	Demoted to 西頭供奉官 8b, dispatched as Director-in-Chief 都監差遣	CB 152.3696
Song Youyan 宋有言	Eunuch	Baozhou Circuit Mounted Courier 保州路走嗎承受公事 (SHY Zhiguan 64.47)	入內西頭供奉官 8b	Demoted to 入內殿頭 9a (CB 152.3696), dispatched as State Monopoly Agent 監當差遣 (SHY Zhiguan 64.47)	CB 152.3696
Wang Guo 王果	Military	Dingzhou Prefect 知定州	皇城使 7a and Prestige Title 賀州刺史 4a	Demoted one step 降一官 (SHY Zhiguan 64.47) and made Mizhou Prefect 知密州 in Jingdong East	Unable to pacify when first commanding troops (SHY Zhiguan 64.44) and lost too many soldiers in battle (CB 152.3697)
Wei Gui 韋貴	Military	Provisional Baozhou Director-in-Chief 權保州都監	西頭供奉官 8b	Demoted to 右侍禁 9a and made Supervisor of Yuezhou's State Monopolies and Commercial Taxes 監岳州茶鹽酒稅 in Jinghu North	Led or otherwise affiliated with mutineers (SHY Zhiguan 64.47-48)
					CB 152.3699

	Shiqi Zhen 侍其臻	Military	Supervisor of Baozhou's Granaries and Pastures 監保州倉草場 and Provisional Supervisor of Infantry and Cavalry Militias 權保州兵馬監押	左班殿直 9a	Demoted to 右班殿直 9a and made Supervisor of Caozhou's Granaries 監曹州倉 in Jingdong West		CB 152.3699-700
	Jia Shiyong 賈世永	Military	Supervisor of Baozhou's State Farms 監保州屯田務	右侍禁 9a	Transferred to Supervisor of Yunzhou's Granaries 監鄆州倉 in Jingdong West		CB 152.3700
	Shi Keshun 史克順	Military	Baozhou-Guangxinjun Border Patrolling Inspector 保州、廣信軍管界巡檢	右侍禁 9a	Transferred to Zezhou Border Patrolling Inspector 澤州管界巡檢 in Hedong		CB 152.3700
	Zhang Du 張瀆	Military	Baozhou Commander 保州指揮	三班奉職 9b	Twenty blows on the back, tattooed and sent to Sramana Island 決脊杖二十，刺配沙門島 in Jingdong East	Joined mutineers, informed Wei Gui that he had read magical texts 法書 (presumably hoping to use magic to help mutineers, SHY Zhiguan 64.48)	CB 152.3700
Beizhou, Hebei Mutiny of 1047-1048 (Wang Ze)	Huangfu Bi 皇甫泌	Civil	Hebei Fiscal Intendant 河北轉運使	兵部郎中 6b	Initially made Supervisor of Qingzhou's Commercial Taxes 監青州稅 in Jingdong East (CB 162.3908), later partially restored as Zezhou Prefect 知澤州 (CB 163.3917)	Mutiny happened in their jurisdiction (SHY Zhiguan 65.2)	CB 162.3908
	Tian Jing 田京	Civil	Hebei Judicial Intendant 提點河北刑獄 (SS 303.10052)	祠部員外郎 7a	Initially made Supervisor of Yunzhou's Commercial Taxes 監鄆州稅 in Jingdong West (CB 162.3908), later		CB 162.3908

				partially restored as Yanzhou Vice Prefect 通判兗州 (CB 163.3917)		
Pei Deyu 裴德輿	Military	Former Beizhou Prefect 前知恩州	四方館使 5b and Prestige Title 昭州刺史 4a	Demoted three steps 追三官 and Prestige Title 池州團練副使 8b	Failed to investigate heterodox group 妖黨 that formed in Beizhou (SHY Zhiguan 65.2)	CB 162.3908
Li Zhaodu 李昭度	Military	Former Beizhou Military Administrator 前恩州鈐轄	皇城使 7a	Demoted three steps 追三官 and Prestige Title 濠州團練副使 8b		CB 162.3908
Feng Wenji 馮文吉	Military	Beizhou Director-in-Chief 恩州都監	內殿承制 8a	Disenrolled 除名 and exiled to Meizhou 長流梅州 in Guangnan East	Cowardly and abandoned Beizhou (punishment mitigated because struggled hard afterward, SHY Zhiguan 65.2)	CB 162.3908
Zhao Weiyi 趙惟一	Military	[Beizhou] Supervisor of Militia 監押	右侍禁 9a	Blows to the back 杖脊, tattooed and sentenced to Sramana Island 黥配沙門島 in Jingdong East (SHY Zhiguan 65.2)	Cowardly and abandoned Beizhou (SHY Zhiguan 65.2)	CB 162.3908
Zhang Deyi 張得一	Military	Beizhou Prefect 知恩州	西上閣門使 6a	Executed 誅, brothers (Zhang Deyi's father Zhang Qi 張耆 had 24 sons in all, including Zhang Xiyi below) demoted 其弟兄悉坐降官, wife and children spared punishment by joint adjudication 得一妻子免緣坐	Assisted Wang Ze	CB 162.3912-13
Zhang Xiyi 張希一	Military	Unknown (led troops at Beizhou against brother Zhang Deyi, captured a water gate 水門)	Reached rank 引進使 5b	Made Supervisor of Hongzhou's Salt Monopoly 監洪州鹽 in Jiangnan West	Punished by joint adjudication for his brother Zhang Deyi's crime 絳兄得一累	SS 290.9712
Wang Gongchen 王拱辰	Civil	Chanzhou Prefect 知澶州	禮部侍郎 3b	Demoted to Hanlin Academician and Reader-in-Waiting 翰林侍讀學士 and	Punished for having sponsored Zhang Deyi (joint adjudication)	CB 164.3943

				Longtu Pavilion Academician 龍圖閣學士		
Liu Zhi 柳植	Civil	Unknown	給事中 4a	Demoted to Hanlin Academician and Reader-in- Waiting 翰林侍讀學士 and made Caizhou Prefect 知蔡 州		CB 164.3943
Cheng Kan 程戡	Civil	Yizhou (Chengdu) Prefect 知益州	刑部郎中 6b	Demoted to Auxiliary Academician of the Bureau of Military Affairs 樞密直學 士 and made Fengxiangfu Prefect 知鳳翔府		CB 164.3943
Yu Zhouxun 魚周詢	Civil	Unknown	右諫議大夫 4b	Demoted to Provisional Vice Censor-in-Chief 權御史中丞 and Yongxingjun Prefect 知 永興軍 in Yongxingjun Circuit		CB 164.3943
Wang Deji 王德基	Military	Chanzhou Prefect 知澶州	衛州團練使 3b	Demoted to 四方館使 5b and Prestige Title 榮州刺史 4a	Punished for having sponsored Zhang Deyi (joint adjudication)	CB 164.3949
Wang Zhongyong 王中庸	Military	Baozhou Prefect 知保州	西上閣門使 6a	Demoted to 引進副使 6b		CB 164.3949
Liu Yuanyu 劉元瑜	Civil	Palace Censor 殿中侍御史	殿中侍御史 7a	Fined 30 catties of copper 罰 銅三十斤 (20 catties according to SHY Zhiguan 65.5)		CB 164.3949
Zhang Cun 張存	Civil	Auxiliary Academician of the Longtu Pavilion 龍圖 閣直學士	給事中 4a	Demoted to 左諫議大夫 4b, made Chizhou Prefect 知池 州 in Jiangnan East	Punished for having previously been Zhendingfu Prefect (where Li Jiao learned sorcery from Zhao Zhong, presumably during Zhang's tenure), and his daughter married Li Tan's son Li Yang 李 馱 (CB 163.3918, Li Yang identified in QSW 56:1227.295; name might be miswritten as "Bai 敗" in <i>Changbian</i>)	SHY Zhiguan 65.3

Zhang Mian 張沔	Civil	Auxiliary to the Historiography Institute 直史館	工部郎中 6b	Demoted to 都官員外郎 7a, made Supervisor of Xuanzhou's Commercial Taxes 監宣州稅 in Jiangnan East	Formerly (Hebei) Fiscal Intendants, failed to uncover and investigate (CB 163.3918)	SHY Zhiguan 65.3
Zhang Wenzhi 張晷之	Civil	Unknown	工部郎中 6b	Demoted to 祠部員外郎 7a, made Supervisor of Ezhou's Commercial Taxes 監鄂州稅 in Jinghu North		SHY Zhiguan 65.3
Li Duanyi 李端懿	Military	Unknown	濟州防禦使 3b	Demoted to 單州團練使 3b (higher than <i>fangyushi</i> , but recorded as a demotion 降 according to SS 464.13569), made Zhengzhou Military Administrator 鄭州鈐轄 in Jingxi North (made Junzhou Prefect 知均州 in Jingxi South according to CB 163.3918 and SS 464.13569)	Former Jizhou Prefect 知冀州, where Li Jiao's family lived, failed to uncover and investigate (CB 163.3918)	SHY Zhiguan 65.3
Han Zhi 韓贇	Civil	Unknown	殿中侍御史 7a	Demoted to 太常博士 7b, made Supervisor of Jiangzhou's Commercial Taxes 監江州稅 in Jiangnan West	Former Jizhou Vice Prefect 通判 冀州, where Li Jiao's family lived, failed to uncover and investigate (CB 163.3918)	SHY Zhiguan 65.3-4
Liang Qian 梁蒨	Civil	Unknown	監察御史 7b	Demoted to 秘書丞 8a, made Supervisor of Hengzhou's Commercial Taxes 監衡州稅 in Jinghu South	Former Dezhou Vice Prefect 通 判德州, sent as investigating official 勘官, did not leave detailed record, presumably making it more difficult to confirm Li Jiao killed himself (CB 163.3918)	SHY Zhiguan 65.4
Li Tan 李曇	Civil	Unknown	屯田郎中 6b	Administrative Aide in Zhaozhou 昭州別駕 in Guangnan West (or Nan'enzhou 南恩州 in Guangnan East, according to <i>Sushui jiwén</i> 4.71)	Not stated explicitly (presumably punished by joint adjudication for his son Li Jiao's crime)	SHY Zhiguan 65.4

Li Zhouqing 李周卿	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Registered Control in Shaozhou's Yamen 韶州衙前編管 in Guangnan East	Not stated explicitly (presumably punished by joint adjudication for his younger brother Li Jiao's crime)	SHY Zhiguan 65.4
Li Jiao's Mother 李教母	Unknown	N/A	N/A	Registered Control in Caozhou 曹州 in Jingdong West	Not stated explicitly (presumably punished by joint adjudication for her son Li Jiao's crime)	SHY Zhiguan 65.4
Zhao Zhong's Father 趙仲父	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Registered Control in Yunzhou 鄆州編管 in Jingdong West	Not stated explicitly (presumably punished by joint adjudication for his son Zhao Zhong's crime)	SHY Zhiguan 65.4
Zhao Zhong's Mother 趙仲母	Unknown	N/A	N/A	Registered Control in Yunzhou 鄆州編管 in Jingdong West	Not stated explicitly (presumably punished by joint adjudication for her son Zhao Zhong's crime)	SHY Zhiguan 65.5
Zhao Zhong's Wife 趙仲妻	Unknown	N/A	N/A	Registered Control in Yunzhou 鄆州編管 in Jingdong West	Not stated explicitly (presumably punished by joint adjudication for her husband Zhao Zhong's crime)	SHY Zhiguan 65.6

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SHY *Song huiyao jigao* 宋會要輯稿 edited by Xu Song 徐松 (1781-1848) et al. Beijing:

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SS *Songshi* 宋史 edited by Tuo Tuo 脫脫 (1313-1355) et al. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977.

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