REECAS NEWSLETTER

Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies Center

JACKSON SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON SPRING 2001

Remembering Chornobyl

The Fallout that Changed a Society and Ruined a System

BY MIKHAIL A. MOLCHANOV

Outside reactor at Chornobyl

On April 26, 1986, I was digging in my friend's garden on the outskirts of one of the beautiful towns north of Kyiv. A small group of friends had gathered there to celebrate the final coming of spring with plenty of homemade wine and a never-ending stream of Ukrainian songs. The day was unseasonably warm, and we were looking forward to some time outdoors.

I had planned to stay through the weekend at my friend's rural residence, but I cut it short and departed the next day after I started coughing and sneezing in the morning. What made my illness unusual was the total absence of fever. I took a bus to my home city of Rovno (about 330 km west of Kyiv), and while on the bus I learned of the Chornobyl catastrophe. Though the official media had been silent, the grapevine was up-to-date. Too bad I dismissed it then as just another "babushka" rumor and returned to Kyiv as soon as I felt better, on May 3 or 4.

By that time, Kyiv had already seen an infamous May Day demonstration, complete with red-cheeked girls in traditional Ukrainian dresses waving to the Party bosses supervising the event.

Meanwhile, the children of the Party bosses had been hastily relocated to resorts in the remote areas of the country. My roommate, a sloppy chap who was less than cooperative in household chores, and who happened to be a nuclear physicist, had voluntarily taken it upon himself to wash the floor three times a day. He also insisted that the window remain closed at all times. When I asked why, he uttered "Chornobyl." "Is it that serious?" My naïve belief in the human ability to control everything and anything, which many Soviets shared, was still largely undeterred. Then in a dull voice, as if lecturing an idiot—which I apparently was in his eyes—he told me some facts that were not to be found anywhere in the media. For me, that was the day when Chornobyl ceased to be routine news and presented its true meaning as a landmark sign separating rosy hopes of the past from ugly certainties of the future.

For the Soviet system and the way of life that sustained it, Chornobyl became in a very real sense an omen of the end-of-days. The flow of time suddenly transcended the payday schedule, and one's personal time horizon was no longer shaped by career and family goals. Now, benchmarks were set by the half-life of strontium, forcing ordinary people to adopt a centennial scale of thinking. As Western "voices" stepped in to fill the information vacuum and people learned of contamination in Great Britain and Scandinavia, the boundaries between "us" and "them" ceased to exist. Chornobyl's clouds melted the Iron Curtain in Europe, organizing geographic space in checkered patterns of higher and lower radioactive risk well before the first ray

continued on page 2

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

continued from page 1

of "new thinking" entered the patterned head of the reformist General Secretary Gorbachev. In neo-medieval fashion, the world of the Soviets had acquired a distinctively concentric shape—with all distances being measured in radial lengths from Chornobyl. The other-worldly "zone" invented by the Strugatsky brothers in one of their sci-fi stories entered the everyday lexicon.

With radioactive fallout about 200 times that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined, Chornobyl and its aftermath vividly demonstrated the organizational incapacity of the Soviet system, and its blunt disregard for the people whose labor it purported to represent. In hindsight, May Day 1986 was the Soviet Man's funeral procession. From the ashes, an ecological movement was born, contributing to the rise of a unified anti-Communist front by late 1988. The environmental agenda focused amorphous feelings of dissatisfaction, and it mobilized those whose latent dissent had had little opportunity to come out into the open under ordinary circumstances. The establishment was ill-prepared to counter this sort of public criticism, which soon expanded to cover the previously untouchable topics of governance and accountability. As people demanded full disclosure of the circumstances that led to the catastrophe, democratic control of the government ceased to be an abstract principle and became a necessity.

Chornobyl invalidated the Party's claim to legitimacy and paved the way for the fall of the Berlin Wall, the departure of the Baltic states from the USSR, the failure of the August putsch and, eventually, the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is hard to overestimate the disaster's significance as a motor of radical social change. In post-Chornobyl society, the idea of individual survival has eclipsed the last vestiges of collective loyalty, whatever the object of that loyalty might be. Henceforth, nationalism can not command blind popular affection. Henceforth, 'survival of the fittest' guides higher politics. Henceforth, there may be periodic outbursts of anger, but no further revolution. ◆

Mikhail A. Molchanov teaches Soviet and Russian foreign policy at the University of Victoria, British Columbia.

The Consequences of Chornobyl: Two Research Projects

A HISTORY OF THE CHORNOBYL SHELTER PROJECT

BY DENNIS KREID

The Chornobyl Unit 4 reactor was destroyed in a massive steam explosion on April 26, 1986. The accident occurred as an unforeseen consequence of experiments gone horribly wrong. The explosion and subsequent fires resulted in about 30 immediate deaths, severely contaminated large areas of Ukraine and Belarus, and spread radioactive contamination worldwide. During the following six months, a "shelter" was hastily constructed in order to isolate and protect the ruins of the reactor and contain the contamination. The shelter was a heroic accomplishment under such terrible conditions, but it was never intended to be a permanent solution. It is deteriorating, unstable, and in danger of collapse, posing a potential threat to workers and the environment.

From 1992-95, international teams of experts studied proposals for repairing or replacing the shelter, but they did not identify a suitable solution. Continuing safety problems led the international community to call for the permanent closure of the Chornobyl plants. In December 1995, the Ukrainian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the G-7 countries to close down the Chornobyl plant by the year 2000, in return for financial help to fix the shelter, improve worker safety, compensate for the lost energy production, and alleviate the socioeconomic impact of the plant closure. The government fulfilled its commitment in the MOU by shutting down the last operating Chornobyl reactor on Dec.15, 2000.

International studies funded by the G-7 nations in 1996-97 led to the development of the "Shelter Implementation Plan" (SIP). A team of DOE national laboratory and US industry experts led by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory worked in collaboration with experts from the European Union and Ukraine to complete studies that led to the SIP. The SIP defines a strategy and process for stabilization and replacement of the shelter to prevent and mitigate the consequences of potential collapse, protect workers, and prevent further contamination.

The G-7 and Ukraine selected the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to serve as the financial manager for the SIP project. In early 1998, the EBRD competitively tendered a contract for a Western consultant to support the Ukrainian-led Program Management Unit (PMU), which manages the SIP Project. The PMU consultant contract was awarded in April 1998 to a team led by Bechtel and including Battelle Memorial Institute and Electricité de France. Over the following six months, the PMU awarded contracts for four "Early Biddable Projects" (EBPs) for the development of decision documents and conceptual designs.

The consultant contract was renewed in July 2000, and the EBPs were essentially completed by December 2000. Resolution of key decisions on shelter design and waste management, which will establish the course for the SIP Project, is currently pending. Next on the agenda is the hiring of engineering and procurement contractors, who will place and manage contracts for the actual construction work. ◆

Dennis Kreid is a Senior Project Manager with Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

SCREENING, REFERRAL, AND TREATMENT OF PSYCHOSOCIAL ABNORMALITIES IN CHILDREN AFTER THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT

BY MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN AND OTHERS

Several studies have shown an increase in psychosocial problems among children exposed to radiation after the Chornobyl disaster. There is also scientific speculation about whether psychosocial disorders are an additional risk factor for thyroid abnormalities. For these reasons, a holistic public health/medical/psychosocial approach was chosen to screen and treat children exposed to radioactive iodine after the nuclear disaster.

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Patient at Ukrainian National Center for Radiation Medicine, Kyiv.

Funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) through a mandate from the US Congress, the Chornobyl Childhood Illness Program (CCIP) was designed to help Ukrainian psychologists and health-care providers to detect and manage the treatment of clinical depression, chronic stress, and thyroid pathology among adolescents who were less than 6 years of age at the time of the disaster. CCIP created four mobile teams to undertake the screening in the most contaminated parts of Volyn, Rivne, Zhytomyr and Cherkassy oblasts. Each team consists of three psychologists, one physician ultrasonographer, and a driver/computer operator.

The CCIP's psychosocial component includes administration of the Children's Depression Inventory (the CDI was translated into Ukrainian and validated in Ukraine by CCIP); individual interviews after CDI testing; crisis intervention for children with more severe depression, including suicidal ideation; referral of children with psychosocial abnormalities; and training programs for local psychosocial specialists and community leaders. By January 2001, CCIP had conducted 23 training events attended by 871 trainees, including psychologists, social workers, school-based practitioners, community leaders, and school physicians.

Approximately 35,000 children were screened by January 2001. Among these, an average of 15.4 % (Volyn – 14.1%; Rivne – 20.4%; Zhytomyr – 12.9%; Cherkassy – 14.2%) were identified as having emotional disorders. Of these, 16.3% had both depression and thyroid gland pathology. Suicidal trends were identified in 1.5% of those screened. Common problems faced by the children included domestic violence, low family income, parental abuse of alcohol, sexual abuse, lack of social protection in a society affected by the Chornobyl disaster, and the children's fear for their own and their families' future. Psychological crisis interventions were provided to 16.5% of all those screened.

Data about the prevalence of depression among children and teenagers in different populations vary. Western researchers estimate the incidence of teenage major depression at between 5-7%[1]. Among children from the areas contaminated by Chornobyl, the incidence of neurological and psychological disorders, including depression and anxiety, was as high as 50%[2]. Our data are consistent with the screening data collected among school teenagers by Russian researchers: depression in 11% of children in regular school, and in 19% of students from schools for children with social maladaptation[3].

Despite the fact that there are so many children who require psychosocial assistance, there are very few specialists to provide care in remote, contaminated areas of Ukraine. While CCIP has developed a network to assist those children, more will have to be done by the Ukrainian government, international government programs, NGOs, and other groups in the future. ◆

Michael Christensen worked for three years as International Coordinator for World Vision's Children of Chernobyl Project in Gomel, Belarus. Currently he is Project Manager and Senior Consultant of the psychosocial component of the Chernobyl Childhood Illness Recovery Project funded by USAID. Director of the Doctor of Ministry Program at Drew University, he is also the author of *Children of Chernobyl: Raising Hope from the Ashes.*

1 Marcelli D. (1998) "Depression de l'adolescent. Perspectives Psy";Vol. 37, 4, p. 241-248. In *Review of Contemporary Psychiatry*, no. 7(3), 2000.

2 Yakovenko S. (1996) *Human Psychology under Radioecological Disaster Conditions*, p.108.

3 Iovchuk N. and Batygina G. (1998) "Prevalence and Clinical Manifestation of Depression in School Juvenile Population," *Journal of Neurology and Psychiatry* named after Korsakov, no. 9, p. 33-36.

ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION

CHORNOBYL: 15 YEARS LATER

Thursday, April 26, 7 pm

KANE HALL ROOM 210, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE

A free roundtable discussion marking the anniversary of the nuclear accident.
An exhibition of related artwork will follow in the Walker-Ames Room.

FEATURING:

Michael J. Christensen, *Chernobyl Childhood Illness Recovery Project*
Dennis Kreid, *Pacific Northwest National Laboratory*
Mikhail A. Molchanov, *University of Victoria, British Columbia*

Moderated by Herbert J. Ellison, UW Professor of History and International Studies.
For more information please call 206-543-4852 or e-mail *reecas@u.washington.edu.*

Sponsors: REECAS/JSIS, the UW Institute for Global and Regional Security Studies, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the UW Ukrainian Studies Endowment Committee, and the UW Program on the Environment.

REECAS SPRING QUARTER EVENTS

MARCH 28: International Update Dinner-Lecture
"The Coming Collapse of Russian Education? Demographics and the Fate of Schooling in the Former Soviet Union," Stephen T. Kerr, Professor of Education, UW, 5:30–8:00 p.m., Walker-Ames Room, Kane Hall; see p. 22 for more information.

APRIL 5: Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Resolution
"When Genocide? Interpretations of the Causes and Timing of the Armenian Genocide," Ronald Grigor Suny, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, 3:30 p.m., Parrington Hall Forum (309).

APRIL 6: REECAS Seminar
"Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations in the Post-Soviet Region," Ronald Grigor Suny, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, 3:30–5:00 p.m., Thomson Hall Room 317.

APRIL 12: Putin and the New Russian Foreign Policy
"Russia's Relations with Eastern Europe and the Baltic States: A New Divide in Europe?" Mark Kramer, Director, Harvard Project on Cold War Studies, Harvard University, 7:30 p.m., Kane Hall Room 210.

APRIL 14: REECAS-NW Conference
Seventh Annual Northwest Regional Conference for Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, 9:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m., Evergreen State College, Olympia; see p. 30 for more information.

APRIL 26: Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Resolution
"Ethnic Mobilization without Prerequisites: The East European Gypsies," Zoltan D. Barany, University of Texas at Austin, 3:30 p.m., Parrington Hall Forum (309).

APRIL 26: Chornobyl – 15 Years Later
A roundtable discussion on the anniversary of the nuclear accident, 7:00 p.m., Kane Hall Room 210; see p. 3 for more information.

APRIL 28: Children's Festival Mosaic
A workshop for teachers, grades K-8, Thomson Hall. Presentations include "East European Roma Culture." see p. 22 for more information.

APRIL 28: Northwest Working Group for Russian History and Culture
Annual meeting, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

MAY 2: REECAS Seminar
"International Institutions and Human Rights in Post-Soviet Ukraine," Jeffrey T. Checkel, Research Professor, ARENA, University of Oslo, 3:30–5:00 p.m., Thomson Hall Room 317.

MAY 3: Putin and the New Russian Foreign Policy
"Russia's Road to a Market Economy under Putin," Anders Aslund, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7:30 p.m., Kane Hall Room 210.

MAY 10: Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Resolution
"Willing Europeans: Preventing Ethno-National Conflict in Macedonia," Anastasia Karakasidou, Wellesley College, 3:30 p.m., Parrington Hall Forum (309).

MAY 10: Putin and the New Russian Foreign Policy
"Putin's Nature: A Cautionary Fable," Steven Solnick, Associate Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, 7:30 p.m., Kane Hall Room 210.

MAY 16: Putin and the New Russian Foreign Policy
"Putin as the Un-Yeltsin: A Sea Change in Russian Foreign Policy" Strobe Talbott, Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, 6:30 p.m., Kane Hall Room 120.

MAY 24: Putin and the New Russian Foreign Policy
"Russia's Unfinished Revolution: The Protracted Transition from Communism to Democracy," Michael A. McFaul, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7:30 p.m., Kane Hall Room 210.

MAY 24: Theodore Roethke Memorial Poetry Reading
Tomaž Šalamun, Slovenian poet, 8:00 p.m., Roethke Auditorium (Kane Hall Room 130). Sponsored by the Department of English.

JUNE 2: Northern Dreams – Art, Life and Environment in the Far North
A "mosaic" workshop for educators, grades K-8, 8:30 a.m. – 4:30 p.m.; see p. 22 for more information.

JUNE 27–29: Spiritual Spaces around the World
Summer seminar for educators, grades 7–12. Presenters include REECAS faculty member Glennys Young; see p. 27 for more information.

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COMMENTARY

Searching for Consistency in US-Russian Relations

BY STEPHEN E. HANSON

The elections in 2000 of Vladimir V. Putin and George W. Bush have marked a fundamental change in the dynamics of relations between Russia and the United States. The early post-communist conception of a US-Russian "partnership," publicly embraced by both Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton, has been replaced in both countries with a wary emphasis on defending the national interest. Meanwhile, serious disputes on a wide range of issues—including US plans to build a national missile defense, Russian conduct in Chechnya, conflicting pipeline plans for energy exports from the Caspian basin, contested arms sales to regional powers in Asia and the Middle East, and the prospect of NATO expansion to the Baltic States—make the future of US-Russian relations even more uncertain. Will the new foreign policy pragmatism of the 1990's help to resolve such issues and place relations between the two countries on a sounder footing? Or will escalating tensions lead to a new Cold War only a decade after the end of the first?

As the 21st century begins, most analysts now accept that the process of integrating post-Soviet Russia into the global liberal capitalist order will take several decades, not years or months, as optimists on both sides initially believed. Indeed, many of the important foreign policy advisors to Putin and Bush have spent the last decade criticizing Russian "Westernizers" and American "liberal internationalists" on precisely these grounds, pointing out that unrealistic promises of immediate transformation in Russia, if unfulfilled, were likely to have negative long-term effects on Russia's integration into the global system. Thus, in both countries, foreign policy "realists" now feel vindicated, and are determined to shed the "romantic illusions" of their liberal predecessors.

Ironically, however, the collapse of the notion of a US-Russian foreign policy "partnership" may have occurred precisely when building a mutually acceptable framework for stable relations between the two countries has actually become feasible. Certainly, both sides continue to maintain public support for continued US-Russian cooperation in areas of common interest, such as reinforcing control over weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, negotiations on such issues as the conditions for Russia's accession to the WTO, the scheduling of Russian payment of Soviet-era debt to the Paris Club, the status of Soviet-era bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties, and Russian relations with NATO and the EU are only now reaching their critical stages. Putin and Bush, with their reputations for foreign policy conservatism, are arguably more likely than their predecessors to convince their respective legislatures to approve controversial international agreements. In short, current prospects for long-lasting agreements between Russia and the United States on a whole series of crucial political, economic, and military questions are actually a bit more favorable than might be assumed on the basis of skeptical contemporary foreign policy rhetoric.

In order to avoid a costly break in US-Russian relations, then, foreign policy elites in both the Putin and Bush administrations should simply try to remain consistent with their own earlier, more realistic analyses of the likely course of Russia's reconciliation with the West—namely, that this process will be lengthy and complex, requiring constant communication and negotiation, rather than quick and relatively painless. Foregoing unrealistic hopes for immediate international integration, but focusing on their genuine shared desire to avoid a return to open confrontation, both countries may be able to find ways to accommodate each other's vital national interests without sacrificing key national principles. The danger, however, is that a rather different argument will win out in Moscow and Washington, DC: that Russia and America represent implacably opposed "civilizations" destined for perpetual conflict. This position—initially embraced only by nationalist extremists such as Gennady Zyuganov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, David Duke, and Pat Buchanan—has recently become a mainstream position in international relations theory in both countries. Unfortunately, the adoption of an inevitable "clash of civilizations" as a paradigm for foreign policymaking—at such a pivotal moment in US-Russian relations—will almost surely prove a self-fulfilling prophecy. ◆

Stephen Hanson is the Director and Chair of the REECAS Center and Program, and Associate Professor of Political Science.

Establishing the Rule of Law in Kosovo: *The UN Mission*

BY F.M. LORENZ

During the past ten years, the former Yugoslavia has been the site of the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. The war in Bosnia came to an end in 1995 with US leadership, and US troops continue to serve as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission. But resolving the conflict in Kosovo, the historic Serb heartland, has proven even more difficult. Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia until 1989, when President Milošević revoked that status. In 1999, when the Serbs began to suppress and later "cleanse" the Albanian majority, a humanitarian catastrophe was at hand. NATO military action in March 1999 led to the withdrawal of Serb forces and the establishment of a United Nations (UN) civil administration.

News reports from Kosovo seem to be consistently negative. Despite the presence of NATO military forces, ethnic violence continues, this time against the Serb minority. The tables have been turned, and the Albanian victims have become the oppressors. The UN Civil Administration is struggling to establish the rule of law; after eighteen months the courts are barely functioning, and there is serious doubt that a Serb can get a fair trial in a court system that is essentially Albanian. I spent the first five months of the year 2000 as a United Nations (UN) legal advisor in Kosovo, and was able to see the challenges first hand.

In January 2000, I was assigned as one of twelve civilian attorneys to the UN headquarters Legal Affairs Office in Pristina, Kosovo. The other attorneys came from India, the United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark, France, Australia, and Russia, as well as the United States. Most had experience with other UN field missions. One of the important functions of the office was drafting regulations for the signature of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Lawyers in Kosovo are essentially building the government brick by brick, a classic example of nation building at the most basic level.

The UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is unique, in terms of the scope of authority and the complexity of the task. This is the first time that the United Nations has been given full executive authority to run a "transitional administration" with all civil powers, including government, courts, police, transportation, finances, and infrastructure. The NATO military force (KFOR) provides the security presence, on equal footing with the civil administration. Other international organizations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), are serving as the "pillars" of the mission. Some overlap in responsibilities exists, and coordination has often been difficult, both within the UN mission and with outside agencies. During the day, the streets of Pristina are jammed with hundreds of new four-wheel drive vehicles, owned by the UN and other international organizations. The 200 non-governmental organizations (NGO's) registered in Kosovo present a bewildering series of names and acronyms: CARE, MSF, DOW, GOAL, ICRC, etc.

Adequate law enforcement is an essential component in establishing security, and courts cannot function properly without it. This is particularly true in Kosovo, where the threat of violence and other forms of intimidation for court person-

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Belgian solder guarding one of the "Three Towers" in Mitrovica, March 2000

nel run high. Since no functioning local police force exists in Kosovo, UNMIK introduced international civilian police (CIVPOL) drawn from many different countries. The Secretary-General originally recommended to the Security Council that 6,000 CIVPOL be authorized, but only 4, 718 were approved. In February 2000, there were only 2,123 CIVPOL in Kosovo, eight months into the mission. Despite repeated requests, the international community has not provided sufficient numbers of qualified police. The result is an atmosphere of lawlessness, with the UN unable to protect the minority (now primarily Serb) population. Kosovo's serious security problems feed a vicious cycle of inadequate police, lack of jail space, and a malfunctioning court system, and it is difficult to detect any progress.

Most of my time working in Pristina was devoted to the drafting of new legislation.[1] Since there is no legislature in Kosovo, the SRSG issues new laws by mandate, after conferring with local political figures. In one case, I provided advice to a UN administrator on water utility rates, a subject on which the UN had not passed regulations. The water companies were essentially unregulated. Each Regional Administrator reviewed and approved rates on a case-by-case basis. I started the first draft of a public utilities regulation based upon a copy of the Washington State Public Utilities Code. Additional problems resulted when utility bills were used to intimidate poor families or terminate service for Serb or Roma minorities. Everything in Kosovo seems to have a political and ethnic twist.

The mission in Kosovo has been more difficult than the mission in Bosnia; there are deeper divisions between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. A complicating factor in Kosovo is the mission's lack of a clearly defined political end-state. In Bosnia we have the Dayton Peace Agreement, imperfect as it is, which sets the political framework and preserves Bosnia as a sovereign state. In Kosovo, the Security Council mandate was a compromise, and Kosovo is supposed to have "substantial autonomy" within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But most Albanians in Kosovo will never accept a union with Yugoslavia, and their political agenda includes only one thing: independence. Another alternative could be partition, but that is contrary to the terms of the UN mandate and would set a dangerous precedent for the Balkans and elsewhere. Albanian emotions are high against the Serbs and other minorities, and this infects every aspect of the political process. As a result, there seems to be no middle ground, and the UN is likely to administer a protectorate, another expensive quasi-state, for a long time. The hard decisions on political status will have to be deferred, and the uncertainty colors every decision made by the UN about Kosovo.

In March 2000, I was transferred from the Office of Legal Affairs in Pristina to the Regional Legal Office in Mitrovica. My office overlooked the main bridge over the Ibar River, now the dividing line between the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. Mitrovica remains the most significant flash point for the mission, a symbol of the challenge to the international community. In Mitrovica, Kosovo, the north side of the Ibar River is for all practical purposes part of Serbia. The Yugoslav dinar is standard currency, the borders with Serbia are open to those with a Yugoslav passport, and it is possible to make a local call to Belgrade. Yugoslav officials travel freely in North Mitrovica. I lived with a host Serb family, walking across the divide every day, through the KFOR checkpoints to the UN Headquarters on the south side. This made me much more open to the plight of the remaining Kosovo Serbs, and I developed some new insight, which had not been possible in Albanian-dominated Pristina. The Kosovo Serbs, most of whom were not responsible for the war, have valid security concerns that are not being met.

Questions of environmental and land-use law presented a particular challenge. In April, I drafted documents to order the closure of illegal gas stations in Vushtrii, a small town twenty minutes south of Mitrovica. In Kosovo, individuals sit by the side of the road with large Coke bottles full of gasoline, offering them for sale to passing motorists. There were some additional, more extreme cases that required action by the UN municipal administrators when they began to threaten public health and safety. In one case, an enterprising Kosovo Albanian had destroyed the municipal guardrails, leveled property he did not own, and excavated for large underground tanks to open a gas station. It was not easy to find the applicable law, because the Yugoslav civil codes had not yet been translated into English. With the assistance of a local Serb lawyer on our staff, I drafted the cease and desist order in English, and had it translated into Albanian to be issued. The owner was ordered to stop



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Albanian children.

work and apply for a permit. Unfortunately, no one in Kosovo could then issue the permit, but law required the UN to take action. The real problem was the lack of enforcement: KFOR (the military) would not undertake these civil enforcement actions, and the UN civilian police maintained they did not have the resources. Three weeks after the "orders" that I drafted were issued in the town of Vushtrii, the illegal construction was still underway. This is typical of the problems in Kosovo; even with the broad legal authority given to UNMIK, actual regulation and enforcement seem beyond reach.

The first international judge and prosecutor in Kosovo were assigned to Mitrovica; this was required by the unique conditions in the divided city. The judge was from Sweden, and the prosecutor was an American. The courthouse was located in the northern part of the city, but no Serb judges would participate in the system. We had essentially created an Albanian court in the heart of Serb North Mitrovica. Each working day we transported 70 judges, prosecutors and support staff to and from the courthouse in a special armored convoy, with CIVPOL and KFOR escort. Our law office became the focus of the "judicial

continued on page 8

continued from page 3

security" and transportation issues for Mitrovica. We began to lay the groundwork for operating courts and could only hope that they would be free from bias. The Albanian judges are under tremendous pressure. Even if they want to be fair in cases involving Serbs, they may be under threat from Albanian extremists who harbor a desire for revenge against the Serbs.

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Damage from April 1999 NATO attack, Pristina, Kosovo.

The Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court (KWECC) now includes international judges and prosecutors. This is intended as a partial solution to the problem of creating a fair and independent court system to deal with the very serious crimes that took place in Kosovo during the past few years. The Kosovo court system is overwhelmingly Albanian, but there are many Serb defendants charged with war crimes. The International Tribunal in The Hague (ICTY) is unable to take more than a handful of cases. But the KWECC will have problems, if any lessons can be drawn from the appointments of the first international judge and prosecutor in Mitrovica. UNMIK was unable to provide adequate support, security was lacking, and the system was barely functioning one year after the beginning of the mission. Appointing international judges and prosecutors is relatively easy, but support and security will pose a more formidable problem.

There will be no real security in Kosovo without functioning courts, and the courts cannot operate without adequate security. Court decisions that are perceived as biased will inflame the situation rather than contribute to peace and security. When I was in Mitrovica, the District and Municipal Courts were in a status of "indefinite delay" at the request of the UNMIK Administration. Only minor offenses and a few small civil cases were heard. There was no commitment by KFOR (the military force) to provide adequate court security—KFOR argued that this was an UNMIK civil administration responsibility. But, again, the UNMIK Civilian Police maintained that they had insufficient resources to do the job. At times it seemed to be an impossible situation, with the danger that violence would overtake the fragile court system before it could begin to function properly.

The Kosovo UNMIK mission is very difficult; the Western democracies participated in an historic military intervention in Yugoslavia but have been unable or unwilling to follow through. The German KFOR military commander pointed out that one day of NATO bombing last year cost more than the first six months' budget to run the UN mission. Just outside my office window in Pristina I could see the huge hole caused by a cruise missile in the adjacent building—each weapon cost more than one million dollars. It will be years before the building is open and functioning. Rebuilding Kosovo will be a slow and expensive process.

The major Western powers went to war in March 1999 to reverse ethnic cleansing and protect the Albanian population. But the UN mission is still jeopardized by a lack of resources, and security has not been established. Despite these difficulties, the mission is not a failure. During the first year, more than 800,000 displaced persons were returned to Kosovo and protected from the harsh winter conditions--no small feat. There have been some recent positive developments. Kosovo's local elections last October seemed to favor the moderate party of Ibrahim Rugova, which might be seen as a rejection of the radical elements that have obstructed the creation of a tolerant, multi-ethnic Kosovo.

The landscape has changed in the Balkans in the past few months; there are high expectations in the West that the new Yugoslav president will be able to reverse the destructive course set by former President Milosevic. But we should not expect Yugoslavia and Serbia to be turned into democratic, tolerant, and peaceful societies overnight. And the changes in Belgrade may complicate the decision-making process on the future of Kosovo. President Kostunica, a constitutional lawyer, will certainly push for implementation of the Security Council Resolution that calls for an autonomous Kosovo *within* a sovereign Yugoslavia. This is anathema to most Kosovo Albanians, who seek only one objective: full independence.

The Bush administration has indicated that it will thoroughly review its Balkan policy, and some statements indicate that "nation-building" commitments will now be reduced. But a strong US presence in Bosnia and Kosovo is an essential ingredient for stability in the Balkans. The UNMIK administration is slowly piecing together the elements of a representative government in Kosovo. There are signs that the institutions are beginning to work. Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of continuation is this: There is no reasonable alternative. Without a military presence and an interim civil administration in Kosovo, there would certainly be a return to the repressive and bloody situation that existed before the intervention. ◆

Frederick Lorenz completed a 27-year career as a US Marine Corps attorney in 1998. During that time, he served in senior legal advisor positions in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope and Operation United Shield) and Bosnia (Operation Joint Endeavor). In 1998-1999, he was a Fulbright Senior Scholar in St. Petersburg, Russia, teaching courses in US Foreign Policy and International Law. He served as a United Nations legal advisor in Kosovo during the first five months of 2000, and is teaching a new course at the UW, "International Law and Conflict Resolution in the Balkans," in Spring Quarter 2001.

1 The full text of the UNMIK regulations (legislation) can be found on the UN website, *www.un.org*, under Peacekeeping, Kosovo, Regulations.

Project in Siberian Microfinance

The Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs has agreed to form a partnership with the School of Business, Department of Economics, and Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington; Irkutsk State University; and the Siberian Academy for Public Administration to develop jointly a unique curriculum, conduct innovative and applicable research, and promote professional training and outreach in the field of microfinance. This endeavor is supported by a three-year grant from the US Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and by nonprofit organizations committed to poverty alleviation and enterprise development, such as the Siberian International Microfinance Association.

Microfinance encompasses a range of small-scale financial services, including microcredit, savings, and insurance. Microcredit allows the very poor — often women — to take out small loans for self-employment projects, even though they are without financial collateral and therefore unable to borrow from conventional banks. Microcredit often employs group-lending techniques, relying on the borrower's reputation in the community to ensure repayment (using their social, rather than financial, capital). Microfinance organizations offer savings and credit programs that have the potential to generate income, encourage entrepreneurship, build social capital, and allow individuals to care for themselves and their families.

The Siberian project will include annual two-way faculty exchanges between the UW and the Siberian institutions for a minimum of 6 weeks, which will help participants develop a curriculum, teach courses, develop indicators and databases, collect resources, conduct joint research on the impact of microcredit, receive case-teaching training, and assist in evaluating the program. In addition, the project calls for two-way research-assistant exchanges: two UW students visiting Russia for a minimum of 10 weeks every year to develop case studies based on Russian microfinance efforts, provide field research support, and work collaboratively with their Russian student counterparts. One student from each Siberian institution will also visit the UW for a minimum of 10 weeks every year to collect resources for microfinance centers at their universities, provide research and case-writing support, and work collaboratively with their UW student counterparts.

The project will provide for professional outreach and field training, with a subset of the curriculum taken directly to communities wishing to initiate microfinance programs, and it will create microfinance resource centers at each institution to sustain the project beyond the grant terms. It will produce a minimum of three jointly designed modules in microcredit in the areas of Program Design, Program Management, and Program Evaluation. Approximately six case studies on microfinance in Russia and the US will be made available for use in teaching at academic institutions, with some widely available online through the Electronic Hallway™. Research will be presented to scholars, practitioners, policy makers, and donors at conferences and workshops; this will contribute to our collective knowledge about designing and managing microfinance programs, particularly in transition economies, and to a better understanding of the impact of microcredit on the economic and social conditions of the individuals, their households, and their communities.

The classic program success story is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, founded by Mohammad Yunus. It now lends to more than two million of the poor worldwide, and thousands of borrowers, primarily illiterate and extremely poor women, have become successful micro-entrepreneurs. Microcredit has less history in transition economies. The difference in Russia will be the high levels of education and training of many potential borrowers, as well as their greater mobility, and the very complex regulatory and political environment.

There are compelling reasons to promote microfinance in distressed regions of Siberia. This project is expected to result in stronger microfinance programs in economically distressed Siberian communities, which will promote market incentives, employment opportunities, entrepreneurship, social capital, and local collective action. It is hoped that the project will result in long-term partnership and collaboration opportunities between the partner institutions, contribute to greater cultural understanding between the people of the United States and Russia, and provide students and practitioners unique preparation for professional careers in the field of microfinance. ◆

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Press Freedom in the Russian Federation:

Local Media Under Trial

BY DOUGLAS CARMAN

"I do not agree with the thesis that the state is more dangerous to the media than the media is to the state. I believe quite the opposite." RUSSIAN PRESS MINISTER MIKHAIL LESIN

This quote demonstrates the Kremlin's posture toward the mass media in the Russian Federation since Vladimir Putin's election to the presidency. Much has been made of Putin's "war on the oligarchs," and his targeting of the two media magnates Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky has attracted the attention of Russian and Western observers alike. These high-stakes disputes have been covered by the major newspapers in the United States and have even inspired commentary from members of Congress and former President Clinton. The recent attempt to extradite Gusinsky from Spain in order to prosecute him for alleged financial improprieties, and the investigations of Berezovsky's investments, further demonstrate the political will of the Kremlin to persecute those who pose a threat to the Putin government. It is clear that these oligarchs have been deliberately singled out, both because of their controlling interest in two of the largest television stations and because of their vocal opposition to Putin's scheme of power consolidation. However, these men have achieved their extraordinary wealth in a very suspect manner, and they do not enjoy popular support among many Russians; some consider their defense of freedom of the press as a ruse to protect their personal interests. This charge is arguable, but it is certain that Gusinsky and Berezovsky are not virtuous champions of the right to free speech. The real victims are representatives of the local press.

Some analysts have observed that Putin's pressure on the media represents a shift from Yeltsin's explicit support of an independent press and relative tolerance of criticism. However, the task of a journalist to expose the truth and check the exploitation of power by government officials has never been an easy one in the Russian Federation. This has been particularly true for journalists and editors of the regional press. The regional press is an extremely important institution for holding local officials accountable for their actions, especially in light of the liberties many regional and oblast officials have allowed themselves, given the weak federation. Arguably, the regional press is in greater jeopardy than the national media, as it is more vulnerable to pressure from the authorities. It simply does not have the resources or the political capital to protect itself.

Opponents of the free press have at their disposal many instruments of coercion with which they can influence reporting content, or exact revenge on editors or journalists who compromise their interests. Of course, the most odious method of coercion is the threat of physical violence or murder, and there are regular reports of journalists being beaten or killed for their work. Often, regional or municipal governments that provide funds for the operation of a newspaper withdraw their support after being subjected to unfavorable coverage. Alternative methods of influencing the press are available in the courts, and the high-profile financial fraud cases of Gusinsky and Berezovsky are evidence of one way the Kremlin seeks to extort compliance with its wishes. Tax evasion and fraud cases are comparatively rare, however, as most representatives of the mass media, especially those working for regional newspapers, are not involved in enterprises of sufficient scale to be vulnerable to attacks on their financial activities.

A common instrument of pressure, employed with increasing frequency during the Yeltsin era and currently being used under Putin, is accusing journalists of libel when they publish information implicating government officials in scandals. Since defending oneself in a Russian court of law is a costly business, the state is able to impede the operations of already financially strapped newspapers and other media organizations by taking the allegedly libelous journalists and editors to court. This represents an abuse of legal procedures that is becoming increasingly common in Russian society. In the Russian Federation, exploiting the "independent" judiciary has emerged as a significant instrument of state control.

Suing the press is relatively popular in the Russian Federation, compared to other countries, and the practice has grown more pervasive over the years. According to Judge V. Knysheva of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, "since 1994, there has been a marked increase in the amount of such [libel] cases." The years 1996-1999 showed a 400% increase in the amount of cases filed: in the year 2000, there were 255. The Glasnost Defense Fund, in a study of the freedom of the Russian press, determined that approximately one out of three editorial offices of the mass media had been sued in 1997. In addition, the Fund discovered that a majority of the plaintiffs in these cases were government officials or political candidates. These numbers, of course, do not take into account the amount of self-censorship made likely by the threat of vindictive litigation. These statistics are not direct proof of abuse of the legal system to control the press, but a closer examination of libel law and its use by the authorities demonstrates an unambiguous trend of state interference with the work of journalists and freedom of information.

The increase of libel suits brought against the mass media could be explained by a number of factors connected with changes in the relationship between the state and the media since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the abandonment of direct state control of the press. For example, many journalists will admit that they tend to investigate and report on the activities of the government much more aggressively than in the Soviet era. There is also

added pressure on the media to maintain commercial viability in the free market, which creates a temptation to publish more sensational stories in order to attract readers. However, the character of many of the suits reveals an unmistakable misuse of the legal system to harass journalists. One example of a suit brought against the newspaper *Zvezda Langepasa* in Tyumen oblast is representative of many cases in the regions. The offending article was about the city administration's failure to pay wages to city employees for quite some time. The author wrote, "... enough sitting in your [the city administration] soft chairs! How long will this disgrace continue? Maybe you will go to the people, talk with them, listen to them, and finally establish order in the region?" The city public prosecutor brought a case against the newspaper and won in court.

In general legal understanding, libel is a false and defamatory statement, published by the defendant with malice or intent to defame the plaintiff. In addition, a statement must be an allegation of fact to qualify as a claim for libel: statements of opinion do not count. The case in Langepas certainly offers a provocative statement, but it does not meet the criteria for libel, as there does not appear to be any content that could be proven false. A call to action, like an opinion, cannot be the basis of a libel claim. This is just one of many examples, documented by the Glasnost Defense Fund and other organizations, of a troubling trend of government pressure on the mass media.

The peculiarities of Russian libel law put the accused in an unreasonably precarious position, and authorities familiar with this imbalance have used it to their advantage. As opposed to libel law in countries like the United States, libel in Russia is both a civil and a criminal offense. In fact, a person can be prosecuted under the criminal code and sued in a civil proceeding for the same violation. Transcripts from a December 1997 conference sponsored by the Glasnost Defense Fund, "*Chest', dostoinstvo i reputatsiya: zhurnalistika i yurisprudentsiya v konflikte (rezultaty issledovaniya i materialy konferentsii),*" reproduce dialogues on a range of topics addressing the relationship between legal institutions and the press. Some conference participants voiced their concerns about the possibility of abuse of litigation under both civil and criminal codes, and lawyer Henry Reznik suggested that the laws be modified to correspond with the "norms of libel law," by making slander only a civil violation.

In the Russian Federation, libel suits are handled very differently from other civil actions. According to Article 151 of the Civil Code and Article 43 of the law "On Mass Media," the burden of proof is on the defendant: he or she must prove the truth of the information reported. If the defendant cannot verify the truth of the information, he or she must prove that the information did not compromise the honor, dignity, or reputation of the plaintiff. Obviously, this means the defendant is considered guilty until proven innocent, which puts the plaintiff, usually a person with greater resources and influence, at quite an advantage. In the relationship between the state and its citizens, the mere fact that the citizens are deprived of the basic right of presumption of innocence gives cause for concern.

Another characteristic of libel law in Russia that puts an extreme burden on journalists in particular is that there is no statute of limitations for slander. An individual can be sued at any time after the publication of the allegedly defaming article. One might argue that it is likely that a court would not find the defendant guilty in a case where an unreasonably long period of time had passed, as the offense would be too remote to provide remedy to the plaintiff. The threat, however, remains, and a strict interpretation of the law would hold a journalist accountable for things she had written years before. It is not unreasonable to expect a court infected with the spirit of Putin's "*diktatura zakona*" (dictatorship of the law) campaign to apply this principle to the prosecution of a journalist.

Libel law in the United States has been limited by superseding concerns such as the First Amendment of the Constitution. Supreme Court decisions have raised the standards of proof of libel in the relationship between public official plaintiffs and media defendants. The public official must prove the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the statement or a "reckless disregard for the truth." It is an accepted doctrine that it is in the public interest for the media not to be subjected to pressure that would compromise its duty to inform citizens. The Constitution of the Russian Federation also contains a free speech clause, but it apparently has not been cited to enforce the right of the media to criticize the state. The failure to guarantee such basic rights is representative of the fundamental problem facing the press, and society in general. Laws are in place, but rather than governing the activity of state officials and ordinary citizens alike, these laws are exploited by the authorities to achieve their own objectives. The abuse of libel law in dealing with the media is only one example of a wider threat.

Putin's targeted attacks on the media oligarchs are part of a large-scale campaign to control the media. High-profile victims of this campaign, such as Gusinsky and Berezovsky, have received a great deal of attention from outside observers, and Putin has been criticized for his treatment of them. It is imperative, however, that we not ignore the plight of the regional press. The example the Kremlin sets by its treatment of major television stations and newspapers only encourages regional leaders to do the same. There are many instruments in place, both legal and extralegal, for disrupting the work of the press. Civic and government organizations should conduct a careful examination of such abuses in order to stop them. As libel suits become a more widespread means of controlling the press, this subject will demand further investigation. ◆

Douglas Carman is concurrently enrolled in the UW Law School and the REECAS program.

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The State of Romania

BY DANIEL CHIROT

I was in Bucharest in late October 2000, and was able to talk with some of the people involved in Ion Iliescu's presidential campaign. Romania has a political system somewhat like that of France, with a strong president and a prime minister. As in France, a candidate must win a majority of the votes to become president; if no one manages to do that in the first round, a runoff is held between the top two candidates. Polls at the end of October placed Iliescu far ahead of the pack with about 40% of the votes; three others were behind him with between 10% and 15%. These included two moderates promising to continue with liberal reforms and one extreme right-wing candidate, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, who is known for his anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic, and frankly fascist program. Tudor, as it happens, was once Nicolae Ceausescu's court poet.

Ion Iliescu, the October front-runner, had been Romania's first post-communist president from 1990 to 1996. Earlier, in the late 1960's and early 1970's, he had been a leading young communist with a very promising future. He had gathered a group of bright young technocrats around him and seemed to have Dictator Ceausescu's backing. However, Iliescu fell out of favor in 1971 and was gradually demoted to ever lower positions. By 1989, he was head of a minor publishing house and was being followed everywhere by the security police. There are unverifiable rumors that Elena Ceausescu, the dictator's wife, wanted him shot. In late December 1989, Iliescu emerged as a leader because many Party people trusted him, yet he was untainted by the corruption, abuse, and sheer incompetence of Ceausescu's last decade in power.

The overthrow of Ceausescu was in part the result of a plot by Party and army people who understood the writing on the Berlin Wall as a sign that Stalinism could not survive in Romania, and in part the result of a spontaneous outburst of anger against the growing misery and suffering of the 1980's. There were, therefore, no viable anti-communist leaders available, only former communists who had been far enough removed from power to remain relatively untouched by the regime. There was no Romanian Vaclav Havel or Vaclav Klause, no Lech Walesa, no group of well-known activist dissenters as in Hungary and Poland, and not even a Yeltsin or a Sakharov. Virtually no political organization of any kind was left standing in Romania on the Christmas day of 1989, when Ceausescu and his wife were shot. Iliescu was in some ways a Romanian version of Gorbachev. In fact, many Romanians believed that Iliescu and Gorbachev knew each other and were friends; this was untrue but helpful in 1989 and 1990, when it still seemed that Gorbachev's reforms might work.

Iliescu proved himself to be a clever politician; he gained legitimacy by holding reasonably free and fair elections and reassuring Romania that there would be gradual change toward a mixed capitalist-socialist economy, and also democratization without reprisals against those who had previously been in power. He won a full presidential term in the election of 1992.

Unfortunately, Iliescu's program fared poorly, as Romania's industrial and agricultural sectors had been devastated by communism and were grossly inefficient, unproductive, and ill-suited to any kind of market reforms. We now know that the same was true in Russia, but Iliescu was slow to see the magnitude of the problem. On top of this, he was slow to clean out the corruption in the police and among the old apparatchiki, who still held onto power in many institutions. Romania's economy, which had taken a steep fall after 1989, having declined all through the 1980's, began to recover somewhat only in 1994 and 1995. This was not good enough for the Romanian electorate, and in 1996 Iliescu lost his bid for re-election.

The president from 1996 to 2000 was Emil Constantinescu, a well-meaning former university rector with no political experience. His victory was hailed as a triumph of liberalism over the old communist Iliescu, of market reform over socialism, and as an opening to Romania's minorities. Constantinescu was backed by the more urban, more educated, and more economically advanced sectors of the population. Iliescu, on the other hand, was backed by more traditional forces: the peasants, the economically backward areas of Romania, the less educated, and the elderly.

The Constantinescu regime was a disaster from the start. It bet on being admitted to NATO and securing large amounts of Western aid and investment. Instead, NATO deemed Romania too poor and unreliable for membership; foreign investment remained minuscule compared to that received by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic; and there was not even much direct foreign aid. Further, the embargo against Yugoslavia badly hurt the economy; Romania (and Bulgaria) lost billions of dollars in trade. Whereas inflation had gradually been brought under control and economic growth had begun toward the end of Iliescu's term in office, Constantinescu oversaw an almost continuous economic decline from 1996 to 1999. Nor was he able to curb corruption: it seemed to grow even worse under his rule. A friend of mine succinctly characterized the situation by saying that, under Iliescu, many of the people in charge were former communists who had been running things before Ceausescu's fall, while under Constantinescu the ruling class consisted of former communists who had been too incompetent to run anything at all, even under Ceausescu. This is somewhat unfair, but not entirely. The Constantinescu period saw staggering incompetence at many levels.

Thus, it was not surprising that by 2000 the country was ready for Iliescu's return. Under him, things had been improving, even if slowly. The liberals, on the other hand, were badly discredited. Even at the age of 70, Iliescu was the favorite.

The first round of the election, held on November 26, was a great shock. Iliescu came in first, as expected, but the xenophobic Tudor placed a close second, with the moderates trailing far behind. It is clear that the pollsters had missed some of the electorate's fury, and their resulting willingness to turn to the far right. In fact, Romania had had Eastern Europe's most powerful fascist movement in the 1930's,

so the revival of the far right should not have come as a surprise. Most likely, pollsters missed this trend for the same reason that their counterparts in the United States often miss some of the racist sentiment when African American candidates are running. Many people are either afraid or embarrassed to admit their worst sentiments to pollsters.

In any case, the liberal forces in Romania rallied to Iliescu, and he defeated his fascist opponent by a two-fold margin, carrying all but one of Romania's 42 counties in the second round of elections on December 10.

After conversations I had with his advisors, I am somewhat optimistic about what will probably be the last Iliescu presidency. He now understands that he must continue to push for additional market reforms and finish closing the inefficient old communist factories, even at the cost of creating short-term discontent. He does not expect to run again in 2004, and because he feels he has no political debts to pay, or favor to curry, he can do what he thinks is right and not what is necessarily politically expedient. Iliescu may have been a communist at one time, but he knows that there will be no return to the past, and that he must help prepare Romania for eventual integration into the European Union. He refused to play the ultra-nationalist card during his first term in office, even though some of his advisors urged him to. He will be even less likely to try this now; in fact, in the second round of the presidential election, he received heavy support from Romanian Hungarians. Therefore, ethnic tensions will not increase during his term. All this is the positive side.

In my conversations, I emphasized the fact that Romania's tax structure is perverse and kills honest incentive. It invites corruption and capital flight, and frightens away most foreign investors, as well as potential domestic ones. The president's advisors told me he was perfectly aware of this, which remains to be seen. Many who have grown up in communist systems simply do not understand very basic market economics, nor do they fully accept the legitimacy of profit or the importance of keeping taxes low enough to avoid excessive concealment and fraud. Even if President Iliescu now understands this, many in his government who have no business experience, and who are suspicious of markets, will not.

This is Romania's general problem. The country had only one generation of real economic modernization before World War II, which was not long enough to create a sizeable body of entrepreneurs and workers familiar with how to operate in a modern market society. The few entrepreneurs who did emerge in Romania tended to be Jews, Greeks, and Germans, minorities that were killed during the war or forced to emigrate after World War II. Then came forty years of communism. Romania therefore has an appalling lack of competent personnel at every level, as does Russia, which also had only one real generation of modern industrialization before the Bolshevik revolution. There is a small, well-educated Romanian elite, but they are not enough. In the United States, most of us know how to operate in a market economy, and how to adapt to changing market conditions. In societies like Romania, few do, even those with formal schooling. President Iliescu will therefore have trouble finding good people to work for him, just as businesses in Romania have trouble finding good employees and managers. It will take three generations, at least, to overcome this problem. Iliescu will certainly further the process, but too many Romanians expect miracles from their leaders, and Romanian intellectuals who bitterly hate Iliescu because he was a former Ceausescu aide will make life difficult for him. They backed Constantinescu and are bitter about his failure. This may leave the door open for a continuing growth of far-right forces, which would be a disaster for Romania.

We can only hope that Western Europe and the United States will understand the situation and do what they can to help Iliescu, and that Romanians will be patient as they learn to develop a sound and prosperous economy. Turning to extremes will not help. Perhaps Iliescu can teach Romania that. ◆

Daniel Chirot is Professor of Sociology and International Studies at the UW.

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The Other Caucasus

BY KELLI HASH

The Caucasus is an ancient and fascinating region located at the intersection of several civilizations. Situated between southwest Russia, Iran, and eastern Turkey, and bordered by the Caspian and Black Seas, the Caucasus has for millennia served as a crossroads and object of conquest for the Turks, Persians, Mongols, and Russians. Not too far to the south lie Mesopotamia and Mt. Ararat, where Noah's Ark is believed to have come to rest. The Greater Caucasus Mountain Range divides the Russian Federation from the Transcaucasus states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which until 1991 were part of the Soviet Union. In the early post-Cold War years, the attention of the West was drawn to the terrible wars and conflicts in these three countries. Georgia combated separatism in two of its regions—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—and fought a civil war. Armenia and Azerbaijan were at war from 1988 to 1994 over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian enclave located within Azerbaijan. The US government has been following developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan with some interest, both because of the number of politically active Armenian-Americans living in this country and because of the still-unresolved tensions between Turkey and Armenia over the massacre and deportation of Armenians from eastern Turkey in 1915 and earlier. The United State's eventual characterization of those massacres will affect its relations with Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, which in turn could affect US involvement in the local petroleum industry and pipeline construction.

To the north of the Caucasus Mountains, sharing a border with Georgia, is the separatist Chechen Republic. Alone among the Caucasus republics of southwestern Russia, 'Chechnya' has become a household name because of the latest installments of its people's centuries-old battle against Russian rule. The latest war is winding down, but underlying problems are still far from resolved. Despite Chechnya's notoriety, its neighbors in the North Caucasus remain relatively unknown, even though they too have been dealing with ethnic and territorial conflicts. The Southern Federal

CIA Ethnoloinguistic Map of the Caucasus, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection.

District of the Russian Federation contains a number of other Caucasian republics: Adygea, Karachaev-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Dagestan. Their obscurity is unfortunate and deceptive, because these republics play a significant role in the security and stability of the Caucasus region, and of the Russian Federation as a whole.

An amazing number of peoples, languages, and religions have been packed into this small space. Three main ethnolinguistic groups are found here: Caucasian, Indo-European, and Altaic. The first group includes the Abkhaz, Adygeans, Cherkess, Kabards, Georgians, Aguls, Avars, Dergins, Laks, Lezgins, Rutuls, Tabasarans, Tsakhurs, Chechens, and Ingush. The Indo-Europeans are represented by Armenians, Ossetians, Kurds, Talysh, and Russians. The Altaic peoples in the Caucasus include the Azeris, Balkars, Karachais, Kumyks, Nogais, Turkmens, and Kalmyks.[1] This list is by no means exhaustive; in fact, some of these groups can be further broken down. For example, the 'Georgian' group includes the related but distinct Svans and Mingrelians.

It is difficult to find an exact count, but the languages branched from their Caucasian, Indo-European, and Turkic/Altaic beginnings into an estimated fifty different languages and dialects. This diversification was helped by the local topography: the mountains isolated peoples from each other, allowing the languages to develop independently. A more colorful local explanation for the sheer number of languages and dialects is that, having distributed languages around the rest of the world, God found that he had many left over, and simply sprinkled these over the Caucasus Mountain region.

Most of the major world religions are represented in the Caucasus region. Although the majority of the national groups are at least nominally Muslim, the Armenian Apostolic and Georgian and Russian Orthodox churches also have a strong presence. Judaism and, among the nearby Kalmyks, Buddhism are also present to a lesser degree, and various pagan religions are still practiced in the region.

Upon the formation of the USSR in the early 1920's, the Caucasus was first divided into the Autonomous Soviet Mountain Republic and the Autonomous Soviet Republic of Dagestan. Over the next decade, the Mountain Republic was redesigned several times. By 1936, it had separated into the Adygei Autonomous District within Krasnodar krai; the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous District in Stavropol krai; and the Kabardino-Balkar, Chechen-Ingush, and North Ossetian Autonomous Republics. The political boundaries did not necessarily correspond to the actual distribution of peoples, nor was each national group in the region represented in the names of the republics and autonomous areas. It would have been quite a feat to set up an administrative government for each people: tiny Dagestan alone contains more than thirty.

continued on page 16

continued from page 15

The peoples of the North Caucasus were not combined into republics and autonomous districts according to ethnic or religious affinities. For instance, even though the Adygeans, Cherkess, and Kabards are ethnically close, they were separated into three different republics. And instead of giving the Altaic Balkars and Karachais their own shared republic, they were combined with the Kabards and Cherkess, respectively. This strange phenomenon was also found in the South Caucasus; the mostly Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh was made part of Azerbaijan, while the Azeri Nakhichevan was separated from Azerbaijan by Armenia. These moves were part of a divide-and-conquer approach aimed at keeping local unity to a minimum. After all, Moscow had reason to fear Caucasian solidarity:



Refugee in Ingushetia.

Chechens, Dagestanis, and others already had a long and glorious history of resisting Russian rule.

During World War II, Hitler's army made it all the way to the North Caucasus in its pursuit of Caspian oil. In 1944, Soviet leaders accused several national groups of having collaborated with the Nazis during the occupation, and deported them to Central Asia and Siberia; these included the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, and Karachais. In 1957, Khrushchev did allow most of those who had survived to return home, but the deportations created logistical and psychological problems that linger to this day. The deportations also did little for the "friendship of the peoples" or center-periphery relations.

Beginning in the late 1980's, the Caucasus underwent substantial political change. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan became independent countries as the USSR fell apart, although they must still contend with Russian manipulation. For example, Georgia declined to join the Commonwealth of Independent States when it was originally formed in 1991, but in order to receive Russia's help in ending Georgia's civil war with Abkhazia, President Shevardnadze agreed to join in 1993. In the North Caucasus, the republics and regions 'upgraded' their status within the Russian Federation. Adygea went from being an autonomous district within Krasnodar krai to a republic of the Russian Federation in 1991. Others did likewise, and then the 1993 constitution accorded these republics equal status with the other subjects of the Federation. The Chechen-Ingush Republic split apart in 1992; the Ingush did not want to accompany the Chechens in their defiance of Moscow. Led by Dzhokhar Dudaev, a faction of Chechens had declared their republic's independence from Russia even before the Soviet Union had been dismantled. Ten years and two brutal wars have barely contained this separatism.

Today, the North Caucasus republics face serious problems with each other and with Moscow, some of which have resulted from the deportations and the 'divide and conquer' policies. When the Ingush were deported during World War II, some of their territory, the Prigorodny District, was transferred to the neighboring republic of North Ossetia. After they returned more than a decade later, they began to petition the central government in vain for the return of this agricultural land—a scarce commodity in the mountains. In October 1992, the Ingush and North Ossetians took the matter into their own hands, and an armed conflict along the lines of Balkan ethnic cleansing broke out. In the five days of fighting, tens of thousands of Ingush were expelled from the territory, and five hundred people were killed.[2] Even though the 'war' ended quickly, the fighting did not. Viktor Polyanichko, a Russian Deputy Prime Minister, was assassinated soon after Yeltsin appointed him governor of North Ossetia and Ingushetia in 1993. To this day, some Ingush are still petitioning Moscow to help them return to their homes in North Ossetia.

The Karachais and Cherkess have also had their share of ethnic rivalry and tension. Throughout last year, ethnic factions fought each other over the republican presidency. When Viktor Semyonov, a Karachai, was elected president, Abazins and Cherkess protested that the elections had been rigged. Despite official warnings against assembling in protest, the Abazins and Cherkess rallied and even appealed to Moscow to break up the republic and give them their own territory within Stavropol krai. A similar conflict occurred in Kabardino-Balkaria in 1993, when Lieutenant-General Beppaev led the Balkars in an attempt to secede from the republic and become part of Krasnodar krai.

Last fall, Stanislav Derev, the Cherkess presidential candidate who lost to Semyonov, left his position as mayor of the republic's capital to become an aide to Viktor Kazantsev, President Putin's envoy to the Southern Federal District. It was hoped that this promotion would calm tensions in the republic, but that hope is threatened by renewed inter-republic ethnic movements. According to an article published by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, the Turkic Karachais and Balkars are increasingly asserting their kinship and solidarity. At a conference this year, delegates from each group spoke of discrimination at the hands of other ethnic groups within their respective republics.[3]

The wars with Russia have devastated the Chechen people, ruining the republic's physical infrastructure and social fabric. Yet the years of fighting have taken a toll on Chechnya's neighbors as well. One effect of the war is a flood of refugees that Ingushetia and Dagestan are not equipped to deal with. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there are 40,000 Chechen refugees in Dagestan, and about 160,000 in Ingushetia.[4] This influx of desperate people is straining economies that can hardly provide for their own people, and the resulting unhealthy conditions have already led to an outbreak of hepatitis among refugees in Ingushetia, which then spread to the local population. Hospitals lack the facilities and medicine to treat these patients adequately, and the UNHCR feared in December that Ingushetia would give up and expel its Chechen refugees.[5]

Another consequence of the wars is the Moscow-led campaign against

Wahhabism, a radical and militant branch of Islam 'imported' from Saudi Arabia. Moscow's experience with Chechnya has made it highly allergic to religious extremism, leading officials like Victor Kazantsev to condemn Wahhabism and Islamic fundamentalism as threats to national stability. In November, Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo called for a ban on such 'extreme' religious sects.[6] Akhmed Kadyrov, the Moscow-appointed leader of Chechnya, has banned Wahhabism there. Of course, not all Muslims in the region are Wahhabis. Shamil Basayev, one of the leaders of the 1999 Chechen raids into Dagestan and an instigator of the 1999 war with Moscow, does not associate himself with the Wahhabi movement.[7] And those Muslim leaders who challenge the path of continued resistance risk assassination. Several Chechen clerics have already been murdered by Wahhabis.

Dagestani authorities have banned the movement as well. Dagestan's strategic location next to the Caspian Sea makes it key to Moscow's plans for exploiting Caspian oil resources. This helps explain why local and federal leaders are so concerned with managing the local political and religious dynamics. In December, Colonel Bagomedov, Chair of Counterterrorist Operations of the Dagestani Division of the Federal Security Service, accused foreign religious groups and foreign intelligence organizations of fomenting conflict in this vulnerable area. In his opinion, these groups want to destabilize Dagestan in order to weaken Russia.[8] In an apparent effort to reassure Moscow of their loyalty, Dagestani leaders recently celebrated their republic's 80th birthday with Putin and other Russian leaders. The emphasis Dagestani leaders placed on their friendship with Russia has evidently already paid off: this republic was granted a larger share of the 2001 federal budget than any other republic in the North Caucasus.[9] Lieutenant-General Magomed Tinamagomedov, Dagestan's military commissioner, proclaimed last month that his republic had met its quota of about 6000 new army and navy recruits. He assured the Military News Agency that the local situation was under control, and that efforts were being made to rid the youth of the influence of Wahhabism.[10]

This fear of religious extremism has also put the Karachai-Cherkess Republic in an uncomfortable position. During the above-mentioned conflict between Semyonov and Derev, the republic was referred to as a possible second Chechnya—a 'hot spot.' Alexander Volkodav, Chief of Stavropol Territory's Internal Affairs Main Directorate, made the same comparison. He suggested in September of last year that Russia 'reinforce' its internal border with Karachai-Cherkessia. In his opinion, the young men of that republic were being poisoned by Wahhabi ideas; he noted that Russia's problems with Chechnya had begun in a similar manner, and that Moscow had underestimated the potential danger there.[11]

All bad news aside, there has been some progress. In 1999, the Russian State Duma passed a law designed to protect small ethnic and linguistic groups from extinction. This is directly relevant to the Caucasus, where some of the national groups number only a few hundred people. Dagestan implemented this law, but not until the fall of 2000, out of fear that it could lead to further ethnic conflict.[12] Considering Moscow's fear of separatist nationalism, this can be seen as a significant step. It is taking a chance on regional stability for the sake of protecting cultural and ethnolinguistic diversity.

Perhaps the greatest cause for hope is the amazing restraint shown by the peoples of the North Caucasus. Most likely, this restraint has been inspired by the vivid lesson of Chechnya; that republic's neighbors can have no doubts about how far Moscow is willing to go in its fight against "terrorism and separatism." There has already been far too much fighting and bloodshed, but given the political and economic collapse and the continuing ethnic and territorial conflicts, the North Caucasus has not achieved its worst potential. ◆



Emblem of the Republic of North Ossetia.

Newsletter Editor Kelli Hash is completing her MA in REECAS.

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Schizophrenic Nation Building in Uzbekistan: *A Field Report*

BY DAVID R. HUNSICKER, JR.

The government of Uzbekistan is caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Like the other former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan is trying diligently to construct a national identity out of the ruins of communist ideology. In many ways, Uzbekistan has an advantage over many of its neighbors in Central Asia in this effort. The Uzbeks are heir to the rich *Turki* or *Chaghatay* literary heritage of Nava'i, Babur, and many other writers. Other than repeated reforms and changes in the alphabet, the Uzbek literary language has barely changed over the last 500 years. Architectural wonders in Samarqand, Bukhara, Khiva, and cities and towns throughout Uzbekistan stand as monuments to the past glories of the ancestors of the modern Uzbek nation.

One challenge for the current regime arises from the fact that the history of the Uzbeks is very much an Islamic one. Uzbeks, much more so than the other nominally Muslim Central Asian peoples (with the possible exception of the Tajiks, with whom they share a great deal of cultural unity), have always defined their identity largely in terms of Islamicity. The architectural and literary monuments that serve as a symbolic basis for the new nation-building efforts are the products of past generations that possessed a largely Islamic worldview.

Uzbekistan's roads are lined with signs and billboards encouraging the Uzbeks to be proud of and loyal to their country. This is evidence of the slow pace of free market reforms in Uzbekistan: these slogans stand in place of advertisements that could be promoting a range of locally produced or foreign goods. Another striking feature is the language used in these signs. While universally nationalistic, a great many of them appeal directly to Islamic sensibilities in their desire to inspire national pride. The prime example is the purported *hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad: "To love one's country is an element of faith" *("Vatanni sevmoq iymondandir").* The word *iymon/imon* (Ar. *imân*) has a very specific meaning in the Islamic context. It is not a generic "faith," but rather a specific faith in the unity of Allah and in the prophethood of Muhammad. Even the *O'zbek tilining izohli lug'ati,* published in the Soviet period, says that the phrase *"imon keltirmoq"* ("to declare one's faith") means specifically to declare one's belief in the Islamic creed of *"La ilaha illa Allah"* ("There is no deity but Allah").[1] In this way, patriotism is Islamicized and fundamentally different from secular appeals to love one's country. A synonym of *iymon, e'tiqod* (Ar. *i'tiqâd*), also occasionally appears, e.g., *"E'tiqod va axloq, milliy ramziy"* ("Faith and morality are national symbols, i.e., traits").

Another word used repeatedly in these slogans is *muqaddas* (holy). The use of

Hidoyat Sari © DAVID R. HUNSICKER, JR.

this word in nationalistic slogans seems to be a very conscious attempt to sacralize the nationalistic discourse. The slogans in which it is used include the following: *"Vatan sajdagoh kabi muqaddasdir"* ("The country is holy like a place of prayer"), *"Vatan-el mafaati muqaddasdir"* ("The benefit of the country and the people is holy"), or, in a slightly less nationalistic vein: *"Oila muqaddas dargoh"* ("The family is a holy place of refuge"). Another example can be found in the following title of an article in the independent weekly paper *Hurriyat, "Davlat ramzlariga hurmat—muqaddas burch"* ("Respect for state symbols is a holy duty").[2] In its attempts to create a post-Soviet national patriotism, the propagandistic rhetoric of the avowedly secular Uzbek government appeals to the dominant feature of its people's traditional identity: Islam.

This appeal to Islam is also evidenced in the state-controlled media, particularly in the programming of the two main Uzbek television channels, First Channel and *Yoshlar* (Youth). A weekly program on the First Channel, *Hidoyat sari* (Toward [Right] Guidance), features lectures by Anvar Hoji Tursun, head imam of Tashkent and of the newly rebuilt *Hoji Ahror Valiy* mosque next to the *Kukaldosh madrasa,* an Islamic seminary and architectural monument. Anvar Hoji covers a range of topics in his television programs and sermons. Episodes of *Hidoyat sari* compiled on a newly released video deal mostly with moral issues, such as respect for parents. Yet Anvar Hoji is favored because he is the main spokesman for the official orthodoxy espoused by the state-controlled Spiritual Board of Muslims, the successor organization to the Soviet-era Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Anvar Hoji's sermons often deal with sects or movements that have strayed from the accepted orthodoxy, and with their negative impact on both the spiritual development of Muslims and the peace and security of Uzbekistan. The main targets are of course what the authorities call "Wahhabis," a misnomer used to describe almost anyone who attempts religious activity outside of the official apparatus, and also the *Hizb ut-Tahrir* movement. This push for orthodoxy manifests itself mainly in calls for strict adherence to the *Maturudi* school of theology and the *Hanafi* school of jurisprudence, even in seemingly minor issues. Sermons contain repeated admonitions to pronounce the "Amin" silently in prayer, in accordance with the accepted ruling of the *Hanafi* school,

rather than out loud, as is the practice in other schools of Islamic law. I have personally witnessed an "inspection" by representatives of the Spiritual Board for evidence of such transgressions at a small neighborhood mosque. Repeated transgressions can and do result in the closure of mosques.

During this past Ramadan, the government's enthusiasm for overt displays of religiosity in the media apparently reached its limit. Each night of Ramadan, Uzbek television broadcast dubbed versions of foreign, largely Turkish, films with religious themes. Although they were shown relatively late in the evening, around 10:00 p.m., many people stayed up to watch them. One such film was a subtle appeal to young women to accept the Islamic head covering, the *hijob* (Ar. *hijâb*).This may have been the straw that broke the camel's back: overt signs of religiosity, like beards for men and the *hijob* for women, are an extremely touchy issue in Uzbekistan. Young men with beards are often harassed by police and, along with women in *hijob,* they are barred from many jobs and educational opportunities despite some legal challenges to these discriminating practices. The daily films, with their obvious religious messages, were discontinued, and viewers were left puzzled when they were replaced with other programming.

An interview conducted by the *Yoshlar* channel with the editorial staff of the official magazine of the Spiritual Board, *Hidoyat* (Guidance), in which I also participated, was affected as well. The interview was scheduled to appear the evening after the censored religious films were pulled. Yet because of the tense atmosphere, it was decided that the interview could not be shown. It was first postponed for two weeks, and then never broadcast. Thus, an interview with the editorial staff of an official publication of the government's own religious affairs administration on state-controlled television was cancelled because of fears of a government backlash. However, with the arrival of the *hayit* (Ar. *'eid*), the holiday marking the end of Ramadan, came the broadcast of many interviews with elderly men praising the president for enabling Muslims to practice their faith freely, unlike in Soviet days. The mufti, head of the Spiritual Board and the highest religious official in Uzbekistan, made a similar televised statement congratulating Muslims for their successful completion of the Ramadan fast.

The Uzbek government and the Spiritual Board also take a very active interest in Islamic publishing. All publications that deal with Islamic topics must be approved by the government's Committee for Religious Affairs, which is connected to the Cabinet of Ministers. A list outlining which books can be sold within the borders of Uzbekistan is published periodically.[3] This list, which contained 167 books in its August 20, 2000 edition, includes even academic works: e.g., a catalog of manuscripts relating to the *Naqshbandi sufi* order. Printed along with the list is a summary of regulations clearly prohibiting the sale of any unlisted work or the works of unapproved "religious movements, sects, and groups." The regulations also require all books of religious content entering the country to be inspected by experts from the Committee for Religious Affairs.

Obtaining permission to publish a book is not always easy, even for authors who publish regularly. One author recounted a problem he faced when he tried to publish a history of the Muslim prophets, which he had co-authored for children. He was told that the book would receive approval only if he removed sections on the wars waged by the Prophet Muhammad and the early Muslims, in effect falsifying history through omission. Even the bi-weekly and monthly periodicals of the Spiritual Board, *Islom Nuri* (The Light of Islam) and *Hidoyat,* must be approved before they can be distributed for sale, which sometimes delays their release. The February 2000 Issue has been delayed because the Religious Committee's censor rejected my article on the life of Malcolm X. While the article apparently passed the general censor, the Committee for Religious Affairs' censor refused to approve it for publication. Even though the issue was ready to go to press, it was delayed because this article had to be removed and replaced.

Many religious books being published in Uzbekistan today are meant to encourage the people to follow the traditional orthodoxy of the *Maturudi* and *Hanafi*

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Maturudi

schools, as dictated by the Spiritual Board. This is particularly true of translations of works on Islamic theology and law written by natives of cities now within the borders of Uzbekistan. These translations strengthen the government's nation-building program because they emphasize the accomplishments of the Uzbeks' forefathers. These carefully chosen works also, however, provide people with primary source materials on Islamic law and theology in an effort to reinforce the Spriritual Board's emphasis on indigenous orthodoxy. The first volume of the translation of Bukhari's collection of *hadith, Sahih ul-Buhkari,* was first published in 1991 and has since been both translated in its entirety and reprinted.[4] Imam Bukhari's collection of the sayings of the Prophet is considered second only to the Qur'an as a source for Islamic law and theology. The translation of Imam Bukhari's *hadith* collection was not followed as might be expected by a translation of Muslim's *Sahih,* generally accepted as the next most authoritative text, but by a translation of at-Tirmidhi's *Sunan.*[5] The reason for this is obvious: the desire to elevate the status of a native of Termiz, a city within the borders of modern Uzbekistan. This was followed by a translation of a major work on Islamic law according to the *Hanafi* school, *al-Hidaya,* by Burhanuddin al-Marghinani, a native of the city of Marghilan in the Ferghana Valley.[6] A

continued on page 20

continued from page 19

translation of Samarqand native, Abu Mansur al-Maturudi's main theological treatise, *Kitab at-Tawhid,* is also underway and should be published shortly. Many secondary works about these authors' lives have also been published, and one finds large feature articles in the official newspaper of the People's Democratic Party (the successor to the Communist Party), *O'zbekiston ovozi,* praising the role of al-Maturudi and al-Marghanani in Central Asian history and Islamic thought.[7] One set of three large articles about al-Marghanani has appeared under the heading, "*Fiqh Ilmining Sultoni, Hidoyat Yo'lining Sarboni*" ("The Sultan of the Science of Islamic Jurisprudence, the Caravan Leader of the Road of Guidance").[8] In essence, the ruling ex-Communist Party's official organ is praising the role played by Uzbeks in the development of Islamic law.

The government has taken a very active interest in promoting mausoleums as pilgrimage sites, and it sponsors various symposia and conferences to mark anniversaries of Islamic scholars' births. President Karimov had the mausoleum complex of Imam Bukhari north of Samarqand rebuilt in eight months in 1998. A mosque and a museum were built, and the 1225th anniversary (calculated according to the Islamic lunar calendar) of the imam's birth was celebrated. President Karimov also decreed that the 910th anniversary of the birth of al-Marghinani and the 1130th anniversary of the birth of al-Maturudi were to be celebrated in the year 2000. As a result, massive projects were undertaken in Samarqand in June 2000. A new mausoleum was built for Abu Mansur al-Maturudi in the former Chokidiza cemetery, which the Soviets had bulldozed; by November, an ornate new structure had been constructed at the place where archeologists claimed to have found the scholar's tomb. An imam is now on duty to recite the Qur'an for the steady stream of visitors. Al-Marghinani's exact burial location in the Chokidiza cemetery is being sought, and there are plans to build a mausoleum for him, as well.

The government is also very careful to discourage popular religious rituals that have persisted from pre-Islamic religious beliefs. The Spiritual Board issued a *fatwa* (religious verdict) on July 4, 2000, concerning the correct procedure for visiting graves. It includes directives against circling tombs, rubbing one's hands on the tomb and then over the face, tying strips of cloth on trees in the vicinity of the tombs, or requesting help from the inhabitant of the grave.[9] A sign outside the entrance to the mausoleum of the founder of the *Naqshbandi* Sufi order, Bahauddin Naqshband, also enumerates these prohibitions. A very concerted effort has thus been made to advance an orthodox interpretation of the pilgrimage rituals practiced at the tombs of the founders of Sunni *Hanafi* orthodoxy. Although Sufism is generally associated with heterodoxy, one of the distinguishing features of the *Naqshbandi* order of dervishes is its emphasis on strict adherence to the *shari'ah,* Islamic law. Through its efforts to promote the ancestry of the Uzbek nation, the government is once again promoting the example of *Hanafi* orthodoxy.

The impact of such promotion is significant. I discussed the government's promotion of Uzbekistan's Islamic legacy with the former mufti, Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf, who fled Uzbekistan under pressure from the government in 1993 and spends most of his time in self-imposed exile abroad. In his opinion, while the government declares itself a secular state, it is also faced with the fact that Uzbekistan is a traditional center of Islamic scholarship. It freely acknowledges this, and in recognition it organizes anniversary celebrations and the construction of new pilgrimage sites. But this is the extent of the official appreciation for this Islamic past; the government does not necessarily intend to promote Islamic practice. According to the former mufti, officials see their actions as perfectly compatible with steps taken against supposedly anti-government groups of Muslims, whom they perceive as attempting to overthrow the constitutional order illegally.[10]

In reality, the effect is much broader, as the government continually defines its legitimacy in terms of its Islamic past. It makes appeals to the people's religiosity and specifically attempts to promote Islamic orthodoxy through the Spiritual Board. These actions contribute progressively to the Islamicization of public space and discourse, which is especially significant when one considers that a very large proportion of those attending mosques are young men, many of whom barely remember their Soviet primary educations. They are reaching maturity in a system that attempts to portray itself as the champion of Uzbekistan's Islamic past. In the fall of 1999, the government opened the Tashkent Islamic University with the purpose of educating youth in both worldly and Islamic sciences, but to prepare them to be future government functionaries and business leaders, not imams or preachers; for that there are



Bukhari

separate *madrasas.* Students from Tashkent Islamic University regularly appear on television, both as participants in talk shows debating contemporary issues and as hosts of their own programs.

The problem remains that these steps are not enough to satisfy everyone, as evidenced by the armed incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan over the past several years and by the generally peaceful activities of banned groups such as *Hizb ut-Tahrir.* Islam remains the only currently viable form of opposition to the government. In order to combat the perceived threat from Islam, the government has employed a two-prong strategy. The first tactic is to suppress independent religious activity, to the extent of detaining people for growing beards or wearing the *hijob.* This only further radicalizes the opposition and forces normally complacent individuals into the opposition camp. The second tactic is to promote a Muslim nationalism as an alternative to arguments of the Islamic opposition. However, this slowly and almost imperceptibly changes what the populace expects from the government. Leaders will have to continue this move toward Islam in order to meet the expectations they themselves have created. This strategy may ultimately prove too difficult to maintain, and could contribute to the demise of the current system. ◆

David R. Hunsicker, Jr., a UW MA student in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, is currently carrying out research on Turkic religious epics in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

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4 Al-Buxoriy, Abu Abdulloh Muhammad ibn Ismoil. *Hadis: al-Jomi' as-Sahih (Ishonchli To'plam),* vol. 1, Zokirjon Ismoil, trans. Toshkent: Qomuslar Bosh Tahririyati, 1991.

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10 Private audience in Tashkent, February 8, 2000.

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Stephen T. Kerr, Professor, College of Education

Wednesday, April 11
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Beyond Rangoon: Political Instability in Burma
Mary Callahan, Assistant Professor, Jackson School of International Studies

Wednesday, April 25
EAST ASIA
North-South Interactions on the Korean Peninsula: Implications for the U.S.
Clark Sorensen, Associate Professor, Jackson School of International Studies

Wednesday, May 9
CANADA
The Emergence of Canadian Cinema: The Making of an Industry through Government Policy
Darryl MacDonald, Director, Cinema Seattle/Seattle International Film Festival

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Reconstructing the Aging Fleet of the Russian Far East

BY VLAD M. KACZYNSKI

Our Winter 2001 Mission to Vladivostok

In the middle of the Russian Far East's winter, Mr. Zbigniew Przydzielski and I traveled to Vladivostok at the invitation of the USAID-sponsored Far Eastern Center for Economic Development, which is contracting volunteer consultants to help solve local and regional socioeconomic problems. This mission had many objectives. Our main goals were to advise on the development of small-scale fishing and processing activity in the Maritime Territory (the Association of Industrial Fishing Companies of the Maritime Territory is also involved in this project) and to discuss the training program for Russian fishery product inspectors for the Far East Institute for Training of Fishery Industry Specialists (DVIPK).



Frozen Vladivostok

The Scientific-Technical Company "PELENG" organized a seminar on the US experience in allocation of fishery resources for fishermen, ethnic groups, and coastal communities in Alaska. More than twenty local experts and management specialists participated. We also discussed a proposal for a new book to be written jointly by authors from the School of Marine Affairs at the UW and a team from the International Institute of Economic Analysis and Forecasting (MIPK) in Vladivostok. We reached an agreement with the Director of MIPK, Professor Alexander Latkin, on launching the project, titled *Socioeconomic Impacts of Russian-US Economic Collaboration on Far East Resources and Economy.* This book is to be financed by MIPK, and it is expected that the Russian edition will be published in March 2002.

An additional mission objective was to share our university's experience with the internet, computer system management, and computer graphics. Mr. Przydzielski, who is affiliated with the UW School of Marine Affairs and who also works in computer services for the City of Seattle's Metro Safety Department, provided this last expertise. We laid the groundwork for future exchanges of electronic information with our university. Mr. Przydzielski delivered presentations to "PELENG" and MIKP on the exchange of information and transfer of know-how on the internet, communications, establishment of websites, data transfer and maintenance of email contacts between participating institutions and individuals contacted during the mission.

General information on Far East marine affairs was delivered to the Consul General of the United States in Vladivostok, Ms. Lysbeth J. Rickerman, who visited MIPK on January 19 and spoke with us on the socioeconomic and environmental problems of this region. We presented her with a copy our book on *Impacts of Population and Markets on Sustainability of Ocean and Coastal Resources: Perspectives of Developing and Transition Economies of the North Pacific.* Professor Latkin and Dr. Kuzmina, both from MIKP and the University of Vladivostok, are co-authors of this book, which the UW School of Marine Affairs published in December 1999. We delivered two additional seminars ("How to Participate in Internationally Funded Research and Development Projects Funded by US Foundations," and "The Role of the Internet in Socioeconomic Development and Information Access in the Far East") to University of Vladivostok and MIPK faculty and students. However, our most important and controversial activity in Vladivostok involved an evaluation of the Fleet Reconstruction Project, the only current attempt to renew the rapidly aging Russian Far East's fishing, transportation, and auxiliary fleets.

Russian Fleet Reconstruction Project

We were asked to evaluate the viability of a proposal to renew the Far East fleet, which had been prepared by the group of foreign and Russian experts who also produced the Coastal Fishery Development Business Plan. This initiative, financed by the US Trade Development Agency, is designed to replace 620 aging fishing ships in the Far East with new vessels, which are to be built in Russia but with full foreign financing. We met with the Association of the Maritime Territory Industrial Fishing Companies and with its executive officers: President Alexander Platonov, Vice President Peter Churkin, and other Russian specialists.

The concept of foreign financing and posterior management controls of the vessels introduced under the project is particularly significant. Unlike in other Russian Fleet reconstruction transactions made with foreign shipyards and Western banks and endorsed by the Russian Government in the 1990's, the main guarantor in the present project will be the US Ex-Im Bank. Funding to build the vessels will come from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Considering the rapidly shrinking supply of marine life in the Russian Far East, foreign suppliers of investment capital (which includes marine equipment and other inputs) requested assurances from the Russian government that vessels built and operated under this project will have priority access to the fishery resources in the Maritime Territory's coastal waters, and possibly in the whole Far East region. They have also demanded federal elimination or

continued on page 25

Exhibit. **RUSSIAN FAR EAST FLEET RENEWAL PILOT PROJECT (First 8 Ships): Legal, Financial, and Management Arrangement Involving Foreign and Russian Partners**



continued from page 23

In the streets of Vladivostok.

reduction of heavy taxes and customs duties – conditions the Russian government has not yet met.

What struck us during our review of the entire plan is that the Pilot Project (covering the construction of the first eight ships only; see diagram on page 24) is testing the water for an expected massive renewal of the Russian Far East fleet, but it foresees complete control of each vessel by foreign companies, who are expected to manage these vessels from abroad on behalf of the Russian vessel owner–operators.

Russian Far East Fleet Renewal Pilot Project: Legal, Financial, and Management Arrangements

The diagram shows how complicated the Fleet Renewal system could be. Note that, for each ship built in Russia and leased by the Greek company, there will be three operating companies involved: one is the Cypriot company, another is the Russian fishing vessel "owner," and the third is the Russian mother company that theoretically owns the vessel. In addition, there will be a fourth entity, i.e., a foreign (most likely American) management and marketing company. These companies will be dependent on the Federal Government in Moscow, which is expected to issue quotas, waivers of taxes and duties, and other guarantees.

Each vessel built with foreign financing in the Russian Far East shipyard will be leased by the foreign (Greek) company to the Russian enterprise, which will pay leasing fees over a period of 8 years, until the vessel is fully paid for. Foreign companies will control exports of fish from these vessels and all revenues generated from sales of fish products in foreign markets. Since these vessels are to operate in the territorial sea (12-mile zone) of the Russian Federation, they will be subject to full local jurisdiction, unless otherwise exempted by the government. This includes paying federal and local taxes, customs tariffs, and port fees, and other regulations that are usually difficult for the foreign boat operators to predict. The entire project is based on the expectation that these costs will be avoided - otherwise, vessel operation will not be profitable.

We expressed a series of concerns founded on Russia's negative previous experience in acquiring new vessels from Spain, Norway, and Germany. As a result of the former deals endorsed by the Russian Government (most of them in the early 1990s), the total unpaid obligations to Western banks created by these leasing arrangements reached over 1 billion US$ during 1992 – 1998. Many leased Russian vessels have been seized in various foreign ports such as Busan, Hong-Kong, or Seattle because they have not paid their leasing fees.

The Russian Government has introduced a completely new resource allocation system based on auctions. From now on, Russian fishing companies must pay for the resources they want to harvest. All Far East companies strongly oppose this, because it will intensify the competition for access to dwindling resources, and there are very slim chances that the Fleet Renewal Project will enjoy any of the priorities granted by the Federal Government. With this possibility in mind, we asked our Russian counterparts if the project would be financed at all by foreign sources, and if it would be financially viable if there were to be no tax holidays or removal of other financial charges that currently make investment in the industry practically impossible. We did not receive clear answers to these questions and agreed that further efforts must be made, particularly in simplification of the complicated financial/management and marketing schemes. In Russian conditions, these must be more transparent, and they should bring more benefit to the local population through supplies of seafood for the local market and employment of land-based processing workers for fish harvested by these ships.

According to the original plan, practically all production from these vessels is to be exported, with hard currency proceeds to be deposited in foreign bank accounts. The resulting socioeconomic benefit for the local population might be reduced, so the program proposal will require further review, with a possible strategic reorientation to satisfy the growing demand for seafood supplies by Russian consumers.

Throughout our stay in Vladivostok (January 11–20, 2001), we enjoyed the very friendly cooperation and support of all our Russian hosts, which was offered to us in difficult conditions. With temperatures occasionally as low as -40°C, there were also frequent breakdowns of city services, including routine power outages and difficulties with heating, water delivery, and the poor public transportation system. Despite these problems, we consider our mission a success that will provide lasting benefits for our projects as well as those of our Russian host organizations. ◆

Wlodzimierz Kacsynski is an Associate Professor in the UW's School of Marine Affairs and Adjunct Associate Professor in the Jackson School of International Studies.

Internet Communications with the Scientific Research and Development Sector in the Russian Far East

BY ZBIGNIEW PRZYDZIELSKI

I was invited by the University of Washington's School of Marine Affairs to participate as a computer software and internet specialist in the research project *Impacts of Population and Markets on the Sustainability of Ocean and Coastal Resources: Perspectives of the Developing and Transition Economies of the North Pacific.* My task is to create a computer map of the North Pacific Rim population and marine resources, and to establish a website supporting the exchange of scientific information between the participating countries' research teams. This project involves researchers from China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Canada, the United States, Mexico, and the Russian Federation.

In order to discuss the project with Russian participants and make some decisions regarding internet communications and data exchange, I joined Professor Vlad Kaczynski on a January trip to Vladivistok. In meetings with our Russian counterparts, we discussed issues related to the project's graphics and website standards. We also discussed the creation of various forms of electronic links; sought agreements with the Russian research team on standards of data transfer; and established a discussion forum and other means of continuing contacts between UW and the University of Vladivostok, the Institute of Economics and Forecasting, and the Far East Business Development Center.

We were particularly interested in how internet technology could create new opportunities for research and exchange of information between our project teams. The internet is crucial for the project: it allows the participants to exchange data and e-mail messages, share ideas through discussion forums, cooperate in preparation of other joint project proposals, and jointly write and edit scientific papers.

We made use of the University of Washington Peer Review tool, established by the UW Center for Teaching, Learning & Technology, and agreed with our Russian partners on the following means of internet collaboration in preparation of the book that is to finalize our joint research project: editing of articles after peer-review, final lay-out and approval of the book's presentation, creation of electronic and CD-Rom versions of the book, and establishment and maintenance of the book website.

We also initiated discussion with the Russians on creating a *Small Atlas of Population and Consumption of Natural Resources in the North Pacific.* We agreed to use the internet to collaborate on establishing and maintaining the joint database needed for maps and statistical analysis, map preparation, discussion and review of maps, publication of the atlas on the internet, and establishing and maintaining the atlas website.

We created discussion forums to facilitate the exchange of ideas between experts and students of both UW and the University of Vladivostok. This involved setting standards for contact between professors and research staff, creating an internet chat room, and developing a database of questions and answers to be used in online question-and-answer sessions between experts and students. In addition, we defined standards for sharing raw data, documents, pictures, and video and sound files.

The current energy crisis in the Russian Far East creates real difficulties for our project, as electricity is turned off for several hours each day. Because the construction of Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) systems is expensive, smart Russian website owners establish mirror websites in the United States. While some institutions have back-up power generators, individuals do not enjoy such a luxury, and although computer hardware is up-to-date, it is also very expensive. The prices for computers and peripherals are higher than in the United States, while the average salary for a good programmer is around $200 a month. The telecommunications network is not reliable or suitable for data transmission, as it is very noisy. Internet access costs approximately $1/hour, which is very expensive even for a relatively well-paid Russian programmer. And while many Russian students are conversant in the English language, middle-aged and older people don't speak English at all, which means collaboration over the internet will be slower (with translations from one language to another), more expensive, and more difficult.

We found our Russian counterparts extremely bright and well educated, but they lack funds for the purchase of state-of-the-art hardware and software and for training in emerging internet technologies, such as XML. Russian institutions are run on extremely low budgets. If the US participants want this cooperative project with the Russians to succeed, they will be forced to finance some of the purchases and personnel training. ◆

Zbigniew Przydzielski works in computer services for the City of Seattle's Metro Safety Department. He is also affiliated with the UW School of Marine Affairs.

US Consul General Ms. Lysbeth J. Ryckerman and (from left) Mr. S. Malovany, Professor Kaczynski, and Professor Latkin.

In the Eye of the Revolution

On March 2, REECAS and the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures hosted *In the Eye of the Revolution,* a symposium on early Soviet film. The event was also supported by The Walter Chapin Simpson Center for the Humanities, The College of Arts and Sciences, The Department of Comparative Literature, and The Division of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences (UW Tacoma). Some last-minute excitement was generated when the airport was shut down following the February 28th earthquake, and it was for a time uncertain whether the keynote speakers would be able to land in Seattle. But luck prevailed, and the symposium went according to schedule, with as many as fifty people in attendance.

Professor Anne Nesbet, a leading specialist on Eisenstein who teaches Russian literature and film at the University of California, Berkeley, gave the morning keynote presentation. Her talk, "Spectacular Commodities: Visions of Capitalism in Soviet Film of the Twenties," focused on examples from Eisenstein, Vertov, and Protazanov. A panel of University of Washington faculty and graduate students then presented papers on numerous aspects of Soviet film in the 1920's, including interconnections between the Soviet cinema of the time and the West. The topics included Oganesov and Pearl White (Professor Jennifer Bean, Film Studies), Dziga Vertov's vision of the city (Amarilis Lugo de Fabritz), and discourse and politics in the work of Eisenstein and others (Professor Bruce Kochis, Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences, UW Bothell).

Following the panel discussion, participants and guests watched a rare film from the 1920's, Kozintsev and Trauberg's 1926 *Devil's Wheel (Chertovo koleso).* The screening was made possible by the Pacific Film Archive in Berkeley, California.

The afternoon continued with the theme of early Soviet film and the West, featuring a talk by Professor Anthony Anemone, "Reevaluating the Soviet Musical Comedy: Entertainment and Utopia." Professor Anemone, who teaches Russian Literature and Culture at the College of William and Mary, drew provocative parallels between Busby Berkeley's *Footlight Parade* (1933) and Grigory Alexandrov's *Circus* (1936). An afternoon panel of UW faculty followed, with papers on *Seekers of Happiness,* a film on Jews finding "paradise" in the Siberian region of Birobidzhan, as an example of Stalin's "Hollywood" (Professor Galya Diment, Slavic Languages and Literatures), and on the use of early Soviet film in the experimental cinema of Yugoslav director Dusan Makavejev (Professor Gordana Crnkovic, Slavic Languages and Literatures).

Professor Zoran Kuzmanovich, who teaches American Literature and Film at Davidson College, North Carolina, moderated a concluding roundtable discussion on "Teaching with and about Film," which also featured Gordana Crnkovic, Lynne Walker, and Professor Anthony Geist (Spanish and Portuguese Studies). Many in the audience joined in the discussion, raising many questions, answering some, and suggesting numerous avenues for future research. The symposium was only a start, but a good one. ◆

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Submissions are currently being accepted. For submission information, contact Professor Sabrina P. Ramet, Editor, at the above address.

Excerpts of the Treadgold Papers are available at our website: http://depts.washington.edu/reecas/dwt/dwt.htm

REECAS FACULTY AND ALUMNI NEWS

KATE BROWN, who completed her MA in REECAS in 1993, has published "Gridded Lives: Why Kazakhstan and Montana Are Nearly the Same Place" in the February 2001 issue of the *American Historical Review.*

GORDANA P. CRNKOVIC was recently granted tenure and promoted to Associate Professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures and Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Comparative Literature. She has also recently published *Imagined Dialogues: Eastern European Literature in Conversation with American and English Literature,* as part of the "Rethinking Theory" series from Northwestern University Press. Combining reflections on the main trends in contemporary literary theory with a proposal for a new way of reading which takes greater account of increasing globalization, this book creates "imagined dialogues" between the collection of stories *Tomb for Boris Davidovich* by Yugoslav Danilo Kis and American John Cage's collection of experimental writings *Silence* (on language, history, and the possibility of freedom); Polish Tadeusz Borowski's stories in *This Way for the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen* and British Kazuo Ishiguro's novel *Remains of the Day* (on power); and Croatian Irena Vrkljan's experimental autobiography *Marina, or About Biography* and American Susan Howe's *My Emily Dickinson* (on poetry, community, and gender).

Professor Crnkovic also received the Jack Straw Foundation's "Artist Support Program Grant 2000" for creating and recording texts for the spoken-word piece "Zagreb Everywhere." This piece is intended as an unorthodox lecture on the city of Zagreb, Croatia, which complements Crnkovic's more traditional course of lectures and seminars on the culture of the former Yugoslavia and its successor states. The soundscape, by Seattle composer David Hahn, consists of edited sounds recorded in Zagreb, as well as some of Hahn's music performed by Zagreb musicians. The CD of live readings and soundscape have already been recorded and produced in Seattle's Jack Straw Studio, and the live performance of this piece, accompanied by images of the city of Zagreb, is scheduled to take place in May at the University of Washington. The ASP grant is funded by the NEA, Washington Arts Commission, Seattle Arts Commission, King County Arts Commission, and the Experience Music Project.

KATARZYNA DZIWIREK, Associate Professor in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, will be on sabbatical leave next academic year. She will travel to Poland several times during the year to work on various projects, but thanks to the generous support of the Henry M. Jackson Foundation, Polish will continue to be taught at the UW in her absence.

STEPHEN E. HANSON, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Director of the REECAS program, presented a paper-in-progress on "The Dilemmas of Anti-Revolutionary Revolution in Russia" at the Tenth Anniversary Conference of the Institute for the Economy in Transition (the Gaidar Institute) in Moscow, Dec. 1–2, 2000.

DAN WAUGH, Associate Professor in the Department of History and Jackson School of International Studies, lectured on February 14th at Stanford in the Inner Asia/Silk Road Study Group series on the subject of "Deconstructing Sven Hedin: Great Explorer, Reckless Adventurer, or Self-Promoting 'Foreign Devil on the Silk Road'?" In connection with this project, Waugh has posted a chronology of Hedin and a detailed annotated bibliography on the Silk Road Foundation website (*www.silk-road.com*). These electronic connections helped bring out to the Stanford talk some 100 listeners—roughly double the turnout normally expected at such presentations—and have produced a variety of interesting responses, including an invitation from Hedin's relatives to come work in the family archive in Stockholm. Learning to read some Swedish is now one of Professor Waugh's priorities.

Waugh's Bay Area visit was also very fruitful for discussions with the partners in upcoming Silk Road projects here in Seattle. The Walter Chapin Simpson Center for the Humanities at the UW has recently awarded a generous grant of $23,000 to support a variety of public projects in 2001–2002 in conjunction with the Silk Road Project Inc. events sponsored by The Seattle Symphony and Cal Performances.

Other principal organizations involved in these activities include The Seattle Art Museum and The Silk Road Foundation. Several departments at the University of Washington have pledged support, and the Silk Road Project will be working closely with the educational outreach centers in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, the Asia Society, the Stanford University Center for Buddhist Studies, several other art museums, and other organizations and individuals committed to public education projects related to our theme. At the University of Washington, principal faculty members organizing the proposed activities include Professors Cynthea Bogel (Art History, Asian Studies), Joel Walker (History, Comparative Religion, Middle Eastern Studies) and Daniel Waugh (History, and Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies).

The project's focus will be the culture of the historic Silk Road. Specific initiatives will include: an online "Art of the Silk Road" exhibit displaying items from the collections of the Seattle Art Museum and several other major museums; a photography exhibit of superb work by Gary Tepfer and Wu Jian (who have both photographed extensively in Inner Asia), which will be mounted both in the Bay Area and in Seattle; a six-part lecture series focusing on the art and history of the Silk Road, to be presented both in the Bay Area and in Seattle, and involving several leading experts on Silk Road culture; development of a variety of web-based materials pertaining to the Silk Road for a general audience and for specific use by teachers and students at various levels; teacher workshops; and a non-credit adult education course on the Silk Road to be hosted by the Seattle Symphony. ◆



THE SEVENTH ANNUAL NORTHWEST REGIONAL CONFERENCE FOR

RUSSIAN, EAST EUROPEAN, AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

Saturday, April 14, 2001

The Evergreen State College, Olympia

The most recent update of the conference program is available at:
http://depts.washington.edu/reecas/events/conf2001/regconf01.htm
and can be downloaded in Adobe PDF format.

SPONSORED BY:

The Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies Center (REECAS)
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle
The Evergreen State College, Olympia

Directions to The Evergreen State College

The Evergreen State College is an hour's drive from the Seattle-Tacoma airport. Olympia is also served by the Greyhound and Trailways bus companies and Amtrak. Whether you are coming from the north or south, you can reach the campus by taking Interstate 5 into Olympia and then turning onto Highway 101 at Exit 104. Drive west on 101 North for three miles to The Evergreen State College exit, then proceed another two miles north on the Evergreen Parkway to the campus entrance (on the left).

Admission to the conference is ABSOLUTELY FREE, although advance registration is required. Lunch tickets will be available for purchase on the day of the conference.

We welcome students, faculty, and staff from institutions of higher learning throughout the Northwest, as well as K-12 educators and the general public.

A vanpool service will be available from the University of Washington, Seattle, and we encourage participants from other cities in the region to arrange carpooling. Conference attendees wishing to stay one or more nights in Olympia must arrange their own accommodation, but we have secured a special rate at the West Coast Olympia Hotel, 2300 Evergreen Park Drive ($58 per night, reference "REECAS-NW"), tel. 360-943-4000.

For general information on the conference please call 206-543-4852 or e-mail *reecas@u.washington.edu*.

VERY TENTATIVE PROGRAM

8:00-8:30am
Coffee, pastries and no-fee registration (GWP-Atrium)

9:00 am – 10:00 am

SESSION 1A:
Novgorod Past and Present

SESSION 1B:
Russian Integration – Economic and Political Perspectives

10:10 am – 11:40 am

SESSION 2A:
The International Kuril Islands Project

SESSION 2B:
Ukraine and Russia

11:50 am – 12:50 pm

SESSION 3A:
Jewish Identity in Mid-Century Central Europe

SESSION 3B:
Environment and Planning in the Baltic Region

SESSION 3C:
Central Asia and Its Neighbors

Lunch

1:50 – 3:00 pm
Plenary Session

Welcoming Remarks

Roundtable on Decommunization in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

3:10 – 4:10 pm

SESSION 4A:
Evolving Governance in Russia and Eastern Europe

SESSION 4B:
Cultural Studies

4:20 pm – 5:50 pm

SESSION 5A:
Human Rights and Democracy Building

SESSION 5B:
Kazakhstan Past and Present

6:00 – 7:00 pm
Closing Reception

REGISTRATION

All conference attendees and presenters please complete this form and return by Friday, April 6 to the following address: REECAS-NW Conference Registration, REECAS Center, Box 353650, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195-3650.

NAME

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You may also register by phone (206-543-4852) or e-mail (*reecas@u.washington.edu*)

A FREE LECTURE SERIES

PUTIN AND THE NEW RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

All lectures take place in Kane Hall on the campus of the University of Washington, Seattle

Future talks include:

THURSDAY, APRIL 12, 2001, 7:30 P.M., KANE HALL 210

Russia's Relations with Eastern Europe and the Baltic States: A New Divide in Europe?

Mark Kramer, Director, Harvard Project on Cold War Studies, Harvard University

THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2001, 7:30 P.M., KANE HALL 210

Russia's Road to a Market Economy Under Putin

Anders Åslund, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

THURSDAY, MAY 10, 2001, 7:30 P.M., KANE HALL 210

Putin's Nature: A Cautionary Fable

Steven Solnick, Associate Professor of Political Science, Columbia University

THURSDAY, MAY 16, 2001, 6:30 P.M., KANE HALL 120

Putin as the Un-Yeltsin: A Sea Change in Russian Foreign Policy

Strobe Talbott, Former US Deputy Secretary of State

THURSDAY, MAY 24, 2001, 7:30 P.M., KANE HALL 210

Russia's Unfinished Revolution: The Protracted Transition from Communism to Democracy"

Michael A. McFaul, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

VLADIMIR PUTIN
President of Russia

This series is sponsored by Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies (REECAS) in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington; the World Affairs Council; the UW Institute for Global and Regional Security Studies; the Foundation for Russian-American Economic Cooperation; *The Seattle Post-Intelligencer;* and the Henry M. Jackson Foundation. For additional information, please call 206-543-4852.

REECAS NEWSLETTER

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