

Essays on Government-led Collaborative Governance

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Abstract

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Governments increasingly use collaborative governance as a strategy for policymaking and management. This dissertation is a collection of three essays each addressing an important question regarding government-led collaborative governance. Social Security Consultative Bodies (SSCBs) in South Korea—a case of government-mandated collaborative governance—constitute the empirical context of the essays. The first essay explores whether governments serving as collaborative platforms can breed trust using repeated measures survey data. Findings show that as a result of participating in government-led collaborative governance, SSCB participants report an increase in both institutional and individual-level trust. The study confirms that governments serving as collaborative platforms can initiate genuine collaboration as evidenced by enhanced trust and identifies factors that government platforms can leverage to facilitate trust building at different

levels. The second essay explores the policy feedback effects of government-led collaborative governance. The central question is whether government-created venues crowd out or reinforce participation in alternative participatory venues. A mixed-methods analysis using both survey and interview data uncovers that government-led collaborative governance generates both resource effects and interpretive effects which promotes further civic engagement. The findings imply that government-created collaborative venues generate cooperative feedback effects that reinforce other participatory venues. The final essay focuses on the co-production function of SSCBs. I explore what implications service delivery through government-led collaborative governance has for place-based inequities in access to public services. Using survey data, I find that internal process dynamics are associated with co-production performance in delivering public services, rather than local resource capacities. This implies successful management of government-led collaborative governance can mitigate place-based inequities that arise due to local resource disparities. Collectively, the essays advance our knowledge of a particular type of collaborative governance that is government-led while making both theoretical and methodological contributions to the study of public management.

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DEDICATION

To my husband, Sungyong.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

From COVID-19 to climate change and advances in technology, governments around the world are continuously challenged to innovate ways of governing. Challenges often arise in the form of wicked problems that span across policy domains as well as organizational, jurisdictional, and geographical boundaries (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Endorsing collaboration has been one approach to innovating governance to address such challenges (Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson et al. 2012; Gash 2017; Scott and Thomas 2017). As a result, collaborative governance is increasingly considered a proactive “policy instrument” (Ansell & Gash, 2018) or “policy toolbox” (Scott and Thomas 2017) that can be strategically used as a means of policymaking and implementation. This is a shift away from its initial perception as a dispute resolution mechanism which was considered a “plan B” (Gash, 2017) or something to “fail into” (Bryson et al., 2006). Discussions of government-mandated collaboration continue to grow, implying that collaborative governance is more commonly pursued out of strategic choice rather than as a last resort (An et al., 2021; Cain et al., 2020; Carboni et al., 2019; Getha-Taylor et al., 2019; Mosley & Jarpe, 2019; Ran & Qi, 2018; Siddiki et al., 2015). In this context, collaborative governance theories can benefit from a greater understanding of government roles in collaborative governance.

Collaborative governance scholars have emphasized the need to understand how formative type—or differences in how collaboration is initiated—shapes the subsequent evolution of collaborative dynamics. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015, p. 152) called attention to “distinguish[ing] between collaboration that is initiated top-down by upper-level government institutions and bottom-up through grassroots organizations.” They proposed a *Typology of Collaborative Governance Regimes (CGRs)* by formative type to spur research on distinct *species* of collaborative governance. The typology distinguishes between externally directed, self-initiated, and independently convened types of collaborative governance regimes. Ulibarri et al. (2020) have added to this line of research by exploring the variation in form and dynamics of externally directed and self-initiated CGRs over time. The study finds notable differences in trajectories of evolution between externally directed and self-initiated CGRs in terms of leadership, collaborative processes, accountability, as well as outputs and outcomes. Their finding emphasizes the need to further distill collaborative governance theories by accounting for distinctions in formative type.

Despite such foundational work, there are still major gaps in our understanding of different formative types of collaborative governance and how they vary in terms of processes and outcomes. To address this gap, this dissertation focuses on a particular formative type of collaborative governance which is government-led. Koontz et al. (2004) identify three distinct roles for governments in collaborative governance; as leaders, encouragers, and followers. Governments lead collaboration by strategically utilizing their command-and-control authority along with various incentives to define issues, provide the majority of resources, and organize group structure and decision-making for collaboration.

Governments are in advantageous positions to lead collaborative governance for public purposes given their authority, legitimacy, and control over resources in public domains (Shergold, 2008). As governments increasingly employ collaborative governance in the public sector which has traditionally been governed by hierarchical orders, we observe a unique form of governance that incorporates collaborative deliberation with top-down traditions. Booher (2004, p. 41) describes that “[c]ollaborative governance practice is emerging as an augmentation to existing government, not a replacement.” This calls for a change in perspective from regarding collaborative governance as antithetical to traditional hierarchical governance toward understanding how the two modes of governance are compatible and may even be complementary. This dissertation focuses on government-led collaborative governance to better understand government roles in bringing together these seemingly contrasting modes of governance.


1.2. A Review of Key Concepts and Definitions

Public management encompasses “organizational structures, managerial practices, and institutionalized values by which officials enact the will of the sovereign authority” (Lynn, 2005, p. 28). If the purpose of public management is to enact the will of the sovereign, collaborative governance confers that authority to a group of individuals and organizations. Procedures and institutional arrangements that shape the collective decision-making process become imperative as public actors must work with others to achieve public purposes. As a result, the scope of governance is expanded to incorporate “processes and institutions for public decision making and action that include actors from

both government and other sectors” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 15). Such governing arrangement has come to be known as collaborative governance defined as: “processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 18).

Collaborative governance can be initiated by collaborative platforms which are organizations or programs that facilitate collaboration by dedicating competencies and resources (Ansell & Gash, 2018). Collaborative governance is government-led when governments serve as platforms. Governments lead collaborative governance by purposefully designing collaborative arenas (design phase of Figure 1)—spaces in which actors are invited to engage in collaborative deliberation (Torfing et al., 2021). If collaborative dynamics and collaborative actions are successfully initiated (initiation phase in Figure 1) and sustained (sustainment phase in Figure 1) within the collaborative arenas, the arrangements constitute collaborative governance regimes (CGRs) which are governance systems where collaboration is the dominant mode of governance (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). In summary, government-led collaborative governance occurs when governments act as collaborative platforms to design and facilitate the initiation of collaborative dynamics and actions in collaborative arenas, which when sustained, constitute a type of externally directed CGR according to the Typology of Collaborative Governance Regimes (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

Figure 1. Phases of Government-led Collaborative Governance



1.3. Opportunities and Risks of Government-led Collaborative Governance

Governments are in advantageous positions to serve as platforms to lead collaborative governance (Shergold, 2008). However, CGRs are sustained modes and systems of collaborative governance composed of collaborative dynamics and collaborative actions (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015), and it is not realistic to expect that all government-led collaborative governance will be institutionalized and sustained to evolve into CGRs. There are risks associated with government-led collaborative governance as well, which have not been thoroughly explored in former research. As government-led collaborative government becomes a widespread management strategy, there is a need to better understand the opportunities and risks it presents. I build upon general discussions of collaborative governance to highlight how they are upheld in the more narrowly defined

context of government-led collaborative governance, focusing on highlighting the opportunities and risks it creates.

A major opportunity government-led collaborative governance presents is the strengthening of democracy. Modern representative democracies that operate through traditional bureaucratic governance have been criticized for being unrepresentative of and unresponsive to citizens and being ill-suited to handle the policy problems of our times (Fung & Wright, 2001). Limitations of bureaucratic governance were amplified as modern societies demanded greater inclusion and representation of diverse values in public policy (Booher, 2004). Government-led collaborative governance creates participatory arenas where citizens can voice their needs more directly in policy processes and further co-produce and co-create public value (Ansell et al., 2021). This enhances the ability of democratic governments to better identify and respond to public values with the added benefit of fostering civic capacities (Ghose, 2005; Nabatchi, 2012).

Other opportunities arise in the form of greater alignment between levels of government. Government-led collaborative governance often follows a structure where higher-level governments act as platforms to promote more localized public service provision (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). In governments that are designed to work through devolution of powers, such structure promotes greater alignment between levels of government in delivering public services. This highlights how government-led collaborative governance complements, rather than replaces, traditional hierarchical governance structures. It shows one way that higher-level governments can capitalize on

local expertise and knowledge while respecting the autonomy of lower-level governments in an era of devolution (Mullin & Daley, 2010).

Scalability is another major opportunity offered by collaborative platforms that allow for the “replicat[ion] of collaborative governance on a wider scale” (Ansell & Gash, 2018, p. 20). By investing in the design of a single platform, governments can facilitate the creation of multiple, parallel collaborative arenas that operate in different jurisdictions. This relates to Emerson and Nabatchi’s (2015) claim that externally directed collaborative governance may be better fitted to address extensive policy problems. Functioning as collaborative platforms requires significant investment of government capacities and resources because platform functions must be carefully defined, designed, and implemented in order to create a collaborative arena that can generate authentic collaboration. Extensive problems that are common across jurisdictions better justify the investment necessary to create a collaborative platform as they can be scaled and replicated across jurisdictions, realizing economies of scale (Ansell & Gash, 2018).

Related to scalability is the benefit of greater long-term automaticity in government responses to policy problems. The automaticity of a policy refers to “the extent to which a tool utilizes an existing administrative structure to produce its effect rather than having to create its own special administrative apparatus” (Salamon & Elliott, 2002, p. 32). While government-led collaborative governance requires a significant upfront investment of resources on the part of the government to design the platform and the collaborative arena, once created, the collaborative arena can nest continued capacities to address a policy problem. This can add to the automaticity of the government’s response in the long term as

the arena allows the government to continuously harness the capacities of non-state actors to serve a policy purpose over time. In addressing policy issues that require continuous management, investing in the creation of a semi-permanent arena that can continuously harness the capacities of participants dedicated to the issue can be an efficient strategy that is high in automaticity.

Trade-offs to these opportunities come in the form of various risks. The first risk can be expressed in terms of failures of government-led collaborative governance to generate “authentic collaboration” (Booher, 2004; Purdy, 2012) or the “failure to activate” (Ulibarri et al., 2020). The failure to initiate is a major challenge for government-led collaborative governance because sufficient buy-in from actors can be hard to attain as they often do not have direct stakes involved (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Ulibarri et al., 2020). This translates to failures in fostering collaborative dynamics or producing collaborative action. As collaborative dynamics and collaborative action are key elements of CGRs, their absence denotes the failure to generate authentic collaboration. Such failures translate into government failures resulting in a detrimental impact on citizens who rely on government services. Government-led collaborative governance is an induced process. The fact that governments artificially create collaborative arenas and impose collaboration among participants leads to risks of the arena becoming a ceremonial institution that will fail to generate collaboration to serve the purpose it was created for. Governments may be responsible for this failure if collaborative arenas are tokenized to justify government efforts to be inclusive, or if they manipulate collaboration to divert opposition which Booher (2004) refers to as counterfeit processes. Non-state participants can contribute to

this failure through their lack of buy-in and/or pursuit of agendas or interests that deter the formation of shared motivations.

Second, how government-led collaborative governance interacts with the existing polycscape is unknown. Government-led collaborative governance does not take place in a vacuum. It occurs in a landscape that is populated with existing policies which act as institutions to shape governance, power structures, and political behaviors, conceptualized as the polycscape (Mettler, 2016). However, we know little about how government-led collaborative governance interacts with existing policies and institutions. One specific consideration can focus on the impact of government-created arenas on other self-initiated arenas of public participation. Rational choice institutional theories suggest that capacities and social capital fostered in one venue can lower transaction costs to collaboration in other venues, suggesting that government-led collaborative governance will strengthen other participatory venues (Lubell, 2005; Lubell et al., 2002). On the contrary, government-created collaborative arenas may have the intended or unintended consequence of crowding out other organic venues of civic participation. According to the ecology of games perspective, competition among participatory venues to attract resources can lead to a crowding out effect as the ecology can only sustain a finite number of venues (Lubell et al., 2010). Governments may intentionally leverage their official status, legitimacy, and authority as a comparative advantage over other venues to “extend power at a reduced cost” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 153). Such abuses may be detrimental to democracy if governments use government-led collaborative governance as a mechanism to limit and control bottom-up channels of civic participation.

Finally, there are risks associated with inequities both within and across collaborative arenas. First, there is the inequity of representation as a result of who participates in the collaborative arena (Ansell et al., 2020). If certain groups are not invited to participate, unwilling to participate, or unable to participate, the venue will be unable to represent the full spectrum of public values. This raises questions of whether government-led collaborative governance are legitimate means to deliver public services equitably, as the interests of citizens are not represented equally. Within the arena, power inequities can lead to the domination of few or single participants, which can be attributable to politics, resource dependence among participants, pre-existing histories that draw existing power structures into the arena, as well as institutional design (Bryson et al., 2006; Purdy, 2012). Regardless of the cause, irreconcilable power dynamics can undermine collaborative deliberation. In the case of government-led collaborative governance, government actors are in a position to exercise greater authority over the process, making it particularly challenging to ensure that traditional hierarchical power relations do not hinder collaborative deliberation.

There are also risks associated with inequity across collaborative arenas. If government-led collaborative governance is used for local public service provision, we may observe high inequalities in the quantity and quality of services provided to citizens depending on the resource capacity of local communities, resulting in place-based inequity. In their study of representation in Sustainable Groundwater Management in California, Dobbin and Lubell (2021, p. 562) confirm such a possibility by observing that “representation of the smallest, most low-income communities and those lacking political

recognition...lags far behind their more advantaged counterparts. In fact, disparities in representation along these lines increased.”

1.4. Overview of Essays

This dissertation presents three empirical essays on government-led collaborative governance to contribute to our understanding of this evermore prevalent form of governance. The three essays address each of the potential risks introduced above. Social Security Consultative Bodies (SSCBs)—legislatively mandated collaborative governance arrangements in South Korea—provide the context for the studies.

The first paper addresses the question of whether government-led collaboration can generate authentic collaboration. Governments increasingly lead collaborative governance to deliver public services which calls for evidence that they can generate authentic collaboration that performs. Research suggests that trust is imperative for collaborative performance but fostering dynamics of trust may prove particularly challenging in the context of government-led collaborative governance. This study leverages the case of SSCBs in South Korea to empirically test whether governments serving as collaborative platforms can breed trust. Repeated measures data collected from a panel of SSCB participants over a 16-month period is analyzed using multilevel models to track participants’ trust trajectories as they partake in government-led collaborative governance. Trust is analyzed at two distinct subject levels including trust in the institution and trust in individuals. Findings show that as a result of participating in government-led collaborative governance, SSCB participants report an increase in both institutional and individual-level trust.

Positive histories of interaction, trustiness, and perceptions of fairness and transparency contribute to trust at both levels. Additionally, perceptions of efficacy and perceptions of value congruence contribute to institutional-level trust. The study confirms that governments serving as collaborative platforms can initiate genuine collaboration as evidenced by enhanced trust and identifies factors that government platforms can leverage to facilitate trust building at different levels.

What impact does the proliferation of government-created collaborative venues have on the broader polycscape? The second paper of this dissertation studies the policy feedback effects of government-led collaborative governance on citizen participation in alternative venues. A mixed-methods approach is used to examine explanations offered by two contrasting theoretical perspectives. The institutional rational choice (IRC) perspective suggests that collaboration in a venue lowers transaction costs of collaborating in other venues, creating a spillover effect that sustains the mutual prosperity of multiple participatory venues. Contrastingly, the ecology of games (EG) framework implies there will be a crowding-out effect between participatory venues, especially if citizens are attracted to government-created venues that can offer greater legitimacy and resources. Survey and interview data collected from SSCB members are analyzed to answer if and how participating in government-led collaboration affected their participation in alternative venues. Quantitative analysis provides empirical support for the IRC perspective. Participants report greater trust in other participants and higher interest levels in regional social security issues since joining the SSCBs. These changes, which indicate the presence of resource effects and interpretive effects, are positively associated with higher levels of

participation in other social security venues. Qualitative analysis triangulates the findings to confirm that increased participation in alternative venues is attributable to policy feedback effects, both resource effects and interpretive effects, created by government-led collaborative governance.

The third paper focuses on the equity implications of government-led collaboration as a service provision strategy. Despite the popularity of participatory approaches to public service provision, our understanding of their implications for social equity is limited. In this paper, I focus on the co-productive function of SSCBs and explore how this form of public management which includes citizens in the production of goods and services, affects place-based inequity—disparities in the distribution of public services according to where one lives. Drawing on original survey data from South Korea’s SSCBs and administrative data, this paper investigates which plays a greater role in shaping co-production performance: external resources or internal process dynamics. Using ordinal logistic regression models, the paper finds that internal process dynamics play a more significant role in shaping co-production performance. The finding implies that co-production can serve as a public management strategy to promote the equitable distribution of public services and alleviate place-based inequities by mitigating disparities in local resources. Furthermore, the findings suggest that public management should focus on designing co-production arrangements that facilitate trust formation, ensure procedural fairness and transparency, and promote value congruence between members. Such design elements can contribute to the effectiveness of co-production as a means of advancing equity in public service provision.

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II. DO COLLABORATIVE PLATFORMS BREED TRUST? A REPEATED MEASURES STUDY OF TRUST IN SOCIAL SECURITY CONSULTATIVE BODIES (SSCBS)

1. Introduction

Collaborative governance encompasses “processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across...boundaries...to carry out a public purpose” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 229). Governments increasingly lead collaborative governance to co-produce public services with non-state actors. To do so, they serve as collaborative platforms which are organizations that dedicate “competences, institutions and resources” to facilitate collaborative projects (Ansell & Gash, 2018, p. 20; Ansell & Miura, 2020). The prevalence of government-led collaborative governance is evidenced by the growing discourse on state-mandated collaboration (Ran & Qi, 2018; Siddiki et al., 2015; Carboni et al., 2019; Getha-Taylor et al., 2019; Cain et al., 2020; An et al., 2021; Ivery, 2008) as well as the dominant portion of cases classified as externally directed by law or authority in the *Collaborative Governance Case Database* (Douglas et al., 2020). Despite the prevalence of government-led collaborative governance, however, little effort has been dedicated to understanding this specific type of collaborative governance. As a result, we have a limited understanding of the opportunities or risks it presents as a means of public service delivery.

Collaborative governance is a complex mode of governance that is accompanied by risks of failure. When used to deliver public services, performance failures translate into government failures which have detrimental impacts on citizens who rely on those

government services. In such a scenario, the validity of government-led collaborative governance as a means of public service delivery can be fundamentally challenged. This study is motivated by the puzzle of whether government-led collaborative governance can perform as a reliable means of public service delivery. I answer two questions related to this puzzle: 1) do governments serving as collaborative platforms breed trust, and 2) what factors are more or less relevant to trust building in the context of government-led collaborative governance?

One way government-led collaborative governance can fail to perform is by failing to generate authentic collaboration which is accompanied by collaborative dynamics and collaborative action (Booher, 2004; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Purdy, 2012). Among numerous factors that can lead to this failure, the absence of trust is particularly relevant to government-led collaborative governance. Government-led collaborative governance is initiated by the strategic facilitation of governments serving as collaborative platforms. It constitutes a type of externally directed collaboration that differs from self-initiated processes that arise more organically by stakeholders that come together to resolve a shared problem. Government-led collaborative governance is an induced arrangement where participants are purposefully incentivized or even mandated to collaborate for a public purpose. It is often focused on creating public value rather than resolving a problem that is closely tied to the direct interests of the participants. Therefore, government-led collaborative governance is likely to face greater challenges in eliciting participant buy-in (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Further, ensuring that participants share the public goals of governments that lead collaboration can be difficult. There is potential for goal

misalignment between the government and participants as well as rent-seeking behaviors on the part of the participants (Romzek et al., 2014; Moynihan, 2022). As a result, government platforms may fail to initiate any collaboration at all (Ulibarri et al., 2020), or even if collaboration is initiated, there are risks of the process operating in a way that is decoupled from the original public purpose it was intended to serve (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Seeking evidence on whether platforms can generate authentic collaboration, this study analyzes repeated measures survey data on trust collected from a panel of Social Security Consultative Bodies (SSCBs) participants. SSCBs are legislatively mandated collaborative governance committees that operate in all autonomous local jurisdictions in South Korea. Their goal is to co-produce community-based social security services through cross-sector collaboration. SSCBs present a setting to observe changes in participants' trust over time as they partake in government-led collaborative governance. In this study, the growing trust trajectories of participants are indicative of the ability of government platforms to generate authentic collaboration and lend partial evidence to validate government-led collaborative governance as a reliable means of service delivery. The study also analyzes the level at which trust is formed by distinguishing between institutional and individual-level trust, as well as factors that impact trust formation. The following section presents the theoretical background of the study which identifies factors that contribute to trust formation in government-led collaborative governance. A multi-theoretical approach that pulls from organizational, individual, and institutional factors is applied to identify the foundations of trust that inform the hypotheses. Then, the methods and results are

presented, followed by a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. The study concludes with a summary of the contributions and limitations.

2. Background

2.1. Trust as an Indicator of Authentic Collaboration

In this study, trust is indicative of the platform's ability to generate authentic collaboration that performs. Trust is a crucial element of collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). The *Contingency Model for Collaborative Governance* specifies trust as both an input and output of collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Starting conditions define existing levels of trust. Once collaboration is initiated, iterative cycles of trust building amplify existing levels of trust to create a virtuous cycle of collaboration. The *Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance* identifies trust as a part of the system context which continuously shapes collaborative dynamics as well as an element of shared motivation that constitutes collaborative dynamics (Emerson et al., 2012). According to these works, trust is both an important input and output of collaboration which also represents successfully fostered collaborative dynamics. Therefore, changes in levels of trust can be used to assess whether authentic collaboration is taking place and provide a mechanism to test whether government platforms can foster genuine collaboration that can perform as a reliable means of public service delivery.

Building trust is an important role of collaborative platforms. Public management research shows that trust can and should be purposefully fostered for collaboration. Booher (2004) states:

Creating the dynamics of trust for these [new governance] practices becomes a critical challenge. Policy making is not simply about finding solutions but also creating processes for collective action and problem solving that generate trust among the actors (p.34).

Empirical network studies also confirm that active facilitation and management contribute to trust building (Huang & Provan, 2007; Klijn et al., 2010). Klijn (2010) summarizes that “[t]rust is not a characteristic which is naturally present” and “[t]o achieve trust, it is necessary to facilitate intensive levels of interaction”(p.316). The author emphasizes that “trust does not arise automatically” and must be “consciously achieved through improvements in the interaction between actors and through dedicated network management activities” (p.306). Collectively, these studies suggest that fostering trust is an important function of collaborative platforms, and their ability to do so will shape prospects for collaborative performance.

2.2. A Multi-Theoretical Perspective on Trust

Trust is a concept that is operationalized and measured in many different ways. Table 1 presents a review of definitions and measures of trust used in key collaborative governance studies.

Table 1. Definitions and Measures of Trust in Collaborative Governance Literature


Definition	Measures
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Leach and Sabatier (2005b)	“involves faith or confidence in another's propensity to keep promises, to negotiate honestly, to show respect for other points of view, and to express some level of concern for the welfare of others” (p. 492)	Interpersonal trust is measured by perceptions of other participants as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • honest, forthright, and true to their word • have reasonable motives and concerns • willing to listen, and sincerely try to understand other points of view • reciprocate acts of good will or generosity • propose solutions that are compatible with the needs of other members of the partnership
Calanni et al. (2014)	Employ a multidimensional definition of trust including the following dimensions: “(1) <i>participant motives</i> , not exploiting or betraying purposes; (2) <i>competency</i> , possessing the knowledge and skills to do what is expected; (3) <i>dependability</i> , holding the necessary resources; and (4) <i>collegiality</i> , showing respect and fairness” (pp.904-905).	Trust-based motivations to coordinate with others are measured by the following statements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • I trust them to keep their promises. • They are professionally competent. • I have worked with them in the past.
Emerson and Nabatchi (2015)	“Confidence in the reliability, truthfulness, and abilities of others” (p.194).	Sample indicators proposed by the authors include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of perceived trust among participants • The extent to which they believe each other to be reasonable, predictable, and dependable

In this study, trust refers to “the intention to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations or beliefs regarding the intentions or behavior of another person or other people in general” (Van Lange, 2015, p. 71). This bridges definitions of trust proposed by


Rousseau et al. (1998) and Rotter (1967) who incorporate multiple theoretical perspectives to understanding trust as illustrated in Figure 1. The definition accounts for institutional factors that shape individual perceptions and behavior which derive from economic and sociological traditions. The definition also accounts for different levels of influence at the organizational and individual levels. I briefly discuss these theoretical perspectives, which will collectively guide the identification of factors that are more or less relevant to trust building in the context of government-led collaborative governance.

Figure 1. Theoretical Foundations and Approaches to Understanding Trust



One institutional perspective on trust derives from the economic or rational choice school of thought which emphasizes the self-seeking and calculative behaviors of individuals (Williamson, 1993). It is a “calculative element” (Gulati & Sytch, 2008, p. 167) of trust that derives from traditions of “classic liberalism” (Choi & Robertson, 2019, p. 394) or “rational choice” institutionalism (Leach & Sabatier, 2005b, p. 492). According to this view, a history of interactions creates experiential knowledge and allows actors to engage in information collection that allows them to reduce risks that arise due to uncertainty. Factors that contribute to trust formation according to this school of thought include fairness and transparency of the institution in which interactions take place as well as a notion of institutional efficacy or whether the institution is capable of achieving its goals. Another institutional perspective is represented by the sociological school of thought which emphasizes the “non-calculative element” of trust (Gulati & Sytch, 2008, p. 167). It aligns with “civic republicanism” (Choi & Robertson, 2019, p. 394) or “social psychological” (Leach & Sabatier, 2005b, p. 493) perspectives. The central assumption is that individuals are willing to restrain self-maximizing behaviors for the sake of collective gains. A history of interactions helps individuals to learn about other actors and identify with them eventually leading to the internalization of their interests. This helps the establishment of shared preferences and collective goals (Choi & Robertson, 2019; Gulati & Sytch, 2008). Value congruence is a factor that contributes to trust formation according to this school of thought which represents mission and goal alignment between participants as well as convergence in beliefs. Figure 2 illustrates rational choice and sociological institutional pathways to trust.

Figure 2. A Simplified Process of Trust Formation



Two levels of influence also shape trust. Trust is a “meso concept” which is shaped by “group dynamics with macro level institutional arrangements” and “micro level psychological processes” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 393). An organizational-level factor that affects trust includes histories of interaction among the group of participants which reflects organizational dynamics and culture (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati & Sytch, 2008). An individual-level factor that affects trust is the individual’s trustingness or propensity to trust (Roy et al., 2016).

Given these guiding theoretical perspectives on trust, recent trends in literature acknowledge that both micro and macro-level influences that account for rational choice and sociological approaches should be incorporated for a full account of trust. Choi and Robertson (2019) elaborate on this:

any given collaborative governance system will likely be populated by participants with a mix of interests reflecting personal, institutional, and social or public-oriented goals. Thus, efforts to understand these systems, and to improve their functioning, should take this mix of motives into account (p. 395).

This multi-theoretical perspective is most compatible with understanding trust formation in the context of collaborative governance which engages multiple actors in a multi-level process. Accordingly, I assume SSCBs are populated by participants who hold both rational choice and sociological behavioral tendencies and are under the continuous influence of organizational and individual-level factors. This provides a realistic way to understand and operationalize the complexities surrounding the concept of trust in collaborative governance.

2.3. Accounting for the Subject Level of Trust

This study differentiates between two distinct subject levels of trust. Subject level refers to the level of the subject (trustee) toward which trust is directed. Subjects of trust can be other participants one collaborates with as well as the institution that is governed collaboratively in the context of government-led collaborative governance. This is supported by measures presented in Table 1 which show that the collaborative governance literature has focused on both interpersonal and inter-organizational levels of trust. However, studies have seldom considered trust in multiple subject levels simultaneously. I argue that trust benefits from a multilevel analysis as actors can simultaneously hold different perceptions of trust at different subject levels. Theories of trust that are based on the study of a single subject level may not apply to contexts where there are multiple

nested levels of subjects as “it remains unclear as to whether the antecedents and consequences currently identified in studies at one level are unique to that level of analysis or applicable across levels” (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012, p. 1168). Thus, treating trust in different subject levels as inherently different constructs can be a starting point to enhance our understanding of trust.

To do so, this study tracks changes in trust at two distinct subject levels: institutional-level trust captures trust directed toward the institution that is being governed as a collective; individual-level trust captures trust toward other individuals with whom participants collaborate with. Accordingly, I use two outcome variables that measure trust at the institutional and individual levels in this study. This approach takes into account the advice of Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) who recommend using multiple units of analysis when assessing collaborative performance. It also aligns with the OECD Trustlab approach that distinguishes trust in institutions and trust in other people. The need to precisely define “trust in whom” is emphasized through this approach as such distinctions are “fundamental to understanding trust meaningfully” (Murtin et al., 2018, p. 11).

3. Empirical Context and Hypotheses

3.1. Empirical Context

Social Security Consultative Bodies (SSCBs) in South Korea provide the context for this study. SSCBs constitute cases of government-led collaborative governance. They are legislatively mandated by the *2014 Act on the Use And Provision of Social Security Benefits And Search For Eligible Beneficiaries*. The central government and regional local governments jointly serve platform functions which include defining the purpose and scope of operation, setting organizational and procedural rules, and identifying and recruiting participants to continuously facilitate the operation of SSCBs. The foundational purpose of SSCBs is to establish an integrative system of community-based social security provision through cross-sector collaboration. SSCBs are intended to fulfill three core functions: a governance function that realizes collaborative governance by engaging non-government actors in policy deliberation; a networking function to establish and strengthen a regional network of related organizations to foster a networked approach to social security; and an integration function across sectors and domains of social security to create a foundation for integrated service delivery.

SSCBs consist of government officials, private and non-profit sector participants who represent agencies and organizations working in social security-related domains, subject matter experts such as academics, and citizen representatives. SSCBs operate at local-level governments in South Korea including city (*Si*), county (*Gun*), and district (*Gu*) levels. SSCBs are also formed at lower administrative units which are non-autonomous, but this study focuses only on those in autonomous jurisdictions. The committee size varies across jurisdictions. The mayor of the local government formally appoints or commissions members to serve terms with the possibility of extension according to local-level operating

rules. In each jurisdiction, SSCBs are structured into two distinct committees and several practical divisions. The representative committee focuses on policy deliberation and decision-making functions. This committee determines the broader direction of community social security policies. The working-level practitioner committee works alongside practical divisions to identify regional social security issues and translates the high-level decisions made by the representative committee into action. This committee proposes, implements, and monitors projects to address identified needs. The practical divisions focus on specific issues or populations to facilitate the implementation of projects. Collectively, SSCBs deliberate to produce and evaluate regional social security plans.

3.2. Hypotheses


CHANGES IN TRUST OVER TIME. Trust is recognized as both an input and output of successful collaboration (Leach & Sabatier, 2005a; Calanni et al., 2014; Koebele, 2019; Scott & Thomas, 2015; Klijn, 2010; Klijn et al., 2016; Leach & Sabatier, 2005b). Regardless of directionality, these studies imply there is a robust relationship between collaborative governance and trust formation. If government platforms can generate authentic collaboration, on average, there will be an increase in trust over time. Trust building happens in time as “parties work together, get to know each other, and prove to each other that they can be reasonable, predictable, and dependable” (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015, p. 66). Therefore, time is the key variable that captures the effect of participating in government-led collaborative governance on participant trust. Increasing trust trajectories

over time will confirm that collaborative platforms can breed trust. This informs the following hypothesis:

H1. Participants will report higher levels of trust over time as they partake in government-led collaborative governance.

Subsequent hypotheses differentiate between initial levels of trust and changes in levels of trust over time. Building relational dynamics is concentrated in the early stages of collaboration with trust-forming activities becoming less frequent as collaboration reaches maturity or termination (Mandell & Keast, 2008; Ulibarri et al., 2020). This suggests trust trajectories will plateau over time as illustrated in Figure 3. Under this assumption, if my observational timeframe is window A, I will observe lower initial levels of trust relative to window B and vice versa. Additionally, I will observe higher changes in levels of trust over time in window A relative to window B and vice versa. While tracking trust from the initiation of collaborative governance would be ideal, this is not an available option when studying existing collaborative arrangements. There will already be a history of interactions that developed before the window of observation when studying existing collaborations, which can lead to differences in the initial levels of trust a researcher observes. To account for this, I test hypotheses that observe initial levels of trust as well as changes in trust over time. Initial levels of trust account for pre-existing dynamics that developed before my window of observation.

Figure 3. Expected Change in Levels of Trust in Collaborative Governance over Time



LONGEVITY OF PARTICIPATION. Assuming the trust trajectory in Figure 3, the longevity of participation, or how long the participant has been collaborating, will affect levels of trust. Participants who have been part of the collaboration for a longer amount of time will have had more opportunities to build trust. From the rational choice point of view, participants will have more confidence in their assessments of others as they accrue experiential knowledge regarding the reliability of others through repeated interactions. From the sociological perspective, a “durable history of interaction usually also results in the bilateral accumulation of moral obligations” to “establish a strong normative environment” making it “easier for them to establish a reciprocal and equitable exchange of trusting acts” (Gulati & Sytch, 2008, p. 169). Therefore, I hypothesize the following:

H2a. Participants with greater longevity of participation in government-led collaborative governance will likely report higher levels of initial trust.

With greater longevity, participants will experience slower increases in trust over time. This is based on the expectation that trust formation follows a non-linear growth trajectory, increasing faster in the initial phases of collaborative governance and plateauing over time as supported by Mandell and Keast (2008). I expect to observe an S-shaped growth curve where incremental increases in levels of trust slow over time as illustrated in Figure 3.

H2b. Participants with greater longevity of participation in government-led collaborative governance will likely report lower increases in trust over time.

POSITIVE HISTORY OF INTERACTION. A history of interactions is an antecedent to trust (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Gulati & Sytch, 2008). Existing levels of trust based on prior interactions as a collective are important characteristics that shape subsequent collaborative processes and dynamics in collaborative governance models and frameworks (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). This has been confirmed empirically by studies that focus on trust as an input for successful collaborative governance. Organizational perspectives also add theoretical strength by highlighting the importance of shared experiences and a shared history that shapes subsequent interactions through organizational learning (March & Olsen, 1975). To capture the cyclical nature of trust that substantiates the expectation that trust breeds trust, this study tests the effect of histories of interaction. I hypothesize that participants with a positive history of interaction within the arrangement will report higher initial levels of trust and increases in trust over time.

H3a. Participants with a positive history of interaction will likely report higher levels of initial trust.

H3b. Participants with a positive history of interaction will likely report higher increases in trust over time.

TRUSTINGNESS. Another factor that explains variation in trust is the individual's propensity to trust, or trustingness (Roy et al., 2016). Trustingness is an individual-level characteristic that captures how trusting one is of general institutions and individuals. Trust in the government and generalized trust—trust in other members of the society that reaches beyond private or personalized trust (Stolle, 1998)—are used to capture trustingness at the institutional level and individual level respectively.

H4a. Participants with higher levels of trustingness will likely report higher levels of initial trust.

H4b. Participants with higher levels of trustingness will likely report higher increases in trust over time.

INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST. Understanding institutional influences has been a focus of collaborative governance research (Leach & Sabatier, 2005b; Lubell et al., 2010). Following Choi and Robertson (2019), I assume collaborative governance is populated by participants who hold both rational choice and sociological behavioral tendencies. Therefore, rational choice and sociological tendencies are both crucial factors that collectively shape trust. Three hypotheses test institutional foundations of trust in government-led collaborative governance. Rational choice foundations are captured through perceived fairness and transparency and perceived efficacy. Sociological foundations are captured through perceived value congruence.

H5a. Participants with higher perceptions of fairness and transparency will likely report higher levels of initial trust.

H5b. Participants with higher perceptions of fairness and transparency will likely report higher increases in trust over time.

H6a. Participants with higher perceptions of efficacy will likely report higher levels of initial trust.

H6b. Participants with higher perceptions of efficacy will likely report higher increases in trust over time.

H7a. Participants with higher perceptions of value congruence will likely report higher levels of initial trust.

H7b. Participants with higher perceptions of value congruence will likely report higher increases in trust over time.

4. Methods

4.1. Data Collection

SAMPLE. SSCB members were sampled as clusters from a sampling frame consisting of a total of 228 autonomous jurisdictions in South Korea.¹ A stratified random sample of 128 SSCBs was drawn proportional to each province. A written invitation to participate in the study was sent to the local governments of sampled jurisdictions. This was followed by phone calls to local SSCB managers to request their assistance in disseminating the survey link to SSCB members in their jurisdiction. Direct distribution of the survey link was not possible for the baseline survey as privacy regulations prohibit government officials from disclosing personal information including email lists. The data was collected via online surveys administered through the REDCap platform. All surveys were administered in the Korean language. An English version of the survey protocol is attached in Appendix 1.

¹ Jurisdictions constitute the sampling frame as SSCBs operate at each jurisdiction level. Jeju and Sejong Special District were excluded from the sampling frame.

Three rounds of surveys—one baseline survey and two follow-ups—were administered at seven-month intervals to track temporal changes in the two outcome variables: trust in the SSCB (institutional level) and trust in SSCB members (individual level). The baseline survey collected additional data on the explanatory and control variables. The baseline survey was administered in the second quarter of 2021 with the majority of responses collected between April and June. A total of 837 SSCB members from 58 SSCBs responded. The response rate for the baseline survey is approximately 19% assuming the size of each SSCB is 75 members. Descriptive statistics of survey respondents are summarized in Table 2 below. Among respondents of the baseline survey, 619 agreed to participate in the follow-up surveys. The follow-up surveys used an email list provided by individual respondents allowing for direct dissemination. The first follow-up survey was administered between November and December 2021 with a total of 251 responses. The second and final follow-up survey was administered between June and July 2022 with a total of 217 responses.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Survey Respondents

Variable	N	Composition
SSCB Committee Level	837	
... Representative Committee	116	13.9%
... Working Level Committee	194	23.2%
... Practical Division	354	42.3%
... multiple	155	18.5%
...NA	18	2.2%
sector	837	

... public	152	18.2%
... non-profit	587	70.1%
... for-profit	32	3.8%
... citizen rep	22	2.6%
... academic	9	1.1%
... other	24	2.9%
...NA	11	1.3%
years	837	
... 5 years and below	520	62.1%
... 6-10 years	195	23.3%
... 11-15 years	66	7.9%
... 16-20 years	22	2.6%
... 21-25 years	17	2%
... 26-30 years	4	0.5%
... 31 years and above	4	0.5%
... NA	9	1.1%
age	837	
... 29 and under	19	2.3%
... 30s	141	16.8%
... 40s	308	36.8%
... 50s	282	33.7%
... 60s	72	8.6%
... 70s	8	1%
...NA	7	0.8%
education	837	
... highschool or less	37	4.4%
... associates	107	12.8%
... bachelors	372	44.4%
... graduate	313	37.4%

... NA	8	1%
sex	837	
... male	338	40.4%
... female	488	58.3%
...NA	11	1.3%

Attrition is a major issue that can compromise the quality of repeated-measures data. Two major points of attrition arise in the data due to the data collection method of this study. The first point of attrition is when baseline survey respondents opt out of the study by deciding not to provide their email addresses for the follow-up surveys. Among baseline survey respondents, 218 opted out of the study at this point. The second point of attrition arises due to survey nonresponse. Of the 619 who opted in, 336 did not respond to any of the follow-up surveys. Data missingness due to attrition leads to biased estimates if the cause of attrition is systematic (Venkatesh & Vitalari, 1991). In the context of this study, it is reasonable to suspect attrition is systematically related to baseline levels of trust with those who have higher levels of trust being more likely to opt in and respond to follow-up surveys. I use logistic regression analysis to test whether the baseline levels of trust have a statistically significant impact on attrition (Gomila & Clark, 2022). I find that the probability of opting into the study is indeed positively associated with baseline levels of trust. However, there is no association between baseline trust and the probability of responding to at least one of the follow-up surveys. As missingness is associated with observed levels of baseline trust, the missingness mechanism at the first point of attrition is Missing At Random (MAR). I use inverse probability weighting to correct for missing

outcomes in the models to address biases arising due to this missingness pattern (Gomila & Clark, 2022; Metten et al., 2022; Seaman & White, 2013). The second point of attrition is addressed through the default mechanism of the *lme4* package which uses complete case analysis. According to Metten et al. (2022), this approach is the most efficient (in terms of the variance of the estimated regression coefficient) while equivalently effective to other approaches in addressing biases in various scenarios of missingness.

VARIABLES. The main outcome variables are trust in the SSCB and trust in other SSCB members. Trust is measured at two levels to distinguish between subject levels of trust. The study analyzes both initial levels of trust captured in the baseline survey and changes in levels of trust over time captured by differences in the repeated measures. When studying trust it is important to “make a distinction between trust and institutional characteristics such as rules and norms which often serve to facilitate trustworthy behaviors” (Klijn, 2010, p. 310). I use perceived levels of trust that are self-reported by participants to measure the two outcome variables to distinguish between trust and factors that contribute to trust formation. The outcome variables and measures are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3. Measures for Outcome Variables

Variable	Measure
trustsscb (Institutional level)	Measures level of trust in the SSCB through self-reported levels of trust (0-10 point scale)
trustmem (Individual level)	Measures level of trust in other SSCB members through self-reported levels of trust (0-10 point scale)

This study includes measures of unobservable concepts such as trust and perceptions of various institutional characteristics. The majority of variables are measured

using self-reported levels of the constructs on a numerical scale ranging from 0 to 10 which is presented with verbal anchors. This approach aligns with measures used and recommended by the OECD and OECD Trustlab (OECD, 2017; Murtin et al., 2018). Despite criticism that self-reported measures diverge from actual behavior (Glaeser et al., 2000), the validity of self-reported measures of trust has been tested and confirmed through experimentation (Murtin et al., 2018). It is also a frequent approach to measuring trust in popular datasets such as the *Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey*, *OECD Trust Database*, and *World Value Survey*. The 0-10 scale offers three major benefits. First, it creates a sensitive measure of trust which may not drastically change over the seven-month intervals at which the surveys were administered. Second, it is possible to treat the distribution captured on the scale as continuous by estimating the statistical properties of the continuous distribution of the population (Kalmijn et al., 2011). This is preferable for statistical analysis as continuous variables allow more intuitive interpretations compared to ordinal scales such as Likert scales. Last but not least, it aligns with the assumption that unobservable concepts such as trust are best captured in on a continuum rather than artificially defined scales. Scales with a broader range allow variables to be treated as latent continuous variables (Kalmijn et al., 2011). Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables are presented below in Table 4.

Table 4. Summary Statistics for Outcome Variables and Repeated Measures

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Trust in the SSCB	826	8.024	1.659	1	7	9	10
...Follow up 1	227	7.943	1.924	1	7	9	10
...Follow up 2	195	7.867	1.914	0	7	9	10
Trust in Members	823	8.024	1.631	0	7	9	10

...Follow up 1	225	7.951	1.788	1	7	9	10
...Follow up 2	194	7.912	1.768	1	7	9	10

Explanatory variables include time (which is captured by repeated measures), the longevity of participation in terms of the number of months served on the SSCBs, a positive history of interaction, individual tendencies of trustingness, and three institutional variables including perceived fairness and transparency, capability, and value congruence. Variables, measures, and directions of hypothesized effects are summarized in Table 5 and descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are presented in Table 6.

Table 5. Explanatory Variables

Variable Name	Measure	Hypothesized Effect
time	Measures the effect of participating in government-led collaborative governance over time using repeated measures of trust in each round of surveys.	+
months served	Measures longevity of participation based on the count of months served as an SSCB committee member	+/-
history sscb history mem	Measures positive histories of interaction through self-reported changes in levels of trust since joining the SSCB (five-point Likert scale)	+
trust government	Measures trustingness through self-reported levels of trust in the government at baseline (0-10 point scale)	+
trust general	Measures trustingness through self-reported levels of generalized trust at baseline (0-10 point scale)	+
fair sscb fair mem	Measures perceived fairness and transparency through the self-reported perception of fairness and transparency of the SSCB and SSCB members (five-point Likert scale)	+
capable sscb capable mem	Measures perceived efficacy through the self-reported perception of the capability of the SSCB and SSCB members (five-point Likert scale)	+

value_sscb	Measures perceived value congruence through the self-reported perception of mission and goal alignment with the SSCB and SSCB members (five-point Likert scale)	
value_mem		+

Table 6. Summary Statistics for Predictor Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
months_served	799	35.461	31.324	1	11	53	114
history_sscb	810	4.042	0.763	1	4	5	5
history_mem	805	4.051	0.741	1	4	5	5
trust_government	820	6.686	1.989	0	5.5	8	10
trust_general	820	6.815	1.787	0	6	8	10
fair_sscb	828	4.246	0.724	1	4	5	5
capable_sscb	828	4.069	0.798	1	4	5	5
value_sscb	820	4.039	0.771	1	4	5	5
fair_mem	824	4.237	0.74	1	4	5	5
capable_mem	824	4.106	0.77	1	4	5	5
value_mem	819	3.976	0.795	1	4	5	5

4.2. Data Analysis

The hierarchical data structure merits the use of multilevel models which can account for non-independence between the observations (Garson, 2013; Gelman & Hill, 2019). Individual SSCB committee members constitute the unit of analysis for this study. For each SSCB member, three repeated measures of trust are collected over a 16-month observational window to create a panel dataset. These measures are non-independent as they are nested within individual SSCB members which are in turn clustered within SSCBs. This results in three distinct levels in the data structure: level 1 consists of repeated observations of trust over time; level 2 consists of individual participants; level 3 consists of the SSCB jurisdictions which represent the institutional level.

A mixed-effects multilevel model is used to analyze the data considering the hierarchical nature of the data structure. Multilevel models are “extensions of regression in which data are structured in groups and coefficients can vary by group” (Gelman & Hill, 2019, p. 237). These coefficients are assumed to be drawn from a distribution of their own and are themselves modeled for. This accounts for the variation arising from individual and group-level idiosyncrasies and offers a much more detailed representation of reality relative to using single fixed-point estimates. Treating the outcomes of trust as continuous, generalized linear models based on restricted maximum likelihood were fitted using the *lme4* package in R. The appropriateness of the data structure for multilevel modeling using these models is confirmed by testing assumptions of normally distributed residuals as presented in Appendix 2. Traditional goodness of fit measures including the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistics and likelihood ratio tests were used to assess model fit in addition to the pseudo R^2 and the deviance statistic as suggested by Holden et al. (2008). Ideal models for this study would include both random intercepts and random slopes. However, current data limitations prevent the inclusion of random slopes so only random intercepts are estimated. Sensitivity analysis is conducted by adding various individual predictors including age, gender, education, and SSCB-related predictors including the level and sector of origin. The results are not sensitive to these variables, and I proceed with more efficient models with better goodness of fit indicators as they do not meaningfully contribute to the model.

5. Results

Model results are reported in Table 7, for trust in the SSCB (institutional-level trust), and Table 8, for trust in SSCB members (individual-level trust). The columns each present three different model specifications in the order of the unconditional means model, the unconditional growth model, and the full model. The unconditional means models, which do not account for time, estimate a grand mean of 8.12 and 8.10 for baseline trust in the SSCB (institutional level) and in SSCB members (individual level) respectively. The unconditional growth models, which account for time only, do not find any change in trust over time. However, the full models, which account for time and variables that test for other hypotheses, show that participants report increased trust in both the SSCB and SSCB members over time. As a result of participating in government-led collaborative governance, I observe a 2.81 and 2.53 increase in trust in the SSCB and SSCB members respectively between the baseline and follow-up 1 surveys (Hypothesis 1).

The second question of this study asks what factors influence trust in the context of government-led collaborative governance. Results show that how long one has been part of the arrangement did not affect trust (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), but a shared positive history of interaction had a significant impact on trust (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). The history of interaction with the SSCB and with SSCB members is positively associated with higher levels of baseline within respective subject levels. Over time, the history of interaction is only associated with changes in institutional-level trust. The history of interaction with the institution has a negative impact on institutional-level trust while the history of interaction with individuals has a positive impact. There are two implications from this finding. First,

the quality of interactions is more important for trust building than the longevity of time spent in the arrangement. Second, while a positive interaction with the institution may initially draw individuals to participate in government-led collaborative governance, interactions with other participants may be a stronger driver of institutional-level trust over time. Additionally, trustingness, or an individual's tendency to trust, is associated with higher levels of baseline trust in both the SSCB and SSCB members (Hypothesis 4a). However, trustingness does not affect trust over time (Hypothesis 4b). This finding supports former studies that focus on the importance of picking team members as the identification and recruitment of individual members shape subsequent collaborative dynamics (Silvia, 2018).

The three variables for institutional foundations of trust—including perceived fairness and transparency, capability, and value congruence—have different impacts on institutional and individual-level trust. Perceived fairness and transparency is positively associated with baseline trust in both the SSCB and SSCB members (Hypotheses 5a and 5b). While perceptions of institutional fairness and transparency trickle down to enhance individual-level trust, the opposite is not true. Perceived capability is the only variable that does not affect baseline trust while having an impact on trust over time (Hypotheses 6a and 6b). Perceptions of institutional capability and individual capability have mixed implications in terms of the direction of impact. Lastly, perceived value congruence is positively associated with baseline trust in the SSCB, but has no association with trust in SSBB members (Hypothesis 7a). It is not associated with changes in trust over time (Hypothesis 7b).

All model specifications estimate high intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) which is a statistic to assess the correlation in measures of trust reported by the same respondents over time (Monsalves et al., 2020). According to the full models, approximately 20% of the variation in trust in the SSCB and in SSCB members is attributable to intraclass correlation. This observation justifies proceeding with multilevel analysis using random intercepts to account for the nested structure of the data.²

Table 7. Trust in the SSCB (Institutional Level)

<i>Predictors</i>	trustsscb		trustsscb		trustsscb	
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>
(Intercept)	8.12 ***	8.02 – 8.22	8.09 ***	7.98 – 8.19	0.44	-0.12 – 1.00
time [Follow up 1]			0.10	-0.08 – 0.28	2.81 ***	1.44 – 4.17
time [Follow up 2]			-0.08	-0.27 – 0.11	-0.17	-1.73 – 1.39
months served					0.00	-0.00 – 0.00
history sscb					0.46 ***	0.26 – 0.66
history mem					0.06	-0.15 – 0.27
trust government					0.11 ***	0.05 – 0.17
trust general					0.14 ***	0.08 – 0.20
fair sscb					0.39 ***	0.17 – 0.61
capable sscb					0.04	-0.16 – 0.23
value sscb					0.24 *	0.04 – 0.45
fair mem					0.19	-0.02 – 0.41
capable mem					0.11	-0.10 – 0.31

² The variance explained by adding SSCBs as a third level in the models is near 0. Therefore, use a two-level model for the analysis.

value mem	-0.06	-0.28 – 0.15
time [Follow up 1] * months served	-0.00	-0.01 – 0.01
time [Follow up 2] * months served	0.00	-0.00 – 0.01
time [Follow up 1] * history sscb	-0.59 **	-1.00 – -0.19
time [Follow up 2] * history sscb	-0.26	-0.70 – 0.19
time [Follow up 1] * history mem	0.50 *	0.07 – 0.93
time [Follow up 2] * history mem	0.28	-0.20 – 0.76
time [Follow up 1] * trust government	-0.01	-0.13 – 0.11
time [Follow up 2] * trust government	-0.08	-0.21 – 0.06
time [Follow up 1] * trust general	-0.08	-0.20 – 0.05
time [Follow up 2] * trust general	0.02	-0.11 – 0.16
time [Follow up 1] * fair sscb	-0.05	-0.52 – 0.42
time [Follow up 2] * fair sscb	0.19	-0.39 – 0.77
time [Follow up 1] * capable sscb	0.51 *	0.11 – 0.92
time [Follow up 2] * capable sscb	0.16	-0.26 – 0.59
time [Follow up 1] * value sscb	0.25	-0.15 – 0.66
time [Follow up 2] * value sscb	0.23	-0.25 – 0.71

time [Follow up 1] * fair mem	-0.29	-0.74 – 0.16
time [Follow up 2] * fair mem	-0.38	-0.93 – 0.16
time [Follow up 1] * capable mem	-0.50 *	-0.92 – -0.07
time [Follow up 2] * capable mem	-0.17	-0.65 – 0.31
time [Follow up 1] * value mem	-0.33	-0.77 – 0.10
time [Follow up 2] * value mem	0.04	-0.45 – 0.54

Random Effects

σ^2	1.04	1.16	1.06
τ_{00}	1.32 _{id}	1.49 _{id}	0.35 _{id}
ICC	0.56	0.56	0.25
N	806 _{id}	806 _{id}	722 _{id}
Observations	1202	1202	1088
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	0.000 / 0.558	0.001 / 0.563	0.439 / 0.578

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8. Trust in SSCB Participants (Individual Level)

<i>Predictors</i>	trustmem		trustmem		trustmem	
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>
(Intercept)	8.10 ***	8.00 – 8.20	8.07 ***	7.96 – 8.17	0.27	-0.28 – 0.83
time [Follow up 1]			0.05	-0.13 – 0.24	2.53 ***	1.18 – 3.88
time [Follow up 2]			-0.06	-0.25 – 0.14	1.51	-0.00 – 3.03
months served					0.00	-0.00 – 0.00
history sscb					-0.19 *	-0.39 – -0.00
history mem					0.61 ***	0.41 – 0.81
trust government					0.13 ***	0.07 – 0.19

trust general	0.16 ***	0.10 – 0.22
fair sscb	0.38 ***	0.17 – 0.60
capable sscb	0.07	-0.12 – 0.26
value sscb	0.01	-0.18 – 0.21
fair mem	0.25 *	0.05 – 0.46
capable mem	0.14	-0.06 – 0.34
value mem	0.12	-0.08 – 0.32
time [Follow up 1] * months served	-0.00	-0.01 – 0.00
time [Follow up 2] * months served	0.00	-0.00 – 0.01
time [Follow up 1] * history sscb	0.07	-0.32 – 0.46
time [Follow up 2] * history sscb	0.35	-0.09 – 0.79
time [Follow up 1] * history mem	-0.16	-0.60 – 0.27
time [Follow up 2] * history mem	-0.43	-0.91 – 0.04
time [Follow up 1] * trust government	-0.08	-0.20 – 0.05
time [Follow up 2] * trust government	-0.01	-0.14 – 0.13
time [Follow up 1] * trust general	-0.07	-0.20 – 0.06
time [Follow up 2] * trust general	-0.11	-0.24 – 0.03
time [Follow up 1] * fair sscb	-0.13	-0.60 – 0.34
time [Follow up 2] * fair sscb	-0.32	-0.89 – 0.25

time [Follow up 1] * capable sscb			-0.07	-0.49 – 0.35
time [Follow up 2] * capable sscb			-0.07	-0.50 – 0.35
time [Follow up 1] * value sscb			0.33	-0.06 – 0.72
time [Follow up 2] * value sscb			0.20	-0.26 – 0.67
time [Follow up 1] * fair mem			-0.01	-0.45 – 0.43
time [Follow up 2] * fair mem			0.00	-0.52 – 0.53
time [Follow up 1] * capable mem			-0.01	-0.43 – 0.41
time [Follow up 2] * capable mem			0.27	-0.18 – 0.72
time [Follow up 1] * value mem			-0.34	-0.76 – 0.08
time [Follow up 2] * value mem			-0.19	-0.67 – 0.29

Random Effects

σ^2	1.09	1.22	1.12
τ_{00}	1.20 _{id}	1.37 _{id}	0.25 _{id}
ICC	0.52	0.53	0.18
N	807 _{id}	807 _{id}	725 _{id}
Observations	1204	1204	1094
Marginal R ² / Conditional R ²	0.000 / 0.524	0.000 / 0.530	0.448 / 0.548

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

6. Discussion

This study addresses two questions: 1) do governments serving as collaborative platforms breed trust, and 2) what factors are more or less relevant to trust building in the context of government-led collaborative governance? In this section, I discuss the theoretical and applied implications of the findings along with the broader contributions and limitations of the study.

6.1. Do Collaborative Platforms Breed Trust?

The study finds that as a result of participating in government-led collaborative governance, SSCB participants experience an increase in trust toward both the institution and the individual members with whom they collaborate. This confirms that government-led collaborative governance, though induced, can foster genuine collaboration as evidenced by enhanced trust. For practice, the finding adds legitimacy to government-led collaborative governance as a reliable means of public service delivery. Theoretically, the finding adds empirical strength to former studies that theorize trust as an outcome of collaboration by demonstrating that the theory holds in the more narrowly defined context of government-led collaborative governance.

The study of collaborative governance can benefit from refined theories that account for distinct types of collaborative governance arrangements. There has been a lack of consideration for the tremendous variation in modes of governance that are bundled under the term. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) have attempted to initiate a shift in focus from “[g]enus to [s]pecies” (p.159) to produce better-scoped theories, but collaborative governance theories seldom define scopes or boundaries detailing to what extent they can

be generalized. This study contributes a step in that direction by building a theoretical foundation for a particular type of collaborative governance that is government-led. Another notable contribution of this study is that it presents one of the first cases of longitudinal analysis of trust in collaborative governance, answering to the much-called-for need to account for time in the study of public management (Stritch, 2017). In line with Emerson and Nabatchi's (2015) identification of trust as an element of collaborative dynamics, I observe that trust in collaborative governance is indeed dynamic. Changes in trust over time are not linear as the increase in trust is only observed in the seven months between the baseline and follow-up 1 survey. This study goes beyond static cross-sectional observations to track individuals' trust trajectories over time. Research on collaborative governance using individual-level panel data has been relatively scarce, and this study adds greater diversity to methodological approaches to the study of collaborative dynamics.

However, there are several limitations regarding the longitudinal design of this study. First, this study has a limited observational timeframe of 16 months, accounting for only a partial segment of the evolution of collaborative dynamics. Further, the data comes from collaborative governance arrangements that have already been relatively stabilized. This means the data is unable to fully capture dynamics developed before the observational window. As a result, this study relies on a central assumption that trust develops in a S-shape trajectory. However, a recent study potentially challenges this assumption by showing that collaborative dynamics remain rather stable over time in CGRs with a slight decrease towards the end of the collaboration period following an inverted v-shape (Ulibarri et al., 2020). This warrants confirmatory research that uses data from

collaborative governance regimes at various stages of maturation to fully account for trajectories of trust and other collaborative dynamics over time.

Second, the study is unable to answer whether the nonlinear trajectory of trust is because trust formation has plateaued to a level that is undetectable in the data or due to other causes. A plausible alternative explanation is that South Korea experienced the most severe outbreak of COVID-19 cases during the period between the follow-up 1 and 2 surveys which hindered trust-building activities. The pandemic is expected to have reduced opportunities for trust building in general as suggested by former research that confirms the importance of face-to-face interactions and regular meetings for collaborative governance (Leach & Sabatier, 2005b). However, there is insufficient evidence to confirm this explanation. While scholars have studied how collaborative governance can address shocks and crises (Criado & Guevara-Gómez, 2021; Guo & Li, 2022; Klimovsky et al., 2021; Li et al., 2022), there are major gaps in understanding how external shocks can impact collaborative governance. Therefore, the impact of COVID-19 must be considered when interpreting the results of this study.

Third, this study suffers from major attrition in the survey data. Following an analysis of missingness, the study uses inverse probability weighting to address biases that can arise from observed missingness patterns. However, this does not make up for the fact that a significant portion of the baseline respondents is lost which compromises the full potential of the data. This limitation calls for creative and innovative methods that will allow the public management literature to continue to build high-quality longitudinal datasets that expand the scope of our theories by accounting for one of the most important

variables, time. Due to these limitations, while this study presents evidence that government platforms can breed trust, it offers limited explanations as to how and why trust evolves differently at distinct stages of collaboration.

6.2. Factors that Contribute to Trust in Government-led Collaborative Governance

This study identifies various factors that influence trust in the context of government-led collaborative governance. The findings confirm the need for a multi-theoretical approach to understanding trust which is informed by organizational, individual, and institutional theoretical foundations (Choi & Robertson, 2019). Given the importance of institutional design in leading collaborative governance, this multi-theoretical approach to understanding trust offers practical guidelines for actors who seek to serve as collaborative platforms by highlighting factors they can leverage to facilitate trust.

All three institutional factors are associated with trust, but the effect of perceived fairness and transparency was robust across subject levels, suggesting the rational choice perspective may better explain trust building in the context of government-led collaborative governance. I derive three implications from the results. First, understanding trust formation at the institutional level requires a multi-theoretical approach as both rational choice and sociological factors significantly and distinctly shape trust at institutional and individual levels. Second, while institutional-level perceptions affect individual-level trust, the opposite does not hold. This suggests that in the context of government-led collaborative governance, institutional perceptions have a stronger

influence on overall trust building, trickling down to impact individual-level trust. Third, rational choice institutionalism may better explain trust across subject levels in the context of government-led collaborative governance. A more calculative process of trust formation may better account for the context where participants are brought together by the government platform. This raises the possibility that different institutional theoretical explanations may better explain trust formation in different initiative types of collaboration governance arrangements. The robustness of sociological perspectives in explaining trust may be greater in the context of self-initiated collaborations that arise more organically among people who come together with a shared purpose. A logical line of research would be to explore the relative impacts of organizational, individual, and institutional factors on trust across different types of collaborative governance arrangements.

In addition to addressing the two research questions, this study highlights the importance of considering distinct subject levels of trust in public management research. The outcome of trust as well as key explanatory variables in this study are measured as distinct constructs at the institutional and individual levels. By diversifying levels of analysis, the study presents empirical evidence that institutional and individual-level trust evolve differently over time and are shaped by different factors. The finding invites further attention in clarifying and diversifying the levels of analysis in future public management literature. Trust is an important construct in public management literature and we need more nuanced theories that account for the multilevel nature of trust.

Distinctions in levels of trust also offer practical guidance for government-led collaborative governance. As platforms, governments are more likely to invest in collaborative governance with a long-term vision assuming the continuity of the arrangement. However, in many government-led collaborative processes, the participants will continue to change over time. In SSCBs, for instance, the majority of participants serve limited terms. As a result, there is a clear distinction between properties that pertain to SSCBs as an institution and their participants. Observing different trajectories of trust at the institutional and individual levels over time requires collaborative platforms to consider distinct approaches to facilitating trust at institutional and individual levels.

The data originating from the South Korean social policy context enriches our empirical understanding of collaborative governance. Many collaborative governance studies have focused on cases from Western liberal democracies and in the environmental policy domain. This study shows how existing theories translate into and can be complemented by studies of non-western contexts. South Korea is a liberal democracy that has a relatively strong central government owing to its history of rapid democratization. Korea is an alloy of its traditional history as well as the Western influences that have guided its rapid political and economic modernization. Therefore, South Korea provides a good testing ground for middle theory that offers relevant implications for different country settings.

In conclusion, this study validates government-led collaborative governance as a mode of public service delivery by confirming that governments serving as platforms can breed trust, which is crucial for collaborative performance. The study also identifies

various factors collaborative platforms can leverage to facilitate trust building at institutional and individual levels. Through these findings, this study makes important theoretical, methodological, and practical contributions to public management.

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Appendix II-1. Survey Protocol



Dear Social Security Consultative Body (SSCB) Committee Members:

My name is Yulan Kim, and I am a doctoral candidate at the Evans School of Public Policy and Governance at the University of Washington.

I kindly request your participation in this survey that is conducted as part of a doctoral dissertation on collaborative governance.

The survey asks about changes in your perceptions since serving on the committee and should take about 4 minutes to complete. All data will be anonymized for analysis.

Your contribution will help promote meaningful understandings of SSCBs from a public management perspective.

If you have any questions about this survey, please contact Yulan Kim at ylkim33@uw.edu. Thank you.

*As a small token of gratitude, five respondents will be randomly selected to receive a \$50 gift card.

1. This section asks about your SSCB membership. 'SSCB' in this survey refers to the regional SSCB that you currently serve on.

1.1 Please select the City/Province of your SSCB.

1.2 Which SSCB Committee do you currently serve on? Please select all that apply.

- Representative Committee
- Working-level Practioner Committee
- Practical Division
- None of the above

1.3 What year did you start your term on the SSCB? (yyyy)

What month in ____ did you start your term on the SSCB?

1.4 What sector do you represent on the SSCB?

- Government and public sector
- Nonprofit and philanthropic sector
- For-profit sector
- Academic sector
- Citizen representative
- Other

[reset](#)

1.5 How long have you worked in the sector specified above?

- 5 years and below
- 6~10 years
- 11~15 years
- 16~20 years
- 21~25 years
- 26~30 years
- 31 years and above

[reset](#)

2. 'Trust' in this survey refers to "a psychological state comprising the intention to believe in and rely on another based upon positive expectations of their intentions or behavior".

Please indicate your current level of trust in the following. 0 indicates 'Do not trust at all', 5 indicates 'Neutral', and 10 indicates 'Fully trust'.

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
The SSCB	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
											reset
SSCB committee members	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
											reset
The South Korean Government (comprehensive of legislative, executive and judicial)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
											reset
South Korean Local Governments	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
											reset
Most general people	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
											reset

3. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the presented statement?

	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
The SSCB is fair and transparent.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
					reset
SSCB committee members are fair and transparent.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
					reset
The SSCB is capable of effectively addressing community social security issues.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
					reset
SSCB committee members are capable of effectively addressing community social security issues.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
					reset
The goal and mission of the SSCB is well aligned with that of mine.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
					reset
The goal and mission of SSCB committee members is well aligned with that of mine.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
					reset

4. How did your trust level in the following change since serving on the SSCB?

	Strongly Decreased	Somewhat Decreased	No change	Somewhat Increased	Strongly Increased
The SSCB	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
					reset
SSCB committee members	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
					reset

5. How did the following change since serving on the SSCB?

	Strongly Decreased	Somewhat Decreased	No Change	Somewhat Increased	Strongly Increased
Your overall interest level in community social security issues	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
					reset
Your overall participation in community social security activities related to SSCBs (volunteering, charitable giving, participation in trainings, seminars and campaigns etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
					reset

Your overall participation in community social security activities unrelated to SSCBs (volunteering, charitable giving, participation in trainings, seminars and campaigns etc.)

[reset](#)

6. This section asks about you.

6.1 What is your gender?

- Male Female Non-binary

[reset](#)

6.2 What is your age group?

- 29 and below
 30-39
 40-49
 50-59
 60-69
 70-79
 80 and above

[reset](#)

6.3 What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- High school or less
 Associate's degree
 Bachelor's degree
 Graduate degree

[reset](#)


6.4 We would like to follow up with a one-question survey in 6 months about changes in your trust level.

Please provide a good email for follow-up:

Appendix II-2. Testing Assumptions of the Data Structure


Appendix II-2 Figure 1.

Tests of normality and homoscedasticity of residuals for 'trustsscb'



Appendix II-2 Figure 2.

Tests of normality and homoscedasticity of residuals for 'trustmem'



III. DOES GOVERNMENT-LED COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE CROWD OUT ALTERNATIVE VENUES OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION? A STUDY OF POLICY FEEDBACK EFFECTS

1. Introduction

Associational membership and civic participation that lead to social capital formation have been in decline since the 1950s, leading to the erosion of civic life in modern democracies (Putnam, 2000). According to normative democratic theory, citizen nonparticipation can be considered a key threat to modern democracy (Cohen, 1971; Parry, 1972; Dahl, 1971; Powell, 2009; Salisbury, 1975). Sirianni (2009) argues that governments must act strategically to counteract this trend as it is “unlikely that capacities for self-government will simply bubble up from the wellsprings of civil society, and they will certainly not come about through the invisible hand of the market (p. 2).” Collaborative governance, by serving as a venue for participation and ensuring public policy is more reflective of public values, can preserve democratic values (Nabatchi, 2012; Singleton, 2002). Therefore, in addition to addressing policy problems, government-led collaborative governance, initiated through the facilitation of governments serving as collaborative platforms, offers a strategy for governments to elicit civic participation (Koontz et al., 2004; Ansell & Gash, 2018).

While governments’ increasing use of collaborative governance as a strategy of policy making and implementation can have positive effects on civic participation, it is imperative to understand how such decisions influence the broader policyscape.

Governments create new venues of civic participation when they lead collaborative governance. They intervene in the policyscape which is densely populated with existing policies and institutions by creating such venues (Mettler, 2016). But how government-led collaborative governance influences power structures, resource distribution, and other relational dynamics between existing policies, programs, and institutions in the policyscape remains underexplored. To address this gap, this paper addresses the following question: what impact does the proliferation of government-led collaborative governance venues have on the broader policyscape? In other words, what policy feedback effects do these government-created participatory venues generate?

This paper studies whether policy feedback effects of government-led collaborative governance are cooperative in that they enhance prospects for civic participation in other venues, or competitive in that they detract from participation in other venues. Institutional rational choice (IRC) and ecology of games (EG) frameworks offer contrasting perspectives (Berardo & Lubell, 2016; Lubell et al., 2010; Scott & Thomas, 2017). IRC suggests that collaboration in one venue lowers transaction costs to collaboration in other venues, creating a spillover effect that sustains the mutual prosperity of multiple participatory venues. Contrastingly, the EG framework focuses on the interdependence of multiple venues. A key assumption is that participation in multiple forums is costly and cannot be sustained given that participants have limited resources to commit. Resultingly, government-led collaboration can potentially crowd out alternative venues of civic participation, especially if there are reasons for participants to prefer government-created venues.

This study will contribute empirical evidence from Social Security Consultative Bodies (SSCBs) in South Korea to the ongoing debate between IRC and EG perspectives on collaborative venues. SSCBs are legislatively mandated collaborative governance arrangements that operate at local government levels. I apply the policy feedback theory to identify the underlying mechanisms through which government-created collaborative venues interact with other venues, focusing on participant-level feedback effects. I analyze quantitative and qualitative data collected from SSCB participants through surveys and interviews. The following section presents the theoretical background and empirical context of the paper and proposes the hypotheses to be tested. It is followed by a description of the methods, preliminary findings, and conclusion.


2. Theoretical Background

2.1. The Policy Feedback Theory and Civic Engagement

The Policy Feedback Theory focuses on how the impacts of a policy travel through time to shape subsequent policies created at future time points (Mettler & SoRelle, 2017). The theory identifies two types of feedback effects including resource effects and interpretive effects. Resource effects capture how enhanced access to resources such as information, knowledge, time, money and civic skills lead to changes in civic capacities and predispositions (Mettler & SoRelle, 2017). Interpretive effects capture changes in civic predispositions due to shifts in norms, values, and attitudes of citizens that are caused by policy learning or changes in social constructions (Mettler & SoRelle, 2017). Mettler (2002)

offers a model to understand how policy feedback effects shape civic engagement as illustrated in Figure 1. Collectively, resource effects and interpretive effects influence civic engagement in future time points which in turn impacts future policy processes.

Figure 1. Policy Feedback Mechanisms for Mass Publics: How Policy Affects Civic Engagement



Source: (Mettler, 2002, p. 353)

The Policy Feedback Theory can be applied to understand how government-led collaborative governance impacts civic participation. According to the Policy Feedback Theory, participants will gain civic capacities and experience changes in civic predispositions through their participation in government-led collaborations. Government-provided resources and facilitation such as the provision of professional facilitators, budgetary support, and knowledge, information, and training can generate resource effects and interpretive effects that contribute to changes in civic capacities and predispositions. Interpretive effects are also expected. In the process of collaborative deliberation, participants can gain experiential knowledge that shapes their perceptions of self-efficacy, identities, roles, and status in the community, leading to attitudinal and behavioral changes. The attitudinal and behavioral changes constitute positive changes in civic predispositions

that enhance prospects for further civic engagement. Through such pathways, participation in government-led collaborative governance is expected to lead to changes in civic participation.

2.2. Accounting for Multiple Participatory Venues

The Policy Feedback Theory focuses on a theory of change without assumptions about the existence of multiple participatory venues. The direct application of the Policy Feedback Theory to collaborative governance only captures feedback effects expected within a single collaborative institution. This approach will be useful to understand how collaborative governance affects future policies through their deliberation function. However, how collaborative governance impacts citizen participation in other social security-related policies, programs, and institutions outside the boundaries of the collaborative venue is unknown.

According to Lubell et al. (2010), it is necessary to consider a games perspective to study collaborative institutions. A games perspective expands the scope of analysis beyond a single collaborative institution to the broader policy domain that consists of multiple collaborative venues. The contrasting perspectives of the Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) and Ecology of Games (EG) Framework offer opportunities to analyze policy feedback effects accounting for the interrelation between multiple participatory venues. The two contrasting theoretical perspectives are highlighted in the following quote:

The traditional institutional rational choice analysis argues that collaborative institutions reduce the transaction costs of cooperation among multiple policy actors. The ecology of games framework extends IRC by emphasizing the

consequences of multiple institutions and identifies several reasons why collaborative institutions may actually reduce the amount of cooperation in existing policy venues (Lubell et al., 2010, p. 287).

The IRC perspective suggests that participation in government-led collaborative governance arrangements will foster participation in other venues through the creation of social capital and networks that reduce transaction costs to collaboration in the alternative venues. The EG framework focuses on the interdependence of multiple venues by assuming that participation in multiple forums is costly. Actors have limited resources to invest and will engage in venue shopping to choose a venue to commit their limited resources to maximize their self-interests (Berardo & Lubell, 2016; Lubell et al., 2010; Scott & Thomas, 2017). Therefore, the choice of participants to participate in government-created collaborative venues may consequently detract from other participatory venues. The contrasting implications are illustrated in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. Implications of the Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) and Ecology of Games (EG) Framework on Multiple Participatory Venues



The contrast between the IRC and EG perspectives offers important implications for understanding whether the policy feedback effects generated by government-led

collaborative governance are cooperative or competitive. Government-created collaborative venues may promote civic engagement in other venues by changing participant capacities and predispositions that transfer beyond their boundaries, but they may also instigate inequalities across venues through unequal concentration of civic resources. A vibrant civil society depends on the healthy functioning of multiple participatory venues (Wampler & McNulty, 2011). Therefore, the latter scenario suggests governments leading collaborative governance may have potentially harmful impacts on the polycscape, especially if government-created venues detract from the capacities of grassroots venues, resulting in monopolistic government dominance over the ecology of participatory venues. The contrast between the IRC and EG perspectives is also observable in existing collaborative governance research. Some suggest collaborative governance can produce spin-off collaborations that contribute to joint action outside the particular venue (Ansell & Gash, 2018). Others emphasize that collaboration may “reinforce preexisting power and resource dynamics instead of distributing resources and facilitating joint action” (Scott & Thomas, 2017, p. 647) leading relatively more powerful and resourceful venues to potentially crowd out others. Given these mixed theoretical perspectives, which theoretical perspective is upheld under what conditions require further empirical exploration.

3. Empirical Context and Hypotheses

3.1. Social Security Consultative Bodies as a Case of Government-led Collaborative Governance

Government-led collaborative governance is initiated by a policy decision by governments serving as collaborative platforms to purposefully facilitate collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2018; Koontz et al., 2004). These policy decisions are often in the form of laws that mandate the creation of collaborative governance venues as is the case with Social Security Consultative Bodies (SSCBs) in South Korea. SSCBs are collaborative governance arrangements created through the *2014 Act on the Use And Provision Of Social Security Benefits And Search For Eligible Beneficiaries*. They operate in all autonomous local jurisdictions. SSCBs consist of public, private, and non-profit actors working in social security domains, subject matter experts in academia, and citizen representatives. SSCBs are expected to co-create community-based social security services through collaborative governance. Their tasks include creating community social security plans which are updated every four years, as well as planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating new and ongoing programs and projects that address regional social security issues. Their goal is to pool regional social security resources through cross-sector collaboration to establish sustainable models for local social security service provision.

SSCBs constitute a form of government-led collaborative governance. The central and local governments serve as platforms that facilitate the operation of SSCBs. The central government publishes operational guidelines and provides budgetary support while local governments carry out more detailed managerial tasks considering the context of the locality. Local governments identify and appoint members, host meetings and activities,


and facilitate the overall functions of SSCBs at the local level. This paper studies the policy feedback effects of government-led collaborative governance in the context of SSCBs.

Per Lubell et al., I look beyond the boundaries of the SSCBs to fully understand the policy feedback effects of government-led collaborative governance on other participatory venues. The purpose of SSCBs outlined in the *2014 Act on the Use And Provision Of Social Security Benefits And Search For Eligible Beneficiaries* and government-issued operational guidelines suggest a theory of change that aligns with the IRC perspective. The SSCBs are expected to foster collaboration of local actors to provide sustainable solutions to local social security services through a network function. This would be an ideal function of government-led collaborative governance as Ansell and Gash (2018) state that maximizing the possibilities of spin-off collaborations should be a focus of platform facilitators from the outset. Therefore, this paper tests hypotheses that reflect the IRC perspective.

3.2. Hypotheses

This paper applies the Policy Feedback Theory to the context of SSCBs to understand the effects of government-led collaborative governance on civic engagement, but while accounting for multiple interrelated participatory venues. Figure 3 illustrates the policy feedback mechanisms that will carry the impact of SSCBs into the broader polycscape. Going beyond the formal policy documents that illustrate the expected theory of change within SSCBs, Figure 3 illustrates potential policy feedback effects that are hypothesized based on the IRC perspective.

Figure 3. Policy Feedback Mechanisms in Social Security Consultative Bodies



The 2014 legislative mandate requiring the establishment of SSCBs constitutes the initial policy. I explore the policy feedback effects of this policy that mandates government-led collaborative governance. I hypothesize that the resource effects created by this policy will lead to the strengthening of trust networks that translate into social capital for collaboration in alternative venues. The facilitation and resources provided by governments will help SSCB participants focus on policy deliberation and develop trust in others which lowers transaction costs to extended engagement outside the SSCB. This hypothesis provides evidence that government-led collaborative governance creates resource effects to enhance the civic capacities of participants.

Hypothesis 1. Participation in government-led collaborative governance will enhance the civic capacities of participants through resource effects as evidenced by the creation of trust networks.

Participants serving on SSCBs are also expected to undergo attitudinal and behavioral changes that shape their civic predispositions. This paper focuses on changes in

interest levels regarding regional social security issues. Participants may experience higher perceptions of self-efficacy as they feel they are capable of creating positive impacts in their community, or they may internalize the mission of the SSCB to develop motivations for continued service in the social security domain even outside of the SSCBs. This hypothesis provides evidence that government-led collaborative governance creates interpretive effects to enhance the civic predispositions of participants.

Hypothesis 2. Participation in government-led collaborative governance will enhance the civic predispositions of participants through interpretive effects as evidenced by enhanced interest levels in regional social security issues.

In addition to investigating whether government-led collaborative governance generates resource effects and interpretive effects, I also hypothesize how resulting changes in civic capacities and predispositions transfer outside the boundary of SSCBs to impact participation in alternative venues. Traditional IRC suggests social networks created through resource effects will serve as social capital which reduces transaction costs of future collaboration in other venues (Lubell et al., 2010). This is captured by Hypothesis 3. The EG framework contrastingly suggests that civic capacities created in one venue can lead to more active engagement of the participants within that particular venue but will not transfer to other venues. Therefore, failure to endorse Hypothesis 3 will add empirical weight to the EG framework which suggests participation in one venue will detract from participation in other venues because participants have limited resources to commit.

Hypothesis 3. Civic capacities created through participation in SSCBs will increase participation in alternative social security-related venues.

The Policy Feedback Theory and IRC perspective also suggest that collaboration in government-created venues will contribute to other participatory venues by enhancing the cooperative attitudes and behaviors of participants. In line with these theoretical perspectives, I hypothesize that changes in civic predispositions will act as positive feedback effects that enhance participation in other venues. This is captured by Hypothesis 4.

Hypothesis 4. Civic predispositions cultivated through participation in SSCBs will increase participation in alternative social security-related venues.

The impact of civic capacities and predispositions on civic participation is established in the Policy Feedback Theory. What is unclear is whether the impact will be positive or negative in the context of government-led collaborative governance when we acknowledge the interdependence of multiple participatory venues. The endorsement of hypotheses 3 and 4 will provide support for the IRC perspective that civic capacities and predispositions resulting from participation in government-created collaborative venues enhance engagement in other venues. This implies that government-led collaborative governance reinforces alternative venues of civic participation through cooperative policy feedback effects. Failure to find support for hypotheses 3 and 4 will add empirical weight to the EG framework that suggests participation in government-created collaborative venues undermines participation in other venues. This implies that government-led collaborative governance can crowd out alternative venues of civic participation through competitive policy feedback effects.

4. Methods

This paper uses a mixed-methods approach combining both quantitative and qualitative analysis. I empirically test the proposed hypotheses by analyzing both survey data and interview data collected from SSCB participants. The survey data was collected from SSCB participants between April and June 2021. I created a stratified random sample of SSCBs using local jurisdictions as the sampling frame.³ An official document requesting participation in the study was sent to Mayors of sampled jurisdictions. Then, public managers were contacted to request the distribution of the survey link to SSCB members. Resultantly, a total of 837 respondents contributed to the survey from 58 different SSCBs, with a response rate of approximately 19% assuming the size of each SSCB is 75. Table 1 below presents descriptive statistics on the survey respondents.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Survey Respondents

Variable	N	Composition
level	818	
... Practical Division	354	43%
... Representative Committee	115	14%
... Working Level Committee	194	24%
... multiple	155	19%
sector	825	

³ Jurisdictions constitute the sampling frame as SSCBs operate in each jurisdiction. Jeju and Sejong Special District were excluded from the sampling frame.

Variable	N	Composition
... public	152	18.4%
... non-profit	586	71%
... for-profit	32	3.9%
... academic	9	1.1%
... citizen rep	22	2.7%
... other	24	2.9%
years	827	
... 5 years and below	520	62.9%
... 6-10 years	194	23.5%
... 11-15 years	66	8%
... 16-20 years	22	2.7%
... 21~25 years	17	2.1%
... 26~30 years	4	0.5%
... 31 years and above	4	0.5%
sex	825	
... female	488	59.2%
... male	337	40.8%
age	829	
... 29 and under	19	2.3%
... 30s	141	17%
... 40s	308	37.2%
... 50s	281	33.9%
... 60s	72	8.7%
... 70s	8	1%
education	828	
... high school or less	37	4.5%
... associates degree	107	12.9%
... bachelors degree	372	44.9%
... graduate degree	312	37.7%

Chronologically, the surveys were implemented before the interviews. This is because further inquiry into the underlying mechanisms of change (policy feedback effects) is only

necessary if changes in civic capacities (trust in other participants) and changes civic dispositions (interest in community social security issues) are observed in the survey data.

The interview data for qualitative analysis was collected between September and November 2023 through semi-structured interviews with SSCB committee members. Interview questions were structured to collect information on key variables to test the proposed hypotheses through pattern-matching methods. Additionally, the interviews elicited narratives that aided in uncovering the underlying factors that contributed to the changes. A total of 20 interviewees were randomly selected from a pool of SSCB participants who opted in through their responses to the survey (Bernard et al., 2017). Respondents were additionally sampled to replace any participants who were not responsive to the invitation to interview until a total of 22 interviews were completed. I concluded sufficient data saturation has been reached through the 22 interviews as no new patterns emerged. The interviews were conducted on Zoom or phone calls in the Korean language and ranged from 21 to 62 minutes. One interview was conducted in writing upon the interviewee’s request. Table 2 summarizes the interviewee details.

Table 2. Interviewee Characteristics

ID	Current	Province	Committee Level	Sector	Gender
1	y	Jeollanam-do	Representative	Nonprofit	M
2	y	Daegu	Working-level	Nonprofit	M
3	y	Gyeonggi-do	Practitioner Division	Nonprofit	M
4	n	Gyeongsangnam-do	Practitioner Division	Nonprofit	F
5	y	Gyeongsangnam-do	Practitioner Division	Nonprofit	F
6	y	Incheon	Representative & Working-level	Nonprofit	M

7	y	Gyeonggi-do	Representative & Working-level	Nonprofit	F
8	y	Busan	Representative	Nonprofit	F
9	n	Gyeonggi-do	Working-level	Public	M
10	y	Gyeonggi-do	Representative	Nonprofit	M
11	y	Seoul	Practitioner Division	Nonprofit	M
12	y	Seoul	Practitioner Division	Nonprofit	M
13	y	Gyeonggi	Working-level & Practitioner Division	Nonprofit	F
14	n	Gyeonggi	Working-level	Nonprofit	M
15	n	Seoul	Working-level	Nonprofit	F
16	y	Gyeongsangnam-do	Practitioner Division	Nonprofit	M
17	y	Jeollabuk-do	Representative & Working-level	Citizen	M
18	y	Ulsan	Working-level & Practitioner Division	For-profit	M
19	y	Gyeongsangbuk-do	Working-level	Nonprofit	M
20	n	Gyeonggi-do	Representative	Nonprofit	F
21	y	Gangwon-do	Working-level	Nonprofit	F
22	y	Gyeongsangnam-do	Practitioner Division	Public	F

Descriptive statistics from the survey data are triangulated with qualitative analysis of the interview to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. I use pattern matching to identify whether resource effects and interpretive effects are observed in the form of changes in trust in other participants (Hypothesis 1) and community social security issues (Hypothesis 2). Pattern matching methods can complement deductive thematic analysis by adding a systematic component where patterns identified in the data are compared against findings suggested by theory (Pearse, 2019). In this study, each participant interview contributed

an observational case to seek patterns of resource effects and interpretive effects as a result of participating in government-led collaborative governance. All interviews were transcribed and then coded to verify patterns of policy feedback effects illustrated in Hypotheses 1 and 2. This deductive approach also aligns with directed content analysis which is used “to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). I used Atlas.ti to code the data according to the coding scheme that was developed based on theory. A priori themes deduced from theory were initially included in the coding scheme, but themes were iteratively updated to include induced themes as necessary. A qualitative data matrix with rows for each interviewee was created to identify and compare patterns in the data. I identified repeated responses and patterns of consensus as well as divergent responses that challenge the hypotheses. Through this analysis, I identified patterns in the qualitative data and conducted additional thematic analysis to deduce general conclusions on Hypotheses 1 and 2.

To test for intercoder reliability, a subset of three interviews was sampled and coded independently by three coders. With three independent coders and many semantic domains with subcodes that captured whether interviewees experienced resource effects and interpretive effects, Krippendorff's alpha coefficient, which is calculated via Atlas.ti, is used to test for intercoder reliability. The initial Krippendorff's alpha coefficient was 0.819 which indicates strong reliability in the coding (Krippendorff, 2019). The three coders engaged in iterative discussions to resolve outstanding coding disagreements, after which the Krippendorff's Alpha coefficient was 0.912 which gives a confident level of intercoder reliability.

The survey data tests for Hypotheses 3 and 4 looking at whether changes in civic capacities and civic predispositions lead to significant changes in participation in non-SSCB-related social security venues. Changes in civic capacities are measured through changes in trust in other participants. Changes in civic predispositions are measured through changes in interest in community social security issues. Table 3 shows the variables and the corresponding survey questions used to measure them. Answers were recorded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly decreased’ to ‘strongly increased’ with ‘no change’ as the mid-point value. Given the ordinal response variable, I conduct ordinal logistic regression using cumulative link models to identify the impacts of the independent variables on the dependent variable.

Table 3. Measures for Quantitative Analysis


Variable	Survey Item Used to Measure Variable
Changes in civic capacities (independent variable)	How did your overall trust in other SSCB committee members change since serving on the SSCB?
Changes in civic predisposition (independent variable)	How did your overall interest level in community social security issues change since serving on the SSCB?
Changes in participation in alternative social security venues (dependent variable)	How did your overall participation level (volunteering, charitable activities, etc.) in community social security issues unrelated to the SSCB change since serving on the SSCB?

5. Results

5.1. Hypotheses 1 & 2

The mixed method analysis confirms both Hypothesis 1 and 2, implying that as a result of the resource effects and interpretive effects created by government-led collaborative governance, participants experience both changes in civic capacities and civic predispositions. Figure 4 below presents a distribution of the responses to questions that measure changes in civic capacities, as captured by changes in trust in other participants, and civic predispositions, as captured by changes in interest in regional social security issues. The distribution suggests that most participants experienced an increase in both trust in other SSCB participants and interest in community social security issues.

Figure 4. Changes in Trust and Interest of SSCB Participants



Finding evidence that there are noticeable changes in trust in other participants and interest in community social security issues, I proceeded with the interviews. To triangulate the findings from these descriptive statistics, further qualitative analysis is

conducted to confirm the policy feedback mechanisms to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. The qualitative analysis is intended to provide a more detailed understanding of the policy feedback effects. Patterns captured through qualitative coding of the interviews are presented in the matrix below.

Table 4. Qualitative Data Matrix

ID	Hypothesis 1				Hypothesis 2		
	Resources			Trust Change	Perceptions & Experiences		Interest Change
	Secretariat	Per Diem	Training & Education		Respected as an equal partner	Contributed Positively	
4	y	n	n	increase	y	n	increase
1	unclear	unclear	y	increase	mixed	y	increase
19	y	y	y	increase	n	y	increase
5	y	y	y	increase	mixed	y	increase
13	y	y	y	increase	y	y	increase
18	y	y	y	increase	n	unclear	increase
8	y	n	y	increase	mixed	y	increase
6	y	y	y	increase	mixed	mixed	increase
17	y	n	y	increase	n	y	increase
9	y	y	unclear	increase	y	unclear	increase
14	y	y	y	increase	mixed	y	increase
16	y	n	y	increase	y	y	increase
15	y	n	n	increase	n	y	increase
3	y	n	y	increase	y	y	increase
2	y	y	y	increase	mixed	unclear	increase
7	y	y	y	increase	mixed	y	increase
11	y	n	y	increase	mixed	y	increase
10	y	n	y	increase	y	y	increase
22	y	n	y	increase	mixed	y	unclear
21	y	y	y	increase	n	y	unclear
20	y	y	n	decrease	y	y	increase
12	y	y	y	decrease	n	mixed	unclear

Based on the qualitative patterns as presented in the matrix, I first confirm that the majority of interviewees experienced increased trust in other participants and interest in community social security issues as a result of engaging in government-led collaborative governance through SSCBs. Interviews confirm that participants feel their civic capacities have been enhanced through trust networks formed with other participants. As a result of

enhanced trust networks, SSCB participants felt they could easily reach out to collaborate on other matters and realized new opportunities for collaboration. Below are quotes that illustrate the creation of trust relationships through SSCBs and the synergies created through them.

ID 21: I am confident that it [participating in the SSCB] has had a very positive impact on enhancing relationships. We are all working in the same field, so when we share our thoughts and exchange information about the newest trends, mutually beneficial relationships are sustained. These official relationships also have a positive impact on personal relationships, leading to stronger trust, and when we need to collaborate, I see more active participation.

ID 5: Yes, trust has increased significantly. This kind of work is about meeting people. The SSCB needs to meet to work, and I've been part of the disability practitioners' committee for about 8 years now. Almost all members served about 7 to 8 years. Without trust, I don't think all the participants and organizations could have collaborated and worked together.

ID 13: Our trust deepens. Yes, we are close acquaintances, but in a way, we are also a public interest committee working for the public good. We are engaging in public service activities together. I think the shared sense of accomplishment that comes from this and the trust we form in each other in the process can only deepen.

ID 22: If we only had formal meetings, in reality, we wouldn't get to know each other well. However, when I requested one or two committee members to help with a cleaning project, the interaction I had with the committee members who came to help was very positive. So, next time I need help, it is possible to ask directly because of that experience, which is very beneficial.

Through such networks of trust, participants can create additional opportunities to collaborate beyond the SSCBs to further serve the community, an illustration of their enhanced civic capacities.

ID 18: As our trust increases, from my point of view, we can collaborate on other projects or establish MOUs (Memorandum of Understanding) to design actual projects and work together, and it seems like such activities are increasing every year. This year too, we have had several MOUs with comprehensive social welfare institutions to discuss services for vulnerable groups together. Seeing this happening, participating in the SSCB helps with my business while I can also contribute to the social security of the local community.

ID 12: I believe that proactivity is crucial. There must be clear leadership from the people in the front and clear planning and directions. I make a lot of effort to take the lead in such gatherings and we are organizing a private-private cooperation network (in addition to the SSCB).

Participants also expressed developing a greater interest in regional social security issues, showing that interpretive effects have changed their civic predispositions.

ID 3: Given the significant relevance of my work to other welfare domains, it is true that my interest has increased in these areas. There are many cases I can reference from other participants. I can benchmark their practices which seems to provide a broader perspective to my work. So, my interest has increased a lot, and I am making efforts to apply it in practice.

ID 8: I have developed more interest in activities where the residents come together and collaborate to change the community. And when I go to meetings outside or visit other areas, I seem to take more interest in the activities of the residents and the communities in those areas.

ID 19: Yes, now I see the problems in the local community. Such issues have always existed, but through SSCB activities, certain problems in the area are continuously highlighted...There have been more opportunities to discuss such local community issues, and the residents have more chances to look back on the community while participating in SSCB activities. I believe that such opportunities continue to be created.

Such changes in civic predispositions lead to more proactive participation and action to create change, and more pride in working in the social security domain.

ID 10: Collaboratively contemplating and creating good solutions for these issues are undoubtedly a source of fulfillment for social welfare professionals, wouldn't you agree? In that regard, it holds a significant personal meaning. This is not about prestige or power, but truly about serving others. As a social worker, it is natural to have an interest in this aspect, and I am grateful to be working in this manner.

ID 18: The field I am working in is now in the employment sector, it is inclusive of the welfare field. Through committee activities, my perspective has broadened, and I also see the monitoring or deliberation of social security plans and the planning of budgets. Consequently, I have come to know more about welfare areas that I didn't know much about before that serve children, the elderly, and people with disabilities. As a result, I have developed interest and my opinions and ideas have become more refined... Besides employment issues, in my Practitioners' committee, there seems to be increased interest and participation in the current issues and policies regarding women, children, and the elderly, among others. As a result, I find myself naturally observing more of the work of other practitioners' committees, and I also look at the meeting results of other practitioners' committees to see how I can tie it to the employment sector to collaborate on specialized projects.

From these qualitative patterns, I can gather substantive evidence that demonstrates increased trust in other SSCB participants and interest in community social security issues as captured through the survey data (see Figure 4). Therefore, I conclude that government-led collaborative governance does create policy feedback effects in the form of resource effects and interpretive effects that lead to enhanced civic capacities and predispositions, confirming Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Additional thematic analysis of the qualitative data was conducted to identify what factors drove changes in civic capacities and civic predispositions. According to the Policy Feedback Theory, resources provided and participant perceptions and experiences

contribute to such changes. In the interviews, I asked whether resources such as professional facilitation through a secretariat, per diems provided to participants, and training and educational opportunities contributed to enhanced trust networks and civic capacities. I also asked whether the participants felt respected as an equal collaborative partner and whether they felt they contributed to the community by playing a central role to explore participants' perceptions and experiences that could contribute to changes in civic predispositions.

In terms of resource effects, I was unable to identify consistent patterns in the types of resources or participant perceptions and experiences that explain the changes. Whether the SSCB had professional facilitation through a secretariat, provided per diems to participants, and provided training and educational opportunities did not seem to align with changes in trust in other participants as presented in the matrix above. Some interviewees describe how the lack of such resources detracted from the operation of SSCBs, but their presence did not seem to be necessary for the formation of trust between participants.

Instead, I find that the information that participants acquired by participating in the SSCBs, which allowed them to learn about the broader social security system and others' roles within the bigger picture, was the most important resource that fostered trust in other participants. Information was consistently mentioned by a majority of interviewees as an important asset they gained, unlike other resources like professional managerial support through a secretariat, financial support through per diems, or training and educational opportunities. Participants repeatedly reported gaining broader perspectives

and understandings of how social security service provision worked and the interconnected role of different actors in the process. This helped them appreciate experts working in other social security domains, which led to a sense of connectedness and trust. Interviewees identified acquiring information that they previously did not have and learning about and from other participants as the most important factors driving this change.

ID 16: While engaging in SSCB activities, I gain the most from the relationships and information exchange with various committee members from different important fields, as well as from the professional collaborative relationships. I am also able to participate to a certain extent in the establishment of social security plans within the local government, which is highly valued in this administration. These are some of the benefits of participating in the SSCB.

ID 14: Now I see that various activities are being carried out by different groups and experts. As a result, when discussing issues related to women or children, I can now perceive the situation more comprehensively. For instance, I have been helping only those I have been interested in and assisting so far, but now I think there has been a bit of a change as I am willing to help in the area of children as well. So, maybe I can say that the scope of volunteering has broadened a bit?

ID 9: By participating not only in my job but in general welfare activities, I came to know about the overall welfare situation of the city. It provided me with valuable opportunities to gain background knowledge in this area, even though I am not currently involved in welfare work. It seems that all the organic connections are made in the overall big picture and plans, and welfare activities are not haphazard but are actually carried out through certain plans and systems. I also came to understand that efforts are being made to incorporate the opinions of the private sector. Participating in this has been an opportunity for me to reduce personal prejudices and misunderstandings to some extent.

ID 3: Of course I might see things through broadcasts or newspaper coverage, but essentially, we are the ones performing administrative tasks through the SSCB. So I can catch on to how things are actually progressing a little faster. Especially, information about what the city is proactively doing in line with the leadership of

the central government can be known quickly. We can be more proactive and prepared in that aspect.

Their policy learning led to a broader perspective in how they viewed the overall social service provision process as well as a greater understanding of the role and competencies of other actors in that process, contributing to enhanced trust in other participants.

Additionally, time spent together deliberating on and delivering services was another resource that contributed to the formation of trust networks.

ID 18: In the SSCBs, I have been meeting those who were only acquaintances before. I have more conversations and interactions with them and we collaborate more, and this naturally leads to discussions about our work within our affiliated organizations and related trends. So, I can say that the relationships have expanded further.

ID 5: While working with the committee, as I mentioned earlier, there is a positive aspect in terms of pooling resources, but there is also the strengthening of the network. In social security or the SSCB, the networks are human networks. When networks are strengthened, it has power over how people behave. So after participating in the SSCB, I think there have been a lot of changes among the participants... We continuously meet people which leads to sharing what each person does and what the organization is involved in, so I can say that the individuals influence has grown positively.

In terms of interpretive effects, almost half the interviewees did not feel respected as a true partner to the government, highlighting the potential power dynamics of government-led collaborative governance. Many private and non-profit sector participants discussed limitations in autonomy due to restrictions in budgetary decisions and the SSCB activities being subject to the performance goals of the local governments. Some felt they

were being “ordered” to be part of the SSCB, and others mentioned if the mandate was not there the SSCBs would not be sustained.

ID 7: The public sector, they need performance. They need achievements to demonstrate performance goals. So they want us to set goals that we can 100% achieve, and if we want to innovate beyond what has been being done, we have to make some adjustments...We also face limitations because everything needs to be feasible within the human and financial resources that are allowed.

ID 5: We do have autonomy, but there are more constraints than I anticipated. These constraints somewhat limit the freedom to pursue certain projects in ways we would prefer such as wishing to go in a different direction from the local government. So I would describe the SSCB as being autonomous but not fully autonomous.

ID 17: According to the regulations, it is expected that welfare social security systems and plans should be autonomously established in the region, but despite this regulation, I feel that we have not yet reached that point...If the government does not pay attention, I don't know what will happen. I wonder how many SSCBs will continue to operate if that happens, and think that a lot of them will just disappear.

Others were more hopeful, suggesting that the SSCBs are still in the initiation phase where both the government and private participants are learning how to work together. They see improvement over time and expect more equal partnerships with the public sector will be formed in time.

On the contrary, almost all interviewees reported that they felt they had positively contributed to the community by their participation in the SSCB. Therefore, I find that the greatest contributing factor to interpretive effects was the participant's direct, tangible experiences of seeing their suggestions realized and reflected in the social security services implemented by SSCBs. Many quoted this as the most impactful factor that gave them a

sense of achievement and the realization that they contributed to the community through their participation in SSCBs.

ID 8: In my efforts to establish and implement the community social security plan with members of the SSCB, I felt that I had a significant impact in successfully transforming the local community.

ID 11: I feel that we are making significant contributions. Through our activities, we have been able to resolve many difficulties, and seeing individuals confidently living their lives due to our assistance makes me wonder what would have happened to them without our help. I also wonder whether these many individuals with disabilities would have found the satisfaction we provide if we hadn't engaged in these activities. Overall, our activities contribute to helping many people, providing them with satisfaction and contributing to communal life, and we find satisfaction in these aspects.

In sum, information provided by the SSCBs which allowed participants to engage in policy learning was the greatest resource that led to the resource effects of enhanced trust in other participants. In terms of interpretive effects, the concrete experiences of contributing to the community's social security scene were the drivers of the change in enhanced interest. Collectively, the quantitative and qualitative data confirm Hypotheses 1 and 2. I conclude that government-led collaborative governance generates policy feedback effects through both resource effects and interpretive effects.

5.2. Hypotheses 3 & 4

Testing for Hypotheses 3 and 4, I investigate how the policy feedback effects generated through SSCBs affected civic participation in alternative social security-related venues beyond the SSCBs. I find evidence that the policy feedback effects created by the SSCBs have a cooperative impact on other participatory venues. Collectively, the resource

effects and interpretive effects shape participation in alternative venues. Ordinal regression outcomes presented in Table 5 below provide empirical support for both hypotheses.

Table 5. Ordinal Regression Model for Changes in Participation

<i>Predictors</i>	Changes in Participation	
	<i>Odds Ratios</i>	<i>CI</i>
interest	6.96 ***	4.93 – 9.82
trustchange mem	3.36 ***	2.52 – 4.49
sw expenseratio	0.99	0.98 – 1.00
level [Practical Division]	0.67	0.43 – 1.06
level [Representative Committee]	0.68	0.37 – 1.26
level [Working Level Committee]	0.87	0.53 – 1.42
sector [citizen rep]	0.46	0.07 – 2.83
sector [for-profit]	0.80	0.15 – 4.38
sector [non-profit]	0.67	0.15 – 3.06
sector [other]	0.51	0.08 – 3.05
sector [public]	0.99	0.21 – 4.70
years16-20 years	1.23	0.40 – 3.78
years [21~25 years]	0.67	0.19 – 2.43
years [26~30 years]	0.31	0.02 – 4.85
years [31 years and above]	0.18	0.02 – 1.44
years [5 years and below]	1.14	0.61 – 2.12

years6-10 years	1.03	0.53 – 1.99
age [30s]	1.59	0.55 – 4.63
age [40s]	1.48	0.52 – 4.22
age [50s]	2.00	0.68 – 5.84
age [60s]	2.39	0.71 – 8.10
age [70s]	1.24	0.19 – 8.24
sex [male]	1.03	0.74 – 1.43
education [bachelors degree]	0.82	0.49 – 1.37
education [graduate degree]	0.88	0.51 – 1.52
education [highschool or less]	0.58	0.21 – 1.57
Observations	728	
R ² Nagelkerke	0.669	
AIC	1183.715	

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Outcomes show that changes in trust in other participants and changes in interest in regional social security issues are both positively associated with participation in other social security-related venues. For a one-unit increase on the scale measuring change in trust in other committee members, the cumulative log-odds of being in a higher category for change in participation is 1.213. This means the odds of being in a higher category of participation are over 3.36 times higher for each one-point increase in trust. For a one-unit increase on the scale measuring change in interest in regional social security issues, the cumulative log-odds of being in a higher category for change in participation is 1.94. This

means the odds of being in a higher category of participation are 6.96 times higher for each one-point increase in interest. The regression results confirm that the changes in civic capacities and civic predispositions positively influence participation in alternative values. Additionally, we observe that the effect of interpretive effects that lead to changes in civic predispositions, or changes in regional social security issues, has a much stronger cooperative effect that promotes civic participation in alternative venues.

Interviewees also provided narratives that illustrate this finding, suggesting that their participation in SSCBs often created new opportunities to collaborate in alternative venues, or reinforced their participation in alternative venues. Interviewee 13 and 2 discuss how trust networks formed with other participants leads to participation and collaboration in other venues.

ID 13: In 2019, while participating in the SSCB, I found myself engaged in various volunteer activities throughout. For instance, along with close acquaintances and other members of the SSCB, we established a Red Cross volunteer group in one area. We established this group in March of last year, and it's been almost two years since then, during which we have expanded our activities. Additionally, I have actively been involved within the Social Workers Association, One of the leading figures in our city's SSCB is a social worker, and because I hold a social work license, I became part of the association. I developed a lot of interest in the welfare of social workers and in aspects such as healing and stress relief, and it seems that my interest and participation have expanded to include these areas as well.

ID 2: So members in the private sector and public sector created a new task force team together and collaborated to create projects for our community, which gives us more opportunities to talk and mingle and network with each other. Naturally, when we meet to work on other tasks later on, the whole process is much smoother.

Interviewee 19 illustrates how participation in other venues has increased through changes in civic predispositions of learning the value of participation.

ID 19: Of course it [participation in other venues] has increased, because I realized that public-private collaboration is possible through the SSCB. It became apparent that citizen leadership works, whereas previously, in the public sector, we hadn't seen residents taking the lead. Public officials always thought that they had to take the lead, but now it has become evident that resident-led initiatives are possible, and [the SSCB] has provided an opportunity to demonstrate that. So, I am also involved in residents' self-governing activities, and I am helping to establish participation in creating the village welfare plan. In these capacities, I continue to promote volunteering, allowing volunteers to take the lead as I serve as the director of the volunteer center.

Collectively, the mixed-methods analysis confirms all proposed hypotheses of this study. I find that government-led collaborative governance generates both resource effects and interpretive effects, which have a cooperative effect on other participatory venues. The implications of the findings are discussed in the following section.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

The primary goal of this study is to validate the policy feedback theory in the context of government-led collaborative governance. This paper studies the policy feedback effects of government-led collaborative governance using quantitative and qualitative data from SSCBs in South Korea. Based on my analysis, I confirm the presence of both resource effects and interpretive effects as a result of participating in government-led collaborative governance. Participants reported higher levels of trust in other participants, mainly as a result of more information and policy learning, confirming resource effects.

Participants reported higher levels of interest in regional social security issues, mainly as a result of positive experiences of contributing to the community.

In addition to testing for the presence of policy feedback effects of government-led collaborative governance, the paper also studies how such policy feedback effects shape participation in alternative venues beyond the SSCBs. I find evidence that increased trust in other participants and interest in regional social security issues translated into higher levels of participation in other social security-related venues outside the SSCBs. This provides evidence in support of the institutional rational choice perspective that theorizes that participation in a collaborative venue can foster collaboration in other venues. Therefore, I conclude that policy feedback effects of government-led collaborative governance are cooperative in that they enhance prospects for civic participation in other venues.

This paper makes several meaningful contributions to the literature. First, it contributes empirical knowledge on the effects and mechanisms of policy feedback created by government-led collaborative governance. Relative to other policy process frameworks such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) or Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, policy feedback theory has been used less in collaborative governance research. Scholars such as Mettler, SoRelle, Patashnik, Zelizer, Soss, and Schram who work with the theory suggest that it is imperative to consider how complex policy arrangements such as collaborative governance can influence political landscapes by “altering state capacities, changing incentives for collective action, and encouraging social adaptations that may become difficult to reverse” (Patashnik & Zelizer, 2013, p. 1075).

Second, it extends Lubell et al.'s (2010) efforts to empirically test whether IRC or EG frameworks better explain how collaborative institutions, which operate in policy domains populated with multiple participatory venues, influence alternative participatory venues. This answers their call for future researchers to better study the “potentially negative or positive feedback between the evolution of cooperation in one policy game and the potential for cooperation in other games” (p.299). In addition to empirically testing the IRC and EG debate, this study opens avenues of research to build theory on conditions that can be managed to ensure a cooperative effect between participatory venues. Related to resource effects, I find that policy learning effects generated from information provided by governments, and direct experiences interacting with actors in other organizations and policy domains enhanced trust that generates trust which contributes to collaboration in alternative venues. Related to interpretive effects, the findings highlight the importance of direct experiences of having their ideas translated into the social services that are provided in the community leading to positive perceptions of self, that can foster civic activism. These findings provide important lessons for governments that lead collaborative governance for policy purposes, as they show how governments can design collaborative governance to vitalize and encourage participation in, rather than detract from and crowd out alternative participatory venues.

Last but not least, this qualitative analysis uncovers how government-led collaborative governance contributes to the preservation and promotion of democratic values which is often cited as one of the core functions of collaborative governance. Singleton (2002) argues in addition to generating better policies, governance also

strengthens democratic foundations by promoting inclusiveness and civic participation in the policy process. According to Sirianni (2009), collaborative governance can be regarded as an institutional choice through which governments act as “strategic, systematic, and effective enabler[s] of civic engagement” (p.2). Whether governments can foster more participation or whether it will simply detract from other venues is worthy of consideration to fully assess how beneficial government-led collaborative governance is in promoting civic activism.

A major limitation of this paper is that the generalizability of findings is limited as the interviewees are sampled purposefully from a single institution of government-led collaborative governance, SSCBs in South Korea. It will be interesting to extend the scope of inquiry to other forms of government-led collaborative governance to understand whether there is variation in terms of how policy feedback effects work across different institutional and cultural contexts. Another limitation can be attributed to the fact that it does not fully take into account how civic engagement can change after participants leave the SSCBs. It is possible that while participants serve on the SSCBs, their participation in other venues expands. Whether this effect is sustained over time remains unanswered. Exploring such possibilities will help develop a more comprehensive understanding of policy feedback effects of government-led collaborative governance by accounting for temporal variation.

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IV. CO-PRODUCTION OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PLACE-BASED INEQUITY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SOUTH KOREA

1. Introduction

Increasing diversity in modern societies challenges governments to become more responsive to a broader range of values (Booher, 2004; Baldwin & Huber, 2010). Yet, economic resource constraints and political dynamics hinder governments from being fully inclusive of the diverse values in our societies. As a result, social equity has been in steady decline as evidenced by “[d]isparities of income, wealth, and access to opportunity” (Frederickson, 2005, p. 33; Gooden, 2014). One way governments seek to address this problem is by innovating governance to enhance representation in policy processes. In this context, co-production has become an increasingly popular participatory approach to public service delivery (Osborne, 2018). Through co-production, public management, which traditionally centers on enacting the will of sovereign authorities, translates into a more granular process of enacting the will of citizens by allowing them to define public problems and collaboratively work toward their resolution (Ansell et al., 2021; Lynn, 2005).

Despite the popularity of participatory approaches to public service provision, our understanding of their implications for social equity is limited. Per Cepiku and Mastrodascio (2021, p. 1027), “[e]mpirical evidence is needed on the relative impact of particular co-productive activities.” Various literature on social equity approaches the topic

from a group-based perspective, discussing equity along the lines of groups and identities such as race, gender, ethnicity, class, and intersectionality (Guy & McCandless, 2012). This study approaches social equity from a public management perspective, exploring how co-production—as a form of public management—affects the equitable distribution of public services.

The motivation of this study is to empirically enhance our understanding of the equity implications of public service co-production. I focus on place-based inequity in particular. Place-based inequity arises from spatial constraints that determine one's access to public services. A simple illustration is the quality of education a student receives according to the school district they live in. Research finds that student performance is linked to contextual factors that are determined at the district level such as school budgets, policy decisions, district size, and so on (Driscoll et al., 2003; Jacques & Brorsen, 2002). Therefore, citizens receive distinct services according to place (Michener, 2018; Conley & Dix, 2004; Savas, 1978).

In considering the implications of co-production for place-based inequity, I address the following research question: which is a strong driver of co-production performance, externally predetermined local resource capacities of the jurisdiction in which co-production takes place, or internally developed process dynamics that emerge as part of the co-production arrangement? This question can be simplified into a question of what matters more for performance, inputs, or processes. Co-production can be pursued for various reasons, but I operationalize co-production performance in terms of its ability to deliver satisfactory public services to citizens. While both external inputs and internal

processes are important drivers of co-production performance, analyzing the relative impacts of inputs and processes is important to understand how co-production influences place-based inequity. If the co-production of public service delivery is largely determined by predetermined local resource capacities, co-production may perpetuate or aggravate rather than alleviate place-based inequity owing to existing disparities in resource capacities across jurisdictions. On the other hand, stronger impacts of internally developed process dynamics imply that co-production, when properly managed, can serve as a mode of service delivery that overcomes resource disparities across jurisdictions to alleviate place-based inequity.

This study addresses the question using empirical data collected from Social Security Consultative Bodies (SSCBs) in South Korea. SSCBs are collaborative arrangements that are mandated to operate in autonomous jurisdictions to co-produce community-based social security services. I test the impact of externally predetermined local resource capacities and internally developed process dynamics on the perceived capability of SSCBs to address regional social security issues. Perceived capability, a subjective measure of performance, is used given current data limitations that prohibit the attainment of more direct measures of performance. The following sections are organized as follows: a literature review on place-based inequity, co-production, and the relation between the two is presented. Then the research design, including the study context and methods is presented, followed by the results, discussion, and conclusion sections.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Place-Based Inequity

Place-based inequity concerns inequitable access to public services arising from one's geographic location of residence. All citizens should be served by public services regardless of their place of residence in theory. In reality, however, access to services is often a function of where one lives (Michener, 2018; Conley & Dix, 2004; Savas, 1978). Disparities in educational, vocational, and health outcomes as well as gaps in overall well-being across neighborhoods are often cited as evidence of service disparities (Diez Roux, 2001; Gomez et al., 2020; Huie, 2001). Several causes of place-based inequity in public services can be identified. First, is the fact that neighborhoods are often historical artifacts of discriminatory practices which determine the spatial distribution of resources. Redlining in the U.S., for instance, resulted in the flow of resources to affluent neighborhoods while minority-dominant neighborhoods were systematically deprived of public services (Antunes & Plumlee, 1977). Second, disparities in local government capacities are a cause of place-based inequity. When public programs are implemented through polycentric systems of governance (Stokan et al., 2022), disparities in outcomes are inevitably tied to the capacity of local governments. The outbreak of COVID-19 and the variation in the ability to procure health equipment across local governments in the U.S. illustrates disparities in local government preparedness in serving their residents. The third contributing factor is urbanization which leads to the concentration of resources and services in urban areas. In many countries, there is a stark contrast between how thick and

thin service markets are between urban and rural areas which impacts access to services (André et al., 2021; Moon, 2003). The concentration of services in urban areas leads to problems like food deserts or education deserts where rural residents face challenges in accessing basic services (Blanchard & Matthews, 2007; Dutko et al., 2012; Kim, 2019; Park et al., 2021). Collectively, these factors, along with the fact that mobility is often restricted for lower-income citizens, generate place-based inequity in access to public services. Over time, these factors generate policy feedback effects that systemize inequity across place (Michener, 2018).

2.2. Co-production as an Innovative Management Strategy

Co-production refers to the involvement of public service users in any or all stages of public service delivery (Osborne et al., 2018). Co-production is an innovative mechanism for public service delivery because it involves service recipients in the production process departing from the model of the public sector acting as the producer of services. Co-production has naturally been tightly knitted to social welfare service provision, given that third-sector actors including nonprofit organizations that specialize as welfare service providers actively participate in the process (Pestoff, 2012). Much research is based on the context of European social service provision and in relation to topics of social innovation and the broader welfare state reform (Pestoff, 2009; Pestoff et al., 2006; Rantamäki, 2017). Researchers highlight many advantages of co-production as a mode of service delivery. Co-production allows for tax savings which are attractive as strains on budgets for local service delivery are on the increase (Rosentraub & Sharp, 1981; Wilson, 1981). Consumers

themselves voluntarily serve as resources or provide other forms of inputs to produce services that allow governments to produce more with smaller budgets. Co-production also allows for the provision of services that better meet the needs of the community (Vanleene & Verschuere, 2018; Rich, 1979). Consumers often have the most information and knowledge regarding what exact services are necessary and beneficial. Co-production allows consumers to contribute such information in the early stages of service production to better meet the needs of users. Co-production can also change power dynamics between governments as producers and citizens as consumers. Traditionally, bureaucrats are believed to have a greater voice in determining how services are delivered, but co-production redefines power dynamics to ensure service delivery is more responsive to citizens (Antunes & Plumlee, 1977; Young & Tanner, 2022). Last but not least, co-production constitutes a form of citizen participation that contributes to the reinforcement of democracy and realizes individual-level transformations through learning and empowerment (Pestoff, 2006; Rosentraub & Sharp, 1981; Jo & Nabatchi, 2018).

While the literature on co-production highlights many positive aspects of co-production, some aspects remain understudied including the implications of co-production on equity. Ideally, co-production will enhance the quality of services in all jurisdictions as “co-production may offer the only realistic hope for improved quality of life in many poor communities around the world” (Bovaird, 2007, p. 857). However, the distributional consequences of co-production are unknown and questions of “[w]hich citizens will experience improved service outcomes because of co-production? Does co-production

potentially increase the gap in service outcomes between advantaged and disadvantaged citizens?”(Jakobsen & Andersen, 2013, p. 704) remain outstanding.

2.3. Drivers of Co-production and Mixed Implications for Place-based Equity

Currently, the theoretical implications of co-production for the equitable distribution of public services are mixed. Polycentric governance systems of co-production may reproduce local resource disparities in the quantities and qualities of services. Co-production is often pursued as a means of service delivery in polycentric systems of governance where decision-making authority is spread across various levels of government, and multiple co-production arrangements operate parallelly across autonomous jurisdictions (Stokan et al., 2022). Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) are illustrative examples of such polycentric governance structures of co-production in the U.S. (Stokan et al., 2022). Residents are served by the arrangement that takes shape within their locality under such polycentric systems, suggesting that the performance of a local co-production arrangement determines the quality and quantity of services that residents in a given jurisdiction receive.

Due to this polycentric nature, delivering public services through co-production may aggravate if not perpetuate place-based inequity if performance is determined largely by local resource capacities. Some researchers note the risks of co-production perpetuating or further exacerbating gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged groups in accessing public services. Wealthier and more affluent neighborhoods are likely to have greater


capacities to mobilize and pool necessary resources that determine the success of co-production (Rich, 1979; Rosentraub & Sharp, 1981; Sundeen, 1988). Also, citizens of higher socioeconomic status are often more active participants in co-production which allows them to advocate for their needs over those of disadvantaged groups (Jakobsen & Andersen, 2013). Jakobsen and Andersen (2013, p. 704) note that “disadvantaged citizens may be constrained by a lack of knowledge or other resources necessary to contribute to and benefit from the co-production process.” According to this logic, and the fact that place is reflective of the residence of advantaged and disadvantaged groups, co-production will have negative implications for place-based equity if the quality and quantity of services co-produced is driven largely by predetermined local resource capacities. Factors representative of local resource capacities that are considered in this study include the affluence of households in the jurisdiction and the jurisdiction’s social welfare budget per capita.

Contrastingly, co-production may have positive implications for place-based equity. Some scholars see co-production as an approach to overcoming disparities in service provision. “[B]y providing citizens with an opportunity to shape service delivery, it may be possible to remove some of the major barriers to equitable distribution of public services” (Rich, 1979, p. 81). A foundational assumption of this perspective is the performance of the co-production process assessed in terms of being able to successfully deliver services to service recipients. From a public management perspective, this implies that the proper design and management of the co-production process is important in realizing its potential to mitigate existing place-based inequities. This study focuses on several factors of

internally fostered procedural dynamics that are necessary for co-production performance including levels of trust, procedural fairness and transparency, and value congruence between members in the co-production arrangement. Co-production performance is dependent on the ability to motivate actors to engage in the process and elicit participant buy-in. Fledderus et al. (2014) note that while empirical research that clarifies the relationship between co-production and trust is scarce, earlier works on collective action identify trust as a key condition that allows for collective action. They state that “trust...may affect the particular motivations of users to co-produce” (Fledderus et al., 2014, p. 437). The authors note that congruence in values is also an important intrinsic motivator of co-production that can foster co-production performance (Fledderus et al., 2014). In addition to motivating participants through trust and value congruence, co-production arrangements need to establish legitimacy in order to perform. In this context, procedural fairness and transparency is another important characteristic of a performing co-production process as it establishes the legitimacy of the co-production arrangement and the outcomes that it produces (Mees et al., 2017).

Figure 1 presents externally determined local resource capacities as well as internally developed process dynamics that drive outcomes of co-production that are considered in this study. Local resource capacities are externally predetermined contextual drivers that include the affluence of households in the jurisdiction and social welfare budget per capita. Process dynamics are internally developed dynamics that include levels of trust participants have in the co-production arrangement, perceived procedural fairness and transparency, and perceived value congruence.

Figure 1. External and Internal Drivers of Co-production



There are other drivers of co-production beyond what is considered in this study. The willingness of public leaders and managers, jurisdiction size, level of demand for services, thick markets that supply sufficient contributors to the co-production arrangement, and local social capital are examples of external drivers that are not considered in the scope of this study. Member composition, group size, and individual participant traits and characteristics such as level of participant buy-in are factors that influence internal dynamics that are not considered in the scope of this study.

The following sections present an empirical analysis to explore whether externally predetermined local resource capacities or internally developed process dynamics are stronger drivers of co-production performance. In practice, both external and internal conditions will collectively drive performance. However, as an early empirical study, this study focuses on assessing the relative impacts of external and internal drivers of co-production to derive implications of co-production for place-based equity. In other words, this study analyzes external and internal conditions as linear variables that independently

affect co-production. The findings of this study will contribute towards a more general understanding of what external and internal conditions are more or less associated with co-production performance and how public managers can leverage them with greater attention to social equity.

3. Empirical Context

The empirical context for this study consists of Social Security Consultative Bodies (SSCBs) in South Korea. The analysis is based on survey data collected from SSCB participants. Before introducing SSCBs in greater depth, this section begins with a brief overview of the social security service delivery structure of South Korea. The emphasis is on introducing the government structure and demonstrating how co-production is woven into social security provision.

South Korea's social welfare system has been continuously expanding alongside its rapid economic growth since the 1960s. As a result, welfare spending constitutes the largest portion of government spending since 2004 (Lee, 2015). The *Framework Act of Social Security* defines that the state and local governments are responsible for social security policies "to allow all citizens to lead a happy living worthy of human dignity without various social risks, by supporting their self-reliance and establishing necessary systems and conditions for social participation and self-realization" (*Framework Act on Social Security*, 2012). As such, both the central and local governments share responsibilities of social security provision within a system of devolution. This is analogous

to the federal system of the United States where the federal and local governments shape social policies, but heterogeneity in services arises due to variation in implementation across local jurisdictions (Michener, 2018). In terms of the budget structure, local welfare expenditures pull from both self-raised local budgets as well as assistance from the central government. Given the different capacities of local governments, researchers find high inequality in welfare expenditure per service consumer across jurisdictions in South Korea (Koo et al., 2014). Such variation in local government capacities manifests as significant inequities in access to social services across the country (Lee, 2022). While the central government plays a role in addressing such inequities by providing assistance, demonstrating the complementary central and local government structure, place-based inequities in access to services remain a national challenge (Lee, 2022; Koo et al., 2014).

Upon this government structure, the central government has legislatively mandated cross-sector collaboration to meet increasing demands for local welfare services (Chang, 2009). In 2014, the Government of South Korea mandated all local autonomous jurisdictions to establish SSCBs. SSCBs pool resources and capacities from public, private, and nonprofit sectors within the jurisdiction to realize a community-based co-production model for social security services. SSCB participants include public, private, nonprofit, academic, and citizen representatives who work in the domain of social security and welfare. While the Ministry of Health and Welfare provides higher-level management by designating basic structures and operational rules, SSCBs across all jurisdictions operate independently with autonomous decision-making authority. Through their operations, SSCBs are expected to create and deliver social security-related services that best reflect

the demands of the community they serve. This study uses this jurisdictional boundary of SSCBs as an indication of 'place', an endogenously defined context across which I assess how co-production in SSCBs place-based disparities in access to services.

SSCBs take on a range of roles to promote regional social security services from deliberating on and establishing the 4-year community social security plans to directly delivering services to those in need. Household LED bulb conversion initiatives, holiday meal deliveries to the elderly, and after-school enrichment activities for school-aged students are a few examples of services delivered directly through SSCBs. Additionally, SSCBs engage in local capacity building to enhance the provision of social security services. SSCBs also aim to foster cross-jurisdictional knowledge transfers by congregating through an annual conference where best practices are recognized. Such activities collectively contribute to the community-based co-production of social security services. However, given that each jurisdiction significantly varies in conditions that impact the performance of SSCBs, they provide a testing ground to assess the research question of whether externally determined local resource capacities or internally developed process dynamics are stronger drivers of co-production.

4. Methods

The data for this study consists of both original survey data and administrative data retrieved from the Korean Statistical Information Service. Survey data was collected using an online survey platform, REDCap, between April and June 2021. SSCB participants

completed the questionnaire in Korean. A total of 922 participants from 64 SSCBs participated in the survey. Descriptive statistics of the respondents are presented in Table 1 below. Survey respondents come from a stratified (by province) random sample of SSCBs. Autonomous jurisdictions in South Korea were used as the sampling frame since SSCBs operate in all local autonomous jurisdictions. A total of 128 SSCBs were invited to participate in the study. Written invitations to participate in the study were sent to local governments of sampled jurisdictions. The invitations were followed up by a phone call to local SSCB managers explaining the purpose of the study. SSCB managers who chose to participate in the study then distributed the survey link to all SSCB members within their jurisdiction. SSCB participants from a total of 58 jurisdictions responded to the survey through this channel. Additionally, participants from SSCBs who were not included in the random sample also contributed to the survey. The national secretariat distributed the survey link to SSCB participants whom they were in direct communication with. As a result, survey responses were also recorded from SSCB participants of six non-randomly recruited jurisdictions. The final data used for analysis integrates responses from both random and non-random samples.⁴ Characteristics of survey respondents are presented in Table 1 below. The distribution aligns with the general composition of SSCBs, with nonprofit representatives in their mid-careers constituting the majority.

⁴ Robustness checks using datasets with only randomly sampled participants are presented in Appendix A. There are minimal differences in the effect and effect size of the key variables. However, the significance of gender, a control variable, shows sensitivity.

Table 1. Characteristics of Survey Respondents

Variable	N	Composition
Sector	910	
... other	59	6%
... private	35	4%
... nonprofit	652	72%
... public	164	18%
Education	914	
... associates degree	119	13%
... bachelors degree	407	45%
... graduate degree	348	38%
... highschool or less	40	4%
Age_Group	915	
... early_career	175	19%
... mid_career	652	71%
... late_career	88	10%
Gender	911	
... female	523	57%
... male	388	43%

Table 2 presents the set of independent variables representing externally determined local resource capacities and internally developed process dynamics along with their measures.

Table 2. Independent Variables and Measures

Local Resource Capacities		Process Dynamics	
Affluence	Measured by the annual average household income of the jurisdiction (KRW).	Trust	Measured by the self-reported levels of trust in SSCBs on a scale of 0-10.
Budget Per Capita	Measured by the total annual local government social	Fairness	Measured by an assessment of the following statement on a 5-point Likert scale:

welfare budget per capita (KRW).		<i>The SSCB is fair, open, and transparent.</i>
	Value Congruence	Measured by an assessment of the following statement on a 5-point Likert scale: <i>The goal and mission of the SSCB align with that of mine and my organization.</i>

Externally predetermined local resource capacities were captured using two variables. Affluence is a variable for local resource capacity measured by average household income at the jurisdiction level. Affluence is reflective of theories that find citizens with higher socioeconomic status can mobilize more resources for co-production and are more proactive in advocating their needs in such venues (Jakobsen & Andersen, 2013; Rich, 1979). Budget per capita is measured by the total social welfare-related budget per capita of the jurisdiction. It represents the overall resourcefulness of the jurisdiction in addressing social security and welfare-related issues. Local governments can contribute discretionary funds to support their local SSCBs. Exploratory interviews conducted with elites revealed that there is variation in the level of support the local governments provide. Jurisdictions with overall higher budgets dedicated to social security and welfare will be in more favorable positions to invest in SSCBs should the need arise.

Internal process dynamics are represented by three distinct variables. First, is the level of trust that participants have toward the SSCBs they are associated with. Following the practice of the OECD Trustlab, this variable is measured on a zero to 10 scale (OECD, 2017). Trust is identified as a critical input for successful collaboration in groups (Emerson et al., 2012). Higher levels of perceived trust in the SSCB thus are expected to translate into

greater capacities to perform (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Silvia, 2018). Procedural fairness and transparency reflect perceptions of how fair and transparent the operation of SSCBs are. The variable is measured on a five-point Likert scale of ‘Strongly Disagree’, ‘Disagree’, ‘Neutral’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Strongly Agree.’ Survey participants were asked to assess the statement: “The SSCB is fair, open, and transparent.” Procedural fairness and transparency are foundational to establishing the fundamental legitimacy of co-production (O’Connor et al., 2019; Turk et al., 2021; Howarth & Monasterolo, 2017). Procedural fairness and transparency also reduce the risks of investing in collaborative efforts, allowing participants to be more invested in a process by lowering uncertainty. Favorable process dynamics are also supported by the perceived value-congruence of participants with the SSCBs. Value congruence is also measured on a five-point Likert scale where survey participants were asked to assess the statement: “The goal and mission of the SSCB align with that of mine and my organization.” The variance inflation factor (VIF) was used to test for multicollinearity between the independent variables. No concerning levels of correlation were found. Descriptive statistics of the key independent variables are summarized in Table 3 below.


Table 3. Descriptive Statistics: Independent Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 50	Pctl. 75	Max
Affluence	873	30.26	11.85	10.44	20.45	31.48	35.81	66.47
Budget Per Capita	873	1.78	0.66	1.01	1.22	1.55	2.13	3.66
Trust	910	8.05	1.67	0	7	8	9	10
Fairness	913	4.26	0.73	1	4	4	5	5
Value Congruence	905	4.05	0.78	1	4	4	5	5

Note: Affluence and Budget Per Capita are in millions of Korean Won (KRW)

This study focuses on the association between the independent variables and the performance of SSCBs. There is no available measure of co-production performance for SSCBs at this time. Therefore, in lieu of a standardized measure of performance, the dependent variable on the co-production performance of SSCBs is measured by the perceived capability of SSCBs reported by SSCB participants. The survey asked participants to assess the statement: “The SSCB is capable of effectively addressing community social security issues.” The dependent variable was measured on a five-point Likert scale of ‘Strongly Disagree’, ‘Disagree’, ‘Neutral’, ‘Agree’, and ‘Strongly Agree.’ The responses were collapsed into an ordinal variable with three distinct levels of ‘Negative’, ‘Neutral’, and ‘Positive’ for this analysis. This is to address the skewness of the data where few responded that they ‘Strongly Disagree’ or ‘Disagree’ with the statement. Collapsing the levels addresses sparseness in lower levels and adds statistical power to the models (Chuang et al., 2020). Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the dependent variable.

Figure 2. Dependent Variable Distribution: Assessment of the Statement ‘The SSCB is capable of effectively addressing community social security issues.’



Ordinal logistic regression models were fitted given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. The model is flexible to leverage information provided by the ordinal response categories created by Likert scales that would be lost if treated as a continuous variable (Agresti, 2010). The “polr” function in the MASS package in R was used to fit the models. The model is based on proportional odds assumptions and estimates cumulative probabilities of being in a higher response level relative to the levels below for a latent response variable that is constructed from the ordinal dependent variable we observe (Barrows et al., 2016). The proportional odds assumption, which assumes that the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable is linear across all levels, is central to ensuring the validity of these models (Brant, 1990). The Brant test was conducted to confirm that assumptions of proportional odds were met. Results of the Brant test show

that the proportional odds assumptions are met as the test statistics are insignificant (see Appendix 2).

5. Results

The model outputs show that internally developed process dynamics are significantly associated with the probability of a more positive assessment of the capability of SSCBs to effectively address community social security issues. The outcomes of two proportional odds models are presented in Table 4. Model 1 is the reduced model which only tests for independent variables capturing external and internal drives of co-production. Model 2 is the full model which includes jurisdiction-level and individual-level control variables. Population size and the level of service demand, measured by the number of households receiving basic livelihood support, are controlled for at the jurisdiction level. Characteristics of survey respondents including their sector, number of months served on the SSCB, education level, age group, and gender are controlled for at the individual level. The MASS package derives estimates in terms of log odds. However, intuitive interpretations of log odds beyond the effect sign (positive or negative) and statistical significance are limited. Therefore, Table 4 presents the coefficients in terms of odds ratios along with the confidence intervals.

Table 4. Drivers of Co-production on the Perceived Capability of SSCBs

Predictors	Capability		Capability	
	Odds Ratios	CI	Odds Ratios	CI
Affluence	0.99	0.96 – 1.01	1.00	0.97 – 1.03
Budget Per Capita	1.03	0.69 – 1.57	1.20	0.67 – 2.21
Trust	1.33 ***	1.15 – 1.55	1.33 ***	1.14 – 1.55
Fairness	3.09 ***	2.12 – 4.56	3.11 ***	2.10 – 4.67
Value Congruence	3.58 ***	2.60 – 4.99	3.72 ***	2.66 – 5.26
Population			1.00	1.00 – 1.00
Service Demand			1.01	1.00 – 1.02
Sector [private]			1.45	0.36 – 6.14
Sector [nonprofit]			1.58	0.60 – 3.78
Sector [public]			1.42	0.50 – 3.74
Months Served			1.00	1.00 – 1.01
Education [bachelors degree]			0.96	0.45 – 1.95
Education [graduate degree]			0.77	0.36 – 1.60
Education [highschool or less]			0.74	0.21 – 2.80
Age Group [mid_career]			0.80	0.45 – 1.41
Age Group [late_career]			0.92	0.36 – 2.51
Gender [male]			0.62 *	0.41 – 0.96
Observations		854		811
R ² Nagelkerke		0.531		0.568
AIC		698.650		692.656

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Model results show that all three variables capturing internally developed process dynamics are significantly and positively associated with a higher probability of positively assessing the capability of SSCBs. Those with higher levels of trust are about 33% more likely to positively assess the capability of SSCBs according to both Model 1 and Model 2. This confirms former studies that associate trust with positive performance in co-production. Positive perceptions of procedural fairness and transparency are also significantly associated with a higher probability of positively assessing the capability of SSCBs. Participants with a more positive perception of procedural fairness and transparency are over three times more likely to positively assess the capability of SSCBs. Participants with higher perceptions of value congruence with SSCBs are also over three and a half times more likely to positively assess the capability of SSCBs in addressing community social security issues. Perceptions of procedural fairness and transparency and value congruence appear to have a much stronger impact on the outcome variable relative to levels of trust.

In contrast to the theoretical suggestion that co-production will perform better in more affluent neighborhoods with higher social welfare budgets, there is no significant association between the two variables and perceived capability. Therefore, this study concludes there is no significant association between any of the local resource capacity variables and perceived co-production performance in the context of SSCBs.

Last but not least, the impact of gender is also significant, with male participants being about 38% less likely to assess the capability of SSCBs positively relative to female participants. Other individual characteristics including sector and age group have no

significance on the dependent variable. There is also no association between the dependent variable and jurisdiction-level controls including population size and the level of service demand.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

The motivation of this study is to understand the implications of public service co-production for place-based inequity. Using survey data from SSCB participants who partake in the co-production of community-based social security services, this study tests whether externally determined resource capacities or internally developed process dynamics are stronger drivers of co-production performance. Local resource capacities are fixed, contextual conditions of co-production that are externally predetermined. Addressing resource disparities requires structural change at the grander level. If co-production performance is driven solely by local resource capacities, co-production may inadvertently aggravate if not perpetuate place-based inequity despite having other positive functions as a mode of service delivery. This is because disparities in local resource capacities will put jurisdictions with greater resource capacities in better positions to co-produce higher quality and quantities of public services. Co-production will likely reproduce inequities in access to services across more and less resourceful areas in such a scenario.

However, this study finds evidence that internally developed process dynamics are relatively stronger drivers of co-production performance in the context of SSCBs. Co-production performance is associated with all variables capturing internally developed

process dynamics including levels of trust, procedural fairness and transparency, and value congruence. Externally determined resource capacities did not have a robust association.

The finding suggests that jurisdictions can co-produce services that derive similar levels of satisfaction regardless of local resource capacities. This is meaningful in thinking about the equity implications of co-production in public management. Disparities in local resources are considered causes of disparities in services delivered through co-production (Jakobsen & Andersen, 2013; Rich, 1979; Sundeen, 1988), but this finding suggests that co-production, when managed properly, can serve as a workaround strategy to deliver services in ways that alleviate place-based inequity arising from resource disparities. Through these implications, this study contributes to addressing the empirical gap in understanding the equity implications of co-production.

Another implication is the emphasis on the need for greater managerial capacity for co-production. By emphasizing the importance of the internal dynamics of co-production, the findings of this study put more weight on the role of public management in ensuring co-production functions as a mechanism to address place-based inequity. The study identifies several drivers of co-production that public managers can leverage to enhance the performance of co-production. Trust, procedural fairness and transparency, and value congruence are procedurally important drivers that can be leveraged by public managers in delivering public services. This confirms former research that points to the importance of managerial capacity fostering equity in co-production (Cepiku & Mastrodascio, 2021). The findings also connect with the ongoing research on policy design suggesting that co-production arrangements should be purposefully designed to enhance trust, ensure

procedural fairness and transparency, and foster congruence between the goals and mission of the co-production arrangement and its participants.

Co-production is widely endorsed as an innovative public management strategy to deliver public services. In fact, the co-production of public services may be challenging traditional modes of service delivery that are driven by single bureaucracies as evidenced by the statement that “[t]here is much agreement that monopolistic provision entirely through state agencies is unfeasible, undesirable, or simply rather old fashioned” (Joshi & Moore, 2004, p. 31). This study offers meaningful implications that can be generalized to public service co-production arrangements that operate within polycentric systems. SSCBs represent a case of both vertical and horizontal decentralization where local participants as well as non-state participants are delegated greater authority to create and deliver public services (Cepiku & Mastrodascio, 2021). Such structure is commonly observed in service delivery arrangements across various policy domains and country settings as illustrated by Workforce Development Boards in the United States, the New Socialist Countryside Initiative in China, and Regional Development Australia Committees in Australia to name a few. As considerations of social equity are also universal and relevant to all such forms of service delivery, the findings of this study offer broadly transferable implications for public managers that facilitate co-productive arrangements. Further, South Korea is a liberal democracy with a history of rapid-economic development that is heavily influenced by Western powers, but at the same time a country where the government holds strong centralized powers. This allows findings from the context of SSCBs to offer implications that appeal broadly to both Western and non-Western contexts.

The study has several limitations. First, the study uses self-reported perceptions of the capability of SSCBs to effectively address community social security issues as a measure of co-production performance. However, the measure is a subjective assessment of SSCB performance by the participants. This measure provides insight into SSCB performance, but studies that employ more objective measures of co-production performance will be necessary to validate the findings of the study. This leads us to the issue that there is no consensus on what successful co-production entails. How the performance of co-production should be defined, measured, and evaluated remains an outstanding question that must be addressed to develop more valid measures. Another limitation arises from the fact that the survey was conducted during the pandemic. There have been disruptions to SSCB operations due to COVID-19 such as restrictions on in-person meetings and service delivery activities. Such operational disruptions may impact perceptions of performance as well as measures of process dynamics.

How public service delivery, in particular the co-production of public services, interacts with equity remains conceptually, theoretically, and empirically unclear in the study of public administration and management (Cepiku & Mastrodascio, 2021). Particularly, there have been mixed theoretical implications regarding whether co-production reproduces or alleviates place-based inequity. This study empirically contributes to the debate by presenting evidence that internal procedural dynamics fostered by proper management may be more central to co-production performance than local resource capacities.

This study addresses an important question, but there is outstanding research to be completed to fully understand the equity implications of co-production. Equity is a multidimensional concept. Social equity is defined in relation to various group identities as it addresses fair and just allocations of benefits and costs between distinct groups in our society (Guy & McCandless, 2012). While place-based equity is closely related to other dimensions of equity that arise from factors such as gender, age, and socioeconomic status, co-production may have unique implications in understanding other forms of equity including gender equity, intergenerational equity, procedural equity, distributional equity, and so on. More studies should contribute to a comprehensive understanding of co-production and social equity by exploring such various dimensions of equity. Further, moving beyond a simple analysis of whether or not co-production can serve as a managerial strategy to address inequity, future studies should build upon the findings of this study to explore in greater depth what drivers are more or less associated with equitable co-production. This will offer important insights into how public managers should design co-production arrangements. Foundational to this research, we must also dedicate greater attention to defining, measuring, and evaluating co-production performance in ways that incorporate pillars of public administration including social equity.

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Appendix IV-1. Model Outputs on the Perceived Capability of SSCBs Using Randomly Sampled Data Only

Predictors	Capability		Capability	
	Odds Ratios	CI	Odds Ratios	CI
Affluence	0.99	0.97 – 1.02	1.00	0.97 – 1.03
Budget Per Capita	1.08	0.71 – 1.68	1.21	0.66 – 2.25
Trust	1.33 ***	1.14 – 1.55	1.32 ***	1.13 – 1.56
Fairness	3.09 ***	2.07 – 4.65	3.10 ***	2.05 – 4.73
Value Congruence	3.53 ***	2.53 – 4.98	3.67 ***	2.59 – 5.28
Population			1.00	1.00 – 1.00
Service Demand			1.01	1.00 – 1.02
Sector [private]			1.40	0.34 – 6.05
Sector [nonprofit]			1.70	0.64 – 4.14
Sector [public]			1.72	0.59 – 4.66
Months Served			1.01	1.00 – 1.01
Education [bachelors degree]			0.95	0.44 – 1.99
Education [graduate degree]			0.80	0.36 – 1.71
Education [highschool or less]			1.00	0.25 – 4.14
Age Group [mid_career]			0.73	0.39 – 1.33
Age Group [late_career]			0.68	0.26 – 1.90
Gender [male]			0.65	0.41 – 1.01
Observations		770		733
R ² Nagelkerke		0.521		0.558
AIC		643.628		640.409

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix VI -2. Brant Test for Proportional Odds Assumption

Test for	X2	df	probability
Omnibus	14.03	17	0.66
Affluence	0.87	1	0.35
Budget_Per_Capita	1.05	1	0.31
Trust	0.09	1	0.76
Fairness	2.83	1	0.09
Value_Congruence	2.57	1	0.11
Population	0.13	1	0.72
Service_Demand	1.16	1	0.28
Sector[private]	1.7	1	0.19
Sector[nonprofit]	1.88	1	0.17
Sector[public]	3.23	1	0.07
Months_Served	0.04	1	0.85
Education[bachelors degree]	0.07	1	0.79
Education[graduate degree]	0.35	1	0.55
Education[highschool or less]	0.07	1	0.8
Age_Group[mid_career]	3.81	1	0.05
Age_Group[late_career]	3.13	1	0.08
Gender[male]	0.07	1	0.79

V. CONCLUSION

Contributing to theory building that accounts for the variation across different types of collaborative governance arrangements, the three essays of this dissertation add depth to our knowledge of a particular type of collaborative governance that is government-led. Empirical findings from each essay answer important questions that can manifest as potential risks of government-led collaborative governance.

By applying a repeated measures design, the first essay finds evidence that by participating in government-led collaborative governance, participants develop trust at both the organizational and individual levels. This speaks to the ability of government platforms to initiate authentic collaboration that can perform as a means of service delivery. The second essay finds evidence that government-led collaborative governance generates policy feedback effects. Participants experienced changes in civic capacities as well as civic dispositions, which expanded their participation in venues beyond the government-led collaborative governance arrangement. This suggests that government-led collaboration may generate civic capacities that overflow to other participatory venues, contributing to the health of civic societies. The last essay explores how government-led collaborative governance functions as a co-production arrangement for regional social services, and finds that proper management of such arrangements can mitigate place-based inequities in access to services.

Collectively, the essays address the most prevalent challenges to modern democracy including the erosion of trust in the government, dwindling civic participation, and

increasing inequities that divide our societies, highlighting the promises of government-led collaborative governance as a public management strategy to be used by governments. For practitioners, the essays highlight how potential risks associated with government-led collaborative governance can work as opportunities to build trust, promote civic participation, and bridge inequities in access to services. Most importantly, the essays collectively emphasize the role of management in how government-led collaborative governance arrangements can be designed and facilitated to realize such opportunities.

For public management scholarship, the dissertation makes several theoretical and methodological contributions. First, the dissertation calls for more nuanced theory development that accounts for the variation in the types of arrangements labeled collaborative governance and contributes a step in such direction. Second, the dissertation makes methodological innovations to consider how collaborative governance dynamics evolve over time. While the repeated measures survey only tracks one collaborative dynamic, trust, over a limited observational window, this dissertation showcases a methodological approach to which public management literature can build robust datasets that account for time. Last but not least, the dissertation adds diversity to the collaborative governance literature by focusing on data from the social policy domain in South Korea. We must continue to include studies that test how existing theories apply to and can be complemented by non-Western contexts, and this dissertation pulls from a unique empirical domain to do so. Building upon these contributions, future research on collaborative governance should continue to advance theory on how different types of

collaborative governance arrangements are initiated and evolve over time, based on evidence from diverse policy and country domains.